Social Psychology Australian & New Zealand Edition [2 ed.] 9781305580220, 9780170420563

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Copyright 2020 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-202

Copyright 2020 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-202

Copyright 2020 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-202

Copyright 2020 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-202

Social Psychology: 2nd Australian and New Zealand edition 2nd Edition Saul Kassin Steven Fein Hazel Rose Markus Kerry Anne McBain Lisa A. Williams

Head of content management: Dorothy Chiu Senior content manager: Fiona Hammond Content developer: James Cole Project editor: Raymond Williams Cover design: Regine Abos Text designer: Linda Davidson Editor: Jade Jakovcic Permissions/Photo researcher: Mira Fatin Proofreader: James Anderson Indexer: Julie King Cover: Getty Images/Benjamin Lee / EyeEm Typeset by MPS Limited Any URLs contained in this publication were checked for currency during the production process. Note, however, that the publisher cannot vouch for the ongoing currency of URLs. Authorised adaptation of Social Psychology 10th edition, by Saul Kassin, Steven Fein, Hazel Rose Markus, published by Cengage Learning 2017 [ISBN 9781305580220] First local edition published in 2015

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Copyright 2020 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-202

BRIEF CONTENTS PART ONE

INTRODUCTION 1 What is social psychology?

PART TWO

SOCIAL PERCEPTION 2 The social self 3 Perceiving others 4 Stereotypes, prejudice and discrimination 5 Gender identity

1 2 40 41 92 140 195

PART THREE SOCIAL INFLUENCE 6 Attitudes 7 Conformity, compliance and obedience 8 Group processes

222 223 272 312

PART FOUR

SOCIAL RELATIONS 9 Attraction and close relationships 10 Helping others 11 Aggression and antisocial behaviour

348 349 405 448

PART FIVE

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AND REAL-WORLD APPLICATIONS 12 Environmental psychology 13 Community psychology 14 Stress, health and wellbeing 15 Law 16 Business

501 502 544 579 627 673

Copyright 2020 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-202

v

CONTENTS GUIDE TO THE TEXT GUIDE TO THE ONLINE RESOURCES

VIII

5

XII

PREFACE XIV ABOUT THE AUTHORS

XVII

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS XIX PART ONE   1

INTRODUCTION

WHAT IS SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY? What is social psychology? A brief history of social psychology Research methods Developing ideas Refining ideas Testing ideas: research designs Ethics and values in social psychology

2 4 8 15 16 17 20 30

Chapter review

33

PART TWO   2

3

4

41 42 59 76 81

Chapter review

82

PERCEIVING OTHERS Observation: elements of social perception Attribution: from elements to dispositions Integration: from dispositions to impressions Confirmation biases: from impressions to reality Social perception: the bottom line

92 93 103 116 122 128

Chapter review

131

STEREOTYPES, PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION Fundamental processes of intergroup relations Stereotypes: the cognitive core of the problem Conflict, prejudice and discrimination: persistence and change Addressing the problem: reducing prejudice and discrimination

140 142 150 164 174

Chapter review

216

196 202 204 206 211 213

222

6 ATTITUDES The study of attitudes Persuasion by communication Persuasion by our own actions Changing attitudes: the takeaway

223 224 232 250 262

7

THE SOCIAL SELF Self-concept Self-esteem Self-presentation The multifaceted self

195

PART THREE  SOCIAL INFLUENCE

SOCIAL PERCEPTION 40

Chapter review

vi

1

GENDER IDENTITY Defining sex, intersex, gender, and sexual orientation Gender identification, roles and stereotypes The gender binary and the gender spectrum Embracing gender diversity Gender transitions and sex assignment surgery Stigma and discrimination

8

Chapter review

263

CONFORMITY, COMPLIANCE AND OBEDIENCE Social influence as ‘automatic’ Conformity Compliance Obedience The continuum of social influence

272 273 275 286 292 301

Chapter review

305

GROUP PROCESSES Fundamentals of groups Individuals in groups: the presence of others Group performance: problems and solutions Conflict: cooperation and competition within and between groups

312 313 318 324

Chapter review

340

PART FOUR   SOCIAL RELATIONS 9

332

348

ATTRACTION AND CLOSE RELATIONSHIPS The need to belong Initial attraction Close relationships

349 350 352 372

Chapter review

394

183

Copyright 2020 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-202

CON TENTS

10 HELPING OTHERS Evolutionary and motivational factors Personal influences on the decision to help Interpersonal influences on who people help Situational influences on when people help Chapter review 11 AGGRESSION AND ANTISOCIAL BEHAVIOUR What is aggression? Culture, gender and individual differences Origins of aggression Situational influences on aggression Media effects Reducing violence Chapter review PART SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AND FIVE REAL-WORLD APPLICATIONS 12 ENVIRONMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY What is environmental psychology? Environmental influences on human behaviour Environmental psychology and sustainable behaviours The human footprint Climate change Chapter review 13 COMMUNITY PSYCHOLOGY The origins of community psychology People, community and context United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals Chapter review

405 407 419 421 425 439 448 449 450 461 469 477 484 489

501 502 503 505 521 522 523 536 544 545 550 560 573

14 STRESS, HEALTH AND WELLBEING Stress, health and wellbeing Causes of stress Physical responses to stress Obesity and stress Appraisal Coping with stress Treatment and prevention of stress The pursuit of happiness Chapter review 15 LAW Eyewitness testimony Confessions Jury decision-making Post-trial Perceptions of justice and the influence of culture Social psychologists’ role in the legal system Chapter review 16 BUSINESS Industrial/organisational psychology Personnel selection Performance appraisals Leadership Motivation at work Employee engagement Economic decision-making Chapter review

579 580 581 587 593 595 600 610 612 618 627 628 638 645 656 659 662 664 673 675 676 691 694 702 707 708 710

REVIEW QUIZ ANSWERS

718

NAME INDEX

719

SUBJECT INDEX

742

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vii

Guide to the text As you read this text you will find a number of features in every chapter to enhance your study of Social Psychology and help you understand how the theory is applied in the real world. PART OPENING FEATURES

PART TWO

SOCIAL PERCEPTION

CHAPTER 2: THE SOCIAL SELF CHAPTER 3: PERCEIVING OTHERS CHAPTER 4: STEREOTYPES, PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION CHAPTER 5: GENDER IDENTITY

An Organisational model included at the beginning of each part introduces the chapters and how they relate to each other to give you an overview of the content ahead.

The dimension of time: Socio-historical context

Attitudes and ideologies of culture

The environment

Interpersonal networks The individual Part 2: Social perception Chapter 2: The social self Chapter 3: Perceiving others Chapter 4: Stereotypes, prejudice and discrimination Chapter 5: Gender identity

In this section our focus is social perception – the way that we form impressions and make inferences about others. We begin by discussing the social self, examining the topics of selfesteem, self-presentation and self-concept. We then shift our attention to perceiving others, where we look at people, situations and behaviours; the way we integrate observations into a coherent impression of others; and the way that our impressions might distort reality. Next, we consider stereotypes, prejudice and discrimination, including the issues of racism, sexism and ageism, before focusing on gender identity.

CHAPTER OPENING FEATURES

1

CHAPTER

What is social psychology?

Learning Objectives

Learning objectives give you a clear sense of what each chapter will cover and what you should be able to do after reading the chapter.

By the end of this chapter, you should be able to: 1 define social psychology, identify the kinds of questions that social psychologists try to answer, and differentiate social psychology from other related fields 2 describe the trajectory of the field of social psychology from the 1880s to the end of the twentieth century and identify key areas that are trending in social psychology in current times 3 explain the use of research methods in the field of social psychology 4 describe the process of generating research ideas in social psychology, searching the relevant literature and developing hypotheses 5 explain how social psychologists go about conceptualising, operationalising and measuring variables 6 compare and contrast the process for testing ideas for the different research approaches adopted by social psychologists 7 discuss the function of ethics in social psychological research, including the use of deception and confederates and scientific integrity.

Looking back and moving forward How many times in the last 24 hours have you stopped to

you learn interesting

wonder why a person reacted to a situation the way they did, or considered your own reactions in an attempt to

and relevant details of research findings

understand your thoughts, feelings and behaviours? Ask the people around you the same questions and you will see

throughout the book, but you also will learn

a common trend. As social beings living in a social world, we cannot escape the complexities of our interactions with

how social psychologists have discovered this evidence. It is an exciting process and

others or, sometimes, our isolation from them. The history of social psychology is paved with questions regarding

one that we are enthusiastic about sharing with you. The purpose of this first chapter is to provide you with

social behaviours, with questions and ideas from inquiring minds just like yours providing the paving stones. Hundreds

a broad overview of the field of social psychology and to introduce you to some of the methodologies we use to carry

of thousands of studies and experiments have formed the cement that holds the pavers together, and the questions that those studies have generated have provided the complexity

out scientific investigations in this field. By the time you finish the chapter, you should be ready and, we hope, eager for what lies ahead.

in the direction of the paths they have created. Not only will

2

viii

Copyright 2020 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-202

Source: Fairfax Syndication/Rohan Thomson

An Opening vignette introduces and illustrates the chapter topics in a real-world context. This example is revisited in the Topical reflection at the end of the chapter to connect student learning of theory back to the real world.

GUIDE TO THE TEXT

FEATURES WITHIN CHAPTERS

PERCEIVING OTHERS

A Common sense test in every chapter challenges you to think about your intuitive beliefs of the material covered in the chapter. Find the answers in the margins when the topic is discussed, and explained further in the end of chapter review

CHAPTER THREE

PUTTING COMMON SENSE TO THE TEST Circle Your Answer T

F

The impressions we form of others are influenced by superficial aspects of their appearance.

T

F

Adaptively, people are skilled at knowing when someone is lying rather than telling the truth.

T

F

Like social psychologists, people are sensitive to situational causes when explaining the behaviour of others.

T

F

People are slow to change their first impressions on the basis of new information.

T

F

The notion that we can create a ‘self-fulfilling prophecy’ by getting others to behave in ways we expect is a myth.

T

F

People are more accurate at judging the personalities of friends and acquaintances than of strangers. GENDER IDENTITY

CHAPTER FIVE

INTRODUCTION WHATEVER THE TOPIC – crime, business, sport, politics, entertainment, personal events, or explaining CRITICAL THINKING ACTIVITY

tragedies, such as the shooting of Trayvon Martin – we are all engaged and interested participants in social What can healthcare professionals, such psychologists, do to Onetoofunderstand the issues which social psychologists with how perception, theas processes by which people come one another. This chapterface examines help reduce the stigma and discrimination experienced by the the LGBTQI population worldwide is a lack of accurate and people come to know (or think that they know) other people and is divided into four sections. First, we look LGBTQI population? transparent data, largely due to the reluctance of many to be at the ‘raw data’ of social perception: people, situations and behaviours. Second, we examine how people PART SOCIAL PERCEPTION we noted the rising numbers of seen and heard, and the inability of our administrative systems TWO Earlier in this chapterexplain and analyse behaviour. Third, we consider how people integrate their various observations into children being diagnosed with gender dysphoria, and the to acknowledge and recognise their presence. As a researcher a coherent impression of others. Fourth, we discuss some of the subtle ways that our impressions create early age at which they are being referred for assessment and how would you suggest we improve our ability to collect to recover from the of victory oroften defeat. This bias disappeared, however, when theAsstudents a distorted picture reality, setting in motion a self-fulfilling prophecy. you readfirst thiscompleted chapter, treatment. What recommendations would you make to our meaningful data from gender diverse populations? ayou ‘prospective in which they estimated amount from of future time theyvantage would spend everyday will children, noticediary’ that the various processes arethe considered a perceiver’s point.on Keep in mind, educators for dealing with these their parents activities like going toevents class,of talking to friends, studying andand eating meals (Wilson & Ross, 2000). Other however, that in the life, you are both a perceiver a target of others’ perceptions. and peers? variations in the impact bias stem from cultural orientation, as detailed in the following Cultural Diversity feature on impact bias. OBSERVATION: ELEMENTS OF SOCIAL PERCEPTION

Challenge the theory you have learned by considering the Critical thinking activities, perhaps in group discussion.

CULTURAL DIVERSITY BOXES

A general term for the processes by which people come to understand one another.

Understanding others and explaining their actions may be difficult (especially in cases like the shooting of RESEARCH SPOTLIGHT CULTURAL DIVERSITYTrayvon Martin), but it is a common and vital part of everyday life. How do we do it? What kinds of evidence

Source: Courtesy of Professor Kerry Robinson

Explore the similarities and differences that exist in social psychological processes around the world through the Cultural diversity boxes.

Social perception

PROFESSOR KERRY ROBINSON, UNIVERSITY OFactually ‘see’ someone’sofmental the most prominentstate formsorofhis ‘difficult’ knowledge do we use? We cannot or emotional or her motives or intentions IMPACT BIAS ACROSS CULTURES later,associated they asked another set of white and East Asian WESTERN SYDNEY with children and young people. any more than a detective can see a crime that has already been committed. So,Canadian like a detective who tries students tochildren report blood how happy they were ondeveloping the first day that 2 Young are actively engaged in Is the impact bias observed equivalently around the world? toWhat reconstruct crimeareas by turning fingerprints, samples and other evidence, the social are theatopic of yourup witnesses, weather actually reached 20around degrees Celsius their gender identities from the age of(experienced three, It appears that the answer is ‘no’. Kent Lamtoand colleagues perceiver comes know others by relying the on indirect clues – the elements of social perception. These clues research? happiness). In this way, the researchers were able to measure and through this process, they are actively constituting (2005) investigated whether cultural orientation – collectivist or My research has primarily focused on people, situations and behaviour. arise from an interplay of three sources: biased affective as forecasts – was predicted higher than themselves gendered subjects and happiness sexual subjects, individualist – would determine theand degree to which individuals gender sexuality, particularly in experienced happiness? Would East Asiansaround have lower biasand than reinforcing dominant power relations gender demonstrate the impact Physical bias. In particular, the researchers appearance childhood and young people. I have their white Canadian counterparts, as expected? of who they Many young children’s predicted that, given their individualist orientation, white examined themet social construction Have you ever someone for the first time orsexuality. visited their social media profileperceptions and formed a quick The results revealed that predicted happiness was indeed are as gendered subjects is framed in heterosexuality, Canadians would be more prone focus a particular event of gender and sexuality, and howto dominant beliefs, and impression basedononly on avalues quick ‘snapshot’ of information? As children, we were told not to judge a book than actual through happiness, but only for white demonstrated engagement inthe play, suchCanadian as, and thus demonstrate the biasthat than would East practices underpin what isimpact considered to be ‘normative’, which whathigher by its cover, things are notAsians, always they seem, that surface appearances are deceiving, and that all students. Theand Eastfathers, Asian students reportedand equal levels of and mothers mock-weddings, boyfriends who, duehistorically to their collectivist orientation, might have a more can vary and that across different cultures, ethnicities, glitters is not gold. Yet we cannot seemhappiness, to help ourselves. whether predicting is the event or experiencing it. In girlfriends. This behaviour often encouraged by adults, holistic and less focal outlook.religions and so on. In western ages, geographical locations, To illustrate the rapid-fire nature of theaprocess, Janine Willis and Alexander Todorov (2006) showed follow-up study, the researchers were able to get East Asian including educators. On a cold the researchers asked white contexts, whatearly-spring is viewed university asday, ‘normative’ is constituted in binary students photographs of unfamiliar facesto forengage one-tenth ofaffective a second, half a second or ahaving full second. students in the forecasting biasin by 3 Children from early ages are actively engaged regulating Canadian or foreign-born East Asian students tofemale, predictwhich how gender, which refers to two genders, male and Whether the students judged the faces for how attractive, likeable, trustworthy aggressive them focus on the event.competent, Thus, effect of cultural orientation the gendered behaviours ofthe other children. Fororexample, happy they would weather reachedcharacteristics. a warm 20 traditionally, have feel beenwhen seenthe as having opposite they were, their ratings, even at the briefestexists exposure, quick highly correlated with judgements but is were also children whomalleable. wish toand transgress ‘normative’ gender, degrees Celsius (predicted happiness). A couple the of months Within this binary framework, I have examined ways in that other observers made without time-exposure limits (see Table In fact, research for example, two boys3.1). wishing to be marriedhas in ashown mock that which ‘normative’ gender is linked to ‘normative’ sexuality; people evaluate spontaneously and unconsciously whether a face indicates thatchildren a personwho is dominant wedding, are challenged by many view thisor that is, how gender is heterosexualised in early childhood and submissive, and trustworthy or untrustworthy as (Stewart et al., 2012). Flipinquickly through the pages of an Self-perception inappropriate, not just relation to gender, but also how gender is rigidly regulated through every day relationships illustrated magazine, scroll through your social media feeds, and&you may2019; seethat for yourself that sometimes sexuality (Robinson Davies, Robinson Davies, of what weor can learn from introspection, Daryl Bem (1967) proposed people&can learn about and practices, including Regardless those in which children engage. When it takes a mere fraction of a second for you todo form impressions a strangerBem’s from self-perception his or her face. 2015; Robinson, 2012). themselves the same way outside observers – bycertain watching their ownof behaviour. Self-perception children and young people transgress normative gender and If severe first impressions are quick form, then ondid what they based? In 500 BCE, How youare become interested your the area of research? theory is simple yet profound. Totothe extent that internal states are weak orin difficult tomathematician interpret, people theory sexuality they can experience consequences. Pythagoras looked into the eyes prospective students to determine ifand theythe were gifted. At about the My interests this area of research started wellin before I became TheWhich theoryof that when infer what they think or how theyof feel by observing theirinown behaviour situation which that your research findings have you found most internal cues are difficult anback academic. Myused experiences as both high school same time,takes Hippocrates, theyou founder of modern medicine, facial features toa make diagnoses of life behaviour place. Have ever looked at an email argument with someone, only toteacher realise with intriguing? to interpret, people gain refuge crisis worker with homeless young women have and death. nineteenth century, Franz Gall introduced atime, carnival-like science There is one project in particular thatInhow I the have undertaken that I Viennese amazement angry you were? Have youand everaphysician devoured a sandwich in record only then to conclude self-insight by observing my you research aninference academic. I learnt that there consider to be particularly interesting tobeen haveincredibly importanthungry?influenced that you mustand have In each case, madeasan about yourself by watching their own behaviour. were serious consequences to children’s and young people’s implications for children’s andown young people’s gender and your actions. agency According and healthto and wellbeing, result of their a lackown of access sexual citizenship. This project wasare conducted early There limits towith self-perception, of course. Bem, people as doanot infer internal to different gender and sexuality identities beyond the binary, childhood and primary aged children, their parents states from behaviour thatand occurred in the presence of compelling situational pressures such as reward and to certain types of knowledge, such as sexuality education, educators. The focus of this research wasIfbuilding respectful or punishment. you argued intensely or gobbled down a sandwich because you were paid to do so, considered by many adults as ‘inappropriate’, ‘controversial’ or and ethical relationshipsyou early in life with particular attention probably would not assume that you were angry or hungry. In other words, people learn about too ‘difficult’. to gender and sexuality. themselves The researchthrough includedself-perception a mixed method only when the situation alone seems insufficient to have caused their How does your area of research speak to life in Australia approach: online surveysbehaviour. and interviews with parents and and New Zealand? educators, and interviews with children 4 to 12 years of age. Over the years, a good deal of researchInhas supported self-perception theory. When people are gently recent years we have seen an emergence in public The research raised many important issues, but three key coaxed into saying or doing something andacknowledgement when they are notofotherwise certain how they feel, they the inequities thatabout exist around gender findings were: often come to view themselves in ways that arepower consistent with their publicthe statements and behaviours and relationships through global #MeToo campaign. 1 The discourse of childhood innocence seriously impacts (Chaiken & Baldwin, 1981; Kelly & Rodriguez, 2006). In one study, participants induced to is describe Domestic violence in Australia and New Zealand a major the regulation of children’s access to knowledge that is themselves in flattering terms scored higher on aproblem. later testUnintended of self-esteem than did those who were led social pregnancy, sexually transmitted critical to the development of their identities, agency, and toThis describe themselves modestly (Jones, Rhodewalt, Skelton, 1981). abuse Similarly, those infections, sexual Berglas, violence,&and child sexual are prevalent health and wellbeing. knowledge is oftenmore viewed as manoeuvred leading questions intolives describing themselves as introverted or extroverted – in the of young people, especially young women and ‘difficult’ knowledge,who as itwere is information thatby is problematic whether orchildren. not theyGendered really were – often came to define as such later on (Swann & Ely, 1984). sexuality andthemselves gender diverse young people. Facebook has for many adults to discuss with power British E. education M. Forsterare long ago anticipated theory when he asked, can I tell what I think over 70the gender category options for‘How users, a point reinforced relationships, sexuality and author sexuality some until I see what I say?’

Impact bias across cultures

Ch 2, p. 46

Social comparisons in New Zealand

Ch 2, p. 52

Terror management worldwide

Ch 2, p. 61

Better-than-average effect in Ma ¯ori culture

Ch 2, p. 70

Australian by greeting

Ch 3, p. 101

Belief in a just world internationally

Ch 3, p. 115

Shifting national identities

Ch 4, p. 143

Ingroup favouritism around the world

Ch 4, p. 147

Stereotype content around the world

Ch 4, p. 150

Global attitudes toward transgender people

Ch 5, p. 208

Non-binary identities – two spirits and 46 third genders Ch 5, p. 209

Obedience: worldwide consistency or variation?

Ch 7, p. 295

Tolerance of group norm deviation around the world

Ch 8, p. 316

Culture and cohesiveness

Ch 8, p. 317

Cultural nuances of social loafing

Ch 8, p. 322

Cultural differences in negotiation

Ch 8, p. 338

93

Perceptions of beauty around the world Ch 9, p. 359 Global divorce rates on the rise

Ch 9, p. 388

Same-sex marriage around the world

Ch 9, p. 390

Vicarious self-perception

Self-perception theory maytowards have even more reach than Bem had anticipated. argued people Global attitudes helping ChBem10, p.that417

>>

215

sometimes learn about themselves by observing their own freely chosen behaviour. But might you also infer something about yourself by observing the behaviour of someone else with whom you

Arecompletely you too broke, hot and toCialdini (2007) demonstrated identify? In a series of studies, Noah unhappy Goldstein and Robert this phenomenon, which they call vicarious self-perception. In one experiment, for example, they asked offer help? Ch 10, p. 434 Violence against women

Ch 11, p. 457

Implicit measures of cultural difference Ch 6, p. 228

Pornography: the big picture

Ch 11, p. 483

Cultural influences on the attitude– behaviour link

Ch 6, p. 230

Global housing crisis

Ch 12, p. 510

Cultural influences on persuasion

Ch 6, p. 249

Cognitive dissonance across cultures

Ch 6, p. 258

Cultural differences in ostracism outcomes

Ch 7, p. 279

The global divide of sexual orientation Ch 13, p. 571

Cultural differences in reciprocation

Ch 7, p. 288

Work stress around the world

Ch 14, p. 585

Compliance techniques around the world

Ch 7, p. 290

The daily commute: stress on a global scale

Ch 14, p. 586

Poverty in Australia and New Zealand Ch 13, p. 561 Global hunger index

Ch 13, p. 563

Ageing well: global trends

Ch 13, p. 567

Copyright 2020 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-202

ix

GUIDE TO THE TEXT

FEATURES WITHIN CHAPTERS STEREOTYPES, PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION

CULTURAL DIVERSITY BOXES Obesity: the growing epidemic Suspect interviews: the psychology of lie detection Jury decision-making around the world Procedural justice around the world

CHAPTER FOUR

clearly behind them – cause hearts and minds to follow (Aronson, 1992). Laura Barron and Mikki Hebl (2013), for example, found across a series of studies that laws that make employment discrimination against gays

(which many states in the USassessment do not currently have) make a significantfor and positive difference in Ch 14, illegal p. 593 Global trends individuals’ attitudes and behaviours. recruitment Ch 16, p. 685 Elizabeth Levy Paluck (2011) has conducted some fascinating field studies showing the power of peer and cultural influences. In one study, students in several high schools were trained to be ‘peer leaders’

expressions of intergroup prejudice. These students not only engaged in more antiCh 15, who p.would 639confrontThe globe project Ch 16, p. 697 prejudice behaviours, but these behaviours also spread to their friends. Recently, the power of a brief, 10-minute conversation was demonstrated in Florida, US. David

Brookman and Joshua Kalla (2016) examined the impact ofglobally door-to-door canvassing on anti-transgender Women on boards Ch 16, p. 701 prejudice. The canvassers engaged voters in an active perspective-taking exercise that involved voters Ch 15, considering p. 648a time when they themselves were judged negatively for being different. Reduced antiGlobal comparisons ofeven gender Ch 16, p. 706 transgender prejudice was observed three weeks, six weeks, and three monthsgaps later. like these show that a source for much positive change stems from what is at the very core of Ch 15, social p.Studies 660 psychology: the social nature of the human animal. Some of our baser instincts – such as intergroup competition that breeds intergroup biases – may always be present, but we also can learn from each other the thoughts, values and goals that make us less vulnerable to perpetuating or being the targets of stereotypes, prejudice and discrimination.

RESEARCH SPOTLIGHT

Source: © Courtesy of Associate Professor Fiona Kate Barlow.

ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR FIONA KATE BARLOW, SCHOOL OF PSYCHOLOGY, UNIVERSITY OF QUEENSLAND

Research spotlight boxes profile Australian and New Zealand social psychology researchers.

What are the topic areas of your research? I look at contact between members of different groups and how such contact (or expectations about contact) shapes intergroup relations. I look extensively at how fears around contact (e.g., expecting rejection on the basis of race) can encourage race-based segregation, and how negative contact between members of traditionally oppositional groups can effectively poison intergroup relations. My work informs researchers about expecting rejection on the basis of your race, minority group experiences of contact and rejection, the differential impact of negative and positive contact on racism and discrimination, and how contact might be associated with collective action and political solidarity. I am currently doing research with the support of an Australian Research Council Future Fellowship on these topics (Barlow, Louis & Hewstone, 2009; Barlow et al., 2012; Hayward et al., 2017; Tropp & Barlow, 2018). I also do work looking at body image, romantic relationships, and sex.

RESEARCH SPOTLIGHT BOXES

people in Western settings) are perpetually denied their national identity. They are always being asked, ‘Where are you really from?’ and so on and so forth. Given these pressures, we proposed that under certain conditions Asian Australian participants might actually strategically befriend ethnic deviants; that is, ‘white-acting’ Asians and ‘Asian-acting’ whites (i.e., members of each group who fit stereotypes about the other group). In order to test our hypotheses we first ran a pilot study – finding out what sort of interests were stereotypically associated with both white and Asian Australians. Michael then designed fake Facebook profiles of an Asian man (William Lee) or white man (Lee Williams) who displayed either stereotypically white or Asian interests and likes. Asian and white Australians each saw one profile (random assignment to conditions). Sure enough, under certain conditions Asian Australians actually preferentially ‘friended’ the ‘boundary blurrers’; that is, ethnic deviants. No such pattern was evident for white Australians. In a second study we explained the pattern, demonstrating that this pattern was explained by Asian Australians’ desire for integration into the majority group and perceived efficacy of ethnic deviance at gaining such integration. Our results demonstrate just how important it is not to overgeneralise results – instead, different groups may display different responses to intergroup situations. In addition, it speaks to the consequences of identity denial for Asian Australians (and most likely, Asian New Zealanders).

Ch 2,Which p. of81 Dr Arthur A. Stukas, La Trobe your research findings have you found most intriguing? University One paper that I am very proud of was authored by my past

Dr Jackie Hunter, University of Otago Professor Ottmar Lipp, Curtin University

PhD student Michael Thai (Thai, Barlow & Hornsey, 2014). In PART SOCIAL PERCEPTION TWO this paper we took on the topic of ‘ethnic deviance’. Typically,

Ch 3, p. 130 Dr Thomas Denson, University of work shows that humans really dislike deviance – and we police Wales the groups to whichNew we belongSouth by making sure that anyone Associate Professor Fiona Kate Barlow, who does not ‘act like us’ is either disciplined or ejected from FIGURE 2.3 Facial feedback the group. Michael I proposed thatholding for some groups, this As suggested by facialand feedback research, a pencil with School of Psychology, University of Professor Joseph Griffith general hold true. we lookedReser, at your teethpattern (so thatmay you not smile) may leadSpecifically, you to rate something as Asian Australians. Asian Australians other and more enjoyable than if you(like holdmany a pencil withAsian your Queensland Ch 4, funnier p. 181 University and Durham University lips (so that you cannot smile). Professor Kerry Robinson, University of Western Sydney Ch 5, p. 215

Ch 10, p. 438

How did you become interested in your area of research? When I was aged four, I told my mother that I would make improving race-relations in Australia a priority. Over thirty years later, nothing has changed. My core area of research is Self-perceptions of to emotion social psychology. I want know how groups interact with Draw the corners of your mouth back andand up when and tense your eye one another – when we get things right, we fall prey muscles. relax.intergroup Now raisehostility. your eyebrows, open your eyes to really Okay, damaging I’m fascinated by the wide andtolet yourour mouth openinterest slightly. Relax.education Now pull your degree which race,drop gender, groups, brows down and together and press your lips together. Relax. >> If you followed these directions, you would have appeared to others to be feeling first happy, then fearful and finally angry. 181 The question is: ‘How would you have appeared to yourself?’

Ch 11, p. 488 Ch 12, p. 534

Dr Neville Robertson: Community Psychologist, Hamilton, Aotearoa/ Facial feedback New Zealand Chhave13, 572 Social psychologists who study emotion askedp. precisely that

Dr Yoshihisa Kashima, University of Melbourne

Ch 6, p. 262

Dr Jolanda Jetten, University of Queensland

facial feedback hypothesis states that changes in facial expression Professor Julia Rucklidge, University can trigger corresponding changes in the subjective experience of emotion. In the first test of this hypothesis, told of Canterbury Ch James 14,Laird p.(1974) 617

Ch 7, p. 304

Dr Dirk Van Rooy, Australian National University

Dr Blake Mckimmie, University ofof cartoons. Before each one, the participants showed them a series were instructed to contract certain facial muscles in ways that created Queensland Ch 15, p. 662 either a smile or a frown. As Laird predicted, participants rated what

Ch 8, p. 339

Dr Nickola Overall, University of Auckland

frowning. As depicted in Figure 2.3, similar results have emerged Professor Paula Brough, Griffith comparing the effect of holding a pencil with your teeth (so that you University 16, p.you709 smile) relative to holding a pencil withCh your lips (so that cannot

Ch 9, p. 393

question. Viewed within the framework of self-perception theory, the

participants that they were taking part in an experiment on activity of the facial muscles. After attaching electrodes to their faces, he

they saw as funnier when they were smiling than when they were

Source: Shutterstock.com/ImageryMajestic

Critically explore social psychology research and replication failures with the Current scene on… boxes

smile) (Sedlmeier, Weigelt & Walther, 2011), suggesting that this effect is universal. Researchers recently replicated these findings in Ghana, West Africa (Dzokoto, Wallace, Peters, & Bentsi-Enchill, 2014); however, substantial debate has arisen regarding the nature of facial feedback, as outlined in the following Current Scene On feature.

CURRENT SCENE ON … FACIAL FEEDBACK In 1988, Fritz Strack, Leonard Martin and Sabine Stepper conducted what would become one of the most cited studies in support of the facial feedback hypothesis. Much like the images in Figure 2.3, participants were asked to hold a pen with their teeth (inducing a smile) or with their lips (inhibiting a smile) while viewing cartoons, among other tasks. Analysis of ratings of participants’ amusement while viewing the cartoons revealed higher levels of amusement among participants in the ‘smile’ condition relative to those in the ‘pout’ condition. The article reporting these findings has been cited more than 1700 times and prompted a long stream of follow-up research. In 2016, a team of researchers around the world led by Eric-Jan Wagenmakers undertook a large-scale attempt to

CURRENT SCENE ON… BOXES

Facial feedback hypothesis

The hypothesis that changes in facial expression can lead to corresponding changes in emotion.

replicate the effect. The methodology and analysis plan for the replication were carefully devised and registered ahead of time. Seventeen labs around the world independently collected data in as consistent a way as possible, mimicking the methodology of the original study as much as feasible. However, when the data were collated across the nearly 1900 participants who took part, the results showed that funniness ratings between the ‘smile’ and ‘pout’ conditions did not differ significantly, casting doubt on the robustness of the effect. Despite this so-called failure to replicate, it is important to note that a single non-replicable finding does not negate the facial feedback hypothesis more generally.

Facial feedback can evoke and magnify certain emotional states. It is important to note, however, that the face is not necessary to the subjective experience of emotion. When neuropsychologists tested a young woman who suffered from bilateral facial paralysis, they found that despite her inability to outwardly show emotion, she reported feeling various emotions in response to positive and negative visual images (Keillor, Barrett, Crucian, Kortenkamp, & Heilman, 2003). How does facial feedback work? With 80 muscles in the human face that can create over 7000 expressions, can we actually vary our own emotions by contracting certain muscles and wearing different expressions? Research suggests that we can, although it is not clear what the results mean. Laird argues that facial expressions affect emotion through a process of self-perception: ‘If I’m smiling, I must be happy’. Consistent with this hypothesis, Chris Kleinke and colleagues (1998) asked people to emulate either the

Facial feedback

Ch 2, p. 48

The great outdoors

Ch 12, p. 530

Social priming

Ch 3, p. 119

Replication failures

Ch 15, p. 643

Publication bias

Ch 4, p. 164 48

x

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PART TWO

SOCIAL PERCEPTION

through my own research. However, my research with sexuality and gender diverse young people shows that they are six times more likely to harm themselves and to attempt suicide than their cisgender peers as a result of homophobia and transphobia (Robinson, Bansel, Denson, Ovenden & Davies, 2014). The values and beliefs that underpin this behaviour start

early in life. Relationships and sexuality education in schools is generally not addressing these issues adequately and is not providing young people access to the knowledge they require to be respectful, ethical citizens. My research shows that education about gender and sexuality needs to start in early childhood.

GUIDE TO THE TEXT

Topical Reflection

END-OF-CHAPTER FEATURES

PART TWO

SOCIAL PERCEPTION

SISTERGIRLS OF TIWI ISLAND Research conducted by Damien Riggs and Kate Toon (2015) provided an insight into the

through my ownofresearch. However, my research with sexuality earlytheir in life. Relationships experiences Indigenous Sistergirls. Many spoke of trying to keep identity a secretand sexuality education in schools andfrom gender diverse young for people that they are six generally not addressing these issues adequately and is not family members fear shows of rejection, which was balancediswith relief and joy when their times more likely harm themselvesOthers and toreflected attempt suicide providing young people access to the knowledge they require to disclosure mettowith acceptance. the pain of rejection from family members than their as a result of homophobia and be respectful, ethical citizens. and thecisgender violence peers or threats of violence they experienced, particularly from their fathers, but My research shows that education transphobia (Robinson, Denson, Ovenden & Davies, about gender and sexuality needs to start in early childhood. also extended familyBansel, and friends. The long-term emotional consequences of such experiences 2014). The values and beliefshomelessness, that underpindrugs this behaviour startabuse – some even turned to sex work often led to depression, and alcohol

At the end of each chapter you will find several tools to help you to review, practise and extend your knowledge of the key learning objectives. or sex for favours, such as a bed for the night. Many highlighted the complexities of often rigidly defined feminine roles within Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities and the effect this had in terms of affirming their Topical Reflection

Revisit opening vignette in the Topical reflection to connect student learning of theory back to the real-world context.

identity. Where the expectation is that a Sistergirl will undertake a traditionally feminine role, such as child rearing, child care and caregiving, it isISLAND also expected that they will adopt a feminine appearance. For some this is interpreted as marginalisation, SISTERGIRLS OF TIWI whereas for others it is seen as affirming their identify. For those in remote communities with no access to gender affirming Research conducted by Damien Riggs and Kate Toon (2015) provided an insight into the surgeries and therapies, such as hormones, this level of acceptance is important. Establishing a sense of place within their experiences of Indigenous Sistergirls. Many spoke of trying to keep their identity a secret communities is important to the concepts of identity and wellbeing. Because of this, discrimination and social exclusion can from family members for fear of rejection, which was balanced with relief and joy when their have devastating effects on individuals. Sistergirls are substantially more vulnerable to physical and sexual violence, and are disclosure met with acceptance. Others reflected the pain of rejection from family members often the targets of misogyny, transphobia, and racism, which is shaped by histories of colonisation (Costello & Nannup, 1999; and the violence or threats of violence they experienced, particularly from their fathers, but Hyde et al., 2014). These contribute to the high rates of poor mental health often reported within Sistergirl communities. also extended family and friends. The long-term emotional consequences of such experiences often led to depression, homelessness, drugs and alcohol abuse – some even turned to sex work or sex for favours, such as a bed for the night. Many highlighted the complexities of often rigidly defined feminine roles within Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities and the effect this had in terms of affirming their identity. Where the expectation is that a Sistergirl will undertake a traditionally feminine role, such as child rearing, child care and caregiving, it is also expected that they will adopt a feminine appearance. For some this is interpreted as marginalisation, whereas for others it is seen as affirming their identify. For those in remote communities with no access to gender affirming SUMMARY

CHAPTER REVIEW

Review your understanding of the key chapter topics with the Summary.

surgeries and therapies, such as hormones, this level of acceptance is important. Establishing a sense of place within their GENDERof this, discrimination and social exclusion can communities is important to the conceptsAND of identity and wellbeing. Because DEFINING SEX, INTERSEX, GENDER, SEXUAL • The attitudes, behaviours that weand associate ORIENTATION have devastating effects on individuals. Sistergirls are substantially more vulnerable tofeelings physicaland and sexual violence, are with a person’s sex. (Costello & Nannup, 1999; • The sexofand gender are often usedand interchangeably, often theterms targets misogyny, transphobia, racism, whichbut is shaped by historiesbiological of colonisation are distinct differences between Hydethere et al., 2014). These contribute to the them. high rates of poor mental health often reported within Sistergirl communities. SEXUAL ORIENTATION

BIOLOGICAL SEX • Biological sex is a label assigned at birth (or by ultrasound or other prenatal test before birth) based on medical factors such as genitals and chromosomes.

•

•

CHAPTER REVIEW INTERSEX

• There are a multitude of intersex variations and not all are LINKAGES LINKAGES visible in infancy. SUMMARY

Linkages diagrams present a set of questions that illustrate and help you understand the network of relationships among social psychology concepts in different chapters.

• The frequency of intersex people who possess The research reviewed in this chapter reveals chromosomal the dynamic Theand research reviewed in this chapter reveals the dynamic anatomical features of both males and females is DEFINING SEX, AND SEXUAL processes thatINTERSEX, drive how GENDER, we perceive others. From the processes that drive we perceive approximately 17 ofhow every 1000 people.others. From the ORIENTATION information we gather, to the attributions we make, to we gather, toare theoften attributions we make, to but • information The terms sex and gender used interchangeably, inferring others’, personality, we appear to both get it inferring we appear there areothers’, distinct personality, differences between them.to both get it right and get it wrong. Recall that some of the biases in right and get it wrong. Recall that some of the biases in BIOLOGICAL attributionSEX that emerge are grounded in the desire for high attribution that emerge are grounded in the desire for high • Biological sex is a label assigned at birth (or by ultrasound or other prenatal test before birth) based on medical factors such 216 as genitals and chromosomes.

Sexual orientation describes a person’s enduring physical, romantic and emotional preference and attraction to another person. PERCEIVING OTHERS CHAPTER A sexual self-concept is informed by aspects of our sexuality PERCEIVING OTHERS CHAPTER THREE THREE including sexual attraction, sexual behaviours and sexual identity.

PUTTING COMMON SENSE TO THE TEST

self-esteem (as outlined in Chapter 2, ‘The social self’). The self-esteem (as outlined in Chapter 2, ‘The social self’). The GENDER Sex is binary. ‘Linkages’ diagram also shows ties to two other chapters in diagram also ties tothat two chapters • ‘Linkages’ The attitudes, feelings andshows behaviours weother associate with in which weResearch see howsuggests the perceptions we haveanchored of othersbyhas FALSE. sex is a spectrum which we see how the a person’s biological sex.perceptions we have of others has far-reaching consequences – in the legal domain and in the male and female far-reaching consequences – in the legal domain and in the SEXUAL ORIENTATION business domain. business domain. • Sexual orientation describes a person’s enduring physical, romantic and emotional preference and attraction to another person. • A sexual self-concept is informed by aspects of our sexuality including sexual attraction, sexual behaviours and sexual identity. Perceiving

INTERSEX CHAPTER • There are a multitude of intersex variations and not all are CHAPTER Perceiving others visible in infancy. others PUTTING COMMON SENSE TO THE TEST • The frequency of intersex people who possess chromosomal and anatomical features of both males and females is Sex is binary. approximately 17 of every 1000 people. LINKAGES FALSE. Research suggests sex is a spectrum anchored by LINKAGES male and female

3 3

216

Self-esteem Self-esteem

CHAPTER CHAPTER

2 2

The social self The social self

Jury decision-making Jury decision-making

CHAPTER CHAPTER

15 15

Law Law

Who gets hired? Who gets hired?

CHAPTER CHAPTER

16 16

Business Business

REVIEW REVIEW QUIZ QUIZ

Test your knowledge and consolidate your learning through the Revision quiz. With answers at the end of the book.

Extend your understanding through the suggested Weblinks and References relevant to each chapter

1 1

Which of the following is not considered a major source of Which of the following is not considered a major source of information in the processes of perceiving others? information in the processes of perceiving others? a Situations. a Situations. b Behaviours. b Behaviours. c Physical appearance. c Physical appearance. d Heuristics. d Heuristics. 2 Which of the following stem from Kelley’s covariation 2 Which of the following stem from Kelley’s covariation theory? theory? a Choice, expectedness and effects. a Choice, expectedness and effects. b Consensus, distinctiveness and consistency. b Consensus, distinctiveness and consistency. c Availability, choice and consistency. c Availability, choice and consistency. d Personal attribution, situational attribution and d Personal attribution, situational attribution and attribution. PART behavioural SOCIAL PERCEPTION behavioural attribution. 3TWO Which of the following best describes current understanding 3 Which of the following best describes current understanding of the arithmetic of integrating information about others? of the arithmetic of integrating information about others? a Weighted average. WEBLINKS a Weighted average. b Summation. b Summation. c Standard deviation. Decision-making and heuristics c Standard deviation. d Difference scores. https://cat.xula.edu/thinker/decisions/heuristics d Difference scores. A demonstration of the availability heuristic as well as other heuristics used in attributions and decision-making.

4 4

TED talks on deception and lying https://blog.ted.com/5-talks-that-are-all-about-lying/ A series of 5 TED talks on deception and lying.

Spot the fake smile http://www.bbc.co.uk/science/humanbody/mind/surveys/ smiles/index.shtml ‘Spot the fake smile’ activity from the BBC.

System 1 and System 2 https://www.inc.com/daniel-kahneman/idea-lab-makingsmarter-decisions.html An interview featuring Daniel Kahneman discussing the System 1 and System 2 cognitive processes.

Which term refers to the phenomenon whereby individuals Which term refers to the phenomenon whereby individuals interpret ambiguous information as supporting their prior interpret ambiguous information as supporting their prior beliefs? beliefs? a Belief perseverance. a Belief perseverance. b False consensus. b False consensus. c Confirmatory hypothesis testing. c Confirmatory hypothesis testing. d Base-rate fallacy. d Base-rate fallacy. 5 Of the following pairs of traits, which has been argued to form 5 Of the following pairs of traits, which has been argued to form the basis of ‘central traits’ of person perception? the basis of ‘central traits’ of person perception? a Warmth and competence. a Warmth and competence. b Extroversion and agreeableness. b Extroversion and agreeableness. c Confidence and humility. c Confidence and humility. d Dominance and nurturance. d Dominance and nurturance. 6 Which of the following is not a motivational bias for attribution 6 Which of the following is not a motivational bias for attribution identified in this chapter? identified in this chapter? a Belief in a just world. a Belief in a just world. b Self-esteem. b Self-esteem. c Confirmatory hypothesis testing. Social lab c perception Confirmatory hypothesis testing. d None of the options given are motivational biases related http://tlab.princeton.edu/demonstrations d None of the options given are motivational biases related to attribution. A demonstration site for Alex Todorov’s laboratory in which you to attribution. can see how traits appear on the face.

133 133

REFERENCES Abelson, R. P. (1981). Psychological status of the script concept. American Psychologist, 36, 715–729. Ackerman, J. M., Griskevicius, V., & Li, N. P. (2011). Let’s get serious: Communicating commitment in romantic relationships. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 100, 1079–1094. Aguiar, P., Vala, J., Correia, I., & Pereira, C. (2008). Justice in our world and in that of others: Belief in a just world and reactions to victims. Social Justice Research, 21, 50–68. Alicke, M. D., & Largo, E. (1995). The role of the self in the false consensus effect. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 31, 28–47. Alquist, J. L., Ainsworth, S. E., Baumeister, R. F., Daly, M., & Stillman, T. F. (2015). The making of mighthave-beens: Effects of free will belief on counterfactual thinking. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 41, 268–283. Ambady, N., & Rosenthal, R. (1993). Half a minute: Predicting teacher evaluations from thin slices of nonverbal behavior and physical attractiveness. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 64, 431–441. Anderson, C. A., Lepper, M. R., & Ross, L. (1980). Perseverance of social theories: The role of explanation in the persistence of discredited information. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 39, 1037–1049. Anderson, C. A., & Sechler, E. S. (1986). Effects of explanation and counterexplanation on the development and use of social theories. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 50, 24–34. Anderson, N. H. (1965). Averaging versus adding as a stimulus combination rule in impression formation. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 70, 394–400.

Balcetis, E., & Dunning, D. (2006). See what you want to see: Motivational influences on visual perception. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 91, 612–625. Balcetis, E., & Dunning, D. (2010). Wishful seeing: More desired objects are seen as closer. Psychological Science, 21, 147–152. Bargh, J. A., Chen, M., & Burrows, L. (1996). Automaticity of social behavior: Direct effects of trait construct and stereotype activation on action. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71, 230–244. Bargh, J. A., Gollwitzer, P. M., Lee-Chai, A., Barndollar, K., Trötschel, R. (2001). The automated will: Nonconscious activation and pursuit of behavioral goals. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 81, 1014–1027. https://doi.org/10.1037/00223514.81.6.1014 Bargh, J. A., Lombardi, W. J., & Higgins, E. T. (1988). Automaticity of chronically accessible constructs in person x situation effects on person perception: It’s just a matter of time. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 55, 599–605. Barrett, H. C., Todd, P. M., Miller, G. F., & Blythe, P. W. (2005). Accurate judgments of intention from motion cues alone: A cross-cultural study. Evolution and Human Behavior, 26, 313–331. Barrett, L. F., Mesquita, B., & Gendron, M. (2011). Emotion perception in context. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 20, 286–290. Baumeister, R. F., Bratslavsky, E., Finkenauer, C., & Vohs, K. D. (2001). Bad is stronger than good. Review of General Psychology, 5, 323–370. Belmore, S. M. (1987). Determinants of attention

Bond, C., & DePaulo, B. (2006). Accuracy of deception judgments. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 10, 214–234. Borkenau, P., Mauer, N., Riemann, R., Spinath, F. M., & Angleitner, A. (2004). Thin slices of behavior as cues of personality and intelligence. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 86, 599–614. Boroditsky, L. (2011, February). How language shapes thought. Scientific American. Brambilla, M., & Leach, C. W. (2014). On the importance of being moral: The distinctive role of morality in social judgment. Social Cognition, 32, 397–408. Bressan, P., & Martello, M. F. D. (2002). Talis pater, talis filius: Perceived resemblance and the belief in genetic relatedness. Psychological Science, 13, 213–218. Brooks, R., & Meltzoff, A. N. (2002). The importance of eyes: How infants interpret adult looking behavior. Developmental Psychology, 38, 958–966. Brown, J. A., & Bernieri, F. (2017). Trait perception accuracy and acquaintance within groups: Tracking accuracy development. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 43(5), 716–728. Bruner, J. S., & Potter, M. C. (1964). Interference in visual recognition. Science, 144, 424–425. Bui, N. H. (2012). False consensus in attitudes toward celebrities. Psychology of Popular Media Culture, 1, 236–243. Burleson, M. H., Roberts, N. A., Coon, D. W., & Soto, J. A. (2018). Perceived cultural acceptability and comfort with affectionate touch: Differences between Mexican Americans and European American. Journal of Social and Personal Relationships, 36(3) https://doi.

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Guide to the online resources FOR THE INSTRUCTOR Cengage is pleased to provide you with a selection of resources that will help you to prepare your lectures and assessments, when you choose this textbook for your course. Log in or request an account to access instructor resources at cengage.com.au/instructors for Australia or cengage.co.nz/instructors for New Zealand. MINDTAP Premium online teaching and learning tools are available on the MindTap platform – the personalised eLearning solution.

MindTap is a flexible and easy-to-use platform that helps build student confidence and gives you a clear picture of their progress. We partner with you to ease the transition to digital – we’re with you every step of the way. The Cengage Mobile App puts your course directly into students’ hands with course materials available on their smartphone or tablet. Students can read on the go, complete practice quizzes or participate in interactive real-time activities.

MindTap for Kassin’s Social Psychology 2nd edition is full of innovative resources to support critical thinking, and help your students move from memorisation to mastery! Includes: • Kassin’s Social Psychology 2nd edition eBook • Video polling • Videos and Apply Yourself activities • Cerego mastery training • Revisions quizzing • Psychology resource centre

MindTap is a premium purchasable eLearning tool. Contact your Cengage learning consultant to find out how MindTap can transform your course.

INSTRUCTOR’S MANUAL The Instructor’s manual includes:

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• Learning objectives

• Classroom activities

• Chapter outlines

• Suggested multimedia resources

• Lecture and discussion ideas

• Answers to critical thinking activities

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GUIDE TO THE ONLINE RESOURCES

COGNERO TEST BANK A bank of questions has been developed in conjunction with the text for creating quizzes, tests and exams for your students. Create multiple test versions in an instant and deliver tests from your LMS, your classroom, or wherever you want using Cognero. Cognero test generator is a flexible online system that allows you to import, edit, and manipulate content from the text’s test bank or elsewhere, including your own favourite test questions.

POWERPOINT™ PRESENTATIONS Use the chapter-by-chapter PowerPoint slides to enhance your lecture presentations and handouts by reinforcing the key principles of your subject.

ARTWORK FROM THE TEXT Add the digital files of graphs, tables, pictures and flow charts into your course management system, use them in student handouts, or copy them into your lecture presentations.

FOR THE STUDENT MINDTAP MindTap is the next-level online learning tool that helps you get better grades! MindTap gives you the resources you need to study – all in one place and available when you need them. In the MindTap Reader, you can make notes, highlight text and even find a definition directly from the page. If your instructor has chosen MindTap for your subject this semester, log in to MindTap to: • Get better grades • Save time and get organised • Connect with your instructor and peers • Study when and where you want, online and mobile • Complete assessment tasks as set by your instructor When your instructor creates a course using MindTap, they will let you know your course key so you can access the content. Please purchase MindTap only when directed by your instructor. Course length is set by your instructor.

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xiii

PREFACE The opening years of the twenty-first century have proved to be an exciting and tumultuous time – more so, it seems, than any in recent memory. On the one hand, thanks to the rising popularity of Facebook, Twitter, Skype, Instagram and other social media, all of which are available on mobile apps, wherever we are, it has never been easier to be ‘social’ – to talk to others or share opinions, pictures, music and footage of live events as they occur with people from every corner of the world. On the other hand, deep social and political divisions, religious and ethnic conflicts all over the world, economic turmoil and an ever-present threat of terrorism surround us. Encircled by its place in science and by current world events, social psychology – its theories, research methods and basic findings – has never been more relevant or more important. We used to think of social psychology as a discipline that is slow to change. It was thought that, as in other sciences, knowledge builds in small increments, one brick at a time. Social psychology has no ‘critical’ experiments, no single study can ‘prove’ a theory, and no single theory can fully explain the complexities of human social behaviour. While all this remains true, the process of revising this textbook always seems to shows us how complex, dynamic and responsive our field can be. As the world around us rapidly changes, so too does social psychology. Whether the topic is world news, politics, business, health, education, law, travel, sport or entertainment, social psychology has weighed in. Despite the promise that it has fulfilled and brings to the future, social psychology recently has been rocked by scandal and controversy. Three events in particular have weighed on the field. First, in 2011, a social psychologist in the Netherlands was found to have falsified data that were published in some fifty articles. That case was followed by two other instances of fraud and a paper that survived peer review at a leading journal in the field, the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, purporting to prove extrasensory perception (ESP). Second, after an exhaustive multiyear effort to replicate 100 published studies, a group of social psychologists reported in Science, in 2015, that more than half of the findings they sought to replicate failed when retested. This finding was heavily reported in the news media, as seen in The New York Times article, ‘Many Psychology Findings Not as Strong as Claimed, Study Says’. Third, a ‘political’ controversy has erupted over the question of whether social psychology research is inherently biased by a liberal ideology. This debate, in terms of how ideology can influence what researchers choose to study and how they interpret the results, continues unabated as we revise this book. It is clear that social psychology is undergoing a process of self-examination. This has led the field to adopt new, more rigorous methods, statistical practices, and safeguards, and it has led us to raise the bar in the standards we use to decide which new findings to report. What has not changed in this reassessment is the enthusiasm with which we present classic and contemporary social psychology in each and every page of this textbook.

GOALS FOR THIS EDITION We had four main goals for this second edition, which includes both revision and further adaptation to the Australia and New Zealand region: 1 To present the most important and exciting perspectives in the field as a whole. To communicate the breadth and depth of social psychology, we have consciously expanded our coverage to include not only the classics but also the most recent developments in the field – developments that capture new thinking about social neuroscience, evolutionary theory, nonconscious and implicit processes, effects of social media and technology and cultural influences. 2 To try to vet brand new findings in an effort to ensure that the discipline we present will prove accurate over time. No method of vetting is perfect. But as a departure from past practice, we have chosen to exclude any research presented at professional conferences or reported in the news that has not been published in a peer-reviewed journal. For articles newly published, we sought to determine if the findings were consistent with other research. We also added Current Scene On features that reflect the most recent research seeking to replicate classic findings in the field. 3 For the book to serve as a good teacher outside the classroom. While speaking the student’s language, we always want to connect social psychology to current events in politics, sport, business, law, entertainment, the use of social networking sites and other life domains.

xiv

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PREFACE

4 To make this book relevant to students and instructors in the Australia and New Zealand region. From current events examples to local research, societal trends to our Research spotlight series, we have made every attempt to regionalise the content to Australasia and to integrate, where possible, Indigenous perspectives. It is important to be aware that social psychology has strong historical roots in the United States, so there may be some sections that seem quite focused on that region. In these cases, we urge students to make their own connections to personal, local or global experience.

WHAT IS NEW IN THIS EDITION As in the first edition, we have tried to both capture the essence of social psychology from its inception as well as to reflect the shifts within the field and culture over time. It is our hope that the reader will feel the pulse of social psychology today in each and every page of this textbook.

The content Comprehensive, up-to-date scholarship This second edition offers a broad, balanced, mainstream look at social psychology. Thus, it includes detailed descriptions of classic studies from social psychology’s historical warehouse as well as the latest research findings from Australia, New Zealand and throughout the world. In particular, we draw your attention to the following topics, which are either new to this edition or have received expanded coverage: • The social brain and body (Chapter 1) • Ethics and consent in online research (Chapter 1) • Facebook as a venue for social comparison (Chapter 2) • Social class as a cultural influence (Chapter 2) • Attributing mind to machines (Chapter 3) • Perceptions of moral character (Chapter 3) • New research and discussion of dehumanisation (Chapter 4) • A new section on gender identity (Chapter 5) • Ethical dissonance (Chapter 6) • Engaged followership model of obedience (Chapter 7) • Collective intelligence: Are some groups smarter than others? (Chapter 8) • Uses of technology to train real decision-making groups (Chapter 8) • New research on online dating (Chapter 9) • Mate selection and conspicuous consumption (Chapter 9) • Neuroscience of empathy (Chapter 10) • Social influences on helping in philanthropy (Chapter 10) • Evolutionary psychology approaches to aggression (Chapter 11) • Effects of genes, hormones and brain functioning on aggression (Chapter 11) • An introduction to environmental psychology – the applied side of social psychology (Chapter 12) • The application of social psychology in the community (Chapter 13) • The link between obesity and stress (Chapter 14) • Cultural differences in social support seeking (Chapter 14). • Alibis as eyewitnesses to innocence (Chapter 15) • Pleading guilty in the shadow of trial (Chapter 15) • Cybervetting in personnel selection (Chapter 16) • Cultural influences on leadership (Chapter 16). As this non-exhaustive list shows, this second edition contains new (and newsy) material. We made particular efforts to ensure that we incorporated research published within the last five years, to ensure that the text reflects the most recent state of understanding on a given topic. In this second edition, we have also added Current Scene On features, which draw attention to the most current research relating to classic studies in the field. In some cases, that recent research involves failures to replicate originally-reported findings. In others, the recent work highlights the boundary conditions under which certain findings emerge. We feel that this feature will draw students in to the state of the science, increasing appreciation of the dynamic nature of findings in the field and building confidence that the field continues in its enthusiastic efforts to establish a solid base of understanding of social processes.

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PREFACE

Connections with current and local events To cover social psychology is one thing, but to use its principles to explain events in the real world is quite another. More than fifteen years ago, the events of 9/11 changed the world. In different ways not fully discernible, so did the global financial crisis; the election of Australia’s first female prime minister, Julia Gillard; the changes that have swept through the Arab world; and the increasing ease with which people can now meet, interact, and share services – as seen in the global rise of Uber and Airbnb – through online social networking sites on mobile devices. More than ever, connecting basic theory to real life is the best way to heighten student interest. The second edition, like its predecessor, is committed to making social psychology relevant. Accordingly, almost every page refers to people, places, events, social trends and issues that are prominent in contemporary culture. These references are designed to further illustrate the connectedness of social psychology to a world that extends beyond the borders of a university campus. We have also updated our Research Spotlight features at the end of each chapter. Each feature includes an interview with a social psychologist in Australia or New Zealand, highlighting their contributions to the topic at hand.

Gender and sexuality In this edition we have increased our focus on gender identity. In our brand-new chapter on gender identity we explore the development of gender identity, gender roles and stereotypes, the gender binary and the diversity of gender identity. In our chapter on attraction and close relationships we take a look at sexuality, sexual orientation and same sex relationships.

Cultural perspectives Carrying on the tradition of the first edition, this text embraces current research on cultural influences in social behaviour. Social psychologists have long been fascinated by similarity and difference among cultural groups and between racial and ethnic groups within cultures. As social psychology is a truly international discipline, this book also includes many citations to research conducted throughout North America, Europe, Asia and other parts of the world. We believe that the study of human diversity from the perspectives of researchers who themselves are a diverse lot can help students become better informed about social relations as well as about ethics and values. In addition to discussion of cultural influences throughout the body of the text, we also highlight research addressing cultural perspectives in Cultural Diversity boxes. These boxes serve to highlight both the similarities and differences that exist in social psychological processes around the world and appear throughout each chapter. Further, we undertook efforts to integrate content on Indigenous perspectives in Australia and New Zealand throughout this second edition. With the guidance of Julie Homewood, who served as advisor for this effort, we incorporated research acknowledging points of convergence and divergence as related to Aboriginal, Torres Strait Islander, and Māori peoples.

Social psychology and common sense Building on a discussion in Chapter 1 about the links (and lack thereof) between social psychology and common sense, each chapter opens with a Putting common sense to the test quiz – a set of true–false questions designed to assess the student’s intuitive beliefs about material later contained in that chapter. The answers to these questions are revealed in a margin box after the topic is presented in the text. These answers are then explained at the end of each chapter. We think that students will find this exercise engaging. It will also enable them, as they read, to check their intuitive beliefs against the findings in the field of social psychology and to notice the discrepancies that exist.

The organisation Of all the challenges faced by teachers and textbooks, perhaps the greatest is to put information together in a way that is both accurate and easy to understand. A strong organisational framework helps in meeting this challenge. Informing our thoughts for this edition is the view that social psychology is a dynamic discipline – one that embraces feelings, thoughts, behaviours, the contexts in which they occur across the lifespan, and the fact that each of these elements shapes and is shaped by the social environment in which we interact. Hence, we have

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ABOUT THE AUTHORS

taken a social ecological approach, loosely guided by the work of Urie Bronfenbrenner (1974) who suggested that in order to understand a person you must consider the entire ecological system in which they develop. Accordingly the model we have chosen emphasises multiple levels or spheres of influence emanating from: 1 the intra-individual level that considers the characteristics of the individual 2 the interpersonal networks – the people that they share their lives with and those they interact with 3 the environments in which they live, work and interact, and the systems which govern and guide them 4 the institutional patterns of culture (such as customary practices and beliefs) that help to define them and their behaviours 5 the socio-historical context in which they live. The book opens with the history, subject matter and research methods of social psychology, which orients readers to the socio-historical context and the environment in which the discipline has evolved (Part I). We then move to an intra-individual focus on social perception (Part II), followed by a shift outward to the interpersonal networks with which a person interacts – focusing on social influence (Part III) and social relations (Part IV). We conclude with social psychology and real world applications, which embeds research and practice in social psychology into some of the environments in which it is commonly applied (Part V). Each chapter in this text talks about issues of relevance to an individual’s ‘as lived’ experience, incorporating research that embraces the human journey with all of its uniqueness and its similarities. We realise that some instructors like to reshuffle the deck to develop a chapter order that better fits their own approach. There is no problem in doing this. Each chapter stands on its own and does not require that others be read first.

The presentation Even when the content of a textbook is accurate and up to date, and even when its organisation is sound, there is still the matter of presentation. As the ‘teacher outside the classroom’, a good textbook should facilitate learning. Thus, every chapter contains the following pedagogical features: • An opening vignette that highlights aspects of material covered in the chapter, which is followed up with a Topical Reflection box at the end of the chapter. • Learning objectives and a Putting common sense to the test quiz at the beginning of the chapter. • Bar graphs, line graphs, tables, sketches, photographs and flowcharts that illustrate, extend, enhance and enliven material in the text. Some of these depict classic images and studies from social psychology’s history; others are contemporary. • Critical thinking activities that have been designed to get students thinking about concepts and issues of relevance to social psychology. • Cultural Diversity features that highlight global and regional themes of relevance to the chapter content. These boxes serve to highlight both the similarities and differences that exist in social psychological processes around the world. • Current Scene On features, which highlights trajectories of research from classic studies to recent replications. • A Research Spotlight feature highlighting the research of contemporary Australian and New Zealand researchers (Chapter 2 onwards). • A comprehensive bulleted Summary outlining the major sections and points. • A Linkage diagram highlighting cross-connections between chapters. • A Review quiz to test your understanding. • A Weblinks section linking to material covered.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS Saul Kassin Saul Kassin is Distinguished Professor of Psychology at John Jay College of Criminal Justice in New York, and Massachusetts Professor of Psychology at Williams College in Massachusetts. Born and raised in Brooklyn, New York, he received his PhD from the University of Connecticut, followed by a postdoctoral fellowship at the University of Kansas, a US Supreme Court Fellowship and a visiting professorship at Stanford University. In

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ABOUT THE AUTHORS

addition to authoring textbooks, he has co-authored and edited Confessions in the Courtroom, The Psychology of Evidence and Trial Procedure, The American Jury on Trial and Developmental Social Psychology. Interested in using social psychology to prevent wrongful convictions, Kassin pioneered the scientific study of false confessions, an interest that continues to this day. He is past president of the American Psychology-Law Society and recipient of its Lifetime Contribution Award, and is a Fellow of the APS and APA. He has testified as an expert witness in state, military, and federal courts and has appeared as a media consultant in documentaries and on national news programs.

Steven Fein Steven Fein is Professor of Psychology at Williams College in Massachusetts, United States. Born and raised in Bayonne, New Jersey, he received his AB from Princeton University and PhD in social psychology from the University of Michigan. He has been teaching at Williams College since 1991, with time spent teaching at Stanford University in 1999. His edited books include Emotion: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, Readings in Social Psychology: The Art and Science of Research and Motivated Social Perception: The Ontario Symposium. He has served on the executive committee of the Society of Personality and Social Psychology and as the social and personality psychology representative at the APA. His research interests concern stereotyping and prejudice, suspicion and attributional processes, social influence, and self-affirmation theory.

Hazel Rose Markus Hazel Rose Markus is the Davis-Brack Professor in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford University, California, United States. She also co-directs the Research Institute of the Stanford Center for Comparative Studies in Race and Ethnicity. Before moving to Stanford in 1994, she was a professor at the University of Michigan, where she received her PhD. Her work focuses on how the self-system, including current conceptions of self and possible selves structure and lend meaning to experience. Born in England and raised in San Diego, California, she has been persistently fascinated by how nation of origin, region of the country, gender, ethnicity, race, religion and social class shape self and identity. With her colleague Shinobu Kitayama at the University of Michigan, she has pioneered the experimental study of how culture and self-influence one another. Markus was elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1994 and is a Fellow of APS, APA and Division 8 and received the 2008 APA award for Distinguished Scientific Contribution. Some of her recent co-edited books include Culture and Emotion: Empirical Studies of Mutual Influence, Engaging Cultural Differences: The Multicultural Challenge in Liberal Democracies, Just Schools: Pursuing Equal Education in Societies of Difference, and Doing Race: 21 Essays for the 21st Century and Clash! How to Thrive in a Multicultural World.

Kerry Anne McBain Kerry Anne McBain is a senior lecturer and the Head of Discipline in the Psychology Department at James Cook University in Queensland, Australia. She has been teaching and coordinating courses and supervising research at the undergraduate and postgraduate levels of the psychology program in Townsville, Cairns and Singapore since 2001. She is a registered psychologist who owned and operated a successful private practice for many years, working with clients across a broad spectrum of areas including sport psychology. At the centre of her development as an educator and her career within the tertiary sector is a passionate commitment to research as a vehicle to informing curriculum and the development of learning materials. Her focus on the application of research-based practice directly reflects the changing and trending nature of the global community in which we live and the cultural, social and geographic environment through which human services are delivered. Her research spans the areas of social, environmental and developmental psychology, with a specific interest in interpersonal communication and the relationships we form with people, animals and the places in which we live and interact. Kerry is an active member of the Australian Psychological Society, the Environmental and Design Research Association and the International Association of Applied Psychology.

Lisa A. Williams Lisa A. Williams is a Senior Lecturer in the School of Psychology at the University of New South Wales, Australia. She is highly active in both research and teaching. Her teaching spans all levels of undergraduate psychology and a variety of topics, from broad themes of social psychology to focused seminars on specific topics. Whether teaching small seminars or large lectures, she aims to impart a passion for the field of social psychology to her students. As an emotion researcher, her focus is on how emotions shape and are shaped by social factors and behaviours. Specifically, her research, funded by the Australian Research Council, considers the adaptive functions of social emotions such as pride and gratitude. She collaborates widely with researchers

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

across Australia and New Zealand as well as overseas. She is an active member of the Society for Australasian Social Psychologists, the Society for Affective Science and the Society for Personality and Social Psychology.

Diane Sivasubramaniam Diane Sivasubramaniam is an Associate Professor in Psychology at Swinburne University of Technology, where she teaches Social Psychology. Her PhD was awarded in 2006 by the University of New South Wales. Before moving to Swinburne University, she completed Postdoctoral Fellowships in New York at John Jay College of Criminal Justice and Barnard College, Columbia University, and was an Assistant Professor at the University of Ontario Institute of Technology (UOIT) in Canada. Diane’s research applies the social psychology of procedural justice to the legal system, focusing on restorative justice, jury decision-making and interrogations. Diane is an active researcher in the psychology–law field, is a member of the Editorial Board of Law and Human Behavior and co-chaired the 2012 meeting of the American Psychology-Law Society.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS We extend our sincerest thanks to our families, friends and colleagues who have lent their support throughout the journey of revising this text. The journey has had its ups and downs, like all journeys. The downs would have been lower and the ups not so high without your enduring encouragement. We would also like to acknowledge those who contributed to chapters in a variety of ways: Alexandra Godwin, Marlene Lee, Rebecca Sealey and Beryl Buckby. A special thanks goes to Diane Sivasubramaniam, who championed the chapter on law – a truly invaluable addition to the book. Further, thank you to our ‘spotlight’ researchers, whose contributions enliven the content and truly contextualise the topics: Fiona Barlow, Paula Brough, Thomas Denson, Jackie Hunter, Jolanda Jetten, Yoshihisa Kashima, Ottmar Lipp, Blake Mckimmie, Nickola Overall, Joseph Reser, Neville Robertson, Kerry Robinson, Dirk Van Rooy, Julia Rucklidge and Arthur Stukas. This book would not have been possible without the guidance and support of the ever-knowledgeable Cengage production team, including Jessica Brennan, Fiona Hammond and Raymond Williams. We would like to thank Saul Kassin, Steven Fein and Hazel Rose Markus for allowing adaptation of their original work for the Australian and New Zealand edition. For their invaluable insights, comments, and suggestions, we thank reviewers of this edition: Dr Boris Bizumic, Australian National University Dr Matt Crawford, Victoria University of Wellington Dr Guy Curtis, Murdoch University Dr Rachael Fox, Charles Sturt University. Dr Mervyn Jackson, RMIT University Dr Carla Jeffries, University of Southern Queensland Dr Leah Kaufmann, Australian Catholic University Dr Mark Symmons, Monash University Cengage wishes to extend special thanks to reviewer Judi Homewood who was specialist Indigenous advisor for this 2nd edition. Judi Homewood is a member of the Psychology department at Macquarie University and a participant in the Australian Indigenous Psychology Education Project (AIPEP). AIPEP is a partnership between Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander psychologists and representatives of the discipline and profession of psychology. The overarching aim of AIPEP is to increase the number of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander psychologists and ensure that all psychology graduates have the competencies needed to work with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander clients. Every effort has been made to trace and acknowledge copyright. However, if any infringement has occurred, the publishers tender their apologies and invite the copyright holders to contact them.

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PART ONE

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER 1: WHAT IS SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY?

The dimension of time: Socio-historical context Part 1: Introduction Chapter 1: What is social psychology?

Attitudes and ideologies of culture

The environment

Interpersonal networks

The individual

In this section we introduce you to the study of social psychology. We begin by identifying how it is distinct from but related to some other areas of study, both outside and within psychology. Next, we review the history of the field and consider the important themes and perspectives propelling social psychology into a new century. But, of course, no introduction would be complete without a discussion of the way that social psychologists conduct research, so we step you through the process of developing, refining and testing ideas. Finally, we turn our attention to some important questions about ethics and values in social psychology.

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CHAPTER

What is social psychology?

Learning Objectives By the end of this chapter, you should be able to: 1 define social psychology, identify the kinds of questions that social psychologists try to answer, and differentiate social psychology from other related fields 2 describe the trajectory of the field of social psychology from the 1880s to the end of the twentieth century and identify key areas that are trending in social psychology in current times 3 explain the use of research methods in the field of social psychology 4 describe the process of generating research ideas in social psychology, searching the relevant literature and developing hypotheses 5 explain how social psychologists go about conceptualising, operationalising and measuring variables 6 compare and contrast the process for testing ideas for the different research approaches adopted by social psychologists 7 discuss the function of ethics in social psychological research, including the use of deception and confederates and scientific integrity.

Looking back and moving forward

2

you learn interesting and relevant details of research findings throughout the book, but you also will learn how social psychologists have discovered this evidence. It is an exciting process and one that we are enthusiastic about sharing with you. The purpose of this first chapter is to provide you with a broad overview of the field of social psychology and to introduce you to some of the methodologies we use to carry out scientific investigations in this field. By the time you finish the chapter, you should be ready and, we hope, eager for what lies ahead.

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Source: Fairfax Syndication/Rohan Thomson

How many times in the last 24 hours have you stopped to wonder why a person reacted to a situation the way they did, or considered your own reactions in an attempt to understand your thoughts, feelings and behaviours? Ask the people around you the same questions and you will see a common trend. As social beings living in a social world, we cannot escape the complexities of our interactions with others or, sometimes, our isolation from them. The history of social psychology is paved with questions regarding social behaviours, with questions and ideas from inquiring minds just like yours providing the paving stones. Hundreds of thousands of studies and experiments have formed the cement that holds the pavers together, and the questions that those studies have generated have provided the complexity in the direction of the paths they have created. Not only will

WHAT IS SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY?

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION WE ARE CERTAINLY NOT ONE OF THE LARGEST ANIMALS. But compared to the rest of the animal world, the size of the human brain relative to the size of the human body is massive. Why is this? The most obvious explanation is that we are smarter, and that we have mastered our environments to a degree no other animal has. But recent evidence suggests that the relatively huge size of the human brain, and particularly of the neocortex at its outermost layer, may be due to something more specific and rather surprising – we have such large brains in order to socialise (Dunbar, 2014; Noonan, Mars, Sallet, Dunbar, & Fellows, 2018). The remarkable success of the human species can be traced to humans having the ability to work together in groups, to infer others’ intentions and to coordinate with extended networks of people. The human brain needed to be able to handle the incredibly complex challenges associated with these tasks. Long ago Aristotle famously observed, ‘Man is by nature a social animal’; but even Aristotle could not have imagined the degree to which that is true, that the social nature of humans seems to be written into our very DNA. Indeed, recent studies of brain activity have found that when the brain is at rest, not engaging in any active task, its default pattern of activity seems to involve social thinking, such as thinking about other people’s thoughts and goals (Spunt, Meyer, & Lieberman, 2015). The social nature of the human animal is what this book and the field of social psychology is all about. The ways in which humans are social animals are countless and can be obvious or incredibly subtle. We work, play and live together. We hurt and help each other. We define happiness and success for each other. We forge our individual identities not alone but in the context of other people. We visit family, make friends, have parties, build networks, go on dates, pledge an enduring commitment, decide to have children. We watch others, speculate about them and predict who will wind up with whom, whether in real life or in popular culture as we keep up with the Kardashians or watch The Bachelorette. Many of us text or tweet each other about what we are up to, or spend lots of time on social networking sites, interacting with countless peers from around the world, adding hundreds or even thousands of ‘friends’ to our social networks. Our moods can fluctuate with the number of virtual friends who ‘like’ our latest posted photo. Even being ignored by a stranger we do not really care about can be as painful as the experience of real physical pain (Eisenberger, 2015). Precisely because we need and care so much about social interactions and relationships, the social contexts in which we find ourselves can influence us profoundly. You can find many examples of this kind of influence in your own life. Have you ever laughed at a joke you did not understand just because those around you were laughing? Do you present yourself in one way with one group of people and in quite a different way with another group? The power of the situation can also be much subtler and yet more powerful than in these examples, such as when another’s unspoken expectations of you cause you to become a different person. The relevance of social psychology is evident in everyday life, such as when two people become attracted to each other FIGURE 1.1 Social media and social protest or when a group coordinates its efforts on a project. Dramatic Egyptian youth post video to Facebook and Twitter of footage events can heighten its significance even more, as is evident in shot earlier that day of revolutionary protests in Tahrir Square people’s behaviour during and after natural disasters or war. In during the Arab Spring of 2011. Social psychologists study, these traumatic times a spotlight shines on how people help or among other things, the expanding role of online social exploit each other, and some of the worst and best that human networks and technology in our lives, as well as how people deal with conflict. relations have to offer can be seen. These events invariably call attention to the kinds of questions that social psychologists Source: Ed Ou/The New York Times/Redux study – questions about hatred and violence, about intergroup conflict and suspicion, and about heroism, cooperation and the capacity for understanding across cultural, ethnic, racial, religious and geographic divides. We are reminded of the need for a better understanding of social psychological issues as we see footage of protests in the Middle East or Africa (see Figure 1.1) or are confronted with the reality of an all-too-violent world in our own neighbourhoods and university campuses. We also appreciate the majesty and power of social connections as we recognise the courage of a firefighter, read about the charity of a donor or see the glow of pride in the eyes of a new parent. These are all part of the fascinating landscape of social psychology – the bad and the good, the mundane and the Source: Reuters/Samar Abo Elouf extraordinary. Copyright 2020 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-202

3

PART ONE

INTRODUCTION

This chapter introduces you to the study of social psychology and examines how social psychologists do their research. We begin by defining social psychology and identifying how it is distinct from but related to other areas of study. Next, we review the history of the field, and then look forward with a discussion of the important themes and perspectives that are propelling social psychology in the twenty-first century. Then we turn to methodology, research question development and design, and finally important questions about ethics and values in social psychology.

WHAT IS SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY? We begin by defining social psychology and mapping out its relationship to sociology and other disciplines within the field of psychology.

Defining social psychology Social psychology

The scientific study of how individuals think, feel and behave in a social context.

Social psychology is the scientific study of how individuals think, feel and behave in a social context. Let us look at each part of this definition.

Scientific study There are many approaches to understanding how people think, feel and behave. We can learn about human behaviour from novels, films, history and philosophy, to name just a few possibilities. What makes social psychology different from these artistic and humanistic endeavours is that social psychology is a science. It applies the scientific method of systematic observation, description and measurement to the study of the human condition. How and why social psychologists do this is explained later in this chapter.

How individuals think, feel and behave Social psychology concerns an amazingly diverse set of topics. People’s private and even non-conscious beliefs and attitudes; their most passionate emotions; their heroic, cowardly or merely mundane public behaviours, all fall within the broad scope of social psychology. In this way, social psychology differs from other social sciences such as economics and political science. Research on attitudes offers a good illustration. Whereas economists and political scientists may be interested in people’s economic and political attitudes, respectively, social psychologists investigate a wide variety of attitudes and contexts, such as individuals’ attitudes towards particular groups of people or how their attitudes are affected by their peers or their mood. In so doing, social psychologists strive to establish general principles of attitude formation and change that apply in a variety of situations rather than exclusively to particular domains. Note the word individuals in our definition of social psychology. This word points to another important way in FIGURE 1.2 The social nature of the human animal which social psychology differs from some other social sciences. Sociology, for example, typically classifies people in terms of Our social relationships and interactions are extremely important to us. Most people seek out and are profoundly affected by other their nationality, race, socioeconomic class and other group people. This social nature of the human animal is what social factors. By contrast, social psychology typically focuses on the psychology is all about. psychology of the individual. Even when social psychologists study groups of people, they usually emphasise the behaviour of the individual in the group context.

Social context

Source: IT Stock/Jupiter Images

4

Here is where the ‘social’ in social psychology comes into play and how social psychology is distinguished from other branches of psychology. As a whole, the discipline of psychology is an immense, sprawling enterprise – the 800-pound gorilla of the social sciences concerned with everything from the actions of neurotransmitters in the brain to the actions of music fans in a crowded club. What makes social psychology unique is its emphasis on the social nature of individuals, as highlighted in Figure 1.2. However, the ‘socialness’ of social psychology varies. In attempting to establish general principles of human behaviour, social psychologists sometimes examine non-social factors that affect people’s thoughts, emotions, motives and actions.

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WHAT IS SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY?

CHAPTER ONE

For example, they may study whether hot weather causes people to behave more aggressively (Rinderu, Bushman, & Van Lange, 2018). The social element of this is the behaviour; that is, people hurting each other. In addition, social psychologists sometimes study people’s thoughts or feelings about non-social things; for example, people’s attitudes towards Nike products. This may be of interest to social psychologists if these attitudes are influenced by something social, such as whether the endorsement of Nike by tennis stars Maria Sharapova, Rafael Nadal and Roger Federer makes people prefer that brand. Both examples – determining whether heat causes an increase in aggression or whether tennis stars cause an increase in sales of Nike shoes – are social psychological pursuits because the thoughts, feelings or behaviours either (1) concern other people or (2) are influenced by other people. The ‘social context’ referred to in the definition of social psychology does not have to be real or present. Even the implied or imagined presence of others can have important effects on individuals (Allport, 1985). For example, if people imagine receiving positive or negative reactions from others, their self-esteem can be affected substantially (Libby, Valenti, Pfent, & Eibach, 2011; Smart Richman & Leary, 2009). If students imagine having contact with a stranger from another country, their attitudes towards people from that country and their experiences visiting that country can become more positive (Vezzali, Crisp, Stathi, & Giovannini, 2015). And if university students imagine living a day in the life of a professor, they are then likely to perform better on an analytic test (Galinsky, Wang, & Ku, 2008)!

Social psychological questions and applications For those of us fascinated by social behaviour, social psychology is a dream come true. Just look at Table 1.1 and consider a small sample of the questions you will explore in this textbook. As you can see, the social nature of the human animal is what social psychology is all about. Learning about social psychology is learning about ourselves and our social worlds. And because social psychology is scientific rather than anecdotal, it provides insights that would be impossible to gain through intuition or experience alone. TABLE 1.1 Examples of social psychological questions Social perception What affects the way we perceive ourselves and others?

• Why do people sometimes sabotage their own performance, making it more likely that they will fail? (Chapter 2)

•

What is the nature of gender identity and how does it relate to gender roles and stereotypes? (Chapter 5)

Social influence How do we influence each other?

•

Why do we often like what we suffer for? (Chapter 6)

•

How do salespeople sometimes trick us into buying things we never really wanted in the first place? (Chapter 7)

•

Why do people often perform worse in groups than they would have alone? (Chapter 8)

• How do we form impressions of others – sometimes in the blink of an eye? (Chapter 3) • Where do stereotypes come from, and why are they so resistant to change? (Chapter 4)

• Social relations What causes us to • like, love, help and • hurt others?

How similar or different are the sexes in what they look for in an intimate relationship? (Chapter 9)

Applying social psychology How does social psychology help us understand other domains of life?

•

What can psychology contribute to the climate change debate? (Chapter 12)

•

How can being part of a community help in the aftermath of a disaster? (Chapter 13)

•

How does stress affect an individual’s health, and what are the most effective ways of coping with stressful experiences? (Chapter 14)

•

Can interrogators really get people to confess to serious crimes they did not commit? (Chapter 15)

•

How can business leaders most effectively motivate their employees? (Chapter 16)

When is a bystander more or less likely to help you in an emergency? (Chapter 10) Does exposure to television violence or to pornography trigger aggressive behaviour? (Chapter 11)

The value of social psychology’s perspective on human behaviour is widely recognised. Courses in social psychology are often required or encouraged for students interested in careers in business, education, medicine, law and journalism, as well as in psychology and sociology. Although many advanced graduates with a doctorate in social psychology hold faculty appointments in universities, others work in medical centres, law firms, government agencies, the military and a variety of business settings, including investment banking, marketing, advertising, human resources, negotiating and social networking. The number and importance of these applications continue to grow. Climate scientists and governments utilise social psychological findings to determine the best ways to assess and, sometimes, change attitudes

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5

PART ONE

INTRODUCTION

and shape behaviour. Community groups and local governments draw from the knowledge gained in the social psychological study of group processes and prosocial behaviour. Judges draw from social psychological research to render landmark decisions, and lawyers depend on it to select juries and to support or refute evidence. Businesses use cross-cultural social psychological research to operate in the global marketplace, and consult research on group dynamics to foster the best conditions for their work forces. Healthcare professionals are increasingly aware of the role of social psychological factors in the prevention and treatment of disease. We consider these applied contexts further in the final five chapters of this book. Indeed, we can think of no other field of study that offers expertise that is more clearly relevant to so many different career paths.

Social psychology and related fields Social psychology is sometimes confused with certain other fields of study. Before we go on, it is important to clarify how social psychology is distinct from these other fields, and to also show how interesting and significant questions can be addressed through interactions between them (see Table 1.2). TABLE 1.2 Distinctions between social psychology and related fields: the case of research on prejudice To see the differences between social psychology and related fields, consider each example of how researchers in each field might conduct a study of prejudice.

Field of study

Example of how a researcher in the field might study prejudice

Sociology

Measure how prejudice varies as a function of social or economic class.

Clinical psychology

Test various therapies for people with antisocial personalities who exhibit great degrees of prejudice.

Personality psychology

Develop a questionnaire to identify men who are very high or low in degree of prejudice towards women.

Cognitive psychology

Manipulate exposure to a member of some category of people and measure the thoughts and concepts that are automatically activated. (Note that a study of prejudice in this field would, by definition, be at the intersection of cognitive and social psychology.)

Social psychology

Manipulate various kinds of contact between individuals of different groups and examine the effect of these manipulations on the degree of prejudice exhibited.

Social psychology and sociology Sociologists and social psychologists share an interest in many issues, such as violence, prejudice, cultural differences and marriage. As noted, however, sociology tends to focus on the group level, whereas social psychology tends to focus on the individual level. For example, sociologists might track a society’s racial attitudes over time, whereas social psychologists might examine some of the specific factors that make individuals more or less likely to behave in a racist way towards members of a group. In addition, although there are many exceptions, social psychologists are more likely than sociologists to conduct experiments in which they manipulate some variable and determine the effects of this manipulation using precise, quantifiable measures. Despite these differences, sociology and social psychology are clearly related. Indeed, many sociologists and social psychologists share the same training and publish in the same journals. When these two fields intersect, the result can be a more complete understanding of important issues. For example, interdisciplinary research on stereotyping and prejudice has examined the dynamic roles of both societal and immediate factors, such as how particular social systems or institutional norms and beliefs affect individuals’ attitudes and behaviours (Crawford, Brandt, Inbar, Chambers, & Motyl, 2018; Koenig & Eagly, 2014; Rosenthal & Levy, 2013).

Social psychology and related areas of psychology If you tell people not very familiar with psychology that you are taking a social psychology class, they may say things like, ‘Oh, great, now you’re going to start psychoanalysing me’, or ‘Finally, maybe you can tell me why everyone in my family is so messed up’. The assumption underlying these reactions, of course, is that you are studying clinical, or abnormal, psychology. If you base your impressions of psychology primarily on how it is portrayed in popular culture, you are likely to miss how incredibly broad and diverse the field is. Although social psychology is related to other areas of psychology, each has a very different focus.

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CHAPTER ONE

Clinical psychologists, for example, seek to understand and treat people with psychological difficulties or disorders. Social psychologists do not focus on disorders; rather, they focus on the more typical ways in which individuals think, feel, behave and influence each other. Personality psychology is another area that is often confused with social psychology. However, personality psychology seeks to understand stable differences between individuals, whereas social psychology seeks to understand how social factors affect most individuals regardless of their different personalities. In other words, a personality psychologist may ask, ‘Is this person outgoing and friendly almost all the time, in just about any setting?’, while a social psychologist may ask, ‘Are people in general more likely to seek out friends when they are made anxious by a situation than when they are made to feel relaxed?’ Cognitive psychologists study mental processes such as thinking, learning, remembering and reasoning. Social psychologists are often interested in these same processes, but they are concerned with these processes more specifically in a social context. These examples show the contrast between the fields; however, social psychological theory and research often intersect with these other areas quite a bit. For example, social psychologists and clinical psychologists are working on methods to identify symptoms of depression, mental illness and mental wellbeing on social media (Guntuku, Yaden, Kern, Ungar, & Eichstaedt, 2017; Seabrook, Kern, Fulcher, & Rickard, 2018; Yaden, Eichstaedt, & Medaglia, 2018). Personality and social psychology are especially closely linked because they complement each other so well. For example, some social psychologists examine how receiving negative feedback (a social factor) varies as a function of their self-esteem (a personality factor) (Hoplock, Stinson, Marigold, & Fisher, 2018). Cognitive and social psychology are also closely connected, and the last few decades have seen an explosion of interest in their intersection. The study of social cognition is discussed in more detail later in this chapter, and it is a focus throughout this text, especially in Part 2.

Social psychology and other fields of study Social psychologists today more than ever are conducting research that spans traditional boundaries between fields. The intersections of social psychology with disciplines such as neuroscience, biology, economics, political science, public health, environmental studies, law and medicine are increasingly important to contemporary social psychology. We discuss some of these intersections later in this chapter, but these connections also emerge throughout this book, especially in Part 5.

Social psychology and common sense After reading about a theory or finding of social psychology, you may sometimes think, ‘Of course. I knew that all along. Anyone could have told me that’. This ‘knew-it-all-along’ phenomenon often causes people to question how social psychology is different from common sense or traditional folk wisdom. After all, why would any of the following social psychological findings be surprising? • Beauty and brains do not mix. Physically attractive people tend to be seen as less smart than physically unattractive people. • People will like an activity more if you offer them a large reward for doing it, causing them to associate the activity with the positive reinforcement. • People think that they are more distinctive than they really are. They tend to underestimate the extent to which others share the same opinions or interests. • Playing contact sport or violent video games releases aggression and makes people less likely to vent their anger in violent ways. Common sense may seem to explain many social psychological findings after the fact. The problem is distinguishing common-sense fact from common-sense myth; after all, for many common-sense notions, there is an equally sensible-sounding notion that says the opposite. Is it ‘Birds of a feather flock together’ or ‘Opposites attract’? Is it ‘Two heads are better than one’ or ‘Too many cooks spoil the broth’? Which of these contradictory notions are correct? We have no reliable way to answer such questions using common sense or intuition alone. Social psychology, unlike common sense, uses the scientific method to put its theories to the test. How it does so is discussed in greater detail in the next chapter. But before we leave this section, one word of caution: those four ‘findings’ we listed previously? They are all false. Although there may be sensible reasons to believe each of the statements, research indicates otherwise. Therein lies another problem with relying on common sense – despite offering very compelling predictions and explanations, it is sometimes wildly

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INTRODUCTION

inaccurate. And even when it is not completely wrong, common sense can be misleading in its simplicity. Often there is no simple answer to a question such as, ‘Does absence make the heart grow fonder?’ In reality the answer is more complex than common sense would suggest, and social psychological research reveals how such an answer depends on a variety of factors. To emphasise these points and to encourage you to think critically about social psychological issues before as well as after learning about them, this textbook contains a feature called ‘Putting common sense to the test’. Beginning with Chapter 2, each chapter opens with a few statements about social psychological issues that are covered in that chapter. Some of the statements are true and some are false. As you read each statement, make a prediction about whether it is true or false and think about why this is your prediction. Margin notes throughout the chapter will tell you whether the statements are true or false. We revisit these statements again in the review section at the end of each chapter, with a brief explanation to help you understand why the answer is correct. In reading the chapter, check not only whether your prediction was correct but also whether your reasons for the prediction were appropriate. If your intuition was not quite on the mark, think about what the right answer is and how the evidence supports that answer. There are few better ways of learning and remembering than through this kind of critical thinking.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY People have probably been asking social psychological questions for as long as humans could think about each other. Certainly, early philosophers such as Plato offered keen insights into many social psychological issues. But no systematic and scientific study of social psychological issues developed until the end of the nineteenth century. The field of social psychology is therefore a relatively young one. Recent years have marked a tremendous interest in social psychology and an injection of many new scholars into the field. As social psychology is now in its second century, it is instructive to look back to see how the field today has been shaped by the people and events of its first century. Specific histories of Australian social psychology (Feather, 2009; Taft, 1989) and the Society for Australasian Social Psychologists (Innes, 2008) have been written. In this chapter, we focus broadly on the history of the field as it unfolded around the world. In each of the other chapters, we highlight a local social psychologist or researcher who handles themes of social psychology in Australia and New Zealand. Keep your eye out – you may spot academics from your university or even some of your own lecturers!

FIGURE 1.3 Social influence on sport performance Racers from around the world compete in a stage of the Tour de France. Would these cyclists have raced faster or slower if they were racing individually against the clock rather than racing simultaneously with their competitors? More generally, how does the presence of others affect an individual’s performance? The earliest social psychology experiments ever done sought to answer questions such as these.

Source: iStock.com/Razvan

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1880s to 1920s: the birth and infancy of social psychology Like most such honours, the title ‘founder of social psychology’ has many potential recipients, and not everyone agrees on who should prevail. Over the years, most have pointed to the American psychologist Norman Triplett, who is credited with having published the first research article in social psychology at the end of the nineteenth century (1897–1898). Triplett’s work was noteworthy because after observing that cyclists tended to race faster when racing in the presence of others rather than when simply racing against a clock, he designed an experiment to study this phenomenon in a carefully controlled and precise way. This scientific approach to studying the effects of the social context on individuals’ behaviour can be seen as marking the birth of social psychology. A case can also be made for the French agricultural engineer Max Ringelmann. Ringelmann’s research was conducted in the 1880s but was not published until 1913. In an interesting coincidence, Ringelmann also studied the effects of the presence of others on the performance of individuals. In contrast to Triplett, however, Ringelmann noted that individuals often performed worse on simple tasks such as tug-of-war when they performed the tasks with other people. The issues addressed by these two early researchers continue to be of vital interest, as is highlighted in Figure 1.3 and will be seen later in Chapter 8 where group processes are discussed.

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WHAT IS SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY?

CHAPTER ONE

Some scholars (Haines & Vaughan, 1979; Stroebe, 2012) suggest a handful of other possible examples of the first social psychology studies, including research that Triplett himself cited. These studies also were conducted in the 1880s and 1890s, which seems to have been a particularly fertile time for social psychology to begin to set its foundation. Despite their place in the history of social psychology, these late-nineteenth-century studies did not truly establish social psychology as a distinct field of study. Credit for this creation goes to the writers of the first three textbooks in social psychology: the English psychologist William McDougall (1908) and two Americans, Edward Ross (1908) and Floyd Allport (1924). Allport’s book, in particular, with its focus on the interaction of individuals and their social context and its emphasis on the use of experimentation and the scientific method, helped to establish social psychology as the discipline it is today. These authors announced the arrival of a new approach to the social aspects of human behaviour. Social psychology was born.

1930s to 1950s: a call to action What one person would you guess has had the strongest influence on the field of social psychology? Various social psychologists, as well as psychologists outside of social psychology, might be mentioned in response to this question. But someone who was not a psychologist at all may have had the most dramatic impact on the field – dictator of Nazi Germany, Adolf Hitler. Hitler’s rise to power and the horrendous events that followed caused people around the world to become desperate for answers to social psychological questions about what causes violence, prejudice, genocide, conformity and obedience, and a host of other social problems and behaviours. In addition, many social psychologists living in Europe in the 1930s fled to the US and helped to establish a critical mass of social psychologists who would give shape to the rapidly maturing field. The years just before, during and soon after World War II marked an explosion of interest in social psychology. In 1936, Gordon Allport (younger brother of Floyd, author of the 1924 textbook) and a number of other social psychologists formed the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues. The name of the society illustrates these psychologists’ concern for making important, practical contributions to society. Also in 1936, a social psychologist named Muzafer Sherif published groundbreaking experimental research on social influence. As a youth in Turkey, Sherif had witnessed groups of Greek soldiers brutally killing his friends. After migrating to the US, Sherif drew on this experience and began to conduct research on the powerful influences that groups can exert on their individual members. Sherif’s research was crucial for the development of social psychology because it demonstrated that it is possible to study complex social processes such as conformity and social influence in a rigorous, scientific manner. Another great contributor to social psychology, Kurt Lewin, fled the Nazi onslaught in Germany and migrated to the US in the early 1930s. Lewin was a bold and creative theorist whose concepts have had lasting effects on the field (see, for example, Lewin, 1935, 1947). One of the fundamental principles of social psychology that Lewin helped establish was that behaviour is a function of the interaction between the person and the environment. This position, which later became known as the interactionist perspective (Blass, 1991; Snyder, 2013), emphasised the dynamic interplay of internal and external factors, and marked a sharp contrast from other major psychological paradigms during Lewin’s lifetime; namely, psychoanalysis, with its emphasis on internal motives and fantasies; and behaviourism, with its focus on external rewards and punishments. Lewin also profoundly influenced the field by advocating for social psychological theories to be applied to important, practical issues. Lewin researched a number of practical issues, such as how to persuade Americans at home during the war to conserve materials to help the war effort, how to promote more economical and nutritious eating habits, and what kinds of leaders elicit the best work from group members. Built on Lewin’s legacy, applied social psychology flourishes today in areas such as advertising, business, education, environmental protection (see also Figure 1.4), health, law, politics, public policy, religion and sport. Throughout this text, we draw on the findings of applied social psychology to illustrate the implications of social psychological principles for our daily lives. In Part 5, five prominent areas of applied social psychology are discussed in detail, including environment and conservation, community processes, health, law and business. One of Lewin’s statements can be seen as a call to action for the entire field – ‘No research without action, no action without research’.

Interactionist perspective

An emphasis on how both an individual’s personality and environmental characteristics influence behaviour.

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INTRODUCTION

FIGURE 1.4 Applying social psychology What determines whether people are likely to act to conserve their environment, as these individuals have by volunteering on Clean Up Australia Day? Built on the legacy of Kurt Lewin, applied social psychology contributes to the solution of numerous social problems, including environmental degradation.

Source: AAP Images/PR Handout Image/James Morgan

During World War II, many social psychologists answered Lewin’s call as they worked for their government to investigate how to protect soldiers from the propaganda of the enemy, how to persuade citizens to support the war effort, how to select officers for various positions, and other practical issues. During and after the war, social psychologists sought to understand the prejudice, aggression and conformity the war had brought to light. The 1950s saw many major contributions to the field of social psychology. For example, Gordon Allport (1954) published The Nature of Prejudice, a book that continues to inspire research on stereotyping and prejudice more than a half century later. Solomon Asch’s (1951) demonstration of how willing people are to conform to an obviously wrong majority amazes students even today. Leon Festinger (1954, 1957) introduced two important theories that remain among the most influential theories in the field – one concerning how people try to learn about themselves by comparing themselves to other people, and one about how people’s attitudes can be changed by their own behaviour. These are just a sample of a long list of landmark contributions made during the 1950s. With this remarkable burst of activity and impact, social psychology was clearly and irrevocably on the map.

1960s to mid-1970s: confidence and crisis In spectacular fashion, Stanley Milgram’s research in the early and middle 1960s linked the post-World War II era with the coming era of social revolution. Milgram’s research was inspired by the destructive obedience demonstrated by Nazi officers and ordinary citizens in World War II, but it also looked ahead to the civil disobedience that was beginning to challenge institutions in many parts of the world. Milgram’s experiments, which demonstrated individuals’ vulnerability to the destructive commands of authority, became the most famous research in the history of social psychology. This research is discussed in detail in Chapter 7. With its foundation firmly in place, social psychology entered a period of expansion and enthusiasm. The sheer range of its investigations was staggering. Social psychologists considered how people thought and felt about themselves and others. They studied interactions in groups and social problems, such as why people fail to help others in distress. They also examined aggression, physical attractiveness and stress. For the field as a whole, it was a time of great productivity. Ironically, it was also a time of crisis and heated debate. Many of the strong disagreements during this period can be understood as a reaction to the dominant research method of the day – the laboratory experiment. Critics of this method asserted that certain practices were unethical, that experimenters’ expectations influenced their participants’ behaviour and that the theories being tested in the laboratory were historically and culturally limited (Gergen, 1973; Kelman, 1967; Rosenthal, 1976). Those who favoured laboratory experimentation, on the other hand, contended that their procedures were ethical, their results were valid and their theoretical principles were widely applicable (McGuire, 1967). For a while during this period, social psychology seemed split in two.

Mid-1970s to 1990s: an era of pluralism

Social cognition

The study of how people perceive, remember and interpret information about themselves and others.

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Fortunately, both sides won. As we will see later in this chapter, more rigorous ethical standards for research were instituted, more stringent procedures to guard against bias were adopted and more attention was paid to possible cross-cultural differences in behaviour. Laboratory experiments continued to dominate, but often with more precise methods. However, a pluralistic approach emerged as a wider range of research techniques and questions became established. Pluralism in social psychology extends far beyond its methods. There are also important variations in what aspects of human behaviour are emphasised. For example, social psychologists became more and more interested in processes relevant to cognitive psychology and adapting methods from this field. A new subfield was born called social cognition, the study of how we perceive, remember and interpret

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WHAT IS SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY?

information about ourselves and others. Social cognition research continues to thrive today and examines issues important to virtually every major area in social psychology (Greifeneder, Bless, & Fiedler, 2017). Another source of pluralism in social psychology is its development of international and multicultural perspectives. Although individuals from many countries helped establish the field, social psychology was most prominent in the US and Canada. At one point, it was estimated that 75–90% of social psychologists lived in North America (Smith & Bond, 1993; Triandis, 1994). However, this aspect of social psychology began to change rapidly in the 1990s, reflecting not only the different geographic and cultural backgrounds of its researchers and participants but also the recognition that many social psychological phenomena once assumed to be universal may actually vary dramatically as a function of culture (see Figure 1.5). You can find evidence of this new appreciation of the role of culture in every chapter of this book – look for content on cultural perspectives and considerations set apart in feature boxes throughout each chapter.

Social psychology today

CHAPTER ONE

FIGURE 1.5 Cross-cultural social psychology Social psychologists are becoming increasingly interested in cross-cultural research, which helps us break out of our culturebound perspective. Many of our behaviours differ across cultures. In some cultures, for example, people are expected to negotiate the price of the products they buy, as in this market in Tunisia. In other cultures, such bargaining would be highly unusual and cause confusion and distress.

Source: Getty Images/The Image Bank/Lorne Resnick

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, social psychology began its second hundred years. The field today continues to grow in the number and diversity of researchers and research topics, areas of the world in which research is conducted, and industries that hire social psychologists and apply their work. Throughout this text, we emphasise the most current, cutting-edge research in the field, along with the classic findings of the past. First, we focus on a few of the exciting themes and perspectives emerging from current research.

Integration of emotion, motivation and cognition In the earlier days of social cognition research in the 1970s and 1980s, the dominant perspective was described as ‘cold’ because it emphasised the role of cognition and de-emphasised the role of emotion and motivation in explaining social psychological issues. This was contrasted with a ‘hot’ perspective that focused on emotion and motivation as determinants of individuals' thoughts and actions. Today there is growing interest in integrating both ‘hot’ and ‘cold’ perspectives, as researchers study how individuals’ emotions and motivations influence their thoughts and actions, and vice versa. For example, researchers today examine how motivations we are not even consciously aware of (i.e., being motivated to treat others fairly or to feel superior to others) can bias how we interact with or interpret information about another person (Kawakami, Amodio, & Hugenberg, 2017; Plaks, 2017). Another theme running through many chapters of this book is the growing interest in distinguishing between automatic and controllable processes and understanding the relationship between them (Rand, 2016; Sherman, Gawronski, & Trope, 2014). How much do individuals have control over their thoughts and actions, and how vulnerable are they to influences beyond their awareness or control? Are individuals sometimes influenced by stereotypes even if they do not want to believe them? Can they train themselves to regulate against automatic impulses?

Genetics and evolutionary perspectives Recent advances in behavioural genetics – a subfield of psychology that examines the effects of genes on behaviour – has triggered new research to investigate such matters as the extent to which political attitudes and personality are at least partially inherited (Abdellaoui et al., 2018; Bell & Kandler, 2015). The role of genes in an ever-growing array of social behaviours is being better understood as breakthroughs continue to drive interdisciplinary research involving genetics. Evolutionary psychology, which uses the principles of evolution to understand human behaviour, is another growing area that is sparking new research in social psychology. According to this perspective, to understand a social psychological topic such as jealousy, we should ask how tendencies and reactions

Behavioural genetics A subfield of psychology that examines the role of genetic factors in behaviour.

Evolutionary psychology

A subfield of psychology that uses the principles of evolution to understand human social behaviour.

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INTRODUCTION

underlying jealousy today may have evolved from the natural selection pressures our ancestors faced. Evolutionary psychological theories can then be used to explain and predict gender differences in jealousy, the situational factors most likely to trigger jealousy, and so on (Brase, Adair, & Monk, 2014; Buss, 2018; Edlund & Sagarin, 2017). This perspective is discussed in many places throughout the textbook, especially in Part 4.

Cultural perspectives

Culture

A system of enduring meanings, beliefs, values, assumptions, institutions and practices shared by a large group of people and transmitted from one generation to the next.

Cross-cultural research

Research designed to compare and contrast people of different cultures.

Multicultural research

Research designed to examine racial and ethnic groups within cultures.

Because of the fantastic advancements in communication technologies and the globalisation of the world’s economies, it is faster, easier and more necessary than ever for people from vastly different cultures to interact with one another. Thus, our need and desire to understand how we are similar to and different from one another are greater than ever as well. Social psychology is currently experiencing tremendous growth in research designed to give a better understanding and appreciation of the role of culture in all aspects of social psychology. What is meant by ‘culture’ is not easy to pin down because many researchers think of culture in very different ways. Broadly speaking, culture is the system of enduring meanings, beliefs, values, assumptions, institutions and practices shared by a large group of people and transmitted from one generation to the next. Whatever the specific definition, it is clear that how individuals perceive and derive meaning from their world is influenced profoundly by the beliefs, norms and practices of the people and institutions around them. Increasingly, social psychologists are evaluating the universal generality or cultural specificity of their theories and findings by conducting cross-cultural research, whereby they examine similarities and differences across a variety of cultures. More and more social psychologists are also conducting multicultural research, in which they examine racial and ethnic groups within cultures. These developments are already profoundly influencing our view of human behaviour. For example, cross-cultural research has revealed important distinctions between the collectivist cultures (which value interdependence and social harmony) typically found in Asia, Africa and Latin America, and the individualistic cultures (which value independence and self-reliance) typically found in Australia, New Zealand and much of North America and Europe. Even within Australia and New Zealand, variations in cultural orientations emerge. For example, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander and Māori cultures are relatively collectivistic in nature compared to non-Indigenous and New Zealand Pākehā (i.e., those not of Māori descent) cultures, which are relatively more individualistic. The implications of these differences can be seen throughout this textbook. Consider, for example, our earlier discussion of the integration of ‘hot’ and ‘cold’ variables in contemporary social psychology, in which we mentioned the conflict people have between wanting to be right and wanting to feel good about themselves. Cross-cultural research has shown that how people try to juggle these two goals can differ dramatically across cultures.

CRITICAL THINKING ACTIVITY How would you describe your cultural background? Is it the same as the culture in which you currently find yourself? Reflect on how your own personal cultural orientation might shape the way you interact with and respond to others, and even how others respond to you.

Throughout this textbook, you will see that many social psychological processes are impacted by culture. It is important for you to understand how your own culture might fit into your social psychological experience.

For instance, as will be discussed in more depth in Chapter 3, social psychological research has shown that individuals from Asian cultures are more likely than those from Australia, New Zealand and North America to have an interdependent model of self, one in which motivation and action stem in large part from the influences of close others. Although Australians, New Zealanders and North Americans are also certainly influenced by close others, they tend to have a relatively independent model of self, one emphasising personal preferences and goals. In this text, we describe studies conducted in dozens of countries, representing every populated continent on Earth. As our knowledge expands, we should be able to see much more clearly both the behavioural differences among cultures and the similarities we all share. But it is important to note that even within a particular society, people are often treated differently as a function of social categories such as gender, race, physical appearance and economic class. They may be raised differently by their parents, confronted with different expectations by teachers, exposed to different types of advertising and marketing, 12

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CHAPTER ONE

and offered different kinds of jobs. Even people within the same town or region may develop and live in distinct subcultures, and these differences can have profound effects on people’s lives. Some social psychology textbooks devote a separate chapter to culture. We have chosen not to do so because we believe that cultural influences are inherent in all aspects of social psychology. We have chosen instead to integrate discussions of the role of culture in every chapter of this textbook. Further, we include features that highlight cross-cultural or multicultural research.

Behavioural economics, political and moral issues, and other interdisciplinary approaches A rapidly growing number of social psychologists today are asking questions and using methodologies that cross traditional academic boundaries. We have already discussed intersections that social psychology has with neuroscience, evolutionary theory and cultural psychology. Other topics are beginning to trend in increasing numbers. For example, one relatively new area of study that has received a great deal of attention is behavioural economics. This subfield focuses on how psychology, and particularly social and cognitive psychology, relates to economic decision-making (Thaler, 2016). Behavioural economics research has revealed that the traditional economic models were inadequate because they failed to account for the powerful, and often seemingly irrational, role that psychological factors have on people’s economic behaviour. For example, Jiang and colleagues (2015) conducted a series of experiments with high-school students in China in which some students were made to either experience a rejection by a peer while playing a simple game or to recall a time when they were rejected by peers. This group, compared to other students in the study who were not made to experience or recall a peer rejection, became more materialistic. For example, they were more likely to answer the question, ‘What makes me happy?’ by emphasising material things like new clothes and money. This is but one example of how subtle social psychological factors seemingly unrelated to an economic-related judgement can exert significant influence in ways that would not be predicted by economic analyses alone. The rise of behavioural economics has seen an increase in the number of social psychologists hired by business schools and within the business world more generally. Social psychologists are also increasingly involved in research intersecting other areas such as politics and moral philosophy. Might political inclinations, social attitudes and moral decisions have their roots in fundamental processes regarding social relations and identity (Bliuc, McGarty, Thomas, Berndsen, & Misajon, 2015; Smith, Alford, Hibbing, Martin, & Hatemi, 2017; Uhlmann, Pizarro, & Diermeier, 2015)? The surge of interest in questions like this has brought together an exciting and productive mix of social psychology, political science, philosophy and neuroscience. Similarly, social psychologists are collaborating in greater numbers with researchers in environmental studies, public health and related areas to address a wide variety of issues, such as how to get people to access HIV-prevention counselling (Wilson & Albarracín, 2015), or how simple alterations to the physical surroundings around primary schools, such as providing some green space, can improve students’ education (Dadvand et al., 2015).

Behavioural economics

An interdisciplinary subfield that focuses on how psychology – particularly social and cognitive psychology – relates to economic decision-making.

The social brain and body We are, of course, biological organisms, and it is clear that our brains and bodies influence, and are influenced by, our social experiences. This interaction between the physical and the social is the focus of more social psychological research than ever before. Examples can be found throughout the textbook; for example, in studies demonstrating how being the target of racial discrimination can affect individuals’ physical health, and research that examines the role of hormones and neurotransmitters in human aggression (Bedrosian & Nelson, 2018; de Almeida, Cabral, & Narvaes, 2015; Fuller-Rowell, Curtis, Chae, & Ryff, 2018; Paradies et al., 2015). A particularly exciting development is the emergence of the subfield of social neuroscience – the study of the relationship between neural and social processes. This intersection of social psychology and neuroscience is addressing a rapidly growing number of fascinating issues, such as how playing violent video games can affect brain activity and subsequent acts of aggression, or how different patterns of activity in parts of the brain relate to how people perceive members of a different racial group (Gentile, Swing, Anderson, Rinker, & Thomas, 2016; Szycik Mohammadi, Münte, & Te Wildt, 2017; Zhou, Liu, Xiao, Wu, Li, & Lee, 2018). Another interdisciplinary area of research attracting increasing interest among social psychologists is embodied cognition, which focuses on the close links between our minds and the positioning, experiences

Social neuroscience The study of the relationship between neural and social processes.

Embodied cognition

An interdisciplinary subfield that examines the close links between our minds and the positioning, experiences and actions of our bodies.

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PART ONE

INTRODUCTION

and actions of our bodies. According to this perspective, people’s perceptions and judgements reflect and can influence their bodily experiences. For example, studies have found that participants who were touching something rough (i.e., sandpaper) judged an interaction between two people as more rough and unfriendly than if they were touching something smooth, and that participants made to sit in an upright position experienced higher self-esteem and lower fear in response to a stressful situation than did those sitting in a more slumped position (Nair, Sagar, Sollers, Consedine, & Broadbent, 2015; Schaefer, Denke, Heinze, & Rotte, 2014; Veenstra, Schneider, & Koole, 2017). We began this chapter discussing how the evolution of the human brain seems to have been linked closely to the social nature of our species. Research continues to find new evidence of how deeply rooted and basic this social nature is. Consider just a few examples from very recent studies: • Having close friends and staying in contact with family members is associated with health benefits such as protecting against heart disease, infection, diabetes and cancer, and with living longer and more actively (Cacioppo, Grippo, London, Goossens, & Cacioppo, 2015). • Among minority group members, such as Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders, stronger attachment to traditional culture is associated with better life outcomes (Zubrick et al., 2014). • Experiencing a social rejection or loss is so painful that it produces activity in the same parts of the brain as when we feel physical pain. Being treated well and fairly by other people, on the other hand, activates parts of the brain associated with physical rewards such as desirable food and drink (Eisenberger, 2015). • There is something medically very real about a ‘broken heart’. For example, a person is more than 20 times more likely than usual to suffer a heart attack within one day of the death of a loved one, and the effects of ‘broken heart syndrome’ can endure for months (Cohen, Murphy, & Prather, 2018; Mostofsky et al., 2012; Neil et al., 2015).

New technologies and the online world Advances in technologies that allow researchers to see images of the brain at work through non-invasive procedures have had a profound effect on several areas of psychology, including social psychology. A growing number of social psychologists are using techniques such as event-related potential (ERP), transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), magnetoencephalography (MEG), and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to study the interplay of the brain and discrete thoughts, feelings and behaviours (see Figure 1.6). Social psychological research today benefits from other technological advances as well, such as new and better techniques to measure hormone levels, code people’s everyday FIGURE 1.6 Measuring brain activity dialogue into quantifiable units, and present visual stimuli Advances in technology enable social psychologists to to research participants at fractions of a second and then extend their research in exciting new directions, such as by record the number of milliseconds it takes the participants to using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and magnetoencephalography (MEG) to study activity in the brain in respond to these stimuli. Some researchers are using virtual response to various thoughts or stimuli. reality technology to examine a number of social psychological questions. James Blascovich and others created the Research Center for Virtual Environments and Behavior at the University of California and are conducting fascinating research on issues such as conformity, group dynamics, aggression and altruism, social support and eyewitness testimony (Bailey & Bailenson, 2015; Blascovich, 2014). Because participants in these experiments are immersed in a virtual reality that the experimenters create for them, the researchers can test questions that would be impractical, impossible or unethical without this technology. ‘Awesome’ is an overused word, but it surely describes the revolution that is taking place in how we access information Source: Shutterstock.com/Gorodenkoff and communicate with each other. The waves of this revolution have carried social psychological research along with it. Social psychologists around the world can now not only communicate and collaborate much more easily but can also gain access to research participants from populations that would otherwise never have been available. These developments have sparked the field’s internationalisation, perhaps its most exciting course in its second century. 14

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WHAT IS SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY?

CHAPTER ONE

Online communication not only facilitates research but is FIGURE 1.7 Social media influences on social interaction also becoming a provocative topic of study. As more people interact with each other through social networking sites, Together, and apart. Even when interacting in a group, many of us today are also pulled away by our individual phones, electronic online dating services and communications services such as games, laptops, tablets, and so on. How new technologies and Skype or WhatsApp, there is growing interest in studying how living so much of our lives online affect human interaction is attraction, prejudice, group dynamics and a host of other social becoming increasingly important to social psychology. psychological phenomena unfold online versus offline. Other important and potentially troubling questions raised by our increasingly online lives are the subject of new research, such as: • What factors contribute to or protect against cyberbullying? • Can too much time on social networking sites lead to depression or loneliness (see Figure 1.7)? • Does the habit of frequent texting or checking to see who has commented on one’s most recent shared photo lead to attentional and social problems offline? We would be presumptuous and probably naive to try to predict how new communication and new technologies will influence the ways that people will interact in the coming years, but it probably is safe to predict that their influence will be great. As more and more people fall in love online, fall into social Source: Getty Images/Getty Images News/Joe Raedle/ isolation or react with anxiety or violence to the loss of individual privacy, social psychology will explore these issues. We expect that some of the students reading this textbook today will be among those explorers in the years to come.

RESEARCH METHODS Because we all are interested in predicting and explaining people’s behaviours and their thoughts and feelings about each other, we all have our own opinions and intuitions about social psychological matters. If the discipline of social psychology were built on the personal experiences, observations and intuitions of everyone who is interested in social psychological questions, it would be full of interesting theories and ideas, but it would also be a morass of contradictions, ambiguities and relativism. Instead, social psychology is built on the scientific method. Of course, it is easy to see how a field such as chemistry is scientific. When you mix two specific compounds in the laboratory, you can predict exactly what will happen. The compounds will act the same way every time you mix them if the general conditions in the laboratory are the same. But what happens when you mix together two chemists, or any two people, in a social context? Sometimes you get great synergy between them; at other times you get apathy or even repulsion. How, then, can social behaviour, which seems so variable, be studied scientifically? To many of us in the field of social psychology, that is the great excitement and challenge – the fact that it is so dynamic and diverse. Furthermore, in spite of these characteristics, social psychology can, and should, be studied according to scientific principles. Social psychologists develop specific, quantifiable hypotheses that can be tested empirically. If these hypotheses are wrong, they can be proven wrong. In addition, social scientists report the details of how they conduct their tests so that others can try to replicate their findings. They integrate evidence from across time and place. And slowly but steadily they build a consistent and ever more precise understanding of human nature. How social psychologists investigate social psychological questions scientifically is the focus of this section of this chapter. Before we explain the methodology they use, we first explain why it is important and interesting for you to learn about research methods. One important benefit for learning about research methods is that it can make you a better, more sophisticated consumer of information. Training in research methods in psychology can improve your reasoning about real-life events and problems (Bensley, Crowe, Bernhardt, Buckner, & Allman, 2010; Daniel & Braasch, 2013; Lehman, Lempert, & Nisbett, 1988; VanderStoep & Shaughnessy, 1997). We are constantly bombarded with ‘facts’ from the media, sales pitches and other people. Much of this information turns out to be wrong or, at best, oversimplified and misleading. We are told about the health benefits of eating certain kinds of food, the drawbacks of being digitally dependent, or the social status benefits of driving a certain kind of car or wearing a certain kind of shoe. To each of these pronouncements, we should say: ‘Prove it! What is the evidence? What alternative explanations are there?’ For example, a commercial tells us that most doctors prefer a particular brand of paracetamol. So, should we buy this brand? Think about

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INTRODUCTION

what it was compared with. Perhaps the doctors did not prefer that brand of paracetamol more than other (and cheaper) brands of paracetamol, but rather were asked to compare that brand of paracetamol with several non-paracetamol products for a particular problem. In that event, the doctors may have preferred any brand of paracetamol more than non-paracetamol products for that need. Thinking like a scientist while reading this textbook will foster a healthy sense of doubt about claims such as these. You will be in a better position to critically evaluate the information to which you are exposed and be better able to separate fact from fiction. More immediately, learning about research methods should help you better understand the research findings reported in the rest of this textbook, which will in turn help you on tests and in subsequent courses. If you read a list of social psychological findings without knowing and understanding the supporting evidence, you may later find it difficult to remember which the actual findings were and which merely sound plausible. Being able to understand and remember the research evidence on which social psychological principles are based should provide you with a deeper comprehension of the material.

DEVELOPING IDEAS The research process involves coming up with ideas, refining them, testing them and interpreting the meaning of the results obtained. This section describes the first stage of research – coming up with ideas. It also discusses the role of hypotheses and theories and of basic and applied research.

Getting ideas and finding out what has been done Every social psychology study begins with a question; and these questions come from everywhere. As discussed earlier in this chapter, one of the first social psychology experiments published was triggered by the question: ‘Why do bicyclists race faster in the presence of other bicyclists?’ (Triplett, 1897–1898). Or consider a much more recent example; social psychologist Dylan Selterman has conducted fascinating studies examining the connection between people’s dreams about romantic partners and their actual patterns of emotions and behaviours in personal relationships (Selterman, Apetroaia, & Waters, 2012; Selterman, Apetroaia, Riela, & Aron, 2014). Where did this idea come from? It was inspired in part by the dreams some of his ex-girlfriends told him about! Questions can come from a variety of sources – from something tragic, such as the elevated mortality risk of chronic loneliness; to something perplexing, such as the underrepresentation of women in maths and science; to something light-hearted, such as the impact of emoji and emoticon use on social communication (Holt-Lunstad, Smith, Baker, Harris, & Stephenson, 2015; Rattan et al., 2018; Wall, Kaye, & Malone 2016). For research with disadvantaged groups who may distrust researchers, the best practice for designing research questions involves collaboration between participants and researchers. Consultation with community leaders determines what research questions are their priority (Goulding, Steels, & McGarty, 2016). Ideas also come from reading about research that has already been done. The most important research not only answers some pressing questions but also raises new questions, inspiring additional research. The most reliable way to get ideas for new research, therefore, is to read about research already published. Even if you already have an idea, you will need to search the social psychological literature to find out what has been researched already. How do you find these published studies? Textbooks such as this one offer a good starting point. You also can find information about many research findings by searching the internet, of course, but general searches on the internet can be wildly variable in the relevance, quality and accuracy of the information presented (a notable exception is Google Scholar, which limits the search to academic outlets and books). Instead, scholars in the field rely on electronic databases of published research, typically available via university library systems. Some of these databases, such as PsycINFO, are specific to psychology literature; others are more general. These databases allow an instant search of hundreds of thousands of published articles and books.

Hypotheses and theories Hypothesis

An explicit, testable prediction about the conditions under which an event will occur.

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An initial idea for research may be so vague that it amounts to little more than a hunch or an educated guess. Some ideas vanish with the break of day, but others can be shaped into a hypothesis – an explicit, testable prediction about the conditions under which an event will occur. Based on observations, existing theories or previous research findings, one might test a hypothesis such as ‘Teenage boys are more likely to be aggressive towards others if they have just played a violent video game for an hour than if they played a non-violent video game for an hour’. This is a specific prediction, and it can be tested empirically.

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WHAT IS SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY?

Formulating a hypothesis is a critical step towards planning and conducting research. It allows us to move from the realm of common sense to the rigours of the scientific method. As hypotheses proliferate and data are collected to test them, a more advanced step in the research process may take place – the proposal of a theory – an organised set of principles used to explain observed phenomena. Social psychologists aspire to do more than collect a list of findings. The goal is to explain these findings, to articulate the connections between the variables that are studied, and to thereby predict and more completely understand our social worlds. All else being equal, the best theories are efficient and precise; they encompass all of the relevant information and lead to new hypotheses, further research and better understanding. Good social psychological theories inspire subsequent research designed to test various aspects of the theories and the specific hypotheses that are derived from them. Whether it truly is accurate or not, a theory has little worth if it cannot be tested. One of the chief criticisms of many of Sigmund Freud’s theories of personality in the early twentieth century, for example, was that they could not be tested sufficiently. A theory may make an important contribution to the field even if it turns out to be wrong. The research it inspires may prove more valuable than the theory itself, as the results shed light on new truths that might not have been discovered without the directions suggested by the theory. Indeed, the best theorists want their ideas to be debated and even doubted, in order to inspire others in the field to put their ideas to the test. The goal is for these theories to evolve – to become more and more accurate and complete.

CHAPTER ONE

Theory

An organised set of principles used to explain observed phenomena.

Basic research

Research in which the goal is to increase the understanding of human behaviour, often by testing a hypothesis based on a theory.

Basic and applied research

Applied research Research in which the Is testing a theory the purpose of research in social psychology? For some researchers, yes. Basic research goals are to enlarge seeks to increase our understanding of human behaviour and is often designed to test a specific hypothesis the understanding of from a specific theory. Applied research has a different purpose – to enlarge our understanding of naturally naturally occurring occurring events and to contribute to the solution of social problems. events and to find Despite their differences, basic and applied research are closely connected in social psychology; and solutions to practical problems. some researchers switch back and forth between the two. Some studies test a theory and examine a real-world phenomenon simultaneously. For instance, Carol Dweck and others have tested theories about the effects FIGURE 1.8 Loneliness by observation? of people’s beliefs about human abilities while addressing From this picture, we might guess that the boy sitting by important problems such as dropping out of school or the himself in the playground is lonely, but if you were interested underrepresentation of women in maths and science (Good, in researching loneliness, how would you precisely define and Rattan, & Dweck, 2012; Paunesku et al., 2015). As a pioneer in measure this construct? Researchers may use any of a number of both basic and applied approaches, Kurt Lewin (1951) set the approaches, such as asking people how they feel and observing their behaviour. tone when he encouraged basic researchers to be concerned with complex social problems and urged applied researchers to recognise that there is nothing so practical as a good theory.

REFINING IDEAS To test their hypotheses, researchers always must decide how they will define and measure the variables in which they are interested. This is sometimes a straightforward process; for example, if you are interested in comparing how quickly people run a 100-metre race when alone and when racing against another person, you are all set if you have a stopwatch and runners who can race alone or in pairs. On many other occasions, however, the process is less straightforward, as highlighted in Figure 1.8. It is in these cases that careful consideration must be placed into the process of conceptualising and operationalising variables.

Source: Corbis/Flirt/Emma Shervington

CRITICAL THINKING ACTIVITY Imagine you are interested in studying loneliness. It sounds simple, right? But what do you mean by loneliness? How would you measure it? Would a self-report scale be sufficient? What about observing behaviour?

In order to engage fully in this process as a social psychologist, you would need to carefully define the concept and then decide on the best measurement approach.

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INTRODUCTION

Conceptual variables and operational definitions

Operational definition

The specific procedures for manipulating or measuring a conceptual variable.

Construct validity

The extent to which the measures used in a study measure the variables they were designed to measure and to which the manipulations in an experiment manipulate the variables they were designed to manipulate.

When a researcher first develops a hypothesis, the variables typically are in an abstract, general form. These are conceptual variables. Examples of conceptual variables include prejudice, conformity, attraction, love, group pressure and social anxiety. In order to test specific hypotheses, researchers must then transform these conceptual variables into variables that can be manipulated or measured in a study. The specific way in which a conceptual variable is manipulated or measured is called the operational definition of the variable. Part of the challenge and fun of designing research in social psychology is taking an abstract conceptual variable, such as love or group pressure, and deciding how to operationally define it so as to manipulate or measure it. Imagine, for example, wanting to conduct a study on the effects of alcohol intoxication on aggression. One of the conceptual variables might be whether or not participants are intoxicated. There are several ways of measuring this variable, most of which are relatively straightforward. For example, one researcher might operationally define intoxication as when a participant has a blood alcohol level of 0.10 or more, whereas another might define it as when a participant says that he or she feels drunk. A second conceptual variable in this study would be aggression. Measuring aggression in experiments is particularly difficult because of ethical and practical issues. Researchers cannot let participants in their studies attack each other. Researchers interested in measuring aggression are therefore often forced to measure relatively unusual behaviours, such as administering shocks or blasts of noise to another person, as part of a specific task. Often there is no single best way to transform a variable from the abstract (conceptual) to the specific (operational). A great deal of trial and error may be involved. However, sometimes there are systematic, statistical ways of checking how valid various manipulations and measures are, and researchers spend a great deal of time fine-tuning their operational definitions to best capture the conceptual variables they wish to study. Researchers evaluate the manipulation and measurement of variables in terms of their construct validity. Construct validity refers to the extent to which (1) the manipulations in an experiment really manipulate the conceptual variables they were designed to manipulate, and (2) the measures used in a study (experimental or otherwise) really measure the conceptual variables they were designed to measure.

Measuring variables Social psychologists measure variables in many ways, but most can be placed into one of two categories – self-reports and observations. We discuss each of these methods in the next sections, along with how advances in technology are enabling social psychologists to measure variables in new ways.

Self-reports

Bogus pipeline technique

A procedure in which research participants are (falsely) led to believe that their responses will be verified by an infallible lie detector.

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Collecting self-reports, in which participants disclose their thoughts, feelings, desires and actions, is a widely used measurement technique in social psychology. Self-reports can consist of individual questions or sets of questions that together measure a single conceptual variable. One popular self-report measure, the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale, consists of a set of questions that measures individuals’ overall selfesteem. For example, respondents are asked the extent to which they agree with statements such as ‘I feel that I have a number of good qualities’ and ‘All in all, I am inclined to feel that I’m a failure’. This scale, first developed by Morris Rosenberg in the 1960s, continues to be used today in a wide variety of settings in countries across the world because many researchers consider it to have good construct validity (Alessandri, Vecchione, Eisenberg, & Łaguna, 2015; Donnellan, Ackerman, & Brecheen, 2016; Webster, Smith, Brunell, Paddock, & Nezlek, 2017). Self-reports give the researcher access to an individual’s beliefs and perceptions. But self-reports are not always accurate and can be misleading; for example, the desire to look good to ourselves and others can influence how we respond. This is evident in the results of research using the bogus pipeline technique – a procedure in which participants are led to believe that their responses will be verified by an infallible lie detector (Jones & Sigall, 1971) (see Figure 1.9). When participants believe their lies will be detected, they report facts about themselves more accurately and endorse socially unacceptable opinions more frequently. Of course no such infallible device exists, but belief in its powers discourages people from lying (Brunell & Fischer, 2014; Grover & Miller, 2012; Mann & Kawakami, 2012; Strang & Peterson, 2016). Self-reports are also affected by the way that questions are asked, such as how they are worded or in what order or context they are asked (Betts & Hartley, 2012; Schwarz & Oyserman, 2011). For example, although ‘global warming’ and ‘climate change’ mean the same thing to most people, Jonathon Schuldt

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WHAT IS SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY?

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and colleagues (2011) found that politically conservative FIGURE 1.9 The bogus pipeline respondents were much less likely than liberal respondents to indicate that they believe in the issue if it was referred to A simple set of electrodes can increase the accuracy of selfreports when they serve as a bogus pipeline. Participants believe as ‘global warming’ rather than ‘climate change’. There are that any lies will be detected and therefore end up providing theoretical explanations that can account for the seemingly more honest responses. irrational results reported in this study, but the point here is that subtle factors can have significant effects on the attitudes and opinions that people report. Indeed, even the exact same question can elicit very different responses depending on the context in which the question occurs. For example, all individuals contacted in one telephone survey were asked how important the issue of skin cancer was in their lives, but this question was asked either before or after a series of questions about other health concerns. Even though the wording of the question was identical, respondents rated skin cancer as significantly more important if the question was asked first than if it came after the other health questions (Rimal & Real, 2005). In another example of the impact of previous questions, Kimberly Morrison and Adrienne Chung (2011) found that white university students indicated significantly less support for Source: Getty Images/Epsilon/Dima Korotayev multiculturalism if they had earlier marked their race/ethnicity as ‘White’ on a questionnaire than if the questionnaire used the term ‘European American’ instead. Another reason self-reports can be inaccurate is that they often ask participants to report on thoughts or behaviours from the past, and people’s memory of their thoughts or behaviours is very prone to error, particularly if how they feel now about things is different from how they felt in the past. To minimise this problem, psychologists have developed ways to reduce the time that elapses between an actual experience and the person’s report of it. For example, some use interval-contingent self-reports, in which respondents report their experiences at regular intervals, usually once a day. Researchers may also collect signalcontingent self-reports. Here, respondents report their experiences as soon as possible after being signalled to do so, usually by means of a text message or a special app on a smartphone. Finally, some researchers collect event-contingent self-reports, in which respondents report on a designated set of events as soon as possible after such events have occurred.

Observations Self-reports are but one tool that social psychologists use to measure variables; they also observe people’s actions. Sometimes these observations are very simple, as when a researcher notes which of two items a person selects or how long two people spend talking to one another. At other times, however, the observations are more elaborate and require interrater reliability be established. Interrater reliability refers to the level of agreement among multiple observers of the same behaviour. Only when different observers agree can the data be trusted. The advantage of observational methods is that they avoid our sometimes-faulty recollections and distorted interpretations of our own behaviour. Actions can speak louder than words. Of course, if individuals know they are being observed, their behaviours, like their self-reports, may be biased by the desire to present themselves in a favourable light. Therefore, researchers sometimes make observations much more subtly. For example, in experiments concerning interactions with minorities or stigmatised individuals, researchers may record participants’ seating distance to demonstrate biases that would not be revealed using more overt measures (Vartanian, Trewartha, & Vanman, 2016; Wang, Kenneth, Ku, & Galinsky, 2014).

Interrater reliability

The degree to which different observers agree on their observations.

Technology Of course, social psychologists use more than merely their eyes and ears to observe their subjects. Advances in technology offer researchers exciting new tools that enable them to make extremely precise, subtle and complex observations that were beyond the dreams of social psychologists just a generation

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FIGURE 1.10 Eye-tracking technology Eye-tracking technology allows researchers to examine patterns of visual fixation in real time.

Source: Image courtesy of Objective Experience Labs, Sydney, http://www.objectiveexperience.com/

or so ago. Various kinds of equipment are used to measure physiological responses such as changes in heart rate, levels of particular hormones and degrees of sexual arousal. Eyetracking technology, as featured in Figure 1.10, is used to measure exactly where and for how long participants look at particular parts of a stimulus, such as a face or video of a social interaction. Recently, social psychologists have begun opening a window into the live human brain – fortunately, without having to lift a scalpel. Brain-imaging technologies take and combine thousands of images of the brain in action. These images can show researchers what parts of the brain show increased activity in response to a particular stimulus or situation. For example, although participants in a study may show no signs of intergroup biases in their self-reports or through easily observable behaviour in the laboratory, their patterns of brain activity may reveal a very different conclusion (Amodio, 2014; Cikara & Van Bavel, 2014; Mattan, Wei, Cloutier, & Kubota, 2018).

TESTING IDEAS: RESEARCH DESIGNS Social psychologists use several different methods to test their research hypotheses and theories. Although methods vary, the field generally emphasises objective, systematic and quantifiable approaches. Social psychologists do not simply seek out evidence that supports their ideas; rather, they test their ideas in ways that could very clearly prove them wrong. We can divide these types of tests into three categories: descriptive, correlational and experimental.

CRITICAL THINKING ACTIVITY

Descriptive research: discovering trends and tendencies

The advent of the internet has brought about a great deal of change in availability of archival research. Consider your own ‘archives’ on the internet. How might they be used to answer social psychological research questions? Consider the different conclusions that might be reached if different sources of your archival data were used (e.g., Google search history, Facebook wall posts or time-perday spent online).

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One obvious way of testing ideas about people is simply to record how frequently or how typically people think, feel or behave in particular ways. The goal of descriptive research in social psychology is, as the term implies, to describe people and their thoughts, feelings and behaviours. This method can test questions such as: Do most people support capital punishment? What percentage of people who encounter a person lying on the footpath would offer to help that person? What do men and women say are the things most likely to make them jealous in their romantic relationships? Particular methods of doing descriptive research include observing people, studying records of past events and behaviours, and surveying people. We discuss each of these methods in this section.

Observational studies We just discussed using observations as a way to measure and assess variables. Many social psychologists use these methods to test ideas involving descriptive research. For example, although researchers around the world who study bullying among schoolchildren often use self-report measures to ask children and teachers about the frequency and severity of bullying, some researchers have taken a more direct look at the problem by spending time in playgrounds and schoolyards, carefully watching and taking notes on the children’s interactions, sometimes using hidden cameras and microphones (with the schools and parents’ consent) to record incidents of bullying (Azeredo, Rinaldi, de Moraes, Levy, & Menezes, 2015; Santoyo & Mendoza, 2018; Volk, Veenstra, & Espelage, 2017).

Archival studies Archival research involves examining existing records of past events and behaviours, such as newspaper articles, medical records, diaries, sporting statistics, personal advertisements, crime statistics or visits to a web page. A major advantage of archival measures is that because the researchers are observing behaviour second-hand, they can be sure that they did not influence the behaviour by their presence. A limitation of this approach is that available records are not always complete or sufficiently detailed, and they may have been collected in a non-systematic manner. Archival measures are particularly valuable for examining cultural and historical trends. In Chapter 11, for example, we report several trends concerning the rate of violent crime and how it has changed over time,

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WHAT IS SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY?

CHAPTER ONE

and we report differences in homicide rates in countries around the world. These data come from archival records, such as the records of police stations, governmental bodies and the United Nations.

Surveys Surveys have become increasingly popular in recent years, and FIGURE 1.11 Surveys in social psychology they are conducted on everything from politics and attitudes Many social psychological questions are addressed using about social issues to the percentages of people who think surveys, which can be conducted over the phone, by mail, via the internet or face-to-face in field settings. the best cure for hiccups is to drink a glass of water or hold your breath. (For those of you that are curious – according to a May 2012 poll on Yahoo.com with almost 60 000 responses, 52% say drink water, 37% say hold your breath and 12% say have someone scare you.) Conducting surveys involves asking people questions about their attitudes, beliefs and behaviours, as depicted in Figure 1.11. Surveys can be conducted in person, over the phone, by mail or via the internet. Many social psychological questions can be addressed only with surveys because they involve variables that are impossible or unethical to observe directly or manipulate, such as people’s sexual behaviours or their optimism about the future. Although anyone can conduct a survey (and sometimes it seems that everyone does), there is a science to designing, conducting and interpreting the results of surveys. Like other self-report measures, surveys can be affected strongly by subtle aspects of the wording and context of questions, and good survey researchers are trained to consider these issues and Source: iStock.com/JackF to test various kinds of wording and question ordering before conducting their surveys. One of the most important issues that survey researchers face is how to select the people who will take part in the survey. The researchers first must identify the population in which they are interested. Is this survey supposed to tell us about the attitudes of Australians in general, shoppers at David Jones, or students in an Introduction to Social Psychology course at a particular university? From this general population, the researchers select a subset, or sample, of individuals. For a survey to be accurate, the sample must be similar to, or representative of, the population on important characteristics such as age, sex, race, income, education and cultural background. The best way to achieve this representativeness is Random sampling to use random sampling, a method of selection in which everyone in a population has an equal chance A method of selecting of being selected for the sample. Survey researchers use randomising procedures, such as randomly participants for a study distributed numbers generated by computers, to decide how to select individuals for their samples.

Qualitative versus quantitative research There are two types of research that are conducted in social psychology – qualitative and quantitative. These methods differ in the way that they collect and analyse data; qualitative research gathers data in non-numerical form and quantitative research gathers data in numerical form. Although they do share some methods of collecting data (e.g., surveys, interviews and observations) their emphasis on the type of data collection is quite different. For example, where a quantitative researcher would make use of a structured interview or structured observation, a qualitative researcher would use non-structured interviews and unstructured observations – a far less rigid approach that allows a person to tell a story in terms of what is important to them rather than being restricted to the information which the researcher deems to be important. According to Carla Willig (2013), qualitative researchers are concerned with meaning; that is, how people experience their world and how they make sense of their world: ‘They are interested in the quality and texture of experience rather than with the identification of cause–effect relationships’ (p. 8). Qualitative researchers may make use of diary accounts, open-ended questionnaires, case studies, focus groups, drawings and other forms of visual media in their pursuit to understand the ‘as lived experience’ of a person in relation to the aspect of the research they are interested in. It is a time-consuming approach to research, of course, because this method requires a great deal of attention to detail during data collection and analysis, with expert knowledge of an area being used to interpret and code those data into theoretically meaningful responses or themes.

so that everyone in a population has an equal chance of being in the study.

Qualitative research A research method that seeks to identify what something means to a person.

Quantitative research

A research method that is concerned with quantifying a problem.

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INTRODUCTION

Correlational research: looking for associations

Correlational research

Research designed to measure the association between variables that are not manipulated by the researcher.

Although there is much to learn from descriptive research, social psychologists typically want to know more. Most research hypotheses in social psychology concern the relationship between variables. For example, is there a relationship between people’s gender and their willingness to ask for help from others, or between how physically attractive people are and how much money they make? One way to test such hypotheses is with correlational research. Like descriptive research, correlational research can be conducted using observational, archival or survey methods. Unlike descriptive research, however, correlational approaches measure the relationship between different variables. The extent to which variables relate to each other, or correlate, can suggest how similar or distinct two different measures are (e.g., how related people’s self-esteem and popularity are) and how well one variable can be used to predict another (e.g., how well we can predict academic success in university from HSC or NCEA scores). It is important to note that researchers doing correlational research typically do not manipulate the variables they study, they simply measure them. One interesting correlational study was conducted recently by a team of researchers who got access to 826 million tweets made available to them by Twitter. The researchers looked at the relationship between the language that people in more than 1300 counties in the US used on Twitter and measures of health (from public records) in those counties. They found, for example, that communities in which people tended to tweet using angry language also had greater rates of heart-disease mortality (Eichstaedt et al., 2015).

Correlation coefficient Correlation coefficient

A statistical measure of the strength and direction of the association between two variables.

When researchers examine the relationship between variables that vary in quantity (e.g., temperature or degree of self-esteem), they can measure the strength and direction of the relationship between the variables and calculate a statistic called a correlation coefficient. Correlation coefficients can range from −1.0 to +1.0. The absolute value of the number (i.e., the number itself, without the positive or negative sign) indicates how strongly the two variables are associated. The larger the absolute value of the number, the stronger the association between the two variables, and thus the better either of the variables is as a predictor of the other. Whether the coefficient is positive or negative indicates the direction of the relationship. A positive correlation coefficient indicates that as one variable increases, so does the other. For example, high-school marks correlate positively with university marks. The positive direction of this relationship indicates higher high-school marks are associated with higher university marks and that lower high-school marks are associated with lower university marks. This correlation is not perfect: some people with impressive high school marks have poor university marks and vice versa. Therefore, the correlation is less than +1.0, but it is greater than 0 because there is some association between the two. A negative coefficient indicates that the two variables go in opposite directions; that is, as one goes up, the other tends to go down. For example, number of classes missed and weighted average mark (WAM) are likely to be negatively correlated. And a correlation close to 0 indicates that there is no consistent relationship at all. These three types of patterns are illustrated in Figure 1.12. Because few variables are perfectly related to each other, most correlation coefficients do not approach −1.0 or +1.0 but have more moderate values, such as +.39 or −.57. Some correlational studies involve a variable that does not vary in quantity, such as race, gender or political affiliation, or preferences for Thai, Indian or Italian food. In this case, researchers cannot compute a typical correlation coefficient but instead use different kinds of statistical analysis. The same point applies, though, as the researchers can determine if there is a relationship between the two variables.

Advantages and disadvantages of correlational research Correlational research has many advantages. It can study the associations of naturally occurring variables that cannot be manipulated or induced, such as gender, race, ethnicity and age. It can examine phenomena that would be difficult or unethical to create for research purposes, such as love, hate and abuse. And it offers researchers a great deal of freedom in where variables are measured. Participants can be brought into a laboratory specially constructed for research purposes or they can be approached in a real-world setting (often called ‘the field’) such as a shopping centre or airport. Despite these advantages, however, correlational research has one very serious disadvantage. And here it is in bold letters: correlation is not causation.

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CHAPTER ONE

FIGURE 1.12 Correlations: positive, negative and none Correlations reveal a systematic association between two variables. Positive correlations indicate that variables are in sync – increases in one variable are associated with increases in the other; decreases are associated with decreases. Negative correlations indicate that Positive correlation

variables go in opposite directions – increases in one variable are associated with decreases in the other. When two variables are not systematically associated, there is no correlation.

Negative correlation

Hot

No correlation

Daily temperature

Hot

Daily temperature

Daily temperature

Hot

Cold

Cold Few

Many

Cold Many

Few

Number of people who purchase cold drinks

Many

Few

Number of people who wear sweaters

Number of people who have the hiccups

A correlation cannot demonstrate a cause-and-effect relationship. Instead of revealing a specific causal pathway from one variable (A) to another variable (B), a correlation between variables A and B contains within it three possible causal effects: A could cause B; B could cause A; or a third variable, C, could cause both A and B. For example, imagine learning that the number of hours per night an individual sleeps is negatively correlated with the number of colds they get. This means that as the amount of sleep increases, colds decrease in frequency. Conversely, as sleep decreases, colds become more frequent. One reasonable explanation for this relationship is that lack of sleep (variable A) causes people to become more vulnerable to colds (variable B). Another reasonable explanation, however, is that people who have colds cannot sleep well, and so colds (variable B) cause lack of sleep (variable A). A third reasonable explanation is that some other variable (C) causes both lack of sleep and greater frequency of colds. This third variable could be stress. Indeed, stress has many effects on people, as is discussed in Chapter 14. Figure 1.13 describes another correlation that can be explained in many ways: the correlation between playing violent video games and aggression.

FIGURE 1.13 Explaining correlations: three possibilities A correlation between how much children play violent video games and how aggressively they behave could be explained in the following ways: 1 Playing violent video games causes aggressive behaviour. 2 Children who behave aggressively like to play a lot of violent video games. 3 Children who have family troubles, such as parents who are not very involved in their development, tend both to play a lot of violent video games and to behave aggressively.

A (video games)

B (aggression)

A (video games)

B (aggression)

C (family troubles)

A (video games)

B (aggression)

We can guarantee you this – there will be many, many times in your life when you will encounter reports in the media that suggest cause-and-effect relationships based on correlational research. Even the most

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INTRODUCTION

respectable news sources are guilty of this repeatedly. If you look, you can find numerous examples on a weekly basis. One of the great benefits of learning and gaining experience with the material in this chapter is that you can see the flaws in media reports such as these and are less likely to be taken in by them. Again, correlation is not causation.

CRITICAL THINKING ACTIVITY Spend a few moments browsing your favourite news source for coverage of scientific findings. Is there evidence of the ‘correlation equals causation’ trap? By reading the article carefully, it can be clear that the methods used were correlational (i.e., variables were measured) but the conclusions

the journalist makes are causal (that is, presuming at least one of the variables was manipulated). How might you rewrite the article to accurately reflect the correlational nature of the findings?

Do we learn nothing, then, from correlations? To say that would be to take caution too far. Correlations tell researchers about the strength and direction of relationships between variables, thus helping them understand these variables better and allowing them to use one variable to predict the other. Correlations can be extremely useful in developing new hypotheses to guide future research. And by gathering large sets of correlations and using complicated statistical techniques to crunch the data, we can develop highly accurate predictions of future events.

Experiments: looking for cause and effect

Experiment

A form of research that can demonstrate causal relationships because (1) the experimenter has control over the events that occur and (2) participants are randomly assigned to conditions.

Random assignment

A method of assigning participants to the various conditions of an experiment so that each participant in the experiment has an equal chance of being in any of the conditions.

Social psychologists often do want to examine cause-and-effect relationships. Although it is informative to know, for example, that playing a lot of violent video games is correlated with violent behaviour in real life, the inevitable next question is whether playing these video games causes an increase in violent behaviour. If we want to examine cause-and-effect relationships, we need to conduct an experiment. Experiments are the most popular method of testing ideas in social psychology, and they can range from the very simple to the incredibly elaborate. All of them, however, share two essential characteristics. 1 The experimenter has control over the experimental procedures, manipulating the variables of interest while ensuring uniformity elsewhere. In other words, all participants in the research are treated in exactly the same manner – except for the specific differences the experimenter wants to create. 2 Participants in the study are randomly assigned to the different manipulations (called ‘conditions’) included in the experiment. If there are two conditions, who goes where may be determined by simply flipping a coin. If there are many conditions, a computer program may be used. But however it is done, random assignment means that participants are not assigned to a condition on the basis of their personal or behavioural characteristics. Through random assignment, the experimenter attempts to ensure a level playing field; meaning, on average, the participants randomly assigned to one condition are no different from those assigned to another condition. Differences that appear between conditions after an experimental manipulation can therefore be attributed to the impact of that manipulation and not to any pre-existing differences between participants. Because of experimenter control and random assignment of participants, an experiment is a powerful technique for examining cause and effect. Both characteristics serve the same goal – to eliminate the influence of any factors other than the experimental manipulation. By ruling out alternative explanations for research results, we become more confident that we understand just what causes a certain outcome to occur. Table 1.3 summarises the distinctions between correlational and experimental research.

TABLE 1.3 Correlational research versus experimental research

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Correlational research

Experimental research

What does it involve?

Measuring variables and the degree of association between them

Random assignment to conditions and control over the events that occur; determining the effects of manipulations of the independent variable(s) on changes in the dependent variable(s)

What is the biggest advantage of using this method?

Enables researchers to study naturally occurring variables, including variables that would be too difficult or unethical to manipulate

Enables researchers to determine cause-and-effect relationships; that is, whether the independent variable can cause a change in the dependent variable

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CHAPTER ONE

TABLE 1.4 Random sampling versus random assignment Random sampling

Random assignment

What does it involve?

Selecting participants to be in the study so that everyone from a population has an equal chance of being a participant in the study

Assigning participants (who are already in the study) to the various conditions of the experiment so that each participant has an equal chance of being in any of the conditions

What is the biggest advantage of using this procedure?

It enables researchers to collect data from samples that are representative of the broader population; it is important for being able to generalise the results to the broader population

It equalises the conditions of the experiment so that it is very unlikely that the conditions differ in terms of pre-existing differences among the participants; it is essential to determine that the independent variable(s) caused an effect on the dependent variable(s)

Random sampling versus random assignment You may recall that we mentioned random sampling earlier, in connection with surveys. it is important to remember the differences between random sampling and random assignment. Table 1.4 summarises these differences. Random sampling concerns how individuals are selected to be in a study. It is essential for generalising the results obtained from a sample to a broader population, and it is therefore very important for survey research. Random assignment concerns not who is selected to be in the study but rather how participants in the study are assigned to different conditions, as previously explained. Random assignment is essential to experiments because it is necessary for determining cause-and-effect relationships. Without it there FIGURE 1.14 Field research in social psychology is always the possibility that any differences found between the In field research, people are observed in real-world settings. Field conditions in a study were caused by pre-existing differences researchers may observe children in a schoolyard, for example, among participants. Random sampling, by contrast, is not to study any of a variety of social psychological topics, such necessary for establishing causality. For that reason, and as friendship patterns, group dynamics, conformity, helping, aggression and cultural differences. because random sampling is difficult and expensive, very few experiments use random sampling. We consider the implications of this fact later in the chapter.

Laboratory and field experiments Most experiments in social psychology are conducted in a laboratory setting, usually located in a university, so that the environment can be controlled and the participants carefully studied. Social psychology labs do not necessarily look like stereotypical laboratories with liquid bubbling in beakers or expensive equipment everywhere (although many social psychology labs are indeed very high-tech). They can resemble ordinary living rooms or even games rooms. The key point here is that the laboratory setting enables researchers to have control over the setting, measure participants’ behaviours precisely and keep conditions identical for participants. Field research is conducted in real-world settings outside the laboratory, as depicted in Figure 1.14. Researchers interested in studying helping behaviour, for example, might conduct an experiment in a public park. The advantage of field experiments is that people are more likely to act naturally in a natural setting than in a laboratory in which they know they are being studied. The disadvantage of a field setting is that the experimenter often has less control and cannot ensure that the participants in the various conditions of the experiment will be exposed to the same things. Because of the important role that experiments play in social psychology, let us take a closer look at the elements of experiments by focusing on the following experiment.

Source: Newspix/Brett Faulkner

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A social psychology experiment on norm deviation Imagine that someone shows you a handful of pens. Most of the pens are of one colour (black) and a minority of the pens are of a different colour (blue). You can choose to keep one of the pens. Do you choose a colour from the majority or the minority? Believe it or not, there is a consistent cultural difference in how people make this choice. People from Western cultures, such as Australia, New Zealand and the US, tend to choose the uncommon pen colour, whereas people from East Asian cultures, such as Korea, Thailand and China, tend to choose the majority pen colour. This cultural difference was explored in an interesting way in a norm-deviation experiment by Claire Ashton-James and colleagues (2009). The researchers hypothesised that being in a positive mood makes people more open to new experiences, which can result in their acting in ways that are inconsistent with how people in their culture typically behave. Would being in a good mood, therefore, cause people to become more likely to defy their cultural norm, making Westerners more interested in the common colour pen and East Asians more interested in the uncommon colour pen? The researchers tested this idea by presenting participants from either Western (European or European Canadian) or East Asian backgrounds with the pen choice previously described. Before looking at the pens, though, the participants were randomly assigned TABLE 1.5 Mood and culture: the conditions to be placed into a positive or negative mood. How was mood In Ashton-James and colleagues’ norm-deviation experiment, manipulated? The participants in the positive mood condition participants from a Western or an East Asian background listened to a very pleasant, upbeat piece of classical music by were put in a positive or negative mood. Combining these two Mozart, while those in the negative mood condition listened to variables – culture and the manipulation of mood – created the a much more serious, rather depressing piece by Rachmaninov. four conditions displayed here. Table 1.5 summarises the design of this experiment. Western East Asian Among the Western participants, those put in a positive Condition 1 Condition 2 mood were less likely to choose the uncommon pen compared with those in the negative mood condition. The opposite was Positive mood Western/Positive East Asian/Positive true for the East Asian participants: Those put in a positive mood Condition 3 Condition 4 were more likely to choose the uncommon pen compared with Negative mood Western/Negative East Asian/Negative those in the negative mood condition. The results, therefore, Source: Ashton-James, C. E., Maddux, W. W., Galinsky, A. D., & Chartrand, T. L. (2009). Who supported the researchers’ predictions – positive moods did I am depends on how I feel: The role of affect in the expression of culture. Psychological make individuals more likely to act in ways that deviated from Science, 20, 340–346. the norms of their cultures relative to negative moods.

Independent and dependent variables Independent variable In an experiment, a factor that experimenters manipulate to see if it affects the dependent variable.

Dependent variable

In an experiment, a factor that experimenters measure to see if it is affected by the independent variable.

Subject variable

A variable that characterises pre-existing differences among the participants in a study.

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Let us now focus on some of the specific elements of experiments. In an experiment, researchers manipulate one or more independent variables and examine the effect of these manipulations on one or more dependent variables. In the experiment we have just described, there was one independent variable, mood, with participants randomly assigned to the positive mood or negative mood condition. The dependent variable was the likelihood of selecting the uncommon pen. It was the dependent variable because the researchers were interested in seeing if it would depend on (i.e., be influenced by) the manipulation of the independent variable.

Subject variables Some experiments include variables that are neither dependent nor truly independent. The gender, ethnicity and prior political leanings of the participants may vary, for example, and researchers may be interested in examining some of these differences. These variables cannot be manipulated and randomly assigned, so they are not true independent variables, and they are not influenced by the independent variables, so they are not dependent variables. Variables such as these are called subject variables because they characterise pre-existing differences among the subjects, or participants, in the experiment. If a study includes subject variables but no true, randomly assigned independent variable, it is not a true experiment. But experiments often include subject variables along with independent variables so that researchers can test whether the independent variables have the same or different effects on different kinds of participants. The norm-deviation experiment discussed previously is an example of an experiment with one true independent variable and one subject variable. The randomly assigned independent variable was the manipulation of mood – some participants were placed into a good mood and some into a bad mood. The subject variable was the participants’ cultural background – some were of Western background and some were of East Asian background.

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CHAPTER ONE

Statistical significance and replications In the norm-deviation experiment, 60% of the Western participants chose the uncommon colour pen when in a negative mood, but only 13% did so when in a positive mood. Is the difference between 60% and 13% large enough to be meaningful, or could this difference simply be due to chance; that is, just random variation, like flipping a coin 10 times and getting heads six times and tails four? The answer is that you cannot tell just by looking at these numbers alone. Results obtained in an experiment are examined with statistical analyses that allow the researcher to determine how likely it is that the results could have occurred by random chance. The standard convention is that if the results could have occurred by chance five or fewer times in 100 possible outcomes, then the result is statistically significant and should be taken seriously. The fact that results are statistically significant does not mean, however, that they are absolutely certain. In essence, statistical significance is an attractive betting proposition. The odds are quite good (at least 95 out of 100) that the effects obtained in the study were due to the experimental manipulation of the independent variable. But there is still the possibility (as high as 5 out of 100) that the findings occurred by chance. This is one reason why it is important to try to replicate the results of an experiment – to repeat the experiment and see if similar results are found. If similar results are found, the probability that these results could have occurred by chance both times is less than 1 out of 400. Statistical significance is relevant not only for the results of experiments but also for many other kinds of data as well, such as correlations. A correlation between two variables may be statistically significant or not, depending on the strength of the correlation and the number of participants or observations in the data. When the results of some research are reported in the media or an advertisement, it is not always clear from the reporting whether the results are statistically significant, so it is important to be very cautious when learning about them. You can be sure, however, that whenever we report in this textbook that there is a difference between conditions of an experiment or that two variables are correlated, these results are statistically significant. Very recently there has been a growing emphasis in psychology (and some other disciplines, such as medicine) on the importance of both replicating research findings and using statistical techniques that serve as alternatives to the focus on statistical significance (Trafimow & Marks, 2015). Geoff Cumming of La Trobe University is a renowned advocate of these alternative approaches. In the coming years these alternatives will no doubt become more popular. We will return to this topic in the final section of this chapter.

Internal validity When an experiment is properly conducted, its results are said to have internal validity. That is, there is reasonable certainty that the independent variable did, in fact, cause the effects obtained on the dependent variable (Cook & Campbell, 1979). As noted earlier, both experimenter control and random assignment seek to rule out alternative explanations of the research results, thereby strengthening the internal validity of the research. If some other factor varies consistently along with the manipulation, this other factor is called a confound. A confound is a serious threat to internal validity and, therefore, makes the issue of cause and effect in the experiment uncertain. For example, if the subjects in the norm-deviation experiment who listened to the pleasant music did so at a loud volume, and the subjects who listened to the serious music did so at a quiet volume, then this would be a confound. It would be impossible to know if it was the manipulation of the type of music or if it was the volume of the music that caused the effect on pen choice. Fortunately, the experimenters knew to avoid this problem. Experiments sometimes include control groups for purposes of internal validity. Typically, a control group consists of participants who experience all of the procedures except the experimental treatment. In the norm-deviation experiment, for example, the participants in the negative-mood condition could be considered a control group, which provided a baseline against which to compare the behaviour of participants in the positive-mood condition. Outside the laboratory, creating control groups in natural settings that examine real-life events raises many practical and ethical problems. For example, researchers testing new medical treatments for deadly diseases face a terrible dilemma. Individuals randomly assigned to the control group receive the standard treatment, but they are excluded for the duration of the study from what could turn out to be a life-saving new intervention. Yet without such a comparison, it is extremely difficult to determine which new treatments are effective and which are useless.

Internal validity

The degree to which there can be reasonable certainty that the independent variables in an experiment caused the effects obtained on the dependent variables.

Confound

A factor other than the independent variable that varies between the conditions of an experiment, thereby calling into question what caused any effects on the dependent variable.

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INTRODUCTION

Experimenter expectancy effects

The effects produced when an experimenter’s expectations about the results of an experiment affect his or her behaviour towards a participant and thereby influence the participant’s responses.

In assessing internal validity, researchers need to consider their own role as well. Unwittingly, they can sometimes sabotage their own research. For example, imagine you are a researcher and you know which participants are in which conditions of your experiment. You will no doubt have expectations (and possibly even strong hopes) about how your participants will respond differently between conditions. Because of these expectations, and without realising it, you may treat the participants in a slightly different way between conditions. It turns out that even very subtle differences in an experimenter’s behaviour can influence participants’ behaviour (Rosenthal, 1976). Therefore, because of these experimenter expectancy effects, the results you find in your experiment may be produced by your own actions rather than by the independent variable! The best way to protect an experiment from these effects is to keep experimenters uninformed about assignments to conditions. This often is called being ‘blind to the conditions’ in a study. If the experimenters do not know the condition to which a participant has been assigned, they cannot treat participants differently as a function of their condition. Of course, there may be times when keeping experimenters uninformed is impossible or impractical. In such cases, the opportunity for experimenter expectancy effects to occur can at least be reduced somewhat by minimising the interaction between experimenters and participants. For example, rather than receiving instructions directly from an experimenter, participants can be asked to read the instructions on a computer screen.

External validity In addition to guarding internal validity, researchers are concerned about external validity – the extent to which the results obtained under one set of circumstances would also occur in a different set of circumstances (Berkowitz & Donnerstein, 1982). When an experiment has external validity, its findings can be assumed to generalise to other people and to other situations. Both the participants in the experiment and the setting in which it takes place affect external validity. To help increase external validity, social psychologists would ideally conduct their experiments with huge samples of participants that are representative of the general population. Usually, however, they must rely on convenience samples drawn from populations that are readily available to them, which explains why so much of social psychological research is conducted on university students. There are very practical reasons for the use of convenience samples. Representative samples are fine for surveys that require short answers to a short list of questions. But what about complex, time-consuming experiments? The costs and logistical problems associated with this would be staggering. Advocates of convenience samples contend that the more basic the principle, the less it matters who participates in the research. For example, people from different cultures, regions and ages might differ in the form of aggression they typically exhibit when angry, but the situational factors that cause people to be more likely to aggress – in whatever way that aggression is FIGURE 1.15 Amazon’s Mechanical Turk: a research expressed – may be similar for most individuals across time and recruitment tool place. Yet in spite of these arguments, having the most diverse, Many individuals earn money at home by participating in online representative samples of research participants as possible is research projects through a service provided by Amazon called ideal. The growing interest in cross-cultural research in the field Mechanical Turk. Online services like this now allow social is certainly one step in the right direction. psychologists to reach out to vastly more diverse samples of Another promising development is the rapidly increasing use people from around the world to participate in their studies. of the internet to collect data, which allows for far more diverse sets of participants. However, there are numerous challenges associated with this approach as well, such as having less control over what participants are seeing or doing as they participate in the study from afar. Fortunately, recent research testing the data collected via of one of most popular online services, called Mechanical Turk (see Figure 1.15), suggests that the data are at least as reliable as data collected through traditional methods and offer a much greater diversity of participants (Buhrmester, Talaifar, & Gosling, 2018; Mason & Suri, 2012; Paolacci & Chandler, 2014). The external validity of an experiment may also depend in part on how realistic the study is for the participants. But what is meant by ‘realistic’ is not as straightforward as one might Source: Shutterstock.com/Dragon Images think. Two types of realism can be distinguished – mundane and

External validity

The degree to which there can be reasonable confidence that the results of a study would be obtained for other people and in other situations.

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experimental (Aronson & Carlsmith, 1968). Mundane realism refers to the extent to which the research setting resembles the real-world setting of interest. In order to study interpersonal attraction, Theodore Newcomb (1961) set up an entire university dormitory – a striking example of mundane realism. Advocates of mundane realism contend that if research procedures are more realistic, research findings are more likely to reveal what really goes on. By contrast, experimental realism refers to the degree to which the experimental setting and procedures are real and involving to the participant, regardless of whether they resemble real life or not. According to those who favour experimental realism, if the experimental situation is compelling and real to the participants while they are participating in the study, their behaviour in the laboratory – even if the laboratory is in the basement of the psychology building – will be as natural and spontaneous as their behaviour in the real world. The majority of social psychologists who conduct experiments emphasise experimental realism.

CHAPTER ONE

Mundane realism

The degree to which the experimental situation resembles places and events in the real world.

Experimental realism The degree to which experimental procedures are involving to participants and lead them to behave naturally and spontaneously.

Deception in experiments Researchers who strive to create a highly involving experience for participants often rely on deception – providing participants with false information about experimental procedures. To this end, social psychologists sometimes employ confederates, or people who act as though they are participants in the experiment but are really working for the experimenter. For example, in Solomon Asch’s (1956) classic research on conformity, research participants made judgements about the lengths of lines while in the midst of a number of confederates who were pretending to be ordinary participants and who at various times all gave wrong answers. The researchers wanted to see if the real participants would conform to the confederates and give the obviously wrong answer that the confederates had given. Although it was a very odd setting, the situation was a very real one to the participants (and therefore was high in experimental realism), and many of the participants clearly struggled with the decision about whether or not to conform. We will revisit Asch’s study in Chapter 7. Deception not only strengthens experimental realism but also provides other benefits. It allows the experimenter to create situations in the laboratory that would be difficult to find in a natural setting, such as a regulated, safe environment in which to study a potentially harmful behaviour such as aggression or discrimination. Studies have shown that participants are rarely bothered by deception and often particularly enjoy studies that use it (Smith & Richardson, 1983). Nevertheless, the use of deception creates some serious ethical concerns, leading to debate about whether and how it should be used (Hegtvedt, 2014; Kimmel, 2012). Fortunately, as we will see a bit later in the chapter, procedures have been put in place to try to ensure the ethical integrity of research today.

Deception

In the context of research, a method that provides false information to participants.

Confederate

An accomplice of an experimenter who, in dealing with the real participants in an experiment, acts as if he or she is also a participant.

Meta-analysis: combining results across studies We have seen that social psychologists conduct original descriptive, correlational and experimental studies to test their hypotheses. Another way to test hypotheses in social psychology is to use a set of statistical procedures to examine, in a new way, relevant research that has already been conducted. This technique is called meta-analysis. By ‘meta-analysing’ the results of a number of studies that have been conducted in different places and by different researchers, researchers can measure precisely how strong and reliable particular effects are. For example, studies published concerning the effects of alcohol on aggression may sometimes contradict each other. Sometimes alcohol increases aggression; sometimes it doesn’t. By combining the data from all the studies that are relevant to this hypothesis and conducting a meta-analysis, a researcher can determine what effect alcohol typically has, how strong that effect typically is, and perhaps under what specific conditions that effect is most likely to occur. This technique is being used with increasing frequency in social psychology today, and we report the results of many meta-analyses in this textbook.

Meta-analysis

A set of statistical procedures used to review a body of evidence by combining the results of individual studies to measure the overall reliability and strength of particular effects.

Culture and research methods The study by Ashton-James and others on the effects of mood on Western and East Asian participants’ pen choices is but one example of the growing interest in studying culture in social psychology. One of the advantages of this approach is that it provides better tests of the external validity of research that has been conducted in any one setting. By examining whether the results of an experiment generalise to a very different culture, social psychologists can begin to answer questions about the universality or cultural specificity of their research. It is important to keep in mind that when a finding in one culture does not generalise well to another culture, this should be seen not simply as a failure to replicate but also as an opportunity to learn about potentially interesting and important cultural differences.

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As important and exciting as these cultural investigations are, however, they offer special challenges to researchers. For example, cultural differences have been found in how affected people are by the context of questions as they complete a ‘Drop your trousers here for best results.’ (A dry cleaner in survey, or about the assumptions respondents make about what Thailand) the researchers have in mind for a given question (Schwarz, ‘You are invited to take advantage of the chambermaid.’ Oyserman, & Peytcheva, 2010; Uskul, Oyserman, Schwarz, Lee, (A hotel in Japan) & Xu, 2013). It also can be difficult for researchers to translate ‘Ladies are requested not to have children in the bar.’ materials from one language to another. Although it is relatively (A cocktail lounge in Mexico) easy to create literal translations, it can be surprisingly ‘Take one of our horse-driven city tours – we guarantee challenging to create translations that have the same meaning no miscarriages.’ (A tourist agency in the former to people from various cultures. Figure 1.16 presents examples, Czechoslovakia) from signs displayed around the world, of what can go wrong ‘We take your bags and send them in all directions.’ when simple sentences are poorly translated. (An airline in Denmark) An even more subtle point about language is that multilingual Source: Triandis, H. C. (1994). Culture and social behavior. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill. people may think or act differently as a function of which language is being used in a particular setting. A study by Nairán Ramírez-Esparza and colleagues (2008) illustrates this point. They found that how agreeable a sample of bilingual Mexican–American participants appeared to be, either on a self-report questionnaire or in their behaviour in an interview, varied significantly as a function of whether the study was conducted in Spanish or in English.

FIGURE 1.16 Lost in translation: Imperfect translation around the world • • • •

•

ETHICS AND VALUES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY Regardless of where research is conducted and what method is used, ethical issues must always be considered. Researchers in all fields have a moral and legal responsibility to abide by ethical principles. In social psychology, the use of deception has caused some concern about ethics, as we indicated earlier. In addition, several studies have provoked fierce debate about whether the procedures used in the studies went beyond the bounds of ethical acceptability. The most famous of these controversial studies was designed by Stanley Milgram in the early 1960s. Milgram (1963) designed a series of studies to address the question: ‘Would people obey orders to harm an innocent person?’ To test this question, he put volunteers into a situation in which an experimenter commanded them to administer painful electric shocks to someone they thought was another volunteer participant. (In fact, the other person was a confederate who was not actually receiving any shocks.) The experiment had extremely high experimental realism – many of the participants experienced a great deal of anxiety and stress as they debated whether they should disobey the experimenter or continue to inflict pain on another person. The details and results of this experiment are discussed in Chapter 7, but suffice it to say that the results of the study made people realise how prevalent and powerful obedience can be. Milgram’s research was inspired by the obedience displayed by Nazi officers in World War II. Noone disputes the importance of his research question. What has been debated, however, is whether the significance of the research topic justified exposing participants to possibly harmful psychological consequences. Even though no-one in Milgram’s studies actually received the electric shocks, the participants were quite stressed during the study because they thought they were harming another person, until the experimenter finally told them the truth at the conclusion of the experiment. Under today’s provisions for the protection of human participants, Milgram’s classic experiments probably could not be conducted in their original form. (In an interesting twist, even though conducting an experiment like Milgram’s might be impossible now, in popular culture today individuals endure far greater stress and even humiliation in numerous unscripted television shows for the entertainment of viewers at home.) Several other studies in the history of social psychology have sparked ethical debate or controversy, including a famous study in which Philip Zimbardo and others simulated a prison environment in the basement of Stanford University’s psychology department building to study how ordinary people can be affected in extraordinary ways by the roles they are assigned in a prison environment (Haney, Banks, & Zimbardo, 1973). This study is discussed in detail in Chapter 15. Although the controversial studies such as Milgram’s and Zimbardo’s have received the most public attention, today virtually every social psychology study is evaluated for its ethics by other people before the study can be conducted. In the following sections, we describe current policies and procedures as well as continuing concerns about ethics and values in social psychological research. 30

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Ethics review bodies and informed consent Nearly all universities and research organisations have human research ethics committees or institutional review boards that are designed to review and ensure the protection of human participants in research. Such bodies are a key safeguard for research, taking on the responsibility of reviewing research proposals to ensure that the welfare of participants is adequately protected. Extra care must be taken when research is conducted with particular populations (e.g., Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders, or individuals from nonEnglish speaking backgrounds). Besides submitting their research to such ethical bodies, researchers must also abide by their profession’s code of ethics. The Australian Psychological Society and the New Zealand Psychological Society publish codes of ethics, however these are fairly specific to clinical practice. The American Psychological Association (APA), publishes the ‘Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct’ (2002, 2010), which addresses academic research questions more broadly. A great deal of research carried out in Australia is evaluated against the National Health and Medical Research Council’s ‘National Statement of Ethical Conduct in Human Research’ (2007). These codes consider a wide range of ethical issues, including those related to research procedures and practices. Such codes stipulate that researchers are obliged to guard the rights and welfare of all those who participate in their studies. One such obligation is to obtain informed consent. Individuals must be asked whether they wish to participate in the research project and must be given enough information to make an informed decision. Participants must also know that they are free to withdraw from participation in the research at any point. Note that the APA code recognises that research involving ‘only anonymous questionnaires, naturalistic observations, or certain kinds of archival research’ (p. 11) may not require informed consent. The same is true for the NHMRC code.

Debriefing Just as participants should receive informed consent before they begin their participation in a study, they should also receive a debriefing at the end of it, especially if deception was used. Debriefing is a process of disclosure in which researchers fully inform their participants about the nature of the research in which they have participated. During a debriefing, the researcher goes over all procedures, explaining exactly what happened and why. The researcher discusses the purpose of the research, reveals any deceptions and makes every effort to help the participant feel good about having participated. A skilful debriefing takes time and requires close attention to the individual participant. Indeed, we have known students who became so fascinated by what they learned during a debriefing that it sparked their interest in social psychology, and eventually they became social psychologists themselves!

Ethics and consent online Along with the tremendous benefits of our ever-expanding online worlds has come a troubling loss of privacy. This loss of privacy has opened the window for corporations, marketers and researchers to record your actions in ways that raise new questions about ethics. A firestorm of controversy erupted in the summer of 2014, for instance, when scientists working with Facebook published a paper in which they revealed they had conducted an experiment on nearly 700 000 Facebook users without their knowledge by manipulating their news feeds and recording how the manipulation affected users’ subsequent status updates. As the opening line of a New York Times article about the controversy put it, ‘To Facebook, we are all lab rats’ (Goel, 2014). Technically, every Facebook user gives consent to being ‘lab rats’ to Facebook scientists when he or she agrees to its terms of service, but, in reality, we all know that very few people pay attention to all that fine print when they begin to use a new app or service. Other internet giants like Google routinely manipulate and measure what their users are doing, although typically the (stated) purpose is to improve the user experience or make a site or app more popular. Questions about ethics and informed consent in the online world will no doubt continue to be asked and wrestled with in the coming years (Bambauer, 2018).

Informed consent

An individual’s deliberate, voluntary decision to participate in research, based on the researcher’s description of what will be required during such participation.

Debriefing

A disclosure, made to participants after research procedures are completed, in which the researcher explains the purpose of the research, attempts to resolve any negative feelings and emphasises the scientific contribution made by the participants’ involvement.

Values and science: points of view and new controversies Ethical principles are based on moral values that set standards for, and impose limits on, the conduct of research. But do values affect science in other ways as well? Although many people hold science to a standard of complete objectivity, science can probably never be completely unbiased and objective because it is a human enterprise. Scientists choose what to study and how to study it; their choices are affected by personal values as well as by professional rewards. Indeed, some think that values should fuel

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scientific research and that scientists would be not only naive but also irresponsible to try to keep values out of the picture. However, most social psychologists strive to use the scientific methods described in this chapter to free themselves of their preconceptions and, thereby, to see reality more clearly and objectively, even if never perfectly. One value on which the entire field of social psychology agrees is that researchers must conduct and report their research with complete honesty. It is therefore both shocking and deeply disturbing when a case of academic fraud is revealed. One such example rocked the field towards the end of 2011, when a Dutch social psychologist was caught, and soon confessed to, having committed a massive amount of dishonesty, involving the fabrication of data published in dozens of studies for about a decade (Stroebe, Postmes, & Spears, 2012). The news of this scandal, together with a few other events during this period of time, caused some social psychologists to question the field’s practices. One event was the publication of a set of studies that claimed to find evidence for the seemingly outrageous idea that a future outcome can influence a past action (Bem, 2011). Not surprisingly, this publication set off a firestorm of criticism and controversy. Also around this time, social psychologist Jonathan Haidt made news by criticising the lack of diversity of political ideologies represented by social psychologists today and suggesting that this could bias research (Inbar & Lammers, 2012). This, too, triggered a good deal of criticism and controversy. Following this, a wave of suggestions for how the field should better protect itself against intentional or unintentional bias or dishonesty emerged. These suggestions included, among many, utilising more advanced and precise statistical methods to better and more fairly test researchers’ ideas; demanding researchers be more open for public scrutiny of their materials and data, and instituting much more emphasis on replicating each other’s research; making public commitments to articulate predictions and planning data analyses before the data are collected; and for journals to agree to publish the results no matter how the data turn out (Baumeister, 2016; Cumming, 2014; Finkel, Eastwick, & Reis, 2015; Munafo et al., 2017; Nosek et al., 2015; van’t Veer & Giner-Sorolla, 2016; Wegener & Fabrigar, 2018). One particular focus of this era of social psychology is on the replicability of findings in the field. There have been several high-profile failures to replicate studies held as cornerstones of the field. The reasons why a particular study may not replicate are hotly debated, with some pointing to methodological or sample differences between the original study and the replication attempt, and others pointing to historical research practices that may have led to unreliable findings in the first place (Earp & Trafimow, 2015; Maxwell, Lau, & Howard, 2015; Open Science Collaboration, 2015; Simons, 2014; Simonsohn, 2015). Throughout the text, we highlight several of these cases in sections named ‘Current Scene On …’ It is important to note that the strong reaction by the social psychology community to these issues is a testament to how much it cares about its integrity. It is also a reminder of the importance for community members to work diligently to reassert and protect that integrity in the years to come. The new practices and directions that researchers are taking to ensure integrity and accuracy are exciting and energising, particularly for the next generation of young social psychologists who are beginning to take the reins of the field as it continues to grow rapidly in its findings, scope and importance.

Topical Reflection LOOKING BACK AND MOVING FORWARD Your introduction to the field of social psychology is now complete. In this first chapter you have gone step-by-step through a definition of social psychology, a review of its history and discussion of its future, an overview of its research methods and a consideration of ethics and values. As you study the material presented in the coming chapters, we invite you to share our enthusiasm. You can look forward to information that overturns common-sense assumptions, to lively debate and heated controversy, and to a better understanding of yourself and other people. Welcome to the world according to social psychology. We hope you enjoy it!

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CHAPTER REVIEW SUMMARY WHAT IS SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY? DEFINING SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY • Social psychology is the scientific study of how individuals think, feel and behave in a social context. • Like other sciences, social psychology relies on the systematic approach of the scientific method. • Distinctive characteristics of social psychology include a focus on the individual as well as a broad perspective on a variety of social contexts and behaviours. SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL QUESTIONS AND APPLICATIONS • Social psychologists study a large variety of fascinating questions about people and their social worlds. The scope and relevance of these questions to so many important aspects of our lives makes social psychology applicable to many careers and interests. SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AND RELATED FIELDS • Social psychology is related to a number of different areas of study, including sociology, clinical psychology, personality psychology and cognitive psychology. • Social psychology tends to focus on individuals, whereas sociology tends to focus on groups. SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AND COMMON SENSE • Many social psychological theories and findings appear to be like common sense. The problem with common sense, however, is that it may offer conflicting explanations, provides no way to test which is correct and is often oversimplified and therefore misleading.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 1880s TO 1920s: THE BIRTH AND INFANCY OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY • Early research by Triplett and Ringelmann established an enduring topic in social psychology – how the presence of others affects an individual’s performance. • The first social psychology textbooks in 1908 and 1924 began to shape the emerging field. 1930s TO 1950s: A CALL TO ACTION • Social psychology began to flourish because the world needed an explanation for the violence of war and solutions to it. • The 1940s and 1950s saw a burst of activity in social psychology, including by researchers Sherif and Lewin, that firmly established it as a major social science. 1960s TO MID-1970s: CONFIDENCE AND CRISIS • Stanley Milgram’s experiments demonstrated individuals’ vulnerability to the destructive commands of authority. • While social psychology was expanding in many new directions, there was also intense debate about the ethics of research procedures, the validity of research results and the generalisability of conclusions drawn from research.

MID-1970s TO 1990s: AN ERA OF PLURALISM • During the 1970s, social psychology began to take a pluralistic approach to its research methods, the integration of perspectives into a subfield such as social cognition, and the development of international and multicultural perspectives. SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY TODAY • Several exciting themes and perspectives are helping to shape the beginning of social psychology’s second century. • Researchers are becoming more interested in how emotion, motivation and cognition can operate together in influencing individuals’ thoughts, feelings and behaviours. • Individuals sometimes are faced with a conflict between wanting to be right and wanting to feel good about themselves. • Biological perspectives, including perspectives based on neuroscience, genetics and evolutionary principles, are being applied to the study of social psychological issues such as gender differences, relationships and aggression. • Increasing numbers of social psychologists are evaluating the universal generality or cultural specificity of their theories and findings by examining similarities and differences across cultures as well as between racial and ethnic groups within cultures. • The emerging subfield of behavioural economics studies how psychology – particularly social and cognitive psychology – relates to economic decision-making. • Research on embodied cognition focuses on the connections between the mind and the body, such as in how body gestures or movements can influence and be influenced by our thoughts and feelings. • Social psychological research that intersects with political science can offer valuable insights into a variety of important contemporary issues. • Advances in technology, such as improved brain-imaging techniques, have given rise to groundbreaking research in social psychology. • Virtual reality technology enables researchers to test questions that otherwise would be impractical, impossible or unethical. • The internet has fostered communication and collaboration among researchers around the world, enabled researchers to study participants from diverse populations, and inspired researchers to investigate whether various social psychological phenomena are similar or different online versus offline.

RESEARCH METHODS • Studying research methods in psychology improves people’s reasoning about real-life events and information presented by the media and other sources. • Understanding the scientific evidence upon which social psychological theories and findings are based will help you to better understand the research that is reported throughout this textbook, which in turn will help you learn the material more deeply.

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DEVELOPING IDEAS GETTING IDEAS AND FINDING OUT WHAT HAS BEEN DONE • Ideas for research in social psychology come from everywhere, including personal experiences and observations, events in the news and other research. • Before pursuing a research idea, it is important to establish what research has already been done on that idea and related topics. Electronic databases are invaluable in this effort. HYPOTHESES AND THEORIES • Formulating a hypothesis is a critical step towards planning and conducting research. • Theories in social psychology attempt to explain and predict social psychological phenomena. The best theories are precise, explain all the relevant information, and generate research that can support or disprove them. They should be revised and improved as a result of the research they inspire. BASIC AND APPLIED RESEARCH • The goal of basic research is to increase understanding of human behaviour. • The goal of applied research is to increase understanding of real-world events and contribute to the solution of social problems.

REFINING IDEAS CONCEPTUAL VARIABLES AND OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS • Researchers often must transform abstract, conceptual variables into specific operational definitions that indicate exactly how the variables are to be manipulated or measured. • Construct validity is the extent to which the operational definitions successfully manipulate or measure the conceptual variables to which they correspond.

• •

• •

•

In observational research, researchers observe individuals systematically, often in natural settings. In archival research, researchers examine existing records and documents such as newspaper articles, diaries and published statistics. Surveys involve asking people questions about their attitudes, beliefs and behaviours. Survey researchers identify the population to which they want the results of the survey to generalise, and they select a sample of people from that population to take the survey. Two types of research are conducted in psychology – qualitative and quantitative. Quantitative research is concerned with quantifying things whereas qualitative research is concerned with understanding meaning.

CORRELATIONAL RESEARCH: LOOKING FOR ASSOCIATIONS • Correlational research examines the association between variables. • A correlation coefficient is a measure of the strength and direction of the association between two variables. • Positive correlations indicate that as scores on one variable increase, scores on the other variable increase; and that as scores on one variable decrease, scores on the other decrease. • Negative correlations indicate that as scores on one variable increase, scores on the other decrease. • Correlation does not indicate causation; the fact that two variables are correlated does not necessarily mean that one causes the other.

MEASURING VARIABLES • In self-reports, participants indicate their thoughts, feelings, desires and actions. • Self-reports can be distorted by efforts to make a good impression as well as by the effects of the wording and context of questions. • Observations are another way for social psychologists to measure variables. • Interrater reliability, or the level of agreement among multiple observers of the same behaviour, is important when measuring variables using observation. • New and improved technologies enable researchers to measure physiological responses, reaction times, eye movements and activity in regions of the brain.

EXPERIMENTS: LOOKING FOR CAUSE AND EFFECT • Experiments require (1) control by the experimenter over events in the study, and (2) random assignment of participants to conditions. • Random sampling concerns how people are selected to be in a study, whereas random assignment concerns how people who are in the study are assigned to the different conditions of the study. • Experiments are often conducted in a laboratory so that the researchers can have control over the context and can measure variables precisely. • Field experiments are conducted in real-world settings outside the laboratory. • Results that are statistically significant could have occurred by chance five or fewer times in 100 possible outcomes. • The rapidly increasing use of the internet to collect data allows for far more diverse sets of participants in social psychological research today.

TESTING IDEAS: RESEARCH DESIGNS • Most social psychologists test their ideas by using objective, systematic and quantifiable methods.

META-ANALYSIS: COMBINING RESULTS ACROSS STUDIES • Meta-analysis uses statistical techniques to integrate the quantitative results of different studies.

DESCRIPTIVE RESEARCH: DISCOVERING TRENDS AND TENDENCIES • In descriptive research, social psychologists record how frequently or typically people think, feel or behave in particular ways.

CULTURE AND RESEARCH METHODS • When conducting research with different cultures, social psychologists must be mindful of contextual effects and accurate translation in the cases of non-English-speaking cultures.

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ETHICS AND VALUES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY • Ethical issues are particularly important in social psychology because of the use of deception in some research. ETHICS REVIEW BODIES AND INFORMED CONSENT • Ethics review bodies are responsible for reviewing research proposals to ensure that the welfare of participants is adequately protected. • Professional association codes of ethics require psychologists to secure informed consent from research participants. DEBRIEFING • During a debriefing at the end of a study the researchers disclose the facts about the study and make sure that participants do not experience any distress. This is especially important if deception was used.

CHAPTER ONE

VALUES AND SCIENCE: POINTS OF VIEW AND NEW CONTROVERSIES • Moral values set standards for and impose limits on the conduct of research. • Various views exist on the relation between values and science. Few believe that there can be a completely valuefree science, but some advocate trying to minimise values influence. Others argue that values should be recognised and encouraged as an important factor in science. • Controversies in social psychology have led to a variety of suggestions for how the field should better protect itself against intentional or unintentional bias or dishonesty, including more openness to scrutiny, use of different statistical analyses and greater emphasis on replication.

LINKAGES There are many connections across the topics featured in this textbook. Gaining a broad conceptual understanding of social psychology as a whole requires seeing such connections. To help you recognise some of these connections, we include a ‘Linkages’ diagram at the end of each chapter. Each diagram features three topics, formed as a question or statement, featured in other chapters that connect to content from the current chapter. Chapter numbers guide you to where you can read more about each topic.   

We hope that seeing these relationships among social psychology’s many areas will highlight the interconnectedness of concepts in the field. This will ultimately help you to build a holistic picture of social psychology – understanding that will no doubt be helpful in learning about this fascinating field of research. Moreover, we hope that the Linkage diagrams will inspire to look for other linkages not featured; there are certainly many!

REVIEW QUIZ 1 Social psychology is primarily concerned with the ways in which: a group factors contribute to the functioning of social institutions. b unconscious forces influence conscious motivations and desires. c specific personality characteristics predict behaviour across situations. d individuals think, feel and behave with regard to others. 2 Social psychologists use the scientific method when they study human behaviour in order to: a allow other social psychologists to attempt to replicate the findings. b ensure that the right people get credit for the research. c ensure that their research aligns with ethical standards. d encourage social psychologists to conduct more basic, rather than applied, research. 3 Social psychology differs from common sense in that: a common sense tends to produce more accurate knowledge about human behaviour than social psychology. b common sense captures the full complexity of human behaviour.

c social psychology is far more intuitive than common sense. d social psychology relies on the scientific method to test its theories. 4 Among the following social psychologists, who was one of the original founders of social psychology? a Norman Triplett. b Stanley Milgram. c Michael Norton. d Philip Zimbardo. 5 A new technology used in contemporary social psychological research is: a positron emission tomography. b functional magnetic resonance imaging. c virtual reality. d all of the above. 6 Which of the following stands as a key ethical obligation for social psychologists? a Replication. b Informed consent. c Deception. d External validity.

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WEBLINKS Australian Psychological Society: ethics http://www.psychology.org.au/About-Us/What-we-do/ethicsand-practice-standards/APS-Code-of-Ethics A link to the Australian Psychological Society’s code of ethics, with details of the ethical code of conduct applicable to practice in Australia and a number of other documents of relevance.

https://osf.io/ezcuj The website for the Reproducibility Project, a crowdsourced empirical effort to estimate the reproducibility of a sample of studies from scientific literature. The project is a large-scale, open collaboration currently involving more than 150 scientists from around the world.

Historical figures in social psychology http://www.socialpsychology.org/social-figures.htm A link to a page containing biographical sketches on many of the key historical figures in the field of social psychology maintained by the Social Psychology Network.

Society for the Improvement of Psychological Science http://improvingpsych.org The website for the Society for the Improvement of Psychological Science contains links to various initiatives aimed towards improving the methods and practices across the field of psychology.

New Zealand Psychological Society: publications and media http://www.psychology.org.nz/publications-media A link to the New Zealand Psychological Society’s code of ethics, along with documents relevant to practice in New Zealand. Reproducibility Project: psychology

Society of Australasian Social Psychologists https://sasp.org.au The website for the Society of Australasian Social Psychologists contains links to funding opportunities and events of relevance to social psychology.

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Cohen, S., Murphy, M. L., & Prather, A. A. (2018). Ten surprising facts about stressful life events and disease risk. Annual review of psychology, 70. https://doi. org/10.1146/annurev-psych-010418-102857 Cook, T. D., & Campbell, D. T. (1979). Quasiexperimentation: Design and analysis issues for field settings. Chicago, IL: Rand McNally. Crawford, J. T., Brandt, M. J., Inbar, Y., Chambers, J. R., & Motyl, M. (2017). Social and economic ideologies differentially predict prejudice across the political spectrum, but social issues are most divisive. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 112(3), 383. Cumming, G. (2014). The new statistics: Why and how. Psychological Science, 25, 7–29. Dadvand, P., Nieuwenhuijsen, M.J., Esnaola, M., Forns, J., Basagaña, X., Alvarez-Pedrerol, M., … & Sunyer J. (2015). Green spaces and cognitive development in primary schoolchildren. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 112, 7937–7942. Daniel, F., & Braasch, J. G. (2013). Application exercises improve transfer of statistical knowledge in real-world situations. Teaching of Psychology, 40, 200–207. de Almeida, R. M., Cabral, J. C., & Narvaes, R. (2015). Behavioral, hormonal and neurobiological mechanisms of aggressive behavior in human and nonhuman primates. Physiology & Behavior, 143, 121–135. Donnellan, M. B., Ackerman, R. A., & Brecheen, C. (2016). Extending structural analyses of the Rosenberg self-esteem scale to consider criterion-related validity: Can composite self-esteem scores be good enough? Journal of Personality Assessment, 98(2), 169–177. Dunbar, R. M. (2014). The social brain: Psychological underpinnings and implications for the structure of organizations. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 23, 109–114. Dweck, C. S. (2012). Implicit theories. In P. M. Van Lange, A. W. Kruglanski & E. Higgins (Eds.), Handbook of theories of social psychology (Vol. 2, pp. 43–61). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Earp, B. D., & Trafimow, D. (2015). Replication, falsification, and the crisis of confidence in social psychology. Frontiers in psychology, 6, 621. Edlund, J. E., & Sagarin, B. J. (2017). Sex differences in jealousy: A 25-year retrospective. In Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 55, pp. 259–302). Cambridge, MA: Academic Press. Eichstaedt, J. C., Schwartz, H. A., Kern, M. L., Park, G., Labarthe, D. R., Merchant, R. M., … Seligman, M. P. (2015). Psychological language on Twitter predicts county-level heart disease mortality. Psychological Science, 26, 159–169. Eisenberger, N. I. (2015). Social pain and the brain: Controversies, questions, and where to go from here. Annual Review of Psychology, 66, 601–629. Feather, N. T. (2009). Social psychology in Australia: Past and present. In D. Wedding, M. J. Stevens (Eds.), Psychology: IUPsyS Global Resource: Edition 2009. Hove, UK: Taylor & Francis. Festinger, L. (1954). A theory of social comparison processes. Human Relations, 7, 117–140. Festinger, L. (1957). A theory of cognitive dissonance. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Finkel, E. J., Eastwick, P. W., & Reis, H. T. (2015). Best research practices in psychology: Illustrating epistemological and pragmatic considerations with the case of relationship science. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 108, 275–297. Fuller-Rowell, T. E., Curtis, D. S., Chae, D. H., & Ryff, C. D. (2018). Longitudinal health consequences of socioeconomic disadvantage: Examining perceived discrimination as a mediator. Health Psychology, 37(5), 491.

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WHAT IS SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY?

reliability. Journal of Research in Personality, 69, 156–169. Wegener, D. T., & Fabrigar, L. R. (2018). Holding replication studies to mainstream standards of evidence. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 41, e155. Willig, C. (2013). Introducing qualitative research in psychology (3rd ed.). London, UK: McGraw Hill. Wilson, K., & Albarracín, D. (2015). Barriers to accessing HIV prevention in clinic settings: Higher

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holistic processing for own-race faces than other-race faces. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 12, 220. Zubrick, S. R., Shepherd, C. C. J., Dudgeon, P., Gee, G., Paradies, Y., Scrine, C., & Walker, R. (2014) Social determinants of social and emotional wellbeing. In P. Dudgeon, H. Milroy & R. Walker. Working together: Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander mental health and wellbeing principles and practice (pp. 93–112). Canberra, ACT: Commonwealth of Australia.

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39

PART TWO

SOCIAL PERCEPTION

CHAPTER 2: THE SOCIAL SELF CHAPTER 3: PERCEIVING OTHERS CHAPTER 4: STEREOTYPES, PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION CHAPTER 5: GENDER IDENTITY

The dimension of time: Socio-historical context

Attitudes and ideologies of culture

The environment

Interpersonal networks The individual Part 2: Social perception Chapter 2: The social self Chapter 3: Perceiving others Chapter 4: Stereotypes, prejudice and discrimination Chapter 5: Gender identity

In this section our focus is social perception – the way that we form impressions and make inferences about others. We begin by discussing the social self, examining the topics of selfesteem, self-presentation and self-concept. We then shift our attention to perceiving others, where we look at people, situations and behaviours; the way we integrate observations into a coherent impression of others; and the way that our impressions might distort reality. Next, we consider stereotypes, prejudice and discrimination, including the issues of racism, sexism and ageism, before focusing on gender identity.

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2

CHAPTER

The social self

Learning Objectives By the end of this chapter, you should be able to: 1 describe the processes that underlie how people come to have a self-concept and how those processes are affected by internal and external factors 2 explain current theory on why individuals have a sense of self-esteem and describe findings regarding gender and cultural differences, why situational factors and personal factors influence self-awareness and the ways in which individuals engage in selfenhancement 3 name the three motives that may drive self-presentation and differentiate them from one another 4 discuss how the multifaceted cognitive, affective and behavioural components of the self are complex, interrelated, and shaped by experience and the situation.

Social construction of the self put it. Further, Thompson himself seemed compelled to put on a face for others and to improvise characters for the company he kept. Thompson seemed to be pressed to answer the question ‘I am …’ even if that meant that his answers changed over time. However, this is something we all do to some extent, as will be shown throughout this chapter.

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Source: Shutterstock.com/eamesBot

In The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat, neurologist Oliver Sacks (1985) described William Thompson, who suffered from an organic brain disorder that impairs a person’s memory of recent events. Unable to recall anything for more than a few seconds, Thompson was always disoriented and lacked a sense of inner continuity. Thompson would construct one tale after another to account for who he was, where he was and what he was doing. He was a grocery store assistant one moment, a minister the next and a medical patient still later. Since Thompson was unable to reflect on his own actions, he appeared vacant and without feeling – ‘desouled’, as Sacks

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SOCIAL PERCEPTION

PUTTING COMMON SENSE TO THE TEST Circle Your Answer T

F

Humans are the only animals who recognise themselves in the mirror.

T

F

Rewards are a good way to boost internal motivation for a task.

T

F

Sitting in a slumped posture can make a negative mood last longer.

T

F

Sometimes the harder you try to control a thought, feeling or behaviour, the less likely you are to succeed.

T

F

People often sabotage their own performance in order to protect their self-esteem.

T

F

It is more adaptive to alter one’s behaviour than to stay consistent from one social situation to the next.

INTRODUCTION THIS CHAPTER EXAMINES three interrelated aspects of the ‘social self’. First, it considers a cognitive component of the self, the self-concept, and the question of how people come to understand who they are, their own actions, emotions, and motivations. Second, it considers self-esteem, the affective component, and the question of how people evaluate themselves and defend against threats to their selfesteem. Third, it considers self-presentation, a behavioural manifestation of the self, and the question of how people present themselves to others. Together, these three interrelated aspects of the ‘social self’ can be thought of as the ABCs of the self: A for affect (self-esteem), B for behaviour (self-presentation) and C for cognition (self-concept). As we will see, the self is complex and multifaceted and has attracted unprecedented interest among social psychologists (Brown, 2014; Leary & Tangney, 2013; Sedikides & Spencer, 2007).

SELF-CONCEPT

Self-concept

The sum of an individual’s beliefs about his or her own personal attributes.

Self-schema

A belief people hold about themselves that guides the processing of self-relevant information.

42

Have you ever been at a noisy gathering, holding a drink in one hand and a spring roll in the other, struggling to have a conversation over music and the chatter of voices, and yet managed to hear someone at the other end of the room say your name? If so, then you have experienced the ‘cocktail party effect’ – the tendency of people to pick a personally relevant stimulus, like a name, out of a complex and noisy environment (Cherry, 1953; Conway, Cowan & Bunting, 2001). This tendency is seen among infants who are too young to walk or talk (Newman, 2005) and even in online settings (Rigutti, Fantoni, Gerbino, & Peer, 2015). To the cognitive psychologist, this phenomenon shows that human beings are selective in their attention. To the social psychologist, it also shows that the self is an important object of our own attention. The term self-concept refers to the sum of the cognitive beliefs that people have about themselves. But what specifically does the self-concept consist of? According to Hazel Markus (1977), the self-concept is made up of cognitive molecules called self-schemas – beliefs about oneself that guide the processing of self-relevant information. Self-schemas are to an individual’s total self-concept as hypotheses are to a theory or as books are to a library. You can think of yourself as masculine or feminine, as independent or dependent, as introverted or extroverted. Indeed, any specific attribute may have relevance to the self-concept of some people but not of others. The self-schema for body weight is a good example. Men and women who regard themselves as extremely overweight or underweight, or for whom body image is a prominent aspect of their self-concept, are considered schematic with respect to weight. For these body-weight schematics, a wide range of otherwise mundane events – shopping for groceries, buying new clothing, eating dinner at a restaurant or spending the day at the beach – may trigger thoughts about the self. By contrast, those who do not regard their own weight as extreme or as an important part of their lives are aschematic for that attribute (Markus, Hamill, & Sentis, 1987). It is important to realise that people are multifaceted and that our self-concept may consist of a multitude of self-schemas. For instance, as we will see shortly, people who identify with two cultures may have a ‘double consciousness’ about who they are, and hold different self-schemas that fit within each culture. At the same time, however, consistency across various facets of the self-concept is also important, contributing positively to wellbeing in cultures around the world (Church et al., 2008).

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CHAPTER TWO

Rudiments of self-concept Clearly the self is a special object of our attention. Whether you are mentally focused on a memory, a conversation, a foul odour, the song in your head, the growling in your stomach or this sentence, consciousness is like a ‘spotlight’. It can shine on only one object at a point in time, but it can shift rapidly from one object to another. In this spotlight, the self is front and centre. But is the self so special that it is uniquely represented in the neural circuitry of the brain? And is the self a uniquely human concept or do other animals also distinguish the self from everything else?

Is the self specially represented in the brain? As illustrated by the story of William Thompson that opened this chapter, our sense of identity is based in our biology. In The Synaptic Self: How Our Brains Become Who We Are, neuroscientist Joseph LeDoux (2002) argues that the synaptic connections in the brain provide the biological base for memory, which makes possible the sense of continuity that is needed for a normal identity. Further, Todd Feinberg and Julian Keenan (2005) describe how the self can be transformed and even completely destroyed by severe head injuries, brain tumours, diseases and exposure to toxic substances that damage the brain and nervous system. Social neuroscientists are starting to explore these possibilities. Using positron emission tomography (PET) scans, functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and other imaging techniques that can capture the brain in action, these researchers are finding that certain areas of the brain become more active when laboratory participants see a picture of themselves rather than a picture of another person (Platek, Wathne, Tierney, & Thomson, 2008), when they viewed self-relevant words such as their own name or street address rather than non-self-relevant words (Moran, Heatherton, & Kelley, 2009), and when they take a first-person perspective while playing a video game as opposed to a third-person perspective (David et al., 2006). As we will see throughout this chapter, the self is a frame of reference that powerfully influences our thoughts, feelings and behaviours. Not all aspects of the self are housed in a single structure of the brain; however, the bulk of research seems to suggest that various self-based processes can be traced to activities occurring in certain areas (Heatherton, 2011; Qin, Duncan, & Northoff, 2013).

Do non-human animals show self-recognition?

Humans are the only animals who recognise themselves in the mirror.

When you stand in front of a mirror, you recognise the image as a reflection of yourself. This recognition is thought to signal that you have a self-concept. But what about dogs, cats and other animals – how can we FALSE possibly know what non-humans think when they see themselves in mirrors? In a series of studies, Gordon Gallup (1977) placed different species of animals in a room with a large mirror. At first, they greeted their own images by vocalising, gesturing and making other social responses. After several days, FIGURE 2.1 Non-human animals’ self-recognition only great apes (i.e., chimpanzees, gorillas and orangutans) of Researchers found that elephants placed in front of a jumboall the animals tested, seemed capable of self-recognition, using sized mirror used the mirror to inspect themselves. This the mirror to pick food out of their teeth, groom themselves, observation suggests that elephants join human beings, great blow bubbles and make faces for their own entertainment. The apes and bottlenose dolphins as animal species that exhibit self-recognition (Plotnik et al., 2006). researchers concluded, from all the indicators, that the apes recognised themselves. In other studies, Gallup anaesthetised the animals, then painted an odourless red dye on their brows and returned them to the mirror. Upon seeing the red spot, only the apes spontaneously reached for their own brows, which was interpreted as proof that they perceived the image as their own (Povinelli et al., 1997; Keenan, Gallup, & Falk, 2003). Among the apes, this form of self-recognition emerges in young adolescence and is stable across the life span, at least until old age (de Veer, Gallup, Theall, van den Bos, & Povinelli, 2003). Research suggests that certain intelligent non-primates can also recognise themselves. In one study, researchers at a New York aquarium found that two bottlenose dolphins marked with black ink often stopped to examine themselves in a mirror (Reiss & Marino, 2001). In a second study, researchers found that three Asian elephants placed in front of a jumbo-sized mirror (see Source: Landov/PA Photos/Joshua Plotnik Figure 2.1) used the mirror to inspect themselves – as evidenced

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when they moved their trunks to see the insides of their mouths, a part of the body they usually cannot see (Plotnik, de Waal & Reiss, 2006). It is important not to assume from this research that the mirror test is a pure measure of self-recognition or self-concept, or that either of these emerge among all species. For example, testing of giant pandas showed that they did not recognise their own images in the mirror (Ma et al., 2015).

When does self-recognition emerge in human infants? Many researchers believe that self-recognition is the first clear expression of the concept ‘me’ (Boysen & Himes, 1999). So, at what age does self-recognition emerge? Using a similar red dye test as used in Gallup’s animal tests, developmental psychologists have found that most humans begin to recognise themselves in the mirror between the ages of 18 and 24 months (Lewis & Brooks-Gunn, 1979). That said, it may be the case that self-recognition varies according to culture. Tanya Broesch and colleagues (2011) tested children between the ages of 33 and 72 months in a number of countries. In line with past research, 88% of US children and 77% of Canadian children ‘passed’ the test. Yet only 58% of children passed in Saint Lucia, 52% in Peru and 51% in Grenada, and only two children passed in Kenya, and none passed in Fiji. Based on their observations, the researchers speculated that children in these non-Western countries did not, in fact, lack self-recognition. They knew it was their image in the mirror, but having been raised for compliance, and trained not to ask questions, they did not dare to touch or remove the mark. Whatever the interpretation, this cross-cultural research raises questions as to whether the mirror test can be used to measure the self-concept (Broesch et al., 2011).

What makes the self a social concept? The ability to see yourself as a distinct entity in the world may be a necessary first step in the evolution and development of a self-concept. The second step involves social factors. Sociologist Charles Cooley (1902) introduced the term ‘looking-glass self’ to suggest that other people serve as a mirror in which we see ourselves. Expanding on this idea, George Mead (1934) added that we often come to know ourselves by imagining what significant others think of us and then incorporating these perceptions into our self-concepts. Picking up where these sociologists left off, Susan Andersen and Serena Chen (2002) theorised that the self is ‘relational’ – that we draw our sense of who we are from our past and current relationships with the significant others in our lives. It is interesting to note that when Gallup tested his apes, those that had been raised in isolation – without exposure to peers – did not recognise themselves in the mirror. Only after such exposure did they begin to show signs of self-recognition. Among human beings, our self-concepts match our perceptions of what others think of us. Illustrating our capacity for ‘meta-insight’, research also shows that people can distinguish between how they perceive themselves – for example, how smart, funny or outgoing they are – and how others see them (Carlson, Vazire & Furr, 2011). Recent research also highlights how there are also sometimes ‘blind spots’ in self-perception; that is, sometimes others have high consensus about a particular trait that the individual does not know about or necessarily agree with (Gallrein, Carlson, Holstein & Leising, 2013).

Sources of self-concept Social psychologists have made substantial progress in the effort to understand the social self. People are not born thinking of themselves as reckless, likeable, shy or sociable. So where do their self-concepts come from? In later chapters, we will see just how important group memberships are for forming an identity. In particular, research based on social identity theory (Tajfel, 1982; Turner, 1987) highlights just how strongly the social self is grounded in group memberships. First, however, the following sources are considered: introspection, self-perception, influences of other people, autobiographical memories, and culture.

Introspection Common sense would hold that people achieve insight into their own beliefs, attitudes, emotions and motivations via internal reflection. After all, don’t you know what you think because you think it? And don’t you know how you feel because you feel it? If you look through popular books on how to achieve self-insight, you will find the unambiguous answers to these questions to be ‘yes’. Whether the prescribed technique is yoga, meditation, psychotherapy, religion, dream analysis or hypnosis, the advice is basically the same: Self-knowledge is derived from introspection; that is, looking inward at one’s own thoughts and feelings. If these how-to books are correct, 44

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it stands to reason that no-one can know you as well as you know yourself. Thus, people tend to assume that for others to know you at all, they would need information about your private thoughts, feelings and other inner states – not just your externally viewed behaviour. But is this really the case?

Is introspection reliable? Most social psychologists are not sure that this faith in introspection is justified. Richard Nisbett and Timothy Wilson (1977) found that research participants often cannot accurately explain the causes or correlates of their own behaviour. This observation forced researchers to confront a thorny question: Does introspection provide a direct pipeline to self-knowledge? In Strangers to Ourselves, Wilson (2002) argues that it does not. In fact, he finds that introspection can sometimes impair self-knowledge. In a series of studies, he found that the attitudes people reported having about different objects corresponded closely to their behaviour towards those objects. The more participants said they enjoyed a task, the more time they spent on it. Similarly, the more attractive they found a scenic landscape, the more pleasure they revealed in their facial expressions; and the happier they said they were with a current dating partner, the longer the relationship with that partner ultimately lasted. Yet after participants were told to analyse the reasons for how they felt, the attitudes that they reported no longer corresponded to their behaviour. There are a few sources likely to be responsible for this effect. The first, as described by Wilson, is that our thoughts, feelings and behaviours are largely governed by non-conscious processes. When we attempt to make sense of these processes consciously, we can erroneously choose rationales that miss the mark. Apparently, it is possible to think too much and be too analytical, ultimately resulting in confusion. The second was identified by David Dunning (2005), who argued that people typically overestimate the positive aspects of themselves. Most people, most of the time, think they are better than average, even though it is statistically impossible for this to be the case. As we will see in our later discussion of selfenhancement, people from all walks of life tend to overrate their own skills, their prospects for success, the accuracy of their opinions and the impressions they form of others – sometimes with dire consequences for their health and wellbeing. We will also see, however, that many people have insight into their own positive – and sometimes negative – biases. In a study that demonstrates the point, Kathryn Bollich and colleagues (2015) found that most people who harbour biased self-perceptions (e.g., about how warm, dependable, stable and funny they are relative to how they are rated by their own peers) accurately describe themselves as biased when prompted. Third, people also have difficulty projecting forward and predicting how they would feel in response to future emotional events – a process referred to as affective forecasting. Imagine that you have a favourite candidate in an upcoming political campaign. Can you anticipate how happy you would be one month after the election if this candidate were to win? How unhappy would you be if she were to lose? Alternatively, how happy would you be six months after winning a million-dollar lottery? Or how unhappy would you be if you were injured in an automobile accident? In a series of studies, Timothy Wilson and Daniel Gilbert (2003, 2005) asked research participants to predict how they would feel after various positive and negative life events and compared their predictions to how others experiencing those events said they actually felt. Consistently, they found that people overestimate the strength and duration of their emotional reactions, a phenomenon they call the impact bias (Wilson & Gilbert, 2013). In one study, voters predicted they would be happier one month after an election if their candidate won than if he or she lost. However, in actuality, supporters of the winning and losing candidates did not differ in their happiness levels one month after the election. There are two possible reasons for the impact bias in affective forecasting. First, when it comes to negative life events, such as an injury, illness or big financial loss, people do not fully appreciate the extent to which psychological coping mechanisms help to cushion the blow. In the face of adversity, human beings can be remarkably resilient, and not as devastated as they may have anticipated (Gilbert, Pelham, & Krull, 1998). People are even more likely to overlook the coping mechanisms that others use. The result is a self– other difference: we tend to predict that others will suffer even longer than we will (Igou, 2008). A second reason for these overestimates is that when we introspect about the emotional impact on us of a future event – say, the break-up of a close relationship – we become so focused on that single event that we neglect to consider the effects of other life experiences. To become more accurate in our predictions, then, we need to force ourselves to think more broadly, about all the events that impact us. In one study, university students were asked to predict their emotional reactions to their university sporting team winning or losing an important game. As usual, they tended to overestimate how long it would take them

Affective forecasting

The process of predicting how one would feel in response to future emotional events.

Impact bias

The phenomenon whereby people overestimate the strength and duration of their emotional reactions.

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to recover from the victory or defeat. This bias disappeared, however, when the students first completed a ‘prospective diary’ in which they estimated the amount of future time they would spend on everyday activities like going to class, talking to friends, studying and eating meals (Wilson & Ross, 2000). Other variations in the impact bias stem from cultural orientation, as detailed in the following Cultural Diversity feature on impact bias.

CULTURAL DIVERSITY IMPACT BIAS ACROSS CULTURES Is the impact bias observed equivalently around the world? It appears that the answer is ‘no’. Kent Lam and colleagues (2005) investigated whether cultural orientation – collectivist or individualist – would determine the degree to which individuals demonstrate the impact bias. In particular, the researchers predicted that, given their individualist orientation, white Canadians would be more prone to focus on a particular event and thus demonstrate the impact bias than would East Asians, who, due to their collectivist orientation, might have a more holistic and less focal outlook. On a cold early-spring day, the researchers asked white Canadian or foreign-born East Asian students to predict how happy they would feel when the weather reached a warm 20 degrees Celsius (predicted happiness). A couple of months

later, they asked another set of white Canadian and East Asian students to report how happy they were on the first day that the weather actually reached 20 degrees Celsius (experienced happiness). In this way, the researchers were able to measure biased affective forecasts – was predicted happiness higher than experienced happiness? Would East Asians have lower bias than their white Canadian counterparts, as expected? The results revealed that predicted happiness was indeed higher than actual happiness, but only for the white Canadian students. The East Asian students reported equal levels of happiness, whether predicting the event or experiencing it. In a follow-up study, the researchers were able to get East Asian students to engage in the affective forecasting bias by having them focus on the event. Thus, the effect of cultural orientation exists but is also malleable.

Self-perception Self-perception theory

The theory that when internal cues are difficult to interpret, people gain self-insight by observing their own behaviour.

Regardless of what we can learn from introspection, Daryl Bem (1967) proposed that people can learn about themselves the same way outside observers do – by watching their own behaviour. Bem’s self-perception theory is simple yet profound. To the extent that internal states are weak or difficult to interpret, people infer what they think or how they feel by observing their own behaviour and the situation in which that behaviour takes place. Have you ever looked back at an email argument with someone, only to realise with amazement how angry you were? Have you ever devoured a sandwich in record time, only then to conclude that you must have been incredibly hungry? In each case, you made an inference about yourself by watching your own actions. There are limits to self-perception, of course. According to Bem, people do not infer their own internal states from behaviour that occurred in the presence of compelling situational pressures such as reward or punishment. If you argued intensely or gobbled down a sandwich because you were paid to do so, you probably would not assume that you were angry or hungry. In other words, people learn about themselves through self-perception only when the situation alone seems insufficient to have caused their behaviour. Over the years, a good deal of research has supported self-perception theory. When people are gently coaxed into saying or doing something and when they are not otherwise certain about how they feel, they often come to view themselves in ways that are consistent with their public statements and behaviours (Chaiken & Baldwin, 1981; Kelly & Rodriguez, 2006). In one study, participants induced to describe themselves in flattering terms scored higher on a later test of self-esteem than did those who were led to describe themselves more modestly (Jones, Rhodewalt, Berglas, & Skelton, 1981). Similarly, those who were manoeuvred by leading questions into describing themselves as introverted or extroverted – whether or not they really were – often came to define themselves as such later on (Swann & Ely, 1984). British author E. M. Forster long ago anticipated the theory when he asked, ‘How can I tell what I think until I see what I say?’

Vicarious self-perception Self-perception theory may have even more reach than Bem had anticipated. Bem argued that people sometimes learn about themselves by observing their own freely chosen behaviour. But might you also infer something about yourself by observing the behaviour of someone else with whom you completely identify? In a series of studies, Noah Goldstein and Robert Cialdini (2007) demonstrated this phenomenon, which they call vicarious self-perception. In one experiment, for example, they asked 46

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university students to listen to an interview with a fellow student who had agreed afterwards to spend a few extra minutes helping on a project on homelessness. Before listening to the interview, all participants were fitted with an electroencephalogram (EEG) recording device on their foreheads that allegedly measured brain activity as they viewed a series of images and words. By random assignment, some participants were then told that their brain-wave patterns closely resembled that of the person whose interview they would soon hear – a level of resemblance, they were told, that signalled genetic similarity and relationship closeness. Would participants in this similarity feedback condition draw inferences about themselves by observing the behaviour of a fellow student? Yes. In a post-interview questionnaire, these participants (compared with those in the no-feedback control group) rated themselves as more sensitive and as more self-sacrificing if the student whose helpfulness they observed was said to be biologically similar. What is more, when the session was over, 93% of those in the similarity condition agreed to spend some extra time themselves helping the experimenter – compared with only 61% in the no-feedback control group. Introspection and self-perception theory make different predictions about the extent to which people can know themselves. If self-knowledge derives from introspection, then clearly you know yourself better than anyone else can. If self-knowledge derives solely from observations of behaviour, then it should be possible for others to know us as well as we know ourselves. Assuming that self-knowledge is gained from both sources, then the truth lies somewhere in the middle. But wait. Is it ever possible for others to know us better than we know ourselves?

The self–other knowledge asymmetry (SOKA) model

Accuracy of ratings

Simine Vazire (2010) asked this very question and came up with a surprising answer. Vazire proposed a self–other knowledge asymmetry (SOKA) model in which she predicts that we know ourselves better than others do when it comes to traits that are ‘internal’ and hard to observe (e.g., how optimistic, anxious or easily upset a person is) and that there is no self–other difference when it comes to traits that are ‘external’ and easy to observe (e.g., how quiet, sociable or messy a person is). She also predicts that others may actually know us better than we know ourselves when it comes to observable traits that can be so touchy for self-esteem purposes that we have motivated ‘blind spots’ (e.g., how smart, creative or rude a person is). In these FIGURE 2.2 The self–other knowledge asymmetry (SOKA) model latter instances, Vazire predicts that others Participants rated themselves and were rated by friends on personality traits for can be more objective than we are about which they took various objective tests. As shown, self-ratings were more accurate for ourselves. internal/non-evaluative traits (left) and self- and friend-ratings were equally accurate To test these predictions, Vazire asked for observable/non-evaluative traits (centre). Interestingly, however, friend-ratings university students to rate themselves, and were more accurate for internal/evaluative traits. Supporting the SOKA model, this pattern shows that ‘know thyself’ requires a combination of information and then had their friends rate the participants, objectivity. on a number of personality traits. Three types of traits were studied: (1) high in observability 0.4 (talkativeness, dominance and leadership), (2) low in observability and not evaluative (self-esteem and anxiety) and (3) low in 0.3 observability and highly evaluative (intelligent and creative). To determine accuracy, Vazire then measured how participants fared on 0.2 objective measures of these traits using various laboratory exercises and self-report tests. The results provided strong support 0.1 for the SOKA model. Figure 2.2 shows that self-ratings and friend-ratings were equally accurate for highly-observable traits, and that 0 self-ratings were more accurate for internal Internal/ Internal/ Observable/ non-evaluative traits evaluative traits non-evaluative traits non-evaluative traits, but that friend-ratings were more accurate for internal evaluative Self-ratings Friend ratings traits. Clearly, to know oneself requires a Source: Based on Vazire, S. (2010). Who knows what about a person? The self–other knowledge asymmetry combination of information and objectivity (SOKA) model. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 98, 281–300. (Vazire & Carlson, 2011).

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FIGURE 2.3 Facial feedback As suggested by facial feedback research, holding a pencil with your teeth (so that you smile) may lead you to rate something as funnier and more enjoyable than if you hold a pencil with your lips (so that you cannot smile).

Source: Shutterstock.com/ImageryMajestic

Self-perceptions of emotion Draw the corners of your mouth back and up and tense your eye muscles. Okay, relax. Now raise your eyebrows, open your eyes wide and let your mouth drop open slightly. Relax. Now pull your brows down and together and press your lips together. Relax. If you followed these directions, you would have appeared to others to be feeling first happy, then fearful and finally angry. The question is: ‘How would you have appeared to yourself?’ Facial feedback Social psychologists who study emotion have asked precisely that question. Viewed within the framework of self-perception theory, the facial feedback hypothesis states that changes in facial expression can trigger corresponding changes in the subjective experience of emotion. In the first test of this hypothesis, James Laird (1974) told participants that they were taking part in an experiment on activity of the facial muscles. After attaching electrodes to their faces, he showed them a series of cartoons. Before each one, the participants were instructed to contract certain facial muscles in ways that created either a smile or a frown. As Laird predicted, participants rated what they saw as funnier when they were smiling than when they were frowning. As depicted in Figure 2.3, similar results have emerged comparing the effect of holding a pencil with your teeth (so that you smile) relative to holding a pencil with your lips (so that you cannot smile) (Sedlmeier, Weigelt & Walther, 2011), suggesting that this effect is universal. Researchers recently replicated these findings in Ghana, West Africa (Dzokoto, Wallace, Peters, & Bentsi-Enchill, 2014); however, substantial debate has arisen regarding the nature of facial feedback, as outlined in the following Current Scene On feature.

CURRENT SCENE ON … FACIAL FEEDBACK In 1988, Fritz Strack, Leonard Martin and Sabine Stepper conducted what would become one of the most cited studies in support of the facial feedback hypothesis. Much like the images in Figure 2.3, participants were asked to hold a pen with their teeth (inducing a smile) or with their lips (inhibiting a smile) while viewing cartoons, among other tasks. Analysis of ratings of participants’ amusement while viewing the cartoons revealed higher levels of amusement among participants in the ‘smile’ condition relative to those in the ‘pout’ condition. The article reporting these findings has been cited more than 1700 times and prompted a long stream of follow-up research. In 2016, a team of researchers around the world led by Eric-Jan Wagenmakers undertook a large-scale attempt to Facial feedback hypothesis

The hypothesis that changes in facial expression can lead to corresponding changes in emotion.

48

replicate the effect. The methodology and analysis plan for the replication were carefully devised and registered ahead of time. Seventeen labs around the world independently collected data in as consistent a way as possible, mimicking the methodology of the original study as much as feasible. However, when the data were collated across the nearly 1900 participants who took part, the results showed that funniness ratings between the ‘smile’ and ‘pout’ conditions did not differ significantly, casting doubt on the robustness of the effect. Despite this so-called failure to replicate, it is important to note that a single non-replicable finding does not negate the facial feedback hypothesis more generally.

Facial feedback can evoke and magnify certain emotional states. It is important to note, however, that the face is not necessary to the subjective experience of emotion. When neuropsychologists tested a young woman who suffered from bilateral facial paralysis, they found that despite her inability to outwardly show emotion, she reported feeling various emotions in response to positive and negative visual images (Keillor, Barrett, Crucian, Kortenkamp, & Heilman, 2003). How does facial feedback work? With 80 muscles in the human face that can create over 7000 expressions, can we actually vary our own emotions by contracting certain muscles and wearing different expressions? Research suggests that we can, although it is not clear what the results mean. Laird argues that facial expressions affect emotion through a process of self-perception: ‘If I’m smiling, I must be happy’. Consistent with this hypothesis, Chris Kleinke and colleagues (1998) asked people to emulate either the

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happy or angry facial expressions depicted in a series of photographs. Half the participants saw themselves in a mirror during the task; the others did not. Did these manipulations affect mood states? Yes. Compared with participants in a no-expression control group, those who put on happy faces felt better, and those who put on angry faces felt worse. As predicted by self-perception theory, the differences were particularly pronounced among participants who saw themselves in a mirror. Other researchers believe that facial movements spark emotion by producing physiological changes in the brain (Izard, 1990). For example, Robert Zajonc (1993) argues that smiling causes facial muscles to increase the flow of air-cooled blood to the brain, a process that produces a pleasant state by lowering brain temperature. Conversely, frowning decreases blood flow, producing an unpleasant state by raising temperature. To demonstrate, Zajonc and colleagues (1989) conducted a study in which they asked participants to repeat certain vowels 20 times each, including the sounds ah, e, u and the German vowel ü. In the meantime, temperature changes in the forehead were measured and participants reported on how they felt. As it turned out, ah and e – sounds that cause people to mimic smiling – lowered forehead temperature and elevated mood, whereas u and ü – sounds that cause us to mimic frowning – increased forehead temperature and dampened mood. In short, people need not infer how they feel; rather, facial expressions evoke physiological changes that produce an emotional experience. Body posture Other expressive behaviours, such as body posture, can also provide us with sensory feedback and influence the way we feel. When people feel proud, they stand erect with their shoulders raised, chest expanded and head held high (expansion). When dejected, however, people slump over with shoulders drooping and head bowed (contraction). Clearly, your emotional state is revealed in the way you carry yourself. But is it also possible that the way you carry yourself affects your emotional state? Can people lift their spirits by expansion or lower their spirits by contraction? Yes. Sabine Stepper and Fritz Strack (1993) arranged for people to sit in either a slumped or an upright position by varying the height of the table they had to write on. Those forced to sit upright reported feeling more pride after succeeding at a task than did those placed in a slumped position. Moreover, a slumped posture prolongs the experience of negative mood relative to an upright posture (Veenstra, Schneider, & Koole, 2017).

Sitting in a slumped posture can make a negative mood last longer.

TRUE

Self-perceptions of motivation Think of the activity you most enjoy doing. Would you opt to get paid to engage in that activity? Chances are, you would. Research suggests, however that you might come to enjoy the activity less if you get paid to do it (Deci & Ryan, 1985). This idea, that reward for an enjoyable activity can undermine interest in that activity, seems to contradict intuition – but is sensible from a self-perception standpoint. Whether a reward is motivating or demotivating depends on how motivation is defined. A key distinction arises between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. Intrinsic motivation originates in factors within a person. People are said to be intrinsically motivated when they engage in an activity for the sake of their own interest, the challenge or sheer enjoyment. Listening to music, spending time with friends, or getting engrossed in a book or a movie on Netflix are among the activities that you might find intrinsically motivating. By contrast, extrinsic motivation originates in factors outside the person. People are said to be extrinsically motivated when they engage in an activity as a means to an end for tangible benefit. It might be to acquire money, marks or recognition; to fulfil obligations; or to avoid punishment. Clearly, people strive for reward. The question is: ‘What happens to the intrinsic motivation once that reward is no longer available?’

CRITICAL THINKING ACTIVITY Why are you studying psychology? Is your motivation to do so mainly intrinsic, extrinsic or a mix of the two? Consider the rewards that you might gain from your study of psychology – maybe praise from your lecturers or tutors,

marks on your university transcript or social prestige. Reflect on how these rewards might shape your motivation to study psychology.

From the standpoint of self-perception theory, the idea that you might enjoy an activity less if you get rewarded to do it makes sense. When someone is rewarded for listening to music, reading or watching movies, his or her behaviour becomes over-justified or over-rewarded, which means that it can be attributed to extrinsic as well as intrinsic motives. By creating ambiguity about a person’s motivation, can the overjustification effect have unintended consequences? When athletes are paid millions of dollars to play their sport, does the money overwhelm their love of the game, making play feel like work? Once paid, do people begin to wonder if the activity was ever worth pursuing in its own right?

Over-justification effect

The tendency for intrinsic motivation to diminish for activities that have become associated with reward or other extrinsic factors.

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The paradox of reward Research has shown that when people start getting rewarded for a task they already enjoy, they sometimes lose interest in it. In this study, an expected reward undermined children’s intrinsic In an early demonstration of this phenomenon, Mark Lepper and motivation to play with markers. Children who received an colleagues (1973) gave preschool children an opportunity to play unexpected reward or no reward did not lose interest. with colourful markers – an opportunity most could not resist. By observing how much time the children spent on the activity, the researchers were able to measure their intrinsic motivation. 20 Two weeks later, the children were divided into three groups, all about equal in terms of initial levels of intrinsic motivation. In one, the children were simply asked to draw some pictures with 15 the markers. In the second, they were told that if they used the markers, they would receive a ‘Good Player Award’ – a certificate with a gold star and a red ribbon. In a third group, the children 10 were not offered a reward for drawing pictures, but, like those in the second group, they received a reward when they were done. About a week later, the teachers placed the markers and 5 paper on a table in the classroom while the experimenters observed through a one-way mirror. Since no rewards were offered on this occasion, the amount of free time the children spent playing with the markers reflected their intrinsic No Unexpected Expected motivation. As predicted, those who had expected and received reward reward reward a reward for their efforts were no longer as interested in the Source: Based on Lepper, M. R., Greene, D., & Nisbett, R. E. (1973). Undermining children’s markers as they had been. Children who had not received intrinsic interest with extrinsic reward: A test of the ‘overjustification’ hypothesis. Journal a reward were not adversely affected, nor were those who of Personality and Social Psychology, 28, 129–137. had received the unexpected reward. Having played with the markers without the promise of tangible benefit, these children remained intrinsically motivated (see Figure 2.4). The paradox that reward can undermine rather than enhance intrinsic motivation has been observed in many settings, with both children and adults (Deci & Ryan, 1985; Pittman & Heller, 1987; Tang & Hall, 1995). Accept money for a leisure activity and, before you know it, what used to be ‘play’ comes to feel more like ‘work’. In terms of performance, the outlook might not be so bleak. In light of findings of a meta-analysis of 40 years of research in this area, Christopher Cerasoli and colleagues (2014) concluded that intrinsic motivation and extrinsic incentives both uniquely and positively predict performance. The key is that intrinsic motivation predicts the quality of performance whereas extrinsic incentives predict the quantity of performance. Percentage of time spent playing with markers

FIGURE 2.4 Paradoxical effects of reward on intrinsic motivation

Rewards are a good way to boost internal motivation for a task.

FALSE

50

Verbal praise as reward Given all this, should teachers and parents not offer rewards to their children? Are the employee incentive programs that are so often used to motivate workers in the business world doomed to fail? It all depends on how the reward is perceived and by whom. If a reward is presented in the form of verbal praise that is perceived to be sincere or as a special ‘bonus’ for superior performance, then it can enhance intrinsic motivation by providing positive feedback about competence – as when people win competitions, scholarships or a pat on the back from people they respect (Cameron & Pierce, 1994; Cameron, Pierce, Banko, & Gear, 2005; Eisenberger & Cameron, 1996; Henderlong & Lepper, 2002). The notion that intrinsic motivation is undermined by some types of reward but not others was observed even among 20-month-old babies. In a clever study, Felix Warneken and Michael Tomasello (2006) brought babies into the laboratory, where the experimenter accidentally dropped a pen or crumpled paper onto the floor and appeared unable to reach it. The child could help by picking up the object and handing it to the experimenter. Most of the babies helped in this situation. In a treatment phase, the researchers responded to the assistance by giving the child a toy cube (‘For this you get a cube’), verbal praise (‘Thank you, that’s really nice!’) or nothing at all. Would these same children continue to help? In a later test phase, when presented with a number of helping opportunities, those in the no-response and the verbal praise conditions helped to a high degree. Yet among children who had earlier received a reward, helping in the test phase dropped.

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Personality and reward Individual differences in people’s motivational orientation towards work must also be considered. For intrinsically oriented people who say, ‘What matters most to me is enjoying what I do’ and ‘I seldom think about salary and promotions’, reward may be unnecessary and may even be detrimental (Amabile, Hill, Hennessey, & Tighe, 1994). Yet for people who are highly focused on the achievement of certain goals, whether at school, at work or in sport, inducements such as marks, scores, bonuses, awards, trophies and the sheer thrill of competition, as in team sport, tend to boost intrinsic motivation (Durik & Harackiewicz, 2007; Harackiewicz & Elliot, 1993).

Influences of other people As we noted earlier, Cooley’s (1902) theory of the looking-glass self emphasised that other people help us define ourselves. In this section, we will see the importance of this proposition to our self-concepts.

Social comparison theory Suppose a stranger were to ask, ‘Who are you?’ If you had only a minute or two to answer, would you mention your religion or your ethnic background? What about your home town? Would you describe your talents and your interests or your likes and dislikes? When asked this question, people tend to describe themselves in ways that set them apart from others in their immediate vicinity (McGuire & McGuire, 1988); for example, on university campuses ‘non-traditional’ older students are more likely to mention their age than are traditional younger students (Kite, 1992). Regardless of whether the unique attribute is gender, age, height or eye colour, this pattern emerges. The implication is intriguing – change someone’s social surroundings and you can change that person’s spontaneous self-description. This reliance on distinguishing features in self-description indicates that the self is ‘relative’ – a social construct – and that each of us defines ourselves in part by using family members, friends, acquaintances and others as a benchmark (Mussweiler & Rüter, 2003; Mussweiler & Strack, 2000). At least temporarily, our standards of self-comparison can even be influenced by our fleeting, everyday exposure to strangers (Mussweiler, Rüter & Epstude, 2004). Importantly, the self is also ‘malleable’ according to our need to fit in with those around us. Stephanie Richman and her colleagues (2015) demonstrated in a series of studies showing that when university students are socially excluded by being left out of an online game, they go on to modify their self-concept descriptions in ways that make them more similar to a fellow student who emerges as a potential friend (e.g., on such traits as warm, adventurous, creative, enthusiastic, thoughtful and funny). Enter Leon Festinger’ (1954) social comparison theory. Festinger argued that when people are uncertain of their abilities or opinions – that is, when objective information is not readily available – they evaluate themselves through comparisons with similar others. The theory seems reasonable, but is it valid? Over the years, social psychologists have put social comparison theory to the test, focusing on two key questions: (1) ‘When do people turn to others for comparative information?’ and (2) ‘Of all the people who inhabit the Earth, with whom do we choose to compare ourselves?’ (Suls & Wheeler, 2000).

Social comparison theory

The theory that people evaluate their own abilities and opinions by comparing themselves to others.

When do we compare ourselves to others? As Festinger proposed, the answer to the ‘when’ question appears to be that people engage in social comparison in states of uncertainty, when more objective means of self-evaluation are not available. It is not clear whether Festinger understated the importance of social comparison processes. Some research suggests that people judge themselves in relation to others even when more objective standards really are available (Klein, 1997). Yet other research supports Festinger’s theory that people are less influenced by social comparison information when objective information is available, for example, through our personal histories of success and failure (Steyn & Mynhardt, 2008). With whom do we choose to compare ourselves? The ‘with whom’ question has also been the subject of many studies. The answer seems to be that when we evaluate our own taste in music, value on the job market or athletic ability, we look to others who are similar to us in relevant ways (Goethals & Darley, 1977; Wheeler, Koestner, & Driver, 1982). If you are curious about your flair for writing, for example, you’re more likely to compare yourself with other university students than with high schoolers or best-selling authors. There also exist cultural differences in targets of social comparison, as outlined in the following Cultural Diversity feature on social comparisons in New Zealand. There are exceptions to this rule, of course. Later in this chapter, we will see that people often cope with personal inadequacies by focusing on others who are less able or less fortunate than themselves, regardless of similarity.

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CULTURAL DIVERSITY SOCIAL COMPARISONS IN NEW ZEALAND Diane Mackie (1984) was interested in social comparisons in the context of New Zealand ethnic groups. She asked Samoan and Pākehā (New Zealanders of European descent) children in New Zealand to indicate who they make comparisons to in a variety of contexts. For example, they responded to the question, ‘When you think of someone who is a better person than you, who do you think of?’ After responding to the questions, the researchers established whether the targets the children identified were part of their ethnic ingroup or not. Overall, Pākehā children nominated members of their in-group in 67% of cases and Samoan children nominated members of their in-group in 54% of cases (see Figure 2.5). Thus, the ‘similarity rule’ plays out even among children of varying cultures and ethnicities.

FIGURE 2.5 The similarity rule in the context of social comparisons Samoan children

Other 20%

Pākehā 26%

Pākehā

Other 12%

Samoan 21%

Samoan 54% Pākehā 67%

Source: Adapted from Mackie, D. (1984). Social comparison in high- and low-status groups. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 15, 379–398.

Facebook as a venue for social comparison As of the third quarter of 2018, Facebook – the most heavily populated social networking site – had 2.27 billion active users worldwide (Statista, 2018). On computers, tablets and mobile phones, more than a billion people a day log into Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and other sites. Two types of usage can be distinguished: active usage, where people post information about themselves and communicate with others; and passive usage, in which people consume information from other people’s Facebook pages without making direct contact (Deters & Mehl, 2013; Verduyn et al., 2015). Now that social networking sites enable us to access countless numbers of people, what effect do all the social comparison opportunities available to us have on our self-concepts, our self-evaluations and our overall wellbeing? Does looking at other people’s Facebook pages make you feel better about yourself, or worse, or does it depend on whose pages you visit and how they present themselves? At first, research was reported in the news suggesting a phenomenon that was being called ‘Facebook Depression’ – the more time people spent on Facebook, the unhappier they were (Feinstein et al., 2013; Kalpidou, Costin, & Morris, 2011; O’Keeffe & Clarke-Pearson, 2011). Immediately, social psychologists were quick to warn that this correlation should not be interpreted to mean that Facebook usage causes depression. There are two reasons why Facebook usage may undermine a person’s wellbeing. First, as predicted by Festinger’s social comparison theory, recent studies have shown that the link between Facebook usage and self-evaluation depends on whom we compare ourselves to. University-age adults were randomly assigned to engage in upward – as opposed to downward – social comparisons, with others who are highly active and successful, they came to rate themselves less favourably (Vogel, Rose, Roberts, & Eckles, 2014). A second possible reason for this negative effect is that people on Facebook, as in life more generally, tend to portray themselves in overly flattering ways – which increases the likelihood that the social comparisons we make are not personally favourable. For that reason, research shows that the more Facebook time people dedicate to passively scrolling through other people’s pages, rather than directly interacting with others, the worse they felt about themselves (Verduyn et al., 2015).

Two-factor theory of emotion People seek social comparison information to evaluate their abilities and opinions. Do they also turn to others to determine something as personal and subjective as their own emotions? In classic experiments on affiliation, Stanley Schachter (1959) found that when people were frightened into thinking they would receive painful electric shocks, most sought the company of others who were in the same predicament. Nervous and uncertain about how they should be feeling, participants wanted to affiliate with similar others, presumably for the purpose of comparison. Yet when they were not fearful and expected only mild shocks or when the ‘others’ were not taking part in the same experiment, participants preferred to be alone. As Schachter put it, ‘Misery doesn’t just love any kind of company; it loves only miserable company’ (p. 24). 52

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Intrigued by the possibilities, Schachter and his research team took the next step. Could it be, they wondered, that when people are uncertain about how they feel, their emotional state is actually determined by the reactions of others around them? In answer to this question, the researchers proposed that two factors are necessary to feel a specific emotion. First, the person must experience the symptoms of physiological arousal, such as a racing heart, perspiration, rapid breathing and tightening of the stomach. Second, the person must make a cognitive interpretation that explains the source of the arousal. And that is where the people around us come in – their reactions help us interpret our own arousal. Testing the two-factor theory of emotion To test this provocative two-factor theory of emotion, Schachter and Singer (1962) injected male volunteers with epinephrine, a drug that heightens physiological arousal. Although one group was forewarned about the drug’s effects, a second group was not. Members of a third group were injected with a harmless placebo. Before the drug, which was described as a vitamin supplement, took effect, participants were left alone with a male confederate introduced as another participant who had received the same injection. In some sessions, the confederate behaved in a euphoric manner. For 20 minutes, he bounced around happily, doodling on scratch paper, practising scoring ‘goals’ by tossing paper into the wastebasket, flying paper aeroplanes across the room, and playing with a hula-hoop. In other sessions, the confederate displayed anger, ridiculing a questionnaire they were filling out and, in a fit of rage, ripping it up and hurling it into the wastebasket. Think for a moment about these various combinations of situations. As the drug takes effect, participants in the drug-informed group will begin to feel their hearts pound, their hands shake and their faces flush. Having been told to expect these symptoms, however, they need not search for an explanation. Participants in the placebo group will not become aroused in the first place, so they will have no symptoms to explain. But now consider the plight of those in the drug-uninformed group, who suddenly become aroused without knowing why. Trying to identify the sensations, these participants, according to the theory, should take their cues from someone else in the same predicament – in this case, the confederate. In general, the experimental results supported Schachter and Singer’s line of reasoning. Druguninformed participants reported feeling relatively happy or angry depending on the confederate’s performance. In many instances, they even exhibited similar kinds of behaviour. One participant, for example, ‘threw open the window and, laughing, hurled paper basketballs at passers-by’. In the drug-informed and placebo groups, however, participants were, as expected, less influenced by these social cues.

Two-factor theory of emotion

The theory that the experience of emotion is based on two factors: physiological arousal and a cognitive interpretation of that arousal.

Moderators of two-factor theory findings Schachter and Singer’s two-factor theory has attracted a good deal of controversy, as some studies have corroborated their findings but others have not. In one experiment, for example, participants who were injected with epinephrine and not forewarned about the symptoms later exhibited more fear in response to a scary film, but they were not angrier or more amused while seeing films that tend to elicit these other emotions (Mezzacappa, Katkin, & Palmer, 1999). Overall, it now appears that one limited but important conclusion can safely be drawn: when people are unclear about their own emotional states, they sometimes interpret how they feel by watching others (Reisenzein, 1983). The ‘sometimes’ part of the conclusion is important. For other people to influence your emotions, your level of physiological arousal cannot be too intense or else it will be experienced as aversive, regardless of the situation (Maslach, 1979; Zimbardo, LaBerge, & Butler, 1993). Also, research shows that other people must be present as a possible explanation for arousal before its onset. Once people are aroused, they turn for an explanation to events that preceded the change in their physiological state (Schachter & Singer, 1979; Sinclair, Hoffman, Mark, Martin, & Pickering, 1994). In later chapters, we will see that the two-factor theory of emotion has far-reaching implications for passionate love, anger and aggression, and other affective experiences.

Autobiographical memories Philosopher James Mill once said, ‘The phenomenon of the Self and that of Memory are merely two sides of the same fact’. If the story of patient William Thompson at the start of this chapter is any indication, Mill was right. Without autobiographical memories – recollections of the sequences of events that have touched your life – you would have no coherent self-concept (Bernsten, 2009; Fivush, Haden, & Dimmick, 2003; Rubin, 1996; Thompson et al., 1998). After all, who would you be if you could not remember your

Autobiographical memories

Recollections of the sequences of events of one’s life.

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CRITICAL THINKING ACTIVITY Reflect for a moment on your own university career. What events come to mind and when did they occur? Did you come up with the day you arrived on campus or the first time you

met your closest friend? What about notable classes, parties or sporting events?

parents or your childhood playmates, your successes and failures, the places you lived, the schools you attended, the books you read and the teams you played for? Clearly, memories shape the self-concept. In this section, we will see that the self-concept shapes our personal memories as well (Conway & PleydellPearce, 2000). It is worth noting that the links between our sense of self and autobiographical memory are subtle, complex and often not straightforward (Prebble, Addis, & Tippet, 2013). In fact, research traditions vary in terms of whether they posit the self as a collection of diverse neural components or as subjective awareness of the first-person point of view (Klein, 2012). Each approach brings with it consequences for how the relationship between memory and the self is examined. What you will see, however, is that the interplay between these two is dynamic and of great impact.

Which memories are autobiographical? When people are prompted to recall their own experiences, they typically report more events from the recent past than from the distant past. There are, however, two consistent exceptions to this simple recency rule. The first is that older adults tend to retrieve a large number of personal memories from their adolescence and early adulthood years – a ‘reminiscence bump’ found across many cultures that may occur because these are busy and formative years in an individual’s life (Conway, Wang, Hanyu, & Haque 2005; Fitzgerald, 1988; Jansari & Parkin, 1996). A second exception is that people tend to remember transitional ‘firsts’. When David Pillemer and colleagues (1996) asked second- and third-year university students to recount the most memorable experiences of their first year, 32% of all recollections were from the first month of that first year. When university graduates were given the same task, they too cited a disproportionate number of events from the opening two months of their first year, followed by the next major transitional period, the last month of their final year. Obviously, not all experiences leave the same impression. Ask people to remember 11 September 2001, and they probably can tell you where they were, who they were with and what was happening when they heard the news about the terrorist attack on the US (Hirst et al., 2015). Roger Brown and James Kulik (1977) coined the term ‘flashbulb memories’ to describe these enduring, detailed, high-resolution recollections and speculated that humans are biologically equipped for survival purposes to ‘print’ dramatic events in memory. These flashbulb memories are not necessarily accurate or even consistent over time; however, they still ‘feel’ special and serve as prominent landmarks in the biographies that we tell about ourselves (Hirst & Phelps, 2016).

Self-inflation in memories Intriguingly, people tend to revise their personal histories to reflect favourably on the self. In one study, Harry Bahrick and colleagues (1996) had 99 university students try to recall all their high school marks and then checked their reports against the actual transcripts. Overall, the majority of marks were recalled correctly. But most of the errors in memory were mark inflations – and most of these were made when the actual marks were low. In another study, Burcu Demiray and Steve Janssen (2015) asked hundreds of adults, 18 to 80 years old, to report the seven most important events from their lives, and to rate these memories according to how good, important, emotional, vivid and close they were. The results showed that respondents felt psychologically ‘closer’ to memories that were positive rather than negative, especially among those with high self-esteem. The emotional valence of memories appears to shift across the lifespan. Simone Schlagman and colleagues (2006) talked to young and old volunteers for a period of one week and then analysed the autobiographical memories that they spontaneously recounted – about births, deaths, holidays, accidents, school events, special occasions, and the like. Both groups recalled plenty of positive events, but older adults recalled fewer negative memories (see Table 2.1). Other research has documented a ‘positivity effect’, reflecting older adults’ bias towards positive memories (Carstensen & DeLiema, 2018).

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TABLE 2.1 Emotional autobiographical memories vary with age Analysis of the valence of spontaneously recalled autobiographical memories revealed that among both young and old adults, half of those memories were positive. Older adults, however, spontaneously recalled fewer negative memories.

Very negative or negative

Neutral

Positive or very positive

Young

34%

16%

50%

Old

22%

28%

50%

The visual lens of memory Our autobiographies are so interconnected with our sense of who we are that as our self-concept changes, so too does our visual perspective on the past. Think about an important way in which you have changed. Once you were a kid; now you are in university or working. Or maybe you were a smoker and stopped, or obese and lost weight. Or maybe you underwent a religious conversion, or had cancer and survived, and now you feel ‘reborn’. Theorising that our current self-concept colours how we see our past selves, Lisa Libby and Richard Eibach (2002) asked university students to write about one aspect of themselves that had changed a lot and another that had not changed since high school. Analysing the language used to describe these recollections, Libby and Eibach found that participants used more third-person pronouns to describe past actions that no longer fit their current selves, and participants rated themselves as more detached from these actions. Finally, it is interesting to note that just as the contents of our autobiographical memories are intertwined with our sense of who we are, the process of remembering can prove to be a positive emotional experience. Have you ever lost yourself in a daydream thinking back to a childhood vacation, a graduation, the time you spent at a sports camp, or the day you met a good friend? Nostalgia – defined as a sentimental longing for the past – is common and universal. Research shows that people often become nostalgic during distressing life events such as a breakup or divorce, a long-distance move, feelings of loneliness, or serious illness (Wildschut, Sedikides, Arndt, & Routledge, 2006). Research also shows that nostalgia not only plays an important role in connecting one’s past sense of self to the present (Sedikides et al., 2016) but also contributes substantially to wellbeing (Routledge, Wildschut, Sedikides, & Juhl, 2013).

Culture and self-concept Self-concept is also heavily influenced by cultural factors. Research has revealed two contrasting cultural orientations: individualism and collectivism (Triandis, 1994). Cultures with an individualistic orientation value independence, autonomy and self-reliance. Cultures with a collectivistic orientation value interdependence, cooperation and social harmony. Under the banner of individualism, one’s personal goals take priority over group allegiances. In collectivist cultures, by contrast, a person is first and foremost a loyal member of a family, team, company and state, motivated to be part of a group – not different, better or worse. In what countries are these orientations the most extreme? A recent study of 56 countries points to the Netherlands and Denmark as among the most individualistic and Kenya and Nigeria as the most collectivistic (Minkov et al., 2017). Australia ranked 12th and New Zealand 16th, with higher rankings reflecting more individualistic orientation. As noted in Chapter 1, it is likely that non-Indigenous Australians and New Zealand Pākehā (i.e., non-Māori) cultures drive this effect. Individualism and collectivism are not clear-cut categories, and substantial variation exists within geographic areas and even within individual countries. In a meta-analysis of 83 studies, Daphna Oyserman and colleagues (2002) found that collectivist orientations varied across Asia, in that the Chinese respondents were more collectivistic than Japanese and Korean respondents. Astrid Podsiadlowski and Stephen Fox from Victoria University of Wellington (2011) conducted a study within New Zealand, revealing that Pākehā participants were less collectivistic than Māori, Pacific Islander and Chinese participants.

Individualistic orientation

A cultural orientation that values independence, autonomy and selfreliance.

Collectivist orientation

A cultural orientation that values interdependence, cooperation and social harmony.

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In Clash!: How to Thrive in a Multicultural World, Hazel Markus and Alan Conner (2013) describe the conflicts that often arise between groups all over the world – East versus West, rich versus poor, urban versus rural, coastal versus heartland, and whites versus people of colour, to name a few. They note that national boundaries are not the only source of cultural differences; that each of us combines a special mix of biology and cultures to make us who we are. According to Markus and Conner, culture is made up of four I’s – ideas, institutions, and social interactions that shape how individuals think, feel and act. In turn, how individuals act influences their ideas, institutions and social interactions. This dynamic culture cycle is depicted in Figure 2.6. FIGURE 2.6 Culture cycle The culture cycle shows that individuals are shaped by their interactions with others, by formal institutions, and by commonly shared ideas of what is a good and right way to be a person. In turn, through their actions and behaviours, individuals shape these aspects of their own world.

Ideas Institutions Interactions Individuals (e.g. government, media, sports, science, education)

(e.g. what is good, right, natural)

(e.g. family, home workplace, school) (e.g. thoughts, feelings and behaviour)

Source: Based on Markus, H. R., & Conner, A. (2013). Clash!: 8 cultural conflicts that make us who we are. New York, NY: Hudson Street Press.

Cultural conceptions of self Individualism and collectivism are so deeply ingrained in a culture that they mould our very selfconceptions and identities. According to Hazel Markus and Shinobu Kitayama (1991), most North Americans, Europeans, non-Indigenous Australians and Pākehā New Zealanders have an independent view of the self. In this view, the self is an entity that is distinct, autonomous, self-contained and endowed with unique dispositions. Yet in much of Asia, Africa and Latin America, and among Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Australians and Māori New Zealanders, people hold an interdependent view of the self. Here, the self is part of a larger network that includes an individual’s family, co-workers and others with whom they are socially connected. People with an independent view say such things as: ‘the only person you can count on is yourself’, and ‘I enjoy being unique and different from others’. By contrast, those with an interdependent view are more likely to agree that: ‘I’m partly to blame if one of my family members or co-workers fails’, and ‘my happiness depends on the happiness of those around me’ (Rhee, Uleman, Lee, & Roman, 1995; Singelis, 1994; Triandis, Chen & Chan, 1998). These contrasting orientations – one focused on the personal self, the other on a collective self – are depicted in Figure 2.7. Research of various sorts confirms the close link between cultural orientation and conceptions of the self. In one study, David Trafimow and colleagues (1991) had Chinese and North American university students complete 20 sentences beginning with ‘I am …’ The Chinese students were more likely to identify 56

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FIGURE 2.7 Cultural conceptions of self As depicted here, different cultures foster different conceptions of the self. Many Westerners have an independent view of the self as an entity that is distinct, autonomous and self-contained. Yet many Asians, Africans and Latin Americans hold an interdependent view of the self that encompasses others in a larger social network. B. Interdependent view of self

A. Independent view of self

Father

Mother

Father

Mother Sibling

Self

Friend

Friend

Co-worker

Self

Friend

Friend

Sibling

Co-worker

Source: Based on Markus, H. R. and Kitayama, S., “Culture and the self: Implications for cognition, emotion, and motivation,” Psychological Review vol 98 (p. 226). Copyright © 1991 by the American Psychological Association.

themselves by group affiliations (‘I am a university student’), whereas the American students were more likely to fill in the blank with trait descriptions (‘I am shy’). Consistent with this finding, a second study showed that compared with American children who tend to recall autobiographical events that feature personal aspects of themselves, Chinese children tend to recall relationships, group memberships and other social aspects of themselves (Wang, 2006). Further, when it comes to making career decisions, Chinese students with interdependent selves are more likely to seek advice from others and compromise than are American students with independent selves (Guan et al., 2015).

Culture shapes self-striving and similarity Cultural orientations can colour the way people perceive, evaluate and present themselves in relation to others. Markus and Kitayama (1991) identified two interesting differences between individualistic and collectivistic cultures. The first is that people in individualistic cultures strive for personal achievement, whereas those living in collectivist cultures derive more satisfaction from the status of a valued group. Thus, whereas FIGURE 2.8 What is your preference: similarity or non-Indigenous Australians and Pākehā New Zealanders would uniqueness? tend to overestimate their own contributions to a team effort, Which subfigure within each set do you prefer? Kim and Markus seize the credit for success and blame others for failure, people (1999) found that Americans tend to like subfigures that ‘stand from Hong Kong or Indonesia, for example, would tend to out’ as unique or in the minority, while Koreans tend to like underestimate their own role and present themselves in more subfigures that ‘fit in’ with the surrounding group. modest, self-effacing terms in relation to other members of the group (Heine, Takata & Lehman, 2000). A second consequence of these differing conceptions of the self is that university students in individualistic cultures see themselves as less similar to other people than do students in collectivistic cultures. This difference reinforces the idea that individuals with independent self-conceptions believe they are unique. In fact, our cultural orientations towards conformity or independence may lead us to favour similarity or uniqueness in all things. In a study that illustrates the point, Heejung Kim and Hazel Markus (1999) showed abstract figures to subjects from the US and Korea. Each figure contained nine parts. Most of the parts were identical in shape, position and direction, but one or more Source: From Kim, H. and Markus, H. R., “Deviance or uniqueness, harmony or were different. Look at Figure 2.8 – which of the nine subfigures conformity? A cultural analysis,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology vol 77 (pp. 785–800). Copyright © 1999 by the American Psychological within each group do you like most? The American subjects liked Association. Reprinted by permission. the subfigures that were unique or in the minority, while Korean

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subjects preferred those that ‘fit in’ as part of the group. In another study, these same researchers approached pedestrians of American and East Asian heritage at a US airport and had them fill out a questionnaire. Afterwards, as a gift, they offered the participants a choice of one pen from a handful of pens, three or four of which had the same colour barrel. The result was that 74% of the Americans chose a uniquely coloured pen and 76% of the East Asians selected a commonly coloured pen. It seems that culturally ingrained orientations to conformity and independence leave a mark, leading us to form preferences for things that ‘fit in’ or ‘stand out’. So, are people from disparate cultures locked into thinking about the self in either personal or collective terms, or are both aspects present in everyone, to be expressed according to the situation? Reconsider the study where American students described themselves more in terms of personal traits and Chinese students cited more group affiliations. In a follow-up to that study, Trafimow and colleagues (1997) tested students from Hong Kong, all of whom spoke English as a second language. One half of the students were given the ‘I am …’ test in Chinese, and the other half took the test in English. Did this variation influence the results? Yes. Students who took the test in English focused more on personal traits, whereas those who took the test in Chinese focused more on group affiliations. It appears that each of us has both personal and collective aspects of the self to draw on – and that the part that comes to mind depends on the situation we are in or the mindset we have at that moment.

Dialecticism and dialectical style

Dialecticism

An Eastern system of thought that accepts the coexistence of contradictory characteristics within a single person.

The more closely social psychologists examine cultures and their impact on how people think, the more complex is the picture that emerges. Clearly, research documents the extent to which self-conceptions are influenced by the individualist and collectivist impulses within a culture. But there are other core differences as well. Kaiping Peng and Richard Nisbett (1999) note that people in East Asian cultures think in dialectical terms about contradictory characteristics; accepting, for example, that apparent opposites (e.g., black and white, friend and enemy, and strong and weak) can coexist within a single person either at the same time or as a result of changes over time. Grounded in Eastern traditions, dialecticism is a system of thought characterised by the acceptance of such contradictions through compromise, as implied by the Chinese proverb ‘Beware of your friends, not your enemies’. This thought style contrasts sharply with the American and European perspective, grounded in Western logic, by which people differentiate seeming opposites on the assumption that if one is right, the other must be wrong. Wondering if a dialectical style of thought has implications for the self, Tammy English and Serena Chen (2007) conducted a series of studies in which they questioned white American and Asian American university students about what kind of person they are in such different everyday situations as a classroom, a restaurant, a party or the gym. Overall, they found that compared with white Americans who portray their ‘true selves’ as stable across the board, Asian Americans vary their self-concepts more to suit different relationship situations – although they are consistent within these situations. Further, other research has shown that East Asians are more willing than Americans to see and accept contradictory aspects of themselves (Spencer-Rodgers, Boucher, Mori, Wang, & Peng, 2009) – as seen in their willingness to accept both positive and negative aspects of themselves at the same time (Boucher, Peng, Shi, & Wang, 2009). The study of cultural aspects of the self is also expanded by social psychologists interested in Latin American cultures, where social and emotional relationships are a particularly important part of the collectivist orientation. Nairán Ramírez-Esparza and colleagues (2012) found that Mexican participants were more likely to describe their own personality using words about relationships (e.g., parents, house, love, friends) and empathy (e.g., affectionate, honest, noble, tolerant). A follow-up study demonstrated that bilingual Mexican Americans described themselves relatively more independently when doing so in English compared to in Spanish (Rodríguez-Arauz, Ramírez-Esparza, Pérez-Brena, & Boyd, 2017).

Generational shifts Before we conclude our discussion of cultural influences, it is important to realise that cultures themselves change over time, from one generation to another. Patricia Greenfield (2013) looked at the frequency of word usage from the year 1800 until 2000. She found that accompanying a shift from a more rural to urban population, there was also a shift in cultural values. As the occurrence of words such as ‘duty’, ‘obliged’, ‘give’, ‘obedience’, ‘authority’, ‘belong’, and ‘benevolence’ decreased over time, the words ‘decision’, ‘choose’, ‘unique’, ‘individual’, ‘self’, and ‘acquisition’ increased over time. Generational changes within a culture can also be seen within smaller frames of time. People who grew up in the 1940s and 1950s, a generation known as ‘Baby Boomers’, grew up in a very different culture from those who grew up in the 1960s and 1970s (Generation X or Gen X), and those who grew up in the 1980s 58

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and 1990s (Millennials). Analysing questionnaire data collected from 9.2 million high school and university students from 1966 to 2009, Jean Twenge and colleagues (2012) found that compared with Baby Boomers, subsequent generations are more focused on money, fame and self-image, and less concerned with affiliation, community and civic engagement (see Figure 2.9). This change in values – described as a shift from ‘Generation We’ to ‘Generation Me’ – suggests that American culture is more individualistic today than it was a half century ago. It remains to be seen if similar patterns hold around the world. FIGURE 2.9 Generational differences in American cultural orientation From the responses of American high school and university students from 1966 to 2009, it seems that compared to Baby Boomers, later generations are more focused on money, fame and self-image, and less concerned with affiliation, community and civic engagement. These changes suggest that American culture is more individualistic today than it was a half century ago. 100 90 80

Importance ratings

70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 1966

1969

1972

1975

1978

1981

1984

1987

1990

1993

1996

1999

2002

2005

2008

Goal Philosophy of life

Well-off financially

Money

Being a leader

Source: Based on Twenge, J. M., Campbell, W. K., & Freeman, E. C. (2012). Generational differences in young adults’ life goals, concern for others, and civic orientation, 1966–009, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 102, 1045–062.

Social class is another cultural factor that can influence the self-concept. In Western countries, people with more income, education and status tend to have many opportunities to exhibit individualism by expressing their desires, their autonomy and the pursuit of personal goals. They have more control over their lives, greater personal choice, and more independence and self-focus. In contrast, people with less income, education and status are more constrained in terms of what they can and cannot do. Navigating a low-income world means having to rely more on others and fitting-in, fostering ‘hard interdependence’ (Fiske & Markus, 2012; Kraus, Piff, Mendoza-Denton, Rheinschmidt, & Keltner, 2012; Stephens, Markus, & Phillips, 2014). Recent studies confirm that characteristics of the self are associated with social class. For example, in one study, people classified as low in social class were less likely to agree with statements of entitlement such as ‘I honestly feel I’m just more deserving than others’, and with statements indicating narcissism such as ‘I like to look at myself in the mirror’ (Piff, 2014). Recent work has highlighted differences in self-schemas among Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people (Arens, Bodkin-Andrews, Craven, & Yeung, 2014; Bodkin-Andrews, Seaton, Nelson, Craven, & Yeung, 2010) and Māori people (Houkamau & Sibley, 2010). Moreover, Gawaian Bodkin-Andrews and Bronwyn Carlson (2016) point out that Western notions of the dimensions of the self do not have an exact or even a good correspondence with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander perspectives.

SELF-ESTEEM How do you feel about yourself? Are you generally satisfied with the way you look, your personality, your academic or athletic abilities, your accomplishments and your friendships? Are you optimistic about your future? When it comes to the self, there is more to the picture than the cognitive features of the self-concept. Copyright 2020 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-202

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Self-esteem

An affective component of the self, consisting of an individual’s positive and negative selfevaluations.

Rather, we are judgemental, motivated, emotional and highly protective of our self-esteem – an affectively charged component of the self. The word esteem comes from the Latin aestimare, which means ‘to estimate or appraise’. Self-esteem thus refers to our positive and negative evaluations of ourselves (Coopersmith, 1967). Some individuals have a higher self-esteem than others do – an attribute that can have a profound impact on the way they think about, feel about and present themselves. It is important to keep in mind, however, that although some of us have higher self-esteem than others, a feeling of self-worth is not a single trait etched permanently in stone. Rather, it is a state of mind that fluctuates up and down in response to success, failure, social relations and other life experiences (Heatherton & Polivy, 1991). With the self-concept made up of many self-schemas, people typically view parts of the self differently: Some parts they judge more favourably or see more clearly or as more important than other parts (Pelham, 1995). Indeed, just as individuals differ according to how high or low their self-esteem is, they also differ in the extent to which their self-esteem is stable or unstable. As a general rule, self-esteem stays roughly the same from childhood through old age (Trzesniewski, Donnellan, & Robins, 2003). Although an individual’s self-esteem relative to others remains stable, the average level of self-esteem in a population varies over the course of a lifetime. Longitudinal studies that track individuals over time, and cross-sectional studies that compare people from different age groups at one point in time, show that self-esteem declines from childhood to adolescence, gradually increases during the transition to adulthood, continues to rise as adults get older, and declines in old age (Erol & Orth, 2011; Orth, Trzesniewski, & Robins, 2010). Research with university students shows that average levels of self-esteem vary even over the course of a university career. Think for a moment about the whole university experience. What changes in selfesteem might you predict? In a longitudinal study, 295 male and female American university students had their self-esteem tested six times over a four-year period. As shown in Figure 2.10, average levels dropped sharply during the very first semester, rebounded by the end of the first year, and then gradually increased from that point on (Chung et al., 2014). FIGURE 2.10 Self-esteem over the course of a university career In this longitudinal study on self-esteem of American university students, self-esteem dropped sharply during their first semester but then recovered and increased into their final year. 4

Level of self-esteem

3.9 3.8 3.7 3.6 3.5 3.4 3.3 Week 1

Semester 1

Year 1

Year 2

Year 3

Year 4

Source: Chung, J. M., Robins, R. W., Trzesniewski, K. H., Noftle, E. E., Roberts, B. W., & Widaman, K. F. (2014). Continuity and change in self-esteem during emerging adulthood. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 106, 469–483.

The need for self-esteem You, me and just about everyone else on the planet seem to have a need for self-esteem; we all want to see ourselves in a positive light. As a result of who we are and the culture we live in, each of us may value different attributes and pursue this need in different ways. Some people derive a sense of worth from their appearance; others value physical strength, professional accomplishments, wealth, people skills or group affiliations. Whatever the source, it is clear that the pursuit of self-worth is an aspect of human motivation that runs deep. But let us step back for a moment and ask, why do we seem to need self-esteem the way we need food, air, sleep and water?

60

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Sociometer theory At present, there are two social psychological answers to the question of why self-esteem is so essential. Sociometer theory, proposed by Mark Leary and Roy Baumeister (2000), maintains that people are inherently social animals and that the desire for self-esteem is driven by a more primitive need to connect with others and gain their approval. As a result of this drive, people may have evolved a ‘sociometer’ – a mechanism that enables us to detect acceptance and rejection, and then translate these perceptions into high and low self-esteem. In this way, self-esteem serves as a rough indicator of how we are doing in the eyes of others. The threat of social rejection thus lowers self-esteem, which activates the need to regain approval and acceptance. In an experiment aimed at identifying a ‘neural sociometer’, participants underwent fMRI while viewing positive and negative feedback words that a confederate ostensibly used to describe them (words such as ‘interesting’ and ‘boring’). Participants also rated their self-esteem in response to each feedback word. Results showed that increased activity in brain regions known to be involved in responses to rejection was associated with lowered self-esteem (Eisenberger, Inagaki, Muscatell, Haltom, & Leary, 2011).

Terror management theory There is a second important theory. Jeff Greenberg, Sheldon Solomon and Thomas Pyszczynski (1997) proposed terror management theory to help explain our need for self-esteem. According to this provocative and influential theory, humans are biologically programmed for life and self-preservation. Yet we are conscious of, and terrified by, the inevitability of our own death. To cope with this paralysing, deeply rooted fear, we construct and accept cultural worldviews about how, why and by whom the Earth was created, including religious explanations of the purpose of our existence, and a sense of history filled with heroes, villains and momentous events. These worldviews provide meaning and purpose, and a buffer against anxiety. In a series of experiments, these investigators found that people react to graphic scenes of death or to the thought of their own death with intense defensiveness and anxiety. However, when people are given positive feedback on a test that boosts their self-esteem, this reaction is muted. Other research has since confirmed this type of result (Schmeichel et al., 2009), although variations across cultures have been found, as outlined in the following Cultural Diversity feature. As we will see in later chapters, terror management theory has been used to explain how people cope with traumas such as the terrorist attack of 9/11 (Pyszczynski, Solomon, & Greenberg, 2002) and why people all over the world seek solace in religion, strong leaders, and cultural institutions (Pyszczynski, Solomon, & Greenberg, 2015). As for the need for self-esteem, Pyszczynski and colleagues (2004, p. 436) put it this way:

Sociometer theory

The theory that people are inherently social animals and their desire for self-esteem is driven by a more primitive need to connect with others and gain their approval. This leads to some having a ‘sociometer’ – that detects acceptance and rejection, and translates these into high and low self-esteem.

Terror management theory

The theory that humans cope with the fear of their own death by constructing worldviews that help to preserve their self-esteem.

Self-esteem is a protective shield designed to control the potential for terror that results from awareness of the horrifying possibility that we humans are merely transient animals groping to survive in a meaningless universe, designed only to die and decay. From this perspective, each individual human’s name and identity, family and social identifications, goals and aspirations, occupation and title, and humanly created adornments are draped over an animal that, in the cosmic scheme of things, may be no more significant or enduring than any individual potato, pineapple, or porcupine.

CULTURAL DIVERSITY TERROR MANAGEMENT WORLDWIDE Imagine participating in a psychology study and being asked to answer the following two prompts: 1 Please briefly describe the emotions that the thought of your own death arouses in you. 2 Jot down, as specifically as you can, what you think will happen to you as you physically die and once you are physically dead. Terror management theory suggests that this instils a high degree of anxiety in most individuals. However, there is evidence that death anxiety may differ according to one’s

cultural orientation. John Schumaker and colleagues (1988, 1991) examined levels of death anxiety across individuals from different cultures. These researchers found that death anxiety (e.g., ‘I am very much afraid to die’) was significantly higher among Australians than Malaysians or Japanese. These patterns are explained by cultural differences in the conceptualisations of death (e.g., bodily death as death of self versus a transition), in the treatment of the elderly (e.g., integration versus marginalisation) and in religion (e.g., Christianity versus Hinduism and Buddhism).

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The widespread impact of high and low self-esteem Confirming folk wisdom, a good deal of research shows that high and low self-esteem can colour our outlook on life. People with positive self-images tend to be happy, healthy, productive and successful. They also tend to be confident, bringing to new challenges a winning attitude that leads them to persist longer at difficult tasks, sleep better at night, maintain their independence in the face of peer pressure and suffer from fewer ulcers. By contrast, people with negative self-images tend to be more depressed, pessimistic about the future and prone to failure. Lacking confidence, they bring to new tasks a losing attitude that traps them in a vicious, self-defeating cycle. Expecting to fail and fearing the worst, they become anxious, exert less effort and ‘tune out’ on important challenges. Does high self-esteem ensure good life outcomes? This seemingly simple question is now the subject of debate. On the one hand, based on an extensive review of the research, Roy Baumeister and colleagues (2003) conclude that although high self-esteem leads people to feel good, take on new challenges and persist through failure, the correlational evidence does not clearly support the strong conclusion that boosting self-esteem causes beneficial outcomes. What is more, Jennifer Crocker and Lora Park (2004) argue that the process of pursuing self-esteem itself can be costly despite its benefits. Specifically, they point to research showing that in trying hard to boost and maintain their self-esteem, people often become anxious, avoid activities that risk failure, neglect the needs of others and suffer from stress-related health problems. Challenging the conclusion that self-esteem is not worth striving for, William Swann and colleagues (2007) note that although a person’s overall, or global, sense of self-worth may not be predictive of positive life outcomes, specific domains of self-esteem provide benefits in more circumscribed ways. In other words, research suggests that individuals with high self-esteem specifically for public speaking or social situations will outperform those who have less self-confidence in the domains of public speaking and social situations, respectively. In addition to facilitating success in various life domains, research suggests that self-esteem is associated with a reduced risk for physical and mental health problems, substance abuse and antisocial behaviour (Orth, Robins, & Widaman, 2012; Swann et al., 2007).

Self-esteem, gender and minority status Just as individuals differ in their self-esteem, so too do social and cultural groups. If you were to administer a self-esteem test to thousands of people all over the world, would you find that some segments of the population score higher than others? Would you expect to see differences in the averages of men and women, or people of different ethnicities? Given that self-esteem might promote health, happiness and success, it could be of concern if some groups are disadvantaged in this regard. Are there gender differences in self-esteem? Over the years, a lot has been written in the popular press about the inflated but fragile ‘male ego’, the low self-regard among adolescent girls and young women, and the resulting gender-related ‘confidence gap’ (Orenstein, 1994). Does the research support these descriptions? To find out, Miron Zuckerman and colleagues (2016) statistically combined the results of 1148 studies involving a total of 1 170 935 individuals. The result? Males did indeed report higher levels of self-esteem than females. However, the difference was very small and diminished after adolescence. Moreover, observed gender differences in selfesteem have been declining since the mid-1990s. In fact, male–female differences are specific to different aspects of self-esteem. In a meta-analysis of 115 studies involving 32 486 individuals, Brittany Gentile and colleagues (2009) found, for example, that men have higher self-esteem with regard to their physical appearance and athletic abilities, while women have higher self-esteem when it comes to matters of ethics and personal morality. Researchers have also wondered if low self-esteem is a problem for members of stigmatised minority groups who have historically been victims of prejudice and discrimination. Does membership in a minority group deflate an individual’s sense of self-worth? Based on the combined results of studies involving more than half a million respondents, Bernadette Gray-Little and Adam Hafdahl (2000) reported that African American children, adolescents and adults consistently score higher – not lower – than their white counterparts on measures of self-esteem. A more recent study of annual surveys spanning 1991–2008 revealed that African American adolescents score highest and Asian American adolescents lowest on selfesteem measures (Bachman et al., 2011). More locally, Leigh Harrington and James Liu (2002) examined selfesteem levels of Māori and Pākehā people. Results revealed higher self-esteem among the Māori than the Pākehā. Therefore, minority status matters for self-esteem, although the direction of that effect varies.

Self-discrepancy theory What determines how people feel about themselves? According to E. Tory Higgins (1989), our self-esteem is defined by the match or mismatch between how we see ourselves and how we want to see ourselves. To demonstrate, try the exercise described in the following Critical Thinking Activity feature. 62

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CRITICAL THINKING ACTIVITY 1 On a blank sheet of paper, write down 10 traits that describe the kind of person you think you are (e.g., smart, easy-going, sexy, thoughtful). 2 Next, list 10 traits that describe the kind of person you think you ought to be; that is, characteristics that would enable you to meet your sense of duty, obligation and responsibility.

3 Then make a list of traits that describe the kind of person you would like to be; that is, an ideal that embodies your hopes, wishes and dreams. If you follow these instructions, you should have three lists: (1) your actual self, (2) your ‘ought self’ and (3) your ideal self.

Research has shown that lists, such as the one made in the Critical Thinking Activity, can be used to predict your self-esteem and your emotional wellbeing. The first list is your self-concept. The others represent your personal standards, or self-guides. To the extent that you fall short of these standards, you will experience lowered self-esteem, negative emotion and, in extreme cases, a serious affective disorder. The specific consequence depends on which self-guide you fail to achieve. If there is a discrepancy between your actual and ought selves, you will feel guilty, ashamed and resentful. You might even suffer from excessive fears and anxiety-related disorders. If the mismatch is between your actual and ideal selves, you will feel disappointed, frustrated, unfulfilled and sad. In the worst-case scenario you might even become depressed (Boldero & Francis, 2000; Higgins, 1999; Strauman, 1992). Our self-discrepancies may even set into motion a self-perpetuating process. Participating in a study of body images, university women with high rather than low discrepancies between their actual and ideal selves were more likely to compare themselves with thin models in television commercials, which further increased their body dissatisfaction and depression (Bessenoff, 2006). Every one of us must cope with some degree of self-discrepancy – nobody is perfect. Yet we do not all suffer from the emotional consequences. The reason, according to Higgins (1999), is that self-esteem depends on a number of factors: • The amount of discrepancy – the more of it there is, the worse we feel. • The importance of the discrepancy to the self – the more important the domain in which we fall short, again, the worse we feel. • How much we focus on our self-discrepancies – the more focused we are, the greater the harm. This last observation raises an important question: ‘What causes us to be more or less focused on our personal shortcomings?’ To answer this we turn to self-awareness theory.

The self-awareness ‘trap’ If you carefully review your daily routine – classes, work, errands, sport, leisure activities, social interactions and meals – you will probably be surprised at how little time you actually spend thinking about yourself. In a study that illustrates this point, more than a hundred people, ranging in age from 19 to 63, were equipped for a week with electronic beepers that sounded every two hours or so between 7:30 a.m. and 10:30 p.m. Each time the beepers went off, participants interrupted whatever they were doing, wrote down what they were thinking at that moment and filled out a brief questionnaire. Out of 4700 recorded thoughts, only 8% were about the self. For the most part, attention was focused on work and other activities. In fact, when participants were thinking about themselves, they reported feeling relatively unhappy and wished they were doing something else (Csikszentmihalyi & Figurski, 1982).

Self-awareness theory The finding that people may be unhappy while they think about themselves is interesting; but what does it mean? Does self-reflection bring out our personal shortcomings the way staring into a mirror draws our gaze to every facial blemish? Is self-awareness an unpleasant mental state from which we need to retreat? Many years ago, Robert Wicklund and colleagues theorised that the answer is ‘yes’ (Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Silvia & Duval, 2001; Wicklund, 1975). According to their self-awareness theory, most people are not usually self-focused, but certain situations predictably force us to turn our attention inward. When we talk about ourselves, glance into a mirror, stand before an audience or in front of a camera, watch a video of ourselves or behave in a socially conspicuous manner, we enter into a state of heightened selfawareness that leads us naturally to compare our behaviour to some high standard. Even a brightly lit room can make us feel self-aware and acutely concerned about what other people think of us (Steidle & Werth, 2014).

Self-awareness theory

The theory that selffocused attention leads people to notice selfdiscrepancies, thereby motivating either an escape from selfawareness or a change in behaviour.

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As you might expect, comparing yourself to some high standard often results in a negative discrepancy and a temporary reduction in self-esteem because we discover that we fall short of the standard. Thus, research participants who are seated in front of a mirror tend to react more negatively to their selfdiscrepancies, often slipping into a negative mood state (Hass & Eisenstadt, 1990; Phillips & Silvia, 2005). Interestingly, people from Japan – whose culture already leads them to be highly concerned about their public ‘face’ – are unaffected by the added presence of a mirror (Heine, Takemoto, Moskalenko, Lasaleta, & Henrich, 2008). The real-life consequences can be substantial. The more self-focused people are in general, the more likely they are to find themselves in a bad mood (Flory, Raikkonen, Matthews, & Owens, 2000) or depressed (Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987). People who are self-absorbed are also more likely to suffer from alcoholism, anxiety and other clinical disorders (Mor & Winquist, 2002) and have self-destructive, suiciderelated thoughts when they fail to meet their own standards (Chatard & Selimbegović, 2011). Is there a solution? Self-awareness theory suggests two basic ways of coping with such discomfort: (1) ‘shape up’ by behaving in ways that reduce our self-discrepancies; or (2) ‘ship out’ by withdrawing from self-awareness. According to Charles Carver and Michael Scheier (1981), the solution chosen depends on whether people think they can reduce their self-discrepancy and whether they are pleased with the progress they make once they try (Duval, Duval, & Mulilis, 1992). If so, they tend to match their behaviour to personal or societal standards; if not, they tune out, look for distractions and turn attention away from the self. This process is depicted in Figure 2.11. FIGURE 2.11 The causes and effects of self-awareness Self-awareness pressures people to reduce self-discrepancies either by matching their behaviour to personal or societal standards or by withdrawing from self-awareness. Self-focusing individuals

Selfawareness

Accessibility of selfdiscrepancies

High

Match behaviour to standards

Low

Withdraw from selfawareness

Expectation for discrepancy reduction

Self-focusing situations

From self-awareness to self-discrepancy In general, research supports the prediction that when people are self-focused, they are more likely to behave in ways that are consistent either with their own personal values or with socially accepted ideals. It is why one team of researchers, after using bright lights to induce a state of self-awareness, has concluded that ‘good lamps are the best police’ (Zhong, Bohns, & Gino, 2010). An interesting field study conducted in the United Kingdom illustrates this point. People who frequented a university coffee room were trusted to pay for their coffee, tea and milk by depositing money into an unsupervised ‘honesty box’. Hanging on the wall behind the counter was a poster that featured a picture of flowers or a pair of eyes. By calculating the ratio of money deposited to drinks consumed, researchers observed that people paid nearly three times more money in the presence of the eyes than in the presence of the flowers (Bateson, Nettle, & Roberts, 2006). More recent research has demonstrated similar prosocial outcomes for littering behaviour (Bateson, Callow, Holmes, Redmond Roche, & Nettle, 2013). It appears however, that the direction of gaze is important. Images of averted eyes fail to produce the effect (Manesi, Van Lange, & Pollet, 2016). Self-awareness theory states that if a successful reduction of self-discrepancy seems unlikely, individuals will instead escape from self-awareness. Roy Baumeister (1991) speculates that drug abuse, sexual masochism, spiritual ecstasy, binge eating, and suicide all serve this escapist function. Even watching television may serve as a form of escape. Sophia Moskalenko and Steven Heine (2003) brought university students into a laboratory and twice tested their actual–ideal self-discrepancies. Half watched a brief television show on nature before the second test. In a second study, students were sent home with the 64

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questionnaire and instructed to fill it out either before or after watching television. In both cases, those who watched television had lower self-discrepancies on the second measure. In yet a third study, students who were told they had done poorly on an IQ test spent more time watching television while waiting in the laboratory than those who were told they had succeeded. Perhaps television and other forms of entertainment enable people to ‘watch their troubles away’.

Alcohol and self-awareness One particularly disturbing health implication concerns the use of alcohol. According to Jay Hull, people often drown their sorrows in a bottle as a way to escape the negative implications of self-awareness. To test this hypothesis, Hull and Richard Young (1983) administered what was supposed to be an IQ test to male participants and gave false feedback suggesting that they had either succeeded or failed. Supposedly as part of a separate study, those participants were then asked to taste and rate different wines. As they did so, researchers kept track of how much they drank during a 15-minute tasting period. As predicted, participants who were prone to self-awareness drank more wine after failure than after success, presumably to dodge the blow to their self-esteem. Among participants not prone to self-awareness, there was no difference in alcohol consumption. These results come as no surprise. Indeed, many of us expect alcohol to grant this form of relief (Leigh & Stacy, 1993) and to help us manage our emotional highs and lows (Cooper, Frone, Russell, & Mudar, 1995). Claude Steele and Robert Josephs (1990) believe that alcoholic intoxication offers more than just a means of tuning out on the self. Alcohol can cause people to lose touch with reality and shed their inhibitions (Giancola, Josephs, Parrott, & Duke, 2010). It also evokes a state of ‘drunken self-inflation’. In one study, for example, participants rated their actual and ideal selves on various traits – some important to self-esteem, others not important. After drinking either a strong vodka cocktail or a harmless placebo, they rated themselves again on the same traits. As measured by the perceived discrepancy between actual and ideal selves, intoxicated participants expressed inflated views of themselves on traits they considered important (Banaji & Steele, 1989).

Self-consciousness Just as situations evoke a state of self-awareness, some individuals are generally more self-focused than others. Research has revealed an important distinction between private self-consciousness – the tendency to introspect about our inner thoughts and feelings – and public self-consciousness – the tendency to focus on our outer public image (Buss, 1980; Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975). Figure 2.12 presents a sample of items used to measure these traits.

Private selfconsciousness

A personality characteristic of individuals who are introspective, often attending to their own inner states.

Public selfconsciousness

A personality characteristic of individuals who focus on themselves as social objects, as seen by others.

FIGURE 2.12 How self-conscious are you? This sample of items appears in the self-consciousness scale. How many of these statements indicating private or public self-consciousness would you use to describe yourself?

Items that measure private self-consciousness •

I am always trying to figure myself out.

•

I am constantly examining my motives.

•

I am often the subject of my fantasies.

•

I am alert to changes in my mood.

•

I am aware of the way my mind works when I work on a problem.

Items that measure public self-consciousness •

I am concerned about what other people think of me.

•

I am self-conscious about the way I look.

•

I am concerned about the way I present myself.

•

I usually worry about making a good impression.

•

One of the last things I do before leaving my house is look in the mirror. Source: Fenigstein, A., Scheier, M. F., & Buss, A. H. (1975). Public and private self-consciousness: Assessment and theory. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 43, 522–527. Copyright © 1975 by the American Psychological Association. Reprinted by permission.

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FIGURE 2.13 Revolving images of self According to self-awareness theory, people try to meet either their own standards or standards held for them by others – depending, perhaps, on whether they are in a state of private or public self-consciousness. As Scheier and Carver (1983, p. 123) put it, there are ‘two sides of the self: one for you and one for me’.

Source: Based on Scheier and Carver (1983, p. 123) Scheier, M. F., & Carver, C. S. (1983). Two sides of the self: One for you and one for me. In J. Suls and A. G. Greenwald (Eds.), Psychological perspectives on the self (Vol. 2, pp. 123–157). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

FIGURE 2.14 Does thinking about God produce selfawareness effects? Participants classified as high- or low-believers completed a word task that led them to think about God or something neutral. Afterward, they answered questions about themselves. Consistent with self-awareness theory, thinking about God, as opposed to something neutral, led high-believers (but not low-believers) to answer the questions in ways that were more socially desirable. 6

Socially desirable response

5 4 3 2 1 0

High belief in God Control Condition

Low belief in God Think about God Condition

Source: Based on Gervais, W. M., & Norenzayan, A. (2012). Like a camera in the sky? Thinking about God increases public self-awareness and socially desirable responding. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 48, 298–302.

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Private and public self-consciousness are distinct traits. People who score high on a measure of private selfconsciousness tend to fill in incomplete sentences with firstperson pronouns. They also make self-descriptive statements and recognise self-relevant words more quickly than other words (Mueller, 1982; Eichstaedt & Silvia, 2003). By contrast, those who score high on a measure of public self-consciousness are sensitive to the way they are viewed from an outsider’s perspective. Thus, when people were asked to draw a capital letter E on their foreheads, 43% of those with high levels of public self-consciousness, compared with only 6% of those with low levels, oriented the E so that it was backward from their own standpoint but correct for an outside observer (Hass, 1984). People who are high in public self-consciousness are also particularly sensitive to the extent to which others share their opinions (Fenigstein & Abrams, 1993). The distinction between private and public self-awareness has implications for the ways in which people reduce selfdiscrepancies. According to Higgins (1989), people are motivated to meet either their own standards or the standards held for them by significant others. If you’re privately self-conscious, you listen to an inner voice and try to reduce discrepancies relative to your own standards; if you’re publicly self-conscious, however, you try to match your behaviour to socially accepted norms. As illustrated in Figure 2.13, there may be ‘two sides of the self: one for you and one for me’ (Scheier & Carver, 1983, p. 123).

God: like a camera in the sky? Across nations, cultures and religions, more than 90% of the people on Earth believe in God or some other omnipotent force (Zuckerman, 2015). In most religions, people believe that God watches, evaluates, rewards and punishes people for their moral and immoral behaviour (Atran & Norenzayan, 2004). For people of faith, thinking about God should trigger a state of self-focus, in the same way that cameras, microphones and other forms of surveillance do. As we saw, self-awareness theory predicts that self-focus should heighten a concern for our standards of good behaviour. Does thinking about God have this effect? In a series of experiments, Will Gervais and Ara Norenzayan (2012) administered a religiosity scale to sort people into groups of high-believers and low-believers. All participants were then randomly assigned to complete a word task that required them to think about God, the presence of other people or something neutral. One study showed that high-believers, who were primed to think about God, became more self-aware, as if they were being observed by other people. A second study showed that thinking about God, as opposed to something neutral, led high-believers to answer various questions in ways that were socially desirable; for example, they claimed that they were always good listeners and that they were never irritated by people who ask for favours (see Figure 2.14). As you might expect from this finding, other research has shown that thoughts of God can lead people of faith to behave more prosocially towards others. In one study, participants were given 10 $1 coins to keep or donate to an anonymous

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stranger. Before engaging in this ‘economic decision-making task’, participants were instructed to unscramble sentences containing words that were neutral or religious (God, divine, spirit, prophet, sacred). How much of the $10 did the participants then leave for the stranger? Those who had worked with neutral words left an average of $1.84, but those primed with God-related words left more than twice that amount, an average of $4.44 (Shariff & Norenzayan, 2007). Other researchers, reasoning that thoughts of an all-knowing God should reduce people’s sense of anonymity and increase their sense of accountability, have found that reminders of God increase resistance to temptation – as measured, for example, by the number of bite-sized chocolate chip biscuits participants ate in a taste-testing experiment (Laurin, Kay & Fitzsimons, 2012).

Self-regulation and its limits To this point, we have seen that self-focused attention can motivate us to control our behaviour and strive towards personal or social ideals. Achieving these goals – which enables us to reduce the selfdiscrepancies that haunt us – means that we must constantly engage in self-regulation, the processes by which we seek to control or alter our thoughts, feelings, behaviours and urges in order to live an acceptable social life. From lifting ourselves out of bed in the early morning to dieting, jogging daily, limiting how much we drink at a party, practising safe sex, smiling politely at people we really do not like, and working or studying when we have more fun things to do, the exercise of self-control is something we practise all the time (Baumeister & Vohs, 2004; Bridgett, Burt, Edwards, & Deater-Deckard, 2015; Carver & Scheier, 1998; Heatherton, 2011). Conflicts between our desires and need for self-control are constant. When a sample of 205 adults wore beepers for a week and reported their current states on cue, they indicated 7827 episodes of desire; including, in order, biological desires to eat, sleep and drink, followed by desires for media use, leisure activities, social contact, grooming and hygiene, sex, work and sporting activities. In nearly half of all instances, the desire was described as posing a conflict with other motivations, goals and values (Hofmann, Baumeister, Förster, & Vohs, 2012).

Self-regulation

The process by which people control their thoughts, feelings or behaviour in order to achieve a personal or social goal.

Self-control as a limited resource Although the need is constant, Mark Muraven and Roy Baumeister (2000) theorised that self-control is a limited inner resource that can temporarily be depleted by usage. There are two components to their theory. The first is that all self-control efforts draw from a single common reservoir. The second is that exercising self-control is like flexing a muscle: once used, it becomes fatigued and loses strength, making it more difficult to re-exert self-control – at least for a while, until the resource is replenished. Deny yourself the ice-cream that satisfies your sweet tooth and you will find it more difficult to hold your temper when angered. Try to conceal your stage fright as you stand before an audience and you will find it harder to resist the urge to watch television when you should be studying. Research has supported this provocative hypothesis. Muraven and Baumeister (1998) had participants watch a brief clip from an upsetting film that shows scenes of sick and dying animals exposed to radioactive waste. Some of the participants were instructed to stifle their emotional responses to the clip, including their facial expressions; others were told to amplify or exaggerate their facial responses; and a third group received no special instructions. Both before and after the film, self-control was measured by the length of time participants were able to squeeze a handgrip exerciser without letting go. As predicted, those who had to inhibit or amplify their emotions during the film, but not those in the group that received no instructions, lost their willpower in the second handgrip task compared to the first time they tried it prior to watching the video. Although some studies since have confirmed the effect of depleted self-control on later self-regulation (Vohs, Baumeister, & Ciarocco, 2005; Hagger, Wood, Stiff, & Chatzisarantis 2010), there have been several that have not found this to be true (Haggar et al., 2016). It turns out that belief in willpower determines selfregulation processes. Veronika Job and colleagues (2010, 2015) theorised that people who hold a nonlimited theory of willpower (as described by the statement, ‘After a strenuous mental activity, you feel energised for further challenging activities’) are more likely to maintain the ability to self-regulate after exertion than those who believe that self-control is limited and difficult to overcome (‘After a strenuous mental activity, your energy is depleted and you must rest to get it refuelled again’). In longitudinal studies that tracked American university students over a semester, Job and colleagues found that students who endorsed a nonlimited belief in willpower relative to those who endorsed a limited belief were better able to selfregulate during the difficult week before final exams: they ate fewer unhealthy foods, did less impulsive

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FIGURE 2.15 Does the belief in willpower predict selfregulation? Tracking American university students over time, researchers found that students who endorsed a non-limited belief in willpower, compared to those who endorsed a limited belief, were less likely to procrastinate when work demands were high. 7

shopping, and spent more time studying. But does having a nonlimited theory of willpower create problems in everyday life when self-regulation demands are particularly high? Not necessarily. Among students who took a heavier-than-normal course load or in other ways had a highly demanding semester, those who endorsed a nonlimited theory procrastinated less and ultimately scored higher grades (see Figure 2.15).

Ironic mental processes

6

Procrastination

There is another possible downside to self-control that is often seen in sport when athletes become so self-focused under 5 pressure that they ‘choke’. Although many athletes rise to the occasion, the pages of sport history are filled with stories 4 of footballers who lose their touch in the final minute of a championship game, of golfers who cannot sink a routine final 3 putt to win a tournament, and of tennis players who lose their serve, double-faulting when it matters most. ‘Choking’ in these 2 ways seems to be a paradoxical type of failure caused by trying too hard and thinking too much. When you learn a new motor 1 activity like how to perform a drop kick or land a jump, you must Low demands High demands think through the mechanics in a slow and cautious manner. As Nonlimited belief Limited belief you get better, however, your movements become automatic, so Source: Job, V., Walton, G. M., Bernecker, K., & Dweck, C. S. (2015). Implicit you do not have to think about timing, breathing, the position theories about willpower predict self-regulation and grades in everyday of your head and limbs, or the distribution of your weight. You life. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 108, 637–647. relax and just do it. Unless trained to perform while self-focused, athletes under pressure often try their hardest not to fail, becoming self-conscious and thinking too much – all of which disrupts the fluidity and natural flow of their performance (Baumeister, 1984; Beilock & Carr, 2001; Gray, 2004; Lewis & Linder, 1997) (see Figure 2.16). FIGURE 2.16 Choking under pressure or rising to the challenge Why do some athletes choke under pressure and others rise to the occasion? Heading into the 2016 Summer Olympics in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, Australian swimmer Cate Campbell (left) was favoured to win several medals. However, she finished a disappointing sixth in the 100-metre freestyle and fifth in the 50-metre freestyle, leaving the Games without an individual medal. She herself called it ‘the greatest choke in Olympic history’. By contrast, New Zealand rowing pair Hamish Bond and Eric Murray

(right) entered the 2012 London Olympic Games having won all 36 of the international rowing races they had participated in over the previous four years. Despite the pressure to defend their stellar performance record, they won gold by a large margin. Whereas Cate Campbell may have fallen prey to the ironic mental process of overthinking, it appears that Hamish Bond and Eric Murray escaped the trap.

Source: age fotostock/David Ebener/dpa (L) and Alamy Stock Photo/epa european pressphoto agency b.v.

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The paradoxical effects of attempted self-control are evident in other situations, too. Studying what he called ironic processes, Daniel Wegner (1994) found that, at times, the harder you try to inhibit a thought, feeling or behaviour, the less likely you are to succeed. He found that if you are asked not to think about a white bear for the next 30 seconds, that very image intrudes upon consciousness with remarkable frequency. Instruct the members of a jury to disregard inadmissible evidence and the censored material is sure to pop to mind as they deliberate. Try not to worry about how long it is taking you to fall asleep and you will stay awake. Try not to laugh in class, think about the chocolate cake in the fridge or scratch the itch on your nose – well, you get the idea.

Ironic operating process According to Wegner, every conscious effort at maintaining control is met by a concern about failing to do so. This concern automatically triggers an ‘ironic operating process’ as the person trying hard not to fail searches his or her mind for the unwanted thought. The ironic process will not necessarily prevail, says Wegner. Sometimes we can put the imaginary white bear out of mind. But if the person is cognitively busy, tired, distracted, hurried or under stress, then the ironic process, because it ‘just happens’, will prevail over the intentional process, which requires conscious attention and effort. As Wegner (1997) put it, ‘Any attempt at mental control contains the seeds of its own undoing’ (p. 148). Ironic processes have been observed in a wide range of behaviours. In an intriguing study of this effect on motor behaviour, Wegner and colleagues (1998) had participants hold a pendulum (a crystalline pendant suspended from a nylon fishing line) over the centre of two intersecting axes on a glass grid, which formed a plus sign. Some participants were instructed simply to keep the pendulum steady, while others were Sometimes the harder pointedly told not to allow it to swing back and forth along the horizontal axis. Try this yourself and you will you try to control see that it is not easy to prevent all movement. In this experiment, however, the pendulum was found to be a thought, feeling more likely to swing horizontally when this direction was specifically forbidden. or behaviour, the To further examine the role of mental distraction, the researchers had some participants count backward less likely you are to from a thousand by sevens while trying to control the pendulum. In this situation, the ironic effect was even succeed. greater. Among those who tried to prevent horizontal movement but could not concentrate fully on the task, TRUE the pendulum swayed freely back and forth in the forbidden direction (see Figure 2.17). Applying this logic to keeping secrets, other researchers have found that instructing word-game players to conceal hidden clues from a fellow player FIGURE 2.17 Ironic effects of mental control increased rather than decreased their tendency to leak that In this study, participants tried to hold a pendulum motionless information (Lane, Groisman, & Ferreira, 2006). It may seem both over a grid. As illustrated in the tracings shown here, they were comic and tragic, but at times our efforts at self-control backfire, better at the task when simply instructed to keep the pendulum thwarting even the best of intentions. steady (a) than when specifically told to prevent horizontal

Mechanisms of self-enhancement We have seen that self-awareness can lower self-esteem by focusing attention on self-discrepancies. We have seen that people often avoid focusing on themselves and turn away from unpleasant truths, but that such avoidance is not always possible. And we have seen that efforts at self-control often fail and sometimes even backfire. How, then, does the average person cope with his or her faults, inadequacies and uncertain future? Next, we review six processes that serve self-enhancement functions – the better-than-average effect, implicit egotism, self-serving beliefs, self-handicapping, basking in reflected glory, and downward social comparisons.

movement (c). Among participants who were mentally distracted during the task, this ironic effect was even greater (b and d). a.

b.

c.

d.

The better-than-average effect At least in individualistic cultures, most people most of the time think highly of themselves. Consistently, and across a broad range of life domains, people see positive traits as more selfdescriptive than negative traits, rate themselves more highly than they do others, rate themselves more highly than they are rated by others, exaggerate their control over life events, and predict that they have a bright future (Dunning, Heath, & Suls, 2004; Sedikides & Gregg, 2008; Taylor, 1989).

Source: Wegner, D. M., Ansfield, M., & Pilloff, D. (1998). The putt and the pendulum: Ironic effects of the mental control of action. Psychological Science, 9, 196–199.

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The list of self-enhancement biases is long and impressive. Research shows that people: overrate their effectiveness as speakers to an audience (Keysar & Henly, 2002) overestimate their own contributions to a group and how much they would be missed if absent (Savitsky, Gilovich, Berger, & Medvec, 2003) • selectively recall positive feedback while neglecting the negative (Green, Sedikides, & Gregg, 2008) • believe that they will achieve more in the future than they had in the past (Johnson, 2009) • choose a photo that is digitally morphed with 10% of another highly attractive face as themselves over an actual photo of themselves (Eply & Whitchurch, 2008) • credit themselves but not others for future but yet unrealised potential (Williams, Gilovich, & Dunning, 2012). Relative to others and across a wide range of domains, it seems that people in general believe they are better, more honourable, more capable and more compassionate than others. This pattern is known as the ‘better-than-average’ effect. What is particularly interesting is that people are more likely to see themselves as better than average when it comes to personal traits that are important to them. Jonathon Brown (2012) presented participants with a list of characteristics and asked them to rate how important they believed each one to be, how well it described them and how well it describes most other people. He found that this effect of judging oneself as better than average is greater for traits that were rated as high in importance (e.g., honest, kind, responsible and intelligent) than for traits of lesser importance (e.g., conscientious, agreeable, imaginative and outgoing). Moreover, cultural orientations guide which domains individuals are most likely to engage in self-enhancement in this way, as detailed in regard to Māori culture in the following Cultural Diversity feature. • •

CULTURAL DIVERSITY BETTER-THAN-AVERAGE EFFECT IN MĀORI CULTURE

FIGURE 2.18 Percentages of Māori and Pākehā samples self-rated among top 50% and top 10% of students in six domains

Percentage

Do cultural orientations drive differences in selfenhancement? Do those differences depend on 100 the domain of self-enhancement? At least in New Zealand, the answer appears to be ‘yes’. Leigh 80 Harrington and James Liu (2002) from the Victoria University of Wellington hypothesised that Māori and Pākehā individuals might differ in the degree 60 to which they self-enhance across different domains. The authors based their reasoning on 40 differences between the cultural orientations of these groups. Despite Māori culture’s predominant collectivistic orientation (e.g., the principle of 20 whanaungatanga, which emphasises commitment to the collective group), it also has individualist 0 values (e.g., the maintenance of mana, or personal Academic Social Art/music Athletic Cultural Appearance prestige, via individual goal pursuit). In particular, Domains cultural knowledge is valued, and great emphasis is placed on the personal communication of that Pākehā Ma¯ori knowledge across generations. Therefore, the Source: Harrington, L. & Liu, J. H. (2002). Self-enhancement and attitudes toward high achievers: A bicultural view of the independent and interdependent self. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 33(1), 37–55. authors predicted that self-enhancement would be particularly strong among Māori participants in the domain of cultural knowledge because that self-enhanced more in the cultural knowledge domain, as domain is particularly important to them. expected, and relatively less in the art/music and academic Māori and Pākehā students rated their own relative domains as compared with Pākehā participants. As expected, performance in six domains: academic ability, physical Māori participants rated cultural knowledge as more important appearance, artistic/musical ability, athletic ability, knowledge than did Pākehā participants (see Figure 2.18). of own culture and customs, and social skills. Results showed These findings support the idea that self-enhancement varies that both groups self-enhanced, with a considerable number of by culture in predictable manners. Self-enhancement should be participants rating themselves better than average (i.e., in the higher in those domains upon which the culture places value. top 50%) in four of the six domains. However, Māori participants 70

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Implicit egotism It is clear and perhaps not surprising that people tilt towards the positive when asked explicitly to evaluate themselves relative to other people. Other research suggests that people also exhibit implicit egotism – an unconscious and subtle expression of self-esteem. Implicit egotism is illustrated in various types of research, such as studies showing that people are quicker to associate ‘self’ words with positive traits than with negative traits. Particularly interesting is the finding that people evaluate the letters contained within their own names more favourably than other letters of the alphabet (Hoorens & Nuttin, 1993). This name– letter effect is also found in people’s preferences for their own birthday numbers (Jones, Pelham, Carvallo, & Mirenberg, 2004). In an article entitled ‘Why Susie Sells Seashells by the Seashore’, Brett Pelham and colleagues (2002) theorised that the positive associations people form with the sight and sound of their own name may draw them towards other people, places and entities that share this most personal aspect of ‘self’. In a thoughtprovoking series of studies, these researchers examined several important life choices that we make and found that people exhibit a small but statistically detectable tendency to gravitate towards things that contain the letters of their own name. For example, men and women are more likely than would be predicted by chance to live in certain places (Brittany in Brisbane or Chris in Christchurch), attend schools (Andrew from the University of Adelaide or Mary from Macquarie University), and choose careers (Dennis and Denise as dentists) whose names resemble their own. Marriage records found on various genealogical websites also indicate that people are disproportionately likely to marry others with first or last names that resemble their own (Jones et al., 2004). Perhaps in a subtle but remarkable way, we unconsciously seek out reflections of the self in our surroundings (Pelham, Carvallo, & Jones, 2005). Those surroundings even involve who we choose to interact with. Researchers Sylvia Kocan and Guy Curtis (2009) from the University of Western Sydney showed that individuals with high implicit self-esteem chose to sit closer to a peer who shared their initials than to a peer with different initials. The reverse was true for individuals with low implicit self-esteem. Uri Simonsohn (2011) is not so sure. Although impressed with evidence for implicit egotism in the laboratory, Simonsohn re-analysed the real-life data and concluded that too often the links resulted from a statistical fluke. Consider the finding that people are more likely than expected to marry others whose names resemble their own. A closer look at these numbers reveals that the name effect results from an ethnic bias, so that people often marry others who share the same Asian, European or other group’s last name. In turn, Pelham and Carvallo (2011) point to ways in which Simonsohn’s criticism is overstated. To sum up, it is clear that people prefer the letters of their own name and the number of their own birthday. What is less clear is whether these preferences influence the highest stakes decisions we make with regard to a marriage partner, career or place to live.

Implicit egotism

A non-conscious form of self-enhancement.

Self-serving beliefs How well did you do on your tertiary entrance score? When James Shepperd (1993) asked university students about their performance on such scores, he uncovered two interesting patterns. First, the students overestimated their actual scores. This inflationary distortion was most pronounced among those with relatively low scores, and it persisted somewhat even when students knew that the experimenter would check their academic files. Second, a majority of students whose scores were low described their scores as inaccurate and the assessments in general as invalid. In fact, the scores for the group as a whole were predictive of their university performance. It is not that people are delusional. But as memories fade, which can occur with the passage of time, the potential for self-enhancing recollections of test scores is increased (Willard & Gramzow, 2008). When students receive exam marks, those who do well take credit for the success, but those who do poorly complain about the instructor or test questions. When researchers have articles accepted for publication, they credit the quality of their work; when articles are rejected, they blame the editors and reviewers. When gamblers win a bet, they marvel at their skilfulness; when they lose, they blame fluke events that transformed a near-victory into defeat. Whether people have high or low self-esteem, explain their own outcomes publicly or in private, or try to be honest or to make a good impression, there is bias. Across a range of cultures, people tend to take credit for success and distance themselves from failure (Mezulis, Abramson, Hyde, & Hankin, 2004; Schlenker & Trudeau, 1990), all while seeing themselves as objective rather than biased (Pronin, Gilovich, & Ross, 2004). Most of us are also unrealistically optimistic about the future. University students who were asked to predict their own future compared with that of the average peer believed that they would graduate higher in their class, get a better job, have a happier marriage and bear a gifted child. They also believed that they

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were less likely to get fired or divorced, have a car accident, become depressed, be victimised by crime or suffer a heart attack (Weinstein, 1980). In sport, politics, health and social The illusion of control at sporting events is palpable. Many fans visualise the team’s success, and then infer their own causal role in issues, people exhibit an optimistic bias – essentially a the success. case of wishful thinking – about their own future, judging desirable events as more likely to occur than undesirable events (Krizan & Windschitl, 2007; Shepperd, Klein, Waters, & Weinstein, 2013). Perhaps one reason that people are eternally optimistic is that they harbour illusions of control, overestimating the extent to which they can influence personal outcomes that are not, in fact, within their power to control (Stefan & David, 2013). In a series of classic experiments on the illusion of control, Ellen Langer (1975) found that university students bet more money in a chance game when their opponent seemed nervous rather than confident, and were more reluctant to sell a lottery ticket if they had chosen the numbers themselves than if they were assigned. Emily Pronin and colleagues (2006) tested the related hypothesis that imagining an event before it occurs can lead people Source: Getty Images/Jason McCawley to think they had influenced it. In one study, for example, participants watched a trained athlete shoot hoops on a netball court (see Figure 2.19). Before each shot, they were instructed to visualise her success (‘the shooter releases the ball and it swooshes through the net’) or an irrelevant event (‘the shooter’s arm curls to lift a dumbbell’). After the athlete’s successful run at making shots, spectators rated the extent of their influence over her performance. As if linking thoughts to outcomes, they exhibited an illusion of mental causation, taking more credit when they had visualised the shooter’s success than when they had not. FIGURE 2.19 Illusion of control at sporting events

Self-handicapping

Self-handicapping

Behaviours designed to sabotage one’s own performance in order to provide a subsequent excuse for failure.

72

‘My dog ate my homework.’ ‘I had a flat tyre.’ ‘My alarm didn’t go off.’ ‘My computer crashed.’ ‘I had a bad headache.’ On occasion, people make excuses for their past performance. Sometimes they even come up with excuses in anticipation of future performance. Particularly when people are afraid that they might fail in an important situation, they use illness, shyness, anxiety, pain, trauma and other complaints as excuses (Kowalski, 1996; Snyder & Higgins, 1988). The reason people do this is simple; by admitting to a limited physical or mental weakness, they can shield themselves from what could be the most shattering implication of failure – a lack of ability. One form of excuse-making that many of us can relate to is procrastination – a purposive delay in starting or completing a task that is due at a particular time (Ferrari, Johnson, & McCowan, 1995). Some people procrastinate chronically, whereas others do so only in certain situations. The phenomenon itself is found in a number of cultures, in countries including Spain, Peru, Venezuela, the UK, Australia, and the US, where nearly 15% of men and women identify themselves as chronic procrastinators (Ferrari, Diaz-Morales, O’Callaghan, Diaz, & Argumedo, 2007). There are many reasons why someone might put off what needs to get done, whether it is studying for a test, shopping for Christmas or preparing their tax return. Maybe you have procrastinated studying this chapter until just before the exam! According to Joseph Ferrari (1998), one ‘benefit’ of procrastinating is that it helps to provide an excuse for possible failure. Making excuses is one way to cope with the threatening implications of failure. Under certain conditions, this strategy is taken one step further, as when people actually sabotage their own performance. It seems like the ultimate paradox, but there are times when we purposely set ourselves up for failure in order to preserve our precious self-esteem. As first described by Stephen Berglas and Edward Jones (1978), self-handicapping refers to actions people take to handicap their own performance in order to build an excuse for anticipated failure. To demonstrate, Berglas and Jones recruited university students for an experiment supposedly concerning the effects of drugs on intellectual performance. All the participants worked on a 20-item test of analogies and were told that they had done well, after which they expected to work on a second, similar test. For one group, the problems in the first test were relatively easy, leading

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participants to expect more success in the second test; for a second group, the problems were insoluble, leaving participants confused about their initial success and worried about possible failure on the second test. Before seeing or taking the second test, participants were given a choice of two drugs: Actavil, which was supposed to improve performance, and Pandocrin, which was supposed to impair it. Although no drugs were actually administered, most participants who were confident about the upcoming test selected the Actavil. By contrast, most males (but not females) who feared the outcome of the second test chose the Pandocrin. By handicapping themselves, these men set up a convenient excuse for failure – an excuse, we should add, that may have been intended more for the experimenter’s benefit than for the benefit of the participants themselves. A follow-up study showed that although selfhandicapping occurs when the experimenter witnesses the participants’ drug choice, it is reduced when the experimenter is not present while that choice is being made (Kolditz & Arkin, 1982). Some people use self-handicapping as a defence more than others do – and in different ways (Rhodewalt, 1990). For example, some men self-handicap by taking drugs (Higgins & Harris, 1988) or neglecting to practise (Hirt, Deppe, & Gordon, 1991), whereas some women tend to report stress and physical symptoms (Smith, Snyder, & Perkins, 1983). Another tactic is to set one’s goals too high, as perfectionists like to do, which sets up failure that is not interpreted to reflect a lack of ability (Hewitt et al., 2003). Yet another paradoxical tactic used to reduce performance pressure is for people to play down their own ability, lower expectations and publicly predict that they will fail – a self-presentation strategy called ‘sandbagging’ (Gibson & Sachau, 2000). People also differ in their reasons for self-handicapping. Dianne Tice (1991) found that people who are low in self-esteem use self-handicapping to set up a defensive, face-saving excuse in case they fail, whereas those who are high in self-esteem use it as an opportunity to claim extra credit if they succeed. Whatever the tactics and whatever the goal, self-handicapping seems like an ingenious strategy – with the odds seemingly stacked against us, the self is insulated from failure and enhanced by success. Of course, this strategy is not without a cost. Sabotaging ourselves – by not practising, drinking too much, faking illness or setting goals too high – objectively increases the risk of failure. What is worse, it does not exactly endear us to others. Frederick Rhodewalt and colleagues (1995) found that participants did not like their partners in an experiment when they thought that these partners had self-handicapped by claiming they did not care, were anxious or were medically impaired. Women in particular are suspicious and critical of people who self-handicap (Hirt, McCrea, & Boris, 2003). Moreover, in school settings, self-handicapping ultimately limits students’ academic achievement and potential (Schwinger, Wirthwein, Lemmer, & Steinmayr, 2014).

CHAPTER TWO

People often sabotage their own performance in order to protect their selfesteem.

TRUE

Basking in reflected glory To some extent, your self-esteem is influenced by individuals and groups with whom you identify. According to Robert Cialdini and colleagues (1976), people often bask in reflected glory (BIRG) by showing off their connections to successful others. Cialdini’s team first observed BIRGing on seven university campuses in the US. On the Monday mornings after football games, they counted the number of school sweatshirts worn on campus and found that more of them were worn if the team had won its game on the previous Saturday. In fact, the larger the margin of victory, the more school shirts they counted. To evaluate the effects of self-esteem on BIRGing, Cialdini gave students a general-knowledge test and rigged the results so half would succeed and half would fail. The students were then asked to describe in their own words the outcome of a recent university football game. In these descriptions, students who thought they had just failed a test were more likely than those who thought they had succeeded to share in their team’s victory by exclaiming that ‘we won’ and to distance themselves from defeat by lamenting how ‘they lost’. In another study, participants coming off a recent failure were quick to point out that they had the same birth date as someone known to be successful – thus BIRGing by a merely coincidental association (Cialdini & De Nicholas, 1989). If self-esteem is influenced by our links to others, how do we cope with friends, family members, teammates and co-workers of low status? Again, consider sports fans – they loudly cheer their team in victory, but they often turn and jeer their team in defeat. This behaviour seems fickle, but it is consistent with the notion that people derive part of their self-esteem from associations with others. In one study, participants took part in a problem-solving team that succeeded, failed or received no feedback about its performance. Participants were later offered a chance to take home a team badge. In the success and no-feedback groups, 68% and 50%, respectively, took badges; in the failure group, only 9% did (Snyder, Lassegard, & Ford, 1986). This shows the tendency to cut off reflected failure (CORF) – to increase selfesteem by dissociating with others who are unsuccessful – and is also seen frequently among our previously mentioned sports fans (Ware & Kowalski, 2012). Even average citizens engage in BIRGing and CORFing – they

Bask in reflected glory (BIRG)

To increase selfesteem by associating with others who are successful.

Cut off reflected failure (CORF)

To increase selfesteem by dissociating with others who are unsuccessful.

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are more likely to leave up campaign signs following a candidate’s win and more likely to take them down following a candidate’s loss (Boen et al., 2002; Miller, 2009).

Downward social comparisons

Downward social comparison

The defensive tendency to compare ourselves with others who are worse off than we are.

Earlier, we discussed Festinger’s (1954) theory that people evaluate themselves by comparison with similar others. But contemplate the implications. If the people around us achieve more than we do, what does that do to our self-esteem? Perhaps adults who shy away from class reunions in order to avoid having to compare themselves with former classmates are acting out an answer to that question. Festinger fully realised that people do not always seek out objective information and that social comparisons are sometimes made in self-defence. When a person’s self-esteem is at stake, he or she often benefits from making downward social comparisons with others who are less successful, less happy or less fortunate (Wills, 1981; Wood, 1989). Research shows that people who suffer some form of setback or failure adjust their social comparisons in a downward direction (Gibbons et al., 2002) and that these comparisons have an uplifting effect on their mood and on their outlook for the future (Aspinwall & Taylor, 1993; Gibbons & McCoy, 1991).

Downward temporal comparisons Although Festinger never addressed the issue, Anne Wilson and Michael Ross (2000) note that in addition to making social comparisons between ourselves and similar others, we make temporal comparisons between our past and present selves. In one study, these investigators had university students describe themselves; in another, they analysed the autobiographical accounts of celebrities appearing in popular magazines. In both cases, Wilson and Ross counted the number of times the self-descriptions contained references to past selves, to future selves and to others. The result was that people made more comparisons to their own past selves than to others, and most of these temporal comparisons were favourable. Other research has confirmed the basic point – keenly aware of how ‘I’m better today than I was in the past’, people use downward temporal comparisons the way they use downward social comparisons as a means of selfenhancement (Zell & Alicke, 2009).

Health implications of social comparisons Whether people make upward or downward social comparisons can have striking health implications. When victimised by tragic life events (e.g., a crime, an accident, a disease or the death of a loved one), people like to affiliate with others in the same predicament who have adjusted well – role models who offer hope and guidance. But they tend to compare themselves with others who are worse off, a form of downward social comparison (Taylor & Lobel, 1989). Clearly it helps to know that life could be worse, which is why most cancer patients tend to compare themselves with others in the same predicament but who are adjusting less well than they are. In a study of 312 women who had early-stage breast cancer and were in peer support groups, Laura Bogart and Vicki Helgeson (2000) had the patients report every week for seven weeks on instances in which they talked to, heard about or thought about another patient. They found that 53% of all the social comparisons made were downward, to others who were worse off; only 12% were upward, to others who were better off (the rest were ‘lateral’ comparisons to similar or dissimilar others). Bogart and Helgeson also found that the more often patients made downward social comparisons, the better they felt. Downward social comparison is also associated with an ability to cope with the kinds of life regrets that sometimes haunt people as they get older. Adult development researchers have observed that ageing adults often experience intense feelings of regret over decisions made, contacts lost, opportunities passed up, and the like – and these regrets can compromise the quality of their lives. Isabelle Bauer and colleagues (2008) asked adults ranging from ages 18 to 83 to disclose their biggest regret and then indicate whether their same-age peers had regrets that were more or less severe. Among the older adults in the sample, those who tended to see others as having more severe regrets than their own felt better than those who saw others as less regretful.

Positive illusions Psychologists used to maintain that an accurate perception of reality is vital to mental health. This view, however, has been challenged by research on the mechanisms of self-enhancement. Consistently, as we have seen, people preserve their self-esteem by deluding themselves and others with biased beliefs, selfhandicapping, BIRGing and downward comparisons. The result is that most people see themselves as better than average. Are these strategies a sign of health and wellbeing or are they symptoms of disorder? 74

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When Shelley Taylor and Jonathon Brown (1988) first reviewed the research, they found that individuals who are depressed or low in self-esteem actually have more realistic views of themselves than do most others who are better adjusted. Their self-appraisals are more likely to match appraisals of them made by neutral observers, they make fewer self-serving attributions to account for success and failure, they are less likely to exaggerate their control over uncontrollable events, and they make more balanced predictions about their future. Based on these results, Taylor and Brown reached the provocative conclusion that positive illusions promote happiness, the desire to care for others and the ability to engage in productive work, which are all hallmark attributes of mental wellbeing: ‘These illusions help make each individual’s world a warmer and more active and beneficent place in which to live’ (p. 205). People with high self-esteem thus appear to be better adjusted in personality tests and in interviews rated by friends, strangers and mental-health professionals (Taylor, Lerner, Sherman, Sage, & McDowell, 2003).

Advantages of positive illusions Drawing on evolutionary theory, William von Hippel from the University of Queensland and his colleague Robert Trivers (2011) have offered a new and provocative perspective on the adaptive advantages of selfdeception. Over the years, evolutionary psychologists have noted that deceit is a communication skill that animals use to curry favour, attract a mate and influence others to share food, shelter and other resources. Just as humans have evolved ways to deceive others, we have also evolved ways to detect deception in others. The more skilled we are in these interactions, the more we flourish. The problem is that when people lie, they become nervous, try to suppress the nervousness and work hard to make the lie sound believable – especially when talking to others who know them. However, if deceivers can convince themselves that their deception is true, they will not be as nervous, not have to suppress, not have to work so hard at the presentation and, therefore, be more successful in their deception. When it comes to the illusion of control, unrealistic optimism and the other self-enhancement biases that enable people to see themselves as better than average, von Hippel and Trivers (2011) extend their argument: by deceiving ourselves in ways that create positive illusions, we are able to display greater confidence in public than we may actually feel, making us more successful at our social relations. Perhaps this explains the research finding that people tend to overestimate the self-esteem of other people – independent of how well we know them (Kilianski, 2008).

Disadvantages of positive illusions Not everyone agrees with the notion that it is adaptive in the long run to maintain positive illusions. Roy Baumeister and Steven Scher (1988) warned that positive illusions can give rise to chronic patterns of selfdefeating behaviour, as when people escape from self-awareness through alcohol and other drugs, selfhandicap themselves into failure and underachievement, deny health-related problems until it is too late for treatment, and rely on the illusion of control to protect them from the inescapable odds of the gambling casino. Others have noted that people sometimes need to be self-critical in order to improve. In a study on success and failure feedback, Heine and colleagues (2001) found that whereas North American university students persisted less on a task after an initial failure than after success, Japanese students persisted more in this situation. This suggests that sometimes we have to face up to our shortcomings in order to correct them. From an interpersonal standpoint, C. Randall Colvin and colleagues (1995) found that people with inflated rather than realistic views of themselves were rated less favourably on certain dimensions by their own friends. In their studies, self-enhancing men were seen as boastful, condescending, hostile and less considerate of others; self-enhancing women were seen as more hostile, more defensive and sensitive to criticism, more likely to overreact to minor setbacks and less well liked. People with inflated self-images may make a good first impression on others, but they are liked less and less as time wears on (Paulhus, 1998). Realism or illusion – which orientation is more adaptive? As social psychologists debate the shortterm and long-term effects of positive illusions, and their evolutionary advantages, it seems that there is no simple answer. For now, the picture that has emerged is this: people who harbour positive illusions of themselves are likely to enjoy the benefits and achievements of high self-esteem and social influence. But these same individuals may pay a price in other ways, as in their relations with others. Do positive illusions motivate personal achievement but alienate us socially from others? Is it adaptive to see oneself in slightly inflated terms but maladaptive to take a view that is too biased? It will be interesting to see how this debate is resolved in the years to come.

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Culture and self-esteem Earlier we saw that inhabitants of individualistic cultures tend to view themselves as distinct and autonomous, whereas those in collectivist cultures view themselves as part of an interdependent social network. Do these different orientations have implications for self-esteem? This turns out to be a tricky question. Steven Heine and colleagues (1999) argued that different cultures have different effects on the pursuit of self-esteem. Comparing the distribution of self-esteem test scores in Canada and Japan, they found that whereas most Canadians’ scores clustered in the high-end range, a majority of Japanese respondents scored in the centre of that same range. In other studies, they also observed that Japanese respondents can sometimes be quite self-critical, talking about themselves in negative, self-effacing terms. Do Japanese people have a less positive self-esteem compared with Canadians? Or do Japanese respondents have a positive self-esteem but feel compelled to present themselves modestly to others as a function of the collectivist need to ‘fit in’ rather than ‘stand out’? To answer this question, some researchers have used indirect, subtle, ‘implicit’ tests of self-esteem – tests that would enable them to measure a person’s self-esteem without his or her awareness. In a timed word-association study, researchers found that despite their lower scores on overt self-esteem tests, Asian Americans – just like their white American counterparts – are quicker to associate themselves with positive words like happy and sunshine than with negative words such as vomit and poison (Greenwald & Farnham, 2000; Kitayama & Uchida, 2003). In keeping with the Eastern dialectical perspective described earlier, other implicit self-esteem research has shown that although East Asians, like Westerners, are quick to associate themselves with positive traits, they are more likely to associate themselves with contradictory negative traits as well (Boucher et al., 2009). Drawing on these results, Constantine Sedikides and colleagues (2003) maintain that people from individualist and collectivist cultures are similarly motivated to think highly of themselves; that the burning need for positive self-regard is universal or ‘pancultural’. The observed differences, they argue, stem from the fact that cultures influence how we seek to fulfil that need; that is, individualists present themselves as unique and self-confident, whereas collectivists present themselves as modest, equal members of a group. From this perspective, people are tactical in their self-enhancements, exhibiting self-praise or humility depending on what is desirable within their cultural surroundings (Brown, 2003; Lalwani, Shavitt, & Johnson, 2006; Sedikides, Gaertner, & Vevea, 2005). As for what is desirable, when Japanese and American students evaluated a fictitious person on the basis of his or her high or low responses on a self-esteem questionnaire, Americans showed a stronger preference for the high-self-esteem person (Brown, 2010). Heine and colleagues agree only in part with this interpretation of the research. They also argue that all people have a need for positive self-regard, wanting to become ‘good selves’ within their own culture. They note, however, that in the effort to achieve this goal, Westerners and other individualists tend to use self-enhancement tactics to stand out, confirm and express themselves, whereas East Asians and other collectivists tend to maintain face in order to fit in, improve the self and adjust to the standards set by their groups. In short, the underlying need for positive self-regard is universal, but the specific drive towards selfenhancement is culturally ingrained (Heine, 2005; Heine & Hamamura, 2007).

SELF-PRESENTATION The human quest for self-knowledge and esteem tells us about the cognitive and affective aspects of the inner self. The portrait is not complete, however, until we paint in the outermost layer – the behavioural expression of the social self. Most people are acutely concerned about the image they present to others. The fashion industry, along with cosmetic surgeries designed to reshape everything from eyelids and noses to buttocks and breasts, and the endless search for miracle drugs that grow hair, remove hair, whiten teeth, freshen breath and smooth out wrinkles all exploit our preoccupation with physical appearance. In a similar manner, we are concerned about the impressions we convey through our public behaviour both in person and on Facebook, Twitter and other social networking sites. Thomas Gilovich and colleagues (2000) found that people are so self-conscious in public settings that they are often subject to the spotlight effect – a tendency to believe that the social spotlight shines more brightly on them than it really does. In one set of studies, participants were asked to wear a T-shirt with a flattering or embarrassing image into a room full of strangers, after which they estimated how many of those strangers would be able to identify the image. Demonstrating that people self-consciously feel as if all eyes are upon them, the T-shirted participants overestimated by 23–40% the number of observers who had noticed and could recall what they were wearing. Follow-up studies have similarly shown that when people commit a public social blunder, they later overestimate the negative impact of their behaviour on those who had observed them (Savitsky, Epley & Gilovich, 2001). 76

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In As You Like It, William Shakespeare wrote, ‘All the world’s a stage, and all the men and women merely players’. This insight was first put into social science terms by sociologist Erving Goffman (1959), who argued that life is like a theatre and each of us acts out certain lines, as if from a script. Most important, said Goffman, is that each of us assumes a certain face, or social identity, that others politely help us maintain. This ‘dramaturgical’ perspective on social behaviour – in which society is seen as an elaborately scripted play in which individuals enact different roles, as if performing in a reality TV show – has a long tradition in social psychology (Sandstrom, Martin, & Fine, 2009; Sullivan, Landau, Young, & Stewart, 2014). Inspired by Goffman’s theory, social psychologists study self-presentation – the process by which we try to shape what other people think of us and what we think of ourselves (Schlenker, 2003). An act of selfpresentation may take many different forms. It may be conscious or unconscious, accurate or misleading, or intended for an external audience or for ourselves. In The Manipulation of Online Self-Presentation: Create, Edit, Re-edit and Present, Alison Attrill (2015) describes how this process plays out on social networking sites, where people determine how to present their selves to a vast online public. In the following sections, we look at the various goals of self-presentation and the ways that people try to achieve these goals.

CHAPTER TWO

Self-presentation

Strategies people use to shape what others think of them.

Strategic self-presentation There are basically two types of self-presentation, each serving a different motive. Strategic selfpresentation consists of our efforts to shape others’ impressions in specific ways in order to gain influence, power, sympathy or approval. Prominent examples of strategic self-presentation are everywhere – in personal advertisements, in online message boards, in political campaign promises and in defendants’ appeals to the jury. The specific goals vary and include the desire to be seen as likeable, competent, moral, dangerous or helpless. Whatever the goal may be, strategic self-presentation requires effort; people find it less effortful to present themselves in ways that are accurate rather than contrived (Vohs et al., 2005). To illustrate this point, Beth Pontari and Barry Schlenker (2000) instructed research participants who tested as introverted or extroverted to present themselves for a job interviewer in a way that was either consistent or inconsistent with their true personality. Without distraction, all participants successfully presented themselves as introverted or extroverted, depending on the task they were given. But could they present themselves as needed if, during the interview, they also had to keep an eight-digit number in mind for a memorisation test? In this situation, cognitively busy participants self-presented successfully when asked to convey their true personalities but FIGURE 2.20 Strategic self-presentation in the employment not when asked to portray themselves in a way that was out of interview character. In studies of the influence-tactics that job applicants report using in The specific identities that people try to present may employment interviews, the following uses of ingratiation and selfvary from one person and situation to another. However, two promotion were commonly reported. strategic self-presentation goals are very common. The first is Ingratiation ingratiation, a term used to describe acts that are motivated by the desire to ‘get along’ with others and be liked. The • I complimented the interviewer or organisation. other is self-promotion, a term used to describe acts that are • I discussed interests I shared in common with the recruiter. motivated by a desire to ‘get ahead’ and gain respect for one’s • I indicated my interest in the position and the company. competence (Arkin, 1981; Jones & Pittman, 1982). As shown • I indicated my enthusiasm for working for this organisation. in Figure 2.20, observations of employment interviews reveal • I smiled a lot or used other friendly non-verbal behaviours. that ingratiation and self-promotion are the most common self-presentation tactics that job applicants use (Stevens Self-promotion & Kristof, 1995). Of course, as you might expect, research • I played up the value of positive events that I took credit for. shows that job applicants will present themselves in very • I described my skills and abilities in an attractive way. different ways depending on the ideals of their culture (Sandal • I took charge during the interview to get my main points et al., 2014). across.

Trade-offs of self-promotion So, it seems simple – when people want to be liked, they put their best foot forward, smile a lot, nod their heads, express agreement and, if necessary, use favours, compliments and flattery. When people want to be admired for their competence, they try to impress others by talking about themselves and immodestly showing off their status,

•

I took credit for positive events even if I was not solely responsible.

•

I made positive events I was responsible for appear better than they actually were.

Source: Higgins, C. A. & Judge, T. A. (2004). The effect of applicant influence tactics on recruiter perceptions of fit and hiring recommendations: A field study. Journal of Applied Psychology, 89, 622–632; Stevens, C. K. & Kristof, A. L. (1995). Making the right impression: A field study of applicant impression management during job interviews. Journal of Applied Psychology, 80, 587–606.

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knowledge and exploits. In both cases, there are trade-offs. Ingratiation tactics need to be subtle or else they will backfire (Jones, 1964). People also do not like those who relentlessly trumpet and brag about their own achievements (Godfrey, Jones, & Lord, 1986) or who exhibit a ‘slimy’ pattern of being friendly to their superiors but not to subordinates (Vonk, 1998). Self-presentation may give rise to other problems as well. Suggesting that self-presentation can be hazardous to an individual's health, Mark Leary and colleagues (1994) reviewed evidence suggesting that the need to project a favourable public image can lure us into unsafe patterns of behaviour. For example, self-presentation concerns can increase the risk of contracting HIV (i.e., when men are too embarrassed to buy condoms and talk openly with their sex partners), skin cancer (i.e., when people bake under the sun to get an attractive tan), eating disorders (i.e., when women over-diet or use amphetamines, laxatives and forced vomiting to stay thin), drug abuse (i.e., when teenagers smoke, drink and use drugs to impress their peers) and accidental injury (i.e., when young men drive recklessly to look fearless to others).

Narcissism and self-promotion According to research from David Collins and La Trobe University social psychologist Art Stukas (2008), some of us are more prone to self-promotion than others. Individuals high in the personality trait of narcissism, associated with grandiose and unrealistically positive self-perceptions, over-exaggerated their positive traits – especially when they thought they would be held accountable for their own self-ratings. This seemingly contradictory effect was not observed in individuals low in narcissism, who indeed resisted selfpromotion when they thought they would be accountable for their ratings.

Self-verification In contrast to strategic self-presentation is a second motive, self-verification – the desire to have others perceive us as we truly perceive ourselves. According to William Swann (1987), people are highly motivated in their social encounters to confirm or verify their existing self-concept in the eyes of others. Swann and colleagues have gathered a great deal of evidence for this hypothesis and have found, for example, that people selectively elicit, recall and accept personality feedback that confirms their self-conceptions. In fact, people sometimes bend over backwards to correct others whose impressions are positive but mistaken. In one study, participants interacted with a confederate who later said that they seemed dominant or submissive. When the comment was consistent with the participant’s self-concept, it was accepted at face value. Yet when it was inconsistent, participants went out of their way to prove the confederate wrong. Those who perceived themselves as dominant but were labelled submissive, subsequently behaved more assertively than usual; while those who viewed themselves as submissive but were labelled dominant, subsequently became even more docile (Swann & Hill, 1982).

Self-verification and social choice Self-verification seems desirable, but do people who harbour a negative self-concept want others to share that impression? Everyone has some faults – but do we really want to verify these faults in the eyes of others? Do those of us who feel painfully shy, socially awkward or insecure about an ability want others to see these weaknesses? Or would we prefer to present ourselves in public as bold, graceful or competent? What happens when the desire for self-verification clashes with the need for self-enhancement? Seeking to answer this question, Swann and colleagues (1992) asked each student participant in a laboratory study to fill out a self-concept questionnaire and then choose an interaction partner from two other participants – one of whom supposedly had evaluated them favourably and another who had supposedly evaluated them unfavourably. The result? Although participants with a positive self-concept chose partners who viewed them in a positive light, a majority of those with a negative self-concept preferred partners who confirmed their admitted shortcomings. In a later study, 64% of participants with low self-esteem (compared with only 25% with high self-esteem) sought clinical feedback about their weaknesses rather than strengths when given a choice (Giesler, Josephs, & Swann, 1996). Indeed, research suggests that people also prefer to interact with others who verify their group memberships as an aspect of their collective self (Chen, Langner, & Mendoza-Denton, 2009). Indeed, the desire for self-verification appears to be universal, observed in both individualist and collectivist cultures (Seih, Buhrmester, Lin, Huang, & Swann, 2013). If people seek self-verification from laboratory partners, it stands to reason that they would want the same from their close relationships. In a study of married couples, husbands and wives separately answered questions about their self-concepts, their spouse and their commitment to the marriage. As predicted, 78

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people who had a positive self-concept expressed more commitment to partners who appraised them favourably, whereas those with a negative self-concept felt more committed to partners who appraised them unfavourably (Swann, Hixon, & De La Ronde, 1992).

CRITICAL THINKING ACTIVITY Imagine your next job interview. Of course, you want to present yourself in the best possible light. You want the job, right? But also consider the motive for self-verification – you likely want to be truthful, not only so that your future employer will have an accurate view of you, but also so that you can feel that you have been authentic to who you are.

How might you resolve these conflicting pressures on how to present yourself? Reflect on the possible outcomes if you choose one route over the other.

On important aspects of the self-concept, research shows that people would rather reflect on and learn more about their positive qualities than negative ones. Still, it appears that the desire for self-verification is powerful and can even, at times, trump the need for self-enhancement. We all want to make a good impression, but we also want others in our lives to have an accurate impression of us (Swann & Bosson, 2010). Studying online social-networking sites, Mitja Back and colleagues (2010) found strong support for this proposition. They studied 236 Facebook users in the US and Germany and found that the impressions conveyed by their posted profiles correlated highly with a combination of objective personality tests, selfreports and reports from a sample of well-acquainted friends.

Self-monitoring Although self-presentation is a way of life for all of us, it differs considerably among individuals. Some people are generally more conscious of their public image than others. Also, some people are more likely to engage in strategic self-presentation, whereas others seem to prefer self-verification. According to Mark Snyder (1987), these differences are related to a personality trait he called self-monitoring – the tendency to regulate one’s own behaviour to meet the demands of social situations. Individuals who are high in self-monitoring appear to have a repertoire of selves from which to draw. Sensitive to strategic self-presentation concerns, they are poised, ready and able to modify their behaviour as they move from one setting to another. As measured by the Self-Monitoring Scale (see Table 2.2) (Snyder, 1974; Snyder & Gangestad, 1986), they are likely to agree with such statements as, ‘I would probably make a good actor’ and ‘In different situations and with different people, I often act like very different people’. By contrast, low self-monitors are self-verifiers by nature, appearing less concerned about the social acceptability of their behaviour. Like character actors always cast in the same role, they express themselves in a consistent manner from one situation to the next, exhibiting what they regard as their true and honest self. On the Self-Monitoring Scale, low self-monitors say that ‘I can only argue for ideas which I already believe’ and ‘I have never been good at games like charades or improvisational acting’. Social psychologists disagree on whether the Self-Monitoring Scale measures one global trait or a combination of two or more specific traits. They also disagree about whether high and low self-monitors represent two discrete types of people or just points along a continuum – a position supported by a recent analysis of test scores (Wilmot, 2015). Either way, the test scores do appear to predict important social behaviours (Gangestad & Snyder, 2000). Concerned with public image, high self-monitors go out of their way to learn about others with whom they might interact and about the rules for appropriate conduct. Then, once they have the situation sized up, they modify their behaviour accordingly. If a situation calls for conformity, high self-monitors conform; if the same situation calls for autonomy, they refuse to conform. By contrast, low self-monitors maintain a relatively consistent posture across a range of situations (Snyder & Monson, 1975). Unconsciously adapting to social situations, high self-monitors are likely to mimic the demeanour of others in subtle ways that facilitate smooth social interactions (Cheng & Chartrand, 2003). They are also more likely to switch dialects according to their local surroundings, facilitating ‘linguistic adaptation’ (Blank, Ziegler, & de Bloom, 2012). Consistent with the finding that high self-monitors are more concerned than lows about what other people think of them, research conducted in work settings shows that high self-monitors receive higher performance ratings and more promotions and that they are more likely to emerge as leaders (Day, Shleicher, Unckless, & Hiller, 2002).

Self-monitoring

The tendency to change behaviour in response to the self-presentation concerns of the situation.

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TABLE 2.2 Self-monitoring scale Are you a high or low self-monitor? For each statement, answer True or False.

Statement

True/False

1

I find it hard to imitate the behaviour of other people.

2

At parties and social gatherings, I do not attempt to do or say things that others will like.

3

I can only argue for ideas that I already believe.

4

I can make impromptu speeches even on topics about which I have almost no information.

5

I guess I put on a show to impress or entertain others.

6

I would probably make a good actor.

7

In a group of people I am rarely the centre of attention.

8

In different situations and with different people, I often act like a very different person.

9

I am not particularly good at making other people like me.

10

I am not always the person I appear to be.

11

I would not change my opinions (or the way I do things) in order to please someone or win their favour.

12

I have considered being an entertainer.

13

I have never been good at games like charades or improvisational acting.

14

I have trouble changing my behaviour to suit different people and different situations.

15

At a party I let others keep the jokes and stories going.

16

I feel a bit awkward in company and do not show up quite as well as I should.

17

I can look anyone in the eye and tell a lie with a straight face (if for a right end).

18

I may deceive people by being friendly when I really dislike them.

When you are done, give yourself one point if you answered True to items 4, 5, 6, 8, 10, 12, 17 and 18. Then give yourself one point if you answered False to items 1, 2, 3, 7, 9, 11, 13, 14, 15 and 16. Count your total number of points. This total represents your self-monitoring score. Among Australian and US university students, the average score is about 10 or 11; among Hong Kong, Japanese and Taiwanese students, the average score is 8 or 9. Source: Snyder, M. & Gangestad, S. (1986). On the nature of self-monitoring: Matters of assessment, matters of validity. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 51, 125–139. Copyright © 1986 by the American Psychological Association. Reprinted by permission.

CRITICAL THINKING ACTIVITY Complete the Self-Monitoring Scale in Table 2.2 and calculate your score. Do you think this score accurately reflects you, given the description of self-monitors in the text?

It is more adaptive to alter one’s behaviour than to stay consistent from one social situation to the next.

FALSE

80

Do you think that your level of self-monitoring influences how you interact with others? What might this mean for your success in the workplace?

Throughout this textbook, we see that because so much of our behaviour is influenced by social norms, self-monitoring is relevant to many aspects of social psychology. There are also interesting developmental implications. A survey of 18–73-year-olds revealed that self-monitoring scores tend to drop with age, presumably because people become more settled and secure about their personal identities as they get older (Reifman, Klein, & Murphy, 1989). For now, however, ponder these questions: ‘Is it better to be a high or low self-monitor?’ and ‘Is one orientation inherently more adaptive than the other?’ The existing research does not enable us to make this kind of value judgement. Consider high selfmonitors. Quite accurately, they regard themselves as pragmatic, flexible and adaptive, and able to cope with the diversity of life’s roles. But they could also be described as fickle or phoney opportunists, more concerned with appearances than with reality, and willing to change colours like a chameleon just to fit in. Now think about low self-monitors. They describe themselves as principled and forthright; they are without pretence, always speaking their minds so others know where they stand. Of course, they could also be viewed as stubborn, insensitive to their surroundings and unwilling to compromise in order to get along. Concerning the relative value of these two orientations, then, it is safe to conclude that neither high nor low

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self-monitoring is necessarily undesirable – unless carried to the extreme. Goffman (1955, p. 227) made the same point many years ago, when he wrote: Too little perceptiveness, too little savoir faire, too little pride and considerateness, and the person ceases to be someone who can be trusted to take a hint about himself or give a hint that will save others embarrassment. … Too much savoir faire or too much considerateness and he becomes someone who is too socialised, who leaves others with the feeling that they do not know how they really stand with him, nor what they should do to make an effective long-term adjustment.

THE MULTIFACETED SELF Throughout human history, writers, poets, philosophers and personality theorists have portrayed the self as an enduring aspect of personality, as an invisible ‘inner core’ that is stable over time and slow to change. The struggle to find your ‘true self’ is based on this portrait. Indeed, when people older than 85 years were asked to reflect on their lives, almost all said that despite having changed in certain ways, they had remained essentially the same person (Troll & Skaff, 1997). Taking a different view, social psychologists have focused on change. In doing so, they have discovered that at least part of the self is malleable – moulded by life experiences and varying from one situation to the next. From this perspective, the self has many different faces. More recently, Allen McConnell (2011) presented an integrative theoretical perspective on the self, known as the multiple self-aspects framework. This framework holds that the self-concept is a collection of multiple selves, each of which might be activated at a given moment. McConnell writes that the multiple self-aspects framework ‘presents a common stage on which to address the interplay of many perspectives on the self’ (p. 21). It will be exciting to see how this framework is applied as research on the self-concept continues. Consider the following: When you look in the mirror, what do you see – one self or many? Do you see a person whose self-concept is enduring or one whose identity seems to change from time to time? Do you see a person whose strengths and weaknesses are evaluated with an objective eye or one who is insulated from unpleasant truths by mechanisms of self-defence? Do you see a person who has an inner, hidden self that is different from the face shown to others? Based on the material presented in this chapter, the answer to such questions seems always to be the same – the self has all these characteristics. Long before social psychology was born, William James (1890) said that the self is not simple but complex and multifaceted. Based on current theories and research, we can now appreciate just how right James was. Yes, there is an aspect of the self-concept that we can come to know only through introspection and that is stable over time; but there is also an aspect that changes with the company we keep and the information we get from others. When it comes to self-esteem, there are times when we are self-focused enough to become acutely aware of our shortcomings. Yet there are also times when we guard ourselves through self-serving cognitions, self-handicapping, BIRGing and downward social comparisons. Then there is the matter of self-presentation. It is clear that each of us has a private self that consists of our inner thoughts, feelings and memories; but it is equally clear that we also have an outer self, portrayed by the roles we play and the masks we wear in public. As you read through the pages of this text, you will see that the cognitive, affective and behavioural components of the self are not separate and distinct but interrelated. They are also of great significance for the rest of social psychology.

RESEARCH SPOTLIGHT Source: © Courtesy of Dr Jackie Hunter

DR JACKIE HUNTER, UNIVERSITY OF OTAGO What are the topic areas of your research? The research conducted by my colleagues and I, is concerned with how different components of self-esteem (personal, collective, domain specific) affect and are affected by social behaviour. In this regard my research has focused on two primary issues. The first examines

the link between self-esteem and intergroup discrimination. The second examines the processes by which outdoor education programmes function to promote self-esteem. Which of your research findings have you found most intriguing? Our research has revealed that self-esteem may be improved by means of engaging in both positive and negative behaviours. For example, in one series of studies we found that when people (e.g., New Zealanders, men) behaved negatively by showing intergroup discrimination against others (e.g., Australians, Americans, women) they reported higher levels of domain specific and collective, but not personal self-esteem

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(Hunter et al., 2005). In another series of studies we found the reverse. Specifically, in this programme we discovered that when young people were put in a situation that required cooperation and teamwork (sailing a large ocean-going vessel on a 10-day voyage) they experienced increases in personal and domain specific self-esteem. Moreover, subsequent analyses revealed that these latter effects were both long lasting and did not promote negative outcomes like sexism or risky behaviours (Kafka et al., 2012). In overall terms, these findings are very exciting because they suggest that positive self-esteem can be achieved in very different ways – negatively through discrimination or positively via cooperation and teamwork. What is especially intriguing about these different outcomes is that the same

underlying process may promote self-esteem in both cases. A likely candidate in this regard is, we believe, social acceptance or subjective belonging. Our research reveals that the extent to which people believe others accept them is related to both intergroup discrimination and high self-esteem (Hunter et al., 2017). How does your area of research speak to life in Australia and New Zealand? Our research shows that New Zealanders can achieve self-esteem by showing discrimination against Australians or by taking part in outdoor education programmes that foster cooperation and teamwork. The latter reveals that improvements in self-esteem may be maintained over long periods, and perceived acceptance by others predicts these outcomes.

Topical Reflection SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE SELF Imagining the plight of William Thompson from the opening example, we can now see why he may have felt the need to construct an identity in the situations in which he found himself. His brain disorder compromised his ability to maintain a sense of self over time. Given a cognitive sense of self that was unanchored in memory, Thompson’s affective and behavioural aspects of self were both variable and without depth. While it might seem fun to adopt new identities from time to time – something we all do to a certain extent – being unable to willingly maintain a sense of self over time is clearly aversive. The negative consequences suffered by Thompson underscore the centrality of the self and just how markedly the self is shaped by social processes.

CHAPTER REVIEW SUMMARY SELF-CONCEPT • The self-concept is the sum of a person’s beliefs about his or her own attributes. It is the cognitive component of the self. RUDIMENTS OF SELF-CONCEPT • Using brain scans, social neuroscientists find that certain areas become relatively more active when people process selfrelevant information. • Recognising oneself as a distinct entity is the first step in the development of a self-concept. • Cooley’s looking-glass self suggests that social factors are a necessary second step.

PUTTING COMMON SENSE TO THE TEST Humans are the only animals who recognise themselves in the mirror. FALSE. Studies have shown that the great apes (i.e., chimpanzees, gorillas and orangutans) are also capable of self-recognition. 82

SOURCES OF SELF-CONCEPT • People believe that introspection is a key to knowing the true self, but research shows that introspection sometimes diminishes the accuracy of self-reports, and that people also tend to overestimate their future emotional reactions. • Bem’s self-perception theory holds that when internal states are difficult to interpret, we infer our inner states by observing our own behaviour and the surrounding situation. • The facial feedback hypothesis states that facial expressions can produce – not just reflect – an emotion state.

PUTTING COMMON SENSE TO THE TEST Rewards are a good way to boost internal motivation for a task. FALSE. Consistent with the over-justification effect, providing an external reward for a task can undermine internal, or intrinsic, motivation, causing people to lose interest.

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•

•

•

According to social comparison theory, people often evaluate their own opinions and abilities by comparing themselves to similar others. Facebook and other social media sites provide a venue in which people engage in social comparisons, which can undermine wellbeing. Based on Schachter and Singer’s two-factor theory of emotion, research shows that, under certain conditions, people interpret their own arousal by watching others in the same situation.

PUTTING COMMON SENSE TO THE TEST Sitting in a slumped posture can make a negative mood last longer. TRUE. Paralleling findings regarding the facial feedback hypothesis, body postures can trigger or amplify the subjective experience of emotion. •

•

Autobiographical memories are shaped by self-serving motives as people overemphasise their own roles in past events. When people recall life experiences, recent, vivid and lasting memories are more likely to arise.

CULTURE AND SELF-CONCEPT • Many Europeans and North Americans hold an independent view of the self that emphasises autonomy. • People in certain Asian, African and Latin American cultures hold an interdependent view of the self that encompasses social connections. • These cultural differences influence the way we perceive, feel about and present ourselves in relation to others.

SELF-ESTEEM • Self-esteem refers to a person’s positive and negative evaluations of the self. THE NEED FOR SELF-ESTEEM • People have a need for high self-esteem and want to see themselves in a positive light. • People with low self-esteem often find themselves caught in a vicious cycle of self-defeating behaviour. SELF-ESTEEM, GENDER AND MINORITY STATUS • Among adolescents and young adults, males have higher selfesteem than females do, although the difference is very small, particularly as we age. • Stigmatised minority members often score higher than majority members on self-esteem tests, indicating, perhaps, that stigmatised minorities focus on their positive attributes. SELF-DISCREPANCY THEORY • Self-esteem can be defined by the match between how we see ourselves and how we want to see ourselves. • Discrepancies between the actual and ideal selves are related to feelings of disappointment and depression, whereas discrepancies between the actual and the ought selves are related to shame, guilt and anxiety.

CHAPTER TWO

THE SELF-AWARENESS ‘TRAP’ • Certain situations, such as mirrors, cameras and audiences, increase self-awareness, and certain people are generally more self-conscious than others. • Self-awareness forces us to notice self-discrepancies and can produce a temporary reduction in self-esteem. • To cope, we either adjust our behaviour to meet our standards or withdraw from the self-focusing situation. • Factors such as alcohol consumption and religion impact selfawareness processes. SELF-REGULATION AND ITS LIMITS • Because it requires effort, self-control can temporarily be depleted by usage. • This depletion effect can be reversed, enabling additional selfcontrol by self-affirmation. IRONIC MENTAL PROCESSES • Our efforts at self-control may also backfire, causing us to think, feel and act in ways that are opposite to our intentions, such as choking under pressure in a sport context.

PUTTING COMMON SENSE TO THE TEST Sometimes the harder you try to control a thought, feeling or behaviour, the less likely you are to succeed. TRUE. Research on ironic processes in mental control have revealed that trying to inhibit a thought, feeling or behaviour often backfires. MECHANISMS OF SELF-ENHANCEMENT • Most people have conscious and unconscious positive associations with things related to the self. • People protect their self-esteem in four major ways: through self-serving cognitions, self-handicapping, basking in reflected glory and downward social comparisons. • Upward social comparisons can also boost positive feelings, but only when they occur in a domain that is not self-relevant.

PUTTING COMMON SENSE TO THE TEST People often sabotage their own performance in order to protect their self-esteem. TRUE. Studies have shown that people often handicap their own performance in order to build an excuse for anticipated failure. POSITIVE ILLUSIONS • Debate surrounds whether positive illusions may foster high self-esteem and mental health or whether such illusions promote self-defeating behaviour patterns and result in being liked less by others. CULTURE AND SELF-ESTEEM • People from collectivist cultures tend to be modest in their self-esteem relative to people from individualistic cultures, although it is unclear whether this is due to less inflated selfesteem or selective reporting.

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SELF-PRESENTATION • Self-presentation is the process by which we try to shape what others think of us and even what we think of ourselves. There are two general motives in self-presentation: strategic selfpresentation and self-verification. STRATEGIC SELF-PRESENTATION • Strategic self-presentation is the process by which we try to shape others’ impressions of us; for example, by trying to get others to see us in a positive light. SELF-VERIFICATION • People also seek self-verification, a process by which we try to get others to perceive us ‘accurately’. SELF-MONITORING • High self-monitors modify their behaviour, as appropriate, from one situation to the next.

•

Low self-monitors express themselves in a more consistent manner, exhibiting at all times what they see as their true self.

PUTTING COMMON SENSE TO THE TEST It is more adaptive to alter one’s behaviour than to stay consistent from one social situation to the next. FALSE. High and low self-monitors differ in the extent to which they alter their behaviour to suit the situation they are in, but neither style is inherently more adaptive.

THE MULTIFACETED SELF • As this chapter has shown, the self is not simple but complex and multifaceted.

LINKAGES Our discussion of the cognitive, affective and behavioural components of the self has underscored the multifaceted nature of the self. As you will see, the processes via which we observe ourselves are similar to those via which we

CHAPTER

2

observe others (see Chapter 3). The ‘Linkages’ diagram shows ties to two other chapters in which we see how selfconcept impacts our behaviours towards others.

The social self

LINKAGES

How do we perceive others?

CHAPTER

3

Perceiving others

Who is likely to help others?

CHAPTER

10

Helping others

Origins of aggression

CHAPTER

11

Aggression and antisocial behaviour

REVIEW QUIZ 1 Which of the following suggests that we will always know ourselves better than others can? a Introspection. b Self-perception theory. c Self–other knowledge asymmetry model. d Social comparison theory. 2 Jared looks to others in order to evaluate on his own opinions and abilities. In which process is he engaging? a Social awareness. b Social verification. 84

c Social comparison. d Social monitoring. 3 Which of the following is not one of the three aspects of self according to self-discrepancy theory? a Ought self. b Actual self. c Social self. d Ideal self.

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4 Self-handicapping, basking in reflected glory and downward social comparisons are examples of processes that support: a self-esteem. b self-verification. c self-regulation. d self-enhancement. 5 Which of the following best describes the motive to have others view us in the same way that we view ourselves? a Self-regulation. b Self-discrepancy.

CHAPTER TWO

c Self-verification. d Self-monitoring. 6 Cheryl is planning on visiting a company. She spends time looking into the company’s employees on the company website and getting a sense of their social culture. She does this with the goal of being able to act in a way to fit in when she is there. According to research in this chapter, Cheryl is: a low in self-monitoring. b high in self-monitoring. c high in public self-consciousness. d low in public self-consciousness.

WEBLINKS Affective forecasting http://www.affectiveforecasting.com/ A resource page on affective forecasting maintained by Dr Michael Hoerger. Improving self-esteem https://www.cci.health.wa.gov.au/resources/looking-afteryourself/self-esteem A set of modules on improving self-esteem from the Centre for Clinical Interventions run by the government of Western Australia. I-RISE: Indigenous racial identity and self-esteem project https://healthinfonet.ecu.edu.au/key-resources/programsand-projects/?id=1435

The website for the I-RISE project based in Western Australia, aimed at establishing the best way to examine self-concepts of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Australian children. Self-esteem http://www.uq.edu.au/student-services/counselling/selfesteem The University of Queensland’s Student Services web resources on self-esteem (including a link to an online self-esteem test and workbooks). Terror management theory http://www.tmt.missouri.edu A website on terror management theory maintained by researchers at University of Missouri.

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Veenstra, L., Schneider, I. K., & Koole, S. L. (2017). Embodied mood regulation: the impact of body posture on mood recovery, negative thoughts, and mood-congruent recall. Cognition and Emotion, 31(7), 1361–1376. Verduyn, P., Lee, D. S., Park, J., Shablack, H., Orvell, A., Bayer, J., … Kross, E. (2015). Passive Facebook usage undermines affective well-being: Experimental and longitudinal evidence. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 44(2):480–488. doi: 10.1037/ xge0000057 Vogel, E. A., Rose, J. P., Roberts, L. R., & Eckles, K. (2014). Social comparison, social media, and selfesteem. Psychology of Popular Media Culture, 3(4), 206–222. Vohs, K. D., Baumeister, R. F., & Ciarocco, N. J. (2005). Self-regulation and self-presentation: Regulatory resource depletion impairs impression management and effortful self-presentation depletes regulatory resources. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 88, 632–657. von Hippel, W., & Trivers, R. (2011). The evolution and psychology of self-deception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 34, 1–16. Vonk, R. (1998). The slime effect: Suspicion and dislike of likeable behavior toward superiors. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74, 849–864. Wagenmakers, E. J., Beek, T., Dijkhoff, L., Gronau, Q. F., Acosta, A., Adams, R. B. Jr., … Zwaan, R. A. (2016). Registered Replication Report: Strack, Martin, & Stepper (1988), Perspectives on Psychological Science, 11(6), 917–928. Wang, Q. (2006). Culture and the development of self-knowledge. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 15, 182–187. Ware, A., & Kowalski, G. S. (2012). Sex identification and love of sports: BIRGing and CORFing among sport fans. Journal of Sport Behavior, 35, 223–237. Warneken, F., & Tomasello, M. (2006). Altruistic helping in human infants and young chimpanzees. Science, 311, 1301–1303. Wegner, D. M. (1994). Ironic processes of mental control. Psychological Review, 101, 34–52. Wegner, D. M. (1997). When the antidote is the poison: Ironic mental control processes. Psychological Science, 8, 148–153. Wegner, D. M., Ansfield, M., & Pilloff, D. (1998). The putt and the pendulum: Ironic effects of the mental control of action. Psychological Science, 9, 196–199. Weinstein, N. D. (1980). Unrealistic optimism about future life events. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 39, 806–820. Wheeler, L., Koestner, R., & Driver, R. E. (1982). Related attributes in the choice of comparison others. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 18, 489–500. Wicklund, R. A. (1975). Objective self-awareness. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 8, pp. 233–275). New York, NY: Academic Press. Wildschut, T., Sedikides, C., Arndt, J., & Routledge, C. (2006). Nostalgia: Content, triggers, functions.

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Perceiving others

Learning Objectives By the end of this chapter, you should be able to: 1 discuss the elements of social perception and how people use them to derive meaning and make judgements 2 compare and contrast attribution theories and describe how biases, culture and motivations influence attribution 3 explain how individuals integrate information to form impressions of others 4 detail how belief perseverance, confirmatory hypothesis testing, and self-fulfilling prophecies shape social reality 5 discuss how social perception is characterised by both accuracy and bias.

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In recordings of the call to emergency services, one man can be heard crying for help. According to In 2012, 17-year-old Trayvon Martin Zimmerman, that voice (left) was shot and killed in Sanford, was his, and he shot Martin Florida. The gunman was 28-yearin self-defence. old George Zimmerman (right), who This event gives rise to patrolled the area for a community so many questions. Why was watch group. How people interpret this event raises core questions the shot taken? What led to about social perception. the scuffle? Was it something about these two individuals that led to the tragedy? Answering such questions lies at the heart of social perception. In this chapter, we first look at the ‘raw data’ of social perception: people, situations and behaviours. Second, we examine how people explain and analyse behaviour. Third, we consider how people integrate their observations into a coherent impression of other people. Fourth, we discuss some of the subtle ways that our impressions create a distorted picture of reality, often setting in motion a self-fulfilling prophecy.

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Source: David Shankbone via Flickr, released under CC BY 2.0. Link to license: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/ Source: AAP Images/AP/Orange County Jail via The Miami Herald

On 26 February 2012, Trayvon Martin, a 17-year-old African American, was shot and killed on a street in Sanford, Florida. The gunman was 28-year-old George Zimmerman, a multiracial Hispanic American who patrolled the area for a community watch group. What led to the shooting is a matter of dispute. Zimmerman called police to report seeing Martin at around 7 p.m. ‘This guy looks like he is up to no good or he is on drugs or something’, he said. Zimmerman then said that Martin was running and complained in frustration that ‘they always get away’. Zimmerman then started to follow Martin on foot, leading the dispatcher to say, ‘We don’t need you to do that’. At that same time, Martin was talking via mobile phone to his girlfriend, who later reported that Martin had told her that a ‘crazy and creepy’ man was watching him from a car and then following him. She then heard a verbal exchange and a scuffle, at which point the line dropped out. A police officer arrived moments later and saw Zimmerman standing near Martin, deceased. Zimmerman, armed with a 9 mm semi-automatic pistol, admitted that he had shot Martin. His back was covered with wet grass. He was bleeding from a broken nose and from the back of his head. Zimmerman was taken to the police station for questioning. Witnesses gave varying accounts of who did what to whom.

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PUTTING COMMON SENSE TO THE TEST Circle Your Answer T

F

The impressions we form of others are influenced by superficial aspects of their appearance.

T

F

Adaptively, people are skilled at knowing when someone is lying rather than telling the truth.

T

F

Like social psychologists, people are sensitive to situational causes when explaining the behaviour of others.

T

F

People are slow to change their first impressions on the basis of new information.

T

F

The notion that we can create a ‘self-fulfilling prophecy’ by getting others to behave in ways we expect is a myth.

T

F

People are more accurate at judging the personalities of friends and acquaintances than of strangers.

INTRODUCTION WHATEVER THE TOPIC – crime, business, sport, politics, entertainment, personal events, or explaining tragedies, such as the shooting of Trayvon Martin – we are all engaged and interested participants in social perception, the processes by which people come to understand one another. This chapter examines how people come to know (or think that they know) other people and is divided into four sections. First, we look at the ‘raw data’ of social perception: people, situations and behaviours. Second, we examine how people explain and analyse behaviour. Third, we consider how people integrate their various observations into a coherent impression of others. Fourth, we discuss some of the subtle ways that our impressions create a distorted picture of reality, often setting in motion a self-fulfilling prophecy. As you read this chapter, you will notice that the various processes are considered from a perceiver’s vantage point. Keep in mind, however, that in the events of life, you are both a perceiver and a target of others’ perceptions.

Social perception

A general term for the processes by which people come to understand one another.

OBSERVATION: ELEMENTS OF SOCIAL PERCEPTION Understanding others and explaining their actions may be difficult (especially in cases like the shooting of Trayvon Martin), but it is a common and vital part of everyday life. How do we do it? What kinds of evidence do we use? We cannot actually ‘see’ someone’s mental or emotional state or his or her motives or intentions any more than a detective can see a crime that has already been committed. So, like a detective who tries to reconstruct a crime by turning up witnesses, fingerprints, blood samples and other evidence, the social perceiver comes to know others by relying on indirect clues – the elements of social perception. These clues arise from an interplay of three sources: people, situations and behaviour.

Physical appearance Have you ever met someone for the first time or visited their social media profile and formed a quick impression based only on a quick ‘snapshot’ of information? As children, we were told not to judge a book by its cover, that things are not always what they seem, that surface appearances are deceiving, and that all that glitters is not gold. Yet we cannot seem to help ourselves. To illustrate the rapid-fire nature of the process, Janine Willis and Alexander Todorov (2006) showed university students photographs of unfamiliar faces for one-tenth of a second, half a second or a full second. Whether the students judged the faces for how attractive, likeable, competent, trustworthy or aggressive they were, their ratings, even at the briefest exposure, were quick and highly correlated with judgements that other observers made without time-exposure limits (see Table 3.1). In fact, research has shown that people evaluate spontaneously and unconsciously whether a face indicates that a person is dominant or submissive, and trustworthy or untrustworthy (Stewart et al., 2012). Flip quickly through the pages of an illustrated magazine, or scroll through your social media feeds, and you may see for yourself that sometimes it takes a mere fraction of a second for you to form certain impressions of a stranger from his or her face. If first impressions are quick to form, then on what are they based? In 500 BCE, the mathematician Pythagoras looked into the eyes of prospective students to determine if they were gifted. At about the same time, Hippocrates, the founder of modern medicine, used facial features to make diagnoses of life and death. In the nineteenth century, Viennese physician Franz Gall introduced a carnival-like science Copyright 2020 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-202

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TABLE 3.1 First impressions in a fraction of a second Participants rated unfamiliar faces based on pictures they saw for one-tenth of a second, half a second or a full second. Would their impressions stay the same or change with unlimited time? As measured by the correlations of these ratings with those made by observers who had no exposure time limits, the results showed that ratings were highly correlated even at the briefest exposure times. Giving participants more time did not increase these correlations.

Trait being judged Trustworthy

0.10 second

0.50 second

1 second

0.73

0.66

0.74

Competent

0.52

0.67

0.59

Likeable

0.59

0.57

0.63

Aggressive

0.52

0.56

0.59

Attractive

0.69

0.57

0.66

Source: Willis, J. & Todorov, A. (2006). First impressions: Making up your mind after a 100-ms exposure to a face. Psychological Science, 17, 592–598.

called phrenology and claimed that he could assess people’s character by the shape of their skulls. And in 1954, psychologist William Sheldon concluded from flawed studies of adult men that there is a strong link between physique and personality. People may not assess each other by bumps on the head, as phrenologists used to do, but first impressions are influenced in subtle ways by a person’s height, weight, skin colour, hair colour, tattoos, piercings, eyeglasses and other aspects of physical appearance. As social perceivers, we also form impressions of people that are often accurate based on a host of indirect telltale cues. In Snoop: What Your Stuff Says About You, Sam Gosling (2008) describes research he has conducted showing that people’s personalities can be revealed in the knick-knacks found in their living spaces, their posts to Facebook and the types of music on their MP3 players. Figure 3.1 illustrates this point. FIGURE 3.1 Inferred personality from places Look at these two work spaces. Do these images lead you to form any impressions of their inhabitants? If so, do you suppose these impressions would be accurate or misleading?

Source: Shutterstock.com/Creative Photo Corner; Shutterstock.com/thodonal88

Other superficial cues also lead us to form quick impressions of others. In one study, both men and women were seen as more feminine when they spoke in high-pitched voices than in lower-pitched voices (Ko, Judd, & Blair, 2006). In another study, people rated new computer-generated faces more positively when these faces, unbeknown to them, were created to resemble their romantic partners (Günaydin, Zayas, Selcuk, & Hazan, 2012). In yet another study, people formed impressions of strangers they had never met based on the cartoon-like avatars these strangers had created to represent themselves online, seeing them as introverted or extroverted, calm or anxious, and agreeable or disagreeable (see Figure 3.2) (Fong & Mar, 2015). 94

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The human face attracts more than its share of attention FIGURE 3.2 Visual impressions online (Todorov, Olivola, Dotsch, & Mende-Siedlecki, 2015). For example, Ran Hassin and Yaacov Trope (2000) found that people Sample avatars used in a study showing that people form impressions of unknown others, for example, as introverted or prejudge others in photographs as kind-hearted rather than extroverted, on the basis of what they ‘see’ in their online visual mean-spirited based on such features as a full, round face, curly representations. hair, long eyelashes, large eyes, a short nose, full lips and an upturned mouth. Interestingly, these researchers also found that just as people read traits from faces, at times they read traits into faces based on prior information. In one study, for example, participants who were told that a man was kind – compared with those told he was mean – later judged his face to be fuller, rounder and more attractive. In social perception studies of the human face, researchers have found that adults who have baby-faced features – large, round eyes; high eyebrows; round cheeks; a large forehead; smooth skin and a rounded chin – tend to be seen as warm, kind, naive, weak, honest and submissive. By contrast, adults who have mature features – small eyes, low brows, a small forehead, wrinkled skin and an angular chin – are seen as stronger, more dominant and more competent (Berry & Zebrowitz-McArthur, 1986). In small claims courts, judges are more likely to favour Source: Fong, K., & Mar, R. A. (2015). What does my avatar say about me? baby-faced defendants who are accused of intentional Inferring personality from avatars. Personality and Social Psychology ­Bulletin, 41, 237–249. wrongdoing, but rule against them when accused of negligence (Zebrowitz & McDonald, 1991). Additionally, baby-faced individuals are more likely to receive help than individuals with mature faces (Keating, Randall, Kendrick, & Gutshall, 2003). Recent research even shows that a link between baby-faced appearance and personal characteristics is perceived not only in Western cultures but also among the Tsimané people living in a Bolivian rainforest (Zebrowitz et al., 2012). Results like these have led Leslie Zebrowitz and Joann Montepare (2005) to conclude that baby-facedness ‘profoundly affects human behaviour in the blink of an eye’ (p. 1565). What accounts for these findings? And why, in general, are people so quick to judge others by appearances? To begin with, human beings are programmed by evolution to respond gently to infantile features, so that real babies are treated with tender loving care. Many years ago, animal behaviourist Konrad Lorenz noted that infantile features in many animal species seem to trigger a special nurturing response to cuteness. Recently, this old idea derived new support from a brain-imaging study showing that a frontal brain region associated with love and other positive emotions is activated when people are exposed, even fleetingly, to pictures of babies’ faces, but not to pictures of the faces of other adults (Kringelbach et al., 2008). Further, viewing ‘cute’ images of baby animals, compared with adult animals, leads individuals to behave in a more careful manner, moving slowly and cautiously (Sherman, Haidt & Coan, 2009). Our reflex-like response to babies is understandable. But do we really respond in the same way to baby-faced adults, and, if so, why? Leslie Zebrowitz believes that we do this because we associate infantile features with helplessness traits and then overgeneralise this expectation to baby-faced adults. Consistent with this point, she and colleagues found in a brain-imaging study that the region of the brain that was activated by pictures of babies’ faces was also activated by pictures of baby-faced men (Zebrowitz, Luevano, Bronstad, & Aharon, 2009). Other researchers also believe that people as social perceivers tend to overgeneralise in making snap judgements. Alexander Todorov and colleagues (2008) find that people are quick to perceive unfamiliar faces as more or less trustworthy – an important judgement we must often make – and that we do so by focusing on features that resemble the expressions of happiness and anger (a trustworthy face has a The impressions U-shaped mouth and raised eyebrows; in an untrustworthy face, the mouth curls down and the eyebrows we form of others form a V). In other words, faces are seen as trustworthy if they look happy, an emotion that signals a person are influenced by superficial aspects of who is safe to approach, and untrustworthy if they look angry, an emotion that signals danger to be avoided. their appearance. Facial expressions may be temporary, but they too can influence our perceptions. When people smile, their TRUE faces look lighter and brighter than when they frown (Song, Vonasch, Meier, & Bargh, 2012).

Perceptions of situations In addition to the beliefs we hold about people, each of us has preset notions about certain types of situations – ‘scripts’ that enable us to anticipate the goals, behaviours and outcomes that are likely to occur Copyright 2020 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-202

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in a particular setting (Abelson, 1981). Based on past experience, people can easily imagine the sequences of events likely to unfold, for example, in a typical greeting or at a shopping mall, the dinner table or a tennis match. The more experience you have in a given situation, the more detail your scripts will contain. In Do’s and Taboos Around the World, Roger Axtell (1993) describes many scripts that are culture specific. In Bolivia, dinner guests are expected to fully clean their plates to prove that they enjoyed the meal. Eat in an Indian home however, and you will see that many native guests will leave some food on the plate to show the host that they had enough to eat. Social scripts of this nature can influence perceptions and behaviour. As we will see in Chapter 11, in places that foster a ‘culture of honour’ men are expected to defend against insult, women are expected to remain modest and loyal, and indications of female infidelity can trigger domestic violence (Vandello & Cohen, 2003). According to Angela Leung and Dov Cohen (2011), similar social scripts can be found in other cultures, where a greater value is placed on face (the notion that people are expected to show deference to others of higher status and humility in public situations) and dignity (the notion that everyone at birth has intrinsic and equal value). Knowledge of social settings provides an important context for understanding other people’s verbal and non-verbal FIGURE 3.3 Judging emotions in context behaviour. For example, this knowledge leads us to expect Look at the face of tennis star Li Na (left). How is she feeling? someone to be polite during a job interview, playful at a picnic Angry, perhaps, or in agony? Now look at her in a fuller context and rowdy at a footy match. Often our expectations for how (right). You can see that Na was actually euphoric in the process situations affect us can influence the way we interpret other of winning the singles title at the 2014 Australian Open. people’s facial expressions. In one study, participants looked at photographs of human faces that had ambiguous expressions. When told that the person in the photo was being threatened by a vicious dog, they saw the facial expression as fearful; when told that the individual had just won money, participants interpreted the same expression as a sign of happiness (Trope, 1986). In other studies, scowling faces were seen as afraid when the surrounding situation was described as dangerous, but as determined when said to be in a race for the gold medal on an Olympic rowing team (Carroll & Russell, 1996). Context effects on the perception of joy, anger, fear, pride, disgust, surprise and other emotions in Source: Getty Images/Corbis/Pool photograph the face are quick and automatic (Aviezer et al., 2008; Barrett, Mesquita, & Gendron, 2011). Figure 3.3 illustrates this point.

Behavioural evidence

Mind perception

The process by which people attribute humanlike mental states to various animate and inanimate objects, including other people.

96

An essential first step in social perception is recognising what someone is doing at a given moment. Identifying actions from movement is surprisingly easy. Even when actors dressed in black move about in a dark room with point lights attached only to the joints of their bodies, people quickly and easily recognise such complex acts as walking, running, jumping, exercising and falling. This ability is found in people around the world (Barrett, Todd, Miller, & Blythe, 2005) and enables us to recognise specific individuals, such as friends, strictly on the basis of their movements (Loula, Prasad, Harber, & Shiffrar, 2005). More interesting, perhaps, is that people derive meaning from their observations by dividing the continuous stream of human behaviour into discrete ‘units’. By having participants observe a videorecording of someone and press a button whenever they detect a meaningful action, Darren Newtson and colleagues (1987) found that some perceivers break the behaviour stream into a large number of fine units, whereas others break it into a small number of gross units. While watching a cricket match, for example, you might press the button after each delivery, after each batter, after every inning or only after runs are scored. The manner in which people divide a stream of behaviour can influence their perceptions in important ways. Research participants who were told to break an event into fine units rather than gross units attended more closely, detected more meaningful actions and remembered more details about the actor’s behaviour than did participants who were told to break events into gross units (Lassiter, Stone & Rogers, 1988).

Mind perception The process of mind perception – the process by which people attribute humanlike mental states to various animate and inanimate objects, including other people – has been of increasing interest for social psychologists. Studies show that people who identify someone’s actions in high-level terms rather than low-level terms (e.g., by describing the act of ‘painting a house’ as ‘trying to make a house look new’, not

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just ‘applying brush strokes’) are also more likely to attribute humanising thoughts, feelings, intentions, consciousness and other states of mind to that actor (Kozak, Marsh, & Wegner, 2006). Although people do not tend to attribute mental states to inanimate objects, in general the more humanlike a target object is, the more likely we are to attribute to it qualities of ‘mind’. In a series of studies, Carey Morewedge and colleagues (2007) found that when asked to rate different entities (e.g., a purple blob oozing down a city street at the same, slower or faster pace than the people around it), people see mind in targets that resemble humans in their speed of movement. Asking ‘What kinds of things have minds?’ Heather Gray and colleagues (2007) presented respondents with an array of human and non-human characters such as a 7-week-old foetus, a 5-month-old infant, an adult man, a man in a vegetative state, a dead woman, a frog, a family dog, a chimpanzee, God and a sociable robot. They then asked respondents to rate the extent to which each character possessed various mental capacities such as pleasure, pain, fear, pride, embarrassment, memory, self-control and morality. The results showed that people perceive mind along two dimensions: agency (a target’s ability to plan and execute behaviour) and experience (the capacity to feel pleasure, pain and other sensations). The spacing of the characters across the two dimensions can be seen in Figure 3.4. Overall, the more ‘mind’ respondents attributed to a character in terms of both agency and experience, the more they liked it, valued it, wanted to make it happy and wanted to rescue it from destruction. FIGURE 3.4 Dimensions of mind perception When different entities are rated on the degree to which they are able to be moral agents or moral experiencers, they can be plotted in this two-dimensional space of mind perception. 1

Key Baby Chimp Dead woman Dog Foetus

Experience

Frog Girl God Man PVS man Robot Woman You 0 0

1 Agency Source: Gray, H. M., Gray, K., & Wegner, D. M. (2007, February 2). Dimensions of mind perception. Science, 315, 619.

The perception of mind is an important aspect in how we perceive, connect with, and behave towards one another. People are more likely to ascribe mind to others with whom they share a social connection than to distant others (Waytz, Gray, Epley, & Wegner, 2010). Adam Waytz and Nicholas Epley (2012) found that research participants who were asked to reflect on someone in their lives to whom they are close, such as a good friend, significant other or family member, were then less likely to attribute humanising mental

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FIGURE 3.5 Do autonomous vehicles have mind? If people see mind in machines, what about autonomous vehicles, like Google’s experimental self-driving car? Waytz and collegues (2014) put participants into a simulated autonomous vehicle and found that they saw the car as smart and trustworthy – and as able to feel, anticipate and plan a route – when the vehicle was enhanced with human-like characteristics.

Source: Landov/TNS

qualities to other people. Note that the denial of human mental capacities (or dehumanisation, discussed in Chapter 4) can have quite negative outcomes for the targets.

Mind and machine As technology becomes more and more sophisticated, with robots programmed with artificial intelligence, will people come to see a humanlike mind in machines? For example, what about autonomous vehicles – self-driving cars of the near future, equipped with special cameras, maps and collision avoidance software – that will control their own steering and speed? This technology is currently being developed and tested. In a fascinating study, Waytz, Heafner, and Epley (2014) brought 100 people into a driving simulator to ‘drive’ either a normal car, an autonomous vehicle that controlled steering and speed, or an autonomous vehicle enhanced by a name (Iris), gender (female), and voice (captured by human audio files). Those placed in the enhanced autonomous vehicle were more likely to see their car as smart and to sense that it could feel, anticipate and plan a route. They were also more likely to trust the vehicle. How would you feel about riding in the vehicle pictured in Figure 3.5?

CRITICAL THINKING ACTIVITY Do you believe that electronic gadgets have mind? If not now, do you foresee that they will in the future? With the advent of devices that track our physical activity and alert us when we are too sedentary, voice-guided assistants

such as Siri, and refrigerators that automatically reorder groceries, we are surrounded by technology that is certainly ‘smart’. The question becomes whether these entities have properties of mind – agency and experience.

Non-verbal behaviour

Non-verbal behaviour

Behaviour that reveals a person’s feelings without words, through facial expressions, body language and vocal cues.

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Behavioural cues are used not only to identify someone’s physical actions but also to determine his or her inner states. Knowing how another person is feeling can be tricky because people often try to conceal their true emotions from others. Sometimes people come right out and tell us how they feel. At other times, however, they do not tell us, they are themselves not sure, or they actively try to hide their true feelings. For these reasons, we often tune in to the silent language of non-verbal behaviour. Non-verbal behaviour can influence social perception, enabling us to make quick and sometimes accurate judgements of others based on ‘thin slices’ of expressive behaviour (Ambady & Rosenthal, 1993). But wait. Can you really tell how much eye contact a person gives to people, or how often they smile, nod, gesture from only a 5-second sample of behaviour? Would it help to have more time? To answer these questions, Nora Murphy and colleagues (2015) conducted several studies in which they taped American university students, medical interns, and job applicants engaged in various social interactions. After fully coding their non-verbal behaviours, they took thin slices to determine if these small samples accurately captured the whole. The answer was yes. You can tell how much eye contact a person tends to give in a conversation, or how much smiling, nodding and gesturing, from a mere 30, 60 and 90 seconds of observation. Sometimes the impressions people form from thin slices of behaviour are quite accurate. In one study, people accurately judged the intelligence of strangers, as measured by actual IQ test scores, based only on hearing them read short sentences (Borkenau, Mauer, Riemann, Spinath, & Angleitner, 2004). In a second study, people rated 8- to 12-year-old children on personality characteristics based on mere thin slices of behaviour; these ratings too matched personality assessments of these children made by their own parents (Tackett, Herzhoff, Kushner, & Rule, 2016). In a third study, people watched brief video clips from interviews of maximum-security inmates. Even with only 5 seconds of exposure, their ratings significantly correlated with clinical diagnoses of the inmates’ personality disorders (Fowler, Lilienfeld, & Patrick, 2009). ‘Thin slicing is not an exotic gift’, notes Malcolm Gladwell (2005), author of the best seller Blink. ‘It is a central part of what it means to be human’ (p. 43).

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A focus on the face What kinds of non-verbal cues do people use in judging how someone else is feeling? In The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals, Charles Darwin (1872) proposed that the face expresses emotion in ways that are innate and understood by people all over the world. A substantial amount of contemporary research supports this notion. Many studies have shown that people can reliably identify at least six ‘primary’ emotions: happiness, sadness, anger, fear, surprise and disgust (see Figure 3.6). In one study, participants from 10 different countries – Estonia, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Italy, Japan, Scotland, Indonesia, Turkey and the US – exhibited high levels of agreement in their recognition of these emotions (Ekman et al., 1987). All around the world, it is clear that a smile is a smile and a frown is a frown and that just about everyone knows what they mean, even when the expressions are ‘put on’ by actors and are not genuinely felt. But do the results fully support the claim that several emotions are ‘universally’ recognised when expressed on the face, or is the link culturally specific? To answer this question, Hillary Elfenbein and Nalini Ambady (2002) meta-analysed 97 studies involving a total of 22 148 social perceivers from 42 different countries. As shown in Figure 3.7, they found support for both points of view. On the one hand, people all over the world are able to recognise a small set of emotions from photographs of facial expressions. On the other hand, people are 9% more accurate at judging faces from their own national, ethnic or regional groups than from members of less familiar groups. This indicates that we enjoy an ‘ingroup advantage’ when it comes to knowing how those who are closest to us are feeling. In a study that illustrates the point, Elfenbein and Ambady (2003) showed pictures of American faces to groups with varying degrees of exposure to Americans. As predicted, more life exposure was associated with greater accuracy, from a low of 60% among Chinese participants living in China, up to 83% among Chinese participants living in the US, and 93% among non-Chinese Americans. When it comes to recognising emotions in the face, it appears that familiarity breeds accuracy.

Adaptive significance of facial expressions

CHAPTER THREE

FIGURE 3.6 What does a face convey? Would you be able to guess the emotions shown on these faces? If you are like most people, regardless of culture, you will have little trouble doing so.

Source: Alexandra Godwin.

FIGURE 3.7 How good are people at identifying emotions in the face? A meta-analysis of emotion recognition studies involving 22 148 participants from 42 countries confirmed that people all over the world can recognise the six basic emotions from posed facial expressions. Happiness Sadness Surprise Anger Fear Disgust

Darwin believed that the ability to recognise emotion in others 0 20 40 60 80 100 has survival value for all members of a species. This hypothesis Overall accuracy percentages suggests that it is more important to identify some emotions than others. For example, it may be more adaptive to be wary of Source: Based on Elfenbein, H. A., & Ambady, N. (2002). How good are people at identifying emotions in the face? Psychological Bulletin, 128, 203–235. Copyright © 2002 by the American someone who is angry, and hence prone to lash out in violence, Psychological Association. than of someone who is happy – a non-threatening emotion. Indeed, studies have shown that angry faces arouse us and cause us to frown, even when presented subliminally and without our awareness (Dimberg, Thunberg, & Elmehed, 2000). Illustrating what Christine and Ranald Hansen (1988) called the ‘anger superiority effect’, researchers have found that people are quicker to spot, and slower to look away from, faces displaying anger in a crowd compared with faces displaying neutral and less threatening emotions (Fox et al., 2002; Horstmann & Bauland, 2006). It should be noted, however, that people are not always quicker to spot the threatening face of anger in a crowd compared with, say, a face of happiness. Our tendencies are more complicated in two ways. First, what we search for may be shaped by our current motivational state. In a visual search task resembling Where’s Wally?, research participants who were led to fear social rejection and loneliness were quicker to spot faces in diverse crowds that wore welcoming smiles than other expressions (DeWall, Maner, & Rouby,

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2009). Second, while static angry faces do not necessarily capture our attention, presentations of faces in motion, which is more realistic, may well have this effect. Studies that compared happy and angry faces in a crowd that were dynamic rather than static confirm this hypothesis. When shown neutral faces in a crowd that gradually turn positive or negative in their expression, people are quicker to spot those faces that turn angry (Ceccarini & Caudek, 2013). Disgust is another emotion that has adaptive significance. When confronted with an offensive stimulus such as a foul odour, spoiled food, faeces, rotting flesh or the sight of mutilation, people react with an aversion that shows in the way they wrinkle the nose, raise the upper lip and gape. This visceral reaction is often accompanied by nausea, and in the case of bad food, this can facilitate gagging and vomiting (Rozin & Fallon, 1987). Food poisoning is a real threat, so it is adaptive for us to recognise disgust in the face of others. To illustrate, Bruno Wicker and colleagues (2003) had men watch video clips of people smelling pleasant, disgusting or neutral odours. Afterwards, these same men were exposed to the odours themselves. Using fMRI, researchers monitored activity in the participants’ brains throughout the experiment. They found that a structure in the brain known as TABLE 3.2 Some common emojis the insula was activated not only when participants sniffed the disgusting odour but also when they watched others sniffing it. This In order to clarify the meaning or tone of their written words, people often add emojis to their digital messages. One example result suggests that people not only recognise the face of disgust set is shown here, although you may be familiar with others. but also experience it at a neural level. Emoji

Meaning Smiling

Crying loudly

Winking

Eye roll

Angry

Rolling on the floor laughing

Blowing a kiss

What is in a smile? Turning to the expression of positive emotion, we come to smiles. A great deal of research has examined the functions of smiles. Do they communicate positive emotion? Can they be faked? University of Canterbury researcher Lucy Johnston and colleagues (Johnston et al., 2010; McLellan, Johnston, Dalrymple-Alford, & Porter, 2010) have differentiated between enjoyment smiles (smiles shown spontaneously when happy) and non-enjoyment smiles (smiles posed for any variety of reasons). In their research, participants naturally attune to the difference between these smiles – after all it is important to know whether someone is smiling because they’re happy or because of some other reason. Indeed, participants choose to cooperate more with targets showing enjoyment smiles than targets showing non-enjoyment smiles. Recent research has shown that smiles can convey more than just enjoyment or the lack thereof. Paula Niedenthal and colleagues (2010; Martin, Wood, Rychlowska, & Niedenthal, 2017) have found evidence for three types of smiles: reward, affiliation, and dominance. Reward smiles serve to reinforce behaviour, affiliation smiles convey a desire for social bonding, and dominance smiles assert status. These smiles have subtle differences in their appearance and are readily recognised by perceivers.

Non-verbal behaviour online Love!

Laughing with tears

Embarrassment Source: Shutterstock.com/Carboxylase

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The social value of the human face is evident when we communicate by SMS, Twitter or email. When email first became popular, the written word was often misinterpreted, especially when the writer tried to be funny or sarcastic, because we lacked the non-verbal cues that normally animate and clarify live interactions. Then came along ‘emoticons’ (emotion icons) from standard keyboard characters, which over time evolved into the picture representations now widely used known as emojis (see Table 3.2). Now, nearly every online communication interface – from Gmail to Facebook to WhatsApp – offer still and animated emoji that can be used to communicate an assortment of emotions and other mental states.

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CHAPTER THREE

Gaze and touch Eye contact, or gaze, is another powerful form of non-verbal communication. As social beings, humans are highly attentive to eyes, often following the gaze of others. Look up, down, left or right, and someone observing you will likely follow the direction of your eyes (Langton, Watt, & Bruce, 2000). Even 1-year-old infants tend to follow gaze, looking towards or pointing at the object of an adult researcher’s attention (Brooks & Meltzoff, 2002). Clearly, we are drawn like a magnet to another person’s direct gaze. Controlled laboratory studies of this ‘eye-contact effect’ show that people who look us straight in the eye quickly draw and then hold our attention, increase arousal and activate key ‘social’ areas of the brain (Senju & Johnson, 2009), even when the other person is wearing dark sunglasses (Myllyneva & Hietanen, 2015). Eyes have often been called the ‘windows to the soul’. In many cultures, people tend to assume that someone who avoids eye contact is evasive, cold, fearful, shy or indifferent; that frequent gazing signals intimacy, sincerity, self-confidence and respect; and that the person who stares is tense, angry and unfriendly. If you have ever conversed with someone who kept looking away, as if uninterested, then you would understand why people might form negative impressions from ‘gaze disengagement’ (Mason, Tatkow, & Macrae, 2005). Moreover, as we saw in Chapter 2, even images of eyes carry far-reaching effects on social behaviour such as helping and donating, as long as the gaze is shared (Manesi, Van Lange, & Pollet, 2016). Another powerful and primitive form of non-verbal signal is touch (Gallace & Spence, 2010), such as the congratulatory high-five, the fist bump, the bear hug, the sympathetic pat on the back, the joking elbow in the ribs, the painfully strong handshake and the lingering loving embrace. Recent research points to the importance of touch in conveying social support among dating couples (Robinson, Hoplock, & Cameron, 2015), in building rapport between medical physicians and their patients (Kraft-Todd et al., 2017), and, when positive and appropriate, in producing positive outcomes in workplaces (Simmering, Fuller, Marler, Cox, & Bennett, 2013).

Culture and non-verbal behaviour Non-verbal communication norms vary a great deal from one culture to the next. Axtell (1993) warned of several ways in which such communication can go awry. In Bulgaria, nodding your head means ‘no’ and shaking your head sideways means ‘yes’. In Germany and Brazil, the American ‘okay’ sign (forming a circle with your thumb and forefinger) is an obscene gesture. Personal space habits also vary across cultures. In Japan, people like to maintain a sizeable distance while interacting. But in Puerto Rico and much of Latin America, people stand very close and backing off is considered an insult. Affectionate touch is relatively more embraced in Mexican culture than elsewhere in the world (Burleson, Roberts, Coon, & Soto, 2018). Also, beware of what you do with your eyes. In Latin America, locking eyes is a must, yet in Japan and many Aboriginal cultures, too much eye contact shows a lack of respect or is considered impolite. Even a smile does not convey a universal impression – while smiling tends to make you look smart in Germany and China, it can have the opposite effect in Iran (Krys, Hansen, Xing, Szarota, & Yang, 2014). Different cultures also have different rules for the common greeting. In Finland, you should give a firm handshake; in France, you should loosen the grip; in Zambia, you should use your left hand to support the right; and in Bolivia, you should extend your arm if your hand is dirty. In Japan, people bow; in Thailand, they put both hands together in a praying position on the chest; in Fiji, they smile and raise their eyebrows; and the Māori press noses and foreheads together. In most Arab countries, men greet one another by saying salaam alaykum, then shaking hands, saying kaifhalak, and kissing each other on the cheek. In Australia’s Northern Territory, it is considered especially rude to not wave your hand or tip your index finger to the driver of a car going the other direction, even if the driver is unknown to you. As described in the following Cultural Diversity feature, people can even distinguish between Australians and Americans simply based on waving behaviour.

CULTURAL DIVERSITY AUSTRALIAN BY GREETING You might not expect that someone can identify the country you are from based on how you greet someone, but social psychological research on ‘non-verbal accents’ suggests that this is the case. Abigail Marsh and colleagues (2007) took photographs of Americans and Australians waving and walking towards the camera as if in greeting. All actors wore the same clothes and removed any accessories so that no other identifying features differentiated the nationalities. A sample

of American participants then viewed the photographs and guessed whether the actor was from the US or Australia. Could nationality be identified based on greeting alone? As it turns out, yes! Participants were more accurate than chance at identifying whether each actor was Australian or American based on their wave or walk. This was especially the case for Australian actors who were perceived as being stereotypically Australian (i.e., likeable and not very high in dominance).

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Distinguishing truth from deception Social perception is tricky because people often try to hide or stretch the truth about themselves. Poker players bluff to win money, witnesses lie to protect themselves, public officials make campaign promises they do not really intend to keep, and acquaintances pass compliments to each other to be polite and supportive. On occasion, everyone tells something less than ‘the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth’. Can social perceivers tell the difference? Can you tell when someone is lying?

Cues to deception Sigmund Freud, the founder of psychoanalysis, once said that ‘no mortal can keep a secret. If his lips are silent, he chatters with his fingertips; betrayal oozes out of him at every pore’ (1905, p. 94). Paul Ekman and Wallace Friesen (1974) later revised Freud’s observation by pointing out that some figurative pores ‘ooze’ more than others. Ekman and Friesen proposed that some channels of communication are difficult for deceivers to control, whereas others are relatively easy. To test this hypothesis, they showed a series of films – some pleasant, others disgusting – to a group of female nurses. While watching, the nurses were instructed either to report their honest impressions of these films or to conceal their true feelings. Through the use of hidden cameras, these participants were recorded. Others, acting as observers, then viewed the videorecordings and judged whether the participants had been truthful or deceptive. Observers who watched video-recordings that focused on the body were better at detecting deception than were those who saw recordings that focused on the face. The face can communicate emotion but is relatively easy for deceivers to control, unlike nervous movements of the hands and feet. This study inspired hundreds of related studies. In all of this research, one group of participants makes truthful or TABLE 3.3 Can the ‘experts’ distinguish truth from deceptive statements, while another group reads the transcripts, deception? listens to audio or watches videos, and then tries to judge the Lie-detection experts with experience at making judgements of statements. Consistently, in laboratories all over the world, truth and deception were shown brief videos of 10 women telling results show that people are only about 54% accurate in judging the truth or lying about their feelings. Considering that there truth and deception, too often accepting what others say at face was a 50–50 chance of guessing correctly, the accuracy rates value (Bond & DePaulo, 2006; Vrij, 2008). In fact, a good deal were remarkably low. Only a sample of US Secret Service agents of research shows that professionals who are specially trained posted a better-than-chance score. and who regularly make these kinds of judgements for a living Observer groups Accuracy rates (%) are also highly prone to error, such as police detectives, judges, psychiatrists, customs inspectors, and those who administer University students 52.82 lie-detector tests for government intelligence agencies (Ekman & CIA, FBI and military 55.67 O’Sullivan, 1991; Granhag & Strömwall, 2004; Meissner & Kassin, Police investigators 55.79 2002; Vrij, 2008) (see Table 3.3). Trial judges 56.73 What seems to be the problem? One hypothesis is that Psychiatrists 57.61 there is a mismatch between the behavioural cues that signal deception and those we use to detect deception (DePaulo et al., US Secret Service agents 64.12 2003). Consider that there are four channels of communication Source: Ekman, P., & O’Sullivan, M. (1991). Who can catch a liar? American that provide potentially relevant information: the spoken Psychologist, 46, 913–920. Copyright © 1991 by the American Psychological Association. Reprinted by permission. word, the face, the body and the voice. Yet when people have a reason to lie, the words they choose cannot be trusted, and they are generally able to control both their face and body. The voice is the most telling channel because Adaptively, people when people lie, they tend to hesitate, then speed up and raise the pitch of their voice. In a survey of are skilled at knowing approximately 2500 adults in 58 countries, an international team of researchers found that more than when someone is 70% believed that liars tend to avert their eyes – a cue that is not supported by any research. Similarly, lying rather than telling the truth. most survey respondents believed that people squirm, stutter, fidget and touch themselves when they FALSE lie – also cues that are not supported by the research (Global Deception Research Team, 2006). Perhaps the reason why some poker players excel is that their opponents are looking for such uninformative cues (see Figure 3.8). It is worth noting that violations of non-verbal behaviour norms are often perceived as cues to deception. For instance, individuals who engage in norm-violating behaviours such as teeth-picking and exaggerated changes in speech volume are judged to be engaging in deception more so than individuals making the same statements in the absence of such behaviours (Levine et al., 2000). Given that crosscultural interactions are rife for perceived violations of non-verbal behavioural norms, it is no surprise that individuals are more likely to make false deception judgements about those from other cultures. Work by 102

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Paola Castillo and David Mallard (2011) points to one method to reduce such erroneous judgements: informing individuals about culturally-specific behavioural norms prevented cross-cultural biases in deception judgements.

Cuing in to cognitive effort

CHAPTER THREE

FIGURE 3.8 Is he bluffing? Pius Heinz is a professional poker player from Bonn, Germany. At the age of 22, he won the Main Event at the 2011 World Series of Poker and received $8.7 million in prize money. As with all successful players, Heinz wears the proverbial ‘poker face’ while playing so as not to betray how he feels about his hand.

Some research suggests that none of the behavioural cues people look for to identify deception are actually very telling (Hartwig & Bond, 2011). For this reason, researchers today are seeking a different approach. Most notably, Aldert Vrij and colleagues theorise that lying is harder to do and requires more thinking than telling the truth (Vrij, Granhag, & Porter, 2010; Vrij & Granhag, 2012). Therefore, they argue, we should focus on behavioural cues that betray cognitive effort. This realisation has led researchers to create more challenging types of interviews that could outsmart liars, forcing them to think harder and thereby exposing their deception. In one study, for example, they asked truth tellers and liars to recount their stories in reverse chronological order. This task was more effortful for the deceivers to do, which made the interviewers better able to distinguish between truths and lies (Vrij, 2008). In a second study, truth tellers and liars were instructed to maintain eye contact with their interviewer. This added burden taxed those who were lying more than it did those who were telling the truth, which enabled observers to better distinguish between the two groups (Vrij et al., 2010). In the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks in the US and heightened worldwide concerns about security at airports, train stations and other public places, the ability to distinguish truths and lies has become essential, potentially a matter of life and death. Yet research shows that social perceivers are misguided. Too easily seduced by the silver tongue, the smiling face and the restless body, we often fail to notice the Source: Alamy Stock Photo/David Becker/ZUMAPRESS.com quivering voice. Too focused on how stressed a person seems while speaking – an emotional state that afflicts not only guilty liars but innocent truth tellers who stand falsely accused – we fail to notice the amount of effort it takes someone to recite their story or answer a question. With social psychologists in pursuit of ways to improve upon human lie-detection skills, for example, by preventing individuals from thinking too much before making their judgements (Reinhard, Greifeneder, & Scharmach, 2013) or, by contrast, having individuals come together in groups to discuss and make these judgements (Klein & Epley, 2015) – stay tuned for further developments in years to come.

ATTRIBUTION: FROM ELEMENTS TO DISPOSITIONS To interact effectively with others, we need to know how they feel and when they can be trusted. But to understand people well enough to predict their future behaviour, we must also identify their inner dispositions – stable characteristics such as personality traits, attitudes and abilities. Since we cannot actually see dispositions, we infer them indirectly from what a person says and does. In this section, we look at the processes that lead us to make these inferences.

Attribution theories Do you ever think about the influence you have on other people? What about the roles of heredity, childhood experiences and social forces? Do you wonder why some people succeed while others fail? Individuals differ in the extent to which they feel a need to explain the uncertain events of human behaviour (Weary & Edwards, 1994). Although there are vast differences among us, people in general tend to ask ‘why?’ when they confront events that are important, negative or unexpected (Weiner, 1985), and when understanding these events has personal relevance (Malle & Knobe, 1997).

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Attribution theory

A group of theories that describe how people explain the causes of behaviour.

Personal attribution

Attribution to internal characteristics of an individual, such as ability, personality, mood or effort.

Situational attribution

Attribution to factors external to an individual, such as the task, other people or luck.

To make sense of our social world, we try to understand the causes of other people’s behaviour. But what kinds of explanations do we make, and how do we go about making them? In a classic book entitled The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations, Fritz Heider (1958) made a substantial step towards answering these questions. To Heider, we are all scientists of a sort. Motivated to understand others well enough to manage our social lives, we observe, analyse and explain their behaviour. The explanations we come up with are called attributions, and the theory that describes the process is called attribution theory. Attempts to make sense of the shooting of Trayvon Martin by George Zimmerman, described at the beginning of this chapter, represent questions of attribution: Why did George Zimmerman shoot Trayvon Martin? Ask people to explain why their fellow human beings behave as they do – why they succeed or fail, laugh or cry, work or play, or help or hurt others – and you will see that they come up with complex explanations often focused on whether the behaviour is intentional or unintentional (Malle & Holbrook, 2012). Interested in how people answer these kinds of why questions, Heider found it particularly useful to group the explanations people give into two categories: personal and situational. In the 2012 shooting incident, everyone wanted to know what caused Zimmerman to follow Martin. Immediately, some observers pointed the finger of blame at Zimmerman, an overly suspicious community patrolman (a personal attribution). Yet others speculated that his actions were provoked by a rash of recent crimes in the neighbourhood or something specific about Martin’s appearance or behaviour (a situational attribution). The same questions were asked about why Zimmerman then shot Martin: Was his finger on the trigger and ready to shoot, or did he act in self-defence? The task for the attribution theorist is not to determine the true causes of such an event but rather to understand people’s perceptions of causality. Heider’s insights provided an initial spark for a number of formal models that together came to be known as attribution theory (Weiner, 2008). Here, we describe two of these theories: correspondent inference theory and covariation theory.

Correspondent inference theory

Rating of the students' pro-Castro attitude

According to Edward Jones and Keith Davis (1965), each of us tries to understand other people by observing and analysing their behaviour. Jones and Davis’ correspondent inference theory predicts that people try to infer from an action whether the act corresponds to an enduring personal trait of the individual. Is the person who commits an FIGURE 3.9 What does this speechwriter really believe? act of aggression a beast? Is the person who donates money As predicted by correspondent inference theory, participants who to charity an altruist? To answer these kinds of questions, read a student’s speech (behaviour) were more likely to assume people make inferences on the basis of three factors: choice, that it reflected the student’s true attitude (disposition) when the expectedness and effects. position taken was freely chosen (left) rather than assigned (right). The first factor is a person’s degree of choice. Behaviour But also note the evidence for the fundamental attribution error. Even participants who thought the student had been assigned a that is freely chosen is more informative about a person than position inferred the student’s attitude from the speech. behaviour that is coerced. In one study, participants read a speech, presumably written by a university student, that either favoured or opposed Fidel Castro, then the communist leader of Cuba. Some participants were told that the student had freely chosen this position and others were told that the student had been assigned the position by a lecturer. When asked to judge the student’s true attitude, participants were more likely to assume a correspondence between the essay (behaviour) and the student’s attitude (disposition) when the student had a choice compared to when he or she had been assigned to the role (Jones & Harris, 1967; see Figure 3.9). Keep this study in mind. It supports correspondent inference theory; but, as we will see later, it also demonstrates one of the most tenacious biases of social perception. The second factor that leads us to make dispositional inferences is the expectedness of behaviour. As previously noted, an action tells us more about a person when it departs from the Student chooses Student is assigned norm than when it is typical, part of a social role or otherwise position position expected under the circumstances (Jones, Davis & Gergen, 1961). Pro-Castro speech Anti-Castro speech Thus, people think they know more about a student who wears Source: Based on Jones, E. E., & Harris, V. A. (1967). The attribution of attitudes. Journal three-piece suits to class or a person who openly refuses to pay of Experimental Social Psychology, 3, 1–24. Copyright © 1967 Elsevier.

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taxes than about a student who wears jeans to class or a person who dutifully files their tax return by the deadline. Third, social perceivers take into account the intended effects or consequences of someone’s behaviour. Acts that produce many desirable outcomes do not reveal a person’s specific motives as clearly as acts that produce only a single desirable outcome (Newtson, 1974). For example, you are likely to be uncertain about exactly why a person stays on a job that is enjoyable, high paying and in an attractive location – three highly desirable outcomes, each sufficient to explain the behaviour. By contrast, you may feel more certain about why a person stays on a job that is tedious and low paying but is in an attractive location – only one desirable outcome.

Covariation theory Correspondent inference theory seeks to describe how perceivers try to discern an individual’s personal characteristics from a slice of behavioural evidence. However, behaviour can be attributed not only to personal factors but to situational factors as well. How is this distinction made? In Chapter 1 we noted that the causes of human behaviour can be derived only through experiments. That is, a person has to make more than a single observation and compare behaviour in two or more settings in which everything stays the same except for the independent variables. Like Heider, Harold Kelley (1967) theorised that people are much like scientists in this regard. They may not observe others in a controlled laboratory, but they too search for clues, make comparisons and think in terms of ‘experiments’. According to Kelley, people make attributions by using the covariation principle; that is, in order for something to be the cause of a behaviour, it must be present when the behaviour occurs and absent when it does not. Three kinds of covariation information in particular are useful: consensus, distinctiveness and consistency. To illustrate these concepts, imagine you are standing on a street corner one hot, humid evening minding your own business, when all of a sudden, a stranger comes out of a cool air-conditioned cinema and blurts out, ‘That was excellent!’ Looking up, you do not recognise the film title, so you wonder what to make of this ‘recommendation’. Was the behaviour (the rave review) caused by something about the person (the stranger), the stimulus (the film) or the circumstances (say, the cool, comfortable theatre)? If you are possibly interested in spending the evening watching the film, how would you proceed to explain what happened? What kinds of information would you want to obtain? Thinking like a scientist, you might seek out consensus information to see how different people react to the same stimulus. In other words, what do other film-goers think about this film? If others also rave about it, then this stranger’s behaviour is high in consensus and is attributed to the stimulus. If others are critical of this film, however, then the behaviour is low in consensus and is attributed to the person. Still thinking like a scientist, you might also want distinctiveness information to see how the same person reacts to different stimuli. In other words, what does this film-goer think of other films? If the stranger is generally critical of other films, then the target behaviour is high in distinctiveness and is attributed to the stimulus. If the stranger raves about everything he or she sees, however, then the behaviour is low in distinctiveness and is attributed to the person. Finally, you might want to seek consistency information to see what happens to the behaviour at another time when the person and the stimulus both remain the same. How does this film-goer feel about this film on other occasions? If the stranger raves about the film on video as well as in the theatre, regardless of surroundings, then the behaviour is high in consistency. If the stranger does not always enjoy the film, the behaviour is low in consistency. According to Kelley, behaviour that is consistent is attributed to the stimulus when consensus and distinctiveness are also high and to the person when they are low. By contrast, behaviour that is low in consistency is attributed to transient circumstances, such as the temperature of the cinema. Kelley’s theory and the predictions it makes are represented in Figure 3.10. Does this model describe the kinds of information you seek when you try to determine what causes people to behave as they do? Often it does. Research shows that people who are asked to make attributions for various events do tend to follow the logic of covariation (Cheng & Novick, 1990; Fosterling, 1992; McArthur, 1972). However, this research also shows that individuals have their own attributional styles, so people often disagree about what caused a particular behaviour (Robins, Mendelsohn, Connell, & Kwan, 2004). There are two ways in which social perceivers differ. First, individuals vary in the extent to which they believe that human behaviours are caused by personal characteristics that are fixed (‘Everyone is a certain kind of person; there is not much that can be done to really change that’) or by characteristics that are malleable (‘People can change even their most basic qualities’) (Dweck, 2012). Second, research by University of Queensland researcher Bill von Hippel and colleagues (2005) suggests that some individuals are more likely than others to process new information in ways that are coloured by self-serving motives.

Covariation principle

A principle of attribution theory that holds that people attribute behaviour to factors that are present when a behaviour occurs and are absent when it does not.

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FIGURE 3.10 Kelley’s covariation theory For behaviours that are high in consistency, people make personal attributions when there is low consensus and distinctiveness (top row) and stimulus attributions when there is high consensus Behaviour

Covariation information Consensus

The stranger raves about the film

and distinctiveness (bottom row). Behaviours that are low in consistency (not shown) are attributed to passing circumstances.

Distinctiveness

Attribution Consistency

Low

Low

High

Other persons do not rave about the film.

The stranger raves about many other films.

The stranger always raves about this film.

High

High

High

Other persons rave about the film.

The stranger does not rave about many other films.

The stranger always raves about this film.

Personal Attribution Something about the stranger caused the behaviour.

Stimulus Attribution Something about the film caused the behaviour.

Source: Based on Kelley, H. H. (1967). Attribution in social psychology. Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, 15, 192–238.

Note that covariation theory and attribution theories more generally have not gone without criticism. Summarising these arguments, Bertram Malle (2011) argued that the assumptions made by attribution are too dogmatic and fail to encompass the diversity and complexity of the social world. For example, with specific focus on covariation, Malle explains that there are simply very few cases in which individuals have information about consensus, consistency and distinctiveness.

Attribution biases Daniel Kahneman won a Nobel Prize in Economics for work on the psychology of judgement and decisionmaking. In Thinking, Fast and Slow, Kahneman (2011) summarises a lifetime of research showing that the human mind operates by two different systems of thought. System 1 is quick, easy and automatic, and uses a process that one might call ‘intuitive’. Determining which of two objects is more distant, detecting anger in someone’s face, calculating 2 + 2 and understanding a simple sentence are the kinds of automatic activities engaged by this system. By contrast, System 2 is slow, controlled and requires attention and effort – using a process that feels more reasoned. Looking for a specific face in a crowd, parking in a narrow space, counting the number of letters on a page, figuring out how a magic trick works and filling out complicated forms are the kinds of activities that require focused and undivided attention. According to Kahneman, Systems 1 and 2 are both active when people are awake. System 1 runs automatically and guides us until it runs into difficulty, as when something unexpected happens. At that point the more effortful System 2 is activated. When the theories of attribution were first proposed, they were represented by elaborate flow charts, formulas and diagrams, leading many social psychologists to wonder: Do people really analyse behaviour in the way that one might expect of scientists, or computers? Do people have the time, the motivation or the cognitive capacity for such elaborate, mindful, System 2 processes? The answer to these questions is sometimes ‘yes’ and sometimes ‘no’. As social perceivers, we are limited in our ability to process all relevant information, or we may lack the kinds of training needed to employ fully the principles of attribution theory. More importantly, we often do not make an effort to think carefully about the attributions we make. With so much to explain and not enough time in a day, people take mental shortcuts, cross their fingers, hope for the best and get on with life. The problem is that speed brings bias and perhaps even a loss of accuracy. In this section, we examine some of these shortcuts and their consequences.

Cognitive heuristics According to Kahneman, Tversky and others, people often make attributions and other types of social judgements by using ‘cognitive heuristics’; that is, information-processing guidelines that enable us to think 106

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in ways that are quick and easy but that often lead to error (Gigerenzer, Hertwig, & Pachur, 2011; Gilovich, Griffin, & Kahneman, 2002; Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982; Nisbett & Ross, 1980). One guideline that has particularly troublesome effects on attribution is the availability heuristic – a tendency to estimate the odds that an event will occur by how easily instances of it pop to mind. To demonstrate this phenomenon, Tversky and Kahneman (1973) asked English-speaking research participants: ‘Which is more common, words that start with the letter r or words that contain r as the third letter?’ In actuality, the English language has many more words with r as the third letter than as the first. Yet most people guessed that more words begin with r. Why? Because it is easier to bring to mind words in which r appears first. Apparently, our estimates of likelihood are heavily influenced by events that are readily available in memory (MacLeod & Campbell, 1992).

CHAPTER THREE

Availability heuristic

The tendency to estimate the likelihood that an event will occur by how easily instances of it come to mind.

False consensus

False-consensus The availability heuristic can lead us astray in two ways. First, it gives rise to the false-consensus effect – a effect The tendency for tendency for people to overestimate the extent to which others share their opinions, attributes and people to overestimate behaviours. This bias is pervasive. Regardless of whether people are asked to predict how others feel about the extent to which Vegemite, immigration, marriage equality, gun control, certain types of music or norms for appropriate others share their behaviour, they exaggerate the percentage of others who behave similarly or share their views (Bui, 2012; opinions, attributes and Krueger, 1998). behaviours. To illustrate the effect, Joachim Krueger (2000) asked participants in a study to indicate whether or not they had certain TABLE 3.4 The false-consensus effect personality traits. Then they were asked to estimate the percentage In this study, participants who did and participants who did of people in general who have these same traits. As shown in not rate various personality traits as descriptive of themselves Table 3.4, participants’ beliefs about other people’s personalities estimated the percentage of other people who had these traits. were biased by their own self-perceptions. In part, the falseAs shown below, participants’ estimates of the population consensus were biased by their own self-perceptions. consensus bias is a by-product of the availability heuristic. We tend to associate with others who are like us in important ways, so we Traits Self yes (%) Self no (%) are more likely to notice and recall instances of similar rather than Alert 75 65 dissimilar behaviour. Discontented 48 33 Research in Australia has highlighted false consensus effects in the context of prejudice. A series of studies documents that Loud 46 43 community members in general perceived the rest of the community Meticulous 52 41 to have similar prejudice levels towards Aboriginal and Torres Strait Sly 36 28 Islander people (Pederson, Griffiths, & Watt, 2008; Watt & Larkin, Smug 41 33 2010). More concerningly, perhaps, individuals with the highest levels of prejudice towards Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders Source: Krueger, J. (2000). The projective perception of the social world: A building block of social comparison processes. In J. Suls & L. Wheeler (Eds.), Handbook of social comparison: demonstrate the strongest false consensus effects; that is, they are Theory and research (pp. 323–351). New York, NY: Plenum/Kluwer. the most likely to believe that everyone else is similarly prejudiced!

Base-rate fallacy A second consequence of the availability heuristic is that social perceptions are influenced more by one vivid life story than by hard statistical facts. Have you ever wondered why so many people buy lottery tickets despite the astonishingly low odds of winning, or why so many travellers are afraid to fly even though they are more likely to perish in a car accident? These behaviours are symptomatic of the base-rate fallacy – the fact that people are relatively insensitive to numerical base rates or probabilities; they are influenced more by graphic, dramatic events such as the sight of a multimillion-dollar lottery winner celebrating on television or a photograph of bodies being pulled from the wreckage of a plane crash. The base-rate fallacy can thus lead to various misperceptions of risk. Indeed, people overestimate the number of those who die in shootings, fires, floods and terrorist bombings, and underestimate the death toll caused by heart attacks, strokes, diabetes and other mundane events. Perceptions of risk seem more relevant now than in the past due to newly acquired fears of terrorism or economic collapse, and research shows that such perceptions are affected more by fear, anxiety and other emotions than by cold and objective probabilities (Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001; Pachur, Hertwig, & Steinmann, 2012; Slovic, 2000). At times, the result can be capricious and downright irrational. Consistent with the fact that people tend to fear things that sound unfamiliar, participants in one study rated fictional food additives as more hazardous to health when the names were difficult to pronounce, such as Hnegripitrom, than when they were easier to pronounce, such as Magnalroxate (Song & Schwarz, 2009).

Base-rate fallacy

The finding that people are relatively insensitive to consensus information presented in the form of numerical base rates.

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Every day, we are besieged by both types of information. We read and hear about the unemployment rate, and we watch personal interviews with people who were recently laid off; we read the casualty figures of war, and we witness the agony of a parent who has lost a child in combat. Logically, statistics that summarise the experiences of large numbers of people are more informative than a single and perhaps atypical case, but perceivers march to a different beat. As long as the personal anecdote is seen as relevant (Schwarz, Bless, & Bohner, 1991) and the source as credible (Hinsz, Tindale, Nagao, Davis, & Robertson, 1988), and particularly to the extent that it involves someone we know (Hills & Pachur, 2012) it seems that one vivid image is worth a thousand statistics.

Counterfactual thinking

Counterfactual thinking

The tendency to imagine alternative events or outcomes that might have occurred but did not.

Interestingly, people can also be influenced by how easy it is to imagine events that did not occur. As thoughtful and curious beings, we are often not content to accept what happens to us or to others without wondering, at least in private, ‘What if …?’ According to Kahneman and Miller (1986), people’s emotional reactions to events are often coloured by counterfactual thinking – a tendency to imagine alternative outcomes that might have occurred but did not. There are different types of counterfactual thoughts. If we imagine a result that is better than the actual result, then we are likely to experience disappointment, regret and frustration. If the imagined result is worse, then we react with emotions that range from relief and satisfaction to elation. Thus, the psychological impact of positive and negative events depends on the way we think about ‘what might have been’ (Roese, 1997; Roese & Olson, 1995). What domains of life trigger the most counterfactual thinking, and the regret that may follow? Summarising past research, Neal Roese and Amy Summerville (2005) found that people’s top three regrets centre, in order, on education (‘I should have finished my degree’), career (‘If only I had applied for that job’) and romance (‘If only I had asked her out’) – all domains that present us with opportunities that we may or may not realise. Of course, counterfactual thinking does not necessarily lead people into a sense of regret. In fact, Laura Kray and colleagues (2010) note that reflecting on ‘what might have been’ can sometimes help us to define ourselves as well as the meaning in our lives. These researchers found that participants who were asked to reflect on counterfactual ‘what if’ questions later saw their university choices and friendships as more meaningful than those who did not stop to ask these questions. Perhaps by thinking about what might have been, people can more fully appreciate what they have.

CRITICAL THINKING ACTIVITY What would have happened if you chose to attend a different university? Or enrol in a different degree program? How would this have affected who you are today and who you will be in the

future? Is your reaction to these types of questions regret or satisfaction?

Some individuals think in counterfactual terms more than others do. As you might expect, for example, people who strongly believe in free will – the idea that we can control our own fate by the choices we make – are more likely to wonder ‘what if’ than those who believe that their fate is predetermined or unpredictable (Alquist, Ainsworth, Baumeister, Daly, & Stillman, 2015). Also, some types of experiences lead people to engage in counterfactual thought more than others. Research shows that we are more likely to think about what might have been – often with feelings of regret – after negative outcomes that result from actions we take rather than from actions we do not take (Byrne & McEleney, 2000). Consider an experience that may sound all too familiar. You take a multiple-choice test, and after reviewing an item you struggled over, you want to change the answer. What do you do? Research has shown that most changes in test answers are from incorrect to correct. Yet most university students harbour the ‘first instinct fallacy’ that it is best to stick with one’s original answer. Why? Justin Kruger and colleagues (2005) found that this myth arises from counterfactual thinking: that students are more likely to react with regret and frustration (‘If only I had …’) after changing a correct answer than after failing to change an incorrect answer. According to Victoria Medvec and Kenneth Savitsky (1997), certain situations – such as being on the verge of a better or worse outcome, just above or below some cut-off point – also make it especially easy to conjure up images of what might have been. The implications are intriguing. Imagine, for example, that you are an Olympic athlete and have just won a silver medal – a remarkable feat. Now imagine that you have just won the bronze medal. Which situation would make you feel better? Rationally speaking, you should feel more pride and satisfaction with a silver medal. But what if your achievement had prompted you to engage in counterfactual thinking? 108

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To examine this question, Medvec and colleagues (1995) recorded 41 athletes in the 1992 summer Olympic Games at the moment they realised that they had won a silver or a bronze medal and again, later, during the medal ceremony. Then they showed these recordings, without sound, to people who did not know the order of finish. These participants were asked to observe the medallists and rate their emotional states on a scale ranging from ‘agony’ to ‘ecstasy’. The intriguing result, as you might expect, was that the bronze medallists, on average, seemed happier than the silver medallists. You might even see this in Figure 3.11. In a second study, participants who watched interviews with many of these same athletes rated the silver medallists as more negatively focused on finishing second rather than first, and the bronze medallists as more positively focused on finishing third rather than fourth. For these world-class athletes, feelings of satisfaction were based more on their thoughts of what might have been than on the reality of what was.

CHAPTER THREE

FIGURE 3.11 The face of Olympic medals Here stand three world-class gymnasts during the medal ceremony at the 2016 Rio de Janeiro Olympic Games. Simone Biles of the US (middle) outperformed Russia’s Maria Paseka (right) to win the gold medal. Biles won with a margin of 0.713 points. Thinking about what might have been, Paseka likely focused on not winning gold. Switzerland’s Giulia Steingruber (left), for her part, was ecstatic with her bronze medal placing.

Fundamental attribution error By the time you finish reading this textbook, you will have learned the cardinal lesson of social psychology: people are profoundly influenced by the situational contexts of their behaviour – or, as Samuel Sommers (2011) put it, situations matter. This point is not as obvious as it may seem. For example, parents are often surprised to hear that their mischievous child, the family monster, is a perfect angel in the classroom. And students are often surprised to observe that their favourite lecturer, so eloquent in the lecture theatre, may stumble over words in less formal gatherings. These reactions are symptomatic of a well-documented aspect of social perception. When people explain the behaviour of others, they tend to overestimate the role of personal factors and overlook the impact of situations. Because this bias is so pervasive (and sometimes so misleading) it has been called the fundamental attribution error (Ross, 1977). Evidence of the fundamental attribution error was first reported in the Jones and Harris (1967) study described earlier, in which participants read an essay presumably written by a student. In that study, participants were more likely to infer the student’s true attitude when the position taken had been freely chosen than when they thought that the student had been assigned to it. But look again at Figure 3.9, and you will notice that even when participants thought that the student had no choice but to assert a position, they still used the speech to infer his or her attitude. This finding has been repeated many times. Whether the essay topic is nuclear power, abortion, drug laws or the death penalty, the results are essentially the same (Jones, 1990). People fall prey to the fundamental attribution error even when they are fully aware of the situation’s impact on behaviour. In one experiment, the participants were themselves assigned to take a position, after which they swapped essays and rated each other. Remarkably, they still jumped to conclusions about each other’s attitudes (Miller, Jones, & Hinkle, 1981). In another experiment, participants inferred attitudes from a speech even when they were the ones who had assigned the position to be taken (Gilbert & Jones, 1986). A fascinating study by Lee Ross and colleagues (1977) demonstrates the fundamental attribution error in a familiar setting, the television quiz show. By a flip of the coin, participants in this study were randomly assigned to play the role of either the questioner or the contestant in a quiz game while spectators looked on. In front of the contestant and spectators, the experimenter instructed each questioner to write 10 challenging questions from his or her own store of general knowledge. If you are a trivia buff, you can imagine how esoteric such questions can be. Who was the founder of e-Bay? Which team won the TriNations rugby tournament in 1998? It is no wonder that contestants correctly answered only about 40% of the questions asked. When the game was over, all participants rated the questioners’ and contestants’ general knowledge on a scale of 0 to 100. Picture the events that transpired. The questioners appeared more knowledgeable than the contestants. After all, they knew all the answers. But a moment’s reflection should remind us that the situation put the questioner at a distinct advantage (there were no differences between the two groups on an objective test of general knowledge). Did participants take the questioners’ advantage into account,

Source: Getty Images/Ryan Pierse

Fundamental attribution error

The tendency to focus on the role of personal causes and underestimate the impact of situations on other people’s behaviour.

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FIGURE 3.12 Fundamental attribution error and the TV quiz show Even though the simulated quiz show situation placed questioners in an obvious position of advantage over contestants, observers rated the questioners as more knowledgeable (right). Questioners did not overrate their general knowledge (left), but contestants rated themselves as inferior (middle) and observers rated them as inferior as well. These results illustrate the fundamental attribution error.

or did they assume that the questioners actually had greater knowledge? The results were startling. Spectators rated the questioners as above average in their general knowledge and the contestants as below average. The contestants even rated themselves as inferior to their partners. Like the spectators, they too were fooled by the loaded situation (see Figure 3.12).

Attribution: a two-step process

Rating of general knowledge

What is going on here? Why do social perceivers consistently make assumptions about people and fail to appreciate the impact of situations? According to Daniel Gilbert and Patrick Malone (1995), the problem stems in part from how we make attributions. Attribution theorists used to assume that people survey all the evidence and then decide on whether to make a personal or a situational attribution. Instead, it appears that social perception is a two-step process. First, we identify the behaviour and make a quick personal attribution, then we correct or adjust that Midpoint inference to account for situational influences. At least for those raised in a Western culture, the first step is simple and automatic, like a reflex; the second requires attention, thought and effort. Several research findings support this hypothesis. First, without realising it, people often form impressions of others based on a quick glimpse of a face or fleeting sample of behaviour (Kressel & Uleman, 2015; Uleman, Rim, Saribay, & Kressel, 2012). Second, perceivers are more likely to commit the fundamental attribution error when they are cognitively busy, or distracted, as they observe the target person than when they pay full attention (Gilbert, McNulty, Giuliano, & Benson, 1992; Trope & Alfieri, 1997). Since the two-step model predicts that personal attributions are Questioners' Contestants' Observers' ratings ratings ratings automatic but that the later adjustment for situational factors requires conscious thought, it makes sense to suggest that when Questioner Contestant attention is divided, when the attribution is made hastily, or when Source: Based on Ross, L., Amabile, T. M., & Steinmetz, J. L. (1977). Social roles, social perceivers lack motivation, the second step suffers more than control, and biases in social-perception processes. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 35, 485–494. the first. As Gilbert and colleagues (1988) put it, ‘The first step is a snap, but the second one’s a doozy’ (p. 738). Why is the first step such a snap, and why does it seem so natural for people to assume a link between Like social acts and personal dispositions? One possible explanation is based on Heider’s (1958) insight that people psychologists, people see others’ dispositions in behaviour because of a perceptual bias, something like an optical illusion. When are sensitive to you listen to a speech or watch a quiz show, the individual is the conspicuous figure of your attention and situational causes the situation fades into the background (‘out of sight, out of mind’, as they say). According to Heider, people when explaining the attribute events to factors that are perceptually conspicuous, or salient. To test this hypothesis, Shelley behaviour of others. FALSE Taylor and Susan Fiske (1975) varied the seating arrangements of observers who watched as two actors engaged in a carefully staged conversation. In each session, the participants were seated so that they faced actor A, actor B, or both actors. When later questioned about their observations, most participants rated the actor they faced as the more dominant member of the pair, the one who set the tone and direction.

Culture and attribution In the fifth century BCE, Herodotus, a Greek historian, argued that Greeks and Egyptians thought differently because the Greeks wrote from left to right and the Egyptians from right to left. Many years later, inspired by anthropologist Edward Sapir, Benjamin Lee Whorf (1956) theorised that the language people speak – the words, the rules and so on – can influence the way they conceptualise the world. To illustrate, he pointed to cultural variations in the use of words to represent reality. He noted that the Hanunoo of the Philippines have 92 different terms for rice, in contrast to the crude distinction North Americans make between ‘white rice’ and ‘brown rice’. More recent research has revealed differences in the way that languages conceptualise space. While English speakers give directions in terms of egocentric, relative spatial descriptions (‘turn to your right and the book will be in front of you to the left’), other languages, including Kuuk Thaayorre spoken in northern Australia, use absolute cardinal spatial descriptions (‘turn east and the book will be on the west 110

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CHAPTER THREE

edge of the table’) (Boroditsky, 2011). To show just what an impact this has – close your eyes as soon as you finish reading this sentence and point north. Speakers of languages that use cardinal descriptions have no problem doing this, but we imagine you might have struggled. As a result of many years of research, it is now clear that language and culture can influence the way people think about time, space, objects and other aspects of the physical world around them. Consider perceptions of colour. The rainbow is a continuum of light varying smoothly between the shortest and longest wavelengths of the visible spectrum. Yet when we look at it, we see distinct categories of colour that correspond to ‘red’, ‘orange’, ‘yellow’, ‘green’, ‘blue’ and so on. Languages differ in the parts of the colour spectrum that are named. In Papua New Guinea, where Berinmo speakers distinguish between green and brown (they single out a form of ‘khaki’ as the colour of dead leaves), an object reflecting light at 450 nanometres would be called green. Yet many English speakers, who distinguish between colours that cross the blue–green part of the spectrum, might see that same object as blue (Özgen, 2004). Just as culture influences the way we perceive the physical world, it also influences the way we view individuals and their place in the social world around them. Hence, although attribution researchers used to assume that people all over the world explain human behaviour in the same ways, it is now clear that cultures shape the kinds of attributions we make about people, their behaviour and social situations in subtle but profound ways (Nisbett, 2003).

Culture and the fundamental attribution error Consider the contrasting orientations between Western ‘individualist’ cultures (whose members tend to believe that people are autonomous, motivated by internal forces and responsible for their own actions) and non-Western ‘collectivist’ cultures (whose members take a more holistic view that emphasises the relationship between people and their surroundings). Do these differing worldviews influence the attributions we make? Is it possible that the fundamental attribution error is a uniquely Western phenomenon? To answer these questions, Joan Miller (1984) asked people from the US and India of varying ages to describe the causes of positive and negative behaviours they had observed in their lives. Among young children, there were no cultural differences. With increasing age, however, the American participants made more personal attributions, while the Indians made more situational attributions (see Figure 3.13). Testing this hypothesis in different ways, other studies as well have revealed that people form habits of thought, FIGURE 3.13 Is the fundamental attribution error a Western bias? Participants from the US and India of varying ages described the causes of negative actions they had observed. Among young children, there were no cultural differences. With increasing age, however, Americans made more personal attributions and Indian participants made more situational attributions. Explanations for positive behaviours followed a similar pattern. This finding suggests that the fundamental attribution error is a Western phenomenon. Personal attributions

Situational attributions

Proportion of personal and situational attributions

50

25

8

11

15

Adult

8

Age American participants

11

15

Adult

Age Indian participants

Source: Based on Miller, J. G. (1984). Culture and the development of everyday social explanation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 46, 961–978. Copyright © 1984 by the American Psychological Association.

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learning to make attributions according to culturally formed beliefs about the causes of human behaviour (Miller, 2011; Na & Kitayama, 2011). In all cultures of the world, individual members vary in their wealth, material possessions, education and prestige. These differences in social class can be seen as yet another cultural influence on attributions. People in upper social classes, relative to those less fortunate, have more choices to make, more opportunities, and greater control over their lives (Fiske & Markus, 2012; Kraus, Côté, & Keltner, 2010). Consistent with these differences, recent research shows that people in the upper social classes are more likely than those in the lower classes to see behaviour in general as caused by internal personal traits (Varnum, 2012).

Focal objects and backgrounds Ara Norenzayan and Richard Nisbett (2000) note that cultural differences in attribution are founded on varying folk theories about human causality. Western cultures, they note, emphasise the individual and his or her attributes, whereas East Asian cultures focus on the background or field that surrounds that individual. To test this hypothesis, they showed American and Japanese university students underwater scenes featuring a cast of small fish, small animals, plants, rocks, coral and one or more large, fast-moving focal fish, the stars of the show. Try the task for yourself in Figure 3.14. Moments later, when asked to recount what they had seen, both groups recalled details about the focal fish to a nearly equal extent, but the Japanese reported far more details about the supporting cast in the background. Other researchers have also observed FIGURE 3.14 Cultural differences in attribution cultural differences in the extent to which people notice, think Look at this tropical underwater scene, then turn away and try to about and remember the details of focal objects and their recount as much of it as you can. What did you notice? What did contexts (Kitayama, Duffy, Kawamura, & Larsen, 2003; Masuda & you forget? When researchers showed American and Japanese Nisbett, 2006; Savani & Markus, 2012). students underwater scenes, they found that even though both Cultural differences in terms of what people focus on can groups recalled the focal fish (like the large striped one shown be seen in natural settings outside the psychology laboratory. here), the Japanese recalled more about the elements of the background (Norenzayan & Nisbett, 2000). For example, Takahiko Masuda and others (2008) found that the art created in Western countries – whether the artists were professionals or schoolchildren – tends to highlight individual people and objects, whereas art created in East Asia dedicates more space to backgrounds and scenery (see Figure 3.15). Today, this difference in emphasis can be seen on the internet. Comparative analyses show Western websites tend to present a small number of central details on a page, while East Asian websites contain more information overall, including more peripheral details (Wang, Masuda, Ito, & Rashid, 2012). Similarly, while the focal face tends to dominate Facebook profile pictures posted in Western countries, more background space appears in Facebook profile pictures in East Asian cultures (Huang & Park, 2013). Moving from visual representations into the world of Source: Shutterstock.com/Vlad61. sports, Hazel Markus and colleagues (2006) compared the way Olympic performances were described in the US and Japan. By analysing the newspaper and television coverage in these countries, the researchers discovered that although everyone attributed victory and defeat to the athletes, American media were more likely to focus on each athlete’s unique personal attributes (e.g., strength, speed, health and determination). In addition to reflecting on personal attributes, Japanese media were also more likely to report more wholly on an athlete’s background, his or her mental state, and the role of others such as parents, coaches and competitors. Exemplifying this, Misty Hyman, American gold medallist swimmer, said of her victory, ‘I just stayed focused. It was time to show the world what I could do’. Women’s marathon gold medallist Naoko Takahashi of Japan explained her own success this way: ‘Here is the best coach in the world, the best manager in the world, and all of the people who support me – all of these things were getting together and became a gold medal.’

Biculturalism and attributions Increasingly, the world is becoming a global village characterised by growing racial and ethnic diversity within countries. Many people who migrate from one country to another become bicultural in their identity, 112

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FIGURE 3.15 Art around the world As demonstrated by these pieces of thirteenth-century art, East Asian art tends to have higher horizons and smaller people-to-scenery ratios (left) than Western art, in which people tend to occupy more space (right).

Source: Icon of Santa Marina and stories of her life, 13th century Byzantine art. Church of the Holy Cross, Pedhoulas, Nicosia, Cyprus/De Agostini Picture ­Library/A. Dagli Orti / Bridgeman Images.

retaining some ancestral manners of thought while adopting some of the lifestyles and values of their new homeland (Schwartz, Birman, Benet-Martínez, & Unger, 2017). How might these bicultural individuals make attributions for human behaviour? Is it possible that they view people through one cultural frame or the other, depending on which one is brought to mind? It is interesting that when shown a picture of one fish swimming ahead of a group, Americans see the lone fish as leading the others (a personal attribution), while Chinese see the same fish as being chased by the others (a situational attribution). But what about bicultural social perceivers? In a study of students born in China who attend university in the US, researchers presented images symbolising one of the two cultures (e.g., the US or Chinese flags), administered the fish test, and found that compared with students exposed to the American images, those who saw the Chinese images made more FIGURE 3.16 Motivated visual perception: how people see situational attributions, seeing the lone fish as being chased what they want to see rather than as leading. Apparently, it is possible for us to hold What do you see in this image – the letter B or the number 13? differing cultural worldviews at the same time and to perceive The stimulus itself is ambiguous and can plausibly be seen either others through either lens, depending on which culture is way. Research participants who thought they were in a tastebrought to mind (Hong, 2000; Oyserman & Lee, 2008). testing experiment were told that they would be assigned to taste

Motivational biases As objective as we try to be, our social perceptions are sometimes coloured by personal needs, wishes and preferences. This tendency shows itself in the officiating controversies of the Olympics and the Commonwealth Games, in other competitive sport, and in talent contests such as The X Factor and The Voice.

orange juice or a foul-smelling green drink depending on whether a letter or a number was flashed on a laptop computer. For those told that a letter would yield orange juice, 72% saw the image as B. For those told that a number would yield orange juice, 61% saw a 13. This difference shows that sometimes people see what they want to see.

Wishful seeing To illustrate wishful seeing in action, look at the object in Figure 3.16. What do you see? In a series of studies, Emily Balcetis and David Dunning (2006) showed stimuli like this to university students who thought that they were participating in a taste-testing experiment. The students were told that they would be randomly assigned to taste either freshly squeezed orange juice or a greenish, foul-smelling ‘organic’ drink – depending on whether a letter or a number was flashed on a laptop computer.

Source: Balcetis, E., & Dunning, D. (2006). See what you want to see: Motivational influences on visual perception. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 91, 612–625. Copyright © 2006 by the American Psychological Association. Reprinted by permission.

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For those told that a letter would assign them to the orange juice condition, 72% saw the letter B. For those told that a number would assign them to the orange juice, 61% saw the number 13. In another study, research participants in a laboratory were quicker to identify rapidly presented food words on a computer screen when they were hungry than when they had recently eaten (Radel & Clement-Guillotin, 2012). In some very basic ways, people tend to see what they want to see (Dunning & Balcetis, 2013). In a particularly ingenious program of research on wishful seeing, Balcetis and Dunning (2010) wondered if people would judge objects that they desired to be physically closer than more neutral objects. In one study, university students who were thirsty (they were fed pretzels without water) compared with those who were quenched (they drank as much water as they wanted) estimated that a bottle of water across a table was 8 centimetres closer to them. In a second study, students estimated their distance in a room from a $100 bill as 20 centimetres closer when they thought they could win it compared to when they did not have a chance to win it. In a third study, participants took part in a beanbag toss in which they tried to hit a target on the floor that was 4 metres away. When the target was said to be worth $25, compared with when it had $0 value, participants underthrew the beanbag by an average of 23 centimetres, suggesting that they perceived the target to be closer than it was.

Need for self-esteem Motivations can bias our social perceptions in other ways as well. In Chapter 2, we saw that people have a strong need for self-esteem, a motive that can lead us to make favourable, self-serving and one-sided attributions for our own behaviour. Research with students, teachers, parents, workers, athletes and others shows that people tend to take more credit for success than blame for failure. This self-serving bias in attribution holds even when people outperform a competitor who is incompetent (Zell, Alicke, & Strickhouser, 2015)! Similarly, people seek more information about their strengths than about weaknesses, overestimate their contributions to group efforts, exaggerate their control and predict a rosy future. The false-consensus effect described earlier also has a self-serving side to it. It seems that we overestimate the extent to which others think, feel and behave as we do, in part to assure ourselves that our ways are correct, normal and socially appropriate (Alicke & Largo, 1995). This positivity bias in attributions is ubiquitous. Through a meta-analysis of 266 studies involving thousands of participants, Amy Mezulis and colleagues (2004) found that, aside from some Asian cultures, ‘the self-serving bias is pervasive in the general population’ (p. 711). According to Dunning (2005), the need for self-esteem can bias social perceptions in other subtle ways too, even when we do not realise that the self is implicated. For example, do you consider yourself to be a ‘people person’ or are you more of a ‘task-oriented’ type? And which of the two styles do you think makes for great leadership? It turns out that students who describe themselves as people-oriented see social skills as necessary for good leadership, whereas those who are more task-focused see a task orientation as better for leadership. Hence, people tend to judge favourably others who are similar to themselves rather than different on key characteristics (McElwee, Dunning, Tan, & Hollmann, 2001).

Belief in a just world

Belief in a just world The belief that individuals get what they deserve in life – an orientation that leads people to disparage victims.

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At times, personal defensive motives lead us to blame others for their misfortunes. Consider the following classic experiment. Participants thought they were taking part in an emotion-perception study. One person, actually a confederate, was selected randomly to take a memory test while the others looked on. Each time the confederate made a mistake, she was jolted by a painful electric shock (actually, there was no shock; what participants saw was a staged video-recording). Since participants knew that only the luck of the draw had kept them off the ‘hot seat’, you might think they would react with sympathy and compassion. Not so. In fact, they belittled the hapless confederate (Lerner & Simmons, 1966). Melvin Lerner (1980) argues that the tendency to be critical of victims stems from our deep-seated belief in a just world. According to Lerner, people need to view the world as a just place in which we ‘get what we deserve’ and ‘deserve what we get’ – a world where hard work and clean living always pay off and where laziness and a sinful lifestyle are punished. To believe otherwise is to concede that we, too, are vulnerable to the cruel twists and turns of fate. A good deal of research supports this theory (Hafer & Sutton, 2016), although just-world beliefs do vary according to culture, as discussed in the following Cultural Diversity feature.

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CULTURAL DIVERSITY BELIEF IN A JUST WORLD INTERNATIONALLY Belief in a just world appears to be a very robust construct. Measured around the world, people respond to varying degrees with the extent to which personal outcomes are deserved. That is not to say, however, that there are not systematic differences according to the countries in which people live. Adrian Furnham (1993) set out to examine precisely how belief in a just world might vary across countries. He hypothesised that belief in a just world would vary by country according to the degree of power-distance in that country. Power-distance refers to the degree to which a society sees disparities between those high and low in power as justified and proper. To test this, Furnham sampled over 1600 participants from 12 countries worldwide. All participants completed a measure of belief in a just world, translated into their native language. Furnham averaged the data to form an index of the level of justworld beliefs in that society. The ranked countries (from high to low just-world beliefs) are as shown in Table 3.5. In making sense of these country-level differences, Furnham compared the just-world beliefs ranking to each country’s ranking in power-distance. Sure enough, countries very high in powerdistance (e.g., India and Greece) scored highly on just-world

TABLE 3.5 Belief in a just world: countries ranked from high to low 1

India

5

Zimbabwe

9

Germany

2

West Indies

6

Hong Kong

10

New Zealand

3

South Africa

7

Britain

11

America

4

Greece

8

Australia

12

Israel

Source: Furnham, A. (1993). Just world beliefs in twelve societies. The Journal of Social Psychology, 133(3), 317–329.

beliefs, and countries low in power-distance (e.g., Israel and New Zealand) scored relatively lower on just-world beliefs. As you might expect, cross-nation comparisons reveal that people in poorer countries are less likely than those in more affluent countries to believe in a just world (Furnham, 2003). These findings provide intriguing insight into what most feel to be a very personal belief. Our opinions towards whether individuals get what they deserve stem not only from our own preferences, but also from the societies in which we are raised and live.

How might this belief system influence perceptions of others? At least in some cases, it increases forgiveness. According to research by Peter Strelan (2007) of the University of Adelaide, individuals who endorse a belief in a just world are also those individuals who tend to forgive those who have transgressed against them. This is especially the case when forgiveness is considered as refraining from negativity and revenge (Strelan & Sutton, 2011).

Blaming the victim There is also a pattern whereby if people cannot forgive, help or compensate the victims of misfortune, they disparage them. Thus, it is often assumed that poor people are lazy, that victims of crime are careless, that battered wives provoke their abusive husbands, and that gay men and women with AIDS are promiscuous. The tendency to disparage victims may seem like a symptom of the fundamental attribution error – too much focus on the person and not enough on the situation – but the conditions that trigger this tendency suggest there is more to it. Over the years, studies have shown that accident victims are held more responsible for their fate when the damages from the accident are severe rather than mild (Walster, 1966), when the victim’s situation is similar to the perceiver’s (Shaver, 1970), when the perceiver is generally anxious about threats to the self (Thornton, 1992), and when the perceiver identifies with the victim (Aguiar, Vala, Correia, & Pereira, 2008). Apparently, the more threatened we feel by an apparent injustice, the greater is the need to protect ourselves from the dreadful implication that it could happen to us, an implication we defend by disparaging the victim. Ironically, research shows that people may also satisfy their belief in a just world by enhancing members of disadvantaged groups; for example, inferring that poor people are happy and that obese people are sociable are attempts to restore justice by compensation (Kay & Jost, 2003; Kay, Jost, & Young, 2005). In a laboratory experiment that reveals part of this process at work, participants watched a television news story about a boy who was robbed and beaten. Some were told that the boy’s assailants were captured, tried and sent to prison. Others were told that the assailants fled the country, never to be brought to trial – a story that strains one’s belief in a just world. Afterwards, participants were asked to name as quickly as they could the colours in which various words in a list were typed (e.g., the word chair may have been written in blue, floor in yellow and wide in red). When the words themselves were neutral, all participants, regardless of which story they had seen, were equally fast at naming the colours. But when the words pertained to justice (i.e., words such as fair and unequal), those who had seen the justice-threatened version of the story were more distracted by the words and hence slower to name the colours. In fact, the

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more distracted they were, the more they derogated the victim. With their cherished belief in a just world threatened, these participants became highly sensitive to the concept of ‘justice’ and quick to disparage the innocent victim (Hafer, 2000).

INTEGRATION: FROM DISPOSITIONS TO IMPRESSIONS When behaviour is attributed to situational factors, we do not make strong inferences about the actor. However, personal attributions often lead us to infer that a person has a certain disposition; such as, that the leader of a failing business is incompetent, or that the enemy who extends the proverbial olive branch wants peace. However, human beings are not one-dimensional, and one trait does not make a person. To have a complete picture of someone, social perceivers must assemble the various bits and pieces into a unified impression.

Information integration: the arithmetic Impression formation

The process of integrating information about a person to form a coherent impression.

Information integration theory

The theory that impressions are based on (1) personal dispositions and the current state of the perceiver and (2) a weighted average of a target person’s characteristics.

Once personal attributions are made, how are they combined into a single coherent picture of a person? How do we approach the process of impression formation? Do we simply add up all of a person’s traits and calculate a mental average, or do we combine the information in more complicated ways? Anyone who has written or received letters of recommendation will surely appreciate the practical implications. Suppose you are told that an applicant is friendly and intelligent – two highly favourable qualities. Would you be more or less impressed if you then learned that this applicant was also prudent and even-tempered – two moderately favourable qualities? If you are more impressed, then you are intuitively following a summation model of impression formation – the more positive traits there are, the better. If you are less impressed, then you are using an averaging model – the higher the average value of all the various traits, the better. To quantify the formation of impressions, Norman Anderson (1968) had research participants rate the desirability of 555 traits on a seven-point scale. By calculating the average ratings, he obtained a scale value for each trait (sincere had the highest scale value; liar had the lowest). In an earlier study, Anderson (1965) used similar values and compared the summation and averaging models. Specifically, he asked a group of participants to rate how much they liked a person described by two traits with extremely high scale values (H, H). A second group received a list of four traits that included two that were high and two that were moderately high in their scale values (H, H, MH1, MH1). In a third group, participants received two extremely low, negative traits (L, L). In a fourth group, they received four traits, including two that were low and two that were moderately low (L, L, ML2, ML2). What effect did the moderate traits have on impressions? As predicted by an averaging model, the moderate traits diluted from, rather than added to, the impact of the highly positive and negative traits. The practical implication for those who write letters of recommendation is clear. Applicants are better off if their letters include only the most glowing comments and omit favourable remarks that are somewhat more guarded in nature. After extensive amounts of research, it appears that although people do tend to combine traits by averaging, the process is somewhat more complicated. Consistent with Anderson’s (1981) information integration theory, impressions formed of others are based on a combination or integration of (1) personal dispositions and the current state of the perceiver, and (2) a weighted average, not a simple average, of the target person’s characteristics (Kashima & Kerekes, 1994).

Deviations from the arithmetic Like other aspects of our social perceptions and attributions, impression formation does not follow the rules of cold logic. Weighted averaging may describe the way most people combine different traits, but the whole process begins with a warm-blooded human perceiver, not a computer. Thus, certain deviations from the ‘arithmetic’ are inevitable.

Perceiver characteristics Each of us differs in terms of the kinds of impressions we form of others. Some people seem to measure others with an intellectual yardstick; others look for physical beauty, a warm smile, a good sense of humour or a firm handshake. Whatever the attribute, each of us is more likely to notice and recall certain traits than others (Bargh, Lombardi, & Higgins, 1988; Higgins, King, & Mavin, 1982). Thus, when people are asked to describe a group of target individuals, there is typically more overlap between the various descriptions provided by the same perceiver than there is between those provided for the same target (Park, 1986). Part of the reason for differences among perceivers is that we tend to use ourselves as a standard, or frame of reference, when evaluating others. Compared with the inert couch potato, for example, the serious athlete 116

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is more likely to see others as less active and fit. As we saw earlier, people also tend to see their own skills and traits as particularly desirable for others to have (McElwee et al., 2001). A perceiver’s current mood state can also influence the impressions formed of others (Forgas, 2000). In a classic experiment, Joseph Forgas from the University of New South Wales and Gordon Bower (1987) told research participants that they had performed very well or poorly on a test of social adjustment. This positive feedback not only altered their moods but also affected their view of other people. When presented with behavioural information about various characters, participants spent more time attending to positive facts and formed more favourable impressions when they were happy than when they were sad. Follow-up research has shown that people who are induced into a positive mood are also more optimistic, more lenient and less critical in the attributions they make for others who succeed or fail (Forgas & Locke, 2005). In a positive mood, we are also more likely to interpret another person’s smile as genuine and heartfelt (Forgas & East, 2008a), be more trusting and gullible in judging someone who is lying (Forgas & East, 2008b), and are more likely to form a quick impression of someone based on the first information we receive (Forgas, 2011). Recent work suggests that perceiver characteristics are most likely to influence impressions of others when inferred traits are about character (e.g., honesty) rather than appearance (e.g., beauty) (Hehman, Sutherland, Flake, & Slepian, 2017). This is especially the case when impressions are being made from relatively ambiguous information.

CRITICAL THINKING ACTIVITY Think back to the first day of this course. What impressions did you form of your lecturer? Was he or she energetic and excited, or apathetic and tired? Now reflect on how you, as a perceiver, may have contributed to those attributions. Were you in a

particularly good or bad mood? What about the temperature of the lecture theatre or the comfort of your seat? Perhaps your own characteristics contributed greatly to the impression you formed of your lecturer!

Embodied perception Current mood is one aspect of our temporary state that can influence how we perceive other people. More and more, social psychologists are finding that human thought is ‘embodied’ – that the way we view ourselves and others is influenced by the physical position, orientation, sensations and movements of our bodies (Meier, Schnall, Schwarz, & Bargh, 2012; Niedenthal, Barsalou, Winkielman, Krauth-Gruber, & Ric, 2005; Schnall, 2017). Several studies illustrate embodiment effects in social perception. Consider the physical sensation of warmth. Research has shown that warm–cold is one of the two most powerful dimensions in terms of the way we judge others (the other dimension is competent–incompetent). As we will see shortly, once we see a person as warm versus cold we assume that this person is also trustworthy, friendly, caring and helpful. Of course, warmth is also a physical sensation that because of early life experiences we tend to associate with shelter, safety and nourishment. Would feeling warm influence social perception? To find out, Lawrence Williams and John Bargh (2008a) asked research participants to hold a cup of hot or iced coffee just before they read about and evaluated a fictitious target person. Compared with those who held the iced coffee, those who held the hot drink described the target as warmer, more generous and more caring. In another study, participants who were seated in a warm room, compared to those in a colder room, reported feeling interpersonally closer to the experimenter (Ijzerman & Semin, 2009). When they emerge, these embodiment effects may be rooted in the brain. Social neuroscience research shows that physical warmth and social closeness activate neural activity in the same region of the brain, showing that the structure that regulates body temperature may also regulate feelings of social warmth (Inagaki & Eisenberger, 2013). If these results seem far-fetched, other studies have also demonstrated embodiment effects in social perception. In one study, participants made harsher moral judgements about the behaviour of other people when they were given a bitter herbal mix rather than a sweet berry punch or water to drink during the experiment (Eskine, Kacinic, & Prinz, 2011). In another study, participants who read a resumé on a heavy clipboard rated the applicant as a better candidate and more serious compared with when they read the same resumé on a lightweight clipboard (Ackerman, Griskevicius, & Li, 2011). In yet another study, participants on a computer judged people in photographs to be more trustworthy when they were induced to pull the palm of their hand up against the underside of the desk (i.e., a motion that we associate with approach) than when they were induced to press that same palm down against the top of the desk (i.e., a motion we associate with avoidance) (Slepian, Young, Rule, Weisbuch, & Ambady, 2012). Copyright 2020 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-202

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It should be noted, however, as you will see in the case of social priming that follows (also see Current Scene On … feature), some recent research on embodied perception has not replicated these effects (LeBel & Wilbur, 2014; Lynott et al., 2014; Rabelo, Keller, Pilati, & Wicherts, 2015).

Social priming

Percentage who interrupted

The combined effects of stable perceiver differences, fluctuating moods and bodily sensations point to an important conclusion: to some extent, impression formation is in the eye of the beholder. The characteristics we tend to see in other people also change from time-to-time, depending on recent experiences. Have you ever noticed that once a seldom-used word slips into a conversation or appears on a Priming blog, it is often repeated over and over again? If so, then you have observed priming; that is, the tendency The tendency for recently for frequently or recently used concepts to come to mind easily and influence the way we interpret new used or perceived words information. or ideas to come to mind The effect of priming on person impressions was first demonstrated by E. Tory Higgins and colleagues easily and influence the (1977). Research participants were presented with a list of trait words, ostensibly as part of an experiment interpretation of new information. on memory. In fact, the task was designed as a priming device to plant certain ideas in their minds. Some participants read words that evoked a positive image: brave, independent and adventurous. Others read words that evoked a more negative image: reckless, foolish and careless. Later, in what they thought to be an unrelated experiment, participants read about a man named Donald who climbed mountains, drove in a demolition derby and tried to cross the Atlantic Ocean in a sailboat. As predicted, their impressions of Donald were shaped by the trait words they had earlier memorised. Those exposed to positive words later formed more favourable impressions of him than those exposed to negative words. All the participants read exactly the same description, yet they formed different impressions depending on what concept was already on their minds to be used as a basis for comparison (Mussweiler & Damisch, 2008). Additional research has shown that our social behaviours are also subject to the automatic effects of priming without awareness. In one provocative study, Bargh, Chen and Burrows FIGURE 3.17 The priming of social behaviour without (1996) gave people 30 sets of words presented in scrambled awareness order (‘he it hides finds instantly’) and told them to use some Would waiting participants interrupt the busy experimenter? of the words in each set to form grammatical sentences. Compared with those who had previously been given After explaining the test, which would take 5 minutes, the neutral words to unscramble (centre), participants given experimenter told participants to locate him down the hall when politeness words were less likely to cut in (left), and those they were finished so he could administer a second task. So far given rudeness words were more likely to cut in (right). These results show that priming can influence not only our social so good. But when participants found the experimenter, he was judgements but our behaviour as well. in the hallway immersed in conversation, and he stayed in that conversation for 10 full minutes without acknowledging their 70 presence. What is a person to do? Wait patiently or interrupt? The participants did not know it, but some had worked on a 60 scrambled word test that contained many ‘politeness’ words (yield, respect, considerate and courteous), whereas others had 50 been exposed to words related to rudeness (disturb, intrude, bold and bluntly). Would these test words secretly prime participants, 40 a few minutes later, to behave in one way or the other? Yes. Compared with those given the neutral words to unscramble, 30 participants primed for rudeness were more likely – and those primed for politeness were less likely – to interrupt the 20 experimenter’s conversation (see Figure 3.17).

Target characteristics

10

Polite

Neutral

Rude

Priming condition Source: Based on Bargh, J. A., Chen, M., & Burrows, L. (1996). ­ utomaticity of social behavior: Direct effects of trait construct A and stereotype activation on action. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71, 230–244. Copyright © 1996 by the American Psychological Association.

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Just as not all social perceivers are created equal, neither are all traits created equal. In recent years, personality researchers have discovered, across cultures, that individuals can reliably be distinguished from one another along five broad traits or factors: extroversion, emotional stability, openness to experience, agreeableness and conscientiousness (Widiger, 2017). Some of these factors are easier to judge than others. Based on their review of 32 studies, David Kenny and colleagues (1994) found that social perceivers are most likely to agree in their judgements

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CURRENT SCENE ON … SOCIAL PRIMING The field of research on social priming has not been without controversy. In one of the most well-known studies, participants who unscrambled words that prime the ‘elderly’ stereotype (old and bingo) walked out of the experiment more slowly, as if mimicking an elderly person (Dijksterhuis & Bargh, 2001; Cesario, Plaks, & Higgins, 2006), relative to participants not primed with that stereotype. However, despite concerted effort, other studies failed to replicate this effect (Doyen, Klein, Pichon, & Cleeremans, 2012). Similar discrepancies have emerged for the effect of thinking about a professor versus a hooligan on performance on a trivia test (original effect: Dijksterhuis & van Knippenberg, 1998; failed replication: Shanks et al., 2013), the effect of being exposed to achievement-related words on performance on a cognitive test (original effect: Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, Barndollar, & Trötschel, 2001; failed replication: Harris, Coburn,

Rohrer, & Pashler, 2013), the effect of plotting spatial distance on perceived social distance (original effect: Williams & Bargh, 2008b; failed replication: Pashler, Coburn, & Harris, 2012) and the effect of completing a vocabulary test that included honesty-related words on admitting problematic drinking behaviour (original effect: Rasinski, Visser, Zagatsky, & Rickett, 2005; failed replication: Pashler, Rohrer, & Harris, 2013). Understandably, such discrepancies across studies are deeply concerning. Is social priming a robust effect worthy of study? This was even the topic of a special issue of the journal Social Cognition in 2014. Many researchers in this area, however, feel that all is not lost, calling for theory and experiments that will establish when and why social priming might and might not happen (Cesario, 2014). Lending confidence to the endeavour, a recent meta-analysis of 352 effects of word primes on behaviour revealed a small but robust effect (Weingarten et al., 2016).

of a target’s extroversion; that is, the extent to which he or she is sociable, friendly, fun-loving, outgoing and adventurous. It seems that extroversion is easy to spot, and different perceivers often agree on it even when rating a target person whom they are seeing for the first time. The valence of a trait (i.e., whether it is considered good or bad) also affects its impact on our final impressions. Over the years, research has shown that people exhibit a trait negativity bias – the tendency for negative information to weigh more heavily on our impressions than positive information (Rozin & Royzman, 2001; Skowronski & Carlston, 1989). This means that we form more extreme impressions of a person who is said to be dishonest than of one who is said to be honest. When you think about it, this makes sense. We tend to view others favourably, so we are quick to take notice and pay careful attention when this expectation is violated (Pratto & John, 1991). As a result, one bad trait may be enough to tarnish a person’s reputation, regardless of other qualities. Considering this research, Baumeister and colleagues (2001) have concluded that bad is stronger than good in a ‘disappointingly relentless pattern’ (p. 362). Our positive expectations of others are so strong that the absence of a favourable evaluation may lead us to assume the worst. Consider letters of recommendation; whether it is for school, a job or membership in a social group, it is customary to comment on two characteristics of that person – warmth and competence. What if you are reading a letter that raves about how competent an applicant is but says nothing about how nice he or she is as a person? Or what if a letter comments on how nice the applicant is but says nothing about competence? No negative information is stated, but is it implied by omission? In a series of studies, Nicolas Kervyn and colleagues (2012) found that when research participants read brief but praiseworthy evaluations of a person that focused only on competence (‘seems like a very smart, hardworking and competent person’) or only on warmth (‘seems like a very nice, sociable and outgoing person’), they drew negative inferences about the dimension that was omitted. Kervyn and colleagues referred to this result as the innuendo effect. Logically, it is probably adaptive for people to stay alert for negative, potentially threatening information. Research suggests that people are quicker to sense their exposure to subliminally presented negative words such as bomb, thief, shark and cancer than to positive words such as baby, sweet, friend and beach (Dijksterhuis & Aarts, 2003). This sensitivity to negative information is found in infants less than a year old (Vaish, Grossmann, & Woodward, 2008) and is reflected in brain activity stimulated by negative stimuli (Ito, Larsen, Smith, & Cacioppo, 1998; Smith, Rissel, Richters, Grulich, & de Visser, 2003).

Context characteristics The impact of trait information on our impressions of other people depends not only on characteristics of the perceiver and target but on context as well. Think, for example, about when you met a person for the first time who was in the company of someone you liked or disliked, or found attractive or unattractive. Would your impression of the target person be coloured by this relationship? In studies of ‘stigma by association’, John Pryor and colleagues (2012) found that the answer is ‘yes’. Even when a target person’s relationship to the positive or negative other comes about by chance, not as a matter of choice, your first impressions are influenced by it. Copyright 2020 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-202

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Two other contextual factors are also particularly important: (1) implicit theories of personality, and (2) the order in which we receive information about one trait relative to other traits.

Implicit personality theories Implicit personality theory A network of assumptions people make about the relationships among traits and behaviours.

Central traits

Traits that exert a powerful influence on overall impressions.

Whether we realise it or not, each of us harbours an implicit personality theory – a network of assumptions about the relationships among various types of people, traits and behaviours. Knowing that someone has one trait leads us to infer that he or she has other related traits as well (Schneider, 1973). For example, you might assume that a person who is unpredictable is probably also dangerous, or that someone who speaks slowly is also slow-witted. You might also assume that certain traits and behaviours are linked together (Reeder, 1993); for example, that a celebrity with a sweet and beloved persona could not possibly have skeletons in the closet. Solomon Asch (1946) was the first to discover that the presence of one trait often implies the presence of other traits. Asch told one group of research participants that an individual was ‘intelligent, skilful, industrious, warm, determined, practical and cautious’. Another group read an identical list of traits, except that the word warm was replaced by cold. Only the one term was changed, but the two groups formed very different impressions. Participants inferred that the warm person was also happier and more generous, good-natured and humorous than the cold person. Yet when two other words were varied (polite and blunt), the differences were less pronounced. Why? Asch concluded that warm and cold are central traits, meaning that they imply the presence of certain other traits and exert a powerful influence on final impressions. In fact, when university students in different classes were told ahead of time that a guest lecturer was a warm or cold person, their impressions after the lecture were consistent with these beliefs, even though he gave the same lecture to everyone (Kelley, 1950; Widmeyer & Loy, 1988).

Warmth and competence Is there something magical about the traits warm and cold? To learn more about the structure of implicit personality theories, Seymour Rosenberg and colleagues (1968) handed research participants 60 cards, each with a trait word written on it, and asked them to sort the cards into piles that represented specific people, perhaps friends, co-workers, acquaintances or celebrities. The traits were then statistically correlated to determine how often they appeared together in the same pile. The results were plotted to display the psychological distance between the various characteristics. The ‘map’ (see Figure 3.18) shows that the traits – positive and negative alike – were best captured by two dimensions: social and intellectual. More recent research has since confirmed this basic point that people differentiate each other first in terms of warmth (warm is seen in such traits as friendly, helpful and sincere), and second in terms of their competence (competent is seen in such traits as smart, skilful and determined). According to Susan Fiske and colleagues (2007), warmth and competence are ‘universal dimensions of social cognition’.

Inferring moral character In addition to focusing on warmth and competence, social perceivers all over the world also form strong impressions of how moral people are. When you think about it, accurate perceptions of moral character are essential for social living so that we can identify whether someone we meet, and may need to rely on in the future, is moral and good, and therefore can be trusted. Geoffrey Goodwin (2015) argues that morality is not just a third facet of social perception, but rather it is the most important factor in the impressions we form of others. Noting that people sometimes conflate warm and moral, Goodwin and colleagues (2014) conducted a series of studies in which they found that distinctly moral traits (e.g., courageous, fair, principled, just, honest, trustworthy and loyal) proved more important than distinctly warm traits (e.g., sociable, happy, agreeable, enthusiastic, easygoing, fun and playful) at predicting the positive and negative impressions that people form of others. This result was the same regardless of whether participants judged real people from their own lives, politicians, fictitious individuals, or deceased men and women whose obituaries they were given to read. There is a growing consensus among researchers that the perception of morality plays a special role in the impressions we form of others (Brambilla & Leach, 2014). In fact, research shows that people make moral judgements about others instantly and intuitively – without intention, thought, or awareness (Van Berkum, Holleman, Nieuwland, Otten, & Murre, 2009). If perceptions of moral character are so basic and so adaptive, it would stand to reason that different social perceivers, despite their otherwise unique perspectives, would agree on what constitutes moral character. Research supports this hypothesis. To measure agreement rates among different social perceivers, Erik Helzer and others (2014) developed a ‘Moral Character Questionnaire’ in which people were asked to rate 120

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FIGURE 3.18 Universal dimensions of social cognition Both positive and negative traits can be ordered along two dimensions: social (warmth) and intellectual (competence). Warmth and competence are universal dimensions by which people perceive each other. High intellectual Scientific Determined Persistent Industrious Skillful Intelligent Imaginative

Stern Cold Unsociable

Humorless

Dominating Irritable Moody

Unhappy Vain Boring

Serious Important

Practical Meditative Artistic Daring

Cautious

Critical

Pessimistic Unpopular Low social

Discriminating Shrewd

Reliable

Reserved

Finicky Unimaginative

Squeamish Impulsive Insignificant Submissive Superficial Naive Unreliable Wavering Clumsy Wasteful Irresponsible Frivolous Unintelligent

Dishonest

Honest

High social

Tolerant Helpful Sincere

Modest Sentimental

Happy Humorous Popular Sociable Good natured Warm

Foolish

Low intellectual Source: Rosenberg, S., Nelson, C., & Vivekananthan, P. S. (1968). A multidimensional approach to the structure of personality impressions. Journal of ­Personality and Social Psychology, 9, 283–294. Copyright © 1968 by the American Psychological Association. Reprinted by permission.

the extent to which various brief statements accurately described themselves. Friends, family members, and acquaintances also rated the participant. Each of the statements described a facet of moral character (see Table 3.6). The results showed that there were high levels of agreement between participants’ selfratings and others’ ratings of the participants themselves.

The primacy effect The order in which a trait is discovered can also influence its impact. It is often said that first impressions are critical, and social psychologists are quick to agree. Studies show that information often has greater impact when presented early in a sequence rather than late, a common phenomenon known as the primacy effect. In another of Asch’s (1946) classic experiments, one group of participants learned that a person was ‘intelligent, industrious, impulsive, critical, stubborn and envious’. A second group received exactly the same list but in reverse order. Rationally speaking, the two groups should have felt the same way about the person. But instead, participants who heard the first list in which the more positive traits came first formed more favourable impressions than did those who heard the second list. Similar findings were obtained among participants who watched a videorecording of a woman taking a test assessing intelligence. In all cases, she correctly answered 15 out of 30 multiple-choice questions. But participants who observed a pattern of initial success followed by failure perceived the woman as more intelligent than did those who observed the opposite pattern of failure followed by success (Jones, Rock, Shaver, Goethals, & Ward, 1968). There are exceptions, but as a general rule, people tend to be more heavily influenced by ‘first-in’ information.

Primacy effect

The tendency for information presented early in a sequence to have more impact on impressions than information presented later.

Mechanisms of the primacy effect What accounts for the primacy effect? There are two basic explanations. The first is that once perceivers think they have formed an accurate impression of someone, they tend to pay less attention to subsequent information. Copyright 2020 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-202

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TABLE 3.6 Moral character questionnaire To what degree do these statements describe you? How would a friend rate you? The following have been developed along with other items to tap into six facets of moral character. Participants’ ratings of themselves and those made by a friend of the participants revealed high levels of agreement.

Trait

Characteristics

Compassion

1 Anticipates the needs of others 2 Takes time out to help others 3 Tries to be helpful to strangers

Fairness

1 Tries to follow the rules 2 Treats everyone in a similar way 3 Respects others

Honesty

1 Tells the truth 2 Can keep promises 3 Does not pretend to be more than he/she is

Self-control

1 Is able to control his/her cravings 2 Is good at resisting temptation 3 Rarely overindulges

Moral concern

1 Thinks about how to be a good person 2 Thinks about how to be moral person 3 Makes decisions with ‘doing the right thing’ in mind

General morality

1 Is a moral person 2 Is an ethical person 3 Usually does the right thing

Check all that apply

Source: Helzer, E. G., Furr, R. M., Hawkins, A., Barranti, M., Blackie, L., & Fleeson, W. (2014). Agreement on the perception of moral character. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 40, 1698–1710. © 2014. Reprinted by Permission of SAGE Publications, Inc.

Need for closure

The desire to reduce cognitive uncertainty, which heightens the importance of first impressions.

Thus, when research participants read a series of statements about a person, the amount of time they spent reading each of the items declined steadily with each succeeding statement (Belmore, 1987). Does this mean we are doomed to a life of primacy? Not at all. If we are unstimulated or mentally tired, our attention may wane. But if perceivers are sufficiently motivated to avoid tuning out and are not pressured to form a quick first impression, then primacy effects are diminished (Anderson & Hubert, 1963; Kruglanski & Freund, 1983). In one study, university students ‘leaped to conclusions’ about a target person on the basis of preliminary information when they were mentally fatigued from having just taken a two-hour exam, but not when they were fresh, alert and motivated to pay attention (Webster, Richter, & Kruglanski, 1996). In addition, Arie Kruglanski and Donna Webster (1996) found that some people are more likely than others to ‘seize’ upon and ‘freeze’ their first impressions. Apparently, individuals differ in their need for closure – the desire to reduce ambiguity. People who are low in this regard are open-minded, deliberate and perhaps even reluctant to draw firm conclusions about others. By contrast, those who are high in the need for closure tend to be impulsive and impatient and tend to form quick and lasting judgements of others. More unsettling is the second reason for primacy, known as the change-of-meaning hypothesis. Once people have formed an impression, they start to interpret inconsistent information in light of that impression. Asch’s research shows just how malleable the meaning of a trait can be. When people are told that a kind person is calm, they assume that he or she is gentle, peaceful and serene. When a cruel person is said to be calm, however, the same word is interpreted to mean cool, shrewd and calculating. There are many examples to illustrate the point. Based on your first impression, the word proud can mean selfrespecting or conceited, critical can mean astute or picky, and impulsive can mean spontaneous or reckless.

CONFIRMATION BIASES: FROM IMPRESSIONS TO REALITY It is striking but often true that once people make up their minds about something, even if they have incomplete information, they become more and more unlikely to change their minds when confronted with new evidence. People can be quite intellectually stubborn. Political leaders often refuse to withdraw support for government programs that do not work, and scientists often steadfastly defend their pet theories in the face 122

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of contradictory research data. These instances are easy to explain. Politicians and scientists have personal stakes in their opinions, as votes, pride, funding and reputation may be at risk. But what about people who more innocently fail to revise their opinions, often to their own detriment? What about the rugby coach who clings to old strategies that do not work? As we will see, people are subject to various confirmation biases, tending to interpret, seek and create information in ways that verify existing beliefs.

Perseverance of beliefs Imagine you are looking at an image that is completely out of focus. Gradually, it becomes focused enough so that the image is less blurry, not unlike Figure 3.19. At this point, the experimenter wants to know if you can recognise the picture. The response you are likely to give is interesting. Participants in experiments of this type have more trouble making an identification if they watch the gradual focusing procedure than if they simply view the final, blurry image. In the mechanics of the perceptual process, people apparently form early impressions that interfere with their subsequent ability to ‘see straight’ once presented with improved evidence (Bruner & Potter, 1964). As we will see in this section, social perception is subject to the same kind of interference, which is another reason why first impressions often strongly persist, even after we are forced to confront information that discredits them.

CHAPTER THREE

Confirmation bias

The tendency to seek, interpret and create information that verifies existing beliefs.

FIGURE 3.19 Inferences through blurriness What do you see? The chances are that you can make out that this is a photograph of a cup of coffee, even though it is blurry. However, if you had started with a completely blurred image, you would have had a much more difficult time making out what was in the image, given the sense-making processes you would have engaged in while it was coming into focus.

Mixed evidence is confirmatory evidence Consider what happens when you are faced with ambiguous information. In one study, John Darley and Paget Gross (1983) asked participants to evaluate the academic potential of a 9-year-old girl named Hannah. One group was led to believe that Hannah came from an affluent community in which both parents were well-educated professionals (high expectations). A second group thought that she was from a run-down urban neighbourhood and that both parents were uneducated bluecollar workers (low expectations). As shown in Figure 3.20, participants in the first group were slightly more optimistic in their ratings of Hannah’s potential than were those in the second group. In each of these groups, however, half the participants then watched a recording of Hannah taking an achievement test. Her performance on the tape seemed average. She correctly answered some difficult questions but missed others that were relatively easy. Look again at Figure 3.20 and you will see that even though all participants saw the same video, Hannah now received much lower ratings of ability from those who thought she was poor and higher ratings from those who thought she was affluent. Apparently, presenting an identical body of mixed evidence did not extinguish the biasing effects of beliefs, instead it fuelled these effects. Events that are ambiguous enough to support contrasting interpretations are like inkblots – we see or hear in them what we expect to see or hear. Illustrating the point, one group of researchers had people rate from photographs the extent to which pairs of adults and children resembled each other. Interestingly, the participants did not see more resemblance in parents and offspring than in random pairs of adults and children. Yet when told that certain pairs were related, they did ‘see’ a resemblance, even when the relatedness information was false (Bressan & Martello, 2002). In another study, participants acting as mock jurors were asked to determine if the handwriting in a bank robbery note was similar to a handwriting sample taken from a suspect who had confessed or denied involvement in the crime. Consistent with expectations, participants who believed the suspect had confessed were more likely to see the two handwritings as a match – even though they were not (Kukucka & Kassin, 2014; for a discussion of the implications of ‘forensic confirmation biases’, see Kassin, Dror, & Kukucka, 2013).

Source: Lisa Williams.

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FIGURE 3.20 Mixed evidence: does it extinguish or fuel first impressions? Participants evaluated the potential of a schoolgirl. Without seeing her test performance, those with high expectations rated her slightly higher than did those with low expectations. After the participants watched a tape of the girl taking a test, the expectations effect was even greater. The same patterns held across judgements in the reading and mathematics domains. Reading

Mathematics

Participant's grade level placement of Hannah

5

4

3

Performance not viewed High expectations

Performance viewed

Performance not viewed

Performance viewed

Low expectations

Source: Based on Darley, J. M., & Gross, P. H. (1983). A hypothesis-confirming bias in labeling effects. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 44, 20–33. Copyright © 1983 by the American Psychological Association.

Contrary evidence is dismissed evidence

Belief perseverance

The tendency to maintain beliefs even after they have been discredited.

People are slow to change their first impressions on the basis of new information.

TRUE

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What about information that plainly disconfirms our beliefs? What then happens to our first impressions? Craig Anderson and colleagues (1980) addressed this question by supplying participants with false information. After they had time to think about it, they were told that it was untrue. In one experiment, half the participants read case studies suggesting that people who take risks make better firefighters than do those who are cautious. The others read cases suggesting the opposite conclusion. Next, participants were asked to come up with a theory for the suggested correlation. The possibilities are easy to imagine: ‘He who hesitates is lost’ supports risk-taking, whereas ‘You have to look before you leap’ supports caution. Finally, participants were led to believe that the session was over and were told that the information they had received was false, manufactured for the sake of the experiment. Participants, however, did not abandon their theories about firefighters. Instead, they exhibited belief perseverance, sticking to initial beliefs even after these had been discredited. Apparently, it is easier to get people to build a theory than to convince them to tear it down. In a brilliant illustration, Tobias Greitemeyer (2014) wondered what happens when a scientific journal retracts an article it has already published because of proof that data were fabricated and could not be trusted. To answer this question, he presented university students with a summary of a research paper ‘indicating’ that people who experience an elevated physical height (as in riding an escalator up) are more likely to offer help to a stranger than those who experience a lowered physical height (as in riding an escalator down). Students who read this summary, compared to those who did not, were later more likely to believe the result when asked for their beliefs about the link between physical height and helping. In a third group, however, the students read after the summary that the data supporting this hypothesis had been fabricated. Did this disclosure and retraction fully erase the effect? No. Students who read the summary and retraction persevered in their belief in the result. Why do beliefs often outlive the evidence on which they are supposed to be based? The reason is that when people conjure up explanations that make sense, those explanations take on a life of their own. In fact, once people form an opinion, that opinion becomes strengthened when they merely think about the topic, even if they do not articulate the reasons for it (Tesser, 1978). And therein lies a possible solution. By asking people to consider why an alternative theory might be true, we can reduce or eliminate the belief perseverance effects to which they are vulnerable (Anderson & Sechler, 1986).

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Social perceivers are not passive recipients of information. Like detectives, we ask questions and actively search for clues. But do we seek information objectively or are we inclined to confirm the suspicions we already hold? Mark Snyder and William Swann (1978) addressed this question by having pairs of participants who were strangers to one another take part in a getting-acquainted interview. In each pair, one participant was supposed to interview the other. But first, that participant was falsely led to believe that his or her partner was either introverted or extroverted (actually, participants were assigned to these conditions on a random basis) and was then told to select questions from a prepared list (see Figure 3.21). Those who thought they were talking to an introvert chose mostly introvert-oriented questions (‘Have you ever felt left out of some social group?’), whereas those who thought they were talking to an extrovert asked extrovertoriented questions (‘How do you liven up a party?’). Expecting a certain kind of person, participants unwittingly sought evidence that would confirm their expectations. By asking loaded questions, in fact, the interviewers actually gathered support for their beliefs. Thus, neutral observers who later listened to the tapes were also left with the mistaken impression that the interviewees really were as introverted or extroverted, as the interviewers had assumed. This last part of the study is powerful, but in hindsight not all that surprising. Imagine yourself on the receiving end of an interview. Asked about what you do to liven up parties, you would probably talk about organising group games, playing dance music and telling jokes. On the other hand, if you were asked about difficult social situations, you might talk about being nervous before oral presentations or about what it feels like to be the new kid on the block. In other words, simply by going along with the questions that are asked, you supply evidence confirming the interviewer’s beliefs. Thus, perceivers set in motion a vicious cycle: thinking someone has a certain trait, they engage in a one-sided search for information, and in doing so, they create a reality that ultimately supports their beliefs (Zuckerman Knee, Hodgins, & Miyake, 1995).

Consequences of confirmation biases

FIGURE 3.21 Leading questions In a study, participants were asked to choose 12 questions from a list to ask their interaction partner. Choices were made based on the type of person they hypothesised their partner to be: introverted or extroverted. The items were coded: E = extrovert-oriented, I = introvert-oriented, N = neutral/neither. Example items from the list include: What events make you feel popular with people? (E) What activities do you usually excel in? (N) In what situations do you wish you could be more outgoing? (I) What kind of events make you feel like being alone? (I) What kind of situations do you seek out if you want to meet new people? (E) What kind of charities do you like to contribute to? (N) Think about times when your shyness in social situations has made you come across as being aloof. Give me an example. (I) What are your career goals? (N) What would you do if you wanted to liven things up at a party? (E) 8

7 6 Average number of questions selected

Confirmatory hypothesis testing

CHAPTER THREE

5 4 3 2 1 0 Extrovert-oriented questions Extrovert hypothesis

Introvert-oriented questions

Neutral/neither questions

Introvert hypothesis

Source: Adapted from Snyder, M., & Swann, W. B. Jr. (1978). Behavioral confirmation Sadly, the fact that people can be blinded by their existing beliefs in social interaction: From social perception to social reality. Journal of Personality is a pervasive phenomenon with consequences. In one study, and Social Psychology, 36, 1202–1212. research participants reviewed a mock police file on a crime investigation into a home invasion and shooting case. The file contained weak circumstantial evidence pointing to a possible suspect. At that point, some participants, but not others, were asked to form and state an initial hypothesis as to the likely offender. As predicted, those who did went on to search for additional evidence and then interpret that evidence in ways that confirmed their hypothesis. In these ways, a weak suspect became the prime suspect (O’Brien, 2009). In a second study, researchers presented psychiatrists and medical students with an experimental patient file and found that 13% of psychiatrists and 25% of medical students who had made a preliminary diagnosis exhibited confirmation biases in searching for new information – and those who did were less likely than others to make the correct diagnosis and prescribed treatment (Mendel et al., 2011). Let us stop for a moment and contemplate what all this research means for the broader question of why we often seem to resist changing our negative but mistaken impressions of others more than our positive

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but mistaken impressions. Jerker Denrell (2005) argues that even when we form a negative first impression on the basis of all available evidence, and even when we interpret that evidence accurately, our impression may be misleading. The reason is biased experience sampling. Meet someone who seems likeable and you may interact with that person again. Then if he or she turns out to be twisted, dishonest or self-centred, you will be in a position to observe these traits and revise your impression. But if you meet someone you do not like, you will try to avoid that person in the future, cutting yourself off from new information and limiting the opportunity to revise your opinion. Attraction breeds interaction, which is why our negative first impressions in particular tend to persist.

Self-fulfilling prophecy

Self-fulfilling prophecy

The process by which an individual’s expectations about a person eventually lead that person to behave in ways that confirm those expectations.

In 1948, sociologist Robert Merton told a story that is particularly instructive for us today in light of the latest worldwide economic downturn. The story took place in the Great Depression of the 1930s and was about Cartwright Millingville, president of the Last National Bank in the US. The bank was solvent, yet a rumour began to spread that it was floundering. Within hours, hundreds of depositors were lined up to withdraw their savings before no money was left to withdraw. The rumour was false, but the bank eventually failed. Using stories such as this, Merton proposed what seemed like an outrageous hypothesis: that a perceiver’s expectation can actually lead to its own fulfilment – a self-fulfilling prophecy. Merton’s hypothesis lay dormant within psychology until Robert Rosenthal and Lenore Jacobson (1968) published the results of a study in a book entitled Pygmalion in the Classroom. Noticing that teachers had higher expectations for better students, they wondered if teacher expectations influenced student performance rather than the other way around. To address the question, they told teachers in a California primary school that certain students were on the verge of an intellectual growth spurt. The results of an IQ test were cited, but in fact the students had been randomly selected. Eight months later, when real tests were administered, the ‘late bloomers’ exhibited an increase in their IQ scores compared with students assigned to a control group. They were also evaluated more favourably by their classroom teachers. When the Pygmalion study was first published, it was greeted with chagrin. If positive teacher expectations can boost student performance, can negative expectations have the opposite effect? What about the social implications? Could it be that affluent children are destined for success and disadvantaged children are doomed to failure because educators hold different expectations for them? Many researchers were critical of the study and sceptical about the generality of the results. Unfortunately, though, these findings cannot be swept under the rug. In a review of additional studies, Rosenthal (1985) found that teachers’ expectations significantly predicted students’ performance 36% of the time. Fortunately, teachers are less and less able to make these accurate predictions in current school models in which children graduate from one grade to the next (Smith, Jussim & Eccles,1999).

CRITICAL THINKING ACTIVITY How did you expect to perform in the course that you are doing this reading for? Think about how those expectations may in fact shape how you have performed or will perform in the course. Consider not only the way you approach assignments

and readings, but also your participation during lectures and tutorials and your interactions with the teaching staff. Could you yourself be shaping your own reality outside of your conscious awareness?

Contrasting views of the self-fulfilling prophecy How might teacher expectations be transformed into reality? There are two points of view. According to Rosenthal (2002), the process involves covert communication. The teacher forms an initial impression of students early in the school year. The teacher then alters his or her behaviour in ways that are consistent with that impression. If initial expectations are high rather than low, the teacher gives the student more praise, more attention, more challenging homework and better feedback. In turn, the student adjusts his or her own behaviour. If the signals are positive, the student may become energised, work hard and succeed. If negative, there may be a loss of interest and self-confidence. The cycle is thus complete and the expectations are confirmed. While recognising that this effect can occur, Lee Jussim (2012) has long questioned whether teachers in real life are so prone in the first place to form erroneous impressions of their students. It is true that in many naturalistic studies, occurring in real classrooms, the expectations teachers have at the start of a school year are ultimately confirmed by their students – a result that is consistent with the notion that the teachers had a hand in producing that outcome. But wait. That same result is also consistent with a more innocent 126

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possibility – that perhaps the expectations that teachers form of their students are accurate. In other words, sometimes teachers can accurately predict how their students will perform in the future without necessarily influencing that performance (Jussim & Stevens, 2016). Jussim admits that there are times when teachers may stereotype a student and without realising it behave in ways that create a self-fulfilling prophecy. But his review of the research literature suggests that evidence for bias is not nearly as strong as it appears on the surface. Addressing this question in a longitudinal study of mothers and their children, Stephanie Madon and colleagues (2003) found that underage adolescents are more likely to drink alcohol when their mothers had earlier expected them to. Statistical analyses revealed that this prophecy was fulfilled in part because the mothers influence their sons and daughters, as Rosenthal’s work would suggest, but also in part because the mothers are able to predict their children’s behaviour, as Jussim’s model would suggest. In fact, a follow-up study suggests that the link between a mother’s expectations and her adolescent’s later alcohol consumption did not strengthen or weaken over time, remaining stable as the child moved from the beginning to the end of high school (Madon, Willard, Guyll, Trudeau, & Spoth, 2006). Similar longitudinal evidence regarding the impact of parents’ expectations has emerged for adolescent marijuana use (Lamb & Crano, 2014).

Self-fulfilling prophecy outside the classroom It is clear that self-fulfilling prophecies are at work, to a greater or lesser degree, not only in schools but also in a wide range of organisations, including the military (Kierein & Gold, 2000; McNatt, 2000). In a study of 1000 men assigned to 29 platoons in the Israel Defence Forces, Dov Eden (1990) led some platoon leaders, but not others, to expect that groups of trainees they were about to receive had great potential (in fact, these groups were of average ability). After 10 weeks, the trainees assigned to the high-expectation platoons scored higher than the others on written exams and on the ability to operate a weapon. The process may also be found in the criminal justice system when police interrogate suspects. To illustrate, Saul Kassin and colleagues (2003) had some university students, but not others, commit a mock crime, stealing $100 from a laboratory. All suspects were then questioned by interrogators who were led to believe that their suspect was probably guilty or probably innocent. Interrogators who presumed guilt asked more incriminating questions, conducted more coercive interrogations and tried harder to get the suspect to confess. In turn, this more aggressive style made the suspects sound defensive and led observers who later listened to the tapes to judge them guilty, even when they were innocent. Follow-up research has confirmed this process in the police interrogation room (Hill, Memon & McGeorge, 2008; Narchet, Meissner, & Russano, 2011). On a more personal level, the self-fulfilling prophecy is a process that can have particularly sad and ironic effects on people who are insecure about their social relationships. Consistent with what researchers have called the rejection prophecy: (1) people who are insecure are fearful of rejection, which makes them tense and awkward in the social situations, (2) their resulting behaviour is off-putting to others, which (3) increases the likelihood of rejection and reinforces their initial insecurity (Stinson, Cameron, Wood, Gaucher, & Holmes, 2009; Cameron, Stinson, Gaetz, & Balchen, 2010; Loeb, Hessel, & Allen, 2016). Fortunately, there is a way to break this vicious cycle. In a three-phase study that spanned 8 weeks, Stinson and colleagues (2011) found that participants who were provided with an early opportunity to affirm the self – by writing about values that were important to them – became more secure over time and more relaxed in their social interactions.

Self-fulfilling processes The self-fulfilling prophecy is a powerful phenomenon. But how does it work? How do social perceivers transform their expectations of others into reality? Research indicates that the phenomenon occurs as a three-step process: (1) a perceiver forms an impression of a target person, which may be based on interactions with the target or on other information; (2) the perceiver then behaves in a manner that is consistent with that first impression; and (3) the target person unwittingly adjusts his or her behaviour to the perceiver’s actions (Jussim, 1986). The net result is behavioural confirmation of the first impression (see Figure 3.22). Now let us straighten out this picture. It would be a sad commentary on human nature if each of us were so easily shaped by others’ perceptions into appearing brilliant or stupid, introverted or extroverted, competitive or cooperative, or warm or cold. The effects are well established, but there are limits. By viewing the self-fulfilling prophecy as a three-step process, social psychologists can identify the links in the chain that can be broken to prevent the vicious cycle.

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FIGURE 3.22 The self-fulfilling prophecy as a three-step process How do perceivers transform their expectations into reality? (1) A perceiver has expectations of a target person, (2) the perceiver then behaves in a manner consistent with those expectations, and (3) the target unwittingly adjusts his or her behaviour according to the perceiver’s actions.

Perceiver's expectations

Step 1

Step 3

Perceiver's behaviour toward the target

Step 2 Target's behaviour toward the perceiver

The notion that we can create a ‘selffulfilling prophecy’ by getting others to behave in ways we expect is a myth.

FALSE

Consider the first step: the link between one’s expectations and one’s behaviour towards the target person. In the typical study, perceivers try to get to know the target on only a casual basis and are not necessarily driven to form an accurate impression. But when perceivers are highly motivated to seek the truth, for example, when they are considering the target as a possible teammate or opponent, they become more objective and often do not confirm prior expectations (Harris & Perkins, 1995; Hilton & Darley, 1991). The link between expectations and behaviour depends in other ways on a perceiver’s goals and motivations in the interaction (Snyder & Stukas, 1999). In one study, John Copeland (1994) put either the perceiver or the target into a position of relative power. In all cases, the perceiver interacted with a target person who was said to be introverted or extroverted. In half the pairs, the perceiver was given the power to accept or reject the target as a teammate for a money-winning game. In the other half, it was the target who was empowered to choose a teammate. The two participants interacted, the interaction was recorded, and neutral observers listened to the tapes and rated the target person. So, did perceivers cause the targets to behave as introverted or extroverted, depending on initial expectations? Yes and no. Illustrating what Copeland called ‘prophecies of power’, the results showed that high-power perceivers triggered the selffulfilling prophecy, as in past research, but that low-power perceivers did not. In the low-power situation, the perceivers spent less time getting to know the target person and more time trying to be liked. Now consider the second step, the link between a perceiver’s behaviour and the target’s response. In the designs of much of the past research (as in much of life), target individuals were not aware of the false impressions held by others. Thus, it is unlikely that Rosenthal and Jacobson’s (1968) ‘late bloomers’ knew of their teachers’ high expectations or that Snyder and Swann’s (1978) ‘introverts’ and ‘extroverts’ knew of their interviewers’ misconceptions. But what if they had known? How would you react if you found yourself being cast in a particular light? When it happened to participants in one experiment, they managed to overcome the effect by behaving in ways that forced the perceivers to abandon their expectations (Hilton & Darley, 1985). As you may recall from the discussion of self-verification in Chapter 2, this result is most likely to occur when the expectations of perceivers clash with a target person’s own self-concept. When targets who viewed themselves as extroverted were interviewed by perceivers who believed they were introverted (and vice versa), what changed as a result of the interaction were the perceivers’ beliefs, not the targets’ behaviour (Swann & Ely, 1984). Social perception is a two-way street; the people we judge have their own prophecies to fulfil.

SOCIAL PERCEPTION: THE BOTTOM LINE Trying to understand people – whether they are crime suspects, celebrities, professional athletes, world leaders, trial lawyers or loved ones closer to home – is no easy task. As you reflect on the material in this chapter, you will notice that there are two radically different views of social perception. One suggests that the process is quick and relatively automatic. At the drop of a hat, without much thought, effort or awareness, people make snap judgements about others based on physical appearance, preconceptions, cognitive heuristics or just a hint of behavioural evidence. According to a second view, however, the process is far more mindful. People observe others carefully and reserve judgement until 128

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their analysis of the target person, behaviour and situation is complete. As suggested by theories of attribution and information integration, the process is eminently logical. In light of recent research, it is now safe to conclude that both accounts of social perception are correct. Sometimes our judgements are made instantly; at other times, they are based on a more painstaking analysis of behaviour. Either way, we often steer our interactions with others along a path that is narrowed by first impressions, a process that can set in motion a self-fulfilling prophecy. The various aspects of social perception, as described in this chapter, are summarised in Figure 3.23.

FIGURE 3.23 The processes of social perception Social perception begins with the observation of individuals, situations and behaviour. Sometimes we make snap judgements from these cues. At other times, we form impressions only after

making attributions and integrating these attributions. Either way, our impressions are subject to confirmation biases and the risk of self-fulfilling prophecy. Snap judgements

Perceiver

Observation

People Situations Behaviour

Attribution

Dispositions

Integration

Impressions

Confirmation

Impression inaccuracy and overconfidence At this point, we must confront an important question: ‘How accurate are our impressions of each other?’ For years, this question has proved provocative but hard to answer (Cronbach, 1955; Funder, 2012; West & Kenny, 2011). Granted, people often depart from the ideals of logic and exhibit bias in their social perceptions. In this chapter alone, we have seen that perceivers typically focus on the wrong cues to judge if someone is lying, use cognitive heuristics without regard for numerical base rates, overlook the situational influences on behaviour, disparage victims whose misfortunes threaten their sense of justice, form premature first impressions, and interpret, seek and create evidence in ways that support these impressions. To make matters worse, we often have little awareness of our limitations, leading us to feel overconfident in our judgements. In a series of studies, David Dunning and colleagues (1990) asked university students to predict how a target person would react in various situations. Some made predictions about a fellow student whom they had just met and interviewed, and others made predictions about their roommates whom they knew quite well. In both cases, participants reported their confidence in each prediction, and accuracy was determined by the responses of the target individuals. The results were clear. Regardless of whether they judged a stranger or a roommate, the students consistently overestimated the accuracy of their predictions. In fact, Kruger and Dunning (1999) found that people who scored low on tests of spelling, logic, grammar and humour appreciation were later the most likely to overestimate their own performance. Apparently, poor performers are doubly cursed – they don’t know what they don’t know, and they don’t know they are biased (Dunning, 2011).

Getting social perception right Standing back from the material presented in this chapter, you may find the list of human shortcomings, punctuated by the problem of overconfidence, to be long and depressing. How can this list be reconciled with the triumphs of civilisation? Or, to put it another way, ‘If we’re so dumb, how come we made it to the moon?’ (Nisbett & Ross, 1980, p. 249). It is true that people fall prey to the biases identified by social psychologists and probably even to some that have not yet been documented. It is also true that we often get fooled by con artists, misjudge our partners in marriage and hire the wrong job applicants, and that our biases can have harmful consequences – sometimes giving rise, as we will see in Chapter 4, to stereotypes, prejudice

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People are more accurate at judging the personalities of friends and acquaintances than of strangers.

TRUE

and discrimination. Despite our imperfections, there are reasons to be guardedly optimistic about our competence as social perceivers: • The more experience people have with each other, the more accurate they are. For example, although people have a limited ability to assess the personality of strangers they meet in a laboratory, they are generally better at judging their own friends and acquaintances (Biesanz, West, & Millevoi, 2007; Brown & Bernieri, 2017). People are also more accurate at judging the true emotional state – happy, sad or angry – of friends than of strangers based on non-verbal behaviour (Sternglanz & DePaulo, 2004). • People can form more accurate impressions of others when they are motivated by concerns for accuracy and open-mindedness (Biesanz & Human, 2010; Kruglanski & Webster, 1996). Many of the studies described in this chapter have shown that people exhibit less bias when there is an incentive for accuracy within the experiment, as when participants are asked to judge a prospective teammate’s ability to facilitate success in a future task (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990) or a future dating partner’s social competence (Goodwin, Fiske, Rosen, & Rosenthal, 2002). • Not everyone suffers from high levels of error and bias. Some people are more accurate than others in their social perceptions. In particular, people who are psychologically well adjusted tend to be more accurate (Human & Biesanz, 2011). To summarise, research on the accuracy of social perceptions offers a valuable lesson. To the extent that we observe others with whom we have had time to interact, make judgements that are reasonably specific, are motivated to form an accurate impression and are reasonably well adjusted, the problems that plague us can be minimised. Indeed, just being aware of the biases described in this chapter may well be a necessary first step towards a better understanding of others and our perceptions of them.

RESEARCH SPOTLIGHT

Source: © Courtesy of Ottmar Lipp

PROFESSOR OTTMAR LIPP, CURTIN UNIVERSITY What are the topic areas of your research? My research, both basic and applied, is concerned with emotion and attention, and their interaction. In particular, it is concerned with the manner in which emotionally salient events are processed, and how emotional valence and arousal guide attention and affect learning and information processing. Facial expressions of emotion are amongst the most frequently encountered emotionally salient stimuli in our environment and much of my recent research has been aimed at understanding how we process them, and how other information we have about a person affects this processing. Which of your research findings have you found most intriguing? Initially, our research was guided by the assumption that we are biased to detect facial expressions which express a threat such as anger. As it turns out, that is not the case for either photographic (Savage et al., 2016) or schematic faces (Craig, Becker, & Lipp, 2014) – there is no such thing as a ‘face in the crowd effect’. Rather, we are faster to recognise happiness than anger, or any other negative expression (Craig, Koch, & Lipp, 2017). Interestingly, this happy face advantage is modulated by other information available on a face, such as sex or race cues. When Caucasian participants are asked to recognise emotions on male and female Caucasian faces, they will show a happy face advantage for female faces, but not males – if the same male Caucasian faces are presented among male African American faces, then the happy face advantage is there (Lipp,

Craig, & Dat, 2015). So, for the same faces a different result emerges depending on the other faces that are presented in the same task. This pattern of results also emerged when we tested Caucasian and Chinese participants using Chinese and Caucasian faces. No happy face advantage for male ingroup faces if presented amongst female faces, but a happy face advantage for the same faces if presented amongst male outgroup faces (Craig, Zhang, & Lipp, 2017). However, it is not only social category cues that modulate the happy face advantage. Facial attractiveness (Lindeberg, Craig, & Lipp, 2018a) and knowledge that this person is a ‘good guy’ (Lindeberg, Craig, & Lipp, 2018b) will also enhance the happy face advantage. So, the perception of facial expressions is modulated by a range of information we have about a person, social category and attractiveness cues that are available from a face as well as general knowledge about a person. And one final bit – how a smiling face is perceived is not only dependent on the person who expresses the emotion, it also depends on the perceiver and their cultural background. In a large cross-cultural study, we found that in some cultures negative traits are attributed to people who smile without obvious reason – in particular in cultures that have high levels of corruption (Krys et al., 2016). How did you become interested in your area of research? I blame my wife for this. Much of my past (and current) research is on emotional learning involving stimuli such as simple geometric shapes or pictures of animals, snakes and spiders for instance. Discussing work over dinner, she pointed out to me (correctly) that this work was missing the social dimension that most emotional processes involve and that this can be addressed by looking at the most frequently encountered stimuli that will trigger emotions – human faces. So, we

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started to look at the differences and similarities in how we process stimuli relevant to animal fears (snakes and spiders), interpersonal fears (angry and happy faces), and intergroup fears (same and other race faces). This then led to an interest in how we process emotional expressions and the factors that can modulate this. How does your area of research speak to life in Australia and New Zealand? Australia and New Zealand are multicultural societies with a large number of migrants from a diverse range of cultural backgrounds. These diverse people have brought their own ways of displaying emotions, either with exuberance or restraint,

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and their expectations as to how emotions should be displayed to their new home. Our research on how we perceive emotional expressions and which factors influence expression perception provides information as to the richness of the process that is person perception. On a more personal level, knowing the factors that influence person perception in an automatic, obligatory manner, as for instance seen in categorisation, can allow us to counteract biases that may arise out of this process. It may allow us to have, for instance, a second take at a male, other race face that is smiling at us and permit it to be appreciated as what it most likely is intended to be – an expression of friendliness that can initiate a positive interaction.

Topical Reflection SOCIETY AMID ATTRIBUTIONS When we encounter tragedies such as the shooting of Trayvon Martin, we are often motivated to seek determination about ‘why’ these things occur. Are humans inherently evil? Are particular humans inherently evil? Is there something about a particular society that drives aggressive violence (e.g., availability of guns or violent videogames)? These questions are all related to attributions. While social psychologists have revealed a number of basic processes, and indeed a variety of biases, we engage in when we make attributions, there is still a great deal of soul-searching when we encounter such events. It is worth considering how we come to decisions on social policies based on the attributions we make in such cases. For example, if someone attributes the cause of the shooting to the availability of guns in the US, they may support gun control. If, however, someone attributes the cause to the negative stereotypes of African Americans, they might support efforts to address these stereotypes, such as positive media. In Chapter 4 we turn to the question of attitudes towards these policies and how attitudes can determine behaviour.

CHAPTER REVIEW SUMMARY OBSERVATION: ELEMENTS OF SOCIAL PERCEPTION • To understand others, social perceivers rely on indirect clues – the elements of social perception. PHYSICAL APPEARANCE • People often make snap judgements of others based on physical appearances (e.g., adults with baby-faced features are seen as having childlike qualities). PERCEPTIONS OF SITUATIONS • People have preconceptions, or ‘scripts’, about certain types of situations. These scripts guide our interpretations of behaviour. BEHAVIOURAL EVIDENCE • People derive meaning from behaviour by dividing it into discrete, meaningful units. Inferences are made from nonverbal behaviours, facial expressions, and body language, gaze and touch.

DISTINGUISHING TRUTH FROM DECEPTION • People use non-verbal cues to detect deception but are often not accurate in making these judgements because they pay too much attention to the face and neglect cues that are more revealing.

PUTTING COMMON SENSE TO THE TEST The impressions we form of others are influenced by superficial aspects of their appearance. TRUE. Research shows that first impressions are influenced by height, weight, clothing, facial characteristics and other aspects of appearance. Adaptively, people are skilled at knowing when someone is lying rather than telling the truth. FALSE. People frequently make mistakes in their judgements of truth and deception, too often accepting what others say at face value.

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ATTRIBUTION: FROM ELEMENTS TO DISPOSITIONS • Attribution is the process by which we explain people’s behaviour. ATTRIBUTION THEORIES • People begin to understand others by making personal or situational attributions for their behaviour. • Correspondent inference theory states that people learn about others from behaviour that is freely chosen, that is unexpected, and that results in a small number of desirable outcomes. • From multiple behaviours, we base our attributions on three kinds of covariation information: consensus, distinctiveness and consistency. ATTRIBUTION BIASES • People depart from the logic of attribution theory in two major ways. First, we use cognitive heuristics – rules of thumb that enable us to make judgements that are quick but often in error. Second, we tend to commit the fundamental attribution error – overestimating the role of personal factors and underestimating the impact of situations. CULTURE AND ATTRIBUTION • Cultures differ in their implicit theories about the causes of human behaviour. Studies show, for example, that East Asians are more likely than Americans to consider the impact of the social and situational contexts of which they are a part. MOTIVATIONAL BIASES • Our attributions for the behaviour of others are often biased by our own self-esteem motives. • Needing to believe in a just world, people often criticise victims and blame them for their fate.

PUTTING COMMON SENSE TO THE TEST Like social psychologists, people are sensitive to situational causes when explaining the behaviour of others. FALSE. In explaining the behaviour of others, people overestimate the importance of personal factors and overlook the impact of situations, a bias known as the fundamental attribution error.

INTEGRATION: FROM DISPOSITIONS TO IMPRESSIONS INFORMATION INTEGRATION: THE ARITHMETIC • According to information integration theory, impressions are based on perceiver predispositions and a weighted average of individual traits rather than summation. DEVIATIONS FROM THE ARITHMETIC • Perceivers differ in individuals’ sensitivity to certain traits and in the impressions they form due to stable perceiver characteristics, priming from recent experiences, implicit personality theories and the primacy effect.

PERSEVERANCE OF BELIEFS • First impressions may survive in the face of inconsistent information and are bolstered by ambiguous evidence. • The effect of evidence that is later discredited perseveres because people formulate theories to support their initial beliefs. CONFIRMATORY HYPOTHESIS TESTING • Once perceivers have beliefs about someone, they seek further information in ways that confirm those beliefs. CONSEQUENCES OF CONFIRMATION BIASES • People resist changing negative-but-mistaken impressions of others more than positive-but-mistaken impressions, often by engaging in biased experience sampling. SELF-FULFILLING PROPHECY • Self-fulfilling prophecies are the product of a three-step process: (1) a perceiver forms an expectation of a target person, (2) the perceiver behaves accordingly, and (3) the target adjusts to the perceiver’s actions. • This self-fulfilling prophecy effect is powerful but limited in important ways.

PUTTING COMMON SENSE TO THE TEST People are slow to change their first impressions on the basis of new information. TRUE. Studies have shown that once people form an impression of someone, they become resistant to change even when faced with contradictory new evidence. The notion that we can create a ‘self-fulfilling prophecy’ by getting others to behave in ways we expect is a myth. FALSE. In the laboratory and in the classroom, a perceiver’s expectation can actually lead to its own fulfilment.

SOCIAL PERCEPTION: THE BOTTOM LINE IMPRESSION INACCURACY AND OVERCONFIDENCE • Sometimes people make snap judgements; at other times, they evaluate others by carefully analysing their behaviour. GETTING SOCIAL PERCEPTION RIGHT • Research suggests that our judgements are often biased and that we are overconfident, yet there are conditions in which we are competent social perceivers.

PUTTING COMMON SENSE TO THE TEST People are more accurate at judging the personalities of friends and acquaintances than of strangers. TRUE. People often form erroneous impressions of strangers but tend to be more accurate in their judgements of friends and acquaintances.

CONFIRMATION BIASES: FROM IMPRESSIONS TO REALITY • Once an impression is formed, people become less likely to change their minds when confronted with non-supportive evidence, tending to interpret, seek and create information in ways that confirm existing beliefs. 132

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LINKAGES The research reviewed in this chapter reveals the dynamic processes that drive how we perceive others. From the information we gather, to the attributions we make, to inferring others’, personality, we appear to both get it right and get it wrong. Recall that some of the biases in attribution that emerge are grounded in the desire for high

CHAPTER

3

self-esteem (as outlined in Chapter 2, ‘The social self’). The ‘Linkages’ diagram also shows ties to two other chapters in which we see how the perceptions we have of others has far-reaching consequences – in the legal domain and in the business domain.

Perceiving others

LINKAGES

Self-esteem

CHAPTER

2

The social self

Jury decision-making

CHAPTER

15

Law

Who gets hired?

CHAPTER

16

Business

REVIEW QUIZ 1 Which of the following is not considered a major source of information in the processes of perceiving others? a Situations. b Behaviours. c Physical appearance. d Heuristics. 2 Which of the following stem from Kelley’s covariation theory? a Choice, expectedness and effects. b Consensus, distinctiveness and consistency. c Availability, choice and consistency. d Personal attribution, situational attribution and behavioural attribution. 3 Which of the following best describes current understanding of the arithmetic of integrating information about others? a Weighted average. b Summation. c Standard deviation. d Difference scores.

4 Which term refers to the phenomenon whereby individuals interpret ambiguous information as supporting their prior beliefs? a Belief perseverance. b False consensus. c Confirmatory hypothesis testing. d Base-rate fallacy. 5 Of the following pairs of traits, which has been argued to form the basis of ‘central traits’ of person perception? a Warmth and competence. b Extroversion and agreeableness. c Confidence and humility. d Dominance and nurturance. 6 Which of the following is not a motivational bias for attribution identified in this chapter? a Belief in a just world. b Self-esteem. c Confirmatory hypothesis testing. d None of the options given are motivational biases related to attribution.

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WEBLINKS Decision-making and heuristics https://cat.xula.edu/thinker/decisions/heuristics A demonstration of the availability heuristic as well as other heuristics used in attributions and decision-making.

Social perception lab http://tlab.princeton.edu/demonstrations A demonstration site for Alex Todorov’s laboratory in which you can see how traits appear on the face.

TED talks on deception and lying https://blog.ted.com/5-talks-that-are-all-about-lying/ A series of 5 TED talks on deception and lying.

Spot the fake smile http://www.bbc.co.uk/science/humanbody/mind/surveys/ smiles/index.shtml ‘Spot the fake smile’ activity from the BBC.

System 1 and System 2 https://www.inc.com/daniel-kahneman/idea-lab-makingsmarter-decisions.html An interview featuring Daniel Kahneman discussing the System 1 and System 2 cognitive processes.

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CHAPTER THREE

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Stereotypes, prejudice and discrimination Learning Objectives By the end of this chapter, you should be able to: 1 define and differentiate stereotypes, prejudice and discrimination and explain the fundamental processes of intergroup relations 2 describe how stereotypes arise and how they are maintained 3 assess similarities and differences against modern forms of prejudice and discrimination (racism, sexism and others) 4 compare and contrast the various methods that can address the problem of prejudice and discrimination.

Stereotypes and prejudice in today’s world

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emergency. Riot police cleared the area, but the day had not yet seen its end. Two hours later, a man supporting the white-supremacist message drove his car at high speed into a crowd of counterprotestors. A young woman was killed and 19 more suffered injuries. These events took many by surprise. The progress that has been made on issues of civil rights and discrimination globally during the past 70 years has been stunning. Yet, the reality of the world is not quite so rosy – negative stereotypes, prejudice and discrimination still abound. In this chapter, we take a close look at the nature of the problem of intergroup bias in contemporary life, including a focus on the different levels on which these biases operate today. Later in the chapter we address some of the key causes and important consequences of intergroup biases, and we close by discussing some of the most promising directions in efforts to reduce these problems.

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Source: Getty Images/Samuel Corum/Anadolu Agency

On the evening of 11 August 2017, a group of mostly white men marched through the University of Virginia campus in Charlottesville, US. Their aim? To communicate a message of white supremacy. The group chanted, ‘White lives matter’ and ‘you will not replace us’. Some carried tiki-torches, invoking historical memories of lynch mobs targeting African Americans in the Southern US. What was the group’s impetus? They were protesting the removal of Confederate statues, an action many US cities were undertaking in order to reduce the perception that they wished to honour the concepts of slavery and white supremacy. On that night in Charlottesville, violence erupted between white supremacists protesting the statue removals and counter-protestors challenging their view. The next day saw heightened tensions in Charlottesville. Crowds were larger, topping 1500 active protestors and counter-protestors. Chants and signs conveyed hatred. Nazi and Confederate flags were waved. Many demonstrators on both sides were armed. Violence between these factions erupted and at 11:00 a.m. the city declared a state of

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PUTTING COMMON SENSE TO THE TEST Circle Your Answer T

F

Being reminded of one’s own mortality makes people put things into greater perspective, thereby tending to reduce ingroup–outgroup distinctions and hostilities.

T

F

People’s very quick judgements are not influenced by a stereotype unless they actually believe the stereotype to be true.

T

F

A woman is likely to perform worse on an arithmetic task if the task is described as one that produces gender differences than if it is described as one that women and men perform equally on.

T

F

Children do not tend to show biases based on race; it is only after they become adolescents that they learn to respond to people differently based on race.

T

F

Interracial interactions tend to go better if a colour-blind mentality is used, which denies or minimises any acknowledgement of racial differences.

INTRODUCTION IN LATE 2011, then Prime Minister of Australia, Julia Gillard, welcomed then President of the US, Barack Obama, to Australia for his first official visit, as pictured in Figure 4.1. The fact that this meeting of two major world leaders was between a woman and an African American man was hailed as a sign of a modern era of tolerance and acceptance of diversity – given that it would have been unimaginable a generation or two ago. While this meeting was certainly historically significant, consider for a moment these stories, all of which took place six years later: • In the US, a man of Middle Eastern origin was assaulted by two other men, who yelled at him to ‘go back to your country’ and ‘you don’t belong here’ (Stabley, 2018). • Australian Aboriginal politician Lidia Thorpe received a note under her door that read ‘all Abos must die’ (Thorpe, 2018). • Two teenagers placed another passenger on the London underground in a headlock, forcing him to apologise for being gay (Morrison, 2018). • A series of attacks in Barcelona, Spain left 16 dead and more than 100 injured. The men who carried out the attacks were members of an Islamic extremist group (Smith-Spark, 2017). These are just a sample of stories reflecting the troubling persistence of stereotyping, prejudice and discrimination targeting various groups around the world today. Also consider that, in 2016–2017, the complaints lodged with the Australian Human Rights Commission were diverse, clearly showing that intergroup bias is alive and well: • 39% were filed under the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 FIGURE 4.1 A historic meeting (Cth) Tremendous progress in reducing negative stereotypes, • 24% under the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) discrimination and prejudice worldwide has been achieved, as evidenced by two major world leaders coming from typically • 21% under the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) underrepresented groups in politics. • 8% under the Australian Human Rights Commission Act • 8% under the Age Discrimination Act 2004 (Cth) (Australian Human Rights Commission, 2017). Faced with these events and statistics, it is easy to lose sight of the fact that progress, in some cases tremendous progress, has been made. The march toward progress is real, but its rhythm is frustratingly unsteady, at its best a ‘two-steps forward and one-step back’ motion. To better understand and improve our diverse world, to help the march toward progress accelerate in the right direction, it is critically important to understand the complexity and causes of stereotypes, prejudice and discrimination. That is the primary goal of this chapter. To begin, we first need to understand the fundamental processes of how Source: Getty Images/Bloomberg/Olivier Douliery people categorise others into groups.

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Racism

Prejudice and discrimination based on a person’s racial background, or institutional and cultural practices that promote the domination of one racial group over another.

Sexism

Prejudice and discrimination based on a person’s gender, or institutional and cultural practices that promote the domination of one gender over another.

Stereotype

A cognitive belief or association that links a whole group of people with certain traits or characteristics.

Prejudice

Negative affective feelings towards certain people based on them being members of a certain group.

Discrimination

Behaviour directed against people based on them being members of a certain group.

Social categorisation The classification of people into groups on the basis of common attributes.

FUNDAMENTAL PROCESSES OF INTERGROUP RELATIONS The psychological processes that underpin intergroup relations – whether in the form of stereotypes, prejudice or discrimination – are incredibly complex. Before discussing the motives at play in intergroup contexts, we will first define the related terms.

Defining the terms Given the complexity of these issues, defining concepts such as prejudice or racism is no simple matter. Debates persist about how best to define these terms – how broad or specific they should be, whether they should focus on individual or institutional levels, and so on. For example, one way to define racism is as prejudice and discrimination based on a person’s racial background. It is important to realise, however, that racism exists at several different levels. At the individual level, as this definition reflects, any of us can be racist toward anyone else. At the institutional and cultural levels, in contrast, some people are privileged while others are disadvantaged. Aspects of various institutions and culture more generally may perpetuate this inequality, even if unintentionally. For example, institutions may unwittingly perpetuate racism by tending to accept or hire individuals similar or connected to the people who are already in the institution, and popular culture may signal what kinds of people are most and least valued. Therefore, another way to define racism is as institutional and cultural practices that promote the domination of one racial group over another (Jones, 1997). The incidents described at the beginning of this chapter sparked much discussion about systemic racism, which concerns these institutional and cultural levels of racial discrimination. Similarly, sexism may be defined as prejudice and discrimination based on a person’s gender or as institutional and cultural practices that promote the domination of one gender (typically men) over another (typically women). For the purposes of this chapter, we define stereotypes as beliefs or associations that link whole groups of people with certain traits or characteristics. Prejudice consists of negative feelings about others because of their connection to a social group. Whereas stereotypes concern associations or beliefs, and prejudice concerns feelings, discrimination concerns behaviours, specifically negative behaviours directed against people based on them being members of a certain group. Stereotypes, prejudice and discrimination can operate somewhat independently, but they often influence and reinforce each other. Once again, we see the ABCs of social psychology arise – the affective component of intergroup relations is represented as prejudice, the behaviour as discrimination, and the cognition as stereotypes. While we do not discuss this content in alphabetical order, it can be helpful to think about these constructs in that way. Before discussing stereotypes, prejudice and discrimination in detail, it is first important to understand the fundamental processes that drive intergroup psychological processes in the first place. That is, why do individuals seem to have a basic driving motive to see some people as part of their group and others as not?

Social categories FIGURE 4.2 Categorisation dynamics Whether people are likely to categorise this person by his race, gender or occupation depends on a combination of cognitive, cultural and motivational factors.

Source: iStock.com/ndoeljindoel

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At the root of stereotyping, prejudice and discrimination is the fact that we divide our social world into groups. As perceivers, we routinely sort each other into groups on the basis of gender, race, age and other common attributes in a process called social categorisation. As highlighted in Figure 4.2, the nature of social categorisation depends on a dynamic mix of cognitive, cultural and motivational factors. In some ways, social categorisation is natural and adaptive. It allows us to form impressions quickly and use experience to guide new interactions. With so many things to pay attention to in our social worlds, we can save time and effort by using people’s group memberships to make inferences about them. The time and energy saved through social categorisation does come at a cost, however. Categorising people leads us to overestimate the differences between groups and to underestimate the differences within groups (Krueger & DiDonato, 2008; Wyer, Sadler, & Judd, 2002). Indeed, even basic perception is affected by categorisation; for example, studies have shown that people see racially ambiguous faces as darker if they are labelled racially black rather than white (Levin & Banaji, 2006).

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Categorisations: variation and stability Each of us is a member of multiple social categories (Amiot, Sablonniere, Smith, & Smith, 2015), but some categorisations, particularly race, gender and age, are more likely to quickly dominate our perceptions than others (Amodio, Bartholow, & Ito, 2014; Kaul, Ratner, & Van Bavel, 2014; Ito, 2011; Willadsen-Jensen & Ito, 2015). In addition, prejudice can heighten this kind of bias. Markus Kemmelmeier and Lysette Chavez (2014) found that white Americans perceived Barack Obama’s face as darker if they were relatively high in racism. As Yarrow Dunham and colleagues (2013) found, even young children show these kinds of effects; they noted in their study that children were more likely to categorise a racially ambiguous face as black than white if it was expressing anger. The distinctions between some social categories may be seen as more rigid, even more biologically rooted, than they actually are. Many people assume, for example, that there is a clear genetic basis for classifying people by race. The fact is, however, that numerous biologists, anthropologists and psychologists note that there is more genetic variation within races than between them, and emphasise that race is more of a social concept than a genetic reality (Marks, 2011; Markus, 2008; Plaks, Malahy, Sedlins, & Shoda, 2012). Indeed, how societies make distinctions between races can change dramatically over time. As people today increasingly identify themselves in multiracial ways, or in ways that defy the traditional binary distinction between men and women, a greater recognition of the role of factors beyond biology in social categorisation becomes all the more relevant. Along these lines, Diana Sanchez and colleagues (2015) found that after a brief interaction with a racially ambiguous other student, white students became less likely to see race as a fixed, biological entity, an effect that endured when the students’ attitudes were assessed again two weeks later. Whether individuals think of various social categories as fixed and biologically rooted or not can be important (Andreychik & Gill, 2015; Cimpian & Salomon, 2014; Sanchez & Garcia, 2009). For example, Melissa Williams and Jennifer Eberhardt (2008) found that people who tend to think of race as stable and biologically determined are less likely to interact with racial outgroup members and are more likely to accept racial inequalities than are people who see race as more socially determined. Other research has found that biracial individuals are more vulnerable to some effects of stereotypes if they think of race as stable and biological (Sanchez & Garcia, 2009; Shih, Bonam, Sanchez, & Peck, 2007). Just as race is a blurrier category than many people realise, so too are nationalities. A series of studies by Thierry Devos and colleagues demonstrated how various ethnic minority groups within a nation are not perceived as true members of that nation, but some situational factors, such as presenting individuals with examples of positive stereotypic traits of one of these groups, can reduce this tendency (Devos, Gavin, & Quintana, 2010; Huynh, Devos, & Smalarz, 2011; Rydell, Hamilton, & Devos, 2010). Moreover, as can be seen in the following Cultural Diversity feature, national identities can shift over time and as a reflection of changing societal attitudes. As immigration battles intensify throughout much of the world, a variety of social, historical, economic and political factors all play a role in who is categorised as ‘foreign’.

CULTURAL DIVERSITY SHIFTING NATIONAL IDENTITIES In New Zealand, census surveys allow people to write in a response under the ‘other’ category. For example, in 2006 the ethnicity question read: ‘Which ethnic group do you belong to? Mark the space or spaces which apply to you’. The options were: New Zealand European, Māori, Samoan, Cook Island Māori, Tongan, Niuean, Chinese, Indian, and other (e.g., Dutch, Japanese, Tokelauan). Tahu Kukutai and Robert Didham (2012) analysed trends in New Zealand census data from this ethnicity question. From 2001 to 2006, the number of respondents who wrote ‘New Zealander’ on the ‘other’ category increased five-fold. Their analysis revealed that this increase was largely driven by people who previously identified as ‘New Zealand European’. Further, those who wrote in ‘New Zealander’ tended to choose that as a single option, rather than indicating that as well as another category.

At first glance, this trend appears to be a curious one. Why would ethnic majority members claim national identity? It turns out a broad email campaign was launched in the weeks prior to the census imploring New Zealand citizens to ‘Declare your pride’ by opting to write ‘New Zealander’ for the ethnicity question. At its heart, the campaign argued that ethnic categorisations were discriminatory. Kukutai and Didham suggest that this trend reflects a broadening of how citizens view their identities, writing, ‘New Zealander identification is thus part of a complex project of reimagining settler identity: one in which white New Zealanders seek to indigenize themselves in place, while at the same time distancing themselves from their colonial past’ (p. 1441). Rates of individuals choosing to write ‘New Zealander’ dropped in 2013 (the results of the 2018 census were unavailable at the time of writing). What is certain is that concepts about ethnic identities will continue to evolve over time.

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Ingroups versus outgroups Although categorising humans is much like categorising objects, there is a key difference. When it comes to social categorisation, perceivers themselves are members or non-members of the categories they use. Groups that we identify with – our country, religion, political party and even our sporting teams – are called Ingroups ingroups, whereas groups other than our own are called outgroups. We see people in fundamentally Groups with which an different ways if we consider them to be part of our ingroup or as part of an outgroup. individual feels a sense of One cognitive consequence is that we exaggerate the differences between our ingroup and other membership, belonging outgroups, and this exaggeration of differences helps to form and reinforce stereotypes. Another consequence and identity. is a phenomenon known as the outgroup homogeneity effect, whereby perceivers assume that there is a Outgroups greater similarity among members of outgroups than among members of their own group. In other words, Groups with which an there may be many and subtle differences among ‘us’, but ‘they’ are all alike (Rubin & Badea, 2012). It is individual does not feel easy to think of real-life examples. People from China, Korea, Taiwan and Japan see themselves as quite a sense of membership, distinct from one another, but to many Australians or New Zealanders they are seen simply as ‘Asian’. There belonging or identity. is even abundant variability among particular cultures within a country which rarely gets acknowledged. For Outgroup instance, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people differ substantively on the basis of kinship values and homogeneity effect language (Dudgeon & Ugle, 2014; Dudgeon, Wright, Paradies, Garvey, & Walker, 2014). At university, literature The tendency to assume students see themselves as dissimilar to history students, but science students often lump them together as that there is greater similarity among ‘humanities types’. To people outside the group, outgroup members even look alike. People are less accurate members of outgroups at distinguishing and recognising the faces of members of racial outgroups than of ingroups (Horry, Cheong, & than among members of Brewer, 2015; McDonnell, Bornstein, Laub, Mills, & Dodd, 2014; Meissner, Susa, & Ross, 2013). ingroups. Why do people tend to perceive outgroups as homogeneous? One reason is that people tend to have less personal contact and familiarity with individual members of outgroups. Indeed, the more familiar people are with an outgroup, the less likely they are to perceive it as homogeneous. Second, people often do not encounter a representative sample of outgroup members. A student from one school who encounters students from a rival school only at a sporting match screaming at the top of their lungs sees only the most avid rival fans – hardly a diverse lot. Lack of familiarity and lack of diversity of experiences with outgroup members are two reasons why ‘they all look alike’, but there is more to the story than that. Research using brain imaging or cognitive methods has found that as soon as we categorise an unfamiliar person as a member of our ingroup or an outgroup, we immediately process information about them differently – at even the most basic levels. For example, student participants in experiments by Kurt Hugenberg and Olivier Corneille (2009) were exposed to unfamiliar faces of people who were the same race as themselves. These faces were categorised as ingroup members (from the same university as the participants) or outgroup members (from a rival university). The students processed faces more holistically (i.e., they integrated the features of the faces into a global representation of the overall face) for those categorised as being from their ingroup than those categorised FIGURE 4.3 The neuroscience of ingroups and outgroups as members of the outgroup. Jay Van Bavel, The colour highlights in these anatomical images of the brain are some key brain Dominic Packer and William Cunningham and regions associated with making ingroup–outgroup distinctions and related their colleagues (2008, 2011; Van Bavel, Hackel, intergroup evaluations. ‘OFC’ is the orbitofrontal cortex, and ‘mPFC’ is the medial & Xiao, 2014) have found related results in a prefrontal cortex. Greater activity in the OFC, for example, has been associated with stronger preference for ingroup faces. series of studies, revealing greater activation in particular areas of perceivers’ brains, such Anterior cingulate as the fusiform face area and the orbitofrontal cortex, upon exposure to unfamiliar faces labelled as ingroup members compared to outgroup members (see Figure 4.3). The effects mPFC of ingroup–outgroup labelling can even override the effects of racial biases on these measures. OFC

fusiform gyn

Ventral striatum Source: Based on Cikara, M., & Van Bavel, J. J. (2014). The neuroscience of intergroup relations: An integrative review. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 9, 245–274.

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Dehumanising outgroups Not only might perceivers process outgroup faces more superficially, but they also sometimes process them more like objects than fellow human beings (Harris, 2017). Dehumanisation has played a role in atrocities throughout history, such as in the Nazi

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propaganda that characterised the Jews in Germany as disease-spreading rats and blacks as half-apes. The continued presence of some of this kind of imagery in contemporary life is chilling; for example, black athletes in numerous countries are taunted with monkey chants and former rock star Ted Nugent called Barack Obama ‘a chimpanzee’ and ‘sub-human mongrel’ in a 2014 interview (Haraldsson, 2014). Many social psychologists have illustrated both the subtle and not-so-subtle ways that people see or treat outgroup members as less than fully human (Demoulin, Pozo, & Leyens, 2009; Harris & Fiske, 2009; Haslam & Loughnan, 2012; Landau, Sullivan, Keefer, Rothschild, & Osman, 2012). Steve Loughnan and University of Melbourne’s Nick Haslam have found, for example, that Australian undergraduates, who are not typically from low socioeconomic backgrounds, perceived ‘bogans’ (people of low socioeconomic status, typically white Australians) as possessing the same traits attributed to apes, rats and dogs (Loughnan, Haslam, Sutton, & Spencer, 2014). The same pattern was found for US adults’ views of ‘white trash’ and UK students’ views of ‘chavs’. Dehumanisation may very well occur outside of conscious awareness. Indeed, researchers around the world have found strong evidence for automatic, nonconscious dehumanisation of various outgroups (Haslam, 2015; Kteily, Bruneau, Waytz, & Cotterill, 2015). Related to the studies mentioned, other studies have shown, for example, that many individuals, even as young as 6 years old, automatically but unconsciously associate people of low socioeconomic status and people from various countries with animals such as apes, rats and dogs (Costello & Hodson, 2014; Goff, Eberhardt, Williams, & Jackson, 2008; Loughnan et al., 2014; Wilde, Martin, & Goff, 2014). Dehumanisation processes are deeply rooted and can be seen in neural activity. Lasana Harris and others have found that when people perceive or think about members of particular stigmatised outgroups, their patterns of brain activity suggest that they are responding to these outgroup members more as they would to objects than to human individuals who are capable of their own agency and mental states (Harris & Fiske, 2011; Lee & Harris, 2014). These implicit processes of dehumanisation may be subtle, but the consequences can be profound. Phillip Goff and his colleagues (2014) found that police officers who more strongly associated black men with apes were more likely to use force against black children. Laurie Rudman and Kris Mescher (2012) found that men who automatically associated women with animals or objects showed stronger inclination to sexually harass or rape women. Luca Andrighetto and others (2014) found that Italian students who tended to associate Japanese and Haitians in dehumanising ways (i.e., as machines or animals, respectively) were less willing than other students to help them after natural disasters occurred in Japan and Haiti.

Motives for social categorisation The roots of dividing into ingroups and outgroups run quite deep in our evolutionary history – early humans’ survival depended on forming relatively small groups of similar others. A fundamental motive to protect one’s ingroup and be suspicious of outgroups is therefore likely to have evolved. Consistent with this idea are the results of experiments that demonstrate that when people’s basic motivations of self-protection are activated – such as in response to facing a threatening situation, seeing a scary film or even being in a completely dark room – people are more prone to exhibit prejudice towards outgroups, or to be especially hesitant to see possible outgroup members as part of their ingroup (Makhanova, Miller, & Maner, 2015; Maner, Miller, Moss, Leo, & Plant, 2012; Schaller & Neuberg, 2012). We will now review several motives that underpin social categorisation: social identity, terror management, dominance and status, and warmth and competence.

Social identity motives The process of seeing others as one of ‘us’ or one of ‘them’ appears to be fundamental. A classic study of highschool boys in Bristol, England, conducted by Henri Tajfel and colleagues (1971) reveals this point. The boys in the study were shown a series of dotted slides, and their task was to estimate the number of dots on each. The slides were presented in rapid-fire succession so the dots could not be counted. Later, the experimenter told the participants that some people are chronic ‘overestimators’ and that others are ‘underestimators’. As part of a second, entirely separate task, participants were divided into two groups – one that was said to consist of overestimators and the other of underestimators. (In fact, they were divided randomly.) Participants were then told to allocate points to other participants that could be cashed in for money. This procedure was designed to create minimal groups in which people are categorised on the basis of trivial, minimally important similarities. Tajfel’s overestimators and underestimators were not long-term rivals, did not have a history of antagonism, were not frustrated, did not compete for a limited resource, and were not even acquainted with each other. Still, participants consistently allocated more points to members Copyright 2020 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-202

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Ingroup favouritism

The tendency to discriminate in favour of ingroups over outgroups.

Social identity theory

The theory that people favour ingroups over outgroups in order to enhance their selfesteem.

of their own group than to members of the other group. This pattern of discrimination, called ingroup favouritism, has been found in studies performed in many countries, including many conducted in Australia and New Zealand, and using a variety of different measures (Capozza & Brown, 2000; Pinter & Greenwald, 2011; Scheepers, Spears, Doosje, & Manstead, 2006). There is, however, variability in the degree to which people from different cultures engage in ingroup favouritism, as highlighted in the Cultural Diversity feature. To explain ingroup favouritism, Tajfel (1982) and John Turner (1987) proposed social identity theory. According to this theory, which is illustrated in Figure 4.4, each of us strives to enhance our self-esteem, which has two components: (1) a personal identity and (2) various collective or social identities that are based on the groups to which we belong. In other words, people can boost their self-esteem through their own personal achievements or through affiliation with successful groups. The benefit of the need for social identity is that it leads us to derive pride from our connections with others, even if we do not receive any direct benefits from them, as depicted in Figure 4.5.

FIGURE 4.4 Social identity theory According to social identity theory people strive to enhance selfesteem, which has two components: a personal identity and various social identities that derive from the groups to which we belong. Personal identity

Need for self-esteem

Thus, people may boost their self-esteem by viewing their ingroups more favourably than outgroups.

Personal achievements

Group achievements

Self-esteem

Social identities

Favouritism toward ingroup and derogation of outgroups

FIGURE 4.5 Social identity motives in sport fandom Fans of New Zealand’s All Blacks rugby team bask in the glory of their team’s success at the 2015 Rugby World Cup. These fans are likely satisfying their motive for social identity.

Source: Getty Images/Chris Ratcliffe

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The drawback to this process, however, is that we often feel the need to belittle ‘them’ in order to feel secure about ‘us’. Religious fervour, racial and ethnic conceit, and aggressive nationalism may all fulfil this more negative side of our social identity. Even gossiping can play this role; Jennifer Bosson and colleagues found that when people shared negative attitudes about a third party, they felt closer to each other (Bosson, Johnson, Niederhoffer, & Swann, 2006; Weaver & Bosson, 2011). Similar processes can also produce schadenfreude – an intimidating-looking word for a familiar feeling: the experience of pleasure at other people’s misfortunes, particularly toward celebrities or others we do not feel empathy for. Mina Cikara (2015) found that people who identify strongly with their social groups frequently experience this pleasure toward outgroup misfortunes, along with a lack of empathy. That said, intergroup discrimination is achieved not only through negative reactions and behaviours toward outgroups but also through being especially favourable and helpful toward one’s ingroups. In their aptly titled paper, ‘With malice toward none and charity for some’, Anthony Greenwald and Thomas Pettigrew (2014) propose that positive treatment of ingroups is the more

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common type of intergroup bias, at least today. Malice toward outgroups tends to be frowned upon, whereas providing important advantages to one’s ingroups may be subtler and more acceptable. For instance, a metaanalysis of data from more than 200 studies revealed that people display a consistent relative bias towards cooperating with ingroup members over outgroup members (Balliet et al., 2014). Despite the fact that selective cooperation with ingroup members is not an overtly negative behaviour, discriminatory outcomes still arise.

Social identity and self-esteem Two basic predictions arose from social identity theory: (1) threats to one’s self-esteem heighten the need for ingroup favouritism, and (2) expressions of ingroup favouritism enhance one’s self-esteem. Research generally supports these predictions (Fiske & Tablante, 2015; Mackie & Smith, 2015). In a classic test of the relationship between social identity and self-esteem, Steven Fein and Steven Spencer (1997) proposed that threats to one’s self-esteem can lead individuals to use available negative stereotypes to derogate members of stereotyped groups, and that by derogating others they can feel better about themselves. In one study, for example, Fein and Spencer bolstered or threatened participants’ selfesteem via false positive or negative feedback. These participants then took part in what was supposedly a second experiment in which they evaluated a job applicant. All participants received a photograph of a young woman, her resumé and a videotape of a job interview. Half the participants were given information that suggested that the woman (named Julie Goldberg) was Jewish. The other half was given information that suggested that the woman (named Maria D’Agostino) was not Jewish. At the university where the study was held, there was a popular negative stereotype of the ‘Jewish American princess’ that often targeted upper-middle-class Jewish women. As predicted, there were two important results (see Figure 4.6). First, among participants whose selfesteem had been lowered by negative feedback, they rated the woman more negatively if she seemed to be Jewish than if she did not, even though the videotaped job interview and credentials of the two women were the same. Second, participants who had received negative feedback and were given an opportunity to belittle the Jewish woman later exhibited a post-experiment increase in self-esteem – the more negatively they evaluated the Jewish woman, the better these participants felt about themselves. In sum, the results of this experiment suggest that a blow to an individual’s self-image can evoke prejudice, and the expression of prejudice, in turn, helps restore self-image.

Terror management motives From time-to-time our fundamental motivation for self-protection and preservation runs smack into the ultimate obstacle – thoughts about death and mortality. According to terror management theory (discussed in Chapter 2), people cope with the fear of their own death by constructing worldviews that help preserve their self-esteem and important values. According to this perspective, favouring ingroups over outgroups is one important way that people preserve their cultural worldviews and, by doing so, try to attain a kind of immortality.

CULTURAL DIVERSITY INGROUP FAVOURITISM AROUND THE WORLD Individuals’ social identities are clearly important to people across cultures. Collectivists are more likely than individualists to value their connectedness and interdependence with the people and groups around them, and their personal identities are tied closely with their social identities. Collectivists do show some biases favouring their ingroups; indeed, being oriented strongly toward one’s ingroup can be highly valued in their cultures and may draw sharper distinctions between ingroup and outgroup members than individualists do (Chen, Brockner, & Chen, 2002; Gudykunst & Bond, 1997; Owe et al., 2013; Ruffle & Sosis, 2006). Along these lines, in a study of nearly 45 000 individuals from 36 countries André van Hoorn (2015) found that

collectivists tend to have a narrower circle of people they trust than do individualists. However, a number of researchers have found that people from collectivist cultures are less likely to enhance their ingroups in order to boost their own self-esteem (Heine, 2005; Lehman, Chiu, & Schaller, 2004; Snibbe, Kitayama, Markus, & Suzuki 2003; Yuki, 2003). In addition, people from the collectivist cultures of East Asia tend to have higher tolerance for what Westerners would consider contradictions; for example, that something can be both good and bad at the same time. In fact, this may explain why East Asians are more likely to see their ingroups as having both positive and negative qualities compared with Westerners, who instead tend to emphasise the positive aspects of their ingroups much more exclusively (Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2012).

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FIGURE 4.6 Self-esteem and prejudice Participants received positive or negative feedback and then evaluated a female job applicant who was believed to be either Jewish or not Jewish. This study had two key results: (1) Participants whose self-esteem had been lowered by negative feedback evaluated the woman more negatively if they thought she was Jewish than if they thought she was not (left); and (2) negative-feedback participants given the opportunity to belittle the Jewish woman showed a post-experiment increase in self-esteem (right). 90

5

85 4 Increase in self-esteem

Rating of target

80 75 70 65

3

2

60 1 55 50 Positive feedback Non-Jewish

Negative feedback

Positive feedback

Negative feedback

Jewish Source: Fein, S., & Spencer, S. J. (1997). Prejudice as self-image maintenance: Affirming the self through derogating others. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 73, 31–44.

Being reminded of one’s own mortality makes people put things into greater perspective, thereby tending to reduce ingroup–outgroup distinctions and hostilities.

FALSE

Social dominance orientation

A desire to see one’s ingroup as dominant over other groups, and a willingness to adopt cultural values that facilitate oppression over other groups.

System justification theory

A theory that proposes that people are motivated (at least in part) to defend and justify the existing social, political and economic conditions

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Numerous studies demonstrate that when individuals are made to think about mortality, such as by presenting them with images of cemeteries or making them think about decomposing bodies, they become more likely to exhibit various ingroup biases, including negatively stereotyping and exhibiting prejudice towards a variety of outgroups (Greenberg & Arndt, 2012; Greenberg, Landau, Kosloff, & Solomon, 2009). Male students in an experiment by Russell Webster and Donald Saucier (2011), for example, indicated a variety of significantly more negative attitudes towards gay men if they had just written about what they thought would happen to them when they die than if they had written about the pain of going to the dentist. In a mock-jury situation, thinking about death led participants to be more likely to perceive outgroup defendants as guilty of murder than when thinking about something innocuous; no difference emerged according to death priming for ingroup members accused of murder (Leippe et al., 2017).

Intergroup dominance and status motives Some people are especially motivated to preserve inequities between groups of people in society. For example, people with a social dominance orientation have a desire to see their ingroups as dominant over other groups and a willingness to adopt cultural values that facilitate the oppression of other groups. Individuals with this orientation tend to endorse sentiments such as: ‘If certain groups stayed in their place, we would have fewer problems’, and tend to disagree with statements such as: ‘Group equality should be our ideal’. Research in numerous countries throughout the world has found that ingroup identification and outgroup derogation can be especially strong among people with a social dominance orientation (Kteily et al., 2015; Prati, Moscatelli, Pratto, & Rubini, 2016; Pratto et al., 2013). Social dominance orientations promote self-interest, but some ideologies support a social structure that may actually oppose an individual’s self-interest, depending on the status of their groups. John Jost and colleagues (Jost, 2017; Jost et al., 2017) have focused on what they call system justification theory,

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which proposes that people are motivated (at least in part) to defend and justify the existing social, political and economic conditions. System-justifying beliefs protect the status quo. Groups with power, of course, may promote the status quo to preserve their own advantaged position. But although some disadvantaged groups might be able to improve their circumstances if they were to challenge an economic or political system, members of disadvantaged groups with a system justification orientation think that the system is fair and just, and they may admire and even show favouritism to outgroups that thrive in this system. There exists considerable debate about whether, and more specifically when, social dominance orientation or system justification best explain social structure attitudes (Brandt, 2013; Sengupta, Osborne, & Sibley, 2015; Vargas-Salfate, Paez, Liu, Pratto, & Gil de Zúñiga, 2018). Irrespective of which side of the debate you are on, it is clear that fundamental motives that impact on an individual’s group and others’ groups are at play in intergroup relations.

Stereotype content model: warmth and competence The relative status and relations between groups in a culture influence the content of the culture’s stereotypes about these groups. This is a central point in the stereotype content model (Fiske, 2015). According to this model, many group stereotypes vary along two dimensions: warmth and competence (you may recall these two dimensions from the discussion of impression formation in Chapter 3). Groups may be considered high on warmth and competence, low on both, or high on one dimension but low on the other. For example, the elderly may be stereotyped as high on warmth but low on competence. The stereotype content model proposes that warmth and competence stereotypes follow from status and competition (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002). Specifically, stereotypes about the competence of a group are influenced by the relative status of that group in society, with higher relative status being associated with higher competence. Stereotypes about the warmth of a group are influenced by perceived competition with the group, with greater perceived competition being associated with lower warmth. For example, groups that are of low status but that remain compliant and do not try to upset the status quo are likely to be stereotyped as low in competence but high in warmth. A wave of immigrants who enter a country with low status but compete for jobs and resources, on the other hand, may be seen as low in both competence and warmth. For groups that are seen as high on one dimension but low on the other, there may be a perceived trade-off between competence and warmth. A woman climbing up the corporate ladder by demonstrating strong competence, for example, may be seen as much less warm. If she tries to demonstrate warmth, however, she may be seen as less competent. When researchers have examined where social groups fall in perceived warmth and competence in cultures around the world, a high degree of correspondence emerges. As noted in Table 4.1, the elderly are consistently perceived as low in competence and high in warmth. In particular cultures, social groups relevant to that society also occupy positions in the stereotype content space. For instance, in the US, Italians and Irish are perceived as low in competence and high in warmth. The positioning of those groups may be more prone to movement across cultures and may not even be a relevant social group in others. See the Cultural Diversity feature for further discussion of variation in stereotype content around the world.

Stereotype content model

A model proposing that the relative status and competition between groups influence group stereotypes along the dimensions of competence and warmth.

TABLE 4.1 Social groups in the stereotype content model Common stereotypes about social groups, mostly based on socioeconomic status and age, are shared across many countries.

Warmth and Competence Levels

Social groups

High warmth, high competence

Citizens, middle class

High warmth, low competence

Elderly, people with disability, children

Low warmth, high competence

Rich, professionals, technical experts

Low warmth, low competence

Poor, homeless, immigrants

(Note change from disabled to people with disability to follow person-first language) Source: Fiske, S. (2018). Stereotype content: warmth and competence endure. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 27(2), 67–73.

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CULTURAL DIVERSITY STEREOTYPE CONTENT AROUND THE WORLD The stereotype content model has been tested across cultures worldwide. Research has consistently shown that the dimensions of warmth and competence are universal; that is, all cultures studied to date differentiate groups in their culture based on these dimensions. The way in which those groups fall on the two dimensions, however, can vary dramatically. Consider the

results of Federica Durante and colleagues’ (2013) examination of warmth and competence perceptions of social groups among white Australians, depicted in Figure 4.7. Note several of the ‘common’ groups from Table 4.1, but also groups that might be more unique to Australian society, such as tradies and Aboriginal Australians.

FIGURE 4.7 Australian social groups in the stereotype content model

High Women

Elderly

Australians Middle class

Buddhists

Children

Gay

Warmth

Disabled people

Christians Catholics

Immigrants Teenagers Refugees Unemployed

Indians

Asian Australians Asian

Black Muslims

Au ite Wh White

Blue collar Students Tradies

Fat people Poor

ns

lia

a str

Men White collar

HC-MW Rich

Aboriginal Australians

Low Low

Competence

High

Source: Durante, F., Fiske, S. T., Kervyn, N., Cuddy, A. J., Akande, A. D., Adetoun, B. E., … Barlow, F. K. (2013). Nations’ income inequality predicts ambivalence in stereotype content: How societies mind the gap. British Journal of Social Psychology, 52(4), 726–746.

STEREOTYPES: THE COGNITIVE CORE OF THE PROBLEM Now that we understand some of the basic motives that drive social categorisation of others into ‘us’ and ‘them’, we can turn attention to the source of the stereotypes, or cognitive beliefs, about members of those groups. Later in this section, we focus on how stereotypes are maintained, the consequences of stigma and the damaging effects of stereotype threat.

Socialisation of stereotypes The list of familiar stereotypes is quite long. Athletes are dumb, video gamers are geeks, Americans are loud, Italians are emotional, Queenslanders are laidback, Sydneysiders are snobbish, used-car salesmen cannot be trusted – and on and on it goes. Dividing people into social categories, including ingroups and outgroups, certainly is a key factor in the formation of stereotypes and prejudices; but with so many wellknown stereotypes, many of which are shared around the world, it is clear that at some level we learn these stereotypes from our social surroundings. We turn now to examine those processes. Socialisation refers to the processes by which people learn the norms, rules and information of a culture or group. We learn a tremendous amount of information (often without even realising it) by absorbing what we see around us in our culture, groups and families. These lessons include what various stereotypes are, how valued or devalued various groups are, and which prejudices are acceptable to have.

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Consider the story of something that happened to one of the authors of this book. When he was about 8 years old, his two best friends one day turned on him and derisively called him a ‘Jew ball’. They had never thought of him as different from them or categorised him as Jewish before, and yet on this day, suddenly Jewishness was relevant and negative to them. But why then, and, how on earth did they come up with ‘Jew ball’? Only much later did it become clear that they had misheard their father say: ‘Jew boy’. Trying to model their father’s values, they used an approximation of this expression against their friend, and thereafter they saw him in a different way. The biased lens through which the father saw people was passed down to the next generation. Although it certainly is not always the case, the stereotypes and prejudices of a parent can shape the stereotypes and prejudices of a child, often in implicit ways (Castelli, Zogmaister, & Tomelleri, 2009). More generally, and more pervasively, the stereotypes and prejudices exhibited by peers, the popular media and our relevant culture are part of the air each of us breathes as we develop, and these influences can be profound. These effects typically are gradual, as they develop over the course of a lifetime of exposure. But they can also be immediate, as demonstrated in a set of studies in the US by Greg Willard and colleagues (2015). White students who were exposed to a fellow white student’s negative non-verbal behaviour toward a black student became more likely to exhibit a variety of negative racial attitudes and behaviours than if they saw the same behaviour targeting a white student or if they saw positive non-verbal behaviour toward a black student. Willard and his colleagues characterised this effect as a contagion of racial bias, as if the students ‘caught’ the disease from exposure to the subtly prejudiced behaviour of a fellow student. To narrow our discussion of these cultural and socialisation processes, we will focus on gender stereotypes in the following, but it is important to recognise that these processes are relevant to all kinds and targets of stereotypes.

Gender stereotypes Consider the first words uttered when a baby is born: ‘It’s a boy!’ or ‘It’s a girl!’ In many hospitals, the newborn boy is immediately given a blue hat and the newborn girl a pink hat. The infant receives a ‘genderappropriate’ name and is showered with ‘gender-appropriate’ gifts. Over the next few years, the typical boy is supplied with toy trucks, footballs, pretend tools, toy guns and chemistry sets; while the typical girl is furnished with dolls, stuffed animals, pretend cosmetics kits, tea sets and dress-up clothes (see Figure 4.8).

FIGURE 4.8 Gendered toy departments Even a very quick look at a toy store illustrates dramatic differences in how boys and girls are socialised. For example, boys are



encouraged to play active, loud and violent games (left), whereas girls are encouraged to engage in quieter, nurturing role play (right).

Source: Alamy Stock Photo/UrbanZone

 Source:  Alamy Stock Photo/Art Directors & Trip/Spencer Grant

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By the time children are school-aged, many expect boys to enjoy violent superhero films and to earn money by mowing lawns; while they expect the girl to enjoy sweet stories about friendship or love and to earn money by babysitting. These distinctions persist at university, as more male students major in economics and the sciences and more female students major in the arts, languages and humanities. In the work force, more men become doctors, construction workers, mechanics, aeroplane pilots, investment bankers and engineers. By contrast, more women become secretaries, schoolteachers, nurses, flight attendants, bank tellers and homemakers. And then the life cycle begins again when a couple has their first baby and discover that ‘It’s a girl!’ or ‘It’s a boy!’ The traditional pinks and blues are not as distinct today as they used to be. Many gender barriers of the past have broken down and the colours have somewhat blended together. In fact, many parents now dress their children in supposedly ‘gender-neutral’ yellows and greens. There has also been a dramatic increase in awareness of gender as something other than a binary category and that the gender an individual is assigned to at birth does not always reflect the gender identity of the individual later in life. In addition, people are more likely to defy and confront gender-based stereotyping and discrimination today than in years past. Nevertheless, the stereotypes persist. (For a more in-depth discussion on gender-related issues, see Chapter 5.) What do people say when asked to describe the typical man and woman? Males are said to be more adventurous, assertive, aggressive, independent and task-oriented; females are thought to be more sensitive, gentle, dependent, emotional and people-oriented. Young children distinguish men from women well before their first birthday; identify themselves and others as boys or girls by 3 years of age; form gender-stereotypic beliefs and preferences about stories, toys and other objects soon after that; and then use their simplified stereotypes in judging others and favouring their own gender over the other in intergroup situations (Golombok & Hines, 2002; Knobloch, Callison, Chen, Fritzsche, & Zillmann, 2005; Löckenhoff et al., 2014; Martin & Ruble, 2010; Wood & Eagly, 2010). Gerianne Alexander (2003) proposes that children’s toy preferences, although partly due to gender socialisation, also have neurobiological and evolutionary roots. She based this conclusion from data about children exposed prenatally to atypical levels of sex hormones and data about sex differences in toy preferences among non-human primates. For example, one intriguing study reported that vervet monkeys showed sex differences in toy preferences similar to those seen in human children (Alexander & Hines, 2002). Although biological and evolutionary factors may play a role in some of these preferences, it is clear that children have ample opportunity to learn gender stereotypes and roles from their parents and other role models (Montañés et al., 2012; Tenenbaum & Leaper, 2002). Beliefs about males and females are so deeply ingrained that they influence the behaviour of adults from the moment a baby is born. In one fascinating study, first-time parents of 15 girls and 15 boys were interviewed within 24 hours of the babies’ births. There were no differences between the male and female newborns in height, weight or other aspects of physical appearance. Yet the parents of girls rated their babies as softer, smaller and more finely featured. The fathers of boys saw their sons as stronger, larger, more alert and better coordinated (Rubin, Provenzano, & Luria, 1974). Could it be that there were differences that only the parents were able to discern? It is doubtful. In another study, Emily Mondschein and colleagues (2000) found that mothers of 11-month-olds underestimated their infants’ crawling ability if they were girls but overestimated it if they were boys. As they develop, boys and girls receive many divergent messages in many different settings. Barbara Morrongiello and Tess Dawber (2000) conducted a study that reflects this point. They showed mothers videotapes of children engaging in somewhat risky activities in a playground and asked them to stop the tape and indicate whatever they would ordinarily say to their own child in the situation shown. Mothers of daughters intervened more frequently and more quickly than did mothers of sons. As shown in Table 4.2, mothers of daughters were more likely to caution the child about getting hurt, whereas mothers of sons were more likely to encourage the child’s risky playing. In a study by Morrongiello and colleagues (2010), mothers and fathers were more likely to react to a toddler’s risk-taking behaviour with anger and a focus on discipline if it was a boy, and with safety and the sense that the child could learn not to engage in such behaviour if it was a girl.

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TABLE 4.2 What mothers say Mothers of young boys or girls watched a videotape of another child engaging in somewhat risky behaviour in a playground. The mothers were instructed to stop the videotape whenever they would say something to the child if the child were theirs and to indicate what they would say. Mothers of daughters stopped the tape much more often than mothers of sons to express caution (‘Be careful!’), worry about injury (‘You could fall!’) and directives to stop (‘Stop that this instant!’). By contrast, mothers of sons were more likely to indicate encouragement (‘Good job! Let me see you go higher!’).

Frequency of statement by Context of statement

Mothers of girls

Mothers of boys

Caution

3.9

0.7

Worry about injury

9.2

0.2

Directive to stop

9.3

0.6

Encouragement

0.5

3.0

Source: Adapted from Morrongiello, B. A., & Dawber, T. (2000). Mothers’ responses to sons and daughters engaging in injury-risk behaviors on a playground: Implications for sex differences in injury rates. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 76, 89–103.

Social role theory As children develop, they begin to look at the larger culture around them and see who occupies what roles in society, as well as how these roles are valued. According to Alice Eagly’s social role theory (Eagly & Wood, 2016), although the perception of sex differences may be based on some real differences, it is magnified by the unequal social roles men and women occupy. The process involves three steps. First, through a combination of biological and social factors, a division of labour between the sexes has emerged over time, both at home and in the work setting. Men are more likely to work in construction or business; women are more likely to care for children and to take lower-status jobs. Second, since people behave in ways that fit the roles they play, men are more likely than women to wield physical, social and economic power. Third, these behavioural differences provide a continuing basis for social perception, leading us to perceive men as dominant and women as domestic ‘by nature’, when in fact the differences may reflect the roles they play. In short, sex stereotypes are shaped by, and often confused with, the unequal distribution of men and women into different social roles. According to this theory, perceived differences between men and women are based on real behavioural differences that are mistakenly assumed to arise from gender rather than from social roles. Social role theory and socialisation processes can more generally be extended beyond gender stereotypes and sexism. For instance, a recent series of studies by Anne Koenig and Alice Eagly (2014) highlighted how stereotypes of groups of varying ages, ethnicities and social classes are derived from observations regarding the various occupational roles individuals from these groups typically hold. Seeing that some groups of people occupy particular roles in society more than other people do can fuel numerous stereotypes and prejudices. One extremely important factor in determining what kinds of people we see in what kinds of roles is the popular media. We examine some of the effects associated with media exposure next.

Social role theory

The theory that small gender differences are magnified in perception by the contrasting social roles occupied by men and women.

Media effects More than ever, children, adolescents and adults seem to be immersed in popular culture transmitted via the mass media. Watching television shows on our phones or iPads while on the exercise bike at the gym, checking out the latest viral video sweeping the internet while taking a break at work or the coffee shop, glancing at the tabloid cover shots of a celebrity hounded by relentless paparazzi – there often seems no escape. Through the ever-present media, we are fed a steady diet of images of people, and these images have the potential to perpetuate stereotypes.

CRITICAL THINKING ACTIVITY When was the last time you consumed media – television, films or videos on the internet? Can you identify any stereotypes conveyed in that media content?

Better yet, next time you watch television or go to the cinema, reflect on how different social groups are depicted. Are these groups portrayed in stereotype consistent or stereotype inconsistent ways?

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Fortunately, the days when the media portrayed women and ethnic minority members in almost exclusively stereotypical, powerless roles are gone. Still, research in numerous countries around the world examining such content from a variety of platforms reveals that some stereotyping persists (Kay & Furnham, 2013; Kirsch & Murnen, 2015; Matthes, Prieler, & Adam, 2016; Michelle, 2012; Wallis, 2011). Notably, negative stereotyped portrayals of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people and Māori are unfortunately still common (Barnes et al., 2012; Stoneham, Goodman, & Daube, 2014). Media depictions can influence viewers, often without the viewers realising it. Studies have shown, for example, that female university students who had just watched a set of commercials in which the female characters were portrayed in stereotypical fashion tended to express lower self-confidence, less independence and fewer career aspirations, and even performed more poorly on a maths test, than did those who viewed stereotype-irrelevant or counter-stereotypical advertisements (Davies, Spencer, Quinn, & Gerhardstein, 2002; Ward & Friedman, 2006). Media images of impossibly thin or atypically proportioned female models are implicated in the nearepidemic incidence of eating disorders and debilitating anxiety over physical appearance, particularly among young white American women (Henderson-King, Henderson-King, & Hoffman, 2001; Moradi, Dirks, & Matteson, 2005; Ward & Friedman, 2006). The media’s impact may be especially negative among individuals who already have concerns about their appearance or are particularly concerned with other people’s opinions (Henderson-King & Henderson-King, 1997; McCabe, Ricciardelli, & Holt, 2010). Men’s body images may also be affected by the media (Mulgrew & Cragg, 2017); indeed, vivid images of muscular and lean male models have become increasingly prevalent. More and more cases come to light every year of boys and young men copying star athletes by taking steroids and other drugs that can make them look more like their role models, which can seriously threaten their physical and mental health (Piacentino et al., 2015; van Amsterdam et al., 2010; Sagoe, Molde, Andreassen, Torsheim, & Pallesen, 2014). Chasing the stereotyped portrayal of men and women in popular media clearly has pernicious effects.

How stereotypes distort perceptions and resist change Social categorisation helps give rise to stereotypes, which offer us quick and convenient summaries of social groups. Also, being socialised in a particular way teaches us many of the stereotypes that we carry with us in our lives. But once these stereotypes are in place due to these types of factors, why are they often so resistant to change? Although some stereotypes may be superficially accurate, some certainly are false, and many are at least oversimplifications (Hall & Goh, 2017; Jussim, Crawford, & Rubinstein, 2015; McCrae et al., 2013; Scherer, Windschitl, & Graham, 2015). Why, then, do inaccurate stereotypes defy evidence that should discredit them? In this section we turn to some of the mechanisms that help perpetuate stereotypes.

The role of ambiguity Imagine learning that a mother yelled at a 16-year-old girl, that a lawyer behaved aggressively and that a Scout grabbed the arm of an elderly woman crossing the street. Now imagine that a construction worker yelled at a 16-year-old girl, that a homeless man behaved aggressively and that an ex-convict grabbed the arm of an elderly woman crossing the street. Do very different images of these actions come to mind? This is a fundamental effect of stereotyping – stereotypes of groups influence people’s perceptions and interpretations of the behaviours of group members. This is especially likely when a target of a stereotype behaves in an ambiguous way; perceivers reduce the ambiguity by interpreting the behaviour as consistent with the stereotype (Dunning & Sherman, 1997; Kunda, Sinclair, & Griffin, 1997). For example, black and white sixth-grade boys in one US study saw pictures and descriptions of ambiguously aggressive behaviours, such as one child bumping into another. Both the black and the white boys judged the behaviours as meaner and more threatening if the behaviours were performed by black boys than if they were performed by white boys (Sagar & Schofield, 1980). A popular news show in the US replicated this classic study in 2012 with the same results (see Figure 4.9). Ambiguity contributes to the persistence of stereotypes because under ambiguity, everyone can confirm their views. Illusory correlation An overestimate of the association between variables that are only slightly or not at all correlated.

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Illusory correlations Stereotypes can also be reinforced via the illusory correlation – a tendency for people to overestimate the link between variables that are only slightly or not at all correlated (Carraro, Negri, Castelli, & Pastore, 2014; Meiser & Hewstone, 2006; Sherman, Haidt, & Coan 2009). One kind of illusory correlation occurs when people overestimate the association between variables that are relatively rare. For example, if people read about a variety of criminal acts, most of which are committed by members of a majority group and some of which are committed by members of a particular minority group, they may overestimate the association

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FIGURE 4.9 The power of stereotypes in ambiguous situations In a study demonstrating how stereotypes are used to resolve ambiguity, children in one US study who saw pictures and descriptions of ambiguously aggressive behaviours judged the behaviours as meaner and more threatening if the behaviours were performed by black boys than if they were performed by white boys (Sagar & Schofield, 1980). When a popular news program replicated the study setup years later, they found the same result: on the left, Bobby (with darker skin tone) was more likely to have pushed Scott; on the right, Bobby was more likely to have simply fallen off the swing.

Source: © 2011 Joan M. K. Tycko, Illustrator.

between minority group status (a relatively rare group) and criminal behaviour (a relatively rare behaviour). This tendency can create or perpetuate negative stereotypes. Illusory correlations may also be produced through people’s tendency to overestimate the association between variables they already expect to go together. For example, if perceivers who hold stereotypes about women being poor drivers witness 100 men and 100 women driving, and 10% of each group get into an accident, they may overestimate the number of women and underestimate the number of men who had accidents. In other words, they see an association between gender and accidents that is not supported by the data.

Confirmation via communication Stereotypes typically are held not just by individuals but by many people within a culture, and they are often perpetuated through repeated communications. In a classic demonstration, Gordon Allport and Leo Postman (1947) showed participants a picture of a subway train filled with passengers. In the picture was a black man dressed in a suit and a white man holding a razor. One participant viewed the scene briefly and then described it to a second participant who had not seen it. The second participant communicated the description to a third participant and so on, through six rounds of communication. The result? In more than half the sessions, the final participant’s report indicated that the black man, not the white man, held the razor. In a more recent demonstration of a similar point, Anthony Lyons from La Trobe University and Yoshihisa Kashima from the University of Melbourne (2001) had Australian students read a story about an Australian Rules football player. The students were put in groups of four. One person read the story, and after a delay of a few minutes transmitted the story to the next student, and so on down the four-person chain. The

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FIGURE 4.10 Stereotype confirmation via communication Students had to relay a story one-at-a-time, across four participants, about an Australian Rules football player who behaved in ways both consistent and inconsistent with stereotypes. Although the first student told both stereotypeconsistent and -inconsistent details, by the time of the final telling of the story, more of the stereotype-inconsistent details dropped out, making the player sound much more stereotypical than he was. 3

Number of details

2.5 2

students were supposed to relay the story as accurately as possible. Some of the information in the story was consistent with stereotypes about Australian Rules football players (e.g., ‘On the way, Gary and his mate drank several beers in the car’) and some of it was inconsistent with the stereotype (e.g., ‘He switched on some classical music’). Although the first student in the chain was likely to communicate both stereotype-consistent and stereotype-inconsistent information, as the story went from person to person the stereotype-inconsistent information was progressively screened out (see Figure 4.10). By the time the third person told the story to the fourth person, the football player seemed much more clearly stereotypical than he had seemed in the original story.

Self-fulfilling prophecies

1.5

Stereotypes can in fact create self-fulfilling prophecies (Madon, Willard, Guyll, & Scherr, 2011; Rosenthal, 2002), serving to 0.5 perpetuate them further. As noted in Chapter 3, a self-fulfilling prophecy occurs when a perceiver’s false expectations about 0 a person cause that person to behave in ways that confirm 1st person to 2nd person to 3rd person to those expectations. Stereotypes can trigger such behavioural 2nd person 3rd person 4th person confirmation. Consider a classic experiment by Carl Word and Story-telling round colleagues (1974) involving a situation of great importance in Stereotype-consistent information people’s lives – the job interview. White participants, without Stereotype-inconsistent information realising it, sat further away, made more speech errors and Source: Based on Kashima, Y., Lyons, A., & Clark, A. (2013). The held shorter interviews when interviewing black applicants maintenance of ­cultural stereotypes in the conversational retelling of narratives. Asian Journal of Social Psychology, 16, 60–70. than they did when interviewing white applicants. This colder interpersonal style, in turn, caused the black applicants to behave in a nervous and awkward manner. In short, the white interviewers’ racial stereotypes and prejudice actually hurt the interview performance of the black candidates. Since the black candidates’ interview performance tended to be objectively worse than that of the white candidates, it seemed to confirm the interviewers’ negative stereotypes – but this poor performance was caused by the interviewers, not the interviewees. Similar self-fulfilling prophecy effects have emerged for the role of gender stereotypes in interviewing contexts (Latu, Mast, & Stewart, 2015). 1

Attributions and subtyping People also maintain their stereotypes through how they explain the behaviours of others. Chapter 3 discussed how perceivers make attributions, or explanations, about the causes of other people’s behaviours and how these attributions can sometimes be flawed. One key finding discussed in that chapter is that people often do not take into account the context that someone was in when they try to explain his or her behaviour. This can help perpetuate negative stereotypes by, for example, people failing to recognise how the poor performance of a member of a stereotyped group may be due to the effects of these stereotypes rather than a lack of actual ability. On the other hand, when people see others acting in ways that seem to contradict a stereotype, they may be more likely to think about situational factors in order to explain the surprising behaviour. Rather than accept a stereotype-disconfirming behaviour at face value, such as a woman defeating a man in an athletic contest, perceivers imagine the situational factors that might explain the reason that something has happened that opposes expectations of a sterotype, such as random luck, ulterior motives or other special circumstances. In this way, perceivers can more easily maintain their stereotypes of these groups (Espinoza, da Luz Fontes, & Arms-Chavez, 2014; Sekaquaptewa, Espinoza, Thompson, Vargas, & von Hippel, 2003; Sherman, Stroessner, Conrey, & Azam, 2005). If we encounter someone’s behaviour that clearly contradicts our stereotypes and we can’t easily explain it away as due to some situational factor, we may unwittingly pull out another trick – we consider the action or the person a mere exception to the rule. Confronted with a woman who does not seem particularly modest and nurturing, for example, people can either develop a more diversified image of females or toss the mismatch into a special subtype, such as ‘career women’. To the extent that people create this subtype, 156

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their existing image of women in general will remain relatively intact (Riek, Mania, & Gaertner, 2013; Schneider & Bos, 2014; Wilder, Simon, & Myles, 1996).

Automatic stereotype activation Part of the power of stereotypes is they can bias our perceptions and responses even if we do not personally agree with them. In other words, we do not have to believe a stereotype for it to trigger illusory correlations and self-fulfilling prophecies, or to bias how we think, feel and behave towards group members. Sometimes just being aware of stereotypes in one’s culture is enough to cause these effects. Moreover, stereotypes can be activated without our awareness. In a very influential line of research, Patricia Devine (1989) distinguished between automatic and controlled processes in stereotyping. She argued that people have become highly aware of the content of many stereotypes through socialisation from their culture. Because of this high level of awareness, people may automatically activate stereotypes whenever they are exposed to members of groups for which popular stereotypes exist. Thus, in the same way that hearing the words ‘bacon and’ makes many of us automatically think ‘eggs’, when we think of a stereotyped group we are also primed to think of concepts relevant to a stereotype. To demonstrate this point Devine exposed white participants in one study to subliminal presentations on a computer monitor. For one group, these presentations consisted of words relevant to stereotypes about black people, such as Africa, ghetto, welfare and basketball. Subliminally presented information is presented so quickly that perceivers do not even realise that they have been exposed to it. Thus, these students were not consciously aware that they had seen these words. Those who were subliminally primed with many of these words activated the African American stereotype and saw another person’s behaviour in a more negative, hostile light. Especially noteworthy is the fact that these effects occurred even among participants who did not consciously believe in the stereotypes in question. Devine’s theory sparked an explosion of interest in these issues. The conclusion from the ensuing research is that it is clear that stereotype activation can be triggered implicitly and automatically, influencing subsequent thoughts, feelings and behaviours even among perceivers who are relatively low in prejudice. But it also is clear that several factors can make such activation more or less likely to happen. For example, some stereotypes are much more prevalent than others in a particular culture, and with more exposure to a stereotype comes a greater likelihood of automatic activation. Another factor is how prejudiced the perceiver is. Although stereotypes can be activated automatically, even among perceivers very low in prejudice, the threshold for what triggers stereotype activation may be lower for those relatively high in prejudice (Lepore & Brown, 2002; Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 1997). Motivation can also play an important role. For example, when their self-esteem is threatened, people may become motivated to stereotype others so that they feel better about themselves, and this can make them more likely to activate stereotypes automatically (Spencer, Fein, Wolfe, Fong, & Dunn, 1998). What about being motivated to control oneself from activating or applying stereotypes? Is this effective? People who are motivated for intrinsic reasons (i.e., they really do not want to be prejudiced, rather than just not wanting to be seen by others as prejudiced) tend to be somewhat more successful at this kind of selfregulation. We return to this issue in more detail in the final section of the chapter.

Subliminal presentation

A method of presenting stimuli so faintly or rapidly that people do not have any conscious awareness of having been exposed to them.

People’s very quick judgements are not influenced by a stereotype unless they actually believe the stereotype to be true.

FALSE

The case of Amadou Diallo The issue of automatic activation of stereotypes and its effects can be seen in concrete terms by focusing on one particular tragedy that has occurred far too often: the shooting of an unarmed African American man by police. The opening of Chapter 3 mentioned the case in which a community watch member killed an unarmed African American man, Trayvon Martin, in response to what was interpreted as threatening behaviour. A similar incident that occurred more than a decade before inspired a wave of social psychological research relevant to this issue. Just after midnight on 4 February 1999, in New York City, a West African immigrant named Amadou Diallo was spotted by four white police officers who thought he was acting suspiciously and that he matched the general description of a suspected rapist they were searching for. As they approached him, Diallo reached into his pocket and began pulling out his wallet. One of the officers yelled, ‘Gun!’ The police fired at Diallo 41 times, hitting him with 19 of the bullets. Diallo lay dead; he did not have a weapon. Protesters held rallies in the days that followed, as depicted in Figure 4.11, chanting ‘forty-one shots’ and holding up wallets. Others defended the police officers, noting how difficult it is to make life-or-

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FIGURE 4.11 Protesting the ‘forty-one shots’ Protesters against police violence walk down Broadway in New York City on 5 April 2000. At the centre is a photo of Amadou Diallo, an unarmed African immigrant who was killed in a burst of 41 gunshots by New York City police.

Source: Getty Images/Chris Hondros

death decisions in the blink of an eye. The officers were found not guilty of any criminal charges. A central question, of course, was whether stereotypes associated with the colour of Diallo’s skin made the officers more likely to misperceive the wallet as a gun. Although none of us can ever know whether this was the case in the Diallo tragedy, it is possible to apply social psychological research to answer related questions, such as whether, in general, a black man is more likely than a white man to be misperceived as holding a gun when they are actually holding a wallet, and whether making such a mistake signals that a perceiver is prejudiced.

Shooter bias Keith Payne (2001) was the first to publish a study directly inspired by these questions. The participants in his study were undergraduate students, not police officers, but their task was to try to make the kind of decision the police had to make: very quickly identify an object as a weapon or not. Pictures of these objects, such as guns or tools, were presented on a computer screen, immediately preceded by a quick presentation of a black or a white male face. The pictures were presented for fractions of a second. Payne found that the participants were more likely to mistake a harmless object for a weapon if it was preceded by a black face than if the object was preceded by a white face. In other words, a quick glimpse of a black male face primed the participants to see a threatening object more than seeing a white male face. Joshua Correll and colleagues (2002) designed a video game for their experiment in which they had participants decide whether or not to ‘shoot’ a target person who appeared on their computer screen (see Figure 4.12). Some of these targets were white men and others were black men. Some of them held guns and others held harmless objects, such as a black mobile phone or a wallet. If the target held a gun, the participants were supposed to hit a ‘shoot’ key as quickly as possible. If he held a harmless object, they were to hit a ‘do not shoot’ key as quickly as they could.

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FIGURE 4.12 Shoot or not? Scenes from the video game that Joshua Correll and his colleagues created to investigate whether perceivers, playing the role of police officers, would be biased by the target’s race when trying

to determine very quickly whether they should shoot because the target is holding a weapon or refrain from shooting because they are holding a harmless object.

Source: Correll, J., Park, B., Judd, C. M., & Wittenbrink, B. (2002). The police officer’s dilemma: Using ethnicity to disambiguate potentially threatening individuals. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 83, 1314–1329.

As in the Payne study, these participants showed a bias consistent with racial stereotypes. If the target held a gun, they were quicker to press the ‘shoot’ key if he was black than if he was white. If the target held a harmless object, they took longer to press the ‘don’t shoot’ key if he was black than if he was white. In addition, participants were more likely to mistakenly ‘shoot’ an unarmed target if he was black than if he was white. Since these first publications, a rapidly growing number of others followed to examine the processes involved more closely (Bradley & Kennison, 2012; Correll, Wittenbrink, Judd, & Goyle, 2011; Essien et al., 2017). For example, Debbie Ma and Joshua Correll (2011) found that this racial bias in decisions to shoot was significantly stronger if the targets looked more stereotypical of their respective races, as rated by samples of participants, than if they did not. In a study targeting a different stereotype, Christian Unkelbach and colleagues (2008) found that Australian participants were more likely to shoot at targets wearing Muslim headgear than bareheaded targets who did not appear Muslim. Taken together, the results of these studies suggest that when the decision must be made very quickly, members of some groups are more likely to be mistakenly perceived as holding a gun than members of other groups. It is important to note, though, that the participants in the initial studies were not police officers but rather undergraduate students or individuals from a community sample. Police officers receive extensive training in these kinds of tasks, but police may not be trained to avoid activating racial stereotypes, and given the prevalence and power of these stereotypes, there is good reason to suspect that they would be influenced by them in split-second decisions. Fortunately, several researchers have conducted these experiments with police officers as participants (Correll et al., 2007b; Ma & Correll, 2011; Peruche & Plant, 2006). In some of this research, the police have shown a similar bias to mistakenly ‘shoot’ a black than white target, and in some they have shown less of this racial bias than civilians. Even in the studies in which the police officers’ decisions were not as racially biased as the civilians’ decisions, racial bias was evident in the officers’ response times. Reviewing all these studies, Joshua Correll and others (2014) concluded that stereotypes certainly can alter perceptions about the presence of weapons and the decision to shoot. In addition, even though police officers are able to avoid these biases under testing conditions, when officers must make these decisions under conditions of fatigue, high stress, and distraction – the conditions officers often face when having to make real shoot-or-not decisions – their ability to overcome stereotype-based biases are compromised, thus increasing the likelihood of the mistakes seen in the tragic incidents that sparked all this research. William Cox and colleagues (2014) present a holistic view that acknowledges that features aside from the race of the suspect such as neighbourhood and officers’ demographics can impact decisions to shoot. Recent research brings encouraging results. In one experiment with 50 police officers, Michelle Peruche and Ashby Plant (2006) found that in initial trials the officers were more likely to erroneously decide to ‘shoot’ an unarmed target when the target was black than if the target was white. With more and more trials,

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however, this racial bias was eventually reduced (see Figure 4.13). This greater accuracy with practice is consistent with the encouraging results of another Police officers completed Joshua Correll’s video game, which involved making decisions to shoot black or white targets who were armed or unarmed. In series of studies using undergraduate students initial trials, the officers were more likely to erroneously decide to ‘shoot’ an playing the role of police officers (Plant, Peruche, unarmed target when the target was black than if the target was white. With & Butz, 2005). The students showed the typical more and more trials, however, this racial bias was reduced. racial bias in the decision to shoot or not, but the 4 researchers also found that training the participants 3.5 by exposing them to repeated trials in which the race of the target was unrelated to criminality eliminated 3 this bias both immediately after the training and 24 2.5 hours later. 2 In addition to the question about whether racial 1.5 bias may exist in perceptions of a weapon or the decision to shoot, a second question we posed 1 previously was whether exhibiting racial bias in the 0.5 decision to shoot means that a perceiver has racist 0 attitudes and beliefs. The evidence thus far suggests Early trials Later trials that this may not be the case. For example, Correll Unarmed black target Unarmed white target and colleagues (2002) found that the magnitude Source: Peruche, B. M., & Plant, E. A. (2006). The correlates of law enforcement officers’ automatic and controlled race-based responses to criminal suspects. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 28, 193–199. of the racial bias in the decision to shoot was not related to participants’ levels of racial prejudice as measured by a series of questionnaires. In addition, these researchers also found that African American participants showed the same bias against black targets as white participants did, again suggesting that racial prejudice is not necessarily reflected in this bias. Consistent with much of the research we have discussed in this chapter, awareness of the stereotype was a necessary factor, but endorsing it was not. Indeed, Correll and colleagues (2007a) found that by manipulating the accessibility of stereotypes that associate blacks with danger in perceivers’ minds, such as by having them first read newspaper articles about black or white criminals, they could strengthen or weaken this bias. Contextual cues such as a threatening neighbourhood or clothing also impact the magnitude of the shooter bias (Kahn & Davies, 2017). Erroneous decisions to ‘shoot’

FIGURE 4.13 Shooter bias reduces with practice

Being stigmatised

Stigmatised

Persistently being stereotyped, perceived as deviant and devalued in society due to being a member of a particular social group or possessing a particular characteristic.

We are all targets of other people’s stereotypes and prejudices. These may be based on how we look, how we talk, how we dress, where we come from, and so on. None of us is immune from having our work evaluated in a biased way, our motives questioned or our attempts at making new friends rejected because of stereotypes and prejudices. But for the targets of some stereotypes and prejudices, these concerns are relentless and profound. For them, there seem to be few safe havens. Social psychologists often refer to these targets as stigmatised, meaning these individuals are targets of negative stereotypes, are perceived as deviant, and are devalued in society because they are members of a particular social group or because they have a particular characteristic (Major & O’Brien, 2005). It is important to distinguish between two types of stigma (Bos, Pryor, Reeder, & Stutterheim, 2013). Public stigma reflects social and psychological reactions to a stigmatised individual. Self-stigma captures the social and psychological effects of being stigmatised. Additional research has uncovered that stigma can spread through a social network – stigma by association reflects the impact of being friends or family members with a stigmatised individual (Pryor, Reeder, & Monroe, 2012).

CRITICAL THINKING ACTIVITY Reflect on your various identities. Have you ever been stigmatised based on one of these identities? How would you characterise that experience? Further, recall the last time you interacted with someone who may have felt stigmatised due to an aspect of their identity.

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Were you aware that they might feel that way? If not, would you have acted differently towards them?

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The negative impact of stigma is profound. A meta-analysis by Michael Schmitt and colleagues (2014) of hundreds of correlational and experimental studies involving nearly 150 000 participants supports this point. It is clear that if an individual has been discriminated against and that the discrimination is likely to be experienced frequently, it is associated with negative effects on that individual’s self-esteem, depression, anxiety and life satisfaction. Even if the individual simply anticipates interacting with someone who they think is prejudiced, it can trigger cardiovascular stress responses (Sawyer, Major, Casad, Townsend, & Mendes, 2012). It is, therefore, no surprise that if an individual has a stigmatised status that they can hide during interactions with others, such as a history of mental illness, they often prefer to do so. But even the act of concealing this status can itself be stressful and lead to negative effects and outcomes (Newheiser, Barreto, & Tiemersma, 2017). More generally, there has been a surge of research findings in recent years concerning how stigmatised targets are at increased risk for serious and long-term physical and psychological problems, including increased blood pressure, depression, breast cancer rates, diabetes, stroke, respiratory problems, chronic pain, substance abuse and impaired relationships (Major, Dovidio, & Link, 2017).

Stereotype threat One of the more tragic effects of stereotyping in contemporary life is its effects on the intellectual performance and identity of its targets. An enormous wave of research on this issue was generated when social psychologist Claude Steele began writing about this problem in the 1990s. Steele proposed that in situations where a negative stereotype can apply to certain groups, members of these groups can fear being seen ‘through the lens of diminishing stereotypes and low expectations’ (Steele, 1999, p. 44). Steele (1997) called this predicament stereotype threat, for it hangs like ‘a threat in the air’ when the individual is in the stereotype-relevant situation. The predicament can be particularly threatening for individuals whose identity and self-esteem are invested in domains where the stereotype is relevant. Steele argued that stereotype threat plays a crucial role in influencing the intellectual performance and identity of stereotyped group members. Steele and colleagues (2002) later broadened the scope of their analysis to include social identity threats more generally. These threats are not necessarily tied to specific stereotypes but instead reflect a more general devaluing of a person’s social group. According to Steele’s theory, stereotype threat can hamper achievement in academic domains in two ways. First, reactions to the ‘threat in the air’ can directly interfere with performance; for example, by increasing anxiety and triggering distracting thoughts. Second, if this stereotype threat is chronic in the academic domain, it can cause individuals to disidentify from that domain – to dismiss the domain as no longer relevant to their self-esteem and identity. To illustrate, imagine a female student and a male student who enter high school equally qualified in academic performance. Imagine that while taking a particularly difficult maths test at the beginning of the school year, each student struggles on the first few problems. Both students may begin to worry about failing, but the female student may have a whole set of additional worries about appearing to confirm a negative stereotype. Even if the female student does not believe the stereotype at all, the threat of being reduced to a stereotype in the eyes of those around her can trigger anxiety and distraction, impairing her performance. And if she experiences this threat in school often, the situation may become too threatening to her self-esteem. To buffer herself against the threat, she may disidentify with school. If she does this, her academic performance will become less relevant to her identity and self-esteem, and she will therefore work less hard and perform worse.

Stereotype threat The experience of concern about being evaluated based on negative stereotypes about one’s group.

The original experiments Steele and others conducted a series of experiments in which they manipulated factors likely to increase or decrease stereotype threat as students took academic tests. For example, Steele and Joshua Aronson (1995) had black and white students from a highly selective university take a very difficult standardised verbal test. To some participants, it was introduced as a test of intellectual ability; to others, it was introduced as a problem-solving task unrelated to ability. Steele and Aronson reasoned that because of the difficulty of the test, all the students would struggle with it. If the test was said to be related to intellectual ability, however, the black students would feel the threat of a negative stereotype in addition to the stress of struggling with the test. By contrast, if the test was described simply as a research task and not a real test of intelligence, then negative stereotypes would be less applicable and the stereotype threat would be reduced. In that case, black students would be less impaired while taking the test. As shown in Figure 4.14, the results supported these predictions.

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FIGURE 4.14 Stereotype threat and academic performance Black students did worse on a difficult verbal test than white students (even after the students’ scores were adjusted based on their performance on standardised university entrance verbal examinations) if they had been told the test was of intellectual ability (left). In contrast, there was no difference in adjusted scores between black and white students on the same test if they had been told the test was unrelated to ability (right). Mean items solved (adjusted by SAT* score)

14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 ‘Test of intelligence’

‘Task unrelated to intelligence’

White participants Black participants *SAT = Scholastic assessment test Source: Steele, C. M., & Aronson, J. (1995). Stereotype vulnerability and the ­intellectual test performance of African Americans. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 69, 797–811.

Thus, a seemingly minor change in the setting – a few words about the meaning of a test – had a powerful effect on the black students’ performance. In a second study, the researchers used an even more subtle manipulation of stereotype threat – whether or not the students were asked to report their ethnicity just before taking the test. Making them think about ethnicity for a few seconds just before taking the test impaired the performance of black students but had no effect on white students. Think about the implications of such findings for important real-world contexts. After years of conducting this research, social psychologists were finally able to convince the US University Board and Educational Testing Service in June 2012 to agree to discontinue the practice of asking students demographic questions immediately before they begin high-stakes testing. As alluded to in the opening example to stereotype threat, because negative stereotypes concerning women’s advanced maths skills are prevalent, women may often experience stereotype threat in settings relevant to these skills. Reducing stereotype threat in these settings, therefore, should reduce the underperformance that women tend to exhibit in these areas. To test this idea, Steven Spencer and colleagues (1999) recruited male and female students who were good at maths and felt that maths was important to their identities. The researchers gave these students a very difficult standardised maths test, one on which all of them would perform poorly. Before taking the test, some students were told that the test generally showed no gender differences, thereby implying that the negative stereotype of women’s ability in maths was not relevant to this particular test. Other students were told that the test did generally show gender differences. As Steele’s theory predicted, women performed worse than men when they were told that the test typically produced gender differences, but they performed as well as men when they were told that the test typically did not produce gender differences.

Prevalence and diversity of threats A woman is likely to perform worse on an arithmetic task if the task is described as one that produces gender differences than if it is described as one that women and men perform equally on.

TRUE

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Since these original studies, research inspired by the theory of stereotype threat has grown at a stunningly fast pace. The evidence for underperformance due to stereotype threat is quite strong and broad (Schmader, Hall, & Croft, 2015; Spencer, Logel, & Davies, 2016), though recent reviews of the literature reveal some controversy about the nature and consistency of the effect, as described in the Current Scene On feature. Regardless of the controversy, it remains that stereotype threat has been found both in the laboratory and in real-world settings, including schools and businesses. Although much of the research has documented the power of the effects of stereotype threat on African Americans and women, the scope of the research extends much further. Stereotype threats can affect any group for which strong, well-known negative stereotypes are relevant in particular settings. Social identity threats can be more general than that, affecting groups that may be devalued even in the absence of specific negative stereotypes about a particular domain. It should be pointed out that just knowing about the stereotype is enough for a person to be affected by stereotype threat, particularly if the individual identifies strongly with the targeted group and cares about performing well. He or she does not have to believe in the negative stereotype to be affected. This point is particularly poignant – the performance of people who have had success at something and who care the most may be most affected by stereotype threat effects. Here is a small sample of groups in recent years whose performance in various domains was hurt by stereotype threat: • young females in live chess tournaments against young males (Rothgerber & Wolsiefer, 2014) • women performing soccer drills when the task was described as one in which men tend to outperform women (Heidrich & Chiviacowsky, 2015) • overweight individuals primed to think about weight-related stereotypes (Major, Hunger, Bunyan, & Miller, 2014)

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first-generation students taking a biology class (Harackiewicz et al., 2014) student-athletes completing a maths test (Riciputi & Erdal, 2017) boys and girls completing a reading comprehension assessment when the test was presented to the boys as a reading test and to the girls as a game (Pansu et al., 2016) older adults completing a memory test (Brubaker & Naveh-Benjamin, 2018).

Causes of stereotype threat effects Stereotype threat exerts its effects in multiple ways (Forbes & Leitner, 2014; Rydell, Van Loo, & Boucher, 2014; Schmader et al., 2015). Stereotype threat has been shown to: • trigger physiological arousal and stress • drain cognitive resources • cause a loss of focus to the task at hand because of attempts to suppress thoughts about the relevant stereotype • impair working memory • activate negative thoughts, worry, feelings of dejection and concerns about trying to avoid failure than trying to achieve success • elicit neural activity biased toward negative, stereotype-confirming feedback. Think about trying to do your best on a difficult test that is important to you while all of these things are happening to you – you get some sense of how stereotype threat can undermine people’s performance and ambitions. Even though stereotype threat effects are widespread, the growing body of research on this topic also gives us reason to hope. Social psychologists have been uncovering ways that people can be better protected against these threats. We will focus on these promising ways in the final section of this chapter.

Reducing stereotype threat Dozens and dozens of experiments on stereotype threat were published soon after the theory was introduced in the mid-1990s, and in virtually each of them the negative effects of stereotype threat were reduced significantly or eliminated completely in some conditions of the study. Often this was achieved with seemingly very minor, but important, changes in the setting. Here is a sample of these successful interventions: • describing the task as not indicative of individuals’ intellectual capabilities (Steele & Aronson, 1995) • informing individuals that their group typically does not perform worse than other groups on the task (Spencer et al., 1999) • giving individuals reason to attribute their anxiety while taking a test to irrelevant factors (Ben-Zeev, Fein, & Inzlicht, 2005) • getting individuals to think of intelligence as not a fixed trait but instead as something that is malleable and can be improved (Good, Aronson, & Inzlicht, 2003) • exposing individuals to a member of their group who is said to be an expert in the domain in question (Stout, Dasgupta, Hunsinger, & McManus, 2011) • having individuals think about values and interests that are very important to them that are not under threat (Taylor & Walton, 2011; von Hippel, Wiryakusuma, Bowden, & Shochet, 2011) • highlighting other aspects of individuals’ identities that are associated with positive performance on the task at hand (Shih, Pittinsky, & Ho, 2012; Yopyk & Prentice, 2005) • excluding the presence of members of outgroups (Sekaquaptewa & Thompson, 2003). One takeaway from these findings is that a simple shift in mindset or a shift in the social context can have a profound effect.

Stereotype boost A moment’s reflection reveals that not all stereotypes are negative (Czopp, Kay, & Cheryan, 2015). Older people and women are stereotyped as warm and caring. Asians are stereotyped as intelligent at maths. Is there a parallel process to stereotype threat that is driven by awareness of being the target of positive stereotypes? Evidence suggests there is! Researchers call this stereotype boost (Shih et al., 2012). Several studies have documented stereotype boost effects. For instance, Asian American women performed better on a verbal test when their female identity was primed by the stereotype that women have superior verbal skills than men, and better on a maths test when their Asian identity was primed by the stereotype that Asian Americans have superior maths skills compared to White Americans (Shih, Pittinsky, & Ambady, 1999; Shih, Pittinsky, & Trahan, 2006). Copyright 2020 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-202

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CURRENT SCENE ON … PUBLICATION BIAS It is clear that stereotype threat has received a vast amount of research attention. While many studies support the existence of stereotype threat effects as described previously, others, especially recently, have failed to find them (Finnigan & Corker, 2016; Moon & Roeder, 2014; Stoet & Geary, 2012). Some researchers argue that publication bias against null findings – the fact that it is difficult to publish results of studies that do not show an effect – compound the situation (Flore & Wicherts, 2015). Further, meta-analyses across several domains

of stereotype threat research, including race and gender, have yielded ‘inconclusive’ findings (Ryan & Nguyen, 2017). In their review of twenty years of stereotype threat research, Charlotte Pennington and colleagues (2016) noted that diverse social groups are affected by stereotype threat in different ways. If stereotype threat effects are indeed so variable, it is no wonder that much controversy around the nature of those effects has arisen.

CONFLICT, PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION: PERSISTENCE AND CHANGE In this section, we first discuss the broad theme of intergroup conflict before turning to specific ways in which prejudice and discrimination based on group membership occur in modern life. To provide a focus and to reflect the topics in this section that have most dominated the research literature, we will continue to concentrate on racism and sexism in particular, even though many of the points hold true across a wide variety of targets of prejudice and discrimination.

Intergroup conflict: the source of the tension As discussed earlier in this chapter, there are a number of motivating factors that cause individuals to categorise others into social groups. This process in and of itself does not necessarily give rise to intergroup conflict, and in many ways can be construed as an adaptive social process. After all, belonging to an ingroup satisfies needs for social identity, helps contribute to terror management and addresses fundamental motives relating to status and dominance. That said, the nature of groups is that they sometimes conflict.

Robbers Cave: a field study of intergroup conflict Robbers Cave State Park in Oklahoma, US, was the unlikely setting for one of the classic field experiments in social psychology. In the summer of 1954, a small group of 11-year-old boys – all white, middle-class youngsters, and all strangers to one another – arrived at a 200-acre camp located in a densely wooded area of the park. The FIGURE 4.15 Robbers Cave boys spent the first week or so hiking, swimming, boating and In one of the most famous social psychological field experiments, camping out. After a while, they gave themselves a group name boys at Robbers Cave quickly formed groups that perceived the and printed it on their caps and T-shirts. At first, the boys thought other as the enemy. they were the only ones at the camp. Soon, however, they discovered that there was a second group and that tournaments had been arranged between the two groups. What these boys didn’t know was that they were participants in an elaborate study conducted by Muzafer Sherif and colleagues (1961). Parents had given permission for their sons to take part in an experiment for a study of competitiveness and cooperation. The two groups were brought in separately, and only after each had formed its own culture was the other group’s presence revealed. Once the ‘Rattlers’ and the ‘Eagles’ were ready to meet, they did so under tense circumstances, competing against each other in football, a treasure hunt, a tug of war and other events. For each event, the winning team was awarded points; the tournament winner was promised a trophy, medals and other prizes. Almost overnight, the groups turned into hostile antagonists and their rivalry escalated into a full-scale battle. Source: The Drs Nicholas and Dorothy Cummings Center for the History of Psychology, Group flags were burned, cabins were ransacked and a food fight The University of Akron. that resembled a riot exploded in the canteen (see Figure 4.15). 164

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Keep in mind that the participants in this study were well-adjusted boys. Yet, as Sherif (1966) noted, a naive observer would have thought the boys were ‘wicked, disturbed, and vicious’ (p. 85). Creating a monster through competition was easy. Restoring the peace, however, was not. First the experimenters tried saying nice things to the Rattlers about the Eagles and vice versa, but the positive propaganda campaign did not work. Then the two groups were brought together under non-competitive circumstances, but that didn’t help either. What did eventually work was the introduction of superordinate goals; that is, mutual goals that could be achieved only through cooperation between the groups. For example, the experimenters arranged for the camp truck to break down, and both groups were needed to pull it up a steep hill. This strategy was successful, and by the end of camp the two groups were so friendly that they insisted on travelling home on the same bus. In just 3 weeks, the Rattlers and Eagles experienced the kinds of changes that often take generations to unfold – they formed close-knit groups, went to war and made peace. The events of Robbers Cave mimicked the kinds of conflict that plague people all over the world. The simplest explanation for this conflict is competition. Recall for a moment that, according to the stereotype content model, competition is the driving force behind stereotypes. Here we see that competition also drives intergroup behaviour. Assign strangers to groups, throw the groups into contention, stir the pot, and soon there is conflict. Similarly, the intergroup benefits of reducing the focus on competition by activating superordinate goals are also evident around the world. When the disparate and contentious groups of a country or university find themselves pulling together in conflict or competition with another country or university, for example, the prejudices and discrimination that kept the groups apart often are cast aside in pursuit of a common goal.

CHAPTER FOUR

Superordinate goal

A shared goal that can be achieved only through cooperation among individuals or groups.

Realistic conflict theory The view that direct competition for valuable but limited resources breeds hostility between groups is called realistic conflict theory (Levine & Campbell, 1972). As a simple matter of economics, one group may fare better in the struggle for land, jobs or power than another group. The losing group becomes frustrated and resentful, the winning group feels threatened and protective, and, before long, conflict heats to a rapid boil. It is likely that a good deal of prejudice in the world is driven by the realities of competition (Duckitt & Mphuthing, 1998; Filindra & Pearson-Merkowitz, 2013; Stephan, Renfro, Esses, Stephan, & Martin, 2005; Zárate et al., 2004). For example, Marcel Coenders and colleagues (2008) found that support for discrimination against ethnic minority groups tended to increase in the Netherlands when the unemployment level had recently risen. Confirming the link between competition and overall discontent, Jolanda Jetten of the University of Queensland and colleagues (2017) showed that collective angst tracked economic instability – especially among those higher in wealth. It turns out that ‘realistic’ competition for resources may in fact be imagined – a perception in the mind of an individual who is not engaged in any real conflict. In addition, people may become resentful of other groups not because of their conviction that their own security or resources are threatened by these groups but because of their sense of relative deprivation; that is, the belief that they fare poorly compared with others. What matters is not what you have, but how what you have compares to what others have (Moscatelli, Albarello, Prati, & Rubini, 2014; Smith & Pettigrew, 2015). According to research at Murdoch University, Australians high in relative deprivation – in particular, those who feel that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people are faring better than them – are also high in prejudice against Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders (Pedersen & Walker, 1997). This relationship was particularly strong for modern forms of racism, which we turn our attention to next.

Realistic conflict theory

The theory that hostility between groups is caused by direct competition for limited resources.

Relative deprivation Feelings of discontent aroused by the belief that one fares poorly compared with others.

Racism: current forms and challenges A close examination of legislation, opinion polls, sociological data and social psychological research indicates that racial prejudice and discrimination have been decreasing in many nations around the world. In the UK, for instance, the percentage of people who would mind a close relative marrying an Asian or Caribbean partner dropped by 25 percentage points from approximately 55% in 1983 to 35% in 2013 (Storm, Sobolewska, & Ford, 2017). Such change has also been documented in the US (Dovidio, Gaertner, Kawakami, & Hodson, 2002; Pew Research Center for People and the Press, 2009). The election of Barack Obama as the first African-American President of the US in 2008 was a significant sign of progress in that country, as was his re-election in 2012. However, when those of us who study stereotypes, prejudice and discrimination heard that some were heralding the dawn of a ‘post-racial America’, we knew how naive and wrong such notions were.

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FIGURE 4.16 Does colour matter today? Artist Megan Adams painted her Archibald Prize entry, Colour Doesn’t Matter, of Australian Football League player and Aboriginal Australian, Adam Goodes, who was the victim of ongoing racist taunts.

There are legitimate reasons to celebrate racial progress. Racism, however, remains a fact of life and is by no means limited merely to the actions of some fringe individuals or groups. And as we will see in the following section, it exists in ways that escape the recognition of most people. Note that a great deal of work on racism has been carried out in the US, focusing on racism against blacks by whites. Therefore, many of the examples will describe this dynamic. Where possible, we have pointed to work in other countries and with other ethnicities.

Modern and aversive racism

Modern racism

A form of prejudice that surfaces in subtle ways when it is safe, socially acceptable and easy to rationalise.

Aversive racism

Racism that concerns the ambivalence between fair-minded attitudes and beliefs, and unconscious and unrecognised prejudicial feelings and beliefs.

166

Consider two stories from the world of sport: 1 In 2013, Australian Football League player and Aboriginal Australian Adam Goodes (see Figure 4.16) was called an ‘ape’ by a member of the crowd attending the game. On the tails of that incident and his confrontation of it, Goodes was regularly booed during games over the course of several seasons – behaviour that has been argued to be raciallymotivated (Parry, 2015). Black football players at the Euro 2012 tournament and the World Cup tournament in 2014 were the targets of similar racist taunts (Barnes, 2014; Brown, 2012; Cue, 2012). 2 Christopher Parsons and colleagues (2009) analysed every pitch from four US Major League Baseball seasons, 2004 Source: News Ltd/Newspix/Glenn Campbell through to 2008, including more than 3.5 million pitches in all, and found a fascinating set of results. Umpires were more likely to call strikes for pitchers who were of the same race or ethnicity as they were. Even more interesting is the fact that this bias emerged only under three conditions: (1) if the game was played without a computerised monitoring system the league uses to review umpires’ performance in making calls; (2) if the number of people attending the game was relatively low; and (3) if the call would not be the final ball or strike of the player at bat. In other words, the racial or ethnic bias was evident only under the conditions when there would be the least accountability or public outcry. The first of these examples, concerning racist taunts, illustrates what some call old-fashioned racism – blatant, explicit and unmistakable. The second, concerning the bias in umpiring, is what some call modern racism – a subtle form of prejudice that tends to surface when it is safe, socially acceptable or easy to rationalise. Modern racism is far subtler and most likely to be present under a cloud of ambiguity. According to theories of modern racism, many people are racially ambivalent. They want to see themselves as fair, but they still harbour feelings of anxiety and discomfort about other racial groups (Hass, Katz, Rizzo, Bailey, & Moore, 1992). There are several specific theories of modern racism, but they all emphasise contradictions and tensions that lead to subtle, often unconscious forms of prejudice and discrimination (Gawronski, Brochu, Sritharan, & Strack, 2012; Ramírez, Rosenthal, Levy, & Karafantis 2013; Nier & Gaertner, 2012). Pedersen and Iain Walker (1997) effectively applied the concepts of old-fashioned versus modern racism to social attitudes towards Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people, highlighting the increase in modern forms of racism within Australia. Samuel Gaertner and John Dovidio (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; Hodson, Dovidio, & Gaertner, 2010) proposed the related concept of aversive racism, which concerns the ambivalence between individuals’ sincerely fair-minded attitudes and beliefs, and their largely unconscious and unrecognised negative feelings and beliefs about other ethnicities. In addition, some scholars today use the term microaggression to characterise the everyday, typically rather subtle but hurtful forms of discrimination that are experienced quite frequently by members of targeted groups (Dover, 2016). In these forms of racism, prejudice surfaces primarily under circumstances when the expression of prejudice is safe, socially acceptable and easy to rationalise because of its ambiguity. For example, several studies have found that white participants playing the role of jurors may be more likely to convict a black than a white defendant for a crime when the evidence is rather ambiguous, and thus one can justify either a guilty or not guilty verdict for reasons having nothing to do with race. If, on the other hand, race is made to seem to be an important aspect of the case, then this bias may be eliminated or even reversed (Bucolo & Cohn, 2010; Fein, Morgan, Norton, & Sommers, 1997; Sommers & Ellsworth, 2009).

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Perceived racism

These modern, ambivalent forms of racism are FIGURE 4.17 Moral credentials on Facebook often evident in the ‘but some of my best friends are …’ excuse. That is, people establish their moral Participants rated the racism levels of a white Facebook user who visually depicted as being surrounded by no, few or many Asian friends. The user credentials of not being racist by demonstrating, to had either made an anti-Asian statement (‘way too many Asians around’) or others or even to themselves, that they have good a control statement (‘way too many squirrels around’). While the anti-Asian friends from the racial or ethnic group in question statement increased perceived racism, this effect was attenuated when the or they have behaved in ways that were quite fair to user was portrayed as having Asian friends, a form of moral credentialing. members of this group (Cascio & Plant, 2015; Merritt, 5.5 Effron, & Morin, 2010). Having such good behaviour 5 to their credit gives people the licence to take actions 4.5 that might otherwise put them at risk for seeming prejudiced. It appears that this strategy may work. 4 As seen in Figure 4.17, Michael Thai and colleagues 3.5 at the University of Queensland (2016) demonstrated 3 that people who made an anti-Asian statement 2.5 on Facebook were perceived as less racist when 2 depicted as having Asian friends. A follow-up study 1.5 demonstrated a similar effect when the user simply verbally claimed they had Asian friends. 1 Control statement Anti-Asian statement In just about any setting, examples of subtle but impactful discrimination can be found. Here is just a No Asian friends Few Asian friends Many Asian friends sample from recent research: Source: Thai, M., Hornsey, M. J., & Barlow, F. K. (2016). Friends with moral credentials: Minority friendships • Within Canadian organisations, Asian-named reduce attributions of racism for majority group members who make conceivably racist statements. Social Psychological and Personality Science, 7(3), 272–280. applicants are 20–40% less likely to be called for a job interview (Banerjee, Reitz, & Oreopoulos, 2018). • Emails to US local public services from blacksounding names relative to white-sounding names were not only less likely to receive a response but, when a response was sent, the response was more negative in tone (Giulietti, Tonin, & Vlassopoulos, 2019). • In Germany, applicants for apartments with German-sounding names were 9% more likely to receive a response than applications for apartments with Turkish-sounding names (Auspurg, Hinz, & Schmid, 2017). All these examples suggest two key points. First, although these biases are often very difficult to see, they are present in abundance, across a multitude of settings, ranging from the everyday to the profound. The second key point is that in each of these cases, it would be impossible to be sure that racism was behind any one person’s specific behaviour – after all, there may be many reasons why any one person might receive a job interview or not, or a rental application response. There is just too much ambiguity or subtlety. But by looking at trends and by running experiments with careful controls, the underlying bias can be revealed.

Implicit race-based bias Modern forms of racism sometimes operate consciously and sometimes operate outside people’s conscious awareness. Scholars call racism that operates unconsciously and unintentionally implicit race-based bias. The question of how to detect and measure implicit race-based bias is a challenging one. Because of its implicit nature, it can’t be assessed by simply asking people to answer some questions about their attitudes. Rather, much more subtle, indirect measures typically are used. By far the most well-known measure of this kind is the Implicit Association Test (IAT), first developed and tested by Anthony Greenwald and colleagues (1998). The IAT measures the extent to which two concepts are associated. It measures implicit race-based bias against African Americans, for example, by comparing how quickly or slowly participants associate African American cues (e.g., a face) with negative and positive concepts compared with how quickly or slowly they make the same kinds of associations with white American cues. Other IATs focus on associations concerning other racial and ethnic groups, older versus younger people, men versus women, and so on. The IAT is discussed in more detail in Chapter 6. It has sparked an explosion of research, with more than 700 scientific publications, but not without some controversy about its validity and uses (Blanton, Jaccard, Strauts, Mitchell, & Tetlock 2015; Greenwald, Banaji, & Nosek, 2015; Oswald, Mitchell, Blanton, Jaccard, & Tetlock, 2013; Nosek & Smyth, 2011).

Implicit race-based bias

Race-based bias that operates unconsciously and unintentionally.

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Children do not tend to show biases based on race; it is only after they become adolescents that they learn to respond to people differently based on race.

FALSE

Implicit race-based bias, as measured by the IAT, has been documented in adults around the world and even among children as young as 6 and 7 years old (Baron & Banaji, 2006; Dunham, Stepanova, Dotsch, & Todorov, 2015; Rae & Olson, 2018). One interesting point is that compared to 6-year-olds, 10-year-olds begin to show less bias on explicit measures, and adults exhibit even less than the 10-year-olds; however, levels of implicit racism as measured by the IAT remain consistent across children and adults. Implicit race-based bias correlates with a variety of attitudes and behaviours. For example, higher implicit race-based bias by white participants in several studies predicted negative, unfriendly nonverbal behaviours in interracial interactions, such as physical distancing or lack of eye contact – actions that can make the other person feel uncomfortable and disliked, and that can lead to, for example, poor performance in a job interview (Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, & Banaji, 2009). A particularly disturbing, and growing, set of findings concerns the link between doctors’ and other healthcare providers’ implicit race-based bias and their treatment of patients from racial and ethnic minority groups (Hall et al., 2015; Penner et al., 2016; Schaa, Roter, Biesecker, Cooper, & Erby, 2015). For example, Lisa Cooper and colleagues (2012) found that higher implicit race-based bias among American clinicians was related to poorer communication and less warmth towards black, but not white, patients. Janice Sabin and Anthony Greenwald (2012) found that American doctors with stronger pro-white bias on the IAT were more likely to recommend prescribing pain-relieving medication after surgery for white patients and less likely to do so for black patients, compared with physicians with less of a pro-white IAT score.

Interracial interactions

% of trials in which race was mentioned

The divides between racial and ethnic groups tend to be greater and may promote stronger feelings of hostility, fear and distrust than the divides based on other social categories, such as those based on gender, appearance and age. This can make interracial interaction particularly challenging and fraught with emotion and tension. When engaging in interracial interactions, whites may be concerned about a number of things, including not wanting to be, or to appear to be, racist. They may therefore try to regulate their behaviours, be on the lookout for signs of distrust or dislike from their interaction partners, and so on. Because of these concerns, what should ideally be a smooth-flowing normal interaction can become awkward and even exhausting. This, in turn, can affect their partner’s perceptions of them, possibly leading to the ironic outcome of well-intentioned individuals appearing to be racist precisely because they were trying not to be. Because of these concerns, engaging in interracial interactions can be so stressful as to leave the individuals cognitively exhausted and less able immediately after the interaction to complete mental tasks (Shelton & Richeson, 2015). According to Jacquie Vorauer (Vorauer, 2003; Vorauer & FIGURE 4.18 Avoiding race Sasaki, 2014), individuals engaging in intergroup interactions When white participants played a face-matching game in which often activate meta-stereotypes, or thoughts about the they had to ask questions of a confederate to guess which of a outgroup’s stereotypes about them, and worry about being series of photographs the confederate had, they were much less seen as consistent with these stereotypes. Indeed, this likely to ask about the race of the people in the photographs kind of concern about interracial interactions can lead to if they were interacting with a black confederate than a white confederate, even though this hurt their performance in the game. cardiovascular reactions associated with feelings of threat (Mendes, Blascovich, Lickel, & Hunter, 2002; Trawalter et al., 100 2012). It should not be surprising, then, that people sometimes try to avoid interracial interaction for fear of appearing racist or being treated in a racist way, and this avoidant behaviour can have the ironic effect of making things all the worse. Phillip 80 Goff, Claude Steele and Paul Davies (2008), for example, found that white male students sat further away from black students than white students in an interaction – but only if they thought they would be engaged in a conversation about a racially 60 sensitive topic. In a clever demonstration of the kind of anxiety whites sometimes feel about race, Michael Norton and colleagues (2006) paired white participants with either a white or black 40 White confederate Black confederate confederate in a game that required the participants to ask the Source: Based on Norton, M. I., Sommers, S. R., Apfelbaum, E. P., Pura, confederate questions so they could guess which of a series of N., & Ariely D. (2006). Color blindness and interracial interaction: photographs the confederate had been given. As can be seen Playing the political correctness game. Psychological Science, 17, 949–953. in Figure 4.18, participants were significantly less likely to ask about the race of the person in the photograph when playing the 168

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game with a black confederate than a white confederate, even though this hurt their ability to win the game. It seemed that the white participants would rather lose the game than run the risk of appearing racist by paying any attention to the race of the people in the photographs. An interesting follow-up to this study examined the performance of children in this task (Apfelbaum, Pauker, Ambady, Sommers, & Norton, 2008). On a race-neutral version of the game, older children (10- and 11-year-olds), not surprisingly, outperformed younger children (8- and 9-year-olds). However, when race was a relevant category, the older children were much more likely to avoid asking about race, presumably because they are more aware of the sensitivities surrounding race. The result of this was that in the racerelevant version of the game, the younger children significantly outperformed the older children! White adults in an interracial interaction often try to adopt a ‘colourblind’ mentality and demeanour, acting, or trying to act, as if race is so unimportant to them that they may not even perceive their interaction partner’s race. Often this attempt is sincere and with the best of intentions, but a variety of research findings has accumulated suggesting that this approach often backfires and makes members of racial minority groups more, rather than less, uncomfortable (Apfelbaum, Norton, & Sommers, 2012). A multicultural approach that acknowledges and positively values racial and ethnic differences is often more effective in promoting better intergroup attitudes and behaviours (Plaut, Cheryan, & Stevens, 2015; Rattan & Ambady, 2012). Lisa Rosenthal and Sheri Levy (2016) similarly find that thinking in a more polycultural way can be very effective in promoting positive intergroup relations; that is, focusing on the ways that racial and ethnic groups have interacted and influenced each other’s cultures throughout history

CHAPTER FOUR

Interracial interactions tend to go better if a colourblind mentality is used, which denies or minimises any acknowledgement of racial differences.

FALSE

CRITICAL THINKING ACTIVITY Recall the last interracial interaction that you had with someone in person. Did you feel anxiety? From memory, did you attempt or sense that the other person was trying to adopt a colourblind mentality?

Given what you now know about interracial interactions, how might you go about interacting with this person in the future? What about someone new from another racial group?

Anxieties and challenges associated with intergroup interactions are not limited to those between whites and blacks, of course, despite the fact that the majority of research has focused on this particular intergroup dynamic. Feelings of threat and anxiety in the face of intergroup interaction or relations play an important role in people’s prejudice towards a variety of groups (Davis & Stephan, 2011; Stephan, Ybarra, & Morrison, 2009). Next, we turn to intergroup dynamics between men and women.

Sexism: ambivalence, objectification and double standards As with racism, blatant displays of sexism are less socially accepted than in years past, although they continue to exist at a frequency and with an intensity that would surprise many. In response to a social and political climate that was in many ways antagonistic toward women, the 2017 March for Women saw an estimated 7 million people take part in protests around the world to call for women’s FIGURE 4.19 March for Women 2017 rights, as pictured in Figure 4.19. An estimated seven million people worldwide united to protest As with racism, researchers have been documenting and and call for women’s rights at the March for Women 2017. studying modern and implicit forms of sexism that tend to escape the notice of most people, but that can exert powerful discriminatory effects (Girvan, Deason, & Borgida, 2015; Swim & Hyers, 2009). There are some ways that sexism is unique, however. Gender stereotypes are distinct from virtually all other stereotypes in that they often are prescriptive rather than merely descriptive. In other words, they indicate what many people in a given culture believe men and women should be like, not merely what people think they actually are like (Ramos, Barreto, Ellemers, Moya, & Ferreira, 2018). Few people, for example, think that same-sex attracted men should be artistic and sensitive or that old people should be forgetful and conservative, but many think that women should be nurturing and that men should be unemotional. Therefore, women who exhibit unemotional Source: Brian Allen traits and men who exhibit emotional traits may be viewed

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in especially harsh terms, contributing to the double standards that are a hallmark of sexism (Brescoll, Dawson, & Uhlmann, 2010; Rudman, Fetterolf, & Sanchez, 2013; Zaikman & Marks, 2014). Another way that sexism is unique concerns the degree to which the ingroup and outgroup members interact. Men and women are intimately familiar with each other. They typically (although certainly not always) come from the same families, grow up together, are attracted to one another, live together, and produce and raise children together. Because of this, sexism involves more of an overt ambivalence between positive and negative feelings and beliefs than is typical of racism and other forms of prejudice and discrimination. In this section, we focus on this ambivalence and on some of the double standards that exist in sexism in degrees that are not as evident in most other forms of discrimination.

Ambivalent sexism

Ambivalent sexism

A form of sexism characterised by attitudes about women that reflect negative, resentful beliefs and feelings, as well as affectionate and chivalrous but potentially patronising beliefs and feelings.

It may surprise you to learn that, overall, stereotypes of women tend to be more positive than those of men (Eagly, Mladinic, & Otto, 1994). However, the positive traits associated with women are less valued in important domains such as the business world than the positive traits associated with men. These contradictions are reflected in Peter Glick and Susan Fiske’s (2001, 2012) concept of ambivalent sexism. Ambivalent sexism consists of two elements: hostile sexism, characterised by negative, resentful feelings about women’s abilities, value and ability to challenge men’s power (e.g., ‘Once a woman gets a man to commit to her, she usually tries to put him on a tight leash’); and benevolent sexism, characterised by affectionate, chivalrous feelings founded on the potentially patronising belief that women need and deserve protection (e.g., ‘Women should be cherished and protected by men’). Benevolent sexism, on the surface, does not strike many women or men as terribly troubling, but the two forms of sexism are positively correlated. Both types of sexism are associated with supporting gender inequality in a variety of ways, and both predict many kinds of discriminatory behaviours and negative consequences (Durán, Moya, & Megías, 2011; Masser, Lee, & McKimmie, 2010; Rudman & Fetterolf, 2014). For example, Allison Skinner and colleagues (2015) found that, depending on the context, hostile and benevolent sexism each predicted more negative judgements of the driver in an accident if the driver was said to be a woman rather than a man. Kristen Salomon and colleagues (2015) found that being the target of either type of sexism triggered negative cardiovascular responses in the women in their study. Glick and colleagues (2000) conducted an ambitious study of 15 000 men and women in 19 nations across six continents, including Australia, and found that ambivalent sexism was prevalent around the world. Among their most intriguing findings was that people from countries with the greatest degree of economic and political inequality between the sexes tended to exhibit the most hostile and benevolent sexism.

Objectification Women are all too often treated in objectifying ways; that is, they are viewed or treated more as mere bodies or objects and less as fully functioning human beings. The advertising industry specifically, and the popular media more generally, are filled with imagery of women represented as sexual objects or just parts of a body (Kilbourne, 2003). For example, Julie Stankiewicz and Francine Rosselli (2008) examined almost 2000 advertisements depicting women from 58 popular magazines in the US and found that half of them featured women as sex objects. Women also experience being treated and seen as objects in numerous interactions in their real lives. University of Melbourne’s Elise Holland and colleagues (2017) asked young women to record instances in which they were targeted by or witnessed a sexually objectifying event on their mobile devices over the course of a week. The results speak for themselves: the women reported being targeted by a sexually objectifying event, most frequently objectifying gazes, once every 2 days on average and reported witnessing sexually objectifying events of others 1.35 times per day on average. Although men are also objectified in the media, and men are sometimes objectified in real interactions, it is still the case that women experience this much more frequently, and a good deal of research documents a variety of negative effects of this objectification on women, including on their mental and physical health, their academic performance and how they behave in social interactions (Calogero, Tantleff-Dunn, & Thompson, 2011; Fredrickson, Roberts, Noll, Quinn, & Twenge, 1998; Saguy, Quinn, Dovidio, & Pratto, 2010; Tiggemann & Williams, 2012).

Double standards Many years ago, Philip Goldberg (1968) asked students at a small women’s university to evaluate the content and writing style of some articles. When the material was supposedly written by John McKay rather than 170

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Joan McKay it received higher ratings, a result that led Goldberg to wonder if even women were prejudiced against women. Certain other studies showed that people often devalue the performance of women who take on tasks usually reserved for men (Lott, 1985) and attribute women’s achievements to luck rather than ability (Deaux & Emswiller, 1974; Nieva & Gutek, 1981). These studies generated a lot of attention, but it now appears that this kind of devaluation of women is not commonly found in similar studies. Meta-analyses of studies modelled after Goldberg’s, as well as those conducted in the field, indicate that people are not generally biased by gender in the evaluation of performance (Bowen, Swim, & Jacobs, 2000; Swim & Sanna, 1996; Top, 1991). More recently, two different sets of studies involved having professors from science-related fields evaluate the materials of candidates for research or faculty positions in their fields, and these studies found completely contradictory results. One found a bias in favour of candidates if they were said to be male (Moss-Racusin, Dovidio, Brescoll, Graham, & Handelsman, 2012), and the other found a bias in favour of candidates if they were said to be female (Williams & Ceci, 2015). The point here is that in studies involving the evaluation of materials that are identical except for the gender of the person who supposedly produced the materials, the findings have been inconsistent.

Pervasiveness of sex-based stereotypes What is quite clear, however, is that sex discrimination continues to exist in numerous other ways and instances. As with forms of modern and implicit racism, subtle but impactful examples of sexism abound. For example, Juan Madera and colleagues (2018) looked at real letters of recommendation that professors wrote for candidates FIGURE 4.20 Malala Yousafzai for academic jobs. A quick look at these letters probably would not After surviving being shot in the head by the Taliban for reveal any obvious differences based on the gender of the candidates. defying their ban against girls attending school in Pakistan, A more thorough analysis, however, indicated that both male and Malala Yousafzai has worked tirelessly in her quest to help female professors tended to include more pieces of information girls around the world receive education. She became the raising slight doubts (e.g., ‘she has a somewhat challenging youngest person to win the Nobel Peace Prize in 2014. Her personality’, ‘she might make a good colleague’) for female than for experience speaks not only to the blatant sexism that exists in the world, but also the power of taking action against it. male candidates. Moreover, these seemingly minor doubts made a significant difference in the evaluations of people reading these letters. Sexism today is by no means limited to subtle biases. In many parts of the world blatant sexism is still quite evident. Consider Malala Yousafzai, pictured in Figure 4.20, a Pakistani teenage girl who was shot in the head in 2012 by the Taliban when she defied their bans against girls attending school. She survived the attack, became an inspiring activist dedicated to female education, and in October 2014 became the youngest person to date to win a Nobel Peace Prize. Other examples are far less extreme but still important. Look at Figure 4.21 and Table 4.3, for example, and you’ll notice some striking sex differences in occupational choice. How many female airline pilots have you met lately? What about male dental hygienists? (It is interesting to note that 98% of the dental hygienists in Australia in 2016 were women, but only 42% of the dentists were.) The question is: ‘What explains these differences?’ Decades of social science research point to sexist attitudes and discrimination as a key part of the equation. Sex discrimination during the early school years may pave the way for diverging career paths in adulthood. Then, when equally qualified men and women compete for a job, gender considerations enter in once again, as some research indicates that business professionals favour men for so-called masculine jobs, such as a manager for a machinery company, and women for so-called feminine jobs, such as a receptionist (Barbulescu & Bidwell, 2013; Caleo & Heilman, 2014; Koch, D’Mello, & Sackett, 2015). A recent study by Sylvia Beyer (2018) revealed that most people are unaware of this occupational segregation by gender, and that low levels of awareness Source: Getty Images/The Asahi Shimbun have been relatively stable since the mid-1990s.

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FIGURE 4.21 Percentage of women in specific occupations in Australia, 2016 Census statistics reveal that men and women occupy very different positions in the Australian workforce. Dental assistants Audiologists and speech pathologists\therapists Hairdressers Psychologists Social and welfare professionals, nfd School teachers, nfd Physiotherapists Pharmacists Human resource managers Accountants Photographers Total Call or contact centre and customer service managers Sales representatives Music professionals Chefs Chief executives and managing directors Security officers and guards Construction managers Truck drivers Carpenters and joiners 0.0

0.2

0.4 0.6 Proportion women

0.8

1.0

Note: Occupations marked ‘nfd’ are not further defined into occupational subgroups Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics (2018), Census of Population and Housing: Reflecting Australia, cat. no. 2071.0, Released under CC BY 4.0 International. Link to license: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

Even when women and men have comparable jobs, the odds are good that the women will be paid less than their male counterparts and will be confronted with a so-called glass ceiling that makes it harder for women to rise to the highest positions of power in a business or organisation (Blau & Kahn, 2017; Powell & Butterfield, 2015). In 2018, the Australian Government’s Workplace Gender Equality Agency released a report showing that females working in the financial and insurance services industry earn 26.6% lower than their male colleagues – the highest gap observed in the by-industry analysis. The gender pay gap in the public administration sector, on the other hand, was 5.8%. Women vying for jobs and career advancement often face a virtually impossible dilemma: they are seen as more competent if they present themselves with stereotypically masculine rather than feminine traits, yet when they do this they are also perceived as less socially skilled and attractive – a perception that may ultimately cost them the job or career advancement they were seeking (Ferguson, 2018; Rudman, MossRacusin, Phelan, & Nauts, 2012; Zheng, Kark, & Meister, 2018). For both women and men, being in a job that is traditionally seen as more typical of the other gender can be especially challenging. Consistent with this idea are the results of a study by Victoria Brescoll and colleagues (2010). These researchers found that men and women were judged more harshly for a mistake made on a job traditionally held by the other sex than for the same kind of mistake on a job in which their gender was the majority. Janine Bosak and colleagues (2018) found that men who advocated for their team rather than for themselves, thus exhibiting gender atypical behaviour, were penalised both in terms of how competent they were perceived to be as well as whether they would be endorsed for promotion. The role of career atypicality emerges early: a recent study revealed that male university students were more likely 172

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TABLE 4.3 Women in work settings in selected countries around the world These international labour statistics show the percentage of workers in each category who are women in each of several countries. These data show some of the differences between nations, as well as some

Country

Total workforce (%)

Clerks (%)

Australia

45

67

Canada

47

Colombia Costa Rica

similarities concerning which types of jobs women are more or less likely to occupy around the world.

Craft and trade workers (%)

Legislators, senior officials, managers (%)

Sales and service workers (%)

5

37

68

77

8

37

63

39

58

19

46

61

37

57

14

27

54

Egypt

21

29

3

11

10

Iran

18

24

23

13

11

Israel

46

74

5

30

60

Italy

39

59

14

33

57

Republic of Korea

42

52

15

9

63

Mexico

37

61

24

31

54

Morocco

27

25

19

12

6

Netherlands

45

69

5

28

69

United Kingdom

46

78

8

34

76

Source: International Labour Office (2008). LABORSTA Internet. Retrieved from http://laborsta.ilo.org.

to switch degree programs if they started in a female-dominated area than a male-dominated area (RiegleCrumb, King, & Moore, 2016). Examples like these show that even with all the great strides that have been made over the decades, defying traditional gender roles can still be daunting.

Beyond racism and sexism: age, weight, sexuality and other targets Other forms of bias and discrimination are, of course, quite important and are the subject of contemporary social psychological research. In fact, social psychologists today are studying a wider variety of stereotypes, prejudices and targets of discrimination than ever. It is probably no coincidence, for example, that as the world’s population ages and people tend to live longer, more researchers are studying ageism; that is, prejudice and discrimination targeting the elderly (Nelson, 2016; North & Fiske, 2015). One of the interesting things about ageism is how much attitudes and behaviours towards the elderly vary so greatly across cultures. Another interesting aspect is that it is the rare prejudice that is held by people who will one day – if they are lucky enough to live that long – become members of the group they once were prejudiced against. Other forms of prejudice and discrimination that are attracting recent attention include those targeting people’s physical disabilities or disfigurements, mental health, political ideology, economic class, marital status (particularly being unmarried), sexual orientation and religion (or lack of religious beliefs) (DePaulo, 2011; Gervais, 2013; Madera & Hebl, 2012; Pirlott & Neuberg, 2014; West, Hewstone, & Lolliot, 2014). Although it is much less socially acceptable to display obvious prejudice and discrimination of any kind today, some forms of these biases appear to be considered more acceptable by many people. Among these are prejudice based on weight and based on sexuality. Although what is considered as ideal body types can vary dramatically in some ways across times and cultures, it is clear that in some cultures today jokes, negative attitudes and insensitive behaviours directed towards those who are perceived to be overweight can be pervasive and hurtful (Brochu & Esses, 2011; Hebl et al., 2009; Ruggs, Hebl, & Williams, 2015; Schafer & Ferraro, 2011). Lisa Rosenthal and colleagues (2015), for example, found that children in the fifth and sixth grade who experienced weight-based bullying were more likely to have negative health outcomes two years later, even after statistically controlling for any physical and mental health differences that existed at the beginning of the study. The negative impact of weight stigma among adults is equally as profound (Vartanian & Porter, 2016). Prejudice and discrimination based on sexuality remain unusually overt and blatant, often being among the most divisive social issues in a society. Recent years have seen the legalisation of same-sex

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marriage as a hot-button social and political issue. Indeed, a very divisive public campaign in Australia over same-sex marriage occurred in 2017. Australian Catholic University’s Joel Anderson and colleagues (2017) determined several psychological factors that predicted Australians’ likelihood of supporting marriage equality: religious affiliation, political orientation, and attitudes towards gay men (but not lesbian women). Other research has identified the role of beliefs about the nature or nurture basis for same-sex attraction in predicting support for same-sex marriage in Australia: nature-based aetiology beliefs are associated with increased support and nurture-based aetiology beliefs with decreased support (Sloane & Robillard, 2017). Whatever the source of support or opposition to same-sex marriage, the trend appears towards lowered prejudice. Following 61.6% of the Australian electorate voting ‘yes’ in favour of same-sex marriage, the Australian parliament passed the Marriage Amendment Bill that modified the definition of marriage to recognise a ‘union of two people’. It is important to recognise that nearly any social categorisation can lead to prejudice and discrimination. For example, distinctions between vegetarians and omnivores and even sports team affiliations have been shown to be the source of both implicit and explicit biases (Cikara & Fiske 2013; MacInnis & Hodson, 2017).

ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM: REDUCING PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION We have discussed the persistence of stereotypes, prejudice and discrimination today, as well as numerous factors at the root of these problems. In this final section, we focus on some of the approaches that have been suggested for combating prejudice and discrimination.

Intergroup contact Contact hypothesis

The theory that direct contact between hostile groups will reduce intergroup prejudice under certain conditions.

One of the many enduring ideas in Gordon Allport’s (1954) classic book, The Nature of Prejudice, is the contact hypothesis, which states that under certain conditions, direct contact between members of rival groups will reduce intergroup prejudice. Around the time of the publication of Allport’s book, the US Supreme Court ruled in the historic 1954 case of Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka that racially separate schools were inherently unequal and violated the US Constitution. Despite the court’s ruling, desegregation proceeded slowly. Many schools remained untouched until the early 1970s. Then, as the dust began to settle, research brought the grave realisation that contact between black and white schoolchildren was not having the intended effect on intergroup attitudes. Walter Stephan (1986) reviewed studies conducted during and after desegregation and found that although 13% of the studies reported a decrease in prejudice among whites, 34% reported no change and 53% reported an increase. These findings forced social psychologists to re-examine the contact hypothesis. Is the original contact hypothesis wrong? No. Although desegregation did not immediately produce the desired changes, it is important to realise that the ideal conditions for successful intergroup contact did not exist in the public schools that desegregated. Nobody ever said that deeply rooted prejudices could be erased just by throwing groups together. According to the contact hypothesis, four conditions are ideal for contact to succeed, equal status, personal interaction, cooperative activities and social norms, as outlined in Table 4.4. TABLE 4.4 Conditions under which the contact hypothesis holds true Four conditions are deemed ideal for intergroup contact to serve as a treatment for racism.

174

Condition

Explanation

Equal status

The contact should occur in circumstances that give the two groups equal status.

Personal interaction

The contact should involve one-on-one interactions among individual members of the two groups.

Cooperative activities

Members of the two groups should join together in an effort to achieve superordinate goals.

Social norms

The social norms, defined in part by relevant authorities, should favour intergroup contact.

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The value of intergroup contact Extensive reviews of the research relevant to the contact hypothesis have led to very encouraging conclusions (Dovidio, Love, Schellhaas, & Hewstone, 2017; Hayward, Tropp, Hornsey, & Barlow, 2017; Tropp, 2013; Tropp & Barlow, 2018). In a series of meta-analyses involving more than 500 studies and a quarter of a million participants in 38 nations, Pettigrew and Tropp (2000, 2006, 2008) found reliable support for the benefits of intergroup contact in reducing prejudice, particularly when the contact satisfies at least some of the conditions listed in Table 4.4. Researchers propose that contact reduces prejudice by: (1) enhancing knowledge about the outgroup; (2) reducing anxiety about intergroup contact; and (3) increasing empathy and perspective taking. A substantial portion of work relating to intergroup contact has been carried out in Australia and New Zealand (Ata, Bastian, & Lusher, 2009; Barlow et al., 2012a; Leong & Ward, 2011; Mak, Brown, & Wadey, 2014; Nesdale & Todd, 2000; Sengupta & Sibley, 2013; Turoy-Smith, Kane, & Pedersen, 2013; White, Abu-Rayya, & Weitzel, 2014). Shelley McKeown and John Dixon (2017) summarised three ways in which positive outcomes predicted by the contact hypothesis might be attenuated: 1 Contact can be negative, thus undermining intergroup benefits. 2 Actual intergroup contact can be difficult based on societal segregation along group lines. 3 Intergroup contact might undermine the efforts of minority group members in attaining recognition for disadvantage. Research by Fiona Barlow and colleagues (2012a) documented the risks of negative intergroup contact for enhancing prejudice against Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people, Muslim Australians, and asylum seekers. It is clear that the parameters around intergroup contact must be considered carefully.

The jigsaw classroom One context that is rife for intergroup contact is the classroom. To combat what can typically be a competitive dynamic between students in the classroom, which might undermine intergroup contact as per Table 4.4, Elliot Aronson and colleagues (1978) developed a cooperative learning method called the jigsaw classroom. In newly desegregated public schools in the US, they assigned fifth graders to small racially and academically mixed groups. The material to be learned within each group was divided into subtopics, much the way a jigsaw puzzle is broken into pieces. Each student was responsible for learning one piece of the puzzle, after which all members took turns teaching their material to one another. In this system, everyone, regardless of race, ability or self-confidence, needs everyone else if the group as a whole is to succeed. Initial tests of the method produced impressive results (Aronson, 2004). Compared with children in traditional classes, those in jigsaw classrooms grew to like each other more, liked school more, were less prejudiced and had higher self-esteem. What’s more, academic test scores improved for minority students and remained the same for white students. Some later tests confirmed these benefits (Santos Rego & Moldeo, 2005), while others showed no effect of the jigsaw approach for intergroup outcomes (Bratt, 2008). Despite these mixed findings, implementing the principles of the jigsaw classroom offers a promising way to promote learning more generally (Crone & Portillo, 2013).

Jigsaw classroom

A cooperative learning method used to reduce racial prejudice through interaction in group efforts.

Intergroup friendship Developing friendships across groups is one of the best ways to experience many of the optimal conditions for contact that are listed in Table 4.4. Friendships typically involve equal status, meaningful one-on-one interactions that extend across time and settings, and cooperation towards shared goals. It therefore makes sense that one of the most encouraging lines of research on improving intergroup relations has focused on cross-group friendships. A recent meta-analysis of 135 studies by Kristin Davies and colleagues (2011) supports the idea that cross-group friendships are associated with more positive attitudes and behaviours towards outgroup members. The link between friendship and better intergroup relations has been examined in multiple ways. Numerous surveys have found that cross-group friendship is associated with less intergroup anxiety and prejudice (Davies et al., 2011; Page-Gould & Mendoza-Denton, 2011). For example, white Australians who have cross-group friendships with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people report lower levels of prejudice and avoidance of the outgroup (Barlow, Louis, & Hewstone, 2009). To establish that cross-group friendship can cause improvement in intergroup attitudes and behaviours, however, it is important to have experimental evidence. Fortunately, a growing number of experiments have done just that (MendozaDenton & Page-Gould, 2008; Page-Gould, Mendoza-Denton, & Tropp, 2008; Page-Gould, Mendoza-Denton, Alegre, & Siy, 2010).

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In a daily diary study Elizabeth Page-Gould (2012) tracked the social interactions of 60 participants in Toronto, Canada, for 10 days. She found that if individuals who had no or very few close cross-group friends experienced an intergroup conflict on a particular day, they became less likely to initiate intergroup contact the next day. However, among individuals who did have close cross-group friends, there was no reduction in initiating intergroup contact after an intergroup conflict occurred. Having these crossgroup friends seemed to buffer the individuals against any lingering effects of an intergroup conflict experience.

CRITICAL THINKING ACTIVITY List the 10 friends who you have interacted with most recently. Next to their name, note down characteristics of their identities – gender, race, age or any other group. Evaluate the diversity of your peer group. How do you think this shapes your

perceptions of the social world? Have any of your stereotypes about others been shaped by friends who come from a different social group – if so, were they changed for the positive or the negative?

Of course, there is often even greater contact – psychologically as well as physically – between romantic partners than friends, and some research has examined whether cross-group dating is associated with more positive intergroup attitudes. For example, a longitudinal study of university dating by Shana Levin and colleagues (2007) revealed that white, Asian American and Latino students who dated outside their group more during university showed less ingroup bias and intergroup anxiety at the end of university than students who did not date outside their own racial group.

Extended contact Even people who do not have a friend from an outgroup can benefit from having ingroup friends who do. A number of studies have found evidence for what is known as the extended contact effect – where knowing that an ingroup friend has a good and close relationship with a member of an outgroup can produce positive intergroup benefits in ways similar to direct contact (Zhou, Page-Gould, Aron, Moyer, & Hewstone, 2018). Extending what we know about the role of romantic partners in direct contact, evidence suggests that romantic relationships can serve as a conduit for extended contact (Paterson, Turner, & Conner, 2015). Why might extended contact function to promote positive intergroup outcomes? Several causes are involved, such as reducing ignorance and anxiety about outgroup members and providing individuals with positive examples of outgroup members (Cameron, Rutland, Hossain, & Petley, 2011; Dovidio, Eller, & Hewstone, 2011; Eller, Abrams, & Zimmermann, 2011; Wright, Aron, & Brody, 2008). So, which is best – direct or extended contact? One might imagine that direct contact would carry the biggest impact given how tangible the interaction is. Or perhaps extended contact would produce the most benefit since it might come with less anxiety. Maria Ioannou and colleagues (2018) put this question to the test in the context of Greek Cypriot participants interacting with Turkish Cypriots either directly or vicariously in an extended contact manner. The results showed that direct contact produced a larger immediate benefit for outgroup attitudes than extended contact, but that extended contact produced larger long-term benefits than direct contact in the form of reduced anxiety for future contact.

Imagined contact What about situations in which intergroup contact is not feasible? Research suggests that even imagining a positive interaction with an outgroup member can increase positive intergroup behaviour and decrease prejudice (Miles & Crisp, 2014). Imagined intergroup contact effects have been documented for intergroup relations with regard to mental health, religion, ethnicity and sexual orientation (Meleady & Seger, 2017; Visintin, Birtel, & Crisp, 2017; West, Holmes, & Hewstone, 2011, West, Husnu, & Lipps, 2015). One reason why imagined intergroup contact might carry benefit is that it serves to increase the perceived humanness of outgroups who might otherwise be dehumanised (Prati & Loughnan, 2018). As is the case with direct contact, the nature of the imagined contact matters. In one study, participants asked to imagine interacting with a confident, attractive (i.e., counterstereotypical) obese person reported lower anti-obesity bias than participants asked to imagine interacting with an insecure, unattractive (i.e., stereotypical) obese person (Dunaev, Brochu, & Markey, 2018). Other studies underscore the benefit of imagined contact with counterstereotypical outgroup members across religious affiliations (Yetkili, Abrams, Travaglino, & Giner-Sorolla, 2018). 176

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Shared identities Intergroup contact that emphasises shared goals and fates can effectively reduce prejudice and discrimination, specifically by changing how group members categorise each other (Bettencourt, Molix, Talley, & Eubanks, 2007; Van Bavel & Cunningham, 2009). The common ingroup identity model developed by Samuel Gaertner and John Dovidio (2014) proposes that if members of different groups recategorise themselves as members of a more inclusive superordinate group, intergroup attitudes and relations can improve. By recognising their shared categorisation, just as the Rattlers and Eagles did when they changed from competitors to collaborators in Robbers Cave State Park, ‘they’ become ‘we’ and a common ingroup identity can be forged. Researchers have induced a common ingroup identity among participants in their studies in a variety of ways, such as by having different groups share a common label, dispersing them around a table so that they are not separated according to group, or having them wear similar T-shirts. For example, Blake Riek and colleagues (2010) put Democrat supporters and Republican supporters together into two-person groups. When their different political party memberships were highlighted, the participants rated the other group more negatively. When their shared identity as Americans was highlighted, however, such as by having them wear shirts with the American flag printed on the front and calling their group the America Group, their intergroup ratings were significantly more positive. It is worth noting that, in some contexts at least, individuals from minority groups or groups that have less power in a society tend to not feel as positively as majority group members do about recategorising their groups into one common ingroup (Ufkes, Calcagno, Glasford, & Dovidio, 2016). A group with smaller numbers or less power may feel overwhelmed and experience a sense of lost identity if they merge completely with a larger or more powerful group. Instead, members of these groups sometimes prefer or benefit more from dual-identity categorisations, in which their distinctiveness as a member of their specific group is preserved, but in which their connection and potential for cooperation with the majority or more powerful group is recognised (Dovidio, Saguy, Gaertner, & Thomas, 2013). A key point remains, though, that seeing connections between the groups and ways in which their identities are shared is essential.

Enhancing belonging One of the most powerful ways that minority status affects wellbeing and performance is reduced belonging. That is, targeted students are likely to feel that ‘people like me do not belong here’, such as in a particular course, school, career or some other domain (Cook, Purdie-Vaughns, Garcia, & Cohen, 2012; Walton & Cohen, 2007). Gregory Walton has applied social psychological techniques to create belonging interventions outside the lab that have had truly remarkable success with students in a number of schools (Walton, 2014). For example, Walton and colleague Geoffrey Cohen (2011) gave first-semester African American students, at a university with predominantly white students, information designed to reduce feelings of uncertainty about their sense of belonging at the university. They read that it is quite typical of most students, regardless of their gender, race or ethnicity, to go through periods of social stress and uncertainty during their first year, and that these struggles tend to go away soon after their first year. Walton and Cohen found that this information raised the African American students’ performance significantly higher relative to other African American students who were not given this information. Especially impressive was that this effect lasted through their entire university experience. Nilanjana Dasgupta and colleagues (2015) also conducted a recent study with female engineers. They reasoned that women’s uncertainty about belonging in engineering is heightened by typically being so outnumbered by men. To examine this issue, the researchers had female engineers work on engineering problems in small groups that were either mostly female, mostly male, or equally male and female. The results indicated that women who were in the majority were more motivated and interested in the group task, demonstrated more confidence, and gave more helpful input than women who were in the minority or even women who were in groups with equal numbers of males and females (see Figure 4.22 for an illustration of one of these findings).

Exerting self-control A key point in this chapter is that people often stereotype and show prejudice towards others even when they would rather not. For example, we have reported research indicating that people often activate negative stereotypes about groups even if they do not believe them. Can we learn to control and rise above these impulses?

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FIGURE 4.22 Safety in numbers Female engineers worked on engineering problems in small groups that were either mostly (75%) female, equally male and female, or mostly (75%) male. Women in the male-majority groups felt significantly more worried about working on the group task than did the women in the female-majority groups (left). Women in the female-majority groups actively participated on the task much more than did women in the other two groups (right). 6

1.6 1.4

5.5

0.8

75%

50%

0.6 0.4

Group participation

Degree of worry

1

75%

25%

1.2

5

50%

25%

4.5 4 3.5

0.2 0

3 Percent female in group

Percent female in group

Source: Dasgupta et al., 2015 Reference Crediting: Blair, I. V., Dasgupta, N., & Glaser, J. (2015). Implicit attitudes. In M. Mikulincer, P. R. Shaver, E. Borgida, & J. A. Bargh (Eds.), APA handbook of personality and social psychology, Volume 1: Attitudes and social cognition (pp. 665–691). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.

Controlling prejudice takes effort One of the obstacles to this is that trying to suppress stereotyping or to control prejudiced actions can take mental effort, and people do not have the time, energy or awareness to dedicate to this effort (Ito et al., 2015). Some factors make people less likely to have sufficient cognitive resources for successful control. For example, research from the University of Queensland shows that older people have a harder time suppressing stereotypes than younger people, which may explain in part why older people often appear more prejudiced than younger people (von Hippel & Henry, 2011). Further, being intoxicated makes people have a difficult time suppressing thoughts or inhibiting impulses (e.g., consider the dreaded drunk dialling or texting). It may come as little surprise, therefore, that intoxication impairs people’s ability to control stereotype activation and suppress prejudice expression (Noor, Reed, & Doosje, 2017; Schofield, Unkelbach, & Denson, 2017; Stepanova, Bartholow, Saults, & Friedman, 2018). Being physically tired or being affected by strong emotion or arousal can sap perceivers of the cognitive resources necessary to avoid stereotyping. In an intriguing demonstration of this, Galen Bodenhausen (1990) ran an experiment with two types of people: ‘morning people’ (who are most alert early in the morning) and ‘night people’ (who peak much later, in the evening). By random assignment, participants took part in an experiment that was scheduled at either 9 a.m. or 8 p.m. The result? Morning people were more likely to use stereotypes when tested at night; night owls were more likely to do so early in the morning. More recently, Sonia Ghumman and Christopher Barnes (2013) found that the sleepier the students in their study were, the more stereotyping and prejudice they exhibited.

Controlling prejudice takes motivation In addition to people’s ability to control prejudice, another issue is what motivates people to do so. Researchers have distinguished between two kinds of motivation to control prejudiced responses and behaviours. One kind is externally driven – not wanting to appear to others to be prejudiced. A second type is internally driven – not wanting to be prejudiced, regardless of whether or not others would find out (Dunton & Fazio, 1997; Plant & Devine, 1998, 2009). Internally motivated individuals are likely to be more successful at controlling stereotyping and prejudice, even on implicit measures, but even they are vulnerable to the strong power of automatic stereotyping and implicit biases.

178

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Prejudice

According to the self-regulation of prejudiced responses model FIGURE 4.23 Productive and counterproductive proposed by Margo Monteith and colleagues (Monteith, Ashburnantiprejudice messages Nardo, Voils, & Czopp, 2002; Monteith & Mark, 2009), internally motivated individuals in particular may learn to control their Compared to students who did not receive any brochure, those who read an antiprejudice brochure that emphasised internally prejudices more effectively over time. According to this model, driven motivations to not be prejudiced, such as why one would people who are truly motivated to be fair and unprejudiced are benefit by promoting diversity, later exhibited significantly often confronted with the sad reality that they have failed to live less prejudice toward black people. In contrast, students who up to that goal. These realisations lead to unpleasant emotions received the brochure that appealed to external factors, such such as guilt. As individuals experience such feelings of guilt as how one could get into trouble if caught doing or saying something racist, exhibited significantly more prejudice. repeatedly, they begin to develop expertise at recognising the situations and stimuli that tend to trigger these failures, and 4.8 therefore they can exert more control over them. In so doing, they begin to interrupt what had been automatic stereotype 4.6 activation. Just as people who are internally motivated to control 4.4 prejudice tend to become more successful at self-regulation than people who are motivated for external reasons, antiprejudice messages that are designed to appeal more to 4.2 people’s internal motivations may be more effective than messages that seem more externally focused. To study this 4.0 issue, Lisa Legault and colleagues (2011) developed a pair of prejudice-reduction brochures. One brochure appealed to 3.8 internal motivations, emphasising the personal as well as societal benefits of tolerance and diversity. The other brochure 3.6 appealed to external motivations, emphasising the obligations that compel individuals and organisations to act in nonInternal No External prejudiced ways. Students at a Canadian university read one of motives brochure motives the two brochures, or they received no brochure at all, and later Source: Legault, L., Gutsell, J. N., & Inzlicht, M. (2011). Ironic effects of antiprejudice messages: How motivational interventions can reduce (but also increase) prejudice. completed a measure of their prejudice towards black people (no Psychological Science, 22, 1472–1477. black students were included in the study). Students exhibited significantly less prejudice if they received the brochure that appealed to internal motivations to control prejudice than if they received no brochure. On the other hand, the students who received the brochure appealing to external factors exhibited significantly more prejudice than the students who received no brochure (see Figure 4.23). The brochure that emphasised the external rather than internal reasons to control prejudice likely came across to the students as very controlling and made students rebel against it somewhat. People do not like to be told how they must think and not think, and so antiprejudice messages that are perceived in that way can be counterproductive.

Changing cognitions We have just discussed some of the challenges involved in trying not to think about stereotypes or act in a prejudiced way. There are several ways of thinking that can be more productive. Social–cognitive factors that research has shown can reduce stereotyping and prejudice include: • being exposed to and thinking about examples of group members that are inconsistent with the stereotype (Columb & Plant, 2011) • learning about the variability that exists among the people in a group (Brauer & Er-rafiy, 2011; Brauer, Er-rafiy, Kawakami, & Phills, 2012) • being induced to take the perspective of a person from a stereotyped group (Maister, Slater, SanchezVives, & Tsakiris, 2015; Peck, Seinfeld, Aglioti, & Slater, 2013; Todd, Galinsky, & Bodenhausen, 2012) • being encouraged to pay attention to instances of discrimination (Becker & Swim, 2011; Dickter & Newton, 2013; Gulker, Mark, & Monteith, 2013) • believing that prejudice can be learned and unlearned and is therefore malleable rather than a fixed, unchanging reality (Carr, Dweck, & Pauker, 2012; Neel & Shapiro, 2012) • learning that race is more ambiguous and socially determined than simply a genetic, fixed category (Williams & Eberhardt, 2008) • taking a multicultural view that not only recognises but also values group differences, that reveal new ways of thinking, and that acknowledge how different groups have influenced each other throughout history, as opposed to pretending to not notice distinctions between groups (Apfelbaum et al., 2008; Copyright 2020 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-202

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•

Holoien & Shelton, 2012; Plaut, Thomas, & Goren, 2009; Rattan & Ambady, 2012; Rosenthal & Levy, 2013; Tadmor, Hong, Chao, Wiruchnipawan, & Wang 2012) thinking of multiculturalism as an approach that is inclusive of everyone, including the majority group, rather than as one that excludes the majority group to benefit only minority groups (Plaut, Garnett, Buffardi, & Sanchez-Burks, 2011). Refer to Figure 4.24 for how countries around the world fare on multiculturalism endorsement. FIGURE 4.24 Multicultural views Researchers from Victoria University of Wellington revealed that New Zealand and Australia lead the world in endorsement of multicultural views. Of those countries included, Greece fares the poorest. Percentage of population strongly endorsing multicultural views

100 80 60 40 20

Au

st

ra

li Sw a ed en S Ne pa in th er la nd s Fr a Lu nc x Un emb e ite ou d kin rg gd o De m nm ar Fin k la nd Ita Po ly rtu ga Ire l la n Be d lg iu Ge m rm an y Au st ria Gr ee ce

Ne

w

Ze

al

an

d

0

Source: Ward, C., & Masgoret, A. M. (2008). Attitudes toward immigrants, immigration, and multiculturalism in New Zealand: A social psychological analysis. International Migration Review, 42, 227–248.

How can these types of thinking be promoted? One important factor may be education. Anne Pedersen and Fiona Barlow (2008) demonstrated just how effective education can be. After completing a crosscultural psychology unit that integrated many of these themes, Australian students in the study reported lowered prejudice towards Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people.

Changing culture Motivations, norms and values can and often do change over time. It is at the cultural level that much potential for positive change can be found. People – especially younger people – look to images in popular culture as well as to their peers and role models for information about what attitudes and behaviours are in fashion or out of date. For example, many people cite celebrities such as Ellen DeGeneres or television shows like Modern Family for helping to change their attitudes toward gay rights (Lang, 2015). Similarly, seeing antiprejudice campaigns that promote ideas like ‘Black Lives Matter’ or ‘Me Too’ go viral around the world in response to violence against targeted groups no doubt affects many people’s attitudes. We also look to our peers to get a sense of the local norms around us, including norms about stereotypes and prejudice (Fein, Hoshino-Browne, Davies, & Spencer, 2003; Nelson, 2015; Pryor, Reeder, Wesselmann, Williams, & Wirth, 2013). In a particular high school, a Year 12 student might feel comfortable calling a friend ‘gay’ and mean little by it and think nothing of it. Yet several months later, as a first-year university student, this student might realise the prejudicial implications of using that word in that way. If this lesson is learned, it is more likely to have been learned by watching and interacting with one’s peers than from having been lectured about diversity and sensitivity by a campus speaker. Learning these norms can motivate us to adopt them. Of course, legislating against hate speech, unequal treatment and hostile environments can also be an important weapon. Although they can create resistance and backlashes, laws and policies that require behaviour change can – if done properly, with no suggestion of compromise and with important leaders

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clearly behind them – cause hearts and minds to follow (Aronson, 1992). Laura Barron and Mikki Hebl (2013), for example, found across a series of studies that laws that make employment discrimination against gays illegal (which many states in the US do not currently have) make a significant and positive difference in individuals’ attitudes and behaviours. Elizabeth Levy Paluck (2011) has conducted some fascinating field studies showing the power of peer and cultural influences. In one study, students in several high schools were trained to be ‘peer leaders’ who would confront expressions of intergroup prejudice. These students not only engaged in more antiprejudice behaviours, but these behaviours also spread to their friends. Recently, the power of a brief, 10-minute conversation was demonstrated in Florida, US. David Brookman and Joshua Kalla (2016) examined the impact of door-to-door canvassing on anti-transgender prejudice. The canvassers engaged voters in an active perspective-taking exercise that involved voters considering a time when they themselves were judged negatively for being different. Reduced antitransgender prejudice was observed three weeks, six weeks, and even three months later. Studies like these show that a source for much positive change stems from what is at the very core of social psychology: the social nature of the human animal. Some of our baser instincts – such as intergroup competition that breeds intergroup biases – may always be present, but we also can learn from each other the thoughts, values and goals that make us less vulnerable to perpetuating or being the targets of stereotypes, prejudice and discrimination.

Source: © Courtesy of Associate Professor Fiona Kate Barlow.

RESEARCH SPOTLIGHT ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR FIONA KATE BARLOW, SCHOOL OF PSYCHOLOGY, UNIVERSITY OF QUEENSLAND What are the topic areas of your research? I look at contact between members of different groups and how such contact (or expectations about contact) shapes intergroup relations. I look extensively at how fears around contact (e.g., expecting rejection on the basis of race) can encourage race-based segregation, and how negative contact between members of traditionally oppositional groups can effectively poison intergroup relations. My work informs researchers about expecting rejection on the basis of your race, minority group experiences of contact and rejection, the differential impact of negative and positive contact on racism and discrimination, and how contact might be associated with collective action and political solidarity. I am currently doing research with the support of an Australian Research Council Future Fellowship on these topics (Barlow, Louis & Hewstone, 2009; Barlow et al., 2012; Hayward et al., 2017; Tropp & Barlow, 2018). I also do work looking at body image, romantic relationships, and sex. Which of your research findings have you found most intriguing? One paper that I am very proud of was authored by my past PhD student Michael Thai (Thai, Barlow & Hornsey, 2014). In this paper we took on the topic of ‘ethnic deviance’. Typically, work shows that humans really dislike deviance – and we police the groups to which we belong by making sure that anyone who does not ‘act like us’ is either disciplined or ejected from the group. Michael and I proposed that for some groups, this general pattern may not hold true. Specifically, we looked at Asian Australians. Asian Australians (like many other Asian

people in Western settings) are perpetually denied their national identity. They are always being asked, ‘Where are you really from?’ and so on and so forth. Given these pressures, we proposed that under certain conditions Asian Australian participants might actually strategically befriend ethnic deviants; that is, ‘white-acting’ Asians and ‘Asian-acting’ whites (i.e., members of each group who fit stereotypes about the other group). In order to test our hypotheses we first ran a pilot study – finding out what sort of interests were stereotypically associated with both white and Asian Australians. Michael then designed fake Facebook profiles of an Asian man (William Lee) or white man (Lee Williams) who displayed either stereotypically white or Asian interests and likes. Asian and white Australians each saw one profile (random assignment to conditions). Sure enough, under certain conditions Asian Australians actually preferentially ‘friended’ the ‘boundary blurrers’; that is, ethnic deviants. No such pattern was evident for white Australians. In a second study we explained the pattern, demonstrating that this pattern was explained by Asian Australians’ desire for integration into the majority group and perceived efficacy of ethnic deviance at gaining such integration. Our results demonstrate just how important it is not to overgeneralise results – instead, different groups may display different responses to intergroup situations. In addition, it speaks to the consequences of identity denial for Asian Australians (and most likely, Asian New Zealanders). How did you become interested in your area of research? When I was aged four, I told my mother that I would make improving race-relations in Australia a priority. Over thirty years later, nothing has changed. My core area of research is social psychology. I want to know how groups interact with one another – when we get things right, and when we fall prey to really damaging intergroup hostility. I’m fascinated by the degree to which our race, gender, interest groups, education

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level, you name it, influence how we interact with and perceive the world around us. In terms of how I came to study social psychology specifically, however, the story is a little more complex. When I finished high school I knew exactly what I wanted to be, or more accurately, who: Ally MacBeal. I promptly enrolled in law at the University of Queensland, and saw a bright future stretching out ahead, surrounded by wacky law-firm colleagues who would join me in my hilarious court hijinks. Before I began studying, however, I decided to take a gap year and go to the US. I ended up in Minnesota, completing Year 12 for the second time in a row. While at school there, there was an option to take a [university] course online at Lake Superior University. I signed up for Introduction to Psychology. It was like nothing I had ever experienced before! I found myself actually wanting to read the textbook, wanting to learn more and more about clinical psychology, and other areas that I only dimly knew existed before – developmental psychology, cognitive psychology, behavioural psychology and, my one true love, social psychology. At no stage did I think of making it a career, however. It wasn’t until towards the end of my stay that my subconscious gave me a kick. I woke up in the middle of the night, in a cold sweat, with the sudden realisation that I could do law, or I could do something that would make me happy, keep me entertained and stimulate and satisfy my curiosity – psychology! I changed my preferences the next day and the rest is history.

How does your area of research speak to life in Australia and New Zealand? My work looks at prejudice, with a special focus on intergroup relations in Australia and New Zealand. I am based in Australia, and collaborate with Professor Chris Sibley on the New Zealand Attitudes and Values Survey. As an undergraduate student I completed my Bachelor of Arts with a double major in psychology, and a major in Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies. As I learned about the racism faced by Aboriginal people in Australia I began to wonder if the empirical light of psychology could be turned on the problem to better understand it, and eventually inform anti-racism measures. I have written papers looking at how friendships with Aboriginal people reduce white Australians’ racism and avoidance (Barlow et al., 2009), and how Asian Australians’ attitudes towards Aboriginal people are formed (Barlow et al., 2010). I have also implemented and evaluated anti-racism interventions (Pedersen & Barlow, 2008). Naturally, my scope has broadened, and I now look at multiple other forms of discrimination, including anti-fat stigma (e.g., Diedrichs & Barlow, 2011) and anti-gay attitudes (e.g., Barlow et al., 2012a). In moving to understand prejudice, it is my hope that we as social psychologists can work towards its reduction.

Topical Reflection STEREOTYPES AND PREJUDICE IN TODAY’S WORLD Now that we are at the end of the chapter on stereotyping, prejudice and discrimination, it is an appropriate time to consider for a moment how these factors could help explain the white supremacist rally in Charlottesville described in the chapter opening. Racial prejudice was a clear factor. Some have argued that the rise of white supremacist views and far-right ideologies is a reaction to challenged status (Mutz, 2018). Whether via systemic discrimination against women and ethnic minorities or via outright violence as seen in Charlottesville, the consequences of the reactions to such challenged status are palpable. We can also consider again the fatal shooting of Trayvon Martin discussed in the opening of Chapter 3. The results of the shooter bias research inspired by the Diallo tragedy (described in this chapter) add some support to the idea that negative stereotypes about African American young men may have played a role. More generally, it is quite likely that many of the factors that we have discussed in this chapter played a role here – factors such as social categorisation, distrust of outgroup members, prevalence of particular stereotypes in the culture and through the media, confirmation biases, illusory correlations and automatic stereotype activation. Each of these could have triggered not only Zimmerman’s initial suspicions of Martin that eventually led to the fatal confrontation but also many of the negative reactions people posted online or discussed in the media about Martin. At first, such questions seem impossible to answer. But as you have seen in this chapter, these are exactly the types of questions that social psychologists are poised and keen to answer. The unfortunate truth is that these cases are unlikely to be the last tragedies related to stereotypes, prejudice and discrimination. In 2017, 68 unarmed individuals were fatally shot by police in the US. More than half were of minority ethnicity. At the end of 2018 that number was 42, with 21 of minority ethnicity (Washington Post, 2018). It is our hope that continued efforts by social psychologists and other researchers to uncover the dynamics that lead to such tragedies may result in their prevention.

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CHAPTER FOUR

CHAPTER REVIEW SUMMARY FUNDAMENTAL PROCESSES OF INTERGROUP RELATIONS DEFINING THE TERMS • Stereotypes are cognitive beliefs or associations that link groups of people with certain characteristics; prejudice refers to negative affective feelings towards people because they are members of a certain group; and discrimination is negative behaviour directed against people because they are members of a certain group. • These can be thought of in terms of ABCs of affect, behaviour and cognition – the affective component is prejudice, the behaviour is discrimination, and the cognition is stereotypes. • Racism and sexism are forms of prejudice and discrimination based on a person’s racial or gender background. SOCIAL CATEGORIES • Social categories allow perceivers to make quick inferences about group members. • Ingroups are groups we identify with; we contrast these with outgroups. • People tend to exaggerate the differences between ingroups and outgroups and see more similarity among members of outgroups than among members of ingroups. • Perceivers sometimes dehumanise outgroups. MOTIVES FOR SOCIAL CATEGORISATION • According to social identity theory, the tendency in people to divide the world into ingroups and outgroups – ‘us’ versus ‘them’ – stems from self-esteem needs, which are achieved via social identities as well as personal identity. • Social identity processes lead to ingroup favouritism and, in the face of threats to the self, outgroup derogation. • Social categorisation also stems from terror management in the face of mortality. • Dominance and status also underlie processes of social categorisation. • Many group stereotypes vary along two dimensions: warmth and competence.

PUTTING COMMON SENSE TO THE TEST Being reminded of one’s own mortality makes people put things into greater perspective, thereby tending to reduce ingroup–outgroup distinctions and hostilities. FALSE. Research has shown that when people feel threatened by thoughts of their own mortality, they tend to seek greater affiliation with their ingroups and exhibit greater prejudice against outgroups, in part to reaffirm their sense of place and purpose in the world.

STEREOTYPES: THE COGNITIVE CORE OF THE PROBLEM SOCIALISATION OF STEREOTYPES • We learn information relevant to stereotypes without even realising it by absorbing what we see around us in our culture, groups and families.

• •

Boys and girls tend to show gender-stereotypical preferences. Likewise, parents carry gender-stereotypical expectations. Perceived differences between men and women are magnified by the contrasting social roles they occupy, which are often reflected in media.

HOW STEREOTYPES DISTORT PERCEPTIONS AND RESIST CHANGE • Stereotypes influence people’s perceptions and interpretations of the behaviours of group members, causing them to confirm stereotype-based expectancies. • Stereotypes may produce a self-fulfilling prophecy, whereby stereotyped group members come to behave in a manner consistent with the stereotype. • People perceive illusory correlations between groups and traits, which inform stereotypes and make attributions about the causes of group members’ behaviours in ways that help maintain their stereotypes. • Group members who do not fit the mould are often subtyped, leaving the overall stereotype intact. AUTOMATIC STEREOTYPE ACTIVATION • Stereotypes, even ones in which we do not believe, are often activated without our awareness or intention and can influence our perceptions and reactions.

PUTTING COMMON SENSE TO THE TEST People’s very quick judgements are not influenced by a stereotype unless they actually believe the stereotype to be true. FALSE. Even very brief exposure to a member of a stereotyped group can activate the stereotype about the group, even if they do not believe the stereotype. THE CASE OF AMADOU DIALLO • The shooting of an unarmed African man by New York City police officers inspired several studies that found a bias towards seeing an unarmed man as holding a weapon if he is black or wearing Muslim headgear compared with if he is white. • Training may be effective in reducing the tendency of civilians or police officers to exhibit this bias. BEING STIGMATISED • People are stigmatised when they are targets of negative stereotypes, perceived as deviant and devalued in society because they are members of a particular social group or because they have a particular characteristic. • Stigmatised individuals can experience benefits and drawbacks to their self-esteem and feelings of control and are at increased risk for long-term physical and mental health problems.

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STEREOTYPE THREAT • Situations that activate stereotype threat cause individuals to worry that others will see them in negative and stereotypical ways. • Stereotype threat can impair the performance and affect the identity of members of stereotyped or devalued groups. Effects have been found among racial and ethnic groups, gendered groups, student groups and others. • Stereotype threat causes its effects through multiple processes: increased arousal, attempts to suppress negative stereotypes, impairments to working memory and dejectionrelated emotions or to engage in negative thinking.

•

• •

Racism often works implicitly, as stereotypes and prejudice can fuel discrimination without conscious intent or awareness on the part of perceivers. Implicit race-based bias is associated with prejudice and discrimination across a variety of domains. Interracial interactions can feel threatening, can provoke anxiety and can drain cognitive resources – sometimes resulting in avoidance of interracial interactions altogether.

A woman is likely to perform worse on an arithmetic task if the task is described as one that produces gender differences than if it is described as one that women and men perform equally on.

SEXISM: AMBIVALENCE, OBJECTIFICATION AND DOUBLE STANDARDS • Sexism differs from other forms of prejudice and discrimination in part because gender stereotypes are prescriptive, dictating how particular genders should behave. • Ambivalent sexism reflects both hostile and benevolent sexism. • Women are often objectified in the media. • Violating gender-based expectations in the workplace can be particularly deleterious.

TRUE. The way a task is framed can elicit stereotype threat; that is, framing a task as one that generates gender differences makes females concerned that they may confirm the stereotype that females are worse at arithmetic, hence undermining their performance.

BEYOND RACISM AND SEXISM: AGE, WEIGHT, SEXUALITY AND OTHER TARGETS • A wide variety of forms of bias and discrimination exist, including those based on dimensions such as age, weight and sexuality.

PUTTING COMMON SENSE TO THE TEST

CONFLICT, PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION: PERSISTENCE AND CHANGE INTERGROUP CONFLICT: THE SOURCE OF THE TENSION • In the Robbers Cave study, boys divided into rival groups quickly showed intergroup prejudice, which was subsequently reduced when intergroup cooperation was required. • Realistic conflict theory maintains that direct competition for resources gives rise to prejudice. This competition can be real or imagined. RACISM: CURRENT FORMS AND CHALLENGES • Modern forms of racism are subtle, sometimes ambivalent, and play out in less direct ways, particularly in situations where people can rationalise racist behaviour.

PUTTING COMMON SENSE TO THE TEST Children do not tend to show biases based on race; it is only after they become adolescents that they learn to respond to people differently based on race. FALSE. Children learn about social categories quite early and use stereotypes when they are very young. Children show biases in favour of their racial ingroup on both explicit and implicit measures. Interracial interactions tend to go better if a colourblind mentality is used, which denies or minimises any acknowledgement of racial differences. FALSE. Research has shown that this approach often backfires and makes members of racial minority groups more, rather than less, uncomfortable; a multicultural approach that acknowledges and positively values racial and ethnic differences is often more effective.

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ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM: REDUCING PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION INTERGROUP CONTACT • According to the contact hypothesis, direct contact between members of rival groups will reduce intergroup prejudice. • Extensive research supports the contact hypothesis, especially if the ideal conditions for contact are met. • Having friends from outgroups is associated with decreased intergroup anxiety and prejudice. This link has been established in both correlational and experimental studies. • Even having an ingroup friend who has a good and close relationship with a member of an outgroup can reduce one’s prejudice towards the outgroup. • The jigsaw classroom model can foster intergroup cooperation and interdependence by promoting ideal conditions for contact. SHARED IDENTITIES • Research on the common ingroup identity model has found that if members of different groups recategorise themselves as members of a more inclusive superordinate group, intergroup attitudes and relations tend to improve. • Members of minority groups may benefit more from dualidentity categorisations that allow them to preserve their smaller group identity but also recognise their connection with the majority or more powerful group. ENHANCING BELONGING • Stereotype threat can undermine an individual’s sense of belonging in a particular setting, such as in a school. Interventions that promote feelings of belonging have been effective in reducing stereotype threat effects. EXERTING SELF-CONTROL • Trying to suppress stereotyping can be cognitively tiring. When age, fatigue, intoxication or other cognitive impairment

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•

reduces people’s cognitive resources, they are less able to control stereotype activation and suppress prejudice expression. People whose motivation to control their prejudice is externally driven tend to be less successful at exerting control than people whose motivation is internally driven.

CHANGING COGNITIONS • Recent research suggests several changes to how people think that can reduce prejudice and discrimination, such as thinking

CHAPTER FOUR

of examples that counter stereotypes, taking the perspective of others, learning that race is more ambiguous and socially determined, and taking a multicultural approach to intergroup relations. CHANGING CULTURE • Changes in the kinds of information perpetuated in one’s culture and via campaigns can alter how one perceives social groups.

LINKAGES The research reviewed in this chapter addresses how we think and feel about, and behave towards, individuals from our own groups and other groups. Negative stereotypes, prejudice and discrimination present some of the largest challenges to social cohesion that society faces. The ‘Linkages’ diagram highlights the connections between

CHAPTER

4

implicit group-based associations covered here and attitudes more generally (Chapter 6). The diagram also draws ties to two other chapters in which we see how stereotypes and intergroup processes play out in daily contexts.

Stereotypes, prejudice and discrimination

LINKAGES

Implicit associations and attitudes

CHAPTER

6

Attitudes

Shared identity sits at the core of relationships

CHAPTER

9

Attraction and close relationships

Women and ethnic minorities in the workforce

CHAPTER

16

Business

REVIEW QUIZ 1 The ABCs of this chapter are ____________ for affect, ____________ for behaviour and ____________ for cognition. a stereotypes; prejudice; discrimination. b prejudice; discrimination; stereotypes. c prejudice; stereotypes; discrimination. d discrimination; stereotypes; prejudice. 2 Which theory explains that social categorisation stems from the need to satisfy self-esteem from multiple aspects of the self? a Social identity theory. b Realistic conflict theory. c Social role theory. d Intergroup contact theory.

3 Which of the following refers to the effect whereby individuals from negatively stereotyped groups are concerned with confirming those stereotypes, and thus end up performing poorly? a Stereotype confirmation. b Self-fulfilling prophecy. c Stereotype threat. d Objectification. 4 Ambivalent sexism comprises both ____________ and ____________ forms of sexism. a hostile; benevolent. b benevolent; implicit. c hostile; implicit. d implicit; modern.

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5 Jacob, a Pākehā New Zealander, does not personally know any people of Māori descent. However, his best mate Chad, who is also Pākehā, is close friends with John, who is Māori. The extended contact effect predicts which of the following? a Jacob and John will become friends. b Chad will stop being friends with Jacob. c Chad will show reduced prejudice against Māori. d Jacob will show reduced prejudice against Māori.

6 Which of the following have been shown to undermine efforts to control prejudice or discrimination? a Intoxication. b Older age. c Sleepiness. d All of the above.

WEBLINKS Australia Human Rights Commission https://www.humanrights.gov.au A website that includes policy statements, legislative Acts and complaints procedures on prejudice and discrimination. Racism https://www.psychology.org.au/for-the-public/PsychologyTopics/Racism Australian Psychological Society’s resources on racism and prejudice. Racism. It stops with me http://itstopswithme.humanrights.gov.au Australian Human Rights Commission’s campaign. Reconciliation Australia http://www.reconciliation.org.au A website for this not-for-profit organisation that aims to build relationships between Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander

peoples and the wider Australian community. Includes information on the annual National Reconciliation Week. Reducing stereotype threat http://www.reducingstereotypethreat.org A comprehensive website on the topic of stereotype threat maintained by Dr Steve Stroessner and Dr Catherine Good. Understanding prejudice http://www.understandingprejudice.org/demos A series of demonstrations maintained by Dr Scott Plous. Working together: Racial discrimination in New Zealand http://archive.stats.govt.nz/browse_for_stats/people_and_ communities/asian-peoples/racial-discrimination-in-nz.aspx A report by the New Zealand government on reports of discrimination, including rates, categories and location.

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5

CHAPTER

Gender identity

Learning Objectives By the end of this chapter, you should be able to: 1 identify the difference between sex, sexual orientation and gender 2 describe the interplay between gender identification, gender roles and gender stereotypes 3 discuss differences between the view of gender as binary and as a spectrum 4 describe the evolving concept of gender and how it has changed over time 5 discuss the processes of gender transition and sex assignment surgery, including the physical and psychological effects on transitioning individuals 6 identify the stigma and discrimination faced by people who identify as gender variant and the effects this has on their daily living.

Sistergirls of Tiwi Island to attend the Sydney Mardi Gras for the first time to showcase their culture and the strong sense of community that has helped them survive through their battle towards acceptance. Visit the topical reflection at the end of the chapter to find out more about the Sistergirls of the Tiwi Islands.

The Sistergirls of Tiwi Island, one of the largest populations of transgender Indigenous people in Australia, travelled to Sydney in 2017 to attend their first Mardi Gras. Wearing traditional Tiwi designs featuring clan totem animals, hand-printed in glowing rainbow paint, the Sistergirls proudly showcased their culture and community.

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Source: Getty Images/Zak Kaczmarek

The Tiwi Islands (Bathurst, Melville and nine smaller uninhabited islands) which are located 80 kilometres north of Darwin, are home to what is thought to be the largest per capita transgender and gay Indigenous population in Australia with up to 5% of the 3000 residents identifying as transgender, gay, lesbian or bisexual (Palin, 2017). The Tiwi Sistergirls or Yimpininni, who featured in an episode of SBS TV program Australiana titled ‘Island Queens’ (Hasbold, 2017), have fought hard to be accepted in this remote community. Struggling with isolation, abuse and racism they are often socially excluded by family, who are heavily grounded in cultural and religious traditions which reinforce gendered stereotypes. The Sistergirls rose to media attention in 2017 when they travelled

PART TWO

SOCIAL PERCEPTION

PUTTING COMMON SENSE TO THE TEST Circle Your Answer T

F

Sex is binary.

T

F

Gender identity and sexual orientation are the same thing.

T

F

Intersex is extremely rare.

T

F

Children are not old enough to know their own gender identity.

T

F

Surgery is a top priority for transgender people.

DEFINING SEX, INTERSEX, GENDER, AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION Gender identity

A person’s deeply felt, inherent sense of being a girl, woman or female; a boy, man or male; or an alternative gender. This may or may not correspond to a person’s sex assigned at birth, primary or secondary sex characteristics.

Gender identity, according to the American Psychological Association (APA, 2015a, 2015b), is a person’s deeply felt, inherent sense of being a girl, woman or female; a boy, man or male; or an alternative gender (e.g., genderqueer, gender nonconforming, gender neutral). This sense of being may or may not correspond to a person’s sex assigned at birth or to a person’s primary or secondary sex characteristic. It is generally not visible to others because it is an internal state of being, but the important influence of societal structures, cultural expectations and personal interactions in its development are well recognised. There is significant evidence to support the conceptualisation of gender identity is influenced by both environmental and biological factors. In this chapter we will explore some of the commonly used terms associated with this fascinating area of study. We will also examine the development of gender identity, and consider the development of gender roles and stereotypes, the gender binary and the diversity of gender identity. A quick search of the terms sex, sexual orientation, and gender on the internet reveals a great deal of variation in their usage. Although they are often used interchangeably, there are distinct differences. Let us begin by differentiating them to clearly frame our journey through this chapter.

Biological sex Biological sex

A label which is assigned at birth and is typically categorised as male, female or intersex as determined by sex chromosomes, gonads, internal reproductive organs and external genitalia.

Sex is binary.

FALSE

196

Biological sex is a label assigned at birth (or by ultrasound or other prenatal test before birth) based on medical factors such as genitals and chromosomes. Most of the population fit the biological pattern of male or female, however there are those who are born with a combination of characteristics, for example, those that are considered female along with characteristics which are also considered male.

Variants of biological sex Each cell in our body has 46 chromosomes made up of a father’s sperm and a mother’s egg – an even match of 23 each. At conception, the chromosomes of the sperm and the egg match up into 22 identical pairs plus the 23rd pair which is the sex chromosome. Those with XX chromosomes become female and those with XY chromosomes become male. Sounds like a simple equation, right? In reality, it is anything but simple. There are a number of conditions which lead to the development of chromosomal, anatomical or gonadal sex that is atypical. These atypical traits create a spectrum of sex characteristics that are more diverse than the commonly considered binary notions of the male and female sex. At least 30 or 40 different variations of XX (female) and XY (male) sex chromosomes and extra or missing sex chromosomes are known to exist, most of which are genetically determined. These include variations in the number of sex chromosomes, different tissue responses to sex hormones, and hormone balances (Carpenter, 2017). For instance, according to the World Health Organization Genomic Resource Centre (n.d.), for a few births per thousand there will be babies born with sex monosomy (i.e., with a single sex chromosome – 45X or 45Y), and there will be some babies born with sex polysomy (i.e., three or more sex chromosomes – 47XXX, 47XYY or 47XXY). In addition, some males are with born 48XXXY or 49XXXXY – chromosomal conditions that cause intellectual disability, developmental delays, physical differences and infertility. Examples of intersex variations include congenital adrenal hyperplasia, an inherited autosomal recessive condition affecting both boys and girls, which occurs with a frequency of roughly 1:5000. The most common cause of intersexuality in females, 46XX, results from a genetic deficiency of cortisol and produces an outwardly male appearance in girls. Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome is an X-linked recessive disorder where affected individuals have external female genitalia and breast development despite being genetically male (46XY). Although this condition is unresponsive to male hormones (androgens) it does respond to oestrogens.

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GENDER IDENTITY

Intersex

CHAPTER FIVE

Intersex is extremely rare.

Intersex is a term used for a variety of conditions whereby the reproductive or sexual anatomy does not FALSE fit neatly within the typical descriptions of female and male. It is an umbrella term which is used when biological sex is unable to be assigned as distinctly male or female at birth. There are a multitude of intersex variations (see Figure 5.1) and not all are FIGURE 5.1 Intersex variations visible in infancy. Some become apparent prenatally, others at birth, during puberty or adulthood or while trying to conceive. Estimates on the frequency of intersex people who possess chromosomal and anatomical features of both males and females are varied; but according to Intersex Human Rights Australia (IHRA, 2013) the figure is approximately 1.7%, or 17 of every 1000 people. Male and female sex organs develop from the same tissue. Chromosomes and the presence or absence of male hormones determine whether this tissue becomes male organs or female organs. In males, the Y chromosome triggers the development of testicles, which produce male hormones. Male genitals develop in response to male hormones from the foetal testicles, whereas in a foetus without a Y chromosome and male hormones the genitals develop Source: Shutterstock.com/Lemon Tree Images as female. There are instances however when a chromosomal abnormality may make determining sex a difficult task. According to Alice Domurat Dreger (2017) roughly one in 2000 babies is born with genitals that are halfway between male and female types. Intersex People who are born Other forms of in-between sex development however are far more common; it is thought that as many as with genetic, hormonal one in 100 of us have some sex-development type other than the standard male or female, although we may or physical sex never have occasion to discover it. In fact, research between 1955 and 2000 suggests the frequency of this characteristics that are happening was as high as 2% of live births, and the frequency of those receiving ‘corrective’ genital surgery not typically ‘male’ or during this period was estimated at around 1 or 2 per 1000 (Blackless et al., 2000). ‘female’. Intersex people have a diversity of bodies Domurat Dregar (2017) suggests that in the US today, at least one in 300 children is born with a and identities. difference of sex development (DSD), evident enough to the naked eye that a paediatrician might recommend an expert consultation. However, these cases are becoming more common, with figures Differences of sex development (DSD) suggesting a frequency of 1 in 4500 births where the baby’s genitals are not easily recognisable as female Conditions where or male. In some cases, the genitals may be partially masculinised or feminised, in others there may be the development anatomical variations, such as a small penis, undescended testes in boys, or an enlarged clitoris or labia of chromosomal, in girls, which are generally considered to be mild forms on the spectrum of ambiguous genitalia (NHMRC anatomical or gonadal Research Program in Disorders of Human Sex Development, n.d.). sex is atypical. A nationwide study of 272 people with over 40 specific intersex variations was conducted in Australia in 2015 (Jones et al., 2016). This provided valuable insight into the experience of the intersex population, and the story of shame and humiliation threaded through their narratives. Many of those who participated in this study were only told of their intersex variation prior to their eighteenth birthday, a third found out in adulthood, and two thirds said that they had undergone medical interventions related to their intersex variation (more than 50% had treatments before their eighteenth birthday). The most commonly reported treatments were genital surgeries, many of which occurred in infancy, and hormone treatments. Many were given no choice in these procedures and received no information on what treatments had been undertaken. A large majority talked about the negative impacts of treatment, referring to the institutional shaming and coercion which they were subjected to. Alarmingly, two thirds had contemplated suicide, and almost one fifth had attempted it. Although support groups helped to improve levels of wellbeing there were many who spoke of regular occurrences of stigma and discrimination. Many had left high school early, and 18% reported that they had dropped out of school because of bullying, as compared to only 2% of the general population. The report also highlighted the diversity of the intersex population in terms of their sexual orientation with 22% identifying as bisexual; 18% identifying as lesbian, gay or other labels (e.g., asexual and queer); and 30% selecting multiple labels.

Legal recognition of intersex people – Yogyakarta Principles and beyond In 2006, a group of international human rights experts from a range of backgrounds – judges, academics, a former United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, non-government organizations and others – met in Yogyakarta, Indonesia to formulate a set of international principles relating to sexual orientation and gender identity in response to the patterns of abuse which have been evidenced across the globe for

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Yogyakarta Principles

A set of 29 international legal principles on the application of international law to human rights violations based on sexual orientation and gender identity, adopted in 2006.

Yogyakarta Principles plus 10

Ten additional Principles and State obligations on the application of international human rights law in relation to sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression and sex characteristics implemented in 2017 to complement the Yogyakarta Principles

people of diverse sexual orientations and gender identity. The result of this meeting was the Yogyakarta Principles: international legal principles on the application of international law to human rights violations based on sexual orientation and gender identity. The Principles, as outlined in Table 5.1, address a broad range of human rights standards, including extrajudicial executions, violence and torture, access to justice, privacy, non-discrimination, rights to freedom of expression and assembly, employment, health, education, immigration and refugee issues, and their application to issues of sexual orientation and gender identity (yogyakartaprinciples.org, 2007). In November 2017, the Yogyakarta Plus 10 was adopted to supplement the initial agreement in recognition of the significant developments in the field of international human rights law, the understanding of violations affecting people of diverse sexual orientations and gender identities, and with full recognition of the violations affecting people on grounds of gender expression and sex characteristics. The principles and obligations work together to provide a comprehensive, authoritative, expert exposition of international human rights law relative to the grounds of sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression and sex characteristics (yogyakartaprinciples.org, 2017).

TABLE 5.1 Yogyakarta Principles and Yogyakarta Plus 10 Yogyakarta Principles Principle 1 Principle 2 Principle 3 Principle 4 Principle 5 Principle 6 Principle 7 Principle 8 Principle 9 Principle 10 Principle 11 Principle 12 Principle 13 Principle 14 Principle 15 Principle 16 Principle 17 Principle 18 Principle 19 Principle 20 Principle 21 Principle 22 Principle 23 Principle 24 Principle 25 Principle 26 Principle 27 Principle 28 Principle 29

The right to the universal enjoyment of human rights The rights to equality and non-discrimination The right to recognition before the law The right to life The right to security of the person The right to privacy The right to freedom from arbitrary deprivation of liberty The right to a fair trial The right to treatment with humanity while in detention The right to freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment The right to protection from all forms of exploitation, sale and trafficking of human beings The right to work The right to social security and to other social protection measures The right to an adequate standard of living The right to adequate housing The right to education The right to the highest attainable standard of health Protection from medical abuses The right to freedom of opinion and expression The right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association The right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion The right to freedom of movement The right to seek asylum The right to found a family The right to participate in public life The right to participate in cultural life The right to promote human rights The right to effective remedies and redress Accountability

Yogyakarta Plus 10 Principle 30 Principle 31 Principle 32 Principle 33 Principle 34

198

The right to state protection The right to legal recognition The right to bodily and mental integrity The right to freedom from criminalisation and sanction on the basis of sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression or sex characteristics The right to protection from poverty

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>>

GENDER IDENTITY

Principle 35 Principle 36

CHAPTER FIVE

The right to sanitation The right to the enjoyment of human rights in relation to information and communication technologies The right to truth The right to practise, protect, preserve and revive cultural diversity

Principle 37 Principle 38

Source: yogyakartaprinciples.org (2007). The Yogyakarta Principles: Principles on the application of international human rights law in relation to sexual ­orientation and gender identity; yogyakartaprinciples.org. The Yogyakarta Principles plus 10.

In March of 2017, at a meeting of intersex advocates from Australia and New Zealand, a declaration of the policy goals for intersex people in the two countries was agreed upon. The ‘Darlington Statement’ recommended changes to policy across a range of areas, including health, sex classification, marriage, and anti-discrimination legislation. Central to the Darlington Statement is an emphasis on the continued practice of normalisation surgeries facing intersex people and the urgent need to put an end to the medical interventions (surgical and hormonal), which have been used to alter the sex characteristics of infants and children without personal consent. The document also highlights the continued practice of official gender and sex classification which disrespect those of gender variations outside of the binary notions of male and female. It proposes instead a range of measures to eliminate sex and gender on birth certificates and other identification documents. Although such classifications exist in some countries (see Figure 5.2), individuals were not able to change their classification as a simple administrative process. In Australia in 2013 changes to passport rules took the important step of allowing travellers to choose ‘indeterminate’ as their gender, without having to provide proof of having undergone surgery to change their sex. The federal guidelines for the recognition

Darlington Statement

Agreed upon in March 2017; presents policy demands across a range of key areas, including human rights and legal reform; health and wellbeing; peer support; allies; and education, awareness and employment. It contains a statement on prohibition of the continued practice of normalisation surgeries facing intersex people.

FIGURE 5.2 Countries where changing sex assignment is legal In Australia in 2013 changes to passport rules took the important step of allowing travellers to choose ‘indeterminate’ as their gender without having to provide proof of having undergone surgery to change their sex. Many countries across the globe are moving in this direction. Global United States United Kingdom

Right To Change Legal Gender Legal recognition of sex reassignment by permitting a change of legal gender on an individual’s birth certificate.

Legal, surgery not reqired Legal, but requires surgery Illegal Unknown, N/A, or ambiguous

Recent Changes

Feb 12 2018

Feb 12 2018

Feb 2 2018

Jan 9 2018

Jan 1 2018

Dec 17 2017

Oct 10 2017

Oct 6 2017

Became Legal, surgery not required in New Jersey.

Became Legal, but requires surgery in Maine.

Became Legal, surgery not required in Minnesota.

Became Legal, surgery not required in New Hampshire.

Became Legal, surgery not required in California.

Became Legal, surgery not required in Jammu and Kashmir.

Became Legal, surgery not required in Greece.

Became Legal, surgery not required in Oregon.

Source: Courtesy of http://www.equaldex.com/

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of sex and gender enable access to ‘X’ gender markers by any intersex or gender diverse person who seeks it and has a doctor or psychologist certification. Similarly in March of 2018 the New Zealand Human Rights Commission, recommended to the New Zealand Government that the process of changing and updating the details on birth certification be simplified in a manner consistent with that which is used to update passports and driver's licenses (NZ HRC, 2018). Although there are currently no national guidelines or legislation for the management of people born with variations in sex characteristics in Australia, there are important steps being taken in the right direction. The Australian Human Rights Commission (2018) has embarked on a major project to consider how to best protect the human rights of people born with variations in sex characteristics through clinical practice, law, education and training. The overarching goals of the project are to: • learn about the experiences of people born with bodies that do not meet the medical or social norms of male or female • learn about the impact of medical interventions on their wellbeing • evaluate the current approaches of medical interventions in Australia • develop recommendations for a nationally consistent human-rights based approach to decision-making about medical interventions. Having discussed biological sex, intersex variations and differences of sex development we turn our attention to the notion of gender – the culturally ascribed expectations of attitudes, feelings and behaviours associated with the biological sex to which we are aligned.

Gender Our bodies are gendered in the context of cultural expectations. We are typically labelled as more or less man or woman, and masculine or feminine based on the degree to which socially prescribed physical attributes, mannerisms and behaviours are present in us. The gendering of our bodies affects the way that Gender we feel about ourselves, and how others perceive and interact with us. So, when we talk about gender, we The attitudes, feelings are referring to the attitudes, feelings and behaviours that we associate with a person’s biological sex. and behaviours that a From the time that new parents announce the news of the impending pitter patter of little feet, there given culture associates is the question of whether it is a boy or a girl. Generally, this is followed by the enthusiastic search for with a person’s appropriately themed gifts and clothing and the decorating of the space in which the baby will live. This is biological sex. where the societal and cultural depiction of what it is to be a boy or girl begins. Throughout this text we talk Gender expression about many gendered differences in behaviours and what we often refer to as the stereotypical presentation Individual presentation, of them; for example, in Chapter 10 we look at the gendered expression of aggression, and in Chapter 9 we including physical consider gendered differences in courtship behaviours. So, does the biological sex assigned at birth always appearance, clothing correspond with our gender? The short answer is not always! choice and accessories, The environment in which we live plays a large role in determining gender identity, culturally derived and other behaviours which express aspects of gender normative behaviours, and gendered ideologies. Behaviours that are compatible with cultural gender identity or role. expectations are referred to as gender-normative, whereas those that are incompatible are referred to as gender non-conformity (APA, 2013). The topic of gender identity is one which plays a pivotal role in our understanding of people and one which is important for psychologists to consider in a therapeutic setting, so we will revisit this topic again in far greater depth later in the chapter. FIGURE 5.3 Gender expression is impressed upon The way a person chooses to socially express themselves within individuals from birth, from the clothes babies are the culturally constructed roles and behaviours associated with a man dressed in to the toys they are given to play with or a woman is referred to as gender expression. Gender expression is generally portrayed in our behaviours and mannerisms, the clothing we choose to wear, and our speech characteristics. Almost everything in our society is classified by its relevance to gender – from the toys that children (and adults) play with, to the colours of the clothes we wear, and the social and sporting activities which we engage in. The expression of gender, ascribing to the narrow, stereotypical definitions of male and female or boy and girl, is impressed upon us from birth and is reinforced in a myriad of ways through family, culture, peers, schools, community, media and religion (see for example Figure 5.3). So, in summary – gender is our sense of being a boy/man, girl/ woman or something else which may be entirely different to what our physical characteristics, genes and hormones indicate. Our expression Source: Shutterstock.com/Katrina Elena of the gender we align with and the gender identity which we construct 200

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GENDER IDENTITY

CHAPTER FIVE

over time provides clues to others as to how we feel about ourselves and where we locate ourselves on the gender spectrum. To a large extent our gender, the gender identity that we construct and the way that we choose to express our gender impact the way that we feel about others in an intimate sense. We will cover the topic of gender identity later in the chapter; for now though, it is important that we consider the topic of sexual orientation.

Sexual orientation The term sexual orientation describes a person’s enduring physical, romantic and/or emotional preference for and attraction to another person. It consists of three characteristics: 1 attraction to a person of the same or opposite gender 2 behaviour relating to the sex of the sex partner which may be the same sex, different sex, or both sexes 3 self-identification (Koehler & Menzies, 2017). Sexual orientation is not the same as gender identity, but both can be thought of in terms of a continuum or a spectrum. Gender identity is anchored by the extreme binary categories of male and female, whereas sexual orientation is anchored by the exclusive preference (and attraction to) the opposite sex and the exclusive preference for (and attraction to) the same sex (Savin-Williams, 2014; Savin-Williams, 2016). Although the popular notion of people fitting nicely into the boxes at either end of the spectrum is the socially constructed norm, in reality, these boundaries are anything but neatly defined.

Sexual self-concept Think back to Chapter 2 where we discussed the concept of self and the development of self-schemas – the beliefs people hold about themselves that guide the processing of self-relevant information. Self-schemas provide the baseline information from which our concept of self is determined. We form self-schemas about many things including our personality traits, the way we look, the way we act, and the things we like to do. Therefore, it should come as no surprise to you that we also form sexual self-schemas – cognitive generalisations about sexual aspects of oneself which contribute to our sexual identity. In 1988, Laraine Winter defined the sexual self-concept as an individual’s evaluation of his or her sexual feelings and actions. By extension, an individual’s sexual orientation self-concept can be described as a person’s own evaluation of their sexual orientation. Prior to research conducted by Barbara Andersen and her colleague Jill Cyranowski in 1994 there was little research on the cognitive representations of sexuality. They set out to measure sexual self-schemas in women by asking them to describe a ‘sexual woman’ using the list of trait adjectives. According to Andersen and Cyranowski, sexual self-schemas shape and are shaped by sexual experience. Their findings indicated evidence of two positive aspects and two negative aspects. On the positive side of the equation there was an inclination to experience passionate–romantic emotions, and a behavioural openness to sexual experience. Women who scored high in the positive dimension (positive sexual schema) viewed themselves as emotionally romantic or passionate, open to romantic and sexual relationships and experiences. They tend to be liberal in their sexual attitudes, mostly free of social inhibitions (selfconsciousness or embarrassment), they tend to evaluate sexual behaviours more positively, report higher levels of arousability and are more willing to engage in uncommitted sexual relations. They also report having experienced a wider range of lifetime sexual activities and a greater range of sexual partners and one-night stands (or short-term sexual encounters), and also report extensive histories of longer romantic ties. Conversely, on the negative side there is embarrassment or conservatism with many describing themselves as relatively emotionally cold or unromantic, they may be behaviourally inhibited in their sexual and romantic relationships, sometimes describing themselves as self-conscious, embarrassed or not confident (Andersen & Cyranowski, 1994). Andersen, Cyranowski and Espindle (1999) conducted a follow-up study with men, where they identified 27 adjectives to represent a ‘sexual man’ and found three dimensions – passionate/loving, powerful/aggressive and open minded/liberal. Men who scored high on the three factors were more sexual, more willing to engage in casual sex, and more sexually arousable. They reported a wider range of sexual activities, more lifetime partners and more brief encounters, but also were more likely to be involved in a relationship than those who scored low on the three dimensions. Research conducted in 2007 by Daryl Hill explored the use of a combined measure for use among both men and women which allowed a comparison of how men and women think about their sexual selves. His findings indicated that both men and women incorporate negative and positive dimensions into their sexual self-schema. He also noted gender differences in self-ratings with men scoring themselves lower on both the loving/warmth and reserved/conservative factors compared to women. Daryl suggested that this may

Sexual orientation

Describes a person’s enduring physical, romantic and/or emotional preference for and attraction to another person

Gender identity and sexual orientation are the same thing.

FALSE

Sexual self-schema

cognitive generalisations about sexual aspects of oneself which contribute to our sexual identity.

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be due to men internalising gender-role expectations of a masculine stereotype which is more traditionally associated with being unemotional and sexually outgoing. While much has been reported throughout the literature on the role of sexual schemas in heterosexual men and women, little until recent times has been reported about people whose sexual orientation differs from the heteronormative perspective. Research conducted by William Elder and colleagues in 2015 represents one such example. Elder and the team conducted interviews with twenty gay men, exploring the romantic and sexual experiences which underpinned the development of their sexual self-schemas. Their findings indicated seven components of sexual self-schemas, including avoiding the use of emotional expression; pornography and its links to sexual orientation identity; the importance of being deemed physically attractive; managing sex and social perceptions (using sex to bolster their own self confidence and that of others); the perceived competition for physically attractive men; sex, emotion and intimacy; and the commitment and work required to maintain relationships. The men participating in this study also discussed how cognitive representations of themselves, sex and relationships had changed with experience as a result of cultural influences (e.g., the growing social acceptance of gay and lesbian people and increased cultural emphasis on muscularity), and relationship characteristics (e.g., placing increasing importance on finding a partner who was developmentally similar, came out for the sake of their relationship, and placed less emphasis on appearance). The sexual selfschema transition involved periods of early sexual exploration, a first relationship, and the negotiation of open relationships. This research provided evidence of the capacity for change in gay men’s sexual self-schemas as a result of developmental processes, relationship experiences and the expansion of ideas about masculinity. The same team (Elder, Morrow, & Brookes, 2015) conducted similar research with a sample of twenty bisexual men noting that this population have largely been neglected in studies of gender and sexuality. Their results indicated eight common themes (1) the overt sexualising of women’s bodies, (2) the covert sexualising of men’s bodies, (3) the importance of physical appearance for gay men, (4) the importance of emotional connection, (5) the difficulty of emotionally connecting with men, (6) anxiety in relation to longterm relationships, (7) a belief that others misperceive male bisexuality, and (8) finding the ‘right person’. Similar to the previous study, participants identified how their sexual self-schemas changed over time as they dated both men and women, had sexual experiences and developed awareness of their bisexual attraction. Mostly participants described an evolving realisation that, although they were attracted to individuals of both sexes, they had greater attraction to one sex or the other. However, there was evidence of additional intermediate categories of attraction. In some cases, participants were more attracted to women – a pattern of attraction situated between heterosexual and bisexual, while others were more attracted to men – situated between bisexual and gay.

GENDER IDENTIFICATION, ROLES AND STEREOTYPES Research tells us that children are tuned in to cues about gender during their first year of development with evidence of their ability to discriminate male and female faces by gender and race (Quinn, Yahr, Kuhn, Slater, & Pascalis, 2002; Quinn, et al., 2011), and they can match male and female voices to male and female faces (Poulin-Dubois, Serbin, Kenyon, & Derbyshire, 1998). During the preschool period (3–5 years of age), gender becomes far more salient, motivating children’s expectations of the appearance and activities of others (Miller, Lurye, Zosuls, & Ruble, 2009) and their preferences for choice of clothing (Halim et al., 2014), toys and same-gender play mates (Shutts, Pemberton, & Spelke, 2013). It is also during this period that children are thought to develop an understanding of gender constancy and gender stereotypical roles and behaviour.

Gender roles and stereotypes Children from about the age of three can accurately label other children as boys or girls, sort photographs according to gender, and correctly apply gender labels such as mummy and daddy, sister and brother. The use of these labels helps children make important distinctions between males and females (Dunham, Baron, & Banaji, 2008; Dunham, Baron, & Carey, 2011). Although we may use physical features to define people as male or female based on their observable sexual anatomy, we rely on the society in which we live to inform us of the system of social rules and customs concerning what males and females are supposed to be and do. According to Beverly Fagot (Fagot, Rodgers, & Leinbach, 2012), once children master and internalise the use of this system, they can discriminate and label themselves and others on the basis of sex. At this stage they also understand the attributes, attitudes and behaviours which are typically expected of males and females and to apply this 202

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knowledge to themselves. So, from an early age, we are socialised into cultural norms for masculine and feminine ideals which instruct us in gender-specific behaviours appropriate to the time and context in which we live. But from what age do we begin thinking and behaving in terms of the stereotyped behaviours and roles associated with the biological sex to which we have been assigned at birth? Prior to the age of five children appear to have little understanding of gender as a permanent feature; that is, their understanding of gender is somewhat flexible. In 1989, Sandra Bem conducted an interesting study designed to investigate the flexibility of children’s gender concepts. Bem showed children aged between 3 and 5 years old three photographs – a naked toddler, the same toddler dressed in gender-typical clothing for either a boy or a girl and then in stereotypical clothing of the opposite gender (as can be seen in Figure 5.4). She asked children a series of questions to determine whether their ability to correctly identify the gender of the child in the photo changed with the child’s wardrobe and appearance. First, Bem showed the photos of the naked toddler and the toddler dressed in gender-typical clothing, and asked if the toddler was a boy or a girl. Second, with the nude photo of the toddler still visible for reference, she presented the photo of the toddler dressed in opposite-gendered clothing, telling the children that the toddler was playing a dress-up game. She asked the children whether the toddler in the third photograph was still a boy or was now a girl. Most of the children thought that the boy who chose to dress up like a girl had indeed become a girl. It was not until children were able to comprehend that the difference in anatomy constitutes the defining attribute of being a boy or a girl (genital knowledge) that they understood that changing clothes does not change your gender. FIGURE 5.4 Does the clothing a child wears determine their gender? Bem’s research investigated if children’s opinion of the gender of a toddler in a series of photographs changed according to the clothing the child wore. Younger children believed so, whereas older children who recognised genitals as a defining feature between boys and girls understood that changing clothes did not change the gender of the child.

Source: Child development by Society for Research in Child development. Reproduced with permission of Blackwell Publishing, Inc. in the format Book via Copyright Clearance Centre.

Once a child has mastered the concept of gender as stable from infancy to adulthood they progressively understand that gender is consistent across changes in appearance (Ruble et al., 2007), so they no longer believe that a hairstyle or clothing change constitutes a change of gender; this is known as gender constancy. Once they are able to comprehend gender as a stable trait they are also able to incorporate gender into their own identity. It is about this time that children become aware of gender roles and stereotypes, often displaying rather rigid definitions of the way that boys and girls should behave (Martin & Ruble, 2004). Research conducted by Nancy Freeman (2007) on a group of three- to five-year-olds showed that from an early age, children were able to clearly differentiate ‘girl toys’ from ‘boy toys’. They were also

Gender constancy

A child’s understanding of the irreversibility of their sex, which develops in stages in early childhood.

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able to state which of the toys their parents would approve or disapprove of. Interestingly the children suggested that the opposite sex parent would be far more supportive of cross-gender choices, which indicated that children had internalised stereotypical definitions of gender. What was surprising about these findings was that many of the parents reported non-stereotypical attitudes and beliefs and applied the same standards of behaviours for their sons and daughters. The results of the Global Early Adolescent Study of gender expectations which gathered data on 450 early adolescents aged between 10–14 highlighted a uniformity of attitudes towards what it is to be a boy or a girl. Their data indicated that the onset of adolescence triggers a common set of rigidly enforced gender expectations such as the perception that men are the dominant sex, strong and independent, while women should be protected (Mmari et al., 2017). The boys who took part in the study described having the freedom to come and go as they please, and to pursue education and other opportunities. They were encouraged to be tough, strong and brave and to demonstrate heterosexual prowess. Conversely the girls portrayed an understanding of limited mobility and restricted access to education. Girls were taught to be nice, polite, submissive and to accentuate their physical beauty (although not at the expense of their modesty). Across all settings, the period of adolescence brought freedom and autonomy for boys, whereas for girls the opposite was the case – their range of freedom shrank as their behaviours became increasingly more controlled and restricted (Mmari et al., 2017). Parental influence on the development of young adolescents’ gender norms and attitudes was also clear in this study, with most expressing a desire for their children to assume roles that conform to the prevailing gender norms of their culture and community. They reinforce these norms through instruction, encouragement, reward, regulation, discipline and punishment. The findings suggest that children and young adolescents look to their parents not only to deliver their basic needs, but also as a valuable source of information and advice, and as a source of love and affection. They are astute observers of what their parents say and do, and model themselves accordingly (Mmari et al., 2017). Not all parents conform to the norm of impressing culturally ascribed notions of gender upon children however. In a 2017 interview with the Mirror, rock superstar Pink revealed that her daughter Willow and son Jameson are being raised in a gender-neutral environment to ensure they are not constrained by culturally ascribed notions of gender (Watts, 2017).

CRITICAL THINKING ACTIVITY What are your thoughts on raising children in a gender-neutral environment? Can you suggest the issues (if any) the child may confront as they progress through school? Would there be

differences in the experience of schooling for children in rural and remote areas as compared to those in larger cities?

THE GENDER BINARY AND THE GENDER SPECTRUM Gender binary

A person who identifies as either a boy or a girl, regardless of the sex they were assigned at birth.

Gender spectrum

Expression of gender viewed as a continuum from masculine to feminine with androgyny at the midpoint.

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The two most commonly recognised gender identities are boys (men) and girls (women) – thinking of gender in this manner is referred to as gender binary. Gender binary is a system of culturally and socially constructed ideas and expectations used to classify contrasting genders (males who identify as men and females who identify as women) and qualities (masculine and feminine) in terms of socially accepted behavioural norms. Accepted forms of self-expression in terms of lifestyle choices are largely driven by a gender binary system; for example, the way we dress, the way we behave, our use of personal pronouns and our sexual orientation commonly follow societal expectations. In recent years, however, there have been serious debates regarding the gender binary standpoint versus the gender spectrum. Proponents of the gender spectrum approach view the expression of gender on a continuum anchored by masculine and feminine, with androgyny as the mid-point; and everyone falls somewhere on that spectrum. Evidence in favour of the gender spectrum is mounting, with research from a variety of fields such as neuroscience, behavioural neuroendocrinology, and psychology providing a kaleidoscope of information to challenge the long-held assumptions of the binary argument. One example of this challenge may be found in the research conducted by Joel and colleagues (2015) which analysed MRIs of over 1400 human brains. These researchers found that, in terms of sex differences in the human brain, one and one does not necessarily add up to two – a male brain and a female brain. Rather, their research indicated that most brains are gender/sex mosaics (a mixture of both female and male form) – regardless of the sample, age, type of imaging, and method of analysis. Mosaicism, which was seen in 23–53% of the brains, was much more common than internal consistency (male or female), which was present in only 0.7–10.4% of brains, depending on the sample and specific brain measure.

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Similarly, findings from the area of neuroendocrine research investigating the potential of gendered experiences to modulate hormones, indicates that testosterone may respond to gender socialisation and gender norms. Interesting research conducted by van Anders and colleagues (2015) using a novel experimental design, where participants (trained actors) performed a specific task (wielding power in a workplace by firing a subordinate) in stereotypically masculine (taking up space, dominance posturing, infrequent smiles) versus feminine ways (upending sentences, hesitancy, infrequent eye contact), as shown in Figure 5.5. They found that wielding power increased testosterone in women regardless of whether it was performed in gender-stereotyped masculine or feminine ways. These findings indicate that the gender–testosterone pathway may actually be mediated by competitive behaviour. In which case cultural notions of men wielding power and women avoiding doing so may partially explain why testosterone levels tend to be higher in men than in women: So, it is plausible that gender socialisation and lived experiences could in fact contribute to sex differences in testosterone, therefore shaping the hormones thought to underlie the essence of femaleness and maleness. FIGURE 5.5 The effect of gender socialisation and lived experiences Research conducted by van Anders and team (2015) found that gender socialisation and lived experiences could in fact contribute to sex differences by shaping the hormones thought to underlie the essence of femininity and masculinity.

Source: Shutterstock.com/George Rudy

Source: Shutterstock.com/Pressmaster

Gender similarity Adding to the gender binary versus gender spectrum debate is the gender similarity hypothesis, hypothesis originally suggested by Janet Shibley Hyde (2005). Her argument was based on a review of 46 meta-analyses Suggests that males of gender differences and the effect sizes which were found in each. The articles chosen for review focused and females are similar on behaviours believed to show gender differences across a wide variety of psychological domains, such as on most, but not all cognitive abilities, communication, social and personality variables, and psychological wellbeing. Her findings psychological variables. indicated that three quarters of the effect sizes were either trivial (30%) or small (48%) with some notable exceptions recognised in the areas of aggression and sexuality. Further support for the gender similarities hypothesis was demonstrated with an independent replication in 2015 by Zell, Krizan, and Teeter, which found the average, absolute difference between males and females across domains were either small (46%) or very small (39%). The magnitude of FIGURE 5.6 Facebook gender identity options differences fluctuated as a function of the psychological domain (e.g., cognitive variables, social and personality variables, wellbeing), but Facebook now provides over 50 gender identity options from which to choose. remained largely constant across age, culture and generations. Highlighting the diversity of gender identity are the descriptors which are commonly used to describe those who do not ascribe to the notion of one of two genders. A person may have a non-binary gender identity whereby they do not identify strictly as either a boy or a girl – they may identify as both, neither or another gender entirely. To give you an indication of just how diverse the terminology is, the Queensland University of Technology (QUT) ‘Sex in Australia 2’ survey provided 33 options under the question of what terms best described the gender of participants (Queensland Behavioural Economics Group & Queensland University of Technology, 2018). Similarly, social media applications have increased their gender identity options; for example, Facebook now has Source: Courtesy of Facebook over fifty different choices (see Figure 5.6). One thing is clear, gender

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identity represents an inherent aspect of a person’s make-up, and although we do not choose our gender, the words we use to communicate our gender identity may change over time.

EMBRACING GENDER DIVERSITY There can be no doubt that the notion of gender is a constantly evolving concept in terms of the development of our personal gender identity and the understanding, acknowledgement and acceptance of gender identity within the greater society, culture and time in which we live. Generations of young people are moving beyond the limited understanding of a world which recognises only binary distinctions in sex and gender. The internet and social media native generation has unlimited exposure to a diverse range of variations which are also seen in primetime broadcasting. A survey conducted by GLAAD during the American 2017–2018 broadcasting period (see Table 5.2) showed that of the 901 regular characters expected to appear on primetime scripted broadcast programming, almost 6.5% were identified as gay, lesbian, bisexual, transgender, queer and/or intersex (LGBTQI) – the highest percentage of LGBTQI series regulars reported in the 20-year history of the data collection. Similar increases were found on cable TV and streaming networks.

TABLE 5.2 Gender diversity on TV, cable and streaming in the United States Research indicates that the appearance of LGBTQI characters on screen is increasing, with the highest number of new characters appearing in the 2017–2018 broadcast period; more than in any other period of the 20-year history of the survey. Broadcast television

58 (6.4%) of the 901 regular characters on broadcast scripted primetime were identified as LGBTQI – the highest percentage in the report’s history. There were also 28 recurring LGBTQI characters.

Cable television

There were 173 LGBTQI characters on scripted primetime cable – 103 regular characters and 70 recurring.

Streaming services

There were 70 LGBTQI characters in original scripted series on Amazon, Hulu, and Netflix – 51 regular and 19 recurring. An increase from the previous year’s total of 65.

Bisexual+ characters

Bisexual+ characters made up 28% of the LGBTQI characters across all platforms (75 women to 18 men), a slight decrease from the previous year.

Transgender characters

There were 17 regular and recurring transgender characters across all platforms. Of those, nine are trans women, four are trans men, and four are nonbinary – the first time GLAAD has been able to count non-binary characters.

Asexual characters

For the first time since GLAAD started this report, there are asexual characters counted. One each on cable and streaming, but still none on broadcast.

Source: Adapted from GLAAD Media Institute (2018). Where we are on TV ‘17–’18: GLAAD’s annual report on LGBTQ inclusion, ‘Executive summary’, p.4. Retrieved from http://glaad.org/files/WWAT/WWAT_GLAAD_2017-2018.pdf

According to the GLAAD Accelerating Acceptance 2017 Survey, Millennials (aged 18–34) were significantly more likely to openly identify as LGBTQI than older generations, and researchers at GLAAD believe the increases in the online presence of LGBTQI characters as well as increasingly accepting environments has contributed to this. Increased media visibility may be introducing a greater level of understanding of LGBTQI people in the community, helping to reduce stereotypes, stigma and discriminatory behaviours, which in turn are making it less challenging to openly identify as LGBTQI. In the following section we will take a closer look at some of the diversity which we find in the development of gender identities. Transgender

A person whose gender identity, gender expression or behaviour does not conform to that which is typically associated with the sex assigned at birth

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Under the transgender umbrella According to the APA (2015a) transgender is a term for people whose gender identity, gender expression or behaviour does not conform to that which is typically associated with the sex they were assigned to at birth, as well as to those who do not identify with either gender. The term includes those who seek medical intervention to align their bodies with the sex associated with their gender identity (transsexual men and women), people who cross-dress, drag performers, and those who cross (trans-) gender

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boundaries in some way. A person whose gender identity differs from their male sex assignment at birth is often referred to as a male-to-female transgender woman, a person whose gender identity differs from a female sex assignment at birth is often referred to as a female-to-male transgender man. Transgender people may be sexually oriented toward men, women, other transgender people or a combination of these (APA, 2009). With the visibility and acceptance of transgender people increasing across the world, the numbers of children and adolescents identifying as transgender at various ages during the course of normal development is becoming more common. Therefore, an understanding of the development of gender identity within this population is becoming increasingly necessary. When children authentically express themselves or identify themselves in ways that do not conform to cultural norms, they generally receive explicit or implicit messages from family and community members that what they are doing is wrong (Malpas, 2011). For transgender children and adolescents this may lead to the development of negative selfesteem setting up a lifelong expectation of rejection from others which may result in chronic depression and anxiety, self-harm and suicide (Olson, Schrager, Belzer, Simons, & Clark, 2015). There have been a number of life challenges linked to transgender people throughout the literature, including violence and stigmatisation, barriers to health care, and rejection by society and family members (Gamarel, Reisner, Laurenceau, Nemoto, & Operario, 2014; James et al., 2016). Research conducted by Tracy Becerra-Culqui and colleagues (2018) found that transgender and gender-nonconforming youth are diagnosed with mental health conditions much more frequently than young people who identify with the gender they are assigned at birth. Based on a review of a health database associated with a large group of transgender/gender nonconforming individuals enrolled in a comprehensive healthcare system, the team examined the prevalence of mental health conditions such as anxiety, depression and suicidal thoughts. Their findings indicated that in almost all instances, mental health diagnoses were more common for transgender and gender-nonconforming youth than for youth who identified with the gender assigned at birth. Their sample, which included health records from 1347 transgender and gender-nonconforming youth (3–17 years of age), found that these youths presented with up to 13 times more mental health conditions than their peers. Of the transgender and gender-nonconforming children and adolescents in the sample, diagnoses of attention deficit disorder indicated levels 3–7 times higher than the matched reference group (transfeminine: 15%; transmasculine: 16%); and those with depressive disorder, 4–7 times higher (transfeminine: 49%; transmasculine: 62%). The research team indicated that the prevalence of these conditions could be linked to the feeling of distress a person feels when their assigned gender does not match their identity, as well as the stress of prejudice and discrimination typically experienced by these groups. For transgender people, the anticipated rejection they often experience in public spaces, particularly gender-segregated spaces at work, when using public toilets, when meeting someone new, and in the company of family members, is accompanied by feelings of hypervigilance, fear, anxiety, stress, mental and physical exhaustion, and genuine concerns about their personal safety. As a coping mechanism many suggest that they resort to avoiding spaces and situations where they may encounter this type of rejection (Rood et al., 2016). Transgender youth are particularly vulnerable as they face the many unique and complex issues which confront them at the junction of their need to pursue an authentic personal development and the societal and cultural expectations of gender expression which highlight difference. Striving to achieve that balance between the authentic development of gender identity, learning to cope with difference, questioning, and eventually becoming comfortable with one’s gender identity and sexual orientation, are a vital part of the space which needs to be negotiated to enable healthy growth and development. Inadequate social support during this time places youth at risk for a number of unhealthy and often risky behaviours (Stieglitz, 2010). Family and social support has been linked to the development of resilience in transgender youth (Koken, Bimbi, & Parsons, 2009; Singh & McKleroy, 2011). For instance, findings from a study of 433 transgender youth demonstrated that participants who perceived their parents were supportive, had higher levels of life satisfaction and self-esteem and recorded lower levels of depression and suicide attempts. In fact only 4% of transgender youth with supportive parents had attempted suicide as compared to 57% of transgender youth without supportive parents (Travers et al., 2012). The importance of role models and being a role model for others has also been linked to the development of resilience in the transgender population. Findings from the research conducted by Bird, Kuhns, and Garofalo (2012) suggested that positive role models may help to minimise psychological

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Non-binary

A person who identifies with neither or both genders.

Genderqueer

An overarching term used to describe people who do not identify exclusively as either male or female.

distress and foster resilience in transgender people. Which brings us to an interesting question: where does a transgender person find such a role model (Bockting et al., 2013)? As we saw in the introduction to this section, the answer lies with the media and popular press! Shelley Craig and her colleagues (2015) suggest that the use of media such as television, movies, music, social media, blogs and online videos can be used to facilitate resilience in transgender youth. Their findings indicated that online media such as YouTube, Facebook and Tumblr may give transgender individuals access to more diverse representations of transgender people that are less bound by the stereotypical representations in mainstream media, buffering some of the effects of marginalisation, such as isolation or victimisation. Using online media as an avenue of escape and emotional relief enables these young people to actively create meaning through online activities. Similarly, the responsibility of being a positive role model to others provides a sense of purpose and meaning – lessening suicidal ideation (Moody, Fuks, Peláez, & Smith, 2015).

CULTURAL DIVERSITY GLOBAL ATTITUDES TOWARD TRANSGENDER PEOPLE In 2017, Ipsos conducted a global survey on the topic of transgender people which collected data from 19 747 individuals aged between 16 and 64, from 27 countries, including Australia. Their findings indicated almost two thirds of people surveyed would like their country to do more to support and protect transgender people, with Spain leading the way (Clark & Jackson, 2018). As you can see from Figure 5.7, the majority of the sample were united in their belief that governments need to do more to protect transgender people from discrimination, with Argentinians overwhelmingly in favour of this. People in Sweden, Australia and the US believe their countries are becoming more tolerant of transgender people, but those in Hungary, Poland and Japan are less likely to agree. Just over half of those surveyed believe that being transgender is a natural occurrence (although almost half of those surveyed in Hungary, Italy and Japan were less likely to agree) and the majority of countries surveyed regarded transgendered people as brave. Disturbingly, some countries still see transgendered people as having a mental illness, and others believe that being transgender is a sin. Over a third of Americans believe that society has gone too far in allowing people to dress and live as one sex even though they were not born that way, and one third globally would be concerned about exposing their child to a transgender person (Clark & Jackson, 2018).

FIGURE 5.7 Global attitudes towards transgender people. The Ipsos Global Attitudes Towards Transgender People report shows that overall people across the globe are more accepting of transgender people. But there is still a long way to go, with evidence of division in terms of whether transgender people should be allowed to use the restroom of the sex they identify with and those who still believe being transgender is sinful. 60% I want our country to do more to support and protect transgender people 59% Our country is becoming more tolerant toward transgender people 52% Transgender people are a natural occurrence 60% Transgender people are brave 23% Transgender people have a form of mental illness 14% Transgender people are committing a sin 21%

Society has gone too far in allowing people to dress and live as one sex even though they were born another

30% I worry about exposing children to transgender people Source: Clark, J., & Jackson, C. (2018 January). Global attitudes toward transgender ­people. Ipsos. Retrieved from https://www.ipsos.com/en-us/news-polls/globalattitudes-toward-transgender-people

Non-binary and genderqueer Intergender

A variation of sex characteristics which does not allow classification as either male or female.

Demigender

An umbrella term for non-binary gender identities with a partial connection to a particular gender (i.e .demigirl/demiboy).

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Non-binary is an umbrella term which embraces a range of identities on the gender spectrum including genderqueer, intergender and demigender. Non-binary gender identity does not fall within strict categories of man or woman; rather it captures individuals who may experience a gender identity that is neither exclusively male nor female, is a combination of male and female, or is between or beyond genders, as well as those who reject having a gender (James et al., 2016; Losty & O’Connor, 2018; Webb, Matsuno, Budge, Krishnan, & Balsam, 2016). James and colleagues have suggested that approximately 35% of people who identify as transgender identify primarily as non-binary. However, outside of the transgender population, it is difficult to gain accurate estimates of how many people identify as non-binary, because most research conducted to date has not included it as a response category (James et al., 2016; Barr, Budge, & Adelson, 2016). Data from the GLAAD Accelerating Acceptance 2017 survey revealed a generation of young people who are increasingly rejecting traditional labels, preferring instead to talk about themselves in words that are beyond the binary. Their findings indicated that 12% of Millennials identified as transgender or gender nonconforming (i.e., do not identify with the sex they were assigned at birth, or their gender expression

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is different from conventional expectations of masculinity and femininity), which was double the number of transgender and gender nonconforming people reported by Generation X. Millennials are more likely to identify in terminology that falls outside previously traditional binaries, which could be the result of increased cultural acceptance and media visibility driving our understanding of sexual orientation and gender identity in terms of a spectrum. Many of the Millennials who took part in the GLAAD study reported knowing someone who identifies beyond the traditional binaries. However, examples of people who have redefined the traditional gender conventions have existed for centuries, as can be seen in our Cultural Diversity feature which acknowledges non-traditional gender identities around the world.

CULTURAL DIVERSITY NON-BINARY IDENTITIES – TWO SPIRITS AND THIRD GENDERS Although most Western societies are slowly recognising nonbinary identities, there are many cultures around the world that have long embraced multiple genders as part of their cultural landscape (Figure 5.8). Evidence of a third gender, known as Wakashu or beautiful youths due to their androgynous appearance and variable sexuality, appeared in Japanese art

as early as the 1600s. They were depicted as playful, sexual and feminine, and were objects of desire for both women and men (Kunimoto, 2017). The concept of Two Spirits (people who are both masculine and feminine) has been recognised in Indigenous North American culture for countless generations. The term encompasses a broad range of sexual and gender identities of Indigenous peoples, and references the cultural

FIGURE 5.8 Non-binary gender identities worldwide Around the globe we find a rich history of the cultural kaleidoscope of non-binary gender identities.

Leitis in Tonga

Fa’afafines of Samoa

Source: Courtesy of Leitis in Waiting film, QWaves (http://qwaves.com/)

Muxes of Mexico Source: © Mario Patino and Lukas Avendano

Source: Getty Images/Olivier Chouchana

Hijras of India Source: Sara Hylton/The New York Times

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roles of individuals who embody both female and male spirits. The term is also used to describe Indigenous people who identify as lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender or queer. Oral histories reflect widespread respect and honour for Two-Spirit people with many occupying roles which were considered vital to the nations’ collective wellbeing and survival such as teachers, knowledge keepers, healers and spiritual leaders (Hunt, 2016). In Hawaiian culture there are the Māhū, who embody both male and female and embrace both male and female qualities. Similarly, in Samoa, are the Fa’afifines – boys raised as girls, adopting female gender roles and the attributes traditionally associated with women. This practice is

deeply embedded in much of Polynesia (Vassey & Bartlett, 2007; SBS, 2013). The Muxes of Mexico are men who identify more as women, and those who do not align with the traditional male–female or gay–straight categories. The Hijras of India are considered neither man nor woman, and are thought to have the power to bless or curse (Nanda, 2015). The Hijras recently received official recognition as a third gender in India. The Navajo Indians have the Nádleehí, or one who is transformed; in Siberia are the Chuckchi; in the Philippines the Bakla; in Peru the Quariwarmi; in Thailand the Tom, Dee and Kaathoey identities; and among the Apsáalooke Indians the Bote/Bate/ Bade are found (Goldberg, 2016).

Data on the lived experience of those who identify as non-binary is somewhat limited. A small-scale qualitative study conducted by Mairead Losty and John O’Connor (2018) conveyed the painful history of those who identify as non-binary. Their findings highlighted the role that mental health professionals play in invalidating the identity of these people. It also drew attention to the overwhelming perception that nonbinary identities were not respected by society as evidenced by the incorrect and insensitive use of personal pronouns. The descriptions of gender identity which were illustrated throughout the study conveyed the complex and diverse range of experiences, and the importance of viewing non-binary gender as a valid alternative to biological sex. The experiences of poor mental health, feelings of rejection, discrimination, misunderstanding and isolation were also strongly represented throughout. The largest study conducted on almost 28 000 transgender adults in the US found that almost 50% of the non-binary respondents reported current serious psychological distress, compared to 33% of transgender men and women, and 5% of the overall US population (James et al., 2016). Research also suggests higher rates of depression and anxiety, the impact of which is lessened with greater social support (Budge, Rossman, & Howard, 2014).

Personal pronouns There are many gender-neutral pronouns used by non-binary people; some may choose they/them/ their as a singular pronoun, or zie/hir/hirs, xe/xem/xyr, and ey/em/eir. Others may use a combination of pronouns while others will use none at all (Matsuno & Budge, 2017). When asked about the correct pronoun usages for transgender people, Ipsos developed two questions to be administered only to countries where English is the primary language (Australia, Canada, the UK and the US) (see Figure 5.9). In these countries, FIGURE 5.9 Using the correct pronoun Around the globe only two in five people reported referring to transgender men as ‘he’ and transgender women as

‘she’, rather than using the pronoun relevant to the biological sex.

Using the correct pronoun: transgender women What pronoun would you use when speaking about each of the following people who dress and live as one sex even though they were born another? Someone who was considered male at birth but dresses and lives as a woman. A feminine pronoun (she/ her) Australia

44%

A masculine pronoun (he/ him) 13%

A neutral pronoun (they/ them) 18%

Don't Know 25%

Using the correct pronoun: transgender men What pronoun would you use when speaking about each of the following people who dress and live as one sex even though they were born another? Someone who was considered female at birth but dresses and lives as a man. A masculine pronoun (he/him) Australia

42%

A feminine pronoun (she/her) 14%

A neutral pronoun (they/ them) 19%

Don't Know 25%

Source: Clark, J., & Jackson, C. (2018, January). Global attitudes toward transgender people. Ipsos, Retrieved from https://www.ipsos.com/en-us/news-polls/globalattitudes-toward-transgender-people

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approximately two in five people reported referring to transgender men as ‘he’ and transgender women as ‘she’, rather than using the pronoun relevant to the individual’s biological sex. Approximately one in five would use the neutral pronoun of ‘they’. Americans were most likely to use the pronoun of the transgender person’s birth, with 22% reporting they would refer to a transgender woman as ‘he’ and 21% reporting referring to a transgender man as ‘she’; considerably more than reported in Australia (13% and 14%, respectively), Canada (14% for each), and the UK (12% and 13%, respectively) (Clark & Jackson, 2018). One of the problems experienced by transgender people is associated with the use of first names, which are generally gender-specific. Aligning one’s gender presentation with one’s gender identity is a very important part of the social transition process, so it is not surprising to see that changing first names, pronouns, hair and clothing are associated with better mental health among outcomes for those who choose to transition (Steensma, McGuire, Kreukels, Beekman, & Cohen-Kettenis, 2013). Unfortunately, many are unable to use their chosen name for interpersonal or institutional reasons, such as resistance from families or peers, the rejection of their chosen name, or medical institutions and education systems which require a legal name change to enable the use of the chosen name (Thaler, Bermudez, & Sommer, 2009). Those whose gender, expression and names do not match face further discrimination and victimisation and ‘outing’. Research conducted by Stephen Russell and colleagues (2018) indicates that transgender youth who were able to use their chosen names in multiple contexts reported fewer depressive symptoms and less suicidal ideation and behaviour; that is, being able to choose a name different from the name given at birth, and to use their chosen name in multiple contexts provided affirmation of their gender identity. Over the past decade, we have seen a growing push towards the correct and consistent use of chosen names and preferred personal pronouns; and it seems that it is increasingly gaining momentum. For example, the Victorian State Government introduced a campaign encouraging people to use gender neutral pronouns; and ‘They Day’, which occurs on the first Wednesday of every month, was introduced in August of 2018 in an email sent to the 10 000 staff of the Department of Health and Human Services. The email urged the use of inclusive terms such as they and them (Baxendale, 2018).

GENDER TRANSITIONS AND SEX ASSIGNMENT SURGERY Altering one’s birth sex is a complex process that occurs over an extended period. For some the transition will include the administration of cross-sex hormone therapy, or involve the surgical alteration of their genitalia and other sex characteristics, and for others it will involve a combination of both. The transition period may also include communicating change to family and friends, the use of a different name and personal pronouns, and a new way of dressing and presenting oneself. Not all people choose to transition; in fact, many transgender individuals choose to not have any medical interventions (Budge et al., 2014).

Hormone treatments According to the TranZnation report (Couch et al., 2007), which documented the health and wellbeing of 287 transgender people in Australia and New Zealand, almost three quarters of the sample had used hormone treatments. Of those who had not, almost half said they had no intention of using them in the future, about a third said they intended to do so in the future, and the balance were unsure. The reactions of the people who had used them were mixed; positive included body changes, and the feeling of wellbeing that followed these changes; negatives included the side-effects of treatment including headaches, migraines, nausea, allergic reactions and digestive problems, as well as longer-term issues such as liver disease, elevated cholesterol levels and cardiac problems. Many believed that the therapy was a necessary part of their lives; however, the small number who had decided not to go on hormone therapy made this decision because they felt it was not necessary for their wellbeing. Some also cited health and financial concerns.

Surgical options Research suggests that surgical interventions generally result in positive outcomes across a range of domains (Smith et al., 2005). Extensive screening processes, psychological therapy and staged levels of treatment are recommended prior to surgery to prepare the person for the surgery and minimise the chances of regret following irreversible surgical procedures (Lawrence, 2003; Olsson & Moller, 2006). The preferred option is a combination of surgery and hormone therapy (Couch et al., 2007). Only around 40% of respondents in the TranZnation report had undergone some form of surgery; with similar numbers among assigned males compared with assigned females. There were fifteen different surgical procedures which were conducted in both the public and private health systems, and some had undergone surgery overseas. Participants who had chosen surgical options tended to be older than those who had not and most of those who had undergone

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Surgery is a top priority for transgender people.

FALSE

surgery said they felt a deep sense of satisfaction, relief and completeness, having a body they felt to be right for them. Although there were many barriers to surgery identified, such as work, family, legal issues and access to specialists; by far the most significant barrier was reported to be financial cost. Other interesting results were reported in a study investigating the effects of testosterone treatment (with or without chest reconstruction surgery) on the mental health of 200 female-to-male transgender people, where roughly 57% of the participants were taking testosterone and 40% had undergone chest reconstruction surgery. Those who were receiving testosterone reported fewer symptoms of anxiety and depression, as well as less anger, than the untreated group. And those injecting on a weekly basis showed significantly less anger compared with those injecting every second week. The chest reconstruction surgery was more successful for reducing feelings of body dissatisfaction; and participants who had surgery and testosterone reported less body dissatisfaction than both the testosterone-only or the untreated groups. Half of the participants who were injecting the testosterone also described increased sexual attraction to non-transgender men (Davis & Meier, 2014).

How young is too young?

Gender dysphoria

A sense of distress which is experienced when an individual’s emotional and psychological identity as either male or female differs from the sex assigned at birth.

Children are not old enough to know their own gender identity.

FALSE

In Australia in 2016 a four-year-old identifying as transgender was recorded as the youngest child in Australia to commence a period of transition to another gender (Seven News, 2016). Media and public opinion in Australia at the time were somewhat conflicted, with many believing the child was far too young to identify as transgender. Earlier in this chapter we said that children appear to be quite gender flexible until the age of 2 or 3, with a more rigid understanding evolving a few years later – so at what point could they be deemed able to decide what their gender will be and whether or not they believe they are transgender? In reality there does not appear to be a straightforward answer because much depends on the child’s age and ability to make substantial, informed decisions about the development of their identity. It is not uncommon however for children with gender dysphoria to express their cross-gender identity between the ages of 3 and 4 years, with some making clear statements about their gender not matching their biological sex as early as age 2 (Diamond, Pardo, & Butterworth, 2011), which is around the same time that children begin to self-label as boys or girls (Zosuls et al., 2009). So, in response to the question of whether or not children can identify as transgender; it has been shown that yes they can, and research indicates an average age of 8.5 for children recognising their gender as ‘different’ (Rafferty, 2018). According to the New South Wales Government the four-year-old identifying as transgender is not an isolated case – the child was one of hundreds who make their way into the health system each year for the treatment of gender dysphoria. The diagnosis of gender dysphoria, which is included in the APA Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5) (APA, 2013), states that a person must express a strong and persistent cross-gender identification for more than six months, persistent discomfort with his or her sex, or a sense of inappropriateness in the gender role of that sex. It also notes that the experience must cause clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational or other important areas of functioning. The APA estimates that gender dysphoria affects roughly 5–12% of girls and 2–6% of boys (APA, 2013). Children who identify as transgender in Australia are thought to represent roughly one in 45 000 children (Royal Children’s Hospital, 2018). As a result of two landmark cases in Australia in 2017 and 2018, the Family Court decided that children with gender dysphoria who have parental and medical approval will no longer have to seek court approval to undergo surgery or to commence hormone therapy (Brown, 2018). Children undergoing treatment will typically pass through two stages. The first stage (which is reversible) involves the use of puberty blockers to stop the physical changes which many adolescents find challenging. The second stage involves the use of hormones – the use of either oestrogen to feminise the body in those who have a female gender identity, or the use of testosterone to masculinise the body in those who have a male gender identity. There has been a large increase in the number of children and adolescents who question conventional gender expectations and seek recognition and acceptance of their gender diversity, wishing to develop a body that is congruent with their gender feelings. The 2017 ruling allows a child diagnosed with gender dysphoria to begin stage two, non-surgical treatment, if they have parental and medical approval; the 2018 ruling effectively clears the way for teenagers who are transitioning to undergo surgery.

Administrative changes post-transition Amending public documentation to reflect an individual’s new gender identity is an important step in the process. There are mixed reports from people who have undertaken this exercise in terms of the experience, the outcomes, and the degrees of difficulties and frustrations. For gender or sex to be changed on documentation, evidence of having had a related surgical procedure is generally required, although many 212

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countries, including New Zealand, are changing this. Almost 90% of the participants in the TranZnation study who had undergone surgery had made attempts to change documentation. Of course, the desire to have one’s current gender identity reflected on documentation is not dependent on whether or not someone has had gender-related surgery, and this was evident in this study, with a quarter of those who had not undergone surgery having made attempts to change documentation. Those who had succeeded agreed that it provided affirmation of their gender. The inability to change their documents had consequences in participants’ lives. Also clear was the fact that a mismatch between documentation and their gender presentation exposes people to discrimination and danger (Couch et al., 2007).

STIGMA AND DISCRIMINATION There is a strong trend of stigma and discrimination threaded throughout the literature and experiences of people who identify as gender variant. Although the public face of those ascribing to sex or gender outside of the socially accepted binary is becoming far more familiar, transgender people often receive the message that their gender is invalid or pathological (Nadal, Skolnik, & Wong, 2012). Many transgender and non-binary people develop an expectation or fear of discrimination and/or rejection which leads to psychological distress (Bockting et al., 2013; Breslow et al., 2015; Rood et al., 2016). Non-binary people often encounter difficulties negotiating environments, which are organised around the notion of binary gender (e.g., public toilets), as well as asserting the use of appropriate gendered language (e.g., ‘he’ or ‘she’ rather than ‘they’) (Matsuno & Budge, 2017). These individuals traverse a daily path that makes little allowance for variations in identity, so the daily tasks that people of the gender binary take for granted, such as locating a bathroom or completing paperwork, can be unnecessarily challenging and annoyingly persistent.

Barriers to accessing health care Stigma and discrimination are also found in healthcare settings and impact on health and access to health care. The barriers that LGBTQI individuals face in the healthcare system include internalised shame, interpersonal discrimination and ignorance, and legal, administrative and systemic challenges. There is evidence of many barriers to equitable health care including discrimination, transphobia and homophobia in healthcare settings, a lack of practitioner competency, the use of inappropriate and intrusive language and questions, hostility and verbal abuse – all of which have reinforced a reluctance to seek medical advice and assistance (Australian Medical Students Association, 2016). Transgender individuals are unique in that they require clinicians with appropriate knowledge to make relevant decisions in a gatekeeper role, ability to coordinate multiple types of services (e.g., medical, legal, financial), and awareness of the potential impact of their own reaction to non-traditional gender identities and expressions (Israel, Gorcheva, Burnes & Walther, 2008). A therapist who understands common issues experienced by transgender people can provide those clients with more effective treatment (Grossman, D’Augelli, Howell, & Hubbard, 2005). Despite this, there is a lack of studies that aim to improve mental healthcare provided to transgender individuals.

Mental health impacts of stigma and discrimination While research indicating evidence of elevated risks of depression, anxiety disorders, self-harm and suicide in the LGBTQI population continues to gain momentum (Corboz et al., 2008; Herek & Garnets, 2007; Meyer, 2003; Smith, Rissel, Richters, Grulich, & Visser, 2003), similar research for transgender individuals has been somewhat slower. The TranZnation report indicated that 36% of participants sourced from Australia and New Zealand met the criteria for major depressive disorder – considerably higher than would be expected in the general population (Couch et al., 2007). Similarly, the Private Lives 2 study (Leonard et al., 2012) indicated higher levels of psychological distress in transgender males and females than the population average. Other studies report depressive symptoms in the range of 26–66% among both transsexual and transgender samples (e.g., Bockting, Huang, Ding, Robinson, & Rosser, 2005; Clements-Nolle, Marx, & Katz, 2006; Shipherd, Green, & Abramovitz, 2010; Nemoto, et al., 2004). Research conducted by Crystal Boza and Kathryn Nicholson Perry (2014) examining mental health outcomes, gender-related victimisation, perceived social support, and predictors of depression among 243 transgender Australians indicated 59% of their sample reported depressive symptoms and 44% reported a previous suicide attempt (many of which cited their transgender status as a contributing factor). Not surprisingly, a lack of social support emerged as the most significant predictor of depressive symptoms. Also worth noting is that those who endorsed having had some form of gender affirmative surgery were significantly more likely to present with lower symptoms of depression. Clearly these results highlight the significant health concern in this population and provide evidence of the need to provide culturally sensitive health care. Copyright 2020 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-202

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Research suggests that the emotional distress experienced among transgender people is likely associated with the oppressive environment in which they live (Nuttbrock et al., 2010). Many report that they are frequently exposed to gender-related victimisation across various domains of their lives. This is evidenced by the large majority of respondents in the TranZnation survey who recalled at least one instance of stigma or discrimination on the basis of their gender identity (Couch et al., 2007), and many other studies which draw attention to the high prevalence of gender-related victimisation commencing in childhood and persisting across the lifespan (Clements-Nolle et al., 2006; Couch et al., 2007; Nuttbrock et al., 2010). These experiences occur most notably in the areas of employment and healthcare service provision (Couch et al., 2007). Similarly concerning findings were reflected in research conducted by Robinson and colleagues (2014) which documented the serious impact that homophobia, transphobia and heteronormativity can have on the health and wellbeing of young people who are gender variant or sexuality diverse. The results from their online national survey indicated that many had experienced frequent and ongoing harassment, violence, marginalisation, ostracism from peers, and rejection from families. More alarming however was the data which showed 41% had thought about self-harm and/or suicide; 33% had harmed themselves; and 16% had attempted suicide. What has been made clear throughout the literature is that the more discrimination faced, the poorer an individual’s health and wellbeing (LGBTI National LGBTI Alliance, n.d.).

The path towards inclusion So, what is the current state of play in terms of the rights of LGBTQI around the world? According to the World Economic Forum (Hutt, 2018) there has been tremendous progress globally over the past few years, but there is still a remarkably long way to go. When looking for memorable milestone moments what better way to begin than the 2018 New Year’s Eve rainbow fireworks over Sydney’s Harbour Bridge (see Figure 5.10), marking not only the start of the new year, and celebrating 40 years of the Sydney Gay and Lesbian Mardi Gras, but also heralding the new era of same-sex marriage in Australia – the 26th country to do so. Further afield Germany, Malta, Bermuda and Finland also passed same sex marriage laws and the European Court of Justice granted same sex spouses of EU Citizens the same residency rights as heterosexual spouses. Bolivia, Ecuador, FIGURE 5.10 Sydney Harbour New Year’s Eve 2018 Fiji, Malta and the UK have constitutions that guarantee equality for rainbow fireworks citizens on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity, and Forty years of the Sydney Gay and Lesbian Mardi Gras and the five countries (including New Zealand) have constitutions which right of same sex couples to marry were publicly celebrated provide protection based on sexual orientation. as part of the 2018 Sydney New Year’s Eve fireworks, which were seen by billions of people around the world. Having acknowledged the tremendous progress that has been made around the world we also need to recognise there is still a long road ahead. For instance, there are still eight countries where homosexuality is punishable by death (Iran, Sudan, Saudi Arabia and Yemen; parts of Somalia and northern Nigeria) and others where the death penalty could be handed down if ruled by Sharia law (Hutt, 2018). Seventy-six jurisdictions (including 80 countries of the Commonwealth) still consider gay and lesbian activity between consenting adults to be illegal – that is 40% of all countries – and many countries have expanded the law to include lesbian and bisexual activity. Lesbians and bisexual women are also vulnerable to violence, control and abuse within their own families and social networks, and are often subjected to ‘corrective rape’ (used to Source: Getty Images/City of Sydney/Scott Barbour ‘correct’ their sexual orientation) (Human Dignity Trust, 2016). So, it is clear that despite the advances which have been made there is still a long way to go – LGBTQI people still face widespread exclusion, discrimination and violence across the globe. Tacking these issues is not easy, largely due to the deeply entrenched stigma and discrimination that the LGBTQI population experiences. One of the global initiatives which launched on 17 May 2004 is the International Day Against Homophobia, Transphobia, and Biphobia (IDAHOB). The day has become an annual landmark which draws the attention of governments, the media, and the public, providing a very public front to the alarming situation faced by LGBTQI people around the world. IDAHO, IDAHOB and IDAHOBiT have become the popular hashtags promoting the public celebration of the LGBTQI community uniting millions of people in support of the recognition of human rights for all, irrespective of sexual orientation or gender identity or expression. IDAHOB, 17 May, is now celebrated in more than 130 countries, including 37 where same-sex acts are illegal, with in excess of 100 events reported each year (http://www.dayagainsthomophobia.org). 214

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CRITICAL THINKING ACTIVITY What can healthcare professionals, such as psychologists, do to help reduce the stigma and discrimination experienced by the LGBTQI population? Earlier in this chapter we noted the rising numbers of children being diagnosed with gender dysphoria, and the early age at which they are being referred for assessment and treatment. What recommendations would you make to our educators for dealing with these children, their parents and peers?

One of the issues which social psychologists face with the LGBTQI population worldwide is a lack of accurate and transparent data, largely due to the reluctance of many to be seen and heard, and the inability of our administrative systems to acknowledge and recognise their presence. As a researcher how would you suggest we improve our ability to collect meaningful data from gender diverse populations?

Source: Courtesy of Professor Kerry Robinson

RESEARCH SPOTLIGHT PROFESSOR KERRY ROBINSON, UNIVERSITY OF WESTERN SYDNEY What are the topic areas of your research? My research has primarily focused on gender and sexuality, particularly in childhood and young people. I have examined the social construction of gender and sexuality, and how dominant beliefs, values and practices underpin what is considered to be ‘normative’, which can vary historically and across different cultures, ethnicities, ages, geographical locations, religions and so on. In western contexts, what is viewed as ‘normative’ is constituted in binary gender, which refers to two genders, male and female, which traditionally, have been seen as having opposite characteristics. Within this binary framework, I have examined the ways in which ‘normative’ gender is linked to ‘normative’ sexuality; that is, how gender is heterosexualised in early childhood and how gender is rigidly regulated through every day relationships and practices, including those in which children engage. When children and young people transgress normative gender and sexuality they can experience severe consequences. Which of your research findings have you found most intriguing? There is one project in particular that I have undertaken that I consider to be particularly interesting and to have important implications for children’s and young people’s gender and sexual citizenship. This project was conducted with early childhood and primary aged children, their parents and educators. The focus of this research was building respectful and ethical relationships early in life with particular attention to gender and sexuality. The research included a mixed method approach: online surveys and interviews with parents and educators, and interviews with children 4 to 12 years of age. The research raised many important issues, but three key findings were: 1 The discourse of childhood innocence seriously impacts the regulation of children’s access to knowledge that is critical to the development of their identities, agency, and health and wellbeing. This knowledge is often viewed as ‘difficult’ knowledge, as it is information that is problematic for many adults to discuss with children. Gendered power relationships, sexuality and sexuality education are some

of the most prominent forms of ‘difficult’ knowledge associated with children and young people. 2 Young children are actively engaged in developing their gender identities from around the age of three, and through this process, they are actively constituting themselves as gendered subjects and sexual subjects, reinforcing dominant power relations around gender and sexuality. Many young children’s perceptions of who they are as gendered subjects is framed in heterosexuality, demonstrated through engagement in play, such as, mothers and fathers, mock-weddings, and boyfriends and girlfriends. This behaviour is often encouraged by adults, including educators. 3 Children from early ages are actively engaged in regulating the gendered behaviours of other children. For example, children who wish to transgress ‘normative’ gender, for example, two boys wishing to be married in a mock wedding, are challenged by many children who view this as inappropriate, not just in relation to gender, but also sexuality (Robinson & Davies, 2019; Robinson & Davies, 2015; Robinson, 2012). How did you become interested in your area of research? My interests in this area of research started well before I became an academic. My experiences as both a high school teacher and a refuge crisis worker with homeless young women have influenced my research as an academic. I learnt that there were serious consequences to children’s and young people’s agency and health and wellbeing, as a result of a lack of access to different gender and sexuality identities beyond the binary, and to certain types of knowledge, such as sexuality education, considered by many adults as ‘inappropriate’, ‘controversial’ or too ‘difficult’. How does your area of research speak to life in Australia and New Zealand? In recent years we have seen an emergence in public acknowledgement of the inequities that exist around gender and power relationships through the global #MeToo campaign. Domestic violence in Australia and New Zealand is a major social problem. Unintended pregnancy, sexually transmitted infections, sexual violence, and child sexual abuse are prevalent in the lives of young people, especially young women and sexuality and gender diverse young people. Facebook has over 70 gender category options for users, a point reinforced

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through my own research. However, my research with sexuality and gender diverse young people shows that they are six times more likely to harm themselves and to attempt suicide than their cisgender peers as a result of homophobia and transphobia (Robinson, Bansel, Denson, Ovenden & Davies, 2014). The values and beliefs that underpin this behaviour start

early in life. Relationships and sexuality education in schools is generally not addressing these issues adequately and is not providing young people access to the knowledge they require to be respectful, ethical citizens. My research shows that education about gender and sexuality needs to start in early childhood.

Topical Reflection SISTERGIRLS OF TIWI ISLAND Research conducted by Damien Riggs and Kate Toon (2015) provided an insight into the experiences of Indigenous Sistergirls. Many spoke of trying to keep their identity a secret from family members for fear of rejection, which was balanced with relief and joy when their disclosure met with acceptance. Others reflected the pain of rejection from family members and the violence or threats of violence they experienced, particularly from their fathers, but also extended family and friends. The long-term emotional consequences of such experiences often led to depression, homelessness, drugs and alcohol abuse – some even turned to sex work or sex for favours, such as a bed for the night. Many highlighted the complexities of often rigidly defined feminine roles within Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities and the effect this had in terms of affirming their identity. Where the expectation is that a Sistergirl will undertake a traditionally feminine role, such as child rearing, child care and caregiving, it is also expected that they will adopt a feminine appearance. For some this is interpreted as marginalisation, whereas for others it is seen as affirming their identify. For those in remote communities with no access to gender affirming surgeries and therapies, such as hormones, this level of acceptance is important. Establishing a sense of place within their communities is important to the concepts of identity and wellbeing. Because of this, discrimination and social exclusion can have devastating effects on individuals. Sistergirls are substantially more vulnerable to physical and sexual violence, and are often the targets of misogyny, transphobia, and racism, which is shaped by histories of colonisation (Costello & Nannup, 1999; Hyde et al., 2014). These contribute to the high rates of poor mental health often reported within Sistergirl communities.

CHAPTER REVIEW SUMMARY DEFINING SEX, INTERSEX, GENDER, AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION • The terms sex and gender are often used interchangeably, but there are distinct differences between them. BIOLOGICAL SEX • Biological sex is a label assigned at birth (or by ultrasound or other prenatal test before birth) based on medical factors such as genitals and chromosomes. INTERSEX • There are a multitude of intersex variations and not all are visible in infancy. • The frequency of intersex people who possess chromosomal and anatomical features of both males and females is approximately 17 of every 1000 people.

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GENDER • The attitudes, feelings and behaviours that we associate with a person’s biological sex. SEXUAL ORIENTATION • Sexual orientation describes a person’s enduring physical, romantic and emotional preference and attraction to another person. • A sexual self-concept is informed by aspects of our sexuality including sexual attraction, sexual behaviours and sexual identity.

PUTTING COMMON SENSE TO THE TEST Sex is binary. FALSE. Research suggests sex is a spectrum anchored by male and female

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PUTTING COMMON SENSE TO THE TEST Intersex is extremely rare. FALSE. We believe that intersex people represent approximately 17 of every 1000 people.

PUTTING COMMON SENSE TO THE TEST Gender identity and sexual orientation are the same thing. FALSE. Gender identity refers to a sense of self as male, female or another gender, whereas sexual orientation refers to a person’s enduring physical, romantic and/or emotional preference for and attraction to another person.

GENDER IDENTIFICATION, ROLES AND STEREOTYPES • Children are tuned in to cues about gender during their first years of development. GENDER ROLES AND STEREOTYPES • Children use gender-related labels to make important distinctions between males and females. • Parents play an important role in the development of gender norms and attitudes in children. • Children understand stereotypical gendered roles from an early age.

THE GENDER BINARY AND THE GENDER SPECTRUM • The two most commonly recognised gender identities are boys (men) and girls (women) – the gender binary. • The gender spectrum is a continuum anchored by masculine and feminine with androgyny as the mid-point. EMBRACING GENDER DIVERSITY • Increased media visibility may be introducing a greater level of understanding of LGBTQI people in the community, helping reduce stereotypes, stigma and discriminatory behaviours. • Increases in the online presence of LGBTQI characters has contributed to the increase in Millennials who openly identify as LGBTQI. UNDER THE TRANSGENDER UMBRELLA • Transgender is a term for people whose gender identity, gender expression or behaviour does not conform to the sex to which they were assigned at birth, as well as those who do not identify with either gender. • With the visibility and acceptance of transgender people increasing across the world, the numbers of children and adolescents identifying as transgender at various ages during the course of normal development is becoming more common. NON-BINARY AND GENDERQUEER • Non-binary gender identity captures people who experience a gender identity which may be neither male or female, a combination of male and female, between genders, or be of no chosen gender. • Genderqueer refers to people who do not identify exclusively as either male or female.

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PERSONAL PRONOUNS • There are many gender-neutral pronouns used by non-binary people. • Incorrect usage of pronouns is common.

GENDER TRANSITIONS AND SEX ASSIGNMENT SURGERY • Altering one’s birth sex is a complex process that occurs over an extended period. • The transition may include cross-sex hormone therapy, the surgical alteration of genitalia and other sex characteristics, or a combination of both. HORMONE TREATMENTS • In a survey of transgender people in Australia and New Zealand, almost three quarters had used hormone treatments. • Reactions of those who had used them were mixed, but many believed it was a necessary part of their life. SURGICAL OPTIONS • Surgical interventions generally result in positive outcomes across a range of domains. • The preferred option is a combination of surgery and hormone therapy. HOW YOUNG IS TOO YOUNG? • Children with gender dysphoria may express their crossgender identity between the ages of 3 and 4 years. • Children have been known to make clear statements about their gender which do not match their biological sex as early as age 2.

PUTTING COMMON SENSE TO THE TEST Children are not old enough to know their own gender identity. FALSE. Children have been known to identify a mismatch between their gender and their biological sex as early as 2 years of age. ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGES POST-TRANSITION • Amending public documentation to reflect a new gender identity is an important step in the transition. • For gender or sex to be changed on documentation, evidence of having had a related surgical procedure is generally required, although this is slowly changing. • Those who had succeeded in making administrative changes said it provided affirmation of their new gender. • A mismatch between documentation and the gender a person presents as exposes people to embarrassment and discrimination.

PUTTING COMMON SENSE TO THE TEST Surgery is a top priority for transgender people. FALSE. Many transgender individuals choose to not have any medical interventions.

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STIGMA AND DISCRIMINATION • There is a strong trend of stigma and discrimination threaded throughout the literature and experiences of people who identify as gender variant. • Many transgender and non-binary people develop an expectation or fear of discrimination and/or rejection which leads to psychological distress. • Non-binary people often encounter difficulties negotiating environments which are organised around the notion of binary gender (e.g., public toilets).

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BARRIERS TO ACCESSING HEALTH CARE • Barriers that LGBTQI individuals face in the healthcare system include internalised shame, interpersonal discrimination and ignorance, and legal, administrative and systemic challenges. • Transgender individuals need a therapist who understands common issues they experience for more effective treatment. • There is a lack of studies that aim to improve mental healthcare provided to transgender individuals.

THE PATH TOWARDS INCLUSION • Tremendous progress has been made globally in recent years but there is still a long way to go. • Homosexuality is still punishable by death in eight countries and gay and lesbian activity remains illegal in 76 jurisdictions – some countries have expanded this law to include bisexual activity. • The path forward remains difficult due to stigma and discrimination. • A global initiative International Day against Homophobia, Transphobia, and Biphobia is helping draw attention to issues the LGBTQI population face daily.

MENTAL HEALTH IMPACTS OF STIGMA AND DISCRIMINATION • Studies indicate higher levels of psychological distress in transgender males and females than the population average.

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•

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A lack of social support is the most significant predictor of depressive symptoms. Those who endorsed having had some form of gender affirmative surgery were significantly more likely to present with lower symptoms of depression. Emotional distress experienced among transgender people is likely associated with the oppressive environment in which they live. The more discrimination faced, the poorer an individual’s health and wellbeing.

LINKAGES In this chapter we consider stereotypes, prejudice and discrimination relative to gender identities which do not ascribe to the gender binary. You will find further discussion about stereotypes, prejudice and discrimination in

CHAPTER

5

Chapter 4. There are many more ties between the content of this chapter and other exciting areas of social psychology check out the Linkage diagram below to see some of them.

Gender identity

LINKAGES

The development of selfschemas

CHAPTER

2

The social self

Stereotypes, prejudice and discrimination

CHAPTER

4

Stereotypes Prejudice and Discrimination

Embracing human diversity

CHAPTER

13

Community psychology

REVIEW QUIZ 1 According to the gender similarity hypothesis, which of the following is true? a Males and females are similar on most but not all psychological variables. b Males and females are similar on all psychological variables. 218

c Males and females are not similar at all. d Males and females are sometimes similar and sometimes not similar, depending on the situation.

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2 Intersex is a term used to describe: a A childhood developmental disorder. b People born with genetic, hormonal or physical sex characteristics not typically associated with male or female. c A person whose gender identity is in transition. d A person who is sexually interested in different genders.

4 Gender identity is most closely aligned with which of the following definitions? a An internal state of being. b How a person identifies others. c The expression of gendered beliefs. d A person’s sense of being a male, female or other gender which may not alight with the sex assigned at birth.

3 The gender spectrum is anchored by: a masculine and feminine. b male and female. c blue and pink. d heterosexual and homosexual.

5 What would you call the behavioural component of an attitude towards men and women? a A sex stereotype. b Sexist. c Personal opinion. d Sex discrimination.

WEBLINKS United Nations for Intersex Awareness https://www.unfe.org/about/ The United Nations website drawing attention to intersex populations.

Australian Human Rights Commission http://www.humanrights.gov.au A website containing information relating to sexual orientation, gender identity and intersex status in Australia.

Intersex Human Rights Australia https://ihra.org.au/parents/ The website has lots of information relevant to intersex populations including information for health practitioners and parents of intersex children.

Australiana: Island Queens https://www.vice.com/en_au/article/bjjnkd/island-queens A documentary as part of the Australiana series exploring the intersections of traditional culture and gender identity of the gay and transgender population of the Tiwi Islands.

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Thaler, C., Bermudez, F., & Sommer, S. (2009). Legal advocacy on behalf of transgender and gender nonconforming youth. In G.P. Mallon (Ed.), Social work practice with transgender and gender variant youth (2nd ed, pp. 139–162), New York, NY: Routledge. Travers, R., Bauer, G., Pyne, J., Bradley, K., Gale, L., & Papadimitriou, M. (2012). Impacts of strong parental support for trans youth: A report prepared for Children’s Aid Society of Toronto and Delisle Youth Services. http://transpulseproject.ca/wp-content/ uploads/2012/10/Impacts-of-Strong-Parental-Supportfor-Trans-Youth-vFINAL.pdf. van Anders, S. M., Steiger, J., & Goldey, K. L. (2015). Effects of gendered behavior on testosterone in women and men. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 112(45), 13 805–13 810. doi:10.1073/pnas.1509591112 Vasey, P. L., & Bartlett, N. H. (2007). What can the Samoan 'fa’afafine' teach us about the western concept of gender identity disorder in childhood? Perspectives in Biology and Medicine, 50(4), 481–490. doi:10.1353/ pbm.2007.0056 Watts, H. (2017, 2 December). Pink reveals her daughter wants to marry an African woman – and she’s delighted about it. Mirror. Retrieved from https:// www.mirror.co.uk/3am/celebrity-news/pink-revealsdaughter-6-wants-11629738 Webb, A., Matsuno, E., Budge, S., Krishnan, M., & Balsam, K. (2016). Non-binary gender identities fact sheet. The Society for the Psychological Study of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Issues APA Division 44. Washington, DC: The American Psychological Association. Winter, L. (1988). The role of sexual self-concept in the use of contraceptives. Family Planning Perspectives, 20(3), 123–127. doi:10.2307/2135700 World Health Organization Genomic Resource Centre (n.d.). Gender and genetics, WHO. Retrieved from http://www.who.int/genomics/gender/en/index1. html yogyakartaprinciples.org (2007). The Yogyakarta Principles: Principles on the application of international human rights law in relation to sexual orientation and gender identity. http://yogyakartaprinciples.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/08/principles_en.pdf. yogyakartaprinciples.org (2017). The Yogyakarta Principles plus 10. http://yogyakartaprinciples.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/11/A5_yogyakartaWEB-2.pdf. Zell, E., Krizan, Z., & Teeter, S. R. (2015). Evaluating gender similarities and differences using metasynthesis. American Psychologist, 70(1), 10–20. http://dx.doi.org. elibrary.jcu.edu.au/10.1037/a0038208 Zosuls, K. M., Ruble, D. N., Tamis-Lemonda, C. S., Shrout, P. E., Bornstein, M. H., & Greulich, F. K. (2009). The acquisition of gender labels in infancy: Implications for gender-typed play. Developmental Psychology, 45(3), 688–701.

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CHAPTER 6: ATTITUDES CHAPTER 7: CONFORMITY, COMPLIANCE AND OBEDIENCE CHAPTER 8: GROUP PROCESSES

The dimension of time: Socio-historical context

Attitudes and ideologies of culture

The environment Part V Real World Applications Interpersonal networks Part 3: Social influence Chapter 6: Attitudes Chapter 7: Conformity, compliance and obedience Chapter 8: Group processes The individual

Social influence takes many forms, and this is the topic under examination in Part 3. We begin by looking at how social influence helps shape our attitudes, including how attitudes impact our behaviour and how attitudes can be changed. We then look at why people conform, how people elicit compliance and how obedience to the commands of authority affects us. We finish off this section by looking at group processes; specifically, what groups are, how they develop and how they influence people.

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6

Learning Objectives By the end of this chapter, you should be able to: 1 explain attitude measurement, attitude formation and the link between attitudes and behaviour 2 detail the two main routes to persuasion and describe how features of the source, the message and the audience are relevant to persuasion processes 3 compare and contrast classic cognitive dissonance theory with the ‘new look’ views of cognitive dissonance 4 explain the internal and external processes by which attitudes can change.

Persuasion on a pack The goal of such legislation is ultimately to reduce the uptake of smoking, especially by youth. By making smoking less appealing, and perhaps even unappealing, the packaging is meant to shape attitudes – in a negative direction – about smoking cigarettes. Social psychological research provides a great deal of insight into how and why such attempts to shape public attitude might be effective.

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Source: Getty Images/Ryan Pierse

Cigarettes – some would say you either love them or hate them. Whether that is the case, it is certainly true that public campaigns to shape attitudes towards smoking are at the forefront of the collective Australasian mind. In 2011, Australia passed legislation not only removing branded marketing from cigarette packages, but also introducing graphic health warnings about the consequences of smoking tobacco. New Zealand has similar regulations on packaging, including health warnings; in fact, New Zealand was one of the first countries to introduce legislation regarding plain packaging of cigarettes, back in 1989!

SOCIAL INFLUENCE

PART THREE

PUTTING COMMON SENSE TO THE TEST Circle Your Answer T

F

Researchers can tell if someone has a positive or negative attitude by measuring physiological arousal.

T

F

In reacting to persuasive communications, people are influenced more by superficial images than by logical arguments.

T

F

People are most easily persuaded by commercial messages that are presented without their awareness.

T

F

The more money you pay people to tell a lie, the more they will come to believe it.

T

F

People often come to like what they suffer for.

INTRODUCTION ANYONE WHO HAS FOLLOWED RECENT EVENTS in Australia and New Zealand – or anywhere in the world for that matter – knows how passionately people feel about the issues of the day; be it immigration, abortion rights, asylum seekers, same-sex marriage or environmental regulation, to name a few. Attitudes and the mechanisms of attitude change, or persuasion, are a vital part of human social life. This chapter addresses three sets of questions: 1 What is an attitude, how can it be measured and what is its link to behaviour? 2 What kinds of persuasive messages lead people to change their attitudes? 3 Why do we often change our attitudes as a result of our own actions?

THE STUDY OF ATTITUDES

Low

Positive reaction

High

Should marijuana be legalised? Would you rather listen to indie rock, country and western or hip-hop? Do you prefer drinking coffee or tea, working on a PC or Mac, or using an iPhone or Samsung device? Should Attitude terrorism be contained by war or via conciliation? As these questions suggest, each of us has positive and A positive, negative negative reactions to various people, objects and ideas. These reactions are called attitudes; that is, a or mixed reaction to a person, object or idea. positive, negative or mixed evaluation of an object that is expressed at some level of intensity – nothing more, nothing less. Like, love, dislike, hate, admire and detest are the kinds of words that people use to describe their attitudes. Skim the chapters in this book and you will see just how FIGURE 6.1 Four possible reactions to attitude objects pervasive attitudes are; for example, self-esteem is an attitude As shown, people evaluate objects along both positive and we hold about ourselves, attraction is a positive attitude towards negative dimensions. As a result, our attitudes can be positive, another person, and prejudice is a negative attitude often negative, ambivalent or indifferent. directed against certain groups of people. Indeed, the study of attitudes – what they are, where they come from, how they can be measured, what causes them to change and how they interact with behaviour – is central to the whole field of social psychology Positive Dual attitudes attitude (ambivalence) (Albarracín, Johnson, & Zanna, 2014; Greenwald, Brock, & Ostrom, 2013; Petty, 2018; Vogel & Wanke, 2016). It is important to realise that attitudes cannot simply be represented along a single continuum ranging from wholly positive to wholly negative. Rather, as depicted in Figure 6.1, our attitudes can vary in strength along both positive and negative Negative Indifference dimensions. In other words, we can react to something with attitude positive affect, with negative affect, with ambivalence (i.e., strong but mixed emotions) or with apathy and indifference (Cacioppo, Gardner, & Bernston, 1997). In fact, at times people can have High Low both positive and negative reactions to the same attitude or Negative reaction object without feeling conflict, as when they are conscious of one reaction but not the other; for example, someone who is openly Source: Cacioppo, J. T., Gardner, W. L., & Bernston, G. G. (1997). Beyond ­bipolar conceptualizations and measures: The case of attitudes and positive towards racial minorities but harbours implicit race­evaluative space. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 1, 3–25. based bias (Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000). 224

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Everyone routinely forms positive and/or negative evaluations of the people, places, objects and ideas they encounter. This process is often immediate and automatic, much like a reflex action (Bargh, Chaiken, Raymond, & Hymes,1996; De Houwer, 2014; Ferguson, 2007). You might assume that a person’s attitude represents a unique relation between that person and a specific attitude object. There are two ways, however, in which our attitudes reveal a lot about us as individuals. First, people differ in their tendency to like or dislike things. Consider an array of very different and unrelated attitude objects: How do you feel about bicycles? What about crossword puzzles, camping, Japan, taxes, politics, architecture, chess, statistics, Hulu, Netflix, religion and bottled water? Justin Hepler and Dolores Albarracín (2013) investigated whether people have general tendencies to like or dislike things, which they called dispositional attitudes. They found that when they asked research participants to rate how much they liked or disliked a long list of unrelated things, some individuals on average tended to report positive attitudes and others on average tended to report negative attitudes (also see Eschleman, Bowling, & Judge, 2015). A second way in which our attitudes reveal something about us as individuals is in the way we differ not only in terms of our tendencies to like or dislike things but also in how quickly and how strongly we react. What about you – do you form opinions easily? Do you have strong likes and dislikes? Or do you tend to react in more non-evaluative ways? People who describe themselves as high rather than low in the need for evaluation are more likely to view their daily experiences in judgemental terms. They are also more opinionated on a whole range of social, moral and political issues (Bizer et al., 2004; Jarvis & Petty, 1996). Before we examine the elusive science of attitude measurement, let us stop for a moment and ponder why human beings bother to form and have attitudes. Does forming a positive or negative judgement of people, objects and ideas serve any useful purpose? Over the years, researchers have found that attitudes serve important functions; such as enabling us to judge quickly and without much thought whether something we first encounter is good or bad, helpful or hurtful, and to be sought or avoided (Maio & Olson, 2000). The downside is that having pre-existing attitudes towards people, objects and ideas can lead us to become closed-minded, bias the way we interpret new information, and make us more resistant to change. For example, Russell Fazio and colleagues (2000) found that people who were focused on their positive or negative attitudes towards computerised faces, compared with those who were not, were later slower to notice when the faces were ‘morphed’ and no longer the same.

How attitudes are measured In 1928, Louis Thurstone published an article entitled ‘Attitudes can be measured’. What Thurstone failed to anticipate, however, is that attitude measurement is a tricky business. One review of research published in 1972 uncovered more than 500 different methods of determining an individual’s attitudes (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1972). You can imagine how many more there might be now!

Self-report measures of attitudes The easiest way to assess a person’s attitude about something is to ask them. All over the world, public opinions are recorded on a range of issues, such as politics, the economy, health care, foreign affairs, science and technology, sport, entertainment, religion and lifestyles. Simply by asking, polls conducted by Roy Morgan Research in Australia and New Zealand have revealed that Melbourne is Australia’s most popular domestic holiday destination, and that Qantas is the preferred airline to use domestically. Wine is more popular than beer, though more beer than wine is consumed. Older generations are more likely to try to buy locally made products, but younger generations are equally likely to try products from overseas. New Zealanders are more likely to visit McDonald’s than other fast-food chains – a pattern that holds through Generation Z, Millennials, Generation X, and Baby Boomers (Roy Morgan Research, 2018). Self-report measures are direct and straightforward. But attitudes are sometimes too complex to be measured by a single question. As you may recall from Chapter 1, one problem recognised by public opinion pollsters is that responses to attitude questions can be influenced by their wording, the order and context in which they are asked, and other extraneous factors (Sudman, Bradburn, & Schwarz, 2010; Tourangeau, Rips, & Rasinski, 2000). In one survey, the US National Opinion Research Center asked hundreds of Americans if the US government spent too little money on ‘assistance to the poor’, and 65% said ‘yes’. Yet when the very same question was asked using the word ‘welfare’ instead, only 20% said the government spent too little (Schneiderman, 2008). Recognising the shortcomings of single-question measures, survey researchers have developed more sophisticated methods (Nardi, 2018). Often, single questions are abandoned in favour of multiple-item questionnaires known as attitude scales (Robinson, Shaver, & Wrightsman, 1991, 1998). Attitude scales

Attitude scale

A multiple-item questionnaire designed to measure a person’s attitude towards some object.

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Bogus pipeline

A phoney lie-detector device that is sometimes used to get respondents to give truthful answers to sensitive questions.

come in different forms, perhaps the most popular being the Likert Scale, named after its inventor, Rensis Likert (1932). In this technique, respondents are presented with a list of statements about an attitude object and are asked to indicate on a multiple-point scale how strongly they agree or disagree with each statement. Each respondent’s total attitude score is derived by summing his or her responses to all the items. However, regardless of whether attitudes are measured by one question or a full-blown scale, the results should be taken with caution. All self-report measures assume that people honestly express their true opinions. Sometimes this assumption is reasonable and correct, but often it is not. Wanting to make a good impression on others, people are often reluctant to admit to their failures, vices, weaknesses, unpopular opinions and prejudices. For instance, according to work by Curtin University’s Brian Griffiths and Murdoch University’s Anne Pedersen (2009), fewer than half of Australian respondents self-report negatively valenced attitudes towards Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders and Muslim Australians. One approach to this problem is to increase the accuracy of self-report measures. To get respondents to answer attitude questions more truthfully, researchers sometimes use the bogus pipeline – an elaborate but phoney mechanical device that supposedly records respondents’ true feelings physiologically, like a lie-detector test (Myers, 2016), briefly discussed in Chapter 1. When they think that deception would be exposed by the (fake) truth device, and not wanting to get caught in a lie, respondents tend to answer attitude questions more honestly and with less positive spin (Jones & Sigall, 1971; Roese & Jamieson, 1993). In one study, for example, adolescents were more likely to admit to smoking when the bogus pipeline was used than when it was not (Adams, Parkinson, Sanson-Fisher, & Walsh, 2008). Modern forms of the bogus pipeline technique involve telling participants that their reports will be cross-checked via biological samples (Yonkers, Howell, Gotman, & Rounsaville 2011) or via public databases (Hanmer, Banks, & White, 2013).

Non-verbal behaviour measures of attitudes A second general approach to the self-report problem is to collect indirect, covert measures of attitudes that cannot be controlled. One possibility in this regard is to use observable behaviour such as facial expressions, tone of voice and body language. In one study, Gary Wells and Richard Petty (1980) secretly video-recorded university students as they listened to a speech in order to observe their non-verbal behaviour. They noticed that when the speaker took a position that the students agreed with (i.e., that FALSE tuition costs should be lowered), most made vertical head movements; but when the speaker took a contrary position (i.e., that tuition costs should be raised), head movements were in a horizontal direction. Without realising it, the students had signalled their attitudes by nodding and FIGURE 6.2 Facial EMG: a covert measure of attitudes? shaking their heads. Facial EMG makes it possible to detect changes in facial muscle Although behaviour provides clues, it is far from perfect as activity that cannot be detected with the naked eye. Notice the a measure of attitudes. Sometimes we nod our heads because major facial muscles and recording sites for electrodes. When people hear a message with which they agree, there is a relative we agree, but at other times we nod to be polite. The problem is increase in EMG activity in the depressor and zygomatic muscles that people monitor their overt behaviour just as they monitor but a relative decrease in corrugator and frontalis muscles. self-reports. But what about internal physiological reactions that are difficult, if not impossible, to control? Does our body betray how we feel? In the past, researchers tried to infer attitudes from involuntary physical reactions such as perspiration, heart rate and pupil dilation. The result, however, was always the Frontalis same: measures of arousal reveal the intensity of one’s attitude towards an object but not whether that attitude itself is positive Corrugator or negative. On the physiological record, love and hate look very much the same (Petty & Cacioppo, 1983). Although physiological arousal measures cannot distinguish between positive and negative attitudes, some Zygomatic exciting alternatives have been discovered. One is facial electromyography (EMG). As shown in Figure 6.2, certain muscles Depressor in the face contract to produce facial expressions. Some of the muscular changes that cannot be seen with the naked eye can be picked up via facial EMG. By the logic that we might display subtle smiles when we view a positive attitude object and subtle Source: Cacioppo, J. T. and Petty, R. E., (1981) Electromyograms as measures of extent and affectivity of information processing, American Psychologist, 36, 441–456. Copyright © 1981 frowns and brow furrows when we view a negative attitude by the American Psychological Association. Reprinted by permission. object, it might be the case that facial EMG can be used as a

Researchers can tell if someone has a positive or negative attitude by measuring physiological arousal.

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covert measure of attitudes. Supporting this idea, John Cacioppo and Richard Petty (1981) recorded facial muscle activity of university students as they listened to a message with which they agreed or disagreed. The agreeable message increased activity in the cheek muscles – the facial pattern that is characteristic of happiness. The disagreeable message sparked activity in the forehead and brow area – the facial patterns that are characteristic of sadness and distress. Outside observers who later watched the participants were unable to see these subtle changes. Work by University of Queensland’s Eric Vanman and colleagues (2004) has demonstrated that facial EMG can be used to predict racially discriminatory behaviours – even among those low in self-reported prejudice.

Neural activity measures of attitudes Another covert measure of attitudes is electrical activity in the brain. In 1929, Hans Burger invented a machine that could detect, amplify and record ‘waves’ of electrical activity in the brain using electrodes pasted to the surface of the scalp. The instrument is called an electroencephalograph, or EEG, and the information it provides takes the form of line tracings called brain waves. Based on an earlier discovery that certain patterns of electrical brain activity are triggered by exposure to stimuli that are novel or unexpected, Cacioppo and colleagues (1993) had participants list 10 items they liked and 10 they did not like within various object categories (fruit, sport, films, universities etc.). Later, these participants were brought into the laboratory, wired to an EEG and presented with a list of category words that depicted objects they liked and disliked. The result? Brain-wave patterns that are normally triggered by inconsistency increased more when a disliked stimulus appeared after a string of positive items, or when a liked stimulus was shown after a string of negative items, than when either stimulus evoked the same attitude as the items that preceded it. Advances in EEG measurement have seen applications of this methodology to index political attitudes (Morris, Squires, Taber, & Lodge, 2003), health behaviour attitudes (Lust & Bartholow, 2009), and attitudes towards social groups (Ito & Senholzi, 2013). Social psychologists also use other forms of brain imaging in the measurement of attitudes. In a study focused on political attitudes, researchers used fMRI to record brain activity in opinionated men during the election season as they listened to positive and negative statements about the candidate of their choice. Although the brain areas associated with cognitive reasoning were unaffected during these presentations, activity increased in areas that are typically associated with emotion (Westen, Kilts, Blagov, Harenski, & Hamann, 2006). In another study on reactions to advertisements, ‘green’ ads emphasising proenvironmental product features were rated more positively relative to control ads for the same products not mentioning those features; however, brain activity tracked by fMRI revealed a stronger reward response for control ads than ‘green’ ads (Vezich, Gunter, & Lieberman, 2017). Together, this research suggests that people react automatically to positive and negative attitude objects and that such responses can be tracked covertly via capturing brain activity.

The Implicit Association Test (IAT) When it comes to covert measurement, one particularly interesting development is based on the notion that each of us has all sorts of implicit attitudes that we cannot self-report in questionnaires because we are not aware of having them (Fazio & Olson, 2003). To measure these unconscious attitudes, a number of indirect methods have been developed (De Houwer, Kilts, Blagov, Harenski, & Hamann, 2009; Nosek, Hawkins, & Frazier, 2011; Payne & Lundberg, 2014). The most famous of these is the Implicit Association Test (IAT) created by Anthony Greenwald, Mahzarin Banaji, Brian Nosek and others. The IAT measures the speed with which people associate pairs of concepts (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). The IAT unfolds across a series of stages. One of the first versions of the IAT used faces of white and black people to represent white and African American ethnicities, as mentioned in Chapter 4. First, you are asked to categorise black or white faces as quickly as you can; for example, by pressing a left-hand key in response to a black face and a right-hand key for a white face. Next, you are asked to categorise a set of words; for example, by pressing a left-hand key for positive words (love, laughter and friend) and a right-hand key for negative words (war, failure and evil). Once you become familiar with the categorisation task, the test combines faces and words. You may be asked, for example, to press the left-hand key if you see a black face or a positive word and a right-hand key for a white face or a negative word. Then, in the fourth stage, the opposite pairings are presented – black or negative, white or positive. As you work through the list, you may find that some pairings are harder and take longer to respond to than others.

Implicit attitude

An attitude, such as prejudice, that the person is not aware of having.

Implicit association test (IAT)

A measure of conceptual association between pairs of concepts derived from the speed at which people respond to pairings of concepts, such as black or white with good or bad.

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In general, people are quicker to respond when the same key is used to categorise both liked faces and positive words and the other key is used to categorise both disliked faces and negative words, compared with the other way around. Using the IAT, your implicit attitudes about African Americans can thus be detected by the speed it takes you to respond to black–bad/white–good pairings relative to black–good/ white–bad pairings. The test takes only 10–15 minutes to complete. When you are done, you receive the results of your test and an explanation of what it means (see Figure 6.3). You can take the IAT yourself at https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit or by installing a free IAT app onto your Android device or iPhone. FIGURE 6.3 The Implicit Association Test Through a sequence of tasks, the IAT measures implicit racial attitudes toward, for example, African Americans, by measuring how quickly people respond to black-bad/white-good word pairings relative to black-good/whitebad pairings. Most white Americans are quicker to respond to the first type of pairings than to the second, which suggests that they do not as readily connect black-good and white-bad. White or bad

Black or good

Black or bad

White or good

Source: From Kassin, S. Essentials of psychology. Copyright © 2004. Reprinted by permission of Pearson Education, Inc., Upper Saddle River, NJ.

Since 1998, visitors to the IAT website have completed millions of tests. Generally, while completing questionnaires, interviews, public opinion polls and internet surveys, people do not tend to express stereotypes, prejudices or other unpopular attitudes. Yet on the IAT, respondents have exhibited a marked implicit preference for self over other, white over black, young over old, straight over gay, able over disabled, thin over obese, and the stereotype that links males with careers and females with family (Greenwald, Oakes, & Hoffman, 2003; Nosek et al., 2002). Researchers have also developed IAT measures that tap into cultural differences, as explained in the Cultural Diversity feature that follows.

CULTURAL DIVERSITY IMPLICIT MEASURES OF CULTURAL DIFFERENCE One dimension frequently used to differentiate cultures is interdependence versus independence. Cultures such as those in Australia and the US tend to emphasise independent values such as self-sufficiency and differentiation between the self and others. Cultures such as those in Japan and China tend to emphasise interdependent values such as collective orientations and connections between the self and others. Most research has assessed such differences via explicit self-report scales, though researchers have developed ways to assess these constructs implicitly. Jiyoung Park, Yukiko Uchida, and Shinobu Kitayama (2016) developed a version of the IAT that asked respondents to categorise nouns into positive and negative categories, as

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per the original IAT, and verbs into personal and relational categories. For instance, read, stand and wear were to be categorised as personal verbs and meet, join, and help were to be categorised as relational verbs. The resulting IAT score provided the researchers with an index of the relatively positive versus negative association in participants’ minds regarding independence and interdependence, a construct they called implicit independence. The results from a sample of white American and Japanese university students revealed that white Americans demonstrated stronger implicit independence relative to their Japanese counterparts. The IAT thus can be used to covertly measure cultural differences – adding to the methodological toolkit for cross-cultural researchers.

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Do implicit attitudes matter? Do millisecond differences in response times on a computerised test really predict behaviour in real-world settings of consequence? And what does it mean when one’s implicit and explicit attitudes clash? Because more and more researchers are using these kinds of indirect measures, social psychologists who study attitudes find themselves in the midst of a debate over what IAT scores mean, how the implicit attitudes revealed in the IAT are formed and then changed, how these attitudes predict or influence behaviour, and how they differ from the more explicit attitudes that we consciously hold and report (Blanton, Burrows, & Jaccard, 2016; Carlsson & Agerström, 2016; Greenwald, Banaji, & Nosek, 2015; Oswald, Mitchell, Blanton, Jaccard, & Tetlock, 2013). Some researchers are critical of strong claims concerning whether the IAT predicts behaviour (Blanton et al., 2016; Oswald et al., 2015). Although, one area in which IAT measures are particularly useful in predicting behaviour is when it comes to socially sensitive topics for which people often conceal or distort their self-reports. In a poignant illustration of this point, one research team administered to a large group of psychiatric patients an IAT that measured their implicit associations between self and suicide. Over the next 6 months, patients appearing in the emergency room because of a suicide attempt had a stronger implicit association between self and suicide than those who appeared with other types of psychiatric emergencies (Nock et al., 2010). Other research has demonstrated links between adolescents’ implicit attitudes towards non-suicidal self-injury and engagement in non-suicidal self-injury across a 1-year period (Glenn, Kleiman, Cha, Nock, & Prinstein, 2016).

CRITICAL THINKING ACTIVITY Think for a moment about the impact of finding out that you hold negative implicit attitudes towards other social groups (e.g., ethnic minorities) after taking an IAT. How might you react if you consider yourself to be someone who does not consciously hold those views?

Even though receiving such feedback from an IAT can be confronting, many individuals take it as an opportunity to reflect on the subtleties of their attitudes and the ways those attitudes, implicit or not, might shape their behaviour towards others.

The link between attitudes and behaviour People take for granted the notion that attitudes influence behaviour. We assume that voters’ opinions of opposing candidates predict the decisions they make on election day, that consumers’ preference for one product rather than competing products influence the purchases they make, and that feelings of prejudice trigger bad acts of discrimination. Yet as sensible as these assumptions seem, the link between attitudes and behaviour is far from perfect. Sociologist Richard LaPiere (1934) was the first to notice that attitudes and behaviour do not always go hand-in-hand. In the 1930s, during the height of the Great Depression, LaPiere took a young Chinese American couple on a 3-month, 16 000-kilometre car trip, visiting 250 restaurants, campgrounds and hotels across the US. Although prejudice against Asian people was widespread at the time, the couple was refused service only once. Yet when LaPiere wrote to the places they had visited and asked if they would accept Chinese patrons, more than 90% of those who returned an answer said they would not. Self-reported attitudes did not correspond with behaviour. This study was provocative but seriously flawed. LaPiere measured attitudes several months after his trip, and during that time the attitudes may have changed. He also did not know whether those who responded to his letter were the same people who had greeted the couple in person. It was even possible that the Chinese couple were served wherever they went because they were accompanied by LaPiere – or because businesses were desperate during hard economic times. Despite these limitations, LaPiere’s study was the first of many to reveal a lack of correspondence between attitudes and behaviour. In 1969, Allan Wicker reviewed the applicable research and concluded that attitudes and behaviour are correlated only weakly, if at all. Sobered by this conclusion, researchers were puzzled. Is the study of attitudes useless to those interested in human social behaviour? Not at all. During subsequent years, researchers went on to identify the conditions under which attitudes and behaviour are correlated. Thus, when Stephen Kraus (1995) meta-analysed all of this research, he concluded that ‘attitudes significantly and substantially predict future behaviour’ (p. 58). In fact, he calculated that there would have to be 60 983 new studies reporting a zero correlation before this conclusion would have to be revised. Based on a meta-analysis of 41 additional studies, Laura Glasman and Dolores Albarracín (2006) went on to identify some of the conditions under which attitudes most clearly predict future behaviour. Copyright 2020 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-202

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Attitude–behaviour similarity One important condition is the level of similarity between attitude measures and behaviour. Perhaps the reason that LaPiere (1934) did not find a correlation between self-reported prejudice and discrimination was that he had asked proprietors about Asians in general, but then observed their actions towards only one couple. To predict a single act of discrimination, he should have measured people’s more specific attitudes towards a young, well-dressed, attractive Chinese couple accompanied by an American professor. Moreover, he probably should have accounted for the cultural factors at play, as outlined in the following Cultural Diversity feature.

CULTURAL DIVERSITY CULTURAL INFLUENCES ON THE ATTITUDE–BEHAVIOUR LINK In Western cultures that value independence, it is common to see our attitudes as a part of who we are, embodying our values, tastes, preferences, and personalities. Making choices is an exercise of our attitudes and preferences. From that perspective, it is natural to expect that our likes and dislikes will remain relatively consistent over time and be predictive of behaviour. In many East Asian cultures, however, where independence, choice and personal preference are less highly valued, a person’s attitude may well not show this level of consistency. Indeed, Hila Riemer and colleagues (2014) observed that while Western views of attitudes are often person-centric in these ways, in other parts of the world attitudes depend more on contextual factors, such as social norms, others’ expectations, roles and obligations. To the extent that norms can change over time and across situations, people in non-Western cultures may well exhibit less consistency in their attitudes. Research by Brooke Wilken, Yuri Miyamoto and Yukiko Uchida (2011) supports this hypothesis. In one study, American and Japanese participants were asked to report on their favourite musical artists, TV shows, restaurants and other preferences, and to estimate how long these

preferences have lasted. Overall, the Japanese participants reported liking their favourites for a shorter period of time than Americans did. In a second study, participants evaluated how trendy various items were at the time, such as the iPod, Harry Potter books, and the Nintendo Wii. When questioned about those same items one year later, American participants stayed relatively consistent in their evaluations; Japanese participants reported significant changes in their attitudes. If attitudes in Western cultures are consistent parts of a person, which we carry with us over time and across situations, it stands to reason that our attitudes and behaviour would be highly correlated. But does it also stand to reason that attitudes would be less predictive of behaviour in non-Western cultures, where context matters as well? In one study, North American and Indian participants rated how much they liked everyday items, such as watches, shoes and shirts. Later when they had to choose one item from a set of four, Indians were less likely than Americans to choose the watch, shoes or shirts they said they liked the best (Savani, Markus, & Conner, 2008). For Indian participants, their choices presumably depended on factors other than personal preferences.

Icek Ajzen and Martin Fishbein (1977) analysed more than 100 studies and found that attitudes correlate with behaviour only when attitude measures closely match the behaviour in question. Illustrating the point, Andrew Davidson and James Jaccard (1979) tried to use attitudes to predict whether women would use birth control pills within the following two years. Attitudes were measured in a series of questions ranging from very general (‘How do you feel about birth control?’) to very specific (‘How do you feel about using birth control pills during the next two years?’). The more specific the initial attitude question was, the better it predicted the behaviour. Other researchers have replicated this finding (Kraus, 1995).

Attitude–behaviour links in context

Theory of planned behaviour

The theory that attitudes towards a specific behaviour combine with subjective norms and perceived control to influence a person’s actions.

230

The link between our feelings and our actions should also be placed within a broader context. Attitudes are one determinant of social behaviour, but there are other determinants as well. This limitation formed the basis for Fishbein’s (1980) theory of reasoned action, which Ajzen (1991) later expanded into his theory of planned behaviour. According to these theories, our attitudes influence our behaviour through a process of deliberate decision-making, and their impact is limited in four respects (see Figure 6.4): 1 Behaviour is influenced less by general attitudes than by attitudes towards a specific behaviour. 2 Behaviour is influenced not only by attitudes but also by subjective norms – our beliefs about what others think we should do. (As we will see in Chapter 7, social pressures to conform often lead us to behave in ways that are at odds with our inner convictions.) 3 According to Ajzen, attitudes give rise to behaviour only when we perceive the behaviour to be within our control. To the extent that people lack confidence in their ability to engage in some behaviour, they are unlikely to form an intention to do so. 4 Although attitudes (along with subjective norms and perceived control) contribute to an intention to behave in a particular manner, people often do not or cannot follow through on their intentions.

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FIGURE 6.4 Theory of planned behaviour According to the theory of planned behaviour, attitudes toward a specific behaviour combine with subjective norms and perceived behavioural control to influence a person’s intentions. These intentions, in turn, guide but do not completely determine behaviour. This theory places the link between attitudes and behaviour within a broader context. Attitude toward a behaviour

Subjective norm

Intention

Behaviour

Perceived behavioural control Source: Ajzen, I. (1991). The theory of planned behaviour. Organizational Behavior and the Human Decision Process, 50(2), 179–211. Copyright © 1991 Elsevier. Reprinted with permission.

A good deal of research now supports the theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen & Fishbein, 2005; Montaño & Kasprzyk, 2015). Indeed, this general approach, which places the link between attitudes and behaviours within a broader context, has successfully been used to predict a wide range of practical behaviours, such as obeying speed limits, washing hands and other food safety habits, donating blood, complying with medical regimens and reducing risky sexual behaviours (Conner, Godin, Sheeran, & Germain, 2013; Elliott, Armitage, & Baughan, 2003; Milton & Mullan, 2012; Rich, Brandes, Mullan, & Hagger, 2015; Tyson, Covey, & Rosenthal, 2014).

Attitude strength According to the theories of reasoned action and planned behaviour, specific attitudes combine with social factors to produce behaviour. Sometimes attitudes have more influence on behaviour than do the other factors, and sometimes they have less influence. In large part, it depends on the importance, or strength, of the attitude. Each of us has some views that are nearer and dearer to the heart than others. Sport aficionados defend the superiority of their preferred team with vehemence, religious fundamentalists care deeply about issues pertaining to faith, and political activists have fiery passions for one political party or policy over others. In each case, the attitude is held with great confidence and is difficult to change (Petty & Krosnick, 1995). Why are some attitudes stronger than others? David Boninger and colleagues (1995) identified three psychological factors that consistently seem to distinguish between our strongest and weakest attitudes. These investigators asked people to reflect on their views towards defence spending, gun control, the legalisation of marijuana, abortion rights and other issues. They found that the attitudes people held most passionately were those that concerned issues that: 1 directly affected their own self-interests 2 related to deeply held philosophical, political and religious values 3 were of concern to their close friends, family and social ingroups. This last, highly social, point is important. Research shows that when people are surrounded by others who are like-minded, the attitudes they hold are stronger and more resistant to change (Visser & Mirabile, 2004). Attitudes can be strengthened, ironically, by an attack against it from a persuasive message. According to Zakary Tormala and Richard Petty (2002), people become more confident in their attitudes after they successfully resist changing that attitude. In one study, researchers confronted university students with an unpopular proposal to add comprehensive exams as a graduation requirement. Students who continued to oppose the policy despite reading what they thought to be a strong argument became even more certain of their opinion. Additional studies have shown that this effect depends on how satisfied people are with their own resistance and the degree of effort they have put into developing the attitude (Barden & Petty, 2008; Tormala, Briñol, & Petty, 2006).

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Three additional factors In addition to similarity, context and strength, social psychological research points to three other factors that determine the link between attitude and behaviour. One is that people tend to behave in ways that are consistent with their attitudes when they are well informed. For example, university students who knew the factual campaign issues for an upcoming election were later the most likely to actually vote for their favoured candidate (Davidson, Yantis, Norwood, & Montaño, 1985). In another study, highly informed university students showed the most consistency between their attitudes about the environment and their pro-environmental behaviour (Kallgren & Wood, 1986).

CRITICAL THINKING ACTIVITY Bring to mind an attitude you hold – maybe a sporting team you favour, a public policy you object to, or a bad habit you think people should avoid. Reflect on how you came to hold that

attitude. How strong is your attitude? In what circumstances has this attitude shaped your behaviour? Are there other cases in which your behaviour did not align with your attitude?

Another factor relates to how the information that gave rise to the attitude was acquired. Research shows that attitudes are more stable and more predictive of behaviour when they are born of direct personal experience than when based on indirect, second-hand information. In a series of experiments, for example, Russell Fazio and Mark Zanna (1981) introduced two groups of participants to a set of puzzles. One group worked on sample puzzles; the other group merely watched someone else work on them. All participants were then asked to rate their interest in the puzzles (attitude) and were given an opportunity to spend time on them (behaviour). As it turned out, attitudes and behaviours were more consistent among participants who had previously sampled the puzzles. A third key factor is attitude accessibility, how quickly and easily an attitude is brought to mind (Fazio, 1990). It turns out that many attitudes easily pop to mind by the mere sight or even just the mention of an attitude object (Bargh, Chaiken, Govender, & Pratto, 1992). When this happens, the attitude can trigger behaviour in a quick, spontaneous way or by leading us to think carefully about how we feel and how to respond (Fazio & Towles-Schwen, 1999). To sum up, research on the link between attitudes and behaviour leads to an important conclusion. Our evaluations of an object do not always determine our actions because other factors must be considered. However, when attitudes are strong and specific to a behaviour, when attitudes are borne from wellinformed personal experience, and when attitudes are accessible, this link is enhanced. In many ways, attitudes are important determinants of behaviour. The question now is: ‘How can attitudes be changed?’

PERSUASION BY COMMUNICATION

Persuasion

The process by which attitudes are changed.

On a day-to-day basis, we are all involved in the process of changing attitudes. On television, on Facebook pages, in magazines and on billboards, advertisers flood consumers with advertising campaigns designed to sell cars, mobile phones, credit cards, fashion, new films and travel destinations. Likewise, politicians make speeches, run commercials, pass out bumper stickers and kiss babies to win votes. Attitude change is sought whenever parents socialise their children, scientists advance theories, religious groups seek converts, financial analysts recommend stocks and trial lawyers argue cases to a jury. Some appeals work; others do not. Some are soft and subtle; others are hard and blatant. Some serve the public interest; others serve commercial interests. The point is that there is nothing inherently evil or virtuous about changing attitudes, a process known as persuasion. We do it all the time. If you wanted to change someone’s attitude on an issue, you would probably try to do it by making a persuasive communication. Appeals made in person and through the mass media rely on the spoken word, the written word and the image that is worth a thousand words. What determines whether an appeal succeeds or fails? To understand why certain approaches are effective whereas others are not, social psychologists have for many years sought to understand how and why persuasive communications work. For that, we need a road map of the persuasion process.

Two routes to persuasion Richard Petty and John Cacioppo (1986) proposed a dual-process model in which there are two ‘roads’, or routes, to persuasion. This model assumes that we do not always process communications the same way. When people think critically about the contents of a message, they are said to take a 232

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central route to persuasion and are influenced by the strength and quality of the arguments. When people do not think critically about the contents of a message but focus instead on other cues, they take a peripheral route to persuasion. As we will see, the route taken depends on whether one is willing and able to scrutinise the information contained in the message itself. Over the years, this model has provided an important framework for understanding the factors that elicit persuasion (Petty & Wegener, 1998).

The central route In the first systematic attempt to study persuasion, Carl Hovland and colleagues (1949, 1953) started the Yale Communication and Attitude Change Program. They proposed that for a persuasive message to have influence, the recipients of that message must learn its contents and be motivated to accept it. According to this view, people can be persuaded only by an argument they attend to, comprehend and retain in memory for later use. Regardless of whether the message takes the form of a live personal appeal, a newspaper editorial, a Sunday sermon, a television commercial or a pop-up window on a website, these basic requirements remain the same. A few years later, William McGuire (1969) reiterated the information-processing steps necessary for persuasion and, like the Yale group before him, distinguished between the learning, or reception, of a message – a necessary first step – and its later acceptance. In fact, McGuire (1968) used this distinction to explain the surprising finding that a recipient’s self-esteem and intelligence are unrelated to persuasion. In McGuire’s analysis, these characteristics have opposite effects on reception and acceptance. People who are smart or high in self-esteem are better able to learn a message but are less likely to accept its call for a change in attitude. People who are less smart or low in self-esteem are more willing to accept the message, but they may have trouble learning its contents. Overall, then, neither group is generally more vulnerable to persuasion than the other – a prediction that is supported by a good deal of research (Rhodes & Wood, 1992). Anthony Greenwald (1968) and others then argued that persuasion requires a third, intermediate step: elaboration. To illustrate, imagine you are offered a job and your prospective employer tries to convince you over lunch to accept. You listen closely, learn the terms of the offer, and understand what it means. But if it is a really important interview, your head will spin with questions as you weigh all the pros and cons and contemplate the implications. What would it cost to move? Is there potential for advancement? Am I better off staying where I am? When confronted with personally significant messages, we do not listen just for the sake of collecting information – we think about that information. When this happens, the message is effective to the extent that it leads us to focus on favourable rather than unfavourable thoughts. These theories of attitude change all share the assumption that the recipients of persuasive appeals are attentive, active, critical and thoughtful of every word spoken. This assumption is correct – some of the time. When it is, and when people consider a message carefully, their reaction to it depends on the strength of its contents. In these instances, messages have greater impact when they are easily learned rather than difficult, when they are memorable rather than forgettable, and when they stimulate favourable rather than unfavourable elaboration. Ultimately, strong arguments are persuasive and weak arguments are not. On the central route to persuasion, the process is eminently rational. It is important to note, however, that thinking carefully about a persuasive message does not guarantee that the process is objective or that it necessarily promotes truth seeking. At times, each of us prefers to hold a particular attitude and become biased in the way we process information (Petty & Wegener, 1998). Among university students who were politically conservative or liberal, the tendency to agree with a social welfare plan was influenced more rapidly, strongly and persistently by whether it was said to have the support of their preferred political party than by the logical merits of the policy itself (Cohen, 2003; Smith, Ratiiff, & Nosek, 2012). Similarly, university students were less likely to be persuaded by a proposed fee increase to fund campus improvements when the increase would take effect in a year, thus raising the personal stakes, than by a proposal to raise fees in eight years’ time (Darke & Chaiken, 2005). There is one additional complicating factor to consider. Several years ago, Petty and his colleagues (2002) proposed the self-validation hypothesis that people not only ‘elaborate’ on a persuasive communication with positive or negative attitude-relevant thoughts; they also seek to assess the validity of these thoughts. Those thoughts that we hold with high confidence will have a strong impact on our attitudes, as predicted by the dual-process model of persuasion, but those we hold with low confidence will not have a strong impact on our attitudes. This means that various aspects of a persuasive communication, such as whether the source is a knowledgeable expert, and whether the position he or she advocates is one with which we agree or disagree, can affect the confidence we have in our own thoughts and, in turn, our attitudes (Briñol & Petty, 2009).

CHAPTER SIX

Central route to persuasion

The process by which a person thinks carefully about a communication and is influenced by the strength of its arguments.

Peripheral route to persuasion The process by which a person does not think carefully about a communication and is influenced instead by superficial cues.

Elaboration

The process of thinking about and scrutinising the arguments contained in a persuasive communication.

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The peripheral route ‘The receptive ability of the masses is very limited, their understanding small; on the other hand, they have a great power of forgetting.’ The author of this statement was Adolf Hitler (1933, p. 77). Believing that human beings are incompetent processors of information, Hitler relied in his propaganda on the use of slogans, uniforms, marching bands, swastika-covered flags, a special salute and other symbols. For Hitler, ‘meetings were not just occasions to make speeches; they were carefully planned theatrical productions in which settings, lighting, background music, and the timing of entrances were devised to maximize the emotional fervor of an audience’ (Qualter, 1962, p. 112). Do these ploys work? Can the masses be handily manipulated into persuasion? History shows that they can. Audiences are not always thoughtful. Sometimes people do not follow the central route to persuasion but instead take a shortcut through the peripheral route. Rather than try to learn about a message and think through the issues, they respond with little effort on the basis of superficial peripheral cues. Figure 6.5 shows some good examples of ways celebrities are used to take advantage of the peripheral route to persuasion. FIGURE 6.5 Celebrities on the peripheral route to persuasion Serena Williams (left) is no doubt paid a hefty sum for being Berlei’s ‘ambassador’. Also paid millions, music star Taylor Swift is surrounded by kittens in this TV commercial for Diet Coke (top right) and Oscar-winning actor Bradley Cooper is the new, and first-ever, face of Haagen-Dazs ice cream (bottom right). Can celebrities sell products? Targeting the peripheral route to persuasion, the advertising industry seems to think so.

Source: Jez Smith [L]; Diet Coke/Splash News/Corbis [TR]; Splash/Haagen Dazs/Splash News/Corbis [BR].

On the peripheral route to persuasion, people will often evaluate a communication by using simpleminded heuristics, or simple and straightforward cognitive guidelines (Chaiken, 1987; Chen & Chaiken, 1999). If a communicator has a good reputation, speaks fluently or writes well, we tend to assume that his or her message must be correct. And when a speaker has a reputation for being honest, people think less critically about the specific contents of his or her communication (Priester & Petty, 1995). Likewise, we assume that a message must be correct if it contains a long litany of arguments or statistics or an impressive list of supporting experts, if it is familiar, if it elicits cheers from an audience, or if the speaker seems to be arguing against his or her own interests. In some cases, people will change their attitudes simply because they know that an argument has majority support (Giner-Sorolla & Chaiken, 1997).

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On the mindless peripheral route, people are also influenced by a host of factors that are not relevant to attitudes, such as cues from their own body movements. Increasingly, social psychologists are coming to appreciate the extent to which human thought is embodied – that the way we think and feel about things is influenced by the physical position, orientation and movements of our bodies (Meier, Schnall, Schwarz, & Bargh, 2012; Winkielman, Niedenthal, Wielgosz, Eelen, & Kavanagh, 2015), as we learned in Chapter 3. A number of studies illustrate attitude embodiment effects. In one study, participants were coaxed into nodding their heads up and down (as if saying yes) or shaking them from side to side (as if saying no) while listening via headphones to an editorial, presumably to test whether the headphones could endure the physical activity. Those coaxed into nodding later agreed more with the arguments than those coaxed into shaking their heads from side to side (Wells & Petty, 1980). In other studies, participants viewed graphic symbols or word-like stimuli (surtel, primet) while using an exercise bar to either stretch their arms out (which mimics what we do to push something away) or flex their arms in (which we do to bring something closer). Participants later judged these stimuli to be more pleasant when they were associated with the flexing of the arm than when they were associated with the stretching-out motion (Cacioppo et al., 1993; Priester, Cacioppo & Petty, 1996). Even our attitudes towards consumer products can be influenced by bodily sensations. In one study, for example, participants evaluated the appearance of vases, flowers and other products placed at a distance as more appealing when they stood on a soft, comfortable carpet than on a hard tile floor (Meyers-Levy, Zhu, & Jiang, 2010).

Route selection Thanks to Petty and Cacioppo’s (1986) two-track distinction between the central and peripheral routes, it is easy to understand why the persuasion process seems so logical on some occasions yet so illogical on others; for example, why voters select candidates according to issues or images, why juries base their verdicts on evidence or a defendant’s appearance, or why consumers base their purchases on marketing reports or product images. The process that is engaged depends on whether the recipients of a persuasive message have the ability and the motivation to take the central route or whether they rely on peripheral cues instead. To understand the conditions that lead people to process information on one route or the other, it is helpful to view persuasive communication as the outcome of three factors: a source (who), a message (says what and in what context) and an audience (to whom). Each of these factors steers a recipient’s approach to persuasive communication. If a source speaks clearly, if the message is important, and if there is a bright, captive and involved audience that cares deeply about the issue and has time to absorb the information, then audience members will be willing and able to take the effortful central route. But if the source speaks at a rate too fast to comprehend, if the message is trivial or too complex to process, or if audience members are distracted, pressed for time or uninterested, then the less strenuous peripheral route is taken. Figure 6.6 presents a road map of persuasive communication. In the next three sections, we will follow this map from the input factors (source, message and audience) through the central or peripheral processing routes, to reach the final destination – persuasion.

In reacting to persuasive communications, people are influenced more by superficial images than by logical arguments.

FALSE

FIGURE 6.6 Two routes to persuasion Based on aspects of the source, message and audience, recipients of a communication take either a central or peripheral route to persuasion. On the central route, people are influenced by strong arguments and evidence. On the peripheral route, persuasion is

based more on heuristics and other superficial cues. This twoprocess model helps explain how persuasion can seem logical on some occasions and illogical on others.

Processing strategy High ability and motivation

Input Source message

Central route

Output Persuasion

Audience Low ability or motivation

Peripheral route

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FIGURE 6.7 The rise and fall of a persuasive source Lance Armstrong was once a top elite athlete and sponsored by many companies to help sell their products. After his 2012 conviction for using performance-enhancing drugs, most sponsors ended their contracts with him, no doubt due to the change in public perception of him as a persuasive source.

The source Cyclist Lance Armstrong is a living legend, held to be one of the most gifted athletes of our time. Until recently, he was also paid millions of dollars per year to endorse Nissan, bicycle-maker Trek, sunglasses brand Oakley and other companies (see Figure 6.7). Armstrong was considered a highly effective spokesman until his reputation was destroyed in 2012 when he was convicted of using illegal performance-enhancing drugs. Not only was he stripped of his seven Tour de France titles, many sponsors dropped him as spokesman. What does the story of Lance Armstrong tell us about source effects in persuasion? More specifically, what makes some communicators in general more effective than others? As we will see, there are two key attributes: credibility and likeability.

Credibility Imagine you are waiting in line in a supermarket and you catch a glimpse of a headline: ‘Doctors Discover Cure for AIDS!’ As your eye wanders across the front page, you discover that you are reading a tabloid that also features stories about visitations by aliens from another planet. What would you think? Next, imagine that you are reading through scientific periodicals in a library and you come across a similar article, but this time it appears in the New England Journal of Medicine, Source: Getty Images/Spencer Platt one of the top-ranked medical journals in the world. Now what would you think? The chances are that you would react with more excitement to the medical journal than to the tabloid, even though both sources report the same news item. In a study conducted during the 1950s, American participants read a speech that advocated for the development of nuclear submarines. The speech elicited more agreement when it was attributed to an eminent American physicist than when the source was said to be a Soviet government-controlled newspaper (Hovland & Weiss, 1951). Likewise, when participants read a lecture favouring more lenient treatment of juvenile offenders, they changed their attitudes more when they thought the speaker was a judge than when they believed the speaker was a convicted drug dealer (Kelman & Hovland, 1953). More recent research confirms that high-credibility sources are generally more persuasive than low-credibility sources (Pornpitakpan, 2004). People appear to sense this and use credibility as a cue for which information to pass on. During the unfolding of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant disaster following the 2011 Japanese earthquake and tsunami, people were more likely to post links to Twitter from high-credibility sources (traditional media) than low-credibility sources (unidentified individuals) (Thomson & Ito, 2012).

Source competence informs credibility Why are some sources more believable than others? Why are the medical journal, the physicist and the judge more credible than the tabloid, foreign-government-controlled newspaper and drug dealer? For communicators to be seen as credible, they must have two characteristics: competence and trustworthiness. Competence refers to a speaker’s ability. People who are knowledgeable, smart or well spoken, or who have impressive credentials, are persuasive by virtue of their expertise (Hass, 1981). Experts can have a disarming effect on us. We assume they know what they are talking about; so, when they speak, we listen, and when they take a position, even one that is extreme, we often yield. Research has shown that people attend more closely to experts than to nonexperts and scrutinise their arguments more carefully (Tobin & Raymundo, 2009). The impact of experts on our attention, confidence and attitudes, is not simple or uniform. The effect depends on how we feel about the attitude they advocate; for example, on politically charged issues such as immigration policy or climate change. As suggested by the self-validation hypothesis described earlier, a highly credible source who argues for a position we tend to favour bolsters our confidence and existing attitude, more than someone less credible would. In this case, there is less need to scrutinise the expert than the supportive but questionable non-expert. But a highly credible source who advocates for a position we oppose poses a real threat to our confidence and existing attitude, more than someone less credible. In this instance, we need to scrutinise the expert more than the non-expert. Research is consistent with this nuanced hypothesis (Clark, Wegener, Habashi, & Evans, 2012; Clark & Evans, 2014; Clark & Wegner, 2013). 236

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Source trustworthiness informs credibility Expertise is only one aspect of credibility. To have credibility, sources must also be trustworthy; that is, they must be seen as willing to report what they know truthfully and without compromise. What determines whether we trust a communicator? To some extent, we make these judgements on the basis of stereotypes. In 2017, for example, polling research asked 648 Australians to rate how honest people were in various occupational categories. As shown in Table 6.1, nurses topped the list as the most trusted occupational group. Car salespeople and real estate agents were the least trusted (Roy Morgan Research, 2017).

Caution in attributing credibility

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TABLE 6.1 Who do you trust? In 2017, a poll was conducted in Australia to determine the level of honesty attributed to people from various occupational groups. Indicated below are the percentages of respondents who rated each group as ‘high’ or ‘very high’ in ethics and honesty.

Occupation

Honest? (%)

Nurses

94

Doctors

89

Pharmacists

84

School teachers

81

Engineers

80

Dentists 79 In judging the credibility of a source, common sense arms us with a simple rule of caution: beware of people who have Police 76 something to gain from successful persuasion. If a speaker has University lecturers 66 been paid off, has an axe to grind, or is simply telling us what we Accountants 50 want to hear, we suspect some degree of bias. This rule sheds Bank managers 33 light on a classic dilemma in advertising concerning the value of TV reporters 17 celebrity spokespeople; that is, the more products a celebrity endorses, the less trustworthy he or she appears to consumers Real estate agents 7 (Tripp, Jensen, & Carlson, 1994). In the courtroom, the same Car salespeople 4 rule of caution can be used to evaluate witnesses. In one study, Source: Roy Morgan Research (2017), Roy Morgan Image of Professions Survey 2017: research participants served as jurors in a mock trial in which a Health professionals continue domination with Nurses most highly regarded again; man claimed that his exposure to an industrial chemical at work followed by Doctors and Pharmacists. Retrieved from http://www.roymorgan.com/ findings/7244-roy-morgan-image-of-professions-may-2017-201706051543. had caused him to contract cancer. Testifying in support of this claim was a biochemist who was paid either $4800 or $75 for his expert testimony. You might think that jurors would be more impressed by the scientist who commanded the higher fee. Yet while he was highly paid, the expert was perceived to be a ‘hired gun’ and was as a result less believable and less persuasive (Cooper & Neuhaus, 2000). The self-interest rule has other interesting implications. One is that people are impressed by others who take unpopular stands or argue against their own interests. When research participants read a political speech accusing a large corporation of polluting a local river, those who thought that the speechmaker was a pro-environment candidate addressing a staunch environmentalist group perceived him to be biased, whereas those who thought he was a pro-business candidate talking to company supporters assumed he was sincere (Eagly, Wood, & Chaiken, 1978). Trust is also established by speakers who are not purposely trying to change our views. Thus, people are influenced more when they think that they are accidentally overhearing a communication than when they receive a sales pitch clearly intended for their ears (Walster & Festinger, 1962). That is why advertisers sometimes use the ‘overheard communicator’ trick, in which the source tells a buddy about a new product that really works. As if eavesdropping on a personal conversation, viewers assume that what one friend says to another can be trusted. The self-interest rule also has great relevance in law, which is why people are far more likely to believe a crime suspect’s admissions of guilt than his or her denials (Kassin, 2012).

Likeability More than anything else, the celebrity power of Lance Armstrong was based on his athletic dominance, his popularity and his winning smile. Before the revelations that destroyed Armstrong’s reputation as an elite athlete, he was perceived as a likeable person. But does that quality enhance someone’s impact as a communicator? Yes. In his classic bestseller, How to Win Friends and Influence People, Dale Carnegie (1936) said that being liked and being persuasive go hand-in-hand. The trickier question is: ‘What makes a communicator likeable?’ As we will see in more detail in Chapter 9, two factors that spark attraction are similarity and physical attractiveness.

Similarity informs likeability A study by Diane Mackie and colleagues (1990) illustrates the persuasive power of similarity. Students read a strong or a weak speech that argued against continued use of the standardised tests in

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university admissions. Further, the identity of the person purportedly giving the speech was manipulated. Half the participants were led to believe that the speech was written by a fellow student at the same university; the other half thought the author was a student from another university. Very few participants were persuaded by the weak arguments; however, many of those who read the strong message did change their attitudes, but only when they believed it was given by a fellow student. Just as source similarity can spark persuasion, dissimilarity can have the opposite inhibiting effect. In a study of people’s taste in music, Clayton Hilmert and colleagues (2006) introduced participants to a confederate who seemed to like the same or different kinds of music, such as rock, pop, country or classical. Others did not meet a confederate. When later asked to rate a particular song, participants were positively influenced by the similar confederate’s opinion and negatively influenced by the dissimilar confederate’s opinion. In fact, although the effect is more potent when the points of similarity seem relevant to the attitude in question, the participants in this study were also more or less persuaded by a confederate whose similarities or differences were wholly unrelated to music; for example, when the confederate had similar or different interests in shopping, world politics, museums, trying new foods or surfing the internet (Berscheid, 1966). The effect of source similarity on persuasion has obvious implications for those who wish to exert influence. We are all similar to one another in some respects. We might agree on politics, share a common friend, have similar tastes in food or enjoy spending summers on the same beach. If aware of the social benefits of similarity and the social costs of dissimilarity, the astute communicator can use common bonds to enhance his or her impact on an audience. FIGURE 6.8 The value of celebrity endorsement Advertisers are so convinced that beauty sells products that they pay millions of dollars for supermodels to appear in their ads. Shown here, supermodel Miranda Kerr appears in an ad for Swarovski.

Physical attractiveness informs likeability Advertising practices presuppose that beauty is also persuasive. After all, billboards, magazine advertisements, pop-up advertisements and television commercials routinely feature young and glamorous ‘supermodels’ who are tall and slender (for women) or muscular (for men) and who have hard bodies, glowing complexions and radiant smiles. Sure, these models can turn heads, you may think, but can they change minds? In a study that addressed this question, Shelly Chaiken (1979) had male and female university students approach others on campus. They introduced themselves as members of an organisation that wanted the university cafeteria to stop serving meat during breakfast and lunch. In each case, these student assistants gave reasons for the position and then asked respondents to sign a petition. The result? Attractive sources were able to get 41% of respondents to sign the petition, whereas those who were less attractive succeeded only 32% of the time. Additional research has shown that attractive male and female salespeople elicit more positive attitudes and purchasing intentions from customers than less attractive salespeople, even when they are up front about their desire to make a sale (Reinhard, Messner, & Sporer, 2006).

When what you say is more important than who you are

Source: AAP Image/The Advertising Archives

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To this point, it must seem as if the source of a persuasive communication is more important than the communication itself. Is this true? Certainly, there are enough real-life examples – as when a product gains instant popularity because it is endorsed by Kylie Jenner or Kim Kardashian. The advertising industry has long debated the value of high-priced celebrity endorsements. David Ogilvy (1985), who was called ‘the king of advertising’, used to say that celebrities are not effective because viewers know they’ve been bought and paid for. Ogilvy was not alone in his scepticism. Still, many advertisers scramble furiously to sign up famous entertainers, models and athletes, as shown in Figure 6.8. From

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Lance Armstrong to Hugh Jackman, Kylie Minogue, Kim Kardashian, Elle Macpherson and Beyoncé, television commercials regularly feature a parade of stars. The bigger the star, they appear to presume, the more valuable the testimonial. Compared with the contents of a message, does the source really make the big difference that advertisers pay for? Are we so impressed by the expert, so enamoured of the physical talent and so drawn to the charming face that we will embrace whatever they have to say? And are we so scornful of ordinary or unattractive people that their presentations fall on deaf ears? In light of what is known about the central and peripheral routes to persuasion, the answer to these questions is ‘it depends’. First, a recipient’s level of involvement plays an important role. When a message has personal relevance to your life, you pay attention to the source and think critically about the message, the arguments and the implications. When a message does not have personal relevance, however, you may take the source at face value and spend little time scrutinising the information. In a classic study, Richard Petty and colleagues (1981) had students listen to a speaker who proposed that all students in their final year should be required to take comprehensive exams in order to graduate. Three aspects of the communication situation were varied. First, participants were led to believe that the speaker was either an education academic at Princeton University or a high school student. Second, participants heard either well-reasoned arguments and hard evidence or a weak message based only on anecdotes and personal opinion. Third, participants were told either that the proposed exams might be used the following year (‘Uh oh, that means me!’) or that they would not take effect for another 10 years (‘Who cares, I’ll be long gone by then!’). As predicted, personal involvement determined the relative impact of the expertise of the source and the quality of speech. Among participants who would not be affected by the proposed change, attitudes were based largely on the speaker’s credibility: the academic was persuasive; the high-school student was not. Among participants who thought that the proposed change would affect them directly, attitudes were based on the quality of the speaker’s proposal. Strong arguments were persuasive; weak arguments were not. As depicted in Figure 6.9, people followed the source rather than the message under low levels of involvement, illustrating the peripheral route to persuasion. But message factors did outweigh source characteristics under high levels of involvement, when participants cared enough to take the central route to persuasion. Likewise, research has shown that the tilt towards likeable and attractive communicators is reduced when recipients take the central route (Chaiken, 1980).

FIGURE 6.9 Source versus message: the role of audience involvement For low-involvement participants (right), persuasion was based more on the source than on the arguments. Source characteristics have more impact on those who do not care enough to take the central route.

People who were high or low in their personal involvement heard a strong or weak message from an expert or non-expert. For high-involvement participants (left), persuasion was based on the strength of arguments, not on source expertise. .6

Favourable

.6

Favourable

.4 Postcommunication attitude

Postcommunication attitude

.4 .2 0 –.2 −.4

.2 0 −.2 −.4

Unfavourable

Unfavourable High

Low

High

Low

Involvement Strong argument

Weak argument

 

Involvement Expert source

Nonexpert source

Source: Reprinted by permission from Richard E. Petty.

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Sleeper effect

A delayed increase in the persuasive impact of a non-credible source.

There is a second limit to source effects. It is often said that time heals all wounds. Well, time may also heal the effects of a bad reputation. Hovland and Weiss (1951) varied communicator credibility (e.g., the physicist versus the Soviet-controlled newspaper) and found that the change had a large and immediate effect on persuasion. But when they measured attitudes again four weeks later, the effect had vanished. Over time, the attitude change produced by the high-credibility source had decreased and the change caused by the low-credibility source had increased. This finding of a delayed persuasive impact of a lowcredibility communicator is called the sleeper effect. To explain this unforeseen result, the Hovland research group proposed the discounting cue hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, people immediately discount the arguments made by non-credible communicators, but over time they dissociate what was said from who said it. In other words, we tend to remember the message but forget the source (Pratkanis, Greenwald, Leippe, & Baumgardner, 1988). To examine the role of memory in this process, Kelman and Hovland (1953) reminded a group of participants of the source’s identity before reassessing their attitudes. If the sleeper effect was caused by forgetting, they reasoned, then it could be eliminated through reinstatement of the link between the source and the message. As shown in Figure 6.10, they were right. When attitudes were measured after three weeks, participants who were not reminded of the source showed the usual sleeper effect. Yet those who did receive a source reminder did not. For these latter participants, the effects of high and low credibility endured. More recent studies by cognitive psychologists have confirmed that over time, people ‘forget’ the connection between information and its source (Underwood & Pezdek, 1998).

FIGURE 6.10 The sleeper effect In Experiment 1, participants changed their immediate attitudes more in response to a message from a highcredibility source than from a low-credibility source. When attitudes were measured again after three weeks, the high-credibility source had lost impact and the low-credibility source had gained impact due to the sleeper effect. In Experiment 2, the sleeper effect disappeared when participants were reminded of the source.

Attitude Change

Experiment 2: Now you don't

Attitude Change

Experiment 1: Now you see it

Immediate

3 weeks

Immediate

Time interval High-credibility Source

3 weeks Time interval

Low-credibility Source

Source: Kelman, H. C., & Hovland, C. I. (1953). ‘Reinstatement’ of the communicator in delayed measurement of opinion change. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 48, 327–335.

The sleeper effect generated a good deal of controversy. There was never a doubt that credible communicators lose some impact over time. But researchers had a harder time finding evidence for delayed persuasion by non-credible sources. Exasperated at one point by their own failures to obtain this result, Paulette Gillig and Anthony Greenwald (1974) wondered if it was time to lay the sleeper effect to rest. As it turned out, the answer was ‘no’. More recent research showed that the sleeper effect is reliable provided that participants do not learn who the source is until after they have received the original message (Greenwald, Pratkanis, Leippe, & Baumgardner, 1986; Kumkale & Albarracín, 2004). Dolores Albarracín and colleagues (2017) have recently demonstrated a new version of the sleeper effect whereby credible sources presenting weak arguments are not persuasive immediately, but increase in persuasiveness over time. To appreciate the importance of timing, imagine that you are surfing the internet and you come across what appears to be a review of a new mobile phone. Before you begin reading, however, you notice in the 240

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fine print that this so-called review is really an advertisement. Aware that you cannot always trust what you read, you skim the advertisement and reject it. Now imagine the same situation, except that you read the entire advertisement before realising what it is. Again, you reject it. But notice the difference. This time, you have read the message with an open mind. You may still reject it, but after a few weeks the information will have sunk in to influence your evaluation of the device. This scenario illustrates the classic sleeper effect.

The message On the peripheral route to persuasion, audiences are influenced heavily – maybe too heavily – by various source characteristics. But when people care about an issue, the strength of a message determines its impact. On the central route to persuasion, what matters most is whether a scientist’s theory is supported by the data or whether a company has a sound product. Keep in mind, however, that the target of a persuasive appeal comes to know a message only through the medium of communication – what a person has to say and how that person says it. Communicators often struggle with how to structure and present an argument to maximise its impact. Should a message be long and crammed with facts, or short and to the point? Is it better to present a highly partisan, one-sided message or to take a more balanced, two-sided approach? How should arguments be ordered – from strongest to weakest or the other way around? These are the kinds of questions often studied by persuasion researchers, including those interested in marketing, advertising and consumer behaviour (Loken, 2006).

Message length What is the best strategy when it comes to message length? It depends on whether members of the audience process the message on the central or the peripheral route. When people process a message lazily, with their eyes and ears half-closed, they often fall back on a simple heuristic – the longer a message, the more valid it must be. In this case, a large number of words gives the superficial appearance of factual support, regardless of the quality of the arguments (Petty & Cacioppo, 1984; Wood, Kallgren, & Preisler, 1985). Thus, as David Ogilvy (1985) concluded from his years of advertising experience, ‘The more facts you tell, the more you sell’ (p. 88). When people process a communication carefully, however, length is a double-edged sword. If a message is long because it contains lots of supporting information, then longer does mean better. The more supportive arguments you can offer or the more sources you can find to speak on your behalf, the more persuasive your appeal will be (Harkins & Petty, 1981). But if the added arguments are weak or if the new sources are redundant, then an alert audience will not be fooled by length alone. When adding to the length of a message dilutes its quality, an appeal might well lose impact (Friedrich, Fetherstonhaugh, Casey, & Gallagher, 1996; Harkins & Petty, 1987).

Message order When two opposing sides try to persuade the same audience, order of presentation becomes a relevant factor as well. If you were to take turns in a debate, would it be in your best interests to go first to seek a primacy effect or go last and take advantage of a recency effect? There are good reasons to favour either option. On the one hand, first impressions are important. On the other hand, memory fades over time, and people often recall only the last argument they hear before making a decision. In light of these contrasting predictions, Norman Miller and Donald Campbell (1959) searched for the ‘missing link’ that would determine the relative effects of primacy and recency. They discovered that the missing link is time. In a study of jury simulations, they had people: (1) read a summary of the plaintiff’s case; (2) read a summary of the defendant’s case; and (3) make a decision. The researchers varied how much time separated the two messages and then how much time elapsed between the second message and the decisions. When participants read the second message right after the first and then waited a whole week before reporting their opinion, a primacy effect prevailed and the side that came first was favoured. Both messages faded equally from memory, so only the greater impact of first impressions was left. Yet when participants made a decision immediately after the second message but a full week after the first, there was a recency effect. The second argument was fresher in memory, thus favouring the side that went second. Returning to the hypothetical debate: would you want to give your argument first or last? The answer appears in Table 6.2.

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TABLE 6.2 Effects of presentation order and timing on persuasion A study by Miller and Campbell (1959) demonstrated the effect of presentation order and the timing of opposing arguments on persuasion. From these results, it seems that the scheduling of events such as political party conventions or hearings in line with the third or fourth rows would be fair, promoting neither primacy nor recency.

Conditions

Results

1

Message 1

Message 2

One week

Decision

Primacy

2

Message 1

One week

Message 2

Decision

Recency

3

Message 1

Message 2

Decision

Message 1

One week

Message 2

4

None One week

Decision

None

Source: Adapted from Miller, N., & Campbell, D. T. (1959). Recency and primacy in persuasion as a function of the timing of speeches and measurements. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 59, 1–9.

Message discrepancy Persuasion is a process of changing attitudes. This objective is not easy to achieve. As a general rule, people are motivated to defend their opinions and attitudes, which they partly do through selective exposure to information that supports their views (Hart et al., 2009). This gives rise to what is perhaps the most critical strategic question: ‘How extreme a position should a persuader take?’ That is, how discrepant should a message be from the audience’s existing position in order to have the greatest impact? Common sense suggests two opposite answers. One approach is to take an extreme position in the hope that the more change you advocate, the more you will get. Another approach is to exercise caution and not push for too much change so that the audience will not reject the message outright. Which approach seems more effective? Imagine trying to convert die-hard rugby fans into cricket fans, or the other way around. Would you stake out a radical position in order to move them towards the centre, or would you preach moderation so as not to be cast aside? Research shows that communicators should adopt the second, more cautious approach. To be sure, some discrepancy is needed to produce a change in attitude. But the relationship to persuasion can be pictured as an upside-down U, with the most change being produced at moderate amounts of discrepancy (Bochner & Insko, 1966). A study by Kari Edwards and Edward Smith (1996) helps to explain why taking a more extreme position is counterproductive. These investigators first measured people’s attitudes on a number of pressing social issues; for example, whether lesbian and gay couples should adopt children, whether employers should give preference to hiring minorities, and whether asylum seekers arriving by boat should be returned to their home countries. Several weeks later, they asked the same people to read, think about and rate arguments that were either consistent or inconsistent with their own prior attitudes. The result? When given arguments to read that preached attitudes that were discrepant from their own, the participants spent more time scrutinising the material and judged the arguments to be weak. Clearly, people tend to refute and reject persuasive messages they do not agree with. In fact, the more personally important an issue is to us, the more stubborn and resistant to change we become (Zuwerink & Devine, 1996).

Fear appeals Our discussion thus far has focused on many cognitive aspects of persuasion – but what about emotional factors? Of course, very few messages are entirely based on rational argument. A popular approach, especially in persuasive communication is to appeal to an audience’s fear. Fear serves as a signal of danger. Neuroscientific research shows that fear is aroused instantly in response to pain, to stimulation from noxious substances or to threat, enabling us to respond quickly without having to stop to think about it (LeDoux & Pine, 2016). The use of fear-based appeals to change attitudes is common. Certain religious cults have used fearbased tactics to indoctrinate new members. And public health organisations use it when they graphically portray the damage done to those who smoke cigarettes, use illicit drugs, eat too much junk food, engage in unprotected sex, or text while driving (see Figure 6.11). The health warnings and graphic images that replaced branded cigarette packaging in Australia and New Zealand discussed in the opening vignette are a striking example. Negative campaigning in politics is ubiquitous. From the large number of attack advertisements that flood the media during election campaigns, it would certainly seem that candidates, their consultants and political parties strongly believe in the power of attacking their opponents by arousing fear about the 242

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FIGURE 6.11 Fear appeals Public health organisations often use fear, or scare tactics, to change health-related attitudes and behaviour. In New Zealand in 2014, a New Zealand Transport Agency ad was aired titled ‘Speed: Mistakes’, about the dangers of speeding and poor driver judgement. It starts with time ‘stopping’ moments before two cars collide. The drivers get out of their cars and discuss the horrific crash that is about to occur, the fear in both drivers is palpable. One driver pleads for the life of his child, but neither can alter the outcome. Time returns to normal, we see the speedometer reading of 100 kilometres per hour and then the sickening impact as the cars collide. The ad can be view here: https://www.bestadsontv. com/ad/59325/Speed-Mistakes Source: Courtesy of New Zealand Transport Agency. Screenshot from NZTA Speed Campaign: “Mistakes”

consequences of voting for them. Yet one of the most hard-hitting and controversial advertisements ever aired was a television commercial that aired just once, on 7 September 1964. In an advertisement to re-elect US president Lyndon Johnson, a young girl pictured in a field counted to 10 as she picked the petals off a daisy. As she reached 9, an adult voice broke in to count down from 10 to 0, followed by a blinding nuclear explosion and this message: ‘Vote for President Johnson on November 3. The stakes are too high for you to stay home’. The appeal to fear was clear. The effects of fear arousal in politics are evident. Guided by terror management theory (Greenberg, Solomon, & Pyszczynski, 1997; Pyszczynski, Greenberg, Solomon, Arndt, & Schimel, 2004) as discussed in Chapter 2, and the prediction that a deeply rooted fear of death motivates people to rally around their leaders as a way to ward off anxiety, Mark Landau and colleagues (2004) found that university students expressed more support for former US president George W. Bush and his policies when they were reminded of their own mortality or subliminally exposed to images of the 9/11 attacks on the US World Trade Center than when they were not. This result is not limited to the laboratory. Analysing patterns of government-issued terror warnings and public opinion polls, Robb Willer (2004) found that increased government-issued terror alerts were predictably followed by increases in presidential approval ratings. Is fear similarly effective for commercial purposes? What about using fear to promote health and safety? If you are interested in public service advertising, visit the website of the US Ad Council (www.adcouncil. org/Our-Work). In recent years, the Ad Council has run campaigns on a range of issues, including the use of steroids, flu prevention, AIDS prevention, cyberbullying and the online sexploitation of youth. Many of the Ad Council’s campaigns have a strong current of fear. Fear appeals are clearly common. But are they effective? In a meta-analysis of 127 studies, Melanie Tannenbaum and colleagues (2015) established that fear appeals are indeed effective in shifting attitudes, intentions and behaviours. The researchers also established factors that increase the efficacy of fear appeals. These include targeting one-off rather than repeated behaviours and conveying high risk and strong negative consequences for not taking up the message.

Positive emotions It is interesting that just as fear helps induce a change in attitude, so does positive emotion. In one study, people were more likely to agree with a series of controversial arguments when they snacked on peanuts and soft drink than when they did not eat (Janis, Kaye, & Kirschner, 1965). In another study, participants liked a television commercial more when it was embedded within a program that was upbeat rather than sad (Mathur & Chattopadhyay, 1991). Research shows that people are ‘soft touches’ when they are in a good mood. Environmental cues such as sounds, smells or sights can lull us into a positive emotional state – ripe for persuasion (Schwarz, Bless, & Bohner, 1991). According to Alice Isen (1984), people see the world through rose-coloured glasses when they are in a good mood. Filled with high spirits, we become more sociable, more generous and generally more positive in our outlook. We also make decisions more quickly and with relatively little thought. The result? Positive feelings activate the peripheral route to persuasion, facilitating change and allowing superficial cues to take on added importance (Petty, Schumann, Richman, & Strathman, 1993; Worth & Mackie, 1987).

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What is it about feeling good that leads us to take shortcuts to persuasion rather than the more effortful central route? There are three possible explanations. One is that a positive emotional When participants in a positive mood read a message they agreed with, they found strong arguments to be more persuasive state is cognitively distracting, causing the mind to wander and than weak arguments. When the message ran counter to their impairing our ability to think critically about the persuasive beliefs, however, strong and weak arguments were equally arguments (Mackie & Worth, 1989; Mackie, Asuncion, & Rosselli, ineffective in swaying their attitudes. 1992). A second explanation is that when people are in a good mood, they assume that all is well, let down their guard, and 10 become somewhat lazy processors of information (Schwarz, 9 1990). A third explanation is that when people are happy, they become motivated to savour the moment and maintain their 8 happy mood rather than spoiling it by thinking critically about 7 new information (Wegener & Petty, 1994). This last notion raises an interesting question: ‘If happy 6 people are presented with a positive and persuasive message 5 about a topic they agree with, would they still appear cognitively distracted, or lazy, or would they pay close attention in order 4 to prolong the rosy glow?’ To find out, Duane Wegener and 3 colleagues (1995) showed university students a funny film clip. The students were then asked to read and evaluate either an 2 article they agreed with about a new plan to cut student fees, or 1 an article they disagreed with about a new plan to raise student Proattitudinal Counterattitudinal fees. In half the cases, the article they read contained strong message message arguments; in the other cases, the arguments were weak. Did Strong message Weak message the students read the material carefully enough to distinguish Source: Adapted from Wegener, D. T., Petty, R. E., & Smith, S. M. (1995). Positive mood can between the strong and weak arguments? Those in the sombre increase or decrease message scrutiny: The hedonic contingency view of mood and message condition clearly did. As depicted in Figure 6.12, when the processing. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 69, 5–15. happy students read about a fee increase, they tuned out and were not differentially persuaded by the strong and weak arguments. When they read about the proposal to cut fees that they already agreed with, however, they were persuaded more by strong than weak arguments. The route taken was impacted by both mood and persuasive message content. Attitude

FIGURE 6.12 ‘Happily stupid’ is not always the case

CRITICAL THINKING ACTIVITY Anticipate the next time you will need to persuade someone of something. Maybe it will be to gain a parent’s permission or a friend’s agreement, or even an appeal for a mark change to a lecturer. How would you go about shaping your message?

How might you assess the discrepancy between your message and your audience’s prior attitude? Would you attempt to instil fear or use positive emotions as an aid to persuasion?

Subliminal messages In 1957, Vance Packard published The Hidden Persuaders, an exposé on advertising. As the book climbed the best-seller list, it awakened in the public a fear of being manipulated by forces they could not see or hear. What had Packard uncovered? In the 1950s, amid growing fears of communism and the birth of rock’n’roll, a number of advertisers were said to have used subliminal advertising – the presentation of commercial messages outside of conscious awareness. It all started at a drive-in cinema in the US, where the words ‘Drink Coke’ and ‘Eat popcorn’ were flashed on the screen during intermissions for a third of a millisecond. Although the audience never noticed the message, Coke sales were said to have increased 18% and popcorn sales 58% over a six-week period (Brean, 1958). In books entitled Subliminal Seduction (1973) and The Age of Manipulation (1989), William Key charged that advertisers routinely sneak faint sexual images in visual advertisements to heighten the appeal of their products (see Figure 6.13). Several years ago, concerns were also raised about subliminal messages in rock music. In one case, the families of two boys who committed suicide blamed the British rock group Judas Priest for subliminal

244

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Subliminal persuasion in motivated conditions Perhaps people perceive subliminal cues but are not persuaded into action unless they are motivated to do so. To test this hypothesis, Erin Strahan and colleagues (2002) brought thirsty university students into the laboratory for a marketing study and provided drinking water to some but not to others. Then, as part of a test administered by computer, they subliminally exposed these students to neutral words (pirate, won) or to thirst-related words (thirst, dry). Did the subliminal ‘thirsty’ message later lead the students, like automatons, to drink more in a taste test of fruit beverages? Yes and no. Figure 6.14 shows that the subliminal thirst primes had little impact on students whose thirst had just been quenched, but they quite clearly increased consumption among those who were thirsty and had been deprived of water. For a subliminal message to influence behaviour, it has to strike ‘while the iron is hot’. Other researchers have since extended this interesting effect in important ways. In one study, participants who were subliminally presented with the name of a specific soft drink (Lipton Ice) were later more likely to report that they would select that particular brand over others, provided they were thirsty (Karremans, Stroebe, & Claus, 2006). In a second study,

FIGURE 6.13 Subliminal advertising? For years, advertisers have defended against the charge that they embed suggestive and sexual images in print ads. This piece by the American Association of Advertising Agencies defends against this claim.

Source: American Association of Advertising Agencies.

FIGURE 6.14 Subliminal influence Thirsty and non-thirsty research participants were subliminally exposed to neutral or thirst-related words. Afterward they participated in a beverage taste test in which the amount they drank was measured. You can see that the subliminal thirst cues had little impact on nonthirsty participants but that they did increase consumption among those who were thirsty. Apparently, subliminal cues can influence our behaviour when we are otherwise predisposed. 200 190 Amount consumed (mL)

lyrics (‘Do it’) that promoted Satanism and suicide (National Law Journal, 1990). Although the families lost their case, it is clear that many people believe in the power of hidden persuaders. In fact, in Australia and the UK, the use of stimuli below or near the threshold of normal awareness has been banned. A 2011 television advertisement from Australian internet service provider iiNet was taken off the air following the revelation that it contained a comical paragraph of text shown only for two frames (one-tenth of a second). Is there empirical evidence for the efficacy of subliminal messages? In 1982, Timothy Moore reviewed the existing research and concluded that ‘what you see is what you get’; that is, nothing – concluding that they were ‘complete scams’. Moore was right. The original story about the Coke and popcorn messages at the US cinema was later exposed as a publicity stunt and hoax (Pratkanis, 1992). Further, controlled experiments using subliminal self-help CDs that promise to raise self-esteem, improve memory or lose weight show that these products offer no therapeutic benefits (Greenwald, Spangenberg, Pratkanis, & Eskenazi, 1991; Merikle & Skanes, 1992). If there is no solid evidence for subliminal influence, why, you may wonder, does research demonstrate perception without awareness in studies of priming (described elsewhere in this book) but not in studies of subliminal persuasion? If you think about it, the two sets of claims are different. In the laboratory, subliminal exposures have a short-term effect on simple judgements and actions. But in claims of subliminal persuasion, the exposure is presumed to have long-term effects on eating, drinking, consumer purchases, voter sentiment or even the most profound of violent acts – suicide. Psychologists agree that people can process information at an unconscious level, but they are quick to caution that this processing is ‘analytically limited’ (Greenwald, 1992).

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180 170 160 150 140 130 120 Thirsty participants Thirst primes

Not thirsty participants Neutral primes

Source: Strahan, E. J., Spencer, S. J., & Zanna, M. P. (2002). Subliminal priming and persuasion: Striking while the iron is hot. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 38, 556–568.

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People are most easily persuaded by commercial messages that are presented without their awareness.

FALSE

participants were subliminally presented with a logo for one brand of dextrose (a sugar pill) or another, after which they worked on a cognitive task that required intense concentration. The results showed that when given an opportunity to enhance their concentration, participants were more likely to select and consume the subliminally advertised brand than the other brand – provided they were mentally tired and in need of a boost (Bermeitinger et al., 2009).

The audience Although source and message factors are important, the astute communicator must also take his or her audience into account. Presentation strategies that succeed with some people fail with others. Audiences on the central route to persuasion, for example, bear little resemblance to those found strolling along the peripheral route. In this section, we will see that the impact of a message is influenced by two additional factors: the recipient’s personality and their expectations. Right from the start, social psychologists tried to identify types of people who were more or less vulnerable to persuasion. But it turned out that very few individuals are consistently easy or difficult to persuade. Based on this insight, the search for individual and group differences is now guided by an ‘interactionist’ perspective. Assuming that each of us can be persuaded more in some settings than in others, researchers look for an appropriate match between characteristics of the message and the audience. So, what kinds of messages work for you?

The need for cognition Earlier, we saw that people tend to process information more carefully when they are highly involved. Involvement can be determined by the importance and self-relevance of a message. According to Cacioppo and Petty (1982), however, there are also individual differences in the extent to which people become involved and take the central route to persuasion. Specifically, they have found that individuals differ in the Need for cognition extent to which they enjoy and participate in effortful cognitive activities, or, as they call it, the need for A personality variable cognition. People who are high rather than low in their need for cognition like to work on hard problems, that distinguishes people search for clues, make fine distinctions and analyse situations. These differences can be identified by the on the basis of how items contained in the Need for Cognition Scale, some of which appear in Figure 6.15. much they enjoy effortful The need for cognition has interesting implications for changing attitudes. If people are prone to cognitive activities. approach or avoid effortful cognitive activities, then a communicator could prepare messages unique to a particular audience. In theory, the high-need-for-cognition audience should receive information-oriented appeals and the low- need-for-cognition audience should be treated to appeals that rely on the use of peripheral cues. The theory is fine, but does it work? Can a message be customised to fit the informationprocessing style of its recipients? In a test of this hypothesis, participants read an editorial that consisted of either a strong or a weak set of arguments. FIGURE 6.15 Need for cognition scale: sample items As predicted, the higher their need for cognition scores were, Are you high or low in the need for cognition? These statements the more the participants thought about the material, the are taken from the Need for Cognition Scale. If you agree with better they later recalled it, and the more persuaded they items 1, 3 and 5 and disagree with items 2, 4 and 6, you would were by the strength of its arguments (Cacioppo, Petty, & probably be regarded as high in the need for cognition. Morris, 1983). By contrast, people who are low in the need for cognition are persuaded by cues found along the peripheral 1 I really enjoy a task that involves coming up with new solutions to problems. route, such as a speaker’s reputation and physical appearance, the overt reactions of others in the audience, and a positive 2 Thinking is not my idea of fun. mood state (Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996). At 3 The notion of thinking abstractly is appealing to me. times, they are mindlessly influenced by a reputable source 4 I like tasks that require little thought once I’ve learned even when the source’s arguments are weak (Kaufman, them. Stasson, & Hart, 1999). 5 I usually end up deliberating about issues even when they do not affect me personally. 6 It is enough for me that something gets the job done; I don’t care how or why it works. Source: Cacioppo, J. T., & Petty, R. E. (1982). The need for cognition. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 42, 116–131. Copyright © 1982 by the American Psychological Association. Reprinted by permission.

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Self-monitoring Just as people high in the need for cognition crave information, other personality traits are associated with an attraction to other kinds of messages. Consider the trait of self-monitoring. As described in Chapter 2, high self-monitors regulate their behaviour from one situation to another out of concern for

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public self-presentation. Low self-monitors are less image conscious and behave instead according to their own beliefs, values and preferences. In the context of persuasion, high self-monitors may be particularly responsive to messages that promise desirable social images. Whether the product is mobile phones, beverages, jeans or cars, this technique is common in advertising, where often the image is the message. To test the self-monitoring hypothesis, Mark Snyder and Kenneth DeBono (1985) showed imageoriented or information-oriented print advertisements to high and low self-monitors. In an advertisement for Irish Mocha Mint coffee, for example, a man and woman were depicted as relaxing in a candlelit room over a steamy cup of coffee. The image-oriented version promised to ‘Make a chilly night become a cosy evening’, while the informational version offered ‘a delicious blend of three great flavours – coffee, chocolate and mint’. As predicted, high self-monitors were willing to pay more for products after reading imagery advertisements, whereas low self-monitors were influenced more by information-oriented appeals. Smidt and DeBono (2011) found a similar result for energy drinks. They found that high self-monitors rated the drinks more favourably when they had an image-oriented name, and low self-monitors preferred the drinks more when they had a self-descriptive name. Imagery can even influence the way that high self-monitors evaluate a product, independent of its quality. DeBono and colleagues (2003) presented people with one of two perfume samples packaged in either attractive or less attractive bottles. Whereas low self-monitors preferred the more pleasant-scented fragrance, high self-monitors preferred whatever scent came from the more attractive bottles.

Regulatory fit Setting aside your political views, do you find yourself drawn to some types of speeches, arguments, editorials and television commercials more than others? Joseph Cesario and colleagues (2004) proposed that people are more likely to be influenced by messages that fit their frame of mind and ‘feel right’. In particular, they noted that in an effort to regulate their own emotion state, some individuals are promotionoriented (i.e., drawn to the pursuit of success, achievement and their ideals), whereas others are more prevention-oriented (i.e., protective of what they have, fearful of failure and vigilant about avoiding loss). Do these differing outlooks on life make people more responsive to some types of persuasive messages than others? To find out, these researchers presented two versions of an article advocating for a new afterschool children’s program. They found that promotion-motivated participants were more persuaded by the article when the arguments in it were framed in promotional terms (‘because it will advance children’s education and support more children to succeed’), while prevention-motivated participants were persuaded more when the very same arguments were framed in more defensive terms (‘because it will secure children’s education and prevent more children from failing’). In a follow-up study, Cesario and Higgins (2008) found that audience members are also influenced when a speaker’s non-verbal style fits their motivational orientations. Watching a high-school teacher deliver the same communication concerning a new after-school program, promotion-motivated participants were more receptive when the speaker exhibited an ‘eager’ delivery style (i.e., fast, animated and forward leaning, with hand gestures projecting outward), whereas prevention-oriented participants were more receptive when he displayed a cautious style (i.e., slow, precise and backward leaning, with hand gestures pushing in) (see Figure 6.16). There are plenty of other ways that you may be more comfortable with some types of messages than others. We saw earlier that some of us are high in the need for cognition, enjoying effortful forms of reasoning and problem-solving. Some of us are also high in the need for affect, seeking out and enjoying feelings of strong emotion. In matters of persuasion, these traits lead people to be more receptive to messages that are presented in primarily cognitive or emotional terms (Haddock, Maio, Arnold, & Huskinson, 2008).

Audience resistance When our attitudes or values come under attack, we can succumb to the challenge and change the attitude or value, or we can resist it and maintain the attitude or value. There are different means of resistance. In a series of studies, Julia Jacks and Kimberly Cameron (2003) asked people to describe and rate the ways that they manage to resist persuasion in their attitudes on abortion or the death penalty. They identified seven strategies, the most common being attitude bolstering (‘I think about all the reasons I believe the way I do’)

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FIGURE 6.16 Eager and vigilant styles When the non-verbal style used in a persuasive advertisement matches the regulatory style of the viewer, messages are more effective. Eager non-verbal styles (top) are effective with

promotion-oriented individuals, whereas vigilant non-verbal styles (bottom) are effective with prevention-oriented individuals.

Eager non-verbal style

Vigilant non-verbal style

Source: Cesario, J., & Higgins, E. T. (2008). Making message recipients ‘feel right’: How non-verbal cues can increase persuasion. Psychological Science, 19, 415–420.

and the least common being source derogation (‘I look for faults in the person who challenges my belief’). These means of resistance are listed in Table 6.3.

Forewarning If you want to resist persuasion, does it help to be forewarned that your attitude is about to come under attack? Yes; when people are aware that someone is trying to change their attitude, they become more likely to resist. All they need is some time to collect their thoughts and come up with a good defence. Jonathan Freedman and David Sears (1965) first discovered this when they told high school students to expect a speech on why teenagers should not be allowed to drive (an unpopular position, as you can imagine). The students were warned either 2 or 10 minutes before the talk began, or not at all. Those who were the victims of a sneak attack were the most likely to succumb to the speaker’s position. Those who had a full

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10 minutes’ warning were the least likely to agree. To be forewarned is to be forearmed. But why? At least two processes are at work here. To understand them, let us take a closer look at what forewarning does. Participants in the Freedman and Sears study were put on notice in two ways; (1) they were informed of the position the speaker would take, and (2) they were told that the speaker intended to change the audience’s opinion. Psychologically, these two aspects of forewarning have different effects. The first effect is purely cognitive. Knowing in advance what position a speaker will take enables us to come up with counterarguments and, as a result, to become more resistant to change. To explain this effect, William McGuire (1964) drew an analogy. Protecting a person’s attitudes from persuasion, he said, is like inoculating the human body against disease. In medicine, injecting a small dose of infection into a patient stimulates the body to build up a resistance to it. According to this inoculation hypothesis, an attitude can be immunised the same way. Several studies across the last two decades support patterns of inoculation in attitude change (Banas & Rains, 2010; Bernard, Maio, & Olson, 2003; Cook, Lewandowsky, & Ecker, 2017).

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TABLE 6.3 Strategies for resisting persuasion Strategy

Example

Attitude bolstering

‘I think about all the reasons I believe the way I do.’

Counterarguing

‘I would talk to myself and play devil’s advocate.’

Social validation

‘I also rely on others with the same opinion to be there for me.’

Negative affect

‘I tend to get angry when someone tries to change my beliefs.’

Assertions of confidence

‘I doubt anybody could change my viewpoint.’

Selective exposure

‘Most of the time I just ignore them.’

Source derogation

‘I look for faults in the person who challenges my belief.’

Inoculation hypothesis

Reactance Simply knowing that someone is trying to persuade us also sparks a motivational reaction as we brace ourselves to resist the attempt, raising a metaphorical red flag. That red flag is called psychological reactance. According to Jack Brehm’s theory of psychological reactance, all of us want the freedom to think, feel and act as we (and not others) choose. When we sense that freedom is slipping away, we try to restore it (Brehm & Brehm, 1981). One possible result is that when a communicator comes on too strongly, we may react with negative attitude change by moving in the direction that is the opposite of the one being advocated – even, ironically, when the speaker’s position agrees with our own (Heller, Pallak, & Picek, 1973). Sometimes, the motive to protect our freedom to think as we choose trumps our desire to hold a specific opinion. Reactance can trigger resistance to persuasion in two ways. The audience may simply shut down in a reflex-like response; or alternatively, they may disagree in a more thoughtful manner by questioning the credibility of the source and counterarguing the message (Silvia, 2006). No matter the reason, reactance can undermine persuasion. Curtin University’s David Erceg-Hurn and Lyndall Steed (2011) demonstrated that smokers evidence patterns of reactance to graphic health warnings on cigarette packaging, as discussed in the opening of this chapter. It is important to realise that forewarning does not always increase resistance to persuasion because the effects are not that simple. Based on a meta-analysis of 48 experiments, Wendy Wood and Jeffrey Quinn (2003) found that forewarning regarding topics of low personal importance leads people to agree before they even receive the message so as not to appear vulnerable to influence. Yet forewarning for topics of high personal importance leads to a sense of threat and generation of counterarguments to bolster their attitude, ultimately increasing resistance to change. More generally, persuasion processes are also subject to variation due to context. One core source of such contextual variation is cultural orientation, as discussed in the following Cultural Diversity feature.

The idea that exposure to weak versions of a persuasive argument increases later resistance to that argument.

Psychological reactance

The theory that people react against threats to their freedom by asserting themselves and perceiving the threatened freedom as more attractive.

CULTURAL DIVERSITY CULTURAL INFLUENCES ON PERSUASION A communication is persuasive to the extent that the source is favourable and the message, no matter how it is presented, meets the psychological needs of its audience. In this regard, cultural factors also play a subtle but important role. How might cultural orientation impact the degree to which messages such as that seen in Figure 6.17 are persuasive?

Focusing on cultural differences in individualism or collectivism, Sang-Pil Han and Sharon Shavitt (1994) compared the effectiveness of two sets of advertisements for various products. One set focused more on personal benefits, individuality, competition and self-improvement (‘Treat yourself to a breath-freshening experience’), while the other set appealed more to the integrity, achievement and well-being

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FIGURE 6.17 Individualistic advertising In a series of print ads, Apple Computer featured Albert Einstein and other creative geniuses throughout history who dared to ‘think different’. Paying tribute to individualism, Apple saluted ‘The crazy ones. The misfits. The rebels. The troublemakers. The round pegs in the square holes. The ones who see things differently’.

of one’s ingroups (‘Share this breath-freshening experience’). Both sets were presented to American and Korean participants. The result? Americans were persuaded more by individualistic advertisements, and Koreans preferred collectivistic advertisements. Similar differences are found in the way celebrity endorsements are used in the two cultures. In the US, celebrities tend to portray themselves using or talking directly about a product; in Korean commercials that appeal to belongingness, family and traditional values, celebrities are more likely to play the role of someone else without being singled out (Choi, Lee, & Kim, 2005). As people from all over the world come into contact with each other through travel, satellite television, international trade agreements and the internet, cultural values begin to change. Just as humans develop as they get older, cultures change over time from one generation to the next. Recent and substantial modernisation efforts in China – home to roughly one out of every five people on the planet – illustrate the point. There is so much recent change that Zhang and Shavitt (2003) sought to compare the contents of television commercials, which are primarily directed at the traditional mass market, with advertisements in new magazines that specifically target 18–35-year-old, educated, high-income citizens who constitute China’s ‘X-generation’. Based on their analysis of 463 advertisements, they found that although traditional and collectivist values predominated on mainstream television, magazine advertisements were characterised by more modern and individualistic impulses.

Source: The Advertising Archives

PERSUASION BY OUR OWN ACTIONS Anyone who has ever acted on stage knows how easy it is to become so absorbed in a role that the experience seems real. Feigned laughter can make an actor feel happy, and feigned tears can turn into sadness. Even in real life, the effect can be dramatic. In 1974, Patty Hearst, a sheltered university student from a wealthy American family, was kidnapped. Months later she was arrested and had become a guntoting revolutionary who called herself Tania. How could someone be so totally converted? In Hearst’s own words, ‘I had thought I was humouring [my captors] by parroting their clichés and buzzwords without believing in them … In trying to convince them I convinced myself’ (Hearst, 1982).

How attitudes are formed Why do you favour or oppose gay marriage? What draws you towards or away from organised religion? When we stop to consider the sources of the attitudes we hold, the answers are not abundantly clear. Social psychologists have considered whether attitudes are inherited and/or learned. As with many ‘nature versus nurture’ considerations, it is likely to be a combination of the two.

Are attitudes inherited? One hypothesis, first advanced by Abraham Tesser (1993), is that strong likes and dislikes are founded in our genetic make-up. Research shows that on some issues the attitudes of identical twins are more similar than those of fraternal twins, and that twins raised apart are as similar to each other as those who are raised in the same home (see Figure 6.18). This pattern of evidence suggests that people may be genetically predisposed to hold certain attitudes. Indeed, Tesser found that when asked about attitudes for which there seems to be a predisposition (e.g., attitudes towards sexual promiscuity, religion and the death penalty), research participants were quicker to respond and less likely to alter their views in accordance with social norms. 250

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Tesser speculated that individuals are disposed to hold certain strong attitudes as a result of inborn physical, sensory and cognitive skills; temperament; and personality traits. Other twin studies, as well as complex comparisons within extended families, have also supported the notion that people differ in their attitudes towards a range of social and political issues in part because of genetically rooted differences in their biological make-up (Hatemi et al., 2010; Olson et al., 2001). Researchers have also established genetic links for attitudes toward the self, or self-esteem (Bleidorn, Hufer, Kandler, Hopwood & Riemann, 2018). There are different ways in which a person’s inborn tendencies may influence social and political attitudes. In one study, for example, researchers brought 40 adults with strong political views into the laboratory for testing and found that those who were physiologically highly reactive to sudden noise and other unpleasant stimuli were more likely to favour the death penalty, the right to bear arms, defence spending and other policies seen as protective against domestic and foreign threats (Oxley et al., 2008).

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FIGURE 6.18 Genetic influences on attitudes Chances are, these identical twins have more in common than being truck driving partners. Research suggests that people may also be genetically predisposed to hold certain attitudes.

Source: Alamy Stock Photo/National Geographic Image Collection/Jodi Cobb

Are attitudes learned? Whatever dispositions nature provides to us, our most cherished attitudes often form as a result of: • our exposure to attitude objects • our history of rewards and punishments • the attitudes that our parents, friends and enemies express • the social and cultural context in which we live • other types of experiences. In a classic naturalistic study, Theodore Newcomb (1943) surveyed the political attitudes of students at a very small university in Vermont, US. At the time, the small university comprised female-only students who predominantly came from conservative and affluent families. Once at university, however, the students encountered professors and older peers who held more liberal views. Newcomb found that as the women moved from their first year to graduation, they became progressively more liberal. Clearly, attitudes are formed through basic processes of learning. For example, a number of studies have shown that people can form strong positive and negative attitudes towards neutral objects that somehow are linked to emotionally charged stimuli. At the start of the twentieth century, Russian physiologist Ivan Pavlov (1927) discovered that dogs would naturally and reflexively salivate in response to food in the mouth. He then discovered that by repeatedly ringing a bell – a neutral stimulus – before the food was placed in the mouth, the dog would eventually start to salivate at the sound of the bell itself. This process by which organisms learn to associate a once-neutral stimulus with an inherently positive or negative response is a basic and powerful form of learning. It is now clear that this form of learning can help to explain the development of social attitudes. In a classic first study, university students were presented with a list of adjectives that indicate nationality (German, Swedish, Dutch, Italian, French and Greek), each of which was repeatedly presented with words that were known to have connotations that were either very pleasant (happy, gift, sacred) or unpleasant (bitter, ugly, failure). When the participants later evaluated the nationalities by name, they were more positive in their ratings of those that had been paired with pleasant words than with unpleasant words (Staats & Staats, 1958). Additionally, as discovered by Pavlov nearly a hundred years ago, research shows that when an attitude is changed toward one object, attitudes toward similar and related objects are often changed as well (Glaser et al., 2015). More recent studies of evaluative conditioning have shown that implicit and explicit attitudes towards neutral objects can form by their association with positive and negative stimuli, even in people who are not conscious of this association (Hofmann et al., 2010; Olson & Fazio, 2001; Sweldens, Corneille, & Yzerbyt, 2014; Walther, Weil, & Düsing, 2011). That is why political leaders all over the world pose in front of their national flag to derive a benefit from positive associations, while advertisers strategically pair their products with sexy models, uplifting music, beloved celebrities, nostalgic images and other positive

Evaluative conditioning

The process by which we form an attitude towards a neutral stimulus because of its association with a positive or negative person, place or thing.

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emotional symbols. In a series of laboratory studies, researchers found that people came to prefer brands of a consumer product that were paired with humorous advertisements more than those that were associated with non-humorous advertisements (Strick, van Baaren, Holland, & van Knippenberg, 2009). In another demonstration of the power of evaluative conditioning approaches, pairing images of green vegetables with the self resulted in more positive attitudes towards eating green vegetables, even amongst those with very negative pre-existing attitudes towards green vegetables (Mattavelli, Avishai, Perugini, Richetin, & Sheeran, 2017).

Role-playing The Patty Hearst case illustrates the powerful effects of role-playing. Of course, you do not have to be kidnapped or terrorised to know how it feels to be coaxed into behaviour that is at odds with your sense of who you are. People frequently engage in attitude-discrepant behaviour as part of a job, for example, or to fit into a group. As commonplace as this seems, it raises a profound question: ‘When we play along, saying and doing things that are privately discrepant from our own attitudes, do we begin to change those attitudes as a result?’ Certainly, how we feel can determine the way we act; but is it also possible that the way we act can determine how we feel?

From behaviour to attitude change Many years ago, Irving Janis (1968) theorised that attitude change would persist more when it is inspired by our own behaviour than when it stems from a passive exposure to a persuasive communication. Janis conducted a study in which one group of participants listened to a speech that challenged their positions on a topic and others were handed an outline and asked to give the speech themselves. As predicted, participants changed their attitudes more after giving the speech than after listening to it (Janis & King, 1954). According to Janis, role-playing works to change attitudes because it forces people to learn the message. Hence, people tend to remember arguments they come up with on their own better than they remember arguments provided to them by other people (Slamecka & Graff, 1978). In fact, attitude change is more enduring even when people who read a persuasive message merely expect that they will later have to communicate it to others (Boninger, Brock, Cook, Gruder, & Romer, 1990).

CRITICAL THINKING ACTIVITY Have you ever experienced a ‘fake it till you make it’ moment? Maybe you turned on a smile even when you were not enjoying something or feigned anger towards a friend when you were not really upset. Did you come to feel what you had enacted?

The power of role-playing is strong – but it can be a benefit or a detriment!

But there is more to role-playing than improved memory. The effects of enacting a role can be staggering, in part because it is so easy to confuse what we do or what we say with how we really feel. What is fascinating is not that we make adjustments to suit others, but that this role-playing has such powerful effects on our own private attitudes. For example, participants in one study read about a man and then described him to someone else, who supposedly liked or disliked him. As you might expect, they described the man in more positive terms when their listener was favourably disposed toward him. In the process, however, they also convinced themselves. At least to some extent, ‘saying is believing’ (Higgins & Rholes, 1978).

Self-generated persuasion Recent research into this process of self-generated persuasion has shown that more attitude change is produced by having people generate arguments themselves than listen passively to others making the same arguments. Often in life, people hold attitudes they wish they could change; such as when we wish we could like a job more than we do, or our favourite junk foods less. In these instances, people may try to talk themselves deliberately into something they do not already believe (Maio & Thomas, 2007). This research raises an interesting question: ‘What produces more change in attitude, formulating arguments in order to convince yourself of something, or trying to convince someone else?’ The answer is, it depends. In a series of experiments, researchers found that when university students were instructed to advocate for a policy that was largely consistent with their own attitudes (i.e., that their university’s tuition

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should be lowered), more self-persuasion occurred when their intended audience was another student rather than themselves. Not knowing how their target felt about the issue, these students tried harder to generate good arguments and moved themselves in the process. However, when instructed to advocate for a position that they opposed (i.e., that tuition should be raised), more self-persuasion occurred among students who had sought to convince themselves as opposed to another student. Knowing full well that selfpersuasion on the issue would be particularly challenging, these students tried harder and generated better arguments (Briñol, McCaslin, & Petty, 2012). The kind of self-persuasion that occurs when people advocate for something, as when they play a role, is a fascinating process. Consider the implications – we know that attitudes influence behaviour, such as when people help those they like and hurt those they dislike. But research on role-playing emphasises the flipside of the coin – that behaviour can change attitudes. Perhaps we come to like people because we have helped them and blame people whom we have hurt. To change people’s inner feelings, then, maybe we should begin by focusing on their behaviour. Why do people experience changes of attitude in response to changes in their own behaviour? One answer to this question is provided by the theory of cognitive dissonance.

Cognitive dissonance theory: the classic version Many social psychologists believe that people are strongly motivated by a desire for cognitive consistency – a state of mind in which one’s beliefs, attitudes and behaviours are compatible with each other (Abelson et al., 1968). Cognitive consistency theories seem to presuppose that people are generally logical. However, Leon Festinger (1957) turned this assumption on its head. Struck by the irrationalities of human behaviour, Festinger proposed cognitive dissonance theory, which states that a powerful motive to maintain Cognitive dissonance theory cognitive consistency can give rise to irrational, sometimes maladaptive behaviour. The theory holding that According to Festinger, all of us hold many cognitions about ourselves and the world around us. These inconsistent cognitions cognitions include everything we know about our own beliefs, attitudes and behaviour. Although generally arouse psychological our cognitions coexist peacefully, at times they clash. Consider some examples. You say you are on a diet, tension that people yet you just ate a tub of chocolate ice cream. Or you waited in line for hours to get into a concert, and then become motivated to reduce. the band proved to be disappointing. Or you sun-baked for hours under the hot summer sun even though you knew the health risks. Each of these scenarios harbours inconsistency and conflict – you have already committed yourself to a course of action, yet you realise that the action is inconsistent with your attitude. Under certain conditions, discrepancies such as these can evoke an unpleasant state of tension known as cognitive dissonance. But discrepancy does not always produce dissonance. If you broke a diet for a holiday dinner with family, your indiscretion would not lead you to experience dissonance. Or if you mistakenly thought the ice cream you ate was low in calories only to find out the truth later, TABLE 6.4 Ways to reduce dissonance then, again, you would not experience much dissonance. As we ‘I’m on a diet, yet I just ate a tub of chocolate fudge ice cream.’ If will see, what really hurts is the knowledge that you committed this were you, how would you reduce dissonance aroused by the yourself to an attitude-discrepant behaviour freely and with discrepancy between your attitude and your behaviour? some knowledge of the consequences. When that happens, Technique Example dissonance is aroused, and you become motivated to reduce it. As shown in Table 6.4, there are many possible ways to reduce dissonance, including rationalising that others in one’s ingroup are also hypocrites (McKimmie, Terry, & Hogg, 2009), denying personal responsibility for the behaviour (Gosling, Denizeau, & Oberlé, 2006) or trivialising the issue in question (Starzyk, Fabrigar, Soryal, & Fanning, 2009). Of course, sometimes the easiest way to reduce dissonance is to change your attitude to bring it in line with your behaviour. Right from the start, cognitive dissonance theory captured the imagination of social psychology. Festinger’s basic proposition is simple, yet its implications are far-reaching. In this section, we examine three research areas that demonstrate the breadth of what dissonance theory has to say about attitude change: justifying attitude-discrepant behaviour, justifying effort and justifying difficult decisions.

Change your attitude

‘I don’t really need to be on a diet.’

Change your perception of the behaviour

‘I hardly ate any ice cream.’

Add consonant cognitions

‘Chocolate ice cream is very nutritious.’

Minimise the importance of ‘I don’t care if I’m overweight – the conflict life is short!’ Reduce perceived choice

‘I had no choice; my friend bought the tub for me to celebrate and it would have been rude not to.’

Intuit ingroup hypocrisy

‘My other friends on diets cheat like this too.’

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Justifying attitude-discrepant behaviour: when doing is believing

Rating of task enjoyment

Imagine for a moment that you are a participant in the following classic study by Leon Festinger and J. Merrill Carlsmith (1959). As soon as you arrive, you are greeted by an experimenter who says that he is interested in various measures of performance. Wondering what that means, you all too quickly find out. The experimenter hands you a wooden board containing 48 square pegs in square holes and asks you to turn each peg a quarter turn to the left, then a quarter turn back to the right, then back to the left, then back again to the right. The routine seems endless. After 30 minutes, the experimenter comes to your rescue. Or does he? Just when you think things are looking up, he hands you another board, another assignment. For the next half-hour, you are to take 12 spools of thread off the board, put them back, take them off, and put them back again. By now, you are just about ready to tear your hair out. As you think back over better times, even the first task begins to look good. Finally, you are done. After one of the longest hours of your life, the experimenter lets you in on a secret. There is more to this experiment than meets the eye. You were in the control group. To test the effects of motivation on performance, other participants are being told that the experiment will be fun and exciting. You do not realise it, but you are now being set up for the critical part of the study. Would you be willing to The more money you tell the next participant that the experiment is enjoyable? As you hem and haw, the experimenter offers to pay people to tell a pay for your services. Some participants are offered $1; others are offered $20. In either case, you agree lie, the more they will to help. Before you know it, you find yourself in the waiting room trying to dupe an unsuspecting fellow come to believe it. student (who is really a confederate). FALSE By means of this elaborately staged presentation, participants were goaded into an attitude-discrepant behaviour, an action that was inconsistent with their private attitudes. They knew how dull the experiment Insufficient really was, yet they raved about it. Did this conflict arouse cognitive dissonance? It depends on how much justification the participants were paid. Suppose you were one of the lucky ones offered $20 for your assistance. By A condition in which today’s standards, that payment would be worth $170! Surely a sufficient justification for telling a little people freely perform white lie, right? Feeling well compensated, these participants experienced little if any dissonance. But wait. an attitude-discrepant Suppose you were paid only $1 (or $9 by today’s standards). Surely your integrity is worth more than that? behaviour without In this instance, you have insufficient justification for going along, so you need a way to cope. According to receiving a large reward. Festinger (1957), unless you can deny your actions (which is not usually possible), you will feel pressured to change your attitude FIGURE 6.19 The dissonance classic about the task. If you can convince yourself that the experiment Participants in a boring experiment (attitude) were asked to say was not that bad, then saying it was interesting is all right. that it was enjoyable (behaviour) to a fellow student. Those in one The results were as Festinger and Carlsmith predicted. When group were paid $1 to lie; those in a second group were offered the experiment was presumably over, participants were asked $20. Members of a third group, who did not have to lie, admitted how they felt about the peg-board tasks. Those in the control that the task was boring, as did the participants paid $20, which group who did not mislead a confederate openly admitted that was ample justification for telling a lie. Participants paid only $1, however, rated the task as more enjoyable. Behaving in an the tasks were boring, as did those in the $20 condition, who had attitude-discrepant manner without justification, these latter ample justification for what they did. However, participants who participants reduced dissonance by changing their attitude. were paid only $1 rated the experiment as somewhat enjoyable. 25 Having engaged in an attitude-discrepant act without sufficient justification, these participants reduced cognitive dissonance by changing their attitude. The results can be seen in Figure 6.19. 20 Two aspects of this classic study are noteworthy. First, it showed the phenomenon of self-persuasion; that is, when people behave in ways that contradict their attitudes, they 15 sometimes go on to change those attitudes without any exposure to a persuasive communication. Demonstrating the power of this 10 phenomenon, Michael Leippe and Donna Eisenstadt (1994) found in the US that white university students who were coaxed into writing essays in favour of new scholarship funds only for black 5 students later reported more favourable attitudes in general towards African Americans. The second major contribution of Festinger and Carlsmith’s results is that they contradicted the time-honoured belief that big rewards produce greater change. No lie $20 lie $1 lie In fact, the more money participants were offered for their Source: Based on Festinger, L. & Carlsmith, J. M., Cognitive consequences and forced compliance, Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 58, 203–210. Copyright © 1959 by inconsistent behaviour, the more justified they felt and the less the American Psychological Association. Reprinted by permission. likely they were to change their attitudes. 254

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Just as a small reward provides insufficient justification for attitude-discrepant behaviour, mild punishment is insufficient deterrence for attitude-discrepant non-behaviour. Think about it. What happens when people refrain from doing something they really want to do? Do they devalue the activity and convince themselves that they never really wanted to do it in the first place? In one study, children were prohibited from playing with an attractive toy by being threatened with a mild or a severe punishment. All participants refrained. As cognitive dissonance theory predicts, however, only those faced with the mild punishment – an insufficient deterrent – later showed disdain for the forbidden toy. Those who confronted the threat of severe punishment did not (Aronson & Carlsmith, 1963). Once again, cognitive dissonance theory turned common sense on its head: The less severe the threatened punishment, the greater the attitude change produced.

CHAPTER SIX

Insufficient deterrence

A condition in which people refrain from engaging in a desirable activity, even when only mild punishment is threatened.

Justifying effort: coming to like what we suffer for

Ratings

Have you ever spent a lot of money or tried really hard to achieve something, only to discover later that it was not worth the effort? This kind of inconsistency between effort and outcome can arouse cognitive dissonance and motivate a change of heart towards the unsatisfying outcome. The hypothesis is simple but profound. We alter our attitudes to justify our suffering. In a classic test of this hypothesis, Elliot Aronson and Judson Mills (1959) invited female students to take part in a series of group discussions about sex. But there was a hitch. Because sex is a sensitive topic, participants were told that they would have to pass an ‘embarrassment test’ before joining the People often come to group. The test consisted of reading sexual material aloud in front of a male experimenter. One group of like what they suffer participants experienced what amounted to a severe initiation in which they had to recite obscene words for. and lurid passages taken from racy novels. A second group underwent a mild initiation in which they read TRUE a list of more ordinary words pertaining to sex. A third group was admitted to the discussions without an initiation test. Moments later, all participants were given headphones and FIGURE 6.20 The illogical consequences of suffering permitted to eavesdrop on the group they would soon be joining. Only participants who endured a severe initiation rated an Actually, what they heard was a tape-recorded discussion about objectively boring discussion group more favourably – a mild ‘secondary sex behaviour in the lower animals’. It was dreadfully initiation had no effect on ratings. boring. When it was over, participants were asked to rate how 200 much they liked the group members and their discussion. Keep in mind what dissonance theory predicts – the more time, money or effort you choose to invest in something, the more anxious 190 you will feel if the outcome proves disappointing. One way to cope with this inconsistency is to alter your attitudes. That is exactly what happened. Participants who had endured a severe 180 initiation rated the discussion group more favourably than did those who had endured little or no initiation (see Figure 6.20) 170 Social embarrassment is not the only kind of ‘effort’ we feel we need to justify to ourselves. Generally, the more you pay for something – whether you pay in physical exertion, pain, time 160 or money – the more you will come to like it. This principle has provocative implications for hazing practices in US fraternities and sororities, on sporting teams and in the military. Research 150 No initiation Mild initiation Severe initiation even suggests that the harder psychotherapy patients have to work at their own treatment, the more likely they are to feel Source: Adapted from Aronson, E., & Mills, J. (1959). The effect of severity of initiation on liking for a group. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 59, 177–181. better when that treatment is over (Axsom, 1989; Axsom & Cooper, 1985).

Justifying difficult decisions: when good choices get even better Whenever we make difficult decisions – whether to marry, what school to attend, where to live or what job to accept – we feel dissonance. By definition, a decision is difficult when the alternative courses of action are about equally desirable. Marriage offers comfort and stability but staying single enables us to seek out exciting new relationships. One job might pay more money, but the other may offer more interesting work. Once people make difficult decisions like these, they are at risk because negative aspects of the chosen alternatives and positive aspects of the unchosen alternatives are at odds with their decisions. According to dissonance theory, people rationalise whatever they decide by exaggerating the positive features of the chosen alternative and the negative features of the unchosen alternative. Copyright 2020 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-202

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In an early test of this hypothesis, Jack Brehm (1956) asked female participants to evaluate various consumer products, presumably as part of a marketing research project. After rating Suggesting that people need to justify difficult, irrevocable decisions to quell the dissonance they arouse, researchers found a toaster, a coffee pot, a radio, a stopwatch and other products, that gamblers who had already bet on a horse rated themselves participants were told that they could take one home as a gift. as more certain of winning than those who were still waiting to In the high-dissonance condition, they were offered a difficult place a bet. choice between two items they found equally attractive. In the low-dissonance group, they were offered an easier choice between a desirable and an undesirable item. After receiving the gift, participants read a few research reports and then re-evaluated all the products. The results provided strong support for dissonance theory. In the low-dissonance group, the participants’ post-decision ratings were about the same as their pre-decision ratings. But in the high-dissonance condition, ratings increased for the chosen item and decreased for the item that was not chosen. Participants torn between two equivalent alternatives coped by reassuring themselves that they had made the right choice. This phenomenon appears in a wide range of settings. For Source: Shutterstock.com/Neale Cousland example, Robert Knox and James Inkster (1968) took dissonance theory to the racetrack and found that punters who had already placed $2 bets on a horse were more optimistic about winning than were those still standing in line (see Figure 6.21). This type of optimism may even begin to set in once a thoughtful decision is made – even before the bet is placed (Brownstein, Read, & Simon, 2004). Similarly, Dennis Regan and Martin Kilduff (1988) visited several polling stations on an election day and found that voters were more likely to think that their candidates would win when they were interviewed after submitting their ballots than when they were interviewed before they submitted them. Since bets and votes cannot be taken back, people who had committed to a decision were motivated to reduce post-decision dissonance; therefore, they convinced themselves that the decision they made was right. FIGURE 6.21 The dissonance-arousing aspects of gambling

Cognitive dissonance theory: a new look Following in Festinger’s bold footsteps, generations of social psychologists have studied and refined the basic theory (Cooper, 2007; Harmon-Jones & Mills, 1999). Nobody disputes the fact that when people are gently coaxed into performing an attitude-discrepant behaviour, they often go on to change their attitudes. In fact, people will feel discomfort and change their attitudes when they disagree with others in a group (Matz & Wood, 2005) or even when they observe inconsistent behaviour from others with whom they identify – a process of vicarious dissonance (Cooper & Hogg, 2007). Researchers have also examined possible perceptual consequences of cognitive dissonance. In one study, Emily Balcetis and David Dunning (2007) took university students to the crowded centre of campus and asked them to put on and walk around in a costume consisting of a grass skirt, a coconut bra, a flower lei around the neck and a plastic fruit basket on the head. Embarrassing as it was to appear this way in public, all the participants walked across campus in this costume. In a high-choice condition, they were led to believe that they could decline in favour of a different task (insufficient justification). In a low-choice condition, they were told that no alternative tasks were available (sufficient justification). How bad was it? Afterwards, all the students were asked to estimate the distance they had walked in costume. Needing to justify their embarrassing antics, those in the high-choice condition underestimated how far they had walked relative to those in the low-choice condition. Apparently, the motivation to reduce dissonance can alter our visual representations of the natural environment. Through systematic research, it became evident early on that Festinger’s (1957) original theory was not to be the last word. People do change their attitudes to justify attitude-discrepant behaviour, effort and difficult decisions. But for dissonance to be aroused, certain specific conditions must be present. Thanks to Joel Cooper and Russell Fazio’s (1984) ‘new look’ at dissonance theory, we now have a pretty good idea of what those conditions are.

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Four steps to dissonance arousal and dissonance reduction According to Cooper and Fazio, four steps are necessary for both the arousal and reduction of dissonance, depicted in Figure 6.22. First, the attitude-discrepant behaviour must produce unwanted negative consequences. Recall the initial Festinger and Carlsmith (1959) study. Not only did participants say something they knew to be false but they also deceived a fellow student into taking part in a painfully boring experiment. Had these participants lied without causing hardship, they would not have changed their attitudes to justify the action (Cooper, Zanna, & Goethals, 1974). In fact, negative consequences can arouse dissonance even when people’s actions are consistent with their attitudes. This was shown when university students who wrote against fee increases were led to believe that their essays had backfired, prompting a university committee to favour an increase (Scher & Cooper, 1989). FIGURE 6.22 Necessary conditions for the arousal and reduction of dissonance Research suggests that four steps are necessary for attitude change to result from the production and reduction of dissonance. Antecedent conditions that produce discomfort

Behaviour

Step 1 Unwanted negative consequence

+

Step 2 Personal responsibility

Physiological arousal and its interpretation

+

Step 3 Physiological arousal

+

Step 4 Attribution of arousal to behaviour

Attitude change

The second necessary step in the process is a feeling of personal responsibility for the unpleasant outcomes of behaviour. Personal responsibility consists of two factors. The first is the freedom of choice. When people believe they had no choice but to act as they did, there is no dissonance and no attitude change (Linder, Cooper & Jones, 1967). Had Festinger and Carlsmith coerced participants into raving about the boring experiment, the participants would not have felt the need to further justify what they did by changing their attitudes. But the experimental situation led participants to think that their actions were voluntary and that the choice was theirs. Participants were pressured without realising it and believed that they did not have to comply with the experimenter’s request. For people to feel personally responsible, they must also believe that the potential negative consequences of their actions were foreseeable at the time (Goethals, Cooper, & Naficy, 1979). When the outcome could not realistically have been anticipated, then there is no dissonance and no attitude change. Had Festinger and Carlsmith’s participants lied in private and found out only later that their statements had been tape-recorded for subsequent use, then, again, they would not have felt the need to further justify their behaviour. The third necessary step in the process is physiological arousal. Right from the start, Festinger viewed cognitive dissonance as a state of discomfort and tension that people seek to reduce, much like hunger, thirst and other basic drives. Research has shown that this emphasis was well placed. In a study by Robert Croyle and Joel Cooper (1983), participants wrote essays that supported or contradicted their own attitudes. Some were ordered to do so, but others were led to believe that the choice was theirs. During the session, electrodes were attached to each participant’s fingertips to record levels of physiological arousal. As predicted by cognitive dissonance theory, those who freely wrote attitude-discrepant essays were more aroused, an observation made by other researchers as well (Elkin & Leippe, 1986). In fact, participants who write attitude-discrepant essays in a ‘free choice’ situation reported feeling high levels of discomfort, which subsided once they changed their attitudes (Elliot & Devine, 1994). The fourth step in the dissonance process is closely related to the third. It is not enough to feel generally aroused; a person must also make an attribution for that arousal to his or her own behaviour. Suppose you just lied to a friend, studied for an exam that was cancelled or made a difficult decision that you feel you might regret. Suppose further that, although you are upset, you believe that your discomfort is caused by some external factor, not by your dissonance-producing behaviour. Under these circumstances, will you exhibit attitude change as a symptom of cognitive dissonance? Probably not. When participants were led to attribute their dissonance-related arousal to a drug they had supposedly taken (Zanna & Cooper, 1974), to the anticipation of painful electric shocks (Pittman, 1975) or to a pair of prism goggles that they had to wear (Losch & Cacioppo, 1990), attitude change did not occur.

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Classic and ‘new look’ approaches: continued debate To this day, social psychologists continue to debate the ‘classic’ and ‘new look’ theories of cognitive dissonance. On the one hand, research has shown that attitude-discrepant actions do not always produce dissonance, in part because not everyone cares about being cognitively consistent (Cialdini, Trost, & Newsom, 1995) and in part because a change in attitude often seems to require the production of negative consequences (Johnson, Kelly, & LeBlane, 1995). On the other hand, some researchers have found that mere inconsistency can trigger cognitive dissonance, even without negative consequences. For example, Eddie Harmon-Jones and colleagues (1996) had people drink a beverage that was mixed with sugar or vinegar. They either told the participants (no choice) or asked them (high choice) to state in writing that they liked the beverage and then toss these notes, which were not really needed, into the wastebasket. Afterwards, they rated how much they really liked the drink. You may have noticed that this experiment parallels the Festinger and Carlsmith study with one key exception. For participants in the highchoice situation who consumed vinegar and said they liked it, the lie – although it contradicted their true attitudes – did not cause harm to anyone. Did they experience dissonance that they would have to reduce by overrating the vinegar beverage? Yes. Compared with participants who lied about the vinegar in the nochoice situation, those in the high-choice situation rated its taste as more pleasant. The lie was harmless, but the feeling of inconsistency still forced a change in attitude. Beyond the classic and ‘new look’ approaches to cognitive dissonance, it is important to recognise that dissonance processes may be subject to variability according to broad cultural factors. As discussed in the following Cultural Diversity feature, cultural differences in the degree to which decisions are expected to incorporate the opinions of others determines downstream effects of cognitive dissonance.

CULTURAL DIVERSITY COGNITIVE DISSONANCE ACROSS CULTURES

258

FIGURE 6.23 Cognitive dissonance as both universal and culturally dependent Researchers compared Canadian and Japanese individuals in a post-decision dissonance study in which they rank-ordered items on a menu, chose their top dishes, then ranked the list again. Half made the choices for themselves, the others were asked to imagine a close friend. When deciding for themselves, only the Canadians exhibited a significant justification effect; when deciding for a friend, however, Japanese participants exhibited the stronger effect. 0.7 0.6

Spread of alternatives

Over the years, social psychologists have presumed that the cognitive dissonance effects uncovered in 50 years of research and described in this chapter are universal and characteristic of human nature. Increasingly, however, it appears that cultural context may influence both the arousal and reduction of cognitive dissonance. In Western cultures, individuals are expected to make decisions that are consistent with their personal attitudes and to make those decisions free from outside influences. In East Asian cultures, however, individuals are also expected to make decisions that benefit their ingroup members and to take the well-being of others into account in making those decisions. In light of these differences, Etsuko Hoshino-Browne and colleagues (2005) compared the reactions of Canadian and Japanese research participants in a post-decision dissonance experiment in which they rank-ordered items on a menu by choosing their top 10 dishes. Then they ranked the list again. Half made the choices for themselves, and the others were asked to imagine a close friend whose tastes they knew and choose on behalf of that friend. Did participants show the classic post-decision justification effect, becoming more positive in their ratings of the chosen items relative to non-chosen items? Yes and no. When they made decisions for themselves, only the Canadian participants exhibited a significant justification effect. When Japanese participants made decisions for a friend, however, they exhibited the stronger effect (see Figure 6.23). Similar results have been found in other studies (Kitayama, Snibbe, Markus, & Suzuki, 2004). It seems that cognitive dissonance is both universal and dependent on culture. At times everyone feels and tries to reduce dissonance, but cultures influence the conditions under which these processes occur.

0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0

Canadian

Japanese

Choice for self

Choice for friend

Source: Hoshino-Browne, E., Zanna, A. S., Spencer, S. J., Zanna, M. P., Kitayama, S., & Lackenbauer, S. (2005). On the cultural guises of cognitive dissonance: The case of Easterners and Westerners. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 89, 294–310.

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CHAPTER SIX

Alternative routes to self-persuasion It is important to distinguish between the empirical facts uncovered by dissonance researchers and the theory that is used to explain them. The facts themselves are clear – under certain conditions, people who behave in attitude-discrepant ways go on to change their attitudes. Whether this phenomenon reflects a human need to reduce dissonance, however, is a matter of some controversy. Over the years, three other explanations have been proposed: self-perception theory, impression-management theory and self-esteem theories, summarised in Figure 6.24. FIGURE 6.24 Theories of self-persuasion: critical comparisons Here we compare the major theories of self-persuasion. Each alternative challenges a different aspect of dissonance theory. Self-perception theory assumes that attitude change is a matter of inference, not motivation. Impression-management theory maintains that the change is more apparent than real, reported for the sake of public self-presentation. Self-affirmation theory contends that the motivating force is a concern for the self and that attitude change will not occur when the self-concept is affirmed in other ways. Theories Cognitive dissonance

Selfperception

Impression management

Selfaffirmation

Is the attitude change motivated by a desire to reduce discomfort?

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Does a person's private attitude really change?

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Must the change be directly related to the attitudediscrepant behaviour?

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Self-perception theory Daryl Bem’s (1965) self-perception theory, described in Chapter 2, posed the first serious challenge to dissonance theory. Noting that we do not always have firsthand knowledge of our own attitudes, Bem proposed that we infer how we feel by observing ourselves and the circumstances of our own behaviour. This sort of self-persuasion is not fuelled by the need to reduce tension or justify our actions. Instead, it is a cool, calm and rational process in which people interpret ambiguous feelings by observing their own behaviour. But can Bem’s theory replace dissonance theory as an explanation of self-persuasion? Bem confronted this question head-on. What if neutral observers who are not motivated by the need to reduce dissonance were to read a step-by-step description of a dissonance study and predict the results? Bem reasoned that observers can have the same behavioural information as the participants themselves, but not experience the same personal conflict. If observers generate the same results as real participants, it shows that dissonance arousal is not necessary for the resulting changes in attitudes. To test his hypothesis, Bem (1967) described the Festinger and Carlsmith study to observers and had them guess participants’ attitudes. The results closely paralleled the original study. As observers saw it, participants who said the task was interesting for $20 did not mean it; they just went along for the money. But those who made the claim for only $1 must have been sincere. Why else would they have gone along? As far as Bem was concerned, the participants themselves reasoned the same way. No conflict, no arousal – just inference by observation. So, should we conclude that it is self-perception and not dissonance that is necessary to bring about attitude change? That is a difficult question. It is not easy to come up with a critical experiment to distinguish between the two theories. Both predict the same results, but for different reasons. And both offer unique support for their own points of view. On the one hand, Bem’s observer studies show that dissonance-like results can be obtained without arousal. On the other hand, the participants of dissonance studies do experience arousal, which seems necessary for attitude change to take place. Can we say that one theory is right and the other wrong? Fazio and colleagues (1977) concluded that both theories are right but in different situations. When people behave in ways that are strikingly at odds with their attitudes, they feel the unnerving effects of dissonance and change their attitudes to rationalise their actions. When people behave in ways that are

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not terribly discrepant from how they feel, however, they experience relatively little tension and form their attitudes as a matter of inference. In short, highly discrepant behaviour produces attitude change through dissonance, whereas slightly discrepant behaviour produces change through self-perception.

Impression-management theory Another alternative to a dissonance view of self-persuasion is impression-management theory, which says that what matters is not a motive to be consistent but a motive to appear consistent. Nobody wants to be called fickle or be seen by others as a hypocrite. So, we calibrate our attitudes and behaviours publicly in order to present ourselves to others in a particular light (Tedeschi, 2013). Or perhaps we are motivated not by a desire to appear consistent but by a desire to avoid being held responsible for the unpleasant consequences of our actions (Schlenker, 1982). Either way, this theory places the emphasis on our concern for self-presentation. According to this view, participants in the Festinger and Carlsmith study mostly did not want the experimenter to think they had sold out for a paltry sum of money. If the impression-management approach is correct, then cognitive dissonance does not produce attitude change at all, only reported change. In other words, if research participants were to state their attitudes anonymously or if they were to think that the experimenter could determine their true feelings through covert measures, then dissonance-like effects should vanish. Sometimes the effects do vanish, but other times they do not. In general, studies have shown that although self-persuasion can be motivated by impression management, it can also occur in situations that do not clearly arouse self-presentation concerns (Baumeister & Tice, 1984).

Self-esteem theories According to Elliot Aronson, acts that arouse dissonance do so because they threaten the self-concept, making the person feel guilty, dishonest or hypocritical, and motivating a change in attitude or future behaviour (Aronson, 1999; Stone, Perry, & Darley, 1997). This being the case, perhaps Festinger and Carlsmith’s participants needed to change their attitudes towards the boring task in order to repair damage to the self, not to resolve cognitive inconsistency. If cognitive dissonance is aroused only by behaviour that lowers self-esteem, then people with already low expectations of themselves should not be affected. In fact, Jeff Stone (2003) found that when university students were coaxed into writing an essay in favour of a fee increase (a position that contradicted their attitude) and into thinking about their own standards of behaviour, those who had high self-esteem changed their attitude to meet their behaviour, as dissonance theory would predict, more than those who had low self-esteem. Claude Steele (1988) took this notion two steps further. First, he suggested that a dissonance-producing situation sets in motion a process of self-affirmation that serves to revalidate the integrity of the selfconcept. Second, this revalidation can be achieved in many ways, not just by resolving dissonance. Selfaffirmation theory makes a unique prediction: if the active ingredient in dissonance situations is a threat to the self, then people who have an opportunity to affirm the self in other ways will not suffer from the effects of dissonance. Research provides support for this hypothesis. For example, Steele and colleagues (1993) gave people positive or negative feedback about a personality test they had taken. Next, they asked them to rate 10 popular music CDs and then offered them a choice of keeping either their fifth- or sixth-ranked CD (which presumably did not differ much in likeability). Soon after making the decision, the participants were asked to rate the CDs again. As predicted by dissonance theory, most inflated their ratings of the chosen CD relative to the unchosen one. The key word, however, is most. The ratings of the participants who had received positive feedback did not change. Why not? According to Steele, it was because they had just enjoyed a self-affirming experience that was enough to overcome the need to reduce dissonance. Steele’s research suggests that there are many possible ways for people to repair a dissonance-damaged self. But if these efforts at indirect self-affirmation fail, would cognitive dissonance return and create pressure to make a change in attitude? Yes. In one study, cognitive dissonance and its impact on attitudes emerged when attempts at self-affirmation resulted in negative feedback (Galinsky, Stone, & Cooper, 2000). To summarise, dissonance theory states that people change their attitudes to justify their attitudediscrepant behaviours, efforts and decisions. Self-perception theory argues that the change occurs because people infer how they feel by observing their own behaviour. Impression-management theory claims that the attitude change is spurred by concerns about self-presentation. And self-affirmation theory says that the change is motivated by threats to self-concept. 260

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Behavioural ethics and ethical dissonance In recent years, in domains as far and wide as business, law, sports, health and education, many social psychologists have become interested in behavioural ethics, the study of how individuals behave when facing temptations to cheat, steal, plagiarise, commit fraud, lie or otherwise behave unethically. From standing in a supermarket express line with too many groceries to over-claiming business expenses on tax forms, our day-to-day lives provide more examples than any of us would care to admit (Bazerman & Gino, 2012). Some lapses are unintentional, occurring when otherwise good people do not pay attention and are not sufficiently vigilant, causing ‘blind spots’ in ethical judgement (Bazerman & Tenbrunsel, 2011). Research shows that such lapses are most likely to occur when people are fatigued, which is why participants in a series of laboratory experiments were more likely to lie and cheat when tested in the afternoon than in the morning (Kouchaki & Smith, 2014) and when they are overly focused on the temptation of what is to be gained (Pittarello, Leib, Gordon-Hecker, & Shalvi, 2015). Other lapses are intentional, with people knowingly committing unethical acts in order to serve their own interests. Cheating for tangible benefits (monetary and other rewards) is particularly probable when it is unlikely to be detected (Mazar, Amir, & Ariely, 2008; Shalvi, Gino, Barkan, & Ayal, 2015). Further, people are particularly prone to cheat for money after seeing a peer confederate they identify with cheat and get away with it (Gino, Ayal, & Ariely, 2009).

Ethical dissonance Most people feel badly about their unethical acts even when getting caught is unlikely (Hilbig & Hessler, 2013). Behaving in ways that violate our own moral code threatens our self-esteem and arouses an inner state of turmoil. Rachel Barkan and her colleagues (2012) have called such turmoil ethical dissonance. Following in Festinger’s footsteps, these researchers and others have suggested that when we consider or actually engage in unethical behaviour, our moral self-concept is threatened. To help attenuate this threat, we use various self-serving justifications to cope with both the anticipation and the experience of ethical dissonance. These processes are illustrated in Figure 6.25.

Ethical dissonance

The internal state of turmoil that arises from behaving in ways that violate our own moral code.

FIGURE 6.25 The process of ethical dissonance Ordinary people often behave badly but still feel moral. How is this discrepancy possible? As shown, temptation may lead us to misbehave, which threatens our moral self-concept both beforehand (when ethical dissonance is anticipated) and afterward (when ethical dissonance is experienced). Once tempted, pre-violation justifications excuse what we are about to do. Afterward, post-violation justifications compensate for what we did. In these ways, people manage to behave immorally yet maintain a moral self-concept. Pre-violation justification (act is excusable)

Tempting situation

Moral violation

Moral self-concept threatened

Moral self-concept maintained

Post-violation justification (act is compensated for) Source: Shalvi, S., Gino, F., Barkan, R., & Ayal, S. (2015). Self-serving justifications: Doing wrong and feeling moral. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 24, 125–130.

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Social psychologists have begun to explore some of the pre-violation and post-violation types of justifications that enable unethical behaviour by helping violators to do wrong but feel moral. Reviewing this research, Shaul Shalvi and colleagues (2015) describe a number of ways in which people reduce their ethical dissonance; for example, citing social norms to suggest that ‘everyone is doing it’; blaming others or circumstances; rationalising the good that comes from the misdeed; confessing, apologising, and offering compensation; and distancing themselves from the misdeed by asserting stricter ethical standards for the future and judging other transgressors more harshly.

Moral licensing Moral licensing

A tendency to justify an anticipated misdeed by citing good things that we have done.

One particularly interesting form of self-justification, which ‘enables’ people to behave unethically, is called moral licensing, a tendency to justify an anticipated misdeed by citing good things that we have done (Effron & Conway, 2015). Anna Merritt and her colleagues (2010) reviewed research suggesting that past good deeds can liberate individuals to engage in unethical behaviours that they would otherwise avoid for fear of feeling or appearing immoral. In one study, participants were randomly assigned to write stories that describe their own positive or negative traits. Afterward, they were asked if they would make a small donation to a charity of their choice. Those who wrote positively about themselves later donated $1.07, a mere fifth of the $5.30 donated by those who wrote negatively (Sachdeva, Iliev, & Medin, 2009). In a second study, participants were assigned to shop from an online store that carried a predominance of green, environment-friendly products or conventional products equal in price. Moments later, those who shopped at the green store were more likely to lie to the experimenter to increase the money they earned (Mazar & Zhong, 2010). Overall, more than 90 studies have shown that moral licensing operates something like a moral balancing scale. When people feel as if they have established moral credentials, they anticipate less ethical dissonance about engaging in an unethical behaviour and become more likely to do so (Blanken, van de Ven, & Zeelenberg, 2015).

CHANGING ATTITUDES: THE TAKEAWAY Attitudes and attitude change are an important part of social life. In this chapter, we have seen that persuasion can be achieved in different ways. The most common approach is through communication from others. Faced with newspaper editorials, junk mail, books, television commercials, blogs, websites and other messages, we take one of two routes to persuasion. On the central route, attitude change is based on the merits of the source and his or her communication. On the peripheral route, it is based on superficial cues. Either way, the change in attitude often precipitates a change in behaviour. A second, less obvious means of persuasion originates from within each individual. When people behave in ways that run afoul of their true convictions, they often go on to change their attitudes. Once again, there are many routes to change, not just one. Cognitive dissonance, self-perception, impression management and self-esteem concerns are among the possible avenues. From attitudes to behaviour and back again, the processes of persuasion are complex and interwoven.

RESEARCH SPOTLIGHT

Source: Courtesy of Dr Yoshihisa Kashima.

DR YOSHIHISA KASHIMA, UNIVERSITY OF MELBOURNE What are the topic areas of your research? My research area is cultural dynamics: the formation, maintenance and transformation of culture over time. People’s beliefs and attitudes are fundamental aspects of their culture, and I am most interested in how their everyday activities in interaction with each other contribute to cultural processes. Which of your research findings have you found most intriguing? I investigated how interpersonal communications may contribute to the maintenance of cultural stereotypes. 262

A narrative consisting of behavioural episodes of male and female protagonists was constructed and given to a person, so that he or she can relate this story to others. This person told it to a second person from memory, who in turn retold it to a third person, then to a fourth person, and so on in a communication chain. Although those episodes that are incongruent with gender stereotypes were told more than those others that are incongruent in an early part of the communication chain, this was reversed later on, so that the story conveyed was increasingly more gender stereotyped after three or four retellings. This suggests that as gossip travels through our social networks, it tends to become more stereotypical and therefore tends to contribute to the maintenance of culturally shared stereotypes.

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ATTITUDES

How did you become interested in your area of research? I was born in Tokyo, Japan, when Japan was undergoing a tremendous amount of cultural change. I was acutely aware of differences between Japan and Western European cultures, and as I lived in the US and Australia during my adult life, this interest was further strengthened. But, at the same time, I was acutely aware of the fact that culture is not a stable entity as many researchers seemed to have thought. So, I began to research on cultural differences as well as cultural dynamics.

CHAPTER SIX

How does your area of research speak to life in Australia and New Zealand? Both Australia and New Zealand are immigrant countries with people from diverse cultural backgrounds. How can our mundane everyday social actions, like talking with each other, contribute to the dynamic processes by which our cultures are recreated, but also potentially create us anew as a young and socially innovative country with a great potential for the future? It is a fascinating question.

Topical Reflection PERSUASION ON A PACK We can now see that a wealth of research suggests the ways that brand-free cigarette packaging that includes health warnings may or may not work to change the public’s attitude toward smoking – and ultimately their behaviour. The health warnings are a form of fear appeal and the plain packaging is designed to reduce positive brand associations. But do they work? One randomised experiment in the UK compared smokers’ experience over the course of a day using their typical branded packaging or plain packaging (Maynard et al., 2015). While the packaging did not change the number of cigarettes smoked, the plain packaging resulted in more negative attitudes toward smoking. The plain packaging also enhanced attention to the health warning, which appeared on both types of packaging. Laboratory-based work using eye-gaze tracking and brain activity measures corroborates these patterns (Maynard, Brooks, Munafò, & Leonards, 2017; Shankleman, Sykes, Mandeville, Di Costa, & Yarrow, 2015). Speaking to the downstream behavioural influence of packaging regulations, Emily Brennan and colleagues from the Cancer Council Victoria (2018) tracked smoking activity among customers at outdoor cafes in Melbourne. They indexed the number of people smoking and number of cigarette packs visibly displayed across the time just prior to the regulations through to twoyears after the regulations. Across the first year, cafes saw fewer people smoking and fewer packs displayed. By the second year, such effects were only seen at cafes where children were present. The authors suggest that the graphic health warnings be updated regularly to sustain positive effects. Fortunately, both Australia and New Zealand utilise a rotating set of graphic health warnings. Researchers will no doubt continue to research the impact of cigarette packaging regulations on attitudes and behaviour for years to come. Based on these positive initial indicators, it is heartening to see that the UK, France, Ireland, Norway and Hungary have also enacted plain packaging legislation.

CHAPTER REVIEW SUMMARY THE STUDY OF ATTITUDES • An attitude is an affective, evaluative reaction towards a person, place, issue or object. HOW ATTITUDES ARE MEASURED • The most common way to measure attitudes is through selfreports, such as attitude scales. • Covert measures may also be used. Such measures include non-verbal behaviour, the facial electromyograph (EMG), brain-wave patterns and the Implicit Association Test (IAT).

THE LINK BETWEEN ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOUR • Attitudes do not necessarily correlate with behaviour, but under certain conditions there is a high correlation. • Attitudes predict behaviour best when they are specific rather than general and strong rather than weak.

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PERSUASION BY COMMUNICATION • The most common approach to changing attitudes is through persuasive communication. TWO ROUTES TO PERSUASION • When people think critically about a message, they take the central route to persuasion and are influenced by the strength of the arguments. • When people do not think carefully about a message, they take the peripheral route to persuasion and are influenced by peripheral cues. • The route taken depends on whether people have the ability and the motivation to fully process the communication.

PUTTING COMMON SENSE TO THE TEST In reacting to persuasive communications, people are influenced more by superficial images than by logical arguments. FALSE. As indicated by the dual-process model of persuasion, people can be influenced by images or arguments, depending on their ability and motivation to think critically about the information. People are most easily persuaded by commercial messages that are presented without their awareness. FALSE. There is no research evidence to support the presumed effects of subliminal advertisements.

PUTTING COMMON SENSE TO THE TEST Researchers can tell if someone has a positive or negative attitude by measuring physiological arousal. FALSE. Measures of arousal can reveal how intensely someone feels, but not whether the person’s attitude is positive or negative. THE SOURCE • Attitude change is greater for messages delivered by a source that is credible (competent and trustworthy) and/or likeable (similar and attractive). • When an audience has a high level of personal involvement, source factors are less important than the quality of the message. • The sleeper effect shows that people often forget the source but not the message, so the effects of the credibility of the source dissipate over time. THE MESSAGE • On the peripheral route, lengthy messages are persuasive. On the central route, length works only if the added information does not dilute the message. • Whether it is best to present an argument first or second depends on the timing between the arguments, and between the arguments and the decision. • Highly discrepant messages will be scrutinised and rejected. • High-fear messages motivate attitude change when they contain strong arguments and instructions about how to avoid the threatened danger. • Positive emotion also facilitates attitude change because people are easier to persuade when they are in a good mood. • Research shows that subliminal messages do not produce meaningful or lasting changes in attitudes. THE AUDIENCE • People are not consistently difficult or easy to persuade. Rather, different kinds of messages influence different kinds of people. • People who are high in the need for cognition are persuaded more by the strength of arguments, whereas people who are high in self-monitoring are influenced more by appeals to social images. • Messages are persuasive to the extent that they are presented in a way that ‘feels right’, fitting the individual orientations of audience members. • Forewarning increases resistance to persuasive influence. 264

PERSUASION BY OUR OWN ACTIONS ROLE-PLAYING • The way people act can influence how they feel because behaviour can determine attitudes. COGNITIVE DISSONANCE THEORY: THE CLASSIC VERSION • Under certain conditions, inconsistency between attitudes and behaviour produces an unpleasant psychological state called cognitive dissonance. • Motivated to reduce the tension, people often change their attitudes to justify: (1) attitude-discrepant behaviour, (2) wasted effort, and (3) difficult decisions. COGNITIVE DISSONANCE THEORY: A NEW LOOK • According to the ‘new look’ version of cognitive dissonance theory, four conditions must be met for dissonance to be aroused: (1) an act with unwanted consequences, (2) a feeling of personal responsibility, (3) arousal or discomfort, and (4) attribution of the arousal to the attitude-discrepant act.

PUTTING COMMON SENSE TO THE TEST The more money you pay people to tell a lie, the more they will come to believe it. FALSE. Cognitive dissonance studies show that people believe the lies they are underpaid to tell as a way to justify their own actions. People often come to like what they suffer for. TRUE. Studies show that the more people work or suffer for something, the more they come to like it as a way to justify their effort. ALTERNATIVE ROUTES TO SELF-PERSUASION • Alternative explanations of dissonance-related attitude change have been proposed based on self-perception theory, impression-management theory and self-esteem-based theories. BEHAVIOURAL ETHICS AND ETHICAL DISSONANCE • Behavioural ethics is the study of how individuals intentionally and unintentionally behave when facing temptations to cheat, steal, plagiarise, commit fraud, lie or otherwise behave unethically.

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•

People reduce the dissonance that can result from behaving unethically by engaging in self-justification, such as moral licensing.

CHAPTER SIX

CHANGING ATTITUDES • Through persuasive communications and the mechanisms of self-persuasion, the processes of changing attitudes and behaviour are complex and interwoven.

LINKAGES The research reviewed in this chapter addresses the nature of attitudes and attitude change. Attitude change can stem from others, as in the case of persuasion, or from ourselves, as in the case of dissonance. The ‘Linkages’ diagram highlights the connections between the core concepts of

CHAPTER

6

attitudes discussed in this chapter and how they connect to principles of environmental psychology and conservation discussed in Chapter 12. The diagram also draws attention to ties to two other chapters in which attitude change and persuasion play out in applied contexts.

Attitudes

LINKAGES

Pro-environmental attitudes and behaviour

CHAPTER

12

Environmental psychology

Changing health attitudes

CHAPTER

14

Stress, health and wellbeing

Persuasion in the courtroom

CHAPTER

15

Law

REVIEW QUIZ 1 Measuring attitudes is a complicated endeavour. What type of attitude measurement is the Implicit Association Task an example of? a Covert. b Self-report. c Physiological. d Facial EMG. 2 Which of the following is a source of attitudes? a Evaluative conditioning. b Reactance. c Bogus pipeline. d Inoculation. 3 Which of the following are considered the ‘two routes’ to persuasion? a Message and source. b Central and peripheral. c Heuristic and logic. d Elaboration and dissonance. 4 Samuel is attempting to persuade his parents to let him go on a gap-year trip to Ireland. Rather than asking them for a

time to discuss the matter later in the week, Samuel ‘springs’ the idea on them at the dinner table. Samuel is capitalising on what social psychology has found about which of the following? a Recency. b Forewarning. c The sleeper effect. d Dissonance. 5 According to classic cognitive dissonance theory, dissonance is most likely to arise in which of the following situations? a When there is no clear difference between choices. b When behaviours are consistent with attitudes. c When behaviours are inconsistent with attitudes. d When the choice made led to an undesirable outcome. 6 Which of the following theories highlights the need to appear consistent (as different to the need to be consistent)? a Cognitive dissonance theory. b Self-perception theory. c Self-esteem theory (as applied to persuasion). d Impression-management theory.

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WEBLINKS Australian Survey of Social Attitudes https://www.acspri.org.au/aussa The website for an Australian survey assessing a number of different social attitudes, including gay marriage, environmental policy and healthcare reform. National Community Attitudes Survey https://www.anrows.org.au/research-program/ncas A national survey to investigate Australian community attitudes to violence. New Zealand Attitudes and Values Study https://www.psych.auckland.ac.nz/en/about/our-research/ research-groups/new-zealand-attitudes-and-values-study.html The website for a New Zealand survey that takes a longitudinal approach, asking the same participants to respond to questions about social attitudes annually since 2009.

Project Implicit https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit A website for the Implicit Association Test, with access to online versions, background information and more. Steve’s Primer of Practical Persuasion http://healthyinfluence.com/wordpress/steves-primer-ofpractical-persuasion-3-0 A blog on the dynamics of persuasion. Tobacco control http://www.health.gov.au/internet/main/publishing.nsf/ Content/tobacco Information on Australia’s policies and programs regarding tobacco use.

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Conformity, compliance and obedience Learning Objectives By the end of this chapter, you should be able to: 1 describe how subtle social influences, such as mimicking, can affect our behaviour and actions without our awareness 2 explain the social processes that give rise to conformity as well as those that make individuals resist conforming 3 compare and contrast the various strategies that are used to increase compliance, and detail how individuals can resist complying 4 explain both the classic and more recent views of Milgram’s studies on obedience 5 describe how social impact theory accounts for when social influence does and does not occur.

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random day in June! In this sense, our nopants commuters are experiencing social influence. From flash mob dances to protests, people sometimes come to behave in-line with others – even strangers – and sometimes this conforming behaviour goes against social norms. What might lead people to behave in such ways? This chapter explores the complexities of social influence.

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Source: Alamy Stock Photo/Paul Brown

Since 2002, on a designated day each year thousands of community members have gone about their morning commute, as usual, except for one key thing: they are wearing no pants! ImprovEverywhere, a collective oriented around ‘causing scenes’, organises this ‘mission’ each year – with tens of thousands of people participating in the ‘no pants subway ride’ around the world. From Adelaide to New York City and Moscow to Zurich, commuting without pants (at least one day per year) is all the rage (ImprovEverywhere, 2017). By and large, these people are acting at the behest of another – otherwise they might turn up with no pants on a

CONFORMITY, COMPLIANCE AND OBEDIENCE

CHAPTER SEVEN

PUTTING COMMON SENSE TO THE TEST Circle your answer T

F

When all members of a group give an incorrect response to an easy question, most people most of the time conform to that response.

T

F

An effective way to get someone to do you a favour is to make a first request that is so large the person is sure to reject it, before making your actual request.

T

F

Most participants in an obedience experiment would not administer severe shocks to an innocent person if ordered to.

T

F

As the proximity between people in a group increases, so does the group’s impact on an individual.

T

F

Conformity rates vary across different cultures and from one generation to the next.

INTRODUCTION YOU DO NOT NEED TO BE A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGIST to know that people have an impact on each other’s behaviour. The trickier question is: ‘How and with what effect?’ The term social influence refers to the ways that people are affected by the real and imagined pressures of others (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004; Forgas & Williams, 2016). The kinds of influences brought to bear on an individual come in different shapes and sizes, and sometimes in amusing ways, such as the ‘no pants subway ride’. In this chapter, we look at social influences that are mindless and automatic. Then we consider three forms of influence that vary in the degree of pressure exerted on an individual – conformity, compliance and obedience. As depicted in Figure 7.1, conformity, compliance and obedience are not distinct, qualitatively different ‘types’ of influence. In all three cases, the influence may emanate from a person, a group or an institution. And in all instances, the behaviour in question may be constructive (helping oneself or others), destructive (hurting oneself or others) or neutral. It is also useful to note that we do not always succumb to pressure. People may conform or maintain their independence from others, they may comply with direct requests or react with assertiveness, or they may obey the commands of authority or oppose powerful others in an act of defiance. In this chapter, we examine the factors that lead human beings to yield to or resist social influence. FIGURE 7.1 Continuum of social influence Social influences vary in the degree of pressure they bring to bear on an individual. People may (1) conform to group norms or maintain their independence, (2) comply with requests or be assertive, or (3) obey or defy the commands of authority. Yielding to influence

Obedience

Resisting influence

Compliance

Conformity

Independence

Assertiveness

Defiance

SOCIAL INFLUENCE AS ‘AUTOMATIC’ Before we consider the explicit forms of social influence depicted in Figure 7.1, whereby individuals choose whether or not to ‘go along’, it is important to note that, as social animals, humans are vulnerable to a host of subtle, almost reflex-like influences. Without realising it, we often release an involuntary yawn when we see others yawning, laugh aloud when we hear others laughing, and grimace when we see others in pain. In an early demonstration, Stanley Milgram and colleagues (1969) had research confederates stop on a busy city street, look up and stare at the sixth-floor window of a nearby building. Video recordings surreptitiously shot from behind the window indicated that about 80% of passers-by stopped and gazed up when they saw the confederates. Rudimentary forms of automatic imitation have been observed in various animal species, such as pigeons, monkeys, hamsters and fish (Heyes, 2011; Zentall, 2012). There is even evidence to suggest that ‘cultures’ are transmitted through imitation in groups of whales, as when humpback whales use lobtail

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feeding, a technique in which they slam their tail flukes onto the water, then dive and exhale, forming clouds of bubbles that envelop schools of prey fish. This complex behaviour was first Based on the study by Chartrand and Bargh (1999), this graph shows that participants rubbed their face or shook their foot observed in one location in 1980. By 1989 it was measurably more frequently when they were with a confederate who was adopted by 50% of the whale population across a broader area also rubbing or shaking his or her foot. (Rendell & Whitehead, 2001). Even more recently, researchers 0.8 using a network-based diffusion analysis found that up to 87% of whales that adopted this technique learned it by exposure from other humpbacks (Allen, Weinrich, Hoppitt, & Rendell, 2013). 0.7 Similar observations in other species have led animal scientists to suggest that many non-human animals form and transmit 0.6 cultures to succeeding generations (Laland & Galef, 2009). Do humans similarly imitate one another automatically, without thought, effort or conflict? It appears that we do. In 0.5 recent years, controlled studies of human infants have shown that sometimes shortly after birth, babies not only look at faces but (to 0.4 the delight of parents all over the world) often also mimic simple gestures such as moving the head, pursing the lips and sticking out the tongue (Meltzoff & Moore, 1977; Ray & Heyes, 2010). 0.3 Studying 162 infants from 6 to 20 months old, Susan Jones (2007) Participant Participant found that imitation developed at different rates for different rubs face shakes foot behaviours. Using parents as models, she found, for example, that Confederate rubs face infants mimicked opening the mouth wide, tapping their fingers Confederate shakes foot on a table and waving ‘bye-bye’ before they mimicked clapping Source: Adapted from Kassin, S., Psychology, 3rd ed. Copyright © 1997. hands, flexing their fingers or putting their hands on the head. You may not realise it, but human adults unwittingly mimic each other all the time. To demonstrate, Tanya Chartrand and John Bargh (1999) set up participants to work on a task with a partner, a confederate who exhibited the habit of rubbing his face or shaking his foot. Hidden cameras recording the interaction revealed that without realising it, participants mimicked these motor behaviours, rubbing their face or shaking a foot to match their partner’s behaviour. Chartrand and Bargh dubbed this phenomenon the ‘chameleon effect’, after the lizard that changes colours according to its physical environment (see Figure 7.2). There are two possible reasons for this non-conscious form of imitation. Chartrand and Bargh (1999) speculated that such mimicry serves an important social function; that being ‘in sync’ in their pace, posture, mannerisms, facial expressions, tone of voice, accents, speech patterns and other behaviours enables people to interact more smoothly with one another. Accordingly, the researchers turned the tables in a second part of the study in which they instructed their confederate to match in subtle ways the mannerisms of some participants but not others. Sure enough, participants who had been mimicked liked the confederate more than those who had not been mimicked. Three additional sets of findings further demonstrate the social aspect of mimicry. First, research shows that people mimic others more when they are highly motivated to affiliate – say, because they are similar to these others or are feeling excluded (Chartrand & Lakin, 2013; Chartrand & van Baaren, 2009; Lakin, Chartrand, & Arkin, 2008). Second, research shows that when participants interact with others who exhibit negative, antisocial behaviours (e.g., in their tone of voice) mimicry backfires and causes participants to be perceived unfavourably (Smith-Genthôs, Reich, Lakin, & Casa de Calvo, 2015). Third, people mimic others less when they are focused on themselves – such as when they are feeling the self-relevant emotion pride (Dickens & DeSteno, 2014). Social mimicry is so powerful that it can influence us even when the mimicker is not a real person. In a study entitled ‘Digital chameleons’, Jeremy Bailenson and Nick Yee (2005) immersed university students, one at a time, in a virtual reality environment in which they found themselves seated at a table across from a three-dimensional, human-like cartoon character. This character proceeded to argue that students should be required to carry identification cards at all times for security purposes. In half the sessions, this virtual speaker’s back-and-forth head movements perfectly mimicked the participant’s head movements at a four-second delay. In the other half, the speaker repeated the head movements of an earlier recorded participant. Very few of the students who were mimicked were aware of it. Yet when later asked about the experience, they rated the virtual character as more likeable and were persuaded by its speech more if it imitated their head movements than if it imitated the movements of the previous participant. Number of times per minute

FIGURE 7.2 The chameleon effect

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The human impulse to mimic others may have adaptive social value, but these types of effects can also be found in non-social situations. In one study, Roland Neumann and Fritz Strack (2000) had people listen to an abstract philosophical speech that was recited on tape in a happy, sad or neutral tone of voice. Afterwards, participants rated their own mood as more positive when they heard the happy voice and as more negative when they heard the sad voice. Even though the speakers and participants never interacted, the speaker’s emotional state was infectious – an automatic effect that can be described as a form of ‘mood contagion’. The same can be true about the way we mimic the language we hear in other people’s expressions and speech styles. To illustrate, Molly Ireland and James Pennebaker (2010) found that university students answering essay questions or working from excerpts of fictional writing tended in subtle ways to match the language style of the target material to which they were exposed; for example, in terms of their use of personal pronouns (e.g., I and you), conjunctions (e.g., but and while) and quantifiers (e.g., many and few). Linguistic mimicry has interpersonal benefits: individuals who disclosed a personal, problematic event reported more positive coping when the conversation partner engaged in linguistic mimicry than when they did not (Cannava & Bodie, 2017). Such benefits even carry into debates and negotiations. Opponents who engage in linguistic mimicry are viewed more positively than their peers who do so to a lesser degree (Romero, Swaab, Uzzi, & Galinsky, 2015). It is also important to realise that mimicry is a dynamic process, as when two people who are walking or dancing together become more and more coordinated over time. To demonstrate, Michael Richardson and colleagues (2005) sat pairs of university students side-by-side to work on visual problems while swinging a handheld pendulum as ‘a distraction task’. The students did not need to be synchronised in their swinging tempo in order to get along or solve the problems. Yet, when each could see the other’s pendulum (and even without speaking), their tempos gradually converged over time – like two hearts beating as one.

CONFORMITY It is hard to find behaviours that are not in some way affected by exposure to the actions of others. When social psychologists talk of conformity, they specifically refer to the tendency of people to change their perceptions, opinions and behaviour in ways that are consistent with group norms (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004). Using this definition, would you call yourself a conformist or a non-conformist? How often do you feel inclined to follow what others are saying or doing? At first, you may deny the tendency to conform and, instead, declare your individuality and uniqueness. But think about it. When was the last time you attended a formal wedding dressed in jeans or remained seated during the national anthem at a sporting event? People find it difficult to breach social norms. In an early demonstration of this point, research assistants were recruited to ask train passengers to give up their seats – a conspicuous violation of the norm of acceptable conduct (although perhaps not as norm-violating as riding the train with no pants on as described at the opening of this chapter!). Many of the assistants could not carry out their assignment. In fact, some of those who tried it became so anxious that they pretended to be ill just to make their request appear justified (Milgram & Sabini, 1978). Because conformity is so widespread, it is interesting and ironic that research participants who are coaxed into following a group norm will often not admit to being influenced. Instead, they try to reinterpret the task and rationalise their behaviour as a way to see themselves as independent (Hornsey & Jetten, 2004). University of Queensland’s Jolanda Jetten and colleagues (2006) have demonstrated that this resistance to the conformity label is particularly characteristic of individuals who have high status and seniority within a group. But there is a second reason why people do not see themselves as conformist. In a series of studies, Emily Pronin and colleagues (2007) found that people perceive others to be more conforming than themselves in all sorts of domains – from why they bought an iPad to why they hold a popular opinion. Part of the reason for this asymmetry is that whereas people judge others by their overt behaviour and the degree to which it matches what those others do, they tend to judge themselves by focusing inward and introspecting about their thought processes, which blinds them to their own conformity. This dynamic may strike you as similar to the fundamental attribution error described in Chapter 3. People understandably have mixed feelings about conformity. After all, some degree of it is essential if individuals are to maintain communities and coexist peacefully, as when people assume their rightful place in a queue. Yet at other times, conformity can have harmful consequences, as when people drink too heavily at parties, cheat on their taxes or tell offensive jokes because they believe others are doing the same. For social psychologists, the goal is to understand the conditions that promote conformity or independence and the reasons for these behaviours.

Conformity

The tendency to change our perceptions, opinions or behaviour in ways that are consistent with group norms.

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FIGURE 7.3 A classic case of suggestibility This graph, taken from Sherif’s study, shows how three participants’ estimates of the apparent movement of light gradually converged. Before they came together, their perceptions varied considerably. Once in groups, however, participants conformed to the norm that had developed.

Centimetres of perceived movement

20 18 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 Pregroup

Group Session I

Group Session II Participant B

Participant A

Group Session III

Participant C

Source: Sherif, M. (1936). The psychology of social norms. New York, NY: Harper.

Classic studies of conformity In 1936, Muzafer Sherif published a classic laboratory study of how norms develop in small groups. His method was ingenious. Male students, who believed they were participating in a visual perception experiment, sat in a totally darkened room. Fifteen feet in front of them, a small dot of light appeared for 2 seconds, after which participants were asked to estimate how far it had moved. This procedure was repeated several times. Although participants didn’t realise it, the dot of light always remained motionless. The movement they thought they saw was merely an optical illusion known as the autokinetic effect; that is, in darkness a stationary point of light appears to move, sometimes erratically, in various directions. At first, participants sat alone and reported their judgements to the experimenter. After several trials, Sherif found that they settled in on their own stable perceptions of movement, with most estimates ranging from 1 to 10 inches (approximately 2 to 25 centimeters). Over the next 3 days, people returned to participate in three-person FIGURE 7.4 A conformity dilemma groups. As before, lights appeared and the participants, one by After two uneventful rounds in Asch’s study, the participant one, announced their estimates. As shown in Figure 7.3, initial (seated second from the right) faces a dilemma. The answer he estimates varied considerably, but participants later converged wants to give in the third test of visual discrimination differs on a common perception. Eventually, each group established its from that of the first five confederates, who are all in agreement. own set of norms. Should he give his own answers or conform to theirs? Some 15 years after Sherif’s demonstration, Solomon Asch (1951) constructed a very different task for testing how people’s beliefs affect the beliefs of others. To appreciate what Asch did, imagine yourself in the following situation. You arrive for a psychology experiment and find six other students waiting around a table. Soon after you take an empty seat, the experimenter explains that he is interested in the ability to make visual discriminations (see Figure 7.4). As an example, he asks everyone to indicate which of three comparison lines is identical in length to a standard line. That seems easy enough. The experimenter then says that you and the others will take turns announcing your judgements out loud. Beginning on his left, the experimenter asks the first person for his judgement. Seeing that you are in the next-to-last position, you patiently await your turn. Source: Archives of the History of American Psychology/University of Akron. The first couple of iterations pass uneventfully. The task and 276

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discriminations are clear and everyone agrees on the answers. FIGURE 7.5 Line judgement task used in Asch’s conformity On the third set of lines, however, the first participant selects studies what is quite clearly the wrong line. Huh? What happened? Before you have the chance to think on this, the next four participants Which comparison line is the same in length as the standard line – A, B or C,? What would you say if you found yourself in the choose the same wrong line. Now it is your turn. You wonder if presence of a unanimous majority that answered A or C? The you misunderstood the task. And you wonder what the others participants in Asch’s experiments conformed to the majority will think if you have the nerve to disagree. You take another about a third of the time. look. What do you see? More to the point, what do you do? Figure 7.5 gives you a sense of the bind in which Asch’s participants found themselves – caught between the need to be right and the desire to be liked (Insko, Sedlak, & Lipsitz, 1982; Ross, Bierbrauer, & Hoffman, 1976). As you may suspect by now, the other ‘participants’ were actually confederates and had been trained to make incorrect judgements on 12 out of 18 presentations. There seems little doubt that the real participants A B C knew the correct answers. In a control group, where they made Standard line Comparison lines judgements in isolation, they made almost no errors. Yet Asch’s participants went along with the incorrect majority 37% of the Source: Asch, S. E. (1955, November). Opinions and social pressure. time – far more often than most of us would ever predict. Not Scientific American, 31–35. everyone conformed, of course. About 25% refused to agree on any of the incorrect group judgements. Yet 50% went along on at least half of the critical presentations and remaining participants conformed on an occasional basis. Similarly, When all members high levels of conformity were observed when Asch’s study was repeated 30 years later and in studies involving of a group give an other cognitive tasks. For example, research demonstrates strong conformity effects on memory, such as incorrect response to an easy question, when an eyewitness is influenced by the report of a co-witness (Gabbert, Memon, & Allan, 2003; Horry, Palmer, most people most of Sexton, & Brewer, 2012). Other research also shows Asch-like conformity effects on the perceptual judgements the time conform to of 3- and 4-year-old children (Corriveau, Fusaro, & Harris, 2009; Corriveau & Harris, 2010). that response. Let us compare Sherif’s and Asch’s classic studies of social influence. Obviously, both demonstrate that FALSE our visual perceptions can be heavily influenced by others. But how similar are these studies, really? From the start, it was clear that these studies differed in some important ways. In Sherif’s research, participants were quite literally ‘in the dark’, so they naturally turned to others for guidance. When physical reality is ambiguous and we are uncertain of our own judgements, as in the autokinetic situation, others can serve as a valuable source of information (Festinger, 1954). Asch’s participants found themselves in a much more awkward position. Their task was relatively simple, and they could see with their own eyes which answers were correct. Still, they often followed the incorrect majority. In interviews, many of Asch’s participants reported afterwards that they went along with the group even though they were not convinced that the group was right. Many who did not conform said they felt ‘conspicuous’ and ‘crazy’, like a ‘misfit’ (Asch, 1955, p. 31).

CRITICAL THINKING ACTIVITY Reflect on your most recent usage of social media. What influence might those in your network have on you? What about the influence you might have on them?

What norms are present in your network? Do you typically conform to them? Or perhaps subtly shape them by not conforming?

Worldwide, over 4 billion people, accounting for approximately 55% of the planet’s population, have access to the internet (Internet Live Stats, 2018). This being the case, you may wonder: ‘Do the social forces that influence people in the face-to-face encounters studied by Sherif and Asch also operate in virtual groups?’ The answer is ‘yes’. Bargh and McKenna (2004) point out that online communication serves to depersonalise individuals, making them more likely to adhere to local group norms of the online environment. Providing direct evidence of this idea, Nadine Tamburrini and colleagues (2015) analysed data from 189 000 Twitter users, including 200 million messages. Using advanced analytic techniques, the researchers identified 24 unique, English-speaking groups and then coded the messages sent within the group and outside of the group. What emerged was a fascinating picture of social influence: tweets adopted the language of the group to which they were sent. Users, whether consciously or not, conformed to the local language use within the Twitter group. Other work has looked at the development of social norms for communication on other mediums such as Instagram and WhatsApp (Waterloo, Baumgartner, Peter, & Valkenburg, 2018). Copyright 2020 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-202

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Why do people conform? The Sherif and Asch studies demonstrate that people conform for two very different reasons: one informational, the other normative (Crutchfield, 1955; Deutsch & Gerard, 1955).

A need to be right Informational influence

Influence that produces conformity when a person believes others are correct in their judgements.

Through informational influence, people conform because they want to make good and accurate judgements of reality and assume that when others agree on something, they must be right. In Sherif’s autokinetic task, as in other difficult or ambiguous tasks, it is natural to assume that two sets of eyes are better than one. Hence, research shows that eyewitnesses trying to recall a crime or some other event will alter their recollections and even create false memories in response to what they hear other witnesses report (Gabbert et al., 2003). When people are in a state of uncertainty, following the collective wisdom of others may prove to be an effective strategy. In the popular television game show Who Wants to Be a Millionaire? contestants who are stumped on a question can invoke one of two human forms of assistance: (1) calling a friend or relative who serves as a designated ‘expert’; or (2) polling the studio audience who cast votes by computer for instant feedback. Overall, the ‘experts’ are useful, as they typically offer the correct answer 65% of the time. Illustrating the wisdom of crowds, however, the studio audiences were even more useful, picking the right answer 91% of the time (Surowiecki, 2005). These days, relying on the collective wisdom of large numbers of other people is something we do all the time. When buying goods online, we review average customer satisfaction ratings and product reviews; we do the same for restaurants, travel and much more.

A fear of ostracism Normative influence

Influence that produces conformity when a person fears the negative social consequences of appearing deviant.

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In contrast to the informational value of conformity, normative influence leads people to conform because they fear the consequence of rejection that follows deviance. It is easy to see why. Early on, research showed that individuals who stray from a group’s norm tend to be disliked, rejected, ridiculed and outright dismissed (Schachter, 1951). Although some people are more resilient than others, these forms of interpersonal rejection can be hard to take (Smart Richman & Leary, 2009). In a series of controlled studies, people who were socially ostracised – for example, by being neglected, ignored and excluded in a live or online chatroom conversation – react with various types of emotional distress, feeling alone, hurt, angry and lacking in self-esteem (Williams et al., 2002; Gerber & Wheeler, 2009). Even being left out of a three-way text-messaging conversation on a mobile phone can have this effect on us (Smith & Williams, 2004). Kipling Williams and Steve Nida (2011) note that the research on this point is clear: some people become so distressed when they are rejected, ignored or excluded from a group, even one that is newly and briefly formed, that they begin to feel numb, sad, angry or some combination of these emotions. Over time, ostracism becomes a form of social death, making it difficult to cope with. Why does being ostracised hurt so much? Increasingly, social psychologists are coming to appreciate the extent to which human beings, over the course of evolution, have needed each other in order to survive and flourish. According to Geoff MacDonald and Mark Leary (2005), this need is so primitive that rejection can inflict a social pain that feels just like physical pain. You can sense the connection in the way people describe their emotional reactions to social loss using such words as hurt, brokenhearted and crushed. More recent research lends provocative support to this linkage. In brain-imaging studies, for example, young people who were left out by other players in a three-person internet ball tossing game called Cyberball exhibited elevated neural activity in a part of the brain that is normally associated with physical pain (Eisenberger, Lieberman, & Williams, 2003). In some instances, people who are excluded report feeling a heightened sensitivity to pain; in other cases, the experience leads them to feel numb (Bernstein & Claypool, 2012). As you will see in the Cultural Diversity feature, the motivating role of the fear of social exclusion may depend on the type of society one is from. If there is a silver lining, it is that social pain can have positive motivating effects. Once feeling rejected, people seek to reaffiliate with others, which should increase their sensitivity to social perception cues that signal opportunities for inclusion. In a study that tested this hypothesis, Michael Bernstein and colleagues (2008) found that research participants who were led to feel socially rejected or excluded became more accurate in their ability to distinguish between true smiles, which betray happiness and an openness to interaction, and ‘masking’ smiles, which do not express a genuine emotion. Even young children are highly sensitive to cues that signal ostracism. In one study, 4- and 5-year-old children were shown a cartoon video in which a character repeatedly approached a group at play and was either accepted into the group or excluded. Shortly afterward, all the children were asked to ‘draw a picture of you and your friend’. Children who saw the social rejection version of the cartoon drew pictures that placed themselves and their friend closer together (Song, Over, & Carpenter, 2015).

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CULTURAL DIVERSITY CULTURAL DIFFERENCES IN OSTRACISM OUTCOMES The outcomes of ostracism depend on the source of exclusion and the cultural context. In a fascinating series of studies designed to address this question, Ayse Uskul and Harriet Over (2014) compared farmers and herders in the Eastern Black Sea region of Turkey – two groups that shared the same geographical space, national identity, language and religion. The farmers, who grow tea and other products, show a high level of interdependence within their social network, having to rely heavily on family and neighbours. In contrast, the herders, who sell cattle and dairy products, tend to be more individualistic and independent, moving between neighbouring towns and interacting with strangers and others outside their immediate social circle.

In one study, participants recruited from each group were asked to visualise themselves as the character in a vignette who was socially excluded either by a close other person or by a stranger. They were then asked to rate in various ways how they would feel about themselves. Two important results consistently emerged. First, both groups were more distressed about being excluded by close others than by strangers. Second, the herders felt worse about being excluded by strangers than the farmers did. As a cultural subgroup that relies on strangers to make a living, herders did not make the same ingroup–outgroup distinction that the farmers did. In this domain of social influence, as in others, cultural context plays an important role.

Distinguishing types of conformity In group settings, both informational and normative influences are typically at work. Consider the Asch experiment. Even though many of his participants said they had conformed just to avoid being different, others said that they came to agree with their group’s erroneous judgements. Is that possible? At the time, Asch had to rely on what his participants reported in interviews. Thanks to developments in social neuroscience, however, researchers can now view the socially active brain. In an ingenious study that illustrates the point, Gregory Berns and colleagues (2005) put 32 adults into a visual-spatial perception experiment in which they were asked to ‘mentally rotate’ two geometric objects to determine if they were the same or different (see Figure 7.6). As in the original Asch study, participants were accompanied by four confederates who unanimously made incorrect judgements on certain trials. Unlike in the original study, however, participants were placed in an fMRI scanner while engaged in the task. There were two FIGURE 7.6 Conformity effects on perception In this study, participants tried to determine if pairs of geometric objects were the same or different after observing the responses of four unanimous confederates. Participants followed the incorrect group 41% of the time. Subsequently, fMRI results showed that these conforming judgements were accompanied by increased activity in a part of the brain that controls spatial awareness, suggesting that the group had altered participants’ perceptions, not just their behaviour. Same

Same Group Same

Same Participant

Source: Berns, G. S., Chappelow, J., Zink, C. F., Pagnoni, G., Martin-Skurski, M. E., & Richards, J. (2005). Neurobiological correlates of social conformity and independence during mental rotation. Biological Psychiatry, 58, 245–253.

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Percentage of conformity responses

noteworthy results. First, participants conformed to 41% of the group’s incorrect judgements. Second, these conforming judgements were accompanied by heightened activity in a part of the brain that controls spatial awareness – not in areas associated with conscious decision-making. These results suggest that the group altered participants’ perceptions, not just their behaviour. The distinction between the two types of social influence – informational and normative – is important, not just for understanding why people conform but also because the two sources of influence produce different types of conformity: private and public (Allen, 1965; Kelman, 1961). Private conformity, also called true Private conformity The change of beliefs acceptance or conversion, describes instances in which others cause us to change not only our overt behaviour that occurs when a but our minds as well. To conform at this level is to be truly persuaded that others in a group are correct. By person privately accepts contrast, public conformity (sometimes called compliance, a term used later in this chapter to describe a the position taken by different form of influence) refers to a more superficial change in behaviour. People often respond to normative others. pressures by pretending to agree even when privately they do not. This often happens when we want to garner Public confor mity favour with others; for example, the politician who tells constituents whatever they want to hear. A superficial change How, you might be wondering, can social psychologists ever tell the difference between the private and in overt behaviour public conformist? After all, both exhibit the same change in their observable behaviour. The difference without a corresponding change of opinion that is that compared with someone who merely acquiesces in public, the individual who is truly persuaded is produced by real or maintains that change long after the group is out of the picture. When this distinction is applied to Sherif’s imagined group pressure. and Asch’s research, the results come out as expected. At the end of his study, Sherif (1936) retested participants alone and found that their estimates continued to reflect the norm previously established in their group, even among those who were retested a full year after the experiment (Rohrer, Baron, Hoffman, & Swander 1954). Similar results were reported in a study in which university students rated the attractiveness of various faces, were shown the average higher or lower results from other students, and then rerated the same faces – one, three, or seven days or three months later. In this situation, the conformity effect lasted three to seven days (Huang, Kendrick, & Yu, 2014). By contrast, when Asch (1956) had participants write their answers privately, so that others in the group could not see, their level of conformity dropped sharply (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955; Mouton, Blake, & Olmstead 1956). In a study that demonstrated both processes, Robert Baron and colleagues (1996) had people in groups of three (one participant and two confederates) act as eyewitnesses. First, FIGURE 7.7 Distinguishing types of conformity participants would see a picture of a person, then they would People made judgements under conditions in which they had try to pick that person out of a line-up. In some groups, the task a high or low level of motivation. Regardless of whether the was difficult, like Sherif’s, since participants saw each picture judgement task was difficult or easy, there were moderate levels only once for half a second. For other groups, the task was of conformity when participants had low motivation (left). But easier, like Asch’s, in that they saw each picture twice for a total when they were highly motivated (right), participants conformed more when the task was difficult (as in Sherif’s study) and less of 10 seconds. How often did participants conform when the when it was easy (as in Asch’s study). confederates made the wrong identification? It depended on how motivated they were. When the experimenter downplayed 60 the task as only a ‘pilot study’, the conformity rates were 35% when the task was difficult and 33% when it was easy. But 50 when participants were offered a financial incentive to do well, conformity went up to 51% when the task was difficult and down 40 to 16% when it was easy (see Figure 7.7). With pride and money on the line, the Sherif-like participants conformed more and the 30 Asch-like participants conformed less. Table 7.1 summarises the comparison of Sherif’s and 20 Asch’s studies and the depths of social influence that they demonstrate. Looking at this table, you can see that the difficulty 10 of the task is crucial. When reality cannot easily be validated by physical evidence, as in the autokinetic situation, people turn 0 to others for information and conform because they are truly Low motivation High motivation persuaded by that information. When reality is clear, however, Difficult (Sherif-like) task the cost of dissent becomes the major issue. As Asch found, Easy (Asch-like) task it can be difficult to depart too much from others even when Source: Baron, R. S., Vandello, J. A., & Brunsman, B. (1996). The forgotten you know that they, not you, are wrong. So, you play along. variable in conformity research: Impact of task importance on social Privately you do not change your mind, but you nod your head in influence. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71(5), 915–927. agreement anyway. 280

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TABLE 7.1 Two types of conformity A comparison of Sherif’s and Asch’s studies suggests different kinds of conformity for different reasons. Sherif used an ambiguous task, so others provided a source of information and influenced the participants’ true opinions. Asch used a task that required simple judgements of a clear stimulus, so most participants exhibited occasional public conformity in response to normative pressure but privately did not accept the group’s judgements.

Experimental task

Primary effect of group

Depth of conformity produced

Sherif’s ambiguous autokinetic effect

Informational influence

Private acceptance

Asch’s simple-line judgements

Normative influence

Public conformity

Majority influence Realising that people often succumb to pressure from peers is only the first step in understanding the process of social influence. The next step is to identify the situational and personal factors that make us more or less likely to conform. We know that people tend to conform when the social pressure is intense and that they are insecure about how to behave. But what creates these feelings of pressure and insecurity? Here, we look at four factors: group size, social norms, the presence of an ally, and gender.

Group size Common sense would suggest that as the number of other people in a majority increases, so should their impact. Actually, it is not that simple. Asch (1956) varied the size of groups, using one, two, three, four, eight or fifteen confederates, and he found that conformity increased with group size – but only up to a point. Once there were three or four confederates, the amount of additional influence exerted by the rest was negligible. Other researchers have obtained similar results (Gerard, Whilhelmy, & Connolley, 1968). Beyond the presence of three or four others, additions to a group are subject to the law of ‘diminishing returns’ (Knowles, 1983; Mullen, 1983). As we will see later, Bibb Latané (1981) likens the influence of people on an individual to the way light bulbs illuminate a surface. When a second bulb is added to a room, the effect is dramatic. When the tenth bulb is added, however, its impact is barely noticed, if at all. Economists say the same about the perception of money. An additional dollar seems greater to the person who has only $3 than it does to the person who has $300. Another possible explanation is that as more and more people express the same opinion, an individual is likely to suspect that they are acting either in ‘collusion’ or as ‘spineless sheep’. According to David Wilder (1977), what matters is not the actual number of others in a group but rather one’s perception of how many distinct others there are in the group who are thinking independently. Indeed, Wilder found that people were more influenced by two groups of two than by one four-person group, and more by two groups of three than by one six-person group. Conformity increased even more when people were exposed to three two-person groups. When faced with a majority opinion, we do more than just count the number of warm bodies – we try to assess the number of independent minds.

Social norms The size of a majority may influence the amount of pressure that is felt, but social norms give rise to conformity only when we know the norms and focus on them. This may sound like an obvious point, yet we often misperceive what is normative, particularly when others are too afraid or too embarrassed to publicly present their true thoughts, feelings and behaviours. One common example of this pluralistic ignorance concerns perceptions of alcohol usage. In a number of university-wide surveys, Deborah Prentice and Dale Miller (1996) found that most students overestimated how comfortable their peers were with the level of drinking on campus. Those who, at the start of the school year, most overestimated how others felt about drinking eventually conformed to this misperception in their own attitudes and behaviour. By contrast, students who took part in discussion sessions that were designed to correct these misperceptions actually consumed less alcohol six months later. These findings are important. Additional research has shown that both male and female students tend to overestimate how frequently their same-sex peers use various substances and the quantities they consume. Whether the substance in question is alcohol, tobacco or marijuana, the more normative students perceive peer usage to be, the more they consume (Henry, Kobus, & Schoeny, 2011). More generally, across a range of situations

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and intervention purposes, changing people’s perceptions of norms can be used to change their behaviour (Miller & Prentice, 2016). Knowing how others are behaving in a situation is necessary for conformity, but these norms will influence us only when they are brought to our awareness, or ‘activated’. Robert Cialdini (2003) and colleagues have demonstrated this point in studies on littering. In one study, researchers had confederates pass out handbills to amusement park visitors and varied the amount of rubbish that appeared in one section of the park (an indication of how others behave in that setting). The result? The more litter there was, the more likely visitors were to toss their handbills to the ground (Cialdini, Reno, & Kallgren, 1990).

Presence of an ally In Asch’s initial experiment, unwitting participants found themselves pitted against unanimous majorities. But what if they had an ally – a partner in potential dissent? Asch investigated this issue and found that the presence of a single confederate who agreed with the participant reduced conformity by almost 80%. This finding, however, does not tell us why the presence of an ally was so effective. Was it because he or she agreed with the participant or because he or she disagreed with the majority? In other words, were the views of the participants strengthened because a dissenting confederate offered validating information or because dissent reduced normative pressures? A series of experiments explored these two possibilities. In one, Vernon Allen and John Levine (1969) led participants to believe that they were working together with four participants, who were actually confederates. Three of these others consistently agreed on the wrong judgement. The fourth then followed the majority, agreed with the participant or made a third judgement, which was also incorrect. This last variation was the most interesting; even when the confederate did not validate the participants’ own judgement, participants conformed less often to the majority. In another experiment, Allen and Levine (1971) varied the competence of the ally. Some participants received support from an average person. By contrast, others found themselves supported by someone who wore very thick glasses and complained that he could not see TABLE 7.2 On being a lone dissenter: voting patterns in the the visual displays. Not a very reassuring ally, right? Wrong. Even US Supreme Court though participants derived less comfort from this supporter Out of 4178 US Supreme Court decisions handed down from 1953 than from one who seemed more competent at the task, his to 2001, the 8–1 split involving a lone dissenter was the least presence still reduced their level of conformity. common type of vote. This historical observation is consistent Two important conclusions follow from this research. First, with conformity research showing the power of the majority over it is substantially more difficult for people to stand alone for an individual who lacks an ally. their convictions than to be part of even a tiny minority. Second, Voting split Frequency (%) any dissent, whether it validates an individual’s opinion or not, can break the spell cast by a unanimous majority and reduce 9–0 35 the normative pressures to conform. In an interesting possible 8–1 10 illustration of how uncommon it is for individuals to single7–2 14 handedly oppose a majority, researchers examined voting 6–3 20 patterns in the US Supreme Court, involving nine justices, from 5–4 21 1953 to 2001 (a summary of the results shown in Table 7.2). Out Source: Granberg, D., & Bartels, B. (2005). On being a lone dissenter. of 4178 decisions in which all nine justices voted, the 8–1 split Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 35, 1849–1858. was the least frequent, occurring in only 10% of all decisions (Granberg & Bartels, 2005).

Gender Are there gender differences in conformity? Based on Asch’s initial studies, social psychologists used to think that women, once considered the ‘weaker’ sex, conform more than men. In light of available research, however, it appears that two additional factors have to be considered. First, gender differences depend on how comfortable people are with the experimental task. Frank Sistrunk and John McDavid (1971) had male and female participants answer questions on stereotypically masculine, feminine and gender-neutral topics. Along with each question, participants were told the percentage of others who agreed or disagreed. Although females conformed to the contrived majority more on masculine items, males conformed more on feminine items. There were no sex differences on the neutral questions. This finding suggests that one’s familiarity with the issue at hand, not gender, is what affects conformity (Eagly & Carli, 1981). A second factor is the type of social situation people face. As a general rule, gender differences are weak and unreliable. But there is an important exception: in face-to-face encounters, where people must disagree 282

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with each other openly, small differences do emerge. In fact, when participants think they are being observed, women conform more and men conform less than they do in a more private situation. Why does being ‘in public’ create divergence in behaviour? Alice Eagly (1987) argues that in front of others, people worry about how they come across and feel pressured to behave in ways that are viewed as acceptable according to traditional gender-role constraints. At least in public, men behave with fierce independence and autonomy, whereas women play a gentler, more harmonious role. From an evolutionary perspective, Vladas Griskevicius and colleagues (2006) add that people are most likely to behave in gender-stereotyped ways when motivated to attract someone of the opposite gender. Consistent with research showing that women tend to like men who are independent, whereas men prefer women who are agreeable, their research shows that women conform more and that men conform less when primed to think about themselves in a romantic situation. But here’s the interesting part; when University of Queensland’s Matthew Hornsey and colleagues (2015) asked people in a series of experiments to indicate their personal preferences for a romantic partner, both men and women alike were attracted to others who are nonconformists. This pairing of results raises the question: Why did female participants in the first study present themselves as conformist to attract a male partner when men in the second set of studies consistently expressed a preference for nonconformist women? Although more research is needed, these studies seem to suggest that women harbour the belief that men like conformist women – a belief, grounded in the past, that may well turn out to be a myth.

Minority influence The fact is that it has never been easy for individuals to express unpopular views and enlist support for these views from others. Although people who assert their beliefs against the majority are generally seen as competent and honest, they are also disliked and often roundly rejected (Bassili & Provencal, 1988; Levine, 1989). In a series of survey studies of what he called the ‘minority slowness effect’, John Bassili (2003) asked people about their attitudes on social policy issues such as free speech or about their likes and dislikes for various celebrities, sport, foods, places and activities. Consistently, and regardless of the topic, respondents who held minority opinions were slower to answer the questions than those in the majority. Resisting the pressure to conform and maintaining one’s independence may be socially difficult, but it is not impossible. History’s famous heroes, villains and creative minds are living proof: Joan of Arc, Jesus Christ, Charles Darwin, Mahatma Gandhi and Nelson Mandela, to name just a few, were dissenters of their time who continue to capture the imagination. Then there is human behaviour in the laboratory. Social psychologists have been so intrigued by Asch’s initial finding that participants conformed 37% of the time, that textbooks (including this one) routinely refer to ‘Asch’s conformity study’. Yet the overlooked flip side of the coin is that Asch’s participants refused to acquiesce 63% of the time – thus also indicating the power of independence, truth telling and a concern for social harmony (Friend, Rafferty, & Bramel, 1990; Hodges & Geyer, 2006; Jetten & Hornsey, 2011). How about minority influence in the courtroom? When it comes to jury decision-making, as we will see in Chapter 15, the majority usually wins. Yet in trial juries, as in other small groups, there are occasional exceptions where minorities prevail – as when someone from the majority faction defects (Clark, 2001). Thanks to Serge Moscovici and others, we now know quite a bit about minority influence and the strategies that astute non-conformists use to act as agents of social change (Gardikiotis, 2011; Maass & Clark, 1984; Moscovici, Mugny, & Van Avermaet, 1985; Mugny & Perez, 1991).

Minority influence

The process by which dissenters produce change within a group.

Moscovici’s theory According to Serge Moscovici (1980), majorities are powerful by virtue of their sheer numbers, whereas non-conformists derive power from the style of their behaviour. It is not just what non-conformists say that matters but how they say it. To exert influence, says Moscovici, those in the minority must be forceful, persistent and unwavering in support of their position. Yet, at the same time, they must appear flexible and open-minded. Confronted with a consistent but even-handed dissenter, members of the majority will sit up, take notice and rethink their own positions. Why should a consistent behavioural style prove effective? One possible reason is that unwavering repetition draws attention from those in the mainstream, which is a necessary first step to social influence. Another possibility is that consistency signals that the dissenter is unlikely to yield, which leads those in the majority to feel pressured to seek compromise. A third possible reason is that when confronted with someone who has the self-confidence and dedication to take an unpopular stand without backing down, people assume that he or she must have a point. Unless a dissenter is perceived in negative terms – as

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Idiosyncrasy credits Interpersonal ‘credits’ that a person earns by following group norms.

biased, obstinate or just plain crazy – this situation stimulates others to re-examine their own views (Moskowitz, 1996). Of course, it helps to be seen as part of ‘us’ rather than ‘them’. Research shows that dissenters have more influence when people identify with them and perceive them to be similar in ways that are relevant and desirable (Turner, 1991; Wood et al., 1996). Based on a meta-analysis of 97 experiments investigating minority influence, Wendy Wood and colleagues (1994) concluded that there is strong support for the consistency hypothesis. In one classic study, for example, Moscovici and colleagues (1969) turned Asch’s procedure on its head by confronting people with a minority of confederates who made incorrect judgements. When the confederates’ incorrect answers were consistent, they had a surprising degree of influence. About a third of all participants went along with the minority. Subsequent research confirmed that the perception of consistency increases minority influence (Clark, 2001; Crano, 2000). As an alternative to Moscovici’s consistency strategy, Edwin Hollander (1958) suggested that to influence a majority, people should first conform in order to establish their credentials as competent insiders. By becoming members of the mainstream, they accumulate idiosyncrasy credits, or ‘brownie points’. Once they have accumulated enough goodwill within the group, a certain amount of their deviance will then be tolerated. Several studies have shown that this ‘first conform, then dissent’ strategy, like the ‘consistent dissent’ approach, can be effective (Bray, Johnson, & Chilstrom, 1982; Lortie-Lussier, 1987; Rijnbout & McKimmie, 2012).

Processes and outcomes of minority influence Regardless of which strategy is used, minority influence is a force to be reckoned with. But does it work just like conformity, or is there something different about the way that minorities and majorities effect change? Some theorists believe that a single process accounts for both directions of social influence (Latané & Wolf, 1981; Tanford & Penrod, 1984). Others have taken a dual-process approach (Moscovici, 1980; Nemeth, 1986). In this second view, majorities and minorities exert influence in different ways and for different reasons. Majorities, because they have power and control, elicit public conformity by bringing stressful normative pressures to bear on the individual. But minorities, because they are seen as seriously committed to their views, produce a deeper and more lasting form of private conformity, or conversion, by leading others to become curious and rethink their original positions. To evaluate these single- and dual-process theories, researchers have compared the effects of majority and minority viewpoints on participants who are otherwise neutral on an issue in dispute. On the basis of this research, two conclusions can be drawn. First, the relative impact of majorities and minorities depends on whether the judgement that is being made is objective or subjective, a matter of fact or opinion. In a study conducted in Italy, Anne Maass and colleagues (1996) found that majorities have greater influence on factual questions for which only one answer is correct (e.g., ‘What percentage of its raw oil does Italy import from Venezuela?’), but that minorities exert equal impact on opinion questions, for which there is a range of acceptable responses (e.g., ‘What percentage of its raw oil should Italy import from Venezuela?’) People feel freer to stray from the mainstream on matters of opinion, when there is no right or wrong answer. The second conclusion is that the relative effects of majority and minority points of view depend on how and when conformity is measured. To be sure, majorities have a decisive upper hand on direct or public measures of conformity. After all, people are reluctant to oppose a group norm in a conspicuous manner. But on more indirect or private measures of conformity, on attitude issues that are related but not focal to the point of conflict, or after the passage of time (all of which softens the extent to which majority participants would appear deviant), minorities exert a strong impact (Clark & Maass, 1990; Crano & Seyranian, 2009; Moscovici & Personnaz, 1991). As Moscovici (1980) cogently argued, each of us is changed in a meaningful but subtle way by minority opinion.

CRITICAL THINKING ACTIVITY Have you ever exerted, or attempted to exert, minority influence? How did it feel to go against the majority? Were you successful in swaying the majority?

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Now that you are aware of the social psychological principles underlying minority influence, how might you go about it in the future?

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Charlan Nemeth’s (2016) review of more than 30 years of research indicates that dissenters in a group serve a valuable purpose, regardless of whether their views are correct. Simply by their willingness to stay firmly independent, minority dissenters can force other group members to think more carefully, more openly, in new and different ways, and more creatively about a problem, enhancing the quality of a group’s output. Interestingly, Nemeth and colleagues (2001) found that to have influence over a group, lone individuals must exhibit ‘authentic dissent’, not merely play ‘devil’s advocate’ – a tactic that actually bolsters a majority’s position.

Culture and conformity Linked together by historical time and geographical space, each culture has its own ideology, music, fashions, foods, laws, customs and manners of expression. As many tourists and exchange students travelling abroad have come to learn – sometimes the hard way – the social norms that influence human conduct can vary in significant ways from one part of the world to another. In Do’s and Taboos Around the World, R. E. Axtell (1993) warns world travellers about some of these differences. For example, dine in an Indian home and you should leave food on the plate to show the host that the portions were generous and you had enough to eat. Yet as a dinner guest in Bolivia, you would show your appreciation by cleaning your plate. Shop in an outdoor market in Iraq and you should expect to negotiate the price of everything you buy. Plan an appointment in Brazil and the person you are scheduled to meet is likely to be late; it is nothing personal. In North America, it is common to sit casually opposite someone with your legs outstretched; yet in Nepal it is an insult to point the bottoms of your feet at someone. Even the way we space ourselves from each other is influenced by culture; Australians, New Zealanders, British, North Americans and northern Europeans keep a polite distance between themselves and others and feel ‘crowded’ by the touchier, nose-to-nose style of the French, Greeks, Arabs, Mexicans and people of South America. Such norms extend to the colour of clothing and adornments (see Figure 7.8). In the affairs of day-to-day living, each culture operates by its own rules of conduct. FIGURE 7.8 Colourful norms around the world Cultures differ in their unique, often colourful norms. In Nigeria it is common to ask guests to wear colourcoordinated outfits, called aso ebi, at social events, such as this wedding in Lagos (top left). In Mumbai, India, a woman’s face is smeared with brightly coloured powders in the festival of Holi, which marks the beginning of spring (top right). In Spain, revellers in Pamplona hold up their red bandanas before the festival of San Fermin, during which six bulls run through the crowded streets in the centre of town (bottom left).

Source: National Geographic Creative/Robin Hammond/; AP Images/Rajanish Kakade; Corbis/Reuters/Desmond Boylan

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Individualism

A cultural orientation in which independence, autonomy and selfreliance take priority over group allegiances.

Collectivism

A cultural orientation in which interdependence, cooperation and social harmony take priority over personal goals.

Just as cultures differ in their social norms, they also differ in the extent to which people are expected to adhere to those norms. As we saw in Chapter 2, there are different cultural orientations towards individuals and their relationships to groups. Some cultures primarily value individualism and the virtues of independence, autonomy and self-reliance, whereas others value collectivism and the virtues of interdependence, cooperation and social harmony. Under the banner of individualism, personal goals take priority over group allegiances. Yet in collectivistic cultures, the person is first and foremost a loyal member of a family, city, team, company, church and state. What determines whether a culture becomes individualistic or collectivistic? Speculating on the origins of these orientations, Harry Triandis (1995) suggests that there are three key factors. The first is the complexity of a society. As people come to live in more complex industrialised societies (compared, for example, with a simpler life of food gathering among desert nomads), there are more groups to identify with, which means less loyalty to any one group and a greater focus on personal rather than collective goals. Second is the affluence of a society. As people prosper, they gain financial independence from each other, a condition that promotes social independence as well as mobility and a focus on personal rather than collective goals. The third factor is heterogeneity. Societies that are homogeneous or ‘tight’ (i.e., where members share the same language, religion and social customs) tend to be rigid and intolerant of those who veer from the norm. Societies that are culturally diverse or ‘loose’ (i.e., where two or more cultures coexist) tend to be more permissive of dissent, thus allowing for more individual expression. According to Edward Sampson (2000), cultural orientations may also be rooted in religious ideologies, as in the link between Christianity and individualism. Early research across nations showed that autonomy and independence are most highly valued in Australia, the UK, Canada, the US and the Netherlands. By contrast, other cultures value social harmony and ‘fitting in’ for the sake of community, the most collectivist people being from Venezuela, Colombia, Pakistan, Peru, Taiwan and China (Hofstede, 1980). Although it now appears that cultures differ in other more complicated ways and that individuals differ even within cultures (Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002), it is clear that nations on average vary in their orientations on the dimension of individualism (Schimmack, Oishi, & Diener, 2005). The difference can be seen in a host of arenas, such as the content of the stories told (Imada, 2012) and the use of the first-person singular pronouns, ‘I’ and ‘me’ (Hamamura & Xu, 2015; Twenge, Campbell, & Gentile, 2013). Do cultural orientations influence conformity? Among the Bantu of Zimbabwe, who scorn deviance, 51% of participants who were placed in an Asch-like study conformed – more than the number typically seen in the US (Whittaker & Meade, 1967). When John Berry (1979) compared participants from 17 cultures, he found that conformity rates ranged from a low of 18% among Inuit hunters of Baffin Island to a high of 60% among village-dwelling Temne farmers of West Africa. Additional analyses have shown that conformity rates are generally higher in cultures that are collectivistic rather than individualistic in orientation (Bond & Smith, 1996). Hence, many anthropologists – interested in human culture and its influence over individuals – study the processes of conformity and independence (Spradley, McCurdy, & Shandy, 2015).

COMPLIANCE Compliance

Changes in behaviour that are elicited by direct requests.

In conformity situations, people follow implicit or explicit group norms. But another common form of social influence occurs when others make direct requests of us in the hope that we will comply. Situations calling for compliance take many forms. These include a friend’s plea for help, sheepishly prefaced by the question ‘Can you do me a favour?’ Or the advertisements on the internet designed to lure you into a commercial site, and the salesperson’s pitch for business prefaced by the dangerous words ‘Have I got a deal for you!’ Sometimes, the request is up front and direct; what you see is what you get. At other times, it is part of a subtle and more elaborate manipulation.

CRITICAL THINKING ACTIVITY How do you gain compliance from others? Do you use threats, promises, politeness, deceit or reason? Do you hint, coax, sulk, negotiate, throw tantrums or pull rank whenever you can?

As you read on, consider whether you utilise these tactics yourself in your efforts to get others to comply with your requests.

How do people get others to comply with self-serving requests? How do police interrogators get crime suspects to confess? How do political parties draw millions of dollars in contributions from voters? To a large

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extent, the compliance strategies we use depend on how well we know the person we target, our status within a relationship, our personality, our culture and the nature of the request. By observing the masters of influence – advertisers, fund-raisers, politicians and business leaders – social psychologists have learned a great deal about the subtle but effective strategies that are commonly used. What we see is that people often get others to comply with their requests by setting traps. Once caught in these traps, the unwary victim often finds it difficult to escape. Anthony Pratkanis (2007) identified 107 methods of social influence that have been researched and published. These tactics go by various colourful names, including the lure, the 1-in-5 prize technique, the dump-and-chase technique, the disruptthen-reframe technique, and the driving toward a goal technique. In the coming pages, some of the bestknown approaches that have been studied empirically will be described.

Mindlessness and compliance Sometimes people can be disarmed by the simple phrasing of a request, regardless of its merit. Consider, for example, requests that sound reasonable but offer no real basis for compliance. Ellen Langer and colleagues (1978) have found that words alone can sometimes trick us into submission. In their research, an experimenter approached people who were using a library photocopying machine and asked to cut in. Three different versions of the request were used. In one, participants were simply asked, ‘Excuse me. I have five pages. May I use the machine?’ In a second version, the request was justified by the added phrase ‘because I’m in a rush’. As you would expect, more participants stepped aside when the request was justified (94%) than when it was not (60%). A third version of the request, however, suggests that the reason offered had little to do with the increase in compliance. In this case, participants heard the following: ‘Excuse me. I have five pages. May I use the machine because I have to make some copies?’ If you read this request closely, you will see that it really offered no reason at all. Yet 93% in this condition complied! It was as if the appearance of a reason, triggered by the word because, was all that was necessary. Indeed, Langer (1989) finds that the mind is often on ‘automatic pilot’ – we respond mindlessly to words without fully processing the information they are supposed to convey. At least for requests that are small, ‘sweet nothings’ may be enough to win compliance. It is interesting that although a state of mindlessness can make us vulnerable to compliance, it can also have the opposite effect. For example, many city dwellers will automatically walk past beggars on the street looking for a handout. Perhaps the way to increase compliance in such situations is to disrupt this mindless refusal response by making a request that is so unusual that it piques the target person’s interest. To test this hypothesis, researchers had a confederate approach people on the street and make a request that was either typical (‘Can you spare a quarter?’) or atypical (‘Can you spare 17 cents?’). The result? Atypical pleas elicited more comments and questions from those who were targeted – and produced a 60% increase in the number of people who gave money (Santos, Leve, & Pratkanis, 1994). In another study, researchers who went door to door selling greeting cards gained more compliance when they disrupted the mindless process and reframed the sales pitch by presenting the price as ‘three hundred pennies – that’s three dollars, it’s a bargain’ than when they simply asked for three dollars (Davis & Knowles, 1999).

The norm of reciprocity A simple, unstated, but powerful rule of social behaviour known as the norm of reciprocity dictates that we treat others as they have treated us (Gouldner, 1960). On the negative side, this norm can be used to sanction retaliation against those who cause us harm – ‘an eye for an eye’. On the positive side, it leads us to feel obliged to repay others for acts of kindness. Thus, whenever we receive gifts, invitations and free samples, we usually go out of our way to return the favour. The norm of reciprocity contributes to the predictability and fairness of social interaction. However, it can also be used to exploit us. For example, research conducted in restaurants shows that waiters and waitresses can increase their tip percentages by placing lollies on the bill tray (Strohmetz, Rind, Fisher, & Lynn, 2002). Christian Happ and colleagues (2016) conducted a study in which research assistants approached participants on the street for a study on IT behaviour. Embedded in the short interview was a question asking participants for their password to their workplace or school account – or at least a password hint. Smartly, only 29.8% divulged this personal information. However, when the researcher casually offered the participant a package of chocolate just before the request, compliance increased to 47.9%! But does receiving a favour make us feel indebted forever, or is there a time limit to the social obligation that is so quietly unleashed? In the chocolate–password study, when the chocolate was offered at the start

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of the interview rather than right before the request, compliance dropped from 47.9% to 39.9% (Happ, Melzer, & Steffgen, 2016). People may feel compelled to reciprocate, but that feeling – at least for small acts of kindness – is relatively short-lived. Further, while favours can be ‘cashed in’ immediately, after one week they lose their effectiveness in prompting compliance (Burger, Horita, Kinoshita, Roberts, & Vera, 1997).

CULTURAL DIVERSITY Cultures may differ in terms of their reciprocation wariness – with interesting consequences for social behaviour. Imagine that you bump into a casual friend at the airport, stop for a drink, and the friend offers to pay for it. Would you let the friend pay? Or, suppose a sales clerk in a supermarket offered you a free sample of soup to taste. Would you accept the offer? Theorising that the norm of reciprocity operates with particular force in collectivist cultures that foster interdependence, Hao Shen and colleagues (2011) conducted a series of studies in which they posed these kinds of questions to Chinese university students from Hong Kong and to white American students from Canada. As you can see in Figure 7.9, the students from China were consistently less willing to accept the favour. Additional questioning revealed that these participants were more likely to see the gift giver’s motives as self-serving and to feel uncomfortably indebted by the situation.

FIGURE 7.9 Cultural differences in accepting favours People from China and Canada rated the likelihood that they would accept a free sample of soup in a supermarket (left) or a free drink from a casual friend at an airport (right). Feeling a greater burden to reciprocate, Chinese participants in both cases said they were less likely to accept the gift.

6

Willingness to accept

CULTURAL DIFFERENCES IN RECIPROCATION

5

4

3

2

Supermarket: soup sample? Chinese

Airport: free drink?

Canadian

Source: Shen, H., Wan, F., & Wyer, R. S. (2011). Cross-cultural differences in the refusal to accept a small gift: The differential influence of reciprocity norms on Asians and North Americans. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 100, 271–281.

Sequential request strategies People who raise money or sell for a living know that it often takes more than a single plea to win over a potential donor or customer. Social psychologists share this knowledge and have studied several compliance techniques that are based on making two or more related requests. Click! The first request sets the trap. Snap! The second captures the prey. In a fascinating book entitled Influence: Science and Practice, Robert Cialdini (2009) describes a number of sequential request tactics in vivid detail. Other social psychologists have continued in this tradition (Boster, 2016; Dolinski, 2016; Kenrick, Golstein, & Braver, 2012). We will review four of these methods, as outlined in Table 7.3. Foot-in-the-door technique

A two-step compliance technique in which an influencer sets the stage for the real request by first getting a person to comply with a much smaller request.

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Foot-in-the-door technique Folk wisdom has it that one way to get a person to comply with a sizeable request is to start small. First devised by travelling salespeople peddling vacuum cleaners, hairbrushes, cosmetics, magazine subscriptions and encyclopaedias to homeowners, the trick is to somehow get your ‘foot in the door’. The expression need not be taken literally, of course. The point of the foot-in-the-door technique is to break the ice with a small initial request that the target cannot easily refuse. Once that first commitment is elicited, the chances are increased that another, larger request will succeed.

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TABLE 7.3 Sequential request strategies Various compliance techniques are based on a sequence of two related requests. Click! The first request sets the trap. Snap! The second captures the prey. Research has shown that the four sequential request strategies summarised in this table are all effective.

Request shifts

Technique

Description

From small to large

Foot in the door

Begin with a very small request, secure agreement, then make a separate, larger request.

Lowballing

Secure agreement with a request and then increase the size of that request by revealing hidden costs.

Door in the face

Begin with a very large request that will be rejected; then follow that up with a more modest request.

That’s not all

Begin with a somewhat inflated request, then immediately decrease the apparent size of that request by offering a discount or bonus.

From large to small

Jonathan Freedman and Scott Fraser (1966) arranged an experimenter to call a large number of females in North America and ask if they would be willing to answer some questions about household products. Those who consented were then asked a few quick and innocuous questions and thanked for their assistance. Three days later, the experimenter called back and made a considerable, almost outrageous, request. He asked the women if they would allow several men into their homes for two hours to take an inventory of their household products. A separate group of women were simply presented with the in-home request. The foot-in-the-door technique proved to be very effective. When the participants were confronted with only the very intrusive request, 22% consented. Yet the rate of agreement among those who had been surveyed earlier more than doubled, to 53%. This basic result has been repeated over and over. People are more likely to donate time, money, food, blood, the use of their home and other resources once they have been induced to go along with a small initial request. Although the effect is not always as dramatic as that obtained by Freedman and Fraser, it increases compliance rates, on average, by about 13% (Burger, 1999). The practical implications of the foot-in-the-door technique are obvious. But why does it work? Over the years, several explanations have been suggested. One that seems plausible is based on self-perception theory (described in Chapter 6) – that people infer their attitudes by observing their own behaviour. This explanation suggests that a two-step process is at work. First, by observing your own behaviour in the initial situation, you come to see yourself as the kind of person who is generally cooperative when approached with a request. Second, when confronted with the more burdensome request, you seek to respond in ways that maintain this new self-image. Based on a review of dozens of studies, Jerry Burger (1999) concludes that the research generally supports the self-perception account. By this logic, if the first request is too trivial or if participants are paid for the first act of compliance, they will not later come to view themselves as inherently cooperative. Under these conditions, the technique does not work. Likewise, according to the self-perception account, the effect occurs only when people are motivated to be consistent with their self-images. If participants do not care about the implication of complying with the initial request, again the technique does not work. More recent studies, however, suggest that the self-perception view cannot account entirely for the foot-in-the-door technique. For instance, even trivial initial requests that everyone agrees to can increase compliance (Dolinski, 2012). Foot-in-the-door effects emerge when the requester is perfumed with vanilla (an appealing scent), but not when perfumed with camphor (a less appealing scent) (Saint-Bauzel & Fointiat, 2012). Further, the foot-in-the-door process can still occur even when a person tries to comply with the initial small request but fails. In a series of studies, Dariusz Dolinski (2000) found that when people were asked if they could find directions to a non-existent street address or decipher an unreadable message – small favours that they could not satisfy – they, too, become more compliant with the next request. Knowing that a foot in the door increases compliance rates is both exciting and troubling – exciting for the owner of the foot, but troubling for the owner of the door. Might the impact of the technique differ according to culture? To find out, see the following Cultural Diversity feature.

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CULTURAL DIVERSITY COMPLIANCE TECHNIQUES AROUND THE WORLD Are compliance techniques similarly effective around the world? The answer is more complicated than a simple yes or no, at least with the foot-in-the-door technique. Petia Petrova and colleagues (2007) were interested to know whether US and Chinese participants would respond similarly to a small request followed, later, by a large request. The authors hypothesised that the collectivistic nature of Chinese culture would drive higher initial compliance with the first request, but also that the individualistic nature of North American society would drive a higher need to be consistent, and thus more compliance with

the second request. Would ‘foot in the door’ work better in the US? To test this, participants from the two countries were first asked, via email, to complete a 20-minute survey. One month later, they were asked to complete a longer, 40-minute survey. Did cultural orientation affect the rates of compliance? In short, yes. Chinese students were indeed more likely to comply with the initial request, as expected. When it came to the second request, however, US participants were twice as likely as Chinese participants to complete the longer survey if they had allowed the ‘foot in the door’ by completing the first survey.

Lowballing

Lowballing

A two-step compliance technique in which the influencer secures agreement with a request but then increases the size of that request by revealing hidden costs.

Another two-step trap, arguably the most unscrupulous of all compliance techniques, is also based on the ‘start small’ idea. Imagine yourself in the following situation. You’re at a local car dealership. After some negotiation, the salesperson offers a great price on the car of your choice. You cast aside other considerations and shake hands on the deal and as the salesperson goes off to ‘write it up’, you begin to feel the thrill of owning a new car. Absorbed in fantasy, you are suddenly interrupted by the return of the salesperson. ‘I’m sorry’, he says. ‘The manager would not approve the sale. We have to raise the price by another $450. I’m afraid that’s the best we can do’. As the victim of an all-too-common trick known as lowballing, you are now faced with a difficult decision. On the one hand, you really like the car; and the more you think about it, the better it looks. On the other hand, you do not want to pay more than you bargained for and you have an uneasy feeling in the pit of your stomach that you’re being duped. What do you do? Salespeople who use this tactic are betting that you will make the purchase despite the added cost. If the way research participants behave is any indication, they are often right. In one study, experimenters phoned introductory psychology students and asked if they would be willing to participate in a study for extra credit. Some were told up front that the session would begin at the uncivilised hour of 7 a.m. Knowing that, only 31% volunteered. But other participants were lowballed. Only after they agreed to participate did the experimenter inform them of the 7 a.m. starting time. Would that be okay? Whether or not it was, the procedure achieved its objective – the signup rate rose to 56% (Cialdini, Cacioppo, Bassett, & Miller, 1978). A meta-analysis of 19 studies revealed that application of the lowball technique increased the odds of compliance by 2.41 (Burger & Caputo, 2015). Disturbing as it may be, lowballing is an interesting technique. Surely, once the lowball offer has been thrown, many recipients suspect that they were misled. Yet they go along. Why? Jerry Burger and Deanna Caputo outline three reasons: 1 As people get increasingly committed to a course of action, they grow more resistant to changing their mind, even if the initial reasons for the action have been changed or withdrawn entirely. 2 When people do not suspect duplicity, they feel a nagging sense of unfulfilled obligation to the person with whom they negotiated. 3 Initial compliance triggers self-presentation concerns, in a similar way to the foot-in-the-door technique. This three-part view explains why lowballing works better when the second request is made by the same person than by someone else (Burger & Petty, 1981) and why people are most vulnerable to the lowball when they make their commitment in public rather than in private (Burger & Cornelius, 2003).

Door-in-the-face technique Although shifting from an initial small request to a larger one can be effective, as in the foot-in-the-door and lowball techniques, oddly enough the opposite is also true. Cialdini (2007) describes the time he was approached by a boy scout and asked to buy two $5 tickets to an upcoming circus. Having better things to do with his time and money, he declined. Then the boy asked if he would be interested in buying chocolate bars at a dollar apiece. Even though he does not particularly like chocolate, Cialdini – an expert on social influence – bought two of them. After a moment’s reflection, he realised what had happened. Whether 290

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the Boy Scout planned it that way or not, Cialdini had fallen for what is known as the door-in-the-face technique; that is, an individual makes an initial request that is so large it is sure to be rejected and then comes back with a second, more reasonable request. The question is: ‘Will the second request fare better after the first one has been declined?’ Plagued by the sight of uneaten chocolate bars, Cialdini and colleagues (1975) tested the effectiveness of the door-inthe-face technique. They stopped university students on campus and asked if they would volunteer to work without pay at a counselling centre for juvenile delinquents. The time commitment would be forbidding: roughly two hours a week for the next two years! Not surprisingly, everyone who was approached politely slammed the proverbial door in the experimenter’s face. But then the experimenter followed up with a more modest proposal, asking the students if they would be willing to take a group of kids on a twohour trip to the zoo. The strategy worked like a charm. Only 17% of the students confronted with only the second request agreed. But of those who initially declined the first request, 50% said yes to the zoo trip. Importantly, the door-in-the-face technique does not elicit mere empty promises. Most research participants who comply subsequently end up doing what they agreed to do (Cialdini & Ascani, 1976). Why is the door-in-the-face technique such an effective trap? One possibility involves the principle of perceptual contrast: To the person exposed to a very large initial request, the second request ‘seems smaller’. Purchasing chocolate bars worth $2 is not bad compared with circus tickets for $10. Likewise, taking a group of kids to the zoo seems trivial compared with two years of volunteer work. As intuitively sensible as this explanation seems, Cialdini and colleagues (1975) concluded that perceptual contrast is only partly responsible for the effect. When participants only heard the large request without actually having to reject it, their rate of compliance with the second request (25%) was only slightly larger than the 17% rate of compliance exhibited by those who heard only the small request. A more compelling explanation for the effect involves the notion of reciprocal concessions. A close cousin of the reciprocity norm, this refers to the pressure to respond to changes in a bargaining position. When an individual backs down from a large request to a smaller one, we view that move as a concession that we should match by our own compliance. The bigger the concession, the more the door-in-the-face technique produces compliance (Feeley, Fico, Shaw, Lee, & Griffin, 2017). Sensibly from the reciprocal concession view, the door-inthe-face technique does not work if the second request is made by a different person (Cialdini et al., 1975).

CHAPTER SEVEN

Door-in-the-face technique

A two-step compliance technique in which an influencer prefaces the real request with one that is so large that it is rejected.

An effective way to get someone to do you a favour is to make a first request that is so large the person is sure to reject it, before making your actual request.

TRUE

That’s not all, folks! If the notion of reciprocal concessions is correct, then a person should not actually have to refuse the initial offer in order for the shift to a smaller request to work. Indeed, another familiar sales strategy manages to use concession without first eliciting refusal. In this strategy, a product is offered at a particular price, but then, before the buyer has a chance to respond, the seller adds, ‘And that’s not all!’ At that point, either the original price is reduced or a bonus is offered to sweeten the pot. The seller, of course, intends all along to make the so-called concession. This ploy, called the that’s-not-all technique, seems transparent, right? Surely no one falls for it, right? Jerry Burger (1986) was not so sure. He predicted that people are more likely to make a purchase when a deal seems to have improved than when the same deal is offered right from the start. To test this hypothesis, Burger set up a booth at a campus fair and sold cupcakes. Some customers who approached the table were told that the cupcakes cost 75 cents each. Others were told that they cost a dollar, but then, before they could respond, the price was reduced to 75 cents. Rationally speaking, Burger’s manipulation did not affect the ultimate price, so it should not have affected sales. But it did. When customers were led to believe that the final price represented a reduction, sales increased from 44% to 73%.

That’s-not-all technique

A two-step compliance technique in which the influencer begins with an inflated request, then decreases its apparent size by offering a discount or bonus.

Resisting sequential compliance At this point, let us step back and look at the various compliance tactics described in this section. All of them are based on a two-step process that involves a shift from a request of one size to another. What differs is whether the small or large request comes first and how the transition between steps is made (refer again to Table 7.3). Moreover, all these strategies work in subtle ways by manipulating a target person’s self-image, commitment to the product, feelings of obligation to the seller, or perceptions of the real request. It is even possible to increase compliance by first asking ‘How are you feeling?’ (Howard, 1990) or by claiming some coincidental similarity like having the same first name or birthday (Burger, Messian, Patel, del Prado, & Anderson, 2004). When you consider these various traps, you have to wonder whether it is ever possible to escape. However, one likely escape route is identifying when sequential compliance is being used. It would seem logical to call it out and simply say no. Yet, many people find it difficult to assert themselves in social

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situations and resist compliance requests. Faced with an unreasonable request from a friend, spouse or stranger, they become anxious at the mere thought of putting a foot down and refusing to comply. There are times when it is uncomfortable for anyone to say no. However, just as we can maintain our autonomy in the face of conformity pressures, we can also refuse direct requests – even clever ones. The trap may be set, but you do not have to get caught. Compliance techniques work smoothly only if they are hidden from view. The problem is that they are not only attempts to influence us – they are also deceptive. Flattery, gifts and other ploys often win compliance, but not if perceived as insincere (Jones, 1964) or if the target has a high level of reciprocity wariness (Eisenberger, Cotterell & Marvel, 1987). Likewise, the sequential request traps are powerful only to the extent that they are subtle and cannot be seen for what they are (Schwarzwald, Raz, & Zvibel, 1979). People do not like to be hustled. In fact, feeling manipulated typically leads us to react with anger, psychological reactance and stubborn noncompliance – unless the request is a command and the requester is a figure of authority. It is this circumstance we turn to next.

OBEDIENCE Taught from birth that it is important to respect legitimate forms of leadership, people think twice before defying parents, teachers, employers, coaches and government officials. One problem with this is that mere symbols of authority – titles, uniforms, badges or the trappings of success, even without the necessary credentials – can sometimes turn ordinary people into docile servants. Leonard Bickman (1974) demonstrated this phenomenon of obedience – that is, change that is produced Obedience Behaviour change in an individual by the commands of authority – in a series of studies in which a male research assistant produced by the stopped passers-by on the street and ordered them to do something unusual. Sometimes he pointed to commands of authority. a paper bag on the ground and said, ‘Pick up this bag for me!’ At other times, he pointed to an individual standing beside a parked car and said, ‘This fellow is overparked at the meter but doesn’t have any change. Give him a dime!’ Would anyone really take this guy seriously? When he was dressed in street clothes, only a third of the people he stopped followed his orders. But when he wore a security guard’s uniform, nearly nine out of every ten people obeyed! Even when the uniformed assistant walked away and turned the corner after issuing his command, the vast majority of passers-by followed his orders. Clearly, uniforms signify the power of authority (Bushman, 1988). Blind obedience such as this may be amusing, but if people are willing to take orders from a total stranger, how far will they go when it really matters? As the pages of history attest, the implications are sobering. In World War II, Nazi officials participated in the deaths of millions of Jews, as well as Poles, Russians, Roma, and gay and lesbian people. Yet when tried for these crimes, all of them raised the same defence: ‘I was following orders’ (see Figure 7.10). Surely, you may be thinking, the Holocaust was a historical anomaly that says more about the Nazis as a group of bigoted, hateful and pathologically frustrated individuals than about FIGURE 7.10 The devastating effects of obedience the situations that lead people in general to commit acts of Taken to the extreme, blind obedience can have devastating destructive obedience. In Hitler’s Willing Executioners, historian results. Nazi officials killed millions during World War II, and Daniel Goldhagen (1996) argued on the basis of past records that many said they did it because they were ‘just following orders’. many German officials were willing participants in the Holocaust rather than just mere ordinary people forced to follow orders. Citing historical records, others have similarly argued that Nazi killers knew, believed in and celebrated their mission (Cesarani, 2004; Haslam & Reicher, 2007; Vetlesen, 2005). Yet two lines of evidence suggest that laying blame on the German people is too simple as an explanation of what happened. First, interviews with Nazi war criminals and doctors who worked in concentration camps suggested, at least to some, the provocative and disturbing conclusion that these people were ‘utterly ordinary’ (Arendt, 1963; Lifton, 1986; Von Lang & Sibyll, 1983). Second, the monstrous events of World War II do not stand alone in modern history. Even today, various crimes of obedience – suicide bombings, abuse and torture among them – are being committed throughout the world (Haritos-Fatouros, Source: Topham/The Image Works. 2002; Kelman & Hamilton, 1989; Victoroff & Kruglanski, 2009). 292

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Crimes of obedience are also found in the corporate world, where business leaders and their subordinates ‘morally disengage’ from fraud and other unethical actions by denying personal responsibility, minimising consequences and dehumanising victims (Beu & Buckley, 2004; Moore, Detert, Treviño, Baker, & Mayer, 2012). On extraordinary but rare occasions, obedience is carried to its ultimate limit. In 1978, 900 members of the People’s Temple cult obeyed a command from Reverend Jim Jones to kill themselves by drinking poison. In 1997, in California, Marshall Applewhite, the leader of the Heaven’s Gate cult, killed himself and convinced 37 followers to do the same. Fanatic cult members have committed mass suicide before, and they will likely do so again (Galanter, 1999).

Milgram’s research: forces of destructive obedience During the time that Adolf Eichmann was being tried in Jerusalem for his Nazi war crimes, Stanley Milgram (1963) began a dramatic series of 18 experiments that culminated in his 1974 book Obedience to Authority. Milgram did not realise it at the time, nor did his research participants, that they were about to make history in one of the most famous psychology experiments ever conducted. Imagine yourself as one of the approximately 1000 participants who found themselves in the following situation (or a variation of it) across Milgram’s program of research. The experience begins when you arrive at a Yale University laboratory and meet two men. One is the experimenter, a stern young man dressed in a grey lab coat and carrying a clipboard. The other is a middle-aged gentleman named Mr Wallace, an accountant who is slightly overweight and average in appearance. You exchange quick introductions, and then the experimenter explains that you and your co-participant will take part in a study on the effects of punishment on learning. After lots have been drawn, it is determined that you will serve as the teacher and that Mr Wallace will be the learner. So far, so good. Soon, however, the situation takes on a more ominous tone. You find out that your job is to test the learner’s memory and administer electric shocks of increasing intensity whenever he makes a mistake. You are then escorted into another room, where the experimenter straps Mr Wallace into a chair, rolls up his sleeves, attaches electrodes to his arms and applies ‘electrode paste’ to prevent blisters and burns. As if that is not bad enough, you may overhear Mr Wallace telling the experimenter that he has a heart problem. The experimenter responds by conceding that the shocks will be painful but reassures Mr Wallace that the procedure will not cause ‘permanent tissue damage’. In the meantime, you can personally vouch for how painful the shocks are because the experimenter stings you with one that is supposed to be mild. The experimenter then takes you back to the main room, where you are seated in front of a ‘shock generator’, a machine with 30 switches that range from 15 volts, labelled ‘slight shock’, to 450 volts, labelled ‘XXX’ (see Figure 7.11). FIGURE 7.11 Milgram’s shock generator This is the shock generator Milgram used (left). It still exists and can be seen in the Archives of the History of American Psychology at the University of Akron. Participants in Milgram’s studies believed they were shocking Mr Wallace, the man being strapped into the chair (right).

Source: From the film Obedience by Stanley Milgram. Copyright 1965 and distributed by The Penn State University Audio Visual Services.

Your role in this experiment is straightforward. First you read a list of word pairs to Mr Wallace through a microphone. Then you test his memory with a series of multiple-choice questions. The learner answers each question by pressing one of four switches that light up signals on the shock generator. If his answer

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is correct, you move on to the next question. If it is incorrect, you announce the correct answer and shock him. When you press the appropriate shock switch, a red light flashes above it, relay switches click inside the machine, and you hear a loud buzzing sound go off in the learner’s room. After each wrong answer, you are told, the intensity of the shock should be increased by 15 volts. You are not aware, of course, that the experiment is rigged and that Mr Wallace – who is actually a confederate – is never really shocked. As far as you know, he gets zapped each time you press one of the switches. As the session proceeds, the learner makes more and more errors, leading you to work your way up the shock scale. As you reach 75, 90 and 105 volts, you hear the learner grunt in pain. At 120 volts, he begins to shout. If you are still in it at 150 volts, you can hear the learner cry out, ‘Experimenter! That’s all. Get me out of here. My heart’s starting to bother me now. I refuse to go on!’ Screams of agony and protest continue. At 300 volts, he says he absolutely refuses to continue. By the time you surpass 330 volts, the learner falls silent and fails to respond – not to be heard from again. Table 7.4 lists ‘the learner’s’ responses in grim detail. TABLE 7.4 The learner’s protests in the Milgram experiment As participants administered progressively more intense shocks, they heard the learner moan, groan, protest and complain. All

participants heard the same programmed set of responses. Eventually, the learner fell silent and ceased to respond.

75 volts

Ugh!

90 volts

Ugh!

105 volts

Ugh! (louder)

120 volts

Ugh! Hey, this really hurts!

135 volts

Ugh!!

150 volts

Ugh!!! Experimenter! That’s all. Get me out of here. I told you I had heart trouble. My heart’s starting to bother me now. Get me out of here, please. My heart’s starting to bother me. I refuse to go on. Let me out.

165 volts

Ugh! Let me out! (shouting)

180 volts

Ugh! I can’t stand the pain. Let me out of here! (shouting)

195 volts

Ugh! Let me out of here. Let me out of here. My heart’s bothering me. Let me out of here! You have no right to keep me here! Let me out! Let me out of here! Let me out! Let me out of here! My heart’s bothering me. Let me out! Let me out!

210 volts

Ugh!! Experimenter! Get me out of here. I’ve had enough. I won’t be in the experiment any more.

225 volts

Ugh!

240 volts

Ugh!

255 volts

Ugh! Get me out of here.

270 volts

(Agonised scream) Let me out of here. Let me out of here. Let me out of here. Let me out. Do you hear? Let me out of here.

285 volts

(Agonised scream)

300 volts

(Agonised scream) I absolutely refuse to answer any more. Get me out of here. You can’t hold me here. Get me out. Get me out of here.

315 volts

(Intensely agonised scream) I told you I refuse to answer. I’m no longer part of this experiment.

330 volts

(Intense and prolonged agonised scream) Let me out of here. Let me out of here. My heart’s bothering me. Let me out, I tell you. (Hysterically) Let me out of here. Let me out of here. You have no right to hold me here. Let me out! Let me out! Let me out! Let me out of here! Let me out! Let me out! Source: Milgram, S. (1974). Obedience to authority: An experimental view, (pp. 56–57). Copyright © 1974 by Stanley Milgram. Used by permission of HarperCollins Publishers.

Somewhere along the line, you turn to the experimenter for guidance. ‘What should I do? Don’t you think I should stop? Shouldn’t we at least check on him?’ You might even confront the experimenter head-on and refuse to continue. Yet in answer to your inquiries, the experimenter – firm in his tone and seemingly unaffected by the learner’s distress – prods you along as follows: • Please continue (or please go on). • The experiment requires that you continue. 294

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• •

It is absolutely essential that you continue. You have no other choice; you must go on. What do you do? In a situation that begins to feel more and more like a bad dream, do you follow your own conscience or obey the experimenter? Milgram described this procedure to psychiatrists, university students and middle-class adults, and he asked them to predict how they would behave. On average, these groups estimated that they would call it quits at the 135-volt level. Not a single person thought he or she would go all the way to 450 volts. When asked to predict the percentage of other people who would deliver the maximum shock, those interviewed gave similar estimates. The psychiatrists estimated that only one out of a thousand people would exhibit that kind of extreme obedience. They were wrong. In the most popular of Milgram’s many iterations of his obedience study, involving 40 men from the surrounding New Haven community, participants exhibited an alarming degree of obedience, administering an average of 27 out of 30 possible shocks. In fact, 26 of the 40 participants – that is 65% – delivered the ultimate punishment of 450 volts. For many years, the ethics of this research has been the focus of extensive debate. Those who say it was unethical point to the potential psychological harm that Milgram’s participants were exposed to. Others emphasise the profound contribution it has made to our understanding of an important social problem. Some conclude that, on balance, understanding the danger that destructive obedience poses for all humankind justified Milgram’s unorthodox methods. Consider both sides of the debate (summarised in Chapter 1) and make your own judgement. Here we turn to four features of the context of Milgram’s studies and the research they inspired: the participant, the authority, the victim, and the procedure.

The participant At first glance, you may see these results as a lesson in the psychology of cruelty and conclude that Milgram’s participants were seriously disturbed. But research does not support such a simple explanation. To begin with, those in a control group who were not prodded along by an experimenter refused to continue early into the shock sequence. What is more, Milgram found that virtually all participants, including those who had administered severe shocks, were tormented by the experience. Many of them pleaded with the experimenter to let them stop. When he refused, they went on. But in the process, they trembled, stuttered, groaned, perspired, bit their lips and dug their fingernails into their flesh. Some burst into fits of nervous laughter. Was the 65% ‘baseline’ level of obedience mentioned previously attributable to the unique sample of male participants? Not at all. Forty women who participated in a later study exhibited precisely the same level of obedience – 65% threw the 450-volt switch. Before you jump to the conclusion that something was amiss in this US town, consider the fact that obedience in this paradigm has been observed in several different cultures and with children as well as university students and older adults, as described in the following Cultural Diversity feature. Obedience in the Milgram situation is so pervasive that it led one author to ask, ‘Are we all Nazis?’ (Askenasy, 1978).

Most participants in an obedience experiment would not administer severe shocks to an innocent person if ordered to.

FALSE

CULTURAL DIVERSITY OBEDIENCE: WORLDWIDE CONSISTENCY OR VARIATION? While obedience is indeed a robust phenomenon, variation exists around the world. In 2012, Thomas Blass surveyed the literature to examine this variation. The average full-obedience rates (i.e., those who obeyed to the end) from Milgram-style studies conducted around the world are as follows: South Africa (87.5%), Germany (85%), Italy (85%), Austria (80%), Jordan (68%), US (60.9%), Spain (50%), India (42.5%) and Australia (28%).

Observing this variability and explaining this variability are certainly two separate endeavours. Blass points out that ‘modal personality’ (i.e., culturally common traits or values) and individualism/collectivism do not explain this variability. What is likely is that subtle differences in the experimental procedure and/or the demographic characteristics of the participant samples influenced the obedience rates. That said, it is interesting to reflect on how culture, however determined, might influence obedience.

The answer, of course, is no. An individual’s character can make a difference, and some people, depending on the situation, are far more obedient than others. In the aftermath of World War II, a group of social scientists, searching for the root causes of prejudice, sought to identify individuals with an authoritarian personality and developed a questionnaire to measure it (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950; Stone, Lederer, & Christie, 1993). What they found is that people who get high scores on the questionnaire are rigid, dogmatic, sexually repressed, ethnocentric, intolerant of dissent, and punitive. They are submissive towards figures of authority but aggressive towards subordinates. Indeed, people with high scores are also more willing than low scorers to administer high-intensity shocks in Milgram’s obedience situation (Elms & Milgram, 1966). Copyright 2020 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-202

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Although personality characteristics may make someone vulnerable or resistant to destructive obedience, what seems to matter most is the situation in which people find themselves. By carefully altering particular aspects of his basic scenario, Milgram identified factors that increase and decrease the 65% rate of obedience in more than 20 variations of the basic experiment (see Figure 7.12). Three factors in addition to characteristics of the participants are important: the authority figure, the proximity of the victim and the experimental procedure (Blass, 1992; Miller, 1986). FIGURE 7.12 Factors that influence obedience Milgram varied many factors in his research program. Without commands from an experimenter, fewer than 3% of the participants exhibited full obedience. Yet in the standard baseline condition, 65% of male and female participants followed the orders. To identify factors that might reduce this level, Milgram varied the location of the experiment, the status of the authority, the participant’s proximity to the victim, and the presence of confederates who rebel. The effects of these variations are illustrated here. Control — no commands Baseline — males Baseline — females Office building Ordinary person in charge Experimenter in remote location Victim in same room as participant Participant required to touch victim Two confederates rebel 10

20

30

40

50

60

70

Percentage of participants who exhibited full obedience Source: Milgram, S. (1974). Obedience to authority: An experimental view. New York, NY: Harper & Row.

The authority What is perhaps most remarkable about Milgram’s findings is that a lab-coated experimenter is not a powerful figure of authority. Unlike a military superior, employer, coach or teacher, the experimenter in Milgram’s research could not ultimately enforce his commands. Still, his physical presence and his apparent legitimacy played major roles in drawing obedience. When Milgram diminished the experimenter’s status by moving his laboratory from the distinguished surroundings of Yale University to a run-down urban office building in a nearby town, the rate of total obedience dropped to 48%. When the experimenter was replaced by an ordinary person – supposedly another participant – there was a sharp reduction to 20%. Similarly, Milgram found that when the experimenter was in charge but issued his commands by telephone, only 21% fully obeyed. (In fact, when the experimenter was not watching, many participants in this condition feigned obedience by pressing the 15-volt switch.) One conclusion, then, is clear. At least in the Milgram setting, destructive obedience requires the physical presence of a prestigious authority figure. If an experimenter can exert such control over research participants, imagine the control wielded by truly powerful authority figures – whether they are present or not. An intriguing field study examined the extent to which hospital nurses would obey unreasonable orders from a doctor. Using a fictitious name, a male physician called several female nurses on the phone and told them to administer a drug to a specific patient. His order violated hospital regulations – the drug was uncommon, the dosage was too large, and the effects could have been harmful. Yet out of the 22 nurses who were contacted, 21 had to be stopped as they prepared to obey the doctor’s orders (Hofling, Brotzman, Dalrymple, Graves, & Pierce, 1966).

The victim Situational characteristics of the victim are also important factors in destructive obedience. Were Milgram’s participants able to distance themselves emotionally from the consequences of their actions because they were physically separated from the learner? 296

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To test the impact of a victim’s proximity on destructive obedience, Milgram seated the learner in one of his studies in the same room as the participant. Under these conditions, only 40% fully obeyed. When participants were required to physically grasp the victim’s hand and force it onto a metal shock plate, full obedience dropped to 30%. These findings represent significant reductions from the 65% of the most wellknown version of the Milgram paradigm. Milgram ran one last variation, never published, that was only recently discovered in the archive of Milgram’s records at Yale University’s library. Run out of a rundown office building in a nearby city, he called it the ‘Bring-a-Friend’ condition. In this situation, 20 male participants were told to bring a friend, neighbour, family member, or co-worker. When they arrived, the two participants drew straws to determine who would be the teacher and who the learner. Unbeknownst to the teacher, Milgram then coached the learner on how to play the role and react to the shocks according to script, at times pleading to the teacher by name. Would participants obey less in this version? Yes. Compared to a Wallace-as-victim condition run in the same location, where the full obedience rate was 50%, the obedience rate in the friend condition was only 15%. Milgram’s participants were indeed capable of resistance when they had a prior relationship with the victim (Rochat & Blass, 2014).

The procedure Finally, there is the situation created by Milgram. A close look at the dilemma his participants faced reveals four important aspects of the experimental procedure. First, participants were led to feel relieved of any personal sense of responsibility for the victim’s welfare. The experimenter said up front that he was accountable. When participants were led to believe that they were responsible, their levels of obedience dropped considerably (Tilker, 1970). The ramifications of this finding are immense. In the military and other organisations, individuals often occupy positions in a hierarchical chain of command. Eichmann was a middle-level bureaucrat who received orders from Hitler and transmitted them to others for implementation. Caught between individuals who make policy and those who carry it out, how personally responsible do those in the middle feel? Wesley Kilham and Leon Mann (1974) examined this issue in an obedience study that cast participants in one of two roles: the transmitter who took orders from the experimenter and passed them on, and the executant who actually pressed the shock levers. As they predicted, transmitters were more obedient (54%) than executants (28%). The second feature of Milgram’s scenario that promoted obedience is gradual escalation. Participants began the session by delivering mild shocks and then only gradually escalated to voltage levels of high intensity. After all, what is another 15 volts compared with the current level? By the time participants realised the frightening implications of what they were doing, it had become more difficult for them to escape (Gilbert, 1981; Packer, 2008). This sequence is much like the foot-in-the-door technique. In Milgram’s words, people become ‘integrated into a situation that carries its own momentum. The subject’s problem … is how to become disengaged from a situation which is moving in an altogether ugly direction’ (1974, p. 73). We should point out that obedience by momentum is not unique to Milgram’s research paradigm. As reported by Amnesty International, many countries still torture political prisoners, and those who are recruited for the dirty work are trained, in part, through an escalating series of commitments (Haritos-Fatouros, 2002). According to Burger (2014), the third feature of Milgram’s situation that made it difficult for participants to resist is that participants found themselves in a novel situation, unimaginable, like no other they have been in before. As such, they did not know what the norms were, how others have reacted, or how they were supposed to respond. That is why, in a variation of Milgram’s research in which two confederates posed as co-participants who refused to continue, the full obedience rate plummeted to 10% (see Figure 7.12). The fourth aspect of the procedure that promoted obedience is that the task was quickly paced. At the outset, Milgram’s experimenter instructed participants to work at a ‘brisk pace’. Indeed, as one can plainly see in the film that Milgram had produced of his sessions, those who hesitated were immediately prompted to proceed. All this gave participants no time to ponder, consider their values and their options, think about possible consequences, or make careful decisions.

Milgram in the twenty-first century When Stanley Milgram published the results of his first experiment in 1963, at the age of 28, a New York Times headline read: ‘Sixty-Five Percent in Test Blindly Obey Order to Inflict Pain’. Milgram had pierced the public consciousness and was poised to become an important and controversial figure in psychology –

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and beyond. In a fascinating biography, Thomas Blass (2004) tells of how Milgram became interested in obedience and the impact his studies have had on social scientists, legal scholars, the US military and popular culture around the world. Milgram’s book has been translated into 11 languages. Now, in an age filled with threats of global conflict, extremism, terrorism, economic desperation and new forms of lethal weaponry, obedience to authority is an issue of such importance that social psychologists all over the world continue to ponder its ramifications (Benjamin & Simpson, 2009; Blass, 2009; Jetten & Mols, 2014; Reicher, Haslam, & Miller, 2014). Would these results be repeated today? Would you obey the commands of Milgram’s experimenter? Due to the ethical concerns discussed in Chapter 1 and in this chapter previously, you are unlikely to be asked to participate in the full-blown experiment. Yet, two approaches have been used to study similar processes.

Harassment instead of shocks One approach to study similar processes seen in Milgram’s experiment involves creating a different but analogous situation. Dutch researchers Wim Meeus and Quinten Raaijmakers (1995) constructed a moral dilemma much like Milgram’s. Rather than order participants to inflict physical pain on someone, they ordered them to cause psychological harm. When participants arrived at a university laboratory, they met a confederate supposedly there to take a test as part of a job interview. If the confederate passed the test, he’d get the job; if he failed, he would not. As part of a study of performance under stress, the experimenter told participants to distract the test-taking applicant by making an escalating series of harassing remarks. On cue, the applicant pleaded with participants to stop, became angry, faltered and eventually fell into a state of despair and failed. As in Milgram’s research, the question was straightforward: ‘How many participants would obey orders through the entire set of 15 harassing remarks, despite the apparent harm caused to a supposedly real-life job applicant?’ In a control group that lacked a prodding experimenter, no one persisted. But when the experimenter ordered them to go on, 92% exhibited complete obedience, despite seeing the task as unfair and distasteful.

Shocks up to 150 volts The second approach is even more direct. Jerry Burger (2009) conducted a ‘partial replication’ for which he paid $50 to 70 men and women, a diverse group that ranged from 20- to 81-years-old, and used the same procedure. In the original experiment, the learner first protested and asked to stop at 150 volts, at which point nearly all participants paused and indicated a reluctance to continue. Some outright refused at this point. Of those participants who did continue, however, most went all the way (Packer, 2008). On the basis of this finding, Burger followed the Milgram protocol up to 150 volts in order to estimate the number of participants who would have pulled the switch at 450 volts. He also added a condition in which a defiant confederate posing as another participant refused to continue. In light of post-Milgram changes in standards for research ethics, he took additional precautions; he excluded from the study individuals he feared would experience too much stress and then informed and reminded participants three times that they could withdraw from the study at any time without penalty. Despite all that has changed in 45 years, the obedience rate was not appreciably lower (see Figure 7.13). In the experiment that Burger modelled, 83% of Milgram’s participants had continued past 150 volts. In Burger’s more recent study, 70% did the same; it can be estimated, therefore, that 55% would have exhibited full 450-volt obedience in the original experiment. Two additional results proved interesting: (1) Just as Milgram had found, there were no differences between men and women, and (2) the obedience rate declined only slightly, to 63%, among participants who saw a defiant confederate refuse to continue. This new replication has drawn a good deal of interest and commentary. Alan Elms (2009), a graduate student and collaborator of Milgram’s in the 1960s, is cautious about comparing Burger’s ‘obedience lite’ procedure to Milgram’s but is eager to see it revitalise the research program Milgram had initiated. Arthur Miller (2009), author of the 1986 book The Obedience Experiments, voices the same cautious excitement. Blass (2009), author of the Milgram biography, The Man Who Shocked the World (2004), sees Burger’s experiment as an important milestone and demonstrates the stability and resilience of obedience in human social behaviour. In contrast, Jean Twenge (2009), author of Generation Me – a 2006 book on how Americans have become more self-centred and wholly focused on personal rights – is sceptical of the conclusion that nothing has changed. Making precise comparisons, Twenge notes that relative to an obedience rate of 83% among Milgram’s male participants, only 67% of Burger’s men exhibited 150-volt obedience, a decline that is 298

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FIGURE 7.13 Obedience in the twenty-first century In the version of the experiment that Burger modelled, 83% of Milgram’s original participants continued past 150 volts. Forty-five years later, Burger saw a slight drop to 70%. Note too that the obedience rate dropped only slightly, to 63%, among participants who saw a defiant confederate refuse to continue. These results show that obedience to authority may have declined a bit over the years, but it has by no means extinguished. Percentages of participants who continued v. stopped at 150 volts 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 Milgram’s experiment Continued

Burger’s base condition

Defiant confederate

Stopped Source: Burger, J. M. (2009). Replicating Milgram: Would people still obey today? American Psychologist, 64, 1–11.

statistically comparable to the alarming change in US obesity rates during that same period of time. Although impressed with the power of Milgram’s situation, Twenge is hopeful that destructive obedience is less prevalent today, in the twenty-first century, than in the past.

Lingering questions Before leaving the Milgram studies, consider two important questions: Why exactly did a substantial portion of Milgram’s participants follow orders, and what are the moral implications of their behaviour?

Engaged followership On the why question, Milgram had theorised that participants were swept up in a situational momentum he had created, leading them to exhibit obedience. What they displayed was not a ‘blind obedience’, as some commentators have suggested; the personal conflict they experienced was palpable – but it was obedience, nevertheless. In contrast, Alex Haslam, Stephen Reicher, and their colleagues recently offered an alternative account – an engaged followership explanation of the results (Reicher, Haslam, & Smith, 2012; Haslam & Reicher, 2017). These researchers theorise that participants shocked the learner because they identified with the scientific enterprise and wanted to both help the experimenter and make a contribution. From this perspective, their behaviour indicated their engagement in the science, not obedience to authority. In support of this account, they noted that Milgram’s second prod, which appealed to science (‘The experiment requires that you continue’) was followed by more shock to the learner than his fourth prod, which took the form of a strong command (‘You have no other choice, you must go on’). To test this hypothesis in a single new experiment, Haslam, Reicher, & Birney (2014) created an immersive digital realism procedure in which they asked participants to engage in a task that involved denigrating certain groups of people in a way that became increasingly unpleasant, much like climbing a shock scale. In this case, they randomly varied which prod came first, and found, as predicted, that 64% of participants completed the study after receiving Prod 2, the science prod, compared to only 44%

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who received Prod 4, the obedience prod. This is an interesting result. But for two reasons it represents only a weak test of the obedience hypothesis. First, ‘You have no choice’ is exactly the kind of command phrase that arouses psychological reactance and leads people in general to refuse in order to protect their threatened freedom (see Chapter 6). Second, the participants completed this task via computer without the physical presence of an authority figure, which Milgram had shown to be necessary. Experiments conducted since using virtual reality technologies have echoed these findings (Haslam, Reicher, & Millard, 2015). From this, we can gather that the engaged followership view accounts, at least in part, for findings previously interpreted as obedience to authority – although the topic continues to be debated (Hollander & Turowetz, 2017; Haslam & Reicher, 2018; Turowetz & Hollander, 2018).

Explanation, not forgiveness Then there is the moral question: ‘By providing a situational explanation for the evils of Nazi Germany or modern-day terrorism, do social psychologists unwittingly excuse the perpetrators?’ Meaning, is the focus on situational forces letting them off the hook of responsibility? Since many of Milgram’s participants were disobedient, indicating that they were free to choose resistance, one would hope not. Andrew Monroe and Glenn Reeder (2014) note that observers integrate information about the participant, his or her behaviour, and the situation, in a manner that accounts for the subtle nature of the participant’s motives in light of the dilemma, ‘as caught between wanting to help the learner and wanting to placate the experimenter’ (p. 550). In a series of studies, Miller and colleagues (1999) found that after people were asked to come up with explanations for acts of wrongdoing, they tended to be more forgiving of the individuals who committed those acts and were seen as more forgiving by others. This appearance of forgiveness was certainly not Milgram’s intent, nor is it the intent of other researchers today who seek to understand cruelty, even while continuing to condemn it. Miller and colleagues are thus quick to caution, ‘To explain is not to forgive’ (p. 265).

Defiance History books call it the ‘Arab Spring’. On 17 December 2010, a young, unemployed, frustrated Tunisian man by the name of Mohamed Bouazizi set fire to himself in protest after police confiscated the fruit and vegetables he was selling on the street because he lacked a permit. Almost immediately, men and women took to the streets in collective protest in line with Bouazizi’s sentiment. Despite the government’s determination to suppress dissent, the crowds grew in size, marching, holding rallies and demanding the resignation of the prime minister. On 14 January 2011, the government of Tunisia was overthrown. Social protests arose in several other countries across the Middle East and North Africa.

From social media to synchrony FIGURE 7.14 Social media powers protests In Hong Kong, September 2014, thousands of pro-democracy protesters waved phones activated with LED lights in a show of unison and instantly sent powerful images across the world. The power of this social-media-facilitated demonstration led the government of China to block the photo-sharing service Instagram.

Source: Corbis/Corbis News

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How did a lone protest spread throughout Tunisia, and then cross borders into other countries? It is now clear that social media played a huge role. By analysing over 3 million Twitter feeds, YouTube videos and Facebook posts, communication researchers concluded that talk of revolution often preceded events on the ground; stories and images of protest then spread from one country to others (Howard & Hussain, 2013). As depicted in Figure 7.14, social media continues to play a strong role in protest, spreading the word both before and after an event (Jost et al., 2018). In addition to the new and evolving role of social networking media, studies indicate that for better or for worse, synchrony of behaviour – for example, walking in step with others, clapping, singing, chanting, or raising arms in unison – can have a unifying effect on people, increasing the tendency to follow what others are doing. In one study, pairs of participants were seated in rocking chairs, side by side, and asked to rock in unison. Other pairs also rocked, but they could not see each other and were not in rhythm. Those in the synchrony condition were later more ‘in sync’ when working jointly to move a steel ball through a wooden maze (Valdesolo, Ouyang, & DeSteno, 2010). A meta-analysis of 42 studies involving 4327 participants to date revealed that

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synchrony promotes cooperation, social bonding, positive mood and cognitive performance (Mogan, Fischer, & Bulbulia, 2017).

CRITICAL THINKING ACTIVITY The power of synchronous activity is strong. Think about the last time you behaved in unison with others. Maybe it was singing the national anthem, marching in a parade or perhaps dancing at a concert. What effect do you think this synchronous

activity might have had on your propensity to obey? Or perhaps defy? More broadly, how do you think conformity and compliance might breed obedience?

Disobedience in groups Are the actions of a whole group harder to control than the behaviour of a single individual? Consider the following study. Pretending to be part of a marketing research organisation, William Gamson and colleagues (1982) recruited people to participate in a supposed discussion of ‘community standards’. Scheduled in groups of nine, participants were told that their discussions would be videotaped for a large oil company that was suing the manager of a local service station who had spoken out against higher petrol prices. After receiving a summary of the case, most participants sided with the station manager. But there was a hitch. The oil company wanted evidence to win its case, said the experimenter posing as the discussion coordinator. He told each of the group members to get in front of the camera and express the company’s viewpoint. Then he told them to sign an affidavit giving the company permission to edit the tapes for use in court. You can see how the obedience script was supposed to unfold. Actually, only one of 33 groups even came close to following the script. In all others, people became incensed by the coordinator’s behaviour and refused to continue. Some groups were so outraged that they planned to take action. One group even threatened to blow the whistle on the organisation by calling the local newspapers. Faced with one emotionally charged mutiny after another, the researchers had to discontinue the experiment. Why did this study produce such active, often passionate revolt when Milgram’s revealed such utterly passive obedience? Could it reflect a change in values from the 1960s, when Milgram’s studies were run? Many university students believe that people would conform less today than in the past, but an analysis of obedience studies has revealed that there is no correlation between the year a study was conducted and the level of obedience that it produced (Blass, 1999) right up through Burger’s (2009) recent effort. So what accounts for the contrasting results? One key difference is that people in Milgram’s studies took part alone and those in Gamson’s were in groups. Perhaps Michael Walzer was right: ‘Disobedience, when it is not criminally but morally, religiously, or politically motivated, is always a collective act’ (quoted in Brown, 1986, p. 17). Our earlier discussion of conformity indicated that the mere presence of one ally in an otherwise unanimous majority gives individuals the courage to dissent. The same may hold true for obedience. Notably, Milgram never had more than one participant present in the same session. But in one experiment, he did use two confederates who posed as co-teachers along with the real participant. In these sessions, one confederate refused to continue at 150 volts and the second refused at 210 volts. These models of disobedience had a profound influence on participants’ willingness to defy the experimenter – in their presence, only 10% delivered the maximum level of shock (see Figure 7.12). We should add that the presence of a group is not a guaranteed safeguard against destructive obedience. Groups can trigger aggression, as we will see in Chapter 11. For example, the followers of cult leader Jim Jones were together when they collectively followed his command to commit group suicide. And lynch mobs are just that – groups, not individuals. Clearly, there is power in sheer numbers. That power can be destructive, but it can also be used for constructive purposes. Indeed, the presence and support of others often provide the extra ounce of courage that people need to resist orders they find offensive.

THE CONTINUUM OF SOCIAL INFLUENCE As we have seen, social influence on behaviour ranges from the implicit pressure of group norms to the traps set by direct requests to the powerful commands of authority. In each case, people choose whether to react with conformity or independence, compliance or assertiveness, obedience or defiance. From all the research, it is tempting to conclude that the more pressure brought to bear on people, the greater the influence. Is it possible, however, that more produces less? In a series of conformity studies, Lucian Conway

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and Mark Schaller (2005) cast participants into a corporate decision-making task in which they were asked to choose between two business options after watching others make the same decision. Consistently, the participants followed the group more when its members had formed their opinions freely than when they were compelled by a leader. It appears that strong-arm tactics that force people to change their behaviour may backfire when it comes to changing opinions. At this point, let us step back and ask two important questions. First, although different kinds of pressure influence us for different reasons, is it possible to predict all effects with a single overarching principle? Second, what does all the theory and research on social influence say about human nature?

Social impact theory Social impact theory

The theory that social influence depends on the strength, immediacy and number of individual sources relative to target people.

In 1981, Bibb Latané proposed that a common bond among the different processes involved in social influence leads people towards or away from such influence. Specifically, Latané proposed social impact theory, which states that social influence of any kind – the total impact of others on a target person – is a function of the others’ strength, immediacy and number. According to Latané, social forces act on individuals in the same way that physical forces act on objects. Consider, for example, how overhead lights illuminate a surface. The total amount of light cast on a surface depends on the strength of the bulbs, their distance from the surface and their number. As illustrated in the left portion of Figure 7.15, the same factors apply to social impact. FIGURE 7.15 Social impact: source factors and target factors According to social impact theory, the total influence of other people, or ‘sources’, on a target individual depends on three source factors: their strength (size of source circles), immediacy (distance from the target) and number (number of the source circles). Similarly, the total influence is diffused, or reduced, by the strength (size of target circles), immediacy (distance from source circle) and number of target people.

Sources

Targets

Target

Source

Source: Latané, B. (1981). The psychology of social impact. American Psychologist, 36, 344. Copyright © 1981 by the American Psychological Association. Reprinted by permission.

As proximity between people in a group increases, so does the group’s impact on an individual.

TRUE

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The strength of a source is determined by his or her status, ability or relationship to a target. The stronger the source, the greater the influence. When people view the other members of a group as competent, they are more likely to conform in their judgements. When it comes to compliance, sources enhance their strength by making targets feel obliged to reciprocate a small favour. And to elicit obedience, authority figures gain strength by wearing uniforms or flaunting their prestigious affiliations. Immediacy refers to a source’s proximity in time and space to the target. The closer the source, the greater its impact. Milgram’s research offers the best example. Obedience rates were higher when the experimenter issued commands in person rather than from a remote location; and when the victim suffered in close proximity to the participant, he acted as a contrary source of influence and obedience levels

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dropped. Consistent with this hypothesis, Latané and colleagues (1995) asked individuals to name up to seven people in their lives and to indicate how far away those people lived and how many memorable interactions they had with them. In three studies, the correlation was the same: the closer others are, geographically, the more impact they have on us. Finally, the theory predicts that as the number of sources increases, so does their influence – at least up to a point. You may recall that when Asch (1956) increased the number of live confederates in his linejudgement studies from one to four, conformity levels rose, yet further increases had only a negligible additional effect. Together, social influence is most likely in cases where strength, immediacy and number are all at play, see Figure 7.16. FIGURE 7.16 Social impact in defence training According to social impact theory, a defence force training officer will exert influence to the extent that he is strong (in a position of power), immediate (physically close) and numerous (backed by others in the institution) relative to his trainees.

Source: Newspix/Megan Taylor.

Social impact theory also predicts that people sometimes resist social pressure. According to Latané, this resistance is most likely to occur when social impact is divided among many strong and distant targets, as seen in the right-hand part of Figure 7.15. There should be less impact on a target who is strong and far from the source than on one who is weak and close to the source, and there should be less impact on a target who is accompanied by other target people than on one who stands alone. Thus, we have seen that conformity is reduced by the presence of an ally and that obedience rates drop when people are in the company of rebellious peers. Over the years, social impact theory has been challenged, defended and refined on various grounds (Jackson, 1986; Mullen, 1985; Sedikides & Jackson, 1990). On the one hand, critics say that it does not enable us to explain the processes that give rise to social influence or answer why questions. On the other hand, the theory enables us to predict the emergence of social influence and determine when it will occur. Whether the topic is conformity, compliance or obedience, this theory provides a stage for interesting new research in the years to come. A number of social psychologists have recently argued that social impact is a fluid, dynamic, everchanging process (Vallacher, Read, & Nowak, 2002). Fifteen years before the Arab Spring became a reality, Latané and L’Herrou (1996) refined the theory in that vein. By having large groups of participants network through email and by controlling their lines of communication, they found that the individuals within the network formed ‘clusters’. Over time, neighbours (i.e., participants who were in direct email contact with each other) became more similar to each other than those who were more distant (i.e., not in direct email contact). Referring to the geometry of social space, Latané and L’Herrou note that in the real world,

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immediacy cannot be defined strictly in terms of physical distance. Speculating on the role of technology, they noted that social impact theory has to account for the type of events that unfolded during the Arab Spring in 2011, and that remote social media may diminish the importance of physical proximity.

Perspectives on human nature

Conformity rates vary across different cultures and from one generation to the next.

TRUE

From the material presented in this chapter, what general conclusions might you draw about human nature? Granted, social influence is more likely to occur in some situations than in others. But are people generally malleable or unyielding? Is there a tilt towards accepting influence or towards putting up resistance? There is no single universal answer to these questions. As we saw earlier, some cultures value autonomy and independence, whereas others place more emphasis on conformity to one’s group. Even within a given culture, values may change over time. To demonstrate the point, ask yourself: ‘If I were a parent, what traits would I like my child to have? When this question was put to American mothers in 1924, they chose ‘obedience’ and ‘loyalty’ – key characteristics of conformity. Yet when mothers were asked the same question in 1978, they cited ‘independence’ and ‘tolerance of others’ – key characteristics of autonomy. Similar trends were found in surveys conducted not only in the US but also in West Germany, Italy, England and Japan (Alwin, 1990; Remley, 1988) and in laboratory experiments, where conformity rates are somewhat lower today than they were in the past (Bond & Smith, 1996). Is it possible that today’s children – tomorrow’s adults – will exhibit more resistance to the various forms of social influence? If so, what effects will this trend have on society as a whole? And what will be the future effects of Facebook, Twitter and other social media? Cast in a positive light, conformity, compliance and obedience are good and necessary human responses. They promote group solidarity and agreement – qualities that keep groups from being torn apart by dissension. Cast in a negative light, a lack of independence, assertiveness and defiance are undesirable behaviours that lend themselves to narrowmindedness, cowardice and destructive obedience, often with terrible costs. For each of us and for society as a whole, the trick is to strike a balance.

RESEARCH SPOTLIGHT

Source: Courtesy of Dr Jolanda Jetten.

DR JOLANDA JETTEN, UNIVERSITY OF QUEENSLAND What are the topic areas of your research? My research is concerned with social identity, group processes and intergroup relations. I am interested in a wide range of groups – groups that may face discrimination and stigma in society (e.g., smokers, people with body-piercings and people who are homeless) and membership in groups where we know all other members (e.g., work teams, sporting teams and friendship groups) as well as large groups or categories where we do not know everyone in the group (e.g., national, gender or ethnic groups). Among others, I examine how membership in these different types of groups affects the behaviours that we think are normative and appropriate, conformity to group norms, people’s willingness to engage in collective action on behalf of the group, people’s wellbeing and the way people interact with others in and outside the group. Which of your research findings have you found most intriguing? There is now a vast literature showing that belonging to multiple social groups is associated with psychological resilience for individuals experiencing stressful life events. Even though this finding may not come as a complete surprise, the question that is more difficult to answer is why that would be the case. What is it that these social groups offer that is so

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beneficial? The most plausible explanation is that multiple social groups might increase the sources of, and receipt of, social, emotional and economic support from others, providing individuals with tangible resources to cope with stressors. Although multiple identities may indeed provide these tangible resources, we argue that identities provide something more fundamental – they provide psychological resources, and the mere salience of group memberships should help us to cope with stressors. With Janelle Jones, I examined the relationship between mere salience of group membership and resilience. In a laboratory context, participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: they were asked to think of either one, three or five groups or categories that they belonged to (groups based on age, gender, nationality, major and occupation) and to considered what these group memberships meant to them. Next participants were asked to take part in another unrelated study and they were asked to submerge their non-dominant hand, up to their wrist, into a bucket of ice water kept at a temperature between 0 and 2 degrees Celsius. The amount of time (in seconds) that participants kept their arm in the ice water was unobtrusively timed by the experimenter and served as the measure of persistence. Results showed that, as more group memberships were made salient, participants were able to endure physical pain for longer periods, such that participants who had five groups made salient were able to keep their hand in freezing water twice as long as participants for whom only one group membership was made salient. We concluded that when we strip the context of the typical benefits group membership

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brings (e.g., access to social support), the mere salience of group membership still acts as a psychological resource that promotes resilience (Jones & Jetten, 2011). How did you become interested in your area of research? When I finished high school and considered what I wanted to do, psychology was certainly not my first choice. I looked into studying architecture, law, civil engineering, anthropology and history. I decided in the end to study psychology because people told me that it was a good way to keep all my options open. That might not be the best reason for getting into psychology, but it worked for me and I never regretted my choice. I quickly became particularly interested in social psychology. I recall a two-hour lecture in my first year on the Milgram’s obedience studies – these studies were a real eye-opener in demonstrating the power of the social context in shaping our behaviour. During my PhD, I became more interested in group processes and how the dynamics

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within groups and relations between groups are powerful determinants of our own values, beliefs and behaviours. How does your area of research speak to life in Australia and New Zealand? Australia and New Zealand pride themselves on having a long history of tolerance and multiculturalism, and it is true that in both countries many different groups live relatively harmoniously together. However, it is also clear that both countries have seen serious backlashes in recent years, with anti-immigrant sentiments on the rise, increased negative depiction of asylum seekers by politicians and in the media, and instances of intergroup tensions (e.g., the Cronulla riots in 2005 in Australia). Examining the group dynamics relating to social justice concerns, inequality, identity and intergroup tensions involved in these developments is important to be able to understand the processes a society needs to promote to enhance solidarity and cohesion, while also nurturing diversity.

Topical Reflection TAKE CARE WITH SOCIAL INFLUENCE The power of social influence is strong. Whether it is conformity to the actions of others (like heading to work or university without your pants one morning), compliance with the requests of others, or obedience to the commands of others, we appear to be susceptible to the ebbs and flows of our social environments. It is relevant to reflect, then, on the care we must take when selecting those with whom we interact. If you surround yourself with individuals who will ask or command you to act in ways you might not want to, or behave themselves in ways you might not want to, the dynamics of compliance, obedience and conformity suggest that you might end up behaving in those ways. There is, of course, opportunity for deviance, noncompliance and minority dissent. Even so, perhaps it is wise to place ourselves in environments in which social influences are positive, or at least not negative! At a larger, societal level, it is worth considering who we put into positions of leadership and power, given the potential sway they have. Army commanders, politicians and celebrities are in unique positions to have widespread social influence. It would be the hope that such individuals are aligned with society’s ethics, values and principles, and hence exercise their social influence in line with those.

CHAPTER REVIEW SUMMARY •

Conformity, compliance and obedience are three kinds of social influence, varying in the degree of pressure brought to bear on an individual.

SOCIAL INFLUENCE AS ‘AUTOMATIC’ • Sometimes we are influenced by other people without our awareness, such as when we mimic each other’s behaviours and moods. CONFORMITY • Conformity is the tendency for people to change their behaviour to be consistent with group norms.

CLASSIC STUDIES OF CONFORMITY • Two classic experiments use different tasks to illustrate contrasting types of conformity: Sherif’s ambiguous autokinetic task and Asch’s line-judgement task. WHY DO PEOPLE CONFORM? • Sherif found that people exhibit private conformity, using others for information in an ambiguous situation. • Asch’s studies indicated that people conform in their public behaviour to avoid appearing deviant.

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MAJORITY INFLUENCE • Larger unanimous majorities increase conformity – up to a point. • People conform to perceived social norms when these norms are brought to mind. • The presence of one dissenter reduces conformity. • Women conform more than men on ‘masculine’ tasks and in face-to-face settings but not on ‘feminine’ or gender-neutral tasks or in private settings. MINORITY INFLUENCE • In general, minority influence is greater when the source is an ingroup member. • Consistent and unwavering positions are successful, but so are patterns whereby minorities first conform, then dissent. • Majority influence is greater on direct and public measures of conformity, but minorities show their impact in indirect or private measures of conformity. CULTURE AND CONFORMITY • Cultures differ in the extent to which people are expected to adhere to social norms. Collectivism guides increased conformity.

PUTTING COMMON SENSE TO THE TEST When all members of a group give an incorrect response to an easy question, most people most of the time conform to that response. FALSE. In Asch’s classic conformity experiments, respondents conformed only about a third of the time.

COMPLIANCE • A common form of social influence occurs when we respond to direct requests. MINDLESSNESS AND COMPLIANCE • People are more likely to comply when they are taken by surprise and when the request sounds reasonable. THE NORM OF RECIPROCITY • We often comply when we feel indebted to a requester who has done us a favour; this tendency does differ according to the individual. SEQUENTIAL REQUEST STRATEGIES • Four compliance techniques are based on a two-step request: the first step sets a trap and the second elicits compliance. • The foot-in-the-door technique, lowballing, the door-in-theface technique and the that’s-not-all technique vary in the ways they achieve compliance.

PUTTING COMMON SENSE TO THE TEST An effective way to get someone to do you a favour is to make a first request that is so large the person is sure to reject it, before making your actual request. TRUE. This approach, known as the door-in-the-face technique, increases compliance by making the person feel bound to make a concession. RESISTING SEQUENTIAL COMPLIANCE • Many people find it hard to be assertive. Doing so requires that we be vigilant and recognise the traps. 306

OBEDIENCE • When the request is a command and the requester is a figure of authority, the resulting influence is called obedience. MILGRAM’S RESEARCH: FORCES OF DESTRUCTIVE OBEDIENCE • In the most popular version of the Milgram paradigm, 65% of participants administered what they believed to be a fatal shock to another person at the command of an authority figure. • Factors such as a participant’s physical proximity to both the authority figure and the victim, personal responsibility and gradual escalation of orders increase obedience.

PUTTING COMMON SENSE TO THE TEST Most participants in an obedience experiment would not administer severe shocks to an innocent person if ordered to. FALSE. In Milgram’s classic research, 65% of all participants obeyed the experimenter and administered the maximum possible shock. MILGRAM IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY • A recent ‘partial replication’ of Milgram’s shock study and a conceptual replication that used a psychological rather than physical pain suggest that most people are still fully obedient today. LINGERING QUESTIONS • Researchers note that a situational explanation for acts of destructive obedience does not forgive the acts. DEFIANCE • Just as processes of social influence breed obedience, they can also support acts of defiance because groups are more difficult to control than individuals.

THE CONTINUUM OF SOCIAL INFLUENCE SOCIAL IMPACT THEORY • Social impact theory predicts that social influence depends on the strength, immediacy and number of sources who exert pressure relative to target people who absorb that pressure.

PUTTING COMMON SENSE TO THE TEST As the proximity between people in a group increases, so does the group’s impact on an individual. TRUE. Increasing proximity, or immediacy, in the group increases the social influence of the group on the individual. PERSPECTIVES ON HUMAN NATURE • There is no single answer to the question of whether people are conformists or non-conformists, and the definition and desirability of each change over time.

PUTTING COMMON SENSE TO THE TEST Conformity rates vary across different cultures and from one generation to the next. TRUE. Research shows that conformity rates are higher in cultures that are collectivistic rather than individualistic in orientation and that values change over time even within cultures.

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LINKAGES connections between compliance and self-perception, discussed in Chapter 7. The diagram also draws attention to ties to two other chapters in which social influence plays out in communities (Chapter 13) and courtrooms (Chapters 15).

The research reviewed in this chapter addresses three forms of social influence: conformity, compliance and obedience. While some situational factors can increase the likelihood of social influence, others can decrease that likelihood. The ‘Linkages’ diagram highlights the

CHAPTER

7

Conformity, compliance and obedience

LINKAGES

Self-perception as the basis for compliance

CHAPTER

2

The social self

Social influence on environmentally responsible behaviour

CHAPTER

13

Community psychology

Minority influence in juries

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15

Law

REVIEW QUIZ 1 Which of the following are examples of social influence? a Non-verbal mimicry. b Buying a car from a salesperson. c Obeying a traffic command. d All of the above. 2 According to the research described in this chapter, ambiguous situations are likely to result in which of the following? a Mindless compliance. b Minority dissent. c Private conformity. d Public conformity. 3 Joanne would like to borrow her sister’s dress. She plans to first ask to borrow her sister’s car, presuming that her sister will say no, and then plans to ask to borrow the dress. Which persuasive technique is Joanne capitalising upon? a Foot in the door. b Door in the face. c Reciprocity. d That’s not all.

4 Which of the following were not described as influencing obedience in Milgram’s experiments? a Personal responsibility. b Gradual escalation of requests. c Proximity of ‘teacher’ to ‘learner’. d Mindlessness. 5 According to Stephen Reicher, Alex Haslam and colleagues, what is the most viable alternative explanation for Milgram’s findings? a Obedience to authority. b Engaged followership. c Minority dissent. d Personal responsibility. 6 Which of the following suggests that the strength, immediacy and number of sources determine the level of social influence? a Latané’s social impact theory. b Cialdini’s influence principles. c Moscovici’s minority influence theory. d Asch’s theory of conformity.

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WEBLINKS Behind the shock machine: The untold story of the notorious Milgram psychology experiments http://www.gina-perry.com/behind-the-shock/about/ Australian writer Gina Perry’s book on Milgram’s obedience experiments. ImprovEverywhere https://improveverywhere.com The website for an organisation that stages acts of collective social deviance, such as the ‘no pants subway ride’ in the chapter opening vignette.

The Psych Files: Stanley Milgram Obedience Study Finally Replicated http://www.thepsychfiles.com/2009/06/episode-97-stanleymilgram-obedience-study-finally-replicated/ An episode from Michael Britt’s podcast, The Psych Files, covering Milgram’s studies and Jerry Burger’s (2009) replication. Resisting influence http://www.lucifereffect.com/guide.htm Philip Zimbardo and Cindy Wang’s list of web resources.

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and more miserable than ever before. New York, NY: Free Press. Twenge, J. M. (2009). Change over time in obedience: The jury’s still out, but it might be decreasing. American Psychologist, 64, 28–31. Twenge, J. M., Campbell, W. K., & Gentile, B. (2013). Changes in pronoun use in American books and the rise of individualism, 1960–2008. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 44, 406–415. Uskul, A. K., & Over, H. (2014). Responses to social exclusion in cultural context: Evidence from farming and herding communities. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 106, 752–771. Valdesolo, P., Ouyang, J., & DeSteno, D. (2010). The rhythm of joint action: Synchrony promotes cooperative activity. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 46, 693–695. Vallacher, R. R., Read, S. J., & Nowak, A. (2002). The dynamical perspective in personality and social psychology. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 6, 264–273. Vetlesen, A. J. (2005). Evil and human agency. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Victoroff, J., & Kruglanski, A. W. (Eds.). (2009). Psychology of terrorism: Classic and contemporary insights. New York, NY: Psychology Press. Von Lang, J., & Sibyll, C. (Eds.). (1983). Eichmann interrogated (R. Manheim, Trans.). New York, NY: Farrar, Straus & Giroux. Waterloo, S. F., Baumgartner, S. E., Peter, J., & Valkenburg, P. M. (2018). Norms of online expressions of emotion: Comparing Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and WhatsApp. New Media & Society, 20(5), 1813–1831. Whittaker, J. O., & Meade, R. D. (1967). Social pressure in the modification and distortion of judgment: A cross-cultural study. International Journal of Psychology, 2, 109–113. Wilder, D. A. (1977). Perception of groups, size of opposition, and social influence. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 13, 253–268. Williams, K. D., Govan, C. L., Croker, V., Tynan, D., Cruickshank, M., & Lam, A. (2002). Investigations into differences between social- and cyberostracism. Group Dynamics: Theory, Research, and Practice, 6, 65–77. Williams, K. D., & Nida, S. A. (2011). Ostracism: Consequences and coping. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 20, 71–75. Wood, W., Lundgren, S., Ouellette, J. A., Busceme, S., & Blackstone, T. (1994). Minority influence: A meta-analytic review of social influence processes. Psychological Bulletin, 115, 323–345. Wood, W., Pool, G. J., Leck, K., & Purvis, D. (1996). Self-definition, defensive processing, and influence: The normative impact of majority and minority groups. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71, 1181–1193. Zentall, T. R. (2012). Perspectives on observational learning in animals. Journal of Comparative Psychology 126(2), 114–128.

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Learning Objectives By the end of this chapter, you should be able to: 1 explain the processes that underlie why individuals form groups as well as the basic group features of roles, norms and cohesiveness 2 describe the differential effects of social facilitation, social loafing and deindividuation 3 identify some of the key processes that impact on group performance including how groups can produce both ‘gain’ and ‘loss’ 4 explain the nature of conflict in social dilemmas and how conflict both escalates and can be reduced.

On balance: the good and the bad of groups

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to try to counteract the ever-increasing numbers of this invasive species. (Note that these culls are not without controversy, mostly stemming from environmental and animal rights concerns.) What might have contributed to this decision, which in hindsight was certainly a poor one? For one, the Bureau was wholly and loyally dedicated to solving this problem. Also, the Bureau did little to establish whether there would be drawbacks to the plan. A review of their decision-making process, covered in Nigel Turvey’s book Cane toads: A tale of saga, politics and flawed science (2011), suggests that there was indeed a voice of objection – but that voice was ignored and, in fact, was rebuked by scientific peers. The focus of this chapter is on social psychological research and theories on how group characteristics can contribute to poor group decision-making, as well as group features that give rise to excellent outcomes.

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Source: Getty Images/Ian Hitchcock.

Groups of people are often tasked with making decisions. Sometimes the resulting decisions are good, and sometimes they are really, really bad. Take, for example, the case of the introduction of the cane toad to Australia in the 1930s (Turvey, 2011). It is not that the group in question, the Bureau of Sugar Experiment Stations, did not have good intentions. They were trying to tackle the problem of a very destructive beetle that was threatening sugar crops. With endorsement from local and international scientists, the Bureau decided that introducing cane toads was the solution. The rationale was that the cane toads, to be imported from Hawaii, would eat the larvae of the beetles, hence eradicating the threat to the sugar crops. It seems simple enough. However, as it turns out, cane toads are extremely invasive, spreading disease that can threaten local (beneficial) species, depleting native plants that they consume, and often poisoning predators that attempt to eat them. Current views hold that the long-term effect of this invasive species is complex, but negative impacts have carried on for decades (Shine, 2010). To make matters worse, it is still unclear whether the cane toads even helped to solve the beetle problem. Australia still suffers from this disastrous decision. In fact, communities in Australia organise ‘cane-toad culls’

GROUP PROCESSES

CHAPTER EIGHT

PUTTING COMMON SENSE TO THE TEST Circle Your Answer T

F

People will cheer louder when they cheer as part of a group than when they cheer alone.

T

F

People brainstorming as a group come up with a greater number of better ideas than the same number of people working individually.

T

F

Group members’ attitudes about a course of action usually become more moderate after group discussion.

T

F

People and groups tend to do worse when they have ‘do your best’ goals than when they have very specific, ambitious goals.

T

F

Large groups are more likely than small groups to exploit a scarce resource that the members collectively depend on.

T

F

When faced with the dilemma of whether to act in one’s self-interest or cooperate with the greater good, women are more likely than men to cooperate.

INTRODUCTION PEOPLE ARE OFTEN at their best – and their worst – in groups. It is through groups that individuals form communities, pool resources and share successes. But it is also through groups that stereotypes turn into oppression, frustrations turn into mob violence, and conflicts turn into wars. Clearly, it is important that we understand how groups work and how individuals influence, and are influenced by, groups – and this is something social psychologists have sought understanding about for decades (Forsyth, 2018). In this chapter, we first introduce the fundamentals of what groups are and how they develop, then we examine groups on several levels. At the individual level, we explore how individuals are influenced by groups. At the group level, we explore how groups perform. And at the intergroup level, we explore how groups interact with each other in cooperation and competition. The research we report in this chapter reveals a fascinating fact: groups can be quite different from the sum of their parts. When you think about that statement, it suggests something almost mystical or magical about groups. How can a group be better – or worse – than its individual members? The maths may not seem to add up, but the theory and research discussed in this chapter will help answer this question.

FUNDAMENTALS OF GROUPS We begin our exploration of groups by asking the basic questions: ‘What is a group?’ ‘Why do people join groups?’ We then focus on three important aspects of groups: roles, norms and cohesiveness, before turning to a discussion of goals and plans in the context of groups.

What is a group? The question might seem quite simple, but if you step back and think about it, the answer is less obvious. For example, many students are members of a variety of groups on Facebook. Are these really groups? You may be part of a large social psychology class, but is this a group identity that is meaningful to you? A group may be characterised as a set of individuals who have direct interactions with each other over a period of time and share a common fate, identity or set of goals. A group can also consist of people who have joint membership in a social category based on sex, race or other attributes; this characteristic is especially relevant for the issues discussed in Chapter 4 on stereotypes, prejudice and discrimination. Groups vary in the extent to which they are seen as distinct entities, such as whether they have rigid boundaries that make them distinct from other groups. In other words, some groups seem more ‘groupy’ (or, in the unfortunate choice of word used by researchers on this issue, ‘entitative’) than others (Brewer, 2015; Hamilton, Chen, & Way, 2011). On the very low end of this dimension are people attending a concert or working out near each other in a gym. These often are not considered real groups, but are rather called collectives – people engaging in a common activity but having little direct interaction with each other (Milgram & Toch, 1969). Quite integrated groups include tight-knit clubs, sporting teams and work teams – groups that engage in very purposeful activities with a lot of interaction over time and clear boundaries of who is in and not in the group. People tend to identify more strongly with these more integrated, coherent groups and to get more satisfaction from them (Crawford & Salaman, 2012).

Group

A set of individuals who interact over time and have shared fate, goals, or identity.

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Culture can also shape the nature of what makes a group a group. People in Western cultures are more likely to define and identify with groups based on what members do, whereas in Eastern cultures how group members relate to each other may be more important (Yuki, 2003). As we will discuss later in this chapter, more groups today defy traditional views of what is a group. Particularly in the worlds of business and technology, groups often consist of people who are dispersed widely across time and space and communicate exclusively through technology, and the dynamics of these groups may be extremely different from those of traditional groups. For example, these newer, more dispersed types of groups tend to have more shifting boundaries and membership, and they tend to be more self-managed or have shared leadership (Hackman & Katz, 2010). Understanding these unique dynamics and determining how to help these groups reach their potential is one of the more exciting challenges in contemporary social psychological research on groups.

CRITICAL THINKING ACTIVITY To which groups do you belong? Did you choose to join these groups or do aspects of your identity place you in these groups? How often do you interact with other members of these groups?

Can you think of benefits that your membership in these groups affords? When we come to reflect on them, we often realise that our group identities are numerous and quite valuable.

Why join a group? The complexity and ambitions of human life require that we work in groups. Much of what we hope to produce and accomplish can be done only through collective action. Lone individuals cannot play symphonies or cricket games, build cities or industries, or run governments or universities. At a more fundamental level, humans may have an innate need to belong to groups stemming from evolutionary pressures that increased people’s chances of survival and reproduction when they lived in groups rather than in isolation. Indeed, according to the social brain hypothesis, the unusually large size of primates’ brains evolved because of their unusually complex social worlds (Dunbar, 2014; van Vugt & Kameda, 2014). For humans, attraction to group life serves not only to protect against threat and uncertainty in a physical sense but also to gain a greater sense of personal and social identity. According to social identity theory, which was discussed in Chapter 4, an important part of people’s feelings of self-worth comes from their identification with particular groups, and so people care a great deal about being part of groups and about how their groups are valued (Ellemers & Haslam, 2012; Greenaway et al., 2015; Jetten et al., 2015). Beyond feelings of self-worth, our groups often give us meaning and purpose and perhaps even a sense of immortality from the knowledge that groups live on after our death (Schimel & Greenberg, 2013). This is also at the root of why being rejected by a group is one of life’s most painful experiences (Eisenberger, 2015).

Key features of groups: roles, norms and cohesiveness Once an individual has joined a group, a process of adjustment takes place as the individual is socialised to how things work in the group. This socialisation process may be formal and explicit, such as through an initiation or orientation program, mentoring or supervision, or documentation. Alternatively, the socialisation may be primarily informal and implicit, as newcomers observe how established members behave in the group. Effectively socialising new members can produce shortterm and long-term benefits for the group as a whole (Levine & Choi, 2010; Moreland & Levine, 2002). One thing that newcomers can do to more quickly get older members to accept them and utilise their knowledge is to use more group-focused language (e.g., using ‘we’ and ‘us’ rather than ‘I’ and ‘you’) with group members (Kane & Rink, 2015). Two especially important group features for newcomers to learn are the roles they are expected to play in the group and what the norms of the group are. Newcomers also often get socialised about how cohesive the group is. We focus on each of these three features of groups – roles, norms and cohesiveness – next.

Roles People’s roles in a group – their set of expected behaviours – can be formal or informal. Formal roles are designated by titles such as teacher or student in a class, and vice president or account executive in a

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CHAPTER EIGHT

corporation. Informal roles are less obvious but still powerful. Robert Bales (1958) distinguished between two fundamental types of roles: an instrumental role to help the group achieve its tasks, and an expressive role to provide emotional support and maintain morale. The same person can fill both roles, but often they are assumed by different individuals. Further, the relative importance of these roles may fluctuate over time depending on the needs of the group. One problem that can seriously harm the performance of groups is when there is a mismatch between members’ skills and what roles they occupy in the group. It is far too common for group members to be assigned roles simply based on who is available at a given point in time rather than who is best suited for the role. Groups function much better when members are assigned roles that best match their talents and personalities (Woolley et al., 2007). Group members sometimes are uncertain about exactly what their group roles are supposed to be. They may also find themselves in roles that conflict with other roles they have to play, either within the group (e.g., needing to be demanding while also being the source of emotional support) or between groups (e.g., between work and family). The consequences can be severe – in the workplace, role uncertainty and role conflict both predict employee depression (Schmidt, Roesler, Kusserow, & Rau, 2014). Sometimes an opposite pattern of role absorption occurs. Group members can become so absorbed in their role that they lose themselves, as well as their personal beliefs and sense of morality, in their group role. For example, interrogators of a prisoner or suspect may get so lost in their role that they fail to recognise the ethical lines they are crossing. One of the most disturbing studies in the history of social psychology examined this kind of issue, in what came to be known as the Stanford Prison Study (Haney, Banks, & Zimbardo, 1973). Participants in this study were randomly assigned to play the roles of prisoners or guards in a simulated prison. Many accounts of the study carry warnings of the risks of role absorption – risks that ran so out of control that the study was cancelled. This fascinating but troubling study is discussed in detail in Chapter 15.

Norms In addition to roles for its members, groups also establish norms; that is, rules of conduct for members. Like roles, norms may be either formal or informal. University-sponsored student groups such as the Psychology Society, for example, usually have written rules for the behaviour expected from their members. Informal norms are subtler. What do I wear? How hard can I push for what I want? What kind of language, joking or socialising is typical? These norms provide individuals with a sense of what it means to be a good group member. Figuring out the unwritten rules of the group can take time and cause anxiety. Groups often exert strong conformity pressures on those who deviate from group norms. Deviant group members can be perceived and treated harshly – the result of a sense that deviant group members threaten a group’s sense of uniformity (Hutchison, Jetten, & Gutierrez, 2011; Packer, 2014). Low-status or new group members are especially punishing of members who break group norms, especially if highstatus group members witness such actions (Jetten, Hornsey, Spears, Haslam, & Cowell, 2010). Deviance sometimes arises, nonetheless. In particular, group members who care about the group’s collective success may be willing to deviate from a group norm if they think that the norm is likely to harm the group (Jetten & Hornsey, 2014; Packer, 2014). How tolerant groups are to violations of norms can be, itself, a kind of norm. Some groups, for example, pride themselves on how heterogeneous and free-thinking its members are. Paul Hutchison and colleagues (2011) designed an experiment to see if they could manipulate this sense of how uniform the group members are supposed to be. They asked some British students questions about their university that were designed to highlight how the students at their university have uniform backgrounds and attitudes. For example, they were asked what percentage of the students preferred popular music over classical music, and what percentage liked to watch films. Because the large majority of the students would prefer popular music and would like films, questions like these would prime the students to see their similarities. Other students were asked questions induced to make them see their school as full of diverse backgrounds and attitudes. They were asked to estimate the percentages of students who most preferred dance, rock, hiphop, pop or classical music, and what percentages most preferred films such as science fiction, romance, comedy, martial arts, and so on. These questions would highlight the wide variety of opinions and tastes that were accepted at their university. The students then read about a student who expressed an attitude about a war that was either typical or atypical of the students there. How would the participants react to

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this student? Participants in general rated the student with the typical attitude towards the war positively. If the student expressed an atypical attitude, however, they were disliked more when the participants were induced to see their university as very uniform in contrast to if they were induced to see their university as diverse and heterogeneous (see Figure 8.1). In other words, a deviation from a group norm was met with more tolerance if the participants saw the group as more variable than if they saw their group as typically sharing similar background and values. Other sources of variation of group norm deviation tolerance, namely cultural factors, are discussed in the following Cultural Diversity feature. FIGURE 8.1 Tolerance for deviating from the norm

6

5

Evaluation

Students evaluated a fellow student who expressed an attitude that was either typical or atypical for their university. In general, the student expressing the typical attitude was evaluated more positively than the atypical student. But if the students had first been primed to see their university as heterogeneous, they were less negative toward the atypical student than were the students who had been primed to see their university as homogeneous.

4

3

2 Typical group member Homogeneous

Atypical group member Heterogeneous

Source: Hutchison, P., Jetten, J., & Gutierrez, R. (2011). Deviant but desirable: Group variability and evaluation of atypical group members. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 47, 1155–1161.

CULTURAL DIVERSITY TOLERANCE OF GROUP NORM DEVIATION AROUND THE WORLD Cultures vary in how much they tolerate behaviour that deviates from the norm. Anthropologist Pertii Pelto (1968) first described the difference between ‘tight’ and ‘loose’ cultures. He proposed that tight cultures have strong norms and little tolerance for behaviour that deviates from the norm, while loose cultures have relatively weaker norms and greater tolerance for deviant behaviour. Michele Gelfand and colleagues (2011) demonstrated that greater ecological and historical threats (e.g., resource scarcity or natural disasters), higher population density, and more restrictive governments and religious institutions encourage the formation of tight societies. Loose societies, in contrast, are more likely to thrive in environments that have fewer historical and ecological threats and are characterised by situations that have few constraints on individuals, allowing individuals to behave according to their own discretion. Analysing the similarity between people’s values, norms and behaviour across 65 countries, Uz (2015) identified Egypt, Indonesia and Morocco as the tightest countries and Belgium, Luxembourg and France as the loosest countries (see Table 8.1).

316

TABLE 8.1 Tightness–looseness of various countries Cultures considered ‘tight’ have strong and homogeneous norms, values, and behaviours, and there is much less tolerance for deviance from norms. The numbers next to the countries listed in this table are an index according to one recent analysis of how tight–loose these countries are, with higher numbers indicating greater looseness. Argentina

75

Belgium

120

Luxembourg

114

Morocco

0

Egypt

4

Nigeria

18

Greece

58

Poland

43

Indonesia Japan Bangladesh

Saudi Arabia

22

43

3

Spain

84

7

Mexico

75

Canada

84

Netherlands

79

France

100

Philippines

32

India

44

Russian Fed.

57

Ireland

71

South Africa

68

Jordan

5

USA

58

Source: Uz, I. (2015). The index of cultural tightness and looseness among 68 countries. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 46, 319–335.

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Cohesiveness Groups whose members share similar attitudes and closely follow the group’s norms are more likely than other groups to be cohesive. Group cohesiveness refers to the forces exerted on a group that push its members closer together (Cartwright & Zander, 1960; Festinger, 1950). Members of cohesive groups tend to feel commitment to the group task, feel positively towards the other group members, feel group pride and engage in many – and often intense – interactions in the group (Dion, 2000; Rosh, Offermann, & Van Diest, 2012). An interesting question is whether cohesiveness makes groups perform better. It may seem obvious that it should. Indeed, groups often strive to achieve cohesiveness, and if they feel that they are not very cohesive they may take steps to improve it, such as ordering everyone to go through bonding exercises or hang out together at a rustic retreat. However, the relationship between cohesiveness and performance is not a simple one. The causal relationship works both ways – when a group is cohesive, group performance often improves; and when a group performs well, it often becomes more cohesive. Research highlighting the impact of cultural orientation on cohesiveness appears in the following Cultural Diversity feature.

Group cohesiveness

The extent to which forces push group members closer together, such as through feelings of intimacy, unity and commitment to group goals.

CULTURAL DIVERSITY CULTURE AND COHESIVENESS Group cohesiveness can be affected in different ways as a function of cultural differences. For example, cohesiveness in collectivist cultures may be associated more with social harmony, cooperation and interpersonal relations than in individualist cultures, where recognising members’ unique skills, perspectives, and job-focused efforts may be more essential for group cohesiveness (Lai, Lam, & Lam, 2013). Cultural differences exist also in norms about how leaders are expected to behave in groups, and this has consequences for group cohesiveness. Respect and obedience to leaders are more important to people from collectivist cultures than those in individualist cultures. Consistent with this point, Hein Wendt and colleagues (2009) found in a study of over 150 000 individuals from 615 organisations across 80 countries that having a directive, controlling leader was associated with greater group cohesiveness in collectivist societies than in individualist cultures. The extent to which groups are comfortable with conflict and heated debate among their members – which has the potential to undermine cohesiveness – also varies across

culture. This was demonstrated in a study by Roger Nibler and Karen Harris (2003) involving five-person groups of strangers and friends in China and the US. Each group had to decide how to rank 15 items to be taken aboard a lifeboat from a ship that was about to sink. This task tends to trigger a fair amount of initial disagreement among group members before a consensus can be reached. With both the Chinese and American groups of strangers, these kinds of disagreements tended to be perceived as troubling and interfered with group performance. To the groups of American friends, in contrast, these disagreements were more likely to be seen as simply part of a freewheeling debate, and the sense of freedom to exchange opinions and disagree with one another tended to improve rather than hurt performance on this task. More recently, Daan Bisseling and Filipe Sobral (2011), using surveys and interviews of 366 members of companies from the Netherlands and Brazil, found that intragroup conflict was associated with reduced satisfaction and job performance among employees in the more collectivistic culture of Brazil, but not among the more individualistic Dutch workers.

Whatever the cause and effect, several meta-analyses and longitudinal studies have provided evidence showing that group cohesion is associated with better performance, but other variables tend to be important in predicting when and to what extent this relationship emerges. These variables include how large the group is, whether the cohesiveness is primarily about the group’s attraction to the task (task cohesion) or to each other (interpersonal cohesion), and what type of task the group performs (Castaño, Watts, & Tekleab, 2013; Mathieu, Kukenberger, D’Innocenzo, & Reilly, 2015; Picazo, Gamero, Zornoza, & Peir, 2015). A recent extension of the cohesion-performance link looks at the role of working with friends – and the link holds. Friendship groups tend to perform better than acquaintance groups (Chung, Lount, Park, & Park, 2018) – likely due in part to the enhanced cohesion of friend groups. However, as we will discuss later in the chapter, highly cohesive groups may be especially vulnerable to making terrible decisions because members fear going against a leader or group norm.

Getting what ‘we’ want: goals and plans in groups You have now seen that roles, norms and cohesiveness are fundamental characteristics of groups. Another set of key features of any group is a duo: the goal towards which the group is working and an effective plan to implement that goal.

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All goals are not created equal. You have probably worked in many groups for which the goal was simply to ‘do your best’. Despite the popularity of such goals, the research clearly shows that they are not as effective as specific goals. Groups tend to excel when they have specific, challenging and reachable goals, particularly if the group members are committed to the goals and believe they have the ability to achieve them. In fact, when a group actively forms a goal, performance doubles in contrast with performance seen upon the adoption of a ‘do your best’ goal (Wegge & Haslam, 2005). Externally imposed goals do not carry the same effect (Haslam, Wegge, & Postmes, 2009). TRUE Translating a goal into reality relies on plans. One benefit of groups over individuals when it comes to following through with plans is that group members can hold each other accountable. For example, Andrew Prestwich and colleagues (2012) recruited a sample of British individuals interested in increasing their physical activity. Some FIGURE 8.2 A goal and a plan: better in groups of the participants were instructed to set specific plans for how Participants wanting to exercise more and lose weight worked to achieve their goal of increasing physical activity, including either alone or with another person as a group, and were either instructed to set specific plans for how to achieve their goal or how they would respond in particular situations (e.g., If we are in were not instructed to do so. Six months later, the participants situation X, then we will do Y), and some were not asked to make who both set a specific plan and worked as a group lost these plans. In addition, some of these participants worked significantly more weight than did the participants in any of the alone, and others worked as a group with a partner. Participants other conditions. who both made these plans and worked as a group significantly 3.5 increased their physical activity and lost significantly more weight than if they made no specific plans or if they made these 3 plans but did not have a partner (see Figure 8.2). 2.5 If a group does not make a good, specific plan to achieve its goal, it can fail to utilise the expertise that various group 2 members have. In an experiment by Anita Woolley and 1.5 colleagues (2008) some four-person groups had two members who were particularly expert at some of the skills needed to 1 solve a complex task, and other groups included no experts. Groups who were further required to plan how they would 0.5 integrate various types of evidence before working on the task 0 benefitted from having an expert. Without a plan, the groups did No plan/ Plan/alone No plan/ Plan/partner no better with experts present. alone partner As we are about to see, however, the simple fact of being in a Source: Based on Prestwich, A., Conner, M. T., Lawton, R. J., Ward, J. K., Ayres, K., & group, and thus in the presence of others, shapes behaviour in a McEachan, R. C. (2012). Randomized controlled trial of collaborative implementation intentions targeting working adults’ physical activity. Health Psychology, 31, 486–495. way that impacts both personal and group performance.

Weight lost (kg)

People and groups tend to do worse when they have ‘do your best’ goals than when they have very specific, ambitious goals.

INDIVIDUALS IN GROUPS: THE PRESENCE OF OTHERS When we engage in activities in groups, we are in the presence (either physically or virtually) of others. It is an obvious point, but some of its consequences are profound and surprising. In this section we focus on three important effects that the presence of others can have on individuals: social facilitation, social loafing and deindividuation.

Social facilitation Social psychologists have long been fascinated by how the presence of others affects behaviour. In Chapter 1, we reported that one of the founders of social psychology was Norman Triplett, whose article ‘The Dynamogenic Factors in Pacemaking and Competition’ (1897–1898) is often cited as the earliest publication in the field. Triplett began his research by studying official bicycle racing records for the 1897 season. He noticed that cyclists who competed against others performed better than those who cycled alone against the clock. After dismissing various theories of the day (our favourite is ‘brain worry’), he proposed his own hypothesis: that the presence of another rider releases the competitive instinct, which increases nervous energy and enhances performance. To test this proposition, Triplett got 40 children to wind up fishing reels, alternating between performing alone and working in parallel. Triplett reported that children performed better when they worked side by side than when they worked alone. Later research following Triplett’s studies provided mixed results. Sometimes the presence of others (side by side or with an audience) enhanced performance; at other times, performance declined. In an interesting contemporary twist on this classic, Michael Strube (2005) used modern statistical techniques

318

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CHAPTER EIGHT

to reanalyse Triplett’s original data and found that the results were quite weak and not as straightforward as Triplett’s report suggested. It seemed that Triplett’s promising lead had turned into a blind alley, and social psychologists had largely abandoned this research by World War II. But years later, Robert Zajonc (1965, 1980) saw a way to reconcile the contradictory results by integrating research from experimental psychology with social psychological research. Zajonc offered an elegant solution: the presence of others increases arousal, which can affect performance in different ways, depending on the task at hand.

Zajonc’s three-step process Zajonc proposed a three-step process (see Figure 8.3): 1. The presence of others creates general physiological FIGURE 8.3 Social facilitation: Zajonc’s three-step process arousal, which energises behaviour. Based on experimental According to Zajonc, the presence of others increases arousal, psychology research and principles of evolution, Zajonc which strengthens the dominant response to a stimulus. On an argued that all animals, including humans, tend to become easy task, the dominant response is usually correct, and thus the aroused when in the presence of conspecifics; that is, presence of others enhances performance. On a difficult task, the members of their own species. dominant response is often incorrect, and thus the presence of 2. Increased arousal enhances an individual’s tendency to others impairs performance. perform the dominant response. The dominant response Presence of another person or is the reaction elicited most quickly and easily by a given member of the same species stimulus. 3. The quality of an individual’s performance varies according to the type of task. On an easy task (i.e., one that is simple Increased arousal or well learned), the dominant response is usually correct or successful. But on a difficult task (i.e., one that is complex or unfamiliar), the dominant response is often incorrect or Strengthened dominant response unsuccessful. Putting these three steps together yields the following Easy task Difficult task scenarios. Suppose you are playing the violin. If you are an Correct response Incorrect response performance enhancement performance impairment excellent player and are performing a well-learned, familiar arrangement, having other people around should enhance your performance – the presence of others will increase your arousal, which will enhance your dominant response. Because this arrangement is so well learned, your dominant response will be to perform it well. However, if you are just learning to play the violin and you are unfamiliar with this arrangement, the presence of others is the last thing you will want. The increase in arousal should enhance the dominant response, which in this case would be unsuccessful violin playing.

Social facilitation of the dominant response Taken as a package, these two effects of the presence of others – helping performance on easy tasks but hurting performance on difficult tasks – are known as social facilitation. Unfortunately, this term has been a prime source of confusion for countless students. The trick is to remember that the presence of others facilitates the dominant response, not necessarily the task itself. This facilitation of the dominant response does, in effect, facilitate easy tasks, but it makes difficult tasks even more difficult. Zajonc proposed that social facilitation is universal, occurring not only in human activities but also among other animals, even insects. Have you ever wondered, for example, how well a cockroach performs in front of other cockroaches? Neither did we; until we first learned of Zajonc’s creative research on the topic. Zajonc and colleagues (1969) had cockroaches placed in a brightly lit start box connected to a darkened goal box, see Figure 8.4. When the track was a simple one, with a straight runway between the start box and the goal box, cockroaches running in pairs ran more quickly towards the goal box than did those running alone. But in a more complex maze that required a right turn to reach the goal box, solitary cockroaches outraced pairs. In a particularly creative follow-up experiment, Zajonc and colleagues found that cockroaches completed the easy maze faster, and the difficult maze slower, if they raced in front of a crowd of spectator cockroaches than if they raced with no audience. How did the researchers get cockroaches to participate as spectators? The researchers placed cockroaches in plexiglass ‘audience boxes’ along either side of the maze, and this ‘audience’ produced social facilitation. Social facilitation effects continue to be demonstrated in an array of settings. For instance, Rui-feng Yu, and Xin Wu (2015), found that the presence of an observer slowed down participants’ screening of

Social facilitation

A process whereby the presence of others enhances performance on easy tasks but impairs performance on difficult tasks.

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FIGURE 8.4 Social facilitation among cockroaches In a creative way to test social facilitation effects in non-human animals, Zajonc had cockroaches run a simple or complex maze, alone or with another racing cockroach, and in front of an audience or without an audience. Here, the two audience conditions are represented. Audience boxes

Easy maze Goal

Difficult maze Goal

Audience boxes

baggage in an X-ray security scan when the task was complex but sped up the performance when the task was simple. Social facilitation effects have also hit the modern era: they emerge even when the ‘others’ present were merely a photograph of a favourite television character or a computer display of a ‘virtual’ person (Eastvold, Belanger, & Vanderploeg, 2012; Gardner & Knowles, 2008; Park & Catrambone, 2007; Rockloff, Greer, & Evans, 2012; Rosenbloom, Shahr, Perlman, Estreich, & Kirzner, 2007).

Alternative explanations for social facilitation Social facilitation effects have been replicated across many domains, but not all aspects of Zajonc’s theory have received universal support. Zajonc proposed the mere Floodlight presence theory; that is, others simply being present is enough to produce social facilitation. Some have argued, Start however, that a better explanation is the evaluation apprehension theory, which proposes that performance Floodlight will be enhanced or impaired only in the presence of others who are in a position to evaluate that performance Source: Zajonc, R. B., Heingartner, A., & Herman, E. M. (1969). Social enhancement and impairment of performance in the cockroach. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 13, 82–92. (Geen, 1991; Henchy & Glass, 1968). In other words, for example, it is not simply because others are around that an individual is so aroused and therefore inept as they try to learn to surf at a crowded break. Rather, it is because they worry that the others are watching and probably laughing at them, possibly even uploading a video of their performance to YouTube. These concerns increase the individual’s dominant response, which, unfortunately, is falling. Another account of social facilitation, distraction–conflict theory, points out that being distracted while we are working on a task creates attentional conflict (Baron, 1986; Sanders, 1981). We are torn between focusing on the task and inspecting the distracting stimulus. When we are conflicted about where to pay attention, our arousal increases. So, is one of these theories right and the others wrong? Probably not. It seems likely that all three of the basic elements described by these theories (mere presence, evaluation and attention) can contribute to the impact others have on our own performance (Seitchik, Brown, & Harkins, 2017; Uziel, 2007). But as we Mere presence are about to see in the next section, there is even more to the story of how individuals are affected by the theory presence of others. Start

The proposition that the mere presence of others is sufficient to produce social facilitation effects.

Evaluation apprehension theory

The theory that the presence of others will produce social facilitation effects only when those others are seen as potential evaluators.

Distraction–conflict theory

A theory that the presence of others will produce social facilitation effects only when those others distract from the task and create attentional conflict.

320

Social loafing The tasks that participants complete in research on social facilitation produce individually identifiable results. That is, individual behaviour can be identified and evaluated. But on some tasks, efforts are pooled so that the specific performance of any one individual cannot be determined. It just so happens that research on these kinds of collective endeavours can also be traced back to Triplett’s era of the late nineteenth century. In Chapter 1 we mentioned the French agricultural engineer Max Ringelmann as another contender for having conducted the first social psychological research. In research conducted during the 1880s, Ringelmann discovered that people’s output declined when they worked together rather than alone on simple tasks like tug-of-war or pushing a cart (Kravitz & Martin, 1986; Ringelmann, 1913). Why did individual output decline? One explanation is that the individuals exerted less effort when they acted collectively, but another explanation is that the individuals simply demonstrated poor coordination when working together – some worked while others relaxed and vice versa. How can you distinguish lack of effort from poor coordination in a task like this? Alan Ingham and colleagues (1974) answered this question by using a rope-pulling machine and blindfolding participants. In one condition, participants were led to think that they were pulling with other participants, and in another condition the participants were informed that they were pulling alone (which, in fact, they were). The researchers told the participants to pull as hard as they could. Ingham and colleagues were able to measure exactly how hard each individual

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GROUP PROCESSES

participant pulled, and they observed that the participants pulled almost 20% harder when they thought they were pulling alone than when they thought they were pulling with others. Bibb Latané and colleagues (1979) found that group-produced reductions in individual output, which they called social loafing, are common in other types of tasks as well. For example, imagine being asked as part of a psychology experiment to cheer or clap as loudly as you can. Common sense might lead you to think that you would cheer and clap louder when doing this together with others in a group than when performing alone because you would be less embarrassed and inhibited if others were doing the same thing as you. But Latané and colleagues found that when performing collectively, individual students loafed; that is, they exerted less effort. The noise generated by each individual decreased as the size of the group increased (see Figure 8.5).

Social loafing on complex tasks

CHAPTER EIGHT

People will cheer louder when they cheer as part of a group than when they cheer alone.

FALSE

Social loafing

A group-produced reduction in individual output on tasks where contributions are pooled.

Social loafing is not restricted to simple motor tasks. Sharing responsibility with others reduces the amount of effort that people put into more complex tasks, such as playing team sport, cognitive tasks, and working collaboratively on team projects (Hoigaard & Ommundsen, 2007; Liden, Wayne, Jaworski, & Bennett, 2004; Miles & Greenberg, 1993; Plaks & Higgins, 2000; Tan & Tan, 2008; Weldon, Blair, & Huebsch, 2000). When others are there to pick up the slack, people slack off (Simms & Nichols, 2014). Most university students are quite familiar with having to work on group projects, and many have seen the pitfalls of social loafing in these settings. Praveen Aggarwal and Connie O’Brien (2008) studied several hundred university students to assess what factors can reduce the incidence of social loafing and they offer these three strategies: (1) limit the scope of the project, (2) keep the groups small, and (3) use peer evaluations (see Figure 8.6). Curt Dommeyer’s (2012) research suggests also that making each group member a ‘manager’ of different segments of the task can also help reduce loafing. Making individual performance public to the group not only counteracts social loafing, but can create social labouring – where group members performed better (Lount Jr & Wilk, 2014). One form of social loafing has emerged in recent times: cyberloafing, FIGURE 8.5 Social loafing – when many produce less which involves personal use of email and the internet at work. Cyberloafing Social loafing is a group-produced reduction in individual output on simple tasks. In this study, university students were told to can be a huge drain on workers’ cheer or clap as loudly as they could. The noise produced by each productivity (Askew et al., 2014; of them decreased as the size of the group increased. Glassman et al., 2015; Karaoğlan et al., 2015). As a consequence, many 5 FIGURE 8.6 Social loafing with classmates

Noise per person

4

Beware the perils of social loafing – it can arise even in small groupwork for a course. Research suggests that three strategies might work to keep social loafing at bay: (1) limit the scope of the project, (2) keep the groups small, and (3) use peer evaluations.

3

2

1

1

2

4

6

Group size Cheering

Clapping

Source: Based on Latané, B., Williams, K., & Harkins, S. (1979). Many hands make light the work: The causes and consequences of social loafing. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 37, 822–832.

Source: iStock.com/Neustockimages

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workers’ actions on the job are coming under increasing surveillance by supervisors who fear the negative outcomes of this form of social loafing. What about cyberloafing in the university classroom? That happens too (Flanigan & Kiewra, 2018) – are you guilty of it? You may wonder if social loafing is a phenomenon seen around the world, or whether it might vary by culture. As seen in the following Cultural Diversity feature, research supports both options.

CULTURAL DIVERSITY CULTURAL NUANCES OF SOCIAL LOAFING Steven Karau and Kipling Williams (1993) conducted a meta-analysis of 78 studies and found social loafing to be a reliable phenomenon that is evident across numerous tasks and in countries around the world. Despite this prevalence, some cultural differences in tendencies to socially loaf have been found. Karau and Williams’s meta-analysis found that social loafing was less prevalent among people from East Asian collectivist cultures (e.g., China, Japan and Taiwan) than among people from Western, individualist cultures (e.g., Australia and New Zealand). With their tendencies to be more aware of their connections and mutual reliance on others, people from collectivist cultures may be relatively more concerned about the possible negative impact on others of their social loafing. If someone in the group does violate a norm of hard work, however, people from collectivist cultures may take more offence. Indeed, supporting this, Tsang-Kai Collective effort model

The theory that individuals will exert effort on a collective task to the degree that they think their individual efforts will be important, relevant and meaningful for achieving outcomes that they value.

Hung and colleagues (2009) found that workers in Taiwan who perceived co-workers as socially loafing were likely to be motivated to seek revenge towards their co-workers and even towards the organisation. In an interesting twist, Ying-yi Hong and colleagues (2008) hypothesised that there are times when people from collectivist cultures may be especially likely to socially loaf. Because people from these cultures tend to be concerned with behaving consistently with group norms, they may be tempted to socially loaf if they are working in a group that has established a group norm of low productivity and effort. The researchers found support for this idea in a set of studies with Chinese students. When these students engaged in a task with a group of co-workers who were not being productive, the participants reduced their own efforts if they thought their effort would be evident to their co-workers. Not wanting to publicly deviate from the group norm, these students conformed to the norm of working less hard.

Collective effort model Several researchers have constructed theoretical accounts to explain the findings about when social loafing is more or less likely to occur. The most influential of these is the collective effort model (Williams & Karau, 2014). This model asserts that individuals will try hard on a collective task when they think their efforts will help them achieve outcomes they personally value. If the outcome is important to individual members of the group and if they believe they can help achieve the desired outcome, they are less likely to socially loaf. In fact, in these cases they may even engage in social compensation by increasing their efforts on collective tasks to try to compensate for the anticipated social loafing or poor performance of other group members.

CRITICAL THINKING ACTIVITY The next time you work on a group project, such as an essay that you and several other students are supposed to write together, consider the factors that increase and decrease social loafing.

What aspects of the situation might you try to change so that all group members are motivated to do their share of the work?

Deindividuation Being in the presence of others can lead to the relatively common effects of social facilitation and social loafing. But occasionally the presence of others can lead to extraordinary actions. For example, a group of soccer fans excited at their home team’s victory spills out of the arena onto the street and soon a riot develops, complete with small fires, overturned cars and looting. Or a conflict between two people late at night in a loud dance club suddenly turns into a raucous brawl, with bottles flying and punches thrown, involving dozens of people. What turns an unruly crowd into a violent mob? No doubt many of the factors that will be described in Chapter 11 contribute to group violence as well as violence done by individuals. These include imitation of aggressive models, intense frustration, alcohol consumption and the presence

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Deindividuation of weapons that trigger aggressive thoughts and actions. But there is also deindividuation; that is, the loss The loss of a person’s of a person’s sense of individuality and the reduction of normal constraints against deviant behaviour. Most sense of individuality and investigators believe that deindividuation is a collective phenomenon that occurs only in the presence of the reduction of normal others (Diener, Fraser, Beaman, & Kelem, 1976; Festinger, Pepitone, & Newcomb, 1952). constraints against Philip Zimbardo (1969) observed that arousal, anonymity and reduced feelings of individual responsibility deviant behaviour. together contribute to deindividuation. While deindividuation comes into play in clearly negative situations, it can also influence behaviours in positive situations as well. Take, for example, the celebrating sport fans who riot violently, FIGURE 8.7 Deindividuation in sports rioting destroying public property and vandalising streets (see It is commonplace for celebrations by groups of fans after their Figure 8.7). At first look, this type of behaviour is illogical – team’s victory to escalate from joy to mayhem and destruction. In it comes from fans of the team who won. They should be this photo, fans of French soccer team Paris Saint-Germain clash celebrating! The principles of deindividuation are likely the with police at an event meant to celebrate the team’s first league source of the behaviour. Fans can be very aroused by their title in nearly 20 years. In the midst of a crowd like this, people may feel deindividuated, which can lead to deviant behaviour. team’s victory, and, when in large groups, each individual fan is provided with relative anonymity, and these factors, quite possibly along with the alcohol that is sometimes consumed at sporting events, contribute to reduced feelings of individual responsibility. According to Steven Prentice-Dunn and Ronald Rogers (1982, 1983), two types of environmental cues make deviant behaviours such as this rioting more likely to occur – accountability cues and attentional cues. Accountability cues affect the individual’s cost–reward calculations. When accountability is low, those who commit deviant acts are less likely to be caught and punished, and people may deliberately choose to engage in gratifying but usually inhibited behaviours. Being in a large crowd or wearing a mask are two examples of instances when accountability may Source: Getty Images/AFP/Franck Fife be low, and these factors are associated with more extreme and destructive behaviours. Attentional cues focus a person’s attention away from the self. In this state, the individual attends less to internal standards of conduct, reacts more to the immediate situation, and is less sensitive to long-term consequences of behaviour (Diener, 1980). Behaviour slips out from the bonds of cognitive control, and people act on impulse. For example, when you are at a party with very loud music and flashing lights, you may be swept up with the pulsating crowd and feel your individual identity slipping away. One context ripe for deindividuation is online behaviour (Liao, Squicciarini, Griffin & Rajtmajer, 2016; Mikal, Rice, Kent, & Uchino, 2016). If you have ever been part of an online community where people can post comments anonymously, there is a good chance that you have witnessed some of the nasty effects of deindividuation. Many well-intentioned sites or discussions or even the comments sections linked to online newspaper stories, videos or celebrity gossip blogs soon devolve into a torrent of crude, hostile and prejudiced venting and taunting that would never happen without the cloak of anonymity.

Trick or treat: field experiments on Halloween One particularly creative set of field experiments by Edward Diener and Arthur Beaman and colleagues (Beaman et al., 1979; Diener et al., 1976) demonstrated how accountability cues and attentional cues can affect behaviour on a night when many otherwise well-behaved individuals act in antisocial ways: Halloween. When you think about it, Halloween is a perfect time to study deindividuation. Children often wear costumes with masks, travel in large groups at night and are highly aroused. In one study, the researchers unobtrusively observed more than 1300 children who came trick-or-treating to 27 homes spread around a city in the north-western US. At each of these homes, a researcher met and greeted the children, who were either alone or in groups. In one condition, the researcher asked the children their names and where they lived; in another condition, the researcher did not ask them any questions about their identities. When asked to identify themselves, the children should have become more self-aware and more accountable for their actions. Children who were not asked to reveal their identities should have felt relatively deindividuated, safe and anonymous in their costumes. The children were then invited to take one item from a bowl full of lollies and were left alone with the bowl. Hidden observers watched to see how many lollies each child took. What did the observers see? As

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Figure 8.8 illustrates, children who were in a group were more likely to break the rule and take extra lollies than were children who were alone. Add anonymity to the presence of a group, and children were even more likely to break the rule. In other words, the children were most likely to take extra lollies when they were the most deindividuated – when they were in a group and had not been asked to identify themselves. In another experiment, the researchers placed a mirror behind the lolly bowl in some conditions. As noted in Chapter 2, the presence of a mirror tends to increase self-awareness. Children who had been asked their names, especially older children, were much less likely to steal lollies if there was a mirror present than if there was not. Older children are more likely to have internal standards against stealing, and making these children self-aware made them more likely to act according to those standards.

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Moving from personal to social identity

FIGURE 8.8 Trick or treat(s) Children trick-or-treating on Halloween were part of a field experiment. Some were alone and some were in groups with other trick-or-treaters. The experimenter who greeted them allowed a random half of the children to remain anonymous but asked the other half to indicate their names and where they lived. The experimenter instructed each child to take only one piece of candy, after which the children were left alone with the bowl of treats. The bars in this graph represent the percentage of children who took more than the one piece of candy. Consistent with predictions based on deindividuation, the children who were in a group and were anonymous were most likely to cheat by taking extra candy.

% Who took extra candy

70

40 30 20 10 0 Alone Not anonymous

Group Anonymous

Source: Based on Diener, E., Fraser, S. C., Beaman, A. L., & Kelem, R. T. (1976). Effects of deindividuation variables on stealing among Halloween trick-or-treaters. Journal of Personality and Social ­Psychology, 33, 178–183.

Social identity model of deindividuation effects (SIDE) A model of group behaviour that explains deindividuation effects as the result of a shift from personal identity to social identity.

The loss of personal identity does not always produce antisocial behaviour. This is the core idea of the social identity model of deindividuation effects (SIDE), which proposes that whether deindividuation affects people for better or for worse reflects the characteristics and norms of the group immediately surrounding the individual, as well as the group’s power to act according to these norms (Spears, 2017). As personal identity and internal controls are quieted, social identity emerges and conformity to the group increases. If a group defines itself in terms of prejudice and hatred against another group, deindividuation can ignite an explosion of violence. By contrast, if a group defines itself in terms of helping others, deindividuation can spark prosocial, selfless actions. The consequences of losing your personal identity, therefore, depend on what you lose it to (Chen & Wu, 2015; Spears & Postmes, 2015).

GROUP PERFORMANCE: PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS Social facilitation, social loafing and deindividuation can all affect individuals, whether they are working in real groups or are merely part of a collective or crowd. In this section, we examine processes that are specific to groups, where interaction among members is more direct and meaningful. We focus on how well groups perform, and in doing so, we address a fundamental question: ‘Aren’t two or more heads generally better than one?’ Although eight people typically can outproduce a lone individual, do eight people working together in a group typically outperform the sum of eight people working individually? You may be surprised to learn how often and in what ways groups perform worse than their potential would suggest. We also discuss when and how groups are more likely to perform well.

Losses and gains in groups Process loss

The reduction in group performance due to obstacles created by group processes, such as problems of coordination and motivation.

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When a group performs worse than its potential, it experiences what Ivan Steiner (1972) called process loss; that is, the reduction in group performance due to obstacles created by group processes, such as problems of coordination and motivation. According to Steiner, some types of group tasks are more vulnerable to process loss than others. For example, on an additive task, the group product is the sum of all the members’ contributions. Donating to a charity is an additive task, as is cheering at a concert. Of course, for these tasks, the more the merrier in terms of overall output. A group typically will make more noise at a concert than an individual. However, as we have seen, people often indulge in social loafing during additive tasks, which creates process loss. In other words, each member’s contribution may be less than it would be if that person worked alone. As a result the group performs less than its potential. On a conjunctive task, the group product is determined by the individual with the poorest performance. Mountain-climbing teams are engaged in such a task; the ‘weakest link’ will determine their success or

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failure (see Figure 8.9). Because of this vulnerability to the poor performance of a single group member, group performance on conjunctive tasks tends to be worse than the performance of a single average individual. On a disjunctive task, the group product is (or can be) determined by the performance of the individual with the best performance. Trying to solve a problem or develop a strategy may be a disjunctive task – what the group needs is a single successful idea or answer, regardless of the number of failures. In principle, groups have an edge on individuals in the performance of disjunctive tasks. The more people involved, the more likely it is that someone will make a breakthrough. In practice, however, group processes can interfere with coming up with ideas and getting them accepted, resulting in process loss. For example, groups may not realise which group members have the best ideas or are most expert. Unless the best solution for a particular problem is easily and clearly identifiable once it has been suggested, the group may fail to implement it; as a result, the group will perform worse than its best members (Kolb & van Swol, 2018; Sohrab, Waller, & Kaplan, 2015; Stasser & Titus, 2003). Later in this chapter, we will discuss strategies that help groups recognise and utilise expertise.

CHAPTER EIGHT

FIGURE 8.9 Mountain climbing is a conjunctive task Just as the strength of a chain depends on its weakest link, the group product of a conjunctive task is determined by the individual with the poorest performance. In mountain climbing, for example, if one person slips or falls, the whole team is endangered.

CRITICAL THINKING ACTIVITY Have you ever known that you had the right idea, but were unable to convince others in your group until it was too late? If so, you may have experienced firsthand the problem of process loss on a disjunctive task. On some kinds of tasks, groups can even show process gain, in which they outperform even the best members. Groups often perform better than the best individuals on tasks in which (1) the correct answer is clearly evident to everyone in the group once it is presented, and (2) the work on the task can be divided up so that various subgroups work on different aspects of the task (Carey & Laughlin, 2012). In the business world, process gain may be known as synergy, and it is the ideal that business and organisational groups strive for (Mercier, Trouche, Yama, Heintz, & Girotto, 2015; Korde & Paulus, 2017; Meslec & Curşeu, 2013).

Brainstorming During the 1950s, advertising executive Alex Osborn developed a technique called brainstorming that was designed to enhance the creativity and productivity of problem-solving groups. The ground rules for brainstorming call for a freewheeling, creative approach: • Express all ideas that come to mind even if they seem outlandish. • The more ideas, the better. • Do not worry whether the ideas are good or bad, and do not criticise anyone’s ideas – they can be evaluated later. • All ideas belong to the group, so members should feel free to build on each other’s work. Osborn (1953) claimed that by using these procedures, groups could generate more and better ideas than could individuals working alone. The idea caught on. Brainstorming was soon a popular exercise in business, government and education. In fact, it remains very popular today. But when the research caught up with the hype, it turned out that Osborn’s faith in the group process was unfounded. In fact, ‘nominal groups’ (i.e., several individuals working alone) produce a greater number of better ideas than do real groups in which members interact with each other. Brainstorming can indeed be effective, but people brainstorming individually produce more and higher-quality ideas than the same number of people

Source: Getty Images/Gordon Wiltsie

Process gain

The increase in group performance so that the group outperforms the individuals who comprise the group.

Brainstorming

A technique that attempts to increase the production of creative ideas by encouraging group members to speak freely without criticising their own or others’ contributions.

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People brainstorming as a group come up with a greater number of better ideas than the same number of people working individually.

FALSE

brainstorming together. One meta-analysis concluded that brainstorming groups are only about half as productive as an equal number of individuals working alone (Mullen, Johnson, & Salas, 1991). Rather than being inspired by each other and building on each other’s ideas, people brainstorming in a group underperform (Paulus, Korde, Dickson, Carmelli, & Cohen-Meitar, 2015; Stroebe, Nijstad, & Rietzschel, 2010). The following list presents several explanations as to why group brainstorming is ineffective: • Production blocking – when people have to wait for their turn to speak, they may forget their ideas, they may be so busy trying to remember their ideas that they do not listen to others or generate additional ideas, or they may simply lose interest. • Free riding – as others contribute ideas, individuals may feel less motivated to work hard themselves. They see their own contributions as less necessary or less likely to have much impact. They therefore engage in social loafing. • Evaluation apprehension – in the presence of others, people may be hesitant to suggest wild, off-the-wall ideas for fear of looking foolish and being criticised. Even if they are willing to suggest such ideas, they may spend time preparing to justify them that they otherwise could have spent coming up with more ideas. • Performance matching – group members work only as hard as they see others work. Once the other three factors have reduced the performance of a brainstorming group, performance matching can help maintain this relatively inferior performance. Despite the research evidence, brainstorming is still a popular device in many organisations. People who participate in interactive brainstorming groups typically think that it works wonderfully and evaluate their performance more favourably than do individuals in nominal groups. They also enjoy themselves more, and group brainstorming can increase group cohesiveness (Henningsen & Henningsen, 2013). But they are working under the illusion that group brainstorming is much more effective than it actually is. Fortunately, after the initial shock at how poor group brainstorming really is, researchers have demonstrated a number of strategies that improve productivity while also preserving the enjoyment that group brainstorming can produce. For example, training people in effective brainstorming, alternating types of brainstorming sessions (e.g., by having members brainstorm alone and then together, or first together then alone) has proven very effective. Other strategies that improve group performance include training people in effective brainstorming, giving the group a subset of categories to begin the brainstorming process, using a trained facilitator and giving groups more time rather than rushing them to a decision (Baruah & Paulus, 2011; Henningsen & Henningsen, 2013; Oxley et al., 1996; Paulus, Nakui, Putman, & Brown, 2006; Paulus, Korde, Dickson, Carmelli, & Cohen-Meitar, 2015). Using technology to allow groups to engage in what is called electronic brainstorming can help a group brainstorm more effectively. By allowing everyone in the group to enter ideas from their own electronic devices and have the ideas appear on a central screen, electronic brainstorming combines the freedom of working alone and not having to take turns with the stimulation of seeing others’ ideas. The following list presents some of the factors that make this type of brainstorming effective: ` • Production blocking is reduced because members can type in ideas whenever they come to mind. • Free riding can be reduced by having the computer keep track of each member’s amount of input. • Evaluation apprehension is reduced because group members contribute their ideas anonymously. • Performance matching is reduced because group members spend less time focusing on the performance of others as they type in their own ideas. In addition, performance matching is less of a problem because the initial performance of groups that brainstorm electronically is likely to be high. • Group members can benefit by seeing the ideas of others, which can inspire new ideas that they might not otherwise have considered.

Group polarisation Imagine that you are given some information and, based on it, are asked to decide whether someone should behave in a risky or a cautious manner, such as whether an entrepreneur should risk trying to expand his or her business or whether an employee in a stable but boring job should quit and take a more creative job at a start-up. Imagine after you come to an initial opinion on this, you and a group of other people who have also arrived at initial opinions come together and discuss the case. What will be the result of the group discussion of the various opinions? Two options are plausible. Perhaps the most reasonable prediction is that there will be a compromise as group members move towards the average of all the individuals’ attitudes. But groups tend to be cautious and slow-moving. Wary of leading the group towards a risky decision, people might become more cautious in their views as they discuss them with other group members. So, another prediction here would be that the people in the group would become more cautious in what they advocate. 326

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Exaggeration of group tendencies So which prediction is the correct one: movement towards the average attitude or movement towards caution? As it turns out - neither! Rather, group discussion tends to enhance or exaggerate the initial leanings of the group. Thus, if most group members initially lean towards a risky position on a particular issue, the group members on average will move towards an even riskier position after the discussion. But if group members in general initially lean towards a cautious position, the group discussion leads to greater caution. This effect is called group polarisation; that is, the exaggeration through group discussion of initial tendencies in the thinking of group members (Moscovici & Zavalloni, 1969; Myers & Lamm, 1976). Group polarisation is not restricted to decisions involving risk versus caution. Any group decision can be influenced by group polarisation. Polarisation effects are seen everywhere from workplace contexts (Zhu, 2013) to social media (Del Vicario et al., 2016).

Causes of group polarisation What causes group polarisation? According to persuasive arguments theory, the greater the number and persuasiveness of the arguments to which group members are exposed, the more extreme their attitudes become. If most group members favour a cautious decision, for example, most of the arguments discussed will favour caution, giving the members more and more reasons to think caution is the correct approach (Pavitt, 1994; Vinokur & Burnstein, 1974). A second explanation is based on social comparison theory. As described in Chapter 2, individuals develop their view of social reality by comparing themselves with others. In the case of group discussions, as individuals learn that most other group members lean in one direction on an issue, they may adopt a more extreme attitude in the same direction. In other words, people who are members of a group that believes that X is good may be willing to state to the group that twice X is even better. By advocating for twice X, individuals can distinguish themselves in the group in a manner that is approved by the group (Lamm & Myers, 1978). In addition, groups may polarise as a way to differentiate themselves from other groups (McGarty et al., 1992; Suhay, 2015). Each of these accounts spotlight particular processes, but taken together they all seem to contribute to the emergence of group polarisation. It seems that political groups today have become more and more polarised, moving to extremes rather than towards moderation and compromise. On a smaller level, it is easy to observe how the culture of a team may evolve over the course of a season or to follow the attitudes of a group as it prepares for a debate against another group. In these cases you are likely to see group polarisation develop through the processes we’ve just described.

Group polarisation

The exaggeration of initial tendencies in the thinking of group members through group discussion.

Group members’ attitudes about a course of action usually become more moderate after group discussion.

FALSE

Groupthink

A group decision-making style characterised by an excessive tendency among group members to seek concurrence.

Groupthink A quick survey of recent world events reveals a frightening picture. Climate change wreaks havoc on ecosystems around the world. Political parties vie for power with increasingly antagonistic clashes. Wars, violence, and poverty have generated huge numbers of refugees – refugees who then struggle to find asylum in other countries. Contrasting these harsh realities with the supposed competence of world leaders who might have the power to implement positive change is puzzling. How is it that governments and international organisations seem to fail to make good decisions – and even in some cases make disastrously bad decisions? According to Irving Janis (1982), the answer to this question lies in a particular kind of flawed group dynamic that he called groupthink, which is an excessive tendency to seek concurrence (i.e., agreement or uniformity) among group members. Groupthink emerges when the need for agreement takes priority over the motivation to obtain accurate information and make appropriate decisions. Figure 8.10 outlines the factors that contribute to groupthink, along with its symptoms and consequences.

Characteristics of groupthink Janis believed that three characteristics contribute to the development of groupthink: 1. Since highly cohesive groups are more likely to reject members with deviant opinions, Janis thought they would be more susceptible to groupthink. 2. Group structure is also important. Groups that are composed of people from similar backgrounds, isolated from other people, directed by a strong leader and lacking in systematic procedures for making and reviewing decisions will be particularly likely to fall prey to groupthink. 3. Stressful situations can provoke groupthink. Under stress, urgency can overrule accuracy and the reassuring support of other group members becomes highly desirable. The idea that high cohesiveness contributes to groupthink received a lot of attention when Janis introduced the model because, as we indicated earlier, most people view cohesiveness as something that Copyright 2020 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-202

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FIGURE 8.10 Charting the course of groupthink Irving Janis depicted groupthink as a kind of social disease, complete with antecedents and symptoms, that increases the chance of making a bad decision. Antecedents • High cohesiveness • Group structure Homogeneous members Isolation Directive leadership Unsystematic procedures • Stressful situations

Symptoms • Overestimation of the group • Closed-mindedness • Increased pressures toward uniformity Mindguards and pressure on dissenters Self-censorship Illusion of unanimity • Defective decision-making Incomplete survey of alternatives Incomplete survey of objectives Failure to examine risks of preferred choice Failure to reappraise initially rejected alternatives Poor information search Selective bias in processing information at hand Failure to work out contingency plans

groups should strive for and value. However, even though high cohesiveness in a group might feel great and make for smooth and easy interactions among group members, it can foster emphasis on preserving each other’s feelings rather than an objective examination of the facts or an honest discussion of differences of opinion. Such a concern with agreement over accuracy is a hallmark of groupthink. In Janis’s formulation, groupthink is a kind of social disease, and infected groups display the behavioural symptoms indicated in the middle of Figure 8.10. Consider again the case of the Australian Bureau of Sugar Experiment Stations’ decision to introduce cane toads, detailed in the opening of this chapter. Historical analysis revealed that the scientists involved demonstrated the symptom of closed-mindedness (Turvey, 2011). They instilled an illusion of unanimity by fervently rejecting the sole voice of dissent. Further, it is clear that they had a failure to examine risks of preferred choice by engaging in poor information search. Even though their intentions were good, they most certainly fell victim to groupthink.

Preventing groupthink

To guard against groupthink, Janis (1982) urged groups to make an active effort to process information more carefully and accurately. He recommended that decision-making groups use the following strategies: • To avoid isolation, groups should consult widely with outsiders. • To reduce group pressures to conform, leaders should explicitly encourage criticism and not take a strong stand High probability of a bad decision early in the group discussion. • To establish a strong norm of critical review, subgroups Source: Based on Janis, I. L. (1982). Groupthink (2nd ed.). Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin. should separately discuss the same issue, a member should be assigned to play devil’s advocate and question all decisions and ideas, and a ‘second chance’ meeting should be held to reconsider the group decision before taking action. Research has shown empirical support for the effectiveness of some strategies in curtailing groupthink tendencies. These include inserting someone into the group to play the role of a ‘reminder’, who is responsible for informing the group about the dangers of biased decision-making; making individual group members believe that they will be held personally responsible for the outcome of their group’s decisions; increasing the diversity of group members; and creating a group norm that encourages critical thinking and discourages the search for concurrence (Kroon, t'Hart, & van Kreveld; Postmes, Spears, & Cihangir, 2001; Schultz, Ketrow, & Urban, 1995; t’Hart, 1998). Additionally, as we will see later in the chapter, technology can also be used during meetings to help avoid groupthink.

Research on groupthink: myth or reality? Groupthink is a rather distinctive theory in social psychology – its impact has been unusually broad. It is discussed in a variety of disciplines outside psychology, including business, political science and communication, and it has spawned numerous workshops, websites and training videos. Yet, there is not a great deal of empirical support for the model, and certainly not in proportion to its fame (Esser, 1998). This may be partly due to the difficulty of experimentally testing such a broad set of variables in high-pressure group settings. In addition, many researchers disagree with Janis about the specific conditions that make groups vulnerable to groupthink (Baron, 2005; Hackman & Katz, 2010; Turner & Pratkanis, 1998). For now, the bottom line may be that even if one is sceptical about the details of Janis’s theory of groupthink, as many and perhaps most scholars are, it does seem clear that many of the factors that Janis specified as antecedents and symptoms of groupthink can contribute to very faulty group decisionmaking, and groups would be wise to be on the lookout for these traps. Perhaps most importantly, Janis’s recommended steps to avoid these traps should help most groups, regardless of the merits or problems with the theory of groupthink. 328

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CHAPTER EIGHT

Communicating information and utilising expertise One of the biggest flaws in how groups perform is that they often fail to use all the information or skills that group members have (Hackman & Katz, 2010). In this section we explore some of the dynamics that cause this problem as well as some factors that can help groups better communicate and use important information.

Information sharing and biased sampling Imagine that the chief executives of a company meet to decide whether to launch a risky expansion of their business. All of them share much of the same information about the potential costs and benefits, and the weight of this evidence suggests the risk is worth it. But one of the executives is an expert on some technical aspects of the stock market and knows a reason why this move might have negative stock implications. Another executive has special knowledge of one of their primary competitors and knows that the competitor might make a countermove that could be devastating. A third executive knows that the morale among the company’s personnel could be hurt by the expansion more than the other executives realise. If these unique pieces of information were shared during the discussion, the weight of the evidence would tip towards not expanding the company. But too often group members fail to share their uniquely held information, which results in bad decisions. These examples illustrate what Garold Stasser (Stasser, 1992; Stasser & Titus, 2003) termed biased sampling; where a group may fail to consider important information that is not common knowledge in the group. Inadequately informed, the group may make a bad decision. There are several reasons why groups tend to exhibit this bias. For example, commonly shared information is likely to be socially validated by the group, and this in turn causes it to be more easily remembered and trusted. The validation also makes group members more confident in discussing and reiterating these pieces of information (Levine & Smith, 2013). The results of a meta-analysis of hundreds of studies make clear how important sufficient information sharing is for group performance, and how biased sampling of information can be a significant problem (Lu, Yuan, & McLeod, 2012; Mesmer-Magnus & DeChurch, 2009). Fortunately, researchers have discovered several conditions under which biased sampling is less likely to occur. For example, leaders who encourage a lot of group participation are more likely to elicit unshared (as well as shared) information during group discussions than are leaders who are more controlling (Larson, Foster-Fishman, & Franz, 1998; Lee, Gillespie, Mann, & Wearing, 2010). Another effective role that leaders can play is to encourage critical discussion of ideas (van Ginkel & van Knippenberg, 2008, 2012). J. Lukas Thürmer and others (2015) found that information sharing and group decisions were much better when group members had to make a plan of when and how they would review alternatives before settling on their ultimate decision. In one of their experiments, for example, three-person groups had to make a series of decisions, such as which job applicant should be hired. All of the group members were given a set of identical information relevant for their decision, but each member also received information unique to them that was crucial for the overall decision. If only commonly shared information was discussed, one of the job candidates would seem the best. But if all of the information, including the unshared information, was discussed, then the best decision would be to hire a different candidate. All of the groups in this study were given financial incentives to reach the best decisions, all knew that each group member had a slightly different (but all true) set of information, and all were encouraged to consider alternatives before reaching their final decision. The only difference between conditions was that half of the groups were given a specific plan about how and when to consider alternatives: ‘When we finally take the decision sheet to note our preferred alternative, then we will go over the advantages of the nonpreferred alternatives again’. Having a specific plan made a big difference. As can be seen in Figure 8.11, groups given this plan were more likely to discuss the unshared information and more likely to reach the correct decision.

Biased sampling

The tendency for groups to spend more time discussing shared information (i.e., information already known by all or most group members) than unshared information (i.e., information known by only one or a few group members).

Information processing and transactive memory Even if everyone in a group has all the available information, group members must process that information and use it to make judgements or perform tasks. How well do groups process information compared with individuals? In general, groups are susceptible to the same information-processing biases as individuals, only more so (Hinsz, Tindale & Vollrath, 1997). Verlin Hinsz and colleagues (2008) have found that, for instance, groups are more influenced by vivid examples than representative statistics; a similar effect, though small, is seen with individual judgements.

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FIGURE 8.11 Improving information sharing specific plan about how and when to consider alternatives to the group decision discussed more of the unique information (left) and made better decisions (right) than did groups just given the more general goal of considering alternatives.

14

14

12

12

10

10 Decision quality

Discussion of unique information

Small groups received sets of information to be used to make a series of group decisions. Some information was known to all group members, but each group member also had some unique information. If only commonly shared information was discussed, the group would make bad decisions. Groups that were given a

8 6

8 6

4

4

2

2

0

0 General goal

Specific plan

General goal

Specific plan

Source: Thürmer, J. L., Wieber, F., & Gollwitzer, P. M. (2015). A Self-regulation perspective on hidden-profile problems: If–Then planning to review information improves group decisions. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 28(2), 101–113.

Transactive memory

A shared system for remembering information that enables multiple people to remember information together more efficiently than they could alone.

One key advantage of groups is that they can divide a large body of information into smaller portions and delegate different members to remember these more manageable portions. Have you and a friend ever divided up a list of things to remember, such as which grocery items to remember to buy at the shop or which sections of a textbook chapter each of you should be responsible for remembering before you study together? If so, you have tried to take advantage of a shared process known as transactive memory, which helps groups remember more information more efficiently than individuals (Barnier, Klein, & Harris, 2018; Peltokorpi, 2008; Wegner, Lane, & Dimitri, 1994). Groups that develop good transactive memory systems have enormous advantages over other groups (Bachrach et al., 2018; Heavey & Simsek, 2017; Huang, Liu, & Zhong, 2013). Research has even identified benefits of transactive memory in best friendships for commitment and trust (Iannone, McCarty, & Kelly, 2017). Effective transactive memory systems involve a few key elements. First, the group must develop a division of knowledge and the group members must be able to communicate and remember this information in the group; everyone must know who knows what. Second, the group members must be able to trust each other’s specialised knowledge. And third, the group members need to coordinate their efforts so that they can work together on a task smoothly and efficiently.

Virtual teams Teams consisting of people dispersed widely across the globe are a rapidly growing part of the business world. Recent surveys indicate that a vast majority of workers today spend time working in virtual teams (Culture Wizard, 2018). Virtual teams, sometimes also called dispersed teams, are ‘groups of people who work interdependently with shared purpose across space, time, and organisation boundaries using technology to communicate and collaborate’ (Kirkman, Rosen, Gibson, Tesluk, & McPherson, 2002, p. 67). Due to globalisation and a variety of related factors, virtual teams will be increasingly important in businesses and organisations. By using virtual teams dispersed across time and space, organisations can have much greater reach, diversity of perspectives and skills, and understanding of broader markets and groups of people than

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can traditional groups. But virtual groups can be especially vulnerable to some of the factors that harm traditional groups. Given the physical distances between members and how little interaction they may have with each other, virtual groups may have a harder time building cohesiveness, keeping membership stable, socialising new members, keeping roles clear, sharing information and developing transactive memory systems that enable the members to recognise or recall who has what knowledge or expertise in the group. Special attention must be paid to virtual groups, therefore, to offset these problems. For example, directories should be available and updated to allow members to access information about who knows what across the virtual team. Frequent teleconferencing sessions and occasional short visits to allow dispersed group members to spend some time together can also help (Hackman & Katz, 2010; Jimenez, Boehe, Taras, & Caprar, 2017; Purvanova, 2014). The lack of cohesiveness in virtual groups can also have some advantages, such as in helping these groups avoid some of the conformity pressures associated with groupthink-like problems.

Collective intelligence We have seen throughout this chapter that groups consisting of very intelligent people, or even people who are expert at a task very relevant to what the group is working on, are far from immune to making poor decisions or falling short of their potential. But are some groups, as a collective working together, particularly smart and effective at ‘group stuff’? Anita Woolley and colleagues (2010) tried to answer this question. They had 699 people work in small groups on a wide variety of group tasks. Across these various group tasks, some groups did tend to outperform the other groups. The researchers considered these groups that tended to do well on a wide variety of group tasks as being high in ‘collective intelligence’. Many argue that collective intelligence is beneficial for the group (Malone & Bernstein, 2015; Woolley, Aggarwal, & Malone, 2015), though some have questioned whether this construct is robust (Credé & Howardson, 2017). What do collectively intelligent groups look like? Woolley and colleagues found that individual intelligence of the group members did not, in fact, predict collective intelligence. Instead, collective intelligence emerged in groups with high average social sensitivity of the group members, who engaged in turn-taking during discussion, and characterised by a higher proportion of women. Recent research found opposite results, with individual performance accounting for 80% of collective intelligence (Bates & Gupta, 2017). Whatever the source, it appears to be the case that collective intelligence – while evident in face-toface groups – may be elusive in virtual teams (Barlow & Dennis, 2016).

Diversity in groups Diversity is increasingly a characteristic of modern groups. This is most obviously the case in terms of sex, race, ethnicity and cultural background, but the meaning of diversity is likely to change as societies change in terms of their demographics and attitudes. In addition, diversity is not restricted to demographic differences among group members, but can also include differences in attitudes, personalities, skill levels, and so on. How does diversity affect group dynamics? The evidence from empirical research concerning the effects of diversity on group performance is decidedly mixed (Hackman & Katz, 2010; Paulus & van der Zee, 2015). On the one hand, diversity often is associated with negative group dynamics stemming from misunderstandings. Frustration and resentment can weaken coordination amongst members and those members’ commitment to the group. On the other hand, research has also demonstrated positive effects of diversity, such as on patterns of socialisation and on complexity and inclusiveness of group discussion (Antonio et al., 2004; Toosi, Sommers, & Ambady, 2012). What about group performance? Some analyses suggest that organisations featuring racial and gender diversity perform better than those who do not fare so well in terms of diversity (Badal & Harter, 2014; Herring, 2009). Other analyses reveal a complex relationship between corporate diversity and performance (Roberson, Holmes, & Perry, 2017), for instance depending on the industry studied (Garnero, Kampelmann, & Rycx, 2014). Considerable effort has been applied to identifying factors that might help groups achieve the benefits of diversity (Ellemers & Rink, 2016; Hebl & Avery, 2013; Paulus & van der Zee, 2015). One set of recent findings is that multicultural groups perform better if their members or leaders have relatively high awareness of their own and others’ cultural assumptions – what is sometimes called cultural metacognition (Chua, Morris, & Mor, 2012; Moon, 2013; Mor, Morris, & Joh, 2013). People exhibit cultural metacognition to the extent that they often think about and check the accuracy of their cultural knowledge, particularly in cross-cultural interactions. Diversity benefits also arise when members have a positive attitude towards learning new

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information (Nederveen Pieterse, van Knippenberg, & Van Dierendonck, 2013) and when members are encouraged to take each other’s perspective as much as possible (Hoever, van Knippenberg, van Ginkel, & Barkema, 2012; Lindsey, King, Hebl, & Levine, 2015). Given trends in populations, globalisation, business practices and people’s attitudes, we can predict that there will continue to be rapid acceleration in research dedicated to illuminating and improving upon the complex relationship between diversity and a variety of group processes.

Tying it together: effectiveness We have discussed a variety of factors that can enhance group processes. Research on the effectiveness of groups and teams seeks to tie these factors together into a coherent account of optimal conditions for performance. Ruth Wageman and colleagues (2009) proposed the following set of conditions for optimal team effectiveness: • Teams should be interdependent for some common purpose and have some stability of membership. • The team’s overall purpose should be challenging, clear and consequential. • Teams should be as small as possible and have clear norms that specify what behaviours are valued or are unacceptable. • A reward system should provide positive consequences for excellent team performance. • Technical assistance and training should be available to the team. These suggestions are consistent with the principles that we have addressed throughout this chapter, and they help illustrate the tremendous value that understanding the social psychology of groups can have in the business world or wherever group performance is essential.

CONFLICT: COOPERATION AND COMPETITION WITHIN AND BETWEEN GROUPS Many of the most crucial issues confronting our world today involve conflicts between groups or between individuals and their groups. The desire of some individuals to consume valuable resources conflicts with the need to protect the environment for the greater good. A nation’s claim to important territory or the right to develop nuclear arms conflicts with another nation’s national security. In this section, we describe some of the dilemmas groups often must confront and what factors influence whether individuals and groups act cooperatively or competitively in dealing with them. We also look at some of the factors that cause conflicts between groups to escalate or be reduced, and we focus on an important mechanism for resolving group conflicts: negotiation.

Social dilemmas

Social dilemma

A situation in which a self-interested choice by everyone will create the worst outcome for everyone.

Prisoner’s dilemma

A type of dilemma in which one party must make either cooperative or competitive moves in relation to another party. The dilemma is typically designed so that the competitive move appears to be in one’s self-interest, but if both sides make this move, they both suffer more than if they had both cooperated.

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Imagine that you have to choose between cooperating with others in your group versus pursuing your own self-interest, which might hurt the others. Examples of these mixed-motive situations are everywhere. An actor in a play may be motivated to try to ‘steal’ a scene, a soccer player may be inclined to hog the ball, an executive may want to keep more of the company’s profits, a family member may want to eat more than his fair share of the leftover birthday cake, and a citizen of the Earth may want to use more than her fair share of finite valuable resources. In each case, the individual can gain something by pursuing his or her self-interest, but if everyone in the group pursues self-interest, all of the group members will ultimately be worse off than if they had cooperated with each other. Each option, therefore, has possible benefits as well as potential costs. When you are in a situation like this, you may feel torn between wanting to cooperate and wanting to compete, and these mixed motives create what is termed a social dilemma (Van Lange, Joireman, Parks, & Van Dijk, 2013). In a social dilemma, what is good for one is bad for all. If everyone makes the most self-rewarding choice, everyone suffers the greatest loss. The following sections review several types of social dilemmas and examines how people resolve the tension between their cooperative and competitive inclinations in such dilemmas.

The prisoner’s dilemma We begin with a crime story involving a situation that forms the basis for the research paradigm known as the prisoner’s dilemma. Two partners in crime are picked up by the police for questioning. Although the police believe they have committed a major offence, there is only enough evidence to convict them on a minor charge. In order to sustain a conviction for the more serious crime, the police will have to convince one

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of them to testify against the other. Separated during questioning, the criminals weigh their alternatives. If neither confesses, they will both get light sentences on the minor charge. If both confess and plead guilty, they will both receive somewhat longer sentences. But if one confesses and the other stays silent, the confessing criminal will go free while the silent criminal will pay the maximum penalty (see Figure 8.12). FIGURE 8.12 The prisoner’s dilemma Each of two criminals is offered immunity from prosecution in exchange for a confession. If both stay silent, both get off with a light sentence on a minor charge (upper left). If both confess, both receive a moderate sentence (lower right). But if one confesses while the other stays mum, the confessing criminal goes free and the silent one spends a long time in jail. Prisoner A

Prisoner B

No confession (cooperates with prisoner B) No confession (cooperates with prisoner A) Confession (competes with prisoner A)

Confession (competes with prisoner B)

A gets 1 year B gets 1 year

A gets 0 years B gets 10 years

A gets 10 years B gets 0 years

A gets 5 years B gets 5 years

In the two-person prisoner’s dilemma, participants are given a series of choices that give them the option of cooperating or competing with each other, but either option has potential costs. Imagine that you are Prisoner A in Figure 8.12. No matter what Prisoner B does, you are better off if you compete with B and confess. If B does not confess to the police (i.e., cooperates with you by not ratting you out), you will get a lighter penalty if you do confess than if you do not – no jail time versus one year in jail. If B confesses, you still get a lighter sentence if you confess than if you do not – five versus ten years. So clearly, you should confess, right? But here is the dilemma: if you both confess, each of you gets five years. If neither of you confesses, each of you gets only one year. In other words, each individual is better off selling out his or her partner, but if both individuals do this, they are worse off than if neither did. It is really a perplexing situation. What do you think you would do?

CRITICAL THINKING ACTIVITY What would you do in the prisoner’s dilemma? You can see for yourself – search online for ‘Play prisoner’s dilemma’ and you should find several websites that offer a chance to do this.

If you have the opportunity, play a variant – the ‘iterated prisoner’s dilemma’. Reflect on how decisions and logic in this version might differ from the standard version.

This kind of social dilemma is not limited to situations involving only two individuals at a time. Imagine, for example, being in a burning building or a sinking ship. Each individual might want to race for the exit or the lifeboats as quickly as possible and push others out of the way, but if everyone does that, more people will die in the panic. More lives will be saved if people leave in an orderly fashion. Soldiers engaged in combat may be better off individually if they take no chances and duck for cover, but if their comrades do the same thing, they all will be slaughtered by the enemy. Nations face such dilemmas as well. Two countries locked in an arms race would be better off if they stopped spending money and resources on weapons of mass destruction, but neither country wants to risk falling behind.

Resource dilemmas Resource dilemmas are a type of social dilemma that people face frequently and in vitally important contexts, which concern how two or more people share a limited resource. As with prisoner’s dilemmas, attempts to gain a personal advantage will backfire if the other party also makes the competitive choice. Resource dilemmas come in two basic types: (1) public goods dilemmas and (2) commons dilemmas.

Resource dilemmas

Social dilemmas involving how two or more people will share a limited resource.

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In public goods dilemmas, all of the individuals are supposed to contribute resources to a common pool. Examples of these public goods include blood supply, public broadcasting, schools, Pollution from an oil refinery in Edmonton, Canada, glows in the dusk – a mark of the modern tragedy of the commons. A clean libraries, roads and parks. If no one gives, the service cannot environment is a public resource that is vital for all of us, but continue, and all will suffer. Again, self-interest conflicts with the protecting it often conflicts with the economic self-interest of public good. individuals or groups. In the commons dilemma, if people take as much as they want of a limited resource that does not replenish itself, nothing will be left for anyone. One popular example of this dilemma is known as the ‘tragedy of the commons’ (Hardin, 1968). Long ago, people would let their animals graze on the town’s lush grassy commons. But if all the animals grazed to their hearts’ content (and to their owners’ benefit), the commons would be stripped, the animals’ food supply would be diminished and the owners’ welfare would be threatened. Today, the tragedy of the commons is a clear danger on a global scale. Deforestation, air pollution, carbon emission, ocean dumping, massive irrigation, overfishing, commercial development of wilderness areas, a rapidly increasing population in some developing countries, and overconsumption of global resources by the richest nations all Source: Corbis/Reuters/Dan Riedlhuber pit individual self-interest against the common good (Van Vugt, 2009) (see Figure 8.13). Imagine for a moment that you had a chance to earn extra credit points on an exam for the course you are currently enrolled in. You are asked to indicate whether you would prefer 2 or 6 points of extra credit. Simple, right? Well, there is a catch. If more than 10% of the class chooses 6 points, no one will get any extra credit. What would you do? Dylan Selterman presents exactly this scenario to his social psychology students each year. The result? Reliably, approximately 20% chose the 6 points, and therefore nobody earns any extra credit. It is simply too tempting for too many individuals to try to maximise their own points at the risk of the greater good. In June 2015, a student in Selterman’s course posted a picture of this exam question to Twitter (see Figure 8.14), FIGURE 8.13 The modern tragedy of the commons

FIGURE 8.14 An academic tragedy of the commons Dylan Selterman’s social psychology students each year face this dilemma. The result? Reliably, approximately 20% chose the 6 points, and therefore nobody earns any extra credit. This is the tragedy of the commons in action.

Source: Courtesy of University of Maryland

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and it went viral. In response to huge public attention, the instructor explained his logic to the world in an article describing the situation (Selterman, 2015).

Responding to social dilemmas: groups and individuals What factors make people more or less cooperative when faced TABLE 8.2 Solving social dilemmas with social dilemmas? Table 8.2 summarises some of the factors Behaviour in a social dilemma is influenced by both that extensive research has identified as facilitating the best psychological factors and structural arrangements. The solutions to social dilemmas. Here we discuss a few of these. characteristics listed here contribute to the successful solution of At the individual level, people differ in their tendencies social dilemmas. towards cooperation and competition. One relevant dimension Psychological factors on which people differ is in their social value orientation. Individuals with a prosocial, cooperative orientation seek to Individual and cultural differences maximise joint gains or achieve equal outcomes. Those with • Having a prosocial, cooperative orientation • Trusting others a pro-self, individualist orientation seek to maximise their own gain. And people with a competitive orientation seek to Situational factors maximise their own gain relative to that of others. Individuals • Being in a good mood • Having experience managing resources and working with a cooperative orientation are less likely to behave in a cooperatively competitive, resource-consuming fashion than are people • Being exposed to unselfish models with individualist or competitive orientations (Balliet, Parks, & • Having reason to expect others to cooperate Joireman, 2009; Emonds, Declerck, Boone, Vandervliet, & Parizel, Group dynamics 2011; van Dijk, De Kwaadsteniet, & De Cremer, 2009). A recent • Acting as an individual rather than in a group meta-analysis points to one reason: prosocial individuals expect • Being in a small group rather than in a large group more cooperation from others relative to pro-self or competitive • Sharing a social identity or superordinate goals individuals (Pletzer et al., 2018). Structural arrangements Does gender matter? Contrary to popular belief that women • Creating a payoff structure that rewards cooperative are more cooperative than men, a meta-analysis of 50 years behaviour and/or punishes selfish behaviour of research on this topic found no overall sex difference on • Removing resources from the public domain and handing cooperation in social dilemmas (Balliet, Li, Macfarlan, & Van them over to private ownership Vugt, 2011). There are particular situations in which gender • Establishing an authority to control the resources differences emerge, though these tend to be mixed-sex scenarios (Balliet et al., 2011; Van Vugt & Iredale, 2013). Further, women are more likely than men to trust again following a trust violation (Haselhuhn et al., 2015). When faced with the dilemma of whether Trust that the other party will not seek to exploit is essential in promoting cooperation (van Lange, to act in one’s selfRockenbach, & Yamagishi, 2017). Similarly, a sense of belongingness and identity with the greater group interest or cooperate also promotes cooperation, in part because this perspective can reduce fear of exploitation (Klapwijk & with the greater good, Van Lange, 2009; McLeish & Oxoby, 2011; Swann, Jetten, Gómez, Whitehouse, & Bastian, 2012). Fear of women are more punishment for not cooperating or for acting selfishly also prompts cooperation (van Lange, Rockenbach, & likely than men to Yamagishi, 2014). cooperate. Turning to group dynamics that might impact decisions in social dilemmas, when the decision to FALSE cooperate in a social dilemma is up to the group, less cooperation emerges than when individual group Large groups are members decide (Pinter & Wildschut, 2012; Wildschut, Pinter, Vevea, Insko, & Schopler, 2003). One reason more likely than small is that members of a group feel that they are less identifiable by members of other groups. The greater groups to exploit anonymity that a group offers frees individual group members to act in a self-interested or aggressive a scarce resource manner. This is one reason why members of large groups are more likely to exploit scarce resources than that the members small ones are (Pruitt, 1998; Seijts & Latham, 2000; Wildschut et al., 2003). collectively depend on. TRUE The fact remains that social dilemmas often do involve very large groups – a city, a state, a nation or the whole world. In these circumstances, the structural arrangements listed in Table 8.2 may be most appropriate.

Negotiation Social dilemmas are but one type of conflict between individuals or groups that often must be resolved through negotiation. Successful negotiation can reduce conflicts, but it is important to ask this question: ‘What constitutes a successful negotiation?’ You might think a 50–50 compromise is an ideal outcome for two negotiating parties. Here, the negotiators start at extreme positions and gradually work towards a mutually acceptable midpoint. In many situations, however, both sides can do better than this. The reason Copyright 2020 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-202

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Integrative agreement

A negotiated resolution to a conflict in which all parties obtain outcomes that are superior to what they would have obtained from an equal division of the contested resources.

for this is that most negotiations are not simply fixed-sum situations in which each side can gain something only if the other side loses it (Bazerman & Neale, 1992). Instead, both sides often have the opportunity to reach an integrative agreement, in which both parties obtain outcomes that are superior to a 50–50 split. A good way to understand this is to consider the tale of the two sisters and the orange (Follett, 1942). One sister wanted the juice to drink; the other wanted the peel for a cake. So, they sliced the orange in half and each one took her portion. These sisters suffered from an advanced case of what is known as the fixedpie syndrome – the belief that whatever one of them won, the other one lost. In fact, however, each of them could have had the whole thing: all of the juice for one, all of the peel for the other. An integrative agreement was well within their grasp, but they failed to see it. Unfortunately, research indicates that this happens all too often. Negotiators frequently agree to settlements that are worse for both sides (Chambers & De Dreu, 2014; Thompson, 2015). It is often difficult for participants in a dispute to listen carefully to each other and reach some reasonable understanding of each other’s perspective. But communication in which both sides disclose their goals and needs is critically important in allowing each side to see opportunities for joint benefits. This may seem obvious and yet people in negotiations, just like the two sisters with the orange, very often fail to communicate their goals and needs. They may hold back information because of lack of trust in the other side, or because they think their goals are clearer to the other party than they actually are. If communication is improved, however, the outcomes can improve dramatically. Outcomes often improve also in response to a number of other factors, such as training in conflictresolution techniques, using computerised negotiation support systems, establishing trust, and getting the parties to take a less egocentric perspective or to think about higher-order motives than just their preferred outcomes (Ade, Schuster, Harinck, & Trötschel, 2018; Eden & Ackermann, 2014; Kong, Dirks, & Ferrin, 2014; Trötschel, Hüffmeier, Loschelder, Schwartz, & Gollwitzer, 2011; Wilson, & Thompson, 2014).

Diversity and negotiation As the world becomes more connected because of advances in technology, the globalisation of business and the economy, and global threats concerning the environment and terrorism, the ability to negotiate effectively across diverse groups becomes increasingly important. Understanding cultural differences relevant to negotiation is therefore vital. Table 8.3 lists some common assumptions made by negotiators from Western, individualistic cultures that are not always shared by representatives from other cultures. TABLE 8.3 Cultural assumptions about negotiating People from different cultures make different assumptions about the negotiation process. This table summarises some assumptions commonly made by Western negotiators. It also presents some alternative assumptions that negotiators from other cultures might hold. As you can see, such different assumptions could make it very difficult to reach a successful agreement.

Assumptions of negotiators from Western countries

Assumptions of negotiators from non-Western cultures

Negotiation is a business, not a social activity.

The first step in negotiating is to develop a trusting relationship between the individual negotiators.

Points should be made with rational, analytical arguments without contradiction.

Arguments may be more holistic, and emotionality and contradiction may be tolerated.

Communication is direct and verbal.

Some of the most important communication is nonverbal or indirect.

Written contracts are binding; oral commitments are not.

Written contracts are less meaningful than oral communications because the non-verbal context clarifies people’s intentions.

Current information and ideas are more valid than historical or traditional opinions and information.

History and tradition are more valid than current information and ideas. Information must be understood in its greater context.

Time is very important; punctuality is expected; deadlines should be set and adhered to.

Building a relationship takes time and is more important than punctuality. Setting deadlines is seen as an effort to humiliate the other party.

Source: Based on Brett & Gelfand, 2006; De Dreu et al., 2007; Gelfand et al., 2007; Giebels & Taylor, 2009; Kimmel, 1994, 2000.

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Quality of negotiation outcome

Consider, for example, our statement that good communication is a key ingredient in successful negotiation. Communication across cultures can present special challenges (Liu & Wilson, 2011; Thompson, Wang, & Gunia, 2010). Whereas an individualistic perspective emphasises direct communication and confrontation, a collectivistic perspective emphasises more indirect communication and a desire to avoid direct conflict. Individualistic negotiators may emphasise rationality, whereas a greater tolerance of contradiction and emotionality is characteristic of a collectivistic style – although collectivists prefer emotionality that is not confrontational. Negotiators from individualistic cultures are more likely to respond with a direct ‘no’ to a proposal; negotiators from collectivistic cultures are more likely to refer to social roles and relationships. According to Yunxia Zhu and colleagues (2007), for example, relationship building is an important part of the negotiation process among Chinese businesspeople. Negotiators from individualistic cultures may need to be uncharacteristically patient with processes that may seem irrelevant to the task at hand because they are important in creating guanxi, a Chinese term for relationship. The initial sessions in negotiations with Chinese businesspeople take on particular importance because they can set the tone for establishing guanxi. Another difference concerns the timing of concessions. Individualists tend to prefer to make compromises and concessions towards the end of a negotiation, whereas collectivists may prefer to begin with generous concessions and gradually reduce their concessions later. Yet another factor concerns ‘saving face’ – feeling that others continue to respect you and that you have maintained honour. Although saving face in a negotiation is important across cultures, it may be of more central importance in collectivistic cultures (Oetzel, Garcia, FIGURE 8.15 Rationality versus honour in negotiations & Ting-Toomey, 2008; Rodriguez Mosquera, Fischer, Manstead, & Participants in the US and in Egypt engaged in hour-long Zaalberg, 2008; Tjosvold, Hui, & Sun, 2004). Michele Gelfand and negotiations, and the transcripts from these negotiations were colleagues (2015), for example, illustrate the contrasting values analysed to measure the frequency with which words associated of rationality and honour across cultures with culture-specific with more traditionally Western objective, rational perspectives quotations: ‘Separate the people from the problem’ is advice were used as well as words concerning honour that are more given to negotiators in the West and emphasises being objective associated with Arabic thinking. The more that rationalrelated words were used during the negotiation, the better the and rational, whereas the Arabic proverbs ‘I’d rather you respect negotiation outcomes were in the US but the worse they were in me than feed me’ or ‘Dignity before bread’ reflect the role of Egypt. The more that honour-related words were used, the better maximising honour rather than profit in cultures such as in Egypt. the outcomes were in Egypt. To study this cultural difference Gelfand and her colleagues 0.5 had participants in the US and Egypt engage in hour-long negotiations. The researchers transcribed the audio from 0.4 these negotiations and measured the frequency of words that 0.3 emphasised ‘a distinctively Western form of logical reasoning’, 0.2 such as rational, logic, deduce, cause and solution, as well as words that concerned honour, such as honest, reputation, appear 0.1 and forbid. 0 The results revealed not only the expected cultural difference in how frequently these types of words were used, but also in the -0.1 relationship between using these expressions and the success -0.2 of the negotiation. In the US, the more that words were used -0.3 that reflected a rational model, the better the outcomes (e.g., the more likely they would reach integrative agreements), but -0.4 the worse the outcomes were in Egypt. On the other hand, in -0.5 Egypt, the more that words reflecting honour were used, the US Egypt better the negotiation outcomes were. There was no relationship Rational Honour between use of honour words and negotiation outcomes in the Source: Based on Gelfand, M. J., Severance, L., Lee, T., Bruss, C. B., Lun, J., US (see Figure 8.15). Research focusing on emotions rather than ­Abdel-Latif, A. H., … & Moustafa Ahmed, S. (2015). Culture and getting to yes: language use is discussed in the Cultural Diversity feature that The linguistic signature of creative agreements in the United States and Egypt. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 36(7), 967–989. follows.

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CULTURAL DIVERSITY Emotional responses may hurt negotiations between members of different cultures if they are deemed inappropriate in one of the cultures. Shirli Kopelman and Ashleigh Rosette (2008) conducted an experiment that illustrates cultural differences in sensitivity to particular emotions. Business students from Hong Kong and Israel participated in a negotiation exercise in which an American female business manager offered them a take-it-or-leave-it proposal by video. For half the students, the manager made the offer displaying positive emotion – she spoke in a friendly tone, smiled and nodded often, and appeared cordial. For the other half, the manager displayed negative emotion – she spoke in an angrier tone and appeared intimidating and irritated. As the researchers had predicted, the students from Hong Kong responded very differently as a function of the emotion displayed. As can be seen in Figure 8.16, they were much more likely to accept the offer if it was made with a display of positive than negative emotions. Students from Israel, where direct and confrontational negotiations are more commonplace (and perhaps where an American woman would be seen less as an outgroup), were relatively unaffected by the emotional display of the negotiator when deciding whether or not to accept the offer.

FIGURE 8.16 Emotions during negotiation: cross-cultural differences Business students from Hong Kong and Israel participated in a negotiation exercise in which they received a take-it-or-leave-it proposal from an American business manager. The manager displayed either warm, positive emotion or angry, negative emotion while making the offer. Students from Hong Kong were much less likely to accept the offer if it was made with negative emotion rather than with positive emotion. The Israeli students’ decisions were not strongly affected by the emotions displayed. 80 70 60

% Accepting offer

CULTURAL DIFFERENCES IN NEGOTIATION

50 40 30 20 10 0

Hong Kong Positive manager demeanour

Israel Negative manager demeanour

Source: Based on Kopelman, S., & Rosette, A. S. (2008). Cultural variation in response to strategic emotions in negotiations. Group Decision and Negotiation, 17, 65–77.

Understanding these kinds of cultural differences is essential for ensuring the best resolutions of conflicts and negotiations. Consistent with this point, Kevin Groves and colleagues (2015) were able to measure the ‘cultural intelligence’ of the business school students in their study, and they found that students with higher cultural intelligence outperformed other students in cross-cultural negotiations. Fortunately, education may help even those who are less culturally intelligent. Sujin Lee and others (2013) had participants from East Asian and North American cultures negotiate with each other. Some of the participants learned information about the kinds of cross-cultural differences discussed in this section of the textbook and were encouraged to think about the other culture’s perspective during the negotiation. Other participants did not receive this cultural information and were instead encouraged to think about the other person’s alternatives in the negotiation. The participants who received the crosscultural perspective-taking procedure achieved much better negotiation outcomes than did the other participants. Wendi Adair and Jeanne Brett (2005) describe negotiation as a kind of dance. The partners move with each other according to various rhythms, and the dance will work only if they can synchronise their movements and work together. Negotiations across cultures can be challenging because the participants have different ways of performing these dances. It is in the best interests of negotiators, therefore, to learn each other’s perspectives so they can work together more effectively and fluently without stepping on each other’s toes.

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Finding common ground Every conflict is unique, as is every attempt at conflict resolution. Still, all efforts to find a constructive solution to conflict require some common ground to build upon. Recognition of a superordinate identity is one way to establish common ground between groups in conflict (Gaertner, Dovidio, Guerra, Hehman, & Saguy, 2016; Wenzel, Mummendey, & Waldzus, 2008). When group members perceive that they have a shared identity – a sense of belonging to something that is larger than and encompasses their own groups – the attractiveness of outgroup members increases, and interactions between the groups often become more peaceful. It is increasingly clear, however, that individuals must be able to simultaneously hold that superordinate identity as well as sub-identities for optimal outcomes to arise (Glasford & Dovidio, 2011; Levy, Saguy, van Zomeren, & Halperin, 2017). In such cases, those who would make peace, rather than stoke conflict, realise that it is in their own self-interest to find common ground and to understand that the cloak of humanity is large enough to cover a multitude of lesser differences.

RESEARCH SPOTLIGHT

Source: © Courtesy of Dr. Dirk Van Rooy

DR DIRK VAN ROOY, AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY What are the topic areas of your research? My research uses a combination of computational and mixed methods to study social behaviour in both small social groups (e.g. team work), but also large complex systems. I have conducted research projects across areas such as behavioural software engineering, showing how culture and social dynamics affect teams and their ability to perform in different settings; and mixed-method research for government and industry in the US and Australia that explores how personality and social values shape the public’s perception of technology and security behaviour. I am currently involved in a number of projects in which mixed methods (ethnographic, quasi-experimental and experimental) are used to investigate ‘wicked’ problems, such as immigration, unemployment and security culture in government agencies. Which of your research findings have you found most intriguing? Some of my more recent research into behavioural software engineering, which investigates how culture and social dynamics affect teams and their ability to perform in different settings, delivered some interesting results. It shows that, although personality traits, such as conscientiousness and openness to experience, can play an important role in team work, local identities (e.g. work groups, teams, etc.) are often more important. Overall, my work with organisations shows how important it is to take into account personality and both team identification and the team’s norm of performance, in order to cultivate higher levels of performance.

My work uses a complex systems approach to study social groups, which includes a connectionist approach to social psychology that depicts human cognition and behaviour as a complex, dynamic and adaptive system. A key insight from this work is that social behaviour, group norms and even prejudice can often be understood in terms of emergent consequences of a large number of simple, often non-cognitive, interacting processes. I think this has important consequences for how we approach such phenomena that we don’t quite fully understand yet. This approach has also proven to be useful in a number of projects I am currently involved in that look at complex problems such as immigration, unemployment and population health. How did you become interested in your area of research? My initial interests were somewhere in between biology, engineering and philosophy. After finishing my PhD, which demonstrated how neural networks can be used to study social phenomena, I briefly worked in computer science. At the Australian National University, I returned to ‘real’ psychological research, which seems to be able to bring most of my interests together. How does your area of research speak to life in Australia and New Zealand? A background in social psychology can give you an understanding that is grounded in real human behaviour and broad system understanding. I have been able to do fascinating work for the public sector, private sector, and the non-profit sector in Australia and New Zealand. Social psychology has a lot to offer in terms of engaging with the complexity and the messiness of real human experiences, and how people live, work and play. I have been involved in research that looks at how people experience services, products, regulations and how they interact with what are often very complex systems – health, education, energy, economic, etc.

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Topical Reflection ON BALANCE: THE GOOD AND THE BAD OF GROUPS We have seen in this chapter both the promises and pitfalls of groups. When in a group, we satisfy a basic desire to belong and need for a social identity, we sometimes perform better, and we are able to negotiate conflict and dilemmas. However, groups of intelligent and good people too often make decisions that are far worse than what any of the individual group members might have made on their own. Recall the example of the cane toad’s introduction to Australia that opened this chapter. Large groups of people sometimes even lose their inhibitions and act out destructively and aggressively, in ways they typically would never endorse when alone. In short, groups can bring out both the best and the worst in people. Groups lie at the heart of our communities, where we cooperate, share resources and exchange expertise. Groups also form the foundation of much of the world’s violence and large-scale conflicts. Now you can evaluate the statement from the start of the chapter: Groups can be quite different from the sum of their parts. Rather than mystical or magical, group dynamics can be explained by social psychological principles.

CHAPTER REVIEW SUMMARY FUNDAMENTALS OF GROUPS WHAT IS A GROUP? • Groups involve direct interactions among group members over a period of time and a shared common fate, identity or set of goals. WHY JOIN A GROUP? • People join a group for a variety of reasons, including to perform tasks that cannot be accomplished alone and to enhance self-esteem and social identity. KEY FEATURES OF GROUPS: ROLES, NORMS AND ­COHESIVENESS • Establishing clear roles can help a group, especially during the socialisation of new members; but when members’ roles are assigned poorly, are ambiguous, come in conflict with other roles or undergo change, it can result in stress and poor performance. • Groups often develop norms that, when violated, may lead to dislike, threat or rejection from the group. • Cohesiveness is related to group performance, but the causal direction of this relationship is not clear and depends on other factors (e.g., the group’s size, task and gender composition). GETTING WHAT ‘WE’ WANT: GOALS AND PLANS IN GROUPS • Setting specific and ambitious goals, and working with a partner, can improve group performance more than vague ‘do your best’ goals. • Having an expert is beneficial only if collaborative planning also takes place.

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PUTTING COMMON SENSE TO THE TEST People and groups tend to do worse when they have ‘do your best’ goals than when they have very specific, ambitious goals. TRUE. People and groups that have vague ‘do your best goals’ do not tend to do their best. They can do better if they set specific, ambitious but reachable goals.

INDIVIDUALS IN GROUPS: THE PRESENCE OF OTHERS SOCIAL FACILITATION • Robert Zajonc proposed that the presence of others creates arousal, and arousal increases tendencies to perform the dominant response. • Social facilitation refers to two effects – how the presence of others enhances performance on easy tasks but impairs performance on difficult tasks. • All three theories that account for social facilitation – mere presence, evaluation apprehension and distraction conflict – probably account for some of the social facilitation effects. SOCIAL LOAFING • Sometimes, individual output declines when people work with others, a social loafing effect. • Social loafing is reduced or eliminated when people think that their individual efforts will be important, relevant and meaningful. In such cases, individuals may engage in social compensation in an effort to offset the anticipated social loafing of others.

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DEINDIVIDUATION • Deindividuation diminishes a person’s sense of individuality and reduces constraints against deviant behaviour. • Two types of environmental cues can increase deviant behaviour: accountability cues and attentional cues. These cues contribute to a sense of anonymity, a lack of responsibility and high levels of arousal that can increase deindividuation. • The effects of deindividuation depend on the characteristics of the immediate group. In the context of an antagonistic social identity, antisocial behaviour increases; in the context of a benevolent social identity, prosocial behaviour increases.

PUTTING COMMON SENSE TO THE TEST People will cheer louder when they cheer as part of a group than when they cheer alone. FALSE. People tend to put less effort into collective tasks, such as group cheering, than into tasks where their individual performance can be identified and evaluated.

GROUP PERFORMANCE: PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS LOSSES AND GAINS IN GROUPS • Because of process loss, a group may perform worse than it would if every individual performed up to his or her potential. This is likely to occur in cases of social loafing, poor coordination and when expertise is not recognised. • Groups can experience process gain, in which they do better than even the best members of the group, on tasks that can be divided among subgroups and when the correct approach is clearly demonstrable to the rest of the group members. BRAINSTORMING • Brainstorming often produces fewer creative ideas than the same number of people working alone; at least without computer-based technology or interventions. GROUP POLARISATION • When individuals who have similar though not identical opinions participate in a group discussion, their opinions become more extreme. • Explanations for group polarisation emphasise the number and persuasiveness of arguments heard and social comparison with other group members. GROUPTHINK • Groupthink refers to an excessive tendency to seek concurrence among group members, which can ultimately produce defective decision-making. • The theory of groupthink proposes that groupthink is more likely to occur when groups are highly cohesive, have particular types of group structure and are engaged in highly stressful situations. • Strategies that have been successful in helping groups avoid groupthink include consulting with outsiders, having the leader play a less controlling role, encouraging criticism and a thorough search for information, and having a group member play devil’s advocate to challenge the consensus.

CHAPTER EIGHT

PUTTING COMMON SENSE TO THE TEST People brainstorming as a group come up with a greater number of better ideas than the same number of people working individually. FALSE. Groups in which members interact face-to-face produce fewer creative ideas when brainstorming than the same number of people brainstorming alone. COMMUNICATING INFORMATION AND UTILISING EXPERTISE • Biased sampling refers to the tendency for groups to pay more attention to information that is already known by all or most group members than to important information that is known by only one or a few group members. • Encouragement of thorough and critical discussion tends to boost information sharing and good decision-making. • Groups can possess transactive memory, a shared process by which the information can be divided among the group members VIRTUAL TEAMS • Virtual teams, that are spread across time and space, carry benefits but also increased risks for factors that can reduce group performance. COLLECTIVE INTELLIGENCE • Groups high in collective intelligence perform well across a variety of tasks. DIVERSITY IN GROUPS • Research on the effects of diversity on group performance is rather mixed; both positive and negative effects have been found thus far. TRYING IT TOGETHER: EFFECTIVENESS • Groups can optimise effectiveness under a set of conditions, including a common purpose, clear group norms, and rewards for excellence.

PUTTING COMMON SENSE TO THE TEST Group members’ attitudes about a course of action usually become more moderate after group discussion. FALSE. Group discussion often causes attitudes to become more extreme as the initial tendencies of the group are exaggerated.

CONFLICT: COOPERATION AND COMPETITION WITHIN AND BETWEEN GROUPS SOCIAL DILEMMAS • In mixed-motive situations, such as the prisoner’s dilemma, there are incentives to compete as well as incentives to cooperate. • In a social dilemma, personal benefit conflicts with the overall good. • Resource dilemmas such as the commons dilemma and the public goods dilemma involve sharing limited resources. • Behaviour in a social dilemma is influenced by situational factors, group dynamics and structural arrangements.

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• •

•

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Groups tend to be more competitive than individuals in mixedmotive situations. Individuals with a cooperative orientation are less likely to behave in a resource-consuming fashion than people with competitive orientations. A recent meta-analysis reports that gender differences in social dilemmas depend on who is playing.

NEGOTIATION • Many negotiations fail to result in integrative agreements in which outcomes exceed a 50–50 split. • Communication and an understanding of the other party’s perspective are key ingredients of successful negotiation.

FINDING COMMON GROUND • Recognition of a shared identity increases the likelihood of a peaceful resolution of differences.

PUTTING COMMON SENSE TO THE TEST Large groups are more likely than small groups to exploit a scarce resource that the members collectively depend on. TRUE. Large groups are more likely to behave selfishly when faced with resource dilemmas, in part because people in large groups feel less identifiable and more anonymous.

DIVERSITY AND NEGOTIATION • People from different cultures may have different styles concerning negotiations, such as whether direct or indirect communication is preferred and how important context and relationship-building is.

When faced with the dilemma of whether to act in one’s self-interest or cooperate with the greater good, women are more likely than men to cooperate. FALSE. Research suggests that there is no overall sex difference in cooperativeness or competitiveness on social dilemmas.

LINKAGES social psychology in business contexts (see Chapter 16). The ‘Linkages’ diagram shows ties to two other chapters as well.

This chapter reviewed the functions of groups, including how they can both help and hinder outcomes. Our discussion of negotiation is linked to the application of

CHAPTER

8

Group processes

LINKAGES

Why do individuals seek membership in groups?

CHAPTER

2

The social self

The impact of the norm to conform, comply and obey on behaviour 

CHAPTER

7

Conformity, compliance and obedience

How does negotiation work in a business context?

CHAPTER

16

Business

REVIEW QUIZ 1 Of the following, which is not thought to be among the three main features of groups? a Norms. b Cohesiveness. c Rules. d Roles.

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2 Which of the following might explain social facilitation? a Mere presence. b Evaluation apprehension. c Distraction conflict. d All of the above.

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3 The three processes of arousal, responsibility and anonymity were proposed by Philip Zimbardo to explain which of the following? a Deindividuation. b Polarisation. c Groupthink. d Escalation. 4 Which of the following captures the excessive tendency among group members to seek concurrence? a Process gain. b Process loss. c Social facilitation. d Groupthink.

CHAPTER EIGHT

5 Several factors influence decision-making in social dilemmas. Which of the following are among these? a Individual factors. b Group factors. c Structural factors. d All of the above. 6 Which is an accurate take-away regarding social psychological research on group processes? a Groups sometimes perform better than the simple sum of individuals. b Groups sometimes perform worse than the simple sum of individuals. c Belonging to a group can bring out both the best and the worst in people. d All of the above.

WEBLINKS Introduction to social dilemmas https://socialdilemma.com/social-dilemmas A comprehensive overview of social dilemmas and the drivers of different decision-making processes across a variety of contexts

Social dilemmas http://www.in-mind.org/content/video-social-dilemmas A video produced by the Inquisitive Mind (In-Mind) Foundation reviewing research on social dilemmas.

Mind 42 http://mind42.com A free online mind-mapping tool that can be used for brainstorming.

Working in groups https://www.monash.edu/rlo/study-skills/learning-atuniversity/working-in-groups-and-teams Advice from Monash University on how to work well in groups – especially geared towards student work groups.

People, culture and lifestyle https://dfat.gov.au/about-australia/society-culture/Pages/ society-and-culture.aspx Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade information on the people, culture and lifestyle of Australia – clearly communicating group norms.

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CHAPTER EIGHT

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PART THREE

SOCIAL INFLUENCE

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GROUP PROCESSES

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PART FOUR

SOCIAL RELATIONS

CHAPTER 9: ATTRACTION AND CLOSE RELATIONSHIPS CHAPTER 10: HELPING OTHERS CHAPTER 11: AGGRESSION AND ANTISOCIAL BEHAVIOUR

The dimension of time: Socio-historical context

Attitudes and ideologies of culture

The environment

Interpersonal networks Part 4: Social relations Chapter 9: Attraction and close relationships Chapter 10: Helping others Chapter 11: Aggression and antisocial behaviour The individual

The focus of our attention in this part is social relations; that is, the relationships we have with others. We first consider the basis of attraction and the formation and trajectory of relationships. Next, we look at helping behaviour, examining who helps whom, when, and for what reasons. The part closes with a look at aggression: how to define aggression, what sparks aggression and violence, and what reduces it.

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9

CHAPTER

Attraction and close relationships Learning Objectives By the end of this chapter, you should be able to: 1 discuss the need to belong and the effect of this fundamental human motive on behaviour, connection and physical and psychological health 2 Summarise the different approaches to classifying initial attraction, including those that cover familiarity, physical attractiveness and mate selection 3 Discuss the theories that aim to predict the future of a close relationship including the types and stages of relationships each theory describes.

The cost of love 2017). But the long and somewhat expensive road to love does not stop with dating apps; in the Topical Married at First Sight has consistently Reflection feature at attracted over a million Australian the end of this chapter viewers. we will consider how Australians prepare for a first date and what it costs. In this chapter we will consider attraction and close relationships.

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Source: News Ltd/Newspix/Tricia Watkinson

According to Relationships Australia there has been an increasing trend of people using the internet and online dating applications to find a potential partner. Their estimates suggest around 4.5 million Australians use online dating sites each year (Relationships Australia, 2017). A significant amount of money is invested in these sites by people who are searching for their perfect mate, with estimates suggesting that one in five Australians will resort to the use of dating services in this pursuit. The collective Australian contribution to services such as Tinder, and eHarmony is thought to represent a staggering $80.7 million each year (ING Direct,

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PUTTING COMMON SENSE TO THE TEST Circle Your Answer T

F

People seek out the company of others, even strangers, in times of stress.

T

F

Infants do not discriminate between faces considered attractive and unattractive in their culture.

T

F

People who are physically attractive are happier and have higher self-esteem than those who are unattractive.

T

F

When it comes to romantic relationships, opposites attract.

T

F

Men are more likely than women to interpret friendly gestures by the opposite sex in sexual terms.

T

F

After the honeymoon period, there is an overall decline in levels of marital satisfaction.

INTRODUCTION NO TOPIC FASCINATES PEOPLE more than interpersonal attraction. Needing to belong, we humans are obsessed about friendships, romantic relationships, dating, love, sex, reproduction, sexual orientation, marriage and divorce. Playwrights, poets and musicians write with eloquence and emotion about loves desired, won and lost. In recent years, television has been filled with relationship-centred reality television shows such as The Farmer Wants a Wife, The Bachelor, The Bachelorette, Married at First Sight, Love Island and Wife Swap. Increasingly, people are meeting romantic partners online – on Facebook, in chat rooms, on Tinder and at dating service websites such as Match.com, eHarmony and RSVP – not just in bars. Both in our hearts and in our minds, the relationships we seek and enjoy with other people are more important than anything else. At one time or another, each of us has been startled by our reaction to someone we have met. But have you ever stopped to wonder why human beings are drawn to each other? Why are we so attracted to some people and yet indifferent to or repelled by others? What determines how our intimate relationships evolve over time? What does it mean to love someone, and what problems are likely to arise along the way? In this chapter we attempt to unravel some of these mysteries.

THE NEED TO BELONG Although born helpless, human infants are equipped with reflexes that orient them towards people. They are uniquely responsive to human faces, they turn their head towards voices and they are able to mimic certain facial gestures on cue. Then, a few weeks later comes a baby’s first smile. Much to the delight of parents all over the world, the newborn seems an inherently social animal. If you reflect on the amount of time that you spend talking to, being with, flirting with, confiding in, pining for or worrying about other people's thoughts, you will realise that we are all social animals. According to Roy Baumeister and Mark Leary (1995), the need to belong is a basic human motive, ‘a pervasive drive to form and maintain at least a minimum quantity of lasting, positive, and significant interpersonal relationships’ (p. 497). This general proposition is supported by everyday observation and a great deal of research. All over the world, people feel joy when they form new social attachments and react with anxiety and grief when these bonds are broken, as when separated from a loved one by distance, divorce or death. The need to belong runs deep, which is why people get very distressed when they are neglected by others, rejected, excluded, stigmatised or ostracised, which are all forms of ‘social death’ (Leary, 2001; Smart Richman & Leary, 2009; Williams & Nida, 2011). We care deeply about what others think of us, which is why we spend so much time and money to make ourselves presentable and attractive. Our need to belong is a fundamental human motive. People who have a network of close social ties, in the form of lovers, friends, family members and co-workers, have higher self-esteem and greater satisfaction with life compared with those who live more isolated lives (Denissen, Penke, & Schmitt, 2008; Leary & Baumeister, 2000). People who are socially connected are also physically healthier and less likely to die a premature death (Cacioppo et al., 2015; Holt-Lunstad et al., 2015; House, Landis, & Umberson, 1988). Research shows that people can even draw the motivation to achieve success from their connections with others (Walton & Carr, 2012). 350

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With regard to social networks, does it help to have a presence on Facebook and other online social media sites that enable people to stay in touch, even if not in person? According to Sensis data released in 2017, 79% of Australian internet users have a presence on social media sites such as Facebook, Twitter and LinkedIn. As can be seen in Figure 9.1, Facebook dominates these figures, capturing 94% of users. Facebook users spend an average of ten hours per week on the site, 59% admit to being online at least once per day and 35% say they do this while watching television. When it comes to friends, fans and followers on social media, Australians have an average of 469; those aged 18–29 have far in excess of this with an average of 812; and men have more than women. The larger your online social network is, the more people there are to view your status updates and the more socially connected you are likely to feel (Manago et al., 2012). FIGURE 9.1 Social media networks: how do you compare? Around 12% of Australians now use social media sites (i.e., Facebook, Twitter and LinkedIn) and 59% use social media every day, mostly after work.

of people access social media every day or most days And over a third...

check social media over five times a day Social networking sites used this year

Facebook 94%

Instagram 46%

Snapchat 40%

Twitter 32%

Linkedln 18%

Pinterest 10%

Google+ 10%

Source: Reproduced with the permission of Sensis Pty Ltd

Some interesting research comparing the use of social networking sites and subjective wellbeing conducted by Robin Nabi and colleagues (2013) suggested that the number of Facebook friends one accumulates is associated with stronger perceptions of social support, which in turn leads to a reduction of stress, less physical illness and greater wellbeing. Their findings also suggested that for those who have experienced a number of life stressors, the number of Facebook friends a person has emerged as a strong predictor of perceived social support – so perhaps the old adage is true: ‘the more friends the merrier’. But do our interactions on Facebook and social media always lead to a positive impact on our wellbeing? It appears not. Research conducted by Holly Shakya and Nicholas Christakis (2017) investigated the associations of Facebook activity and real-world social network activity with perceived physical and mental health and life satisfaction. They found that overall, the use of Facebook was negatively associated with wellbeing. Similarly, associations between time spent on social media and symptoms of depression, anxiety and declines in subjective wellbeing have been presented throughout the literature (Schou Andreassen et al., 2016; Block et al., 2014; Lin et al., 2016; Woods and Scott, 2016). Research has also indicated that frequent exposure to highly scripted, unrealistic portrayals on social media may provide the impression of others living happier, more connected lives – for some people this type of information does little other than increase their sense of social isolation (Shensa, Sidani, Lin, Bowman, & Primack, 2016).

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Need for affiliation Need for affiliation

The desire to establish and maintain many rewarding interpersonal relationships.

People seek out the company of others, even strangers, in times of stress.

TRUE

As social beings, humans are drawn to each other like magnets to metal. We work together, play together, live together and often make lifetime commitments to grow old together. This social motivation begins with the need for affiliation, defined as a desire to establish social contact with others (McAdams, 1989). Individuals differ in the strength of their need for affiliation, but it seems that people are highly motivated to establish and maintain an optimum balance of social contact – sometimes craving the company of others, sometimes wanting to be alone – the way a body maintains a certain temperature level. In an interesting study, Bibb Latané and Carol Werner (1978) found that laboratory rats were more likely to approach others of their species after a period of isolation and were less likely to approach others after prolonged contact. These researchers suggested that rats, like many other animals, have a built-in ‘sociostat’ (social thermostat) to regulate their affiliative tendencies. Is there evidence of a similar mechanism in humans? Shawn O’Connor and Lorne Rosenblood (1996) recruited university students to carry portable beepers for four days. Whenever the beepers went off (on average, every hour), the students wrote down whether at the time they were alone or in the company of other people and whether they wanted to be alone or with others. The results showed that students were in the state they desired two-thirds of the time. In fact, the situation they desired on one occasion (saying they wanted to be alone at 4 p.m.) predicted their actual situation the next time they were signalled (they would be alone at 5 p.m.). Whether it was solitude or social contact that the students sought, they successfully managed to regulate their own personal needs for affiliation. One condition that strongly arouses our need for affiliation is stress. Have you ever noticed the way neighbours who may never stop to say hello will come together in the aftermath of cyclones, floods, bushfires and other major crises? Many years ago, Stanley Schachter (1959) theorised that an external threat triggers fear and motivates us to affiliate, particularly with others who face a similar threat. In a laboratory experiment that demonstrated the point, Schachter found that people who were expecting to receive painful electric shocks chose to wait with other nervous participants rather than wait alone. But when Irving Sarnoff and Philip Zimbardo (1961) led university students to expect that they would be engaging in an embarrassing behaviour – sucking on large bottle nipples and pacifiers – their desire to be with others fell off. It seemed puzzling. Why do people in fearful misery love company, while those in embarrassed misery seek solitude? Yacov Rofé (1984) proposed a simple answer: utility. He argued that stress sparks the desire to affiliate only when being with others is seen as useful in reducing the negative impact of the stressful situation. Schachter’s participants had good reason to believe that affiliation would be useful. They would have the opportunity to compare their emotional reactions with those of others to determine whether they really needed to be fearful. For those in the Sarnoff and Zimbardo study, however, affiliation had little to offer. So, it seems that when we face embarrassment, being with others is more likely to increase stress than reduce it. Let’s return to Schachter’s initial study. What specific benefit do people get from being in the presence of others in times of stress? Research suggests that people facing an imminent threat seek each other out in order to gain cognitive clarity about the danger they are in. In one study, James Kulik and Heike Mahler (1989) found that hospital patients waiting for open-heart surgery preferred to have as roommates other patients who were post-operative rather than pre-operative, presumably because they were in a position to provide information about the experience. Patients in a second study who had been assigned postoperative rather than pre-operative roommates became less anxious about the experience and were later quicker to recover from the surgery (Kulik, Mahler, & Moore, 1996). It appears that under stress, we adaptively become motivated to affiliate with others who can help us cope with an impending threat. Summarising his own work, Schachter (1959) noted that misery loves miserable company. Based on their further studies, Gump and Kulik (1997) further amended this assertion: ‘Misery loves the company of those in the same miserable situation’ (p. 317).

INITIAL ATTRACTION Affiliation is a necessary first step in the formation of a social relationship. But each of us is more drawn to some people than to others. If you have ever had a crush on someone, felt the tingly excitement of a first encounter or enjoyed the first moments of a new friendship, then you know the meaning of the term ‘attraction’. When you meet someone for the first time, what do you look for? Does familiarity breed fondness or contempt? Do birds of a feather flock together or do opposites attract? Is beauty the object of your desire or do you believe that outward appearances are deceiving? And what is it about a situation or 352

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the circumstances of an initial meeting that draws you in for more? In many ways, the subject of attraction, liking, loving, lusting and forming new relationships does not seem to conform to logic. For example, research using the online dating site OkCupid shows that women who look right into the camera or sport cleavage do quite well but that men are more successful when they look away, do not smile – and hold animals! When researchers looked at commonalities in couples who had met on this site, they discovered that their answers tended beyond coincidence to match on certain odd questions, such as ‘Do you like horror movies?’ and ‘Wouldn’t it be fun to chuck it all and go live on a sailboat?’ (Ansari & Klinenberg, 2015). According to one classic perspective known as the reward theory of interpersonal attraction, people are attracted to those with whom they can have a relationship that is rewarding (Byrne & Clore, 1970; Lott & Lott, 1974). The rewards may be direct, as when people provide us with attention, support, money, status, information and other valuable commodities. Or the rewards may be indirect, as when it feels good to be with someone who is beautiful, smart or funny, or who happens to be in our presence when times are good. In an important extension of this perspective, R. Matthew Montoya and Robert Horton (2014) have suggested that each of us is attracted to others we see as being both able and willing to fulfil our various relationship needs. A second powerful perspective on attraction has also emerged in recent years – that of evolutionary psychology, the sub-discipline that uses principles of evolution to understand human social behaviour. According to this view, human beings all over the world exhibit patterns of attraction and mate selection that favour the conception, birth and survival of their offspring. This approach has a great deal to say about differences in this regard between men and women (Buss, 2011; Schaller, Simpson, & Kenrick, 2006). Recognising the role of rewards and the call of our evolutionary past provides broad perspectives for understanding human attraction. But there is more to the story – much more. Over the years, social psychologists have identified many important determinants of attraction and the development of intimate relationships (Berscheid & Regan, 2004; Fugère, Leszczynski, & Cousins, 2014; Miller, 2012; Regan, 2011). It is important to note that most of the research has focused on heterosexuals, so we often do not know how well specific findings apply to the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) population. Although the tide is turning, with a surge of research being conducted in this area, it is still important to realise that many of the basic processes described in this chapter affect the development of all close relationships – regardless of whether the individuals involved are gay, lesbian, bisexual or straight (Herek, 2006; Kurdek, 2005; Peplau & Fingerhut, 2007). Finally, it is important to realise the way that people meet and become attracted is a process that is now in transition, with the advent and increasing popularity of online dating services and mobile phone dating apps, which are used by millions. This form of dating is considered a relatively new phenomenon, but it has exploded over the past decade or so. Why are online dating platforms so popular? Does meeting online rather than in person alter the attraction process? In a critical analysis of this phenomenon, Eli Finkel and colleagues (2012) note that online dating promises three benefits: (1) exposure and access to profiles of potential romantic partners; (2) a means of communicating through email, instant messaging and live chat via webcams; and (3) a matching ‘algorithm’ that brings together users who are likely to be attracted to one another. But can love really be found online? According to John Cacioppo and colleagues (2013), yes it can. They interviewed 20 000 people who had married between 2005 and 2012 and found that more than a third of marriages in America now begin online. Their results have also indicated that not only were marriages that begin online slightly more likely to last than those of couples who had met via more traditional methods (e.g., in a bar, at work or via family and friends), they were also associated with slightly higher levels of marital satisfaction among those who remained married. The authors suggest that not only do these findings indicate changes to the dynamics and outcome of marriage, but they also represent evidence of a dramatic shift in the way that people are meeting their spouses. The sheer number of available potential partners online who are serious about getting married, the selective nature of searching for a partner online and the advance screening of potential partners, in the case of dating services, could be among the reasons for the results. So how does this all shape up in Australia? The sixth Annual Date of the Nation report released by RSVP (one of Australia’s leading online dating sites) in 2015 showed that the use of online dating websites had become the second most popular way to meet a potential partner (being introduced by family and friends is still the most preferred method), with 63% of single Australians reporting that they had either tried to find love online or would consider it a viable option. And it seems to be paying off (see Figure 9.2). Of those who have used the services of RSVP, 48% have been on dates as a result of online dating apps and 12% have formed long-term relationships – one in five married or found a life partner. Generation X appears to be the most likely to have met their most recent date online with women leading the way. According to RSVP, 52% of single Australians believe that being in a serious relationship is important (particularly for single

CHAPTER NINE

Reward theory of interpersonal attraction

The theory that people tend to like others who provide them with rewards that are immediate and deferred, and tangible and intangible.

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FIGURE 9.2 Finding love online Online dating sites or apps are used by 63% of Australians, and for many it has proven successful with 48% saying they had been on a date with someone they met online.

63%

Have online dated or would consider

of single Australians have used or would consider using online dating sites or apps.

54% 47% 51%

Baby boomers

Generation X

72% 64% 69%

Generation Y

69% 65% 68% 65% 59% 63%

All (18+)

Single men

Single women

All single users

Source: RSVP (2015). Date of the Nation Report. Retrieved from http://www.medianet.com.au/releases/release-details/?id=838333.

men and GenY’s) and with statistics suggesting that almost 1200 members join the site each day, and 40 000 conversations commencing per day (RSVP, 2014) it seems this is a trend that is here to stay, at least in the short term (RSVP, 2015).

Familiarity It seems so obvious that people tend to overlook it; however, we are most likely to become attracted to someone we have seen and become familiar with. So, let us begin with two basic and necessary factors in the attraction process: proximity and exposure.

The proximity effect

FIGURE 9.3 Becoming friends by chance First-year university students were randomly assigned to specific seats for a semester-long class. Illustrating the proximity effect on attraction, those who happened to be seated nearby or in the same row were more likely to rate each other as friends one year later.

Friendship intensity

2.5

2.0

1.5 0.0 No physical relation

Same row

Neighbouring seats

Initial seat assignment Source: Back, M. D, Schmukle, S. C., & Egloff, B. (2008). Becoming friends by chance. Psychological Science, 19, 439–440.

354

It hardly sounds romantic, but the single best predictor of whether two people will get together is physical proximity or nearness. Even though it is common for people to find friends, lovers and sexual partners from a distance (e.g., telephone, email, Facebook, Twitter, dating sites, blogs) some of life’s most important social interactions occur among people who find themselves in the same place at the same time (Latané, Liu, Nowak, Bonevento, & Zheng, 1995). To begin with, where we live influences the friends we make. Many years ago, Leon Festinger and colleagues (1950) studied friendship patterns in married-student university housing and found that people were more likely to become friends with residents of nearby apartments than with those who lived further away. More recent research has also shown that university students who live in off-campus accommodation tend to date those who live either nearby (Hays, 1985) or who live in the same type of housing as they do (Whitbeck & Hoyt, 1994). In a field experiment on how people can become friends by chance, researchers randomly assigned first-year university students in an introductory psychology course to their seats for the semester. Figure 9.3 shows that those who happened to be seated nearby or even in the same row were more likely to rate each other as friends one year later (Back, Schmukle, & Egloff, 2008).

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The mere exposure effect Proximity does not necessarily spark attraction, but to the extent that it increases frequency of contact, it is a good first step. Folk wisdom often suggests a dim view of familiarity, which is said to ‘breed contempt’. But in a series of experiments, Robert Zajonc (1968) found that the more often people saw a novel stimulus – whether it was a foreign word, a geometric form or a human face – the more they came to like it. This phenomenon, which Zajonc called the mere exposure effect, has since been observed in more than 200 experiments (Bornstein, 1989). People do not even have to be aware of their prior exposures for this effect to occur. In a typical study, participants are shown pictures of several stimuli, each for 1–5 milliseconds, which is too quick to register in awareness and too quick for anyone to realise that some stimuli are presented more often than others. After the presentation, participants are shown each of the stimuli and asked two questions: ‘Do you like it?’ and ‘Have you ever seen it before?’ Perhaps you can predict the result. The more frequently the stimulus is presented, the more people like it. Yet when asked if they had ever seen the liked stimulus before, they say no. These results demonstrate that the mere exposure effect can influence us without our awareness (Kuntz-Wilson & Zajonc, 1980); in fact, the effect is stronger under these conditions (Bornstein & D’Agostino, 1992; Zajonc, 2001). But will we see the same effect outside of a laboratory? Richard Moreland and Scott Beach (1992) selected four women who looked like typical students to be confederates in this study. One confederate simply had to have her picture taken, and the other three had to attend a certain class either five, ten or fifteen times. Did the frequency of exposure spark attraction among the real students in this situation? Yes. In questionnaires they completed after viewing pictures of all four women, students rated each woman on various traits, such as popularity, honesty, intelligence and physical attractiveness, and recorded their beliefs about how much they would like her, enjoy spending time with her, and want to work with her on a mutual project. The results showed that the more classes a woman attended, the more attracted the students were to her. In a well-controlled test of the familiarity hypothesis, Harry Reis and colleagues (2011) recruited 110 same-sex pairs of university students who did not know each other to chat freely by email, using anonymous screen names, once, twice, four times, six times or eight times in a week. Figure 9.4 shows that when participants were asked to rate how much they liked their partner, ratings increased with the number of interactions they had. When asked if they would like to learn each other’s identities so they could stay in contact, the percentages who said yes also increased with the number of interactions they had. These experiments proved, as a general rule, that familiarity breeds attraction. Familiarity can even influence our self-evaluations. Imagine that you had a portrait photograph of yourself created into two pictures: one that depicted your actual appearance and the other a mirror-image copy. Which image would you prefer? Which would a friend prefer? Theodore Mita and colleagues (1977) tried this interesting experiment with female university students and found that most preferred their mirror images, while their friends liked the actual photos. In both cases, the preference was for the view of the face that was more familiar.

Mere exposure effect The phenomenon whereby the more often people are exposed to a stimulus, the more positively they evaluate that stimulus.

Physical attractiveness What do you look for in a friend or romantic partner? Intelligence? Kindness? A sense of humour? How important, really, is a person’s looks? Children are often taught that ‘beauty is only skin deep’ and that we should not ‘judge a book by its cover’. Yet as adults, we react more favourably to others who are physically attractive than to those who are not. Over the years, studies have shown that in the affairs of our social world, beauty is a force to be reckoned with (Langlois et al., 2000; Patzer, 2006; Swami & Furnham, 2008). The human bias for beauty is pervasive. In one study, fifth-grade teachers were given background information about a boy or girl, accompanied by a photograph. All teachers received identical information, yet those who saw an attractive child saw that child as being smarter and more likely to do well in school (Clifford & Walster, 1973). In a second study, male and female experimenters approached students on a university campus and tried to get them to sign a petition. The more attractive the experimenters were, the more signatures they were able to get (Chaiken, 1979). In a third study, judges set lower bail and imposed smaller fines on suspects who were rated as attractive rather than unattractive on the basis of photographs (Downs & Lyons, 1991). Finally, economists in Australia, the US, Canada and England have discovered that within many occupational groups physically attractive men and women earn a higher salary than peers who are comparable, except for being less attractive (Borland & Leigh, 2014; Hamermesh & Biddle, 1994; Judge,

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FIGURE 9.4 Virtual familiarity breeds liking Same-sex pairs of university students were randomly assigned to chat by email at varying times in a week. The more interactions the participants had, the more they liked their partner. When participants were asked if they wanted to stay in contact after the experiment, the percentage who said yes also increased with the number of interactions they had. 4

Ratings of partner

3.8 3.6 3.4 3.2 3 2.8 1

2

4

6

8

Number of chats (condition)

70

% Desire to stay in contact

60 50 40 30 20 10 0 1

2

4

6

8

Source: Reis, H. T., Maniaci, M. R., Caprariello, P. A., Eastwick, P. W., & Finkel, E. J. (2011). Familiarity does indeed ­promote attraction in live interaction. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 101, 557–570.

Hurst, & Simon, 2009; Mobius & Rosenblat, 2006). There is no doubt about it: across a range of settings, people fare better if they are attractive than if they are not (Hamermesh, 2013; Rhode, 2010). It all seems so shallow, so superficial. Yet this bias for beauty begins literally in the eye of the beholder. Research shows that beautiful faces capture our attention (Lindell & Lindell, 2014; Maner et al., 2003). In one study, participants looked at Facebook profiles of unfamiliar men and women who varied in facial attractiveness. Using an eye-tracking device, researchers found that participants spent more time looking at attractive versus nonattractive faces relative to advertisements (Seidman & Miller, 2013). In a second study, participants were seated at a computer to complete a visual task on the right or left side of the screen. During the task, faces were flashed on the opposite side of the screen. Although participants tried to stay focused, the appearance of beautiful faces, as opposed to ordinary faces, distracted them and slowed down their ability to execute the task (Liu & Chen, 2012). The fact that beauty captures attention can help to explain an odd phenomenon. Imagine looking at photographs of several individuals in a group and rating each on a 1–7-point scale for how attractive they

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are. Or, imagine you were asked to look at the same pictures but had to rate the group as a whole. Would the average of your individual ratings equal your overall rating of the group? What do you think? In a series of clever experiments conducted both over the internet and in the laboratory, Yvette van Osch and her colleagues (2015) sought to answer this question. Time and again, the results supported what they call the group attractiveness effect – the perceived physical attractiveness of a group as a whole is greater than the average attractiveness of its individual members. These researchers next tried to figure out why this occurs. Using an eye-tracking device, the results proved revealing. Participants unwittingly spent more time looking at the most attractive members, which skewed upward their perceptions of the group as a whole. But before we go on to accept the notion that people prefer others who are physically attractive, let us stop for a moment and consider a fundamental question: ‘What constitutes beauty?’ Is it an objective and measurable human characteristic like height, weight or hair colour? Or is beauty a subjective quality, existing in the eye of the beholder? There are advocates on both sides.

CHAPTER NINE

Group attractiveness effect The perceived physical attractiveness of a group as a whole is greater than the average attractiveness of its individual members

What is beauty? No one would argue that there is a ‘gold standard’ for beauty. However, some researchers do believe that certain faces are inherently more attractive than others. There are three sources of evidence for this proposition: (1) cultural perspectives, (2) physical features and (3) innate preference for attractive faces.

Cultural perspectives When people are asked to rate faces on a 10-point scale, there is typically a high level of agreement among children and adults, men and women, and people from the same or different cultures (Langlois et al., 2000). For example, Michael Cunningham and colleagues (1995) asked Asian and Latino students and black and white American students to rate the appearance of women from all these groups. Overall, some faces were rated as more attractive than others, leading these investigators to argue that people everywhere share an image of what is beautiful. People also tend to agree about what constitutes an attractive body. For example, men tend to be drawn to the ‘hourglass’ figure, often seen in women of average weight whose waists are a third narrower than their hips, a shape that is thought to be associated with reproductive fertility. In general, women with a 0.7 waist-to-hip ratio (WHR), where the waist circumference is 70% of the hip circumference, such as Jessica Alba, Beyoncé and Marilyn Monroe, are rated as more attractive by men from European cultures. In fact, when shown photographs of women before and after they had microfat grafting surgery (where fat tissue is taken from the waist and implanted on the buttocks, which lowers the WHR), people rated the postoperative photographs as more attractive – independent of any changes in body weight (Singh & Randall, 2007). The preference is found not only among European men but also in diverse groups in Africa, Indonesia, Samoa, New Zealand, and elsewhere in the world (Singh et al., 2010). By contrast, women like men with a waist-to-hip ratio that forms a tapering V-shaped physique (e.g., Daniel Craig, Hugh Jackman and Gerard Butler), signalling more muscle than fat (Singh, 1995). If marriage statistics are any indication, women also seem to prefer men with height. Comparisons made in Europe indicate that married men are a full inch (2.54 cm) taller, on average, than unmarried men (Pawlowski, Dunbar, & Lipowicz, 2000).

Physical features of beauty Second, a number of researchers have identified physical features of the human face that are reliably associated with ratings of attractiveness, such as smooth skin, a pleasant expression and youthfulness (Rhodes, 2006). Particularly intriguing are studies showing that people like faces in which the eyes, nose, lips and other features are not too different from the average. Judith Langlois and Lori Roggman (1990) showed university students both actual yearbook photos and computerised facial composites that ‘averaged’ features from four, eight, sixteen or thirty-two of the photos (see Figure 9.5). Time and time again, they found that the students preferred the averaged composites to the individual faces; and that the more faces used to form the composite, the more highly it was rated. Other studies have since confirmed this result (Jones, DeBruine, & Little, 2007; Langlois, Roggman, & Musselman, 1994; Rhodes, Sumich, & Byatt, 1999). It seems odd that ‘averaged’ faces are judged attractive when the faces we find the most beautiful are anything but average. What accounts for these findings? Langlois and colleagues (1994) believe that people like averaged faces because they are more prototypically face-like and have features that are less distinctive, so they seem more familiar to us. Consistent with this notion, research shows that just as people

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FIGURE 9.5 Averaged faces are judged to be more attractive Computer-generated images that average the features of different faces are seen as more attractive than the individual faces on which they were based. In fact, up to a point, the more faces are represented in a composite, the more attractive it is. Shown here are sets of male and female composites that combine 2, 4, and 32 faces. Which do you prefer? (Langlois & Roggman, 1990.)

Two-face composite

Two-face composite

are more attracted to averaged human faces than to individual faces, they also prefer averaged dogs, birds, fish, wrist watches and cars (Halberstadt & Rhodes, 2003). Computerised averaging studies also show that people are drawn to faces that are symmetrical, where the paired features of the right and left sides line up and mirror each other (Grammer & Thornhill, 1994; Mealey, Bridgstock, & Townsend, 1999). Why do we prefer symmetrical faces? Although support is mixed, evolutionary psychologists have speculated that our pursuit of symmetry is adaptive because symmetry is naturally associated with biological health, fitness and fertility – all qualities that are highly desirable in a mate (Rhodes et al., 2001; Shackelford & Larsen, 1999; Thornhill & Gangestad, 1993). Perhaps for that reason, people throughout the world try to enhance their appeal by wearing or painting symmetrical designs on their faces and bodies – designs that others find attractive (Cárdenas & Harris, 2006).

Innate preference for attractive faces

Four-face composite

Four-face composite

Thirty-two-face composite

Thirty-two-face composite

Source: Courtesy of Dr Judith Langlois; University of Texas, Austin.

A third source of evidence for the view that beauty is an objective quality is that babies who are far too young to have learned their culture’s standards of beauty exhibit a non-verbal preference for faces considered attractive by adults. Picture the scene in an infant laboratory: a baby lying on its back in a crib is shown a series of faces previously rated by university students. The first face appears and a clock starts ticking as the baby looks at it. As soon as the baby looks away, the clock stops and the next face is presented. The result? Young infants spend more time tracking and looking at attractive faces than at unattractive ones, regardless of whether the faces are young or old, male or female, or black or white (Game, Carchon, & Vital-Durand, 2003; Langlois, Ritter, Roggman, & Vaughn, 1991). ‘These kids don’t read Vogue or watch TV’, notes Langlois, ‘yet they make the same judgments as adults’ (Cowley, 1996, p. 66).

Is beauty still subjective? Infants do not discriminate between faces considered attractive and unattractive in their culture.

FALSE

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In contrast to this strong objective perspective, other researchers argue that physical attractiveness is subjective, and they point for evidence to the influences of culture, time and the circumstances of our perception. When Johannes Hönekopp (2006) had large numbers of people rate the same faces, he found that although some faces were seen as more attractive than others, individuals differed a great deal in their private preferences. To some extent at least, beauty really is in the eye of the beholder. One source of evidence for our variability in taste, first noted by Charles Darwin (1872), is that people from different cultures enhance their beauty in very different ways, with face painting, make-up, plastic surgery, scarring, tattoos, hairstyling, the moulding of bones, the filing of teeth, braces, and the piercing of ears and other body parts all contributing to the ‘enigma of beauty’ (Newman, 2000). In dramatic ways, what people find attractive in one part of the world may be seen as repulsive in another part of the world (Landau, 1989). An interesting cultural variation in this area can be seen in the research on facial hair. A study conducted by Australian researchers Barnaby Dixson and Robert Brooks (2013) found that facial hair strongly influenced judgements of men’s socio-sexual attributes in the eyes of women. Participants (six hundred heterosexual men and women) were shown a series of photographs of men who were clean shaven, lightly stubbled, heavily stubbled and full bearded and asked to rate each one for attractiveness, healthiness, masculinity and parenting ability. They found that women judged faces with heavy stubble as most attractive followed by heavy beards, light stubble and clean-shaven faces. Men, on the other hand, thought that faces with full beards and heavy stubble were more attractive than those which were lightly stubbled and clean shaven. Interestingly, both men and women rated faces with full beards highest for parenting ability and healthiness; perceived levels of masculinity also increased as

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facial hair increased. For women, the link between masculinity and facial hair was more pronounced during the fertile phase of the menstrual cycle, but ratings of attractiveness were not. In contrast to these results is the research conducted by Barnaby Dixson and Paul Vasey (2012) using women from New Zealand and Samoa, which found that while both groups of women judged men with bearded faces as significantly more attractive, they also said they looked older, more aggressive and associated them with higher social status than when they were clean shaven.

Impact of perceived beauty According to the Dove (2010) study The Real Truth About Beauty: Revisited, the majority of Australian women (88%) believe the pressure to be beautiful is all around them, and half of the women surveyed admitted that the biggest influence is the pressure they place upon themselves to look beautiful. It seems Australian women spend an average of 11.7 minutes a day looking at themselves in a mirror, more than two in five women critique themselves when they jump on the scales and in excess of half of Australian women feel they are not as beautiful as they would like to be when they see themselves naked in front of a mirror. And women’s dissatisfaction with their bodies is not limited to the bathroom – 52% of Australian women feel insecure when their body is visible to others, particularly when they are at the beach, and when they are surrounded by beautiful people (45%). Around 40% say that they would have cosmetic surgery if they could afford it and they would do so to improve the way they feel about themselves. Around 36% of those women would surgically alter their stomach and around 24% would alter their breast size (Daine, 2011).

CULTURAL DIVERSITY PERCEPTIONS OF BEAUTY AROUND THE WORLD The 2016 Dove Global Beauty and Confidence report (NathanTilloy, Shann & Skea, 2016) further highlights the pressures associated with perceptions of beauty, with almost two thirds of women globally suggesting that they have avoided social events because of concerns related to their looks. They also reported having engaged in potentially health-compromising behaviours because they did not feel good about the way they look, and the problem is far worse for those who have low self-esteem. Women are increasingly feeling the pressure to look good with ten out of the thirteen countries surveyed experiencing declines in women’s overall confidence around beauty – Australia is certainly not immune to this effect with only 7% of the women surveyed in Australia feeling very confident about the way they look. The impact of the media as a source of pressure on females is also shown, with most women and girls surveyed agreeing

the media and advertising set an unrealistic standard of beauty. Importantly, 70–80% of women and girls understand that female images in media are largely artificial creations and that they create unrealistic standards of beauty that most women cannot achieve. The negative impact of viewing these images is evident however as can be seen by the percentage of women who feel worse about themselves after viewing such images. The effects of social media in terms of the pressure to look a certain way was also evident. There are still many who believe that being beautiful leads to greater opportunities in life. Many women and girls report being complimented for their looks more often than they receive compliments for their achievements and accomplishments and many report feeling as though they need to look a certain way in order to do well in life.

Sadly, it appears that these preferences begin when we are young. In a study conducted by Richard Lerner and Elizabeth Gellert (1969), kindergarten children between five- and six-years-of-age were presented with a series of photographs of overweight, average and thin peers and asked to choose: (1) which of the photos resembled themselves; (2) which resembled their classmates; (3) which of the photos would they most want to look like; and (4) which of the photos would they least want to look like. A significant proportion of the children were able to correctly identify their own body build and that of their peers, and around 86% expressed a consistent aversion to the photo of the overweight child. Similarly, research conducted by Turnbull and colleagues in 2000 reported that children as young as two-and-a-half years old differentiate between an image of a fat child and a thin child when presented with drawn figures. But research conducted by Worobey and Worobey (2014) took this research one step further. Rather than having children respond to photos or abstract drawings, they used the toy dolls shown in Figure 9.6 to gauge young girls’ views towards different body shapes. The girls, aged between three-and-a-half and fiveand-a-half years, typically assigned positive characteristics to the thin and average-sized dolls and negative characteristics to the overweight doll. With results such as these, it is easy to see the ingrained nature of our perceptions of body image and the stereotypes that accompany those perceptions.

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FIGURE 9.6 In a Barbie world

Influences on the perceptions of beauty

Standards of beauty change over time, from one generation to the next. Many years ago, Brett Silverstein and colleagues (1986) examined the measurements of female models appearing in women’s magazines from the years 1901 to 1981, and they found that ‘curvaceousness’, as measured by the BTW ratio, varied over time, with a boyish, slender look becoming particularly desirable in recent years. More recently, researchers took body measurements from all Playboy centrefolds, beginning with the first issue, in 1953, which featured Marilyn Monroe, through the last issue of 2001, with Eva Herzigova. The result? Over time, models became thinner and had lower bust-to-waist ratios – away from the ample ‘hourglass’ to a more slender, athletic, stick-like shape (Voracek & Fisher, 2002). Time and time again, social psychologists have found that our perceptions of someone’s beauty can be inflated or deflated by various circumstances. When it comes to men’s attraction to women, one particularly interesting context factor concerns colour. The colour red is routinely associated with sex. In many species of primates, females display red swelling on their genitals, chest or face as they near ovulation. In human rituals Source: Worobey, J., & Worobey, H. S. (2014). Body-size stigmatization by preschool girls: In a doll’s world it is good to be ‘Barbie’. Body Image, 11(2), 171–174. that date back thousands of years, girls painted red ochre on their face and body at the emergence of puberty and fertility. Today, women use red lipstick and blush to enhance their appeal, red hearts symbolise Valentine’s Day, red lingerie is worn to entice, and red-light districts signal the availability of sex through prostitution. Are men so conditioned by the colour red that its presence boosts their perceptions of attractiveness? In a study of the red–sex link, Andrew Elliot and Daniela Niesta (2008) had male and female research participants rate female photos that were set against a solid red or white background. Everyone saw the same photos, yet the attractiveness ratings were highest among the men for the red background condition. In other studies, men continued to rate women as more attractive – and as more sexually desirable (but not generally more likeable) – in the presence of red, compared with women who were in the presence of grey, blue or green. What is the process by which female red sparks male attraction? Follow-up research provides an answer – women in red are perceived to be sexually receptive, and it is this receptivity that men find attractive (Pazda, Elliot & Greitemeyer, 2012). There may be an empirical truth to this perception. Naturalistic research has shown that women on dating websites who say they are looking for casual sex are more likely to wear red in their profile pictures than women seeking other types of relationships (Elliot & Pazda, 2012). Even in the mundane psychology laboratory, female participants were more likely to choose to wear a red shirt, as opposed to a comparable blue or green shirt, when they expected to meet an attractive man relative to an unattractive man or a woman (Elliot, Greitemeyer, & Pazda, 2013). The receptivity signalled by the colour red increases the odds that men will respond to a personal ad, pick up a female hitchhiker, and leave a larger tip. This same receptivity, however, is what led female participants in recent studies to malign women clad in red versus other colours by rating her as more promiscuous and more likely to cheat in a relationship (see Pazda, Prokop, & Elliot, 2014).

Young girls aged between three-and-a-half and five-and-a-half years consistently assigned positive characteristics to the thin and average sized dolls and negative characteristics to the fat doll.

Why are we blinded by beauty? Regardless of how beauty is defined, it is clear that people who are seen to be physically attractive are at a social advantage. Perhaps that’s why billions of dollars a year are spent on diets, shaving, waxing, make-up, hair dye, tattoos, body piercings, and cosmetic surgery designed to plump up sunken skin, peel and scrape wrinkles from the face, vacuum out fat deposits, lift faces, reshape noses, tuck in tummies and enlarge or reduce breasts. What creates the bias for beauty, and why are we drawn like magnets to people who are physically attractive? One possibility is that it is inherently rewarding to be in the company of people who are aesthetically appealing – that we derive pleasure from beautiful men and women the same way that we enjoy a breathtaking landscape or a magnificent work of art. In an fMRI study of men, for example,

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researchers found that areas of the brain known to respond to rewards such as food, money and drugs (e.g., cocaine) are also activated by facial beauty (Aharon et al., 2001). Or perhaps the rewards are more extrinsic. Perhaps, for example, we expect the glitter of another’s beauty to rub off on us. When averagelooking men and women are seen alongside someone else of the same sex, they are rated as more attractive when the other person is good-looking and as less attractive when he or she is plain-looking (Geiselman, Haight, & Kimata, 1984). A second possible reason for the bias towards beauty is that people tend to associate physical attractiveness with other desirable qualities, an assumption known as the what-is-beautiful-is-good stereotype (Dion, Berscheid, & Walster, 1972). Think about children’s fairy tales, where Snow White and Cinderella are portrayed as beautiful and kind, while the witch and stepsisters are both ugly and cruel. This link between beauty and goodness can even be seen in Hollywood films. Stephen Smith and colleagues (1999) asked people to watch and rate the main characters who appeared in the 100 top-grossing films between 1940 and 1990. They found that the more attractive the characters were, the more frequently they were portrayed as virtuous, romantically active and successful. In this way, the entertainment industry helps to perpetuate our tendency to judge people by their physical appearance. It now appears that the stereotyped link between beauty and goodness can also be seen in the human brain. In a study using fMRI, Takashi Tsukiura and Roberto Cabeza (2011) scanned the brains of participants while they evaluated the attractiveness of faces and the goodness of hypothetical actions. Both types of judgements increased activity in one region of the brain and decreased activity in another. Within each of these regions, the activations sparked by the two types of judgements were similar. Studies have shown that good-looking people are judged to be smart, successful, happy, well-adjusted, sociable, confident and assertive – but also vain (Eagly, Ashmore, Makhijani, & Longo, 1991). Is this physical attractiveness stereotype accurate? Only to a limited extent. Research shows that good-looking people do have more friends, better social skills and a more active sex life – and they are more successful at attracting a mate (Rhodes, Simmons, & Peters, 2005). But beauty is not related to objective measures of intelligence, personality, adjustment or self-esteem. In these domains, popular perception appears to exaggerate the reality (Feingold, 1992b). It also seems that the specific nature of the stereotype depends on cultural conceptions of what is ‘good’. When Ladd Wheeler and Youngmee Kim (1997) asked people in Korea to rate photos of various men and women, they found that people seen as physically attractive were also assumed to have ‘integrity’ and ‘a concern for others’ – traits that are highly valued in this collectivist culture. In contrast to what is considered desirable in more individualistic cultures, attractive people in Korea were not assumed to be dominant or assertive. So it seems, what is beautiful is good, but what is good is partly culturally defined. If the physical attractiveness stereotype is true only in part, why does it endure? One possibility is that each of us creates support for the bias via the type of self-fulfilling prophecy model described in Chapter 3. In a classic study of interpersonal attraction, Mark Snyder and colleagues (1977) brought together unacquainted pairs of male and female university students. All the students were given biographical sketches of their partners. Each man also received a photograph of a physically attractive or unattractive woman, supposedly his partner. At that point, the students rated each other on several dimensions and had a phone-like conversation over headphones, conversations that were taped and later heard by uninvolved participants. The results were provocative. Men who thought they were interacting with a woman who was attractive: (1) formed more positive impressions of her personality, and (2) were friendlier in their conversational behaviour. And now for the clincher – the female students whose partners had seen the attractive picture were later rated by listeners to the conversation as warmer, more confident and more animated. Fulfilling the prophecies of their own expectations, men who expected an attractive partner actually created one.

CHAPTER NINE

What-is-beautiful-isgood stereotype The belief that physically attractive individuals also possess desirable personality characteristics.

CRITICAL THINKING ACTIVITY Do you think that depictions of beauty in the popular media are representative of some groups more than others (e.g., in terms of racial, socioeconomic, sexual orientation, religious and other distinctions)? Make a list of people who are featured in popular media that you consider to be role models for people of

various generations; that is, preschool children, school children, adolescents, young adults and middle adults. What impact has their physical appearance, relative to their personality or accomplishment, had on their rise to rolemodel status?

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Benefits and costs of beauty

Attributing a positive evaluation to quality of work

There is no doubt about it, good-looking people have a significant edge. As a result, they are more popular, more sexually experienced, more socially skilled and more likely to attract a mate. In light of these advantages, it is remarkable that physical attractiveness is not a sure ticket to health, happiness or high selfesteem (Diener, Wolsic, & Fujita, 1995; Feingold, 1992b; Langlois et al., 2000). The life of Marilyn Monroe is a case in point. A celebrity of the 1950s and 1960s, Monroe was considered the most ravishing woman of her time and one of the hottest actresses in Hollywood. Yet she was terribly vulnerable and insecure. Why? One possible problem is that highly attractive people cannot always tell if the attention and praise they receive from others is due to their talent or just their good looks. A study by Brenda Major and colleagues (1984) illustrates the point. Male and female participants who saw themselves as attractive or unattractive wrote essays that were later positively evaluated by an unknown member of the opposite sex. Half the participants were told FIGURE 9.7 When being seen leads to disbelief that their evaluator would be watching them through a one-way People who believed they were physically unattractive were mirror as they wrote the essay; the other half were led to believe more likely to cite the quality of their work as the reason for that they could not be seen. In actuality, there was no evaluator receiving a positive evaluation when they thought they were seen by the evaluator. However, people who believed they were and all participants received identical, very positive evaluations attractive were less likely to credit the quality of their work when of their work. Participants were then asked why their essay was they thought they were seen. so favourably reviewed. The result? Those who saw themselves High as unattractive felt better about the quality of their work after getting a glowing evaluation from someone who had seen them. Yet those who saw themselves as attractive and thought they had been seen attributed the glowing feedback to their looks, not to the quality of their work. For people who are highly attractive, positive feedback is sometimes hard to interpret (see Figure 9.7). This distrust may be well founded. In one study, many men and women openly admitted that if a prospective date was highly attractive, they would lie to present themselves well (Rowatt, Cunningham, & Druen, 1999). Another burden of physical attractiveness as a social asset is the pressure to maintain one’s appearance. In today’s society, such pressure is particularly strong when it comes to the body. This focus on the human form can produce a healthy emphasis on nutrition and exercise. But it can also have unhealthy Low Physically unattractive Physically attractive consequences, as when men use steroids to build muscle and participants participants women over-diet to lose weight and centimetres. Particularly Seen Unseen among young women, an obsession with thinness can give rise Source: From Major, B., and Konar, E., An investigation of sex differences in pay to serious eating disorders such as bulimia nervosa (i.e., food ­expectations and their possible causes, Academy of Management Journal, 27, 777–791. binges followed by purging) and anorexia nervosa (i.e., selfCopyright © 1984 by Academy of Management. imposed starvation, which can prove fatal). Women are more likely than men to suffer from what Janet Polivy and colleagues (1986) once called the ‘modern mania for slenderness’. This slender ideal is regularly projected in the mass media. Studies have shown that young women who see magazine advertisements or television commercials that feature ultra-thin models become more dissatisfied with their own bodies than those who view neutral materials People who are (Posavac, Posavac, & Posavac, 1998). Trying to measure up to multimillion-dollar supermodels can prove physically attractive frustrating. What is worse is that the cultural ideal for thinness may be set early in childhood. Some years are happier and have ago, Kevin Norton and colleagues (1996) projected the life-size dimensions of the original Ken and Barbie higher self-esteem than those who are dolls that are popular all over the world. They found that both were unnaturally thin compared with the unattractive. average young adult. In fact, the estimated odds that any young woman would have Barbie’s original shape FALSE are approximately 1 in 100 000.

CRITICAL THINKING ACTIVITY What effect do you think the portrayal of beauty in the media aimed at children has upon the development of self-esteem and the perception of body image? Has the media portrayal of beauty changed over time? Consider the Disney characters 362

that have emerged since the days of Snow White, including such modern-day equivalents as Tiana, Merida, Rapunzel, Mulan and Moana.

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In sum, being beautiful may be a mixed blessing. There are some real benefits that cannot be denied, but there may be some costs as well. This trade-off makes you wonder about the long-term effects. Many years ago, Ellen Berscheid and colleagues (1972) compared the physical attractiveness levels of university students, based on yearbook pictures, to their adjustment when they reached middle age. There was little relationship between their appearance in youth and their later happiness. Those who were especially goodlooking in university were more likely to be married, but they were not more satisfied with marriage or more content with life. Beauty may confer advantage, but it is not destiny.

First encounters: the getting acquainted stage Speed dating is a fascinating platform for men and women who are looking for a romantic relationship. In speed-dating events, individuals pay to have between 10 and 25 very brief ‘dates’ lasting no more than four minutes. After rotating like clockwork from one partner to another, participants – who wear nametags – let the event hosts know which partners, if any, they would be interested in seeing again. If two participants double-match, the host provides each with the other’s contact information so they can schedule a real date (Finkel & Eastwick, 2008). For a first encounter, does speed dating provide people with enough information? Are four minutes enough for you to determine if you are romantically attracted to someone? To be sure, you get an upclose-and-personal look at a person’s physical appearance. But then what other information would you want? Proximity boosts the odds that we will meet someone, familiarity puts us at ease, and beauty draws us in like magnets to a first encounter. But what determines whether sparks will fly in the early gettingacquainted stages of a relationship? In this section, we consider three characteristics of others that can influence our attraction: similarity, reciprocity and being ‘hard to get’.

Similarity Common sense tells us that ‘birds of a feather flock together’; yet we also hear that ‘opposites attract’. So, which is it? Before answering this question, imagine pulling out your laptop, meeting someone online and striking up a conversation about school, sport, restaurants, films, where you live, where you have travelled or your favourite band, and then realising that the two of you have a lot in common. Now imagine the opposite experience of chatting with someone new who is very different in his or her background, interests, values and outlook on life. Which of the two strangers would you want to meet, the one who is similar or the one who is different? Over the years, research has consistently shown that people tend to associate with others who are similar to themselves (Montoya, Horton, & Kirchner, 2008; Montoya & Horton, 2014). Of course, in a very brief first-time meeting, such as in speed dating where participants do not have enough time to get to know each other, it is the mere perception of similarity that draws people together (Tidwell, Eastwick, & Finkel, 2013). Four types of similarity are most relevant: demographics, attitudinal similarity, level of attractiveness, and subjective experience.

Demographic There are a whole range of demographic variables, such as age, education, race, religion, height, level of intelligence and socioeconomic status; and people who are friends, dates, lovers or in long-term relationships of any kind tend to resemble each other more than randomly paired couples (Warren, 1966). While these correlations cannot be used to prove that similarity causes attraction, a more compelling case could be made, by first measuring people’s demographic characteristics and then determining whether these people, when they met others, liked those who were similar to them more than those who were dissimilar. This is what Theodore Newcomb did more than 50 years ago. In an elaborate study, Newcomb (1961) set up an experimental university dormitory and found that students who had similar backgrounds grew to like each other more than those who were dissimilar did. Is demographic similarity still a factor even today, with all the choices we have in our diverse and multicultural society? Yes. Commenting on the persistently magnetic appeal of similarity, sociologist John Macionis (2014) notes that ‘Cupid’s arrow is aimed by society more than we like to think’. One unfortunate result, as described in Chapter 4, is that by associating with similar others, people form social niches that are homogeneous and divided along the lines of race, ethnic background, age, religion, level of education, and occupation (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001).

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Attitudinal similarity People can also be similar in other ways, as when they share the same opinions, interests and values. So, what about attitude similarity and attraction? Here, the time course is slower because people have to get to know each other first. In Newcomb’s study, the link between actual similarity and liking increased gradually over the school year. Laboratory experiments have confirmed the point. For example, Donn Byrne (1971) had people give their opinions on a whole range of issues and then presented them with an attitude survey that had supposedly been filled out by another person (the responses were rigged). In study after study, he found that participants liked this other person better when they perceived his or her attitudes as being more similar to theirs (Byrne, 1997). The link between attitudes and attraction is evident among newly married couples. In a comprehensive study, Shanhong Luo and Eva Klohnen (2005) tested 291 newlywed couples and found that people tended to marry others who shared their political attitudes, religiosity and values, but who did not necessarily start out having similar personalities (e.g., both being introverted or extroverted). Yet once in the relationship, similarities in personality became relevant. The more similar they were, the happier was the marriage. Does this mean that similarity breeds attraction, or might attraction breed similarity? In all likelihood, both mechanisms are at work. Luo and Klohnen compared couples who had been together for varying lengths of time before marriage and found that similarity was unrelated to the length of the relationship. Yet another study of dating couples showed that when partners who are close discover that they disagree on important moral issues, they bring their views on these issues into alignment and become more similar from that point on (Davis & Rusbult, 2001). According to Milton Rosenbaum (1986), attraction researchers have overplayed the role of attitudinal similarity. Similarity does not spark attraction, he says. Rather, dissimilarity triggers repulsion; that is, the desire to avoid someone. Rosenbaum maintains that people expect most others to be similar, which is why others who are different grab our attention. Taking this hypothesis one step further, Lykken and Tellegen (1993) argue that in mate selection, all forms of interpersonal similarity are irrelevant. After a person discards the 50% of the population who are least similar, they claim, a random selection process takes over. So, which is it? Are we turned on by others who are similar in their attitudes, or are we turned off by those who are different? As depicted in Figure 9.8, Byrne and colleagues proposed a two-step model that takes both reactions into account. First, they claim, we avoid associating with others who are dissimilar; then, among those who remain, we are drawn to those who are most similar (Byrne, Clore, & Smeaton, 1986; Smeaton, Byrne, & Murnen, 1989). Our reactions may also be influenced by expectations. People expect similarity from ingroup members, like fellow students, fellow psychologists or fellow gay and lesbian people. In a series of studies, Fang Chen and Douglas Kenrick (2002) found that research participants were particularly attracted to outgroup members who expressed similar attitudes, and most repulsed by ingroup members who expressed dissimilar attitudes. FIGURE 9.8 A two-stage model of the attraction process Proposed by Byrne and his colleagues (1986), the two-stage model of attraction holds that first we avoid dissimilar others, and then we approach similar others. The negative screen of dissimilarity

The positive screen of similarity

Dissimilar Avoidance People you meet

Low similarity indifference Not dissimilar High similarity attraction

Continuing contact

Source: Byrne, D., Clore, G. L., & Smeaton, G. (1986). The attraction hypothesis: Do similar attitudes affect anything? Journal of Personality and Social ­Psychology, 51, 1167–1170.

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Level of attractiveness In addition to demographics and attitudes, a third source of similarity and difference is also at work, at least in romantic relationships. Have you ever noticed the way people react to couples in which one partner is a knockout and the other is not? Typically, we are startled by ‘mismatches’ of this sort, as if expecting people to pair off with others who are similarly attractive – not more, not less. This reaction has a basis in reality. Early on, laboratory studies showed that both men and women yearn for partners who are highly attractive. Thus, when incoming first-year students at the University of Minnesota were randomly coupled for a dance, their desire for a second date was influenced more by their partner’s physical attractiveness than by any other variable (Walster, 1966). In real-life situations, however, where one can be accepted or rejected by a prospective partner, people tend to shy away from making romantic overtures with others who seem ‘out of reach’ (Berscheid, Dion, Walster, & Walster, 1971; van Straaten, Engels, Finkenauer, & Holland, 2009). Correlational studies of couples who are dating, living together or married support this matching hypothesis – the idea that people tend to become involved romantically with others who are equivalent in their physical attractiveness (Feingold, 1988). Activity in a successful online dating site provides interesting new support. Based on activity logs, ‘popularity’ was calculated for each user on the site. Sure enough, analysis of their interactions indicated popularity-based matching. Men and women tended to contact and be contacted by others whose relative popularity on the site was similar to their own (Taylor, Fiore, Mendelsohn, & Cheshire, 2011).

Matching hypothesis

The proposition that people are attracted to others who are similar in physical attractiveness.

Subjective experience Similarity in subjective experience can also trigger attraction among strangers. Imagine that a lecturer says something in class that strikes you as funny. You glance at the student next to you, who glances back, and the two of you burst out laughing, as if bonded by a private joke. Whenever two people who are at a common event laugh, cry, jump to their feet, cheer, shake their heads or roll their eyes at the same time, they feel as if they have shared a subjective experience. Elizabeth Pinel and colleagues (Pinel et al., 2006; Pinel & Long, 2012) called this experience ‘I-sharing’ and theorised that people who I-share, even if they are otherwise dissimilar, feel a profound sense of connection to one another – like ‘kindred spirits’. In a series of experiments, participants were asked to imagine themselves with a similar or dissimilar stranger with whom they did or did not react in the same way to an external event. Consistently, the participants liked the I-sharers more than everyone else, even when they had different backgrounds. The implications are intriguing: A fundamentalist Christian and an atheist can find themselves enjoying the same sunset; a staunch Republican and an equally staunch Democrat can share a laugh. When two objectively different people I-share in these and other ways, their disliking for one another might lessen, if only for a moment. (Pinel et al., 2006, p. 245)

Before concluding that similarity is the key to attraction, what about the old adage that opposites attract? Many years ago, sociologists proposed the complementarity hypothesis, which holds that people seek others whose needs ‘oppose’ their own – that people who need to dominate, for example, are naturally drawn to those who are submissive (Winch, Ktsanes, & Ktsanes, 1954). Is there any support for this view? Surprisingly, the answer is ‘no’. When it comes to fitting mutual needs and personality traits the way keys fit locks, research shows that complementarity does not make for compatible attraction (Gonzaga, Campos, & Bradbury, 2007; Luo & Klohnen, 2005; O’Leary & Smith, 1991). In an interview with the Washington Post, Gian Gonzaga – a researcher for eHarmony, the online dating service that matches people according to their similarities – debunked the complementarity hypothesis, noting that while opposites may seem exotic at first glance, over time the differences become difficult to negotiate (McCarthy, 2009).

When it comes to romantic relationships, opposites attract.

FALSE

Reciprocity Many years ago, Fritz Heider (1958) theorised that people prefer relationships that are psychologically ‘balanced’ and that a state of imbalance causes distress. In groups of three or more individuals, a balanced social constellation exists when we like someone whose relationships with others parallel our own. Thus, we want to like the friends of our friends and the enemies of our enemies (Aronson & Cope, 1968). If you have ever had a good friend who dated someone you detested, then you know how awkward and unpleasant an unbalanced relationship can be. The fact is we do not expect our friends and enemies to get along (Chapdelaine, Kenny & LaFontana, 1994). Between two people, a state of balance exists when a relationship is characterised by reciprocity – a mutual exchange between what we give and what we receive. Liking is mutual, which is why we tend to

Reciprocity

A mutual exchange between what we give and receive; for example, liking those who like us.

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like others who indicate that they like us. In one experiment, Rebecca Curtis and Kim Miller (1986) brought pairs of students into the laboratory, arranged for them to talk, and then ‘revealed’ to one member in each pair that he or she was either liked or disliked by the partner. When the students were later reunited for conversation, those who thought that they were liked were, in turn, warmer, more agreeable and more selfdisclosing. Feeling liked is important. When groups of men and women were asked to reflect on how they fell in love or developed friendships with specific people, many spontaneously said they had been turned on initially by the realisation that they were liked (Aron, Dutton, Aron, & Iverson, 1989). But does reciprocity mean simply that the more people like us, the more we will like them back? Many years ago, Elliot Aronson and Darwyn Linder (1965) had female university students meet in pairs several times. In each pair, one student was a research participant; her partner was a confederate. After each meeting, the participant overheard a follow-up conversation between the experimenter and the confederate in which she was discussed and evaluated. Over time, the confederate’s evaluation of the participant either was consistent or underwent a change – from negative to positive (gain) or from positive to negative (loss). Put yourself in the participant’s shoes. All else being equal, in which condition would you like your partner more? In this study, participants liked the partner more when her evaluation changed from negative to positive than when it was positive all along. As long as the ‘conversion’ is gradual and believable, people like others more when their affection takes time to earn than when it comes easily. Within a heterosexual speed-dating situation, Paul Eastwick and colleagues (2007) confirmed the conversion point: people are drawn to members of the opposite sex who like them, but only when these others are selective in their liking and, hence, discriminating.

Being ‘hard to get’

Hard-to-get effect

The tendency to prefer people who are highly selective in their social choices over those who are more readily available.

366

The findings of Aronson and Linder (1965) suggests that we like others who are socially selective. This seems to support the popular notion that you can spark romantic interest by playing hard to get. Several years ago, Ellen Fein and Sherri Schneider (1996) wrote a book for women titled The Rules: Time-Tested Secrets for Capturing the Heart of Mr Right. What were the rules? Here is one: ‘Don’t call him and rarely return his calls’. And another: ‘Let him take the lead’. In all cases, the theme was that men are charmed by women who are hard to get. It is an interesting hypothesis. Despite intuition, researchers found that the hard-to-get effect is harder to get than originally anticipated (Walster, Walster, Piliavin, & Schmidt, 1973). One problem is that we are turned off by those who reject us because they are committed to someone else or have no interest in us (Wright & Contrada, 1986). Another problem is that we tend to prefer people who are moderately selective compared with those who are nonselective (i.e., they have poor taste or low standards) or too selective (i.e., they are snobs). In a study that illustrates the point, researchers arranged for male and female university students to have four-minute speed dates with 10 or so other students of the opposite sex, after which they all rated each other and indicated on a website if they were interested in meeting again. Analyses of the ratings showed that participants liked dates who selectively desired them more than others, but they did not like nondiscriminating dates who had indicated a desire for several of the men they encountered (Eastwick & Finkel, 2008). Additional research shows that we are drawn to others who seem ‘hard to get’ because we are uncertain as to whether they like us (Whitchurch, Wilson, & Gilbert, 2011). Now suppose that someone you are interested in is hard to get for external reasons. What if a desired relationship is opposed or forbidden by parents, as in the story of Romeo and Juliet? What about a relationship threatened by catastrophe or a relationship threatened by parents over social class differences? What about distance, a lack of time or a renewed interest from a partner’s old flame? Chapter 6 describes the theory of psychological reactance: that people are highly motivated to protect their freedom to choose and behave as they please. When a valued freedom is threatened (e.g., not getting the object of one’s affection), people reassert themselves, often by wanting that which is unavailable too much – like the proverbial forbidden fruit (Brehm & Brehm, 1981). Consider what happens when you think that your chance to get a sexual partner for the evening is slipping away. Is it true, to quote country and western musician Mickey Gilley, that ‘the girls all get prettier at closing time’? To find out, researchers entered some bars in America and asked patrons three times during the night to rate the physical attractiveness of other patrons of the same and opposite sex. As Gilley’s lyrics suggested, people of the opposite sex were seen as more attractive as the night wore on (Pennebaker et al., 1979). The study is cute, but the correlation between time and attraction can be interpreted in other ways – perhaps attractiveness ratings rise with blood-alcohol levels! In a follow-up study, Scott Madey and colleagues (1996) also had patrons in a bar make attractiveness ratings throughout the night.

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They found that these ratings increased as the night wore on only among patrons who were not committed to a relationship. As reactance theory would predict, closing time posed a threat – which sparked desire – only to those on the lookout for a late-night assignation. Another possible instance of passion fuelled by reactance can be seen in ‘the allure of secret relationships’. In a clever experiment, Daniel Wegner and colleagues (1994) paired up male and female university students to play bridge. Within each foursome, one couple was instructed in writing to play footsie under the table, either secretly or in the open. After a few minutes, the game was stopped and the players were asked to indicate privately how attracted they were to their own partner and to the oppositesex member of the other team. The result? Students who played footsie in secret were more attracted to each other than those who played in the open or not at all. This finding is certainly consistent with reactance theory. But there may be more to it. First, as we will see later, the thrill of engaging in a forbidden act, or the sheer excitement of having to keep a secret, may help fan the flames of attraction. Second, however, it is important to realise that over time keeping a romance secret from others can become so much of a burden that the relationship itself will suffer (Foster & Campbell, 2005).

Gendered selection preferences Before moving on to the topic of close relationships, let us stop and consider this question: ‘When it comes to the search for a short-term or long-term mate, are men and women similarly motivated?’ If not, what are the differences? And why do these sex differences exist, and what do they mean? In The Evolution of Desire, David Buss (2003) argues that the answer can be derived from evolutionary psychology. According to this perspective, human beings all over the world exhibit mate-selection patterns that favour the conception, birth and survival of their offspring – and women and men, by necessity, employ different strategies to achieve that common goal (Buss & Schmitt, 1993; Gangestad & Simpson, 2000; Trivers, 1972). According to Buss, women must be highly selective because they are biologically limited in the number of children they can bear and raise in a lifetime. A woman must, therefore, protect her children and so searches for a mate who possesses (or has the potential to possess) economic resources and is willing to commit those resources to support her offspring. The result is that women should be attracted to men who are older and financially secure or who have ambition, intelligence, stability and other traits predictive of future success. By contrast, men can father an unlimited number of children and can ensure their reproductive success by inseminating many women. Men are restricted, however, by their ability to attract fertile partners and by their lack of certainty as to whether the babies born are actually their own. With these motives springing from their evolutionary past, men seek out women who are young and physically attractive, having smooth skin, full lips, lustrous hair, good muscle tone and other youthful features – attributes that signal health and reproductive fertility. To minimise their paternal uncertainty, men should also favour chastity, pursuing women they think will be sexually faithful rather than promiscuous. In an initial test of this theory, Buss (1989) and a team of researchers surveyed 10 047 men and women in 37 cultures in North and South America, Asia, Africa, Eastern and Western Europe, and the Pacific. All respondents were asked to rank-order and rate the importance of various attributes in choosing a mate. The results were consistent with predictions. Both men and women gave equally high ratings to certain attributes, such as ‘having a pleasant disposition’. In the vast majority of countries, however, ‘good looks’ and ‘no previous experience in sexual intercourse’ were valued more by men, whereas ‘good financial prospect’ and ‘ambitious and industrious’ were more important to women. Analyses of personal advertisements appearing in magazines and newspapers have similarly revealed that in the dating marketplace the ‘deal’ is that women offer beauty, while men offer wealth (Feingold, 1992a; Rajecki, Bledsoe, & Rasmussen, 1991; Sprecher, Sullivan, & Hatfield, 1994). As Buss had suggested, this ‘deal’ is not limited to men and women of the 37 cultures surveyed. In a field experiment using an online dating site in China, researchers randomly assigned income levels to the front pages of 360 contrived profiles and then recorded ‘visits’ to the full profiles. Records showed that although men uniformly visited profiles across all levels of income, women visited male profiles with higher income levels at higher rates. This ‘income attraction’ effect was so large that male profiles with the highest income level received 10 times more visits than the lowest (Ong & Wang, 2015). Some researchers have suggested that these gendered preferences are not mere luxuries but are actually necessities in the mating marketplace. In Buss’ 1989 study, men were more likely to prefer good looks, and women were more likely to prefer good financial prospects, but both sexes saw other characteristics, such as being funny, dependable and kind, as more important. But what happens in real

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life, where mate seekers who cannot have it all must prioritise their desires? Studying the necessities and luxuries in mate preferences, Norman Li and colleagues (2002) asked participants to design their ideal marriage partner by purchasing different characteristics using ‘mate dollars’. In some cases, they were granted a large budget to work with; in other cases, the budget was limited. In the large-budget condition, men spent somewhat more play money on physical attractiveness, and women spent somewhat more on social status, but both were just as interested in a partner who was kind, lively and creative. In the low-budget condition, however, men spent even more of their play money on physical attractiveness, and women spent even more on social status. When mate seekers cannot have it all and must therefore focus on what is most important, they prioritise their choices in the ways predicted by evolutionary theory (see Figure 9.9). FIGURE 9.9 Sex differences in mate preference: evolutionary necessities? In this study, participants built an ideal mate by ‘purchasing’ characteristics. When they were given a large budget, men spent a somewhat higher percentage of money on physical attractiveness, and women spent somewhat more on social status than on other characteristics. On a low budget, however, men spent even more on physical attractiveness, and women spent even more on social status. High budget

Low budget 40 Percentage of money spent

Percentage of money spent

40

30

20

10

0

30

20

10

0 Physical attractiveness Men

Social status

Physical attractiveness

Social status

Women

Source: Li, N. P., Bailey, J. M., Kenrick, D. T., & Linsenmeier, J. A. W. (2002). The necessities and luxuries of mate preferences: Testing the tradeoffs. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 82, 947–955.

Also consistent with the evolutionary perspective is a universal tendency for men to seek younger women (who are most likely to be fertile) and for women to desire older men (who are most likely to have financial resources). Buss (1989) found this age-preference discrepancy in all the cultures he studied, with men on average wanting to marry women who were 2.7 years younger and women wanting men who were 3.4 years older. Based on their analysis of personal advertisements, Douglas Kenrick and Richard Keefe (1992) found that men in their twenties are equally interested in younger women and slightly older women still of fertile age. But men in their thirties seek out women who are 5 years younger, whereas men in their fifties prefer women 10 to 20 years younger. By contrast, girls and women of all ages are attracted to men who are older than they are. These patterns can also be seen in marriage statistics taken from different cultures and generations. There is one interesting exception – teenage boys say they are most attracted to women who are slightly older than they are – women in their fertile twenties (Kenrick, Gabrielidis, Keefe, & Cornelius, 1996). One might think that the mate preferences predicted by evolutionary theory would be limited to fertile men and women of youth. Not so. A study which looked at 600 Yahoo! personal advertisements in the US from four age groups: 20–34, 40–54, 60–74 and 75+, found that men were more likely than women to offer information about their educational, employment and income status. They were also more likely to seek indications of physical attractiveness. The older they were, the more the men wanted increasingly younger women. By contrast, women of all ages were more likely to seek out status information and men who were older (at least until the women were 75, at which point they sought men younger than themselves). Apparently, in the US at least, the mate preferences predicted by evolutionary theory persist throughout the life span (Alterovitz & Mendelsohn, 2009). 368

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Conspicuous consumption: peacocking If women are drawn to men who have wealth or the ability to obtain it, then it stands to reason that men would flaunt their resources the way the male peacock displays his brilliantly coloured tail. Showy displays of wealth are seen in cultures all over the world – from Iceland to Japan, Polynesia and the Amazon jungle – leading evolutionary psychologists to speculate that conspicuous consumption may have evolved as a sexually selected mating signal (Miller, 2009; Saad, 2007). To see if such a signal works, Jill Sundie and colleagues (2011) briefly described to female participants a 32-year-old MBA graduate who made a good living as a financial analyst; who liked to ride bikes, go to the cinema and listen to music; and who just purchased a new car – either an expensive Porsche or a Honda Civic. Sure enough, participants saw him as a more desirable date when he was said to have bought the flashier car. If men flaunt their resources to attract women, then it stands to reason that the more competitive the reproductive landscape is for men, the more likely they are to spend money in conspicuous ways. Historically, the ratio of men to women in a population can vary over time and from one city to another. An abundance of women relative to men is associated with lower marriage rates and lower paternal investment; a relative abundance of men is associated with higher marriage rates and more paternal investment. To test the financial consequences of too many men, Vladas Griskevicius and others (2012) presented male American university students with one of two versions of a reputable local newspaper article concerning the ratio of men to women on their campus. One version indicated that the sex ratio was fast becoming female-biased (more women than men); a second version indicated that the sex ratio was male-biased (more men than women). Afterward, all participants were asked to rate how much money in dollars was appropriate to spend on a Valentine’s Day gift, a dinner date, and an engagement ring. Across the board, the results strongly supported the prediction that the perception of competition among men would lead them to spend more money on mating-related expenditures.

Expressions of love The chances are that common sense arms you to predict the male–female differences found in research on the evolution of desire. But what about romantic expressions of love and affection? Male and female stereotypes would suggest that men are more likely to chase sex, while women are more likely to seek love. It comes as no surprise, therefore, that when the contents of Valentine’s Day cards were analysed, female authors were more likely than men to express love (Gonzalez & Koestner, 2006). Saying ‘I love you’ is a bold step for people seeking a mate because the words signal a marked shift in satisfaction and has implications for devotion, sacrifice and commitment. Who normally professes their love first in a heterosexual relationship – the man or the woman? Have you ever been in love? If so, who broke the ice in your relationship? Interested in gender and expressions of love, Joshua Ackerman and colleagues (2011) stopped pedestrians on a street corner and asked them to indicate which partner in general says it first. The result was consistent with expectations: 64% chose women. When asked who ‘gets serious’ first, 84% chose women. Next, however, these researchers asked male and female university students who once had a past romantic relationship to recall who actually said ‘I love you’ first. The result? 62% reported that the man said it first. In a third study, heterosexual couples from an online community sample were asked to report on their own relationship. Not all partners agreed on the answer – which is interesting. Among those who did agree, however, 70% reported that the man said it first (see Figure 9.10). Does an evolutionary perspective shed light on why men would say ‘I love you’ before women do? And do men and women react similarly to this heartfelt expression? Ackerman and colleagues (2011) predicted that timing matters – specifically, in relation to the onset of sexual activity. In an online study, they recruited male and female Craigslist posters who had received an ‘I love you’ for the first time and asked a number of questions about the experience – including whether the expression of love had come before or after sexual intercourse and how happy they were made by the disclosure. Prior to sexual activity, men reported feeling happier and more positive about the expression of love than women did. After sexual activity, however, women reacted with somewhat more positive emotion. What does it all mean? As interpreted through the lens of an evolutionary perspective: ‘A presex confession may signal interest in advancing a relationship to include sexual activity, whereas a postsex confession may instead more accurately signal a desire for longterm commitment’ (p. 1090).

Jealousy Particularly supportive of evolutionary theory is research on jealousy (‘the dangerous passion’), a negative emotional state that arises from a perceived threat to one’s relationship. Although jealousy is a common

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FIGURE 9.10 Who is the first to say ‘I love you’? In one study, people were asked for their beliefs about which partner in a heterosexual relationship – the man or the woman – is more likely to say ‘I love you’ first. In a second study, men and women who had a past romantic relationship were asked to recall who said ‘I love you’ first. In a third study, both partners in heterosexual couples were asked to report on their own relationship. Contrary to our stereotypic belief (left), it appears that men are more likely to confess their love first (centre and right). Beliefs

Recalled relationship

Current relationship

80%

80%

80%

65%

65%

65%

50%

50%

50%

35%

35%

35%

20%

20%

20%

A.

Women

Men

B.

Women

Men

C.

Women

Men

Source: Ackerman, J. M., Griskevicius, V., & Li, N. P. (2011). Let’s get serious: Communicating commitment in romantic relationships. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 100, 1079–1094.

and normal human reaction, men and women may be aroused by different triggering events. According to the theory, a man should be most upset by sexual infidelity because a wife’s extramarital affair increases the risk that the children he supports are not his own. By contrast, a woman should feel threatened more by emotional infidelity because a husband who falls in love with another woman might leave and withdraw his financial support (Buss, 2000). Male or female, jealousy reactions are intensified among people who believe that there is a scarcity of potential mates, as opposed to an abundance, in the population (Arnocky, Ribout, Mirza, & Knack, 2014). A number of studies support this hypothesis. In one, male and female university students were asked whether they would be more upset if their romantic partner were to form a deep emotional attachment or have sex with another person. Which situation would you find more distressing? The results revealed a striking gender difference: 60% of the men said they would be more upset by a partner’s sexual infidelity, but 83% of the women felt that emotional infidelity was worse (Buss, Larsen, Westen, & Semmelroth, 1992). This difference seems to reveal itself whenever men and women are asked which type of infidelity is more upsetting (Schützwohl, 2004; Shackelford et al., 2004). This gender difference also appeared when newly married husbands and wives were interviewed about how they would react if they suspected their partner of cheating. The men said they would use more ‘mate-retention’ tactics (concealing or threatening the wife; taking action against the male rival) when their wives were young and attractive; women said they would use more mate-retention tactics (being watchful; enhancing their appearance) when married to men who strove for status and made more money (Buss & Shackelford, 1997). In one study, researchers analysed 398 individuals from various countries who had been clinically diagnosed with ‘morbid jealousy’. Using information from published case histories, they found that whereas men were more likely to accuse their partners of sexual infidelity, women were more likely to be upset over emotional infidelity. Although only a few case histories contained details concerning the feared rival, jealous men were more likely to report that their rival had greater status and/or resources, while jealous women were more likely to report that their rival was younger and/or more attractive (Easton, Schipper, & Shackelford, 2007).

Sociocultural perspectives Although the gender differences are intriguing, critics of the evolutionary approach are quick to argue that some of the results can be interpreted in terms that are ‘psychological’ rather than ‘evolutionary’. One common argument is that women trade youth and beauty for money not for reproductive purposes but rather because they often lack direct access to economic power. With this hypothesis in mind, Steven Gangestad (1993) examined women’s access to wealth in each of the countries in Buss’s cross-cultural study.

370

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He found that the more economic power women had, the more important male physical attractiveness was to them. This result suggests that it may be the generally low social and economic status of women relative to men that leads them to care less about the physical attributes of a potential mate. Another argument concerns the finding that men are more fearful of a mate’s sexual infidelity (which threatens paternal certainty) and that women worry more about emotional infidelity (which threatens future support). The difference is consistent, but what does it mean? There are two criticisms. First, in contrast to the explanation evolutionary theory provides, some researchers have found that men get more upset over sexual infidelity not because of uncertain paternity but because they reasonably assume that a married woman who has a sexual affair is also likely to have intimate feelings for her extramarital partner. In other words, the man’s concern, like the woman’s, may be over the threats of loss, not about fatherhood issues (DeSteno & Salovey, 1996; Harris & Christenfeld, 1996). Second, although men and women react differently when asked to imagine a partner’s sexual or emotional infidelity, they are equally more upset by emotional infidelity when asked to recall actual experiences from a past relationship (Harris, 2002). At present, researchers continue to debate what the observed gender differences in romantic jealousy mean and the evolutionary model that is used to explain them (Harris, 2005; Sagarin, 2005). A third argument is that the self-report differences typically found between the sexes are small compared with the similarities. This is an important point. In Buss’s original cross-cultural study, both men and women gave their highest ratings to such attributes as kindness, dependability, a good sense of humour and a pleasant disposition (physical attractiveness and financial prospects did not top the lists). In fact, research shows that women desire physical attractiveness as much as men do when asked about what they want in a short-term casual sex partner (Li & Kenrick, 2006; Regan & Berscheid, 1997). Also limiting is the question of whether the stated preferences reported in the Buss (1989) surveys match the actual preferences when people find themselves face-to-face with real flesh-and-blood partners. Paul Eastwick and Eli Finkel (2008) recruited men and women for a speed-dating event, before which they asked participants about their preferences for an ideal partner. Replicating the usual effect, men were more likely to cite ‘physically attractive’, and women were more likely to cite ‘earning prospects’. Yet the romantic attraction ratings of partners during and after speed dating revealed that the differences among male and female participants about what traits were important had disappeared. In theory, men and women enacted the different roles cast by evolution; yet in practice, their attraction to each other was based on similar characteristics. These results can be seen in Figure 9.11. FIGURE 9.11 Evolutionary mate preferences: in theory and in practice Before they engaged in speed dating, male and female participants stated their preferences for an ideal partner. Consistent with the evolutionary perspective, males were more likely to cite ‘physically attractive’, and females were more likely to cite ‘earning prospects’ (left). In ratings of actual speed-dating partners, however, male and female participants did not differ in their preferences for these characteristics (right). Hypothetical partners

Actual partners

9.0

1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0

Partner preferences

8.5 8.0 7.5 7.0 6.5 6.0 5.5 5.0 Physical attractiveness Men

Earning prospects

Physical attractiveness

Earning prospects

Women

Source: Finkel, E. J., & Eastwick, P. W., Speed-dating, Current Directions in Psychological Science vol 17 (pp. 193–197). Copyright © 2008 by Sage Publcations, Inc. Reprinted by permission.

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CLOSE RELATIONSHIPS

Intimate relationship

A close relationship between two adults involving emotional attachment, fulfilment of psychological needs and/ or interdependence.

Being attracted to people can be exhilarating or frustrating, depending on how the initial encounters develop. How important is a good relationship to you? Some years ago, researchers asked 300 students to weigh the importance of having a satisfying romantic relationship against the importance of other life goals, such as getting a good education, having a successful career or contributing to a better society, and found that 73% said they would sacrifice most other goals before giving up a good relationship (Hammersla & Frease-McMahan, 1990). Intimate relationships often involve three basic components: (1) feelings of attachment, affection and love; (2) fulfilment of psychological needs; and (3) interdependence between partners, each of whom has a meaningful influence on the other. Not all intimate relationships contain all three ingredients. Although people have many significant relationships in their lives that contain one or more of these components, social psychologists have concentrated their research on friends, dating partners, lovers and married couples (Berscheid & Regan, 2004; Hendrick & Hendrick, 2000; Miller & Perlman, 2009; Regan, 2011; Sprecher, Wenzel, & Harvey, 2008). How do we advance from our first encounters to the intimate relationships that warm our lives? Do we proceed gradually over time, in stages, step by step, or by leaps and bounds? According to one perspective, relationships progress in order through a series of stages. For example, Bernard Murstein’s (1986) stimulus– value–role (SVR) theory says there are three with each being important throughout a relationship, but each one is first and foremost during only one stage: 1 Stimulus stage – in which attraction is sparked by external attributes such as physical appearance. 2 Value stage – where attachment is based on similarity of values and beliefs. 3 Role stage – where commitment is based on the enactment of such roles as husband and wife. In evaluating any stage theory, the critical issue is sequence. Does the value stage always precede the role stage, or might a couple work out roles before exploring whether their values are compatible? Most researchers do not believe that intimate relationships progress through a fixed sequence of stages. What, then, accounts for how they change? One common answer is rewards. Love, like attraction, depends on the experience of positive emotions in the presence of a partner. Step by step, as the rewards pile up, love develops. Or, as rewards diminish, love erodes. In reward theories, quantity counts. But some would disagree. Think about your own relationships. Are your feelings for someone you love simply a more intense version of your feelings for someone you like? Is the love of a close friend the same as the love of a romantic partner? If not, then you appreciate that there are qualitative differences among relationships. The next section examines the reward-based approach to building a relationship. Then we consider differences among various types of relationships.

The intimate marketplace: tracking the benefits and costs Earlier, we saw that people are initially attracted to others who provide them with direct or indirect rewards. But is ‘What’s in it for me?’ still important in a relationship that has blossomed and grown? Can an economic approach predict the future of a close relationship?

Social exchange theory Social exchange theory

A perspective that views people as motivated to maximise benefits and minimise costs in their relationships with others.

372

Social exchange theory is an economic model of human behaviour according to which people are motivated by a desire to maximise profit and minimise loss in their social relationships, just as they are in business (Homans, 1961; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959). The basic premise is simple: relationships that provide more rewards and fewer costs will be more satisfying and endure longer. Between intimates, the rewards include love, companionship, consolation in times of distress and sexual gratification, if the relationship is of this nature. The costs include the work it takes to maintain a relationship through conflict, compromise and the sacrifice of opportunities elsewhere. The development of an intimate relationship is clearly associated with the overall level of rewards and costs. Research has shown that dating couples who experience greater increases in rewards as their relationship progresses are more likely to stay together than are those who experience small increases or declines (Berg & McQuinn, 1986). People do not worry about costs during the honeymoon phase of a relationship (Hays, 1985). After a few months, however, both rewards and costs start to contribute to levels of satisfaction, both in married couples (Margolin & Wampold, 1981) and in gay and lesbian couples who are living together (Kurdek, 1991a). Rewards and costs do not arise in a psychological vacuum. All people bring to a relationship certain expectations about what they are entitled to. John Thibaut and Harold Kelley (1959) coined the term

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comparison level (CL) to refer to this average expected outcome in relationships. A person with a high CL expects his or her relationships to be rewarding; someone with a low CL does not. Situations that meet or exceed a person’s expectations are more satisfying than those that fall short. Even a bad relationship can look pretty good to someone who has a low CL. According to Thibaut and Kelley, a second kind of expectation is also important. They coined the term comparison level for alternatives (CLalt) to refer to people’s expectations about what they would receive in an alternative situation. If the rewards available elsewhere are believed to be high, a person will be less committed to staying in the present relationship (Drigotas & Rusbult, 1992). If people perceive that they have few acceptable alternatives (a low CLalt), they will tend to remain, even in an unsatisfying relationship that fails to meet expectations (CL). Of course, just as these alternatives can influence our commitment, a sense of commitment can influence our perceptions of the alternatives. If you have ever been in love, you probably were not cold, calculating and altogether objective in your perceptions of the alternatives. In close and intimate relationships, we tend to act like lovers, not like scientists, and harbour positive illusions. Research shows that people who are in love tend to see their partners and relationships very optomistically (Collins & Feeney, 2000; Gagne & Lydon, 2001; Sanderson & Evans, 2001; Solomon & Vazire, 2014). They also tend to see other prospective partners as less appealing (Johnson & Rusbult, 1989; Simpson et al., 1990) – a motivated perception that enables people in a committed relationship to resist temptation (Lydon, 2010). This generally positive perspective on one’s own partner relative to others is conducive to a happy and stable relationship (Murray, Holmes, & Griffin, 1996; Murray & Holmes, 1999), except when people are in denial about their partner and incorrect in their perceptions (Neff & Karney, 2005). A third element in the social exchange is investment. An investment is something a person puts into a relationship that he or she cannot recover if the relationship ends. If you do not like the way an intimate relationship is working out, you can pack your clothes, grab your laptop and drive away. But what about all the time you put into trying to make the relationship last? What about all the romantic and career opportunities you sacrificed along the way? As you might expect, investments increase commitment. Because of those things we cannot take with us, we are more likely to stay (Rusbult & Buunk, 1993). Over the years, research has shown that the building blocks of the social exchange framework – as depicted in Figure 9.12 and as incorporated into Caryl Rusbult and colleagues’ (1998) investment model – can be used to determine the level of commitment partners bring to a relationship (Le & Agnew, 2003; Rusbult, Agnew, & Arriaga, 2012). This model is important because commitment levels predict how long relationships will last. In studies of dating and married couples, research shows that the best-adjusted ones are those in which each partner is committed and sees the other as mutually committed (Drigotas, Rusbult, & Verette, 1999). Particularly important for the durability of a relationship is that people who are committed are more likely to forgive and forget when their partner betrays a relationship norm by flirting, lying, forgetting an anniversary, revealing a private and embarrassing story in public or having an affair FIGURE 9.12 Relational building blocks The building blocks of social exchange are rewards, costs, comparison level for alternatives, and investments. These factors Rewards

_

Costs

_

are strongly associated with the satisfaction and commitment partners experience in their relationship. Comparison level (CL)

Satisfaction

_

Comparison level for alternatives (CLalt)

+

Investments

Commitment

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(Finkel, Rusbult, Kumashiro, & Hannon, 2002). Unfortunately, there are times when commitment can be a trap. A study of battered women showed that the investment model can be used to predict whether battered women will remain in an abusive relationship (Rhatigan & Axsom, 2006).

Equity theory Equity theory

The theory that people are most satisfied with a relationship when the ratio between benefits and contributions is similar for both partners.

Equity theory provides a special version of how social exchange operates in interpersonal interactions (Adams, 1965; Messick & Cook, 1983; Walster, Walster, & Berscheid, 1978). According to this theory, an equitable relationship is a matter of social justice (Hatfield, Rapson, & Aumer-Ryan, 2008). All over the world, people are most content when the ratio between what they get out of a relationship (benefits) and what they put into it (contributions) is similar for both partners. Thus, the basic equity formula is: Your Benefits Your Partner’s Benefits 5 Your Contributions Your Partner’s Contributions Equity is different from equality. According to equity theory, the balance is what counts. So if one partner benefits more from a relationship but also makes a greater contribution, then the situation is equitable. In an inequitable relationship, the balance is disturbed. One partner (called the over-benefited) receives more benefits than he or she deserves on the basis of contributions made, while the other partner (aptly called the under-benefited) receives fewer benefits than deserved. Both over-benefit and under-benefit are unstable and often unhappy states. As you might expect, underbenefited partners feel angry and resentful because they are giving more than their partner for the benefits they receive, whereas over-benefited partners feel guilty because they are profiting unfairly. Both kinds of inequity are associated with negative emotions in dating couples (Walster et al., 1978), married couples (Schafer & Keith, 1981; Guerrero, La Valley, & Farinelli, 2008) and friendships among elderly widows (Rook, 1987). When it comes to satisfaction with a relationship, as you might expect, it is more unpleasant to feel under-benefited than over-benefited. People prefer to receive too much in life rather than too little, even if they feel bad about it (Grote & Clark, 2001; Hatfield, Greenberger, E., Traupmann, J., & Lambert, 1982; Sprecher, 2001). If equity is so important, then any partner in a close relationship may at times feel a need to restore the balance sheet when he or she is feeling inferior (as if he or she is falling short) or insecure. According to Sandra Murray and John Holmes (2008), people in relationships naturally and unconsciously maintain something of a ‘trust-insurance system’ by which they keep a tally of costs and benefits in order to detect and then repair possible imbalances. Murray and colleagues (2009) went on to demonstrate the process in a series of studies of newlyweds. In one of these studies, more than 200 married couples, averaging 27 years of age, were recruited from local city councils’ offices when they applied for their marriage licence. Each couple had been married for less than six months. All participants were given a personal digital assistant for keeping a daily diary by answering specific questions each night before going to bed about their feelings, behaviours and doubts about the marriage. By tracking and statistically correlating each partner’s answers over time, the researchers observed three steps of the trust-insurance system in action: 1 When participants anxiously felt that they were not good enough for their partner, in the days following they were more likely to make sacrifices; for example, by doing the dishes, making lunch or picking up after the partner. 2 These restorative actions were accompanied by lowered feelings of inferiority that same day. 3 On the next day, the partners who benefited from these actions expressed fewer doubts about their marriage. Murray and her colleagues went on to propose an equilibrium model of relationship maintenance, which states that people are motivated to preserve important relationships, that declines in satisfaction and commitment motivated threat-mitigating tactics (e.g., accommodating the partner rather than retaliating), and that these tactics serve to restore levels of satisfaction and commitment (Murray & Holmes, 2011; Murray, Holmes, Griffin, & Derrick, 2015).

Types of relationships Social exchange models focus on quantity; that is, the more (rewards or equity), the better (satisfaction and endurance). But is reward always necessary? What about qualitative differences among our relationships? Does more reward turn casual acquaintances into friends, and friends into lovers, or are these types of relationships different from each other?

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Exchange and communal relationships According to Margaret Clark and colleagues, people operate by a reward-based model when they are in exchange relationships, which are characterised by an immediate reciprocal repayment of benefits. In these situations, people want costs to be quickly offset by compensation, leaving the balance at zero. But not all relationships fit this mould. Clark maintains that in communal relationships, partners respond to each other’s needs and wellbeing over time and in different ways, without regard for whether they have given or received a benefit (Clark, 1984; Clark & Mills, 1979). Exchange relationships typically exist between strangers and casual acquaintances, and in certain long-term arrangements such as business partnerships. By contrast, strong communal relationships are usually limited to close friends, romantic partners and family members (Clark & Mills, 1993). Based on fieldwork in West Africa, Alan Fiske (1992) is convinced that this distinction applies to human interactions all over the world. But the cynics among us wonder: Are communal relationships truly free of social exchange considerations? Can people really give without any desire to receive, or do partners in a communal relationship follow a more subtle version of social exchange, assuming that the benefits will balance out in the long run? Margaret Clark and Judson Mills (1993) believe that true communal relationships do exist – that once a communal norm has been adopted in a relationship, regardless of how it started, the motivation to respond to the other’s needs becomes automatic.

Exchange relationship

A relationship in which the participants expect and desire strict reciprocity in their interactions.

Communal relationship

A relationship in which the participants expect and desire mutual responsiveness to each other’s needs.

Attachment styles Another interesting approach to understanding relationships is provided by Phillip Shaver, Cindy Hazan and others who have theorised that just as infants display different kinds of attachment towards their parents, adults also exhibit specific attachment styles in their romantic relationships (Cassidy & Shaver, 1999; Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007; Rholes & Simpson, 2004). For many years, developmental psychologists had noticed that infants form intense, exclusive bonds with their primary caretakers. This first relationship is highly charged with emotion, and it emerges with regularity from one culture to the next. By observing the way babies react to both separations from and reunions with the primary caretaker, usually the mother, researchers also noticed that babies have different attachment styles. Those with secure attachments cry in distress when the mother leaves and then beam with sheer delight when she returns. Those with insecure attachments show one of two patterns. They are either anxious, cling and cry when the mother leaves but then greet her with anger or apathy upon her return, or are generally more detached and avoidant, not reacting much on either occasion (Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters, & Wall, 1978). How important is this first attachment? Does a secure and trusting bond in the first year of life set a foundation for close relationships later in life? John Bowlby (1988), a psychiatrist and influential theorist, has argued that there is indeed a link – that infants form ‘internal working models’ of attachment figures and that these models guide their relationships later in life. Research shows that infants classified as securely attached are later more positive in their outlook towards others (Cassidy, Kirsh, Scolton, & Parke, 1996). Other research has shown that adult relationship patterns are predictable from parent–child relations in adolescence (Nosko, Tieu, Lawford, & Pratt, 2011). Either way, whether adult attachment styles are rooted in infancy or traced from adolescence, the distinction among adults has proved to be useful (Dinero et al., 2008). Read the descriptions of three attachment types in Table 9.1. Which fits you best? Hazan and Shaver (1987) presented this task initially in a ‘love quiz’ that appeared in a Denver newspaper and then in a study of university students. The distribution of responses was similar in the two samples, and it proved similar again in a later nationwide sample of 8000 adults (Mickelson, Kessler, & Shaver, 1997). The researchers also found that people who have a secure attachment style report having satisfying relationships that are happy, friendly, based on mutual trust and are enduring. Cognitively, they see people as good-hearted and they believe in romantic love. By contrast, avoidant lovers fear intimacy and believe that romantic love is doomed to fade; and anxious lovers report a love life full of emotional highs and lows, obsessive preoccupation, a greater willingness than others to make long-term commitments, and extreme sexual attraction and jealousy. To some extent, our attachment styles can be seen in our everyday behaviour. For example, Jeffrey Simpson and colleagues (1996) videotaped dating couples as they tried to resolve various conflicts and then showed the tapes to outside observers. They found that men classified from a questionnaire as having an insecure–avoidant attachment style were the least warm and supportive and that women with an insecure–anxious style were the most upset and negative in their behaviour. There is also reason to believe

Attachment style

The way a person typically interacts with significant others.

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TABLE 9.1 Attachment styles Which of the following best describes your feelings?

Attachment style Description Secure

I find it relatively easy to get close to others and am comfortable depending on them and having them depend on me. I do not often worry about being abandoned or about someone getting too close to me.

Insecure–avoidant

I am somewhat uncomfortable being close to others; I find it difficult to trust them completely and difficult to allow myself to depend on them. I am nervous when anyone gets too close, and often love partners want me to be more intimate than I feel comfortable being.

Insecure–anxious

I find that others are reluctant to get as close as I would like. I often worry that my partner doesn’t really love me or won’t want to stay with me. I want to merge completely with another person, and this desire sometimes scares people away.

Source: From Hazan, C., & Shaver, P. (1987). Romantic love conceptualized as an attachment process. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 52, 511–524. Copyright © 1987 by the American Psychological Association. Reprinted by permission.

that people’s attachment styles influence their physiological reactions to relationship conflict. In one study, Sally Powers and colleagues (2006) brought 124 university-age dating couples into the laboratory to discuss a heated conflict they had been having. Before and after this ‘conflict negotiation task’, the researchers took saliva samples from all participants to measure levels of cortisol, a stress hormone. The results showed that boyfriends and girlfriends who were insecurely attached exhibited more physiological stress in response to the conflict task than did those who were securely attached. Research has also shown that we experience multiple attachment figures and that different types of relationships fulfil different attachment needs. Nancy Collins and Stephen Read (1994) suggested that our attachment network is structured hierarchically across three levels: 1 The global level – contains a general representation of relationships across all domains. 2 The mid-level – contains representations of relationships with particular domains of people – romantic partner, parent, child etc. 3 The most specific level – applies to specific individuals within each of those domains (husband/wife, mother/father etc.). This was substantiated in research conducted by Overall and colleagues (2003) and Sibley and Overall (2008), which confirmed evidence of the three-level hierarchical structure. The differential use of attachment figures for a range of attachment functions has also been studied extensively (Hazan & Zeifmann, 1994; Trinke & Bartholomew, 1997; Doherty & Feeney, 2004). What about the future? Does the attachment style you endorse today foretell relational outcomes tomorrow? On this question, the evidence is mixed. People who are secure do tend to have more lasting relationships. But the prognosis for those classified as insecure is harder to predict, with the results less consistent. What is important to realise is that although styles of attachment are modestly stable over time – perhaps as holdovers from infancy and childhood – they are not fixed or set in stone. Lee Kirkpatrick and Cindy Hazan (1994) tracked down participants from a study that had taken place four years earlier and found that 30% had different attachment styles. In keeping with the central theme of social psychology that we are profoundly shaped by the situations we are in, research suggests that people may continuously revise their own attachment styles in response to new relationship experiences.

Types of love The poet Elizabeth Barrett Browning asked, ‘How do I love thee?’ and then went on to ‘count the ways’ – of which there are many. When university students were asked to list all kinds of love that came to mind, they produced 216 items, including friendship, parental, brotherly, sisterly, romantic, sexual, spiritual, obsessive, possessive and puppy love (Fehr & Russell, 1991). In this section we will discuss the various schemes for classifying different types of love that have been proposed over the years (Berscheid, 2010; Sternberg & Weis, 2006).

Colours of love On the basis of ancient writings, sociologist John Alan Lee (1988) identified three primary love styles: eros (erotic love), ludus (game-playing, uncommitted love) and storge (friendship love). As with primary colours, 376

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Lee theorised, these three styles can be blended together to form new secondary types of love, such as mania (demanding and possessive love), pragma (pragmatic love) and agape (other-oriented, altruistic love). With the advent of the Love Attitudes Scale (Hendrick & Hendrick, 1986), designed to measure the types of love, numerous studies have supported Lee’s typology and its ability to capture many of the elements considered central to the experience of love; much of the research has also validated the use of the measure (Davis & Latty-Mann 1987; Frazier & Esterly 1990; Mallandain & Davies 1994; Morrow, Clark, & Brock, 1995). Research has suggested associations between love styles and relationship satisfaction (Frazier & Esterly, 1990; Lin & Huddleston-Casas, 2005; Gana et al., 2013), attachment styles (Levy & Davis, 1988; Hendrick & Hendrick, 1989; Feeney & Noller, 1992), personality and self-esteem (Heaven, Da Silva, Carey, & Holen, 2004; Woll, 1989; Mallandain & Davies, 1994) relationship experience and sensation seeking (Richardson, Medvin, & Hammock, 1998) and, more recently, flirting styles (Hall, 2013). Research has also suggested gender differences; for example, men tend to score higher than women on ludus, and women score higher on storge, mania and pragma (Hendrick & Hendrick, 1995).

Triangular theory of love Another popular taxonomy is derived from Robert Sternberg’s (1986) triangular theory of love. According to Sternberg, there are eight basic subtypes of love – seven different forms and an eighth combination that results in the absence of love – and all can be derived from the presence or absence of three components. The combination can thus be viewed as the vertices of a triangle, as shown in Figure 9.13. FIGURE 9.13 Sternberg’s triangular theory of love According to Sternberg, various combinations of passion, intimacy and commitment give rise to seven different types of love. (Although it is not shown, the absence of all three components produces an eighth result, nonlove.)

Triangular theory of love

A theory proposing that love has three basic components – intimacy, passion and commitment – that can be combined to produce eight subtypes.

INTIMACY Liking (intimacy alone)

Romantic love (intimacy + passion)

Infatuation (passion alone) PASSION

Consummate love (intimacy + passion + commitment)

Fatuous love (passion + commitment)

Companionate love (intimacy + commitment)

Empty love (commitment alone) COMMITMENT

Source: Sternberg, R., and Barnes, M. L. (eds.), The psychology of love. Yale University Press, 1986. Copyright © 1986 by Yale University Press. Reprinted by permission.

Research provides fairly good support for this tri-component model of love (Sternberg, 1999). In one study, Arthur Aron and Lori Westbay (1996) asked people to rate 68 prototypical features of love and found that all the various features fell into three categories: 1 Passion – gazing at the other, euphoria, butterflies in the stomach 2 Intimacy – feeling free to talk about anything, supportive, understanding 3 Commitment – devotion, putting the other first, long-lasting.

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In a second study, Sternberg (1997) asked people to state what they see as important in different kinds of relationships and found that the results were consistent with the theory. For example, ‘ideal lover’ scored high on all three components, ‘friend’ scored high on intimacy and commitment but low on passion, and ‘sibling’ scored high on commitment but low on intimacy and passion.

Liking and loving In light of theories involving infant attachment styles, colours, triangles and other love classification schemes that have been proposed over the years, one wonders: ‘How many types of love are there, really?’ It is hard to tell; but there are two basic types that are built into all models: 1 Liking – the kind of feeling you would have for a platonic friend 2 Loving – the kind of feeling you would have for a romantic partner. According to Zick Rubin (1973), liking and loving are two distinct reactions to an intimate relationship. There is some question, however, about how sharp the difference is. Kenneth and Karen Dion (1976) questioned casual daters, exclusive daters, engaged couples and married couples. Although casual daters reported more liking than loving, liking and loving did not differ among those in the more committed dating relationships.

Companionate versus passionate love The two-pronged distinction Elaine Hatfield and colleagues make between passionate and companionate love is even sharper (Hatfield, 1988; Hatfield & Rapson, 1993).

Passionate love Passionate love

Romantic love characterised by high arousal, intense attraction and fear of rejection.

Excitation transfer

The process whereby arousal caused by one stimulus is added to arousal from a second stimulus, and the combined arousal is attributed to the second stimulus.

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Passionate love is an emotionally intense, often erotic, heart-thumping state of absorption in another person. From thrilling highs to agonising lows, it is the bittersweet stuff of romance paperbacks, popular music, poems and soap operas. What is passionate love, and where does it come from? According to Ellen Berscheid and Elaine Walster (later Hatfield) (1974), the key to understanding passionate love is to recognise that it is an emotion that can be analysed like any other emotion. Drawing on Schachter’s (1964) two-factor theory of emotion (see Chapter 2), they theorised that passionate love is fuelled by two ingredients: (1) a heightened state of physiological arousal; and (2) the belief that this arousal was triggered by the beloved person. Sometimes, the arousal–love connection is obvious, as when a person feels a surge of sexual desire at the sight of a romantic partner. At other times, however, the symptoms of arousal, such as a pounding heart, sweaty palms and weak knees, can be hard to interpret. When you are in the company of an attractive person, these symptoms may be attributed or ‘misattributed’ to passionate love. Dolf Zillmann (1984) calls the process excitation transfer. According to Zillmann, arousal triggered by one stimulus can be transferred or added to the arousal from a second stimulus. The combined arousal is then perceived as having been caused only by the second stimulus. Donald Dutton and Arthur Aron (1974) first tested this provocative hypothesis in a field study that took place on two bridges above a river in British Columbia. One was a narrow, wobbly suspension bridge (137 metres long and 1.5 metres wide, with a low handrail) that swayed 70 metres above rocky rapids – a nightmare for anyone the least bit afraid of heights. The other bridge was wide, sturdy and only 3 metres from the ground. Whenever an unaccompanied young man walked across one of these bridges, he was met by an attractive young woman who introduced herself as a research assistant, asked him to fill out a brief questionnaire, and gave her phone number in case he wanted more information about the project. As predicted, men who crossed the scary bridge were later more likely to call her than those who crossed the stable bridge. In a study of ‘love at first fright’ that took place in two amusement parks, Cindy Meston and Penny Frohlich (2003) similarly found that men and women who were not with a romantic partner rated a photographed person of the opposite sex as more attractive right after they rode on a roller coaster than they did before they began the ride. So, perhaps terror can fan the flames of romance! Or, maybe not. Maybe it is just a relief to be with someone when we are in distress. To rule out the possibility that relief rather than arousal is what fuels attraction, Gregory White and colleagues (1981) had to create arousal without distress. How? A little exercise can do it. Male participants ran in place for either 2 minutes or 15 seconds and then saw a videotape of a woman they expected to meet. The woman had been made up to look physically attractive or unattractive. After watching the video, participants rated her appearance. The result? Those who exercised for 2 minutes as opposed to only 15 seconds saw the physically attractive woman as even more attractive and the

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unattractive woman as less attractive. This study and others like it showed that arousal, even without distress, intensifies emotional reactions, positive or negative (Allen, Kenrick, Linder, & McCall, 1989). The implication of this research – that our passions are at the mercy of bridges, roller coasters, exercise and anything else that causes the heart to race – is intriguing. It is certainly consistent with the common observation that people are vulnerable to falling in love when their lives are turbulent. But does the effect occur, as theorised, because people misattribute their arousal to a person they have just met? Yes and no. Based on their review of 33 experiments, Craig Foster and colleagues (1998) confirmed that the arousal– attraction effect does exist. They also found, however, that the effect occurs even when people know the actual source of their arousal; in other words, even without misattribution. According to these investigators, just being aroused, even if we know why, facilitates whatever is the most natural response. If the person we meet is good-looking and of the right sex, we become more attracted. If the person is not good-looking or is of the wrong sex, we become less attracted. No thought is required. The response is automatic. It is now clear that passionate love is erotic and highly sexualised. In a book titled Lust: What We Know About Human Sexual Desire, Pamela Regan and Ellen Berscheid (1999) present compelling evidence for the proposition that intense sexual desire and excitement are a vital part of passionate love. In this regard, they note that ‘loving’ is different from ‘being in love’. To illustrate, Berscheid and Meyers (1996) asked university students to make three lists: people they loved, people they were in love with, and people they were sexually attracted to. As it turned out, only 2% of those in the ‘love’ category also appeared in the sex list. Yet among those in the ‘in love’ category, the overlap with sex was 85%. And when Regan and colleagues (1997) asked people to list the characteristics of romantic love, two-thirds cited sexual desire – more than the number who put happiness, loyalty, communication, sharing or commitment on the list. Romantic ideals notwithstanding, many people doubt the staying power of passionate love. Does the fire within a relationship burn hot and bright over time, or is it just a passing infatuation? Comparisons of couples at different stages of their relationships and longitudinal studies that measure changes in the same couples over time have suggested that intense, sexual, passionate love does tend to diminish somewhat over time (Acker & Davis, 1992). Yet this decline is not clearly defined or inevitable. Bianca Acevedo and Arthur Aron (2009) meta-analysed past survey research and asked couples who had been together for varying lengths of time questions about passionate love. They found that although the initial ‘obsessional’ aspect of passionate love clearly diminishes in long-term relationships (‘I sometimes find it difficult to concentrate on work because thoughts of my partner occupy my mind’), there is a ‘romantic’ aspect that often endures (‘I would rather be with my partner than anyone else’). Bianca Acevedo and colleagues (2011) next studied men and women who were married an average of 21 years, and who reported long-term, intense, romantic love for their partner. They had these participants undergo fMRI while viewing facial images of their partner, a highly familiar acquaintance, a close friend and a low-familiar person. The scans revealed activity in regions of the brain that were specific to their partner – namely, in dopamine-rich reward areas and areas that are typically activated by maternal attachment. More research is needed, but these results support the self-report data that for some people, the intense love of their long-term partner may last for long periods of time.

Companionate love In contrast to the intense, emotional, erotic and sometimes obsessional nature of passionate love, companionate love is a secure, trusting and stable partnership, similar to what Rubin called liking. It is a form of affection that binds close friends as well as lovers. Companionate relationships rest on a foundation of mutual trust, caring, respect, friendship and commitment – characteristics that John Harvey and Julie Omarzu (2000) see as necessary for ‘minding the close relationship’. Compared with the passionate form of love, companionate love is less intense, but is in some respects deeper and more enduring. Susan Sprecher and Pamela Regan (1998) administered passionate and companionate love scales to heterosexual couples who had been together for varying amounts of time and found that the passionate love scores of both men and women initially rose over time but then peaked and declined somewhat during marriage. Companionate love scores, however, did not similarly decline. In fact, in couples that stay together, partners are likely to identify with the statement: ‘I love you more today than yesterday’ (Sprecher, 1999). Like the slow but steady tortoise in Aesop’s fable, companionate love may seem to be outpaced by the flashier start of passionate love, but it can still cross the finish line well ahead. Companionate love is characterised by high levels of self-disclosure – a willingness to open up and share intimate facts and feelings. In a way, self-disclosure is to companionate love what arousal is to passionate love. Think for a moment about your most embarrassing moment, your most cherished

Companionate love

A secure, trusting, stable partnership.

Self-disclosure

Revelations about the self that a person makes to others.

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ambitions or your sex life. Would you bare your soul on these private matters to a complete stranger? What about a casual acquaintance, date, friend or lover? Whether or not to self-disclose – what, when, how much and to whom – is a decision that each of us makes based on a consideration of what we stand to gain and lose in a relationship (Omarzu, 2000). The willingness to disclose intimate facts and feelings lies at the heart of our closest and most intimate relationships (Derlega, Metts, Petronio, & Margulis, 1993). Research shows that the more emotionally involved people are in a close relationship, the more they self-disclose to each other. Nancy Collins and Lynn Miller (1994) note three possible reasons for this correlation: (1) we disclose to people we like; (2) we like people who disclose to us; and (3) we like people to whom we have disclosed. Thus, among pairs of university students brought together in a laboratory for brief getting-acquainted conversations, the more they self-disclosed, the better they felt about each other afterwards (Vittengl & Holt, 2000). In a longitudinal study of adult dating couples, partners who reported higher levels of self-disclosure also expressed more satisfaction, commitment and love (Sprecher & Hendrick, 2004). When it comes to sex, partners who selfdisclose their likes and dislikes to each other are also more satisfied sexually than those who are less open (MacNeil & Byers, 2009). Over the years, researchers have observed three patterns of self-disclosure in social relationships. One is that partners reveal more to each other as their relationship grows over time. According to Irving Altman and Dalmas Taylor (1973), self-disclosure is a basic form of social exchange that unfolds as relationships develop. Their social penetration theory holds that relationships progress from superficial exchanges to more intimate ones. At first, people give relatively little of themselves to each other and receive little in return. If the initial encounters prove rewarding, however, the exchanges become both broader (covering more areas of their lives) and deeper (involving more sensitive areas). In short, social interaction grows from a narrow, shallow sliver to a wider, more penetrating wedge. Jih-Hsin Tang and Cheng-Chung Wang (2012) conducted an online survey to explore the topics that 1027 bloggers in Taiwan disclosed on their blogs and in the real world. Their results showed that bloggers self-disclose on a range of topics, including their attitudes, body, money, work, feelings, interests and experiences. With regard to what is self-disclosed to three target audiences (online, best friend and parents), bloggers expressed themselves to their best friends the most, followed by parents and online audiences, both in depth and in width. It appears that social penetration theory – proposed long before there was an internet – provides a good description of self-disclosure, today, in online relationships. A second observation is that patterns of self-disclosure change according to the state of a relationship. During a first encounter and in the budding stages of a new relationship, people tend to reciprocate another’s self-disclosure with their own – at a comparable level of intimacy. If a new acquaintance opens up, it is polite to match that self-disclosure by revealing more of ourselves. Once a relationship is well established, however, strict reciprocity occurs less frequently (Altman, 1973; Derlega, Wilson, M., & Chaikin, 1976). Among couples in distress, two different self-disclosure patterns have been observed. For some, breadth and depth both decrease as partners withdraw and cease to communicate (Baxter, 1987). For others, the breadth of self-disclosure declines but depth increases as the partners express anger at each other (Tolstedt & Stokes, 1984). In this case, the social depenetration process resembles neither the sliver of a superficial affiliation nor the wedge of a close relationship, but rather a long, thin dagger of discontent. A third common observation is that individuals differ in the tendency to share private, intimate thoughts with others. For example, Kathryn Dindia and Mike Allen (1992) conducted a meta-analysis of 205 studies and found, on average, that women are more open than men – and that people in general are more selfdisclosing to women than to men. This being the case, it comes as no surprise that women rate their samesex friendships more highly than men rate theirs. Male friends seem to bond more by taking part in common activities, whereas female friends engage more in a sharing of feelings (Duck & Wright, 1993). As Paul Wright (1982) put it, women tend to interact ‘face-to-face’ but men go ‘side-by-side’.

Courtship Imagine that you walk into a club and head to the bar. All of a sudden someone appears beside you and offers to buy you a drink. Conversation flows easily and you feel very comfortable in their presence. Out of the blue you start to contemplate whether or not you may have found Mr or Mrs Right. No sooner has that thought crossed your mind and you are suddenly struck with self-doubt. Is it possible to sum up a person so quickly and begin making lifelong plans? How much information do you need to establish if they are a ‘keeper’? Is there some kind of formula to figure this stuff out? Regrettably there is no formula that confirms or disconfirms your notions of sheer delight and lust – or fear and apprehension. 380

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Scoping the potential As we have seen in the chapter so far, our ability to quickly size up a potential partner is an intuitive skill that likely developed millions of years ago thanks to our evolutionary forebears whose lives depended upon rapidly sorting friends from enemies, and whose ability to pass on their genetic footprint relied upon strategic decisions regarding the strength and virility of a male partner and the fertility of a female partner. In this day and age, the context in which the strategic decisions we make regarding the suitability of a potential partner may have altered a little from our evolutionary past, but we still regularly make decisions about whether an individual could be an appropriate match within the first few minutes of talking to them. In fact Stephanie Ortigue and colleagues (2010) suggest that falling in love may take as little as a fifth of a second and the reason that this feels so good is that it has the same euphoric feeling as using cocaine. So, let us delve a little deeper into the process of falling in love.

Communicating romantic intent The process that we go through to meet potential partners and communicate romantic intent has fascinated researchers for many years. From the moment that your eyes first meet, to the first date and the sequence of events that follow, falling in love has the somewhat alluring potential to make you feel so alive that you are quite literally spellbound. For some people this happens quickly and the ‘right one’ just happens to be the first one they fall in love with. But for others the process feels as though it takes a lifetime, traversing many a rough and winding road, taking many wrong turns until the least likely path ends with the person – the one person – who can make them feel as though that long tedious journey was simply a very well-grounded first step. So, with that first step in mind, how do you communicate to someone that you might like to get to know them? That is where non-verbal cues come in. The ability to convey romantic interest to others and to judge romantic interest in others is such an important component in the process of finding a mate that it should come as no surprise that research into this area spans fifty years (for an excellent review of that literature, see Moore, 2010). In 1974, in a covert observational study, Irenäus Eibl-Eibesfeldt found that people from quite diverse cultural backgrounds elicited similar behaviours when showing interest in another person. The flash of an eyebrow combined with a smile, moving closer to each other while talking, nodding in agreement, using hand gestures to emphasise points of a conversation, frequent moistening of the lips, and holding the gaze of the other person were all common strategies. Moore (1985) also observed similar non-verbal behaviours such as the eyebrow flash (an exaggerated raising of the eyebrows of both eyes, followed by a rapid lowering), the coy smile (a tilting of the head downward, with partial averting of the eyes and, at the end, covering of the mouth) and the exposed neck (turning the head so that the side of the neck is bared). Moore documented 52 different types of non-verbal behaviours ranging from the subtle to more aggressive and found that women often countered their shy moves with other, more aggressive, overt tactics such as hitching their skirts up to bring more leg into a particular man’s field of vision and parading around the room – walking towards the person of interest with hips swaying, breasts pushed out and head held high.

First contact Now that we know what to look for in a flirtatious encounter, let us move on to what is possibly the most confronting part of the initial stages of romantic communication – the opening contact or what is commonly referred to as the ‘pick-up line’. Given that making contact with potential partners is regarded as one of the most serious dating problems (Klaus, Hersen, & Bellack, 1977) the very thought of that first conversation can make even the most confident of people seem like blubbering klutzes. So, who generally makes the initial contact? Traditionally, it is expected to be the man, but research conducted by Monica Moore (1985) suggests that although men may utter the first words, it is women who start the ball rolling. As mentioned previously, Moore observed women sitting alone in singles bars and recorded 52 kinds of flirting behaviour that resulted in male contact within fifteen seconds of the behaviour. These included smiling, skirt hiking, primping, pouting and hair-flipping. According to Moore, women who signal the most often are also those who are most often approached by men. Further research into this area was conducted by Chris Kleinke, Frederick Meeker and Richard Staneski (1986) who categorised the opening lines that men and women use when meeting a potential date. Their findings not only suggested three types of opening lines – cute/flippant, innocuous (harmless) and direct – but also elaborated some distinct gender differences. Of the opening lines that were used by men, the least preferred were the cute or flippant lines such as ‘I’ve got an offer you can’t refuse’. So, what do women want? Well it seems that they prefer the use of innocuous lines (‘I’ve seen you before. Do you live around here?’).

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Interestingly, when it comes to the lines used by women, men like both cute and direct lines (e.g., ‘I’m sort of shy, but I’d like to get to know you’). A word of warning for the women though – although men prefer cute and direct lines, cute lines often carry underlying sexual connotations. Similarly, the use of direct opening lines may be perceived as seductive or promiscuous (Abbey, 1982). It seems that women face a bit of a quandary when it comes to sending out those cues. What this research suggests is that men prefer a direct and aggressive approach to the initiation of romantic communication, whereas women prefer an approach that is non-threatening and benign. Subsequent research by Cunningham (1989) found support for Kleinke’s three opening lines as well as for gender-related responses to the opening lines. More recent research (Bale, Morrison, & Caryl, 2006; Cooper, 2007) has elicited similar results, indicating that the least effective lines are those that deliver compliments, and those that refer to sex or humour. Cunningham suggested that the reason men use cute/flippant lines more frequently, despite their ineffectiveness, may be because they serve to downplay the seriousness of approaching a woman, thus protecting the man from rejection. Alternatively, Bale and colleagues (2006) suggested that men often seek more temporary relationships than women, so perhaps the cute/flippant opening lines are used to determine whether a woman is socio-sexually unrestricted. Further research in this area was conducted in 2009 by Joel Wade, Lauren Butrie and Kelly Hoffman. Their research was designed to assess whether or not women are likely to approach a man to initiate or signal romantic interest, and to determine which opening lines are the most successful in this pursuit. In the first study, the participants (all women) were asked to supply five opening lines that they would use to indicate to a man that they were interested in dating or spending time together. Ten categories of responses were found: direct (‘Want to get dinner?’), indirectly hinting at a date (‘You should come down to the bar with us’), common interest (‘Do you watch that show? We should watch it together’), supplying phone numbers (‘Can I give you my number?’), giving compliments (‘I like spending time with you’), asking about marital status (‘Are you single?’), determining personal interest (‘Are you from around here?’), humorous approaches (‘Wanna make out?’), familiarity (‘Do you know who I am?’) and subtle approaches (‘Hello. How’s it going?’).

What motivates flirting? Have you ever wondered what it is that drives a person to flirt? What are the motivations that underlie the decision to take that leap? Research tells us that people are generally motivated by one of six different reasons. According to David Henningsen (2004) some people flirt for the fun of it, some want to explore the potential for a relationship, and others flirt to initiate sexual contact. Other people want to reinforce or increase the intimacy in a relationship they already have, boost their self-esteem or get something they want from another person (e.g., flirting with an airline hostess to get extra food or flirting with a waiter to get a free drink). Gender differences in the interpretation of these motivations were also found, which suggest that men are far more likely to interpret flirting behaviours as sexual, whereas women are more likely to identify flirting behaviours as motivated by a desire to advance the relationship to the next stage or to simply have fun (La France, Henningsen, Oates, & Shaw, 2009; Henningsen, 2004). So, is it only dating couples that flirt? Absolutely not. In research conducted by Brandi Frisby (2009) that examined differences in flirting behaviours during dating and once married, spouses reported that although the occurrence of flirting in their marriage had remained consistent (in some cases it had actually increased), their motivations for flirting had changed. During the dating phase of the relationship, couples flirt to initiate sexual contact and to explore the potential of a relationship; whereas once they married, they flirt with their spouse not only to initiate sexual contact but also to increase the intimacy in their relationship, to have fun and to boost their levels of self-esteem. Couples also reported additional reasons for flirting with their spouse, including the maintenance of their relationship and the creation of a private world – a world that other individuals were not privy to. Committed partners who flirted with each other were also generally more satisfied with their relationship and more committed to each other. Further research conducted by Frisby and Booth-Butterfield (2012) confirmed that flirting among married couples is different from their dating counterparts – it is an important form of communication that appears to be part of ongoing marital interactions that reinforce the status of the marriage. Given that people are motivated to flirt for a variety of reasons, you may find yourself asking if people adopt a unique style of flirting that they use when they want to express interest in another person. If this is the case, then it is an interest that you share with Jeffrey Hall and colleagues (2010) who set out to define 382

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a typology of styles that people commonly use when flirting. Using a very large sample recruited from one of the largest online dating sites – eHarmony – the results indicated evidence of five distinct styles: • Traditional flirts tend to be introverted. They behave according to traditional gender roles where the man is the one that makes the first and future moves, while the woman waits patiently for this to happen. A woman actively pursuing a man would definitely be frowned upon, although signalling receptiveness using prolonged eye contact and other non-verbal displays would be considered acceptable. • Physical flirts are far more comfortable expressing their desires in a physical manner and generally this is how they express their interest. They are extraverted, open to experience, agreeable and conscientious, and are very comfortable expressing their sexual interest to a potential partner. • Sincere flirts really want to create an emotional bond with a potential partner, so this is the currency in which they deal. They are very comfortable disclosing personal information and showing personal interest in the lives of others. They have no problem approaching someone they are interested in and they find flirting very flattering. They are more likely to be extraverted, agreeable, conscientious and open to experience. • Playful flirts are out to have a good time; they are not really worried about what others think about them. Their behaviours are playful and flirty, and they generally dismiss the link between flirting and the beginning of a relationship. They are extraverted, have an outgoing nature and a lack of concern for others. • Polite flirts embrace a cautious approach to courtship initiation. They are acutely aware that inappropriate or overtly sexual behaviours can be a turn-off, so they tend to adhere to the rules of courtship; they find non-verbal displays of romantic interest difficult because they do not like to draw attention to themselves. They are conscientious and agreeable by nature. For more on the flirting typology, see Jeffrey Hall’s book The Five Flirting Styles (2013). Research also tells us a little about the context in which flirting takes place. For example, research conducted by Kate Fox (2004) found that flirting was most likely to happen at parties, drinking venues (e.g., pubs, bars and clubs), the workplace, educational settings (e.g., universities and TAFE universities), sporting and recreational venues (e.g., race tracks and football games), at singles events such as speed dating, via online websites and a cluster of places such as supermarkets, public transport, gyms and art galleries. Interestingly, though, Fox’s results suggest that flirting is unlikely to be successful if three key elements are missing: sociability (ease of initiating conversation with another), shared interest (environments where likeminded people gather) and, you guessed it, alcohol. Further research designed to examine the impact that context may have upon flirting interactions was included in the research conducted by Kleinke, Meeker and Staneski (1986) that we discussed earlier. Having established the types of opening lines that are commonly used (cute/flippant, direct and innocuous), they examined whether the use of each of the styles varied according to the environment in which the interaction took place (e.g., general situations, supermarkets, bars, restaurants, laundromats and beaches). Table 9.2 shows the most popular and the least popular opening lines for each of these environments. TABLE 9.2 Best and worst opening lines used by men to meet women, by location Here are the most popular and the least popular opening lines for a range of environments. Have you used any of these while flirting?

Most preferred

Least preferred

General situations

Hi (60%)

Is that really your hair? (89%)

Bars

Do you want to dance? (64%)

[Looking at a woman’s jewellery] Wow, it looks like you just robbed Woolworths. (90%)

Restaurants

I haven’t been here before. What’s good on the menu? (58%)

Do you think I deserve a break today? (72%)

Supermarkets

Can I help you to the car with those bags? (61%)

Do you really eat that junk? (90%)

Laundromats

Want to go have a beer or a cup of coffee while we’re waiting? (57%)

A man shouldn’t have to wash his own clothes. (84%)

Beaches

Want to play Frisbee? (68%)

Did you notice me throwing that football? Good arm, huh? (88%)

Source: Adapted from Kleinke, C., Meeker, F., & Staneski, R. (1986). Preference for opening lines: Comparing ratings by men and women. Sex Roles, 15(11/12), 585–600.

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Further, research conducted by Moore (1985) suggested that not only did women in ‘mate relevant’ environments use a lot more non-verbal cues when compared with women in environments where solicitation was not expected, such as libraries and women’s group meetings, the approaches made by men in response to those displays were also more frequent. More recently, McBain and colleagues (2013) developed a series of behavioural descriptors based upon the five flirting styles developed by Hall and colleagues (2010) to investigate individual differences in the flirting behaviours used in eight different environments – party, bar, work, educational setting, gym, supermarket, speed date and public transport. Their results indicated relationships between the flirting styles and their behavioural descriptors for each environment, and provided evidence of the repertoire of behaviours utilised to communicate romantic interest in a variety of areas. Thus, the context certainly appears to be providing some form of cue from which an individual determines a course of action.

CRITICAL THINKING ACTIVITY Can you think of films or television shows where the types of relationships we have described are portrayed? Based upon what the research has to say, how accurate do you think the portrayal of relationships is in popular media? Further, do you

think that the portrayal of relationships in popular film is a true representation of life or a romantic and unachievable notion? What about the relationships that are commonly portrayed in films aimed at young children?

Marital trajectory Because we are social beings, having close relationships is important to us all – for our happiness and emotional wellbeing and even our physical health and longevity. Unfortunately, few relationships are perfect; couples argue, break up, separate and divorce, so the stability that most people crave in a relationship is quite often a far cry from the reality. How do marriages evolve over time, and why do some last while others dissolve? Ellen Berscheid and Harry Reis (1998) say that this is the most frequently asked and vexing question for social psychologists who study intimate relationships. Is there a typical developmental pattern? No and yes. No, it is clear that all marriages are different and cannot be squeezed into a single mould. But yes, certain patterns do emerge when survey results are combined from large numbers of married couples that have been studied over long periods of time. Lawrence Kurdek (1999) reported on a longitudinal study of married couples in which he measured each spouse’s satisfaction every year for 10 years (of the 522 couples he started with, 93 completed the study). Figure 9.14 shows that there was an overall decline in ratings of marital quality and that the ratings given by husbands and wives were very similar. There are two marked periods of decline. The first occurs during the first year of marriage. Newlyweds tend to idealise each other and to enjoy an initial state of marital bliss (Murray et al., 1996). However, this ‘honeymoon’ is soon followed by a decline in satisfaction (Bradbury, 1998). After some stabilisation, a second decline is observed at about the eighth year of marriage – a finding that is consistent with the popular belief in a ‘seven-year itch’ (Kovacs, 1983). This marital trajectory is interesting, but it represents a crude average of different types of marriages. There is no single mould, however, and one size does not fit all relationships. Realising this limitation, researchers are actively seeking to plot more precise trend lines for specific marital situations. Thus far, these studies have shown that in heterosexual couples with a first child, the transition to parenthood hastens the sense of decline in both partners (Lawrence et al., 2008); that cohabiting gay and lesbian couples do not self-report the lowered satisfaction often seen in heterosexual couples (Kurdek, 2008); and that, despite the initial dip, marital satisfaction increases again in middle age for parents whose children grow up, leave home and ‘empty the nest’ (Gorchoff, John, & Helson, 2008). Do specific factors predict future outcomes? To address this question, Benjamin Karney and Thomas Bradbury (1995) reviewed 115 longitudinal studies of more than 45 000 married couples and found only that certain positively valued variables (education, employment, constructive behaviours and similarity in attitudes) are somewhat predictive of positive outcomes. They did find, however, that the steeper the initial decline in satisfaction, the more likely couples are to break up later. This decline is, in part, related to the stress of having and raising children, a stress that is common among newly married couples. Boredom is also predictive of a loss in marital satisfaction. In a longitudinal study of 123 married couples, husbands and wives who felt like they were in a rut at one point in time were significantly less satisfied nine years later (Tsapelas, Aron, & Orbuch, 2009).

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FIGURE 9.14 Marital satisfaction over time

Ratings of marital quality

In a longitudinal study that spanned 10 years, married couples rated the quality of their marriages. On average, these ratings were high, but they declined among both husbands and wives. As you can see, there were two steep drops, occurring during the first and eighth years of marriage.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Years of marriage Wife

Husband

Source: Kurdeck, L. A., The nature and predictors of the trajectory of change in marital quality for husbands and wives over the first 10 years of marriage, Developmental Psychology, 35 (pp. 1283–1296). Copyright © 1999 by the American Psychological Association. Reprinted by permission.

Is there anything a couple can do to avoid a rut and keep the honeymoon alive? Perhaps there is. Arthur Aron and colleagues (2000) theorised that after the exhilaration of a new relationship wears off, partners can combat boredom by engaging together in new and arousing activities. By means of questionnaires and a door-to-door survey, these researchers found that the more new experiences spouses said they had together, the more satisfied they were with their marriages. To test this hypothesis in a controlled experiment, they brought randomly selected couples into the laboratory, spread gymnasium mats across the floor, tied the partners together at a wrist and ankle, and had them crawl on their hands and knees, over a barrier, from one end of the room to the other – all while carrying a pillow between their bodies. Other couples were given the more mundane task of rolling a ball across the mat, one partner at a time. A third group received no assignment. Afterwards, all participants were asked about their relationships. As predicted, the couples that had struggled and laughed their way through the novel and arousing activity reported more satisfaction with the quality of their relationships than did those in the mundane and no-task groups. It is possible that the benefit of shared participation in this study was short-lived. But maybe, just maybe, a steady and changing diet of exciting new experiences can help to keep the flames of love burning.

After the honeymoon period, there is an overall decline in levels of marital satisfaction.

TRUE

Communication and conflict Disagreements about sex, children, money, in-laws and other matters can stir up conflict in close relationships. Of particular relevance during turbulent economic times, research shows that financial pressures can put enormous amounts of strain on marital relations (Conger, Reuter, & Elder, 1999). Whatever the cause, all couples experience some degree of friction. The issue is not whether it occurs but how we respond to it. One source of conflict is the difficulty some people have talking about their disagreements. When relationships break up, communication problems are among the most common causes cited by heterosexual and gay and lesbian couples alike (Kurdek, 1991b; Sprecher, 1994). But what constitutes ‘bad communication’? Comparisons between happy and distressed couples have revealed a number of communication patterns that often occur in troubled relationships (Fincham, 2003). One common pattern is called negative affect reciprocity – a tit-for-tat exchange of expressions of negative feelings. Generally speaking, expressions of negative affect within a couple trigger more in-kind

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CRITICAL THINKING ACTIVITY How is the dissolution of relationships addressed in children’s films, fairy tales and television shows?

responses than do expressions of positive affect. But negative affect reciprocity, especially in non-verbal behaviour, is greater in couples that are unhappy, distressed and locked into a duel. For couples in distress, smiles pass by unnoticed, but every glare and every disgusted look provokes a sharp, reflex-like response. The result, as observed in unhappy couples around the world, is an inability to break the vicious cycle and terminate unpleasant interactions (Gottman, 1998).

Gendered differences Men and women react differently to conflict. Most women report more intense emotions and are more expressive than most men (Grossman & Wood, 1993). She tells him to ‘warm up’; he urges her to ‘calm down’. Thus, many unhappy marriages are also characterised by a demand–withdraw interaction pattern, in which the wife demands that the couple discuss the relationship problems, only to become frustrated when her husband withdraws from such discussions (Christensen & Heavey, 1993). This pattern is not unique to married couples. When dating partners were asked about how they typically deal with problems, the same demand–withdraw pattern was found (Vogel, Wester, & Heesacker, 1999). According to John Gottman (1994), there is nothing wrong with either approach to dealing with conflict. The problem lies in the discrepancy: that healthy relationships are most likely when both partners have similar styles of dealing with conflict.

Reducing the negative effects of conflict Whatever one’s style, there are two basic approaches to reducing the negative effects of conflict. The first is so obvious that it is often overlooked: increase rewarding behaviour in other aspects of the relationship. According to Gottman and Levenson (1992), marital stability rests on a ‘fairly high balance of positive to negative behaviours’ (p. 230). If there is conflict over one issue, partners can and should search for other ways to reward each other. As the balance of positives to negatives improves, so should overall levels of satisfaction, which can reduce conflict (Huston & Vangelisti, 1991). A second approach is to try to understand the other’s point of view. Being sensitive to what the partner thinks and how he or she feels enhances the quality of the relationship (Honeycutt, Woods, & Fontenot, 1993; Long & Andrews, 1990). What motivates individuals in the heat of battle to put in the effort to understand? For starters, it helps if they agree that there is a communication problem. The attributions that partners make for each other’s behaviours and the willingness to forgive are correlated with the quality of their relationship (Bradbury & Fincham, 1992; Fincham, Beach, & Davila, 2007; Harvey & Manusov, 2001). As you might expect, happy couples make relationship-enhancing attributions: they see the partner’s undesirable behaviours as caused by factors that are situational (‘They’re having a bad day’), temporary (‘It’ll pass’), and limited in scope (‘That’s just a sore spot’). Yet they perceive desirable behaviours as caused by factors that are inherent in the partner, which are permanent and generalisable to other aspects of the relationship. By contrast, unhappy couples flip the attributional coin on its tail by making the opposite distress-maintaining attributions. Thus, whereas happy couples minimise the bad and maximise the good, distressed couples do not budge at all. Considering these differing attributional patterns, it would seem that over time happy couples would get happier and miserable couples more miserable. Do they? Yes. By tracking married couples longitudinally, researchers have found that husbands and wives who made distress-maintaining attributions early in marriage reported less satisfaction at a later point in time (Fincham, Harold, & Gano-Phillips, 2000; Karney & Bradbury, 2000). Some interesting research conducted by Nikola Overall, our researcher in the spotlight for this chapter, has shed further light on the success of communication strategies used by relationship partners. According to Overall, one way that people attempt to improve their intimate relationships is to try to make changes to their partner (Overall, Fletcher, & Simpson, 2006). The key to successful regulation attempts lies with the types of communication strategies people engage in; each of which varies in terms of costs (e.g., reducing relationship satisfaction) and benefits (e.g., successfully producing desired change). For example, the use of direct negative strategies, such as nagging or demanding approaches, may be poorly received by the targeted partner and therefore less successful than indirect positive strategies, such as the use of positive affect to soften the attempt. Alternatively, although positive, subtle strategies may keep relationships buoyant for a while, they are unlikely to lead to a change in behaviour over time. Further research conducted by Overall and colleagues (2009) investigated the communication strategies adopted by relationship partners as they discussed attributes of each other that they wanted to change; they also sought to assess the long-term success in relation to producing desired change. Their findings indicated that reliance on explicit, unambiguous attempts to urge partners to change was associated with 386

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both costs and benefits. The use of unsubtle and autocratic communications to encourage partners to change was associated with the perception of failure in the short term but greater success in the long term. By contrast, those who relied upon subtle regulation attempts to accomplish change were likely to maintain harmony and satisfaction in the short term but ultimately ran the risk of failing to produce any real change. According to Overall, if the partner is unable to change and the problem is perceived to worsen over time, the couple may face disappointment and levels of affection are likely to wane. It appears that regulation strategies impact relationship outcomes based on the extent to which the strategies chosen are successful at producing desired change.

Breaking up When an intimate relationship ends, as in divorce, the effect can be traumatic (Fine & Harvey, 2006), and so stressful that people who get divorced are later 23% more likely to die early from all causes of death (Sbarra, Law, & Portley, 2011). As part of a longitudinal study of adults in Germany, Richard Lucas (2005) zeroed in on 817 men and women who at some point were divorced. Every year for 18 years the participants were interviewed and asked to rate how satisfied they were with life on a scale of 0 to 10. On average, the divorcees were more than a half point less satisfied than their married counterparts. But did time heal the wound? Figure 9.15 shows three interesting patterns: 1 Participants had become less and less satisfied even before divorce. 2 Satisfaction levels rebounded somewhat immediately after divorce. 3 Satisfaction levels never returned to original baseline levels. In short, people may adapt but often they do not fully recover from the experience. People’s ability to cope with divorce depends on the nature of the loss. One vital factor is the closeness of a relationship, or the extent to which the line between self and other becomes so blurred that ‘mine’ and ‘yours’ are one and the same. Another important factor in this regard is interdependence – the social glue that binds us together. Research shows that the more interdependent couples are (as measured by the amount of time they spend together, the activities they share and the influence each partner has over the other) and the more invested they are in the relationship, the longer it will likely last (Berscheid, Snyder, M., & Omoto, 1989; Rusbult & Buunk, 1993) and the more devastated they will become when it ends (Fine & Sacher, 1997; Simpson, 1987). In trying to explain how people regulate the risks of forming close romantic relationships, Sandra Murray and colleagues (2006) FIGURE 9.15 Changes in life satisfaction before and note that an ironic theme runs through much of the research: after divorce ‘The relationships that have the most potential to satisfy adult In this study, 817 men and women who were divorced at some point rated how satisfied they were with life on a scale of 0 to 10 every year for 18 years. Overall, divorcees were less satisfied than their married counterparts – a common result. On the question of whether time heals the wound, you can see that satisfaction levels dipped before divorce and rebounded afterward, but did not return to original levels. It appears that people adapt but do not fully recover from this experience. 0.00

Life satisfaction ratings

needs for interpersonal connection are the very relationships that activate the most anxiety about rejection’ (p. 661). The factors that contribute to the endurance of a relationship (closeness and interdependence) turn out to be the same factors that intensify the fear of rejection and make coping more difficult after a relationship ends. So, how do you balance making the psychological investment necessary for a lasting relationship against holding back enough for self-protection? In many Western countries various demographic markers indicate how problematic traditional forms of commitment have become, including a high divorce rate, more single-parent families, more unmarried couples living together, and more never-married individuals. Figures from the Australian Institute of Family Studies (2013) have shown some interesting trends in divorce rates. The number of divorces in Australia from 2007 to 2011 remained relatively constant, with the rate per 1000 people hovering around 2.2–2.3. In 2016 it had dropped to 1.9, the lowest rate since 1976 (ABS, 2017). By comparison, in 2011 the New Zealand rate was 9.8 per 1000 people, dropping under 10% for the first time since 1980 when the Family Proceedings Act 1990 was passed, which allowed the dissolution of marriage on the grounds of irreconcilable difference (Stats NZ, 2013). Further falls were recorded in 2016 (8.7) and 2017 (8.4) (Stats NZ, 2017). The age

–0.50

Divorce –1.00 –8

–6

–4

–2

0

2

4

6

Years before and after divorce Source: Lucas, R. E. (2005). Time does not heal all wounds: A longitudinal study of reaction and adaptation to divorce. Psychological Science, 16, 945–950.

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at which people are divorcing in Australia has risen since the 1980s, with the median age for men rising from 35 to 45.5 years and for women from 33 to 42.6 years. Men and women are more likely to get divorced before they turn 30. and the median duration of marriage is 12 years (ABS, 2018). Similarly, in New Zealand, the median age at divorce in 2017 was 47.0 years for men and 44.5 for women (Stats NZ, 2013).

CULTURAL DIVERSITY GLOBAL DIVORCE RATES ON THE RISE Globally, it seems that fewer people are getting married and more and more people are getting divorced. In fact, an overview of statistics relative to divorce across the globe compiled by Australian law firm Unified Lawyers (2017) suggests that the divorce rate may have increased 250% since 1960

(Figure 9.16). On a country-by-country basis the top 10 highest divorce rates show Luxembourg in first place with Australia and New Zealand occupying eighth and ninth positions respectively. Although the reasons cited for divorce vary, the number one reason reflects the fact that people simply fall out of love with each other.

FIGURE 9.16 Divorce around the world It seems that fewer people across the globe are choosing to wed, while the list of divorcees continues to grow. Fewer marriages, more divorce 1960

2017

8.01

4.84

2.12 1.00

1960

1970

1980

Marriages per 1K people

1990

2000

2010

2017

Divorces per 1K people

Source: Unified Lawyers (2017, 29 September). Divorce rate by country: The world’s 10 most and least divorced nations. Adapted from https://www.unifiedlawyers.com.au, Sydney Family Lawyers

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Sexuality More than a hundred years ago, Sigmund Freud shocked the scientific community by proposing psychoanalytic theory, which placed great emphasis on sex as a driving force in human behaviour. At the time, Freud’s closest associates rejected this focus on sexual motivation. But was he wrong? Sexual images and themes pop up, quite literally, in our dreams, in the jokes we tell, in the television shows we watch, in the novels we read, in the music we hear, and in the sex scandals that swirl around public figures in the news. It is no wonder that advertisers use sex to sell everything from jeans to perfume, soft drinks and cars. Sex, being a relatively private aspect of human relations, is difficult to study systematically. During the 1940s, biologist Alfred Kinsey and colleagues (1948, 1953) conducted the first large-scale survey of sexual practices in the US. Based on confidential interviews of more than 17 0 00 men and women, these researchers sought for the first time to describe what nobody would openly talk about – sexual activity. Many of his results were shocking – reported sexual activity was more frequent and more varied than anyone had expected. Kinsey’s books were instant bestsellers. Certain aspects of his methodology were flawed, however. For example, participants were mostly young, white, urban and middle class – hardly a representative sample. He also asked leading questions to enable respondents to report on sexual activities, or to make up stories (Jones, 1997). Kinsey died in 1954, but his Institute for Sex Research in America remains to this day a major centre for the study of human sexuality. Since Kinsey’s groundbreaking study, many sex surveys have been conducted, and they form part of the research history that has been chronicled, both seriously and with humour, in books with such titles as Kiss and Tell: Surveying Sex in the Twentieth Century (Ericksen & Steffen, 1999) and Bonk: The Curious Coupling of Science and Sex (Roach, 2008). The limits of self-reports, regardless of whether they are taken in face-to-face interviews, telephone surveys or on the internet, is that we can never know for sure how accurate the results are. Part of the problem is that respondents may not be honest in their disclosures. Another limiting factor is that people differ in their interpretations of survey questions. Researchers have used an array of methods to measure sexual attitudes and behaviour. Studies of everyday interactions reveal that men view the world in more sexualised terms than women do. In 1982, Antonia Abbey arranged for pairs of male and female university students to talk for 5 minutes while other students observed the sessions. When she later questioned the actors and observers, Abbey found that the males were more sexually attracted to the females than vice versa. The males also rated the female actors as being more seductive and more flirtatious than the women had rated themselves as being. Among men more than women, eye contact, a compliment, a friendly remark, a brush against the arm and an innocent smile are often interpreted as sexual come-ons (Kowalski, 1993). Despite all that has changed in recent years, these gender differences in perceptions of sexual interest still exist (Levesque, Nave, & Lowe, 2006), as demonstrated by a speed-dating study which showed that men over-perceive sexual interest whereas women tend to under-perceive sexual interest (Perilloux, Easton, & Buss, 2012). Also, in a series of online questionnaire studies, female participants were asked how likely they would be to have sex with a man if they had engaged in each of 15 dating behaviours – such as holding his hand, complimenting his appearance, cooking dinner, staring deeply into his eyes, kissing him, and saying ‘I love you’. Male participants were asked to estimate the sexual intention of women who engaged in those same behaviours. As in the past, men saw more sexual intent in various female behaviours than the women reported about themselves. Interestingly, other women perceived these behaviours in sexual terms – agreeing more with the male participants than the female participants (Perilloux & Kurzban, 2015).

Men are more likely than women to interpret friendly gestures by the opposite sex in sexual terms.

TRUE

Sexual orientation: same-sex relationships At a time when policymakers, judges, religious leaders, scholars and laypeople openly debate the topic of gay marriage, no discussion of human sexuality is complete without a consideration of differences in sexual orientation – defined as one’s sexual preference for members of the same sex (gay or lesbian, or homosexual), the opposite sex (heterosexuality) or both sexes (bisexuality). How common is it for someone to be gay or lesbian, and where does this orientation come from? Throughout history and in all cultures, a vast majority of people have been heterosexual in their orientation. But how vast a majority is a subject of some debate. Together, large-scale surveys in the US, Europe, Asia and the Pacific suggest that the exclusively gay and lesbian population in the world is 3% or 4% among men and about half that number among women (Diamond, 1993). In Australia, research conducted by Anthony Smith and colleagues (2003), suggests that of the 20 0 00 adults surveyed, approximately 1.2% identified as gay or lesbian; 1.6% of men identified as gay, 0.8% of women identified as lesbian, and 1.4% of women and 0.9% of men identified as bisexual. According to the 2016 Australian Census, there were around

Sexual orientation

A person’s preference for members of the same sex (gay or lesbian), opposite sex (heterosexuality) or both sexes (bisexuality).

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48 000 same-sex couples in Australia which equates to 0.9% of all couples (23 700 male same-sex couples and 23 000 female same-sex couples), in Australia at that time (Qu, Knight, & Higgins, 2016). In 2016, about 146 800 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people were living with a partner and, of these, 1.2% (about 1700 people) were living with a partner of the same sex. The number of same-sex couples in Australia has risen significantly in recent years, with an 81% increase since 2006. (ABS, 2016). Although debate in Australia in relation to the legalisation of same-sex marriage dominated the media throughout 2017, protests date back much further. One case worth noting in 2015 was the elders from the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander community in Australia who presented the Uluru Bark Petition, backed by more than 46 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander groups and clans urging members of federal parliament to oppose same-sex marriage (Uluru Bark Petition, 2017). More than 12 million Australians took part in the same-sex marriage postal survey which was conducted in 2017 – a resounding 61.6% agreed that the law should be changed in acceptance of the right of same-sex couples to marry. On 9 December 2017, same-sex marriage officially became legal in Australia – sex or gender could no longer affect the right to marry under Australian law. Within a month of same-sex marriage becoming legal more than 370 had been registered across Australia (SBS News, 2018). The 2013 New Zealand Census shows that in New Zealand there were 8328 same-sex couples – 3672 male couples and 4656 female couples (Stats NZ, 2013). The Civil Unions Act 2004, which introduced a new form of legal relationship, came into force on 26 April 2005. The Act permitted two people aged 18 years and over, whether of opposite or the same sex, to enter into a civil union. As a result, in 2011 there were a total of 2152 civil unions registered to New Zealand residents, of which 1685 (78%) were same-sex civil unions. In the same period, a further 439 civil unions were registered in New Zealand to overseas residents, 87% of which were same-sex couples. In August 2013 gay marriage was legalised in New Zealand – 2016 records indicate of the 20 235 marriages and civil unions which were registered to New Zealand residents, 483 were same-sex marriages or civil unions (Stats NZ, 2017).

CULTURAL DIVERSITY SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AROUND THE WORLD A growing number of governments around the world are either considering or fully recognising the right of same-sex couples to marry. As you can see from the map of the world shown in Figure 9.17, there are now 27 countries who have legalised

same-sex marriages – the most recent of which was Australia. The first country to legalise was the Netherlands in 2000 after a landmark bill was passed overwhelmingly, giving same-sex couples the right to marry, divorce and adopt children (Masci & Desilver, 2017).

FIGURE 9.17 Same-sex marriage around the world A growing number of countries are legalising marriage of same-sex couples. The Netherlands 2000

2001

Spain South Canada Africa

Belgium 2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

Argentina Iceland Portugal

Norway 2007

2008

2009 Sweden

2010

Luxembourg Scotland

Denmark 2011

2012

2013

2014

Brazil Uruguay England & Wales New Zealand France

Colombia 2015

2016

Greenland Ireland United States Finland

2017 Australia Malta Germany

Source: Pew Research Center. (2017, 8 August). Gay Marriage Around the World. Retrieved from http://www.pewforum.org/2017/08/08/gay-marriage-around-the-world-2013/

To explain the roots of gay or lesbian orientation, various theories have been proposed. The Greek philosopher Aristotle believed that it was inborn but strengthened by habit; post-Freud psychoanalysts argue that it stems from family dynamics, specifically a child’s over-attachment to a parent of the same or opposite sex; and social learning theorists point to rewarding sexual experiences with same-sex peers in childhood. Yet there is little hard evidence to support these claims. In a particularly comprehensive study, Alan Bell and colleagues (1981) interviewed 1500 gay or lesbian and heterosexual adults about their lives.

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There were no differences in past family backgrounds, absence of a male or female parent, relationship with parents, sexual abuse, age of onset of puberty, or high-school dating patterns. Except for the fact that gay and lesbian adults described themselves as less conforming as children, the two groups could not be distinguished by past experiences. Both groups felt strongly that their sexual orientation was set long before it was ‘official’. Increasingly, there is scientific evidence of a biological disposition. In a highly publicised study, neurobiologist Simon LeVay (1991) autopsied the brains of 19 gay men who had died of AIDS, 16 heterosexual men (some of whom had died of AIDS) and six heterosexual women. LeVay examined a tiny nucleus in the hypothalamus that is involved in regulating sexual behaviour and is known to be larger in heterosexual men than in women. The specimens were numerically coded, so LeVay did not know whether a particular donor he was examining was male or female, straight or gay. The result? In the brains of the gay males he studied, the nucleus was half the size as in male heterosexual brains and comparable in size to those found in female heterosexual brains. This research is described in LeVay’s (1993) book The Sexual Brain. It is important to recognise that this study revealed only a correlation between sexual orientation and the brain, and cannot be used to draw conclusions about cause and effect. More convincing support for the biological roots of sexual orientation comes from twin studies suggesting that there is a genetic predisposition. Michael Bailey and Richard Pillard (1991) surveyed 167 gay men and their twins and adopted brothers. Overall, 52% of the identical twins were gay, compared with only 22% of fraternal twins and 11% of adoptive brothers. Two years later, Bailey and colleagues (1993) conducted a companion study of lesbians with similar results. The origins of sexual orientation are complex for two reasons. First, it is not clear that sexual orientation for men and women is similarly rooted. In Australia, Bailey and colleagues (2000) had hundreds of pairs of twins rate their own sexuality on a seven-point scale that ranged from ‘exclusively heterosexual’ to ‘exclusively homosexual’. Overall, 92% of both men and women saw themselves as exclusively heterosexual. Among the others, however, more women than men said that they had bisexual tendencies and more men than women said they were exclusively homosexual. In another study, a longitudinal investigation of 18- to 25-year-old women, Lisa Diamond (2003) found that more than a quarter of those who had initially identified themselves as lesbian or bisexual changed their orientation over the next 5 years – far more change than is ever reported among men. Experiments in laboratory settings reinforce the point. In one study, Meredith Chivers and colleagues (2004) recruited men and women who had identified themselves as heterosexual, gay or lesbian in their orientation. In a private, dimly lit room, these participants watched a series of brief sex clips – some involving male couples, others involving female couples. While watching, the participants rated their subjective feelings of sexual attraction on a scale. At the same time, genital arousal was measured using devices that recorded penile erection (for males) and vaginal pulse (for females). Results showed that the women were genitally aroused by both male and female sex clips, regardless of whether they identified themselves as straight or lesbian in their orientation. Yet males exhibited more genital arousal in response to either men or women, depending on their sexual orientation. In fact, although self-identified bisexual men reported an attraction to both sexes, most were genitally aroused by either men or by women – but not both (Rieger, Chivers, & Bailey, 2005). Although one study has since identified a group of men who are bisexual in their genital arousal (Rosenthal, Sylva, Safron & Bailey, 2012), a number of other findings also compel the conclusion that women are sexually more flexible than men, having more erotic plasticity. Simply put, women are more open and more likely to change sexual preferences over the course of a lifetime (Baumeister, 2000; Diamond, 2007; Lippa, 2006; Peplau, 2003). A second complicating factor is that although there is strong evidence for a biological disposition, this does not necessarily mean that there is a ‘gay gene’ (Hamer, Rice, Risch, & Ebers, 1999). Rather, Daryl Bem (1996, 2000) sees the development of sexual orientation as a psychobiological process. According to Bem, genes influence a person’s temperament at birth, leading some infants and young children to be naturally more active, energetic and aggressive than others. These differences in temperament draw some children to male playmates and ‘masculine’ activities and others to female playmates and ‘feminine’ activities. Bem refers to children who prefer same-sex playmates as gender conformists and to those who prefer oppositesex playmates as gender non-conformists (‘sissies’ and ‘tomboys’). Activity preferences in childhood may be biologically rooted, but what happens next is the psychological part. According to Bem, gender-conforming children come to see members of the opposite sex as different, unfamiliar, arousing and even exotic. Gender-nonconforming children, in contrast, come to see same-sex peers as different, unfamiliar, arousing and exotic. Later, at puberty, as children become physically and Copyright 2020 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. 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sexually mature, they find that they are attracted to members of the same or opposite sex – depending on which is the more exotic. Bem describes his proposed chain of events as the exotic becomes erotic theory of sexual orientation. At present, there is only vague support for this theory. It is true that genetic make-up can influence temperament and predispose a child to favour certain kinds of activities over others (Kagan, 1994). It is also true that gay men are likely to have been more feminine as children and lesbians to have been more masculine – differences seen not only in people’s self-reported accounts from childhood (Bailey & Zucker, 1995) but also in their behaviour, as memorialised in home videos (Rieger, Linsenmeier, Gygax, & Bailey, 2008). It may even be true that people are genetically hard-wired to engage in gender-nonconforming behaviour as children (Bailey et al., 2000). But do peer preferences in childhood alter adult sexual orientation as Bem suggests, because the exotic becomes erotic? Or is there a ‘homosexuality gene’ that fosters gender nonconformity in childhood as well as homosexuality in adolescence and adulthood? And can a single theory explain homosexuality in both men and women or are separate theories needed, as some have suggested (Peplau, Garnets, Spalding, Conley, & Veniegas, 1998)? At present, more research is needed to answer these questions and tease apart the biological and psychological influences. Either way, one point looms large – people, especially men, do not seem to wilfully choose their sexual orientation, nor can they easily change it. Is there any reason to believe that the attraction process and the formation of intimate relationships are any different for same-sex couples? Not really. Recent research shows that gay and lesbian individuals meet people in the same ways as straight individuals (i.e., by seeking out others who are attractive and similar in their attitudes); that their satisfaction and commitment levels are affected by social exchange and equity concerns just as they are in heterosexual relationships; and that they report levels of liking and loving in their intimate relationships that are comparable to those in heterosexual couples. Same-sex couples do differ from straight couples in two ways: they are more likely to retain friendships with former sex partners after breaking up, and they tend to divide chores more equally within a household (Kurdek, 2005; Peplau & Fingerhut, 2007).

Culture, attraction and close relationships In looking at attraction, desire, relationships and love, you may wonder if people all over the world are similar or different. To what extent are these processes universal or different from one culture to another? Many social psychologists have raised these kinds of questions (Hatfield, Rapson, & Martel, 2007). In his original cross-cultural study of mate selection, for example, Buss (1989) found that physical attractiveness is more important to men all over the world and that financial resources are more important to women – gender differences that appeared to be universal. Yet even Buss was struck by the powerful impact that culture had on mate preferences. In China, India, Indonesia, Iran, Taiwan and the Palestinian territories of Israel, for example, people valued chastity in a mate. Yet in Finland, France, Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands and West Germany, chastity was either unimportant or negatively valued. When it comes to close relationships, research has shown that passionate love is a widespread and universal emotion. In surveys conducted throughout the world, William Jankowiak and Edward Fischer (1992) detected indications of passionate love in 147 out of 166 cultures as varied as Indonesia, China, Turkey, Nigeria, Trinidad, Morocco, Australia and Micronesia. Drawing on this universality, some researchers have begun to explore the underlying neuroscience. For example, anthropologist Helen Fisher (2004) believes that romantic love is hard-wired in the neurochemistry of the brain. In particular, Fisher argues that the neurotransmitter dopamine, which drives animals to seek rewards such as food and sex, is essential to the pleasure that is felt when these drives are satisfied. Hence, she argues, dopamine levels are associated with both the highs of romantic passion and the lows of rejection. Citing evidence from studies of humans and other animals, she also points to neurochemical parallels between romantic love and substance addiction. Although most people in the world agree that sexual desire is what injects the passion into passionate love, not everyone sees it as necessary for marriage. Think about this question: ‘If a man or woman had all other qualities you desired, would you marry this person if you were not in love?’ When American students were surveyed in 1967, 35% of men and 76% of women said ‘Yes’. Twenty years later, only 14% of men and 20% of women said they would marry someone with whom they were not in love (Simpson, Campbell, & Berscheid, 1986). The shift among women may reflect the pragmatic point that marrying for love is an economic luxury that few women of the past could afford. As seen in the current popularity of prenuptial agreements, pragmatic considerations continue to influence marriage practices, even today.

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The willingness to marry without love is also highly subject to cultural variation. In light of the different values that pervade individualist and collectivist cultures, the differences are not surprising. In many cultures, marriage is seen as a transaction between families that is influenced by social, economic and religious considerations. Indeed, arranged marriages are still common in India, China, many Muslim countries and sub-Saharan Africa. So, when Robert Levine and colleagues (1995) asked university students from 11 countries about marrying without love, they found that the percentage who said they would do so ranged from 4% in the US, 5% in Australia and 8% in England to 49% in India and 51% in Pakistan. In cultures in which love is not a sufficient basis for marriage, other factors play a role. In India, a historically entrenched caste system divides its citizens and holds sway over love and marriage (Singh, 2009). Indeed, even though the government legalised inter-caste marriage more than 50 years ago, and now offers incentives for inter-caste couples to marry, an invisible separation remains between the upper and lower castes that lasts from birth to death, and ‘honour killings’ of couples who dare to cross these traditional lines have been reported (Wax, 2008). However, research conducted in an Indian village by Keera Allendorf in 2013 found that a hybrid of the traditional arranged marriage and a marriage based on love is becoming regarded as the ideal, as people are increasingly influenced by modern ideations, educational expansion, technological change, and foreign influence. Early studies conducted in China (between 2002–2006), where a cultural premium is placed on devotion, respect and obedience of children to parents and other family elders, showed the Western ‘fairytale ideals’ of love and romance were not prominent (Higgins, Zheng, Liu, & Sun, 2002; Jackson, Chen, Guo, & Gao, 2006). But a small interview-based study conducted by Yingchun Ji in 2015 suggests that the concept of the fairytale romance has permeated modern Chinese society. Respondents in Ji’s study said that although they felt parental pressure to get married, they remained invested in the romantic notion of finding ‘Mr Right’. They also mentioned the problems this caused for their parents who were constantly asked about their daughters’ marital status by family members, neighbours, co-workers and acquaintances. Research conducted in China and the US, showed that young adults from China were more likely to be influenced in their mate selection decisions by parents and close friends; for example, they would try to persuade their parents to accept a dating partner but stop dating that partner if their parents did not approve (Zhang & Kline, 2009). In a more recent study, researchers asked participants from China and the US what their minimum criteria were for choosing a spouse. Chinese participants set higher minimum requirements for reputational characteristics such as ‘high social status’, ‘powerful’, ‘wealthy’, ‘high earning capacity’, and ‘good family background’, while Americans rated personal attributes such as ‘honest and trust-worthy’, ‘has a sense of humour’, ‘intelligent’, ‘exciting’, and ‘highly educated’ as more important (Chen et al., 2015). The influence of culture on love is interesting. On the one hand, it could be argued that the rugged individualism found in many Western cultures would inhibit the tendency to become intimate and interdependent with others. On the other hand, individualism leads people to give priority in making marital decisions to their own feelings rather than to family concerns, social obligations, religious constraints, income, and the like (Dion & Dion, 1996; Toro-Morn & Sprecher, 2003).

RESEARCH SPOTLIGHT

Source: Courtesy of Dr Nickola Overall.

DR NICKOLA OVERALL, UNIVERSITY OF AUCKLAND What are the topic areas of your research? The aim of my research is to determine how people can best maintain healthy relationships. To do this, I investigate the factors associated with resilience versus dissatisfaction within important relationship contexts, such as when couples are trying to resolve relationship problems or support each other. The results of this research are not always intuitive. For example, hostile communication strategies exacerbate problems in the short term but can produce improvement over time and convey

investment to the partner. Similarly, individuals high in attachment anxiety manage conflict by inducing guilt in their partners. The resulting partner guilt undermines the partner’s satisfaction, but it helps highly anxious individuals feel more secure and satisfied in their relationships (Overall, 2018; Overall, Girme, Lemay, & Hammond, 2014; Overall & McNulty, 2017). Which of your research findings have you found most intriguing? A research program I am particularly excited about is examining the ways in which partners behave that protects relationships from the damage typically associated with attachment insecurity. For example, one of our studies assessed whether partners can behave in ways that counteract the defensive reactions usually displayed by highly avoidant people during relationship conflicts. Due to histories of rejection, highly

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avoidant individuals are not comfortable being dependent, so they try to maintain distance and autonomy in relationships. We video-recorded 180 couples discussing important areas of conflict in their relationship, and had a team of observers independently code couples’ communication behaviour. Highly avoidant individuals were angrier, disengaged and withdrawn, but, these destructive reactions were ameliorated when partners engaged ‘softening’ communications, which involved being sensitive to the autonomy needs and defences of highly avoidant individuals. These results show that attachment insecurity does not spell doom for relationships. Instead, partners can behave in ways that help insecure individuals regulate their emotions and behaviour more constructively (Overall & Simpson, 2015; Overall, Simpson, & Struthers, 2013). How did you become interested in your area of research? I am invested in this area because relationship research is relevant to everybody and has important practical implications.

Investigating relationships is also complex and exciting. The challenges of dyadic research mean that relationship researchers adopt novel and cutting-edge methods and analytic techniques. Finally, I have been lucky enough to work with inspiring relationship scientists. How does your area of research speak to life in Australia and New Zealand? As you know, intimate relationships play a central role in people’s happiness and wellbeing. People who maintain intimate relationships are happier, healthier and live longer, whereas those who suffer relationship loss or social isolation are at greater risk of cardiovascular disease, cancer, depression and early death. By identifying how people can maintain their relationships successfully, relationship research has important implications for people in Australia, New Zealand and around the world.

Topical Reflection THE COST OF LOVE At the beginning of this chapter we talked about the cost of finding love which for many now begins with online dating apps. ING Direct (2017) have taken a closer look at the dating industry in Australia and their findings suggest that the dating industry is worth roughly $12 billion per year. According to their data – one in four Australians will spend an average of $100 getting ready for a first date. This includes new clothes, shoes, and other elements relevant to the preening and grooming rituals which are enacted prior to the date. Once on the date it is likely to cost (on average) a further $79. One third of Australians will do this at least once a month but for about a third of our population this will happen two to three times a month. In terms of our expectations of what will happen on a first date – it seems that more than half of the men surveyed are happy to pay the bill – a quarter of women expect this but roughly half are willing to pay their share.

CHAPTER REVIEW SUMMARY THE NEED TO BELONG • The need to belong is a fundamental human motive, a pervasive drive to form and maintain lasting relationships. NEED FOR AFFILIATION • This social motivation begins with the need for affiliation – a desire to establish social contact with others.

PUTTING COMMON SENSE TO THE TEST People seek out the company of others, even strangers, in times of stress. TRUE. Research has shown that external threat causes stress and leads people to affiliate with others who are facing or have faced a similar threat. 394

INITIAL ATTRACTION • According to one perspective, people are attracted to others with whom the relationship is rewarding. • Rewards can be direct or indirect. • Evolutionary psychologists argue that human beings exhibit patterns of attraction and mate selection that favour the passing on of their own genes. FAMILIARITY • Proximity sets the stage for social interaction, which is why friendships are most likely to form between people who live near each other. • The more people are exposed to someone the more positively they will evaluate them.

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PHYSICAL ATTRACTIVENESS • In a wide range of social settings, people respond more favourably to men and women who are physically attractive. • Some researchers believe that certain faces (averaged and symmetrical) are inherently attractive – across cultures and to infants as well as adults. • Others argue that beauty is in the eye of the beholder and point to the influences of culture, time and context.

CHAPTER NINE

THE INTIMATE MARKETPLACE: TRACKING THE BENEFITS AND COSTS • According to social exchange theory, people seek to maximise benefits and minimise costs in their relationships. • Equity theory holds that satisfaction is greatest when the ratio between benefits and contributions is similar for both partners.

FIRST ENCOUNTERS: THE GETTING ACQUAINTED STAGE • People tend to associate with, befriend and marry others whose demographic backgrounds, attitudes and interests are similar to their own. • Contrary to popular belief, complementarity in needs or personality does not spark attraction.

TYPES OF RELATIONSHIPS • In exchange relationships, people are oriented towards reward and immediate reciprocity; in communal relationships, partners are responsive to each other’s needs. • People with secure attachment styles have more satisfying romantic relationships than do those with insecure–anxious or insecure–avoidant styles.

GENDERED SELECTION PREFERENCES • Evolutionary psychologists say that women seek men with financial security or traits predictive of future success in order to ensure the survival of their offspring. • By contrast, men seek women who are young and attractive (physical attributes that signal health and fertility) and are not promiscuous (an attribute that diminishes certainty of paternity).

TYPES OF LOVE • According to the triangular theory of love, there are eight subtypes of love produced by the combinations of intimacy, passion and commitment. • Inherent in all classifications of love are two types: passionate and companionate. • When relationships break up, communication problems are among the most common causes.

PUTTING COMMON SENSE TO THE TEST Infants do not discriminate between faces considered attractive and unattractive in their culture. FALSE. Two-month-old infants spend more time gazing at attractive than unattractive faces, indicating that they do make the distinction. People who are physically attractive are happier and have higher self-esteem than those who are unattractive. FALSE. Attractive people are at an advantage in their social lives, but they are not happier, better adjusted or higher in self-esteem. When it comes to romantic relationships, opposites attract. FALSE. Consistently, people are attracted to others who are similar – not opposite or complementary – on a whole range of dimensions.

CLOSE RELATIONSHIPS • Intimate relationships include at least one of three components: feelings of attachment, fulfilment of psychological needs and interdependence. • Stage theories propose that close relationships go through specific stages, but evidence for a fixed sequence is weak.

SEXUALITY • On average, men report being sexually more active than women and see opposite-sex interactions in more sexualised terms. CULTURE, ATTRACTION AND CLOSE RELATIONSHIPS • Although Buss identified universal gender differences in mate preference, he also found some striking cultural differences; for example, in differing preferences for chastity.

PUTTING COMMON SENSE TO THE TEST Men are more likely than women to interpret friendly gestures by the opposite sex in sexual terms. TRUE. Experiments have shown that men are more likely than women to interpret friendly interactions with members of the opposite sex as sexual come-ons. After the honeymoon period, there is an overall decline in levels of marital satisfaction. TRUE. High marital satisfaction levels among newlyweds are often followed by a measurable decline during the first year and then, after a period of stabilisation, by another decline at the eighth year – a pattern found among parents and nonparents alike.

LINKAGES In this chapter we have examined the many ways that people form relationships. We have discussed the personal and situational factors that influence our attraction to others and explored different types of love and close relationships. Our discussion on the use of online dating apps demonstrates the popularity of social media in the quest to

find love, but how can you improve your chances of success? Chapter 2 `The Social Self' may provide some useful clues. The `Linkages' diagram shows two other chapters which build on concepts elaborated in this chapter - similarity and reciprocity and the human bias for beauty.

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CHAPTER

9

Attraction and close relationships

LINKAGES

Maximising your potential in an online dating app

CHAPTER

2

The social self

Similarity and reciprocity

CHAPTER

10

Helping others

Physical attractiveness and the human bias for beauty

CHAPTER

16

Business

REVIEW QUIZ 1 The idea that some faces are inherently more attractive than others is supported by research demonstrating that: a people prefer averaged composite faces to individual faces. b standards of beauty change over time. c people from different cultures enhance their appearance in different ways. d people we like seem more attractive to us. 2 Mark has been dating Kira for some time. He never lets her go out with her friends or talk to other men. He is demanding and possessive of her. His love for Kira could best be categorised as: a agape. b ludus. c storge. d mania. 3 When a man spends money on expensive cars, fancy restaurant dinners and stylish clothes, it may be an evolved sexually selected mating signal known as:

a conspicuous consumption. b excitation transfer. c complementarity hypothesis. d reciprocity. 4 According to social exchange theory, an individual’s primary motive in establishing and maintaining relationships is: a maximising rewards and minimising costs. b achieving an equitable balance of inputs and outputs. c maintaining reciprocal levels of self-disclosure. d the reproductive fitness of a potential partner. 5 The way a person typically interacts with significant others is called a(n): a reciprocity norm. b attachment style. c exchange relationship. d self-disclosure.

WEBLINKS Gottman Institute https://www.gottman.com/about/research/ A website with abstracts and information on the institute’s research projects on marriage and couples, same-sex couples, and parenting. International Association for Relationship Research http://www.iarr.org/research-news-feed The website of IARR brings together hundreds of scholars and practitioners focused on stimulating and supporting the scientific study of personal and social relationships.

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Australian Research Centre in Sex, Health and Society https://www.latrobe.edu.au/arcshs A centre for social research into sexuality, health and the social dimensions of human relationships. SIRC Guide to Flirting http://www.sirc.org/publik/flirt.html A Social Issues Research Centre report that takes a closer look at the context in which flirting occurs.

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Wright, P. H. (1982). Men’s friendships, women’s friendships and the alleged inferiority of the latter. Sex Roles, 8, 1–20. Wright, R. A., & Contrada, R. J. (1986). Dating selectivity and interpersonal attraction: Toward a better understanding of the ‘elusive phenomenon. Journal of Social and Personal Relationships, 3, 131–148. Zajonc, R. B. (1968). Attitudinal effects of mere exposure. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology Monograph Supplement, 9(2), 1–27. Zajonc, R. B. (2001). Mere exposure: A gateway to the subliminal. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 10, 224–228. Zhang, S., & Kline, S. L. (2009). Can I make my own decision? A cross-cultural study of perceived social network influence in mate selection. Journal of CrossCultural Psychology, 40, 3–23. Zillmann, D. (1984). Connections between sex and aggression. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

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Helping others

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Learning Objectives By the end of this chapter, you should be able to: 1 discuss evolutionary and motivational theories that explore the why of helping behaviour. 2 compare and contrast personal influences such as egoistic and altruistic motives and personality traits that impact on who is likely to help 3 explain interpersonal influences such as need, culture and personal attributes that affect whom people help 4 explore the effects of situational influences that affect when people help including the bystander effect and the impact of variables such as time, location, culture, mood and social influences.

Life as a field psychologist

Emergency interventions can be quite chaotic, especially in the early, acute phase of the disaster … each mission poses its own unique challenges. One of the affected areas was situated on a mountain slope. The terrain was hilly with steep valleys and winding dirt roads. In that area, several villages had been swept downhill by landslides triggered by the earthquake. The road leading to the top of the hill was totally destroyed in several places, cutting off vehicular access to the survivors. The Indonesian army had to install two helicopter pads at the midpoint and the top of the mountain to fly in assistance to the communities. In order to work in that area, our team had to hike about eight kilometres each day. We also used motorbikes to transport our material aid (e.g., plastic sheeting, blankets and hygiene kits) to the survivors. In previous missions, I’ve journeyed in 4×4s, flown in helicopters and travelled by boat. It’s important to be able to adapt to the context in order to provide effective assistance to the people.

Dr Marlene Lee is a clinical psychologist who spent two years as a volunteer for Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), an international medical humanitarian non-governmental organisation. As a field psychologist, she was responsible for the provision of emergency mental health assistance to victims of armed conflict and natural disasters in Kashmir, China, Myanmar, South Sudan and Indonesia.

You can learn more about Marlene’s journey and her work as a volunteer at the end of this chapter in the Topical Reflections feature. In this chapter we focus on the social psychology of giving and receiving help.

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Source: Juan Carlos Tomasi.

Dr Marlene Lee is a clinical psychologist who spent a year volunteering with Médecins Sans Frontières. Here she shares her experience as a volunteer in the aftermath of the earthquake in Padang, Indonesia in 2008:

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PUTTING COMMON SENSE TO THE TEST Circle Your Answer T

F

People are more likely to help someone in an emergency if the potential rewards seem high and the potential costs seem low.

T

F

In an emergency, a person who needs help has a much better chance of getting it if three other people are present than if only one other person is present.

T

F

People are much more likely to help someone when they are in a good mood.

T

F

People are much less likely to help someone when they are in a bad mood.

T

F

Attractive people have a better chance than unattractive people of getting help when they need it.

T

F

Women seek help more often than men do.

INTRODUCTION WHEN PEOPLE READ SUCH STORIES as that in this chapter’s opening vignette, it is natural for them to wonder what makes some people, at some times, act to help others? Every day there are numerous unheralded and inspiring acts of helping others and yet every day someone ignores the screams outside his or her window, drives past motorists stranded on the side of a road, or tries to avoid making eye contact with a homeless person on the street. The 15th of December, 2014 started out like any other day for the eight people who went to work and the ten people who chose to begin their day at the Lindt Chocolate Café in Sydney. At 9.41 a.m. their lives changed forever when lone gunman, Man Haron Monis, directed Lindt Café Manager Tori Johnson to call police and advise that those in the café had been taken hostage. During the 16.5 hours which followed eighteen people endured a reign of terror which unfolded live on public and social media, sending shockwaves throughout Australia and across the world. Tragically in the early hours of the following morning Monis executed Tori. Katrina Dawson became the second innocent victim whose life was ended that day – fatally wounded by police bullets when they stormed the café. During the days that followed, the stories of Tori’s bravery became apparent, and in March 2018 he was posthumously honoured with the Star of Courage, Australia’s top peace-time honour for his ‘conspicuous courage’ during the siege. Although Tori knew the layout and the exits of the cafe, he chose not to take the opportunity to escape, instead he remained with elderly hostages and those who were less mobile, relaying information to police and negotiators. He was directly threatened, yet without regard for his own safety, calmly complied with the gunman’s demands in order to protect the other hostages. Katrina was awarded a Bravery Medal as was survivor Jarrod Morton-Hoffman for selflessly Tori Johnson and Katrina Dawson were posthumously supporting others during the siege (Callan, Memmolo, Hennessy, & awarded for their bravery during the Lindt Café siege. Ede, 2015). Source: Alamy Stock Photo/Philip Game All too often we hear of stories that question our faith in the ability of people to act in relation to a moral compass. The fate of a toddler from China’s Quangdong province (see Figure 10.1) in October 2011 is one such example of what appears to represent the moral numbness of modern society. An absolutely horrifying video from a surveillance camera captured the scene of a two-year-old girl run over by a van on a narrow road. As the girl lay under the van, the driver stopped the car for a few seconds and then drove on, running her over again with a back tyre. More than a dozen people walked or drove past the gravely injured girl for about seven minutes. A second vehicle – a truck – ran over her crushed body. Finally, a woman checked on her and pulled her away, just before the girl’s mother arrived. The girl died more than a week later (Blanchard, 2011). In times of natural disasters, the news is full of stories of bravery and split-second decisions that often place the helper in grave danger. The first responder in these situations is not necessarily a trained professional but the person closest to the incident, as was the case for four people buried in a gift shop that collapsed in the 2012 Christchurch earthquake. Erwin Polczak used a crowbar, brooms and any other

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‘tools’ he could find to help these people to safety. Although the many aftershocks that followed threatened to bury him as well, Polczak said: ‘At the time, it was very, very dangerous, but I really want to help people. I didn’t think at the time about the danger’. His help continued over the weeks that followed as he delivered food and supplies into the disaster area (Booker, Leask, & Savage, 2012). There is no simple answer to the question of why some people help and others do not, or why some situations lead to quick assistance and others to shocking displays of inaction. The determinants of helping behaviour are complex and multifaceted. But social psychologists have learned a great deal about these determinants – and therefore about human nature. As you will see in the pages to come, some of their findings are quite surprising. In this chapter, we examine several questions about helping: • Why do people help? • Who is likely to help? • Whom do they help? • When do they help? The concluding section concentrates on a major recurring theme – the social connection – that underlies much of the theory and research on helping.

CHAPTER TEN

FIGURE 10.1 Stories often make people questions their faith in others' moral compasses A 2-year-old girl named Wang Yue lies on a narrow road in Guangdong, China, in October 2011, after getting run over by a van. For several horrifying minutes more than a dozen people passed by the gravely injured girl without checking on her, including the man seen in this photo. While lying in the street she was run over by a second vehicle. She died just over a week later. As discussed in this chapter, this kind of inaction by bystanders is all too common.

EVOLUTIONARY AND MOTIVATIONAL FACTORS Although few individuals reach the heights of heroic helping, virtually everyone helps somebody, at some time. People give their friends a ride to the airport; donate money, food and clothing for disaster relief; work as a volunteer for charitable activities; or pick up the mail for a neighbour who’s out of town. The list of prosocial behaviours – actions intended to benefit others – is endless. But why do people help? In this section we will explore several factors have an impact.

Evolutionary factors

Source: AAP Image/AP/TVS via APTN

Prosocial behaviours Actions intended to benefit others.

We begin with evolution. From an evolutionary perspective, what possible function can there be in helping others, especially at the risk of one’s own life? Does risking one’s life for others fly in the face of evolutionary principles such as ‘survival of the fittest’? There are a few factors that determine this, as we will see.

The ‘selfish gene’ Evolutionary perspectives emphasise not the survival of the fittest individuals but the survival of the individuals’ genes (Dawkins, 1989; Hamilton, 1964). If a specific social behaviour enhances reproductive success, then the genetic underpinnings of that behaviour are more likely to be passed on to subsequent generations. In this way, the behaviour can eventually become part of the common inheritance of the species. The behaviour of helping others could have served the function of preserving individuals’ genes by promoting the survival of those who share their genetic make-up. By means of this indirect route to genetic survival, the tendency to help genetic relatives, called kin selection, could become an innate characteristic of humans. In fact, kin selection is evident in the behaviour of many organisms. For example, ground squirrels, capuchin monkeys and many other mammals and birds emit an alarm to warn nearby relatives of a predator. The alarm helps their relatives, but makes the individual who sounds the alarm more vulnerable to attack (Freeberg et al., 2014; Hollén & Radford, 2009; Schel, Tranquilli, S., & Zuberbühler, 2009; Tórrez, Robles, González, & Crofoot, 2012; Wheeler, 2008). Because kin selection serves the function of genetic survival, it would seem logical to assume that preferential helping of genetic relatives would be strongest when the biological stakes are particularly high, but what does the research suggest? Research appears to confirm our assumption (Burnstein, Crandall, & Kitayama, 1994; Fitzgerald, Thompson, & Whitaker, 2010; Korchmaros, Kenny, & Flory, 2006; StewartWilliams, 2007). For example, participants in a study by Carey Fitzgerald and Stephen Colarelli (2009) were

Kin selection

Preferential helping of genetic relatives, which results in the greater likelihood that genes held in common will survive.

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asked how willing they would be to offer different kinds of help to a friend, a half-sibling or a sibling. There were three levels of helping behaviour: the lowest risk involved picking up items from a shop for the person, the medium risk involved loaning the person $10 000, and the highest risk involved trying to rescue the person from a burning house. For the lowest-risk helping scenario, participants rated themselves as likely to help a friend as a sibling. For the higher-risk scenarios, however, they were significantly more willing to help a sibling than a friend. Their willingness to help a half-sibling fell in between their willingness to help a friend and their willingness to help a sibling. In a later study, Fitzgerald and colleagues (2010) found that under low-risk scenarios, participants were more likely to help romantic partners than siblings, and they were as willing to help romantic partners with whom they had no biological children as they were to help those with whom they did. Under high-risk situations, however, participants became more likely to help siblings and romantic partners with whom they had biological children, but less willing to help romantic partners with whom they had no children or had adopted children. In other words, under high-risk scenarios, genetic relatedness became more important in decisions about helping. Participants in a series of studies by Elaine Madsen and colleagues (2007) did more than speculate about what they thought they would do in different hypothetical scenarios – these participants actually suffered in order to help others. Participants in these studies were asked to hold a difficult position with their legs (from an isometric ski-training exercise). The longer they could hold the position, the more money would be earned for another person. However, the position became more and more painful to hold over time. Consistent with predictions based on kin selection, participants withstood the pain and held the position longer if they were doing so for a genetically close relative than for a more distant relative, a friend or a charity. This effect was found among UK students as well as among participants from Zulu populations in South Africa.

Reciprocal altruism

Reciprocal altruism

Altruism that involves an individual helping another (despite some immediate risk or cost) and becoming more likely to receive help from the other in return.

Kin selection provides only a partial explanation for helping. Relatives are not always helpful to each other. And even though relatives may get preferential treatment, most people help out non-kin as well. What is the reproductive advantage of helping someone who is not related to you? The most common answer is reciprocity. Through reciprocal altruism, helping someone else can be in your best interests because it increases the likelihood that you will be helped in return (Krebs, 1987; Trivers, 1985). If A helps B and B helps A, both A and B increase their chances of survival and reproductive success. Over the course of evolution, individuals who engaged in reciprocal altruism would have theoretically survived and reproduced more than individuals who did not, thus enabling this kind of altruism to flourish. Robert Trivers (1971) cited several examples of reciprocal altruism in animals (see Figure 10.2). For example, monkeys groom each other, as do cats; some large fish allow small fish to swim in their mouths without eating them – the small fish get food for themselves and remove parasites from the larger fish – and chimps who share with other chimps at one feeding are repaid at another feeding; but those who are selfish are rebuffed, sometimes violently, at a later feeding (de Waal, 1996, 2008).

FIGURE 10.2 Animals have also been proven to display reciprocal altruism Many animals groom each other, whether they are chimpanzees in Tanzania or young girls in Australia. According to evolutionary psychologists, such behaviour often reflects reciprocal altruism.

Source: Corbis/Ocean/Tom Brakefield/Ocean

408

Source: C.E. Silva.

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Frans de Waal (2003) observed a group of chimpanzees engaged in nearly 7000 interactions and recorded their grooming and food-sharing behaviours. He noted striking evidence of reciprocal altruism among these chimps. If Chimp A groomed Chimp B, for example, B became much more likely to then share his or her food with A. Moreover, if Chimp A groomed B but was not reciprocated in some way by B, A became unlikely to then share his or her food with B. Similar types of behaviours among capuchin monkeys have also been recorded (Tiddi, Aureli, di Sorrentino, Janson, & Schino, 2011). In addition to being able to negotiate such reciprocal acts across events, chimpanzees have also been reported sharing plants and tools (Pruetz & Lindshield, 2012). It is as if these primates often operate under a norm of: ‘You scratch my back, I’ll scratch yours – or maybe I’ll give you some of my apples’. However, studies have shown this more complicated reciprocation is not uncommon. For example, in a meta-analysis of studies involving 14 different primate species, Gabriele Schino (2007) found evidence that grooming is reciprocated with support in fights (against some other individual – ‘You scratch my back and I’ll have your back in a fight!’) A more charming type of reciprocation was reported by Barbara Tiddi and colleagues (2010), that capuchin mothers allow other females to handle their infants, which young capuchin females apparently love to do, in exchange for being groomed by them. Learning to cooperate, therefore, can be rewarding for both parties. One clever study that illustrates this was conducted by Frans de Waal and Michelle Berger (2000). They observed same-sex pairs of capuchin monkeys working cooperatively in a test chamber to obtain a tray of food. The two monkeys were separated from each other by a mesh partition. One monkey by itself could not pull the tray, but the two monkeys could accomplish the task if they cooperated. When successful, the monkey that wound up with the food consistently shared it with its helper. When they were rewarded in this way, the monkeys became even more likely to help each other on subsequent occasions. According to Valerie Dufour and her team at the University of St Andrews in Scotland (2009), orangutans appear to have taken this skill one step further by demonstrating the ability to learn the value of tokens – trading them to help each other win food – but only if the help is mutual. Two orangutans from the Leipzig Zoo, Germany, became especially good at helping each other. Bim (male) and Dok (female) were initially given several sets of tokens. Each was given one type of token they could exchange for food for themselves, another type that could be used to gain food for a partner, and a third type which had no value. Having learned the difference in value for each of the tokens, Dok was particularly good at swapping tokens to get food for Bim. Bim had cleverly developed a series of gestures to request tokens, occasionally pointing at the tokens or holding out an open hand to encourage Dok’s compliance. While Dok initially complied with these requests, Bim was less interested in trading tokens that would win food for her, and Dok became less willing to help him out. Bim responded by trading more and more, until their efforts were more or less equal. The formulation of gestures to communicate one’s needs and compliance with requests of the partner shows that the orangutans understood each other’s needs. Dufour suggested that Bim’s response provides evidence of a calculation behind the giving that is similar to humans’ expectation that they are given something in return when they cooperate with others. In other words, ‘If I do not receive what I think is enough from you, then I won’t give to you in return, but if you give me what I perceive to be enough, then I will secure your cooperation by giving’ (Dufour et al., 2009). In some human environments, reciprocal altruism is essential for survival even today. Consider, for example, the Northern Ache, who are Indigenous peoples of north-eastern Paraguay. Wesley Allen-Arave and colleagues (2008) studied a group of Northern Ache who lived in households on a reservation and shared virtually all their food across households. The researchers found that households shared more food with other households that reciprocated in kind. Animals also go beyond direct reciprocity, sometimes showing indirect reciprocity, whereby an individual who has helped someone becomes more likely to be helped by someone else. In other words, A helps B, C witnesses A’s helpful behaviour toward B and decides to help A. Through indirect reciprocity cooperation among many members of a group can be established (Roberts, 2015). In order for it to flourish, individuals in the group are rewarded by others for being helpful and punished for being selfish. Consistent with this point, studies have shown that even monkeys and human infants show reliable preferences for individuals they have observed being helpful to others (Anderson, Kuroshima, Takimoto & Fujita, 2013; Hamlin, 2013, 2015; Rand & Nowak, 2013). And animals from reef fish to chimpanzees and humans have been shown to punish individuals they have seen failing to help others, often through social exclusion (dos Santos & Wedekind, 2015; Kurzban et al., 2015; Sasaki & Uchida, 2013).

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Indirect reciprocity

A kind of reciprocal altruism in which an individual who helps someone becomes more likely to receive help from someone else.

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Reciprocal altruism is not restricted to basic needs such as food acquisition, however. Think of file sharing instead of food sharing. Swapping music and videos online through file-sharing services may be considered a form of reciprocal altruism, since an individual makes his or her own files available to others so that he or she can have access to theirs. (Of course, record companies and film studios have other terms for these activities, such as criminal and unethical.) Strong norms often develop in these peer-to-peer networks. An individual who downloads songs or videos from others’ computers, but does not make his or her own files available, is likely to be seen unfavourably.

Empathy

Empathy

Understanding or vicariously experiencing another individual’s perspective and feeling sympathy and compassion for that individual.

Helping, of course, can go beyond assisting kin or members of one’s own group. Consider the story of Binti Jua. At the end of 1996, People magazine honoured her as one of the 25 ‘most intriguing people’ of the year, and Newsweek named her ‘hero of the year’. Earlier that year, while caring for her own 17-month-old daughter, Binti came across a three-year-old boy who had fallen almost 20 feet onto a cement floor and been knocked unconscious. She picked up the boy and gently held him, rocking him softly, and then turned him over to paramedics. What was most ‘intriguing’ about Binti? The fact that she was a gorilla! When the boy climbed over a fence and fell into the primate exhibit at the Brookfield Zoo, near Chicago, witnesses feared the worst. With her own daughter clinging to her back the entire time, Binti looked after the little boy in the same way she would look after her own offspring, keeping other gorillas at bay and eventually placing him gently at the entrance where zookeepers and paramedics could get to him (O’Neill, Green, & Cuadros, 1996). Was this an act of kindness and compassion, or did the gorilla just do what she had been trained to do – pick up and fetch things dropped into her cage? Cases like this raise the more fundamental question of whether concepts such as morality and empathy can apply to non-human animals. Most people think of these as qualities that allow humans to resist and rise above our more selfish, violent, ‘animal’ nature; but instead they may reflect the social nature of many mammals, and particularly primates. The need to live successfully in small groups makes it important for social animals to develop some sense of the proper way to behave in groups, and an ability to recognise and respond to danger or suffering in other group members. Humans appear to have much more highly developed moral reasoning and capacity for empathy, but their roots can be traced down the evolutionary chain (de Waal, 2006; de Waal & Ferrari, 2012; de Waal, Smith Churchland, Pievani, & Parmigiani, 2014; McCullough, Kimeldorf, & Cohen, 2008; Narvaez & Lapsley, 2009; Sinnott-Armstrong, 2008).

Defining empathy We will see throughout this chapter the critically important role that empathy plays in helping. Unfortunately, the exact definition of empathy is much debated; for example, Dan Batson (2009b) has identified no fewer than eight distinct definitions of empathy that scholars use. Most researchers regard empathy as having both a cognitive component of understanding the emotional experience of another individual, and an emotional experience that is consistent with what the other is feeling (Decety, 2011; de Waal, 2009; Eisenberg, Eggum & Di Giunta, L. 2010). A major cognitive component of empathy is perspective taking – using the power of imagination to try to see the world through someone else’s eyes. A key emotional component of empathy is empathic concern, which involves other oriented feelings, such as sympathy, compassion and tenderness.

Empathy in animals Evidence of these aspects of empathy is wonderfully illustrated with the case of Koko, a 46-year-old lowland gorilla who communicated using sign language. Koko had a vocabulary of over 1000 words, had a good understanding of spoken English, regularly engaged in bilingual conversations (responding in sign to questions posed in English), recognised letters of the alphabet and could read some printed words, including her own name. Koko who passed away in 2018 regularly demonstrated self-awareness, examining her teeth and making faces in front of a mirror, producing self-representational paintings and using self-descriptive language, such as personal pronouns, making reference to personal internal and external states, and demonstrated the ability to deceive and display embarrassment (Patterson & Gordon, 1993). She anticipated the responses of others to her actions, engaged in fantasy play alone and with others, and was seen reading story books to herself. She laughed at her own jokes and those of others, cried when

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hurt or left alone, she screamed when frightened or angered, FIGURE 10.3 Koko the gorilla and talked freely about her feelings using words like love, happy, sad, afraid and frustrated (Patterson & Gordon, 1993). But even Koko the gorilla cried when she learned of the death of her feline friend All Ball, who was tragically killed in 1984. She showed more remarkable was her ability to express grief, compassion and evidence of grieving that extended beyond the immediate event. empathy. She was gentle with kittens and other small animals, showing a great deal of compassion when handling them. Koko cried when her pet kitten died and became uncomfortable when asked to talk about it. When Koko next saw a picture of a cat that resembled her kitten, she pointed to it and signed ‘Cry, sad, frown’, indicating that her grief extended beyond the immediate event (see Figure 10. 3). She also showed empathy for those she interacted with, those she had never met and fictional characters in books and films (Patterson & Gordon, 1993). Sadly Koko passed away in her sleep in June of 2018 but if you would like to know about her wonderful life and her legacy visit http://www.koko.org. Frans de Waal, among others, has cited numerous and startling examples of primates such as chimpanzees and bonobos seeming to show empathy (de Waal, 2008; de Waal & Ferrari, 2012; Horner, Carter, Suchak, & de Waal, 2011). For example, de Waal reports an example of a juvenile chimpanzee Source: AAP Image/AP/The Gorilla Foundation/Dr. Ronald H. Cohn putting an arm around an adult male who had just been defeated in a fight; a kind of consoling behaviour that is not uncommon. De Waal also reports examples of chimpanzees who risked their lives trying to save companions from drowning, even though they themselves were unable to swim. Less dramatically, young chimps have been seen helping to push an old and arthritic group member up onto a climbing frame for a grooming session. These examples suggest a degree of perspective taking and sympathy among non-human primates. Not all the evidence concerning empathy in primates relates to issues of such a serious nature – research conducted by Marina Davila-Ross and colleagues (2011) illustrates a humorous aspect of this equation when they found that chimpanzees produce distinct types of laughs when responding to the laughter of others. Many of the great apes smile and laugh, but do these displays represent a humorous response to something they have seen or is the story a little more detailed? Their research suggests that this type of positive expression of emotion promotes social communication, just as it does in humans (see Figure 10.4). It appears that chimps who replicate the laughter of others were engaged in social play for greater periods of time, which ultimately helped them to gain social benefits. FIGURE 10.4 Smiling and laughing behaviour in primates Is laughter contagious? It appears so – research suggests that smiling and laughing chimpanzees elicit similar responses in other apes, which provides them with social benefits.

Source: Pat Driscoll.

An important characteristic of mammals related to empathy is how much the young must be nurtured by the mother or parents. Caregivers must understand the emotional communications from their young and respond to their emotional needs. The gorilla Binti Jua may well have been acting on maternal caregiving impulses as she gently held the little boy who had fallen into her area. Many scholars propose that once the capacity for empathy was established in humans, it evolved beyond the parent–child relationship (Batson, 2011; Decety & Svetlova, 2012). Anthropologist Judith Burkart and colleagues (2014), believes that a key

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feature in human evolution was when our hominin ancestors began to raise their offspring cooperatively, with fathers, siblings, aunts, and others occasionally helping to support the helpless infant rather than just the mother. This set the foundation for what Burkart calls ‘hyper-cooperation’, which is characteristic of humans.

Are we biologically empathetic? Very young human infants show signs of being affected by the distress of others and, by their first birthday, begin to comfort victims of distress (Decety, 2011, Hamlin, 2013). In one particularly interesting study, Felix Warneken and Michael Tomasello (2006) placed 18-month-old human infants with an adult experimenter. At various points in time, the experimenter appeared to have trouble reaching a goal. For example, he accidentally dropped a marker on the floor and tried unsuccessfully to reach it, or he could not put some magazines into a cabinet because the doors were closed. Twenty-two of the 24 infants tested in the study helped the experimenter in at least one of the tasks, and many infants helped on several tasks. In doing so, the infants apparently understood that the experimenter needed help; that is, that he was having trouble completing a task by himself. Two additional details are worth noting about the study. First, the experimenter never requested help from the infants, nor did he praise or reward the infants when they did help. Second, for every task he needed help with, the experimenter created a similar situation in which he did not seem to have a problem. For example, rather than accidentally drop the marker on the floor and try to reach it, the experimenter sometimes intentionally threw the marker on the floor and did not try to retrieve it. In these situations, the infants were not likely to take action by picking up the marker. This suggested that when they did help the experimenter, the infants did so because they understood he was trying to achieve some goal. The researchers also tested three young chimpanzees using a similar procedure. The chimpanzees also helped the human experimenter when they saw that he appeared to need help reaching his goal, although not across as many tasks or as reliably as the human infants did.

CRITICAL THINKING ACTIVITY Can you suggest what effect parental influence has on the development of empathy and altruistic behaviour in children? Would you expect parental influence to wane during the

adolescent years? As a budding psychologist, how would you instruct parents to encourage empathy and altruism in their children?

Neuroscience research supports the idea that the capacity for empathy is part of our biology. Researchers believe that witnessing someone else experience positive or negative emotion triggers activation of neural structures associated with the actual experience of that emotion in an empathic perceiver’s brain. This activation, in turn, predicts individual tendencies to engage in everyday helping behaviour (Lamm, Decety, & Singer 2011; Morelli, Lieberman, & Zaki, 2015). In addition, the hormone oxytocin – which is well known as being involved in mother–infant attachment as well as in bonding between mating pairs – is implicated in empathy and prosocial behaviours (Uzefovsky et al., 2015; Weisman et al., 2015). In fact, humans given a boost of oxytocin (through a nasal spray) in experiments behaved in more cooperative and trusting ways than did participants given a placebo (Israel, Weisel, Ebstein, & Bornstein, 2012).

Rewards of helping

Arousal: cost–reward model The proposition that people react to emergency situations by acting in the most costeffective way to reduce the arousal of shock and alarm.

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Whether or not it can be traced to evolutionary and biological factors, one important reason why people help others is because it often is rewarding, even if the rewards are psychological rather than material. We all like the idea of being the hero, being celebrated by our peers for coming to the rescue of someone in distress. Helping helps the helper. The potential rewards of helping, however, can be offset by significant costs. Indeed, people often seem to conduct a cost–benefit analysis not only when making deliberate decisions to behave prosocially, as when donating blood (the time taken to donate versus the benefit of potentially saving themselves and others), but also in more impulsive, sudden decisions to intervene in an emergency. The empirical evidence on this point is clear: people are much more likely to help when the potential rewards of helping seem high relative to the potential costs. The arousal: cost–reward model of helping stipulates that both emotional and cognitive factors determine whether bystanders to an emergency will intervene (Dovidio, Piliavin, Schroeder, & Penner, 2006). Emotionally, bystanders experience the shock and alarm of personal distress; this unpleasant state

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of arousal motivates them to do something to reduce it. What they do, however, depends on the ‘bystander calculus’ – their computation of the costs and rewards associated with helping. When potential rewards (to self and victim) outweigh potential costs (to self and victim), bystanders will help. But raise those costs and lower those rewards and it is likely that the victims will not be helped (Fischer et al., 2011; Fritzsche, Finkelstein, & Penner, 2000; Piliavin, Dovidio, Gaertner, & Clark, 1981).

Feeling good Helping often simply feels good. A growing body of research reveals a strong relationship between giving help and feeling better, including improvements in mental and physical health (Dillard, Schiavone, & Brown, 2008; Omoto, Malsch, & Barraza, 2009; Mojza, Sonnentag, & Bornemann, 2011; Piliavin, 2003; Post, 2005). For instance, a longitudinal study by Jane Piliavin and Erica Siegl (2008) found that doing volunteer work was associated with improvements in psychological well-being, and that volunteering for multiple organisations was associated with greater improvement. It does not take a rocket scientist to figure out that doing good things for others makes you feel better about your world, but a neuropsychologist may just be able to provide clear evidence that it does! Interesting research conducted by Soyoung Park and colleagues (2017), from the University of Zurich, set out to explore the brain mechanisms that link generous behaviour with increased happiness. They told 50 people they would receive a small amount of money (roughly AU$34) over a period of four weeks. Half (control group) were asked to commit to spending the money on themselves to go out to dinner or to buy something nice, and the other half (experimental group) were asked to spend it on someone they knew by taking them out to dinner or buying them gifts. The aim of the research was to see whether simply pledging to being generous was enough to make people happier. Functional MRI scans were used to measure activity in three regions of the brain associated with social behaviour, generosity, happiness and decision-making. The results indicated that simply planning to give away just a little bit of money had the same effects on happiness as giving away a lot. In a similar vein, research conducted by Whillans and colleagues (2016) with a sample of community-dwelling older adults suggests that making generosity a regular habit may influence long-term well-being and happiness. Their findings indicated that the more money people spent on others, the lower their blood pressure was two years later. They also found that those who were assigned to spend money on others for a period of three weeks exhibited lower systolic and diastolic blood pressure compared to those assigned to spend money on themselves. The effects were comparable to interventions such as medication or exercise. Research has also indicated a positive relationship between helping others and life expectancy, possibly because helping others reduces stress (Poulin, Brown, Dillard, & Smith, 2013). In their negative state relief model, Robert Cialdini and colleagues (1987) propose that because of this positive effect of helping, people who are feeling bad may be inclined to help others in order to improve their mood. Indeed, after experiencing a traumatic event, some individuals seek out opportunities to help others in order to feel better about themselves, instead of becoming bitter and antisocial (Staub & Vollhardt, 2008; Vollhardt, 2009; Vollhardt & Staub, 2011). Research clearly demonstrates mental and physical health benefits in those who have experienced traumatic events, when they extend a helping hand to others (Frazier et al., 2013; Vollhardt & Staub, 2011; Wayment, 2004). So, it seems that helping others may help one heal oneself.

People are more likely to help someone in an emergency if the potential rewards seem high and the potential costs seem low.

TRUE

Negative state relief model

The proposition that people help others in order to counteract their own feelings of sadness.

Being good In addition to wanting to feel good, many of us also are motivated to be good; that is, to help because we recognise that ‘it is the right thing to do’. Some situations are especially likely to call to mind norms that compel helpful behaviours. These may be everyday situations, as when encountering an elderly person in a car park who needs help getting grocery bags into the car. Sometimes norms can compel much more dramatic and risky action, particularly for individuals whose roles in a group or society give them responsibility in a situation. Cases such as Colonel Arnaud Beltrame, the French policeman who selflessly took the place of a female hostage in a deadly siege of a supermarket in the town of Trèbes in the south of France and New South Wales police constable Karen Lowden, who remained with collar bomb hoax victim Madeleine Pulver for three hours while bomb disposal unit members tried to disarm the device; both provide examples of someone risking their own safety in the line of duty. Colonel Beltrame paid the ultimate price when he was killed by Jihadist terrorist Redouane Lakdin (Rubin; 2018). Constable Lowden was awarded the Australian Star of Courage in 2017 (Gusmaroli, 2017); Colonel Beltrame was posthumously awarded the prestigious ‘Commander of the Legion d’Honneur’ medal.

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The cost of helping or of not helping Clearly, helping has its rewards, but it also has its costs. We often are moved by stories of the costs paid by those who offer help, such as NSW skydiving instructor, Tony Rokov who died trying to save a teenage boy during a freak skydiving accident in 2015. Tony was on a tandem skydive with the boy when a freak gust of wind folded their parachute in half 20 metres away from landing. Tony twisted his body underneath the young boy taking the full force of the impact and saving the boy from certain death (Wylie, 2018). Australian celebrity chef Matt Golinsky suffered severe burns to 40% of his body in December 2011 while trying desperately to save his wife and three daughters from their burning home (Remeikis, 2011); Jamie Gilbert, died saving his sister from falling rubble during the Christchurch earthquake in February 2011 (Trevett, 2011); and David Black was killed when the fixed-wing aircraft he was using to drop water onto fires during the 2013 bushfires in New South Wales crashed in rugged bushland (Silmalis, 2013). Other helpers have engaged in more sustained and deliberate helping. Sharon Shepela and colleagues (1999) call this type of thoughtful helping in the face of potentially enormous costs courageous resistance. And although giving help is often associated with positive affect and health, when the help involves constant and exhausting demands, which is often the case when taking long-term care of a very ill person, the effects on helpers’ physical and mental health, as well as on their financial security, can be quite negative (Earle & Heymann, 2012; Fujino & Okamura, 2009; Miller, 2011; Mioshi, Bristow, Cook, & Hodges, 2009).

CRITICAL THINKING ACTIVITY Can you think of some mental health conditions that would place family members in the role of carers? What issues do you think family members would face in their day-to-day

interactions with a family member who has a condition such as dementia? Can you suggest how daily interactions would change over the course of the disease?

Altruism or egoism? Egoistic

Motivated by the desire to increase one’s own welfare.

Altruistic

Motivated by the desire to improve another’s welfare.

We have documented some of the ways that helping others can help the helper. This raises a classic question, however: ‘Are our helpful behaviours always egoistic (motivated by selfish concerns)? Or are humans ever truly altruistic (motivated by the desire to increase another’s welfare)?’ Many psychological theories assume an egoistic bottom line. It is not difficult to imagine egoistic interpretations for almost any acts of helping, even the most seemingly altruistic ones. Tutoring the disadvantaged? It will look good on your resumé or university application. Anonymously helping the homeless? It reduces your guilt. Donating blood to people you will never know? It makes you feel a bit nobler. Risking your life for a stranger? Such heroism may benefit your reputation and status. So, is all helping at some level egoistic? Daniel Batson (2009a, 2011) thinks not. He believes that the motivation behind some helpful actions is truly altruistic and that empathy plays a critically important role in it, as we will see in the following section.

The empathy–altruism hypothesis

Empathy–altruism hypothesis

The proposition that empathic concern for a person in need produces an altruistic motive for helping.

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Batson’s model of altruism is based on his view of the consequences of empathy. According to Batson, if you perceive someone in need and imagine how that person feels, you are likely to experience other-oriented feelings of empathic concern, which in turn produce the altruistic motive to reduce the other person’s distress. There are, however, instances in which people perceive someone in need and focus on their own feelings about this person or on how they would feel in that person’s situation. Although many people (and some researchers) may think of this as ‘empathy’, Batson contrasts this with instances in which people’s concern is with how the other person is feeling. It is when your focus is on the other person that true altruism is possible. The basic features of Batson’s empathy–altruism hypothesis are outlined in Figure 10.5. The hard part, though, is this: How can we tell the difference between egoistic and altruistic motives? In both cases, people help someone else, but the helpers’ reasons are different. Confronted with this puzzle, Batson came up with an elegant solution. It depends, he says, on whether one can obtain the relevant self-benefits without relieving the other’s need. For example, when a person’s motive is egoistic, helping should decline if it is easy for the individual to escape from the situation and therefore escape from his or her own feelings of distress. When a person’s motive is altruistic, however, help will be given regardless of the ease of escape.

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FIGURE 10.5 The empathy–altruism hypothesis According to the empathy–altruism hypothesis, taking the perspective of a person in need creates feelings of empathic concern, which produce the altruistic motive to reduce the other Adoption of the other person's perspective

Emotional response

person’s distress. When people do not take the other’s perspective, they experience feelings of personal distress, which produce the egoistic motive to reduce their own discomfort. Type of motive

Satisfaction of motive

YES

Empathic concern

Altruistic

Reduction of other's distress

NO

Personal distress

Egoistic

Reduction of one's own distress

Perception that someone needs help

Source: Based on Batson, C. D. (1991). The altruism question. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Based on this reasoning, Batson and others have conducted dozens of experiments that have found support for the empathy–altruism hypothesis. For example, Eric Stocks and colleagues (2009) designed a very clever experiment in which student participants learned about a fellow student named Katie whose parents and sister had recently been killed in a car accident, leaving her to care for her younger brother and sister. At the conclusion of the study, the students were given an opportunity to help Katie, such as by volunteering to help her with transportation or to babysit her siblings while she took night classes. Would the students offer to help Katie? The researchers manipulated two variables before the students read about Katie’s plight. One was a manipulation of empathy. Students in the low-empathy condition read that they should ‘try to remain as objective as possible about what has happened to the person described and how it has affected his or her life’. Students in the high-empathy condition, by contrast, read that they should ‘try to imagine how the person described in the segment feels about what has happened and how it has affected his or her life’. The researchers also manipulated whether or not the students would have an easy opportunity to not worry about the distress Katie was going through; in other words, could they psychologically escape the situation without lingering guilt? Students were informed that they would be using a memory training technique that would either enhance or eliminate their memory of the information they would be learning (i.e., the information about Katie). The key question: ‘Would students help Katie if they could simply forget about her, or would they want to help her anyway?’ If they would only help her if they could not easily forget her plight, this would suggest an egoistic motivation. But if they would help her even if they were confident they would not have to remember her suffering, this would suggest altruism. The results supported the empathy–altruism hypothesis. In the low-empathy condition, students’ helping decisions seemed to be governed by egoistic concerns – they agreed to help Katie only if they thought they would remember her problems. In the high-empathy condition, however, they agreed to help her regardless of whether they thought they would remember her or not (see Figure 10.6). But there is a point at which too much empathy can become overwhelming. Doctors, nurses and clinicians are often better able to help their patients if they can maintain some emotional distance and objectivity from them; and too much empathy can be a risk factor for depression (Decety & Svetlova, 2012; Hunsaker et al., 2015; Salvers et al., 2015). The empathy–altruism hypothesis does have its limits, however. For example, Batson has never claimed that all helping is altruistically motivated. There are multiple motives for helping, and many (and probably most) helpful acts are best explained in terms of the processes we consider elsewhere in this chapter. Indeed, as we will discuss next, the most effective way to increase consistent helping in many contexts may be to encourage both self-oriented and other oriented concerns.

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FIGURE 10.6 Empathy and helping: not taking the easy way out Students were induced to experience low or high empathy toward a suffering student named Katie. They were led to believe that they would remember or soon forget what they learned about Katie. The students were then given a chance to volunteer to help Katie. Students in the low-empathy condition tended to not offer their help if they thought they would not remember Katie and her plight. Students in the high-empathy condition offered to help whether or not they thought they would forget her situation. High empathy

0.8

0.8

0.7

0.7

0.6

0.6 Proportion who helped

Proportion who helped

Low empathy

0.5 0.4 0.3

0.5 0.4 0.3

0.2

0.2

0.1

0.1

0.0

0.0 Forget

Remember

Forget

Remember

Source: Based on Stocks, E. L., Lishner, D. A., & Decker, S. K. (2009). Altruism or p ­ sychological escape: Why does empathy promote prosocial behavior? European Journal of Social Psychology, 39(5), 649–665.

CRITICAL THINKING ACTIVITY Client-centred therapy, developed by Carl Rogers in the 1940s and 1950s, is a form of psychotherapy that suggests the creation of a comfortable, non-judgemental environment for clients that is enabled by a non-directive therapist who portrays genuineness, empathy and unconditional positive regard.

This humanistic approach to therapy underpins many of the current approaches to counselling. Given what you have just read on the potential cost of empathy and the impact of that potential cost in relation to offering help, can you suggest ways psychologists might protect themselves from harm?

Convergence of motivations: volunteering People tend to engage in more long-term helping behaviour, such as volunteerism, due to multiple motives. Some of these motives are associated with empathy, such as perspective taking and empathic concern, whereas other motives are more egoistic, such as wanting to enhance one’s resumé, relieve negative emotions or conform to prosocial norms (Hur, 2006; Penner, Dovidio, Piliavin, & Schroeder, 2005; Piferi, Jobe, Jones, & Gaines, 2006; Reeder et al., 2001). Allen Omoto and colleagues (2009) have found that both other-focused motivation and self-focused motivation predicted volunteerism. Snyder and Omoto (2008) observed that purely altruistic motives may not keep individuals motivated long enough to withstand the personal costs associated with some kinds of prolonged helping – self-interest, however, may keep people going. Egoistic motives, therefore, can be put to good use. This was evident in a set of studies by Eamonn Ferguson and colleagues (2008). They conducted a longitudinal study of blood donation in the UK and found that having other-oriented beliefs about blood donation (e.g., society benefits from blood donation) and having self-oriented beliefs (e.g., the donor would benefit by donating blood) each predicted people’s later actual blood donation, but having the self-oriented beliefs was the stronger predictor. Research conducted in Australia by Arthur Stukas and colleagues (2016), which surveyed 4085 Australians, investigated motivations to help and the resulting health benefits. Their findings indicated

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that those who volunteer primarily for other-oriented reasons (e.g., to express prosocial values, reaffirm relationships with close others, to learn about others etc.) were more likely to report higher levels of wellbeing (self-esteem, self-efficacy, social connectedness and trust), higher satisfaction, perceived support from the volunteer organisation, and intentions to continue volunteering. Conversely, those who volunteer primarily for self-oriented reasons (e.g., a distraction from personal problems or to advance their careers), reported lower wellbeing and poorer outcomes.

CULTURAL DIVERSITY GLOBAL ATTITUDES TOWARDS HELPING The Charities Aid Foundation World Giving Index (Charities Aid Foundation, 2017), which is the result of more than 146 000 interviews with people from 139 countries, suggests a global decrease in giving since their last report in 2016. The proportion of people across the world who donated money was the lowest in three years, with all Western countries in the top 20 recording a decrease in their CAF World Giving Index score. In 2012, Australia was found to be the most generous country on Earth – it headed the five-year index of giving between 2007 and 2011. In the latest report however,

Australia has fallen from first to sixth place in the ratings (see Table 10.1). Myanmar retains its position in first place, largely due to the prevalence of small, frequent acts of giving to support those who choose a monastic lifestyle. Indonesia sits in second place, with Kenya, New Zealand and the US rounding out the top five spots. Kenya wins the most improved award – increasing 8%, largely due to improvements in donations, volunteering and helping others. Australia has seen a 10% decrease in the proportion of people donating money – slipping from third to ninth place; New Zealand was down by 2% but retains a top five position.

TABLE 10.1 World Giving Index, 2017: top 20 Country

CAF World Giving Index Rank

CAF World Giving Index score (%)

Helping a stranger (%)

Donating money (%)

Volunteering time (%)

Myanmar

1

65

53

91

51

Indonesia

2

60

47

79

55

Kenya

3

60

76

52

51

New Zealand

4

57

65

65

41

USA

5

56

73

56

41

Australia

6

56

66

63

40

Canada

7

54

67

61

35

Ireland

8

53

61

60

39

United Arab Emirates

9

51

71

55

27

Netherlands

10

51

51

64

36

United Kingdom

11

50

58

64

28

Sierra Leone

12

49

81

26

41

Malta

13

48

45

73

26

Liberia

14

46

75

18

46

Iceland

15

46

44

68

26

Thailand

16

46

51

68

19

Iran

17

45

61

50

25

Zambia

18

45

69

33

33

Germany

19

45

58

55

22

Norway

20

45

49

55

30

Scores are for 2016 only and list includes only countries surveyed during 2016. Data relate to participation in giving behaviours during one month prior to interview. CAF World Giving Index scores are shown to the nearest whole number but the rankings are determined using two decimal points. Source: Charities Aid Foundation. (2017). CAF World Giving Index 2017: A global view of giving trends, p. 11. Retrieved from https://www.cafonline.org/docs/default-source/about-uspublications/cafworldgivingindex2017_2167a_web_210917.pdf?sfvrsn=ed1dac40_10

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In terms of helping a stranger, if we look at absolute numbers, India and China hold the first and second positions largely due to their massive populations – looking at the data it seems that more than 340 million people in India and China help strangers in a typical month! Sierra Leone is one of the most improved countries, driven by an increase in all three activities, but particularly volunteering time. The country has seen a steady improvement in its score for helping a stranger since 2013, despite the Ebola crisis of 2014, a decline in iron ore prices, and the subsequent economic contraction in 2015.

When it comes to volunteering time Indonesia takes first place, Kenya has moved up from eighth to second place, while Mauritius and Australia made their first appearances in the top 10. New Zealand and the US retained their inclusion in the top 10, although both recorded lower scores than previous years. As you can see from Figure 10.7, although the Oceania region has recorded a drop in donating money and helping a stranger, they are still one of the most generations regions of the world.

FIGURE 10.7 World Giving Index 2017 shows the Oceania region was the most generous in the world. The overall World Giving Index scores for the Oceania region consisting of Australia and New Zealand suggests the region is the most generous in the world. Europe 43% 36% 19% Americas 54% 28% 23%

0

0

Asia 47% 33% 21%

5 year score 43% 36% 19%

0 –2

+2 –2

–1

5 year score 49% 36% 22%

–3

–1

5 year score 52% 30% 24% Oceania 65% 64% 40% 5 year score 66% 68% 40%

Africa 57% 18% 21% +2 +1 +2

0 5 year score 55% 17% 19%

–1

–4

Source: Charities Aid Foundation. (2017, September). CAF World Giving Index 2017: A global view of giving trends. Retrieved from https://www.cafonline.org/docs/ default-source/about-us-publications/cafworldgivingindex2017_2167a_web_210917.pdf?sfvrsn=ed1dac40_10

Spontaneous offers to help following disasters is a growing phenomenon that is largely motivated by the amount of media coverage these events receive, coupled with the desire to do something for those who need help. Following the floods of January 2011 that inundated the central business district and at least 28 000 homes in Brisbane, Australia’s third largest city, thousands of well-meaning volunteers converged on the worst-hit areas. There were 62 000 people who registered to join what was dubbed the ‘Mud Army’, with likely triple that number in unregistered volunteers (see Figure 10.8). Many of these were recruited via social media sites such as Facebook and Twitter (Australian Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs & Red Cross, 2010; McDonald, Sonn, Sun, & Creber, 2012). Spontaneous volunteers are people who follow an impulse to help. They are not affiliated with a recognised volunteer agency and may or may not have relevant skills or training. Their desire to volunteer generally coincides with peak media coverage in the first week of the disaster, and most are prepared to do anything to help (Barraket, Keast, Newton, Walters, & James, 2013; Cottrell, 2011). But what is it that motivates these people to action? And do they help rescue efforts or hinder them? A myriad of emotional responses was recalled during post-event interviews with some of Queensland’s Mud Army volunteers. Many spoke of emotions such as sadness and surprise when witnessing the extent

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of the damage. This was contrasted by feelings of happiness, FIGURE 10.8 Spontaneous volunteers – The Mud Army, satisfaction and pride when reviewing their contribution to Queensland 2011 the clean-up effort. An expression of empathy and compassion for the victims was a common theme throughout, as were The Mud Army was the name given to the thousands of people who volunteered to clean up in Queensland after the 2011 floods. suggestions that a sense of community spirit compelled them to help those affected by the disaster (McDonald et al., 2012). It appears that the type of event also plays an important part in determining whether people will volunteer to help. The size or enormity of the event (44%), seeing the need to help (26%) and identifying with the community in need are all factors that have been listed by volunteers (Cottrell, 2011). Although the capacity of spontaneous volunteers to play a valuable role in post-disaster recovery efforts has been recognised, many disadvantages of their use have also been identified. For example, the large number of volunteers that come forward to offer assistance can be overwhelming, placing unnecessary strain on emergency organisations at critical times. They also will have varying degrees of appropriate or credible skills, their motivations to help may be problematic and their involvement could lead Source: Newspix/Craig Greenhill. to post-traumatic responses after the event. Furthermore, the processing of volunteers and organising appropriate activities takes time, and there are further complications with the use of untrained personnel presenting a greater risk of injury, therefore creating issues with insurance coverage and liability (Cottrell, 2011). Many volunteers have expressed a sense of frustration having had their offer to help not accepted, or perhaps having their ‘real’ skills under-utilised during the recovery effort. Many have also expressed frustration with the apparent lack of organisation that often ensues when large groups of people respond en masse to community crises (Cottrell, 2011). These sentiments are not restricted to volunteers in Australia, however – in recent times emergency management organisations throughout the world have been criticised for their inability to quickly incorporate spontaneous volunteers within their established practices. The major challenge that these organisations face is providing a balance between harnessing the enthusiasm of the volunteers while maintaining the integrity of a carefully managed emergency response. What people often fail to consider is the strength of a situationally-driven, problem-focused, locallybased and improvisational response strategy (Tierney, 2001). For some, the perception of chaos is countered by notions of maintaining their own status and social order. Ultimately, when the volunteer experience matches their motivations for helping, people express satisfaction, but when it does not, feelings of dissatisfaction, disappointment and frustration ensue (Cottrell, 2011; Pauline & Pauline, 2009). Social media may play an important role in solving at least some of these issues. In response to the overwhelming numbers of volunteers who came forward after the Queensland floods, the Queensland Government launched ‘The Ready Queensland’ smartphone app. Queenslanders are now able to register their interest to help, watch short volunteer preparedness videos and access many other resources designed to help with streamlining the recruitment of volunteers during the time of a disaster.

PERSONAL INFLUENCES ON THE DECISION TO HELP As we have just seen, social psychological research addressing the question ‘Why do people help?’ has been quite productive. What about the question, ‘Who is likely to help?’ In this section, we consider some of the individual differences between people that address this question.

Individual differences in helpfulness Although situational factors clearly can overwhelm individual differences in influencing helping behaviours in many contexts (Latané & Darley, 1970), researchers have found some evidence that people who are more helpful than others in one situation are likely to be more helpful in other situations as well (Dovidio et al., 2006; Hay & Cook, 2007; Laible, Carlo, Murphy, Augustine, & Roesch, 2014; Rushton, 1981). In addition, longitudinal research suggests that this individual difference may be relatively stable over time (Dovidio et al., 2006). For example, Nancy Eisenberg and colleagues (2002) found that the degree to which preschool children exhibited spontaneous helping behaviour predicted how helpful they would be in later childhood and early adulthood.

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As with so many other individual differences, recent research suggests that differences in helpfulness appears to be partly based on genetics. Genetically identical (monozygotic) twins are more similar to each other in their helpful behavioural tendencies and their helping-related emotions and reactions, such as empathy, than are fraternal (dizygotic) twins, who share only a portion of their genetic make-up. These findings suggest that there may be a heritable component to helpfulness (Ebstein et al., 2010; Fortuna & Knafo, 2014; Mikolajewski, Chavarria, Moltisanti, Hart, & Taylor, 2014). Joan Chiao (2011) estimates that between 56% and 72% of prosocial behaviour can be attributed to genetic effects.

The altruistic personality Some people are more helpful than others, but can we predict who is likely to be altruistic by looking at people’s overall personalities? If so, what are the various components of the altruistic personality? Consider these following people: Bill Gates, a computer geek who co-founded Microsoft and became the richest man in the world; Bono, the extraverted Irish rock star; and Mother Teresa, a Roman Catholic nun from Macedonia. Gates and his wife Melinda have pledged billions of dollars to charity, much of it to target health issues around the world. Bono has worked tirelessly to raise money and awareness about the plight of poor African nations. Mother Teresa devoted her life to the poor in India. These well-known figures seem quite different from each other in overall personality – except for their concern with helping others. The quest to discover the altruistic personality has not been an easy one. Much of the research conducted over the years has failed to find consistent, reliable personality characteristics that predict helping behaviour across situations. Some researchers have changed the nature of the quest, however, focusing on personality variables that predict helping in some specific situations rather than across all situations; and their studies have been more successful in identifying traits that predict such behaviour (Carlo, Okun, Knight, & de Guzman, 2005; Eberly-Lewis & Coetzee, 2015; Finkelstein, 2009; Penner, 2004). Research has found that people who tend to be very agreeable, and people who are relatively humble, are more likely to be helpful than people who are disagreeable or lack humility (Caprara, Alessandri, & Eisenberg, 2012; Courbalay et al., 2015; Hilbig & Hessler, 2013; LaBouff et al., 2012). The two individual difference factors that perhaps most of the research has focused on as predictors of helpfulness are empathy and advanced moral reasoning. We have already discussed empathy in this chapter, such as in the context of Batson’s empathy–altruism hypothesis. Empathy – being able to take the perspective of others and their experience – clearly is associated positively with helping and other prosocial behaviours in children and adults. The second characteristic associated with helping is moral reasoning. Children and adults who exhibit internalised and advanced levels of moral reasoning behave more altruistically than others. Such reasoning involves adhering to moral standards independent of external social controls and taking into account the needs of others when making decisions about courses of action. By contrast, people whose reasoning is focused on their own needs, or on the concrete personal consequences that their actions are likely to have, display a tendency not to engage in many helping behaviours. (Albiero, Matricardi, Speltri, & Toso, 2009; Carlo, Knight, McGinley, & Hayes, 2011; Eisenberg, Hofer, Sulik, & Liew, 2014; Laible, Murphy, & Augustine, 2014; Ongley, Nola, & Malti, 2014; Malti, Gasser, & Gutzwiller-Helfenfinger, 2010; RothHanania, Davidov, & Zahn-Waxler, 2011). Elizabeth Midlarsky, Stephanie Fagin-Jones and their colleagues (Fagin-Jones & Midlarsky, 2007; Midlarsky, Fagin-Jones, & Corley, 2005) have conducted one fascinating line of research that suggests the importance of both empathy and moral reasoning. They contrasted the personalities of ‘non-Jewish heroes of the Holocaust’ – people who risked their lives to help Jews despite having no expectation of any extrinsic rewards – with bystanders who did not help during the Holocaust. The researchers found that rescuers did indeed tend to differ from bystanders on a combination of several variables associated with prosocial behaviour, particularly empathic concern and moral reasoning. Both of these qualities are reflected in the quote of one woman who sheltered 30 Jews in her home in Poland: ‘Helping to give shelter was the natural thing to do, the human thing. When I looked into those eyes, how could I not care? Of course I was afraid – always afraid – but there was no choice but to do the only decent thing’ (Midlarsky et al., 2005, p. 908).

Empathy as a personality variable Having progressed through this chapter, you should not be too surprised that the trait that has received the most attention in predicting helping behaviour is empathy. We have already discussed empathy a couple of times in this chapter, but this time we are going to consider it as a personality variable. Research consistently demonstrates that being able to take the perspective of others and experience empathy is clearly associated with helping and other prosocial behaviours in children and adults (Eisenberg, Spinrad, & Knafo-Noam, 2015; FeldmanHall, Dalgleish, Evans, & Mobbs, 2015; Hastings, Miller, Kahle, & Zahn-Waxler, 420

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2014; Morelli et al., 2015). Additional support however has come from research conducted in the area of social neuroscience. For instance, research conducted by Sylvia Morelli and her colleagues (2015) found links between empathy and brain activation in individuals corresponding to the emotional experiences they saw other people were expressing in photos. This activation in turn predicted the individuals’ degree of everyday helping behaviour. Abigail Marsh and colleagues (2015) found an intriguing neurological difference between people who volunteered to donate a kidney to a stranger and other people. Brain scans and behavioural testing conducted with this population indicated some structural and functional brain differences that may make them more sensitive, on average, to other people’s distress. The team found that the right amygdala (an emotion-sensitive brain region) in this population was larger in volume and displayed greater neural activity while viewing fearful expressions – participants were also more accurate in recognising fearful facial expressions than the control subjects. In a particularly creative study by Marco Zanon and colleagues (2014), participants were virtually immersed in a building on fire and had to evacuate to save their virtual selves. They came across another virtual person (allegedly another participant) who was injured, trapped and calling for help. Would the participants risk their own virtual lives to stop and help this trapped person, or would they look out for themselves and head straight for the exit? While all this was happening the participants were in an MRI scanner and their brain activity was recorded. The findings indicated that participants who showed heightened activation in neural regions associated with perspective taking were the ones most likely to risk their virtual lives to try to help the trapped other person. People differ in how empathic they tend to be, but a growing body of research suggests that empathy can be developed and taught. Emily van Berkhout and John Malouff (2015) conducted a meta-analysis of 19 studies of the impact of empathy training programs and found reliable support for their effectiveness. Moreover, Karina Schumann and others (2014) demonstrated that when people are made to recognise that empathy can be developed and strengthened, they are more willing to exert effort to empathise with others, in part to use these experiences as opportunities to improve this skill.

INTERPERSONAL INFLUENCES ON WHO PEOPLE HELP We have just seen how some people are more helpful than others, but now we turn to the question of whether some people are more likely to receive help than others, at least in certain situations. We also explore some of the interpersonal aspects of helping.

Perceived characteristics of the person in need Although many characteristics of a person in need might affect whether that individual is helped, researchers have paid special attention to two: the personal attractiveness of the person in need and whether the person seems responsible for being in the position of needing assistance.

Attractiveness In Chapter 9, we described the social advantages physically attractive individuals enjoy. The bias towards beauty also affects helping. Attractive people are more likely to be offered help and cooperation across a number of different scenarios, whether it be asking for directions on campus, playing a game that could be either competitive or cooperative, or requesting money in a health emergency (Farrelly et al., 2007; West & Brown, 1975; Wilson, 1978). In addition to physical attractiveness, interpersonal attractiveness (e.g., when an individual displays happiness, is popular, warm, cooperative and affiliative) is also related to receiving more help (Hauser, Preston, & Stansfield, 2014; Siem, Lotz-Schmitt, & Stürmer, 2014; Stürmer, Snyder, & Omoto, 2005). Certainly, one explanation for some of these findings is that people help attractive others in the hope of establishing some kind of relationship with an attractive person. Not many people would be shocked to learn, for example, that male motorists in France were more likely to stop their cars and offer a ride to female hitchhikers whose bust size was enhanced (by a bra worn by a confederate) or who were smiling (Guéguen, 2007; Guéguen & Fischer-Lokou, 2004). The research also considered the response for female drivers and found that although they were more likely to offer a ride to the hitchhikers with the larger bust size, the difference was not significant. For whatever it is worth, Guéguen and Lamy (2009) have also found that female hitchhikers wearing a blonde wig are more likely to be helped by male motorists than those wearing brown or black wigs. A recent study conducted by Stephen Arnocky and colleagues in 2016 found that kind, altruistic people are more desirable to the opposite sex – and, incidentally, have more sex! Participants who scored high for self-reported altruistic acts (e.g., giving to charity) reported that they were more desirable to the

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Attractive people have a better chance than unattractive people of getting help when they need it.

TRUE

opposite sex, had more casual sexual partners and had sex more often in relationships. Those who were willing to donate potential monetary winnings also reported having more lifetime dating experiences and sexual partners, more casual sexual partners and more sexual partners in the previous year. Interestingly, these patterns persisted, even when controlling for narcissism, ‘big five’ personality traits, and socially desirable responding. The authors believe this gives us an indication that altruists have higher mating success. Another interesting study in a similar vein was conducted by Farrelly, Clemson and Guthrie in 2016 with research designed to investigate whether altruism plays a role in mating women’s preferences and long-term relationships. Female participants were presented with photographs of men of varying levels of physical attractiveness, alongside descriptions of them behaving either altruistically or not in a number of different scenarios. The results showed that women preferred men who were both attractive and altruistic (particularly in longer term relationships), that being altruistic made low attractive men more desirable, and that men who were just altruistic were rated more desirable than men who were just attractive.

Attributions of responsibility People are more likely to help someone in need if they think the person should not be held responsible for his or her predicament. If they think – even unjustifiably – that the person can be blamed for his or her situation, they are less likely to help. These effects can be seen in fairly mundane issues ranging through to life-and-death matters, such as requests to take notes for a fellow student (Barnes, Ickes, & Kidd, 1979) or intervening in an instance of domestic violence (Gracia, Garcia, & Lila, 2009) or helping someone very ill. This latter case was illustrated in research by Michelle Lobchuk and colleagues (2008), who found that caregivers of people with lung cancer had more negative emotions and gave less supportive help if they believed the patient was largely responsible for his or her disease. Similarly, Nadine Mackay and Christine Barrowclough (2005) report that the medical and nursing staff at an emergency room felt more negative about, and were less helpful to, patients whose injuries they felt were more controllable and avoidable. More recently, Jean Decety and colleagues (2010), using fMRI technology, found that participants showed brain activity indicating greater sensitivity when learning about the pain of individuals who had contracted AIDS as a result of a blood transfusion rather than drug use.

Helping friends and similar others As we would expect, people are usually more helpful to those they know and care about than to strangers or superficial acquaintances (Clark & Mills, 2012; Stewart-Williams, 2008). People in a communal relationship, such as close friends or romantic partners, feel mutual responsibility for each other’s needs. People in an exchange relationship, such as acquaintances or business associates, give help with the expectation of receiving comparable benefits in return: ‘If I help you move your furniture, you can give me a ride to the airport’. When people are, or desire to be, in a communal relationship with each other, they attend more to each other’s needs, are more likely to help, and are less likely to be concerned with keeping track of rewards and costs than people in an exchange relationship are. People in a communal relationship also feel better about having helped the other, and they feel worse if they are unable to help (Williamson, Clark, Pegalis, & Behan, 1996). Whether they are friends or strangers, we are more likely to help others who are similar to us. All kinds of similarity – from dress and attitudes to nationality – increase our willingness to help, and signs of dissimilarity decrease it (Batson, Lishner, Cook, & Sawyer, 2005; Dovidio, 1984). There are probably several reasons underlying this effect. For one thing, as seen in Chapter 8, we are more likely to be attracted to and develop relationships with people who are similar to ourselves. In addition, people tend to empathise more with similar others or with people in their ingroups (Xu, Zuo, Wang, & Han, 2009). The influence of similarity could even be a form of kin selection, because people may use similarity in appearance as a signal of potential kinship. People are much more likely to help fellow ingroup members than they are to help members of an outgroup (Bernhard, Fischbacher, & Fehr, 2006; Kogut & Ritov, 2007; Levine & Cassidy, 2010; Stürmer, Snyder, Kropp, & Siem, 2006). The results of a meta-analysis of 212 studies affirm the reliability of this intergroup bias and also suggest that it is based more on people being especially helpful to ingroup members rather than being especially negative to outgroup members (Balliet, Wu, & De Dreu, 2014). Numerous scholars refer to an ‘empathy gap’ in intergroup relations – people consistently show greater empathy for the needs and suffering of ingroup members than outgroup members. This has been demonstrated in a variety of ways, including through brain imaging studies. It appears that we quite literally feel the pain of a suffering ingroup member more than for a suffering outgroup member (Cikara, 2015; Eres & Molenberghs, 2013; Gutsell & Inzlicht, 2012; Hackel, Looser, & Van Bavel, 2014). 422

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Intergroup biases in helping can be reduced significantly if the members of the different groups can perceive themselves as members of a common group. Through fostering perceptions of shared identities and highlighting similarities between individuals across groups, an ingroup and an outgroup can begin to see each other as more similar than different, thereby promoting helping and other positive behaviours (Dovidio, Gaertner, Shnabel, Saguy, & Johnson, 2010; Gaertner & Dovidio, 2012). The effects of similarity and ingroup status on helping suggest that members of the same race should help each other more than they help members of different races. However, in a meta-analysis of more than 30 studies, Donald Saucier and colleagues (2005) found no consistent overall relationship between racial similarity and helping. What accounts for these inconsistencies? First, although helping can be a compassionate response to another, it can also be seen as a sign of superiority over the person who needs help, and this can greatly complicate the decision about helping someone (Halabi, Dovidio, & Nadler, 2012; Nadler & Fisher, 1986; Täuber & van Zomeren, 2012; Vorauer & Sasaki, 2009). Given the possibility that helping someone can seem threatening or condescending, it may make it harder to predict when helping as a function of racial ingroup or outgroup will or won’t occur. Second, public displays of racial prejudice risk social disapproval, and prejudiced individuals may bend over backward (in public, at least) to avoid revealing their attitudes. As discussed in Chapter 4, however, modern racism relies on more subtle forms of discrimination. Consistent with predictions from theories of modern racism, Saucier and colleagues’ metaanalysis (2005) found that when the situation provides people with excuses or justifications for not helping, racial discrimination in helping is more likely.

Gender and helping Here is a quick, one-question quiz: Who helps more – men or women? Before you answer, consider the following situations: A Two strangers pass on the street. Suddenly, one of them needs help that might be dangerous to give. Other people are watching. B Two individuals have a close relationship. Every so often, one of them needs assistance that takes time and energy to provide but is not physically dangerous. No one else is around to notice whether help is given. Is your answer different for these two situations? It is likely to be. Situation A is a classic male-helper scenario. Because much of the research on helping once focused on emergency situations, such as in the bystander intervention studies, older reviews tended to find that, on average, men are more helpful than women and women receive more help than men (Eagly & Crowley, 1986). Men also may be more likely to help in dramatic ways when they feel in competition with another man. Frank McAndrew and Carin Perilloux (2012) found that if there is an opportunity to look more heroic than another man in the eyes of a woman observing, men may become especially likely to volunteer to endure pain to benefit the rest of their group. Situation B is the classic female-helper scenario. Every day, millions of people provide support for their friends and loved ones, and some reviews indicate that women are more likely to provide this kind of help than are men (Eagly, 2009; Hyde, 2014). Although it lacks the high drama of an emergency intervention, this type of helping, called ‘social support’, plays a crucial role in the quality of our lives. In Chapter 14 we take a closer look at the evidence indicating that social support is associated with better physical and psychological health. The evidence for gender differences is not strong or reliable for types of helping that do not easily fit into either of these categories, such as helping someone who is deemed to be attractive versus someone who is not, or helping someone of the opposite sex. Overall, then, there does not seem to be a general and consistent gender difference in who is most likely to help others. What about the other side of the coin, though, is there a difference in who is likely to seek help? Have you ever had the experience of getting lost while driving with a member of the opposite sex? Who wanted to stop early on and ask for directions? Who kept insisting that help was not necessary? In this case, the stereotype is true: men ask for help less frequently than women do – a difference replicated in several countries around the world (Chang, 2007; Mackenzie, Gekoski, & Knox, 2006; Murray et al., 2008; Sherer, 2007). Help-seeking is less socially acceptable for men and is more threatening to their self-esteem (Rosette, Mueller, & Lebel, 2015; Wills & DePaulo, 1991).

Women seek help more often than men do.

TRUE

Culture, helping and help-seeking Compared with individualists, collectivists may be more likely to help ingroup members but less likely to help outgroup members (Conway, Ryder, Tweed, & Sokol, 2001; Schwartz, 1990). The difference between individualist and collectivist cultures also affects whether people are less likely to help if they think the person is responsible for his or her plight. Elizabeth Mullen and Linda Skitka (2009) proposed that this may Copyright 2020 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-202

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be a stronger influence on helping in an individualist culture, where individuals may be expected to have more control over their own fates, than in a collectivist one. On the other hand, perceptions of how much the person in need contributes to society might affect the helping decisions of collectivists – who have stronger norms of interdependence – more than of individualists. To test these ideas, Mullen and Skitka had participants from the US and the Ukraine (a more collectivistic society) read about 16 individuals who needed an organ transplant. Information about each individual suggested that some were more responsible for their illness than others (e.g., a person who continued to eat unhealthy foods and resist exercise despite warnings versus a person who had a genetically defective organ). The researchers also varied information about how much contribution the individuals seemed to make to society (e.g., a person who volunteered for multiple organisations versus a person who did not volunteer). After reading about all 16 people, participants were asked to indicate up to six of the patients who should receive a transplant. In both cultures, people were less likely to help patients who were more responsible for their organ failure or who contributed less to society. However, the issue of personal responsibility played a bigger role in the decisions made by the Americans, whereas the issue of contribution to society played a bigger role in the decisions by the Ukrainians. There also may be cultural differences in seeking help. Heejung Kim and colleagues (2012), for example, observed that Asians and Asian Americans report seeking social support less than white Americans do. This greater resistance to seeking help among Asians and Asian Americans may be due to greater concerns about shame, receiving criticism and hurting the relationship with the person or people whom they would ask for help. Indeed, Shelley Taylor and colleagues (2007) found that seeking and receiving social support from close others is more stressful, both psychologically and physiologically, to Asian and Asian American students than to white American students. Asian students benefited more from what the researchers called implicit social support – support that comes from just thinking about close others but that does not involve actually seeking or receiving their help in coping with stressful events. Similar issues have been reported to explain why people do not seek help for common mental health concerns. A systematic review of the literature conducted by Amelia Gulliver and colleagues (2010) suggested that although young people perceived stigma and embarrassment, problems recognising symptoms and a preference for self-reliance to be the most important barriers to help-seeking, they also perceived positive past experiences, and social support and encouragement from others as aids to the help-seeking process. Resistance to seeking help, however, is not limited to concerns about shame, criticism and damaging relationships, nor is it limited to these populations. Distance and socioeconomic factors play an important role in the standard of health, and levels of access to healthcare services in rural and remote Australia. Interviews with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples and healthcare workers in Australia have revealed that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander patients rely heavily on social relationships and issues of respect and trust. By contrast, practitioners focus on making Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people feel comfortable via alterations to physical environments (e.g., the inclusion of Aboriginal art and artefacts to treatment areas) but their systems often place little emphasis on creating strong interpersonal relationships, which ironically are the focal point for their patients. The creation of truly comforting physical environments and systems that are easier to navigate may assist in overcoming cultural barriers, but they are often regarded as token gestures if trusting interpersonal relationships are not formed between patient and practitioner (McBain-Rigg & Veitch, 2011). Research conducted by Helena de Anstiss (2009) suggests that seeking help for mental health issues is also an issue for refugees. Her research examined the nature and scope of help-seeking and service utilisation among refugee children and adolescents from the former republics of Yugoslavia, the Middle East, South Asia, and Northern and Western Africa. Her findings indicated that of the 7.3% of children and adolescents found to have a need for mental health care, three-quarters did not utilise available services (formal or informal). During focus group discussions, a common trend emerged: across and within ethnic and gender groups these adolescents consistently said that they did not, and would not, venture beyond their close friendship networks to recruit the help of professionals, even if their problems were very troubling or distressing. The reasons cited included: • a low priority on psychological issues • little knowledge of mental health and associated services • distrust of helping professionals and agencies • perceived stigma associated with mental health problems and help-seeking • social and cultural factors affecting how problems are understood, how help is sought and from whom. Similarly, research conducted by Shameran Slewa-Younan and colleagues (2017) to investigate mental health and help-seeking behaviour of resettled Afghan refugees in Australia suggested that despite a high 424

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level of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) symptoms in this refugee population (14.7%) there was a very low uptake of mental healthcare services (only 4.6% of people sought help), which may have been impacted by a lack of knowledge of the presence and adverse effects of PTSD symptoms and ultimately where to find help. What these situations highlight, of course, is the overwhelming complexity of the factors that contribute to either seeking or not seeking appropriate support.

SITUATIONAL INFLUENCES ON WHEN PEOPLE HELP Thus far, we have focused on why people help others, who is likely to help others and whom they are likely to help. We now turn to the question of when people help. We begin by discussing a remarkably creative and provocative set of research findings that make a surprising point: if you need help in an emergency, you may be better off if there is only one witness to your plight than if there are several. We then focus on a wide range of other situational factors related to helping.

The bystander effect On 15 January 2008, a man named Rage Ibrahim was convicted for sexually assaulting a woman in the hallway of an apartment building in the US the previous summer. Surveillance video from the hallway showed several residents – as many as 10 – opening their apartment doors, looking at the man beating and raping the screaming woman, and closing their doors as they went back into their apartments. At one point three men approached them, but they left after Ibrahim got off the woman and shoved one of them in the back. Despite the woman’s cries for someone to call the police, no one called 000 for more than an hour. A police commissioner who saw the video said, ‘It was horrifying. I can’t describe how it sent chills up my back, watching this woman getting assaulted and people turning their backs and doing nothing’ (Gottfried, 2007, 2008). The sad truth is that this kind of story of bystanders failing to act, while chilling, is not as uncommon as most people imagine. FIGURE 10.9 Kitty Genovese The story earlier in the chapter, involving the hit-and-run of a toddler in China, presents an additional example of this problem. The murder of Kitty Genovese, pictured here, shocked the nation in 1964. How could 38 witnesses stand by and do nothing? The most famous of these stories occurred a half century ago. Research conducted in the aftermath of this tragedy suggests It has remained famous in large part because of the fascinating that if there had been only one witness rather than almost 40, social psychological research it inspired. Kitty Genovese might have had a better chance of receiving help, The story begins in New York at about 3.20 a.m. on 13 and she might be alive today. March 1964. Twenty-eight-year-old Kitty Genovese (pictured in Figure 10.9) was returning home from her job as a bar manager. Suddenly, a man attacked her with a knife. She was stalked, stabbed and sexually assaulted just 32 metres from her own apartment building. Lights went on and windows went up as she screamed, ‘Oh my God! He stabbed me! Please help me!’ She broke free from her attacker twice, but only briefly. Newspaper reports indicated that 38 of her neighbours witnessed her ordeal, but not one intervened. Finally, after nearly 45 minutes of terror, one man called the police. But before they got her to the hospital, Kitty was dead. The murder of Kitty Genovese shocked the nation. Were her neighbours to blame? It seemed unlikely that all 38 of them could have been moral monsters. Most of the media attention focused on the decline of morals and values in contemporary society and on the anonymity and apathy seen in large American cities such as New York. Indeed, almost 50 years later in 2012 Source: The New York Times/Redux. these very same problems were cited in the Chinese media about contemporary Chinese culture in response to the tragic hit-andrun incident that killed the toddler described earlier in the chapter. A few days after the murder of Kitty Genovese, John Darley and Bibb Latané discussed over dinner the events and the explanations being offered for it. They were not convinced that these explanations were sufficient to account for why Kitty Genovese did not get the help she needed, and they wondered if other, more social psychological processes might have been at work. They speculated that because each witness to the attack could see that many other witnesses had turned on their lights and were looking out their windows, each witness may have assumed that others would, or should, take responsibility and call

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In an emergency, a person who needs help has a much better chance of getting it if three other people are present than if only one other person is present.

FALSE

Bystander effect

The effect whereby the presence of others inhibits helping.

the police. To test their ideas, Darley and Latané (1968) set out to see if they could produce unresponsive bystanders under laboratory conditions. When a participant arrived, he or she was taken to one of a series of small rooms located along a corridor. Speaking over an intercom, the experimenter explained that he wanted participants to discuss personal problems university students often face. Participants were told that to protect confidentiality, the group discussion would take place over the intercom system and that the experimenter would not be listening. They were required to speak one at a time, taking turns. Some participants were assigned to talk with one other person, whereas other participants joined larger groups of three or six people. Although one participant did mention in passing that he suffered from a seizure disorder that was sometimes triggered by study pressures, the opening moments of the conversation were uneventful. But soon, an unexpected problem developed. When the time came for this person to speak again, he stuttered badly, had a hard time speaking clearly, and sounded as if he were in very serious trouble: I could really-er-use some help so if somebody would-er-give me a little h-help-uh-er- erer-er c-could somebody-er-er-help-er-uh-uh-uh [choking sounds] … I’m gonna die-erer-I’m … gonna die-er-help-er-er-seizure-er [chokes, then quiet].

Confronted with this situation, what would you do? Would you interrupt the experiment, dash out of your cubicle and try to find the experimenter? Or would you sit there – concerned but unsure how to react? As it turns out, participants’ responses to this emergency were strongly influenced by the size of their group. In fact, all participants were participating alone, but tape-recorded material led them to believe that others were present. All the participants who thought that only they knew about the emergency quickly left the room to try to get help. In the larger groups, however, participants were less likely and slower to intervene. Indeed, 38% of the participants in the six-person groups never left the room at all during the six minutes before the experimenter would finally terminate the study. This research led Latané and Darley to a chilling conclusion: the more bystanders there are, the less likely the victim will be helped. This is the bystander effect, whereby the presence of others inhibits helping. Before the pioneering work of Latané and Darley, most people would have assumed just the opposite. Surely there is safety in numbers? Do we not feel more secure rushing in to help when others are around to lend their support? Latané and Darley overturned this common-sense assumption and provided a careful, step-by-step analysis of the decision-making process involved in emergency interventions. In the following sections, we examine each of five steps in this process: 1 noticing something unusual 2 interpreting it as an emergency 3 taking responsibility for getting help 4 deciding how to help 5 providing assistance. We also consider the reasons why people sometimes fail to take one of these steps and therefore do not help. These steps, and the obstacles along the way, are summarised in Figure 10.10.

Noticing The first step towards being a helpful bystander is to notice that someone needs help, or at least that something out of the ordinary is happening. Participants in the seizure study could not help but notice the emergency. In many situations, however, the problem is not necessarily perceived. The presence of others can be distracting and can divert attention away from indications of a victim’s plight. People who live in big cities and noisy environments may become so used to seeing people lying on footpaths or hearing screams that they begin to tune them out, becoming susceptible to what Stanley Milgram (1970) called stimulus overload.

Interpreting Pluralistic ignorance

The state in which people in a group mistakenly think that their own individual thoughts, feelings or behaviours are different from those of the others in the group.

426

Noticing is a necessary first step towards helping, but then people must interpret the meaning of what they notice. Cries of pain can be mistaken for shrieks of laughter; a heart-attack victim can appear to be a sleeping drunk. So, observers wonder, ‘Does that person really need help?’ In general, the more ambiguous the situation is, the less likely it is that a bystanders will intervene (Clark & Word, 1972). Perhaps the most powerful information available during an emergency is the behaviour of other people. Startled by a sudden, unexpected and possibly dangerous event, each person looks quickly to see what others are doing. As everyone looks at everyone else for clues about how to behave, the entire group is paralysed by indecision. When this happens, the person needing help is a victim of pluralistic ignorance. In this state of ignorance, each individual believes that his or her own thoughts and feelings are different

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FIGURE 10.10 The five steps to helping in an emergency On the basis of their analysis of the decision-making process in emergency interventions, Latané and Darley outlined five steps that

lead to providing assistance. But obstacles can interfere, and if a step is missed, the victim won’t be helped.

Step 5 Provide help

Audience inhibition I'll look like a fool. Costs exceed rewards What if I do something wrong? He'll sue me!

Step 4 Decide how to help

Step 1 Notice that something is happening

Ambiguity

to H Obs

tac

les

vid Pro h to Pat

Step 2 Interpret event as an emergency

elp

Diffusion of responsibility Someone else must have called 911.

ing

Hel

p

Step 3 Take responsibility for providing help

ing

Lack of competence I'm not trained to handle this, and who would I call?

Is she really sick or just drunk? Relationship between attacker and victim They'll have to resolve their own family quarrels. Pluralistic ignorance No one else seems worried.

Distraction Stop fooling around, kids, we're here to eat. Emergency!

Self-concerns I'm late for a very important date! Source: Latané, B., & Darley, J. M. (1970). The unresponsive bystander: Why doesn’t he help? New York, NY: Appleton-Century-Crofts.

from those of other people, when in fact many of the other people are thinking or feeling the same way. Each bystander thinks that other people are not acting because somehow they know there is not an emergency. Actually, everyone is confused and hesitant, but taking cues from each other’s inaction, each observer concludes that help is not required. Latané and Darley (1968) put this phenomenon to the test in an experiment in which participants completed a questionnaire in a room in which they were either (1) alone; (2) with two confederates who remained passive and took no action; or (3) with two other naive participants just like them. As the participants were working on the questionnaire, smoke began to seep into the room through a vent. Was this an emergency? How do you think you would respond? Within four minutes, half of the participants who were working alone took some action, such as leaving the room to report the smoke to someone. Within six minutes – the maximum time allotted before the researchers terminated the experiment – three-quarters of these participants took action. Clearly, they interpreted the smoke as a potential emergency. But what about the participants working in groups of three? Common sense suggests that the chances that somebody will take action should be greater when more people are present. But only one of the 24 participants in this condition took action within four minutes, and only three did so before the end of the study – even though, at that point, the smoke was so thick they had to fan it away from their faces to see the questionnaire! The rate of action was even lower when participants were in a room with two passive confederates; in this condition, only one in ten participants reported the smoke. If the participants in either of the two group conditions had interpreted the smoke as a potential emergency, they would have acted, Copyright 2020 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-202

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because their own lives would have been at stake. But instead they looked at the reactions of the others in the room, and because of their individual attempts not to look panicky or uncool, they defined the situation for each other as nothing to be worried about.

Taking responsibility

Diffusion of responsibility

The belief that others will or should take the responsibility for providing assistance to a person in need.

Noticing a victim and recognising an emergency are crucial steps, but by themselves they do not ensure that a bystander will come to the rescue. The issue of responsibility remains. When help is needed, who is responsible for providing it? If a person knows that others are around, it is all too easy to place the responsibility on them. People often fail to help because of the diffusion of responsibility – the belief that others will or should intervene. Presumably, each of those people who watched or listened to Kitty Genovese’s murder thought that someone else would do something to stop the attack. But remember those helpful participants in the seizure study who thought that they alone heard the other person’s cry for help? Diffusion of responsibility cannot occur if an individual believes that only he or she is aware of the victim’s need. An interesting set of experiments by Stephen Garcia and colleagues (2002) found that the presence of others can promote diffusion of responsibility even when those others are present only in one’s mind! Garcia and colleagues had participants simply imagine being in a crowd or being alone. Soon after, these participants were given an opportunity to help someone. The results indicated that participants who had just thought of being with many other people were less likely to help than were the participants who had imagined themselves alone. Similarly, Stenico and Greitemeyer (2014) designed an experiment to examine the idea that the presence of multiple characters within a video game reduces the player’s helping behaviour, even after the video game is over. They found that playing a video game with multiple characters present increased commitment to assist in a future study. Those who had played the same video game with only a single character present were less inclined to help. Diffusion of responsibility usually takes place under conditions of anonymity. Bystanders who do not know the victim personally are more likely to see others as responsible for providing help. Accordingly, if the psychological distance between a bystander and the victim is reduced, there will be less diffusion of responsibility and more help. Reducing the psychological distance among bystanders can also counteract the diffusion of responsibility. Established groups in which the members know each other are usually more helpful than groups of strangers (Fischer et al., 2011). For example, Mark Levine and Simon Crowther (2008) replicated the inhibiting effect of bystanders on helping when the bystanders were strangers, but they found that the effect did not occur when the bystanders were all friends. An interesting study by Maria Plötner and others (2015) tested the diffusion of responsibility with a group of 5-year-olds engaged in a painting task. As the children were painting, the adult experimenter ‘accidentally’ knocked over a cup containing coloured water, which then spilled all over the table and onto the floor. She groaned that she needed some paper towels as she feebly tried to hold back the water with her arms, and as luck would have it there just happened to be a pile of paper towels between the children and the experimenter’s table. Based on what you know of the bystander effect would the children stop what they were doing and help? In one condition the children were alone with the experimenter; the children in the other condition were with two five-year-old confederates who were trained to be friendly but to keep painting and not offer assistance during the spill. Replicating the bystander effect, the children who were in the presence of passive bystanders were much less likely to help than were the children who were alone. But the researchers went a step further. Could the inaction among these children be due to something other than diffusion of responsibility, such as feeling shy around the other kids or just following the other children’s behaviour? To isolate the role of responsibility, the researcher added a third condition. In this condition, there were two confederates sitting behind a barrier that made it difficult or impossible for them to get to the paper towels (as shown in Figure 10.11) – in this condition the responsibility was solely on the one child who could help. Would this child help? Indeed, the children where diffusion of responsibility was no longer plausible were as likely to help as if they had been the only witness.

Deciding how to help and providing help If a person has assumed the responsibility to help, he or she still must pass through the final two steps before taking action: deciding how to help and then deciding to provide help. Obstacles here include feeling a lack of competence in knowing how to help, or worrying that the potential costs of helping may be too great to justify taking the risk. The presence of other witnesses can be obstacles in these two steps as well. 428

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FIGURE 10.11 Bystander effect and diffusion of responsibility among children These photos recreate the experimental setup in the three conditions of a study to see if five-year-olds would help an experimenter by bringing paper towels to deal with a spill. When participants were alone with the experimenter (Photo A), they were more likely to help the experimenter than if they were in

(a)

(b)

the presence of two confederates (Photo B). However, if the two confederates were trapped behind a barrier and thus unable to help (Photo C), responsibility for helping could not be diffused, and the participants were as likely to help as if they were alone.

(c) Source: Saul Kassin

Latané and Darley point out that people sometimes feel too socially awkward and embarrassed to act helpfully in a public setting. When observers do not act in an emergency because they fear making a bad impression on other observers, they are under the influence of audience inhibition. This is a very common obstacle to helping, but sometimes it can be especially tragic. Melanie Carlson (2008) reports about a gang rape of an unconscious 15-year-old girl by four perpetrators in the presence of six bystanders at a party in 2002. The district attorney said that the bystanders did not intervene for fear of being considered ‘wusses’ or being ‘made fun of’ (p. 3). When Carlson interviewed young men from a university in California about how they would respond in situations like the gang rape, many of them raised similar concerns, indicating that their masculinity would be threatened if they intervened. This kind of concern about being embarrassed in front of friends and breaking perceived norms that promote minding one’s own business plays a role in a tremendous amount of bystander inaction, involving everything from sexual assault to bullying to abuse of animals (Arluke, 2012; Banyard, 2011). Adolescents, in particular, may be likely to think that the norm among their peers is more tolerant of aggression and bullying than it actually is, and this can make pluralistic ignorance and inaction all the more likely (Sandstrom & Bartini, 2010). Worrying about how others will view us does not, however, always reduce helping. When people think they will be scorned by others for failing to help, the presence of an audience increases their helpful actions (Schwartz & Gottlieb, 1980).

Audience inhibition

Reluctance to help for fear of making a bad impression on observers.

Bystander effect online One relatively new application of the research on the bystander effect is in the world of electronic-based communication. There can be no doubt that the growth and spread of social media has had a tremendous impact on our lives. With tens of millions of internet users engaged, communication on social-networking sites has become a global phenomenon and with that spread has come concerns. Much of this growth has been driven by the accessibility of smart devices which make it so much more convenient for people to be connected. In fact, more than three billion people around the world now use social media each month, and nine in ten of these people use mobile devices to do so. With immediate access to diverse populations the advent of social media has meant that our lives and the life stories we generate are more accessible than ever. Daniel Stalder (2008) reviewed studies on individuals’ responses to email or internet-based requests for help. Even here the bystander effect emerged, indicating that the virtual presence of others reduced the likelihood that any one individual would intervene. Although the majority of people use the hyper accessibility of the internet to keep in touch with others, there are those who have turned the platform into somewhat of an electronic battlefield. Cyberbullying, which has been defined as ‘sending or posting harmful material or engaging in other forms of social aggression using the internet or other digital technologies’ (Willard, 2007, p. 265), operates in virtual spaces and makes use of phone calls, text messaging, email, websites, chat rooms, instant messaging, and the electronic distribution of pictures, photos or video clips (Smith et al., 2008). Similar to traditional forms of bullying, cyberbullying is intentional, repetitive, involves an imbalance of power and generally incorporates

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a perpetrator, a target and bystanders. Due to its virtual and boundless nature, bullying in this form has the potential to reach a limitless audience 24 hours a day. It also facilitates the potential for anonymous interactions, producing a level of disinhibition that provides the opportunity for people to do and say things they would not necessarily do in a face-to-face situation (Cowie & Jennifer, 2008; Dooley, Pyzalski, & Cross, 2009; Lee & Oh, 2012; Lüders, Brandtzæg, & Dunkels, 2009; Patchin & Hinduja, 2016; Shariff, 2008). Abuse online, such as in the form of bullying via a social media site, or cries for attention and help from suicidal FIGURE 10.12 The catastrophic effects of bullying and individuals, may be met with the same kind of bystander cyberbullying were shown in the case of Amy ‘Dolly’ Everett inaction that we have seen in these real-world cases, and the diffusion of responsibility can be all the greater because of The alarming increase in the number of youth suicides in Australia due to cyberbullying is exemplified by the case of Amy the additional physical and psychological distance the online ‘Dolly’ Everett who took her own life to escape severe harassment world creates. Indeed, in multiple cases where people have and bullying online and face to face. announced on Facebook or an online group that they were going to commit suicide, the posts elicited many instances of taunting and indifference from online bystanders (Murphy, 2012; Wells, 2011). A graphic example of the effect of this type of behaviour was witnessed in Australia in 2017 with the suicide of Northern Territory teenager, Amy ‘Dolly’ Everett who was bullied mercilessly online (and face to face). (see Figure 10.12). Research has suggested not only does this form of bullying have a greater impact on the target of the attack but it also impacts upon the bystanders as the witness of the interaction between the bully and the target. Rather than being present and feeling some form of empathy with the victim when an act of physical bullying is perpetrated, in cyberspace they may view uploaded content or malevolent comments on social media as entertainment and not develop empathy for the target (Cowie & Jennifer, 2008). Although Source: AAP/AP/Akubra Hats research has demonstrated similarities between the roles of bystanders in cyberbullying and traditional bullying (Jones, Mitchell, & Turner, 2015; Quirk & Campbell, 2015), differences have also been identified. For instance, research conducted by Kraft (2011) found that bystanders in cyberspace often do not perceive themselves as actual participants, even though by forwarding or posting an image designed to humiliate another they undertake actions that contribute to the harassment. It appears that the key factors are the perceived anonymity of the victim and the bystander (which facilitates deindividuation), the dilution of a sense of responsibility, and internet disinhibition – the loss of self-control and an absence of restraints in social behaviour (Holfeld, 2014; Kowalski, 2008; McKenna, 2008; Smith et al., 2008; Vandebosch & Van Cleemput, 2008).

Legacy of bystander effect research As you can see in Figure 10.10, providing help in an emergency is a challenging process. At each step along the way, barriers and diversions can prevent a potential helper from becoming an actual helper. In 1981, Bibb Latané and Steve Nida conducted a meta-analysis of more than 50 studies on the bystander effect and concluded, ‘The original phenomenon discovered by Latané and Darley has a firm empirical foundation and has withstood the tests of time and replication’ (p. 322). Thirty years later, Peter Fischer and colleagues (2011) conducted a new meta-analysis and similarly found strong support for the bystander effect model. This new review also found that the bystander effect is weaker in dangerous situations compared with nondangerous situations. The researchers offer three reasons for this: 1 dangerous situations are more likely to be clearly interpreted to be emergencies where someone needs help 2 the presence of other bystanders offers physical support, which is more necessary for dangerous situations 3 some dangerous situations can only be resolved through coordination among several bystanders. The power and relevance of Latané and Darley’s analysis are evident in the fact that newspapers around the world typically cite their work when reporting the latest shocking incident of bystander nonintervention. Virtually every such story mentions Kitty Genovese and many of them refer to the Latané and Darley research. Given its enduring legacy, it is interesting to note that some of the original details reported about the witnesses to the Kitty Genovese murder – accounts that have been repeated countless times over 430

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the years since then – may, in fact, be inaccurate. Rachel Manning and colleagues (2008) published an article suggesting that some of the witnesses may have called the police well before the police finally arrived. These were in the days before central emergency call-centres, and it is impossible to know whether or not these calls were made or what may have been said in them. Manning and colleagues also question whether 38 was the correct number of witnesses and suggest that far fewer were likely to have actually seen the incident, although possibly even more than 38 heard it. To us, these questions are interesting but beside the main point. Whether fully accurate or not, these original reports were what inspired John Darley and Bibb Latané to pursue the line of research we have reported in this section, and that research has yielded valuable insight concerning the social psychology of bystander intervention. In addition, we have cited several other more recent stories from the news of tragic inaction of bystanders, and for every one we cite, there are dozens more. Latané and Darley’s theorising continues to help people understand how these incidents can occur. The legacy of bystander research has recently been reaffirmed all the more by an explosion of interest in applying and extending the work to a constantly growing list of prevention and training programs aimed at reducing aggression, bullying, sexual assault, workplace violence, and other antisocial and dangerous behaviours that are often witnessed by bystanders (Polanin, Espelage & Pigott, 2012; Quirk & Campbell, 2015; Saarento et al., 2015). This wave of research has found strong support for the applicability of the bystander research to understanding when and why bystanders are likely to fail to intervene in these situations, and researchers are beginning to find some positive results of training programs to reduce these effects. Numerous primary and secondary schools throughout the world have made ‘bystander’ a buzzword as they try to educate and encourage students to intervene to reduce the prevalence and impacts of bullying.

How to get help in a crowd So, what do all these stories and experiments teach you about what to do if you need help in the presence of many people? Is there anything you can do to enhance the chances that someone will come to your aid? We can offer this advice: try to counteract the ambiguity of the situation by making it very clear that you do need help and try to reduce diffusion of responsibility by singling out particular individuals for help, such as with eye contact, pointing or direct requests (Guéguen & Stefan, 2015; Markey, 2000).

Time pressure The presence of others can create obstacles at each step on the way towards helping in an emergency. Other factors, too, can affect multiple steps in this process. Our good intentions of helping those in need can sometimes conflict with other motivations. One such source of conflict is time pressure. When we are in a hurry or have a lot on our minds, we may be so preoccupied that we fail to notice others who need help, become less likely to accept responsibility for helping someone, or decide that the costs of helping are too high because of the precious time that will be lost. When we have other demands on us that seem very important, getting involved in someone else’s problems may seem like a luxury we cannot afford (Batson et al., 1978; Moore, 2005). John Darley and Daniel Batson (1973) examined the role of time pressure in an experiment that produced what may be the most ironic finding in the history of social psychology. Their study was based on the parable of the Good Samaritan, from the Gospel of Luke. This parable tells the story of three different people – a priest, a Levite and a Samaritan – each travelling on the road from Jerusalem to Jericho. Each encounters a man lying half-dead by the roadside. The priest and the Levite – both considered busy, important and relatively holy people – pass by the man without stopping. The only one who helps is the Samaritan, a social and religious outcast of that time. A moral of the tale is that people with low status are sometimes more virtuous than those who enjoy high status and prestige. Why? Perhaps in part because high-status individuals tend to be busy people, preoccupied with their own concerns and rushing around to various engagements. Such characteristics may prevent them from noticing or deciding to help a victim in need of assistance. Darley and Batson brought this ancient story to life. They asked seminary students to prepare to give a talk. Half of them were told that the talk was to be based on the parable of the Good Samaritan; the other half expected to discuss the jobs that seminary students like best. All participants were then instructed to walk over to a nearby building where the speech would be recorded. At this point, participants were told that they were running ahead of schedule, that they were right on time, or that they were already a few minutes behind schedule. On the way to the other building, all participants passed a research confederate

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slumped in a doorway, coughing and groaning. Which of these future ministers stopped to lend a helping hand? Perhaps surprisingly, the topic of the upcoming speech had little effect on helping. The pressure of time, however, made a real difference. Of those who thought they were ahead of schedule, 63% offered help, compared with 45% of those who believed they were on time and only 10% of those who had been told they were late. In describing the events that took place in their study, Darley and Batson noted that ‘on several occasions a seminary student going to give his talk on the parable of the Good Samaritan literally stepped over the victim as he hurried on his way!’ These seminary students unwittingly demonstrated the very point that the parable they would be discussing warns against.

Location If the presence of others often inhibits helping, do individuals have a worse chance of being helped in an emergency in a big city, with its hectic pace and large crowds, than in a small town? Although place of residence does not seem to affect how much those in close relationships help each other (Franck, 1980; Korte, 1980), in general people are less likely to help strangers in urban areas than in rural ones. This relationship has been found in several countries around the world (Amato, 1983; Hedge & Yousif, 1992; Steblay, 1987).

Cultural effects Around the world, as well, some cities seem to have more helpful citizens than others, suggesting that culture has an effect on when people help. Robert Levine and colleagues (2001) conducted similar field studies in a major city in each of 23 large countries around the world to see how the cities ranked in their propensity to help. In a downtown area in each of these cities during normal business hours on clear summer days, experimenters measured the proportion of passers-by who would help in the following scenarios: (1) picking up a pen that a stranger had apparently dropped accidentally, (2) helping a stranger with a heavy limp pick up a pile of magazines that they had dropped, and (3) helping a blind person seeking help to cross the street. The results indicated that pedestrians in Brazil, Costa Rica and Malawi exhibited the highest rates of helping, and pedestrians in Singapore, the US and Malaysia exhibited the lowest rates. One cultural variable that predicted helping concerned the notion of what is called simpatía in Spanish or simpatico in Portuguese. Some researchers report that this is an important element of Spanish and Latin American cultures and involves a concern with the social wellbeing of others (Markus & Lin, 1999; SanchezBurks, Nisbett, & Ybarra 2000). Indeed, the five cultures in the study conducted by Levine and colleagues (2001) that value simpatía did tend to show higher rates of helping than the non-simpatía cultures. You may find it surprising that collectivism was not a predictor of helping, but the research on the relationship between individualism or collectivism and prosocial behaviour is quite mixed at this time. This inconsistency may stem in part from differences in the kinds of helping studied. Compared with individualists, collectivists may be more likely to help ingroup members, but they are less likely to help outgroup members or to help in abstract situations (Conway et al., 2001; Knafo et al., 2009; Schwartz, 1990).

Moods and helping Helping someone can put people in a better mood, but can being in a good mood increase people’s likelihood of helping someone? Are we less likely to help if we are in a bad mood? What is your prediction?

Good moods and doing good Some studies involving pleasant odours and compliments give us a clue about good moods and helping. One of the more powerful sensations you can count on experiencing while strolling through a shopping centre comes when you pass a bakery or coffee shop, as the pleasant aroma of freshly baked chocolate chip biscuits or a freshly made espresso stops you in your tracks. Robert Baron (1997) believed that these pleasant scents put people in a good mood, and he wondered if this good mood would make them more likely to help someone in need. He tested this with passers-by in a large shopping centre in the US. Each selected passer-by was approached by a member of the research team and asked for change for a dollar. This interaction took place in a location containing either strong pleasant odours (e.g., near a bakery or a café) or no discernible odour (e.g., near a clothing shop). As can be seen in Figure 10.13 people approached in a pleasant-smelling location were much more likely to help than people approached in a neutral-smelling location. Baron also found that people were in a better mood when they were in the pleasant-smelling environments. This effect on their mood appears to 432

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FIGURE 10.13 Scents and sensibilities People approached by a researcher in a shopping centre reported being in a better mood (left) and were more likely to comply to a request for change (right) if they were in an area of the shopping centre with pleasant ambient odours than if they were in an area with no clear odours. 4.2

60

4.1

50 Percent who helped

Mood

4.0 3.9 3.8 3.7

40 30 20 10

3.6 3.5

0 Neutral

Pleasant

Ambient smell

Neutral

Pleasant

Ambient smell

Source: Adapted from Baron, R. A. (1997). The sweet smell of helping: Effects of pleasant ambient fragrance on prosocial behavior in shopping malls. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 23(5), 498–503.

have caused their greater tendency to help. Very similar results were found by Nicolas Guéguen (2012) in a more recent replication in a shopping centre in France. Shoppers are not the only people at the shopping centre affected by mood – the sales staff are affected, too. Joseph Forgas and colleagues (2008) conducted a field experiment at four department stores in Sydney. The moods of salespeople were manipulated by having a confederate approach them and say very complimentary things (e.g., ‘I am so impressed with the service at this shop’), very negative things (e.g., ‘I am so disappointed with the service at this shop’) or neutral things. A few seconds later, a second confederate approached the salesperson and asked for help finding an item that did not really exist. How much did the salesperson attempt to help this confederate? The researchers predicted that the mood manipulation would not have much effect on the most experienced salespeople, as they would have a well-rehearsed set of responses to customer questions and would therefore respond accordingly. For the less-experienced staff, however, Forgas and colleagues expected that they would exert greater effort to help the customer if they had been put in a good mood, and this is exactly what the results indicated. It is clear, then, that good moods increase helping. The next question is: ‘Why?’ There seem to be several factors at work. Table 10.2 summarises some of the reasons why feeling good often leads to doing good, and it also describes some of the detours in this road that can lead away from helping.

People are much more likely to help someone when they are in a good mood.

TRUE

TABLE 10.2 Good moods lead to helping: reasons and limitations Research shows that people in a positive mood are more likely to help someone in need than are people in a neutral mood. There are several explanations for this effect, as well as some limiting conditions that can weaken or reverse the help-promoting effects of good moods.

Why feeling good leads to doing good

•

When feeling good might not lead to doing good

•

•

•

Desire to maintain one’s good mood. When we are in a good mood, we are motivated to maintain that mood. Helping others makes us feel good, so it can help maintain a positive mood. Positive thoughts and expectations. Positive moods trigger positive thoughts, and if we have positive thoughts about others, we should like them more and should have positive expectations about interacting with others, and these factors should make us more likely to help them. Costs of helping are high. If the anticipated costs of helping in a particular situation seem high, helping would put our good mood at risk. In this case, if we can avoid getting involved and thus maintain our good mood, we are less likely to help. Positive thoughts about other social activities that conflict with helping. If our good mood makes us want to go out and party with our friends, our motivation to engage in this social activity may prevent us from taking the time to notice or take responsibility for helping someone in need.

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Bad moods and doing good

CRITICAL THINKING ACTIVITY Having read this section, do you believe that if a person does a good deed for someone in order to improve their own moods their actions are less commendable?

Since a good mood increases helping, does a bad mood decrease it? Not necessarily. Under many circumstances, negative feelings have been found to elicit positive behaviour towards others (Cryder, Springer, & Morewedge, 2012; Niesta Kayser, Greitemeyer, Fischer, & Frey, 2010; Vollhardt, & Staub, 2011; Xu, Bègue, & Shankland, 2011; Zemack-Rugar, Bettman, & Fitzsimons, 2007). Why might a bad mood promote prosocial behaviour? As noted earlier, people know that helping makes them feel good. This point underlies the negative state relief model, which we described earlier as proposing that people who are feeling bad are motivated to repair their mood and they realise that one way to do it is by helping others. Remove the likelihood of feeling better by helping, however, and helping becomes less likely. In a series of studies, Daniela Niesta Kayser and colleagues (2010) found that both positive and negative moods did increase low-cost helping, but neither mood led to increased helping in a situation in which the helper could anticipate that it could be difficult and stressful. Although negative moods can often boost helping, there is not as strong and consistent a relationship as that between good moods and helping. As Table 10.3 indicates, there are several limits to this effect. For example, one important variable is whether people accept responsibility for their bad feelings. If we blame others for our feeling lousy, we are less likely to be generous in our behaviour towards others. If, instead, we feel guilty for something bad that we have caused to happen, we are more likely to act prosocially (Rogers, Miller, Mayer, & Duval, 1982; Zemack-Rugar et al., 2007).

People are much less likely to help someone when they are in a bad mood.

FALSE

TABLE 10.3 Bad moods and helping: when does feeling bad lead to doing good, and when does it not? Research shows that people in a negative mood are often more likely to help someone in need than are people in a neutral mood. However, there are several limitations to this effect. This table summarises some of the factors that make it more or less likely for people to do good when they feel bad.

When negative moods make us more likely to help others

•

When negative moods make us less likely to help others

•

• •

• •

If we take responsibility for what caused our bad mood (‘I feel guilty for what I did.’) If we focus on other people (‘Wow, those people have suffered so much.’) If we think about our personal values that promote helping (‘I really shouldn’t act like such a jerk next time; I have to be nicer.’) If we blame others for our bad mood (‘I feel so angry at that jerk who put me in this situation.’) If we become very self-focused (‘I am so depressed.’) If we think about our personal values that do not promote helping (‘I have to wise up and start thinking about my own needs more.’)

CULTURAL DIVERSITY ARE YOU TOO BROKE, HOT AND UNHAPPY TO OFFER HELP? Some interesting research has made connections between the interaction of climate, collective wealth and the formulation of societal culture. In a study conducted by Van de Vliert and colleagues (2004a) the authors suggested that although our physiological need for thermal and nutritional comfort and healthiness make living in colder and hotter climates more demanding than living in temperate climates, the demands may be tempered by levels of affluence. The authors conducted two studies to examine interactive combinations of climatic variations and national wealth as antecedent conditions of happiness (feeling good) and altruism (wanting to do good). The first study was based upon data from 55 countries and the second from 77 countries (there were 43 countries common to both studies, including Australia and New Zealand). Their findings suggested that in colder and hotter climates, richer societies tend to be happier and more altruistically motivated

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to help improve the happiness of others, compared with poorer societies that are less happy and less altruistically motivated. It seems that people living in countries with colder climates tend to be more altruistic if they are richer but less altruistic if they are poorer. In fact, an average temperature of 22°C appears to be optimal for altruistic motivations for both high- and lowincome countries. In colder and hotter climates richer societies are happier at the expense of being more altruistic, whereas the poorer societies are more altruistic at the expense of their own happiness. These results suggest that social psychological functioning is aided if the demands of a person are fulfilled by access to adequate resources and impaired if adequate resources are not attainable. Take a moment to think about how you would feel if you were living in a place where you could not afford the basic necessities of life, such as a house with heating to compensate for extreme cold weather, no money to buy clothing to

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help cope with exposure to the elements and little food for sustenance. What would your mental state be like? Would you be happy? Would you be likely to help someone else in need at the expense of your own wellbeing? Further study conducted by Van de Vliert and colleagues (2004) examined the impact of climate and economic resources in relation to unpaid voluntary workers. Based upon the notion that volunteerism is motivated by a combination of egoistic desires (e.g., wanting something worthwhile to do, wanting to meet people, wanting to gain experience etc.) and unselfish altruism (e.g., religious beliefs or helping those in need to gain hope and dignity), using data from a sample of 13 584 people across 33 countries they found cultural and climatic differences in the reasons that motivate people to volunteer. It seems that Germans are more egoistic, Chinese more altruistic, and Italians and Brazilians both egoistic and altruistic in their motivations

CHAPTER TEN

to help others. In lower income countries with demanding climates, such as the Baltic states of northern Europe (i.e., Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia), people volunteer for either predominantly egoistic or altruistic motives, whereas those in higher income countries with demanding climates (e.g., the countries of Scandinavia) and temperate climates (e.g., Mediterranean Europe and Australia) integrate both egoistic and altruistic motives. These findings suggest evidence for cultural adaptations as a response to climatic and economic pressures. There appears to be a trade-off between egoistic and altruistic helping that is more apparent in low-income countries with demanding climates than high-income countries; moderate in temperate climates, irrespective of their level of collective wealth; and minimal in higher income countries with demanding climates.

Prosocial media effects Politicians, educators, researchers and parents have voiced strong concerns for decades about the negative effects of the media, such as television, films, music lyrics and videos, and, more recently, video games, on the attitudes and behaviours of adolescents and young adults. And as is discussed in Chapter 11, there is very good reason for these concerns. But what has garnered far less attention is that popular media also can have positive effects, including on promoting prosocial attitudes and behaviours. Douglas Gentile and colleagues (2009) conducted a series of three studies, using very different methods and across different cultures, to test the idea that playing video games featuring characters who help and support each other in non-violent ways can make people more likely to behave in prosocial ways. In a correlational study, the researchers found that primary school students in Singapore who played more prosocial games tended to behave more prosocially in their real lives (e.g., by being more likely to indicate that they share things with others or spend time or money to help others in need). In longitudinal studies of Japanese children and adolescents, playing prosocial games at one point in time predicted increases several months later in prosocial behaviour. Finally, in an experiment involving undergraduates in the US, students randomly assigned to play prosocial video games behaved more prosocially than students assigned to play either neutral or violent games. Longitudinal studies of children and adolescents in Japan and Singapore offer additional support for an association between prosocial game playing and subsequent helping behaviour. Playing prosocial games at one point in time predicted increases several months or even two years later in empathy and in prosocial behaviour. Playing violent video games, in contrast, predicted less subsequent helping behaviour (Gentile et al., 2009; Prot et al., 2014). Jodi Whitaker and Brad Bushman (2012) found that even playing a merely relaxing, rather than prosocial, video game (e.g., a fishing game) led university students to donate more time to help the experimenter with a menial task after the apparent conclusion of the study than if they had played a neutral or violent video game. Why did a relaxing game have this effect? The relaxing game put the students into a more positive mood, and this in turn led to more helpful behaviour. More recent research conducted by Gentile and colleagues (2017) has shown that playing a violent video game may activate the sympathetic nervous system and elicit a fight-or-flight type response in children. Their experimental investigation found that playing violent video games not only increased the accessibility of aggressive thoughts, it also led to an increase in cortisol and, for boys, cardiovascular arousal (relative to baseline) more than the non-violent game. Seeing characters act in helpful, cooperative ways in popular media can serve to model prosocial behaviour, particularly if the behaviour is rewarded or associated with a well-liked character. Supporting this idea are the results of a meta-analysis of 34 studies involving more than 5000 children. This analysis found a reliable positive effect of prosocial television on children’s prosocial behaviour, especially when specific acts of altruism were modelled (Mares & Woodard, 2005).

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Role models The finding about the relationship between prosocial television and children’s real prosocial behaviour illustrates the power of role models. Helpful models are important not only for children but for all of us. Observing helpful models increases helping in a variety of situations (Hearold, 1986; Ng & van Dyne, 2005; Sechrist & Milford, 2007; Siu, Cheng, & Leung, 2006). Similarly, seeing models of selfish, greedy behaviour can promote selfish, greedy behaviour in turn (Gray, Ward, & Norton, 2014). Marlone Henderson and colleagues (2012) proposed that learning about individuals who engage in acts of helping others who are very psychologically and perhaps physically distant from them can capture people’s attention and inspire them to act in kind. In one of their studies to test this idea, students at the University of Texas in the US read about a group of students from Peking University in Beijing, China, who donated their time helping disadvantaged children who were said to be either in Beijing (small-distance condition) or in Istanbul, Turkey (large-distance condition). After reading this information, the Texas students were given the chance to buy a T-shirt to raise money for these children. The students were significantly more likely to buy the shirt if they had read a model of large-distance than small-distance helping. In another study with the same manipulations, the Texas students were instead given the chance to donate money to a charity raising money for victims of a tornado in a Midwestern city in the US. The students were willing to donate more money after reading the large-distance than small-distance examples of helping by the Beijing students. Why do people who exemplify helping inspire us to help? Three reasons stand out. First, they provide an example of behaviour for us to imitate directly. Second, when they are rewarded for their helpful behaviour, people who model helping behaviour teach us that helping is valued and rewarding, which strengthens our own inclination to be helpful. Third, the behaviour of these models makes us think about and become more aware of the standards of conduct in our society. Of course, one especially important type of role model for many of us is our parents. The influential role that parents’ prosocial attitudes and tendencies play in the development of children’s corresponding attitudes and tendencies has been documented in research from Parents play an especially important and influential role in the around the world (Ottoni-Wilhelm, Estell, & Perdue, 2014; Mesurado modelling of prosocial attitudes and behaviours. et al., 2014; Newton, Laible, Carlo, Steele, & McGinley, 2014; Waugh, Source: iStock.com/Steve Debenport Brownell, & Pollock, 2015).

Social norms Social norm

A general rule of conduct reflecting standards of social approval and disapproval.

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General rules of conduct established by society are called social norms. These norms embody standards of socially approved and disapproved behaviour. Two sets of social norms bear directly on when people are likely to help. The first consists of norms based on fairness. As we mentioned in Chapter 7, the norm of reciprocity establishes a strong socially approved standard; that is, people who give to you should be paid back. We discussed reciprocal altruism earlier in this chapter; many animals, including humans, help those who have helped them. Equity is the basis of another norm that calls for fairness in our treatment of others. The norm of equity prescribes that when people are in a situation in which they feel over-benefited (receiving more benefits than earned), they should help those who are under-benefited (receiving fewer benefits than earned). Other social norms related to help go beyond an immediate sense of fairness to a larger sense of what is right. The norm of social responsibility dictates that people should help those who need assistance. When people are more motivated by concerns about justice or fairness, however, their intentions to help someone will be driven more by their belief that this person deserves their assistance than by their belief that he or she simply needs it (Lerner, 1998). Norms based on religion are also important to many people and can influence attitudes and behaviour about helping. In a sample of university students in Thailand, for example, Paul Yablo and Nigel Field (2007) found relatively high rates of self-reported altruistic behaviours, and the researchers attributed this to the fact that the Thai students were very likely to cite norms and values based on religion to explain why they would help in various situations.

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Social influence To what extent are the opinions we hold about subjective matters the result of our own considerations or a reflection of the opinions of others? Even though we would like to believe the former, in most real-life situations individual opinions are highly interdependent. They are, directly or indirectly, influenced by cultural norms, mass FIGURE 10.14 The viral success of the ice bucket challenge media and interactions in social networks. The combined effect demonstrates the impact that social influence can have on of these influences is known as social influence – individuals our desire to help others acting in accordance to the beliefs and expectations of others. Shown here, Formula 1 driver, Daniel Ricciardo, takes the ice If you have ever reluctantly agreed to chip-in to buy a present bucket challenge. The stunning viral success of the Ice Bucket for someone because your friends or co-workers were doing so Challenge in 2014 to raise money and awareness to fight the and you did not want to be the only one not contributing, you neurological disease MND was due in large part to people have likely experienced the act of doing something altruistic publicly naming their friends as the next people who should for reasons having nothing to do with altruism. In reality your participate in the challenge. prosocial behaviour was due to peer pressure and social influence. This type of helping behaviour plays an important role in determining when people help in a variety of situations and is especially strong in collectivist cultures. Charities and other fundraisers often utilise the power of social influence to motivate donations, such as by encouraging people to match others’ contributions and making public lists of who has contributed or participated. The stunning viral success of the Ice Bucket Challenge to raise money and awareness to fight the neurological disease, motor neurone disease (MND), was due in large part to people publicly naming their friends as the next people who should participate in the challenge (see Figure 10.14). Further support of the value of social influence is found in the study conducted by Diane Reyniers and Source: Getty Images/Clive Mason Richa Bhalla (2013), where participants were given money in return for completing a survey; participants where then invited to donate some of this money to charity. If participants thought a fellow participant would know whether and how much they donated, they gave significantly more money than if they did this privately. Reluctant altruism Some researchers call this kind of peer-influenced behaviour reluctant altruism. Altruistic kinds of Another kind of social influence is illustrated in research conducted by Marco van Bommel and behaviour that result colleagues (2014) who had participants (either alone or in the presence of confederates) witness from pressure from peers someone steal money left unattended by the experimenter who had left the room. Replicating the classic or other sources of direct social influence. bystander effect, the researchers found that participants were less likely to intervene in the presence of other witnesses than if they were alone. This effect was eliminated (and even reversed), however, if the participants knew there was a security camera recording the room. Not wanting to look unresponsive and callous on camera, and perhaps wanting to have their heroism documented on video, participants sprang to action. So, it seems that social influence factors can be effective in eliciting prosocial behaviour.

Social connection The relationship between helping and interpersonal connection runs like a bright red thread through much of the research on helping. Although whether or not people help others can be quite variable, a consistent theme appears repeatedly in this chapter: a sense of connection. Throughout the chapter, this connection has taken various forms – genetic relatedness, empathic concern, sense of responsibility for someone, perceived similarity, shared group membership, and so on. In some of the richest countries on Earth, thousands of men, women and children are without a home – many sleep on the street, carry their belongings in grocery carts and rummage through piles of garbage to find food. By contrast, among some of the poorest people on Earth, no one goes without shelter or remains thirsty as long as anyone has water to drink. How can we account for this difference? Homelessness is, of course, a complex phenomenon affected by many specific economic and political factors. But it may also be a symptom of a profound loss of social connection in our global society.

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Consider, however, the outpouring of help after large-scale tragedies, such as the tsunami that hit Japan in 2011, the earthquakes in New Zealand in 2011, or the floods that devastated many areas of Queensland, 2011. People around the world donated time, money and resources to help the victims of these catastrophes and to help to rebuild the shattered communities. Tragedies such as these can remind people of their common humanity, highlighting their social connection while, temporarily at least, rendering their differences insignificant. Taken as a whole, these points suggest that helping requires the recognition of individual human beings with whom we can have a meaningful connection.

RESEARCH SPOTLIGHT

Source: © Courtesy of Dr. Arthur A. Stukas, La Trobe University Department of Psychology and Counselling

DR ARTHUR A. STUKAS, LA TROBE UNIVERSITY What are the topic areas of your research? Although my work spans a number of areas of social psychology, I have enjoyed being part of an active research team studying the psychology of volunteerism and community involvement. Volunteerism involves freely chosen activities undertaken to benefit a community, typically arranged through not-for-profit organisations. It is a fascinating behaviour to study because it brings together questions of motivation, socialisation, values, persuasion, prosocial behaviour, and the effects of situational and organisational contexts on all of these. Which of your research findings have you found most intriguing? My colleagues and I created the Volunteer Functions Inventory to assess six primary functions or motivations for volunteering. People may volunteer to obtain career benefits, to understand social issues, themselves or other people, to express their prosocial values, to have opportunities to feel good about themselves or to avoid feeling bad, or to fit in with close others who are important to them. Our functional approach has several implications. To recruit volunteers, organisations should create persuasive messages that target the benefits that are most important to potential volunteers. To retain volunteers, organisations should ensure that the benefits sought are readily available in the activities offered. That is, we recommend matching volunteers to activities to ensure their primary motivations are fulfilled; this is likely to increase volunteerism and positive outcomes for volunteers. In contrast, requirements to ‘volunteer’, sometimes used by governments and educational institutions, may undermine intentions. To test this, we conducted two studies: a longitudinal but correlational study

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of students who were required to do 40 hours of community service and an experimental study that saw students randomly assigned to be required to perform community service in our lab or encouraged to do so freely. In both studies, we found that requirements reduced intentions to volunteer in the future but only for students who perceived the requirement to be controlling. More recently, in a sample of 4000 volunteers from Victoria, we found positive correlations between otheroriented motivations (such as value expression) and well-being, but negative correlations between self-oriented motivations (such as career development) and well-being, suggesting that altruism and positive states go hand-in-hand. How did you become interested in your area of research? My training in social psychology focused not only on the theories and findings of the discipline but importantly on the application of social psychological principles to the solution of practical problems of society. We followed Kurt Lewin’s dictate that ‘There is nothing so practical as a good theory’ and joined the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues. Through the study of volunteering, I feel that my work is making a difference to the world we live in. Research in this area has the potential to offer real benefits to communities and community organisations as well as to public policy. How does your area of research speak to life in Australia and New Zealand? Although there may be a stronger social safety net here than in my birthplace (I moved from the US in 2000), it is still the case that volunteers form the backbone of most community organisations. Whether it is the local footy club, an urban soup kitchen, a political advocacy group, or a community radio station, without volunteers, organisations would soon cease to function. Therefore, it is critical to understand how to recruit and retain volunteers to promote the health of our communities and to increase social capital for all in Australia and New Zealand. Social psychology helps us to do that.

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Topical Reflection LIFE AS A FIELD PSYCHOLOGIST According to Dr Marlene Lee, the clinical psychologist featured in our opening vignette, people often ask her about the role of a field psychologist and what the role entails. In a nutshell, field psychologists (or mental health officers) are responsible for planning, implementing and coordinating the mental health component of the Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) intervention. During natural disasters, such as the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, people may be exposed to traumatic or extremely distressing events such as being injured or trapped under debris, witnessing someone dying or being injured, seeing dismembered bodies, or witnessing the destruction of their home and property. Following the initial traumatic event, the drastic change in socioeconomic circumstances arising from the subsequent displacement can also give rise to a variety of stress-related symptoms. Consequently, one of the key activities implemented by MSF mental health teams is to provide individual and group counselling to quake survivors with the aim of minimising psychological distress and containing traumatic stress symptoms. We also provide psychoeducation to the quake-affected communities to increase awareness about common reactions to be expected after a traumatic event (e.g., sadness, fear, flashbacks, difficulty concentrating, loss of appetite and sleep disturbances) and to teach self-help coping techniques to manage problematic symptoms (e.g., get adequate nutrition, rest and exercise, return to daily routine, and share your feelings with family and friends). In general, MSF employs a community-based psychosocial approach that aims to empower the population by harnessing natural coping resources in the community.

CHAPTER REVIEW SUMMARY EVOLUTIONARY AND MOTIVATIONAL FACTORS EVOLUTIONARY FACTORS • Evolutionary perspectives emphasise two ways that helping could become an innate, universal behavioural tendency: kin selection, in which individuals protect their own genes by helping close relatives; and reciprocal altruism, in which those who give also receive. EMPATHY • Altruistic behaviour is motivated by empathy, which involves understanding the emotional experience of another individual and experiencing emotions consistent with what the other is feeling. REWARDS OF HELPING • People are much more likely to help when the potential rewards of helping seem high relative to the potential costs. • Helping others often makes the helper feel good – it can relieve negative feelings such as guilt and it is associated with better health. Long-term or high-risk helping, however, can be costly to the health and wellbeing of the helper. ALTRUISM OR EGOISM? • Scholars have debated whether egoistic motives are always behind helpful behaviours or whether helping is ever truly altruistic. • According to the empathy–altruism hypothesis, taking the perspective of a person perceived to be in need creates the

other-oriented emotion of empathic concern, which in turn produces the altruistic motive to reduce the other’s distress.

PUTTING COMMON SENSE TO THE TEST People are more likely to help someone in an emergency if the potential rewards seem high and the potential costs seem low. TRUE. For both emergency situations and more long-term, well-planned helping, people’s helping behaviours are determined in part by a cost–benefit analysis.

PERSONAL INFLUENCES ON THE DECISION TO HELP INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN HELPFULNESS • There is some evidence of relatively stable individual differences in helping tendencies. • Recent findings suggest that there may be a genetic, heritable component to helpfulness. THE ALTRUISTIC PERSONALITY • Some personality traits are associated with helpful behavioural tendencies in some situations, but no single set of traits appears to define the altruistic personality.

INTERPERSONAL INFLUENCES ON WHO PEOPLE HELP PERCEIVED CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PERSON IN NEED • Attractive individuals are more likely to receive help than are those who are less attractive.

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People are more willing to help when they attribute a person’s need for assistance to uncontrollable causes rather than to events perceived to be under the person’s control.

CULTURAL EFFECTS • Cross-cultural research has found variation in the helping rates of people in cities around the world

HELPING FRIENDS AND SIMILAR OTHERS • People in a communal relationship feel mutual responsibility for each other’s needs; and people in an exchange relationship are more likely to keep track of how reciprocal the relationship is in terms of costs and benefits. • In general, perceived similarity to a person in need increases willingness to help.

MOODS AND HELPING • A good mood increases helpfulness. • A bad mood can often increase helpfulness under certain conditions; for example, when people feel guilty about something.

•

GENDER AND HELPING • Men help strangers in potentially dangerous situations more than women do; women help friends and relations with social support more than men do. • The evidence for gender differences is not strong for acts of helping that do not easily fit either of these categories. CULTURE, HELPING AND HELP-SEEKING • Some research has shown that people with a collectivistic orientation may be less likely to help outgroup members or strangers than are those with an individualistic orientation.

PUTTING COMMON SENSE TO THE TEST Attractive people have a better chance than unattractive people of getting help when they need it. TRUE. People are more likely to help those who are attractive.

PROSOCIAL MEDIA EFFECTS • Playing video games featuring prosocial content and watching prosocial television are both associated with increased prosocial behaviour. ROLE MODELS • Observing a person modelling helpful behaviour increases helping. SOCIAL NORMS • Social norms that promote helping are based on a sense of fairness or on standards about what is right. SOCIAL INFLUENCE • People sometimes do something altruistic due to peer pressure and social influence. SOCIAL CONNECTION • The relationship between helping and interpersonal connection runs like a bright red thread through much of the research on helping.

Women seek help more often than men do.

PUTTING COMMON SENSE TO THE TEST

TRUE. At least for relatively minor problems, men ask for help less frequently than women do.

In an emergency, a person who needs help has a much better chance of getting it if three other people are present than if only one other person is present.

SITUATIONAL INFLUENCES ON WHEN PEOPLE HELP THE BYSTANDER EFFECT • Research on the bystander effect, in which the presence of others inhibits helping in an emergency, indicates why the five steps necessary for helping – noticing, interpreting, taking responsibility, deciding how to help, and providing help – may not be taken. • The distractions caused by the presence of other people and by our own self-concerns may impair our ability to notice that someone needs help. TIME PRESSURE • When people are in a hurry, they are less likely to notice or choose to help others in need. LOCATION • Residents of heavily populated areas are less likely to provide spontaneous, informal help to strangers than are residents of smaller or less densely populated communities.

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FALSE. In several ways, the presence of others inhibits helping. People are much more likely to help someone when they are in a good mood. TRUE. Compared with neutral moods, good moods tend to elicit more helping and other prosocial behaviours. People are much less likely to help someone when they are in a bad mood. FALSE. Compared with neutral moods, negative moods often elicit more helping and prosocial behaviours. This effect depends on a number of factors, including whether people take responsibility for their bad mood or blame it on others, but in many circumstances, feeling bad leads to doing good.

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LINKAGES In this chapter we considered the role that personal attractiveness plays when a person seeks help. In Chapter 9 we take a look at some of the other social advantages

CHAPTER

10

physically attractive individuals enjoy. The ‘Linkages’ diagram below shows two other chapters which shed light on the development of helping behaviours.

Helping others

LINKAGES

When do people help? The norm of reciprocity

CHAPTER

7

Conformity, Compliance, and Obedience

Social advantages of being physically attractive

CHAPTER

9

Attraction and close relationships

Links between lack of empathy and violence

CHAPTER

11

Aggression and antisocial behaviour

REVIEW QUIZ 1 The principle of kin selection is based on which of the following assumptions? a Although it is sometimes beneficial to help our kin, we must focus primarily on helping ourselves if we are to survive danger. b It is the survival of genes that matters most from an evolutionary perspective. c We will help those who are likely to reciprocate that help regardless of whether or not they are genetically related to us. d Those who have the greatest reproductive fitness share more genes with their kin. 2 The negative state relief model of helping behaviour: a supports the existence of altruism in the real world. b applies more to emergencies than to non-emergency situations. c identifies yet another way in which helping can be egoistic. d All of the above.

3 The empathy–altruism model suggests that when escape from a situation is easy, people will do which of the following? a Offer help only when they have empathic concern. b Offer help only when they are in a good mood. c Almost always exhibit altruism. d Be likely to experience empathic concern. 4 Which of the following factors will lead to greater helping in an emergency? a A large group of bystander witnesses being present. b The emergency occurring in a busy environment. c The emergency involving two people who are clearly related. d It being very clear that the situation is an emergency. 5 Kevin asks Winnie to drive him to the airport. Although Winnie does not really want to, she agrees because Kevin loaned her money last week. Winnie agreed to help because of which norm? a Equity. b Reciprocity. c Justice. d Cooperation.

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WEBLINKS Charities Aid Foundation https://www.cafonline.org A site containing links to a number of publications, including the World Giving Index 2017. Koko the gorilla http://www.koko.org The website of Koko the signing gorilla and the Gorilla Foundation, which contains information on Koko and her exploits, including many videos. Honours Unit https://dpmc.govt.nz/our-business-units/cabinet-office/ honours-unit A New Zealand Government website with details of awards recipients and the nomination and award process.

It’s an honour https://www.pmc.gov.au/government/its-honour An Australian Government website covering all aspects of the Australian honours system and the people who have been recognised for excellence, achievement or meritorious service. Volunteering Australia https://www.volunteeringaustralia.org A website containing information relevant to volunteering in Australia, which promotes the activity of volunteering as one of enduring social, cultural and economic value. Volunteering New Zealand https://www.volunteeringnz.org.nz A website containing information relevant to volunteering in New Zealand, as well as many interesting research articles.

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CHAPTER TEN

Ferguson, E., Farrell, K., & Lawrence, C. (2008). Blood donation is an act of benevolence rather than altruism. Health Psychology, 27, 327–336. Finkelstein, M. A. (2009). Intrinsic vs. extrinsic motivational orientations and the volunteer process. Personality and Individual Differences, 46, 653–658. Fischer, P., Krueger, J. I., Greitemeyer, T., Vogrincic, C., Kastenmüller, A., Frey, D., … Kainbacher, M. (2011). The bystander-effect: A meta-analytic review on bystander intervention in dangerous and nondangerous emergencies. Psychological Bulletin, 137, 517–537. Fitzgerald, C. J., & Colarelli, S. M. (2009). Altruism and reproductive limitations. Evolutionary Psychology, 7, 234–252. Fitzgerald, C. J., Thompson, M. C., & Whitaker, M. B. (2010). Altruism between romantic partners: Biological offspring as a genetic bridge between altruist and recipient. Evolutionary Psychology, 8, 462–476. Forgas, J. P., Dunn, E., & Granland, S. (2008). Are you being served …? An unobtrusive experiment of affective influences on helping in a department store. European Journal of Social Psychology, 38, 333–342. Fortuna, K., & Knafo, A. (2014). Parental and genetic contributions to prosocial behavior during childhood. In L. M. Padilla-Walker, & G. Carlo (Eds.), Prosocial development: A multidimensional approach (pp. 70–89). New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Franck, K. A. (1980). Friends and strangers: The social experience of living in urban and non-urban settings. Journal of Social Issues, 36(3), 52–71. Frazier, P., Greer, C., Gabrielsen, S., Tennen, H., Park, C., & Tomich, P. (2013). The relation between trauma exposure and prosocial behavior. Psychological Trauma: Theory, Research, Practice, and Policy, 5, 286–294. Freeberg, T. M., Krama, T., Vrublevska, J., Krams, I., Kullberg, C., Stockholms universitet, . . . Zoologiska institutionen. (2014). Tufted titmouse (Baeolophus bicolor) calling and risk-sensitive foraging in the face of threat. Animal Cognition, 17(6), 1341–1352. doi: 10.1007/ s10071-014-0770-z Fritzsche, B. A., Finkelstein, M. A., & Penner, L. A. (2000). To help or not to help: Capturing individuals’ decision policies. Social Behavior and Personality, 28, 561–578. Fujino, N., & Okamura, H. (2009, April). Factors affecting the sense of burden felt by family members caring for patients with mental illness. Archives of Psychiatric Nursing, 23(2), 128–137. Gaertner, S. L., & Dovidio, J. F. (2012). The common ingroup identity model. In P. M. Van Lange, A. W. Kruglanski & E. T. Higgins (Eds.), Handbook of theories of social psychology (Vol. 2, pp. 439–457). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Garcia, S. M., Weaver, K., Moskowitz, G. B., & Darley, J. M. (2002). Crowded minds: The implicit bystander effect. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 83, 843–853. Gentile, D. A., Anderson, C. A., Yukawa, S., Ihori, N., Saleem, M., & Ming, L. M., … Akira, S. (2009). The effects of prosocial video games on prosocial behaviors: International evidence from correlational, longitudinal, and experimental studies. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 35, 752–763. Gentile, D. A., Bender, P. K., & Anderson, C. A. (2017). Violent video game effects on salivary cortisol, arousal, and aggressive thoughts in children. Computers in Human Behavior, 70, 39–43. doi: 10.1016/j. chb.2016.12.045 Gottfried, M. (2007, August 23). A rape witnessed, a rape ignored. St. Paul Pioneer Press. Gottfried, M. (2008, 18 July). Man gets 12 years for hallway rape captured on video. St. Paul Pioneer Press.

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Islanders in Mount Isa. Australian Journal of Rural Health, 19, 70–74. McCullough, M. E., Kimeldorf, M. B., & Cohen, A. D. (2008). An adaptation for altruism? The social causes, social effects, and social evolution of gratitude. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 17, 281–285. McDonald, L., Sonn, L., Sun, H., & Creber, M. (2012). Developing public disaster communication for volunteer recruitment: Understanding volunteer motivations. Melbourne: World Public Relations. Mackay, N., & Barrowclough, C. (2005). Accident and emergency staff’s perceptions of deliberate selfharm: Attributions, emotions, and willingness to help. British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 44, 255–267. McKenna, K. Y. A. (2008). Influences on the nature and functioning of online groups. In A. Barak (Ed.), Psychological aspects of cyberspace: Theory, research, applications (pp. 228–242). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Mackenzie, C. S., Gekoski, W. L., & Knox, V. J. (2006). Age, gender, and the underutilization of mental health services: The influence of help-seeking attitudes. Aging & Mental Health, 10, 574–582. Madsen, E. A., Tunney, R. J., Fieldman, G., Plotkin, H. C., Dunbar, R. I. M., Richardson, J. M., & McFarland, D. (2007). Kinship and altruism: A cross-cultural experimental study. British Journal of Psychology, 98, 339–359. Malti, T., Gasser, L., & Gutzwiller-Helfenfinger, E. (2010). Children’s interpretive understanding, moral judgments, and emotion attributions: Relations to social behaviour. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 28, 275–292. Manning, R., Levine, M., & Collins, A. (2008). The legacy of the 38 witnesses and the importance of getting history right. American Psychologist, 63, 562–563. Mares, M. L., & Woodard, E. (2005). Positive effects of television on children’s social interactions: A metaanalysis. Media Psychology, 7, 301–322. Markey, P. M. (2000). Bystander intervention in computer-mediated communication. Computers in Human Behavior, 16, 183–188. Markus, H. R., & Lin, L. R. (1999). Conflictways: Cultural diversity in the meanings and practices of conflict. In D. A. Prentice & D. T. Miller (Eds.), Cultural divides: Understanding and overcoming group conflict (pp. 302–333). New York, NY: Russell Sage. Marsh, A. A., Stoycos, S. A., Brethel-Haurwitz, K. M., Robinson, P., VanMeter, J. W., & Cardinale, E. M. (2015). Neural and cognitive characteristics of extraordinary altruists. PNAS Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 111, 15 036–15 041. Mesurado, B., Richaud, M. C., Mestre, M. V., Samper-García, P., Tur-Porcar, A., Morales Mesa, S. A., Viveros, E. F. (2014). Parental expectations and prosocial behavior of adolescents from low-income backgrounds: A cross-cultural comparison between three countries – Argentina, Colombia, and Spain. Journal of CrossCultural Psychology, 45, 1471–1488. Midlarsky, E., Fagin-Jones, S., & Corley, R. P. (2005). Personality correlates of heroic rescue during the Holocaust. Journal of Personality, 73, 907–934. Mikolajewski, A. J., Chavarria, J., Moltisanti, A., Hart, S. A., & Taylor, J. (2014). Examining the factor structure and etiology of prosociality. Psychological Assessment, 26, 1259–1267. Milgram, S. (1970). The experience of living in cities. Science, 167, 1461–1468. Miller, E. (2011). ‘There are no words that can possibly express how we feel’: Toward an understanding of the social-psychological experiences of caregivers of the mentally ill. Illness, Crisis, & Loss, 19, 381–386.

Mioshi, E., Bristow, M., Cook, R., & Hodges, J. R. (2009). Factors underlying caregiver stress in frontotemporal dementia and Alzheimer’s disease. Dementia and Geriatric Cognitive Disorders, 27, 76–81. Mojza, E. J., Sonnentag, S., & Bornemann, C. (2011). Volunteer work as a valuable leisure-time activity: A day-level study on volunteer work, nonwork experiences, and well-being at work. Journal of Occupational and Organizational Psychology, 84, 123–152. Moore, D. A. (2005). Myopic biases in strategic social prediction: Why deadlines put everyone under more pressure than everyone else. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 31, 668–679. Morelli, S. A., Lieberman, M. D., & Zaki, J. (2015). The emerging study of positive empathy. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 9, 57–68. Mullen, E., & Skitka, L. J. (2009). Comparing Americans’ and Ukrainians’ allocations of public assistance: The role of affective reactions in helping behavior. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 40, 301–318. Murphy, V. (2012, 28 March). Woman dies during chat on Facebook. The Mirror, 14. Murray, G., Judd, F., Jackson, H., Komiti, A., Wearing, A., Robins, G. (2008). Big boys don’t cry: An investigation of stoicism and its mental health outcomes. Personality and Individual Differences, 44, 1369–1381. Nadler, A., & Fisher, J. D. (1986). The role of threat to self-esteem and perceived control in recipient reactions to help: Theory development and empirical validation. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 19, pp. 81–122). New York, NY: Academic Press. Narvaez, D., & Lapsley, D. K. (2009). Moral identity, moral functioning, and the development of moral character. In D. M. Bartels, C. W. Bauman, L. J. Skitka & D. L. Medin (Eds.), Moral judgment and decision making (pp. 237–274). San Diego, CA: Elsevier Academic Press. Newton, E. K., Laible, D., Carlo, G., Steele, J. S., & McGinley, M. (2014). Do sensitive parents foster kind children, or vice versa? Bidirectional influences between children’s prosocial behavior and parental sensitivity. Developmental Psychology, 50, 1808–1816. Ng, K. Y., & van Dyne, L. (2005). Antecedents and performance consequences of helping behavior in work groups: A multilevel analysis. Group and Organization Management, 30, 514–540. Niesta Kayser, D., Greitemeyer, T., Fischer, P., & Frey, D. (2010). Why mood affects help giving, but not moral courage: Comparing two types of prosocial behaviour. European Journal of Social Psychology, 40, 1136–1157. Omoto, A. M., Malsch, A. M., & Barraza, J. A. (2009). Compassionate acts: Motivations for and correlates of volunteerism among older adults. In B. Fehr, S. Sprecher & L. G. Underwood (Eds.), The science of compassionate love: Theory, research, and applications. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. O’Neill, A. M., Green, M., & Cuadros, P. (1996, 2 September). One Great Ape. People, 72. Ongley, S. F., Nola, M., & Malti, T. (2014). Children’s giving: Moral reasoning and moral emotions in the development of donation behaviours. Frontiers in Psychology, 5, 545. Ottoni-Wilhelm, M., Estell, D. B., & Perdue, N. H. (2014). Role-modeling and conversations about giving in the socialization of adolescent charitable giving and volunteering. Journal of Adolescence, 37, 53–66. Park, S. Q., Kahnt, T., Dogan, A., Strang, S., Fehr, E., & Tobler, P. N. (2017). A neural link between generosity and happiness. Nature Communications, 8, doi: 15964. 10.1038/ncomms15964

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PART FOUR

SOCIAL RELATIONS

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CHAPTER TEN

net.au/news/2018-03-29/brave-aussies-awarded-forextraordinary-acts-of-courage/9597102 Xu, H., Bègue, L., & Shankland, R. (2011). Guilt and guiltlessness: An integrative review. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 5, 440–457. Xu, X., Zuo, X., Wang, X., & Han, S. (2009). Do you feel my pain? Racial group membership modulates empathic neural responses. Journal of Neuroscience, 29, 8525–8529. Yablo, P. D., & Field, N. P. (2007). The role of culture in altruism: Thailand and the United States. Psychologia: An International Journal of Psychology in the Orient, 50, 236–251. Zanon, M., Novembre, G., Zangrando, N., Chittaro, L., & Silani, G. (2014). Brain activity and prosocial behavior in a simulated life-threatening situation. Neuroimage, 98, 134–146. Zemack-Rugar, Y., Bettman, J. R., & Fitzsimons, G. J. (2007). The effects of nonconsciously priming emotion concepts on behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 93, 927–939.

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CHAPTER

Aggression and antisocial behaviour Learning Objectives By the end of this chapter, you should be able to: 1 define aggression 2 discuss the role of culture, gender and individual differences in aggression, and attitudes towards aggression 3 consider the origins of aggression and the effects of socialisation 4 discuss how situational influences impact effect, arousal and cognition of aggression 5 summarise the immediate and long-term effects that exposure to violent forms of media has on aggression 6 discuss the different approaches to reducing violence, including situational, sociocultural and multiple-level approaches.

The pain of Port Arthur

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service personnel who worked amid the pandemonium that day. For many the scars have lingered, with evidence Port Arthur, the scene of one of the of post-traumatic deadliest mass murders in Australian stress and survivor history. guilt over 20 years after the event; but there is also evidence of restoration, hope and resilience. You can read more about the stories of hope in the Topical Reflection feature at the end of this chapter. In this chapter we examine a disturbing aspect of human behaviour – aggression.

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Source: Fairfax Syndication/Bruce Miller

Sunday 28 April 1996 was a lovely autumn day in Port Arthur that started out like any other day. Hundreds of tourists visited the popular tourist attraction, while workers went about their daily routines providing service to the visitors, tending the grounds and leading tours. At lunchtime, the Broad Arrow Café and adjoining gift shop were filled with tourists looking for a welcome rest, a bite to eat and some souvenirs to help them remember their visit. One of those people, however, had other plans. Having calmly eaten lunch, Martin Bryant perpetrated one of the deadliest mass murders in recent Australian history. Left in the wake of this disaster were the survivors and their family and friends, the families and friends of those who did not survive, and the emergency

AGGRESSION AND ANTISOCIAL BEHAVIOUR

CHAPTER ELEVEN

PUTTING COMMON SENSE TO THE TEST Circle Your Answer T

F

In virtually every culture, males are more violent than females.

T

F

For almost every category of aggression, males are more aggressive than females.

T

F

Children who are spanked or otherwise physically disciplined (but not abused) for behaving aggressively tend to become less aggressive.

T

F

Blowing off steam by engaging in safe but aggressive activities (e.g., sport) makes people less likely to aggress later.

T

F

Exposure to television violence in childhood is related to aggression later in life.

INTRODUCTION WHEN THE SAFETY OF A SCHOOL, a cinema, a city street, a government building or a tourist attraction is destroyed by violence, it raises profoundly important questions about the causes of aggression and violence and about how to reduce its prevalence. But while high-profile incidents get most of the attention, every day there are numerous acts of aggression and violence that should also raise these questions and promote their urgency. For example, globally, at least 560 000 people lost their lives violently in 2016 – 7.5 violent deaths per 100 000 population. Between 2015–2016 the global homicide rate rose for the first time since 2004 – from 5.11 to 5.15 homicides per 100 000 (McEvoy & Hideg, 2017). The suffering caused by aggression is not limited even to these millions of cases a year of violent crime, of course. Every day schoolchildren are bullied, sometimes relentlessly and with tragic outcomes. Every day people spread malicious gossip about others. Every day some parents wound their children with physical or verbal abuse. It is clear, then, that aggression and violence are not limited to a handful of crazed individuals who confuse fiction with reality or whose frustrations with life boil over into explosions of mass violence. It is all the more important, therefore, that we try to understand the root causes and situational triggers of aggression; and this is the goal of this chapter. It focuses primarily on aggression by individuals (aggression by groups, such as rampaging mobs and warring nations is discussed in Chapter 7) and factors that reduce aggression.

WHAT IS AGGRESSION? Although there are numerous ways one can define aggression, the definition that best represents the research today is that aggression is behaviour that is intended to harm another individual. Aggressive behaviours come in many forms. Words as well as deeds can be aggressive. Quarrelling couples who intend their spiteful remarks to hurt are behaving aggressively. Spreading a vicious rumour about someone is another form of aggression. Even failure to act can be aggressive, if that failure is intended to hurt someone, such as by not helping someone avoid what you know will be a humiliating outcome. To distinguish them from less harmful behaviours, extreme acts of aggression are called violence. Some other terms in the language of aggression refer to emotions and attitudes. Anger consists of strong feelings of displeasure in response to a perceived injury; the exact nature of these feelings (e.g., outrage, hate or irritation) depends on the specific situation. Hostility is a negative, antagonistic attitude towards another person or group. Anger and hostility are often closely connected to aggression, but not always. People can be angry with others and regard them with great hostility without ever trying to harm them. And aggression can occur without a trace of anger or hostility, like when a contract killer murders a perfect stranger for financial gain. The aggression of a hired gun is an example of proactive aggression, or instrumental aggression as it is also known, in which harm is inflicted as a means to a desired end. Aggression aimed at harming someone for personal gain, attention or even self-defence fits this definition. If the aggressor believes that there is an easier way to obtain the goal, aggression will not occur. In reactive aggression, or emotional aggression as it is also known, the means and the end coincide; that is, harm is inflicted for its own sake. Reactive aggression is often impulsive and carried out in the heat of the moment, as when a jealous lover strikes out in rage, the driver of a motor vehicle lashes out at another driver, or fans of rival football teams attack each other with fists and weapons. Reactive aggression, however, can also be calm, cool and calculating. Revenge, so the saying goes, is a dish best served cold.

Aggression

Behaviour intended to harm another individual.

Proactive aggression

Aggressive behaviour whereby harm is inflicted as a means to a desired end (also called instrumental aggression).

Reactive aggression

Aggressive behaviour where the means and the end coincide; harm is inflicted for its own sake.

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Of course, sometimes it is hard to distinguish between proactive and reactive aggression. Why does a frustrated fighter illegally head butt his opponent? Is it a deliberate, sneaky attempt to gain an advantage over a frustrating opponent, or does it simply reflect someone losing control and lashing out unthinkingly in frustration? It can be difficult to know where to draw the line between the two types of aggression and motives. Indeed, some scholars believe that all aggression is fundamentally proactive – serving some need – and still others suggest that proactive and reactive aggression are not distinct categories but endpoints on a continuum (Anderson & Huesmann, 2007; Tedeschi & Bond, 2001).

CULTURE, GENDER AND INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES Just as not all types of aggression are alike, not all groups of people are alike in their attitudes and propensities towards aggression. Before we discuss the causes of aggression and what can be done about it, we need to consider how aggression is similar and different across cultures, gender and individuals.

Culture and aggression Cultures vary dramatically in how and how much their members aggress against each other. We can see this variation across societies and across specific groups (or subcultures) within a society.

Comparisons across societies According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Global Study on Homicide (2013) intentional homicide caused Rates of intentional homicides per 100 000 people in the the deaths of 437 000 people across the world in 2012. Although population in each region of the populated world. many in Australia believe we are in the grip of a crime wave, the Oceania region recorded homicide rates almost half the global Americas average. Murder rates were much higher in Central and South Africa America, the Caribbean, and Southern and Central Africa than in other regions in the world (United Nations Office on Drugs Global and Crime, 2011) (see Figure 11.1). Several factors contribute to this tendency, including poverty, drug trafficking, availability Europe of guns, political and social unrest, and so on. Countries with wide disparities in income have murder rates almost four times Oceania greater than societies with more equal income distribution (see Asia Figure 11.2). That said, the overall trend in the global homicide rate seems to be a decreasing one. Trend analysis of the five-year 0 5 10 15 20 period preceding that report shows the stability of homicide rates in much of Asia, Oceania and many sub-regions of Europe, Rate per 100 000 population and a consistent decrease in Eastern Europe (see Figure 11.3). Source: © United Nations, March 2014. All rights reserved, worldwide. By contrast, homicide levels had increased in Eastern, Northern and Southern Africa. Another difference across countries concerns how individualistic or collectivistic cultures are. As discussed throughout this book, individualistic cultures place more emphasis on the values of independence, autonomy and self-reliance, whereas collectivistic cultures place greater emphasis on the values of interdependence, cooperation and social harmony. Gordon Forbes and colleagues (2009, 2011) hypothesised that individualistic cultures, which are less concerned with social harmony and the avoidance of open conflict, are most likely to have a relatively high rate of aggression. To examine this idea, they asked university students in China (a highly collectivistic culture) and the US (a highly individualistic culture) to answer questions about how they would likely respond in a particular conflict situation. The researchers found that men in the US tended to be significantly more likely to advocate overt aggressive responses compared with men in China; yet women tended not to differ in their responses across cultures. A more recent study involving 15 countries found that countries high in individualism were associated with greater frequency of school violence (Menzer & Torney-Purta, 2012). In addition, Yan Li and colleagues (2010) found that within a sample of Chinese adolescents, those who were more likely to endorse values associated with individualism tended to be more aggressive – as rated by their teachers and peers – than were adolescents who more strongly endorsed collectivist values. It is important to note, however, that collectivist cultures are not immune from aggression and violence. For example, murder rates in India and Korea (relatively collectivistic cultures) tend to be much higher than in the UK or France (relatively individualistic cultures). FIGURE 11.1 Homicide by world region, 2012

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FIGURE 11.2 Homicide around the world, 2012 This map indicates the number of recorded intentional homicides per 100 000 people across the globe in 2012. Interpret the numbers with great caution, however, because there are large differences in reporting and recording practices in the various countries, but

the basic point is clear: There is wide variation in the frequency of murder around the world. (These are the most recent data collected by UNODC).

Homicide rate 0.00–2.99 3.00–4.99 5.00–9.99 10.00–19.99 20.00–29.99 >=30.00 WHO estimates No data available Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Dashed lines represent undetermined boundaries. The dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties. The final boundary between the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan has not yet been determined. A dispute exists between the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland concerning sovereignty over the Falkland Islands (Malvinas). Source: © United Nations, March 2014. All rights reserved, worldwide.

FIGURE 11.3 Global trend of homicide rates, 2013 Homicide rates from 2008 to 2012 indicate that most countries are either stable or decreasing. An upward trend is noted, however, in regions such as Africa and South America. 40

30 25 20 15 10 5

2008

2009

2010

2011

Oceania

Western Europe

Southern Europe

Northern Europe

Eastern Europe

Western Asia

Southern Asia

South-Eastern Asia

Eastern Asia

Central Asia

South America

Northern America

Central America

Caribbean

Southern Africa

Northern Africa

0 Eastern Africa

Rate per 100 000 population

35

2012 Source: © United Nations, March 2014. All rights reserved, worldwide.

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The forms that violence typically takes, and people’s attitudes towards various kinds of aggression, also differ internationally. Relative to most of the world, the US has a tremendous amount of gun-related violence. The prevalence of handguns in the US is exceptionally high, and even when compared with countries with which it shares much culturally, such as England and Australia, attitudes about guns tend to be much more permissive and positive, especially among males (Cooke, 2004). Indeed, although the rate of violent crime is actually lower in the US than in the UK or Canada, the murder rate is much higher in the US than in the UK (Barclay & Tavares, 2003; Slack, 2009). Researchers believe that the higher murder rate in the US is due to the prevalence of guns. According to one report, the firearm homicide rate was about 20 times higher in the US than in other high-income countries; and for 15–24-year-olds, the rate was almost 43 times higher (Richardson & Hemenway, 2011)! The violence in Australia and New Zealand tends to involve individuals rather than groups of people. Group attacks against other groups in political, ethnic, tribal or other institutionalised conflicts are seen throughout the world, but are particularly associated with the Middle East, Africa, Eastern Europe and parts of South America. And the violent mobs of football fans that are not uncommon in England and other parts of Europe are rarely seen at Australian and New Zealand sporting events. Cultures also differ in their attitudes toward aggression. In a study involving students at 36 universities in 19 different countries around the world, there was considerable variation in how acceptable the students found different actions, such as a husband slapping a wife or vice versa (Douglas & Straus, 2006). For example, almost 80% of the respondents from a university in India did not strongly disapprove of a husband slapping a wife, compared with only about 24% at a university in the US. In general, respondents from Europe were more approving of a husband slapping a wife than were respondents from Australia and New Zealand, who in turn tended to be somewhat more approving than respondents from North America. By contrast, these trends were reversed for the question of whether respondents had ever injured a dating partner – on this issue, North American rates tended to be highest. According to a 2012 United Nations Children’s Fund report, a majority of adolescent girls and boys in India and in Nepal believe that it is acceptable for a man to beat his wife (Sinha, 2012). Even within the same region, cultural differences can lead to very different attitudes and behaviours regarding aggression between men and women. A study of Israeli youths revealed that rates of dating violence were much higher among Israeli Arabs than Israeli Jews, apparently reflecting the very different norms between the two cultures (Sherer, 2009). What is considered to be aggression and unacceptable in relation to children also can differ across cultures. For example, in Japan it is not uncommon for Japanese adult businessmen to grope women and schoolgirls on public transportation (Ronzone, 2009), a practice that would be considered aggressive and unacceptable in many other cultures, including Australia and New Zealand. Indeed, the problem has become so bad that some train companies in Tokyo introduced female-only cars to protect women and girls against this practice, such as on one train line that was formerly considered ‘a gropers’ paradise’ because of long gaps between stops and the large number of schoolgirl passengers (Joyce, 2005, p. A6). For similar reasons a program was announced to reserve some subway cars for women in Seoul, South Korea, to protect them from groping, but the plan was scrapped due to an outpouring of criticism (Jung-Yoon, 2011; Kiong, 2011). Exploiting this behaviour to more extreme ends, a Japanese 3D video game called RapeLay has players simulate raping a woman and her two ‘virgin schoolgirl’ daughters in a subway. This game caused an international uproar in February 2009 when it was discovered to be on sale (temporarily) at Amazon.com (Fennelly, 2009). Numerous websites, DVDs and even fetish clubs in Japan are available for men to watch or act out their fantasies of groping schoolgirls and young women in train carriages. Another example concerns female genital mutilation – any of several procedures in which, according to some estimates, the genitals of approximately 6000 girls a day are cut in several countries around the world, particularly in parts of Africa and Asia. It is estimated that about 140 million females worldwide have undergone this procedure, mostly in childhood and often without anaesthesia or sterile techniques (World Health Organization, 2012a). The cultures that practise this consider it an important, sacred ritual, but the cultures that condemn it consider it an inhumane and dangerous act of violence and have vigorously called for a worldwide ban (Allam, 2012; Corbett, 2008).

Bullying around the world One form of aggression that is prevalent across virtually all cultures is bullying (Chester et al., 2015; Volk, Dane, Marini, & Vaillancourt, 2015). There are children and adolescents around the world who are physically, sexually or emotionally bullied by their peers. Bullying involves intentional harm (physical or 452

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psychological), repetition (the victim is targeted a number of times) and a power imbalance (the bully abuses his or her power over the victim). The reported prevalence of bullying varies widely across research studies, with estimates on the low end suggesting that 5% or 10% of schoolchildren are involved in bullying, and estimates on the high end suggesting numbers as high as 70% to 90% (Borntrager, Davis, Bernstein, & Gorman, 2009; Due & Holstein, 2008; Fleming & Jacobsen, 2010; Olweus, 2004; Rigby & Smith, 2011; Santalahti et al., 2008). When Wendy Craig and colleagues set up hidden video cameras and microphones to get an unfiltered peek into aggression in schoolyards in Canada, they saw bullying in midsized schools at a rate of 4.5 episodes per hour (Craig, Pepler, & Atlas, 2000; Pepler, Craig, Yuile, & Connolly, 2004). But of course, the bully and the victim are not always face-to-face adversaries. With our reliance upon technology growing at a rapid rate, we are now more accessible, for longer periods of time, than ever before. The internet and the use of emails, electronic chat rooms, social networking sites and other electronic means of communication have not only brought us all closer together, but have also blurred the boundaries of time and space and allowed the concept of bullying to potentially infiltrate every waking hour of our lives. A poll of 28 countries around the world (IPSOS Global Advisor, 2018) suggested that approximately 17% of children have experienced cyberbullying and roughly 33% of people know a child who has experienced the same. According to this report approximately 65% had experienced cyberbullying as a result of social networking sites such as Facebook, mobile phones or other mobile devices (45%), online messaging (38%) or chat rooms (34%), email (19%), other websites (14%) and other forms of technology (6%). The level of awareness of cyberbullying was generally high among the countries surveyed (75%), with people from Sweden and Italy sharing the highest levels of awareness (91%), followed by Chile (89%). As you can see from Table 11.1, Australia and New Zealand also report high levels of awareness. TABLE 11.1 A portrait of cyberbullying in Australia and New Zealand Awareness of cyberbullying in Australia is generally high as is the estimated experience of cyberbullying, with New Zealand the third highest of countries surveyed.

Highest 3

Lowest 3

Awareness of cyberbullying

Parents' estimated incidence of cyberbullying

All 28 countries in survey

75%

17%

Sweden

91%

23%

Italy

91%

11%

Chile

89%

 8%

New Zealand

84%

 2%

Australia

80%

19%

Japan

56%

 4%

France

50%

 9%

Saudi Arabia

37%

19%

Source: IPSOS Public Affairs. (2018). Cyberbullying: An Ipsos Survey – August 2018. Retrieved from https://www.ipsos.com/en-nz/ cyberbullying-nz-3rd-highest-29-countries-surveyed

Australian research conducted by Boystown in 2010 showed that cyberbullying was most likely to occur during the transitional stages between primary and high school, and that the most common platforms were email, online chat rooms, social network sites and mobile phones. Social networking sites, however, become the more dominant platform for victims aged 17–18 years. Males were more likely to be bullied in chat rooms, whereas female bullying was more evenly spread across emails, mobile phones, social networking sites and chat rooms. These seemingly ordinary rites of childhood can lead to extraordinary suffering, including feelings of panic, nervousness and distraction in school; recurring memories of abuse; depression and anxiety that can endure through adulthood; and even suicide (Birkett, Espelage, & Koenig, 2009; Hilton, Anngela-Cole, & Wakita, 2010; Jordan & Austin, 2012). It is worth noting that the perpetrators in most of the instances of school shootings and massacres during the past couple of decades reportedly felt that they had been bullied or picked on by their peers, including Martin Bryant.

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CRITICAL THINKING ACTIVITY There seems to be an increasing amount of bullying where a person is attacked and the incident is filmed and uploaded to social media and YouTube. Having read the previous chapter on the topic of ‘helping others’, why do you think so many people

stand and idly watch the attacks, help to film the attacks or walk on by? Do you think that the size of the potential audience of these videos has a greater impact on the victim than an incident where only one or two people are witness?

Non-violent cultures Although violence seems to be just about everywhere, a handful of societies stand out as non-violent exceptions. A number of societies have been identified around the world that are almost completely without violence (Bonta, 1997, 2013; Bonta & Fry, 2006; Fry, 2012; Miklikowska & Fry, 2010). For example, the Chewong, who live in the mountains of the Malay Peninsula, do not even have words in their language for quarrelling, fighting, aggression or warfare. Among the Ifaluk, who live on a small atoll in the Federated States of Micronesia, the most serious act of aggression noted during one year was when a man touched another on the shoulder in anger. The punishment? ‘A stiff fine’. Bonta (2013) emphasises that these cultures cherish peacefulness, which has become a core part of their identity. Many of these societies have religious or mythological reasons for remaining peaceful, which seems to have helped them stay nonviolent even in the face of violent contact from others.

Subcultures within a country There are important variations in aggression within particular societies as a function of age, class, race and region. For example, teenagers and young adults in countries such as the US have a much greater rate of involvement in violent crime – as both offenders and victims – than any other age group. Similar associations have not been found in Australia, however, where neither population changes (males aged 15–19 years – declining) nor changes in their rate of offending (also declining) have suggested a significant relationship with declining trends in homicide, robbery or sexual assault (Aebi, 2004; Bricknell, 2008; Gartner & Parker, 1990).

Violence in childhood According to the Ending Violence in Childhood: Global Report 2017, launched by the Know Violence in Childhood Initiative in 2017, every year, as many as 1.7 billion children around the world experience severe forms of physical, emotional and sexual violence. As you can see from the infographic provided in Figure 11.4 children are exposed to various forms of violence from birth to adolescence, the influence of which remains across the lifespan. FIGURE 11.4 In 2015 three out of four of the world’s children had experienced interpersonal violence The Ending Violence in Childhood (2017) report estimated that 1.7 billion children had experienced some form of violence including Prenatal and birth

Early childhood 0–4

corporal punishment in the home, sexual abuse, and peer violence.

Middle childhood 5–9

Early adolescence 10–14

Late adolescence 15–19

Home

Home

Home School

Home School Community

Home School Community

Sex-selective abortion Witnessing intimate partner violence

Witnessing domestic violence Violent discipline at home Neglect Homicide

Violent discipline at home Corporal punishment at school Witnessing domestic violence Bullying by peers at school Physical fight at school Sexual violence

Sexual violent Bullying by peers at school Physical fight at school Witnessing domestic violence

Intimate partner violence Sexual violence Physical violence Homicide

Source: Know Violence in Childhood. (2017). Ending Violence in Childhood: Global Report 2017. Retrieved from http://www.knowviolenceinchildhood.org/

Gender and aggression Despite all the variation across cultures, one thing is universal – men are more violent than women. This has been found in virtually all cultures studied around the world. In Australia, homicide incidents between 2013–2014 were recorded at a rate of 1 per 100 000 people (Figure 11.5). The majority (88%) of homiciderelated offences were committed by men – in fact they are six times more likely to offend than females.

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Men were also more likely to be the victims of murder (64%). Research also shows that alcohol plays a role in many homicides, that roughly a third of homicides happen on either a Sunday or Thursday, almost half happen in the victim’s home, and the most common weapon of choice are knives and sharp implements (Bryant & Bricknell, 2017). Despite the significant variation in total violence from one country to another, the gender difference remains remarkably stable over time and place. Men commit the very large majority of homicides, and men constitute the very large majority of homicide victims, as you can see in Figure 11.6 FIGURE 11.5 Homicide in Australia 2013–2014 Men are far more likely to be the perpetrators and the victims of homicide than women. Homicide incidents in Australia (2012–14) 64% of homicide victims were male

64%

79% of intimate partner homicide victims were females

Six in ten homicide victims died from a stab wound or from being beaten

The offending rate among males was six times that of females

79%

Victims from 45% of homicide incidents were killed in their own home

45%

32% of homicides occurred on a Sunday or Thursday.

32%

Source: Bryant, W., & Bricknell, S. (2017). Homicide in Australia 2012–13 to 2013–14: National Homicide Monitoring Program report. Statistical Reports No. 2. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. https://aic.gov.au/publications/sr/sr002, Released under CC BY 4.0 International. Link to license: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

FIGURE 11.6 Global distribution of homicide victims by age and sex, 2014 According to World Health Organization, in 2015 there were 470 million people worldwide who were victims of homicide (6.4 people per 100 000) – 80% of these were male and a large percentage were aged between 15–29 years. Global estimated homicides by sex and age group (2015) 18 17.1

16

15.3

Rate per 100 000 population

14 12 10

10.3 9.3

8

7.2

6 4 3.3

2 0

2.8

1.9

1.5 1.7 0–14 years

15–29 years

30–44 years

45–59 years

2.7

2.4

60+ years

All ages

Age group Female

Male Source: World Health Organization. (2015). Homicide: WHO Global Health Estimates (2015 update). Retrieved from http://apps.who.int/violence-info/homicide

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In virtually every culture, males are more violent than females.

TRUE

For almost every category of aggression, males are more aggressive than females.

FALSE

(Buss, 2012; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2013). According to the World Health Organization in 2015, an estimated 470 000 people worldwide were victims of homicide (a global rate of 6.4 per 100 000), the greatest proportion of which were males aged 15–29 years. But what about aggression in general, as opposed to violence? In meta-analyses involving hundreds of samples from numerous countries, John Archer (2004) and Noel Card and colleagues (2008) have found that males are consistently more physically aggressive than females. This was true across all ages and cultures sampled. Females were as likely to feel anger as males, but they were much less likely to act on their anger in aggressive ways. Even among children between one and six years old, boys show higher rates of physical aggression than girls. So, does all this mean that the stereotype that males are more aggressive than females is correct? Not necessarily. Most of the earlier research on this issue focused on the form of aggression that is typical of males – physical aggression. But think back to our definition of aggression, it concerns intent to harm. However, there are many ways to harm someone other than through physical means, as summarised by a child’s remark in research conducted by Britt Galen and Marion Underwood (1997): ‘Boys may use their fists to fight, but at least it’s over with quickly; girls use their tongues, and it goes on forever’ (p. 589). This research reveals that although boys tend to be more overtly aggressive than girls, boys do not tend to be more aggressive than girls when it comes to indirect or relational aggression. Indeed, for these types of aggression, girls sometimes are more aggressive than boys. Indirect forms of aggression include acts such as telling lies to get someone in trouble or shutting a person out of desired activities. Relational aggression is one kind of indirect aggression that particularly targets a person’s relationships and social status, such as by threatening to end a friendship, engaging in gossip and backstabbing, and trying to get others to dislike the target. Numerous studies conducted in a variety of countries around the world have found that females tend to engage in indirect aggression more often than males, although many others have found only small or no significant gender differences. The results of meta-analyses that have reviewed the very large research literature on the topic have found a very small but statistically significant gender difference, with girls exhibiting somewhat more indirect aggression than boys (Archer, 2004; Card et al., 2008). Why are girls at least as aggressive as boys on relational (but not physical) forms of aggression? Researchers believe that one reason is because females typically care more about relationships and intimacy than males do, and so may see injuring someone socially as particularly effective. Another reason may be that strong norms encourage boys to aggress physically, but these same norms discourage girls from doing so (Busching & Krahé, 2015; Crick et al., 1999; McEachern & Snyder, 2012; Spieker et al., 2012). In addition to gender differences, there may be differences in the types of aggression people exhibit as a function of sexual orientation. Mark Sergeant and colleagues (2006), for example, found that gay men reported significantly lower levels of physical aggression than straight men did, but there was no difference between the two groups on self-reported rates of indirect aggression.

Culture and gendered violence Globally, violence against women is recognised as a significant public health problem (World Health Organization, 2013; see the Cultural Diversity feature that follows). In Australia, one in four women have experienced violence at the hands of a current or previous partner. According to the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (AIHW) (2017) in 2014–15, on average, almost eight women (and two men) were hospitalised each day after being assaulted by their spouse or partner and two in five have experienced at least one incident of violence since the age of 15. The rate of domestic assaults for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander women in 2014–2015 was far higher than for non-Indigenous women. Rates indicated that 1 in 7 experienced physical violence in the previous year – 28% of which said the most recent incident was perpetrated by a cohabiting partner. Alarmingly, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander men are 23 times more likely, and women 32 times more likely, to be hospitalised due to family violence than non-Indigenous men and women; and Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children are seven times more likely to be the subject of child abuse and neglect than their non-Indigenous peers (AIHW, 2018b). Tom Powell and colleagues (2014) highlight several stressors and risk factors which may underpin the transgenerational patterns of violence in Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander populations which unfortunately appears to be normalised at an early age. For instance, many Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander youths under the age of 15 had witnessed or knew of someone who had witnessed violence in the community (16%), and almost half had also been the victim of violent crime. Location also played an important role – Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people in remote areas were three times more likely to have witnessed violence than those in non-remote areas. The generational effects of colonisation, drug and alcohol abuse, and history of rejection and oppression are evidenced in the high rates of homelessness, incarceration, family-and community-based violence. 456

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The situation is equally concerning in New Zealand with about half of all homicides in New Zealand committed by a family member; between 2009 and 2015 an average of 13 women, 10 men, and 9 children were killed each year as a result of family violence. In 2016, New Zealand Police investigated almost 119 000 incidents of family violence (roughly one every 5 minutes!). One in three New Zealand women experience physical and/or sexual violence from a partner in their life-time, three quarters of recorded assaults against females are committed by a family member, and between 2009 and 2012 three quarters of the intimate-

CULTURAL DIVERSITY VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN According to the United Nations (2017), violence against women and girls is one of the most widespread, persistent and devastating breaches of human rights that we face today. On the basis of data for 87 countries during the period of 2005–2016 (shown in Figure 11.7), 19% of women, aged 15–49, had experienced physical or sexual violence at the hands of an intimate partner in the twelve months prior to data collection. The report also highlighted the fact that almost one in four children around the world were married before they turned 18 and one in three had suffered genital mutilation/cutting. It is estimated that 35% of women globally have experienced some form of physical or sexual violence, with a large proportion attributed to intimate partners (World Health Organization, 2013). In fact, current estimates suggest as many as 38% of women who are murdered worldwide are killed by an intimate partner, while 42% have experienced injuries as a result of physical or sexual abuse

and are significantly more likely to experience emotional distress, suicide attempts, physical health limitations, unintended pregnancy, abortion and miscarriage (World Health Organization, 2013). While the highest prevalence of intimate partner violence was found in central sub-Saharan Africa (65.6%), all countries of sub-Saharan Africa are above the global average of 26.4%. By contrast, the lowest rates were found in East Asia (16.3%), Western Europe (19.3%), North America (21.3%), Central Asia (22.9%) and Southern Latin America (23.7%). Keep in mind, however, that although these regions are below the global average, between one-quarter and one-fifth of women in these areas have still experienced partner violence. Women who have been sexually assaulted by someone other than a partner represent 7% of women worldwide, and for many the first sexual encounter is forced (17% in rural Tanzania, 24% in Peru and 30% in Bangladesh) (World Health Organization, 2012a and b).

FIGURE 11.7 Prevalence of violence towards women across the globe World Health Organization estimates suggest at least one-third of women globally experience some form of physical or sexual violence in their lifetime.

25.4% WHO European Region

29.8% WHO Region of the Americas

23.2% High income

37.0% WHO Eastern Mediterranean Region

KEY: Region of the Americas African Region

36.6% WHO African Region

24.6% Western Pacific Region 37.7% South-East Asia Region

Eastern Mediterranean Region European Region South-East Asia Region Western Pacific Region High income countries Source: World Health Organization, Department of Reproductive Health and Research, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, South African Medical Research Council. (2013). Global and regional estimates of violence against women: prevalence and health effects of intimate partner violence and non-partner sexual violence, p. 18. Reproduced with permission of the publisher, World Health Organization. Retrieved from http://www.who.int/reproductivehealth/publications/violence/9789241564625/en/

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partner violence-related offences were perpetrated by men (Family Violence Death Review Committee, 2014; New Zealand Crime Survey, 2015; New Zealand Family Violence Clearinghouse, 2017). Although it is clear that violence against intimate partners occurs in all countries and that domestic violence is most commonly perpetrated by males against a female partner, one research finding that is often met with a great deal of surprise and scepticism is that there is no reliable gender difference in the percentage of women and men who physically assault their intimate partners. That is, women are at least as likely to aggress against male partners as men are to aggress against female partners. This has been reported in more than 200 studies over the past few decades (Straus, 2011; Straus & Gozjolko, 2014), including those that are relevant to Australia (Mitchell, 2011). Of men surveyed in Australia, 1% said that they had experienced violence in the relationship with their current partner and 5% with a previous partner. For Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander men, 19% were hospitalised as a result of spousal-inflicted assaults – figures twenty-times higher than their non-Indigenous counterparts (Mitchell, 2011). These results not only defy most people’s expectations and stereotypes, but they also quite often do not match up with statistics from the police or agencies involved in helping people suffering from intimate partner violence. Researchers in this area explain that the reason for this difference is that men are far less likely than women to report to the police or various agencies that their partners physically assaulted them. Norms play a role in this, of course, because it is seen by many as far more acceptable for a woman to hit her male partner than it is for a man to hit his female partner. Another, and somewhat related, important reason is that the consequences of aggression and violence are far from equal. Women are more often killed, seriously injured or sexually assaulted during domestic disputes than are men (Straus, 2011; Straus & Gozjolko, 2014). As Barbara Morse (1995) put it, ‘Women were more often the victims of severe partner assault and injury not because men strike more often, but because men strike harder’ (p. 251). Rates of aggression and violence in the form of sexual assault differ greatly by gender, with males being overwhelmingly more likely to be perpetrators and females to be targets.

LGBTI and domestic violence Of course, domestic violence also occurs in same-sex relationships. The reported prevalence of violence, however, varies dramatically. One of the reasons for this is the lack of recognition of intimate partner violence within gender-diverse or same-sex relationships and an under-reporting of intimate partner violence in general (Donovan & Hester, 2010; Leonard, Mitchell, Patel, & Fox, 2008). A report on the health and wellbeing of lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans, and/or intersex (LGBTI) Australians conducted by Pitts, Smith, Mitchell, and Patel (2006) found significant levels of intimate partner violence. Research has also indicated that abusive partners within an LGBTI relationship may use ‘outing’ or the disclosing of HIV status (Ball & Hayes, 2009; Calton, Cattaneo, & Gebhard, 2015; Kay & Jefferies, 2010); or they may use their partner’s sexuality or identity as a form of control by limiting their access to friends and social networks, or threatening to tell their partner’s employer, family or friends about their same-sex relationship or transidentity (Calton et al., 2015; Donovan, Hester, Holmes, & McCarry, 2006). Monica Campo and Sarah Tayton (2015) suggest that heteronormative notions of intimate partner violence may prevent victims from recognising their experience as intimate partner violence largely because it is predominantly viewed as a phenomenon that affects women at the hands of a male perpetrator. Research also suggests that gay men may have difficulty conceptualising behaviours such as rape within an intimate relationship as intimate partner violence (Donovan et al., 2006; Fileborn, 2012). It has been noted also that discrimination, stigma and non-recognition of same-sex or other genderdiverse relationships present barriers to the collection of statistical and demographic data obscuring the realities of intimate partner violence in LGBTI communities (Lorenzetti, Wells, Callaghan, & Logie, 2015). For instance, in lesbian relationships involving physical violence there may be the assumption that women are incapable of exerting physical power over other women; and stereotypes about gay men not being masculine may lead to views that they are not capable of violence (Calton et al., 2015; Kay & Jefferies, 2010). Further complexities arise with lesbian abusers who present as victims to shelters, further perpetuating abuse against their partner by pursuing them in these spaces or making it impossible for them to seek support utilising such services (Calton et al., 2015; Peterman & Dixon, 2003).

Violence and natural disasters Violence is of great concern to communities dealing with the aftermath of natural disasters, and it appears that the concern is somewhat elevated when it comes to women and children (World Health Organization, 2005). Following the earthquake in Haiti in 2010, reports from a number of humanitarian organisations 458

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indicated that sexual violence in camps set up for those who were displaced was a great concern, with 14% of women reporting one or more experiences of sexual violence (Amnesty International, 2011) and 60% of women and young girls indicating that they feared sexual violence against them (Canadian Red Cross, 2012). There is compelling evidence for the increase in intimate partner violence following large-scale disasters (Schumacher et al., 2010). For example, following Hurricane Hugo in the Caribbean in 1989, there was a notable increase in sexual violence against women and young girls forced to live in storm shelters; following Hurricane Mitch in Nicaragua, 1998, there was a documented increase in levels of domestic violence (Canadian Red Cross, 2012; World Health Organization, 2005); and following Hurricane Katrina in America in 2005, there was a 98% increase in the physical victimisation of women. Similarly, in New Zealand police reported a 53% increase in domestic violence after the Canterbury earthquake in 2010 (New Zealand Herald, 2010). Australia is not immune to this effect, with research suggesting similar trends following the Charleville floods in Queensland in 1990 and the Black Saturday bushfires in Victoria in 2009 (Parkinson & Zara, 2013). Many explanations have been suggested for the increased level of violence that is witnessed following these events, including loss of life, increased levels of stress and depression (including post-traumatic stress), feelings of powerlessness, loss of property, loss of livelihood, the lack of basic provisions, the destruction of social networks and the breakdown of law enforcement capabilities (World Health Organization, 2005). Certainly, there are immense pressures placed upon everyone who survives a disaster as they try to re-establish their lives, and for many a period of grief and loss goes hand in hand with the recovery period. For the survivors of the Black Saturday bushfires in Australia, homelessness, unemployment and increased alcohol and drug use were noted as characteristic of the recovery period, as was the increased contact with family members that came as a direct result of having to share cramped accommodation. But many men also struggled with their perceptions of the societal definitions of masculinity (Pease & Pringle, 2001). It has been suggested that the inability to control the spread of the fire, to protect property and to preserve life represented a loss of control that may have threatened the male provider and protector role (Phillips, Jenkins, & Enarson, 2009). Unfortunately, when feelings of inadequacy acted out in a violent manner coincide with a community attitude that largely condones or excuses violence against women, as long as it is a consequence of temporary anger or results in genuine regret, it provides the impetus for, and legitimisation of, violent tendencies (Parkinson & Zara, 2013). As Duke Austin (2008) puts it: ‘Men are likely to have a feeling of inadequacy because they are unable to live up to the expectations of their socially constructed gender role … The presence of these conditions unfortunately influences higher numbers of partnered, heterosexual men to act in violent and abusive ways towards the women in their lives’.

CRITICAL THINKING ACTIVITY Given the stigma that is often attached to domestic violence, can you list the factors that you believe would limit a woman coming forward to ask for help? Now think about a gay woman, a gay man and a heterosexual man.

Compare your lists – are there similarities? Can you think of ways that domestic violence programs and shelters may address these issues in order to instil confidence that services are available to address the needs of all people affected by domestic violence?

Respect. Now. Always. In February 2016, universities in Australia launched an initiative to address and to prevent sexual assault and harassment. The initiative aims to raise awareness of sexual assault and sexual harassment, improve the visibility of support services available to students, to obtain data to guide improvements in policies and services, and to assist universities to develop resources to address the aims. Tens of thousands of Australian university students participated in the first-ever national prevalence survey on university students’ experiences of sexual assault and sexual harassment (Universities Australia, 2018). The Australian Human Rights Commission, Change the Course report, released in 2017, illustrated the depth of the problems students were facing. As you can see from Figure 11.8 the magnitude of the situation was deeply concerning, with one in five students saying they were sexually harassed in a university setting and one in five saying they were sexually assaulted at a social event at a university setting. A large majority of these victims had not reported these incidents.

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FIGURE 11.8 Prevalence of sexual assault and sexual harassment at Australian universities

Individual differences

Although it is clear that aggression can vary across cultures and by gender, a different question is whether Current estimates suggest at least one in five people have been the victim there is consistency in aggression within specific of sexual assault or sexual harassment at an Australian University. individuals. In other words, do some people simply Prevalence and location of sexual assault tend to be more aggressive than others, across time and sexual harassment at university. and contexts? The evidence on this point is fairly One in five (21%) students were sexually clear – although situational variables (as we will see harassed in a university setting, excluding later in this chapter) certainly do influence whether travel to and from university, in 2016. and how someone will aggress, there are some stable Recent incidents most commonly occurred: individual differences in aggressiveness. Aggression in childhood does predict aggression in adolescence and 14% 13% 8% adulthood, along with adult criminality, alcohol abuse and other antisocial behaviours – although the strength On university grounds In university teaching spaces University social spaces of this relationship can vary as a function of the child’s upbringing (Ehrenreich, Beron, Brinkley, & Underwood, 2014; Kokko et al., 2014; Warburton & Anderson, 2015). 1.6% of students were sexually assaulted in a university setting, including travel to and from university, What types of personalities tend to be associated on at least one occasion in 2015 or 2016. with aggressiveness? Researchers often identify Recent incidents most commonly occurred: individuals’ personalities based on what are called the ‘big five’ factors – five dimensions that account for a great deal of variability in people’s personalities across 21% 15% 10% 10% gender and culture: 1. agreeableness – good-natured, trustful, cooperative At a university At a social event at On public transport on On university 2. conscientiousness – responsible, orderly, dependable grounds residence or college university or residence the way to or from 3.  openness to experience – intellectual, independentsocial event university minded, prefer novelty Source: Australian Human Rights Commission. (2017). Change the course: National report on sexual assault and sexual harassment at Australian Universities. Retrieved from https://www.humanrights.gov. 4. extraversion – outgoing, energetic, assertive au/our-work/sex-discrimination/publications/change-course-national-report-sexual-assault-and-sexual 5. neuroticism – easily upset, emotionally unstable. Of these five factors, being low in agreeableness is a particularly strong predictor of aggression. Being low on the dimension of openness or high on the dimension of neuroticism are also associated with aggression (Barlett & Anderson, 2012). Some traits associated with aggression tend to predict aggression reliably only under conditions of provocation; that is, situations in which the individual feels threatened, insulted or stressed (Bettencourt, Molix, Talley, & Sheldon, 2006). Among these traits are: • emotional susceptibility – the tendency to feel distressed, inadequate and vulnerable to perceived threats • Type A personality – the tendency to be driven by feelings of inadequacy to try to prove oneself through personal accomplishments • impulsivity – being relatively unable to control one’s thoughts and behaviours. When not provoked, individuals with these traits are not much more likely than others to behave aggressively. Provocation, however, can light the relatively short fuses of these individuals, leading to the potential explosion of aggression. Many people assume that individuals, and particularly adolescents, with low self-esteem are more likely to aggress than people with average or high self-esteem. The evidence on this is mixed at best (Bushman et al., 2009; Donnellan et al., 2005; Locke, 2009). In fact, recent research suggests that low self-esteem does not predict aggression, and also that people with high self-esteem are particularly likely to aggress if: (1) they also are high in narcissism, and (2) have received a threat to their ego, such as from humiliation or insult (Bushman et al., 2009; Thomaes, Bushman, Stegge, & Olthof, 2008). The relationship between selfesteem and aggression may also be quite different across cultures; the results of a recent meta-analysis of studies conducted in China found that higher self-esteem was moderately associated with greater aggression (Teng, Liu, & Guo, 2015). Although self-esteem is not a great predictor of aggression, narcissism clearly is. Narcissism involves having an inflated sense of self-worth and self-love; having low empathy for others, tending to focus on the self rather than others, and being especially sensitive to perceived insults. Narcissism is consistently and positively correlated with aggression in response to provocation, particularly if the provocation is 460

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public rather than private (Chester & DeWall, 2015; DeWall, Anderson, & Bushman, 2013; Krizan & Johar, 2015). Narcissism is one of the three traits some researchers call the dark triad (which we admit sounds like it should be the name of the villains in the next Star Wars movie) for their role in aggressiveness and violence. The other two traits in the dark triad are Machiavellianism (characterised by manipulativeness) and psychopathy (characterised by impulsivity, poor self-control, and a lack of empathy) (Goodboy & Martin, 2015; Pabian, De Backer, & Vandebosch, 2015). Unlike self-esteem, one factor that has a very clear and consistent relationship with aggression is self-control (Denson, DeWall, & Finkel, 2012; DeWall et al., 2013). It seems that individuals with strong selfcontrol can resist impulses and act in ways that are consistent with their personal and societal standards for appropriate behaviour. For example, research suggests that poor self-control is one of the strongest predictors of crime (Pratt & Cullen, 2000) and that children who are low in self-control tend to be more aggressive as young adults (Moffitt et al., 2011). A study involving samples of adolescents and teenagers from 25 European countries found that low self-control was a significant predictor of cyberbullying (Vazsonyi et al., 2012). Poor self-control also predicts aggression towards strangers and romantic partners (DeWall, Finkel, & Denson, 2011; Finkel, DeWall, Slotter, Oaten, & Foshee, 2009; Li, Nie, Boardley, Situ, & Dou, 2014).

CHAPTER ELEVEN

Dark triad

A set of three traits that are associated with higher levels of aggressiveness: Machiavellianism, psychopathy, and narcissism.

ORIGINS OF AGGRESSION Regardless of these various cultural, gender and individual differences, aggression has been a prevalent part of human interaction throughout history and around the world. It is not surprising that many have speculated about the origins of aggression. Where does it come from? Are we born aggressive or are we taught to be aggressive? Many have argued for one side or the other of the ‘nature–nurture’ debate – the ‘nature’ side holding that aggression is an innate characteristic of human beings and the ‘nurture’ side holding that aggression is learned through experience. In this section, we look at the theory and research most relevant to tracing the origins of human aggression. In reviewing each perspective, we examine how well it can account for the overall prevalence of aggression as well as for the cultural and gender differences that we have discussed.

Is aggression innate? Innate characteristics are not dependent on learning for their development, although they can be influenced by learning, culture and other factors. Here, we examine two approaches to the issue of whether aggression is innate: (1) evolutionary psychological accounts, and (2) biological factors, including genes, hormones, neurotransmitters, and brain and executive functioning.

Evolutionary psychology Evolutionary psychological accounts of aggression use principles of evolution to understand both the roots and the contemporary patterns of human aggression. For example, in his provocative book The Most Dangerous Animal: Human Nature and the Origins of War, David Smith (2007) takes an evolutionary psychological perspective in his analysis of the origins of human warfare. This account emphasises that human warfare originated not only to obtain valuable resources but also to attract mates and forge intragroup bonds. While it might seem that in our evolutionary history it would have been the pacifists who would have been more likely to survive than the warriors, Smith argues that it was the warriors who would have been more likely to attract mates and be accepted as part of a group. Therefore, the individuals who could and would fight had greater chances for reproductive success, and they would pass down these tendencies to their offspring, and so on. The greater reproductive success of warriors over pacifists would result in the tendencies towards aggression and war to evolve to become part of human nature. Anthony Volk and colleagues (2012) have argued the case that the prevalence of bullying across most cultures around the world reflects the fact that bullying is, in part, an evolved adaptive strategy for particular sets of conditions. Evolutionary social psychology is geared not only to describe the origins of human social behaviour but also to generate testable, falsifiable predictions. For example, evolutionary theories emphasise genetic survival rather than the survival of the individual. Because at least some of a person’s genes can be transmitted through the reproductive success of genetic relatives, evolution should have favoured the inhibition of aggression against those who are genetically related to us. Consistent with that hypothesis, Martin Daly and Margo Wilson (1988, 1996, 2005) report that birth parents are much less likely to abuse or murder their own offspring than step-parents are to harm stepchildren. In two samples studied, preschool

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children living with a step-parent or foster parent were 70 to 100 times more likely to be fatally abused than were children living with both biological parents. What can account for the gender differences in aggression? According to an evolutionary perspective, males are competitive with each other because females select high-status males for mating, and aggression is a means by which males traditionally have been able to achieve and maintain status. As researcher Vladas Griskevicius said in an interview about his work on this topic, ‘For men, fighting for status is akin to fighting for the survival of their genes. Not caring about status, which can be implied by backing away from a fight, can be evolutionary suicide. Aggression can lead to status. A higher status leads to sex, and that leads to more or higher-quality offspring’ (Science Daily, 2008). Similarly, Joseph Vandello and Jennifer Bosson (2013) argue that for many men, manhood is a status that is precarious. In other words, it must be earned and maintained repeatedly through action. Situations that threaten this status increase the likelihood of aggressive behaviour (Kroeper, Sanchez, & Himmelstein, 2014; Mescher & Rudman, 2014; Reidy, Berke, Gentile, & Zeichner, 2014). As we saw earlier in the chapter, partner abuse is a worldwide phenomenon that has occurred throughout history. Indeed, evolutionary psychologists point to a number of factors that predict such behaviour, including males’ uncertainty over whether they are the biological fathers of their children. Behaviours triggered by sexual jealousy, including aggression and the threat of aggression, may be designed to enhance the male’s confidence in his paternity of offspring. Consistent with evolutionary reasoning, crime statistics indicate that male-to-male violence is most likely to occur when one male is perceived as challenging the other’s status or social power, and male-to-female violence is predominantly triggered by sexual jealousy (Buss & Duntley, 2014; Wilson & Daly, 1996). Following this logic, some interesting research conducted by Sarah Ainsworth and Jon Maner (2014) found that when heterosexual men’s motivations about mating are activated, they become more aggressive toward other men whom they consider to be a potential threat to their ability to attract women, particularly if their opponent is considered to be socially dominant. Of course, as noted earlier, women also aggress. From an evolutionary perspective, reproductive success is dependent on the survival of one’s offspring. Because women are much more limited than men in terms of the number of children they can have, evolution presumably favoured those women who were committed to protecting their children. Indeed, much research on aggression by females has focused on maternal aggression, whereby females aggress to defend their offspring against threats by others. For example, females in a variety of species attack male strangers who come too close to their offspring (Ferreira et al., 2000; Gammie, Olaghere-da-Silva, & Nelson, 2000). In a similar vein, Anne Campbell (1999) proposes that females tend to place a higher value on protecting their own lives – again, in order to protect their offspring. This hypothesis may explain not only why human males engage more often in risky, potentially self-destructive behaviours, but also why human females, when they do aggress, are more likely to use less obvious, and thus less dangerous, means, such as indirect or relational aggression rather than overt physical aggression. Relational aggression also may be particularly effective for women because it can harm the reputations of rival females – which can make men less interested in them (Vaillancourt, 2005). Vladas Griskevicius and colleagues (2009) propose that men are more likely than women to boost their status (and successfully compete for women) through direct, face-to-face aggression against other men, whereas women are more likely to boost their status (and successfully compete for men) through indirect aggression against other women. In a series of experiments, Griskevicius and colleagues activated either a status motive for some of the male and female participants (e.g., by having them think about competing with same-sex others for a high-status job promotion) or an unrelated motive for other participants. All participants then read about a scenario in which a same-sex person is publicly rude to them, and they were asked to indicate how they would respond. Activating a status motive increased direct aggression responses (e.g., to push or hit the person) in men, whereas it increased indirect aggressive responses (e.g., to talk behind the person’s back or exclude the person from a social group) in women.

CRITICAL THINKING ACTIVITY Walt Disney films are recognised for their depiction of the evil stepmother. To what extent do you think art imitates life? What impact do you think that the Disney depiction of the evil

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stepfamily has upon the formation of a young child’s ‘step’ relationships?

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Genes, hormones and the brain Whatever the evolutionary roots, it is clear that biological factors play very important roles in contemporary human aggression. We look at several of these factors in this section.

Genes As mentioned earlier, aggressiveness is a relatively stable personality characteristic – children relatively high in aggressiveness are more likely to be aggressive later in life. Can this aggressive personality type be due to genes? To answer this question, researchers often compare monozygotic twins (identical in their genetic make-up) with dizygotic twins (who share only part of their genes). On any heritable trait, monozygotic twins will be more similar than dizygotic twins. Researchers also conduct studies of children who are adopted to see the extent a trait is heritable, given that adopted children will resemble their biological parents more than they resemble their adoptive parents. The results of twin and adoptee studies have produced somewhat inconsistent results, but the trend in the research supports the heritability of human aggressive behaviour to at least some degree (Ball et al., 2008; Bezdjian, Tuvblad, Raine, & Baker, 2011; Niv, Tuvblad, Raine, & Baker, 2013; Tuvblad, Raine, Zheng, & Baker, 2009; Yeh, Coccaro, & Jacobson, 2010). Particular genetic variations, such as of the monoamine oxidase A (MAOA) gene, have been linked to aggressive behaviour in growing number of studies (Gorodetsky et al., 2014; Stetler et al., 2014).

The role of testosterone In addition to the question of heritability, researchers have long been interested in determining what specific biological factors influence aggression. Because of the persistent sex differences in physical aggression among humans and other animals, many researchers have wondered if testosterone plays a role. Although men and women both have this ‘male sex hormone’, men usually have much higher levels than women. Research conducted on a variety of animals has found a strong correlation between testosterone levels and aggression. The relationship is far weaker among humans. Even so, a number of studies have documented an association between testosterone and aggression in humans. Using diverse samples of people, such as young boys, prison inmates, university students and elderly men, these studies tend to show a positive correlation between testosterone levels and physical aggression or violence (Archer, 2006; Book, Starzyk, & Qunisey, 2001; Dabbs & Dabbs, 2000; Montoya, Terburg, Bos, & van Honk, 2012; van Bokhoven et al., 2006). But, of course, the relationship between testosterone and aggression is not limited to males. Studies have also shown a positive relationship between testosterone and aggression and related behaviours (e.g., competitiveness) in women (Cashdan, 2003; Dabbs & Dabbs, 2000; von der Pahlen, Lindman, Sarkola, Maekisalo, & Eriksson, 2002). Recent research suggests that high testosterone is especially likely to be associated with aggression if the individuals are also relatively low in the hormone cortisol (Denson, Mehta, & Ho Tan, 2013; Denson, Ronay, von Hippel, & Schira, 2013; Montoya et al., 2012). Intriguing as they are, correlational findings cannot prove that testosterone causes aggression, and there are alternative explanations. For example, aggression itself can cause temporary increases in testosterone if the aggression is successful (Gladue, Boechler, & McCaul, 1989; Mazur, Booth, & Dabbs, 1992). Stress may also be involved in the correlation between testosterone and aggression. Stress may simultaneously elevate both testosterone and aggression, resulting in a correlation that may reflect the effects of stress rather than the effects of testosterone. For ethical reasons, researchers cannot manipulate people’s levels of testosterone to measure its effects on aggression and other behaviours. But Stephanie Van Goozen and colleagues (1995; Cohen-Ketteinis & Van Goozen, 1997) studied individuals who were voluntarily manipulating their sex hormones – transsexuals undergoing sex reassignment treatments. The researchers administered tests of aggression to 35 femaleto-male transsexuals and 15 male-to-female transsexuals shortly before and three months after the start of cross-sex hormone treatment in a Dutch hospital. As their levels of male hormones increased, the female-to-male transsexuals exhibited increased proneness to aggression. In contrast, the deprivation of these hormones in the male-to-female group was associated with a decrease in proneness to aggression. It is important to note, however, that these changes in aggressiveness may have been caused not by the hormone treatment per se but rather by indirect factors, such as the transsexuals’ expectations or other people’s reactions to them. Another line of research that supports the idea that testosterone may predict aggressiveness may strike you as somewhat odd. Look at your index and ring fingers. Which is longer, from tip to where they connect with the hand? Believe it or not, your answer may be a clue to how aggressive you are likely to be!

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Well, that may be overstating it a bit, but research has shown some intriguing correlations among fingerlength ratio, testosterone and aggression. Men tend to have relatively shorter index fingers relative to ring fingers; shorter ratios (especially on the right hand) are considered more ‘masculine’. Lower ratios (called low 2D:4D in the literature, with 2D and 4D meaning the second and fourth digits, respectively) are thought to be associated with exposure to higher prenatal testosterone levels. Studies have shown that for men, lower 2D:4D ratios (i.e., more ‘masculine’ ratios) are associated with higher scores for the trait of physical aggression, reports of being more threatening and physically aggressive toward their dating partners, personalities higher in aggressive dominance, and mental toughness and aptitude in sports (Bailey & Hurd, 2005; Cousins, Fugère, & Franklin, 2009; Golby & Meggs, 2011; Hönekopp, 2011; van der Meij et al., 2012). The relationship between finger-length ratios and aggression or aggression-related measures is more mixed for women. Sarah Coyne and colleagues (2007) found that for women this finger-length ratio was not associated with a measure of direct aggression, but it was positively correlated with indirect aggression. However, the results of a meta-analysis of dozens of studies investigating how reliable and strong these kinds of findings are reported only a small relationship between 2D:4D ratios and aggression in men and no reliable relationship in women (Hönekopp & Watson, 2011). More generally, the initial confidence that many had in the link between testosterone and human aggression has met with a harsh reality – the association between testosterone and human aggression is weaker and less reliable than expected. Other factors seem to play critical roles in determining when and whether this association is likely to emerge. Recent research has pointed to one such factor that may be very important: the hormone cortisol. The combination of high testosterone and low cortisol is what predicts aggression, perhaps particularly aggression in the context of status-seeking or dominance behaviours. When cortisol levels are high, in contrast, the effects of testosterone on aggression are more likely to be blocked or inhibited (Denson, Ronay, et al., 2013; Mehta & Prasad, 2015).

The role of serotonin Testosterone is not the only biological factor linked to human aggression. Many researchers are investigating the role of the neurotransmitter serotonin (de Almeida, Cabral, & Narvaes, 2015; Ficks & Waldman, 2014; Helmbold et al., 2015). Serotonin appears to work like a braking mechanism to restrain impulsive, reactive acts of aggression. Low levels of serotonin in the nervous systems of humans and many animals are associated with high levels of aggression. Drugs that boost serotonin’s activity can dampen aggressiveness, along with a range of other impulsive and socially deviant behaviours. Such drugs have even been used to treat ‘road rage’ – people’s impulsive acts of aggression and violence while driving.

Brain and executive functioning In addition to hormones and neurotransmitters, the frontal lobe of the brain is another hot topic in research on the biological underpinnings of human aggression. Researchers using a variety of techniques have found evidence linking abnormalities in frontal lobe structures with tendencies towards aggressive and violent behaviour (de Almeida et al., 2015; Raine, 2013; Reznikova et al., 2015). The prefrontal cortex, in particular, has been implicated. Impaired prefrontal processing can disrupt what is called executive functioning; that is, the cognitive abilities and processes that allow humans to plan or inhibit their actions. Executive functioning enables people to respond to situations in a reasoned, flexible manner, as opposed to being driven purely by external stimuli (Hoaken, Allaby, & Earle, 2007). A growing body of research finds a link between poor executive functioning and high aggression (Buckholtz, 2015; Perkins, Smith-Darden, Ametrano, & Graham-Bermann, 2014; Raaijmakers et al., 2008; Sorge, Skilling, & Toplak, 2015; Verlinden et al., 2014). One noteworthy recent finding is that very aggressive teenagers showed different patterns of brain activity in response to witnessing someone else in pain than did less aggressive youth (Decety, Michalska, Akitsuki, & Lahey, 2009). In particular, when watching situations in which someone intentionally inflicted pain on another person, healthy teenagers showed brain activity associated with empathy. The highly aggressive teens, however, exhibited a pattern of brain activity associated with experiencing rewards, suggesting that they enjoyed watching others experience pain that someone intentionally inflicted on them. In addition, the aggressive teenagers showed less activation in areas associated with self-regulation and moral reasoning when seeing someone inflict pain on another than did the non-aggressive teenagers. Recently a great deal of attention has been dedicated to the issue of concussions, especially in sports, and the link between concussions and aggression, along with other impulsive behaviours. Ruma Goswami and others (2016), for example, examined the brains (through fMRI scans) and the aggressive and impulsive 464

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tendencies of a group of retired Canadian Football League players with a history of multiple concussions. The researchers found that damage to the uncinate fasciculus, which connects the orbitofrontal cortex with the anterior temporal lobe, was associated with more aggression and impulsivity and compromised executive functioning. These are among the lines of research that demonstrate associations between brain functioning and aggression and other antisocial behaviours. Figure 11.9 illustrates some of the brain regions implicated in these studies.

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FIGURE 11.9 Brain functioning and aggression This fMRI image from a study by Ruma Goswami and others (2016) of former professional football players with a history of concussions highlights the uncinate fasciculus, which connects the orbitofrontal cortex with the anterior temporal lobe. The areas in red and blue signal differences in functioning between the football players and control participants, and these differences were associated with more aggression and impulsivity and compromised executive functioning.

Is aggression learned? Regardless of the precise contribution of genetic and biological factors, it is clear that aggressive behaviour is strongly affected by learning (Bandura, 1973). Rewards obtained by aggression today will increase its use tomorrow. There are two types of such rewards: positive reinforcement, when aggression produces desired outcomes; and negative reinforcement, when aggression prevents or stops undesirable outcomes. The child who gets a toy by hitting the toy’s owner is likely to hit again. Similarly, the child who can stop other children from teasing by shoving them away has learned the fateful lesson that the use of aggression can pay off. Children who see aggression producing more positive outcomes and fewer negative outcomes are more aggressive than other children (Guerra, Source: Goswami, R., Dufort, P., Tartaglia, M. C., Green, R. E., Crawley, A., Tator, C. H., … 2012; Krahé & Busching, 2014). Davis, K. D. (2016). Frontotemporal correlates of impulsivity and machine learning in retired Rewards are one part of the learning equation, but what professional athletes with a history of multiple concussions. Brain Structure and Function, 221(4), 1911–1925. about punishment? Punishment is often promoted as a way to reduce aggressive behaviour. Can people learn not to act aggressively through punishment? Research suggests that punishment is most likely to decrease aggression when it: (1) immediately follows the aggressive behaviour, (2) is strong enough to deter the aggressor, and (3) is consistently applied and perceived as fair and legitimate by the aggressor. However, such stringent conditions are seldom met, and when they are not met, punishment can backfire. When courts are overburdened and prisons are overcrowded, which is often the case, the relationship between crime and punishment can seem more like a lottery than a rational system in which the punishment fits the crime. In short, the certainty of punishment is more important than its severity (Berkowitz, 1998).

Corporal punishment There are other problems with punishment as well. Punishment perceived as unfair or arbitrary can provoke retaliation, creating an escalating cycle of aggression. Perhaps most troubling is that punishment, especially when delivered in an angry or hostile manner, offers a model to imitate. Murray Straus and colleagues (Straus, 2000, 2010; Straus & Douglas, 2008) have been outspoken critics of the use of corporal punishment; that is, physical force, such as spanking, hitting and pinching, intended to cause a child pain, but not injury, for the purpose of controlling or correcting the child’s behaviour. Numerous studies report a positive relationship between corporal punishment and the likelihood of aggression – more corporal punishment now is associated with more aggression later. For instance, Elizabeth Gershoff (2002) investigated this issue with a meta-analysis of 88 studies conducted over six decades and involving more than 36 000 participants. Her analysis revealed strong evidence for a positive correlation between corporal punishment and several categories of subsequent antisocial behaviours, such as aggression later as a child, aggression as an adult, and adult criminal behaviour. More recent reviews continue to find evidence from countries around the world for the relationship between corporal punishment and later problems of aggression, violence, criminality, drug abuse and mental health problems (Afifi et al., 2012; Straus, 2010). Research from the Longitudinal Study of Australian Children has demonstrated a strong link between behavioural problems and higher levels of parental hostility. Their findings indicate that children are four times more likely to have conduct problems and twice as likely to have hyperactivity problems when

Corporal punishment Physical force, such as spanking or hitting, intended to cause a child pain, but not injury, for the purpose of controlling or correcting the child’s behaviour.

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Children who are spanked or otherwise physically disciplined (but not abused) for behaving aggressively tend to become less aggressive.

FALSE

subjected to hostile parenting (Smart, Sanson, Baxter, Edwards & Hayes, 2008). A review of the literature on the link between corporal punishment in childhood and involvement in intimate partner violence in adulthood conducted by Angelika Poulsen (2018) found a growing body of research linking corporal punishment of children in the home and a raft of adverse outcomes in childhood and adulthood. The research indicated that some of the adverse longitudinal outcomes of corporal punishment in childhood include involvement in intimate partner violence as an adult, both as victim and as perpetrator. Evidence suggests that more positive outcomes, such as an increase in levels of self-esteem and a reduction of behavioural problems such as conduct disorders, low prosocial behaviour and peer problems, are the result of warmth and affection in parent–child relationships (Holzer & Lamont, 2010; Smart et al., 2008).

Social learning theory Social learning theory

The theory that behaviour is learned through the observation of others as well as through the direct experience of rewards and punishments.

Cycle of violence

The transmission of domestic violence across generations.

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The power of models to modify behaviour is a crucial tenet of Albert Bandura’s (1977) social learning theory. Social learning theory emphasises that we learn from the example of others as well as from direct experience with rewards and punishments. Models influence the prosocial, helpful behaviour described in Chapter 10. They also affect antisocial, aggressive behaviour. In a classic study, Bandura and colleagues (1961) observed the behaviour of mildly frustrated children. Those who had previously watched an adult throw around, punch and kick an inflatable doll (known as a Bobo doll, named after the character depicted on it) were more aggressive when they later played with the Bobo doll than were those who had watched a quiet, subdued adult. These children followed the adult model’s lead not only in degree of aggression but also in the kinds of aggression they exhibited. Subsequent research has amply demonstrated that a wide range of aggressive models can elicit a wide range of aggressive imitations. Furthermore, these models do not have to be present; people on television (even cartoon characters) can serve as powerful models of aggression (Bandura, 1983; Baron & Richardson, 1994; Berkowitz, 1993). People learn more than specific aggressive behaviours from aggressive models. They also develop more positive attitudes and beliefs about aggression in general, and they construct aggressive ‘scripts’ that serve as guides for how to behave and solve social problems. These scripts can be activated automatically in various situations, leading to quick, often unthinking aggressive responses that follow the scripts they have learned (Bennett, Farrington, & Huesmann, 2005; Huesmann, 1998). Learning these scripts from their parents is one of the reasons that there are positive correlations between witnessing parents behaving aggressively or violently with each other during conflicts and individuals’ subsequent aggressiveness as adolescents and adults (Hill & Nathan, 2008; O’Leary, Tintle, & Bromet, 2014; Perkins et al., 2014). When parents use physical force to discipline their children, they also may be teaching the children a script of how to deal with conflict. Aggression or violence scripts play important roles in the lives of many young men and women who have committed violent crimes. In a thorough analysis of 416 young violent offenders from two New York City neighbourhoods, Deanna Wilkinson and Patrick Carr (2008) found that 93% had seen someone get beaten badly, 75% had seen someone get stabbed, 92% had seen someone get shot and 77% had seen someone get killed. More than 75% of these violent offenders reported that a close friend had been killed through violence. Wilkinson and Carr collected chilling interviews with these individuals, many of which illustrated how so much early exposure to violence taught these individuals the unfortunate lesson that violence is the appropriate way to both deal with conflicts and attain a degree of high status in the neighbourhood. Just as aggressive models can increase aggressive behaviour, non-aggressive models can decrease it. Observing a non-aggressive response to a provoking situation teaches a peaceful alternative and strengthens existing restraints against aggression. In addition, observing someone who is calm and reasonable may help an angry person settle down rather than strike out. Aggression can spread like wildfire – but non-violence and prosocial behaviour can also be contagious (Donnerstein & Donnerstein, 1976; Gibbons & Ebbeck, 1997). Consistent with social learning theory and the idea that people learn aggressive scripts is a particularly tragic outcome known as the cycle of violence. Children who witness parental violence or who are themselves abused are more likely as adults to inflict abuse on intimate partners or their children, or to be victims of intimate violence (Cochran, Sellers, Wiesbrock, & Palacios, 2011; Gómez, 2011; Smith et al., 2011; Sunday et al., 2011). There are multiple reasons for this, but one factor is that children and adolescents learn through observation that aggression and violence are how adults deal with problems, try to resolve conflicts or respond to frustrations. This intergenerational transmission of domestic violence is by no means inevitable, however, as most people who witness or experience abuse in their families of origin are not abusive. The cycle of violence refers to a greater tendency, not an absolute certainty.

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CRITICAL THINKING ACTIVITY Given the increasing levels of aggression that have crept into many sports, both on and off the field, and the media attention that is apportioned to this behaviour, what can social learning

theory tell us about the modelling of aggressive behaviour in our children? Visit the SearchMe! website to see what research has to say about this topic.

Bandura’s social learning theory has been one of the most important social psychological approaches to the study of human aggression since his classic early experiments in the early 1960s. Its simplicity should not obscure the fact that it can help explain a great amount of human behaviour. Daniel Batson and Adam Powell (2003) wrote that social learning theory ‘has probably come closer to [the goal of accounting for the most facts with the fewest principles] than has any other theory in the history of social psychology’ (p. 466).

Gender differences and socialisation To account for gender differences in aggression, social learning approaches emphasise that males and females are taught different lessons about aggression; that is, they are rewarded and punished differently for aggression and are presented with different models. Whether or not gender differences in aggressive behaviour originated from innate biological factors, today they are maintained and perpetuated through lessons, passed on from one generation to the next, about the acceptability of various kinds and degrees of aggression. Overt aggression tends to be more socially acceptable in stereotypically male roles than in female roles. Boys may be more likely than girls to be taught that physical aggression is an appropriate and rewarding way to handle conflict or manipulate other people, whereas relational aggression may be rewarded for girls at least as much or perhaps more than it is for boys (Bosson & Vandello, 2011; Bowker & Etkin, 2014; Crick & Rose, 2000; Werner & Grant, 2009). For example, in a study of children in Years 3 and 4 in an urban primary school in the US, Tracy Evian Waasdorp and others (2013) found that overt aggression was associated with more popularity for boys and less popularity for girls, whereas relational aggression was more strongly associated with popularity for girls rather than boys. Boys who use their fists to deal with conflict are much more likely to be rewarded with increased social status than are girls, who might suffer scorn and ridicule for fighting. As we discussed earlier in the chapter, males often feel that their status as men is precarious and must be repeatedly demonstrated and proven, and direct aggression is an important way to do this (Bosson & Vandello, 2011). On the other hand, a girl who successfully uses relational aggression, such as through social manipulation, can reap social benefits more easily than a boy (Crick & Rose, 2000). One study reported that girls’ (but not boys’) beliefs about the acceptability of relational aggression correlated significantly with their mothers’ attitudes about relational aggression (Werner & Grant, 2009).

Culture and socialisation: cultures of honour Socialisation of aggression also varies from culture to culture. For example, Giovanna Tomada and Barry Schneider (1997) report that adolescent boys in traditional villages in Italy are encouraged to aggress as an indication of their sexual prowess and in preparation for their dominant role in the household. These authors believe that this is why schoolyard bullying among primary school boys is significantly higher in central and southern Italy than it is in Norway, England, Spain or Japan. Similarly, some researchers believe that machismo – which in its most stereotyped characterisation prescribes that challenges, abuse and even differences of opinion ‘must be met with fists or other weapons’ (Ingoldsby, 1991, p. 57) – contributes to the fact that rates of violence are higher among American men of Latin heritage than among American men of European heritage (Harris, 1995). Machismo may represent one form of what anthropologists call a culture of honour, which emphasises honour and social status, particularly for males, and the role of aggression in protecting that honour. Even minor conflicts or disputes are often seen as challenges to social status and reputation and can therefore trigger aggressive responses. Several such subcultures exist around the world (and Star Trek fans might recognise the Klingon empire as an intergalactic example of a culture of honour). In an extensive series of studies, Dov Cohen, Richard Nisbett, Joseph Vandello and their colleagues have examined various cultures of honour. Their original focus was on white men in the American South (Nisbett & Cohen, 1996). Rates of violence are consistently higher in the South compared to all other regions of the country. Southerners are more likely than Northerners to agree that ‘a man has the right to kill’ in order to defend his family and house, and are more accepting of using violence to protect their honour. Note, however, that Southerners are not more likely than other Americans to accept violence unrelated to the protection of honour.

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Data from surveys, field experiments and laboratory experiments suggest that this culture of honour promotes violent behaviour. In one series of experiments, Cohen and colleagues (1996) investigated how white male students, who had grown up either in the North or in the South, responded to insults. The experiments, conducted on a large Midwestern campus, involved an encounter that took place as the participant and the confederate were passing each other in a narrow hallway. The confederate did not give way to the participant, bumped into him and hurled an insult. Compared with Northerners, Southerners were more likely to think that their masculine reputations had been threatened, exhibited greater physiological signs of being upset, appeared more physiologically primed for aggression (their testosterone levels rose), and engaged in more aggressive and dominant subsequent behaviour, such as giving firmer handshakes and being more unwilling to yield to a subsequent confederate as they walked towards them in a very narrow hallway. Ryan Brown and colleagues (2009) found that cultures of honour are associated with school violence. For example, states in the US associated with cultures of honour had more than twice as many school shootings per capita as other states, and high-school students from culture-of-honour states were significantly more likely to bring a weapon to school. Lindsay Osterman and Ryan Brown (2011) also found that suicide rates are higher in culture-of-honour states, which the authors speculate may be due in part to greater concern and focus on interpersonal threat and loss of status, and a greater feeling of personal responsibility for failure to protect one’s honour. Irshad Altheimer (2013) assessed the degree to which a very diverse set of 51 nations adhered to the culture of honour and found that countries with higher degrees of culture of honour had the highest homicide rates. (We should note that in these studies comparing various regions or countries, the researchers statistically control for other factors that might be related to these variables, such as differences in economic conditions, so that the results they report are not due to these other factors.) Institutions support norms about the acceptability of honour-based violence. Cohen and Nisbett (1997) illustrated this in a clever experiment in which they sent letters to employers all over the US from a fictitious job applicant who admitted that he had been convicted of a felony. To half the employers, the applicant reported that he had impulsively killed a man after the man taunted him in a crowded bar about the affair he had been having with the applicant’s fiancée. To the other half, the applicant reported that he had stolen a car because he needed the money to pay off debts. Employers from the South and the West (which both have a similar culture of honour) were more likely than their Northern counterparts to respond in an understanding and cooperative way to the letter from the convicted killer, but not to the letter from the car thief. Joseph Vandello and Dov Cohen (2003) examined the culture of honour in Brazil and found that a wife’s infidelity harmed a man’s reputation more in the eyes of Brazilian students than in the eyes of students from the northern US. In a related study, Vandello and colleagues (2009) had participants from Chile (a culture that emphasises honour) or Canada (a culture that is neutral concerning honour) listen to a tape of a man describing how he behaved violently towards his wife during a conflict. In one condition, the conflict was triggered when the husband thought she was flirting with another man at a party. In a different condition, the conflict was triggered by something having nothing to do with jealousy or threats to the man’s honour. When the conflict was related to jealousy the Chilean participants rated the violence as more acceptable and rated the husband more positively across several dimensions than the Canadian participants did, but there was no cultural difference when the conflict was not related to jealousy or honour. A key to the aggression associated with cultures of honour is the fact that individuals in these cultures perceive aggressive responses to honour-based threats as the norm among their peers. That is, cultures of honour persist because the individuals believe that most people in their peer group have positive attitudes towards aggression (and negative attitudes towards not acting aggressively) in response to threats to one’s honour. Consistent with this idea, Vandello and colleagues (2008) found that relative to white men from the northern US, white men from the South were significantly more likely to overestimate the aggressiveness of their peers and to interpret others’ ambiguous advice about how to respond in an interpersonal conflict as encouraging aggression. Although this research focuses on populations outside of Australia and New Zealand, it does not mean that crimes of this nature do not exist in either country. It is also important to realise that women are not always the victims of honour killings. For example, in February 2010, in the Sydney suburb of Leichhardt, the 43-year-old lover of a woman was murdered by her husband and son after their affair was discovered. Both men were found guilty of murder, with Justice David Davies declaring that the notion of honour killing had no place in Australian society: ‘No society or culture that regards itself as civilised can tolerate to any extent, or make any allowance for, the killing of another person for such an amorphous concept as honour’ (Hall, 2012). 468

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Nature versus nurture The origins of aggression are a source not only of scientific disagreement but also of political controversy. Politicians frequently engage in heated debates about whether to fund research and treatment programs, and they disagree with each other strongly about whether aggression is, to any significant extent, attributable to stable biological characteristics present at birth. However important it may be, this contentious issue should not obscure the considerable agreement that exists on other points. The effects of learning are not disputed – aggression is, at least to some extent, ‘made’ by experience. Nor is there any doubt that in aggression, as in all human behaviour, biology and environment interact. Indeed, contemporary research on aggression is paying increasing attention to the interactions of genes and environment (Bezdjian et al., 2011; Boutwell, Franklin, Barnes, & Beaver, 2011; Rhee & Waldman, 2011; Simons et al., 2012). The debate between nature and nurture may rage on among politicians, but to scientists it is clear that the origins of human aggression represent a profound interaction of evolved mechanisms and environmental and social factors.

SITUATIONAL INFLUENCES ON AGGRESSION Whatever the ultimate causes of aggression, it is clear that specific, immediate situational factors can promote or inhibit it. In this section, we take a close look at several of these factors: frustration, negative affect, arousal, and influences on an individual’s cognition and information processing.

Frustration–aggression hypothesis In 1939, the year that World War II began, John Dollard and colleagues published Frustration and Aggression, one of the most influential books on aggression ever written. This book set forth two major propositions that taken together were called the frustration–aggression hypothesis: 1. Frustration – which is produced by interrupting a person’s progress towards an expected goal – will always elicit the motive to aggress. 2. All aggression is caused by frustration. Dollard and colleagues claimed that the motive to aggress is a psychological drive that resembles physiological drives like hunger. According to this theory, just as food deprivation elicits a hunger drive, so frustration elicits an aggressive drive. Just as the hunger drive prompts the search for food, so the aggressive drive prompts the attempt to inflict injury. But what if we are unable to aggress against the source of our frustration? After all, we cannot hit our boss, nor can we strike out against abstractions such as health problems or financial setbacks. Dollard and colleagues believed that in such instances the aggressive drive can seep out in the form of displacement. Here, the inclination to aggress is deflected from the real target to a substitute. After a bad day at work or at school, do you sometimes come home and yell at the first available target – be it friend, lover or pet? Drawing from the ancient idea of catharsis, Dollard and colleagues believed that displacing aggression in these ways can be effective at reducing the drive to aggress further. Since the Dollard group defined aggression quite broadly to include making hostile jokes, telling violent stories, swearing and observing the aggression of others, real or fictional, they held out the hope that engaging in some relatively harmless pursuit could drain away energy from more violent tendencies.

Frustration–aggression hypothesis: does evidence support it? Obviously, there is a connection between frustration and aggression. Break into a line of shoppers at the supermarket or interrupt a student cramming for an exam, and you may see it for yourself. James Holmes, the gunman in The Dark Knight Rises cinema tragedy in the US in 2012, in which 12 people were killed, reportedly bought a high-powered rifle hours after he failed an important exam at the University of Colorado (Harris, 2012). Soon after the frustration–aggression theory was proposed, however, critics pointed out that the Dollard group had overstated their case. And early on, Neal Miller (1941), one of the originators of the hypothesis, acknowledged that frustration does not always produce aggressive inclinations. The other absolute – that all aggression is caused by frustration – was soon overturned as well. The concepts of displacement and catharsis were also subjected to close scrutiny. Although there were some inconsistent findings concerning displacement over the years, a meta-analysis of 49 published articles found significant evidence for displaced aggression in response to provocation (Marcus-Newhall, Pedersen, Carlson, & Miller, 2000). Provoked individuals are especially likely to displace aggression towards others they dislike or others who are outgroup members (Pedersen & Barlow, 2008).

Frustration– aggression hypothesis

The idea that frustration always elicits the motive to aggress, and that all aggression is caused by frustration.

Displacement

Aggressing against a substitute target because aggressive acts against the source of the frustration are inhibited by fear or lack of access.

Catharsis

A reduction of the motive to aggress that is said to result from any imagined, observed or actual act of aggression.

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Blowing off steam by engaging in safe but aggressive activities (e.g., sport) makes people less likely to aggress later.

FALSE

But what about catharsis? Dollard and colleagues described catharsis as a two-step sequence. First, aggression reduces the level of physiological arousal. Second, because arousal is reduced, people are less angry and less likely to aggress further. It sounds logical, and many people believe it. But when put to the test, most researchers concluded that the catharsis idea is a myth. In fact, it is more counterproductive than effective in reducing subsequent aggression (Bushman, 2002; Geen & Quanty, 1977). Aggressive behaviour may sometimes reduce the likelihood of further immediate aggression, but so can just letting the frustration dissipate over time. For that matter, a response incompatible with aggression, such as experiencing sympathy or humour, can be more effective. In the long run, successful aggression sets the stage for more aggression later. In sum, relying on catharsis is dangerous, and is more likely to inflame aggression than to extinguish it.

Negative affect So, as is the case with many great theories, over time the original frustration–aggression hypothesis has had its challengers. But Leonard Berkowitz (1989) offered a different way to think about frustration as a trigger of aggression that has more merit. Berkowitz proposed that frustration is but one of many unpleasant experiences that can lead to aggression by creating negative, uncomfortable feelings. It is these negative feelings, and not the frustration itself, that can trigger aggression. A wide variety of noxious stimuli and bad feelings can create negative feelings and increase aggression: noise, crowding, physical pain, threatened self-esteem, feelings of jealousy, social rejection, bad odours and your team losing a grand final match (Baumeister, 2000; Berkowitz, 1998; DeSteno, Valdesolo, & Bartlett, 2006; Leary, Twenge, & Quinlivan, 2006; Panee, & Ballard, 2002; Verona, Patrick, & Lang, 2002; Warburton, Williams, & Cairns, 2006). Reactions to a very common unpleasant condition – hot weather – are especially intriguing. Many people assume that temperature and tempers rise together, while others think it is just a myth. Who is right?

Heat and aggression Craig Anderson and others have conducted extensive research on the question of whether heat leads to aggression; and data across time, cultures and methodologies strongly support the notion that people lose their cool in hot temperatures and behave more aggressively (Anderson, 2001, 2012; Anderson et al., 2000; Anderson & DeLisi, 2011; Bushman, Wang, & Anderson, 2005). More violent crimes occur in the summer than in the winter, in hot years than in cooler years, and in hot cities than in cooler cities at any given time of year. The numbers of political uprisings, riots, homicides, assaults, rapes and reports of violence peak in the summer months (see Figure 11.10). Hospital admissions in Australia show a significant association between high temperatures (>26.7 degrees) and the incidence of mental and behavioural disorders. When compared with non-heat wave conditions, hospital admissions increased by 7.3% during heat waves for conditions such as dementia, affective disorders, neurotic disorders, stress-related disorders and somatoform disorders (Hansen et al., 2008). A study conducted by Kenrick and MacFarlane (1986) uncovered a direct relationship between temperature and driver aggression; as the temperature increased drivers were more likely to honk their horn in response to a car stopped at a green light. Another study (Hsian, Burke, & Miguel, 2013), which analysed data from 60 previous studies, found that warmer temperatures and extremes in rainfall can substantially increase the risk of many types of intergroup conflict, including riots and civil wars (an increase of up to 14%) and interpersonal conflict such as domestic violence or rape (an increase of up to 4%). With global temperatures expected to increase, these results suggest we may be in for some interesting times. With climate change having the potential to make hotter temperatures much more common in years to come, some scholars have speculated about the effects this may have on aggression and violence. Matthew Ranson (2014), for example, conducted a sophisticated analysis of 30 years of monthly data on temperature and crime rates in nearly 3000 counties in the US. Based on these analyses he estimates that global warming will cause an additional 22 000 murders, 1.2 million aggravated assaults, and a host of other criminal behaviours over the remainder of the century, at a financial cost of over $100 billion.

Provocation and social rejection Most aggressive incidents can be directly linked to some type of provocation, and the negative affect caused by the provocation plays a critically important role in triggering aggression. One type of provocation is an insult or threat to one’s ego or status; another type of provocation is social rejection. One of the most

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FIGURE 11.10 The link between heat and violence Worldwide weather records and crime statistics reveal that more violent crimes are committed during the summer than in the other seasons. 40

Percentage of yearly total

35

30

25

20

15 0

Winter Uprisings

Spring Season Family disturbances

Summer Rapes

Autumn Assaults

Source: From Anderson, C.A. (1989). Temperature and aggression: Ubiquitous effects of heat on occurrence of human violence. Psychological Bulletin, 106, 74–96. Copyright © 1989 by the American Psychological Association. Reprinted by permission.

unpleasant feelings that people experience is being rejected or ostracised by others. Many experiments have manipulated provocation or social rejection to examine their causal effects on aggression. For example, a participant in an experiment might find himself or herself insulted or suddenly ignored by the other participants, who engage in pleasant interactions only with each other during the experiment. These studies have shown that provocation and social rejection increase the likelihood of aggressive responses (Bettencourt et al., 2006; DeWall, Twenge, Bushman, Im, & Williams, 2010; Williams & Wesselmann, 2011). The effect of social rejection may be particularly strong when the person feels disrespected, rather than simply disliked, by the rejection (DeBono & Muraven, 2014). In an interesting correlational study, Richard Larrick and colleagues (2011) found that baseball pitchers are more likely to hit opposing batters when it was hot outside. They also found that pitchers were especially likely to hit batters in the heat if their teammates had been hit first, suggesting that provocation strengthened the effect of heat on their likelihood to aggress. On a more extreme level, social rejection has been cited as the most significant risk factor for adolescent violence (Leary et al., 2006). Indeed, in 13 of the 15 US school shootings between 1995 and 2001 that Mark Leary and colleagues (2003) examined, the shooters had apparently been frustrated by social rejection.

Culture and negative affect The types of negative affect experienced by people can vary according to culture, as can their reactions to it. For example, Michael Boiger and colleagues (2013) found that American participants in their study were relatively more likely to experience anger than the Japanese participants, and the reverse was true for the experience of shame. Shinobu Kitayama and colleagues (2015) propose that for people in collectivist cultures, such as Japan, anger in reaction to frustration might violate cultural values of social harmony. Instead, collectivist cultures show greater support for hierarchy and social rankings, and anger in these settings is more likely to reflect a display of dominance from those occupying a high social status. Consistent with this hypothesis, Jiyoung Park and colleagues (2013) found that Japanese individuals of relatively low status expressed anger less often than those of higher status did. For Americans, in contrast, those who felt they had relatively low status expressed anger more frequently than did those who felt they had relatively high status.

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Arousal Research on affect clearly indicates that emotion influences aggression. The intensity of arousal is important as well. In Chapter 9, we described the process of excitation transfer, in which the arousal created by one stimulus can intensify an individual’s emotional response to another stimulus. For example, men who engaged in vigorous exercise were later more attracted to an attractive female than were those who had barely moved (White, Fishbein, & Rutstein, 1981). Physical exercise is a highly arousing but emotionally neutral experience. Can it increase aggression as well as attraction? The research of Dolf Zillmann (1983, 2003) suggests that it can. The scope of excitation transfer is not limited to physical exercise. Noise, violent films and arousing music have all been shown to increase aggression. Heat also has an interesting effect on arousal. Although people believe that heat lowers arousal, it actually increases it. This misperception makes heat a prime candidate for excitation transfer, as people are likely to misattribute arousal caused by heat to something else, such as anger, which can then lead to aggression (Anderson, Anderson, & Deuser, 1996). Later in this chapter, we describe the effects of another arousing stimulus – pornography – on the inclination to aggress.

Cognition Step by step, we have been making our way towards a comprehensive theory of social and situational influences on aggression, particularly reactive aggression. We have examined several kinds of unpleasant experiences that can create a negative effect – frustration, heat, provocation and social rejection. We have also considered how arousal can contribute to aggression. The next step is to add cognition. People do not just feel; they also think. These thoughts may be as primitive as automatic, unconscious associations, or they may be higher-order, conscious deliberations. Both automatic and deliberate thoughts play a critically important role in aggressive behaviour.

Aggressive cues

Weapons effect

The tendency that the likelihood of aggression will increase by the mere presence of weapons.

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As we have already stated, no other stable, relatively wealthy country in the world comes even close to the US in terms of the prevalence of guns used in violent crime. Guns, of course, are only instruments – it is the people who are pulling the trigger. However, social psychologist Leonard Berkowitz wondered whether guns were in fact entirely neutral. He hypothesised that the presence of a weapon can act as a situational cue that automatically triggers aggressive thoughts and feelings, thereby increasing the likelihood of aggression. In a classic study designed to test this idea, Berkowitz and Anthony LePage (1967) had a confederate provoke male participants who could later respond by giving the confederate electric shocks (although in reality the confederate was not shocked). On a table near the shock apparatus just happened to be some objects scattered about, allegedly left there from a previous experiment. For half of the participants, these objects were a revolver and rifle, and for the other half they were badminton racquets and shuttlecocks. Berkowitz and LePage found that participants delivered more shocks to the confederate when a revolver and rifle were present than when badminton racquets and shuttlecocks were. In other words, although they did not use these weapons, their mere presence seemed to make the participants more aggressive. This tendency for the presence of guns to increase aggression came to be known as the weapons effect. As Berkowitz put it: ‘The finger pulls the trigger, but the trigger may also be pulling the finger’ (1968, p. 22). Individuals may differ in what associations they have with various weapons. Bruce Bartholow and colleagues (2005) found that hunters were less likely than non-hunters to associate hunting guns with aggression. Hunters had more positive associations with hunting guns; for example, they linked guns with sport and the pleasurable experiences they had had hunting with friends and family. Non-hunters not only had more negative, aggressive thoughts after exposure to hunting guns than did hunters, but they also behaved more aggressively while doing a subsequent task. However, exposure to assault guns had a very different effect: hunters had more negative, aggressive associations with assault guns than did non-hunters, and they behaved more aggressively than non-hunters after exposure to them. In other words, hunters cognitively differentiated hunting guns from assault guns more than non-hunters did, and so these two types of weapons triggered very different effects for them. Jennifer Klinesmith and colleagues (2006) found that weapons had an effect on men’s testosterone levels as well as on their aggression. Male university students in this experiment handled either a handgun or a children’s game for 15 minutes. Relative to the students who interacted with the game, the students who interacted with the gun showed increased testosterone levels and exhibited greater aggression against another person; in this case by adding a lot more of ‘Frank’s Red Hot Sauce’ to a cup of water they thought

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another subject would have to drink! The greater the increase in testosterone in response to the gun, the more hot sauce the students added to the other person’s drink. More generally, any object or external characteristic that is associated with either successful aggression or the negative effect of pain or unpleasantness can serve as an aggression-enhancing situational cue (Berkowitz, 1993, 1998, 2008). Even brief exposure to words associated with hot temperatures can trigger aggressive thoughts (DeWall & Bushman, 2009).

Higher-order cognition Situational cues can trigger automatic associations. More complex information about one’s situation, however, influences the deliberate, thoughtful consideration that we call higher-order cognitive processing. For example, an angry person might refrain from acting aggressively if the potential costs of fighting seem too high. In this case, the person might choose to flee rather than fight. In addition, people who believe that aggression is inappropriate in a particular situation, or whose moral values and principles mandate non-violent behaviour, may realise that better alternatives to aggression exist (Huesmann & Guerra, 1997). The behaviour of other people in the immediate situation can also influence an individual’s considerations. If one or more others in a group are reacting aggressively to the situation, aggression can be contagious (Freeman, Hadwin, & Halligan, 2011; Levy & Nail, 1993). People’s thoughts about the intentions of other people can determine whether they are likely to respond aggressively. Some individuals exhibit a hostile attribution bias, in that they tend to perceive hostile intent in others. For example, socially maladjusted children who are chronically aggressive and have been rejected by their peers see hostile intent where others do not (Crick & Dodge, 1994; Helfritz-Sinville & Stanford, 2014; Helseth, Waschbusch, King, & Willoughby, 2015). Such perceptions then increase their aggression, and their peers respond by rejecting them further, locking these children into an ever-escalating vicious circle. Chronically aggressive adults, too, tend to expect and perceive hostility in others’ motives and behaviours (Dill, Anderson, Anderson, & Deuser, 1997). Michael Schönenberg and Aiste Jusyte (2014) had a group of male violent offenders in a correctional facility in Germany view photos of faces and judged what emotion the person depicted was experiencing. Some of the photos were ambiguous – they were a mix of fear and anger, or of happiness and anger (see Figure 11.11). Compared to a control group of participants (of the same age and educational status), the violent prisoners were much more likely to interpret the ambiguous faces as angry. This result illustrates the violent men’s bias of perceiving relatively more hostility in others, which is likely to trigger more aggressive responses in turn. Research has found hostile attribution bias to be associated with both physical and relational aggression (Bailey & Ostrov, 2008; Orobio de Castro et al., 2002; Werner, 2012).

Hostile attribution bias

The tendency to perceive hostile intent in others.

FIGURE 11.11 Biased toward hostility The face in the middle is perfectly ambiguous in terms of the emotion expressed – it is a combination of the angry face on the left with the happy face on the right. Michael Schönenberg and Aiste Jusyte (2014) found that men with a history of violence were much more likely to perceive faces like the ambiguous one in the middle here as angry than were control participants.

Source: Images sent to authors by Michael Schönenberg, 2015. Originals from Langner et al., 2010.

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Self-control: rumination, alcohol, and caffeinated or sugar-rich drinks Not all insults, frustrations or other situational triggers lead to aggressive behaviours. More often than not we control our aggressive impulses and restrict our fantasies for revenge to our daydreams. It is quite clear that the ability to practise self-control is vital to the inhibition of aggression. It is also quite clear that behind a majority of aggressive and violent acts lies the failure of self-control (Denson, DeWall et al., 2012; DeWall, Finkel, & Denson, 2011).

Rumination Rumination

In the context of aggression, repeatedly thinking about and reliving an angerinducing event, focusing on angry thoughts and feelings, and perhaps even planning or imagining revenge.

One important factor that works against self-control of aggression is rumination. In the context of anger and aggression, rumination involves repeatedly thinking about and reliving an anger-inducing event, focusing on angry thoughts and feelings, and perhaps even planning or imagining revenge. Angry rumination can take a minor situational factor that otherwise might have faded away after a few minutes and enable it to retain its force to cause anger and aggression over a long period of time. A rapidly growing set of studies have found that this kind of rumination contributes to direct and displaced aggression, arousal and raised blood pressure, negative affect and aggressive cognitions (Denson, Moulds, & Grisham, 2012; DeWall, Finkel, & Denson, 2011; Pedersen et al., 2011). Rumination also reduces people’s self-control abilities. Therefore, this is another way that rumination contributes to aggression – by impairing an individual’s ability to inhibit aggression through regulating themself against their aggressive impulses (see Figure 11.12) (Denson, DeWall et al., 2012; Denson, Pedersen et al., 2011). FIGURE 11.12 The path from provocation to aggression: the roles of rumination and self-control Research by Thomas Denson and others has shown that an anger-inducing provocation, such as an insult or social rejection, can trigger angry rumination, which in turn reduces self-control, which in turn increases the likelihood and severity of aggression.

Anger-inducing provocation

Angry rumination

Reduced self-control

Aggression

Source: Denson, T. F., Capper, M. M., Oaten, M., Friese, M., & Schofield, T. P. (2011). Self-control training decreases aggression in response to provocation in aggressive individuals. Journal of Research in Personality, 45, 252–256; Denson, T. F., DeWall, C. N., & Finkel, E. J. (2012). Self-control and aggression. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 21, 20–25.

Some other conditions make it more difficult to engage in the higher-order cognition and self-control mechanisms that can inhibit aggressive impulses. High arousal, for example, impairs the cognitive control of aggression (Zillmann, Bryant, Cantor, & Day, 1975). When you are very emotional and angry, it is hard to focus on anything else or to be as reasonable as you might ordinarily like to be. One unusual example of this might be the story of a man in Nepal who was bitten by a cobra in August 2012. He chased the cobra and bit it back! Why did he kill the cobra in this rather intimate and dangerous way? ‘I could have killed it with a stick but bit it with my teeth instead because I was angry’, he explained (Sharma, 2012).

Alcohol Alcohol is a notorious obstacle to self-control that has been implicated in the majority of violent crimes, suicides, automobile fatalities and sexually aggressive incidents between university students. The evidence is quite clear about this point: alcohol consumption often increases aggressive behaviour (Bushman, Giancola, Parrott, & Roth, 2012; Carr & Van Deusen, 2004; Exum, 2006; Graham, Osgood, Wells, & Stockwell, 2006). But how does alcohol increase aggression? As many people who drink alcohol know, alcohol can lower inhibitions, and reducing inhibitions against aggression certainly facilitates aggressive behaviours (Ito, Miller, & Pollock, 1996). Alcohol impairs executive functioning, which, as we discussed earlier, involves cognitive processes that enable people to plan or inhibit actions (Giancola, Godlaski, & Roth, 2012; Weiss & Marksteiner, 2007). This in turn increases aggression. Another way that alcohol can lead to aggression is through what Claude Steele and Robert Josephs (1990) called alcohol myopia; that is, alcohol narrows people’s focus of attention. Intoxicated people respond to initial, salient information about the situation but often miss later, more subtle indicators. They may, therefore, focus on a perceived provocation, such 474

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as an insult or threat to their status, and fail to see or think about information that would explain away this provocation or to consider the long-term problems of retaliation, such as injury, guilt or arrest. This narrowed focus can make aggression much more likely to occur, unless the intoxicated person’s narrow focus can be distracted towards something safer (Bushman et al., 2012; Giancola et al., 2010). It is estimated that the harmful use of alcohol results in 2.5 million deaths globally each year. Approximately 320 000 deaths in the age range of 15–29 are alcohol related, which is 9% of the total deaths in that age group. Overall, alcohol is the world’s third largest risk factor for disease and disability; it is a causal factor in 60 types of diseases and injuries, and a contributing factor of 200 others. With almost 4% of all deaths worldwide attributed to alcohol, it kills more people than HIV/AIDS, violence or tuberculosis (World Health Organization, 2011). The link between alcohol and aggression or violence is so strong that alcohol can serve as an aggressive cue, just as weapons can. For example, participants in some studies were more likely to activate aggressive thoughts and behaviours if they had been exposed briefly to images or words associated with alcohol (e.g., a vodka bottle or the word vodka) than if they had been exposed to neutral images or words (Bartholow & Heinz, 2006; Subra, Muller, Bègue, Bushman, & Delmas, 2010). In addition, alcohol can also affect aggressiveness because of people’s expectations about alcohol’s effects. The more people expect alcohol to affect them and make them more aggressive, the more likely it is that it will have that effect (Bègue et al., 2009; Quigley & Leonard, 2006). Historically, in Australia and New Zealand pubs and clubs have served as community meeting places, so the consumption of alcohol has generally been viewed as an integral way of life. Having a drink at the local ‘watering hole’ has long been associated with celebrations, relaxation, socialisation and ‘good times with mates’, so it should come as no surprise that most Australians drink (81%) and consider alcohol consumption to be acceptable (61%). Australia’s baby boomers (aged 45–64 years) are more likely to drink at home (73%). They generally suggest that feeling relaxed or slurring their speech (40%) is an indication that they are drunk, but around 10% also think that when they pass out this may be a good indication! Baby boomers (17%) are also more likely than Gen Ys (aged 18–29 years; 11%) to report having been the victim of alcohol-related violence. By comparison, the Gen Ys are more likely to drink at a friend’s house (22%), consume alcohol to get drunk (61%) and generally rely upon slurring their speech or losing their balance (51%) to indicate they are drunk (Foundation of Alcohol Research and Education, 2012). Similarly, New Zealand has a drinking culture that accepts high per occasion consumption as normal, with some 1.2 million New Zealanders believing that it is okay to get drunk and 275 000 aimed to get drunk during their last drinking session (Connor, Broad, Jackson, Vander Hoorn, & Rehm, 2004). Alcohol has been identified as a causal and contributing factor in the burden of both unintentional and intentional injuries. According to a recent World Health Organization Report (2018), in excess of 3 million people died as a result of the harmful use of alcohol in 2016 – roughly 1 in 20 deaths. More than three quarters of these deaths were men. The harmful use of alcohol is estimated to represent more than 5% of the global disease burden. And unfortunately, these figures are expected to rise over the next ten years particularly in South-East Asia, Western Pacific Regions and the Americas, with roughly 42% of deaths attributed to the misuse of alcohol. In 2001, the misuse of alcohol in Australia was recognised by the National Drug Strategic Framework (AIHW, 2002) as one of the most significant causes of drug-related harm, second only to tobacco as a preventable cause of death and hospitalisation in Australia. According to the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (2018a), one in six people in Australia consume alcohol at levels which place them at lifetime risk of disease and injury; one in four have consumed alcohol at levels placing them at risk of harm on a single occasion on a monthly basis; and one in seven have consumed 11 or more standard drinks at least once in the preceding year. In fact, in 2017, 1366 alcohol-related deaths were recorded in Australia – the highest rate in two decades. This was on average 3.5 times higher for men than women. Similarly, in New Zealand the rate of alcohol consumption is high, with estimates in 2017/18 indicating that almost 20% of adults over the age of 15 engage in drinking at hazardous levels (Alcohol Healthwatch, 2018) But when it comes to counting the costs of the misuse of alcohol, the links to alcohol-related violence cannot be ignored, with one in four Australians saying they have been the victim of alcohol-related violence and roughly one in three reporting that they have been affected by it in some way. In New Zealand, across all offence categories, the use of alcohol and other drugs was a significant factor for more than a quarter of crimes committed (Slack, Nana, Webster, Stokes, & Wu, 2009). But perhaps one of the greatest problems experienced in both countries is the rate of alcohol consumption and alcohol misuse in Indigenous populations. Estimates suggest that a large proportion of

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the Māori population in New Zealand drink at hazardous levels, with one in five Māori men suggesting that their drinking habits were harmful to their health and had negative effects on their home life and financial position (Dacey, 1997; New Zealand Ministry of Health 1999; Wyllie, Millard, & Zhang, 1996). Research also suggests that many prison inmates of Māori descent had suffered from alcohol abuse or dependence issues at some point throughout their lives (Brinded et al., 1996; Simpson et al., 1999) and a large percentage indicated they had been drinking prior to a violent incident (Bradbury, 1984). Similarly, in Australia the prevalence of harmful alcohol use among Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people is estimated to be approximately twice the rate of non-Indigenous people. The misuse of alcohol, socioeconomic disadvantage, childhood exposure to violence and abuse, the younger age profile of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander population, previous involvement with the criminal justice system and psychological distress have all been identified as risk factors for being involved in violence as either an offender or a victim (Wilson, Stearne, Gray, & Saggers, 2010).

Caffeinated or sugar-rich drinks While alcohol reduces people’s executive functioning and self-control, non-alcoholic sugar-rich drinks can boost them, especially when people’s cognitive resources are already depleted through fatigue or other factors, and this in turn can reduce aggression (Denson, von Hippel, Kemp, & Teo, 2010; DeWall, Deckman, Gailliot, & Bushman, 2011). What about caffeine? Does it give people a boost that might help them control their impulses if their cognitive resources have been depleted? The problem here is that caffeine also significantly increases people’s physiological and mental arousal, such as by raising blood pressure and adrenaline, and this in turn can increase aggression. Indeed, Thomas Denson, Mandi Jacobson and colleagues (2012) found that participants who thought they had consumed caffeine (but actually had not) showed reduced aggression after they had been cognitively depleted by a long and boring mental task, but those who actually consumed caffeine did not.

Situational influences: putting it all together We have seen that negative affect, arousal and aggression-related thoughts can lead to aggression. There are also a number of factors that influence whether an individual is likely to experience negative affect, arousal and aggressive thoughts, such as aversive experiences (frustration, heat and provocation), situational cues (guns and violent films) and individual and cultural differences (chronic hostility and cultures of honour). Craig Anderson and others put all these various factors together to create a model called the General Aggression Model (GAM) (Anderson et al., 1996; DeWall, Anderson, & Bushman, 2011). Figure 11.13 illustrates the basics of this model. As this figure illustrates, various aversive experiences (e.g., frustration or heat), situational cues (e.g., weapons) and individual differences (e.g., a hostile attribution bias) can create negative affect, high arousal and/or aggressive thoughts, each of which can lead to aggressive behaviour. Whether the affect, arousal and thoughts translate into aggressive behaviour, however, may depend in part on the outcome of higher-order thinking, which can either inhibit aggression (e.g., by recognising the danger of the situation or recognising that what seemed like a provocation was really just an accident) or facilitate it (e.g., by perceiving that aggression is encouraged by one’s peers in this situation or that a provocation was intentional). More recently, Anderson and colleagues have added elements to this model, such as to integrate more recent research on biological factors; but the basics of the model remain the same and have done an excellent job of capturing the variety of factors that contribute to reactive aggression (Anderson & Bushman, 2002; Anderson & Carnagey, 2004; DeWall, Anderson, & Bushman, 2011). Eli Finkel and colleagues recently introduced a new theory of aggression called I3 theory (pronounced ‘i-cubed theory’) (Denson, DeWall et al., 2012; Finkel, 2014; Finkel et al., 2012; Finkel & Eckhardt, 2013). This theory focuses especially on the role of self-control in aggression. The three ‘i’s in this theory stand for: • Instigation – social factors that often trigger aggressive impulses, such as provocation or social rejection. • Impellance – personality and situational factors that promote the urge to aggress when encountering instigating factors, such as angry rumination or personality types prone to aggressiveness. • Inhibition – the various factors of self-control we previously described. This theory pits the forces of instigation and impellance on the one hand against the power of inhibition on the other to determine the likelihood of aggression. Strong provocation coupled with angry rumination can overpower a person’s self-control abilities that have been compromised by alcohol, for example, resulting in an elevated likelihood of aggression. Figure 11.13 presents a diagram that includes aspects of both the General Aggression Model and I3 theory, along with a few other factors we have discussed in this 476

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FIGURE 11.13 Factors promoting and inhibiting reactive aggression This graph attempts to pull together a variety of the situational and individual-difference factors that we have discussed in this chapter to illustrate the path from a trigger of potential aggression to actual aggression. It is based in part on the General Aggression Model (e.g., DeWall & Anderson, 2011) and I3 theory (Denson, DeWall, & Finkel, 2012). The factors on the left (‘Readiness to aggress’) are among those that make aggression more likely. The factors on the right (‘Inhibition’) make aggression less likely. Triggers Provocation social rejection

Readiness to aggress • Traits (trait aggressiveness, dark triad traits, low empathy) • History (aggressive role models, see aggression rewarded, lots of media violence) • Aggressive cues (weapons, models) • Affect, arousal, cognition (negative affect, high arousal, hostile attributions) • Rumination

1

2

Inhibition • Good executive functioning (prefrontal cortical control, practised self-control) • Cognitive resources (not depleted through fatigue, alcohol, stress) • Traits and history (high empathy, prosocial models)

Aggression? Source: From Anderson, C. A., Anderson, K. B, & Deuser, W. E. (1996). Examining and affective framework: weapon and temperature effects on aggressive thoughts, affect, and attitudes. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 22, 366–376. Copyright © 1996 Sage Publications, Inc. Reprinted by permission.

chapter. The likelihood that a trigger of potential aggression toward someone will result in actual aggression is heightened by the kinds of factors listed on the left side of the figure and reduced by the factors listed on the right side.

MEDIA EFFECTS Having looked at origins and specific factors that contribute to aggression, we now focus on a special topic that has been a major concern of politicians, families and social scientists alike for many years; that is, violence in television, film, video games and other media. Does violence in the media promote real-world aggression and violence? We address this important question, along with another hotly debated question: ‘Does pornography promote real-world aggression?’

Violence in media According to the Growing up in Australia study 4–5-year-old children in Australia spend an average of two hours screen time per weekday; by the time they are 12–13 years old, this increases to more than three hours average per weekday and almost four hours per weekend day – this equates to 30% of a child’s waking time spent in front of a screen. This study also indicates that as children get older, the time they spend on computers and electronic games increases – the majority of children spending at least one hour per weekday on a computer or gaming device (Australian Institute of Family Studies, 2015). A large portion of this screen-based time will include acts of violence. Research conducted in New Zealand (Working Group for TV Violence Project, 2004) found 8217 incidents involving violence over a total of 669 hours of television viewing and 800 programs – or 8.02 incidents per hour of viewing. Television programs accounted for 65% of violent incidents, promotions to programs that were yet to air were responsible for 25% and advertisements 6%; the worst channels were Sky Movies (11.9 incidents per hour) and Nickelodeon (13.4 incidents per hour). According to these statistics, by the age of 18, children will have viewed on average about 200 000 acts of

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violence on television alone. Similarly, previous research indicates that about 97% of 12- to 17-year-olds in the US play video games, and the majority also report playing violent video games (Willoughby et al., 2012). The video game industry is booming, with global sales at around US$137 billion in 2018 (Newzoo, 2018). Data released by the Interactive Games & Entertainment Association (IGEA, 2018) indicates that the total physical retail sales in Australia in 2017 reached $1.176 billion and digital sales $2.054 billion. The Digital Australia (2017) report indicates: • roughly 67% of Australians play video games and the average age is 34 years • 97% of homes with children in Australia have computer games, and 60% have five or more screens • 60% of parents play with their children in the same room • 44% play with their children and 84% have communicated with them about playing safely online • approximately 76% of children under the age of 18 play video games. The most popular of the games in this age group are first-person shooters, action, fighting and roleplaying games (Brand, 2012). If consumers did not enjoy violence in television, film, music, videos and video games, these media would not be featuring it. So, can it really be harmful? We explore this question in the sections that follow.

Source: Alamy Stock Photo/David Pearson

Linking media violence to real-world violence Does life imitate art? It often seems that way. On 31 May 2014, two 12-year-old girls in the US lured their friend into the woods and stabbed her 19 times; allegedly they committed their crime in dedication to Slender Man, a fictional horror character, who told them to do it. On the night James Holmes opened fire in the Colorado theatre showing the latest Batman film in July 2012, he reportedly referred to himself as ‘The Joker’ – the villain who brought random violence to innocent masses in the previous Batman film. Dylan Klebold and Eric Harris were big fans of the violent video game Doom when they went on their 1999 shooting spree at Columbine High School, and reports indicate that they based their plans for their massacre on the game. Anders Behring Breivik said that when he planned his 2011 bombing and shooting attacks in Norway, he played violent video games such as Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 2 and World of Warcraft for training purposes. He claimed that he played these games for about 16 hours a day in 2006, doing little else but playing and sleeping for the entire year (Gibbs & Koranyi, 2012; Jacobo, 2017; Nizza, 2007; Pancevski, 2012; Paterson, 2012). Tim Kretschmer, the gunman in the March 2009 rampage at a high school in Winnenden, Germany, had numerous brutally violent video games and videos. This led one of Germany’s largest retail chains to stop selling films or games with very violent material (Roxborough, 2009). In fact, many of the boys and young men involved in the waves of school shootings had consumed a steady diet of violent video games, including the gunman behind the mass killings at the Sandy Hook Elementary School in the US state of Connecticut in 2012. Each shooting, moreover, was soon followed by additional threats and violent acts. According to one analysis, there were 400 copycat incidents in the US and Canada in the month after the Columbine shooting (Tobin, 2006). If you ask people whether exposure to media violence causes real aggression, most would probably say that they doubt that it does, or that there has never been clear evidence one way or another on this question. When this issue is discussed on the news or in the media in general, the reports tend to conclude that the relevant scientific evidence is weak and mixed, at best. Defenders of the entertainment industry consistently argue that there is no evidence that viewing media violence causes real-world aggression. Social psychologists and others who study this issue are often confronted by people who assert, ‘I’ve played lots of violent video games and I never killed anyone’. But what does the social psychological research really say on this matter? Here, we do not need to qualify the answer with ‘It depends’. Enough research evidence has accumulated in the past few decades that six major professional societies in the US – the American Psychological Association, the American Academy of Pediatrics, the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, the American Medical Association, the American Academy of Family Physicians and the American Can playing violent video games cause children and young adults Psychiatric Association – together concluded that the research to become more aggressive and violent? A growing body of ‘reveals unequivocal evidence that media violence increases research suggests that it can. the likelihood of aggressive and violent behaviour in both 478

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immediate and long-term contexts’ (Anderson et al., 2003, p. 81). The American Academy of Pediatrics, which represents 60 000 child specialists, stated, ‘Exposure to violence in media, including television, movies, music, and video games, represents a significant risk to the health of children and adolescents. Extensive research indicates that media violence can contribute to aggressive behaviour, desensitisation to violence, nightmares, and fear of being harmed’ (American Academy of Pediatrics, 2009, p. 1495). The general public may not be aware of this, but the scientific community is more convinced than ever.

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FIGURE 11.14 Violent TV viewing and aggression 15 years later A longitudinal study tracked individuals over a 15-year period. Based on how much TV violence they viewed as 8-year-olds, individuals were categorised as having viewed low (lower 20%), medium (middle 60%), or high (upper 20%) levels of TV violence. Their aggressiveness as adults was measured 15 years later. For both females and males, those who tended to watch the greatest amount of violent TV as children tended to be the most aggressive as adults. 0.6

Measuring effects of media violence

Adult aggression

What is the evidence behind these conclusions? The best way 0.4 to investigate the issue of media violence is to use multiple methods, each of which has different sets of strengths and 0.2 weaknesses. This is exactly what researchers in this area have done. What is particularly impressive about this research is that the results have been strikingly consistent across methods. 0 Longitudinal research, which examines individuals’ exposure to violent media early in life and then examines their real-world –0.2 aggression years later, has found, for example, that the extent to which eight-year-olds watched violent television predicts their –0.4 aggressiveness and criminality as adults, even when statistically Females Males controlling for other factors such as socioeconomic status and parenting practices (Huesmann, Moise-Titus, Podolski, & Eron, Degree of violent TV viewing as a child 2003) (see Figure 11.14). More recently, a study of more than 1700 Low Medium High high school students in Germany found that exposure to media Source: Based on Huesmann, L. R., Moise-Titus, J., Podolski, C. P., & Eron, L. D. (2003). Longitudinal relations between children’s exposure to TV violence and their aggressive and violence predicted increases in aggression (based on students’ violent behavior in young adulthood: 1977–1992. Developmental Psychology, 39, 201–229. self-reports as well as their teachers’ ratings) over a two-year period (Krahé, Busching, R., & Möller, 2012). A similar result was found in a study of almost 1500 high school students in Canada over a four-year period; but this study focused specifically on violent video games rather than media violence more generally (Willoughby, Adachi, & Good, 2012). In both of these longitudinal studies, other risk factors were statistically controlled for, and nonviolent media or video games play did not predict later aggression. Several meta-analyses that review and combine the results of dozens or even hundreds of studies have found across all types of research a significant link between violent media and actual aggressive thoughts and behaviours. A literature review conducted by Craig Anderson and Nicholas Carnagey (2004), for example, examined the relationship between exposure to media violence and real aggression in 46 longitudinal studies, 86 cross-sectional surveys, 28 field experiments, and 124 laboratory experiments – totalling more than 50 000 participants. The positive relationship between exposure to media violence and real aggressive behaviour was present across all types of studies (Anderson et al., 2004). More recently, Tobias Greitemeyer and Dirk Mügge (2014) reviewed about 100 different studies specifically on playing violent or prosocial video games, involving nearly 40 000 participants. As can be seen in Figure 11.15, playing violent video games was associated with increased aggressive behaviour, cognition and affect, and decreased prosocial behaviour and affect, whereas playing prosocial games had the opposite pattern. Violent video games have not been around for as long as violent television, but in recent years they have become increasingly popular and more graphically violent. Craig Anderson and colleagues (2010) conducted a meta-analysis of more than 136 research papers, involving more than 130 000 participants in Western countries as well as in Japan and other Asian countries. This analysis revealed that exposure to violent video games was a significant risk factor for increased aggressive behaviour, aggressive cognition and aggressive affect (e.g., feelings of hostility or anger), and for decreased empathy and prosocial (helpful) behaviour (see Figure 11.16). Here, again, the set of studies included longitudinal, cross-sectional and experimental designs, and the significant relationship between video game violence and aggression was found for both Western and Eastern cultures. Physical violence is not the only kind of aggression portrayed in the media. A major review of the literature on violent video games released between 2009–2013 was conducted by the American Copyright 2020 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-202

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FIGURE 11.15 Playing violent and prosocial video games: links with thoughts, feelings, and actions A recent meta-analysis of 98 studies involving almost 40 000 participants in multiple countries found significant relationships between playing violent or prosocial video games and a number of outcomes. The sizes of the bars in this graph represent the magnitude of the relationships between video-game playing and these other variables; bars in a positive direction indicate a positive relationship; bars in a negative direction indicate a negative relationship. Playing violent video games (blue bars) was associated with increased aggressive behaviour, cognition, and affect, and decreased prosocial behaviour and affect. Playing prosocial games (red bars) had the opposite pattern. 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 –0.1 –0.2 –0.3 –0.4 Aggressive behaviour Violent games

Prosocial behaviour

Aggressive cognition

Prosocial cognition

Aggressive affect

Prosocial affect

Prosocial games

Source: Based on Greitemeyer, T., & Mügge, D. O. (2014). Video games do affect social outcomes: A meta-analytic review of the effects of violent and prosocial video game play. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 40(5), 578–589.

FIGURE 11.16 Violent video games as risk factors for several outcomes A meta-analysis of more than 136 research papers, involving more than 130 000 participants in several countries found strong relationships between playing violent video games and a number of outcomes, including higher levels of aggressive behaviour, aggressive cognition, aggressive affect and physiological arousal, along with reduced levels of prosocial behaviours and empathy (and an associated increase in desensitisation). (The sizes of the bars in this graph represent the magnitude of the relationships between violent video games and these other variables; bars in a positive direction indicate a positive relationship and bars in a negative direction indicate a negative relationship.) 0.3

Average effect size: r+

0.2 0.1 0 –0.1 –0.2 –0.3 Aggressive behaviour

Aggressive cognition

Aggressive affect

Prosocial behaviour

Empathy/ desensitisation

Physiological arousal

Source: Based Anderson, C. A., & Prot, S. (2011). Effects of playing violent video games. In M. Paludi (Ed.), The psychology of teen violence and victimization (Vols 1 and 2: From bullying to cyberstalking to assault and sexual violation; Prevention strategies for f­ amilies and schools), pp. 41–70. Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger.

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Psychological Association (Calvert et al., 2017). The review’s findings indicated that violent video game exposure was consistently associated with an increased composite aggression score; increased aggressive behaviour; increased aggressive cognitions; increased aggressive affect; increased desensitisation and decreased empathy; and increased physiological arousal. They researchers concluded that although violent video game use is a risk factor for adverse outcomes, there were insufficient studies to examine a potential link between violent video game use and delinquency or criminal behaviour. Sarah Coyne and John Archer (2004) found examples of indirect aggression in 92% of programs that are popular with adolescents on UK television, a rate much higher than physical aggression. Compared with physical aggressors, the indirect aggressors portrayed tended to be more rewarded for their aggression, and they were more likely to be female and attractive. In a later experiment, Coyne and colleagues found that television exposure to indirect aggression had immediate effects on adolescents’ own behaviour, such as leading to less helping behaviour, more negative evaluations of others, and greater endorsement of using indirect aggression in response to an ambiguous situation (Coyne, Archer & Eslea, 2004). More recent research indicates that there is a common theme apparent in cartoon shows appearing on the Cartoon Network, Nickelodeon and Toon Disney which showed that acts of physical aggression were more likely to be carried out by male characters, whereas acts of social aggression were more likely to be committed by female characters (Luther & Legg, 2010). In subsequent studies, Coyne and colleagues (2008) randomly assigned female university students to watch film clips involving physical aggression (from the film Kill Bill: Volume 1), relational aggression (from the film Mean Girls) or no aggression (from the film What Lies Beneath). Although the different clips produced equal degrees of excitement and arousal, the clips showing either physical or relational aggression led the students to become more aggressive (blasting a confederate with painful noise) than did the non-aggressive clip. Other studies have demonstrated that exposure to media violence can lead to later increases in both physical and relational aggression; and that the relationship between watching media violence and engaging in relational aggression may be stronger for girls than boys (Gentile, Coyne, & Walsh, 2011; Gentile, Mathieson, & Crick, 2011). Elizabeth Behm-Morawitz and others (2016) note as well that relational aggression (or what these researchers refer to as ‘social aggression’) is very common in popular reality TV shows. They found that female university students who perceived the lifestyle on these shows (e.g., Keeping Up with the Kardashians and The Bachelor) as desirable were especially favourable in their attitudes toward relational aggression. It is important to note that media violence is neither a necessary nor a sufficient cause of real-world aggression and violence. In other words, not everyone exposed to media violence will necessarily become more aggressive, and not all acts of aggression are fuelled by media violence. Rather, frequent exposure to media violence should be seen as an important risk factor for real-world aggression, just as frequent consumption of alcohol is a risk factor for various health problems. It is important to note as well that although the majority of published work supports the link between media violence and real-world aggression, some researchers are more sceptical. Chris Ferguson in particular has led the charge criticising much of the research that has been published on this issue, and he has published a series of studies finding no effects of watching violent media or playing violent video games on children’s and adolescents’ aggression (Elson & Ferguson, 2014; Ferguson, 2015; Ferguson et al., 2015). Several of the most prominent researchers on aggression have countered these criticisms and challenged these null findings, and these counterarguments have in turn been rebutted by Ferguson and others, and so on (Bender, Plante, & Gentile, 2018). More work will surely be conducted in the coming years to clarify some of these issues.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

Exposure to television violence in childhood is related to aggression later in life.

TRUE

How media violence causes these effects The evidence from hundreds of studies makes it clear that media violence can have both immediate and long-term effects. Another issue, is how it can have these effects. Social psychologists have found several paths through which media violence produces real-world aggression. For example, exposure to media violence can trigger aggressive and hostile thoughts, which in turn can lead individuals to interpret others’ actions in hostile ways and promote aggression (Krahé, 2014). Combine these aggressive cognitions with the high arousal caused by these games, and the recipe for aggression becomes more potent. Media violence also influences aggression by desensitising individuals to violence. Desensitisation to violence refers to a reduction in emotion-related physiological reactivity to real violence. Desensitisation is one form of habituation. A novel stimulus gets our attention, and if it is sufficiently interesting or exciting it elicits physiological arousal. But when we get used to something, our reactions diminish. Familiarity with violence reduces physiological arousal to new incidents of violence (Brockmyer, 2014; Geen, 1981; Gentile

Desensitisation

Reduction in emotionrelated physiological reactivity in response to a stimulus.

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Cultivation

The process by which the mass media (particularly television) construct a version of social reality for the public.

et al., 2016; Montag et al., 2012). When an individual is desensitised to violence, they may become more accepting of it. Douglas Gentile and others (2016) demonstrated this point in an experiment that examined participants’ brain activity using fMRI technology while they played violent and nonviolent versions of a video game. All the participants were young adult men who frequently played video games, but some of these gamers mostly played violent games and the others mostly played nonviolent games. The fMRI results revealed that the participants who had played a lot of violent video games showed suppression in neural responses in regions of the brain that typically are associated with emotions such as fear and disgust. Another experiment demonstrated that violent video games can desensitise individuals to the needs of a stranger who might be hurt. In one experiment, participants played either a violent or non-violent video game for 20 minutes. Later, while completing a long questionnaire, they heard someone appear to get injured in a fight outside their laboratory room. With this person groaning in pain, how long would it take for the participants to leave their room and see if they could help? The participants who had played a violent video game took more than 450% longer to help an injured stranger than did participants who played a nonviolent video game. Those who played the violent game also perceived the fight to be less serious than did those who played the non-violent game (Bushman & Anderson, 2009). Tom Hummer and colleagues (2010) found intriguing social-neuroscientific evidence, using fMRI procedures, suggesting that playing violent video games impaired players’ executive functioning and ability to engage in successful self-control of their impulses. As we have indicated earlier in the chapter, impaired self-control is an important contributor to aggression. Media violence can also produce long-term effects by influencing people’s values and attitudes towards aggression, making it seem more legitimate and even necessary for social interaction and the resolution of social conflicts. Consistent with social learning theory, children may learn that aggression and violence are common, normal ways of dealing with threats or problems and are often rewarded. Frequent exposure to such imagery fuels the aggressive scripts that children and adolescents develop, which they subsequently use to guide their behaviour (Anderson & Huesmann, 2007). The effects of exposure to violence in the media also operate through what George Gerbner and colleagues (1986) called cultivation, which refers to the capacity of the mass media to construct a social reality that people perceive as true, even if it is not. The media tend to depict the world as much more violent than it actually is. This can make people become more fearful, more distrustful, more likely to arm themselves and more likely to behave aggressively in what they perceive as a threatening situation (Morgan & Shanahan, 2010; Riddle & De Simone, 2013).

Positive, prosocial effects of media The vast amount of attention and research has focused on the negative effects of media, but can positive media images and messages produce prosocial rather than antisocial effects? Although there is not a great deal of research on this yet, there are some encouraging results. For example, Tobias Greitemeyer and colleagues (2009) found that listening to music lyrics that promoted socially positive messages caused participants to behave more helpfully. As discussed in Chapter 10, a meta-analysis of 34 studies found a reliable positive effect of prosocial television on children’s prosocial behaviour, especially when specific acts of altruism were modelled on television (Mares & Woodard, 2005). Chapter 10 also reported the results of an international set of studies by Douglas Gentile and colleagues (2009) that demonstrated that playing prosocial video games was associated with, and can promote, prosocial behaviour. Indeed, playing prosocial video games has been found not only to increase prosocial behaviour but also to decrease aggressive behaviour (Greitemeyer & Mügge, 2014).

Pornography Pornography

Explicit sexual material.

482

Just as the effects of violence in popular media have been discussed and debated for decades, so too have the effects of media displays of sexual material. Defenders and opponents of pornography – explicit sexual material – argue their positions passionately. So, what does social psychological research say? It is important to recognise the challenges of conducting research on such a controversial and sensitive issue, such as the ethical challenges involved in conducting experiments using pornography. Even defining what is meant by pornography or obscenity is rarely straightforward because of the subjectivity involved in such definitions. The term ‘pornography’ is used here to refer to explicit sexual material, regardless of its moral or aesthetic qualities. It is crucial, however, to distinguish between non-violent and violent pornography in discussing the relationship between pornographic displays and aggression.

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CULTURAL DIVERSITY PORNOGRAPHY: THE BIG PICTURE The sheer volume of pornographic materials and their ease of access are such that it is not a matter of whether a person will be exposed to pornography but when (Bryant, 2010). According to the Pornhub 2018 year in review, there were 33.5 billion visits to the Pornhub site in 2018 – 92 million on average per day and 962 searches per second, and the number one country for per capita page views was the US, followed by India and Japan. Australia occupied the eighth position. Time spent per visit on average is 10 minutes and 13 seconds – people in the Philippines record the longest views with 13 minutes and 50 seconds. The most popular days are Sundays and daily peak hour happens between 10 p.m.

to midnight. Female traffic to the Pornhub site is growing globally – now sitting at 29%, with the largest proportion of viewers in the Philippines (38%). The average age of viewers globally is 35.5, although Millennials represent 61% of the Pornhub traffic. Not surprisingly the most popular choice of accessing the Pornhub site is by smartphone, with data suggesting 80% of people utilise this method versus 20% utilising a desktop computer. (Pornhub Insights, 2018) A study conducted by Virginia Braun and Gary Terry in New Zealand in 2012 found that 30% of men but fewer than 4% of women reported regularly watching or reading pornography. And according to the Great Australian Sex Census (2014), 75% of men and 58.5% of women say that they enjoy pornography.

Non-violent and violent pornography Earlier in this chapter, we described how both arousal and affect can influence aggression. The results of research on non-violent pornography confirm the importance of these factors (Donnerstein, Linz, & Penrod, 1987). For many people, viewing attractive bodies elicits a pleasant emotional response and moderate levels of sexual arousal. This combination of positive affect and only moderate arousal is unlikely to trigger much aggression. According to Michael Seto and colleagues (2001), there is little support for a direct causal link between the use of non-violent pornography and sexual aggression. However, there is more evidence for an association between pornography use and attitudes supporting violence against women (Hald, Malamuth, & Yuen, 2010; Malamuth, Hald, & Koss, 2012). Adding violence to pornography greatly increases the possibility of harmful effects. Violent pornography is a triple threat – it brings together high arousal; negative emotional reactions such as shock, alarm and disgust; and aggressive thoughts. Numerous internet sites, including many that are free and can be viewed easily by minors, focus specifically on images of sexual violence against women and use depictions of women’s pain as a selling point (Gossett & Byrne, 2002). Research suggests that the effects of violent pornography are gender-specific. Male-to-male aggression is no greater after exposure to violent pornography than it is after exposure to highly arousing but non-violent pornography, but male-to-female aggression is markedly increased (Donnerstein & Malamuth, 1997; Linz, Donnerstein, & Penrod, 1987; Malamuth & Donnerstein, 1982). A great deal of the literature surrounding pornography points to the volume of online pornography depicting violent and aggressive acts – a content analysis of pornographic videos conducted by Bridges and colleagues (2010) found that over 88% of scenes involved acts of physical aggression, 70% of those were perpetrated by men, and 87% of the acts were committed against women. Given the research conducted by Sun and colleagues (2016) indicating that the consumption of pornography increased subscription to negative and patriarchal gender roles, acceptance of sexual violence and the formation of unrealistic sexual expectations, the level of aggression and gender inequality displayed in this form of adult entertainment is concerning. Evidence of the effect described by Sun and colleagues was also found in a recent study of New Zealand men conducted by Aleksandra Antevska and Nicola Gavey (2015), whose findings indicated that those who enjoyed watching pornography were highly dismissive of the sexist and degrading nature of the porn they viewed; they were also unable to identify the social and ethical implications of their attitudes, suggesting that the viewing of pornography normalised traditional female-submissive and male-dominant gender roles.

Individual differences Not everyone is affected by pornography in the same way. Neil Malamuth has developed what he calls the ‘rapist’s profile’. Men fit the profile if they have relatively high levels of sexual arousal in response to violent pornography and also express attitudes and opinions indicating acceptance of violence towards women. These individuals report more sexually coercive behaviour in the past and more sexually aggressive intentions for the future. Men who score relatively high on scales such as these are more predisposed to sexual aggression than other men. The effects of pornography on aggression or negative attitudes towards women are stronger for these men than they are for other men (Hald et al., 2010; Malamuth et al., 2012).

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Another risk factor concerns men’s family histories. Leslie Simons and colleagues (2012) reported that men who regularly use pornography and whose parents frequently used harsh corporal punishment were most likely to report engaging in sexually coercive behaviours. Hald & Malamuth (2015) synthesised much of this research into the confluence model of sexual aggression. This model proposes that for the subset of individuals who already score high on multiple known risk factors of sexual aggression, consuming pornography (even nonviolent pornography, especially if it is highly arousing) adds ‘fuel to the fire’ and increases the risk of sexually aggressive attitudes and behaviours. According to this model, the presence of multiple risk factors at once is particularly dangerous, such as hostile, distrustful attitudes toward women; acceptance of rape myths; sexual gratification from controlling women; a family history of abuse; and an impersonal attitude toward sexual relations. For these individuals especially, pornography becomes a greater risk factor for aggression.

REDUCING VIOLENCE Now that we have explained the many factors that contribute to aggression and violence, and have illustrated the extent of the problem with a variety of grim stories and statistics, a key question must be addressed: ‘What can be done to reduce rates of aggression and violence?’ Are we simply aggressive animals who are destined to go on hurting and killing each other? Fortunately, there is reason for optimism – evidence shows that these rates have already reduced. An intriguing and comprehensive book by psychologist Steven Pinker (2011), called The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined, is among the analyses that make the case that we are living in a time that is less violent and more peaceful than at any period in human history. He calls this reduction in violence ‘the most important thing that has happened in human history’ and that ‘no aspect of life is untouched by the retreat from violence’ (p. xxi). This claim flies in the face of how people tend to perceive the contemporary world as extraordinarily violent. Reasons for this tendency include our tendency to focus on recent events, the bias to report the most shocking stories on the news, and so on. However, Pinker presents chart after chart illustrating a dramatic reduction in violence over the centuries. For example, see Figure 11.17 for the rates of homicide in Western Europe from 1300 to 2000, and in England and New England over several centuries. There are numerous causes for such huge changes. Among these are better education and enhanced power of reason, including moral reasoning, that allows us to better see beyond our immediate needs and circumstances and think in more abstract and universal terms. Norms have also changed dramatically to discourage aggression. It is no longer acceptable in most modern societies, as it once was, to answer a perceived insult with the challenge of a duel to the death, for example, or to treat fellow humans as property. Pinker and others also argue that people’s motivations and abilities to practise self-control of aggressive impulses are stronger today; and, as we have seen in this chapter, self-control plays a crucially important role in moderating aggression. The historical trends, therefore, are encouraging, as are more recent huge drops in the rates of homicide and violent crime in many countries since the early 1990s. But ‘the better angels of our nature’ still have strong competition from our inner demons, as the numerous studies and stories reported throughout this chapter make clear. So, what can we do to reduce aggression and violence in our lives today? We turn to examine this question for the remainder of this chapter.

Changing how we think and feel Let us start with the enhanced education, intelligence and reasoning that Pinker (2011) proposed helped cause the decline in violence over the past several centuries. Continued improvements in these areas clearly can pave the way for more prosocial and less antisocial behaviours. Along with education and reasoning – particularly moral reasoning – comes empathy. As discussed in Chapter 10, empathy plays a vital role in promoting helpful, cooperative behaviour. A lack of empathy similarly contributes greatly to numerous forms of aggression and violence, including bullying, sexual assault and abuse of animals (Bussey, Quinn, & Dobson, 2015, Mancke et al., 2015; Day, Casey, & Gerace, 2010; Schwartz, Fremouw, Schenk, & Ragatz, 2012). Improving education and moral reasoning is likely to improve empathy. In addition, numerous programs and interventions are designed specifically to teach individuals to be more empathetic, such as by training them to see things from others’ perspectives through various exercises, assignments and role play. Several of these programs have been very successful at reducing aggression (Feddes, Mann, & Doosje, 2015; McGuire, 2008; Sahin, 2012). A meta-analysis of 19 studies found reliable support for the effectiveness of empathy-training programs (van Berkhout & Malouff, 2016). 484

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FIGURE 11.17 The decline of violence: homicide rates over several centuries The homicide rates per 100 000 people per year in five regions of Western Europe from the year 1300 to 2000 are depicted in the graph on the top. The rates for England (from 1300 to 1925) and New England (from 1630 to 1914) are presented in the graph on the bottom.

Homicides per 100 000 people per year

100

10

1

0.1 1200

1300 Italy

1400

1500

Scandinavia

1600 Netherlands

1700

1800

1900

Germany & Switzerland

2000 England

Homicides per 100 000 people per year

100

10

1

0.1 1200

1300 England

1400

1500

1600

1700

1800

1900

2000

New England

Source: Pinker, S., The better angels of our nature: Why violence has declined. Copyright © 2011 by Steven Pinker. Used by permission of Viking Penguin, a division of Penguin Group (USA) Inc. and Brockman Inc.

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Improved moral reasoning is one part of the formula behind what is known as aggression replacement training. The other two components are social competence training and aggression control. These themes are taught with guided instructions and role playing, typically over the course of twice-weekly sessions for 10 weeks. For example, adolescents in the program go through exercises designed to help them detect when they are on the verge of becoming angry, and they are taught how to think and behave in response to those feelings in ways that steer them away from aggression. They are also taught social skills, such as making eye contact and developing interpersonal trust. Several studies of the effectiveness of aggression replacement training have reported very promising results (Glick & Gibbs, 2010; Holmqvist, Hill, & Lang, 2009; Koposov, Gundersen, & Svartdal, 2014). As we have discussed multiple times in this chapter, failure at self-control plays a very important role in aggression and violence. In light of its importance, researchers are beginning to study the effectiveness of methods designed to improve people’s self-control abilities. Thomas Denson, Miriam Capper and colleagues (2011) found that participants high in trait aggressiveness were less aggressive after a provocation if they had completed a two-week self-control training task (requiring them to resist the impulse to use their dominant hand and instead use their non-dominant hand between 8 a.m. and 6 p.m. every day!). Improving self-control is the goal of one of the four types of interventions that Thomas Denson (2015) argues are the most promising for reducing reactive aggression. The other three successful interventions emphasise cognitive reappraisal, cognitive control, and mindfulness (see Figure 11.18). Cognitive reappraisal programs train individuals to interpret provocations in more neutral, less emotional terms by thinking about the events from an objective, nonpersonal perspective. Cognitive control is related to selfcontrol, but interventions targeting cognitive control more specifically focus on training the regulation of emotion, such as anger, in response to emotionally relevant stimuli. Finally, mindfulness training involves getting people to be in a nonjudgemental, nonreactive state in which they more easily just accept their physical and mental experiences. Denson reviews evidence in support of each of these approaches (although the evidence for the effectiveness of mindfulness is the least developed at this point) in reducing aggression. Their effectiveness no doubt stems from the fact that each targets some aspects of executive functioning, which we have said earlier in this chapter plays a critically important role in moderating reactive aggression. FIGURE 11.18 Reducing aggression – four interventions The orange boxes illustrate a typical path toward reactive aggression. The blue boxes indicate the points at which each of four interventions can block this path and thereby reduce aggression. Provocation

Anger

• Cognitive reappraisal • Self-control training • Cognitive control training

Aggression

• Mindfulness

Source: Based on Denson, T. F. (2015). Four promising psychological interventions for reducing reactive aggression. Current Opinion in Behavioral ­Sciences, 3, 136–141.

Individuals who have unusually severe problems with self-control, aggressive impulses, social skills, lack of empathy, and other factors we have been discussing, are likely to need more extensive therapy and treatment. Treatments using behaviour modification, for example, are often used to try to alter individuals’ behaviour through learning principles that reinforce non-aggressive actions. Medications may also be used, such as to balance serotonin levels to help impulse control.

Situational and sociocultural factors In addition to educating, training and treating individuals, what can be done at a broader level? Towards this end, an improved economy, healthier living conditions and social support are extremely important in reducing the frustration, negative affect and thinking, and provocations that fuel much aggression. Improvements on these fronts would likely have a cascade of positive effects. For example, as Peter 486

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Sidebotham and Jon Heron (2006) observed, ‘The association between poverty and child maltreatment is one of the most consistent observations in the published research’ (p. 499). Thus, protecting families from violence also means providing family members with educational and employment opportunities. Furthermore, because abuse of alcohol and other drugs so often leads to family violence, better education about the effects of such substances, as well as support for individuals who need help dealing with them, would be a worthy investment not only for these individuals but also for the people around them. Because research has shown how the presence of weapons can promote aggressive thoughts, emotions and actions, reducing the prevalence of guns in society – particularly guns associated strongly with violence rather than sport – may have a number of calming effects. At the same time, teaching and modelling nonviolent responses to frustrations and social problems, and encouraging thoughtful responses that are incompatible with anger, such as humour and relaxation, are among the most effective things we can do for our society’s children, and for each other. Having observed the relative non-violence of cultures that emphasise cooperation over competitiveness, social psychologists have concluded that cooperation and shared goals across groups are effective methods for reducing intergroup hostilities and aggression. In addition, because communities beset by broken windows and petty crime reveal a loss of control and support, thus possibly signalling to those who live there that aggression and antisocial behaviour are left unpunished, police departments in numerous cities in America have begun to crack down on relatively minor acts of vandalism and aggression in the hope that doing so will prevent more serious acts of violence (Taylor, 2000). Finally, changing the cost–reward payoffs associated with aggression can have profound effects on the aggressive tendencies exhibited within a culture. Socialisation practices that reward prosocial rather than antisocial behaviour therefore have the potential to greatly reduce the tendency to engage in bullying, fighting and other aggressive behaviours. Conversely, when overt or even indirect aggression is legitimised, we are all at risk. The media, of course, play an important role in legitimising, and even glorifying, violence. What, then, can we do about it? Government censorship is one answer, but it is not a very popular one, for a number of reasons. Another alternative is to use public pressure to increase media self-censorship. Of course, the most powerful kind of public pressure would be a commercial boycott. If violence did not sell, the media would not keep producing it. Violence, however, continues to be a money-maker. Research on the effects of prosocial song lyrics, television and video games are quite encouraging in this regard, as discussed earlier in the chapter. If parents can help children select shows and games that provide compelling, vivid prosocial models, the effects may be strong. Parents have also been advised to watch television with their children and to monitor their video game usage, and to teach them how television and video games differ from real life and how imitating the fictional characters can produce undesirable outcomes. This kind of ongoing parental tutoring takes significant time and effort; but given the extent of media depictions of violence in our society, strengthening children’s critical viewing skills is a wise investment. Ingrid Möller, Barbara Krahé and Robert Busching (2015) conducted a media intervention study along these lines. Students from several schools in Berlin, Germany, were made to monitor their use of electronic media and to reduce their usage, such as with a ‘media-free weekend’, and were encouraged to substitute that time for other activities. In five weekly sessions during school the researchers educated the students about the kinds of issues discussed in this chapter, including how violence is often rewarded in the media or how exposure to violence can lead to desensitisation. The students’ parents were also given guidelines for sensible media use and about the harmful effects of exposure to media violence. The results of the program were impressive. The intervention significantly reduced students’ use of violent media according to measures taken two years after the intervention. In addition, for students whose rates of aggression before the study were relatively high, the intervention significantly reduced their rates of both physical and relational aggression.

Multiple-level approaches: programs to prevent violence A variety of factors contribute to aggression and violence; and, as we have seen, the impact of any one factor often involves other factors simultaneously. The link between hot temperatures and aggression, for example, may involve factors such as arousal, aggressive thoughts and negative affect. How harmful corporal punishment is can depend on other family dynamics. The most effective strategies for reducing aggression recognise this complexity and work on multiple levels.

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Multisystemic therapy One of the most successful treatment programs for violent juvenile delinquents is called multisystemic therapy (MST). This approach addresses individuals’ problems at several different levels, including the needs of the adolescents and the many contexts in which they are embedded, such as family, peer group, school and neighbourhood (Borduin, Schaeffer, & Heiblum, 2009; Curtis, Ronan, Heiblum, & Crellin, 2009; Henggeler et al., 2009; Letourneau et al., 2009; Timmons-Mitchell et al., 2006). A case study of a 14-year-old boy named Luke illustrates this approach (Wells, Adhyaru, Cannon, Lamond, & Baruch, 2010). Luke was engaging in some serious antisocial behaviours. Rather than just treat Luke with individual therapy, the therapist applying MST wanted to understand the family dynamics in which Luke lived. This enabled the therapist to learn that there was a lack of household routine or rules, and that bad behaviour was often rewarded (with attention and money) and good behaviour was ignored. The therapist therefore worked with Luke’s grandmother (his caregiver) and some other nearby family members to help her set up rules, establish routines, determine better and more consistent ways of handing sources of conflict, and to reward positive rather than negative behaviour. This approach of learning about and working with his family and environment, along with individualised treatment of Luke, produced dramatic improvement in Luke’s behaviour and life. Multiple studies evaluating the effectiveness of MST have reported very positive results, especially for juveniles under 15 (van der Stouwe et al., 2014). For example, in one study violent juvenile offenders with an average of almost four felony arrests per person were assigned randomly to either MST or individual therapy during adolescence, and they were assessed more than two decades later. The adolescents were four times less likely to be arrested for a violent felony during the follow-up period if they were treated with MST than with individual therapy (Sawyer & Borduin, 2011). Even the siblings of juveniles who are treated with MST have been found to be three times less likely to be convicted of a felony in the 25 years that follow compared to siblings of offenders who were treated with individual therapy (Wagner, Borduin, Sawyer, & Dopp, 2014). This illustrates one important benefit of MST; in treating the offender’s entire family, the benefits can spread beyond the individual. Although this type of multiple-level approach takes a lot of time and resources, the money saved by significantly reducing the rates of violent crimes and in keeping these individuals out of prison far outweighs the costs. For example, in one study of 176 serious juvenile offenders, MST was estimated to have saved taxpayers and crime victims between US$75 000 and US$200 000 per MST participant (Klietz, Borduin, & Schaeffer, 2010).

RESEARCH SPOTLIGHT

Source: Courtesy of Dr Thomas Denson.

DR THOMAS DENSON, UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES What are the topic areas of your research? The research in my laboratory primarily focuses on the causes, consequences and biological underpinnings of anger-fuelled aggression. We are hoping to find out how people can control angry feelings and aggressive impulses. We do this by using multiple complementary methodologies. For instance, we conduct behavioural laboratory experiments and also examine hormonal, cardiovascular and brain responses during anger provocation, anger control and aggressive behaviour. My secondary research interest is in understanding how the mind can influence physical responses to stress. Which of your research findings have you found most intriguing? Because science involves the slow accumulation of evidence over many years, I cannot say that one finding in particular stands out. However, over the past several years, there are two

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sets of findings that consistently interest me. The first is that aggressive people report trying to control their anger as much as non-aggressive people. However, they have inefficient brain functioning in the neural circuitry responsible for self-control and emotion regulation. As an example, in this study (Denson et al., 2014), we genotyped people by taking a DNA sample from their saliva. We then brought them into the brain imaging centre and a research assistant told them that I was getting angry at participants, but that it was really important that the participants control their anger. Once in the scanner, I insulted them by telling them that they screwed up my experiment. (Don’t worry – everyone was debriefed and left in a good mood at the end of the study!) What we found is that people who were genetically predisposed towards aggression did report trying to control themselves as much as those who were not predisposed towards aggression. But they showed hyperactivation in the amygdala (which is involved in emotional arousal) and the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (which is involved in controlling emotions and behaviour). The second, complementary set of findings is that if you give aggressive people the ability to control themselves, they do not behave aggressively. One way we do that is by having them

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practise self-control in very simple ways for two weeks. When we bring them back into the laboratory and provoke them, they are no longer aggressive. Together, these findings suggest that aggressive people are not socially reckless or uncaring about harming others. They do try to control their anger and aggressive impulses, but they often lack the ability. When we experimentally give aggressive people the ability to control themselves, they do. As we know from social psychology, we may have the tendency to make the fundamental attribution error and attribute aggressive behaviour to a cold, heartless underlying disposition. However, our research suggests that by altering people’s self-control capacity, we may be able to create less aggressive situations (reviewed in Denson, DeWall et al., 2012). How did you become interested in your area of research? In 2001, I was finishing up my Master’s degree in Research Psychology at California State University, Long Beach. My wife had been accepted to the University of California, Los Angeles to do a PhD in Education, so I wanted to stay in the area. I looked around and met with several potential PhD supervisors, and was very lucky to have Norman Miller accept me as his student at the University of Southern California. Norman was nearly

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70 years old at the time and one of the most well-respected social psychologists alive. He was doing some really interesting work on aggression at the time. Norman has since retired, but I still collaborate with some of his former students. Together, we all share Norman’s passion for understanding the causes and consequences of human aggression. How does your area of research speak to life in Australia and New Zealand? In the global scheme of things, Australia and New Zealand are relatively safe and rates of violent crime have been steady or on the decline for the past several years. Society is becoming increasingly intolerant of angry and aggressive outbursts (for an excellent handling of the topic, I urge you to read Steven Pinker’s book The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence has Declined). People are becoming more concerned with controlling anger and aggressive impulses. Nonetheless, aggression is a problem all over the world and all humans have the evolved tendency to hurt other people if pushed far enough. Hopefully, by understanding how people can control anger and aggression, we can give people the ability to create a more peaceful Australasia and planet.

Topical Reflection THE PAIN OF PORT ARTHUR Of all the stories of devastation and loss that came to light in the days and weeks following the Port Arthur Massacre, few were as publicly traumatic as that of Walter Mikac, whose wife and two young daughters were shot at point blank range. Walter, who had been playing golf with friends at the time, recalls hearing gunshots that he now knows could have been those that killed his family. Having returned home to find an empty house where his family should have been, he heard of the horror that had unfolded at the popular tourist site. Knowing that his family was there, he was faced with the unenviable task of going to find them. Having arrived at the site, he was led by a local doctor, who was a friend of the family, to the place where his wife and daughters lay dead. Although what he saw was beyond comprehension, he was able to hug them and say goodbye, which he says helped him through the recovery period. The period of grieving that followed for Walter, as well as the families of others who died, and those who had survived, was often protracted and played out under the ever-watchful gaze of the media. Having contemplated taking his own life many times during the 18 months that followed, Walter survived by taking one day at a time. With courage and dignity he moved forward with a desire to create something positive from the depths of this tragedy, launching the Alannah and Madeline Foundation to help children who are the victims of violence and to initiate programs to prevent violence (Bearup, 2013).

CHAPTER REVIEW SUMMARY WHAT IS AGGRESSION? • Aggression is behaviour intended to harm another individual; an emotional response to a perceived injury. • Hostility is an antagonistic attitude.

CULTURE, GENDER AND INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES CULTURE AND AGGRESSION • The rates of violence and the forms violence takes vary dramatically from one society to another.

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Some research suggests that individualistic cultures tend to have higher rates of aggression than collectivistic cultures. The forms that aggression may take and attitudes about whether various practices should be considered aggressive vary across cultures.

GENDER AND AGGRESSION • Men are more violent than women in virtually every culture and time period that has been studied. • Males tend to be more overtly, physically aggressive than females. • Females tend to be at least as – and perhaps somewhat more – indirectly or relationally aggressive compared with males.

PUTTING COMMON SENSE TO THE TEST In virtually every culture, males are more violent than females. TRUE. In almost all cultures and time periods that have been studied, men commit the large majority of violent crimes. For almost every category of aggression, males are more aggressive than females. FALSE. Females tend to be somewhat more indirectly, or relationally, aggressive than boys. INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES • There is some stability in aggression; that is, aggression in childhood predicts aggression in adulthood. • Individuals low on the dimensions of agreeableness and openness and high on the dimension of neuroticism are more likely than other people to be aggressive, whereas narcissism is associated with aggressiveness in response to provocation.

ORIGINS OF AGGRESSION IS AGGRESSION INNATE? • Evolutionary psychology views aggression as a universal, innate characteristic that has evolved from natural and sexual selection pressures. • Evolutionary accounts propose that gender differences in aggression can be traced to competition for status (and the most desirable mates) and sexual jealousy. IS AGGRESSION LEARNED? • Aggression is increased when it is rewarded. • Aggression is decreased by punishment only under specific conditions that are often not met in the real world.

PUTTING COMMON SENSE TO THE TEST Children who are spanked or otherwise physically disciplined (but not abused) for behaving aggressively tend to become less aggressive. FALSE. Evidence indicates that the use of even a little physical punishment to discipline children is associated with increases in subsequent aggressive and antisocial behaviour by the children, even years later, although this relationship may depend on a variety of other factors.

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GENDER DIFFERENCES AND SOCIALISATION • Gender and cultural differences in human aggression may be due, in part, to differences in socialisation practices – lessons taught, reinforcements and punishments given, models offered, and roles and norms emphasised. CULTURE AND SOCIALISATION: CULTURES OF HONOUR • A culture of honour promotes status-protecting aggression among white males in the American South and West as well as among men in other parts of the world, such as in Brazil and Chile. NATURE VERSUS NURTURE • Human aggression clearly is affected by learning and experience. • In aggression, as in all human behaviour, biological and environmental influences interact.

SITUATIONAL INFLUENCES ON AGGRESSION FRUSTRATION–AGGRESSION HYPOTHESIS • The frustration–aggression hypothesis proposes that frustration produces the motive to aggress and that aggression is caused by frustration. • In fact, frustration produces many motives, and aggression is caused by many factors.

PUTTING COMMON SENSE TO THE TEST Blowing off steam by engaging in safe but aggressive activities (e.g., sport) makes people less likely to aggress later. FALSE. Although people may be less likely to aggress immediately after such activities, initial aggression makes future aggression more – not less – likely. NEGATIVE AFFECT • A wide variety of noxious stimuli can create negative feelings and increase aggression. • The negative affect due to provocation is a key factor behind much aggression. AROUSAL • Highly arousing stimuli increase aggression. COGNITION • Situational cues associated with aggression, such as the presence of a gun, can automatically activate aggressionrelated thoughts and increase aggressive behaviour. • Deliberate thoughts that affect aggression include the perception of the cost or appropriateness of aggression. SELF-CONTROL: RUMINATION, ALCOHOL, AND CAFFEINATED OR SUGAR-RICH DRINKS • Self-control failure is behind most acts of aggression and violence. • Angry rumination, in which an individual repeatedly thinks about an anger-inducing event, reduces self-control and increases aggression. • Alcohol can lower inhibitions against aggression facilitating aggressive behaviours. • Self-control failure is behind most acts of aggression and violence; poor executive functioning, angry rumination, high

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arousal and low glucose are among the factors that can impair self-control. Caffeine significantly increases people’s physiological and mental arousal, which in turn can increase aggression.

SITUATIONAL INFLUENCES: PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER • The General Aggression Model helps explain the relationships among various factors that contribute to aggression, such as the separate and interactive effects of affect, arousal and cognitions.

MEDIA EFFECTS VIOLENCE IN MEDIA • There is a tremendous amount of violence depicted in the media, and much of it is targeted to children and adolescents. • A large number of studies, using a variety of different methods, have shown a significant positive relationship between exposure to media violence and real-world aggressive cognitions and behaviours. • Exposure to television violence and violent video games in childhood and adolescence is related to aggression later in life.

PUTTING COMMON SENSE TO THE TEST Exposure to television violence in childhood is related to aggression later in life. TRUE. Laboratory experiments, field experiments and correlational research all suggest a link between exposure to violence on television and subsequent aggressive behaviour.

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PORNOGRAPHY • In general, the evidence pointing to a causal link between viewing non-violent pornography and aggressive behaviour is weak, although there is stronger evidence that it can promote attitudes more accepting of violence towards women. • Violent pornography increases aggression, particularly maleto-female aggression.

REDUCING VIOLENCE • Rates of violence in much of the world have declined dramatically over the centuries. CHANGING HOW WE THINK AND FEEL • Improvements in education, intelligence, reasoning and empathy can reduce aggression. • Improving one’s self-control abilities is another way to reduce aggression. SITUATIONAL AND SOCIOCULTURAL FACTORS • Situational and sociocultural factors that can help reduce violence include reductions in negative affect, aggressive thinking, poverty, the presence of weapons, competitiveness, minor acts of aggression and vandalism, and social rewards for aggressive behaviour. MULTIPLE-LEVEL APPROACHES: PROGRAMS TO PREVENT ­VIOLENCE • Recognising that aggression has multiple levels of causes, multisystemic therapy has been effective in reducing aggressive behaviours among violent adolescents.

LINKAGES As you can see from this chapter a great deal of our antisocial and aggressive behaviour may well be learned from watching others. Not all social learning is bad however – our direct experience with positive social situations, rewards and punishments can be used to better ourselves and

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11

assist others – explore this further in Chapter 10 Helping others. The ‘Linkages’ diagram below shows two other chapters which help us to understand aggression and violence.

Aggression and antisocial behaviour

LINKAGES

Social scripts and the culture of honour

CHAPTER

3

Perceiving others

Group related violence

CHAPTER

7

Conformity, compliance and obedience

Social Learning and helping others

CHAPTER

10

Helping others

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REVIEW QUIZ 1 Which of the following is most consistent with evolutionary explanations of aggression? a Children are more likely to be abused by their biological parents than by step-parents. b Male-to-female violence is predominantly triggered by sexual jealousy. c Male-to-male violence is triggered by a rise in testosterone. d Different cultures demonstrate different levels of aggressiveness. 2 Which of the following research results would provide evidence that aggression is a heritable trait? a Identical twins reared together are more similar in their levels of aggressiveness than identical twins reared apart. b Adopted children are more similar in levels of aggressiveness to their adoptive parents than to their biological parents. c Fraternal twins are more similar in levels of aggressiveness than non-twin siblings. d Identical twins are more similar in levels of aggressiveness than fraternal twins.

3 The theory that behaviour is learned through the observation of others as well as through the direct experience of rewards and punishments is called: a modelling theory. b frustration–aggression theory. c social learning theory. d cultivation theory. 4 Which of the following concerning a culture of honour is true? a It is more prevalent among women than men. b It is more prevalent in the US than Australia. c It is a product of socialisation that can influence the tendency to aggress. d It is produced by differences in testosterone and serotonin levels. 5 Research suggests that we are most likely to displace aggression: a toward others who are members of an outgroup. b toward those who are biologically related to us. c in the absence of provocation. d when opportunities for catharsis are unavailable to us.

WEBLINKS International Society for Research on Aggression www.israsociety.com This website is devoted to the scientific study of aggression and violence. It provides links to several other sites involved with studying or reducing aggression. UNODC homicide statistics https://www.unodc.org/gsh/en/data.html A collection of statistical data on intentional homicide from 207 countries, including homicide levels, trends and contextual characteristics. Violence against women https://www.who.int/en/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/ violence-against-women A World Health Organization website with a great deal of research and statistics in relation to global levels of violence against women.

Violence Research and Prevention Program https://www.griffith.edu.au/arts-education-law/violenceresearch-and-prevention-program A Griffith University program that aims to produce cutting-edge knowledge about the causes, consequences and best approaches to understand, control and prevent violence. White Ribbon https://www.whiteribbon.org.au/find-help An Australian prevention campaign trying to change the attitudes and behaviours that lead to violence against women. The website includes links to some interesting research.

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disadvantaged children. Final Report. Sydney: The Smith Family and Australian Institute of Family Studies. Retrieved from http://www.thesmithfamily.com.au/ webdata/ resources/files/HomeToSchool_ SummaryReport_WEB.pdf Smith, C. A., Ireland, T. O., Park, A., Elwyn, L., & Thornberry, T. P. (2011). Intergenerational continuities and discontinuities in intimate partner violence: A twogenerational prospective study. Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 26, 3720–3752. Smith, D. L. (2007). The most dangerous animal: Human nature and the origins of war. New York, NY: St. Martin’s. Sorge, G. B., Skilling, T. A., & Toplak, M. E. (2015). Intelligence, Executive Functions, and Decision Making as Predictors of Antisocial Behavior in an Adolescent Sample of Justice-Involved Youth and a Community Comparison Group. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 28(5), 477–490. Spieker, S. J., Campbell, S. B., Vandergrift, N., Pierce, K. M., Cauffman, E., Susman, E. J., & Roisman, G. I. (2012). Relational aggression in middle childhood: Predictors and adolescent outcomes. Social Development, 21, 354–375. Steele, C. M., & Josephs, R. A. (1990). Alcohol myopia: Its prized and dangerous effects. American Psychologist, 45, 921–933. Stetler, D. A., Davis, C., Leavitt, K., Schriger, I., Benson, K., Bhakta, S., … & Bortolato, M. (2014). Association of low-activity MAOA allelic variants with violent crime in incarcerated offenders. Journal of Psychiatric Research, 58, 69–75. Straus, M. A. (2000). Beating the devil out of them: Corporal punishment in American families and its effects on children (2nd ed.). New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers. Straus, M. A. (2010). Criminogenic effects of corporal punishment by parents. In M. Herzog-Evans & I. Dréan-Rivette (Eds.), Transnational criminology manual (Vol. 1, pp. 373–390). Amsterdam: Wolf Legal Publishing. Straus, M. A. (2011). Gender symmetry and mutuality in perpetration of clinical-level partner violence: Empirical evidence and implications for prevention and treatment. Aggression and Violent Behavior, 16, 279–288. Straus, M. A., & Douglas, E. M. (2008). Research on spanking by parents: Implications for public policy. The Family Psychologist: Bulletin of the Division of Family Psychology, 43, 18–20. Straus, M. A., & Gozjolko, K. L. (2014). ‘Intimate terrorism’ and gender differences in injury of dating partners by male and female university students. Journal of Family Violence, 29, 51–65. Subra, B., Muller, D., Bègue, L., Bushman, B. J., & Delmas, F. (2010). Automatic effects of alcohol and aggressive cues on aggressive thoughts and behaviors. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 36, 1052–1057. Sun, C., Bridges, A., Johnson, J. A., & Ezzell, M. B. (2016). Pornography and the male sexual script: An analysis of consumption and sexual relations. Archives of Sexual Behavior, 45(4), 983–994. doi:10.1007/s10508014-0391-2 Sunday, S., Kline, M., Labruna, V., Pelcovitz, D., Salzinger, S., & Kaplan, S. (2011). The role of adolescent physical abuse in adult intimate partner violence. Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 26, 3773–3789. Taylor, R. B. (2000). Breaking away from broken windows: Baltimore neighborhoods and the nationwide fight against crime, grime, fear, and decline. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Tedeschi, J. T., & Bond, M. H. (2001). Aversive behavior and aggression in cultural perspective. In R. M. Kowalski (Ed.), Behaving badly: Aversive behaviors in

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Vandello, J. A., & Cohen, D. (2003). Male honor and female fidelity: Implicit cultural scripts that perpetuate domestic violence. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 84, 997–1010. Vandello, J. A., Cohen, D., Grandon, R., & Franiuk, R. (2009). Stand by your man: Indirect prescriptions for honorable violence and feminine loyalty in Canada, Chile, and the United States. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 40, 81–104. Vandello, J. A., Cohen, D., & Ransom, S. (2008). U.S. Southern and Northern differences in perceptions of norms about aggression: Mechanisms for the perpetuation of a culture of honor. Journal of CrossCultural Psychology, 39, 162–177. Vazsonyi, A. T., Machackova, H., Sevcikova, A., Smahel, D., & Cerna, A. (2012). Cyberbullying in context: Direct and indirect effects by low self-control across 25 European countries. European Journal of Developmental Psychology, 9, 210–227. Verlinden, M., Veenstra, R., Ghassabian, A., Jansen, P. W., Hofman, A., Jaddoe, V. W., … & Tiemeier, H. (2014). Executive functioning and non-verbal intelligence as predictors of bullying in early elementary school. Journal of Abnormal Child Psychology, 42(6), 953–966. Verona, E., Patrick, C. J., & Lang, A. R. (2002). A direct assessment of the role of state and trait negative emotion in aggressive behavior. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 111, 249–258. Volk, A. A., Camilleri, J. A., Dane, A. V., & Marini, Z. A. (2012). Is adolescent bullying an evolutionary adaptation? Aggressive Behavior, 38, 222–238. Volk, A. A., Dane, A. V., Marini, Z. A., & Vaillancourt, T. (2015). Adolescent bullying, dating, and mating: Testing an evolutionary hypothesis. Evolutionary Psychology, 13(4), https://doi. org/10.1177/1474704915613909. von der Pahlen, B., Lindman, R., Sarkola, T., Maekisalo, H., & Eriksson, C. J. P. (2002). An exploratory study on self-evaluated aggression and androgens in women. Aggressive Behavior, 28, 273–280. Waasdorp, T. E., Baker, C. N., Paskewich, B. S., & Leff, S. S. (2013). The association between forms of aggression, leadership, and social status among urban youth. Journal of Youth and Adolescence, 42, 263–274. Wagner, D. V., Borduin, C. M., Sawyer, A. M., & Dopp, A. R. (2014). Long-term prevention of criminality in siblings of serious and violent juvenile offenders: A 25-year follow-up to a randomized clinical trial of multisystemic therapy. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 82, 492. Warburton, W. A., & Anderson, C. A. (2015). Aggression, social psychology of. International encyclopedia of the social & behavioral sciences, 373–380. Warburton, W. A., Williams, K. D., & Cairns, D. R. (2006). When ostracism leads to aggression: The moderating effects of control deprivation. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 42, 213–220. Weiss, E., & Marksteiner, J. (2007). Alcohol-related cognitive disorders with a focus on neuropsychology. International Journal on Disability and Human Development, 6, 337–342. Wells, C., Adhyaru, J., Cannon, J., Lamond, M., & Baruch, G. (2010). Multisystemic therapy (MST) for youth offending, psychiatric disorder and substance abuse: Case examples from a UK MST team. Child and Adolescent Mental Health, 15, 142–149. Werner, N. E. (2012). Do hostile attribution biases in children and parents predict relationally aggressive behavior? The Journal of genetic psychology, 173(3), 221–245. Werner, N. E., & Grant, S. (2009). Mothers’ cognitions about relational aggression: Associations

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PART FIVE

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AND REAL-WORLD APPLICATIONS

CHAPTER 12: ENVIRONMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY CHAPTER 13: COMMUNITY PSYCHOLOGY CHAPTER 14: STRESS, HEALTH AND WELLBEING CHAPTER 15: LAW CHAPTER 16: BUSINESS

The dimension of time: Socio-historical context

Attitudes and ideologies of culture

The environment Part 5: Social psychology and real-world applications Chapter 12: Environmental psychology Chapter 13: Community psychology Chapter 14: Stress, health and wellbeing Chapter 15: Law Chapter 16: Business Interpersonal networks

The individual

In this part, we turn to the real-world application of social psychology. We begin in Chapter 12 with a brief look at environmental psychology and conservation, and the reciprocal relationship between the environment and humanity. Chapter 13 then looks at community psychology where we examine the impact of fly-in fly-out work practices, the refugee crisis, poverty and disadvantaged populations. Chapter 14 then considers the application of social psychology to health and wellbeing – here we talk about the stresses of daily living and how we cope with them. We live in a society that is governed by laws, and this is the focus of Chapter 15, where we consider eyewitness testimonies, juries and perceptions of the process of law. We finish this section with Chapter 16, which takes a closer look at the social aspects of business: from the hiring process to performance appraisals and leadership qualities.

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CHAPTER

Environmental psychology

Learning Objectives By the end of this chapter, you should be able to: 1 define environmental psychology 2 understand the key role that the environment plays in human behaviour and emotion 3 understand the role of psychology in the development of sustainable behaviours 4 identify the links between human behaviours and the size of the human footprint 5 explain the important role that psychology plays in responding to climate change.

The growth of megacities

502

almost half a billion urban residents live in coastal areas which are susceptible to rising sea levels and storm surges. And it is becoming apparent that now, more than ever, is the time to build cities that work – cities that are inclusive, safe and sustainable (Palma, 2017). With full recognition of this the United Nations (UN) Sustainable Development Goal 11 – Sustainable Cities and Communities – has set a challenge for global leaders to address many of the issues that accompany urban density (UN, 2015). In this chapter we look at the important contributions that environmental psychology is making in response to this challenge and many of the other Sustainable Development Goals.

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Source: iStock.com/Dkart

Hong Kong is one of the most densely populated cities in the world. In 2018, there was an estimated population of 7.45 million people, occupying a land area of roughly 1104 square metres (Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department, 2018). According to the World Bank, over 50% of the world’s population currently live in an urban area. Five million people will live in cities by the year 2030; by 2045 the urban population will increase to an astonishing 6 billion people. Five years after that 68% of people will be urban residents. In excess of 80% of global gross domestic product (GDP) is generated in cities, the same cities which consume roughly 66% of the world’s energy and produce 70% of the global greenhouse gas emissions. However, tragically, roughly 1 billion of those living in cities are found in informal settlements or slums, and

ENVIRONMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY

CHAPTER TWELVE

PUTTING COMMON SENSE TO THE TEST Circle Your Answer T

F

Environmental psychology is solely focused on the natural environment.

T

F

Playing French music in a wine shop leads to an increase in purchases of French wine.

T

F

Open-plan offices have a positive impact on health.

T

F

Being at work can make you sick.

T

F

How beautiful an animal is deemed to be will impact upon whether or not a person wants to save it.

OVER THE YEARS, psychologists have become increasingly interested in the relationships between people and their surroundings. In this chapter we focus on an area which is closely aligned with applied social psychology – environmental psychology. First, we will look at what environmental psychology is and what this exciting area of research offers in terms of understanding our reactions to and interactions with the spaces, places, people and animals we encounter over the course of our lives. We will then take a closer look at the role that environmental psychology may play in response to the UN Sustainable Development Goals (UN, 2015) and the growing concerns about climate change.

WHAT IS ENVIRONMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY? Environmental psychology is often referred to as an interdisciplinary field because it evolved from many perspectives of psychology. It generally maintains a broad focus on the interplay between humans and their surroundings, encompassing a wide range of environments such as natural environments, social settings, homes and communities, built environments, learning environments, informational environments and virtual environments. Environmental psychologists take a direct approach to the study of relationships between people and the spaces and places in which they interact. As an applied discipline it is generally problem-oriented, working from the identification of a problem or a gap in the literature towards the discovery of a solution or the formulation of a theory. Environmental psychology is multidisciplinary, as evidenced by Figure 12.1. Environmental psychologists often work in conjunction with professionals from a diverse range of fields including architecture, landscape architecture, interior design, urban design and planning, urban forestry, geography, ergonomics, human factors, information technology, health and allied health, natural resource management and conservation.

The nature and origins of environmental psychology As a recognised field, environmental psychology is relatively new. Although the relationship between people and their environment has been the subject of discussion, debate and scholarly interest from the time of the early philosophers, it was not until the late 1960s that the field really gained momentum with the publication of two journals devoted to it – the Journal of Environmental Psychology and Environment and Behavior – and the implementation of the Environmental and Design Research Association (EDRA) in the US (Altman, 1975; Stokols, 1978). The empirical roots of the field, however, were established much earlier than this. In fact, some of the earliest research of a similar ilk was conducted prior to and during the 1920s, with observations of the effect of heat and noise on work performance; a study that examined a student’s grades based upon where they sat in a classroom (Weinstein, 1979); and the Hawthorne experiment that examined the effect of light upon work performance (for more on Hawthorne’s experiment see Chapter 16).

Environmental psychology

An interdisciplinary field of study that examines the complex interrelationships between individuals and their physical and virtual settings.

FIGURE 12.1 Areas of interest to environmental psychologists The growing population worldwide, the impact of crowding on mental health and the environmental impact that population growth has upon our natural resources are all areas of interest to environmental psychologists.

Source: Shutterstock.com/Piotr Gatlik.

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The 1940s saw the emergence of two people who are commonly regarded as the fathers of the field: Egon Brunswik (1903–1955) and Kurt Lewin (1890–1947). Brunswik was one of the first to recognise the importance of the environment when he suggested that psychological processes are adapted as a result of interactions with the environment. He also advocated for a more detailed analysis of the way that FALSE the physical environment affects behaviour. In fact, he was the first recorded person to use the term environmental psychology (Brunswik, 1943). Kurt Lewin also played a major part in laying the foundations of environmental psychology. Lewin argued that scientific enquiry should be driven by real-world social problems and emphasised the importance of the environment as a key determinant of behaviour. Lewin’s belief that behaviour is a function of the relationship between the person and the environment formed the Field theory basis of field theory, which is represented by the formula B = f(P,E), or that behaviour (B) is a function (f) of The theory that the person (P) and their environment (E). In Lewin’s opinion, a person and their psychological environment behaviour is a function together comprise a lifespace, so in order to fully understand and predict behaviour, the entire lifespace of the combination in which a person acts must be considered, as it is the totality of events in that space that determines of the person and the behaviour at any given time (Gifford, 2007a). forces in the surrounding environment or field. Although the theories of Brunswik and Lewin were integral in highlighting the importance of the environmental impact upon behaviour, neither of them conducted empirical work that could be classified Lifespace in this domain today (Gifford, 2007a). Their ideas did, however, stimulate some important research. A person and the Perhaps one of the most important, from the perspective of environmental psychology, was the work psychological of two students of Lewin – Roger Barker and Herbert Wright. In 1947, Barker and Wright began a largeenvironment in which they exist. scale longitudinal research project that studied behaviour settings – settings that enable and enclose the behaviours that occur in everyday life. Barker found that in many cases, a person’s behaviour could be predicted more accurately on the basis of the situation in which they were located, rather than relying on aspects of their personality. According to Barker, behaviour settings consist of one or more behaviour episodes that occur within highly visible ecological units or contexts (Barker, 1963). They represent the intersection of people, behaviour episodes and objects that occur in space and time, forming a bounded pattern that is easily differentiated from the patterns that are outside the boundary of the setting. Barker’s work (1968) provided evidence of people behaving in similar ways in similar places where there were Behaviour setting accepted cultural rules, boundaries and artefacts to signal appropriate behaviour and yet the same people A setting that enables behaving differently in different places (Duerk, 1993). It appears that when a person enters a behaviour and encloses the setting there are pressures to behave in a manner consistent with the perceived character of the setting, as behaviours that occur in seen in Figure 12.2. So when you enter a lecture theatre as a student, there is an expectation that you will everyday life. sit and pay attention to the speaker; and when you arrive at a coffee shop where people are queued around a central counter, FIGURE 12.2 Behavioural setting and expected behaviour you perceive that orders are placed there and you must wait your turn to place your order. For every setting we look for the A university lecture theatre is a good example of a behaviour setting – as a student you know that you are expected to sit cues to tell us what is expected of us (we take a closer look at down, get settled and pay attention. environmental cues a little later in the chapter). During the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s there was increasing interest in research that examined the relationships between psychological processes and everyday environments, particularly built environments. During the latter stages of the 1960s the field also gained momentum in the area of environmental problems. Many a research agenda during this time was focused on environmental issues such as pollution (DeGroot, 1967), urban noise (Griffiths & Langdon, 1968) and environmental appraisals (Appleyard & Craik, 1974), to name but a few. From the 1970s to the 1980s the research turned its focus to conservation, with research that included topics such as consumer attitudes and conservation behaviours (Cone & Hayes, 1980). The new millennium heralded a broader focus on issues of resource management and sustainability (Giuliani & Scopellitti, Source: iStock.com/skynesher 2009; Gifford, 2007a). Environmental psychology is solely focused on the natural environment.

504

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ENVIRONMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY

CHAPTER TWELVE

ENVIRONMENTAL INFLUENCES ON HUMAN BEHAVIOUR There can be no doubt that the environments in which we interact not only affect our behaviour, but also affect the way that we feel, think and communicate. In this section we examine interesting research that investigates some of the environmental cues – personal space, privacy, crowding and territoriality – that affect us all on a daily basis.

Environmental cues So how does the environment influence us? It provides us with important environmental cues – elements in the environment that convey information, which triggers affective reactions. Environments are rarely neutral, so there will always be some form of impact on you in terms of the way you feel, the way you think and the way you behave, and you probably will not even be aware of it happening. Environmental cues influence normative behaviours by strengthening or weakening our responses to three overarching goals: to fit in to the society in which we live (normative), to fulfil our needs (hedonic) and to acquire and maintain the ability to fulfil those needs (gain). These goals help to guide our behaviour and, to a large extent, determine what we pay attention to in an environment, how we process the information that we are receiving, what alternatives we are willing to consider, what we like and what we do not, and our expectations of others in the environment (Bargh et al., 2001; Kruglanski & Köpetz, 2009; Steg, van den Berg, & De Groot, 2013). Activation of these goals may be due to internal or external cues – such as feeling tired and craving a coffee or seeing a person eating doughnuts and wanting to do the same. Generally, our behaviour is steered by multiple goals, but the relative strength of one of those goals in comparison to the others will play a major role in determining the strength of the environmental cue. For example, the most important environmental cues are the presence or absence of others, cues that provide information relative to the norms of conformity, objects associated with a particular goal, and visceral cues such as ambience and smells. These cues will strengthen or weaken our normative goals (to act appropriately), our hedonic goals (to feel better right now) and our gain goals (to guard and improve one’s resources). However, because the environment tends to be full of cues that strengthen the latter two, these tend to win. Imagine standing in a bottle shop. French music is playing while you walk around looking at the great choice available. You notice a stand that has some new imported wines – a selection of French and German wines. You decide to buy one of them, but which would it be? If you ask Adrian North and colleagues (1999) they would say that you would buy French. Their research, which examined whether stereotypically French or German music would influence customer selections of wine from each country, found that it did. Over a two-week period, alternating French and German music, there was an increase of French wine purchased on the days the French music played and German wines on the days the German music played. Interestingly, most customers were unable to remember what music was actually playing when they bought the wine, so it seems that the music influenced product selection outside of conscious awareness. Similar research has provided evidence of the influence of scents. Research conducted by Lieve Doucé and colleagues (2013) investigated the effects that the smell of chocolate would have on consumers’ behaviour towards thematically congruent products, such as cookbooks and romantic literature. The researchers conducted field study of 201 participants in a bookshop in Belgium where chocolate scent dispensers were placed throughout the shop, and they found people were three-and-a-half times more likely to pick up and flick through a romance novel, and almost six times more likely to buy it, when the chocolate smell was present. A similar effect was found for cookbooks, but not other genres. The researchers argued that when the smell of chocolate was present, concepts associated with chocolate (e.g., romance and cooking) become more readily accessible. We will take another look at environmental cues a little later in this chapter when we consider their role in the development of sustainable behaviours.

Environmental cues

Personal space

Personal space

Everyone has one. It is invisible, it is silent, and we use it and defend it on a daily basis, regardless of culture and location. What is it? Personal space of course! This is one of the most widely studied areas of environmental psychology. It is a personal and portable territory that you control. Not only do you control who enters that space, but also how close to you or far away from you they can come. No matter whether you are standing, sitting or lying, if there is a person or people around you then you are surrounded by it. However, it is not defined by visible, definitive boundaries; rather, it is a gradual demarcation of comfort

Elements in the environment that convey information that triggers affective reactions.

Normative goal A goal to act appropriately.

Hedonic goal

A goal to feel better right now.

Gain goal

A goal to guard and improve one’s resources.

Playing French music in a wine shop leads to an increase in purchases of French wine.

TRUE

CRITICAL THINKING ACTIVITY How many times have you altered your behaviour based on something such as a visual or ambient cue in the environment? Can you think of cues that you may be susceptible to when you are online?

An interpersonal area surrounding a person’s body, undefined by visible boundaries, and determined by circumstance, distance, angle of orientation and type of interaction.

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Proxemics

The study of the perception, use and communication of personal space.

zones that are communicated to others by various means, including the distance at which you choose to interact and the orientation of that interaction (e.g., side-by-side or face-to-face) (Sommer, 1959, 1969; Gifford, 2007a). Proxemics is the study of personal space and the communication of that space. Proxemics research came to prominence in the 1960s with the research of Edward Hall (1959, 1963, 1969). Hall suggested evidence of four zones – intimate, personal, social and public – which you can see in Figure 12.3. The innermost area of the intimate zone is generally reserved for those who you share an intimate relationship with, whereas the outer region of the intimate zone incorporates people with whom you have a close relationship, such as good friends. The inner area of the personal zone is for people who you share a good but not close relationship with, and it is generally a distance that reflects comfortable conversation. The outer area of this zone is for interactions with non-special friends and acquaintances – those you pass in the street and share a brief conversation with. The social zone is generally assigned to those you do not really know – a distance often reflected in corporate or business transactions. The near phase of the public zone is what you would see when you attend small classes; this is the typical distance from which a lecturer would address an audience of between 30 and 40 people. The farther area of this zone represents the distance you have between yourself and your lecturer in rooms that seat larger numbers. According to Hall, a person can tell a lot about the nature of a relationship by observing the interpersonal distance people use to interact. FIGURE 12.3 Personal space zones According to Edward Hall, we maintain a certain distance between others and us, based upon the relationship we share with them. He divided personal space into four zones: intimate, personal, social and public.

Intimate Social

Public

Personal

0 to 15 cm (15 to 45 cm)

45 to 75 cm (75 to 1.2 m)

1.2 to 2 m (2 to 3.5 m)

3.5 to 7 m (>7 m)

Source: Hall, E. T. (1959). The silent language. New York, NY: Doubleday; Hall, E. T. (1963). A system for the notation of proxemic behavior. American Anthropologist, 65, 1003–1026; Hall, E. T. (1969). The hidden dimension. New York, NY: Doubleday.

But what is the purpose of this personal space zone? Aside from Hall’s assertion that we use this zone as a communication channel to control the type of interactions we have with others, and to let others know the type of relationship we have with the people we interact with, research suggests that we want to maintain optimum levels of personal space so we are not overwhelmed by too much information from social and physical stimuli, including sights, sounds, smell and touch – sensations that are part of everyday experience and human interactions (Scott, 1993). Research has also suggested that we maintain personal space so that we can avoid the stress that comes from people encroaching on areas in close proximity to us (Altman, 1975, 1979; Altman & Vinsel, 1977). Another point of view suggests that when our space is encroached or intruded upon we become aroused, which consequently dictates the space we feel we need when interacting with others (Patterson, 1977). Lastly, the behaviour constraint approach suggests that we need space around us 506

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so we feel that we have behavioural freedom – when a person gets too close our behaviour is constrained by their proximity and we react by adjusting the space available or removing ourselves from the situation (Brehm, 1966; Brehm & Brehm, 1981). There are other opinions on the function of personal space though. For example, Irwin Altman (1975) proposed that we use personal space as a boundary control mechanism to achieve a desired level of privacy, whereas Argyle and Dean (1965) thought it was more about eye contact. In their opinion, mutual gaze (a form of non-verbal communication that promotes intimacy) and personal space are inversely related. If eye contact is deemed inappropriate to the relationship, the situation will be addressed by either moving further away to lessen eye contact or moving closer together to increase eye contact. Some interesting research on this topic was conducted by Jeremy Bailenson and colleagues in 2001. In an experiment designed to test Argyle and Dean’s theory, participants were immersed in a three-dimensional virtual room in which a virtual human stood. They were asked to walk towards, and around, the virtual human and the distance between them was tracked. The results showed that all participants allowed more space around the virtual human than they did around objects of a similar shape and size. They also noted gender differences – females were more likely to maintain greater interpersonal distance between themselves and the virtual humans who engaged them in eye contact as opposed to those who did not, but the same effect was not found for males. Is it possible that these zones of personal space may have a biological basis? This is a question that was answered with some clever research conducted by neuroscientist Ralph Adolphs and colleagues (Kennedy et al., 2009). They observed the reactions of personal space intrusions of a 42-year-old woman who had suffered damage to the amygdala (which plays a key role in the processing of emotion including fear, anxiety and aggression) on both sides of her brain. Having asked her to indicate where she felt comfortable with the distance between herself and the experimenter, they tested personal space intrusions in 32 separate trials. She reported that she felt comfortable at any distance, including nose-to-nose – as indicated when tested secretly by a male research assistant who engaged her in conversation while standing far closer to her than would be considered socially acceptable. Interestingly, she was also unable to judge the distance that she thought would be uncomfortably close for others. These results indicated that the lack of an amygdala could be involved in personal space delineations. In order to test this, the researchers used an fMRI brain scanner to compare their own reactions to space intrusions. The results of these scans indicated spikes of activity in the amygdala whenever there was a perceived violation of their personal space. So, what does this all mean in relation to our personal space preferences? According to these researchers, it appears that the amygdala triggers the strong emotional reactions we have to personal space intrusions, which in turn regulate our preference for interpersonal distances. It seems that the amygdala enables us to judge not only the amount of personal space that is right for us, but also the distance that seems appropriate for other people. Research of a similar nature conducted by a research team headed by Miiamaaria Kujala (2012) asked participants to view images of people either facing towards or away from each other. The amygdala was most highly activated when the people in the pictures faced each other. Thus, the amygdala appears to be important not only in regulating interpersonal distances but also in the assessment of the proximity in interactions between others.

Cultural differences in personal space When was the last time you travelled overseas to a country you had never visited before? During your preparations for the trip did you read a travel guide such as those published by Lonely Planet? If you did, it is highly likely that you would have seen a section on cultural etiquette that included information on personal space. A quick look at the Lonely Planet Latin American Spanish Phrasebook tells us that personal space zones are closer in Latin American than they are in Anglo-Saxon countries. People in Latin America stand closer when talking to each other, and casual touching during conversation is considered normal. In Korea, standing at arm’s length from another person is the standard, but if you are strangers the distance should probably be increased (though when it comes to public transport and public areas, invasions of personal space are more a matter of when than if). Cross-cultural research in the area of personal space and proxemics dates back to Hall’s early research (1963, 1969), which considered differences between what he referred to as contact and non-contact cultures. Hall’s findings suggested that North Americans and people from Northern Europe and Asia (non-contact cultures) generally stand further apart during social interactions than people from South American, Southern and Eastern Europe and Arabic countries (contact cultures). These findings were supported by research conducted by John Aiello (1987) and Martin Remland, Tricia Jones and Heidi Brinkman (1995).

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But research on cultural differences has not always sung from the same song sheet. In a twist to research that had largely focused on front and rear intrusions to personal space zones, Allan Mazur (1977) compared populations from Spain, the US and Morocco in an experiment that examined preferences for side-on proxemic distances between male strangers. Mazur took photos of strangers sitting on benches in public areas and measured the distances between the heads and torsos of the people sitting on the benches. He found that people would not sit on the same bench as someone else unless there was no other option, at which point they sat at opposite ends of a bench, creating as much space between them as possible. Interestingly, though, the distance between people who were forced to sit on the same bench did not differ significantly across the three countries. These results indicated little difference across cultures. Using a similar technique, Lara Parker and Tara Leo (2011) tested preferences of proxemic distances in an Australian population. Rather than focusing on cultural differences, however, they chose to examine differences between males and females. Their observations, which were conducted at a public bus stop, suggested that participants of both genders chose to sit close to or at the extreme ends of the bench when someone else was sharing the space. Other research on gender differences tends to lean towards female pairs maintaining closer distances than males, which could be explained by the female predisposition to be more affiliative than males (Aiello, 1987; Gifford, 2007b). Research has also suggested within-group differences; for example, research conducted by Fatemeh Gharaei, Mojtaba Rafieian and Nehzat Jalalkamali (2012) found that Kurdish women and women from Northern Iran both prefer less interpersonal space while standing and walking compared with sitting on a park bench. However, the comparison between the dimensions of interpersonal space of these women show that Kurdish women require more interpersonal space while walking and sitting than Northern Iranian women. Aydin Ozdemir (2008) examined cultural differences in the interpersonal distances commonly used by shopping mall patrons. Using unobtrusive observations and time-lapse digital photography, he recorded over 3000 naturally occurring interactions between mall users in Turkey and the US. His results indicated that pairs in Turkish malls interact more closely than those in US malls, in both open and closed areas; that adolescents interacting with other adolescents have the largest interpersonal distance; and that male–female pairs interact more closely than male–male and female–female pairs in all malls. He also noted that most of the interactions happened at a distance that would be regarded by Hall as a personal space (45–120 centimetres), which is generally reserved for social interactions between friends and acquaintances in public spaces. Research conducted by Gary Evans, Stephen Lepore and Karen Allen (2000) found that Latin Americans and Asians have a smaller personal space zone than North Americans and Northern Europeans. They also found that within the US, Mexican Americans and Vietnamese Americans had different personal space requirements when compared with white Americans and African Americans; and that these differences were indicative of differences between contact and non-contact cultures and collectivist and non-collectivist cultures. Similarly, work conducted by Beaulieu (2004) demonstrated that people from non-contact cultures make use of larger personal space zones than those from contact cultures.

Crowded spaces and preserving personal space No doubt you would have no problem coming up with a list of places that irritate you when it comes to people invading your personal space – generally lifts, airport departure lounges, and aeroplanes and other forms of public transport would all gain a mention. With crowded spaces comes the likelihood that one or many intrusions to your personal space will occur, so how do we cope with that? A study conducted by Jared Thomas in New Zealand (2009) highlighted the fact that being squashed up against strangers on public transport is one of the most uncomfortable everyday activities we have to endure. In an observational study of 1703 New Zealand commuters, Thomas found that about a quarter of passengers defended their space by sitting on an aisle, placing a bag or coat on the next seat or spreading out to take up more space. Roughly the same percentage of participants withdrew into an activity such as reading or listening to music. These attempts to preserve their personal space worked, with 78% of commuters choosing not to sit next to ‘defensive’ passengers. This technique was not favoured by all, however, and it annoyed regular commuters the most – these people regarded defensive behaviour as rude. Thomas’s findings also suggested that time spent on public transport could be made more bearable if we socialised a little more. Passengers who regularly socialised on public transport were less worried about personal space and safety. Unfortunately, only 15% of the people he observed engaged in conversations with commuters they did not know. Popular topics of conversation were the weather, sporting events and the shortcomings of public transport; and those most likely to talk were schoolchildren, tourists and older passengers. 508

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Similarly, Lily Hirsch and Kirrilly Thompson (2011) conducted research to see how Australian commuters preserve their personal space on crowded public transport. Her results suggest that people tend to avoid eye contact, play with their mobile phones, increase the volume on their mobile devices, pretend to be sick or mark their space by placing their bags on the seat beside them. This repertoire of behaviours was regularly engaged in efforts to deter a stranger who was looking for a seat or standing too close to them. Some young males even doused themselves in strongly scented deodorant in an attempt to make sure no one got too close!

CRITICAL THINKING ACTIVITY Can you think of a time where your personal space has been invaded? How did it make you feel and how did you react? How do you generally protect your personal space?

Talk to your friends and family about their space zones and how they protect them. Do their strategies vary?

Crowding With the world population breaking through the 7 billion mark in 2012, and being projected to reach 8 billion by 2020, it is no wonder this topic has gained momentum over the past few decades. As we mentioned in our opening vignette the majority of the world’s population now lives in cities and the proportion is growing. Over the next 30 years, it is expected that the majority of this growth will be in developing countries. The continuing growth of urban areas and the overcrowding and pollution that accompanies that growth has been identified by the UN as a significant problem. Our world is becoming increasingly crowded and we are all feeling the effects – and one of the ways it manifests is as stress. As you will see in Chapter 14, the frustration that accompanies the morning and afternoon traffic jams and parking woes are linked up to population increases and the influx of city dwellers – as is the increased demand for housing and the squeeze of available space, crowded working environments, overcrowded prisons, camping areas and van parks that are full to the brim (particularly during school holidays), and overcrowded remote wilderness areas that are no longer remote given that all-terrain vehicles can ferry passengers in ever-increasing numbers. Crowding is a personally defined, subjective experience of too many people in a given space. It may correspond to perceptions of density, which is an objective measure of the ratio of people per unit area (e.g., people per square metre), but not always. It is possible to feel crowded with only one other person in a large space, and equally plausible to not feel crowded when surrounded by people at a rock concert. Crowding is a function of a number of personal, cultural, situational, emotional (usually negative, but positive emotions can occur) and behavioural variables (Gifford, 2007b; Montano & Adamopoulos, 1984; Stokols, 1972). It is a feeling that is based upon a situational antecedent; for example, behaviour may be constrained, there may be physical interference, the mere presence of others may cause discomfort, or personal expectations may not be met. It also implies emotion or affect, which, although it can be positive, is generally negative (i.e., reactions to others and to the situation); and it produces a behavioural response of some sort, ranging from overt displays of aggression to subtle responses such as leaving the immediate environment, withdrawing social contact or avoiding eye contact (Gifford, 2007b; Montano & Adamopoulos, 1984). In general terms, though, the feeling of being crowded is a stressor that has psychological, physiological and social consequences for all of us. Given the rather intrusive effect that the concept of crowding has upon our lives, how much do we really know about it in terms of its effects and how we deal with them? Luckily there is a substantial body of research detailing the effects of crowding – much of which focuses on urban environments. With growing concerns about the quality of life in our ever-expanding cities, the research focus on crowding in urban environments is not only well founded but also timely. Research in this area has investigated many physical settings, including university dormitories, prisons, high-rise apartment blocks and housing developments, to name just a few; and the repertoire of environments continues to grow.

Crowding

A personally defined subjective experience of too many people in a given space.

Density

A measure of the amount of people per unit area.

Crowded housing and homelessness With the world experiencing unprecedented population growth, we are witnessing a global trend of overcrowded and inadequate housing. According to research conducted by demographer Joseph Chamie (2107), there are roughly 150 million people who are homeless, which amounts to about 2% of the world’s population; and there are about 1.6 billion, which is in excess of 20%, who are lacking adequate housing. New Zealand is at the top of list with 1% of the population who are reportedly homeless. In the US, onethird of the population is living in overcrowded, poor-quality housing, and the figures for Australia are equally daunting. Copyright 2020 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-202

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Although Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples made up 3% of the Australian population in 2016; they accounted for 20% (23 437 people, a reduction from 26% in 2011) of all people who were homeless on Census night in 2016. Seventy per cent were living in ‘severely’ crowded dwellings, 12% were living in supported accommodation and 9% were living in improvised dwellings, tents or were sleeping out. In comparison 42% of non-Indigenous homeless people were living in ‘severely’ crowded dwellings, 15% in supported accommodation, and 6% in improvised dwellings, tents or sleeping out (ABS, 2018). There is no doubt that social housing stock is not keeping pace with demand in Australia, but when we take a closer look at the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander population we find a particularly grim outlook – according to the 2016 census data there are substantially lower rates of home ownership in Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander populations when compared to other households (38% versus 66% of non-Indigenous homeowners) with the majority in remote areas living in social housing (57%). Although there has been a slight improvement in home ownership over time, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander households were still considered to be overcrowded – more than double the rate of non-Indigenous populations (3.5%), with many households requiring at least one more bedroom to be considered adequate to accommodate those that live there. The rate is the highest, at 23%, in social housing, and up to 39% in very remote areas. In the major cities – the rate was far worse with some 17 200 households feeling the pressure (AIHW, 2017).

CULTURAL DIVERSITY GLOBAL HOUSING CRISIS The UN regards adequate housing as the right of every woman, man, youth and child to enable and sustain a safe and secure home and community in which to live in peace and dignity (UN Human Rights Council, 2009). Despite this recognition, millions of people around the world live in squalid conditions on the street, in overcrowded slums, in informal settlements, in refugee camps and in substandard housing developments; and many are forcibly evicted or threatened with evictions from their homes every year because they simply cannot cope financially. According to the UN, in some cities up to 80% of the population live in slums and the figure is growing rapidly. Since 2000 there have been 55 million new slum dwellers added to the global population – in Asian cities there are daily

increases of about 120 000 people. Currently sub-Saharan Africa is the largest affected region, with a slum population of 199.5 million, followed by South Asia with an estimated 190.7 million, East Asia with 189.6 million, Latin America and the Caribbean with 110.7 million, Southeast Asia with 88.9 million, West Asia with 35 million and North Africa with 11.8 million. Can these nations cope with the ever-increasing numbers? Consider the size of the issue for a brief moment – to accommodate the growth, Asian cities would need to build at least 20 000 new dwellings with supporting infrastructure for the 120 000 people that are added to their population each day; Latin America and the Caribbean would need 42 million and 52 million dwellings, respectively; and Africa would need around 4 million units per year!

Quite clearly there are many people throughout the world who live in situations that are overcrowded. The psychological distress that comes from people trying to cope with the daily stress of living in areas of high residential crowding has been confirmed throughout the literature. For instance, there is evidence of a range of mental health issues in refugees in overcrowded conditions (Akinyemi, Owoaje & Ige, 2016; Al-Madi et al., 2003; Fazel et al., 2015). Further, research conducted by Kenneth FIGURE 12.4 Nano Flats Miller (2002) found a loss of identity and autonomy were related Nano Flats in Hong Kong are smaller than a car park space. to overcrowding, particularly when people were forced to live with extended family. Conversely, recent research conducted by Whitsett and Sherman (2017) demonstrated the positive impact of stable, uncrowded housing and the related improvements in mental health outcomes such as depression, anxiety and trauma symptoms among the sample of refugees undergoing treatment for mental health issues.

Nano flats

Source: South China Morning Post/Nora Tam

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If you suffer from claustrophobia, best you look away now. As one of the most densely populated cities in the world, Hong Kong is dealing with its housing issues in a novel way – nano flats (also referred to as gnat flats). Nano flats are roughly 11.9 square metres in size and rent for an average of $660 AUD per month. As you can see from Figure 12.4, they are on the smaller side of tiny,

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particularly when you consider that some of them come with a car park space which is actually larger than the living quarters (about 12.4 square metres). Nano flats, account for 1.4% of new homes now built in Hong Kong (Li, 2017).

Territoriality Another environmental influence on human behaviour is territoriality, which refers to a pattern of behaviour and attitudes that are held by an individual or group based on perceived, attempted or actual control of a definable space, object or idea by means of habitual occupation, defence, personalisation and demarcation. Displays of territoriality communicate individual and group ownership, and encroachment on these spaces may result in social conflict to repel undesired boundary crossings. You may have seen this behaviour before. Take, for example, an airline departure lounge during the busy pre-flight period when space is at a premium. You find a spare seat and need to grab a coffee so you mark your space by leaving your bags, coats and other belongings, which suggest that someone belongs to that space. We tend to mark out the boundaries of our personal territory to send a clear message to discourage others from entering that space. Research conducted by Irwin Altman in 1975 suggested three types of territory an individual or group may claim: • Primary territories – spaces that are owned or controlled on a relatively permanent basis. These spaces are central to our daily lives, such as our home and bedroom. • Secondary territories – spaces that are used regularly but their control is less important, and they are often shared by others. Areas such as a desk at work, a table at your favourite restaurant and your favourite seat in the lecture theatre would all be regarded as secondary territories. • Tertiary territories – also referred to as public territories; these are spaces that are open to anyone, such as beaches, footpaths, trains and buses. But it should be noted that some tertiary territories do have rules for entrance; for example, adult entertainment venues are restricted to those over the age of 18 and admission is strictly monitored by security staff. But have you ever wondered why you feel territorial? Research suggests that feelings of territoriality arise largely as a result of attitudes and behaviours related to the control and perceived or actual ownership of something. It generally involves a physical space, possessions, defence of something, exclusivity of use, markers, personalisation or a sense of identity (Edney, 1974). Those of you that watch The Big Bang Theory will be familiar with all of these aspects, as they are brilliantly portrayed by the character Sheldon Cooper and his ‘spot’. The spot (and the chair that houses it) is located in a physical space; no one is left in any doubt that it belongs to Sheldon; in his mind it is exclusive; he defends it quite obsessively; and in many ways the spot defines him. Objects and ideas are also closely guarded, personalised, defended and controlled, so could these also technically be regarded as territories? It appears so. Australian researcher Graham Fraine and colleagues (2007) conducted a series of 13 focus groups with a cross-section of 89 participants, ranging from young, novice drivers to those who were more experienced and had driven vehicles for a living. Drawing on Altman’s typology of territories, their findings indicated that cars were regarded as a form of primary territory, similar to the way people regard their homes. Participants referred to their car as a safe haven (‘Sometimes if I’m not going for a drive, I’ll just go and sit in it and put on the radio’) and as a repository of memories (‘I don’t want to get rid of it because of the sentimental value’), both of which are regarded as signs of primary territory. Many participants talked about the way they personalised their cars in terms of self-expression and communication, and said that they regarded the aggressive driving displays of other drivers, such as tailgating or cutting in, as an invasion of space. Overall, the findings suggested that most of the participants (even those who used their cars primarily for work) regarded their car as either a primary or secondary territory, although the behaviours associated with the distinction between the two varied within and across groups. To date, much of the research on territoriality has focused on relationships with the home (Harris & Brown, 1996; Omata, 1995) and public places such as shopping centres and video game arcades (Ruback & Snow, 1993; Werner, Brown, & Damron, 1981). But the work environment has also been of interest for many researchers (Konar, Sundstrom, Brady, Mandel, & Rice, 1982; Wollman, Kelly, & Bordens, 1994). For example, Graham Brown, Craig Crossley and Sandra Robinson (2013) examined the role of trust in the work environment in the relationship between psychological ownership, territoriality and being perceived as a team contributor. They asked a sample of working adults to report on their psychological ownership and territorial behaviour towards an important object at work. They then asked a co-worker to provide

Territoriality

A pattern of behaviour and attitudes that is held by an individual or group based on perceived, attempted or actual control of a definable space, object or idea by means of habitual occupation, defence, personalisation and demarcation.

Primary territory

A space that is owned or controlled on a relatively permanent basis.

Secondary territory

A space that is used regularly but where control is less important; often an area that is shared by others.

Tertiary territory

A public area that is open to anyone.

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evaluations on the level of trust in the work environment and rate that person’s contributions to the team. Their findings suggested that a high-trust environment reduces the territorial behaviour associated with psychological ownership, but when territorial behaviour does occur, co-workers rate the territorial employee’s contributions to the team as significantly lower.

CRITICAL THINKING ACTIVITY List some examples of primary, secondary and tertiary territories in your life. How do you feel when someone intrudes on each of these territories and how do you generally react?

What impact do you think long-term intrusion on these spaces would have upon you?

Continuing with the workplace theme, research conducted by Max Nathan and Judith Doyle (2002) found that three-quarters of office workers admitted to marking company stationery and other items with their own names, and roughly half said they always used the same mug and admitted to having a favourite toilet cubicle, which they would wait to use if necessary! When questioned over the effects that dropping these habits would have, half of those sampled said it would cause depression and reductions in their productivity.

Place attachment Place

The intersection of people and their physical, virtual or imaginary setting.

Place attachment

The affective bonds that we form with place.

Place, which represents the intersection of people and their physical setting, is considered a core element in environmental psychology. So, it should come as no surprise to hear that the research surrounding people–place relationships is continually expanding. As you will see in the sections that follow, research has examined our relationships with many environments and the results suggest a great deal of individual variation in those relationships, and in the places as entities in their own right. One of the areas that has received considerable attention over the past four decades is that of place attachment – the affective bonds that we form with place. People experience place in a variety of ways, attaching affective evaluations to specific locations and settings that have acquired some form of meaning as a result of accumulated interactions between an individual, the setting and the participants within that setting. These evaluations are very much ‘place centred’, and although the experience of place is considered to be personally unique among individuals, place attachment is a process that we observe at many levels, including groups, communities, towns, cities and countries (Bell, Greene, Fisher, & Baum, 2001; Gifford, 2007a; Lewicka, 2011).

Defining place attachment When we talk of attachment in relation to place, what is it that we are actually referring to? Definitions of attachment in relation to place have been fiercely contested since this area of research began, but most seem to agree that it is a multidimensional concept. For example, a great deal of the research in this area has suggested that attachments to place reflect a process of individuation (differentiation of the self in relation to others), integration (maintenance of a sense of self) and temporal orientation (stabilising a sense of the self) (Belk, 1988; Csikszentmihalyi & Rochberg-Halton, 1981; Myers, 1985; Schultz, Kleine, & Kernan, 1989; Wallendorf & Arnould, 1988). Others, however, have suggested that underlying attachments to place are the two dimensions of place identity and place dependence (Proshansky, Fabian, & Kaminoff, 1983; Williams, Anderson, & McDonald, 1995; Williams & Roggenbuck, 1989). According to Proshansky and colleagues (1983), place identity refers to a part of an individual’s personal identity that is defined in relation to the physical environment and the social and cultural experiences that are intricately tied to place. Place dependence, on the other hand, is determined by the ability of a place to fulfil our needs in comparison to similar alternative environments (Jorgensen & Stedman, 2001). Although these dimensions are no doubt important in the formation and development of our relationships with place, they may be a little limited in explaining the scope of this phenomenon. One of the best, and most comprehensive, ways of thinking about place attachment was suggested by Leila Scannell and Robert Gifford (2010). They proposed a tripartite framework that recognises the dimensions of person, place and process – or to put it simply, who is attached, what they are attached to, and how they form and express these attachments (see Figure 12.5).

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FIGURE 12.5 Tripartite organising framework Scannell and Gifford proposed a three-dimensional framework that suggests that place attachment is a multidimensional concept with person, place and process dimensions.

Religious Historical

Place attachment

Cultural/ group

Affect

Person

Process

Experience Realisations Individual Milestones

Social Social arena Social symbol

Cognition

Behaviour

Place

Happiness Pride Love Memory Knowledge Schemas Meaning

Proximity-maintaining Reconstruction of place

Physical Natural Built

Source: Scannell, L., & Gifford, R. (2010). Defining place attachment: A tripartite organizing framework. Journal of Environmental Psychology, 30(1), 1–10.

Person dimension The person dimension embraces the person and their individual and collectively based meanings; incorporating personal, cultural and religious experiences and beliefs. This dimension includes things such as memories of places with which you have interacted, and those places that have significance as part of your cultural heritage or religious affiliation (e.g., sacred places). Individual differences in the way that we feel about the places where we spend time have been well documented throughout the literature, and generally revolve around issues such as time, mobility, personality and gender. The time that we spend in a place has an effect on the ties that are formed and it is generally accepted that the strength of the ties increase over time (Brown, Perkins, & Brown, 2003; Lewicka, 2011). Hay (1992) has suggested that people who develop strong emotional bonds with place show a good deal of territoriality and local knowledge, which strengthens over time, whereas those who exhibit weak emotional bonds, or those that develop none at all, tend to show evidence of increased levels of mobility. Those that have a rational and perhaps detached relationship with place tend to be those who have lived in an area for a short period of time and who are still uncertain of how long they will remain there. But what happens when a person is unable to attach to a place in which they live and work? Will they cut their losses and move? Or stick it out in the hope that they will eventually become bonded to that place? These are questions of great concern to the health sector in Australia. Rural and remote areas of Australia provide many challenges for health professionals, as you will see in Chapter 13. The harsh climate that is generally associated with working in a remote area, along with the isolation, inadequate infrastructure, poor transport and communication, are issues faced by people who work in rural and remote parts of the country. An interview-based study conducted by Kathrin Auer and Dean Carson (2010) in Australia sought to investigate the high turnover rates of general practitioners (GPs) in remote parts of Australia. The study was specifically aimed at the process of forming place attachments between GPs and their practice location, and the impact of those attachments upon retention. It examined the methods that people use to either adapt or adjust to their environment and the strategies they use to cope with the move to a rural and remote location. The research was conducted in the Northern Territory, which has the country’s highest rates of population turnover among GPs. In the five-year period from 2001, the number of GPs who moved in and out of the Territory was equivalent to 60% of the total workforce – more than double the rates of any other jurisdiction and 50% higher than rates in other rural and remote parts of the country. They found a number of specific conditions that contribute to the abnormally high turnover rates, including the isolated nature of many communities. Although all the GPs interviewed were actively seeking to attach, many indicated that the quality of their work and difficulties with regards to travelling in and out of their current location would

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only support stays of a temporary nature (one to two years could be tolerated). Concerns were also raised for continuing education and career development in the case of a lengthier duration. On a personal and social level, isolation from relatives and friends was a critical factor; and although they adapted by forming support networks with colleagues, the isolation was a defining factor in the period that they would remain in the locale. The formation of support networks for those working in remote or Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities was particularly difficult. But it seems the major factor in determining attachment was the physical environment – largely due to its intimate connection to lifestyle. The laid-back nature of the rural and remote practice, along with the connections to nature inherent in these areas, were seen as positives. So, the findings of this research indicated evidence of a mutually reinforcing dynamic between systemic expectations of the temporariness of the stay, and a process of adjustment rather than adaptation to the new environment. The seeking of place attachment appears to be a fairly natural part of the relocation process, even for stays of a short duration. There is a transition period that moves from a focus on purely work-related matters in the first few months to a broader concern for the place of practice as time goes on. Of course, the bonds that are formed with place that are historically bound by culture are remarkably strong, as can be seen in Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander groups. Although there appears to have been little research conducted to investigate Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander attachments to place, one piece of research conducted by Kelly Greenop (2009) examined the concept in relation to an urban Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander community in Inala, located in Brisbane, Queensland. The study specifically focused on the development of place meaning, attachment and identity, and the activities that have resulted in Inala becoming a significant Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander place over a period of 60 years. Her findings indicated that links to traditional country and to places outside Inala have been maintained – so some aspects of traditional culture are evident – but there is also evidence of some community sectors having self-consciously constructed or reconstructed aspects of culture, which they regard as ‘traditional’. Inala itself has become a significant place for many in its position as a home and as a place of memories and traditions that have been accumulated over the decades of modern inhabitation. She found no evidence of a stereotypical relationship to place; rather, there was a dynamic and personal set of associations linking places and communities. People both maintained traditional links elsewhere and managed to establish places of significance within Inala, creating a cultural landscape that reflected a desire to be rooted in place, in a similar manner to traditional relationships to land and country. Qualitative research conducted by Jonathan Kingsley and colleagues (2009) revealed common themes revolving around the significant spiritual and cultural relationships with the land and the resulting linkage to wellbeing. The role of country was also intricately tied to self-esteem, self-worth and pride, fostering selfidentity and belonging, all of which enabled positive states of wellbeing. The importance of relationships with country is also evident in the cultural domains of social and emotional wellbeing, as shown in Figure 12.6. According to Graham Gee and colleagues (2014) the diagram shows how individuals, families and communities are shaped by connections to body, mind and emotions, family and kinship, community, culture, land and spirituality. The nature of these connections varies across the lifespan. Disruption across these domains leads to poorer social and emotional wellbeing; however, restoration or strengthening of connections leads to improvements. Additionally, in New Zealand, research conducted by Lani Teddy and colleagues (2008) shed light on the relationship that Māori people have with place. Their research explored the way that Māori talk about their connections to traditional lands to see how this fits with our notions of place attachment. All participants reported that a connection to place was important, and most also mentioned feelings of belonging, connection and participation and suggested that attachment to place encompasses all social relationships, past and present. Previous research conducted by Bernado Hernández and colleagues (2007) similarly suggests that Māori people in New Zealand have developed a stronger sense of attachment to place than non-Māori, as their connection is historically connected to their tribal and cultural groups.

Process dimension The next dimension in the framework suggested by Scannell and Gifford (2010) is the process dimension; which is how people attach psychologically to place and how they express those attachments. This dimension incorporates affect, cognition and behaviour. The affect component details our emotional reactions to place. These are generally positive, but in some cases there may be an element of negativity or even ambivalence. The cognitive dimension consists of the knowledge, memories and beliefs that we have about the places we spend time in. We form mental representations of places in our mind that incorporate 514

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FIGURE 12.6 Social and emotional wellbeing from an Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander perspective

EX PE Connection to spirit, spirituality and ancestors

Connection to body

Connection to country Self*

Connection to mind and emotions

S CE EN ERI EXP

Connection to family and kinship

Connection to culture Connection to community

SS IO NS

NS SIO ES

S CE EN RI

EX PR

The importance of place is demonstrated by its inclusion in the domains of wellbeing that typically characterise Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples’ definitions of social and emotional wellbeing.

E PR EX

*This conception of self is grounded within a collectivist perspective that views the self as inseparable from, and embedded within, family and community. Source: Gee, G., Dudgeon, P., Schultz, C., Hart, A., & Kelly, K. (2014) Adapted from National Strategic Framework for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples’ Mental Health and Social and Emotional Wellbeing 2017–2023. Canberra, ACT: Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet.

structural and symbolic aspects of place, and our memories of time spent in places connect us to the people that we have interacted with and the events that have taken place there. Given the very strong emotional reactions that people have to place, research has maintained a heavy focus on this area. The emotional reactions that people have to involuntary relocations (Fried, 1963; Manzo, Kleit, & Couch, 2008) and political resettlements (Boğaç, 2009; Possick, 2004) have been studied, along with the phase of readjustment that follows resettlement (Fried, 2000). As you will see in Chapter 13, the effects of displacement have become a major source of interest globally as millions of people flee their homelands as a result of war, genocide, torture and persecution. Some interesting research conducted in Australia documented the problems that refugees face in relation to settlement in a new country. Kiros Hiruy (2009) conducted a series of focus group interviews with 26 refugees from the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethopia, Sierra Leone and Sudan who had been resettled in Hobart. This research noted that forced displacement is a key phenomenon in the life of a refugee, with some displaced a number of times before they are eventually resettled. This means that they will interact with and live in a number of places before they gain the ability to settle with any form of permanence; and during this time refugees experience a strong need to maintain their cultural roots, signifying not only the emotional bonds they form with the physical environment but also notions of local community and shared culture (Gustafson, 2001). They are essentially betwixt and between – living in a liminal stage of being psychologically removed from their home yet often connected to it as a result of the control that is exerted over them in refugee camps, and the harsh conditions in which they are expected to live. They long for the home they once had, while also longing for a home of the future. Thus, there are positive and negative emotional attachments that become apparent. Many of the participants in Hiruy’s study expressed both negative and positive emotional attachments to places in countries of asylum, as represented by the emotions of a woman from the Congo who lost her son during the war – she suggested that although she does not want to go back to her country because of the people who killed her son, she would love to see her relatives who still live there. Copyright 2020 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-202

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So how do refugees settle in new environments? Unfortunately, many find themselves in protracted, long-term exile in refugee camps, and attaching to a space is notoriously difficult, if not impossible, where they have no control, little privacy and little opportunity to alter their environment. From her field work in a Palestinian refugee camp on the West Bank, Dorota Woroniecka-Krzyzanowska (2013) found that the relationship between identity and place becomes increasingly complex in situations of protracted exile, as refugees become torn between feelings of belonging to their place of origin and their growing need to attach to the refugee camp in which they are located.

Place dimension The third and final dimension of Scannell and Gifford’s framework (2010) relates to the place itself – the physical components and the social aspects. Research on the physical dimensions of place attachment abound throughout the literature, with evidence of attachments to a variety of places such as homes, neighbourhoods and cities (Bonaiuto, Fornara, & Bonnes, 2006; Fried, 1982; Gustafson, 2009; Hidalgo & Hernandez, 2001; Lewicka, 2010), as well as countries (Gustafson, 2009, Laczko, 2005; Lewicka, 2005), sacred sites (Mazumdar & Mazumdar, 1993), working places (Milligan, 1998), and virtual or imagined places (Droseltis & Vignoles, 2010). Some interesting research conducted in Australia by Joanna Tonge and colleagues (2010) confirms the importance of connections between physical elements of a place and the social components in the development of place attachment. The research, which was conducted at the Ningaloo Marine Park in north-western Australia, found that of the people who had previously visited the park, 44% stayed at the same location on following visits, which suggested evidence of strong place attachment. Visitors were asked to supply some of the photos they had taken in the park, which were used as the basis for a subsequent interview to explore their attachments to place. The results of this process suggested that place attachment at the marine park comprised similar elements to research conducted in land-based natural areas. When talking about the physical environment, people said that they enjoyed the coastal vistas because of the sheer beauty of the area, and the feelings of remoteness and isolation they promoted. Activities were also important, with people suggesting that marine expeditions, such as snorkelling, diving and fishing, all formed part of the attraction to the area. Social ties were evidenced by the bonds that were developed between visitors largely as a result of the activities they took part in (e.g., boating). The emotional connections that resulted from families being able to visit a location that provided for individual preferences in activities, and where everybody was happy, were strongly threaded throughout the research. Interestingly, these attachments to place also led to place-protective behaviours, such as picking up rubbish and educating others when they were perceived to be doing the ‘wrong’ thing. Thus, place attachment has important connotations for conservation. The similarities between place attachment and interpersonal attachment have been of interest to those researching in this area for quite some time. One of the authors of this text conducted research (McBain, 2010) designed to examine the concept of place attachment to see whether or not the bonds that we form with place could in fact be termed attachment relationships, from the perspective of Bowlby (1969) and Ainsworth and colleagues’ (1978) attachment theory. Attachment theory suggests a number of factors that are considered crucial in the development of an attachment bond: • actively seeking to be in close proximity to the attachment figure • use of an attachment figure as a safe haven in times of distress • use of the attachment figure as a secure base from which to explore • strength of emotional ties to an attachment figure • mourning the loss of an attachment figure when they are no longer present. In testing for the appearance of these aspects in our interactions with place, participants were asked to identify five environments to which they felt emotionally connected, and rate each of them according to how much they used these environments to fulfil the attachment functions. McBain’s results indicated that all participants had at least one environment to which an attachment bond had been formed. The types of environments listed clustered into five distinct categories: current homes, previous homes, the parental home, the home of a relative, the home of a friend, leisure environments and holiday destinations. Not surprisingly, the majority were deemed to have formed an attachment bond with the current home. If you would like to learn more about place attachment, seek out the two comprehensive reviews of research provided by Robert Gifford (2014) and Marta Lewicka (2011).

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Environments of interest Environmental psychologist are interested in all environments, so the range of research is as vast as it is diverse. Natural and wilderness environments, social settings, built environments, learning environments, residential settings, workplaces and virtual spaces are all of interest, and in this section we will take a closer at the great outdoors, homes and the workplace in particular.

The great outdoors Given the passion that Australians and New Zealanders have for the great outdoors, it seems like a logical place to begin our discussion of areas that are of interest to environmental psychologists. The research in this area is quite prolific. Take a look at the numerous travel guides and websites for Australia and New Zealand and you will see a common trend – the focus on outdoor and natural environments. In Australia, the commonly recommended bucket list areas include: the Great Ocean Road, Grampians National Park, Sydney Harbour, Byron Bay, Fraser Island, Great Barrier Reef, Kakadu National Park, Uluru, Cradle Mountain National Park, Ningaloo Marine Park and – for all the wine lovers out there – the Barossa Valley. For New Zealand a similar trend appears: Kaikoura, the Coromandel Peninsula, Tongariro National Park, Mount Cook, Bay of Islands, Fiordland National Park and the Glaciers. There is no doubt that we have an affinity with natural environments, but why? There are many theories that seek to answer this question, but for now we will focus on just one of them – the restorative effects of nature. Attention restoration theory, or ART as it is commonly known, suggests that we can improve mental fatigue and concentration by spending time in or looking at visions of nature. Steven Kaplan (Kaplan, 1995; Kaplan & Kaplan, 1989) argued that nature is particularly rich in the characteristics needed for a restorative experience and can play a major part in the reduction of stress. The logic behind the theory suggests that tasks requiring mental effort draw our directed attention. We expend a great deal of effort in order to maintain the focus required to complete these tasks and to suppress the expression of inappropriate emotions or actions to inhibit intrusive distractions. Directed attention is particularly fragile, so when a task becomes protracted it is likely that you will suffer from directed attention fatigue – a situation with which most university students are familiar as the exhaustion that tends to follow end-of-semester exams. Once the stage of directed attention fatigue has been reached, there is a need to recharge the batteries; and although sleep will help, it is generally not enough. This is where ART comes in. The theory suggests that it is necessary for you to rest your directed attention by subverting it to a different, involuntary attention that requires little effort from you. How do you achieve this? Fascination is what they recommend. Fascination provides us with effortless attention and nature is full of elements that have the ability to fascinate us. Soft fascinations are particularly important as they require little effort from us to capture our attention – these are elements of the environment such as clouds, sunrise and sunsets. The benefits of being immersed in a natural environment are twofold – they provide for fascination, and they provide us with the opportunity of time for reflections removed from everyday routines and tasks. A great deal of research has investigated ways of dealing with our increasingly stressful lifestyle, much of which has been directed towards the natural environment. For example, Roger Ulrich (1979) showed a series of nature scenes to a group of university students, which successfully reduced the effects of stress induced by exams. Further research by Ulrich (1984) compared the post-surgical recovery rates of patients who had a room that overlooked trees and those who had a view of a brick wall, and found that those with the natural view had fewer post-surgical complications, enjoyed faster recovery times and asked for fewer painkillers. In 1986, Ulrich and Simons extended this work to show that exposure to natural scenes may in fact reduce preoperative tension and anxiety. Continuing this line of research, in 1991 Ulrich investigated the effects that watching a videotape of either a natural or urban scene, followed by a stressful video, would have upon stress levels. His findings indicated that viewing scenes of natural areas resulted in positive feelings and lower levels of stressful arousal; the urban scenes, however, failed to deliver similar results. Much of the research has also focused on the relationships between our interactions with nature and our perceptions of wellbeing. Richard Ryan and colleagues (2010) conducted a series of five studies to assess the effects of being outdoors on participants’ feelings of vitality. During one experiment, students were asked to imagine themselves in a variety of situations that took place either indoors or outdoors, and with or without other people. In the other experiments, students embarked upon a 15-minute walk either through indoor hallways or along a tree lined path; they were shown photographic scenes of buildings or landscapes; and were then asked to record their moods, energy levels, amount of exercise, social interactions, time spent outdoors and exposure to natural environments over a period of time. The findings indicated that people consistently felt more energetic when they actually spent time in natural settings and even when they imagined that they did. Of significance in these findings was the suggestion that even short periods (15–20 minutes in duration)

Attention restoration theory

The theory that spending time with nature or looking at visions of nature relieves mental fatigue and improves concentration.

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were enough to boost energy levels, and that the presence of nature was even more important than simply being outdoors. So, the feelings we get from being outdoors are enhanced by the presence of nature. Further links between the natural environment and its energising effect may be found in the research conducted by Florence-Emilie Kinnafick and colleagues (2014) who investigated the effects of two opposing environments (urban versus natural) and two levels of activity (walking and sitting) on the subsequent affective states of a person in a laboratory or an outdoor setting. In this experiment participants were asked to either watch video clips of urban or natural outdoor settings, or to immerse themselves in an urban or natural environment. In each setting they were either walking or sitting. The researchers tested for affect prior to, during and after each condition, and found that being immersed in a natural outdoor environment while engaging in physical activity was the key to developing positive effects on energy. Short bouts of sedentary behaviour increased the levels of negative affect and tiredness, and decreased energy levels. And it seems the effect that nature has upon us may also impact upon our willingness to help others, as demonstrated by research conducted by Jia Wei Zhang, Paul Piff and colleagues (2014). In a series of four studies, the team investigated whether exposure to more beautiful nature (relative to less beautiful nature) increases prosocial behaviour. Their results presented correlational evidence to suggest that participants prone to perceiving natural beauty reported greater prosocial behaviours. They also found that exposure to more beautiful images of nature led participants to be more generous and trusting, and that exposure to more beautiful plants in their laboratory led participants to exhibit increased helping behaviours. Overall, their results indicated that nature promotes prosocial tendencies in people, but only when it is subjectively assessed as beautiful; and that the reaction is more pronounced for those who are sensitive to nature’s beauty. Thus, positive emotions and individual tendencies to perceive natural beauty appear to determine the relationship between beauty and prosociality. Over time, research has consistently found evidence of the relationships between our interactions with natural environments and our perceptions of wellbeing. A study conducted by Kalevi Korpela and colleagues (2014) investigated the relationship between the average time used for nature-based recreation and emotional wellbeing to see whether the relationship was mediated through restorative experiences, social company and the perceived duration of the most recent nature-based recreational visit. Their findings, from a sample of 3060 Finnish people ranging in age from 15–74 years, indicated a relationship between the self-reported participation in nature-based recreation and emotional wellbeing, largely as a result of the restorative experience that was gained from the interaction rather than the social interaction experienced during the visit. The importance of time spent in natural settings and the effects that this has on perceptions of wellbeing was also demonstrated in research conducted by Jia Wei Zhang, Ryan Howell and Ravi Iyer (2014), who found that connectedness with nature only predicts wellbeing when individuals are also emotionally attuned to nature’s beauty – although people who are more connected with nature report greater levels of subjective wellbeing, a person must be tuned in to nature’s beauty in order for this effect to take place. Some interesting research conducted in Australia provides practical evidence of the benefits of including nature-based activities for those who suffer from depression and anxiety. The ‘Feel Blue, Touch Green’ study (Townsend & Ebden, 2006) investigated the effect of participation in conservation activities in a group of people who were depressed, anxious or socially isolated. The results of this program indicated improvements in confidence levels, feelings of self-worth, mood management and mental health status, which included reductions in stress, anxiety and depression. Participants also reported increased levels of social integration and connectedness.

Homes Have you ever thought about the conversation you have with a person you have just been introduced to? It generally revolves around some common themes such as your name and where you are from. For most people their home represents a large part of who they are. Homes may vary in permanence and form; they are generally considered one of the most important places in our lives and are often considered to represent a universal human experience (Dovey, 1978; Marcus, 1974; Smith, 1994). Homes provide us with privacy, comfort, security and refuge, and a sense of continuity and order (Marcus, 1995; Moore, 2000; Tognoli, 1987). It is a place from which journeys begin and sometimes end, and a space that contains the memories of those journeys and the possessions that define who we are, who we long to be and who we once were. Home means many things to many people, so as a term it is a little mercurial. It is a space that is ‘lived in’ and as such it may refer to a space that is bounded by walls but it may also represent a space that is open to the environment (some homeless people refer to their place of shelter, such as a bus stop, as ‘home’, and refugees living in camps in tents may refer to that space as ‘home’) or a place that exists in our minds, hearts and souls. 518

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Judith Sixsmith (1986) has helped us to understand the types of places people call home and what those places mean to them. Her findings suggested three distinct categories of meaning revolving around the personal aspects of home (an extension of the self), the social aspects (relationships with others in the shared space of home) and the physical aspects (the house and household facilities). Similarly, Susan Smith (1994) investigated what it was that differentiates a home and a non-home for a small sample of university students and their partners. Her results indicated evidence of 15 recurrent themes, 10 of which dealt with personal aspects – elements, such as the atmosphere of the home, evaluations of the home, feelings of comfort, personal freedom, privacy and the ability to control the space within the home, all fell into this category. Half of the people involved in this study described their home in terms of the ability to express aspects of self, and about a third talked about the way that they had adapted the home environment to suit themselves. Many also referred to the financial value of the home and shared their thoughts of home as a refuge and a place of relaxation. The research also indicated some evidence of gender differences, with males more likely to talk about their home in terms of its location whereas females were more likely to talk about their home in terms of its atmosphere. Qualitative research conducted by Kerry McBain (2010) provided evidence of the rich array of components used to describe the current home, including its location, its appearance and ambience, the level of comfort it provides, the people that are commonly found there and the times that are shared. When participants were asked how they made a house feel like home, most people said they engaged in some form of ritual such as unpacking and locating personal possessions, introducing the home to friends and family, or throwing a housewarming party. Given the emotional connection that most people have to their homes, it is often when a person is disrupted from place that we see the important role a home plays in the everyday existence of people. Some of you who have moved from home for the first time, perhaps to attend university, will understand the sentiments associated with homesickness – that intense longing for a favourite home and other places left behind. For example, research conducted by Brown and Perkins (1992) indicated that university students often reflect upon how they miss the physical elements of their home. Research conducted with students in America, where relocating for university is common, suggests that the feelings of identity disruption and the loss of family and friends peaks in the first semester, lessening during the second semester as ties with the new environment are forged. According to Riemer (2000), a person’s sense of home, fond memories and meaningful social relationships with family and friends can serve as a stable feature in an unstable environment, so when we are away from home, it is not uncommon for us to feel adrift and homesick, which can lead to a preoccupation with searching for a way back home. How often do you cast your thoughts back to a time when you were growing up? Which are the places that you remember? According to Clare Marcus (1979) most people (80%) recall outdoor areas, which is quite logical given that most children between the ages of 5 and 10 years prefer to play outdoors, exploring and manipulating their environment away from parental supervision and control. She also noted links between the environments described in childhood and the ideal homes of adulthood – it seems that the continued influence of childhood environments is often reflected in our choice (as adults) of home, from its location and form to the design of its interior and garden. For most people, some of the most powerful memories revolve around the places and the houses where we grew up, the houses that represent a first step such as our first house as an adult, the holiday houses that we enjoyed along the way, the cubby houses that we built, the trees we climbed and the spaces we made our own (Marcus, 1992).

The workplace The workplace is of growing concern to many researchers and, given the amount of time that most people spend at work, there is no doubt that the emphasis is warranted. As with all environments in which we find ourselves, the work environment has many positive and negative aspects in terms of the wellbeing of workers, and environmental psychology has considered many of them. One topic that has drawn a great deal of attention over the years is the concept of the open-plan office. Office designs have changed over the past few decades, largely as a result of the architectural ability to design large, functional open spaces. Office layouts have transitioned from conventional private, enclosed spaces to modern interactive, open-plan work stations – a move which for many has led to complaints about the lack of privacy and personal space, along with noise and cramped conditions. It is thought that the concept of an open-plan working environment may have kicked off in Germany (Sundstrom & Sundstrom, 1986) in an attempt to make maximum use of space in the workplace and to improve workflow. Tangible benefits of this form of workspace were framed in economic terms, such as increasing the usable area available and increasing occupant density (Duffy, 1992; Hedge, 1982). Many have suggested that open-plan layouts facilitate communication and interaction between co-workers, improving individual work performance and overall Copyright 2020 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-202

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productivity (Brand & Smith, 2005; Kupritz, 2003). But recent research calls this notion into question. Ethan Bernstein and Stephen Turban (2018) conducted two intervention-based field studies of corporate headquarters transitioning to open office spaces to see what changes occurred in interaction patterns between workers. Using digital data from advanced wearable devices and electronic communication servers, the effect of open office architectures on employees’ face-to-face, email and instant messaging (IM) interaction patterns was tested. Their results showed that the volume of face-to-face interaction decreased significantly (approximately 70%) in both cases, but there was an increase in electronic interaction. So, it seems that rather than prompting increasingly vibrant face-to-face collaboration, this type of open-plan design triggered a social withdrawal response, with people choosing to communicate with their colleagues over email and instant messaging. Further research in this area suggests more evidence of the negative effects of this type of workplace than the positive. For example, longitudinal research has suggested a significant decline in workspace satisfaction (Sundstrom, Kring Herbert, & Brown, 1982). There has also been a great deal written about levels of dissatisfaction in relation to the distractions and loss of privacy that are inherent in these workplaces (Kaarlela-Tuomaala, Helenius, Keskinen, & Hongisto, 2009). A large study of 42 764 people from 303 office buildings in Australia, the US, Finland and Canada conducted by Jungsoo Kim and Richard de Dear (2013) suggests that open-plan offices elicit higher levels of dissatisfaction than enclosed offices and a great deal of the dissatisfaction comes from the perceived lack of privacy and excessive noise. The workers who took part in this study mostly worked in open-plan offices (67%) with just over half working in an open-plan cubicle with high partitions and the rest in open-plan offices with no cubicles or limited partitions. Workers were asked how satisfied they were with elements of the office design such as temperature, visual privacy and noise. Enclosed private offices clearly outperformed their open-plan counterparts in terms of acoustics, privacy and personal space. The amount of individual space available was identified as the most important predictor of overall workspace satisfaction across all types of office layout. Visual privacy and noise level were highly regarded priorities for inhabitants of open-plan offices, whereas light, ease of interaction and comfort of furnishing were considered more important to those in private offices. The authors concluded that in terms of worker satisfaction, the disadvantages brought by noise disruption were bigger than the predicted benefits of increased interaction. Overall, private office configuration outperformed open-plan layouts on almost all aspects of the quality of indoor environments. The ability to concentrate is another factor that has been considered in relation to open-plan offices. For example, Aram Seddigh and colleagues (2014) examined the interaction between the need for concentration on the job and six different office types in relation to distraction, cognitive stress, emotional exhaustion, depersonalisation, personal efficiency and general health. In a sample of 1241 employees they found that levels of distraction and cognitive stress were less for those who worked in private offices than any other type of work space, and the effect was stronger in those who deem that their job requires high levels of concentration. Given that noise seems to be a common factor in establishing levels of satisfaction – or, more to the point, dissatisfaction – what sort of noise is it that gets on people’s nerves at work? Some interesting research conducted by Helena Jahncke (2012) suggests that unintelligible speech is worse than a low rumble. The aim of Jahncke’s research was to see which tasks are suitable for work in open-plan offices based on how susceptible they are to the disruption that is produced by the presence of irrelevant speech. Jahncke asked her participants to engage in a variety of common office tasks such as searching for relevant information, remembering material, counting and generating words. Her results indicated that the tasks that were based on episodic short-term memory and the rehearsal of presented material were more sensitive to disruption by irrelevant speech than those tasks that did not require rehearsal or were based on long-term memory retrieval. For the short-term episodic tasks, a worker’s performance declines by somewhere in the order of 2% to 10%. This represents a problem for open-plan offices where irrelevant speech is ubiquitous – some tasks are simply that much harder when a person cannot isolate themselves from the constant chatter of their office colleagues. Similar research conducted by Nick Perham and colleagues (2013), has suggested that basic office noise decreases a worker’s ability to recall information, and to carry out a basic arithmetic task. Further research conducted by Jahncke and colleagues (2011) investigated the cognitive, emotional and physiological effects of two open-plan office noise conditions during work in a simulated open-plan office, followed by four restoration conditions. Their findings indicated that an inability to remember words, higher levels of fatigue and lower levels of motivation were associated with greater office noise. During the restoration phase those who saw a nature film (including river sounds) said they had more energy and motivation after the restoration period than those who listened to office noise or river sounds. So not only does noise in an office annoy people, but it may also lead to an increase in fatigue and a loss of productivity. But what about music while you work? There are many people in open office settings who resort to playing music on their iPhones or iPods while they work, but what effect does this have on their performance? 520

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Research conducted by Anneli Haake (2010) suggests that although music may be distracting while you work, it may help to mitigate other distractions in the office environment. Employees in this study said that music was relaxing when they chose to listen to it, but annoying when they felt it was imposed on them. Many of the people involved in this research said that music in the office was very important to them in their pursuit of managing the auditory office environment and its inherent distractions, to manage their mood and internal thought processes, to help them deal with tedious work tasks, and to inspire them. Their listening patterns were impacted, however, by things such as the presence of other people, the potential impact on the organisation and the demands of their job. Further, research conducted by Nick Perham and Martinne Sykora (2012) found that listening to music may impair mental acuity, so if you are using music to block out the general hum of the office to aid concentration, be warned, it may not actually help you in this pursuit. After reading all of this you are probably inclined to think that open-plan offices are enough to make you sick – and you could be right! According to research conducted by Christina Bodin Danielsson and colleagues (2014) workplace layout has a surprising effect on rates of sick leave. Employees who worked in open-plan offices were the most likely to have taken sick days. Although women in large open-plan offices were at higher risk of extended bouts of sick leave, men who worked in flexible open-plan offices (often referred to as ‘hot desking’, where there is a group of workstations with no one assigned a particular space) recorded the highest number of total annual sick days.

CHAPTER TWELVE

Open-plan offices have a positive impact on health.

FALSE

Being at work can make you sick.

TRUE

ENVIRONMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY AND SUSTAINABLE BEHAVIOURS Sustainability has become an area of increasing global importance since the 1980s. In September 2000 the UN announced the Millennium Development Goals, which further cemented the issues of sustainability into the minds of 191 UN member states who signed an agreement to combat poverty, hunger, disease, illiteracy, environmental degradation, and discrimination against women by the year 2015. Significant promises were made, and many were delivered, with notable reductions in global poverty, increases in the number of children enrolled in primary school education, increasing levels of gender parity in schools in developing countries, reductions to child and maternal mortality, and substantial increases in the proportion of people with access to piped drinking water (MDG Monitor; UN, 2015). Not all goals were met by the end of 2015 however, so it was important to consider how to move forward past this point in time. In Rio de Janeiro in 2012 the Rio+20 summit brought the leaders of the 192 UN member states together to commence planning the next very important steps. In September 2015, the UN adopted the 2030 Development Agenda which identified 17 goals and 169 targets, many of which expanded on the Millennium Development Goals that had not been met prior to 2015. The race to deliver the UN Sustainable Development Goals, as shown in Figure 12.7, commenced on 1 January 2016 and will run through until 2030. You may be wondering exactly how psychology might be involved in the pursuit of the Sustainable Development Goals. Firstly, as mental health professionals we tend to be at the front line of the war on unsustainable behaviours. As noted by Rashmi Jaipal (an NGO representative to the UN Economic and Social Council for the American Psychological Association) in her Psychology Day address to the UN in 2014 a society is unsustainable if its economic and social systems and institutions are compromising mental and physical health. Sadly, all too often we as psychologists witness decreasing levels of wellbeing, as evidenced by the rising rates of stress-related disorders, depression, suicide, dementia, chronic insomnia, and obesity. In fact, we see it as such an important aspect of psychology that we have featured stress, health and wellbeing in Chapter 14 of this text. Further contributions of Psychology may be seen in our work with those who are affected by natural disasters brought about by climate change, and those who are displaced as a result of conflict and war. You might recall in Chapter 10 we talked about Psychology’s involvement in relation to helping others, as well as identifying why people do and do not help – important knowledge when it comes to delivering the Sustainable Development Goals. In Chapter 13 you will find further links in our discussions about the importance of building a sense of community and embedding psychologists into that community to work closely with those who need a hand up in tough times and those who suffer from poverty, disadvantage, social exclusion and isolation. Psychology further contributes with academic rigour by identifying and examining many of the unsustainable aspects of the materialistic, consumer-driven lifestyles which we find in many developed countries and the equally unsustainable behaviours which we find in impoverished and undeveloped countries. Psychology can help by influencing social policies to foster mental health and wellbeing worldwide.

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FIGURE 12.7 United Nations Sustainable Development Goals The UN Sustainable Development Goals were designed to address the global challenges which have been identified, including poverty,

hunger, education, inequality, climate, environmental degradation, prosperity, peace and justice.

Source: ©2019 United Nations. Reprinted with the permission of the United Nations.

THE HUMAN FOOTPRINT Have you ever stopped to consider your daily routine and the raw costs of that routine for the planet? You would not be alone if you answered ‘No’. From the moment you get out of bed, every light that you turn on, every tap you use, every toilet you flush, every vehicle you travel in, the food you eat, the liquids you drink, all leave an indelible footprint on Earth. According to the World Wide Fund for Nature (known also as the World Wildlife Fund in the US and Canada), when measuring our footprint, we need to include the costs of carbon emissions, land for crops and grazing, forests, fishing grounds, and builtup land. We also need to factor in the planet’s ability to produce natural resources, to provide land for us to build on, and to absorb waste such as carbon emissions – this is referred to as the planet’s biocapacity. So, if we add the costs and the biocapacity we arrive at an equation of how many Earths we need to sustain us. That figure is currently nothing short of mind boggling – it would take 1.7 Earths to produce all the renewable resources that we use. To add to the depth of this equation – by the year 2050 predicted increases to the human population will mean that we need two Earths – not at all a sustainable future (World Wide Fund for Nature, 2018)!

Earth Overshoot Day So, let us look a little closer at our footprint. Each of us produces an individual ecological footprint. The size of the footprint is typically determined by the wealth and level of development in the country in which we live. Naturally, on average the more developed the country the larger the footprint will be. You may well ask how we know what the footprint will be? We calculate it – the footprint per person is the nation’s total ecological footprint divided by the total population of the nation. If we were going to live within the means of our planet’s resources, the ecological footprint in world terms would need to equal the available biocapacity per person on the planet which is currently 1.7 global hectares. Applying that equation to Australia with an ecological footprint of 6.9 per person our citizens are demanding roughly four times the resources and wastes that our planet can regenerate and absorb in the atmosphere (Earth Overshoot Days, 522

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2018). Given these numbers we can then calculate a date each year when humanity’s demand for ecological resources and services exceeds what the Earth can regenerate in that year – this is referred to as Earth Overshoot Day (Global Footprint Network, 2018): Earth Overshoot Day = (Planet’s Biocapacity / Humanity’s Ecological Footprint) × 365. Qatar was the first to overshoot Earth on 19 February 2018, Australia followed in eighth position on 31 March 2018. Given data such as this, it is quite easy to see the effect that we have on the planet. This is not a one-way relationship however, it is reciprocal as evidenced by the effects of climate change which are becoming an increasingly familiar component of the global research agenda and the popular press. As you will see in the chapter to follow the complex relationship that exists between people and the environment in which they live is heavily influenced by the attitudes and behaviours which have placed us in this precarious position. The important role that psychology will play in the fight to slow down the yearly race to overshoot Earth will become increasingly clear as we move through this chapter.

The tragedy of our global commons dilemma The concept of individual needs conflicting with collective interests is not new to psychology. In 1968, ecologist Garrett Hardin wrote about the tragedy of the commons – an essay referring to a shared commons (a limited resource supply) and the increasing reliance of a growing number of people on that commons for survival. Hardin described a group of herders who had open access to a common parcel of land where their cattle were free to graze. Economically it is in the best interest of each of the herders to maximise the amount of cattle they have grazing on the land – after all, it is a free resource and the return on individual investment is clear. But what happens to that resource over time with more and more herders making individual-gain decisions over the shared interest and future of the commons? The resource depletes, and the entire group pays the ultimate cost. Earth as a commons has been overexploited - its finite communal resources have been depleted and are diminishing at a rate which is difficult to fathom. With population estimates indicating that the global population will exceed 9 billion by 2025 (UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2017), there is no doubt that we will continue to overshoot Earth’s resources. The question is, how do we lessen the effect and slow its progress?

Tragedy of the commons

The depletion of a shared resource due to individuals, acting to further their own interest, behaving in a manner which is contrary to the common good of the group.

CLIMATE CHANGE Take a quick look at your local and national newspapers and you will find that stories referring to climate change, environmental issues and variations in weather patterns appear most days. Although our awareness of these issues is increasing, so too are the often strong emotions that accompany them. As psychologists we are unavoidably immersed in the diversity of this problem – we treat people who are dealing with the everyday realities of climatic variations in weather; we see people who are increasingly anxious about the effects that climate change will bring to their lives and the lives of future generations; and we investigate, facilitate and measure changes in attitudes towards climate change and behaviours that will mitigate or exacerbate that change. Climate Change Action is the thirteenth UN Sustainable Development Goal – two of its key aims are to strengthen resilience and adaptive capacity to climate-related hazards and natural disasters in all countries, and to improve education and awareness on climate change. No country is immune to the impact of climate changes but there is no doubt that some face more acute challenges than others. The World Health Organization suggests that there are likely to be 250 000 additional deaths per year due to climate change between 2030–2050 as changes in temperatures and increasingly extreme weather events become increasingly normal. In March of 2018 the HSBC Bank released the results of a comprehensive study which scored 67 countries around the world in terms of their vulnerability to climate change. The countries which were considered the most vulnerable to the effects of climate change were India, followed by Pakistan and the Philippines (South and South-East Asian countries account for five of the ten most vulnerable). Finland, Sweden, Norway, Estonia and New Zealand were the five least vulnerable countries. Australia was ranked in 29th position (Table 12.1) (Paun, Acton, & Chan, 2018).

Attitudes towards climate change Australia and New Zealand are faced with many issues in relation to the environment, including the conservation of wilderness areas, the management of natural resources and the restoration of areas ravaged by natural disasters. Both countries have also experienced a range of environmental threats such as earthquakes, droughts and floods, as well as the impact of logging, mining and habitat loss. We are also impacted by increases in population, consumption patterns, pollution and the diminishing reserves of fossil fuels.

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TABLE 12.1 Climate risk in countries around the world – overall climate vulnerability (lower score = higher vulnerability) In March of 2018 the HSBC Bank released a report which scored 67 G20 countries for their vulnerability to climate risk. Australia came in at 29th position whereas New Zealand sits in the bottom five. The lower the ranking the higher the vulnerability.

Physical impacts

Country

Score

Weights

rank

Sensitivity to extreme events

Energy transition risk

score

score

25%

rank

25%

rank

Potential to respond to climate risks score

25%

Overall climate vulnerability

rank

score

rank

market

25%

India

3.84

17

1.67

7

4.34

20

2.54

10

3.10

1

EM

Pakistan

3.55

13

0.93

3

6.43

58

1.87

3

3.19

2

EM

Philippines

3.64

15

0.37

1

6.17

52

2.63

11

3.20

3

EM

Bangladesh

4.49

24

1.16

5

5.17

34

2.48

8

3.33

4

FM

Oman

2.89

7

2.09

9

2.85

4

5.62

45

3.36

5

FM

Sri Lanka

3.99

19

1.04

4

6.42

57

2.03

4

3.37

6

FM

Colombia

6.11

49

2.16

10

3.05

8

2.72

16

3.51

7

EM

Mexico

4.43

23

3.10

15

4.38

22

2.37

7

3.57

8

EM

Kenya

2.90

8

3.15

16

6.63

61

1.74

1

3.60

9

FM

S Africa

3.80

16

4.39

29

3.90

14

2.63

12

3.68

10

EM

Australia

5.72

41

2.28

12

3.12

9

7.93

65

4.76

29

DM

Austria

5.73

42

6.03

42

6.75

63

6.53

53

6.26

58

DM

Canada

8.22

67

4.91

35

5.32

39

6.96

58

6.35

59

DM

Switzerland

5.25

34

6.94

51

7.18

67

6.75

55

6.53

60

DM

Denmark

4.57

27

8.36

59

6.58

60

7.41

63

6.73

61

DM

Ireland

6.78

58

7.48

55

6.04

50

7.28

62

6.89

62

DM

New Zealand

7.07

60

5.69

40

6.78

4

8.19

66

6.93

63

DM

Estonia

7.24

63

8.34

58

6.80

65

5.97

48

7.09

64

FM

Norway

7.12

61

8.03

57

4.68

25

9.03

67

7.21

65

DM

Sweden

7.18

62

8.39

60

6.38

56

7.18

59

7.28

66

DM

Finland

7.50

64

8.52

61

5.94

47

7.26

61

7.30

67

DM

Source: Paun, A., Acton, L., & Chan, W. S. (2018). The Fragile Planet report: Scoring climate risks around the world. HSBC Bank. Retrieved from https://www.sustainablefinance.hsbc.com/-/media/gbm/reports/sustainable-financing/fragile-planet.pdf

Note: DM= developed market, EM= emerging market, FM= frontier market

But are we really concerned about the depth of the problem that we currently face? In 2011 Joseph Reser and colleagues reported data from a large national sample of Australians indicating that threequarters of people believed that the world’s climate is changing; 90% accepted some level of human contribution; 78% were of the opinion that if nothing is done there will be serious problems for Australia; and around 45% thought serious problems were already occurring. Reinforcing these findings, the Ipsos Climate Change Report 2017 found that 42% of Australians accept that climate change is caused by human activity and is already happening, although a further 38% believe that humans and natural processes are operating in unison. Overall, 64% agree that climate change poses a serious threat to our way of life over the next 25–100 years. Yet only 50% think they understand the causes and likely impacts of climate change. Many identified extreme weather events and other natural phenomena as most likely evidence of climate change. Australians were clear on who they believe is acting in response to climate change, with government ranked in first position followed by the global community; however, their belief that no one is performing particularly well in this area was evident. The results of the 2015 Global Concern about Climate Change survey conducted by the Pew Research Center found that people around the world are concerned about a variety of possible consequences of climate change. As you can see from Figure 12.8 fear of drought tops the list – in fact it was the top response 524

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FIGURE 12.8 Global concern about climate change Public sentiment suggests that climate change is a pressing concern.

Drought tops climate change concerns across all regions Regional medians of most concerning effects of global climate change

Severe weather like floods or intense storms

Droughts or water shortages Latin America

59%

Africa

59 50

U.S.

Middle East Europe Global

12%

21%

16

18

27

35 44

5% 3 17

25

6

13

34

19

24

38

Rising sea levels

11

16

41

Asia/ Pacific

Long periods of unusually hot weather

5 15

8 14

6

Note: Russia and Ukraine not Included in Europe median. Source: Spring 2015 Global Attitudes survey. Q43. PEW RESEARCH CENTER Source: Pew Research Center (2015, November). Global concern about climate change, broad support for limiting emissions. Retrieved from http://www.pewglobal.org/2015/11/05/1-concern-about-climate-change-and-its-consequences/

in 31 countries, including the United States, Latin America and Africa. Severe weather and long periods of heat were also of concern. The degree to which people fear the personal effects of climate change varied substantially across the globe ranging from less than 20% in the UK, Australia, Germany, China, Israel and Poland, to more than 70% in Uganda, Brazil, Burkina Faso, the Philippines and Ghana. The country expressing the greatest concerns about climate change was Brazil, the lowest was China, although concern was noticeably low throughout the Middle East (apart from Lebanon) with less than 50% in every country believing that climate change was a very serious concern.

Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander perspectives on climate change Research conducted by Daphne Nash, Paul Memmott, Joseph Reser and Samid Suliman in 2018 has provided an interesting insight into Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander perspectives on climate change. Many participants reported feeling not so confident about specific aspects of climate change. Some (44%) believed that the effects of change would be felt far away from them, roughly half (54%) reported personal experience with natural disaster. Many (60%) reported being worried about the specific aspects of climate change - a similar proportion to that which was reported in a national survey of respondents in 2011 (64%).

Weather and climate change perception What is it that influences a person’s opinions in relation to climate change? According to Ye Li, Eric Johnson and Lisa Zaval (2011), it may be as simple as what the weather is doing at the time! Their first survey, which was conducted using 582 people from the US and Australia, asked participants how convinced they were Copyright 2020 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-202

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Affect heuristic

A mental shortcut in which people make decisions that are heavily influenced by their current emotions.

that global warming was happening, and how much they personally worried about it. Participants were also asked to indicate how much colder or warmer the weather was from normal for that time of year. They found that people who thought the current day’s temperature was warmer than usual were more likely to believe in and worry about global warming than people who thought the current day’s temperature was colder than usual. To investigate whether or not the perceived variation in temperature swayed beliefs or affected behaviour, the researchers conducted a second study utilising the same questions but asking participants to also indicate whether they would donate some of the fee awarded for participating in the study to an organisation that was focused on finding and promoting solutions to global warming. The results showed that 63% of participants who rated the day as much warmer than usual donated money at an average of $2.04, as compared with 24% of the participants who rated the weather as much colder than usual with the average donation of 48 cents. What these findings suggest is that people in general use an easily accessible judgement (current weather) instead of a more complex and less accessible one (global temperature trends) when thinking about climate change. Perhaps this is a valuable lesson for those engaging in education in this area. Apart from the current weather, what other factors influence a person’s attitudes towards climate change? Christina Demski and colleagues (2017) suggest that direct experience with weather events such as flooding, may increase awareness of climate change, leading to pronounced emotional responses, greater perceived personal vulnerability and risk perceptions. Their findings also suggested experiencing a weather event, such as flooding, may give rise to behavioural intentions beyond individual sustainability actions – such as provisional support for mitigation policies, and personal climate adaptation in matters unrelated to the direct experience. Research of similar nature suggests that extreme weather experiences may increase belief in climate change and promote support for sustainable behaviour change (Lujala, Lein, & Rød, 2015; Myers et al., 2013; Spence, Poortinga, Butler, & Pidgeon, 2011; Taylor, de Bruin, & Dessai, 2014). You may be questioning how these changes in perception come about. There are two heuristics that come to mind. Think back to Chapter 3 where we discussed cognitive heuristics – the information processing guidelines that we use to make quick and easy decisions. The availability heuristic, which is a tendency to estimate the odds that an event will occur by how easily instances of it happening pop into our mind, has been linked to the process by which experiences of weather events might affect risk perceptions. Research suggests people’s judgements about risk may be influenced by the ease with which relevant weather events come to mind – so if a person experiences a weather event it is likely that the impact of climate risk will be more cognitively available or salient in their mind. These links appear to be particularly prominent when a similar link has appeared in the media or when statements have been made by prominent figures (Keller, Siegrist & Gutscher, 2006; Taylor et al., 2014; Weber, 2010). A good example of this is when people who have been the victim of flooding purchase insurance due to the increased salience of flooding making them feel vulnerable (Browne & Hoyt 2000). Another heuristic which may be operating with extreme weather events however is the affect heuristic – a mental shortcut which is facilitated via an emotional response to an event (Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic, & Johnson, 2000). In this situation it is easy to remember an emotion-laden event, such as a major weather event, and the intense emotions which accompanied it. This provides a very powerful mechanism for linking such a weather event with future risk of climate change (Keller, et al., 2006; Weber 2010).

Climate change and mental health Research on climate change also considers the mental health issues that arise as a result of the extreme weather events that appear to be linked to it. Certainly, in Australia the toll that climate change is having is starting to become clear, with rates of depression, anxiety, post-traumatic stress and substance abuse on the increase among those affected by extreme weather events. According to a 2011 Climate Institute report, A Climate of Suffering: The Real Cost of Living with Inaction on Climate Change, climate change is emerging as a major threat to mental health. The disasters we have witnessed in Australia and New Zealand over the past 20 years have demonstrated both the resilience of our populations and their vulnerabilities. And it is those vulnerabilities to which the report refers. Following a severe weather event, one in five members of the community will suffer extreme stress, emotional injury and despair. Further burden is added by lengthy and hostile climate periods, which generally facilitate a substantial increase in the incidence of post-traumatic stress, anxiety and depression. The psychological effects of disasters linger for months and in some cases for years, with the effects borne by families and entire communities. Higher rates of drug abuse, violence, family dissolutions, self-harm and suicide are all more likely to occur as a result of an extreme weather event. Estimates in the order of 8% higher incidence of suicide and self-harm have been suggested in the wake of drought and heat waves. 526

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Climate change refugees

FIGURE 12.9 Climate refugees are likely to increase over the An interesting twist to the problems associated with climate coming decades change played out in court in New Zealand when a Pacific A man from Kiribati, a Pacific island nation threatened by rising Island man from Kiribati (a small Pacific Island nation) lodged sea levels, had his bid to be recognised as a climate change a claim to be regarded as a climate refugee seeking asylum in refugee in New Zealand refused. The man was seeking asylum based on the fact that he was escaping the rising seas and the New Zealand (see Figure 12.9). The claim was based on the fact environmental risks incurred as a result of global warming. that global warming has led to rising sea levels, shrinking land areas and dwindling supplies of fresh water, and locals are being encouraged to leave. The man, who had lived in New Zealand for six years, had overstayed a work permit and faced deportation back to his homeland if his bid for refugee status failed. And fail it did – the court rejected his application based upon the fact that it did not meet the legal criteria of a person living in fear of persecution or threats to his life if he returned to his homeland (Buchanan, 2015; Martin, 2015). Until recently, New Zealand and Australia had both resisted calls to change their immigration rules to accommodate the effects of climate change. In 2017 however the New Zealand government commenced conversations about offering 100 climate change refugee visas annually; these conversations are Source: AAP Images/Richard Vogel. continuing (Randall, 2017; News 24, 2018). No matter what the outcome of the New Zealand climate change visa debate, the fact remains that millions of people around the world will be in a difficult situation if forced to flee their homes as a direct result of climate change. Current predictions suggest there are likely to be up to 1 billion people displaced by climate change by 2050, a further 135 million people are likely to be displaced by 2045 as a result of desertification (land becoming desert due to environmental changes) (Kamal, 2017).

Psychological barriers to action Both the American Psychological Association (2011) and the Australian Psychological Society (2014) have signalled the important role that psychology will play in relation to the topic of climate change. Engaging in research designed to assess our attitudes towards climate change is one small step in the right direction; but understanding the motives that drive us to action or inaction represents a far greater stride. According to Robert Gifford (2011), although most people think climate change and sustainability are important problems, too few engage in mitigating behaviours to stem the tide of the ever-increasing number of environmental problems. So, what is it that gets in the way? Gifford has suggested that people are hindered by seven categories of psychological barriers, or what he refers to as the ‘dragons of inaction’ (see Table 12.2). The first of the dragons is limited cognition. This dragon encompasses things such as ignorance (not getting to know enough about environmental problems and how you can be a part of the solutions), uncertainty, leading to postponing any form of action (does climate change pose as much of a threat as the media portrays it to be or is this simply a media beat-up?), optimism bias (it simply can’t be as bad as some say it is or they would have come up with a solution by now), and temporal and spatial discounting (presuming that the problems will be worse for the next generations and elsewhere in the world, so there is no need to be in a hurry to act). Our ancient brain is also an issue. Given that our brain has not evolved a great deal in thousands of years. Evolutionary we have largely been concerned with protecting our immediate tribe, assessing immediate risks, utilising exploitable resources, and focusing on the present. The focus on the present is somewhat out of step with the future considerations involved in solving environmental problems, future risk and long term impacts. The second dragon, comparisons with others, relates to other people. Whether we like it or not, we care a great deal about what others think about us and we pay a lot of attention to what others are doing, so it is only natural that we compare ourselves to others in order to weigh up what we are or are not prepared to do. Although others may inspire us to act, they may also lull us into a false sense of security that irresponsible behaviour is actually okay. If green is the new black, then we are likely to go green! The third dragon is perceived risks. Humans are generally risk-averse, so we may feel threatened by many different types of risks. Thus, in weighing up environmentally friendly behaviour, we are likely to ask questions such as: Will it be safe? What will everybody think? Will it impact on my time? Will it work for me?

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TABLE 12.2 Psychological barriers to climate change mitigation Robert Gifford (2011) suggested evidence of seven key barriers to psychological change in terms of modifying environmental behaviours.

General psychological barrier

Specific manifestation

Limited cognition

Ancient brain Ignorance Environmental numbness Uncertainty Judgemental discounting Optimism bias Perceived behavioural control/ self-efficacy

Comparisons with others

Social comparison Social norms and networks Perceived inequity

Perceived risks

Functional Physical Financial Social Psychological Temporal

Sunk costs

Financial investments Behavioural momentum Conflicting values, goals and aspirations

Ideologies

Worldviews Suprahuman powers Technosalvation System justification

Discredence

Mistrust Perceived program inadequacy Denial Reactance

So, any form of behavioural change needs to be framed in terms of minimising risks and maximising benefit. Sunk costs is the next of the dragons. What are the investments that a person has made already that will be difficult to give up? Could you give up the long hot shower in the morning that invigorates you before you start your day? Could you resist taking your luxury car for a drive to the corner shop to buy some milk? Many of these behaviours are habits that have been a long time in the making. Ideology is a dragon that is often resistant to change simply because it represents a way of thinking about the world. This may limit our preparedness to adopt pro-environmental behaviours because our worldview or way of living is so comfortable and our beliefs are so well cast in relation to who we are. Thoughts such as a belief in technology to formulate a solution to our problems fit into this logic. The next of the dragons is the concept of discredence or a general sense of non-believing, including denial, mistrust (of science, politicians and the success of behaviour change) and reactions against suggestions that something must be done. The last of the dragons relates to limited behaviour; that is, we may choose a less effective pro-environmental solution simply because it is easier to change, or perhaps more recognisable, even though the gains are negligible. Thus, any effort that is expended becomes tokenistic, and often prevents further action. According to Gifford, the way forward is paved by first developing an understanding of our behaviour. What is it that people do? What behaviours have the most impact? What are the antecedents to those behaviours? We then need to develop, evaluate and implement interventions, with change framed as an attractive option so that people really want to engage.

Linking environmental cues and sustainable behaviours

Earlier in the chapter we talked about environmental cues and the way that they help to shape our behaviours. In this section we look at environmental cues and how they can be used to Source: Gifford, R. (2011). The dragons of inaction: Psychological barriers that limit climate shape sustainable behaviours which will be required in order to change mitigation and adaptation. American Psychologist, 66(4), 290–302. respond to the the twelfth UN Sustainable Development Goal of Responsible Consumption and Production. This goal promotes resource and energy efficiency, the development of sustainable infrastructure, the provision of access to basic services, and a better quality of life for all. Psychologists will play a vital role in response to this goal in terms of understanding the barriers that may stand in the way of its success and in reconfiguring behaviours which align to its aims. So, let us turn to what has been done in this space so far.

Limited behaviour

Tokenism Rebound effect

Social norms and pro-environmental behaviour In Chapter 10 we looked at social norms in relation to helping behaviours. We talked about norms of reciprocity and social responsibility and their impact in terms of when and why people step in to help others. In Chapter 7 we considered social norms in relation to littering behaviour – we saw that people were more likely to litter in environments where littering was prolific, largely because that form of behaviour appeared to be the norm for that particular environment. Social norms have significant impacts on our behaviour and from what we know of the research conducted in this area the degree of impact varies according to characteristics of the person, the norm being evoked in the message, the implied reference group, and the social and environmental context in which the decision will be made. But can we enlist

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social norms as behavioural cues to increase pro-environmental FIGURE 12.10 A sign promoting pro-environmental behaviours? Of course we can, and there is no doubt that you behaviour seen commonly in hotels saw evidence of it the last time you stayed in a hotel. Signs such as the one in the image shown in Figure 12.10 are now commonplace in hotel rooms. Robert Cialdini and two graduate students (Goldstein, Cialdini & Griskevicius, 2008) worked with a local hotel on a program to encourage guests to reuse their towels. Each of the 260 guest rooms was randomly assigned cards with one of five different messages: 1 Help the hotel save energy. 2 Help save the environment. 3 Partner with us to help save the environment. 4 Help save resources for future generations. 5 Join your fellow citizens in helping to save the environment. Source: Alamy Stock Photo/Northern Ireland/Stephen Barnes Which one do you think was the most affective? The last message, which invoked a descriptive social norm, was the most successful – 41% of guests who received those cards recycled their towels. In second place were the messages urging environmental protection and the benefit to future generations – these cards accounted for 31% reusing their towels. By far the least successful was the message which emphasised the benefit to the hotel: only 20% of guests receiving this card reusing their towels. In a follow-up study, the team boosted towel reuse even further by placing a sign in the room that said ‘75% of guests who stayed in this room chose to reuse their towels’. What these early studies demonstrate is the effectiveness of using finely targeted descriptive norms linking hotel guests to others Descriptive norm A person’s perception like them, and provincial norms linking the target behaviour to guests who had stayed in the same room. of how people typically The important take-home message from this research is that when people are trying to figure out what behave in a given to do in a new situation, they generally take their cue from what seems to be normal behaviour for others – situation. the social norm. Utilising descriptive norm messages that say, ‘you should do this because everyone else is’ seems to be effective in promoting environmentally friendly actions. Provincial norm The norms of one’s Given that human attitudes and behaviours have contributed a great deal to the environmental local setting and challenges that we face, psychology as the scientific study of human thought and behaviour has much to offer circumstances. in this area. For example, psychologists can provide a better understanding of the human–nature relationship and the behaviours and motivations that are derived from those relationships – information that may help to foster greater sustainability in human actions. As you have seen from the previous sections in this chapter, environmental psychology has invested heavily in research documenting the many benefits of the natural environment in terms of its impact on individuals and local, national and global communities (Kaplan, 1995; Ulrich, 1993; Uzzell & Moser, 2006). There has also been a great deal of interest in human–natural environment relationships and the factors that contribute to the degradation and destruction of natural environments and their inhabitants (Clayton & Brook, 2005; Clayton & Myers, 2009; Gifford, 2000; Oskamp, 2000a, 2000b; Saunders, 2003). And although we are beginning to piece together knowledge of what drives some people to refrain from overusing non-renewable resources, such as forests, and less tangible resources, such as clean air and physical space, we do not know enough about what it is that limits others to engage in such pursuits. So, this is one of the areas to which environmental psychologists are now turning their attention.

Environmental attitudes What is it that moves a person who is thinking about taking action to actually do so? The answer is anything but simple. But one explanation that appears regularly in the literature is related to attitudes. An environmental attitude is an evaluative summary of the attributes of an environment expressed as a psychological tendency with some degree of favour or disfavour (good/bad, like/dislike, worthy of saving/ not worthy of saving etc.). Attitudes may be held by an individual or group. As a learned response they are generally consistent – positive or negative, favourable or unfavourable – and involve a combination of motivational, emotional, perceptual and cognitive processes that relate to an aspect of the environment such as the natural environment, wildlife, pollution, energy, conservation or recycling. Human attitudes towards the environment have been the subject of a great deal of scientific enquiry over the past 40 years, and although attitudes do not always transfer into action, having an understanding of how attitudes are formed and how they can be changed is a vital component of this field of psychology.

Environmental attitude

An evaluative tendency to respond with some degree of favour or disfavour to the perceptions of, or beliefs regarding, the environment.

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Attitudes are generally accepted to have three recognisable components: cognitive, affective and behavioural (conative). In the environmental context: • cognitive – refers to what a person knows or thinks about an environment • affective – concerns the emotional reaction a person has to the environment • behavioural or conative – is the behavioural intentions a person has towards the environment (Breckler, 1984). Although the relationship between attitudes and behaviour has been debated by psychologists for many decades, the link between these variables and environmental education is one that is of particular concern for those who work in the field of environmental education.

CURRENT SCENE ON … THE GREAT OUTDOORS BACKYARD BAROMETER SHOWS RISING CONCERNS

The emphasis that Australians place on the great outdoors is reinforced in this report with data suggesting that in the past two years, most people have visited a national park or nature reserve. Many have expressed concerns about the future and are worried that younger Australians may grow up with less access to nature and wildlife. Protecting the Great Barrier Reef was at the top of the list of environmental issues and its protection is considered paramount. The majority are now of the opinion that the overall state of the Great Barrier Reef is declining compared with a decade ago. But, as you can see from Figure 12.11, Australians are also trying to do the right thing by the environment with recycling and composting now common practice in Australian homes. Almost half of those surveyed said they had already switched to renewable energy and solar, and many said they intend to do so.

A recent report by Roy Morgan Research on behalf of the World Wide Fund for Nature (2018) has found Australians’ concern about the state of Australia’s environment is rising, with the majority of Australians saying that action should be taken now on environmental problems. This is the first report of a 20-year plan to track Australian attitudes toward the environment. Australians have a strong affinity with forests, beaches, oceans and wildlife, and overwhelmingly support taking action to protect natural habitats. The protection of Australia’s endangered animals, forests and trees ranked second in terms of environmental issues – and it seems Australians are particularly partial to saving koalas!

FIGURE 12.11 The World Wide Fund for Nature Backyard Barometer shows that Australians are taking regular action to help the environment Recycle/composting

88%

Fix things rather than replace them

68%

Reduced water usage around house & garden

66%

Buying local products where possible

63%

Reduced gas/electricity usage around the house

61%

Switched environment-friendly products

53%

Usually walk, cycle, carpool/take public transport

37%

Installed a solar hot water system or solar panels

32%

Installed a rainwater tank

31%

Changed diet

26%

Reduced amount of air travel

17%

Switched to a renewable energy supplier

14%

Taken part in an environmental political campaign

11%

Contracted a government member about climate change

6%

Buy carbon-offsets to reduce carbon footprint

6%

None of these

1% 0

20

40

60

80

100

Source: Roy Morgan Research (2017). Australian Attitudes to Nature 2017: Report prepared for WWF-Australia. Retrieved from https://www.wwf.org.au/ArticleDocuments/353/pub-backyard-barometer-australian-attitudes-to-nature-05jun18.pdf.aspx?Embed=Y. Reprinted with the permission of WWF-Australia

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Environmentally responsible behaviour Goal 12 of the UN Sustainable Development Goals is Sustainable Consumption and Production. This goal aims to ensure sustainable consumption and production practices with respect to the biophysical boundaries of the planet and to reduce current global consumption rates to fit with the biophysical capacity to produce ecosystem services and benefits. In the following sections, we explore ways to encourage people across the globe to act responsibly.

Personality effects First we need to understand why people choose to act or not to act. According to Robert Gifford (2014) in order to influence pro-environmental behaviour we need to understand the person. For instance, childhood history; level of knowledge and education; personality traits; values, attitudes and worldviews; felt responsibility; and moral commitment to change, are all likely to influence a person’s intention to act. Gifford also believes that we need to know which of the domains of environmental behaviour are likely to be more influential in terms of motivating a person to act (i.e., energy conservation, waste disposal, and food and water security). There is a great deal of research that links personality traits, such as agreeableness and openness, with a greater concern for environmental issues. According to Jacob Hirsh (2010), these traits may be important predictors of environmental attitudes among individuals, but there is a growing body of research that has started to examine the broader consequences of population differences in such traits. Hirsh’s study investigated the potential of nationally aggregated personality traits to predict a country’s environmental sustainability. He derived a national personality score from an existing database of 12 156 respondents across 51 countries, and used that score to assess the sustainability of each country’s environmental policies. His findings indicated that just as agreeableness and openness predict environmental concern on an individual level, countries which had higher population levels of those traits also had significantly better performance on the sustainability index. Similarly, two New Zealand researchers, Taciano Milfont and Chris Sibley (2012), compared the person and national-level personality correlates of environmental engagement. Their findings indicated that across both people and nations, agreeableness, conscientiousness and openness to experience were the traits that were most strongly linked to environmental engagement. What these findings and those of Hirsh suggest is that theoretical models of the behaviour of people as individuals, and the behaviour of aggregate individuals who exist in cohesive communities and nations, may be the way to move forward. By understanding the network of more general behavioural tendencies in which the specific behaviours of interest are embedded, we can maximise change-specific behaviours and attitudes.

Generational effects We are also starting to uncover generational effects of green consumption with information provided by the 2015 Nielsen Global Survey of Corporate Social Responsibility and Sustainability, which polled over 30 000 online consumers in 60 countries throughout Asia-Pacific, Europe, Latin America, the Middle East/Africa and North America. Their results indicate that almost 75% respondent Millennials are the most willing to pay extra for sustainable offerings, up from approximately 50% in 2014. Generation Z (aged 15–20), were also willing to pay more for products and services that came from companies committed to positive social and environmental impact, rising from 55% in 2014 to 72% in 2015. Baby Boomers also showed their caring side with 51% willing to pay extra, indicating that they will remain a substantial and viable market in the coming decade. As you can see from Table 12.3, globally, those who were willing to pay more for a product also responded favourably to statements about product sustainability, statements regarding a company’s environmental friendliness, and statements about a company’s commitment to social value. Statements about price-driving attributes, such as sales, did not even make the top five, so it appears that personal values are more important than personal benefits, such as cost or convenience.

Goals effects Research on a slightly different tangent assessed the role that our goals play in determining whether we will act in terms of environmental issues. Linda Steg and colleagues (2014) believe that there are many environmental behaviours that involve a conflict between normative goals and hedonic and gain goals (discussed earlier in this chapter), so people quite often need to incur some form of cost to benefit the

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TABLE 12.3 Millennials and Generation Z are increasingly willing to pay more for sustainable products according to the Nielsen Global Survey of Corporate Social Responsibility and Sustainability Top Sustainability Purchasing Drivers for Global Respondents vs. Those Willing to Pay more

Global Those Willing Respondents to Pay More The products are made by a brand/company that I trust

62%

72%

The product is known for its health and wellness benefits

59%

70%

The product is made from fresh, natural and/or organic ingredients

57%

69%

The product is from a company known for being environmentally friendly*

45%

58%

The product is from a company known for its commitment to social value*

43%

56%

The product’s packaging is environmentally friendly

41%

53%

The product is from a company known for its commitment to my community

41%

53%

I saw an ad on television about the social and/or environmental good the product’s company is doing

34%

45%

*For those willing to pay extra, the importance of these factors increased the most Source: Nielsen. (2015, October). The sustainability imperative: New insights on consumer expectations, p. 10. Retrieved from https://www.nielsen.com/eu/en/insights/reports/2015/the-sustainability-imperative.html

environment. These goals steer our attention and influence which information we detect, what knowledge is most accessible, what action alternatives are perceived, and how we will act. Steg and colleagues suggest that in many cases we may not be aware of which goals are steering our perceptions, evaluations and behaviour, because goal-directed behaviour is not necessarily intentional. So, the strength of the three goals depends on the extent to which we endorse different values, as well as on situational cues that activate or deactivate particular values. Their research suggests that because pro-environmental choices often imply that people need to sacrifice personal benefits in order to benefit the environment, there are two ways to encourage pro-environmental behaviour. The first way is to change the actual or perceived outcomes of environmental behaviour – reducing or removing the conflict between normative goals and hedonic and gain goals, or strengthening the normative goals to make the conflict between the normative goals and the other two goals less prominent. The second strategy is to get people to focus on the environmental consequences (and reduce the value that they attach to hedonic and gain consequences) of behavioural options and encourage pro-environmental actions, even though those actions may have some personal costs.

Green consumerism There is no doubt that the environmental challenges that we face today are the result of human consumption, and as our global population continues to grow and technological advances continue to make consumption easier, our increasingly materialistic lifestyle will continue to deplete the planet’s resources. So how do we convince people to buy a pro-environmental green product over a non-green product? In a series of experiments, Vladas Griskevicius and colleagues (2010) offered participants a choice between two equally priced items – one was more luxurious (a fuel-efficient Honda Civic) and the other was more environmentally friendly (an electric hybrid Toyota Prius). They found that if there was no immediate audience (e.g., when shopping online), participants were more likely to forgo environmentalism and opt for the luxury item. If, however, they were asked to decide in front of others, they were significantly more likely to choose the green item. The effect was lessened, however, when the pro-environmental item was a less expensive option – thus the ability to obtain status recognition was diminished by the cheaper goods. Further, people’s reasons for purchasing green items are not always predictable. In an article in the New York Times, Prius owners were asked to list the reasons why they chose that vehicle. Although the Prius is marketed for its benefits in relation to environmental conservation, interestingly the number one reason people gave for purchasing one was that the car makes a statement about them; that is, the car tells the world that its owner cares (Maynard, 2007).

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All of this research suggests that clearly recognising people for their self-sacrificing efforts is important when attempting to convince people to take action on environmental issues. But if this is the case, why don’t more people catch public transport to work instead of driving? Research suggests that because people who choose to make use of public transport are often perceived as having lower social status than those who drive their own cars, the motivation comes from the perceived status of driving and not from environmental concerns (Maynard, 2007). Further research conducted by Kelly Tate, Andrew Stewart and Michael Daly (2014) proposed that a key element in promoting sustainable consumer choice is understanding how pro-environmental messages influence behaviour. They suggested that exposing people to a pro-environmental message would prime an environmental-protection goal, which would ultimately produce more positive automatic evaluations and lead people to make the pro-environmental choice of selecting loose rather than packaged products in a hypothetical choice task. Their findings indicted that those who were primed with an environmentalprotection goal automatically evaluated loose products more positively, selecting more of the loose consumer products than a control group. The researchers concluded that the effect of environmental goal priming on choices or implicit attitudes towards packaging was not contingent on existing environmental attitudes. Thus, by using pro-environmental messages we could induce more environmentally-friendly consumer choices by leading people to positively evaluate the readily available goal-relevant stimuli.

Fighting extinction Worldwide there are many animals that currently face extinction. The orangutan is one of many species that is of immediate grave concern. Orangutans are sentient beings; they are highly intelligent and share a great deal of similarities to humans, and current estimates suggest we may lose all evidence of them in the wild within 10 years if the destruction of their habitat continues at current FIGURE 12.12 Palm oil plantations are one of the largest rates. Two of the greatest contributing factors to the destruction contributors to the demise of orangutan habitat. of their habitats are the production of palm oil (Figure 12.12) and deforestation, and it is our daily purchasing decisions that are driving the rapidity of their demise. As a result, research has started to turn its attention to what can be done to educate people about the plight of the orangutan and other great apes in order to effect change. A study conducted by Elissa Pearson and colleagues (2014) took an innovative approach to this challenge with a conservation education campaign titled ‘Don’t Palm Us Off’, which was implemented at the Melbourne Zoo in Australia. The campaign, which sought to address a lack of public awareness regarding palm oil and to create public support for mandatory labelling of palm oil on food products, utilised an educational video presentation played on site, a YouTube video, celebrity Source: From World Urbanization Prospects 2018 – Urbanization around the world ambassadors and a social media campaign. Evaluation took © United Nations (16 May 2018). Reprinted with permission from the United Nations. place across four time-points over a period of 12 months. Zoo visitors (N = 403) who entered the orangutan exhibit were randomly selected to complete a questionnaire of their knowledge about and their attitudes towards orangutans. They were also asked about their support for introducing palm oil labelling, their previous conservation behaviour, and their intentions for future behaviour. The results of this study indicated significant increases in palm oil awareness, positive attitudes towards orangutans, support for palm oil labelling and the influence this would have upon purchasing behaviour, and significant increases in selfreported conservation behaviour at the end of the campaign and during the follow-up. Additionally, in excess of 160 000 people signed a petition for mandatory palm oil labelling. These findings certainly indicate support for the efficacy of a multifaceted approach to education and conservation, and highlighted the importance of the integration of emerging technologies and traditional on-site education to maximise conservation efforts.

Impact of beauty in animal conservation campaigns This text has provided several examples of areas of life where our perception of beauty impacts on behaviour and on our attitudes towards helping people. Could it also impact on our desire to help

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save a species? An interesting line of research suggests that it may. While the concept of harnessing the cute factor in campaigns designed to increase public support for the conservation of animals is not new, the understanding of the role that the aesthetic appreciation of animals plays in conservation has recently become a priority for researchers in this area. A great deal of research has been conducted in an attempt to identify the visual characteristics of animals for which people have a preference and to uncover the attitudes related to them (Frynta, Lišková, Bültmann, & Burda, 2010; Gunnthorsdottir, 2001; Stokes, 2007). Other research investigating the influence of animal attractiveness on decisions made in relation to conservation have found evidence that aesthetic judgements of wild animals do impact upon a person’s feelings in terms of conservation (Knight, 2008; Gunnthorsdottir, 2001; Huddy & Gunnthorsdottir, 2000) and in terms of decisions made by policymakers (Knegtering, Hendrickx, van der Windt, & Uiterkamp, 2002; Metrick & Weitzman, 1996). With this information in mind, there is no doubt that a greater understanding of the process involved is important to enable conservation of all species. Research designed to test the effects that the aesthetic appreciation of animal species have on public attitudes in developing countries has also been conducted. One study by Joana de Pinho and colleagues (2014) investigated the relative strength of human aesthetic appreciation on local attitudes towards the conservation of four wildlife species. The research team investigated the influence that perceptions of four species as ‘beautiful’ has on local support for their protection (‘rescuing them’); and, in contrast, the influence that perceptions of four other species as ‘ugly’ has on support for their removal from the area. Their findings suggested that the perception of giraffes, gazelles and eland as beautiful had the strongest impact in terms of rescue, whereas the perception of ugliness was the strongest influence in terms of the removal of buffalo, hyena and elephant – but not lions. How does this affect the way that we frame conservation messages for those animals who find themselves in the predicament of being deemed ugly or unattractive?

The role of psychology in a sustainable future How beautiful an animal is deemed to be will impact upon whether or not a person wants to save it.

TRUE

We commenced this chapter with a brief overview of the rich, eclectic past of environmental psychology, which has positioned this exciting area of applied psychology as pivotal to seeking sustainable solutions to the global challenges which unite and divide us. There is no doubt that psychology and environmental psychology will have a role in the push towards meeting the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals targets by 2030. Additionally, they will assist to alter human perceptions of sustainable living beyond that time. Learning what drives the human actions which contribute to unsustainable lifestyles and finding ways of changing the attitudes which underpin those actions will be imperative.

RESEARCH SPOTLIGHT

Source: Courtesy of Professor Joseph Reser.

PROFESSOR JOSEPH RESER, GRIFFITH UNIVERSITY AND DURHAM UNIVERSITY



•

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What are the topic areas of your research? •  Environmental perception and cognition – this covers a broad spectrum from risk perception and environmental aesthetics to environmental legibility and place attachment and meaning. Much of this body of theory and research is founded on our biological history and phylogenetic adaptation to natural and social environments far different from those settings in which most of humanity resides. However, this is an arena where our hard-wired information processing and sense-making are strongly intertwined with social and cultural sense and meaning-making in cue-laden natural, human formed and social environments. Psychosocial environmental impact assessment – this more psychological form of impact assessment examines not

•

only how planned developments impact on community concerns, physical and psychological health and wellbeing, and perceived environmental quality and quality of life, but also the psychological impact of virtual exposure through multimedia coverage of environmental threats, such as industrial contamination, the nuclear threat, natural disasters and climate change. Recent Australian research has addressed the impacts of visitation and use in World Heritage Areas, including the biophysical impacts of visitation on these protected environments and the impacts of these powerful natural environments on visitors. Natural disaster risk communication, preparedness and response – the threat of natural disasters and extreme weather events, and the risk communications about such events, constitute a very relevant applied research domain that falls under the broader headings of the ‘social representation of environmental threats’ and ‘risk representation and communication’. Australian research addressing such environmental stressors and psychological responses has led to the development of now widely adopted psychological preparedness interventions that

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assist individuals in being able to anticipate, identify and manage their emotional and cognitive responses to such stressful circumstances, helping to ensure that exposed residents are able to effectively manage their internal environment as well as the emergency challenges of an impending natural disaster. Which of your research findings have you found most intriguing? A very interesting research finding is that 45% of Australian respondents to two comprehensive national surveys believe that they have personally encountered climate change. Our research findings suggest that such direct experience with climate change is far more significant and influential than direct experience with natural disasters across almost all of our core psychological response variables (e.g., concern, distress, self-efficacy, psychological adaptation, and issue and behavioural engagement). The methodology employed involved comprehensive, online national surveys utilising multi-item psychometric scales, both established and purposedesigned, to measure convergent psychological and sociodemographic variables, along with cross-validating and open qualitative survey items. The most salient and striking finding was the significance and influence of direct personal – and for many transformative – experience as contrasted with indirect, virtual and vicarious exposure and experience. This has sparked multiple considerations relating to the nature and dynamics of cumulative adversity and human adaptation, the existential character of climate change, the interacting processes and motivational power of experiential learning and personal realisation, and the need for a reformulating of stress and coping models in addressing ongoing and interacting environmental stressors. It is likely that such direct personal experience catalyses and ‘makes real’ extensive prior indirect and virtual exposure to, and experience of, the threat of climate change, overcoming the psychological distance of such a

CHAPTER TWELVE

complex, abstract, and geographically and temporally distant global phenomenon, and bringing the biosphere home. (For more see Reser & Swim, 2011; and Reser, Bradley & Ellul, 2014.) How did you become interested in your area of research? Undertaking postgraduate research on environmental aesthetics, environmental risk perception and responses, and the evolutionary hard-wiring of environmental responses in humans and with other species led me to take a more environmental and ecological perspective on the design, planning and fundamental understanding of the multiple natural, built and social environments we inhabit and transact with, including our virtual information environment, and our shared social and cultural ‘realities’. How does your area of research speak to life in Australia and New Zealand? My most current research focus in Australia is that of public risk perceptions, understandings and responses to climate change. Australia is one of the most exposed developed countries and continents to climate change. It is also ‘a land of droughts and flooding rains’. Our current research program has been examining public responses to both climate change and natural disasters, the perceived nature of these seemingly intersecting risk domains, the underlying social, environmental and political issue nature of this hybrid (natural/technological) risk domain, and the nature of individual level and social psychological adaptation processes as Australian society comes to terms with climate change. Australia is viewed with extreme interest as a seriously exposed continent and nation with very real challenges, but also much-heralded resilience and strengths – a litmus test for what lays in store in the context of climate change. What does psychology have to offer here? The 2011 special issue of the American Psychologist on psychology and climate change attempts to address this question (Swim et al., 2011).

Topical Reflection THE GROWTH OF MEGACITIES A megacity is defined as an urban area with more than 10 million residents – based on this there are currently more than 31 megacities around the world (UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2018). According to the 2018 Revision of the World Urbanization Prospects, Tokyo is currently the largest of the megacities, with 37 million inhabitants, followed by Delhi, São Paulo and Mumbai. The UN is predicting that there will be 43 megacities by 2030. As you can see from Figure 12.13 the Americas is the most urbanised region in the world today, with some 82% of its population living in urban areas. Australia, with 68% of urban dwellers, sits in fourth position. The UN has indicated that future increases in the size of the world’s urban population are likely to be highly concentrated in just a few countries, with India, China and Nigeria accounting for 35% of the projected growth between 2018 and 2050. By 2050, they predict that India will have added 416 million urban dwellers, China 255 million and Nigeria 189 million. The rapid growth of megacities presents several challenges, not the least of which are the high levels of inequality, affordable housing and the sense of isolation which is felt by those who move to the city without a strong established social network.

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FIGURE 12.13 Megacities continue to grow as the push towards urban centres increases globally The UN predicts that there will be 43 Megacities by 2050 as the global population continues to drift towards life in urban centres.

Urbanization around the world The Americas are the most urbanized regions in the world today.

74% 50%

82%

43%

81%

68%

More megacities to come! By 2030, 43 cities around the globe will have 10 million or more inhabitants.

43 10 1990

2030

World urbanization prospects: The 2018 revision Access the report: bit.ly/wup2018 • # UNPopulation

Source: United Nations. (2018, 16 May). 2018 Revision of world urbanization prospects. Retrieved from https://www.un.org/development/desa/publications/2018-revision-of-world-urbanization-prospects.html

CHAPTER REVIEW SUMMARY WHAT IS ENVIRONMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY? • Environmental psychology is an applied discipline. • Environmental psychology generally maintains a broad focus on the interplay between humans and their surroundings, encompassing natural, built and virtual environments. • Environmental psychologists often work in conjunction with other professionals from a diverse range of fields.

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PUTTING COMMON SENSE TO THE TEST Environmental psychology is solely focused on the natural environment. FALSE. Although the natural environment is of great interest to environmental psychologists, it is only one of many environments of interest.

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THE NATURE AND ORIGINS OF ENVIRONMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY • As a recognised field, environmental psychology is relatively new. • It was not until the late 1960s that the field really gained momentum with the publication of two journals devoted to it.

ENVIRONMENTAL INFLUENCES ON HUMAN BEHAVIOUR • Environments affect the way we feel, think, behave and communicate. ENVIRONMENTAL CUES • Elements in our environment convey vital information that triggers affective reactions. • Environmental cues influence normative behaviours by strengthening or weakening our responses to normative, hedonic and gain goals.

• • •

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environment, restoration, wellbeing and prosocial behaviour. Homes may vary in permanence and form but are generally regarded as a universal experience. For many, the most powerful memories are those that surround childhood homes. Many researchers have suggested open-plan layouts facilitate greater communication between workers and improve work performance, but there is also a large amount of research that supports counterarguments.

PUTTING COMMON SENSE TO THE TEST Open-plan offices have a positive impact on health. FALSE. The majority of the literature suggests evidence of negative effects that result from a lack of satisfaction, loss of privacy, workplace distractions and stress.

PUTTING COMMON SENSE TO THE TEST

Being at work can make you sick.

Playing French music in a wine shop leads to an increase in purchases of French wine.

TRUE. Those who work in open-plan offices are particularly susceptible to sickness.

TRUE. Environmental cues may play a major role in determining our behaviour. Many of these cues operate outside of our conscious awareness. PERSONAL SPACE • This is one of the most widely studied areas of environmental psychology. • Proxemics is the study of personal space and the communication of that space. CROWDING • Our world is becoming increasingly crowded and many are feeling the effects, which manifests as stress. • Crowding is a function of a number of personal, cultural, situational, emotional and behavioural variables. TERRITORIALITY • Displays of territoriality communicate individual and group ownership – encroachment on these spaces may result in social conflict to repel undesired boundary crossings. • Research suggests three types of territories – primary, secondary and tertiary. PLACE ATTACHMENT • Place attachment is the affective bonds that we form with place. • People experience place in a variety of ways, attaching affective evaluations to specific locations and settings that have acquired some form of meaning. ENVIRONMENTS OF INTEREST • All environments (including virtual environments) are of interest to an environmental psychologist, particularly the great outdoors, homes and the workplace. THE GREAT OUTDOORS • A great deal of research has investigated ways of dealing with our increasingly stressful lifestyle, a good deal of which has been directed towards natural environments. • Research has suggested links between the natural

ENVIRONMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY AND SUSTAINABLE BEHAVIOURS • Psychologists will be in the front line of the war on unsustainable behaviours. THE HUMAN FOOTPRINT • By 2050 we will need two Earths to resource our growing population. EARTH OVERSHOOT DAY • The day when our demand for ecological resources and services in a given year outstrips what Earth can generate. THE TRAGEDY OF OUR GLOBAL COMMONS DILEMMA • The overexploitation of Earth’s resources for individual gain has placed the global population at risk.

CLIMATE CHANGE • As psychologists we are unavoidably immersed in the diversity of the problem. ATTITUDES TOWARDS CLIMATE CHANGE • Surveys have suggested variations in attitudes towards climate change over time. • Global indications suggest that although many people are aware of climate change, many still do not perceive it as a personal threat. WEATHER AND CLIMATE CHANGE PERCEPTION • Research suggests that weather may influence our attitudes towards climate change. • Direct experience with weather events such as flooding, may increase awareness of climate change. CLIMATE CHANGE AND MENTAL HEALTH • The impact of climate change is impacting on rates of depression, anxiety, post-traumatic stress and substance abuse in the wake of extreme weather events.

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CLIMATE CHANGE REFUGEES • The number of people who need to escape their homes as a result of climate change is expected to increase in coming years. • Research has suggested many barriers that prevent a person from taking climate change action. PSYCHOLOGICAL BARRIERS TO ACTION • Understanding the motives that drive us to action or inaction is of great interest to psychologists. • Research has suggested many barriers that prevent a person from taking action. LINKING ENVIRONMENTAL CUES AND SUSTAINABLE BEHAVIOURS • Psychology plays an important role in educating people on sustainable behaviour. SOCIAL NORMS AND PRO-ENVIRONMENTAL BEHAVIOUR • Social norms can be used to increase pro-environmental behaviours. • Most Australians and New Zealanders say they are concerned about the environment. ENVIRONMENTAL ATTITUDES • Research suggests that attitudes do not always translate into behaviours.

•

Most Australians and New Zealanders say they are concerned about the environment.

ENVIRONMENTALLY RESPONSIBLE BEHAVIOUR • Different strategies tailored to meet the needs of different groups are needed to get people to act. • Understanding how pro-environmental messages influence behaviour is a key element in promoting sustainable behaviour. FIGHTING EXTINCTION • Research suggests the importance of using emerging technologies alongside traditional educational programs to maximise conservation efforts.

PUTTING COMMON SENSE TO THE TEST How beautiful an animal is deemed to be will impact upon whether or not a person wants to save it. TRUE. Unfortunately, research confirms that not only is beauty in the eye of the beholder but that it may also determine the fate of species that are deemed to be unattractive.

LINKAGES In this chapter we have talked about the use of social norms to encourage people to change behaviours to save the environment. In Chapter 10 we examine the way that

CHAPTER

12

social norms increase helping behaviour. The `Linkages’ diagram below shows connections to other areas of social psychology.

Environmental psychology

LINKAGES

Mental shortcuts – the use of cognitive heuristics

CHAPTER

3

538

Perceiving others

Social norms increase helping behaviours

CHAPTER

10

Helping others

The impact of stress in relation to health and wellbeing

CHAPTER

14

Stress, health and wellbeing

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REVIEW QUIZ 1 What is environmental psychology primarily concerned? a The effect of the environment on humans. b The effect of humans on the environment. c The interaction between humans and the environment. d All of the above. 2 Research findings have demonstrated that feeling crowded elicits: a increased eye contact. b increased willingness to discuss intimate topics. c strengthening of social networks. d withdrawal from contact. 3 With long-term exposure to high density: a the availability of social support increases. b social support networks become increasingly effective. c social support networks tend to be disrupted and less efficient. d friendship groups become more important and broaden.

4 What is the study of how people use space known as? a Proxemics. b Social ecology. c Behaviour effect. d Psychological ecology. e Transactional analysis. 5 Altman’s ________territory may be personalised somewhat, but ownership is shared. a public b private c external d secondary e personal

WEBLINKS United Nations Sustainable Development Goals https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/sustainabledevelopment-goals Outlines each of the UN Sustainable Development Goals and related information. Australian Conservation Foundation https://www.acf.org.au A site with many useful resources and tips for minimising your impact on the environment. New Zealand Department of Conservation https://www.doc.govt.nz A New Zealand Government site with a wealth of information on conservation issues of relevance to New Zealand, plus links to projects that you can get involved in. Environmental Design Research Association https://www.edra.org/default.aspx The site of this international, interdisciplinary organisation, with a variety of resources on environment and behaviour research.

What keeps a climate change scientist up at night? https://vimeo.com/channels/theclimateinstitute/75000023 An interview by the Climate Institute of 20 climate scientists from the University of New South Wales, University of Melbourne, Monash University and CSIRO to find out how we can close the gap between the science of climate change and public opinion. World Wide Fund for Nature Australia https://www.wwf.org.au A site with links to many of the conservation programs being conducted in Australia and globally, plus resources on endangered and critically endangered species and links to animal adoption programs. World Wide Fund for Nature New Zealand https://www.wwf.org.nz The New Zealand equivalent to the Australian WWF site, with links to conservation programs being conducted in New Zealand and internationally.

Green Practice http://www.greenpractice.org.au/resources-and-links A site with information on improving the sustainable features of your office or workplace, like purchasing green power, installing energy-efficient appliances and reducing air travel.

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Teddy, L., Nikora, J., Waimarie, L., & Guerin, B. (2008). Place attachment of Ngai Te Ahi to Hairini Marae. MAI Review, 1, Art. 3. Thomas, J. (2009). The social environment of public transport. Wellington: Victoria University of Wellington. Tognoli, J. (1987). Residential environments. In D. Stokols & I. Altman (Eds.), Handbook of environmental psychology (pp. 655–690). New York, NY: Wiley. Tonge, J., Moore, S. A., Beckley, L. E., & Ryan, M. (2010). The place attachment of visitors to Ningaloo Marine Park, north-western Australia. In 16th International Symposium on Society and Natural Resource Management, 6–10 June, Corpus Christi, US. Townsend, M., & Ebden, M., (2006). ‘Feel blue, touch green’: Final report of a project undertaken by Deakin University, Barwon Health, Parks Victoria, Alcoa Anglesea, ANGAIR and Surf Coast Shire. Deakin University, Melbourne. Ulrich, R. S. (1979). Visual landscapes and psychological well-being. Landscape Research, 4, 17–19. Ulrich, R. S. (1984). View through a window may influence recovery from surgery. Science, 224, 420–421. Ulrich, R. S. (1993). Biophilia, biophobia, and natural landscapes. In S. R. Kellert & E. O. Wilson (Eds.), The biophilia hypothesis (pp. 73–137). Washington, DC: Island Press. Ulrich, R. S., & Simons, R. F. (1986). Recovery from stress during exposure to everyday outdoor environments. In J. Wineman, R. Barnes & C. Zimring (Eds.), The costs of not knowing: Proceedings of the Seventeenth Annual Conference of the Environmental Design Research Association. Washington DC: Environmental Design Research Association. United Nations (2015) Millennium development goals and beyond 2015. Retrieved from http://www. un.org/millenniumgoals/ United Nations. (2015). Sustainable Development Goals. Retrieved from https://www.un.org/ sustainabledevelopment/sustainable-developmentgoals/

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torture? International Journal of Social Psychiatry, 63, 674–685. Williams, D. R., Anderson, B. S., & McDonald, C. D., & Patterson, M. E. (1995, 4–8 October). Measuring place attachment: More preliminary results. Paper presented at the 1995 NRPA Leisure Research Symposium, San Antonio, TX. Retrieved from http://www.fs.fed.us/rm/ value/ research-place.html Williams, D. R., & Roggenbuck, J. W. (1989, October). Measuring place attachment: Some preliminary results. Paper presented at the NRPA Symposium on Leisure Research, San Antonio, TX. Retrieved from http://www .fs.fed.us/rm/value/ research-place.html Wollman, N., Kelly, B. M., & Bordens, K. S. (1994). Environmental and intrapersonal predictors of reactions to potential territorial intrusions in the workplace. Environment and Behavior, 26, 179–194. World Health Organization. (2018). Climate change and health: Key facts. Retrieved from https://www.who. int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/climate-change-andhealth World Wide Fund for Nature. (2018). Living Planet Report 2018: Aiming higher. Retrieved from https:// www.footprintnetwork.org/content/uploads/2018/10/ LPR-2018-full-report.pdf Woroniecka-Krzyzanowska, D. (2013). Identity and place in extended exile: The case of a Palestinian refugee city-camp. Studia Universitatis Babes-Bolyai, 58(1), 21. Zhang, J. W., Howell, R. T., & Iyer, R. (2014). Engagement with natural beauty moderates the positive relation between connectedness with nature and psychological well-being. Journal of Environmental Psychology, 38, 55–63. Zhang, J. W., Piff, P. K., Iyer, R., Koleva, S., & Keltner, D. (2014). An occasion for unselfing: Beautiful nature leads to prosociality. Journal of Environmental Psychology, 37, 61–72.

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CHAPTER

Community psychology

Learning Objectives By the end of this chapter, you should be able to: 1 identify the ethos which underpins community psychology, the inter-relationships between people and the systems with which they interact, and the core values of community psychology and how they are applied in real-life settings 2 understand the people, communities and contexts with which community psychologists work 3 identify the Sustainable Development Goals which are aligned with the work of a community psychologist.

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suicide prevention. Research investigating the role that community psychologists may play in preventing youth suicide and self-harm was conducted by Andrew Day and Danielle Newton (2017). Their findings indicated that community psychologists can play a vital role in implementing community-based interventions. We will take a closer look at what these researchers suggested in the Topical Reflection feature at the end of the chapter – for now though we examine the application of social psychology in the context of community.

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Source: Newspix/Kris Reichl

Community psychologists work in a variety of settings within Australia and New Zealand. The focus of community psychology is both applied and theoretical, but more often than not it is a combination of both. Community psychologists maintain an eclectic approach to practice, applying their knowledge of psychological theory framed by a core set of values, concepts and principles to guide research and action in order to understand the problems inherent in the populations they deal with to create real-world solutions and strategies which advocate change and empowerment in the community. Community psychology also maintains an interest in the prevention of problems and the promotion of health and wellbeing. An issue of great concern in Australia, New Zealand and many other countries throughout the world is suicide and

COMMUNITY PSYCHOLOGY

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PUTTING COMMON SENSE TO THE TEST Circle Your Answer T

F

A sense of community may be improved or maintained as a result of time spent using social media.

T

F

The circulation of myths and misinformation is one of the biggest barriers to understanding the issues affecting refugees and asylum seekers.

T

F

On a global scale, rates of poverty are declining.

T

F

All age groups are equally disadvantaged when it comes to unemployment.

INTRODUCTION COMMUNITY PSYCHOLOGY i s a holistic, systems-based approach to understanding the relationships between people, the community and the environments in which they live and interact. It is an applied area of social psychology that seeks to understand the context in which we live and the impact that this has upon our wellbeing, behaviours, cognitions and emotions. At the very heart of community psychology is diversity, with research spanning areas such as poverty, education, empowerment, delinquency and migration.

THE ORIGINS OF COMMUNITY PSYCHOLOGY

Community psychology

A holistic, systemsbased approach to the understanding of the relationships between people, the community and the social worlds in which they live and interact.

As a field, community psychology is relatively new, with history tracing back to the 1960s. It is developing and expanding rapidly, with community psychologists working to understand and provide interventions for a wide range of social and mental health problems. It is both applied and theoretical by nature, working from the identification of a problem to the structural changes designed in response to community issues that impact upon individuals, groups and entire communities. So, in effect community psychologists focus on second order change – changing systems and structures to adjust the person–environment fit – rather than first order change – changing individuals in a setting to fix a problem. Research and interventions take place in public and private community settings, enhancing wellbeing, promoting social justice and fostering collaboration and empowerment, with full recognition that change happens across multiple levels. Community psychologists work collaboratively with others, building on the existing strengths of people, organisations and FIGURE 13.1 The ecological systems approach – each communities to create sustainable change, and may be found in system fits inside the others, with the individual at the core a variety of settings including academia, government and nonThe ecological systems approach has often been likened to a profit organisations. In the sections which follow we will take set of nested structures similar to Russian nesting dolls – each a closer look at this exciting field and some of the core values system fits inside the others, with the individual at the core. For which underpin research and practice in the field.

Ecological systems approach The ecological systems approach, which originated with Urie Bronfenbrenner (1979), provides a logical framework for understanding both the context in which the community exists and the people within the context of that community. It is a holistic approach that operates under the assumption that communities are open systems with many different levels and connections. Attention is directed towards the transactions between the individual and the opportunities, resources and constraints of the social contexts in which they live – it is an approach which has often been likened to a set of nested structures similar to the Russian dolls pictured in Figure 13.1. In terms of community psychology, individuals, societies and the levels in between them are interdependent – all overlapping with the individual and their immediate context at the centre. Let us take a closer look at how this works.

a community psychologist, it is the relationships between the dolls that are important. So, although you can take the dolls apart, each of the surrounding layers is interdependent; the relationships between them are vital to understanding people and the social systems in which they live.

Source: iStock.com/KevinDyer

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FIGURE 13.2 The ecological model underpinning community psychology

Levels of analysis

From the perspective of the ecological systems approach, people develop within a set of interrelated systems. Look at Figure 13.2 – A community psychologist is concerned with the interactions the individual is found at the core, and the second layer is between people and the settings in which they live. An ecological the microsystem. The microsystem embraces relationships systems approach considers the multiple levels of interaction a that have direct impact on the individual (e.g., mother–child, person has and the settings in which they occur. father–child, teacher–child relationships). But rather than considering the individual components of the microsystems, a Macrosystems Cultures Societies community psychologist is interested in the social unit of which they are part. Consider for example a family unit – each member Governments Corporations Social movements forms interpersonal relationships, they take on roles and Mass media Belief systems share activities, power within the roles may shift over time and intermittently, and family members may be a source of support, Localities conflict or burden at any given time. The setting in which all Neighbourhoods Cities of this occurs is of fundamental importance to a community Towns Rural areas psychologist (Kloos, Hill, Thomas, Wandersman, & Elias, 2012). Individuals The next level consists of organisations, which are larger Organisations than microsystems with a formal structure, as seen in healthcare Schools settings, universities, workplaces, treatment programs and Microsystems Local business or labour Families Classroom community groups. Each organisation contains microsystems; groups Friends Work group Religious congregations so again, the dynamics of the organisation as a whole and the Community coalitions culture which exists within it are of importance. However, all organisations exist within a larger context and sometimes we find organisations within organisations – the inter-relationships are the key. Next, we have localities – which are geographic, such as rural and remote communities, urban neighbourhoods, entire cities and countries. They contain organisations, microsystems and individuals, all Microsystem of which are inter-related. Environments in which Lastly, the macrosystem is the furthest distance from the individual. It is represented by the a person repeatedly engages in direct, cultural, political and ideological factors that shape and influence the individual, the microsystems, the personal interaction with organisations and the localities. Macrosystems include societies, populations, social movements, mass others. media, governments and political parties, just to name a few (Kloos et al., 2012). Kelly and his colleagues (2000) also suggested four ecological principles which are important to Macrosystem Societal, cultural, understanding human environments: political and ideological 1 Principle of interdependence – acknowledges that all social systems have multiple related parts and factors that shape and multiple relationships to other social systems. This means that a change in one component affects and influence people. potentially changes other components of that system. 2 Cycling of resources – the use, distribution, conservation and transformation of resources which are present in a social setting. Resources may be personal, social or physical, such as individuals, events and community settings. 3 Principle of adaptation – the transactions between people and environments. Both impact each other so both must adapt to changes in each other. 4 Succession – changes in social settings, social systems and the people within them – the recognition that change is constant and inevitable underlies the need to anticipate and respond to future needs, changes to resources and organisations. The ecological systems approach has framed a great deal of the research conducted in community psychology, with many researchers and practitioners demonstrating concern about issues on a global, national and local scale that affect the individuals with whom they work. Their approach to research is as wide as the topics they examine, with methods including the use of qualitative interviews, focus groups, quantitative field research, program evaluations and evaluation research. For example, community psychologists may conduct research to assess the quality of community-based programs or to evaluate program outcomes. Interventions include the development of research-driven programs, community consultations, social action and social policy advocacy – all of which are considered within the frame of the ecological systems in which an individual lives.

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Seven core values One of the defining features of community psychology is the core values which underpin the approach to research and practice (Dalton, Elias, & Wandersman 2007; Duffy and Wong, 2003; Dzidic, Breen, & Bishop, 2013). The seven core values will frame this chapter, and will show how community psychology is applied in real-world settings; they include: 1 individual and family wellness 2 sense of community 3 putting common sense to the test 4 respect for human diversity 5 social justice, empowerment and participation 6 collaboration and community strengths 7 empirical grounding. Following from the ecological systems approach we will start with the values most closely linked to the individual level of analysis (values 1 to 3) and work our way out to the values which are more closely aligned to the localities and macrosystem levels (values 4 to 7).

Individual and family wellness Rather than focusing on the aetiology and remediation of mental illness, community psychologists are more interested in identifying and understanding the factors that contribute to wellbeing and the development of programs that help to prevent physical and psychological problems. They are concerned with the physical and psychological wellbeing of all people and seek preventative measures as a means to promote individual wellness. From a community psychology perspective, elements such as the links between stress and illness, the causes of stress in our everyday lives and common coping mechanisms, as well as the pursuit of happiness, may be used as indicators and outcome criteria for researching, developing and testing interventions or prevention programs. (Chapter 14 discusses in further detail health and wellbeing, and all these elements, from the perspective of health psychology.) Community psychologists address systemic barriers to good health and wellbeing, supporting behaviour change in individuals, families and groups, while working at the broader level to reduce inequality. With full recognition of the social determinants of health that lie in disadvantage and exclusion, they implement systems and structures to enable and empower communities.

Sense of community A sense of community is the perception of belongingness, interdependence and mutual commitment that links individuals in a collective unity; that is, a feeling of connectedness to a larger group. We often hear this term in the media in reference to community responses to natural disasters. It also appears in advertising for real estate as a sales pitch designed to convince prospective buyers of a desirable community in which to live. It is also something that religious groups, universities and workplaces strive to achieve it (McMillan & Chavis, 1986; Pretty, Bishop, Fisher, & Sonn, 2006). The term also pertains to relational communities (i.e., those with shared goals and activities, such as churches, professional associations, sporting groups and online communities) and geographical communities (i.e., neighbourhoods, cities, islands and nations). Sense of community became a topic of interest in 1974 when Seymour Sarason suggested that it should form the conceptual centre of community psychology. In Sarason’s opinion, when people are integrated into networks where they experience belongingness, meaningful roles and relationships, they are less likely to experience isolation and more likely to maintain healthy levels of psychological wellbeing and quality of life. In 1986, research conducted by David McMillan and David Chavis suggested that a sense of community could be further defined in relation to four major components: membership, influence, integration and fulfilment of needs, and shared emotional connection. The first component, membership, is defined primarily in relation to five dimensions: 1 boundaries – consist of elements indicating who belongs to the group and who does not 2 emotional safety – the feeling of security as a result of membership 3 sense of belonging – when accepted by the group 4 personal investment – when working as part of a community leads to feelings of having earned membership, which is regarded as valuable and meaningful 5 common system of symbols – a logo that has been assigned to a community, such as a flag or a landmark.

Sense of community

The perception of belongingness, interdependence and mutual commitment that links individuals in a collective unity.

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Although membership boundaries provide a platform from which intimate social connections can develop, they can also repel, reject and isolate those who are deemed inappropriate or deviant, such as is often the case with refugees, ethnic and Indigenous minorities, who are seen as culturally different. The second component, influence, refers to the bi-directional relationship between an individual and the community. While group members need to feel that they can influence what a group does, the cohesiveness of the group depends on its ability to influence its members. The third component, integration and the fulfilment of needs, relates to the continued reinforcement that people receive from group membership. In this context, needs are those that are desired and valued, such as the rewards that one receives from membership (e.g., the status that one gains from living in prestigious properties at Point Piper in Sydney or Herne Bay in New Zealand). The final component, shared emotional connection, is based largely upon the identification and reification of a shared history. The more important a shared event in the history of the group, the greater the bond is likely to be (e.g., the bonds that are formed during an event such as a natural disaster are particularly strong, as we saw in Chapter 10). According to McMillan and Chavis (1986), all four components fit together in a circular and selfreinforcing way. But what does a sense of community mean in terms of our everyday interactions with the world in which we live? The response to this question, of course, is quite complex. A sense of community helps to unite people in times of need – something that the people of Australia and New Zealand have a good deal of experience with. Prior to the earthquake that devastated Christchurch in 2010, residents reported lower levels of sense of community than the national average. Following the earthquake, however, Christchurch residents recorded slightly higher levels (55%) than elsewhere in New Zealand (53%) (Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority, 2014). But how is it that strangers come together during times of crisis and work so well cooperatively, as seen in Figure 13.3? Omoto and Snyder (2002) suggest that the answer is the development of a sense of community that encourages and maintains people’s connection and the responsibility they feel towards each other, even though they are not personally acquainted. A great deal of research has provided evidence of links between sense of community and wellbeing. In a survey conducted with a sample of 11 709 Australians, Helen Berry and Jennifer Welsh (2010) found that sense of community was positively related to both psychological and physical wellbeing. Similarly, the research of Bradley Jorgensen and colleagues (2010) found that a greater sense of community contributes to wellbeing, irrespective of whether a person resides in higher- or lower-income households. Stephanie Kutek and colleagues (2011) investigated the importance of social support and sense of community in relation to wellbeing in men who live in rural areas of Australia. Their findings indicated higher levels of subjective wellbeing for men with more social support and a greater sense of community, and suggested that both social support and sense of community may in fact act as a stress buffer for rural men. These findings are important as a first step in understanding FIGURE 13.3 Sense of community in the aftermath of the issues relevant to the community of interest. At a greater a disaster level, these findings help community psychologists to inform Sense of community is often strengthened by the shared community members, organisations and policymakers of the emotional connections we experience in the aftermath of disasters such as the 2011 Christchurch earthquake. capacity of both social supports and sense of community to buffer stress and promote wellbeing. Based on these findings the provision of structural, community-based approaches may have greater capacity to cost-effectively provide this support, rather than the trend towards individual-based approaches for mental health (Kutek, Turnbull, & Fairweather-Schmidt, 2011). Community-based initiatives that closely align with the outcomes of this research are the community driven Men’s Sheds. Research suggests that Men’s Sheds, which vary in terms of their focus, resources, programs and membership base, offer direct and indirect opportunities for improved health and wellbeing for shedders and their families. Men’s Sheds help to combat the effects of social isolation, provide a sense of purpose and self-esteem, and are linked to improvements in physical and mental health and wellbeing (Flood & Blair, 2013). Source: Shutterstock.com/Lakeview Images

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Social media and sense of community

FIGURE 13.4 ‘Tassie Fires – We Can Help’ Facebook page Interesting research conducted by Douglas Paton and Melanie Melanie Irons set up a Facebook page called ‘Tassie Fires – Irons (2016) demonstrated the tremendous power of social We Can Help’ to help people communicate during the 2013 media to rally a sense of community in the aftermath of disaster. Tasmanian bushfires. The social media page reached over two Their research considered the experience of people who used million people in three weeks, uniting people through a sense the Facebook page ‘Tassie Fires – We Can Help’, which was of community. specifically developed to assist response and recovery during the 2013 Tasmanian bushfire disaster (see Figure 13.4). Their findings indicated that the establishment and management of Facebook-based communications strategically engineered to support disaster response and recovery, can facilitate effective disaster communication, enable and sustain the development of a sense of community, and in turn help the affected populations Source: Courtesy of Melanie Irons via Facebook develop and apply collaborative disaster response strategies. Research has also indicated the importance of technology in terms of wellbeing and sense of community. For example, in a study investigating the use of electronic communication, a sense of community and the perception of wellbeing in a sample of university students, A sense of community Sara Henry (2012) found that the more time spent using technology that was social in nature (e.g., Facebook, may be improved or maintained as a talking via telephone or interacting in virtual chat rooms), the greater the sense of community and result of time spent perception of wellbeing. By contrast, the greater the time spent using technologies that were solitary in using social media. nature (e.g., playing video and computer games or surfing the internet), the lower the scores on measures of TRUE wellbeing and sense of community. But the effect of technology is not limited to university students and the younger generation. Research conducted by Shina Sum and colleagues (2009), designed to explore the effect of internet use on older Australian adults’ sense of community, found a positive association between the sense of belonging to an online community, sense of community, and wellbeing. For the seniors who took part in this study, the use of the internet for communication purposes and as a source of information, and the frequency and history of their use, were consistently related to a greater sense of community, wellbeing and satisfaction.

Respect for human diversity Human diversity is a theme that runs throughout this text. In each of the chapters we have highlighted some of the interesting areas of research which illustrate the differences and the similarities of people around the world. For a community psychologist, an appreciation of and respect for human diversity is one of the core values which underpin research and action. Some of the key dimensions that are considered in community psychology are culture, race, ethnicity, locality, social class, gender, sexual orientation, ability or disability, nationality and intergenerational differences (Kloos et al., 2012). You will see many of these aspects of diversity in the sections which follow when we explore some of the contexts in which community psychologists may be found.

Social justice, empowerment and participation Community psychologists are particularly interested in the social issues of the day. They focus on empowering marginalised groups, enhancing their access to economic, political and psychological resources. They advocate for change or implementation of social policies and for changes in public attitudes. They engage with members of oppressed populations and are genuinely concerned with the wellbeing of all people in the community. For community psychologists social justice takes two forms – distributive and procedural. Distributive justice focuses on the allocation of resources for a population, such as funding, access to health services and education, and the outcomes of a program or social policy. Procedural justice on the other hand focuses on whether or not the process of collective decision-making includes a fair representation of the people involved, and is therefore more focused on planning and implementation (Drew, Bishop, & Syme, 2002; Fondacaro & Weinberg, 2002). Advocating for the needs of marginalised groups, equitable access to health services and resources represents a substantial portion of the role of community psychologists. They traditionally work with some of the most disadvantaged people in our society, including Indigenous populations, homeless people, refugees, rural and remote communities, people living with a disability, and ageing populations.

Distributive justice

Focuses on the allocation of resources for a population, such as funding, access to health services and education, and the outcomes of a program or social policy.

Procedural justice

Focuses on whether or not the processes of collective decisionmaking include a fair representation of the people involved.

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Often considered hand in hand with social justice are empowerment and citizen participation. Community psychologists work in partnership with a range of stakeholders and organisations to empower families and communities to address risk factors which impact their health and wellbeing. Citizen participation is encouraged, enabling the potential of people to control their own lives, across multiple levels and contexts. Engaging community members to participate in and influence decisions by larger organisations that affect their future is fundamental to this approach (Kloos et al., 2012). Clear examples of this can be seen with community psychologists working with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people in Australia. Working to develop respectful partnerships at an individual, family and community level is paramount to develop trust, relationships and the cultural competence needed to deliver effective interventions. The role of a community psychologist in this context is important for achieving equity in mental health outcomes for rural and remote communities and for closing the gap in social and emotional wellbeing and mental health for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander populations and communities (InPsych, 2010).

Collaboration and community strengths Community psychology embraces a strengths-based perspective by regarding citizens and community groups as the sources of solutions to community problems. Working in partnership with community members, both contribute knowledge and resources, and both participate in making decisions. The expertise of the community psychologist paired with the life experiences, wisdom, social networks, organisations, cultural traditions, personal and community strengths is a powerful combination to enact change.

Empirical grounding The concept of research informing action is certainly not new for psychology, so it should come as no surprise to find a core value related to empirical research. The ethos of merging research with community action while respecting the context and interests of the community in which it occurred is the key to understanding individual and social problems and central to effective program development, community action and social policy.

PEOPLE, COMMUNITY AND CONTEXT In social psychology we pay considerable attention to the individual and the groups in which they find themselves. But of course, we cannot separate the individual or the group from the contexts in which they live, so in reality the context exerts as much influence on us as individual and group characteristics. Community psychology has devoted considerable attention to investigating the contextual effects that a community has upon its members, and vice versa. A wide range of environments and communities have been considered, with community psychologists working in and with communities of varying scale and denomination. In this section, we take a look at some of the communities of interest in Australia and New Zealand as we explore the impact of the setting on the individual and those who share their life story.

FIFO, DIDO and BIBO The fly-in fly-out (FIFO), drive-in drive-out (DIDO) and bus-in bus-out (BIBO) workforce employed in the Australia mining industry represents quite a large chunk of the population these days. The Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) in 2015 suggested that almost a quarter of million people are reliant on the mining industry as their source of income. FIFO refers specifically to employment in relatively remote locations where food and accommodation is provided on site for employees (Storey, 2001). Workers remain on site for a fixed period, followed by a fixed period at home (e.g., working 12-hour shifts for 7 days on site, followed by 7 days off), with employees commuting by plane from their home-base to the jobsite. This is the most common form of transport for land-based mining and the offshore oil industry (Storey & Shrimpton, 1991). DIDO refers to work where the employee drives to and from work and generally applies to mines that are close to major cities. BIBO employees take a bus to and from the work site; shifts are generally of shorter duration, utilising employees who live within a day’s drive of the mine.

Mining communities Although the mining industry is responsible for the employment of a considerable number of people in Australia, this industry does not come without its fair share of problems, many of which are linked to the living conditions. The literature surrounding the impact that this form of work has upon the employees 550

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and their families has become quite prolific over the past decade. Not surprisingly, the work schedules of FIFO workers present a range of difficulties for families and the communities in which they live. The House of Representatives Standing Committee on Regional Australia (2013) report Cancer of the Bush or Salvation for our Cities? Fly-in, fly-out and Drive-in, Drive-out Workforce Practices in Regional Australia provided an overview of many of the problems that are endemic in the industry. The report drew attention to issues such as the impact that these work practices have on those employed in the sector and the effects on the communities in which they work – the perceived decline in social cohesion, community safety and community image; the divide between FIFO workers and locals; the impact on the housing market in terms of inflated costs and lack of maintenance of housing stock.

Impact on individual and family wellness At an individual level, it seems that the impact of work practices for those employed in the mining sector includes elevated stress levels, depression, a culture of binge drinking and recreational drug use, poor health, obesity, poor relationship quality, family disruption and stress, and feelings of loneliness and isolation (Joyce, Tomlin, Somerford, & Weeramanthri, 2013; Morris, 2012; Torkington, Larkins, & Gupta, 2011; Tynan et al., 2017). A report conducted by Lifeline (Henry, Hamilton, Watson, & McDonald, 2013) suggested that many FIFO workers were oblivious to the realities of this form of lifestyle before they started work. It also suggested that the greatest impact upon workers and their stress levels was the separation from their families and their home environment, and the long shifts that disrupted sleep patterns, with many resorting to alcohol or drugs to solve this problem. Support services in this industry appear to be rather lacking, with one in five workers claiming that they do not have access to mental health or on-site counselling services; many also said that the stigma involved in accessing this form of service meant that they were unlikely to seek help even if it were available. Thus, the provision of support is of primary importance as the industry forges ahead. There is a great deal of research that documents the delicate balancing of work and family that is required, and the effects that this has on marital satisfaction and stability (Saginak & Saginak, 2005; Sharma & Rees, 2007). The research also tells us a great deal about the difficulties of working non-standard and inflexible hours when it comes to trying to achieve a work–life balance in this sector (Grosswald, 2003; Heiler, Pickersgill, & Briggs, 2001; Presser, 2000). For example, research conducted by Susan Clifford (2009) found that employee and partner dissatisfaction in a sample of Western Australia miners revolved around a number of key issues including the inability to participate in community events, being tired early in the period they spend at home, missing important events at home and wanting to be more involved in the daily lives of their family. For their partners, lack of quality relationship time and having their partner miss important life events were the most significant sources of dissatisfaction. Recent research conducted by Gardner, Alfrey, Vandelanotte and Rebar (2018) highlighted the difficulties workers face in adjusting between the responsibilities of on-shift and off-shift lives, and managing potential psychological distance that develops while they are on site. The workers that they interviewed emphasised the importance of maintaining quality communication and support from family members. Workers and their partners relied upon the regular use of support networks to maintain mental health and wellbeing. Further research has provided evidence that family cohesion, connectedness, flexibility and meaningful communication are important factors for buffering from potential negative effects of FIFO life in terms of wellbeing; while spending quality time with family helps in terms of adjusting to and managing the FIFO lifestyle (Lester et al., 2015; Taylor & Simmonds, 2009). But there are positives as well. Consider the high remuneration of these workers. The average wage in this sector was reported to be almost $2600 per week in 2017 (ABS, 2017a), so financial security does to some degree offset the negatives. There is also the opportunity to spend long periods of quality time with family during the downtime between shifts. Research conducted by Jill Taylor and Janette Simmonds of Monash University (2009) indicated that the profile of Western Australian FIFO families that took part in their study was a relatively healthy one. Their findings provided evidence of families who were generally happy, and who reported healthy levels of cohesion (balancing separateness and togetherness) and flexibility (balancing stability and change), which were enhanced and sustained by strong communication skills. Overall, the results of this research suggested that gaining a better understanding of the impacts of the FIFO lifestyle can assist families who are considering finding work in a FIFO situation and those already engaged in FIFO. It will also impact the practices of counsellors working with families, the companies who employ FIFO workers and the communities in which they live.

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Women and the mining sector A challenge for the mining sector in general is to reduce the traditionally unequal gendered structure of its workforce. A great deal of time and research funding has been devoted to understanding the gender imbalance that is found throughout the industry, and the experience of women who have managed to gain a foothold in the industry. To give you an indication of the extent of the issue, the Workplace Gender Equality Agency’s 2016–17 data suggest that only 16% of employees, 2.8% of chief executive officers and 14.8% of key management personnel in the mining industry in Australia were women (Workplace Gender Equity Agency, 2017). And although the provision of services on site are slowly becoming more female-friendly (e.g., the introduction of contracts that allow working hours to be compressed and that provide for maternity leave), women are still underpaid when compared with their male counterparts. This in part reflects the different types of positions that are afforded to women, with the majority employed in clerical and administrative roles. Only 11% of machinery operators and drivers were women. Julie Pirotta (2009) suggests that there are a number of strong attractions to FIFO work for women as well as distinct drawbacks. In a small qualitative study of female FIFO workers, she found that some participants thought this type of work was isolating (on a professional and social level) and lonely, they found it difficult to make and maintain friendships, and referred to the long hours on site as physically, emotionally and psychologically demanding. Some also mentioned issues that result from working in a male-dominated environment, including the lack of female contact, coping with male behaviours, a lack of privacy, being the focus of attention, and suffering from workplace harassment and discrimination. On the flipside, however, they also reported many aspects that they felt were positive, such as financial security, work satisfaction, career advancement, a sense of belonging, the ability to fulfil a sense of adventure and the potential to build long-term friendships. There are, however, signs of change, with large mining companies such as BHP setting an aspirational goal to achieve gender balance by 2025 (Chessell, 2016). Some of the strategies being implemented include wage mapping and gap analysis, introducing childcare facilities to help women return to work after parental leave, flexible work conditions, the implementation of gender-aware trainee programs, and greater efforts toward recruiting women to higher positions (Abrahamsson et al., 2014; AusIMM, 2018).

Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people and the mining sector The Great Australian Mine located on the outskirts of Cloncurry, a small town in rural Queensland, has managed to move away from the trend of FIFO employment by hiring a local workforce. Since February 2013 the mine has reduced its FIFO workforce from 80% to 20% in a move that has placed a focus on sustainable local employees. According to Indigenous Liaison Officer Leon Gertz, local people offer a better level of stability as they already have a connection to, and understanding of, the area, and they generally have secure housing and are less likely to move on after a period of time (Validakis, 2013). Many of these workers have been recruited from the Dugalunji Training Camp near Camooweal, which was set up to host a 10-week training course to prepare people for work in the mining industry, with participants guaranteed employment on completion of the course. Even though data from the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Census (ABS, 2017b) show a 22% increase in employment in the mining industry between 2011–2016, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander workers remain underrepresented in this industry. But this appears to be changing. According to the Rio Tinto Reconciliation Action Plan 2016–2019, the company employed 1450 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander trainees, apprentices and graduates; it supported 50 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander students in tertiary studies, thousands of children in primary and secondary school education programs, and had trained over 700 people in pre-employment programs since the year 2000. The company had also provided cultural awareness training for over 13 000 employees, held in excess of 40 NAIDOC week or Reconciliation events each year and invested over $5 million in community ventures set up to support Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people. Their goal is to continue providing support across the employment lifecycle from early education to tertiary, retaining its Indigenous workforce and actively developing career pathways (Rio Tinto, 2016). Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander workers do experience difficulties associated with working in the mining industry, such as inflexible employment practices. They also experience issues which result from cultural practices and connection to kin and country, such as the distance from their workplace to their local community; camp accommodation that houses them away from country, support networks and family groups; and the feelings of isolation that result (House of Representatives Standing Committee on Regional Australia, 2013). 552

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FIFO and DIDO health workers It is not just the mining industry that relies upon FIFO and DIDO arrangements. Health service providers to remote communities also regularly employ the practice. There are a number of differences, of course. While a good number of mining sector workers are housed on site, this is not the case for FIFO and DIDO health workers, who are not always ‘based’ in the communities into which they commute. In fact, they are likely to visit that space and many others during their time in that location, and the visits tend to be more ad hoc than the regular shifts offered in the mining sector (Guerin & Guerin, 2009; Haslam McKenzie, 2007). Service providers may spend a day or just a few hours in a single community before returning to a central base or returning home. As with FIFO and DIDO arrangements in the mining sector, Pauline and Bernard Guerin (2009) identified that there are many positives and negatives associated with this lifestyle in the health sector, including the convenience and cost of service, the social diversity of the service personnel involved in the provision of service, the quality of the service, communication issues, and developing social relationships. For example, recipients of health services usually do not have to travel great distances to gain access to these services, which is definitely a plus on many levels because it keeps families together during times of illness and stress. Unfortunately, the reverse is true for the service providers who are required to travel substantial distances across multiple communities, which means devoting a great deal of their time to travel. In addition, travel and accommodation costs place a greater burden on funding bodies, particularly governments. This type of work also means that health workers are often separated from their families and support networks, in some cases for lengthy periods of time, which leads to feelings of isolation and stress. The irregularity of staff who provide health services also can be a problem – imagine having to see a different doctor every time you went for medical assistance; having to constantly familiarise them with your history and circumstances, not to mention trying to build rapport and trust. Attracting quality staff for a reasonable length of time is also problematic. Because of the excessive time spent away from family and friends, the many hours of travelling, and the poor accommodation and housing options, the people who self-select to engage in this type of work may be younger and less experienced. It may also mean constantly revolving staff. Although these authors highlight a number of problems, they also suggest some viable solutions, such as finding ways of attracting staff with expertise for short durations; spending more time on recruitment and selection into such positions and enlisting community input in this pursuit; engaging the community to help to support staff, to provide assistance with the transitioning of new staff, and to assist with communication; and focusing on the social and relationship aspects of this type of service provision. The pivotal role of community psychologists in identifying problems and potential solutions to those problems is quite evident throughout this research.

FIFO sex workers An industry that is not often thought of in terms of a fly-in fly-out workforce is the sex industry. Like others employed in FIFO and DIDO work environments, sex workers leave behind their children, partners and families in order to work, although this is often counterbalanced by the flexible working conditions and financial incentives. The industry was thrown into the spotlight when the president of the Australian Medical Association, Queensland linked the rising rates of sexually transmitted infections in rural mining communities with mine workers who are cashed up and bored, and engaging the services of FIFO sex workers (Duffy, 2012). But the problems associated with the FIFO sex industry do not stop there – many problems ensue between workers and the accommodation houses from which sex workers operate. This issue came to prominence in Australia in 2012 with the case of ‘Karlaa’, a sex worker who lodged and eventually won a discrimination case against a motel in rural Queensland when they refused her access to a motel room that she planned to use to conduct business (Latimer, 2012). The ruling was overturned in 2013, however, with accommodation venues winning the right to turn away clients who they deem to be sex workers without fear of breaching anti-discrimination laws. The law in Queensland now stipulates that although a person cannot be refused accommodation simply based upon the fact that they work in the sex industry, they can be refused if they intend to use the room for ‘sex work’ (Times Leader, 2015). A submission to the federal government’s consolidation of anti-discrimination laws by the Scarlet Alliance suggests the plight of sex workers is one of systemic discrimination across many levels, including access to goods and services, justice, housing and accommodation, and employment opportunities (Australian Sex Workers Alliance, 2012). Add to this the state-sanctioned discrimination from governments, organisations and the public, and the somewhat relentless vilification they receive from the media, and the

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situation becomes quite dire. The effects of this are felt in many aspects of the lives of these workers, both personal and professional, including their health, wellbeing and working conditions. According to the Scarlet Alliance (2012), current protections for sex workers in Australia are inconsistent and insufficient. For example, although the law in Queensland protects people from discrimination on the basis of ‘lawful sexual activity’, it is limited to people working legally, thus street-based sex workers, private workers operating together or sex workers operating out of unlicensed agencies or brothels remain unprotected. In comparison, the criminalisation of many aspects of sex work in Tasmania and Victoria renders the use of the term ‘lawful’ sexual activity inadequate. In Victoria, sex workers are specifically singled out as an exception to the classification of ‘lawful’ sexual activity. The mining sector and its reliance upon contracts that facilitate FIFO and DIDO arrangements will remain an influence for quite some time; consequently, there is no doubt that we need to develop a better understanding of the social and health dynamics that are evolving in the rural communities that surround and support them (Scott, MacPhail, & Minichiello, 2012).

Worldwide refugee crisis

Refugee

A person who is outside of their home country or habitual residence and who has a well-founded fear of persecution because of their race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular group or because they have a particular political opinion.

Asylum seeker

A person who claims to be a refugee but whose claim has not been substantiated.

Internally displaced person

A person who has not crossed an internationally recognised state border but has been forced or obliged to flee from their home to avoid the effects of armed conflicts, situations of generalised violence, violations of human rights, or natural or human-made disasters.

Stateless person

A person who, under national laws, does not have a legal bond of nationality with any state.

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Another community of interest in Australia is the growing refugee community. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (2017), the forcibly displaced population around the globe increased by 2.9 million in 2017, reaching yet another record high (Figure 13.5). It is estimated that 31 people were newly displaced every minute, 44 400 people forcibly displaced from their homes every day, and by year’s end there were an estimated 16.2 million newly displaced people. By the end of 2017 the cumulative total of people who had been forcibly displaced due to persecution, conflict and generalised violence was greater than the population of the UK. What this tells us is that there are indisputably high numbers of people who are dislocated from their homes, countries and psychological anchor points. Before we go on to look at the difficulties faced by the individuals who are represented by these numbers, we should first acquaint ourselves with the terms that have been used to categorise them. A refugee is a person who is outside of their home country or habitual residence and who has a well-founded fear of persecution because of their race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular group or because they have a particular political opinion. They are fleeing war or persecution and they have no protection from their own country – in fact, it is often their own government that is responsible for their persecution. If countries such as Australia and New Zealand do not provide assistance in the form of a safe refuge and they are returned to their homes, there is a very real possibility that they may be tortured or put to death, or forced to remain in conditions where they have no rights or security. There were estimated to be 25.4 million refugees worldwide by the end of 2017, an increase of 2.9 million from 2016. During this period of time there were 6.3 million refugees from the Syrian Arab Republic (UNHCR, 2017). An asylum seeker is a person who claims to be a refugee but whose claim has not been substantiated. Those who are judged not to be refugees and those deemed to not require any other form of international protection can be (and generally are) sent back to their home country. Figures recorded by UNHCR for 2017 indicated at least 1.9 million claims for asylum in 162 countries; the largest number of these were from Afghanistan (UNHCR, 2017). Internally displaced people, or IDPs as they are often called, have not crossed an international border seeking sanctuary, but remain in their country of origin under the protection of their own government. IDPs may have been displaced as a result of armed conflicts, situations of generalised violence, violations of human rights, or natural or human-made disasters, and they live in a state of legal limbo. UNHCR data estimated 65.6 million people as IDPs at the end of 2017 – 12.6 million were Syrian, 7.7 million were from Colombia (UNHCR, 2017). The case of a stateless person was depicted by Hollywood in the 2004 film The Terminal starring Tom Hanks, who played the part of Victor Navorski – a man who finds himself stranded at an airport when war breaks out in his home country. He is rendered stateless; he cannot be accepted into the US but he also cannot be deported home, so he is forced to survive in legal limbo for a considerable period of time. UNHCR figures estimated as many as 10 million people were stateless in 2017 although only 3.9 million were captured by the data (UNHCR, 2017).

Individuals and families Half of those who are forcibly displaced are children – many of whom will spend their entire childhood in displacement, confronting issues of abuse, neglect, violence and exploitation, and face an uncertain future. A large proportion of these children have witnessed acts of atrocity and violence; some have been separated

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FIGURE 13.5 Worldwide statistics of forcibly displaced population By the end of 2017, 68.5 million individuals worldwide had been forcibly displaced as a result of persecution, conflict, or generalised violence.

UNHCR Global Trends: Forced displacement in 2017.

68.5

MILLION FORCIBLY DISPLACED WORLDWIDE as a result of persecution, conflict, violence, or human rights violations

16.2 52%

of the refugee population are children

MILLION NEWLY DISPLACED in 2017

173,800 44,400 UNACCOMPANIED OR SEPARATED CHILDREN

NEW DISPLACEMENTS EVERY DAY

85% HOSTED BY DEVELOPING REGIONS

68% of all refugees worldwide came from just FIVE countries:

1.2

Syrian Arab Republic

million

6.3

Myanmar

million

Afghanistan

2.6 million

2.4 million

986,400 Somalia

South Sudan

5 MILLION displaced people returned to their area or country of origin Source: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. (2017). Based on Global Trends: Forced displacement in 2017. Adapted from https://www.unhcr.org/globaltrends2017/

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from their family, friends and support networks; and others have been forced into situations where they become a primary caregiver for other family members. Many have never experienced freedom, nor have they experienced personal space and privacy to the level that most of us take for granted. In many cases, they and their family have fled their homes in the dead of night with little more than what they can carry, while others have been born in detention centres never knowing what it is like to have a home. All unauthorised asylum seekers entering Australia are placed into mandatory detention centres while they wait for their applications to be assessed. Statistics released in 2018 by the Refugee Council of Australia suggested that there were 1303 people in detention. The number of children in immigration detention facilities reduced dramatically from September 2013 to January 2015 and have continued to drop. As you can see from Figure 13.6 the number of children in detention facilities, processing centres, and community detention in April 2018 presents a vastly different picture. FIGURE 13.6 The number of children housed in detention centres in Australia has greatly reduced over time. 2000 1800 1600

Number of children in detention

1400 1200 1000 800 600 400 200

39 08 3 39 29 3 39 44 8 39 65 9 39 84 3 40 02 4 40 20 8 40 45 1 40 84 6 41 12 0 41 36 3 41 54 7 41 72 8 41 91 2 42 09 3 42 27 7 42 45 9 42 61 4 42 79 5 42 97 9 43 16 0

0

Facility (Immigration residential housing, Immigration transit accommodation, alternative places of detention)

Residence determination (in community)

Nauru

Source: Refugee Council of Australia. (2018, 12 November). Statistics on people in detention in Australia. Retrieved from https://www.refugeecouncil.org.au/ getfacts/statistics/aust/asylum-stats/detention-australia-statistics/

An inquiry into the wellbeing of children in the Christmas Island detention centres (Australian Human Rights Commission, 2014) shed light on the conditions in which these children were being housed. Many of the 315 children on Christmas Island (who had been detained for between six and eight months) described the facility as hell, and many showed signs of anxiety, depression, mental illness and developmental retardation – some of the children were non-verbal. Many of the children provided drawings depicting life in a prison and portrayed messages asking for freedom such as the one shown in Figure 13.7. Perhaps even more distressing was the fact that these children identified themselves by number rather than by name (Metherell, 2014). According to The Forgotten Children report (AHRC, 2014), there were 800 children in closed detention centres (186 were located on Nauru) with significantly higher rates of mental health disorders than children in the Australian community. Children detained indefinitely on Nauru were suffering from extreme levels of physical, emotional, psychological and developmental distress and many had physical and mental disabilities. As a result of the inquiry all children under 10 years of age who arrived prior to July 2013 were released, those who had physical and mental illness were brought to the Australian mainland and given medical care (some were released into the community on humanitarian grounds); many however remained in detention. Research conducted by Young and Gordon (2016) shows that longer time spent in detention was associated with higher self-reported depression scores – approximately one-half of the refugee group 556

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had post-traumatic stress disorder symptoms. The continuing FIGURE 13.7 A child’s depiction of detention in Australia negative impacts of immigration detention on asylum-seeking children’s health and development should be of concern, Drawings from children detained on Christmas Island show life behind bars. The drawings by children housed at the Christmas with consistent evidence of high rates of psychiatric disorders Island detention centre paint a clear picture of the anguish (worsening over time) linked to injurious or hazardous aspects experienced by children who wait for their refugee claims to be of the environment, such as trauma and violence. But of course, processed. the situation is not limited to children – parents also suffer and are largely powerless to protect themselves and their children (Mares, 2016). Indefinite detention prolongs the uncertainty of a future for these families and has been shown to be a major factor in increasing hopelessness, mental deterioration and the persistence of mental disorder (Newman, Proctor, & Dudley, 2013). Further, self-harm and suicidal behaviour, allegations of sexual and physical assault and abuse, and cruel and degrading treatment have been found to be endemic in detention facilities (AHRC, 2014; Amnesty International, 2016). A systematic review conducted by Filges and colleagues (2015) confirmed the deleterious effects of detention on the mental health of asylum seekers and refugees. Unfortunately, mental health conditions are unlikely to respond to treatment until key stressors have been removed, so while people are held in difficult (often re-traumatising conditions) with an uncertain future, Source: Picture drawn by a child in detention on Christmas Island, National Inquiry into Children in Immigration Detention 2014. mental disorders are likely to persist or worsen. An extensive review of local and international research into the mental health status of children and adolescents who were refugees, or were detained in the course of claiming refugee status, was conducted by Trang Thomas and Winnie Lau (2002). Their findings indicated that symptoms of post-traumatic stress are common, although they vary across age groups. For example, preschoolers have very high anxiety levels, social withdrawal and regressive behaviours; school-aged children often have flashbacks, exaggerated startle responses, poor concentration, sleep disturbance, complaints of physical discomfort and conduct problems; and adolescents experience nightmares, trauma and guilt, and exhibit aggressive and delinquent behaviours. As you can see, there are many complex factors that affect the mental health of displaced children as they negotiate their way through the many significant life challenges that form part of their journey to resettlement or repatriation. Although research has provided us with some indication of the depth of the problems that these children face, and the reality of the long-term effect that being displaced has upon them, given the growing numbers of globally displaced children it is an area that is still largely in its infancy. For community psychologists the hard work has just begun.

Invisible refugees This population includes people who have long-term physical, mental, intellectual and sensory impairments. Although they would be considered to be among the most vulnerable populations, these people are the ones who tend to be forgotten in times of displacement, repatriation and resettlement. Their needs are often overlooked during times of humanitarian emergencies – not only are they excluded from readily available support and services, but they are often subjected to discriminatory practices, exploitation and violence. Children in this category are of particular concern as they tend to be at greater risk of abuse, neglect, abandonment, exploitation and poor health. They are also the innocent victims of family separation, are often denied the right to education, and tend to be at a greater risk of long-term psychological harm. The issue is compounded by the fact that many refugees find their way to host nations that are developing countries with limited resources; thus the challenges associated with the provision of satisfactory services and facilities are often insurmountable (UNHCR, 2010). The Syrian crisis has generated the largest refugee movement since that of Rwanda in 1994 and many of the affected people are disabled, injured and/or aged. Many are also suffering chronic health conditions. Research conducted by HelpAge International (2014), in conjunction with Handicap International, shows that older, disabled and injured Syrian refugees are struggling to maintain their daily needs. Data collected from 3200 refugees suggest that 30% of those living in Jordan and Lebanon have specific needs – one person in five has a physical sensory or intellectual impairment, one person in seven suffers from a chronic

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health condition, and one person in 20 suffers from some form of injury (80% of which are the direct result of the conflict in their country). The situation is also dire for the elderly, with 77% of this population reported as having a chronic disease or injury, or being affected by an impairment of some sort, and 65% showed signs of psychological distress. In fact, refugees who were affected by these conditions were twice as likely to suffer psychological distress as refugees who were in good health. Of particular concern was the finding that suggested that 45% of refugees with specific needs found it difficult on many levels to carry out simple daily tasks. So how do people cope in these circumstances? The report suggests that the role of family and caregivers is of paramount importance. The toll on family members, however, is great as they are often forced to choose between meeting the basic needs of the whole family and meeting the specific needs of one family member; and the situation becomes increasingly difficult as the duration of displacement increases. In addition to family, those with specific needs also reach out for community support, seeking to build a larger support network through friends, peer groups and community-based associations. Once again, however, as the duration of the displacement increases, the ability of these networks to cope with the drain on their resources decreases. The International Rescue Committee is one organisation that has responded to the needs of disabled refugees in the Northern Turkana District of Kenya, with the implementation of a community-based rehabilitation program, a curative mental health program and a special needs education program at the Kakuma Refugee camp (International Rescue Committee, 2007a, 2007b). Kakuma plays host to approximately 70 000 refugees from eight countries. It is estimated that around 6.8% of refugees in the camp have some form of disability, including physical disabilities (51%), hearing impairments (16%), visual disabilities (26%) and learning and cognitive disabilities (10%). The special needs education program has successfully streamed 400 children into regular schools – 122 of these had some form of intellectual disability. The community-based rehabilitation program offers a range of services, including home-based care, physiotherapy, occupational therapy, family therapy and referrals to medical services and programs designed to assist with life skills development. It also engages in community sensitisation designed to help communities embrace the refugees and to reduce the stigma often associated with having them in the community. Initiatives such as these have contributed a great deal to future discussions in relation to the provision of services to refugees and to the empowerment of those who are disabled and displaced (International Rescue Committee, 2007a, 2007b; Karanja, 2009).

Psychological impact of refugee journeys The mental health of refugees, asylum seekers, IDPs and stateless people is a growing global concern. The mental health issues in this population are complex and multifactorial. Not only do these people have to contend with the experience of forced displacement, but they are also impacted by the process of resettlement or repatriation. Many are dealing with issues of trauma and loss that have profound and long-term effects on their psychological wellbeing. A great deal of research has been conducted in this area and there appears to be healthy support for the suggestion that exposure to trauma during the phase of displacement and beyond leads to a range of psychological reactions, including post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), depression and anxiety (Robjant, Hassan, & Katona, 2009; Silove et al., 1997; Smith, Perrin, Yule, & Rabe-Hesketh, 2001; Steel, Silove, Phan, & Bauman, 2002; Terheggen, Stroebe & Kleber, 2001). Asylum seekers in detention experience a unique set of stressors that reflect the environment and the inadequacies of the system in which they find themselves. For some this process is long and arduous, and the effects on their mental health have been well noted through research. A study conducted by Dudley (2003) alarmingly estimated suicidal behaviours among men in Australian detention centres as 41 times higher than the national average and among women as 26 times higher than the national average. In fact, the rates of suicidal behaviours in males were estimated to be 1.8 times higher than those recorded for men incarcerated in Australian prisons. Research has also identified a number of systemic issues, with links to psychiatric distress, including conflict with immigration officials, obstacles to employment and delays in processing of applications (Silove et al., 1997). Regrettably, conflicts and delays in processing applications often result in anger and frustration, which can provide headline news stories in the form of asylum seekers burning buildings and rioting. Research conducted by Steel and colleagues (2004) examined the experience of a sample of parents and children who had been held in Australian immigration detention centres for approximately two years. They found that the entire sample met diagnostic criteria for at least one current psychiatric disorder. In total, there were 26 disorders among 14 adults, and 52 disorders among 20 children. Other research conducted by Sarah Mares and Jon Jureidini (2004) found high levels of mood disturbance and post-traumatic 558

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symptoms – of the 10 children aged between 6 and 17 years included in their sample, all fulfilled the criteria for both PTSD and major depression with suicidal ideation. Further, seven had symptoms consistent with an anxiety disorder, eight had attempted self-harm and eight were identified with significant developmental delays and emotional disturbances. The authors concluded that there was very little support and few interventions provided in those settings, so the road to wellness was largely blocked by obstacles.

Prejudice and discrimination One of the most critical aspects of a successful transition into society is the attitude of the host country and its people. Much has been said in the media about Australian attitudes towards asylum seekers and refugees. Community responses vary from overt prejudice and discrimination, to subtle systemic prejudice and discrimination, to varying levels of acceptance. But how do negative attitudes take hold? Is it possible that the transmission of negative attitudes may be partially attributed to the perceptions that are fostered by governments through the media? An interesting study conducted by Kieran O’Doherty and Amanda Lecouteur (2007) examined the media categorisation of asylum seekers in Australia by conducting an archival search of all major Australian newspapers between 1996 and 2001. They noted that unexpected arrivals (i.e., asylum seekers) were referred to as ‘boat people’, ‘detainees’ and ‘illegal immigrants’ – terminology that was used interchangeably. They suggest that media coverage was written in a manner that legitimises government policies, justifies sending asylum seekers home or placing them in detention, and thus encourages marginalising practices. Research by Winnifred Louis and colleagues (2007) clarifies the effect that these practices may have. They suggest that Australians’ support for harsh, exclusionary treatment of refugee claimants increases if there is a perception (1) of threat to social status and position by admitting refugee claimants, (2) that the refugee claimants do not have a legitimate claim to residency, and (3) that social attitudes towards refugee claimants are generally negative. These opinions tend to be mediated by perceptions of procedural justice (e.g., fairness of regulations and policies) and distributive justice (e.g., quality of life deserved by refugee claimants versus Australian citizens). A national study on racism conducted in 2015 by Katie Blair, Kevin Dunn and colleagues, set out to measure the extent and variation of racist attitudes and experiences in Australia. Their findings indicated 36% of respondents had positive or somewhat positive feelings toward refugees in Australia, 44% were neutral and only 19% claimed to have very negative or somewhat negative feelings. When asked if boats carrying asylum seekers should be turned back, 43% agreed with the proposition and only 29% disagreed. Just over half of the respondents agreed that Australia should help refugees fleeing persecution in their homeland and only 14% disagreed. The authors also noted that although the vast majority of respondents (80.4%) believe it is a good thing for a society to be made up of different cultures, appreciate the need to challenge racism and for there to be anti-racism initiatives (77%), and many (76%) expressed a commitment to personal action, yet there was still a great deal of apathy. Almost a third of people said they would be ‘extremely’ or ‘very concerned’ if a relative were to marry a Muslim, and two thirds expressed some degree (ranging from slightly to extremely) of intolerance or discomfort with Muslim Australians. Many also expressed anti-Middle Eastern (51.4%) and anti-African (43.9%) sentiments. Not surprisingly the experience of racism among refugees was quite high with roughly 35% having experienced racism on public transport or in the street, 33% said they had experienced racism in the work place. A meta-analytic review of the literature conducted by Joel Anderson and Rose Ferguson (2018) suggests that negative attitudes towards asylum seekers continue to be pervasive and widespread. Their findings indicated that being male, less educated, affiliated with religion, politically conservative, with a high level of national identification are linked to negative attitudes towards asylum seekers. These problems are not limited to Australia. Migrants and refugees from diverse language and cultural backgrounds trying to settle in New Zealand also encounter obstacles gaining host community acceptance, which limits their ability to participate, contribute and settle there. Some of these obstacles and barriers include being greeted with indifference or hostility, expectations that they will quickly adapt to the new country, negative stereotypical views and discriminatory attitudes that impede access to employment, education, health and housing (all of which increase the time it takes for a refugee to become self-sufficient). They are also confronted by negative and stereotypical reporting in the local media and insufficient opportunities to connect with the host community to embrace its heritage, culture and language, and to impart these aspects of life that form part of the identity of the refugee. The common perception of migrants and refugees is that these barriers have arisen as a result of a lack of understanding of the mutual benefits of immigration and refugee resettlement policy (Immigration New Zealand, 2014).

The circulation of myths and misinformation is one of the biggest barriers to understanding the issues affecting refugees and asylum seekers.

TRUE

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Programs and interventions There are programs in place in Australia and New Zealand to make the transition to life in a new country a little easier. As we featured the Asylum Seeker Resource Centre in our opening vignette (and we will talk a little more about that program in the Topical Reflections feature at the end of the chapter), we will draw attention to a New Zealand program: Refugees as Survivors New Zealand (RASNZ). RASNZ is the lead mental health agency for refugees entering New Zealand, based at the Mangere Refugee Reception Centre in Auckland. It is made up of a multidisciplinary team that brings together clinical psychologists, counsellors, psychiatrists, nurses, physiotherapists, occupational and body work therapists, interpreters and cross-cultural workers. They are responsible for resettling 750 refugees each year, helping to overcome the challenges of adapting to life in a new country. In 2007, RASNZ launched the Auckland Regional Refugee Mobile Community Clinical Team, which is committed to providing mental health services to diverse former refugee communities throughout the region. The team ensures that all refugees have access to culturally responsive specialist mental health and support services, and have been responsible for developing programs targeting smoking cessation, injury prevention, drug and alcohol abuse, child and maternal health, family violence, personal safety, gambling, human rights and education. They have also designed a Road Safety Program, which has a 90% success rate, and a Celebrating Success group for refugee women that focuses on developing self-esteem and career and life planning. Among the other notable achievements to come from this organisation is the Refugee Lifeline program, which is staffed by well-trained former refugees who operate a toll-free national call line providing counselling in a number of languages (Thorburn, Hagi, & Jackson, 2009).

UNITED NATIONS’ SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS In Chapter 12, Environmental Psychology, we discussed the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals and the way that psychology can help to make a difference in terms of achieving the global goals. In this section we take a closer look at three of those goals: (1) no poverty, (2) zero hunger, and (10) reduced inequalities. At the beginning of this chapter we talked about the core values of community psychology and the importance of the inter-relationships between individuals, the people they share their lives with, those they interact with on a day-to-day basis, and the contexts in which they live. One of the clearly identified goals of community psychology is addressing systemic barriers to good health and wellbeing – from supporting behavioural changes in individuals and groups to reducing inequality, implementing systems and structures that enable and empower communities, and understanding the problems associated with disadvantage and exclusion. So, with this in mind, we will set out to learn a little more about the people that community psychology embraces and the world in which they live, with specific focus on the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals.

Poverty, hunger and inequality Poverty

The deprivation of wellbeing or the inability to satisfy one’s basic needs as a result of a person’s income dipping below the poverty line.

Poverty line

The minimum income deemed adequate to live.

On a global scale, rates of poverty are declining.

TRUE

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In 2015, in response to the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals (1) and (10) the World Bank Group set itself the ambitious goal of ending extreme poverty by 2030. Poverty is defined by a person’s income dipping below the poverty line. The poverty line is the minimum income deemed adequate to live – the nominal figure set in 2015 by the World Health Organization was 1.90 international dollars per day (UN, n.d.). The key findings of the World Bank’s report Poverty and Shared Prosperity 2016: Taking on Inequality (World Bank, 2016) suggests that they are making good progress in this pursuit because poverty has declined. In 1990, the absolute number of people living in extreme poverty was almost 2 billion; by 2013, that number had plunged by well over half, to 767 million. The number of children that are living in extreme poverty remains alarmingly high at 385 million (United Nations, 2015a). Of course, the harsh reality of living below the poverty line is that there is no financial buffer in the event of a crisis, such as a family member falling ill or becoming unemployed, or the onset of a drought. When a crisis hits, these people fall into a negative feedback loop where the family diet may need to be reduced to one meagre meal a day, and a child’s education may suffer due to financial difficulties, which leads to a generational effect that is difficult to break away from. The harsh and unavoidable realities of life suggest that building resilient communities may be the way to implement sustainable changes and improvements in food and nutrition security for the most vulnerable of these populations (International Food Policy Research Institute, 2013).

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CULTURAL DIVERSITY POVERTY IN AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND Statistics on poverty do not only apply to developing countries – consider our own backyards for a moment. In their 2018 report on poverty in Australia, the Australian Council of Social Service painted quite a bleak picture. Despite many years of economic growth in Australia, there remain many whose standard of living is sub-standard. As you can see from Table 13.1, 13.2% of Australians, and 17.3% of Australian children, were living

below the poverty line in 2013–2014. Concerningly, there was a 2% rise in the number of children living in poverty over the past 10 years. Similarly, figures released for New Zealand in 2016 indicate that child poverty levels are alarmingly high, with almost one-third of children identified as living below the poverty line. Overall, it is estimated that 4% of the population of New Zealand is living in severe poverty – 7% of whom are children (Child Poverty Monitor, 2017).

TABLE 13.1 Snapshot of poverty in Australia (2015–2016) Key figures and trends

Income and housing

Rural communities, and Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander People

3.05 million people (13.2% of the population) lived below the poverty line (after housing costs)

The poverty line (50% of median income, before housing costs) for a single adult was $433 per week. For a couple with two children, it was $909 per week

People in rural and remote Australia had lower incomes and net household worth compared to those living in metropolitan areas

17.3% of children and 13.9% of youth between 15–24 years old lived below the poverty line

53% of people below the poverty line relied on social security as their main source of income, while 38% relied on wages

Although cost of housing in regional and remote areas was mostly lower than in metropolitan areas, other costs were higher – e.g., food and petrol prices increased with remoteness, and were 10–20% more expensive in remote areas

The proportion of people in poverty fluctuated within a band between 11.5% and 14.1% from 1999 to 2015. Child poverty moved within a higher band between 14.3% and 18.6%

52% of people below the poverty line were in rental housing, while 15% of people in poverty were home-owners without a mortgage

Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people, of whom around 65% lived outside the major cities, were disproportionately affected by poverty

Australia had the 14th highest poverty rate among 34 OECD countries, and is part of a group of English-speaking wealthy nations with above-average poverty levels

The high poverty rate (32%) among sole parent families was a major source of child poverty

The poverty rate for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people was 31%–54% in very remote communities compared to 24% in major cities

Source: Davidson, P., Saunders, P., Bradbury, B. and Wong, M. (2018), Poverty in Australia, 2018. ACOSS/UNSW Poverty and Inequality Partnership Report No. 2, Sydney: ACOSS

Youth poverty in Australia and New Zealand In New Zealand, there is no agreed definition of poverty, nor is there an official poverty measure, so statistical comparisons with other countries are quite difficult (Expert Advisory Group on Solutions to Child Poverty, 2012). In a report on solutions to child poverty in New Zealand put forward by an expert advisory group, it was suggested that there are many children who experience hardship or are excluded from what would be considered the normal patterns of modern life, and in some cases this remains so for an extended period of time. In real terms, the numbers equate to 80 000 children who have insufficient access to nutritious food. These children go to school hungry, they wear worn-out shoes or go barefoot, they have inadequate clothing and often live in cold, damp houses, where they sleep in a shared bed. They also miss out on activities that most people take for granted, such as playing sport, having birthday parties or travelling any distance from home because their families are unable to afford the cost. For the children who are forced to live in these conditions, their developmental opportunities are limited and their education is often stifled, so their future earning potential, health and wellbeing are all reduced. However, the situation is not only reserved for children. For example, in Auckland in 2009 it was estimated that 20% of children were living in low income households that experience material hardship, the number of young adults who are forced to live with poverty is increasing, and Māori and Pacific populations

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endure hardship rates that are two to three times higher than other ethnic groups (Ministry of Social Development, 2009; Royal Commission on Auckland Governance, 2009). Similar problems are reported for the youth of Australia, as suggested by a report produced by the Youth Action and Policy Association (Ferguson, 2008), which examined poverty and disadvantage in young Australians aged between 12 and 25 years. The results of their inquiry found that 5% of respondents said they were deprived of a safe or stable place to live, 10% were denied access to dental treatment, 18% did not have enough money to ‘get by’, 33% could not pay basic living expenses (e.g., gas and electricity) and 15% lived in a jobless household. Many were suffering from psychological deprivation (10%) and indicated that they lacked a sense of belonging and had no confidence in anything they do, and that they receive little support from family. Rural youth were at a greater disadvantage in many areas, with one in five saying they have no access to mental health services (as compared with 12% in urban areas), and 40% saying they were unable to pay for basic living expenses (e.g., gas, electricity and mobile phones). Youth from Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander backgrounds also displayed high levels of disadvantage, with many deprived of a safe and stable home and unable to access mental health services, while 11.4% did not have at least one substantial meal each day. A 10-year study conducted in Australia by Professor Helen Berry and colleagues (Cruwys et al., 2013) suggests that the most disadvantaged people in Australia are Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander women. The study, which tracked a group of 900 people over a 10-year period, found that although 60% of those who had been regarded as marginalised in 2001 had escaped those conditions by 2010, the remaining 40% had experienced no change in conditions – many of whom were female, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander and suffered from chronic health conditions.

Advocating change Most community psychologists are strong proponents of social justice and advocacy, so they have a lot to offer when it comes to understanding and empowering those who have found their way into the poverty cycle. Advocacy around the issues of social inclusion and exclusion takes many forms: working with individuals, working to change public policy, working with community groups to identify and rectify inadequacies in available resources, and working to reduce the stereotypes and resulting stigma that often ostracises disadvantaged people. According to Emma Sampson, Heather Gridley and Colleen Turner (2013), community psychology is in a position to offer a locally grounded, strengths-based approach to address the structural inequalities that lie at the heart of poverty and disadvantage, rather than simply framing interventions based upon the individually focused cycle of disadvantage. Reflecting this ethos, some promising work has been done at a community level, such as the work conducted by Deborah Warr in Melbourne (2008). Warr conducted a case study of an early learning centre that was set up in the socioeconomically disadvantaged suburb of Broadmeadows, in Victoria. The centre offered early childhood education that fostered links with other community-based programs, promoted community development processes and was oriented towards achieving long-term sustainable changes in the neighbourhood. It also offered preschool programs for young children, a playgroup for toddlers and ‘transition to school’ programs. At the time of the study, the local community recorded unemployment over double the national average, with many families living in public housing. It also had an ethnically diverse population with people from over 35 non-English-speaking countries located in the area. The early learning centre’s approach to family engagement focused on providing a welcoming, socially and culturally inclusive environment, integrating educational and support services by forging cooperative links with local community agencies. The centre eventually morphed into a community hub, supporting families to not only become actively involved in their children’s education but also to develop friendship networks and connections with community organisations and health services, making inroads into reducing inequalities. Community consultation played a large role in the success of the project, with local initiatives and programs determined by the needs of the locals. For example, a speech pathologist was employed to address the language needs of the children in preparation for school, and a supported playgroup referred to as the Rising Stars was set up to help parents dealing with anxiety and depression. Given the concerns about the impact of the geographic concentration of disadvantage, there have been a number of similar programs implemented throughout Australia. One of the largest is the Communities for Children initiative, which was designed to enhance the development of children in 45 disadvantaged communities across the country. As part of this initiative, non-government organisations are funded to implement sustainable whole-of-community approaches to childhood development, all of which are

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developed in consultation with local community members. The ultimate aim is to improve the resources available to the community to improve the context in which children develop (Australian Government Department of Social Services, 2014). Darrin Hodgetts and colleagues (2013) have reflected on poverty in New Zealand and their attempts to advocate for the rights of the disadvantaged. The team, working with the Auckland City Mission Family 100 project, explored the everyday lives and frustrations experienced by 100 families (40% Mā ori, 25% Pacific Islander, 22% Pākehā and 13% Asian and other minorities) living in poverty. They provided food parcels for a year to these households in return for its occupants engaging in researcher-structured fortnightly conversations with social workers for a period of nine months. The aim of this exercise was to draw out their personal journeys of poverty in order to understand them and to enable change. This information was put together into a series of case studies that formulated the basis of an interactive workshop for judges that took place during an annual professional development event for the New Zealand judiciary. The ultimate aim of the workshop was to make available discursive resources that were relevant to the conversation of how the courts can work to improve a person’s situation. Given that the courts deal with the flow-on effects of poverty on a daily basis, it was a timely and important conversation.

CRITICAL THINKING ACTIVITY Could you live on $2 a day? Make a list of your daily spending for a week and see how much you would need to give up in order to accomplish this task. Now consider how the loss of these items would impact on how you feel about yourself and those around

you. Visit the website http://www.livebelowtheline.com.au and read about what Australians are doing to experience poverty and raise money for those who are struggling.

CULTURAL DIVERSITY GLOBAL HUNGER INDEX Relevant to Sustainable Development Goal (2) hunger. Globally it is estimated that one in nine people in the world are undernourished, amounting to approximately 815 million people! The vast majority of the world's hungry live in developing countries where 12.9% of the population are undernourished. Asia is the continent with the greatest number of hungry people with estimates suggesting they make up two thirds of the total population. South Asia appears to have the greatest burden with roughly 281 million thought to be undernourished. According to the United Nations, with figures such as these, profound change is needed if the goal of zero hunger is to be achieved by 2030. Global food and agriculture will need to alter rapidly to nourish the 815 million who are currently listed as hungry and the 2 billion people who are expected to be regarded as hungry by 2050 (United Nations, 2015b). The Global Hunger Index is a measure that is derived from three equally weighted indicators: 1 the proportion of people who are undernourished 2 the proportion of children aged under five who are underweight

3 the mortality rate of children aged under five. According to the 2017 index, global hunger is decreasing, with figures suggesting a fall of 27% since 2000. Hunger is still a serious threat, however, with famine declared in parts of South Sedan and imminent famine warnings issued for Northern Nigeria, Somalia and Yemen, which places 20 million people at risk of starvation. Overall, in 2017, there was one country in the extremely alarming range, seven in the alarming range, and 44 considered serious (see Figure 13.8). Current results indicate the scores of 14 countries improved by 50% or more; 72 countries dropped by between 25–49.9%; and 27 countries fell by less than 25%. Vietnam has showed remarkable progress in reducing the proportion of its people who are undernourished from 47% to 9%. It has also halved the mortality rate of children aged five years or less and reduced the numbers of underweight children from more than 40% to 12%. Ghana is one of the 10 best performers in terms of improvement since 1990, but Comoros, Swaziland and Burundi (all located south of the Sahara in Africa) have been among the worst (see Figure 13.8) (von Grebmer, 2017).

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FIGURE 13.8 Severity of global hunger, 2018 Global Hunger Index There is one country (Central African Republic) that qualifies as ‘extremely alarming’ in the Global Hunger Index for 2018 and seven countries with ‘alarming’ scores (Yemen, Chad, Liberia, Madagascar, Sierra Leone, Sudan, and Zambia).

Greenland

Iceland Sweden Norway

Canada

United States of America

Mexico

Cuba Dominican Rep. Jamaica Haiti Belize Honduras

Guatemala El Salvador

Nicaragua

Costa Rica Panama

Trinidad & Tobago Venezuela Guyana Suriname French Guiana

Colombia Ecuador

Peru

Finland

Russian Federation

Estonia Latvia United United Denmark Lithuania Kingdom Kingdom Neth. Poland Belarus Ireland Germany Bel. Lux. Czech Rep. Ukraine Mongolia Kazakhstan Slovakia France Austria Hungary Moldova Switz. Slov. Slov.Croatia Romania Italy Bos. & Serbia N. Korea Georgia Uzbekistan Kyrgyz Rep. Herz. Mont.Bulgaria Azerb. Japan Spain Mace. Armenia Turkmenistan Tajikistan Albania S. Korea Portugal Turkey China Greece Syria Cyprus Afghanistan Tunisia Lebanon Iran Morocco Israel Iraq Pakistan Jordan Kuwait Nepal Bhutan Algeria Bahrain Libya Egypt Taiwan Qatar Saudi Bangladesh Western Sahara Hong Kong India U.A.E Arabia Myanmar Lao Oman Mauritania PDR Philippines Niger Mali Thailand Sudan Eritrea Yemen Senegal Chad Gambia Cambodia Burkina Faso Djibouti Guinea-Bissau Guinea Viet Nam Benin Nigeria Somalia Côte Ghana Central South Sierra Leone Sri Lanka Ethiopia d'Ivoire African Sudan Togo Brunei Liberia Republic Cameroon Malaysia Uganda Equatorial Guinea Congo, Singapore Indonesia Gabon Rep. Rwanda Kenya Congo, Dem. Burundi Rep. Tanzania

Brazil

Angola

Bolivia

Malawi Zambia

Zimbabwe Namibia Botswana

Paraguay Chile

South Africa

Uruguay

Alarming 35.0–49.9

Extremely alarming 50.0 ≤

Argentina

Serious 20.0–34.9

Alarming 35.0–49.9 Moderate 10.0–19.9

Serious 20.0–34.9 Low ≤ 9.9

Moderate 10.0–19.9 Insufficent data, significant concern*

Low ≤ 9.9

Insufficient data

Insufficent data, significant concern* Not calculated**

Insufficient data

*See Box 2.1 for details

Not calculated** **See Chapter 1 for details *See Box 2.1 for details **See Chapter 1 for details

Timor-Leste

Comoros Mozambique Mauritius

Fiji

Madagascar

Swaziland

Extremely alarming 50.0 ≤

Papua New Guinea

Australia

Lesotho

Source: Authors. Note: For the 2017 GHI, data on the proportion of undernourished are for 2014–2016; data on child stunting and wasting are for the latest year in the period 2012–2016 for which data are available; and data on child mortality are for 2015. GHI scores were not calculated for countries for which data were not available and for certain countries with small populations. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), Welthun gerhilfe (WHH), or Concern Worldwide.

New Zealand -

Recommended citation: “Figure 2.5: 2017 Global Hunger Index by Severity.” Map in 2017 Global Hunger Index: The Inequalities of Hunger, by K. von Grebmer, J. Bernstein, N. Hossain, T. Brown, N. Prasai, Y. Yohannes, F. Patterson, A. Sonntag, S. M. Zimmermann, O. Towey, and C.Foley. 2017. Bonn, Washington, DC, and Dublin: Welthungerhilfe, International Food Policy Research Institute, and Concern Worldwide.

Source: 2018 Global Hunger Index by Severity.” Map in 2018 Global Hunger Index: Forced Migration and Hunger, by K. von Grebmer, J. Bernstein, L. Hammond, F. Patterson, A. Sonntag, L. Klaus, J. Fahlbusch, O. Towey, C. Foley, S. Gitter, K. Ekstrom, and H. Fritschel. 2018. Bonn and Dublin: Welthungerhilfe and Concern Worldwide.

Unemployment, underemployment and inequality According to the United Nations roughly half the world’s population still lives on the equivalent of $2 per day and there are no guarantees that having a job is going to keep you from being on or below the poverty line. Of concern to the United Nations is the continued scarcity of adequate work opportunities. The United Nations suggests that global unemployment surpassed the 200 million mark (5.8% of the population) in 2017 – an increase of 3.4 million since the previous year. Almost 780 million workers located in emerging and developing countries are living in conditions of moderate to extreme poverty, and in excess of 1.4 billion workers occupy positions of vulnerable employment, many in emerging and developing countries. The number of workers in vulnerable employment increases by roughly 11 million each year, so the rate of unemployment is likely to continue to rise (International Labour Organization, 2017). The International Labour Organization (2018) report World Employment and Social Outlook: Trends 2018 shows 192.7 million people are unemployed in 2018. The report highlights the fact that progress towards reducing vulnerable employment has essentially stalled since 2012, with almost 1.4 billion workers estimated to be in vulnerable employment in 2017, and an additional 35 million are expected to join them by 2019. Their figures suggest that in developing countries, vulnerable employment affects three out of four

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workers. It shows that the growth of the global workforce will not be sufficient to compensate for the rapidly expanding pool of retirees. The average age of working people is projected to rise from just under 40 in 2017 to over 41 in 2030. According to the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2012), unemployment and underemployment lie at the core of poverty. For the poor, labour is quite often the only asset they have to improve their life circumstances, so the link between employment and the reduction of poverty seems clear – meaningful employment that secures income and empowerment for the poor and the disadvantaged (particularly women and youth) is crucial. Unemployment is also a major social problem in Australia and New Zealand; 5.4% in June 2018 in Australia (ABS, 2018) and 4.4% in New Zealand (Statistics New Zealand, 2018). Youth unemployment in both countries, however, mirrored the global trend with alarmingly high rates. According to the Brotherhood of St Laurence (2017) report Reality Bites, youth unemployment in Australia at the time of the report was 12.4%, which is more than double the overall national rate. There were 267 000 youth aged between 15 and 24 who were unemployed and 50 500 who had been unemployed for greater than a year. Unfortunately, it seems their long-term prospects are not promising either, with the long-term unemployed representing 18.4% of all unemployed 15–24-year-olds in September 2017 – almost one in five. As you can see from Table 13.2, youth unemployment hotspots have developed across the country, with the worst figures reported in rural Queensland. TABLE 13.2 Australia’s hotspots for youth unemployment The Queensland outback has record high youth unemployment levels.

State/Territory

Region

Youth Unemployment

QLD

Outback

67.1%

NSW

Southern Highlands and Shoalhaven

28.9%

TAS

South East

21.8%

VIC

Melbourne – West

18.7%

SA

Adelaide – North

18.4%

WA

Mandurah

17.7%

ACT

Australian Capital Territory

10.9%

NT

Outback

10.9%

Source: Brotherhood of St Laurence. (2017). An unfair Australia? Mapping youth unemployment hotspots. Retrieved from http://library.bsl.org.au/jspui/ bitstream/1/10573/1/BSL_Unfair_Australia_Mapping_youth_unemployment_hotspots_Mar2018.pdf

There has been a great deal of psychological research into the links between unemployment, psychological distress and ill health, much of which paints a bleak picture. For example, the loss of a job has been associated with elevated rates of mental health problems; higher incidence of anxiety and depression; lower levels of subjective wellbeing and self-esteem; lower levels of satisfaction with life, marital and family relationships; and poorer levels of physical health (Buffel, Misinne & Bracke, 2017; McKee-Ryan et al., 2005; Moore, et al., 2017; Paul & Moser, 2009). Some interesting research conducted by Ed Helmes and Melody-Anna Fudge (2016) considered the frequency of psychological distress among welfare recipients seeking jobs in Australia. Their research provided evidence of a link between high levels of psychological distress and a reduced capacity to work. The findings of the current study indicated up to 45% of the unemployed jobseeking welfare recipients considered as part of their research may in fact be at substantial risk of failing to satisfy the requirements of active participation programmes which were required to obtain welfare. This suggests that welfare recipient jobseekers in Australia may be up to five times more likely than the general Australian population to develop psychological distress, and as many as 280 000 who may be at risk. The research team have issued a note of caution for policymakers to consider the nature and extent of disadvantage among this population and reinforced the need to develop appropriate policies to assist in preventing and reducing the effects of psychological distress on the jobseeker’s capacity to comply with social security obligations to work.

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All age groups are equally disadvantaged when it comes to unemployment.

FALSE

Wendy Patton and Ross Donohue (1998) conducted research designed to investigate the life experience and coping skills of long-term unemployed people. In a sample of 38 Australians who had been unemployed for over a year, they found evidence of two discrete groups: those who were coping relatively effectively with unemployment and those who were not. Those who were not coping were aware of constructive coping strategies, but their negative thoughts and feelings largely prevented them from actively engaging those techniques. They also experienced financial difficulties and feelings of social isolation. Those who were coping actively engaged in community and leisure activities, found ways of keeping busy, had a positive outlook, religious faith and had gone through a process of re-evaluating their expectations. Mature-aged unemployed citizens were the focus of research conducted by Chris Kossen and Sara Hammer (2010), who examined the problems such people experienced when dealing with the Australian government’s unemployment and employment agencies, Centrelink and Job Network. Their findings (based on multiple in-depth interviews with 21 people aged 45 years or older) suggested evidence of three themes: 1 experiences of disregard, disrespect and discrimination 2 the restrictiveness of job information 3 inappropriate job matching coupled with inadequate employability training. People who engaged the services of the Job Network perceived that there was little real assistance provided because staff showed a lack of willingness to help and were biased towards helping people who were regarded as easier to find work for (particularly young people). Many also talked about disrespect, embarrassment and stigma, as well as tacit and overt discrimination in relation to their age. Overall, the authors concluded that, for the population addressed by this study, government agencies such as Centrelink and Job Network were disabling, inadequate and discriminatory. The services provided by these organisations were largely predicated by a set of negative assumptions that were made about the life experience, job histories and training of people, which highlighted the extent of negative effects of restrictive and poorly targeted services on perceived levels of control and self-efficacy. Overall recommendations suggested that mature-age jobseekers require more time with caseworkers to overcome the barriers to employment, enabling them to spend less time engaged in compliance and more time to actively search for employment. Mature-aged people also require more information in relation to potential employers, and need to be more appropriately matched to potential work or referred for training to improve their ability to compete for such work.

The elderly According to the Global Age Watch Index – in 2015 there were around 901 million people aged 60 or over worldwide; that is, 12.3% of the global population. People over 60 now outnumber children under five, and by 2050 they will outnumber those under the age of 15. The developing world, by 2050, will be home to eight out of 10 of the world’s population over 60. Similar to most developed countries, the populations of Australia and New Zealand are ageing. In Australia over one in seven people were aged 65 and over in 2016; that is 3.7 million people or 15% of the population. The number and the proportion of older Australians is expected to continue to grow, with projections indicating that there will be 8.7 million older Australians by 2056, making up 22% of the population. By 2096, it is estimated that 12.8 million people (25%) will be aged 65 years and over (ABS, 2013). In 2013, the population of New Zealanders over the age of 65 hit the 607 000 mark, which means that one in seven New Zealanders, or 14% of the population, were aged over 65 years. The population aged 85 and over was 73 000 – this figure is projected to rise to nearly 200 000 in 2036 (Environmental Health Indicators New Zealand, 2014). This trend toward an ageing population is mirrored across the globe. Within ten years, the number of older people will surpass the one billion mark, and by 2050 this figure will double (HelpAge International, 2015). If you are having trouble wrapping your head around statistics such as these, think of it in real terms – around the world, every second, two people celebrate their sixtieth birthday. This equates to almost 58 million sixtieth birthdays every year!

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CULTURAL DIVERSITY AGEING WELL: GLOBAL TRENDS The Global Age Watch Index aims to capture the multidimensional nature of the quality of life and wellbeing of older people across the globe. The index is derived from 13 indicators across four key domains: income status, health, employment and education, and enabling environments (see Figure 13.9 and Table 13.3). The index is based upon how close to the ideal value (an index of 100) a country scored. So, what do the figures tell us? According to the 2015 index, Australia and New Zealand are in the top 20, with New Zealand (12th place) faring better than Australia (17th place) in overall scores. The global ranking of countries shows us that the

elderly in Nordic countries, Western Europe, North America and some East Asian and Latin American countries are faring better than others in terms of how well they are looked after, with Switzerland occupying 1st position. Seven of the ten lowest ranked countries are in Africa. Income security for those in Luxembourg, France and Norway is good, although the situation in Australia and New Zealand is not so good – Australia ranks 62nd and New Zealand 23rd. Australia occupies 5th place in the health domain, but New Zealand is 9th. And, as far as enabling environments are concerned, Australia sits in 26th position and New Zealand in 30th.

FIGURE 13.9 Global Age Watch Index domains and indicators The Global Age Watch Index is calculated by combining country scores on four domains: income security, health status, employment and education, and enabling environment.

Global age watch index

Domains 1. Income security

2. Health status

3. Employment and education

4. Enabling environment

Indicators 1.1

Pension income coverage

2.1

Life expectancy at 60

3.1

Employment of older people

4.1

Social connections

1.2

Poverty rate in old age

2.2

Healthy life expectancy at 60

3.2

Educational status of older people

4.2

Physical safety

1.3

Relative welfare of older people

2.3

Psychological wellbeing

4.3

Civic freedom

1.4

GDP per capita

4.4

Access to public transport

Direct ‘outcome’ indicators of older people’s wellbeing

Proxy of enabling attributes/ capabilities of older people

Enabling social environment of society

Source: HelpAge International. (2015). Global Age Watch Index 2015, Retrieved from https://www.helpage.org/global-agewatch/reports/ global-agewatch-index-2015-insight-report-summary-and-methodology/

>>

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TABLE 13.3 Global Age Watch Country Rankings Both Australia and New Zealand are ranked in the top 20 for health status and capability but do not fare so well when it comes to income security and enabling environments.

Switzerland

Health status

Income security

Overall rank and value

Capablity

Enabling environment

Rank

Value

Rank

Value

Rank

Value

Rank

Value

Rank

Value

 1

90.1

27

77.3

 2

81.3

 2

75.0

 1

83.7

Norway

 2

89.3

 2

89.4

16

73.5

 1

76.3

 4

80.1

Sweden

 3

84.4

 7

83.5

12

75.2

 5

65.6

 6

79.4

Germany

 4

84.3

15

80.9

11

75.6

 3

68.4

11

78.6

Canada

 5

84.0

10

82.9

 4

80.3

10

61.2

 9

78.9

Netherlands

 6

83.0

 5

85.9

13

74.8

12

59.6

 5

79.6

Iceland

 7

81.8

 4

86.6

 8

78.2

18

54.5

10

78.8

Japan

 8

80.8

33

75.1

 1

83.9

 7

62.7

21

75.0

USA

 9

79.3

29

76.3

25

70.1

 4

65.7

17

76.8

United Kingdom

10

79.2

14

81.5

27

69.3

20

53.6

 3

81.8

Denmark

11

78.6

16

80.9

33

68.1

11

59.9

14

77.7

New Zealand

12

76.0

23

78.4

 9

77.8

14

57.8

30

71.5

Austria

13

74.4

 6

84.3

19

72.7

40

37.6

 2

82.7

Finland

14

72.7

17

80.3

21

70.8

29

44.8

18

76.1

Ireland

15

72.0

18

79.9

17

73.1

35

40.6

16

77.0

France

16

71.2

 3

88.4

 7

78.3

42

35.8

23

74.2

Australia

17

71.0

62

53.5

 5

79.8

 8

62.5

26

72.5

Israel

18

70.1

47

67.8

26

69.8

13

59.2

35

69.6

Luxembourg

19

69.5

 1

89.7

10

76.6

53

31.0

19

76.1

Panama

20

67.7

40

72.4

31

68.7

16

56.4

48

66.4

Source: HelpAge International. (2015). Global Age Watch Index 2015, Retrieved from https://www.helpage.org/global-agewatch/reports/ global-agewatch-index-2015-insight-report-summary-and-methodology/

In response to the global ageing epidemic, the World Health Organization (2016) implemented a Global Strategy and Action Plan on Ageing and Health, which essentially has five strategic objectives: 1 committing to action to combat ageism 2 alignment of health systems to the needs of older populations 3 develop age-friendly environments 4 strengthen long-term care 5 improve measurement, monitoring and research. Aligning this strategy to the core goals of community psychology means addressing inequities, advocating for the right of older people to age safely in a place that is right for them, ensuring they are free from poverty, enabling them to contribute to their communities while retaining autonomy and health, and empowering them to develop personally.

Improving health and wellbeing in ageing populations Quality of life is sometimes difficult to find for older residents of aged-care settings, with statistics suggesting that just over half of all permanent residents of aged-care facilities have symptoms of depression (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2013). Research suggests that elements such as physical comfort, physical amenities, social and recreational aids, personal space and privacy, autonomy, dignity, meaningful activity, meaningful relationships and safety play a very important role (Edwards, Courtney, & O’Reilly, 2003; Timko & Moos, 1990). A study conducted in Australia by Elaine Tsang and colleagues (2004), utilising a sample of

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Chinese immigrants in residential aged care, found that a high self-rated quality of life was associated with a number of factors, including a sense of strong ties to one’s ethnic community and family, which demonstrates the importance of cultural understanding and compatibility with others living in an aged-care home. Maintaining a social life is frequently identified as an important factor in the process of ageing and the perceptions of quality of life. A study conducted at Melbourne University suggests that social media may be the key to keeping our elderly population in touch. The study provided a small group of older people aged over 80 years with iPads and a purpose-built social media application that they used to share information with other study participants. According to this research, by creating and sharing content the participants were able to build social connections and alleviate feelings of social isolation. It seems that the ability to record and share photographs and messages had a positive effect on wellbeing (Vetere, Kulik, & Pedell, 2012). Similarly, a study conducted by Julie Delello and Rochell McWhorter (2015) suggests that the use of information and communication technologies, specifically iPads, improved the lives of older adults by eliciting closer family ties and providing a greater overall connection to society.

Addressing inequalities and discrimination in ageing populations A major concern, given the growing numbers of aged people in our society, is the issue of ageism – discrimination and prejudice that is suffered by a person as a result of their biological age. Unfortunately, ageism is fast becoming a cultural norm (Angus & Reeve, 2006). Many of the biological theories of ageing that define old age as a period of decline and deterioration reinforce the social narrative of this age group that they are a burden upon society, rather than a resource that comes equipped with a wealth of experience and wisdom. Although many countries, including Australia and New Zealand, have implemented antidiscrimination laws that supposedly restrict the adverse effects of stereotypical notions of age, most would agree that these effects are still evident across many levels of the community, particularly in employment. Ageism differs from other forms of prejudice and discrimination in that it lacks the undertone of separation as represented by the ‘us and them’ mentality – the elderly are not seen as a threat to values and ideals, but they are seen as a threat to productivity and resources (in the form of welfare). One organisation that is bucking this trend is hardware chain Bunnings. In Australia, Bunnings has recruited 2000 team members aged over 55, and two individuals in their early eighties, and is one of the largest employers of older Australians. Bunnings is so proud of this fact and so certain of its market that it uses this age group as part of its marketing strategy. According to John Gillam (managing director), ‘We are not fearful of having older workers. We find they have patience and a depth of knowledge, and they love teaching the younger workers. The older workers generally command more respect’ (Burrell, 2011). And in case you are wondering, Bunnings does not have a mandatory retirement age, which is good news in times where politicians frequently consider increases to the retirement age in Australia (Morton, 2014). Of course, the benefits of working longer extend beyond government necessities. Given the suggested links between post-retirement stagnation, social withdrawal and the onset of neurodegenerative diseases such as Alzheimer’s and dementia, working longer, community engagement and mental and physical stimulation may in fact provide an element of protection in the maintenance of function in the elderly (Willis & Schaie, 2009). This may represent an area of potential growth for community psychology: identifying and implementing programs that optimise the skills of the elderly and help to maintain cognitive functionality, providing economic and social benefits to the communities in which they live and helping to reduce the stigma associated with ageing.

Ageism

Discrimination and prejudice that is suffered by a person as a result of their biological age.

CRITICAL THINKING ACTIVITY Given what you have read in this section about ageism, can you think of some communitybased programs that may help to alleviate the stereotypical view of the elderly and lessen the effects of ageism?

Social exclusion and sexual orientation Community psychology takes a particular interest in strengthening community action in relation to the pressing social issues of the day. Emphasising empowerment and self-determination, which is regarded as fundamental to the wellbeing of individuals, families and communities, community psychologists work with disadvantaged, marginalised or socially excluded groups, enhancing their access to economic, political and psychological resources. As many countries attempt to reconcile their attitudes towards same-sex marriage, few could argue with the fact that lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) people continue to face discriminatory practices and social exclusion in all spheres of life in many countries across the globe. In this section, we will take a brief look at some of the research that has been conducted in the area to date. As you will read in the Cultural Diversity feature, there is a great deal of variation in opinions towards those who identify as gay or lesbian, so it is not at all surprising to find a great deal of research interest in the prevalence of discrimination, harassment and violence that this population experiences. One such study, conducted by Anthony D’Augelli and colleagues (2002), found that the more open young people

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were about their sexual orientation, the more verbal abuse they suffered and the more they displayed symptoms of having experienced trauma. The study’s results also indicated that lesbian and bisexual females were more likely to experience depression, anxiety, sexual abuse and sleep disturbances than their male counterparts. Research conducted in Australia suggests the problems may be more pronounced outside of city boundaries. For example, research conducted by Lorene Gottschalk (2007) found that although gay men and lesbians experience similar types of stigma and discrimination in rural areas as those in urban centres, the problems are exacerbated by the lack of anonymity that is common in smaller communities, and the fact that there are few services and little support available. Research has suggested that social exclusion may be mitigated to some extent by the presence of a gay community (Kline, 2006), although this is problematic for residents of smaller towns in Australia (Pitts, Smith, Mitchell, & Patel, 2006) where identifiable gay communities are often unavailable. According to the Private Lives 2 report (Leonard et al., 2012), despite reforms in Australia recognising the rights and responsibilities of LGBT people and same-sex couples, there has been little change in the levels of violence perpetrated against them, including isolated incidents of physical and sexual abuse and systemic acts of harassment, discrimination and vilification, with the most common forms of abuse being verbal. For many, the implementation of strategies to deter this treatment is to avoid expressions of affection or to simply hide their sexuality or gender identity in public places, with 44% of respondents saying that they ‘usually’ or ‘occasionally’ hide their sexuality or gender identity in public. A follow-up report A closer look at Private Lives 2 (Leonard, Lyons, & Bariola, 2015) clearly demonstrated the effect of harassment and discrimination, with non-heterosexuals self-reporting much higher rates of psychological distress and poorer general mental health than the national averages. The report also confirmed significant differences in mental health and wellbeing between same-sex attracted and bisexual people, and between bisexual women and men. The findings also illustrated the variation in discrimination within LGBT communities according to differences in gender identity, sexual identity, and age (Table 13.4), and the impact of these variations in terms of mental health issues.

TABLE 13.4 The impact of discrimination and harassment in LGBT populations in Australia. LGBT Australians self-report rates of depression, anxiety and psychological distress far higher than the national averages – tragically these rates have not changed since 2006. Psychological distress, resilience, and diagnosis and treatment across the lifespan

• Mental health improved and resilience increased with age among all gender identity and sexual identity groups; however, there was less variation in in levels of psychological distress and resilience according to age among bisexual females whose resilience remains relatively low for all age groups • In late adolescence and early adulthood (16–24 years) rates of diagnosis or treatment for a mental disorder were considerably higher among lesbian females (47.1%) than gay males (29.5%). However, by late adulthood (60–89 years) gay males reported higher rates of diagnosis or treatment than lesbian females (22.5% vs 14.9%)

The impact of heterosexist harassment and abuse

• A large percentage of respondents had been subjected to harassment or abuse based on their gender identity or sexual identity in the past 12 months • Trans males and trans females reported the highest levels of abuse (55.3% and 49.2% respectively) and bisexual females the lowest (30.9%). • There was little variation in rates of heterosexist harassment or abuse by sexual identity, with gay males (35.1%) reporting only slightly higher rates than the other sexual identity groups • The experience of heterosexist harassment or abuse was an indicator of poorer mental health. Respondents who reported having experienced one or more incidents of heterosexist harassment or abuse in the past 12 months had higher levels of psychological distress than those who did not.

Use of mental health services

• Rates of mental health service use were highest among trans females (67.2%) and trans males (59.6%) • Rates of mental health service use varied significantly according to sexual identity, with bisexual females reporting the highest rate (52.5%) and gay males the lowest (29.4%) • Rates of psychological distress were higher among respondents who reported having used a mental health service recently compared with those who did not

Source: Leonard, W., Lyons, A., & Bariola, E. (2015). A closer look at Private Lives 2: Addressing the mental health and well-being of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) Australians. Monograph Series No. 103. Melbourne, VIC: The Australian Research Centre in Sex, Health & Society, La Trobe University.

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CULTURAL DIVERSITY THE GLOBAL DIVIDE OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION Over the past few years, the issue of same-sex marriage has been the subject of political conversation in Australia and the US. According to the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association (2016) Global Attitudes Survey on LGBTI People, the question of whether or not individuals who identify as gay or lesbian should be accepted or rejected by society is one that is far from settled. The findings from the report, which surveyed 65 countries around the world, show that on a global average half of the respondents felt that being LGBTI should not be regarded as a crime; for Australia and New Zealand on average roughly two thirds of the population were in agreement. Global opinions were split, however, on whether adults should be able to have private consensual sex, with only 38% in agreement – the Oceania region was somewhat more accepting. There was considerable difference in terms of how people would feel if they found that their neighbour was gay or lesbian, with roughly two thirds of people globally being OK with the

prospect; Australia and New Zealand were among the highest, and the lowest positive response was in Africa. Two thirds of people globally said they would be upset if their child was in love with someone of the same sex; and roughly a third would be OK if their male child chose to dress and express himself as a girl or if their female child chose to dress as a male. Attitudes to marriage equality have been slowly changing on a global level, with the strongest support in the Oceania region. Interestingly, one third of people indicated that their opinions in terms of marriage equality have become more favourable in the past five years – almost a quarter saying that knowing someone who is LGBTI had led to their growing acceptance. In the Asia-Pacific region, 79% of people in Australia say gay or lesbian people should be accepted by society, compared with 54% in Japan and 73% in the Philippines. Opinions towards the acceptance of gay or lesbian people have been relatively stable in recent years, although the US, Canada and South Korea appear to have become more tolerant, with acceptance levels growing roughly 10% since 2007. (For more see Figure 13.10.)

FIGURE 13.10 Attitudes towards gay or lesbian people in 65 countries The largest ever global survey on attitudes towards LGBTI people has found that Africa is among the world’s most negative regions when it comes to sexual minorities. Would you be upset if one of your children told you they were in love with someone of the same sex? Africa-16% Africa-62% Africa-21% Asia-25% Asia-52% Asia-23% Americas-35% Americas-29% Americas-36% Europe-39% Europe-31% Europe-30% Oceania-28% Oceania-16% Oceania-56% No upset

Somewhat upset

How would you feel if your neighbour were gay or lesbian? Africa-43% Africa-18% Asia-50% Asia-21% Americas-81% Americas-11% Europe-74% Europe-14% Oceania-83% Oceania-09%

No concerns

Somewhat uncomfortable

Very upset

Africa-39% Asia-28% Americas-08% Europe-12% Oceania-08%

Very uncomfortable

Source: International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association (2016). The ILGA-RIWI 2016 Global Attitudes Survey on LGBTI 2016. Retrieved from https://ilga.org/ilga-riwi-global-attitudes-survey

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So where does community psychology fit into the scheme of problems such as these? It would appear that as a discipline it is well positioned to help reduce the discrimination and harassment that is so clearly entrenched in our societal attitudes towards disadvantaged groups such as the LGBT community. We can contribute a great deal to the empowerment of this community through research, education, advocacy and practice.

CRITICAL THINKING ACTIVITY Having read about the discrimination that members of the LGBT community face and having read about the psychological trauma that is associated with being a refugee, consider

the problems that a refugee who identifies with the LGBT community would face. Suggest some ways that a community psychologist may be able to help a refugee in such a position.

RESEARCH SPOTLIGHT

Source: Courtesy of Dr Neville Robertson.

DR NEVILLE ROBERTSON: COMMUNITY PSYCHOLOGIST, HAMILTON, AOTEAROA/NEW ZEALAND What are the topic areas of your research? I am really interested in what I call institutional and community responses to domestic violence and child abuse. In collaboration with feminist co-researchers, I have spent a long time examining how the police, the judiciary, counsellors, social workers, lawyers, community advocates, church leaders, employers, immigration officers, corrections officials, medical staff, family and friends respond when confronted with evidence of violence and abuse. Sadly, the response of the sort of people mentioned is often to look the other way, to minimise the violence, to blame women and/or to collude with the men who are perpetrating the abuse. Their actions – or inaction – needlessly expose women and children to further violence, sometimes with fatal consequences. Too often, there is a significant gap between the lived experience of women and children exposed to men’s violence and the way the ‘system’ responds. Of course, that is not always the case. There are people who ‘get it’: refuge workers who provide 24/7 support; lawyers who help women navigate the legal system; cops who go the extra mile to apprehend offenders; judges who understand the way violence and abuse places major constraints on women’s ability to mother their children; and courageous family members who confront the abuser. Which of your research findings have you found most intriguing? None of the above should be taken as suggesting that battered women are passive victims lacking agency. Perhaps the most intriguing thing for me has been understanding the resilience of women in resisting abuse and developing strategies for keeping their children – and hopefully themselves – safe from the abuser’s violence. I’m thinking here of women who sometimes fight back. Women whose access to money is controlled by their abuser but who nevertheless surreptitiously save enough of the housekeeping to live on while they make a run for it. Women

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who know how to get just the right amount of alcohol into an angry man to make him mellow. Women who seemingly obey the abuser’s command to use corporal punishment on their children, but take them into the next room and smack their own hands. Women who stay in the relationship because they figure the children will be safer with them there. Or women who leave the relationship with their children because that is what is needed to keep them safe. ‘Interveners’ need to understand this stuff if they are to be effective allies for battered women and their children. (For more see Robertson et al., 2007) How did you become interested in your area of research? Having noticed as a kid how my brother and I were treated differently to our sisters, I was always interested in gender. But it took the mentorship of strong feminist women, particularly Ruth Busch (a legal academic) and Roma Balzer (a community advocate), to really get me on the right track in understanding the ‘hard’ end of sexism – men’s violence against women. I have come to see how good research can play a role in getting heard the voices of the marginalised and the oppressed. Good research can inform public policy and enhance social services. It does, however, sometimes require researchers to be staunch advocates of their work, becoming, in effect, allies of their research participants. How does your area of research speak to life in Australia and New Zealand? When I started in this field, ‘misogyny’ was not a word that tripped off my tongue. Now, I see it as the only way to explain the systematic way women are denied justice in our society. It is easy to point the finger at certain overseas cultures when some particularly vicious example of violence against women hits the headlines, but misogyny is very much alive and well Down Under. Think of the tolerance of prostitution; the sexualisation of young girls; the use of soft porn to sell all sorts of products; the sexual objectification of women generally; the ready availability of pornography; the use of the ‘C word’ as the strongest possible term of contempt; the regularity with which women die as a result of male violence. We have a long way to go before the misogynist thread within settler society on both sides of the Tasman is cut forever.

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Topical Reflection COMMUNITY PSYCHOLOGY, YOUTH SUICIDE AND SELF-HARM Researchers Andrew Day and Danielle Newton (2017) recognise that the prevention of suicide and self-harm behaviour among young people represents a significant challenge for community psychologists. They have identified ways that this profession can help on three levels. 1 Working to strengthen the factors that have been shown to protect young people against self-harm and suicide, including by increasing psychological wellbeing (whether in the context of direct clinical care or working with young people in the community), increasing resilience, encouraging and facilitating social connectedness and support, and promoting healthy lifestyle choices. 2 Ensuring they are knowledgeable about the risk-factors for young people and that they are therapeutically skilled in suicide/self-harm screening in order to play a vital role in identifying those at risk, delivering care or referring to those who can help where needed. 3 Playing a valuable role in dealing with the consequences of suicide, suicide attempts, and self-harming behaviour by providing outreach care and support to the families and friends impacted by these tragic events.

CHAPTER REVIEW SUMMARY THE ORIGINS OF COMMUNITY PSYCHOLOGY • Community psychology is an applied area of social psychology that seeks to understand the context in which we live and the impact that this has upon our wellbeing, behaviours, cognitions and emotions.

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ECOLOGICAL SYSTEMS APPROACH • A framework for understanding both the context in which the community exists, and the people within the context of that community. • From the perspective of the ecological systems approach, people develop within a set of interrelated systems.

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SEVEN CORE VALUES • One of the defining features of community psychology is the core values which underpin the approach to research and practice. • Community psychologists are specifically interested in identifying and understanding the factors that contribute to wellbeing, and the development of programs that help to prevent physical and psychological problems. • Community psychologists are concerned with the physical and psychological wellbeing of all people and seek preventative measures as a means to promote individual wellness. • A sense of community is a perception of belongingness and connection to a larger group. It helps to unite people in times of need and is positively related to psychological wellbeing. • An appreciation of and respect for human diversity is one of the core values which underpin research and action. • Community psychologists are particularly interested in the social issues of the day. They work to empower marginalised groups, enhancing their access to economic, political and psychological resources. They also advocate for change or

•

implementation of social policies and for changes in public attitudes. Community psychology embraces a strengths-based perspective, regarding citizens and community groups as the sources of solutions to community problems. Working in partnership with community members, both contribute knowledge and resources, and participate in making decisions. Merging research with community action while respecting the context and interests of the community in which it occurred is the key to understanding individual and social problems.

PUTTING COMMON SENSE TO THE TEST A sense of community may be improved or maintained as a result of time spent using social media. TRUE. Research has suggested that time spent using social media improves an individual’s sense of community and improves feelings of wellbeing. However, time spent using solo applications such as playing games and surfing the net do not.

PEOPLE, COMMUNITY AND CONTEXT • Community psychology has devoted considerable attention to investigating the contextual effects that a community has upon its members. • A wide range of environments and communities, varying in size and denomination, have been considered. FIFO, DIDO AND BIBO • Research into the practices associated with this type of work indicates elevated stress levels, depression, binge drinking,

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SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AND REAL-WORLD APPLICATIONS

drug use, poor health, obesity, poor relationship quality, family disruption, isolation and loneliness. For some, the negatives of this type of work are balanced by excellent financial remuneration and extended periods of quality time with family. The proportion of women employed in these industries is growing, but still lagging behind in terms of remuneration and type of work. Careers in the mining sector are not seen as long term for most women. The proportion of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander workers in this sector is growing. However, in addition to the challenges faced by all mining workers, they have to deal with issues specific to their cultural imperatives of kin and country. FIFO and DIDO health workers face specific issues, including the demands of travel to multiple locations, and difficulties in establishing connections and trust with clients due to the sporadic nature of their interactions. Sex workers have been attracted to the FIFO sector due to the high number of cashed-up and bored male workers. They face discrimination and an inconsistent legislative framework that affords them little protection if their rights are abused.

WORLDWIDE REFUGEE CRISIS • There are indisputably high numbers of people who are dislocated from their homes and countries. • Almost half of those who are forcibly displaced are children who face a very uncertain future. • Symptoms of post-traumatic stress in these children are common. • The World Health Organization estimates between 2.3 and 3.3 million of the world’s forcibly displaced people live with disabilities – two thirds of these are children. • The needs of the disabled are often overlooked during times of humanitarian crisis. • The mental health of refugees, asylum seekers, internally displaced people (IDPs) and stateless people is a growing global concern. • The mental health issues in this population are complex. • Asylum seekers in detention experience a unique set of stressors that reflect the environment and the inadequacies of the system in which they find themselves. • Critical to a successful transition is the attitude of the host country and its people.

PUTTING COMMON SENSE TO THE TEST The circulation of myths and misinformation is one of the biggest barriers to understanding the issues affecting refugees and asylum seekers. TRUE. Media coverage is often written in a manner that legitimises harsh government policies, justifying sending asylum seekers home or placing them in detention.

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UNITED NATIONS’ SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS • The influence of a community on the welfare of its children, its aged and its disadvantaged groups should not be underestimated. • Community psychologists play an important role in addressing global systemic barriers to good health and wellbeing. POVERTY, HUNGER AND INEQUALITY • One in two children around the world lives in poverty. • The eradication of poverty has been listed as the number one priority of the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals.

PUTTING COMMON SENSE TO THE TEST On a global scale, rates of poverty are declining. TRUE. The United Nations Millennium Development Goal of reducing poverty rates by half was reached in 2010 – five years ahead of target. UNEMPLOYMENT, UNDEREMPLOYMENT AND INEQUALITY • According to the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, unemployment and underemployment lie at the core of poverty. • There has been a great deal of research into the links between unemployment, psychological distress and ill health, much of which paints a bleak picture.

PUTTING COMMON SENSE TO THE TEST All age groups are equally disadvantaged when it comes to unemployment. FALSE. Young people are disproportionately affected by unemployment. THE ELDERLY • Similar to most developed countries, the population of Australia and New Zealand is ageing. • Increasing life spans are not necessarily good news for all because for many it is a period accompanied by an increase in chronic health conditions and increasing mental and physical frailty. SOCIAL EXCLUSION AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION • Despite recent reforms in Australia, there has been little change in the prevalence of discrimination, harassment and violence that the lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) population experiences.

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LINKAGES In this chapter we have investigated systemic barriers to good health and wellbeing. In Chapter 14 we consider health and wellbeing from the perspective of the identification and

CHAPTER

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treatment of illness. The ‘Linkages’ diagram also links to two additional areas of social psychology - helping behaviour and gender diversity.

Community psychology

LINKAGES

Human Diversity - gender identity

CHAPTER

5

Gender identity

Sense of community and helping behaviour in times of disaster

CHAPTER

10

Helping others

Health and wellbeing - the identification and treatment of illness

CHAPTER

14

Stress, health and wellbeing

REVIEW QUIZ 1 Which of the following best describes a community as seen from the perspective of community psychology. a A group of people who have a legal bond of nationality with a particular state. b A perception of belongingness; mutual commitment that links individuals in a collective unity. c A social unit whose members interact with a specific locality. d An Australian television mini-series. 2 McMillan and Chavis (1986) describe four components of ‘sense of community’, including membership, influence, integration and fulfilment of needs, and: a communication. b integrated connectedness. c feelings of worth. d shared emotional connection. 3 Community psychologists would consider which of the following as a context? a Neighbourhoods, schools and workplaces. b Culture and the economy.

c Personality traits or characteristics. d Both a and b. 4 A community psychologist develops a program to help unemployed workers develop new skills to help them gain employment, which includes the provision of social support groups. Which levels of analysis does this program target? a Individuals and microsystems. b Microsystems and localities. c Microsystems and macrosystems. d Individuals and macrosystems. 5 What is the main difference between a refugee and an asylum seeker? a An asylum seeker does not have a legal bond of nationality to any state. b An asylum seeker is still within the boundary of their own country. c A refugee’s claims of persecution have been substantiated. d A refugee does not have a legal bond of nationality with any state.

WEBLINKS Active Ageing Australia https://activeageing.org.au A website promoting physical activity for a lifetime of health and wellbeing, with resources promoting the benefits of physical activity and the role it plays in maintaining our ability to live independent, healthy lifestyles.

Agewell http://www.agewell.org.nz A website promoting healthy ageing throughout New Zealand, with many suggestions for healthy ageing across the lifespan.

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Global Citizen https://www.globalcitizen.org The website of an international education and advocacy organisation working towards the end of extreme poverty by 2030, with information on current campaigns involving health and education; food, water and sanitation; women and girls; innovation and enterprise; and environmental sustainability. Live below the line https://www.livebelowtheline.com.au The website of a charity organisation designed to get people thinking about what it is like to live in poverty, with blogs from

people who have taken the challenge to eat for $2 a day for five days, plus other resources. Refugee Council of Australia https://www.refugeecouncil.org.au The website of the Australian national umbrella body for refugees and the organisations and individuals who support them, with information and resources about the issues that affect refugee and asylum seekers in Australia and overseas.

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Filges, T., Montgomery, E., Kastrup, M., & Jørgensen, A. M. K. (2015). The impact of detention on the health of asylum seekers: A systematic review. Available at: www.campbellcollaboration.org/library/ the-impact-of-detention-on-the-health-of-asylumseekers-a-systematic-review.html. Flood, P., & Blair, S. (2013). BeyondBlue: Men's Sheds in Australia: Effects on physical health and mental wellbeing. UltraFeedback. Retrieved from http://www.mengage.org.au/MENGAGE/media/ MediaLibraryOne/bw0209.pdf 21/7/18 Fondacaro, M. R., & Weinberg, D. (2002). Concepts of social justice in community psychology: Toward a social ecological epistemology. American journal of community psychology, 30(4), 473–492 Gardner, B., Alfrey, K. L., Vandelanotte, C., & Rebar, A. L. (2018). Mental health and well-being concerns of fly-in fly-out workers and their partners in Australia: a qualitative study. BMJ Open, 8(3), e019516. doi: 10.1136/bmjopen-2017-019516. Gottschalk, L. (2007). Coping with stigma: Coming out and living as lesbians and gay men in regional and rural areas in the context of problems of rural confidentiality and social exclusion. Retrieved from http: //www.cecc.com.au /clients/sob/research /docs/ lgottschalk /bushneedssocial workjournal.pdf Grosswald, B. (2003). Shift work and negative work-to-family spillover. Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare, 30(4), 31–56. Guerin, P., & Guerin, B. (2009). Social effects of fly-in-fly-out and drive-in-drive-out services for remote Indigenous communities. Australian Community Psychologist, 21(2), 7–22. Haslam McKenzie, F. (2007). Attracting and retaining skilled and professional staff in remote locations. Desert Knowledge CRC Report Number 21. Heiler, K., Pickersgill, R., & Briggs, C. (2001). Working time arrangements in the Australian mining industry: Trends and implications with particular reference to occupational health and safety. Sectoral Activities Programme Working Paper 162. Retrieved from http://www.ilo.org/ public/english/dialogue/ sector/papers/austrmin/index.htm. Helmes, E., & Fudge, M. (2016). Psychological distress among Australian welfare recipient job seekers. Australian Journal of Psychology, 69(2), 106–111. doi:10.1111/ajpy.12123 HelpAge International. (2014). Hidden victims of the Syrian crisis. Help Age International and Handicap International. Retrieved from http://www.helpage.org/ global-agewatch/reports/global-agewatch-index-2013insight-report-summary-and-methodology./ HelpAge International. (2015). Global AgeWatch Index. Retrieved from https://www.helpage.org/globalagewatch/ Henry, P., Hamilton, K., Watson, S., & McDonald, M. (2013). FIFO/DIDO mental health: Research report 2013. Perth: Lifeline WA. Henry, S. K. (2012). On social connection in university life. About Campus, 16, 18–24. Hodgetts, D., Chamberlain, K., Tankel, Y., & Groot, S. (2013). Researching poverty to make a difference: The need for reciprocity and advocacy in community research. Australian Community Psychologist, 25(1), 35–48. House of Representatives Standing Committee on Regional Australia. (2013). Cancer of the bush or salvation of our cities? Fly-in, fly-out and drive-in, drive out workforce practices in regional Australia. Canberra, ACT: Commonwealth of Australia. Retrieved from http:// www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/ House_of_Representatives_Committees?url=/ra/ fifodido/report.htm. Immigration New Zealand. (2014). Auckland regional settlement strategy. Retrieved from http://

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transgender (LGBT) Australians. Monograph Series No. 103. Melbourne, VIC: The Australian Research Centre in Sex, Health & Society, La Trobe University. Leonard, W., Pitts, M., Mitchell, A., Lyons, A., Smith, A., Patel, S., Couch, M., & Barrett, A. (2012). Private Lives 2: The second national survey of the health and wellbeing of gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgender (GLBT) Australians. Monograph Series Number 86. Melbourne, VIC: The Australian Research Centre in Sex, Health & Society, La Trobe University. Lester, L., Waters, S., Spears, B., Epstein, M., Watson, J., & Wenden, E. (2015). Parenting adolescents: developing strategies for FIFO parents. Journal of Child and Family Studies, 24(12), 3757–3766. Louis, W. R., Duck, J. M., Terry, D. J., Schuller, R. A., & Lalonde, R. N. (2007). Why do citizens want to keep refugees out? Threats, fairness and hostile norms in the treatment of asylum seekers. European Journal of Social Psychology, 37(1), 53–73. Mares S. (2016). Fifteen years of detaining children who seek asylum in Australia – evidence and consequences. Australasian Psychiatry, 24(1), 11–4. Mares, S., & Jureidini, J. (2004). Psychiatric assessment of children and families in immigration detention – clinical, administrative and ethical issues. Australian and New Zealand Journal of Public Health, 28(6), 520–526. McKee-Ryan, F. M., Song, Z., Wanberg, C. R., & Kinicki, A. J. (2005). Psychological and physical wellbeing during unemployment: A meta-analytic study. Journal of Applied Psychology, 90(1), 53–76. McMillan, D. W., & Chavis, D. M. (1986). Sense of community: A definition and theory. Journal of Community Psychology, 14, 6–23. Metherell, L. (2014). Asylum seeker children describe Christmas Island detention centre as ‘hell’, Human Rights Commission says. ABC News: The World Today. Retrieved from http://australia.isidewith. com/ news/ article /asylum-seeker-children-describechristmas -island-detention- centre. Ministry of Social Development. (2009). Nonincome measures of material wellbeing and hardship: first results from the 2008 New Zealand living standards survey, with international comparisons. Wellington, NZ: Ministry of Social Development. Moore, T. H. M., Kapur, N., Hawton, K., Richards, A., Metcalfe, C., & Gunnell, D. (2017). Interventions to reduce the impact of unemployment and economic hardship on mental health in the general population: a systematic review. Psychological Medicine, 47(6), 1062–1084. Morris, R. (2012). Scoping study: Impact of fly-in fly-out/drive-in drive-out work practices on local government. Sydney, NSW: Australian Centre of Excellence for Local Government, University of Technology. Morton, R. (2014, 13 April). Prepare for a retirement age of 70: Joe Hockey. The Australian. Retrieved from http://www.theaustralian.com.au/ national-affairs/ prepare-for-a-retirement-age-of-70–joe-hockey/storyfn59niix-1226882446948. Newman, L., Proctor, N., & Dudley, M. (2013). Seeking asylum in Australia: immigration detention, human rights and mental health care. Australasian Psychiatry, 21, 315–20. Newton, D., & Day, A. (2017). The role of the community psychologist in preventing youth suicide and self-harm. Australian Community Psychologist, 28(2), 5–16. O’Doherty, K., & Lecouteur, A. (2007). ‘Asylum seekers’, ‘boat people’ and ‘illegal immigrants’: Social categorisation in the media. Australian Journal of Psychology, 59(1), 1–12. Omoto, A. M., & Snyder, M. (2002). Considerations of community: The context and process of

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Stress, health and wellbeing

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CHAPTER

Learning Objectives By the end of this chapter, you should be able to: 1 identify the links between stress, health and wellbeing 2 discuss the causes of stress 3 consider how the body responds to stress 4 define the links between stress and obesity 5 explain the processes of appraisal 6 identify the ways that people cope with stress 7 discuss the social psychological components of a successful approach to treating and preventing stress 8 consider the factors that affect the pursuit of happiness and subjective wellbeing.

The social connection between health and illness psychology of physical and mental health. To find out more about the social connections between health and illness, visit the Topical Reflections feature at the end of the chapter.

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Source: Getty Images/AFP/Dominique Faget

Sometimes health and illness are inherently social in nature. The highly contagious Ebola virus, which broke out in 2014, rapidly became the largest Ebola epidemic in history, affecting all of West Africa. To prevent person-to-person transmission, healthcare workers at this hospital in Liberia, and elsewhere, had to wear protective suits. In total, 28 000 cases were identified, 15 000 were confirmed, and 11 314 died (WHO Ebola Response Team, 2016). This chapter will explore the social

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PUTTING COMMON SENSE TO THE TEST Circle Your Answer T

F

The accumulation of daily hassles does more to make people sick than catastrophes or major life changes.

T

F

Stress is a leading cause of stomach ulcers.

T

F

Stress can weaken the heart, but it cannot affect the immune system.

T

F

People who have lots of friends are healthier and live longer than those who live more isolated lives.

T

F

In all countries and at all levels of wealth, the more money people have, the happier they are.

INTRODUCTION

Health psychology

The study of physical health and illness by psychologists from various areas of specialisation.

The reasons that social psychologists study mental health, including disorders such as anxiety and depression, are obvious. Humans are inherently social creatures, and our psychological wellbeing can be both damaged and repaired by our relationships with other people. But social psychologists are also interested in physical health, a domain normally associated with medicine. Working in universities, medical schools, hospitals and government agencies, many social psychologists are involved in the relatively new area of health psychology, which is the application of psychology to the promotion of physical health and the prevention and treatment of illness (Straub, 2012; Taylor, 2012a). You may wonder: What does social psychology have to do with catching a cold, becoming obese, slimming down, having a heart attack or being afflicted by cancer? If you could turn the clock back a few years and ask your family doctor, his or her reply would be ‘nothing’. In the past, physical illness was considered a purely biological event. But this narrow medical perspective has given way to a broader model which holds that health is a joint product of biological, psychological and social factors. In light of useful research that has been conducted in recent years, and the many links that have been found between stress and illness, this chapter begins by focusing on stress, including what causes it, what it does to the body and how we appraise stressful situations in order to cope with them. Next, we look at some social influences on the treatment and prevention of illness. Finally, we consider the pursuit of happiness and life satisfaction.

STRESS, HEALTH AND WELLBEING Stress is an unpleasant state of arousal that occurs when we perceive that the demands of a situation threaten our ability to cope effectively. In 2015 the Australian Psychological Society (APS) conducted its fifth successive ‘state of the nation’ survey investigating levels of stress and wellbeing in the community. The aim of the survey was to gain an understanding of the overall wellbeing of Australians, to identify the major causes of stress Australians are under, and to investigate the strategies people are using to manage it. The APS report indicated that although fewer Australians reported being distressed, anxiety and depression had increased substantially over a five-year period (Figure 14.1). In fact, anxiety symptoms reached a peak in 2015 with 26% of those surveyed reporting symptoms of anxiety, with most symptoms being severe to extremely severe. But what is it that stresses us out? The top five contributors are finance, health, family, and trying to maintain a healthy lifestyle. The APS survey in 2015 also examined, for the first time, the use and impact of social media and how it relates to a ‘fear FIGURE 14.1 Stress in Australia of missing out’ (FoMO) on what others are doing. The results According to the Australian Psychological Society’s Stress and indicated that social media is both a cause of stress and a means Wellbeing in Australia Survey (2015), four in ten Australians say of managing stress with more than one in ten Australians saying that stress has a moderate to severe impact on their physical and that keeping up to date with social media is a source of stress. mental health Conversely almost one in two say they visit social media sites to manage stress. High usage levels indicate the attraction that social media has for many teenagers with just over half of those surveyed saying that they connect in excess of five times per day. Source: Australian Psychological Society. (2015). Stress and wellbeing: How Australians are Not surprisingly, many say that they are suffering from ‘burnout’ coping with life. Retrieved from https://www.headsup.org.au/docs/default-source/ default-document-library/stress-and-wellbeing-in-australia-report.pdf?sfvrsn=7f08274d_4 from the constant connectivity (Figure 14.2).

Stress

An unpleasant state of arousal in which people perceive the demands of an event as taxing or exceeding their ability to satisfy or alter those demands.

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STRESS, HEALTH AND WELLBEING

Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people and stress

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

FIGURE 14.2 Social media and the fear of missing out It seems that constant connectivity is taking its toll with many

The impact of European colonisation of Australia and the practice Australians saying they feel burnout from the pressure of keeping of forcibly separating Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children up with social media. from their families, identities, lands, languages, and cultures and the effect of such practices on the health and wellbeing of successive generations has had significant implications for Indigenous mental health. For Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Australians the Source: Australian Psychological Society. (2015). Stress and wellbeing: How Australians are coping with life. Retrieved from https://www.headsup.org.au/docs/default-source/ notion of social and emotional wellbeing broadly encompasses default-document-library/stress-and-wellbeing-in-australia-report.pdf?sfvrsn=7f08274d_4 mental health, connection to country, culture, spirituality, ancestry, family and community and is heavily influenced by discrimination, social exclusion, grief, past and ongoing child removals, unresolved trauma, economic and social disadvantage, incarceration, experiences of violence, substance use and poor physical health. According to the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (AIHW) (2017) mental and substance use disorders were the largest contributor to the burden of disease in Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people in 2011, making up 19% of the total burden, followed by suicide and self-inflicted injuries at 4.5% of the burden. Alarmingly Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander adults were 2.6 times more likely than non-Indigenous adults to report high or very high levels of psychological distress. It is worth keeping in mind however that the psychometric tools used to measure psychological distress have rarely been validated for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander populations despite consensus that theoretical constructs developed in the context of the dominant Western psychology may not be adequate. Brown and colleagues (2016) noted this limitation and sought to address the lack of accessible, culturally specific measures of psychosocial stress, depression and quality of life which have been developed for, and validated within, this population. The team investigated the antecedents of poor mental health in Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander men and developed a culturally specific scale to measure depression and associated factors. Similarly, in New Zealand, indicators suggest that rates of psychological distress were significantly higher among Māori (10%) and Pacific adults (9%) than in the general population (6%). Māori adults were 1.7 times as likely, and Pacific adults 1.4 times as likely, to have experienced psychological distress as the general public (Hudson, Russell, & Holland, 2017). An interesting finding, however, indicates that traditional cultures and practices may serve a protective function against poor environmental safety and emotional health, with figures suggesting that the emotional and social health of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children was better in more remote areas. In fact, Zubrick and colleagues (2005) suggest that children living in cities had emotional and social health that was five times worse than those living in very remote communities.

CAUSES OF STRESS Make a list of the stressors in your own life and you will probably find that the items on your list can be sorted into three major categories: crises and catastrophes, major life events, and microstressors, or everyday hassles. In the following we examine the common causes of stress.

Stressor

Anything that causes stress.

Crises and catastrophes On 26 December 2004, one of the worst natural disasters in history spread over Southeast Asia, India, Indonesia and Africa. It started when a powerful earthquake struck deep under the Indian Ocean, triggering massive tsunamis that obliterated cities, seaside communities and holiday resorts across the region. Approximately 320 000 people in a dozen countries were killed, 1.7 million people were displaced, and thousands of survivors were injured (Phillips, 2011). In 2011, a massive earthquake – the fourth largest ever recorded – set off a tsunami with waves up to 9 metres high hitting the Japanese coast. It devastated everything in its path, killed almost 19 000 and displaced what was estimated to be in excess of 470 000 people – a great many of whom are still displaced (CNN Library, 2014; Diep, 2011; Norris, 2012). A report by the International Displacement Monitoring Centre (2017) suggests that although the number of people displaced had very gradually fallen by 61% to just over 134 000 people as of November 2016, the rate at which people have found permanent settlement solutions is far less than optimal. In fact, there are suggestions that if the rate of return continues at such a slow pace there may well be over 100 000 people still displaced in 2021 –10 years after the disaster. According to Craig Van Dyke and fellow psychiatrist John Takayama, who travelled to Japan in the aftermath, the levels of distress experienced by survivors came from many sources. Not only were these people coping with a traumatic event and loss of life, property and possessions, but they were also experiencing the stress of living

CRITICAL THINKING ACTIVITY Can you describe a time when you experienced stress? How did you know you were experiencing it? What emotional and physiological changes did you notice?

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in shelters that were overcrowded and lacked privacy (Norris, 2012). Distress is also exacerbated by the time that elapses between the event and the return of normality. It is not uncommon for resentment to build up over time among the survivors because some have managed to get their lives back on track faster than others. According to psychologist Ayako Sato, ‘In the first year, there is a collective feeling of working together, of overcoming this together. In the second year, everyone wants to help each other because everyone suffered a loss in the disaster. But by the third year, you start to see a rift in living standards. People drift apart’ (Saito, 2014).

Long-term effects of crisis

CRITICAL THINKING ACTIVITY What role do you think the media and social networking play in our responses to catastrophic events? Can you think of five reasons why our easy access to such events increases the levels of stress witnessed immediately after and in the days that follow? Now think of five reasons why easy access to this information may lead to a decrease in stress.

An indication of the long-term effects is beautifully illustrated by a systematic literature review conducted by Shuntaro Ando and colleagues in 2017. The study which examined the trends in mental health problems reported over time (and the associated risk factors) found varying rates of depression and child behaviour problems. Their results suggested evidence of improvements in post-traumatic stress symptoms over time, persistent symptoms of depression, and an initial increase in suicide rates followed by a decrease two years post event – albeit still higher than the pre-disaster level in Fukushima when compared to other prefectures. In the aftermath of the disaster, those who were displaced were relocated to small temporary apartments. The risk of deteriorating health was clearly an issue for all who were impacted by the disaster, although the very young and the elderly were identified as being particularly at risk, with estimates suggesting that at the time of the disaster up to two-thirds of the population were aged 60 years and older. In terms of the elderly, the risk appeared on two fronts – physical and mental health. A longitudinal cohort study conducted by Aiko Ishiki and colleagues (2016) examined health conditions and cognitive functions of elderly people residing in temporary housing at 28, 32, and 42 months after the disaster. The findings showed incidence of people considered to be cognitively impaired significantly increased over time. Another interesting study conducted by Hiroyuki Hikichi and colleagues in 2016 examined potential links between the experience of a disaster and cognitive decline in the aftermath of the 2011 event. Utilising baseline data which was drawn from a survey of older community-dwelling adults who lived 80 kilometres west of the epicentre seven months prior to the disaster, the authors were keen to examine the personal stories of disaster and the incidence of dementia two-and-half-years post disaster. Based on their sample of those who had lost relatives or friends in the disaster, and those who had reported property damage, the authors identified a relationship between major housing damage and cognitive decline.

Stigma associated with seeking help This Japanese disaster highlighted not only a chronic shortage of mental health resources in Japan, but also the level of stigma associated with seeking mental health services (Yamashita & Shigemura, 2013). Research conducted by Adam Karz and colleagues (2014) highlighted the persistent stigma against mental health issues that healthcare professionals who travelled to the area to provide assistance encountered. Mental health workers struggled to gain trust from those who were displaced because they were not used to sharing their feelings with others – the overarching result of this was survivors reluctant to communicate their problems. ‘There are people who feel better when they speak to someone, and then there are those who feel more traumatised when they remember the past’, one survivor said (Saito, 2014). In this case the mental health professionals who travelled to the area were offering services to populations traditionally uncomfortable with acknowledging the need for such help. As we saw in Chapter 10, although the challenges that confront the professionals who come to provide aid impact upon them in many ways – negative psychological consequences such as acute stress disorder, anxiety, depression and posttraumatic distress (Mao et al., 2018), the end result for the communities in need is well worth the effort.

The scarring effects of large-scale disasters, war and the challenge of PTSD

Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) A condition in which a person experiences enduring physical and psychological symptoms after an extremely stressful event.

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The scarring effects of large-scale disasters are without dispute. Anthony Rubonis and Leonard Bickman (1991), based on their review of 52 studies, found that high rates of psychological disorders are common among residents of areas that have been hit by these catastrophic events. In another study of disasters involving 377 US counties, a team of researchers found that compared with the years preceding each disaster, the suicide rate increased by 14% after floods, 31% after hurricanes and 63% after earthquakes (Krug et al., 1998). Other events that can have similarly traumatic effects include war, car accidents, plane crashes, violent crimes, physical or sexual abuse, and the death of a loved one (Kubany et al., 2000). War, in particular, leaves deep, permanent psychological scars. Soldiers in combat believe that they have to kill or be killed. They suffer intense anxiety and see horrifying injuries, death and destruction, all of which leaves them with images and emotions that do not fade. Given this level of stress, it is not surprising that when a war is over, some veterans suffer greatly. In World War I, the problem was called ‘shell shock’. In World War II, it was called ‘combat fatigue’. Now the problem is seen as a specific form of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)

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and is identified by such enduring symptoms as recurring anxiety, sleeplessness, nightmares, intrusive bad thoughts, flashbacks, attention problems and social withdrawal. What is worse, families are often shattered when a loved one returns from war and seems different, as if still trapped in combat (McCarty-Gould, 2000). Studies conducted in Australia and overseas suggest that 8% of Australian soldiers and up to 10% of soldiers from the US have experienced PTSD in the wake of operational deployments (Hodson, McFarlane, Van Hooff, & Davies, 2011). The Australian Defence Force (ADF) Mental Health Prevalence and Wellbeing Study 2010, one of the largest studies conducted to examine mental disorder prevalence in the ADF, found that one in five members met the criteria for a mental disorder, the most common of which was anxiety (14.8%). There is no doubt that military service is an occupation where personnel are selected and These soldiers, like thousands of other troops and trained to face stressful and potentially traumatising situations but the rates of civilians, have experienced the recent wars in Iraq and both military and non-military related traumas appear to be higher in the ADF Afghanistan firsthand. It has long been recognised that combat leaves psychological scars and increases than in the rest of the Australian community. The report indicates that 90% of ADF the risk of posttraumatic stress disorder. members have experienced at least one potentially traumatic event at some time in their life, compared to 73% of an age and employment matched sample of the Australian community. It also estimated approximately 8.3% of ADF members will have experienced PTSD in the last 12 months – significantly higher rates than the Australian community (5.2%), and men in the defence force appear to be at much higher risk of PTSD compared with the general community (8.1% versus 4.6%) (McFarlane, Hodson, Van Hooff, & Davies, 2011; Van Hooff, et al., 2014). Although some studies suggest that certain soldiers are more vulnerable than others to PTSD, especially those who were exposed to high levels of combat, had discharged a weapon, and had witnessed someone being wounded or killed (Xue et al., 2015), the ADF study indicates that members who have never been deployed also experience PTSD at the same rate as those who have deployed. What is clear from the report is that those who experience multiple traumas across their lifetime, including on deployment, are at greater risk of PTSD. War can traumatise civilian populations as well. In 2003, 16% of Israeli adults had personally been exposed to a terrorist attack, and 37% had a close friend or family member who had been exposed (Bleich, Gelkopf, & Solomon, 2003). With regard to the mental health consequences of such exposure, a study of 905 Jewish and Palestinian citizens revealed that exposure to terrorism was associated with PTSD symptoms in both groups – although more so among the Palestinian citizens, members of an ethnic minority who have fewer coping resources to turn to when in distress (Hobfoll, Canetti-Nisim, & Johnson, 2006). Since 2012, the war in Syria has killed more than 300 000 people, displaced at least half of the entire Syrian population and trapped hundreds of thousands under siege, has caused PTSD in Syrian children that is so severe mental health professionals have given it a new name ‘human devastation syndrome’ (McVeight, 2017; Sahloul, 2018; Jones, 2017). While studies examining the mental health of Syrian refugee children have provided evidence of the levels of trauma and distress, little is known of the impact on children who remain in Syria; however, it is estimated that one in four is at risk of developing mental health disorders (UNOCHA, 2017). The results of a large study conducted by the Save the Children organisation provides graphic evidence of how the conflict has affected children’s daily lives. Their findings indicated that 84% of adults and almost all the children they spoke with report the ongoing bombing as the major cause of daily stress. Almost 90% said that children’s behaviour has become more nervous and fearful as the war continues; 80% believe that children and adolescents have become more aggressive and have turned to drugs to cope with the stress; and many children have either lost the ability to speak or have speech impediments. There are also reports of children suffering from frequent bedwetting and involuntary urination, which are linked to toxic stress and PTSD among children. To compound the issue, there is sometimes only one treating psychiatrist in areas with over a million people. The very harsh reality is that with daily exposure to the traumatic events that Syrian children endure, there will be a rise in long-term mental health disorders, such as major depressive disorder, separation anxiety disorder, and PTSD, which will continue long after the conflict ends.

Post-traumatic stress research Over the years, clinical psychologists have studied PTSD and the life experiences that precipitate its onset (Friedman et al., 2014). The Australian National Survey of Mental Health and Wellbeing (Creamer, Burgess, & McFarlane, 2001), conducted with a sample of more than 10 000 people, found that 65% of Australian men and 50% of Australian women had experienced at least one traumatic event in their life, and estimated the 12-month prevalence rate of PTSD in Australia at 1.33% (1.2% for men and 1.4% for women). For Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people the situation appears considerably worse. One study conducted in a remote Aboriginal community in Western Australia, found that 97% of participants had been exposed to traumatic events throughout their lives. Copyright 2020 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-202

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Source: © Commonwealth of Australia 2018, CPL David Said

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In fact, the lifetime prevalence of PTSD in this group was estimated at 55.2%, with 91% of these also meeting the diagnostic criteria for disorders related to alcohol use. Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people have been subjected to generations of traumatic events and, as such, the prevalence of PTSD is disproportionately higher in these communities than the national average, and is recognised as one of the highest in the world (Nadew, 2012).

Major life events Some people are lucky enough to avoid major catastrophes. But nobody can completely avoid stress. Indeed, change itself may cause stress by forcing us to adapt to new circumstances. This hypothesis was first proposed by Thomas Holmes and Richard Rahe (1967), who interviewed hospital patients and found that their illnesses had often been preceded by major changes in some aspect of their lives. Some of the changes were negative, such as getting hurt, divorced or fired; but others were positive, such as getting married, promoted or having a baby. To measure life stress, Holmes and Rahe then devised the Social Readjustment Rating Scale (SRRS), a checklist of 43 major life events with each assigned a numerical value based on the amount of readjustment it requires. Among the events sampled (and the numerical values they were assigned) were the death of a spouse (100), divorce (73), imprisonment (63), marriage (50), job loss (47), pregnancy (40), school transfer (20) and even holidays (13). The simple notion that change is inherently stressful has an intuitive ring about it. But is change, be it positive or negative, necessarily harmful? There are two complicating factors to answering this. First, although there is a statistical link between negative events and illness, research does not similarly support the claim that positive ‘stressors’, such as taking a holiday, graduating, winning the lottery, starting a new career or getting married, are similarly harmful (Stewart, Sokol, Healy Jr, & Chester, 1986). Happiness is not the absence of distress, nor is distress the absence of happiness. A person can simultaneously experience both emotions (Carver & Scheier, 1990), and the health consequences are different (Taylor, 1991). Second is that the impact of any change depends on who the person is and how the change is interpreted. For example, moving to a new country is less stressful to immigrants who can speak the language of the new location (Berry, Poortinga, Segall, & Dasen, 1992); victims of physical assault who keep wondering ‘What if ?’ take longer to recover emotionally than those who do not (El Leithy, Brown, & Robbins, 2006); and workers who have stressful jobs cope better when they disengage during nonwork times than when they do not (Sonnentag & Fritz, 2015). To sum up, change in a person’s life may provide a crude estimate of stress and future health, but the predictive equation is not that simple.

Microstressors Think again about the stress in your life, and catastrophes and other exceptional events will spring to mind. Yet the most common source of stress arises from the hassles that irritate us every day. Environmental factors such as population density, loud noise, extreme heat or cold, and cigarette smoke are all sources of stress. Exams, car problems, the cost of living, waiting in lines, traffic, losing keys, bad days at work, money troubles and other ‘microstressors’ also place a constant strain on us. Unfortunately, there is nothing ‘micro’ about the impact of these stressors on health and wellbeing. Studies suggest that the accumulation of daily hassles contributes more to illness than do major life events (Kohn, Lafreniere, & Gurevich, 1991). Interpersonal conflicts are the most upsetting of our daily stressors and have a particularly long-lasting impact (Bolger, DeLongis, Kessler, & Schilling, 1989). One problem that plagues many people in the workplace is occupational stress (Barling, Kelloway, & Frone, 2005). One type of reaction is burnout – a prolonged response to job stress that is characterised by emotional exhaustion, cynicism, disengagement and a lack of personal accomplishment. Teachers, doctors, nurses, police officers, social workers, psychologists and other professions in human-service are especially at risk. Under relentless job pressures, those who are burned out describe themselves as feeling drained, frustrated, hardened, apathetic and lacking in energy and motivation (Leiter, Bakker, & Maslach, 2014; Maslach, Schaufeli, & Leiter, 2001). People are most likely to have this experience when they do not have enough resources at work to meet the demands of the job, such as support from supervisors and friendly relations with co-workers (Lee & Ashforth, 1996). To make matters worse, people who burn out at work are at greater risk for cardiovascular disease (Melamed, Shirom, Toker, Berliner, & Shapira, 2006).

Burnout and workplace fatigue Over the years, research had suggested that burnout was an experience that afflicted women more than men, but it now appears that the role of gender is more complex. A recent analysis of 183 studies has shown both men and women are potentially susceptible to burnout under bad circumstances, but the symptoms are different. Female employees are 8% more likely than men to become emotionally exhausted in the workplace – feeling overwhelmed and physically drained. However, men are 14% more likely to become depersonalised at work, withdrawing and distancing themselves from clients and co-workers (Purvanova & Muros, 2010). 584

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Burnout is an inherent risk for some professions, and those working in the area of mental health tend to be more at risk than most. Research conducted by Gary Ackerley and colleagues (1988) examined the extent of burnout in a sample of 562 licensed, doctoral-level, practising psychologists employed primarily within human service settings in the US. Their findings indicated that more than a third of the sample was experiencing high levels of emotional exhaustion and depersonalisation. Those who were affected most were young, had a low income, engaged in little individual psychotherapy, experienced feelings of lack of control in the therapeutic setting, and felt overcommitted to clients. Research has also examined the volume, nature and severity of client problems, and the effect that these variables may have upon burnout and compassion, with findings indicating that compassion fatigue was directly related to the number of hours spent counselling trauma victims (Flannelly, Roberts & Weaver, 2005; Kassam-Adams, 1999). This is a tenuous correlation, however, with research from Stephanie Baird and Sharon Jenkins (2003) suggesting no correlation between the number of trauma clients, the hours per week spent counselling trauma clients, and the degree of compassion fatigue in staff working in sexual assault and domestic violence agencies. However, workplace characteristics may buffer the effects of job stress, with research indicating co-worker support and social support from supervisors and colleagues may help to alleviate or prevent burnout, whereas a lack of support from supervisors can lead to an increase in burnout levels (Ducharme, Knudsen & Roman, 2008; Maslach et al., 2001). Similarly, research conducted by Isabel Thompson and colleagues (2014) confirmed that perceptions of working conditions (e.g., the support of co-workers and work atmosphere) was a significant predictor of burnout – so it seems that working conditions may be an important consideration in the amelioration of burnout.

CULTURAL DIVERSITY WORK STRESS AROUND THE WORLD The Global Wellness Institute report – The future of Wellness at Work (2016) indicates that in excess of 3.2 billion of the world’s 7.3 billion people go to work every day which means that the average person will spend 90 000 hours at work in their lifetime. In fact, many of us will spend anywhere from a third to a half of our waking hours doing work or work-related tasks. With figures such as these it is not surprising to see that a good work–life balance is not easy to obtain.

There is growing evidence globally to suggest that the wellbeing of the global workforce has deteriorated in terms of stress, disengagement, poor health, workplace injuries and death; but how big is the problem and how widespread? The figures indicated in the Global Wellness Institute report suggest that 3.2 billion workers worldwide are increasingly unwell (Figure 14.3); they are ageing rapidly; many are overweight or obese, and there are indications of diabetes levels rising. In terms of the mental health of workers the situation is

FIGURE 14.3 The global impact of stress in the workplace Stress is one of the biggest threats to workplace health, costing billions of dollars each year.

23% Europe 52% North America

7% Middle East N. Africa

5% AsiaPacific

1% Africa 5% Latin America & Caribbean

Source: Global Wellness Institute. (2016). The future of wellness at work. Retrieved from https://globalwellnessinstitute.org/industry-research/the-future-of-wellness-at-work/

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alarming – increasing numbers of employees report excessive pressure on the job, and many are actively disengaged at work. In Australia only 52% of workers believe their workplace is mentally healthy and 20% say they have taken time off because of stress, anxiety or depression (TNS, 2014). Globally there are an estimated 2.3 million work-related deaths each year and 313 million work-related accidents with figures in the US alone suggesting a cost of $1 billion every week devoted to compensation for workplace injuries and illness. The costs of work-related stress around the world are estimated to be: $650 billion in Europe, $3.9 billion in

Australia, $2.8 billion in Canada, and $300 billion in the US (Yeung & Johnston, 2016). And if you are asking what is being done to address what appears to be a global epidemic – the demand for improvements in workplace wellbeing have spurred a growth industry. Worldwide, spending on employee wellness has risen consistently over the 5–10 years prior to the survey, with estimates from the Global Wellness Institute suggesting that workplace wellness is a $40.7 billion industry. That said – with only 9% of people globally having access to such programs there is a great deal of work yet to be done.

Commuting and stress Another form of daily stress comes from commuting to and from work. Research has shown that driving to work can increase stress (Koslowsky, Kluger, & Riech, 1995). For 97% of Australians, at the top of the list of annoyances during their commute to work are dangerous drivers, traffic jams, road rage, people talking loudly on mobile phones, pollution, overheating and bad body odour. Some cities in Australia have a more stressful commute than others, with Brisbane drivers reportedly feeling the most stressed (90% of those surveyed said they are more stressed after being in traffic), followed by Adelaide (81%), Melbourne (78%), Sydney (74%) and Perth (73%) (IBM, 2011b). Frustrations for 80% of New Zealanders come in the form of stop–start traffic (51%), aggressive drivers (30%), low speed (27%) and unreliable journey time (19%). Stress levels as a result of traffic are worse in Auckland (80%) than Christchurch (62%), and more commuters in Auckland (30%) are likely to suggest this has a negative effect on their health than those living in Christchurch (18%) or Wellington (13%) (IBM, 2011c). Commuting long distances by train can have the same effect. Studying railroad commuters who travelled regularly from their homes in suburban New Jersey to work in Manhattan, Gary Evans and Richard Wener (2006) found that the longer the commute, the more stress responders reported feeling, the sloppier they were at a simple proofreading task, and the higher their level of cortisol – a stress hormone that was measured by taking saliva samples after the morning trip to work.

CULTURAL DIVERSITY THE DAILY COMMUTE: STRESS ON A GLOBAL SCALE The IBM Commuter Pain Survey (2011a) rated the top 10 worst commutes around the world, based upon commuting time, time stuck in traffic, cost of fuel and stress levels. Beijing took the lead followed by Mexico City and Moscow. For people living in these cities, the average two-and-a-half-hour traffic jams provided a constant source of frustration. On average, 57% reported that being stuck in traffic negatively affected their health, and this figure increased dramatically for those based in New Delhi (96%) and Beijing (95%). Almost a third of people said that traffic negatively affected their performance on the job but the impact was greatly increased in Beijing (84%), New Delhi and Mexico City (both at 56%). Across all cities surveyed, most agreed that traffic was getting worse, with 87% suggesting that they have been stuck in traffic at some stage in the preceding three years, for an average delay of one hour. Interestingly, if commuting time was reduced, 16% said they would work more, and in New Delhi the figure jumped

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to 40%. In many cases, traffic had been so bad on occasions that respondents had turned around and gone home – in Beijing this strategy was employed for 69% of commuters. And if you think you are stressed following the commute to work, consider the frustration that comes from parking! Half of all drivers in 16 of the 20 countries surveyed say that they had been so frustrated looking for a park that they simply gave up and drove away! So how far have we come with traffic woes since 2011 – traffic congestion in Australia has increased by an average of 4% over the last eight years. According to Ford’s online commuter calculator tool, the average Australian commute equates to 417 days or 1.1 years on the road when spread out over their working life (Brook, 2016). The annual traffic index, conducted by Tom Tom (2017), shows Sydney as Australia’s most congested city with the worst commute times (41 minutes per day), and a ranking of 29th most congested city in the world. Melbourne was the second-most congested Australian city, followed by

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Brisbane, Adelaide and Perth (Figure 14.4). Mexico City had the worst congestion and the longest commute in the world – 59 minutes per day or 227 hours per year. It was closely followed

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by Bangkok, Jakarta, Chongqing and Bucharest. According to historical data, traffic congestion is up by 23% globally since 2008, with Asia and Oceania up by 12%.

FIGURE 14.4 Traffic congestion levels According to the TomTom Traffic Index, traffic congestion has increased globally by 23% since 2008. 50% Bucharset

49% Istanbul 66% Mexico City

46% Beijing 52% 47% Chengdu Chongqing 61% Bangkok

46% Tainan 36% Hongkong

58% Singapore

47% Rio De Janeiro

27% Perth

58% Jakarta

46% Beijing

27% Adelaide 39% Sydney 33% Melbourne

28% Brisbane 38% New Zealand

Source: Based on data from TomTom Traffic Index (2017). TomTom Traffic Index: Measuring congestion worldwide. Retrieved from https://www.tomtom.com/en_gb/trafficindex/list?citySize=LARGE&continent=ALL&country=ALL

Stress and socioeconomic status Health psychologists have come to realise that socioeconomic status is a powerful representation for the hassles of everyday living. Across a range of health outcomes, individuals who are less educated, have lower status jobs and earn less (or have no income) are more likely to suffer from health problems relative to others who are better off (Adler et al., 1994). There are two reasons for this association. First, people who live in lowincome neighbourhoods are invariably subject to more exposure to noise, crowding, crime, poor diet and other stressors. Second, people of low socioeconomic status have fewer tangible, medical, social and psychological resources to help them meet these daily challenges. For children who grow up in low socioeconomic status families, the influences can accumulate over time and endure (Matthews & Gallo, 2011).

The accumulation of daily hassles does more to make people sick than catastrophes or major life changes.

TRUE

PHYSICAL RESPONSES TO STRESS The term ‘stress’ was first popularised by Hans Selye (1936), an endocrinologist. As a young medical student, Selye noticed that patients who were hospitalised for many different illnesses often had similar symptoms, such as muscle weakness, a loss of weight and appetite, and a lack of ambition. He theorised that perhaps these symptoms were part of a generalised response to an attack on the body. In the 1930s, Selye tested this hypothesis by exposing laboratory rats to various stressors, including heat, cold, heavy exercise, toxic substances, food deprivation and electric shock. As anticipated, the different stressors all produced a similar physiological response: enlarged adrenal glands, shrunken lymph nodes and bleeding stomach ulcers. Borrowing a term from engineering, Selye called the reaction stress – a word that quickly became part of everyday language.

General adaptation syndrome According to Selye (1936), the body naturally responds to stress in a three-stage process that he called the general adaptation syndrome (see Figure 14.5). Sparked by the recognition of a threat, such as a predator, an enemy soldier, a speeding car or a virus, the body has an initial alarm reaction. To meet the challenge, adrenaline and other hormones are poured into the bloodstream, creating physiological arousal. Heart rate,

General adaptation syndrome

A three-stage process (alarm, resistance and exhaustion) by which the body responds to stress.

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FIGURE 14.5 The general adaptation syndrome

Resistance to stress

According to Selye (1936), the human body responds to a threat in three phases: alarm, resistance and exhaustion.

Shock

Phase 1 alarm

Normal level of resistance to stress

Phase 2 resistance

Phase 3 exhaustion

Source: Selye, H. (1936). A syndrome produced by diverse nocuous agents. Nature, 138, 32.

Stress is a leading cause of stomach ulcers.

FALSE

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blood pressure and breathing rates increase, while slower, long-term functions such as growth, digestion and the operation of the immune system are inhibited. At this stage, the body mobilises all of its resources to ward off the threat. Next comes a resistance stage, during which the body remains aroused and on the alert. There is continued release of stress hormones and local defences are activated. But if the stress persists for a prolonged period of time, the body will fall into an exhaustion stage. According to Selye, our anti-stress resources are limited; however, research has shown that exhaustion occurs not because our stress-fighting resources are limited but because their overuse causes other systems in the body to break down, which puts us at risk for illness and even death. Selye’s basic model thus makes an important point. Stress may be an adaptive short-term reaction to threat, but over time it compromises our health and wellbeing. A stress response is found in all mammals. So why, asks neuroscientist Robert Sapolsky (2004), do zebras not get ulcers? Sapolsky notes that the physiological stress response is superbly designed through evolution to help animals mobilise to fight or escape in acute emergencies. For the zebra, this occurs when a hungry lion leaps out from a bush and sprints at top speed across the savannah. For humans, it occurs during combat or competitive sport and perhaps even on first dates and in job interviews. But think about the list of situations you find stressful, and you will see that people become anxious over things that would make no sense to a zebra. ‘We humans live well enough and long enough, and are smart enough, to generate all sorts of stressful events purely in our heads,’ says Sapolsky. From the perspective of the evolution of the animal kingdom, he notes, psychological stress is a ‘recent invention’ (p. 5). The reason stress causes ulcers and other illnesses, then, is that the response is designed for acute physical emergencies, yet we turn it on often and for prolonged periods of time as we worry about taxes, mortgages, job presentations, the employment market, marital problems and the inevitability of death. It should, however, be noted that in the early 1980s Australian scientists, Dr Robin Warren (a pathologist from Perth) and Professor Barry Marshall presented an irrefutable case to suggest the cause of stomach ulcers was in fact a bacterium called Helicobacter pylori. At the time of the discovery, stress and lifestyle were considered the major causes of peptic ulcers. The pair were awarded a Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine for 2005 jointly for this ground-breaking discovery (Pincock, 2005). All humans respond bodily to stress, which is what enables us to mount a defence. Physiologically, the sympathetic nervous system is activated and more adrenaline is secreted, which increases the heart rate and heightens arousal. Then all at once the liver pours extra sugar into the bloodstream for energy, the pupils dilate to let in more light, breathing speeds up for more oxygen, perspiration increases to cool down the body, blood clots faster to heal wounds, saliva flow is inhibited, and digestion slows down to divert blood to the brain and skeletal muscles. Faced with threat, the body readies itself for action. But what, behaviourally, is the nature of the defence? Many years ago, Walter Cannon (1932) described the body as prepared for ‘fight or flight’. To be sure, men often lash out aggressively when under siege. But do women respond similarly? In her book The Tending Instinct, Shelley Taylor (2002) argues that while men frequently exhibit the classic fight-or-flight reaction to stress, women are more likely to exhibit a ‘tend-and-befriend’ response. Prepared by evolution

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to enhance the survival of their offspring, women adapt to hardship by caring for their children and seeking out others who might help. Consistent with this argument, studies have shown that, under stress, women become more nurturing than men – and more affiliative. Interestingly, animal and human studies show that when females are isolated, unsupported and in social distress, they exhibit elevated levels of the hormone oxytocin, which, in turn, increases their tendency to seek out social contact (Taylor, 2012b).

Stress and the heart Coronary heart disease (CHD) is a narrowing of the blood vessels that carry oxygen and nutrients to the heart muscle. It is by far the leading cause of death in Australia and New Zealand among both men and women. An estimated 1.4 million Australian adults (or one in six) suffer from CHD. It kills 59 Australians every day, which equates to one person every 24 minutes. For Aboriginal and Torres Straight Islander people, the situation is even more concerning – they are 1.3 times more likely to suffer from CHD than non-Indigenous Australians (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2006). In New Zealand, 193 000 people (or one in 18) suffer from CHD, which accounts for 40% of deaths annually in New Zealand; that is 16 deaths per day (or one person every 90 minutes). Members of the Māori population are almost twice as likely to be hospitalised for cardiovascular disease and two-and-a-half times more likely to suffer ischaemic heart disease and to die from a cardiovascular disease than other New Zealanders (Reanga Consultancy New Zealand Ltd, 2012). For many people with CHD, the result is a heart attack, which occurs when the precious blood supply to the heart is blocked. This causes an uncomfortable feeling of pressure, fullness, squeezing or pain in the centre of the chest – and sometimes sweating, dizziness, nausea, fainting and shortness of breath. Every year, 55 000 Australians suffer a heart attack, which equates to 150 heart attacks per day (or one every 10 minutes). There are almost 10 000 Australians who die every year as the result of a heart attack (or one every 54 minutes). Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people are three times more likely than non-Indigenous Australians to have a major coronary event such as a heart attack, and more than twice as likely to die in hospital from CHD (National Heart Foundation, 2014).

Personality type and CHD Several factors are known to increase the risk of CHD. The three most important are hypertension (or high blood pressure), cigarette smoking and high cholesterol. Others include a family history of CHD, a high-fat diet, obesity and a lack of exercise. People with one of the three major risk factors are twice as likely to develop CHD, those with two risk factors are three-and-a-half times as likely, and those with all three are six times as likely. These statistics are compelling and should not be taken lightly. Combined, however, these variables account for fewer than half the known cases of CHD. What is missing from the equation is the fourth major risk factor: psychological stress – from work, from marital troubles and from the negative life events that plague people who lack resources because of low socioeconomic status (Gallo & Matthews, 2003; Matthews, 2005). In 1956, cardiologists Meyer Friedman and Ray Rosenman were studying the relationship between cholesterol and CHD. After noticing that husbands were more likely than their wives to have CHD, they speculated that work-related stress might be the reason (at the time, most women rarely worked outside the home). To test this hypothesis, Friedman and Rosenman interviewed 3000 healthy middle-aged men. They classified the participants as having either a Type A personality or a Type B personality (Rosenman et al., 1975). The Type A personality (also called coronary-prone behaviour pattern) is made up of a cluster of traits, including competitive drive, a sense of time urgency and a dangerous mix of anger, cynicism and hostility (Friedman & Booth-Kewley, 1987; Matthews, 1988). In interviews and written questionnaires, Type As report that they walk fast, talk fast, work late, interrupt speakers in mid-sentence, detest waiting in lines, race through yellow lights when they drive, lash out at others in frustration, strive to win at all costs, and save time by multitasking. By contrast, men who were easy-going, relaxed and laid-back were classified as having a Type B personality. It should be noted that are also ‘those who breeze through the day – despite having deadlines and kids and a broken down car and charity work and scowling Aunt Agnes living in the spare bedroom’ (Carey, 1997, p. 75). Interestingly, out of 258 men who went on to have heart attacks over the following nine years, 69% had been classified as Type A and only 31% as Type B (Rosenman et al., 1975). By the early 1980s, the influence of the Type A behaviour pattern on CHD was widely accepted. A panel of distinguished scientists convened by the National Heart, Lung and Blood Institute in America concluded that the Type A pattern was a risk factor for CHD, comparable to more traditional risks such as high blood pressure, smoking, high blood cholesterol and obesity. Later studies on the correlation between Type A personality and CHD obtained weaker results, which varied depending on how Type A was measured and the kind of population that was studied (Matthews, 1988). Certainty about the bad effects of ‘hurry sickness’ and ‘workaholism’ began to crumble. One issue that arose

Type A personality

A pattern of behaviour characterised by extremes of competitive striving for achievement, a sense of time urgency, hostility and aggression.

Type B personality

A pattern of behaviour characterised by being easy-going, relaxed and laid-back.

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concerned measurement. Specifically, it turns out that the strength of the link between Type A behaviour and CHD depends on how people are diagnosed. In the original study, Friedman and Rosenman classified men by means of a structured interview in which they could observe the men’s verbal and non-verbal behaviour. Afterwards, however, many psychologists, in their haste to pursue this vital line of research, tried to identify Type A personality in individuals using quick, easy-to-take questionnaires instead of time-consuming interviews. The questionnaires were not nearly as predictive. Apparently, the Type A pattern is more evident from a person’s interview behaviour (whether he or she constantly checks the time, speaks quickly, interrupts the interviewer and makes restless fidgety movements) than from self-reports. One study using diagnostic interviews found that 70% of men who have CHD also have a Type A behaviour pattern – compared with only 46% of those who are healthy (Miller et al., 1991).

Anger, hostility and CHD The Type A behaviour pattern was also refined conceptually, and a new line of inquiry sprang up. This research showed the primary toxic ingredient in CHD is hostility – as seen in people who are constantly angry, resentful, cynical, suspicious and mistrustful of others. Apparently, people who are always in a negative emotional state and are quick to explode are besieged by stress. Because the heart is just a dumb pump and the blood vessels mere hoses, the health result is predictable – they wear out, just like pumps and hoses you buy for household use (Sapolsky, 1994). In the long run, chronic hostility and anger can be lethal (Miller et al., 1996; Siegman & Smith, 1994). In fact, people who have lots of anger and suppress it are as likely to develop high blood pressure as those with anger who express it. It is the emotion that is toxic, not whether you hold it in or let it out (Everson, Goldberg, Kaplan, Julkunen, & Salonen, 1998; Everson-Rose & Lewis, 2005). What else explains the connection between hostility and CHD? One possibility is that hostile people are less health-conscious – that they tend to smoke more, consume more caffeine and alcohol, exercise less, sleep less and eat less healthy foods. They are also less likely to comply with advice from doctors (Leiker & Hailey, 1988; Siegler, 1994). A second explanation is that hostile people are physiologically reactive, so in tense social situations they exhibit greater increases in blood pressure, pulse rate and adrenaline, a hormone that accelerates the build-up of fatty plaques on the artery walls, causing hardening of the arteries (Krantz & McCeney, 2002). In fact, research shows that people who are hostile exhibit more intense cardiovascular reactions, not only during the event that makes them angry (e.g., being involved in a heated argument), but long afterwards as well, when asked to relive the event (Davis, Matthews, & McGrath, 2000; Fredirickson et al., 2000). As a result of all this research and its many offshoots, a whole new subfield has developed that is sure to produce more valuable and practical insights (Hjemdahl et al., 2012; Matthews, 2013). For example, developmental researchers have found that growing up poor during childhood and adolescence increases the risk of cardiovascular disease in adulthood – sometimes even among those who elevated their socioeconomic status as adults (Galobardes et al., 2006). Focused on the link between positive states of mind and cardiovascular health, other researchers have found that such states as optimism, happiness, and the Japanese concept of ikigai – which means ‘having a life worth living’ – are associated with a more healthful lifestyle and a reduction in the risk of cardiovascular disease (Boehm & Kubzansky, 2012). Testing a biopsychosocial model of stress responses, different research has found that orienting people to think of their physiological arousal during a stressful public speaking task as adaptive can have beneficial effects on their cardiovascular stress responses – a demonstration of ‘mind over matter’ (Jamieson et al., 2012). Research demonstrating psychological influences on CHD has broadened quite a bit from the initial studies of the Type A personality. Appropriately enough, this subfield, which brings together the heart and the mind, has been called psychocardiology (Jordan, Bardé & Zeiher, 2007) – or the practice of cardiac psychology (Allan & Fisher, 2011).

Stress and the immune system

Immune system

A biological surveillance system that detects and destroys ‘non-self’ substances that invade the body.

590

Increasingly, it has become clear that psychological stress produces a wide range of effects on the body, including increases in the risk of chronic back pain, diabetes, appendicitis, upper respiratory infections, arthritis, herpes, gum disease, common colds and some forms of cancer. How can stress have so broad a range of disabling effects? It does this by compromising the body’s immune system, the first line of defence against illness (Ader, 2007). The immune system is a complex surveillance system that fights bacteria, viruses, parasites, fungi and other ‘non-self’ substances that invade the body. The system contains more than a trillion specialised white blood cells called lymphocytes that circulate throughout the bloodstream and secrete chemical antibodies. These shark-like search-and-destroy cells protect us 24 hours a day by patrolling the body and attacking trespassers. The immune system is also equipped with large scavenger cells that zero in on viruses and cancerous tumours. Serving as a ‘sixth sense’ for foreign invaders, the immune system continually renews

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itself. For example, during the few seconds it took to read this sentence, your body produced 10 million new lymphocytes.

Psychoneuroimmunology, stress and the immune system Today, many health psychologists specialising in psychoneuroimmunology, or PNI (psycho for the mind, neuro for the nervous system and immunology for the immune system) study the connections among the brain, behaviour, the immune system, health and illness. Before we get into some of the fascinating results, let us pause for a moment and consider three of the methods these researchers use to spy on the operations of the immune system. One method is to take blood samples from animal or human participants exposed to varying degrees of stress and count the number of lymphocytes and other white blood cells circulating in the bloodstream. A second is to extract blood, add cancerous tumour cells to the mix, and measure the extent to which the natural killer cells destroy the tumours. A third method is to ‘challenge’ the living organism by injecting a foreign agent into the skin and measuring the amount of swelling that arises at the site of the injection. The more swelling there is, the more potent the immune reaction is assumed to be (Ader, 2007; Daruna, 2012; Segerstrom, 2012).

Psychoneuroimmu­ nology (PNI)

A subfield of psychology that examines the links among psychological factors, the brain and nervous system, and the immune system.

Research linking stress and the immune system It is now clear that stress can affect the immune system, at least temporarily. The medical community used to reject the idea outright, but no longer. What changed? First, animal experiments showed that rats exposed to noise, overcrowding or inescapable shocks, and primates separated from their social companions, exhibit a drop in immune cell activity compared with non-exposed animals (Coe, 1993; Moynihan & Ader, 1996). A link was also observed in humans. Intrigued by the fact that people often become sick and die shortly after they are widowed, Roger Barthrop and colleagues (1977) took blood samples from 26 men and women whose spouses had recently died. Compared with non-widowed controls, these griefstricken spouses exhibited a weakened immune response. This demonstration was the first of its kind. Additional studies soon revealed weakened immune responses in NASA astronauts after their re-entry into the atmosphere and splashdown, in people deprived of sleep for a prolonged period of time, in students in the midst of final exams, in men and women recently divorced or separated, in people caring for a family member with Alzheimer’s disease, in snake-phobic people who are exposed to a live snake, and in workers who have just lost their jobs. Even in the laboratory, people who are given complex arithmetic problems to solve or painful stimuli to tolerate exhibit changes in immune cell activity that last for one or more hours after the stress has subsided (Cohen & Herbert, 1996). In an intriguing study, Arthur Stone and colleagues (1994) paid 48 adult volunteers to take a harmless but novel protein pill every day for 12 weeks – a substance that would lead the immune system to respond by producing an antibody. Every day, the participants completed a diary in which they reported about their moods and experiences at work, at home, in financial matters, in leisure activities and in social relationships with their friends, spouses and children. The participants also gave daily saliva samples that were later used to measure the amount of antibody produced. The results were striking, as are their implications: the more positive events participants experienced in a given day, the more antibody was produced. The more negative events they experienced, the less antibody was produced. In many ways, it is now clear that negative experiences and the emotions they elicit can weaken our immune system’s ability to protect us from injuries, infections and a wide range of illnesses (Kiecolt-Glaser, McGuire, Robles, & Glaser, 2002). In an experiment that well illustrates this point in action, researchers brought healthy male and female volunteers into a clinical research laboratory, administered a battery of questionnaires, injected them with a needle in the arm, and then used a vacuum pump to raise a blister. In follow-up visits during the next eight days, the researchers measured the speed with which the wounds were healing. They found that participants whose questionnaires indicated that they had anger control problems – for example, losing their temper or boiling inside – secreted more of the stress hormone cortisol in response to the blistering procedure and the wound was slower to heal over time (Gouin, Kiecolt-Glaser, Malarkey, & Glaser, 2008). Clearly, psychological states can ‘get into’ the immune system. As illustrated in Figure 14.6, there are two possible ways this can happen. First, people who are under intense stress tend to smoke more, ingest more alcohol and drugs, sleep less, exercise less and have poorer diets – behaviours that tend to compromise the immune system. For example, one study showed that when healthy male adults were kept awake between 3 a.m. and 7 a.m., immune cell activity diminished and returned to normal only after a full night of uninterrupted sleep (Irwin et al., 1994). Second, stress triggers the release of adrenaline and other stress hormones into the bloodstream, and these hormones tend to suppress immune cell activity. The Copyright 2020 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-202

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FIGURE 14.6 Pathways from stress to illness Hostility, stress and other negative emotional states may cause illness in two ways: (1) by promoting unhealthy behaviours (more alcohol, less sleep, and so on) and (2) by triggering the release of hormones that weaken the immune system. Unhealthy behaviours Negative emotional states

Stress hormones

Weakened immune system

Illness

result is a temporary lowering of the body’s resistance (Cohen & Williamson, 1991). Either way, hundreds of studies now show that the effects of stress on the immune system are complex. Brief stressors (e.g., a shark attack, a difficult exam or an injury) can enhance the immune response in ways that are adaptive in the short term, but chronic life stressors (e.g., a high-pressure job, a distressed marriage or a family illness) can suppress the immune response over time, putting the person at risk (Segerstrom & Miller, 2004).

Stress and illness

Relative risk of a cold

If chronic stress can weaken the immune system, are people who are stressed in life more likely to become sick? Might some people, for example, be psychologically more susceptible than others to catching the flu? Sheldon Cohen and colleagues (1993) conducted a fascinating and elaborate study to help answer this question. They paid 420 volunteers to spend nine days in a medical experiment and risk exposure to a common cold virus. In the first two days, participants filled out several questionnaires, including one that measured recent stressful experiences in their lives. They also received a physical examination, including a blood test. Then, to simulate the person-to-person transmission of a virus, the researchers dropped a clear liquid solution into each participant’s nose. Those randomly assigned to the control group received a placebo saline solution. Others, less fortunate, received a cold virus in doses that tend to produce illness rates of 20–60%. For the next week, participants were quarantined in large apartments, where they were examined daily by a nurse who took their temperature, extracted mucus samples and looked for signs of the virus, such as sneezing, watery eyes, stuffy nose and sore throat. (The participants did not realise it, but the nurse also kept track of the number of tissues they used.) All participants were healthy at the start of the project, and not a single one FIGURE 14.7 Stress duration and illness in the saline control group developed a cold. Yet among those Two hundred and seventy-six volunteers were interviewed about exposed to a virus, 82% became infected, and 46% of those recent life stress, then infected with a cold virus. As shown above, who were infected displayed symptoms. A virus is a virus, so the more months a stressor had lasted, the more likely a person often there is no escape. Most interesting, however, is that life was to catch the cold virus. Over time, stress breaks down the stress made a difference. Among those who became infected, body’s immune system. high-stress participants were more likely to catch a cold than 4 were the low-stress participants – 53% compared with 40%. In short, people whose lives are filled with stress are particularly 3 vulnerable to contagious illness. In a follow-up of this experiment, Cohen and colleagues 2 (1998) interviewed 276 volunteers about recent life stressors, infected them with a cold virus and then measured whether 1 or not they developed a cold. They found that some types of stress were more toxic than others. Specifically, people who had 0 endured chronic stressors that lasted for more than a month No 24 (e.g., ongoing marital problems or unemployment) were more Stressor likely to catch a cold than those who had experienced acute Duration of life stressor (in months) short-term stress (e.g., a fight with a spouse or a reprimand at Source: Cohen, S., Frank, E., Doyle, W. J., Skoner, D. P., Rabin, B. S., & Gwaltney, J. M. (1998). Types of stressors work). Figure 14.7 shows that the longer a stressor had lasted, that increase susceptibility to the common cold in the more likely a person was to catch a virus. Over time, stress healthy adults. Health Psychology, 17, 214–223. breaks down the body’s immune system. 592

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The effects of stress are clear. But it appears that certain personal characteristics can buffer people against the adverse health effects. In yet another follow-up study, Cohen and colleagues (2006) found that the more sociable people were in life, the more resistant they were to developing the laboratory-induced cold. They also found that the more positively people see themselves on the socioeconomic status ladder relative to others in the population, regardless of their actual levels of education, occupation and income, the less likely they were to catch the laboratory-induced cold virus. These common-cold studies are important because they demonstrate not only that stress can weaken the immune system but also that it can leave us vulnerable to illness as a result.

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

Stress can weaken the heart, but it cannot affect the immune system.

FALSE

OBESITY AND STRESS Having looked at the links between stress and illness, we move our attention to another area that has been linked to stress – obesity. Given the rising levels of obesity worldwide, this is an area that has become of great interest to researchers across the globe and the results indicate a broad range of contributing factors, with societal influences playing a prominent role. Research in this area is particularly relevant to Australia, which is currently rated as one of the most overweight nations in the world. Estimates suggest that some 14 million Australians are overweight, with 5 million classified as obese. Alarmingly, if weight gain continues at the current rate, close to 80% of all Australians will be obese by 2025 (Haby, Markwick, Peeters, Shaw, & Vos, 2012). According to a report issued by Australia’s National Health Performance Authority in 2013, in almost three-quarters of the Australian communities studied, one in four adults were classified as obese. Although the percentage of adults who were overweight or obese increased with geographic remoteness and lower socioeconomic status, 54% of adults in the wealthiest urban areas were overweight or obese, with 19% (one in ten) obese. An AIHW report released in 2017 reaffirms the message of the growing problem of obesity, with figures indicating almost 63% of Australian adults were overweight or obese in 2014–2015 (an increase of 6% from 1995). Alarmingly the rate of severely obese Australians (BMI of 35+) has almost doubled from 5% in 1995 to 9% in 2014–2015. The report also noted that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people were more likely to be overweight or obese when compared with non-Indigenous populations. Not only is obesity a growing concern for its impact on health, but it is also a concern for the healthcare system that needs to provide care for the problems associated with obesity. It is estimated that in 2008 the obesity epidemic cost the Australian health system somewhere in the order of $2 billion in direct costs. Costs associated with obesity in Australia continue to rise with estimates suggesting a health burden of $8.6 billion in 2011–2012 (AIHW, 2017). If no further action is taken to slow the rise in obesity, estimates indicate that there will be $87.7 billion in added costs over a 10-year period. In 2014–2015 alone there were more than 124 600 procedures relating to weight-loss surgery billed to Medicare; the estimated total cost of the 10 most common weight loss surgery procedures in public hospitals was $30.4 million. If you add in the cost from private hospitals, the total cost was in the order of $62.8 million – $25.7 million in benefits paid by Medicare with the remaining $37.1 million of out-of-pocket expenses covered by patients and/or health insurers (AIHW, 2018). In New Zealand, 31% of adults (three in ten) were recorded as obese in 2012–2013, which equates to more than 1.1 million adults. The obesity rate increases with age, with figures suggesting 21% of people aged 15–24 years are obese, compared with 39% of people aged 65–74 years. The obesity rates were highest among Pacific women (68%) and children (27%), and Māori adults (48%) and children (19%). Pacific children were more than three times as likely to be obese than non-Pacific children; and Māori children were twice as likely to be obese than non-Māori children. Similar to the Australian experience and global trends, those living in the most deprived areas of New Zealand were 1.5 times more likely to be obese than those living in other areas (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2013; New Zealand Ministry of Health, 2013). The following Cultural Diversity feature explores how Australia and New Zealand compare with other countries.

CULTURAL DIVERSITY OBESITY: THE GROWING EPIDEMIC Obesity continues to be one of the largest public health concerns in the developed world, with figures from the World Health Organization (2017) suggesting that rates have almost tripled since 1975. Globally in 2016 there were in excess of 1.9 billion adults who were overweight (650 million of these

considered obese) and 41 million children under 5 years of age and over 340 million aged between 5 and 19 who were considered overweight or obese. According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2017), that equates to one in two adults and almost one in six children in OECD countries who are either overweight or obese. Adult

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obesity rates are highest in the US, Mexico, New Zealand, Hungary and Australia (Figure 14.8). Japan and Korea are by far the lowest. But somewhat alarmingly these figures are predicted to rise even further by 2030 with Korea and

Switzerland expected to increase at a faster rate than other countries. The US is expected to reach 47% with Mexico (39%) and UK (35%) not far behind.

FIGURE 14.8 A comparison of adult obesity rates for OECD countries Obesity levels are on the rise across the world, with New Zealand and Australia weighing in at third and fifth positions. Self-reported data Measured data

Japan Korea Italy Switzerland Norway Sweden Netherlands Austria Denmark France Slovak Rep. Portugal Poland Spain Greece Israel Estonia Belgium Iceland Slovenia OECD Czech Rep. Latvia Turkey Luxembourg Ireland Germany Finland Chile Canada United Kingdom Australia Hungary New Zealand Mexico United States

3.7 5.3

9.8 10.3 12.0 12.3 12.8 14.7 14.9 15.3 16.3 16.6 16.7 16.7 17 17.8 18 18.6 19 19.2 19.5 21 21.3 22.3 22.6 23 23.6 24.8 25.1 25.8 26.9 27.9 30 30.7 32.4 38.2

17.3 19.6 20.8 20.9

40

Men

India Indonesia China Lithuania Russian Fed. Brazil Colombia Costa Rica South Africa

5.0 5.7 7.0

24.4 26.5 30 20 10 % of population aged 15 years and over

Women

0

0

10 20 30 % of population aged 15 years and over

40

Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. (2017). Obesity update 2017. Retrieved from https://www.oecd.org/els/health-systems/Obesity-­Update-2017.pdf

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Obesity, stress and childhood Research suggests that the link between stress and obesity begins at an early age. Ketan Shankardass and colleagues (2013) found that children whose parents have high levels of stress tended to have a body mass index about 2% higher than those whose parents have low levels of stress. These children also had a propensity to gain weight that was 7% higher than the other children. Research conducted by Lori Francis and colleagues (2013) suggested that children who are at risk of becoming obese can be identified by their biological response to a stressor. To test this theory they had children complete a Social Stress Test consisting of a 5-minute anticipation period followed by a 10-minute stress period, during which time the children were asked to deliver a speech and perform a mathematics task. The children’s responses were measured by comparing the cortisol content of their saliva before and after the procedure. They also measured the extent to which the children ate after saying they were not hungry. To do this the researchers provided lunch for the children, asked them to indicate their hunger level and then gave free access to generous portions of 10 snack foods. They were also given access to a variety of toys and activities and were told they could play or eat while the researchers were out of the room. Their findings indicated that older children (aged 8–11 years) who recorded greater cortisol release over the course of the procedure had significantly higher BMI and consumed significantly more kilojoules when they were supposedly ‘not hungry’ compared with children whose cortisol levels rose only slightly in response to the stressful activity. These results indicate that children who respond poorly to stressors are at risk of becoming overweight or obese.

Obesity, stress and illness The links between obesity, stress and other illnesses are also becoming clearer. A study conducted by Anne Turner and colleagues from Deakin University in Australia have suggested that overweight and obese men secrete higher levels of cortisol (a stress hormone) after eating, which may make them more susceptible to chronic diseases. Participants in the study were aged between 50 and 70 years; 19 of the men were in the healthy weight range and 17 were overweight or obese. The study, which tested cortisol levels at 15- and 30-minute intervals after the men ate a lunchtime meal (which was equivalent in protein, fat and carbohydrates), showed that cortisol levels in the overweight and obese men increased by 51%. This suggests that once the body is carrying excess fat stores, the body may produce an increase in cortisol levels every time food is ingested, increasing a person’s susceptibility to stress-related illness (Jayasinghe, Torres, Nowson, Tilbrook, & Turner, 2014). A review of obesity research conducted by Carla Moore and Solveig Cunningham (2012) shed further light on the influence of social factors on the world’s growing problem with obesity. Their findings reinforced the role of socioeconomic factors, indicating that individuals in higher status positions of society tend to have lower stress levels, healthier eating patterns and lower body weight. Further, higher stress levels, which are generally found in the lower socioeconomic groups, are associated with less healthy dietary behaviours and higher body weight – a pattern that appears to be more pronounced in women than men.

APPRAISAL Can you remember a time in your life where you felt as though your world was crumbling around you? A time when every day dawned with the arrival of more problems, more hardship and more stress to the point where you did not know how to move forward? Did you ever sit and wonder why these things were happening to you, possibly seeking solace with friends and family in an attempt to workshop the reasons for your situation and to figure out a way of coping? If you have, then you and your family and friends have engaged in the process of appraisal; that is, the process by which people make judgements about the demands of potentially stressful events and their ability to meet those demands. Let us take a look at what the research tells us about the process of appraisal in relation to stress and coping.

Attributions and explanatory styles Depression is a mood disorder characterised by feelings of sadness, pessimism, apathy and slowed thought processes. Other symptoms include disturbances in sleeping and eating patterns, and a reduced interest in sex. Every year, about 4% of people in Australia and 5.7% of New Zealanders over the age of 16 will experience a major depressive episode (ABS, 2007; Wells, 2006). Many more suffer from briefer, milder bouts with the blues. Sometimes called the ‘common cold’ of psychological disorders, depression is universal and widespread (Gotlib & Hammen, 2009).

Appraisal

The process by which people make judgements about the demands of potentially stressful events and their ability to meet those demands.

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About twice as many women as men seek treatment for being depressed. During the course of a lifetime, an estimated 14.5% of Australian women, 8.8% of Australian men, 19.4% of New Zealand women and 10% of New Zealand men will suffer from a major depression (ABS, 2007; Oakley Browne et al., 2006). This sex difference first begins to appear in adolescence, although the disparity is a bit smaller in less developed nations (Culbertson, 1997). While depression has many causes, some researchers have focused on the attributions people make for the positive and negative events of their lives.

Theory of learned helplessness Learned helplessness A phenomenon in which experience with an uncontrollable event creates passive behaviour in the face of subsequent threats to wellbeing.

In 1975, Martin Seligman argued that depression results from a feeling of learned helplessness; that is, the acquired expectation that one cannot control important outcomes. In a classic series of experiments, Seligman found that dogs strapped into a harness and exposed to painful electric shocks soon became passive and gave up trying to escape, even in new situations where escape was possible. By contrast, dogs that had not received uncontrollable shocks quickly learned the escape routine. As applied to humans, this finding suggested that prolonged exposure to uncontrollable events might similarly cause apathy, inactivity, a loss of motivation and pessimism. In human research participants, those exposed to inescapable bursts of noise thus failed to protect themselves in a later situation where the noise could be easily avoided. Seligman was quick to note that people who are exposed to uncontrollable events become, in many ways, like depressed individuals: discouraged, pessimistic about the future and lacking in initiative.

Depressive explanatory style Depressive explanatory style

A habitual tendency to attribute negative events to causes that are stable, global and internal.

Lynn Abramson and colleagues (1989) proposed that depression is a state of hopelessness brought on by the negative self-attributions people make for failure. In fact, some people have a depressive explanatory style; that is, a tendency to attribute bad events to factors that are internal rather than external (‘It’s my fault’), stable rather than unstable (‘It won’t change’) and global rather than specific (‘It spreads to all parts of my life’). Research supports this proposition. Whether people are trying to explain social rejection, a sporting defeat, low grades or their inability to solve an experimenter’s puzzle, those who are depressed are more likely than others to blame factors that are within the self, unlikely to change, and broad enough to impair other aspects of life. The result? hopelessness and despair (Abramson, Metalsky, & Alloy, 1989; Metalsky, Joiner, Hardin, & Abramson, 1993). This way of thinking may signal a vulnerability to future depression. Indeed, when Lauren Alloy and colleagues (2006) measured the explanatory styles of non-depressed newly entered university students, and then followed up on these students in their third year of study, they found that those with a negative explanatory style in their first year were far more likely to have suffered from a major or minor depressive disorder than classmates with a more positive style.

Human capacity for resilience Stress affects people differently, an observation that first led Suzanne Kobasa and colleagues (1982) to wonder why some of us are more resilient than others in the face of stress. Kobasa studied some 200 business executives who were under stress. Many said they were frequently sick, affirming the link between stress and illness, while others had managed to stay healthy. The two groups were similar in terms of age, education, job status, income, and ethnic and religious background. But it was clear from various tests that they differed in their attitudes towards themselves, their jobs and the people in their lives. Based on these differences, Kobasa identified a personality style that she called hardiness and concluded that hardy people have three characteristics: 1 Commitment – a sense of purpose with regard to one’s work, family and other domains. 2 Challenge – an openness to new experiences and a desire to embrace change. 3 Control – the belief that one has the power to influence important future outcomes. Research supports the general point that resilience, or hardiness, serves as a buffer against stress (Funk, 1992). As you might expect, most people are exposed to at least one highly traumatic event during the course of a lifetime. Yet while many react with PTSD, others maintain their equilibrium and mental health (Ozer, Best, Lipsey, & Weiss, 2003). Thus, Ann Masten (2001) and George Bonanno (2004) both argue that most human beings are highly resilient and exhibit a remarkable capacity to thrive in the wake of highly aversive events. In fact, Vicki Helgeson and colleagues (2006) note that many people who confront heart attacks, cancer, divorce, war, family illness and other traumas will often find ways to accept, benefit and grow from the experience.

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Self-efficacy When Kobasa and colleagues (1982) first identified hardiness as an adaptive trait, they, and other researchers (Florian, Mikulincer, & Taubman, 1995), were quick to notice that the perception of control is an important ingredient. Early on, research showed that the harmful effects of crowding, noise, heat and other stressors are reduced when people think they can exert control over these aspects of their environment (Glass & Singer, 1972). The perception of control is especially meaningful for people whose lives are regulated to a large extent by others. For example, elderly residents of nursing homes who were given more control over daily routines became happier and more active (Langer & Rodin, 1976; Schulz, 1976). Other studies showed that patients with heart disease, cancer and AIDS were better adjusted emotionally when they felt that they could influence the course of their illness (Helgeson, 1992; Rodin, 1986; Thompson et al., 1993).

Research shows that allowing elderly residents of nursing homes to have control over their daily routines improves happiness.

Satisfying outcomes, self-efficacy and the perception of control The perception of control refers to the expectation that our behaviours can produce satisfying outcomes. But people also differ in the extent to which they believe that they can perform these behaviours in the first place. These concepts seem related, but in fact they refer to different beliefs, both of which are necessary for us to feel that we control important outcomes in our lives (Skinner, 1996). According to Albert Bandura (1997), these latter expectations are based on feelings of competence, or self-efficacy. Some individuals may be generally more confident than others, but self-efficacy is a state of mind that varies from one specific task and situation to another. In other words, you may have high self-efficacy about meeting new people but not about raising your grades. Or you may have high self-efficacy about solving a maths problem but not about writing a paper. Research on self-efficacy has shown that the more of it you have at a particular task, the more likely you are to take on that task, try hard, persist in the face of failure, and succeed. The implications for mental and physical health are particularly striking. For example, individuals with high self-efficacy on health-related matters are more likely, if they want, to stay physically fit, abstain from alcohol, and tolerate the pain of arthritis, childbirth and migraine headaches (Maddux, 1995) – and even to stop smoking (Baldwin et al., 2006) or lose weight (Linde, Rothman, Baldwin, & Jeffery, 2006).

Self-efficacy

A person’s belief that he or she is capable of the specific behaviour required to produce a desired outcome in a given situation.

Impact of self-efficacy on longevity At times, having a strong sense of self-efficacy may literally mean the difference between life and death. In one study, Urmimala Sarkar and colleagues (2009) recruited 1024 heart disease patients and tracked their health over time. At the start of the study, all participants completed a Cardiac Self-efficacy Scale in which they indicated how confident they were in their ability to maintain their usual activities, engage in sexual activity and get aerobic exercise. Over the ensuing years, 124 of the patients were hospitalised and 235 died. When the patients were sorted into four categories of self-efficacy – from the highest scores to the lowest – the results showed that the higher their self-efficacy at the start of the study, the more likely they were to survive hospitalisation years later (see Figure 14.9).

Dispositional optimism The reason it is important to understand our attributions for past outcomes and our perceptions of control in present situations is that both have implications for our outlook on the future. In Learned Optimism, Seligman (1991) argues that a generalised tendency to expect positive outcomes is characterised by a nondepressive explanatory style – optimists tend to blame failure on factors that are external, temporary and specific, and to credit success to factors that are internal, permanent and global. Thankfully, in light of the advantages that optimism brings, even pessimists can retrain themselves to think in optimistic ways (Nes & Segerstrom, 2006). Consider your own view of the future. Are you the eternal optimist who looks on the bright side and generally expects good things to happen, or do you tend to believe in Murphy’s Law – that if something can go wrong it will? By asking questions such as these, Michael Scheier and Charles Carver (1985) categorised

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FIGURE 14.9 Self-efficacy: a matter of life and death? One thousand and twenty-four heart disease patients varying in ‘cardiac self-efficacy’ were tracked over time. As shown, the higher their cardiac self-efficacy scores were at the start of the study, the more likely they were to survive hospitalisation up to 78 months later. 1.0

Proportion surviving

0.9

0.8

0.7

0.6

0.5

0

6

12

18

24

Lowest

30

36 42 48 Time (months)

Second

54

Third

60

66

72

78

84

Highest

Source: Sarkar, U., Ali, S., & Whooley, M. A. (2009). Self-efficacy as a marker of cardiac function and predictor of heart failure hospitalization and mortality in patients with stable coronary heart disease: Findings from the Heart and Soul Study. Health Psychology, 28, 166–173. Copyright © 2009 by the American Psychological Association. Reprinted by permission.

university students along this dimension and found that dispositional optimists reported fewer illness symptoms during the semester than did pessimists. Correlations between optimism and health are common. Studies have shown that optimists are more likely to take an active problem-focused approach in coping with stress (Nes & Segerstrom, 2006). As a result, they are more likely to complete a rehabilitation program for alcoholics; make a quicker, fuller recovery from coronary artery bypass surgery; and, among gay men concerned about AIDS, take a more active approach to the threat (Scheier & Carver, 1992). In a study of 1306 healthy adult men from the Boston area, those reporting high levels of optimism rather than pessimism were half as likely to have CHD 10 years later (Kubzansky, Sparrow, Vokonas, & Kawachi, 2001). Similarly, in a study of 5000 workers in Finland, those who were high rather than low in optimism were healthier and missed fewer days from work if they were dealing with a death or serious illness in the family over the next five years (Kivimäki et al., 2005).

Setbacks, optimistic disposition, and hope In the course of a lifetime, everyone has setbacks. But an optimistic disposition may help us better weather the storms. There may even be long-term health implications. In one study, researchers collected personal essays written in the 1940s by 99 men who had just graduated from Harvard, and analysed these materials to determine what each man’s explanatory style had been in his youth. Thirty-five years later, those who in their youth had an optimistic outlook were healthier than their more pessimistic peers (Peterson et al., 1988). How can these results be explained? There are two possibilities: one biological and the other behavioural. In research that supports a biological explanation, investigators analysing blood samples have found that optimists exhibit a stronger immune response to stress than pessimists do (Kamen-Siegel, Rodin, Seligman, & Dwyer, 1991; Segerstrom, Taylor, Kemeny, & Fahey, 1998). In research that supports a behavioural explanation, Christopher Peterson and colleagues (1988) scored the explanatory styles of 1528 healthy young adults from questionnaires they had filled out between 1936 and 1940. Astonishingly, after 50 years the optimists, specifically those who had made global rather than specific attributions for good

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events, were less likely to have died an accidental, reckless or violent death. In light of volumes of research on the subject, it is now clear that both explanations are correct (Scheier & Carver, 2014). There is an old saying: ‘Where there’s life, there’s hope’. Perhaps the opposite is also true: ‘Where there’s hope, there’s life’. In a stunning illustration of this possibility, Susan Everson and colleagues (1996) studied 2428 middle-aged men in Finland. Based on the extent to which they agreed with two simple statements (‘I feel that it is impossible to reach the goals I would like to strive for’ and ‘The future seems hopeless, and I can’t believe that things are changing for the better’), the men were initially classified as having a high, medium or low sense of hopelessness. When the investigators checked the death records roughly six years later, they found that the more hopeless the men were at the start, the more likely they were to have died of various causes – even when the men were otherwise equated for their age and prior health status. Compared with those who were low in hopelessness, the highs were more than twice as likely to die from cancer and four times more likely to die of cardiovascular disease (see Figure 14.10). These results bring to life what Norman Cousins (1989) described as the biology of hope, reminding us that ‘positive expectations can be self-fulfilling’ (Peterson, 2000). FIGURE 14.10 Hopelessness and the risk of death Among middle-aged men in Finland, those who were initially high rather than low in hopelessness were more likely to die within six years – overall, from cancer and from cardiovascular disease. Those who were moderate in hopelessness fell between the two extremes. 5

Mortality rate

4

3

2

1

All causes

Cardiovascular disease

Cancer

Hopelessness level Low

Moderate

High

Source: Everson, S. A., Goldberg, D. E., Kaplan, G. A., Cohen, R. D., Pukkala, E., Tuomiletho, P., & Salonen, J. T. (1996). Hopelessness and risk of mortality and incidence of myorcardial infarction and cancer. Psychosomatic Medicine, 58, 113–121. Copyright © 1996 Wolters Kluwer Health. Reprinted by permission.

Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander perspectives For Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children, families and communities, culture frames a sense of identity, and enhances a deep sense of belonging involving a spiritual and emotional relationship to the land. Unlike Western cultures, the person is perceived not as an isolated, independent self but a self-in-relationship with culture, whereby the maintenance of culture is regarded as central to healthy development. For Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities the educational, physical, emotional and spiritual needs of a person cannot be met in isolation from each other, nor can they be met in isolation from immediate family, extended family, community, relationships to the land and the spirit beings that determine law, politics and meaning (Department of Human Services, 2008; Dockery, 2010). In fact, Dockery (2010) suggests that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander culture should be considered part of the solution to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander disadvantage in Australia rather than part of the problem. According to Pat Dudgeon (2013), mental health, social and wellbeing initiatives adapted from non-Indigenous perspectives overlook sources of resilience and recovery naturally found within Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people. Social cohesion or the cultural identification and reciprocal relationships that underpin

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Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander cultures offer some protection to the stressful events that they have endured since the time of colonisation. The connection to the land and country is one of the most central aspects of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander cultures; thus the maintenance of spiritual, emotional and physical connections to the land is what underpins social and emotional wellbeing. Their deep, centred connection to the physical and spiritual world begins with connection to country; and as such the land and its associated spirituality and culture is tightly woven into the fabric of their beliefs. Essentially, their reason for existence is the land (Gee et al., 2014; Zubrick, 2014). And it is possibly because of this that living in remote areas, on or near traditional lands, may mitigate the effects of negative life experiences (e.g., unresolved grief and loss, trauma, abuse, domestic violence and substance abuse). Research suggests that those who live in remote areas are more resilient to the effects of stress than those living in urban areas (Azzopardi et al., 2018; Dudgeon, 2013; Australian Indigenous HealthInfoNet, 2018; Kelly, Dudgeon, Gee, & Glaskin, 2009; Purdie Dudgeon & Walker, 2010; Zubrick et al., 2010).

COPING WITH STRESS

Coping

Efforts to reduce stress.

Leaving home. Studying for final exams. Breaking up with a boyfriend or girlfriend. Working long nights – or not at all. Waiting in long security lines at the airport. Feeling squeezed in a tight job-market. Having children. Raising children. Struggling to meet the deadline to complete a textbook. Whether the stress is short-term or long-term, serious or mild, no one is immune from it. The best we can do is to minimise its harmful effects on our health. Depending on the person and stressor, people can cope by trying to solve the problem, talking to friends, inviting distractions, sleeping or drinking too much to escape, brooding, venting, lashing out, laughing it off, getting outside help, pretending that all is well, or freaking out. Combining all psychological theories and research, it appears that there are about 400 specific ways to cope with stress (Skinner, Edge, Altman, & Sherwood, 2003). The APS Stress and Wellbeing Survey (2015) shows that Australians cope with stress by watching television, focusing on the positives, spending time with family and friends, listening to music, reading, adjusting our expectations of life and eating (see Figure 14.11)! Not all of these methods are rated as highly effective; however, many Australians choose to engage in non-productive ways of managing stress such as drinking alcohol, smoking, taking recreational drugs and gambling. Most concerningly those who engaged these methods of stress relief rated them as being effective. According to Richard Lazarus and Susan Folkman (1984), the stress-and-coping process (see Figure 14.12) is an ongoing transaction between a person and his or her environment. Faced with an event that may prove threatening, our subjective appraisal of the situation determines how we will experience the stress and what coping strategies we will use – in other words, what thoughts, feelings and behaviours we will employ to try to reduce the stress. At times, people also take proactive steps to keep a potentially stressful event from occurring in the first place. As we will see, effective coping helps to maintain good health, and ineffective coping can cause harm (Monat, Lazarus and Reevy, 2007; Harrington, 2013). By grouping specific strategies that are similar, researchers have studied different general types of coping. Based on the self-reports of large numbers of people, Charles Carver and colleagues (1989) constructed a multidimensional questionnaire they called COPE that measures 12 distinct methods of coping. While noting that people can use different coping strategies, Lazarus and Folkman (1984) distinguished two general types: problem-focused coping and emotion-focused coping, and Lisa Aspinwall and Shelley Taylor (1997) note that there is a third alternative: proactive coping; the three of which we will further discuss in the following sections.

Problem-focused coping Problem-focused coping

Cognitive and behavioural efforts to alter a stressful situation.

600

Problem-focused coping involves cognitive and behavioural efforts to reduce stress by overcoming the source of the problem. Difficulties in school? Study harder, hire a tutor or reduce your workload. Marriage on the rocks? Talk it out or see a counsellor. Problem finding work? Look for an internship, expand your search or try a new location. The goal is to attack the source of stress. It may seem like the prime candidate for a starring role in the war against stress. Surely our most active and assertive efforts are associated with better health (Aspinwall & Taylor, 1992), and clearly we often benefit from confronting a stressor head on rather than avoiding it. Consider something we all are guilty of on occasion – procrastination, or a purposeful delay in beginning or completing a task, often accompanied by feelings of discomfort (Ferrari, Johnson & McCowan, 1995). In a longitudinal study of university students enrolled in a health psychology class, Dianne Tice and Roy Baumeister (1997) administered a questionnaire

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FIGURE 14.11 Stress management techniques in Australia Over the past decade a number of stress management techniques have gained popularity in Australia – how do you cope with stress?

Ways of managing stress (2011–2015) 79 %

Watch television (avg = 85%) 0%

81 % 81 % 81 % 80 %

^Focus on the positives (avg = 81%) 75 %

82 % 82 % 83 % 81 %

Spend time with friends, family (avg = 81%) 0%

79 % 81 % 80 % 78 %

^Listen to music (avg = 80%) 69 %

77 % 77 % 76 % 76 %

Read (avg = 75%) 0%

72 % 73 % 75 % 73 %

^Adjust expectations (avg = 73%) 66 %

69 %

Eat something (avg = 72%)

76 % 75 % 75 %

60 %

70 % 71 % 73 % 71 %

Do something active (avg = 69%) 0%

63 % 67 % 66 % 64 % 64 % 63 % 62 % 66 % 65 %

^Consciously avoid people (avg = 65%) Do a hobby (avg = 64%) 47 %

57 % 60 % 60 % 61 %

Go shopping (avg = 57%)

50 % 53 %

Sleep (avg = 54%)

59 % 54 % 56 %

37 %

Social networking sites (avg = 46%) 31 %

49 % 50 % 51 %

40 % 40 % 41 % 39 % 40 %

Drink alcohol (avg = 40%) 28 % 30 % 34 % 33 % 33 %

Play video games (avg = 32%) 25 %

Something spiritual (avg = 30%) Smoke cigarettes (avg = 18%)

16 % 18 % 19 % 18 % 18 %

Gamble (avg = 16%)

13 % 15 % 15 % 18 % 19 %

0%

41 %

39 % 43 % 44 % 46 %

Something relaxing (avg = 41%)

Take drugs (avg = 8%)

85 % 88 % 87 % 86 %

28 % 30 % 33 % 32 %

7% 7% 10 % 9% 9%

10%

20% 2011

30% 2012

40%

50%

2013

2014

60%

70% 2015

80%

90%

100%

Average

^Not asked in 2011 NOTE: In the figure above prevalence is classified as the percentage of respondents who indicated that they used one of the stress relievers either ‘sometimes’, ‘fairly often’ or ‘very often’. Source: Australian Psychological Society. (2015). Stress and wellbeing: How Australians are coping with life. Retrieved from https://www.headsup.org.au/ docs/default-source/default-document-library/stress-and-wellbeing-in-australia-report.pdf?sfvrsn=7f08274d_4

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FIGURE 14.12 The stress-and-coping process This process involves a potentially stressful event, the appraisal of that event and attempts to cope. Played out against a variety of background factors unique to each individual, the stress-andcoping process influences health outcomes. Personal and situational background factors

The stress-and-coping process Potentially stressful event

at the start of the semester that assesses the extent to which people tend to procrastinate. True to their word, those students who were classified from their test scores as procrastinators turned in their term papers later than did their classmates and received lower grades. More interesting was the relationship to daily reports of stress and physical health. Early on, while procrastinators were in the ‘putting it off’ stage of their projects, they were relatively stress-free compared with others. Later in the semester, however, as the deadline neared and passed, procrastinators were under greater stress and reported having more symptoms of illness. In the end, the short-term benefits of avoidance were outweighed by the long-term costs.

Coping and control In dealing with essential tasks, it seems it is better to confront and control than to avoid. But is this always the more beneficial approach? There are two reasons why sometimes it is not. First, to exert control a person must stay vigilant, alert and actively engaged, which is physiologically taxing (Light & Obrist, 1980). Second, a controlling orientation can cause problems if it leads us to develop an over-controlling, stress-inducing, Type A pattern Health outcomes of behaviour – whether that means always having the last word in an argument, ‘driving’ from the back seat of a car, or planning every last detail of a leisurely holiday. Not all events are within our control or important enough to worry about. There are times when it is better to just let go (Friedland, Keinan & Regev, 1992; Wright et al., 1990). When we use the word control, we usually have in mind active efforts to manage something: win an argument, work out a marital problem or solve a problem at work. But control comes in many guises. Knowledge, for example, is a form of control. Knowing why something happens increases your chance of making sure it goes your way – if not now, then the next time. Sometimes we can cope effectively with tragedies such as technological disasters, terrorist acts and spousal abuse by blaming the perpetrators for their actions. In these situations, holding others responsible can force a helpful response, such as financial compensation or police protection. Appraisal

Coping

Coping and blame But what about self-blame? Is it ever adaptive to cope with a bad situation by blaming oneself? According to Ronnie Janoff-Bulman (1979), it depends on whether you blame your behaviour or yourself as a person. People can change their own behaviour, she notes, so behavioural self-blame paves the way for control in an effort to reduce current stresses or avoid future ones. But it is not similarly adaptive, she warns, to blame your own enduring personal characteristics, which are harder to change. Janoff-Bulman (1992) later amended this hypothesis, noting that it may take time to realise the mental health benefits of behavioural self-blame. This prediction was tested in studies of how female rape victims adjust to the trauma of their experience. Consistently, both behavioural and characterological self-blame were associated with an increase in distress. Contrary to prediction, rape victims who blame their own behaviour for what happened do not cope better than those who blame their character (Frazier & Schauben, 1994; Hall, French & Marteau, 2003). In light of past research, Patricia Frazier (2003) offers a somewhat more complex perspective on blame, control and coping. Clearly, she notes, it can be adaptive for the victims of rape and other traumas to own a sense of future control (Carver et al., 2000; Frazier, Steward, & Mortensen, 2004). But noting that behavioural self-blame for a past trauma does not guarantee the prevention of future trauma, she distinguishes past, present and future control, and what each implies about the dreaded possibility of a future recurrence. In a longitudinal study of female rape victims appearing in an emergency room, she assessed attributions of blame and responsibility, perceptions of control, and feelings of distress periodically from two weeks up to a year later. Overall, women blamed the rapist more than they blamed themselves, a tendency that strengthened over time. As in other studies, however, those who assigned more blame either to the rapist or to themselves were more distressed. Apparently, the problem with behavioural self-blame, once thought 602

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to be adaptive, is that it did not engender feelings of future safety. In this regard, the most useful sense of control was over the present – women who believed that they could help themselves get better and facilitate their own recovery were more optimistic about the future and the least distressed.

Emotion-focused coping Emotion-focused coping involves efforts to manage our emotional reactions to stressors rather than trying to change the stressors themselves. If you struggle at school, at work or in a romantic relationship, you can keep a stiff upper lip, accept what is happening, tune out or vent your emotions. According to Lazarus and Folkman (1984), we tend to take an active, problem-focused approach when we think we can overcome a stressor, but fall back on an emotion-focused approach when we perceive the problem to be out of our control. Given that, by definition, stress is an unpleasant and arousing experience that fills people with negative and unhealthy emotions. Do some coping mechanisms focus on this emotional aspect of adversity?

Emotion-focused coping

Cognitive and behavioural efforts to reduce the distress produced by a stressful situation.

Positive emotions It is possible for positive and negative feelings to coexist, as when we find consolation in loss (Folkman & Moskowitz, 2000). People who cope well and are resilient tend to experience positive emotions in the face of stress, a common capacity that Ann Masten (2001) termed ‘ordinary magic’. How is it that positive emotions work like magic? On the basis of numerous studies, Barbara Fredirickson (2009) suggests that positive emotions help people to broaden their outlook in times of stress so they can cope with adversity – in part by providing a welcome distraction from the anger, fear and other negative states that increase blood pressure and arousal and narrow the focusing of attention. Positive emotions may serve the coping process better than negative emotions, but are all positive emotions equally adaptive? Maybe not. Sarah Pressman and Sheldon Cohen (2012) analysed the language used in the writings of 88 highly influential deceased psychologists. Specifically, they categorised and counted the words used that were positive or negative and high or low in arousal. These distinctions resulted in four types of emotion words: 1 Positive–high arousal – lively, enthusiastic, energetic. 2 Positive–low arousal – calm, peaceful, content. 3 Negative–high arousal – tense, afraid, angry. 4 Negative–low arousal – lonely, drowsy, tired. The psychologists sampled had lived an average of 79 years. Even after controlling for the possible effects of sex, year of birth and other individual factors, Pressman and Cohen found that the more positive– high arousal emotion words the psychologists had used in their writings, the longer they lived – by an average of five years. The use of positive–low arousal emotion words was not similarly associated with longevity.

Shutting down and suppression Often, we react to stress by shutting down and trying to deny or suppress the unpleasant thoughts and feelings. Although potentially effective, suppression of unwanted thoughts from awareness can have a peculiar, paradoxical effect. As described in Chapter 2, Daniel Wegner (1994, 1997) conducted a series of studies in which he told people not to think of a white bear and found that they could not then keep the image from popping to mind. What is more, he found that among participants who were permitted later to think about the bear, those who had earlier tried to suppress the image were unusually preoccupied with it, providing evidence of a rebound effect. Sometimes, the harder you try not to think about something, the less likely you are to succeed (Wegner, Ansfield, & Pilloff, 1998). The solution? Focused distraction. When participants were told to imagine a tiny red Volkswagen every time the forbidden bear intruded into their consciousness, the rebound effect vanished (Wenzlaff & Wegner, 2000). What do white bears and red cars have to do with coping? A lot. When people try to block stressful thoughts from awareness, the problem may worsen. That is where focused distraction comes in. In a study of pain tolerance, Delia Cioffi and James Holloway (1993) had people put a hand into a bucket of ice-cold water and keep it there until they could no longer bear the pain. One group was instructed to avoid thinking about the sensation. A second group was told to form a mental picture of their home. Afterwards, those who had coped through suppression were slower to recover from the pain than were those who had used focused self-distraction. So, the next time you need to manage stress (whether it is caused by physical pain, a strained romance, final exams or problems at work), use distraction – or think about lying on a beach! It seems to be a better coping strategy than mere suppression (‘Don’t think about the pain’).

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Keeping secrets and holding in strong emotions may also be physically taxing. In the laboratory, James Gross and Robert Levenson (1997) showed female students funny, sad and neutral films. Half the time, they told the students to not let their feelings show. From a hidden camera, videotapes confirmed that when they were asked to conceal their feelings, the students were less expressive. But physiological recordings revealed that as they watched the funny and sad films, the students exhibited a greater cardiovascular response when they tried to inhibit their feelings than when they did not. Physiologically, the effort to suppress the display of emotion backfired. Also, Michael Slepian and colleagues (2012) found that people who harboured and recalled important secrets (e.g., concerning cheating or sexual orientation) perceived distances to be further, hills to be steeper and physical tasks to require more effort, suggesting that they are as weighty as physical burdens in their own way. So, it seems that in Western cultures that encourage selfexpression, actively concealing your innermost thoughts and feelings can be hazardous to your health.

Opening up The research just described suggests that just as shutting down can sometimes have benefits, so too can the opposite form of coping; that is, opening up. There are two aspects to this emotional means of coping with stress. The first is acknowledging and understanding our emotional reactions to important events; the second is expressing these inner feelings to ourselves and colleagues (Stanton, Kirk, Cameron, & Danoff-Berg, 2000). According to James Pennebaker (1997), psychotherapy, self-help groups such as the one shown in Figure 14.13, and FIGURE 14.13 Self-help groups can be a huge benefit in various religious rituals, have something in common: all offer a coping with stress chance for people to confide in someone, confess and talk freely Self-help groups offer a chance for people to confide in someone about their troubles – maybe for the first time. To test for the or share their troubles freely which helps to cope with stress. healing power of opening up, Pennebaker conducted a series of controlled studies in which he brought university students into a laboratory and asked them to talk into a tape recorder or write for 20 minutes either about past traumas or trivial daily events. While speaking or writing, students were upset and physiologically aroused. Many tearfully recounted accidents, failures, instances of physical or sexual abuse, loneliness, the death or divorce of their parents, shattered relationships and their fears about the future. Soon these students felt better than ever. Pennebaker found that when they opened up, their systolic blood pressure levels rose during the disclosures but then later dipped below their pre-experiment levels. The students even exhibited a decline in the number of times they visited the campus health centre over the next six months. Other Source: iStock.com/HRAUN studies have also shown that keeping personal secrets can be stressful and that ‘letting it out’ and ‘getting it off your chest’ can have true therapeutic effects on mental and physical health. These effects are especially strong when participants are comfortable with disclosure, when the disclosures are made across multiple sessions, and when the events being described are recent and traumatic (Frattaroli, 2006; Lepore & Smyth, 2002). It appears that confession may be good for the body as well as the soul. But why does it help to open up? Why do you sometimes feel the need to talk out your problems? One possibility, recognised a full century ago by Sigmund Freud, is that the experience provides a much-needed catharsis – a discharge of tension like taking the lid off a boiling pot of water to slow the boiling. People who experience trauma, whether it is due to cancer, death of a loved one, an accident, a natural disaster or exposure to violence, are often haunted by intrusive images of their stressor that pop to mind and cannot be stopped. In these cases, disclosure may bring emotional closure. Another explanation, one favoured by Pennebaker, is that talking about a problem can help you to sort out your thoughts, understand the problem better and gain insight, in cognitive terms. Whatever the reason, it is clear that opening up, perhaps to someone else, can be therapeutic – provided that the listener can be trusted. This last point is critical. Despite the potential for gain, opening up can also cause great distress when the people we confide in react with rejection or unwanted advice or, worse, betray what was said to others (Kelly & McKillop, 1996).

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Indicating the importance of the ‘to whom’ part of opening up, Stephen Lepore and colleagues (2000) exposed university students to disturbing Nazi Holocaust images. Afterwards, the students were randomly divided into groups and asked to talk about their reactions either out loud while alone in a room, to a validating confederate who smiled and agreed, or to an invalidating confederate who avoided eye contact and disagreed. An additional group was given no opportunity to talk. As reported two days later, students who talked alone or to a validating confederate – compared with those who did not talk – said they had fewer intrusive Holocaust thoughts in the intervening period and were less stressed when re-exposed to the original images. However, for students who talked to an invalidating confederate, the benefits of opening up were muted. This finding supports our earlier conclusion that it is better to discuss one’s demons than to conceal them – but the extent of the benefit depends on whether the people we talk to are supportive. It’s no wonder, then, that people are more likely to join mutual support groups, both live and online, when they suffer from stigmatising disorders such as AIDS, alcoholism, breast cancer and prostate cancer than when they have less embarrassing but equally toxic illnesses such as heart disease and diabetes (Davison, Pennebaker & Dickerson, 2000).

Self-focus In Chapter 2 we saw that people spend little time actually thinking about the self – and when they do, they wish they were doing something else (Csikszentmihalyi & Figurski, 1982). According to self-awareness theory, self-focus brings out our personal shortcomings the way staring in a mirror draws our attention to every blemish on our face. It comes as no surprise, then, that self-focus seems to intensify some of the most undesirable consequences of emotion-focused coping. The state of self-awareness can be induced in us by external stimuli such as mirrors, cameras and audiences. Mood, too, plays a role. Peter Salovey (1992) found that, compared with a neutral mood state, both positive and negative moods increase awareness of the self. Thus, when a stressful event occurs, the negative feelings that arise magnify self-focus. What happens next depends on a person’s self-esteem, as people with a negative self-concept experience more negative moods when self-focused than do those with a positive self-concept (Sedikides, 1992). The end result is a self-perpetuating feedback loop – being in a bad mood triggers self-focus, which in people with low self-esteem further worsens the mood. This vicious circle forms the basis for a self-focusing model of depression, according to which coping with stress by attending to your own feelings only makes things worse (Mor & Winquist, 2002; Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1992). A great deal of research has shown that individuals who respond to distress by rumination and repetitive thought – by constantly fixating on themselves, their feelings, their symptoms and the source of their distress – are more likely to become anxious and depressed than those who allow themselves to be distracted (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991; Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco & Lyubomirsky, 2008). Although some types of self-focus may be useful – as when people react to a stressful event by focusing on the positives or worrying in ways that lead them to plan, problem solve and alter their expectations in adaptive ways – the adverse effects are clear (Watkins, 2008). Over the years, and across a range of different cultures, research has also shown that females in particular have a tendency to ruminate, confront their negative feelings and seek treatment for being depressed, while males resort to alcohol and other drugs, physical activity, antisocial behaviour and other FIGURE 14.14 Healthy distractions, such as exercise, are a means of distraction. As a general rule, it appears that females good way to break out of the trap of self-focused depression. who are upset tend to brood, while males who are upset are more likely to act out (Culbertson, 1997; Nolen-Hoeksema & Girgus, 1994). Thankfully, there are healthier alternatives, as you can see from Figure 14.14. To redirect attention away from the self, it helps to become absorbed in an activity such as aerobic exercise, gardening, writing or reading a book. Whatever the activity, it should be difficult, demanding and fully engaging. Ralph Erber and Abraham Tesser (1992) found that people who were in a bad mood felt better after performing a difficult task than a simple task or none at all. Difficult tasks, it appears, can ‘absorb’ a bad mood. Meditation, which requires you to focus your attention on a chosen non-self object, can have positive effects for the same reason (Lutz, Slagter, Dunne, & Davidson, 2008). Referring to techniques of focused relaxation that he had developed, Source: Getty Images/AFP/Stan Honda

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Cardiologist Herbert Benson recommended that people sit comfortably, close their eyes, relax the muscles, breathe deeply and silently utter some word over and over again. Says Benson (1993), ‘By practicing two basic steps – the repetition of a sound, word, phrase, prayer, or muscular activity; and a passive return to the repetition whenever distracting thoughts recur – you can trigger a series of physiological changes that offer protection against stress’ (p. 256).

Proactive coping Proactive coping

Up-front efforts to ward off or modify the onset of a stressful event.

According to Lisa Aspinwall and Shelley Taylor (1997), people often benefit from proactive coping, which consists of up-front efforts to ward off or modify the onset of a stressful event. As illustrated in Figure 14.15, coping can be seen as an ongoing process by which we try to prevent as well as react to the bumps and bruises of daily life. Also, as shown, the first line of defence involves the accumulation of resources – personal, financial, social and otherwise – that can later, if needed, serve as a buffer against stress. FIGURE 14.15 Aspinwall and Taylor’s model of proactive coping Coping can be seen as an ongoing, multistep process by which people try to prevent, not just react to, life’s daily stressors. Resource accumulation

Build a reserve of temporal, financial, and social resources

Attention-recognition

Screen environment for danger

What is it?

Negative arousal

Initial appraisal What will it become?

Preliminary coping

What can I do?

Has the event developed?

Elicit and use feedback

Have preliminary efforts had an effect? What has been learned about the potential stressor?

Source: Aspinwall, L. G., & Taylor, S. E. (1997). A stitch in time: Self-regulation and proactive coping. Psychological Bulletin, 121, 417–436. Copyright © 1997 by the American Psychological Association. Reprinted by permission.

Social support

Social support

The helpful coping resources provided by friends and other people.

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If the world is crashing down around you, what do you do? Do you try to stop it? Do you try to manage your emotions? Or do you try to get help from others? Throughout this book, we have seen that human beings are social animals that need other people. But do our social nature and our connections to others have anything to do with health? Do close family ties, lovers, friends, online support groups and relationships at work serve as a buffer against stress? The answer is ‘yes’. The evidence is now overwhelming that social support has therapeutic effects on our physical and psychological wellbeing (Cohen, 2004; Uchino, 2009). David Spiegel, of Stanford University’s School of Medicine, came to appreciate the value of social connections many years ago when he organised support groups for women with advanced breast cancer. The groups met weekly in 90-minute sessions to laugh, cry, share stories and discuss ways of coping. Spiegel

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had fully expected the women to benefit emotionally from the experience. But he found something else he did not expect: these women lived an average of 18 months longer than did similar others who did not attend the groups. According to Spiegel (1993), ‘The added survival time was longer than any medication or other known medical treatment could be expected to provide for women with breast cancer so far advanced’ (pp. 331–2). Similar discoveries were then made by other researchers. In one study, Lisa Berkman and Leonard Syme (1979) surveyed 7000 people and conducted a nine-year follow-up of mortality rates. They found that the more social contacts people had, the longer they lived. This was true of men and women, young and old, rich and poor, and people from all racial and ethnic backgrounds. James House and colleagues (1988) studied 2754 adults interviewed during visits to their doctors. He found that the most socially active men were two to three times less likely to die within nine to twelve years than others of similar age who were more isolated. According to House, social isolation was statistically just as predictive of an early death as smoking or high cholesterol.

Social support and longevity Research findings like these are common. For example, married people are more likely than those who are single, divorced or widowed to survive cancer for five years (Taylor, 1990), gay men infected with HIV are less likely to contemplate suicide if they have close ties than if they do not (Schneider et al., 1991), people who have a heart attack are less likely to have a second one if they live with someone rather than alone (Case et al., 1992), and people, once married, who are then separated or divorced for long periods of time, are at an increased risk of early death (Sbarra & Nietert, 2009). Based on this type of research, Bert Uchino and colleagues (1996) concluded that in times of stress, having social support lowers blood pressure, lessens the secretion of stress hormones and strengthens immune responses. On the flip side of the coin, research shows that people who are socially isolated (as measured objectively) or feel lonely (as measured by their own self-reports) are at risk to exhibit more behavioural problems (e.g., smoking, an inactive lifestyle, and poorer sleep) and biological risk factors (e.g., high blood pressure and weaker immune functions). The net effect is a shortened life expectancy (Cacioppo et al., 2015; Holt-Lunstad et al., 2015). For example, a study of first-year university students showed that feelings of loneliness during the semester were linked to elevated levels of the stress hormone cortisol and a weakened immune response to a flu shot they had received at the university health clinic (Pressman et al., 2005). There’s no doubt about it – being isolated from other people can be hazardous to your health. The health value of social support has been amply demonstrated in the laboratory. In one experiment, female university students were instructed to immerse one hand into an ice-water container for up to three minutes. Every 20 seconds, they rated how much they felt; overall pain tolerance was measured by how long they lasted. Throughout the session, their blood pressure and heart rate were recorded. Levels of cortisol, a stress hormone, were taken from saliva samples after the session. Some participants were accompanied by a fellow student, actually a confederate, who was highly supportive. Others were accompanied by a neutral confederate or none at all. The benefits of social support – even in the form of a stranger – were clear: participants accompanied by a supportive confederate, relative to the others, exhibited lower blood pressure, a lower hear rate, lower cortisol reactivity and lower pain ratings (Roberts et al., 2015).

Social connections: therapeutic value and health benefits Our social connections are therapeutic for many reasons. Friends may encourage us to get out, eat well, exercise and take care of ourselves. They also give sympathy, reassurance, someone to talk to, advice and a second opinion. The value of social support is so basic that people who support us do not need to be physically present. In one study, for example, the physiological responses of research participants were measured as they played a competitive fire-fighting simulation on computer. Via closed-circuit monitor, some participants thought they were being watched, spoken to and comforted by a friendly person of the same sex, while others were left alone. The result? Social support delivered over a monitor, even from a confederate who was not physically present, had a calming influence on participants. It lowered their heart rate, reduced the level of cortisol in their saliva, and led them to see the task as easier (Thorsteinsson, James & Gregg, 1998). The health benefits of social support show just how important it is to connect with others. Are there any drawbacks to an active social life? Is it possible, for example, that the more people we see in a day (e.g., family, friends, classmates, teammates, co-workers and neighbours), the more exposed we are to colds or the flu? Natalie Hamrick and colleagues (2002) asked 18–30-year-old adults about recent stressful

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FIGURE 14.16 Does being popular always promote health?

Percentage of colds

Young adults were asked about recent stressful events and about their social lives and then kept a health diary for three months. As you can see, social contact made no difference for people under low stress. For people under high stress, however, those with active social lives were more likely to get sick. Social contact increases exposure to infectious agents, and can bring illness for those whose resistance is compromised by stress.

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events and about their social lives, then had them keep a health diary for three months. Based on past research, they expected that participants who were under high stress would get sick more than those under low stress. But what about people with high versus low levels of social contact? Would their social connections make them vulnerable to illness or protect them? It depends. Look at Figure 14.16 and you will see that for people under low stress, social connections did not matter. For people under high stress, however, those with high levels of social contact were more likely to catch a cold or flu. So it seems, it is healthy to be popular, except, perhaps, during flu season.

Measuring social support

Precisely because researchers agree that social support is vital to health, they have struggled to come up with ways to 20 measure it (Cohen et al., 2000). In some studies, social support is defined by the sheer number of social contacts a person has. This measure can be useful, but a simple social contact model 0 Low High has some limitations. One is that it glosses over the fact that Social connections people who are stuck in bad relationships are sometimes more Low life stress High life stress distressed, not less (Rook, 1984). Another problem is that Source: Hamrick, N., Cohen, S., and Rodriguez, M. S. (2002). Being having too many contacts can actually reduce levels of support. popular can be healthy or unhealthy: Stress, social network ­diversity, Consider the plight of the urban poor in India who are packed and incidence of upper respiratory ­infection. Health Psychology, 21, 294–298. Copyright © 2002 by the American Psychological into overcrowded residences of up to 11 people per room. They ­Association. Reprinted by permission. are more stressed than people in less crowded conditions and have less social support, in part because they tend to withdraw (Evans & Lepore, 1993). Overcrowding is also an issue for many Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people People who have in Australia, with figures suggesting that in 2016 (ABS, 2016) around one in five (18%) Aboriginal and Torres lots of friends are Strait Islander people aged 15 years and over were living in housing that was overcrowded. Although healthier and live longer than those this was a significant decrease from 25% in 2008 and 26% in 2002 the figure is unacceptably high. The who live more figure increases in remote areas where 38% of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people were living in isolated lives. overcrowded conditions – three times the rate of non-remote areas (13%). TRUE Not only does overcrowding place stress on facilities, but it also facilitates the spread of infectious diseases such as meningococcal disease, tuberculosis, rheumatic fever, respiratory diseases and skin infections (Howden-Chapman & Wilson, 2000) and has been associated with poorer self-reported physical and mental health, and higher rates of smoking and hazardous drinking (Shaw, 2004; Waters, 2001). Zubrick and colleagues (2005), however, note that children living in households with high occupancy levels were less likely to suffer from emotional and behavioural difficulties, compared with those living in low occupancy households. In New Zealand in 2013 it is estimated that one in 10 people were living in crowded conditions. Māori people have consistently experienced higher rates of crowding than the Pākehā population. Pacific peoples, however, have consistently experienced the highest levels of crowding in the country, thus the risk of infectious diseases in these populations is much higher than in the general population (Statistics New Zealand, 2018). In 2013, four in ten people of Pacific ethnicity in New Zealand lived in a crowded household. Research has suggested unrelated households sharing accommodation leads to psychological stress in both Māori and Samoan households (Macpherson, 1993; Māori Women’s Housing Project, 1991). A second model of social support focuses on the diversity of a person’s social network; one that consists, for example, of a spouse, close family members, friends, co-workers and neighbours. Over the years, research has shown that people who are socially ‘integrated’ – who have connections to different types of people in different types of relationships – are healthier and live longer lives (Cohen & JanickiDeverts, 2009). A third model focuses on the quality of a person’s relationships rather than their quantity. This intimacy model predicts that the key is to have a close relationship with a significant other who is emotionally on call for late-night conversations. Having one special relationship may be all a person needs. Thus, while many women with breast cancer benefit physically and emotionally from peer discussion groups, these groups are not needed by – and do not help – women who have supportive partners at home (Helgeson, Cohen, Schulz, & Yasko, 2000). 608

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A fourth approach defines social support by its perceived availability (Sarason, Levine, Basham, & Sarason, 1983). Compared with people who are uncertain of what social resources they have, those who believe that ample support is available when needed cope more effectively. In almost any demanding situation you can imagine, perceived support is associated with better adjustment – even when these perceptions are not entirely accurate (Lakey & Cassady, 1990; Lakey & Orehek, 2011).

Culture and coping Everyone in the world feels stress during the course of a lifetime. Whether the result of a natural disaster, the death of a loved one, the break-up of a relationship, war, serious illness, an accident or the chronic microstressors of life – stress is universal to the human experience. But do people in all cultures solve problems and cope in the same ways? Most of the research on coping is conducted with people from Western cultures, in which individualism and independence are highly valued. Do people from collectivist cultures that value interdependence use the same coping mechanisms? The answer may not be as obvious as it seems. In view of the differences between Eastern and Western cultures, for example, one might predict that Asian people are more likely than white Americans to cope with stress by turning to others for support. Yet Shelley Taylor and colleagues (2004) found that when they asked university students to describe what they do to relieve stress, only 39% of South Koreans (compared with 57% of Americans) said they sought social support. Additional research has confirmed this surprising cultural difference. Regardless of whether the source of stress is social, academic, financial or health related, across age groups and in diverse Asian samples that included Chinese, Japanese, Korean and Vietnamese participants, the result is always the same. People from Asian cultures are less likely to seek out social support in times of stress. Additional probing has shed light on this difference. In individualistic cultures, people often use others to service their personal goals. Yet in collectivist cultures, where social groups take precedence over the self, people are reluctant to strain relationships by calling on others for support. This being the case, Heejung Kim and colleagues (2008) distinguished between explicit social support – disclosing one’s distress to others and seeking their advice, aid or comfort – and implicit social support – merely thinking about or being with close others without openly asking for help. In a study that asked participants to imagine themselves in one of these two situations, Asian Americans reacted with more stress to the explicit social support situation, while white Americans found the more contained implicit situation more stressful (Taylor, Welch, Kim, & Sherman, 2007).

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

CRITICAL THINKING ACTIVITY Do you think it is possible for social support to be a detriment to health? Can you suggest instances where social support may have this paradoxical effect?

Understanding collectivist coping To better understand the ‘collectivist coping style’, Paul Heppner and colleagues (2006) administered extensive questionnaires to more than 3000 Asian university students in Taiwan, many of whom had endured the kinds of traumatic events described in this chapter – the three most frequent were break-ups, academic pressure and the death or illness of a loved one. Their research provided evidence of five ways of coping. In order of how often they are used, the strategies are (1) acceptance, reframing and striving; (2) avoidance and detachment; (3) family support; (4) religion and spirituality; and (5) private emotional outlets. Of the five strategies, participants rated acceptance as the most helpful. Do these results describe how Taiwanese adults cope with stress? What about people from Korea, Japan, China and elsewhere? Interest is growing in these questions and, more generally, in the intersections of social psychology, culture and health (Gurung, 2010). Research by Jacqueline Chen and colleagues (2012) sheds some light on these questions. They note that social support can take a variety of forms, most notably problem-solving support (i.e., providing insight, advice, money and other tangible resources to help resolve the stressor) and emotion-focused support (i.e., providing comfort, reassurance and a boost to self-esteem). In one study, university students from the US and Japan were asked to describe their most recent social interaction with someone they were close to and then to indicate whether they did something to try to help that person. Overall participants from the US were twice as likely as the Japanese participants to spontaneously report giving social support in their interactions. But the two groups also differed in terms of the types of social support they provided. Americans gave more emotion-focused support aimed at helping their close other feel better about himself or herself, while Japanese gave more problem-focused support aimed at helping to resolve the stressor.

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TREATMENT AND PREVENTION OF STRESS Understanding what social support is and how it operates is important in the study of health because so many of life’s problems and prospects occur in a social context, and so many of our efforts to cope with stress involve other people. Indeed, as we will see in this section, health psychologists are actively trying to find ways in which social influences can be used to improve the development of treatment and prevention programs.

Treatment Often, what ails us can be treated through medical intervention. The treatments vary widely – from a simple change in diet to vitamin supplements, aspirin, antibiotics, surgery and the like. There is no doubt about it, medicine is vital to health. In addition, however, treatment has a social component; what the family doctor used to call ‘bedside manner’. What are the active social ingredients?

Factors affecting psychotherapy: social support, hope, and choice. To begin to answer this question, let us consider research on the benefits of psychotherapy. Over the years, studies have shown that although there are vastly different schools of thought and techniques for doing psychotherapy, all approaches are somewhat effective and, surprisingly, all are generally equivalent (Smith, Glass, & Miller, 1980; Wampold et al., 1997). Apparently, despite the surface differences, all psychotherapies have a great deal in common at a deeper level and these common factors, more than the specific techniques used, provide the active ingredients necessary for change. These factors include social support, hope and choice.

Social support First, all healers – regardless of whether they are medical doctors, psychologists or others – provide social support, a close human relationship characterised by warmth, expressions of concern, a shoulder to cry on and someone to talk to. Earlier, we discussed the benefits to health and longevity of having social contacts. In psychological therapy, studies have shown that the better the ‘working alliance’ between a therapist and client, the more favourable the outcome is likely to be (Horvath & Luborsky, 1993). As psychotherapist Hans Strupp (1996) put it, ‘The simple and incontrovertible truth is that if you are anxious or depressed, or if you are experiencing difficulties with significant people in your life, chances are that you feel better if you talk to someone you can trust’ (p. 1017).

Hope Second, all therapies offer a ray of hope to people who are sick, demoralised, unhappy or in pain. In all aspects of life, people are motivated by upbeat, positive expectations. Although some of us are more optimistic than others, optimism is a specific expectation that can be increased or decreased in certain situations (Armor & Taylor, 1998). Indeed, a common aspect of all treatments is that they communicate and instil positive expectations. It has been suggested that high expectations can spark change even when they are not justified (Prioleau, Murdock, & Brody, 1983). This suggestion is consistent with the well-known placebo effect in medicine, whereby patients improve after being given an inactive drug or treatment. Believing can help make it so, which is how faith healers, shamans and witch doctors all over the world have managed to perform ‘miracle cures’ with elaborate rituals. Even modern medicine exploits the power of hope. As Walter Brown (1998) puts it, ‘The symbols and rituals of healing – the doctor’s office, the stethoscope, the physical examination – offer reassurance’ (p. 91).

Choice A third important ingredient is choice. Allowing patients to make meaningful choices, such as deciding on a type of treatment, increases the effectiveness of treatments, for example, for alcoholism (Miller, 1985) and obesity (Mendonca & Brehm, 1983). Choosing to undergo an effortful or costly treatment is particularly beneficial in this regard. The person who voluntarily pays in time, money or discomfort needs to self-justify that investment – a predicament sure to arouse cognitive dissonance. As seen in Chapter 6, one way to reduce dissonance is to become ultra-motivated to succeed: ‘Why have I chosen to do this? Because I really want to get better’. Perhaps because highly motivated individuals are more careful and conscientious about carrying out the prescribed treatment, they tend to improve more. Danny Axsom (1989) tested this specific proposition in a study of snake phobias. Participants, all of whom were highly snake-phobic, were or were not given an explicit choice about undertaking a treatment

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that was described as either requiring ‘extreme exertion’ or being ‘easy’. Among the four experimental conditions, participants who were given an explicit choice about continuing an effortful treatment reported the greatest motivation to change their phobic behaviour and came closest to the snake used to measure approach behaviour. Some interesting research to come out of the New Zealand earthquakes of 2011 suggests that stress, trauma, anxiety and depression for those who suffered post-event psychological stress improved a great deal if they took daily doses of micronutrients (vitamins and minerals) for a month. According to Julia Rucklidge and colleagues (2012), although there are many treatments that are helpful in dealing with postevent stress, many are expensive and rather challenging to provide to large populations; micronutrients, however, are readily available and relatively inexpensive. This is certainly a much healthier option than using food to deal with distress, which, according to Roeline Kuijer and Jessica Boyce (2012), many people did. Their research suggested that prior to the 2011 earthquake, eating habits in the sample of mostly middle-aged Christchurch women were normal. However, following the earthquakes this changed, with many participants reporting that they had resorted to unhealthier eating in an attempt to boost their mood. It seems that those who had a propensity to resort to emotional eating during times of stress before the earthquake were more likely to report an increase in overeating post event; and the effect was worse for those who reported high levels of post-event distress (Kuijer & Boyce, 2012).

Prevention We live in what could aptly be described as the era of prevention, in that many serious health threats are now preventable. Just watch television, leaf through a magazine or surf the internet and you will find programs for AIDS prevention; campaigns to persuade smokers to break the habit; sunscreens that protect the skin from harmful rays; screening for various types of cancer; warnings about high-sugar foods, high-fat foods and obesity; and laws that mandate the use of seatbelts and forbid the use of a mobile phone while driving. To a large extent, we know what to do and what not to do to promote good health and to avoid disease and injury. But just how do we convince ourselves and others to translate that knowledge into action? Sometimes we need to think outside the square to develop a product that delivers a message clearly interpretable by the population of interest. Some promising findings have come from Australia and New Zealand, with programs designed to improve the wellbeing of young Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people (Hip Hop Projects) and survivors of the Christchurch earthquakes (All Right Campaign). The All Right Campaign is a social marketing wellbeing campaign put in place by the Canterbury District Health Board and the Mental Health Foundation of New Zealand in 2013. Focused on the psychosocial recovery of Cantabrians post 2010 and 2011 earthquakes through the ‘Five Ways to Wellbeing’ (Give, Connect, Take Notice, Keep Learning and Be Active – Huppert, 2008), the campaign utilised creative street posters; billboards; newspaper and radio advertisements; social media; events and stunts (e.g., impromptu orchestra performances at local stores), consistently communicating the importance of mental health and wellbeing to all corners of the Christchurch area, providing simple and easy evidence-based tips for improving wellbeing. Research suggests that the campaign reached approximately 70% of the affected population, many of whom (87%) reported the messages they received to be very helpful in the recovery phase (Calder et al., 2016). Indigenous Hip Hop Projects, based on a US model (Tyson, 2002), fuses traditional culture with hip hop, rap, beatboxing and breakdancing. Designed to foster positive mental health and leadership skills in remote communities with a view to improving physical, social and emotional wellbeing of these disadvantaged youth, the program employs a team of hip hop and performing artists from culturally diverse backgrounds working in conjunction with depression advocacy organisation beyondblue; it aims to raise awareness of anxiety and depression and to promote a healthy lifestyle. The results were encouraging, with the program evaluation indicating that young people responded well to the health promotion messages, with evidence of recall of the messages relating to depression and self-respect, along with the key messages of look, listen, talk and seek help, and a level of understanding as to the nature of depression and how to recognise it. Improvements were also seen in the number of young people who were comfortable talking with friends or family during tough times, and those who were comfortable listening to others in difficult circumstances (beyondblue, 2010). The program has also been used successfully in the Torres Strait Islands and Northern Peninsula area of Queensland to raise awareness of sexual health in disadvantaged populations (McEwan, Crouch, Robertson, & Fagan, 2013). There have also been programs developed for diverse issues such

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as drug and alcohol use, anti-smoking, bullying and cybersafety, diabetes and eye health, and domestic violence. Since its inception, Indigenous Hip Hop Projects has worked extensively across the country, in remote, regional and urban Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities, reaching out to over 250 000 participants to date (Indigenous Hip Hop Projects, n.d.).

CRITICAL THINKING ACTIVITY Thinking as a health professional, what advice would you give someone who is experiencing stress that might help them better cope with it? Would your advice change according to the

cultural background of your client? If so, in what ways would your advice be different?

THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS

Subjective wellbeing

One’s happiness, or life satisfaction, as measured by self-report.

Long before the emergence of social psychology, philosophers regarded happiness as the ultimate state of being. But what is happiness, and how is it achieved? Aristotle said it was the reward of an active life; Freud linked it with both work and love; and others have variously suggested that happiness requires money and power, health and fitness, religion, beauty, the satisfaction of basic needs and an ability to derive pleasure from the events of everyday life. In recent years, social psychologists have applied their theories and methods to the study of this most basic human motive: the pursuit of happiness (Diener & Biswas-Diener, 2008; Gilbert, 2006; Haidt, 2006; Hanson, 2013; Lynn et al., 2015; Lyubomirsky, 2013). During the past decade the pursuit of happiness has attracted attention from a wide range of stakeholders, from individuals to researchers, governments and international organisations. But how do we study happiness – or subjective wellbeing, as social psychologists like to call it? How do researchers know whether someone is happy? They ask. Better yet, they use questionnaires such as the Satisfaction with Life Scale, in which people respond to statements such as ‘If I could live my life over, I would change almost nothing’ (Diener, Emmerson, Larsen, & Griffin, 1984; Pavot & Diener, 1993). As Marcus Aurelius said, ‘No man is happy who does not think himself so’. In general, people who are happy also have cheerful moods, high self-esteem, a sense of personal control, more memories of positive as opposed to negative events, and optimism about the future (Myers & Diener, 1995). Even more than physical beauty or material wealth, happiness underlies people’s belief that life is worth living (King & Napa, 1998). A meta-analysis of 225 studies revealed that happiness gives rise to many successful life outcomes in the domains of marriage, friendship, health, income and work performance (Lyubomirsky, King, & Diener, 2005). It is no secret that our outlook on life becomes rosy right after we win a big game, fall in love, land a great job or make money, and that the world seems gloomy right after we lose, fall out of love, or suffer a personal tragedy or financial setback. Predictably, aspects of everyday life trigger fluctuations in mood. For example, research shows that even after other factors are accounted for, city people are happier when they live near green spaces with parks, trees and other greenery (White et al., 2013). Of course, we can also look to social media as an indication of how people are feeling; Facebook’s Gross National Happiness index provides an analysis of the positive and negative words used in the millions of status updates around the world each day. Using an automatic program to scan the updates it provides an indication of how a nation’s mood is fluctuating over time. The data suggest, somewhat not surprisingly, a weekly cycle of positivity on Fridays, Saturdays and Sundays, with spikes on New Year’s Eve, Christmas Day, Valentine’s Day and other national holidays (Zhang, 2010).

Factors affecting long-term happiness But what determines our long-term satisfaction, and why are some of us happier than others? Seeking the roots of happiness, Ed Diener and colleagues (1999) reviewed many years of research and found that subjective wellbeing is not meaningfully related to demographic factors such as age, sex, racial and ethnic background, IQ, education level or physical attractiveness. Contrary to popular belief, people are no less happy during the so-called crisis years of midlife or in old age than during their youth and ‘peak’ youngadult years, and men and women do not differ on this measure. It is clear that people from all walks of life have ways to make themselves happy. In a survey of ‘online happiness seekers’, Acacia Parks and colleagues (2012) found that most respondents cited such activities as engaging in acts of kindness, pursuing

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important goals, expressing gratitude, staying optimistic, doing physical exercise and nurturing social relationships. Overall, there are three key predictors of happiness: 1 Social relationships – people with an active social life, close friends and a happy marriage are more satisfied than those who lack these intimate connections. 2 Employment status – regardless of income, employed people are happier than those who are out of work. 3 Physical and mental health – people who are healthy are happier than those who are not. Reflecting the impact of these factors, worldwide surveys of more than 100 000 respondents in 55 countries have shown that happiness levels vary from one culture to the next (Diener & Suh, 2000). Although specific rankings fluctuate from one survey to the next, national happiness ratings are consistently higher in some countries than in others. In a study commissioned by the United Nations General Assembly, the World Happiness Report (Helliwell, Layard, & Sachs, 2018) revealed that the happiest countries in the world, from 2015–2017 are clustered in Northern Europe; that is, Finland, Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Switzerland and the Netherlands. The least happy countries are in sub-Saharan Africa. A partial list is presented in Figure 14.17. Interestingly the average life evaluations in the top 10 countries are more than twice as high as those in the bottom 10 with notable differences in: gross domestic product per capita (30 times higher in the top 10), social support, healthy life expectancy, freedom, freedom from corruption, and generosity. Australia (which currently sits in tenth position) has fallen below New Zealand (eight position); the US comes in at eighteenth. (Helliwell et al., 2018). To see the full report visit http://worldhappiness. report/ed/2018. FIGURE 14.17 The World Happiness Report top 20 Based on recent surveys conducted all over the globe, the World Happiness Report ranked nations according to their average happiness levels. This list presents the ranking of the top 20 on the list. 1. Finland (7.632) 2. Norway (7.594) 3. Denmark (7.555) 4. Iceland (7.495) 5. Switzerland (7.487) 6. Netherlands (7.441) 7. Canada (7.328) 8. New Zealand (7.324) 9. Sweden (7.314) 10. Australia (7.272) 11. Israel (7.190) 12. Austria (7.139) 13. Costa Rica (7.072) 14. Ireland (6.977) 15. Germany (6.965) 16. Belgium (6.927) 17. Luxembourg (6.910) 18. United States (6.886) 19. United Kingdom (6.814) 20. United Arab Emirates (6.774) 0

1 2 3 4 Explained by: GDP per capita Explained by: social support Explained by: healthy life expectancy Explained by: freedom to make life choices

5 6 7 8 Explained by: generosity Explained by: perceptions of corruption Dystopia (1.92) + residual 95% confidence interval

Source: Helliwell, J., Layard, R., & Sachs, J. (Eds.) (2018). World Happiness Report 2018. New York, NY: Sustainable Development Solutions Network

Money and happiness Over the years, the most interesting statistical relationship has been between income and subjective wellbeing. We all know the saying that ‘money can’t buy you happiness’ – although some people (particularly those who are financially strapped) do not believe it. But is wealth truly a key to happiness? To some extent the answer is ‘yes’, but the evidence is complex. Ed Diener and Martin Seligman (2004) note that

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multimillionaires from the Forbes list of the 400 richest Americans report high levels of life satisfaction (5.8 on a 7-point scale), but so do the Masai, a herding people in East Africa with no electricity or running water, and who live in huts made with dung (5.7 on the same 7-point scale). As seen in the huge disparity in wealth between the happiest countries of Northern Europe and the unhappiest countries of sub-Saharan Africa, cross-national studies reveal a strong positive association between a nation’s wealth and the subjective wellbeing of its people. There are some exceptions, but as a general rule, the more money a country has, the happier its citizens are, at least up to a point. Within any given country, however, the differences between wealthy and middle-income people are modest. According to Australian Unity’s What Makes Us Happy? report (Mead & Tooley, 2015), although happiness broadly increases with income, it hits a ceiling when total household income reaches between $101 000 and $150 000. There is evidence of a slight increase in levels of happiness within the higher income brackets, although it takes a very large increase to achieve a small gain at this level. For those in the low-income bracket, however, small increases in income produce a noticeable increase in happiness for most people. But how much of an increase is required? According to the report’s authors, an additional $18 750 is enough, on average, to raise the happiness of people on a household income of between $15 000 and $30 000. But the figure increases dramatically from there – those on a household income of between $150 000 and $250 000 would require an additional $147 000 to increase happiness levels. So, it seems that although money can buy a level of happiness, there is an element of diminishing returns.

Comparing our happiness and reflecting on our past So, what are we to conclude? At this point, it appears that having shelter, food, safety and security is essential for subjective wellbeing. But once these basic needs are met, particularly in an already prosperous society, additional increases in wealth do not appreciably raise levels of happiness. Why does money not contribute more to subjective wellbeing? One reason is that our perceptions of wealth are not absolute, but are instead relative to certain personally set standards (Parducci, 1995). These standards are derived from two sources: other people and our own past. According to social comparison theory, as described in Chapter 2, people tend to naturally compare themselves to others and feel contented or deprived depending on how they fare in this comparison. To demonstrate, Ladd Wheeler and Kunitate Miyake (1992) had university students for two weeks keep a written record of every time they mentally compared their own grades, appearance, abilities, possessions or personality traits to someone else’s. Consistently, these diaries revealed that making ‘upward comparisons’ to others who were better off sparked negative feelings, while making ‘downward comparisons’ to others who were worse off triggered positive feelings. That is why the middle-class worker whose neighbours cannot pay their bills feels fortunate, but the upper-class social climber who rubs elbows with the rich and famous feels deprived. This relativity may also help explain why there are only modest relationships between happiness and actual income and perceptions of financial status (Johnson & Krueger, 2006). It is also natural for people to use their own recent past as a basis of comparison. According to adaptation-level theory, our satisfaction with the present depends on the level of success to which we are accustomed. Get married, buy a new house or a flashy new car, or get the job or a promotion you were aiming for, and you will surely enjoy a wave of euphoria. Before long, however, the glitter will wear off, and you will adapt to your better situation and raise your standard of comparison. This phenomenon is known as hedonic adaptation. Indeed, when Philip Brickman and colleagues (1978) interviewed 22 people who had won between $50 000 and $1 million in a lottery, they found that these people did not rate themselves as happier than in the past. Compared with others from similar backgrounds, the winners said that they now derived less pleasure from routine activities such as shopping, reading and talking to a friend. Perhaps the more money you have, the more money you need to stay happy. The results of one American public opinion poll suggest that this is the case. Whereas people who earned less than $30 000 a year said that $50 000 would fulfil their dreams, those who earned more than $100 000 said it would take $250 000 to make them happy (Csikszentmihalyi, 1999). Research also shows that the more materialistic people are, the less satisfied they seem to be (Nickerson, Schwarz, Diener, & Kahneman, 2003). Economists have thus come to appreciate that our sense of wellbeing stems in part from the gap between our income and material aspirations (Stutzer, 2004). There’s one other possible and intriguing explanation for why money, and other major life events, are not more predictive of happiness over time: perhaps each of us, as a result of both biological and

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environmental factors, has a set baseline level of happiness – a ‘set point’ towards which we gravitate. This notion is supported by three findings. One is that ratings of happiness are higher among pairs of identical twins than among fraternal twins, leading David Lykken (2000) to suggest that there may be a genetic basis for having a certain set level of contentment. A second finding is that the fluctuations in mood that accompany positive and negative life events tend to wear off over time. For example, in a study spanning two years, Eunkook Suh and colleagues (1996) found that only experiences occurring in the last three months correlated with reports of subjective wellbeing. Getting engaged or married, breaking up, starting a new job and being hospitalised are the kinds of high-impact experiences that people assume have lasting, if not permanent, effects on happiness levels (Gilbert et al., 1998) – but in fact, the impacts are often temporary. A third finding is that happiness levels, like personality traits, are relatively stable over time and place, which leads to the conclusion that some people are, in general, happier than others (DeNeve & Cooper, 1998).

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In all countries and at all levels of wealth, the more money people have, the happier they are.

FALSE

Emerging science on how to increase happiness The pursuit of happiness is a powerful human motive that is still not fully understood. Each of us may well be predisposed by nature towards a particular set point, but it is clear that our happiness is not completely set in stone. In a 17-year study of individuals in Germany, researchers found that 24% of the respondents had significantly higher or lower levels of life satisfaction in the last five years of the study than they did in the first five years (Fujita & Diener, 2005). In a study of national surveys that spanned from 1981 to 2007, other researchers found that average happiness ratings increased in 45 out of 52 countries in which multiple surveys were administered over time – an increase that was linked to increasing democratisation in these countries (Inglehart Foa, Peterson, & Welzel, 2008). Realising that happiness is malleable, both for individuals and large populations, social psychologists are now trying to figure out how people can produce sustainable increases in subjective wellbeing (Lyubomirsky, Sheldon, & Schkade, 2005). Consider this question. If you had money to spend, would you rather use it to purchase an experience or a material object? Would one type of purchase make you happier? Leaf Van Boven and Thomas Gilovich (2003) conducted a telephone survey in which they asked people of varying income levels about a time they purchased an experience (they most often named tickets to a concert, theatre, travel, dinner or spa) or a material object (they most often named clothing, jewellery, a computer or electronic equipment) to make themselves happy. Respondents were then asked to indicate which purchase, if any, made them happier. As can be seen in Figure 14.18, the survey showed that except at the lowest income levels, where people have to satisfy basic material needs, the experiences they purchased made them happier than the material objects – thanks, in part, to the memories that lingered (Van Boven, 2005).

FIGURE 14.18 What yields more happiness: experiences or material objects? After recalling a time when they spent money on an experience or a material object, people in general said that the experiences they purchased made them happier than the material objects. 80% 60% 40% 20% 0%

$0–15

$15–25

$25–35

$35–50

$50–75

Experiential

$75–100

$100– 125

$125– 150

> $150

Material

Source: Van Boven, L. (2005). Experientialism, materialism, and the pursuit of happiness. Review of General Psychology, 9, 132–142. Copyright © 2005 by the American Psychological Association. Reprinted by permission.

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Social psychological research has uncovered other ways to boost happiness levels as well. For example, people exhibit increases in subjective wellbeing when they are prompted by random assignment to write gratitude letters, savour a happy memory or engage in acts of kindness, when compared with others in a control group (Sin & Lyubomirsky, 2009). As for the fact that people tend to ‘adapt’ to a positive change in fortune, get used to it and then revert to their own baseline levels, a collateral question comes into play: once your level of happiness is raised, is there a way to ensure that you stay that way? In answer to this question, researchers are now looking for ways to prevent hedonic adaptation so that the benefits of positive changes will endure over time (Sheldon & Lyubomirsky, 2012).

Bhutan and ‘gross national happiness’ Quite apart from developments in Western psychological science is the question of how, if at all, governments should try to foster happiness in their citizens. Consider the Kingdom of Bhutan, a small, secluded, landlocked Buddhist country nestled high in the Himalayan mountains and bordering India and Tibet. In 1972, the King of Bhutan adopted ‘Gross National Happiness’ (GNH) as its national goal instead of the Gross National Product – making a choice of happiness over wealth. Every year since that time, the government has systematically measured GNH and has shaped policies designed to sustain it. In contrast to the Western scientists’ measurement focus on people’s ratings of their own subjective wellbeing, happiness in the GNH is a multidimensional concept that measures many aspects of the quality of a person’s material, physical, social and spiritual life. By tracking these indicators over time and in various communities, the GNH is used to advance government policies in ways that increase happiness in people who are ‘not yet happy’ (for a fascinating case study on the GNH in Bhutan, see Ura, Alkire, & Zangmo, 2012). What is particularly fascinating about the Bhutan story is that it is part of a new cross-national trend. Several years ago, social psychologist Ed Diener and Eunkook Suh (2000) proposed that all countries should collect subjective well being (SWB) information from their citizens and then adopt what he called ‘National Accounts of Wellbeing’. The goal would be to assess how happy a population is and create national policies aimed at increasing that level of happiness. The research literature offers a good deal of guidance; showing, for example, the happiest nations are economically developed and have strong rules of law, human rights, efficient governments, high employment rates, environmental quality, income security programs, political freedom, and physical health. Diener and his colleagues (2015) present an alphabetised list of 43 countries – from Australia through the US – in which SWB statistics are being collected from its citizens.

Can people be too happy? The research described in this section offers some concrete advice on how people can maximise their levels of happiness. Should social psychologists and nations use this research to seek to maximise levels of happiness within a population? In light of the undisputed benefits of being happy, this hardly seems like a controversial question. But let us stop and ponder the question. Concerned that there is a possible dark side to the pursuit of happiness, Iris Mauss and colleagues (2011) asked, ‘Can seeking happiness make people unhappy?’ Echoing this concern, June Gruber and colleagues (2011) suggested that sometimes being ‘too happy’ is not adaptive because excessive positive emotions can lead people to engage in risky behaviours and not pay enough attention to possible threats (e.g., consuming alcohol, having sex with strangers and driving too fast). What is more, some situations call for fear, anger or a more sober emotional state for coping purposes. They also note that although most people say they are reasonably happy, many report wanting to be even happier – a state of desire that can have paradoxical effects: ‘The more people strive for happiness, the more likely it is that they will become disappointed about how they feel’ (p. 226). Since people who are happy tend to be content with what they have rather than focused on what they lack, this last point is particularly thought-provoking. Is it possible to be too focused on being happy? Is it possible to be too happy? Stay tuned for future research on these questions.

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RESEARCH SPOTLIGHT

Source: Courtesy of Professor Julia Rucklidge

PROFESSOR JULIA RUCKLIDGE, UNIVERSITY OF CANTERBURY What are the topic areas of your research? I research the impact of micronutrients (vitamins and minerals) on mental health disorders, like ADHD, depression, anxiety, insomnia and stress. The rationale for taking this approach is based on the idea that people with psychological symptoms may need more nutrients than they can get out of their diet alone. As such, not only do I look at whether nutrients can positively affect mental illness but also when they work and why they might work. Which of your research findings have you found most intriguing? My favourite study is the one we ran right after the February 2011 earthquake. People in Christchurch were really stressed, there were ongoing earthquakes daily, the city was devastated, many people had lost their homes, workplaces had changed dramatically, and people were feeling very out of control. My team of students and I decided to launch a randomised controlled trial to see whether a simple intervention – that is, giving micronutrients – could help alleviate the stress and anxiety people were experiencing. We had some preliminary data after the September 2010 earthquake that suggested people who were taking nutrients at the time of the earthquake recovered more quickly than those not taking them. The February earthquake gave us an opportunity to see whether this effect we observed could be generalised to the wider community. We managed to get the study up and running within two months of the earthquake and complete data collection in

another three months. The community response and desire to seek this approach to treat stress was overwhelming. Overall, we helped many Cantabrians cope better with the earthquakes, we reduced post-traumatic stress disorder symptoms in those treated compared with controls, and the effect of acute administration of nutrients was maintained one year later (Rucklidge & Blampied, 2011; Rucklidge, Blampied, Gorman, Gordon, & Sole, 2014). I then participated in a replication of the study following a flood in Alberta, Canada (Kaplan, Rucklidge, Romijn, & Dolph, 2015). How did you become interested in your area of research? I was trained as a clinical psychologist but was aware that many people were not being well managed with medications and therapy alone. I was introduced to the area of using nutrients to treat mental health problems and quickly observed the potential this treatment offers. With very little research, though, to support it as a viable way forward, I have dedicated the last decade of my career to studying the impact of nutrients on mental health in controlled trials. How does your area of research speak to life in Australia and New Zealand? One in five New Zealanders suffer from a mental illness in any one given year. Our current treatments help many, but there are far too many who do not respond or cannot tolerate the side effects. I have noticed people are starting to become more aware that food can impact substantially on mental and physical health. I think we are at a crossroads where people are recognising that our conventional treatments are not as good as we hoped they were, and so we are seeking other solutions to chronic health problems. Good nutrition intuitively makes sense. Psychologists are well positioned to evaluate the evidence.

Topical Reflection THE SOCIAL CONNECTION BETWEEN HEALTH AND ILLNESS As we saw in the opening vignette, the outbreak of Ebola in 2014, graphically illustrated the power of social networks in terms of their ability to facilitate the spread of infectious diseases. An analysis of the ongoing Ebola outbreak revealed that transmission of the virus occurs in social clusters. Based on the fact that the transmission of the virus happens most often in hospitals, households and funeral settings, a team of investigators from Yale University investigated the possibility of clustered transmission, or the spread between individuals in small social groups. In their review of genomic and epidemiological data from the outbreak in Sierra Leone, the team found evidence to suggest significant social clustering whereby an infected individual transmits the disease to another individual, the next transmission is likely to be to someone who the first individual knew. The team found that as social clustering increases, the interactions between infected and susceptible individuals, underlying transmission decrease, because contacts are shared among infectious individuals – it all happens within little social networks. This research has important long-term ramifications as it demonstrates the importance of social networks when seeking to understand and predict the spread of infectious diseases in human populations (Scarpino et al., 2015).

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CHAPTER REVIEW SUMMARY STRESS, HEALTH AND WELLBEING • Stress is an unpleasant state that arises when we perceive that the demands of an event strain our ability to cope effectively. CAUSES OF STRESS • There are many different causes of stress, known as stressors. CRISES AND CATASTROPHES • Natural disasters and other catastrophic events can have harmful and long-term effects on mental and physical health. • People with post-traumatic stress disorder suffer from psychological and physical symptoms long after the event is over. MAJOR LIFE EVENTS • Early research suggested that all change is stressful. • More recent studies suggest that only negative events are harmful. MICROSTRESSORS • The most common sources of stress are minor everyday hassles. • Constant noise, burnout from job pressures and the demands of commuting are all stressful in this regard.

PUTTING COMMON SENSE TO THE TEST The accumulation of daily hassles does more to make people sick than catastrophes or major life changes. TRUE. Commuting hassles, arguments with friends and other ‘microstressors’ contribute more to our levels of stress than larger but less frequent stressors.

PHYSICAL RESPONSES TO STRESS • Selye coined the term stress upon observing that different stressors produce similar physiological effects on the body. GENERAL ADAPTATION SYNDROME • The body responds to stress in three stages: alarm, resistance and exhaustion. • The stress response is designed for acute emergencies, not for the constant long-term stress that humans often experience.

PUTTING COMMON SENSE TO THE TEST Stress is a leading cause of stomach ulcers. FALSE. Ulcers are now thought to be caused by a bacterial infection. STRESS AND THE HEART • Stress is a major risk factor in coronary heart disease (CHD). • Early research suggested that the hard-driving Type A personality, also called coronary behaviour pattern, is associated with CHD.

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STRESS AND THE IMMUNE SYSTEM • The immune system contains specialised white blood cells called lymphocytes that detect and destroy foreign substances in the body. • Laboratory and field research shows that stress affects the activity of these cells, sometimes resulting in a weakened immune response. STRESS AND ILLNESS • Stress weakens the immune system, so people under stress are more likely to catch a cold when exposed to a virus.

PUTTING COMMON SENSE TO THE TEST Stress can weaken the heart, but it cannot affect the immune system. FALSE. Recent research has shown that stress and other psychological states can alter the activity of white blood cells in the immune system and affect our resistance to illness.

OBESITY AND STRESS • The links between stress and obesity begin at an early age. • Once the body is carrying excess fat stores, the body may produce an increase in cortisol levels every time food is ingested, increasing susceptibility to stress-related illness. OBESITY, STRESS AND CHILDHOOD • Research suggests that the link between stress and obesity begins at an early age. • Children whose parents have high levels of stress tend to have a higher BMI than those whose parents have low stress and have a propensity to gain weight 7% higher than other children. OBESITY, STRESS AND ILLNESS • Research has indicted that overweight men secrete higher levels of cortisol (stress hormone) after eating which makes them more susceptible to chronic diseases.

APPRAISAL • Appraisal is the process by which people make judgements about the demands of potentially stressful events and their ability to meet those demands. ATTRIBUTIONS AND EXPLANATORY STYLES • According to the learned helplessness model of depression, exposure to an uncontrollable event sparks passive, apathetic, depression-like symptoms. • Research shows that the attributions people make for their lack of control are of central importance. HUMAN CAPACITY FOR RESILIENCE • Some individuals are more resilient than others in the face of stress, a trait called ‘hardiness’.

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•

The key ingredient of hardiness is the belief that one has the power to control future outcomes through one’s own behaviour.

COPING WITH STRESS • The stress-and-coping process is an ongoing transaction between a person and his or her environment. • Effective coping helps to maintain good health, and ineffective coping can cause harm. PROBLEM-FOCUSED COPING • People try to reduce stress by overcoming the source of the problem. EMOTION-FOCUSED COPING • People try to manage the emotional turmoil produced by a stressful situation. PROACTIVE COPING • As a first line of defence, people can ward off stress through proactive coping efforts such as the accumulation of resources.

PUTTING COMMON SENSE TO THE TEST People who have lots of friends are healthier and live longer than those who live more isolated lives. TRUE. Across a range of studies, researchers have found that social support is strongly associated with positive health outcomes. CULTURE AND COPING • Stress is universal, but people from collectivist cultures appear to rely less often on social support as a means of coping than do people from individualist cultures.

TREATMENT AND PREVENTION OF STRESS • Understanding what social support is and how it operates is important in the study of health. • Health psychologists are actively trying to find ways in which social influences can be used to improve the development of treatment and prevention programs.

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PREVENTION • Many causes of death are preventable through changes in lifestyle and behaviour, which is where social psychology comes in.

THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS • Most people report being relatively happy, but there are individual differences. • Three important factors are social relationships, employment and health. FACTORS AFFECTING LONG-TERM HAPPINESS • Contrary to popular belief age and gender have no effect on happiness. • People from all walks of life have ways to make themselves happy. • The three key predictors of happiness are: social relationships, employment status, and physical and mental health. MONEY AND HAPPINESS • Evidence that money can buy happiness is mixed. More affluent nations tend to have happier citizens than less affluent nations, but correlations with groups of citizens within nations are modest. • Research suggests that each of us has a baseline level of happiness towards which we gravitate over time.

PUTTING COMMON SENSE TO THE TEST In all countries and at all levels of wealth, the more money people have, the happier they are. FALSE. Research results are complex, but it is clear that once people have enough money to satisfy basic needs, additional wealth does not produce more happiness. EMERGING SCIENCE ON HOW TO INCREASE HAPPINESS • Research shows that happiness levels are somewhat malleable in individuals and in nations. • Researchers are starting to test ways that people can use to make themselves happier; for example, by using their money to purchase experiences, not material objects.

TREATMENT • Medical treatment includes an important social component. • Doctors, therapists and other healthcare workers provide patients with social support and a ray of hope.

LINKAGES In this chapter we talked about the how people compare themselves to others in ways which cause stress and anxiety – such as comparing the grade received on a social psychology assignment with those of their peers. But do social comparisons always lead to stress? Turn to Chapter 2,

The social self, to answer this question. There are many more ties between the content of this chapter and other exciting areas of social psychology – check out the Linkage diagram below to see some of them.

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CHAPTER

14

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LINKAGES

Do social comparisons always cause stress?

CHAPTER

2

The social self

Understanding cognitive dissonance?

CHAPTER

5

Gender identity

Changing attitudes to health

CHAPTER

6

Attitudes

REVIEW QUIZ 1 The process by which we make judgements about the demands of potentially stressful events is called: a coping. b subjective wellbeing. c appraisal. d stress-and-coping process. 2 According to Lazarus and Folkman (1984), the way in which stress is experienced and the particular coping strategies that are used depend primarily on: a a person’s amount of social support. b the health of the immune system. c a subjective appraisal of the situation. d the general adaptation syndrome. 3 Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD): a is most likely to occur when an individual feels personally responsible for the outcome of a traumatic event.

b is more prevalent among men versus women. c is observed among military personnel, but not the general citizenry. d often occurs three to six months after a soldier’s return rather than immediately afterward. 4 Research on burnout suggests it is more likely when workers lack: a support from their supervisors. b cordial relationships with their co-workers. c adequate resources at work. d all of the above. 5 High levels of hostility have been found to predict a decreased use of alcohol and cigarettes. b greater use of emotion-focused coping. c more intense cardiovascular responses to events. d risky behaviours.

WEBLINKS APS University of Health Psychologists http://groups.psychology.org.au/chp A website with information about health psychology and the University of Health Psychologists in Australia. Australian Indigenous HealthInfo Net https://healthinfonet.ecu.edu.au/about A site with valuable information designed to inform practice and policy in Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander health, including links to research, advocacy and health promotion programs. beyondblue https://www.beyondblue.org.au The website of an organisation that works to reduce the impact of depression and anxiety in the community, with resources to raise

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awareness and understanding, empower people to seek help, and to support recovery, management and resilience. NZ health statistics https://www.health.govt.nz/nz-health-statistics Results from the New Zealand Health Survey 2012–2013 for both adults and children, including information on health behaviours and risk factors, health conditions and access to health services. Sane Australia https://www.sane.org The website of an organisation that supports people affected by mental illness, their family and friends, with links to research, education, training and online support programs.

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CHAPTER FOURTEEN

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White, M. P., Alcock, I., Wheeler, B. W., & Depledge, M. H. (2013). Would you be happier living in a greener urban area? A fixed-effects analysis of panel data. Psychological Science, 24, 920–928 World Health Organization. (2017). World Health Fact Sheet October 2017. Retrieved from http://www. who.int/en/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/obesity-andoverweight World Health Organization Ebola Response Team. (2016). After Ebola in West Africa – unpredictable risks, preventable epidemics. New England Journal of Medicine, 375(6), 587–596. Wright, L., von Bussman, K., Friedman, A., Khoury, M., & Owens, F. (1990). Exaggerated social control and its relationship to the Type A behavior pattern. Journal of Research in Personality, 24, 258–269. Xue, C., et al. (2015, 10 March). A meta-analysis of risk factors for combat related PTSD among military personnel and veterans. PLOS ONE, 20. Article e0120270. Yamashita, J., & Shigemura, J. (2013). The Great East Japan Earthquake, tsunami, and Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident: A triple disaster affecting the mental health of the country. Psychiatric Clinics, 36(3), 351–370. Yeung, O., & Johnston, K. (2016). The future of wellness at work. Global Wellness Institute. Retrieved from https://globalwellnessinstitute.org/press-room/ press-releases/global-wellness-institute-releasesreport-and-survey-on-the-future-of-wellness-at-work/ Zhang (2010). Continuing our study of happiness. Retrieved from https://www.facebook.com/notes/ facebook-data-science/continuing-our-study-ofhappiness/375901788858/) Zubrick, S., Dudgeon, P., Gee, G., Glaskin, B., Kelly, K., Paradies, Y., Scrine, C., & Walker, R. (2010). Social determinants of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander social and emotional wellbeing. In N. Purdie, P. Dudgeon & R. Walker (Eds.), Working together: Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander mental health and wellbeing principles and practice. Canberra, ACT: Office of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Health, Department of Ageing. Zubrick, S. R., Silburn, S. R., Lawrence, D. M., Mitrou, F. G., Dalby, R. B., Blair, … Li, J. (2005). The social and emotional wellbeing of Aboriginal children and young people: Vol. 2. Perth, WA: Telethon Institute for Child Health Research and Curtin University of Technology.

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Learning Objectives By the end of this chapter, you should be able to: 1 understand the problems of, and potential improvements to, eyewitness testimony 2 describe approaches used for confessions and how juries evaluate them 3 describe factors that affect jury decisions and deliberations 4 discuss the sentencing process and the prison experience 5 consider perceptions of justice and the influence of culture 6 describe the role social psychologists can play in the legal system.

Miscarriages of justice – the social impact decisions? In this chapter, we address how the functioning of the legal system can be impacted by human affect, behaviour and cognition, and how that intersection between social psychology and the law can sometimes lead us to miscarriages of justice.

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Source: Alamy/Rob Walls.

In 1982, Lindy Chamberlain was convicted of murder for the 1980 death of her infant daughter, Azaria. The case made headlines around the world, and although Lindy Chamberlain always maintained her innocence, many people judged her to be guilty. In cases like these, what factors lead us to decide that a suspect is guilty of a crime? How can we tell whether witnesses are accurate, or whether they are being truthful? How does deliberation affect the process in which jurors reach

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PUTTING COMMON SENSE TO THE TEST Circle Your Answer T

F

Eyewitnesses find it relatively difficult to recognise members of a race other than their own.

T

F

The more confident an eyewitness is about an identification, the more accurate he or she is likely to be.

T

F

It is not possible to knowingly fool a lie-detector test.

T

F

Without being beaten or threatened, innocent people sometimes confess to crimes they did not commit.

T

F

One can usually predict a jury’s final verdict by knowing where the individual jurors stand the first time they vote.

INTRODUCTION In criminal justice systems around the world, the trial is just the tip of the iceberg. Once a crime is committed, it must be detected and then reported if it is to receive further attention. Through investigation, the police find a suspect and decide whether to make an arrest. If they do, the suspect is jailed or bail is set, and a judge or public prosecutor decides if there is sufficient evidence for a formal accusation. If there is sufficient evidence, the prosecuting and defence lawyers begin a lengthy process in which they gather evidence. The prosecutors must then convince a judge that there is sufficient evidence to proceed to trial. At or before this point, many defendants plead guilty as part of a plea deal negotiated by the lawyers. In cases that do go to trial, the ordeal does not end with a verdict (Findlay, Odgers, & Yeo, 2009). After conviction, the trial judge imposes punishment in the form of a sentence and the defendant decides whether to appeal to a higher court. For those in prison, decisions concerning their release are made by parole boards. As Figure 15.1 illustrates, the criminal justice apparatus is complex and the actors behind the scenes are numerous. Social psychologists have a lot to say about various aspects of the legal system (Costanzo & Krauss, 2015; Greene & Heilbrun, 2014; McKimmie, Masters, Masser, Schuller, & Terry, 2012). The issues that social psychologists study are broad and varied. At present, researchers are looking at a wide range of issues, such as: • whether police can tell when someone is lying and how they can make these judgements more accurately (Granhag, Vrij, & Verschuere, 2015; Vrij, Granhag, & Porter, 2010) • how juries make decisions in civil lawsuits involving large sums of money (Bornstein, Wiener, Schopp, & Willborn, 2008; Reyna et al., 2015) • why people cooperate with authorities and obey the law (Tyler, 2011) • how information can best be gathered in the wake of terrorist attacks (Loftus, 2011) • how appellate courts receive oral arguments and make decisions (Wrightsman, 2006, 2008) • how social psychology can be used to prevent the wrongful conviction of innocent people (Cutler, 2011). Importantly, much of what social psychologists have discovered regarding law and justice is not known to judges, lawyers and laypeople as a matter of common sense (Borgida & Fiske, 2007). In this chapter, we look at the social psychology of evidence, jury decision-making, sentencing and prison, and perceptions of justice.

EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY Once the commission of a crime is discovered, police investigate in an effort to identify the perpetrator. Eyewitnesses and possible suspects are interviewed, and all sorts of physical evidence in the form of fingerprints, shoe prints, hair samples, DNA-rich biological materials, ballistics and autopsy results are collected and analysed. Solving crimes is not easy. In this all-too-human enterprise, as we will see, some of the most critical types of evidence that police gather are subject to social influences and the potential for bias and error. ‘I’ll never forget that face!’ When these words are uttered, police officers, judges and juries all take notice. Too often, however, eyewitnesses make mistakes. In Australia in 1999, Frank Alan Button was accused of the rape of a 13-year-old girl, who identified him as the rapist. Sentenced to seven years in 628

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FIGURE 15.1 Overview of the criminal justice system This flow chart presents the movement of cases through different branches of the criminal justice system. As illustrated here, the trial is just one aspect of it.

Not guilty verdict

Crime committed

No arrest

Arrest

Charges dropped

Formal accusation

Case dismissed

Pleabargain

Trial

Sentence determined via alternative process, e.g. restorative justice

Sentencing

Fine Probation Other alternatives

Prison

Source: Adapted from the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice. (1967). The challenge of crime in a free society. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.

prison, Frank Button served 10 months behind bars before all DNA evidence was finally tested , revealing a DNA profile that did not match his. Instead, the DNA profile matched that of a convicted rapist who lived in the victim’s community and matched the victim’s initial description of the offender (R v Button [2001] QCA 133; New South Wales Bar Association, 2006). In a similar case in North Carolina in the US in 1984, a young man broke into Jennifer Thompson’s apartment, cut the phone wires and raped her. She described him to the police, helped construct a composite sketch, and then positively identified Ronald Cotton as her assailant. Cotton had alibis for his whereabouts that night, but based on Thompson’s eyewitness identification, he was found guilty and sentenced to life in prison. Ten years later, DNA tests of semen stains revealed that Cotton was innocent and that Bobby Poole, a known offender, was the real assailant. In 1995, after 10 years in prison, Cotton was released and offered US$5000 in compensation (Weir, 2016). Every year, thousands of people around the world are charged with crimes solely on the basis of eyewitness evidence. Many of these eyewitness accounts are accurate, but many are not – which is why psychologists have been interested in the topic for more than 100 years (Doyle, 2005). In the US, the Innocence Project was established in 1992 to exonerate wrongfully convicted people through DNA testing (Innocence Project, 2014). Now, more than 300 DNA exonerations later, it is clear that eyewitness error is the most common cause of wrongful convictions (Brewer & Wells, 2011; Wells, 2006). As eyewitnesses, people can be called upon to remember just about anything – a face, a weapon, an accident or a conversation. To date, hundreds of tightly controlled studies of eyewitness testimony have been conducted. Based on this research, three conclusions can be drawn: (1) eyewitnesses are imperfect, (2) certain personal and situational factors can systematically influence their performance, and (3) judges, juries and lawyers are not adequately informed about these factors (Cutler & Penrod, 1995; Lindsay, Ross, Read, & Toglia, 2007).

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FIGURE 15.2 How accurate are your memories of events really? People often believe that they have highly accurate, detailed memories of significant public events, such as the death of Princess Diana. However, research shows that even conversing about these events can distort our memory for their details, leading to inaccurate accounts of the event (Coman, Manier, & Hirst, 2009).

People tend to think that human memory works like a video camera – that if you turn on the power, all events will be recorded for subsequent playback. Unfortunately, it is not that simple and people often remember events, even significant ones, differently to how they occur (see Figure 15.2). Over the years, researchers have found it useful to view memory as a three-stage process involving the encoding, storage and retrieval of information. The first of these stages, encoding, refers to a witness’s perceptions at the time of the event in question. Second, the witness rehearses and stores the information in memory to avoid forgetting. Third, the witness retrieves the information from storage when needed. This model suggests that errors can occur at three different points.

Perception Some kinds of individuals and events are more difficult to perceive than others. Common sense tells us that brief exposure time, poor lighting, long distance, physical disguise and distraction can all limit a witness’s perceptions. For example, Rod Lindsay and colleagues (2008) had approximately 1300 participants observe a target person outdoors, at one of various distances ranging from 5 metres to 50 metres. They found, first, that the witnesses were not accurate at estimating distance and, second, that the further witnesses were from the target, the less accurate they were at identifying the target in a line-up shortly afterwards. Lampien, Erickson, Moore and Hittson (2014), conducted a similar study, finding that those who observed a target person from greater distances were more susceptible to response bias when identifying the person.

Effects of emotional state Research has uncovered other relevant aspects of the witnessing situation. Consider the effects of a witness’s emotional state. Source: Getty Images/Tim Graham (inset), AAP/AP/Jerome Delay Often people are asked to recall a bloody attack, a car crash or an assault – emotional events that trigger high levels of stress. In a study that illustrates the debilitating effects of stress, Charles Morgan and colleagues (2004) randomly assigned trainees in a military survival school to undergo a realistic high-stress or low-stress mock interrogation. Twenty-four hours later, he found that those in the high-stress condition had difficulty identifying their interrogators in a line-up. It turns out that arousal has a complex effect on memory. Realising the importance of what they are observing, highly aroused witnesses zoom in on the central features of an event such as the culprit, the victim or a weapon. As a direct result of this narrowed field of attention, however, arousal impairs a witness’s memory for other less central details (Christianson, 1992; Houston, Clifford, Phillips, & Memon, 2012). Alcohol, a drug often involved in crimes, can also cause problems. When participants in one study witnessed a live staged crime, those who had earlier consumed fruit juice were more accurate in their recollections than were those who had been served an alcoholic beverage (Yuille & Tollestrup, 1990). Under the influence of alcohol, people can recognise the perpetrator in a line-up, but they often make false identifications when the actual perpetrator is absent (Dysart, Lindsay, MacDonald, & Wicke, 2002).

Weapon-focus effect Weapon-focus effect

The tendency for the presence of a weapon to draw attention and impair a witness’s ability to identify the culprit.

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The weapon-focus effect is also an important factor. Across a wide range of settings, research shows that when a criminal pulls out a gun, a razor blade or a knife, witnesses are less able to identify that culprit than if no weapon is present (Pickel, 1999; Steblay, 1992). There are two reasons for this effect. First, people are agitated by the sight of a menacing stimulus, as when participants in one study were approached by an experimenter who was holding a syringe or threatening to administer an injection (Maass & Kohnken, 1989).

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Second, even in a harmless situation, the weapon is a novelty item, and a witness’s eyes lock in on it like magnets, drawing attention away from the face (Erickson, Lampinen, & Leding, 2014). To demonstrate, Elizabeth Loftus and colleagues (1987) showed people slides of a customer who walked up to a bank cashier and pulled out either a pistol or a chequebook. By tracking eye movements, these researchers found that people spent more time looking at the gun than at the chequebook. The net result is an impairment in the ability to identify the criminal in a line-up.

Own-race identification bias Race is another important consideration. By varying the racial make-up of participants and target individuals in laboratory and real-life interactions, researchers discovered that people are more accurate at recognising members of their own racial group than of a race other than their own – an effect known as the own-race identification bias (Malpass & Kravitz, 1969). In one field study, for example, 86 convenience store staff in El Paso, Texas were asked to identify three customers – one white, one African American and one Mexican American – who were all confederates that had stopped in and made a purchase earlier that day. It turned out that the white, African American and Mexican American clerks were all most likely to accurately identify customers belonging to their own racial or ethnic group (Platz & Hosch, 1988). The finding that ‘they all look alike’ (referring to members of other groups) is found reliably and in many different racial and ethnic groups. A group of Australian researchers replicated the own-race identification bias in an Australian sample, showing that Asian participants displayed better recognition for Asian faces than for European faces, and European participants displayed better recognition for European faces than for Asian faces (Hilliar, Kemp, & Denson, 2010). Christian Meissner and John Brigham (2001) statistically combined the results of 39 studies involving a total of 5000 mock witnesses. They found that the witnesses were consistently less accurate and more prone to making false identifications when they tried to recognise target individuals from racial and ethnic groups other than their own. Paralleling this research, studies also show that children, young adults and the elderly have more difficulty recognising people of an age group other than their own (Rhodes & Anastasi, 2012).

Own-race identification bias

The tendency for people to be more accurate at recognising members of their own racial group than of other groups.

Eyewitnesses find it relatively difficult to recognise members of a race other than their own.

TRUE

Storing memories Can remembrances of the remote past be trusted? As you might expect, memory for faces and events tends to decline with the passage of time. Longer intervals between an event and its retrieval are generally associated with increased forgetting (Shapiro & Penrod, 1986). But not all recollections fade, and time alone does not cause memory slippage. Consider the plight of bystanders who witness firsthand incidents such as terrorist bombings, shootings, plane crashes or fatal car accidents. Afterwards, they may talk about what they saw, read about it, hear what other bystanders have to say, and answer questions from investigators and reporters. By the time witnesses to these events are officially questioned, they are likely to have been exposed to so much post-event information that it is unclear if their original memory is still ‘pure’. According to Loftus (1996), it probably is not, as we will discuss in the next section.

The misinformation effect Many years ago, based on her own studies of eyewitness testimony, Loftus proposed a now classic theory of reconstructive memory. After people observe an event, she said, later information about that event – whether the information is true or not – becomes integrated into the fabric of their memory. An initial experiment by Loftus and John Palmer (1974) illustrates the point. Participants viewed a film of a traffic accident and then answered questions, including: ‘About how fast were the cars going when they hit each other?’ Other participants answered the same question, except that the verb hit was replaced by smashed, collided, bumped or contacted. All participants saw the same accident, yet the wording of the question affected their reports. Figure 15.3 shows that participants given the ‘smashed’ question estimated the highest average speed and those responding to the ‘contacted’ question estimated the lowest. But there is more. One week later, participants were called back for more probing. Had the wording of the questions caused them to reconstruct their memories of the accident? Yes. When asked whether they had seen broken glass at the accident (there was in fact none present), 32% of the ‘smashed’ participants said they had. As Loftus had predicted, what these participants remembered of the accident was based on two sources: the event itself and post-event information. This is what they have described as the misinformation effect; that is the tendency for false post-event misinformation to become integrated into people’s memory of an event.

Misinformation effect

The tendency for false post-event misinformation to become integrated into people’s memory of an event.

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FIGURE 15.3 Biasing eyewitness reports with loaded questions Participants viewed a film of a traffic accident and then answered this question: ‘About how fast were these cars going when they (hit, smashed, or contacted) each other?’ As shown, the wording of the question influenced speed estimates (top). One week later, it also caused participants to reconstruct their memory of other aspects of the accident (bottom). Question About how fast were the cars going when they _____ each other?

Original information

Verb

Estimated Speed

Smashed

65

Hit

55

Contacted

50

External information

The 'memory'

About how fast were the cars going when they SMASHED into each other? Source: Loftus, G. R., and Loftus, E. F., Human memory: The processing of information. Copyright © 1976.

This misinformation effect has aroused a great deal of controversy. It is clear that eyewitnesses can be compromised when exposed to post-event information, such as when they are told that either the person they identified or someone else had confessed during an interrogation (Hasel & Kassin, 2009). But does this information actually alter a witness’s real memory so that it can never be retrieved again? Or do participants merely follow the experimenter’s suggestion, leaving their true memory intact for retrieval under other conditions? Either way, whether memory is truly altered or not, it is clear that eyewitness reports are hopelessly biased by post-event information, and that this effect can be dramatic (Paterson, Kemp, & McIntyre 2012). In one laboratory study, Craig Stark and colleagues (2010) showed participants a series of slides showing a man stealing a woman’s wallet and tucking it into his jacket pocket. These same participants then heard a recorded account of the event that was accurate or misinformed them that the man hid the wallet in his pants pocket. All were later tested about the details of the event while placed within an MRI scanner. Sure enough, a substantial number of misinformation participants incorrectly recalled that the thief put the wallet in his pants, not his jacket, and said that they remembered that detail from the photographs. Interestingly, the neuroimaging data from the MRI scans showed that the true memories – those based on the slides – were accompanied by more activation of the visual cortex of the brain, while false memories – those based on the audio recording – were accompanied by more activation in the auditory cortex.

Children as witnesses This phenomenon raises an additional, potentially troubling question. If adults can be misled by post-event information, what about young children? In 1988, Margaret Kelly Michaels, a 26-year-old preschool teacher, was found guilty of 115 counts of sex abuse committed at the Wee Care Nursery School in the US state of New Jersey. The charges against her were shocking. For a period of more than seven months, the jury was told, she danced nude in the classroom, stripped the children, licked peanut butter off their genitals, and raped them with knives, forks, spoons and Lego blocks (Possley, 2012). Were the children’s stories accurate? On the one hand, there were some striking consistencies in the testimonies of 19 child witnesses. On the other hand, the social workers and investigators who conducted the interviews often prompted the children with suggestive, leading questions, told them that Michaels was a bad person, urged them to describe acts they had initially denied, offered bribes for disclosures and pressured those who claimed ignorance. Except for this testimony, there was no physical evidence

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of abuse and no other witnesses, even though the acts were supposed to have occurred during school hours in an open classroom. Michaels was found guilty and sentenced to 47 years in prison. After serving 5 of those years, she was released when the state appeals court overturned the conviction on the ground that the children’s testimony could not be trusted. ‘One day you’re getting ready for work and making coffee, minding your business’, said Michaels, ‘and the next minute you are an accused child molester’ (ABC News USA, 2006). Can suggestive interview procedures cause young children to confuse appearance and reality? Over the years, thousands of sex abuse charges have been filed against babysitters, preschool teachers and family members. Rekindling images of the Salem witch trials of the seventeenth century, some of these suspects were falsely accused of participating in satanic cults (Bottoms & Davis, 1997). In light of these events, judges struggled to decide: were preschoolers competent to take the witness stand, or were they too suggestible – too prone to confuse reality and fantasy? To provide guidance to the courts, researchers have studied the factors that influence children’s eyewitness memory (Brown & Lamb, 2015; Bruck & Ceci, 1999). This research has evolved through several stages. At first, simple laboratory experiments showed that preschoolers were more likely than older children and adults to incorporate misleading ‘trick’ questions into their memories for simple stories (Ceci, Ross, & Toglia, 1987). Other studies showed that interviewers could get young children to change their memories (or at least their answers) simply by repeating a question over and over – a behaviour that implies that the answer given is not good enough (Poole & White, 1991). But are young children similarly suggestible about stressful real-life experiences? In one study, Michelle Leichtman and Stephen Ceci (1995) told preschool children about a clumsy man named Sam Stone who always broke things. A month later, a man visited the school, spent time in the classroom and left. The next day, the children were shown a ripped book and a soiled teddy bear and asked what had happened. Reasonably, no one said that they saw Stone cause the damage. But then, over the next 10 weeks, they were asked suggestive questions (‘I wonder if Sam Stone was wearing long pants or short pants when he ripped the book?’). The result? When a new interviewer asked the children in the class to tell what happened, 72% of the three- and four-year-olds blamed Stone for the damage and 45% said they saw him do it. One child ‘recalled’ that Stone took a paintbrush and painted melted chocolate on the bear. Others ‘saw’ him spill coffee, throw toys in the air, rip the book in anger and soak the book in warm water until it fell apart. It is important to realise that false memories in children are not necessarily a by-product of bad questioning procedures. Even when interviews are fair and neutral, false reports can stem from young children’s exposure to misinformation from such outside sources as television (Principe, Ornstein, BakerWard, & Gordon, 2000), parents (Poole & Lindsay, 2001), and classmates (Principe & Ceci, 2002), and the use of anatomical dolls and diagrams as props that interviewers sometimes use to get children to demonstrate how they were touched (Poole, Bruck, & Pipe, 2011). To summarise, research shows that repetition, misinformation and leading questions can bias a child’s memory report and that preschoolers are particularly vulnerable in this regard. The effects can be dramatic. In dozens of studies, these kinds of procedures have led children to falsely report that they were touched, hit, kissed and hugged; that a thief came into their classroom; that something ‘yucky’ was put into their mouth; and even that a doctor had cut a bone from their nose to stop it from bleeding. Somehow, the courts must distinguish between true and false claims – and do so on a case-by-case basis. To assist in this endeavour, researchers have proposed that clear interviewing guidelines be set so that future child witnesses will be questioned in an objective, non-biasing manner (Brown & Lamb, 2015).

Identifying the culprit For eyewitnesses, testifying is only the last in a series of efforts to retrieve what they saw from memory. Before witnesses reach the courtroom, they are questioned by police and lawyers, view a line-up or mug shots, and even assist in the construction of a facial composite or an artist’s sketch of the perpetrator. Yet each of these experiences increases the risk of error and distortion.

Facial composites Imagine trying to reconstruct a culprit’s face by selecting a set of eyes, a nose, a mouth and a hairstyle from vast collections of features and then combining them into a composite of the face. Research shows that this process seldom produces a face that resembles the actual culprit (Kovera, Penrod, Pappas, & Thill, 1997). To further complicate matters, the face construction process itself may confuse witnesses, making it more difficult for them later to identify the culprit. In one study, for example, participants were asked to select

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from six pictures a person’s face they had seen two days earlier, and 60% accurately identified the target. When they first tried to reconstruct the face using a computerised facial composite program, however, their identification accuracy dropped to 18% (Wells, Charman, & Olson, 2005).

Line-ups Nothing an eyewitness does has greater impact than making an identification from a photographic or live line-up. Once police have made an arrest, they often call on their witnesses to view a line-up that includes the suspect and several other individuals. Generally, in Australia, larger line-ups are preferred. For example, police in New South Wales are instructed to conduct line-ups with at least eight but preferably 20 or more individuals (New South Wales Police Force, 1998).This procedure may take place within days of a crime or months later. Either way, the line-up often results in tragic cases of mistaken identity. Through the application of eyewitness research findings, this risk can be reduced (Cutler, 2013; Wells, Yang, & Smalarz, 2015). Five factors can affect identification performance at this stage: line-up construction, instructions, format, familiarity and administration.

Line-up construction To be fair, a line-up should contain at least four to eight innocent people, or ‘foils’, who match the witness’s general description of the culprit. If the witness describes seeing a white male in his twenties with curly hair, for example, foils should not be included that are old, non-white and bald. Also, anything that makes a suspect distinctive compared with the others in the line-up increases his or her chance of being selected (Buckhout, 1974). In one experiment, for example, ‘innocent suspects’ were more likely to get identified from a photographic line-up when their picture depicted an angry expression, and when the foils in the lineup did not also depict angry expressions (Flowe, Klatt, & Colloff, 2014).

Line-up instructions Line-up instructions to the witness are very important. In a study by Roy Malpass and Patricia Devine (1981), students saw a staged act of vandalism, after which they attended a line-up. Half of the students received ‘biased’ instructions: they were led to believe that the culprit was in the line-up. The others were told that he might or might not be present. Line-ups were then presented either with or without the culprit. When the students received biased instructions, they felt compelled to identify someone and often picked an innocent person (see Table 15.1). Additional studies have both confirmed and qualified this basic result – when the criminal is present in the line-up, biased instructions are not problematic. When the criminal is not in the lineup, however – which occurs whenever the police suspect is innocent – biased instructions substantially increase the rate of mistaken identifications (Brewer & Wells, 2006; Clark, 2005). The case of Steve Titus, who was mistakenly accused of rape, is a case in point. The police told the victim to pick her assailant from a group of six. After studying the pictures for several minutes and shaking her head in confusion, she was urged to concentrate and make a choice. ‘This one is the closest’, she said. ‘It has to be this one’ (Loftus & Ketcham, 1991, p. 38).

TABLE 15.1 Effects of line-up and instructions on false identifications After witnessing a crime, participants were told either that the culprit was in the line-up (biased instruction) or that he might or might not be in the line-up (unbiased instruction). Participants then viewed a line-up in which the real culprit was present or absent. Notice the percentage of participants in each group who identified an innocent person. Those who received the biased instruction were more likely to make a false identification, picking an innocent person rather than no one at all, especially when the real culprit was not in the line-up.

Percentage of false identifications Experimental task

Unbiased instructions

Biased instructions

Culprit present

0

25

Culprit absent

33

78

Source: Based on Malpass, R., & Devine, P., Eyewitness identification: Lineup instructions and the absence of the offender, Journal of Applied Psychology, 66, 482–489. Copyright © 1981 by the American Psychological Association.

Line-up format The format of a line-up also influences whether a witness feels compelled to make a selection. When witnesses are presented with a simultaneous spread of all photographs, they tend to make relative, 634

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multiple-choice-like judgements, comparing the different alternatives and picking the one who looks most like the criminal. This strategy increases the tendency to make a false identification. Psychological research indicates that the solution to this problem is to present the same photos to a witness in a sequential lineup (one picture at a time); the theory behind this is that witnesses tend to make absolute judgements by comparing each target person with their memory of the criminal. This situation diminishes the risk of a forced and often false identification of an innocent suspect (Lindsay, Lea, & Fulford, 1991; Lindsay & Wells, 1985; Wells, Steblay, & Dysart, 2015). There have been concerns about the adoption of the sequential line-up technique (Amendola & Wixted, 2014; Lindsay, Mansour, Beaudry, Leach, & Bertrand, 2011; Wixted, Mickes, Dunn, Clark, & Wells, 2016). Compared to simultaneous line-ups, sequential line-ups raise the response criterion, which causes witnesses to be more conservative with their answers and makes them less likely to identify any one person out of a line-up (Lindsay et al., 2011). In the case of sequential line-ups, clear and effective instructions must be given to a witness in order to increase correct identifications (Wixted et al., 2016). But overall, the results are clear. In a meta-analysis of 72 comparisons of simultaneous and sequential line-ups involving more than 13 000 mock witnesses, identifications were more accurate when the photos were presented in a sequential format (Steblay, Dysart, & Wells, 2011).

Line-up familiarity The fourth factor is perhaps the most subtle because it pertains to familiarity-induced biases. Research shows that people often remember a face but not the circumstances in which they saw that face. In one study, for example, participants witnessed a staged crime and then looked through mug shots. A few days later, they were asked to view a line-up. The result was startling – participants were just as likely to identify an innocent person whose picture was in the mug shots as they were to pick the actual criminal (Brown, Deffenbacher, & Sturgill, 1977). Many different studies have shown that witnesses will often identify someone from a line-up that they had seen in another context, including innocent bystanders who also happened to be at the crime scene (Deffenbacher, Bornstein, & Penrod, 2006).

Line-up administration The fifth potential influence can be traced to the police officer who administers the line-up – typically a line-up that contains a suspect and some innocent foils. Can a line-up administrator inadvertently steer a witness’s identification decision, most likely to the suspect, who may or may not be the culprit? In a study that specifically addressed this question, Sarah Greathouse and Margaret Kovera (2009) paired student ‘witnesses’ to a staged theft with student ‘police’ who were trained how to administer a simultaneous or sequential photo line-up using either biased or unbiased instructions. In these line-ups, a picture of the actual culprit was either present or absent. Half the administrators were informed of who the police suspect was in the line-up; the other half were blind as to the suspect’s identity. The results showed that under relatively biasing conditions (simultaneous photo spreads and biased instructions), witnesses made more suspect identifications – even when the suspect was truly innocent – when the administrator was informed rather than blind. Videotapes of the sessions showed that the informed administrators unwittingly increased identification rates by telling witnesses to look carefully, by asking them to look again when they failed to make a selection, and in some cases by letting on that they knew who the suspect was. Other studies have also shown that comments made by a line-up administrator can influence eyewitness identification decisions (Clark, Marshall, & Rosenthal, 2009). This research strongly supports a point of reform that eyewitness researchers have long advocated – the use of a ‘double-blind’ procedure in which neither the suspect nor the police administrator know who the suspect is within the line-up. In Australia, courts offer strong direction to juries in court about the potential dangers of eyewitness identifications (Weathered, 2003), but stop short of prescribing identification instructions for police to follow. The Australian Law Reform Commission (1975) noted that rather than attempting to provide an exhaustive list of procedures that police should or should not follow, basic guidelines for line-up procedures are outlined in legislation, and the details are left up to police agencies’ standing orders. An important role of the trial is to test the quality of the eyewitness (and other) evidence produced by the Crown, according to the best judgement of jurors.

Testifying in court Eyewitnesses can be inaccurate, but that is only part of the problem. The other part is that their testimony is not easy to evaluate. To examine how juries view eyewitness testimony, Gary Wells, Rod Lindsay and

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The more confident an eyewitness is about an identification, the more accurate he or she is likely to be.

FALSE

colleagues conducted a series of early experiments in which they staged the theft of a calculator in the presence of unsuspecting research participants, who were later cross-examined after trying to pick the culprit from a photo spread. Other participants, who served as mock jurors, observed the questioning and judged the witnesses. The results were sobering. Jurors overestimated how accurate the eyewitnesses were and could not distinguish between witnesses whose identifications were correct and those whose identifications were incorrect (Lindsay, Wells & Rumpel, 1981; Wells, Lindsay & Ferguson, 1979). There appear to be two problems. First, people do not know about many aspects of human perception and memory through common sense. Brian Cutler and colleagues (1988) found that mock jurors were not sensitive enough to the effects of line-up instructions, weapon focus and certain other aspects of an eyewitness situation, such as the own-race bias, in evaluating the testimony of an eyewitness. People are knowledgeable about some factors but not others (Desmarais & Read, 2011). The second problem is that people tend to base their judgements of an eyewitness largely on how confident that witness is, a factor that is only modestly predictive of accuracy. This statement may seem surprising, but studies have shown that the witness who declares ‘I am absolutely certain’ is not necessarily more likely to be right than the one who appears less certain (Penrod & Cutler, 1995; Sporer, Penrod, Read, & Cutler, 1995; Wells & Murray, 1984). Why are eyewitness confidence and accuracy not more highly related? The reason is that confidence levels can be raised and lowered by factors that do not have an impact on identification accuracy. To demonstrate, Luus and Wells (1994) staged a theft in front of pairs of participants and then had each separately identify the culprit from a photographic line-up. After the participants made their identifications, the experimenters led them to believe that their partner, a co-witness, either had picked the same person, a similar-looking different person or a dissimilar-looking different person – or had said that the thief was not in the line-up. Participants were then questioned by a police officer who asked, ‘On a scale from 1 to 10, how confident are you in your identification?’ The result? Participants became more confident when told that a co-witness picked the same person or a dissimilar alternative, and less confident when told that the co-witness picked a similar alternative or none at all. Other studies have also demonstrated that eyewitnesses are influenced in this way by the reports of co-witnesses (Gabbert, Memon, & Allan, 2003; Skagerberg, 2007). A witness’s confidence is not all that can be affected by extraneous information. Gary Wells and Amy Bradfield (1998) found that eyewitnesses who received positive feedback about their false identifications went on to reconstruct their memory of other aspects of the eyewitnessing experience. In a series of studies, they showed participants a security camera videotape of a man who shot a guard, followed by a set of photographs that did not contain the actual gunman (in other words, all identifications made were false). The experimenter then said to some witnesses, but not to others, ‘Oh good. You identified the actual murder suspect’. When witnesses were later asked about the whole experience, those given the confirming feedback ‘recalled’ that they had paid more attention to the event, had a better view of the culprit, and found it easier to make the identification. They were also more willing to testify in court (see Figure 15.4). Subsequent research has confirmed this finding – positive feedback inflates a witness’s confidence and alters his or her account of the eyewitnessing experience (Steblay, Wells, & Douglas, 2014). Clearly, an eyewitness’s account of the entire experience can be altered by feedback, and this makes confidence even less predictive of accuracy (Bradfield, Wells, & Olson, 2002; Smalarz & Wells, 2014; Steblay et al., 2014). To make matters worse, research now shows that eyewitnesses who have been tainted by extraneous information are not fully aware of that influence (Charman & Wells, 2008). Also, the witness whose confidence is artificially inflated is more likely to be believed by jurors – even when that witness has identified an innocent person (Beaudry et al., 2015).

Improving eyewitness justice Having described the problems with information obtained from eyewitnesses, social psychologists are in a position to put their knowledge to use in two important ways: (1) by educating judges and juries about the science so they can better evaluate eyewitnesses who testify in court, and (2) by making eyewitness identification evidence itself more accurate. To educate juries, psychologists sometimes testify as eyewitness experts at trial. Just like medical doctors who testify about a patient’s physical condition, economists who testify on monopolies and architectural engineers who testify on the structural integrity of buildings, psychologists are often called by a party to inform the trial jury about relevant aspects of human perception, memory and behaviour (Cutler & Kovera, 2011). 636

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FIGURE 15.4 The biasing effects of post-identification feedback Participants saw a gunman on videotape and then tried to make an identification from a set of photographs in which he was absent. Afterward, the experimenter gave some witnesses confirming feedback about their selection. As shown, those given the confirming feedback later recalled that they had paid more attention to the event, had a better view of it, could make out details of the culprit’s face, and found it easier to make the identification. They were also more willing to testify in court.

Ratings of witnessing experience

7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Attention

View

Confirming feedback

Details

Ease

Testify

No feedback

Source: Wells, G. L., & Bradfield, A. L. (1998). ‘Good, you identified the suspect’: Feedback to eyewitnesses distorts their reports of the witnessing experience. Journal of Applied Psychology, 83, 360–376.

What, specifically, do these experts say to the jury? What findings do they present in court? Several years ago, researchers surveyed 64 eyewitness experts, many of whose studies are described in this chapter. The principles listed in Table 15.2 were seen by the vast majority of respondents as highly reliable and worthy TABLE 15.2 What eyewitness experts say in court Presented with a list of eyewitness factors, 64 experts were asked what research findings were strong enough to present in court. In order of how much support they elicited, the following are among the most highly regarded topics of expert testimony.

Eyewitness factor

Statement

Wording of questions

An eyewitness’s testimony about an event can be affected by how the questions put to the witness are worded.

Line-up instructions

Police instructions can affect an eyewitness’s willingness to make an identification.

Mug shot-induced bias

Exposure to mug shots of a suspect increases the likelihood that the witness will later choose that suspect in a line-up.

Confidence malleability

An eyewitness’s confidence can be influenced by factors that are unrelated to the accuracy of an identification.

Post-event information

Eyewitness testimony about an event often reflects not only what the witness actually saw but also information he or she obtained later on.

Child suggestibility

Young children are more vulnerable than adults to interviewer suggestion, peer pressures and other social influences.

Alcoholic intoxication

Alcoholic intoxication impairs an eyewitness’s later ability to recall individuals and events.

Cross-race bias

Eyewitnesses are more accurate at identifying members of their own race than they are at identifying members of other races.

Weapon focus

The presence of a weapon impairs an eyewitness’s ability to accurately identify the perpetrator’s face.

Accuracy confidence

An eyewitness’s confidence is not a good predictor of the accuracy of his or her identification.

Source: Kassin, S. M., Tubb, V. A., Hosch, H. M., & Memon, A. (2001). On the ‘general acceptance’ of eyewitness testimony research: A new survey of the experts. American Psychologist, Copyright © 2001 by the American Psychological Association. Reprinted by permission.

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of expert testimony (Kassin, Tubb, Hosch, & Memon, 2001). Does the jury need to be informed? On some matters, yes. Research shows that there are certain aspects of the psychology of eyewitness testimony (e.g., the fact that line-up instructions and presentation format can affect whether eyewitnesses will identify an innocent person) that the average person does not already know as a matter of common sense (Desmarais & Read, 2011). This selective lack of knowledge is not limited to lay people. Surveys show that, compared with experts, court personnel such as judges, prosecutors and defence lawyers also lack awareness of many of the factors described in this chapter that influence eyewitness memory (Benton et al., 2005; Wise & Safer, 2004; Magnussen et al., 2008). In recent years, psychologists have also helped to improve upon the accuracy of eyewitness identifications. Eyewitness researchers have replicated their laboratory experiments in police departments; they have testified not only in trials but in legislatures and criminal justice commissions; they have appeared in news shows; they have submitted briefs to courts; and they have inspired a wave of reforms – all designed to improve the procedures that are used in getting line-up identifications from eyewitnesses. At present, for example, a growing number of police departments around the world require the use of double-blind lineups, unbiased instructions, sequential presentation formats and the immediate assessment of a witness’s confidence without any post-identification feedback provided to the witness.

CRITICAL THINKING ACTIVITY Eyewitness researchers strive to create conditions in a laboratory that mimic those experienced by real eyewitnesses. Think about the experience of real eyewitnesses to a crime – they may experience trauma or fear for their lives, or react to the crime in ways they would not predict (e.g., attempting to intervene or fleeing the scene).

What are the ethical issues associated with recreating these conditions in a laboratory in order to obtain valid results that can be generalised to real eyewitnesses to a crime? Imagine that you are an eyewitness researcher. How would you go about designing your study to make it both realistic and ethical?

CONFESSIONS In 1963, 19-year-old Western Australian resident John Button was charged with the murder of his 17-yearold girlfriend, Rosemary Anderson. While being interviewed by police, Button falsely confessed to running Anderson down in his car. In fact, Button had found Anderson lying injured by the side of the road, and raced her to the doctor in an attempt to save her life. During the trial, Button’s defence counsel attempted to exclude the confession, but it was ruled admissible and played a significant role in his conviction for manslaughter (Weathered, 2003). Button served 5 years of a 10-year sentence in prison, before being paroled. In 2002, the Western Australian Court of Criminal Appeal quashed Button’s conviction, finding that forensic evidence was consistent with the confession of another man, Eric Cooke, to the hit-and-run murder of Rosemary Anderson. In a similar miscarriage of justice in the US in 1989, five boys aged 14–16 years were found guilty of a monstrous assault and rape of a female jogger in New York’s Central Park after they confessed (four of them did so on videotape) in vivid detail. Thirteen years later, a serial rapist named Matias Reyes stepped forward from prison to admit that he alone, not the boys, had committed the crime. As part of a thorough investigation of Reyes’s claim, the district attorney DNA-tested the semen from the crime scene and found that it was a match – Reyes was the rapist. The five boys, now men, were innocent. Their confessions were false, and the convictions were vacated (Burns, 2011).

Suspect interviews and lie detection Sometimes police identify a suspect for interrogation by talking to witnesses and informants, obtaining physical evidence from the crime scene, and other methods of investigation. Sometimes, however, police decide to interview a particular person based solely on a personal judgement they make by conducting a special pre-interrogation interview that exposes deception. Criminal Interrogations and Confessions is a manual on interrogation first published in 1962 and now in its fifth edition. The manual outlines the ‘Reid Technique of Interrogation’ (discussed later in the chapter), the most common interrogation training program offered to North American police officers (Pozzulo, Bennell, & Forth, 2009). In this manual, Inbau and colleagues (2013) have proposed a process by which police can distinguish truths from lies when using the Reid Technique. Police are advised to ask certain non-accusatory questions and then to observe changes in the suspect’s verbal and non-verbal behaviour, looking, for example, at eye contact, pauses, posture and fidgety movements, to determine whether an individual is telling the truth or lying.

638

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CULTURAL DIVERSITY SUSPECT INTERVIEWS: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LIE DETECTION While many studies demonstrate that people are generally poor at detecting lies, recent research has shown that people are even poorer at detecting lies when interacting with people who are speaking in their second language. Amy Leach and Cayla Da Silva (2013) had targets in their study either lie or tell the

truth about an event, in either their first or second language. Participants then had to judge whether the target was being truthful or deceptive. Participants were better able to detect deception in native language speakers than in second language speakers. They also tended to believe more often that the native language speakers were being truthful.

For a person who is under suspicion, a police officer’s judgement at this stage is crucial because it can determine whether a suspect is judged deceptive and interrogated, or presumed innocent and sent home. In theory, this approach makes sense. As described in Chapter 3 on social perception, however, research has consistently shown that most of the verbal and non-verbal demeanour cues that are suggested do not discriminate at high levels of accuracy between truth-telling and deception (DePaulo et al., 2003; Hartwig & Bond, 2011). At present, it appears that laypeople are only 54% accurate; that training produces little if any improvement; and that police officers, judges, psychiatrists, customs inspectors and other ‘professionals’ tend to perform only slightly better, if at all (Meissner & Kassin, 2002; Vrij, 2008). That people are notoriously inept at making accurate judgements of truth and deception can be seen every day; which is why Ponzi scheme perpetrators like David Hobbs (a New Zealander who operated a Ponzi scheme worth more than $30 million in New South Wales) can fool even affluent and intelligent clientele (Australian Securities and Investments Commission, 2013). So, are there more accurate means of lie detection? Police over the years have used a polygraph, or what most of us would call a lie-detector test, in part to improve performance. A polygraph is an electronic instrument that simultaneously records multiple channels of physiological arousal. The signals are picked up by sensors attached to different parts of the body. For example, rubber tubes are strapped around a suspect’s torso to measure breathing, bloodpressure cuffs are wrapped around the upper arm to measure pulse rate, and electrodes are placed on the fingertips to record sweat-gland activity, or perspiration. These signals are then boosted by amplifiers and converted into a visual display. The polygraph is used to detect deception on the assumption that when people lie, they become anxious and physiologically aroused in ways that can be measured. The test is conducted by first convincing a suspect that the polygraph works and establishing his or her baseline level of arousal. The examiner then asks a series of yes–no questions and compares how the suspect reacts to emotionally arousing crime-relevant questions (‘Did you steal the money?’) and control questions that are arousing but not relevant to the crime (‘Did you take anything that did not belong to you when you were younger?’). In theory, suspects who are innocent (whose denials are truthful) should be more aroused by the control questions, while guilty suspects (whose denials are false) should be more aroused by the crimerelevant questions. Does the lie-detector test really work? Many laypeople think of it as foolproof, but scientific opinion is split. Some researchers report accuracy rates of up to 80% to 90%, while others believe that such claims are exaggerated. One well-documented problem is that truthful individuals too often fail the test. A second problem is that people who understand the test can fake the results. Studies show that you can beat the polygraph by tensing your muscles, squeezing your toes or using other physical countermeasures while answering the control questions. By artificially inflating the responses to ‘innocent’ questions, one can mask the stress that is aroused by lying on the crime-relevant questions (for a comprehensive overview of research, see Honts, Raskin, & Kircher, 2002).

Polygraph

A mechanical instrument that records physiological arousal from multiple channels; it is often used as a liedetector test.

CRITICAL THINKING ACTIVITY While it might be called a ‘lie detector’, the polygraph does not really measure ‘lies’ at all. Instead, it measures autonomic nervous system arousal – shallow breathing, increased heart rate, sweating etc. The rationale behind the polygraph is that, when people lie, they become anxious, and when people are anxious, their autonomic nervous system

is aroused. While we know that particular physiological responses are related to anxiety, what else might these physiological responses be related to? Think about other emotional states that may produce shallow breathing, increased heart rate or sweaty palms. Why might this present a problem for the ‘lie detector’?

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It is not possible to knowingly fool a liedetector test.

FALSE

What, then, are we to conclude? The US National Research Council (2003) has concluded that there is no simple answer. Under certain conditions – for example, when the suspect is naive and the examiner is competent – it is possible for the polygraph to detect truth and deception at fairly high levels of accuracy. Still, the problems identified by research (e.g., large uncertainties in the accuracy of polygraph results; Rigdon, 2018) are hard to overcome, hence its use in the criminal justice system has been limited, with Australian courts generally refusing to admit polygraph test results into evidence (e.g., Mallard v. The Queen [2003]; R v. Murray [1981]; Freckelton, 2003). Seeking alternatives, researchers are trying to develop tests that distinguish between truth and deception, including: • a modified polygraph test that asks different types of questions (Ben-Shakhar & Elaad, 2003) • measurement of involuntary electrical activity in the brain (Meixner & Rosenfeld, 2014) • pupil dilation when the person being tested is asked to lie, which requires more cognitive effort than telling the truth (Dionisio, Granholm, Hillix, & Perrine, 2001) • Implicit Association Test, or IAT, which shows that people are quicker to respond to true statements than to false statements (Sartori, Agosta, Zogmaister, Ferrara, & Castiello, 2008) • fMRI to measure blood oxygen levels in areas of the brain that are associated with deception (Bhatt et al., 2009; Kozel et al., 2005) • functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS) to measure the neuronal changes that occur during the process of deception (Bhutta, Hong, Kim, & Hong, 2015) • thermal imaging cameras in airports to detect lying through rises in skin temperature (Warmelink et al., 2011). Especially in light of the need for intelligence gathering from terrorism suspects, prisoners of war, witnesses and informants, researchers are also working to improve the quality of the interviewing methods used in the field (Granhag, Vrij, & Meissner, 2014).

Police interrogations As the events of the Central Park jogger case unfolded (discussed previously), questions mounted. Why would five boys – or anyone else, for that matter – confess to a crime they did not commit? In general, what social influences are brought to bear on suspects interrogated by police? Many years ago, police detectives all over the world would use brute force to get confessions. Among the commonly used coercive methods were prolonged confinement and isolation; explicit threats; deprivation of sleep, food and other needs; extreme sensory discomfort, such as shining a bright, blinding strobe light on a suspect’s face; and assorted forms of physical violence, for example, forcing suspects to stand for hours at a time or beating them with a rubber hose, which seldom left visible marks. Today, police in many countries around the world are required to warn suspects of their rights while in custody and under questioning, and the tactics they use are more psychological in nature. This is particularly true in North America, where the Reid Technique is widely used. Under this technique, once police have identified a suspect they believe to be lying, they are advised to conduct a specific process of interrogation. This process begins when police put a suspect alone (with no friends or family present) into a small, bare, FIGURE 15.5 The nine steps of interrogation soundproof room – a physical environment that is designed to arouse feelings of social isolation and discomfort. Next, they 1 Confront the suspect with assertions of his or her guilt. present a vivid nine-step procedure designed to get suspects to 2 Develop ‘themes’ that appear to justify or excuse the crime. confess (see Figure 15.5). Once a suspect is isolated, this method of interrogation 3 Interrupt all statements of innocence and denial. instructs the interrogating officer to employ two parallel 4 Overcome all of the suspect’s objections to the charges. approaches. One approach is to pressure the suspect into submission by expressing certainty in his or her guilt and even, 5 Keep the increasingly passive suspect from tuning out. at times, claiming falsely to have damaging evidence such as 6 Show sympathy and understanding and urge the suspect to tell all. fingerprints or an eyewitness. In this way, the accused is led to 7 Offer the suspect a face-saving explanation for his or her guilty action. believe that it is futile to continue in his or her denials. The second approach is to befriend the suspect, offer sympathy and friendly 8 Get the suspect to recount the details of the crime. advice, and ‘minimise’ the offence by offering face-saving excuses 9 Convert that statement into a full written confession. or blaming the victim. Under stress, feeling trapped, lulled into a false sense of security and led to expect leniency, many suspects Source: Inbau, F. E., Reid, J. E., Buckley, J. P., & Jayne, B. C. (2001). Criminal interrogation and confessions (4th ed.). Gaithersburg, MD: Aspen. agree to give a confession. This approach is carefully designed to 640

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increase the anxiety associated with denial and reduce the anxiety associated with confession. It may sound like the interrogation process springs from a Law & Order television script, but in real life these tactics are routinely used throughout North America. It should be noted that use of the Reid Technique is widespread, but only within particular jurisdictions (e.g., across the US and Canada). In other jurisdictions (e.g., Australia and the UK), it is not used because techniques advocated by the authors of the Reid Technique, such as claiming falsely to have damaging evidence, are not allowed in those jurisdictions.

Social psychological issues of the Reid Technique In an observational study of 182 live and videotaped interrogations in the US, Richard Leo (1996) found that detectives used an average of five to six tactics per suspect. In a survey of 631 police investigators in North America, Kassin and colleagues (2007) found that the most common reported tactics were to physically isolate suspects, identify contradictions in their accounts, establish rapport, confront them with evidence of their guilt, appeal to their self-interest, and offer sympathy and moral justification. Whatever specific methods are used, it is clear that being accused and pointedly questioned about a crime is a very stressful experience. In one study, participants who were accused of cheating on a laboratory task, compared with those who were not accused, were less able to process the rights they were given to remain silent and to have a lawyer present (Scherr & Madon, 2013). It is also now clear that physically painful methods of persuasion, often referred to as ‘enhanced interrogation’ techniques, have been used in recent years to interrogate suspected terrorists (McKelvey, 2007; O’Mara, 2009).

False confessions It could be argued that the use of trickery and deception does not pose a serious problem because only perpetrators confess – innocent people never confess to crimes they did not commit. This assumption, however, is incorrect. As hard as it is to believe, a number of chilling cases of false confessions are on record. Illustrating the point are the two cases already discussed in this chapter: John Button of Western Australia, who was convicted of the 1963 manslaughter of his girlfriend; and the Central Park jogger case, in which five false confessions to a rape were taken. In fact, research shows that as of July 2017, false confessions were present in 28% of all cases in the US Innocence Project, in which prisoners who were convicted of serious crimes were later proven innocent by DNA evidence (Kassin, 2017). Importantly, too, this sample represents just the tip of an iceberg. Although most case studies are based in the US and the UK, proven false confessions have been documented in countries all over the world, including Canada, Norway, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, the Netherlands, Australia, New Zealand, China and Japan (Kassin et al., 2010). It seems unimaginable. Why would an innocent person ever confess to a crime he or she did not commit? There are two reasons: compliance and internalisation. Additionally, tactics can be used to cause innocent people to confess, including the use of false evidence, the promise of leniency, and accusatorial interrogation.

Compliance Sometimes innocent people under police interrogation agree to confess as an act of mere compliance; that is, to escape a very stressful situation. Applying basic psychology, Stephanie Madon and colleagues (2012) point out that human beings in general are influenced more by rewards and punishments that are immediate (now) than by those that are delayed (later). They demonstrated that participants were more likely to admit to various transgressions (e.g., buying alcohol while they were underage, driving without a licence, illegally downloading music, shoplifting or taking credit for someone else’s idea) when doing so was in their immediate interest and the negative consequence would come later. People are particularly short-sighted when they are tired, stressed or otherwise in need. For a suspect under intense scrutiny and interrogation, stopping the process through confession may feel so urgent that he or she does not fully consider the future consequence of doing so. Furthermore, Hazelwood and Bergess (2016) showed that promises involving immunity or leniency or threats implying punishment or harm increased the likelihood of a false confession. In real life, the process of interrogation can be so stressful that the short-term benefit of confession outweighs the long-term benefit of denial. The experiences of the Central Park jogger boys illustrate the point. All had been in custody and interrogated overnight, relentlessly, for several hours, before giving their confessions. Such long periods of time bring fatigue, despair and a deprivation of sleep and other need states. The police and suspects disagree about what happened during these unrecorded hours so it is not possible to know for sure. In all cases, however, the defendants claimed that they felt threatened and uncertain as to what would happen if they refused to confess. In all cases, the defendants who confessed then tried to withdraw their confessions as soon as the pressure of interrogation had passed. Copyright 2020 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-202

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Internalisation In contrast to instances in which innocent people confess as an act of compliance, or obedience to authority, sometimes the process of interrogation can cause innocent people to confess because they come to believe that they are guilty of the crime. In these instances, the false confession illustrates a strong form of social influence known as internalisation. These cases are rare, but this process was evident in the story of three men and three women in the US state of Nebraska. In 1989, they were convicted of the murder of a 68-yearold woman. Five of them pleaded guilty, and four gave vividly detailed confessions to police as a result of intense interrogations. Twenty years later, all six defendants were pardoned after DNA testing cleared them and identified the actual culprit. After a reinvestigation, the Nebraska Attorney General’s Office concluded that despite all the confessions, these individuals were innocent ‘beyond all doubt’. Yet, remarkably, all of them had come to internalise the erroneous belief in their own guilt. One woman stood by her statement until just before she was pardoned, at which point she said, ‘I guess I was brainwashed’ (Hammel, 2008).

False evidence Is it really possible to get people to confess to an act they did not commit? Based on the events of actual cases, Kassin and Kiechel (1996) theorised that two factors can increase this risk: (1) a suspect who lacks a clear memory of the event in question, and (2) the presentation of false evidence. To test this hypothesis, they recruited pairs of university students to work on a fast- or slow-paced computer task. At one point, the computer crashed and students were accused of having caused the damage by pressing a key they had been specifically instructed to avoid. All students were truly innocent and denied the charge. In half the sessions, however, the second student (who was really a confederate) said that she had seen the student hit the forbidden key. Demonstrating the process of compliance, many students confronted by this false witness agreed to sign a confession handwritten by the experimenter. Further demonstrating the process of internalisation, some students later ‘admitted’ guilt to a stranger (also a confederate) after the study was supposedly over and the two were alone. In short, innocent people who are vulnerable to suggestion can be induced to confess and to internalise guilt by the presentation of false evidence (see Table 15.3). This finding has been replicated in a number of experiments (Horselenberg, Merckelbach, & Josephs, 2003; Nash & Wade, 2009; Perillo & Kassin, 2011). TABLE 15.3 Factors that produce false confessions As participants worked on a fast- or slow-paced task, the computer crashed, and they were accused of causing the damage. A confederate then said that she had or had not seen the participants hit the forbidden key. As shown, many participants signed a confession (compliance), and some even ‘admitted’ their guilt in private to another confederate (internalisation). Despite their innocence, many participants in the fast-false witness condition confessed on both measures.

Control Compliance Internalisation

False witness

Slow

Fast

Slow

Fast

35%

65%

89%

100%

0%

12%

44%

65%

Source: Based on Kassin, S. M., & Kiechel, K. L. (1996). The social psychology of false confessions: compliance, internalization, and confabulation. Psychological Science, 7(3), 127, Table 1.

Leniency Another tactic that can cause innocent people to confess is an offer of leniency. Melissa Russano and colleagues (2005) asked participants to solve a series of problems, sometimes alone and sometimes with a fellow participant (who was actually a confederate). In the solo trials, participants were instructed not to seek or provide assistance. In a guilty condition, the confederate asked for help, inducing most participants to break the rule. In an innocent condition, no such request was made. Moments later, the experimenter returned, accused the pair of participants of cheating – a possible violation of their university’s code of conduct – and then interrogated everyone as to whether they had cheated. As part of this interrogation, the experimenter offered leniency for cooperation to some participants, minimised the seriousness of the violation to others, used both tactics, or used no tactics at all. Would students sign a confession to cheating? Yes. Both promises and minimisation increased the number of true confessions among students who broke the rule. But these same tactics also increased the rate of false confessions among students who did nothing wrong. 642

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Accusatorial interrogation The Reid Technique is an example of an accusatorial-interrogation model of interviewing, where the suspect is confronted with accusations against him. Everyone agrees that the objective of an interrogation is to draw confessions from people who are guilty but not from those who are innocent. In that vein, interrogation tactics that put innocent people at risk should be avoided if possible. There is, however, a basic problem with accusatorial interrogation – it is a process of social influence that police employ on suspects that they believe to be guilty. Can this expectation of guilt lead police to use tactics that draw false confessions? To test this hypothesis, Fadia Narchet and colleagues (2011) trained eight young men, over five weeks, on how to conduct interrogations using various techniques. In a study like the one just described in the previous section, these trainees were asked to interrogate guilty and innocent participants to determine if they had cheated on the solo task. In some cases, the interrogators were led to believe the participant was probably guilty; in other cases, that he or she was probably innocent. Did expectations influence outcomes? Yes. Figure 15.6 shows that interrogators elicited confessions from most participants who had actually cheated, regardless of expectations. But when they interrogated participants who did not cheat, interrogators with guilty expectations used more coercive tactics and produced a high rate of false confessions. FIGURE 15.6 Interrogation as a self-fulfilling prophecy – do guilty expectations produce false confessions? Participants were asked to solve a series of problems, sometimes alone and sometimes with a confederate. Half were induced to cheat on the alone task, making them guilty of violating the rule; the other half were not induced to cheat, making them innocent. Eight young men then interrogated participants to determine if they had cheated. In some cases, the interrogators were led to believe the participant was probably guilty; in other cases, that he or she was probably innocent. As shown, interrogators produced confessions from most participants who had cheated. Armed with guilty expectations, however, they also produced a high rate of false confessions from participants who were innocent. 100

% Values

80

60

40

20

0 Control

Innocent bias

Guilty bias

Condition Guilty (true confessions)

Innocent (false confessions)

Source: Narchet, F. M., Meissner, C. A., & Russano, M. B. (2011). Modeling the influence of investigator bias on the elicitation of true and false confessions. Law and Human Behavior, 35, 452–465.

Without being beaten or threatened, innocent people sometimes confess to crimes they did not commit.

TRUE

CURRENT SCENE ON … REPLICATION FAILURES THE IMPORTANCE OF OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS Misinformation can alter people’s memories of events, and even prompt them to form false memories of events that never occurred. In 2015, Julia Shaw and Steven Porter published a study in which they fed their participants misinformation in three 40-minute interviews over three weeks. The misinformation was designed to convince their participants

that they had committed a crime as an adolescent. Their findings indicated that 70% of their participants formed false memories of having committed the crime! The study was highly publicised, making headlines in news outlets all over the world, and featuring on television specials about false memories. The figure of 70%, however, seemed high to many researchers in the field. While it is well established that false

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memories can be implanted, the more typical finding is that about 20% of participants actually form false memories about an invented event. Shaw shared the data with other researchers in the field, who reanalysed it. The key issue was the definition of the term ‘false memory’ in the experiment. Shaw and Porter used a novel coding system, in which a participant’s statements had to meet several criteria in order to be considered a ‘false memory’. Other researchers, however, argued that the Shaw and Porter criteria were not stringent enough, and that they did not align with the coding systems used by other researchers in the field. When the data were reanalysed using more established coding systems, the false memory rate fell to around 28%. Julia Shaw stands by her findings, saying that there are many ways to define false memories, and that theirs was not necessarily incorrect. However, critics argue that the Shaw and Porter study poorly defined ‘false memories’, overlooking signs that the volunteers did not actually remember the invented crimes. For instance, one critic, Kimberley Wade, told BuzzFeed

News: ‘The problem with reporting inaccurate, inflated results is this: It fuels skepticism of memory research and can detract from how we understand why people develop false memories. It can slow science down and even lead scientists to draw erroneous conclusions about real-world behaviour.’ (Wade, Garry & Pezdek, 2018) For further reading: • Lee, S. M. (2018, 8 February). Scientists are doubting a famous study that claimed you can be easily tricked into a false confession, Buzzfeed, Retrieved from https://www. buzzfeed.com/stephaniemlee/false-crime-memoriesdebate?utm_term=.gb9ox1wn5#.lc5248bgv • Shaw, J., & Porter, S. (2015). Constructing rich false memories of committing crime. Psychological Science, 26(3), 291–301. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797614562862 • Wade, K. A., Garry, M., & Pezdek, K. (2018). Deconstructing rich false memories of committing crime: Commentary on Shaw and Porter (2015). Psychological Science, 29(3), 471–4765. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797617703667

Confessions in the courtroom How does the legal system treat confessions brought out by police interrogations? The process is straightforward. Whenever a suspect confesses but then withdraws the statement, pleads not guilty and goes to trial, the judge must determine whether the statement was voluntary or coerced. If the confession was clearly coerced – as when a suspect is isolated for long periods of time, deprived of food or sleep, threatened or abused – it is excluded. In Australia, a confession made by a suspect is considered to be an ‘improperly obtained admission’ (and therefore ruled inadmissible by the judge) if the police officer mistreats or misleads the suspect; for example, if the officer: (1) did an act or omission which he or she knew or ought to have known would substantially impair the ability of the suspect to answer the question; or (2) made a false statement where the questioner knew or ought to have known it was false, and that it was likely to cause the suspect to make an admission (s. 138(2), Evidence Act 1995 [NSW]). If the confession is not coerced, it can be admitted into evidence for the jury to evaluate. In these cases, juries are confronted with a classic attribution dilemma. A suspect’s statement may indicate guilt (personal attribution) or it may indicate pressure from external factors (situational attribution). According to the law, jurors should reject all confessions made in response to external pressure. But wait. Remember the fundamental attribution error? In Chapter 3, we saw that people tend to overattribute behaviour to individuals and overlook the influence of situational forces. Is it similarly possible, as in the John Button and Central Park jogger cases, that jurors view suspects who confess as guilty even if their confessions were coerced during interrogation? To examine this question, Kassin and Sukel (1997) had mock jurors read one of three versions of a double murder trial. In a control version that did not contain a confession, only 19% voted guilty. In a low-pressure version in which the defendant was said to have confessed immediately upon questioning, the conviction rate rose considerably, to 62%. But there was a third, high-pressure condition in which participants were told that the defendant had confessed out of fear while his hands were cuffed behind his back, causing him pain. How did jurors in this situation react? Reasonably, they judged the confession to be coerced and said it did not influence their verdicts. Yet the conviction rate in this situation increased sharply, this time from 19% to 50%. Apparently, people are powerfully influenced by evidence of a confession, even when they concede that it was coerced. Confessions are powerfully incriminating not only to lay people; the same result was recently found in a study involving judges (Wallace & Kassin, 2012). The jury’s reaction to confession evidence may also depend on how that evidence is presented. Today, many police departments videotape confessions for presentation in court. In Australia, police are required to record interviews with suspects. If a suspect admits during a police interview that he or she committed a crime, the recording of that admission and the circumstances under which it was obtained have to be provided to the court, in order for the admission to be considered as evidence against the suspect (s. 165, Evidence Act 1995 [NSW]; Carr [1988], 165 CLR 314; McKinney and Judge [1991], 171 CLR 468, 51 A Crim R 240). 644

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But could you tell the difference between a true confession and a false confession? The research suggests that observers are unable to tell the difference between a true confession and a false confession (Bradford & Goodman-Delahunty, 2008). To test this question inside prison walls, Kassin and colleagues (2005) videotaped male inmates giving full confessions to the crimes for which they were incarcerated and concocting false confessions to offences suggested by the researchers that they did not commit. University students and police investigators then watched and judged 10 different inmates, each of whom gave a true or false confession to one of five crimes: aggravated assault, armed robbery, burglary, breaking and entering, and car theft. The results showed that neither group exhibited high levels of accuracy.

Police interviewing: beyond North America Earlier, we noted that the Reid Technique, used in North America, follows an accusatorial-interrogation model. The alternative to accusatorial models is the information-gathering model, whereby the police interview with the suspect is non-accusatory; that is, the police officer conducting the interview is not accusing the suspect of having committed the crime, and is not necessarily aiming to extract a confession from the suspect. Rather, the information-gathering strategy involves an open-ended question style that is designed to encourage suspects to talk (Moston, Stephenson, & Williamson, 1992). Information-gathering interviews aim to gather information about a past or future event, and they function as one part of the inquiry into the truth within the overall investigation. Police agencies outside of North America are more likely to use information-gathering than accusatory models of interviewing. This is partly because research has shown techniques such as the Reid Technique can lead to both wrongful conviction and failed prosecution (Dixon, 2010), and courts have begun to recognise that psychologically coercive interrogation tactics produce problems and can result in significant miscarriages of justice. By making evidence obtained under these tactics inadmissible, the courts have ensured that police agencies change their interrogation practices. In the UK and Australia, for example, many of the techniques used in the Reid model have been restricted by the courts (Gudjonsson, 2003). So how do police in these jurisdictions go about questioning suspects? The PEACE model, as shown in Figure 15.7, has been developed as an alternative to the Reid Technique. It has been used in the UK since 1993 and is now used all over the world, including Australia and New Zealand (Bull & Soukara, 2010). PEACE stands for: Planning and preparation; Engage and explain; Account; Closure; and Evaluation. In the PEACE model, which uses an information-gathering framework, police officers focus on securing information rather than focusing on securing a confession. (Compare this to the accusatorial model, in which the interrogator presumes FIGURE 15.7 The PEACE model of investigative interviewing guilt and then aims to get the confession.) The PEACE model is a rapport-based method of interrogation, utilising a respectful P Planning and preparation procedure (Alison, Alison, Noone, Elntib & Christiansen, 2013). E Engage and explain Police officers outside of North America no longer even refer to the process as ‘interrogation’, but rather as ‘investigative A Account interviewing’. There are two reasons for this change in C Closure terminology: (1) to emphasise that the interview is part of the E Evaluation ongoing investigative process; and (2) to dissociate the process from more accusatorial, North American interrogation models (Pozzulo et al., 2009). There has been less research on the PEACE model than on the Reid Technique, but some research indicates that the decrease in social psychological pressures during the interrogation process does not reduce the number of confessions obtained overall (Meissner & Russano, 2003), and in fact shows that the PEACE model is still producing a high rate of confessions (Bull & Soukara, 2010). While the rate of false confessions resulting from the PEACE model has not been empirically investigated, interrogation researchers are unaware of any reported real-life cases of false confession involving the model (Gudjonsson & Pearse, 2011). Considering that the PEACE model is neither guilt-presumptive nor overly confrontational, researchers who study the social psychology of interrogations argue that it is far less likely to elicit false confessions for any of the reasons we have previously discussed (Gudjonsson & Pearse, 2011; Meissner, Russano, & Narchet, 2010).

JURY DECISION-MAKING The criminal justice system is complex. Through it all, the trial – a relatively infrequent but highly dramatic event – is at the heart and soul of the system. The threat of trial is what motivates parties to gather evidence and, later, to negotiate a deal. And when it is over, the trial by judge or jury forms the basis for sentencing Copyright 2020 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-202

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and appeals decisions. In this section, we examine the three stages of a jury trial: (1) jury selection; (2) the presentation of evidence, arguments and instructions; and (3) the processes by which juries deliberate to reach a verdict.

Jury selection

Voir dire

The pretrial examination of prospective jurors by the judge or opposing lawyers to uncover signs of bias.

Challenge for cause

A means by which lawyers can exclude prospective jurors due to a perception that a juror is biased.

Peremptory challenge

A means by which lawyers can exclude a limited number of prospective jurors without the judge’s approval.

If you are ever accused of a crime, you have the right to a trial by an impartial jury from your community. This right is considered essential to doing justice within a democracy. Yet whenever a controversial verdict is reached in a high-profile case, people, right or wrong, blame the 12 individuals who constituted the jury. That is why it is important to know how juries are selected. Some would argue that the outcome for the defendant is determined the moment the jury is selected (Anthony & Longman, 2017). Jury selection is a three-stage process. First, the court uses electoral rolls to compile a master list of eligible citizens who live in the community. Prospective jurors receive a questionnaire in the mail that is designed to ascertain whether they are eligible for jury service. If they are, they may be issued with a summons requiring them to attend court on a specific day. When they arrive at court, potential jurors are gathered in the jury poolroom, where they receive information about their duties as jurors. Jurors then proceed to the courtroom, where they are empanelled. (In the US, this process is known as ‘voir dire’.) Before jurors are sworn in, the parties in the case are allowed to ‘challenge’ jurors, asking the judge to excuse that person from jury service. In fact, if it can be proven that an entire community is biased, perhaps because of pretrial publicity, then the trial might be postponed or moved to another location, or other measures may be taken. In one example, several parallels were drawn between the plot of the film Wolf Creek and the presumed murder of Peter Falconio in the Northern Territory of Australia. The Director of Public Prosecutions asked for (and distributors agreed to) a delayed release of the film in the Northern Territory to avoid biasing potential jurors in the case (Chai, 2005). Parties can challenge jurors in two ways: challenges for cause and peremptory challenges. A challenge for cause is one in which there is reason to believe that a particular juror is biased (e.g., the juror knows someone involved in the trial, or has an interest in the outcome of the case). Generally, in states and territories across Australia, parties are allowed an unlimited number of challenges for cause. A peremptory challenge is a challenge that a party can exercise without having to provide a reason or win the judge’s approval. By using a peremptory challenge, a party in the case can reject a juror even if the juror appears fair and open-minded. The number of peremptory challenges is limited, so parties can only reject a certain limited number of prospective jurors in this way. Across Australia, the number of peremptory challenges permitted for each party varies (Queensland Law Reform Commission, 2011). Lawyers will want as sympathetic a jury as possible, and certainly will not want a hostile jury, so why would a lawyer challenge someone who appears to be impartial? In Australia, lawyers barely receive any information about potential jurors. In the majority of Australian jurisdictions, the name, address and occupation of the potential jurors (where available from the electoral roll) are provided to each party just prior to the empanelling process – usually on the morning that the trial begins. This severely limits the ability of each party to conduct any research into the potential jurors based on these demographic features (Horan & Goodman-Delahunty, 2010; Queensland Law Reform Commission, 2011). In the US, the questioning of jurors is much more extensive and during the voir dire process lawyers are permitted to question potential jurors about their values and beliefs. This process holds high importance and is thought to influence the trajectory of the case (Marder, 2015). Anthony and Longman (2017) noted that the absence of this process in Australia may reduce the opportunity for jurors’ explicit racial biases against Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people to be discovered. Considering the information that is available to them at the time about potential jurors, what guides lawyers’ decisions to accept some jurors and reject others? These questions make the empanelment or voir dire process particularly interesting to social psychologists (Lee, 2015; Vidmar & Hans, 2007).

Trial lawyers as intuitive psychologists Rumour has it that trial lawyers have used some unconventional methods to select juries. Under pressure to make choices quickly and without much information, lawyers often rely on implicit personality theories and stereotypes. As described in Chapter 3, an implicit personality theory is a set of assumptions that people make about how certain attributes are related to each other and to behaviour. When we believe that all members of a group share the same attributes, these implicit theories are called stereotypes. As far as trial practice is concerned, how-to books claim that the astute lawyer can predict a juror’s verdict by his or her gender, race, age, ethnic background and other simple demographics. It has been 646

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suggested, for example, that athletes lack sympathy for fragile and injured victims, that engineers are unemotional, that men with beards resist authority, and that cabinetmakers are so meticulous in their work that they will never be completely satisfied with the evidence. Clarence Darrow, one of the most prominent North American trial lawyers of the twentieth century, suggested that jurors of southern European descent favour the defence, whereas those from Scandinavia favour the prosecution (Darrow, 1936). Other lawyers have theorised that women are more sceptical as jurors than men, particularly in response to attractive female witnesses. Still others offer selection advice based on faces, facial expressions, body language and clothing. The intuitive approach to jury selection by which lawyers use peremptory challenges may provide for colourful stories from inside the courtroom, but the consequences of this kind of stereotyping for justice can be troubling. For example, what if a prosecutor were to use peremptory challenges to exclude from the jury all white people, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people, or Asian people, or all men or all women, possibly stripping the jury of the defendant’s peers? Peremptory challenges are being used in some parts of the US to exclude disproportionate numbers of African Americans (Liptak, 2015), and some research suggests that members of minority groups in the US are two to three times more likely to be challenged compared to majority group members (Gastwirth, 2016). Other research has found that professionals selected jurors who held implicit racial biases aligning with their legal interests (Morrison, De-VaulFretters, & Gawronski, 2016): defence lawyers for a black person were more likely to exclude those with high implicit racism, while prosecutors did the opposite. Courts have been limiting the use of peremptory challenges to prevent lawyers from systematically excluding prospective jurors on the basis of race. Some researchers have called for the elimination of peremptory challenges altogether (Horan & GoodmanDelahunty, 2010). Citing social psychological research on stereotyping and prejudice, Samuel Sommers and Michael Norton (2008) point to two problems: (1) the influence of conscious and unconscious racial stereotypes on social perceptions is prevalent and likely to influence lawyers in the courtroom; and (2) these racial biases are difficult to identify in specific instances because lawyers, like everyone else, typically do not acknowledge having been influenced by their stereotypes. In a study that illustrated both points, Sommers and Norton (2007) presented university students, law students and lawyers with a summary of a criminal trial involving a black defendant and asked them to choose between two prospective jurors with various characteristics – one white, the other African American. As predicted, all groups were far more likely to challenge the juror who was black rather than the one who was white, yet very few subjects cited race as a factor in their decisions. The intuitive approach to jury selection sometimes leads to discrimination on the basis of race and other characteristics. This approach is also not very effective. Thus, although some experienced trial lawyers take pride in their jury-selection skills, researchers have found that most lawyers cannot effectively predict how jurors will vote, either on the basis of their intuitive rules of thumb (Olczak, Kaplan, & Penrod, 1991) or by relying on how prospective jurors answer questions during the empanelment process (Kerr, Kramer, Carroll, & Alfini, 1991; Zeisel & Diamond, 1978). Apparently, whether a juror characteristic predicts verdicts depends on the specifics of each and every case. Hence in the US, where such extensive questioning of potential jurors is permitted in the voir dire, a new service industry was born – scientific jury selection.

Scientific jury selection In a film based on John Grisham’s Runaway Jury, a ruthless jury consultant named Rankin Fitch, played by Gene Hackman, helps lawyers to select jurors through the use of intrusive high-tech surveillance work. Burrowing deep into the lives of prospective jurors, Fitch trails them, investigates them and even resorts at times to bribery, blackmail and intimidation. Determined to stack the jury in order to defend gun company defendants against a multimillion-dollar wrongful death lawsuit, Fitch declares, ‘A trial is too important to be left up to juries’. Grisham’s depiction of jury consulting is a work of fiction, not fact. But it is based on a kernel of truth. Instead of relying on hunches, successful stock market investors, football coaches and poker players play the odds whenever they can. Now many US-based trial lawyers do too. In recent years, the ‘art’ of jury selection has been transformed into something of a ‘science’ (Blaise, Singh, & Pappas, 2015); that is the technique known as scientific jury selection. This use of jury consultants began during the Vietnam War era, when the US government prosecuted a group of antiwar activists known as the Harrisburg Seven. The case against the defendants was strong,

Scientific jury selection

A method of selecting juries through surveys that yield correlations between demographics and trial-relevant attitudes.

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and the trial was to be held in the conservative city of Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. To help the defence select a jury, sociologist Jay Schulman and colleagues (1973) surveyed the local community by interviewing 840 residents. Two kinds of information were taken from each resident: demographics (e.g., sex, race, age and education) and attitudes relevant to the trial (e.g., attitudes towards the government, the war and political dissent). By correlating these variables, Schulman’s team came up with a profile of the ideal defence juror: ‘a female Democrat with no religious preference and a white-collar job or a skilled blue-collar job’ (p. 40). Guided by this result, the defence selected its jury. The rest is history. Against all odds, the trial ended in a hung jury, split 10–2 in favour of acquittal. Today, scientific jury selection is used often, especially in high-profile criminal trials and civil trials in the US in which large sums of money are at stake. Research shows, for example, that jurors are differently predisposed when confronted with cases that pit individuals against large corporations, with some people biased towards big business and others harbouring an anti-business prejudice (Hans, 2000). How is scientific jury selection carried out? What are the methods used? The procedure is simple. Lawyers try to determine jurors’ attitudes and verdict tendencies from information that is known about their backgrounds. The relevance of this information can be determined through focus groups, mock juries or communitywide surveys, in which statistical relationships are sought between general demographic factors and attitudes relevant to a particular case. Then, during the voir dire, lawyers ask prospective jurors about their backgrounds and use peremptory challenges to exclude those whose profiles are associated with unfavourable attitudes. As you might expect, scientific jury selection is a controversial enterprise. By law, consultants are not permitted to communicate with or approach the prospective jurors themselves. But how effective are the techniques that are employed? It is hard to say. On the one hand, trial lawyers who have used scientific jury selection boast an impressive winning percentage. On the other hand, it is impossible to know the extent to which these victories are attributable to the jury-selection surveys (Strier, 1999). So, does scientific jury selection work? Although more data are needed to evaluate the claims made, it appears that attitudes can influence verdicts in some cases and that pretrial research can help lawyers identify these attitudes (Lieberman, Krauss, & Weiner, 2011; Seltzer, 2006).

Race and jury decision-making To what extent does a juror’s race affect his or her decision-making? Research from the US suggests that there is no simple answer. In one study, Norbert Kerr and colleagues (1995) tested the most intuitive hypothesis of all – that jurors favour defendants who are similar to themselves. They presented mixed-race groups with a strong or weak case involving a black or white defendant. They found that when the evidence was weak, the participants were more lenient in their verdicts towards the defendant of the same race. Yet when the evidence was strong, they were harsher against that similar defendant, as if distancing themselves from his or her wrongdoing. In a second study, Samuel Sommers and Phoebe Ellsworth (2001) tested the popular notion that jurors will show preference for others of their racial group when a crime involves race, as when it is a motivated hate crime or when lawyers ‘play the race card’ in arguments to the jury. Yet they found the opposite pattern. When race was not an issue that is ‘on the radar’, white jurors predictably treated the defendant more favourably when he was white than when he was black. Yet when race was made a prominent issue at trial, white jurors bent over backward not to appear prejudiced and did not discriminate. Other research has shown that jurors may at times be motivated to watch for racist tendencies in themselves, processing evidence more carefully and exhibiting less racial bias in the verdicts when race is brought out into the open (Cohn, Bucolo, Pride, & Sommers, 2009; Sargent & Bradfield, 2004).

CULTURAL DIVERSITY JURY DECISION-MAKING AROUND THE WORLD The effects of race and culture on jury decision-making may vary over time and across locations. A study in Canada examined the way that jurors react to testimony by Muslim women who wear veils covering part of their faces. Evelyn Maeder and colleagues (2013) examined the effect of a victim wearing a veil while testifying in a sexual assault trial.

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The study also looked at the effect of the defendant’s race, varying whether the defendant was Middle Eastern or Caucasian. Contrary to hypotheses, the researchers found that defendant race did not have any effects on jurors’ decisionmaking, and jurors were more convinced of the defendant’s guilt when the victim was wearing a burqa or hijab to testify than when she testified wearing no veil.

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FIGURE 15.8 Effects of racial diversity on the jury Six-person mock juries watched the trial of an African American defendant in groups that were homogeneous (all white) or diverse (four white, two black). In some cases, the issue of race was raised during the voir dire; in others, it was not. Either way, the white jurors in homogeneous groups were more likely to vote guilty than white jurors in diverse groups who, in turn, were more likely to vote guilty than black jurors in diverse groups. It seems that individual jurors are influenced in their decisions by the racial composition of their groups. 70 60 50 % Guilty votes

The potential for individual jurors to exhibit racial bias may also depend on the composition of the jury with whom they expect to deliberate. In a courthouse in Ann Arbor, Michigan, Sommers (2006) showed a Court TV summary of a sexual assault trial in which the defendant was African American. A total of 200 locals participated in 29 six-person mock juries after a voir dire that either did or did not make race an issue. Ultimately, the juries that were formed were either all white or heterogeneous, consisting of four whites and two blacks. After the videotaped trial summary, but before the groups deliberated, each juror was asked to indicate his or her verdict preference. Look at Figure 15.8, and you will see that jurors were influenced by the racial composition of their groups as a whole. In diverse groups, 34% of white jurors voted guilty compared with 23% of black jurors – a small difference. In the all-white groups, however, 51% of jurors voted guilty, which represented a significant jump compared with both blacks and whites in the more diverse groups. While this research on the racial composition of the jury has been conducted in the US, it is of course an issue all over the world, with cases in Australia and New Zealand raising the issue of Indigenous under-representation on juries (R v. Cornelius [1994]; R v. Grant and Lovett [1972]). Researchers in Australia have argued that this problem undermines the ability of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people to receive a fair trial, yet it is often overlooked as an issue in the justice system (Anthony & Longman, 2017).

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40 30 20 10 0 Race-relevant

Race-neutral Voir dire condition

Blacks in diverse groups Whites in diverse groups Whites in all-white groups

Once a jury is selected, the trial officially begins and the evidence previously gathered comes to life. The evidence produced in the Source: Sommers, S. (2006). On racial diversity and group decision making: Identifying multiple effects of racial composition on jury deliberations. Journal of courtroom can range from eyewitness testimony, informants and Personality and Social Psychology, 90, 597–612. confessions to DNA and other types of physical evidence, medical tests, handwriting samples, diaries, fingerprints, photographs and business documents. The trial is a well-orchestrated event. Lawyers for both sides make opening statements. Witnesses then answer questions under oath. Lawyers make closing arguments. The judge instructs the jury. Yet there are many problems in this all-too-human enterprise – the evidence may not be accurate or reliable, jurors may harbour misconceptions or bias from extraneous factors, judges’ instructions may fall on deaf ears, and the process of deliberation may cause some jurors to vote for a verdict that contradicts their beliefs. The social psychology of jury decision-making is involved and fascinating (Bornstein & Greene, 2011; Lieberman & Krauss, 2009; Vidmar & Hans, 2007). In this section, we identify some of the problems and possible solutions.

Competence of the jury Over the years, psychologists and other social scientists have sought to evaluate the competence of trial juries to reach accurate verdicts. In The American Jury, Henry Kalven and Hans Zeisel (1966) surveyed 550 judges who presided over 3576 criminal jury trials across the US. While each jury was deliberating, judges were asked to indicate what their verdict would be. A comparison of their responses to the actual jury verdicts revealed that judges and juries agreed on a verdict in 78% of all cases (in a separate study of civil cases, typically involving disputes over money, a 78% agreement rate was also observed). Among the 22% of cases in which there was a disagreement, it was because the jury voted to acquit a defendant that judges perceived to be guilty. This last result suggests that juries are more lenient than judges. Are juries competent, objective and accurate in their verdicts? There is no simple way to answer this question. As a general rule, research has shown that juries are sound decision-makers, even in cases containing complex evidence, and that jury verdicts are based largely on the strength of the evidence presented at trial (Devine, 2012; Eisenberg et al., 2005; Hans, Kaye, Dann, Farley, & Albertson, 2011). Still, as

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we saw earlier, juries tend to accept eyewitness identifications and confessions – often without sufficient scrutiny or concern about the situations and ways in which these types of evidence were taken. To help inform juries in these cases, psychologists sometimes testify as expert witnesses (Costanzo, Blandon-Glitin, & Davis, 2016).

Non-evidentiary influences A trial is a well-orchestrated event that follows strict rules of evidence and procedure. The goal is to ensure that juries base their verdicts solely on the evidence and testimony presented in court – not on rumours, newspaper stories, a defendant’s physical appearance or other information. The question is: ‘To what extent is this goal achieved, and to what extent are jury verdicts tainted by non-evidentiary influences?’ A good example of this is the murder trial of American Amanda Knox in Perugia, Italy in 2007. Prior to the trial actually taking place, newspapers and social media, not only in Italy, but in the US, the UK and elsewhere in the world, were saturated with stories about Knox, her past, her Italian boyfriend, her alleged confession and witnesses who claimed to have seen her near the crime scene. By the time Knox went to trial, her jury had already been exposed to a good deal of information that was not in evidence.

Pretrial publicity

Percentage of guilty votes

Many high-profile cases find their way into newspapers and other mass media long before they appear in court. In these instances, the legal system struggles with this dilemma – does exposure to pretrial news stories corrupt the pool of prospective jurors? Public opinion surveys consistently show that the more people know about a case, the more likely they are to presume the defendant guilty, even when they claim to be impartial (Kovera, 2002; Moran & Cutler, 1991). There is nothing mysterious about this result. The information in news reports usually comes from the police or public prosecutors, so it often reveals facts unfavourable to the defence. The question is whether these reports have an impact on juries that go on to hear evidence in court and deliberate to a verdict. To examine the effects of pretrial publicity, Geoffrey Kramer and colleagues (1990) played a videotaped reFIGURE 15.9 Contaminating effects of pretrial publicity enactment of an armed robbery trial to hundreds of people In this study, participants were exposed to prejudicial or neutral news participating in 108 mock juries. Before watching the tape, reports about a defendant, watched a videotaped trial, and voted participants were exposed to news clippings about the case. before and after participating in a mock jury deliberation. As shown, pretrial publicity increased the conviction rate both before and after Some read news material that was neutral. Others read deliberation, even among participants perceived to be impartial by information that was incriminating; for example, revealing judges and lawyers. that the defendant had a prior record or implicating the defendant in a hit-and-run accident in which a child was 60 killed. Even though participants were instructed to base their decisions solely on the evidence, pretrial publicity had a marked effect. Among those exposed to neutral material, 50 33% voted guilty after deliberating in a jury. Among those exposed to the prejudicial material, that figure increased to 48%. What is worse, however, is that neither judges nor 40 defence lawyers could identify in a simulated voir dire (in this US study) which of the jurors had been biased by the publicity. As shown in Figure 15.9, 48% of jurors who were 30 questioned and perceived to be impartial – that is, those who said they were unaffected – went on to vote guilty (Kerr, Harmon, & Graves, 1982). Pretrial publicity is potentially dangerous in two respects. First, it often divulges information that is not later After Before deliberation deliberation allowed into the trial record. Second is the matter of timing. Because many news stories precede the actual trial, jurors Neutral-publicity jurors learn certain facts even before they enter the courtroom. Prejudicial-publicity jurors From what is known about the power of first impressions, Prejudicial-publicity jurors who ‘passed’ the voir dire the implications are clear. If jurors receive prejudicial news Source: Kerr, M. I., Kramer, G. P., Carroll, J. S., & Alfini, J. J. (1991) On the information about a defendant before trial, that information ­effectiveness of voir dire in criminal cases with prejudicial pretrial publicity: An empirical study, American University Law Review, 40, 665–701. Copyright © 1991 will distort the way they interpret the facts of the case American University Law Review. Reprinted with permission. (Hope, Memon, & McGeorge, 2004). In fact, an analysis of 650

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secretly recorded mock jury deliberations showed that exposure to pretrial publicity completely tainted their discussions of the defendant and evidence – despite the judge’s warning to disregard that information (Ruva & Guenther, 2015; Ruva & LeVasseur, 2012). So, is there a solution? Since the biasing effects persist despite the practices of jury selection, the presentation of hard evidence, cautionary words from the judge and open jury deliberations, justice may demand that highly publicised cases be postponed or their trials moved to less informed communities (Steblay, Besirevic, Fulero, & Jiminez-Lorente, 1999; Studebaker & Penrod, 1997).

The ‘CSI’ effect Is it possible that juries are influenced by pretrial publicity of a more general nature that is unrelated to their specific case? Perhaps you have watched the popular television drama CSI: Crime Scene Investigation and focused on the process by which police investigators collect and analyse fingerprints, bodily fluids and other types of forensic evidence. Many legal commentators are speculating that the public’s exposure to this show and others like it is influencing jury verdicts; they call it the ‘CSI effect’. The fear is that the television programs lead jurors to have unrealistically high expectations of what to expect of evidence submitted during the trial, that cause them to vote cautiously for acquittal because they find the actual evidence insufficient to support a guilty verdict. If true, then the CSI effect would represent a special type of pretrial publicity potentially influencing an entire population of juries. Australian researchers are investigating whether structured multimedia presentations can be used to educate jurors about the nature of DNA and other scientific evidence in order to counter the CSI effect (Hewson & Goodman-Delahunty, 2008). Researchers note, however, that although the hypothesis regarding a CSI effect is plausible, there is at present very little hard evidence to support it, and more research is needed to explore the extent of its impact (Schanz & Salfati, 2016; Tyler, 2006).

Inadmissible information Just as jurors are biased by news stories, they occasionally receive extra-legal information within the body of the trial itself. If a witness discloses hearsay that is not considered reliable, or blurts out something about the defendant’s past that the courts consider prejudicial – that is, information the jury is not supposed to hear – then what? What happens next, typically, is that the opposing lawyer will object and the judge will sustain the objection and instruct the jury to disregard the disclosure. If something seems wrong with this series of events, you should know that it is a script often replayed in the courtroom. But can people really strike information from their minds the way court reporters can strike it from the record? Can people on a jury resist the forbidden fruit of inadmissible testimony? Although common sense suggests they cannot, the research is mixed. In one study, a group of mock jurors read about a murder case based on evidence so weak that not a single juror voted guilty. A second group read the same case, except that the prosecution introduced an illegally obtained tape recording of a phone call made by the defendant: ‘I finally got the money to pay you off … When you read the papers tomorrow, you will know what I mean’. The defence argued that the illegal tape should not be admissible but the judge disagreed. At this point, the conviction rate increased to 26%. In a third group, as in the second, the tape was brought in and the defence objected. Yet this time, the judge sustained the objection and told jurors to disregard the tape. The result? Thirty-five per cent voted for conviction (Sue, Smith, & Caldwell, 1973). Other studies have also revealed that jurors are often not deterred by ‘limiting instructions’ in which jurors are instructed to use a particular piece of evidence only for a restricted purpose (Steblay, Hosch, Culhane, & McWethy, 2006), although some research indicates that limiting instructions are more effective if presented earlier rather than later in a trial (Cush & Goodman-Delahunty, 2006). Why do people not follow a judge’s order to disregard inadmissible evidence? There are several possible explanations (Lieberman & Arndt, 2000), but three are most prominent. First, the added instruction draws attention to the information in controversy. It is like being told not to think about white bears. As we saw in Chapter 2, trying to suppress a specific thought increases its tendency to intrude upon our consciousness (Wegner, 1994). A second reason is that a judge’s instruction to disregard, much like censorship, restricts a juror’s decision-making freedom. As a result, it can backfire by arousing reactance. So, when a judge emphasises the ruling by forbidding jurors from using the information (‘You have no choice but to disregard it’), they become even more likely to use it (Wolf & Montgomery, 1977). The third reason is the easiest to understand. Jurors want to reach the right decision. If they stumble onto relevant information, they want to use that information whether it satisfies the law’s technical rules or not. To test this third hypothesis, Kassin and Sommers (1997) had mock jurors read a transcript of a double murder trial that was based on weak evidence, leading only 24% to vote guilty. Three other groups read

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the same case except that the evidence presented by the prosecution included a wire-tapped phone conversation in which the defendant confessed to a friend. In all cases, the defence lawyer objected to the disclosure. When the judge ruled to admit the tape into evidence, the conviction rate increased considerably to 79%. But when the judge excluded the tape and instructed jurors to disregard it, their reaction depended on the reason the tape was excluded. When told to disregard the tape because it was barely audible and could not be trusted, participants mentally erased the information, as they should, and delivered the same 24% conviction rate as in the no-tape control group. But when told to disregard the item because it had been illegally obtained, 55% voted guilty. Despite the judge’s warning, these latter participants were unwilling to ignore testimony they saw as highly relevant merely because of a legal technicality. Additional studies indicate that jurors in this situation may comply with a judge’s instruction to disregard when the technicality involves a serious violation of the defendant’s rights (Fleming, Wegener, & Petty, 1999) and that the process of deliberation increases compliance, which minimises the bias (London & Nunez, 2000).

Judge’s instructions One of the most important rituals in any trial is the judge’s instructions to the jury. It is through these instructions that juries are educated about relevant legal concepts, informed of the verdict options, admonished to disregard extra-legal factors and advised on how to conduct their deliberations. To ensure verdicts adhere to the law, juries are supposed to comply with these instructions. The task seems simple enough, but there are problems. To begin with, the jury’s intellectual competence has been called into question. For years, the courts have doubted whether jurors understood their instructions. One sceptical judge put it bluntly when he said that ‘these words may as well be spoken in a foreign language’ (Frank, 1949, p. 181). He may have been right. When actual instructions are tested with community mock jurors, the results reveal high levels of misunderstanding – a serious problem in light of the fact that jurors seem to have many preconceptions about crimes and the requirements of the law. Comprehensibility is even problematic when it comes to death penalty instructions that are required in the US in capital cases (Wiener, Prichard, & Weston, 1995), and this applies to university students as well as ordinary jurors from the community (Rose & Ogloff, 2001). Jurors need to understand the expectations that accompany their role, but the comprehensibility of judges’ instructions has been a difficult problem to solve. There is, however, reason for hope. Research has shown that when conventional instructions – which are poorly structured, esoteric and filled with complex legal terms – are rewritten in plain English, comprehension rates increase markedly (Elwork, Sales, & Alfini, 1982; English & Sales, 1997). Aside from reducing the complex language used, efforts to enhance comprehension have included providing a written copy of the instructions, using decision aids, and providing jurors with legal examples to explain content. An Australian study by Chantelle Baguley, Blake McKimmie, and Barbera Masser (2017) found jurors’ comprehension and ability to apply instructions was enhanced when concepts were simplified and when decision aids where used (e.g., outlining the process in a visual format). Courts around the world are beginning to respond to this research. For example, in Australia, a report by the Victorian Law Reform Commission recommended shortening and simplifying jury directions in criminal trials, and many of the recommendations of this Commission were enacted in the form of the Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic). The Act states that jury directions should be as clear, brief, simple and comprehensible as possible, and that judges should avoid technical legal language. The subsequent Jury Directions and Other Acts Amendment Act 2017 (Vic) allows judges to order a jury guide to be given to the jury to help it carry out its task.

Jury deliberations Anyone who has seen the original 1957 film Twelve Angry Men can appreciate how colourful and passionate a jury’s deliberation can be. This film classic opens with a jury eager to convict a young man of murder. The group selects a foreperson and takes a show-of-hands vote. The result is an 11–1 majority, with actor Henry Fonda the lone dissenter. After many tense moments, Fonda manages to convert his peers, and the jury votes unanimously for acquittal. It is often said that the unique power of the jury stems from the wisdom that emerges when individuals come together privately as one group. Is this assumption justified? Twelve Angry Men is a work of fiction, but does it realistically portray what transpires in the jury room? And in what ways does the legal system influence the group dynamics? By interviewing jurors after trials and by recruiting people to participate on 652

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mock juries and then recording their deliberations, researchers have learned a great deal about how juries make their decisions.

Jury room leadership In theory, all jurors are created equal. In practice, however, dominance hierarchies tend to develop. As in other decision-making groups, a handful of individuals lead the discussion while others join in at a lower rate or watch from the sidelines, speaking only to cast their votes (Hastie, Penrod, & Pennington, 1983). It is almost as if there is a jury within the jury. The question is: ‘What kinds of people emerge as leaders?’ It is often assumed that the foreperson is the leader. After all, they call for votes, act as a liaison between the judge and jury, and announce the verdict in court. It seems like a position of importance, yet the selection process is very quick and casual. It is interesting that foreperson selection outcomes do follow a predictable pattern (Stasser, Kerr, & Bray, 1982). People of higher occupational status or with prior experience on a jury are frequently chosen. Interestingly, too, the first person who speaks is often chosen to be the foreperson (Strodtbeck, James, & Hawkins, 1957). And when jurors deliberate around a rectangular table, those who sit at the heads of the table are more likely to be chosen than are those seated in the middle (Bray et al., 1978; Strodtbeck & Hook, 1961). If you find such inequalities bothersome, fear not: a foreperson may act as nominal leaders, but they do not exert more than their fair share of influence over the group. In fact, although they spend more time than other jurors talking about procedural matters, they spend less time expressing opinions about the verdict (Hastie et al., 1983). Thus, it may be most accurate to think of the foreperson not as the jury’s leader but as its moderator.

Dynamics of deliberation In most jurisdictions, the jury room is a highly secretive setting that researchers can only access with very rarely obtained, special permission. If the walls of the jury room could talk, they would tell us that the decision-making process typically passes through three stages (Hastie et al., 1983; Stasser et al., 1982). Like other problem-solving groups, juries begin in a relaxed orientation period during which they set an agenda, talk in openended terms, raise questions and explore the facts. Then, once differences of opinion are revealed (usually after the first vote is taken), factions develop and the group shifts abruptly into a period of open conflict. With the battle lines sharply drawn, discussion takes on a more focused, argumentative tone. Together, jurors scrutinise the evidence, construct stories to account for that evidence and discuss the judge’s instructions (Pennington & Hastie, 1992). If all jurors agree, they return a verdict. If not, the majority tries to achieve a consensus by converting the holdouts through information and social pressure. If unanimity is achieved, the group enters a period of reconciliation, during which it smooths over the conflicts and affirms its satisfaction with the outcome. If the holdouts continue to disagree, the jury declares itself hung. This process is illustrated in Figure 15.10. When it comes to decision-making outcomes, deliberations follow a predictable course first discovered by Harry Kalven and Hans Zeisel (1966). By interviewing the members of 225 juries, they were able to reconstruct how these juries split on their very first vote. Out of 215 juries that opened with an initial majority, 209 reached a final verdict consistent with that first vote. This finding – which was later bolstered by the results of mock jury studies (Kerr, 1981; Stasser & Davis, 1981; see Table 15.4) – led Kalven and Zeisel to conclude that ‘the deliberation process might well be likened to what the developer does for an exposed film; it brings out the picture, but the outcome is predetermined’

FIGURE 15.10 Jury deliberations: the process Juries move through various tasks en route to a verdict. They begin by setting and reviewing the case. If all jurors agree, they return a verdict. If not, they continue to discuss the case until they reach a consensus. If the holdouts refuse to vote with the majority, the jury becomes deadlocked and declares itself hung. Deliberation begins

Select a foreperson and set an agenda

Discuss the evidence, arguments, instructions

Vote

Necessary consensus reached?

Yes

Return a verdict

No

Declare a hung jury

No Progress toward consensus? Yes

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(1966, p. 489). Setting aside Henry Fonda’s Twelve Angry Men heroics, one can usually predict the final verdict by knowing where the individual jurors stand the first time they vote. Juries are not generally more or less subject to bias than the individuals Research has shown how verdicts are reached by mock juries that begin with different combinations of initial votes. You can see who constitute the groups (Kerr, Niedermeier, & Kaplan, 1999); that the results support the majority-wins rule. But also note the hence, ‘majority rules’ seems to describe what happens not only evidence for a leniency bias: when the initial vote is split, juries in juries but in most other small decision-making groups (Hastie gravitate toward acquittal. & Kameda, 2005). There is one exception to this majority-wins rule in the jury Initial votes Final jury verdicts (%) (Guilty–Not Guilty) Conviction Acquittal room. In criminal trials, deliberation tends to produce a leniency Hung bias that favours the defendant. All other factors being equal, 6–0 100 0 0 individual jurors are more likely to vote guilty on their own than 5–1 78 7 16 they are in a group; they are also more prone to convict before deliberations than they are afterwards (MacCoun & Kerr, 1988). 4–2 44 26 30 Look again at Table 15.4, and you will see that juries that are 3–3 9 51 40 equally divided in their initial vote are ultimately likely to return 2–4 4 79 17 not-guilty verdicts. Perhaps it is easier to raise a ‘reasonable 1–5 0 93 7 doubt’ in other people’s minds than it is to erase all doubt. In this regard, it is interesting to note that in their classic study, as 0–6 0 100 0 described earlier, Kalven and Zeisel (1996) found that juries are Source: Stasser, G., Kerr, N. L., & Bray, R. M. (1982). The social psychology of jury deliberations: Structure, process, and product. In N. Kerr & R. Bray (Eds.), The psychology of more lenient than their judges would have been. Perhaps this the courtroom (pp. 221–256). New York, NY: Academic Press. disagreement is due, in part, to the fact that juries decide as groups and judges decide as individuals. Knowing that the majority tends to prevail does not tell us how juries manage to resolve disagreements Leniency bias en route to a verdict. From the conformity studies discussed in Chapter 7, we know that there are two The tendency for jury possibilities. Sometimes people conform because, through a process of informational influence, they are deliberation to produce a genuinely persuaded by what others say. At other times, people yield to the pressures of normative influence tilt towards acquittal. by changing their overt behaviour in the majority’s direction, even though they may disagree in private. Justice demands that juries reach a consensus through a vigorous exchange of views and information, not as the result of heavy-handed social pressure. But is that how it works? Research shows that juries achieve unanimity not by one process or the other but by a combination of both (Kaplan & Schersching, One can usually predict a jury’s final 1981). Research also shows that certain factors can upset the delicate balance between informational and verdict by knowing normative influences. Social pressure is increased, for example, in juries that vote by a public roll call or where the individual show of hands (Davis, Kameda, Parks, Stasson, & Zimmerman, 1989) and in deadlocked juries that are called jurors stand the first back into the courtroom and urged by the judge to resolve their differences (Smith & Kassin, 1993). time they vote. Over the years, courts around the world have addressed the decision-making dynamics of the jury in TRUE two ways: changing the size of juries and accepting less-than-unanimous verdicts. TABLE 15.4 The road to agreement: from individual votes to a group verdict

Jury size How many people does it take to form a jury? In all Australian states and territories, and in New Zealand, juries in criminal trials always consist of 12 people (although, in Australia, juries as small as four people are permitted in civil trials). However, in other jurisdictions around the world, small juries are permitted for both criminal and civil cases. In the case of Williams v. Florida (1970), the defendant was convicted of armed robbery by a six-person jury. He appealed the verdict to the US Supreme Court but lost. As a result of this precedent, American courts are now permitted to cut trial costs by using six-person juries in cases that do not involve the death penalty. Juries consisting of fewer than six are not permitted (Ballew v. Georgia [1978]). What is the impact of moving from 12 to six? The US Supreme Court approached this question as a social psychologist would. It sought to determine whether the change would affect the decision-making process. Unfortunately, the court misinterpreted the available research so badly that Michael Saks (1974) concluded that it ‘would not win a passing grade in a high school psychology class’ (p. 18). Consider whether a reduction in size affects the ability of those in the voting minority to resist normative pressures. The Supreme Court did not think it would. Citing Asch’s (1956) conformity studies, the court argued that an individual juror’s resistance depends on the proportional size of the majority. But is that true? Is the lone dissenter caught in a 5–l bind as well insulated from the group norm as the minority in a 10–2 split? The court argued that these 83% to 17% divisions are psychologically identical. However, Asch’s research 654

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showed exactly the opposite – that the mere presence of a single ally enables dissenters to keep their independence better than anything else. Research has shown that the size of a jury has other effects, too. Michael Saks and Molli Marti (1997) conducted a meta-analysis of studies involving 15 000 mock jurors who deliberated in over 2000 sixperson or 12-person juries. Overall, they found that the smaller juries were less likely to represent minority segments of the population. They were also more likely to reach a unanimous verdict and to do so while deliberating for shorter periods of time. Even in civil trials, in which juries have to make complex decisions on how much money to award the plaintiff, six-person groups spend less time discussing the case (Davis, Au, Hulbert, Chen & Zarnoth, 1997).

Less-than-unanimous verdicts The jury’s size is not all that has changed. In many jurisdictions, courts may accept jury verdicts that are not unanimous. In Australia, unanimous verdicts are required for murder trials in all states and territories except the Northern Territory. In New Zealand, unanimous verdicts were required in criminal cases until 2009, when legislation passed that allowed 11–1 majority decisions. In the US in 1972, the US Supreme Court considered the question of majority verdicts. In one opinion, two defendants had been convicted by jury verdicts that were not unanimous – one by a vote of 11–1, the other by 10–2 (Apodaca v. Oregon [1972]). In a second opinion, a guilty verdict was determined by a 9–3 margin ( Johnson v. Louisiana [1972]). In both decisions, the US Supreme Court upheld the convictions. The court was divided in its view of these cases. Five justices argued that a rule allowing verdicts that are not unanimous would not adversely affect the jury, while four justices believed that it would reduce the intensity of deliberations and undermine the potential for minority influence. Figure 15.11 presents these duelling points of view. Which do you find more convincing? Imagine yourself on a jury that needs only a 9–3 majority to FIGURE 15.11 Johnson v. Louisiana (1972): contrasting views return a verdict. You begin by polling the group and find that Notice the contrasting views in the US Supreme Court’s decision you already have the nine votes needed. What next? According to permit jury verdicts that are not unanimous. Justice White to one script, the group continues to argue vigorously and with wrote the majority opinion and Justice Douglas wrote the open minds. According to the alternative scenario, the group dissent. The decision was reached by a vote of 5–4. begins to deliberate but the dissenters are quickly cast aside Mr Justice White, for the majority because their votes are not needed. Again, which scenario seems more realistic? ‘We have no grounds for believing that majority jurors, To answer that question, Reid Hastie and colleagues (1983) aware of their responsibility and power over the liberty of the defendant, would simply refuse to listen to arguments recruited more than 800 people from around the Boston area, presented to them in favour of acquittal, terminate discussion, in the US state of Massachusetts, to take part in 69 mock juries. and render a verdict. On the contrary, it is far more likely that After watching a re-enactment of a murder trial, the groups were a juror presenting reasoned argument in favour of acquittal instructed to reach a verdict by a 12–0, 10–2 or 8–4 margin. The could either have his arguments answered or would carry differences were striking. Compared with juries that needed enough other jurors with him to prevent conviction. A majority unanimous decisions, the others spent less time discussing the will cease discussion and outvote a minority only after case and more time voting. After reaching the required number reasoned discussion has ceased to have persuasive effect or to serve any other purpose – when a minority, that is, continues of votes, they often rejected the holdouts, terminated discussion to insist upon acquittal without having persuasive reasons in and returned a verdict. Afterwards, participants in the nonsupport of its position.’ unanimous juries rated their peers as more closed-minded and Mr Justice Douglas, for the minority themselves as less informed and less confident about the verdict. What is worse, Hastie’s team saw in tapes of the deliberations ‘Non-unanimous juries need not debate and deliberate as fully that majority-rule juries often adopted ‘a more forceful, as most unanimous juries. As soon as the requisite majority is attained, further consideration is not required either by bullying, persuasive style’ (1983, p. 112). After being permitted Oregon or by Louisiana, even though the dissident jurors to videotape 50 non-unanimous civil juries in the US state of might, if given the chance, be able to convince the majority … Arizona, Shari Diamond and colleagues (2006) similarly observed The collective effort to piece together the puzzle of historical that thoughtful minorities were sometimes ‘marginalised’ by truth … is cut short as soon as the requisite majority is majorities that had the power to ignore them. reached in Oregon and Louisiana … It is said that there is no Today, only two states in the US permit less-than-unanimous evidence that majority jurors will refuse to listen to dissenters verdicts in criminal trials. A substantial number do so for civil whose votes are unneeded for conviction. Yet human experience teaches us that polite and academic conversation cases. However, the situation is quite different in Australia. While is no substitute for the earnest and robust argument necessary murder convictions require unanimous verdicts in all Australian to reach unanimity.’ states and territories (except for the Northern Territory), majority verdicts are allowed in most states and territories for most other Source: Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972).

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criminal offences. Yet research has shown that this procedure weakens jurors who are in the voting minority, breeds closed-mindedness, short-circuits the discussion and leaves many jurors uncertain about the decision. Henry Fonda, step aside. The jury has reached its verdict.

CRITICAL THINKING ACTIVITY Many studies on jury decision-making are criticised because they do not accurately replicate the juror experience. Find one journal article on jury decision-making and think about some gaps between the methodology employed in that article and real jurors’ experiences. Did the researchers who conducted

the study you found consider issues such as the length of a real trial (which often last days, whereas the typical laboratory study only lasts about an hour) or the process of deliberation (which may change an individual’s initial decision, although many laboratory studies omit this important step)?

POST-TRIAL In Italy, Amanda Knox and her boyfriend were sentenced to 26- and subsequently acquitted 25-years prison, respectively, after they were convicted of the murder for which they were ultimately found innocent. By contrast, Rudy Guede – the perpetrator who fled Italy and whose fingerprints, shoe prints and DNA littered the crime scene – was sentenced to 30 years, but that sentence was reduced to 16 years after he apologised for his role in the crime. As this case illustrates, sentencing decisions are human judgements of great consequence. The question is: ‘What influences these judgements?’

The sentencing process Defendants who are found not guilty are free to go home. For those convicted of crimes, however, the jury’s verdict is followed by a second decision to determine the nature and extent of their punishment. Sentencing decisions are usually made by judges, not juries, and they are often controversial. One reason for the controversy is that many people see judges as being too lenient (Stalans & Diamond, 1990). Another is that people disagree on the goals served by imprisonment. For many judges, the goal of a prison sentence is practical: to incapacitate offenders and deter them from committing future crimes. For many citizens, however, there is a more powerful motive at work: to exact retribution, or revenge, against the offender for his or her misdeeds. Research shows that people are driven by this ‘just deserts’ motive, recommending sentences of increasing harshness for crimes of increasing severity, regardless of whether the offender is seen as likely to strike again and regardless of whether such sentences deter crime or serve other useful purposes (Carlsmith, 2006; Darley, Carlsmith, & Robinson, 2000; Carlsmith, Darley, & Robinson, 2002; Darley & Pittman, 2003). Interestingly, research also shows that although people think that revenge against someone who exploited them will make them feel better, sometimes it has the opposite effect (Carlsmith, Wilson, & Gilbert, 2008).

Sentencing disparity Sentencing disparity Inconsistency of sentences for the same offence from one judge to another.

Judges also disagree about issues related to sentencing. Thus, a recurring public complaint is that there is too much sentencing disparity – that punishments for crime are inconsistent from one judge to the next. To document the problem, Anthony Partridge and William Eldridge (1974) compiled identical sets of files from 20 actual cases and sent them to 50 federal judges in the US for sentencing recommendations. They found major disparities in the sentences the judges said they would impose. In one case, for example, judges had read about a man who was convicted of extortion and tax evasion. One judge recommended a 3-year prison sentence, while another recommended 20 years in prison and a fine of US$65 000. It is hard to believe these two judges read the same case. But other studies have uncovered similar differences.

Mandatory sentencing Some judges are unusually creative in their sentencing of convicted felons, particularly in the US. For example, a judge in Texas ordered a piano teacher who molested two students to donate his piano to a local school, a South Dakota judge sentenced cattle rustlers to shovel manure for a week, and a Florida judge ordered drunk drivers to display a bumper sticker on their cars that said ‘Convicted DUI’ (Greene, Heilbrun, Fortune, & Nietzel, 2007). In Australia, legislation governs sentencing (e.g., Crimes Act 1914 [Cth]; Sentencing Act 1991 [Vic]), with the legislative view of the gravity of an offence being expressed primarily through the maximum sentence available for that offence (Freiberg, 2000). Recently, however, state governments in Australia have also introduced mandatory sentencing provisions that prescribed specific minimum sentences for particular offences, in an attempt to minimise the disparities and bring greater consistency into the process. For example, New South Wales has mandatory sentencing requirements for drug- and 656

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alcohol-fuelled offences, and Victoria imposes mandatory sentences for assault of emergency workers. These ‘mandatory sentencing’ protocols are controversial; mandatory sentencing laws in the Northern Territory, which were introduced in 1997 for property offences, were repealed in 2001.

Anchoring Sentencing decisions can be influenced by irrelevant factors, despite the various protocols in place. For example, Mark Bennet (2014) theorised that judges would be influenced by the ‘anchoring effect’; that is, the tendency to use one stimulus as an ‘anchor’, or reference point, in judging a second stimulus. This theory was supported by a series of studies conducted in Germany by Birte Englich and colleagues (2006), who presented legal professionals – mostly judges – with materials about a criminal case. All participants received the same file except that some files suggested a low sentencing number (one year) and others suggested a high number (three years). Regardless of whether the number was presented as a prosecutor’s recommendation, a question from a journalist or a random roll of the dice, those first exposed to the high anchor point assigned harsher sentences than those exposed to the lower anchor point.

Race Some influences on this human decision-making process are even more disturbing. In Australia, research clearly indicates that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people are grossly overrepresented in the prison population (Snowball & Weatherburn, 2006). Although Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders make up only 2.8% of the Australian population, they represent over 25% of the Australian prison population (Bushnell, 2017). To examine the factors contributing to this overrepresentation, Snowball and Weatherburn focused on adult offenders convicted of specific offences in New South Wales between 2001 and 2004. In a statistical analysis of case characteristics, the researchers found no evidence of racial bias in sentencing per se. Their results indicated that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander status did not itself lead to a higher risk of a prison sentence, but rather the higher rate of imprisonment of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander offenders can be explained in terms of factors that the courts can legitimately take into account in sentencing, such as prior convictions, or convictions for serious violent offences. Snowball and Weatherburn argued that policies to reduce overrepresentation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander offenders in the prison system should focus on addressing the economic and social disadvantage that might increase Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander involvement in crime. Evidence from the US, however, suggests that sentencing decisions are consistently biased by race. By combing through US death penalty statistics, researchers have found that, all else being equal, convicted murderers are more likely to be sentenced to death if they are black or if the victim is white (Baldus, Woodworth, & Pulaski, 1990). Experimental evidence isolates some of the subtle factors driving this disturbing bias. Informed by the racial stereotyping studies we saw in Chapter 4, Jennifer Eberhardt and colleagues (2006) revisited several capital cases involving black defendants. For each case, they obtained a photograph of the defendant and had university students rate the degree to which the individual had a stereotypically black appearance; for example, a broad nose, thick lips and dark skin. Using these ratings, they found that when the victim was black, the defendant’s appearance was unrelated to sentencing. When the victim was white, however, the death penalty odds were predictable by the blackness of the defendant’s appearance (24% among the least stereotypical; 58% among the most stereotypical). It seems that there are shades of black that influence whether judges and juries perceive defendants to be ‘deathworthy’.

The prison experience It is no secret that the prison population in Australia has grown over the years, with the incarceration rate rising from 168 prisoners per 100 000 Australian adults in 2012 to 216 prisoners per 100 000 Australian adults in 2017 – giving a total prison population of 41 202 (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2017). It is also no secret that prison life can be cruel, violent and degrading, with many prisons overcrowded and unable to provide inmates with the services and treatments they need (Mackay, 2015). The setting is highly oppressive and regimented, some prison guards are abusive, and many inmates fall into a state of despair (Paulus, 1988). Clearly, prisoners are not representative of the population as a whole. Still, it is natural for social psychologists to wonder: is there something about the prison situation that leads guards and prisoners to behave as they do? Would the rest of us react in the same way?

Stanford Prison Experiment For ethical reasons, one obviously cannot place research participants inside a real prison. So, many years ago, a team of researchers from Stanford University did the next best thing; they constructed a simulated Copyright 2020 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-202

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prison in the basement of the psychology department building (Haney, Banks, & Zimbardo, 1973; Haney & Zimbardo, 1998; Zimbardo, Banks, Haney, & Jaffe, 1973). Complete with iron-barred cells, a solitary-confinement closet and a recreation area for guards, the facility housed 21 participants – all healthy and stable men between the ages of 17 and 30 who had answered a newspaper advertisement promising US$15 a day for a two-week study of prison life. By the flip of a coin, half the participants were designated as guards and the other half as prisoners. Neither group was told specifically how to fulfil its role. On the first day, each of the participant prisoners was unexpectedly ‘arrested’ at his home, booked, fingerprinted and driven to the simulated prison by officers of the local police department. These prisoners were then stripped, searched and dressed in loose-fitting smocks with an identification number, a nylon stocking to cover their hair and rubber sandals. A chain was bolted to the ankle of each prisoner. The guards were dressed in khaki uniforms and supplied with nightsticks, handcuffs, reflector sunglasses, keys and whistles. The rules specified that prisoners were to be called by their assigned number, routinely lined up to be counted, fed three bland meals per day and permitted three supervised toilet visits per day (see Figure 15.12). The stage was set. It remained to be seen just how seriously the participants would take their roles and react to one another in this novel setting. FIGURE 15.12 The Stanford prison experiment In this famous simulation study of prison behaviour, subjects were arbitrarily assigned to be prisoners or guards. Local police officers arrested the prisoners, who were brought to a jail constructed at Stanford University. After several days, the guards took on cruel, authoritarian roles that demoralised the prisoners to such an extent that the experiment was terminated.

Source: P. G. Zimbardo, Inc. Stanford, CA.

The events of the next few days were startling – so startling, in fact, that the results of this experiment have made a strong impression on generations of psychology students, and a film about the experiment was released in 2015. Filled with a sense of power and authority, a few guards became progressively more abusive. They harassed the inmates, forced them into crowded cells, woke them during the night and subjected them to hard labour and solitary confinement. These guards were particularly cruel when they thought they were alone with a prisoner. The prisoners themselves were rebellious at first, but their efforts were met with retaliation. Soon they all became passive and demoralised. After 36 hours, the experimenters had to release their first prisoner, who was suffering from acute depression. On subsequent days, other prisoners had to be released. By the sixth day, those who remained were so shaken by the experience that the study was terminated. It is reassuring, if not remarkable, that after a series of debriefing sessions, participants seemed to show no signs of lasting distress.

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Criticisms and questions Stanford Prison Experiment was instantly criticised on methodological and ethical grounds (Banuazizi & Movahedi, 1975; Savin, 1973). Still, the results are fascinating. Within a brief period of time, under relatively mild conditions, and with a group of men not prone to violence, they recreated some of the prisoner and guard behaviours actually found behind prison walls. But would this occur today if the experiment was run again? To find out, social psychologists Steve Reicher and Alex Haslam (2006) worked in the spring of 2002 with the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) to create a survivor-like reality television special called The Experiment, modelled after Zimbardo’s study. Shown in four episodes, the television special brought together 15 men, all of whom were carefully screened, were warned that they would be exposed to hardships, and were randomly assigned to prisoner and guard roles. Determined to set limits, monitor events closely and adhere to ethical guidelines for research with human subjects, Haslam and Reicher did not fully recreate the conditions of the original study and did not observe the same kinds of brutality from the guards. Alex Haslam has also argued that Zimbardo and the other original experimenters ‘actually engaged in “identity leadership”, in which they encouraged the guards to engage in toxic behaviour by trying to persuade them that this was necessary for the achievement of worthy group goals’. These problems challenge the conclusion that normal people can be dehumanised by the mere assignment to institutional roles. They also note that while the Stanford prison study demonstrated oppression and abuse of power, it also provided a glimpse into how members of low-status groups can form a shared identity – which provides a basis for the social psychology of resistance (Haslam & Reicher, 2012). One other profound question has arisen concerning the Stanford prison study, the same question that is often raised about Milgram’s obedience experiments (described in detail in Chapter 7). Did the behaviour of guards reflect on the power of the situation they were in or were the men who took part in the study uniquely prone to violence? Seeking an answer to this question, Thomas Carnahan and Sam McFarland (2007) posted two newspaper advertisements – one, like Zimbardo’s, for a study on prison life; the other, identical in every way except that it omitted the words ‘prison life’. Those who volunteered for the prison study scored higher on tests that measure aggressiveness, authoritarianism and narcissism, and lower on tests that measure empathy and altruism. Reflecting on the differences, these researchers suggested that perhaps the Stanford prison study had attracted individuals who were prone to antisocial behaviour. In response, Craig Haney and Philip Zimbardo (2009) note that volunteers in the original study were also tested and that no personality differences were found between them and the general population. More importantly, they note, no differences were found between those assigned to prisoner and guard roles within the experiment. Reiterating his belief in the power of the situation, Zimbardo (2007) points to the striking parallels between the behaviours observed in his simulated prison and the sadistic abuses of real prisoners in 2004, more than 30 years later, by military guards at the Abu Ghraib Prison in Iraq. Noting that various social psychological factors create a ‘perfect storm’ that leads good people to behave in evil ways, Zimbardo refers to this unfortunate transformation as the ‘Lucifer Effect’, named after God’s favourite angel, Lucifer, who fell from grace and ultimately became Satan.

PERCEPTIONS OF JUSTICE AND THE INFLUENCE OF CULTURE People tend to measure the success of a legal system by its ability to produce fair and accurate results. But is that all there is to justice? Let us step back for a moment from the specifics and ask if it is possible to define justice in a way that is unrelated to outcomes.

Justice as a matter of procedure In a book entitled Procedural Justice (1975), John Thibaut and Laurens Walker proposed that our satisfaction with the way legal and other disputes are resolved depends not only on outcomes but also on the procedures used to achieve those outcomes. Two aspects of procedure are important in this regard. One is decision control – whether a procedure affords the involved parties the power to accept, reject or otherwise influence the final decision. The other is process control – whether it offers the parties an opportunity to present their case to a third-party decision-maker. In the courtroom, of course, the disputants are limited in their decision control. Thus, their satisfaction must depend on whether they feel that they had a chance to express their views. There are two ways to look at the effects of process control on perceptions of justice. Originally, it was thought that people want an opportunity to express their opinions only because having a voice in the

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process improves the odds of achieving a favourable ruling. In this view, process control is satisfying only because it increases decision control (Thibaut & Walker, 1978). However, research suggests that people value the chance to present their side of a story to an impartial decision maker even when they do not prevail in the ultimate outcome. In other words, process control is more than just an instrumental means to an end. When people believe that they have a voice in the proceedings, are treated with respect and are judged by an impartial decision-maker, process control can be an end in itself (Lind, Kanfer, & Farley, 1990).

CULTURAL DIVERSITY PROCEDURAL JUSTICE AROUND THE WORLD Power–distance is a value that varies across cultures. It refers to the degree of hierarchy that people believe to be appropriate in a society or organisation. People in high power–distance cultures (e.g., China or India) tend to believe that societies and organisations function better when there is a more clearly defined, hierarchical structure of power. People in low power– distance cultures (e.g., Australia or the US) tend to believe that there should be a closer and more consultative relationship

between authorities and those they govern (Hofstede, 1980, 2001). Research has shown that the importance of voice, or process control, is moderated by culture. Tom Tyler and colleagues (2000) investigated the value that people place on voice across cultures and found that voice has stronger effects on procedural justice perceptions in low power–distance cultures than in high power–distance cultures (Tyler, Lind, & Huo, 2000).

This aspect of the legal system is important because it makes the system appear fair and legitimate and fosters cooperation – which is why many social psychologists study people’s perceptions of justice (Bradford, 2014; Tornblom & Vermunt, 2007). It means, for example, that regardless of whether people agree or disagree with how a case turns out, they can find solace in the fact that both sides had their ‘day in court’, at least when the decision-maker is seen as impartial. Yet, certain members of the legal community are openly critical of that so-called ‘day in court’. As law professor Alan Dershowitz put it, ‘Nobody really wants justice. Winning is the only thing to most participants in the criminal justice system, just as it is to professional athletes’ (1982, p. xvi).

The adversarial and inquisitorial models Adversarial model

A dispute-resolution system in which the prosecution and defence present opposing sides of the story.

Inquisitorial model

A dispute-resolution system in which a neutral investigator gathers evidence from both sides and presents the findings in court.

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Dershowitz’s scepticism is centred on something that many of us take for granted: the adversarial model of justice. In the adversarial system (as practised in North America, the UK, Australia, New Zealand and a handful of other countries), the prosecution and defence oppose each other, each presenting one side of the story in an effort to win a favourable verdict. By contrast, many other countries (e.g., France and Germany) use an inquisitorial model, in which a neutral investigator gathers the evidence from both sides and presents the findings in court. With two such different methods of doing justice, social psychologists could not resist the temptation to make comparisons (van Koppen & Penrod, 2003). Interested in which approach people prefer, Laurens Walker and colleagues (1974) constructed a business simulation in which two companies competed for a cash prize. Participants who were assigned to the role of president of a company learned that someone on their staff was accused of spying on the competition. To resolve the dispute, a ‘trial’ was held. In some cases, the trial followed an adversarial procedure in which the two sides were presented by law students who were chosen by participants and whose payment was contingent on winning. Other cases followed an inquisitorial model in which a single law student, who was appointed by the experimenter and paid regardless of the outcome, presented both sides. Regardless of whether they had won or lost the verdict, participants who took part in an adversarial trial were more satisfied than those involved in an inquisitorial trial. Even impartial observers preferred the adversarial proceedings. Other researchers found similar results, not only in the US and the UK, where citizens are accustomed to the adversarial system, but in France and West Germany as well (Lind, Erickson, Friedland, & Dickenberger, 1978). This perception of procedural justice is not limited to adversarial methods of resolving legal disputes. Rather, it seems that any method that offers participants a voice in the proceedings, including methods that are non-adversarial, is seen as most fair and just – not only in law but also in business, politics, school settings and intimate relationships (Folger & Greenberg, 1985; Sheppard, 1985). It is also important in this regard for people to perceive that they were granted as much ‘voice’ as others were (Van Prooijen, Van den Bos, Lind, & Wilke, 2006) and that the decision-maker was open-minded and not acting out of self-interest (De Cremer, 2004). In matters of justice, people all over the world are motivated not only by the desire for personal gain but also by their need to be recognised, respected and treated fairly by others who are

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impartial. Research thus shows that for people to accept the rule of law and comply with outcomes they do not like, they must see the decision-making procedures as fair (Miller & Hefner, 2015).

Culture, law and justice When it comes to the basics of human behaviour, much of the research in this chapter can be universally applied. In eyewitness testimony, the problems and limitations of human memory, as seen in our ability to accurately encode, store and retrieve certain types of information, are universal. In police interviews and interrogations, suspects all over the world, including some who are innocent, are more likely to confess when they are isolated and intensely pressured than when they are not. In courtrooms wherever juries are used, their decision-making will invariably reflect the joint influences of their personal dispositions, the information they receive in court and the conformity dynamics that seize hold of small groups. Finally, recurring stories of prison abuses have shown that prison is a social setting that tends to bring out the worst in guards and their prisoners – wherever they are. Although the similarities are clear, there are also important cross-cultural differences. Because cultures have different norms, customs and values, they also create different laws to regulate their citizens’ behaviour. To be sure, certain universal values have evolved among humans and are passed from one generation to the next, such as prohibitions against physical violence, taking someone’s property without consent, and deception in important transactions. In other ways, however, the world’s cultural and religious groups differ markedly in the behaviours they scorn and seek to regulate. In some countries, but not in others, it is against the law to have sex outside of marriage, take more than one husband or wife, assist in a suicide, gamble, eat meat or drink alcohol. Based on the belief in an afterlife, some religions prohibit autopsies. And others impose strict dress codes, particularly for women.

Cultural differences in diverse populations In diverse populations such as the US, Australia, New Zealand and the UK, differing cultural practices can put governments and cultures in conflict with one another. In one highly publicised case, a Japanese woman living in California was prosecuted for drowning her two children in the Pacific Ocean before being rescued herself. At trial, she testified that she had tried to commit oyaku-shinju, a Japanese custom of parent– child suicide, after learning that her husband was having an affair. Her motive, she said, was to save her children from the shame that their father had brought to the family. In the Northern Territory in Australia, courts have discounted sentences when an Aboriginal offender has undergone or will undergo traditional punishment involving shaming, exile, compensation or spearing. Judges issued these discounted sentences on the basis of double jeopardy, the function of traditional punishment in the maintenance of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities, and because traditional punishments were a fact of the defendant’s community circumstances (R v. Mamarika [1982]; Jadurin v. R [1982]; R v. Minor [1992]; Munugurr v. R [1994]; R v. Miyatatawuy [1996]; R v. Poulson [2001]). As these examples illustrate, judges and juries are sometimes asked to consider cultural issues in their decision-making (Renteln, 2004).

Differences in legal processes Just as nations differ in the crime laws that are set, the study of comparative law shows that they also differ in the processes used to enforce these laws. In the UK, the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, the accused has a right to be tried by a jury composed of fellow citizens. In France, Russia and Brazil, that right is reserved for only the most serious crimes. In India and throughout Asia, all defendants are tried by professional judges, not juries. Yet China recently introduced mixed panels consisting of one judge and two lay jurors. Beginning in 2009, Japan also started to use a quasi-jury system, called saiban-in, in which three law-trained judges and six lay citizens chosen by lottery come together to render verdicts and sentencing decisions by a majority vote. Ever since juries were abolished in Japan during World War II, all Japanese defendants have been tried by three-judge panels, and almost all have been convicted, typically after confessing to save face and minimise embarrassment to their family.

Differences in sentencing For people judged guilty of serious crimes, the consequences may also vary from one country to another. As noted earlier, ‘doing justice’ often means punishing those who violate rules as a means of seeking retribution. But whether people are offended enough to seek revenge depends in part on the power of individualist and collectivist norms within the culture. For example, research shows that US university students are offended more when their personal rights are violated (e.g., when a peer steals the credit for their idea), while Korean students are offended more when their sense of duty and obligation is violated Copyright 2020 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-202

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(e.g., when a peer fails to contribute his or her promised share in a cooperative effort) (Shteynberg, Gelfand, & Kim, 2009). When it comes to punishment, the most notable cultural difference concerns the death penalty. In the case of the Bali Nine, where two Australians, Andre Chan and Myuran Sukumaran, were executed in Indonesia on 29 April 2015 for attempting to smuggle heroin out of Bali, people from all over the world took a stand against capital punishment. In the days leading up to the execution, many turned to social media to voice their dissent and to attempt to sway the Indonesian government from taking the lives of the offenders. Online campaigns such as #Keep Hope Alive and #I Stand for Mercy were created, gathering support not only from the general public but from celebrities and members of Australian parliament (Amnesty International, 2016). Currently the death penalty is utilised or not in different ways across the world: • 97 countries prohibit the death penalty for all crimes, including Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, the UK, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and Venezuela • eight ban the death penalty as a general rule but permit it for exceptional crimes, such as espionage or crimes committed in exceptional circumstances, including Brazil, Chile, Israel and Peru • 36 countries allow for the death penalty by law but do not execute people as a matter of practice, including Algeria, Kenya, Morocco and Russia • 57 countries permit and use the death penalty; including China, Cuba, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, India, Japan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Thailand and the US. On matters of crime and punishment, it is clear that cultural influences are substantial.

CRITICAL THINKING ACTIVITY The majority of research in this field has been done in the US. However, as we have pointed out throughout this chapter, many countries do not share the eyewitness identification procedures, interviewing methods, jury trial mechanisms, justice processes and prison conditions of the US. Think about

how you might extend the study of social psychology and the law to your own country. How would you conduct social psychological research that would investigate the effectiveness of laws and legal processes in your own jurisdiction?

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGISTS’ ROLE IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM This chapter focused on criminal justice, from the gathering of evidence from witnesses and suspects to the various stages of a jury trial, sentencing and prison. Yet we’ve only scratched the surface. In recent years, more and more judges, lawyers and policymakers have come to recognise that social psychology can make important contributions to the legal system. Thus, with increasing frequency, social psychologists are called on for expert advice in and out of court, and are cited in the opinions written by judges. Clearly, the collection, presentation and evaluation of evidence are imperfect human enterprises and subject to bias. Through an understanding of social psychology, however, we can now identify the problems – and even some solutions.

RESEARCH SPOTLIGHT

Source: Courtesy of Dr Blake McKimmie.

DR BLAKE McKIMMIE, UNIVERSITY OF QUEENSLAND What are the topic areas of your research? I have two main areas of research. The first is jury decision-making. In this area I am interested in the way in which jurors are influenced by expert testimony; how stereotypes about defendants, witnesses and victims influence jurors’ perceptions; and how jurors understand and use judicial directions. My second main area of research is how groups affect individuals. In this area, I have studied how

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dissonance is experienced in groups, how group norms and dissent influence attitudes and behaviour, and how being in a group impacts on how we experience stress. Which of your research findings have you found most intriguing? In one series of studies we looked at the way in which stereotypes about defendants influence mock jurors’ perceptions in a hypothetical criminal case. We were interested in finding out whether stereotypes might be just a simple decision cue. Generally, the research has cast perceivers as being cognitive misers or mental sluggards. This is true of the persuasion literature in general, and also the

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jury decision-making literature. Recent work suggests that perceivers might actually be better thought of as cognitive optimisers in that they use stereotypes to strategically extract as much information as possible from a social situation when under high cognitive demands. This perspective argues that perceivers use flexible encoding strategies by encoding targets according to stereotypes where possible, freeing up capacity to use more detail-oriented encoding for other aspects of the context. In our research, we took this optimiser perspective and examined whether presenting mock jurors with a stereotypical defendant would mean that the case evidence would receive more careful consideration. We manipulated both the stereotypicality of the defendant and the strength of the case evidence. The defendant was described as being male or female – some initial pilot work indicated that for crimes such as certain types of murder and armed robbery, men are seen as the stereotypical offender. In our first study, we found that evidence strength mattered most when the defendant was male compared with female. We conducted a second study to see whether this was because participants couldn’t use a stereotype to encode information about the female defendant and so had to rely on more effortful feature-based encoding at the expense of paying attention to the evidence. We tested whether participants were better able to recognise the counter-stereotypical versus stereotypical defendant in a photo array after the case was presented. Consistent with our predictions and the findings of the first study, this is exactly what we found. A final study using a 30-minute video trial found, consistent with this, that participants also spent

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longer looking at the counter-stereotypical defendant. Thus, the results suggest that mock jurors can best be thought of as cognitive optimisers rather than cognitive misers (McKimmie et al., 2012). How did you become interested in your area of research? I started out studying law, psychology and computer science. During the course of my undergraduate studies I gravitated towards psychology, and ended up doing a PhD in social psychology (in the area of cognitive dissonance). From the start of my PhD, I had a parallel line of research on expert testimony, which is what then developed into my broader work on jury decision-making. I guess, although I never finished my law degree, I never lost interest in the intersection between psychology and law. How does your area of research speak to life in Australia and New Zealand? Although juries are only involved in a small fraction of all trials in Australia and New Zealand, the trials that they do take part in are often those with the most extreme potential consequences for defendants. Not only that, juries are seen as one of the last ways in which the average person can be directly involved in the running of society. Juries are also important for public confidence in the legal system and administration of justice. Because of both the real and symbolic impact of juries on our lives in Australia and New Zealand, it is essential that we understand how they function by collecting empirical data, so that we can make sound recommendations about potential changes to the jury system.

Topical Reflection MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE – THE SOCIAL IMPACT A range of human factors can impact the effective functioning of every stage of the legal system. For the Chamberlain family, the trauma of losing a child was compounded by ongoing battles with a legal system that wrongfully convicted a grieving mother. Lindy Chamberlain spent three years in prison for a murder that she did not commit, and gave birth to her fourth child while in prison. The errors made in cases like this can also be costly to the justice system. In 1992, Lindy Chamberlain was awarded $1.3 million in restitution for the time that she spent in prison, and the legal and other costs that she incurred fighting her case. In 2012, a coroner’s inquest finally ruled that a dingo had taken Azaria Chamberlain from a campsite in the Northern Territory in 1980, leading to her death. Elizabeth Morris, the Deputy Coroner who delivered the decision, said: ‘Mrs Chamberlain-Creighton, Mr Chamberlain, Aidan and your extended families, please accept my sincere sympathy on the death of your special and loved daughter and sister, Azaria. I am so sorry for your loss. Time does not remove the pain and sadness of the death of a child’ (Milsom, 2012).

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CHAPTER REVIEW SUMMARY EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY • Mistaken eyewitness identifications are the most frequent cause of wrongful convictions. • Eyewitness memory is a three-stage process involving encoding, storage and retrieval. PERCEPTION • During encoding, witnesses who are highly stressed zoom in on the central features of an event but lose memory for peripheral details. • The presence of a weapon hinders a witness’s ability to identify the perpetrator. • Witnesses have trouble recognising members of a race other than their own. STORING MEMORIES • During storage, misleading post-event information biases eyewitness memory. • Young children are particularly suggestible in this regard. IDENTIFYING THE CULPRIT • In court, jurors overestimate eyewitnesses’ accuracy and cannot distinguish between accurate and inaccurate witnesses. • Line-ups are biased when a suspect is distinctive, when the police hint that the criminal is in the line-up, when witnesses make relative judgements and when the suspect is familiar for other reasons. TESTIFYING IN COURT • In court, jurors overestimate eyewitnesses’ accuracy and cannot distinguish between accurate and inaccurate witnesses. • People are too readily persuaded by a witness’s confidence – a factor that does not reliably predict identification accuracy. IMPROVING EYEWITNESS JUSTICE • Psychologists are sometimes called to testify as experts on eyewitness evidence. • Through reforms to police practices, social psychologists have also helped to improve the accuracy of eyewitness identifications.

PUTTING COMMON SENSE TO THE TEST The more confident an eyewitness is about an identification, the more accurate he or she is likely to be. FALSE. Studies have shown that the confidence of an eyewitness does not reliably predict accuracy, in part because confidence is influenced by post-identification factors. Eyewitnesses find it relatively difficult to recognise members of a race other than their own. TRUE. Researchers have observed this own-race identification bias in both laboratory and field settings. 664

CONFESSIONS SUSPECT INTERVIEWS AND LIE DETECTION • The Reid Technique instructs police to conduct interviews to determine if suspects are telling the truth or if they are lying and should be interrogated. • These judgements of truth and deception are not highly accurate. • Polygraph examiners report high rates of accuracy; however, truthful individuals are too often judged guilty, and the test can be fooled. POLICE INTERROGATIONS • In accusatorial models of interrogation, the police employ various methods designed to induce suspects believed to be guilty to confess. • One method is to befriend the suspect and ‘minimise’ the offence; a second is to scare the suspect into believing that it is futile to deny the charges. FALSE CONFESSIONS • Under pressure, people sometimes give false confessions to crimes they did not commit. • Actual cases and laboratory research show that certain interrogation tactics, such as the presentation of false evidence and offers of leniency, increase false confessions. CONFESSIONS IN THE COURTROOM • Although judges and juries are supposed to reject coerced confessions, their verdicts are still influenced by such evidence. POLICE INTERVIEWING: BEYOND NORTH AMERICA • In Australia, information-gathering models are employed in which police aim to gather evidence (rather than extract confessions) from suspects.

PUTTING COMMON SENSE TO THE TEST It is not possible to knowingly fool a lie-detector test. FALSE. It is possible to beat a lie-detector test by elevating arousal when ‘innocent’ questions are asked but not by trying to suppress arousal in response to ‘guilty’ questions. Without being beaten or threatened, innocent people sometimes confess to crimes they did not commit. TRUE. Innocent suspects sometimes confess, either to escape an unpleasant situation or because they are led to believe they committed a crime they cannot recall.

JURY DECISION-MAKING JURY SELECTION • Once called for service, prospective jurors are screened by the judge or lawyers in a process known as empanelment (Australia) or voir dire (US). • Those who exhibit a clear bias are excluded. Lawyers may also strike out a limited number of jurors through the use of peremptory challenges.

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• • •

•

Pressured to make juror selections quickly, lawyers rely on implicit personality theories and stereotypes. But general demographic factors do not reliably predict how jurors will vote. In the US, where parties can question jurors extensively, lawyers sometimes hire psychologists to conduct surveys that identify correlations between demographics and trial-relevant attitudes. Whether or not jurors are biased by race may depend on the strength of the evidence, the extent to which attention is drawn to race, and the diversity of the jury as a whole.

THE COURTROOM TRIAL • Once the jury is selected, evidence previously gathered is presented in court. • Questions are often raised about whether juries are accurate and objective or biased in their decision-making. • Research shows that pretrial publicity can bias jury verdicts. • Once inadmissible testimony leaks out in court, the jury is contaminated by it. • The judge’s instructions often have little impact, in part because they are often incomprehensible. • The judge’s instructions are usually delivered after the evidence, after many jurors have formed an opinion. JURY DELIBERATIONS • Certain people are more likely than others to be elected foreperson, but the foreperson tends to play the role of moderator rather than group leader. • Jury deliberations are filled with informational and normative pressures. • When it comes to outcomes, the initial majority typically wins, although deliberation tends to produce a leniency bias. • Many courts around the world have ruled that the use of juries smaller than 12 people is acceptable, but these smaller groups do not deliberate for as long as 12-person juries do and contain less minority representation. • In some jurisdictions, juries are permitted to reach verdicts by a less-than-unanimous majority. • Research shows that once a required majority is reached, these juries reject the holdouts, terminate discussion and return a verdict.

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POST-TRIAL THE SENTENCING PROCESS • Many people believe that judges are too lenient and that punishments for the same offence are often inconsistent from one case to another. • Part of the problem is that people have different views of the goals of sentencing and punishment. THE PRISON EXPERIENCE • Stanford researchers built a simulated prison and recruited male adults to act as guards and prisoners. • During the Stanford Prison Experiment some guards were abusive, the prisoners became passive and the study had to be terminated. • To this day, the Stanford Prison Experiment continues to draw debate concerning the power of the situation and the similarity between these findings and more recent events.

PERCEPTIONS OF JUSTICE AND THE INFLUENCE OF CULTURE JUSTICE AS A MATTER OF PROCEDURE • Satisfaction with justice depends not only on winning and losing but also on the procedures used to achieve the outcome. • People of all cultures prefer models of justice that offer participants a voice in the proceedings and the opportunity to be judged by an impartial decision maker. CULTURE, LAW AND JUSTICE • Reflecting cultural and religious values, countries set different laws in an effort to regulate behaviour. • In diverse populations, differing cultural practices sometimes put governments into conflict with segments of their population. • Cultures also differ in the processes used to enforce laws and the consequences for those who are convicted.

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGISTS’ ROLE IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM • Increasingly, social psychologists have become involved in studying the legal system – identifying the problems and seeking solutions.

PUTTING COMMON SENSE TO THE TEST One can usually predict a jury’s final verdict by knowing where the individual jurors stand the first time they vote. TRUE. As a result of both informational and normative group influences, the preference of the initial voting majority usually prevails.

LINKAGES As noted in Chapter 1, ‘Introducing psychology’, all of psychology’s subfields are related to one another. Our discussion of confessions in interrogations illustrates just one way in which a topic in this chapter, confessions, is linked to the subfield of compliance (see Chapter 7, ‘Conformity, Compliance and Obedience’). The ‘Linkages’

diagram shows ties to two other subfields as well, and there are many more ties throughout the book. Looking for linkages among subfields will help you see how they all fit together and help you better appreciate the big picture that is psychology.

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15

Law

LINKAGES

What drives sentencing disparity?

CHAPTER

4

Stereotypes, prejudice and discrimination

Why do people falsely confess during interrogations?

CHAPTER

7

Conformity, compliance and obedience

How does jury deliberation affect verdicts?

CHAPTER

8

Group Processes

REVIEW QUIZ 1 When judging the credibility of eyewitnesses, jurors: a tend to believe confident eyewitnesses. b are very sceptical of confident eyewitnesses. c are good at detecting whether eyewitnesses are lying. d are good at detecting whether eyewitnesses are accurate. 2 Research shows that false confessions: a occur in the laboratory but not in real cases. b can occur, but it is not possible to convince an innocent person that they are actually guilty. c only occur when an innocent person believes that they are actually guilty. d can occur as a result of compliance or internalisation. 3 Judges’ instructions to jurors are generally: a framed in simple language that jurors understand. b framed in complex language that jurors do not understand.

c framed in complex language, but research shows that jurors understand them quite well. d designed by judges in consultation with psychologists to ensure that jurors understand them. 4 Which of the following factors are known to contribute to sentencing disparity? a Anchoring effects b Defendant race c Both a and b d None of the above 5 The two key aspects of procedures that drive people’s perceptions of justice are: a process control and decision control. b voice and trust. c decision control and adversarial control. d none of the above.

WEBLINKS Australia New Zealand Association of Psychiatry, Psychology and Law https://anzappl.org American Psychology-Law Society https://www.apadivisions.org/division-41/index European Association of Psychology and Law http://eapl.eu Three professional societies that focus on the application of psychology to the legal system, with information about research on the application of psychology to legal issues and problems.

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Coerced confession http://www.oprah.com/oprahshow/marty-tankleffs-wrongfulconviction Oprah Winfrey’s coverage of the Marty Tankleff case, in which an innocent man was convicted on the basis of a false confession. Innocence Project https://www.innocenceproject.org The website of this US-based organisation in which lawyers and scientists collaborate to investigate claims of wrongful conviction and exonerate those who have been wrongfully convicted. The site contains information about exonerees and the key features of their cases.

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Innocence Project, Griffith University https://www.griffith.edu.au/arts-education-law/griffith-lawschool/learning-teaching/innocence-project A member of the Innocence Network (the worldwide network of Innocence Projects); it investigates Australian claims of wrongful conviction, working to exonerate Australians who have been wrongfully convicted.

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Wrongful convictions https://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/lawreport/ wrongful-convictions/3886774 A radio story about Betty Anne Waters, who earned a law degree following her brother’s wrongful conviction, and found the evidence that exonerated him.

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answer questions about touching? Current Directions in Psychological Science, 20, 11–15. Poole, D., & Lindsay, D. S. (2001). Children’s eyewitness reports after exposure to misinformation from parents. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied, 7, 27–50. Poole, D. A., & White, L. T. (1991). Effects of question repetition on the eyewitness testimony of children and adults. Developmental Psychology, 27, 975–986. Possley, M. (2012). Margaret Kelly Michaels. The National Registry of Exonerations. Retrieved from https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/ Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3867 Pozzulo, J., Bennell, C., & Forth, A. (2009). Forensic psychology (2nd ed.). Toronto, ON: Pearson Prentice Hall. Principe, G. F., & Ceci, S. J. (2002). ‘I saw it with my own ears’: The effects of peer conversations on preschoolers’ reports of nonexperienced events. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 83, 1–25. Principe, G. F., Ornstein, P. A., Baker-Ward, L., & Gordon, B. N. (2000). The effects of intervening experiences on children’s memory for a physical examination. Applied Cognitive Psychology 14, 59–80. Queensland Law Reform Commission. (2011). A review of jury selection. QLRC Publication No. 68. Retrieved from http://www.qlrc.qld.gov.au/reports/ r68.pdf R v. Button [2001] QCA 133 R v. Cornelius [1994] 2 NZLR 74 (CA) R v. Grant and Lovett [1972] VR 423 R v. Mamarika (1982). 5 A Crim R 354 (NT) R v. Minor (1992). 59 A Crim R 227 (NT) R v. Miyatatawuy (1995). 87 A Crim R 574 (NT) R v. Murray (1981). 7 A Crim R 48 R v. Poulson (2001). 122 A Crim R 388 (NT) Reicher, S. D., & Haslam, S. A. (2006). Rethinking the psychology of tyranny: The BBC prison study. British Journal of Social Psychology, 45, 1–40. Renteln, A. D. (2004). The cultural defense. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Reyna, V. F., Hans, V. P., Corbin, J. C., Yeh, R., Lin, K., & Royer, C. (2015). The gist of juries: Testing a model of damage award decision making. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 21(3), 280. Rhodes, M. G., & Anastasi, J. S. (2012). The own-age bias in face recognition: A meta-analytic and theoretical review. Psychological Bulletin, 138, 146–174. Rigdon, S. (2018). Exact Bayesian inference for assessing the accuracy of polygraph testing. Journal Of The Indian Society For Probability And Statistics, 19(1), 67–78. Rose, V. G., & Ogloff, J. R. P. (2001). Evaluating the comprehensibility of jury instructions: A method and an example. Law and Human Behavior, 25, 409–431. Russano, M. B., Meissner, C. A., Narchet, F. M., & Kassin, S. M. (2005). Investigating true and false confessions within a novel experimental paradigm. Psychological Science, 16, 481–486. Ruva, C. L., & Guenther, C. C. (2015). From the shadows into the light: How pretrial publicity and deliberation affect mock jurors’ decisions, impressions, and memory. Law and Human Behavior, 39(3), 294–310. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/lhb0000117 Ruva, C. L., & LeVasseur, M. A. (2012). Behind closed doors: The effect of pretrial publicity on jury deliberations. Psychology, Crime & Law, 18, 431–452. Saks, M. J. (1974). Ignorance of science is no excuse. Trial, 10, 18–20. Saks, M. J., & Marti, M. W. (1997). A meta-analysis of the effects of jury size. Law and Human Behavior, 21, 451–468. Sargent, M. J., & Bradfield, A. L. (2004). Race and information processing in criminal trials: Does the

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defendant’s race affect how the facts are evaluated? Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 30, 995–1008. Sartori, G., Agosta, S., Zogmaister, C., Ferrara, S. D., & Castiello, U. (2008). How to accurately assess autobiographical events. Psychological Science, 19, 772–780. Savin, H. B. (1973). Professors and psychological researchers: Conflicting values in conflicting roles. Cognition, 2, 147–149. Schanz, K., & Salfati, C. G. (2016). The CSI effect and its controversial existence and impact: a mixed methods review. Crime Psychology Review, 2(1), 60–79. doi: 10.1080/23744006.2016.1260276 Scherr, K. C., & Madon, S. (2013). ‘Go ahead and sign’: An experimental examination of Miranda waivers and comprehension. Law and Human Behavior, 37, 208. Schulman, J., Shaver, P., Colman, R., Emrick, B., & Christie, R. (1973, May). Recipe for a jury. Psychology Sustainable Development Solutions Network. Seltzer, R. (2006). Scientific jury selection: Does it work? Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 36, 2417–2435. Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic), Version No. 110, No. 49 of 1991. Version incorporating amendments as at 15 January 2009. Shapiro, P. N., & Penrod, S. (1986). Meta-analysis of facial identification studies. Psychological Bulletin, 100, 139–156. Shaw, J., & Porter, S. (2015). Constructing rich false memories of committing crime. Psychological Science, 26(3), 291–301. Sheppard, B. H. (1985). Justice is no simple matter: Case for elaborating our model of procedural fairness. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 49, 953–962. Shteynberg, G., Gelfand, M. J., & Kim, K. (2009). Peering into the ‘magnum mysterium’ of culture: The explanatory power of descriptive norms. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 40, 46–69. Skagerberg, E. M. (2007). Co-witness feedback in line-ups. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 21, 489–497. Smalarz, L., & Wells, G. L. (2014). Post-identification feedback to eyewitnesses impairs evaluators’ abilities to discriminate between accurate and mistaken testimony. Law and Human Behavior, 38(2), 194. Smith, V. L., & Kassin, S. M. (1993). Effects of the dynamite charge on the deliberations of deadlocked mock juries. Law and Human Behavior, 17, 625–643. Snowball, L., & Weatherburn, D. (2006, September). Indigenous over-representation in prison: The role of offender characteristics. Crime and Justice Bulletin: Contemporary Issues in Criminal Justice, 99. Retrieved from http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/bocsar/ ll_bocsar.nsf/vwFiles/CJB99.pdf/$file/CJB99.pdf Sommers, S. (2006). On racial diversity and group decision making: Identifying multiple effects of racial composition on jury deliberations. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 90, 597–612. Sommers, S. R., & Ellsworth, P. C. (2001). White juror bias: An investigation of racial prejudice against black defendants in the American courtroom. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 7, 201–229. Sommers, S. R., & Norton, M. I. (2007). Race-based judgments, race-neutral justifications: Experimental examination of peremptory use and the Batson challenge procedure. Law and Human Behavior, 31, 261–273. Sommers, S. R., & Norton, M. I. (2008). Race and jury selection: Psychological perspectives on the peremptory challenge debate. American Psychologist, 63, 527–539. Sporer, S. L., Penrod, S. D., Read, J. D., & Cutler, B. L. (1995). Choosing, confidence, and accuracy: A meta-analysis of the confidence-accuracy relation

in eyewitness identification studies. Psychological Bulletin, 118, 315–327. Stalans, L. J., & Diamond, S. S. (1990). Formation and change in lay evaluations of criminal sentencing: Misperception and discontent. Law and Human Behavior, 14, 199–214. Stark, C. E. L., Okado, Y., & Loftus, E. F. (2010). Imaging the reconstruction of true and false memories using sensory reactivation and the misinformation paradigms. Learning and Memory, 17, 485–488. Stasser, G., & Davis, J. H. (1981). Group decision making and social influence: A social interaction sequence model. Psychological Review, 88, 523–551. Stasser, G., Kerr, N. L., & Bray, R. M. (1982). The social psychology of jury deliberations: Structure, process, and product. In N. Kerr & R. Bray (Eds.), The psychology of the courtroom (pp. 221–256). New York, NY: Academic Press. Steblay, N. K., Dysart, J. E., & Wells, G. L. (2011). Seventy-two tests of the sequential lineup superiority effect: A meta-analysis and policy discussion. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 17, 99–139. Steblay, N. K., Wells, G. L., & Douglass, A. B. (2014). The eyewitness post identification feedback effect 15 years later: Theoretical and policy implications. Psychology, Public Policy and Law, 20(1), 1–18. doi: 10.1037/law0000001 Steblay, N. M. (1992). A meta-analytic review of the weapon-focus effect. Law and Human Behavior, 16, 413–424. Steblay, N. M. (1997). Social influence in eyewitness recall: A meta-analytic review of lineup instruction effects. Law and Human Behavior, 21, 283–297. Steblay, N., Besirevic, J., Fulero, S., & JiminezLorente, B. (1999). The effects of pretrial publicity on juror verdicts: A meta-analytic review. Law and Human Behavior, 23, 219–235. Steblay, N., Hosch, H. M., Culhane, S. E., & McWethy, A. (2006). The impact on juror verdicts of judicial instruction to disregard inadmissible evidence: A meta-analysis. Law and Human Behavior, 30, 469–492. Strier, F. (1999). Whither trial consulting: Issues and projections. Law and Human Behavior, 23, 93–115. Strodtbeck, F. L., & Hook, L. (1961). The social dimensions of a twelve-man jury table. Sociometry, 24, 397–415. Strodtbeck, F. L., James, R., & Hawkins, C. (1957). Social status in jury deliberations. American Sociological Review, 22, 713–719. Studebaker, C. A., & Penrod, S. D. (1997). Pretrial publicity: The media, the law, and common sense. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 3, 428–460. Sue, S., Smith, R. E., & Caldwell, C. (1973). Effects of inadmissible evidence on the decisions of simulated jurors: A moral dilemma. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 3, 345–353. Thibaut, J., & Walker, L. (1975). Procedural justice: A psychological analysis. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Thibaut, J., & Walker, L. (1978). A theory of procedure. California Law Review, 66, 541–566. Tornblom, K., & Vermunt, R. (Eds.) (2007). Distributive and procedural justice: Research and social applications. Burlington, VT: Ashgate. Tyler, T. R. (2006). Viewing CSI and the threshold of guilt: Managing truth and justice in reality and fiction. Yale Law Journal, 115, 1050–1085. Tyler, T. R. (2011). Why people cooperate: The role of social motivations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Tyler, T. R., Lind, E. A., & Huo, Y. J. (2000). Cultural values and authority relations: The psychology of conflict resolution across cultures. Psychology, Public Policy, & Law, 6, 1138–1163.

CHAPTER FIFTEEN

van Koppen, P. J., & Penrod, S. D. (Eds.). (2003). Adversarial versus inquisitorial justice: Psychological perspectives on criminal justice systems. New York, NY: Kluwer Academic/Plenum. Van Prooijen, J. W., Van den Bos, K., Lind, E. A., & Wilke, H. (2006). How do people react to negative procedures? On the moderating role of authority’s biased attitudes. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 42, 632–645. Victorian Government. (2015). Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic). Retrieved from http://www.legislation.vic. gov.au/domino/web_notes/ldms/pubstatbook.nsf/ f932b66241ecf1b7ca256e92000e23be/FE9B106C48805 E41CA257E43000B6720/$FILE/15-014aa%20authorised. pdf Victorian Government. (2017). Jury Directions and Other Acts Amendment Act 2017 (Vic). Retrieved from http://www.legislation.vic.gov. au/domino/web_notes/ldms/pubstatbook.nsf/ f932b66241ecf1b7ca256e92000e23be/BBFE8F6F186CE7 AECA25818B001ECFE7/$FILE/17-037aa%20authorised. pdf Vidmar, N., & Hans, V. P. (2007). American juries: The verdict. Amherst, NY: Prometheus. Vrij, A. (2008). Detecting lies and deceit: Pitfalls and opportunities. Chichester, UK: Wiley. Vrij, A., Granhag, P. A., & Porter, S. (2010). Pitfalls and opportunities in nonverbal and verbal lie detection. Psychological Science in the Public Interest, 11, 89–121. Wade, K. A., Garry, M., & Pezdek, K. (2018). Deconstructing rich false memories of committing crime: commentary on Shaw and Porter (2015). Psychological Science, 29(3), 471–476. Walker, L., LaTour, S., Lind, E. A., & Thibaut, J. (1974). Reactions of participants and observers to modes of adjudication. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 4, 295–310. Wallace, D. B., & Kassin S. M. (2012). Harmless error analysis: How do judges respond to confession errors? Law and Human Behavior, 36, 151–157. Warmelink, L., Vrij, A., Mann, S., Leal, S., Forrester, D., & Fisher, R. (2011). Thermal imaging as a lie detection tool at airports. Law and Human Behavior, 35, 40–48. Weathered, L. (2003). The emergence of Innocence Projects in the correction of wrongful conviction in Australia. Griffith Law Review, 12(1), 64–90. Wegner, D. M. (1994). Ironic processes of mental control. Psychological Review, 101, 34–52. Weir, K. (2016). Mistaken identity: Is eyewitness identification more reliable than we think? Monitor in Psychology, 47(2), 40. Retrieved from https://www.apa. org/monitor/2016/02/mistaken-identity.aspx Wells, G. L., & Bradfield, A. L. (1998). ‘Good, you identified the suspect’: Feedback to eyewitnesses distorts their reports of the witnessing experience. Journal of Applied Psychology, 83, 360–376. Wells, G. L., Charman, S. D., & Olson, E. A. (2005). Building face composites can harm lineup identification performance. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied, 11, 147–156. Wells, G. L., Lindsay, R. C. L., & Ferguson, T. J. (1979). Accuracy, confidence, and juror perceptions in eyewitness identification. Journal of Applied Psychology, 64, 440–448. Wells, G. L., & Murray, D. M. (1984). Eyewitness confidence. In G. Wells & E. Loftus (Eds.), Eyewitness testimony: Psychological perspectives (pp. 155–170). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. Wells, G. L., Steblay, N. K., & Dysart, J. E. (2015). Double-blind photo lineups using actual eyewitnesses: An experimental test of a sequential versus simultaneous lineup procedure. Law and Human Behavior, 39(1), 1.

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Wells, G. L., Yang, Y., & Smalarz, L. (2015). Eyewitness identification: Bayesian information gain, base-rate effect–equivalency curves, and reasonable suspicion. Law and Human Behavior, 39(2), 99–122. doi: 10.1037/lhb0000125 Wells, J. E. (2006). Twelve-month prevalence. In M. A. Oakley Browne, J. E. Wells, K. M. Scott (Eds.), Te Rau Hinengaro: The New Zealand mental health survey. Wellington: Ministry of Health. Wiener, R. L., Prichard, C. C., & Weston, M. (1995). Comprehensibility of approved jury instructions in capital murder cases. Journal of Applied Psychology, 80, 455–467. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970). Wise, R. A., & Safer, M. A. (2004). What U.S. judges know and believe about eyewitness testimony. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 18, 427–443.

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Yuille, J. C., & Tollestrup, P. A. (1990). Some effects of alcohol on eyewitness memory. Journal of Applied Psychology, 75, 268–273. Zeisel, H., & Diamond, S. (1978). The effect of peremptory challenges on jury and verdict: An experiment in a federal district court. Stanford Law Review, 30, 491–531. Zimbardo, P. G. (2007). The Lucifer Effect: How good people turn evil. New York, NY: Random House. Zimbardo, P. G., Banks, W. C., Haney, C., & Jaffe, D. (1973, 8 April). The mind is a formidable jailer: A Pirandellian prison. New York Times Magazine, pp. 38–60.

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CHAPTER

Business

16

Learning Objectives By the end of this chapter, you should be able to: 1 define industrial/organisational psychology 2 describe the effectiveness of the traditional employment interview, and discuss social psychological perspectives on the debate concerning affirmative action in hiring and promotion 3 identify the types of performance appraisals commonly used 4 identify the different types of leadership and discuss the problems faced by women and ethnic minorities when it comes to advancement in the workplace 5 discuss economic decision-making and the symbolic power of money.

Rudeness – the new workplace flu Hershcovis, Ogunfowora, Reich, & Christie, 2017). And research conducted by Trevor Foulk and colleagues (2016) unfortunately indicates that like the common cold, common negative workplace behaviours can spread easily and have significant consequences for people in organisations. You can find out more about this research in the Topical Reflections feature at the end of the chapter. In this chapter we examine the social side of business and the role of social factors in the workplace.

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Source: iStock.com/fizkesi

How many times have you experienced rude behaviour in the workplace? A casual rolling of the eyes when you speak, a co-worker not saying hello to you when they arrive at work, a co-worker who continually insults you (in jest of course!) or sends you rude emails – these low intensity, deviant behaviours with an ambiguous intent to harm are collectively referred to as workplace incivility (Andersson & Pearson, 1999). Unfortunately, workplace incivility has the capacity to escalate in terms of its intensity and its effect, with research showing negative impacts on wellbeing, work attitudes and behaviours, creativity, productivity and performance (Cortina, Magley, Williams, & Langhout, 2001; Hershcovis, 2011;

PART FIVE

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AND REAL-WORLD APPLICATIONS

PUTTING COMMON SENSE TO THE TEST Circle Your Answer T

F

Although flawed, job interviews consistently make for better hiring decisions.

T

F

A problem with having workers evaluate their own job performance is that self-ratings are overly positive.

T

F

The most effective type of leader is one who knows how to win support through the use of reward.

T

F

People who feel overpaid work harder on the job than those who see their pay as appropriate.

WHENEVER TWO ADULTS meet for the first time, the opening line of their conversation is predictable: ‘So, what do you do?’ ‘Oh, I’m a [social psychologist]. And you?’ For many people, work is an integral part of their personal identity. Of course, most of us would rather spend our days lying on a warm and breezy beach, reading a novel and sipping a tropical drink, but most people spend more time on work than leisure. In large part, we work to make money, but jobs also provide us with activity, a sense of purpose and a social community. There is no doubt that the concept of work and its role in society is evolving at a pace which is sometimes difficult to comprehend. The International Labour Organization World Employment and Social Outlook report for 2018 shows that although the global unemployment rate is stabilising, vulnerable employment is on the rise, with almost 1.4 billion people in 2017 in vulnerable employment and an additional 35 million expected to join them by 2019.

The changing nature of work FIGURE 16.1 The future of the gig economy The future of the gig economy appears to be strong with a report from Manpower in 2017 indicating a majority of people are keen to try this type of work and those that have are keen to continue. The trend towards alternative, flexible, contractual type work is growing stronger across the globe. 19%

Only work I can find

21%

Feels less stressful

23%

Try temporary job first

25%

Get hired permanently

28%

Spend time with family

31%

Try different job/roles

32%

Control my schedule

33%

Learn new skills

38%

Earn extra money

Source: ManpowerGroup. (2017). Gig responsibility: The rise of NextGen Work. Adapted from https://www.manpowergroup.com.au/documents/ white-papers/2017_MG_GiggingResponsibly.pdf

674

Over the past few years, with the introduction of newer technologies worldwide there have been tremendous changes to the way that we work and where we work. Standard contracts and long-term employment have changed dramatically with a rapid shift towards more intermittent and often less stable work. We are witnessing the rise of nonstandard work arrangements and the advent of the ‘gig economy’ whereby people are increasingly drifting (some being forced to do so) in and out of jobs. Within the gig economy, work is often broken down into smaller, time-bound tasks which has paved the way for an ever-expanding choice of sites that list tasks for people to perform (e.g., Uber, Airtasker and TaskRabbit) advertising simple services like driving a car, delivering food, moving furniture or engaging in home repairs. The growth of the gig economy has been exponential in recent years and it is not without its share of problems, with the International Labour Organization (2018) reporting as many as 50% of workers find it difficult to be compensated for the work they undertake. However, according to a global survey of 9500 employees from 12 countries conducted by labour hire group Manpower, the gig economy (or what Manpower refer to as Nextgen) is not going away in a hurry. As you can see from Figure 16.1 most of the people surveyed were open to trying this type of employment, and there are many who actively chose this type of work with a sound majority who said they would continue to work in this manner (ManpowerGroup, 2017). The gig economy trend is also growing across the globe; the reasons people give for its popularity include that this type of work boosts their bank balance, allows them to develop skills and provides greater flexibility than traditional work arrangements.

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BUSINESS

CHAPTER SIXTEEN

Given the impact that work has on our lives, it is important to address the flip side that has an equally large impact – unemployment. The 2007–2008 financial crisis caused the worst job market since the Great Depression, with an estimated 210 million people worldwide out of work. The largest increases in unemployment were found in the US, New Zealand, Spain and Taiwan. All these people lost their jobs and were unable to find new jobs, often plunging them into a situation, through no fault of their own, that was financially and psychologically devastating. (To learn more about the individual experience of unemployment, see Myles, Large, Myles, Adams, Liu & Galletly 2017; Wanberg, 2012; Strandh, Winefield, Nilsson, & Hammarström, 2014).

INDUSTRIAL/ORGANISATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY

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Source: Courtesy of AT&T Archives.

This chapter considers applications of social psychology to business. Let us begin by talking about Industrial/ industrial/organisational (I/O) psychology – the study of human behaviour in the workplace. This suborganisational (I/O) discipline of psychology is broad and includes in its ranks both social and non-social psychologists who do psychology research, teach in business schools or universities, and work in government and private industry. Whatever The study of human the setting, I/O psychology raises important practical questions about job interviews, evaluations, behaviour in business promotions, leadership, motivation and other aspects of life in the workplace. and other organisational The impact of social psychological factors in the workplace was first recognised many years ago, thanks, settings. oddly enough, to a study of industrial lighting. The year was 1927. In the US just outside of Chicago, the Hawthorne plant of the Western Electric Company employed 30 000 men and women who manufactured telephones and central office equipment. As in other companies, management wanted to boost productivity. The bottom line was important. At first, managers thought that they could make workers at the plant more productive by altering the illumination levels in the factory. Proceeding logically, they increased the lighting for one group of workers in a special test room, kept the same lighting in a control room, and compared the effects. Much to their surprise, productivity rates increased in both rooms. At that point, a team of psychologists was brought in to vary other conditions in the factory. Over the next five years, groups of employees from various departments were selected to do their work in a test room where, at different times, they were given more rest periods, coffee breaks, a free mid-morning lunch, shorter work days, shorter weeks, a new location, overtime, financial incentives or just a different method of payment. At one point, the researchers even went back and reinstated the original pre-study conditions inside the test room. Yet no matter what changes were made, productivity levels always increased. The Hawthorne studies, described in a classic book entitled These women were among the assembly plant workers who Management and the Worker (Roethlisberger & Dickson, took part in the classic Hawthorne studies of productivity in the workplace. 1939), has had a great impact on the study of behaviour in the workplace. At first, the researchers were puzzled and discouraged. With positive effects observed among all test-room workers, even when the original pre-test conditions were in place, it seemed that the project had failed. Ponder the results, however, and you will see why these studies are so important. With striking consistency, workers became more productive not because of any of the specific changes made, but because they had Hawthorne effect been singled out for special assignment; a phenomenon that has become known as the Hawthorne effect. The finding that workers However, many researchers have criticised the methods used in this study and the ways the results have who were given special been interpreted (Adair, 1984; Chiesa & Hobbs, 2008; Parsons, 1974). attention increased their Still, the Hawthorne effect laid a foundation for I/O psychology. And even though the Hawthorne plant productivity regardless no longer exists, the studies that were conducted there helped psychologists to understand the profound of what actual changes impact of social influences in the workplace. Interested in the conditions that affect satisfaction, motivation were made in the work setting. and performance, today’s researchers study all aspects of life in the workplace, including the effects of monitoring workers’ activity on the computer (Alge, 2001); the benefits of sabbaticals (Davidson et al., 2010); perceptions and realities of sexual harassment (O’Leary-Kelly, Bowes-Sperry, Bates, & Lean, 2009); the relationship between daylight saving time, sleep and workplace injuries (Barnes & Wagner, 2009); the perpetrators and targets of bullying in the workplace (Glasø, Nielsen, & Einarsen, 2009); and the effects of sabotage, revenge, sexist humour and other forms of insidious behaviour in the workplace (Greenberg, 2010).

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All the authors of this textbook work on university campuses amid students, academics and administrators. We spend most of our time in classrooms, offices and research laboratories. For women and men in other occupations, such as shop assistants, taxi drivers, carpenters, doctors, web designers, farmers, teachers, accountants, fire-fighters and airline pilots, the workplace is very different. Yet despite the diversity of roles and settings, certain common concerns arise. How are applicants selected for jobs? How is performance then evaluated? What makes for an effective leader who can influence others and mobilise their support? What motivates people to work hard and feel satisfied with this aspect of their lives? And what factors influence the kinds of economic decisions that people make? We will address these important questions in the sections that follow.

PERSONNEL SELECTION For all kinds of organisations, especially in a tight economy, the secret to success begins with the recruitment and development of a competent work staff. For that reason, personnel selection is the first important step. Personnel selection and assessment is an applied area of research and practice in the area of organisational psychology, which is largely informed by two theoretical traditions. The predictive perspective presumes that the job itself is a stable entity for which a candidate must be appointed. Generally, the number of candidates outweighs the number of jobs available so the company or the recruiting organisation uses selection techniques to prepare a shortlist from which to appoint the best person for the job. The selection techniques are predictive – designed to identify the most suitable applicant for the role. This approach is prefaced upon the notion of the employer making the crucial decision of who will be selected so the employer maintains control. The constructivist approach, however, views the selection process as a two-way street, with the development of mutual expectations and obligations to determine the right fit between the organisation, the person and the job – both parties are keen to ascertain whether or not a future working relationship is viable (Chmiel, Fraccaroli, & Sverke, 2017; Moscoso, Salgado, Anderson, Fraccaroli, & Sverke, 2017).

Searching for work Where previous generations commenced their job search by leafing through newspapers, nowadays we search online. Social networking platforms, such as Facebook, Twitter and LinkedIn, are continuing to grow at a rapid pace, heralding a new era of recruitment. A great deal of the research coming from recruitment firms seems to reinforce the fact that social media platforms are increasingly being used as the method of choice to locate career opportunities. People now expect to easily find and have access to more information about a potential employer – the same way they expect to find information online to help them decide where to eat out, buy a product or where to go on holidays. In fact, 77% say they value reviews and ratings from employees at a company when making a job decision (Glassdoor, 2016). Because of this, employers who embrace and promote workplace transparency will have a recruiting advantage. Most people do not expect any company to be perfect, but when information is hidden, it can be a red flag. Employers who are up front with job candidates about what is working well and what needs improvement within their organisations are likely to see a boost in higher quality candidates applying to their open jobs. In a report detailing the future of the digitally enabled workforce in Australia (Hajkowicz et al., 2016), it seems that the explosion in device connectivity, rapid advances in artificial intelligence (AI) and growth in technological capabilities are likely to continue reshaping the workforce. According to LinkedIn’s Australia and New Zealand Recruitment Trends 2016 Report, 40% of employers regarded the use of social and professional networks as one of the most essential and long-lasting trends in recruitment. Similarly, a largescale study conducted by CareerArc (2017) suggests that because both jobseekers and employers expect their reliance on social and professional networks to increase over time, these platforms will have a more significant impact as a source of recruitment over the next five years (see Table 16.1).

E-recruitment: artificial intelligence, gamification, chatbots and cybervetting It seems highly likely that the physical and digital worlds will continue to merge, as the workplace is reshaped by online or e-recruitment and further advances in artificial intelligence (AI), chat bots, predictive software and augmented reality. The demand for recruitment-related networking sites is growing at doubleor triple-digit rates (Recruiting Daily, 2015), with hundreds of startups offering technologies to screen, interview and profile candidates online (Davison, Maraist, Hamilton, & Bing, 2012).

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TABLE 16.1 The future of recruitment A 2017 survey conducted by CareerArc, showed the impact of social media platforms on recruitment practices. Their results indicated that the use of technology will continue to grow in this space as virtual reality and gamification present new and innovative ways of connecting employers and candidates.

Social/ professional networks

% Employers use to recruit talent

% Job seekers found useful when looking for a job

91%

55%

Employee referrals

89%

30%

Job boards

81%

37%

Job advertising

72%

44%

Recruiting events

67%

16%

Recruiting agencies

41%

33%

Source: CareerArc. (2017). 23 surprising stats on the future of recruiting – infographic. Retrieved from https://www.careerarc.com/blog/2017/04/04/future-of-recruiting-study-infographic/

Artificial intelligence According to the LinkedIn Global Recruiting Trends report (2018) recruiters and hiring managers around the world have suggested that AI represents the way forward in the recruitment space – it saves time (67%), removes human bias (43%), theoretically delivers the best candidate matches (31%); and is regarded as the most helpful when sourcing (58%), screening (56%) and nurturing candidates (55%). The National Australia Bank (NAB) has taken the challenge of technology to a new level by putting a stop to the use of CVs and resumés for job applications, moving instead to the use of online recruitment, cognitive assessments and recorded video interviews. Candidates are tested on their problem-solving abilities via a series of abstract questions, such as which picture comes next in this series; they submit a short recorded video interview in response to specific questions, which is screened electronically for mentions of words, achievements and experience to provide a short-list of candidates for training. NAB estimates it has saved them in excess of 700 hours per month in management time (Marin-Guzman, 2017). But of course, AI is only as good as the algorithms which drive it, and given that algorithms are written by humans it stands to reason that AI is susceptible to the biases of those that construct them. According to Cathy O’Neil (2016), given that algorithms (the rule-based processes for solving mathematical problems), are being applied to a rapidly growing repertoire of areas which impact our lives, the potential for biased mathematical manipulation is becoming more realistic. And O’Neil is not alone in her opinions – in the summer of 2015, researchers from Carnegie Mellon and the International Computer Science Institute (Datta, Tschantz, & Datta, 2015) set out to examine what drives Google’s ad-targeting algorithms. They designed software to simulate web-browsing activities and used it to gather data about ads shown to fake users with a range of profiles and browsing behaviours. Their findings indicated that the profiles which Google identified as males were more likely to be shown ads for high-paying executive jobs than those identified as female. Given that this logic presents evidence of clear bias and discrimination in the functions that may be inherent in the design of these algorithms, it casts a shadow over the feasibility of AI and its ability to successfully find, screen and deliver the right person for the job.

Gamification According to digital trend reports in Australia and New Zealand, there is a growing number of people who engage with digital gaming (68% of Australians and 67% of New Zealanders), and it would appear to be an obvious choice to try to recruit via this medium. In what is a dynamic market, some companies claim to be able to evaluate a range of talents (‘knacks’) from candidates playing puzzle-solving games on mobile phones; and others have gamified assessment principles common in neuroscience to infer the personality and intelligence of candidates. As noted by Tomas Chamorro-Premuzic and colleagues (2016), gamification (the application of elements of game playing to other areas of activity such as engagement, recruitment and psychological assessment) represents a shift in the relationship between test providers, test takers and organisations, from a business-to-business model to a business-to-consumer model, and from a reactive test taker to a proactive test taker. They boldly predict that the testing market will increasingly transition from the current push model, where organisations require people to complete a set of assessments in order to quantify their

Gamification

The application of elements of game playing to other areas of activity such as engagement, recruitment and psychological assessment.

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talent, to a pull model where organisations will search various talent badges to identify the people they seek to hire. In fact, they go so far as to suggest that the talent industry may follow the footsteps of the mobile dating industry, with the development of apps similar to the popular mobile dating app Tinder, except if you swipe right you get a job interview rather than a date. If the algorithm determines a match, both parties receive instant feedback on their preferences – will it be a perfect match?

Chatbots Chatbots

A class of intelligent, conversational software agents activated by natural language input (often via text, but sometimes by voice) to provide conversational output in response.

One of the significant changes to this landscape has been the emergence of chatbots – a class of intelligent, conversational software agents activated by natural language input (often via text, but sometimes by voice) to provide conversational output in response. Chatbots enable organisations and candidates to achieve the best result, in a short time frame, delivering a very cost-effective way to reduce the bottom line in all aspects of the human resources process. Chatbots help to merge the predictive and constructivist approaches to recruitment. They can handle the process of initial communication, screening and evaluation of applicants, providing a seamless and efficient method of recruitment for the candidate, improving the perception of the brand for the organisation and improving the chances of a successful fit between the organisation, the person and the job. But how do candidates feel about the intrusion of AI and chatbots in the recruitment process? Research suggests that mostly job seekers are comfortable or fairly comfortable interacting with chatbots to answer initial questions about the interview process (58%), schedule an interview (66%) and perform a skills assessment (Maurer, 2017).

Cybervetting

Cybervetting

A controversial new practice by which employers use the internet to get informal, non-institutional data that applicants did not choose to share.

678

People tend to think that when they apply for a job, the information they submit through applications, resumés, transcripts, letters of recommendation and other work-related credentials will largely determine if they are interviewed and hired. Not so anymore. If you have a Facebook page, a Twitter page, or a Pinterest account, if you have posted pictures of yourself on Instagram or videos on YouTube, or if you have expressed opinions on blogs, you should know that these personal traces online may well be examined when you apply for a job. In recent years, employers have increasingly been engaging in cybervetting; that is, using the internet to get informal, noninstitutional data about applicants that they did not choose to share (Berkelaar & Buzzanell, 2015). This is partly because employers are wary that applicants present themselves in a lessthan-fully-honest way for impression management purposes, and in light of the fact that over three billion people now inhabit the internet. Despite concerns about whether it is ethical to ‘spy’ on applicants in this way, employers would say that they merely seek honest signals about an applicant’s ability, character, and ‘fit’ – information that is hard for applicants to fake (Bangerter, Roulin, & König, 2012; Roulin & Bangerter, 2013). To add to concerns about ethics, some companies have been reported to have asked applicants for their social networking site passwords so they could access even more private information (Levinson, 2011). Two questions can be raised about cybervetting: (1) What kinds of information do employers seek and get in their internet searches of applicants? (2) What effects does this new approach to personnel selection have on who gets hired? To answer the first question, Brenda Berkelaar and Patrice Buzzanell (2015) interviewed 45 employers from companies in the financial services, education, law, information technology, media, manufacturing, and other industries, about their selection practices. Most employers reported cybervetting good applicants after receiving their resumés. Specifically, more than 90% said they used visual information (e.g., avatars, site designs, and ‘definitely pictures’ – so, yes, applicants who had posted ‘naughty’ or lewd pictures were disqualified), 75% used textual information (e.g., focusing on content, communication skills, spelling, typos and grammar), over 50% used technological information (e.g., the professional look of a Facebook page or time spent playing games on social media sites), and 50% used relational information (e.g., number and quality of friends and contacts within the industry). Ironically, half of the employers said that the complete absence of an online presence has caused them to lower their evaluations of an applicant. What are the effects of cybervetting on the quality of hiring decisions? Does an individual’s online persona accurately portray the person to be hired, and are the social perceptions of employers predictive of job performance or subject to bias and error? Despite the prevalence of the practice, there is no research on these ultimate questions. But what about the controversial practice of demanding that applicants disclose their social networking passwords? Has this ever happened to you? In one recent study, Travis Schneider and others (2015) posed this hypothetical situation to 892 Canadian participants by asking them to imagine that they have applied for a highly desirable job but that the hiring manager required passwords. At that

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point, they were asked what they would do. It is a tough call. How would you respond? Overall, 58% of men and women said they would refuse. Importantly, so did 72% of Asian people, 79% of gay and lesbian respondents, and 77% of those without a formal religion. Based on these results, it appears that these groups would be disproportionately harmed by this requirement.

The interview process For many years research has focused on the ways in which different personnel selection procedures serve employers – a predictive approach to personnel selection. As we noted earlier, however, the hiring process is more a two-way street in which organisations and applicants size each other up. The type and format of a job interview has varied over time with the employer now spoiled for choice in regards to delivery (inperson vs phone; one-on-one vs panel) and format (structured vs unstructured questions). Traditional interviews have been the industry standard for decades. Call them old-school, call them boring, but they are still widely used and considered effective. In a typical interview, a representative of the organisation and an applicant meet in person to discuss the job. They provide a two-way opportunity for the applicant and employer to evaluate each other. What a social perception dilemma these opportunities present! As an applicant, you have only a half-hour or so to make a favourable impression. As an interviewer, you have the same brief period to penetrate the applicant’s self-presentation while at the same time presenting the company in a favourable light. Very few employers would consider hiring a complete stranger for a responsible position without an interview. Would you? Like most of us, you probably trust your own ability to size people up. But should you? Do interviews promote sound hiring or do they produce decisions that are biased by job-irrelevant personal characteristics? Laws, both state and federal, explicitly forbid employers from discriminating in the recruitment process on the basis of sex, race, age, religion, national origin, disability, sexual orientation or pregnancy status. But does the interview process itself intensify or diminish these possible sources of bias? And are interviews valid and predictive of performance? Focusing on the possibility of race and ethnic background biases in an interview setting, the research presents some interesting findings. In an experiment designed to examine implicit sources of bias in judgements and decisions made during the employment interview process, Sharon Segrest Purkiss and colleagues (2006) found that ethnic cues, such as name and accent, triggered prejudicial attitudes and decisions. Their results suggested that an applicant with an ethnic name who spoke with an accent was viewed less positively by interviewers (and thus was less likely to be hired) than an ethnic-named applicant who did not speak with an accent and non-ethnic applicants with and without accents. Similarly, research conducted by Derous, Pepermans and Ryan (2017) showed that equally qualified applicants with a dark skin tone received lower job suitability ratings than applicants with a light skin tone when applying for high client contact positions. It seems that the subtle environmental cues of context and skin colour may have aligned in a manner which influenced the hiring decision in a discriminatory manner. Although most employers have learned to guard against discriminatory hiring practices, there is one possible source of bias that is difficult to regulate – physical appearance. Except for certain types of work (e.g., modelling), beauty is not relevant to job performance. Yet people in general tend to favour others who are attractive. Does this bias operate in hiring situations? Research conducted by Cynthia Marlowe and colleagues (1996) suggests that it does. They presented a set of job application folders, including resumés, data sheets and photographs, to 112 male and female managers of a financial institution. Each manager was asked to rank-order four equivalent and qualified applicants: two men and two women, of which one man and one woman were highly attractive. Physical appearance had a large impact, with 62% of all managers selecting an attractive applicant as their top choice. Other research has since confirmed that human resource professionals show a preference for applicants who are attractive (Jawahar & Mattsson, 2005). Are there times however when being attractive is not necessarily an advantage? Margaret Lee and her colleagues (2018) believe that this may actually be the case particularly if the job in question is somewhat less desirable. In a series of four experiments Margaret found that the more attractive a person is the more they are disadvantaged when it comes to getting a job which is considered relatively less desirable – people tend to avoid hiring those who they believe (consciously or subconsciously) deserve better. In a series of four experiments Lee found that people do not just hire attractive people because they consciously or unconsciously prefer them. People actively consider what roles the physically attractive applicant would themselves prefer, and then base the hiring decision on that perceived preference (see Figure 16.2). Her findings indicate that people recruit attractive people in better positions because of the belief that they will be more satisfied in such roles.

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FIGURE 16.2 The bias against beauty in hiring In this study participants rated an attractive versus unattractive applicant in terms of their perceived sense of entitlement to good outcomes. The attractive candidate was perceived to be more entitled to good outcomes and that they would be less satisfied to occupy an undesirable job. As a result, they were less likely to be appointed to an undesirable position. 5 4.5 4

65%

3.5

57%

3 35%

2.5

43%

2 1.5 1 Perceived sense of entitlement to good outcomes

Undesirable job Desirable job Predicted satisfaction Unattractive candidate

Undesirable job Desirable job Selection decision Attractive candidate

Source: Lee, M., Pitesa, M., Pillutla, M. M., & Thau, S. (2018). Perceived entitlement causes discrimination against attractive job candidates in the domain of relatively less desirable jobs. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 114(3), 422–442.

What this research tells us is that the way you look can significantly influence your success in a job interview. Further evidence of this may be found in research that showed an applicant may be handicapped merely by a scar or stain on the face, which steals attention, distracts the interviewer and results in less positive outcomes (Madera & Hebl, 2012). Similarly, research conducted by Andrew Timming and colleagues (2015) suggested that visible body art can potentially be a real impediment to employment, particularly if the applicant is seeking a job that involves face-to-face contact with customers.

Impression management Impression management

The use of various strategies to make others see the person in a better light.

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Although interviews often result in the right selection of new employees, they sometimes lack predictive validity (Eder & Harris, 1999). Part of the problem is that most job applicants use impression management tactics to present themselves in a positive light – as you would expect – and that some engage in more selfpromotion than others, often with positive results (Barrick, Swider, & Stewart, 2010). ‘Faking’ in an employment interview – which occurs whenever a job applicant consciously presents himself or herself in distorted ways in order to create a favourable impression – may well compromise the predictive validity of the process. Given the universal appeal of interviewing as a key component of the selection process, it should come as no surprise that there has been a wealth of research conducted to explore the use of impression management tactics which can potentially bias hiring decisions (Higgins & Judge, 2004; Levashina & Campion, 2007). Research suggests that the tactics which are used take many forms, including complimenting or flattering the interviewer; self-promotion; ingratiation; minimising negative aspects of a resumé, such as being let go from a previous job; and exaggerating, embellishing or inventing qualifications (Levashina & Campion, 2007; Levashina, Hartwell, Morgeson, & Campion, 2014). Research has also suggested a number of traits which may be inherent in those who use impression management tactics. Nicolas Roulin (2016) found that applicants high in extraversion tend to engage in more honest self-promotion whereas applicants who possess more undesirable personality traits (i.e., low on honesty–humility and conscientiousness, high on Machiavellianism, narcissism and competitive worldviews) tend to use more deceptive tactics and are more likely to adapt their strategy across interviews. This is deeply problematic for an employer because although deceptive users tend to obtain better evaluations from interviewers, the personality profile of those users is often associated with undesirable workplace outcomes. Following from our earlier discussion, an interview is a two-way street; so what does the research tell us about the interviewer in relation to not only the detection of those who are faking it but also their ability to fake it? Let us begin with what we know of their detection ability. Research tells us that interviewers are

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rather poor in their ability to detect applicants who are using impression management tactics, and equally poor when it comes to distinguishing between honest and deceptive forms (Robie, Tuzinski, & Bly, 2006; Roulin, Bangerter, & Levashina, 2014, 2015). You may be asking how hard can this be? Well, an interesting series of experimental studies conducted by Roulin and colleagues (2015) suggested that detection may be much harder than you think. Their findings indicated that interviewers correctly detected deception during an interview on average 20% of the time, and prior experience did not appear to help. It seems university students with no interviewing experience had as much ability to detect lies as hiring managers with up to 10 years of interviewing experience. Similarly, earlier research conducted by Roulin and colleagues (2014) found that interviewers’ perceptions of the tactics used by applicants failed to converge with the tactics applicants reported they had used. A meta-analytic study, however, highlighted the fact that some selfreport measures of detection may actually confound honest and deceptive strategies (Levashina et al., 2014), so it pays to read the literature carefully. Moving our focus now to interviewer use of impression management tactics, we look to the work of Annika Wilhelmy and colleagues (2016) who suggested that interviewer use of impression management can ultimately impact perceptions of the organisation and an applicant's positive affect and feelings (see Figure 16.3). This research indicated that interviewers are well aware that they may influence applicant impressions; in fact they know which specific impressions they want applicants to form and intentionally use a broad range of different signals to create them.

CHAPTER SIXTEEN

Although flawed, job interviews consistently make for better hiring decisions.

FALSE

FIGURE 16.3 A conceptual model of interviewer impression management with some insight into why interviewers apply these tactics in terms of their intended outcomes.

Annika Wilhelmy and colleagues (2016) conceptual model shows how interviewer intentions (blue boxes), behaviours (orange boxes) and intended outcomes (arrows) are linked. The model provides us Fast recruiting Job-organisation attraction Job choice intention and behaviour, recommendation intention and behaviour, consumer intention and behaviour, reapplication intention and behaviour

Sustainable recruiting Identification with the organisation, strong organisational image and reputation

Primary IM intentions

Authenticity IM behaviours to create an attractive and authentic image, e.g.

IM behaviours to create an attractive image, e.g. Expressing enthusiasm Decorating the interview room

IM behaviours to create an attractive image, e.g. Demonstrating humour Shaking hands

Secondary IM intentions

Intended IM outcomes

Attractiveness

IM behaviours to create a close relation image, e.g. Demonstrating similarity Laughing

IM behaviours to create an authentic image, e.g.

Positive framing Demonstrating job knowledge IM behaviours to create an attractive and professional image, e.g. Demonstrating knowledge of the applicant Offering support IM behaviours to create a close relation and professional image, e.g. Inviting the applicant by telephone Making eye contact

Closeness

Amount of personal information disclosed, informative value of personal information disclosed Applicants’ positive affective state, applicants’ self-esteem

IM behaviours that can be used in a multipurpose way, e.g. Modifying applicants’ speech portion Placement of seating furniture

Confessing Mirroring

IM behaviours to create a professional and authentic image, e.g.

IM behaviours to create an authentic and superior image, e.g.

Goal setting for the applicant Offering a site visit

IM behaviours to create a professional image, e.g. Displaying application documents Note taking

Giving voice Incorporating future colleagues

IM behaviours to create a professional and superior image Challenging

IM behaviours to create a superior image, e.g. Applicant-deprecation Speaking in an authoritative way

Distance in terms of professionalism

Distance in terms of superiority

Prevention of legal action

Strong interviewer reputation

Source: Wilhelmy, A., Kleinmann, M., König, C. J., Melchers, K., and Truxillo, D. M. (2016). How interviewers try to make favorable impressions: a qualitative study. Journal of Applied Psychology, 101, 313–332. doi: 10.1037/apl0000046

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Technology and interviews We talked earlier about the impact of technology on recruitment, but of course technology has also changed the way that organisations conduct job interviews. A number of studies have compared the effectiveness of different interview technologies on job applicant ratings; they have, however, yielded mixed results. For example, research conducted by Silvester and colleagues (2000) found that applicants were rated lower in interviews conducted by telephone than face-to-face. On the other hand, research conducted by Straus and colleagues (2001) found that applicants were rated higher in terms of ability and likeability when interviewed by telephone as opposed to face-to-face, but found no differences in ratings between videoconferencing and face-to-face. Researchers have also argued that interviews conducted by videoconference may not be effective because they fail to include rich information (e.g., body language, facial expressions) which is conveyed in face-to-face interviews (Chapman, Uggerslev, & Webster, 2003).

‘Scientific’ alternatives to traditional interviews Face-to-face interviews bring to life both job-relevant and not-so-relevant personal characteristics. Given that the process is so variable, should interviews be eliminated? Should they, perhaps, be computerised, leaving applicants to interact with companies through a programmed sequence of questions and answers administered by computer? Online interviews may offer a forum for an initial screening of applicants. The chances are, however, that not too many people would feel comfortable making important life decisions in such an impersonal manner. Is it possible, then, to preserve the human touch of an interview while eliminating the bias and error?

Standardised tests Today, many companies use standardised tests in the personnel selection process. Three general types of test are used for this purpose: intelligence tests, personality tests and integrity tests.

Intelligence tests Intelligence tests are designed to measure intellectual and cognitive abilities, job-specific knowledge and skills, and ‘street smarts’ or common sense, which all may contribute to success on the job. When it comes to measures of general intelligence, the use of cognitive ability tests in the workplace is a matter of serious debate. On the basis of extensive research, some psychologists believe that cognitive ability tests are useful because they are predictive of job success in high-stakes work settings (Gottfredson, 2002; Schmidt, 2002), and importantly, they do this without discriminating against minorities and others who lack the resources to pay for test preparation courses (Kuncel & Hezlett, 2010; Sackett, Borneman, & Connelly, 2008). The predictive benefits of cognitive ability testing in the workplace have been amply demonstrated. Still, some researchers caution that general intelligence is only one relevant factor and that this focus discriminates against individuals with other abilities who do not happen to score well on these tests (Sternberg & Hedlund, 2002). For this reason, I/O psychologists as a group are ambivalent about the use of intelligence testing in personnel selection. When Kevin Murphy and colleagues (2003) surveyed more than 700 professionals in the field, they found that most agreed that intelligence is not fully captured by standardised tests, that different jobs require different cognitive abilities, and that both cognitive and noncognitive selection measures should be used.

Personality tests Personality tests are designed to measure traits that predict such work-related outcomes as leadership, productivity, helpfulness, absenteeism and theft (Cha, 2005). Research shows that people who score high rather than low in the trait of conscientiousness – which tends to make them more achievement oriented, dependable, orderly and cautious – are more likely in general to perform well on the job (Dudley, Orvis, Lebiecki, & Cortina, 2006). And people who score as extroverted rather than introverted are especially likely to succeed as business managers and salespeople (Hurtz & Donovan, 2000; Salgado, 1997). Research shows that young adults who have high self-esteem, self-confidence and a sense of control tend to seek out more challenging lines of work and, as a result, are more satisfied with their jobs later in life (Judge, Bono, & Locke, 2000). Research also shows that people who have a certain cluster of traits, that include emotional stability, conscientiousness and agreeableness, are more likely to exhibit good organisational citizenship behaviours (Chiaburu, Oh, Berry, Li, & Gardner, 2011). These research findings are clear. But does that mean that companies should test all job applicants and hire those with favourable personalities? Reflecting this trend, one US News & World Report writer explains 682

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‘why a psychologist might be at your next interview’ (Wolgemuth, 2009). But is this a sound development in the practical world of personnel selection? Not according to five editors of the research journals that have published much of this personality research. In an article they collectively wrote, these editors concluded that although certain personality factors may well relate to job performance, researchers would need to devise tests that are more predictive – tests that do not rely on the motivated applicant’s self-report and therefore cannot easily be faked (Morgeson et al., 2007).

Integrity tests A number of companies have begun to administer integrity tests – questionnaires designed specifically to assess an applicant’s honesty and character by asking direct questions concerning illicit drug use, shoplifting, petty theft and other transgressions. The tests are easy to administer and the responses are scored by computer. Narrative profiles are provided, and arbitrary cut-off scores are often used to determine if an applicant has passed or failed (Camara & Schneider, 1994). Are integrity tests useful for predicting job performance? A major concern about integrity tests – and personality tests as well, for that matter – is that applicants may be able to fake the tests on their own or with the help of coaching. Specifically, the concern is that applicants will use the tests to present themselves in overly positive ways; for example, as highly stable, conscientious, agreeable or extroverted (Schmitt & Oswald, 2006). But is this the case with integrity tests? Can they be faked? Let us consider the two different types of integrity tests that are used: (1) overt tests, in which the purpose is obvious to the test-taker; and (2) covert tests, in which items measure broad personality characteristics that are not clearly related to the workplace. To examine the susceptibility of these tests to faking, George Alliger and colleagues (1996) gave both overt and covert tests to university students. Some were told to just take the tests, others were instructed to ‘fake good’, and still others were coached and given specific strategies for how to beat the tests. Figure 16.4 shows how well the students did. On the overt test, the scores increased for those instructed to ‘fake good’ and then increased again among those who were specifically coached. Yet on the covert personality test, scores were unaffected by these interventions. Other studies, too, reinforce the point – when it comes to faking, the covert tests, quite literally, pass the test (Alliger & Dwight, 2000).

Integrity tests

Questionnaires designed to test a job applicant’s honesty and character.

FIGURE 16.4 Can integrity tests be faked? Alliger and others (1996) gave university students overt and covert integrity tests. Some just took the test; others were told to ‘fake good’; others were coached. On the overt test, scores increased for subjects who faked good or were coached (left). On the covert test, scores were unaffected by these interventions (right). Covert test

100

100

90

90 Percentage of total possible score

Percentage of total possible score

Overt test

80 70 60 50

80 70 60 50

Test condition Just take

Fake good

Test condition Coaching

Source: Alliger, G. M., Lilienfield, S. O., & Mitchell, K. E. (1996) The susceptibility of overt and covert integrity tests to coaching and faking. Psychological Science, 7, 32–39.

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But are such instruments sufficiently valid to be used for personnel selection? This is a source of much debate. Although there is reason for scepticism, research suggests that both types of tests do predict various work-related behaviours (Berry, Sackett, & Wiemann, 2007). How useful are integrity tests in practice? Deniz Ones and colleagues (1993) conducted a meta-analysis of tests taken by thousands of workers and found that test scores were highly predictive of job performance, as well as of such counterproductive behaviours as theft, absenteeism, lateness and other disciplinary problems. When Chad Van Iddekinge and colleagues (2012) revisited the issue in a meta-analysis of 104 separate studies, they also found that integrity test scores were predictive of job performance and counterproductive behaviours, although to a lesser degree. At this point, it seems clear that integrity tests have value for use in personnel selection; it is just unclear exactly how much that value is (Sackett & Schmitt, 2012).

Structured interviews Another way to improve personnel selection decisions is through the use of structured interviews. A structured interview is much like a standardised test in that the same information is obtained in the same situation from all applicants, who are then compared on a common, relevant set of dimensions (Campion, Palmer, & Campion, 1997; Pettersen & Durivage, 2008). By asking exactly the same set of questions or using the same set of tasks, employers can stop themselves from unwittingly conducting biased interviews that merely confirm their preexisting conceptions. The use of these methods does appear to be gaining momentum globally, with the figures suggesting the use of structured interviews rose from 85% in 2009 to 95% in 2013 (Fallaw & Kantrowitz, 2013). Similarly, the use of unstructured interviews rose from 44% to 60% during the same period of time Over the years, studies have shown that structured interviews are more informative than conventional interviews in the selection of insurance agents, sales staff and other workers (Wiesner & Cronshaw, 1988) and are more predictive than paper-and-pencil personality tests (Huffcutt, Conway, Roth, & Stone, 2001) – perhaps because they are more difficult to fake (Van Iddekinge, Raymark, & Roth, 2005). In fact, structured interviews can be conducted by phone and later scored from a taped transcript, providing information that can be used to predict a future worker’s attendance rate, productivity and tenure on the job (Schmidt & Rader, 1999). But does the structured interview completely eliminate the human element that comes with conventional interviews? It appears that the answer is ‘No’. Structured interviews typically are preceded by a meetand-greet session in which the interviewer and applicant engage in small talk to get acquainted before the serious questioning begins. In light of social psychological research showing that people form first impressions quickly on the basis of appearances and a thin slice of behaviour, Murray Barrick and colleagues (2010) examined whether this ‘pre-interview’ predicts the outcomes that follow. In a mock interview study of university-level accounting students, they found that the impressions interviewers formed in the initial meeting, including their sense of the applicants’ competence, were highly predictive of post-interview evaluations and of whether the applicants later received internship offers from actual accounting firms. FIGURE 16.5 The use of robots in interviews So how does one potentially avoid bias in an interview? Matilda the interviewing robot can conduct 25-minute interviews Employ a robot! Dr Rajiv Khosla, Director of the La Trobe with a roster of up to 76 questions. University Centre for Computers, Communication and Social Innovations developed a robot named Matilda that has been programmed to conduct 25-minute interviews working through a roster of up to 76 questions. Matilda can record and analyse an interviewee’s responses, monitor facial expressions and compare them to other successful employees within the organisation. Although Matilda is only about as tall as a wine bottle, its introduction to the recruitment industry sparks the dawning of new age (Recruiting Times, 2016).

Structured interview

An interview in which each job applicant is asked a standard set of questions and evaluated on the same criteria.

Robotic interviewers

Source: La Trobe University

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The use of robots to conduct interviews has its sceptics, who warn that companies using them risk putting off potential future employees. This is where we return to the concept of the interview as a two-way process and question whether conversations with robots like Matilda (see Figure 16.5) actually qualify in that regard. And of course, we must also consider the potential of Matilda to deliver a biased verdict based on

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her programming – if she is mathematically comparing all applicants against a current staff that is biased towards one specific demographic, how fair will her hiring algorithm be? According to someone how took an interview with Matilda, however, the overall experience was a positive one that promoted the feeling of a standardised interview process. Of course, Matilda's cute appearance contributed to the overall positive experience encouraging the candidate to open up in ways that would not have been possible with a human interview process (Recruiting Times, 2016). Visit Matilda and her friends at the HC innovations site: https:// www.hc-inv.com.

Assessment centres To create a more structured, multidimensional setting for selection and evaluation purposes, many organisations use assessment centres, in which several applicants take part in a group of activities such as written tests, situational tests and role-playing exercises that are monitored by a group of evaluators. Instead of one method (an interview) and one evaluator (an interviewer), multiple methods and evaluators are used. Assessment centres are widely assumed to be more effective than traditional interviews at identifying applicants who will succeed in a particular position (Thornton & Rupp, 2006). When companies struggle to cut hiring costs, assessments are sometimes streamlined to involve fewer evaluators, fewer exercises, briefer exercises and other types of shortcuts (Borman, Hanson, & Hedge, 1997). Still, research shows that an assessment centre’s multidimensional approach is a good way to make hiring decisions that are ultimately quite predictive of job performance (Arthur, Day, McNelly, & Edens, 2003; Hoffman et al., 2015; Meriac, Hoffman, Woehr, & Fleisher, 2008).

Assessment centre

A structured setting in which job applicants are exhaustively tested and judged by multiple evaluators.

CRITICAL THINKING ACTIVITY Do you think structured interviews may help reduce some of the biases associated with traditional interviews? Why do you think employers may be reluctant to use structured interviews?

Do you think there is potential for bias in the questions used for structured interviews similar to that which is evident in the criticisms of standardised achievement tests?

How do job seekers feel about all of these methods? What is your reaction to these methods? In general, people see concrete, job-specific tests and interview situations as the fairest, and they dislike impersonal standardised tests of intelligence, personality and honesty (Rosse, Miller, & Stecher, 1994; Rynes & Connerly, 1993). For employers on the lookout for strong recruits, the perceived fairness of the selection process that is used may well influence whether top applicants accept the offers that are made (Bauer, Maertz, Dolen, & Campion, 1998).

CULTURAL DIVERSITY GLOBAL ASSESSMENT TRENDS FOR RECRUITMENT Data from the Global Assessment Barometer 2016 show that human resource professionals in emerging economies (including China and India) are being placed under increasing pressure to provide assessments via mobile devices, compared with those in established economies such as Australia, the UK, the US, Singapore and Hong Kong. Data from the report suggest that support for the use of smartphones and mobile

devices is growing, with nearly 40% of respondents believing that having mobile access to candidate data would make their processes more efficient, while a little over 40% indicated they would allow their candidates to complete tests via such devices. Not everyone was convinced, however, with 24% saying that mobile devices would be unfair to candidates, and 23% believing it would encourage cheating, or be inappropriate for hiring purposes.

Affirmative action Affirmative action is a policy that gives special consideration to women and members of underrepresented minority groups in recruitment, hiring, admissions and promotion decisions. This policy is among the most emotional and explosive social issues of our time. On one side of the debate is the argument that preferential treatment is necessary as a way to overcome historical inequities and to bring the benefits of diversity to the workplace. On the other side is the claim that the policy results in unfair reverse discrimination. For instance, surveys show that Americans are divided on the issue: women are more supportive than men, and African Americans and Hispanic Americans are more supportive than whites (Crosby et al., 2006; Shteynberg et al., 2011). To some extent, the result depends on how the question is posed: when phrasing includes the word ‘help’, 60% of Americans favour affirmative action. When the

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word ‘preference’ is used instead, support drops to 46% (Kopicki, 2014). After years of research on attitudes toward affirmative action, it is now clear that although there are sharp differences of opinion, people’s reactions depend on, and can be changed by, how the policy is implemented. But of course, there is no single approach. Faye Crosby and her colleagues (2006) note that policies have ranged from ‘soft’ forms of affirmative action, such as outreach programs designed to identify, recruit or specially train applicants from underrepresented groups, to ‘hard’ forms of affirmative action that give preference in hiring to applicants from targeted groups who are equally or less qualified than others. Based on a meta-analysis of 126 studies involving 29 000 respondents, David Harrison and others (2006) found that people are most favourable toward softer forms of affirmative action and least favourable toward quotas and other hard policies that favour some applicants over others regardless of their qualifications. By describing different affirmative action programs to business school students, Ariel Levi and Yitzhak Fried (2008) found not only that people prefer a soft affirmative action policy but that they are most supportive of a policy that influenced the hiring and training of new employees and least supportive of a policy that affected promotions and layoffs for existing employees. Lisa Leslie and her colleagues (2014) have concluded that when individuals are hired in a preferential selection process, an unfortunate chain of events is set into motion. Drawing on existing stereotypes, others assume that these individuals lack competence or social warmth; this stigma leads these individuals to question their own qualifications; and these selfdoubts increase the risk of failure. The key, clearly, is that people need to know that they were selected on the basis of merit (Unzueta et al., 2010).

Anti-discrimination legislation In Australia, the implementation of programs designed to guard against discrimination began with the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth). It was followed by the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) and the Affirmative Action (Equal Employment Opportunity for Women) Act 1986 (Cth). The Affirmative Action Act required all organisations with 100 or more employees to develop and implement affirmative action programs detailing evidence of goals for the employment of women and a time frame in which the goals were to be achieved (Sheridan, 1998). However, the latter Act was replaced with the Equal Opportunity for Women in the Workplace Act 1999 (Cth), which explicitly moved away from the language of affirmative action to embrace the language of equal employment opportunity. In New Zealand, there are two Acts that guard against discrimination based upon sex, race, age and disability: the Bill of Rights Act 1990 and the Human Rights Act 1993. These Acts recognise that in order to overcome discrimination there need to be measures to protect those who are vulnerable and to encourage positive action to assist those people to achieve an equal place in the community. So how do people generally feel about anti-discrimination legislation? A study conducted in Australia in 2000 by Lynne Bennington and Ruth Wein suggested that the legislation may not be having the desired effect. In a telephone survey of randomly selected employers and people looking for work, their findings suggested that discrimination in the recruitment and selection process was flourishing. From an employer’s perspective, 17% of those surveyed felt that the legislation was unfair and difficult to comply with, particularly in the mining sector where it is often difficult to facilitate the placement of women into areas where heavy lifting is involved or where facilities are not necessarily designed appropriately. Others complained that it was difficult to hold a position open for 12 months while a woman takes leave to have a child. By contrast, just over half of the job applicants who were surveyed felt that anti-discrimination laws were fair, although a good portion of these said they had been asked questions relating to their age, marital status, race or ethnicity, religious views, child-care responsibilities and what their plans were in regard to pregnancy. Of course, under Australian legislation questions of this nature are illegal, so how do employers gain access to this sort of information if they are forbidden to ask potentially discriminatory questions? According to Bennington and Wein (2002), job applicants are aiding and abetting employer discrimination by providing this information in their resumés. Having examined 107 resumés from Australian managerial applicants, they found a considerable amount of personal information was disclosed either directly or indirectly in the categories of age, gender, marital status, parental status and ethnicity. Interestingly, women were found to provide less overt information on age, marital status and parental status than men, which suggests that they are aware that they may be treated differently based upon this information.

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Gender differences in affirmative action In 2001, Alison Konrad and Linley Hartmann considered gender differences in relation to affirmative action in Australian universities and found that women were more likely than men to believe women are discriminated against in academic hiring and promotions; women were also more likely to support the implementation of affirmative action programs. Further research alluding to gender differences was conducted in Australia in 2007 (Feather & Boeckmann), with women suggesting that men had an advantage in gaining promotions whereas men thought the advantage was with women. Women were also less likely to agree that they should feel guilty about any advantages they might have over men in gaining promotions, and they reported more resentment when men were promoted over equally qualified women. Similarly, research conducted by Robert Boeckmann and Norman Feather (2007) confirmed that men regard women as more responsible for women’s relatively poor career outcomes; men also felt that women should feel guilty about affirmative action.

Racial discrimination Having considered the situation with regards to discrimination against women, let us take a look at another source of bias that is evident in Australia and New Zealand – racial discrimination. Research in Australia (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2016) suggests a disparity between the employment of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people and non-Indigenous Australians, with the difference being greatest for young people aged 15–24 years – estimates indicated 31.8% for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people, compared with 16.7% for non-Indigenous people (see Figure 16.6). One of the reasons for this disparity may be that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people are far less likely to obtain a job interview when compared with non-Indigenous Australians. Alison Booth, Andrew Leigh and Elena Varganova (2009), mailed identical resumés with different ethnic names (that sounded Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander, AngloSaxon, Italian, Chinese or Middle Eastern) to potential employers and then measured the call-back rate to test for evidence of discrimination. Their results suggested that applicants with Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander sounding names would need to submit 35% more applications to get the same call-back rate as applicants with Anglo-Saxon names. Similarly, those with Chinese sounding names required 68% more applications and those with Middle Eastern sounding names 64% more applications. FIGURE 16.6 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander employment to population ratio, by age and sex – 2014–15 80%

60%

40%

20%

0% 15–24 Males

25–34

35–44 Age group (years)

45–54

55 and over

Females

Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics. (2016). ABS 4714.0 – National Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Survey, 2014-15. Figure 6.3. Retrieved from http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/[email protected]/Lookup/by%20Subject/4714.0~2014-15~Main%20Features~Labour%20force%20characteristics~6 Released under CC BY 4.0. Link to license: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

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Further evidence was found by Andre Sammartino and colleagues (2003), who documented the results of a survey of chief executive officers (CEOs) and senior managers of Australian-based businesses. They found that, on average, CEOs perceived Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander workers to be less skilled, less committed to the job and more prone to absenteeism. They also reported greater levels of difficulty with retaining Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander employees than people from non-English-speaking backgrounds. More recently, Lauren Hughes and Graham Davidson (2011) conducted a web-based survey in which 60 non-Indigenous Australian human resource professionals reviewed four fictitious job resumés for an Aboriginal male and a non-Indigenous male, and an Aboriginal female and non-Indigenous female. They were asked to complete a measure of attitudes towards Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people, and to rate the resumés based on a number of key selection criteria, plus their suitability for a human resources position, suitability to work within their organisation and suitability to work with clients. Although the ratings assigned to each of the resumés in relation to the selection criteria (background and experience) were similar across all applicants, the ranks assigned to the resumés were dependent on the participants’ attitude towards Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders. Those that held a positive attitude differed little in their ranking of Aboriginal versus non-Indigenous resumés, whereas those with negative attitudes consistently ranked non-Indigenous resumés more favourably. Thus, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander applicants may be excluded at the interview stage because they are ranked less favourably than similarly qualified non-Indigenous applicants. Similar evidence may be found in New Zealand. The Working Together: Racial Discrimination in New Zealand report (Statistics New Zealand, 2012) asked New Zealanders aged over 15 years whether they had felt discriminated against over the past year. One in 10 people said they had experienced some form of discrimination in that period (which equates to an estimated 343 000 New Zealanders) and 6% (approximately 187 000 New Zealanders) believed racial discrimination was the reason for them being treated unfairly or unfavourably. Asian people reported the highest levels of racial discrimination in any setting, followed by Māori and Pacific people. Māori, Pacific and Asian people were also more likely to report experiencing racial discrimination in the workplace; and migrants were more likely to experience racial discrimination in the workplace than non-migrants.

Unforeseen effects of affirmative action Proponents of affirmative action often accuse opponents of harbouring conscious or unconscious prejudice. By contrast, opponents argue that they support a meritocracy – a form of justice in which everyone receives an equal opportunity and in which rewards are matched to contributions. In support of this reasoning, Ramona Bobocel and colleagues (1998) studied affirmative action attitudes and found that opposition to it was associated with a strong belief in the principle of merit, not with measures of racial prejudice. So, would these opponents favour preferential selection procedures to rectify the injustice of a workplace contaminated by discrimination? It appears that many would. When opponents of affirmative action were led to see women and minorities as targets of discrimination in a particular workplace, which itself undermines the principle of merit, they became more favourable towards a system of preferential treatment (Son Hing, Bobocel, & Zanna, 2002). Further complicating the question of deservingness is whether all minorities are seen as fully-fledged members of their group and thus equally entitled. In an article entitled ‘Are You Minority Enough?’ Diana Sanchez and George Chavez (2010) describe a study in which they presented research participants with a Latino candidate for a highly selective minority internship. The candidate’s resumé was strong and included backgrounds in research and business, computer skills, volunteer experience and a sound university grade point average. For some participants, the candidate’s resumé indicated a fluency in Spanish and English; for others, it indicated a fluency in English only (according to the US Census Bureau, 78% of Latino Americans speak Spanish). In their evaluations, participants saw the Spanish-speaking candidate as more of a Latino minority than the English-only candidate, as more suitable for affirmative action, and as more deserving of the internship. Interestingly, Latino participants in a second study shared these perceptions. Amid political debate, many questions are raised. According to Rupert Nacoste (1996), affirmative action affects those the policy is designed to help, those who feel excluded by it, the organisations that implement it, and the interactions among these three interested groups. In addition, Nacoste argues that people react not to the abstract concept of affirmative action but rather to the procedures that are used to implement the concept – and that these reactions can set off ‘procedural reverberations’ within the system. For example, people will be dissatisfied and the system will reverberate to the extent that the policy is set 688

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secretly rather than in the open, that interested parties have no opportunity to express their personal views, and that group membership considerations are seen as more important than the individual contributions of each applicant.

What happens when affirmative action is implemented? After years of research on attitudes towards affirmative action, it is now clear that although there are sharp differences of opinion, people’s reactions depend on, and can be changed by, how the policy is implemented. There is no single approach. Faye Crosby and colleagues (2006) note that policies have ranged from ‘soft’ forms of affirmative action – such as outreach programs designed to identify, recruit or specially train applicants from underrepresented groups – to ‘hard’ forms of affirmative action that give preference in hiring to applicants from targeted groups who are equally or less qualified than others. Based on a meta-analysis of 126 studies involving 29 000 respondents, David Harrison and colleagues (2006) found that people are most favourable towards softer forms of affirmative action and least favourable towards quotas and other hard policies that favour some applicants over others, regardless of their qualifications. By describing different affirmative action programs to business school students, Ariel Levi and Yitzhak Fried (2008) found that participants not only preferred a soft affirmative action policy but were also most supportive of a policy that influenced the hiring and training of new employees and least supportive of a policy that affected promotions and layoffs for existing employees. As you might expect, many people who do not personally benefit from affirmative action react negatively to both the policy and those who benefit from it (Heilman, McCullough, & Gilbert, 1996). What about the recipients of affirmative action? Does the policy psychologically bolster or undermine those it is intended to help? In an early series of studies, Madeline Heilman and colleagues (1987) selected male and female university students to serve as leaders of a two-person task. These students were then led to think that they had been chosen for the leadership role either by a preferential selection process that was based on gender or by a merit selection process based solely on qualifications. The result? The women (but not the men) who believed they were chosen because of their gender later devalued their own performance, even after receiving positive feedback. Further evidence of this was found in research conducted by Ming Singer (1996) using a sample of 312 New Zealand adults to examine: (1) the public’s reactions to the philosophical justifications for merit versus preferential selection, and (2) the effect of information frame (merit, preferential and diversity) and gender on people’s views towards preferential selection. His results showed that, in general, the public supported a process of merit selection (46%), as opposed to preferential practice (6%), but a large number did not show a clear preference for either (48%). So, it appears that evaluations of merit selection may be universally positive, but evaluations of preferential treatment are moderated by such factors as respondent gender, self-efficacy and knowledge about applicant qualifications. There are three explanations for why preferential selection policies may have negative effects. First, people perceive a procedure as unjust to the extent that it excludes those who are qualified simply because of their non-membership in a group (Nacoste, 1994; Heilman et al., 1996). Second, the recipients become less able to attribute success on the job to their own abilities and efforts, leading them and their co-workers to harbour doubts about their competence (Heilman, Block, & Lucas, 1992; Major, Feinstein, & Crocker, 1994). Third, preferential selection is seen as a form of assistance, a situation that can lead recipients to feel stigmatised by what they assume to be the negative perceptions of others (Heilman & Alcott, 2001). Are the recipients of affirmative action doomed to feel stigmatised, like second-class citizens? No. We saw earlier that the way people tend to react to a preferential selection procedure depends on how it is structured and for what purpose it is implemented. A good deal of research shows that people draw negative inferences about themselves and others when employment selections are made solely on the basis of sex, skin colour or ethnic background. But would they react more favourably to a preferential selection process if it is clear that merit-based factors also play a role and that the person chosen is competent and qualified for the position? To find out, Heilman and colleagues (1998) again brought together male and female participants to take part in a joint two-person task that required a leader and a follower. As in prior experiments, the researchers administered a bogus qualifications test and then assigned each female to the leadership role. Some participants were told that the appointment was based strictly on merit (that the person with the higher test score had been selected as the leader). Others were told that the process favoured the woman in a way that was preferential equivalent (that she was chosen only when her score was similar to that of her male counterpart), preferential minimum standard (that she was chosen only if she was minimally qualified)

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or preferential absolute (that she was chosen regardless of merit). The result? Appointed female leaders later rated their own performance and leadership abilities most favourably and saw the process as most fair when their appointment was based on merit, not gender (see Figure 16.7). Also important is that they did not devalue their performance or see the selection process as unfair in the preferential equivalent condition, where merit was clearly taken into account. Similarly, neither male co-participants nor observers were troubled by this type of preferential selection process. The key, clearly, is that people need to know that they were selected on the basis of merit (Unzueta, Gutiérrez, & Ghavami, 2010). FIGURE 16.7 Varying effects of affirmative action on women Women appointed as task leaders were told that they were selected by merit or by gender. Those in the gender condition were further told that preference was given (1) only if they were equivalent to their male partner, (2) only if they met a minimum standard, or (3) absolutely regardless of merit. These participants later rated their performance and leadership highest and saw the process as most fair when their appointment was based on merit rather than on preference. But the score was not much lower in the equivalent condition where merit was taken into account. 8 7

Self ratings

6 5 4 3 2 Self-evaluation Merit

Leadership ability

Preferential-equivalent

Preferential-minimum

Fairness Preferential-absolute

Source: Heilman, M. E., Battle, W. S., Keller, C. E., & Lee, R. A. (1998). Type of affirmative action policy: A determinant of reactions to sexbased preferential selection? Journal of Applied Psychology, 83, 190–205.

CRITICAL THINKING ACTIVITY If affirmative action can lead women and minorities to devalue their own performance, as suggested by research, what actions

can managers in organisations take to prevent this from happening?

Culture and organisational diversity For many years, the study of organisational behaviour was ‘culture blind and culture bound’ (Gelfand, Erez, & Aycan, 2007). As a result of two dramatic historical changes, researchers now look at the workplace through a broader lens. The first change has resulted from affirmative action programs, which increase the number of women and minorities who populate most organisations. The second is the worldwide trend towards globalisation, which has brought more and more people from disparate cultures into daily contact as colleagues and co-workers. Georgia Chao and Henry Moon (2005) note that every individual worker has a multidimensional identity that can be characterised within a cultural mosaic consisting of the various ‘tiles’ of his or her demographic groups (e.g., age, gender, race and ethnic heritage), geographical background (e.g., country of origin, region, climate and population density) and personal associations (e.g., with religion, profession and political affiliation). In some ways, everyone is similar, but in other ways, no two people are alike. For researchers who study organisational behaviour, the challenge is to represent the full complexity that comes with a diverse workplace. As diversity has become a fact of life, researchers have sought to understand what effect this change is having on motivation, morale and performance in the workplace. On the one hand, a pessimist would predict that diversity would breed division and conflict, making worker teams less effective. In Chapter 4, we saw that people categorise one another into ingroups and outgroups based on gender, age, race and other visible characteristics, and show a marked preference for ‘us’ over ‘them’. We also saw in Chapter 8 that 690

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people prefer the company of others who have similar rather than dissimilar attitudes and values. If people dislike each other, they will not work well together. On the other hand, an optimist would predict that diversity increases the range of perspectives and skills that are brought to bear on a problem, enhancing productivity and creative problem-solving by providing a group with a larger pool of resources to draw from. What is the net impact of diversity on a group’s performance? There is a hint of evidence for both effects. At present, researchers agree that there is no single or simple answer because the effect is likely to depend on the nature of the diversity, whether similarities or differences are accentuated, the proportion of majority to minority members, whether there is a culture of smooth integration within the organisation, the type of work to be completed, the group’s ability and motivation, and other factors (Mannix & Neale, 2005; van Knippenberg & Schippers, 2007). A workplace may strive for diversity, but its success may well depend on its philosophy and approach. Reflecting a society-wide debate, many companies struggle with this question: is it better to acknowledge group differences in the workplace by celebrating multiculturalism, or ignore these differences in an effort to encourage a uniform, colour-blind environment? To see if there is a relationship between the beliefs held within a company and how engaged its minority workers feel, Victoria Plaut and colleagues (2009) conducted an online ‘diversity climate survey’ of 5000 white and minority employees from 18 departments of a large healthcare organisation. By comparing departments, they found that the more multicultural the dominant white employees were in their diversity beliefs (endorsing ‘employees should recognise and celebrate racial and ethnic differences’ rather than ‘employees should downplay their racial and ethnic differences’), the more engaged their minority workers felt (e.g., ‘I am proud to tell others that I work at this organisation’). The real-world correlation is intriguing, but it does not prove that the multicultural beliefs within the organisation caused minority employees to feel more engaged. To test that hypothesis directly, Valerie Purdie-Vaughns and colleagues (2008) presented African American corporate professionals with a brochure for a fictitious management consulting company. For participants assigned to a value-diversity condition, the brochure stated: ‘While other consulting firms mistakenly try to shape their staff into a single mould, we believe that embracing our diversity enriches our culture’. For others in a colour-blind condition, the brochure stated: ‘While other firms mistakenly focus on their staff’s diversity, we train our diverse workforce to embrace their similarities’. Did the African American participants feel comfortable with this company? If the brochure photographs depicted a high level of minority representation, they were fine. If the photos depicted a low level of minority representation, however, their comfort level depended on the company’s diversity beliefs. In this case, they trusted the multicultural organisation that celebrated diversity and difference more than the colour-blind organisation that sought to minimise it.

PERFORMANCE APPRAISALS Even after a person is hired, the evaluation process continues. Nobody enjoys being scrutinised by a boss – or by anyone else, for that matter. Still, performance appraisal – the process of evaluating an employee’s work and communicating the results to that person – is an inevitable fact of working life. Performance appraisals provide a basis for placement decisions, transfers, promotions, raises, salary cuts, bonuses and layoffs. It would be easy if a worker’s performance could be measured by purely objective and quantifiable criteria, as when researchers are judged by the number of articles they publish, car dealers by the number of cars they sell, and sales agents by the number of customers they service. However, these kinds of quantitative measures are often not available, and they do not take into account the quality of work. By necessity, then, performance appraisals are often based on more subjective measures, such as the perceptions of employees by supervisors and co-workers, and sometimes even the employees themselves.

Performance appraisal

The process of evaluating an employee’s work within the organisation.

Supervisor ratings Based on the assumption that supervisors stay informed about the performance of their subordinates, they are most often called on to make evaluations. But are these ratings accurate? And is the process fair? The process has both benefits and drawbacks. On the one hand, research shows that supervisors are influenced more by a worker’s on-the-job knowledge, ability and dependability than by less relevant factors such as friendliness (Borman, White & Dorsey, 1995). On the other hand, as we will see, evaluators predictably fall prey to the social perception biases described elsewhere in this book. Over the years, a number of appraisal-related problems have been identified. A good deal of research has identified various types of rating errors. One prominent example is the halo effect – a failure to discriminate among different and distinct aspects of a single worker’s performance (Cooper, 1981). In

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Chapter 3, we saw that people’s impressions of one another are guided by implicit personality theories – by the preconceptions they have about the relationships among different traits. Believing that someone is warm, we assume that he or she is also generous and good-natured. In a similar manner, supervisors who believe that a worker is unproductive may also rate that worker negatively on teamwork, independence, creativity and other distinct dimensions. Halo effects are most pronounced when evaluators rate someone they do not know well or when a time delay has caused their memory of performance to fade (Koslowski, Kirsch, & Chao, 1986; Murphy & Balzer, 1986). One illustration of the halo effect pertains to the stereotypes people have about workers who start their day early or late. In recent years, inspired in part by the increased numbers of women with children in the workplace, flexible work practices have become more common. But do supervisors hold stereotypes about workers who arrive late to the start of the day? Kai Chi Yam and others (2014) questioned 149 pairs of full-time employees and their supervisors from different industries. Employees reported starting times that ranged from 5 a.m. to 9:45 a.m. Even though the employees put in the same total number of hours, supervisors saw the early starters as more conscientious and gave higher ratings to their job performance. In a follow-up study, university students read about a fictitious worker whose eight-hour work day was said to start early or late, and they too exhibited this morning bias. A second problem is that evaluators differ in the average numerical ratings they give to others. Because of what is known as the restriction of range problem, some people provide uniformly high, lenient ratings; others are inclined to give stingy, low ratings; and still others gravitate towards the centre of the numerical scale. In all cases, people who use a restricted range fail to make adequate distinctions. Sometimes the differences among raters are considerable, as was seen in a study of managers employed in numerous organisations (Scullen, Mount, & Goff, 2000), in part because of differences in their personality. Individuals who have agreeable personalities tend to be lenient in their ratings of others, while those who are highly conscientious tend to be harsher (Bernardin, Cooke, & Villanova, 2000). In addition to problems with rating error and bias, supervisors may also intentionally distort their evaluations depending on their objectives within the organisation (Murphy, Cleveland, Skattebo, & Kinney, 2004). In a study of students in a human management resources course, for example, raters gave higher ratings overall when their goal was to encourage group harmony, to ensure fairness and accuracy, or to motivate those they were rating, compared with when the purpose was merely to help members to identify their strengths and weaknesses (Wang, Wong, & Kwong, 2010). An obvious but often overlooked fact of life in the workplace is that performance evaluation is not just a measurement process but one that also serves social and communication purposes.

Self-evaluations

A problem with having workers evaluate their own job performance is that self-ratings are overly positive.

TRUE

692

Although performance appraisals are typically made by supervisors, input is often sought from co-workers, subordinates, clients, customers and others whose opinions are relevant. You may not realise it, but by filling out course-evaluation surveys at university, you may have had an influence on tenure and promotion decisions involving your own lecturers. As when workers are asked to evaluate their managers, these evaluations provide valuable ‘upward feedback’. One particularly interesting source of information comes from self-evaluations. If you have ever had to describe yourself in a job application, you know that a self-evaluation is not exactly a lesson in modesty. Most people see themselves in overly flattering terms, taking credit for success, denying the blame for failure, having an inflated sense of control and exhibiting unrealistic optimism about the future. Add the fact that people like to present themselves favourably to others and it comes as no surprise that self-evaluations in the workplace are consistently more positive than the ratings made by supervisors (Campbell & Lee, 1988) and less predictive of job success (Shore, Shore, & Thornton, 1992). In a simple illustration of this point, studies have shown that workers tend to underestimate the number of times they had been absent compared with co-workers (Harrison & Shaffer, 1994; Johns, 1994). Another issue with self-evaluation is that individuals differ in the extent to which they tend to present themselves in a positive light. Research shows that the more power people have in an organisation, the higher their self-evaluations are (Georgesen & Harris, 1998). Similarly, men in general are more boastful than women and more likely to overestimate their own performance (Beyer, 1990). Insofar as work appraisals are based on self-evaluations, then, these differences put both subordinates and female employees at a disadvantage.

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New and improved methods of appraisal Performance appraisals cannot always be trusted. When more objective measures of work output are not available, however, organisations have no choice but to rely on imperfect and sometimes prejudiced human judges. Simple practices such as ensuring timely evaluations relative to the observation of performance can help to reduce errors in the process – once memory for details begins to fade, evaluators fall back on stereotypes and other biases (Murphy & Balzer, 1986; Sanchez & De La Torre, 1996). Some organisations are moving to a ‘360-degree performance appraisal’ – a full circle of ratings from multiple evaluators, which is thought to be an improvement on the conventional single-rater approach (Lepsinger & Lucia, 2009). In a typical 360-degree assessment, an employee’s performance is rated by superiors, peers, subordinates, the employees themselves and sometimes even outside stakeholders; so whatever idiosyncratic bias a single individual brings to his or her ratings can be offset by others. Although there is debate over how to combine, compare and contrast different sources, research shows that this approach is an improvement over single-rater methods (Craig & Hannum, 2006; Morgeson, Mumford, & Campion, 2005). However, in light of globalisation and technological trends, many are starting to rethink what constitutes employee performance and how information on performance is gathered. According to Boris Ewenstein, Bryan Hancock and Asmus Komm (2016) many companies are collecting more objective performance data through systems that automate real-time analyses. By continually crowd-sourcing performance data throughout the year, as opposed to relying on a once-a-year, inexact analysis of individuals, companies gain better insights on the performance of people and teams. Developing apps for these purposes allows employees to request feedback from supervisors, colleagues, and others which allows people to provide both positive and not so positive comments about each other in a playful and engaging way and in real time.

Due-process considerations In the all-too-human enterprise of performance appraisal, especially in a slow economy in which jobs are at a premium, accuracy is not the only concern. There’s also another problem: perceptions of fairness. Precisely because the stakes are high in decisions that are made about personnel, performance ratings may be biased and sometimes deliberately distorted by those motivated by political and self-serving agendas within the workplace. Particularly at the executive level, office politics are an organisational fact of life (Gioia & Longnecker, 1994). To enhance perceptions of fairness, Robert Folger and colleagues (1992) proposed a ‘due process’ model of performance appraisal. In general, this model is designed to guard the rights of employees in the same way that the criminal justice system seeks to protect the accused. The model consists of three principles. The first is that there should be adequate notice; that is, there should be clear performance standards that employees can understand and ask questions about. The second is that employees should receive a fair hearing in which they are evaluated by a supervisor who knows their work and in which they receive timely feedback as well as an opportunity to present their own case. The third principle is that appraisals should be based on evidence of job performance, not on prejudice, corruption or external considerations. As indicated by research on how people react to pay raises, pay cuts, promotions, layoffs and the implementation of affirmative action policies, procedural fairness (how decisions are made) can be just as important to people as a favourable outcome (what decisions are made). Thus, workers who are dissatisfied with their pay are more likely to retaliate (e.g., by calling in sick, stealing or wasting the company’s supplies, or damaging equipment) when they believe the procedures used to determine pay are unfair and they were not consulted about the decision (Skarlicki & Folger, 1997). Further research has shown that people judge organisational justice according to a large number of criteria, such as the transparency and fairness of the procedures that are used; the extent to which the procedures and the outcomes they produce are explained; the extent to which affected workers are treated with dignity, politeness and respect; and the decision-making outcomes by which salaries, promotions and other resources are allocated. Together, the combination of these specific types of justice influences people’s satisfaction, commitment and on-the-job performance within the workplace (Ambrose & Schminke, 2009). In fact, a meta-analysis of 83 studies revealed that employees’ perceptions of unfairness in the workplace were associated with increases in negative emotional states, stress, burnout, and physical and mental health problems (Robbins, Ford, & Tetrick, 2012).

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LEADERSHIP Regardless of where you are employed, the work experience depends in large part on the quality of the leadership in the organisation. A leader is someone who can move a group of people towards a common goal. She or he may be a head of state, the chancellor of a university, the principal investigator of a research team, the executive officer of a corporation or the coach of a sporting team. Across a wide range of settings, researchers have long wondered: ‘What personal and situational factors make for effective leadership?’ There is no single formula. Some leaders succeed by winning supporters; others lead by mending fences, uniting rivals, negotiating deals, building coalitions, solving problems or stirring emotions. Whatever the strategy, there is one common denominator – good leadership is about social influence (Avolio, 2011; Bass & Bass, 2008; Goethals, Sorensen, & Burns, 2004; Northouse, 2013).

The classic trait approach One approach to the study of leadership is to identify the traits that characterise ‘natural-born’ leaders – those who have the ‘right stuff’. According to the ‘great person’ theory of history, exceptional individuals rise up to determine the course of human events. This approach has had some support over the years, since certain traits – such as ambition, intelligence, a need for power, self-confidence, a high energy level, and an ability to be flexible and adapt to change – are characteristic of people who go on to become leaders (Hogan, Curphy, & Hogan, 1994; Kenny & Zaccaro, 1983). Even physical height may play a role. In this regard, it is striking that across the entire twentieth century, the taller candidate for the US presidency won an astonishing 23 out of 25 elections – that is 92% of the time (1972 and 1976 were the only exceptions). On the basis of past research, Shelley Kirkpatrick and Edwin Locke (1991) argued that certain stable characteristics are associated with successful leadership among business executives. In particular, they pointed to the importance of the following: • cognitive ability – intelligence and an ability to quickly process large amounts of information • inner drive – a need for achievement, ambition and a high energy level • leadership motivation – a desire to influence others in order to reach a common goal • expertise – specific knowledge of technical issues relevant to the organisation • creativity – an ability to generate original ideas • self-confidence – faith in one’s own abilities and ideas • integrity – reliability, honesty and an open communication style • flexibility – an ability to adapt to the needs of followers and to changes in the situation. ‘Regardless of whether leaders are born or made’, they say, ‘it is unequivocally clear that leaders are not like other people’ (p. 58). Locke (2000) picked up on this theme in The Prime Movers, a book in which he describes the traits that ‘great wealth creators’ – self-made multimillionaires and billionaires – seem to have in common. Zaccaro (2007) adds that various aspects of leadership can best be predicted by unique combinations of attributes rather than by single traits. In contrast to this approach, more situationally oriented theories were introduced based on the notion that the emergence of a given leader depends on time, place and circumstances – that different situations call for different types of leaders (Vroom & Jago, 2007). As the needs, expectations and resources of a group change, so too will the person best suited to lead it. An alternative to the classic trait perspective, then, is a view that leadership is the product of a unique interaction between the person and the surrounding situation. Situations may well dictate the success of a particular leadership style. For example, during the emergence of the dot-com era, the traditional image of a leader who presides from the top down over a hierarchical command structure gave way to a corporate culture in which a leader should be accessible, fluid, lateral and relationship oriented. But is this situational doctrine necessarily incompatible with the classic trait approach? Maybe not. In Primal Leadership, Daniel Goleman, Richard Boyatzis and Annie McKee (2002) argue that the primary job of leadership is emotional and that great leaders are endowed with emotional intelligence – an ability to know how people are feeling and how to use that information to guide their own actions. Great leaders are men and women who exude interest, enthusiasm and other positive emotions and whose energy is contagious. Leaders with emotional intelligence are by nature flexible in their style, and serve as visionaries, coaches, pacesetters, or whatever is needed at the time.

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Contingency models of leadership Illustrative of this interactional perspective is Fred Fiedler’s (1967) contingency model of leadership. Fiedler argues that a key difference among leaders is whether they are primarily task oriented (singlemindedly focused on the job) or relations oriented (concerned about the feelings of employees). The amount of control that a leader has determines which type of leadership is more effective. Leaders enjoy high situational control when they have good relations with their staff, a position of power and a clearly structured task. By contrast, leaders exhibit low situational control when they have poor relations with their staff, limited power and a task that is not clearly defined. Combining these personal and situational components, studies of various work groups suggest that task-oriented leaders are the most effective in clear-cut situations that are either low or high in control. In low-control situations, they provide guidance by staying focused on the job. In high control situations, where conditions are already favourable, these same leaders maintain a relaxed and low profile. In contrast, relations-oriented leaders perform better in situations that afford a moderate degree of control. They offer too little guidance in low-control situations and they meddle too much in high-control situations. However, in ambiguous situations relations-oriented leaders, because of their open, participative and social style, motivate workers to solve problems in creative ways. Making decisions is one of the most important tasks for any leader. However, in the two-way street between leaders and followers, it is often important to solicit the opinions of others. How much participation should leaders invite? According to the normative model of leadership proposed by Victor Vroom and Philip Yetton (1973), leaders vary widely in this regard. Some are highly autocratic and directive (i.e., they invite no feedback from workers), while others are highly participative (i.e., they frequently seek and use suggestions from workers). For effective long-term leadership, the key is to invite just the right amount of worker participation – not too much (which is often not efficient) and not too little (which can lower morale). As to what constitutes the right amount, Vroom and Yetton argued that it depends on various factors, such as the clarity of the problem, the information available to the leader and followers, and whether it is more important that the decision be right or that one has support. Although the ideal leader is one who adjusts his or her style to meet the situation, people generally prefer leaders who involve them in important decisions. Research shows that participative decision-making boosts worker morale, motivation and productivity, and reduces turnover and absenteeism rates. Benefits such as these have been found especially in situations where employees want to have input (Vroom & Jago, 1988) and when they are involved in decision-making directly rather than through elected representatives (Rubenowitz, Norrgren, & Tannenbaum, 1983).

CHAPTER SIXTEEN

Contingency model of leadership

The theory that leadership effectiveness is determined both by the personal characteristics of leaders and by the control afforded by the situation.

Normative model of leadership

The theory that leadership effectiveness is determined by the amount of feedback and participation that leaders invite from workers.

Transactional leadership Although contingency models take both the person and situation into account, Edwin Hollander (1985) criticised these ‘top-down’ views of leadership in which workers are portrayed as inert, passive, faceless creatures to be mobilised at management’s discretion. Instead, he sees leadership as a two-way social exchange in which there is mutual and reciprocal influence between a leader and his or her followers. According to Hollander, a good transactional leader is one who gains compliance and support from followers by setting clear goals for them, by offering tangible rewards, by providing assistance and by fulfilling psychological needs in exchange for an expected level of job performance. Transactional leadership thus rests on the leader’s willingness and ability to reward subordinates who keep up their end of the bargain and to correct those who do not. Bass (1985) developed a typology of leadership behaviours which he believed were aligned with this type of leadership, including laissez-faire, management by exception and contingent award. Laissez-faire leaders offer little support and guidance to their subordinates. Their tendency to allow complete freedom generally leads to confusion and disorganisation. It is a ‘hands off’ approach to leadership which can be somewhat frustrating. Management by exception leaders do not generally become involved with their subordinates unless failures become evident and punishment or corrections are warranted. Active leaders in this space regularly search for failures and devise systems to avoid them recurring whereas passive leaders seek involvement only when needed and are unlikely to see the need to set a plan of action – they accept the status quo and encourage the ‘non-exceptional’ performance. Finally, the contingent rewards approach reflects reciprocal behaviour with each party identifying a system of rewards which they strive to achieve (Barbuto, 2005; Bass, 1990; Bass & Stogdill, 1990).

Transactional leader

A leader who gains compliance and support from followers primarily through goal-setting and the use of rewards.

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FIGURE 16.8 Steve Jobs

Transformational leadership

Two prominent models of such leadership are Microsoft’s Bill Gates and Apple’s Steve Jobs, both of whom co-founded two of the most important technology companies in the world. In 1975, Gates dropped out of Harvard and co-founded what was then a small company by the name of Microsoft. Long before it seemed possible, he envisioned a day when there would be a personal computer in every home and office. Then, as it was becoming clear that the future resided in cyberspace, he shocked the business world by refocusing Microsoft around the internet. Retired from Microsoft, he is now one of the richest and most philanthropic people in the world. In 1973, Steve Jobs (see Figure 16.8, like Gates, also dropped out of university. He soon co-founded Apple and helped popularise and innovate the ‘Mac’, bringing to it the mouse, a sleek design and other creative elements. Before Jobs died in October 2011, his innovations also included the iPod, the iPhone and the iPad – the all-in-one gadget. In an industry that demands an ability to anticipate the future, adapt quickly to change, take great risks and enlist support from others, both Gates and Jobs go down in history as world leaders. What is special about successful leaders? Based on the work of political scientist James Burns (1978, 2003), Bernard Bass calls them transformational leaders (Bass, 1998; Bass & Riggio, 2006). Transformational leaders motivate others to transcend their personal needs in the interest of a common cause, particularly in times of growth, change and crisis. Through consciousness raising and raw emotional Source: AAP Images/AP/Paul Sakuma inspiration, they articulate a clear vision for the future and then mobilise others to join in that vision. Over the years, Bass and colleagues asked people who work for various business managers and executives, military officers, school principals, government bureaucrats, fire chiefs and shop owners to describe the most outstanding leaders they know (Bass & Avolio, 1990). The descriptions they gave revealed four attributes: charisma, inspirational motivation, intellectual stimulation and an individualised consideration of others. Other studies have shown that transformational leaders are also more extroverted than the average person (Bono & Judge, 2004) – and more likely to exhibit positive emotions (Joseph et al., 2015). To measure the extent to which individuals possess the attributes of transactional and transformational leadership styles, Bass (1985) devised the Multifactor Leader Questionnaire, or MLQ. Using this instrument, researchers have studied leadership in different cultures and in different types of organisations, including car manufacturers, express-mail companies, multinational corporations, banks, government agencies and military groups. Others have varied the use of the different leadership styles in controlled laboratory settings. Indicating that inspiration is universally a more powerful motivator than reward, the results have shown that transformational leaders are more effective than transactional leaders (Bass, 1998; Lowe, Kroeck, & Sivasubramaniam, 1996) and exert influence by getting others to identify with them and the group they represent (Kark, Shamir, & Chen, 2003). In light of their ability to exert influence, it is not surprising that in a study of 39 managers and 130 employees in 6 companies, those who emerged as transformational leaders on the MLQ were also more socially networked within their organisations (Bono & Anderson, 2005). People are drawn like magnets to transformational leaders who have what it takes. But wait. Does this mean that Adolf Hitler and other authoritarian heads of state were leaders of the same stripe as Mahatma Gandhi and Nelson Mandela? Is there a ‘dark side of transformational leadership’ (Tourish, 2013)? One would hope not. To separate human evil from virtue, Bernard Bass and Paul Steidlmeier (1999) sought

A pioneer of the technology revolution, Steve Jobs, co-founder of Apple, was one of the most forward- looking, transformational business leaders of our time.

Transformational leader

A leader who inspires followers to transcend their own needs in the interest of a common cause.

The most effective type of leader is one who knows how to win support through the use of reward.

FALSE

CRITICAL THINKING ACTIVITY Is it sufficient for a group leader to quietly lead by example, or does he or she have to play a vocal, prominent role in rallying the rest of the group? 696

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to distinguish between what they call pseudo-transformational leaders, who appeal to emotions rather than to reason and manipulate ignorant followers to further their own personal interests, and authentic transformational leaders, who morally uplift followers and help them transform their collective visions into realities.

CULTURAL DIVERSITY THE GLOBE PROJECT The Global Leadership and Organisational Behaviour Effectiveness (GLOBE) project is dedicated to the study of culture, leadership and organisational effectiveness around the world. With over 200 researchers from 62 countries it has become one of the largest and most comprehensive projects of its kind. The project has established that leader effectiveness is contextual, heavily grounded in the societal and organisational norms and values of its people. With the establishment of nine cultural dimensions, the project has been able to capture similarities and differences among societies (Globe, n.d.).

Figure 16.9 shows these nine dimensions. Cultural similarity is greatest among societies that constitute a cluster – the farther apart a cluster, the more dissimilar they are. Take for example the Anglo cluster in which Australia and New Zealand sit; looking at the wheel, we are most dissimilar to the Middle Eastern cluster. The dissimilarities become even clearer when you look at the data differences between countries from the Anglo cluster and the Middle Eastern cluster, where country scores represent the leadership styles of a sample of the countries from each cluster. Table 16.2 gives a brief description of leadership styles and the clusters that relate to each.

FIGURE 16.9 The nine dimensions established by the Global Leadership and Organisational Behaviour Effectiveness (GLOBE) project

ma n ic

Eu

ro

p

El Ecua Co Salva dor l Bo ombi dor livi a B Gu ra a A ate zil Co rgent mala Ven sta R ina ezu ica M La tin exico ela Am e ri ca

Sub Italy -Sa h Switzerland Zim ara A (French-speaking) Na babw fric Spain Za mibia e mb N Portugal Sou iger ia (bl th ia France ack Afr sam ica ple )

Latin Europe

Southern Asia

Philipinnes Indonesia Malaysia India Thailand Iran

s ia str nd Au herla d t n Ne erla The Switz many r Ge

G er

e

Cana da USA Austr al Irelan ia d U South K (whit Africa es New ample) Zeala nd A n gl o

Middle Ea Turke st y Kuwa it Egyp Moro t cco Qata r

sia nA cia e nfu por Co ga ng Sin g Ko n n Ho aiwa T na a i Ch Kore th n Sou Japa

a

Europe tern Eas Greece ary Hung ia Alban ia n Slove d Polan ia Russ a i Georg tan s h k a Kaz

ark Denm d n a l n i F en Swed pe Euro Nordic

Source: House, R., Hanges, P., Javidan, M., Dorfman, P., Gupta, V. (2004). Culture, Leadership, and Organizations: The GLOBE Study of 62 Societies. California: Sage Publications.

>>

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TABLE 16.2 Leadership styles and the related clusters, according to the Global Leadership and Organisational Behaviour Effectiveness (GLOBE) project Leadership style

Description

Social cluster

Performance-oriented, or charismatic/ value-based, style

Stresses high standards, decisiveness, and innovation; seeks to inspire people around a vision; creates a passion among them to perform; and does so by firmly holding on to core values.

Germanic Europe Nordic Europe South East Asia Latin Europe Latin America

Team-oriented style

Instils pride, loyalty and collaboration among organisational members; and highly values team cohesiveness and a common purpose or goals.

South East Asia Confucian Asia Latin American Eastern Europe Sub-Saharan Africa Latin Europe Nordic Europe Anglo Middle Eastern Germanic Europe

Participative style

Encourages input from others in decisionmaking and implementation; and emphasises delegation and equality.

Germanic Europe Anglo Nordic Europe

Humane style

Stresses compassion and generosity; and it is patient, supportive and concerned with the wellbeing of others.

South East Asia Anglo Sub-Saharan Africa Confucian Asia

Autonomous style

Germanic Europe Characterised by an independent, individualistic and self-centric approach to Eastern Europe Confucian Asia leadership. Nordic South East Asia Anglo Sub-Saharan Africa Middle East Latin Europe Latin America

Self or group-protective style

Emphasises procedural, status-conscious and ‘face-saving’ behaviours; and focuses on the safety and security of the individual and the group.

Middle East Confucian Asia South East Asia Latin America Eastern Europe

Source: House, R., Hanges, P., Javidan, M., Dorfman, P., Gupta, V. (2004). Culture, Leadership, and Organizations: The GLOBE Study of 62 Societies. California: Sage Publications.

Leadership among women and minorities Despite progress that has been made in entry- and middle-level positions, working women and minorities who seek positions of leadership have still not fully broken through the ‘glass ceiling’ – a barrier so subtle that it is transparent, yet so strong that it keeps women from reaching the top of the hierarchy (Morrison & Von Glinow, 1990). Indeed, women may also encounter ‘glass walls’ that keep them from moving laterally within an organisation as well; for example, from positions in public relations to those in core areas such as production, marketing and sales (Lopez, 1992). And if that is not bad enough, women who do break through the ‘glass ceiling’ and somehow manage to penetrate the ‘glass walls’ may face new barriers, with research indicating evidence of a glass cliff – when women are appointed to positions of power in circumstances of crisis and instability where they are often doomed to fail (Ryan, Haslam, & Postmes, 2007). The concept of the ‘glass cliff’ was originally recognised by Michelle Ryan and Alex Haslam in 2005 who acknowledged that although women were indeed being offered a seat at the table the seat was somewhat 698

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unstable, risky and precarious. The term has become synonymous with women leaders taking the reins during difficult times – take for example Hillary Clinton and the race for the US Presidency; Theresa May, the British Prime Minister who came to power at the time of Brexit; and in our own backyard politicians such as Julia Gillard, Carmen Lawrence, Joan Kirner and Kristina Keneally.

Sex differences in leadership Many women are highly qualified for positions of power. Research shows that male and female managers have very similar aspirations, abilities, values and job-related skills. Reviewing what amounted to a massive quantity of research literature on sex differences in leadership, Alice Eagly and Linda Carli (2007) found that female leaders in the workplace are as task oriented as their male counterparts, and that male and female leaders in general are equally effective. The only difference seems to be that men are more controlling and women more democratic in their approaches. As a result, men may be more effective as leaders in positions that require a more directive style (e.g., in the military), whereas women may be more effective in managerial settings that require openness and cooperation. Indeed, when university students in one study were assigned to participate in long-term workgroups, centralised leadership structures emerged over time in all-male groups, while more balanced decentralised leadership structures emerged in all-female groups (Berdahl & Anderson, 2005). This portrayal of women leaders is consistent with Judy Rosener’s (1995) observation that leading women draw effectively on qualities traditionally seen as feminine. It is also consistent with Sally Helgesen’s (1995) observation that female managers interact more with subordinates, invite them to participate in the decision-making process, share information and power, and spin more extensive networks, or ‘webs of inclusion’ – a leadership style that she sees as a feminine advantage. Research shows that men and women differ in their style – not in the capacity for leadership. A meta-analysis of 45 comparative studies suggests that female leaders may even be slightly more transactional and transformational than men (Eagly, Johannesen-Schmidt, & van Engen, 2003). Other researchers are quick to caution that all claims of a gender advantage in favour of men or women are based on stereotypes and are overstated (Vecchio, 2002). If women are competent to serve as leaders, why have so relatively few managed to reach the top in executive positions? For women, the path to power – from their entry into the labour market, to recruitment in an organisation and up the promotion ladder is something of a labyrinth (Eagly & Carli, 2007).

Impediments to female leadership Three sets of impediments have been identified. One is that many women are deeply conflicted about having to juggle a career and family responsibilities, and feel as though they have to pick one or the other (Halpern & Cheung, 2008; O’Driscoll, 2013). A second impediment is that some women shy away from competitive, hierarchical positions that offer the potential for leadership in favour of professions that involve helping people (Pratto, Stallworth, Sidanius, & Sieres, 1997). Yet a third impediment is societal; that is, lingering stereotypes, which portray women as followers and not having the leadership traits commonly associated with masculinity. As a result, some people are uneasy about women in leadership roles – particularly women who occupy task-oriented or ‘masculine’ positions, as in business (Eagly & Karau, 2002; Koenig, Eagly, Mitchell, & Ristikari, 2011). In a survey of 100 male and female corporate executives, Karen Lyness and Donna Thompson (2000) found that although the men and women were equally successful, the women had overcome more barriers to get where they were going, such as being excluded from informal social networks, being passed over for jobs that required relocating, and not fitting into the corporate culture. To further complicate matters, research shows that people in general exhibit a bias against motherhood when it comes to recommending women with children for promotion (Heilman & Okimoto, 2008). In Australia, as in many other countries such as New Zealand, the US and the UK, it is unlawful to discriminate against employees on the basis of pregnancy or potential pregnancies. Yet in Australia the most commonly reported forms of discrimination include dismissal (especially of pregnant women), delays in career advancement, allocation to inferior job roles or responsibilities, unexpected changes to work hours and hostility from co-workers (O’Driscoll, Brough, & Biggs, 2007). A report conducted by the Australian Human Rights Commission in 2014 revealed that one in five mothers had their employment significantly altered during or after parental leave. The report suggests that 32% of mothers who have been discriminated against for their pregnancy resign, 22% choose not to return to the workforce, and 23% choose not to return to the same employer after their maternity leave.

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Research conducted by Barbara Masser, Kirsten Grass and Michelle Nesic (2007) further reinforced the argument of bias against motherhood, with their findings demonstrating that pregnant women were discriminated against in terms of hiring preferences and starting salaries. These findings were also confirmed by Paula Brough and Michael O’Driscoll (2010), who suggest that despite evidence of the advantages experienced by organisations who adopt family-friendly employment policies, there have been reports of discrimination and disadvantages experienced by employees who choose to access these policies, largely because those employees are seen as being fundamentally less committed to work.

The pace of progress in female leadership Despite the aspirations to have more women in senior leadership roles, progress in Australia over the past decade has been notoriously slow. As you can see from Figure 16.10, during the period 2016–2017, women FIGURE 16.10 The gender pay gap in Australia Key findings from the Workplace Gender Equality Agency’s 2016–2017 reporting data show that gender equality remains an issue in Australia.

+$26K

Biggest pay gap in trades All manager and occupational categories record a full-time gender pay gap in favour of men. At the top are Technicians and trades at 26.7%.

26.7% Pay gap technicians and trades

$26K gender pay gap The full-time gender pay gap is trending down, but men still take home $26,527 a year more than women on average.

Gender equality missing at the board table Female representation on boards is static (24.9%) and few management teams are reporting pay equity metrics to the board.

Source: Workplace Gender Equality Agency. (2017). Australia’s gender equality scorecard: Key findings from the Workplace Gender Equality Agency’s 2016–2017 reporting data. Retrieved from https://www.wgea.gov.au/sites/default/files/2016-17-gender-equality-scorecard.pdf

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represented almost half of Australia’s workforce but took home an average of $251.20 less than men each week. This means that Australian women need to work an extra 56 days a year to earn the same pay as men for the same work. Added to this, in 2015–2016 women were reaching retirement with an average of $113 660 less superannuation than the average male. According to the Australian Census of Women in Leadership (Workplace Gender Equality Agency, 2012) there was no substantial increase in female board representation over the 8-year period between 2002 and 2010, with female directors consistently hovering at around the 8.5% mark and those at the senior executive level at around 10%. There is some good news however as the number of women on the boards of ASX 200 companies grew from 8.3% in 2009 to 28.4% in 2018. Additionally, women made up 44.4% of new appointments to ASX 200 boards in 2018, with only four ASX 200 boards that do not have a female member (Australian Institute of Company Directors, 2018). Things are also slowly moving forward in New Zealand, with figures suggesting a 2% to 3% increase in many areas for the representation of women at senior levels. The news is not all good, however, with the levels of representation of women in the top echelon of many areas remaining unacceptably low. For example, women still represent less than 30% of judges, less than 25% of senior academic staff and less than 20% of partners in top legal firms. Gender pay gaps are also still evident, with nine government departments showing a gender pay gap in excess of 20% and a further 22 government departments where the pay gap is larger than the average wage (New Zealand Human Rights Commission, 2012). According to a new policy pledge, however, the New Zealand Government has moved forward with a bold initiative to have all state boards and committees with gender equality by 2021 – they are even prepared to impose quotas to make it happen (Lambert, 2018).

CULTURAL DIVERSITY WOMEN ON BOARDS GLOBALLY According to the Deloitte Women in the Boardroom Report (2016), although the number of boardroom seats provided to women has risen, women are still largely under-represented on corporate boards, despite continued efforts to improve inclusion and diversity. Only 15% of board seats worldwide are held by women, a modest increase from the 12% reported in the previous report in 2014. Norway recorded the largest share of board seats held by women at 42%, followed by France (33%) and Sweden (32%). The UK comes in at 12th position with

20% (up from 15.6%). New Zealand has achieved the strongest growth since 2015, with the number of board seats held by women increasing from 18% to 28% – the number of female chairs also increased from 5% to 11%. In Australia there has been a 5.3% rise in women serving on boards and a decrease of 1% in female chairs. The report also shows that companies with a female CEO have almost twice as many women on the board as companies led by men. In the survey of 64 countries they found 29% of board positions were held by women in companies with a female CEO as compared to 15% in companies with a male CEO.

Impediments to leadership for minorities Statistics show that minorities also fight an uphill battle for leadership positions, although research is mixed on the question of whether employee evaluations are biased by race (Roth, Huffcutt, & Bobko, 2003; Sackett & DuBois, 1991; Stauffer & Buckley, 2005; Waldman & Avolio, 1991). Still, in light of what social psychologists have discovered about the subtleties of modern racism, as described in Chapter 4, business leaders should be aware of the indirect ways in which minorities are handicapped in the pursuit of leadership. Overcoming the obstacles, some minorities do manage to break through the racial divide into positions of leadership. How did these individuals, and others who have risen to executive ranks, do it? In Breaking Through, David Thomas and John Gabarro (1999) studied the career trajectories and experiences of 54 managers and executives in three large companies. Referring to the corporate career ladder as a tournament, they discovered that the successful African American, Asian American and Hispanic American executives they studied climbed slowly at first to positions of middle management, but were then fast-tracked relative to their white peers into the executive suite. Minority managers have to build a solid foundation early, they suggested that these candidates need to prove their worth multiple times before being promoted. At every step of this developmental process, they found that mentors played a key role – opening doors, offering challenging assignments and sponsoring them for recruitment into important, high-profile positions. In Leading in Black and White, Ancella Livers and Keith Caver (2003) further suggested, based on surveys and interviews of black professionals, that success involved some common ingredients such as having a distinct identity and a heightened focus on race, office politics, networking and, again, the need for mentors. People need other people, and the corporate world is no exception. Copyright 2020 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-202

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MOTIVATION AT WORK Have you ever woken up on a Monday morning and questioned the need to get out of bed to go to work? What generally convinces you to get up, get dressed and go to work? The thought of the overseas holiday you have been planning? Or maybe simply being able to afford to eat next week may be the contributing factor. But have you ever stopped for a minute to think seriously about motivation in terms of your workplace? This is something that organisational psychologists think about a lot. Perhaps one of the most common definitions of work motivation is the psychological processes which determine the direction, intensity and persistence of action within the continued stream of experiences that characterise the person in relation to work (Kanfer, 1990). What motivates individuals to work hard and to work well? What determines your on-the-job satisfaction, attendance, loyalty and commitment? People’s attitudes about their job can positively and negatively affect their productivity and performance (Judge & Kammeyer-Mueller, 2012). Are you driven strictly by economics, or do you have other personal needs to fulfil? It is likely that there is no single answer. At work, as in the rest of life, our behaviour often stems from the convergence of many different motives; so let us take a closer look at some of them.

Economic reward models

Expectancy theory

The theory that workers become motivated when they believe that their efforts will produce valued outcomes.

Out of necessity, people work to make a living. Yet in strictly economic terms, the issue of payment is more complicated than it may appear. To begin with, someone’s overall satisfaction with his or her compensation depends not only on salary (gross income and take-home pay) but also on raises (upward changes in pay and how these changes are determined), how income is distributed (the number of cheques received or salary differences within the company) and what benefits an employer offers (e.g., transport, telephone, housing, shares or bonuses, study leave, annual leave, sick leave and other services). Each of these factors constitutes part of a formula for satisfaction (Heneman & Schwab, 1985; Judge & Welbourne, 1994). In fact, many rewards are not monetary but symbolic – such as titles, office size, location, car, furnishings, an office with a window and the ability to regulate access by others (Sundstrom, 1986). Perhaps the most basic theory of worker motivation is Victor Vroom’s (1964) expectancy theory. According to Vroom, people are rational decision-makers who analyse the benefits and costs of the possible courses of action. Accordingly, he said, workers become motivated and exert effort when they believe that: 1. their effort will result in an improved performance 2. their performance will be recognised and rewarded 3. the monetary and symbolic rewards that are offered are valuable and desirable. Over the years, this theory has been used with some success to predict worker attendance, productivity and other job-related behaviours (Mitchell, 1974; Van Eerde & Thierry, 1996). Goal-setting is particularly important for motivation. Research shows that people perform better at work and are more productive when they are given specific goals and clear standards for success and failure than when they are simply told to ‘do your best’ (Locke & Latham, 1990). Financial incentives, in particular, can effectively boost worker productivity without compromising the quality of the work (Jenkins, Mitra, Gupta, & Shaw, 1998). Based on past research, Edwin Locke and Gary Latham (2002) offer a practically useful theory of goal-setting. The key, they maintain, is for people to set specific and difficult goals for themselves or others. This practice increases goal-related choice, effort and persistence; increases productivity and other aspects of performance; brings reward and satisfaction; and triggers a willingness to take on new challenges and set new goals, thus setting into motion a self-perpetuating cycle of high performance (see Figure 16.11). FIGURE 16.11 Goal-setting and performance cycle

A specific, difficult goal

Goal-relevant choices, effort, and persistence

Productivity and performance

Reward and satisfaction

Source: Locke, E. A., & Latham, G. P. (2002). Building a practically useful theory of goal setting and task motivation: A 35-year odyssey. American Psychologist, 57, 705–717.

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The value of goal-setting in the workplace cannot be overstated. In recent years, many organisations have moved from a focus on the individual to work teams. Reflecting this shift in practice, researchers have wondered whether goal-setting functions at the group level in the same way that it does for individuals. A meta-analysis of this research indicates that it does. For groups as well as for individuals, it is best to set goals that are specific and difficult (Kleingeld, van Mierlo, & Arends, 2011).

Bonuses, bribes and intrinsic motivation People may strive for reward, but there’s more to money than just economics and more to motivation than the size of a pay cheque – social psychological factors must also be considered. Under certain conditions, reward systems that increase extrinsic motivation may undermine intrinsic motivation. As we saw in Chapter 2, people are thought to be extrinsically motivated when they engage in an activity for money, recognition or other tangible rewards. By contrast, people are said to be intrinsically motivated when they perform for the sake of interest, challenge or sheer enjoyment. Business leaders want employees to feel intrinsically motivated and committed to their work. So where do expectancy theory and incentive programs fit in? Is tangible reward the bottom line or not? Research shows that when people start getting paid for a task they already enjoy, they sometimes lose interest in it. In the first demonstration of this effect, Edward Deci (1971) recruited university students to work for three one-hour sessions on block-building puzzles they found interesting. During the first and third sessions, all participants were treated in the same manner. In the second session, however, half were paid $1 for each puzzle they completed. To measure intrinsic motivation, Deci left participants alone during a break in the first and third sessions and recorded the amount of time they spent on the puzzles rather than on other available activities. Compared with participants in the unrewarded group, those who had been paid in the second session later showed less interest in the puzzles when the money was no longer available. This paradoxical finding that rewards undermine intrinsic motivation has been observed for many years in laboratory and field studies (Deci & Ryan, 1985; Lepper & Greene, 1978; Tang & Hall, 1995). By making people feel controlled rather than autonomous, various extrinsic factors commonly found in the workplace – deadlines, punishment, close supervision, evaluation and competition – also have adverse effects on motivation and performance. Thus, Teresa Amabile (1996) found that people who were paid for artistic activities, compared with others who were not paid, produced work that was later judged to be less creative by independent raters. To be maximally productive, people should feel internally driven, not compelled by outside forces. But wait. If money undermines intrinsic motivation, should employers avoid the use of monetary incentives? Are the pay-for-performance programs often used in the workplace doomed to fail, as some have suggested (Kohn, 1993)? Not at all. To answer these questions, it is important to realise that any given reward can be interpreted in two ways, depending on how it is presented. On the one hand, being offered payment can make a person feel bribed, bought off and controlled, which can result in the detrimental effects just described. On the other hand, rewards often provide people with positive feedback about the quality of their performance, as when people earn bonuses, scholarships and verbal praise from others they respect. Research shows that although controlling rewards tend to lower intrinsic motivation, informational rewards have the opposite positive effect on motivation (Eisenberger & Cameron, 1996) and creativity (Eisenberger & Rhoades, 2001). In fact, for people who are highly focused on the achievement of certain goals at work, or elsewhere, tangible inducements tend to boost intrinsic motivation (Durik & Harackiewicz, 2007; Harackiewicz & Elliot, 1993). Christopher Cerasoli and colleagues (2014) reviewed more than four decades of research into the debate over whether the provision of extrinsic incentives may erode intrinsic motivation. They found that internally motivated people who enjoy what they do rarely perform poorly – not entirely surprising given that enjoyment and internal interest rarely appear in isolation. Given that external rewards such as bonuses, promotions, and awards have become an integral part of almost every job Christopher and his team considered whether the provision of extrinsic incentives might impact the relationship between intrinsic motivation and work-related outcomes. They found that intrinsic motivation and incentives work together to influence productivity but only when the incentive is indirectly salient. It appears that rewards strictly linked to productivity may negatively alter the link between internal interest and performance outcomes. So, which matters more for performance, intrinsic or extrinsic motivation? It depends on the type of task being performed and whether or not it is creative or complex (i.e., a quality-type task) or straightforward and repetitive (i.e., a quantity-type task). The findings showed that intrinsic motivation is likely to be more meaningful for quality-focused tasks whereas extrinsic incentives are more predictive of performance

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when it comes to quantity-oriented tasks. Importantly, the study indicated that intrinsic motivation may also play a role for quantity-type tasks – so it seems as though incentives may actually coexist with intrinsic motivation, depending on the type of performance and the contingency of the incentive.

Equity considerations Another aspect of payment that influences motivation is the perception that it is fair. According to equity theory, presented in Chapter 9, people want rewards to be equitable. In other words, the ratio between inputs and outcomes should be the same for the self as it is for others. Relative to co-workers, then, the more effort you exert and the more you contribute, the more money you should earn. If you feel overpaid or underpaid, however, you will experience distress and try to relieve it by: (1) restoring actual equity, say, by working less or getting a raise; or (2) convincing yourself that equity already exists (Cropanzano, 1993). Equity theory has some fascinating implications for behaviour in the workplace. Consider Jerald Greenberg’s (1988) study of employees in a large insurance firm. To allow for refurbishing, nearly 200 workers had to be moved temporarily from one office to another. The workers were randomly assigned to offices that usually belonged to others who were higher, lower or equal in rank. Predictably, the usual occupants with the higher rank had a more spacious office, fewer occupants and a larger desk. Would the random assignments influence job performance? By keeping track of the number of insurance cases processed and by rating the complexity of the cases and the quality of the decisions made, Greenberg was able to derive a measure of job performance for each worker before, during and after the office switch. To restore equity, he reasoned, workers assigned to higher-status offices would feel overcompensated and improve their job performance, while those sent to lower-status offices would feel undercompensated and slow their performance down. That is exactly what happened. Figure 16.12 shows that the results offered sound support for equity theory. FIGURE 16.12 Equity in the workplace Insurance company workers were moved temporarily to offices that were the workplaces of those who were higher, lower or equal in status to their own rank. Supporting equity theory, those assigned to the offices of higher-status individuals increased their job performance, and those sent to offices of lower-status individuals showed a decrease. When workers were reassigned to their original offices, productivity levels returned to normal. 80

70

Job performance

60

50

40

30

1

2 Weeks before reassignment Higher-status office Same-status office

1

2 Weeks during reassignment

1

2 Weeks after reassignment

Lower-status office Control

Source: Greenberg, J. (1988) Equity and workplace status: A field experiment, Journal of Applied Psychology, 73, 606–613. Copyright © 1988 by the American Psychological Association. Reprinted by permission.

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Satisfaction depends not only on equity outcomes but also on the belief that the means used to determine those outcomes are fair and clearly communicated (Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996; Folger, 1986). For example, Greenberg (1990) studied workers in three manufacturing plants owned by the same parent company. Business was slow, so the company reduced its payroll through temporary pay cuts. Would the cuts make workers feel underpaid? If so, how would the workers restore equity? Concerned that the policy might trigger employee theft, Greenberg randomly varied the conditions in the three plants. In one, the employees were told, without an explanation, that they would receive a 15% pay cut for 10 weeks. In the second plant, the same pay cut was accompanied by an explanation and expressions of regret. In the third plant, salaries were not cut. By keeping track of inventories for the 10 weeks before, during and after the pay cuts, Greenberg was able to estimate the employee theft rate. The result? Workers whose pay had been cut stole more from the company – presumably to restore equity – but only when they were not provided with an adequate explanation for their loss. When it comes to getting paid, praised and treated with respect, people are most dedicated to their jobs when they believe they are being treated fairly (Folger & Cropanzano, 1998). People are so sensitive to unfairness, underpayment and maltreatment that these feelings can cause stress and compromise their health. In a survey of more than 3500 workers, Bennett Tepper (2001) discovered that those who felt victimised by injustice in the workplace also reported the most fatigue, anxiety and depression. Particularly stressful is the combination of feeling underpaid and unfairly treated. Theorising that people will lose sleep over these concerns, Greenberg (2006) studied 467 nurses at four private hospitals, two of which cut nurses’ salaries by 10% and two of which did not. In one hospital from each group, he taught nursing supervisors how to help promote feelings of organisational justice. Across a six-month period, participants periodically reported on their night-time sleep patterns. The results showed two interesting patterns: (1) underpaid nurses reported more symptoms of insomnia than those whose salaries were unchanged; and (2) this problem was reduced among underpaid nurses whose supervisors had been trained to treat them fairly.

CHAPTER SIXTEEN

People who feel overpaid work harder on the job than those who see their pay as appropriate.

TRUE

Gender and remuneration equity Despite major advances for women in the workforce, the latest figures released by the Workplace Gender Equality Agency (2017) show that women working full-time in Australia earn, on average, 17.3% less than men working full-time, which equates to roughly $26 527 a year. Research by Canberra University’s National Centre for Social and Economic Modelling shows that, since 1990, the gender wage gap in Australia has been steadily increasing. Furthermore, it is suggested that the gender pay gap over a lifetime would result in an average earnings deficit of nearly $1 million if a woman does not have a university degree and $1.5 million if she does. The Global Gender Gap Index (World Economic Forum, 2018), which examines differences between men and women across four fundamental categories – economic participation and opportunity, educational attainment, health and survival, and political empowerment – mirrors these findings, placing Australia in 39th position globally. So, when it comes to closing the gap between men and women, it seems that Australia is not making great progress. In fact, a closer look at the statistics suggests that Australia has gone backwards in some areas while making progress in others. For example, Australia ranks very well when it comes to educational attainment (1st) but not when it comes to areas such as economic participation and opportunity, labour force participation, and wage equality for similar work (currently ranked 73rd). This shows that although women are gaining an education, it is not being fully utilised. So, how does the situation look in New Zealand? New Zealand is currently ranked in 7th position (see Table 16.3). Although the New Zealand ranking for educational attainment is the same as Australia’s, there are differences in all other aspects. For example, New Zealand is ranked lower in economic participation and opportunity, and health and survival, but higher in political empowerment, labour force participation and wage equality.

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CULTURAL DIVERSITY GLOBAL COMPARISONS OF GENDER GAPS According to the latest Global Gender Gap Index (World Economic Forum, 2018), despite an additional quarter of a billion women entering the global workforce since the index commenced in 2006, wage inequality persists, with women’s pay only recently equalling what men were paid ten years ago. Based on current trends, the overall global gender gap could be closed in 100 years but given the economic gap appears to be widening, estimates are now creeping out to 217 years to close the gap completely. Looking closely at the 2018 results (as shown in Table 16.3), the Nordic region is still setting the pace, occupying the top four positions, with Iceland (which has held the first rank for ten years) recording the narrowest gap in the world. How did they achieve this? By placing a greater emphasis on policies that make it easier for parents to combine work and family, such as tax incentives and parental leave schemes that help to encourage women to return to work. This has led to an increase in shared childcare and a more equitable distribution of housework. It has also led to rising birth rates. Australia currently occupies the 39th position on the index while New Zealand is in 7th.

TABLE 16.3 Global Gender Gap Index 2018, top 25 countries Although no country can lay claim to gender equality, the Nordic region has made great progress in recent years.

2018 rank

Country

2018 rank

Iceland

1

Germany

14

Norway

2

United Kingdom

15

Sweden

3

Canada

16

Finland

4

Latvia

17

Nicaragua

5

Bulgaria

18

Rwanda

6

South Africa

19

New Zealand

7

Switzerland

20

Philippines

8

Barbados

21

Ireland

9

Costa Rica

22

Namibia

10

Cuba

23

Slovenia

11

Lithuania

24

France

12

Bolivia

25

Country

Denmark

13 Source: World Economic Forum. (2018). The global gender gap report 2018. Geneva: World Economic Forum.

There are many possible explanations for this gender wage gap. The results of an interesting Australian study, From girls to men: Social attitudes to gender equality issues in Australia (Evans, Haussegger, Halupka, & Rowe, 2018), looked at the attitudes of men and women in relation to issues of gender equality. The findings of the report indicate that a significant proportion of Australians (88%) agreed that gender inequality was still a problem in Australia. Two in five Australians said that their gender had impacted their career advancement, with women more likely than men to report having been personally impacted. Of those surveyed, 43% ascribed to traditional values (negative views of women in leadership roles, the workplace and the home), 62% held moderate views (supportive of equality for all), and 68% held progressive views (those who strongly align with the need for action to address issues at the workplace and societal levels). Sexism was considered to be most prevalent in politics (58%), the workplace (53%), the media (42%), and advertising (33%), with women overwhelmingly feeling that gender equality should be a policy priority in Australia – younger women are the most vocal in this area. Women (63%) and men (53%) regarded Australian politics to be the greatest perpetrators of sexism. Somewhat alarmingly, nearly half of all male respondents were of the belief that gender equality strategies in the workplace do not take men into account – in fact this report indicates that the younger generations of men are increasingly feeling like outsiders, actively excluded from measures designed to address gender inequality. Overall, the authors assert that traditional beliefs, and social attitudes continue to inhibit the push forward.

The progress principle A great deal of research has centred on the effects of money and other intrinsic or extrinsic rewards. There is no question that people work primarily to make a living and that money is a powerful motivating force. But is one’s compensation the key to job satisfaction? Through a meta-analysis of 92 studies that reported correlations between pay and various aspects of job satisfaction, Timothy Judge and colleagues (2010) found that although the correlation is greater than zero, people’s level of satisfaction at work was only weakly correlated with how much they were paid. Regarding the implications, they concluded that, ‘Given a choice, individuals would be better off weighing other job attributes more heavily than pay’ (p. 163).

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Clearly, there is more to motivation in the workplace than money – at least for some people. But what is it? In a Harvard Business Review article entitled ‘What Really Motivates Workers’, Teresa Amabile and Steven Kramer (2010) surveyed more than 600 managers from dozens of companies to rank the impact of various factors on employee motivation. They ranked ‘recognition for good work’ as number one – even ahead of financial incentives. ‘Unfortunately,’ note Amabile and Kramer, ‘those managers are wrong’. In a massive multi-year study described in their book The Progress Principle, Amabile and Kramer (2011) tracked 238 ‘knowledge workers’ – such as software engineers, architects, scientists, writers and lawyers – from a variety of settings through entries in a structured diary that they emailed to researchers at the end of every work day. Each day, the workers reported on their activities, emotions and motivation levels. Through nearly 12 000 entries, the results showed that people’s sense that they had made meaningful progress in their work was the aspect of their day most frequently associated with a positive mood; feelings of joy, warmth and pride; a perception of support; a sense of accomplishment; and a high level of motivation. As one computer programmer put it, ‘I smashed that bug that’s been frustrating me for almost a calendar week. That may not be an event to you, but I live a very drab life, so I’m all hyped.’ Overall, participants noted progress on 76% of their best days and only 25% of their worst days. The association between making progress and feeling good is a correlation that can be interpreted in different ways. On the basis of this association, however, Amabile and Kramer offer advice on how to set this positive process in motion. Managers, they note, can motivate workers not only through financial incentives – seldom mentioned in the diary entries – but also by facilitating progress. They can do this by providing more time, resources, encouragement and personal assistance; by removing unnecessary obstacles, distractions and demands; by keeping a daily progress checklist; and then by celebrating the incremental advances or ‘small wins’ that are made along the way.

EMPLOYEE ENGAGEMENT A topic that has been gaining momentum over the past decade is employee engagement – defined as the cognitive, emotional and behavioural energy an employee directs towards positive organisational outcomes (Shuck & Wollard, 2010). The concept has been identified by Michael Goodman and colleagues (2009) as one of the three top trends facing organisations today. Similarly, research conducted in Europe by David MacLeod and Nita Clarke (2009) found employee engagement was a concern for leaders in private, public and voluntary sector organisations. Mary Welch (2011) concurs and suggests that although the topic appears to be a matter of concern for leaders and managers in organisations across the globe due to its perceived effects on organisational effectiveness, innovation and competitiveness, there is considerable confusion about the meaning of the term. This was confirmed by research that uncovered 20 different models of engagement inside one single organisation (Balain & Sparrow, 2009). So, what does an engaged employee look like? According to Tim Rutledge (2005) an engaged employee is a person who is fully involved in, and enthusiastic about, their work. In his book, Getting Engaged: The New Workplace Loyalty, he suggests that these employees are attracted to, and inspired by, their work. They are also committed, care about the future of the company and are willing to invest effort to see that the organisation succeeds. But it seems that these employees are not easy to find. According to Gallup’s State of the Global Workplace report (2013), only 13% of employees worldwide are engaged at work (Reilly, 2014). The Gallup report suggests three types of employees: actively engaged, non-engaged and actively disengaged. Engaged workers are easily identified due to the discretionary effort they consistently bring to their roles. According to Reilly, they willingly give that little bit extra – they work with passion and feel a profound connection to their company. By contrast, those who are actively disengaged are unhappy at work, often monopolise a manager’s time and are certainly not known for providing good customer service. They have also been known to undermine employees who are actively engaged. Those who are non-engaged, however, are a little more difficult to spot in a workplace as they are not overly hostile or disruptive; they tend to do just enough to say that they are doing what they are paid for but there will be no effort in excess of this. They are largely uninspired, lack motivation and are not at all concerned about customer service, productivity, profitability, safety or quality – in fact, they spend most of their time thinking about their next work break. So how do Australia and New Zealand fare in terms of employee engagement? Among the countries surveyed, Australia has one of the highest levels of engaged employees at 24%. New Zealand’s engagement rate is similar at 23%. But both countries fall short of the US, where 30% of employed residents are engaged at work. China has one of the lowest proportions of engagement in the world at 6%. Following global trends,

Employee engagement

Defined as the cognitive, emotional and behavioural energy an employee directs towards positive organisational outcomes.

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the majority of workers in Australia and New Zealand fall into the not engaged (Australia 60% and New Zealand 62%) and actively disengaged (Australia 16% and New Zealand 15%) categories. It is estimated that Australian employees who are actively disengaged cost the country around A$54.8 billion per year; the figure for New Zealand is NZ$7.5 billion (Gallup, 2013). Evidence of the effect of non-engagement was found in Mercer’s What’s Working Australia report (2011), which showed that although Australians were demonstrating greater commitment to their employers (64%), were satisfied with their job (70%) and were proud to work for their organisation (68%), there was a level of discontent. A staggering 40% of staff were seriously considering leaving their jobs, even though they say they are committed to their current employer. The figure was higher for younger workers (52% of 25–34-year-olds) and men (42%).

ECONOMIC DECISION-MAKING People are intensely focused on money – anxious to have more of it and afraid to be without it. In powerful and symbolic ways, money arouses emotion, activates thought and motivates action. Think about it. If you had a fortune, you would be financially independent. How would that make you feel? In a series of laboratory experiments, Kathleen Vohs and colleagues (2006) found that when university students were merely primed to think about money, they became more self-sufficient, more autonomous and less social in relation to others. In each study, the researchers primed money in some participants but not others in subtle ways; for example, by having them read an essay that mentioned money, by presenting them with scrambled sentences that relate to money, by having them count a large stack of Monopoly money, or by seating them at a computer with a screensaver that featured floating bills. Across the board, those who were exposed to money cues later became more independent. Put into a social situation, they preferred working alone rather than on a team, they put more distance between themselves and a fellow participant, they sought less help on a puzzle they could not solve, and they gave less help to someone who needed it. Reflecting on these findings, Vohs speculates that ‘money changes people at a core, basic level’, that ‘having money makes people feel less connected and more independent, whereas having little money makes you feel more interdependent with others’ (Carpenter, 2005, p. 27). Let us take this speculation one step further. If money leads us to feel more self-sufficient, does it lessen our need for approval and blunt the pain of social rejection? And following rejection, do we attach greater value to money? Through research conducted in China, Xinyue Zhou and colleagues (2009) sought to answer these questions. In one study, they brought a handful of university students together for a getting-acquainted conversation. The students were then separated and asked to pick someone from the group they’d like to work with. At that point, by random assignment, all students were told that they had to be dismissed – either because everyone selected them (social acceptance) or because no one selected them (social rejection). Afterwards, they completed a set of money-related tasks. Here’s the interesting part. When asked to draw a Chinese coin from memory, students in the rejection condition drew larger coins. They also said they were more willing to permanently give up such pleasures as chocolate, sunshine and the beach in exchange for the equivalent of $1.4 million. Rejection had increased the subjective value of money. In a second study, students engaged in what they thought to be a ‘finger dexterity’ task. They counted out either 80 pieces of paper or 80 $100 notes. Next, they played a computerised online ball-tossing game, presumably with three live students. In the normal condition, the game proceeded uneventfully. In a rejection condition, however, the others soon started to exclude the participant from the ball toss. When later asked how they felt about the game, those who had counted paper were more distressed than those who had counted money. Somehow, the money served to buffer students from the distress normally caused by social rejection. There is now a wealth of research (pun intended) on the symbolic power of money to ‘prime’ people’s thoughts, feelings and motivations. At last count, 165 studies in 18 countries have suggested that priming money has two effects on us. First, people become less interpersonally attuned, less prosocial toward others, less caring, and less inter-dependent. Second, people primed with money start to focus on matters of price, trade, economics, and the virtues of a free market; they exhibit a heightened work ethic, putting more effort into challenging tasks; and they become more likely to succeed (Caruso, Vohs, Baxter, & Waytz, 2013; Vohs, 2015).

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CHAPTER SIXTEEN

RESEARCH SPOTLIGHT

Source: Courtesy of Professor Paula Brough.

PROFESSOR PAULA BROUGH, GRIFFITH UNIVERSITY What are the topic areas of your research? My research focuses on occupational stress, coping, the psychological health of high-risk workers (e.g., emergency service workers), work–life balance and the effective measurement of psychological constructs. Which of your research findings have you found most intriguing? In the article ‘Organisational interventions for balancing work and home demands: An overview’ Professor Mike O’Driscoll (from the University of Waikato) and I conducted a review of publications describing work–life balance interventions that had been successfully trialled in actual workplaces (Brough & O’Driscoll, 2010). Three criteria were employed to select the empirical articles: (1) a description of organisational interventions or initiatives addressing work and family demands, (2) inclusion of methodological controls such as control groups, pre- and post-evaluations, and (3) inclusion of information on the effectiveness of the intervention. These criteria were informed by discussions of what constitutes empirical organisational interventions. A total of 43 articles were initially identified by the search criteria, although this was reduced to 18 suitable articles. We found three main groups of results: (1) initiatives addressing working time and/or working hours, (2) collaborative action research focused on improving workplace equity and performance levels, and (3) initiatives to embed work–life balance within organisational cultures. We discuss these three groups of work–life balance interventions

in our article and we also comment on the common difficulties faced by researchers in evaluating workplace interventions. How did you become interested in your area of research? The issue of how workers achieve an effective level of work– life balance is of increasing concern due primarily to recent technological changes. The development of smartphones, for example, means employees are theoretically available via phone, email or text to their employers and/or customers even when they are physically absent from their place of work. This is both a good and a bad thing. My interest comes from an occupational stress perspective. Are constant job demands on workers a good thing? How does this impact on levels of employee health, fatigue and job performance in the longer term? How can workers in high stress occupations best manage these constant work demands? How do we prevent psychological burnout? How does your area of research speak to life in Australia and New Zealand? Both occupational stress and work–life balance are pertinent areas of research in Australia and New Zealand, and are also an increasing issue of importance for both workers and employers. Occupational stress remains one of the most common reasons for the submission of formal psychological mental health claims in both countries. My research, for example, clearly identifies how new parents both in Australia and New Zealand are likely to leave their current employer if their ability to access appropriate work–life balance policies is hindered. Employers offering generous ‘family-friendly’ work–life balance policies are the ones who both attract and retain their workers. As Australia and New Zealand increase their levels of employment in the service and knowledge industries, this attraction and retention of skilled workers is an increasingly important issue for local employers.

Topical Reflection RUDENESS – THE NEW WORKPLACE FLU Our opening vignette reported the results of a series of three studies designed to examine the way that people react to rude behaviour, conducted by Foulk and his colleagues (2016). In Study 1 participants engaged in a series of business negotiations (in the role of either a negotiator or a partner) and were asked to rate how rude their partners were based on whether they ignored, excluded or were negative towards the other person. Those who rated their negotiating partner as rude in the first session were themselves rated as rude in a second negotiation a week later – people were more likely to behave rudely toward future partners if their previous partner had been rude to them. The following two studies had participants watch staged encounters designed to represent either a rude or polite scenario and either identify rude words from a list (Study 2) or respond to a neutral-toned customer email (Study 3). In Study 2, those who witnessed a rude interaction recognised rude words more quickly, and in Study 3 those who watched the rude interaction were more likely to be hostile in their email response than those who witnessed the polite scenario – so not only are people more likely to become hostile if a person is rude to them but they are also more likely to be rude if they witness rude behaviour. Given the evidence, the team believe that not only do these negative behaviours have first-order consequences, subsequent interactions may potentially lead to second-order consequences whereby the behaviour is passed on. In summary, negative

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behaviours such as rudeness, may be contagious in a similar way to the common cold – with low intensity, negative behaviours spread easily across carriers. These studies also

indicated that people may be unaware of the source of their aggressive behaviours and that these behaviours may spread without people being able to stop them.

CHAPTER REVIEW SUMMARY INTRODUCTION • Work is an important part of our personal identity. • Although we work to make money jobs provide us with a sense of purpose and social community. THE CHANGING NATURE OF WORK • The concept of work is changing at a rate that is difficult to comprehend. • Standard contracts and long-term employment have changed dramatically with a rapid shift towards casualisation and nonstandard work arrangements. • The growth of the gig economy has been exponential in recent years.

INDUSTRIAL/ORGANISATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY • The classic Hawthorne studies showed that attention paid to workers increased their productivity. • In the workplace and other business settings, behaviour is heavily influenced by social psychological factors. PERSONNEL SELECTION • Recruiting a competent staff is the first important step in developing a successful organisation. SEARCHING FOR WORK • Social networking platforms such as Facebook, Twitter and LinkedIn are continuing to grow at a rapid pace heralding a new era of recruitment. • The physical and digital worlds continue to merge, as the workplace is reshaped by e-recruitment, artificial intelligence (AI), chat bots, predictive software and augmented reality. • Many employers now engage in cybervetting to access informal, noninstitutional data about job applicants. THE INTERVIEW PROCESS • Employment interviews may actually diminish the tendency of employers to make simple stereotyped judgements. • Interviews often give rise to poor selection decisions, in part because of the self-presentation of applicants and by expectations of the interviewer that bias the interview.

PUTTING COMMON SENSE TO THE TEST Although flawed, job interviews consistently make for better hiring decisions. FALSE. Although interviews may lessen the tendency among employers to make simple stereotyped judgements, they often lack predictive validity. 710

‘SCIENTIFIC’ ALTERNATIVES TO TRADITIONAL INTERVIEWS • Many companies use standardised tests of cognitive ability, personality and integrity as part of the selection process. • A more effective selection method is the structured interview, in which all applicants are evaluated in a standardised manner. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION • Affirmative action affects those it is designed to help, those who feel excluded by it, organisations that implement it, and interactions among these three groups. CULTURE AND ORGANISATIONAL DIVERSITY • Affirmative action and the globalisation of business have combined to increase diversity in the workplace.

PERFORMANCE APPRAISALS • Performance appraisals involve the evaluation of an employee and communication of the results to that person. SUPERVISOR RATINGS • Research shows that supervisor ratings are based largely on job-relevant characteristics. • These ratings may be biased by halo effects, contrast effects and individual differences in the tendency to give high, low or neutral ratings on a numeric scale. SELF-EVALUATIONS • Self-evaluations also figure into performance appraisals, but they tend to be self-serving and inflated.

PUTTING COMMON SENSE TO THE TEST A problem with having workers evaluate their own job performance is that self-ratings are overly positive. TRUE. Self-evaluations of job performance are not only more positive than ratings made by others but also less predictive of success. NEW AND IMPROVED METHODS OF APPRAISAL • Performance appraisals can be improved when ratings are made shortly after observation, careful notes are taken, multiple raters are used, and raters are trained in the necessary skills. DUE-PROCESS CONSIDERATIONS • Procedural fairness (not just outcomes) is an important factor in the way people react to evaluations of their performance.

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LEADERSHIP • Everyone agrees that leadership requires social influence. THE CLASSIC TRAIT APPROACH • One approach is to identify the traits that characterise people who appear to have leadership qualities. CONTINGENCY MODELS OF LEADERSHIP • In Fiedler’s contingency model, task-oriented leaders excel in high- and low-control situations, whereas relations-oriented leaders are effective in moderate-control situations.

CHAPTER SIXTEEN

BONUSES, BRIBES AND INTRINSIC MOTIVATION • When people perceive a reward as a bribe and a means of controlling their behaviour, they lose interest in the work itself. • But when a reward is presented as a bonus, giving positive information about the quality of work, it can enhance intrinsic motivation. EQUITY CONSIDERATIONS • Equity theory says that the ratio between inputs and outcomes should be the same for all workers.

TRANSACTIONAL LEADERSHIP • Transactional leaders reward followers who keep up their end of the bargain and correct those who do not.

PUTTING COMMON SENSE TO THE TEST

TRANSFORMATIONAL LEADERSHIP • Transformational leaders motivate followers through their charisma, inspiration, intellectual stimulation, and personal concern for others.

TRUE. People who feel overpaid work harder to restore their sense of equity.

PUTTING COMMON SENSE TO THE TEST The most effective type of leader is one who knows how to win support through the use of reward. FALSE. Great leaders articulate a vision and then inspire others to join in that vision and work for a common cause. LEADERSHIP AMONG WOMEN AND MINORITIES • Despite recent gains, working women and members of minority groups are underrepresented in positions of leadership.

MOTIVATION AT WORK • Both economic and social factors influence motivation in the workplace. ECONOMIC REWARD MODELS • Vroom’s expectancy theory states that workers behave in ways designed to produce the most desirable outcome. • Various incentive programs are thus used to motivate by reward.

People who feel overpaid work harder on the job than those who see their pay as appropriate.

THE PROGRESS PRINCIPLE • Although money is a powerful motivating force, a study of ‘knowledge workers’ showed that making meaningful progress in their work was the aspect of the individual’s day most frequently associated with a good mood and high level of motivation.

EMPLOYEE ENGAGEMENT • An engaged employee is fully involved in, and enthusiastic about, their work. • Employee engagement has been identified as one of the top three trends facing organisations today. ECONOMIC DECISION-MAKING • People are intensely focused on money – anxious to have more of it and afraid to be without it. • Research shows that money makes people feel more independent, more self-sufficient and less in need of others. • Exposure to money can mute the distressing effects of social rejection.

LINKAGES Our discussion on job interviews and the techniques that people use to present the right image and to influence the outcome illustrates just one way in which the topic of this chapter, business, is linked to our earlier discussions of

strategic self-presentation (see Chapter 2, ‘The Social Self’). The `Linkages' diagram shows ties to two other chapters as well, and there are many more ties throughout the book.

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CHAPTER

16

Business

LINKAGES

What are the most common self-presentation techniques used to influence the outcome of a job interview? CHAPTER

2

The social self

How do you make a good impression in an interview?

CHAPTER

3

Perceiving others

What techniques can you use to help persuade someone to hire you?

CHAPTER

6

Attitudes

REVIEW QUIZ 1 The discovery of the Hawthorne effect laid the foundation for industrial/organisational psychology because it illustrated the role of: a social influences in the workplace. b job interviewing techniques in the creation of a homogeneous workforce. c equity motivation in worker loyalty. d personality variables in economic decision-making. 2 Research on physical attractiveness and job hiring suggests that attractiveness influences: a perceptions of female applicants, but not of male applicants. b perceptions of both female and male applicants. c evaluations made by male interviewers, but not female interviewers. d evaluations made by both male and female interviewers. 3 Research that examines workers’ personality characteristics has concluded that: a people who score high in conscientiousness tend to be too timid and cautious to be highly productive workers.

b low self-monitors are more likely to become organisational leaders. c extraverts are more likely than introverts to succeed as managers. d self-esteem has little ability to predict job productivity or satisfaction. 4 A leader who sets clear goals for her followers, rewarding those who live up to their end of the bargain and providing assistance, is known as a(n) _____ leader. a transformational b normative c transactional d autocratic 5 According to expectancy theory, worker motivation depends on all of the following, except: a valued rewards. b high intrinsic motivation. c performance recognition. d a belief that extra effort will be effective.

WEBLINKS Australasian Journal of Organisational Psychology https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/australasianjournal-of-organisational-psychology A quality peer-reviewed journal of the University of Organisational Psychologists of the Australian Psychological Society, the largest professional association for psychologists in Australia, representing more than 20 000 members.

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Australian Policy Online http://apo.org.au/research A research database and alert service providing free access to fulltext research reports and papers, statistics and other resources essential for public policy development and implementation in Australia and New Zealand.

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The Progress Principle http://progressprinciple.com/research The website of Teresa Amabile, Professor of Business Administration and Director of Research at Harvard Business School. Her research encompasses creativity, productivity, innovation and inner work life – the confluence of emotions, perceptions and motivation that people experience as they react to events at work.

CHAPTER SIXTEEN

Workplace Gender Equality Agency https://www.wgea.gov.au Website of the Australian Government statutory agency charged with promoting and improving gender equality in Australian workplaces.

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BUSINESS

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CHAPTER SIXTEEN

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REVIEW QUIZ ANSWERS Chapter 1

Chapter 7

Chapter 12

1d 2a 3d 4a 5d 6b

1d 2c 3b 4d 5b 6a

1d 2d 3c 4a 5d

Chapter 2

Chapter 8

1a 2c 3c 4d 5c 6b

1c 2d 3a 4d 5d 6d

1c 2d 3d 4a 5c

Chapter 3

Chapter 9

1d 2b 3a 4a 5a 6c

1a 2d 3a 4a 5b

Chapter 4

1b 2c 3a 4d 5b

1b 2a 3c 4a 5d 6d

Chapter 5 1a 2b 3a 4d 5a

Chapter 10

Chapter 11 1b 2d 3c 4c 5a

Chapter 13

Chapter 14 1c 2c 3d 4d 5c

Chapter 15 1a 2d 3b 4c 5a

Chapter 16 1a 2b 3c 4c 5b

Chapter 6 1a 2a 3b 4b 5c 6d

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NAME INDEX A Aarts, H. 119 Abbey, A. 382, 389 Abdellaoui, A. 11 Abdel-Latif, A. H. 337 Abelson, R. P. 96, 253 Abrahamsson, L. 552 Abramovitz, S. 213 Abrams, D. 66, 176 Abramson, L. Y. 71, 596 Abu-Rayya, H. 175 Acevedo, B. P. 379 Acker, M. 379 Ackerley, G. 585 Ackerman, J. M. 117, 369–70 Ackerman, R. A. 18 Ackermann, F. 336 Acton, L. 523–4 Adachi, P. C. 479 Adair, J. G. 675 Adair, L. 12 Adair, W. L. 338 Adam, K. 154 Adamopoulos, J. 509 Adams, J. 226 Adams, J. S. 374 Adams, M. 166 Adams, R. 675 Addis D. R. 54 Ade, V. 336 Adelson, J. L. 208 Ader, R. 590–1 Adetoun, B. E. 150 Adhyaru, J. 488 Adler, N. E. 587 Adolphs, R. 507 Adorno, T. 295 Aebi, M. F. 454 Afifi, T. O. 465 Agerström, J. 229 Aggarwal, I. 331 Aglioti, S. M. 179 Agnew, C. R. 373 Agosta, S. 640 Aguiar, P. 115 Aharon, I. 95, 361 Aiello, J. R. 507–8 Ainsworth, M. D. S. 375, 516 Ainsworth, S. E. 108, 462 Ajzen, I. 225, 230–1 Akande, A. D. 150 Akinyemi, E. T. 510 Akitsuki, Y. 464 Alba, Jessica 357 Albarello, F. 165 Albarracín, D. 13, 224–5, 229, 240 Alberts, H. 67 Albertson, S. 649 Albiero, P. 420 Alcott, V. B. 689 Alegre, J. 175 Alessandri, G. 18, 420

Alexander, G. M. 152 Alfieri, T. 110 Alfini, J. J. 647, 650, 652 Alford, J. R. 13 Alfrey, K. L. 551 Alge, B. J. 675 Alhakami, A. 526 Alicke, M. D. 74, 114 Alison, E. 645 Alison, L. 645 Alkire, S. 616 Allaby, D. B. 464 Allam, A. 452 Allan, K. 277, 636 Allan, R. 590 Allen, J. 127, 274, 280 Allen, J. B. 379 Allen, K. M. 508 Allen, M. 380 Allen, V. L. 282 Allen-Arave, W. 409 Allendorf, K. 393 Alliger, G. M. 683 Allman, A. L. 15 Alloy, L. B. 596 Allport, F. H. 5, 9 Allport, G. W. 9–10, 155, 174 Al-Madi, Y. 510 Alquist, J. L. 108 Alterovitz, S. S. R. 368 Altheimer, I. 468 Altman, I. 380, 503, 506–7, 511 Altman, J. 600 Alwin, D. F. 304 Amabile, T. M. 51, 703, 707 Amato, P. R. 432 Ambady, N. 98–9, 117, 163, 169, 179–80, 331 Ambady N. 99 Ambrose, M. L. 693 Amendola, K. L. 635 Ametrano, R. M. 464 Amiot, C. E. 143 Amir, O. 261 Amodio, D. M. 11, 20, 143 Anastasi, J. S. 631 Andersen, B. L. 201 Andersen, S. M. 44 Anderson, B. S. 512 Anderson, C. A. 13, 124, 291, 450, 460–1, 470, 472–3, 476–7, 479–80, 482, 699 Anderson, J. 174, 559 Anderson, J. R. 409 Anderson, K. B. 472–3, 477 Anderson, M. H. 696 Anderson, N. 676 Anderson, N. H. 116, 122 Anderson, R. 638 Andersson, L. M. 673 Ando, S. 582 Andreassen, C. S. 154 Andrews, D. W. 386

Andreychik, M. R. 143 Andrighetto, L. 145 Anggono, C. O. 67 Angleitner, A. 98 Angus, J. 569 Anngela-Cole, L. 453 Ansari, A. 353 Ansfield, M. 69, 603 Antevska, A. 483 Anthony, T. 646, 649 Antonio, A. L. 331 Apetroaia, A. I. 16 Apfelbaum, E. P. 168–9, 179–80 Applewhite, M. 293 Appleyard, D. 504 Archer, J. 456, 463, 481 Arendt, H. 292 Arens, A. K. 59 Argumedo, D. 72 Argyle, M. 507 Ariely, D. 168, 261 Aristotle 3, 390 Arkin, R. M. 73, 77, 274 Arluke, A. 429 Armitage, C. J. 231 Armor, D. A. 610 Arms-Chavez, C. J. 156 Arndt, J. 55, 148, 243, 651 Arnocky, S. 370, 421 Arnold, E. J. 512 Arnold, K. 247 Aron, A. 16, 176, 366, 377, 378–9, 384–5 Aron, E. N. 366 Aronson, E. 29, 175, 181, 255, 260, 365–6 Aronson, J. 161–3 Arriaga, X. B. 373 Arthur, W. 685 Ascani, K. 291 Asch, S. E. 10, 29, 120–1, 276–8, 280–2, 284, 303, 654–5 Ashburn-Nardo, L. 179 Ashforth, B. E. 584 Ashmore, R. D. 361 Ashton-James, C. E. 26 Askenasy, H. 295 Askew, K. 321 Aspinwall, L. G. 74, 600, 606 Asuncion, A. G. 244 Ata, A. 175 Atlas, R. 453 Atran, S. 66 Attrill, A. 77 Au, W. T. 655 Auer, K. 513 Augustine, M. 419–20 Aumer-Ryan, K. 374 Aureli, F. 409 Auspurg, K. 167 Austin, D. W. 459 Austin, J. 453 Avery, D. R. 331

Aviezer, H. 96 Avishai, A. 252 Avolio, B. J. 694, 696, 701 Axsom, D. 255, 610 Axsom, D. K. 374 Axtell, R. E. 96, 101, 285 Ayal, S. 261 Aycan, Z. 690 Ayres, K. 318 Azam, O. A. 156 Azeredo, C. M. 20 Azzopardi, P. S. 600

B Bachman, J. G. 62 Bachrach, D. G. 330 Back, M. D. 79, 354 Badal, S. 331 Badea, C. 144 Baguley, C. M. 652 Bahrick, H. P. 54 Bailenson, J. N. 14, 274, 507 Bailey, A. A. 464 Bailey, C. A. 473 Bailey, J. 166 Bailey, J. M. 368, 391–2 Bailey, J. O. 14 Baird, S. 585 Baker, L. A. 463 Baker, M. 16 Baker, V. L. 293 Baker-Ward, L. 633 Bakker, A. B. 584 Balain, S. 707 Balcetis, E. 113–14, 256 Balchen, S. 127 Baldus, D. C. 657 Baldwin, A. S. 597 Baldwin, M. W. 46 Bale, C. 382 Bales, R. F. 314 Ball, H. A. 463 Ball, M. 458 Ballard, M. E. 470 Balliet, D. 147, 335, 422 Balsam, K. 208 Balzer, R. 572 Balzer, W. K. 692–3 Bambauer, J. R. 31 Banaji, M. R. 65, 142, 167–8, 202, 227, 229 Banas, J. A. 249 Bandura, A. 465–6, 597 Banerjee, R. 167 Bangerter, A. 678, 681 Banko, K. M. 50 Banks, A. J. 226 Banks, C. 30, 315, 658 Banks, W. C. 658 Bansel, P. 216 Banuazizi, A. 659 Banyard, V. L. 429

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719

NAME INDEX Barbulescu, R. 171 Barbuto, J. E. Jr 695 Barclay, G. 452 Bardé, B. 590 Barden, J. 231 Bargh, J. A. 95, 116–19, 225, 232, 235, 274, 277, 505 Bariola, E. 570 Barkan, R. 261 Barkema, H. G. 332 Barker, R. 504 Barlett, C. P. 460 Barling, J. 584 Barlow, F. K. 150, 167, 175, 180–2, 469 Barlow, J. B. 331 Barlow, M. 181 Barndollar, K. 119 Barnes, A. M. 154 Barnes, C. M. 178, 675 Barnes, J. C. 469 Barnes, M. L. 377 Barnes, R. D. 422 Barnes, T. 166 Barnier, A. J. 330 Baron, A. S. 168, 202 Baron, R. A. 432–3, 466 Baron, R. S. 280, 320, 328 Baron, S. H. 280 Barr, S. M. 208 Barraket, J. 418 Barranti, M. 122 Barraza, J. A. 413 Barreto, M. 161, 169 Barrett, A. M. 48 Barrett, H. C. 96 Barrett, L. F. 96 Barrett Browning, E. 376 Barrick, M. R. 680, 684 Barron, L. G. 181 Barrowclough, C. 422 Barsalou, L. W. 117 Bartels, B. 282 Bartholomew, K. 376 Bartholow, B. D. 143, 178, 227, 472, 475 Barthrop, R. W. 591 Bartini, M. 429 Bartlett, M. Y. 470 Bartlett, N. H. 210 Baruah, J. 326 Baruch, G. 488 Basham, R. B. 609 Bass, B. M. 694–6 Bass, R. 694 Bassett, R. 290 Bassili, J. N. 283 Bastian, B. 175, 335 Batailler, C. 67 Bates, C. A. 675 Bates, T. C. 331 Bateson, M. 64 Batson, C. D. 410–11, 414–15, 422, 431, 467 Battle, W. S. 690 Bauer, I. 74 Bauer, T. N. 685

720

Baughan, C. J. 231 Bauland, A. 99 Baum, A. 512 Bauman, A. 558 Baumeister, R. F. 32, 64, 67–8, 75, 108, 119, 260, 350, 391, 470, 600 Baumgardner, M. H. 240 Baumgartner, S. E. 277 Baxendale, R. 211 Baxter, B. 708 Baxter, J. 466 Baxter, L. A. 380 Bazerman, M. H. 261, 336 Beach, S. 386 Beaman, A. L. 323–4 Beaudry, J. L. 635–6 Beaulieu, C. M. J. 508 Beaver, K. M. 469 Becerra-Culqui, T. A. 207 Becker, J. C. 179 Becker, S. I. 130 Bedrosian, T. A. 13 Beekman, A. J. 211 Bègue, L. 434, 475 Behan, A. 422 Behm-Morawitz, E. 481 Beilock, S. L. 68 Belanger, H. G. 320 Belk, R. W. 512 Bell, A. P. 390 Bell, E. 11 Bell, P. A. 512 Bellack, A. S. 381 Belmore, S. M. 122 Beltrame, A. 413 Belzer, M. 207 Bem, D. J. 32, 46, 259, 391–2 Bem, S. L. 203 Bender, P. K. 481 Benet-Martínez, V. 113 Benjamin, L. T. 298 Bennell, C. 638 Bennet, M. 657 Bennett, N. 321 Bennett, R. 101 Bennett, S. 466 Bennington, L. 686 Ben-Shakhar, G. 640 Bensley, D. A. 15 Benson, H. 606 Benson, J. E. 110 Benton, R. B. 638 Bentsi-Enchill, E. 48 Ben-Zeev, T. 163 Berdahl, J. L. 699 Berg, J. H. 372 Berger, G. 70 Berger, M. L. 409 Berglas, S. 46, 72 Berke, D. S. 462 Berkelaar, B. L. 678 Berkman, L. 607 Berkowitz, L. 28, 465–6, 470, 472–3 Berliner, S. 584 Bermeitinger, C. 246 Bermudez, F. 211 Bernard, M. M. 249

Bernardin, H. J. 692 Berndsen, M. 13 Bernecker, K. 68 Bernhard, H. 422 Bernhardt, P. 15 Bernieri, F. 130 Berns, G. S. 279 Bernstein, A. 453 Bernstein, E. S. 519 Bernstein, J. 564 Bernstein, M. J. 278 Bernstein, M. S. 331 Bernsten, D. 53 Bernston, G. G. 224 Beron, K. J. 460 Berry, C. M. 682, 684 Berry, D. S. 95 Berry, H. L. 548, 562 Berry, J. W. 286, 584 Berscheid, E. 353, 361, 363, 365, 371–2, 374, 376, 378–9, 384, 387, 392 Bertrand, M. J. 635 Besirevic, J. 651 Bessenoff, G. R. 63 Best, S. R. 596 Bettencourt, B. A. 177, 460, 471 Bettman, J. R. 434 Betts, L. 18 Beu, D. S. 293 Beyer, S. 171, 692 Bezdjian, S. 463, 469 Bhalla, R. 437 Bhatt, S. 640 Bhutta, M. 640 Bickman, L. 292, 582 Biddle, J. E. 355–6 Bidwell, M. 171 Bierbrauer, G. 277 Biesanz, J. C. 130 Biesecker, B. B. 168 Biggs, A. 699 Bim 409 Bimbi, D. S. 207 Bing, M. N. 676 Bird, J. D. 207 Birkett, M. 453 Birman, D. 113 Birney, M. 299 Birt, A. R. 67 Birtel, M. D. 176 Bishop, B. J. 547 Bisseling, D. 317 Biswas-Diener, R. 612 Bizer, G. 225 Black, David 414 Blackie, L. 122 Blackless, M. 197 Blagov, P. 227 Blair, C. 321 Blair, I. V. 94 Blair, K. 559 Blair, S. 548 Blais, J. 647 Blake, R. 280 Blampied, N. M. 617 Blanchard, B. 406

Blandón-Gitlin I. 650 Blank, A. 79 Blanken, I. 262 Blanton, H. 167, 229 Blascovich, J. 14, 168 Blass, T 301 Blass, T. 9, 295–8 Blau, F. D. 172 Bledsoe, S. B. 367 Blehar, M. C. 375 Bleich, A. 583 Bleidorn, W. 251 Bless, H. 11, 108, 243 Bliuc, A. M. 13 Block, C. J. 689 Block, M. 351 Bly, P. R. 681 Blythe, P. W. 96 Boardley, I. D. 461 Bobko, P. 701 Bobocel, D. R. 688 Bochner, S. 242 Bockting, W. O. 208, 213 Bodenhausen, G. V. 178–9 Bodie, G. D. 275 Bodin Danielsson, C. 521 Bodkin-Andrews, G. H. 59 Boechler, M. 463 Boeckmann, R. J. 687 Boehe, D. M. 331 Boehm, J. K. 590 Boen, F. 74 Bogaç, C. 515 Bogart, L. M. 74 Bohner, G. 108, 243 Bohns, V. K. 64 Boiger, M. 471 Boldero, J. 63 Bolger, N. 584 Bollich, K. L. 45 Bonaiuto, M. 516 Bonam, C. 143 Bonanno, G. A. 596 Bond, C. F. 102–3, 639 Bond, Hamish 68 Bond, M. H. 11, 147, 450 Bond, R. 286, 304 Bonevento, M. 354 Boninger, D. S. 231, 252 Bonnes, M. 516 Bono 420 Bono, J. E. 682, 696 Bonta, B. D. 454 Book, A. S. 463 Booker, J. 407 Boone, C. 335 Booth, A. 463, 687 Booth-Butterfield, M. 382 Booth-Kewley, S. 589 Bordens, K. S. 511 Borduin, C. M. 488 Borgida, E. 169, 628 Boris, H. I. 73 Borkenau, P. 98 Borland, J. 355–6 Borman, W. C. 685, 691 Borneman, M. J. 682

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NAME INDEX Bornemann, C. 413 Bornstein, B. H. 144, 628, 635, 649 Bornstein, G. 412 Bornstein, R. F. 355 Borntrager, C. 453 Boroditsky, L. 111 Bos, A. E. 160 Bos, A. L. 157 Bos, P. A. 463 Bosak, J. 172 Bosson, J. K. 79, 146, 462, 467 Boster, F. J. 288 Bottoms, B. L. 633 Boucher, H. C. 58, 76 Boucher, K. L. 163 Boutwell, B. B. 469 Bowden, J. 163 Bowen, C. C. 171 Bower, G. H. 117 Bowes-Sperry, L. 675 Bowker, J. C. 467 Bowlby, J. 375, 516 Bowling, N. A. 225 Bowman, N. D. 351 Boyatzis, R. 694 Boyce, J. A. 611 Boyd, R. L. 58 Boysen, S. T. 44 Boza, C. 213 Braasch, J. G. 15 Bracke, P. 565 Bradburn, N. M. 225 Bradbury, J. 476 Bradbury, T. 365 Bradbury, T. N. 384, 386 Bradfield, A. L. 636–7, 648 Bradford, B. 660 Bradford, D. 645 Bradley, G. L. 535 Bradley, K. I. 159 Brady, C. 511 Brambilla, M. 120 Bramel, D. 283 Brand, J. 478 Brand, J. L. 519 Brandes, K. 231 Brandt, M. J. 6, 149 Brandtzæg, P. 430 Brase, G. L. 12 Bratt, C. 175 Brauer, M. 179 Braun, V. 483 Braver, S. L. 288 Bray, R. M 653–4 Bray, R. M. 284, 653 Brean, H. 244 Brecheen, C. 18 Breen, L. J. 547 Brehm, J. W. 249, 256, 366, 507 Brehm, S. S. 249, 366, 507, 610 Brescoll, V. L. 170–2 Breslow, A. S. 213 Bressan, P. 123 Brett, J. M. 336, 338 Brewer, M. B. 313 Brewer, N. 144, 277, 629, 634 Brickman, P. 614 Bricknell, S. 454–5

Bridges, A. J. 483 Bridgett, D. J. 67 Bridgstock, R. 358 Briggs, C. 551 Brigham, J. C. 631 Brinded, P. M. J. 476 Brinkley, D. Y. 460 Brinkman, H. 507 Briñol, P. 231, 233, 253 Bristow, M. 414 Broad, J. 475 Broadbent, E. 14 Brochu, P. M. 166, 173, 176 Brock, K. F. 377 Brock, T. C. 224, 252 Brockmyer, J. F. 481 Brockner, J. 147, 705 Brody, N. 610 Brody, S. M. 176 Broesch, T. 44 Bronfenbrenner, U. 545 Bronstad, P. M. 95 Broockman, D. 181 Brook, A. 529 Brook, B 586 Brooks, G. R. 202 Brooks, J. C. 263 Brooks, R. 101 Brooks, R. C. 358 Brotzman, E. 296 Brough, P. 699–700 Brown, A. 581 Brown, A. J. 320 Brown, B. 511 Brown, B. B. 511, 513, 519 Brown, D. A. 633 Brown, D. W. 520 Brown, E. 635 Brown, G. 511, 513 Brown, G. P. 584 Brown, J. A. 130 Brown, J. D. 42, 70, 75–6, 166 Brown, M. 212 Brown, P. M. 175 Brown, R. 54, 146, 157, 301 Brown, R. A. 76 Brown, R. P. 468 Brown, S. L 413 Brown, S. L. 413 Brown, T. 564 Brown, T. J. 421 Brown, W. A. 610 Browne, M. J. 526 Brownell, C. 436 Brownstein, A. 256 Brubaker, M. S. 163 Bruce, V. 101 Bruck, M. 633 Bruneau, E. 145 Brunell, A. B. 18 Bruner, J. S. 123 Brunsman, B. 280 Brunswik, E. 504 Bruss, C. B. 337 Bryant, C. 483 Bryant, J. 474 Bryant, M. 448, 453 Bryant, W. 455

Buchanan, K. 527 Buckholtz, J. W. 464 Buckhout, R. 634 Buckley, J. P. 640 Buckley, M. R. 293, 701 Buckner, C. 15 Bucolo, D. O. 166, 648 Budge, S. 208 Budge, S. L. 208, 210–11, 213 Buffardi, L. E. 179–80 Buffel, V. 565 Buhrmester, M. D. 28, 78 Bui, N. H. 107 Bulbulia, J. A. 301 Bull, R. 645 Bültmann, S. 534 Bunting, M. 42 Bunyan, D. P. 162 Burda, H. 534 Burger, H. 227 Burger, J. M. 288–91, 297–9, 301 Burgess, A. 641 Burgess, P. 583 Burkart, J. M. 411–12 Burke, M. 470 Burleson, M. H. 101 Burnes, T. R. 213 Burns, J. M. 694, 696 Burns, S. 638 Burnstein, E. 327, 407 Burrell, A. 569 Burrows, C. N. 229 Burrows, L. 118 Burt, N. M. 67 Busch, R. 572 Busching, R. 456, 465, 479, 487 Bushman, B. J. 5, 292, 435, 460–1, 470–1, 473–6, 482 Bushnell, A. 657 Buss, A. H. 65 Buss, D. M. 12, 353, 367–8, 370–1, 389, 392, 456, 462 Bussey, K. 484 Butler, C. 526 Butler, G. 357 Butler, L. D. 53 Butrie, L. K. 382 Butterfield, D. A. 172 Butterworth, M. R. 212 Button, F. A. 628–9 Button, John 638, 641, 644 Butz, D. A. 160 Buunk, B. P. 373, 387 Buzzanell, P. M. 678 Byatt, G. 357 Byers, E. S. 380 Byrne, D. 353, 364 Byrne, R. M. J. 108 Byrne, S. 483

C Cabeza, R. 361 Cabral, J. C. C. 13, 464 Cacioppo, J. T. 14, 119, 224, 226–7, 232, 235, 241, 246, 257, 290, 353, 607 Cacioppo, S. 14, 350

Cairns, D. R. 470 Calcagno, J. 177 Calder, K. 611 Caldwell, C. 651 Caleo, S. 171 Callaghan, T. 458 Callan, S. 406 Callison, C. 152 Callow, L. 64 Calogero, R. M. 170 Calton, J. 458 Calvert, S. L. 481 Camara, W. J. 683 Cameron, C. L. 604 Cameron, J. 50, 703 Cameron, J. J. 127 Cameron, K. A. 247 Cameron, L. 176 Campbell, A. 462 Campbell, B. 392 Campbell, C. 68 Campbell, D. J. 692 Campbell, D. T. 27, 165, 241–2 Campbell, L. 107 Campbell, M. 430–1 Campbell, W. K. 59, 286, 367 Campion, J. E. 684 Campion, M. A. 680, 684–5, 693 Campo, M. 458 Campos, B. 365 Canetti-Nisim, D. 583 Cannava, K. 275 Cannon, J. 488 Cannon, W. B. 588 Cantor, J. R. 474 Capozza, D. 146 Capper, M. M. 474, 486 Caprar, D. V. 331 Caprara, G. 420 Caprariello, P. A. 356 Caputo, D. 290 Carchon, I. 358 Card, N. A. 456 Cárdenas, R. A. 358 Carey, B. 589 Carey, C. 377 Carey, H. R. 325 Carey, S. 202 Carli, L. L. 282, 699 Carlo, G. 419–20, 436 Carlsmith, J. M. 29, 254–5, 257–60 Carlsmith, K. M. 656 Carlson, B. 59 Carlson, E. N. 44, 47 Carlson, L. 237 Carlson, M. 429, 469 Carlsson, R. 229 Carlston, D. E. 119 Carmelli, A. 326 Carnagey, N. L. 479 Carnahan, T. 659 Carnegie, D. 237 Carpenter, M. 196, 278, 429 Carpenter, S. 708 Carr, J. L. 474 Carr, P. B. 179, 350 Carr, P. J. 466

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721

NAME INDEX Carr, T. H. 68 Carraro, L. 154 Carroll, J. M. 96 Carroll, J. S. 647, 650 Carson, D. 513 Carstensen, L. L. 54 Carter, J. 411 Cartwright, D. 317 Caruso, E. M. 708 Carvallo, M. 71 Carver, C. S. 64, 66–7, 584, 597–600, 602 Caryl, P. G. 382 Casa de Calvo, M. P. 274 Casad, B. J. 161 Cascio, J. 167 Case, R. B. 607 Casey, S. 241, 484 Cashdan, E. 463 Cassady, P. B. 609 Cassidy, C. 422 Cassidy, J. 375 Castaño, N. 317 Castelli, L. 151, 154 Castiello, U. 640 Castillo, P. A. 103 Castro, F. 104 Catrambone, R. 320 Cattaneo, L. B. 458 Caudek, C. 100 Caver, K. A. 701 Ceccarini, F. 100 Ceci, S. J. 171, 633 Cerasoli, C. P. 50, 703 Cesarani, D. 292 Cesario, J. 119, 247–8 Cha, A. E. 682 Cha, C. B. 229 Chae, D. H. 13 Chai, P. 646 Chaiken, S. 46, 225, 232–4, 237–9, 355 Chaikin, A. L. 380 Chamberlain, A. 663 Chamberlain, L. 627, 663 Chambers, J. R. 6, 336 Chamie, J. 509 Chamorro-Premuzic, T. 677 Chan, A. 662 Chan, D. K. 56 Chan, W. S. 523–4 Chandler, J. 28 Chang, H. 423 Chao, G. T. 690, 692 Chao, M. M. 179–80 Chapdelaine, A. 365 Chapman, D. S. 682 Chappelow, J. 279 Charman, S. D. 634, 636 Chartrand, T. L. 79, 274 Chatard, A. 64 Chattopadhyay, A. 243 Chatzisarantis, N. L. D. 67 Chavarria, J. 420 Chavez, G. 688 Chavez, H. L. 143 Chavis, D. M. 547–8

722

Chen, F. F. 364 Chen, G. 696 Chen, H. 393 Chen, J. M. 313, 609 Chen, L. 152 Chen, M. 118 Chen, R. 393 Chen, S. 44, 78, 234 Chen, V. H. 324 Chen, W. F. 356 Chen, X. 655 Chen, X. P. 56, 147 Chen, Y. R. 147 Cheng, C. M. 79 Cheng, H. C. H. 436 Cheng, P. W. 105 Cheong, W. 144 Cherry, E. C. 42 Cheryan, S. 163, 169 Cheshire, C. 365 Chessell, J. 552 Chester, D. S. 461 Chester, K. L. 452 Chester, N. L. 584 Cheung, F. M. 699 Chiaburu, D. S. 682 Chiao, J. Y. 420 Chiesa, M. 675 Chilstrom, J. T. Jr 284 Chiu, C. Y. 147 Chivers, M. L. 391 Chiviacowsky, S. 162 Chmiel, N. 676 Choi, H. S. 314 Choi, S. M. 250 Christakis N. A 351 Christenfeld, N. 371 Christensen, A. 386 Christiansen, P. 645 Christianson, S. 630 Christie, A. M. 673 Christie, R. 295 Chua, R. J. 331 Chung, A. H. 19 Chung, J. M. 60 Chung, S. 317 Church, A. T. 42 Cialdini, R. B. 73, 258, 273, 275, 282, 288, 290–1, 413, 529 Ciarocco, N. J. 67 Cihangir, S. 328 Cikara, M. 20, 146, 174, 422 Cimpian, A. 143 Cioffi, D. 603 Clark, A. 156 Clark, E. M. 377 Clark, J. 208, 210–11 Clark, J. K. 236 Clark, L. F. 207 Clark, M. S. 374–5, 422 Clark, R. D. 283–4 Clark, R. D. III 413 Clark, S. E. 634–5 Clarke, N. 707 Clarke, R. D. 426 Clarke-Pearson, K. 52 Claus, J. 245

Claypool, H. M. 278 Clayton, S. 529 Cleeremans, A. 119 Clement-Guillotin, C. 114 Clements-Nolle, K. 213–14 Clemson, P. 422 Cleveland, J. 692 Clifford, B. R. 630 Clifford, M. M. 355 Clifford, S. 551 Clinton, H. 699 Clore, G. L. 353, 364 Cloutier, J. 20 Coan, J. 95, 154 Coburn, N. 119 Coccaro, E. F. 463 Cochran, J. K. 466 Coe, C. L. 591 Coenders, M. 165 Coetzee, T. M. 420 Cohen, A. D. 410 Cohen, D. 96, 467–8 Cohen, G. L. 177, 233 Cohen, R. D. 599 Cohen, S. 14, 591–3, 603, 606, 608 Cohen-Ketteinis, P. T. 211, 463 Cohen-Meitar, R. 326 Cohn, E. S. 166, 648 Colarelli, S. M. 407 Collins, D. R. 78 Collins, N. 376 Collins, N. L. 373, 380 Colloff, M. F. 634 Columb, C. 179 Colvin, C. R. 75 Coman, A. 630 Cone, J. D. 504 Conger, R. D. 385 Conley, T. D. 392 Connell, J. B. 105 Connelly, B. S. 682 Conner, A. 56 Conner, A. L. 230 Conner, M. 231 Conner, M. T. 318 Connerly, M. L. 685 Connolley, R. S. 281 Connolly, J. 453 Connor, J. 475 Conrey, F. R. 156 Consedine, N. 14 Contrada, R. J. 366 Conway, A. 42 Conway, J. M. 684 Conway, L. G. 301–2, 423, 432 Conway, M. A. 54 Conway, P. 262 Cook, J. 249, 422 Cook, J. E. 177 Cook, J. M. 363 Cook, K. S. 374 Cook, K. V. 419 Cook, R. 414 Cook, T. D. 27, 252 Cooke, C. A. 452 Cooke, D. K. 692 Cooke, E. 638

Cooley, C. H. 44, 51 Coon, D. W. 101 Coon, H. M. 286 Cooper, B. 234 Cooper, H. 615 Cooper, J. 237, 255–7, 260, 382 Cooper, L. A. 168 Cooper, M. L. 65 Cooper, S. 511 Cooper, W. H. 691 Coopersmith, S. 60 Cope, V. 365 Copeland, J. T. 128 Corbett, S. 452 Corboz, J. 213 Corker, K. S. 164 Corley, R. P. 420 Corneille, O. 144, 251 Cornelius, J. S. 368 Cornelius, T. 290 Correia, I. 115 Correll, J. 158–60 Corriveau, K. H. 277 Cortina, J. M. 682 Cortina, L. M. 673 Costanzo, M. 628, 650 Costello, K. 145 Costello, M. 216 Costin, D. 52 Côté S. 112 Cotterill, S. 145 Cotton, R. 629 Cottrell, A. 418–19 Couch, D. 515 Couch, M. 211, 213–14 Courbalay, A. 420 Courtney, M. 568 Cousins, A. J. 353, 464 Cousins, N. 599 Covey, J. 231 Cowan, N. 42 Cowell, E. 315 Cowie, H. 430 Cowley, G. 358 Cox, S. 101 Cox, W. T. 159 Coyne, S. 481 Coyne, S. M. 464, 481 Cragg, D. N. 154 Craig, B. M. 130 Craig, D. 357 Craig, S. B. 693 Craig, S. L. 208 Craig, W. 453 Craig, W. M. 453 Craik, K. H. 504 Crandall, C. 407 Crano, W. D. 127, 284 Craven, R. G. 59 Crawford, J. T. 6, 154 Crawford, M. T. 313 Crawley, A. 465 Creamer, M. C. 583 Creber, M. 418 Credé, M. 331 Crellin, K. 488 Crick, N. R. 456, 467, 473, 481

Copyright 2020 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-202

NAME INDEX Crisp, R. J. 5, 176 Crocker, J. 62, 689 Crofoot, M. C. 407 Croft, A. 162 Cronbach, L. J. 129 Crone, T. S. 175 Cronshaw, S. F. 684 Cropanzano, R. 704–5 Crosby, F. J. 685–6, 689 Cross, D. 430 Crossley, C. 511 Crouch, A. 611 Crowe, D. S. 15 Crowley, M. 423 Crowther, S. 428 Croyle, R. 257 Crucian, G. P. 48 Crutchfield, R. S. 278 Cruwys, T. 562 Cryder, C. E. 434 Csikszentmihalyi, M. 63, 512, 605, 614 Cuadros, P. 410 Cuddy, A. J. 149–50 Cue, M. 166 Culbertson, F. M. 596, 605 Culhane, S. E. 651 Cullen, F. T. 461 Cumming, G. 27, 32 Cunningham, M. R. 357, 362, 382 Cunningham, S. A. 595 Cunningham, W. A. 144, 177 Curphy, G. J. 694 Curseu, P. L. 325 Curtis, D. S. 13 Curtis, G. J. 71 Curtis, N. M. 488 Curtis, R. C. 366 Cush, R. 651 Cutler, B. L. 628–9, 634, 636, 650 Cyranowski, J. M. 201 Czopp, A. M. 163, 179

D da Luz Fontes, A. A. 156 Da Silva, C.S. 639 Da Silva, T. 377 Dabbs, J. M. 463 Dabbs, M. G. 463 Dacey, B. 476 Dadvand, P. 13 D’Agostino, M. 147 D’Agostino, P. R. 355 Daine, G. G. 359 Dalgleish, T. 420 Dalrymple, S. 296 Dalrymple-Alford, J. 100 Dalton, J. H. 547 Daly, M. 108, 461–2, 533 Damisch, L. 118 Damron, G. 511 Dane, A. V. 452 Daniel, F. 15 Dann, B. M. 649 Danoff-Berg, S. 604 Darke, P. R. 233 Darley, J. 51

Darley, J. M. 123–4, 128, 260, 419, 425–7, 431, 656 Darrow, C. 647 Daruna, J. H. 591 Darwin, C. 99, 283, 358 Dasen, P. R. 584 Dasgupta, N. 163, 177–8 Dat, M. C. 130 Datta, A. 677 Daube, M. 154 D’Augelli, A. R. 213, 569 David, D. 72 David, N. 43 Davidov, M. 420 Davidson, A. R. 230, 232 Davidson, G. R. 688 Davidson, O. B. 675 Davidson, R. J. 605 Davies, C. 215–16 Davies, C. E. 583 Davies, D. 468 Davies, K. 175 Davies, M. F. 377 Davies, P. G. 154, 160, 162, 168, 180 Davila, J. 386 Davila-Ross, M. 411 Davis, B. P. 287 Davis, J. H. 108, 653–5 Davis, J. L. 364, 453 Davis, K. D. 465 Davis, K. E. 104, 377 Davis, M. C. 590 Davis, M. D. 169 Davis, M. H. 379 Davis, S. A. 212 Davis, S. L 633 Davison, H K. 676 Davison, K. P. 605 Dawber, T. 152–3 Dawkins, R. 407 Dawson, E. 170 Dawson, K. 406 Day, A. 484, 544, 573 Day, D. V. 79 Day, E. D. 685 Day, K. D. 474 de Almeida, R. M. M. 13, 464 de Anstiss, H. 424 De Backer, C. J. 461 de Bloom, J. 79 de Bruin, W. B. 526 De Cremer, D. 335, 660 de Dear, R. 520 De Dreu, C. W. 336, 422 De Groot, J. I. M. 505 de Guzman, M. R. T. 420 De Houwer, J. D. 225, 227 De Kwaadsteniet, E. W. 335 De La Ronde, C. 78 De La Torre, P. 693 de Moraes, C. L. 20 De Nicholas, M. E. 73 de Pinho, J. R. 534 De Simone, J. J. 482 de Veer, M. W. 43 de Visser, R. 119 de Waal, F. B. M. 43, 408–11

Dean, J. 507 Deason, G. 169 Deater-Deckard, K. 67 Deaux, K. 171 DeBono, A. 471 DeBono, K. G. 247 DeBruine, L. M. 357 Decety, J. 410–12, 415, 464 Deci, E. L. 49–50, 703 Decker, S. K. 416 Deckman, T. 476 Declerck, C. H. 335 Deffenbacher, K. A. 635 DeGeneres, E. 180 DeGroot, I. 504 del Prado, A. 291 Del Vicario, M. 327 Delello, J. 569 DeLiema, M. 54 DeLisi, M. 470 Delmas, F. 475 DeLongis, A. 584 Demiray, B. 54 Demoulin, S. 145 Demski, C. 526 DeNeve, K. M. 615 Denissen, J. A. 350 Denizeau, M. 253 Denke, C. 14 Dennis, A. R. 331 Denrell, J. 126 Denson, N. 216 Denson, T. 631 Denson, T. F. 178, 461, 463–4, 474, 476–7, 486, 488–9 DePaulo, B. M. 102, 130, 173, |423, 639 Deppe, R. K. 73 Derbyshire, A. 202 Derlega, V. J. 380 Derous, E. 679 Derrick, J. L. 374 Dershowitz, A. M. 660 Desilver, D. 390 Desmarais, S. L. 636, 638 Dessai, S. 526 DeSteno, D. 274, 300 DeSteno, D. A. 371 DeSteno, D. M. 470 Deters, F. G. 52 Detert, J. R. 293 Deuser, W. E. 472–3, 477 Deutsch, M. 278, 280 DeVaul-Fetters, A. 647 Devine, D. J. 649 Devine, P. G. 157, 178, 242, 257, 634 Devos, T. 143 DeWall, C. N. 99–100, 461, 471, 473–4, 476–7, 489 Di Costa, S. 263 Di Giunta, L. 410 di Sorrentino, E. 409 Diallo, A. 157–8 Diamond, L. M. 212, 391 Diamond, M. 389 Diamond, S. S. 647, 655–6

Diaz, K. 72 Diaz-Morales, J. F. 72 Dickenberger, M. 660 Dickens, L. 274 Dickerson, S. S. 605 Dickson, J. J. 326 Dickson, W. J. 675 Dickter, C. L. 179 Didham, R. 143 DiDonato, T. E. 142 Diedrichs, P. C. 182 Diener, E. 286, 323–4, 362, 612–16 Diep, F. 581 Diermeier, D. 13 Dijksterhuis, A. 119 Dill, K. E. 473 Dillard, A. J. 413 Dimberg, U. 99 Dimitri, S. 330 Dimmick, J. W. 53 Dindia, K. 380 Ding, H. 213 D’Innocenzo, L. 317 Dion, K. 365 Dion, K. K. 361, 378, 393 Dion, K. L. 317, 378, 393 Dionisio, D. P. 640 Dirks, D. 154 Dirks, K. T. 336 Dixon, C. G. 458 Dixon, D. 645 Dixon, J. 175 Dixson, B. J. 358–9 D’Mello, S. D. 171 Dobson, J. 484 Dockery, A. M. 599 Dodd, M. D. 144 Dodge, K. A. 473 Dok 409 Dolen, M. R. 685 Dolinski, D. 288–9 Dollard, J. 469–70 Dolph, M. 617 Dommeyer, C. J. 321 Domurat Dregar, A. 197 Donnellan, M. B. 18, 60, 460 Donnerstein, E. I. 28, 466, 483 Donnerstein, M. 466 Donohue, R. 566 Donovan, C. 458 Donovan, J. J. 682 Dooley, J. J. 430 Doosje, B. 146, 178, 484 Dopp, A. R. 488 Dorsey, D. W. 691 dos Santos, M. 409 Dotsch, R. 95, 168 Dou, K. 461 Doucé, L. 505 Douglas, A. B. 636 Douglas, E. M. 452, 465 Douglass, A. B. 636 Dover, M. A. 166 Dovey, K. 518 Dovidio, J. F. 161, 165–6, 170–1, 175–7, 339, 412–13, 416, 419, 422–3

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723

NAME INDEX Downs, A. C. 355 Doyen, S. 119 Doyle, J. 512 Doyle, J. M. 629 Doyle, W. J. 592 Drigotas, S. M. 373 Driver, R. E. 51 Dror, I. 123 Droseltis, O. 516 Druen, P. B. 362 DuBois, C. L. Z. 701 Ducharme, L. J. 585 Duck, S. 380 Duckitt, J. 165 Dudgeon, P. 144, 515, 599–600 Dudley, M. 557 Dudley, N. M. 682 Due, P. 453 Duerk, D. 504 Duffy, A. 553 Duffy, F. 519 Duffy, K. G. 547 Duffy, S. 112 Dufort, P. 465 Dufour, V. 409 Duke, A. A. 65 Dunaev, J. L. 176 Dunbar, R. I. M. 3, 357 Dunbar, R. M. 3, 314 Duncan, N. 43 Dunham, Y. 143, 168, 202 Dunkels, E. 430 Dunn, J. C. 635 Dunn, K. M. 559 Dunn, M. A. 157 Dunne, J. D. 605 Dunning, D. 45, 69–70, 113–14, 129, 154, 256 Duntley, J. D. 462 Dunton, B. C. 178 Durán, M. 170 Durante, F. 150 Durik, A. M. 51, 703 Durivage, A. 684 Düsing, J. 251 Dutton, D. G. 366, 378 Duval, S. 63–4, 434 Duval, T. S. 63 Duval, V. H. 64 Dweck, C. S. 17, 68, 105, 179 Dwight, S. A. 683 Dwyer, J. 598 Dysart, J. E. 630, 635 Dzidic, P. 547 Dzokoto, V. 48

E Eagly, A. H. 6, 152–3, 170, 237, 282–3, 361, 423, 699 Earle, A. 414 Earle, J. 464 Earp, B. D. 32 East, R. 117 Easton, J. 370 Easton, J. A. 389 Eastvold, A. D. 320

724

Eastwick, P. W. 32, 356, 363, 366, 371 Ebbeck, V. 466 Ebden, M. 518 Eberhardt, J. L. 145, 179, 657 Eberly-Lewis, M. B. 420 Ebers, G. 391 Ebstein, R. P. 412, 420 Eccles, J. 126 Ecker, U. K. 249 Eckhardt, C. I. 476 Eckles, K. 52 Ede, L. 406 Eden, C. 336 Eden, D. 127 Edens, P. S. 685 Eder, R. W. 680 Edge, K. 600 Edlund, J. E. 12 Edney, J. J. 511 Edwards, B. 466 Edwards, E. S. 67 Edwards, H. 568 Edwards, J. A. 103 Edwards, K. 242 Eelen, J. 235 Effron, D. A. 167, 262 Eggum, N. D. 410 Egloff, B. 354 Ehrenreich, S. E. 460 Eibach, R. P. 5, 55 Eibl-Eibesfeldt, I. 381 Eichmann, A. 293 Eichstaedt, J. 66 Eichstaedt, J. C. 7, 22 Einarsen, S. 675 Einstein, Albert 250 Eisenberg, N. 18, 410, 419–20 Eisenberg, T. 649 Eisenberger, N. I. 3, 14, 50, 61, 278, 292, 314 Eisenberger, N. L. 117 Eisenberger, R. 703 Eisenstadt, D. 64, 254 Ekman, P. 99, 102 El Leithy, S. 584 Elaad, E 640 Elder, G. H. Jr 385 Elder, W. B. 202 Eldridge, W. B. 656 Elfenbein, H. A. 99 Elias, M. J. 546–7 Elkin, R. A. 257 Ellemers, N. 169, 314, 331 Eller, A. 176 Elliot, A. J. 51, 257, 360, 703 Elliott, M. A. 231 Ellsworth, P. C. 166, 648 Ellul, C. 535 Elmehed, K. 99 Elms, A. C. 295, 298 Elntib, S. 645 Elson, M. 481 Elwork, A. 652 Ely, R. J. 46 Emonds, G. 335 Emswiller, T. 171

Enarson, E. 459 Engels, R. 365 Englich, B. 657 English, P. W. 652 Epley, N. 76, 97–8, 103 Eply, N. 70 Epstude, K. 51 Erber, R. 605 Erby, L. H. 168 Erceg-Hurn, D. M. 249 Erdal, K. 163 Eres, R. 422 Erez, M. 690 Ericksen, J. A. 389 Erickson, B. E. 660 Erickson, W. B. 630–1 Eriksson, C. J. P. 463 Erol, R. Y. 60 Eron, L. D. 479 Er-rafiy, A. 179 Eschleman, K. J. 225 Eskenazi, J. 245 Eskine, K. J. 117 Eslea, M. 481 Espelage, D. L. 20, 431, 453 Espindle, D. 201 Espinoza, P. 156 Esser, J. K. 328 Esses, V. M. 165, 173 Essien, I. 159 Estell, D. B. 436 Esterly, E. 377 Estreich, D. 320 Etkin, R. G. 467 Eubanks, J. P. 177 Evans, A. T. 236 Evans, D. 420 Evans, G. W. 508, 586, 608 Evans, L. G. 320 Evans, M. 706 Evans, S. M. 373 Everson, S. A. 599 Ewenstein, B. 693 Exum, M. L. 474

F Fabian, A. K. 512 Fabrigar, L. 253 Fabrigar, L. R. 32 Fagan, P. 611 Fagin-Jones, S. 420 Fagot, B. 202 Fahey, J. L. 598 Fairweather-Schmidt, A. K. 548 Falconio, P. 646 Falk, D. 43 Fallaw, S. 684 Fallon, A. E. 100 Fanning, J. 253 Farinelli, L. 374 Farley, E. J. 649 Farnham, S. D. 76 Farrelly, D. 421–2 Farrington, D. P. 466 Fazel, M. 510 Fazio, R. H. 178, 225, 227, 232, 251, 256, 259

Feather, N. T. 8, 687 Feddes, A. R. 484 Federer, R. 5 Feeley, T. 291 Feeney, B. C. 373 Feeney, J. A. 377 Fehr, B. 376 Fehr, E. 422 Fein, E. 366 Fein, S. 147–8, 157, 163, 166, 180 Feinberg, T. E. 43 Feingold, A. 361–2, 365, 367 Feinstein, B. A. 52 Feinstein, J. 689 Feinstein, J. A. 246 FeldmanHall, O. 420 Fellows, L. K. 3 Fenigstein, A. 65–6 Fennelly, G. 452 Ferguson, C. J. 481 Ferguson, E. 416 Ferguson, F. 562 Ferguson, M. 225 Ferguson, R. 559 Ferguson, T. J. 636 Ferguson, T. W. 172 Ferrara, S. D. 640 Ferrari, J. R. 72, 600 Ferrari, P. 410–11 Ferraro, K. F. 173 Ferreira, A. 462 Ferreira, L. 169 Ferreira, V. S. 69 Ferrin, D. L. 336 Festinger, L. 10, 51, 74, 237, 253–4, 256–60, 277, 317, 323, 354 Fetherstonhaugh, D. 241 Fetterolf, J. C. 170 Ficks, C. A. 464 Fico, A. E. 291 Fiedler, F. E. 695 Fiedler, K. 11 Field, N. P. 436 Figurski, T. J. 63, 605 Fileborn, B. 458 Filges, T. 557 Filindra, A. 165 Fincham, F. D. 385–6 Findlay, M. 628 Fine, G. A. 77 Fine, M. A. 387 Fingerhut, A. W. 353, 392 Finkel, E. J. 32, 353, 356, 363, 366, 371, 374, 461, 474, 476–7 Finkelstein, M. A. 413, 420 Finkenauer, C. 365 Finnigan, K. M. 164 Finucane, M. L. 526 Fiore, A. T. 365 Fischbacher, U. 422 Fischer, A. H. 337 Fischer, E. F. 392 Fischer, P. 413, 428, 430, 434 Fischer, R. 301 Fischer-Lokou, J. 421 Fishbein, M. 225, 230–1 Fishbein, S. 472

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NAME INDEX Fisher, A. 547 Fisher, A. N. 7 Fisher, H. E. 392 Fisher, J. 590 Fisher, J. D. 423, 512 Fisher, M. L. 360 Fisher, R. 287 Fisher, T. D. 18 Fiske, A. P. 375 Fiske, S. T. 59, 110, 112, 130, 145, 147, 149–50, 170, 173–4, 628 Fitzgerald, C. J. 407–8 Fitzgerald, J. M. 54 Fitzsimons, G. J. 434 Fitzsimons, G. M. 67 Fivush, R. 53 Flake, J. K. 117 Flanigan, A. E. 322 Flannelly, K. 585 Fleeson, W. 122 Fleisher, M. S. 685 Fleming, L. C. 453 Fleming, M. A. 652 Fletcher, G. J. O. 386 Flood, P. 548 Flore, P. C. 164 Florian, V. 597 Flory, J. D. 64 Flory, K. 407 Flowe, H. D. 634 Foa, R. 615 Fointiat, V. 289 Folger, R. 660, 693, 705 Folkman, S. 600, 603 Follett, M. P. 336 Fonda, Henry 654 Fondacaro, M, R. 549 Fong, C. 157 Fong, K. 94–5 Fontenot, K. 386 Forbes, C. E. 163 Forbes, G. B. 450, 475 Ford, C. E. 73 Ford, M. T. 693 Ford, R. 165 Forgas, J. P. 117, 273, 433 Fornara, F. 516 Forster, E. M. 46 Förster, G. 67 Forsyth, D. R. 313 Forth, A. 638 Fortuna, K. 420 Fortune, W. H. 656 Foshee, V. A. 461 Foster, C. A. 367, 379 Foster-Fishman, P. G. 329 Fosterling, F. 105 Foulk, T. 673 Fowler, K. A. 98 Fox, C. 458 Fox, E. 99 Fox, K. 383 Fox, S. 55 Fraccaroli, F. 676 Fraine, G. 511 Francis, J. 63 Francis, L. A. 595

Franck, K. A. 432 Frank, E. 592 Frank, J. 652 Franklin, C. A. 469 Franklin, M. 464 Franz, T. M. 329 Fraser, S. C. 289, 323–4 Frattaroli, J. 604 Frazier, P. 413, 602 Frazier, P. A. 377, 602 Frazier, R. S. 227 Frease-McMahan, L. 372 Freckelton, I. 640 Fredrickson, B. L. 170, 590, 603 Freeberg, T. M. 407 Freedman, J. L. 248–9, 289 Freeman, E. C. 59 Freeman, K. 473 Freeman, N. K. 203 Freiberg, A. 656 Fremouw, W. 484 French, D. P. 602 Frenkel-Brunswik, E. 295 Freud, S. 102, 389, 604 Freund, T. 122 Frey, D. 434 Fried, M. 515–16 Fried, Y. 686, 689 Friedland, N. 602, 660 Friedman, H. S. 583, 589–90 Friedman, K. 154 Friedman, M. 589 Friedman, R. S. 178 Friedrich, J. 241 Friend, R. 283 Friese, M. 474 Friesen, W. V. 102 Frisby, B. N. 382 Fritz, C. 584 Fritzsche, A. 152 Fritzsche, B. A. 413 Frohlich, P. F. 378 Frone, M. R. 65, 584 Fry, D. P. 454 Frynta, D. 534 Fudge, M. 565 Fugère, M. A. 353, 464 Fujino, N. 414 Fujita, F. 362, 615 Fujita, K. 409 Fuks, N. 208 Fulcher, B. D. 7 Fulero, S. 651 Fulford, J. A. 635 Fuller, J. 101 Fuller-Rowell, T. E. 13 Funder, D. C. 129 Funk, S. C. 596 Furnham, A. 115, 154, 355 Furr, R. M. 44, 122 Fusaro, M. 277

G Gabarro, J. J. 701 Gabbert, F. 277–8, 636 Gabrielidis, C. 368 Gaertner, L. 76

Gaertner, S. L. 157, 165–6, 177, 339, 413, 423 Gaetz, R. 127 Gagne, F. M. 373 Gailliot, M. T. 476 Gaines, S. O. Jr 416 Galanter, M. 293 Galef, B. G. 274 Galen, B. R. 456 Galinsky, A. D. 5, 19, 179, 260, 275 Gall, F. 93–4 Gallace, A. 101 Gallagher, D. 241 Galletly, C. 675 Gallo, L. C. 587, 589 Gallrein, A. M. B. 44 Gallup, G. G. 43 Gallup, G. G. Jr 43–4 Galobardes, B. 590 Gamarel, K. E. 207 Game, F. 358 Gamero, N. 317 Gammie, S. C. 462 Gamson, W. A. 301 Gana, K. 377 Gandhi, M. 283, 696 Gangestad, S. 79–80 Gangestad, S. W. 79, 358, 367, 370 Gano-Phillips, S. 386 Gao, X. 393 Garcia, A. J. 337 Garcia, F. 422 Garcia, J. 177 Garcia, J. A. 143 Garcia, S. M. 428 Gardikiotis, A. 283 Gardner, B. 551 Gardner, R. G. 682 Gardner, W. L. 224, 320 Garnero, A. 331 Garnets, L. D. 213, 392 Garnett, F. G. 179–80 Garofalo, R. 207 Garry, M. 644 Gartner, R. 454 Garvey, D. 144 Gasser, L. 420 Gastwirth, J. L. 647 Gates, B. 420, 696 Gaucher, G. 127 Gavey, N. 483 Gavin, K. 143 Gawronski, B. 11, 166, 647 Gear, A. 50 Geary, D. C. 164 Gebhard, K. T. 458 Gee, G. 514–15, 600 Geen, R. G. 320, 470, 481 Geiselman, R. E. 361 Gekoski, W. L. 423 Gelfand, M. J. 316, 336–7, 662, 690 Gelkopf, M. 583 Gellert, E. 359 Gendron, M. 96 Genovese, K. 425, 430 Gentile, B. 62, 286, 462 Gentile, D. A. 13, 435, 481–2

Georgesen, J. C. 692 Gerace, A. 484 Gerard, H. B. 278, 280–1 Gerber, J. 278 Gerbner, G. 482 Gergen, K. 104 Gergen, K. J. 10 Gerhardstein, R. 154 Germain, M. 231 Gershoff, E. T. 465 Gervais, W. M. 66, 173 Geyer, A. L. 283 Gharaei, F. M. N. 508 Ghavami, N. 690 Ghumman, S. 178 Giancola, P. R. 65, 474–5 Gibbons, F. X. 74 Gibbons, S. L. 466 Gibbs, J. C. 486 Gibbs, W. 478 Gibson, B. 73 Gibson, C. B. 330 Giebels, E. 336 Giesler, R. B. 78 Gifford, R. 504, 506, 508–9, 512–14, 516, 527–9, 531 Gigerenzer, G. 107 Gil de Zúñiga, H. 149 Gilbert, D. 612, 689 Gilbert, D. T. 45, 109–10, 366, 615 Gilbert, J. 414 Gilbert, S. J. 297 Gill, M. J. 143 Gillam, J. 569 Gillard, J. 141, 699 Gillespie, N. 329 Gilley, M. 366 Gillig, P. M. 240 Gilovich, T. 70–1, 76, 107, 615 Giner-Sorolla, R. 32, 176, 234 Gino, F. 64, 261 Gioia, D. A. 693 Giovannini, D. 5 Girgus, J. S. 605 Girme, Y. U. 393 Girotto, V. 325 Girvan, E. J. 169 Giuliani, M. V. 504 Giuliano, T. A. 110 Giulietti, C. 167 Gladue, B. A. 463 Gladwell, M. 98 Glaser, R. 591 Glaser, T. 251 Glasford, D. E. 177, 339 Glaskin, B. 600 Glasman, L. R. 229 Glasø, L. 675 Glass, D. C. 320, 597 Glass, G. V. 610 Glenn, C. R. 229 Glick, B. 486 Glick, P. 149, 170 Godfrey, D. K. 78 Godin, G. 231 Godlaski, A. J. 474 Goel, V. 31

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725

NAME INDEX Goethals, G. R. 51, 121, 257, 694 Goff, M. 692 Goff, P. A. 145, 168 Goffman, E. 77, 81 Goh, J. X. 154 Golby, J. 464 Gold, M. A. 127 Goldberg, A. E. 210 Goldberg, D. E. 599 Goldberg, J. 147 Goldberg, P. 170–1 Goldhagen, D. J. 292 Goldstein, N. J. 273, 275, 288, 529 Goleman, D. 694 Golinsky, M. 414 Gollwitzer, P. M. 119, 330, 336 Golombok, S. 152 Gómez, Á. 335, 466 Gonzaga, G. 365 González, A. Q. 369, 407 Good, C. 17, 163 Good, M. 479 Goodboy, A. K. 461 Goodes, Adam 166 Goodman, J. 154 Goodman, M. B. 707 Goodman-Delahunty, J. 645–7, 651 Goodwin, G. P. 120 Goodwin, S. A. 130 Goossens, L. 14 Gorcheva, R. 213 Gorchoff, S. 384 Gordon, H. 617 Gordon, L. J. 73 Gordon, M. S. 556 Gordon, W. 410–11 Gordon-Hecker, T. 261 Goren, M. J. 179–80 Gorman, B. 617 Gorman, H. 453 Gorodetsky, E. 463 Gosling, P. 253 Gosling, S. 94 Gosling, S. D. 28 Gossett, J. L. 483 Goswami, R. 464–5 Gotlib, I. H. 595 Gotman, N. 226 Gottfredson, L. S. 682 Gottfried, M 425 Gottlieb, A. 429 Gottman, J. M. 386 Gottschalk, L. 570 Gouin, J. 591 Goulding, D. 16 Gouldner, A. W. 287 Govender, R. 232 Goyle, A. 159 Gozjolko, K. L. 458 Gracia, E. 422 Graff, P. 252 Graham, J. 154 Graham, K. 474 Graham, M. J. 171 Graham-Bermann, S. 464 Grammer, K. 358 Gramzow, R. H. 71

726

Granberg, D. 282 Granhag, P. A. 102–3, 628, 640 Granholm, E. 640 Grant, S. 467 Grass, K. 700 Graves, J. K. 650 Graves, N. 296 Gray, D. 476 Gray, H. M. 97 Gray, K. 97, 436 Gray, R. 68 Gray-Little, B. 62 Greathouse, S. M. 635 Green, J. D. 70 Green, K. E. 213 Green, M. 410 Green, R. E. 465 Greenaway, K. H. 314 Greenberg, J. 61, 64, 148, 243, 321, 605, 660, 675, 704–5 Greenberger, E. 374 Greene, D. 50, 703 Greene, E. 628, 649, 656 Greene, T. C. 512 Greenfield, P. M. 58 Greenop, K. 514 Greenwald, A. G. 76, 146, 167–8, 224, 227–9, 233, 240, 245 Greer, N. 320 Gregg, A. P. 69–70 Gregg, M. E. 607 Greifeneder, R. 11, 103 Greitemeyer, T. 124, 360, 428, 434, 479–80, 482 Gridley, H. 562 Griffin, C. 323 Griffin, D. 107, 154 Griffin, D. J. 291 Griffin, D. W. 373–4 Griffin, S. 612 Griffiths, B. 107, 226 Griffiths, I. D. 504 Grippo, A. J. 14 Grisham, J. R. 474 Grisham, J. 647 Griskevicius, V. 117, 283, 369–70, 462, 529, 532 Groisman, M. 69 Gross, J. J. 604 Gross, P. H. 123–4 Grossman, A. H. 213 Grossman, M. 386 Grossmann, T. 119 Grosswald, B. 551 Grote, N. K. 374 Grover, K. W. 18 Groves, K. S. 338 Gruber, J. 616 Gruder, C. L. 252 Grulich, A. 119 Grulich, A. E. 213 Guan, Y. 57 Gudjonsson, G. H. 645 Gudykunst, W. 147 Guede, Rudy 656 Guéguen, N. 421, 431, 433 Guenther, C. C. 651

Guerin, B. 553 Guerin, P. 553 Guerra, N. G. 465, 473 Guerra, R. 339 Guerrero, L. K. 374 Gulker, J. E. 179 Gulliver, A. 424 Gump, B. B. 352 Günaydin, G. 94 Gundersen, K. K. 486 Gunia, B. C. 337 Gunnthorsdottir, A. H. 534 Gunter, B. C. 227 Guntuku, S. C. 7 Guo, C. 393, 460 Gupta, N. 702 Gupta, S. 331 Gupta, T. S. 551 Gurevich, M. 584 Gurung, R. A. R. 609 Gusmaroli, D. 413 Gustafson, P. 515–16 Gutek, B. A. 171 Guthrie, M. 422 Gutiérrez, A. S. 690 Gutierrez, R. 315–16 Gutscher, H. 526 Gutsell, J. N. 179, 422 Gutshall, K. A. 95 Gutzwiller-Helfenfinger, E. 420 Guyll, M. 127, 156 Gwaltney, J. M. 592 Gygax, L. 392

H Haake, A. B. 520 Habashi, M. M. 236 Haby, M. M. 593 Hackel, L. M. 144, 422 Hackman, G. 647 Hackman, J. R. 314, 328–9, 331 Hadad, C. 155 Haddock, G. 247 Haden, C. A. 53 Hadwin, J. A. 473 Hafdahl, A. R. 62 Hafer, C. L. 114, 116 Hagger, M. S. 67, 231 Hagi, I. 560 Haidt, J. 95, 154, 612 Haight, N. A. 361 Hailey, B. J. 590 Haines, H. 9 Hajkowicz, S. 676 Halabi, S. 423 Halberstadt, J. 358 Hald, G. 483 Hald, G. M. 484 Halim, M. L. 202 Hall, E. T. 506–8 Hall, J. 377 Hall, J. A. 154, 382–4 Hall, L. 468 Hall, S. 602 Hall, V. C. 50, 703 Hall, W. 162 Hall, W. J. 168

Halligan, S. L. 473 Halperin, E. 339 Halpern, D. F. 699 Haltom, K. E. B. 61 Halupka, M. 706 Hamamura, T. 76, 286 Hamann, S. 227 Hamer, D. H. 391 Hamermesh, D. S. 355–6 Hamill, R. 42 Hamilton, D. L. 143, 313 Hamilton, K. 551 Hamilton, R H. 676 Hamilton, V. L. 292 Hamilton, W. D. 407 Hamlin, J. K. 409, 412 Hammarström, A. 675 Hammel, P. 642 Hammen, C. L. 595 Hammer, S. 566 Hammersla, J. F. 372 Hammock, G. 377 Hammond, M. D. 393 Hamrick, N. 607 Han, S. 249, 422 Hancock, B. 693 Handelsman, J. 171 Haney, C. 30, 315, 658–9 Hankin, B. L. 71 Hanmer, M. J. 226 Hannon, P. A. 374 Hannum, K 693 Hans, V. P. 646, 648–9 Hansen, A. 470 Hansen, C. H. 99 Hansen, K. 101 Hansen, R. D. 99 Hanson, M. A. 685 Hanson, R. 612 Hanyu, K. 54 Happ, C. 287–8 Haque, S. 54 Harackiewicz, J. M. 51, 163, 703 Haraldsson, H. 145 Harber, K. 96 Hardin, G. 334, 523 Hardin, T. S. 596 Harenski, K. 227 Harinck, F. 336 Haritos-Fatouros, M. 292, 297 Harkins, S. 321 Harkins, S. G. 241, 320 Harmon, D. L. 650 Harmon-Jones, E. 256, 258 Harold, G. T. 386 Harrington, L. 62, 70 Harrington, R. 600 Harris, C. B. 330 Harris, C. R. 119, 371 Harris, D. 467, 469 Harris, E. 478 Harris, K. L. 317 Harris, L. J. 358 Harris, L. T. 145 Harris, M. J. 128, 692 Harris, M. M. 680 Harris, P. B. 511

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NAME INDEX Harris, P. L. 277 Harris, R. N. 73 Harris, T. 16 Harris, V. A. 104, 109 Harrison, D. A. 686, 689, 692 Hart, A. 515 Hart, J. W. 246 Hart, S. A. 420 Hart, W. 242 Harter, J. K. 331 Hartley, J. 18 Hartmann, L. 687 Hartwell, C. J. 680 Hartwig, M. 103, 639 Harvey, J. 372 Harvey, J. H. 379, 386–7 Hasbold, A. 195 Hasel, L. E. 632 Haselhuhn, M. P. 335 Haslam, A. S. 315 Haslam, N. 145 Haslam, S. A. 292, 298–300, 314, 318, 659, 698 Haslam McKenzie, F. 553 Hass, R. G. 64, 66, 166, 236 Hassan, R. 558 Hassin, R. 95 Hastie, R. 653–5 Hastings, P. D. 420 Hatemi, P. K. 13, 251 Hatfield, E. 367, 374, 378, 392 Hauser, D. J. 421 Haussegger, V. 706 Hawkins, A. 122 Hawkins, C. 653 Hawkins, C. B. 227 Hay, D. F. 419 Hay, R. B. 513 Hayes, A. 466 Hayes, R. 420 Hayes, S. 458 Hayes, S. C. 504 Hays, R. B. 354, 372 Hayward, L. E. 175, 181 Hazan, C. 94, 375–6 Hazelwood, R. 641 Heafner, J. 98 Healy, J. M. Jr 584 Hearold, S. 436 Hearst, P. C. 250 Hearst, Patty 250 Heath, C. 69 Heatherton, T. F. 43, 60, 67 Heaven, P. C. L. 377 Heavey, C. 330 Heavey, C. L. 386 Hebl, M. R. 173, 181, 331–2, 680 Hedge, A. 432, 519 Hedge, J. W. 685 Hedlund, J. 682 Heesacker, M. 386 Hefner, M. K. 661 Hegtvedt, K. A. 29 Hehman, E. 117, 339 Heiblum, N. 488 Heider, F. 104, 110, 365 Heidrich, C. 162 Heilbrun, K. 628, 656

Heiler, K. 551 Heilman, K. M. 48 Heilman, M. E. 171, 689–90, 699 Heine, S. J. 57, 64, 75–6, 147 Heingartner, A. 320 Heintz, C. 325 Heinz, A. 475 Heinze, H. 14 Helenius, R. 520 Helgesen, S. 699 Helgeson, V. S. 74, 596–7, 608 Heller, J. F. 50, 249 Helliwell, J. 613 Helmbold, K. 464 Helmes, E. 565 Helseth, S. A. 473 Helson, R. 384 Helzer, E. G. 120, 122 Hemenway, D. 452 Henchy, T. 320 Henderlong, J. 50 Henderson, M. D. 436 Henderson-King, D. 154 Henderson-King, E. 154 Hendrick, C. 372, 377 Hendrick, S. 377 Hendrick, S. S. 372, 377, 380 Hendrickx, L. 534 Heneman, H. G. 702 Henggeler, S. W. 488 Henly, A. S. 70 Hennessey, B. A. 51 Hennessy, R. 406 Henningsen, D. D. 326, 382 Henningsen, M. M. 326 Henrich, J. 64 Henry, D. B. 281 Henry, J. D. 178 Henry, P. 551 Henry, S. K. 549 Hepler, J. 225 Heppner, P. P. 609 Herbert, T. 591 Herek, G. M. 213, 353 Herman, E. M. 320 Hernández, B. 514, 516 Herodotus 110 Heron, J. 487 Herring, C. 331 Hersen, M. 381 Hershcovis, M. S. 673 Hertwig, R. 107 Herzhoff, K. 98 Herzigova, E. 360 Hessel, E. T. 127 Hessler, C. M. 261, 420 Hester, M. 458 Hewitt, P. L. 73 Hewson, L. 651 Hewstone, M. 154, 173, 175–6, 181 Heyes, C. 273–4 Heymann, J 414 Hezlett, S. A. 682 Hibbing, J. R. 13 Hidalgo, M. C. 516 Hideg, G. 449 Hietanen, J. K. 101

Higgins, C. A. 77, 680 Higgins, D. 390 Higgins, E. T. 62–3, 66, 116, 118–19, 247–8, 252, 321 Higgins, L. T. 393 Higgins, R. L. 72–3 Hikichi, H. 582 Hilbig, B. E. 261, 420 Hill, C. 127 Hill, C. A. 78 Hill, D. B. 201 Hill, J. 466, 546 Hill, K. G. 51 Hill, T. 486 Hiller, N. J. 79 Hilliar, K. 631 Hillix, W. A. 640 Hills, T. T. 108 Hilmert, C. J. 238 Hilton, J. L. 128 Hilton, J. M. 453 Himes, G. T. 44 Himmelstein, M. S. 462 Hinduja, S. 430 Hines, M. 152 Hinsz, V. B. 108, 329 Hinz, T. 167 Hirsch, L. 509 Hirsh, J. B. 531 Hirst, W. 54, 630 Hirt, E. R. 73 Hiruy, K. 515 Hitler, A. 9, 234, 292, 696 Hittson, A. 630 Hixon, J. G. 78 Hjemdahl, P. 590 Ho, G. C. 163 Ho Tan, D. 463 Hoaken, P. N. S. 464 Hobbs, D. 639 Hobbs, S. 675 Hodges, B. H. 283 Hodges, J. R. 414 Hodgetts, D. 563 Hodgins, H. S. 125 Hodson, G. 145, 165–6, 174 Hodson, S. E. 583 Hoever, I. J. 332 Hofer, C. 420 Hoffman, B. J. 685 Hoffman, C. 53 Hoffman, E. L. 280 Hoffman, H. G. 228 Hoffman, K. M. 382 Hoffman, L. 154 Hoffman, S. 277 Hofling, C. K. 296 Hofmann, W. 67, 251 Hofstede, G. 286, 660 Hogan, J. 694 Hogan, R. 694 Hogg, M. A. 253, 256 Hoigaard, R. 321 Holbrook, J. 104 Holen, J. 377 Holfeld, B. 430 Holland, E. 170

Holland, K. 581 Holland, R. W. 252, 365 Hollander, E. P. 284, 695 Hollander, M. M. 300 Holleman, B. 120 Hollén, L. I. 407 Hollmann, S. 114 Holloway, J. 603 Holmes, E. 176 Holmes, J. 458 Holmes, J. G. 127, 373–4 Holmes, J. R. 64 Holmes, James 469, 478 Holmes, T. H. 584 Holmes IV, O. 331 Holmqvist, R. 486 Holoien, D. S. 179–80 Holstein, B. 453 Holstein, M. 44 Holt, C. S. 380 Holt, K. 154 Holt-Lunstad, J. 16, 350, 607 Holzer, P. 466 Homans, G. C. 372 Hönekopp, J. 358, 464 Honeycutt, J. M. 386 Hong, K. 640 Hong, L. 113 Hong, M. 640 Hong, Y. 179–80 Hong, Y. Y. 322 Hongisto, V. 520 Honts, C. R. 639 Hook, L. 653 Hoorens, V. 71 Hope, L. 650 Hoplock, L. B. 7 Hoppitt, W. 274 Hopwood, C. J. 251 Horan, J. 646 Horita, M. 288 Horner, V. 411 Hornsey, M. J. 167, 175, 181, 275, 283, 315 Horry, R. 144, 277 Horselenberg, R. 642 Horstmann, G. 99 Horton, R. S. 353, 363 Horvath, A. O. 610 Hosch, H. M. 631, 637–8, 651 Hoshino-Browne, E. 180, 258 Hossain, N. 564 Hossain, R. 176 Houkamau, C. A. 59 House, J. S. 350, 607 Houston, K. A. 630 Hovland, C. I. 233, 236, 240 Howard, D. J. 291 Howard, G. S. 32 Howard, K. H. 210 Howard, P. N. 300 Howardson, G. 331 Howden-Chapman, P. 608 Howell, H. B. 226 Howell, R. T. 518 Hoyt, D. R. 354 Hoyt, R. E. 526

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727

NAME INDEX Hsee, C. K. 107 Hsian, S. M. 470 Huffmeier, J. 336 Huang, C. 78, 213 Huang, C. M. 112 Huang, Q. 330 Huang, Y. 280 Hubbard, S. 213 Hubert, S. 122 Huddleston-Casas, C. A. 377 Huddy, L. 534 Hudson, S. 581 Huebsch, D. 321 Huesmann, L. R. 450, 466, 473, 479, 482 Hufer, A. 251 Huffcutt, A. I. 684, 701 Hugenberg, K. 11, 144 Hughes, L. 688 Hui, C. 337 Hulbert, L. 655 Hull, J. G. 65 Human, L. J. 130 Hummer, T. A. 482 Hung, T. 322 Hunger, J. M. 162 Hunsaker, S. 415 Hunsinger, M. 163, 177–8 Hunt, S. 210 Hunter, J. A. 81–2 Hunter, S. 168 Huo, Y. J. 660 Hur, M. H. 416 Hurd, P. L. 464 Hurst, C. 355–6 Hurtz, G. M. 682 Huskinson, T. 247 Husnu, S. 176 Hussain, M. M. 300 Huston, T. L. 386 Hutchison, P. 315–16 Hutt, R. 214 Huynh, Q. 143 Hyde, J. S. 71, 423 Hyde, Z. 216 Hyers, L. L. 169 Hyman, M. 112 Hymes, C. 225

I Iannone, N. E. 330 Ibrahim, R. 425 Ickes, W. 422 Ige, O. A. 510 Igou, E. R. 45 Ijzerman, H. 117 Iliev, R. 262 Im, C. 471 Inagaki, T. K. 61, 117 Inbar, J. 32 Inbar, Y. 6 Inbau, F. E. 638, 640 Ingham, A. G. 320 Inglehart, R. 615 Ingoldsby, B. B. 467 Inkster, J. A. 256 Innes, M. 8

728

Insko, C. A. 242, 277, 335 Inzlicht, M. 163, 179, 422 Ioannou, M. 176 Iredale, W. 335 Ireland, M. E. 275 Irons, M. 549 Irwin, M. 591 Isen, A. M. 243 Ishiki, A. 582 Israel, S. 412, 430 Israel, T. 213 Ito, K. 112 Ito, N. 236 Ito, T. A. 119, 143, 178, 227, 474 Iverson, A. 366 Iyer, R. 518 Izard, C. E. 49

J Jaccard, J. 167, 229 Jaccard, J. J. 230 Jacks, J. Z. 247 Jackson, C. 208, 210–11 Jackson, J. M. 303 Jackson, K. 560 Jackson, M. C. 145 Jackson, R. 475 Jackson, T. 393 Jacobo, J. 478 Jacobs, R. R. 171 Jacobsen, K. H. 453 Jacobson, K. C. 463 Jacobson, L. 126, 128 Jacobson, M. 476 Jaffe, D. 658 Jago, A. G. 694–5 Jahncke, H. 520 Jaipal, R. 521 Jalalkamali, N. 508 James, E. 418 James, J. E. 607 James, R. 653 James, S. E. 207–8, 210 James, W. 81 Jamieson, D. W. 226 Jamieson, J. P. 590 Janicki-Deverts, D. 608 Janis, I. L. 243, 252, 327–8 Jankowiak, W. R. 392 Janoff-Bulman, R. 602 Jansari, A. 54 Janson, C. H. 409 Janssen, L. 54 Jarrett Howell, T. 213 Jarvis, W. B. G. 225, 246 Jawahar, I. M. 679 Jaworski, R. A. 321 Jayasinghe, S. U. 595 Jayne, B. C. 640 Jeffery, R. W. 597 Jeffries, S. 458 Jenkins, G. D. Jr 702 Jenkins, P. 459 Jenkins, S. 585 Jennifer, D. 430 Jensen, T. D. 237 Jesus Christ 283

Jetten, J. 165, 275, 283, 298, 304– 5, 314–16, 335 Jiang, J. 13 Jiang, L. 235 Jimenez, A. 331 Jiminez-Lorente, B. 651 Joan of Arc 283 Job, V. 67–8 Jobe, R. L. 416 Jobs, Steve 696 Joel, D. 204 Joh, J. 331 Johannesen-Schmidt, M. C. 699 Johar, O. 461 John, O. 384 John, O. P. 119 Johns, G. 692 Johnson, A. B. 146 Johnson, B. T. 224 Johnson, C. 326 Johnson, D. 284 Johnson, D. J. 373 Johnson, J. 423 Johnson, J. A. 72, 600 Johnson, L. 243 Johnson, M. 101 Johnson, R. J. 583 Johnson, R. W. 258 Johnson, S. M. 526 Johnson, T. 76 Johnson, T. 406 Johnson, W. 614 Johnston, K. 586 Johnston, L. 100 Joiner, T. E. 596 Joireman, J. 332, 335 Jones, B. C. 357 Jones, E. E. 18, 46, 72, 77–8, 104, 109, 121, 226, 257, 292 Jones, J. H. 389 Jones, J. M. 142, 304–5 Jones, J. T. 71 Jones, Jim 293 Jones, L. M. 430 Jones, S. S. 274, 583 Jones, T. 197 Jones, T. S. 507 Jones, W. H. 416 Jordan, J. 590 Jordan, K. 453 Jorgensen, B. S. 512, 548 Joseph, D. L. 696 Josephs, R. A. 65, 78, 474 Josephs, S. 642 Jost, J. T. 115, 148–9 Joyce, C. 452 Joyce, S. J. 551 Jua, Binti 410–11 Judd, C. M. 94, 142, 157, 159 Judge, T. A. 77, 225, 355–6, 680, 682, 696, 702, 706 Juhl, J. 55 Jureidini, J. 558 Jussim, L. 126–7, 154 Jusyte, A. 473

K Kaarlela-Tuomaala, A. 520 Kacinic, N. A. 117 Kafka, S. 82 Kagan, J. 392 Kahle, S. 420 Kahn, K. B. 160 Kahneman, D. 106–8, 614 Kalla, J 181 Kallgren, C. A. 232, 241, 282 Kalpidou, M. 52 Kalven, H. 649, 653–4 Kameda, T. 314, 654 Kamen-Siegel, L. 598 Kaminoff, R. 512 Kammeyer-Mueller, J. D. 702 Kampelmann, S. 331 Kandler, C. 11, 251 Kane, A. A. 314 Kane, R. 175 Kanfer, R. 702 Kantrowitz, T. 684 Kaplan, B. J. 617 Kaplan, G. A. 599 Kaplan, M. F. 647, 654 Kaplan, R. 517 Kaplan, S. 325, 517, 529 Karafantis, D. M. 166 Karanja, M. 558 Karau, S. J. 322, 699 Kark, R. 172, 696 Karney, B. R. 373, 384, 386 Karremans, J. C. 245 Karz, A. 582 Kashima, Y. 116, 155–6, 262–3 Kasprzyk, D. 231 Kassam-Adams, N. 585 Kassin, S. M. 102, 123, 127, 228, 237, 274, 632, 637–9, 641–2, 644–5, 651, 654 Katkin, E. S. 53 Katona, C. 558 Katz, I. 166 Katz, M. 213 Katz, N. 314, 328–9, 331 Kaufman, D. Q. 246 Kaul, C. 143 Kavanagh, L. C. 235 Kawachi, I. 598 Kawakami, K. 11, 18, 165, 179 Kay, A. 154 Kay, A. C. 67, 115, 163 Kay, M. 458 Kaye, D. 243 Kaye, D. H. 649 Kaye, L. K. 16 Keast, R. 418 Keating, C. F. 95 Keefe, R. C. 368 Keefer, L. A. 145 Keenan, J. P. 43 Keillor, J. M. 48 Keinan, G. 602 Keith, P. M. 374 Kelem, R. T. 323–4 Keller, C. 526 Keller, C. E. 690

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NAME INDEX Keller, V. N. 118 Kelley, H. H. 105–6, 120, 372–3 Kelley, W. M. 43 Kelloway, K. 584 Kelly, A. E. 46, 604 Kelly, B. M. 511 Kelly, J. G. 546 Kelly, J. R. 330 Kelly, K. 515, 600 Kelly, R. J. 258 Kelman, H. C. 10, 236, 240, 280, 292 Keltner, D. 59, 112 Kemeny, M. E. 598 Kemmelmeier, M. 143, 286 Kemp, R. 631–2 Kemp, R. I. 476 Kendrick, K. M. 280 Kendrick, T. 95 Keneally, Kristina 699 Kennedy, D. P. 507 Kenneth, T. 19 Kennison, S. M. 159 Kenny, D. A. 118, 129, 365, 407, 694 Kenrick, D. T. 288, 353, 364, 368, 371, 379, 470 Kerekes, A. R. Z. 116 Kern, M. L. 7 Kernan, J. B. 512 Kerner, Joan 699 Kerr, N. L. 647–8, 650, 653–4 Kervyn, N. 119, 150 Keskinen, E. 520 Kessler, R. C. 375, 584 Ketcham, K. 634 Ketrow, S. M. 328 Key, W. B. 244 Keysar, B. 70 Khosla, R. 684 Kidd, R. F. 422 Kiechel, K. L. 642 Kiecolt-Glaser, J. K. 591 Kierein, N. M. 127 Kiewra, K. A. 322 Kilbourne, J. 170 Kilduff, M. 256 Kilham, W. 297 Kilianski, S. E. 75 Kilts, C. 227 Kim, H. 57 Kim, H. J. 250 Kim, H. S. 424, 609 Kim, J. 520 Kim, K. 662 Kim, Y. 361, 640 Kimata, L. G. 361 Kimeldorf, M. B. 410 Kimmel, A. J. 29 Kimmel, P. R. 336 King, B. 173 King, B. T. 252 King, E. 332 King, G. A. 116 King, L. 612 King, L. A. 612 King, S. 473 Kingsley J. 514 Kinnafick, F. E. 518

Kinney, T. 692 Kinoshita, L. 288 Kinsey, A. C. 389 Kiong, L. C. 452 Kircher, J. C. 639 Kirchner, J. 363 Kirk, S. B. 604 Kirkman, B. L. 330 Kirkpatrick, L. A. 376 Kirkpatrick, S. A. 694 Kirsch, A. C. 154 Kirsch, M. P. 692 Kirschner, P. 243 Kirsh, S. J. 375 Kirzner, E. 320 Kitayama, S. 56–7, 76, 112, 147, 228, 258, 407, 471 Kite, M. E. 51 Kivimäki, M. 598 Klapwijk, A. 335 Klatt, T. 634 Klaus, D. 381 Kleber, R. J. 558 Klebold, D. 478 Kleiman, E. M. 229 Klein, J. G. 80 Klein, L. 330 Klein, N. 103 Klein, O. 119 Klein, S. B. 54 Klein, W. M. P. 51, 72 Kleine, R. E. 512 Kleingeld, A. 703 Kleinke, C. 381–3 Kleinke, C. L. 48 Kleinmann, M. 681 Kleit, R. G. 515 Klietz, S. J. 488 Kline, J. 570 Kline, S. L. 393 Klinenberg, E. 353 Klinesmith, J. 472 Klohnen, E. C. 364–5 Kloos, B. 546, 549–50 Kluger, A. 586 Knack, J. M. 370 Knafo, A. 432 Knafo-Noam, A. 420 Knee, C. R. 125 Knegtering, E. 534 Knight, A. J. 534 Knight, G. P. 420 Knight, K. 390 Knobe, J. 103 Knobloch, S. 152 Knowles, E. S. 281, 287 Knowles, M. L. 320 Knox, A. 650, 656 Knox, R. E. 256 Knox, V. J. 423 Knudsen, H. K. 585 Ko, S. J. 94 Kobasa, S. C. 596–7 Kobus, K. 281 Kocan, S. E. 71 Koch, A. J. 171 Koch, S. 129 Koehler, D. 201

Koenig, A. M. 6, 153, 699 Koenig, B. 453 Koestner, R. 51, 369 Kogut, T. 422 Kohn, A. 703 Kohn, P. M. 584 Kohnken, G. 630 Koken, J. A. 207 Kokko, K. 460 Koko 410–11 Kolb, M. R. 325 Kolditz, T. A. 73 Komm, A. 693 Konar, E. 362, 511 Kong, D. T. 336 König, C. J. 678, 681 Konrad, A. M. 687 Koole, S. L. 14, 49 Kopelman, S. 338 Köpetz, C. 505 Kopicki, A. 686 Koposov, R. 486 Koranyi, B. 478 Korchmaros, J. D. 407 Korde, R. 325 Korde, R. M. 326 Korpela, K. 518 Korte, C. 432 Kortenkamp, S. 48 Kosloff, S. 148 Koslowski, S. W. 692 Koslowsky, M. 586 Koss, M. 483 Kossen, C. 566 Kouchaki, M. 261 Kovacs, L. 384 Kovera, M. B. 633, 635–6, 650 Kowalski, G. S. 73 Kowalski, R. M. 72, 389, 430 Kozak, M. N. 97 Kozel, F. 640 Kraft, E. 430 Kraft-Todd, G. T. 101 Krahé, B. 456, 465, 479, 481, 487 Kramer, G. P. 647, 650 Kramer, S. J. 707 Kraus, M. W. 59, 112 Kraus, S. J. 229–30 Krauss, D. A. 628, 648–9 Krauth-Gruber, S. 117 Kravitz, D. A. 320 Kravitz, J. 631 Kray, L. J. 108 Krebs, D. 408 Kressel, L. M. 110 Kreukels, B. P. 211 Kring Herbert, R. 520 Kringelbach, M. L. 95 Krishnan, M. 208 Kristof, A. L. 77 Krizan, Z. 72, 205, 461 Kroeck, K. 696 Kroeper, K. M. 462 Kroon, M. B. R. 328 Kropp, A. 422 Krosnick, J. A. 231 Krueger, J. 107 Krueger, J. I. 142

Krueger, R. F 614 Krug, E. G. 582 Kruger, J. 108, 129 Kruglanski, A. W. 122, 130, 292, 505 Krull, D. S. 45 Krys, K. 101, 130 Kteily, N. 145, 148 Ktsanes, I. 365 Ktsanes, V. 365 Ku, G. 5, 19 Kubany, E. S. 582 Kubota, J. T. 20 Kubzansky, L. D. 590, 598 Kuhn, A. 202 Kuhns, L. 207 Kuijer, R. G. 611 Kujala, M. V. 507 Kukenberger, M. R. 317 Kukucka, J. 123 Kukutai, T. 143 Kulik, J. A. 54, 352 Kulik, L. 569 Kumashiro, M. 374 Kumkale, G. T. 240 Kuncel, N. R. 682 Kunda, Z. 154 Kunimoto, N. 209 Kuntz-Wilson, W. 355 Kupritz, V. 519 Kurdeck, L. A 385 Kurdek, L. A. 353, 372, 384–5, 392 Kuroshima, H. 409 Kurzban, R. 389, 409 Kushner, S. C. 98 Kusserow, T. 315 Kutek, S. M. 548 Kwan, V. S. Y. 105 Kwong, J. Y. Y. 692

L La France, B. H. 382 La Valley, A. G. 374 LaBerge, S. 53 LaBouff, J. 420 Lackenbauer, S. 258 Laczko, L. S. 516 LaFontana, K. M. 365 Lafreniere, K. 584 Laguna, M. 18 Lahey, B. B. 464 Lai, J. M. 317 Laible, D. 419, 436 Laible, D. J. 420 Laird, J. D. 48 Lakdin, R. 413 Lakey, B. 609 Lakin, J. L. 274 Laland, K. N. 274 Lalwani, A. K. 76 Lam, K. C. H. 46 Lam, L. W. 317 Lam, S. K. 317 Lamb, C. S. 127 Lamb, M. E. 633 Lambert, P. 374 Lambert, T. 701 Lamm, C. 412 Lamm, H. 327

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729

NAME INDEX Lammers, J. 32 Lamond, M. 488 Lamont, A. 466 Lamoreaux, M. J. 177 Lampien, J. M. 630–1 Lamy, L. 421 Landau, M. J. 77, 145, 148, 243 Landau, T. 358 Landis, K. R. 350 Lane, J. D. 330 Lane, L. W. 69 Lang, A. R. 470, 486 Lang, B. 180 Langdon, F. J. 504 Langer, E. J. 72, 287, 597 Langhout, R. D. 673 Langlois, J. H. 355, 357–8, 362 Langner, C. A. 78 Langton, S. R. H. 101 LaPiere, R. T. 229–30 Lapsley, D. K. 410 Large, M. 675 Largo, E. 114 Larkin, C. 107 Larkins, S. 551 Larrick, R. P. 471 Larsen, J. T. 112, 119 Larsen, R. J. 358, 370, 612 Larson, J. R. Jr 329 Lasaleta, J. 64 Lassegard, M. A. 73 Lassiter, G. D. 96 Latané, B. 281, 284, 302–4, 321, 352, 354, 419, 425–7, 430–1 Latham, G. P. 335, 702 Latimer, C. 553 Latty-Mann, H. 377 Latu, I. M. 156 Lau, M. Y. 32 Lau, W. 557 Laub, C. E. 144 Laughlin, P. R. 325 Laurenceau, J. 207 Laurin, K. 67 Law, R. W. 387 Lawford, H. 375 Lawrence, A. A. 211 Lawrence, C. 699 Lawrence, E. 384 Lawton, R. J. 318 Layard, R. 613 Lazarus, R. S. 600, 603 Le, B. 373 Lea, J. A. 635 Leach, A. 635 Leach, A. M. 639 Leach, C. W. 120 Lean, E. R. 675 Leaper, C. 152 Leary, M. R. 5, 42, 61, 78, 278, 350, 470–1 Leask, A. 407 LeBel, E. P. 118 Lebel, R. D. 423 Lebiecki, J. E. 682 LeBlane, B. A. 258 Lecouteur, A. 559

730

Lederer, G. 295 Leding, J. K. 631 LeDoux, J. E. 43, 242 Lee, C. 646, 692 Lee, H. K. 56 Lee, J. A. 376 Lee, K. 13, 170 Lee, M. 679–80 Lee, Marlene 405, 439 Lee, P. 329 Lee, R. A 690 Lee, R. T. 584 Lee, S. 291, 338, 430 Lee, S. S. 30 Lee, S. W. 113 Lee, T. 337 Lee, V. K. 145 Lee, W. N. 250 Lee-Chai, A. 119 Legault, L. 179 Legg, J. R. 481 Lehman, D. R. 15, 57, 147 Leib, M. 261 Leichtman, M. D. 633 Leigh, A. 355–6, 687 Leigh, B. C. 65 Leiker, M. 590 Lein, H. 526 Leinbach, M. D. 202 Leippe, M. R. 148, 240, 254, 257 Leising, D. 44 Leiter, M. P. 584 Leitner, J. B. 163 Lemay, E. P. 393 Lemmer, G. 73 Lempert, R. O. 15 Leo, J. L. 145 Leo, R. A. 641 Leo, T. 508 Leonard, K. E. 475 Leonard, W. 213, 458, 570 Leonards, U. 263 Leong, C. H. 175 LePage, A. 472 Lepore, L. 157 Lepore, S. J. 508, 604–5, 608 Lepper, M. R. 50, 703 Lepsinger, R. 693 Lerner, J. S. 75 Lerner, M. J. 114, 436 Lerner, R. M. 359 Leslie, L. M. 686 Lester, L. 551 Leszczynski, J. P. 353 Letourneau, E. J. 488 Leung, A. K. Y. 96 Leung, M. C. M. 436 Levashina, J. 680–1 LeVasseur, M. A. 651 LeVay, S. 391 Leve, C. 287 Levenson, R. W. 386, 604 Levesque, M. J. 389 Levi, A. S. 686, 689 Levin, D. T. 142 Levin, S. 176 Levine, H. M. 609

Levine, J. M. 282–3, 314, 329 Levine, M. 422, 428 Levine, N. 332 Levine, R. 393 Levine, R. A. 165 Levine, R. V. 432 Levine, T. R. 102 Levinson, D. 295 Levinson, M. 678 Levy, A. 339 Levy, D. A. 473 Levy, M. B. 377 Levy, R. B. 20 Levy, S. 166 Levy, S. R. 169, 179–80 Lewandowsky, S. 249 Lewicka, M. 512–13, 516 Lewin, K. 9, 17, 504 Lewis, B. P. 68 Leyens, J. P. 145 L’Herrou, T. 303–4 Li, H. 13 Li, J. B. 461 Li, N. 682 Li, N. P. 117, 335, 368, 370–1 Li, S. 511 Li, Y. 450, 526 Liao, C. 323 Libby, L. K. 5, 55 Lickel, B. 168 Liden, R. C. 321 Lieberman, J. D. 648–9, 651 Lieberman, M. D. 3, 227, 412 Lieberman, M. I. 278 Liew, J. 420 Lifton, R. J. 292 Light, K. C. 602 Likert, R. 226 Lila, M. 422 Lilienfeld, S. O. 98, 683 Lin, L. 377 Lin, L. R. 432 Lin, L. Y. 351 Lin, Y. 78 Lind, E. A. 660 Linde, J. A. 597 Lindeberg, S. 130 Lindell, A. K. 356 Lindell, K. L. 356 Linder, D. E. 68, 257, 366, 379 Lindman, R. 463 Lindsay, R. C. L. 629–30, 635–6 Lindsey, A. 332 Lindsey, S. 224 Lindshield, S. 409 Link, B. G. 161 Linsenmeier, J. A. W. 368, 392 Linz, D. 483 Lipowicz, A. 357 Lipp, O. V. 130 Lippa, R. A. 391 Lipps, G. 176 Lipsey, T. L. 596 Lipsitz, A. 277 Liptak, A. 647 Lishner, D. A. 416, 422 Lišková, S. 534

Little, A. C. 357 Liu, C. H. 356 Liu, D. 675 Liu, H. 330 Liu, J. 13 Liu, J. H. 62, 70, 149, 354 Liu, M. 337 Liu, Y. 393, 460 Livers, A. B. 701 Lobchuk, M. M. 422 Lobel, M. 74 Locke, E. A. 682, 694, 702 Locke, J. 117 Locke, K. 460 Löckenhoff, C. E. 152 Lodge, M. 227 Loeb, E. 127 Loewenstein, G. F. 107 Loftus, E. F. 628, 631–2, 634 Loftus, G. R. 632 Logel, C. 162 Logie, C. 458 Loken, B. 241 Lolliot, S. 173 Lombardi, W. J. 116 London, K. 652 London, S. 14 Long, A. E. 365 Long, E. C. J. 386 Longman, C. 646, 649 Longnecker, C. O. 693 Longo, L. C. 361 Looser, C. E. 422 Lopez, J. A. 698 Lord, C. G. 78 Lorenzetti, L. 458 Lortie-Lussier, M. 284 Losch, M. E. 257 Loschelder, D. D. 336 Losty, M. 208, 210 Lott, A. J. 353 Lott, B. 171 Lott, B. E. 353 Lotz-Schmitt, K. 421 Loughnan, S. 145, 176 Louis, W. R. 175, 181, 559 Loula, F. 96 Lount, R. B. Jr 317, 321 Love, A. 175 Lowe, C. A. 389 Lowe, K. 696 Loy, J. W. 120 Luborsky, L. 610 Lucas, J. A. 689 Lucas, R. E. 387 Lucia, A. D 693 Lüders, M. 430 Luevano, V. X. 95 Lujala, P. 526 Lun, J. 337 Lundberg, K. 227 Luo, S. 364–5 Luria, Z. 152 Lurye, L. E. 202 Lusher, D. 175 Lust, S. A. 227 Luther, C. A. 481

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NAME INDEX Lutz, A. 605 Luus, C. A. E. 636 Lydon, J. E. 373 Lykken, D. T. 364, 615 Lyness, K. S. 699 Lynn, S, J.612 Lynn, M. 287 Lynott, D. 118 Lyons, A. 155–6, 570 Lyons, P. M. 355 Lyubomirsky, S. 605, 612, 615–16

M Ma, D. S. 159 Ma, X. 44 Maass, A. 283–4, 630 McAdams, D. P. 352 McAndrew, F. T. 423 McArthur, L. A. 105 McBain, K. A. 384, 516, 519 McBain-Rigg, K. E. 424 McCabe, M. P. 154 McCall, M. A. 379 McCarry, M. 458 McCarthy, E. 365 McCarty, M. K. 330 McCarty-Gould, C. 583 McCaslin, M. J. 253 McCaul, K. D. 463 McConnell, A. R. 81 MacCoun, R. J. 654 McCowan, W. G. 72, 600 McCoy, S. B. 74 McCrae, R. R. 154 McCrea, S. M. 73 McCullough, M. E. 410 McCullough, W. F. 689 McCurdy, D. W. 286 McDavid, J. W. 282 McDonald, C. D. 512 MacDonald, G. 278 McDonald, L. 418–19 McDonald, M 551 McDonald, S. A. 177 McDonald, S. M. 95 MacDonald, T. K. 630 McDonnell, G. P. 144 McDougall, W. 9 McDowell, N. K. 75 McEachan, R. C. 318 McEachern, A. D. 456 McEleney, A. 108 McElwee, R. O. 114, 117 McEvoy, C. 449 McEwan, A. 611 Macfarlan, S. J. 335 McFarland, S. 659 McFarlane, A. C. 583 MacFarlane, S. 470 McGarty, C. 13, 16, 327 McGeorge, P. 127, 650 McGhee, D. E. 227 McGinley, M. 420, 436 McGrath, C. 590 McGuire, C. V. 51 McGuire, J. 484 McGuire, J. K. 211

McGuire, L. 591 McGuire, W. J. 10, 51, 233, 249 MacInnis, C. C. 174 McIntyre, S. 632 Macionis, J. J. 363 Mackay, A. 657 McKay, J. 170–1 Mackay, N. 422 McKee, A. 694 McKee-Ryan, F. M. 565 McKelvey, T. 641 McKenna, K. Y. A. 277, 430 Mackenzie, C. S. 423 McKeown, S. 175 Mackie, D. 52 Mackie, D. M. 147, 237, 243–4 McKillop, K. J. 604 McKimmie, B. M. 170, 253, 284, 628, 652, 662–3 McKleroy, V. S. 207 McLeish, K. N. 335 McLellan, T. 100 MacLeod, C. 107 MacLeod, D. 707 McManus, M. A. 163 McMillan, D. W. 547–8 McNatt, D. B. 127 MacNeil, S. 380 McNelly, T. L. 685 McNulty, J. K. 393 McNulty, S. E. 110 MacPhail, C. 554 Macpherson, C. 608 McPherson, M. 363 McPherson, S. O. 330 McQuinn, R. D. 372 Macrae, C. N. 101 McVeight, K. 583 McWethy, A. 651 McWhorter, R. 569 Maddux, J. E. 597 Madera, J. M. 171, 173, 680 Madey, S. F. 366 Madon, S. 127, 156, 641 Madsen, E. A. 408 Maeder, E. 648 Maekisalo, H. 463 Maertz, C. P. 685 Magley, V. J. 673 Magnussen, S. 638 Mahler, H. I. M. 352 Maio, G. R. 247, 252 Maister, L. 179 Major, B. 160–2, 362, 689 Mak, A. S. 175 Makhanova, A. 145 Makhijani, M. G. 361 Malahy, L. 143 Malamuth, N. M. 483 Malamuth, N. N. 484 Malarkey, W. 591 Mallandain, I. 377 Mallard, D. 103 Malle, B. F. 103–4, 106 Malone, P. S. 110 Malone, S. A. 16 Malone, T. W. 331

Malouff, J. M. 421, 484 Malpass, R. S. 202, 631, 634 Malsch, A. M. 413 Malti, T. 420 Manago, A. M. 351 Mancke, F. 484 Mandel, D. 511 Mandela, N. 283, 696 Mandeville, K. L. 263 Maner, J. K. 99–100, 145, 356, 462 Manesi, Z. 64, 101 Mania, E. W. 157, 177 Maniaci, M. R. 356 Manier, D. 630 Mann, L. 297, 329, 484 Mann, N. H. 18 Manning, R. 431 Mannix, E. 691 Mansour, J. K. 635 Manstead, A. S. R. 146, 337 Manusov, V. L. 386 Manzo, L. C. 515 Mao, X. 582 Mar, R. A. 94–5 Maraist, C. C. 676 Marcus, C. 518–19 Marcus-Newhall, A. 469 Marder, N. S. 646 Mares, M. L. 435, 482 Mares, S. 557–8 Margolin, G. 372 Margulis, S. T. 380 Marigold, D. C. 7 Marin-Guzman, D. 677 Marini, Z. A. 452 Marino, L. 43 Mark, A. Y. 179 Mark, M. M. 53 Markey, C. H. 176 Markey, P. M. 431 Marks, J. 143 Marks, M. J. 27, 170 Marksteiner, J. 474 Markus, H. R. 42, 56–7, 59, 112, 143, 147, 230, 258, 432 Markwick, A. 593 Marler, L. 101 Marlowe, C. M. 679 Mars, R. B. 3 Marsh, A. A. 97, 101, 421 Marshall, B. 588 Marshall, T. E. 635 Marteau, T. M. 602 Martel, L. D. 392 Martello, M. F. D. 123 Marti, M. W. 655 Martin, B. 320 Martin, C. L. 152, 203 Martin, D. D. 77 Martin, J. 100 Martin, K. D. 145 Martin, L. L. 48 Martin, L. M. 53 Martin, M. M. 461 Martin, N. G. 13 Martin, S. 527 Martin, T. 165

Martin, Trayvon 92, 104, 157–8, 182 Martin-Skurski, M. E. 279 Marx, R. 213 Masci, D. 390 Masgoret, A. M. 180 Maslach, C. 53, 584–5 Mason, M. F. 101 Mason, W. 28 Masser, B. 170, 700 Masser, B. M. 628, 652 Mast, M. S. 156 Masten, A. S. 596, 603 Masters, J. M. 628 Masuda, T. 112 Mathieson, L. C. 481 Mathur, M. 243 Matricardi, G. 420 Matsuno, E. 208, 210, 213 Mattan, B. D. 20 Mattavelli, S. 252 Matteson, A. V. 154 Matthes, J. 154 Matthews, K. A. 64, 587, 589–90 Mattsson, J. 679 Mauer, N. 98 Maurer, R. 678 Mauss, I. B. 616 Mavin, G. H. 116 Maxwell, S. E. 32 May, T. 699 Mayer, D. M. 293 Mayer, F. S. 434 Maynard, M. 532–3 Maynard, O. M. 263 Mazar, N. 261–2 Mazumdar, S. 516 Mazur, A. 463, 508 Mead, G. H. 44 Mead, R. 614 Meade, R. D. 286 Mealey, L. 358 Medaglia, J. D. 7 Medin, D. L. 262 Medvec, V. H. 70, 108–9 Medvin, N. 377 Meeker, F. 381–3 Meeus, W. H. J. 298 Meggs, J. 464 Megías, J. L. 170 Mehl, M. R. 52 Mehta, P. H. 463–4 Meier, B. P. 95, 117, 235 Meiser, T. 154 Meissner, C. A. 102, 127, 144, 631, 639–40, 643, 645 Meister, A. L. 172 Meixner, J. B. 640 Melamed, S. 584 Melchers, K. 681 Meleady, R. 176 Meltzoff, A. N. 101, 274 Melzer, A. 288 Memmolo, A. 406 Memmott, P. 525 Memon, A. 127, 277, 630, 636–8, 650

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731

NAME INDEX Mendel, R. 125 Mendelsohn, G. A. 105, 365, 368 Mendes, W. 161 Mendes, W. B. 168 Mende-Siedlecki, P. 95 Mendonca, P. J. 610 Mendoza, B. G. 20 Mendoza-Denton, R. 59, 78, 175 Menezes, P. R. 20 Menzer, M. M. 450 Menzies, N. 201 Mercier, H. 325 Merckelbach, H. 642 Meriac, J. P. 685 Merikle, P. 245 Merritt, A. C. 167, 262 Merton, R. 126 Mescher, K. 145, 462 Meslec, N. 325 Mesquita, B. 96 Messian, N. 291 Messick, D. M. 374 Messner, M. 238 Messo, J. 631 Meston, C. M. 378 Mesurado, B. 436 Metalsky, G. I. 596 Metherell, L. 556 Metts, S. 380 Meyer, I. H. 213 Meyer, M. L. 3 Meyers, S. A. 379 Meyers-Levy, J. 235 Mezulis, A. H. 71, 114 Mezzacappa, E. S. 53 Michaels, M. K. 632–3 Michalska, K. J. 464 Michelle, C. 154 Mickelson, K. D. 375 Mickes, L. 635 Midlarsky, E. 420 Miguel, E. 470 Miklikowska, M. 454 Mikolajewski, A. J. 420 Mikulincer, M. 375, 597 Miles, E. 176 Milfont, T. L. 531 Milford, L. R. 436 Milgram, S. 10, 30, 273, 275, 293–8, 301, 313, 426, 659 Millard, K. 300 Millard, M. 476 Miller, A. G. 74, 109, 296, 298, 300 Miller, C. 414 Miller, C. F. 202 Miller, C. T. 18, 162 Miller, D. T. 108, 281–2 Miller, G. E. 592 Miller, G. F. 96, 369 Miller, J. A. 290 Miller, J. G. 111, 420 Miller, J. L 685 Miller, K. 366 Miller, K. E. 510 Miller, L. C. 380 Miller, N. 241–2, 434, 469, 474 Miller, N. E. 469

732

Miller, Norman 489 Miller, O. S. 356 Miller, R. S. 353, 372 Miller, S. L. 145, 661 Miller, T. I. 610 Miller, T. Q. 590 Miller, W. R. 610 Millevoi, A. 130 Milligan, M. 516 Millingville, C. 126 Mills, J. 255–6, 375 Mills, M. 144 Milsom, R. 663 Milton, A. C. 231 Minichiello, V. 554 Minkov, M. 55 Mioshi, E. 414 Mirabile, R. R. 231 Mirenberg, M. C. 71 Mirza, R. 370 Misajon, R. 13 Missinne, S. 565 Mita, T. H. 355 Mitchell, A. 458, 570 Mitchell, A. A. 699 Mitchell, G. 167, 229 Mitchell, K. E. 683 Mitchell, K. J. 430 Mitchell, L. 458 Mitchell, T. R. 702 Mitra, A. 702 Miyake, K. 125, 614 Miyamoto, Y. 230 Mladinic, A. 170 Mmari, K. 204 Mobbs, D. 420 Mobius, M. M. 355–6 Moffitt, T. E. 461 Mogan, R. 301 Mohammadi, B. 13 Moise-Titus, J. 479 Mojza, E. J. 413 Molde, H. 154 Moledo, M. D. M. L. 175 Molenberghs, P. 422 Molix, L. 177, 460 Möller, A. 211 Möller, I. 479, 487 Mols, F. 298 Moltisanti, A. 420 Monat, A. 600 Mondschein, E. R. 152 Monin, B. 167 Monis, M. H. 406 Monk, K. 12 Monroe, A. E. 160, 300 Monroe, M. 357, 360, 362 Monson, T. C. 79 Montag, C. 482 Montañés, P. 152 Montano, D. 509 Montaño, D. E. 231–2 Monteith, M. J. 179 Montepare, J. M. 95 Montgomery, D. A. 651 Montoya, E. R. 463 Montoya, R. M. 353, 363

Moody, C. 208 Moon, A. 164 Moon, H. 690 Moon, T. 331 Moore, C. 173, 293 Moore, C. J. 595 Moore, D. A. 431 Moore, J. 518 Moore, K. N. 630 Moore, L. 166 Moore, M. K. 274 Moore, M. M. 381, 384 Moore, P. J. 352 Moore, T. E. 245 Moore, T. H. M. 565 Moos, R. H. 568 Mor, N. 64, 605 Mor, S. 331 Moradi, B. 154 Moran, G. 650 Moran, J. M. 43 Moreland, R. L. 314, 355 Morelli, S. A. 412, 421 Morewedge, C. K. 97, 434 Morgan, C. A. 630 Morgan, M. 482 Morgan, S. J. 166 Morgeson, F. P. 680, 683, 693 Mori, S. C. 58 Morris, E. 663 Morris, J. 52 Morris, J. P. 227 Morris, K. 246 Morris, M. 331 Morris, M. W. 331 Morris, R. 551 Morrison, A. M. 698 Morrison, K. 19, 169 Morrison, M. 647 Morrison, R. 382 Morrison, S. 141 Morrongiello, B. A. 152–3 Morrow, G. D. 377 Morrow, S. L. 202 Morse, B. J. 458 Mortensen, H. 602 Morton, R. 569 Morton-Hoffman, J. 406 Moscatelli, S. 148, 165 Moscoso, S. 676 Moscovici, S. 283–4, 327 Moser, G. 529 Moser, K. 565 Moskalenko, S. 64 Moskowitz, G. B. 284 Moskowitz, J. T. 603 Moss, J. H. 145 Moss-Racusin, C. A. 171–2 Mostofsky, E. 14 Moston, S. 645 Motyl, M. 6 Moulds, M. L. 474 Mount, M. 692 Moustafa Ahmed, S. 337 Mouton, J. 280 Movahedi, S. 659 Moya, M. 169–70

Moyer, A. 176 Moynihan, J. A. 591 Mphuthing, T. 165 Mudar, P. 65 Mueller, J. H. 66 Mueller, J. S. 423 Mügge, D. O. 479–80, 482 Mugny, G. 283 Mulgrew, K. E. 154 Mulilis, J. P. 64 Mullan, B. A. 231 Mullen, B. 281, 326 Mullen, E. 423–4 Muller, D. 475 Mumford, T. V. 693 Mummendey, A. 339 Munafò, M. R. 32, 263 Münte, T. F. 13 Muraven, M. 67, 471 Murdock, M. 610 Murnen, S. K. 154, 364 Muros, J. P. 584 Murphy, K. R. 682, 692–3 Murphy, M. L. 14 Murphy, N. A. 98 Murphy, S. T. 80 Murphy, T. 419 Murphy, T. P. 420 Murphy, V. 430 Murray, D. M. 636 Murray, E. 68 Murray, G. 423 Murray, S. L. 373–4, 384, 387 Murre, J. M. 120 Murstein, B. I. 372 Muscatell, K. A. 61 Musselman, L. 357 Mussweiler, T. 51, 118 Mutz, D. C. 182 Myers, D. G. 327, 612 Myers, E. 226, 512 Myers, G. 529 Myers, T. A. 526 Myles, F. 157 Myles, H. 675 Myles, N. 675 Myllyneva, A. 101 Mynhardt, J. 51

N Na, J. 112 Nabi, R. L. 351 Nacoste, R. W. 688–9 Nadal, K. L. 213 Nadal, R. 5 Nadew, G. T. 584 Nadler, A. 423 Naficy, A. 257 Nagao, D. H. 108 Nail, P. R. 473 Nair, S. 14 Nana, G. 475 Nanda, S. 210 Nannup, R. 216 Napa, C. K. 612 Narchet, F. M. 127, 643, 645 Nardi, P. M. 225

Copyright 2020 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-202

NAME INDEX Narvaes, R. 13, 464 Narvaez, D. 410 Nash, D. 525 Nash, R. A. 642 Nathan, M. 512 Nathan-Tilloy, C. 359 Nauts, S. 172 Nave, C. S. 389 Naveh-Benjamin, M. 163 Neale, M. A. 336, 691 Nederveen Pieterse, A. 332 Neel, R. 179 Neff, L. A. 373 Negri, P. 154 Neil, C. J. 14 Nelson, C. 121 Nelson, G. F. 59 Nelson, R. J. 13, 462 Nelson, T. D. 173, 180 Nemeth, C. 284 Nemeth, C. J. 285 Nemoto, T. 207, 213 Nes, L. S. 597–8 Nesdale, A. R. 175 Nesic, M. 700 Nettle, D. 64 Neuberg, S. L. 130, 145, 173 Neuhaus, I. M. 237 Neumann, R. 275 Newcomb, T. M. 29, 251, 323, 363 Newheiser, A. K. 161 Newman, C. 358 Newman, L. 557 Newman, R. S. 42 Newsom, J. T. 258 Newton, C. J. 418 Newton, D. 544, 573 Newton, E. K. 436 Newton, V. A. 179 Newtson, D. 96, 105 Nezlek, J. B. 18 Ng, K. Y. 436 Nguyen, H. H. D. 164 Nibler, R. 317 Nichols, T. 321 Nicholson Perry, K. 213 Nickerson, C. 614 Nida, S. 430 Nida, S. A. 278, 350 Nie, Y. G. 461 Niedenthal, P. M. 100, 117, 235 Niederhoffer, K. 146 Niedermeier, K. E. 654 Nielsen, M. B. 675 Nier, J. A. 166 Niesta, D. 360 Niesta Kayser, D. 434 Nietert, P. J. 607 Nietzel, M. T. 656 Nieuwland, M. S. 120 Nieva, V. F. 171 Nijstad, B. A. 326 Nilsson, K. 675 Nisbett, R. E. 15, 45, 50, 58, 107, 111–12, 129, 432, 467–8 Niv, S. 463 Nizza, M. 478

Nock, M. 229 Nock, M. K. 229 Noftle, E. E. 60 Nola, M. 420 Nolen-Hoeksema, S. 605 Noll, S. M. 170 Noller, P. 377 Noonan, M. P. 3 Noone, G. 645 Noor, M. 178 Norenzayan, A. 66–7, 112 Norrgren, F. 695 Norris, J. 581–2 North, A. C. 505 North, M. S. 173 Northoff, G. 43 Northouse, P. G. 694 Norton, K. I. 362 Norton, M. I. 166, 168–9, 436, 647 Norwood, M. 232 Nosek, B. A. 32, 167, 227–9, 233 Nosko, A. 375 Novick, L. R. 105 Nowak, A. 303, 354 Nowak, M. A. 409 Nowson, C. A. 595 Nunez, N. 652 Nuttbrock, L. 214 Nuttin, J. M. 71

O Oakes, M. A. 228 Oakley Browne, M. A. 596 Oaten, M. 461, 474 Oates, A. 382 Obama, B. 141, 165 Oberlé, D. 253 O’Brien, B. 125 O’Brien, C. L. 321 O’Brien, L. T. 160 Obrist, P. A. 602 O’Callaghan, J. 72 O’Connor, J. 208, 210 O’Connor, S. C. 352 Odgers, S. 628 O’Doherty, K. 559 O’Driscoll, M. 699–700 Oetzel, J. 337 Offermann, L. R. 317 Ogilvy, D. 238, 241 Ogloff, J. R. P. 652 Ogunfowora, B. 673 Oh, I. 430 Oishi, S. 286 Okamura, H. 414 O’Keeffe, G. S. 52 Okimoto, T. G. 699 Okun, M. A. 420 Olaghere-da-Silva, U. B. 462 Olczak, P. V. 647 O’Leary, K. D. 365, 466 O’Leary-Kelly, A. M. 675 Olivola, C. Y. 95 Olmstead, J. 280 Olson, E. A. 634, 636 Olson, J. 207 Olson, J. M. 108, 249, 251

Olson, K. R. 168 Olson, M. A. 227, 251 Olsson, S. E. 211 Olthof, T. 460 Olweus, D. 453 O’Mara, S. 641 Omarzu, J. 379–80 Omata, K. 511 Ommundsen, Y. 321 Omoto, A. M. 387, 413, 416, 421, 548 O’Neil, C. 677 O’Neill, A. M. 410 Ones, D. S. 684 Ong, D. 367 Ongley, S. F. 420 Operario, D. 207 Orbuch, T. 384 Orehek, E. 609 O’Reilly, M. 568 Orenstein, P. 62 Oreopoulos, P. 167 Ornstein, P. A. 633 Orobio de Castro, B. 473 Orth, U. 60, 62 Ortigue, S. 381 Orvis, K. A. 682 Osborn, A. F. 325 Osborne, D. 149 Osgood, D. W. 474 Oskamp, S. 529 Osman, M. R. 145 Osterman, L. L. 468 Ostrom, T. M. 224 Ostrov, J. M. 473 O’Sullivan, M. 102 Oswald, F. L. 167, 229, 683 Otten, M. 120 Otto, S. 170 Ottoni-Wilhelm, M. 436 Ouyang, J. 300 Ovenden, G. 216 Over, H. 278–9, 429 Overall, N. C. 376, 386–7, 393–4 Owe, E. 147 Owens, J. F. 64 Owoaje, O. K. 510 Oxley, D. R. 251 Oxoby, R. J. 335 Oyserman, D. 18, 30, 55, 113, 286 Ozdemir, A. 508 Ozer, E. J. 596 Özgen, E. 111

P Pabian, S. 461 Pachur, T. 107–8 Packer, D. J. 144, 297–8, 315 Paddock, E. L. 18 Paez, D. 149 Page-Gould, E. 175–6 Pagnoni, G. 279 Palacios, W. R. 466 Palin, M. 195 Pallak, M. S. 249 Pallesen, S. 154 Palma, J. 502

Palmer, D. K. 684 Palmer, J. C. 631 Palmer, M. A. 277 Palmer, S. N. 53 Paluck, E. L. 181 Pancevski, B. 478 Panee, C. D. 470 Pansu, P. 163 Paolacci, G. 28 Pappas, C. 633 Pappas, J. 647 Paradies, Y. 13, 144 Pardo, S. T. 212 Parducci, A. 614 Parizel, P. M. 335 Park, B. 116, 157, 159 Park, D. 112 Park, E. S. 317 Park, H. M. 317 Park, J. 228, 471 Park, L. E. 62 Park, S. 320 Park, S. Q. 413 Parke, R. D. 375 Parker, L. 508 Parker, R. N. 454 Parkin, A. J. 54 Parkinson, D. 459 Parkinson, L. 226 Parks, A. C. 612 Parks, C. 335, 654 Parks, C. D. 332 Parmigiani, S. 410 Parrott, D. J. 65, 474 Parry, K. 166 Parsons, C. A. 166 Parsons, H. M. 675 Parsons, J. T. 207 Partridge, A. 656 Pascalis, O. 202 Paseka, M. 109 Pashler, H. 119 Pastore, M. 154 Patchin, J. W. 430 Patel, S. 291, 458, 570 Paterson, H. M. 632 Paterson, T. 478 Paton, D. 549 Patrick, C. J. 98, 470 Patterson, F. 410–11 Patterson, M. L. 506 Patton, W. 566 Patzer, G. L. 355 Pauker, K. 169, 179 Paul, K. I. 565 Paulhus, D. L. 75 Pauline, G. 419 Pauline, J. S. 419 Paulus, P. B. 325–6, 331, 657 Paun, A. 523–4 Paunesku, D. 17 Pavitt, C. 327 Pavlov, I. P. 251 Pavot, W. 612 Pawlowski, B. 357 Payne, K. 158–9, 227 Pazda, A. D. 360

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733

NAME INDEX Pearse, J. 645 Pearson, C. M. 673 Pearson, E. L. 533 Pearson-Merkowitz, S. 165 Pease, B. 459 Peck, C. 143 Peck, T. C. 179 Pedell, S. 569 Pedersen, A. 107, 165–6, 175, 180, 182, 226, 469 Pedersen, W. C. 469, 474 Peeters, A. 593 Pegalis, L. J. 422 Peir, J. M. 317 Peláez, S. 208 Pelham, B. W. 45, 60, 71 Pelto, P. J. 316 Peltokorpi, V. 330 Pemberton, C. K. P. 202 Peng, K. 58 Penke, L. 350 Pennebaker, J. W. 275, 366, 604–5 Penner, L. 412–13 Penner, L. A. 168, 416, 420 Pennington, C. R. 164 Pennington, N. 653 Penrod, S. 284, 483, 631, 647 Penrod, S. D. 629, 633, 635–6, 651, 653, 660 Pepermans, R. 679 Pepitone, A. 323 Peplau, L. A. 353, 391–2 Pepler, D. 453 Perdue, N. H. 436 Pereira, C. 115 Perez, J. A. 283 Pérez-Brena, N. 58 Perham, N. 520–1 Perillo, J. T. 642 Perilloux, C. 389, 423 Perkins, D. D. 513, 519 Perkins, R. 128 Perkins, S. C. 73, 464, 466 Perlman, A. 320 Perlman, D. 372 Perrin, S. 558 Perrine, W. F. 640 Perry, J. L. 331 Perry, Z. W. 260 Personnaz, B. 284 Peruche, B. M. 159–60 Perugini, M. 252 Peter, J. 277 Peterman, L. M. 458 Peters, L. 48 Peters, M. 361 Peterson, C. 598–9, 615 Peterson, Z. D. 18 Petley, R. 176 Petronio, S. 380 Petrova, P. K. 290 Pettersen, N. 684 Pettigrew, T. F. 146, 165 Petty, R. E. 224–7, 231–5, 239, 241, 243–4, 246, 253, 290, 652 Peytcheva, E. 30 Pezdek, K. 240, 644

734

Pfent, A. 5 Phan, T. 558 Phelan, J. E. 172 Phelps, E. A. 54 Phillips, A. G. 64 Phillips, B. 459 Phillips, C. 581 Phillips, L. H. 630 Phillips, L. T. 59 Phills, C. E. 179 Piacentino, D. 154 Picazo, C. 317 Picek, J. M. 249 Pichon, C. L. 119 Pickel, K. L. 630 Pickering, T. L. 53 Pickersgill, R. 551 Pidgeon, N. F. 526 Pierce, C. 296 Pierce, W. D. 50 Pievani, T. 410 Piferi, R. L. 416 Piff, P. K. 59, 518 Pigott, T. D. 431 Pilati, R. 118 Piliavin, J. 366, 412 Piliavin, J. A. 413, 416 Pillard, R. C. 391 Pillemer, D. B. 54 Pilloff, D. 69, 603 Pillutla, M. M. 680 Pincock, S. 588 Pine, D. S. 242 Pinel, E. C. 365 Pinker, S. 484–5 Pinter, B. 146, 335 Pipe, M. E. 633 Pirlott, A. G. 173 Pirotta, J. 552 Pitesa, M. 680 Pittarello, A. 261 Pittinsky, T. L. 163 Pittman, T. S. 50, 77, 257, 656 Pitts, M. 458, 570 Pizarro, D. A. 13 Plaks, J. E. 11, 119, 143, 321 Plant, E. A. 145, 159–60, 167, 178–9 Plante, C. 481 Platek, S. M. 43 Platz, S. J. 631 Plaut, V. C. 169, 179–80, 691 Pletzer, J. L. 335 Pleydell-Pearce, C. W. 54 Plötner, M. 428–9 Plotnik, J. M. 43–4 Podolski, C. P. 479 Podsiadlowski, A. 55 Poehlman, T. A. 168 Polanin, J. R. 431 Polczak, E. 406–7 Polivy, J. 60, 362 Pollet, T. V. 64, 101 Pollock, B. 436 Pollock, V. E. 474 Pontari, B. A. 77 Poole, B. 629 Poole, D. A. 633

Poortinga, W. 526 Poortinga, Y. H. 584 Pornpitakpan, C. 236 Porter, A. M. 173 Porter, R. 100 Porter, S. 103, 628, 643–4 Portillo, M. C. 175 Portley, R. M. 387 Posavac, E. J. 362 Posavac, H. D. 362 Posavac, S. S. 362 Possick, C. 515 Possley, M. 632 Post, S. G. 413 Postman, L. J. 155 Postmes, T. 32, 318, 324, 328, 698 Potter, M. C. 123 Poulin, M. J. 413 Poulin-Dubois, D. 202 Poulsen, A. 466 Povinelli, D. J. 43 Powell, A. A. 467 Powell, G. N. 172 Powell, T. 456 Powers, S. I. 376 Pozo, B. C. 145 Pozzulo, J. 638, 645 Prasad, S. 96, 464 Prasai, N. 564 Prather, A. A. 14 Prati, F. 148, 165, 176 Pratkanis, A. R. 240, 245, 287, 328 Pratt, M. W. 375 Pratt, T. C. 461 Pratto, F. 119, 148–9, 170, 232, 699 Prebble S. C. 54 Preisler, R. M. 241 Prentice, D. A. 163, 281–2 Prentice-Dunn, S. 323 Presser, H. B. 551 Pressman, S. D. 603, 607 Preston, S. D. 421 Prestwich, A. 318 Pretty, G. 547 Prichard, C. C. 652 Pride, M. 648 Prieler, M. 154 Priester, J. R. 234–5 Primack, B. A. 351 Principe, G. F. 633 Pringle, K. 459 Prinstein, M. J. 229 Prinz, J. J. 117 Prioleau, L. 610 Proctor, N. 557 Prokop, P. 360 Pronin, E. 71–2, 275 Proshansky, H. M. 512 Prot, S. 435, 480 Provencal, A. 283 Provenzano, F. J. 152 Pruetz, J. D. 409 Pruitt, D. G. 335 Pryor, J. B. 119, 160, 180 Pukkala, E. 599 Pulaski, C. A. 657 Pulver, M. 413

Pura, N. 168 Purdie, N. 600 Purdie-Vaughns, V. 177, 691 Purvanova, R. K. 331, 584 Pyszczynski, T. 61, 64, 243, 605 Pythagoras 93 Pyzalski, J. 430

Q Qin, P. 43 Qu, L. 390 Qualter, T. H. 234 Quanty, M. B. 470 Quigley, B. M. 475 Quinlivan, E. 470 Quinn, C. 484 Quinn, D. M. 154, 170 Quinn, J. M. 249 Quinn, P. C. 202 Quintana, F. J. 143 Quirk, R. 430–1 Qunisey, V. L. 463

R Raaijmakers, M. A. 464 Raaijmakers, Q. A. W. 298 Rabe-Hesketh, S. 558 Rabelo, A. L. 118 Rabin, B. S. 592 Radel, R. 114 Rader, M. 684 Radford, A. N. 407 Rae, J. R. 168 Rafferty, J. 212 Rafferty, Y. 283 Rafieian, M. 508 Ragatz, L. L. 484 Rahe, R. H. 584 Raikkonen, K. 64 Raine, A. 463–4 Rains, S. A. 249 Rajecki, D. W. 367 Rajtmajer, S. 323 Ramírez, R. 166 Ramirez-Esparza, N. 30, 58 Ramos, M. 169 Rand, D. G. 11, 409 Randall, A. 527 Randall, D. W. 95 Randall, P. K. 357 Ranson, M. 470 Rapson, R. L. 374, 378, 392 Rashid, M. 112 Rasinski, K. A. 119, 225 Raskin, D. C. 639 Rasmussen, J. L. 367 Ratiiff, K. A. 233 Ratner, K. G. 143 Rattan, A. 16–17, 169, 179–80 Rau, R. 315 Ray, E. 274 Raymark, P. H. 684 Raymond, P. 225 Raymundo, M. M. 236 Raz, M. 292 Read, J. D. 629, 636, 638 Read, S. 376

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NAME INDEX Read, S. J. 256, 303 Real, K. 19 Rebar, A. L. 551 Redmond Roche, M. L. 64 Reed, H. 178 Reeder, G. D. 120, 160, 180, 300, 416 Rees, S. 551 Reeve, P. 569 Reevy, G. 600 Regan, D. T. 256 Regan, P. 353, 372 Regan, P. C. 371, 379 Regev, Y. 602 Rehm, J. 475 Reich, D. A. 274 Reich, M. 586 Reich, T. C. 673 Reicher, S. D. 292, 298–300, 659 Reid, J. E. 640 Reidy, D. E. 462 Reifman, A. 80 Reilly, G. 317 Reilly, R. 707 Reinhard, M. A. 103, 238 Reis, H. T. 32, 355–6, 384 Reisenzein, R. 53 Reisner, S. L. 207 Reiss, D. 43 Reitz, J. G. 167 Remeikis, A. 414 Remland, M. S. 507 Remley, A. 304 Rendell, L. 274 Renfro, C. L. 165 Reno, R. R. 282 Renteln, A. D. 661 Reser, J. 525 Reser, J. P. 524, 534–5 Reuter, M. A. 385 Reyes, Matias 638 Reyna, V. F. 628 Reyniers, D. 437 Reznikova, T. N. 464 Rhatigan, D. L. 374 Rhee, E. 56 Rhee, S. 469 Rheinschmidt, M. L. 59 Rhoades, L. 703 Rhode, D. L. 356 Rhodes, G. 357–8, 361 Rhodes, M. G. 631 Rhodes, N. 233 Rhodewalt, F. 46, 73 Rholes, W. S. 252, 375 Ribout, A. 370 Ric, F. 117 Ricciardelli, L. A. 154 Ricciardo, D. 437 Rice, G. 391 Rice, R. W. 511 Rich, A. 231 Richards, J. 279 Richardson, D. R. 29, 377, 466 Richardson, E. G. 452 Richardson, M. J. 275 Richeson, J. A. 168

Richetin, J. 252 Richman, S. A. 243 Richman, S. B. 51 Richter, L. 122 Richters, J. 119, 213 Riciputi, S. 163 Rickard, N. S. 7 Rickett, E. M. 119 Riddle, K. 482 Rieger, G. 391–2 Riegle-Crumb, C. 173 Riek, B. M. 157, 177 Riela, S. 16 Riemann, R. 98, 251 Riemer, H. 230 Riemer, J. W. 519 Rietzschel, E. F. 326 Rigby, K. 453 Rigdon, S. 640 Riggio, R. E. 696 Riggs, D. W. 216 Rijnbout, J. S. 284 Rim, S. 110 Rimal, R. N. 19 Rinaldi, A. E. M. 20 Rind, B. 287 Rinderu, M. I. 5 Ringelmann, M. 8, 320 Ringelmann, Max 8 Rink, F. 314, 331 Rinker, D. 13 Rips, L. J. 225 Risch, N. 391 Rissel, C. 119 Rissel, C. E. 213 Ristikari, T. 699 Ritov, I. 422 Ritter, J. M. 358 Rizzo, N. 166 Roach, M. 389 Robbins, I. 584 Robbins, J. M. 693 Roberson, Q. 331 Roberts, B. W. 60 Roberts, G. 64, 409 Roberts, K. 288 Roberts, L. R. 52 Roberts, M. H. 607 Roberts, N. A. 101 Roberts, S. 585 Roberts, T. 170 Robertson, B. A. 108 Robertson, H. 611 Robertson, N. R. 572 Robie, C. 681 Robillard, L. M. 174 Robins, R. W. 60, 62, 105 Robinson, B. 213 Robinson, J. P. 225 Robinson, K. H. 214–16 Robinson, P. H. 656 Robinson, S. L. 511 Robjant, K. 558 Robles, N. 407 Robles, T. 591 Rochat, F. 297 Rochberg-Halton, E. 512

Rock, L. 121 Rockenbach, B. 335 Rockloff, M. J. 320 Rød, J. K. 526 Rodgers, C. 202 Rodin, J. 597–8 Rodriguez, R. R. 46 Rodriguez Mosquera, P. M. 337 Rodríguez-Arauz, G. 58 Roeder, S. S. 164 Roesch, S. 419 Roese, N. J. 108, 226 Roesler, U. 315 Roethlisberger, F. J. 675 Rofé, Y. 352 Rogers, M. 434 Rogers, R. W. 323 Rogers, S. L. 96 Roggenbuck, J. W. 512 Roggman, L. A. 357–8 Rohrer, D. 119 Rohrer, J. H. 280 Rokov, T. 414 Roman, P. M. 585 Roman, R. J. 56 Romer, D. 252 Romero, D. M. 275 Romijn, A. R. 617 Ronan, K. R. 488 Ronay, R. 463–4 Ronzone, R. 452 Rood, B. A. 207, 213 Rook, K. S. 374, 608 Rose, A. J. 467 Rose, J. P. 52 Rose, V. G. 652 Rosen, B. 330 Rosen, L. D. 130 Rosenbaum, M. E. 364 Rosenberg, M. J. 18 Rosenberg, S. 120–1 Rosenblat, T. S. 355–6 Rosenblood, L. K. 352 Rosenbloom, T. 320 Rosener, J. B. 699 Rosenfeld, J. P. 640 Rosenman, R. H. 589–90 Rosenthal, A. M. 130, 391 Rosenthal, H. E. S. 231 Rosenthal, L. 166, 169, 173, 179–80 Rosenthal, R. 10, 98, 126–8, 156, 635 Rosette, A. S. 338, 423 Rosh, L. 317 Ross, A. B. 144 Ross, D. F. 629, 633 Ross, E. A. 9 Ross, L. 71, 107, 109, 129, 277 Ross, M. 46, 74 Rosse, J. G. 685 Rosselli, F. 170, 244 Rosser, B. R. S. 213 Rossman, H. K. 210 Roter, D. L. 168 Roth, P. L. 684, 701 Roth, R. M. 474 Rothgerber, H. 162

Roth-Hanania, R. 420 Rothman, A. J. 597 Rothschild, Z. K. 145 Rotte, M. 14 Rouby, D. A. 99–100 Roulin, N. 678, 680–1 Rounsaville, B. J. 226 Routledge, C. 55 Rowatt, W. C. 362 Rowe, P. 706 Roxborough, S. 478 Royzman, E. B. 119 Rozin, P. 100, 119 Ruback, R. B. 511 Rubenowitz, S. 695 Rubin, A. J. 413 Rubin, D. C. 53 Rubin, J. Z. 152 Rubin, M. 144 Rubin, Z. 378–9 Rubini, M. 148, 165 Rubinstein, R. S. 154 Ruble, D. 203 Ruble, D. N. 152, 202–3 Rubonis, A. V. 582 Rucklidge, J. J. 611, 617 Rudman, L. A. 145, 170, 172, 462 Ruffle, B. J. 147 Ruggs, E. N. 173 Rule, N. 98, 117 Rumpel, C. M. 635–6 Rupp, D. E. 685 Rusbult, C. E. 364, 373–4, 387 Rushton, J. P. 419 Russano, M. B. 127, 642–3, 645 Russell, J. A. 96, 376 Russell, L. 581 Russell, M. 65 Russell, S. T. 211 Rüter, K. 51 Rutland, A. 176 Rutledge, T. 707 Rutstein, J. 472 Ruva, C. L. 651 Ryan, A. M 679 Ryan, A. M. 164 Ryan, M. K. 698 Ryan, R. M. 49–50, 517, 703 Rychlowska, M. 100 Rycx, F. 331 Rydell, R. J. 143, 163 Ryder, A. G. 423 Ryff, C. D. 13 Rynes, S. L. 685

S Saad, G. 369 Saarento, S. 431 Sabin, J. A. 168 Sabini, J. 275 Sablonniere, R. 143 Sachau, D. 73 Sachdeva, S. 262 Sacher, J. A. 387 Sachs, J. 613 Sackett, P. R. 171, 682, 684, 701 Sacks, O. 41

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735

NAME INDEX Sadler, M. S. 142 Safer, M. A. 638 Safron, A. 391 Sagar, H. A. 154–5 Sagar, M. 14 Sagarin, B. J. 12, 371 Sage, R. M. 75 Saggers, S. 476 Saginak, K. A. 551 Sagoe, D. 154 Saguy, T. 170, 177, 339, 423 Sahin, M. 484 Sahloul, Z. 583 Saint-Bauzel, R. 289 Saito, M. 582 Saks, M. J. 654–5 Salaman, L. 313 Salas, E. 326 Sales, B. D. 652 Salfati, C. G. 651 Salgado, J. F. 676, 682 Sallet, J. 3 Salomon, E. 143 Salomon, K. 170 Salonen, J. T. 599 Salovey, P. 371, 605 Salvers, M. P. 415 Sammartino, A. 688 Sampson, E. 562 Sampson, E. E. 286 Sanchez, D. 143 Sanchez, D. T. 143, 170, 462, 688 Sanchez, J. I. 693 Sanchez-Burks, J. 179–80, 432 Sanchez-Vives, M. V. 179 Sandal, G. M. 77 Sanders, G. S. 320 Sanderson, C. A. 373 Sandstrom, K. L. 77 Sandstrom, M. J. 429 Sanford, R. N. 295 Sanna, L. J. 171 Sanson, A. 466 Sanson-Fisher, R. W. 226 Santalahti, P. 453 Santos, M. D. 287 Santos Rego, M. A. 175 Santoyo, C. V. 20 Sapir, E. 110 Sapolsky, R. M. 588, 590 Sarason, B. R. 609 Sarason, I. G. 609 Sarason, S. B. 547 Sargent, M. J. 648 Saribay, S. A. 110 Sarkar, U. 597–8 Sarkola, T. 463 Sarnoff, I. 352 Sartori, G. 640 Sasaki, S. J. 168, 423 Sasaki, T. 409 Saucier, D. A. 148, 423 Saults, J. S. 178 Saunders, C. D. 529 Savage, J. 407 Savage, R. A. 130 Savani, K. 112, 230 Savin, H. B. 659

736

Savin-Williams, R. C. 201 Savitsky, K. 70, 76, 108 Sawyer, A. M. 488 Sawyer, P. J. 161 Sawyer, S. 422 Sbarra, D. A. 387, 607 Scannell, L. 512–14, 516 Scarpino, S. V. 617 Schaa, K. L. 168 Schachter, S. 52–3, 278, 352, 378 Schaefer, M. 14 Schaeffer, C. M. 488 Schafer, M. H. 173 Schafer, R. B. 374 Schaie, K. 569 Schaller, M. 145, 147, 302, 353 Schanz, K. 651 Scharmach, M. 103 Schauben, L. 602 Schaufeli, W. B. 584 Scheepers, D. 146 Scheier, M. F. 64–7, 584, 597–9 Schel, A. M. 407 Schellhaas, F. M. 175 Schenk, A. 484 Scher, S. J. 75, 257 Scherer, A. M. 154 Scherr, K. C. 156, 641 Schersching, C. 654 Schiavone, A. 413 Schilling, E. A. 584 Schimel, J. 243, 314 Schimmack, U. 286 Schino, G. 409 Schipper, L. 370 Schippers, M. C. 691 Schira, M. M. 463 Schkade, D. 615 Schlagman, S. 54 Schlenker, B. R. 71, 77, 260 Schmader, T. 162–3 Schmid, L. 167 Schmidt, F. L. 682, 684 Schmidt, L. 366 Schmidt, S. 315 Schminke, M. 693 Schmitt, D. P. 350, 367 Schmitt, M. T. 161 Schmitt, N. 683–4 Schmukle, S. C. 354 Schnall, S. 117, 235 Schneider, B. H. 467 Schneider, D. J. 120 Schneider, D. L. 683 Schneider, I. K. 14, 49 Schneider, M. C. 157 Schneider, S. 366 Schneider, S. G. 607 Schneider, T. J. 678 Schoeny, M. E. 281 Schofield, J. W. 154–5 Schofield, T. P. 178, 474 Schönenberg, M. 473 Schooler, T. Y. 224 Schopler, J. 335 Schopp, R. 628 Schou Andreassen, C. 351 Schrager, S. M. 207

Schroeder, D. A. 412, 416 Schuldt, J. P. 18–19 Schuller, R. A. 628 Schulman, J. 648 Schultz, B. 328 Schultz, C. 515 Schultz, S. E. 512 Schulz, R. 597, 608 Schumacher, J. 459 Schumaker, J. F. 61 Schumann, D. W. 243 Schumann, K. 421 Schuster, C. 336 Schützwohl, A. 370 Schwab, D. P. 702 Schwartz, J. L. K. 227 Schwartz, K. 336 Schwartz, R. L. 484 Schwartz, S. H. 423, 429, 432 Schwartz, S. J. 113 Schwarz, N. 18–19, 30, 107–8, 117, 225, 235, 243–4, 614 Schwarzwald, J. 292 Schwinger, M. 73 Scircle, M. M. 177–8 Scolton, K. L. 375 Scopelliti, M. 504 Scott, A. L. 506 Scott, H. 351 Scott, J. 554 Scullen, S. E. 692 Seabrook, E. M. 7 Sears, D. O. 248–9 Seaton, M. 59 Sechler, E. S. 124 Sechrist, G. B. 436 Seddigh, A. 520 Sedikides, C. 42, 55, 69–70, 76, 303, 605 Sedlak, A. J. 277 Sedlins, M. 143 Sedlmeier, P. 48 Segall, M. H. 584 Seger, C. R. 176 Segerstrom, S. C. 591–2, 597–8 Segrest Purkiss, S. L. 679 Seidman, G. 356 Seih, Y. 78 Seijts, G. H. 335 Seitchik, A. E. 320 Sekaquaptewa, D. 156, 163 Selcuk, E. 94 Seligman, M. E. P. 596–8, 613–14 Selimbegovic, L. 64 Sellers, C. S. 466 Selterman, D. F. 16, 334 Seltzer, R. 648 Selye, H. 587–8 Semin, G. R. 117 Semmelroth, J. 370 Sengupta, N. K. 149, 175 Senholzi, K. B. 227 Senju, A. 101 Sentis, K. P. 42 Serbin, L. A. 202 Sergeant, M. J. T. 456 Seto, M. C. 483 Severance, L. 337

Sexton, M. L. 277 Seyranian, V. 284 Shackelford, T. K. 358, 370 Shaffer, M. A. 692 Shahr, A. 320 Shakespeare, W. 77 Shakya, H. B. 351 Shalvi, S. 261–2 Shamir, B. 696 Shanahan, J. 482 Shandy, D. 286 Shankardass, K. 595 Shankland, R. 434 Shankleman, M. 263 Shanks, D. R. 119 Shann, G. 359 Shapira, I. 584 Shapiro, J. R. 179 Shapiro, P. N. 631 Sharapova, M. 5 Shariff, A. F. 67 Shariff, S. 430 Sharma, G. 474 Sharma, S. 551 Sharmer, S. 551 Shaughnessy, J. J. 15 Shaver, K. G. 115, 121 Shaver, P. 376 Shaver, P. R. 225, 375 Shavitt, S. 76, 249–50 Shaw, A. Z. 291 Shaw, C. M. 382 Shaw, J. 593, 644 Shaw, J. D. 702 Shaw, Julia 643–4 Shaw, M. 608 Sheeran, P. 231, 252 Sheldon, K. M. 460, 615–16 Sheldon, W. 94 Shelton, J. N. 168, 179–80 Shen, H. 288 Shensa, A. 351 Shepela, S. T. 414 Sheppard, B. H. 660 Shepperd, J. A. 71–2 Sherer, M. 423, 452 Sheridan, A. 686 Sherif, M. 9, 164–5, 276–8, 280 Sherman, D. K. 75, 609 Sherman, G. 95, 154 Sherman, J. W. 11, 156 Sherman, M. F. 510 Sherwood, H. 600 Shi, J. 58 Shibley Hyde, J. 205 Shiffrar, M. 96 Shigemura, J. 582 Shih, M. 143, 163 Shine, R. 312 Shipherd, J. C. 213 Shirom, A. 584 Shleicher, D. J. 79 Shnabel, N. 423 Shochet, M. 163 Shoda, Y. 143 Shore, L. M. 692 Shore, T. H. 692 Shrimpton, M. 550

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NAME INDEX Shteynberg, G. 662, 685 Shuck, B. 707 Shutts, K. 202 Sibley, C. G. 59, 149, 175, 376, 531 Sibyll, C. 292 Sidani, J. E. 351 Sidanius, J. 699 Sidebotham, P. 487 Siegman, A. W. 590 Siegrist, M. 526 Siem, B. 421–2 Sieres, B. 699 Sigall, H. 18, 226 Silmalis, L. 414 Silove, D. 558 Silove, D. M. 558 Silverstein, B. 360 Silvester, J. 682 Silvia, P. J. 63–4, 66, 249 Simmering, M. 101 Simmonds, J. G. 551 Simmons, C. H. 114 Simmons, L. W. 361 Simms, A. 321 Simon, A. F. 157 Simon, D. 256 Simon, L. S. 355–6 Simons, D. J. 32 Simons, L. K. 207 Simons, R. F. 517 Simons, R. L. 469, 484 Simonsohn, U. 32, 71 Simpson, A. I. F. 375, 476 Simpson, J. A. 298, 353, 367, 373, 375, 386–7, 392, 394 Simsek, Z. 330 Sin, N. L. 616 Sinclair, L. 154 Sinclair, R. C. 53 Singelis, T. M. 56 Singer, J. 53 Singer, J. E. 597 Singer, M. S. 689 Singer, T. 412 Singh, A. A. 207 Singh, D. 357 Singh, J. P. 647 Sinha, K. 452 Sinnott-Armstrong, W. 410 Sistrunk, F. 282 Situ, Q. M. 461 Siu, A. M. H. 436 Sivasubramaniam, N. 696 Sixsmith, J. 518 Siy, J. 175 Skaff, M. M. 81 Skagerberg, E. M. 636 Skanes, H. E. 245 Skarlicki, D. P. 693 Skattebo, A. 692 Skea, B. 359 Skelton, J. A. 46 Skilling, T. A. 464 Skinner, E. A. 597, 600 Skitka, L. J. 423–4 Skolnik, A. 213 Skoner, D. P. 592 Skowronski, J. J. 119

Slack, A. 475 Slack, J. 452 Slagter, H. A. 605 Slamecka, N. J. 252 Slater, A. 202 Slater, M. 179 Slepian, M. L. 117, 604 Slewa-Younan, S. 424 Sloane, J. L. 174 Slotter, E. B. 461 Slovic, P. 107, 526 Smalarz, L. 143, 634, 636 Smart, D. 466 Smart Richman, L. 5, 278, 350 Smeaton, G. 364 Smidt, K. E. 247 Smith, A. 119, 126, 278, 389, 458, 570 Smith, A. M. A. 213 Smith, C. A. 466 Smith, C. T. 233 Smith, C. V. 18 Smith, D. A. 365 Smith, D. L. 461 Smith, D. M. 413 Smith, E. E. 242 Smith, E. R. 147, 329 Smith, H. J. 165 Smith, I. H. 261 Smith, J. R. 143, 299 Smith, K. B. 13 Smith, L. G. 143 Smith, M. L. 610 Smith, N. G. 208 Smith, N. K. 119 Smith, P. 558 Smith, P. B. 11, 286, 304 Smith, P. K. 429–30, 453 Smith, R. E. 651 Smith, S. G. 518–19 Smith, S. M. 244, 361 Smith, S. S. 29 Smith, T. B. 16 Smith, T. J. 519 Smith, T. W. 73, 590 Smith, V. L. 654 Smith Churchland, P. 410 Smith-Darden, J. 464 Smith-Genthôs, K. R. 274 Smith-Lovin, L. 363 Smith-Spark, L. 141 Smyth, F. L. 167 Smyth, J. M. 604 Snibbe, A. C. 147, 258 Snow, J. N. 511 Snowball, L. 657 Snyder, C. R. 72–3 Snyder, J. 456 Snyder, M. 9, 79–80, 125, 128, 247, 361, 387, 416, 421–2, 548 Sobolewska, M. 165 Sobral, F. 317 Sohrab, S. G. 325 Sokol, B. W. 423 Sokol, M. 584 Sole, E. 617 Sollers, J. I. 14

Solomon, B. C. 373 Solomon, S. 61, 148, 243 Solomon, Z. 583 Somerford, P. J. 551 Sommer, R. 506 Sommer, S. 211 Sommers, S. 109, 649 Sommers, S. R. 166, 168–9, 331, 647–8, 651 Son Hing, L. S. 688 Song, H. 95, 107 Song, R. 278 Sonn, L. 418 Sonn C. C. 547 Sonnentag, S. 413, 584 Sorensen, G. 694 Sorge, G. B. 464 Soryal, A. 253 Sosis, R. 147 Soto, J. A. 101 Soukara, S. 645 Spalding, L. R. 392 Spangenberg, E. R. 245 Sparrow, D. 598 Sparrow, P. 707 Spears, R. 32, 146, 315, 324, 328 Spelke, E. S. 202 Speltri, D. 420 Spence, A. 526 Spence, C. 101 Spencer, B. 145 Spencer, S. J. 42, 147–8, 154, 157, 162–3, 180, 245, 258 Spencer-Rodgers, J. 58, 147 Spiegel, D. 606–7 Spieker, S. J. 456 Spinath, F. M. 98 Spinrad, T. L. 420 Sporer, S. L. 238, 636 Spoth, R. 127 Spradley, J. W. 286 Sprecher, S. 367, 372, 374, 379–80, 385, 393 Springer, S. 434 Spunt, R. P. 3 Squicciarini, A. 323 Squires, N. K. 227 Sritharan, R. 166 Staats, A. W. 251 Staats, C. K. 251 Stabley, M. 141 Stacy, A. W. 65 Stalans, L. J. 656 Stalder, D. 429 Stallworth, L. M. 699 Staneski, R. 381–3 Stanford, M. S. 473 Stankiewicz, J. M. 170 Stansfield, R. B. 421 Stanton, A. L. 604 Stark, C. E. L. 632 Starzyk, K. 253 Starzyk, K. B. 463 Stasser, G. 325, 329, 653–4 Stasson, M. 654 Stasson, M. F. 246 Stathi, S. 5

Staub, E. 413, 434 Stauffer, J. M. 701 Stearne, A. 476 Steblay, N. 651 Steblay, N. K. 635–6 Steblay, N. M. 432, 630 Stecher, M. D. 685 Stedman, R. 512 Steed, L. G. 249 Steel, Z. 558 Steele, C. M. 65, 161–3, 168, 260, 474 Steele, J. S. 436 Steels, B. 16 Steensma, T. D. 211 Stefan, J. 431 Stefan, S. 72 Steffen, S. A. 389 Steffgen, G. 288 Steg, L. 505, 531 Stegge, H. 460 Steidle, A. 63 Steidlmeier, P. 696 Steiner, I. D. 324 Steingruber, G. 109 Steinmann, F. 107 Steinmayr, R. 73 Stenico, C. 428 Stepanova, E. V. 168, 178 Stephan, C. W. 165 Stephan, W. G. 165, 169, 174 Stephens, N. M. 59 Stephenson, D. 16 Stephenson, G. M. 645 Stepper, S. 48–9 Sternberg, R. J. 376–8, 682 Sternglanz, R. W. 130 Stetler, D. A. 463 Stevens, C. K. 77 Stevens, F. G. 169 Stevens, S. T. 127 Steward, J. 602 Stewart, A. J. 533, 584 Stewart, G. L. 680 Stewart, L. H. 93 Stewart, S. A. 77 Stewart, T. L. 156 Stewart-Williams, S. 407, 422 Steyn, R. 51 Stieglitz, K. A. 207 Stiff, C. 67 Stillman, T. F 108 Stinson, D. A. 7, 127 Stocks, E. L. 415–16 Stockwell, T. 474 Stoet, G. 164 Stogdill, R. M. 695 Stokes, D. L. 534 Stokes, F. 475 Stokes, J. P. 380 Stokols, D. 503, 509 Stone, A. A. 591 Stone, J. 260 Stone, J. I. 96 Stone, N. J. 684 Stone, S. 633 Stone, W. F. 295

Copyright 2020 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-202

737

NAME INDEX Stoneham, M. J. 154 Storey, K. 550 Storm, I. 165 Stout, J. G. 163 Strack, F. 48–9, 51, 166, 275 Strahan, E. J. 245 Strandh, M. 675 Strang, E. 18 Strathman, A. J. 243 Straub, R. O. 580 Strauman, T. J. 63 Straus, M. A. 452, 458, 465 Straus, S. G. 682 Strauts, E. 167 Strelan, P. G. 115 Strick, M. 252 Strickhouser, J. E. 114 Strier, F. 648 Strodtbeck, F. L. 653 Stroebe, M. S. 558 Stroebe, W. 9, 32, 245, 326 Stroessner, S. J. 156 Strohmetz, D. B. 287 Strömwall. L. A. 102 Strube, M. J. 318 Strupp, H. H. 610 Struthers, H. 394 Studebaker, C. A. 651 Stukas, A. A. 78, 128, 416, 438 Sturgill, W. 635 Stürmer, S. 421–2 Stutterheim, S. E. 160 Stutzer, A. 614 Subra, B. 475 Suchak, M. 411 Sudman, S. 225 Sue, S. 651 Suh, E. M. 613, 615–6 Suhay, E. 327 Sukel, H. 644 Sukumaran, M. 662 Sulik, M. J. 420 Suliman, S. 525 Sullivan, D. 77, 145 Sullivan, Q. 367 Suls, J. M. 51, 69 Sum, S. 549 Sumich, A. 357 Summerville, A. 108 Sun, C. 483 Sun, C. H. 393 Sun, H. 337, 418 Sunday, S. 466 Sundie, J. M. 369 Sundstrom, E. 511, 520, 702 Sundstrom, E. D. 519 Sundstrom, M. G. 519 Suri, S. 28 Surowiecki, J. 278 Susa, K. J. 144 Sutherland, C. A. M. 117 Sutton, R. 114 Sutton, R. M. 115, 145 Suzuki, T. 147, 258 Svartdal, F. 486 Sverke, M. 676 Svetlova, M. 411, 415

738

Swaab, R. I. 275 Swami, V. 355 Swander, D. V. 280 Swann, W. B. Jr 46, 62, 78–9, 125, 128, 146, 335 Sweldens, S. 251 Swider, B. W. 680 Swift, T. 234 Swim, J. 535 Swim, J. K. 169, 171, 179 Swing, E. L. 13 Sykes, C. 263 Sykora, M. 521 Sylva, D. 391 Syme, S. L. 607 Szarota, P. 101

T Taber, C. S. 227 Tablante, C. B. 147 Tackett, J. L. 98 Tadmor, C. T. 179–80 Taft, R. 8 Tajfel, H. 44, 145–6 Takahashi, N. 112 Takata, T. 57 Takayama, J. 581 Takemoto, T. 64 Takimoto, A. 409 Talaifar, S. 28 Talley, A. E. 177, 460 Tamburrini, N. 277 Tan, H. H. 321 Tan, M. L. 321 Tan, P. L. 114 Tanford, S. 284 Tang, J. H. 380 Tang, S. 50, 703 Tangney, J. P. 42 Tannenbaum, A. S. 695 Tannenbaum, M. B. 243 Tantleff-Dunn, S. 170 Taras, V. 331 Tartaglia, M. C. 465 Tate, K. 533 Tatkow, E. P. 101 Tator, C. H. 465 Täuber, S. 423 Taubman, O. 597 Tavares, C. 452 Taylor, A. 526 Taylor, D. A. 380 Taylor, J. 420 Taylor, J. C. 551 Taylor, L. S. 365 Taylor, P. J. 336 Taylor, R. B. 487 Taylor, S. E. 69, 74–5, 110, 424, 580, 584, 588–9, 598, 600, 606–7, 609–10 Taylor, V. 163 Tayton, S. 458 Te Wildt, B. T. 13 Teddy, L. 514 Tedeschi, J. T. 260, 450 Teeter, S. R. 205 Tekleab, A. G. 317

Tellegen, A. 364 Tenbrunsel, A. E. 261 Tenenbaum, H. R. 152 Teng, Z. 460 Teo, L. S. 476 Tepper, B. J. 705 Terburg, D. 463 Teresa, Mother 420 Terheggen, M. A. 558 Terry, D. J. 253, 628 Terry, G. 483 Tesluk, P. 330 Tesser, A. 124, 250, 605 Tetlock, P. E. 167, 229 Tetrick, L. E. 693 Thai, M. 167, 181 Thaler, C. 211 Thaler, R. H. 13 t’Hart, P. 328 Thau, S. 680 Theall, L. A. 43 Thibaut, J. W. 372–3, 659–60 Thierry, H. 702 Thill, D. L. 633 Thomaes, S. 460 Thomas, D. A. 701 Thomas, E. 546 Thomas, E. F. 13 Thomas, E. L. 177 Thomas, G. 252 Thomas, J. 508 Thomas, K. M. 13, 179–80 Thomas, T. 557 Thompson, C. P. 53 Thompson, D. E. 699 Thompson, I. A. 585 Thompson, J. 170 Thompson, K. 509 Thompson, L. 336 Thompson, L. L. 336–7 Thompson, M. 156, 163 Thompson, M. C. 407 Thompson, S. C. 597 Thompson, William 41, 43, 82 Thomson, J. W. 43 Thomson, R. 236 Thorburn, J. R. 560 Thornhill, R. 358 Thornton, B. 115 Thornton, G. C. 685, 692 Thorpe, N. 141 Thorsteinsson, E. B. 607 Thurmer, J. L. 329–30 Thunberg, M. 99 Tice, D. M. 73, 260, 600 Tiddi, B. 409 Tidwell, N. D. 363 Tiemersma, J. 161 Tierney, K. J. 419 Tierney, N. G. 43 Tieu, T. T. 375 Tiggemann, M. 170 Tighe, E. M. 51 Tilbrook, A. J. 595 Tilker, H. A. 297 Timko, C. 568 Timming, A. R. 680

Timmons-Mitchell, J. 488 Tindale, R. S. 108, 329 Ting-Toomey, S. 337 Tippett L. J. 54 Titus, W. 325, 329 Tjosvold, D. 337 Tobin, A. M. 478 Tobin, S. J. 236 Toch, H. 313 Todd, A. R. 179 Todd, P. M. 96, 175 Todorov, A. 93–5, 168 Toglia, M. P. 629, 633 Tognoli, J. 518 Toker, S. 584 Tollestrup, P. A. 630 Tolstedt, B. E. 380 Tomada, G. 467 Tomasello, M. 50, 412, 429 Tomelleri, S. 151 Tomlin, S. M. 551 Tonge, J. 516 Tonin, M. 167 Tooley, G. 614 Toone, K. 216 Toosi, N. R. 331 Top, T. J. 171 Toplak, M. E. 464 Torkington, A. M. 551 Tormala, Z. L. 231 Tornblom, K. 660 Torney-Purta, J. 450 Toro-Morn, M. 393 Torres, S. J. 595 Tórrez, L. 407 Torsheim, T. 154 Toso, D. 420 Tourangeau, R. 225 Tourish, D. 696 Towles-Schwen, T. 232 Townsend, G. C. 358 Townsend, M. 518 Townsend, S. M. 161 Trafimow, D. 27, 32, 56, 58 Trahan, A. 163 Tranquilli, S. 407 Traupmann, J. 374 Travaglino, G. A. 176 Travers, R. 207 Trawalter, S. 168 Trevett, C. 414 Treviño, L. K. 293 Trewartha, T. 19 Triandis, H. C. 11, 30, 55–6, 286 Trinke, S. 376 Triplett, N. 8–9, 16, 318–19 Tripp, C. 237 Trivers, R. 75 Trivers, R. L. 367, 408 Troll, L. E. 81 Trope, Y. 11, 95–6, 110 Tropp, L. R. 175, 181 Trost, M. R. 258 Trötschel, R. 119, 336 Trouche, E. 325 Trudeau, J. V. 71 Trudeau, L. 127

Copyright 2020 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-202

NAME INDEX Truxillo, D. M. 681 Trzesniewski, K. H. 60 Tsakiris, M. 179 Tsang, E. Y. L. 568 Tsapelas, I. 384 Tschantz, M. 677 Tsukiura, T. 361 Tubb, V. A. 637–8 Tuomiletho, P. 599 Turban, S. 519 Turnbull, D. 548 Turnbull, J. D. 359 Turner, A. I. 595 Turner, Anne 595 Turner, C. 562 Turner, H. A. 430 Turner, J. C. 44, 146, 284 Turner, M. E. 328 Turowetz, J. 300 Turoy-Smith, K. M. 175 Turvey, N. 312, 328 Tuvblad, C. 463 Tuzinski, K. A. 681 Tversky, A. 107 Tweed, R. G. 423 Twenge, J. M. 58–9, 170, 286, 298–9, 470–1 Tyler, T. R. 628, 651, 660 Tynan, R. J. 551 Tyson, E. H. 611 Tyson, M. 231

U Uchida, S. 409 Uchida, Y. 76, 228, 230 Uchino, B. N. 606 Ufkes, E. G. 177 Uggerslev, K. L. 682 Ugle, K. 144 Uhlmann, E. 170 Uhlmann, E. L. 13, 168 Uleman, J. S. 56, 110 Ulrich, R. S. 517, 529 Umberson, D. 350 Unckless, A. L. 79 Underwood, J. 240 Underwood, M. K. 456, 460 Ungar, L. H. 7 Unger, J. B. 113 Unkelbach, C. 159, 178 Unzueta, M. M. 686, 690 Ura, K. 616 Urban, D. M. 328 Uskul, A. K. 30, 279 Uz, I. 316 Uzefovsky, F. 412 Uziel, L. 320 Uzzell, D. 529 Uzzi, B. 275

V Vaillancourt, T. 452, 462 Vaish, A. 119 Vala, J. 115 Valdesolo, P. 300, 470 Valenti, G. 5 Validakis, V. 552

Valkenburg, P. M. 277 Vallacher, R. R. 303 van Amsterdam, J. 154 van Anders, S. M. 205 Van Avermaet, E. 283 van Baaren, R. B. 252, 274 Van Bavel, J. J. 20, 143–4, 177, 422 van Berkhout, E. T. 421, 484 Van Berkum, J. J. A. 120 van Bokhoven, I. 463 van Bommel, M. 437 Van Boven, L. 615 Van Cleemput, K. 430 van de Ven, N. 262 Van de Vliert, E. 434–5 van den Berg, A. E. 505 Van den Bos, K. 660 van den Bos, R. 43 van der Meij, L. 464 van der Stouwe, T. 488 van der Windt, H. J. 534 van der Zee, K. 331 Van Deusen, K. M. 474 Van Dierendonck, D. 332 Van Diest, R. 317 Van Dijk, E. 332, 335 Van Dyke, C. 581 van Dyne, L. 436 Van Eerde, W. 702 van Engen, M. L. 699 van Ginkel, W. P. 329, 332 Van Goozen, S. H. M. 463 van Honk, J. 463 Van Hooff, M. 583 van Hoorn, A. 147 Van Iddekinge, C. H. 684 van Knippenberg, A. 119, 252 van Knippenberg, D. 329, 332, 691 van Koppen, P. J. 660 van Kreveld, D. 328 Van Lange, P. A. M. 5, 64, 101, 332, 335 Van Loo, K. J. 163 van Mierlo, H. 703 van Osch, Y. 357 Van Prooijen, J. W. 660 van Rooy, D. 339 van Straaten, I. 365 van Swol, L. M. 325 Van Vugt, M. 314, 334–5 van Zomeren, M. 339, 423 Vandebosch, H. 430, 461 Vandelanotte, C. 551 Vandello, J. A. 96, 280, 462, 467–8 Vander Hoorn, S. 475 Vanderploeg, R. D. 320 VanderStoep, S. W. 15 Vandervliet, E. M. 335 Vangelisti, A. L. 386 Vanman, E. J. 19, 227 van’t Veer, A. E. 32 Varganova, E. 687 Vargas, P. 156 Vargas-Salfate, S. 149 Varnum, M. E. W. 112 Vartanian, L. R. 19, 173 Vasey, P. 359

Vasey, P. L. 210 Vaughan, G. M. 9 Vaughn, L. S. 358 Vazire, S. 44, 47, 373 Vazsonyi, A. T. 461 Vecchione, M. 18 Veenstra, L. 14, 49 Veenstra, R. 20 Veitch, C. 424 Veniegas, R. C. 392 Vera, C. 288 Verduyn, P. 52 Verette, J. 373 Verlinden, M. 464 Vermunt, R. 660 Verona, E. 470 Verschuere, B. 628 Vetere, F. 569 Vetlesen, A. J. 292 Vevea, J. L. 76, 335 Vezich, I. S. 227 Vezzali, L. 5 Victoroff, J. 292 Vidmar, N. 649 Vignoles, V. L. 516 Villanova, P. 692 Vinokur, A. 327 Vinsel, A. M. 506 Visintin, E. P. 176 Visser, P. S. 119, 231 Visser, R. O. 213 Vital-Durand, F. 358 Vittengl, J. R. 380 Vivekananthan, P. S. 121 Vlassopoulos, M. 167 Vogel, D. L. 386 Vogel, E. A. 52 Vogel, T. 224 Vohs, K. D. 67, 77, 708 Voils, C. I. 179 Vokonas, P. 598 Volk, A. A. 20, 452, 461 Vollhardt, J. R. 413, 434 Vollrath, D. A. 329 von der Pahlen, B. 463 Von Glinow, M. A 698 von Grebmer, K. 564 von Hippel, C. 163 von Hippel, W. 75, 105, 112, 156, 178, 463, 476 Von Lang, J. 292 Vonasch, A. J. 95 Voracek, M. 360 Vorauer, J. D. 168, 423 Vos, T. 593 Vrij, A. 102–3, 628, 640 Vroom, V. H. 694–5, 702

W Waasdorp, T. E. 467 Wade, K. A. 642, 644 Wade, T. J. 382 Wadey, D. 175 Wageman, R. 332 Wagenmakers, E. J. 48 Wagner, D. T. 675 Wagner, D. V. 488

Wakita, J. 453 Waldman, D. A. 701 Waldman, I. D. 464, 469 Waldzus, S. 339 Walker, I. 144, 165–6 Walker, L. 659–60 Walker, R. 600 Wall, H. J. 16 Wall, S. 375 Wallace, D. B. 644 Wallace, D. S. 48 Wallendorf, M. 512 Waller, M. J. 325 Wallis, C. 154 Walsh, D. A. 481 Walsh, R. A. 226 Walster, E. 237, 361, 365–6, 374, 378 Walster, E. H. 355 Walster, G. W. 365–6, 374 Walters, K. 418 Walther, E. 48, 251 Walther, W. A. 213 Walton, G. M. 68, 163, 177, 350 Walzer, M. 301 Wampold, B. E. 372, 610 Wan, F. 288 Wanberg, C. R. 675 Wandersman, A. 546–7 Wang, C. C. 380 Wang, C. S. 5, 19 Wang, H. 112 Wang, J. 337, 367 Wang, L. 58 Wang, M. C. 470 Wang, Q. 54, 57 Wang, W. 179–80 Wang, X. 422 Wang, X. M. 692 Wanke, M. 224 Warburton, W. A. 460, 470 Ward, A. F. 436 Ward, C. 175, 180 Ward, J. K. 318 Ward, L. M. 121, 154 Ware, A. 73 Warmelink, L. 640 Warneken, F. 50, 412 Warr, D. 562 Warren, R. 588 Warren, B. L. 363 Waschbusch, D. A. 473 Waterloo, S. F. 277 Waters, A. 608 Waters, E. 16, 375 Waters, E. A. 72 Wathne, K. 43 Watkins, E. R. 605 Watson, S. 464, 551 Watt, R. J. 101 Watt, S. E. 107 Watts, H. 204 Watts, T. 317 Waugh, W. 436 Wax, E. 393 Way, N. 313 Wayment, H. A. 413

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739

NAME INDEX Wayne, S. J. 321 Waytz, A. 97–8, 145, 708 Wearing, A. 329 Weary, G. 103 Weatherburn, D. 657 Weathered, L. 635, 638 Weaver, A. 585 Weaver, J. R. 146 Webb, A. 208 Weber, E. U. 107, 526 Webster, D. M. 122, 130 Webster, G. D. 18 Webster, J 682 Webster, M. 475 Webster, R. J. 148 Wedekind, C. 409 Weeramanthri, T. S. 551 Wegener, D. T. 32, 233, 236, 244, 652 Wegge, J. 318 Wegner, D. M. 69, 97, 330, 367, 603, 651 Wei, K. Y. 20 Weigelt, O. 48 Weil, R. 251 Wein, R. 686 Weinberg, M. S. 549 Weiner, B. 103–4 Weiner, R. L. 648 Weingarten, E. 119 Weinrich, M. 274 Weinstein, C. S. 503 Weinstein, N. D. 72 Weir, K. 629 Weis, K. 376 Weisbuch, M. 117 Weisel, O. 412 Weisman, O. 412 Weiss, D. S. 596 Weiss, E. 474 Weiss, W. 236, 240 Weitzel, C. 175 Welbourne, T. M. 702 Welch, M. 707 Welch, N. 107 Welch, W. T. 609 Weldon, M. S. 321 Wells, C. 488 Wells, G. L. 226, 235, 629, 634–7 Wells, J. E. 595 Wells, L. 458 Wells, R. 430 Wells, S. 474 Wells, W. 635 Welsh, J. A. 548 Welzel, C. 615 Wendt, H. 317 Wener, R. E. 586 Wenzel, A. 372 Wenzel, M. 339 Wenzlaff, R. M. 603 Werner, C. 352 Werner, C. M. 511 Werner, N. E. 467, 473 Werth, L. 63 Wesselmann, E. D. 180, 471 West, K. 173, 176

740

West, S. G. 130, 421 West, T. V. 129 Westbay, L. 377 Westen, D. 227, 370 Wester, S. R. 386 Weston, M. 652 Wheeler, B. C. 407 Wheeler, L. 51, 278, 361, 614 Whilhelmy, R. A. 281 Whillans, A. V. 413 Whitaker, J. L. 435 Whitaker, M. B. 407 Whitbeck, L. B. 354 Whitchurch, E. R. 70, 366 White, F. 175 White, G. L. 378, 472 White, I. K. 226 White, L. A. 691 White, L. T. 633 White, M. P. 612 Whitehead, H. 274 Whitehouse, H. 335 Whitsett, D. 510 Whittaker, J. O. 286 Whooley, M. A. 598 Whorf, B. L. 110 Wicherts, J. M. 118, 164 Wicke, C. 630 Wicker, A. W. 229 Wicker, B. 100 Wicklund, R. A. 63 Widaman, K. F. 60, 62 Widiger, T. A. 118 Widmeyer, W. N. 120 Wieber, F. 330 Wielgosz, J. 235 Wiemann, S. 684 Wiener, R. L. 628, 652 Wiesbrock, V. 466 Wiesenfeld, B. M. 705 Wiesner, W. H. 684 Wiiliams, S. 234 Wilbur, C. J. 118 Wilde, V. K. 145 Wilder, D. A. 157, 281 Wildschut, T. 55, 335 Wilhelmy, A. 681 Wilk, S. L. 321 Wilke, H. 660 Wilken, B. 230 Wilkinson, D. L. 466 Willadsen-Jensen, E. 143 Willard, G. 71, 151 Willard, J. 127, 156 Willard, N. 429 Willborn, S. L. 628 Willer, R. 243 Williams, A. 173 Williams, D. R. 512 Williams, E. 170 Williams, E. F. 70 Williams, J. H. 673 Williams, K. 321, 471 Williams, K. D. 180, 273, 278, 322, 350, 470–1 Williams, L. E. 117, 119 Williams, M. J. 145, 179

Williams, W. M. 171 Williamson, G. M. 422, 592 Williamson, T. M. 645 Willig, C. 21 Willis, J. 93–4 Willis, S. 569 Willoughby, M. T. 473 Willoughby, T. 478–9 Wills, T. A. 74, 423 Wilmot, M. P. 79 Wilson, A. E. 46, 74 Wilson, E. R. 336 Wilson, K. 13 Wilson, M. 380, 461, 476 Wilson, M. I. 462 Wilson, N. 608 Wilson, S. R. 337 Wilson, T. D. 45, 224, 366 Winch, R. F. 365 Windschitl, P. D. 72, 154 Winefield, A. 675 Winkielman, P. 117, 235 Winquist, J. 64, 605 Winter, L. 201 Wirth, J. H. 180 Wirthwein, L. 73 Wiruchnipawan, F. 179–80 Wiryakusuma, C. 163 Wisco, B. E. 605 Wise, R. A. 638 Wittenbrink, B. 157, 159 Wixted, J. T. 635 Woehr, D. J. 685 Wolf, S. 284, 651 Wolfe, C. T. 157 Wolgemuth, L. 683 Woll, S. B. 377 Wollard, K. 707 Wollman, N. 511 Wolsic, B. 362 Wolsiefer, K. 162 Wong, F. Y. 547 Wong, K. F. E. 692 Wong, Y. 213 Wood, A. 100 Wood, C. 67 Wood, J. V. 74, 127 Wood, W. 152–3, 232–3, 237, 241, 249, 284, 386 Woodard, E. 435, 482 Woods, B. L. 386 Woods, H. C. 351 Woodward, A. 119 Woodworth, G. 657 Woolley, A. W. 315, 318, 331 Word, C. O. 156 Word, L. E. 426 Worobey, H. S. 359–60 Worobey, J. 359–60 Woroniecka-Krzyzanowska, D. 516 Worth, L. T. 243–4 Wright, H. 504 Wright, L. 602 Wright, M. 144 Wright, P. H. 380 Wright, R. A. 366 Wright, S. C. 176

Wrightsman, L. S. 225, 628 Wu, J. 422, 475 Wu, S. J. 13 Wu, X. 319 Wu, Y. 324 Wyer, N. A. 142 Wyer, R. S. 288 Wylie, B. 414 Wyllie, A. 476

X Xiao, N. G. 13 Xiao, Y. J. 144 Xing, C. 101 Xu, A. J. 30 Xu, H. 434 Xu, J. 149 Xu, X. 422 Xu, Y. 286 Xue, C. 583

Y Yablo, P. D. 436 Yaden, D. B. 7 Yahr, J. 202 Yam, K. C. 692 Yama, H. 325 Yamagishi, T. 335 Yamashita, J. 582 Yang, M. 101 Yang, Y. 634 Yantis, S. 232 Yarrow, K. 263 Yasko, J. 608 Ybarra, O. 169, 432 Yee, N. 274 Yeh, M. T. 463 Yeo, S. 628 Yetkili, O. 176 Yetton, P. W. 695 Yeung, A. S. 59 Yeung, O. 586 Yohannes, Y. 564 Yonkers, K. A. 226 Yopyk, D. J. A. 163 Young, I. F. 77 Young, P. 556 Young, R. D. 65 Young, S. 115, 117 Yousafzai, M. 171 Yu, R. 319 Yue, Wang 407 Yuen, C. 483 Yuile, A. 453 Yuille, J. C. 630 Yuki, M. 147, 314 Yule, W. 558 Yzerbyt, V. 251

Z Zaalberg, R. 337 Zaccaro, S. J. 694 Zagatsky, M. 119 Zahn-Waxler, C. 420 Zaikman, Y. 170 Zajonc, R. B. 49, 319–20, 355

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NAME INDEX Zaki, J. 412 Zander, A. 317 Zangmo, T. 616 Zanna, A. S. 258 Zanna, M. P. 224, 232, 245, 257–8, 688 Zanon, M. 421 Zara, C. 459 Zárate, M. A. 165 Zarnoth, P. 655 Zaval, L. 526 Zavalloni, M. 327 Zayas, V. 94 Zebrowitz, L. A. 95 Zebrowitz-McArthur, L. 95

Zeelenberg, M. 262 Zeichner, A. 462 Zeifman, D. 376 Zeiher, A. M. 590 Zeisel, H. 647, 649, 653–4 Zell, E. 74, 114, 205 Zemack-Rugar, Y. 434 Zentall, T. R. 273 Zhang, J. 130, 250 Zhang, J. F. 476 Zhang, J. W. 518 Zhang, L. 612 Zhang, S. 393 Zheng, L. 354 Zheng, M. 393, 463

Zheng, W. 172 Zhong, C. B. 64, 262 Zhong, X. 330 Zhou, G. 13 Zhou, S. 176 Zhou, X. 708 Zhu, D. H. 327 Zhu, R. 235 Zhu, Y. 337 Ziegler, R. 79 Zillmann, D. 152, 378, 472, 474 Zimbardo, P. 30, 315, 352 Zimbardo, P. G. 53, 658–9 Zimmerman, George 92, 104 Zimmerman, S. 654

Zimmermann, A. 176 Zink, C. F. 279 Zogmaister, C. 151, 640 Zornoza, A. 317 Zosuls, K. M. 202, 212 Zuberbühler, K. 407 Zubrick, S. R. 14, 581, 600, 608 Zucker, K. J. 392 Zuckerman, M. 62, 125 Zuckerman, P. 66 Zuo, X. 422 Zuwerink, J. R. 242 Zvibel, M. 292 Zwienenberg, M. 67

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741

SUBJECT INDEX A abilities 103 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Census 552 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people 31, 59, 165, 175, 180, 390, 510, 514, 552, 589, 646, 687 climate change perspectives 525 domestic assaults on women 456 harmful alcohol use 476 prison overrepresentation 657 social and emotional wellbeing 515 standard of health 424 stress and 581 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander perspectives 599–600 absenteeism 692 absolute value 22 abuse 214, 374, 456, 484, 572, 658 academic fraud 32 acceptance 609, 708 accountability 78, 323 accuracy 19, 99, 636, 645 accusatorial interrogations 643–4 action 18, 250–62, 290, 480 affirmative see affirmative action Lewin’s call to 9–10 ‘No research without action, no action without research’ 9 psychological barriers to 527–8 activities 391–2 adaptation 75, 435, 546, 587–9, 614 adaptation-level theory 614 adaptive social value 275 adequate notice 693 admissions 644 adversarial model 660–1 advertising 27 advocacy 546, 562–3, 572 affect 42, 470–1, 526 see also self-esteem affect heuristic 526 affection 372 affective attitudes 530 affective forecasting 45 affiliation 52, 56–8, 100, 274 need for 352 affirmative action 685–90 unforeseen effects of 688–9 Affirmative Action (Equal Employment Opportunity for Women) Act 1986 (Cth) 686 age 22, 168, 173–4, 363, 565, 679 memory variances with 55 aged-care facilities 568–9 ageing, global trends 567

742

ageing populations 568–9 ageism 173, 569 aggression 5, 10, 23, 301, 429, 449–59, 463–5, 469–77, 484 defined 449–50 innateness? 461–5 learned? 465–7 origins 461–9 aggression control 486 aggression replacement training 486 aggressive cues 472–3 agreeableness 118–19, 460, 531 agreement 280, 337 alarm 483, 588 alcohol 65, 474–5, 630 alcohol myopia 474–5 algorithms 677–8 All Right Campaign 611 allies 282, 301 altruism 408, 414–19, 434–5, 437 altruistic 414 altruistic personality 420–1 ambiguity 117, 123–4, 154, 166, 259 ambiguous genitalia 197 ambivalence 169–73, 224 American Psychological Association (APA) 31 amygdala 507 analysis, levels of 546 anchoring effect 657 Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome 196 androgyny 209 anger 95, 99, 456, 558, 590 animal conservation campaigns 533–4 animals abuse of 484 non-human 43–4 reciprocal altruism 408–9 anonymity 67, 323, 428, 430 antagonism 169 anti-discrimination legislation 553, 686 anti-prejudice messages 179 antisocial behaviour 449–89 anxiety 161, 175–6, 453, 583, 611 apathy 224 appeal 628 appearance 168 applicants 679 see also candidates applied research 17 appraisals 595–600 new and improved methods of 693 of performance see performance appraisals apps 678 APS Stress and Wellbeing Survey 600

Arab Spring 300, 304 archival studies 20–1 arithmetic 116–22 aromas 432 arousal 53, 226, 257, 319, 323, 378–9, 391, 412–13, 472, 517, 630 on lying 639 art 113, 360–1 artificial intelligence (AI) 677–8 advances 676 artistic quality 169 assault 458–60, 484 assessment 677 assessment centres 685 assignment, randomly see random assignment association 22–4, 228, 472 associations 587 assumption 12, 58, 119, 226, 336, 426, 566, 646 asylum 515 asylum seekers 554, 558–9 attachment 372, 394–5, 514 hierarchy – global, mid- and specific levels 376 styles 376 attachment styles 375–6 attachment theory 516 attention 42, 95, 430, 474–5, 631 attention problems 583 attention restoration theory (ART) 517 attentional cues 323 attitude embodiment effects 235 attitude scales 225–6 attitude similarity 364 attitude–behaviour link 229–32 in context 230–1 cultural influences on 230 factors 232 attitude-discrepant behaviour 254, 256, 259 attitudes 4–5, 10, 19, 21, 103, 109–10, 175, 224–32, 315, 417, 452, 511, 571, 648 attitude–attraction link 364 changing 252, 262–3 components 530 correspondence of 45 formation 250–2 genetic influences 251 global 208 inherited? 250–1 learned? 251–2 neural activity measures of 227 non-verbal behaviour measures of 226–7 self-report measures of 225–6 sexual attitudes 389 strength 231 study of 224–32 towards climate change 523–4 unpopular 228

attraction 126, 202, 350–93 attitude–attraction link 364 attractiveness 10, 238, 378–9, 392, 421–2 level of 365 attractiveness ratings 366–7 attributes 367, 393 misattribution 379 attribution 92, 103–13, 131, 156–7, 257, 595–6 dilemma 644 of responsibility 422 a two-step process 110 attribution bias 106–10, 473 attribution theories 103–6 Auckland Regional Refugee Mobile Community Clinical Team 560 audience 235, 246–50, 318 resistance 247–9 audience inhibition 429 audience involvement 239 Australian Census 389–90 Australian Census of Women in Leadership 701 Australian Human Rights Commission 141, 699–700 Australian Institute of Family Studies 387 Australian Psychological Society 31 Australian Star of Courage 413 authentic transformational leaders 697 authority 10, 296, 298 autobiographical memories 53–5 which memories are autobiographical? 54 autokinetic effect 276 automatic imitation 273–4 automatic pilot 287 automatic stereotype activation 157 autonomic nervous system 639 autonomous vehicles 98 autonomy 79, 204, 286, 292, 304 availability heuristic 107 aversive racism 166–7 avoidance 69, 375, 609 of race 168 awareness 54, 63–7, 129, 282, 324, 453, 459

B Baby Boomers 58–9, 225, 531 backgrounds 112 backstabbing 456 bail 628 Bali Nine 662 Barbie world 360, 362 base-rate fallacy 107–8 basic research 17 bask in reflected glory (BIRG) 73–4

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SUBJECT INDEX beauty 355–7, 533–4, 679–80 blinded by? 360–1 physical features of 357–8 subjective? 358–9 beauty perceptions 359–60 influences on 360 behaviour 4, 6–7, 10, 21, 42–3, 67, 93, 175, 229–32, 275, 323, 381, 408, 488, 511 antisocial 449–89 determinants 504 expectation links with 128 expected 504 human see human behaviour insidious 675 owning 257 rude 673 standards of 436 sustainable 521–2 unethical 261–2 see also self-presentation behaviour constraint approach 506 behaviour modification 486 behaviour settings 504 behavioural attitudes 530 behavioural descriptors 384 behavioural economics 13 behavioural ethics 261–2 behavioural evidence 96–101 behavioural genetics 11 behavioural neuroendocrinology 204 behaviourism 9 being 196 being good 413 being stigmatised 160–1 belief in a just world 114–15 belief perseverance 123–4 beliefs 4, 6, 12, 21, 42, 67–8, 114– 15, 416, 514, 679 self-serving 71–2 belonging 335, 514, 547 enhanced 177 need to belong 350–2 benefits 314, 329, 372–3, 532, 559 of beauty 362–3 over-benefit and under-benefit 374 benevolent sexism 170 best interests 408 better-than-average effect 69–70 beyondblue 611 bias 19–20, 32, 45–6, 54, 71, 107, 114, 125–6, 129–30, 166–8, 176, 178, 181, 225, 360–1, 473, 628, 631, 633, 637, 646, 654, 657, 677–80 also under specific bias biased lens 151 biased sampling 329 biculturalism 112–13 ‘big five’ factors 460 biocapacity 523 biological disposition 391 biological parents 463 biological sex/variants 196

biology 412 birth parents 461–2 bisexual orientation 389 Black Saturday bushfires 459 blame 292, 602–3 blaming the victim 115–16 bloggers 380 blogs 678 bluff 103 Bobo doll 466 body, the 3, 13–14, 588–9 body mass index (BMI) 593 body posture 49 bogus pipeline/technique 18, 226 bonding 100 bonds 350 bonuses 703–4 boredom 384 bottom line 678 boundaries 56, 181, 547 brain, the 20, 144, 464–5 representation of self in 43 size relative to body size 3 brain functioning 465 brain waves 227 brain-imaging technologies 20, 43 brainstorming 325–6 breaking up 387–8 bribes 703–4 ‘Bring-a-Friend’ condition 297 brooding 605 bucket list areas 517 bullying 20, 173, 429–30, 461, 467, 484, 675 globally 452–3 Bunnings 569 burnout 580, 584–5 bus-in bus-out (BIBO) 550–4 business, social psychology applications 673–710 bystander effect 425–31 online 429–30 research legacy 430–1

C caffeinated drinks 476 calmness 122 candidates see job candidates Cardiac Self-efficacy Scale 597 career development 514 case studies 21 caste system 393 catastrophes 581–4 categorisation 143, 686 catharsis 469–70 cause and effect 64 experiments for 24–9 cause-and-effect relationships 23, 25 Celebrating Success group 560 censorship 69, 487 Census 510 central route to persuasion 233 central traits 120 Centrelink 566 certainty 640 challenge 596

challenge for cause 646 chameleon effect 274 chance 27, 109, 354 change 154–7, 164–74, 225, 545 advocating 562–3 change-of-meaning hypothesis 122 charisma 696 Charities Aid Foundation World Giving Index 417–18 chatbots 678 cheating 261, 642–3 chest reconstruction surgery 212 chief executive officers (CEOs) 688 child abuse 456, 572 child maltreatment 487 childhood obesity 595 childhood violence 454 children detention and 556–7 diffusion of responsibility 428–9 as witnesses 632–3 choice 104, 255–7, 328, 610–11 of person for self-comparison 51 social 78–9 ‘choking’ 68 Christchurch earthquakes 548, 611 Christmas Island detention centres 556 citizen participation 550 civil disobedience 10 Civil Unions Act 2004 390 claims 15–16, 633 classic attribution dilemma 644 classic trait approach 694 climate change 470, 523–7 perception 526 Climate Change Action 523 Climate Institute 526 close relationships 78–9, 350–93 tracking benefits and costs 372–4 closed-mindedness 328, 656 closing the gap 550 closure 122 clothing 203 clubs 475 cocktail party effect 42 codes of conduct 642 codes of ethics 31 codes/coding 31, 630 coercion 127, 197, 643–4 coercive methods 640 cognition 13–14, 42, 472–3 integration of 11 need for 246 see also self-concept cognitive ability testing 682 cognitive attitudes 530 cognitive clarity 352 cognitive control 486 cognitive dissonance 258, 260, 262 ‘classic’ and ‘new look’ theories 253–8 cognitive dissonance theory 253–6 cognitive factors 412–13

cognitive heuristics 106–7 cognitive interpretation 53 cognitive performance 301 cognitive psychology 13 cognitive reappraisal 486 cohesiveness 317 collaboration 13–14, 550 collective action 314 collective effort model 322 collective intelligence 331 collectivism 56, 58, 76, 286, 423–4, 432, 450, 508 collectivist coping 609 collectivist cultures 12 collectivist societies 317 collectivistic orientation 55 collectivistic perspective 337 collision 98 collusion 281 ‘colourblind’ mentality 169 comfort 518 comfort zones 505–9 commitment 373–4, 377, 379, 392, 596 common ground 339 common ingroup identity 177 common sense 7–8, 242, 426, 636 commons dilemma 334 communal relationships 375 communication 14, 155–6, 232–50, 336, 379, 385–7, 534–5 of information 329–30 of romantic intent 381 ‘soft’ 394 technologies 12 communication channels 102, 506 community 200–1, 487, 524, 550–60 mining 550–1 social 674 community, sense of 547–9 community psychology 573 origins 545–50 social psychology applications 545–73 community strengths 550 community-wide surveys 648 commuters 508–9 commuting 586–7 companionship 372 comparison 74, 675 critical 259 of gender gaps 706 of happiness 614–15 ‘upward comparisons’ 614 with others 51, 527 comparison level (CL) 373 comparison level for alternatives (CLalt) 373 compassion 410 compassionate love 379–80 compensation 661 competence 120, 149–50, 652 competition 332–40 competitive orientation 335 competitive worldviews 680 complementarity hypothesis 365

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743

SUBJECT INDEX compliance 272–92, 641–2, 652 techniques 290 compromise 337 computerised averaging studies 358 conative attitudes 530 concentration 520 conceptual variables 18 conceptualisation 17, 61 concussion 464–5 conditions 24, 26, 47, 257 ‘blind to the conditions’ 28 changing 179–80 mimicking real eyewitnesses 638 conduct 642 confederates 29–30, 273, 607, 642 confession 333, 604, 638–45 in courtrooms 643–4 false 641–4 confidence 10, 562 confidence gap 62 confidence levels 636 confinement 640 confirmation 155–6 confirmation biases 122–8 consequences 125–6 confirmatory evidence 123–4 confirmatory hypothesis testing 125 conflict 3, 67, 164–74, 317, 332–40, 385–7, 431, 466, 468 institutionalised conflicts 452 management 394 open 653 reducing the negative effects of 386–7 wanting to be right versus feeling good 12 within groups 56 conflict resolution 338 confluence model of sexual aggression 484 conformity 10, 29, 57, 79, 272–86 classic studies of 276–7 distinguishing types of 279–81 reasons for 278–81 conformity effects 279 conformity studies 301–2 confound 27 confrontation 337 confusion 45 connectedness 417, 518 connection 437–8, 514 conscientiousness 118–19, 460, 680 consciousness 42–3 consensus 654 consensus information 105 consent 31 conservation 534 consistency information 105 consolation 372 conspecifics 319 conspicuous consumption 369 constitutions 214 construct validity 18

744

constructivist approach 676, 678 contact 175–6 optimal conditions for 175 see also eye contact contact cultures 507 contact hypothesis 174–6 true conditions 174 contaminating effects 650 context 550–60, 679 characteristics 119–20 contextual considerations 21 contextual effects 550 contingency leadership models 695 contingent award 695 contingent rewards approach 695 contracts 674 contradiction 29 contrary evidence 124 contributions (to relationship) 374 control 24, 72, 214, 596, 602 self-control 67–8, 177–9, 486 control groups 27 controversy 30–2, 53, 113, 240, 259, 297–8, 632 convenience samples 28 convention 27 conversation 678 conversion 279, 284 convictions 282 cooperation 55, 100, 286, 301, 332–40, 409, 421, 435, 468, 660 coordination 320–1 coping 387, 595, 600–6, 609 with stress 600–9 coping mechanisms 45, 566, 600 core values 547–50 coronary heart disease (CHD) 589–90 corporal punishment 465–6, 487 ‘corrective’ genital surgery 197 correlation 27, 93, 124, 154–5, 464–6 is not causation 22, 24 correlation coefficient 22 correlational research advantages and disadvantages 22–4 experimental research, distinction 24 finding associations 22–4 correspondent inference theory 104–5 cortisol 607 cost–reward model 412–13 costs 329, 372–3, 394, 413, 528, 532 of alcohol misuse 475 of beauty 362–3 of helping or not helping 414 of obesity 593 counterfactual thinking 108–9 country 552 courageous resistance 414 courtroom trials 649–52 courts/courtroom confessions in 643–4 testifying 635–6

courtship 380–4 covariation principle 105 covariation theory 105–6 covert tests 683 credibility 236–7 caution attributing 237 source competence informing 236 source trustworthiness informing 237 criminal justice system 628–9 see also justice criminal trials 655 crises 10, 557–8, 581–4 long-term effects of 582 cross-cultural differences 661 cross-cultural research 12 cross-examination 636 cross-group friendships 175–6 cross-sectional studies 60 crowded spaces 508–9 crowding 509–11 ‘CSI’ effect 651 cues 94, 278, 323, 384, 427, 472–3, 504, 528, 639, 679 cuing 103 culprits 633–5 cultivation 482 cults 633 cultural adaptation 435 cultural conceptions 56–7 cultural context 279 cultural differences 288, 338, 424, 452 implicit measures of 228 cultural diversity 26, 29, 46, 61, 70, 101, 115, 143, 147, 150, 208–10, 228, 230, 249–50, 258, 279, 288, 290, 295, 316–17, 322, 338, 359, 388, 390, 417, 434–5, 483, 510, 561, 563, 567, 571, 585–6, 593–4, 661, 685, 701, 706 cultural effects 432 cultural issues 661 cultural mosaic 690 cultural norms 203 cultural nuances 322 cultural orientation 46 cultural perspectives 12–13, 357 culture 101, 110–13, 200–1, 285–6, 314, 392–3, 423–5, 450–8, 609, 661–2 changing 180–1 cognitive dissonance across 258 four I’s 56 function 11 influence of 13, 393, 659–62 organisational diversity and 690–1 research methods and 29–30 self-concept and 55–9 self-esteem and 76 shaping self-striving/similarity 57–8 culture cycle 56 cultures of honour 96, 467–8

customer service 707 customs 661 cut off reflected failure (CORF) 73–4 Cyberball 278 cyberbullying 429–30, 453 cyberspace 430 cybervetting 678–9 cycle of violence 466

D daily routines 597 dance 338 dark triad 461 Darlington Statement 199 data 678 fabrication 32 public scrutiny of 32 data collection 28 dating problems 381 daylight saving time 675 death 214, 475, 598–9, 607 death penalty 652, 654, 662 debate 10 debriefing 31 deception 29, 75, 102–3, 226, 639, 641, 680–1 decision control 659 decision-making 106, 258, 329, 659–60, 676 cultural issues in 661 decision to help 419–21 economic 13, 708–10 by jury 645–56 justifying difficult 255–6 defence forces 583 defence training 303 defiance 300–1 dehumanisation 144–5 deindividuation 322–4, 430 deliberation 652–6 dynamics of 653–4 demand–withdraw pattern 386 demeanour cues 639 demigender 208 demographic variables 363 demographics 648 dependent variables 26 depenetration 380 depression 161, 213, 453, 459, 568–9, 595–6, 611 depressive explanatory style 596 deprivation 165, 562 descriptive norms 529 descriptive research 20–1 desegregation 174 desensitisation 481–2 deservingness 688 desirability 360, 421–2 desires 18 despair 526 destructive obedience 10 forces 293–7 detachment 609 detention 558–9 children’s views of 557 Development Agenda 521

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SUBJECT INDEX deviance 181 dialecticism/style 58 Diallo, Amadou [case] 157–60 diaries 614 diary accounts 21 ‘prospective’ 46 difference 12–13, 26, 419–20, 450–61, 661 gender differences 12, 687 in legal processes 661 pre-existing 25 in sentencing 661–2 sex differences 699 see also diversity difference of sex development (DSD) 197 diffusion of responsibility 428–9 Digital Australia 478 digital gaming 677 digital realism 299–300 digitally enabled workforce 676 dignity 510 dilemma 297, 332–5, 644 direct communication 337 direct requests 431 disability 196, 558, 679 disadvantage 562–3, 565, 611–12 disagreement 282–3 disaster 458–9, 521, 548 scarring effects 582–4 disclosure 369, 379–80, 604, 678, 681 discomfort 257, 640 discredence 528 discrepancy 63–5, 242 discrimination 6, 62, 81–2, 130, 141– 74, 181–2, 207, 213–16, 276, 304, 458, 559, 570, 581, 647, 679, 687–8 in ageing populations 569 mental health impacts of 213–14 reducing 174–82 state-sanctioned 553–4 disease 475 disgust 99–100, 483 disinhibition 430 dismissed evidence 124 disobedience 301 disorders 362 disparity 614 displaced persons 459 displacement 469 dispositional attitudes 225 dispositional optimism 597–9 dispositions 103–22, 391 disruption 520 dissent 300 dissimilarity 364 dissociation 73 dissonance 260 arousal and reduction of 257 distinctiveness information 105 distortion 154–7, 630, 633 distraction 64, 275, 426, 520–1, 603 distraction–conflict theory 320 distress 214, 372, 380, 386, 412, 415, 556, 581–2, 608, 611 distress-maintaining attributions 386

distributive justice 549 diversity 29, 331–2, 336–8, 608, 685 within organisations see organisational diversity see also cultural diversity; difference divorce 387–8 global rate 388 DNA evidence 629, 641–2 ‘do your best’ goal 318 domestic assaults 456 domestic violence 470, 572 dominance 100 dominance hierarchies 653 dominant response 319–20 ‘Don’t Palm Us Off’ 533 door-in-the-face technique 290–1 dopamine levels 392 ‘double consciousness’ 42 double jeopardy 661 double standards 169–73 double-blind procedures 635, 638 Dove Global Beauty and Confidence report 359 downward social/temporal comparisons 74 drawings 21 dreams 16 drinking habits 476 drive-in drive-out (DIDO) 550–4 drought 525 drug trafficking 450 drug-related harm 475 drugs 72–3 dual-identity categorisations 177 dual-process approach 284 due-process considerations 693 duplicity 290

E eagerness 248 Earth 522 Earth Overshoot Day 522–3 earthquakes 438, 458–9, 581–2, 611, 617 Eastern cultures 609 eating disorders 362 ecological footprints 522–3 ecological systems approach 545–50 economic class 12–13 economic decision-making 13, 708–10 economic reward models 702–3 economics, behavioural 13 economy 674, 693 gig economy 674 world economies 12 education 180, 363, 484, 514, 533, 559, 572, 636 opportunities 487 effects 42, 49–50, 53–4, 68–70, 104–5, 235, 432, 477–84, 630–2, 634, 675, 688–9 see also cause and effect; cause-and-effect relationships

effort 255 egoism 414–19 egoistic 414, 416 egotism 71 elderly people 566–9, 582 see also ageing populations electroencephalographs (EEGs) 47, 227 emails 520 embarrassment 97, 255–6 embodied cognition 13–14 embodied perception 117–18 embodiment effects 117 emergency situations 426–8, 430–2, 557 emoticons 100 emotion highs and lows 65 holding in 604 integration of 11 judging 96 positive 243–4 regulation 486 self-perceptions of 48–9 emotional distress 214 emotional factors 412–13 emotional patterns 16 emotional safety 547 emotional stability 118–19 emotional state effects 630 emotional susceptibility 460 emotional wellbeing 384 emotion-focused coping 603–6 empathic concern 410, 414 empathy 175, 410–12, 416, 420, 430, 484 in animals 410–12 biological? 412 as personality variable 420–1 empathy–altruism hypothesis 414–16, 420 empirical grounding 550 employee engagement 707–8 employees 704 employment 559, 565, 674 opportunities 487 vulnerable 674 see also unemployment employment status 613 empowerment 549–50, 558, 565 see also power ‘empty nest’ 384 encoding (information) 630 encouragement 424 engaged followership 299–300 engagement 313 of employees see employee engagement surveys 707–8 ‘enhanced interrogation’ techniques 641 entertainment 65 entities 313 environment 504 clusters 516 hostile 180–1 persons–environment see interactionist perspective

Environmental and Design Research Association (EDRA) 503 environmental attitude 529–30 environmental cues 505, 528 environmental influences 505–21 environmental issues 504 environmental perception/ cognition 534 environmental psychology 521–2 arenas 503 defined 503–4 nature and origins of 503–4 social psychology applications 503–36 environmentally responsible behaviour 531–3 equality 96, 653, 707 equity 436, 704 remuneration 705–6 equity considerations 704–6 gender and gender differences 705–6 equity theory 374, 704 e-recruitment 676–9 eros 376–7 erotic plasticity 391 error 19, 102, 109–10, 130, 628, 678 escalation 297 escapism 64 ethical dissonance 261–2 ethical issues 29–30, 658–9 ethical judgement 261 ethical practice 10 Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct 31 ethics 10, 62, 261–2, 678 in social psychology 30–2 ethics review bodies 31 ethics values 261–2 ethnic background 679 ethnic cues 679 ethnic groups 631 ethnicity 22, 62 euphoria 614 European colonisation 581 evaluation 60, 171, 225, 675, 678, 692 self 51, 692 two-way 679 evaluation apprehension 326 evaluation apprehension theory 320 evaluative conditioning 251–2 event-contingent self-reports 19 event-related potential (ERP) 14 events 53–4, 123–4 enormity of 419 everyday 612 implementation 689–90 eviction 510 evidence 15–16, 93, 641 false 642 of guilt 641 presentation of 644–5 supporting frustration– aggression hypothesis 469–70 Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) 644 evidence gathering 628

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745

SUBJECT INDEX evolution 353 evolutionary factors 407–10 evolutionary model 371 evolutionary perspectives 11–12 evolutionary psychology 353, 367, 461–2 evolutionary theory 368 exchange relationships 375 excitation transfer 378, 472 exclusion 559 excuse-making 72 executive functioning 464–5, 474–5, 486 exhaustion 588 exile 661 expectancy theory 702 expectation 10, 53, 73, 119, 126, 128, 202, 204, 372–3, 409, 458, 475, 643, 652 behavioural link 128 expected behaviours 314–15 expectedness 104–5 experientialism 421, 615 experimental realism 29 experimental research 24 experiments 10 for cause and effect 24–9 deception in 29 elements 26 for the empathy–altruism hypothesis 415 field see field experiments laboratory see laboratory experiments repeating see replication on stereotype threat 161–2 expert testimony 637–8 expertise 329–30 explanation 300 explanatory styles 595–6 explicit social support 609 exploitation 452, 557 expression, gender 200–1 expressions (facial) 67, 96, 99–100, 130, 226, 634 extended contact effect 176 external validity 28–9 extinction 533–4 extraversion 460 extrinsic motivation 49–50 extroversion 118–19 extroverts 125, 128, 682 eye contact 431, 486, 507 eyes 101 eye-tracking technology 20 eyewitness identifications 638 eyewitness testimony 628–38 improving eyewitness justice 636–8 topics 637

F Facebook 3, 31, 100, 208, 300, 304, 351, 612, 676, 678 gender identity options 205 moral credentials 167 as social comparison venue 50

746

faces averaged 357–8 facial features 93–4 facial feedback 48–9 focus on 99 words/face combination with IAT 227–8 face-to-face interactions 282–3, 520 face-to-face interviews 524 facial composites 633–4 facial electromyography (EMG) 226–7 facilitation 319–20 fact 7 failure 72, 74–5, 597 fairness 179, 660–1, 693, 704 ‘fairy-tale ideals’ 393 faith 67 false confessions 641–4 false evidence 642 false memories 643–4 false-consensus effect 107 familiarity 354–6 familiarity-induced biases 635 family 200–1, 487, 551, 581, 699 dynamics 488 extended 510 Family Proceedings Act 1990 387 family support 609 family violence 457 family wellness 547, 551 famine 563 fatigue 517 favourable outcome 693 favouritism 146–7 fear 61, 97, 99, 278, 352, 375 fear-based appeals 242–3 ‘fear of missing out’ (FoMO) 580 feedback 48–9, 78, 126, 147–8, 260, 636–7, 678, 692 feeling good 244, 413 feelings 4, 7, 18, 43, 67, 376, 410, 414, 421, 470, 480 changing 484–6 female genital mutilation 452 female leadership impediments 699–700 pace of progress 700–1 femaleness 205 feminine ideals 203 field, the 22 field experiments 10, 25, 323–4, 468 field psychologists 439 field theory 504 FIFO and DIDO health workers 553 FIFO sex workers 553–4 fight-or-flight response 588–9 financial crisis 675 findings see research findings first contact 381–2 first impressions 94 first order change 545 ‘firsts’ 54, 519 getting acquainted 363–7 to say ‘I love you’ 370

fit (organisation–person–job) 676, 678 Five Ways to Wellbeing 611 fixation 605 flashbacks 583 flattery 77 flippancy 381 flirting 350, 382–4, 389 typology 383 flood 418 fly-in fly-out (FIFO) 550–4 focal objects 112 focus groups 21, 424, 648 focused distraction 603 ‘foils’ 634 food 392, 590, 614 food deprivation 640, 644 foot-in-the-door technique 289–90 forced displacement 555 forecasting 45 see also prediction foreseeability 257 forewarning 248–9 forgetting/forgetfulness 630–1 forgiveness 300 Forgotten Children, The report 556–7 four-person chain 155–6 fraud 32 free riding 326 freedom 204 freedom of choice 257 friction 385 friend-ratings 47 friendship 175–6, 304, 354 frowning 48–9 frustration–aggression hypothesis 469–70 functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) 14, 43, 61, 100, 227, 279, 360–1, 379, 413, 422, 482, 507 fundamental attribution error 109–12

G gain goals 505 games 23 gamification 677–8 gay orientation 389–91 gaze 101 gender 12–13, 22, 62–3, 168, 196–201, 282–3, 335, 423, 450–9, 584, 705–7 heterosexualised 215 identification, roles and stereotypes 202–4 occupation by 172 stereotypical definitions of 204 gender balance 552 gender binary 204–6 gender constancy 203 gender differences 12, 282–3, 335, 382, 392, 423, 456, 462, 467 in affirmative action 687 gender diversity 206–11

gender dysphoria 212 gender equality strategies 707 gender expression 200–1 gender gaps 707–8 gender identity 196–216, 570 gender inequality 170, 483 gender norms 204 gender pay gaps 700–1, 705 gender roles and stereotypes 202–4 gender similarity hypothesis 205–6 gender socialisation 205 gender spectrum 204–6 gender transitions 211–13 administrative changes posttransition 212–13 hormone treatments 211 surgical options 211–12 too young? 212 gendered differences 386 gendered language 213 gendered selection preferences 367–71 gendered violence 456–8 genderqueer 208–10 gender-stereotyped behaviour 283 gender–testosterone pathway 205 general adaptation syndrome 587–9 General Aggression Model (GAM) 476 general practitioners (GPs) 513 generalisation 201 ‘Generation We’ to ‘Generation Me’ 59 Generation X (Gen X) 58–9, 209, 225, 353–4 Generation Z 225, 532 generational effects 531 generational shifts 58–9 generosity 418 genes 407–8, 463–5 genetic make-up 392 genetics 11–12, 420 behavioural 11 genocide 515 gestures 409 gig economy 674 GLAAD Accelerating Acceptance 2017 Survey 206, 208–9 ‘glass cliff’ 698–9 ‘glass walls’ 698 Global Age Watch Index 566–7 Country Rankings 568 global community 524 Global Concern about Climate Change survey 524–5 Global Early Adolescent Study 204 Global Gender Gap Index 705–6 Global Hunger Index 563–4 Global Leadership and Organisational Behaviour Effectiveness (GLOBE) project 697–8 Global Survey of Corporate Social Responsibility and Sustainability (Nielson) 531–2 global unemployment 674

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SUBJECT INDEX global warming 526 globalisation 12, 693 Gmail 100 goals 12, 55, 77, 317–18, 336, 505, 521, 560–73, 609 too high 73 goals effects 531–2 goal-setting 702–3 God 66–7 Good Samaritan 431 ‘good self’ 76 goodwill 284 Google 31, 677 Google Scholar 16 gossip 456 gradual escalation 297 grandiose 78 Great Australian Mine 552 Great Depression 229, 675 great outdoors 517–18, 530 green consumerism 532–3 greeting (Australian) 101 grief 581 groping 452 gross domestic product (GDP) 502 ‘gross national happiness’ 616 Gross National Happiness (GNH) index 612, 616 group allegiances 286 group attacks 452 group attractiveness effect 357 group cohesiveness 317, 326 group dynamics 335 group membership 304, 689 identity formation and 44 group performance 324–32 group polarisation 326–7 causes 327 group processes 313–40 group size 281 ‘group stuff’ 331 groups 3, 27, 74 affiliation 56–8 conflict within 56 cooperation/competition within and between 332–40 defined 313–14 disobedience in 301 diversity 331–2 dual-identity categorisations 177 effectiveness 332 ethnic 631 features 314–17 fundamentals 313–18 goals and plans 317–18 individuals in 318–24 influences of 9 intergroup contact 175 losses and gains in 324–5 minority 698–701 norms 315–16 racial composition of 649 reasons for joining 314 roles 314–15 sociology’s group-level focus 6

groupthink 327–8 preventing 328 guided instructions 486 guilt 127, 179, 641–3 guilty pleas 628 gun-related violence 452

H Halloween 323–4 handicapping, of oneself 72–3 ‘happily stupid’ 244 happiness 95, 99, 130, 379, 394, 419, 434–5, 584, 613–15 emerging science on increasing 615–16 key predictors of 613 predicted versus actual 46 pursuit of 612–17 happy face advantage 130 harassment 298, 570 sexual 675 hardiness 596–7 hard-to-get effect 366–7 harm 214, 287, 452–3, 475, 573 harmony 55 Harrisburg Seven 647–8 hate 180–1 Hawthorne effect 675 Hawthorne experiment 503 health 214, 384, 559, 608, 613 improving health in ageing populations 568–9 social connection with illness 617 social psychology applications 580–617 health benefits 416–17, 607–8 health care access 213 culturally sensitive 213 health implications 74 health psychology 580 health warnings 223, 263 health workers 553 hearsay 651 heart 588–90 heart rate, increased 639 heat 470–1 hedonic adaptation 614, 616 hedonic goals 505 height 363 helpfulness individual differences in 419–20 predictors 420 help/helping 416, 423–5, 685–6 in a crowd 431 friends and similar others 422–3 gender and 423 global attitudes towards 417 moods and 432–5 providing and deciding how to 428–9 reasons and limitations 433 helping behaviour 408 helping others 406–39

decision to help 419–21 interpersonal influences 421–5 situational influences 425–39 too broke, hot and unhappy to help 434–5 willingness 518 help-seeking 423–5, 582 heredity 103 heritability 463 heterogeneity 286 heteronormative perspective 202 heterosexual orientation 389, 391 heuristics 106–7, 234, 526 high-empathy condition 415 higher-order cognition 473 holdovers 376 Holocaust 292, 605 homelessness 510 homes 518–19 homicide 450–1, 454–5, 484–5 global victim distribution 455 male perpetrators 454–5 homosexual orientation 391 homosexuality 214 honesty 32 honesty–humility 680 honeymoon 384–5 honour 467–8 honour-based violence 468 hope 598–9, 610 hopelessness 599 hormones 212, 463–5, 591–2, 607 hormone treatments 211 hospitalisation 475 hostile attribution bias 473 hostile sexism 170 hostility 180–1, 473, 590 House of Representatives Standing Committee on rural Australia, The 551 household income 614 housing 509, 559 global crisis in 510 human attraction 353 human behaviour 10, 12, 283, 675 environmental influences on 505–21 social psychology’s perspective on 5–6 units 96 human bias 355 human diversity 549 human footprint 522–3 human nature 304 social nature 3–5, 14 human resources 678 preferences? 679 human rights 200 humanitarian emergencies 557 humour 353, 411, 675 funniness ratings 48 hunger 560–4, 595 global 563–4 Hurricane Hugo 459 hyperactivity 465–6 hypotheses 16–17 facial feedback 48

quantifiable 15 also under specific hypothesis

I ‘I am …’ 41, 57–8 Ice Bucket Challenge 437 ideals 203, 393 ideas 56, 511 developing and refining 16–20 from previous research 16 testing see research designs ideation 393 identity 56, 177, 208–10, 323, 339, 514, 570, 581, 599–600 gender 196–216 identity formation and group membership 44 personal 674 identity leadership 659 ideology 528 ikigai 590 illness 591–3, 598, 617 stress and 592 illumination 675 illusion 72, 74–5 illusory correlation 154–5 images 62, 108, 154 imagined contact 176 imitation 273–4, 466 immediacy 302 immigrants 569, 584 immune system 590–2 immunity 641 impact bias 45–6 impartiality 646, 650, 660–1 impellance 476–7 implementation, of policy 689–90 Implicit Association Test (IAT) 167–8, 227–8 implicit attitudes 227 implicit egotism 71 implicit personality theory 120, 692 implicit race-based bias 167–8 implicit social support 424, 609 impression formation 116 impression management 262, 680–1 impression-management theory 259–60 impressions 79, 94, 98, 116–29, 226 ‘improperly obtained admission’ 644 impulsivity 460 inaccuracy 630 inadmissible information 651–2 Inala 514 incarceration 581 incentives 49, 707 inclusion 699 path towards 214–15 inclusivity 180 income 614 indebtedness 287–8 independence 12, 57, 228, 285–6 financial 708 independent variables 26

Copyright 2020 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-202

747

SUBJECT INDEX indifference 224 Indigenous Hip Hop Projects 611–12 Indigenous populations 475–6 indirect aggression 456 indirect clues 93 indirect reciprocity 409 individual differences 419–20, 450–61, 483–4 individualisation 488 individualised consideration 696 individualism 55–6, 76, 286, 393, 432, 450 individualistic advertising 250 individualistic orientation 55 individualistic perspective 337 individuals 56, 65, 96 defined 4 in groups 318–24 social psychology’s focus 6 thinking, feeling and behaviour 4, 7 wellness 547, 551 individuation 512 industrial/organisational (I/O) psychology 675 inequality 180–1, 483, 560–6 in ageing populations 569 inequity 685 infants, self-recognition emergence 44 infection 591 inference 3, 46–7, 103, 120–1, 123, 677 infidelity 370–1 inflation 54, 65, 75, 636, 639 influence(s) 181–2, 548, 694 of culture 13, 393, 659–62 environmental see environmental influences of expectation 10 group influences 9 on judgement 656 masters of 287 of new technology 15 non-evidentiary 650–2 of other people 51–3 situational see situational influences social see social influence on sport 8 also under specific influence information 329–30 encoding, storage and retrieval of 630 inadmissible 651–2 online 676 prior 95 information integration theory 116 information processing 329–30 information sharing 329–30 informational influence 278, 654 information-gathering model 645 information-processing biases 329 informed consent 31 ingratiation 77 ingroup favouritism 146–7

748

ingroups 177 advantage 99 versus outgroups 144 inhibition 69, 178, 340, 476–7 initial attraction 352–71 injury 475, 526, 591, 675 innate preferences 358 inner self 76 Innocence Project 641 innuendo effect 119 inoculation hypothesis 250–1 inquisitorial model 660–1 insecure–anxious attachment style 375–6 insecure–avoidant attachment style 375–6 insecurity 127, 375 insensitivity 80 inspirational motivation 696 instant messaging (IM) 520 instigation 476–7 instincts 181 Institute for Sex Research 389 institutional norms 6 institutionalisation 452 institutions 56 instruction 486 instrumental aggression 449 insufficient justification 254 insula 100 integration 11, 116–22, 548, 631 integrative agreement 336 integrity 29, 32, 260 integrity tests 683–4 intellectual stimulation 696 intelligence 677 level of 363 intelligence tests 682 interactionist perspective 9 interactions 2–3, 56, 79, 168–9, 287, 303, 351, 356, 386, 506, 512, 520 persons–environment 9 interdependence 55, 57, 228, 286, 372, 387, 546 hard 59 interdisciplinary approaches 6, 13 intergroup conflict 164–5 intergroup contact 174–6 value of 175 intergroup dominance 148–9 intergroup friendship 175–6 intergroup relations, fundamental processes of 142–50 internal validity 27–8 internalisation 641–2 internally displaced people (IDPs) 554 International Day Against Homophobia, Transphobia, and Biphobia (IDAHOB) 214 International Labour Organization (ILO) 564–5, 674 international perspectives 11 International Rescue Committee 558 internationalisation 14

internet 16, 277, 678 interpersonal distance 506, 508 interpersonal influences 421–5 interpretation 53, 426–8 interracial interactions 168–9 interrater reliability 19 interrogations 127, 630, 638, 643–4 police 640–1 steps 640 intersex 196–202 intersex people 197–200 intersexuality 196 intervention 426, 484, 486, 560, 605 for stereotype threat reduction 163 interviewers 684–5 interviews 21, 77, 147, 292, 524, 640, 643, 675, 677, 679 ‘faking’ 680 police interviews 645 process 679–82 scientific’ alternatives to traditional 682–5 structured 684–5 suspect interviews 638–40 technology and 682 traditional 682–5 intimacy 375, 377, 507 intimate marketplace 372–4 intimate relationships 372, 380, 506 intimate zones 506 intrinsic motivation 49–51, 703–4 introspection 44–6 reliability of 45–6 introverts 125, 128, 682 intrusive bad thoughts 583 intuition 366, 647 invasion (personal space) 507–8 investigation 638 investment 373 ironic processes 69 irony/ironic effects 68–9 isolation 2, 314, 552–3, 607, 640, 644

J jail 628 jealousy 12, 369–70, 375, 468 jigsaw classroom 175 job candidates 677 attractiveness of 679–80 job interviews see interviews 675 job markets 675 Job Network 566 job performance 317 job satisfaction 706–7 job searches 676–9 Johnson v. Louisiana (1972) 655 Journal of Environmental Psychology and Environment and Behavior 503 judgement 14, 93, 95, 106, 117, 129, 634–5, 639 ‘blind spots’ in 261 incorrect 277, 279, 284

influences on 656 snap 128 judges 652 juries competence 649–50 deliberations 652–6 hung 653 leadership 653 less-than-unanimous verdicts 655–6 non-evidentiary influences 650–2 orientation period 653 size of 654–5 jury decision-making 645–56 race and 648–9 world perspectives 648 Jury Directions and Other Acts Amendment Act 2017 (Vic) 652 jury selection 646–9 intuitive approach to 647 scientific 647–8 jury trials, stages 646–9 ‘just deserts’ motive 656 just world 114–15 justice 660–2, 688 improving 636–8 miscarriage of 638, 663 perceptions of 659–62 justice as a matter of procedure 659–61 justification 254–8, 262, 287 juveniles 488

K ‘Karlaa’ 553 kin 552 kin selection 407 kindness 287, 361, 371, 410 ‘kindred spirits’ 365 ‘knacks’ 677 ‘know thyself’ 47 knowledge 175, 514 of self see self-knowledge who knows what 330

L ‘lab rats’ 31 labels/labelling 197, 202 laboratory experiments 10, 25, 468 laissez-faire leaders 695 lands 581 spiritual and cultural relationships with 514, 581, 600 language 30, 213, 275, 581, 584 second 639 silent 98 laughter 411 law 661–2 legal recognition of intersex people 197–200 social psychology applications 628–63 law of ‘diminishing returns’ 281 ‘lawful sexual activity’ 554 laypeople 639

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SUBJECT INDEX leadership 114, 675, 694–701 among women and minorities 698–701 characteristics 694 contingency models of 695 female 699–701 impediments 699–701 jury room 653 sex differences in 699 transactional 695 transformational 696–8 learned helplessness 596 Learned Optimism 597 learning 8, 175 legal system 628 social psychologists’ role in 662–3 legislation anti-discrimination 553, 686 combating hate, inequality and hostility 180–1 governing sentencing 656–7 regarding cigarette packaging 223 of same-sex marriage 390 leniency 641–2 leniency bias 654 lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans, and/ or intersex (LGBTI) people 197, 206, 213, 353, 458, 569–70 rights 214 lesbian orientation 389–91 lie detection 103, 638–40 lies 75 life satisfaction 161 lifespace 504 lighting 675 likeability 237–8 physical attractiveness informing 238 similarity informing 237–8 Likert Scale 226 liking 356, 378–9 limited behaviour 528 limited cognition 527 Lindt Chocolate Café 406 line judgement task 277 line-up familiarity 635 line-ups administration 635 construction and instructions 634 formats 634–5 linguistic mimicry 275 LinkedIn 676 lists 63 lived experience 21, 205 living standards 582 lobtail feeding 273–4 location 432 longevity 384, 597, 607, 610 longitudinal studies 384, 435, 465–6 Longitudinal Study of Australian Children 465–6 long-term happiness, factors affecting 612–13

‘looking-glass self’ 51 love 372, 392, 612 colours of 376–7 companionate versus passionate 378–80 cost of finding 349, 394 erosion of 372 expressions of 369 prototypical features of 377 scoping the potential 381 types of 376–92 Love Attitudes Scale 377 loving, liking and 378 low situational control 695 lowballing 290 low-empathy condition 415–16 loyalty 379 ludus 376–7 lust 380 lying 18 lymphocytes 590–1

M Machiavellianism 461, 680 machine 98 machismo 467 macrosystem 546 magnetoencephalography (MEG) 14 major life events 583–4 majority influence 281–3 majority rules 654 maladaptation 75 maleness 205 maltreatment 705 mana 70 management by exception leaders 695 mandatory detention centres 556 mandatory sentencing 656–7 mania 377 manipulation 6, 18, 24, 26–7, 433, 461, 463 ManpowerGroup 674 Māori culture 70, 514 Māori people 476, 561–2, 589 marginalisation 562 marital trajectory 384–5 marketing 611 marketplaces 372–4 markets, job 675 marriage 174, 368, 388, 390, 392–3, 571 feelings, behaviours and doubts about 374 inter-caste 393 Marriage Amendment Bill 174 masculine ideals 203 masculinity 459 mass media 482, 650 matching hypothesis 365 mate preferences 368, 371, 392–3 mate selection 353 material hardship 560 materialism 615 materials 32 Matilda 684–5

meaning 12, 21, 30, 514 measurement/measures archival 20–1 of attitudes 225–9, 389 ‘lies’ versus arousal 639 measuring effects of media violence 479–81 of sexual attitudes/behaviour 389 social support 608–9 of variables 18–20 Mechanical Turk 28 media 27, 200–1, 359, 435, 527, 549, 650 self-censorship 487 see also social media media coverage 418 media effects 477–84 media violence 477–9, 481–2 measuring effects of 479–81 medication 486 meditation 605–6 megacities 502, 535–6 memory 19, 97, 329–30, 514, 643–4 autobiographical 53–5 base for see synaptic connections distortion of 630, 633 ‘flashbulb memories’ 54 self-inflation in 54 storing 631–3 true and false 632 visual lens of 55 memory slippage 631 memory systems 330 Men’s Sheds 548 mental capacities 97 mental control 69 mental disorder 583 mental health 526–7, 613 mental illness 617 mental processes 7 ironic 68–9 mental representations 514–15 mere exposure effect 355 mere presence theory 320 merit 328, 689–90 meritocracy 688 messages 239 anti-prejudice messages 179 coding 277 discrepancy 242 divergent 152 fear-based appeals 242–3 length and order 241 positive emotions 243–4 subliminal 244–6 meta-analysis 229, 456 combining results across studies 29 meta-stereotypes 168 methodology 15–17 microaggression 166 Microstressors 584–7 microsystem 546 migrants 559

Millennials 206, 208–9, 225, 532 Millennium Development Goals 521 mimicry 274, 638 see also imitation mind 98 mind perception, dimensions 96–7 mindfulness 486 mindlessness 287 mining sector 552 minority groups 165, 177, 655 impediments to leadership for 701 leadership among 698–701 minority influence 283–4 processes and outcomes 284–5 minority status 62–3 mirror tests 43–4 mirrors 64 misconceptions 281, 649 misinformation 633, 643–4 misinformation effect 631–2 mistaken identity 634 mixed evidence 123–4 mock juries 648 models/modelling 47, 413, 435, 645, 660–1, 677–8, 695, 702–3 also under specific model modern racism 166–7 money 64, 279, 612–15 monitoring 79 computer use 675 of self see self-monitoring mood 4, 26–7, 29, 49, 117, 301, 432–5, 605 bad moods and doing good 434 good moods and doing good 432–3 manipulation of 26 posture and 49 mood contagion 275 mood manipulation 433 moral character 120–1 Moral Character Questionnaire 120–2 moral compass 406 moral credentials 167 moral justification 641 moral licensing 262 moral reasoning 420, 484, 486 moral values 31–2 morale 690, 695 morality 62, 97 moral issues 13 morbid jealousy 370 Mosaicism 204 Moscovici’s theory 283–4 motivated conditions 245–6 motivating factors 164 motivation 49–51, 60, 106, 180, 367, 416–17, 484, 584, 675, 695, 703–4 for flirting 382–4 integration of 11 internal and external drivers 178

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749

SUBJECT INDEX motivation (Continued) for prejudice control 178–9 self-perceptions of 49–50 at work 702–7 motivational biases 113–16 motivational factors 407–19 Mud Army volunteers 418–19 multicultural perspectives 11 multicultural research 12 multiculturalism 180 multifaceted self 81–2 Multifactor Leader Questionnaire (MLQ) 696 multiple-level approaches 487–8 multisystemic therapy (MST) 488 mundane realism 29 Murphy’s Law 597 mutual trust 375 myth 7, 283, 328

N NAIDOC week 552 names 210–11 nano flats 510–11 narcissism 78, 422, 460–1, 680 narrative profiles 683 narrow-mindedness 304 National Centre for Social and Economic Modelling 705 National Drug Strategic Framework 475 national happiness ratings 613 National Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC) 31 national identities 143, 559 national origin 679 nationalities 143 natural disaster 521 risk communication, preparedness and response 534–5 natural disasters 406–7, 458–9 natural selection 12 natural settings 25, 27, 518 see also real-world settings naturalistic research 360 nature 517 Nature of Prejudice, The 10 nature versus nurture 469 need for affiliation 352 need for cognition 246 need to be right 277–8 needs 336, 420, 640 for closure 122 fulfilment of 548 for self-esteem 60–2, 114 negative affect 470–1 negative affect reciprocity 385–6 negative consequences 257 negative correlation 23 negative feedback 147, 260 negative state relief model 413, 434 neglect 456 negotiation 335–8, 628, 645–6 neocortex 3 network-based diffusion analysis 274

750

networking 3, 77, 279, 351, 429, 437, 453, 608, 617 recruitment-related sites 676 see also social networking neuroendocrine research 205 neuroscience 13, 144, 204, 279, 392, 421 neuroticism 460 New Zealand Census 390 New Zealand Human Rights Commission 200 New Zealand Psychological Society 31 Nielsen Global Survey of Corporate Social Responsibility and Sustainability 531–2 nightmares 583 nodding (heads) 226 noise 520, 596 non-binary identities 208–10 non-collectivist cultures 508 non-engagement 708 non-human animals 43–4 non-Indigenous people 456 non-verbal behaviour 96, 98, 101, 381 online 100 non-verbal communication 507 non-verbal cues 384 non-violent cultures 454 non-violent pornography 483 norm deviation 25–7 norm of equity 436 norm of reciprocity 287–8 norm of social responsibility 436 normalisation 199 normative behaviours 505 normative goals 505 normative influence 278, 654 normative model of leadership 695 norms 12, 80, 180, 203–4, 230, 285, 315, 375, 458, 468, 484, 528–9, 661 deviation from 316–17 norm-violating behaviours 102, 315 nostalgia 55 noticing 426

O oath 649 obedience 30, 272–97 obesity 585, 593–5 objectification 169–73 objectivity 47, 51 objects 511 attitude objects 224–5 observation 19, 93–102, 638 observational studies 20 obstacles 428–9, 431 odds 27 see also chance odours 432 online behaviour 323 online consent 31 online dating 349, 353, 367

online media 208 online presence 678 online recruitment 677 online world 14–15, 31 open systems 545 open-ended questionnaires 21 opening lines 383 opening statements 649 opening up 604–5 open-mindedness 660–1 openness 531 openness to experience 118–19, 460 open-plan offices 519–20 operating process, ironic 69 operational definitions (of variables) 18 operationalising (variables) 17 opinion 212, 225, 275, 284 optimism 71–2, 117, 597–9 optimistic disposition 598–9 organisational diversity 690–1 organisational psychology see industrial/organisational (I/O) psychology organisations 546 orientation 56 also under specific orientation orientation period 653 ostracism 214, 278–9, 471 others communication from 262 comparisons with 51, 527 helping 406–23 influences of 51–3 ‘looking-glass self’ 44, 51 ‘other’ category 143 perceiving 93–131 presence of 318–24 outgroup homogeneity effect 144 outgroups 175–6 dehumanising 144–5 versus ingroups 144 outreach programs 686 overconfidence 129 overcrowding 608 over-justification effect 49 overt aggression 456, 467 overt tests 683 overweight 359, 585, 593, 595 own-race identification bias 631 oxytocin 412

P Pacific populations 561–2 pain 97, 278, 464, 603 Pākehā culture 70 palm oil 533 paparazzi 153 paradigm 297 paradoxical effects 69, 616, 703 parent–child relationships 466 parole boards 628 partial replication 298 participants 28, 31, 295–6 participation 549–50 partner abuse 462

partner violence 458, 466 partners 73, 372, 374, 381, 456, 608 casual sex partner 371 with shortcomings 78 passion 367, 377, 392 ‘dangerous’ see jealousy passionate love 378–9 past 581 patterns 16, 20, 78, 121, 315, 380, 386, 520, 595 peace 454, 510 PEACE model 645 peacocking 369 peer pressure 62, 437 peer support groups 74 peers 4, 181, 200–1, 214, 412, 429, 453, 468 pendulum 69 people 93, 550–60 at odds with attitudes 259–60 perceived characteristics of person in need 421–2 too happy? 616 see also humans; persons People’s Temple cult 293 perceived risks 527–8 perceiver characteristics 116–17 perception 13–14, 74, 275, 526, 630–1 conformity effects on 279 distortion 154–7 perceiving others 93–131 of situations 95–6 perception of control 597 perception of mind 97–8 perceptual contrast principle 291 perceptual judgements 277 peremptory challenge 646 perfect storms 659 performance 68, 162, 317, 675, 690, 703–4 of groups 324–32 quality and quantity 49 performance appraisals 691–3 performance cycle 702 performance matching 326 peripheral route to persuasion 234–5 persecution 515 persistence 164–74 person dimension 513–14 personal (online) traces 678 personal attributes 393 personal attribution 104 personal goals 286 personal identity 324, 674 personal influences 419–21 personal pronouns 210–11 personal responsibility 257 personal space 101, 505–9 cultural differences in 507–8 preserving 508–9 personal standards 63 personal zones 506 personality 7, 81, 94, 377, 420–1, 460, 677 reward and 51

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SUBJECT INDEX personality effects 531 personality research 683 personality tests 260, 682–3 personality theories 646 personality traits 47, 103 person–environment fit 545 personnel selection 676–91 techniques 676, 678 persons stateless 554 see also humans; people persons–environment interactions 9 perspective taking 410 perspectives 484, 525, 599–600 on human nature 304 perspectives taking 175 persuasion by communication 232–50 cultural influences on 249–50 by own actions 250–62 routes 262 routes/selection 232–5 source effects in 236–41 persuasive arguments theory 327 persuasive communication 238–41 phenomena 11, 15, 17, 111, 125, 256, 322, 524 ‘Facebook Depression’ 52 impact bias 45 ‘knew-it-all-along’ 7 self-fulfilling prophecy 126–9, 643 vicarious self-perception 46–7 phrenology 94 physical and mental health 613 physical appearance 12–13, 93–5, 679 physical attractiveness 10, 238, 355–63, 368, 371, 392 physical flirts 383 physique 94 ‘pick-up line’ 381 Pinterest 678 place attachment 512–16 place dimension 516 place meaning 514 placebo effect 53 ‘play’ versus ‘work’ 49 playful flirts 383 pleas 628 pleasure 97, 146 pluralism, sources 10–11 pluralistic ignorance 281, 426–7, 429 points of view 31–2, 54–5 police interrogations 640–1 police interviewing 645 policy 559, 688–9 policy changes 199 policy implementation 689–90 polite flirts 383 ‘politeness’ words 118 political affiliation 22 political issues 13 polls 225 pollution 504 polygraph 639 see also lie detection

popularity 365, 608 population turnover 513 populations 31 cultural differences in 661 diverse 661 slum 510 pornography 482–4 Port Arthur Massacre 489 positive correlation 23 positive emotions 603 positive illusions 74–5 advantages and disadvantages 75 positive mood 301 positivity bias 114 positron emission tomography (PET) scans 43 post-event distress 611 post-identification feedback 637 post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) 425, 556–8, 582–3, 617 challenge of 582–4 post-trial 656–9 pout condition 48 poverty 450, 487, 560–4 in Australia/New Zealand 561–2 flow-on effects of 563 poverty line 560 power 324, 659 ‘prophecies of power’ 128 of stereotypes in ambiguous situations 155 willpower 67–8 power-distance 115, 660 practice 572, 676 discriminatory hiring practices 679 ethical and unethical 10 marriage 393 meaning-making and 12 recruitment 677–8 shooter bias reduction with 160 pragma 377 praise 50 prediction 22, 47, 75, 129, 230, 504, 532, 683–4, 691 predictive perspective 676, 678 predisposition 648 preference 22, 58, 71, 152, 181, 358, 391–2, 409, 648, 685–6 perceived 679 preferential absolute 690 preferential equivalent 689 preferential minimum standard 689 preferential selection policies 689 preferred choice 328 pregnancy status 679 prejudice 10, 62, 129–30, 141–74, 177–8, 182, 207, 227–8, 559, 693 anti-prejudice messages 179 control efforts 178 intergroup 174 reducing 174–80 prejudicial material 650

prenuptial agreements 392 pressure 46, 283, 315, 437, 586 choking under 68 see also time pressure pretrial publicity 650–1 prevention era 611 pride 97, 279, 419 primacy effect 241 mechanisms 121–2 primary territories 511 priming 118–19 money 708 principles and procedures difference in legal processes 661 double-blind procedures 635, 638 evidentiary and procedural rules 650 justice as matter of procedure 659–61 organised set of principles 17 perceptual contrast principle 291 procedures 297 progress principle 706–7 scientific 15 Yogyakarta Principles 197–200 prison experience 657–9 prisoner’s dilemma 332–3 privacy 516, 518, 520, 556, 582 private conformity 280, 284 private emotional outlets 609 Private Lives 2 report 570 private self-consciousness 65 proactive aggression 449–50 proactive coping 606–9 problem solving 605, 642, 677, 691 problem-focused coping 600–3 procedural fairness 693 procedural justice 549, 659–61 process control 659 process dimension 514–16 process gain 325 process loss 324 procrastination 72 production blocking 326 productivity 695 productivity levels 675 pro-environmental behaviour 528–9 pro-environmental messages 533 programs 560 progress principle 706–7 promotions 675 pronouns 210–11 propaganda 10 pro-self, individualist orientation 335 prosocial, cooperative orientation 335 prosocial behaviour 407, 420–1, 432, 434 prosocial media effects 435, 482 prosocial outcomes 64 prosocial video games 480 provincial norms 529 provocation 229, 460–1, 470–1, 474–6

proxemics 506 proximity 507–8 proximity effect 354 pseudo-transformational leaders 697 psychoanalysis 9 psychoanalytic theory 389 psychological deprivation 562 psychological distress 565 psychological needs, fulfilment of 372 psychological reactance 249 psychologists, trial lawyers as 646–7 psychology 13, 204 areas of 6–7 cognitive 13 community see community psychology environmental see environmental psychology evolutionary 11–12 of the individual 4 industrial/organisational 675–91 social see social psychology sustainability role 534–5 psychoneuroimmunology (PNI) 591 psychopathy 461 psychosocial environmental impact assessment 534 puberty blockers 212 public conformity 279, 284 public goods dilemmas 334 public image 78 public self-consciousness 65 public zones 506 publication bias 164 publicity 650–1 pubs 475 punishment 49, 214, 409, 465–7, 487, 628, 641, 661–2 external 9 see also sentencing push–pull testing models 677–8 Pygmalion study 126

Q qualitative research versus quantitative 21 quality of life 569 quantitative research 21 quantity 22 Queensland University of Technology (QUT) 205 questions 16, 315, 631 answering under oath 649 leading 125, 633 lingering 299–300 loaded 632 manner of asking 18–19 miscarriage of justice 638 social psychological 5–6 yes–no 639

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751

SUBJECT INDEX

R race 12–13, 22, 363, 423, 631, 648–9, 657, 679 racial attitudes 227–8 racial biases 647, 649, 657 racial discrimination 687–8 Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) 686 racism 165–9 random assignment 24, 47, 178, 315, 616, 708 versus random sampling 25 random sampling 25 rapport 641, 645 ratings/rankings 260, 286, 691–2, 704 attractiveness ratings 366–7 attributes 367 cross-society death comparisons 450–2 funniness ratings 48 Global Age Watch Index Country Rankings 568 global divorce rates 388 of homicide 451, 485 incarceration rate 657 national happiness ratings 613, 615 of obesity 593 of potential employers 676 of productivity 675 unemployment rate 674 rationality 337 reactance 249, 367, 651–2 reactive aggression 477 real life 126 Real Truth About Beauty, The: Revisited 359 realism 28–9, 75 realistic conflict theory 165 reality 74, 122–8 real-world settings 22, 25, 478–9 social psychology applications 503–36, 545–73, 580–617, 628–63, 673–710 real-world violence 478–9, 481 real-world violence link to media violence 478–9 reasonable doubt 654 reasoning 420, 484, 486 rebound effect 603 recall 41, 57, 78, 520, 629 recency effect 241 recency rule 54 reciprocal altruism 408 reciprocal relationships 599–600 reciprocation 288, 302 reciprocity 287–8, 365–6, 385–6 recollection 19, 54, 630 reconciliation 653 Reconciliation events 552 reconstructive memory 631 recruitment 371, 685 approaches 676, 678 e-recruitment 676–9 future perspectives 677 trends 676

752

recycling 546 red–sex link 360 reflection 614–15 reframing 609 refuge 518–19 Refugee Lifeline program 560 refugee resettlement policy 559 refugees 424, 516, 527, 559, 583 invisible 557–8 psychological impact of journeys 558–9 Refugees as Survivors New Zealand (RASNZ) 560 refugees with specific needs 558 regret 74, 108–9, 459 regulatory fit 247 rehabilitation program 558 Reid Technique 638, 640–1, 643 social psychological issues of 641 rejection 127, 207, 392, 470–1, 708 rejection prophecy 127 relational aggression 456, 462 relational building blocks 373 relationship-enhancing attributions 386 relationships 3, 350–93, 434, 676 of cause and effect see causeand-effect relationships daylight saving time–sleep– injury 675 land, spiritual and cultural relationships with 514 types of 374–6 between variables 22, 24 relative deprivation 165 relaxation 475, 519, 605 religion 173, 200–1, 363, 436, 609, 679 reluctant altruism 437 remembering 8 remuneration equity, gender and 705–6 repetition 633 replication 27, 430 reports/reporting 18–19 see also self-reports representative samples 28 research 572, 683 on groupthink 328 ideas from previous 16 immune system–stress link 591–2 ‘No research without action, no action without research’ 9 also under specific research type Research Center for Virtual Environments and Behavior 14 research designs 20–30 research findings 16, 32 research methods 15–16, 29–30 researchers 21 resemblance 47 resilience 45, 207–8, 298, 304, 526, 596 human capacity for 596–600 resistance 154–7, 225, 247–9, 291–2, 424, 588

resource dilemmas 333–5 resource management 504 resources limited 67–8 recycling 546 scarce 335 see also human resources respect 424, 459, 549, 645 Respect. Now. Always. 459 response bias 630 responses 19, 294, 335, 426, 526, 534–5, 572 behaviour–response link 128 responsibility 323, 413, 428, 431, 468, 699 attributions of 422 Responsible Consumption and Production 528 restriction of range problem 692 results 19 cross-study combinations see meta-analysis resumés 687–8 retaliation 287 retrieval (information) 630 revenge 449, 675 review 676 ethics review bodies 31 reward 49–51, 100, 353, 372–5, 386, 392, 409, 467, 641, 695, 702–3 external 9 of helping 412–14 paradoxical effects of 50 reward theory of interpersonal attraction 353 rights 31, 200, 214, 390, 557, 640, 652, 661–2 Rio Tinto Reconciliation Action Plan 2016–2019 552 Rising Stars 562 risk 408, 413, 421, 527–8, 534–5, 565, 582, 585, 607 climate risk 524 risk factors 480 risk-taking behaviour 152–3 ritual 452 road rage 464 Robbers Cave 164–5 robotic interviewers 684–5 role absorption 315 role models 154, 436 role playing 252–3, 486 role stage 372 Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale 18 Roy Morgan Research 225, 530 RSVP 353 rudeness 462, 673, 709–80 rules 315, 650 rumination 474, 476 rural and remote areas 513–14, 581 Russian dolls 545

S sabbaticals 675 sabotage 28, 73, 675 sadness 99

safety 178, 406, 508, 547, 614 cars as safe havens 511 in numbers 426 saiban-in 661 salaries 700 Salem witch trials 633 same-sex marriage 390, 571 same-sex relationships 389–92 samples/sampling 28 randomly 25 Sandy Hook Elementary School 478 satanic cults 633 Satanism 245 satisfaction 161, 317, 374, 384–5, 387, 392, 417, 419, 612, 675, 702, 705 scales 18, 65, 79, 116, 225–6, 228, 377 scarce resources 335 Scarlet Alliance 553 scarring effects 582–4 scavenger cells 590–1 scents 432–3, 509 schadenfreude 146 school violence 468 schools 200–1 science, values and 31–2 scientific method 7, 15 scientific principles 15 scientific studies 4 scripts 96, 466 second order change 545 secondary territories 511 secrets 69, 604 security 375–6, 518, 527, 614 segregation 174 selection (employee) see personnel selection selectivity 367–71 self 42–82 affective component see selfesteem brain circuitry representation 43 cognitive component see selfconcept cultural conceptions of 56–7 differentiation of 512 interdependent model of 12 manifestation see selfpresentation past selves 55 ‘relational’ aspect 44 representation in brain 43 revolving images of 66 as social concept 44 social construction of 41 self-affirmation 260 self-awareness 64, 324 alcohol and 65 to self-discrepancy 64–5 ‘trap’ 63–7 self-awareness theory 63–4 self-concept 42–59, 128, 201–2, 261 rudiments 43–4 sources 44–55 self-confidence 126 self-consciousness 65–6, 76 scale 65

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SUBJECT INDEX self-control 97, 430, 461, 474–6, 482, 486 exerting 177–9 as limited resource 67–8 self-description 51 self-disclosure 379–80 self-discrepancy/theory 62–5 self-efficacy 417, 597–8 self-enhancement 45, 70 mechanisms of 69–74 self-esteem 7, 18, 59–63, 75–6, 81–2, 147, 161, 262, 359, 377, 417, 460–1 need for 60–2, 114 widespread impact of high/ low 62 self-esteem theories 259–60 self-evaluations 51, 692 self-focus 65–6, 605–6 self-fulfilling processes 127–8 self-fulfilling prophecy 128–9, 156, 361, 643 contrasting views 126–7 outside classrooms 127 self-generated persuasion 252–3 self-handicapping 72–3 self-harm 214, 573 self-image 62, 147 self-inflation 54 self-interest 641, 660–1 self-interest rule 237 ‘selfish gene’ 407–8 selfishness 409 self-knowledge 44–5, 47 self-monitoring 79–81, 246–7 Self-Monitoring Scale 79 self–other knowledge asymmetry (SOKA) model 47 self-perception 46–51, 262 ‘blind spots’ in 44, 47 of emotion 48–9 of motivation 49–50 vicarious 46–7 self-perception account 289 self-perception theory 46, 259–60 self-persuasion 259–60 self-presentation 76–81 strategic 77–8 self-promotion 77 narcissism and 78 trade-offs of 77–8 self-ratings 47, 70 self-recognition 43–4 emergence in infants 44 self-regulation 179 limits 67–8 self-reliance 12, 286 self-reports 18–19, 225–6 self-representation 410–11 self-sacrificing efforts 533 self-schemas 42, 60, 201–2 self-serving beliefs 71–2 self-striving 57–8 self-verification 78–9, 128 self-worth 314 sense of belonging see belonging sense of community 547–9 sense of purpose 674

sensitivity 169, 213, 386 sensory discomfort 640 sensory feedback 49 sentencing differences in 661–2 disparity 656 mandatory 656–7 process 656–7 September 11 terrorist attacks 103 sequential compliance resistance 291–2 sequential line-up technique 635 sequential request strategies 288–91 serotonin 464, 486 setbacks 598–9 ‘seven-year itch’ 384 sex 196–202, 389, 392, 679 sex assignment surgery 211–13 sex differences 699 Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) 686 sex hormones 196 ‘Sex in Australia 2’ survey 205 sex workers 553–4 sex-based stereotypes 171–3 sexism 142, 153, 169–73, 707 sexist humour 675 sexual aggression 484 sexual assault 458–60, 484 sexual attraction 375 sexual come-ons 389 sexual connotations 382 sexual desire 392 sexual gratification 372 sexual harassment 459–60, 675 sexual identity 570 sexual infidelity 370–1 ‘sexual man’ 201–2 sexual orientation 196–202, 214, 389–92, 569–72, 679 global divide 571 origins 391 sexual self-concept 201–2 sexual self-schemas 201–2 sexual violence 459 sexuality 173–4, 215, 389 shallow breathing 639 shaming 197, 661 ‘shape up’/‘ship out 64 shared emotional connection 548 shared identities 177 sharing 379, 409–10 shelter 614 shock 298, 483 generators 293 up to 150 volts 298–9 shooter bias 158–60 shutting down 603–4 signal-contingent self-reports 19 signals 101, 681 significance, statistical 27 similarity 51–2, 57–8, 205–6, 237–8, 291, 363–4, 648 attitude–behaviour 250 similarity conditions 47 simpatico 432 sincere flirts 383

single process 284 single-rater approach 693 Sistergirls 216 situational attribution 104 situational cues 532 situational factors 12, 28, 486–7 situational influences 425–39, 469–77 situational power 659 situational variables 460 situations 93, 95–6 skills mismatch 315 sleep 675 sleep deprivation 640, 644 sleeper effect 240 sleeplessness 583 smile condition 48 smiling 99–100, 411 snacks 595 social acceptance 708 social animals 350 social bonding 100, 301 social brain 13–14 social categories 12–13, 142–4 social categorisation motives 145–50 social choice 78–9 social class 59 social cognition, dimensions 121 social cognition research 11 social cohesion 599–600 social community 674 social comparison theory 50, 327 social comparisons 50 downward 74 health implications of 74 in New Zealand 52 social competence training 486 social connection 437–8, 607–8, 617 social construction 41 social contact 352 social context 3–5 social depenetration process 380 social dilemmas 332–5 social disadvantage 581 social dominance orientation 148–9 social dynamics 339 social embarrassment 255 social exchange theory 372–4 social exclusion 409, 569–72, 581 social facilitation 318–20 alternative explanations 320 social factors 7, 673–710 social groups 149–50 social harmony 55, 286 social identity 146–7 from personal identity 324 social identity model of deindividuation effects (SIDE) 324 social identity motives 145–7 social identity theory 44, 146, 314 social impact theory 302–4 social influence 8, 224–63, 272–305, 313–40, 437, 628, 640, 675, 694 as ‘automatic’ 273–5 continuum of 301–5

social interaction 3, 56, 79, 176, 287 social isolation 607 social justice 374, 549–50 social learning theory 466–7 social loafing 320–2 cultural nuances 322 social loss 278 social marketing 611 social media 3, 300–1, 304, 419, 429, 549, 676–7 apps 569 social nature 3–5, 14 social networking 3, 15, 77, 279, 351, 437, 453, 608, 617, 676, 678 social neuroscience 13 social niches 363 social norms 80, 281–2, 285, 436, 528–9 social pain 278 social perception 42–82, 93–130, 141–82, 196–216 aspects 129 bottom line 128–31 elements see observation social priming 118–19 social protest 3 social psychological factors 13, 15 social psychological issues 641 social psychologists field psychologists 617 role in the legal system 662–3 social psychology 7–8, 13 birth and infancy 8–9 contemporary 7, 11–15 contributors 9–10 defined 4–8 ethics and values in 30–2 history 8–15 individual focus 6 other fields of study 7 perspectives 11 related fields, distinction 6–7 social context 4–5 ‘socialness’ 4–5 timeline – 1880s to current 8–15 social psychology applications arenas 9 questions and 5–6 real-world 503–36, 545–73, 580–617, 628–63, 673–710 Social Readjustment Rating Scale (SRRS) 584 social rejection 470–1, 596, 708 social relations 350–94, 406–39, 449–89 social relationships 613 social revolution 10 social self 42–82 social situations 79 social skills 486 social status 467, 470–1, 559 Social Stress Test 595 social support 606–10 social systems 6 social unrest 450, 452 social value orientation 335

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SUBJECT INDEX social wellbeing 432 social withdrawal 520, 583 social zones 506 social–cognitive factors 179–80 socialisation 205, 467 of stereotypes 150–4 socialising 3, 508 social-networking sites 429 society 131, 317 comparison across 450–2 Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues 9 sociocultural factors 486–7 sociocultural perspectives 370–1 socioeconomic factors 424, 595 socioeconomic status 363, 587 sociology 6 sociometer theory 61 solitary confinement 658 solitude 352 spearing 661 speech 275 ‘spineless sheep’ 281 spirituality 609 spontaneous volunteers 419 spotlight effect 76 standardised tests 682–4 standards 66, 682–4 of behaviour 436 ethical 10 of health 424 living standards 582 personal 63 standard contracts 674 unrealistic 359 Stanford Prison Experiment 657–9 criticisms and questions 659 Star of Courage 406 stateless person 554 states/territories allowable challenges 646 juries 654 legislative sentencing governance 656–7 statistical significance 27 status 149, 213, 296, 462, 467, 470–1, 475, 559, 587 status motives 148–9 status quo 149, 695 step-parents 461–2 stereotype boost 163 stereotype content model 149–50 stereotype threat 161–3 causes of effects 163 reducing 163 stereotype-disconfirming behaviour 156 stereotypes/stereotyping 6, 10, 127, 129–30, 141–82, 201–4, 228, 262–3, 361, 423, 456, 458, 514, 646, 657, 662–3 cognitive core of problem 150–64 gender 202–4 perception distortion/change resistance 154–7 reducing 179–80

754

stigma 62, 160–1, 213–16, 304, 458, 551, 558, 686 associated with seeking help 582 mental health impacts of 213–14 stimulus 20, 42, 179, 227, 378, 470, 472, 486 menacing 630 stimulus overload 426 stimulus stage 372 stimulus–value–role (SVR) theory 372 storage (information) 630 storge 376–7 stories 286 strategic self-presentation 77–8 stress 10, 23, 177, 207, 384, 459, 463, 506, 510, 517, 526, 553, 586–600, 630, 639 buffers 593, 596, 606 causes of 581–7 coping with 600–9 duration 592 physical responses to 587–93 social psychology applications 580–617 treatment and prevention of 610–12 stress hormones 591–2, 607 stress management techniques 601 stress response 588, 590 stress-and-coping process 602 stressors 584, 592, 595 striving 609 stronger effect 258 structured interviews 684–5 studies 4, 20–1, 60, 204, 276–7, 301–2, 420 of attitudes 224–32 ‘blind to the conditions’ 28 combining results across see meta-analysis fields of study 7 regarding justice system 628 also under specific study subcultures 13, 454 subject variables 26 subjective experience 365 subjective norms 230 subjective wellbeing (SWB) 351, 612, 616 subjectivity 358–9 subliminal messages 244–6 subliminal persuasion 245–6 subliminal presentations 157 substance use 581 subtyping 156–7 success 73, 75, 597 succession 546 sugar-rich drinks 476 suggestibility 276 suicidal behaviours 558 suicide 213, 245, 453, 573 sunk costs 528 superficial cues 94

superordinate goals 165 superordinate identity 339 supervisor ratings 691–2 support 551 support groups 197, 605 see also family support suppression 178, 603–4 surgery 211–12 surprise 99 surveillance 647 surveys 21, 384, 390, 468, 524, 531, 615, 648, 699–700, 707–8 survival 145, 407–8, 607 suspicion 73 sustainability 504, 521, 527, 534–5 sustainable behaviours 521–2 environmental cue link 528 Sustainable Consumption and Production 531 sustainable development goals (UN) 502, 521, 528, 560–73 sweating 639 symbols 547 sympathy 410, 641 synaptic connections 43 synchrony 274, 300–1 Syrian crisis 557–8 system justification theory 148–9

T tactics 73, 288, 374, 640–3, 680 talent 677–8 targets 170, 173–4 characteristics 118–19 task orientation 114 tasks 319, 674 complex 321–2 conjunctive 324–5 disjunctive 325 Tassie Fires – We Can Help 549 teams 330–1, 339 see also groups technological advances 14, 19–20 technological trends 693 technology 3, 19–20, 43, 453, 549, 674, 682 growth 676 new 14–15 television 206, 477–8 temperament 392 temperature 434–5, 470, 526 temporal comparisons 74 temptation 373 tendencies 20–1, 466, 484 exaggeration of group tendencies 327 tenderness 410 tension 164–5, 253, 257 terminology 142, 645 gendered language 213 names 210–11 see also words/wording territoriality 511–12 territories see states/territories terror 378–9 terror management motives 147–8

terror management theory 61, 243 terrorism 103 terrorists 641 tertiary territories 511 testosterone 205, 212, 463–4, 468, 472–3 tests/testing 167, 260, 595, 675, 682–4 of ideas see research designs for lies see lie detection of self-recognition 43–4 testability 16–17 testing market 677–8 truth–deception distinction 640 of two-factor theory of emotion 53 also under specific test that’s-not-all technique 291 theories 16–17, 258, 372 of love 377–8 of self-persuasion 259 also under specific theory theory of planned behaviour 230–1 therapeutic value 607–8 thinking 3–4, 7, 106–7 changing 484–6 too much 45, 68 thinness 359 third genders 209–10 third-person 55 thoughts 3, 18, 43, 67, 480 analytical 45 system of 58 threat 161–3, 468, 475, 559, 587–8, 640, 645–6 prevalence and diversity of 162–3 ‘threat in the air’ 161 time pressure 431–2 timing 240–2 tokenism 528 tokens 409 tolerance 316 torture 515 touch 101 trade-offs 78, 363, 435 of self-promotion 77–8 traditional flirts 383 tragedy 602 tragedy of the commons 334, 523 trait adjectives 201 trait negativity bias 119 traits 47, 65, 71, 95, 103, 116, 118–19, 531, 680, 692 transactional leadership 695 transactive memory 329–30 transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) 14 transformational leadership 696–8 transgender people 206–8 transitions 60, 384 see also gender transitions translation 30 transparency 676, 693 TranZnation study 211, 213

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SUBJECT INDEX traps 287 trauma 570, 583–4, 602 trend analysis 450 trends 2, 13, 20–1, 304, 332, 451, 484, 548, 567, 676–7, 693, 707–8 trial (courtroom) 628, 649–52 fair trials 649 pretrial publicity 650–1 trial lawyers as psychologists 646–7 trial and error 18 trials jury trials 646–9 Salem witch trials 633 triangular theory of love 377–8 trick or treat 323–4 trickery 641 triggers 12, 42, 157, 204, 301, 323, 385–6, 470, 520 tripartite framework 512–13 true acceptance 279 trust 375, 417, 424, 512 trustworthiness 93, 117, 237 truth–deception distinction 102–3 truth-telling 639 tsunami 438 Tumblr 208 twin studies 420 Twitter 3, 277, 300, 304, 676, 678 Two Spirits 209 two-factor theory of emotion 52–3, 378 moderators 53 two-stage model of attraction 364 Type A personality 460, 589–90, 602 Type B personality 589–90

U unanimity 653–5 uncertainty 51–3, 177 of roles 315 underemployment 564–6 underpayment 705 unemployment 564–6, 592, 675 global rate 674 see also youth unemployment, hotspots unethical behaviour 261–2 unethical practice 10 unfairness 705 uniqueness 57–8 United Nations (UN) 502, 521, 523, 528, 560–73 untrustworthy 93 upward feedback 692 urges 67 US National Research Council 640

V validity external 28–9 internal 27–8 value 96 value stage 372 values 12, 180, 364, 436, 450, 532, 547–50, 661, 707 science and 31–2 in social psychology 30–2 vandalism 323, 487 vanity 361 variables conceptual see conceptual variables conceptualising and operationalising 17 dependent see dependent variables independent see independent variables manipulation of 6, 18, 24 subject see subject variables verbal behaviour 96 verbal praise 50 verdicts 628, 649–50, 654–6 less-than-unanimous 655 vicarious dissonance 256 vicarious self-perception 46–7 victim blaming 640 victimisation 74 victims 296–7, 585 blaming 115–16 Victorian Law Reform Commission 652 video games 23, 478, 480–1 video interviews 677 videoconference 682 vigilance 248 violence 23, 214, 435, 449–51, 458–9, 484–5, 487, 557, 572, 581 in childhood 454 forms of 452 heteronormative notions 458 male perpetrators/recipients of 458 in media 477–82 programs preventing 487–8 reducing 484–9 against women 457 violent pornography 483 virtual reality 14 virtual teams 330–1 virtual technology 300 visceral reaction 100 visual discrimination 276 visual impressions 95 visual media 21 visual representations 112–13

visualisation 72, 279 visual-spatial perception 279 vitality 517 voices 102 voir dire 646–7 volunteerism 416–19, 438 vulnerable employment 674

W wages 707 war 515, 582–4 against stress 600 war effort 9–10 warfare 454 warmth 120, 149–50 warriors 461 watering hole 475 ‘weakest link’ 324–5 wealth 370–1, 614 weapon-focus effect 630–1 weapons 323, 333, 452, 487 see also shooter bias weapons effect 472 weather 526 ‘webs of inclusion’ 699 weight 173–4 welfare 31 wellbeing 42, 52, 55, 197, 214, 351, 384, 394, 417, 432, 514, 612, 615 domains 515 improving in ageing populations 568–9 social psychology applications 580–617 wellness 547, 585–6 Western cultures 609 Western Electric Company 675 whanaungatanga 70 What Makes Us Happy? report 614 what-is-beautiful-is-good stereotype 361 WhatsApp 100 willpower 67–8 wishful seeing 113–14 wishful thinking 72 witnesses 632–3 women on boards 701 leadership among 698–701 mining sector and 552 return to work 552 varying effects of affirmative action on 690 wealth of 370–1 words/wording 21, 67, 118–19, 157, 225, 275, 337, 606, 631 personal pronouns 210–11 trait adjectives 201 see also questions; terminology

work changing nature of 674–5 motivation at 702–7 nonstandard versus traditional 674 versus ‘play’ 49 searching for 676–9 work arrangements 674 work practices 551 work settings 173 work stress 585–6 Working Together: Racial Discrimination in New Zealand report 688 workplace fatigue 584–5 Workplace Gender Equality Agency 552 workplace injury 675 workplaces 519–21 bullying in see bullying diversity in 691 human behaviour in 675 influences on 675 new flu in see rudeness social factors, role in 673–710 stress in 585–6 world economies 12 World Employment and Social Outlook: Trends 2018 564–5 World Giving Index 417–18 World Happiness Report top 20 613 World Health Organization (WHO) 452, 456–7, 523, 568 World War II 9–10, 295 World Wide Fund for Nature 522 World Wide Fund for Nature Backyard Barometer 530 worldwide refugee crisis 554–60 worth, sense of 60

X ‘X’ gender markers 200 XX and XY chromosomes 196–7

Y Yogyakarta Plus 10 198 Yogyakarta Principles 197–200 Youth Action and Policy Association 562 youth poverty 561–2 youth suicide 573 youth unemployment, hotspots 565 YouTube 208, 300, 678

Z Zajonc’s three-step process 319

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