Social Movements and Digital Activism in Africa 3031302060, 9783031302060

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Social Movements and Digital Activism in Africa Ufuoma Akpojivi

Social Movements and Digital Activism in Africa “This book, authored by Ufuoma Akpojivi, is compelling by all standards, a must read for everyone, especially scholars and students of communication, media, politics, and governance. The book examines social movements and digital activism in Africa focusing socio-politically on three sub-Saharan African countries: South Africa (SA), Nigeria and Ghana. The book frames #FeesMustFall in SA, #OurMumuDonDo and #BringBackOurGirls in Nigeria, and #OccupyGhana in Ghana as movements of social transformation and alternative pathways to social justice in the socio-politically rigid contexts represented in the book. What is fascinating is that the book is motivated by real-life social and political happenings that appeared to have rattled the sensibilities of citizens. The book analytically portrays how the happenings generated strong and spontaneous hashtag counter actions by social movements to contest the political and social orders in digital spaces. The book displays a good understanding of its setting, as it provides in-depth background knowledge of the demographic and socio-economic indices and dispositions to frame issues that have necessitated the rise of protest actions, social movements and digital activism in the sub region. The about 233-­page book’s central argument is that digital activism has evolved in Africa and has become a veritable tool for citizens to protest inherent colonial, political, economic and cultural incongruities, which have continued to plague the development of postcolonial societies, such as those in Africa. The analysis of the book is aptly underpinned by Steve Biko’s black consciousness theory and Ayittey’s (2005) notion of the ‘tiger generation’. These decolonial theories call for a proper deconstruction of colonial inhibitions in post-­ independence territories. These theories again provide a critical and alternative lens to an understanding of contestations concerning the monotonous normative politics of nationalist and suppressive post-colonist leadership using colonial legacies that have inhibited the development of postcolonial states. These theoretical perspectives are complemented by a robust methodology that adopts ethnography, cyber ethnography and in-depth interviews to draw data for the analysis. In reading this book, one gets a sense of the author’s intentions to provide a door to an understanding of digital activism and social movements, the actors/activists, their background and how their various backgrounds shape their ideologies, goals and objectives; and how the movements influence and are influenced by the interplay between the activists and the state. In doing this, the author goes beyond the scope of studies in the field that are mostly country based and

usually about content on Facebook, Twitter and the like. This book, thus, makes a bold and significant contribution to the emerging field of digital activism and social movements and, through this, charts a research path for others to follow. Above all, the book is written in a lucid, easy to read and understandable style that makes the reading itself exhilarating and the content accessible to any reader. The book is a whole package and experience; by reading it, one enjoys a narrative in which domains of inquiry such as history, sociology, politics, governance, culture, among others are imbibed for a holistic appreciation of the region covered by the book.” —Modestus Fosu (PhD), Dean, Faculty of Integrated Communication Sciences, University of Media, Arts and Communication, Ghana Institute of Journalism Campus, Accra [email protected]

Ufuoma Akpojivi

Social Movements and Digital Activism in Africa

Ufuoma Akpojivi Advocates for International Development Policy, Research and Learning Lead London, UK

ISBN 978-3-031-30206-0    ISBN 978-3-031-30207-7 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30207-7 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

To Linda, Oghenemaro, Ogheneyoma and Oghenefejiro I love you all and I appreciate the sacrifice.

Preface

The decision and desire to write a book that examines social movements and digital activism in Africa was influenced by the abduction of the Chibok schoolgirls on April 14, 2014, in Nigeria and the subsequent activism that followed. I watched keenly the reaction of the then government of President Goodluck Jonathan towards the #BringBackOurGirls movement and how the movement was able to sustain itself and mount pressure on the state, despite the criminalisation from the state. Within the sociopolitical context of the Nigerian state, the movement is considered a force to reckon with, as, within the streets, the movement was credited to have played a germane role in ousting President Goodluck Jonathan from power and instituting the transition in government from one political party to another, making it the first of its kind in the history of Nigeria from the fourth republic. I noticed that similar occurrences were happening in other African countries that I have closely followed, such as Ghana and South Africa. In addition, in my observation, I realised that these movements that began to emerge from the late 2010s in these countries were not just challenging the state in relation to economic, political and cultural issues, which most social movements are interested in, but were challenging inherent, deep-­ rooted cultures and practices. For example, in South Africa, the first digital movement, #RhodesMustFall, subsequently led to the formation of movements, such as #FeesMustFall challenging deeply embedded colonial cultures of lack of transformation, white supremacy, and more, that have continued to impact the socioeconomic, political, and cultural developments of black South Africans. Likewise, in Nigeria, the #OurMumuDonDo vii

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movement and the #BringBackOurGirls movement questioned the inherited normative approach of governance, ways of thinking by the populace, and ways of doing things by the state inherited from colonialism. Thus, the objective of bringing about a mental revolution among the populace, as a catalyst to instituting social change of good governance which has been a bane in the country right from the colonial era to postindependence. Furthermore, in Ghana, #OccupyGhana has become a movement that is at the forefront of advocating for change from the normative approach of governance and accountability structures that has been in operation since independence to a governance structure that empowers and places citizens at the helm of governance and demanding for good governance by facilitating accountability within state and nonstate actors. Therefore, what this book attempts to do goes beyond the normative approach of reading social movements and digital activism that emphasises utopianism, egalitarianism and participation. It argues that for scholars to be able to read and understand the rise of social movements and digital activism in the examined case studies of Nigeria, Ghana and South Africa, this should be placed within the ideological backgrounds and contexts in which they exist. Such ideological backgrounds will reveal the micropolitics within the movements (its formation and ideological contestations) and how it shapes the wider micropolitics and engagement with other state actors as a way of bringing about social change that has long eluded these countries. In attempting to buttress my argument, I have used decolonial theories such as Steve Biko’s black consciousness theory to argue that these movements’ call for social change is a drive to achieve what Fanon (2005) termed ‘true decolonization’ as a way of achieving the desired social change. As the movements used social media platforms in the form of digital activism to not only educate and create awareness of social problems but also bring about a revolution, a change to ways of thinking and doing things which have hindered the sociopolitical, economic and cultural developments of these countries. I situated this within Ayittey’s (2005) notion of the ‘tiger generation’, who is tired of the normative politics of nationalist and postcolonist leaders that have suppressed the developments of postcolonial states using colonial legacies. Consequently, such action-revolution via social movements has led to contestation between the state and the movements. Using resource mobilisation theory (Jenkins, 1985; McCarthy & Zald, 2001), I argued that these movements were able to mobilise resources for their campaigns and

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protests as social actors to counterpower the ideologies of the state and their attempt to ‘control the minds’ of citizens by using digital activism not only to speak back to power but also to educate and liberate citizens. Furthermore, I argued that in reading social movements and digital activism within the selected countries, there is the need to understand the place of social constructs or structures such as ‘elitalisation’ of the movement and the ‘personalisation’ or ‘brand nature’ of these movements and the role of such structures in influencing or determining the operation of these movements and their successes. As in Nigeria and Ghana, it is evident that social movements or digital activism are personalised as a way of giving and selling the credibility of the movement to the public. Likewise, such personalisation tends to influence the basis of engagement between the movement and the state and other nonstate actors. While such action can be considered to be a good strategy by social movements, it raises salient questions about the extent to which such movements are vehicles or tools to push the interests or ideas of the person whose identity or brand is used by the movements. Hence, I concluded by stating that in rethinking social movements and digital activism in Africa, the social structures of the movement and how it impacts its operations and the context in which the movement exists must be recognised, as these realities will, to a large extent, influence and determine the ability of such movements to bring about the needed social change. My decision to focus on three sub-Saharan African countries, that is, Nigeria, Ghana and South Africa, is not to make generalised statements but to allow for wider analysis and answer questions that cannot be fully addressed within a single context. Voltmer (2008) posits that adopting a comparative approach of looking at multiple cases allows for broad analysis, which will enable me to show if there are common patterns between the movements from these countries and if these patterns can be used to provide further insights into the readings of social movements and digital activism. I hope and pray that I have been able to successfully do that in this book. This book would not have been possible without the support and assistance of organisations and individuals who played a significant role during the conceptualisation of the idea and the writing process. I will start off by acknowledging the American Council of Learned Societies, which awarded me the African Humanities Program fellowship to undertake this project. Additionally, I want to appreciate the National Research Foundation (NRF) South Africa for its funding that enabled me to complete the study.

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Without these funds, it would have been impossible to undertake a study of this nature. My sincere thanks go to Peggy Ama Donkor, Nana Aferba, and Mitaire Ikpen for providing me with useful contact details while in Ghana and Nigeria. Additionally, I want to thank Fiona Chawana for her assistance in collecting the South African data. My special thanks go to my wife, Dr Linda Boniface Oyama, who was more interested in me finishing this book than I, providing me with all the necessary support, especially when I felt like giving up due to some challenges encountered during the period of writing. To my parents, Dr and Mrs Raymond Akpojivi, and my sisters, Oghenetega Akpojivi Utake and Blessing Akpojivi, thank you very much for all the support, especially for the jokes, laughter and providing invaluable logistics while in Nigeria. I love you all dearly. I want to thank my daughters, Oghenemaro, Ogheneyoma and Oghenefejiro, for their love and support during the process of writing this book. I apologise for the times I was away collecting data and busy trying to complete this book. I promise to make up for all the lost time. I accept full responsibility for any errors, and these people should not be blamed for them. London, UK

Ufuoma Akpojivi

Contents

1 Introduction  1 Digital Activism in Nigeria, Ghana and South Africa   7 Brief Overview of Nigeria, Ghana and South Africa  11 How to Read Social Movement and Digital Activism in this Book  15 Communication Power: Activism and Social Change  20 References  31 2 #OurMumuDonDo  and #BringBackOurGirls: The Rebirth of Consciousness in Nigeria 37 OurMumuDonDo Movement  39 Mental Revolution  44 Ballot Revolution  55 The Charly Boy Brand and the OurMumuDonDo Movement: The Inseparable Twin  65 #BringBackOurGirls Movement  70 References  80 3 #FeesMustFall  Movement: The Revolt for Decolonization 87 Genesis of #FeesMustFall  89 #FeesMustFall and Social Change in South African Higher Education  93 Decolonization of the Curriculum and University  94 Curriculum Reform 101

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Free Education 110 What Is Free Education? 111 References 118 4 #OccupyGhana:  New Wave of Democracy and Accountability in Ghana?123 Background: From OccupyFlagStaff House to #OccupyGhana: The Rise of the Middle Class in Protest 125 Whose Accountability? The Clash of Individual and State Interests  139 #OccupyGhana and Social Change 147 Conclusion 156 References 158 5 The  Politics of Performance by Social Movements in Africa163 Performance and Ideological Spread 165 Performance Politics Within Social Movements in Africa 172 References 188 6 Rethinking  Social Movements and Digital Activism in Africa: Challenges and Prospects193 Rethink Social Movements and Activism in Africa? 201 References 204 Bibliography207 Index225

List of Figures

Fig. 2.1 Fig. 2.2

Fig. 2.3 Fig. 2.4 Fig. 2.5 Fig. 4.1 Fig. 4.2 Fig. 5.1

Fig. 5.2

Fig. 5.3

Poster used for the protest. Source: OurMumuDonDo Movement 51 Men arrested in the Osun State governorship election in 2018 with a bag of rice branded in the image of the political candidate ready to be given out as part of vote-buying. Source: Naij.com 60 Notice at the entrance of Charles Oputa’s house in Gwarinpa Estate Abuja 67 Some of the security assets at Unity Fountain 74 Some of the security men behind the cars. The venue was surrounded by security men daily 75 FlagStaff House, Accra Ghana 127 #OccupyGhana Facebook page 140 BBOG display of school desks on the 5th Anniversary of BBOG. Source: (https://www.facebook.com/ bringbackourgirls/photos/a.218484111695963/ 1100203693523996/?type=3&theater)179 Coconvener Aisha Yesufu inhaling teargas from the Nigerian security force. Source: https://www.facebook.com/ bringbackourgirls/photos/a.218484111695963/85351 5444859490/?type=3&theater)180 Nude protest at Wits University. Source: https://www.google. com/search?q=nude+protest+at+wits+university&rlz=1C1G CEU_enZA822ZA822&sxsrf=ALeKk00PmaA2reoTHZPRNnB MbNkSIQQeA:1582720947759&source=lnms&tbm=isch&sa=X &ved=2ahUKEwjalfrnu_nAhVNxIUKHZwtBx8Q_AUoAXoEC AsQAw&biw=1920&bih=979#imgrc=UJVC_KoS1b5sxM186

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Introduction

The idea of this book was conceived following the abduction of 200 or more Chibok schoolgirls from the Government Secondary School in Chibok, Borno State, Nigeria, on April 14, 2014. As usual, the news led to a public outcry, as citizens criticized the persistent failure of the Nigerian state, both military and civilian governments, to protect citizens, which should be their primary responsibility. At first glance, one would think that the outcry from the public would die down with time, and Nigerians would return to and continue with their daily activities as they have always done with other sociopolitical, economic and cultural issues that have affected them since independence in 1960. This outcry that started in the digital world via digital activism using hashtags of #BringBackOurGirls and #BBOG has continued. In addition, the past five years have also witnessed the rise of other digital activism, such as #OurMumuDonDo and #RedCardMovement, among others, as a way of addressing salient issues confronting the Nigerian state. This scenario is not different from events occurring in other African countries. In South Africa, there has been a rise of what Nyamnjoh (2016) terms #WhatMustRise to ‘#WhatMustFall’ in digital activism, as digital activism has become a common phenomenon for ordinary South Africans to express their dissatisfaction with the everyday running of the country using hashtags. For instance, digital movements such as #RhodesMustFall, #FeesMustFall, #ZumaMustFall, #BlackHairRocks, and #MenAreTrash emerged in 2015, and these hashtags have not only assisted in addressing © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 U. Akpojivi, Social Movements and Digital Activism in Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30207-7_1

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political, economic and cultural issues challenging post-apartheid South Africa following 23 years towards democracy but have also redefined relationships between the state and its citizens. Mandela and Langa (2017) stated that the South African state faced serious transformation issues that had affected the ability of citizens to enjoy the fruits of democracy. This has consequently led to a series of service delivery protests by citizens who believed that the dream of democracy had not had any impact on their day-to-day existence. For instance, there were over 3000 service delivery protests within two years and eight months in South Africa (News24 cited in Akpojivi, 2018a). With the rise of digital activism, the nature of protests that have characterized South African society has changed, as citizens not only need to toyi toyi1 but could use hashtags in organizing their toyi toyi and enforcing the legitimacy of their protest. For instance, #FeesMustFall can be regarded as a successful movement due to its disruption of universities across the country for two years via online hashtag activity and offline protest activity. Similarly, in Ghana, citizens have adopted social movements and digital activism as a form of holding governments accountable. For example, #OccupyGhana has become a fundamental tool in building a positive mindset among citizens on the need to promote good governance and demand transparency and accountability in governance at all levels. Likewise, #FixThisCountry, Stand Point and Pepper have been at the forefront challenging deep-rooted societal issues affecting the socioeconomic, political and cultural development of women in Ghana. Not only have these movements or protest actions challenged deep-rooted societal issues, they are now considered the vanguard of Ghana’s democracy, as they drive and push ideologies and discourses, and are considered by the public as the ‘watchdog’ of society. This assertion is in no way replacing the mass media, which Edmund Burke termed the fourth estate of the realm due to their watchdog roles, but such activism has played a pinnacle role in strengthening Ghana’s democratic process. Across the African continent, protest actions and digital activism have been dominant, as citizens are not only using new media technologies to challenge nation states and but also  shape the politics of their states. Tufekci and Wilson (2012), while drawing from the Arab spring experience, argue that in Egypt, social media has provided an alternative public 1  Toyi toyi is a Southern African phrase that stands for protest. This protest sees ordinary citizens gather in the street and engage with security agencies. This protest is usually violent as citizens burn tyres, and throws stones at security agencies.

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sphere for citizens to deliberate on issues that affect them. Therefore, the rise of protest actions in Nigeria, Ghana and South Africa can be argued to be citizens that were once excluded from the democratic project of their countries due to socioeconomic, political and cultural issues capitalizing on these new media technologies and their affordances to speak about societal ills and shape the polity of their respective countries. In Nigeria, according to the Nigerian Communication Commission (NCC), the teledensity as of April 2020 is 99.96, with 190,475,494 active mobile (GSM) and 107,443 fixed lines (NCC, 2020). This growth in the penetration rate of mobile and internet services has made Nigeria the fastest growing telecommunication industry in Africa. The case is not different in Ghana, as the National Communication Authority (NCA) in their report of March 2020 posited that there are 41,959,298 mobile voice subscriptions, of which 25,479511 are mobile data subscriptions during the said period (NCA, 2020). Likewise, in South Africa, there are approximately 36.5 million active internet users and 34.9 million active mobile internet users as of January 2020 (Statista, 2020). The above numbers show a significant increase and connectivity within these countries following their poor and weak infrastructure (especially Nigeria and Ghana) during colonialism and at the beginning of the democratization and redemocratization processes (see Akpojivi, 2018a). Ndukwe (2011), while buttressing the above, posited that in Nigeria, there were only 18,724 telephone lines as at independence in 1960 and approximately 500,000 lines in 2000. However, this does not neglect the fact that there are still massive inequalities in relation to access due to social inequalities and the urban–rural dichotomy that has made many people unable to access these new media technologies affordance and communicative space (Smith, 2006). Despite these exclusions, it can be argued that the increased penetration rate of both mobile and data services has created an alternative public sphere for citizens to hold their leaders accountable and press for social change via activism and protest action (see Bosch et al., 2020). Diamond (2010) regards these technologies as ‘liberating technology’, as citizens’ application of these technologies has resulted in challenging authoritarian regimes or even democratic regimes that are perceived not to deliver on democratic goals. According to Bosch et al. (2020), while expounding this idea of liberating technologies, these new media technologies, such as social media, have created ‘communicative platforms for political discourse’. In most democratic countries, mainstream communicative platforms such as the mass media have been hijacked by people with political and economic powers,

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preventing ordinary citizens from participating in such communicative and deliberative platforms (see Akpojivi, 2018a). Therefore, it can be argued that the upheave of activism and protest actions that has characterized sub-Saharan countries such as Nigeria, Ghana and South Africa is based on the fact that citizens are trying to circumvent restricted communicative platforms by using these liberating technologies to call for good governance, democracy and transparency. Some scholars, such as Boudreau (2013), have likened the emergence of these protest actions and digital movements to the rise of black consciousness and thoughts that seek to challenge normative societal values that promote germane political, economic and cultural issues. Steve Biko, in his book titled I write what I like, argued that Africans should resist societal cultures and systems that seem to degrade them, and impact negatively on their everyday lives and humanity, and their development. Therefore, the perception that the rise of digital activism across the African continent seeks to promote African identity that will facilitate the sociopolitical, economic and cultural developments of citizens while challenging colonial values and coloniality, which is believed, will lead to true decolonization. For instance, the #OurMumuDonDo and #FeesMustFall and #OccupyGhana have all called for a rebirth, consciousness, and decolonization of their respective countries. This call emphasizes a new societal value and culture that is at the heart of any decolonization project. On the other hand, scholars such as Chiumbu (2015) asserted that the rise of digital activism is a result of radical democracy that has grown on the continent in which people are now empowered more than before to engage with the state and press for the betterment of society. This means that citizens are better informed and ready to hold government accountable instead of being on the sideline. This is in line with Mudhai’s (2004) assertion that digital activism and new media technologies have offered platforms to ordinary citizens to speak back to power on issues that affect them, and this has changed the dynamics of governance. Despite these different positions about digital activism and its potential to bring about social change, some studies have criticized this technological determinism approach or studies (Mutsvairo, 2016a, 2016b; Mudhai, 2013; Diamond, 2010) that have often characterized the discussion of social movements and digital activism in Africa. Recent events and studies have shown that social media and digital activism have not expounded on the democratic space but have threatened it due to the ease with which it can be manipulated to advance certain agendas (see Olaniyan & Akpojivi,

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2021). Mutsvairo (2020), while buttressing on this, argues that despite the significant increase and adaptation of social media in Africa, social media and digital activism have not brought about the needed social change and development in the continent. On the other hand, studies from Deibert et al. (2008) and Morozov (2011) argue that these technologies are being restricted by nation-states and therefore cannot liberate or bring about social change. While these studies have provided invaluable insight into digital activism and information communication technology usage on the African continent, there is a need to examine the processes of these activities. The actors involved, the ideologies of these actors, how these ideologies are playing out and leading to social change, and the interplay/intersection between the different actors and their ideas. The need to examine the above is centered on questions that continue to linger in  my mind and have not been properly addressed in previous studies. Questions such as: Why have citizens resorted to the use of digital activism as a way of addressing their concerns and engaging with the state? What ideologies drive these movements and protest actors? Why and how have these forms of activism continued despite criticism/criminalization from the state and accusations from other stakeholders? What is so unique about these social movements and digital activism that have defied previous norms of public outcry and criticism against the state? Invariably, this study is interested in the micro-macro relationship of social movements, digital movements and protest actions. Therefore, this book explores the ideas of social movements and digital activism and their actors and ideologies for two reasons. First, in understanding digital activism and social movements, scholars should be interested in the role of actors, i.e., activists, their background and how their various backgrounds shape their ideologies, goals and objectives of the movements, and influence the interplay between the activists and the state. This understanding is salient, as one will be unable to understand activism and social movements without a holistic understanding or knowledge of the actors involved. As Brandes and Engel (2011: 5) put it, to understand social and digital movements, there is a need to study these movements against the  historical and sociopolitical surroundings from which they emerged. Second, the ideologies of these movements need to be examined to interrogate and understand the influence and impact of these ideologies on the polity of the national state. These ideologies will help establish the relationship between the various actors, i.e., government, citizens and other stakeholders. Such relationships will determine the nature of

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discourse and counter-discourse that will be produced by the different actors in digital activism and how this shapes the polity of nation-states. In examining the actors, their ideologies and relationships, this book argues that digital activism has evolved in the African continent and has become a variable tool for citizens to protest against inherent colonial, political, economic and cultural issues that have been embedded in society, which has continued to hinder the development of society and citizens. Consequently, due to the importance of digital activism in addressing ‘forbidden issues’, the everyday processes and structure of digital activism and social movements have changed. This change is because digital activism and social movements are regarded as the ‘third force2’ of society where citizens ascend to what Dr. Oby Ezekwesili termed the ‘office of the citizens’ to demand accountability and good governance, and this can only be achieved when these citizens collate and actively use digital or social movements as a force to question and press for good policies. The need for this ‘third force’ within the African continent cannot be overemphasized, as the continent is faced with poor governance, infrastructural deficits, poor economic growth, high mortality rates and poor living standards that have led to lower life expectancy, which has resulted in African countries being labelled ‘shithole countries’ by former President Donald Trump. While this remark from former President Trump has drawn wider criticism, many socialist thinkers have accepted this label due to the underdeveloped and unprogressive nature of the African states. Consequently, digital activism and social movements are seen as the only hope to drive good governance and accountability. Former President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, while buttressing the above fact, further held that for democracy, development and good governance to strive, it depended on a movement commitment to banishing poverty, undemocratic tendencies and despair. A cursory look shows that movements have been sweeping across the African continent in the form of digital activism and social movements. Additionally, this book argues that because of the vested or narrow interests of the actors involved in activism, social movements and activism could easily be manipulated to reflect the selfish interests of the leader or 2  Former President Olusegun Obasanjo in his letter to President Buhari titled ‘The Way Out: A Clarion Call for Coalition for Nigerian Movement’ likened social movements to a third force that can check government and bring about a new wave of transparency and good governance.

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main organizer, and this could be extremely dangerous to the democratic culture of society, as not only does it derail the movement from achieving the overall objectives, but it could lead to shrinking the alternative space of engagement. Although some scholars might see this as a good thing due to the splitter groups of activists, I have argued that within the African continent where democratic cultures are not ‘new’, such an act will lead to distrust from the public about the purpose or essence of social movements and activism. Consequently, there is a disconnect between the actors and the public, which will not advance the democratic project or culture.

Digital Activism in Nigeria, Ghana and South Africa A great deal of activism has been apparent on the African continent, as previously mentioned, and scholars have written about this activism from the perspective of Zimbabwe, South Africa, Kenya, Egypt and the Arab Spring experiences (see Gladwell, 2010; Mutsvairo, 2016a, 2016b; Mudhai, 2013; Nyamnjoh, 2016). However, the focus of this book is centred on three countries, i.e., Nigeria, Ghana and South Africa. The rationale for focusing on these countries is that I have visited them, watched and paid keen interest to the political, economic and social developments of these countries. I realized that ordinary citizens are coming together to address salient inherent issues that have consistently affected their development using digital activism in the form of hashtags. As Olaniyan et al. (2010) describes, the perennial abuse of power by elites and states in postcolonial states since independence has made citizens become anti-state, the coalition of nonconformists who seek to challenge the status quo of repression and massive corruption and social injustice. In addition, the sociopolitical, economic and cultural backgrounds of these countries have influenced the upsurge of digital activism and social movements in these countries, pressing for political, economic, cultural and social redress, which has been ignored for too long. Thus, the high expectations and hopes in the affordances of these technologies to liberate these countries from massive underdevelopment and anti-democratic cultures of corruption, vote buying and election rigging, insecurities and economic inequalities. In South Africa, for example, Statistics South Africa in its 2017 report held that the poverty level had seen a significant increase to 55.5%, which means that over 34 million people are living in poverty. Likewise, unemployment is estimated at 26.6%, attributed to corruption and the state

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being accused of capture by a few business people who have economic and political interests (Pauw, 2017). In Nigeria, there has been an increase in crime from Boko Haram, herdsmen and kidnappers, coupled with an economic crisis (recession), a high unemployment rate (14.2% as of 2016) estimated by Nigeria’s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), and a poor governance record. Likewise, in Ghana, the country is faced with a poor economic situation and a lack of basic amenities such as good roads and drinking water amid high levels of corruption. All these problems have necessitated the rise of protest actions, social movements and digital activism such as #BringBackOurGirls, #RedCardMovement and #OurMumuDonDo, #OccupyGhana, #FixTheCountry, Stand Point, Pepper them, #ZumaMustFall, #FeesMustFall, and #RhodesMustFall from Nigeria, Ghana and South Africa. These different movements have influenced the polity of the different states and impacted the relationship between citizens and the state. As Mutsvairo (2016a) puts it, ordinary citizens have used mobile technologies to adopt social initiatives, empower themselves and inspire ‘collective political and social involvements’ to address societal problems and challenges. Therefore, this study adopts ethnography, cyber ethnography and interview approaches to examine four different social movements and digital movements. #BringBackOurGirls, #OurMumuDonDo, #Occupy Ghana, and #FeesMustFall, respectively. I am aware of readers having different readings or meanings of ethnography, as this is because of the diverse field of anthropology in which ethnography is a primary approach. In this study, my usage of the word ethnography highlights two things. First, I am concerned about studying people in their lived environments and realities (Hallett & Barber, 2014: 307). These lived realities of people entails their interaction and engagement with others, and, in the context of this study, interaction within the social movement and with other stakeholders, i.e., state or nonstate actors. To understand these lives realities, I had to engage in some of the public activities of the studied social movements and protest actions and, in some instances, observed and interviewed participants in the field. This leads to the second point, which is that in the discourse of ethnography, it is generally referred to going to the field, which ascribes a physical space to the field (Geertz, 1973). Street and  Coleman (2013), while buttressing the above further, posited that people using ethnography should immerse themselves in the field-physical space. However, when we speak of the field of study, it is not limited to

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physical place or space, as the emergence of new media technologies means that these technologies could be sites of study. According to Haverinen (2015: 81), social media sites or new media technologies are rich with good contextual material for research activities, making them a site of study that can be undertaken using cyber-­ ethnography3 or digital ethnography (Postill & Pink, 2012). New media technologies are sites of study because they have become people’s lived realities and experiences as they are ingrained into their everyday lives and how they interact with society, hence the assertion that these technologies are an extension of man. Consequently, Gupta and Ferguson (1997) criticized the traditional notion of ethnography and the physical field of study due to its limitations. Therefore, in this study, the field of study, i.e., where data are collected, is not bounded by physical place or space, as data were collected using traditional ethnographic tools of interviews, observation and cyber-ethnography of collecting and using data from social media sites and observing the interactions. The rationale behind using these movements is that these movements, to a large extent, have revolutionized not only social movements and activism but also everyday processes and formation. As such, the processes of activism and social movements have changed from the rudimentary way of protest to a more coordinated approach. As Olaniyan et al. (2010) puts it, these anti-state forces, such as social movements and digital activism, have adopted coordinated, unconventional methods or approaches in their protest actions. These could be online actions of tweeting, posting on Facebook and blogs or offline actions of street protests and campaigns, or in some instances the combination of both online and offline actions  (Tufekci & Wilson, 2012). According to Tufekci and Wilson (2012), drawing from the Egyptian experience during the Arab spring, coordinated approaches of using mainstream media for gathering information and social media for mobilizing and offline protest actions were key during the Egyptian revolution. This coordinated approach has witnessed mixed results. Successes and failures; for example, while #FeesMustFall and #RhodesMustFall were considered successful due to their coordinated approach of online and offline activism (Daniels & Mutsvairo, 2016), #ZumaMustFall was not successful despite embracing the same approach (Akpojivi, 2020). 3  According to Postill and Pink (2012), cyber ethnography or digital ethnography is used in the context where researchers analyse how offline phenomena readily affect the use of online phenomena.

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Hence, using a comparative study of these different protest actions, activism and social movements in these countries, it will be possible to understand and situate these movements around the political, economic and cultural context and ascertain the extent and degree to which these movements influence and impact the polity of the nation state, and promote and achieve their set objectives. This study departs from other studies that have examined digital movements in Africa, as those studies mainly focus on and examine discourses from Twitter and posts on Facebook pages. For example, Aina et  al. (2019), Olutokunbo et  al. (2015), and Njoroge (2015), among others, approached social movements methodologically from discourses emerging from tweets or Facebook posts. Much has been written about activism, movements and their discourses, but little about the politics, ideas and macro-micro relationship from the perspective of the selected cases. Other studies, such as Gustafsson (2012), Castells (2012) and Bosch (2012), have focused on the technological determinism approach, that is, how citizens use new media platforms for political purposes. As stated earlier, in this study, I am interested in the micro and macro relationship within social movements and protest actions and how this relationship influences engagement with other stakeholders. According to Opp (2009), an understanding of this micromacro relationship will provide an in depth perspective on what motives people take in protest actions and social movements, and the incentives they seek to derive. Therefore, I am interested in the politics and ideologies of the selected social movements and their usage of social media to push their ideas and engagement with state and nonstate actors. Additionally, I am interested in the ideologies of these social movements and how these ideologies shape their interaction and engagement with state and nonstate actors. By focusing on the inner politics and ideologies of these movements, I will be able to show the intersection of social movements’ micro-­ macro relationship and their influences in the societal polity. This approach will suffice in providing a nuanced perspective of the social movements’ actors, their ideologies, internal politics, and their ability to facilitate social change. Therefore, this study, by adopting interviews with the actors of the movements, ethnography and cyber-ethnography of the activities of the movements, will be able to effectively interrogate the actors, their ideologies, their strategies, and their ability to facilitate social change in a society, which are the main crux of this study. Additionally, using a comparative approach of these different case studies will help provide rich detailed information in relation to common

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11

patterns, trends, and differences between these digital movements (see Voltmer, 2008). Such information is invaluable in providing knowledge about human interactivity and relationships in a changing dynamitic society.

Brief Overview of Nigeria, Ghana and South Africa Nigeria, located in West Africa, gained independence from Great Britain in 1960. The struggle for independence, according to Nyamnjoh (2005), can be regarded as violence-free, as nationalists used the mass media actively in the struggle for independence. Therefore, the struggle for independence in Nigeria was different from that in other countries whose processes were violent. However, the euphoria that characterized the attainment of independence, i.e., political stability, economic growth and development, and cultural unification, was short lived due to complicated internal issues such as ethnic sentiments and division across the country, the failed promises—hence the military coup and civil war that occurred almost immediately after independence (see Osaghae, 1998). Osaghae (1998) argues that following independence, the Nigerian state had been confronted with a series of political and economic issues, and these problems that faced the new independent Nigerian state were attributed to the colonial legacy and the attempt by the new political elites to emulate colonial practices (see Uko, 2004; Osaghae, 1998). Fanon (1967), while buttressing the above position, argued that the drive for true decolonization and solving African problems was hindered due to the emerging African leaders and elites emulating colonial practices as a result of their desire to be like the colonial master. Uko (2004), while supporting this point, stated that the post-­ independence Nigeria political class emulated colonial tendencies, which impacted the stability of the new state. However, the coming together of civil societies and the active participation of the media helped foster democratic culture in 1999. Nevertheless, the embrace of democracy in 1999 and the stability of this democratic culture4 has not necessarily transformed the Nigerian state, as the country is believed to be deeply rooted in corruption, neo-patrimonial political culture, widespread underdevelopment 4  Nigeria’s democracy can be regarded as fragile as since independence there have been about seven coups with the first occurring just six years after democracy. The redemocratization project that started in 1999 is regarded as the longest democratic experience in Nigeria.

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and citizens’ dissatisfaction (see Adetula et  al., 2010). Consequently, Campbell (2011) alleged that due to the challenges confronting the Nigerian state, Nigeria is dancing on the brink of becoming a failed state. Although this sentiment has widely been criticized, citizens’ actions in the form of street protest and the rise of hashtag activism have attested to a strained relationship between citizens and the state. Nigerians have resorted to the use of hashtags and social movements as a way of addressing the fundamental problems facing the country. This is to avoid the case of using the same old strategy of engagement between citizens and the state, which has not yielded the required results. As Chinua Achebe puts it in his book titled There was a Country, ‘an Igbo proverb tells us that a man who does not know where the rain began to beat him cannot say where he dried his body’ (2012: 1). In other words, the identification of societal problems will determine the approach(es) to be used in addressing the problem, as the old means of addressing societal problems have not been effective. The use of hashtags, i.e., Digital activism, has led to a change in interactions, as citizens can directly engage with societal problems, and demand improvement and accountability from the state or actors involved (Browne, 2015). Thus, digital movements such as #OccupyNigeria, #BringBackOurGirls, #RedCardMovement, and #OurMumuDonDo have sprung up as a way of transforming the Nigerian state into what citizens expect. Similarly, Ghana, located in West Africa, can be regarded as one of the first countries to gain independence from colonial imperials in 1958. The independence of Ghana was birthed by the political renaissance that was sweeping across the continent. According to Kwame Nkrumah, ‘wind of change has become a raging hurricane sweeping away the old colonialist Africa’ as Africans were tired of colonial powers who arrogated to themselves rights and entitlements to the determination of Africa (1961: ix). Therefore, Nkrumah and five other people (Ebenezer Ako-Adjei, Edward Akufo-Addo, Joseph Boakye Danquah, Emmanuel Obetsebi-Lamptey and William Ofori Atta) considered the ‘big six’ founded the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC), which was instrumental in the struggle for independence. As they organized protest actions and boycotts against the colonial authorities, these, and the active use of the media, resulted in Ghana attaining independence in 1957 (Nkrumah, 1961). At independence, the vision was to build an ‘economic freedom for Ghana, and Africans’ emancipation and unity’ was considered a primary objective for the new independent state because Ghana’s independence

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was considered by Nkrumah to be meaningless if it was not economically free and if other African countries were still under colonialism (Nkrumah, 1961: 111). According to Nkrumah, ‘the independence of Ghana is meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of the African continent’ (Nkrumah, 1961: 111). Nevertheless, this vision was short lived, as Nkrumah was removed from power by the military under Colonel Kotaka citing the economic crisis and Ghana’s overinvolvement in trying to liberate other African countries. This subsequently led to governance issues as Ghana witnessed numerous coups and changes in government from civilian to military and military to civilian (see Akpojivi & Fosu, 2016). However, the 1990s witnessed a new drive to redemocratization as Ghana transformed its political space and embraced multiparty elections in 1994 (Akpojivi, 2018a). This move, according to Hasty (2005), was facilitated by economic pressures from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank and Western governments. This redemocratized era has been sustained by civil societies and the media that have constantly been engaging with the state and other actors by questioning both state and nonstate actors, and demanding accountability. Hasty (2005), while exploring this idea, further stated that the participation of the public and the ability of civil societies to give voice to the subaltern helped to strengthen the democratic process, as people were able to express themselves and demand action from the new political order. This development does not ignore the fact that there have been changes and challenges to the political and economic situation in Ghana. Challenges such as inflation that resulted in the devaluing of the currency, high corruption and unemployment, among others. Furthermore, the assertion that Ghana was the first nation to gain independence in the Sub-Saharan African region and not living up to the expectation of political transparency, good governance and accountability was needed to facilitate political, economic and cultural developments. Consequently, these challenges have led to the establishment of social movements or digital activism that seek advocacy for good governance and transparency within society. According to Tilly (2004), social movements and digital activism have become tools for highlighting problems in society and the need to address these problems. It is believed that highlighting these problems and the dissatisfaction of citizens, government and other stakeholders will be able to take action to address these problems (see Akpojivi, 2018b). Hence, movements such as #OccupyGhana have sprung up, acting as a platform for Ghanaians to advocate for

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development and holding governments accountable for their actions and inactions. South Africa, considered the most developed African country, and a beacon of democracy on the continent, has not been left behind with the wave of social movements and digital activism. South Africa gained independence in 1994 following years of settler-colonizer colonialism, which significantly impacted not only the socioeconomic, political and cultural development of the country but also the structure of the country. By this, I mean, every discussion on South Africa has to be contextualized within its unique historical attendance that has continued to determine or influence the readings of the country. In 1994, the dawn of democracy, the challenge confronting the state was fostering unity among all and advancing political and economic emancipation (Mandela & Langa, 2017), which influenced the policy approach of the country. However, 23  years following the institution of democracy, there has been unrest amongst the citizens who question the path of the country and the democratic culture. According to Brunlof (2017), due to the inability of citizens to attain economic transformation, there is the belief that South Africans were sold a ‘pipe dream’ of democracy. Therefore, the incessant protests that have characterized the South African state over service delivery, drive for accountability and good governance persist. Although protest is not a new phenomenon in the South African state due to the antecedence of apartheid, postapartheid South Africa has witnessed a significant increase in violent protest. Von Liere (2014) claims that these violent protests are centred around one fundamental problem: service delivery. These protests, which usually occur in predominantly black communities, attest to the inequality that has characterized infrastructural development. Pauw (2017) added that corruption within governmental establishments has contributed to the disconnect between citizens and the state. Transparency International, in its corruption perception index report of 2017, scored South Africa 43 out of 100 and ranked the country 71 out of 180 (https://www.transparency.org/country/ZAF). This dissatisfaction, coupled with the need to address inequality, has resulted in social movements and digital activism such as #FeesMustFall, which will be discussed in Chap. 3. These movements have highlighted the deeply inherent transformational issues ranging from governance to racial contestations confronting South Africa. Therefore, the need to ask whether social movements and digital activism have a role to play in facilitating social change? Whose ideas inform or shape social movements and digital

1 INTRODUCTION 

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activism? How do the contestations of ideologies play out during the process of social movement and digital activism and in their drive for social change? These and many other questions concerning social movements and digital activism in Nigeria, South Africa and Ghana are discussed later in the chapters that follow.

How to Read Social Movement and Digital Activism in this Book Social movements and digital activism are concepts that will often be mentioned in this book. Both concepts mean different things to different people, and this has influenced how scholars conceptualize both concepts. For instance, some scholars have approached the concept of social movement from the characteristic approach, that is, what features can be found or should a social movement exhibit/display (see Aminzade, 1995). Others such as Castells (2012) and Tilly (1984) have approached social movement from the outcome perspective, i.e., participatory and engagement. These different approaches in which social movements can be conceptualized have made it difficult to have a universally acceptable definition, and in most cases, such definitions are problematic due to the simplicity of such definitions (Opp, 2009). According to Opp (2009), most of these ideas from scholars about social movements are from the narrow prism, which is mostly influenced by the neo-classic economics perspective, and the wider prism of social movements is usually embraced by sociologists. Leslie (2006: 21) defines social movements as “a sustained interaction between a specific set of authorities and various spokespersons holding a set of opinions and beliefs and preferences for changing some aspects of the social structure and reward distribution of a society.” This definition focuses on the characteristics of social movements, as it identifies actors as well as the change that social movements seek to achieve either socioeconomic or ideological as central features of social movements. This definition emphasizes the sustained interaction between different actors, and this sustained interaction differentiates social movements from protests. The above definition can be regarded to focus on the macrostructure of social movements, that is, the social behaviour and the coordination and usage of resources to achieve set goals (Opp, 2009). Such a definition ignores the microstructure of the social movement and the view that any discussion of social movement must integrate or view social movements

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from the macro-micro structure. As Opp (2009) describes, the impact of one of the structures, whether macro, will shape or influence the micro, and likewise, the microstructure will impact the macro. Therefore, juxtaposing the argument that a holistic examination of the macro-micro relationship of social movement must be reflective in any definition. For instance, Opp (2009), while showing the interconnectedness of macro-­ micro relationships within social movements, argued that ‘proponents of the macro approaches (resource mobilization and political opportunity perspectives) as well as those who focus on micro model (identity and framing approaches) propose a model that includes macro as well as micro hypotheses’. Hence, by focusing on ideologies of social movements and the intersection of all the actors of the selected cases, this study invariably adopts a macro-micro approach to social movement study. Therefore, in this book, what I mean by social movements is the coming together of people to create awareness of social issues to challenge the relevant authorities to take action (Smith et al. 2001). This working definition highlights the ‘fruitful criteria for theory basis’ identified by Opp (2009) that every social movement must meet since it is impossible to have a universally acceptable definition. These are collective identity and actors, protest groups, and sustained engagement (Opp, 2009). On collective identity and actors, Opp (2009) posited that social movement is the collectivity of people coming together to address social or societal issues. Mair et al. (2002) further posits that social issues such as economic inequality, access to education, and social injustice, which are deep-rooted societal issues, bring people together to advocate for social change in society. This means that social movements are activism-led movements that are facilitated by societal problems, and the need to address these problems brings different people irrespective of background, gender, race or class to come together to fathom ways of addressing these problems via collective action (see Castells, 2012). This collective action is reflected in the collective behaviour to engage with relevant stakeholders/actors and bring about social change. Tarrow (2011) argues that the idea of collective is critical in social movements, as it guarantees the impact that a movement can make. According to Leslie (2006), social movement actors rely on each other and maintain the existing social networks for increased opportunities for success. In addition, they do this via their collective actions of pulling resources (financial and humans) and mobilizing others to join their cause (Dobash & Dobash,

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1992). Dobash and Dobash (1992) argue that for social movements to make more significant impacts, the resource mobilization stance allows them to lie dormant for periods and resume when issues they focus on re-­ emerge in communities or when there are new possibilities for change. This is indicative of the ever-transforming nature of social movements and how the element of collective has remained key in the operations of social movements. While the collective is inherently good for social movements, Dobash and Dobash (1992) argue that a critical component within a collective is the existence of radical factions within movements because they ultimately push for the most extreme of changes through the most radical means, making the demands of moderate factions seem more moderate from within and outside the movement. This idea of collectivity and the transformative nature of sustained series of engagement brings to bear the notion of contentious politics by movement actors as posited by Tarrow (1998, 2011), as it includes collective acts by movement actors to coerce the state into giving in to their demands. Tarrow (1998: 2) argues that ‘contentious politics occurs when ordinary people, often in league with more influential citizens, join forces in confrontation with elites, authorities, and opponents’ (1998: 2). The notion of contentious politics brings to the fore the issues of confrontation between movement actors and the state, particularly authorities such as the police and army during the processes of sustained interaction. Therefore, I highlight the sustained series of engagement between the different actors involved in addressing the problems. This shows that social movement is about engagement, which usually has the state or instruments of the state as key political actors, and there is a contestation for resources. As Tarrow (1998: 2) puts it, ‘contentious politics is triggered when changing political opportunities and constraints create incentives for social actors who lack resources on their own. They contend through known repertoires of contention and expand them by creating innovations as the margin. When backed by dense social networks and galvanized by cultural resonant, action-oriented symbols, contentious politics lead to sustained interaction with opponents. The result is a social movement’. This speaks about the political struggle by different actors, and the nature of the struggle and change that the social movement seeks to achieve, as this will set the tone for actions the movement organizes and implements to achieve maximum impact. According to Leslie (2006: 42), ‘in order for social movements to realize their potential to effect social

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change, they need to exert control over the state apparatus’. This can only be achieved by exerting pressure on the state, as the state is the key actor that most movements seek to transform, therefore making the state key to the operations of social movement action. While identifying the state as a key actor within social movement politics, Leslie adds that ‘social movements make demands on the state yet, paradoxically for social change to prevail it has to have the support of the state… the state is the architect of the political environment within which social movements emerge and operate, thus creating the opportunities for action and, alternatively, imposing restrictions on movement activities’ (Leslie, 2006: 35). Consequently, social movement actors are in a precarious position, as social movements are born out of the failures of the state, but social change can only be realized with the support of the state. Whether it relates to policy changes or the provision of essential services, social movements heavily rely on responses from the state. Consequently, social movements are a formidable tool for ordinary citizens to organize themselves and address social injustice in society through their constant engagement with the state and other relevant stakeholders (Tilly, 1984). Tilly (1984: 5) emphasized this constant engagement in social movements, as it is this ‘sustained series of interactions between challenging groups {social movement) and the state’ that will bring about the needed change. This ‘engagement’ between the movement and the state broadens the democratic process (Beck, 1992), as citizens are able to contribute to societal discourse on issues affecting its development. Such a contribution enhances participation between social movement members and the state, thus building and strengthening ‘relationships’ with each other and having ‘meaningful interactions’ with themselves, expounding the democratic culture and process. Klandermans (1995: 3) added that such interaction and relationship is the main motive of social movements, as social movements seek to facilitate a four-way interaction mechanism, i.e., interaction with citizens, interaction with social movements, interaction with the state and interaction with various political representative systems. This four-way interaction mechanism highlights that social change to political, economic and cultural issues that social movements seek to address is tied to the complex structure of society, and by building a ‘healthy interaction and relationship’ between the different actors involved, i.e., state actors and nonstate actors is what will drive the process of change. Therefore, social movements are a pivotal tool for initiating social change

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through activism. Social movement activism is manifested in different ways. Rudimentary activism on the street via protest and occupying public spaces or digital activism—activism that involves the use of technology in advocacy. Joyce (2010) sees digital activism as the use of digital technology by people to initiate and facilitate campaigns for change in policy reform in the political, economic and social spheres. These digital technologies used for digital activism include the internet and web-based applications on social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter and YouTube (see Akpojivi, 2018). There has been a significant shift from the rudimentary activism of social movements, which has been widely studied by Castells and Tilly, to digital activism in the Global South, especially in Africa. The rise of digital activism in contemporary society is rooted in three factors. First, there has been a significant increase in the penetration rate of mobile phone technology on the African continent. Although the internet arrived first in Africa, due to a lack of infrastructure, its penetration was limited. Nevertheless, with the emergence of mobile and smart mobile phones, there has been a significant increase in the usage of mobile phone technology and the internet (Otieno, 2009). According to Otieno (2009: 18), the penetration rate of mobile phones has skyrocketed in Africa, as there is no single African country that is left out of mobile phone reach. Access to mobile phones has enhanced communication and the free flow of information. Second, the security associated with the usage of mobile phones for digital activism has led to an increase in digital activism. These technologies, to a large extent, are devoid of state monopoly and control, and authoritarian governments are thinking of ways to regulate or control these technologies (Morozov, 2011). Third, Ghobadi and Clegg (2015) argue that digital activism through the use of hashtags helps to challenge dominant powerful elites and power structures in society. With digital activism, awareness is easily created as people become informed about events occurring in society. The ability of local, national and international publics to be aware has necessitated digital activism, despite government control of the mainstream media (see Akpojivi, 2014), and has made digital activism an agent of social change. Assange (2014: 10) attested to this fact by stating that social movements in the twenty-first century had adopted digital activism (use of new media platforms) because it offered people with ‘shared culture, shared values and shared aspirations’ a platform to engage with themselves and seek ways of addressing societal problems.

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It is this shared culture, values and aspirations that constitute the collective action of digital activism. However, scholars have questioned the ability of digital activism to have collective action as a result of the diverse people coming together with personal interests (see Fenton & Barassi, 2011). However, the idea that people could come together despite their personal motive to seek to address a societal problem, which is the shared value and aspiration, makes digital activism a good source of collective action. Through the use of hashtags and other new media/social media platforms, citizens are able to engage with themselves irrespective of their backgrounds and personal interest to form a collective interest that pushes and campaigns for social change to economic, political and cultural issues that affect their development. Porta and Mosca (2005), and Bennett (2003: 124) argue that it is this collective action through the use of new media technologies that have made digital activism ‘efficient’ in taking ‘political action…or change the political game itself’. Hence, justifying Assange’s (2014: 10) claims that digital activism ‘has become a place where history happens, a place people identify with’.

Communication Power: Activism and Social Change The purpose of this section is to explain the theoretical framework grounding the arguments made in this book. This section will discuss three theories, i.e., communication power theory by Manuel Castells, resource mobilization theory by McCarthy and Zald, and black consciousness by Steve Biko. All three theories will be used to examine the macro-micro relationships of all selected cases in this study, that is, the ideologies of the movements and their engagement with the states, and to show how the intersection of both macro-micro relationships impacts their abilities to achieve or bring about social change as reflected in their causes. The argument made in this section is that communication is central to any activism and the need to bring about social change in society. This communication is over the minds of others (state actors and nonstate actors) to take action over an issue, and this process is contentious or what Tarrow (1998) called ‘contentious politics’, as the mind is considered a battle place (Biko, 1978). For social movements to win in this contentious politics between themselves and the state, they need to pull all their resources (human, financial, moral, time) in collectivity for the sake of societal good and to achieve their set objectives. The desire and consciousness of the social problems in society will make social movements come together in a

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collective, pulling all resources as a means of engaging with the relevant stakeholder (mainly the state) to address the social problem. As Biko puts it, it is the consciousness of social injustices and the need to address them that will prompt citizens to take action. This consciousness in the form of social movements and digital activism can be regarded as the ‘current wave of decolonization project’ that is sweeping across Africa to press for improved sociopolitical, economic and cultural life. Or what MaldonadoTorres termed the logic of coloniality of being, i.e., the struggle for a new order of life that would be beneficial to all and not the normative few (Wynter, 2003). Manuel Castells, in his book titled Communication Power, examined the power relationship and dynamics that exist between state and nonstate actors, i.e., citizens, government and other stakeholders. By communication power, Castells means that communication is a very important component of ‘power structure’, as it influences and shapes the human mind to take certain actions/decisions in their interactions with the social and natural environment. According to Castells (2012: 5), ‘the way people think determines the fate of the institutions, norms and values in which societies are organized’; consequently, government and state actors have always tried to control and influence processes. Therefore, Foucault (2000) argues that government and those in power define and interpret discourse, knowledge and truth. By so doing, they exercise and influence people’s understanding of society via discourse, and this attempt has resulted in constant struggles between all the actors in society or what Tarrow (1998) labelled contentious politics. Although Tarrow (1998) argued that this struggle or contention is to influence social polity, this argument can be extended to the public, that is, the struggle for the public to accept the position of the state, as their acceptance of the position of the social movement will to a large extent highlight the ills of the current societal polity or social injustice and, hence the need for reform or social change. One way the different actors try to establish their power and influence other stakeholders (public) in the struggle is through communication, thus making communication a germane element in the ‘structure and dynamics of society’ (Castells, 2009: 3). There is a constant struggle in the communication process of society, as in most African states, governments and state institutions exercise control over the information that is disclosed and shared with the public on national issues (Assange, 2014). For instance, in Cameroon, the government of Paul Biya shut down the internet in the Anglophone region of the

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country for over four months in 2017 during its struggle against separatists. Uganda’s Yoweri Museveni imposed a social media tax of 200 Ugandan Shillings on users of social media platforms such as Twitter, Facebook and WhatsApp that allowed an alternative source of information for the public. Similarly, in Kenya, the government of Uhuru Kenyatta censored the media and information about the political crisis of 2018 and likewise the attempt by the Nigerian military to censor and monitor information shared among new media technologies and the resultant ban of Twitter in 2021. The fundamental basis for the strict control of information is to prevent citizens from being informed and empowered to challenge, critique and hold the government accountable. A democratic culture is centred on an informed public and the free flow of information. However, media or social media has become a dominant site for the struggle for information between stakeholders and a site of engagement. For instance, Mare (2020) argued that governments have militarized communication through their act of shutdown/censorship of the media or internet, and this has become a common feature in postcolonial African states. In other cases, state actors could criminalize the activities of these counterpowers to control and maintain the status quo, and such criminalization includes the use of state police or military machinery to suppress the counterpower flow from social actors (see Okonjo-Iweale, 2018; Nyamnjoh, 2016; Mare, 2020; Mutsvairo, 2020; Morozov, 2011; Olaniyan & Akpojivi, 2021). Alfandika and Akpojivi (2020) argue that the media and social media, as vehicles for information, have become ideological sites for contestation between the different actors in society trying to influence or shape polity, and, in such ideological control, as Mare (2020) and Akpojivi (2018) argued, the state is always at an advantaged point due to political and economic powers that allow it to project a single view or ideas. Such control is to allow for a single view or idea of society that limits citizens’ ability to critically engage with the state. Morozov (2012), buttressing the above, posited that states had gone beyond the normative control or censorship of information in the mainstream media to include new media technologies. Repressive tendencies are now witnessed within new media platforms, as evident in the examples previously mentioned. Such repression encapsulates the struggle for the human mind, as according to Castells, ‘if a majority of people think in ways that are contradictory to the values and norms institutionalised in the state and enshrined in the law and regulations, ultimately the system will change’ (2007: 238–239).

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Castells’ assertion highlights the fact that the control of information and of the human mind revolves around power, i.e., who has the power to say what, do what {influence what} and in what ways, therefore giving room for contestation between the state and other actors. To Castells, ‘power is more than communication, and communication is more than power, but power relies on the control of communication’ (2011: 3), thus making communication a principal tool in the contestation for power. Mbembe (1992) argued that most postcolonial African states were not willing to share this power, hence the need for a counterpower that Castells reasoned was able to highlight the capacity of other social actors to challenge and change the power relations institutionalised in society. This counterpower is made possible with the use of communication (alternative ideology) to question and critique the dominant ideology of the state. According to Castells (2012), the rules and power relations between the different actors in society are changing as social actors such as social movements and activists use {alternative} information to appeal to the emotions and agency of other actors, i.e., the public and the state to compel them to either change them in the struggle or address sociopolitical, economic and cultural concerns. Therefore, citizens and the general public are empowered to take a stand over national issues that might be contrary to the interests of the state and other relevant actors (Arendt, 1958). However, as already highlighted, these alternative social media outlets are not devoid of government control (see Mare, 2020; Mutsvairo, 2020; Morozov, 2011; Olaniyan & Akpojivi, 2021). The principal idea of Castells behind communication power theory recognizes that there is a constant contestation and struggle of ideas by different actors and stakeholders, and this struggle is won based on the power of communication for the human mind and heart via the flow of ideology. Ideology is pivotal to social movements, their struggles and in bringing about social change. Eagleton (1991), while explaining ideology and its impact on society, argues that ‘ideology is a system of concepts and views which serves to make sense of the world while obscuring the social interests that are expressed therein, and by its completeness and relative internal consistency tends to form a closed system and maintain itself in the face of contradictory or inconsistent experience’. This means that people’s sense of the world or events is based on the ideas or views that are dominant in society mostly from the state and propagated by the media, and, in most cases, these ideas or views are from elites. As Marx puts it, ideology grows from the jurisdiction of production, which reflects the ruling class

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and seeks to maintain the status quo to keep them in power. In the context of this study, it means that societal ideologies are produced by the state, and the ruling class and social movements seek to counter this dominant ideology of the state by producing a counter ideology that highlights the failings of the state, thus the contestation over not just the ideologies that are produced but for the ‘human minds’ and their consumption of these ideologies. The public consumption of ideology, whether from the state or social movement, will influence the reality of society and its line of action. Additionally, the formation of most social movements, as this book will show, is influenced by elites, i.e., the middle class or people with some form of political, economic or cultural power. They established movements and used the movements to either counter state dominant ideologies or push their ideologies to bring about social change. Therefore, fitting into Marx’s idea of them being part of the base or superstructure of society in which ideology originates and is pushed into society. This ideology, information flow and communication structures (mainstream media or new media) are important to social movements, their strategy/action plan and their engagement with the state. Consequently, Marx argues that the awareness of people about their exploitation will lead to a fundamental change in ideology, as the people will organize and demand social change in the political, economic and cultural structures of society. As such, information and communication provide the ‘means by which competing views of the world and what is possible or not possible is articulated, transmitted, contested and mediated’ (Loader, 2008: 1922). Therefore, black consciousness and resource mobilization theory are brought into play. According to Steve Biko, the founder of the black consciousness movement, black consciousness revolves around the idea that for society or the black man to live a decent and meaningful life, the black man has to rally together around their cause to fight injustice and break free from the shackles that hold them down to a life of servitude. Although Biko was speaking more about apartheid South Africa and the need for black people to rally together to fight against the white apartheid state to achieve freedom, his idea of the ‘collectivity action’ of people is salient to any debate on resistance and social change. For Biko (1978), the realization of injustice in society and the need to address such injustice should encourage people to come together to fight and press for change for the betterment of society. The consciousness of injustice in society breeds anger and self-­ affirmation among people to resist such injustice and press for social

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justice. That is, the realization of the failure of the state to fulfil its responsibilities to citizens, whether political, economic or cultural, should encourage people to come together and take collective action to address such failures. Most studies on social movements and activism within the African continent have highlighted this collectivity based on the consciousness of the people. According to Mutsvairo (2016a), the rapid increase in digital activism within the continent is the consciousness and desire of the people to bring or change the status quo. On the other hand, Olson (1971) posited that this consciousness and collective action is for a ‘public good’, as such public good will lead to coordinated mass gathering and participation of citizens in achieving a desirable change or outcome in society due to the contestation of ideas and exploration of alternatives that will occur due to social movement providing the platform for such contestation. Du Bois (1903), while buttressing the above further, alluded to the idea of double consciousness within a black man, the awareness of oneself, deprivation, injustice and the awareness of an alternative and the desire to crave a better alternative based on their experience. Although Du Bois’ (1903) usage of the double consciousness is based on race and colonized people in an oppressed society, the ideas of self/internal conflict, oppression in society and awareness of alternatives are germane arguments within the context of this study. According to Du Bois, there is self/internal conflict within man, as the awareness of the present state and desire for change brings about strife. As Du Bois puts it ‘however, the vistas disclosed as yet no goal, no resting place, little but flattery and criticism, the journey at least gave leisure for reflection and self-examination; it changed the child of emancipation to the youth with dawning self—consciousness, self-realization, self-respect. In those somber forests of his striving his own soul rose before him, and saw himself, -darkly as through a veil; and yet he saw in himself some faint revelation of his power, of his mission’ (1903: 4). Consequently, this awareness of the injustice and oppressed nature of society will prompt anger, protest and the need to seek social change. As there is a longing for an alternative, a society where citizens’ concerns and oppression are addressed. According to Fatton, ‘consciousness is a place of moral anger and self-affirmation which embodies an ethical and political standard that condemns the existing social order and offers the vision of an alternative society’ (1986: 39). Fatton’s assertion highlights the fact that until there is a consciousness among the people, the status quo will remain, as it is the awareness of political, economic and sociocultural issues

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that will prompt people coming together to take collective action against the state or the relevant stakeholder. This idea is in line with Amilcar Cabral’s (1966) position of ideological weaponry, which recognizes alternative ideas as a ‘weapon’ to address social injustice that has affected the sociopolitical, economic and cultural development of Africa. This consciousness coupled with the desire to resist and withstand the criminalization of the state or what Choudry (2019) termed the ‘pedagogies of repression’, that is, the ability of activists to resist and circumvent the architecture of the state not only surveilling activists and their activities but also harassing and criminalizing them, is what will lead to change and adaptation of the alternative. The state largely sees these activists and social movements as enemies of the state that should be controlled or squashed. As the dominant idea or view of activists, social movements and their ideologies ‘challenge the prevailing social, economic and political order as criminal activity, a treat to national security’ (2019: 4). Therefore, they are to be avoided by all means, as states see them as ‘dictatorship of the mob’ (Taine 2002 cited in Borch, 2012: 39). Hence, there is a contestation of ideas and struggle between the state and social movements within the African continent. This contestation over ideas, the control of communication, and consciousness help explain the micro/macro structures of social movements and digital activism in Africa. It sheds light on why ordinary citizens are increasingly becoming aware/conscious of the perpetual injustice of poverty, underdevelopment, lack of transparency and good governance that has eluded the continent, while a few continue to enjoy the benefits accruable to all. How this consciousness has led to people coming together irrespective of their ethnic, gender or class backgrounds to form a group to rid themselves of the shackles of injustices by protesting and critiquing government policies and actions. Using communication as a crucial tool, these movements battle to win the human mind by using the consciousness of social injustice in society to influence and change the human orientation or perception about such issues (see Castells, 2009). However, this leads to the final theory of resource mobilization adopted by this study. The theory of resource mobilization is key to social movement studies. As the theory encapsulates how the pulling or aggregation of resources, i.e., material and immaterial resources (money, labour, media, advocacy, etc.) are central to the realization of social movement goals. McCarthy and Zald (1977), who postulated the theory, argue that the collective action and behaviour of actors/activists towards collective gathering and pulling of resources to publicise societal injustice, align

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with media,  create alliances with other relevant actors, gather support from the public and government, etc., are pivotal to bringing about the public good that social movements seek to achieve. In other words, the ability of social movements to raise consciousness about the injustice and the oppressed nature of society and highlight the alternative is dependent on the collective action of activists to pull together all necessary resources, i.e., communication, sensitization and education of the public to accept the projected public good. Within the context of this study, the notion of resource mobilization cannot be ignored, as the study showed that all the selected cases of social movements embrace resource mobilization of money to fund protest actions and to create publicity, used experts to formulate and push ideas, and use the media and new media technologies as platforms for publicizing and engaging with relevant stakeholders, including the state. Alfandika and Akpojivi (2020) argue that activists and their desire for reform are rooted in communication and their ability to counter the hegemonic narrative of the state, and this can only be done with effective coordination, i.e., ‘collection action and behaviour’ of resources needed to facilitate the desired social change. As McCarthy and Zald (1977: 1212) put it, the theory is interested in the ‘relationship of social movements to the media, authorities, and other parties, and the interaction among movement organizations’. Therefore, showing the intersection and connectivity of all three theories, i.e., communication power, black consciousness and resource mobilization to this study. As communication is key to activism, as without any communication or information, activism or social movement is dead (Porta & Mosca, 2005), as is their objective of the public good. Likewise, the consciousness of injustice or the oppressed nature of society will result in collective action, and this collective action is reliant on communication for strategic organization and engagement in the realization of the public good. On the other hand, this public good attainment is rooted in the effective coordination of both material and immaterial resources. These theories have not been without criticism, as Fuchs (2009) argues that the communication power theory of Castells over-emphasized the place of technology in society and its ability to bring about change. Fuchs’ position critiqued the technological determinism position that has informed the growing use of new information technologies. While Fuchs is right to support this position, today’s social movements and digital activism highlight the place of agency, as social change will only become a mirage if agency and consciousness of societal issues, and how to use

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technology to address these issues are not determined. It is the use of agency for both online and offline strategies that has differentiated the successes recorded by different movements and activism. Additionally, social movements and digital activism are alleged to be elite-driven, as digital activism presents a platform for these elites to push an agenda that is self-oriented and not communal. Fenton and Barassi (2011), while elaborating on the above, held that in most cases within these movements and activism, people ask the ‘questions of who are involved in digital activism and for what purpose?’ According to Fenton and Barassi (2011), while problematising these movements, the individual interests of those behind such movements were made to become the collective interests or identity of the movement. Therefore, the belief in some quarters of society that disgruntled members of society, mainly elites, used digital activism and social movements as a tool or opportunity to settle scores with the state. Although the concept of elitism is complex due to the different positions with which scholars approach it, in the context of this book, I have approached it from the social construct perspective, i.e., in the context of political, economic and cultural privileges (see Akpojivi, 2018b). Within social movements and digital activism, it is the consciousness of injustice that can only be derived from privilege to be aware of better political, economic and cultural systems that will necessitate the need to be involved in the struggle for a better society. This struggle entails political, economic and cultural resources and factors to bring about social change. Fenton and Barassi (2011) call these the social relations and structures of society. In other words, for a movement or activism to be successful, social relations and structures such as political, economic and cultural relations are essential, and movements are beginning to tap into this idea by using all resources available at their disposal to address deep-rooted societal issues. Consequently, there exists the belief that these movements and activism are elite-oriented. Previous struggles in Africa have seen people with political, economic and cultural influence shaping activism. For example, Cabral, Fanon, Biko, and Nkrumah, among others, used resources available to them to press for social change during colonialism. Therefore, today’s activism requires people with the necessary political, economic and cultural structures to address a deep-rooted issue that has continued to affect socioeconomic, political and economic developments. Hence, individuals providing these services within digital activism and social movements should not be constructed as ‘negative’, i.e., tools for

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pushing a personal agenda instead of a collective or communal agenda. In most cases, these personal agendas of ‘good governance, transparency, good living conditions’ are for the wider benefit of society, and this should be acknowledged in the discourse of social movements and digital activism. The subsequent chapters will examine some of these movements and how they are advocating for social change in Nigeria, Ghana and South Africa. The discussions will examine the actors involved in the movements and their ideological contestation with relevant stakeholders in the process of bringing about the needed change. This book is divided into six chapters. Chapter 1 justifies the study on the need to examine social movements and their activism from the perspectives of Nigeria, South Africa, and Ghana. The chapter argues that there are common characteristics of corruption, state failure, and dissatisfaction among citizens in these countries, and these dissatisfactions have resulted in or given birth to a new wave of consciousness among citizens who are demanding good governance, transparency, and accountability. Additionally, this chapter situated its argument within Biko’s black consciousness theory, McCarthy and Zald’s  resource mobilization theory, and Castell’s communication power theory. It argued that the struggle between the different social movements, i.e., #OurMumuDonDo, #BringBackOurGirls, #FeesMustFall and #OccupyGhana and the state was for the human mind, i.e., they acknowledge the injustices confronting them and the need to rise together by empowering themselves to address the injustices confronting their states. In Chap. 2, the discussion focused on Nigeria, as the dire socioeconomic, political, and cultural situations facilitated the creation of two movements, i.e., #OurMumuDonDo and #BringBackOurGirls that are at the forefront calling for the creation of a new Nigeria. The chapter argues that the ideological background of the movement’s actors—founder/ coordinator—influenced their decision to establish these movements, which, to a large extent, shaped the goals/objective and ideologies of the movements. Their ideology calls for the rebirth of every citizen to be politically conscious and demands good governance, accountability, and transparency from the state. As the politics of the ‘bigman’ that has characterized the Nigerian state since 1960 has led to a neopatrimonialism relationship between the state and citizens, which has consequently resulted in high levels of corruption and lack of security, Campbell (2011) posits that Nigeria is becoming a ‘failed state’. Therefore, these movements advocate for social change within government and citizens through their online and offline activities, which has resulted in the criminalization

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of the movements by the state. Despite this criminalization, the movements have been able to call for the consciousness of Nigerians to be good citizens by not selling their votes and demand for good governance and accountability instead of being dependent on God for their basic services. Chapter 3 examines the #FeesMustFall movement that originated at the University of Witwatersrand, South Africa in 2015, and later swept across all the universities in the country. The chapter argues that the failure of the post-1994 leaders to address the legacies of apartheid and the inequalities within society resulted in the formation of a movement that seeks to decolonize the university and stop the commodification of education. The universities were seen by the student activists to be continuing with the oppressive, marginalized systems of apartheid that failed to recognize the African experiences and culture despite 26 years of independence (see Radebe, 2020). The embrace of Biko’s and Fanon’s ideologies of black consciousness and true decolonization resulted in the contestation of ideas between the movement, university management and the state over what constitutes free education and decolonized curricula, consequently leading to the criminalization of the movement via the militarization of campuses. The chapter posits that despite the criminalization, the movement has been able to bring about some levels of social change within the South African higher education sector, as universities, especially the University of Witwatersrand, have embarked on extensive curriculum reforms and opening of the university. Thus, the assertion that what the movement achieved in 10 days was what vice-chancellors have been struggling to achieve in 10 years (Habib, 2016). In Chap. 4, the #OccupyGhana movement was examined. The chapter traces the historical development of the movement, the actors involved and their ideologies. The chapter argues that the consistently high level and normalization of corruption gave birth to the movement. The movement, which is mainly made up of the middle class and elites (lawyers, doctors, miners, and journalists), utilizes their resources, e.g., lawyers in confronting the state on good governance and accountability via the rule of law. Consequently, making the movement a household name in addressing injustices and bringing about social change. For instance, the movement was able to force the state and Attorney General to exercise his/her persecutory powers within the constitution for the first time in the history of the country to disallow some of these corrupt financial transactions and charge offenders of corruption. Due to the potential of the movement, the

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movement has been capitalised upon by some members who used the movement and their activities to get into elective power. Additionally, the classism structure of the movement has resulted in questions of whose interests the movement represents within the Ghanaian state. Chapter 5 looks at the politics of performance as a key strategic tool embraced by the different movements in their drive to bring about social change. The chapter argues that performance is invaluable in the communication of counterideology by the movements, and the performance in speech action is not a new kind of politics as performance has always been used by social movements and protest groups. However, the usage of new media technologies has enabled social movements and activists to amplify these performances in different and new ways. Additionally, the chapter argues that these movements embraced the politics of spectacle by using rhetorics to push their ideologies and call for social change. It is this rhetoric and spectacle that is embraced by the public in the struggle for the human mind to be conscious of their society and demand sociopolitical, economic and cultural developments of their societies. The conclusion chapter (Chap. 6) uses comparative analysis to examine whether there are common patterns within the different movements across the respective countries of Nigeria, Ghana and South Africa. The chapter argues that there are some common patterns among the movements, i.e., personalization of movements, social structures of the respective countries’, and these have greatly impacted the movements and their goals. The chapter concludes that in reading social movements in Africa, there is the need to recognize the unique context of each movement, their actors and ideologies, as these factors will, to a large extent, determine and influence the success of the movements. The study critiques the notion of a one size fits all approach that tends to characterize social movements in Africa and that promotes the technological deterministic view of social movements. The study acknowledges that while digital, social media technologies were widely used by the different movements, they were largely dependent on the context and agency of the movements.

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CHAPTER 2

#OurMumuDonDo and #BringBackOurGirls: The Rebirth of Consciousness in Nigeria

This chapter will draw from ethnographic and interview data collected during the study and argues that the rise of social movements and digital activism in Nigeria is due to the consciousness of Nigerians of the injustice that has continued to plague the Nigerian state. Consequently, social actors have adopted digital activism as a platform for demanding social change to the political and economic challenges that have confronted the Nigerian state. There is a general sense among social actors and activists that new media technologies offer ordinary Nigerians the opportunity to question and influence state polity at both the state and national levels. However, such actions are not without criminalisation from the state and public scoffs at these activists due to the polarised nature of the Nigerian state, where every movement or activism is seen as a tool of the opposition to discredit the state. However, these movements and activists have devised a strategy of ‘coalition’ of all movements and activists of similar agendas and objectives to form a collective force to resist state criminalisation and influence the process of social change. This idea of collective force is in line with McCarthy and Zald’s (1977) argument that social movements need to mobilise resources in a collective action in their protest, as such collective pull of resources will give the movement the opportunity and edge to achieve their goals. In addition, this chapter argues that social movements in Nigeria are caught in what Loader (2008) calls the ‘politics of identity’, which, in this case, is the politics and clash of individual interests against the movement’s interests, that is, individual identity against the identity of © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 U. Akpojivi, Social Movements and Digital Activism in Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30207-7_2

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the movement. As Loader (2008: 1922) puts it, when this happens,  a social movement ‘ceases to exist and becomes instead an organisation’. Therefore, impacting the public’s perception or ideas of a social movement is seen as a tool for driving personal agendas and wider interests. As previously mentioned in chapter one, Nigeria has seen a rise in social movements and digital activism in the last decade. This is not without the effect of global or transnational movements and the perceived impact they have had in their respective countries. For instance, the Occupy Wall Street movement, What Would Jesus Do (WWJD) in the United Kingdom and the events of the Arab Spring greatly influenced the formation and utilisation of social movements and digital activism as a mechanism for addressing social injustice and pressing for social change. For example, OccupyNigeria can be regarded as a pioneering movement that incorporated digital activism in Nigeria in 2012 and was instrumental in highlighting the challenges of the Nigerian state on a global stage. Chiluwa (2015), while buttressing the above, posits that the OccupyNigeria movement was largely influenced by global activism and the belief that such a global strategy can be effective at home. Therefore, OccupyNigeria witnessed citizens resisting the government’s action of fuel subsidy removal, which resulted in a massive protest across the country from Lagos to Kano, Abuja and the Nigerian High Commission in London. Although Obadare and Adebanwi (2013) argued that this protest movement is an example of prebendal politics, where ethnicity and religion played a dominant role, the protest can be considered successful as the goal of the protesting movement of reducing the pump price of petroleum was achieved. The retraction of the decision by the government of Goodluck Johnathan led to a euphoric embrace of new media technologies for activism. This chapter will focus on two key movements addressing different issues but with a common goal of promoting good governance and accountability in the country. I intend to examine their ideologies, how these ideologies shape their relationship with the state, and the wider micro-macro structures of activism/social movements. This is germane because Mare (2014) argued that scholars should look beyond the ‘demonstration effect’ of social movements and activism, and focus on the ‘demands for political, economic and social rights’ within the African context and how social media and new media technologies are entangled in this process. Within the context of this study, the ideologies of the movement and the individuals involved will shape the appropriation of these technologies and their engagement with the state. Therefore, the discussion below will

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highlight how Nigerians have appropriated new media technologies and affordance and activism to demand their rights and re-consciousness and rebirth of the Nigerian state.

OurMumuDonDo Movement When looters and killers and stealers are still contesting election o Politicians wey thief some billions and billions no dey go prison o Police station dey close by 6 for security reason o (Falz, 2018, This is Nigeria song)

The Nigerian state can be regarded as a complex web, faced with numerous political, economic, religious, and cultural challenges due to ethnicity, religion and corruption. Corruption, ethnicity and religion are considered the evil or enemy of the Nigerian state (Adebanwi & Obadare, 2013), and these have resulted in the exploitation of citizens and the excessive miscarriage of injustice and inequality within the Nigerian state. These challenges are not new and to a large extent have been vividly recorded by Nigerian scholars, artists and social critics right from when Nigeria became an independent state to date. For instance, Achebe, in his works ‘The trouble with Nigeria’ (1983) and ‘There was a country: a personal history of Biafra’ (2012), highlighted the perennial problems confronting the country and inspired Nigerians to rise up to the problems by rejecting old inherited habits that have continued to impact the socioeconomic and political development of the Nigerian state. Richard Joseph, in his book titled ‘Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria: The Rise and Fall of the Second Republic’  (1987), argued that these old habits had shaped the interaction between the state and the citizens and the kind of politics that is played within the public arena, which consequently led to the fall of the second republic. Fela Anikulapo Kuti reiterated these old habits in his songs and used his songs as a mechanism to fight for social justice and highlight the problems of the Nigerian state and the challenges ordinary citizens are confronted with in their day-to-day lives. It is against this background of the prebendal politics, lack of accountability and transparency that the OurMumuDonDo movement was established to address these problems and campaign for a new Nigeria. OurMumuDonDo movement emerged in late December 2016 and has been at the forefront of demanding good governance in Nigeria. The movement started with approximately seven young people with the

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support of Charles Oputa, popularly known as Area Fada or Charly Boy. The movement came into existence following its first public appearance, when renowned Nigerian singer Innocent Idebia, popularly called ‘Tuface’, called for a nationwide protest on February 6 due to the worsening political and economic situations in Nigeria that have affected every Nigerian. Although Tuface1 was unable to attend the protest according to him ‘due to security concerns and public safety considerations, I hereby announced the cancellation of the planned march’ (Premium Times, February 5, 2017 https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/222566-­tuface-­ backs-­off-­cancels-­anti-­govt-­protest.html). Other Nigerians and civil societies participated in the protest, and this protest gave birth to the OurMumuDonDo movement. The name of the movement, which is derived from one of the dominant spoken languages in Nigeria, i.e., Pidgin English, is a grammatically simplified form of the English language and is understood by both educated and uneducated individuals in Nigeria. OurMumuDonDo literarily means ‘enough of our stupidity’ or ‘enough of our foolishness’, and this has influenced people’s perception of the movement based on its name. While some perceive the name to be violent and forceful based on the sound or pronunciation of the movement’s name, that is, the revolution and reawakening associated with the name, others see it like any other movement that has been in existence in Nigeria. According to  Caballero and Gravante (2018: 24), social movements choose names that reflect their ideology, desires and motivation to institute change. That is, a movement’s name serves as a unifying factor for collective identity, and the ‘righteous rage’ that comes from having one’s dignity defiled shifts the locus of ideology from victimhood to the point of action. Therefore, it can be argued that adopting the name “OurMumuDonDo” was a deliberate strategy to reflect their ideology and reach out to Nigerians, highlighting the failures of the Nigerian state and the need to act. The strategy that is rooted in national reawakening is evident in the objective of the movement, as they consider themselves ‘a national reawakening social movement dedicated to promoting social justice, accountability, transparency, good governance, and engendering a new social order in Nigeria through sustained activism and a formidable coalition’ ­(https:// www.ourmumudondo.org/who-­we-­are/). 1  It was alleged that Tuface was intimidated by the Nigerian security forces hence he pulled out of the protest.

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The national secretary of the movement, Adebayo Raphael, while summarising the rationale for the establishment of the movement, held the following: There comes a time in the history of people when the status quo that has eternally failed can no longer be sustained, a time when the angry, hungry, vexed and frustrated must be bonded in the coalition of their willingness to reclaim the country, in desperate need of a savior. This was the background when the opportunity to start the ourmumudondo movement presented itself… It started with about seven different people, young people who know the urgency in coming together to salvage our country and we sought the support of area fade Charly boy and it happened that the movement started in December 2016 (Personal interview, June 13, 2018, Abuja).

It is this ideology of failed state and desperation for change that the movement claimed as their identity and belief as a strategy to attract people to participate in their cause and be aware of societal reality (Caballero & Gravante, 2018, 29). It can be argued that the frustration of Nigerians over the state of the country (politically and economically) resulted in people coming together to challenge the status quo and press for good governance and development in the country. It should be noted that the Nigerian state was on the verge of collapse or being classified as a ‘failed state’ following serious security challenges of Boko Haram, Herdsmen and Kidnappers that had killed and maimed thousands of Nigerians. Likewise, the economy sliding into recession impacted the development of the country and brought hardship to Nigerians (Kazeem, 2017). The situation of the country was vividly reflected in Folarin Falana, also known as Falz, in his song ‘This is Nigeria’, whose lyrics form the epigraph of this chapter. Although these problems are not new phenomena in the country, the worsening situation and the inability of the government to address these problems over time was beginning to slide the country into becoming a failed state. Adebayo Raphael, while summarising these happenings, stated: People are feeding from hand to mouth, the economy is in shambles, the state of security is bad, in the north we have the Boko Haram plunging our people, killing them in their numbers in the north east, come to the north central we have people who are committing unquestionable massacre on our people: they are herdsmen but the government has chosen to call them bandits. Whatever name you give them, these people have made life

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­ ncomfortable for Nigerians. You come to the south there is kidnapping, u there is lawlessness, the states are oppressive and the members of the public are oppressive as well. The state, through its instrument of the brutal special antirobbery squad through SAR operatives, has meted out several atrocities against the Nigerian people. Therefore, the entire country is in chaos, and no matter how the government of the day tries to glamourise things, it will not cover up the wound that is open for the entire world to see (Personal Interview, June 13, 2018, Abuja).

Therefore, the assertion that #OurMumuDonDo formation was well timed, and the timing was part of the strategy to highlight the issues confronting the Nigerian states and call for social change. Ganz (2004: 181) argues that ‘targeting, timing and tactics’ are crucial strategies for social movements. The timing means that social movements or protest movements must be aware of a social problem and capitalize on that social problem to have an effective campaign and attract people to the movement. Meyer and Staggenborg (2012: 3) argue that ‘social movement strategy sits at the intersection of structure and agency, as activists seek to respond to changing political and cultural circumstances and maximise their impact’. That is, social movements have to seize the moment by applying agency and timing to achieve their goals. According to Meyer and Staggenborg (2012: 3), while buttressing this further, ‘for activists, strategy refers to choices about claims, issues, allies, frames, identity and presentation of self, resources and tactics’. That is, within the context of the study, #OurMumuDonDo frames itself and its ideology of reawakening and consciousness based on the lived realities within the Nigerian state. These lived realities shaped their timing, strategy and targeting of the people and other actors for social engagement and change. Therefore, the events leading to the formation of the #OurMumuDonDo capture the whole essence of the movement and the call for the rebirth of a new Nigeria and a new way of doing things. According to Suberu (2013: 79), the Nigerian state can be summarised as a system that operates ‘almost exclusively as a mechanism for the intergovernmental distribution and ethno-political appropriation of centrally collected oil revenue. In short, the system abets and is enmeshed and subsumed in an overall context of prebendal, neo-patrimonial politics’. These problems and situations confronting the country can be attributed to the political class and political system that has capitalised on the ignorance of the masses to continue to oppress the masses and maintain

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the status quo. These problems, although not new to the Nigerian state, as Nigeria has often been described as lacking political leaders that can push for the development of the Nigerian state, as the political system described as corrupt and favouring the exploitation of the weak (see Adebanwi & Obadare, 2013), are deeply rooted in the historical structure of the Nigerian state. According to Osaghae, ‘the roots of Nigeria’s post-­ independence politics are deeply entrenched in its colonial history… in a profound sense, many of the postindependence sociopolitical and economic formations and malformations are a direct consequence of the state-building and economic integration processes begun under colonial rule’ (1998: 1). Hence, Fanon (2005) argues that most African leaders and ruling classes want to embrace the colonial system of development at the attainment of independence, and this has not facilitated the development of African states. The inherited structures promoted and supported the ‘exploitation of the masses for the benefit of a few’ (Kalu et al., 2018: ix). This historical antecedence has continued to shape the political and economic structures and development of the Nigerian state, as the few ‘big men’ making up the elites have refused to ‘dismantle the exploitative governance’ structures but built on it to advance their personal interest (Kalu et al., 2018). Hence, Ellis argues that years after independence and the postindependent era, political elites have continued to tap into these deep-rooted historical issues to exploit the majority of Nigerians and the state. According to him, ‘Nigeria had the misfortune to acquire a political elite and a political system that were shot through with practices of fraud and embezzlement not to mention illicit violence’ (2016: 4). These practices of fraud and corruption have denied public basic amenities such as good roads, hospitals, water and other social amenities, hence the sense of hopelessness among the public that they are powerless and cannot change the system. Such a situation gave birth to two distinct groups of citizens, ‘us’ and ‘them’, i.e., ‘us’ the poor, marginalised group and ‘them’ the rich political elites that have continued to suppress the development and growth of the country and can afford the luxury they desire.2 Huntington illustrated this discourse of ‘us’ and ‘them’ further by positing that ‘a two-part world picture may in some measure correspond 2  Most Nigerian elites seek treatment abroad when sick, import luxury goods into the country (even toothpicks) to meet their daily needs, and send their children abroad for studies. In fact, one’s position in the society is dependent on the public display of wealth. Rogers Orock has researched extensively big man and elite culture in Africa.

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with reality. The most common division, which appears under various names, is between rich and poor’ (2002: 32 emphasis added). This reality necessitates the call for ordinary, poor citizens to be conscious of these happenings, the need to revolt against the current political system and demand a country that works for all. This reality facilitated the need for the OurMumuDonDo movement, which sees its prime objective of reawakening Nigerians to the challenges confronting the country, and the need to address these challenges holistically. Consequently, the primary goal of the movement is to push for a ballot revolution and mental revolution as a strategy to bring about the needed social change. As Adebayo Raphael puts it: The OurMumuDonDo movement is about two major objectives: one is a mental revolution that is critical because right now; the mental state of our people is not wired in a way where they see revolution as the option or the only thing to be done. In addition, ballot revolution is the sense that there is a lot of political apathy right now in the system between 1999 and 2015, you will realise if you check the number of people who have been getting their PVC3 has been on the rise but the number of people who eventually go to the polling booth is consistently declined and this is so because people are tired of being promised the same thing all the time and not getting it (Personal Interview, June 13, 2018, Abuja).

Therefore, there is a need to examine both strategies of mental revolution and ballot revolution to understand the extent to which these strategies have been effective tools by the OurMumuDonDo movement in bringing about social change and facilitating the sociopolitical, economic and cultural developments of the Nigerian state.

Mental Revolution The concept of mental revolution is old and long associated with the need for ‘black humans’ to free themselves from bondage and change their minds from colonial thinking. Bob Marley, in his song titled ‘Redemption Song’, calls for the emancipation of oneself from mental slavery, which can only be achieved within oneself and resolution. This emancipation is necessary, as the long years of colonial rule have impacted the mental state 3

 PVC means Permanent Voters Card.

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and lives of Africans. As Cesaire put it, ‘I am talking about societies drained of their essence, culture trampled underfoot, institutions undermined, land confiscated, religions smashed, magnificent artistic creations destroyed, extraordinary possibilities wiped out…I am talking about millions of women and men torn from their gods, their land, their habits, their life’ (1972: 21). This process has continued, even at independence, as African leaders have continued to use the inherited colonial systems to suppress their people (see Fanon, 2005). Therefore, mental revolution can be seen as a product of the angry toward a system that has been used by the few ‘big men’ and elites to continually hold onto inherited governance structures. Mental revolution can be regarded as a change in the paradigm of thinking or approach to doing things. It is considered to be ‘highly disruptive’, as it entails a complete breakdown and disruption of old ways of thinking and doing things (Taylor cited in Nelson, 1992). This disruptive nature of mental revolution can only occur when critical thinking by oneself, or what Ndebele Njabulo termed the ‘the envisioned self’ (2017), has been carried out to determine what has been done and what is to come, i.e., what can be done better. This ‘envisioned self’ embodies the freedom to break away from oppression or bondage that might have hindered individuals from witnessing growth and development both at a personal and societal level. In other words, one is able to carry out a mental revolution upon self-reflection and analysis of the situation and environment that has resulted in the imprisonment of one’s view and analysis of society. As Steve Biko puts it, ‘we cannot be conscious of ourselves and yet remain in bondage. We want to attain the envisioned self which is a free self.’ (2017: viii). This view by Biko reasoned that mental revolution happens in the conscious state of man to his/her environment and things that affect him/her. This is in line with Ndebele, who argues that this process of mental revolution through the ‘envisioned self’ entails a journey of the mind and body, and that the awareness or consciousness of this journey as a result of past experiences will help disrupt, dismember the old systems and lead to a recovery and remold human essence (2017). It is the journey to the rediscovery of a new Nigeria that the OurMumuDonDo movement seeks to achieve. According to the founder and face of the movement, Charles

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Oputa,4 while buttressing the above, held that ‘our stupidity, our ­ignorance, and our nonchalant attitude has kept us (Nigerians) in this state of hopelessness. The electorate, the average Nigerian, does not know what his/her rights are about, which is sad because if you do not know, you cannot demand. When you do not know, you accept anything’ (Personal Interview, June 13, 2018, Abuja). This raises the issue of why Nigerians are nonchalant or ignorant despite being recognised as one of the most educated people on the African continent and in the world at large (see Adichie, 2013). Colonialism and its impact can create either a politicised or depoliticised public. During the struggle for independence, most Nigerians were politicised, as they were actively involved at the grassroots level to achieve freedom and independence. Market women, framers and educated nationalists played different roles in the attainment of independence (see Nyamnjoh, 2005; Achebe, 1958). This politicised public continued during the military era, as it is argued that the active civil societies and the mass media played a central role in the restoration of democracy in 1999 following the long period of military rule (Danladi & Tanko, n/d). However, this changed as the majority of Nigerians moved from being politicised to being depoliticised. According to Obadare (2018), religion has contributed significantly to the depoliticization of Nigerians, as everything is seen from the prism of spirituality. Nigerians have embraced religion and the perceived ‘assurances of salvation’, i.e., prosperity, divine health, etc. (2018), as a way of life, and this religion has also influenced national politics and produced a ‘theocratic class’. As Obadare (2018: 30) describes, the average Nigerian mentality is spirituality oriented, as ‘Christianity, has a tremendous potential to be a reactionary force with a demobilising effect on civil society in Nigeria’. Therefore, there is a sense of hopelessness towards the state and the ability of citizens to depend on the state for social amenities but instead rely on ‘God’ and ‘religion’. On the other hand, Frank and Ukpere (2017) argue that the long years of military rule have made Nigerians complacent in the affairs of the country and in  demanding their rights. This, coupled with the vast majority of 4  Charles Chukwuemeka Oputa, popularly known as Charly Boy or Area Fada is a singer, television presenter and entertainer and can be regarded as one of the controversial figures in Nigeria who has used his music to criticise government and push for good governance in Nigeria. Charly Boy is the son of the renowned former Supreme Court justice, the late Chukwudifu Oputa.

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Nigerians who are uneducated, has also contributed to the status quo. According to Onuoha (2017), over 10.5 million children are not currently in school, and the Minister of Education Adamu alleged that over 60 million Nigerians are illiterate (Adedigba, 2017). Consequently, the mental state of the average Nigerian is to ignore social injustice and be indifferent to sociopolitical and economic issues, and this has continued to support the poor political structures and their exploitation of the people. Achebe (1983), while reinforcing the above, held that it was the responsibility of every citizen to ensure that good governance thrived and for the nation to discover itself. However, in a society where citizens are not empowered or educated to know their responsibilities, the leaders and ruling political class will exploit these and produce a society that is largely underdeveloped and establish a neopatrimonialism system of governance. Therefore, the name OurMumuDonDo is a way to ‘prick the minds of people and conscientise them… It is a mental revolution to make people think and rethink the current situation confronting the country’ (Charles Oputa, Personal Interview, June 13, 2018, Abuja). Such an assertion situates development and good governance within the Nigerian state to active thinking and critical thoughts, and places social movements as a veritable tool in this process. According to Herbele (1951: 23), the ideology of the movement, which in the case of #OurMumuDonDo is a mental revolution, serves as the basis for informing the minds of the public about a desired change. Informing the minds of the people entails communication as the human mind, according to Castells, is a battlefield, as to him, communication shapes the thinking process of people and is instrumental to acting as an agent of social change. Escobar (1992) posited that there had always been unanswered questions or critiques regarding to what extent thinking or critical thought could bring about development. To him, development should be seen from the prism of ‘reason and modernity’, as critical thought ‘should help recognise the pervasive character and functioning of development as a paradigm of self-definition’ (1992: 25). In other words, the process of development entails thinking about societal problems and how such problems can be addressed, hence emphasising the importance of Castells’ communication power in the intersection between agency and social movement action. Therefore, the OurMumuDonDo mental revolution calls for questioning and critiquing why Nigeria has lagged behind in terms of development despite 58  years of independence, while other nations such as Singapore and Qatar, amongst others that recently gained

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independence, are making significant progress. Additionally, this involves being aware of and ignoring divisive elements such as ethnicity, religion and the politics of immediate gain, or what Bayart (2009) termed the ‘politics of the belly’, that the political class uses in exploiting ordinary Nigerians for their gain. Many scholars, such as Achebe (1983, 2012), Okonjo-Iwela (2012, 2018), and Adebanwi and Obadare (2011), have highlighted how these elements have hindered the growth and development of the Nigerian state. For instance, as Adebayo Raphael put it, ‘the mentality of the average Nigerian is that government is not about them, they have eroded their ability to think for a collective purpose and the growth of the nation. To them, it’s about the pecuniary gains or what they can get from the system. Therefore, the need to reorient the people to get to understand what is expected of them as citizens, getting them to know that accountability, transformative democracy and the power to bring about ultimate change lies with them.’ (Personal Interview, June 13, 2018, Abuja). This is in line with Rohr Lopes’s position that ‘people are motivated to organise out of a sense of deprivation or inequality brought forth by a comparison to others or in relation to their own expectation’ (Lopes, 2014). Likewise, Caballero and Gravante (2018) called this the ‘righteous rage’, which comes from having one’s dignity defiled and shifting the locus to action for a better society. This motivation to act is not centred around personal gain but the collective gain for society as a way of fostering development. Part of the actions taken to bring about mental revolution in the minds of Nigerians by the movement is a series of campaigns to create awareness about events happening in the country that would normally have been ignored. For instance, the movement staged a campaign titled ‘Resume or Resign’ protest in August 2017. This protest follows the long absence of President Buhari from the country on May 7, 2017, when he travelled to London, United Kingdom, to seek medical treatment. The absence of the president resulted in the mockery of the country as CNN, through its programme ‘The Global Public Square’ anchored by Fareed Zakari on July 30, 2017, had a quiz asking, ‘Which head of state from which country has not set foot in his homeland in over two months?’, with the multichoice answer having Nigeria (CNN: The Global Public Square, 2017). This generated uproar among the movement because part of the electioneering campaign of President Buhari during the 2015 elections was the idea to scrap medical tourism, and the cause of his illness was not

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disclosed to Nigerians. Therefore, the movement had a sit-in protest at the Millennium Park Abuja staging a protest (http://saharareporters. com/2017/08/08/one-­i njured-­p olice-­t ear-­g as-­r esume-­o r-­r esign-­ protesters). They were not only protesting against the long stay of the present in the United Kingdom, but they were questioning the failed promises of President Buhari to stop medical tourism, which the privileged ruling elites have enjoyed to the detriment of ordinary Nigerians who have to battle to access the poor health care facilities across the country. In addition, the absence of the President was perceived to have given the ‘cabal’5 within the government the opportunity to interfere with the day-to-day running of government and promote their selfish interests. However, the protest was criminalised, as the state used the Nigerian securities (police), teargas and water canisters to drive away protests from the venue of the protest for the 11 days of the protests, thereby injuring some protesters. According to the national secretary, Adebayo Raphael, while recounting the criminalisation of the state towards the movement, held that: In this country, when our President was out for more than 90 days, it was the OurMumuDonDo movement that stood up and said this is an aberration and should not be allowed to continue, but the instrument of the state they saw it as an affront against their ego and decided to attack us. We have done the first day of that particular struggle and on the second day they were approximately 200 policemen who came out to say what we did the day before was an embarrassment against the county and that it has gone viral and that local and international media and powers are aware of what we did, and we said yes that is exactly what we wanted. Because it is an aberration that our president will leave his position for more than 90 days and will not give us a reason why he had decided to do so. You said you have gone out to treat yourself, but we do not know what illness you are suffering from as our president. Therefore, you saw what happened they attacked us with teargas, water cannons and the attack happened more than four times during the 11  days which the campaign lasted (Personal Interview, June 13, 2018, Abuja).

5  A lot has been written about the cabal within the Nigeria political structure. The cabals are regarded as powerful people with vested political and economic interests and are willing to do all it takes to protect their interest. See Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala book titled ‘Fighting Corruption is Dangerous’ for more insights into the concept of cabal.

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Furthermore, a protest held under the title #FreeSamuelOgundipe was held on August 16, 2018 at the Nigeria Police Force Headquarters. Samuel Ogundipe, a journalist with the Premium Times, was arrested and detained by the Nigerian police for refusing to disclose his source over a news story that revolves around the secret memo of the Inspector General of Police Mr. Ibrahim Idris to the Acting President Yemi Osinbajo over the sacked director of the Department of State Security Lawal Musa Daura. According to the movement, the protest was geared to protect the freedom of speech, expression and media freedom, which has been under threat under the regime of President Buhari. Freedom of speech and media are considered essential in any democratic society (Ojo, 2003). Akpojivi (2012, 2018a) and Ojo (2003) argue that the constitution of Nigeria accords citizens’ freedom of expression and the media with the freedom to hold the state accountable. However, this freedom in recent years, especially during the regime of President Buhari, has been gagged, as the press is easily criminalised. Journalists are arrested, go missing, fined, and repressive policies have been formulated to suppress them (see Olaniyan & Akpojivi,  2021). Onyenankeya and Salawu (2020), while extending this argument, argue that although the Nigerian media is known to be vocal, it has failed to live up to their constituted responsibilities due to political and economic interference. Such acts of criminalisation by the state against social movements or nonstate actors by the state are not a new phenomenon in postcolonial African states. Mare (2020) argues that postcolonial African states are ‘ever-expanding’ their authoritarian enclave by using state instruments, e.g., internet shutdown, clamping down on opposition to suppress social movements, which he termed the ‘new protest drum’ (2014), due to their appropriation of technologies and offline strategies. Such criminalisation as witnessed by the #OurMumuDonDo movement by the state using teargas and water canisters, however, did not deter the movement, as the protesters were able to secure the release of the detained journalist, as he was later released by the police after a court judgement (see Fig. 2.1 for poster of protest). There have been numerous other protests organised to create awareness of the injustice happening within the Nigerian state. Therefore, Mare’s (2014) and (2020) argument of social media usage by activists or social movements is supported as the new protest drum in Africa. As such, protests are easily organised online and coordinated offline. One such protest that highlighted the high level of corruption and lack of transparency

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Fig. 2.1  Poster used for the protest. Source: OurMumuDonDo Movement

within the government is the #BuhariActorQuit protest. This two-week sit-out protest called on the President to persecute top government officials that have alleged corruption cases against them. These cases are the 270 million naira looted by the former secretary to the government of the federation Mr. Babachair; 120-billion-naira fraud against the Inspector General of Police Mr. Ibrahim Idris; $25 billion contract scandal approved by the group managing director of Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation without following due process; 500 million naira alleged MTN bribe against the Chief of Staff to the President Mr. Abba Kyari; and reinstatement of Mr. Abdulrasheed Maine back to the civil service despite the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) declaring him wanted for the alleged 100 billion naira pension fund fraud. The sit-out

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protest climaxed with the presentation of a petition to the Attorney General of the Federation (AGF) with a call on the AGF to respond to their petition since the state had refused to make known the reports of the investigations into these cases and the continual occupation of office of these people who are perceived to be ‘untouchable’ due to their closeness to the cabals (Independent Newspaper, 2017, https://independent.ng/ charly-­boy-­ourmumudondo-­protesters-­storm-­agfs-­office-­submit-­protest-­ letter/). Although none of the persons involved in the above cases have been charged and prosecuted by the state, the ability of the movement to create awareness and reorient Nigerians to stand up for good governance despite criminalisation shows the drive of the movement to its cause for accountability and good governance, which has become a bane in Nigeria. Nigeria, according to the Transparency International corruption report of 2020, is one of the most corrupt nations, scoring 25/100 and ranking 149/180 in the corruption perception index. This is despite the mantra of President Buhari’s government being anti-corruption. Ngozi Okonjo-Iwela (2012), Nigeria’s former finance minister, alludes that corruption is endemic within the Nigerian state, as both the public and private sectors have been enablers of this corruption since the preindependence era. According to her, ‘institutions of state were severely undermined as meritocracy gave way to mediocrity. Corruption, already burgeoning under the early politicians, became entrenched under military rule, and a kleptocratic elite with a very limited vision of the future of the country came into being. That elite remains largely intact today, even under democracy, and may constitute one of the biggest stumbling blocks in the way of Nigeria’s progress’ (2012: 2). Such an assessment highlighted how large corruption is rooted within the Nigerian state and the need to address it. One of the strategies of addressing this problem by the #OurMumuDonDo movement is to create awareness of the problem and call for rethinking/conscientizing people about the impact of corruption on the growth and development of the country. According to Charles Oputa, while buttressing the above stated, ‘the awareness is out there, people are becoming more aware of what is happening around them, the oppression will only continue as long as the people remain quiet. They are now talking about it, they are trying to do something about it. All over social media people are discussing, it’s not like what it used to be before, they are more conscious now’ (Personal Interview, June 13, 2018, Abuja).

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This strategy of conscientising people by getting them aware and talking about the issues as a form of mental revolution has made the movement embrace the ‘OurMumuDonDo Ambassador’ strategy. This strategy entails using people who are considered to be exceptional Nigerians, i.e., activists, singers and other renowned figures, to talk about sociopolitical, economic and cultural issues on their social media platforms such as Instagram. At the time of writing this chapter, the movement had featured two prominent Nigerians, i.e., Aisha Yesufu and Dr. Oby Ezekwesili.6 In the video featuring Aisha Yesufu posted on Charles Oputa’s Instagram account on September 12, 2018, Aisha Yesufu started off by reminding Nigerians that the primary responsibility of the government was to protect lives and property. However, the government had failed in this responsibility. She recounted how a town in northeast Nigeria was overtaken by Boko Haram, but the presidency said nothing. However, the presidency responded to the critique of the chief of staff to the presidency, Mr. Abba Kyari, who was accused of corruption by releasing a thread of tweets. Aisha Yesufu concluded in the video that the primary responsibility of the current government was to protect corruption, and she called on all Nigerians to defy religion and sentiments in the forthcoming elections to build a Nigeria that works. Similarly, in the video featuring Dr. Oby Ezekwesili posted on May 30, 2018, she is seen questioning the normative way of life of Nigerians, which has contributed to the underdevelopment of the country. She challenged Nigerians to question the source of wealth of people and called on people to contribute their quota to the development of the country by putting an end to their mumu (ignorance). The above shows that communication is central to this rethinking or creation of a new Nigeria that will be devoid of corruption. By creating awareness and brining the issue of corruption to the fore, people will be interested in how they are governed and find ways of addressing the problem. For instance, Pauw (2017) posited that the media were instrumental in revealing the complex, systemic corruption happening within the Zuma presidency in South Africa. The public outcry following the revelations was pivotal to Zuma’s removal from office. Therefore, the importance of communication in addressing deep-rooted social issues such as corruption and good governance in Africa should be emphasised. Although Mare 6  Both Aisha Yesufu and Dr. Oby Ezekwesili are the conveners of the BringBackOurGirls movement. They are known activists who call for good governance and transparency in Nigeria.

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(2020) sees social media as the new protest drum due to its potential, such potential is dependent on information and communication that is shared by activists and social movements using social media. Such information and communication are vital in orienting people to fight corruption by exposing corrupt acts and questionable wealth as the #OurMumuDonDo ambassadors did in their videos and conscientising people about the dangers of corruption in any society. Therefore, there is the need to empower Nigerians to be aware of their rights and the powers that they possess and to be actively involved in the political process and system in Nigeria by demanding accountability and transparency in government. As Charles Oputa puts it, ‘the name ourmumudondon resonates with the minds of people, as it pricks and conscientisises them. So that when you say ourmumudondo everybody can relate to it, as it is a mental revolution’ (Personal Interview, June 13, 2018, Abuja). The name can be regarded as a strategy to make people think and rethink the current situation confronting the country. Such strategies by the movement of conscientising people via online activism using social media platforms and their interactive website, and offline strategy of protest in the streets are fundamental in the reawakening and rebirth of a new country. Because ordinary people, once excluded from national discourse, are reached out concerning the state of the nation, they are also encouraged to actively participate in this national discourse. This is in line with Mutsvairo’s (2016) and Mabweazara’s (2015) argument that in the case of Africa, digital activism should be understood within the lived experiences of Africans that led to their appropriation, domestication and adaptation of digital technologies for protest. Within the context of the OurMumuDonDo movement, they appropriated activism for their lived reality by using social media as a tool of protest and creating a public sphere for citizens to participate in national discourse and be politicized (Badr & Ghali, 2016). Badr and Ghali, while buttressing this argument, stated that ‘social movements (in this case #OurMumuDonDo) have used the internet, in particular the social media, not only as a means of mobilisation but also to circulate preferred frames of various political and social issues and to present their interpretation of the political reality. If the opportunity is used by social movements to gain public support for their claims. Social movements can use the public sphere to advance their own claims and engage in public deliberations’ (2016: 1). #OurMumuDonDo have been able to do that as not only have they framed social issues of corruption, medical tourism, and

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nonparticipation of citizens in national discourse to reflect the realities of the national state but also to garner support of the public to push their claims in both online and offline activities.

Ballot Revolution The democratic culture and process in Nigeria has always been problematic and questioned. Numerous studies, such as Ake (2000), Osaghae (1998), Akpojivi (2018a), and Adebanwi and Obadare (2010, 2011), have pointed to a faulty democratic culture that has not produced or provided the dividend of democracy but breeds corruption and inefficiency. This has been zeroed down to the political class and religious structures of Nigeria that have exploited the democratic process and composition of the Nigerian state for their selfish interest. Kalu (2018: 47) argues that the democratic experience in Nigeria has not changed from what it used to be during colonialism and at independence, as ‘democracy has not brought the government closer to the citizens, but has perhaps created opportunities for a few more individuals to join the elite club of big men’. Since democracy is about who gets to ‘control state resources’, it has produced a class of political leaders who decide who occupies state positions based on royalties. Okonjo-Iwela (2012: 1) argues that ‘Nigeria has had a checkered political and economic history….. Nigeria has always been complex to govern due to political, religious and regional differences exploited by the political class’. Obadare (2006), while extending this position, posited that ethnoreligious groups had actively played a significant role in the democratic culture of Nigeria since 1999. According to him, governance in Nigeria can be regarded as ‘pentecostalisation’, as religion is seen to be constantly creeping into national life and used to influence or limit people’s participation. Consequently, the sense of hopelessness among the people as the political structure is seen to be predefined and determined by the ‘big men’ or few elites’. Nwogwugwu (2018: 124), while speaking of the hopelessness due to the limited participation of all, especially the youth in Nigeria, held that the political class had ‘created a condition in which much of the potential of the youth as agents of social engineering and change had been seriously extenuated’. The socioeconomic environment on the continent is experiencing the dominance of a triad of illness, poverty, illiteracy and unemployment, which has trapped a large number of youth.

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The face of the OurMumuDonDo movement, Charles Oputa, while buttressing the above impact on the Nigerian state, posited the following: There is injustice between those who claim to own Nigeria and the common man because nobody is seeing the common man again and there is a lot of impunity that is happening that I call demonic. Unfortunately, we are ruled by the worst of us leading the best of us, that is abnormal and very abnormal and it’s only because of that ignorance, that nonchalant attitude, e no consign me, waiting for my turn, that is what has kept us in this state from 1960 since independence. We have lived on corruption money, everything has been about corruption, so this is where all of that mess has landed us. (Personal Interview, June 13, 2018, Abuja).

Oputa’s assertion reveals the concept of the big men and elitism which continue to use their position to govern the country by determining leaders who will help them control the state resources that he called abnormal or what Bayart (2016) called the politics of the belly. Where politicians and the elites ‘visualise themselves against all likelihood being promoted to responsible positions in reward for money, actually reveals a relatively astute understanding of politics’ (Bayart 2016: 1xxxiv). Osaghae (1998: 13) argues that politics in Nigeria can be summarised ‘as a long-drawn-out decay or decline, whose empirical elements are political instability, a low level of national cohesion, and economic crisis, all of which are mutually reinforcing’. Therefore, this results in the depoliticisation of a significant portion of the populace from the process, as they await the few big men to contend or fight it out during the contestation of power at elections, with the feeling of helplessness in contributing to the political process and structure. Because alternative power structures, i.e., people who could contend for electoral positions, are limited as a result of this, as it is believed that the only way to occupy elective positions is via the big men who usually have their preferred candidates, i.e., people they can easily control and use to manage state resources. According to Nwogwugwu (2018: 124), ‘the scenario is usually created that it is in the best interest of the followers to be associated with a ‘big man’’ as without these big men the political aspiration, businesses and career won’t be successful. Hence, the end result of this is the high level of corruption and underdevelopment in the country, as eluded to in Oputa’s quote (see also Okonjo-Iwela, 2018). Consequently, the ripple effect has resulted in a political system that is monetised and corrupted, and this has, to a large extent, impacted the

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development of the Nigerian state compared to its counterparts. For instance, Okonjo-Ieala posited that Nigeria is ‘riddled with corruption, bloated with debt, battered by economic volatility. The macroeconomy was seriously imbalanced. A series of national institutions—the civil service, pensions, and customs—were broken. Health care, education, and other basic services were poorly delivered. Infrastructure was in disarray or disrepair. Poverty rampant and inequality deep’ (2012: ix). This, according to Osaghae (1998: ix), has made Nigeria, which was at par ‘with Malaysia and Indonesia in 1960, one of the world’s poorest’. To address this political problem and channel Nigeria to the path of development, the movement has taken different initiatives and campaigns to reorient Nigerians by emphasising the power of the ballot. One such campaign is called the ‘social contract’, which highlights the relationship that should exist between all political office holders and citizens. According to the national secretary of the OurMumuDonDo movement  Adebayo Raphael, while explaining the rationale behind the social contract campaign, posited the following: There is a lot of political apathy right now in the system between 1999 and 2015, you will realise if you check the number of people who have been getting their PVC has been on the rise but the number of people who eventually go to the polling booth is consistently declined, and this is so because people are tired of being promised the same thing all the time and not getting it. People are tired of being deceived and being lied to, they are tired of being disrespected by a group of people who know nothing but their vested interests (Personal Interview, June 13, 2018, Abuja).

This presents the need for a ballot revolution through social contract awareness between citizens and politicians. The idea of the social contract is to reinforce good governance and transparency in the political process despite the hijacked political structure by the big men and cabal. To the movement, ‘social contract is a viable tool for social change and a strategic pro-people initiative for fighting corruption through voters-candidate/ electorate-political parties commitment to good governance starting with the electoral process’ (https://www.ourmumudondo.org/social-­contract-­ framework/). The purpose of the social contract is to help encourage high-level participation of citizens in the democratic process by voting for credible leaders and actively participating in the process of demanding good governance and transparency in the management of state resources.

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As the national secretary Adebayo Raphael puts it: We just launched a campaign called the social contract, the Nigeria social contract campaign is a campaign that returns the ownership of the democratic process back to the people whereby the people are able to demand things that are critical to them from everybody seeking political office. So that once that person gets into power they can hold him accountable for that agreement that he has signed with them. Therefore, the idea of having a social contract will increase citizens’ participation in democratic processes. It is also going to boost citizens’ ownership of the democratic process and ultimately it will bring about an accountable and transformative democracy of the country (Personal Interview, June 13, 2018, Abuja).

A lucid examination of the social contract shows that the contract’s objective is to lay a framework that will guide the relationship between the political class and the citizens. This framework highlights norms and shared values that citizens must adhere to for the collective interest of the people to reign instead of the usual individual interest. These shared norms and values include the following: the active participation of all in the political process, political candidates should not canvass for the people’s vote by engaging in vote-buying as it breeds corruption and bad leadership, and whoever is elected must promote the interests of the common man and be accountable at all times (https://www.ourmumudondo. org/social-­contract-­framework/). These values are the normative values expected within an ideal democracy where the political system is open for active competition, and the interests of citizens define policy and electioneering campaigns. As the national secretary of the movement puts it, ‘so we want to see an environment where the common interests of the people are the priority and not the selected interests or vested interests of the few oligarchs who have held on to power since independence and they have refused to take this country forwards’ (Adebayo Raphael, Personal Interview, June 13, 2018, Abuja). Mbembe (2015) argues that both the government and citizens have this shared matrix of corruption and conviviality, which has resulted in logic that has an underlying definition of how society operates. That is, this corrupted political system cannot be blamed on the political class only but on the citizens who are conjured and in some cases coerced into facilitating what Mbembe calls the banality of power that revolves around the complex relationship between the ruler and the ruled.

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This banality of power could be seen in the way mainstream politics has been practiced in Nigeria. Since the reinstitutionalisation of democracy in Nigeria in 1999, the democratic process has been corrupted as politicians engage in vote-buying or what can be regarded as ‘see and buy democracy’, and other stuff including ballot stealing, etc. This vote-buying has become a common phenomenon, as almost every election is characterised by vote-buying, where politicians and their men offer citizens monetary values as little as N1000 and household items such as rice, salt, and cubes of Maggi to secure their vote. According to Bratton (2008), one out of five Nigerians is exposed to vote-buying. For instance, Ejike (2018), in his study of electioneering processes, held that ‘handouts range from as low as N1,000 ($2.80) to around N5,000 ($14)  are offered to the public in exchange for votes and the agreement can take different forms. Agents may buy people’s permanent voter’s card or take voters’ bank details and transfer the agreed amount on the morning of the vote. In Ekiti state’s governorship election, government employees and pensioners allegedly received mobile money transactions of N3–4000 ($8.40–11.20) a few hours before voting opened’. (see Fig. 2.2 for examples of vote-buying). Nwogwugwu (2018: 124) sees this as the process of ‘oiling the machinery of their social network of clients’. This idea of vote buying or what Nwogwugwu regards as oiling the machinery of the network of clients brings to the fore the neo-patrimonial culture that has defined Nigeria’s politics, where citizens or voters are considered clients whose patronage is secured using state funds by the patrons, which, in this case, are the political class (Erdmann & Engel, 2006). This act is considered to be a threat to the development of any country’s political development. Therefore, to change this attitude, the OurMumuDonDo movement has engaged in different awareness strategies, such as town hall meetings and street and online campaigns, to inform Nigerians about the dangers of vote-buying and to encourage them to believe in the power of their votes. For example, the national secretary Adebayo Raphael and the face of the movement Charles Oputa constantly uploaded videos on the Instagram account of Charles Oputa decrying the habit of vote buying, i.e., citizens selling their votes, and the impact such action posed on the democratic process and development of the country. Charles Oputa, while expanding on the campaign to bring about ballot revolution, held that ‘we have been to the churches, mosques—now for our campaign…the ballot revolution of this movement is on track. As we speak, we have state chapters in Imo, Anambra, Lagos, Benue and the secretariat is here in Abuja. We are

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Fig. 2.2  Men arrested in the Osun State governorship election in 2018 with a bag of rice branded in the image of the political candidate ready to be given out as part of vote-buying. Source: Naij.com

looking to expand because the ultimate objective of us is to be able to mobilise and annex the intellectual resources of the Nigerian people to bring about the social change the country needs’ (Personal Interview, June 13, 2018, Abuja). Additionally, Adebayo Raphael maintained that ‘the social contract is challenging our people to be more intellectually focused in their thinking by looking at the cost of selling narrative’ (National Secretary OurMumuDonDo, Personal Interview, June 13, 2018, Abuja). This cost of selling the narrative component of the social contract is targeted at citizens who consider selling their votes despite the campaign

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to have a framework in which they can charge the politicians for their votes. As Adebayo Raphael stated, You see, during elections, that people lose sight of what is to come because of their interest in the immediate gain, pecuniary gains of the now. Therefore, we say we want to be able to get people to start thinking in the long term, how they can benefit from the democratic process, so we came up with the cost of selling narrative by saying the minimum wage in Nigeria is N18000.7 If you multiply 18,000 by 12  months and four years, you get N864000. Therefore, N864000 is the average amount you should take from the politician if you want to sell your vote at all. An average politician in a democratic space will stay four years in power. Now if you have collected N864000, at least you know you have something to keep to yourself and sustain yourself for the duration the politician will be in power. However, when you sell your vote for N3000, N5000, a cube of Maggi and other ridiculous things like that, then you have denied yourself the right to ask questions when leaders fail. You have denied yourself to have accountability and a democracy that favours everybody (Personal Interview, June 13, 2018, Abuja).

This idea can be considered controversial, as some might see it as promoting vote-buying or a refined neopatrimonial culture. However, this idea emphasises the significance of every vote and the invisible value each vote has on the democratic process. In a country where 35 states out of the 36 states are unable to pay salaries and owe salaries ranging from three to 13 months (Ahiuma-Young, 2018), it leaves a feeling of not being able to benefit from democratic processes among citizens. Hence, the culture of vote buying. Nevertheless, by requesting citizens to collect the sum total of their minimum wage for four years as the cost of vote selling and buying, the OurMumuDonDo movement is redefining the relationship that exists between the big men and the ordinary citizens during the electioneering period. Knowing full well that no politician will be willing to pay that high amount per citizen to purchase their votes, the movement is therefore challenging politicians to do away with vote-buying culture and likewise reorienting citizens about the potential value and invisible worth of each vote. Similarly, in the wake of the 2019 general elections, the OurMumuDonDo movement has been involved in the electioneering process, raising 7  The minimum wage has been increased to N30,000 by the federal government. However, only a handful of states have adopted this minimum wage.

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awareness about the dangers of vote buying and nonparticipation in the election process. Coleman et al. (2011) argue that democracy thrives on citizens’ inclusion and participation in political events, and they need accurate information to deliberate and make an informed decision. #OurMumuDonDo strategies and campaigns have been to promote citizens’ engagement and reorient citizens in making informed decisions that will further the democratic process. For instance, the movement has engaged with different stakeholders such as the electoral body, i.e., Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) on the voters’ registration exercise. The electoral body announced August 17, 2018, as the deadline for the continuous voters’ registration (CVR) exercise (Sahara Reporters, 2018). However, the movement kicked back against this deadline citing the slow process of registration. For instance, Charles Oputa showed videos of long queues of people who had been unable to register due to the delayed process and slow functionality of INEC machines. In a video posted on his Instagram page on January 29, 2018, Charles Oputa is seen visiting different voter registration centres and the long queue of people who are unable to register. He decried the attempts of the government and the electoral body to disenfranchise citizens from the electoral process. In addition, the movement argues that the deadline was in contravention of Section 9 (5) of Nigeria’s Electoral Act of 2010, which states that ‘the registration of voters under this section shall stop not later than 60 days before any election covered by this Act’. Consequently, the electoral body extended the deadline for voter registration, and this was seen as a victory for the people. According to Adebayo Raphael, ‘we have come thus far with this campaign and we have made significant impact, with the different campaigns we have engaged in, and the fight for justice OurMumuDonDo movement is seen as the voice of the common man. It did not happen as a fluke, but we worked hard for it’ (Personal Interview, June 13, 2018, Abuja). Likewise, in the build up to the elections, there has been the emergence of a new political class that seeks to disrupt the normative order as in the history of the country, there were so many young Nigerians that indicated interest in elective positions such as president, governors, etc. Young people such as Fela Durotoye, Omoyele Sowore, Kingsley Moghala, Eunice Atuejide and Donald Duke, who are in their mid-30s and 50s without any political experience—except for Donald Duke, who was once a governor of Cross Rivers State—have sought to become the president. To avoid the ‘big men’ that get to determine who controls the state resources

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(Nwogwugwu, 2018), the OurMumuDonDo movement constituted what is known as PACT, i.e., Presidential Aspirations Coming Together. According to the movement, the purpose of PACT is to form a coalition among all the young presidential aspirants to form a formidable team that will be able to outdo ‘big men’ structures within the political system. However, this process was criticised due to the exclusion of some female aspirants from the process and other presidential aspirants who refused to recognise the consensus candidate Fela Durotoye, who emerged on August 30, 2018, from the process. According to a statement from Charles Oputa, ‘While we believe that in a democratic society like ours, such exercise must be respected regardless of how controversial it may seem, we can also not discount the ambivalent public reactions to its outcome…on our part, we have decided to engage the Nigerian people and different groups on how we can better address the PACT project, rescue the situation, and reinvest and scale up the trust of Nigerians, especially our women and youth in the alternative candidate that we seek’ (The Nigerian Voice, 2018). While the OurMumuDonDo movement has played a significant role in redefining activism in Nigeria by acting as the public sphere for citizens to engage with the state and become the new protest voice, as alluded to by Mare (2014) and Badr and Ghali (2016), the success of the movement lies in its ability to incorporate and engage ordinary Nigerians on issues that affect them. We could see that the movement has recorded some successes in the reawakening of Nigerians to salient issues. However, the movement has not been without criticism. At times, the movement is accused of playing into the gallery or being agents of opposition. According to Adebayo Raphael: Therefore, in trying to reorient the people to get them to understand what is expected of them as citizens, to get them to understand that the ultimate power lies with them, there have been challenges. Some people say sometimes we are sponsored by the opposition, by state elements, and when we are doing something that relates to the opposition, the opposition says we are being sponsored by the state, so there is that dishonesty as to the subject of the discourse or the personality leading the discourse. Most times, we are faced with people ignoring the message and attacking the messenger that has been the culture by the way in Nigeria (Personal Interview, June 13, 2018, Abuja).

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Similarly, Charles Oputa attested to this by positing that ‘Most of the time the people you are fighting for are fighting you—that is the main thing. They do not even know. They think you are gaining something that is why you are talking on their behalf. Somebody has paid you and I have already told you people are severely, arrogantly ignorant’ (Personal Interview, June 13, 2018, Abuja). Both assertions highlight suspicion between citizens, social movements and activists. Kuntsman and Stein (2011) argue that there is a new form of suspicion in the digital sphere, and this suspicion about social movements or their activities has resulted in citizens questioning the credibility, motives and actions of social movements in the digital sphere. This suspicion could be at two levels, i.e., between the citizens, other stakeholders, activists, and the social movements, and suspicion between members of the movement. Most often, citizens are suspicious of the activities of social movements and digital activism, as there is always the perception that the vested interests of these activists who are most often seen as elites (this will be discussed in the next section) drive the formation and activities of the movement (see Akpojivi, 2018b), and this is evident from both quotations above of the national secretary and face of the OurMumuDonDo movement. Likewise, within the movement, there is suspicion in relation to agenda and why people are involved. For example, Charles Oputa stated that: During the formation of the movement, I was working with some groups of young people. I think after working with them for almost two or three months, it was obvious to me that they were truly not as passionate about the cause of the movement as I thought—I figured it was my money they were after. They were collecting money from me for different things funding the project, and somebody would ask why. That has always been the case, whatever I want to do, I will put in money if I believe in it. In addition, I think the young people, they know slightly about me…. I knew what they were about was about the money and not truly protest. Therefore, when I stop to provide the finance, they all disappeared (Personal Interview, June 13, 2018, Abuja).

This position was shared by the national secretary of the movement, who also held that ‘Some people who we started the movement with, they have left because they probably were not getting what they were expecting. Because this is a movement of what you can give and not what you can get

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so when there is a clash of interests in what you want and what is being given, then eventually you have to leave, and I believe that is what happened’ (Personal Interview, June 13, 2018, Abuja). This suspicion is due to difference in interpretation (Kuntsman & Stein, 2011), interpretation of motives and duties as there is no single valence but ‘rather it is highly mobile, contingent, and variable in form and function’ (Kuntsman & Stein, 2011: 8). People join social movements or activism to promote their personal interests, and this has been established by Fenton and Bararssi (2011), who argued that it is often difficult to separate private individual interests from public interests in social movements and digital activism. To this end, it can be argued that it was this clash of individual interests between the different presidential aspirants from that of OurMumuDonDo that has made PACT problematic and its agreements dishonoured. In an interview granted by one of the aspirants, Kingsley Moghala, he stated, ‘The reason I have pulled out of PACT arrangement is that the arrangement had unravelled even before the final selection of the consensus candidate, … and clause 13 of the PACT memorandum of understanding asserts the supremacy of the constitutional rights of the aspirants to pursue their political aspirations’ (Ogbonna, 2018). Irrespective of the contestation of interest, OurMumuDonDo can be regarded as a social force that was birthed due to the failure of the Nigerian state to its primary responsibility of good government, and this force is revolutionising activism in Nigeria. This is in line with Loader’s (2008) argument that social movements are birthed in liberal democracies to address falling democratic cultures. Within the case of #OurMumuDonDo, this is evident, as it has helped in addressing the ever-increasing disaffection and satisfaction with the democratic and political institutions in Nigeria, hence their call for national reawakening and conscientising of citizens to their roles in the democratic process.

The Charly Boy Brand and the OurMumuDonDo Movement: The Inseparable Twin Much has been written about the OurMumuDonDo movement in the previous section, and, from it, the idea of the movement revolving around Charles Oputa popularly known as Charly Boy or Area Fada is evident. Not only has he played a critical role in the establishment of the

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movement, but he is widely considered the face of the movement, and I am interested in ascertaining why, the rationale behind such a decision, and why, in general, the movement is built around Charly Boy? Answers to these questions will help establish whether social movements and digital activism have embraced innovative measures as ways of reaching out to the public and other stakeholders. To answer these questions, there shall be a brief detour into an in-depth ethnography material to show who Charles Oputa (Area Fada/Charly Boy) is before returning to answering the questions posed. This is necessary because these experiences will help to establish how the reality of digital activism and social movements are played out, the ideological framework, and the supposed ‘elitism’ that has characterised social movements and digital activism in Africa. Prior to my travels to Nigeria to get the relevant data for the study, I had established contact with the movement on their website. I was not expecting responses from the movement since I was using a contact detail from a website, and, at best, I was expecting a reply after weeks. However, I received a reply within 48 hours, and an appointment was scheduled for when I arrived in Abuja. A day before the appointment, I enquired about the meeting place and address. I was told to take any taxi and tell the driver you are going to Charly Boy’s house. On appointment day, I booked an Uber and using a location I Googled what I thought would be close to Charly Boy’s house. As I boarded the Uber, I told the driver I was going to Charly Boy’s house, and he said he ‘knows it, as ‘Area Fada’ is well known, and nobody can miss his house’. On our way, the driver enquired why I was visiting Area Fada and I told him I was conducting research around the OurMumuDonDo movement, and immediately the driver responded, ‘Area Fada na blessing oo, he dey always dey fight for us his people (Area Father is a blessing, it’s been long that he has been fighting for us his people). I see you be big man too to be able to get appointment to see Area Fada (I see you are a big man, hence you are able to secure appointment with Area Father).’ The statement by the driver that Charles Oputa fights for them and helps address injustice in society made me question his influence. Similarly, I wondered if the idea that I am ‘supposedly a ‘big man’ for me to be able to see and meet him at his house contradicted the early notion of Charles Oputa being accessible to the poor by picking up their problems and fighting for them.

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Fig. 2.3  Notice at the entrance of Charles Oputa’s house in Gwarinpa Estate Abuja

However, after a few minutes of driving, we arrived at a house that is well-fenced with a notice ‘trespassers will be shot’ (See Fig. 2.3). Upon my arrival, I knocked at the gate, and the security guard asked who I wanted to see. I responded that I had an appointment with Charles Oputa, and he responded ‘oga nor dey house’, i.e., (boss is not at home). I was shocked at his response, and I told him that I had secured an appointment with him, but the security man insisted that he was not home. I called the national secretary Adebayo Raphael to inform him of what I had just been told. He asked that I give the phone to the security man. After a few minutes on the phone, I was allowed into the premises. I noticed that the Uber driver only left after I was allowed into this well-fenced, gigantic building. As I walked into the premises, the security guard asked me to sit in a big lapa close to the main building. While at the lapa I noticed the erected banner of OurMumuDonDo at the lapa with some pictures of Charles Oputa hung in strategic places in the lapa. After a while I saw

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Charles Oputa come out of the main building talking to a guest who was leaving. He then walked towards me and asked who I wanted to see. I told him I was there to see him regarding the OurMumuDonDo movement. He responded, ‘I see’ and walked back into the main building. After two hours of waiting, I was ushered into the main house where I had an interview with him. During the wait, I noticed that people were coming into the premises and walking to another building alongside the main building, which I learned served as an office for the movement. I also observed that the movement was planning a road show, as an event planner was talking about logistical requirements such as appearing on a programme on African Independent Television (AIT) and the timeframe for the jingle, among other things. During the interview with Charles Oputa, when I asked him why he was involved with the OurMumuDonDo movement, he said, ‘Anywhere you find the youth, where the people suffer injustice, where there is poverty, you will likely find me there. I can’t be everywhere; I am just lending the Charly Boy brand to the integrity and be the face to the movement. However, the movement is strictly for the youth, I am only just encouraging them—that is why I am being used as the face of the movement’ (Personal Interview, July 13, 2018, Abuja). This statement implies that the movement needed his ‘brand’ to reach out to the Nigerian public and add credibility and integrity to the movement. Hence, the question of what is this ‘Charly Boy’ brand that is essential to drive the movement, and is this a strategy to redefine the structure and face of social movements and digital activism in Nigeria? This brand alluded to the personality and image of Charles Oputa that the Uber driver attested to, i.e., ‘Area Fada’ and is open to fighting injustice for the common man. According to Charles Oputa, ‘My life revolves around struggles and the fight against injustice. I have always been for the masses because the past 40 years of my life have been about activism, struggle, fighting injustice and trying to encourage young people to realise that the future is in their hands’ (Personal Interview, June 13, 2018, Abuja). Charles Oputa is no doubt a controversial figure in Nigeria due to his style of music and activism. As a musician and television producer, he has used his platform not only to talk about societal problems and speak to authorities, especially during the 1980s and 1990s but also to fight for the welfare of Nigerian musicians, such as the war against copyright and royalty (Information Nigeria 2018). Thus, he was regarded as the man of the people who is always interested in the masses and their welfare, and

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this to a certain extent places him on the same spectrum as the late Fela Kuti. His belief in activism and the need to fight injustice was largely derived from his family. According to him: Well, you know my father was a lawyer, then a judge of the supreme court. As far as Nigeria is concerned, because I am his son—I think he was the most respected judge because of his integrity, uprightness, and fairness. He always told me while I was younger, he said, you have to fight injustice wherever you see it, unless one day it will come and chop your head off— those were his exact words and that’s played a huge role in my life. Therefore, if I see injustice and I do not talk about it, one day someone will come and chop my head off. I was young and impressionable. My father stuffed me with an overdose of integrity, principles, the way somebody should behave, you know. He taught me about the simple things of life, he taught me about contentment, he taught me about my word being my bond. Of course, growing up when your parents are feeding you with those kinds of things, you think they are overbearing, they talk too much, but unknowingly all those messages were sinking in. Now my adult life, I have come to appreciate it, the things I did not appreciate while younger. I think it has always been there. People say something is in the blood, you have a calling—I guess this is my calling (Personal Interview, June 13, 2018, Abuja).

Consequently, it can be argued that the Charly Boy brand of ‘integrity, uprightness and fairness’ was built around the OurMumuDonDo movement for two reasons. First, to reach out and appeal to people who this movement is about the common man, about fighting against injustice in society. This they do to despair any suspicion associated with social movements and activism as argued by Kuntsman and Stein (2011). The family name and linkage to Oputa, a former judge who played a significant role in the truth and reconciliation initiative of Present Obasanjo, can be likened to a strategy to reach out to the people and despair any credibility suspicion. Additionally, by being regarded as Area Fada (father to the masses), using OurMumuDonDo as a platform helps appeal to ordinary people who are often neglected in social movements and digital activism. This could be seen in the spectrum of campaigns that the movement has embraced, such as the extension of voter registration, freedom of detained journalists and awareness of the masses about the invaluable worth of their civic duties. It conveys the message that the movement cares about the masses and not the elite. Second, it establishes the credibility of the

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movement. Because of the suspicion that has characterised the social movements and digital activism, using the Charles Oputa brand in the OurMumuDonDo movement helps convey the message that the movement is different from others that might be about vested personal interest as earlier stated. This credibility is derived from the idea that Charles Oputa is the son of a well-respected supreme court judge, a man that has over the years fought governments and injustice by using his music. This will help endear the movement to citizens who might have any doubt about the movement. This relationship between the movement and Charles Oputa, however, is double-sided. In as much as the movement needs the Charly Boy brand, Charles Oputa likewise needs the movement to maintain and further promote his brand. This could be seen from his assertion, ‘I have been looking to do something that is larger and bigger than me, overwhelm me and carry me until I die. I figured since my life has been that of struggle, I better find a cause, so out of frustration I moved to Lagos where I started connecting with some exceptional young people and that was when we christened the OurMumuDonDo movement’ (Personal Interview, June 13, 2018, Abuja). Consequently, from the above, it can be stated that both OurMumuDonDo and Charles Oputa are inseparable twins that need each other. However, my experiences with the Uber driver and at the Charles Oputa premises make me wonder to what extent Charles Oputa can be regarded as a ‘big man’ who is using his ‘bigness’ to influence and redefine good governance in Nigeria through social movements and digital activism. The fact that Charles Oputa is a ‘big man’ is undisputed, as the assertion of ‘any driver knows where I stay’, which conveys popularity with the masses and the bureaucracy I encountered, speaks of his bigness.

#BringBackOurGirls Movement The #BringBackOurGirls movement came into existence on April 14, 2014, following the abduction of over 200 female students from Chibok Secondary School, Borno State, Nigeria, by members of Boko Haram. Prior to the abduction, the North East region of Nigeria had witnessed a significant rise in terrorism from Boko Haram, an Islamic militant group that means ‘western education is forbidden’. The group targets both hard and soft targets, and this could be seen in the murder of 59 male students from the Federal Government College, Buni Yadi, Yobe State, Nigeria

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(Nossiter, 2014), and the bombing of the United Nations’ offices in Abuja before the said abduction (2011). The rise of terrorism by Boko Haram and the nonresponsive nature8 of the government under the administration of President Goodluck Jonathan gave birth to the movement. Fukuyama (2018) argues that ‘resentment’ over indignity is a vital component of a democratic state, and the resentment over the identity of the country as ‘mismanaged’ and ‘rise of terrorism’ gave birth to the #BringBackOurGirls movement. According to the co-founder of the movement, Dr. Oby Ezekwesili, in an interview with BBC Hardtalk, said the movement was established as a result of the Nigerian government’s silence over salient issues confronting the nation and to demand good governance (BBC Hardtalk, July 2014). Consequently, it can be argued that the movement’s primary objectives are securing the release of the abducted schoolgirls and the demand for good governance across the country. Therefore, the assertion that the identity of the movement revolves around good governance and securing the release of the abducted girls speaks about the insecurity of the state. These objectives are not outside the periphery of the primary responsibility of government, as the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria states that the primary responsibility of the government is to protect and secure lives and property and promote good governance (The 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria). This message of BBOG coupled with the strategy of online and offline integration, i.e., active online activism using social media platforms of Twitter, under the hashtags of #BringBackOurGrils or #BBOG, Facebook account and active website with the offline strategy of occupying public spaces (having daily sit-out at Unity Fountain and protest marches), has made the movement a global phenomenon as world leaders and high profile personalities such as Michelle Obama, David Cameron, Piers Morgan, Alicia Keys and Malala Yousafzai have tweeted and retweeted about the #BringBackOurGirls. According to Shearlaw (2015), ‘In less than three weeks into the movement and the use of the hashtag, the hashtag has been used over 1 million 8  There has been wide assertion that the administration of President Goodluck Jonathan was not responsive enough to Boko Haram activities and the abduction of the Chibok school girls. However, Okonjo-Iwela (2018) stated in her book that the government had good strategies to address these issues nevertheless their inability to communicate these to the public led to the assertion that the government was nonresponsive.

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times’. Olson (2016) asserts that online activism based on the use of hashtags such as the #BringBackOurGirls movement is able to draw global attention to salient national issues. The global attention received by the BBOG for its messages of securing the release of the abducted schoolgirls and the need for good governance has attracted stiff reactions from the state and other stakeholders who tend to criminalise the movement and their activities. According to Egbas (2017), the previous administration of President Goodluck Jonathan refused to recognise the movement and associate with the movement by engaging with them in addressing the issues raised because of the perception that the movement was about ‘scoring cheap political points’. In other words, the then ruling government saw the movement as an agent to discredit the reputation of the government at both the national and international levels. In fact, political opponent, i.e., All Progressive Congress used the narrative of the movement to highlight the failures of Goodluck’s regime and consequently the general perception that President Buhari came into power with the help of the movement. According to Dr. Chidi Odinkalu, the coordinator of the Civic Coalition for Democracy while establishing the above, ‘BBOG {BringBackOurGirls} indeed was instrumental and recognised in many ways in bringing Buhari’s administration into power as people bought into the message of the movement and the then opposition capitalised on their message’ (Personal Interview, June 13, 2018, Abuja). However, one would have expected that under the current administration of President Muhammadu Buhari that benefited from the movement activities, things would be different and that they would be able to engage with the movement in addressing the issues raised by the movement. During the early days of the administration, the government engaged with the movement and other international stakeholders, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Swiss government, which led to the release of 21 girls in October 2016 and a further release of 82 girls in May 2017 (Busari & McCleary, 2017; Busari et al., 2016). Nevertheless, the relationship between the movement and the state became bad due to the persistent pressure of the movement and its message. As Dr. Chidi Odinkalu, the coordinator of Civic Coalition for Democracy, puts it: ‘However, the simple message of BBOG bring back our girls who were abducted by Boko Haram which is symbolism for a much deeper message, has been attacked by both the Jonathan government with the same message under a different administration and it is still

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being treated badly’ (Personal Interview, June 13, 2018, Abuja). This attack due to the contestation of ideas (the symbolic message of good governance, and release of the girls) between the movement and the government has manifested itself in two forms, i.e., the state has deployed a heavy security presence9 to surround the venue of the movement sit-out and the use of hired internal displaced people (IDP) to disturb/disrupt the BBOG activities. BBOG since its establishment has used the Unity Fountain (a public space that symbolises the unity of the country, which is in close proximity to the state house) to have their daily sit-out and to stage their protests. During these sit-outs, the organisers of the movement and other stakeholders, such as officials from the United States Embassy, or invited guests to speak on national issues. Most often, these issues are about the abducted girls, the inability of the state to secure their release, the welfare of the families of the abducted girls and the security of the state. For instance, Aisha Yesufu throughout the fieldwork period talked about the death of democratic culture in the country due to the antidemocratic policy of President Buhari. She cites the criminalisation of the movement and the persecution of people with alternative views as evidence that the democratic space in the country is being eroded. As stated earlier, criminalization by the state is not a new phenomenon within postcolonial African states. Mbembe (2015) argues that threats are often used by states to address concerns raised by citizens, thereby resulting in contestation. Due to the contestation of ideas between the movement and the state, the state has criminalised the movement by deploying a heavy security presence and their hardware to prevent the movement from meeting. The venue of the movement sit-out is either cordoned off by the police or there is a heavy security presence during such meetings, which might end up being violent with the use of tear gas and pepper sprays, among others. Dr. Chidi Odinkalu, while buttressing the above, notes that ‘the Unity Fountain as a shrine for symbolic argument over the faith of Nigeria, what happened is that the FG {federal government} has sort of arrested that space by the deployment of these violent-looking uniformed assets and 9  Before embarking on the field work, I contacted the movement and the co-founder of the movement Aisha Yesufu, who responded. She suggested that the only condition for interviews would be at the sit-out venue, i.e., Unity Fountain. Throughout my field work of collecting data, the venue was not conducive to interviewing due to the heavy militarisation of the venue.

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hardware which then intimidate people who imagine that they can use the space and they have taken over basically’ (Personal Interview, June 13, 2018, Abuja). To some people, this may be an over exaggeration, which is not the case. During the period of carrying out this research, I was scared of entering into the Unity Fountain, as there were over 200 mobile security men with hard assets such as armoured tanks, water cannons and sophisticated weapons (see Figs. 2.4 and 2.5). Thus, the questions of why would the state criminalise #BringBackOurGirls and deploy heavy machinery against them? How can social movements and digital activism be able to overcome such criminalisation and achieve their set goals? The reason for such action is to prevent the movement from meeting and spreading their message. States are wary of the politics of the crowd, as they perceive the crowd to be revolutionary and problematic. Borch (2018), while agreeing with the above argument, further stated that throughout history, governments have treated the crowd or the gathering

Fig. 2.4  Some of the security assets at Unity Fountain

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Fig. 2.5  Some of the security men behind the cars. The venue was surrounded by security men daily

of people as something to be avoided, owing to their powerful effect in changing or altering societal norms. Bennett (2003: 124) posits that through the use of new media via digital activism and offline presence (sit-­ out by BBOG), social movements could ‘increase the efficiencies of political action… or change the political game itself’, thus facilitating their global reach and creating consciousness (Porta and Mosca 2005). Governments in postAfrican states, especially in Nigeria, have not taken lightly to be corrected or engaged with due to the banality of power and logic of power (see Mbembe 2015). As states do not want to be challenged or questioned by others, it is seen as detrimental to their authority and questions their authority, and this is manifested in the changing relationship between the state and the movements that seek to promote good governance such as the BBOG.  Dr. Chidi Odinkalu attested to this by stating that ‘Governments historically in Nigeria have proved unwell and incapable of confronting ideas that are founded on principles’ (Personal Interview, June 13, 2018, Abuja). For example, Ken Saro Wiwa’s message of the environmental protection and development of the Ogoni people was met with resistance, similar to other campaigns such as resource control.

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Hence, it is no surprise that the messages from BBOG reinforce the primary responsibility of the government as they constantly, through their sit-out and online activism, demand the release of the abducted girls by emphasising the number of days the girls have been held captive and highlight the failure of the state in securing their release, which has consequently made the state use heavy security to intimidate the movement. Likewise, the government tries to tarnish the reputation of the movement by alleging that key movement members have a personal agenda against the state due to selfish reasons. For instance, the special assistant to President Muhammadu Buhari on social media, Lauretta Onochie, alleged that Aisha Yesufu is ‘aggrieved because she was denied appointment by the president’. She further held that ‘Aisha Yesufu’s struggle is not for the release of the Chibok girls. Hadaiza Bala Usman’s appointment as managing director of Nigeria Port Authority is driving her crazy.’ (https://www. onlinenigeria.com/site/stories/204920-­aisha-­yesufus-­struggle-­is-­not-­ for-­the-­release-­of-­chibok-­girls-­hadiza-­bala-­usmans-­appointment-­as-­md-­ npa-­is-­driving-­her-­crazy-­ssa-­to-­president-­lauretta-­onochie-­says.html). A similar statement was made of Dr. Oby Ezekwesili that she was aggrieved because she was not made a minister. In addition, the state has used other movements or hired crowds as part of the strategy to tarnish the reputation of the BringBackOurGirls movement. For instance, in one of the sit-­ outs on June 12, 2018, the Buhari Support Group, with the backing of the security men, was at the Unity Fountain, holding a rally at the scheduled time of the BBOG sit-out. Although #BringBackOurGirls can be regarded as a counterhegemonic force challenging dominant state powers (Drezner, 2019), the usage of an alternative movement such as #BuhariSupporrtGroup to confront #BringBackOurGirls can be likened to an alternative counterhegemonic group to challenge the ideologies of the movement. Most often, such action could lead to a clash between both movements.10 Dr. Chidi Odinkalu, while attesting to this, posits the following: Street mobilisation is currently a total business in Abuja. People make money from renting Internally Displace People (IDPs) and staff either to come and reinforce their numbers or come and destroy your credibility…. 10  This is one of the common strategies adopted by both presidents Jonathan and Buhari, as most often their supporters will occupy the Unity Fountain and destroy BringBackOurGirls equipment like chairs, and stone members of BringBackOurGirls (see https://www.vanguardngr.com/2014/05/hooligans-attack-bringbackourgirls-protesters/)

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government is looking for people who can throw stones or be seen to be carrying stones so that they can get an excuse to curb you, and Abuja is a city and Nigeria where there is a lot of hunger, so it’s not difficult to get one or two people and give them N500 to make your picketing look bad. (Personal Interview, June 13, 2018, Abuja). Dr. Chidi Odinkalu’s assertion confirms the view that the interest or agenda of social movements is commonly felt to be in conflict with the interest of the state (Tilly, 2004: 3) and thus the strategies (discredit or use counter movement) of the state in dealing with the movement. Such strategies show the violent and intimidating relationship between the state and the movement. On the other hand, the state strategies have afforded the BringBackOurGirls movement an opportunity to continually highlight the failures of the state and drive their message of social change. BringBackOurGirls has not only become a platform for citizens to press for social, economic and political changes in the country via their messages, i.e., the release of abducted schoolgirls and promoting good governance (Akpojivi, 2020). It has also set out to disrupt the political structure of Nigeria in post-1999 built around the two dominant parties of All Progress Congress (APC) and the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) through its sister hashtag #RedCardMovement. According to Dr. Oby Ezekwesili, the RedCardMovement aims to challenge and address the leadership problem that has confronted the country since its independence 57 years ago and 19 years since the reinstitution of democracy and shift the political discourse from the two dominant political parties, i.e., All Progressive Congress (APC) and the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) (Hard Copy, February 23, 2018). This action has further compounded the idea and promoted the notion that social movements and digital activism are used by few elites to promote their selfish interest (see Akpojivi, 2018b). Hence, the issue of to what extent has the emergence of social movements and digital activism such as BringBackOurGirls been driven by the elite to pursue their own interest? And if these movements can survive without the involvement of elites. The notion of elites driving social movements has been recorded in numerous studies. Fenton and Barassi (2011) held that the personal interest of these ‘elites’ tends to drive and impact the overall objective of social movements. However, situating such an idea within the Nigerian context raises the issue of to what extent ordinary Nigerians can advocate for social change without the resources that these

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elites bring. According to the coordinator of Coalition for Civic Democracy, Dr. Chidi Odinkalu: If you have just young people, have people who are seen as uneducated and do not have a voice, government does not pay a significant cost for resorting to violent means in putting down these things. It is also about recruiting faces if they get attacked by the government. In that way, the costs are escalated. That is where people like Charly Boy become important and obviously Oby Ekezewili, sometimes I may play that role because of my previous work at the national human rights commission, but we got to keep ­recruiting people not just because of the voice and brain but with a face. However, you got to marry up the organisation’s mobility of your movement and platform building with an awareness of the fact that those whom you are bringing are human beings. Governments can sometimes be without compassion; these people need some protection in these kinds of circumstances… The elite word is a word of abuse. I am sorry, yes it’s okay to be elite, by the way, hungry people do not have time to do these things because they are busy doing picking up crumbs to eat. You got to have a minimum level of comfort to be able to deal with this kind of inconvenience. We are talking about face teargas, water cannons with pepper spray and all of that and show up every day to do that. You are not going to do that if you do not have food or are guaranteed one meal a day. So yeah, you got to be an elite to do that big deal (Personal Interview, June 13, 2018, Abuja).

The above assertion places elites at the heart of any social movement, as they provide the necessary financial and moral support that might be needed, which ordinary members cannot provide (see Akpojivi, 2018b). During my attendance at the daily sit-outs, I observed that equipment such as microphones, public speakers, banners, chairs, and media personnel from notable media organisations (Channels Television, African Independent Television, Oak TV, etc.) were present, and these involved financial commitments. Therefore, it can be argued that the elites within the movement (Oby Ezekwesili, Aisha Yesufu, Chidi Odinkalu11 amongst others) pay for such services. Social movements have to tap into all the resources available to them to have a campaign that people can identify with and bring about change. Stekelenburg and Klandermans (2009) 11  These people are well known and occupied high profile positions. For instance, Oby Ezekwesili is a former World Bank Vice President, and co-founder Transparency International. Chidi Odinkalu is the Chair of National Human Rights Commission Abuja, and Senior team manager Open Society Foundation.

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argue that social movements have to capitalise and utilise all resources, i.e., human, material, etc., in their mobilisation, as without these resources, social movements will be ineffective. Therefore, Odinkalu juxtaposes his assertion and the importance of elites with the material resources needed to fund and keep social movements in Nigeria going. According to Odinkalu, the elites behind the BringBackOurGirls movement provide credibility, the needed image before the public, state and security operative and offer financial assistance and moral assistance when members are arrested. Such a statement not only dismisses the idea of vested elite ­interests and agendas but also makes social movements and elite involvement inseparable. This is further seen in Chidi Odinkalu’s statement, in which he stated that ‘This idea that everyone got a price, and our price is cheap because we are advocating for social change in society is insulting. What is there for me to benefit from my involvement in activism in Nigeria? You are going to offer me a post as a commissioner, minister or contractor? Sorry I do not need that stuff.’ (emphasise added, Personal Interview, June 13, 2018, Abuja). Such a statement attests to the selfless service offered in the movement to ensure that Nigeria is working for all, irrespective of class, gender and ethnicity. This makes ‘the elite’ societal ‘moral agent’ in identifying problems and bringing such problems into the public agenda; hence, social movements are not working to promote their personal interests but the interest of humanity (Salter, 2003). In conclusion, there is clear-cut similarity between the #OurMumuDonDo and #BackOurGirls movements. This similarity could be seen in their ideology of good governance and accountability. This has to a large extent shaped their strategies of adopting both online strategy (digital activism) and offline strategy (street protests and sit-outs) in advocating for good governance, accountability and transparency within the Nigerian state. Their activism has reshaped the citizen-state relationship, as both movements have used digital activism as a tool for conscientising Nigerians and demanding social change in the sociopolitical, economic and cultural environments, therefore becoming the new protest drum in Nigeria, as they highlight the social issues confronting the Nigerian state. However, the question remains: to what extent can they bring about these changes despite the criminalisation from the state? These movements can bring about the needed change; however, for a fast attainment of these social changes, there is the need for all these different movements to form a coalition to form a formidable force to

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surpass the state resistance and use of violence. As the Dr. Chidi Odinkalu coordinator of the CCD puts it: No single entity can actually achieve this social change, which is the point we make by creating the collective platform (CCD). The idea is we got to burden share, we have got to do this together as a team and together we can achieve a greater bang. However, if everyone of us is trying to outdo the other we are going to be picked up one after the other and we are all going to get tired, because of the certainty of nature, frustration will come in and that is the way it is. So that’s what we are working at and we absolutely agree that no single organisation will be able to do this successfully that’s why we are in CCD…. For example, BBOG has to show up every day and fight all these battles. No longer. The idea is that we all share burdens. (Personal Interview, June 13, 2018, Abuja)

This coalition, although at its early stage, will enable these different movements in Nigeria seeking to bring about social change, pull resources together, strategise and implement these strategies effectively to achieve the needed social change. The ability of the leaders of these different movements to let go of their individual egos and stay within the collective force is key to the realisation of the needed social change. The state actors ‘big men’ have all the needed resources to resist this social change; thus, the collective force of ideas and resources by the movements will help counter the state and its powers.

References Achebe, C. (1958). Things fall apart. London: Heinemann. Achebe, C. (1983). The trouble with Nigeria. Heinemann. Achebe, C. (2012). There was a country: A personal history of Biafra. Penguin Books. Adebanwi, W., & Obadare, E. (2010). Introducing Nigeria at fifty: The nation in narration. Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 28(4), 379–405. Adebanwi, W., & Obadare, E. (2011). The abrogation of the electorate: An emergent African phenomenon. Democratisation, 18(2), 311–335. Adebanwi, W., & Obadare, E. (2013). Democracy and the Prebendalism in Nigeria: Critical interpretations. Palgrave. Adedigba, A. (2017). 60 million Nigerians are illiterates-Minister. Premium Times, online: premiumtimesng.com/news/more-news/250397-60-million-­nigeriansare-illiterates-minister.html?tztc=1. Accessed 24/11/2017. Adichie, C. (2013). Americanah. Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group.

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CHAPTER 3

#FeesMustFall Movement: The Revolt for Decolonization

Much research has been written about the #FeesMustFall movement that shook post-apartheid South Africa in 2015. Interest around the #FeesMustFall movement by scholars has increased (Hodes, 2016) because the movement can be regarded as one of the first movements in post-apartheid South Africa to challenge inherent social inequalities and injustice within the South African state (see Chawana & Akpojivi, 2022; Ndlovu, 2017). Most of these discussions have focused on the wider national movement and its implications for national politics (Ndlovu, 2017). Others have examined the movement from the perspective of Twitter conversations, i.e., discourses, and participatory politics etc. (see Wessels, 2017; Habib, 2019). Therefore, this chapter will focus on the #FeesMustFall movement from the context of the protests at the University of the Witwatersrand (Wits University), where the movement was born before it moved to other university campuses across the country. Chawana and Akpojivi (2022) argued, as a historically white institution that gave birth to the movement in 2015, it is germane to examine and understand the movement within the prism and structure of Wits University before situating it within the wider context of the movement. This is not to dismiss the impact of the wider  nation-wide protest movement, which has shaped how other scholars approached the subject (see Bosch, 2016; Ndlovu, 2017), but contextualising the movement from its source will shed more light on the micro-macro relationship and the ability of the movement to bring about social change within the confine of its origin. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 U. Akpojivi, Social Movements and Digital Activism in Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30207-7_3

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An understanding of this is very important, as it will provide context into how micro relations and structure (at Wits University) were able to contribute to the wider project of the #FeesMustFall national activism or protests. This chapter further argues that an understanding of the #FeesMustFall movement must be situated within the historical trajectory of apartheid and its impact on post-apartheid South Africa (Ndlovu, 2017). Such a situation will establish the argument that this chapter seeks to make that the movement was born out of the need to advance social change in South Africa’s higher educational institutions by advocating for true decolonization and transformation as a way of uprooting colonial legacies and whiteness that has characterised the educational sector. A position Ndlovu (2017) argued was the primary objective of the national #FeesMustFall protest. While Ndlovu (2017) posited that the protest was not a revolution per say due to the different ideological contestations, I have argued that while these ideological contestations exist within the Wits #FeesMustFall movement, their clamour for ‘social change’ (reform) entails a revolution to disrupt the normative status quo. Therefore, in this chapter, I have likened the #FeesMustFall movement to Ayittey’s (2005) notion of the ‘Cheetah Generation’ or what Fanon (1961) called the ‘lumpen-proletariat’, that is, the new hope for Africa’s generation that wants to delink themselves from old colonial practices and postcolonial leaders’ tactics and culture of corruption, inefficiency and bad governance. As Fanon argues, oppressed members of society will only have a sense of belonging when they challenge and revolt for a better humanity and create the life they want. In addition, #FeesMustFall protests were about challenging the status quo of inequalities that have excluded students from the education sector and climbing the higher income ladder of society (Chawana & Akpojivi, 2022; Ndlovu, 2017). Lastly, by focusing on the student’s protests at the University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa, this chapter will argue that the student’s protests of 2015 and 2016 were grounded in the Biko ideology of black consciousness, which has been discussed in Chap. 1, that is, the gathering together of black students within Wits University and across South Africa to challenge the inherent colonial legacy that has continued to impact their everyday existence. Additionally, the chapter will argue that the consciousness among the students to address a salient social problem, i.e., inequality, made them defy ethnic sentiments that usually characterised postcolonial states such as South Africa, used by postcolonial leaders and

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nationalists to divide the citizens and push for their demands for change and transformation of the higher education institution. These students were able to do so using communication (alternative media) of new media in the struggle for the human minds, i.e., fellow students, university management, other stakeholders and the general public. This, according to Castells (2009), is significant in the ability of social movements to achieve their objectives, as communication is central in shaping people’s opinion and attitude towards a cause, as these movements, state and nonstate actors struggle for the human minds. Consequently, the ability of the movement to utilise both theories successfully has made #FeesMustFall a vintage case for studies, as asserted earlier. The discussion will be situated within the arguments of Ayittey (2005) and Fanon (1961) that students are a generation who defile sentiments that have been used by the older generation, the ‘hippo generation’, to suppress the development of African states and use available resources, in this case, new media technologies to challenge the status quo and advocate for true decolonization within the South African higher education sector.

Genesis of #FeesMustFall #FeesMustFall movement started at the University of the Witwatersrand on Monday, October 12, 2015. The protest started as a result of fees increment by the management of the university by over 10% (Gillespie & Naidoo, 2019a). According to Malabela (2017a), the issue of fees has been a constant and ongoing struggle with students at South African universities, especially at historically white universities such as Wits University, where fees are unusually expensive. According to the Department of Higher Education South Africa, “the average cost of higher education in most historical white institutions such as University of Cape Town, Rhodes University, University of Stellenbosch and the University of the Witwatersrand is more than R90000 annually which is unaffordable for the middle-class” (2015: 22). However, this does not imply that historically black institutions are either affordable or have all the resources needed to facilitate quality teaching and learning experience. As Langa (2017) argues, prior to 2017, historically black universities have also encountered protests due to high fees and inadequate facilities. Therefore, education is exclusionary for students who are unable to afford education. This means that students from poor backgrounds are excluded from seeking education at historically white institutions where they have better

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and well-equipped infrastructure, and are forced to study at historically black institutions that are largely underfunded and have poor facilities (Malabela, 2017b). Alternatively, black poor students already in white historical universities will have to withdraw from their studies since they are unable to afford the fees. This is due to the large inequalities within the South African state, as in post-apartheid South Africa, the economy is still in the hands of the whites despite the political transformation that occurred in 1994 (Erasmus, 2005). MacDonald (2006) argues that race is central to understanding the political economy of South Africa, as blacks are excluded from economic expressions and belonging. This structure, which was rooted in apartheid, has continued to date. Similarly, Seekings and Nattrass (2005) zeroed this exclusion and inequalities to the fact that the capital structure of South Africa is still controlled by whites, which has consequently led to the continued inequalities that were evident during apartheid. This posed a serious problem to postcolonial South Africa and its mission of attaining its goal of being a ‘rainbow state’ where there is equality amongst all. However, such action of high tuition fees continues to perpetuate the colonial tendency of segregation, i.e., superior equality education at white historical institutions where blacks are excluded due to social inequality and an inferior black institution where there are limited resources and affordable to black students (Vilakazi, 2017). According to the former Vice-Chancellor of the University of the Witwatersrand (Wits University), Adam Habib, while attesting to this inequality and its impact on education accessibility by black poor students, held that ‘the biggest challenge of our time is inequality...inequality is the polarisation between rich and poor, and what inequality does is that it polarises society. Wits University is haunted by the challenges it finds itself in, and this challenge is maintaining its standards with the limited resources available to it’ (Interview, December 12, 2018, Johannesburg). Such an assertion from the vice-chancellor shows that despite this inequality, the university was vested in maintaining its global reputation rather than meeting the needs of excluded black students. Hence, there is a need to increase fees to maintain standards. University management blamed the increase in fees on the decline in state funding despite an increasing number of student enrollments, which has created conditions for universities to derive other streams of income, such as tuition fees (Gillespie & Naidoo, 2019a). Hodes (2016: 140), while buttressing this fact, posited that:

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Between 1994 and 2011, the number of students enrolled in higher education in South Africa almost doubled, increasing from 495,356 to 938,201. However, state funding for higher education as a component of total university income decreased from 49 percent in 2000 to 40 percent in 2012. Universities sought to make up for the budget shortfall through private fundraising, but during this time, the contribution of student fees to total university income increased from 24 percent to 31 percent.

The dwindling resources from the state meant that universities had to source alternative funds such as fee increments to fund and open the doors of the universities. According to a Senior Executive Member of Wits University, while attesting to this decline in government funding, ‘at Universities like Wits, fees and subsidies used to be 50/50. Without the 50 percent fees and subside from the state you cannot run the university… due to a decline in subsidy, the university adopted a model of subsidy, fees and money that can be raised elsewhere’ (Interview, December 14, 2018, Johannessburg). From the above, it can be argued that the decrease in government funding and the need to continually open the doors of the university and maintain the standard of education necessitated the annual fee increment that has characterised universities in South Africa. Steyn and De Villiers (2006), while highlighting the impact of the decrease in government funding on the South African higher education sector, stated that such a decrease has forced universities to be innovative in their revenue generation, and one such innovation is through fees, which has consequently resulted in students amassing a huge debt profile since mid-1990. According to Haffajee (2015), tuition fees in South Africa cost approximately 2 billion Rands annually. Therefore, the students’ resistance to such an increment in the #FeesMustFall protests, through what Gillespie and Naidoo (2019b) termed ‘insurgent politics’ as a way of addressing university underfunding and the inability of students to fund their studies. Thus, there is a call for free education. Therefore, it can be argued that this resistance and insurgent politics of the students via the #FeesMustFall protest movement was birthed to uproot the colonial and apartheid legacy of class and inequalities that has continued in post-1994 South Africa (Wessels, 2017). Their dissatisfaction with the continued coloniality and the need to change the system led to a generation that desires real social change and decolonization, as Fanon argues (see Fanon, 1963). As Haffajee (2015) puts it, #FeesMustFall is about ‘unfinished freedom’ from

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the apartheid era that has created and facilitated class and inequality. This unfinished freedom speaks of the continued struggle to free South Africans from political and economic inequalities that have continued to impact their daily existence, such as education. Heffernan and Nieftagodien (2016: 1), while showing the connection of the Soweto’76 uprising and to #FeesMustFall and the quest to address the unfinished business, stated that students have always played a significant political role and have ‘consciously connected their struggles for free and quality education to the struggles of the 1976 generation’. Both protests not only highlighted educational challenges but also challenged deep-rooted institutionalised oppression and inequalities in South Africa (Naidoo, 2016). For instance, the Bantu Education Act of 1953 segregated education between whites and blacks, while whites were exposed to the superior education system, blacks, on the other hand, were subjected to an inferior system lacking basic infrastructure. Such an education was meant to prepare blacks for a menial job and remain within the poverty circle. Therefore, Gillespie and Naidoo (2019a) argue that education is the major catalyst for breaking the poverty cycle and moving upwards in the class structure of society (Gillespie & Naidoo, 2019a); thus, the resistance of students during #FeesMustFall to continued segregation and inequalities has continued to exclude black children from seeking education. To them, #FeesMustFall was not just about free education but about challenging the trajectory of colonialism rooted in apartheid and the failure of the ruling African National Congress government to address the wider socioeconomic and political issues that have impacted the wellbeing of black South Africans since the emergence of democracy in 1994 (Ndlovu, 2017). As the new African National Congress (ANC) government made several promises, but their governance ‘did not make any substantive changes to the existing economic and institutional structure of South African society’ (Gillespie & Naidoo, 2019a: 191). Therefore, the rising dissatisfaction among citizens has led to an increase in the number of protests over service delivery issues such as employment, housing, sanitation, quality hospital care, etc., that occur in South Africa yearly, which has resulted in South Africa being known as the protest capital of the world (Alexander, 2012). Therefore, any reading of #FeesMustFall must be situated within the logic of how disenfranchised students, i.e., The ‘tiger generation’ or ‘lumpen-proletriat’ who are dissatisfied with continued injustice perpetrated by the ruling elite ‘hippo generation’ and the antecedence of

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apartheid, have resolved to use new media technologies to challenge inherent colonial legacies within the South African higher education institutions by mobilising, pulling all available resources, (Ndlovu, 2017) and advocate for social change that will address the inequalities that exist in society right from colonialism to apartheid to date.

#FeesMustFall and Social Change in South African Higher Education In that moment, the students had achieved in a matter of 10 days what vice-­ chancellors had been advocating for at least 10 years (Habib, 2016a).

The above quote from the former Vice-Chancellor of the University of Witwatersrand speaks of the wider impact the #FeesMustFall movement had on addressing the salient issues confronting the South African universities during the 2015 and 2016 protests. Therefore, this section will explore the extent to which the student-led movement has been able to bring about social change within the context of the University of the Witwatersrand, which was the root of the movement. As stated earlier, this chapter is interested in the micro-macro relationship and how this relationship shaped the attainment of the movement’s objectives. This discussion will be situated within the black consciousness and communication power theories, as both theories will help establish the argument that social change was only viable because of the ability of the black students to gather together and struggle for the human minds by using an alternative medium of communication in reaching out to relevant stakeholders that could assist in attaining the desired results. This discussion will be centred on two themes of decolonization of the curriculum and free education, which were the key issues demanded by the students (see Naidoo, 2016; Chawana & Akpojivi, 2022). According to Veriava (2019: 200), while buttressing the above, ‘FMF (FeesMustFall) was about fees, but it was also immediately about more…it’s an act of decolonisation’. The rationale behind the above objectives is to achieve true transformation in which the corrupted African leaders have denied the continent but have continued to promote their selfish interests that have hindered socioeconomic, political and cultural developments. According to Ayittey (2005: xxi), the current generation is tired of excuses and the constant failures of the states, thus their drive for a new direction that will foster growth, or what Fanon calls ‘true transformation’. Consequently, this section will examine how

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the students’ movement of 2015 and 2016 has used digital platforms to advocate for social change in the South African education sector.

Decolonization of the Curriculum and University The term decolonization can be regarded as one of the most abused words within South African higher education, as the term has ‘captured the imagination of many people’ in this ‘era of decolonization of politics and knowledge’ (Madlingozi, 2018). Consequently, there are so many readings and meanings to the term. Predominantly, decolonization has been seen from the reading of Fanon, i.e., the perspective of Africanization-­ dropping or doing away with anything Western (Mupotsa, 2019). To others, it is the coexistence of African and Western epistemologies (Mbembe, 2016a), and some view it from the perspective of humanity/humanness (see Mphahlele, 1974). While these different perspectives might be right in their thinking, these perspectives have, to a large extent, shaped the numerous conversations around decolonising the curriculum and university during the #FeesMustFall protests of 2015 and 2016. However, I have approached decolonization from Mphahlele’s (1974) perspective of humanity because the central argument for decolonization began with the detachment of Africans from their source of humanity. This approach is in line with Fanon’s (1967) position that decolonization is about restoring humanity to the colonised and the oppressed. According to Fanon, ‘the whole of humanity has erupted violently, tumultuously onto the stage of history, taking its own destiny in its hands’ (1965: 1). This implies a violent progress of decolonising of restoring humanity, as colonialisation dehumanised the colonised. As Mphahlele puts it, colonialisation separated the colonised from their source/root, which impacted their mentality and sense of being. That is, despite the attainment of independence, the colonised Africans continued to perpetuate the colonial culture, hence the lack of true decolonialisation (Fanon, 1963). Therefore, Africans continued to be separated from their act of humanness but oriented toward self-driven interests instead of the interest of the collective that reflects humanity. Ake (1979), while buttressing this fact, argues that the African continent inherited values that foist Western cultures (individualism) and epistemology, and the end purpose of this is to promote colonists’ ideas and invariably detach Africans from their source. Mupotsa (2019), while elaborating on Mphahlele’s view of humanity, posited that Mphahlele’s work is rooted in African humanism, which is

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grounded in the ideas of black consciousness thoughts and negritude, as these reflect African expressions and experiences. It is this lack of African expressions and experiences that gave birth to the #FeesMustFall movement and the subsequent call for the decolonisation of the curriculum and university, and the subsequent misconception on decolonisation reading, as #FeesMustFall was not only about fees and free education but also about the broader institutional culture and practices within universities (see Wessels, 2017; Langa, 2017). Peterson (2016), while expounding on this idea, stated that this lack of experiences and their culture can be located within the #feesmustfall 2015 and 2016 protests and resistance to the universal culture, i.e., westernisation of education that excluded African culture, voices and experiences, and this was a central bone of contention within the protests. According to Ashley Mabasa, a student activist during the protests, Wits University is lacking transformation, as the so-called transformation project of the university is from top-down instead of bottom-up, which does not recognise the everyday realities of students but reflects the vested interests of management. True transformation must come from the people, the students and not the elite leaders. According to him, ‘there are no curriculum changes until some of those changes happen we are going nowhere. For instance, in sociology, they study Marx, Durkheim, and Weber, these are the same tools of analysis you will use in postgraduate when doing research. In addition, when you look carefully, they will not solve our problems because they are not ours’ (Interview, January 22, 2019, Johannesburg). This idea of Western knowledge within the curriculum that excludes African experiences and African humanity alluded to by Mabasa was contained in the Transformation Memoranda 2014 by a group of students from the department of politics, as the memoranda questions the lack of African scholarship and the inclusion of African thought at Wits. According to a testimonial included in the memoranda, One time, at another university, we studied political philosophy, from Weber to Marx, to Mandela. We had a test on Mandela’s articulation of positive and negative freedom in his book Long Walk to Freedom; as well as his explanation for Mkhonto, we Sizwe’s reasoning for armed struggle and the specific use of sabotage over other forms of armed struggle. As I was waiting outside the class for the test to begin, a classmate turned to me and said the test should be easy because, ‘well he’s not truly a political philosopher, is he?’ Referring to Mandela (Thoko Chilenga, Transformation Memorandum, 2014: 21).

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The above speaks of the geopolitics of knowledge production in which Western epistemology has characterised African universities in the postcolonial era, and knowledge or experiences from the global south largely ignored due to the perceived superiority of these Western epistemologies (Ngugi, 2016). As African knowledge and experiences are marginalized within the organisation of knowledge, ‘the various fields of knowledge of Africa are in many ways rooted in colonialism’ (Ngugi, 2016: 71). Mignolo (2002), while explaining the geopolitics of knowledge production and distribution, posits that knowledge is built around Western ideas and culture, and this is historical, as it is rooted in colonialism and imperial difference. To Mignolo, the geopolitics of knowledge production and distribution are western, and this was expanded with the aid of capitalism and colonialism. According to him, ‘the expansion of Western capitalism implied the expansion of Western epistemology in all its ramifications, from the instrumental reason that went along with capitalism and the industrial revolution, to the theories of the state, to the criticism of both capitalism and the state’ (2002: 59). Consequently, this process has excluded Africa or the global south from the process of knowledge production, as they became just knowledge distributors, and this did not help with the decolonization project of the 1960s following the attainment of independence. Gillespie and Naidoo (2019a), while supporting the above argument, added that universities in Africa are structured or built around colonist systems and government. According to them, Universities in South Africa were built by British colonial governments in the image of Oxbridge-Greek columns and European philosophy and for white settlers. They were never envisioned as places for the education of black South Africans, who were cast as laborers and working-class professionals in the colonial political economy. Even the one university built for black higher education during the colonial period—Fort Hare—was built by missionaries and was oriented around a European canon (2019: 191).

The above quote shows that the purpose of establishing a university in South Africa was not for citizen empowerment and development as the established systems, i.e., structure and curriculum, excluded their experiences and meant to subjugate them to Western beliefs and epistemology. Therefore, they were not considered or included in the knowledge

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production and distribution processes. According to a Senior Management at the University of the Witwatersrand, while expounding this thought, I think decolonization is Africans doing knowledge creation, not just production but creation, production, and dissemination themselves. This is what Americans and British did as part of colonialism to bring already created knowledge and produced knowledge and to disseminate it to you…. However, this has not happened in every country. In every country after democracy at a particular time, this demand for curriculum transformation occurs. Funny enough, it never always happens at the beginning; it happens much later when people become disillusioned with democracy or independence (Interview, December 14, 2018, Johannesburg).

The above assertion dismisses the normative assumption of decolonization occurring at the attainment of independence by these African countries, as in most cases, decolonialisation is perceived as Africanization, that is, African ideas and thoughts being at the national discourse. Mbembe (2016a: 33) argues that this notion of decolonization is not new, as according to him ‘we all have in mind African postcolonial experiments in the 1960s and 1970. Then, to decolonise was the same thing as to ‘Africanise’. To decolonise was part of a nation-building project’. While some African states such as Tanzania, Kenya, and Ghana might be argued to have had this conversation, the failure of African states such as South Africa to have this discussion of decolonization of curriculum and social structures in post-1994 led to the uprising of #FeesMustFall and the need to embark on curriculum decolorization. The present systems and curriculum reflect the inherent history of colonialism and apartheid, where knowledge is dominantly produced from the West without any recognition of African experiences and humanness. Marisa Lourenco, while supporting the above argument, posited the following: Everywhere I look thought was led by white students and white lecturers. How was this possible, twenty years after democracy, especially at an institution that claimed to be so dedicated to transformation it did not even need race quotas for admission anymore?…this led me to explore the liberal tradition that the university so proudly celebrates. While part of the ‘open’ universities during the 1950s, and while boasting a history of transformation, Wits does not acknowledge it was a beneficiary of the apartheid era and is very much a Western institution that fails to locate itself as a university in an African country with the appropriate syllabus (Transformation Memorandum 2014: 20).

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This above quote reflects the current educational system or structure that is built around race and Western epistemology, whose antecedence is rooted in apartheid, where the Bantu Education Act of 1953, for instance, aided such practices. Mphahlele (1993), while buttressing on the above, states the following: Before 1953, when Bantu Education became law, facilities were separate, and unequal curricula were the same for black and white students. The new curricula and syllabi compelled teachers to instruct their children to feel inferior. The rationale was to lower the quality of education for the Africans so that we did not aspire to pastures set aside for whites. The state insisted on mother-tongue instruction from elementary through high school, knowing full well that English textbooks were not going to be translated. It was hoped that the new system would counter political activism: the Mandelas and the Sobukwes, and their fellow activists had been educated in the earlier system. The frontiers of the imagination would thus be limited because the ideas that came with education would thus be blocked (1993: 184).

Although the Bantu Education Act is no longer in effect, the aftermath of this Act is still being felt in terms of the segregated educational systems in which Wits is a beneficiary, i.e., historical white and black institutions, the use of the English language as a medium of education that tends to exclude learners who are only conversant with their mother tongue, and curricula that are mainly Western. Likewise, the infrastructural, that is, buildings and spaces that reflect these colonial cultures and exclusion, therefore, make black students feel unwelcomed (Mbembe, 2016b). According to Mbembe, the architecture and public spaces of these universities in South Africa raise a salient question of ownership, that is, who owns the space, and if such spaces are reflective of the public good and will. The feeling of unease, especially for black students and lecturers, which has affected their ‘mental disposition’, requires revolution, which Mbembe called ‘pedagogies of presence’, to ‘reconcile a logic of indictment and a logic of self-affirmation, interruption and occupation’ (Mbembe, 2016b). Therefore, the epistemological warfare for the #FeesMustFall protests of 2015 and 2016 (Mupotsa, 2019), and the heart of this warfare is black consciousness, i.e., awareness of black suffering, black agency, and experiences as a critical component of the university and curriculum. According to Mupotsa (2019: 10), the #FeesMustFall protests of 2015 and 2016

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were built around six fundamental pillars, i.e., ‘Afrikanisation of university symbolism and institutional memory, radical revision and Afrikanisation of all university curricula, fast-tracking Afrikanisation of academic staff contingency, an end to workers discrimination, an end to financial exclusion of students, and revision of the departmental academic structures that impede the throughput of black students’ (see also the Wits transformation memoranda 2014). This notion of ‘Africanisation’ or Akrikanisation’ as reflected in the six pillars of decolonisation presented by the students has therefore been at the forefront of the decolonisation debate at the University of the Witwatersrand, its complexities, strategies for attaining the decolonisation projects and the associated problems. The complexities surrounding the decolonization, i.e., Africanisation or not, was stated by the Vice-­ Chancellor, Prof. Adam Habib, and has influenced the decision of the university to think carefully of ways to achieve true decolonisation. According to him, ‘they think changing society is fundamentally throwing some stones and having some rhetoric. I often say you want to truly change society, radical politics requires thinking, require strategy. If you do not understand that complexity of the system, you will destroy the institution and I have been there, I have seen it happen to institutions that I was part of in the 1990s and 1980s’ (Interview, December 12 2019, Johannesburg). This worry was further reflected in his statement titled the politics of transforming and decolonising the university, dated October 4, 2015. In the statement, the Vice-Chancellor called for serious deliberation on what decolonisation means and strategies to utilise to maintain the standard of education and integrity of the university. According to him: However, as we pursue Transformation or Decolonisation, there needs to be serious deliberation about the tactics and strategies used, and the parameters of acceptable engagement….a belief that the activist cohort represents an intellectual and political elite who have an advanced state of consciousness. All others are seen to have a false consciousness, a lack of understanding of the needs of the historical moment. This is a very dangerous politics because there is an assumption that the monopoly of truth is held by a minority of insiders. It is a politics that bred the Stalinism of old or the religious fundamentalism of the present. If not intellectually challenged, it can become pervasive and create a culture within insiders that justifies their violation of the rights of others. When these insiders become dominant within society, as occurred during the cultural revolution in China or under Khmer Rouge

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in Cambodia, it leads to the murder of millions of outsiders (Habib, 2015: n/p).

The above attests to the contestation of ideas between university management and other stakeholders, such as students and staff, around decolonization and the approaches that should be taken. The approach of senior management, as reflected in the above speech, is caution and the need for a more robust conversation to protect the image and integrity of the university. The integrity and global image of the university will be at stake if a haphazard approach is taken. Therefore, the belief by senior management that any initiative of the wider transformation project towards attaining decolonising of the university must be ‘compatible with the University’s fundamental mandate to be globally competitive, research-intensive institution that is responsive to the local development imperatives’ (Wits 2015). However, this position was not shared by the students and some staff members who see such a call as a means to slow or derail the decolonization project. For instance, Ashley Mabasa posits that the transformation committee at the university is good at making recommendations and nothing has changed, as the recommendations were rejected by either the Vice-Chancellor or the Senate. Thus, there is a need for concrete transformation and decolonization where there will be equal access between disadvantaged black students and privileged white students (Interview, January 22, 2019, Johannesburg). To academic staff members, decolonization of the curriculum and the university is long overdue and should make higher education more relevant and inclusive of local ideas to foster the development of South Africa (Smith Jones, Academic Staff Union of Witwatersrand University President, Interview, January 6, 2019, Johannesburg). This perspective of decolonisation of curriculum and university as inclusive of local ideas aligns with the student’s view of inclusiveness within the university space and curriculum reflective of their experiences, as previously alluded to. Therefore, to address the slow pace of transformation within the university, the university proposed the following social changes: increased African and Colour representation in the academy, curriculum reform to include African contexts and theorists, a diverse and cosmopolitan student cohort across campuses and residences, enhanced access for talented students from poor and marginalised communities, an institutional culture that makes Black staff and students feel comfortable, an institutional naming

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policy that reflects the full diversity of our traditions, a language policy that enhances our understanding of one another and prepares students for the workplace, and an end to the exploitative practice of outsourcing (Wits Accelerating Transformation Statement 2015).

From the above, it can be argued that Wits University transformation initiatives geared toward decolonization are mainly serving to address systematic issues that are inherited from the legacies of apartheid and colonialism. To address these issues, it has taken an ‘Africanisation approach’, which the university and senior management have always critiqued. Nevertheless, the discussion below will examine the different initiatives and the extent to which they have been implemented as a way of achieving social change.

Curriculum Reform This is one fundamental issue that gave birth to the #FeesMustFall movement and the protests of 2015 and 2016, as already alluded. Ngugi (1986), in his classic Decolonizing the mind, calls for politics that recognise the ‘othering culture’ in the global culture or system that includes education. Ngugi invokes the idea of Africanisation, which has influenced and shaped the idea of curriculum decolonisation. However, such invocation could be misinterpreted within the debate for curriculum decolonization. Ngugi’s argument centers on the need for Africa to be part of the wider discussion and the equal recognition of Western epistemology and African epistemology (see Ngugi, 2017). Mbembe (2017: 34), while substantiating the above, argues that ‘Ngugi’s Africanisation is part of a larger politics-not the politics of racketeering and looting, but the politics of language….he mainly means a perspective that can allow us to see ourselves clearly in relationship to ourselves and to others in the universe’. Additionally, Mbembe (2016a) added that Ngugi opted for the word decolonization, which is an ongoing process of self-recovery from the state of blindness or dizziness, and not Africanization, which is a narrow prism. This clarity is needed, as shown in the earlier arguments in the previous sections that much of the discussions from students and some staff members, even with the university’s transformation initiatives; there is so much debate around Africanisation. While the need to increase the number of black and African staff members and the inclusion of African theories in curricula cannot be overemphasised as

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a way of addressing the legacies of apartheid and colonialism, there is the need to ask broader questions as to whether such initiatives will help sustain consciousness, lead to self-discovery, and highlight the need to go beyond the rudimentary ticking of boxes. According to Mbembe, Ngugi, while grappling with the issue, asked questions on how postcolonial states and their universities can achieve true decolonization of the curriculum. To him: What should we do with the inherited colonial education system and the consciousness it necessarily inculcated in the African mind? What directions should the education system take in an Africa wishing to break with neo-­ colonialism? How does it want the ‘New Africans’ to view themselves and their universe and from what base, Afrocentric or Eurocentric? What then are the materials they should be exposed to, and in what order and perspective? Who should be interpreting that material to them, an African or non-­ African? If African, what kind of African? One who has internalised the colonial world outlook or one attempting to break free from the inherited slave consciousness? (2016: 35).

These questions are salient and cannot be ignored, as they put to bear or asked questions of how universities such as Witwatersrand can approach curriculum decolonization. It highlights the struggle of what is to be taught and not to be taught, and by whom, and who is to be involved in the whole process. Therefore, this places knowledge generation—what kind of knowledge—at the heart of curriculum decolonization. According to the Deputy Director-General of the Department of Higher Education and Training, Dr. Diane Parker, the knowledge project, i.e., what is taught and not taught, is the sole responsibility of the university to decide, and the department cannot intervene in their conceptualisation of the knowledge project and how their curricular can be decolonised following the #FeesMustFall protests (Interview, January 21, 2019, Pretoria). Therefore, it is the responsibility of each university to address the questions posed earlier and how best to approach curriculum reform to suit the needs of society. Consequently, Wits University approached curriculum reforms from two levels, i.e., at the school/departmental level and at a wider level. Both levels call for a great proactive strategy that might take different forms, such as ‘inclusion of new subject matter and reference material, greater heterodoxy, if you prefer, while in others, it may require rethinking the teaching pedagogy by either contextualising the subject matter with

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the use of relevant local examples and/or using alternative technological instruments to transmit knowledge and enhance understanding’ (Wits 2015). To this end, the university embarked on a five (5) year (2015–2019) review of teaching and learning as part of the mechanism for achieving the wider university’s strategy (Wits 2019). According to the review report, during the review period, there was a proper audit of the curricula at Wits in line with the Higher Education Qualification Sub-Framework. This process entails some significant changes to several academic programmes, and this was submitted to the Council of Higher Education (Wits University, 2020). These changes were made at both the school/department level and the wider university level. At the school and departmental level, schools and departments were to review their curricula in line with the demands of the students—Africanisation—and the university—of being globally competitive. This means achieving what Ngugi (2017) calls equal recognition of both Western and African epistemologies, and reccentring of the African epistemology in the global knowledge debate. This is in line with Mbembe’s (2016a) argument that approaches in decolonisation should not seek to replace one epistemology for another, as that will be problematic in this globalised and knowledge-based society. Furthermore, this process of curriculum review at the school and departmental levels during curriculum design and development should incorporate the participation of students (Wits 2017). Such participation will not only decolonise the classroom but also shift the power dynamics of what constitutes knowledge and from whom. As Mbembe (2016b:6) puts it: A number of our institutions are teaching obsolete forms of knowledge with obsolete pedagogies. Just as we decommission statues, we should decommission a lot of what passes for knowledge in our teaching…in order to set our institutions firmly on the path of future knowledge, we need to reinvent a classroom without walls in which we are all colearners, a university that is capable of convening various publics in new forms of assemblies that become points of convergence of and platforms for the redistribution of different kinds of knowledge.

Such an assertion from Mbembe and the call for student participation from the university show that decolonising the curriculum should change the intellectual project of the university, what is considered knowledge and

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the source of such knowledge. Including students in the knowledge project posits that their experiences and consciousness are central to knowledge production and distribution. The extent to which this has been achieved was not stated in the five-year teaching and learning review document. However, it can be argued that some levels of student participation might have been achieved due to the relative peace that has been experienced at the University of the Witwatersrand. From my discipline perspective, students’ involvement in curricular design was limited to respective course coordinators and lecturers, as there was no wider policy or initiative from the school/department. According to the president of the academic staff association of Witwatersrand University, while supporting the above idea, ‘we worked hard to encourage our colleagues to think deeply and seriously about how they structure their learning environments and whether they were as inclusive as possible to more African based ideological framework’ (Interview, Smith Jones, December 12, 2019, Johannessburg). Therefore, course lecturers and coordinators were the principal actors in this curriculum reform at the departmental/school level. The level at which students were involved is debated, and such involvement might not be at the same level across disciplines and schools. Nevertheless, there was an active drive to incorporate more African voices and scholarship across all disciplines in line with the university’s transformation agenda. At the wider university level, several initiatives, such as cross-faculty collaboration that will help advance the university’s wide strategy of curriculum decolonization, were implemented. Such initiatives include the following: The introduction of a common first year in engineering programmes is one of the outstanding examples. It makes it possible for students to change from one branch of Engineering to another after the first year of study or to switch from Engineering to a Science programme. There has been a complete overhaul of the Architecture and Built Environment programmes, as well as significant transformation in the programmes based in the Humanities and Health Sciences Faculties, including the introduction of a compulsory African language in some programmes (University of Witwatersrand, 2019).

Additionally, the introduction of a compulsory African language programme and language policy can be regarded as the most significant achievement of the university towards the decolonization project. The

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compulsory African language programme makes it mandatory for students within the Faculty of Humanities, Engineering and Health Science to register and pass a language course (isiZulu, isiSotho, and South African Sign Language) before they can graduate. This initiative has consequently made the once-neglected African Languages Department1 with fewer students before the movement have the highest number of students. According to Wit University, this initiative is geared towards empowering students and making them fit into the workplace easily, i.e., being responsive to their immediate environment (University of the Witwatersrand, 2019). The importance of this initiative cannot be overemphasised, as Anderson puts it (1983), the use of indigenous language is central to the development of nation-states because African states are built around sting linguistic and cultural bonds. Kwame Karikari (1994), while buttressing the above, argues that citizens can communicate effectively and understand communication when they use their mother tongue. Invariably, the idea of students undertaking an African language course before graduating means that students will be nuanced in the sociolinguistic structure of the language, communicate effectively using that language in the workplace, and be able to solve societal problems. Similarly, the language policy (2015) recognised that ‘linguistic diversity is a resource for creativity, selfhood, and cognition that should be cultivated and protected through institutions of higher learning in the twenty-first century’, and this is more important within the South African context due to the diversity of the country (University of the Witwatersrand, 2015). This is more important in the decolonization debate, as the historical antecedence of South Africa makes language a central issue within the education sector. For example, Mphahlele (1993), while emphasising the importance of language to the decolonisation debate, argues that the apartheid state insisted on the use of the mother tongue as a mode of instruction when the teaching textbooks were in English. This subsequently led to the Soweto uprising of 1976, where high school students resisted such attempts from the state. Heffernan and Nieftagodien (2016) argue that not much has changed since 1976, and this historical 1  Before the #FeesMustFall protests of 2015 and 2016, the African languages department was one of the smallest departments with the School of Literature, Language and Media. At a point the department was at the verge of been closed down according to sources within the department, but currently they have one of the highest number of students in the School of Literature, Language and Media following the implementation of the compulsory African language programme.

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ground influenced the #FeesMustFall movement and the protests of 2015 and 2016. At Wits University, the English language is the medium of communication, and this excludes students who are more conversant with their indigenous language. Salawu (2006) argues that African language pedagogy is important to the learning process and the ability of students to understand vital communication being shared. To this end, the language policy (2015: n/p) seeks to ‘create opportunities for an appropriate balance between English and other national official languages’. For a globally competitive university such as Wits, whose majority of academic staff members are not fluent in the national official languages, this process will entail training staff members to be fluent in the national languages. According to the Wits language policy (2015), ‘the resources of the university need to be mobilised to develop at least two indigenous spoken African languages, which represent the two major language clusters Nguni and Sotho in South Africa, and to enhance the language competencies of staff and students in learning and teaching, interpersonal communication, research, and administration’. It can be argued that this approach of multilingualism seeks to promote African languages and place them on an equal pair with English language-colonial language- that has been used as tools of oppression and ignoring the indigenous culture of natives (See Ngugi, 1986). Ngugi posits that colonial languages such as English have their own culture and that the use of the English language invariably promotes the culture of the language, which might make the university space unwelcoming to African students. Mbembe (2016b: 5), while substantiating the above, argues that there is a need to decolonise the public space of universities, as to him, ‘decolonising the university starts with the deprivatisation and rehabilitation of the public space….it starts with a redefinition of what is public, i.e., what pertains to the realm of the common and as such, does not belong to anyone in particular because it must be equally shared between equal’. Language is central within this space, as it forms the basis of the interaction between students and staff members. Therefore, the policy goal of multilingualism, i.e., isiZulu, Sotho, South African Sign Language, and English within the university play a central role in the decolonization project. The language policy proposed four (4) phases to the completion of the language policy at the university. According to the policy:

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Phase 1 will focus on developing a multilingual linguistic landscape and branding; phase 2 will focus on the development of the materials and resources needed for the teaching of isiZulu, Sesotho, and SASL as subjects for communicative purposes. Phase 3 will focus on developing the linguistic abilities of staff and students. Staff and students who do not speak or use any indigenous South African language will be required to become communicatively competent in either isiZulu, Sesotho or SASL…. In phase 4, the university will play a role in the development of the isiZulu, Sesotho, and SASL as LOLTs alongside English in appropriate and feasible contexts (Wits Language Policy, 2015).

Thus far, the university has made significant progress, as staff members have enrolled at the Wits Language School to be trained in one of the indigenous languages to promote the multilinguistic culture of the university. Additionally, attempts have been made to have signage, stationery, banners and other material in the indigenous languages, according to the Wits transformation update document. The first two phases are now part of standard university processes and thus are complete. Furthermore, to achieve this decolonised university and make the space conformable for all, the university has embarked on institutional naming in which Wits spaces and places are renamed following consultation with relevant stakeholders. As of 2016, the following buildings (see Table 3.1) have been renamed. This idea of renaming spaces and buildings might be seen by some scholars and social critics as attempts at wiping away history, replacing one history with another, or not being tolerant of other ideas and cultures in this decolonization project. Such oppositions are a reflection of the unequal and ‘polarisation of South Africa along racial and privilege lines’ (Mail and Guardian Newspaper, 2018). A historian, Mulaudzi, argues that the names of public spaces and buildings reflect the complex history of South Africa, and attempts at renaming are a way of addressing the legacies of such history-apartheid/colonialism. As such, ‘renaming forms part of the ongoing process to transform the institutional culture of the university and society (cited in UCT news, 2015). Mbembe (2016b: 6), while summarising it up, posited that such renaming has nothing to do with the liberal notion of tolerance or assimilation but about ownership of the space. Especially for black staff and students, ‘it has to do with creating a set of mental dispositions. We need to reconcile a logic of indictment and a logic of self-affirmation, interruption, and occupation’.

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Table 3.1  Spaces, building renamed Old names

New name

Senate House Central Block Room 336, Richard Ward Building Alan Rothberg Lecture Theatre Physical Education 1 Trematon Place Mathematical Science Building The wall on the 12th Floor of University Corner (Journalism) A boardroom on the 12th Floor of University Corner (Journalism) The Wall on the 9th Floor of University Corner (Wits Radio Academy) A boardroom in the Journalism Department in University Corner A boardroom in the Journalism Department in University Corner Road alongside Alumni House Student Union Building Student Union Seminar Room NWE17

Solomon Mahlangu House Robert Sobukwe Block Peter King Mineral Laboratory Khanya Lecture Theatre Impilo Afrika House T.W. Kambule Mathematical Sciences Building Kabbo

NWE33 NWE36 NWE40

Percy Qoboza Boardroom Capital Radio 604 Christina Scott Bessie Head Alumi Lane Thembalethu (our hope) Tommy Motswai Seminar Room Tshepo which means ‘Hope’ in Sesotho-Setswana Curiosity Imbizo which means ‘Gathering-Questioning’ ‘Summon’ in isiZulu -Xhosa-Sesotho Tumbulwa which means ‘Discovery’ in Tshivenda

Source: Wits University Transformation Update 2016

These conversations and social change achieved thus far at the University of the Witwatersrand were only possible as a result of protesting students whose consciousness of societal injustice due to inherent colonial legacies prompted them to take action (Chawana & Akpojivi, 2022). Their awareness of the lack of decolonization and social equalities that have continued to exclude them from seeking quality education, led to the second wave of black consciousness. The first was in the era of apartheid and the struggle for freedom and independence under Steve Biko. This second wave under the leadership of the students utilised Biko’s idea and philosophy that the awareness of social injustice should make deprived black students come

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together to address the problem. This awareness resulted in the students rejecting the Western monopoly of truth and knowledge, and calling for the recognition of African experiences and culture in the knowledge production of the university. Therefore, facilitating psychological liberation is the core of black consciousness and the #FeesMustFall protests of 2015 and 2016. Thus, the students were able to use digital technologies platforms in the struggle to push their ideologies to both the state and university’s management to act in addressing the issues raised and by struggling for the human mind. However, this process of ideological contestation between the students and the university has not been devoid of tension, as violence and the use of force were dominant during the protests of 2015 and 2016 at Wits University. While the university claimed to have resorted to militarisation of the campus as a strategy to protect the university’s infrastructure, the students claimed that their resort to violence was a direct response to the violence from the university and state (Chawana & Akpojivi, 2022). As Fanon (1961) argues, the process of decolonialisation is inherently violent as the proletarian, in this case students, resist inherited colonial culture and practices. Such resistance shows that students are increasingly showing interest in the political and economic state of the country or what Ndlovu (2017) argued as youths ‘(re)creating a public image’ of being politically active and radical. This idea of the youths (students) being politically active and radical aligns with Ayittey’s (2005) classification of them as the ‘cheetah generation’ that is upset with the sociopolitical and economic situation of their countries and hungry for social change. Consequently, they mobilise all available resources at their disposal in the attainment of social change. As earlier discussions have shown, students at Wits University mobilised using social media platforms and their affordances under the #FeesMustFall movement to engage with the university’s management in addressing deep-rooted colonial issues of untransformed curriculum and university spaces as exclusionary. The following section will examine and discuss the second issue—free education—that was at the heart of the protests from the #FeesMustFall movement. The discussion will highlight the ideological contestation and the social change that has occurred as a result of the protests at the University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa.

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Free Education This was one of the contending issues that led to the establishment of the #FeesMustFall movement in 2015. The persistent increase in tuition fees due to the decline in funding from the state has excluded most black South African students; thus, free education was the crux of the protests in 2015 and 2016 (Chawana & Akpojivi, 2022). According to Zola, while buttressing the importance of education to the younger ‘cheetah generation’ and addressing the antecedence of apartheid, he held that: We’re still connected with that apartheid umbilical cord thing. We do not look at the old generation—our moms and dads—as ignorant but as a deprived nation. They [apartheid’s leaders] did not give them [the old generation] education or gave them the wrong education. In addition, we have to go back to them and explain the things we learn of the world. We live in a global village, from which they were excluded, and we need to tell them that this is how life is now. (The Washington Post, April 14, 2004; cited in Ayittey (2005: xxiv).

This system of exclusion of the older generation, which continued in post-1994, was resisted by the students, as education is key to the cheetah generation and to addressing the economic inequalities of colonialism and apartheid (see Ayittey, 2005). Naidoo (2016: 180), while showing the connection between the old generation and this generation (cheetah generation), stated that ‘while the June 1976 and the October 2015 student uprisings were organised around what can, on the surface, be understood as a single issue, these large-scale protests also wanted larger demands to be met. The students of 1976 were resisting the unequal and segregated school and societal system of apartheid, and in 2015, students were resisting the commodification of education by calling for free, quality, decolonised education and expressing dissatisfaction with the rate and depth of change two decades after South Africa’s democratisation’. This idea of commodification means that universities are commodifying education that is only accessible and available to students who can pay via the fees they charge for their degrees; consequently, students are seen as clients who pay for education and have to graduate on time, thus the need for a high turnover rate. Mbembe (2016a) extends this thought by positing that universities have become businesses and imbibed business principles of turning students into customer-who pay for a service provided- less interested in their

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studies but are happy once the degrees are awarded to them. Consequently, universities are interested in the high number of students who are willing to pay high tuition fees, and are not interested in the welfare of the students and their abilities to meet their financial obligations. As Ashley Mabasa, a student activist, puts it, the notion of free education was to address the commodification of education. Wits is interested in the numbers, and fewer students can actually pay the high tuition fees. According to him, ‘at Wits, only approximately 19% of students are on NSFAS. There is a gap in funding, and I do not think there are any solid ideas for rectifying the situation’ (Interview, January 22, 2019, Johannesburg). Nevertheless, it must be stated that when the #FeesMustFall protest started in 2015, it was about a zero percent fee increment. However, this changed in the cause of the movement after the protest march to the Union Building.2 This notion of free education raises questions about how it can be obtainable in a capitalist-driven society in South Africa. In addition, if such moves will not result in the reduction of quality education and university ranking as alluded to by the former Vice-Chancellor of the University of the Witwatersrand, Prof. Adam Habib. Therefore, this section will examine the micro-macro relations between the students and other stakeholders. That is, the ideological contestation over free education by the different stakeholders and the social changes that have occurred within the university following the agitation for free education by the students.

What Is Free Education? What constitutes free education and its feasibility within the South African context was a major issue during the #FeesMustFall protests of 2015 and 2016. Because the questions of a funding strategy and the need to maintain the global competitiveness of the university were raised, reference was made to other postcolonial African states such as Nigeria and Cameroon that attempted free education and the impact such action had on the quality of education. For instance, the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Allan 2  Union Building is the seat of government in South Africa. Before the match to union building on October 23, 2015, the idea was about zero percentage fees increment. However, that changed when President Jacob Zuma announced no fees increment for 2015 following the nationwide protests. Following the announcement, the students shifted their demands to free education.

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Gray Orbis Foundation Anthony Farr, while buttressing this point, stated that ‘ultimately if fees are free it has an impact of reducing the quantity that we need and ultimately, I would argue, it would reduce the quality’ (Raborife, 2016). Likewise, free education is not necessarily free education, as free education is paid for by other means, which in most cases is the state from taxes. The vice-chancellor of Wits University Prof. Adam Habib, expressed this when he held the statement that ‘I had a conversation with people at the Treasury, they said to me that it’s going to cost around R40 billion in the first cost to roll free education….my big fear is that if government doesn’t make that money available to the universities, then the universities will begin to go into a crisis. The quality will begin to decline, and we will do to higher education what we did to primary and basic education’ (702 FM, 2017). These fears from the corporate and private sector and the university about free education and its impact consequently lead to the questions of what is free education, and the feasibility of implementing free education while maintaining the global competitiveness of the university. To the students, free education entails tuition-free, accommodation, books and living expenses. According to an anonymous student activist and former member of the student representative council, free education is the provision of tuition, accommodation and living expenses that was promised to us by the African National Congress (ANC) (Interview, December 14, 2018, Johannesburg). This notion of free education promised by the ruling party ANC can be linked to the Freedom Charter of 1955. While this argument by the students is debatable and can be viewed as misleading, the Charter only calls for free education at the basic level of education and not at the tertiary level, which should be based on merit through National Student Financial Aid Scheme (NSFAS) scholarship. However, the social equality that exists in South Africa due to the antecedence of apartheid has made such a view from the students valid. Additionally, such an argument for holistic free education is grounded on the notion that education and further education are a public good that should not exclude anyone based on social status. Nevertheless, the practicality of having free education as envisaged by the students poses a serious challenge of how this envisaged free education from the students can be funded. Hence, different stakeholders at the university proposed different strategies. For instance, reference was often made to the Scandinavia model of free education, which is mainly funded by higher tax revenue. This idea is problematic for taxpayers that are

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already burdened with a high level of tax and corruption in South Africa. OECD (2022) held that South Africa’s tax-to-GDP ratio in 2020 was 25.2% and was higher than the average of 31 African countries. In general, South Africa is considered to be among the most heavily taxed countries (OECD, 2022). According to Smith Jones, the students were right about the need for free education, as the South African state has been burdened with a high level of corruption (Interview, December 12, 2019, Johannesburg). Additionally, the German model of free education in higher education was suggested and recommended. This model, according to Kehm (2014: n/p), allows ‘all higher education institutions to receive a budget from the responsible ministry of the state in which they are located, based on annual or biennial negotiations. This basic budget is complemented by additional agreements between higher education institutions and the state concerning the intake of additional numbers of students and the money to compensate for the loss of income from tuition fees’. This model, similar to the Scandinavia model, places free education as a policy issue from the state, as higher education institutions are funded by the state via taxpayers. Hence, the university cannot fund free education unless the government makes the funds available. Adam Habib, the Vice-Chancellors of Wits University, stated that ‘R1.6 billion comes in annually through fees… will the state be providing the funds to the university to fund free education?’ (702 FM, 2017, emphasis added). Based on the high cost of governance and corruption, the possibility of the government providing the funding required for free education is questionable. Lumumba (2011) argues that corruption and high governance have impeded the sociopolitical, economic and cultural development of African states. Therefore, making high education funding via the state unviable and sustainable. However, to address the continued protest and disruption of academic activities across all universities in South Africa, President Jacob Zuma announced free education for first-year students whose household combined income was up to R350,000 for the 2018 academic year, despite the report from the commission of inquiry3 into 3  Following the protests from students, the government of President Jacob Zuma established a Commission of Inquiry to establish the feasibly and sustainability of free education in South Africa. The commission chaired by Honourable Justice Jonathan Arthur Heher heard submissions from different stakeholders, i.e., students, university management, and other stakeholders.

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higher education, which recommended no free education but suggested ‘an income-contingent loan model to fund higher education students, where loans would be sourced from commercial banks’ (Pather, 2017). Although this action from President Zuma brought relative peace to the university campuses, it was widely criticized for two reasons. First, the announcement was considered a political statement and not a policy directive that will help lay to rest the issue of free education once and for all. According to Dr. Diane Parker: The Fees Commission eventually did their work, and we obtained the report in August 2017. Then, there was an announcement in 2017 about implementing free education for the poor and the working class. It is not for all, and that is not a policy of the government, that was a political decision’ (Deputy Director DHET, Interview, January 24, 2019, Pretoria).

This idea that the announcement was not a policy issue but a political statement is centered on the fact that there was no clear plan or strategy on how this free education to some people whose income is up to R350,000 will be funded. According to a Senior Executive Management at Wits University, the announcement by President Zuma ‘did not cover everyone, let me give you an example at Wits, people who get NSFAS are at most 20%, more like 15%. Those are the ones who benefit from free education. 20% can pay for themselves, which leaves 60% of students who still need funding’ (Interview, December 14, 2018, Johannesburg). Therefore, the idea that the announcement has not addressed the issue of free education for the 60% of students who will still not qualify for free education will be excluded. Second, the announcement did not outline the strategy and funding mechanism by which its set goals will be achieved. This concerns the missing middle-these are people considered to be too  poor to afford a university education but do not qualify for a bursary to fund their education. Prof. Adam Habib, while extending this thought, asked how the free education announced by President Jacob Zuma would be paid for, as there was no clarity in the statement on the financing mechanism. Such a lack of clarity means that the state will have to source funds to accommodate such a political decision, and one such way is either an increase in taxes or a value-added tax (VAT). Dr. Diane Parker, while substantiating this further held that ‘it is not free education because it has to be paid for by taxpayers, you know that last year we had to have an increase on VAT,

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and one of the major issues was this because we had to find the additional money’ (Deputy Director-General, Department of Higher Education and Training, Interview, January 24, 2019, Pretoria). Thus, both tax and VAT increases were announced by the then Minister of Finance, Malusi Gigaba, during the 2018 budget as ways of addressing and funding free education. Consequently, VAT was increased from 14% to 15% for the first time in democratic South Africa. This was coupled with a tax hike on household items and government cost-cutting initiatives that will raise funds to address free education and other pressing issues confronting the South African state. According to Merten (2018), the hike in tax and VAT will help in generating R36 billion to the national purse, and the cost-cutting initiatives were meant to save R85 billion in government  expenditure. Therefore, further buttressing the argument that the free education announcement by President Zuma was a political decision that was not carefully thought out but meant to score some political points and immediately address the lingering crisis confronting the higher education sector in South Africa. On the other hand, the students released their proposed funding model that will accommodate all students within the debate for free education in their ‘Thuto ke Lesedi la Sechaba (education is the light of the nation)’ document in October 2016. According to the students, this funding model relies on both the state and the private sector. The state is required to live up to its responsibility of increasing its subsidy to universities or maintain the threshold of 50%, and likewise, the private sector depends on graduates from South African universities to invest in education. As previously mentioned, the subsidy contribution from the state to universities has been on a steady decline over the years, as Mbembe (2016a) argues that South Africa spends 0.6% of its gross domestic product on higher education. Therefore, the idea of a 50% subsidy contribution will be a significant contribution towards the overhauling of the university. This is in line with the Government Gazette Volume 462, which calls for the bulk of the university’s funding to be from the government through the subsidy (cited in DHET, 2004). These have been in steady decline, i.e., ‘dropped from 49% in 2000 to 40% in 2014’ (DHET, 2015: 29). Therefore, the students argued that the ideal contribution of the government to the university should be approximately 1% of the gross domestic product. Additionally, the students in their proposed model call for the active participation of the private sector in the education sector by either

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granting more bursaries or funding the university through the creation of a Higher Education Capital Infrastructure Fund (HECIF). The fund that is to be funded by the private sector from their profits will seek to address the infrastructural needs of each university—mostly accommodation—which is considered expensive and out of reach from poor black students that end up sleeping in classrooms and laboratories. Swartz et al. (2018: 86), while attesting to this, argue that the issue of inadequate accommodation at South African universities has been a perineal problem, and students consequently resort to sleeping in libraries and travelling long distances from home to school, which greatly impacts their studies. Therefore, it contributes to the inequalities that have continued to impact black students from the apartheid era to postdemocratic South Africa. Ashley Mabasa, while buttressing this, further added that at Wits, there are only ‘6000 beds yet they accommodate (admit) 36000 students’, (Interview, January 22, 2019, Johannesburg), meaning that certain students will be excluded based on their income, academic performance, etc. Therefore, the proposed Higher Education Capital Infrastructure Fund (HECIF) contained in the student’s funding mechanism will, to a large extent, help address this inequality. However, this proposal from the students is stalled following the pronouncement by President Jacob Zuma. Nevertheless, at the University of Witwatersrand, management has gone further by addressing this exclusion. For instance, according to the university, ‘over 97% of the students in our residences are Black (this includes 4.78% Indian and 1.80% Coloured). Currently, only 2.26% of students in residences are White’ (Wits 2015). Additionally, Wits University has initiated several programmes to increase accessibility and address the inequality that exists. For the past three (3) years: Wits have made several concessions over the last three years, which has enabled a greater number of students to register. The clearing of historical debt by the state for certain groups of students and the university’s waiver of the first fee payment has continued to allow for increased access. All students are able to ascertain their progression status, regardless of whether they have outstanding debt. All students who owe R15000 or less and who are eligible to graduate provided that they sign an Acknowledgement of Debt to repay the funds. The University administers over R1 billion in financial aid, scholarships and bursaries annually…Wits has also increased its own funding for students through the introduction of the Wits Hardship Fund in 2019, set-

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ting aside more than an additional R13 million to assist students who are experiencing financial hardship by providing funding relief towards registration and accommodation assistance. This fund is utilised to assist students in the missing middle-income category (with an R600000 and below household income), to contribute the required 50% of historical debt to register and to ensure accommodation assistance (Wits Transformation Update, 2019).

From the above, it can be argued that the revolution from the #FeesMustFall movement due to their consciousness to address the inequalities that continued to impact higher education in post-1994 South Africa has resulted in some forms of social change. However, this change might be perceived to be small based on reoccurring issues of free education and the historic antecedence of apartheid. However, there is no doubt that the increase of black students in residences, provision of hardship funds for the missing middle, and a waiver for registration despite the fees owed are no small measures to students who in 2015 and 2016 were confronted with the challenges of registration and fees. This is outside the wider attention that is currently being paid to higher education by the government and universities, i.e., the need to transform the universities and issues of accommodation and fees. As the former president of the Academic Staff Union of Witwatersrand University puts it, ‘funding for higher education now receives attention at the highest level of government, and there is a commitment to improving support through NSFAS changes. There has also been a commitment to ensure that the missing middle and students from poor backgrounds are not excluded due to financial costs’ (Interview, December 12, 2018, Johannesburg). All these would not have been possible if not for the protesting students that mobilised and used digital and social media technologies to advocate for social change, thus justifying the assertion of Prof. Adam Habib that the ‘students achieved in a matter of 10 days, what vice-chancellors had been advocating for at least 10 years’ (Habib, 2016b). This can be situated within Ayittey’s (2005) notion of revolution by the tiger generation that is tired of the status quo and wants to take hold of the future by creating and reimagining a society where the social injustice and inequalities from the past-colonial and postcolonial that were not addressed by early nationalist and postindependence leaders are addressed. In this case, it can be argued that such resistance, although disruptive to society and the system, has to a large extent facilitated much-needed social change.

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As mentioned in Chap. 1, this chapter has not used tweets from the #FeesMustFall movement during the protests. As the usage of tweets will limit the study to discourses, the actual nuanced debate and social change that occurred during the protests of 2015 and 2016 cannot be examined using tweets, hence their exclusion. Therefore, the uniqueness of this study lies in its methodological richness. Interviews, ethnography and documents to offer a nuanced micro-macro relation discussion of the movement as they press for the decolonization of Wits University.

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Fanon, F. (1965). A dying colonialism. Grove Press. Habib, A. (2015). The politics of transforming and decolonizing the university. Accessed 01/02/2020, from https://blogs.wits.ac.za/vc/2015/10/04/ the-­politics-­of-­transforming-­and-­decolonizing-­the-­university/. Habib, A. (2016a). Reimagining the south African university and critically analysing the struggle for its realisation. Accessed 16/09/2019, from https://www. wits.ac.za/news/latest-­n ews/in-­t heir-­o wn-­w ords/2016/2016-­0 1/ reimagining-­the-­south-­african-­university-­and-­critically-­analysing-­the-­struggle-­ for-­its-­realisation.html Habib, A. (2016b). Goals and means-reimaging the south African university. University World News. Accessed 02/02.2020, from https://www.universityworldnews.com/post.php?story=20160211070052665 Habib, A. (2019). Rebels and rage: Reflecting on #FeesMustFall. Jonathan Ball Publishing. Haffajee, F. (2015). What if there are no whites in South Africa? Picador Africa. Heffernan, A., & Nieftagodien, N. (2016). Students must rise: Youth struggles in South Africa before and beyond Soweto’ 76. Wits University Press. Hodes, R. (2016). Briefing questioning ‘fees must all’. African Affairs, 116(462), 140–150. Karikari, K. (1994). Independent broadcasting in Ghana implications and challenges. Ghana University Press. Kehm, B. (2014). How Germany managed to abolish university tuition fees. The Conversation. Accessed 12/02/2020, from http://theconversation.com/ how-­Germany-­managed-­to-­abolish-­university-­tuition-­fees-­32529 Langa, M. (2017). Researching the #FeesMustFall movement. In M. Langa (Ed.), #hashtag an analysis of the #FeesMustFall movement at south African universities. Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR). Lumumba, P. (2011). Corruption: The bane of Africa. In E.  Nduku & J. Tenamwenya (Eds.), Corruption in Africa: A threat to justice and sustainable peace. Globethics.net International Secretariat. MacDonald, M. (2006). Why race matters in South Africa. Harvard University Press. Madlingozi, T. (2018). Decolonizing ‘decolonization’ with Mphahlele. New Frame. Mail and Guardian. (2018). Change the Names to Rid SA of its Colonial, Apartheid Past. Accessed 12/01/2020, from https://mg.co.za/article/2018-­09-­21-­00-­ change-­the-­names-­to-­rid-­sa-­of-­its-­colonial-­apartheid-­past/ Malabela, M. (2017a). We are not violent but just demanding free decolonized education: University of the Witwatersrand. In M. Langa (Ed.), #hashtag an analysis of the #FeesMustFall movement at south African universities (pp. 132–148). Johannesburg. Malabela, M. (2017b). We are already enjoying free education: Protests at the University of Limpopo (Turfloop). In M. Langa (Ed.), #hashtag an analysis of the #FeesMustFall movement at south African universities (pp.  108–120). Johannesburg.

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Seekings, J., & Nattrass, N. (2005). Class, race, and inequality in South Africa. Yale University Press. Steyn, G., & De Villiers, P. (2006). The impact of changing funding on higher education institutions in South Africa. Council of Higher Education. Swartz, S., Mahali, A., Moletsane, R., Arogundade, E., Khalema, N., Cooper, A., & Groenewald, C. (2018). Studying while black. HSRC Press. UCT News. (2015). Renaming: Opportunities and Pitfalls. Accessed, 12/01/2020, from https://www.news.uct.ac.za/article/-­2015-­09-­28-renaming-opportunitiesand-­pitfalls University of the Witwatersrand. (2015). Language policy. Wits University. University of the Witwatersrand. (2019). Transformation update. Wits University. Veriava, F. (2019). Leaving solomon house: A(n Impressionistic) portrait of the FMF movement at Wits. The South Atlantic Quarterly, 118(1), 195–204. Vilakazi, M. (2017). Tshwane University of Technology: Soshanguve campus protests cannot be reduced to #FeesMustFall. In M.  Langa (Ed.), #Hashtag an analysis of the #FeesMustFall Movement at South African Universities (pp. 108–120). Johannesburg. Wessels, N. (2017). #FeesMustFall: Discourse hidden in plain sight. M.A Thesis, Tilburg University. Witwatersrand University. (2015). Wits University executive statement on accelerating transformation. Witwatersrand University. (2017). Transformation Update Document 2017. Online: https://www.wits.ac.za/news/latest-­news/general-­news/2017/2017-­11/ transformation-­update.html, accessed 12/02/2020. Witwatersrand University. (2019). Five Year Review of Teaching and Learning 2015–2019. Accessed 14/02/2020, from https://www.dropbox.com/s/ vu0wommh0vi5n5p/Wits%205-­Year%20Review%20of%20Teaching%20 and%20Learning%202015-­2019.pdf?dl=0

Interviews Prof. Adam Habib, Vice Chancellor, University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa. Anonymous Senior Executive member, University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa. Anonymous Student Activist, University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa. Ashley Mabasa, Student Activists and SRC member, University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa. Diane Parker, Deputy Director, Department of Higher Education and Training, South Africa. Smith Jones, Academic Staff Union of Witwatersrand University President.

CHAPTER 4

#OccupyGhana: New Wave of Democracy and Accountability in Ghana?

This chapter will focus on the third case study of Ghana. I have been fascinated by the growth and development in Ghana ever since I first visited the country in 2010. Each time I visit Ghana, growth and development are evident, and this has subsequently made Ghana the envy of other African countries, especially its rival Nigeria. Ghana has been a role model for other African countries since the ‘third wave of democratisation’ (Huntington, 1991) that started in 1992, as Ghana has made giant strides towards embracing liberal policies that are believed to facilitate its development (Akpojivi, 2018a). For instance, Ghana promoted and implemented liberal democratic cultures of freedom and participation, and this could be seen in the diversification of the media sphere that affords citizens the opportunity to participate in society and media discourses. This also changed the structure of accountability, as the mass media are considered central to the demand for good governance and accountability. Hasty (2005: 1), while alluding to this, posits that ‘Waking up in your house any morning in the bustling Ghanaian capital of Accra, you are immediately drawn in to the local discourse of news. The first sound you may hear in the morning, after the soft sweeping of needle brooms on the compound floor, is the chattering of disc jockeys on the radio, discussing the fresh news of the morning from the pages of the Daily Graphic or the Ghanaian Independence. As you get ready to go out in the morning, a friend or two might stop by to say hello, adding ‘my friend, have © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 U. Akpojivi, Social Movements and Digital Activism in Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30207-7_4

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you heard what they’re saying about the president’s wife’ or ‘can you believe what they found in the finance minister’s closet’.

These ethnographic descriptions by Hasty are true and have not changed over the years, as, irrespective of the cities I have visited in the past eight years, whether Tema, Takoradi, Accra or Kumasi, these discussions centred around good governance and accountability within government and public service, and are an integral part of Ghanaian society and the media.1 The only difference or shift is that these discussions have expounded into the digital space and led to the formation of social movements and digital activism to not only facilitate these discussions but also bring about social change. According to Leighton (2020), new media technologies have created a public sphere for citizens to promote health democracy, and the recent evidence of citizens taking to social media technologies and their affordance to protest and call for good governance speaks of the endearing role of these technologies in democratic culture in contemporary society. Nevertheless, one is left wondering why a society or country such as Ghana, where the mainstream and new media play an active and integral part in national discourse and where citizens are politicised to take part in national discourse, will still be battling issues of accountability, transparency and good governance that have been a bane since independence (see Kwei-Amah, 1968). Therefore, this chapter will examine one such movement that has become a household name, which is at the forefront of promoting and demanding accountability and good governance. This chapter will interrogate the interests that are behind the movement, interrogate the complex relationship between the movement and the state, and examine the extent to which the movement has been able to achieve its set objectives and the challenges that have mitigated against the movement. The chapter will argue that there is a rise of middle-class Ghanaians who have taken digital activism as a tool of speaking back to authority, as this gives them a platform to get their voices heard about the day-to-day running of the country because their very existence and basic needs are 1  There is always a good integration of the mainstream media content in social media discussions and vice versa For instance, during the period of ethnographic data collection Anas Aremeyaw Anas’s popularly known as Anas the ‘masked man’ undercover investigation of corruption in Ghana’s Football Association, was a major discussion across all platforms. Prior to this, he had produced another undercover piece titled ‘Ghana in the Eyes of the God’ that exposed corruption within the judiciary which led to the removal of 13 high court judges.

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being threatened with increasing cases of corruption and poor public service. These middle-class Ghanaians have redefined social movements and activism from the past, previously structured along the poor market, women and students. Therefore, there is an increase in participation as the once unconscious middle class is now actively shaping national polity through their activism. Although this can be considered a good phenomenon, the majority of ordinary Ghanaians who are adversely affected are neglected and excluded from the process. However, this process of activism has not been natural, as the personal interests of these actors tend to influence their involvement and participation.

Background: From OccupyFlagStaff House to #OccupyGhana: The Rise of the Middle Class in Protest The #OccupyGhana  movement emerged from a nonpartisan civil rights organisation called ‘Concerned Ghanaians for Responsible Governance’ (CGRG) that staged a protest march titled Occupy FlagStaff House on July 1, 2014, to celebrate the day Ghana became a republic. This protest against FlagStaff House,2 which serves as the official residence and office for the President of Ghana, was to express their dissatisfaction with the state of the economy in Ghana, and to highlight to President John Mahama the ever-increasing cases of corruption and scandal that had become a common phenomenon in his administration. According to the convener of the CGRG protest, Nana Kwesi Awuah ‘Ghanaians have to grapple with extreme discomfort, lowered productivity, the ever-rising rate of inflation and the continuous loss of their purchasing power. Ghanaians have to come to grips with limited access to essential services such as quality education and health care’ (Bokpe, 2014). To Kofi, Ghana’s underdevelopment can be attributed to the political class and elites that have failed to harness all the rich resources for the economic development of the country and the benefit of all  (cited in Ayittey, 2005: 1). Therefore, strengthening democratic culture and values is a central idea behind the protest, as democracy is rooted in good governance and accountability 2  The FlagStaff House was renamed the Jubilee House by the current president of Ghana Nana Addo Akuffo Addo on March 29, 2018. The renaming was centred around avoiding glorifying Ghana’s history of Gold Coast with the British. The building is located in the heart of Accra (see Fig 6 for details).

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(Keane, 1991; Nyamnjoh, 2005). According to a participant of the said protest and current member of the #OccupyGhana, she articulated the reasons for participating in the Occupy FlagStaff House protest by stating the following: During Mahama’s government, there was quite some disgruntlement in the country, where we felt there was poor government. I do not mean me alone. Many people felt that way. There was a lot of poor governance, lots of corruption, there was quite a lot of hardship, we had issues with electricity, when we had dumsor3 as you know it. There were quite a few scandals, such as the Brazil World Cup. In 2014, people’s discontent increased. So a lot of us—I am a doctor, an ordinary citizen and I am not a politician, I have no political ambition—we decided to meet at the front of Flagstaff House on the 1st of July which is a holiday and let’s present a petition to President Mahama and let him know that these things are what we are upset about and we are demanding change and they can’t go on like this (Dr. Radha Hackman, Personal Interview, June 7, Accra).

The above assertion speaks of the systematic failure within the Ghanaian state, and such failure has impacted the everyday life of citizens despite the euphoria that characterised Ghana as the first sub-Saharan African country to gain independence and the belief that she will grow and progress rapidly. However, the historical antecedence of corruption has continued to hinder her development. As former president Kufour puts it, ‘corruption has been a canker on our public and economic life’ (cited in Ayittey, 2005: 1), and this has consequently resulted in Ghanaians living an improvised life despite its rich natural and human resources, as reflected in Hackman’s statement. This discontentment over the socioeconomic situation of the country coupled with the perceived lack of political action led to the decision to protest. Economic issues have always been a major source of protest in Ghana right from historical times. Awuah (1997) argues that contestation between the state and other stakeholders over economic issues has always resulted in some form of activism against the state. Even during the struggle for independence, one of the salient groups used by the nationalist,  Kwame Nkrumah, was women (marketers/traders), to highlight the issue of tax and the need for political independence (Nkrumah, 1961). As Meredith (2005: 19) puts it, Nkrumah appeals 3  The word dumsor in Ghana is used to refer to power outage, i.e., ‘on and off’ of electricity supply by Ghana’s electricity distributor.

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more to ‘trade unionists, ex-servicemen, clerks, pretty traders…who were seeking a better way of life’. Consequently, economic relations are a pivotal catalyst for political actions and discourse. Nkrumah believes that Africa’s political development is centred on its economic development, which is a key component of his ideas around pan-Africanism (see Meredith, 2005). In other words, as Botwe-Asamoah (2005: 16) puts it, an understanding of ‘Nkrumah’s politico-cultural thoughts’ is rooted in his linkage of ‘economic and political ideas’, and this has continued to shape the formation or understanding of Ghana’s politics (Fig. 4.1). Therefore, the dire economic situation during President John Mahama’s era instigated the Occupy FlagStaff House protest, and this could be seen in their petition to the president. The petition states that the happiness of Ghanaians is tied to responsible governance, and the ability of the government to address

Fig. 4.1  FlagStaff House, Accra Ghana

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‘in no particular order of importance as follows: the erratic supply of electricity nationwide; the unreliable supply of potable water across the country; the ever-depreciating value of the Cedi; constant increases in taxes; inefficient revenue collection; very poor road networks; constant increments in utility tariffs; frequent increases in the price of petroleum products; government’s inability to make statutory payments timeously to schools; health facilities and other state institutions; government’s inability to address labour-related issues on a timely basis; government’s inability to exhibit decisive leadership in the fight against corruption; government’s inability to kick out incompetent and nonperforming appointees; the overpoliticisation of socioeconomic issues along partisan lines; government’s inability to create job opportunities for the youth and fresh graduates; government’s inability to effectively regulate small scale mining (galamsey); improper administrative decisions taken by some government officials; lack of proper communicative skills on the part of some government officials; the nonpassage of the freedom of information bill; the nonimplementation of the Senchi consensus; and government’s inability to tackle perennial flooding in the capital city and elsewhere in Ghana’ (Graphic Online, 2014).

The above concerns are not new but have been issues that the country has been battling since independence, and the failure to address them has significantly impacted Ghana’s growth. As Ayittey (2005: 2) puts it, Ghana ‘stood at the same level of development as South Korea. Both countries had a per capita income of $200. At independence, there was much hope for Ghana. The country’s economic potential was enormous…but 40 years later, South Korea’s income per capita is ten times that of Ghana: $4400 verse $420’. Therefore, the cause for the unhappiness of Ghanaians or the group, as contained in the petition, could be categorised into economic issues, poor governance from corruption and lack of transparency in government activities, and the underdevelopment of the country due to political inaction. Nevertheless, the sum of all of the issues raised is the issue of corruption and poor governance that has trickled down to other issues or is a manifestation of poor leadership, which has resulted in economic and political issues. For instance, the issue of the World Cup, where the state airlifted monies to players in Brazil in 2014, could be seen as the climax of the government’s poor management, scandal and the need to protest. Brigitte Dzogbenuku,4 one of the participants of the protest, posited the following: 4  Ms. Brigitte Dzogbenuku won the Miss Ghana Beauty Pageant in 1991, and was the vice-presidential candidate for the Progressive People’s Party.

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What happened was OccupyGhana started at the time we had the power crisis. We were at the height of it, and there were many scandals and corruption by the ruling party. Scandal after scandal—and one of the scandals was when they actually flew cash of $3.5 million to the black stars5 in Brazil four years ago during the World Cup, which was very embarrassing and truly the peak of it all (Personal Interview, June 6, 2018, Accra).

Likewise, Dr. Radha Hackman opines that ‘before the protest at FlagStaff House, there were numerous scandals and corruption cases, from the Woyome6 judgement scandal to the Brazil World Cup scandal. In fact, for me personally, this was soon after the World Cup at the end of June after we had airlifted all that money to Brazil’ (Personal Interview, June 7, 2018, Accra). There is no doubt that football is regarded as a form of soft power, and helps to construct a good image and representation of the country involved in the tournament (Mhiripiri & Chari, 2014). However, the inability of the government to pay its players and the planned boycott by the players during the tournament necessitated the airlifting of raw cash to Brazil, which tarnished the image of the country in both the national and international press (BBC, 2014), as it portrayed the government as inefficient. Likewise, these monies, i.e., $3.5 million from the World Cup and the GHC51.2 Million Woyome scandal, could have gone a long way in addressing some of the issues listed in the petition. For example, to help build infrastructure in order to address durmor (power crisis) or the healthcare issues. Consequently, the subsequent crash of the Black Stars from the tournament and the embarrassment of airlifting the monies facilitated the need to protest. Della Porta and Tarrow (2004) argue that social movements emerge from within the state and its politics, as such discontentment by citizens over socioeconomic and political issues gives rise to protest and the formation of social movements. Therefore, making social movements and protest groups a key component of a democratic state, as such interactions can be regarded as significant in pushing for good governance and accountability. These social movements are seen and act as  Black Stars is the name of Ghana’s national football team.  Alfred Woyome was requested by the court to refund over GHc51.2 million acquired by unconstitutional and invalid contracts between the state and Waterville Holdings Limited. This scandal became known as Woyome judgement scandal (see: Joy FM, https://www. myjoyonline.com/politics/2016/november-25th/govt-awards-another-gh35m-contract-­­ to-woyome-despite-scandal-says-occupyghana.php) 5 6

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the moral compass of society, as they highlight the wrongs happening in society (Salter, 2003). The success of the planned protest by CGRC despite the confrontation by the state using security forces to arrest some protesters and name-­ calling the protesters (Bokpe, 2014) led to the continuation of the movement, which amalgamated into #OccupyGhana. The protest was successful, as it received both national and international news coverage on the salient issues confronting Ghana. According to Dr. Radha Hackman, ‘After the protest happened, there were people who got together and said, you know, this thing sort of has momentum, let us not just go back home and say that is it. Surely it has to continue. It is from that that OccupyGhana was born. Few members out of that group got together with some of the organisers of Occupy Flagstaff House and that was how OccupyGhana was born’ (Personal Interview, June 7, 2018, Accra). The planned protest and the success of the protest raised questions about the role and place of new media technologies in social movement mobilisation in Ghana, and the category of people involved in the July 1, 2014 protest at Flagstaff House. OccupyFlagstaff House, which metamorphosed into #OccupyGhana, was actually birthed on social media, and social media was used in the mobilisation and coordination of the protest. According to the organisers of the Concerned Ghanaians for Responsible Governance (CGRG) protest, ‘social media was used to mobilise the protest that resulted in over 300 protesters attending the said protest (Bokpe, 2014). As Dr. Radha Hackman describes, It happened at a time when there were many social media platforms available to us, and I think that was what made a lot of a difference to us. You determine you are complaining to another person in the room, and you determine that your complaints are being channelled on social media, so everyone was complaining on Facebook, and with time you determine that there are quite a few like-minded people who are complaining about the same thing and all seem to want change. They were all saying pretty much the same thing. After the World Cup in Brazil, I just saw this thing on Facebook when somebody said we all scream so much on Facebook and all the platforms. Why do we not meet at the front of Flagstaff House on the 1st of July which is a holiday and let’s present a petition to President Mahama….it kind of grew on social media. On Monday, I came to work, and everybody was interested in going to this protest. I went with my daughter, and I took a Ghanaian flag with me. The venue had been changed from Flagstaff House to Efua Sutherland Children’s Park. What stuck with me was that when I

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got there, my sister was there and I never had that conversation with her, my sister-in-law was there, there were friends of mine with whom we never had this discussion, and they were all there. So I ask what are you doing here, what are you doing here? and that was it and how we occupied Flagstaff House (Personal Interview, June 7, 2018, Accra).

Similarly, Brigitte Dzogbenuku, a participant in the protest, states that: Therefore, when I heard of the occupy movement {Occupy FlagStaff} demonstration on Facebook, I decided to go for this demonstration. The demonstration at the time was actually slated for Occupy Flagstaff House, which is the seat of government, so I spoke to a friend about it, it was a holiday, and I asked what are you doing, do you want to join the protest tomorrow? and she said, you know that Flagstaff House is a security zone so if you go there and they decide to brutalise you, they have every right to do that to you, so you do not want to go to Flagstaff House because of any attack. So I cancelled the thought for a while. The next morning, the day of the Occupy Flagstaff House when I woke up, I heard on Facebook that the Occupy movement had moved to Efua Sutherland Park, which is a children’s park just 2 km away, so I said why not. So I got up and went. (Personal Interview, June 6, 2018, Accra).

Social media, especially Facebook and its affordances, are influencing and shaping the democratic culture of participation, engagement and mobilisation in Ghana (see Dzisah, 2020; Boateng et al., 2020). Ghanaians have appropriated technologies to communicate political issues and build a ‘social and virtual’ identity that is considered an ‘extension of a real social and political life’ (Zaghlami, 2020). This speaks of what Papacharissi (2015) calls the affective publics, as the social media platform, in this case Facebook, was used to tell the story of how rampant corruption has characterised Ghanaian society and to convey the sense of immediacy to address the problem. This was done by evoking an affective reaction from the public that led to various forms of mobilisation (Papacharissi, 2015), and, in the context of this study, it was civil mobilisation to protest at the Flagstaff house. Additionally, the above quotes show that outside of using social media platforms such as Facebook to organise and mobilise the protest, social media platforms offer a ‘virtual public space’ (Polat, 2005) for citizens to deliberate on issues affecting their development devoid of any censorship or external hindrance. As Dzisah (2020), in her study of new media technology adoption in Ghana puts it, social media usage and the

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appropriation of new media technologies have ‘deepened the participatory principles in Ghana’s fledging democracy’, as people are no longer limited to mainstream media platforms to participate in national discourses. They do so at the convenience of their living room using their mobile phones. This is very important because, in the mainstream media ecosystem, where people are excluded, social media has become a veritable tool for people to participate, set the agenda and deepen democratic culture (Dzisah, 2020). Dalvit (2015) notes that with the use of mobile phones that facilitate social networking, once excluded people or marginalised individuals are now able to participate and discuss political issues. Within the context of this study, such participation in the virtual public sphere enabled the mobilisation and organisation of the #OccupyFlagStaff house. Although this concept of mobilising and organising protests using social media platforms is not a new phenomenon, as similar things happened during the Arab Spring, Chebib and Sohail quoted an anonymous activist in the Egypt protest saying ‘We mobilised people via Facebook, coordinated via Twitter and informed the world via YouTube’ (Chebib and Sohail, 2011). However, it is germane in this instance because beyond the normative use of social media to communicate (Bevan-Dye & Akpojivi, 2016), the organisers of the protest and the citizens were able to domesticate and appropriate the technology to address problems that are unique to them, i.e., corruption, poor governance and the need for social change. That is, social media was used to share information about the lingering socioeconomic and political issues that have hindered the development of the Ghanaian state. Tufekci and Wilson (2012) argue that social media usage contributed significantly to the success of the Egyptian revolution, as, aside from mobilisation, it was a channel for disseminating information, and within the context of this study, social media was used to deliberate and discuss Ghana’s sociopolitical and economic conditions before it was harnessed for mobilisation. Hence, juxtaposing Mutsvairo’s (2016) assertion that to understand digital activism in Africa, it should be from the prism of the lived realities and experiences of Africans that have necessitated the appropriation, domestication and adaptation of digital technologies for protest. The lived reality in Ghana is that organising such a protest using the mainstream media would have been difficult or unlikely due to the overpoliticisation of the media in Ghana (Fosu & Akpojivi, 2015). Social media platforms have enabled not only the ability to bypass the politicised mainstream media but also to give a voice to dissatisfied Ghanaians to express their concerns and protest against power (the state). According to Dr. Radha Hackman:

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It has never occurred to me that in a million years that I will say something and people will listen. Who am I that I could also say something and someone would listen to it?… It never, never occurred to me you see. It was only when I actually started saying it on Facebook, not on radio, I never went to radio, I am shy. I do not do radio, I do not even do what I am doing right now (talking to you), I do not do radio, I do not do TV. However, Facebook kind of, you are writing you are not truly kind of talking, I was able to use Facebook as a channel, it had dawned on me that I could also say something… you have to be somebody to be able to go to radio and television stations, but thanks to social media you do not have to be anybody to say what you want to say (Personal interview, June 7, 2018, Accra).

The mediated form of communication within social media platforms and the sense of freedom that accompanies social media usage to a certain extent enables citizens to use social media as a platform to express their dissatisfaction and challenge authorities. According to Cohen and Kahne (2012: 8), social media encourages participatory politics through the interactions that occur among individuals who deliberate, have dialogues and shape the agenda for a cause through the sharing of information, thereby ‘exerting both voice and influence on issues of public concern’. To Castells (2012), ‘social media has become a place where history happens, a place people identify with because of the potential to engage with each other devoid of prying eyes of the state’ (cited in Akpojivi, 2018b: 181). Social media affords citizens and other state actors the opportunity to form a community of ‘shared culture, shared values and shared aspirations’ to engage with themselves and seek ways of addressing societal problems (Assange, 2014: 10). This shared culture and value are evident in Dr. Radha Hackman’s earlier assertion that the need to address the issues of corruption and poor governance—which almost everyone was complaining about on Facebook—led to the formation of an ‘imagined community’7 (Occupy Flagstaff House) that seeks to act as the watchdog to government. This socially constructed community on Facebook not only used Facebook to 7  I have used Benedict Anderson’s (1983) concept of imagined communities here because OccupyFlagStaff House and #OccupyGhana can be regarded as a socially constructed community within a wider structure of community. The members and the public see the movement as a community that is significant to the sustenance of good governance in Ghana based on the shared values amongst them. This will be established in subsequent discussions in the chapter.

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organise the protest march but also acted as the watchdog to the government by highlighting the challenges confronting the country, and sharing their values and aspirations of ‘good governance and accountability’. However, a striking feature of this imagined community is the category of people who came together to protest on July 1, 2014 under the banner of #OccupyFlagStaff House, which has continued with the new name of #OccupyGhana. This category of people is not the usual students, market women and traders, the lowest in the society that has normally characterised protests in Ghana, but the ‘middle class’ whom Bagooro and Obeng (2014) refer to as the ‘well-off professional’. According to Bokpe (2014), while attesting to the category of people in the protest stated, ‘Many of the protesters belonged to the middle class, including Ace Kojo Ankomah,8 a legal practitioner, Yoofi Grant of Databank; Dr. Esi Ansah, a lecturer at the Ashesi University; Kofi Kapito, the Chief Executive Officer of the Consumer Protection Agency; Comfort Ocran of Legacy and Legacy; Ken Ofori-Atta, a co-founder of Databank; Selorm Branttie, the communications director of IMANI Ghana; a former chief marketing officer of MTN, George Andah’. This group of people is not the normal or usual people to be found in a protest about economic issues in Ghana, as they have the economic power or resources to address their challenges due to their privileges. Therefore, their coming together raises questions about the place of class and social status in protests. In addition, in what ways was this ‘class’ used to drive the message of the movement? However, in Chap. 2, the role of elites and social class within activism was discussed, as they were considered instruments of credibility and provided the resources needed by social movements to pursue their agenda. However, while this might be the case for #OccupyGhana, there is a point of departure, as the movement distanced itself from the poor people who usually participate in protests. Bagooro and Obeng (2014) stated that ‘Many of the protesters who spoke to the media distanced themselves from the other segments of the Ghanaian population, especially those perceived to be either poor or uneducated or both by claiming 8  Ace Kojo Ankomah is the leader of the #OccupyGhana. He is a well-known and respected lawyer in Ghana. He can be regarded as one of the ‘big men’ in Ghana. It was difficult for the author to schedule an interview with him as he was constantly on the move, i.e., travelling within Ghana and internationally. In fact, a research assistant in Ghana asked me ‘do you know who he is? ‘You can’t meet with him, as he is either lecturing, in the court, on TV stations speaking about national issues or he is outside the country’. This speaks of his bigness and social status in Ghana.

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they were the ‘middle class’ not the riffraff of society’. Dr. Radha Hackman, while attesting to this ‘middle class’ status of the movement, posits that ‘I remember when we went on OccupyFlagstaff house demonstration. One of the things everybody said was that it was like a bunch of middle class people until then sort of sat on the fence’ (Personal Communication, June 7, 2018, Accra). The rise of the middle class in this protest seeks to achieve two objectives. To be heard and to achieve some sort of credibility. According to Bagooro and Obeng (2014), by using classism, that is, the label of ‘middle class’ and distinguishing themselves from the normal class that drives protest in Ghana, the movement assumed that they would most likely be heard or listened to by the state. Because the poor or the normative group that engage in protests, i.e., traders, students and clerks, which Meredith (2005) alluded to earlier, are usually powerless and voiceless based on their economic or social status. They need someone with higher status (political, economic or cultural) to either help channel their grievances or fight their cause. O’Dair (2003: 593) posits that one’s social status offers the opportunity to ‘form cultural citizenship and politics’, which assists in ‘reconstructing democratic public life’. In other words, social status gives political access, and this is most evident within African society, where George Orwell’s quote from Animal Farm, ‘All animals are equal but some are more equal than others’, plays out. This classism can be seen in the category of people who participated in the protest. For instance, Brigitte Dzogbenuku alluded to this classism by stating, ‘When I got there (Flagstaff House), as a fairly popular public figure, I was called by one of the popular radio stations in Ghana and asked why are you here?’ (Personal Interview, June 6, 2018, Accra). The words ‘fairly popular public figure’ speaks of her position as a former Miss Ghana and the vice-presidential candidate, and is used to tell of her elitism and social status in society, whose concerns should not be dismissed but listened to. In addition, Dr. Radha Hackman buttressed this elitism within the movement by stating that ‘I think the active OccupyGhana members are approximately 22 out of this, about three of us are doctors, at least five are lawyers, two accountants, we have an IT specialist, we have a journalist, an engineer, we have somebody who works in mines. Those are the professions that I can remember for now.’ (Personal Interview, June 7, 2018, Accra). These people are top professionals (lawyers, doctors, engineers, journalists) in society; therefore, they have the needed resources for activism

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and push their message across to the state. The resources available to them (social status, monetary) enable them to reach out or get the attention of the state to engage with them (See Akpojivi, 2018b). For instance, Dr. Radha Hackman, attesting to how #OccupyGhana drew the attention of the government to salient issues, posited that ‘We have a legal team within #OccupyGhana, which is actually our strength. So I think one of the things we have achieved and we are very proud about is we had on numerous occasions engaged the state through the Auditor General to push for accountability.’ (Personal Interview, June 7, 2018, Accra). On a continent where social status brings about certain privileges and accessibility to state or nonstate actors such as media and civil societies (See Gorski, 2003), there is no doubt that the movement needed classism as a mechanism in achieving its set aims of highlighting the issues of poor governance and accountability, as can be inferred from Dr. Radha Hackman’s assertion. Their knowledge of the workings of society and likely alternatives based on their exposure and social status could help in mounting public pressure on the state. Teoh et al. (1999) argue that state policy is mostly influenced by social activists who are perceived to draw action plans or policy blueprints based on status. However, this classism excludes the very people who are affected by the issues raised by the movement and, thus the injustice against this group of people. Rawls posited that ‘injustice then is simply inequalities that are not the benefit of all’ (cited in Hendrix, 2005: 64). Bagooro and Obeng (2014) state that ‘The attempt to present this protest in class terms—with the assumption that they are more likely to be heard—diminishes the struggle’s potential to force a serious nonpartisan discussion on how to find credible solutions to the difficult challenges facing the country. Therefore, widening the gap between the group and those outside, i.e., ordinary public. Every Ghanaian, rich or poor, middle class or underclass has an equal stake in this country, and no single group view is more important than the other’. Not only are ordinary Ghanaians excluded from the process of demanding social change, but their experiences are also neglected, and the experiences from all spectra of the society (educated and uneducated) are essential in engaging with the state and demand for social change (see Akpojivi, 2018b). Cusicanqui (2012) faults elites and their ideas in state polity and formation by arguing that these elites lack in-depth understanding and experiences that are essential in the development of society, as ordinary citizens feel and experience the impact of government action and inaction the most due to the lack of alternatives available to them. Akpojivi (2018b) extends this thought by stating that although elitist movements

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have resources, that is, they can harness all material and immaterial resources available to them to push for social change, such movements do not represent the interests of the ordinary citizens affected (this will be discussed in the next section), and by neglecting the vast majority of the population affected in their engagement via their social status structure, such reform processes and engagement might be faulty (see Akpojivi, 2018b). Likewise, in a patrimonial and neopatrimonial system that has characterised postcolonial African states, the fluidity of this relationship between elites and their involvement with the state, where ‘there is no place for systematic dissent: opposition can only take the form of supporting a different patron or seeking a better place within the hierarchy’, calls for a critical examination of the place of elites and social class in activism (de Waal & Ibreck, 2013). That is, there is the likelihood of patronage shaping activism or the cause of social movements characterised by elites. As de Waal and Ibreck (2013) describe, the political system in Africa is complex, as there is evidence of ‘institutionalised politics notably in the form of civil service, trade unions and university’ within the political system. Thus, there is a need to critically evaluate the elitism and middle-class status of the movement and how this played out during their activism. That is, how this class status shaped the micro-macro relationship within the movement. Nevertheless, the formation of this movement around classism is built to achieve some form of credibility. This credibility is at two levels. Representing ordinary Ghanaians who are unable to speak for themselves or channel their grievances, and the fact that they seek not to benefit from the protest due to their status but to highlight the difficulty faced by everyone in society. According to Brigitte Dzogbenuku: Well, I will tell you what it was during Occupy movement that you determine that the middle class could indeed say something about politics because they had been quiet for a long time. The middle class has been quiet for a long time about what was happening. We have a problem, I got the means, I will solve it. You do not have power, I will get a generator. I do not have water, well I will get a water tank to bring me water, and I will get a pump to pump water. Healthcare, I will fly out of the country, or I have a doctor friend, whatever. It was during Occupy that we saw the middle class actually speaking out about politics. Therefore, it will seem it’s heavily or top heavily middle class, but it allows for anybody. So long as you have something to say, occupy allows you to come and say it. (Personal Interview, June 6, 2018, Accra).

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Similarly, Dr. Radha Hackman states: Everybody said that it was like a bunch of middle-class people who seem not to be involved in running the country even though things were bad. They have sort of made life very comfortable for themselves. They have generators, they do not care about dumsor, they have water tanks and they do not care about the lack of water. So basically, it was a group of people who seem slightly detached from reality (I do not want to say reality), but they have found a way of getting comfortable in uncomfortable situations. (Personal Interview, June 7, 2018, Accra).

The above quotes may speak of the credibility of the members ‘middle class’ of the movement. The fact that they decide to speak about economic issues that affect all Ghanaians shows that they are not protesting or demanding accountability based on personal interests, as they have the resources to cater to themselves and their family members. That is, they have the resources to provide basic amenities such as electricity, water and healthcare that the state did not provide. Therefore, they are speaking for ordinary Ghanaians whose voices cannot be heard by the state or do not have the means to engage with the state by using their once ‘silent voice’, which Brigitte Dzogbenuku refers to as sitting on the fence. Bokpe (2014), and Bagooro and Obeng (2014) posit that the movement claims to be fighting or speaking for ordinary Ghanaians who do not truly understand the issues or cannot express these issues to get the attention of the state and engage with the state. Orock (2015) argues that elites in postcolonial Africa are considered by nonelites to be a driving force for development. Consequently, juxtaposing the movement, claiming that they are protesting for ordinary Ghanaians. However, by claiming to speak about issues that every Ghanaian experiences, equality is promoted and the status gap ‘middle class’ is removed. Nevertheless, by using the middle class title, it questions the notion of equality of speaking for ordinary Ghanaians. Castells (1978) posits that social status is significant in power relations, as the image of the ‘middle class’ helps in shaping state engagement. This is especially true in postcolonial African societies, where status defines and determines who has access to economic and political power, which could be instrumental in societal polity. Within African states, such powers are usually used for vested selfish interests (Mbembe 1992). This is in line with the arguments of Fanon (2005) and Mbembe (2001), that in postcolonial states, the ruling class

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wants to emulate or follow the power structures of the colonialist. For instance, in historical African societies, one’s social status, i.e., a chief, man of many wives, or farmlands, was a basis of engagement and recognition, as without this recognition people are ignored or not recognised. Therefore, excluding a group of people from involvement in the process of demanding accountability. Despite this, it can be argued that the emergence of the middle class that has sat on the fence for a long time in the history of Ghana has reshaped activism and the drive for accountability from what it used to be during the struggle for independence and in the post-independence era. Subsequent sections in this chapter will attempt to show the dynamic shift in activism and its impact on the socioeconomic and political development of Ghana.

Whose Accountability? The Clash of Individual and State Interests There comes a time when we must cut the talk and take some action!! That time has come…. Ghana can work again, and we must #OccupyGhana to effect change!! (http://www.occupygh.org/about/)

As stated earlier, the #OccupyFlagStaff House metamorphosed into #OccupyGhana with key members that led the protest of July 1, 2014, continuing with the #OccupyGhana movement. #OccupyGhana is an online activism that makes use of Facebook (see Fig. 4.2) to raise concerns over serious issues confronting the socioeconomic and political development of Ghana. Bosch et al. (2020) argue that social media has become a veritable tool for political communication for both the state and citizens. The platforms and their affordance have enabled politicians, activists, and ordinary citizens, among others, to perform and engage in political activities and debates (Cohen & Kahne, 2012; Bosch et al., 2020). Therefore, by #OccupyGhana structuring their activism predominantly online using social media platforms suggests the need to actively reach and engage their constituencies in political and economic issues quickly, as they can bridge time and space (Gerbaudo 2012 cited in Bosch et  al., 2020). Dzisah (2020) posited that in Ghana, social media usage, especially Facebook, has become a common tool for political communication and mobilisation to reach and engage citizens who have been excluded from the political discourse. Therefore, it is an alternative platform for social movements.

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Fig. 4.2  #OccupyGhana Facebook page

In addition, the movement combines their online activity with offline actions, which are mainly legal actions against the state to push for transparency and good governance or to appear on radio and television programmes to discuss and sensitise the public about the issues they are raising. The combination of online activities and offline actions addresses one of the fundamental criticisms against digital and online activism that most often has resulted in limited impact (see Diamond, 2010). Additionally, this integration seeks to address and balance the criticism against social media usage for political activism, and the belief that it will liberate (see Diamond, 2010) or bring about the needed change without an actively coordinated offline activity (see Chitanana & Mutsvairo, 2019). As Chitanana and Mutsvairo (2019: 67) put it, an examination of the impact or usage of social media should go beyond the ‘deterministic focus on what technology can do’ but on how the everyday realities of Ghanaians, especially within the context of #OccupyGhana, shape their usage of social media and their offline activities. According to #OccupyGhana, the movement’s objective is to ‘seek good and responsible governance and inspire great leadership for Ghana’ (https://www.facebook.com/pg/OccupyGhana/about/?ref=page_ internal). In addition, according to the movement, #OccupyGhana is a ‘social and political nonpartisan group, we are passionately committed to ensuring that Ghana develops its full economic potential and remains a

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strong democracy’ (http://www.occupygh.org/about/), and they do this by acting as a watchdog to government and their elected officials by holding them accountable. They seek to achieve this through building partnerships with other civil society organisations and via their activism (http://www.occupygh.org/about/). This is in line with Mercea’s (2013) position that social movements and digital activism seek to address societal problems. Thus, #OccupyGhana can be argued to be invested in addressing the issues of good governance and accountability that have been a bane in Ghana since the attainment of independence (Kwei-Amah, 1968). In carrying out their civic duties of watchdog using digital activism coupled with offline actions, the movement has found a creative way of enriching the democratic and participatory culture (Bosch et  al., 2020). However, it should be acknowledged that social media usage goes beyond political mobilisation and participation, but social media usage by individuals and social movements is heterogeneous in practice (Skoric & Zhu, 2015). Within the context of this study, its use by #OccupyGhana is to sensitize and communicate messages of good governance by identifying malpractices and holding these leaders (elected or not) to account. Therefore, #OccupyGhana is a key actor in the demand for accountability in Ghana. However, there is the need to ask whose accountability is being demanded by #OccupyGhana and for whose interest, as outside the classism that is associated with the movement, as discussed earlier in the previous section, there is the need to interrogate the different interests of the members of #OccupyGhana, and to what extent the movement has been nonpartisan in their campaign and struggle for good governance and transparency within Ghana. Additionally, such an interrogation will reveal the extent to which the appropriation of technology by the movement has encouraged inclusion and participation of the public in the broader discourse of good governance and transparency (Chitanana & Mutsvairo, 2019). This is important because, just as George Orwell stated in his book Animal Farm, ‘never listen when they tell you that man and the animal have a common interest, that the prosperity of one is the prosperity of the others. It is all lies’ (2000). This speaks of complex or selfish interests that are found in every society, most especially within a shared or imagined community such as #OccupyGhana. Within the movement, not all are involved because of the need to promote good governance; some might be there for personal/individual interests. Hence, there is a need to examine the dynamic relationship within the movement due to the different

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interests of its members. Dzisah (2020: 103) argues that since social media usage in Ghana is used for political communication, it is subjected to elite control in setting agendas to reflect selfish interests. ‘Their manipulative hands in using communication and information technology tools under the guise of democratic and interactive media platforms to gain citizen access to participation while in reality, it could be a subtle coercive participation strategy’. As stated, #OccupyGhana is made up of people who participated in the OccupyFlagStaff House protest. These people might all have different reasons for participating in the July 1, 2014 protest and continuing with the activities to date. According to Dr. Radha Hackman, her decision to participate in the activism of #OccupyGhana is in her interest in wanting Ghana to have good leadership and accountability, necessitating her joining the movement right from inception and not for any personal political reasons (Personal Interview, June 7, 2018, Accra). In other words, the public interest in good roads, healthcare, constant electricity, and education motivated her to be involved in the movement and not for personal, selfish reasons. This might be an exception and not the norm for other members and the basis or reasons for their participation in the July 1, 2014 protest and the subsequent #OccupyGhana. As some joined the movement based on other private reasons, as Fenton and Barassi (2011) argued, the ‘individualised interests of social movement members sometimes shape social movement activism.’ Within a movement, there might be vested economic and political actors that want to use social movements to advance their agenda within the idea of collectivity (See Habib, 2018). Thus, revealing the patrimonial and neopatrimonial systems that characterise African states, such individualised interests could easily filter into activism due to the fluidity of the relationship between middle-class activists and their involvement with the state (de Waal & Ibreck, 2013). Instances of such fluidity of relationship are evident within the movement, as while in Accra, I enquired of one of my research assistants about possible people to interview outside the tentative list of interviewees I had initially drawn. My research assistant was excited to mention the Deputy Minister of Communication, George Nenyi Andah,9 as she said, he was very active during the OccupyFlagStaff House protest  and actively involved with 9  George Nenyi Andah is currently a member of parliament under the New Patriotic Party (NPP) which was an opposition party in 2014 during the OccupyFlagStaff House.

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#OccupyGhana. I was given his mobile phone number and called immediately to schedule an appointment to speak to him. Immediately I introduced myself and the research purpose, he told me, ‘I no longer do #OccupyGhana’, and he repeated this phrase twice. I told my research assistant what the deputy minister said, and she was shocked, saying ‘Before he became a deputy minister, he was doing #OccupyGhana, but now that he is a deputy minister, he no longer does #OccupyGhana’. The deputy minister’s reply coupled with the reaction and expression of the research assistant raises fundamental questions about individual interests within activism and how digital activism and social movements can be used as tools to promote selfish interests under the guise of public interests (see Fenton & Barassi, 2011). This was not an isolated incident, as Brigitte Dzogbenuku alluded to this selfish interest in which #OccupyGhana has/ was a platform for selected people to pursue their individual interests. According to her, ‘I joined out of selfish, personal interests’ (Personal Interview, June 6, 2018, Accra). When pressed to disclose these ‘selfish, personal interests’, Brigitte Dzogbenuku refused. However, this can be connected to the fact that she was the vice presidential candidate for the Progressive People’s Party (PPP), and #OccupyGhana could be used as a platform to reach out to people during the electioneering period to seek their votes and gain some credibility as an activist interested in good governance and accountability in Ghana. According to Brigitte Dzogbenuku, while highlighting reasons for leaving the movement, she stated that the vested interests of members in shaping the overall cause of the movement necessitated her decision to leave. According to her, I attended a few forums {of #OccupyGhana}, and then I realised that maybe not to get deluded. I felt that there was some political infiltration, I might be wrong. To me, it felt like it was leaning towards one side against the other. I was fighting the system, it did not matter which party, so when I started to feel that it seemed to be leaning one way more than the other, I thought to withdraw. Because frankly, it doesn’t matter which party I am for, if it’s wrong, it’s wrong…I am an individual with my personal principle if something doesn’t sit with me, I will rather not be part of it (Personal Interview, June 6, 2018, Accra).

The above quotation speaks about the different contestations of ideas and interests within a movement that classifies itself as nonpartisan and likewise the vested interests or motives surrounding the involvement of

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activists in the #OccupyGhana movement. Both assertions reveal the interplay of the micro and macro relationship between actors and their interests/ideology within the formation of a movement and how the movement is appropriated. Fenton and Barassi (2011) argue that while social movements and digital activism expound the mediated political participation where people can engage with state actors, the notion or sense of empowerment is derived. Such participation is usually confirmed with the logic of individual interest. Stiegler (2009) states that the human psyche acts as a social apparatus that seeks to address societal problems, and the end purpose of improving society has necessitated the need to embrace technology. According to him, the individualisation of this technology from collective interests into spaces for achieving personal interests can undermine democracy. Fenton and Barassi (2011: 181), while extending this thought, posit that ‘Self-centred media production practices, which are promoted by social media (digital activism), represent a challenge to the construction and dissemination of political messages that are born out of the efforts and negotiations of a collective’. When these personal or individualised interests are not effectively managed from shaping the agenda of the movement, this poses a problem due to a clash of interests (Clemens 1996 cited in Mercea, 2013). In other words, the agency and set objectives of an individual will influence his/her decision to embrace technology (activism) to promote and realise set goals (see Stiegler, 2009), and from the ordinary human eye, such activism and communication using social media could be seen as enhancing and promoting democratic culture. However, such participation is manipulative, as the platform is used to promote and set individualised interests (Dzisah, 2020). This individualisation or self-interest could be seen in the rationale or basis for which Deputy Minister of Communication George Nenyi Andah and Brigitte Dzogbenuku have used the digital activism of #OccupyGhana to pursue personal interests of seeking political office by capitalising on the broader affective claims of the movement (Papacharissi, 2015). While their participation within the shared community might have helped highlight the ills in society and the need for social change, their respective interests shaped and influenced their participation and eventual withdrawal from the movement. As Brigitte Dzogbenuku describes, ‘I felt there was some political infiltration and to me, the movement was leaning towards one side…hence I thought to withdraw’ (emphasis added, Personal Interview, June 6, 2018, Accra). The idea that there was some form of political infiltration within

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the movement reveals the clash between the movement’s overall objective of being nonpartisan and individual interests of political goals. It should be noted that President John Mahama was the president of Ghana under the political platform of the National Democratic Congress (NDC), and this political infiltration could be seen as opposition parties using #OccupyGhana as a platform to win elections by discrediting the ruling government of President John Mahama. For example, the movement was labelled by the government of President John Mahama and the National Democratic Congress as a pro-New Patriotic Party. Therefore, one is tempted to ask to what extent #OccupyGhana was a platform for individuals to achieve their selfish interests and a tool for launching the New Patriotic Party into power in 2016. Dzisah (2020), while citing the Governance Social Media Index (GSMI), argued that in the 2016 election, social media was extensively used to gain ‘political leverage’ in terms of mobilisation and participation, and such affective claims of corruption and mismanagement against the NDC could be a potential tool for the opposition NPP in their political messaging. Rubin (2002) argues that due to the fragmentation of society, it is impossible to separate politics that might filter into social movements. This politics shaped individual motives and engagement with the movement in its attempt to achieve its objectives. For example, George Nenyi Andah and Yofi Grant, who played an active role within #OccupyGhana, are ‘now serving in the New Patriotic Party (NPP)’, while Yofi Grant is ‘serving as the Chief Executive Officer of Ghana Investment Promotion Centre (GIPC) and George Nenyi Andah is a member of parliament (Citi FM, 2017). This supports Brigitte Dzogbenuku’s notion of ‘political infiltration’, or the movement used to achieve self-interest. However, the movement disputed this idea of self-­ interest and political infiltration. According to Dr. Radha Hackman: Like I said, we are political but nonpartisan, so he (George Nenyi Andah) may have given some impression that we are a New Patriotic Party (NPP) organisation. As soon as he declared his intentions to run as an MP, as soon as he made that decision and made it public, he just stepped back. So he is still a member, maybe not as active and certainly not what you call in a leadership position. By the time he started campaigning and everything, in fact, people did not know that he was still a member of OccupyGhana (Personal Interview, June 7, 2018, Accra).

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Although the above statement tries to dispute the notion of political infiltration and separate the personal interests of George Andah from the movement. The fact that George campaigned while still being a member of the movement reflects and establishes the idea that #OccupyGhana provided a platform for some credibility for him. This platform was not just to George and Yofi alone but to other members like Brigitte Dzogbenuku, amongst others, who all had their individual (selfish) interests and used the platform as a tool to achieve their respective interests. Papacharissi (2015: 5) argues that society responds to affection from a narrative ‘that emerges through our affectively charged and digitally expressed endorsement, rejection, or view’. Therefore, it can be argued that the narrative of #OccupyGhana as an instrument of good governance and accountability that resonates with the public was capitalised upon by political actors for their vested interests by endearing themselves to the public. Papacharissi (2015: 5) argued that this narrative will make ‘us feel close to some and distancing us from others’, and this, to a certain extent, contributed to the defecting of the NDC and President John. Mahama in the general election of December 7, 2016. As one #OccuppyGhana member puts it, ‘There were a lot of things that we were demanding, and these actually contributed to the downfall of the NDC government’ (Dr. Radha Hackman, Personal Interview, June 7, 2018, Accra). This is not a new phenomenon, as there has been an increased number of cases where movements are used as a platform to achieve self-interests. For example, Fasiha Hassan was criticised by fellow students and movement members for using the #FeesMustFall platform to achieve recognition and reward from systems that the movement was against (Ebrahim, 2018). Likewise, social movements are argued to be the launching platform for activists to enter political office. In the history of Africa, this is evident as nationalist or early trade unions used their movements as strategic tools in actualising and attaining political office. Therefore, this raises the question of whose accountability is being pursued by the movement. It is complex to separate the individual interests behind the usage of technology and digital activism from the broader objective(s) of a movement (Fuchs, 2015). According to Fuchs (2015) and Zuboff (2019), power and control are dominant within social media and social movements, as, within these platforms, there is contestation for political, economic and cultural ideological control, which is subjected to manipulation (Mutsvairo & Ronning, 2020). Activists could hide behind the collective idea of a movement to promote their interests. This

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manipulation of hiding under the collective interests to push individual interests, if not properly managed, could lead to a clash, as evident in Brigitte Dzogbenuku’s withdrawal from the #OccupyGhana movement and the conflicting statements between #OccupyGhana and George Andah. While #OccupyGhana posits that George Andah is still a member of the movement and only resigned from his leadership position as recorded in their statement of March 17, 2017, that reads, ‘OccupyGhana wishes to formally announce the resignation of Nenyi George Andah and Yofi Grant from its Executive Council. Nenyi and Yofi, however, remain members of OccupyGhana and will carry out their respective new endeavours, the core values and ideologies of OccupyGhana, promoting good governance and abhorring corruption’ (http://www.occupygh.org/ media-­release/resignation-­of-­nenyi-­george-­andah-­and-­yofi-­grant-­from-­ occupyghana-­executive-­council/). On the other hand, George Nenyi Andah informed me that ‘he no longer does #OccupyGhana’. Such conflicts of interest resounds in Stiegler (2009), whose idea that the ‘micropolitics of desire {libidinal economy}’, which is the end purpose of technology usage, will determine or shift the discourse from collective interest to individual interest, therefore exposing the bias or complex relationship within a movement. Within the #OccupyGhana movement, the interests of the selected few have questioned the overall objective of promoting accountability and good governance in Ghana.

#OccupyGhana and Social Change There have been numerous contestations and debates about the ability of social movements or digital activism to bring about social change. Most literature suggests that social media and social movement usage within African states can bring about political, economic and cultural changes (see Mare 2014; Mutsvairo & Ronning, 2020; Akpojivi, 2020), while other studies have highlighted the limited impact of these movements on the broader sociopolitical, economic and cultural developments of the African state (see Chitanana & Mutsvairo, 2019; Akpojivi, 2020). Additionally, such contestation revolves around conceptual issues of what constitutes social change, how this social change can be measured, and what yardsticks could be used in determining social movements, digital activism and social change in society. Therefore, the technological determinism view encapsulates the significance of technology in bringing about social change and development in society (Kunz, 2006). This position has

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widely been criticized because it ignores the place of agency, context and other social structures in bringing about social change. Huntington, while buttressing the above, posited that ‘This one-sided approach…leaves little room for social structure and even less for political culture, political institutions and political leadership’ (cited in Mamdani et  al., 1988: 974). Furthermore, as Skoric and Zhu (2015) argued, society uses social media differently based on their needs, and their usage will determine the possible outcome. Within #OccuppyGhana, social media usage for good governance and accountability suggests that social change has been facilitated. To Mackenzie (1997), society is greatly influenced by societal cultures, economic elements and political arrangements, which show that technology alone is insufficient to bring about change, but such change must be seen as the embedment of technology with salient social, political and economic factors. Therefore, emphasising that in the conceptualisation of social change and the positionality of social movements or digital activism in such change, there is the need to go beyond seeing social change as an end product, i.e., shift in structural patterns (Harper & Leicht, 2007). However, to view social change and technology (digital activism or social movement) from the perspective of social processes, i.e., relationships and experiences between the different social actors, in influencing society’s social structures. This approach is salient because according to Mamdani et  al. (1988: 973), the current crisis confronting society (African countries) needs ‘an initiative by organised social forces inside Africa’ to resolve. In other words, social movements or digital activists are central to the process of initiating development or social change on the African continent. Consequently, this section will examine #OccupyGhana and the extent to which it has been able to bring about social change by promoting good governance and accountability. Despite the individualised interests displayed within #OccupyGhana, as discussed in the previous section, it has been involved in numerous cases in which it has engaged the state and demanded accountability. This is in line with their overall objective that state officials and ‘public servants who make use of taxpayers’ money must not be corrupt and that they must be transparent, accountable and open to scrutiny’ (http://www.occupygh. org/about/#1490894264016-­a01fb404-­ef50). The approach the movement adopts in seeking to achieve this objective is in engaging the state using the relevant laws in Ghana by tapping into the rich resources available to them, i.e., lawyers and communication

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experts. According to #OccupyGhana, ‘We are committed to upholding the Ghanaian constitution and the rule of law. However, where we consider that it is necessary to do so to assist the fight against corruption, we shall recommend amendments to the constitution and the enactment, amendment or repeal of legislation. #OccupyGhana will work with any government, public authority or public servant to assist them to effect change for the better in the fight against corruption’ (http://www.occupygh.org/about/#1490894264016-­a01fb404-­ef50). The above shows that upholding the rule of law amongst different stakeholders within the Ghanaian state using the constitution is a fundamental tool or strategy in which social change is being promoted or advanced in Ghana by #OccupyGhana. Consequently, highlighting the. uniqueness and strength of the movement from any other movement or digital activism in Ghana. That is, while other movements might have an online presence and offline presence of protest, #OccupyGhana has an online presence where issues of good governance are raised and the position of the movement stated, and this is followed by an active offline presence of litigation as a way of enforcing the rule of law. According to Dr. Radha Hackman: We have a legal team within #OccupyGhana, which I think is our strength… corruption is one of the biggest issues within the public sector, and one way we have addressed this problem is by using the law. I think everybody says Ghana has beautiful laws which are not truly enforced. Therefore, one of our tools is to look at the laws and see how we can enforce the law to achieve our aims (Personal Interview, June 7, 2018, Accra).

The above quote attests to the instrument (legal) that #OccupyGhana uses to bring about social change and facilitate socioeconomic, political and cultural development in Ghana. Ghana is credited with legislative frameworks that promote good governance; hence, it is a model for other African states (see Akpojivi, 2014; Akpojivi, 2018a). However, Aiseng and Akpojivi (2019) argue that African elites’ maladministration has hindered development across the continent. According to them, despite fine legal instruments across African countries such as South Africa and Ghana, elites are able to bypass the law and promote corruption and maladministration. Therefore, the idea of using the law as a way of achieving social change in the public sector of Ghana expounds the idea that the movement is domesticating and using resources available to them to institute

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social change and promote new ways of doing things, i.e., creating a ‘positive mind set’ on Ghanaians and using the law to show the consequences of corruption and poor governance in Ghana. This is in line with Aldon’s (1992) argument that the ability of social movements to pull all resources available is essential in achieving its set objectives. Therefore, this approach has influenced the movement in its activities, as seen in the number of cases of maladministration, corruption and poor governance in which #OccupyGhana has been involved. One significant case that has endeared the movement to ordinary Ghanaians is the Auditor General’s flawed case, which #OccupyGhana pointed out on November 12, 2014. According to Dr. Radha Hackman: I think one of the things we have achieved, our achievement which we are very proud about is we had the Auditor General for example whose responsibility is to audit the public offices and present a report. In addition, what we found out was that most of the corruption within government and public offices, the Auditor General would present his report at the end of the year with lots of question marks for corruption acts or irregularity. The officials involved are indicted by the report were not persecuted, not probed or nothing was done in parliament. They did not go beyond that, so year after year. Therefore, people think that corruption in public service has increased over the years. Therefore, for #OccupyGhana, for example, one of the things that our legal team was influential about, they found out that the Auditor General has persecutory powers not just to present the report but to disallow some of these financial transactions that had gone through and set charges which means that they have to pay for whatever monies they have misspent. That was the power the Auditor General had and has not been used in the history of Ghana. Therefore, basically, public officials were basically getting away with corruption act, maybe just a slap on the wrists if anything at all. Therefore, we took the Auditor General to court to force him to use his powers of disallowance and set charge. Therefore, it was not just an option that, yes I got it and I have sent my report, but, to exercise his responsibilities within the law (Personal Interview, June 7, 2018, Accra).

The above extract shows the ability of #OccupyGhana to highlight constitutional provisions and try to enforce the implementation of such conditions. Therefore, they are able to bring about social change within government establishments using the law. Legislative provisions empower the Auditor General to not only audit state accounts but ‘set charge’ and ‘disallow transactions’ were actively insisted upon by the movement. In

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addition, for the first time in the history of Ghana, the Auditor General has been made to start exercising his/her constitutional power that has been ignored. The impact of this action cannot be overemphasised, as not only is the Auditor General required to present his report for the financial year but also to disallow any questionable transaction (in which the monies must be refunded if already spent) and to charge public officials that might have committed the fraudulent act. Therefore, strengthening the democratic process by promoting accountability has always been a bane in Africa, especially in Ghana (see Kwei-Amah, 1968). Consequently, this has generally impacted the public perception of the movement, as when topical issues of corruption and mismanagement are highlighted in the media, people tend to wait for the opinion of #OccupyGhana or ask what the movement is doing about the situation. According to Dr. Radha Hackman, while buttressing the above position, ‘You see what happens these days is that when something happens, you go to Facebook almost everyone is saying why won’t OccupyGhana do something about this or saying about this’ (Personal Interview, June 7, 2019, Accra). Therefore, the average Ghanaian sees #OccupyGhana as the body responsible for promoting accountability and good governance in Ghana.10 As Brigitte Dzogbenuku states, #OccupyGhana has probed so many issues. For one example, there was a judgement debt scandal ‘Woyome’, where someone was paid money that was not due to him and it has all kind of people involved. Then, #OccupyGhana brought awareness to that, they brought awareness to many issues. Currently, there is a Ministry of Communication Services where there have been fishy contracts that have been given to a third party to monitor the operations of telecommunication companies (Personal Interview, June 6, 2018, Accra). The ability of #OccupyGhana to pick on issues of maladministration and challenge such issues, and enlighten the public about these issues reveals the engagement between the movement and other state actors. For instance, the Alfred Woyome judgement debt scandal, which involves the payment of Ghc51 million by the government of Ghana to Mr. Alfred 10  One is tempted to assume that the assertion of Dr. Radha Hackman is exaggerated. However, I have made this conclusion based on my experiences during fieldwork. For example, while in Ghana I watched the Anas video about corruption in Ghana Football Association, and there were questions about not only the ethical nature of the report but the extent of corruption within GFA, and taxi drivers, passengers and even at eateries, people were asking questions about what #OccupyGhana is doing or their opinion about the issues raised?.

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Woyome (a financier to NDC) over a said contract that the parliament of Ghana did not approve, generated huge controversy (Ghana Web, 2012) from 2011. However, since its inception in 2014, #OccupyGhana has appeared on television and radio, and used its online platform (Facebook) to educate the general public about the case and challenged the state to do the needful. For example, #OccupyGhana challenged the decision of the attorney general to discount the oral examination of Mr. Alfred Woyome in court. According to the movement, ‘We have seen a ‘Notice of Discontinuance’ filed by the attorney general on 26th October, 2016, discontinuing the present application to orally examine Woyome…we have noticed the immense pressure that was brought to bear on the AG to abandon the process. The key concern we learned had to do with Woyome being compelled to disclose how he spent our money because the answer to that question would reveal the names of all the persons who benefitted from the money. What we did not believe at the time was that the very next day after our statement, the Attorney General would so easily cave in to the pressure and abandon probably the only option left to Ghana to recover OUR MONEY from Woyome’ (ModernGhana, 2016). In addition, Dr. Radha Hackman, while explaining the role #OccupyGhana played in the Woyome scandal, held that ‘There was this big scandal about Woyome for example, a name you might have heard of. We demanded information to help us get a clear position. Oblivious they (government) were not forthcoming with the information and that will sometimes compel us to go to court or at least let them (government) know that the option of court was one of the options available to us’ (Personal Interview, June 7, 2018, Accra).

Although the Supreme Court finally ordered Mr. Alfred Woyome to refund the GHc51 million mistakenly paid to him by the government of Ghana (CitiFM, 2016), there is no doubt that the pressure from #OccupyGhana in challenging the judgement and decision of the state (Attorney General), and enlightening the public contributed to the positive outcome. The engagement between the movement and the government by requesting detailed information and compelling the state to release the required information using litigation, in no doubt, has assisted in the drive to bring about social change in governance in Ghana. From the above, by shedding light on these corrupt activities of the state and briefing citizens on the outcome of court proceedings on their Facebook page, the movement attracts comments from citizens. Therefore,

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#OccupyGhana is decentralising the structure of political communication in Ghana, as citizens are aware of sensitive information that could be hidden from the public. Therefore, creating and fostering affirmative publics (Papacharissi, 2015) that are politically aware and could contribute to the democratic sphere by propagating these narratives from the movements and assist in holding leaders accountable, as citizens amplify these narratives by using these social media platforms, thereby questioning the power structures of society (Cohen & Kahne, 2012). Furthermore, #OccupyGhana has insisted on a change to the allowances paid to board and council members across Ghana’s public service. According to #OccupyGhana, there is a need to streamline the basis on which board members receive allowances for meetings and engage in their functions. In a statement released on May 20, 2018, the movement states the functions of board members and board chairs, and their primary responsibility to the organisation. The statement further mentioned the nature of the relationship that should exist between board members and the chief executive official and his team within an organisation, and frown at some board members seeing their appointments as financial gains and opportunities to receive monthly payments and other allowances (OccupyGhana, 2018). Using sections of the law within Ghana, the movement reminded board members of their duties and called on the state to take action against abuse of power. The call was successful, as the government issued a directive to the public service banning monthly payments and allowances to board members and charged board members to operate within the ambit of the law and to have a good coexisting relationship with state corporations executives (https://www.facebook.com/ OccupyGhana/posts/2235020039902104?__tn__=K-­R). Therefore, reiterate the relationship between #OccupyGhana and the Ghanaian state in their quest to promote good governance and bring about social change in public service. Not only has #OccupyGhana demanded accountability from the state, but it has also demanded accountability from other state actors, such as the mass media, questioning their operations and raising salient ethical issues within their activities. For instance, on November 25, 2015, #OccupyGhana issued a statement questioning journalists’ practice of taking ‘soli’,11 the impact this practice has on news standards, and distancing itself from the practice. According 11  Soli in Ghana refers to money handed to journalists to come to press briefings. It is used for transportation and has become a norm for journalists in Ghana.

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to #OccupyGhana, ‘The issue of soli is wrong and unethical, and hence they would never support the act. This resulted in the low turnout of some journalists in subsequent events and reporting of OccupyGhana’s activities’ (http://www.occupygh.org/story/november-­point-­out-­auditor-­ general-­flaws/). From the above statement, it can be inferred that #OccupyGhana was prepared to suffer the consequence of no media coverage of their activities due to their principal of not giving soli. As Porta and Mosca (2005) argue, without media coverage activism is as good as dead, as such coverage is needed to sell the movement and its cause to the public. In other words, without media coverage, social movements or digital activism will be nonexistent, as communication and information are central in any activism and in the struggle for the human mind; refer to Chap. 1, where this has been addressed in depth. The impact of ‘soli’ on democratic culture and journalism cannot be overemphasised. According to Akpojivi (2018a) and Nyamnjoh (2005), democracy thrives on information for citizens to make informed decisions, and this is endangered in the practice of soli or brown envelopes. Nyamnjoh (2005), while highlighting the impact of bribe ‘soli’ in journalism, posits that such practices do not help advance good governance, as such practices would enable news stories about government officials to be distorted. Likewise, Akpojivi (2018a) posited that the practice of collecting soli in Ghana affects not only the development and growth of the media but also the socioeconomic, political and cultural development of Ghana. As journalists won’t be truthful to their profession due to the inducement from soli, and such inducement will hinder the media from living up to its responsibility of being watchdog and Fourth Estate of the realm. Aiseng and Akpojivi (2019) further added that this watchdog role empowers the media to assist other civil societies in promoting accountability and good governance in society. Therefore, #OccupyGhana picking on this issue shows that they recognise the place of the media in fostering Ghana’s development, hence the need to critique such practice and not encourage it themselves. By so doing, they might encourage other social movements and civil societies to abstain from such practices, hence bringing about social change. These are some of the issues12 that #OccupyGhana has used in demanding social change, and reorienting public service officials toward being 12  #OccupyGhana since its inception have been involved in numerous accountability issues with the public service. It will be practically impossible to discuss every issue, but the purpose of this section is just to discuss some selected cases and use it to show how the movement is pressing/demanding social change in Ghana.

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accountable to the public and promoting transparency within operations. Despite the achievements of #OccupyGhana, Dr. Radha Hackman posited that real social change can occur in Ghana when everyone uses whatever medium is available to them to voice their concerns about the day-to-day running of the country. According to her, One of our missions, like I said, is to try and get other members of the society to understand that they have a voice and to actually try to empower them to use their voices and tools available to them to bring about change. Like I said, we are just a small group of occupiers and need other people who are like-minded to demand accountability in Ghana. You see what Anas is doing now with his investigative videos on corruption, yeah. I think we want to encourage people in their own ways to use tools available to them. When they see something that is wrong in society just say it. If there is anything you can do right, just do, and say it. (Personal Interview, June 7, 2018, Accra).

This assertion juxtaposes Mare’s (2014) argument that social media is the ‘new protest drum’ in Africa, as citizens not only build affective bonding but communicate, mobilise, and amplify discourses from these platforms in seeking good governance and accountability. Additionally, the above assertion highlights that social change is a process and can only happen when people are involved, i.e., civic society, to know and demand accountability by using available tools such as new media technologies including Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, etc., to hold public officials accountable. This means one does not have to be ‘connected’ to a social movement or organisation before he/she can be involved. The collective participation of all in their respective spaces and platforms will facilitate social change in Ghana. Although this idea might be disputed because it does not promote collective resources to achieve social change (Castells, 2009), it has nevertheless been effective in other instances in bringing about social change. It recognises the powers of individuals within a society who have responsibilities of contributing to the socioeconomic, political and cultural developments of society. For example, before the formation of #OccupyFlagStaff House and #OccupyGhana, Dr. Radha Hackman, who is an active member of #OccupyGhana, played a salient role in Ghana’s first H1N1 flu incident and in the fight to rid Ghana of it, and in demanding the state’s readiness for the Ebola crisis, which was successful. As Brigitte Dzogbenuku puts it:

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Radha Hackman is a doctor, she has her own little set up at a private clinic but she is in Occupy and she probes the health issues. When we (Ghana) were at risk of Ebola when other countries were suffering from Ebola, and our government was sitting doing nothing, or seemed not to be doing anything about it. She took it upon herself to put in measures, asking questions and demanding answers from the government. (Personal Interview, June 6, 2018, Accra).

Dr. Radha Hackman’s individual activism in ensuring that basic facilities needed to curb the Ebola virus and HINI flu from the state led to her being involved in the wider spectrum of activism within #OccupyGhana. This participatory politics enabled by new media technologies (Cohen & Kahne, 2012) enabled her to challenge the state on their health strategy for protecting citizens. According to her ‘my fight with the deputy minister of health on Facebook on our preparedness for the Ebola crisis after the ugly incident of HINI flu that happened at my clinic… In fact, that’s what led to proper activism which led me going to OccupyFlagStaff House’. (Personal Interview, June 7, 2018, Accra). This juxtaposes the power of individual activism and its ability to bring about change in society.

Conclusion The place of #OccupyGhana in strengthening Ghana’s public service by enforcing accountability and transparency cannot be overemphasised. The movement has been at the forefront of ensuring that corruption and maladministration are a thing of the past in Ghana by using available resources (legal instruments) and social media to hold state officials accountable. This has not been a smooth process without its problems, as the government responded to the activities of the movement by going after its members. According to Dr. Radha Hackman: As a member of OccupyGhana because of maybe the things we said and the things we achieved in exposing certain things, for example, we did feel threatened. A lot of our members felt threatened as there were few cases where members will actually find their car tyres bot loosened from their tyres. Some other members felt they were being followed, they felt that conversations were been tapped… Personally, I remember after and it may be coincidence I truly do not know but after OccupyFlagStaff House dem-

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onstration which was in July. For the first time ever in August I had people from IRS (Internal Revenue Service) here to do an audit to look through our books. I have been in private practice for 26 years. At that time, it had never happened, it had never never, never, never, happened to have IRS come here and look through my books. I got penalised for some omission. They said I haven’t charged the right amount. I was withholding tax for my staff. I paid what the law said. They said that a staff had a second job elsewhere the PAYE should have been higher but that is for IRS to do and not me. Anyway they fined me, I paid, and I moved on that was what happened (Personal Interview, June 7, 2018, Accra).

Actions from social movements have always elicited a response from the state, and such a response, whether violent or nonviolent, such as in this case, the use of IRS, shows that the movement was considered a threat by the state whose actions had to be curtailed. While there was no evidence to suggest violent criminalisation of the movement using state security forces, as was the case for #BringBackOurGirls and #OurMumuDonDo of Nigeria during their activism, the use of IRS or monitoring of activists suggests a more subtle form of criminalisation by the state against the movement. Such criminalisation speaks of the control of ideology between the movement and state in the struggle for human/citizen minds, which is pivotal in any activism or communication process (Castells, 2009; Cohen & Kahne, 2012). Despite these, #OccupyGhana has continued to live by its principle of promoting good governance, accountability and transparency within government, hence endearing the movement to the public. However, the classism associated within the movement and the use of the ‘middle class’ tag by the movement question the overall objectives of the movement. The use of classism, to a large extent, has excluded ordinary Ghanaians, who might not have the status of ‘middle class’, from participating in the activities of the movement. Therefore, affording some members of the movement the opportunity to pursue their individual interests within the movement. Such interests reveal the complex relationship between the nonpartisan nature of the movement and the partisan nature of these members. Therefore, the perception by the state and some section of the public that #OccupyGhana’s quest for accountability is driven by the personal interest of selected few to attain political positions within the state.

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CHAPTER 5

The Politics of Performance by Social Movements in Africa

This chapter seeks to examine and theorise the internal workings of the case studies of #OurMumuDonDo, #BringBackOurGirls, #FeesMustFall and #OccupyGhana discussed in the previous Chaps. 2–4 and interrogate the politics and dynamics of these movements, that is, the micropolitics and ideologies within the movements, and how these movements embraced politics of performance in conveying their ideologies in their engagement with other stakeholders and in the process of bringing about social change. It is important to examine the micropolitics within social media and their impact on the broader movement’s engagement because society’s understanding of the movement is based on these micropolitics and their activities. Yates (2015) argues that this micropolitics has been influential in the discussions of contemporary movement activities and how society consumes or perceives the movement. This will determine the strategy, tactics and culture of the movement in their orientation towards social change. As the ability of social movements to achieve social change is determined by the nature of performance, whether as individuals, and the political effect of the performance, Rai (2014) posited that performance matters to politics. Additionally, there have been contestations as to how this kind of micropolitics, which I refer to in the context of this study as the ‘politics of performance’, can be regarded as new forms of politics embedded within institutions and their engagement with the state or new ways in which protest is enacted and performed (Yates, 2015). This has become © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 U. Akpojivi, Social Movements and Digital Activism in Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30207-7_5

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necessary, as most studies of social movements and new media tend to argue or posit that social movements and new media present new dynamics of politics, politics of accessibility, equality and collective interest, which are believed to be different from the normative politics of society and media. For instance, Mutsvairo (2016), Mudhai (2013), Castells (2004), and Assange (2014), among others, talked about the ‘disruptive power’ of social movements and new media, and the ability of citizens to ‘speak back to power’ and facilitate the socioeconomic, political and cultural developments of society. One common characteristic among their arguments is that there is a new kind of politics that has emerged within social movements and the usage of new media. However, I argue within this chapter that despite the disruptive power of new media, the kind of politics being played within these movements is not entirely ‘new’ or different from the normative politics of mainstream media and society. Using Yates’ (2015) ideas, I argue that this politics of performance is one of the new ways in which social movements engage with the state and other stakeholders in bringing about social change. This performance is vital in understanding politics and social change within the prism of social movements (Yates, 2015). Additionally, the tactics ‘spectacle or performance’ of these social movements are not different from the tactics used by normative organizations or politicians to attract attention from the public and media (Rohlinger et  al., 2012). Goodman (2000) states that this tactic—theatre—is used as a form of expression over daily political issues and life. Therefore, in contemporary activism in societies, there is a relationship between the politics and aesthetics of these movements behind activism. Activists and social movements need this performance, as such a performance is central to communicating their ideas to the public (Rai, 2014), which is essential in the struggle for the human minds. In addition, the chapter will argue that these movements actively play the ‘politics of performance’ to the gallery of the public, which Baz Kershaw (1992) calls the ‘theatre, or avant-garde theatre’, because their performance of resistance is political, and the theatre of such performance is likewise political because they are inseparable. However, such performance is often misconstrued to be neutral and different as such lenses or approaches tend to devoid the performance from the societal culture which, according to Kershaw (1992), is problematic. As such discourse tends to emphasize the ‘newness’ of order (see Wark, 2004), therefore ignoring the embodiment of these performances within the social structure of society, Schipper (1982) argues that such performance interprets

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societal reality, and such interpretation is usually political (Daniels, 2000). According to Kershaw (1992: 6), the performance of resistance or alternative theatre is embedded in societal culture, and ‘this culture is saturated with discourse of power, and as our chief example of performance aimed to change the audiences’ community and culture, we are dealing with a deeply political approach to theatre’. A cursory examination shows that this politics of performance is synonymous or not different from what is obtainable in mainstream media and society, as mainstream media politics is embedded in societal culture and thus similar. Therefore, I call for a nuanced discussion of how social movements’ micropolitics are played out and used as a new form of protest. Because, only a nuanced perceptive can give a true reflection and detail of social movements micropolitics and its broader implications as political tools in the African continent.

Performance and Ideological Spread Performance means different things to different people despite the certitude of any definition. Diamond (2000: 66) sees performance as ‘embodied acts, in specific sites, witnessed by others’. In other words, performance is about doing things and what is done, and people’s engagement and interpretation of ‘what is done’. McKenzie (2001) sees performance from the perspective of ‘power’ and ‘knowledge’. According to him, ‘individuals work and live only to enact performances dictated by others, performances are normalized according to the dictates of expediency and efficiency’ (2001 cited in Giannachi, 2007: 2). Such a perspective posits that performance is structured according to the needs and dictates of society, and such performance is usually tailored to be more effective and efficient. In addressing the social problem that facilitated such performance in the first place. The knowledge of societal ills and the need to address such ills will lead to performance from social actors to capture the problem and bring about change. Consequently, Giannachi (2007: 14) states that ‘information equals knowledge and knowledge equals real, concrete power’. To Kershaw (1992), performance is an ideological exchange or transaction between a performer and a community. This definition emphasizes the spread or exchange of ideas as a crucial aspect of performance. Relationships are built and sustained based on performance between the different actors.

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The perception and reception of such performance will lay the basis for such a relationship and determine whether such a relationship will be successful or not. Therefore, my usage of the word performance in this chapter revolves around Kershaw’s (1992) notion of ideological exchange because social movements exist to engage with state and other state actors over ideological and social issues. This ideological exchange is an everyday occurrence via communication to audiences. This communication, according to Rai (2014: 2), enables the public or audience to make meaning out of ‘state institutions, policies and discourses’. This meaning-making is read in very specific sociopolitical context; it can be either consolidative or challenging of the dominant narrative of politics’. Therefore, performance is part of everyday life at both the individual and institutional levels. According to Marranca (1981), while buttressing the above, performance is a ‘way of viewing everyday activity, and it does manifest itself in different ways. It could be in the form of ‘popular entertainment, speeches acts, folklore, political demonstration, conference behavior, rituals, medical and religious healing and aspects of everyday life …because it appears to cut across and renegotiate institutional boundaries’ (Diamond, 2000: 67). Marranca (1981:60), while extending this thought, stated that performance ‘encouraged as a therapeutic technique and used to describe the sexual activity, the operation of a car, a politician’s form, business management style. Media commentary is increasingly attuned to describing behavior in theatrical terms as if all human action was incapable of being anything other than artificial’. From this assertion, it can be argued that performance is laced with theatrical, aesthetics, and spectacle; thus, the notion of ‘embodiment’ characterizes every performance and social movement’s and activists’ practices due to the presence of these forms of performance in ‘social relations and decision making processes’ (Boggs 1977 cited in Yates, 2015: 2). Debord (2006), in his classic work titled Society of the Spectacle, argues that spectacle or performance should not be seen from the perspective of mere mass media technologies product but as a worldview that embodies the social relationship between people. This invariably means that spectacles or performance have become an integral part of societal culture, social structures and relationships, a position shared by Yates (2015). Hence, Marranca posited that ‘culture is infatuated with spectacle, communication is more and more conceived of as gesture. Language is losing its ability to express a collective belief, and performance is a private language that when acted out publicly evolves as imagery’ (1981: 60). Similarly, Goodman

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(2000) argues that these theoretical performances have a spectacular presence, meaning that every performance that might vary in nature and form usually has spectacles embedded in it, i.e., act, language, and form. Therefore, performance is a good strategy to communicate goals and objectives, as, without performance, the public might not resonate with the movement or be compelled to participate. Trevor Noah (2016), a South African comedian, while buttressing the above fact, stated that behind every activism, or protest, 90 percent is about performance, i.e., the spectacle, while 10 percent is about the social issue that gave birth to the performance. Giannachi (2007) substantiated the above by arguing that this performance is built around information, and it is also aesthetics. It is this aesthetic nature of performance that attracts people to the performance and makes them resonate with the message or communication. As the public is aware of such activism or political representation through performance (Rai, 2014), Kaye regards it as the spectacle because it is ‘at the level of the spectacle, the world of art and that of economics resolve into one another causing an excess, capital or surplus of information. This excess is where art is politically and aesthetically charged’ (2000  cited in Giannachi (2007: 3). This juxtaposes the idea that information is key to performance, therefore making it difficult to separate information and aesthetics from performance, as the overall objective of any performance is to communicate with the audience in an aesthetic way. Performance that does not communicate a message is invalid and irrelevant, because it is the message from the performance that makes it useful and relevant to the audience and the desire to partake or take action in addressing the social issues performed. According to Giannachi (2007), the principal objective of performance is to communicate information to society and the audience. The purpose of such communication is to push an ideological position and advocate for change. As ‘the heart of any text then is the possibility that the immediate and local effects of particular performance might-individual and collectively contribute to changes of this kind’ (Kershaw, 1992: 1). Change is only possible when such performance is able to connect with the ‘audience ideology or ideologies’ (ibid). Therefore, performance is a strategic tool for social movements and activists in their campaigns and in the facilitation of social changes. Because, performances communicate ideology and create identity, which society should be able to resonate with, and, to a large extent, the performance determines and influences social positioning ‘inscribed in the public

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imaginary’ (Rai, 2014: 1181). Therefore, there is a need to examine these performances and their adoption as a strategic tool for protests in communicating ideologies during protests. Within the examined cases of #OurMumuDonDo, #BringBack OurGirls, #FeesMustFall and #OccupyGhana examined in the previous chapters, all these movements and their protest actions are embedded in the ideologies of good governance, accountability, equality, transparency, and democracy for which the activists and the movements collectively agreed to live and advocate. They are the binding factor linking members of the movement, that is, principles of belief that are performed before the public to gain credibility and attract members (Kershaw, 1992). Kershaw (1992: 18) argues that ideology is ‘any system of more or less coherent values which enables people to live together in groups, communities, and societies, thus to the extent that performance deals in the values of its particular society, it is dealing with ideology’. This means that social movements or activists’ performances must always be laced with the values and ideologies around which they are built, and the performance of social movements is an ideological contestation over societal values. The values of any society are embedded in its ideology, as such values will determine the actions of state actors and nonstate actors, and the state will be judged based on its ability to uphold, live and sustain these values. For instance, values such as transparency, good governance, and democracy, among others, are considered pivotal to the growth and development of a society (Gqubule, 2017), and as discussed in the previous chapters, the absence of these values has resulted in human and societal development issues (see Myburgh, 2019; Ayittey 2005). These ideologies or values, according to Marx, are produced and ‘express the interest of the dominant class of society’ (cited in Kershaw, 1992: 19), who is considered the ‘cultural superstructure’ of society (Mullins, 1972), and these include political, economic, cultural and aesthetic values. Therefore, implying that the entire fabric of society is centered around ideology, and this ideology is pushed and promoted by the dominant ruling class, i.e., those with political and economic powers. These people have the means to decide on the ideological frame a society should adhere to or which counterideological beliefs should be used. Marx, while buttressing the above, argues that the ideology in society is produced by people with capital and resources, and every ruling class wants a theory that orients or promotes their interests (Drucker, 1972). From the examined cases, the

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ideologies of the movements were pushed by individuals with resources (capital, mental, and other human resources). Consequently, it can be argued that ideology is not value-free, and the ideology of any society is pushed or advanced by the ruling class with vested political, economic and cultural interests. For instance, the formation of social movements or the coming together of activists revolves around the ideological position they think can bring about social change in society. Their ideological position is not value-free but most often reflects their vested interests, whether political or economic (Fenton & Barassi, 2011). Gramsci (1971) posits that ‘dominant ideology operates within the interests of the ruling class’. Hence, there is a hegemonic flow of these ideologies, as the ruling class ensures that their ideologies are left unchallenged and remain as the ideal of ‘common sense’ (see Gramsci, 1971; Kershaw, 1992). However, the message from the performance of social movement or alternative theater can be interpreted differently by the audience due to the ideology of such performance (Kershaw, 1992). Drucker (1972) reasoned that due to the complexity of ideology and how it influences or shapes people’s thinking, there is bound to be a disagreement over ideology. This disagreement could lead to distortion of message meanings, as individuals are left unconscious in relation to social relations. For instance, as stated in Chap. 4, the distorted meaning citizens might ascribe to the Deputy Minister of Communication, George Nenyi Andah’s, resignation from #OccupyGhana once elected into public office. Bennett (1982: 48), while explaining this distortion, argues that ‘distortion is viewed not as the result of mendacity but as the effect of the action of the dominant social relationships which, although acting on the consciousness of individuals do so in a way that is profoundly unconscious thus far as they concerned’. That is, due to the contestation of ideologies (ideologies and counter-ideologies) among the different actors, people might ascribe different meanings to the messages being passed across, and such different interpretations might also be influenced by other inherent political, economic and cultural factors (Hall, 1980). Nevertheless, the different platforms through which the different ideologies are disseminated have allowed for this disagreement, as there is the competitiveness of ideologies, and this competitiveness has been facilitated by the mass media and new media technologies that are being used by social movements and the state. According to Della-Porta and Mosca (2005), technological innovation and its adaptation by social movements and activists have led to the spread of political messages and reaching out

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to people once excluded from society. Giannachi (2007: 2), on the other hand, argues that the politics of performance rest on ‘technology’. According to him, ‘technology, culture, and society do not operate separately but are intrinsically embedded in one another’. This makes technology a central tool in performance and in the spread of ideology because mainstream media controlled by the dominant power of the state might not allow counter-ideologies (Herman & Chomsky, 1994). Therefore, new media technology is an alternative space for communicating counterhegemonic ideologies. As Debord (2006) argues, technology has become the mediated space where needs are met due to the inherent values that are ascribed to technology. Goodman, while elaborating on the impact of technology on the spread of ideology, argues that performance is complicated due to the rise of technology that has facilitated mediated performance. According to him, we live in an era of ‘replayed culture’ in which technology has allowed a counter or alternative group (theatre) to quickly address issues from a dominant actor. They are able to use technology ‘to replay images and taped events’ (Goodman, 2000: 288). Consequently, this has affected and redefined performance and how it is carried out. According to Goodman, this replay culture from technology will, to a large extent, determine ‘what we do, how we choose to act and interact and spect-act, perform and play…will differ for each of us, at each moment and for many political and personal reasons’ (2000: 294). This means that activists and social movements have been empowered by the available technological tools to efficiently and quickly respond to pressing issues and use technology to enhance their performance for digital activism. This is evident in the activities of social movements that have emerged on the African continent. For instance, during the #OurMumuDonDo, #FeesMustFall, and #BringBackOurGirls protests, these movements used technologies instantly to perform and respond to the brutalisation from the state security agencies. Their performances were demonstrated through aural, visual and behavioural figuration that sought to make claims towards power. While this is good for the advancement of the movement by reaching out to people and countering any ideology that is not in their interest, this reply culture and technology has posed a serious challenge to social movements and activists. Goodman (2000: 290), while attesting to this struggle, posits that the struggle confronting performers today is the battle to connect the ‘real and the virtual, with ways of making work which is informed by knowledge of new media and respect for more traditional and visceral live art practices’.

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This means there is the challenge of using technology to bridge the disconnect between the offline realities of society and the online realities of new media technology. How can the knowledge of the potential of new media technologies be harnessed effectively to address societal problems and bring about social change during such performance? Additionally, to what extent can the performance from a social movement be a true reflection of what the movement believes in and not just an act? Is micropolitics and performance a true reflection of the movement’s micropolitics? Kershaw (1992) argues that at the heart of any performance is the idea of whether such performance will bring about either an individual or collective change. Change at the ‘microlevel of individual and the macrolevel of the sociopolitical order of society’ (Kershaw, 1992). Therefore, expounding the idea that any form of performance should elicit some form of either ‘immediate’ or ‘ephemeral’ effect and change (ibid). However, Kershaw (1992) further added that it is difficult to accurately measure the influence any performance has on people and the ability to bring about change. This assertion is in line with the earlier position stated in Chap. 1 that social change is a process, and it’s not immediate but occurs over a period of time; and for social change to occur, it is dependent on social relationships, i.e., political, economic and cultural (Fenton & Barassi, 2011). This is what Kershaw (1992) referred to as ‘conditions of performance’, as, according to him, in the discourse of performance and social change, attention should be centered on the ‘conditions of performance’, as that is what will lead to an efficacious result. He further added that performance had been known to have been able to bring about change in society, and the potential of performance to bring about this change led to it being embraced by all. To him, ‘if performance is powerless to affect the sociopolitical future, why then has it been taken so seriously by the successive powers that be?’ (1992: 21). There is no doubt that performance has been embraced by all, i.e., politicians, activists, media, etc., in Sub-Saharan Africa, and this can be seen in all spheres. For example, in Nigeria, politicians have been known to embrace performance to reach out and have the sympathy of the public. For example, Senator Dino Meleya is known for singing and for his theatrical performance to communicate and address his opponents, and this phenomenon is common with other politicians. Likewise, similar performance of theater and spectacle was a common phenomenon during the presidency of Jacob Zuma in South Africa (De Waal, 2019), and the same is evident in Ghana. Edmondson (2007) posited that performance has become a common phenomenon in everyday life and politics in Africa.

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According to her, while drawing from the Tanzania experience, performance has become a wealth of strategy used by individuals and movements who used it as a tool of resistance. Therefore, the following section will examine how the different case studies of this book have adopted the politics of performance and interrogate whether the broader macropolitics of performance is separate from the realities of micropolitics. This is very important because the valuation of social movements and activists by the public is based on their authenticity (Walker & Stepick, 2019), and, over the years, there have been doubts about social movements’ causes and authenticity following reports of irreconcilable macro- and micropolitical performance. As practices (performance) and moral commitments are questioned due to perceived unrealness (see Carroll & Wheaton, 2009). Therefore, juxtaposing my argument for a nuanced reading of the politics of performance within social movements that recognizes the micropolitics within the broader macropolitics of performances.

Performance Politics Within Social Movements in Africa Festus came here after we talked about your problem, I asked Festus ‘do you believe in what I’m doing?’ He said yes. Therefore, I told him ‘because you don go follow these people, you no go fit support me?’ (Sahara Reporters, March 21, 2019)

On March 21, 2019, Nigerians woke up to the news all over social media and news platforms that the founder and face of the #OurMumuDonDo movement, Charles Oputa (known as Charly Boy), collected money from the campaign Spokesperson of President Muhammadu Buhari’s presidential campaign organization, Festus Keyamo, to discredit the presidential candidate of the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), Atiku Abubakar (Sahara Reporters, 2019). In addition, the news stated that he collected the sum, ranging over 9 figures, from the said presidential spokesperson (PM News, 2019). This news was received with outrage and criticism, as people not only questioned his brand of credibility discussed in Chap. 3, but also began to question social movements, activists, their ideologies, and the politics behind activism. These criticisms were dominant in the public domain because the news came to the limelight as a result of a leaked audiotape between Charles

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Oputa and Deji Adeyanju, a coconvener who was dissatisfied with the way Charles Oputa had been handling the affairs of the #OurMumuDonDo movement. Likewise, Charles Oputa accused Deji Adeyanju of ‘being a poster boy’ for the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) and their presidential candidate. These allegations and counterallegations between both members of the #OurMumuDonDo movement raise questions about the micropolitics within the movement, the kind of politics social movements play, and the theatrical performance of social movements during their campaigns. These questions are salient, as the above allegations and counterallegations go against the ideology of the #OurMumuDonDo movement, which calls for a new breed of politics devoid of the dominance of the APC and PDP, and corruption. The idea that the face and founder of the movement collected money from a political party to discredit another political party questions the ideologies of a new breed of politics and the need to promote accountability and transparency in government. Additionally, the criticism raises Carroll and Wheaton’s (2009: 255) concerns about social movements’ authenticity. The moral authenticity- if decisions taken are a ‘sincere reflect choices (i.e., choices true to one’ self) rather than social scripted response’, and type authenticity ‘where the question involves whether an entity is true to its associated type (or category or genre)’. As Kershaw (1992: 18) puts it, ‘ideology is more or less coherent values which enable people to live together in groups, communities and societies’, and the ideology of the #OurMumuDonDo movement of promoting good governance, transparency and accountability were what brought different people together in order to press for a new Nigeria. However, the accusation of enrichment against the face/founder of the movement questions not only the basis of the movement but also the motive (interests) of its existence, and whether the movement has been authentic in its beliefs and causes, which are enacted through their performance before the public (Walker & Stepick, 2019). It shows that the performance of the movement discussed in Chap. 2, i.e., social contract, resume or resign, freedom of media, amongst others, and their ideologies, weren’t different from the normative performance of society and ideology of society. This can best be understood within Bayart’s (2009) notion of the politics of the belly in which elites in society use their resources mainly from the proliferation of bribery to enrich themselves and support the ruling class or political system. Therefore, it can be argued that while the movement and its members were insisting on promoting good governance, on the other hand, it

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was a tool for enriching some and advancing the interest of the ruling class and political structure in Nigeria. Consequently, the public outcried and criticized the movement. Hence, the National Secretary of the #OurMumuDonDo movement, Raphael Adebayo, released a statement that: It is with a heavy and pertinent heart that I offer an unreserved apology on behalf of myself and other members of the OurMumuDonDo movement to the Nigerian People whom we have hitherto proclaimed to represent in all our actions and activities as a pressure group for the last 3 years. My sincere hope is that you will view this development as a necessary event needed to sanitise our civic space and reinvigorate our collective commitment to the struggle for social change (Sahara Reporters, 2019b).

The above statement questions the symbolic exchange between the face of the movement and a state actor that has resulted in delinquency in the moral character of the movement and its authenticity (Carroll & Wheaton, 2009). Additionally, the call to sanitise the civic space of social movements highlights the fact that social movements in Nigeria suffer from trust and authenticity issues (Walker & Stepick, 2019) due to issues of corruption, and have been used by certain actors to push certain ideologies and agendas to protect and promote their vested selfish interests. According to Carroll and Wheaton (2009), movements have sociopolitical, economic and cultural authenticity, which is ‘almost sacred’ and ‘value’. However, such authenticity can easily be lost or abused when collective interests are neglected for vested individual interests. Fenton and Barassi (2011) alluded to the politics of individualisation within social movements, and this individualised interest is wrapped, presented and performed as the collective interest or ideology. Therefore, to realign the movement to its original objectives, Raphael Adebayo announced the sacking of Charles Oputa from the movement. According to him, this was necessary to ‘save the movement from public ridicule and unfortunate collapse following the allegations of bribe-taking involving him (Charles Oputa) and the spokesperson of Buhari campaign organization, Festus Keyamo’ (The Nigerian Voice, 2019). This attempt might be seen as a way of saving the movement from being embroiled into normative Nigerian politics or ideologies of corruption and using movements to advance self-interest, and to restore the reputation of the movement and the public’s support. According to Keck and Sikkink (1998), it is

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invaluable for social movements to build and maintain their reputation based on moral principles and ideologies, as this will help in the attainment or gaining of public trust. Nevertheless, the events that followed further cast doubts and further established the politics of performance. Charles Oputa not only accused Raphael Adebayo and Deji Adeyanju and other elements within the movement of trying to steal the movement that he established from him  but also made a dramatic u-turn claiming he never collected money from anybody (Kabir, 2019). According to Charles Oputa, ‘for someone to believe that I collected money in nine digits from a politician is laughable…..some persons are bent on denting the brand that I have built over the years, but I am not deterred because the struggle for a better Nigeria must continue, and my mouth cannot be shut….. I decided to play along and understand if Mr. Adeyanju the person whom I called son will believe the rumours’ (Kabir, 2019). Such an assertion reveals that, within the movement, there were micropolitics of which ideological position the movement should take or follow and how the movement should be run. The refusal of Charles Oputa to resign from the movement led to the national secretaries Raphael Adebayo and Deji Adeyanju resigning from the movement with others. Such a refusal to resign to restore and gain public trust attests to the individualisation and personalization of the movement around Charles Oputa discussed in Chap. 2. Such personalization was meant to capitalise on his resources, that is, brand and followers, to the movement’s cause, and this is reflected in the performance of the movement’s activities through songs, protest march, etc. For example, in the official song of the movement composed and released by the face and founder of the movement, Charles Oputa. The song, which is sang in Pidgin English, which is the most spoken language by both the educated and uneducated, raises consciousness on issues affecting Nigerians. Below are the lyrics of the song: Everyday the light dey worse oo Government people dey lie to us oo Poor man dey die, e nor consign them Our Children dey die, e nor consign them All they want na to chop all the money Their dey do big party, politicians nor send anybody Omo they nor send o Ourmumu e dey do

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This life nor be life o Ourmumu e don do This people na wicked people Ourmumu e don do This life nor be life Ourmumu e don do This people nor wicked people Ourmumu e don do The preacher preach nonsense E say make dey fall. Their dey fall E say make dey shift, their dey shift E say make dey chop, their dey chop E say make dey pay, their dey pay Ourmumu e don do This life nor be life oo Ourmumu e don do This people na wicked people Ourmumu e don do This lie nor be life o Ourmumu e don do (OurMumuDonDo Song, 2017).

From the lyrics of the song and the video, there is performance tapping into the everyday realities of the ordinary Nigerian. This performance entails addressing the socioeconomic, political and cultural issues confronting the country, and using Charles Oputa as the singer, it seeks to achieve some form of credibility as his style of music resonates with the public, this is despite the controversies that have shrouded him over the years. The lyrics of the song show that socioeconomic issues of poverty, the failure of the government in addressing the needs of citizens, the corruption that characterized the Nigerian state, and the failure of the state to provide basic facilities/amenities were emphasized. According to Chari (2016: 21), music has always been used to ‘give messages about everyday life’ and realities through the vocalisation of aspiration and concerns of contemporary society. Societal struggles and challenges are encapsulated in the lyrics of music, and these lyrics become a tool for advocating for social change. The lyric of the #OurMumuDonDo movement reflects the everyday struggle of Nigerians from the failure of the state in addressing the developmental needs of the country, exploitation of the state and religious organization of the citizens, thus communicating the ideology of the movement. Therefore, it can be argued that the song embodies

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performance, as the song deals with power relations and the culture of society, and seeks to change the mindset of the public. The primary purpose of any performance by social movements or activists is to contest with the power saturated in culture (Kershaw, 1992). As Kershaw (1992: 6) describes, ‘culture is saturated with the discourse of power, and as our chief examples of performance aimed to change the audiences’ community and culture, we are dealing with a deeply political approach to theatre’. Invariably, performance is central to correcting or addressing deep political, economic and cultural issues affecting societies. Consequently, Kershaw (1992) posited that it has become a common phenomenon among alternative social movements that use performance to become ‘popular’ in subverting values. The popularity of performance among social movements in Nigeria cannot be overemphasized, as almost every movement, such as #OccupyNigeria, #ChildNotBride, and #NotToYoungToRule, among others, has embraced performance. Nevertheless, such performances raise a fundamental question as to why there is a gap between the macropolitics performance and the micropolitics within the movement. As, they do not align due to moral authenticity issues as earlier state. Within public spaces, there is the performance of good governance, accountability and transparency, but inwards, there are allegations of corruption, double standards, and striving over ideological position. Such striving resulted in the resignation of key members of the movement and the seeming impression that the movement was not working, as there were no campaign activities following the allegation against Charles Oputa, although Charles Oputa released songs during the period. Additionally, one is left wondering why the dramatic u-turn by Charles Oputa in dismissing earlier claims in the recording that he received 9 figures from the presidential spokesman? The extent to which such performance is used for self-motives or in advancing the cause of the movement is unknown. However, it can be argued that the performance surrounding these events shows that sometimes social movement politics are embedded in the normative politics of society, that is, the politics of the belly. The normative politics of the Nigerian state are the politics of ‘bribery’, the politics of individual contestation, and the politics of ‘spectacle’, which filter every sphere of society. Thus, it is difficult to separate the politics of social movements from the politics of society, as the same cultural ideologies of ‘bribery’ and ‘individualisation’ that characterized society are evident within the #OurMumuDonDo movement.

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Likewise, this performance could also be seen in the #BringBackOurGirls movements that were deeply embedded in performance. The performance of the movement could be seen in the spectacle that characterized the movement’s actions and inactions, i.e., wearing red clothes/dresses, street protest, use of protest cards, in their speeches and addresses to the public. According to Olutokunbo et  al. (2015), the performance on the street was pivotal to the success of the movement, attracting both national and global attention to the salient issues confronting the Nigerian state, i.e., insecurity and feminism debates. In addition, the most visible performance of the #BringBackOurGirls movement is the decision to use/wear red attire during meetings. Olutokunbo et al. (2015: 69), while buttressing the above, state that the ‘mass social mobilization rally by a group of women in red color material expresses, the consciousness of the danger the abducted girls are in’. There is no doubt that there is an intersection between the color ‘red’ and the movement’s performance, as the movement capitalized on the general perception that red signifies danger to support their campaign to appeal to the emotions and consciousness of the public. In addition, one common strategy of the performance used to appeal to the emotion and consciousness of the public is the use of pictures of the abducted schoolgirls. For instance, during the 5th year anniversary of the abducted girls, the movement placed 112 school desks with the names of the abducted girls on the desk at Unity Fountain, the venue of their usual meetings to symbolise the girls that were taken from their educational institution, see Fig. 5.1 below (https://www.facebook.com/bringbackourgirls/photos/ a.218484111695963/1100203693523996/?type=3&theater). Such public display of school desk will easily bring to remembrance the idea that not all abducted schoolgirls have been freed, as some 112 students are still in captivity, and this will lead to renewed pressure on the government by the public to act. Such performance, according to Olutokunbo et  al. (2015: 66), shows the hopelessness and despair over the missing schoolgirls, and the fact that ‘young energetic schoolgirls with ages below twenty years that went to school with the dream that one day they will become doctors, engineers, lawyers, bankers, lecturers’ (Olutokunbo et al., 2015: 66), etc., has been cut short. Furthermore, the performance of the public display of desks speaks of the failure of the government in protecting school children who are now most vulnerable to the activities of kidnappers, bandits, etc. Rai (2014) argues that these kinds of performances are instrumental in resisting and shifting power

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Fig. 5.1  BBOG display of school desks on the 5th Anniversary of BBOG. Source: (https://www.facebook.com/bringbackourgirls/photos/a.218484111695963/ 1100203693523996/?type=3&theater)

relations, as the political legitimacy of the state is called into question. The display of the desks encapsulates such a legitimacy battle between the state and the movement, as the primary functions of the state in safeguarding the lives of her citizens and freedom of choice (to study, movement, etc.), as stated in the constitution, are being interrogated. Similarly, Olutokunbo et  al. (2015), while emphasizing the performance of #BringBackOurGirls, stated that the movement used pictures of the abducted schoolgirls and pictures of their protests to raise issues and draw the attention of the public to the need for social change. Most of these pictures have people holding placards with #BringBacrkOurGirls written on them or showing the violence of the state towards them. For instance, in Fig. 5.2, the coconvener is seen with a fist despite being teargassed by the Nigerian security force. This photo was uploaded on the movement Facebook account. This performance of resistance,

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Fig. 5.2  Coconvener Aisha Yesufu inhaling teargas from the Nigerian security force. Source: https://www.facebook.com/bringbackourgirls/photos/a.21848 4111695963/853515444859490/?type=3&theater)

determination for a better Nigeria despite opposition from the state, is used to communicate the oppression of the state towards the movement, their ideology, and their leaders. This, according to Edmondson (2007), shows that ‘dominant and dominated via for power within the same cultural space’. Edmondson, while substantiating the above using Mbembe’s (2001) notions of intimate and convivial in his classic work titled On the Postcolony, posited that the state and people bargain for power and that such bargaining entails using strategies to survive. Therefore, the usage of this photo and many others on their Facebook account and website could be seen as a survival strategy in a climate of oppression, i.e., the official culture and counterculture between the state and the social movements. Rai (2014: 3) argues that social movements in their performance ‘harness material bodies, rituals and ceremonies, sounds and voices with great effort and labour to generate a political syntax that is both accepted and challenged by different audiences; and how the interaction between performance and its reception generate politics’. By uploading images of resistances and missing schoolgirls, the #BringBackOurGirls movement is creating a syntax calling for social changes on issues confronting the Nigerian state (Akpojivi, 2020). Harding (2002) posits that

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‘performance in Africa lies the seeds of drama’, in other words, the act of any performance is drama as there are the features of the display, communication, costuming with the intent of spectatorship, and with the different strategies of #BringBackOurGirls, they have been able to do that, i.e., attract spectatorship and audiences (Akpojivi, 2020). This is in line with Banham and Wake’s (1976) argument that the purpose of any performance goes beyond just entertainment, i.e., the spectacle, but to communicate with the audience and make them take action(s) that will bring about social change. Although the success of the #BringBackOurGirls in relation to this social change is debatable as discussed in Chap. 2, the intersection between performance and campaigns, i.e., advocating for social change, cannot be ignored. As the movement has mastered the art of performance. This could be seen in the oratory of the leaders, the images uploaded on social media (Facebook and the website of the movement), and how these are used to communicate the problems confronting the Nigerian state and counter the ideologies of the state despite their criminalization. For instance, in one of the events that I attended on June 12, 2018, the co-­ convener Aisha Yesufu not only sang revolutionary songs but also gave a speech that highlighted the failures of President Buhari’s government and how his government is a threat to the democratic sustenance of the country, despite the heavy presence of security forces. However, some social critics have claimed that some members of the movement, such as co-­ founder Hadiza Bala Usman, have used the performance of the movement for personal gains, such as being appointed as managing director  of Nigeria’s Port Authority (NPA), and received funds on behalf of the movement during the 2015 general election to support the then opposition party (APC) in discrediting the ruling party and their handling of the kidnapped girls (Sahara Reporters, 2020). The case is not different in Ghana, as the politics of performance and spectacle could be seen in their messages on both Facebook and media shows. This performance is wrapped around the ‘us’ vs ‘them’ discourses, i.e., ‘us’ the members are corrupt free, good citizens, elites or middle class that have the interests of the general public at heart and seeking for a better Ghana, as against ‘them’ (government) who are corrupt, abuse power and not willing to allow transparency, accountability, and good governance. Therefore, they promote identity politics built around ideology (Probyn, 2015), as they affirm their actions against the state. As previously mentioned, performance is all about ideology and counter ideology, as

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movements use performance to spread their ideology. Within this identity space of being pro-good governance, accountability and transparency that #OccupyGhana has established as the basis of its relationship with the state (see Rai, 2014), it therefore makes #OccupyGhana a key player in the fight against corruption and the promotion of accountability and transparency in Ghana. Edmondson (2007), citing Mbembe (2001), posited that the resistance of social movements should be understood within the ‘dynamics of domesticity and familiarity’. Mbembe argued that there is a system relationship between the state and the public for power. According to Mbembe, in postcolonial states, power play is evident and affects every circumstance of everyday life (cited in Probyn, 2015). This power play leads to what Mbembe calls the ‘banality of power’ in which ‘the champions of the state power invent entire constellations of ideas; they select a distinct set of cultural repertoires and powerfully evocative concept’ (1992: 4). Additionally, Mbembe argues that the banality of power is exercised through the routines of the state, i.e., their direct actions and gestures (1992: 3). In most post-colonial states, the ideology governing the state is championed by the state, and social movements and other actors are in contestation with the state over such an ideology that is showcased or expressed in the government’s actions and gestures. In the case of Ghana, it can be argued that the routine and gesture of the state in addressing serious corruption and scandals gave the impression that the state promotes the ideologies of corruption and mismanagement that are being challenged by #OccupyGhana in their various performances. Therefore, this has led to a ‘dialectical relationship’ between both parties, i.e., the state and #OccupyGhana. This dialectical relationship, to a large extent, influenced the performance of the movement as not only was the movement calling out corrupt practices but distinguishing itself as an advocate for a corrupt free society and enforcers of the rule of law. This could be seen in the different performative campaigns of the movement where the state is accused of perpetuating corruption and allowing corruption to thrive, and the failure for them ‘the movement’ to act will see the status quo continuing. They have ascribed the title of ‘watchdog’ and ‘enforcer’ of good governance and accountability to themselves, consequently shaping their relationship with the state. This could be seen in their website, which stated that ‘OccupyGhana will continue to exist as a watchdog to hold all elected governments accountable for their actions…..we will ensure that government uses its mandate to

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deliver good governance’ (OccupyGhana, 2019). Consequently, their performance is rooted in this ‘watchdog’ and ‘enforcer’ identity phenomenon, for instance, during the Woyome scandal (discussed in Chap. 4) in which the movement was constantly performing, i.e., requesting information from the attorney general and the threat of going to court. Similar performance could be seen in the movement’s call on the Auditor General to disallow illegal expenditure and to press charges against those that have been involved in such illegal expenditure in accordance with the constitution. The movement went to court on November 12, 2014, to force the Auditor General to exercise her constitutional powers, which have been ignored since independence. Such performance resulted in a Supreme Court judgment on June 14, 2017, mandating the Auditor General to exercise her powers in disallowing fraudulent transactions and press charges against those involved in such financial transactions. According to #OccupyGhana, this singular performance of going to court and the resultant judgment has saved the country 5.4 billion Ghana Cedis. The movement stated that: by the last Auditor General Report from 30th November 2018, the exercise of this power to disallow since the judgement and the installation of this present Auditor General in 2016 has saved Ghana the net total of GHS 5,445,676,134.53 (5.4 billion Ghana Cedis)-monies that some government officials fraudulently claimed was owed on various government contracts, but which had already been paid. Furthermore, through his surcharging and recovery efforts, the Auditor General has retrieved GHS67,137,517.86 (67 million Ghana Cedis). (OccupyGhana, 2019b)

Such a statement tends to establish the effectiveness of the performance strategy of the movement and validate its authenticity and identity as promoters of good governance and accountability, as the performance of #OccupyGhana has resulted in such massive savings, consequently addressing a fundamental problem that has consistently characterized the Ghanaian state right from independence. The #FeesMustFall movement was built around performance, i.e., songs, protest, nude protest and confrontation with the police. The performances embraced by the students are not new forms of performance, as performance has always been embedded within protests in South Africa (see Peterson, 2016). For instance, the 1976 Soweto protest in which students were protesting against the apartheid state against Afrikaans as a medium of instruction was laced with performance from both the students and the state. Consequently, Gillespie and Naidoo (2019: 193) argue that

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the protesting students from #FeesMustFall ‘were not scared to borrow tactics from the more radical tendencies of the anti-apartheid struggles, sing its songs with updated lyrics, and call out black parliamentarian, government officials, and police for having sold out the struggle for liberation’. The students used performance to show their struggles—imbalance power play between them, the university management, and the state. Such performance was labelled by the university management as ‘spectacle’, meant to solicit empathy and emotions. According to Adam Habib, the Vice-Chancellor of Wits University, ‘what worried me about a lot of the reflections on FeesMustFall is how people just did not know what happened. There was a lot of rhetoric; there was a lot of emotion’ (cited in EWN, 2019). This rhetoric from the performance is not only to convey their stand on the issues of free education and a decolonized university but to engage with the audience. According to Rai, performance ‘has to be representative of a particular political stand, it must engage the audience that is its particular target, it should satisfy the formal rules, rituals, and conventions of the institutions through which the meaning is being projected, and be received as logical and coherent’ (2014: 1180). Therefore, the #FeeMustFall movement used both linguistic and nonlinguistic forms of performance to embody their acts, i.e., demonstrate, and mobilize other people to join them in their campaign. For example, the decolonized African national anthem, senzeni na? Meaning what have we done? The lyrics of the song (see below for the lyrics) speak of the suffering of the Blackman and the pain of being black in one’s own country. IsiZulu original             English translation Senzeni na senzeni na        What have we done, what have we done? Senzeni na senzeni na        What have we done, what have we done? Senzeni na senzeni na        What have we done, what have we done? Senzeni na Kulomhlaba? What have we done in this country? Amabhunu azizinja         Boers are dogs Amabhunu azizinja         Boers are dogs Amabhunu azizinja         Boers are dogs Amabhunu azizinja         Boers are dogs

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Kuyisono ‘kubamnyama       It’s a sin to be black Kuyisono ‘kubamnyama       It’s a sin to be black Kuyisono ‘kubamnyama       It’s a sin to be black Kuyisono kulelizwe         It’s a sin in this country.

The above song, which is an old anti-apartheid struggle song used by the students and danced to during their protests and shutdown of the university, transcends just music but is a reflection of their pains, hopes, and aspirations. According to Ndlovu (2017a: n/p), while buttressing the above, ‘there is something about music that transcends entertainment in times of struggle. It not only becomes what unites people, it also becomes their voice because they are unable to speak. In music is found the aspirations, hopes, pain, and joys of a people’. This song echoes the rhetoric of helplessness, and this rhetoric was used in almost all of their protests. For instance, the nude protest by three ladies (see Fig. 5.3) in confronting the police and private security personnel during their protest march can be regarded as the climax of the students’ performance. According to Ndlovu (2017a, b: 68), ‘the aim of the nude protest was to stop the violence between armed police firing stun grenades, teargas, and rubber bullets…we were tired of running from police who had been shooting at us since early morning, we no longer had energy to fight on’. Such performance is essential in soliciting public response and empathy, as Iveson (2007: 13) argues that ‘the street and the screen {…} are distinct spaces for public action, but actions undertaken through these distinct spaces tool shape in close relation to one another’ (Cited in Willems, 2019). While the performance speaks of police brutality to nonviolent students, this act solicited the required reactions as the violent confrontation from the police stopped. While some perceived this performance to be novel, a new form of protest and performance, others condemn the act based on morality (see Ndlovu, 2017a, b). However, it should be noted that such ‘nude’ protest is not a new form of politics, as it has been used by activists or nationalists to advocate for social change or independence during the preindependence era. For example, the Aba women riot of 1929 saw women protesting against the colonial government in Nigeria for limiting the role of women and heavy taxation, and similar protest has occurred in other countries such as Uganda.1 1  Dr. Stella Nyanzi embarked on a nude protest in Uganda as a means of advocating/fighting for her fundamental human rights at Makerere University.

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Fig. 5.3  Nude protest at Wits University. Source: https://www.google.com/ search?q=nude+protest+at+wits+university&rlz=1C1GCEU_enZA822ZA822&s xsrf=ALeKk00PmaA2reoTHZPRNnBMbNkSIQQeA:1582720947759&source= lnms&tbm=isch&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjalfrnu_nAhVNxIUKHZwtBx8Q_AUoA XoECAsQAw&biw=1920&bih=979#imgrc=UJVC_KoS1b5sxM

It should be noted that a key component of the performance used by the different movements is rhetoric. Crines et al. (2016) argue that performance must be assessed within rhetoric, i.e., what has been communicated to the public. This means looking beyond the text and understanding the message that the performer is trying to send out and the strategies that they are using to get their message across. The purpose of rhetoric is to persuade others (state and nonstate actors) about societal issues, and this was done via the representation of the performer (see Atkins & Finlayson, 2016). In this case, the performers of #OurMumuDonDo have represented or portrayed the rhetoric of corruption; #BringBackOurGirls the rhetoric of hopelessness, state violence, and injustice; #FeesMustFall the rhetoric of inequality, free education, and decolonization; and #OccupyGhana the rhetoric of corruption, good governance, and accountability. These rhetorics were mediatised through online (social media) and

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offline activities of protests that are performed either through songs, nude protest or demonstrations, which allows for the mass public to actively participate in the discourse. The advent and usage of social media in activism has changed and altered this communication process and the dynamics of persuasion and performance, as it has elevated and accelerated acts of performance and persuasion by amplifying the rhetoric, and giving the public opportunity to interact and critically debate such performance (Douai & Nofal, 2012; Baym, 2010). Therefore, Edmondson (2007) argues that social movements have become vested in performance laced with spectacles to avoid criticism from the public. According to her, while emphasizing the importance of spectacles in performance in Africa, the tradition of performance within Africa highlights that every performance must integrate spectacles in the form of comic sketches, songs, dance, melodrama and acrobatics as a way of inviting audiences and making them alive, i.e., ‘participate’ in the performance. Such liveliness is to make the public a part of a process. In conclusion, this chapter has argued that there is an intersection between performance and social movement politics. This intersection shows that performance is an invaluable strategic tool for social movements in their dealings with the state and other actors. The chapter has also argued that the politics of performance played by these social movements is not new, as argued by some scholars (see Willems, 2019), but these performances are just being manifested in a new way in today’s activism. Additionally, this chapter argues that the performative politics at the micro level of the movement are similar to the normative politics being played in society and media. In fact, such politics are not different from what Bayart (2009) called the ‘politics of the belly’, as social movements have been used to push self-interest under the auspices of fighting for collective interest. Therefore, this chapter argues that when reading social movements and their performative activities, this should be done within the logic of the politics of performance, i.e., internal and external politics (micro and macro) that is played out.

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CHAPTER 6

Rethinking Social Movements and Digital Activism in Africa: Challenges and Prospects

The African continent is confronted with numerous challenges that have impacted its socioeconomic, political and cultural development. According to Meredith (2005), these challenges are caused by historical factors such as colonialism and the current political selfishness and indecisiveness of African leaders. This is true of most Sub-Saharan African countries, such as Nigeria, Ghana and South Africa, which this book has explored through various case studies, as examined and discussed in the previous chapters. There were great promises and expectations of a new dawn at independence; however, these have become a mirage in the post independent era, as there have been cases of corruption and maladministration, among other issues, in these countries (see Habib, 2013; Adebanwi & Obadare, 2010). Fanon (2005) attributed this problem to the failure of these African countries to effectively decolonise and the desire of African leaders to emulate or become colonial masters because the leaders of postcolonial African states continued to imbibe and practise colonial cultures of exploitation and greed that reflect only personal interests and not the general welfare of ordinary citizens (Meredith, 2005; Mbembe, 2015a). Gqubule (2017: 5), while attesting to this from the South African experience, stated, ‘Predictably, development performance plunged along with economic growth. Hunger and anger rose; the ruling elite’s credibility eroded. The project to create a corrupt patrimonial and autocratic state ran into strong headwinds: a surge of political energy emerged, pushing South Africa to a brink’. This quote speaks of massive corruption that © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 U. Akpojivi, Social Movements and Digital Activism in Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30207-7_6

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became evident in postcolonial African states, and one would have expected these nationalist or leaders that ruled these African states, who were actively involved in the struggle for independence, to be attuned with the needs of the people and to formulate policies that would seek to improve the lives of the people. However, this was not the case as they continued with their corrupt acts and tried to protect their ‘enclave’. Mbembe (2015a) argues that there is clear evidence of ‘banality of power’, as the leaders of these African states use different means to ensure their continuous stay in power despite such rule bringing hardship and discomfort to citizens. Jacques Pauw (2017), in his book titled The President’s Keepers: Those Keeping Zuma in Power and out of Prison, which detailed the endemic corruption in Zuma’s era as president of South Africa, posited that President Zuma instituted structures to protect him from persecution, which is in line with Mbembe’s notion of the banality of power. Consequently, the need to confront the conditions that have facilitated such ‘banality of power’ has resulted in the formation of social movements and digital activism as a tool to advocate and bring about social change on the continent. The power to bring about change in any society lies with its citizens to initiate actions in the form of social movements, civil societies and digital activism as a way to redirect the cause of a nation (Diamond, 2010). Mamdani et al. (1988), while expounding on the thought, argued that the solutions to the numerous problems confronting the African states are dependent on social actors within the continent to take initiative and participate with the state. This was an inevitable tool that was embraced by African leaders during the struggle for independence. For instance, Nyamnjoh (2005), Last (2019), and Meredith (2005) posited that the struggle for independence in countries such as Nigeria, Ghana, and Zimbabwe involved activism and the use of media. To this end, we have seen the rebirth of activism on the continent, which is perceived to be an essential tool in (re)negotiating and pushing for reforms in society (see Mutsvairo, 2016). In Nigeria, #OurMumu­ DonDo, although a relatively small group, has been able to use new media technologies for digital activism facilitated by social media platforms such as Instagram, websites and Facebook, coupled with the offline presence of street protests to communicate the dire situation of the country and the need to push for a mental revolution in the minds of Nigeria. This revolution, according to the founder and face of the movement, Charles Oputa, is the only way to bring about social change towards promoting good governance and accountability in government. This can only be achieved

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when there is a mental revolution by ordinary Nigerians, who should know that they are the government, and they have the power to fire and hire any government. The call for mental revolution emphasises reorientation, new ways of thinking and thought from the old systematic approach of doing things. Therefore, justifying Fanon’s (1961) argument that for real fundamental change to occur on the continent, there is the need for true decolonialisation to happen. That is a radical shift in thinking from inherited ways of doing things. Thus, true decolonialisation entails a paradigm shift from citizens who see themselves as subjects of power (authoritarian and suppressive rulers) and accepting decisions made on their behalf with limited powers to confront or challenge such a narrative. There is no doubt that during colonialism, there were  hierarchical power structures where citizens felt inferior to those in authority and were unable to hold their colonial masters accountable for their actions and governance style. Such processes rarely recognise citizens as vital components of the state, as they were hardly consulted in decision-making processes. This system was subsequently inherited by nationalists during the post independence era, and citizens became fearful of speaking to power. The only way of breaking this structure is to violently disrupt the existing, suppressive structure using activism, which Mare (2014) considers the new protest drum within the continent. Therefore, from the examination of the four different case studies in this book, it can be argued that the different movements used digital activism to achieve two fundamental goals. First, they have used new media technology to communicate with ordinary citizens by enlightening them about their problems and educating them about the powers they have in the democratic process. This process of communicating to ordinary citizens by making them conscious of their environment and suffering and steps that should be taken to address their common shared problems of corruption, maladministration and poor governance are highlighted. This process of decolonising the minds1 attributes so much power to the communication process, as, according to Castells (2009), communication is a tool of power that is used to control the populace. Communication affords the populace the opportunity to counterpower the control of the state and influence the power relationship between the state and the citizens 1  This is the title of Ngugi Wa Thiong’o famous work in which he made the case that language as a cultural tool is one fundamental way of decolonising an African society (1986).

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(Castells, 2009: 3). Thus, all the movements examined in this study (#OurMumuDonDo, #BringBackOurGirls, #OccupyGhana and #FeesMustFall) have used communication to counter the powers of the state and conscientise the people about alternatives. Albeit, this success only covers the elites or middle class that have access to these technologies and their affordances, and are conscientise about the potential of these technologies to bring about social change. In a continent where a vast majority of the population resides in rural areas with limited technological access, digital inequalities or lack the skills (Oyedemi, 2014), these people would be excluded and unable to utilise the potential of these technologies, which Diamond (2010) termed liberation technologies. However, the appropriation of these technologies by these movements has aided the decolonization process. For instance, the objectives of the OurMumuDonDo movement in bringing about mental and ballot revolution have been centred on communication, in which the impact and consequences of vote-selling and vote-buying and lack of involvement in the civic process are highlighted as the cause of corruption, lack of transparency and good governance in Nigeria. Therefore, campaigns such as social contracts and consistent engagement with the public via town hall meetings and online posts (Facebook, Instagram and Website) have aided this decolonization process. Ordinary citizens are made to realise that they have the power and that they hold the power to change the fortune of the nation’s leadership. As Gqubule (2017: 40, emphasis added) puts it, ‘Power is entrusted to representatives—it does not belong to them. The people then hold the power to keep their representative and demand for accountability’. Similarly, the #BringBackOurGirls movement communicated the dire situation of the country, i.e., abduction of the schoolgirls, security challenges, amongst others, using social media platforms of Twitter and public sit ins. These were not just to raise awareness but to counterpower the state and its ideologies of lack of accountability and engagement (see Olson, 2016; Akpojivi, 2020). This counterpower of social movements or digital activism to the state could be seen in how #OccupyGhana was established to question the government’s economic policies that had caused undue hardship to ordinary Ghanaians. Not only did the movement highlight these economic challenges, but it also insisted on good governance and transparency as a way of addressing economic problems. The movement acted as a platform for the ‘middle class’ who had been silent on salient sociopolitical and economic issues over the years to speak back to power. Mudhai (2013) argues

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that social media has become an alternative space for citizens who were once disempowered to engage with the state. Such engagement affords the movement to identify the ills in society and proffer solutions or reforms. This is one key strength of #OccupyGhana due to its social status as an educated middle class, i.e., lawyers, doctors, engineers, journalists, etc., that they were able to harness essential resources and push for reforms in governance style and challenge the state. For instance, it was through the movement that the Auditor General of Ghana was made aware of his powers to not only present his financial report of the year but empowered to press charges against people alleged to have been involved in illicit financial transactions with the state and stop/reverse such transactions. Likewise, they have challenged questionable payments to board members of state enterprises and their responsibility; and they have queried the unethical behaviour of media practitioners that solicit for ‘soli’ before covering and reporting an event, even to their detriment where some media practitioners boycotted their coverage. Such action from selected media practitioners did not deter the movement from pressing for reform in the media sphere through the formulation and implementation of the freedom of information (FOI)  act because the movement considered the media as central to upholding and promoting good governance and accountability in Ghana (OccupyGhana, 2018), and this was part of their petition to the state during the initial #OccupyFlagStaffHouse protest. For example, on November 30, 2018, #OccupyGhana, in collaboration with other civil societies, declared that day as ‘Red Friday’ and every other Friday before Christmas. They called on the state and parliament to pass the freedom of information bill that had not been passed into law after 19 years and into the fourth republic under the hashtag #RTIRedFriday, which means Right To Information Red Friday (OccupyGhana, 2018). The call for the passage of the FOI bill into law recognises the free flow of information and upon request by individuals or media organisations as a cornerstone to strengthening Ghana’s democracy. Ogbondah (2004: 9) posited that democracies in Africa need to formulate and implement an FOI act as a way of consolidating their democracies, as such an act will help shift the country from a ‘culture of secrecy’, which has been embedded in most laws on the continent. Thus, the assertion that the movement is expanding accountability drives both state and nonstate actors. Consequently, the government passed the FOI Act into law and signed into law by President Nana Addo Dankwa Afufo-Addo on May 21, 2019.

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In addition, this counterpower was effective in South Africa, where students under the #FeesMustFall movement were calling for a decolonised university and free education for all due to the inequalities that exist in postapartheid South Africa. Using Biko’s idea of black consciousness and Fanon’s notion of true decolonization, the students were able to disrupt teaching and learning activities within the universities using online and offline activities to push for free education and reform curricula that incorporate African experiences and culture. However, there were contestations over what constitutes free education, and the impact such free education will have on the quality of education, especially for a university such as Witwatersrand that wants to remain a global and competitive university. However, the activism from the students has led to serious transformations and decolonisation projects within the University of the Witwatersrand. Not only have there been curriculum reforms, but the spaces within the university have also been decolonized to ensure that all stakeholders feel welcomed (see Mbembe, 2016b). Additionally, the political decision by President Jacob Zuma to grant free education to students whose family income is between R350,000 has brought about relative peace within universities. Although such a decision goes against the findings of the commission of inquiry, the announcement further raises the issue of the missing middle and the continued protests by students over possible exclusion at the commencement of registration at the beginning of the academic year. Nevertheless, the University of the Witwatersrand has embarked on several initiatives to help these students. Therefore, the assertion that what the students achieved in 10 days was what Vice-Chancellors have been trying to achieve in 10  years, as the issues of free education and decolonised education are now national issues. Second, the different movements used digital activism as a tool of engagement with the state by pressing for social change. Engagement with the state was most often one directional. For instance, #OccupyGhana had the Ghanaian state respond to the allowance issue of board members and their functions to state enterprises by banning the payment of monthly salaries and allowances; and the state followed up on Woyome’s scandal until the logical end by making him refund the state payments undue to him, among others. Likewise, in Nigeria, the government responded to the #BringBackOurGirls demand for safe schools for children in the Northeast region affected predominantly by Boko Haram activities by implementing the safe school initiative (Akpojivi, 2020). The safe school initiative seeks to ‘rebuild, rehabilitate and restore normalcy’ to areas affected by providing

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adequate security that will guarantee the safety of schoolchildren in collaboration with the UN special envoy for global education, Mr. Gordon Brown (UNDP, 2018). In South Africa, the issues of free education and decolonised education are no longer on the sideline but are dominant issues that university management and the state are trying to address. Not all the time has such engagement between the movement and the state been successful. In most cases, the state uses power/force to criminalise the movements. The purpose of such criminalisation is to control and minimise the counterpower of the movement. For instance, in Nigeria, the state militarised the symbolic space of the different movements in Nigeria (see Figs. 4 and 5) as a way of preventing the gathering of people and their activism, and likewise to intimidate them. According to Dr. Chidi Odinkalu, while buttressing the above, ‘People are intimidated by the presence of the assets (military and police) by the state...these assets sometimes do get violent on us’ (Personal Interview, June 13, 2018, Abuja). The founder and face of the #OurMumuDonDo movement, while explaining the violence that the movement encountered in their push for social change, held that: In one of our campaigns, we were attacked at the Wusa market by the Nigerian police. The next day, we were back at the market to draw peoples’ attention to the problems confronting the nation, and we were attacked. I had to call off the campaign to restrategise and to avoid a lot of ugly incidences because the people were hurt and injured, and it could have been my kids and I do not want to expose them to such a thing (Personal Interview, June 13, 2018, Abuja, emphasis added).

This was not an isolated event as even during one of the meetings at the Unity Fountain in which I was involved, the police were in full force and heavy equipment unleashed their terror. Similar criminalisation was recorded in Ghana by #OccupyGhana. According to Dr. Radha Hackman: Under the previous government of NDC before government changed hands, there was a period where as a member of #OccupyGhana because maybe of the things we said and things we achieved by exposing certain things, for example, we did feel threatened. A lot of our members felt threatened, there were few cases where members will actually find their car tyres, the bolts loosened from their tyres, and some other members felt they were being followed, they felt that conversations were being tapped… personally, IRS was sent after me (Personal Interview, June 7, 2018, Accra, emphasis added).

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In South Africa, universities were militarised as police and private security personnel confronted students, and such confrontations were usually violent (Chawana & Akpojivi, 2022), although the vice-Chancellor Adam Habib claimed that students got away with the violence that happened on campus (Personal Interview, December 2019). Despite the different forms of violence from the state towards the movements, the movements have continued to challenge and counter the power of the state, as they continue to speak back to the state and push for reforms. This, therefore, substantiates Fanon’s (2005: 36) assertion that the process of bringing about decolonialisation—change the institutionalised culture and system— entails violence, as according to him, ‘decolonisation is always a violent phenomenon…which sets out to change the order of the world, is, obviously, a programme of complete disorder’. The examined cases have shown that the different movements sought to disorder the normative system of states by using the counterpower of communication to shape relationships (see Castells, 2009). Although they did not resort to physical violence, the state used violence to curtail the counterpower of the movements. However, the movements used Cabral’s (1966) notion of ideological violence to bring about this decolonialisation, that is, a violent process to change the mindset of thinking and doing things, and this was evident in movements such as #OurMumuDonDo and #OccupyGhana. As Steve Biko put it, ‘The most potent weapon in the hands of the oppressor is the minds of the oppressed’ (2002); therefore, the use of social media platforms by these movements to communicate and reach the minds of the oppressed makes them realise that they are oppressed and motivates them to take action as a way of bringing about radical social change. According to Adebayo Raphael of the #OurMumuDonDo movement, ‘We are changing our people (Nigerians) to be more intellectually focused on their thinking’ (Personal Interview, June 13, 2018, Abuja). Therefore, social movements and digital activism are formidable instruments in bringing about social change in society. These changes are nevertheless dependent on complex social structures such as political, economic and cultural factors that impact social movement activism, as discussed in preceding chapters.

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Rethink Social Movements and Activism in Africa? The preceding chapters have shown that social movements and digital activism are tools or mechanisms that have been adopted by citizens across Sub-Saharan Africa to engage with their governments and push for sociocultural, economic and political developments. One common issue across the examined countries, i.e., Nigeria, Ghana and South Africa and the case studies, showed that the movements are pushing for good governance and accountability. Be that as it may, it will be theoretically and conceptually wrong to ascribe a unified reading to social movements and digital activism in Africa. As the preceding chapters have shown, the context of the cases differs, and this, to a large extent, influenced their operationalisation and the impact they made on society. Hence, the question of how we should read social movements and digital activism in Africa is faced with almost similar problems of corruption, maladministration and poor governance but has distinct characteristics unique to each country. My aim is not to prescribe a one-size-fits-all approach but to make the case that to understand social movements and activism in Africa, there is the need to comprehend the unique ideas and structures of the movements and the relatability of the public to these. From the examined case studies, I proposed that in reading social movements and activism in Africa, two elements are central. First, there is the elitism of social movements. Some studies, such as Fenton and Barassi (2011), Findlay (2016), Akpojivi (2018) and Tilly (2004), argue that elites have played a fundamental role in the formation of social movements, and this, to a large extent, has impacted the ability of social movements to bring about social change. While this, to a large extent, is true in the examined cases, as the different movements were established by people with some form of social status, this, however, is not a bad thing. These elites outside providing the resources needed for the operationalisation of the movement, it is their status, to a large extent, that enables or facilitates engagement with the state. As Dr. Chidi Odinkalu puts it: Yes, it’s okay to be elite, by the way hungry people do not have time to do these things because they are busy thinking of what to eat. You have got to have a minimum level of comfort to be able to deal with the kind of inconveniences we are talking about, i.e., face teargas, water cannons with pepper spray and all of that…you are not going to do that if you do not have food or guaranteed one meal a day. So, yeah, you got to be elite to do the activism (Personal Interview, June 13, 2018, Abuja).

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While Dr. Chidi Odinkalu is right about having the convenience, that is, resources to cater to oneself if hurt and arrested, what is wrong is the inability of these elites to forgo their status and reach out to ordinary people to cause a radical social change. Such mentality or orientation that only elites can successfully drive social movements and digital activism ignores the fact that the most important resources (human power) are at the heart of any activism. Without human resources, social movements and activism are dead. As Borch (2012) puts it, the ‘politics of the crowd’ is central to activism and the ability of any activism to bring about social change. To him, historically, states have been wary of crowds because they perceive the gathering of people as something to be avoided at all possible cost because of their powerful effect in changing and altering societal norms. Thus, the question of how a social movement or activism can be built around elitism and still be able to bridge the gap (social status) and reach out to other important human resources remains. One salient way is for social movements or activism to be grassroots oriented, as this will enable them to reach out to the excluded people who can then be able to participate in the process. For instance, a town hall meeting between social movements and ordinary people would be a pivotal way for social movements to listen to the opinions of these people and strategise with them on how to bring about social change. In the examined case studies, only the #OurMumuDonDo movement has adopted this grassroots approach, as it has outside town hall meetings and street campaigns in remote areas, and the movement has established offices across Nigeria, i.e., in Imo State, Anambra State, Lagos State, Benue State and Abuja. Therefore, it can be argued that the movement is the first in Nigeria to decentralise its activities from urban areas to rural areas to enlighten ordinary Nigerians about their activities and how they can contribute their quota to the socioeconomic, political and cultural development of the country. This idea was also buttressed by Dr. Radha Hackman, who posited that for social change to be sporadic and cut across all spheres of Ghana, everyone, irrespective of social status, should be able to play an active role by using their voices and whatever platform available to them to highlight issues and push for change. According to her ‘I also tell people you can bring about change because you have a voice, use it…instead of saying why is #OccuppyGhana not doing anything about a problem, why do you not voice it out, what you are thinking’ (Personal Interview, June 7, 2018, Accra).

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Second, an understanding of the social structure of both the movement and the state is salient, as this understanding will help in the contextualisation of social movements and explain why some of their activities are successful and others not, or why some social movements are successful and others are not. From the examined case studies, unique inherent social structures such as race and personalisation of movement, among other factors, impacted the ability of these movements to bring about social change. The #FeesMustFall movement became a victim of the internal structure of the South African state, as to some extent, there was the racialisation of the movements. According to MacDonald, race matters in the composition and understanding of the South African state as ‘colour identified who was the subject and who was the object’ (2006: 8); and such colour identification reinforces the economic debate and exclusion in South Africa. While people might want to racialise the movement, what is true is that the majority of students or black students do not have equal opportunities as their fellow white students due to the legacies of apartheid. Therefore, there is a need to go beyond the racial composition of the movement but focus on the issues that, to a large extent, impact all. Mbembe (2015b) asked ‘If an infernal cycle of repetition but no difference, one form of damaged life is not simply to be replaced by another’. His question calls for a reflection on the place of race in society and the internal works of society in which social movements are part. In Nigeria, social structures such as the personalisation of movement e.g., #OurMumuDonDo adopted the ‘Charly Boy’ brand as a way of reaching out to people and establishing its integrity, or Dr. Oby Ezekwesili and Aisha Yesufu being the faces of the #BringBackOurGirls movement and to project its credibility both at national and international fronts. A similar structure is found in Ghana, as when people talk about #OccupyGhana, the first reference point is Ace Kojo Annan Ankomah, a renowned lawyer who is always engaging with the public. Such actions raise the need to reflect on the impact of such personalisation or the branded nature of movements in Africa and the likely consequences it might have in the movement. From the cases examined, such personalisation could impact the authenticity and credibility of the movement and its cause. As discussed in Chaps. 2–4, personal clashes and micropolitics within any movement can negatively impact moral authenticity (Carroll & Wheaton, 2009), and within #OurMumuDonDo, alleged gratification by the face of the movement resulted in the resignation of some members

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and the subsequent establishment of the ‘Concerned Nigerians’ movement. While such a proliferation of movements might expound the public sphere for citizens to partake in civic and democratic issues, it may lead to citizens questioning the authenticity of these movements and their causes if they are truly interested in the overall development of society or if social movements and activism have become a tool for actualisation of vested interests. Therefore, to understand social movements and digital activism in Africa, there is a need to examine the role or place of personalisation or brand adoption within movements and its impact on facilitating social change. In addition, the political structure within a society will, to a large extent, impact the activities of any movement and its success. The governments from the different case studies, i.e., Nigeria, South Africa, and Ghana criminalised the examined movements in their respective countries by using force and violence; however, the level of violence and criminalisation differs. In all the case studies, such criminalisation is evident in the occupation of the strategic meeting spaces by the security forces and the deployment of heavy assets, which could be a strategic tool by the state to enforce their ideology and banality of power (Mbembe, 2015a, b). Such actions could be seen as attempts by the state to use political and social powers to control the activities of the activists and the movement, thereby controlling the ideological processes and information available to the citizens. Failure to recognise these elements and their interplay within their cultural backgrounds and their interrelationship with other social actors within the movement will be an ineffective attempt to understand social movements and activism. Such readings fail to recognise how social, political and economic realities have a large impact on social movements and digital activism on the continent.

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Interviews Prof. Adam Habib, Vice Chancellor, University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa. Anonymous Senior Executive member, University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa. Anonymous Student Activist, University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa. Ashley Mabasa, Student activists and SRC member, University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa. Diane Parker, Deputy Director, Department of Higher Education and Training, South Africa. Smith Jones, Academic Staff Union of Witwatersrand University President.

Index1

NUMBERS AND SYMBOLS #BringBackOurGirls, i, vii, viii, 1, 8, 12, 29, 37–80, 157, 163, 168, 170, 178–181, 196, 198, 203 #FeesMustFall, i, vii, 1, 2, 4, 8, 9, 14, 29, 30, 87–117, 146, 163, 168, 170, 183, 184, 186, 196, 198, 203 #OccupyGhana, i, viii, 2, 4, 8, 13, 29, 30, 123–157, 163, 168, 169, 182, 183, 186, 196–200, 203 #OurMumuDonDo, i, vii, 1, 4, 8, 12, 29, 37–80, 157, 163, 168, 170, 172–174, 176, 177, 186, 194, 196, 199, 200, 202, 203 A Abuse, 7, 78, 153, 181 Accountability, viii, 2, 6, 12–14, 29, 30, 38–40, 48, 52, 54, 61, 79, 123–157, 168, 173, 177,

181–183, 186, 194, 196, 197, 201 Activism, i, vii, 2–7, 9, 10, 12, 16, 19–31, 37–40, 54, 63, 65, 68, 69, 71, 72, 76, 79, 88, 98, 125, 126, 134, 135, 137, 139–144, 154, 156, 157, 164, 167, 172, 187, 194, 195, 198–204 Activist, i, 5, 7, 23, 26, 27, 30, 31, 37, 42, 50, 53, 53n6, 54, 64, 95, 98, 99, 111, 112, 132, 136, 139, 142–144, 146, 148, 157, 164, 166–172, 177, 185, 204 Affective public, 131 Affordance, 3, 7, 39, 109, 124, 131, 139, 196 Africa, i, vii, ix, 3–5, 10, 12, 19, 21, 26, 28, 31, 43n2, 50, 53, 54, 66, 96, 101, 132, 137, 138, 146, 148, 151, 155, 171–187, 197, 201–204

 Note: Page numbers followed by ‘n’ refer to notes.

1

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 U. Akpojivi, Social Movements and Digital Activism in Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30207-7

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226 

INDEX

African experiences, 30, 95, 97, 109, 198 Africanisation, 99, 101, 103 Africanise, 97 African National Congress (ANC), 92, 112 African states, 6, 21–23, 43, 50, 73, 89, 97, 105, 111, 113, 137, 138, 142, 147, 149, 193, 194 Apartheid, 14, 24, 30, 88, 90–93, 97, 98, 101, 102, 105, 108, 110, 112, 116, 117, 203 Arab spring, 2, 7, 9, 38, 132 Authenticity, 172–174, 177, 183, 203, 204 Awareness, viii, 16, 19, 24, 25, 45, 48, 50, 52, 53, 57, 59, 62, 69, 78, 98, 108, 109, 151, 196 B Ballot, 44, 57, 59, 196 Banality, 58, 59, 75, 182, 194, 204 Bantu education, 98 Battle, 20, 26, 49, 80, 170, 179 Behaviour, 15, 16, 26, 27, 197 Belief, 14, 15, 28, 38, 41, 69, 96, 99, 100, 126, 140, 166, 168, 173 Big man/big men, 43, 43n2, 45, 55–57, 61–63, 66, 70, 80, 134n8 Biko, Steve, i, viii, 4, 20, 24, 45, 108, 200 Black consciousness, i, viii, 4, 20, 24, 27, 29, 30, 88, 93, 95, 98, 108, 109, 198 Boko Haram, 8, 41, 53, 70–72, 71n8, 198 Brand, ix, 68–70, 172, 175, 203, 204

C Campaign, viii, 9, 19, 20, 39, 42, 48, 49, 57–60, 62, 69, 75, 78, 167, 172–174, 177, 178, 181, 182, 184, 196, 199, 202 Capitalism, 96 Challenges, x, 2, 4, 7, 8, 13, 14, 16, 19, 22, 26, 37–39, 41, 44, 63, 76, 77, 87–90, 92, 93, 112, 117, 124, 133, 134, 136, 144, 151, 156, 170, 171, 176, 193–204 Citizens, i, viii, ix, 1–8, 2n1, 10, 12–14, 17, 18, 20–23, 25, 26, 29, 30, 38, 39, 43, 44, 46–48, 50, 54, 55, 57–59, 61–65, 70, 73, 77, 79, 89, 92, 96, 105, 123, 124, 126, 129, 131–133, 136, 137, 139, 142, 152–157, 164, 169, 176, 179, 181, 193–197, 201, 204 Coalition, 7, 37, 40, 41, 63, 79, 80 Collectivity, 16, 17, 20, 24, 25, 142 Colonialism, viii, 3, 13, 14, 28, 46, 55, 92, 96, 97, 101, 102, 107, 110, 195 Coloniality, 4, 21, 91 Colonial legacies, i, viii, 11, 88, 93, 108 Colonial practices, 11, 88 Communication, i, 5, 19–31, 47, 53, 54, 89, 93, 105, 106, 133, 134, 139, 142, 144, 148, 153, 154, 166, 167, 195, 196, 200 Communication process, 21, 157, 187, 195 Confrontation, 17, 130, 183, 185, 200 Consciousness, 4, 20, 21, 24–30, 37–80, 88, 99, 102, 104, 108, 117, 169, 175, 178, 198 Constitution, 30, 50, 71, 149, 179, 183

 INDEX 

Contestation, i, viii, 14, 15, 17, 22–26, 29, 30, 56, 65, 73, 88, 100, 109, 111, 126, 143, 146, 147, 163, 168, 169, 177, 182, 198 Corruption, 7, 8, 11, 13, 14, 29, 30, 39, 43, 50–58, 88, 113, 124n1, 125, 126, 128, 129, 131–133, 145, 147, 149–151, 151n10, 155, 156, 173, 174, 176, 177, 182, 186, 193–196, 201 Counterhegemony, 76, 170 Counterpower, ix, 22, 23, 195, 196, 198–200 Credibility, ix, 64, 68–70, 76, 79, 134, 135, 137, 138, 143, 146, 168, 172, 176, 193, 203 Criminalisation, vii, 37, 49, 50, 52, 73, 74, 79, 157, 199, 204 Curriculum, 30, 93–109, 198 D Decolonisation, 93, 95, 99–101, 103, 105, 198, 200 Deep-root, vii, 2, 16, 28, 43, 53, 92, 109 Democracy, 2, 4, 6, 11, 11n4, 14, 39, 46, 48, 52, 55, 58, 59, 61, 62, 65, 77, 92, 97, 123–157, 168, 197 Democratic culture, 7, 11, 14, 18, 22, 55, 65, 73, 123–125, 131, 132, 144, 154 Depoliticised, 46 Development, i, vii, viii, 2, 4–7, 11, 13, 14, 18, 20, 26, 28, 30, 31, 39, 41, 43–45, 47, 48, 52, 53, 57, 59, 75, 89, 93, 96, 100, 103, 105, 107, 113, 123, 125–128, 131, 132, 136, 138, 139,

227

147–149, 154, 155, 164, 168, 174, 193, 201, 202, 204 Digital activism, i, ii, vii–ix, 1, 2, 4–21, 25–29, 37, 38, 54, 64–66, 68–70, 74, 75, 77, 79, 124, 132, 141, 143, 144, 146–149, 154, 170, 193–204 Dominant ideology, 23, 24, 169 E Economy, 41, 90, 96, 125, 147 Educate, viii, ix, 152 Elites, 7, 11, 17, 19, 23, 24, 28, 30, 43, 43n2, 45, 49, 52, 55, 56, 64, 69, 77–79, 92, 95, 99, 125, 134, 136–138, 142, 149, 173, 181, 193, 196, 201, 202 Elitism, 28, 56, 66, 135, 137, 201, 202 Embodiment, 164, 166 Empower, viii, 8, 54, 150, 154, 155 Engagement, viii, ix, 7, 8, 10, 12, 15–18, 20, 22, 24, 27, 38, 42, 62, 99, 131, 137–139, 145, 151, 152, 163, 165, 196–199, 201 Ethnic, 11, 26, 39, 88 Ethnicity, 38, 39, 48, 79 Exclusion, 3, 63, 90, 98, 99, 110, 116, 118, 198, 203 F Facebook, ii, 9, 10, 19, 22, 71, 130–133, 139, 140, 151, 152, 155, 156, 179–181, 194, 196 Failed state, 12, 29, 41 Fanon, F., viii, 11, 28, 30, 43, 88, 89, 91, 93, 94, 109, 138, 193, 195, 198, 200 Freedom of information, 128, 197

228 

INDEX

Free education, 30, 91–93, 95, 109–118, 111n2, 113n3, 184, 186, 198, 199 G Ghana, i, vii–x, 2–4, 7–15, 29, 31, 97, 123–157, 171, 181–183, 193, 194, 197, 199, 201–204 Global South, 19, 96 Good governance, viii, 2, 4, 6, 6n2, 13, 14, 26, 29, 30, 38–41, 46n4, 47, 52, 53, 53n6, 57, 70–73, 75, 77, 79, 123–125, 129, 133n7, 140, 141, 143, 146–149, 151, 153–155, 157, 168, 173, 177, 181–183, 186, 194, 196, 197, 201 H Hashtags, i, 1, 2, 7, 12, 19, 20, 71, 72, 77, 197 Higher education, 30, 89, 91, 93–94, 96, 100, 112–115, 117 History, vii, 20, 30, 39, 41, 43, 55, 62, 74, 94, 97, 107, 125n2, 133, 139, 146, 150, 151 Human mind, 21–24, 26, 29, 31, 47, 89, 93, 109, 154, 164 I Identity, ix, 4, 16, 28, 37, 40–42, 71, 131, 167, 181–183 Ideology/ideologies, i, ix, 2, 5, 6, 10, 15, 16, 20, 23, 24, 26, 29–31, 38, 40–42, 47, 76, 79, 88, 109, 144, 147, 157, 163, 167–170, 172–177, 180–182, 196, 204

Image, 60, 68, 79, 96, 100, 129, 138, 170, 180, 181 Inclusion, 62, 95, 101, 102, 141 Independence, viii, 1, 3, 7, 11–14, 11n4, 30, 43, 45–48, 55, 56, 58, 77, 94, 96, 97, 108, 124, 126, 128, 139, 141, 183, 185, 193, 194 Inequalities, 3, 7, 14, 16, 30, 39, 48, 57, 87, 88, 90–93, 110, 116, 117, 136, 186, 196, 198 Informed public, 22 Initiatives, 8, 57, 69, 100–102, 104, 105, 115, 148, 194, 198 Insecurities, 7, 71, 178 Interest, ix, 6–8, 20, 23, 28, 31, 37, 38, 43, 49, 49n5, 55–58, 61, 62, 64, 65, 70, 77, 79, 87, 93–95, 109, 124, 125, 137–148, 157, 164, 168–170, 173, 174, 181, 187, 193, 204 Internet, 3, 19, 21, 22, 50, 54 L Language, 40, 98, 101, 104–107, 105n1, 166, 167, 175, 195n1 Legacies, i, viii, 30, 88, 91, 93, 101, 102, 107, 108, 203 Liberate, ix, 5, 7, 13, 140 Logic, 21, 58, 75, 92, 98, 107, 144, 187 M Mainstream, 3, 9, 19, 22, 24, 59, 124, 124n1, 132, 164, 165, 170 Manipulation, 146, 147 Mbembe, A., 23, 58, 73, 75, 94, 97, 98, 101–103, 106, 107, 110, 115, 138, 182, 193, 194, 198, 203, 204

 INDEX 

Media, i, 2, 46, 78, 89, 123, 151, 164, 166, 171, 173, 194 Media sphere, 123, 197 Mental, viii, 44, 45, 47, 48, 53, 54, 98, 107, 169, 194–196 Message(s), 63, 69–77, 134, 136, 141, 144, 167, 169, 176, 181, 186 Micropolitics, viii, 147, 163, 165, 171–173, 175, 177, 203 Middle class, 24, 30, 89, 124–139, 142, 157, 181, 196, 197 Militarisation, 30, 73n9, 109 Mind, ix, 5, 20, 44, 45, 47, 48, 54, 89, 93, 97, 102, 109, 150, 154, 157, 164, 194, 195, 200 Mobile phone(s), 19, 132, 143 Mobile technologies, 8 Mobilise, viii, 37, 60, 109, 130, 131, 155 Moral, 20, 25, 78, 79, 130, 172–175, 177, 203 N Narrative, 27, 60, 61, 72, 146, 153, 166, 195 Nationalists, i, viii, 11, 46, 89, 117, 126, 146, 185, 194, 195 Neopatrimonialism, 29, 47 New media, 2–4, 9, 10, 19, 20, 22, 24, 27, 31, 37–39, 75, 89, 93, 124, 130–132, 155, 156, 164, 169–171, 194, 195 Ngugi, T., 96, 101–103, 106, 195n1 Nigeria, i, vii–x, 1, 3, 4, 6–15, 29, 31, 37–80, 111, 123, 157, 171, 173–175, 177, 180, 185, 193, 194, 196, 198, 199, 201–204

229

Non-state actors, viii, ix, 8, 10, 13, 18, 20, 21, 50, 89, 136, 168, 186, 197 Normative politics, i, viii, 164, 177, 187 O Offline protest, 2, 9 Oppression, 25, 45, 52, 92, 106, 180 P Participation, viii, 11, 13, 18, 25, 55, 57, 58, 62, 103, 104, 115, 123, 125, 131, 132, 141, 142, 144, 145, 155 Performance, 31, 116, 163–187, 193 Personalisation, ix, 31, 175, 203, 204 Police, 17, 22, 49, 50, 73, 183–185, 199, 200 Political class, 11, 42, 47, 48, 55, 58, 59, 62, 125 Politics, 127, 129, 133, 135, 137, 145, 156, 163–187, 202 Polity, 3, 5, 6, 8, 10, 21, 22, 37, 125, 136, 138 Post-apartheid, 2, 14, 87, 88, 90, 198 Postcolonial, i, viii, 7, 22, 23, 50, 73, 88, 90, 96, 97, 102, 111, 117, 137, 138, 182, 193, 194 Post-independence, i, viii, 11, 43, 117, 139, 195 Power, vii, ix, 3, 4, 7, 12, 13, 19–31, 47–49, 54, 56–59, 61, 63, 72, 75, 76, 80, 93, 103, 125, 126n3, 129, 132, 134, 137–139, 145, 146, 150, 151, 153, 155, 156, 164, 165, 168, 170, 171, 177, 178, 180–184, 194–197, 199, 200, 202, 204

230 

INDEX

Pressure, vii, 13, 18, 72, 136, 152, 174, 178 Protest, i, ix, 2–6, 2n1, 8–10, 12, 14–16, 19, 25, 27, 31, 37, 38, 40, 40n1, 42, 48–52, 54, 63, 64, 71, 73, 79, 87–89, 91–95, 98, 101, 102, 105n1, 106, 109–111, 111n2, 113, 113n3, 118, 124–139, 142, 149, 155, 163, 165, 167, 168, 170, 175, 178, 179, 183, 185–187, 185n1, 194, 198 Protest drum, 50, 54, 79, 155, 195 Public good, 25, 27, 98, 112 Public sphere, 2, 3, 54, 63, 124, 132, 204 R Realities, ix, 8, 9, 24, 41, 42, 44, 54, 55, 66, 95, 132, 138, 140, 142, 165, 171, 172, 176, 204 Rebirth, 4, 29, 37–80, 194 Reforms, 19, 21, 27, 30, 88, 100–109, 137, 194, 197, 198, 200 Religion, 38, 39, 45, 46, 48, 53, 55 Resistance, 75, 80, 91, 92, 95, 109, 117, 164, 165, 172, 179, 180, 182 Resource mobilisation, viii Rhetoric, 31, 99, 184–187 S Scandal, 51, 125, 126, 128, 129, 129n6, 151, 152, 182, 183, 198 Security, 2n1, 19, 26, 29, 40, 40n1, 41, 49, 67, 73–76, 79, 130, 131, 157, 170, 179–181, 185, 196, 199, 200, 204 Selfish interests, 6, 49, 55, 77, 93, 138, 141–143, 145, 146, 174

Share culture, 19, 20, 133 Social actors, ix, 17, 22, 23, 37, 148, 165, 194, 204 Social change, viii, ix, 3–5, 10, 14–31, 37, 38, 42, 44, 47, 57, 60, 77, 79, 80, 87, 88, 91, 93–94, 100, 101, 108, 109, 111, 117, 118, 124, 132, 136, 137, 144, 147–156, 154n12, 163, 164, 167, 169, 171, 174, 176, 179–181, 185, 194, 196, 198–204 Social injustice, 7, 16, 18, 21, 26, 38, 47, 108, 117 Social issues, 16, 53, 54, 79, 166, 167 Social media, viii, 2–5, 9, 10, 19, 20, 22, 23, 31, 38, 50, 52–54, 71, 76, 109, 117, 124, 124n1, 130–133, 139–142, 144–148, 153, 155, 156, 163, 172, 181, 186, 187, 194, 196, 197, 200 Social movement, i, vii, viii, 2, 4, 5, 15–20, 37, 38, 89, 124, 125, 129, 163–187, 193–204 Social structures, ix, 15, 31, 97, 148, 164, 166, 200, 203 Societal ills, 3, 165 Soli, 153, 154, 197 South Africa (SA), i, vii–ix, 1–4, 7–15, 24, 29–31, 53, 87, 88, 90–92, 96–98, 105–107, 109–113, 111n2, 113n3, 115–117, 149, 171, 183, 193, 194, 198–201, 203, 204 Soweto, 92, 105, 183 Space, i, 3, 4, 7–9, 13, 19, 61, 71, 73, 74, 98, 100, 106–109, 124, 131, 139, 144, 155, 170, 174, 177, 180, 182, 185, 197–199, 204 Stakeholders, 5, 8, 10, 13, 16, 18, 21–23, 26, 27, 29, 62, 64, 66, 72, 73, 89, 93, 100, 107, 111,

 INDEX 

112, 113n3, 126, 149, 163, 164, 198 State actors, viii, 18, 20–22, 80, 133, 144, 151, 153, 166, 168, 174 Status, 7, 22, 24, 25, 41, 43, 47, 88, 89, 103, 112, 116, 117, 134–139, 134n8, 157, 182, 197, 201, 202 Strategic tools, 31, 146, 167, 168, 187, 204 Strategy, ix, 10, 12, 24, 28, 37, 38, 40–42, 44, 50, 52–54, 59, 62, 68, 69, 71, 71n8, 76, 76n10, 77, 79, 80, 99, 102–104, 109, 111, 112, 114, 142, 149, 156, 163, 167, 172, 178, 180, 181, 183, 186 Struggle, 11, 12, 17, 21–23, 26, 28, 29, 31, 46, 49, 68, 70, 76, 89, 92, 93, 95, 102, 108, 109, 126, 136, 139, 141, 154, 157, 164, 170, 174–176, 184, 185, 194 Suppressed, viii Suspicion, 64, 65, 69, 70 Symbolic, 73, 174, 199 T Tactic, 42, 88, 99, 163, 164, 184 Tension, 109 Theory, i, viii, 16, 20, 23, 24, 26, 27, 29, 89, 93, 96, 101, 168 Transformation, i, vii, 2, 14, 88–90, 93, 95, 97, 99–101, 104, 107, 198 Transparency, 2, 4, 6n2, 13, 26, 29, 39, 40, 50, 53n6, 54, 57, 79, 124, 128, 140, 141, 155–157, 168, 173, 177, 181, 182, 196

231

True decolonisation, viii, 4, 30, 88, 89, 99, 102, 198 Twitter, ii, 10, 19, 22, 71, 87, 132, 155, 196 U Underdevelopment, 7, 11, 26, 53, 56, 125, 128 Unemployment, 7, 8, 13, 55 University of the Witwatersrand, 30, 87–91, 93, 95, 97, 99, 101–106, 108, 109, 111–114, 116, 118, 184, 186, 198 V Values, 4, 19–22, 58, 59, 61, 94, 125, 128, 133, 133n7, 134, 147, 168, 170, 173, 174, 177 Violence, 43, 80, 109, 179, 185, 186, 199, 200, 204 Violent, 2n1, 11, 14, 40, 73, 77, 78, 94, 109, 157, 185, 199, 200 Vote buying, 7, 58–62, 196 W Warfare, 98 Watchdog, 2, 133, 134, 141, 154, 182, 183 Website, 54, 66, 71, 180–182, 194, 196 Western ideas, 96 Wits University, 87–91, 95, 101–103, 106, 109, 112–114, 116, 118, 184, 186 Y YouTube, 19, 132, 155