Social Media and Elections in Africa, Volume 1: Theoretical Perspectives and Election Campaigns 303030552X, 9783030305529

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Social Media and Elections in Africa, Volume 1 Theoretical Perspectives and Election Campaigns Edited by Martin N. Ndlela Winston Mano

Social Media and Elections in Africa, Volume 1

Martin N. Ndlela  •  Winston Mano Editors

Social Media and Elections in Africa, Volume 1 Theoretical Perspectives and Election Campaigns

Editors Martin N. Ndlela Inland Norway University of Applied Sciences Elverum, Norway

Winston Mano University of Westminster, Harrow Campus London, UK

ISBN 978-3-030-30552-9    ISBN 978-3-030-30553-6 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30553-6 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover design: estudioCalamar This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Contents

1 The Changing Face of Election Campaigning in Africa  1 Martin N. Ndlela and Winston Mano 2 Social Media Algorithms, Bots and Elections in Africa 13 Martin N. Ndlela 3 Directions of Political Communication in Africa: Methodology for the Search of an African Model and Epistemology 39 Thomas C. Ijere 4 Alternative Responses to Presidential Tweets on Elections in Africa: A New Counter Power? 61 Winston Mano 5 Tweeting the July 2018 Elections in Zimbabwe 75 Allen Munoriyarwa and Collen Chambwera 6 Social Media and Participation in Ghana’s 2016 Elections 97 Wilberforce S. Dzisah

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CONTENTS

7 Social Media Use in the 2018 Presidential Election in Cameroon119 Kingsley L. Ngange 8 Hybrid Media System and the July 2018 Elections in “Post-Mugabe” Zimbabwe147 Admire Mare and Trust Matsilele 9 Social Media and Elections: A Case of Botswana, Lesotho and Eswatini177 Maxwell V. Mthembu and Carolyne M. Lunga 10 Social Media and Elections in Uganda: The Case of Bobi Wine and the Arua Primary Elections195 Hannah Muzee and Andrew Osehi Enaifoghe 11 Intra-Party Election Campaigns in Ghana: An Analysis of Facebook Use215 Akwasi Bosompem Boateng, Donal Patrick McCracken, and Musara Lubombo Index233

Notes on Contributors

Akwasi  Bosompem  Boateng is a PhD candidate at the Centre for Communication, Media and Society at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. He holds an MA in Communication and Media Studies. He also has a postgraduate diploma in International Studies and a BSc (Administration). His research interests include political communication and persuasion studies, digital communication and social media, as well as political public relations. Collen  Chambwera is a doctoral candidate at the University of Johannesburg, Department of Communication and Media Studies. His research interests are in social media and political communication, business news and journalism. Wilberforce  S.  Dzisah, PhD  is a senior lecturer and communications consultant at the Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration (GIMPA) and former Rector of the Ghana Institute of Journalism. He holds a PhD in Media and Communication from the University of Westminster (UK) and a Masters of Arts in Journalism from the University of Wales (Cardiff University, UK). He is also SUSI Scholar, Ohio University, and alumnus of the Ghana Institute of Journalism. Dzisah, besides his academic career, has practised as a journalist for at least ten years. He is a peer reviewer for some notable journals such as the Journal of African Media, African Journalism Studies and the Ghana Journal of Development Studies. Dzisah is also a media and communications consultant for some organizations in and outside Ghana. He has published ­peer-reviewed articles and book chapters in notable journals. vii

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Andrew  Osehi  Enaifoghe  is a PhD candidate in the Department of Public Administration at the University of Zululand, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. He obtained his Bachelor’s degree in History and International Studies from Ambrose Ali University Ekpoma, Nigeria, and a Masters in Public Administration from University of Zululand, KwaZulu-­ Natal, South Africa. He is the former president of the International Students’ Society and Postgraduate Students’ Society. Enaifoghe has several refereed papers in journals, with topics ranging from African conflict intervention, peace-building and peace-making mechanisms, southern African Regional and Economic Integration, African socio-­ political and economic development, and community participation in grassroots politics, to citizenry participatory democracy, African knowledge and learning systems, gender and African political structure, and decolonization of African education and history. Thomas C. Ijere  is a PhD candidate at the Faculty of Arts, Design, and Social Sciences, Northumbria University. He holds a BSc (Hons) in Political Science from the University of Calabar; a Masters in Public Administration from the Institute of Public Policy and Administration, University of Calabar, Nigeria; and an MA in Governance Development from the Institute of Development studies, University of Sussex, UK. He has been Assistant Research Fellow at the Institute of Public Policy and Administration University of Calabar since 2013. Ijere’s research interests focus on new technology and political communication, with specific focus on comparative political communication in advanced and developing democracies. His doctoral thesis is titled An International study of the impact of new technologies on political communication. Ijere’s is a Chatham House member and Adam Smith Fellow at Mercatus Center, George Mason University, USA. Musara Lubombo, PhD  is a postdoctoral researcher at the Centre for Communication, Media and Society at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. He specializes in cultural and media studies, with research interests in social change communication in the areas of politics and health. Carolyne M. Lunga  is a lecturer in the Department of Journalism and Mass Communication at the University of Eswatini (formerly Swaziland). She holds qualifications in journalism and media studies and higher ­education. She is teaching Media Law and Ethics, Writing for the Media, and Media and Human Rights. Her interests are investigative journalism,

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digital media, contemporary trends in journalism and first-year learning. She is part of the Worlds of Journalism Study project. Winston Mano, PhD  is a reader and course leader for the MA in Media and Development at the University of Westminster and a member of the top-rated Communication and Media Research Institute. He is also the principal editor of the Journal of African Media Studies and a senior research associate in the Department of Communication Studies at the University of Johannesburg. His recent edited books include Everyday Media Culture in Africa  (2016) and China’s Media and Soft Power in Africa: Promotion and Perceptions (2016) (Palgrave Macmillan). Admire  Mare, PhD is a senior lecturer in the Department of Communication, Namibia University of Science and Technology, Windhoek, Namibia. He holds a PhD and Masters of Arts in Journalism and Media Studies from the Department of Journalism and Media Studies, Rhodes University, Grahamstown, South Africa. Mare also holds a Masters of Science in Sociology and Social Anthropology and a BSc Honours in Sociology from the University of Zimbabwe. He also holds a diploma in Mass Communication from Harare Polytechnic’s School of Journalism and Media Studies. His PhD thesis, entitled Facebook, Youth and Political Action: A comparative study of Zimbabwe and South Africa, explores the various ways politically engaged youths in both countries creatively appropriate social media for political purposes. His research mainly focuses on the intersection between technology and society in the global South. He has done work focusing on the relationship between digital media and journalism, politics, digital campaigns in hybrid electoral systems, digital media entrepreneurship (hubs and start-­ups), digital literacy and Internet freedom. He has published in several international, regional and local refereed journals as well as book chapters. Admire sits on the editorial boards of Digital Journalism and Communicare. His latest journal article titled Analytics-Driven Journalism? Editorial metrics and the reconfiguration of online news production practices in African newsrooms was published recently in Digital Journalism. Trust  Matsilele, PhD  is a lecturer in the Department of Journalism, Cape Peninsula University of Technology, South Africa. He recently completed his PhD at the School of Communication at the University of Johannesburg, South Africa. Matsilele also holds a Masters of Philosophy in Journalism from Stellenbosch University and has a BA

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Honours in Journalism and Media Studies from University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. Matsilele worked as a senior economic and political journalist for Forbes Africa magazine and the CNBC Africa television channel, among many other media organizations. He is regularly featured as a political analyst by South African and Zimbabwean media outlets. Donal Patrick McCracken, PhD  is a senior professor at the Centre for Communication, Media and Society in the School of Applied Human Sciences at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. He is a renowned international academic, scholar and author of books and journal articles. Maxwell V. Mthembu, PhD  is a lecturer in the Department of Journalism and Mass Communication at the University of Eswatini (formerly Swaziland). Mthembu has a PhD in Journalism and Media Studies from Cardiff University, UK. His research interests are digital media, history of the media and development communication. Allen Munoriyarwa  is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the University of Johannesburg, Department of Journalism, Film and Television, Faculty of Humanities. His research interests are in peace journalism, media, elections and conflict, and social media and politics. Hannah  Muzee  holds a PhD in Governance and Regional Integration from the Pan African University, Institute of Governance, Humanities and Sciences, University of Yaounde II, Soa, Cameroon. Her PhD thesis focuses on deliberative politics, education and women’s voices in the Ugandan Parliament. She previously worked as an assistant lecturer at Kyambogo University from 2010 to 2015, and holds a Masters in Human Resource Management from Makerere University, Kampala, Uganda, and a Bachelor’s degree in Administrative and Secretarial Science from Kyambogo University, Kampala, Uganda. She has also received certificates from short courses such as UNCTAD online course on Trade and Gender and published in refereed journals. Her research interests lie in gender, deliberation, feminism, social media, ­governance and politics. Martin  N.  Ndlela, PhD is an associate professor at Inland Norway University of Applied Sciences, and former head of the Department of Social Science. He is a research associate in the Department of Strategic

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Communication at the University of Johannesburg, South Africa. Ndlela holds a doctorate from the Department of Media and Communication at the University of Oslo. He is a former lecturer in Media and Communication Studies at the University of Zimbabwe and Open University of Zimbabwe. Ndlela is an editor for the Journal of African Media Studies. Kingsley L. Ngange, PhD  is a senior lecturer and Head of Department (Chair) of Journalism and Mass Communication in the Faculty of Social and Management Sciences, University of Buea, Cameroon. He has been a visiting scholar at the International Centre for Information Technology and Development, Southern University, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, USA (2010), and a Visiting Professor in Lakeland University, Sheboygan, Wisconsin, USA (2015). He teaches, mentors and supervises several Masters and PhD students in different faculties at the University of Buea and in the United Nations Peace University programmes in Ethiopia, Uganda and Somaliland. His areas of interest in research, teaching and publications include political communication, media and conflicts, healthcare education and mass media exposure, information and communication technologies, journalism and e-­ democracy. He received a PhD in Mass Communications in 2012, and is a communication consultant for national and international organizations. He is founder and head of the Center for Communication and Development Research. He has researched and published extensively in national and international journals and books.

List of Figures

Fig. 2.1 Fig. 7.1

Potential bot influence on polls (based on statistics from Portland Communications)22 Operational model of social media use in the electoral process in Cameroon135

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List of Tables

Table 7.1 Table 7.2 Table 7.3 Table 7.4 Table 7.5 Table 7.6 Table 7.7 Table 11.1

Distribution of ICT ownership and use in Cameroon Candidates of the October 7 presidential election, their political parties and date of creation Distribution of social media use by month Distribution of social media use by medium Distribution of social media use by nature/content of posts Distribution of social media use by language of posts Distribution of effects of social media use Categories of Facebook content of the two political parties

124 127 137 137 137 138 138 223

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CHAPTER 1

The Changing Face of Election Campaigning in Africa Martin N. Ndlela and Winston Mano

Introduction The interplay between media and politics is central to any understanding of political campaigning. Indeed, researchers argue that politics is communication and media are central to the mediation of politics. For many years, African politics suffered through a dearth of mass media, which often was government-controlled and had limited penetration beyond urban centres, the exception being the radio (considered the only true mass communication medium in Africa). For example, in the 1970s and ’80s, most media of any significance across the continent were government-­owned, with few exceptions in countries like Nigeria, Kenya and apartheid South Africa, where private media were accommodated. The media liberalization boom of the late 1980s and early ’90s saw the

M. N. Ndlela (*) Inland Norway University of Applied Sciences, Elverum, Norway e-mail: [email protected] W. Mano University of Westminster, Harrow Campus, London, UK e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 M. N. Ndlela, W. Mano (eds.), Social Media and Elections in Africa, Volume 1, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30553-6_1

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appearance of independent media. Political communication was then dominated by o ­ ne-­to-­many communications and augmented with oral forms of communication. Political campaigning in much of Africa was conducted through low-scale traditional structures, door-to-door canvasing, poster advertising, mass rallies, as well as a few news media outlets, with limited distribution beyond urban centres and limited access to those wishing to reach audiences. The bottlenecks induced through media monopolies, ownership structures and affordability dented much of the political campaign processes. The media ecology, dominated by state-owned media and broadcasting monopolies, advantaged incumbent political parties and disadvantaged opposition parties, who found themselves marginalized in the mainstream media. Literature on media and democracy often cited lack of media pluralism, diversity and media freedom as one of the impediments to the democratization process. This obviously had negative implications on the nature of political campaigns. Social media is rapidly changing the political communication landscape in Africa.

The New Communication Landscape The rise in the use of smartphones and an increased adoption of mobile Internet in Africa are fundamentally altering the media ecology for election campaigns. Statistics show that the use of mobile phones and mobile Internet has increased considerably in the continent. It should, however, be noted that access to and use of technologies is not universal. National factors such as media regulation, social media policies, journalism cultures, political cultures, audiences and consumption patterns affect access to the new media. Has Africa joined the trend of modern, digitally enhanced political campaigns? To answer this question, one would have to examine the state of digitalization in general and the penetration of social media in the continent. What is happening in Africa with regard to digitalization? In their overview of the status quo, Schelenz and Schopp (2018) note that much has been done in various countries to advance digitalization with improved telecommunications, electricity provision, integration of information and communication technologies (ICTs) and major innovations in cloud computing, communication tools, electronic record systems and mobile banking. Tech hubs are emerging in countries like South Africa, Kenya, Nigeria, Egypt and Morocco. Internet penetration varies across the continent: Southern Africa (51%), Northern Africa (49%), Western Africa (39%), Eastern Africa (27%) and Middle Africa (12%).1 Africa has

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seen a 20% year-on-year growth in the number of Internet users. However, some of the world’s lowest Internet penetration is in Africa: Eritrea (1%), Niger (4%), Burundi (6%), DRC (6%) and Chad (5%) (ibid.). While Internet penetration is still low, “the digital face of Africa is mobile”, with around 82% of the population in Africa having a mobile connection in 2018 (Majama, 2018). According to the Internet World Stats, there were just above 204 million Facebook subscribers in Africa as of December 2017,2 with higher penetration in countries like Egypt, Angola, Algeria, Nigeria, South Africa and Morocco and less penetration in countries like Togo, Swaziland, Malawi, Guinea-Bissau and Lesotho. Interestingly, statistics show some African countries like Egypt, Nigeria, Ghana, Kenya, South Africa and Morocco (2 hours 24 minutes) leading most Western European countries and USA in time spent on social media.3 As mobile telephones are becoming commonplace even in Africa’s poorest countries, the uptake of social media has become ubiquitous across the continent. De Bruijn, Nyamnjoh, and Brinkman (2009) refer to mobile phones as the new talking drums of everyday Africa. It is through the mobile telephone that Africa is witnessing rapid transition in social media use. Social media applications like Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, WhatsApp, blogs and many others, which did not exist some years ago, now form an integral part of today’s communication landscape in much of Africa. Social media represent an ever-growing number of digital communication spaces being harnessed for political campaign purposes. Social media constitute what has been referred to as disruptive innovations, creating new communication models and transforming the ways political parties do business, consequently affecting how citizens interact with political messages. The advent of social media is disrupting well-­ established forms of elite control over communications that characterized the era of state-controlled broadcasting and news media, and creating new patterns of political communication, including political protests. The most notable example of the use of social media for political protests is the Arab Spring in the early 2010s, a series of anti-government protests across North Africa and Middle East, where social media was used to organize demonstrations (for and against governments), disseminate information and engage the international community. In the youth-led protests in Sudan (2019), various hashtags were used during the protests, which culminated in the toppling of long-serving president Omar al-Bashir. Social media was used to mobilize and disseminate information to the outside world. The role of social media became prominent in the protests against

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the Algerian president Abdelaziz Bouteflika (2019) and in the ­post-­election clashes in Zimbabwe in August 2018. Social media was used in the dissemination of pictures (including fake ones) documenting the shootings of civilians by the military in both Zimbabwe and Sudanese cases. In the past, these tragic events would have gone unnoticed. The increasing role of social media in political protests has heightened fears over its potent powers and hence attempts to diminish its powers, by either deliberately slowing it down or even shutting it down completely. Shutting down social media is also driven by the general desire to curtail freedom of expression and the spread of negative information. The fear of social media has seen a number of governments shutting down or blocking access to it during elections and other periods of political upheaval. Chad has blocked social media platforms several times for periods up to a year, in spite of the low penetration of the Internet in the country, at just above 5%. In 2016, social media was blocked in connection with the contested re-election of President Idriss Déby, and in 2018, it was also shut down following protests over constitutional changes. In Gabon, social media was shut down following violence during the 2016 presidential election. The Gambian government also shut down the Internet on the eve of the 2016 elections. In 2017, Cameroon shut down the Internet in English-speaking regions due to political unrest in the areas. Other countries that have blocked social media before or during elections include Uganda, Burundi, Mali, Congo and Ethiopia. Consider also how on 1 December 2016, Gambians went to the polls using social media as “the most critical resource” in bringing to an end the 22 years of President Jammeh’s dictatorship, ironically after he had vowed to want to rule for a billion years! The Point reports that “after closing the environment of freedom of expression by suppressing free speech and muzzling the mainstream media in the country, social media became the uncontrollable weapon in the hands of the masses”. Gambians abroad and those within the country collaborated to create “online forums to exchange ideas, mobilise funds and people in such unprecedented ways that made it impossible for the suppressive regime of Yahya Jammeh to control”. There is no doubt that the changes in the communication landscape are affecting political communication processes. As governments push back via mass media, which they can easily control, directly or indirectly, social media becomes alternative communication channels or even potential game changers in election campaigning. The implication of social media on election campaigns is, however, far from being straightforward. As

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Chadwick, Dennis, and Smith (2016) argue, political communication is journeying through a chaotic transition period induced by the rise of digital media. Researchers are still pondering on a myriad of questions about its potential implications, both positive and negative. The fact that social media is new and constantly changing in terms of both numbers and characteristics and that its adaptation varies greatly across countries makes it difficult to generalize. Authors in this volume draw upon a number of theoretical underpinnings in their quest to unravel the different uses of social media in African elections.

Theoretical Perspectives on Social Media and Election Campaigns There are a number of theoretical postulations on the relationship between social media and elections. The public sphere idealism informs some of the chapters in this collection. Scholars have used the Habermasean concept of the public sphere to examine social media, discussing whether or not social media can be conceived as an extension of the digital public sphere. Dahlgren (2005) defines the public sphere as “a constellation of communicative spaces in society that permit the circulation of information, ideas, debates…and also the formation of political will” (p. 148). Several scholars view the transformative aspect of the Internet and social media as conducive for the public sphere. Fuchs (2014) notes that contributions to the discussions of the Internet, social media and the public sphere often tend to stress new technologies’ transformative power. Castells (2009) describes the phenomenon as “the construction of the new public sphere in the network society”. Benkler (2006) stresses the emergence of a networked public sphere. “The network allows all citizens to change their relationship to the public sphere. They no longer need be consumers and passive spectators. They can become creators and primary subjects. It is in this sense that the Internet democratizes” (Benkler, 2006, p.  272). Papacharissi (2009) views social media as a ‘virtual sphere’ in which citizens participate and express political opinion through social media. Many chapters in this volume proceed from the presumption that social media constitute a digital public sphere, enhancing political participation, engagement and empowerment. There are indeed dangers of falling into the trappings of cyber-utopianism, a naïve optimism based on the belief that communication technologies are political tools for democracy and emancipation by themselves (Brassier, 2015). In this belief, the new

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media’s positive potential for participatory democracy is emphasized. The birth of the Internet and mobile telephony has been closely linked to the idea that new technologies will leapfrog development in Africa, promote democratic participation, empower citizens and emancipate youth, women and marginalized communities. Literature suggests that new information and communication technologies have an empowering effect on citizens. ICTs are seen as vehicles for fostering political participation and empowerment. This is based on the assumption, and sometimes evidence, that changes in communication technology may play an important role in influencing electoral behaviour. Tolbert and McNeal (2003) argue that “the internet may enhance voter information about candidates and elections, and in turn stimulate increased participation” (p. 175). The argument is based on the belief that new information technology, especially the Internet, “facilitates communication flexibility, allowing individuals to choose what information to access and when to access” and, further, that “it permits users to exchange large amounts of information quickly regardless of geographical distance” (Tolbert & McNeal, 2003, p.  175). The new media and mainstream media can help increase participation on key election issues and provide information that enables citizens to make informed voting decisions. Such deterministic analyses (perceiving the positive role of social media in enhancing democracy) are noted in chapter 10 examining the Ugandan case of Bobi Wine’s successful use of social media for political mobilization. Muzee and Enaifoghe argue that social media deliberations enhance democracy in a country where freedom of expression is continuously curtailed. In chapter  4, Mano examines the responses to the presidential tweets on elections as a form of civic participation. To Mano, the relative ease of creating and disseminating social media content is giving rise to new ways of civic participation. Chapter 6 also advances the thesis that social media is a participatory and mobilizing platform. Dzisah cautions, however, that the use of social media does not take away the vital role of traditional media in the Ghanaian context. In the organizational field of politics, the interplay of older and newer media logics has created new repertoires of engagement that change established orthodoxies about what counts as political participation (Chadwick et  al., 2016, p.  16). Conditions of empowerment or disempowerment are created depending on the context. Chapter 7 on Cameroon shows that in spite of social media having gained considerable grounds in facilitating democratic participation in developing countries, its use in Cameroon is still very low. The impact of social media on political

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­articipation, engagement and empowerment is largely normative. p Political participation is a rather fluid concept. Is participation measured by the degree of contact with political officials, attending rallies, fundraising for the candidates or political party and voting, or does it entail virtual activities like sharing news about political parties or individuals, liking a post on social media or commenting on an item posted on social media? Does online participation translate to offline participation? Chapters in this volume show that participation is contextually determined. In volume two, we examine further the issues of participation and empowerment through the perspectives of gender and youths. We argue that social media can be seen as a liberating technology (Diamond, 2010), but we are aware of other factors that erode its liberating powers. Another framework used in this volume pertains to the use of social media for political mobilization. In this perspective, there is an instrumental view of social media as a tool in political mobilization. Political campaigning and mobilization of voters is carried out through technologically mediated communication channels (Norris, 1999). This perspective draws on global examples like Occupy Wall Street, the Arab Spring and other political protests in the continent. Popular protest movements such as those mentioned earlier demonstrate the instrumental value of social media for the purposes of mobilization around issues and events. What emerges in this volume is that political parties use hybrid media campaigning strategies to engage and mobilize voters. Voters also respond to the campaign messages by sharing, commenting or creating their own content on different media platforms. Social media enables voters to mobilize on their own terms, either for or against political actors. In  chapter 5, Munoriyarwa and Chambwera demonstrate how contesting groups aligned to the major contenders during the Zimbabwean elections in 2018 made use of Twitter to mobilize support and defend their candidates in the Twittersphere. They argue that Twitter changed the patterns of civic and political engagement in the Zimbabwean authoritarian environment. In chapter 8, Mare and Matsilele show how political mobilization in the Zimbabwean 2018 election relied on a sophisticated appropriation of the hybrid media system (Chadwick, 2013). Their study concludes that political parties and candidates in Zimbabwe used a wide array of traditional and digital platforms during the July 2018 elections. This also suggests that in any given context political parties, candidates and voters can possibly deploy all the various layers of the media ecologies rather than the single media technologies (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012).

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The relationship between social media and elections is also examined through the framework of alternative media. In his chapter, Mano discusses how Twitter has emerged as an important counter-power to the “big men” politics in Africa. He argues that in much of Africa, mainstream media is captured by commercial and political interests; hence, ordinary Africans have to rely on alternative communications. Social media constitute these alternatives. This resonates with most of the chapters in this volume, where it is argued that social media is providing a platform to suppressed underground and oppositional communication. Social Media as Game Changer With the emergence of new forms of technology and communication tools, social media has now become an important element in political campaigning, if not a game changer. Social media are reshaping much of political communication in Africa, setting up new rules, winners and losers. They are changing the way political parties and candidates campaign for public office; how they raise funds, mobilize support and establish and maintain relationships with the electorate; and how they fight their adversaries. Likewise, social media is changing the way people communicate, gather news and participate in political processes. As such, we can say that social media is fundamentally changing the conduct of political campaigns and elections. Electoral campaigns, crises and squabbles between contestants have assumed new dimensions due to the influence of social media. Enhanced sharing and connecting has resulted in new cultures and behaviours involving voters and politicians. Political parties, candidates, ‘pundits’ and citizens in general have taken to the social media in unprecedented ways to project their voices on key issues at election time. With an improving accessibility to smartphones, even people with limited access to mainstream media have used social media to send messages in real time with new implications for democratization. While social media creates new opportunities for political campaigns, mobilization, engagement and participation, it also raises urgent questions about the impact and accuracy of viral information conveyed at speed on Facebook, Twitter or even Instagram. Many rightly argue that social media is crucial for free and fair elections, but there are equally genuine concerns about how it can be captured and manipulated by those with vested interests to subvert the electoral systems, undermine the integrity of elections and democracy.

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Those with political power and money can easily hire automated systems like bots. Algorithms are creating new ways of disrupting communication. The digital environment has given rise to more potent forms of fake news, information distortions and below-the-belt campaigning methods that are undermining electoral democracy in Africa. As Ndlela’s chapter demonstrates, social media algorithms and bots are the new players in the conduct of election campaigns in Africa. The power of social media algorithms in controlling social media content makes them a significant factor in any election campaign, where people use social media. African political parties are spending huge sums hiring consultancy companies with expertise in digital campaigning and even manipulation of social media content. There are indications that social media algorithms and bots are slowly changing the dynamics of elections in Africa, presenting new prospects as well as challenges for the fledgling democracies. For example, the list of influencers during elections has extended. Current influencers include not just human actors (politicians, journalists and bloggers) but also social media bots that mimic human behaviour. As noted in the Portland Communications Report, How Africa Tweets 2018, Twitter bots account for more than 20% of influencers in countries like Lesotho and Kenya. Social media is changing not only how politicians and political parties campaign but also how election information is accessed, shared and re-mediated in the new digital media landscape. Social media provides spaces for participation (by both human and non-human actors) and engagements that shape the production of meaning.

Structure of the Book This edited book is part of a series of two volumes, focusing on different aspects of social media and elections in the African context. The first volume focuses on election campaign issues as well as on the theoretical and methodologies issues; the second volume addresses some of the challenges associated with the use of social media. The chapters in this volume illuminate different narratives around the implications of social media on elections in Africa. These narratives are built around studies of social media and elections in selected countries. Each chapter in this volume tries to show, in its own way, how social media platforms have been used in connection with election campaigning. In an attempt to enhance coherence in the volume, chapters have been grouped according to their inclination (theoretical and methodological) as well as the main medium analysed.

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The book opens with three chapters (including the Introduction) addressing theoretical, technological and methodological aspects related to the study of social media. Kaplan and Haenlein (2010) define social media as “a group of internet-based applications that build on the ideological and technological foundations of Web  2.0, and that allow the creation and exchange of user-generated content” (p.  61). Imbued in these technologies is a system of algorithms and bot software that affects the visibility (invisibility) and distribution of social media content. Chapter 2 focuses on the technological dimensions of social media, looking specifically at algorithms used in major platforms like Facebook and Twitter, as well as the increasing use of bots in social media communications. Chapter 3 ponders on the issues of methodology and epistemology in the African context. The chapter is anchored in a quest for comparative scholarship that can specifically explore emerging campaign practices in the continent. The comparative work can be inspired by the need to contend with ‘Africanization’, ‘de-Westernization’ and ‘decolonization’. Chapter  3 is hence concerned with possible future research trajectory. The following two chapters examine a specific social media platform, Twitter. Chapter 4 examines responses to presidential tweets in Africa, citing examples from Nigeria, Uganda and Zimbabwe. The chapter is interested in the critical responses to the presidents’ election messages. Do these responses constitute a challenge to power? Conclusions in this chapter point to the emerging spaces for mobilizing resistance to authoritarianism and failed promises from elections. Chapter 5 discusses the use of Twitter in mediating Zimbabwe’s 2018 elections. The next set of chapters explore the use of social media in general in connection to elections in Ghana, Cameroon, Zimbabwe, Swaziland, Lesotho, Botswana and Uganda. Chapter 6 contextualizes the evolving democratic credentials of social media as a contemporary tool in broadening the participatory principle of Ghana’s multiparty democracy, while chapter 7 examines social media use in the 2018 presidential election in Cameroon. Chapter 8 investigates how, why and for what purposes political actors and citizens in Zimbabwe used traditional and digital media, especially Facebook, WhatsApp and Twitter, before, during and after the 30 July 2018 elections. Chapter 9 examines the use of social media in three Southern African countries of Eswatini, Lesotho and Botswana. It is evident in chapter 9 that the legal frameworks for

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elections have a bearing on the use of social media. For example, the political framework in Eswatini forbids political party competition for public office, preferring a much more traditional structured approach to selecting members of parliament. In this structure, social media use for campaigning diminishes. Chapter 10 examines Ugandan musician Bobi Wine’s successful use of social media in the election campaigns, focusing specifically on the Arua primary elections. Bobi Wine has emerged as one of the popular and controversial opposition contenders in the Ugandan politics, using social media to mobilize against the regime of the long-serving president Yoweri Museveni. Chapter 11 examines the use of Facebook in the intra-party elections by two major political parties in Ghana. Its findings show that the use of social media in intra-party elections was rather minimal, characterized mostly by passive transmission of messages. What emerges from the chapters in this volume is the growing significance of social media in the election campaigns. The uptake of social media is increasing as more and more citizens are gaining access to the new media. Social media is becoming part of the campaign media mix. However, as this volume shows, the use of social media in elections varies greatly, with some countries registering relatively little use of the new media.

Notes 1. https://wearesocial-net.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/ 2018/01/DIGITAL-IN-2018-003-INTERNET-PENETRATION-MAPV1.00.png (accessed 10.05.2019). 2. https://www.internetworldstats.com/stats1.htm (accessed 10.05.2019). 3. https://wearesocial-net.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/ 2018/01/DIGITAL-IN-2018-003-INTERNET-PENETRATION-MAPV1.00.png (accessed 10.05.2019).

References Bennett, L. W., & Segerberg, A. (2012). The Logic of Connective Action: Digital Media and the Personalization of Contentious Politics. Information, Communication and Society, 15(5), 739–768. Benkler, Y. (2006). The Wealth of Networks. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Brassier, R. (2015). Cyber-utopianism. Retrieved from http://crowdsociety.org/ index.php/Cyber-utopianism

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Castells, M. (2009). Communication Power. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chadwick, A. (2013). The Hybrid Media System: Politics and Power. London: Oxford University Press. Chadwick, A., Dennis, J., & Smith, A. P. (2016). Politics in the Age of Hybrid Media. In A. Bruns, G. Enli, E. Skogerbø, A. O. Larsson, & C. Christensen (Eds.), The Routledge Companion to Social Media and Politics. New  York: Routledge. Dahlgren, P. (2005). The Internet, Public Sphere, and Political Communication: Dispersion and Deliberation. Political Communication, 22, 147–162. De Bruijn, M., Nyamnjoh, F., & Brinkman, I. (2009). Mobile Phones: The New Talking Drums of Everyday Africa. Bamenda, Cameroon: Langaa Research and Publishing Common Initiative Group. Diamond, L. (2010). Liberation Technology. Journal of Democracy, 21, 69–83. Fuchs, C. (2014). Social Media and the Public Sphere. TripleC, 12(1), 57–101. Kaplan, A. M., & Haenlein, M. (2010). Users of the World, Unite! The Challenges and Opportunities of Social Media. Business Horizons, 53(1), 59–68. Majama, K. (2018). Exploring Africa’s Digitalisation Agenda in the Context of Promoting Civil Liberties. Paper presented at the Digitalization in Africa: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Technology, Development, and Justice Tübingen, Germany. Norris, P. (1999). On Message: Communicating the Campaign. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Papacharissi, Z. (2009). The Virtual Sphere 2.0. The Internet, the Public Sphere, and Beyond. In A. Chadwick & P. N. Howard (Eds.), Routledge Handbook of Internet Politics (pp. 230–245). New York: Routledge. Schelenz, L., & Schopp, K. (2018). Digitalization in Africa: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Technology, Development, and Justice. International Journal of Digital Society, 9(4). Tolbert, C. J., & McNeal, R. S. (2003). Unraveling the Effects of the Internet on Political Participation? Political Research Quarterly, 56(2), 175–185.

CHAPTER 2

Social Media Algorithms, Bots and Elections in Africa Martin N. Ndlela

Introduction Social media is becoming a dominant factor in electoral processes, with platforms like Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and WhatsApp having a tremendous influence in the creation, dissemination and consumption of political content. The platforms collect more and more data about their users—what they do online, post, share, read, like, forward, their keystrokes, movements, locations, check-ins, interests and so forth. In so doing, social media platforms, including kinds of computer devices they run on, collate virtually every aspect of everyday life. The resulting information, as Pasquale (2015, p. 4) notes, is a vast amount of data that until recently went unrecorded, that is fed into databases and assembled into profiles of unprecedented depth and specificity. Also imbued in these social media platforms is a system of software, codes and algorithms, which manages, sorts and ranks content into manageable levels. Algorithms,

M. N. Ndlela (*) Inland Norway University of Applied Sciences, Elverum, Norway e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 M. N. Ndlela, W. Mano (eds.), Social Media and Elections in Africa, Volume 1, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30553-6_2

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commonly used for calculation and data processing, are “encoded procedures for transforming input data into a desired output, based on specified calculations” (Gillespie, 2014, p. 167). The power of the algorithms, as MacCormick (2012, p.  25) notes, is “its ability to find needles in haystacks,” referring to its ability to filter and rank the content. The power of algorithms in filtering, ranking and selecting media content makes them a significant element in election campaigns, not just in the West but also in emerging democracies in Africa. As Beer (2017) argues, “once we begin to reflect on the scale of these processes – with algorithms, sorting, filtering, searching, prioritizing, recommending, deciding and so on,” discussion on the social role of algorithms becomes pertinent. However, uncertainty about how algorithms work might, as Beer (2017, p. 3) cautions, “lead us to misjudge their power, to overemphasize their importance, to misconceive of the algorithm as a lone detached actor.” The objective of this chapter is to examine how these social media algorithmic processes are, directly or indirectly, influencing elections in the African context. Are social media algorithms changing the election campaign landscape? If so, with what implications to Africa’s fragile democracies? The examination of the influence of algorithms in Africa is attentive to the dangers of framing key debates on electoral democracy and automated communication by means of Western-user behaviour patterns and contexts. As Milan and Treré (2019) argue, the “different, the underprivileged, the silenced, the subaltern, and the ‘have-nots’, whose presence outdoes geographical boundaries, often remain in the blind spot” (p. 320). Africa is still characterized by fragile democracies, weak economies, poverty and unequal distribution of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) resources. It is hence important not to strip the African countries of their particularities. Social media penetration in some countries is still very low, and in some, it is mainly an urban phenomenon. We have to understand Africa as a plural entity by avoiding any forms of digital universalism. As Chan (2013) argues, digital universalism is a myth, as digital cultures and network politics emerging in the periphery do much more than replicate the technological future imagined in the mainstream centres. Digital technology is not just “imported magic” but rather a context-specific appropriation moulded by an array of social forces (Medina, Marques, & Holmes, 2014). Appropriation of social media varies across the continent, and so does its role in elections.

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Algorithmic Power Algorithms are ubiquitous and pervasive, employed in various ways. Today, algorithms are present everywhere, from the most basic functions of the biggest search engines and social networking sites, to the ways formerly laborious operations are fully automatized. Even though the omnipresence of algorithms increasingly shapes and defines digital media ecologies, their quasi-autonomous logic and practice remain largely opaque. As Willson (2017) correctly notes, our everyday practices are increasingly mediated through online technologies, entailing the navigation and also oft-simultaneous creation of large quantities of information and communication data. The enormous amounts of data created require systems that can manage, interpret and disseminate them. These systems include software, codes and the algorithms, which sort and rank the content consumed by the users. The system influences the choices we make ourselves. The recommendation engines lead users into different spheres of consumption of political news. The algorithmic applications promote other items from a stock of many others. Which items are promoted and why? We might never know why the algorithms are coded (by the programmers) in such a way as to rank certain items, individuals or political parties higher. What we know is that the algorithms influence the modalities of visibility and invisibility, a phenomenon akin to media institutions. The media industry is built around the parameters of visibility. Media (in)visibility revolves around the power of the media and journalists to select items from the social field, sort them, amplify or marginalize them and decide not just whether to give them visibility but also how they should be presented. As argued by Bucher (2017), “becoming visible, or being granted visibility is a highly contested power in which the media play a crucial role” (p. 1165). There are several theories in media studies that deal with the aspects and implication of media visibility. One of the essential theories in communication studies is the gatekeeping theory (Lewin, 1951), which uses the metaphor of a gate, and the gatekeeper who decides what information should move to the receivers and what information should not. In the media, the editors play gatekeeping roles and use their own influence to decide which information is published, aired or not. The media receive lot of information and stories from society, but due to considerations of space, time and ethical bias, they cannot share all that to their audiences. In the social media sphere, where the amount

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of information is daunting, algorithms determine an item’s visibility and invisibility. The gatekeepers in this scenario are those behind the design of algorithm used in a particular social media platform, as well as those who can leverage the tools for other purposes, be it marketing, persuasion or manipulation of political discourses. The agenda-setting theory by McCombs and Shaw (1972) describes the media influence and their ability to tell us what issues are important. In their study of US presidential campaigns, McCombs and Shaw found that the mass media exerted a significant influence on what voters considered to be the major issues of the campaign. The basic assumption in agenda-setting is that the media filters and concentrates on few issues, and hence is successful in telling the readers what to think about. This aspect of selecting and ranking stories is central to social media configurations. Social media algorithms participate in configuring what can/should be seen and cannot be seen as well as who can see and who cannot see whom. Google’s PageRank algorithm, for example, ranks millions of search results and puts the most relevant ones on top; therefore, these become visible to the users searching for information. Algorithms analyse hundreds of different factors including quality and relevancy. Introna and Nissenbaum (2000) argue in their work that manipulated by the wealthy and technologically adept, search engines may be presenting an increasingly distorted and limited view of the Web. Human gatekeepers hold key to inclusion in indexing databases and configurations in their algorithms. Tech companies like Google, Twitter and Facebook, for example, have been accused of political bias by the US president Donald Trump.1 Trump’s criticism hinges on high visibility of negative items about him in highly trafficked websites like CNN.com and NYTimes.com, which often appear first in the Google search results. Google algorithms are a major factor in determining what information users are exposed to. In her research on Facebook’s News Feed, Bucher (2017, p.  1167) notes that “akin to the algorithmic logic of search engines, Facebook deploys an automated and predetermined selection mechanism to establish relevancy (most interesting), ultimately demarcating the field of visibility for that media space.” Hence, Facebook’s EdgeRank algorithm determines what is shown on the users’ Top News. How Facebook Algorithms Affect News Flow Facebook’s EdgeRank algorithms determine what is displayed in the user’s News Feed. News Feed, first launched in 2006, only displays a subset of

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stories by one’s friends, derived from a set of factors. As explained by Kincaid (2010), every item that shows up in the user’s News Feed is considered an object. If you have an object in the News Feed (e.g. status update), whenever another user interacts with that object, they are creating what Facebook calls an Edge. An Edge includes actions like tags, likes and comments. There are three different components in the Facebook algorithm: • The affinity score between the viewing user and the item’s creator. Interacting with friend often by checking their profile and sending messages will give you a higher affinity score for that friend, than with other friends with lesser interaction. • The weight given to each type of Edge. This depends on what Facebook considers to be important; for example, giving a comment has more weight than a Like. • The time factor, whereby the older the Edge, the less important it becomes. The object’s EdgeRank is derived through the multiplication of factors for each Edge and then adding the Edge scores. The object’s EdgeRank determines whether it shows up in the News Feed or not. Through this algorithm, Facebook decides which news will appear in your newsfeeds. The Facebook algorithm ranks all available posts that can display on a user’s News Feed, based on how likely that user will have a positive reaction (Swan, 2018).2 Every movement each Facebook user does, be it making a comment, liking a post or watching a video, provides signs that show the algorithm what you might be interested in or not. As Montells (n.d.) remarks, “EdgeRank is Facebook’s big brother. It’s watching you all times.” Facebook’s algorithms continue to evolve due to several factors, including regulatory and data protection issues. One of the major issues has been determining what to prioritize. As outlined in Montells (n.d.), several changes in prioritization have been done by Facebook, and these include prioritization of popular publications (2009), prioritization of friends’ posts (2015) and Facebook Stories (2017), which allow users to share photos and stories that will disappear after 24 hours, and prioritization of videos that engage users on the timeline (2017). In its January 2018 update, Facebook promised to “prioritize posts that spark conversations and meaningful interactions between people. To do this, we will predict which posts you might want to interact with your friends about, and show

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these posts higher in the feed.” This meant that Facebook would prioritize content posted from friends. As Adam Mosseri, VP for Facebook’s News Feed Management, puts it, the goal is to show stories that matter to users. At the Facebook F8 Conference (2018), Facebook revealed that its algorithm for ranking and displaying content on News Feed will be based on the following factors: the inventory of all posts available for display, signals that tell Facebook what each post is, predictions on how a person will react to each post and a final score assigned to the content based on all factors considered (ibid.). Another important change announced by Facebook pertained to the ranking system for news organizations based on trustworthiness. Facebook will use “user surveys” to determine news outlets that are trusted and those that are not. Changes in the ranking of news outlets is a response to the backlash the social platform faced concerning the spread of fake news and misinformation. In its Facebook F8 Conference (2019), Facebook announced a series of drastic changes by promising to shift the social media platform from the dominance of news feeds to more private and encrypted messaging. Facebook and its other applications like Facebook Messenger, Instagram and WhatsApp are key to political communications in Africa. Twitter Algorithms Since its launch in 2006, several changes have been done to Twitter algorithm. Earlier, tweets were displayed in reverse chronological order, where each user’s feed contained tweets from their followers. In 2015, Twitter introduced a feature called “while you were away” meant to recap tweets one may have missed. These tweets are not shown in a chronological order but rather what Twitter considers to be the best tweets from one’s network. The feature pulls tweets only from the accounts one follows and engages with most often—not necessarily the most popular tweets on the service. In so doing Twitter was trying to predict which users one wants to hear from regardless of how popular their content is overall. The algorithmic timeline meant that tweets would no longer appear in the order they were posted. Instead, a complex, opaque software program would decide which tweets the user saw (Oremus, 2017).3 Twitter algorithm is dynamic, and as Deepak Rao (the product manager of the Twitter timeline) said, “our algorithm changes on an almost daily to weekly basis.”4 The Twitter timeline consists of ranked tweets, “in case you missed it,” and remaining tweets in reverse chronological order.

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In its ranked section, the Twitter algorithm analyses and presents tweeter posts that it thinks users want to see (ibid.). In the “in case you missed it” section, tweets are ordered according to what Twitter thinks is relevant to the users. The remaining tweets consist of retweets, promote tweets, suggested tweets and others in reserve-chronological order (Lua, 2018). Twitter algorithm assesses tweets from every person or organization one follows and assigns scores based on a range of other factors built around the tweet itself, the tweet’s author and the user. These factors include the recency of the tweet, presence of image(s) or video(s), total interactions such as retweets, likes and time spent reading it, past interactions with the author, the strength of connections, the origin of your relationship, clicks, time spent reading it and the last activity of the individual on Twitter (Koumchatzky & Andryeyev, 2017). These changes ensured that the most popular tweets are far more widely seen than they used to be, enabling them to go viral on an unprecedented scale (Oremus, 2017). Trends algorithms are designed to capture topics that are enjoying a surge in popularity. For politicians seeking popularity, Twitter is the medium of choice. Donald Trump’s use of Twitter in the American and global political scene exemplifies the power engrained in the tweets. Oremus argues that the implication of these changes is that the Twitter algorithm risks further insulating its users from people whose viewpoints run counter to their own. Such a phenomenon can lead to polarization of the electorate. As Gillespie (2011) argues, we should recognize that these algorithms are not neutral, that they encode political choices and that they frame information in a particular way. The algorithmic power is aptly put in Pasquale’s (2015) postulations that these automated processes influence not only the route we take to a new restaurant but also which restaurant Google, Yelp, OpenTable or Siri recommends to us. Pasquale (2015) further argues that recommendation engines at Amazon and YouTube gently suggest offerings they think we’ll like. The following section looks at how social media algorithm affects elections.

Algorithms and Social Bots in Election Campaigns Algorithms play a major role in the dissemination of information and news on elections. Facebook and Twitter algorithms discussed earlier indicate that social media infrastructure influences the movement of political ­information to the user(s), through recommendations and news feeds.

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This affects visibility or invisibility of certain information, hence highlighting their increasing role as news sources. Visible information is likely to be shared through human agency, far beyond algorithm-based platforms to non-algorithm-based applications like WhatsApp and Messenger as well as mainstream media. Facebook’s role in the automated dissemination of news has become a source of controversy around the world, and more so in a context where Facebook has little or no editorial oversights over news products. Facebook’s instant articles, launched in 2015, gave Facebook dominance in the distribution of news online. As Newton (2016) notes, the arrival of instant news was a turning point for the media. Since then, Facebook’s role as a distributor of news has grown tremendously. The Pew Research surveys in the USA, for example, have shown that one-third of Americans regularly get news from the Facebook and Twitter (Mitchell & Matsa, 2014). Most readers not only read but also share the articles in their networks. Facebook acknowledges that “journalism is one of the primary reasons people return to the News Feed each day” (Newton, 2016). Similarly, in African countries, where the use of mobile devices is increasing, people are using social media, especially Facebook, Twitter and WhatsApp, as an important source of news. For example, research in Kenya shows that most young people get their news via social media (Ndlela, 2020). The role of social media algorithms in elections is further exacerbated by other human and automated actors. Behind social media content are some economic, political and cultural agendas and authority that are increasingly expressed algorithmically. Of major concern are actors that deploy social bots (short for robots) to manipulate public opinion and influence the outcome of the vote. Bots are software that can execute commands when they receive specific input. Social bots mimic and potentially manipulate humans and their behaviour in social networks (Keller & Klinger, 2019). They run automatically to produce messages, post in online forums and interact with social media users through likes, comments, advocate ideas, act as followers (fake accounts) and even share social media contributions. These bots can even start and catalyse online phenomena in order to stir outrage and artificial hypes (ibid.). In so doing, bots can potentially alter perceptions of political reality by spreading propaganda and false information. Bots can infiltrate social media groups and spread messages for malicious purposes. Fake social media accounts can influence politics and even create online personas capable of influencing real people.5

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While it has become harder for automated programs to create fake accounts, with human intervention, fake accounts still flourish in social media. Bad actors such as troll factories, propagandists and unscrupulous PR firms manually create fake accounts, which they then deploy automatically to amplify messages in order to influence the public opinion and election outcome. It is estimated that between 9% and 15% Twitter accounts are social bots (Ferrara, Varol, Davis, Menczer, & Flammini, 2016), while several such accounts also exist on Facebook. Recently, Facebook uncovered sophisticated social media activities targeting elections in various parts of the world including African countries like Nigeria, Senegal, Togo, Niger and Tunisia (Gleicher, 2019). In a blog post, Facebook’s Head of Cybersecurity Policy, Nathaniel Gleicher, announced that they removed 265 Facebook and Instagram accounts, Facebook pages, groups and events involved in coordinated inauthentic behaviour. This activity emanated from an Israeli-based political consultancy company, Archimedes Group. The account holders, posing as locals and local news organizations, shared content, including election-related news and criticism targeting politicians, and artificially increased engagement. As noted earlier, objects with high interaction are the most promoted in Facebook and Twitter feeds. Bots networks and troll factories amplify the dissemination of fake news, often as part of deliberate sophisticated disinformation campaign to influence public opinion and election campaigns. These automated activities endanger interaction and participation in social media, thus undermining the very core of democratic processes. The prevalence of the deployment of social bots in African elections is much more than previously envisaged. According to a report by Portland Communications, How Africa Tweets 2018, 53% of the leading voices on Twitter around ten elections contested between June 2017 and May 2018 came from outside the country in which the elections were contested (Portland Communications, 2018). The authors found that bots, and accounts displaying machine-like behaviour, were active across all elections, and, in some cases, potentially more influential than news media, bloggers, government, campaigners, politicians and think tanks. Figure 2.1 shows the percentage of potential bot influences. The magnitude of the influence of bots in African elections is self-­ evident. During election periods, African countries experience a surge in bot activities, gradually subsiding when the election cycle is over. In some countries like Kenya (27.6%), Senegal (18.6%) and Equatorial Guinea (19.3%), bots are the most highly ranked potential influencers, ahead of

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Potential bot influence on the polls (%) 3.6

Rwanda (August 2017)

9.4

Angola (August 2017)

12.2

Liberia (October 2017)

13.5

Egypt (March 2018) Somaliland (November 2017)

15.7 18.6

Senegal (July 2017)

19.3

Equatorial Guinea (November 2017)

19.8

Lesotho (June 2017)

24.8

Kenya (August 2017)

27.6

Kenya (October 2017)

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

Fig. 2.1  Potential bot influence on polls (based on statistics from Portland Communications)

other influencers. In these countries, bots drove the Twitter conversations during elections. Bots on social media have not only been an influential actor, but also been fingered in the spread of misinformation and fake news. Spreading Fake News Exchanges in social media are good until they stray into the sphere of misinformation and fake news. Used in different contexts, the concept of fake news has come to mean different things. Wardle identifies seven different typologies of fake news: satire or parody (no intention to cause harm but has potential to fool); misleading content (misleading use of information to frame an issue or individual); imposter content (where genuine sources are impersonated); fabricated content (new content is 100% false, designed to deceive and do harm); false connection (when headlines, visuals don’t support the content), false context (when genuine content is shared with false contextual information) and manipulated content (when genuine information or imagery is manipulated to deceive). (Wardle, 2017)

Fake news manifests itself in different ways, spurning three different elements concerning the types of content created and shared, the motivation behind the creation of this content and the mechanism for sharing it (ibid.). Fake news comes in various forms, and these include fabricated

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news articles and videos, which mimic websites and logos of well-known news sources, like BBC, CNN and even local news organizations. For an unsuspecting eye, the information is passed as being authentic. Through social media, disinformation can be targeted at individuals who, oblivious of its fake nature, are likely to accept and share within their own networks, or even respond with physical actions. For example, in India, real-world violence, lynching and murder of innocent people have been attributed to false information circulated through WhatsApp. In the age of automated communications, fake news can easily spread through social media. As Mare (2018) notes, it is this extraordinary ease and rapidity with which information can be disseminated and shared globally over the Internet and social media platforms that distinguishes modern-­day fake news from its predecessors. In social media, any form of human interaction with the fake news, be it a like, play, share or comment, triggers other algorithmic responses that are likely to increase the object’s visibility to other users in the network. As noted earlier, Facebook algorithms increase visibility of items that have more Edge, or levels of interactions. As also argued in the case of Archimedes Group, social bots and botnets also push the dissemination of fake news by manipulating the levels of interaction with the ‘object.’ Archimedes Group is not the only actor seeking to influence the vote in Africa. Other propagandists and hired public relations firms spin and sometimes fabricate stories for the clients in Africa. The production and dissemination of fake news is driven by different motives, be it economical, ideological or political. Some of the actors employ clandestine activities with the intention of influencing election outcome. Furthermore, these actors are often hired as external consultancies by African leaders or by their sponsors. Speaking to a British Channel 4’s undercover journalist, Cambridge Analytica’s (CA) executive claimed that they ran Uhuru Kenyatta’s campaign in the Kenyan 2017 elections. CA’s then CEO Alexander Nix boasted of using, among other things, fake news to swing elections around the world, and “that things don’t necessarily need to be true as long as they are believed.”6 While his claims could not be substantiated, there are speculations of the company’s involvement in the Kenyan elections, at least in the digital communications sphere. Trolls and bots targeted the main contenders in the Kenyan elections, including those organizations believed to be backing them. One case reported in the Kenyan media pertains to the US-based Vanguard Africa, an organization which promotes free and fair elections. Prior to the elections, the

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­ rganization invited opposition leader Raila Odinga to the USA, where he o met with US lawmakers. Soon afterwards, fake letters with Vanguard logo circulated in the Kenyan social media purporting to reveal efforts to rig Kenya’s election for Odinga. The Vanguard director was subjected to coordinated Twitter notifications from bots and trolls posting the same false information.7 The Raila campaign was also targeted with attack ads, videos and anonymous sites like TheRealRaila and Uhuru for Us. The video “Raila’s Kenya 2020” purportedly by Cambridge Analytica, predicts how Kenya would be like if Raila Odinga won the election. Using graphic imagery from Kenya’s past, it tells viewers that Raila would make himself president for life, revoke the constitution, dissolve parliament, allow corruption and foment violence among other things. The video was distributed widely through social media. The exact impact of these dirty tricks is not known, but what is evident is that they became part of the campaign news. Madowo (2018) argues that Cambridge Analytica helped hijack Kenya’s democracy by “manipulating voters with apocalyptic attack ads and smeared Kenyatta’s opponent Raila Odinga as violent, corrupt and dangerous.”8 Another firm, Aristotle International, worked on the side of the opposition candidate, propagating its messages in an already polarized situation. Elsewhere in Nigeria (2015), Cambridge Analytica provided ‘advertising and marketing’ services in support of the then president Goodluck Jonathan campaign, while another company AKPD ran the campaign for Buhari from the opposition.9 These firms played on existing ethno-­ religious animosity, further polarizing the nations along ethnic, sectarian and religious lines. In a testimony to UK Parliament’s Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) Committee, whistle-blower Christopher Wylie told British MPs about the graphic video used by Cambridge Analytica to influence Nigerian elections.10 The video “Coming to Nigeria on February 15th” uses graphic imagery, mostly from Nigeria’s past, to portray Muhammadu Buhari (a Moslem) as a supporter of sharia law and Muslims as violent people. It predicts how Nigeria would be like if Buhari won. The video shows people being dismembered, have their throats cut or burned alive, and it makes claims such as the new president will negotiate with the Islamist militant group Boko Haram and that women will be veiled. It ends by asking voters to stop this from becoming real. These examples highlight the increasing role of social media in African elections. While Facebook has launched fact-checking tools to inhibit the spread of fake news, it has been difficult to track fake news in its applications like

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WhatsApp and Messenger. WhatsApp is the epicentre of fake news distribution in Africa. It has easily become a battleground in polarized elections, raising concerns that it is distorting political debates, some of which take place in secluded groups, where members feast on unverified content. Ideally, political debates should take place within the public sphere. As Boadle (2018) notes in the case of Brazilian elections in 2018, “WhatsApp’s end-to-end encryption allows groups of hundreds of users to exchange texts, photos and video beyond the purview of electoral authorities, independent fact checkers or even the platform itself.”11 In such an environment, “false rumours, manipulated photos, decontextualized videos and audio hoaxes have become campaign ammunition, going viral on the platform with no way to monitor their origin or full reach” (ibid.). For example, during the post-election violence in Kenya (2017) and Zimbabwe (2018), people were taking videos and pictures of past election-­ related violence and posting/sharing them as current occurrences. In an opinion article in Al Jazeera, Sambuli (2017) notes how disinformation and fake news were employed during the 2017 elections in Kenya. Sambuli notes that following the announcement of incumbent Uhuru Kenyatta as the winner of the presidential race, protests and riots erupted in the opposition strongholds. She argues that the scant coverage of the riots by the mainstream media saw people looking to social media for updates. The opposition party claimed in its press statement then that 100 people had been killed by police officers, while the Kenya National Commission for Human Rights put the number of casualties at 24. Social media became awash with graphic footage and images of violence in Nairobi slums of Kibera and Mathare as well as other towns. While it cannot be dismissed that the post-election violence resulted in loss of life, injury and destruction of property, distortion and amplification in social media was exacerbating the situation. When humanitarian organizations on the ground like the Red Cross dismissed the widely shared stories of ‘mayhem’ as fake news, they elicited strong reactions from the public (Sambuli, 2017). This clearly shows how social media users are likely to believe as true, stories circulated in social media, notwithstanding their lack of authenticity. The BBC’s Beyond Fake News research project analysed fake news messages in Nigeria, Kenya and India. It noted that in countries with lower levels of digital literacy such as in the rural areas of Nigeria and Kenya, things on Facebook, just like those on the Internet, might be seen as true. The immediate danger of fake news in highly contested and polarized political situations is that they can easily ignite conflict. The aftermath of the 2007

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elections saw Kenya descending into full mayhem that left 1000 dead and thousands displaced as ethnic groups attacked those they thought did not belong. Social media–driven fake news has become a major issue in African election, raising fears that it distorts democratic processes. As Mare (2018) puts it, fake news has “a corrosive effect of creating misinformed citizens.” In order to make informed choices during elections, voters need credible information and facts. Misleading information undermines democratic discourses. It should, however, be noted that the impact of fake news on elections varies from place to place. Most worrying is how online fake news translates into offline actions. The local media ecology and media cultures determine the consumption and effects of fake news. The impact is likely to be higher in those contexts where media audiences have little access or faith in mainstream media and use social media as their main source of news. In countries with little social media penetration, the impact of fake news will be minimal. As Wasserman (2017) argues, news—whether ‘fake’ or ‘real’—should not be understood outside of its particular contexts of production and consumption. Hence, in discussing the implication of fake news, one has to take into consideration local specificities. The Dangers of ‘Filter Bubbles’ and ‘Echo Chambers’ There have been debates on whether algorithms in social media lead to ‘filter bubbles’ and echo chambers. The concept ‘filter bubble’ refers “to the intellectual isolation that can occur when websites make use of algorithms to selectively assume the information a user wants to see, and then give information to the user according to this assumption” (Techopedia).12 This selective exposure to one-sided information might result in users being locked up in ‘echo chambers,’ in which they are only exposed to like-minded content (Pariser, 2011). Facebook News Feed provides feeds based on the user’s past behaviour, and therefore it is likely to present similar information only. The role of algorithms in the news consumption is aptly captured by people surveyed by Pew Research Center: “the more we clicked links to articles on Facebook, the more of them Facebook showed us” (Newton, 2016). This, according to researchers, results in the creation of spaces with like-minded information, that is, filter bubbles (Pariser, 2011).

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The debate about the filter bubbles caused by algorithmic news recommendation hinges on their implications to media pluralism and diversity considered a cornerstone to democracy. According to theorists, a well-­ functioning democracy needs a kind of shared space of information, debate and engagement (Dahlgren, 2009; Habermas, 1989). Bechmann and Nielbo (2018) have examined whether we are indeed exposed to the same news in the News Feed. Research by Fletcher and Nielsen (2017) concludes that algorithmic recommendation systems have not locked large segments of the audience into bubbles, while Möller, Trilling, Helberger, and van Es (2018) caution that we should not blame it on the algorithm. While there is no agreement yet on the issue of filter bubbles, there is growing evidence on their likelihood in certain social media contexts, including countries in Africa. The existing sociopolitical context as well as the media ecology provide fertile ground for the emergency of filter bubble-­like phenomena. In the African contexts, there is evidence of social media amplifying echo chambers and filter bubbles. Echo chambers are evident in the form of Facebook groups and WhatsApp groups, based on different factors including ideological inclinations, ethnicity, political affiliations and region. It is within these groups that political information is shared and discussed. Very often, it is information that reinforces the group’s existing viewpoints about issues. WhatsApp is one of the most popular platforms to get information in Africa. In Zimbabwe, for example, WhatsApp connections constitute almost half of all Internet usage (Thomas, 2019). In the highly contested 2018 elections, WhatsApp reinforced the deep political polarization between the ruling ZANU-PF and the main opposition, the MDC Alliance. As Zhangazha (2018) notes in the case of Zimbabwe elections, “the striking characteristics of the electoral campaign related social media content is that it appears to be serving the primary function of fortifying political positions of functioning almost strictly as ‘echo-­ chambers’ of already held perspectives/views.”13 Zhangazha further argues that In turn the targeted voter also accepts, likes, receives, shares information that suits their preferences. Especially on the WhatsApp platform. Bringing to the fore, again, the fact that electoral content on social media for the 2018 elections is mainly about confirming, strengthening their already established preferences. (ibid.)

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The same trend was observed in the highly contested Kenyan elections, where social media influencers, specialists and party supporters actively defended their party positions. Filter bubbles have been the main conduit for misinformation and disinformation.

Social Media in Campaign-Newsgathering Algorithms are very much connected with the news production, distribution and consumption. Analytics are now embedded in newsroom practices, with analytics being used in the management of resources, story selection, formatting and future promotion of stories (Blanchett Neheli, 2018). Content monitoring is not something new in the media, but what is fairly recent is the monitoring of content usage online, including social media. Audience metrics are used to measure the content impact, focusing on how the audiences consumed and interacted with the content. Online audience metrics provide data on the essential metrics such as page views, engaged time, average finish, social shares and the degree of interaction with the content. Digital media outlets have embraced analytics in an endeavour to find out more about their audience’s preferences of news content. Editors track digital stories in order to determine which stories are generating more traffic and which ones need to be promoted. Promotion in social media helps build that traffic. Traditional media encourages readers to share the stories through different social media platforms. The focus on metrics realigns practices in newsroom and also affects information-sharing. Metrics and analytics are used to measure the success or failure of news items. Social media analytics are increasingly becoming vital for newsgathering. In her survey of approaches to automation of and assistance with newsgathering from social media for journalism practitioners, Zubiaga (2018) identified seven categories of social media newsgathering: (1) event detection, (2) summarization, (3) recommender systems, (4) content verification, (5) finding information sources, (6) development of newsgathering dashboards and (7) other tasks. Social media has become a go-to resource for journalists during newsgathering. We have noted how algorithms determine social media feeds, influencing ranking and (in)visibility of content. What the journalists access in their feeds when they search around for news is basically algorithmically determined. In analysing the use of Twitter as a news source, Broersma and Graham (2013) argue that the set-up in Twitter creates disparities between the well-known

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people who are followed by many and “ordinary” people who mainly follow others. Another imbalance is between those who tweet on a regular basis and those who never or only incidentally post. As noted by Broersma and Graham (2013), individual tweets or interaction between various agents on Twitter can even trigger news coverage. During exceptional circumstances like elections, social media work as specific environments for the production and dissemination of election campaign news. Tweets by eminent politicians and political parties, or even bots, trigger news stories or provide commentaries to main stories. In some cases, news stories are based solely on tweets and reactions to those tweets. There are several online newspapers in Africa, whose “reporters” hardly get out of office but rely on social media and other communications for their stories. Online newspapers like NewZimbabwe.com often carry stories sourced and constructed around social media postings. A good example of this practice is a story on the by-election results in Zimbabwe based entirely on the tweet by exiled ZANU-PF politician Jonathan Moyo @ProfJNMoyo, and responses to that twitter by other prominent politicians like David Coltart.14 Tweets are also replicated in traditional and online news media. Tweets have increasingly been used as quotes in stories. The most prominent example of this aspect is the embedment of tweets from @realDonalTrump in the news reports, or in online stories of many news outlets like CNN, CBC and BBC. In this way, journalists are integrating social media in their reporting practices (Broersma & Graham, 2013; Zubiaga, 2018). Researchers on Africa have begun pondering on the implications of new digital technologies in (re) defining African journalism practice (Mare, 2013; Mawindi Mabweazara, 2011; Moyo, 2009). In their work on Africa, Moyo, Mare, and Matsilele (2019) examined how newsrooms in East and Southern Africa use editorial analytics to inform their day-to-day news production and distribution practices. They noted that various social media feeds now play such an important role that journalists and editors have to check what is trending on these platforms before they come to the newsroom (p. 11). They argue that questions such as which story to pursue, from what angle and with what emphasis are more and more dependent upon analytic information gathered about the audiences. In this “analytics-driven journalism” context, newsgathering is tailor-made to meet certain consumption patterns and expectations, rather than the ­public interest. Newsroom analytics leads to the “churning out of clickbaiting headlines, fake news, and sensationalized entertainment content aimed at attracting clicks, views, scroll downs, and comments rather than

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fostering engaged citizenship” (Moyo et  al., 2019, p.  3). This is the “unstructured journalism,” the Kenyan telecommunications giant Safaricom refers to in its sustainability report (Safaricom, 2017). The report notes that “the popularity and immediacy of social media has created a medium for unstructured journalism and the publishing of either unverified information or deliberately misleading stories” (p. 62). There are several cases of journalists wittingly or unwittingly sharing fake or unverified news. The Advent of Data-Driven Elections Given the increasing uptake of social media in Africa, with the accompanying accumulation of personal and individual data, it is important to examine how big data is used. Entities with political agendas are interfacing with social media platforms in an attempt to harness their data towards achieving certain political goals. Social media companies operate like middlemen who shift their alliances, sometimes advancing the interests of customers, or suppliers, as they seek to maximize profits (Pasquale, 2015). They work with several data analytics companies, research institutes and marketing and public relations entities who mine the data from the platforms and use it for various purposes, including political persuasion, propaganda and distortion. Some of the work falls within the ambit of acceptable campaign norms in a democracy, while some tactics (e.g. propagating false news) arguably undermine democratic institutions. A well-known example is the case of Cambridge Analytica, a data mining and data analysis company actively involved in election campaign strategic communication. Cambridge Analytica, partly owned by a conservative donor Robert Mercer and whose board members included the then presidential candidate, Donald Trump’s aide Stephen Bannon, indirectly harvested data of tens of millions of American users from Facebook.15 The data was analysed and used to create psychological profiles of American voters, which were then used for target messaging. The company was hired by the Trump campaign to give advice on how to influence voters based on the data the company had. The scandal is indicative of how the data from social media could be used to influence the outcome of elections. There are also allegations that Cambridge Analytica had a role in the “Brexit” campaign. Prior to the US and Brexit examples, the company was allegedly involved in the Kenyan elections, as noted earlier. The incidences heightened concerns over whether that data use had an influence in the

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outcome of the 2016 US presidential election and the Brexit vote. The saga is significant in that it gives a hint as to how data on social media platforms can be harvested and used in connection with election campaign. The implication of data mining and data analysis companies in electoral practices is still unknown, but what is certain is the emergence of big data panic. The Cambridge Analytica and Facebook scandal involving the 2016 US presidential election and the Brexit vote show how political agenda can intersect with algorithmic power and bots and influence election campaigns and results. In an article aptly entitled “The Big Data Panic,”16 Simon (2018) asks whether Cambridge Analytica methods mean the end of democracy as we know it. He raises doubts about the success of the CA’s data analysis and targeting. For some data-driven campaign researchers like Kreiss, “there is little research evidence that psychometric targeting is effective in politics and lots of theoretical expectations that it would not be.”17 However, the role of high-tech companies cannot be underestimated, as they are deeply immersed in data-driven political campaigns. “Data-­ driven campaigning involves two main features: targeting, or deciding which messages go to what potential voters at what time during the campaign, and testing, or empirically measuring how well messages perform against one another and using that information to drive content production and further targeting” (Baldwin-Philippi, 2017). Facebook has its ad platform to make micro targeting easier, allowing campaigns to target more precise interests that are based on keywords or categories that users have entered, geographical data and algorithmically created lifestyle profiles (Baldwin-Philippi, 2017). In Facebook, data-driven strategies involve the use of micro-targeted ads, taking the form of sidebar and in-feed ads, targeted by demographics and other Facebook-created interest categories as well as ‘dark posts’ and promoted posts. Cambridge Analytica employed these strategies in Trump’s campaign (Grassegger & Krogerus, 2017; Green & Issenberg, 2016). Tech companies are hence active in this era of digital campaigning. More and more of these companies harvest enormous amounts of personal data in social media. This data is used or even manipulated to influence the digital feeds of political campaigns we get in social media. Contemporary political campaigns in Africa are enmeshed in data-rich environments, where data mining firms, PR and other consultancy firms are making inroads into African elections. In Kenya, while Uhuru Kenyatta’s campaign was entangled in Cambridge Analytica, Raila

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Odinga’s election campaign was being championed by a US-based company, Aristotle, which also uses data mining and algorithms in its strategies. As reported in the Independent Newspaper (UK), the Aristotle CEO John Aristotle Philips and another staffer were detained and deported by Kenyan authorities for their involvement in elections.18 Cambridge Analytica and its sister company Strategic Communication Laboratories Group (SCL) have been involved in election campaigns in Kenya, Nigeria, Mauritius and South Africa. As also noted earlier, Archimedes Group has had activities in Nigeria, Senegal, Togo, Niger and Tunisia, where it engaged in data-driven political campaigning. Using data analytics and other technologies, these companies target social media users with tailored messages and micro ads, with the intention of influencing voter behaviour. While the exact impact of data-driven campaigning is not known, prospective political parties are investing millions of dollars in their services.

Conclusion Social media is now an indispensable element in elections across Africa. Political elections in Africa are gradually played on the various social media platforms, with spillover effects on mainstream media. While canvassing techniques such as rallies, door-to-door and radio are still prevalent in most countries, social media’s influence is on the rise, especially in those countries with increased penetration of social media. Modern elections in Africa encounter more data than before due to increased social media use. Algorithms and bots play an increasing role in the movement of election news, both ‘real’ and fake, and adverts aimed at influencing voters. The trend in using big data and social media in politics is the present and future of the electoral processes. It is raising profound questions about the changing nature of elections and the implications for Africa’s nascent democracies.

Notes 1. https://www.dw.com/en/donald-trump-accuses-google-of-bias-insearch/a-45262939 (accessed 11.04.2019). 2. https://www.cpcstrategy.com/blog/2018/08/facebook-algorithm/ (accessed 12.03.2019). 3. http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/cover_story/2017/03/ twitter_s_timeline_algorithm_and_its_ef fect_on_us_explained. html?via=gdpr-consent (accessed 27.03.19).

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4. https://buffer.com/library/twitter-timeline-algorithm (accessed 27.03. 2019). 5. https://www.distilnetworks.com/glossary/term/social-media-bots/ (accessed 29.05.19). 6. https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/mar/19/cambridgeanalytica-execs-boast-dirty-tricks-honey-traps-elections (accessed 26.03.19). 7. https://nairobinews.nation.co.ke/news/propaganda-ad-raila-odinganasa (accessed 30.05.19). 8. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/global-opinions/wp/2018/ 03/20/how-cambridge-analytica-poisoned-kenyas-democracy/?utm_ term=.1c9ab38b8446 (accessed 26.03.19). 9. https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/mar/21/cambridgeanalyticas-ruthless-bid-to-sway-the-vote-in-nigeria?CMP=share_btn_tw (accessed 03.06.2019). 10. https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/apr/04/cambridge-analytica-used-violent-video-to-try-to-influence-nigerian-election (accessed 03.06.2019). 11. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-brazil-election-whatsapp-explainer/ facebooks-whatsapp-flooded-with-fake-news-in-brazil-election-idUSKCN1MU0UP (accessed 22.05.19). 12. https://www.techopedia.com/definition/28556/filter-bubble (accessed 21.05.2019). 13. https://www.newsday.co.zw/2018/06/social-media-and-zimbabwes2018-election/ (accessed 22.05.19). 14. https://www.newzimbabwe.com/moyo-red-flag-over-dwindling-mdcsupport-in-stronghold-bulawayo/ (accessed 01.04.2019). 15. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/04/us/politics/cambridge-analytica-scandal-fallout.html (accessed 13.03.2019). 16. https://medium.com/viewpoints/cambridge-analytica-and-thebig-data-panic-5029f12e1bcb (accessed 26.03.2019). 17. https://medium.com/viewpoints/cambridge-analytica-and-thebig-data-panic-5029f12e1bcb (accessed 26.03.2019). 18. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/kenya-election2017-uhuru-kenyatta-raila-odinga-us-expert-campaign-data-deported-a7878651.html (accessed 26.03.2019).

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Sambuli, N. (2017). How Kenya Became the Latest Victim of “Fake News”. Retrieved from https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2017/08/ kenya-latest-victim-fake-news-170816121455181.html Simon, F. (2018). The Big Data Panic. Cambridge Analytica Said It Could Move the Minds of American Voters. Science Tells a Different Story. Retrieved March 26, 2019, from https://medium.com/viewpoints/cambridge-analytica-andthe-big-data-panic-5029f12e1bcb Swan, G. (2018). The Facebook Algorithm. How It Works, How to Master It. Retrieved from https://www.cpcstrategy.com/blog/2018/08/ facebook-algorithm/ Thomas, J. (2019). “WhatsApp Has Come in to Fill the Void”: In Zimbabwe, the Future of News Is Messaging. Retrieved from https://www.niemanlab. org/2019/03/whatsapp-has-come-in-to-fill-the-void-in-zimbabwe-the-futureof-news-is-messaging/ Wardle, C. (2017). Fake News. It’s Complicated. Retrieved from https:// medium.com/1st-draft/fake-news-its-complicated-d0f773766c79 Wasserman, H. (2017). Fake News from Africa: Panics, Politics and Paradigms. Journalism. https://doi.org/10.1177/1464884917746861 Willson, M. (2017). Algorithms (and the) Everyday. Information, Communication & Society, 20(1), 137–150. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2016. 1200645 Zhangazha, T. (2018, June 13). Social Media and Zimbabwe’s 2018 Election. Newsday. Retrieved from https://www.newsday.co.zw/2018/06/social-mediaand-zimbabwes-2018-election/ Zubiaga, A. (2018). Mining Social Media for Newsgathering. Retrieved from https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/6aa2/590939d890961bfdf57c5245121e ad4fa12c.pdf

CHAPTER 3

Directions of Political Communication in Africa: Methodology for the Search of an African Model and Epistemology Thomas C. Ijere

Introduction Evidence from recent scholarship on the dynamics of political communication in Africa suggests that emerging digital practices and their influences are increasingly “appealing to politicians and citizens as technology takes the lead as a focal point of political and economic development” (Mutsvairo & Karam, 2018, p. 6). What is not clear, however, is whether or not they are converging practices and an emerging African model of political communication, since “countries have responded differently to advancement in information and communication technology” (ibid.). Against this background, there is a need to understand the features, characteristics, or converging political communication practices in Africa. In this sense, this chapter makes a case for comparative political communication scholarship. The argument here is that comparative scholarship can serve both as a method for unearthing distinctive continent-wide political T. C. Ijere (*) Faculty of Arts, Design, and Social Sciences, Northumbria University, Newcastle upon Tyne, UK e-mail: [email protected]

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communication practices and as an epistemological locus for questioning the largely Anglo-American perspective and standards of campaign models and literature. This chapter is, therefore, methodological and makes a case for comparative research. Specifically, it proposes a framework for the cross-contextual exploration of emerging campaign practices in Africa. The chapter examines the ontological and epistemological debate in the field and highlights evolving trends and elements that can guide comparison of African political communication. It also provides a clear methodological light on guiding principles of the comparative method. Furthermore, it offers a methodological lens for justifying case selection as well as a signpost for addressing the question of methodological equivalence.

Political Communication and the Ontological and Epistemological Debate Conceptually, several definitions are ascribed to political communication. For example, Chaffee (1975, p.  15) defines the concept as “the role of communication in the political process”. For Norris (2004, p. 1), political communication is “an interactive process concerning the transmission of information among politicians, the news and the public”. McNair (2011, p.  4) refers to political communication as “all forms of communication undertaken by politicians and other political actors for the purpose of achieving specific objectives”. Negrine (2008, p. 1) defines political communication as “the means and practices whereby the communication of politics takes place”. According to Epstein (2011), the transmission of information is at the heart of every democracy, and the changing form, strategies, and tools deployed for political communication are at the centre of the political relationship between citizens and political actors. The origin of this political relationship dates back to several centuries. In recent years, several researchers have taken an interest in examining this relationship, as well as the quality and quantity of changes in the way communication of politics is carried out. Historically, the political communication research community seems to have adopted different positions regarding ontology and epistemology because of the interdisciplinary nature of the field (Hall, 2000; Mutsvairo & Karam, 2018; Nimmo & Swanson, 1990). In ontology, the debate is “whether the objects of any analysis are a socially determined existence”

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(Anderson & Baym, 2004). Here, foundationalists are of the view that the real world constitutes “material objects that display discernible boundaries and exist within relatively stable and observable patterns of relationships”. Anti-foundationalists, on the other hand, hold the view that “objects of inquiry make their appearance within localized patterns of human practice, language, and discourse” (ibid.). In this sense, the African context can generate a specific understanding of political communication practices, trends, and models. Again, epistemologically, foundationalist conceives “knowledge as the correspondence between mental impression and the true shape of the independently existent actual” (Anderson & Baym, 2004). Anti-­ foundationalists perceive “knowledge as simultaneously enabled and constrained within social achievement” (ibid.). These dominant philosophical views as much as shaping the researcher’s worldview and stance also shape methodological choices. According to Ryfe (2001), Bryant and PribanicSmith (2010) and Karpf, Kreiss, Nielsen, and Powers (2015), the early philosophical climate of research in the field of communication was influenced by positivism and functionalism, with quantitative traditions-­ measurement, experimentation, and survey-defining research, with only a few qualitatively designed studies. This philosophical and methodological orientation following behaviourism drew from social psychology, where attitudes, opinions, experiment, and survey methods dominated; political science, with emphasis on politics as process and quantification; and mass communication, where research and methodological emphasis was on media effects and influence (Ryfe, 2001). As Ryfe notes, it was such theoretical and methodological commitments of early research tradition that shaped scholarship in the field. In recent times, however, scholarship in the field reflects a growing interest in epistemological and methodological pluralism because of sustained and rapid changes in the technological, information communication, and media environment and the fact that scientific studies now cover aspects of life not previously considered topics of scientific investigation (Bryant & Miron, 2007; Karpf et al., 2015). Evidence suggests that scholars today borrow freely from other scientific fields and traditions, thus making way for qualitative-critical and cultural methodological innovative approaches (Bryant & Miron, 2007; Bryant & Pribanic-Smith, 2010; Karpf et al., 2015). According to Bennett and Iyengar (2008), methodological innovation has followed the evolution of the field, leading to the incorporation of what they call critical tradition or the development of a

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critical wing of political communication and media studies. Echoing the merits of methodological shift, Fuchs and Qiu (2018) are of the view that the domination of US and Eurocentric scholarship, as well as theory development slowdown, calls for a new epistemological turn and the return of critical communication scholarship and a postcolonial perspective (Shome, 2016). In this sense, African comparative scholarship offers a new vista for theory development and scholarship expansion. Theory development and scholarship expansion, according to scholars in the field, are necessary for the contemporary scholarship since theories have generally not kept pace with sociopolitical and technological advances. In their view, this is affecting the ability of political communication researchers to understand our objects of analysis in today’s rapidly changing political, social, and technological world (Bennett & Iyengar, 2008; Bryant & Miron, 2007; Jones, 2013; Karpf et al., 2015). To develop new theoretical understanding under the rapidly changing environment, Karpf et al. (2015) are of the view that qualitative tools are necessary since they would both contribute to scholarly understanding of contemporary processes of political communication and enable new theorizing. In Bennett and Iyengar’s (2008) view, if the grand theoretical foundations in the field arose at the time when shared social structures and mass communication technologies were glimmer in the eyes of visionary theorists, then today’s ‘third age’ (Blumler & Kavanagh, 1999) requires new theoretical perspectives to guide research. The admonition by scholars is that political communication continues to expand its vision by enlarging the range of data that counts as registers of political communication as the field evolves (Ryfe (2001) Chadwick (2012) and Rogers (2013)). However, the debate as to whether old positivist traditions are still relevant in advancing scholarship in the ‘third age’ remains. Anderson and Baym (2004) argue that even though there is still a desire to reaffirm foundationalist roots in the literature, the need to rethink the media, the increasing hybridization of information communication and technological domains, is opening up new avenues of how we speak of the world, thus creating an ontological and epistemological fragmentation that is serving to legitimize and incentivize critical approaches. According to Jones (2013), there is now a shift in ontological and epistemological positioning, with critical approaches opening up a new lens for studying citizenship and practices in an increasingly proliferated politically relevant media. For Jones, the problematics of quantitative positivist normal science in the field is that it tends to ignore broad swaths of human

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experience that are central to meaning-making (see Ackroyd & Fleetwood, 2000; Bhaskar, 1998; Edwards, O’Mahoney, & Vincent, 2014; Gray, 2009; Hall, 2000; Hartwig, 2007; Savigny, 2007; Yin, 2014). In studying Africa, however, methodological approach to objects of analysis (Gray, 2009), theoretical imperative (Brennen, 2013; O’Mahoney & Vincent, 2014), as well as methods of data collection (King, Keohane, & Verba, 1996) can speak to an African model and epistemology that challenges the positivist root and orientation of the field as well as the epistemological silence in most comparative political communication literature.

Why and How: Imperative for Comparative Scholarship in Africa The lack of comparative political communication research and the need to understand emerging practices in Africa suggest that we need to produce more manuscripts using qualitative, comparative, and computational methods to stay theoretically informed about events in African political communication. The incentive for expanding comparative work hinges on the border-transgressing nature of contemporary information, communication technology, and media arena; emerging practices in political communication and typical pattern in practices taking place in different countries, including Africa; as well as the need to contextualize or decontextualize emerging methods of campaigning (see Kreiss, 2016; Mutsvairo & Karam, 2018). Furthermore, comparative work can be inspired by the need to contend with Africanization, de-Westernization, and decolonization to explain whether practices and features are standard across the globe or distinct to country and continent (Mutsvairo & Karam, 2018, pp. 7–8). Comparative scholarship can also serve to test long-term theories of political communication and the identification of shared and converging practices across the continent. Research can deploy the comparative method to explore differences and similarities in social media, privacy and surveillance laws, and regulations to inform whether or not Africa is ripe for a continent-­ wide framework to protect citizens’ privacy rights. Comparison can be across space—that is, to examine (using operationalized elements) whether practices in one country are applicable or have been exported to another. This way, research, and researchers, can advance understanding of trends, similarities, and contextual differences in Africa. Comparison can also be across time (using a researcher’s choice of ­operationalized elements) (see Blumler, McLeod, & Rosengren, 1992;

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Pfetsch & Esser, 2008), that is, comparison within the context of one election and another, to examine whether there is an advancement away from practices in a previous electioneering cycle. In doing so, research can draw on time as the dimension it uses to explore and analyse differences in political communication in one election cycle and another, in an exploration of ingredients or incidence of continuous advancement or change. Application of the two comparative approaches highlighted earlier can, among other things, guide the empirical definition of evolving and converging model(s) of political communication in the African context, as well as the explanation of changes and discovery of transnational trends, similarities, and contextual differences.

Comparative Research and Comparative Theory Advancement A good number of scholars have theorized several valuable frameworks to guide comparative inquiry. Notable examples include Blumler and Gurevitch’s (1995) and Pfetsch and Esser’s (2008) political communication systems; and Adoni, Caspi, and Cohen’s (2006), Pfetsch’s (2004), and Voltmer’s (2008, 2012) political communication cultures and subcultures. Various theoretical lenses advanced by scholars for explaining the global evolution and convergence of political communication include Americanization, modernization, professionalization, and specialization (see Maarek, 2016; Swanson & Mancini, 1996).This chapter stops short of elaborately explaining these theories. The case made here, however, is that comparatively testing these theories in the African context can enable theory modification, clarification, revalidation, and expansion. Testing theory in Africa is necessary considering that recent events in Africa’s electioneering suggest, for example, that we could, with empirical work, talk about the Africanization of Western political communication as Africa becomes a testing ground for new ideas by Western political consultancies like Cambridge Analytica (see Ekwealor, 2018). To engage with these theories, therefore, research following Rosengren, McLeod, and Blumler (1992) can operationalize frameworks based on emerging trends and elements in African political communication. In this way, we follow academic tradition in the field by outlining a set of ­fundamental parameters, pattern variables (Nimmo & Swanson, 1990, p. 34), or empirical categories (Gideon, 1955) that can guide comparison. However, research must take cognizance of context, that is, political,

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media, journalistic norms/values, style, and character of the political campaign/election news coverage (Stromback & Kaid, 2008). In considering contextual conditions, the research could adopt the implicit or metatheoretical strategy (Esser & Hanitzsch, 2012; Wirth & Kolb, 2004), that is, without contextual variables, where explanation of similarities and differences between countries selected enables the identification of contextual variables or factors that may contribute to shaping political communication. Furthermore, the research can deploy an explicit research strategy (ibid.), where contextual conditions can be identified and analysed with emerging trends and elements. Notwithstanding, it is essential that such research design considers the rapid changes in the conditions of contemporary political communication. Such considerations, therefore, should factor a plan that can enable explanation of modern practices in an era of increasing glocalization, transnationality, proliferation of global mobile communication, and the emergence of big fluidic data across borders (Chan & Lee, 2017, p. 9; Esser & Pfetsch, 2004a).

What to Compare: Evolving Trends in African Political Communication Recent scholarship in Africa (see Jideonwo & Williams, 2018) points to fundamental changes in African elections and the means and practices for communicating politics. In their case studies, Jideonwo and Williams point to examples like Cameroon, Zimbabwe, the Republic of Congo, Ghana, Gambia, and Nigeria, where digitization, electoral outcomes, and government’s abrupt disruption and crackdown of the Internet services point to the emergence of new electoral landscapes. They are of the view that factors that come into play in contemporary electioneering in Africa have become global and globalized (emphasis in italics mine) with tools emerging that can inspire both pre- and post-election mobilization across constituencies. Similarly, on the dynamics of political communication in Africa, Mutsvairo and Karam (2018, p. 6) are of the view that even though history suggests a complicated pattern of African political communication in the context of the continent’s colonial legacy and diverse religious and social cultures, evidence from recent scholarship suggests that emerging digital practices and their influences on the continent are increasingly becoming appealing to politicians and citizens as technology takes the lead as a focal point of political and economic development. Countries in Africa

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have responded differently to advancements in information and communication technology (ICT), with citizens encountering political communication from different players/actors through radio/television, Facebook, and Twitter (ibid.). Historically, citizens’ encounter with political communication rested on the region, group interest, and other socioeconomic attributes that they possess (Campbell, Converse, Miller, & Stokes, 1964). Specifically, this is based on the idea that such socioeconomic and demographic factors affect individual voter participation (Sigler & Getz, 1972). Thus, socioeconomic and demographic factors constituted the basis for understanding voter behaviour and the segmentation of the electorate (Johnson, 2016). Nevertheless, recent evidence suggests that this information is now data-­ driven and more behaviourally focused (Abse, 2013; Jideonwo & Williams, 2018; Johnson, 2016). Social networking platforms and the people-­ profiling they generate, when used with technologically enabled analytical tools, can identify, and profile, people’s interest (Jideonwo & Williams, 2018). According to Jideonwo and Williams, this approach to voter understanding now matters, irrespective of Africa’s digital divide, long-­ standing demographic, geodemographics, and ethnoreligious considerations. Thus, these emerging developments can account as vistas or empirical categories to guide comparative research in Africa. In expanding scholarship in Africa through comparative study, research can operationalize and investigate how emerging digital and social media practices are invigorating or depressing political participation and democracy (see Mutsvairo & Karam, 2018). Comparative research can equally explore levels of Internet penetration and digital divide as well as differences and similarities in social media/privacy policy and surveillance laws/ regulations to inform whether or not the continent is ripe for a continent-­ wide framework for protecting data and privacy rights (see Jideonwo & Williams, 2018). Comparative scholarship can also investigate patterns of political marketing and advertising, forms of grassroots mobilization and activism, levels of tolerance to dissent in the digital public sphere as well as models of restrictions on social media as these become dominant discussions in the continent (see Bosch, 2018; Frassinelli, 2018; Jideonwo & Williams, 2018). Furthermore, as Africa’s electoral landscape continues to change, scholars can also study patterns of face-to-face campaigns in Africa’s electioneering and the sociopolitical impact of fake news as well as evolving legislation to combat the same. The effect of films, rap/hip-hop artists,

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photography, and artistic graffiti on how politics is communicated could also serve as an empirical category for comparison. Gender representation, social media presence of politicians and political parties, levels of issue-­ based versus personality-based campaigning, and media policy of political parties can also represent elements of comparative analysis (Bosch, 2018; Chari, 2018; Karam, 2018; Maractho, 2018; Rodny-Gumede, 2018). Lastly, comparative work can follow themes identified by Mutsvairo and Karam (2018). These include an analysis of (1) the political economy of the media, (2) elections, and (3) the role of politicians, political parties and consultants, pressure groups, non-government organization, and professional bodies. As earlier observed, “while research in political communication is abundantly available in the West, the same cannot be said about Africa” (ibid.). Thus, the scarcity of comparative work implies that an expansion of such scholarship can bridge the gap in the domineering Anglo-American literature and models.

Principles of the Comparative Method The comparative method is variously praised as a prominent approach in the quest for knowledge. In Beniger’s (1992) view, all social science research is comparative, and so too is all analysis. As Peters (1998) notes, since the real world cannot be subjected to experimentation, comparison can act as a substitute for scientific experiments. However, what constitutes the term comparative is still considered debatable. As a definition, Eldestein (1982, p. 14) refers to it as a study that compares two or more nations concerning some activity (cited in Esser & Hanitzsch, 2012). For Blumler, McLeod, and Rosengren (1992, p. 7), research is comparative when comparisons are made across two or more geographically or historically (spatially or temporally) defined systems, the phenomena of scholarly interest which are embedded in a set of interrelations that are relatively coherent, patterned, comprehensive, distinct, and bounded. In the field of communication and media studies, Esser and Hanitzsch (2012, p.  5) are of the view that comparative study is understood as research contrasting different macro-level units (like world regions, countries, subnational regions, social milieus, language areas, cultural ­thickenings) at one point or more points in time. Such comparison, in their view, would involve a minimum of two macro-level units, and at least one subject of investigation relevant to communication research (ibid.). As an approach, it follows the principle that “every observation is without

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significance if it is not compared with other observation” (Esser & Pfetsch, 2004b, p. 7). Methodologically, it affords research the lens for observing patterns for theory-building; helps research to overcome space and time-­ bound limitations on the generalizability of theories, assumptions, and propositions; and enables the exploration and revelation of the consequences of contextual differences (Blumler et al., 1992). In the practical sense, its goal entails describing differences and similarities, identifying functional equivalents, establishing typologies, explaining differences and similarities, and making predictions (Esser & Hanitzsch, 2012). Esser and Hanitzsch also point to six areas where comparative research can prove its superiority: (1) its relevance for establishing the generality of findings and the validity of interpretations, (2) its prevention of overgeneralization, (3) its calibration of the scope of conclusion, (4) its contextualization of understanding, (5) its ability to foster global scholarship and networks, where the world is treated as a global research laboratory, and (6) its ability to offer a wealth of practical knowledge and experience. In the literature, however, principles for comparative analysis vary. To compare, Blumler et al. (1992) propose four principles, where (1) nations serve as objects of study, (2) countries are treated as context—where context serves as conditions for replicating findings and is the focus of comparison, (3) nation is treated as a unit of analysis and point of interest to the researcher, and (4) the national communication system and practices are examined as a subsystem of an emergent global one. For Rosengren et al. (1992), the first principle in a comparative inquiry is to identify a set of basic parameters for comparison, before assessing relationships to compare similarities and differences over space or time. The first task is theoretical, the second is empirical, and the third is representing the essence of comparison (ibid.). For them, comparative studies may be based over time or space, or both. In Ragin and Zaret (1983) and Ragin (1989), view comparison can be variable-based and quantitatively oriented (i.e., identifying relevant variables and their relationship before choosing a sample of observational units). Secondly, comparison can be case-based with qualitative strategies (i.e., starting with an interest in specific historical processes and structures). For them, the theoretical goals and practical strengths of case-study design or what they termed qualitative historical method differ fundamentally from those of quantitative statistical strategies of comparison even though a combination of both is possible. The former produces broad generalization about systemic relations, and the latter historically contextualized knowledge and consequences of historical diversity (ibid.).

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In political communication scholarship, the principle usually takes the form of comparison of a minimum of two political systems, nation-states, regional entities, political subsystems, or parts of subsystems–local areas of communication, elite or media cultures, national political systems and practice, with at least one object of investigation relevant to the field. According to Chan and Lee (2017, p. 1), its epistemological and methodological advantage lies in the fact that it delimits the “generality and specificity of communication theories” and enables research to “identify the influence of socio-political and cultural context in shaping media and communication phenomena”.

Principles of Comparative Case Study Design: Guide for Comparing Africa According to Ragin (2007), the goals of comparative analysis are assumed to be the same as those of variable-oriented analysis (i.e., assessing the relative merit of theory). However, one of the many debates on comparative research is the selection of countries to be studied. In most international comparisons, comparativists select cases for a variety of reasons, usually relying on questions of convenience (data accessibility, etc.) rather than on philosophical ideas (Wirth & Kolb, 2004). As a guiding principle, Przeworski and Teune (1970) suggest two logics (the most similar systems and the most different system designs). For Collier and Mahoney (1996), defining the selection of cases can depend on the research question. Patton (1990) and Palys (2008) also suggest a typical and critical case sampling logic. That is, a selection of a case because it exemplifies a dimension of interest for the research in anticipation that it might allow theory to be tested. Ellis (1973) and Conge (1996) equally favour country selection when a case is ‘crucial’, is ‘prototype’, or is ‘exemplar’, that is, where case selection represents the direction of the research since obscure case selection will not help answer the research question. In the same vein, Rosengren et  al. (1992) are of the view that case selection can be guided by crucial conceptual considerations, dimensions, and levels vital to the theoretical problem in question. For Ragin (1989), cases can also be selected on the basis of a combination of variables as in the quantitative approach and as a configuration of set membership or combination of aspects and conditions. Berg-Schlosser (1997) also suggests and shows in his work how a most similar system and a most different system can be chosen and analysed complementarily to improve research result. Furthermore, case-study design can equally be guided by

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pragmatic concerns (if, e.g., cases are understudied, are of novelty, have readily available data to support the research and are of particular interest to a researcher, and account for recent events that require empirical analysis or are of historical importance (see Eckstein, 1985; Hodgkin, 1976; Liu, 1988). Pragmatic reasons like the definitional and conceptual fitness of a case (Moghadam, 1995), case independence (Kautsky, 1975), the need for theoretical or empirical replication and extension (O’Kane, 1995; Yin, 2014) can equally inform case selection, where cases are constructed to provide “test of prevailing explanations and ideas” (Hakim, 1994, p. 62). Selection strategy could also be based on the attribute of a case (Gerring, 2007) where an event in a particular case is the criterion that guides selection, with the intention that such case is potentially likely to reveal the reputability of a theory (ibid.). Thus, the contextual condition of the object of research can shape design and country selection (Ragin, 1989). In Hancke’s (2009) view, case(s) can be critically selected, where case and theory have a relationship, with theory providing the relevant universe of cases for selection (p. 68) as an “illustrative portraits of social entities or patterns” (Hakim, 1994, p. 61). According to Bryman (1988), since qualitative research follows a theoretical rather than a mathematical logic, qualitative comparative cases should be formulated in terms of their generalizability to theoretical propositions rather than population or universe (i.e., rather than based on a worldwide sample). As Mason (1996) observes, theoretically guided sampling is “constructing a sample which is meaningful theoretically because it builds in certain characteristics or criteria which help to develop and test theory and explanation” (p.  93). Thus, the various aforementioned approaches can inform country selection in a comparative study of African political communication.

Methodological Awareness and Justification of Case Selection Case selection is the first step in comparative study design and a crucial ingredient in comparison since well-chosen cases allow for inferences to be made (Collier, Henry, & Jason, 2004). However, case selection has been the site of many long-standing critiques of comparative studies, and there is yet no methodological consensus and convergence regarding strategies for case selection, with the use of “numerous strategies of case selection” the different, but also the similar accepted in one study (Beck, 2017; Wang & Huang, 2017, p. 94).

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Studying Africa, research can advance several reasons to justify case selection or cases selected. First, the analysis could take the emerging trends highlighted in sections earlier or the various empirical literature on Africa as a point of departure for comparison. Emerging trends and practices can therefore serve as a set of fundamental parameters guiding comparison (see, e.g., Beck, 2017; Dunn, 1972). This approach, following Rosengren et al. (1992), can test models and expand understanding and definition of the dominant typology of political communication in Africa. Second, case selection could follow Przeworski and Teune principles in the critical respect that only democracies are selected, thus meeting the most similar system design. The aim here could be to identify what is different among such democracies within the context of the object of analysis. Conversely, however, cases could be selected based on the most different system design, where levels of economic development, Internet penetration and diffusion, digital divide, as well democratic consolidation serve as indices guiding case selection. Considering and combining country-­specific institutional, cultural, and developmental differences can be particularly useful in revealing how systemic differences shape political communication practices. Third, case study selection can be guided by research question and theory replication logic (see Bryman 2012; Yin 2014), where study follows theoretically guided sampling logic for case selection to exemplify a dimension of interest for the research in anticipation that such cases might enable theory testing and advancement. Methodologically, this approach conforms with pragmatic principles and concerns advanced by Moghadam (1995), and Gerring (2007). Thus, case studies can be constructed based on theory, with cases representing instances in which something similar might have to happen, to test, clarify, modify, or advance theory. However, it is essential to recognize, as noted by Pfetsch (2014, p. 231), that in an era of transnational structures of communication as we have, the nation-­ state may no longer be the only relevant analytical category for comparative analysis.

Theoretical and Methodological Benefit of Comparative Research Generally, the conceptual and methodological advantage of comparative inquiry is the fact that it expands the research database, enables solid generalization, and helps in the clarification, modification, amplification, and

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advancement of political communication theories and practices (Gurevitch & Blumler, 1990, p. 6). From this standpoint, therefore, expanding comparative research in Africa provides different sociopolitical settings and context, first, for testing the validity of existing theories and models of political communication. Second, considering that much scholarship in the field reflects an Anglo-American bias, expanding comparative research in Africa will rescue us from speculations and presumption that emerging global political communication practices in increasingly trans-nationalized information and communication environment are applicable elsewhere (Stromback & Kaid, 2008). Third, in the case of Africa, where the scope of cases will consist of emerging democracies (where the majority of the countries still operate within the range of 46.1% or less Internet penetration) (Internet Live Stats, 2016), comparative work can also test the extent, validity, and applicability of Western-based theories/practices for the study of political communication processes in non-Western societies. For example, Massimo and Glenn (2014) have shown how the digital divide (i.e., unequal access) to Internet communication technologies conditions its use in understudied areas and sub-Saharan Africa. Crossing boundaries, therefore, and extending the research to a range of institutional arrangements that capture countries with different levels of development and Internet diffusion, penetration and use may, according to Jensen, Jorba, and Anduiza (2012), reveal new ways in which population differences in attitudes and resources condition digital politics (see Massimo & Glenn, 2014). As Arora (2016) and Willems and Mano (2017) note, expanding scholarship on emerging political communication practices to the Global South will help us move beyond as well as avoid digital universalism. Africa, in this sense, can serve as an epistemological location for problematizing the “largely Anglo-­American canon of audience and internet studies” (Willems & Mano, 2017, p. 5). Lastly, the comparative scholarship can point us to structural features that can contribute to explaining country-specific practices and offer the opportunity for new conceptualization and theorizing (Hallin & Mancini, 2004, p. 32).

Addressing the Question of Methodological Equivalence One of the challenges of comparative research is the problem of equivalence. According to Smelser (1976), Ragin (1989), Landman (2000), and Chan (2017), the validity of the comparative method hinges on whether

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comparability or equivalence is maintained across sociocultural systems and context. In advancing comparative study in Africa, research must identify clear contextual, sociocultural, and systemic meeting points that serve to validate equivalence within case studies selected. In doing so, equivalence can be contextualized, with measurement indicators and the comparability of the context of chosen cases taken into consideration. Furthermore, research can follow a contextually shared assumption concerning the object of study. Here, the assumption of equivalence could develop context-specific knowledge, where the operationalized framework or parameters for comparison resonate in the political communication practices of case studies selected. This method of ensuring functional equivalence is guided by the assumption that the object of analysis relates to the political circumstance of selected case studies where, for example, ‘glocalization’ (i.e., the local diffusion of a global phenomenon) and ‘transnationalization’ of new technologies serve as the ‘cultural meeting point’. This approach of ensuring equivalence points to the existence of a similar experience, but does not, at the same time, rule out differences (ibid.). Thus, judgement on equivalence could, therefore, be based on, albeit somewhat assumed, knowledge of the contextual conditions of case studies selected. As Wasserman (2018, p. 2) observed, the entry point for addressing the question of equivalence in the Global South could follow ethical dimension—that is, the fact that under contemporary communication, infrastructure interconnections have grown and proliferated, “so that it is impossible today to conceive of communication in any form through which the echoes of the global do not resonate” (ibid.).

Conclusion This chapter, apart from highlighting the epistemological and ontological debate in the field of political communication, has made a case for comparative scholarship and why the comparison is necessary for the study of African political communication, pointing also to the what and how of such comparison. The argument made is that comparative inquiry of the trends and perspectives identified can inspire conceptual, theoretical, and characteristic understanding of African political communication as well as a discovery of model(s) and converging trends, thereby bridging the gap in the literature in Africa. In furtherance of such comparative work, the chapter outlined a set of trends or parameters as well as theoretical and methodological lenses. The theoretical and methodological optimism

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advanced in the chapter is that comparative research in Africa will enable the definition of the dominant typology of political communication and offer a new lens for theory testing, clarification, validation, and expansion as well as new theorizing of contemporary political communication convergence and change.

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CHAPTER 4

Alternative Responses to Presidential Tweets on Elections in Africa: A New Counter Power? Winston Mano

Introduction In much of Africa, mainstream media is captured by commercial and political interests, with limited room for citizens to communicate. Citizens have had to rely on alternative communication. Social media provided an important avenue for citizens to challenge politicians, even though the ramifications for electoral politics are still emerging. The relative ease of creating and disseminating social media content is broadening political communication and giving rise to new ways of civic participation and agency in electoral politics, before, during or after elections. The distributed intelligence of social media is resulting in new hope for democratisation but has also become a thorn in the flesh for those in power. What is at stake is the increased power of users-consumers, which is resulting from easier access, digital behaviours and freer speech than before. Arguably, this is disrupting and reshaping electoral communication. Of relevance is

W. Mano (*) University of Westminster, Harrow Campus, London, UK e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s) 2020 M. N. Ndlela, W. Mano (eds.), Social Media and Elections in Africa, Volume 1, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30553-6_4

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Atton’s (2015, p. 1) concept of alternative and community “media that bypass the usual channels of commercial production and distribution, and that are most often organised and produced by ‘ordinary’ people, local communities and communities of interest”. Social media is enhancing and reshaping the efficacy of alternative politics in Africa (Mano & Mukhongo, 2016). Not only is there increased connectivity to social media as a result of more affordable devices, especially China-made smartphones, but also increased availability of second-hand mobile phones for sale across formal and informal markets on the continent. Diasporic Africans also send phones back to their loved ones, and all this has contributed to a good supply of smart phones for use in everyday life. However, access to reliable electricity and income to purchase Internet data bundle remain major challenges, but the situation has been improving. Mobile money is also making it easier for Africans to spend on data and airtime. The chapter is interested in ways in which ordinary Africans are using social media to speak back to the “big men” of Africa, that is, presidents of African countries. Using purposive sampling, the chapter focuses on responses to presidential election messages on Twitter. Nigeria, Uganda and Zimbabwe are selected because they have similar but also very different political experiences. Constitutionally, they allow freedom of expression, but in reality, citizens have not always enjoyed the right to communicate. An example of this is online activism of fast-spreading hashtags to free activists such as #FreeBobiWine in Uganda, #FreeJonesAbiri in Nigeria and #FreeEvanMawarire in Zimbabwe. These campaigns were led by African “web citizens” to show solidarity with the oppressed and, more importantly, to put pressure on the governments involved. The paranoia and perceived threat of the Internet by power brokers in Africa is testimony to its growing effectiveness. There were 13 shutdowns of Internet in 2017 and 21 across Africa in 2018, and the year 2019 has seen more Internet shutdowns in Africa, with authorities ordering cut-offs during political crisis, especially at election time. The chapter is interested in critical responses to the president’s messages as part of a coping strategy by citizens struggling to survive and make sense of African politics. There is a growing link between online and offline activism which is a concern for those in power, as we have seen in Sudan in 2019. Social media at election times can be co-opted by powerful elites wishing to either destabilise the opposition or maintain a one-sided status quo. Here, power is defined as circulatory capacity to get others to do or stop doing one’s bidding. Power is both transforming and transformative. Power, defined as the capacity to get others to do, or to stop doing, something, is undergoing

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transformation (Naim, 2014). There is a decay of power which coincides with the emergence of social media in Africa as a new micropower that has “come from nowhere” to shake up the established monolithic old media order: “These are the micropowers: small, unknown, or once negligible actors that have found ways to undermine, fence in, or thwart the mega players, the large bureaucratic organisations that previously controlled their fields?” (Naim, 2014, p. 51). Social media is influencing the shape of electoral battles in Africa, but not necessarily the outcomes. Social media’s ability to convey alternative messages has resulted in an ambivalent attitude from authorities. While there are increased attempts by authorities to embrace it as a force for change, there are also signs that they cannot trust it because of their lack of complete control over it. At election time, politicians in Africa are turning to the Internet and social media to put across their messages. Africa’s politicians are hiring professional public relation companies as well as renting local social media services to enhance their chances of winning elections: “Nigerian politicians don’t always understand how social media works, but they know they need it. As the country geared up for national elections …[in 2019], would-be members of Parliament, governors and the president turned to social media entrepreneurs to push out their message and discredit their opponents on Facebook, WhatsApp, Instagram and Twitter. These self-­ styled ‘propaganda secretaries’, most working for less than [US]$14 a month, played a crucial role in shaping political narratives and spreading false information”.1 It is clear from the Nigerian example that social media offers a direct, albeit commodified, access to voters as well as novel ways for politicians to present their views to the electorate. Influencers with huge social media followings are hired to manipulate voters: “Some of these online personalities command Facebook followings in excess of 80,000 and control membership of more than 600 WhatsApp groups”.2 While this is important, this chapter is more interested in how users make sense of the election messages on social media platforms, using Twitter as an example. It has become standard for African leaders, presidents and prime ministers to communicate about elections. What has rarely been discussed from an academic perspective are the responses to presidential messages, especially in a counter-hegemonic sense. The objective of this chapter is to study the ways social media users engage with presidential messages about elections in Africa on social media, as alternative communication that reflects and affects ­democratisation. It is alternative political communication that is located in the politics of every-

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day life which produces comical relief as well as ways of challenging the status quo, including mapping out alternative options. Consider how frustrated one leading blogger was at the lack of social change in Zimbabwe that he went on Facebook to lament: We all have family WhatsApp groups where the young and the old discuss various issues. I suggest that this is a time for us all to use such platforms for not just jokes, but for meaningful educational posts. Let us Educate our folks in both urban and rural areas on these WhatsApp groups about what is happening in the country and how it affects them.3

The blogger, probably interested in digital literacy, went on to suggest how social media can be used to educate and agitate protest among social media users after what he regards to be a failure by politicians to deliver on their election promises. Both the ruling and opposition parties are criticised for leadership failures after the 2018 elections in Zimbabwe. It was accompanied by juxtaposed images showing conspicuous consumption by politicians like buying expensive cars while the poor, in an image, were shown rummaging for food in the bins. The message received 79 likes and 29 comments, which were generally mixed, including this one: To be totally honest…. I for one am tired and feel so helpless. All I have decided to do is survive as best as I can and laugh at my troubles on those family WhatsApp groups. Otherwise my health will be affected and I cannot afford the treatment.4

The point is that social media can offer both serious and lighted-hearted engagement with election messages. As this user pointed out, that can serve as a safety “survival” valve in politically troubled circumstances. This chapter argues that the role of popular culture related to elections has grown to be important but yet has hardly been studied. The chapter will not only provide insights on how users of social media engage with presidential election candidates before, during and after elections in Africa but also analyse civic agency and participation from the new platforms. Mainstream politics is now on Twitter, a micro-blogging Internet service that enables those connected instant interactive communication. Journalists, politicians, donors, voters and campaign managers and interns can be found on Twitter. Political candidates, including presidents and prime ministers in Africa, use Twitter to communicate and update on matters of concern. Some even hire influencers and professional companies to

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increase their impact. Messages can be made public or hidden or directed at other users by including “@”, followed by the user’s account name. Breaking political news is now largely available on Twitter. There are concerns about how the immediacy and speed of Twitter messages impact the accuracy and quality of the issues communicated on the platform. Factual errors often go uncorrected. However, both the brevity and the rapidity of connectivity suit Africans with limited resources, including time, as messages do not need to be that long. Images, auto-playing videos and screenshots of text can be included. Twitter’s format of 140-character messages for exchange with other users can be in any language and also with videos and images circulating through tweets and retweets. Although it is mainly individuals and organisations, there is evidence that bots and other electronic machines are now deployed in ways that manipulate users of the platform. Success on Twitter can be measured by the impact of the messages, including how they are retweeted, how users respond to issues mentioned in tweets and also ways in which there is reference to candidates or their political agendas. What is debatable is the extent to which Twitter interactions impact electoral and non-electoral forms of civic engagement.

Civic and Mediated Agency Across Africa, there are media and non-media forms that support civic culture. Rumours, popular music, cartoons, jokes and graffiti are among forms of communication that have supported civic cultures in Africa. In reality, activists use any or all available channels to push their messages within the given context. Sharing skills and practices and participating in these networks “provides opportunities for informal, peer-to-peer civic education, a process that will link to larger consideration of connected learning” (Jenkins, 2016, p. 17). Digital platforms have given a new lease of life to suppressed underground and oppositional political communication in Africa. Its reach and scope has expanded, with more research needed to analyse the processes, actors, forms, audiences, content and strategies involved. From an African perspective, what needs researching is how such social media exchanges are alternative mediated counter-­ hegemonic political action, both online and offline. “The concept of mediated agency”, as Willems (2015, p. 92) reminds us, “points to a wider spectrum of actions in which citizens engage power through a range of media forms, whether formal or informal”. As the Internet develops, we are witnessing potent forms of multimedia, personalisation and dialogic

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communications that have implications for electoral campaigns and democratisation. Users are taking advantage of these emerging spaces to participate in politics in new ways. Given Africa’s history of harsh controls on the media and restrictions on freedom expression, going back to the colonial era, the emerging social media space allows those connected opportunity to exchange messages on politics. It is a shared space to collect and share vital information and views about elections. It is in this context that social media has opened up a new political communication front that engage with elections in the digital space. Twitter has allowed online Africans to be more politically engaged during elections to the extent that political hashtags are the majority of hashtags across the African continent, higher than the proportion in the USA, UK, France and Canada. African elites, not least the presidential candidates, have had to join and use Twitter to influence, maintain and win over new political supporters. The election messages were not only confined to the African countries but reached far and wide. Jenkins (2006, p.  3) insightfully observes that “circulation of media content – across different media systems, competing media economies, and national borders – depends heavily on consumers’ active participation”. Mainstream journalism has unfairly discounted online participation, and yet this can “count” as politics that makes a difference (Jenkins 2016, p. 9). What is also significant is a candid separation of the production and circulation, with the latter arising from independent popular culture practices that are not influenced by institutions. Twitter is allowing long suppressed Africans a voice and power to challenge authoritarianism. The users are among groups without access to mainstream forms of distribution.

Responses to Presidential Election–Related Messages on Twitter The presidential candidates run Twitter accounts to update their followers and arguably to show the voting publics that they are delivering on their election promises. The chapter takes a purposive or convenient sample of laughter and jokes about African presidential tweets on elections and their messages about delivering election promises, covering periods before, during and after elections. Social media shapes who we know, how we communicate and how others communicate with us—it mediates everyday life and makes the unfamiliar familiar (Milton & Mano, 2017). “Web 2.0

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is like a collective allotment. Instead of individuals tending their own gardens, they come together to work collaboratively in a shared space” (Gauntlett, 2011, p. 5). This means it provides collective input which can make a difference. President Muhammadu Buhari wanted to be taken seriously after winning his second term as president of Nigeria, in the elections held in February 2019. However, President Buhari has repressed freedom of speech in his country: “Between August 2015 and March 2018, nearly 17 Nigerian journalists and bloggers were illegally arrested or detained by the police. Buhari has openly expressed his aversion to the freedom of press”. A prominent blogger and activist in the name of Jones Abiri was arrested and falsely accused of being a militant linked to groups with separatist ambitions. On 17 August 2018, 112 women were arrested in Owerri, northwest of Nigeria, following a peaceful protest in support of the release of Nnamdi Kanu, a separatist leader of the Indigenous People Of Biafra (IPOB).5 As of 2 July 2019, President Muhammadu Buhari@MBuhari (Presidency Nigeria) had 3699 tweets and 2.11 million followers and only 6 likes. Following his re-election in the election held on 23–27 February 2019, and displaying an image of the victory certificate from the Independent Election Commission, Buhari tweeted to promise “hardwork to build a better Nigeria”, assuring peace and the rule of law amongst other things. Buhari sought to convince the nation that he is fulfilling his key election promises, including fighting corruption and promoting economic development. #MBuhari’s tweet from June 2019, for example, suggested that Nigeria’s GDP was expected to grow by 2.7% in 2019. He also pointed out that the manufacturing purchasing index had risen for 26 consecutive months since March 2017. While others lauded him and congratulated him, there was direct criticism in response to his tweets from some familiar with his political record. Many also asked questions and raised issues that needed clarification or simply laughed it off as not sincere: Failed nation that is control by the people without governance ambitions… shameless old fools. (@AyoMusaobi, 21.06.2019)

Using colloquial language, some of the responses asked him to stop violence and promote peace in Nigeria: Continue. Why is it this way…Death upon death??? (@EmoriApostle 05.03.2019)

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The ability of social media to question the candidates, even after elections, is important. The responses expected “integrity” and leadership, blaming him for violence during his tenure. Some suggested that he stole the election as “Nigerians didn’t not vote” for him. They demanded action as shown by their replies to @MBuhari: The anger of God will rest on you because you know too well that Nigerians didn’t vote for you. (@ChiomaStanleyM1, 28.02.2019) Every life lost during your tenure is on your shoulder. Be careful, vigilant and decisive. If you don’t see change, please change the guards. Zamfara, Borno and southern Kaduna are still under duress. Act accordingly. Kaji tsoron Allah kuma. (@Auwal20875, 28.02.2019)

Scrutiny, scepticism and dissenting voices have found expression on Twitter in Nigeria, regardless of the threat of arrest from the Nigerian government. The aforementioned tweets also show ways in which social media users responded to election messages in a critical voice, countering and directly challenging the claims made by the president of Nigeria. As Reimer (2007, p. 305) puts it, old monolithic journalism has not worked, and what is needed is a new form of communication that is more interpretive and capable of dealing with both “rationality and emotions and also a move towards ‘expressivist politics’ that move people, ‘an output that makes them talk and act’” (p.  312). Instead of disengaging with mainstream institutional politics, these users have used Twitter as an avenue for the rapid dissemination of their alternative views. In Nigeria, this seems to be the case with the critical input of users who have sought to hold their president to account using a new form of expressive and discursive power. President Emmerson Mnangagwa’s official Twitter handle has the national flag inscribed with the words “RESTRUCTURE, REFORM AND REBUILD” in capital letters. In his short tenure, he has been accused of torture and killing of protesters. He has also faced accusations of intolerance towards activists such as Evan Mawarire of #ThisFlag citizen’s movement, whose initial protest was related to payment of his children’s fees. His lament on Facebook and Twitter cascaded into national shutdowns to force the government into solving the economic challenges. The state responded harshly, forcing him into exile. Under Mnangagwa the prosecution of activists has continued. Even though he has been the

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president of Zimbabwe after Robert Mugabe’s resignation in 2017, the official Twitter account is from December 2011. As of 3 July, the account had 467 Tweets, 88 Following, 395K Followers and only 46 likes. There is a regular pattern of Tweets that announce how President Mnangagwa’s party and government are fulfilling the reform agenda. A good example is this tweet from 6 June 2019: Government will do all in its power to live the phrase “servant leadership”, improve ease of doing business & facilitate much needed investment. As we journey towards Vision 2030, let us innovate sustainably to create a brighter future for all. 2/2. (@edmnangagwa, 06.06.2019)

The president’s intention was to show that his was a humble servant leadership which listens and fulfils the people’s wishes on the economic front. Responses included when people labelled him an “evil dictator”, and some highlighted that torture and abductions were taking place. One user, Big Shark Nation, replied with the results of an online survey done by ZimLive. com, which showed that 83% of the respondents thought that President Mnangagwa was not taking Zimbabwe in the right direction, against 11% who were positively inclined. Replying to @edmnangagwa, Big Shark Nation asked him to “shut up and hear the voice of the people! aaah” (@ Cdebhunu101, 06.06.19). There were tweets that were approving of the message, but I am more interested in those such as seen earlier, who took to Twitter not just to disagree with the president but to show, with their own evidence, that the majority of people (out of 1111 surveyed) do not approve of the direction the country was going under President Mnangagwa. It was also to influence opinion on the platform towards a more critical stance. The 22 retweets and the 14 likes showed that there were many that identified with this message. There was also a user who thought the country was not going anywhere with a “murderer” as the president. Some threatened with moving to his house as life was difficult everywhere. Mwanasikana wekuGweru posed a satirical message to @edmnangagwa, “Ndine mubvunzo President… ichazonaka iyoyi” (trans. I have a question President. Is Zimbabwe going to be fine?). The tone is one of mistrust. One user who started by stating that they had little knowledge about “Politics” challenged President Mnangagwa to resign for the sake of “peace” as he had failed to deliver on campaign promises:

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Not to say I know much about politics but my question is how do U survive with so much people not wanting you in power. It simply does not make any sense. Unfortunately I am not you. But if I was, I would give up all I have for peace, cz I know that U don’t have that. (@Vic30317198, 06.06.2019)

My third example is President Yoweri Museveni’s Twitter account. Yoweri Museveni is the 74-year-old president of Uganda, who, in 2017, after 32 years in power, changed Uganda’s constitutional age limit for presidential candidates, set at 75, in order to prolong his rule mandate as head of state and to run again for presidency following his current term that ends in 2021. Popular musician-turned-politician Robert Kyagulanyi Sentamu, known as “Bobi Wine”, amassed a large number of social media followers who opposed the decision to change the constitution. “Fearing the growing influence of Bobi Wine, Museveni then pushed further for the age limit change and imposed taxation on social media usage for its ‘indignation of rumours’ which caused massive protests led by Wine. Bobi Wine led the protest and attracted young Ugandans to the political field and even won a seat in parliament”.6 The battle for the governance of Uganda also takes place on Twitter. One Scheaffer Okore@scheafferoo tweeted: Museveni has been calling for a REVOLUTION it’s time Ugandan youth ANSWERED.  There’s nothing to lose but the future. Rise good people. Rise in the Spirit of Lumumba, Biko, Sankara and now BOBI plus the Arua 33. Dictators must fall. Rise Uganda RISE ✊ #FreeBobiWine, 1 336, 05:28–31 août 2018.

President Yoweri K Museveni @KagutaMuseveni joined Twitter in March 2010, and as of 3 July 2019, he had 5626 tweets and 1.08 million followers. His profile image was a half-shot in full colour, showing him as a smiling and slightly young-looking president. The message I analyse is from 14 June 2019, when he was highlighting his tour to promote economic programme. The tweets from President Museveni were accompanied by quality pictures of professional standard, raising the possibility of a public relations team behind the account. The responses were overwhelmingly positive, with 695 likes and 102 retweets, even though this can be staged. However, there was a thread which disproved his overstaying in power, warning him that his tenure might end in bloodshed. The users wanted fresh blood as opposed to old, tired leaders with no capacity to implement

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economic programmes. The users complained that he was wasting resources on the trail because he could not do a cost-­benefit analysis. You need to retire when you can otherwise it will be bloody and messy when it happens. No? Time will tell. (@Mwolooto, 14.06.19) Thanx Old man but we need fresh blood. U will never do what you havnt done in 33yrs. (@KatoMohammed5, 14.06.19) Mr President, in the documentary I watched last about these wealth creation is good but luck merits. Its for the sitting President to constitute a working plan and offer funds that can drive the same ideas not education then leaves citizens to find their own ways up. (@StephenYuri, 14.06.19) So why has operation wealth creation been doing all along? For me, I am just concerned with the benefit cost analysis of your tours. Wouldn’t it be more logical to use that money on setting up industries or better still buy medicines for the white elephants standing as H/Cs. (@ Omoding51641993, 16.06.19)

Added to these was a fascinating response from Sunny Sunday whose tweet from 15 June 2019 had a quote which stated: “The Problem of Africa in general and Uganda in particular is not the people but leaders who want to overstay in power – YK Museveni 1986”. Clearly, users on Twitter refuse to side with authoritarian politicians who lie and abuse them. They are questioning and even suggest action to stop the leaders like Yoweri Museveni from misleading them. The attraction of Twitter is how it provides new ways of directing communicating back to the African leaders who, for a long time, were insulated by monolithic communication systems. Clearly, Twitter provides a new level of interactivity, which enables users to actively engage with political campaign messages and also to directly evaluate the performance of their leaders. The other advantage is personalisation whereby responses from users can be personalised as part of their engagement with election candidates. Even though more Africans are yet to be connected to Twitter, it is already playing an important role as a robust digital platform for allowing users to approve, raise issues, complain and suggest alternatives. The leaders’ deployment of strategic communications to convey political message is challenged by ordinary people using novel ways.

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Concluding Reflections The chapter has identified Twittersphere as an emerging space for mobilising resistance to authoritarianism and failed promises from elections. Twitter conversations produce important shared references and resources for users to help frame their resistance against the African leaders, as demonstrated in this chapter. It has emerged as an important platform to share their vision, hopes and fears about the direction and political futures of their countries. The chapter shows that Twitter allows ordinary Africans, normally persecuted, to develop political voices, providing alternative narratives against bad leadership, before, during and after election campaigns. In the three cases analysed, we find that Presidents Buhari, Mnangagwa and Museveni have received strong messages that challenge them. Ordinary citizens agitate against and ridicule those in power, raising pertinent questions. The distributed intelligence of users are cultural narratives embedded in the rest of society, symptomatic of broader concerns from voters and other members of society not satisfied with the lack of progress in society. They demonstrate a new level of monitoring and evaluating claims by underperforming political leaders. Users with systematic evidence to support their interpretation directly speak back to power holders, signalling a triumph over the usual neat packaging of politics based on strategic public relations, spin over substance as well as image-building over delivery of electoral promises. Twitter has to some extent made politics in Africa more open and less about political marketing, spin doctors and sound bites. The advantage of Twitter is that it is not overburdened by the size, scale, asset and resource portfolio centralisation characteristic of ‘old media’ as it is based on spontaneous feedback from ordinary citizens who are affected by electoral democracy. The emerging African Twittersphere is evidence that ordinary Africans oppose official claims and discourses by the big men of African politics. The Twitter users generate alternative critical narratives informed by their experience in the countries.

Notes 1. Hassan, I. and Hitchen, J. (2019), “The ‘Propaganda Secretaries’ Behind Nigeria’s 2019 Election” in the Mail & Guardian, 18 Apr 2019 00:00, https://mg.co.za/article/2019-04-18-00-nigerias-propaganda-secretaries/ (accessed 2 July 2019). 2. Ibid.

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3. Hopewell Chio’no Facebook Post, 11 June 2019: https://www.facebook. com/search/top/?q=%20Jokes%20About%20elections%20in%20 Africa&epa=SEARCH_BOX (accessed 2 July 2019). 4. Ibid. 5. Afrika News (2019), “Fighting Human Rights Violations in Africa with Hashtags”, https://afrika-news.com/fighting-human-rights-violations-inafrica-with-hashtags/ (Accessed 4 July 2019). 6. Ibid.

References Atton, C. (2015). Introduction: Problems and Positions in Alternative and Community Media. In C. Atton (Ed.), The Routledge Companion to Alternative and Community Media (pp. 1–18). London: Routledge. Gauntlett, D. (2011). Making is Connecting: The Social Meaning of Creativity, From DIYand Knitting to YouTube and Web 2.0. London: Polity Press. Jenkins, H. (2016). Youth Voice, Media, and Political Engagement: Introducing the Core Concepts. In H.  Jenkins, S.  Shresthova, L.  Gamber-Thompson, N. Kligler-Vilenchik, A. Zimmerman, & E. Soep (Eds.), By Any Media Necessary: The New Youth Activism (pp. 1–60). New York: NYU Press. Mano, W., & Mukhongo, L. (2016). Towards Alternative Media as Critical Media in Africa. Journal of Alternative and Community Media, 1(1), 27–29. Milton, V.  C., & Mano, W. (2017). Identity 2.0: Negotiating Identity and the Politics of Belonging in Cyberspace. In P. Fourie (Ed.), Media Studies Volume 4: Social (New) Media and Mediated Communication Today Cape Town Juta pp. 167–207. Naim, M. (2014). The End of Power: From Boardrooms to Battlefields and Churches to States, Why Being in Charge Isn’t What It Used to Be. New York: Basic Books. Reimer, B. (2007). Journalism, Politics and the Public Sphere: On Emotions and Objectivity. In H. Bang & A. Esmark (Eds.), New Publics With/out Democracy (pp. 305–323). Frederiksberg: Samfundslitteratur Press/NORDICOM. Willems, W. (2015). Alternative Mediation, Power and Civic Agency in Africa. In C.  Atton (Ed.), The Routledge Companion to Alternative and Community Media (pp. 88–95). London and New York: Routledge.

CHAPTER 5

Tweeting the July 2018 Elections in Zimbabwe Allen Munoriyarwa and Collen Chambwera

Introduction Since its advent in July 2006, Twitter has become an important platform for political communication the world over. For instance, Michelle Obama’s speech at the National Democratic Convention in 2012 was tweeted 28,003 times in a minute (LaPoe & Miller, 2018). In October 2017, Donald trump said Twitter made him president as it is “a tremendous platform” that allowed him to bypass what he always claimed to be unfair media coverage and to speak directly to the voters (Baynes, 2018). The Pew Research Centre (2018) estimates that Twitter now has about 600  million active users across the globe, up from about 30 million users in 2010. Twitter is growing exponentially, especially as a platform for the communication of politics (McMillan, 2011). A

A. Munoriyarwa (*) Department of Journalism, Film and Television, University of Johannesburg, Auckland Park, South Africa C. Chambwera Department of Communication and Media Studies, University of Johannesburg, Auckland Park, South Africa © The Author(s) 2020 M. N. Ndlela, W. Mano (eds.), Social Media and Elections in Africa, Volume 1, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30553-6_5

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recent report on who is tweeting in Africa (2017) estimates that Twitter has become the second largest platform for political engagement in Africa after Facebook. There is no doubt that Twitter has increased the speed, scope and scale of political engagement amongst politicians, supporters and opponents. In many ways, Twitter has changed the patterns of civic and political engagement, especially in authoritarian environments like Zimbabwe, where the mainstream media is controlled by the ruling regime. While the main goal of Twitter as a platform has been to share information, it has become a popular space where civilians transact largely unfettered conversations. In other political environments, it has been a common platform for organising protests and sharing news (Brenne, 2016). Admittedly, new media can be censored just as conventional media (Mujevinovic, 2017). Several studies (see Neiger et al., 2013; van Dijk, 2007) have demonstrated that the bottom-up, peer-to-peer and horizontal communication that social networking platforms like Twitter offer do facilitate continuous and accumulating forms of political activism. Twitter also offers citizens several opportunities to scrutinise governments, speak back to power and interrogate the performance of their leaders. Thus, in the process, citizens’ engagement with their governments is no longer a one-way process. The potential capacity of Twitter to re-engage disconnected citizens with their leaders is no longer in doubt (Comninos, 2013; Tripp, 2001). In this chapter, we seek to explore how two opposing groups on Twitter, referring to themselves as Varakashi and the Nerrorists, made use of Twitter during the campaign period of the 2018 elections in Zimbabwe. Secondly, we elaborate on the themes that emerged from the use of Twitter during the debates between the two groups identified. Varakashi adopted their name from the Shona word ‘kurakasha’, meaning to destroy. They were ‘online warriors’ who made use of social media in defence of the ruling party candidate, Emmerson Mnangagwa (Moyo, 2018). On the other hand, the Nerrorists adopted their name from Nelson Chamisa’s nickname, ‘Nero’. Chamisa was the main opposition, MDC Alliance candidate standing against the incumbent, Mnangagwa. The two terms are pregnant with meaning in the context of Zimbabwe’s toxic and polarised politics. Varakashi got their name from their candidate Mnangagwa, who openly said that at his age he was no longer capable of using social media. But he would like them to go out on social media and destroy, on those platforms, all opposition supporters. Nerrorists, while they got their name from their candidate’s nickname, have also been asso-

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ciated with ‘terrorism’ on Twitter. Nerrorists had become notorious for throwing verbal expletives on their opponents and Chamisa’s critics. Thus, Nerrorists rhymed well with terrorism for their opponent and sync neatly with how they treated opponents on social media.

The 2018 Elections in Zimbabwe The 30 July 2018 elections in Zimbabwe were one of the most anticipated elections since independence in 1980. Without Robert Mugabe and Morgan Tsvangirai—the usual protagonists—the elections generated both anxiety and hope amongst reformists and other groups that they may, finally, offer a chance for change. Morgan Tsvangirai passed on in February 2018. There were leadership wrangles in the aftermath of his death, which culminated in Nelson Chamisa, one of the three vice presidents, taking over leadership of the party amidst disgruntlement from some sections of the party. Thokozani Khupe, the vice president of the party, claimed she was the rightful candidate, which led to her dissociating herself from Chamisa’s leadership. Robert Mugabe had been removed from power by a military-led operation. His former deputy, Emmerson Mnangagwa, took over power through a military-party-initiated process. The ruling party, ZANU PF, had initiated a purge that was meant to eliminate the so-called G40 faction of the party, allegedly aligned to the former first lady, Grace Mugabe. The G40 faction was opposed to the ascendancy of Emmerson Mnangagwa to power. The final victorious faction aligned to Emmerson Mnangagwa called itself Lacoste. Prior to Morgan Tsvangirai’s death, there were negotiations for an alliance of opposition parties to challenge the ruling ZANU PF party. The alliance brought together the MDC-T and its splinter parties, MDC and People’s Democratic Party (PDP), together with other smaller parties. The grouping came to be known as the MDC Alliance. Nelson Chamisa quickly gained recognition from the alliance partners, a move that seemed to breathe fresh air into opposition politics. Having new leaders for the two main parties in the country seemed to inject new energy into political contestations in the country. As the country’s new leader, Emmerson Mnangagwa sought to distance himself from Robert Mugabe’s leadership style. He adopted the mantra ‘Zimbabwe is open for business’, which was aimed at assuring the international community that the country was ready to end international isolation. His pro-business rhetoric seemed to resonate with a large section of the society who

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longed to see an end to economic hardships they were facing. On the other hand, Chamisa, a 40-year-old politician, seemed to gain widespread appeal for being young, charismatic and offering a complete break from the gerontocratic leadership of Mnangagwa and ZANU PF. The intense contestations between supporters of Emmerson Mnangagwa and Nelson Chamisa were visible both physically and on social media platforms. Social media has assumed great importance in a country that had limited freedoms during Robert Mugabe rule. The limited existence of other mainstream platforms for free and unfettered expressions made Twitter and Facebook important platforms for the mediation of the elections. On this space, participants found themselves being able to freely state their political preferences. This study seeks to establish the way through which Twitter was used by Nelson Chamisa’s supporters, #Nerrorists, and Emmerson Mnangagwa’s supporters, #Varakashi, and the themes that emerged from such use.

Twitter and Hashtag Politics There has been a substantial increase in research on elections, politics and the hashtag across the world (e.g. Broersma & Graham, 2012; Larsson & Moe, 2014). Broersma and Graham (2012) study British and Dutch elections on Twitter, and they find that the Twitter hashtag is fast becoming a space where European politicians, especially Dutch politicians, engage in one-on-one discussions with prospective voters. The hashtag has become the most prominent space for communicating and discussing elections. Twitter hashtags allow users to design politically themed practices on social media. Bruns and Burgess (2015, p. 15) assert, “the most widely recognised mechanism for the coordination of [election coverage] is the hashtag; a largely user-generated mechanism for tagging and collating those tweets which are related to a specific topic”. Rogers (2013) agrees, noting that during elections, Twitter has largely played a critical role of coordinating political conversations and debates as well as spreading information about that particular election, and it is this role that has been critical to its legitimisation or debanalisation as a platform. Supporters of certain election candidates create a specific hashtag to push forward a cause (Bruns & Burgess, 2015). Manfield (2015) notes that across the world, many election hashtags have been created in support of political parties and candidates. For example, in the United States of America (USA), Republicans countered Obama’s rule by creating

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#AreUbetter. In Australia, Tony Abbot’s supporters created #IamStickingwithTony. There was also another trending hashtag during the 2010 elections in Australia: #Ausvotes. Thus, Twitter users and political party supporters can create these spaces and spread political messages of their choice (Manfield, 2015). Other scholars (see Marres, 2015) refer to Twitter as ‘the killer app’. Marres argues that Twitter allows for the emergence of publics through connectivity organised around issues or events rather than pre-existing social groups. Warner, McGowen, and Hawthorne (2012) argue further that due to the dynamism of the platform, publics are understood as formed, re-formed and coordinated via social connectivity organised around an issue like an election. Bruns and Burgess (2015) echo similar sentiments, noting that hashtag spaces allow competing publics to emerge during elections and all of these competing groups can create an infinite number of hashtags to discuss the elections. Thus, Bruns and Burgess (2015, p. 14) argue further that hashtags are not static; they also change over time. Yet, they possess an important vitality in “organising ad hoc discussion communities which existing studies have ascribed to hashtags”. These hashtags may now be changing as users are beginning to construct such communities through different means on Twitter as a platform that curates and mediates discussions. Berenger (2013, p. 512) argues that in political activism, Twitter hashtags are central in mobilising like-minded, “individuals and setting the agenda for established international mass media that spread images, messages and insights” about political events. When it comes to political events like elections, the hashtag is a place where “those in the know and those who want to know meet to exchange gossip, commentary, links to news updates and press releases, and photos of the gathering media throng” (Bruns & Burgess, 2015, p. 14). Bruns and Burgess (2015) further note that the hashtag operates at a macro level as compared to structurally more insular exchanges through the personal publics (Schmidt, 1998) of follower networks that operate at the meso level, to a specifically targeted public. In communicating election issues, the hashtag allows for the quick formation of ad hoc issue publics, the gathering of breaking news relating to that particular election or any other political issue or event (Crawford, 2011). That Twitter offers “dissociative anonymity” (Suler, 2004)—where users can hide their real identities— makes the hashtag even more important during events like elections. However, Twitter’s potential as a platform for political debates has also garnered as much criticism as it has gained appraisal. Twitter hashtags, for

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example, have been criticised for purveying and inducing nonsensical, fragmented and enraged discussions. Papacharissi (2004) calls this tendency of online spaces ‘flaming’. There is no evidence in scholarship, however, that points to the fact that the so-called civil debates are meaningful and democratic (Papacharissi, 2004). Other scholars (e.g. Gladwell, 2010; Wolfsfeld, Segev, & Sheafer, 2013) agree, pointing out that there is need for a “critical mass” if there is to be political engagement and participatory politics. There is a danger of valorising social media platforms in participatory politics. Gladwell (2010, p. 4) states that Twitter “is just a platform that ensures distant connections with acquaintances, with breath-taking efficiency”. Gladwell (2010) disagrees with those he terms “the evangelists of social media”, arguing further that Twitter creates weak ties that seldom lead to high-risk activism. Therefore, in Gladwell’s view, revolutions are not tweeted. What Twitter does is to increase the motivation but cannot contribute to strategy for revolutions (Gladwell, 2010). Furthermore, sceptics have argued that the role of Twitter during revolutions and the role of any other social networking sites (SNS) ought not to be romanticised and overhyped (Wolfsfeld et al., 2013). They argue that the role of these platforms cannot be understood outside the political environment they operate. They further claim that the use of Twitter and other SNS is much more likely to follow a significant amount of protest activities than to precede it. Their view is supported by Christensen (2011) who, despite earlier agreement with the importance of Twitter, cautions that Twitter should not be over-celebrated as the actual levels of Twitter use have not been verified and quantified in any revolution. Berenger (2013) further asserts that revolutions might start in the virtual world, but it takes a motivated populace of sufficient mass to move into the material world where real change occurs. Despite these many divergent views, the role of spaces like Twitter has become widely acknowledged (Dunlap & Lowenthal, 2009; Kushin, 2010). There is still limited research, however, on how Twitter as a platform has been used to discuss elections in Africa, especially highly contentious, divisive and often violent elections like those frequent in post-2000 Zimbabwe. Much of the research around the use of Twitter for political engagement in Africa is still budding (see Mutsvairo & Sirks, 2015). There is still a dearth of research in Africa that investigates the appropriation of specific hashtags during a major event like a heavily contested election, in a country with a history of contentious violent elections such as Zimbabwe.

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The goal of this chapter is to examine how specific Twitter hashtags were used during Zimbabwe’s 2018 elections, and to ascertain the themes that emerged about the elections, from such uses of the hashtags identified. In this chapter, we contribute to an already burgeoning field of literature on Twitter and participatory politics, albeit with a slightly different approach which investigates a micro-element of Twitter—the hashtag.

Twitter as a Public Sphere The concept of the public sphere has attracted much scholarly attention from when Jürgen Habermas conceptualised it as a bourgeois public sphere. Habermas argued that “we call events and occasions ‘public’ when they are open to all, in contrast to closed or exclusive affairs” (Habermas, 1989, p. 1). Publics are marked by their discursive interactional nature, according to Dahlgren (2005). Questions have been raised as to whether the Internet and social media have enabled the operation of the public sphere as Habermas envisioned it or they have brought about an alternative public sphere (Chibuwe & Ureke, 2016). Dahlgren (2005, p. 149) argues that “a functioning public sphere is understood as a constellation of communicative spaces in society that permit the circulation of information, ideas, debates – ideally in an unfettered manner – and also the formation of political will”. While it is true that social media spaces such as Twitter and Facebook have become spaces for the exchange of information and debates, the question may be whether such debates lead to consensus or rather amplify our differences. Despite its noted weaknesses, Habermas’ conception is one of an ideal public sphere in a democracy. Real democracy manifests in individuals’ ability and competence to engage with one another (Barber, 2006). Ruiz et  al. (2011, p.  465) argue that “the bottom line is not whether citizens are saying things (i.e. producing content) or not, what we have to assess is what is being said and how”. This becomes crucial in countries such as Zimbabwe that, for a long time, have been in a political crisis that saw concerted efforts from the state to constrict spaces for public discussion. Social media became the most viable space where citizens could discuss the political situation without the danger of physical harm being meted upon them. However, the recent case, in 2018, of the arrest of a Twitter user for retweeting a tweet about the leader of the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission, Judge Priscilla Chigumba, has served to underline the threat Zimbabweans face in trying to speak on social media platforms.

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Despite this, it is probably reasonable to take an optimistic view of social media as a public sphere in Zimbabwe because other spaces are prone to harsher consequences. In that optimistic light, this study takes a constructionist view of the public sphere that allows for “narrative, emotional, confrontational or even disruptive kinds of communication which may be more suitable, and therefore more empowering, to certain social groups” (Schaefer, 2015, p.  322). We acknowledge that considering that there is no face-to-face communication, Twitter has the ability to promote heated exchanges (Papacharissi, 2004), which is perhaps more appropriate for Zimbabwean audiences who have lived under constant threat from security apparatuses. In the interest of democracy, participation of all interested parties in discussions of any kind must be possible in the public sphere (Schaefer, 2015). Like Papacharissi, we take Lyotard’s (1984, p. xxv) argument that “invention is always born of dissension”. Physical anarchy has not been possible in Zimbabwe largely due to repressive state apparatuses the state, especially under the leadership of Robert Mugabe, often unleashes on dissent. Such repression is further evidenced in the shooting and killing of unarmed and fleeing demonstrators by soldiers on 1 August 2018 in the aftermath of the elections we discuss in this chapter. Habermas (in Fuchs, 2014, p. 65) argues that “in periods of mobilisation, the structures that actually support the authority of a critically engaged public begin to vibrate”. In the run-up to the 30 July 2018 elections, there was intensified mobilisation of supporters by the two main parties ZANU PF and the MDC Alliance. Twitter became one of the key mobilising platforms where supporters of both parties engaged in heated debates. Twitter emerged as a public platform where different groups struggle for a better society (Fuchs, 2014). There was much hope from ZANU PF supporters; with a new man at the helm, Emmerson Mnangagwa, the party could steer the country out of its economic malaise. On the other hand, MDC Alliance supporters saw hope in their party with a new youthful leader, Nelson Chamisa. Could their heated debates signal a digital public sphere of anarchy, an alternative to the ideal?

Methodology The study takes a qualitative approach which takes into account the context within which social actors engage in their activity as well as their reasons for acting that way (Neuman, 2014). Archival research was used to

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retrieve tweets. This was achieved by searching for the #Varakashi and #Nerrorists on the Twitter platform. The search results were then purposively sampled to get the most appropriate that could answer our research questions. Tweets which specifically referred to the 30 July 2018 elections were selected. It was also decided to include even tweets in vernacular languages, considering that Twitter is an informal platform.

Findings We note that the two hashtags were largely appropriated as spaces for two main uses: (a) for mining the historical memory on Zimbabwe’s past elections and other political injustices and (b) for rationalisation of hegemonic masculinities. We also note two main themes that emerged from this use of the hashtags. These were (a) hashtag as spaces for the rationalisation of party-state conflation and (b) hashtag tweets as acts of political resistance. In the next sections we discuss these findings and provide a discussion before our conclusion. The Use of the Hashtag for Collective Memory Mining The hashtag was used for memory mining. Collective memory represents a society’s understanding of its past and defines the relationship between the individuals and the society (Halbwachs, 1992, p. 22). Collective memory does not mean a society’s history. It is, rather, when the past is revisited and reconstructed in the context of the present circumstances (Halbwachs, 1992). It is noted that the hashtag #Nerrorists offered users an opportunity and a platform on which individuals could revisit memories of past elections and other related political events. Participants selected past events of election violence and intimidation that have haunted Zimbabwe’s elections. For example, the following tweets were noted on the hashtag: We owe this election to those who sacrificed their lives at the hands of zanu pf brutality in 2008 and beyond… #Wamba chete. (Nelson only!) Sinyoro; @Sinyoro2018 Let us never forget zanu pf is still the same evil and brutal outfit. The struggle started by Save should continue…. We have suffered under this regime… #Nero chete! (Nelson only!) Zimbo citizen; @Realstylz2018

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One aspect noted is that some of the tweets on the hashtag were posted by former opposition cabinet ministers during the unity government. Thus, senior party elites were revisiting the past in order to goad party supporters. This was a clear attempt to use historical memory for election gains. Thus, it is argued that hashtags can be a new use of online spaces, especially in societies that share a brutal past. Friesem (2018) notes that in Israel, the holocaust is always tweeted along collective remembrance lines, especially during seriously contested elections where parties fight to ‘own’ historical memory and appropriate it for election gains. This means to us that the past memories of violent elections become a tool and an object of the powerful, revisited for the sake of elections. The 2008 elections, arguably the most violent elections in post-independent Zimbabwe, was the most revisited election. For the Nerrorists, specifically, the platform provided an alternative communicative sphere for sharing memories of a traumatic past. Neiger et al. (in Zhao & Liu, 2015, p. 41) note that “networked communication technologies facilitate new opportunities for users to scrutinize and interrogate previous material archives as static memories, thus influencing how the past is remembered”. Kansteiner (2010) agrees, “[N]ew media play an emerging role in the process of shaping and formatting collective memory” (in Zhao & Liu, 2015, p. 42). Rationalising Hegemonic Masculinities: ‘We Want a ZEC Leader Without Breasts’ Hegemonic masculinity was normalised by Nerrorists as they engaged in the delegitimisation of the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) and its electoral processes. Nerrorists found an easy target in Justice Priscilla Chigumba, head of ZEC, to vent out their frustrations with the electoral process. In the whole month of July from which tweets were selected, Nerrorists persistently attacked the electoral process, unlike Varakashi, who hailed it and never pointed fingers of scorn on the way the electoral body was managing the election buildup. The attacks aimed at both the individuals at ZEC, especially Chigumba, the head, ZANU PF’s alleged ‘tricks’ to ‘steal’ the election, and ZEC as a whole. For example, there were clear uncivil sexist and defamatory attacks on Chigumba, which read as follows: So that bitch with the breasts as big as a cow’s head is planning to rig?… the people’s voice can’t be stolen #Nerobedzibedzi baba (Nelson only) Marcs2017: @Markado35

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We want a ZEC leader without breasts! Not a prostitute….#Nerochete (Nelson only) Pasi: @Pasipamireson Save vakabirwa… this time mvana yavo Chigumba hailume Wamba haabirike….Chamisachete chete (translated loosely: They robbed Tsvangirai of his victory. This time that single mother–prostitute won’t steal the people’s victory…Chamisa only). Ticha: @Tichatonga2018

It is important to note that the Nerrorists on this platform were challenging the election process in the same way that Chamisa himself and the rest of the party were challenging the process offline. Thus, the challenge was but a culmination of a debate that had started offline, and a view shared within the party as a collective. Election rigging is a narrative that has dominated Zimbabwe’s election transactions since independence. The perceptions of election rigging, or its real existence, have been the subject of government legitimacy controversies in Zimbabwe and the country’s international diplomacy. The opposition supporters, we can argue, were poking holes in the election system in order to create conditions to challenge any outcome they did not like. And, in retrospect, this is what, finally, happened, as the legitimacy of Mnangagwa’s government comes under serious test. This raises some important questions. For example, can the hashtag be considered as a rationale public sphere considering that, sometimes, users exploited it to insult and defame, on gender grounds, the people involved in the administration of the election? The recurring chorus of ‘Nero bedzi bedzi’ (Nelson only), when juxtaposed with ‘mvana yavo Chigumba’ (their single mother), ‘with big breasts’ underlines the prevalence of a belief in male-only politics in Zimbabwe. Additionally, it underlines the total lack of respect that female election players, at whatever level, have to endure in Zimbabwe’s politics. This is not a new phenomenon, as it is a common practice that female political leaders have to be subordinated to male leaders (De La Rey, 2005; Gipson, Pfaff, Mendelsohn, Catenacci, & Burke, 2017). One major point of contention raised by Nerrorists was ZEC’s (alleged) intention to have Mnangagwa’s name on the ballot paper before Chamisa’s. This would have been in violation of the standing election statute. This allegation dominated a lot of debate and drew a lot of insults from users. For example, Chitando’s prostitute would not stop at anything… now she wants to put Garwe’s name at the top coz the dude is clearly unelectable….Garwe: @ Mueragarwe

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Hahahahahahaha… that’s very criminal… anyway Chigumba is very criminal minded… we expected that from her Rabas: @Rabasmabaso I hope somebody warned her about the dangers of her partisan move… never allow single mothers in love with politicians to run an election for you….Electionthing; @election2018

Such tweets confirm Papacharissi’s (2004) argument that the hashtag can be a space for nonsensical, fragmented and enraged discussions. It can be a space for inflaming debates. From the evidence we presented earlier, the debates went down to fragmented yet sustained insults and defamatory comments on other political players, which raise questions about the civility of hashtag politics. In fact, we argue that Twitter as a public sphere in this case became a platform for “narrative, emotional, confrontational or even disruptive kinds of communication” (Schaefer, 2015, p.  322). However, as Schaefer (2015) further notes, such comments may be more suitable, and therefore more empowering, to certain social groups. For long the MDC has suffered physical violence from ZANU PF, and through Twitter it appeared as if MDC supporters had found a way to effect ‘violence’ on ZANU PF through a figure that appeared to represent their interests, Priscilla Chigumba. The violence in this case was of a gendered nature. Such violence was justified by her alleged connivance with ZANU PF to rig the elections. She became an opponent, not the referee; hence, she became fair game for the exercise of hegemonic masculinities as argued by Ncube and Chawana (2018). The expression of hegemonic masculinities in this case serves to satisfy Nerrorists in three ways: reasserting male dominance over women; returning the favour of violence to ZANU PF and delegitimising ZEC and the electoral process. The Conflation of Party and the State While it is to be expected for Varakashi to tweet in support of their party leader, Emmerson Mnangagwa, what is peculiar is their legitimisation of the electoral body, ZEC and the whole electoral process. In the run-up to the elections, ZEC had been accused of bias by the opposition, particularly the MDC Alliance. Varakashi made it their business to defend the integrity of ZEC in a typical case of the collapse of the party and the state into a single entity (Matyszak, 2017). The MDC has a history of labelling the electoral process in the country as not free and fair (Ncube, 2014). ZEC has been accused of manipulating figures in favour of ZANU PF.

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Such accusations intensified especially after the 2008 elections in which Morgan Tsvangirai, the then MDC presidential candidate, defeated Robert Mugabe but failed to get the constitutionally required 50% plus one vote to be declared the winner. The results were announced five weeks after the poll date (Makumbe, 2009). Suspicions were that ZEC was playing around with figures to deny Morgan Tsvangirai an outright win (Makumbe, 2009). It is against this background that Varakashi took it upon themselves to defend the credibility of ZEC. This is demonstrated in the following tweets: No amount of demonstrations will make ZEC break the law. Chamisa and Mugabes Alliance attempts to use demonstrations to rig the Elections will fail. The elections are unriggable and unstoppable thanx to ZEC competence & Zimbabwean majority mass vigilance! #Edpfee (#Edhasmyvote) Maqolo: @MaqoloAlmot ZEC has the constitutional mandate to run elections in Zimbabwe. Anyone who dreams that SADC and the AU will come to run elections in Zimbabwe is obviously out of their mind, they would have taken leave of their senses. Tinokunda: @Tinokunda

It is noteworthy that ZEC is a constitutional body with a secretariat that ordinarily would be the one to be at pains to defend itself from the delegitimisation efforts by its detractors, particularly the MDC Alliance. That one of the parties’, ZANU PF’s, supporters would be the one to defend it places it in the unenviable position of being regarded as an extension of ZANU PF. It is curious that on the one hand Varakashi would point out that ZEC is an independent commission, for example, in the following tweets: ZEC reports to Parliament. It’s an independent commission Honest: @ Honesttruth What’s supreme is the constitution. Where in the world have you ever seen 128 parties buying voting material pakabuda chinhu (and there was success)? We have institutions to run things. Let them do their job Zanele: @ Zaneleinexile

Yet, by taking on the role of defenders of a constitutional body, they inadvertently undermined its independence. It probably served to emphasise

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the fact that Zimbabwe has always had the party controlling state institutions, a system bequeathed by the colonial regime that collapsed in 1980 (Alexander & McGregor, 2013). The ZANU PF government has been accused of not doing anything to disrupt the inherited powerful state and party overreach into state institutions (Alexander & McGregor, 2013). In these Twitter debates, it appears that these ideas have filtered to the party activists such as Varakashi, who now see it as their duty to defend state institutions. Yet, ordinarily, these institutions should possess their own independent internal mechanisms to state their cause without appearing to favour one party over others. It raises the question, Why were political (ZANU PF) ‘pundits’ and supporters supporting an institution that has roundly been condemned for failing to institute a fair and level ground for elections? The party rendered ZEC susceptible to capture. Hashtags of Resistance to ZANU PF’s ‘Authoritarian Rule’ One dominant theme on the #Nerrorists was that of political resistance. For the Nerrorists who posted on the hashtag, their posts, comments, news discussions and debates echoed the official MDC party position— that ZANU PF’s ‘authoritarianism’ was unacceptable and therefore was supposed to be continuously resisted. The forthcoming elections provided a perfect chance in that regard. At the same time, the hashtag was ­dominated by narratives of resistance to the persecution and victimisation of opposition supporters by ZANU PF. Victimisation and persecution of the opposition supporters, and the imperative to resist such, was a recurring theme on the hashtag, and there was frequent mention of Robert Mugabe’s reign which was marked by such abuses. For example, the following tweets demonstrate these fears and the resolve to withstand persecution and ultimately get rid of ZANU PF: Ours has to be a generational mandate not a generational compromise. We should never be bought. We are ready to resist the JuntaPF violence, their intimidation tactics We have three plus decades to wait and eventually deliver an unadulterated mandate. Delay they can/will try but they can never prevent it! Its coming coz #Nerrorists Wezhira: @Wezhira3 We will never be stopped by the Junta’s violence. We are battle hardened. His Excellency President Nelson Chamisa @nelsonchamisa is our President, he will remain safe in the hands of Zimbabweans because #Nerrorists Godisinit Famba hako Nero! (Go Nelson go). Mwarima: @Wezharawezhira

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True healing should be for the people of Matabeleland and the victims of political violence. August 1, 2018 #Nerrorists godisinit #MDCAlliance Nehoreka: @CdeNehoereka

Discourses of resistance to ZANU PF’s ‘authoritarianism’ were, therefore, those that rejected ZANU PF’s hegemony over the polity. How the Nerrorists tweeted should be viewed as a form of hashtag activism (Berenger, 2013; Bruns & Burgess, 2015). This activism manifested itself on this platform, having migrated from offline political support for the opposition. It was a space to ‘speak back’ against ZANU PF hegemony that straddles every sphere of the Zimbabwe polity. These resistive discourses included, among others, an outright rejection of ZANU PF’s interpretation of the current economic and political situation in Zimbabwe. Thus, the Nerrorists hashtag becomes an ‘interpretive community’ where users demarcate their worldviews from that of ZANU PF, and challenge the ruling party version of events. For example, some posts read: Part of that culture of secrecy is manifest in the overt willingness to tell blatant and embarrassing lies or half-truths on the part of ZANU PF, whilst the reality on the ground is patent. This mistrust from the public has been built up over decades of lies. #Nero chete chete (Nelson only only!) Mutsvangwa: @CdeMutsvangwa What happened to the criminals who surrounded the president? What happened to the criminals who were named and shamed for externalising funds? This ED guy is a big joke.#Nerro chete. Sir: @SirDeeRoyal Issue of violence in Zimbabwe around elections is not new & Madhuku, who has been a victim, knows this clearly. Masora: @KMasora (Madhuku is an opposition leader of a political party (National Constitutional Assembly who used to be a former MDC member).

Nerrorists hashtag users take the platform as a real-time chance to discuss the past, present and what the future is likely to be under the rule of ZANU PF. Thus, the hashtag provides a “political moment” (Hall, 1996, p. 105), in which users fight against the ruling regime’s rhetoric of success and turn the space as a platform of contestation where the mantra of Mnangagwa’s achievements and ZANU PF’s propaganda is challenged.

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To the Nerrorists, the coup and its subsequent installation of Mnangagwa was a political scandal that any democrat (like them) should be outraged about. Nerrorists resist the narratives of renewal and development that formed the backbone of ZANU PF’s electoral campaign. Some advocated for nation-wide anti-ZANU PF protests before the vote to resist the ruling party’s blatant abuse of state institutions for its own survival. One tweet called for a “mass revolution to topple the immoral ruling party… targeting the 80 year olds in power”. Another Nerrorist tweeted that “the regime is made up of the famous law-breakers and the criminals that used to surround Mugabe”. Discourses of resistance showed a deep resentment of the status quo that, according to the users, had to be overthrown during the forthcoming elections. While the discourses of resistance to ZANU PF’s rule seem to resonate well with Nerrorists on the platform, the Nerrorists did not have a broader political strategy of resistance to ZANU PF’s rule; that is, what actions would this resistance include? This is despite the fact that Nerrorists had a widely shared point of convergence that Mnangagwa would be as cruel and undemocratic as his predecessor. One Nerrorist talked about the ‘desirability for anarchy’ while another talked of ‘the need for intense peaceful protests’. This underlined the absence of a consensus amongst Nerrorists on how this resistance would be effected. Furthermore, there was no engagement by Nerrorists with the question of the unavoidable mess that anarchy or protests would bring. Neither was there an engagement amongst Twitter users with the moral and political appropriateness of the fathomed actions, or their efficacy in resisting ZANU PF’s rule. Thus, except for the general consensus that Mnangagwa’s rule would be as immoral as Mugabe’s, and that the country’s military-­ assisted transition was unconstitutional, Nerrorists did not seem to muster a consensus on what forms of resistance to ZANU PF would look like.

Discussion Election discourses on Twitter fell into two categories: the anti-­ establishment Nerrorists and the pro-establishment Varakashi. Nerrorists opposed the logic and consequences of ZANU PF’s hegemony. The discourses, as embodied in the tweets analysed, vehemently opposed the ZANU PF candidate Mnangagwa and the party as a whole because, according to them, the ZANU PF leader has a history of failure.

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The Nerrorists critique of the ruling regime extended to its relationship with formal state institutions like the army, the police, ZEC and the judiciary. The tweets reveal a lack of trust and belief in these institutions, as they felt they now pander to the whims of the ruling party which has captured them. Nerrorists narratives highlighted their belief that ZEC would not be able to deliver free and fair elections because of its alleged ties to Mnangagwa’s executive. Twitter was also useful for Nerrorists, as they, through memory mining on the platform, weaved a narrative of a violent kleptocracy governing Zimbabwe, determined to win elections by hook or by crook. Thus, Nerrorists’ anti-ZANU PF hegemony narrative can be seen as an attempt to reshape the electoral script of Zimbabwe, to narrate on Twitter how elections in Zimbabwe should be viewed. Revisiting past elections provided an opportunity to debate the veracity of past elections, their legitimacy and their meaning. Twitter also offered them a platform to deliberate past electoral wrongs and how they could possibly be redressed. It became a platform on which Nerrorists could ‘liberate’ their ‘suppressed memories’ (suppressed on the largely state-controlled media platforms), and forge a new meaning for the forthcoming elections which they consensually agreed were an election to end dictatorship and misgovernance even if they did not trust the system managing the elections. Thus, historical memory narratives contested the violence of the past elections, the possibility of violence in the current elections and ZANU PF’s hegemony. Varakashi, on the other hand, criticised the disruptive political narrative of the Nerrorists. Their Twitter exchanges broadly covered two issues. Firstly, their discourses were a fervent attempt to legitimise the coup and Mnangagwa’s usurpation of Mugabe’s powers. Secondly, their tweets were an expression of approval for Mnangagwa’s victory in the coming elections. Varakashi engendered the narrative that ZANU PF was on a path of renewal and self-correction, as well as renewing the country. From this angle, it is easy to understand why they found the Nerrorists discourses of change as disruptive of a progressive moral and political order. As Varakashi defended ZANU PF and Mnangagwa, their discourses ‘naturally’ led them to frequent attacks on the opposition’s leader, Nelson Chamisa. They attacked him as too young, immature, unpredictable, blunt and irrational. Varakashi saw any vote for the MDC as a vote for USA’s and other Western powers’ imperial influence on Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe had to remain a sovereignty state, and that was by a ZANU PF victory at the polls. In discussing these issues on Twitter, Varakashi

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flaunted what they called the ‘democratising possibilities’ of ‘the new dispensation’ led by Mnangagwa. In a way, the pro- and anti-ZANU PF polemics on Twitter were a manifestation of Zimbabwe’s polarised politics. Zimbabwe’s politics since 2000, when a strong opposition party emerged, have always been polarised (Mlambo, 2016). The ‘moods of bitterness’ permeating in the politics seem to have spilled on Twitter debates about the elections. The pro- and anti-ZANU PF sentiments have always been reflected in the often violent politics accompanying the country’s elections since 2000. It is not surprising that there were, often, sexist misogyny, mordant and savage discourses on Twitter that can be judged as uncivil. We observe that the discussions on these hashtags lacked the formalism and the rationale that Habermas (1989) had anticipated. On online platforms, formalism and rationality are least expected because they are no longer bourgeoisie public spheres that Habermas had envisaged. Social media, therefore, raises the questions about the sufficiency and sustainability of Habermas’ theory in the digital epoch (Dagoula, 2017). Rather than being a platform of rationality, the hashtags we observe are platforms of ‘discoursal anarchy’ and ‘narrative chaos’ that can be equated to the biblical tower of Babel. Sampedro and Martínez (2018) assert that digital technologies have led to the emergence of an alternative digital public, devoid of the Habermassian rationality and generally counterhegemonic. We note that in this regard, the Nerrorists should be seen as counter-­ hegemonic because they speak back against the hegemonic ZANU PF authority in postcolonial Zimbabwe. On the other hand, Varakashi legitimised ZANU PF’s rule and the country’s electoral processes. Digital public spheres, therefore, were appropriated to (de)legitimise power.

Conclusion The two Twitter hashtags studied in this chapter have illuminated their role as spaces for political activism and discussions. We have argued that hashtags were platforms on which users discussed the legitimacy of the forthcoming elections. The enduring memories of past election violence were shared, and party and candidate supporters engaged, sometimes critically, and challenged each other on the major electoral issues. Issues of reforms, democratisation, preparedness of ZEC, the non-partisanship of electoral and other state institutions, and the post-election future were discussed. We have also noted the incivility of the posts that were sometimes blatantly sexist, defamatory and vulgar. To account for sexist and

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savage discourses, we speculate that, perhaps, because of the lack of physical contact on the Twitter, users had no real motivation to hold back. This study sheds light on the influence of Twitter to mobilise relatively unfettered political debates. Our study supports the thesis that while social media platforms, like Twitter, can be disruptive, they can support open debates that may not be replicable in mainstream media platforms, especially in political environments like Zimbabwe where censorship is pervasive.

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LaPoe, V. L., & Miller, A. L. (2018). Digital Crisis Community Communication: Tweeting the First Anniversary of the Deepwater Horizon Oil Disaster: Responsibility, Recovery and Commemoration. In Underserved Communities and Digital Discourse: Getting Voices Heard. Ohio: Lexington Books. Larsson, A.  O., & Moe, H. (2014). Triumph of the Underdogs? Comparing Twitter Use by Political Actors During Two Norwegian Election Campaigns. Sage Open, 4(4), 90–112. https://doi.org/10.1177/2158244014559015 Lyotard, J. (1984). The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Makumbe, J. (2009). Theft by Numbers: ZEC’s Role in the 2008 Elections. In E. Masunungure (Ed.), Defying the Winds of Change: Zimbabwe’s 2008 Elections. Harare: Weaver Press. Manfield, F. (2015). One Does Not Simply Tweet Without Consequence: A Study of the Electoral Contest in Ashgrove. Wired Spaces. Retrieved November 6, 2018, from https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:354631 Marres, N. (2015). Why Map Issues? On Controversy Analysis as a Digital Method. Science, Technology, & Human Values, 40(5), 655–686. https://doi.org/ 10.1177/0162243915574602 Matyszak, D. (2017, November). Back to the Future: Legitimising Zimbabwe’s 2018 Elections. Institute for Security Studies, Southern Africa Report 12, 2017. Johannesburg: ISS. McMillan, G. (2011, September 21). Twitter Reveals Active User Number, How Many Actually Say Something. The Washington Post. Retrieved November 12, 2018, from https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/02/07/ twitter-reveals-its-daily-active-user-numbers-first-time/ Mlambo, N. (2016). The Politics of Bitterness Understanding the Zimbabwean Crisis 1980–2005. African Renaissance, 3(2), 54–73. Moyo, D. (2018, July 24). A Vicious Online Propaganda War That Includes Fake News Is Being Waged in Zimbabwe. The Conversation. Retrieved September 28, 2018, from https://theconversation.com/-vicious-online-propaganda-warthat-includes-fake-news-is-being-waged-in-zimbabwe-99402 Mujevinovic, D. (2017, November 3). Twitter Admits to Engineering Information and Censoring Tweets About the Leaked DNC Emails [Opinion]. The Inquisitr. Retrieved May 12, 2019, from https://www.inquisitr.com/opinion/4596250/twitter-admits-to-engineering-information-and-censoring-tweetsabout-the-leaked-dnc-emails/ Mutsvairo, B., & Sirks, L. A. (2015). Examining the Contribution of Social Media in Reinforcing Political Participation in Zimbabwe. Journal of African Media Studies, 7(3), 329–344. https://doi.org/10.1386/jams.7.3.329_1 Ncube, L. (2014). The Interface Between Football and Ethnic Identity Discourses in Zimbabwe. Critical African Studies, 6(2–3), 192–210. Ncube, L., & Chawana, F. (2018). What Is in a Song? Constructions of Hegemonic Masculinity by Zimbabwean Football Fans. Muziki, 15(1), 68–88. https:// doi.org/10.1080/18125980.2018.1503560

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Neiger, B.  L., Thackeray, R., Burton, S.  H., Thackeray, C.  R., & Reese, J.  H. (2013). Use of Twitter Among Local Health Departments: An Analysis of Information Sharing, Engagement, and Action. Journal of Medical Internet Research, 15(8), e177. Neuman, W.  L. (2014). Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches. Essex: Pearson Education. Papacharissi, Z. (2004). Democracy Online: Civility, Politeness, and the Democratic Potential of Online Political Discussion Groups. New Media & Society, 6(2), 259–283. https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444804041444 Rogers, R. (2013). Debanalizing Twitter: The Transformation of an Object of Study. In Proceedings of the 5th Annual ACM Web Science Conference. ACM. Ruiz, C., Domingo, D., Mico, J. L., Diaz-Noci, J., Meso, K., & Masip, P. (2011). Public Sphere 2.0? The Democratic Qualities of Citizen Debates in Online Newspapers. The International Journal of Press/Politics, 16(4), 463–487. https://doi.org/10.1177/1940161211415849 Sampedro, V., & Martínez, A.  M. (2018). The Digital Public Sphere: An Alternative and Counterhegemonic Space? The Case of Spain. International Journal of Communication, 12, 23–44. https://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/ article/view/6943 Schaefer, M. S. (2015). Digital Public Sphere. In The International Encyclopaedia of Political Communication. Volume 6 (pp. 322–328). Michigan: Blackwell. Schmidt, J. (1998). Civility, Enlightenment, and Society: Conceptual Confusions and Kantian Remedies. American Political Science Review, 92, 419–448. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2585674 Suler, J. (2004). The Online Disinhibition Effect. Cyber Psychology & Behaviour, 7(3), 321–326. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/15257832 The Pew Research Centre. (2018). More People Are Turning to Twitter for Political Information. Retrieved October 18, 2018, from www.pewresearch.org Tripp. (2001). Invited and Invented Spaces of Participation: Neoliberal Citizenship and Feminists’ Expanded Notion of Politics. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 25(1), 102–117. Van Dijk, J. (2007). Mediated Memories in the Digital Age. California: Stanford University Press. Warner, B.  R., McGowen, S.  T., & Hawthorne, J. (2012). Limbaugh’s Social Media Nightmare: Facebook and Twitter as Spaces for Political Action. Journal of Radio & Audio Media, 19(2), 257–275. https://doi.org/10.1080/193765 29.2012.722479 Wolfsfeld, G., Segev, E., & Sheafer, T. (2013). Social Media and the Arab Spring: Politics Comes First. The International Journal of Press/Politics, 18(2), 115– 137. https://doi.org/10.1177/1940161212471716 Zhao, H., & Liu, J. (2015). Social Media and Collective Remembrance: The Debate over China’s Great Famine on Weibo. China Perspectives, (1), 41–58.

CHAPTER 6

Social Media and Participation in Ghana’s 2016 Elections Wilberforce S. Dzisah

Introduction Ghana’s democratic and media landscape is becoming more complex and seems to be imitating what pertains to other geographic locations across the world. Since the return to the path of constitutional democracy in 1993, both the electors and the elected have been exploring new ways and ideas to effectively communicate their political messages to the target audience. A recent phenomenon in the jigsaw of communication is social media. With an increase in new media technologies in Ghana, which has enabled modest penetration of the internet, the country’s democratic discourse is now being spiced with greater social media activity. While acknowledging the importance of traditional media in rallying political support for political parties and their candidates in Ghana, the emergence of social media is gradually changing the democratic landscape. The 2016 presidential elections in Ghana attest to the growing power of social media, particularly Facebook, in inducing participation among potential voters. It is my contention that the value of social media in Ghana’s

W. S. Dzisah (*) Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration, Accra, Ghana © The Author(s) 2020 M. N. Ndlela, W. Mano (eds.), Social Media and Elections in Africa, Volume 1, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30553-6_6

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electoral democracy is its cross appeal in teaming up with old media to create a multimedia platform. This development has aided democratic ­participation, inclusion and expression (Essoungou, 2010). In this way, the conventional physical mass rallies and advertorials in traditional media to whip up electoral support for political candidates and their parties are gradually diminishing (Strandberg, 2013).

Social Media, Political Mobilization and Democratic Participation This chapter is built around democratic participant media theory as espoused within the context of Arnstein’s ladder of citizen participation theory, uses and gratifications theory and the diffusion of innovations theory. Data for the chapter was collected through desk research and secondary sources. The focus is on social media potency, influence in political mobilization, participation and engagement in the democratic elections. Social media, arguably, is emerging as the most potent and pervasive communication tool today with abundant possibilities for information dissemination. Ghana’s 2016 elections and its heavy dose of social media influence led by Facebook must be contextualized from the perspective of other notable events in other parts of Africa and elsewhere. In this case, it follows on the historical trajectory of other epochs in North Africa, the Middle East and the United States. The impact of social media on the political revolutions that took place in the Middle East commonly referred to as the Arab Spring affirms its influential role as a galvanizing tool (Khondker, 2011). Social media as a mobilizing tool in the Arab Spring not only enhanced participation but helped to create awareness among the public of their rights. As argued by Diamond and Plattner (2014), social media potency is evidenced by how it unleashed abundant energy in mobilizing the people to challenge or erode the legitimacy of the rulers in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. Again, social media is also credited to have been of great influence in the electoral success of Barack Obama. His adoption of the technology facilitated his reach and helped garner support from many young voters during the 2008 American presidential elections. The case of Ghana’s political contestants in the 2016 elections and the use of social media sites such as Facebook and Twitter are worth exploring. The power of social media tools such as Facebook, WhatsApp, Twitter and Instagram has unfolded new possibilities for politicians to engage with

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citizens and this is evident in Ghana’s 2016 elections. While the impact of tweeting on the voting population in Ghana’s 2016 elections is still sketchy, as explained by the penplusbytes social media index report (2016), social media platforms have made considerable influence on voting behaviour, particularly the phenomenal increase in Facebook users in Ghana, with 34% of the total number being between the ages of 25 and 35 and 41% between 18 and 24 years of age. The statistical appreciation of this increase is indicative that social media sooner than later will become the most influential media in Ghana’s democratic elections if juxtaposed against Ghana’s population pyramid with the youth constituting the majority with a share of 57% of the total population of approximately 31 million people. Therefore, with the youth adjudged as being technologically savvy and attracted to internet-based activities, social media cannot be underrated even if its overall influence on Ghana’s 2016 elections still lags behind that of traditional media. The 2012 elections recorded a voter turnout of 79.43%, compared to 68.62% in 2016. These, by global standards, are quite high. While one cannot point to a single factor being responsible for the lower voter turnout in 2016 compared to that of 2012, empirical analysis and arguments in this chapter show a phenomenal increase in the deployment of additional media tools—social media. Kaplan and Haenlein (2010) define social media as a collection of internet-­based applications that extend the fundamentals of Web  2.0  in terms of ideology and technology, and thus permit the creation and exchange of user-generated content. Social media has therefore become the interface between the internet and users, and for many the internet and social media sites are identical. As Guy (2012) explains, internet-based technologies that promote the effectiveness of human interactions keep evolving with Web  2.0 technologies such as social media. Social media, therefore, represents to a large extent a key channel through which people can now achieve their communication and social ends. Interestingly, the attributes of social media as represented by the term user-generated content denote different kinds of media content created by end users and are publicly accessible. For this reason, users of social media are not just participants but consumers and producers at the same time (Gil de Zuniga, Molyneux, & Zheng, 2014). In fact, the efficacy of social media in generating spontaneous events for commentary is circumscribed in its capacity to induce participation and engagement of consumers of user-generated content (Pennington,

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Winfrey, Warner, & Kearney, 2015). In this way, social media platforms are not only important channels for distributing news in the context of Ghana, but they are a central part to how well the news was communicated before, during and after the 2016 elections. Its communicative power is circumscribed in the opportunities it offered for direct interaction and feedback with the target audience—the voting population.1 An exciting aspect of social media in political mobilization, participation and engagement in electoral democracy is its focus on political communication. For example, the most notable tool for the dissemination of political news is Facebook. This position is corroborated by a 2014 study which showed that 62% of web users turn to Facebook for political information and news.2 Facebook was one of the first social media tools to come into operation in 2004, and by the second quarter of 2018, it had recorded 2.23 billion users worldwide (Facebook 25/7/2018). With this impressive statistics, it is no surprise that its twin networking tool—Twitter, a micro-blogging service within the same period—recorded 335 million hits on a daily basis. Interestingly, although social media is demographic blind and accessible to all ages, gender and social groups, it appears to be heavily patronized by the younger demographic groups of both genders. For example, it has been established that 18- to 24-year-olds (50%) go on Facebook daily when they wake up, while 25- to 34-year-olds (29.7%) represent the most common demographic group with greater usage (Centre for European Studies, 2012). A report by Global Digital Agency states that by August 2018 there were 10 million users of the internet in Ghana. Out of this statistics, 5.6 million are active social media users representing 35% of the Ghana’s total population of 29 million. The breakdown is as follows: Facebook and Facebook Messenger (28% and 15%, respectively) representing 43%; WhatsApp 30%, YouTube 15% and Instagram 12%.3 Cumulatively, the gender representation is 64% male and 36% female. For a nascent democracy such as Ghana, the growing influence of social media on elections must be of keen interest to political communication watchers and analysts. The 2016 elections pitted the incumbent John Dramani Mahama of the National Democratic Congress (NDC) against the main opposition candidate, Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo Addo of the New Patriotic Party (NPP). Though there were other contestants in the elections, their influence and appeal pale into the shadows of the two main protagonists. Of interest was that the then incumbent was seeking a second term while the then candidate Akufo Addo was contesting for the

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third time. The stakes were therefore high and recourse to the use of social media underlined its distributive power of information delivery to the target audience to induce political participation and engagement. An affirmation of the intense use of social media to gain political leverage in the run-up to the 2016 elections in terms of mobilization and participation is the result of a study by Penplusbytes’ Governance Social Media Index (GSMI).4 It used a study model which tracked the relevance and effective use of social media in the governance space. Its June 2016 report claims that “key actors within the political and governance ecosystem of Ghana were engaging their electorates on social media as an alternative to traditional media”. Social media usage has been broken down to specific platforms on which candidates and their political parties do battle to mobilize, engage and disseminate their political messages.

Theorizing Social Media The underlying synergies of the positive democratic turns in social media impact on participation, mobilization and democratic engagement are better appreciated through a robust theoretical framework (Tang & Lee, 2013). This is because social media provides the space for active participation of citizens in the democratic process. And this takes place through the genus of information dissemination to assist with mobilization and active engagement of citizens. The theory recognizes the plurality of voices and opinions and like others has a direct bearing on the participatory ideal of social media within a plural setting. Unlike the elitism associated with some traditional media forms such as newspapers and television, social media in its present form could be said to be a replica of what McQuail (1983, p. 96; 2005) refers to as a shift from a distributive agency to one of communicative machinery of not passive listeners and viewers but those of active participants in the market. It is imperative to recognize that the main argument situated within this theory is to seek a solution to the needs, interests and aspirations of the recipients of information in a political setting. It is meant to provide a theoretical space, with direct control of the media by members of the community in which it operates. The democratization of communication using the interactive power of social media and unmediated feedback allows for greater participation of the citizenry in the democratic process. One does not need to be physically mobilized to the village square, community centre and the town hall to be engaged and for him/her to participate in a

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democracy. Social media potency is that it has helped democratize communication, get a lot more people who hitherto would have been left out of the traditional media conversations into the democratic space to ventilate their views, opinions and to share ideas using online platforms. This theory therefore addresses why the presidential candidates and their political parties turned to the use of social media to gain some political advantage. In the main, it helped transform the media space by engaging with new media tools and by embracing technological innovations. Simply, the other signal adduced from the increased use of social media is that it exposes the inadequacies and weaknesses of traditional media. And as an alternative, social media tends to provide more opportunities to the citizenry in the area of political communication than one could imagine a decade earlier. Thus social media has become a consolation for them to fulfil their information and communication desires. Arnstein’s (1969) “ladder of citizen participation” theory also provides some depth and critique about the notion of citizen participation. Arnstein claims that “citizen participation”, “citizen control” and “maximum feasible involvement of the poor” have been waged largely in terms of exacerbated rhetoric and misleading euphemisms. However, to offer a more realistic appreciation and application of the notion of participation, Arnstein offers a more nuanced typology of citizen participation—citizen control, delegated power, partnership, placation, consultation, informing, therapy and manipulation. Admittedly, some of the rungs on the ladder of citizen participation are still relevant. We cannot gloss over global inequalities, elitist power, manipulation and the increasing demand by the have-­ nots for the redistribution of accumulated power and unrestrained participation. For example, the emergence of social media platforms has been hailed as a complementary tool in deepening citizen participation in a democracy. For some media and democracy scholars (Dzisah, 2018), social media tools have become veritable information arteries in mobilizing citizens to be involved in the democratic process. And for some democracy watchers in the Global North, it has provided some tonic in dealing with low voter turnouts in democratic elections. The classic of the 2008 US elections which produced startling deployment of Facebook and other online resources by the protagonists remains the most potent contemporary admission of active participation by citizens in the electoral process by virtue of expanding the frontiers of free expression enabled by information communication technology tools (Centre for European Studies, 2012).

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The mass mobilization of the youth in particular through their attraction to and use of social media platforms for elections must also be seen through the prism of Arnstein’s (1969) typology with emphasis on manipulation, informing and citizen control within the remit of this chapter. For example, Arnstein’s question as to what is citizen participation and what is its relationship to the social imperatives of our time must be viewed beyond its rhetoric relevance. Clearly, there is a conflation of citizen participation which is linked to citizen power and entails active involvement of the citizens in our contemporary democratic engagements. To an extent, the rise of social media could be said to have actually engaged the citizenry to participate in such an enterprise. Within the realm of this chapter, we must also concede that the eight-rung ladder is a simplification in laying bare the gradations of citizen participation (Arnstein, 1969). Arnstein’s fears remain grounded by the sophistication which comes with the deployment of new media tools such as social media when it comes to political participation. The agenda-setting mechanisms are still being controlled by the elite in society. The political communication experts in political parties and their candidates are part of the news production process and its dissemination. Their manipulative hands in using communication and information technology tools under the guise of democratic and interactive media platforms to gain citizen access to participate in democratic projects may represent, on the surface, increased participation while in reality it could be a subtle coercive participatory strategy. To the ordinary eye, seemingly unmediated social media induce democratic participation as citizens freely digest information, ventilate their opinions and largely articulate various positions on a given social, economic and political issue. On the contrary, participation of citizens in political discourses using social media platforms is not immune from manipulation of those who set the agenda. These unseen hands could be working through various media and communication experts who privilege and direct the most important information channels desirable for debates and other discourses in the public sphere. This notwithstanding, though applicable to situations about half a century ago, Arnstein’s (1969) expositions are still relevant to our contemporary discourses and in particular social media. Social media has succeeded in power redistribution in a democracy. It has helped democratize information and broaden citizens’ participation by taking power from elite sites and redistributing the same to ordinary citizens. Today, both the rich and the have-nots all interact

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and debate their respective positions on critical issues of national and international concern without exclusion. Another theory which resonates through the political communication imperatives of the 2016 election is gratifications theory. It is obvious to political actors that social media generates content using various platforms which have the tendency to appeal to the target audience. The main preoccupation of the target audience is not just information but also the satisfaction they derive from it (McQuail, 1983, 2005). As argued by Katz and Blumler (1974), the media, and by extension social media, appears to meet the needs of the audience because there is empirical evidence to show the correlation between gratifications and media choice (ibid.). The increased use of social media tools in Ghana’s 2016 elections arguably points to the demands of satisfying the needs and aspirations of the electorate. The fact that they have become more sophisticated in the consumption of political communication messages is no understatement. In this vein, they could see gaps and weaknesses in the potency of traditional media in dealing with their needs, anxieties and preferences. For media consumers and generators of content alike to resort to social media as a veritable platform for information consumption, interaction and engagement is attributable to the satisfaction they derive from such usage. In essence, the gratifications derived from such a service could be said to meet their individual social and psychological requirements (ibid.). The theory, which provides the framework for understanding the processes by which media participants seek information or content selectively, also argues that it tends to provide a functional linkage commensurate with their needs and interests (ibid.). Clearly, the variety provided by social media affirms its lucidity and fluidity in meeting the demands of the political audience. As stated by Katz and Blumler (ibid.), modern-day media consumers are drifting inexorably towards social media platforms because they best fulfil the needs of the users and offer them greater alternative choices to satisfy their needs. Within the ambit of its impact as an influential media in inducing social and political mobilization for democratic engagement and participation, it has raised the stakes as a more active media which is shaped by not only definite expectations but what kind of content they desire. Conversely, we can deduce from the uses and gratifications theory that it not only cures the theoretical debates about the influence of social media but can also draw on the methodology of self-­ awareness of interests. Simply put, it prioritizes more audience freedoms and orientations over “value judgments about the cultural significance of mass communication” (p. 17).

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Arguably, the increased attention and use of social media by the political candidates and the rise of the new wave of participants in the democratic process in Ghana, particularly the youth via such platforms, must be seen as a positive development for a nascent democracy. A key motivation has been adduced by Kalyango and Adu-Kumi (2013) who attributed it to the new media technological tools. It is their contention that the internet and by extension social media offer spaces for democratic communication to anonymous participants in virtual communities. The creation of virtual communities online has helped remove the scourge of morbid fear in offering one’s thoughts freely on issues of national importance. By removing the fear factor, social media technology is enabling citizens to engage more and to equally participate in the democratic process (Mochtar, 2014). Invariably, the technological innovations which accompany social media tools cannot be wished away. Rogers (2003) in his treatise on diffusion of innovations acknowledges the applicability of technological developments to seek progress. For Rogers, the adoption of any innovation is dependent on certain factors such as relative advantage, compatibility, complexity as well as demographic factors such as age, sex, educational and social background. Clearly, social media usage in Ghana’s 2016 elections fits into this characterization. More importantly, the diffusion of innovations framework has proven to be substantially flexible to the conceptualization of numerous and different kinds of social change processes such as civic participation, public and political dialogue, politics and media effect (Mochtar, 2014; Moseley, 2004). The relevance of the various theories articulated in this chapter is underscored by the perceived needs of the political actors and their audiences to seek alternative media outlets to forcefully articulate their political messages. For example, by going on social media, young people share political messages which have been disseminated on social media or are sometimes even able to create their own political messages (Bachmann, Kaufhold, Lewis, & Gil de Zuniga, 2010). It has been suggested that having a preference for digital media as opposed to print facilitates online political participation for young people as a result of the possible effect of the online content (ibid.).

Social Media Power as a Mobilizing Tool Politicians and their political parties use a variety of media to reach the masses, which includes social media in modern-day politics (Ndavula & Mueni, 2014). This is because the power of social media as a mobilizing

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tool is its dynamic ability to create, share and search for information. It has the capacity to navigate without the user necessarily logging on to a specific portal destination.5 The word “social” which has been prefixed to media to become a “noun phrase” is unique because it allows for the creation of information in ways that permit sharing and interaction among users of the content so generated. However, from the point of political engagement and participation, we need to be mindful that social media usage or being very active on social media does not necessarily translate into strong interest by such users to cast their votes. There is the notion that social media users are mostly the educated ones who are found mostly in towns and cities across Ghana. This assertion has been disputed on the basis of the voting statistics sourced from the Human Development Report on Northern Ghana. The report which captures empirical data from a predominantly rural setting indicates that rural residents are increasingly using social media in determining their political preferences in national elections (Northern Ghana Human Development Report, 2018, p. 132). Clearly, social media power as a mobilizing tool for electoral democracy is gaining traction and becoming very ubiquitous. There is not a doubt that as a mobilizing tool and by virtue of the increasing internet revolution across the world, it is reducing the political cost that comes with democratic politics in terms of massive physical campaign rallies in Ghana and other African countries (Strandberg, 2013). Its impact on the young and the old in terms of news consumption and voting behaviour is deep due to its gradual assumption of centre stage in social and political mobilization among young voters. Besides, social media influence as key platforms for mobilization, engagement and participation has additional attraction evidenced by cheap access in view of its production and consumption as they relate to the currency and freshness of information with no inhibitions of editorial filtering. For example, the Obama presidential campaign in 2008 sought to create a whole new political constituency online raising about half a billion dollars through online platforms such as Facebook (Centre for European Studies, 2012). The campaign which was run on fifteen social media sites (Effing, van Hillegersberg, & Huibers, 2011) produced 2000 official videos which were viewed 80  million times on YouTube alone and generated about 244,000 unofficial video responses. But the success story of the 2008 US elections must be contextualized within the context of technology—the internet penetration rate and its connectivity and use by the population.

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In the case of Ghana, social media is still evolving and runs side by side with the traditional media. However, the evolving trend of social media in terms of impact has come to not only challenge political legitimacy of the rulers but also create sociopolitical awareness among the citizens. According to Essoungou (2010), studies suggest that when African youth including those of Ghana go online mostly with their mobile communication devices, they spend much of their time on social media platforms. In this way, other internet platforms have thus become less important to most African youth who go online. Therefore, the effort by the political class to shift their focus to social media to engage in political mobilization and to woo young voters for electoral projects has increased the efficacy of the media. As argued by Druckman, Kifer, and Parkin (2014), before the advent of social media, the public was largely influenced by the bias of traditional media rather than relying on their own opinions and inferences from the facts and history of the political candidates and parties. However, with the new media platforms such as social media sites politicians now face the challenge of the ever-changing digital world where the voter/ electorate relies heavily on the variety of media for a great deal of choices. In this way, social media have thus become a well-honed tool in the hands of the political actors seeking the mandate of their citizens as evidenced in Ghana’s 2016 elections. As a mobilizing agency, social sites are available for the use of political communicators and politicians to disseminate convincing messages to the target audience. For example, in order to maximize voter impact, a specific strategy is required to mobilize them for participation in what they consider a just cause or part of their civic responsibility. In Ghana, social media, thus, has become an essential part of communal discourse and within the broad spectrum of the democratic space due to its ability to induce participation (Dzisah, 2018).

Social Media and Political Communication in Democracy In the 2008 US elections, the democratic world witnessed how social media became the energizer in enabling citizens’ participation in the democratic process (Tang & Lee, 2013). Statistics provided in this chapter points to unprecedented upsurge in political participation by young voters due to the inspiration they drew from social media. It provided them with cheap and easy access, the freedom to generate content and to

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get feedback from such encounters. Its key lever has been the communication platform it provides without the drudgery of being assisted or invited to participate in discussions, synonymous with the traditional media channels and platforms.6 Taking a cue from the US elections and others in the Global North, emerging democracies such as Ghana and others on the African continent are gradually embracing the use of social media as part and parcel of their political communication architecture. Political candidates seeking the mandate of the citizens and their political parties have come to imbibe social media and its highly visible environment. The realization of its enormous power in communication across platforms unaided provides presidential candidates the ideal platform to promote themselves, articulate their vision and policy goals and interact with their voters directly and without the filtering mechanism associated with the mainstream media (Kalyango & Adu-Kumi, 2013). With limited funding sources staring at most political candidates and parties in Africa and in particular Ghana, these social media networking sites provide them with a powerful avenue for interacting with a more demanding citizenry. While its cost-saving principle is laudable and presents the candidates with the platform to disseminate strategic political messages and market themselves and their parties, it is also offering more personalized images to the public. For example, in the case of Ghana’s 2016 elections, social media has provided the less resourceful parties the opportunity to match well-funded campaigns with creative and relatively inexpensive strategies. It must be emphasized that in Ghana there are twenty-four registered political parties. However, the two dominant political parties—the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the New Patriotic Party (NPP)—could be said to be somehow resourceful. The smaller political parties struggled even to maintain and run a decent constituency let alone a national party office. This is exacerbated by the inability of successive governments to enact a legislation to allow for state funding of political parties. Due to this obvious weakness in Ghana’s democratic development, the political parties struggle to maintain their presence in all the 275 constituencies across the country. For even the two major parties, they hardly operate in the 275 offices on a daily basis due to financial constraints when each one of them is out of government. It is sad to relate that Ghana’s political funding regime is largely unregulated. What this means is that it is difficult to ascertain the total amount of money spent on campaigns. The available data, which provides some semblance of the cost

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of campaigns, deals with parliamentary primaries and elections both at the internal party selection and at the national parliamentary contest. According to the Westminster Foundation for Democracy (2015), parliamentary candidates spent an average of USD 85,000.7 For smaller parties to salvage and boost their political presence, articulate their political vision and alternative policy options to the electorate, these parties have moved to embrace social media. For example, the presidential candidate of the Progressive People’s Party (PPP), Dr. Paa Kwesi Nduom, built his social capital with over 260,000 followers on Facebook and had 50,000 followers on Twitter.8 We must note also that a follow-up report released in September 2016, three months to the December 7, 2016, presidential and parliamentary elections, reveals that the NDC presidential candidate, John Mahama, led his fellow contestants on Facebook with 1,007,595 likes (followers) compared with those of the NPP presidential candidate, Nana Akufo Addo, which stand at 981,057. However, there was a contrast when it came to the political parties and not the candidates. The NPP as a political party had more followers on Facebook with 307,963 likes compared with the NDC’s 24,743 likes on Facebook (penplusbytes.org/site/governance/). The interesting twist here has been the Progressive People’s Party (PPP) with 33,193 followers, which displaced the NDC to the third position even though the NDC is one of the two dominant political parties in the country. In fact, since the inception of the Fourth Republican Constitution, Ghana has held seven elections, with the NDC winning four and the NPP winning three of them overall (Dzisah, 2018). In respect of the micro-­ blogging networking service, Twitter, Nana Akufo Addo took advantage of this social media platform with over 4000 tweets compared with 842 tweets by his main challenger, John Mahama. Impressively, candidates of comparatively small political parties such as the Convention People’s Party (CPP) had 609 followers and Nana Konadu Agyemang-Rawlings (a ­former first lady), the presidential candidate of the National Democratic Party, had 493 followers. The dominant political communication tools utilized by the two main contestants and their political parties has been a curious mixture of short, crisp, eye-catching and attention grabbing political messages. The thrust of the messages revolves around political marketing strategies with emphasis on personality brands, track record, policy options and the intended target audience. Crucially, Nana Akufo Addo was contesting for the third time, having lost the two previous attempts of 2008 and 2012. The third-­

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time bid, therefore, called for a rethink of strategy. He adopted the “Change” campaign slogan and deployed both social and traditional media tools. With the hashtag #Agenda for Change and #Still the battle is the Lords, his campaign focused on content dissemination by driving home the candidate’s flagship policy of Free Senior High School for every Ghanaian pupil. The then candidate Nana Akufo Addo, now President Akufo Addo, and his team of handlers invigorated their presence and aggressive campaigning on Facebook and Twitter by strategically identifying the right demographic groups. They targeted some democratically conscious groups who hitherto included the teeming unemployed youth desirous for employment. Also targeted were trainee-nurses and teacher-­ trainees who had seen their allowances withdrawn by the incumbent NDC government led by John Mahama. The Akufo Addo social media political communication strategy worked to the fullest. John Mahama and the NDC government had their backs to the wall as they struggled to defend their legacy and to counter the sweeping wave of promises and catchy sloganeering of Nana Akufo Addo and his NPP. John Mahama and his team focused their message on “Transformation”. For example, on social media, their target audiences were bombarded with the hashtags #TransformingGhana, #Changing Lives. But it did not stop here as there were other hashtags such as #JmToaso, #Ghanaatwork.

Viral Social Media Threat to Democracy While acknowledging the importance political actors and their parties attach to social media platforms as a mobilizing and participatory avenue to shore up their electoral chances, there is also the discomfiture about the threats they pose to the democratic process. The virality of social media is prevalent in how users concoct and present rumours and gossips as factual information, particularly when it has to do with sensitive political ­information. For example, there are instances where activists spread false stories to the extent of publishing allegations of vote rigging by political opponents to other unsubstantiated explosive information (Dzisah, 2018). The clearest of the concerns by stakeholders and in particular the security agencies were how to deal with social media on polling day. For example, the then Inspector General of Police (IGP), John Kudalor, at a media briefing on their preparations and measures to ensure free, fair and incident-free elections signalled the Ghana Police Service consideration of options including blocking social media across the country on election

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day. The main concern of the Ghana Police Service and allied security agencies has been that social media could be used as a tool for misinformation to create electoral chaos on voting day. Invariably, the Police might have assessed the likely security implications and dangers of the possible abuse of social media messaging to foment trouble during the 2016 polls. The Police Chief further argues that if the patrons of social media dabble in what he considers to be misinformation and falsehood they have every right to think about such options since the peace and security of Ghana is more paramount.9 Curiously, while we acknowledged the potency of social media in serving as a political mobilization and participatory platform in the 2016 elections, its security implications in relaying false information must be taken seriously. In this context, the veiled threats by Ghana’s Chief Constable (the IGP) as the Police considered options to black out Facebook, Twitter and other media platforms make us reconsider the dangers these platforms pose to national peace and stability. In one instance, the Police stated that they were considering a social media blockade for a limited period of less than twenty-four hours with the voting hours of 0700 hours–1700 hours in mind. The Police drew parallels with what pertains in other African countries which limited the use of social media on election day. The most oft cited is Uganda which shut down social media on February 19, 2016, the day of that country’s general elections. In fact, voters woke up in the morning only to realize that their access to social media platforms had been blocked. This action was defended by the Ugandan President, Yoweri Museveni, who argued that it was a “security measure to avert lies … intended to incite violence and illegal declaration of election results”.10 Touching on illegal declaration of election results and how such declarations once they hit social media platforms go viral must be the concern of not only election managers but all stakeholders in the midst of the volatile religious, sectarian, ethnic and political cleavages which characterized our democratic evolution. A case in point is what transpired a few hours after voting ended in Ghana’s 2016 elections. A little over eight hours after polls closed and the election results from the polling stations started trickling in, the campaign manager of the then opposition NPP, Peter Mac Manu, went on air to declare that they have won and urged the then ruling NDC government and the party to concede defeat. This happened at a time that the mandated body empowered to do so, the Electoral Commission of Ghana (EC), was yet to release a single result from any of the 275 constituencies in the country. The impact of this pronouncement

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was huge and resonated across various social media platforms as well as traditional media outlets. The virality of such a declaration poses a danger to the peace and stability of the nation and feeds into the conservative discussions on how to curb the excesses of social media. Concerns as to how to curb the excesses of social media culminated in some well-meaning organizations organizing a colloquium to discuss whether Ghana should ban social media on election day. These organizations were getting agitated by the increasing peddling of rumour, gossip and outright falsehood by fringe elements with the intention to create disaffection and promote electoral violence; Lloyd Evans of the Institute of Financial and Economic Journalists states: “Social media, without some level of control, regulation and editorial restraint, can throw decency out of the window, fuel misinformation, polarisation and encourage mayhem. A temporary ban cannot be dismissed out rightly but if it would, it must at least come with an acceptance of the need to control its use to ensure we don’t get overwhelmed by its potential dangers”.11 But inasmuch as the alarm bells are being sounded as to the threats posed by social media, particularly due to its viral undercurrents of twisting and spreading rumour, generating unnecessary tension with the potential to lead to violence before, during and after elections, there are those who believe that such excesses are curable and do not outstrip the positive output of being a catalyst for social engagement and political mobilization. Attigah of Blogging Ghana states: The ills of social media are not exclusive to it and rather than deny citizens access and use, Ghana must place emphasis on how best to maximize its usefulness especially as a tool that enhances participation and inclusiveness in the monitoring of our electoral process.12

The fear factor with regard to fake news in social media and the threat it poses to national security during elections are not limited to Uganda and Ghana. The virality of rumours and gossip in traditional Africa settings has been transferred on to the social media platforms and therefore the arguments by the authorities to block social media are not isolated cases. At the heart of the anxiety is the spread of fake news with its attendant virality, which not only corrupts the democratic space but also helps to build tensions. It must be noted here that the same calls and considerations reverberated within the walls of Kenya in the run-up to their August 8, 2017, election. In the Kenya situation, Francis Ole Kaparo, the Chairman of the

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National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC), expressed similar sentiments and hinted that the Kenya government might consider shutting down social media during the elections due to security concerns and irresponsible social media use. He added: “There are terrible people in social media who are hell-bent on causing unnecessary anxiety across the country and for that reason we will be cracking down on those who misuse social media.”13 In spite of the threats and the dangers that critics claimed they pose to the democratic projects particularly in Ghana and Africa, the proponents argue that the gradual shift of the locus of media power relations from the traditional media to the new media provides more positives than the setbacks or imagined threats being articulated (Kalyango & Adu-Kumi, 2013). As affirmed by Attigah, social media promotes free advertisements, advocacy works and above all avails itself to the political candidates and parties to promote their campaign messages widely and freely.14 Whatever its weaknesses, the continuous and increasing migration of Ghanaian and African youth onto these virtual spaces to participate in debates and engage their peers in debates with instant feedbacks makes the threats it poses pale into insignificance. The strong support for the positive impact of social media in Ghana’s 2016 elections was corroborated by the European Observation Mission to Ghana. A survey by the EU Observation Mission media group concluded in part that Facebook and Twitter were the key platforms used in keeping people updated about the results of the elections. Presenting the report, Petra Jezkova, a media analyst on the team, states, “Social media was not only used by a large section of Ghanaians but by presidential candidates for the just ended polls. The presidential candidates, including their vice presidents and spouses had engaged in over 10,000 tweets to keep their followers updated”. The emerging power and influence of social media as a news source is underscored by Mark Stevens, the Deputy Chief Observer of the EU Observer Mission. He disclosed that “although many Ghanaians resorted to traditional media like radio, television, and newspapers, many people cited social media as the second major news source”.15 While the EU Mission’s findings point to the rapid growth and influence of social media in democratic elections in Ghana, they added a caveat in respect of the challenges posed by the social media platforms as it has to do with fake news, misinformation, ethnic, tribal, religious and racial incitements. It is their view that the National Media Commission, which is the constitutionally mandated media regulator, should find a more

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acceptable way to ensure that it is used to facilitate healthy debates and not for hate speech. In any case, these challenges are not peculiar to Ghana and African democracies in the bid to use social media for social and political mobilization as well as for political engagements and participation. Stevens argued that while social media and online portals are becoming more prominent as information sources, one global trend and challenge has got to do with regulation (Mochtar, 2014). Clearly, the challenges of social media are on the regulatory side. The absence of regulation around most social and online media has the potential to create disharmony in most emerging democracies, with the July 2018 Zimbabwe elections as a test case. The resort to illegal declarations and fake results posted by politicians, political activists and other partisan elements culminated in the Harare protests with the protesters marching on the Zimbabwe Independent Electoral Commission. The outcome of such irresponsible deployment of social media to whip up sentiments and emotions produced unwelcome results of deaths and maiming on the streets of Zimbabwe. All these could have been avoided if the protagonists had allowed the constitutionally mandated body to do its work while the political candidates, the political parties and partisan followers on social media adhered to the rules of engagement. The resort to social media was not a bad idea but the peddling of falsehood and misinformation with the view to incite the people to push for the declaration of a particular candidate who saw the election as a life or death affair has been very costly. Despite the heightened tension and the illegal declarations using both social media and other traditional media by some of the contestants and their fanatical political activists, the resultant deaths through the use of brute force by an unguarded, reckless and blood-cuddling military apparatus of the State cannot be the solution to the resolution of such uncontrolled and unregulated mediated spaces.

Conclusion This chapter has contextualized the democratic underpinnings of social media as the emerging anchor for a vibrant electoral democracy due to its participatory nature. The theories deployed explained the importance of social media to electoral democracy as they draw on empirical arguments to establish the nexus of participation, engagement and mobilization. These theoretical and conceptual arguments are quite riveting because of their single point of convergence—democratization of communication for active participation of citizens. The theories served as useful veins and

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arteries for this chapter in highlighting greater audience freedoms and orientations rather than being tied to cultural existentialist views on mass communication. In any case, the emergence of social media as a participatory and mobilizing platform does not mean the vital role of traditional media is being rendered redundant. Rather, they must be seen as complementary information vessels due to the multimedia platforms they create for greater access and satisfaction to their audience. Clearly, political actors continue to rely heavily on traditional media sources such as television, radio (particularly for its phone-ins segments), newspapers, stickers and flyers for their political campaigns and communication. However, social media offers a cheap alternative to communicate a political message to constituents, making social media an imperative political campaign strategy (Centre for European Studies, 2012; Okoro & Kenneth, 2013). Social media has therefore revolutionized political communication in Ghana and other emerging democracies in Africa by diversifying news sources and increasing the possibility for feedback in a timely manner. Despite the strides being made by social media as a mobilizing and participatory platform in Ghana’s 2016 elections, the nature of African elections and that of Ghana are not yet ripe enough for social media adherents to start singing the “Hallelujah Chorus” (Nyamnjoh, 2005). Social media does not have the wherewithal to turn around the political fortunes of political candidates and their parties in Ghana and Africa in the immediate future unless they address the key issues of illiteracy and internet connectivity. Again, from the experiences of Ghana, Kenya, Uganda, Zimbabwe and other emerging democracies on the continent, African elections cannot be won on Twitter or Facebook. Regardless, the good thing to come out of these past elections has been the progressive adoption of social media for political campaigns. Ghana and the rest of Africa are catching up with the reality of social media as a major platform for engendering participation, mobilization and engagement. The social and political impact must be seen as gradual on electoral democracy with vast swathe of democratic and technological space to cover.

Notes 1. https://rawgist.com/employ-social-media-actively-in-ghanaian-politicsand-electoral-campaigns/ 2. http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/201409/24/ 3. https://www.gs.statcounter.com

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4. https://penplusbytes.org/site/governance-social-media%2D%2Dindexreport-september-2016 5. http://www.ai.org.za/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2011/11/ no-46 6. https://www.researchgate.net/publication 7. https://www.wfd.org/cost-of-politics-in-ghana_html 8. https://www.circumspect.com/2016/08/Ghana_2016 9. https://www.myjoyonline.com/news/2016 10. https://www.myjoyonline.com/news/2016 11. http://us1campaign-archive.com 12. http://us1campaign-archive.com 13. https://www.dw.com/en/a-39972894 14. http://us1campaign-archive.com 15. https://ghanaweb.com/ghanahomepage/newsarchive/NMC495895

References Arnstein, S. R. (1969). A Ladder of Citizen Participation. Journal of the American Planning Association, 35(4), 216–224. Bachmann, I., Kaufhold, K., Lewis, S. C., & Gil de Zuniga, H. (2010). News Platform Preference: Advancing the Effects of Age and Media Consumption on Political Participation. International Journal of Internet Science, 5(1), 34–47. Centre for European Studies. (2012). Social Media – The New Power of Political Influence. Suomen Toivo Think Tank. Version 1.0 Ari-matti Auvinen. Diamond, L., & Plattner, M.  F. (Eds.). (2014). Democratization and Authoritarianism in the Arab World. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Druckman, J. N., Kifer, M. J., & Parkin, M. (2014). US Congressional Campaign Communications in an Internet Age. Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties, 24(1), 20–44. https://doi.org/10.1080/17457289.2013.832255 Dzisah, W. S. (2018). Social Media and Elections in Ghana: Enhancing Democratic Participation. African Journalism Studies, 39(1), 27–47. https://doi.org/10.1 080/23743670.2018.14527742 Effing, R., van Hillegersberg, J., & Huibers, T. (2011). Social Media and Political Participation: Are Facebook, Twitter and YouTube Democratizing our Political Systems? In E. Tambouris, A. Macintosh, & H. de Bruijn (Eds.), International Conference on Electronic Participation (pp.  25–35). Heidelberg: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-23333-3_3 Essoungou, A. M. (2010). A Social Media Boom Begins in Africa: Using Mobile Phones, Africans Join the Global Conversation. Retrieved from http://www. un.org/en/africarenewal/vol24no4/social-media-boom.html

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Gil de Zuniga, H., Molyneux, L., & Zheng, P. (2014). Social Media, Political Expression, and Political Participation: Panel Analysis of Lagged and Concurrent Relationships. Journal of Communication, 64(4), 612–634. Guy, R. (2012). The Use of Social Media for Academic Practice: A Review of Literature. Kentucky Journal of Higher Education Policy and Practice, 1(2), 7. Kalyango Jr., Y., & Adu-Kumi, B. (2013). Impact of Social Media on Political Mobilization in East and West Africa. Global Media Journal, 72(22), 1. Kaplan, A. M., & Haenlein, M. (2010). Users of the World, Unite! The Challenges and Opportunities of Social Media. Business Horizons, 53(1), 59–68. https:// doi.org/10.1016/j.bushor.2009.09.003 Katz, E., & Blumler, J. (1974). Uses and Gratifications Theory. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Khondker, H. H. (2011). Role of the New Media in the Arab Spring. Globalizations, 5(5), 675–667. McQuail, D. (1983). Mass Communication Theory. London: Sage. McQuail, D. (2005). McQuail’s Mass Communication Theory: An Introduction (2nd ed.). Newbury Park, CA: Sage. Mochtar, H. (2014). Public Participation and Political Culture: A Case Study of Voting Behavior in Jombang Regency. Open Journal of Political Science, 4(4), 244. Moseley, S. F. (2004). Everett Rogers’ Diffusion of Innovations Theory: Its Utility and Value in Public Health. Journal of Health Communication: International Perspectives, 9(S1), 149–151. https://doi.org/10.1080/10810730490271601 Ndavula, J. O., & Mueni, J. (2014). New Media and Political Marketing in Kenya: The Case of 2013 General Elections. International Journal of Arts and Commerce, 3(6), 69–84. Nyamnjoh, F. B. (2005). Africa’s Media, Democracy and the Politics of Belonging. London: Zed Books. Okoro, N., & Kenneth, A. (2013). Social Media and Political Participation in Nigeria During the 2011 General Elections: The Lapses and the Lessons. Global Journal of Arts Humanities and Social Sciences, 1(3), 29–46. Pennington, N., Winfrey, K. L., Warner, B. R., & Kearney, M. W. (2015). Liking Obama and Romney (on Facebook): An Experimental Evaluation of Political Engagement and Efficacy During the 2012 General Election. Computers in Human Behavior, 44, 279–283. Rogers, E. M. (2003). Diffusion of Innovations. New York: Free Press. Strandberg, K. (2013). A Social Media Revolution or Just a Case of History Repeating Itself? The Use of Social Media in the 2011 Finnish Parliamentary Elections. New Media & Society. https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444812470612 Tang, G., & Lee, F.  L. (2013). Facebook Use and Political Participation: The Impact of Exposure to Shared Political Information, Connections with Public

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Political Actors, and Network Structural Heterogeneity. Social Science Computer Review. https://doi.org/10.1177/0894439313490625 UNDP. (2018). Northern Ghana Human Development Report: Bridging the Poverty Gap and Fostering Socio-Economic Transformation and Empowerment to Contribute to Human Development for All. Accra, Ghana: Yamens.

Online References http://us1campaign-archive.com http://www.circumspect.com/2016/08/Ghana-2016 https://ghanaweb.com/ghanahomepage/newsarchive/social-media-will-play-abigger-role-in-next-elections/NMC495895/ https://penplusbytes.org/site/governance-social-media%2D%2Dindexreport-september-2016 https://rawgist.com/employ-social-media-actively-in-ghanaian-politics-andelectoral-campaigns/ https://www.dw.com/en/a-39972894 https://www.gs.statcounter.com https://www.myjoyonline.com/news/2016/igp-considers-blocking-socialmedia-on-election-day.php https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/201409/24/ https://www.researchgate.net/publication

CHAPTER 7

Social Media Use in the 2018 Presidential Election in Cameroon Kingsley L. Ngange

Introduction Social media use for political processes is increasing worldwide, and its role in shaping political debates cannot be disputed (Howard et  al., 2011). The platforms available in social media, such as Facebook, YouTube, Twitter and Instagram, provide tremendous opportunities for different political actors (government, journalists, civil society, voters, political parties, non-governmental organizations, etc.) to communicate their messages and engage in political discourse in the marketplace of ideas (public spheres). Such opportunities are expected to surmount the barriers of dictatorship and censorship of information, which hitherto stood as a hindrance to the democratic process in Africa. Today, with social media, anyone, anywhere, anytime, anyhow, can transmit political information to a heterogeneous audience. For instance, during the Arab Spring of 2011, democratic ideas (in a predominantly dictatorial region) were spread through social media to different Arab nations and the

K. L. Ngange (*) Department of Journalism and Mass Communication, University of Buea, Buea, Cameroon © The Author(s) 2020 M. N. Ndlela, W. Mano (eds.), Social Media and Elections in Africa, Volume 1, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30553-6_7

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Western news houses used the information to report the ongoing events to the rest of the world (Reijswoud, 2014). There were over 2200 tweets from Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Morocco and Yemen about Tunisian president Ben Ali’s resignation on the day he stepped aside. Over the course of a week before President Mubarak’s resignation (in Egypt), the total rate of tweets from Egypt and around the world about political change in that country increased terrifically from 2300 a day to 230,000 a day (Howard, ibid.). Increasingly, social media is now being used for political activities—a significant shift from Mbarika and Mbarika’s (2006) observation about the rapid adoption and use of information and communication technologies (ICTs) more for social than for economic and political reasons in Africa. Rising political consciousness in Cameroon, like in some parts of Africa, has been facilitated by a high rate of ICT adoption. There was a huge difference between social media use during Cameroon’s October 2011 presidential election and that of October 2018. In 2011, social media use was very limited, with no presidential candidate using more than two of the dominant three social media tools (Facebook, Twitter and YouTube). Edith Kahbang Walla, presidential candidate for the Cameroon People’s Party (CPP), used social media, especially Facebook and YouTube, more actively than all other candidates. All candidates did very little to provide feedback to comments posted on social media, hence using the media primarily as a one-way channel to deliver messages to audiences. Social media use in the 2011 election faced two main problems: the general adoption level was lower and the government temporarily suspended their use to avoid the possible effects of the Arab Spring spreading over to Cameroon. In 2018, the story was different. It was the first time social media networks were at the heart of the political process—a significant departure from previous elections when the social media were either banned or used limitedly. Surprisingly, one of the first candidates to embrace social media was the incumbent, Paul Biya, who, after thirty-five years in power, announced his candidature for re-election via his Twitter account on July 13, 2018. The message read: Dear compatriots in Cameroon & the Diaspora, aware of the challenges we must take up together to ensure a more united, stable & prosperous Cameroon, I am willing to respond positively to your overwhelming calls. I will stand as your candidate in the upcoming presidential election.

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The eighty-five-year-old president followed up the announcement on his official Facebook page. Thereafter, the other eight candidates, most of whom belong to a relatively younger generation (38 to 50  years old), ­vigorously joined the incumbent to use social media channels to run their political campaigns. This chapter, therefore, seeks to understand the extent and nature of use, as well as the limitations, of digital political activism in Cameroon, with a focus on the October 2018 presidential election. It employs a content analysis of Facebook, YouTube, Twitter and Instagram postings of candidates in the 2018 presidential election within a three and a half months’ period spanning before and immediately after the elections. It also seeks to understand the use and effectiveness of social media strategies on voter choices/patterns. Several categories including the number of posts, the frequency of posts, the content of posts, the language of posts and the audience engagement with posts were analysed for all the social media investigated in this study. Of the four social media analysed (Facebook, YouTube, Twitter and Instagram), the chapter concludes that election results were consistent with social media use during the elections. For instance, the top two candidates out of nine (Paul Biya and Maurice Kamto) at the end of the election used social media more than all other candidates. Citizens were engaged in some electoral debates on social media but the benefits of social media are yet to be maximized in Cameroon.

Overview of Social Media Use in the 2018 Presidential Election in Cameroon In Cameroon’s 2018 presidential election, the strategy of candidates to use social media was particularly useful in the two English-speaking regions (North West and South West) which have been in serious social, economic and political crisis for the past three years. Since 2017, the conflict has degenerated to an arms battle between separatist fighters advocating for the independence of what they call the “Ambazonian State” and the military of the country working on the instructions of the head of state to maintain the country as one and indivisible. In the fighting process, over 2000 people (civilians, separatists, military, traditional rulers and clergymen) have died, 200,000 have been internally displaced and 50,000 have become refugees in neighbouring Nigeria (International Crisis Group, 2018). The separatists called for a no-movement (lockdown) in the entire English-speaking regions during the presidential campaign and election

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period (September 25 to October 10, 2018) and warned, with death threats, all English-speaking Cameroonians not to be involved in the October 7 presidential election. With this situation, only one presidential candidate (Akere Muna of the Popular Front for Development) struggled to stage a rally in the troubled regions (precisely in Limbe, South West Region). The Limbe rally was scantily attended with about 200 militants. Due to security fears, candidates could not hold physical meetings in the conflict areas. The alternative was social media, which unfortunately has less than 35% connectivity in the conflict areas (France 24, 2018). Political messages were disseminated through Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and WhatsApp on a daily basis and debates and discussions took place in these online platforms. Despite these innovations, there were growing concerns about the measures of regulation put in place to check the excesses and unintended uses of social media, especially in a young democracy like Cameroon. These included hate speech, propagation of falsehood and Internet fraud. To understand the issues surrounding social media use in the 2018 presidential election in Cameroon, the research poses two questions: Firstly, to what extent did candidates use social media during the 2018 presidential election in Cameroon? The rationale for this question is the need to know the rate at which politicians in Cameroon are responding to changing times. This question is answered with the results obtained in the analysis of frequency (by month) and various social media used by candidates during the election (see Tables 7.3 and 7.4). Secondly, what was the nature of social media use by candidates in the 2018 presidential election in Cameroon? This question is crucial because it touches on the heart of the study and highlights the fact that the use of social media, especially Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and Instagram, in various forms of political activism is increasingly affecting political outcomes worldwide. Can Cameroon be an exception? The question was answered with data obtained from content and language of posts, as well as public engagement with the social media messages (see Tables 7.5, 7.6, and 7.7).

Overview of ICTs in Cameroon The Internet was introduced in Cameroon in 1998 and the mobile telephone came two years later, in 2000. Prior to this, Cameroon had adopted the Global System for Mobile Communication (GSM) technology in 1989 (Nana & Tankeu, 2005). This technology was expected to ensure a breakthrough for Cameroon in the field of wireless telecommunication,

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but due to ill-fated policies and lack of investment, it failed to thrive. Though the wireless technology was first used in communication in 1998, the new media sector began developing only in 2000 following the passing of the April 2000 prime ministerial text of application on private audio-visual communication enterprises (Esamba, 2005). Since then the use of computers has been popularized and several mobile telephone companies and Internet providers (Mobile Telephone Network [MTN], Cameroon Telecommunication [CAMTEL] with its CT phone, Orange, Nextel, Yoomee, Ringo, Creolink, Vodacom, Equacomm, Foris) have been set up. The growth of the sector has led to somewhat sectorial specialization. For example, while the aforementioned Internet providers focus their Internet services in the urban areas, an Internet provider, Ringo, was introduced in 2008 with the main objective of providing Internet to remote places (Telecommunication Sector-Cameroon Business, 2011). It is important to note that mobile phones and the Internet were introduced in Cameroon more than two decades after they saw the light of day in developed countries like the USA, Britain and France (Banda, Mudhai, & Tettey, 2009; Neba, 2011; Nyamnjoh, 2005; Tanjong, 2006). The laggard attitude or catch-up syndrome common in Africa is captured vividly by communication scholar Nyamnjoh (2005, pp.  3–4) when he regrets that “while the rest of the world is significantly more advanced and in certain cases (e.g. North America and Western Europe) there is already talk of new media taking over from old media, in Africa the so-called old media are yet to take over from the indigenous forms of communication.” In fact, the Global Competitiveness Report, 2010–2011, ranked Cameroon 121st out of 139 countries in terms of mobile penetration. The country moved down to 119 out of 138 countries in 2016–2017, and in the report of 2017–2018, Cameroon is 116 out of 137. Between 2010 and 2018, the penetration rate has been estimated at 32–37%, making mobile phones the most accessible channel for communication for citizens in the country. On the other hand, Internet usage is less than 3% and only one out of every one hundred Cameroonians has access to a personal computer (ANTIC Report, 2011). Table 7.1 paints a picture of the ICT situation in Cameroon. The statistics in Table  7.1 confirm that in Cameroon people use mobile phones more than the scarce Internet connections to communicate with others in the country and abroad (Ngange & Tchewo, 2017; Sarrazin, 2011).

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Table 7.1  Distribution of ICT ownership and use in Cameroon No.

Indicators

Per 100 inhabitants

1 2 3 4 5 6

Internet users Fixed telephone lines Mobile subscribers Personal computers Fixed broadband International Internet bandwidth

2.93 1.04 32.28 1.12 0.00 –

Source: United Nations Department for Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA), E-Government Global Survey, 2002–2010; World Economic Forum (WEF), Global Competitive Report, 2010–2011, 2016– 2017, 2017–2018 (contained in ANTIC Report, July 2011, page 13)

Mobile Phones Before the introduction of ICTs, communication options in the country were limited to fixed phones, national postal service, one national radio, ten provincial (now regional) radio stations, one television station and a couple of newspapers. The telephony services in Cameroon have increased dramatically with the introduction of the mobile phone. At the break of 2000, the number of subscribed telephone users was about 2  million. When mobile operators Orange and MTN were established, the number of telephone owners increased to over 4 million (Nana & Tankeu, 2005). The success of the two private mobile operators is partly because of poor performance of the government-owned Cameroon Telecommunication, CAMTEL, which has wasted enormous opportunities for the development of the fixed line sector. The telecommunication market of Cameroon took form thanks to law no. 98/014 of July 14, 1998. This law established the modalities for installing, exploiting and equitably developing telecommunication to encourage and to favour the participation of the private sector in the development of telecommunications in a competitive environment (Mahama, 2008). This law was first implemented in June 1999 when an operating licence was granted to France Telecom SCM (Société Cameroonaise de Mobile), which later on became known as Orange Cameroon. The next licence was granted to the South African company Mobile Telephone Network, MTN. CAMTEL was still specialized in fixed telephones. In December 2005, CAMTEL introduced its mobile product known as CTphone. According to Khan and Nkama (2007), between 2003 and 2007, the total number of mobile telephone subscribers rapidly increased

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in Cameroon, as was the case in many African countries. However, the main telephone lines per hundred inhabitants have remained far below the African average. What is interesting to note here is that the earliest adopter of mobile phones in Africa is often the poorest in the society (Rice & Katz, 2003). This brings to light one key issue in ICT adoption—that the motive and zeal to acquire an ICT often overcome the substantial barrier of cost. Most of these users are subscribers to either Orange or MTN or both. These companies overwhelmingly exceed the government-owned CAMTEL, in terms of performance and revenues. Since July 2005, MTN and Orange claim “more than two million subscribers, almost 21  times the number of fixed line subscribers. The phenomenal growth in mobile communication has helped the country’s tele density reach the 12% level. Innovative pricing strategies are helping even lower income” (Nana & Tankeu, 2005, p. 49). The competition not only has been detrimental to the state-owned telecommunication company but has helped it to increase on the quality of its services in order to maintain its customers and attract new ones. Service relations departments are in place though not satisfactory; however, services are rendered much faster than in the CAMTEL monopoly era (Telecommunication Sector-Cameroon Business, 2011). The evolution of the mobile phone in Cameroon has also been characterized by a gradual reduction in the prices of phone calls and other services rendered by the operators. This has been one of the strategies by the companies to allow access to people who are among the poorest in the society (Bruijn, 2009). First phone cards were very expensive, at least 5000 FCFA.1 Today, they are virtually free and it is possible to get transfer of airtime for 200  FCFA.  Despite this drastic drop, the cost of communication in Cameroon remains the most expensive in Africa (Mahama, 2008). The shocking reality about this price discrepancy is that the mobile phone operators found in Cameroon are the same in other African countries which have relatively cheaper call rates. According to Khan and Nkama (2007), Orange bills a minute of a local call in Cameroon for 200 FCFA but charges 100 FCFA and 90 FCFA for the same call in Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal, respectively. The same is true for MTN services in Cameroon and Côte d’Ivoire, and for international calls. Even with a relatively high cost, the use of mobile phones is on the rise in Cameroon, with MTN alone announcing 4  million users by 2011 and 9.9  million subscribers by 2017.

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This rapid growth has brought about many advantages, including increased social contacts with friends and relatives across the country, rapid business transactions and the creation of employment opportunities (Bruijn & Brinkman, 2011). However, the need exists to improve on the ICT infrastructure in order to expand the network coverage and improve on the quality of services (Mahama, 2008). As Khan and Nkama (2007) noted, the government has recognized the importance of ICTs in development, but all efforts are geared towards expanding ICT use and nothing to encourage reduction in the cost of airtime and ICT development/ production, especially application software as evidenced in the national ICTs strategy (see ANTIC, July 2011 Report). Internet According to Mahama (2008), after adopting Internet technology for over a decade now, Cameroon is still lagging far behind countries which adopted the technology a couple of years before Cameroon. At the start of the Internet campaign, the government of Cameroon aspired to make all Cameroonians “Internet literate.” This zeal to vulgarize the Internet in Cameroon was coined in the slogan “Soon the illiterates will be those who can’t use the Internet,” which was contained in CAMTEL’s 1997 campaign (Tsapi, 2000). The main objective of this campaign was to make the Internet available to all Cameroonians. But three years after the energetic launch of the campaign, the Internet failed to take off with full force in the country. However, the number of Internet users in Cameroon increased rapidly from less than 4 per 1000 inhabitants in 2003 to over 22 per 1000 in 2007 (Khan & Nkama, 2007). By 2007, Cameroon had about six Internet providers in the big towns. Compared with other countries, Internet use is still very low. For instance, in 2003, more than 14 Ivorians and almost 22 Senegalese per 1000 were already using the Internet, while the same figure in Cameroon was less than 4, much lower than the African average of almost 16 inhabitants per 1000. Nzepa’s justification, in Khan and Nkama (2007), for this holds that though Internet use in Cameroon still remained far below other African countries, if compared with the rates of increase in the use of Internet, one will realize that the rate of adoption is very high in Cameroon. The situation in 2018 has not significantly improved even with the government’s December 22, 2009, efforts to interconnect all ten regions on fibre optic. The project would have permitted universities, enterprises and

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companies, seventy-two localities and technical points to be connected to the network (Bainkong, 2010). Despite efforts by stakeholders to boost the demand for the Internet, the request still remains low because of relatively high prices of this service compared to the per capita income of the average Cameroonian (Mahama, 2008). To meet up with the cost, most Cameroonians accessed Internet through cybercafés, which were widespread in the country and relatively cheaper than personal lines. If these limited avenues are properly exploited by Cameroonian politicians and voters, then it is likely going to improve on their output in terms of disseminating information and engaging in political discourse.

Candidates of the 2018 Presidential Election The 2018 presidential election in Cameroon was held on October 7, 2018, with nine candidates from nine political parties, as shown in Table 7.2: The nine candidates had their nominations accepted by the election body, Elections Cameroon (ELECAM), out of twenty-eight applications.

Table 7.2  Candidates of the October 7 presidential election, their political parties and date of creation S/N Candidate

Position in the Political party party

Date of formation

1

Chairman

March 1985

3 2 4 5 6 7 8 9

Paul Biya

Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement (CPDM) Maurice Kamto Chairman Cameroon Renaissance Movement Joshua Osih 1st Vice Chair Social Democratic Front (SDF) Cabral Libii 1st Secretary Univers Party Franklin Ndifor Chairman Afanwi Akere Muna Chairman Adamou Ndam Njoya Garga Haman Adji Serge Espoir Matomba

Chairman Chairman Chairman

Cameroon National Citizen Movement Popular Front for Development (PFD) Cameroon Democratic Union (CDU) Alliance for Democracy and Development (ADD) United People for Social Renovation (PURS)

August 2012 May 1990 March 11, 2011 May 2018 2017 April 1991 June 4, 1991 2010

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From Table  7.2, the oldest political party in the country which participated during the elections is the Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement (CPDM). It has been in power since 1985, with its chairman Paul Biya serving as the president of the Republic since November 6, 1982 (36  years of the Biya’s regime, uninterrupted). Seven political parties, except the Social Democratic Front (SDF) and Univers, were represented in the elections by their chairpersons. Worthy of note also is the fact that no woman participated in this presidential election, unlike the October 2011 presidential election in which Edith Kahbang Walla of the Cameroon People’s Party (CPP) participated.

Cameroon’s Democratic System Swedish political scientist Jesper Strömbäck (2005) identified four models of democracy—procedural, competitive, participatory and deliberative democracy—in ascending order of importance/strength. Ngange (2012) stated that Cameroon, with a young democracy and media, is largely fluctuating between procedural and competitive democratic systems (where emphasis is more on respecting democratic procedures and having competitors from different parties participate in an election, regardless of whether the elections were free, fair and credible [participatory democracy] or whether voters and other stakeholders were included in the debates/issues of the elections [deliberative democracy]). But, with the slow integration of social media now seen in the democratic system (especially during elections), it is hoped that the country will have a more participatory and deliberative form of democracy. Social Media Use in Pre-voting, Voting and Post-voting Activities Pre-voting Stage Munir (2018) affirms that social media plays a crucial role in shaping the voting behaviour of electorates. His study affirms that the electorates, especially young persons, seek information from like-minded political experts on social media, and that politically aware electorates become more interactive with candidates on social media and target questions to them regarding their political manifestos. This assertion by Munir is found manifest in the 2018 presidential election in Cameroon, which witnessed the first official use of social media in the electoral process. Considering

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youth are the number one users of social media, it can thus be inferred that their use of social media to obtain information at the pre-voting stage is meant to mould their perceptions about the candidates and the overall electoral process. Gibson and McAllister (2011) attest to the power of social media as a tool for political campaigns. The authors assert that when the political life and activities of candidates are reported on a daily basis, social media transits into agenda-setting devices that tailor the minds of the electorate towards the messages, and the intended action that the messages require from the electorate. How convinced social media users are with a candidate, therefore, is dependent on how powerful political candidates communicate using different social media platforms that electorates have access to (Bimber & Davis, 2003). The idea on whether social media are marketing tools or a forum to express civic responsibility is another area to examine in social media use during pre-voting activities (Gustafsson, 2009). As marketing tools, candidates sell their ideas by convincing electorates. The agenda in doing that is to woo candidates to their side of the political spectrum. As a matter of civic responsibility, Gustaffson asserts that social media engineer public life and public debates on central issues regarding elections. Gustaffson reiterates that participation in online political activities has two implications: it builds one’s public or semi-public identity as someone who expresses political views and concerns and it acts as a way to show activity in the unfolding of events surrounding the candidates and the election. Voting Stage Morisi (2014) affirms that information reduces indecision about voting and increases intention on voting. This refers to credible information about candidates (instead of fake news and manipulations), their parties and the interests they stand to defend in their political manifestos. For candidates to give out credible information on social media, they need to understand the issues affecting the country and tailor messages so as to capture the attention of voters. Baxter and Marcella (2014) confirm this assertion when they note that information plays a vital role in decisions to vote. They uncover the fact that most voting behaviours are engineered by information people have about the electoral process and candidates. It can thus be argued that final decisions that electorates make are informed by details they have gathered about the personalities and agenda of the candidates. Social media, therefore, is used by political candidates to leverage the information needs of potential voters. Larson (2016) asserts that

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though young people are the future of the country, they seem disengaged and disinterested in politics, leading to low turnout rates during voting. When this happens, the younger generation cannot assert its place in the political sphere of the country. The author notes that candidates have a responsibility to draw potential voters like the young to the voting box, thus providing convincing details about a clear plan of action for the populace. Bimber (2003) notes that when voters feel engaged and are part of the political process, the likelihood is that voter turnout will increase. Social media has tremendous potential to do this. Post-voting Stage Sharma and Parma (2017) have described social media as the hottest promotion tool during elections by political parties and political candidates. Social media helps candidates to influence, connect and express their vision and objective, and helps them increase their visibility or gain a majority. This influence is expected to manifest even after elections. Candidates must have captured a community of potential voters with whom it is relevant to discuss continuing political issues affecting political, economic and social life in the country. Unintended Uses and Consequences of Social Media in the Electoral Process There are many unintended consequences of social media use in the electoral process: hate speech, lies telling, fake news/propagation of falsehood, hacking/Internet fraud. Hate speech and the propagation of falsehood were the two dimensions that were noticed with social media use in the 2018 presidential election in Cameroon. Hate speech is foul language against an individual or institution. It is speech targeting the individual or group on the basis of sex, race, tribe, ethnicity, religion, region and nationality. Increasingly, ICT platforms have been transformed into battlegrounds. In fact, scores are settled on social media and other online platforms. This twist of events is a rather unfortunate outcome of the development of ICTs. Fake news/propagation of falsehood involves spreading wrong information about someone’s personality or an institution with the intention of causing harm. With the click of a mouse, this has become increasingly public. Such detrimental information is usually spread without any verification. The Internet has a huge audience, and any wrongful details spread

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about an individual or institution have a tendency to move around the web like wild fire and may affect the reputation of the individual or corporate institution. For instance, Maurice Kamto (who came second in the election results) and his supporters propagated information that they won the 2018 presidential election without any statistics to back them. The propagation of false information and the organization of massive protests by Maurice Kamto and his supporters in major cities in Cameroon (Yaoundé, Douala and Bafoussam) and their partial destruction of the Cameroon embassies in France and Germany in January 2019 led to the arrest of Kamto and some of his supporters. He faces eight charges, ­including sedition and insurrection, in a military court in Yaoundé, the nation’s capital. Hacking can be referred to as an unauthorized intrusion into a computer or network. Hackers do not have genuine intentions. They might be seeking people’s confidential details to leak to the public or a third party. On Facebook, for instance, users’ accounts are often hacked to commit evil or send out wrong information which may appear as though it is the genuine or original user. The Internet can vividly be described as a gold mine and mine field at the same time. Social media are simple tools in the minds of people who have different political, social, cultural, religious and economic agendas. They manipulate the tools according to their whims and caprices. The unintended consequences of social media have been as devastating as the results have been rewarding. The “colossal” win of the Internet (digital space) in the 2011 political and social unrests in China, Russia, and especially Egypt and Syria in what has been termed the Arab Spring, has echoed a new wave of political activism the world over and Africa for the most part. From acts of political accountability (Norris, 2001; Tkacheva et al., 2013), to social interactions, economic prospects and agricultural broadways, the Internet is causing a revolution in every facet of human life. Be that as it may, the ramifications surrounding the surge of the Internet still leave much to be desired. In recent years, growing concerns on the uses, effects and unintended consequences of the Internet are gradually transforming the information superhighway to a ballroom for high-risk potential lawsuits and avenues for high capital top-ups. Sauter (2014) argues that the Internet has created a virtual space that perpetrates civil disobedience. From his historic standpoint, vices that were hitherto acts in the physical world have transformed into virtual ones. This unintended consequence of Internet use raises two issues: the

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need to regulate the digital space and the need to enhance more productive human relationships. In 1996, Malaysia signed an Internet “no censorship bill” to attract foreign investment and develop a knowledge-based economy (Miner, 2011), yet it is this same Internet that brought down a forty-year-old repressive coalition regime in 2008. The Internet in Malaysia had grown into a giant that could penetrate the very fabric of government, in what some consider a good thing. The unintended consequences of the Internet go beyond acts of valour to demeaning practices of hate speech, propagation of falsehood and Internet fraud. Using the Internet for political activism through information disseminated through Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, ­ YouTube and other outlets has increased the political confrontation arena. Abelson, Ledeen, and Lewis (2008) put the Internet in the group of so-called disruptive technologies with the capability of radically altering the context in which they operate, bringing about a profound change to the people who use them, in their strategies and in the effects of their actions, with consequences whose impact are not always obvious. In November 2015, the Norwegian government published a declaration to curb hate speech on the basis of gender, ethnicity, religion or life stance, disability or sexual orientation, gender identity and gender expression (The Norwegian Ministry of Children and Equality, 2015). The importance of regulations cannot be overemphasized. Eggebø and Stubberud (2016) in their research on hate and discrimination noted that acts of hatred and discrimination bear most on the minority as perpetrated by politicians, government authorities and the blogosphere, thus the need for protection.

Theoretical Perspective The merits of using social networks in the political process worldwide have been well established (Shirky, 2011); here are some of them: wider audiences are covered, immediacy in message delivery is attained and maximized, cost is effective and minimized, and campaigning becomes interactive. To understand these uses of social media, this research borrows from one social systems theory—the Technology Acceptance Model (TAM; Venkatesh, Morris, Davis, & Davis, 2003); and two cognitive theories—agenda setting (McCombs & Shaw, 1972) and uses and gratifications theory (Katz & Blumler, 1974).

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The Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) is credited to Davis, Bagozzi, and Warshaw (1989). It basically points to two things—that the adoption of a new technology is influenced by its perceived ease of use (PEOU) and its perceived usefulness (PU). PEOU has to do with “the degree of ease associated with the use of the system” while PU represents “the degree to which an individual believes that using the system will help him or her to attain gains in job performance” (Venkatesh et al., 2003). It is increasingly believed that new media technologies are usually embraced faster by younger generations than by the older generation—mostly considered as the laggards in the diffusion model proposed by Rogers (1995). Such was the main difference between Barrack Obama and John McCain in the 2008 US presidential election. But today, the stakes are different. From Donald Trump in the USA (72 years) to Paul Biya in Cameroon (85 years), social media is more and more engaged by the elderly generation as well as the younger ones in politics. This is due to its usefulness in terms of immediacy, speed, wider reach as well as its perceived ease of use (PEOU) with a mobile phone in the hands of a politician anywhere connected to the Internet. Agenda setting was propounded by Maxwell McCombs and Donald Shaw (1972). The agenda setting theory was first presented by Walter Lippmann in his 1922 publication entitled “The World Outside and the Images in Our Heads.” The article, published in Public Opinion Quarterly, stressed the power of the media in building powerful mental images about the realities in the world. Cohen (1963) established that the theory’s influence lies on not telling people what to think, but what to think about. Agenda setting is used in this research to establish how 2018 presidential election candidates in Cameroon used social media to pass across their agenda to the electorate, especially in prioritizing what the voters should “think about” in the elections. With this, political agendas are easily set, and like the case of America, the electorate, through Trump’s tweets, is engineered towards what to think about the elections. In the case of the November 2018 mid-term elections in the USA, Trump’s agenda of insecurity, immigrant invasion and “America first” dominated the political discourse and what the electorates were forced to think about. In Cameroon, central issues included maintaining national unity, peace, resolution of the Cameroon Anglophone crisis and fighting the terrorist group Boko Haram in North Cameroon. The incumbent Paul Biya was presented as the candidate with the “Force of Experience” through social and conventional media campaigns. He was presented as the only competent manager to

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navigate the country through its numerous crises—political, economic and social. From the results, the agenda worked. Uses and gratifications theory states that users of a system cling to the system because they derive benefits from it. The theory was propounded by Elihu Katz and Jay Blumler (1974). In this study, presidential candidates use social media because they are aware that social media will help better sell their political agenda and campaign messages. Uses and gratifications (U&G) theory has its origin in Harold Lasswell’s 1948 model of who uses which media, how and with what effects (Papacharissi & Rubin, 2000). McQuail (1983) classified four major reasons for media use to include information, personal identity, integration and social interaction and entertainment. The study falls under the first use—information. By information, McQuail (1983) refers to how individuals use a medium to find out about relevant events and conditions in their immediate surroundings, society and the world; seek advice on practical matters or opinion and decision choices; satisfy curiosity and general interest; learn, self-educate; and gain a sense of security through knowledge. These uses, combined with their likely consequences (Katz & Blumler, 1974), would give a theoretical basis for predicting how mobile phones and Internet are changing the way politicians do their work. Studying the effects of ICTs with this theory is appropriate because, as Shao (2009) notes, one major strength of U&G theory is its applicability to study different media contexts—whether old or new media contexts (Fig. 7.1). The operational model is connected to this research in that politicians use social media platforms (Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and Instagram) to disseminate their political agenda to the public at the pre-voting, voting and post-voting election stages. When they do this, there is the likelihood of having outcomes which could be measured in terms of incremental and transformational effects. Boateng (2010, p.  5), writing in Enhancing Micro-Trading Capacities Through Mobile Phones in Ghana, defined incremental and transformational effects thus: Incremental effects characterise benefits from using mobile phones (and Internet) to improve what individuals already do. These include the communication and information exchange with customers and trading partners through use of voice calls and text messages. Transformational effects characterise benefits from using mobile phones (and Internet) to create something new—opportunities and access to services and support which were not previously available or readily accessible.

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3. Uses

1. Target Group Candidates: -

CPDM CRM UNIVERS SDF CDU ADD NCMC PURS PFD

2. Social Media Channels Facebook

4. Elections Activities

- Dissemination political texts

of

- Dissemination political videos

of

- Dissemination political photos

of

Pre-Voting Activities

• Registration process of voters

• Publication of electoral

Twitter Instagram

- Dissemination political audio

of

- Interact with the public

• • • •

Incremental Effects

• Enhanced

communication and information exchange

list

electoral list

• Improved

• Distribution of voters You tube

5. Outcome

• Effective time

• Verification of the cards Political debates Campaign rallies Political meetings Political meetings

135

management

relationships with political stakeholders

• Wider audience reached

• Improved possibilities of varied new news sources

• Surmounting

- Others

Voting Activities

• Voting in polling stations

• Visit by officials to

censorship

Transformational Effects

polling stations

• Redefinition of

problems during elections

• Increased political

• Complaints, protests, • Closing of polling stations

Post Voting Activities

• Vote counting • Release/Publication of results

• Reactions from election

media’s role in a democratic process

and social empowerment of politicians and the electorates • Mobile Internet • Faster propagation and resolution of electoral problems

stakeholders

• Mediation efforts for election problems

Fig. 7.1  Operational model of social media use in the electoral process in Cameroon

Mobile phones and the Internet have been available to potential electorates in Cameroon. However, the level of appropriation of these technologies in the electoral process in the past had not received the type of attention it did during the 2018 presidential election in Cameroon. By accepting that social media can serve as veritable tools of democracy, candidates and voters are likely to achieve desired electoral outcomes.

Methodology This study employed a content analysis of social media (Facebook, YouTube, Twitter and Instagram) postings of candidates of the 2018 presidential election in Cameroon over a period of three and a half months (July 13–October 30, 2018). The postings were pulled mainly from the

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official social media sites of the candidates. The researcher then quantified and analysed the postings using the Statistical Package for Social Scientists (SPSS) version  21.0  in five different categories: number of posts, frequency of posts, content of posts, language of posts and audience engagement with posts. The researcher also observed and monitored social media uses of political stakeholders during the period under study in order to keep track and follow the trend of events as they unfolded rapidly. This observation helped in the quality control and assurance of results obtained. The justification for using Facebook is that it is the most popular social medium. Facebook has successfully penetrated the media landscape in Cameroon, with candidates and electorates showing varying interests in use of the medium to share political issues pertaining to the democracy of Cameroon. Twitter caught the attention of the researcher because it marked the genesis of social media message flow that guided the 2018 Cameroon presidential election. Incumbent Paul Biya was the first to announce his candidature on July 13, after which all other candidates took turns to use Twitter and other social media platforms to woo potential voters. YouTube was selected for the study because it contains videos which help to engage potential voters and bring candidates and events closer to potential voters. YouTube is also the world’s most popular online video site. Instagram is used to complement Facebook, Twitter and YouTube, since it has the potential for sharing of photos, credited as best amongst other social media in this aspect.

Presentation and Discussion of Findings The findings have been discussed within the periods of pre-voting, voting and post-voting. Social media use by politicians within the 2018 presidential election period in Cameroon shows that in September, the month before October (the voting month), Internet use was highest (104 posts). The two leading candidates, Maurice Kamto and Paul Biya, had forty-four and forty-­ three posts, constituting the bulk. In all, Table 7.3 reveals a steady rise in Internet activities as the country geared up towards the polls. The drop in social media use in the month of October is indicative of the fact that campaign activities stop before elections and would hardly continue at the same pace after the results have been proclaimed. Coincidentally, Instagram and Twitter, according to Table  7.4, are equal in terms of use (65 posts each) and higher than any other social

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Table 7.3  Distribution of social media use by month Month Politician

Total

Paul Biya Maurice Kamto Cabral Libii Franklin Ndifor Akere Muna Oct Sept Aug July Total

43 43 2 6 94

16 44 3 4 67

4 3 0 0 7

2 9 0 0 11

8 5 1 0 14

73 104 6 10 193

Table 7.4  Distribution of social media use by medium Medium

Facebook Twitter Instagram YouTube Total

Politician

Total

Paul Biya

Maurice Kamto

Cabral Libii

Franklin Ndifor

Akere Muna

25 26 43 0 94

20 21 22 4 67

0 7 0 0 7

0 11 0 0 11

14 0 0 0 14

59 65 65 4 193

Table 7.5  Distribution of social media use by nature/content of posts Content of post

Politician Paul Biya

Economic condemnation Social condemnation Political praise Economic praise Social praise Mixed praise Mixed condemnation Decries falsehood Total

Total Maurice Kamto

Cabral Libii

Franklin Ndifor

Akere Muna

0

3

0

0

3

6

0 26 2 4 62 0 0 94

1 2 0 1 40 18 2 67

0 0 0 0 5 1 1 7

3 0 0 0 6 2 0 11

1 0 0 0 6 4 0 14

5 28 2 5 119 25 3 193

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Table 7.6  Distribution of social media use by language of posts Language of post

Politician

Abusive Degrading Provocative/insightful Bias Inclusive/peace-loving Frank Total

Total

Paul Biya

Maurice Kamto

Cabral Libii

Franklin Ndifor

Akere Muna

1 1 5 1 86 0 94

0 1 5 0 58 3 67

0 0 2 0 5 0 7

0 0 2 0 9 0 11

0 0 0 0 12 2 14

1 2 14 1 170 5 193

Table 7.7  Distribution of effects of social media use Post engagement

Likes Comments Shares/retweets Views

Politician Paul Biya

Maurice Kamto

Cabral Libii Franklin Ndifor

Akere Muna

6270 908 832 22,682

3082 140 403 6928

0 0 0 0

5239 467 1242 0

0 0 0 0

media platform. Table 7.4 also shows leading politicians making the most of their uses with the incumbent, Paul Biya, leading. Facebook comes very close in use with fifty-nine posts in all. The default video content sharing site, YouTube, got four posts from Maurice Kamto. The other three candidates, Libii, Ndifor and Muna, used more of Twitter and Facebook. The contents of the posts that were used by politicians in the 2018 presidential election in Cameroon form a cross-section of the people’s lives; 119 posts had mixed praise (a combination of political, economic and social aspects). As incumbent, Paul Biya (62 posts) spared no effort in embellishing acts done in Cameroon for his over thirty-six years as president. On the other hand, Maurice Kamto, the opposition leader, also echoed the loftiness of his ideas and manifesto in all those areas which he hoped to realize if voted. The same goes for the other candidates. Individual praise singing like political praise (28 posts), for instance, focuses on specific content. At the level of mixed condemnation (25 posts), all come from opposition leaders as they decried failures of the

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regime in place. Maurice Kamto and Cabril Libii decry falsehood (3 posts) as perpetrated by their detractors. The language of the posts adds to the overall tone and content of the posts, which expresses the basic nature of the posts made by politicians. At the very high end, 170 posts expressed peaceful and an inclusive demeanour of the candidates towards the electorate and opposing party; 14 posts stood out in the provocative category. Politicians made use of words which are inciteful and loose, against an opposing party and in disregard of their candidacy. In very clear and mature terms, some posts expressed frankness on the candidates’ standpoint on certain topical issues. The use of social media for political activism by politicians in Cameroon met with a degree of audience participation. Across every other stratum except for shares or retweets, incumbent Paul Biya had the most of post engagements, followed by Maurice Kamto and Akere Muna, respectively. Anecdotal Evidence Cameroon is still in the very early years of instituting a biometric system in its democratic system. The concept is still nebulous, with very little understanding of it by voters, most of whom are laymen/laywomen. Voters largely rely on conventional media (especially TV and radio) as well as political meetings and one-to-one and one-to-few communication channels to make vital political decisions. In the case of the 2018 presidential election, social media was not sufficiently used in the registration of voters, publication and distribution of electoral lists, as well as the distribution of voters’ cards. When Paul Biya announced his candidature three months to the polls, the rest of the pre-voting activities (political debates, campaign rallies launched on September 22—two weeks to election, and political meetings) were reported and scrutinized on Facebook, YouTube, Twitter and Instagram by candidates. In the four political activities during voting (vote counting, visit by officials, complaints and closing of polls), social media traffic was at its peak with write-ups, audio, video and pictures ­distributed by different candidates and their followers. For instance, while the CPDM called for calm and respect of the Constitution of the country, which stipulates that election results will be announced two weeks from the close of the polls, the CRM’s candidate, Maurice Kamto, quickly announced, at the end of the polls, that he had won the elections, without giving statistics to buttress his claim and in flagrant disrespect of the laws of the country. His message of “scoring the penalty” spread like wild fire

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through social media networks and state authorities became very concerned about a conspiracy to destabilize the country. As a result, while vote counting was going on at different levels, state media and pro-­ government conventional media channels bombarded the public with patriotic messages calling for unity, peace and the need to live together as Cameroonians. Diplomatic missions, like the US Embassy in Yaoundé, published the following message on social media: The US Embassy congratulates all Cameroonians who voted on October 7: we reiterate our neutrality with respect to the outcome and strongly support the right of the Cameroonian people to choose their leader through the democratic process. We call on all parties to wait until the official results are announced before making pronouncements about the supposed winner, and to resolve peacefully any grievances through established legal channels.

Two hours after this post on Facebook, following the close of polls on October 7, there were 118 likes, 81 comments and 46 shares. On October 22, 2018, after the results were released, the US Department of State sent out a press release on social media reaffirming its earlier position and adding that all parties—including the government—should “respect the rule of law, resolve peacefully any disputes through established legal channels, and avoid hate speech.” Despite numerous congratulatory messages from all major diplomatic missions in Cameroon to President Paul Biya, Maurice Kamto has been defiant with a continuous social media campaign to restore what he describes as “stolen victory.” On Sunday, November 25, 2018, he unleashed a social media campaign from Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, for Cameroonians in the eight French regions to observe Ghost Towns on every Monday—a tradition already practised in the two English-speaking regions due to the Anglophone crisis. Kamto promised to intensify this from January 2019 as a way to cripple Paul Biya’s new seven-year mandate. So, the 2018 presidential election in Cameroon might have ended, but in the social media the “war” has just begun. On the contrary, social media was awash with falsehood, hate speech and revolutionary messages centred on the toppling of Paul Biya’s thirty-six-year reign as head of state. By the time results were released on October 22, 2018, reactions of stakeholders were already at saturation point, with social media playing a very divisive role and conventional media (TV, radio and print) reporting, to an extent, in line with Republican values. Some pro-opposition newspapers (Le Messager), TV (Equinoxe) and radio (Sweet FM) relayed the social

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media negativism, in what can be described as a straight farm-to-market style of disseminating information, with no regard for the journalism of verification as advocated by Kovach and Rosenstiel (2001). In the end, after all that was said and done, the results of the Constitutional Council were made public, and Paul Biya was sworn in for his seventh term as president on November 6, 2018 (same date he officially took over power in 1982). He won 2,521,934 (71.28%) votes out of the 3,590,681 votes cast. Maurice Kamto came second with 503,384 (14.23%) votes. The participation rate of voters in the two English-speaking regions of the country (North West and South West) was the lowest in the history of elections in the country. In the North West, out of 600,000 registered voters, only 33,311 voters actually voted, giving a participation rate of 5.55%. In the South West region, out of over 372,000 voters who registered, only 58,980 actually voted, giving a participation rate of 15.85%. Voters in these regions were mostly reached via social media due to threats from secessionists and an escalating arms battle between secessionists and government military for over one year.

Conclusion and Recommendations The principal objectives of this chapter were to investigate the degree and nature of social media use in the October 2018 presidential election in Cameroon. The findings of the study have therefore provided some evidence on how Cameroon’s first official use of social media in a presidential election turned out to be. The data revealed a correlation between the level of social media use and the performance of the presidential candidates. For instance, Paul Biya and Maurice Kamto, who were declared first and second, respectively, in the election results, also turned out to be the candidates who used social media more for campaign activities (see Tables 7.3, 7.4, and 7.5). However, these results need to be further tested through controlled experiments (e.g. exposure of certain communities to the social media, non-exposure to other communities, type of messaging, etc.) for them to be scientifically conclusive. Until that is done, it suffices to state that the outcome of the 2018 presidential election results in Cameroon in relation to social media use can largely be attributed to chance or other intervening variables. Furthermore, the degree of social media use is very low compared with other democracies, even in Africa. So, to respond to the first research question on the extent of social media use, the data obtained show that it

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is significantly low. Though largely insufficient, the candidates engaged different social media to target potential voters. The nature of the messages (to respond to research question two) shows some characteristics of a budding democracy. The messages addressed some key issues affecting national life though some candidates made use of words which are insightful. Some posts expressed frankness on the candidates’ standpoint on certain topical issues in very mature and clear terms, and the response of the public to such posts was overwhelmingly positive. These are features of a growing democracy with hopes of better social media participation in future elections. For this to happen, a strong political will from all political actors (candidates, electorate, election body, media, government, international organizations, civil society, etc.) is needed. The will should be backed by favourable ICT policies and a higher level of adaptability and usability of social media for positive political purposes in Cameroon.

Note 1. FCFA stands for “franc de la Coopération financière en Afrique centrale” in French and translated into English as “Franc of the Financial Cooperation in Central Africa.” It is the legal tender/currency used by some former French colonies in Central Africa sub-region, including Cameroon.

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CHAPTER 8

Hybrid Media System and the July 2018 Elections in “Post-Mugabe” Zimbabwe Admire Mare and Trust Matsilele

Introduction Research on the intersection between digital media and electoral campaigns has grown over the past three decades. Most of the studies have focused on the relationship between social media and democratization, elections, political activism and protest (Mare, 2013, 2016; Matsilele, 2019; Mhiripiri & Mutsvairo, 2014; Mpofu, 2013; Smyth & Best, 2013; Wasserman, 2011). However, fewer studies have looked at the relationship between social media and elections in the African context (see Mare, 2018; Ndlela, 2015; Ngomba, 2015). For instance, Walton and Donner (2011) have explored mobile-mediated publics in South Africa’s 2009 elections. Moyo (2010) has examined the use of mobile phones during Zimbabwe’s

A. Mare (*) Namibia University of Science and Technology, Windhoek, Namibia University of Johannesburg, Johannesburg, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] T. Matsilele Cape Peninsula University of Technology, Cape Town, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 M. N. Ndlela, W. Mano (eds.), Social Media and Elections in Africa, Volume 1, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30553-6_8

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2008 elections, while Okoro and Nwafor (2013) have ­investigated the use of social media in Nigeria’s 2011 general elections. Social media’s affordances where citizens are not compelled to use real identities but can use avatars, fictitious identities or even anonymity explain its popularity especially in authoritarian contexts. In countries where electoral outcomes are usually contested, digital media has become an alternative for contestations and counter-narratives (see Mare, 2016, 2018). As Banda (2010, p. 8) aptly puts it, “there is a greater opportunity for citizens to own their own media and counter the effects of years of reportorial neglect occasioned by an unhealthy concentration of media ownership”. Despite these advantages, there are still challenges around access, affordability and connectivity, which partly explains why most Africans remain disconnected from the information superhighway. There is no denying that election campaigns are central to the political life of modern-day democratic and semi-authoritarian regimes. At the core of these rituals of electoral democracy is the strategic deployment of traditional and digital media. Social media are now widely used for political campaigns and communication in developed and developing nations, although most extant research has been conducted in the United States, Europe and Asia (Kreiss, 2016; Vaccari et al., 2015). As Gibson (2015) points out, the literature on the impact of social media platforms on election campaigning can be divided broadly into two diverging perspectives. On the one hand is a body of literature (Kreiss, 2016; Larsson, 2015) that views the digital technologies as further accelerating trends toward the professionalized and centralized management of voters through enhanced databases and improved political micro-targeting. On the other hand, the other stream of research (Gibson, 2015) focuses on how the digital media platforms spawn a networked model of party organization and targeted campaigning practices. Overall, these strands of literature show that election campaigning has transitioned through a series of phases, prompted largely by the changing media landscape and the decline of strong social class-based loyalties. The changing media landscape has fostered a new form of “citizen-initiated campaigning” (CIC) (Gibson, 2015). With youthful voters comprising a substantial part of the electorate in most countries, political campaigning is increasingly shifting online. In order to reach out to these young and first-time voters who are seen as apathetic toward formal politics, parties and candidates have roped in digital media technologies into their communication toolkits (see Mare, 2013,

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2016). Digital media have also transformed political campaigning in Africa in ways never envisaged before. Facebook live, WhatsApp groups and Twitter have been appropriated for campaign communication and propaganda dissemination during election times (Booysen, 2015; Mare, 2018; Matsilele, 2019; Ndlela, 2015; Willems, 2016). As Ngomba (2015) aptly avers, while research on the use of digital media during elections has blossomed in the global North, our knowledge of how and why parties and candidates in Africa utilize both traditional and digital media technologies is generally scarce. However, a body of literature has begun to emerge in Africa focusing on what parties and politicians are doing on digital media during electoral campaigns. (see Duncan, 2014; Mare, 2018; Ngomba, 2015; Steenkamp & Hyde-Clarke, 2014; Willems, 2016). Like their counterparts in the developed world, political parties and candidates in most African countries “continue to use social media as broadcast media, not as dialogic media, even those who claim to be appealing to a youth audience” (Duncan, 2014, p. 24). Besides the mentioned studies, little is known about how political parties and candidates are incorporating digital (and traditional media) into their political communication toolkits in Zimbabwe. Focusing on the “post-coup”1 elections held on 30 July 2018, this study sought to investigate how and why political parties and candidates used a wide array of communication technologies to mobilize voters in both rural and urban constituencies.

The Political and Electoral Systems in Zimbabwe Contrary to the literature on transitology, Zimbabwe has experienced “elite continuity and renewal” (Sparks, 2011) rather than genuine political transformation (Sparks, 2011). In 1980, the country transitioned from an authoritarian colonial state to a “post-colonial state” with traits of a “hybrid regime” (a combination of democratic and authoritarian governance practices) (Young, 2004). Cognizant of the persistence of institutions of the old regime in the new state, Rønning and Kupe (2000) describe the situation as signifying a “dual legacy of authoritarianism and democracy”. Continuity rather than complete transformation has also manifested itself through the retention of repressive colonial laws and practices. A number of colonial laws were retained in order to restrain and arrest political competitors, silence critics and proscribe democratic space. Because of these institutional legacies, Zimbabwe’s transition has been characterized by the factors of (state) continuity, class, the primacy of “national security” over

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political and economic reform and the conflation of (ruling) party, military and state as a necessary feature of the securocratic state (Mandaza, 2015). Unlike most African countries, Zimbabwe has not yet experienced what Huntington (1991) calls the “two turnover test”, which means that party alternation has not occurred since 1980. The Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) continues to dominate the political sphere despite briefly losing parliamentary majority to the Movement of Democratic Change-Tsvangirai (MDC-T) during the 2008 elections. In many ways, the country fits into the categorization of a “competitive authoritarian regime” because of the dominance of ZANU-PF over the state apparatus. According to Schedler (2002, pp.  36–37), electoral authoritarian regimes organize periodic elections in order to secure at least a semblance of democratic legitimacy, hoping to satisfy external as well as internal actors. In line with this thought, Masunungure and Shumba (2014) argues that Zimbabwe exhibits credentials of a militarized electoral authoritarianism in recognition of the prominence of the military factor in party politics and elections since 2000 up to the present. In November 2017, the military staged a “soft coup” that forced Robert Mugabe to step down, paving the way for the ascendency of Emmerson Mnangagwa to the position of President. He was elected President in July 2018 although the results of election like previous ones were contested in the constitutional court. The November 2017 coup further buttresses the argument that Zimbabwe is a militarized party-state where the military is a pivotal actor in ZANU-PF’s internal politics. Although Mugabe was toppled in a largely bloodless coup, it is important to emphasize that Mugabeism as a system of economic plunder, use of coercion, trampling on human rights and corruption remained intact in Zimbabwean politics. This explains why, on 1 August 2018, civilians were gunned down by the army for protesting against the conduct of the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC). The army was also deployed in January 2019 to quell protest action against fuel price hikes leading to the deaths of several innocent citizens. The Zimbabwean electoral system is characterized by a hybrid system of the first-past-the-post (FPTP) of the single-member plurality system (for the National Assembly) and the party-list system (for the Senate) of the single-member plurality system (Hodzi, 2014). In the FPTP system used for the National Assembly, the country is divided into relatively equal constituencies from which only one representative is chosen to occupy a parliamentary seat on behalf of that constituency. Compared to the

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­ arty-­list system (like South Africa), where there are no direct lines of p political accountability between the Member of Parliament (MP) and his/ her constituency, in the FPTP system some kind of accountability is ensured (Mare, 2018). Senate candidates in Zimbabwe do not contest elections as individuals, but as party candidates appearing on a party list. This chapter is informed by the communicative ecologies approach (Hearn & Foth, 2007), which provides analytical strengths in terms of examining how political parties and candidates deployed digital media (and other technologies) during the July 2018 electoral campaigns in Zimbabwe. The term communicative ecology2 refers to the complex system of communication media and information flows within a community set-up (Hearn & Foth, 2007; Tacchi & Kiran, 2008). It also encapsulates a number of mediated and unmediated forms of communication existing within a particular community (Tacchi & Kiran, 2008). Communicative ecologies are made up of three layers which are the technological layer (ICTs, TV, radio), social layer (community meetings, informal networks, institutions) and the discursive layer (themes or content of both mediated and unmediated communication) (Hearn & Foth, 2007). Based on this conceptual approach, we argue that political parties and candidates rely on a wide range of communication and media technologies to mobilize their voters during elections. We demonstrate that in any given area there are many different communication and information channels and flows (Hearn & Foth, 2007). As such, our study critiques technological deterministic and single-medium studies, which have dominated mainstream research on media and electoral campaigns in the digital age. It also acknowledges that different places, and different people within a place, have quite different communicative opportunities and experiences, depending on many factors, including the availability of infrastructure and technological and social networks (Keeble, 2003). We also argue that rather than relying only on digital media technologies, political parties and candidates still made use of popular and traditional media platforms like posters, community meetings, door-to-door campaigns, songs, face-to-­ face jokes, memes and rumors.

An Overview of the July 2018 Elections On 30 July 2018, Zimbabwe held its ninth election since the dawn of independence from white settler rule in 1980. For the first time in over a decade and a half, two rivals who had come to characterize the past five

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elections were absent. Former President Robert Mugabe, who was ousted in November 2017 following a military coup and a series of army-­ choreographed protests, and his arch-rival, Morgan Tsvangirai, who was the leader of the Movement of Democratic Change-Tsvangirai (MDC-T) and died in February 2018 following a long battle with colon cancer, were not on the ballot. The 76-year-old Emmerson Mnangagwa, Mugabe’s former enforcer and right-hand man and the military’s civilian face after the November 2017 coup, was the ZANU-PF candidate. The MDC Alliance had the 40-year-old advocate Nelson Chamisa, a former student leader, as its candidate. Ironically, both leaders came into the helm of their parties following brutal succession battles for leadership. Interestingly, Robert Mugabe chose to endorse the National Patriotic Front just before the elections and also stunned the world when he indicated that he was going to vote for the youthful Nelson Chamisa for the presidential election. The presidential ballot had 23 presidential candidates3 and some of the names were Mugabe’s former deputy Joice Mujuru of the People’s Rainbow Coalition, Thokozani Khupe from the MDC-T, Elton Steers Mangoma of the Coalition of Democrats, Noah Manyika from Build Zimbabwe Alliance, Nkosana Moyo of the Alliance for People’s Agenda (APA) and Lovemore Madhuku from the National Constitutional Assembly. The election also had an unusual number of Members of Parliament and ward councilors who contested as independent candidates. Pastor Evan Mawarire of #ThisFlag Campaign also led a coalition of ward councilors who contested under the People’s Own Voice (POVO) banner. Altogether, 244 independent candidates contested for the National Assembly seats in the 30 July general elections. Some of the parliamentary independent candidates were Temba Mliswa who won in Norton Constituency, Jessie Majome who lost in Harare West and Fadzayi Mahere who lost to the MDC Alliance in Mt Pleasant. The election also had an unusual number of candidates contesting under the same banner for the same constituency.4 Joice Mujuru’s People’s Rainbow Coalition received less than 1  percent just like every other party with the exception of ZANU-PF and MDC Alliance. The MDC Alliance led by Nelson Chamisa split with Tsvangirai’s first Vice President, Thokozani Khupe, ahead of the elections. Khupe contested the 2018 elections under the MDC-T banner. However, Chamisa was buoyed by the presence of other splinter formations of the original MDC that coalesced around him. These include the MDC led by Welshman Ncube, People’s Democratic Party led by Tendai Biti and other smaller formations started by former ZANU-PF stalwarts

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like Kudakwashe Bhasikiti and Dzikamai Mavhaire—now members of the MDC Alliance led by Nelson Chamisa. When Mnangagwa took over from Mugabe, he promised a complete departure from Mugabe’s despotic rule, which was punctuated by targeted attacks on opposition political and civic figures and lack of respect for the country’s laws. For the first time since 2000, the Zimbabwean government invited observer missions from the West. International media was also invited to cover the pre- and post-election period. Based on these cosmetic changes, Mnangagwa was embraced by some countries in the West as a reformist with the ability to unite the country and chart a new economic trajectory for the Southern African nation. This is despite the fact that his rhetoric was not accompanied by clear policy changes especially on critical aspects of running a free and fair credible election. In many ways, the state-owned media continued to operate in a polarizing way. Food aid and agriculture implements were also distributed on a partisan basis ahead of the plebiscite with traditional leaders being deployed to intimidate and threaten their “subjects” to vote for ZANU-PF. There are also allegations that a number of soldiers and youth militia were deployed in rural areas with the sole mandate of coercing people to vote for Mnangagwa and his party. This picture was a complete opposite to the rhetoric that Mnangagwa was touting as part of his “Zimbabwe is open for business”, “Second Republic” and “New Dispensation” mantra. The Zimbabwe Electoral Commission was also accused of manipulating electoral systems in favor of Mnangagwa as it defiantly refused to fully implement provisions granted by their code of conduct in electoral administration. For instance, crucial information such as who printed the ballot papers, the number of ballots printed remained largely unknown. With such an electoral context, regardless of the outcome, Zimbabwe was poised to hold a contested election. In the end, the election outcome fell short of the yardstick of many observer missions who demanded tangible political and economic reforms before reengagement with Zimbabwe. For instance, the EU and US observer missions rejected the outcome arguing that the playing field was uneven and the traceability of the counted votes was questionable. The EU’s Observer Report5 (2018, p. 1) stated, “While political rights were largely respected, there were concerns regarding the environment for the polls and the failure to achieve a level playing field. Observers widely reported on efforts to undermine the free expression of the will of electors, through inducements, intimidation and coercion against prospective voters to try to ensure a vote in favour of the ruling party”.

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The Media and Communications Context The Zimbabwean system of political campaign communication has been shaped by structural conditions that have affected the ways in which digital politics have evolved. Because of the oral tradition of the country, rallies, slogans, songs, door-to-door canvassing, radio, television, newspapers and community meetings remain crucial avenues through which political parties and candidates convey their messages to the electorate (Mare, 2013, 2018), although these are increasingly being “digitized” (Willems, 2016). Most Zimbabweans still rely more on radio and television than they do on newspapers, the internet and social media. There are geographic and class disparities with radio registering popularity in rural areas while television has more audiences in urban areas (Mare, 2018). Despite the reduction in the free-to-air footprint, satellite TV viewership rose three points to 41 percent of the population (ZAMPS, 2016). Satellite TV is watched by half of the urban population and 16 percent of the rural folk (ZAMPS, 2016). Similarly, mobile phones, the internet and social media are still predominantly an urban phenomenon, although the situation is changing. The country has registered significant growth in terms of broadband and mobile internet diffusion. Internet penetration rates have phenomenally grown from 9.8 percent in March 2008 to around 50 percent in 2016 (POTRAZ, 2016), mostly attributable to mobile internet uptake. Active internet subscriptions increased by 5.7 percent to reach 7,197,279 in the second quarter of 2018 from 6,810,847 recorded in the first quarter of 2018. All the major mobile service providers have introduced data bundles and zero-rated services for popular social media platforms, which have contributed significantly to the upsurge of internet connectivity, although the practice has also been critiqued for violating norms of net neutrality. The massive adoption of mobile data bundles has created what Willems (2016) calls a “social media internet” (a partial form of the internet) in Zimbabwe. Facebook (with 1.2 million users) is the second most popular social network site after WhatsApp, which has 2.2  million users (ITU, 2016). Twitter has an estimated 300,000 active users in Zimbabwe. These platforms are mostly used by the youth in Zimbabwe but with millions of other Zimbabweans in diaspora. However, the trend is changing with older populations coming on board. However, internet shutdowns and throttling have been used to mute online dissent in 2016 and 2019. The Zimbabwean media system fits into the “polarized pluralist” model (Hallin & Mancini, 2004) largely because it is characterized by a high

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degree of political parallelism, relatively low levels of journalistic professionalism and the state has historically played a central, interventionist role in the media. The media have also tended to be polarized with government-­ owned media fully supportive of the ruling party while privately owned newspapers lean toward opposition political figures and issues. Despite the licensing of some newspapers and commercial (and community) radio stations, Zimpapers and Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC) continue to dominate the media sector (Mare, 2016). The two national commercial radio stations are effectively under ZANU-PF control since ZiFM Stereo is owned by a former government minister while StarFM is a subsidiary of Zimpapers (a converged state media company). Most of the commercial community radio stations (especially based in Harare, Gweru, Zvishavane, Mutare and Kariba) are also owned by Zimpapers and ZiFM Stereo. These are generally urban-centric in their programming and audience reach. While StarFM, Capitalk, Midlands 98.4, Hevoi FM, Ya FM, Diamond FM, Nyami Nyami FM and ZiFM Stereo provided robust election coverage for major political parties when compared to the ZBC, it is important to note that their coverage does not match that of more established ZBC radio stations which reached rural people in local languages (Mare, 2016). It is against this background that the opposition parties have consistently complained against the unfair media coverage enjoyed by ZANU-PF, which violates the election regulations of the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) and Southern Africa Development Community (SADC).

Methodology In order to get an insider’s perspective on the deployment of traditional and digital media technologies, we interviewed party leaders and activists who were very active during the 2018 campaign period. A total of 26 respondents participated in the study. A combination of traditional and digital communication platforms was used to interview the respondents. These included face-to-face communication, emails, Skype, Facebook chats, WhatsApp chats and Twitter direct messaging sites. The respondents were mainly drawn from the most active political parties during the 2018 elections. Some of the respondents included the following party activists: Tendai Chirau (ZANU-PF), Tapiwa Mashakada (MDC Alliance) and Trust Ndlovu (MDC Alliance), Nickson Nyikadzino (MDC-T), Madock Chivasa (National Constitutional Assembly), Ngqabutho

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Mabhena (Zimbabwe Communist Party), Dr. Noah Manyika (Build Zimbabwe), independent parliamentary candidates (Fadzayi Mahere for Mt Pleasant) and Kudzai Mubaiwa. Party sympathizers like Mlungisi Dube for APA and Bongani Nyathi for both National People’s Party (NPP) and MDC Alliance as well as Makomborero Haruzivishe for MDC Alliance were interviewed. Some respondents who gave rich data were not authorized by their parties; hence we had to use only the data we independently verified without revealing their identities. Virtual ethnography was also invaluable for this particular study. We observed and interacted with our research subjects via social media. Digital media platforms provided enormous research data in terms of visuals, video, audio and text materials on the campaigns which unfolded in 2018. Because Facebook and Twitter have electronic archiving systems, it allowed us to sift through hours of video footage especially live broadcasts. It also allowed us to make sense of how followers and fans interacted with virtual rallies in real time. Zimbabwe’s social media sphere witnessed brutal Twitter and Facebook battles involving cyber-troops from the two main contesting parties—ZANU-PF and MDC Alliance. Traditional Media and the Campaign Strategies of Zimbabwean Political Parties and Candidates Our study found that political parties and candidates used a wide array of communication technologies during the 2018 elections. Most of these technologies were aimed at mobilizing the electorate based in rural, urban and diaspora contexts. Traditional and digital media technologies were used to campaign during the 2018 July elections. Traditional communication channels included billboards, newspaper adverts, flyers, door-to-door campaigns and rallies. These were heavily used especially in rural and partly in urban contexts. Rallies provided candidates and parties with an opportunity to have face-to-face conversations with voters and also conscientized voters about their manifestos and other electoral promises. Big rallies were held in major towns and cities throughout the country. ZANU-PF used traditional media especially state-owned television and radio stations to beam live all the major rallies addressed by Emmerson Mnangagwa. Personal communications are routinely found to be more effective than impersonal appeals. Because of a combination of lack and limited access to the mainstream media, main opposition parties like the MDC Alliance resorted to Facebook live broadcasts. Most of the Facebook

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live broadcasts were broadcast by born-digital entities like the FeedZW, Sly Media Productions, Nehanda Radio, 263Chat, TechMag, OpenParly and ZimboLive TV. These platforms created a new form of virtual rallies where people inside and outside Zimbabwe could watch live from the comfort of their homes. Unlike any other political party, ZANU-PF erected some of the biggest glittering campaign billboards ever seen in post-independent Zimbabwe in all urban centers. These billboards served to educate and inform voters about Mnangagwa’s electoral promises. This confirms research in the global North that a multilayered communication environment exists for election campaigns (see Chadwick, 2013; Vaccari et al., 2015). Although the media system is in the process of transitioning from a broadcast model associated with traditional media, where general-interest news items are disseminated to the mass public through a narrowcasting model toward carefully crafted messages targeting discrete audience segments, it is important to underscore that traditional communication channels remain the most viable especially in contexts where the electorate has no access to the internet and other communication technologies like television and radio sets. The proliferation of digital media has increased the diversification and fragmentation of the communication environment. The abundance of communication channels made it possible for candidates and parties to tailor their campaign messages to speak to the segmented nature of media consumption in the digital age. Candidates sought to reach voters who were less attentive to print and television news through personal appeals in the media venues they frequented. Overall, political campaigns rely on various tools to mobilize and persuade voters in elections (Panagopoulos & Ha, 2015). The media play an important role in modern society as a platform for the dissemination of information. Some of the communication channels linking candidates with the electorate include personal contact (canvassing, phone calls and direct mail) and mass media (television, radio, newspapers, billboards, signs and posters). Mobilization messages delivered via mass media channels have the capacity to similarly underwrite the costs of electoral participation and to activate citizens’ sense of civic duty (Panagopoulos & Ha, 2015). Traditional media was also heavily used in 2018 especially ­targeting rural voters and the working class in urban residential suburbs. For instance, newspapers, billboards, rallies and radio and television stations were used to reach out to voters. However, the Zimpapers gave more editorial and advertising space to ZANU-PF through its newspapers,

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­ agazines, online television and radio stations. Despite claims of the som called new dispensation, the ZBC empire also gave Emmerson Dambudzo (ED) and ZANU-PF unparalleled editorial and advertising space during prime time and main news and current affairs programs. All ZANU-PF star rallies like in the Mugabe era were beamed live on ZTV and other vernacular radio stations. Most paid advertising slots on radio, television and newspapers were dominated by ZANU-PF.  Political advertising is advertising whose central focus is the marketing of ideas, attitudes and concerns about public issues, including political concepts and political candidates. The essential task of political advertising is to gain the confidence of the people for their acceptance of ideas and, in the case of political campaign advertising, to influence their vote. Private media were generally sympathetic to the MDC Alliance. For instance, the private press and digital platforms like Nehanda Radio, ZimEye, NewZimbabwe.com, 263Chat, ZimLive.com, Zimbabwe Sentinel, Cite Zimbabwe and 3menonaboat.com offered significant editorial space to the MDC Alliance. This corroborates the communicative ecology approach, which foregrounds the idea that a wide variety of communication platforms are used to reach an intended audience. The urban billboard space was dominated by ZANU-PF which had a huge campaign finance compared to its competitors. The MDC Alliance managed to erect a few billboards in Harare because of limited campaign finance in comparison with ZANU-PF. Their strategy focused on circulating online posters via digital media platforms especially on Twitter, Facebook and WhatsApp. Billboards have been identified as one of the most effective mediums for raising awareness, communicating and reaching members of the electorates. These platforms are still considered as the most effective for engaging members of the electorates than other forms of outdoor advertising. In the July 2018 elections in Zimbabwe, billboards constituted an important platform for mobilizing and persuading voters especially in large urban areas. As Panagopoulos and Ha (2015) observe, billboards are commonly part of campaigns’ mix of media and communication tactics. Unlike ZANU-PF, the MDC Alliance and other smaller opposition parties concentrated their efforts on cheaper methods like sticking posters on lamp posts, buildings and notice boards. Dumitrescu (2011) notes that the presence of posters in French and Belgian elections is primarily intended to signal the strength of the party’s campaign. He adds that major parties use the presence of posters to signal their power while minor parties use them to inform the public. The use of traditional media was

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complemented by the use of door-to-door canvassing, music, rallies and traditional meetings (dare) coordinated by traditional leaders such as chiefs, headmen and councilors. For ZANU-PF, traditional leaders acted as foot soldiers with access to people in rural areas, some of whom were inaccessible to opposition parties. Teachers and headmasters were also enlisted as campaign agents for the ruling party in rural areas. Rallies continue to be the most deployed means of mobilization and persuasion in Zimbabwean elections despite the digitization of political campaigns. These platforms provided leaders of political parties and candidates with an opportunity for infortainment, edutainment and face-to-face interaction with voters. Most of the rallies were characterized by pomp and fanfare as popular musicians entertained the electorate. ZimDancehall musicians provided entertainment at most rallies organized by political parties and candidates. Similar findings have been found by Willems (2016) in Zambia. She observed that political songs and rallies remain crucial means through which Zambian political parties convey their messages to the electorate, and these are increasingly being “digitized” (Willems, 2016). Similar to the Zambian context, songs circulated in the urban landscape through the blasting stereos of commuter omnibuses and loudspeakers in bustling markets but were also shared digitally between mobile phone users as MP3 files via WhatsApp or Bluetooth in Zimbabwe. Jah Prayzah’s hit song “kutonga kwaro” (Shona language for “his way of ruling”) was appropriated by ZANU-PF at the height of the campaign trail. On their part, the opposition MDC Alliance played Solomon Madzore’s politically conscious song “Handicheuke” (Shona for “I will not retreat”) and “Niniva kure” Toda Kuyambuka (Shona, literally meaning: “we want to cross over”) at all its star rallies. These songs provided the rallying cry for supporters during the crucial elections. As Rodríguez (2015) notes, situated actors use the available communication channels to address their historical and local needs. Digital Media and Electoral Campaigns During the July 2018 Plebiscite Social media have become ubiquitous communication channels for candidates during election campaigns. Platforms like Facebook, WhatsApp and Twitter are enabling political parties and candidates to directly reach out to voters, mobilize supporters and influence the public agenda. They have also reconfigured campaign strategies of political parties, candidates and political organizations; reshaped election media coverage; and influenced

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voter engagement. Because of their affordances and architectural features, digital media technologies have allowed users to engage in discussions, donate to candidates and engage in second screen practices during rallies and town hall meetings. Dual screening of political events in Zimbabwe is a recent phenomenon. It denotes a bundle of practices that involve integrating and switching across and between live broadcast media and social media (Vaccari et al., 2015). Dual screening is an unusual and still emergent set of social practices in which publics combine consumption and commentary during media events (Vaccari et al., 2015). This practice was rampant amongst citizen campaigners during both physical and virtual rallies in Zimbabwe. Digital media also facilitate networking, collaboration and community building as well as active engagement. Some political parties and candidates also used websites during the July 2018 elections. These platforms provided a space for voters to find extensive information about the candidates as well as election logistics, access and share videos and ads, blog and provide commentary, donate and take part in volunteer activities. Campaigns have also developed advanced micro-targeting methods, including the use of focused text messages to reach specific constituencies, such as ethnic group members and issue constituencies (Kreiss, 2016; Mare, 2018). If the 2013 elections were described as the “Facebook plebiscite” then the 2018 elections can be aptly characterized as the social media election. These elections witnessed the heavy usage of Facebook live broadcasts, Twitter and WhatsApp. Unlike any other previous election, Facebook live broadcasts complemented physical rallies in many ways. They opened platforms for virtual rallies where those in the diaspora and geographically dispersed areas could participate in the election spectacle. The most vibrant Facebook live platforms included Sly Media Productions, 263Chat, OpenParly ZW, Kukurigo, ZimboLive TV, ZimEye, The FeedZW, Zimpapers TV and VOA America. This enabled voters to watch rallies at their workplace, on the go or at home in the evenings (those with broadband internet). Facebook live broadcasts provided the MDC Alliance with instant feedback from voters. Instead of relying on ZTV (which only broadcast ZANU-PF rallies and press conferences), the MDC Alliance, Build Zimbabwe and APA made use of Facebook and Twitter live broadcasts to broadcast their press conferences. Besides these platforms, parties also used their own handles to stream live online braodcasts to their followers and fans. These include the MDC Zimbabwe and Advocate Nelson Chamisa Facebook pages. ZANU-PF on

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their part relied on live television, radio and online newspaper broadcasts and commentaries to reach their audiences. This is understandable because their voters are mostly domiciled in rural and peri-urban areas. Most of these have limited access to the internet and electricity. On average live broadcasts attracted at least 3000 viewers from all over the globe. Facebook live brought a new dimension to the televised nature of rallies. It cut into the broadcasting monopoly enjoyed by ZANU-PF. However, the political economy of internet access meant that only the connected and middle-­ class sections of the population had access to these virtual rallies. Dual screening though allowed viewers to share content via other digital media platforms like WhatsApp and Twitter and face-to-face conversations. Twitter also provided a veritable site of political campaigns, fake news and cyber-propaganda. Not only was it a site for smear campaigns, it also hosted hashtag battles. The MDC Alliance popularized the hashtag #GodIsInIt while ZANU-PF pushed hashtags such as #EDpfee and #EDHasMyVote. Counter hashtags like #GodIsNotInIt and #EDDoesntHaveMyVote were also employed as negative campaign strategies to capture the hearts and minds of voters (Moyo, 2018). Some of the parties enlisted the services of spin doctors and “cyber-troops” (a combination of bots, paid or volunteering youths) to manufacture and disseminate party propaganda on Twitter, Facebook and WhatsApp. Known as varakashi (Shona for “destroyers”), ZANU-PF’s “cybertroops” were pitted against the MDC Alliance’s “Nerrorists” (after Chamisa’s nickname, “Nero”) in the unprecedented online propaganda war to discredit each other. Because of the weaponization of social media, these platforms were rife with online harassment, vitriol attacks, fake news and cyber-­propaganda. Bots like The Real Lord Mutai also came to the rescue of ZANU-PF on Twitter. Anonymous, pseudonymous characters and parody accounts like Matigary, Petinah Gappah, Linda Masarira, Jones Masara, Obert Gutu, Elijah Chiwota, Nicky Mangwana, K Mutisi and Nicole Hondo framed the debate on behalf of ED. ZANU-PF is said to have spent more than USD1.13  million on its social media strategy employing a reported 279 social media users to fight opposition political parties online. Others like Makomborero Haruzivise, Jonathan Moyo, Givemore Chidzidzi, Alex Magaisa, Maureen Kademaunga, Joana Mamombe, Shakespear Hamauswa, Fortune Mguni, Pedzisai Ruhanya played ball for Nero. Presidential c­ andidates like Emmerson Mnangagwa, Nelson Chamisa, Noah Manyika, Thokozani Khupe, Joice Mujuru and Nkosana Moyo also had vibrant pages on Facebook and Twitter. Compared

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to Mugabe who stuck to a­nalogue politics, ED opened Facebook and Twitter pages, which are believed to be administered by a UK-based ­public relations firm on his behalf. This study also found out that the mobile instant messaging application WhatsApp was also very important in terms of coordinating smaller groups of campaigners. It was important for logistics and coordination of rallies. As Vaccari and Valeriani (2016) observe, mobile instant messaging sites (MIMS) are emerging as crucial digital intermediaries that might have a relevant impact on how citizens (as well as what types of citizens) are informed about and engage with politics online. They also suggest that MIMS appeal to citizens who especially value the intimate nature of these services, whether because they are reluctant to express some of their political views on more open digital spaces or because they hold more extreme political views. All the major parties had WhatsApp groups with administrators at national, provincial, district and cell levels. These mini groups acted as alternative public spheres where rally organizers exchanged views and discussed political strategies. Political parties mainly used Facebook, WhatsApp and Twitter for campaigning and information dissemination purposes. Political formations deliberately integrated these technologies for their campaigns so as to improve their audience reach and help control their own narrative. The MDC-T, for example, tasked senior party members to campaign on social media platforms in order to help spread the party message. This was meant to assist the party to distinguish itself from its nemesis rival, the MDC Alliance. According to ZEC statistics on voter registration, 45 percent of the registered voters for the 2018 elections were youths (ages 18–35). This made this demographic group the largest voting bloc, which was also hyper-active on social media platforms. Other political actors used social media for gauging voter sentiment, which would assist contesting candidates to frame their political messages. An independent parliamentary candidate for Mt Pleasant, Fadzayi Mahere, said her campaign team used social media for voter engagement including gauging sentiment, consulting and outreach, getting the electorate to share concerns and issues of interest. The use of these platforms was meant to reach the youth demographic group through a medium that would allow them control of the message. Interviews were conducted with influential staffers and political activists within mainstream and peripheral political parties and movements in Zimbabwe. For instance, all the respondents were asked how they as an

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individual or political party used Facebook, WhatsApp and Twitter during the 2018 campaign season. Some of the responses to this question are as follows: As an individual I used social media to promote the Party’s policies and goals … used it as a medium of monitoring the narrative of our political competitors … most importantly used it to set our agenda. Therefore, social media aided in our mobilization efforts. (Tendai Chirau, ZANU-PF, Secretary for Administration, Youth League) NCA used Facebook and Twitter to campaign for all party candidates. WhatsApp was used for internal communications only. (Madock Chivasa, Spokesperson, National Constitutional Assembly) For messaging on the campaign values, promises and manifesto, for voter education including disseminating voter registration forms. Voter engagement including gauging sentiment, consulting and outreach, getting the electorate to share concerns and issues of interest. Notice board-sharing information on our projects and activities. Mobilizing and coordinating volunteers and coordinating women’s cooperative. (Fadzayi Mahere, ­ Independent Member of Parliament Candidate, Mt Pleasant) I started messaging my opposition to the draconian response of the government to the protests that erupted in 2016 via social media, which at that time was the only means to express my outrage. The thought at the beginning was never that this would be the way to win an election, but rather that we had to use whatever platforms were available to let people know that the government’s response to legitimate protests was unacceptable. Once we got into the race, we like most newer opposition parties and candidates found that both the public and private media were preoccupied with either the ruling party or the MDC-Alliance. While there was much we did on the ground, it did not receive much coverage from the conventional media, and the only platforms open to us were social media. We had regular Facebook live rallies and regular posts on our Facebook page. We also compressed our messages for WhatsApp, which has by far the largest reach of all the social media platforms. (Noah Manyika, Build Zimbabwe President) My party used social media to share party activities and information on the party’s election campaign. At a personal level I used social media to mobilize support for the Harare Central seat that I was campaigning for. (Linda Masarira, Spokesperson, MDC-T)

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Facebook, WhatsApp and Twitter were our main platforms of communication and we did so by uploading content that spoke to prevailing issues whilst calling citizens to action. Our content was deliberately video content and done intentionally in both English and local language so as to exponentially increase our reach. (Evan Mawarire, #ThisFlag Movement)

It is evident from the aforementioned interview quotes that Facebook, Twitter and WhatsApp were the most used digital media platforms. Clearly, these platforms were deployed because of their affordances and ability to reach youthful segments of the population. Various forms of content were posted online throughout the campaign period. Most of the respondents said that their target audience was active on Facebook, hence the reason they used it more often when compared to Twitter and WhatsApp. As Kudzai Mubaiwa noted, “Facebook was great for reach, you could promote posts and friends shared them too”. Unlike Facebook, the second most used platform (WhatsApp) had observable limitations. The MDC-T noted, “The party had a wider audience on Facebook primarily because most Zimbabweans use Facebook. This view is not shared by MDC Alliance member who says: The WhatsApp platform is the most widely accessible platform by voters even though I used Facebook and Twitter as well”. This view is also shared by Evan Mawarire of #ThisFlag movement who campaigned as a councilor in Harare. He had this to say: WhatsApp provides the best reach because of its capacity to spread content via groups of common interest. People tend to believe and engage what they receive from people whom they trust and people they can directly interrogate about the content. WhatsApp also has the added security feature of end-to-end encryption and whether or not people understand what that means it gives them a sense of security. Finally WhatsApp is more accessible to many people from a cost perspective. It has the added advantage of being able to be both online and offline. In other words one does not have to be on the internet to use it, it works as a text platform would. (Evan Mawarire, #ThisFlag Campaign)

Interviewees were also asked to comment on which digital media platform provided them with better reach to the electorate in the Zimbabwean context. Following are some of the most insightful comments from political activists and candidates:

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I still feel that we had recognizable presence on Facebook while we tried to use Linda Masarira Twitter page and other active Twimbos to communicate to audiences even at midnight and beyond. (Nickson Nyikadzino, Secretary General of MDC-T) Facebook was great for reach, you could promote posts and friends shared them too. (Kudzai Mubaiwa, Ward 23 council candidate) It is Facebook, because it is compatible with live feeds (Facebook Live), pictures, and can also accommodate long articles. (Makomborero Haruzivishe, MDC Alliance) While it’s easier to gauge one’s reach on Facebook and Twitter using “likes”, “views” and “retweets”, the platform that has the broadest reach is WhatsApp since most Zimbabweans are on WhatsApp. Unfortunately, it is difficult to measure reach on WhatsApp. We did have several hundred WhatsApp groups with active members and believe that this was the platform with the most reach for us. (Noah Manyika, Build Zimbabwe) It depends from what angle one is looking at this. It’s imperative to note that the consumers of information are not homogeneous. This means that people prefer to communicate on different platforms. Therefore, I maintain that all social media platforms are popular, but it appears that more prefer to use WhatsApp. (Tendai Chirau, ZANU-PF Youth League) Twitter: messages were short and sharp, lots of images, very politically active users. (Fadzayi Mahere, parliamentary candidate for Mt Pleasant)

Citizen-Initiated Campaigning, Fake News and Cyber-Propaganda The changing media landscape has fostered a new form of “citizen-­ initiated campaigning” (CIC) (Gibson, 2015). This refers to “a practice in which digitally registered supporters who are not necessarily members make use of online tools created by the party or candidate team to campaign both online and offline on its behalf” (Gibson, 2015, p. 183). In Zimbabwe, there was the emergence of the institutionalized citizen-­ initiated campaigners. These were citizens with a huge social media following and influence that were roped in by political parties to aid their campaign strategies and tactics. Other parties resorted to paying these

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campaigners while others were just volunteers who took up the role of campaigning for their preferred political parties and candidates. On the issue whether political parties or candidates recruited paid or voluntary citizen campaigners at the height of the 2018 elections, most of the key informants indicated that they had little campaign finance and hence relied heavily on volunteers. ZANU-PF said it had to tap into its party cadreship for its social media campaign. The party representative said, “The generality of Party Cadres from our Party structures volunteered to occupy the cyberspace”. Noah Manyika of Build Zimbabwe observed that his party relied mostly on volunteers for their social media campaign. The MDC Alliance also noted that they recruited volunteers inside and outside Zimbabwe to assist them with social media campaigning. With the exception of one MDC Alliance parliamentary candidate, Fadzayi Mahere, and Kudzai Mubaiwa who said volunteers were only paid for the Facebook campaign, most of the parties and candidates seem to have relied on volunteers. Some of the responses are as follows: The generality of Party Cadres from our Party structures volunteered to occupy the cyberspace. (Tendai Chirau, ZANU-PF Youth activist) Yes, we recruited over 500 volunteers in total in different capacities—communications, marketing, fundraising, admin, legal, medical, accounting, social media, tech and programming, election agents, street campaigners, commissioners of oath. (Fadzayi Mahere, Mt Pleasant parliamentary candidate) The party utilized party members who volunteered to put up party campaigns as well as interacting with people on the social media platforms. (Madock Chivasa, NCA) All our team members were volunteers. What we did provide was a stipend for transport and lunches. Nobody was paid for their contributions. (Evan Mawarire, #ThisFlag Campaign) Unfortunately, most of our campaigns were done by volunteers who had the zeal and determination to see a change in Zimbabwe, but few individuals might have been lucky to get stipends in their endeavors to carry out their duties. The party heavily relied on voluntary citizens campaign. (Trust Ndhlovu, MDC Alliance SA Chairperson)

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Unfortunately, we did not pay volunteers or social media brigades unlike what was done by our colleagues. Ours was purely voluntary. (Nickson Nyikadzino, MDC-T) Yes, volunteers through Facebook mostly. (Kudazi Mubaiwa, council candidate)

Respondents suggested that fake news played a huge role in the July 2018 elections. Fake news encapsulate stories that are generally false, but have enormous popular appeal and are shared far and wide. This includes hoaxes, propaganda and disinformation purporting to be real news—often circulated online to drive web traffic and amplify their effect. Some of the fake news is completely false information that is created for financial and political gains. While fake news is not entirely a new phenomenon, its corrosive effect on electoral politics, democratic processes and general trust in mainstream media and the potential nurturing of an uninformed and misinformed citizenry pose a threat. Digital media platforms media gave ZBC, The Herald and other state media apparatuses a run for their money as the ruling party failed dismally to monopolize the narrative and to control the free flow of information. Haciyakupoglu, Hui, Suguna, Leong, and Rahman (2018) support this view arguing that fake news, in the digital era, span a spectrum of categories, with varied but at times overlapping motivations which include political, subversive, financial and entertainment. The ability to produce and circulate unfiltered information partly explains the popularity of social media platforms especially among opposition political formations in authoritarian regimes. As already argued, opposition parties used social media for their own propaganda and also to discredit information coming from varakashi (cyber-trolls for ZANU-PF). There were trolls whose goal was to amplify fake news, humiliate and subjugate those from the opposite side. ED appears to have enlisted a group that created over 150 ghost accounts with over 100,000 combined reach. Respondents who took part in this study expressed concern about the role of fake news. ZANU-PF’s Tendai Chirau observed that fake news had the effect of creating panic in their supporters. The party countered fake news through the strategic use of alternative communication methods such as using party structures, rallies and WhatsApp groups. Tapiwa Mashakada of the MDC Alliance’s response was more telling, suggesting that fake news was not a new phenomenon. He said:

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In any election there is propaganda campaign and some voters are bound to fall for it. It happened.

This study by and large found that fake news was blamed by respondents for their parties’ poor showing at the polls. The two main political parties were singled out as the major culprits in the production and dissemination of fake news and propaganda that inadvertently undermined citizens’ ability to make informed decisions. As Mlungisi Dube, a political activist with APA, explained, Fake news and propaganda played a major role for the main political parties. The ruling party was using what became known as Varakashi, who sought to peddle the narrative that things were getting better with the signing of multi-billion-dollar deals and also sought to paint the opposition in bad light. The opposition also sought to exaggerate crowds, and the crossing of the floor by former ZANU-PF members. There was also propaganda about planned rigging strategies by ZEC. The role of propaganda was more ­pronounced on the election night when results started to come out showing that opposition presidential candidate (Nelson Chamisa) was winning overwhelmingly and even the presidential candidate went on to tweet that he was in possession of all V11 forms, which showed he has won.

Most interviewees conceded that they suffered from fake news, including those accused of investing enormous financial and human resources in recruiting bots and cyber-troops like ZANU-PF and the MDC Alliance. On the question relating to the role played by fake news and cyber-­ propaganda during campaign seasons, interviewees put it as follows: As a party, we fell victim to fake news and we still have a strong feeling that characters were created by other parties to soil our name and brand and that some were given incentives to simply lie about us especially that were in bed with ZANU-PF, which is an outright lie. For the MDC Alliance it might have helped them to get to an extent but it, might also have worked against them since the varakashi failed to analyze the negative effect of fake news and insults. Other potential voters who might have wanted to vote for them eventually stayed away or voted for the minority parties. (Nickson Nyikadzino, MDC-T) Fake news had the effect of creating panic in some instances to our supporters. However, fake news does not last long as a counter narrative was generated. To counter fake news, the party also made use of alternative communication methods, which include our structures inter alia. (Tendai Chirau, ZANU-PF Youth League)

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Fake news presented the biggest distraction even for our campaign team. An inordinate amount of time was spent determining what was true and what was not true on social media. Unfortunately, even the traditional media, including the private press, would create fake stories even about our own campaign. The biggest challenge during the campaign was trying to change the narrative so we could focus on what in my view are the real issues … including the fact that 72.5% of Zimbabweans live below the poverty datum line, and that 150 out of our 210 constituencies are rural, leaving only 60 in the urban areas. The reality is that electoral outcomes in Zimbabwe will never change if the opposition does not focus on the 150 constituencies, which cannot be reached by social media. Fake news and propaganda kept the opposition fighting pointless urban battles on social media while the ruling party consolidated its hold on the rural areas. (Noah Manyika, ­ Build Zimbabwe) The role of fake news and propaganda was to propel the bigger and older political parties while undermining the existence of new and smaller parties because smaller parties reaction time will be less effective as compared to bigger political parties. (Madock Chivasa, NCA) For us, it was mostly to smear. We had a strong communications team always on the ready to fight back as required. (Fadzayi Mahere, parliamentary candidate, Mt Pleasant) Fake news and propaganda played a part in distorting facts pertaining to genuine events or information. Our realization was that people had a heightened interest during the elections of anything political. This meant that the higher the sensationalization of a story or events the greater circulation it generated in other platforms. The trouble is countering something that has gone viral. We noticed that once people believed the first narrative, it was generally harder to sway them. Fake news and propaganda was also extensively used to intimidate people. Sometimes messages would go out about how the state had acquired technology to track all conversations that included challenging the regime or supporting the opposition. (Evan Mawarire, #ThisFlag Campaign)

Respondents accused each other of abusing social media for political gains. For example, Bongani Nyathi from the MDC Alliance indicated, “Our opponents ZANU-PF appeared to have a well-coordinated, resourced and organized social media campaign that could have benefited them”. Nixon Nyikadzino of the MDC-T observed, “These two parties [MDC Alliance

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and ZANU-PF] had all the resources to invest in the social media unlike some of us. You would remember the Nerrorists had an HR [human resources] manned office just to deal with varakashi or put differently even during rallies they had bundles paid for them to do live streaming”. Nyikadzino’s view was further corroborated by Linda Masarira from the MDC-T who observed, “ZANU and MDC alliance were the chief architects of propaganda and it worked in their favor”. On the question of production of fake news, an interviewee from ZANU-PF said, “The ­parties were competing for space in the cyber-space. Recognizing the impact of social media, the party had a deliberate policy to spread information”. Based on these responses, our study concluded that most respondents tended to accuse their rivals of spreading fake news without taking any responsibility on their part. The Cyberspace as a Battlefront for the Hearts and Souls of Zimbabwean Voters The battle for voters was particularly vicious and intense on Twitter when compared to Facebook and WhatsApp for a number of reasons. This was partly because Twitter has over the past five years curved a niche as a platform for robust political discussions in Zimbabwe. Twitter was also a space where Jonathan Moyo, Alex Magaisa, Temba Mliswa, Chalton Hwende, Kudakwashe Bhasikiti, Pedzisai Ruhanya, Fadzayi Mahere, Obert Gutu, Linda Masarira, Noah Manyika, Joana Mamombe and other civic activists had a huge influence and popularity. Unlike Facebook and WhatsApp, Twitter is considered an elitist space in Zimbabwe where the middle class and highly educated sections of the population have a significant presence. Public intellectuals, company executives, ministers, councilors, mayors and those in the diaspora are very active on Twitter. Consequently, the battle on Twitter was generally elitist in terms of the framing of the political discourse. Some of these responses are the following: Twitter may not reach the masses, but it is very much a platform where the intellectuals and decision makers dialogue. Many high-profile politicians spoke their mind on Twitter and that afforded a rare opportunity for supporters and detractors to engage. The nature of Twitter’s limited character meant that each post had to have the ability to explain a point and demean the opponent at the same time. A lot of debates that happened on Facebook or WhatsApp would in many cases have begun on

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Twitter after a screenshot was taken and shared on another platform. (Evan Mawarire, #ThisFlag Campaign) Twitter has lesser characters and maybe it’s not heavy on bundles. So, comrades jumped to the party. But that is where most of the popular politicians were physically residing and it was a battle of words before they could repost on Facebook or WhatsApp. These platforms were being used to complement each other. (Nyikadzino Nixon, MDC-T) Because Twitter allows anonymity, so people were unrestrained. (Kudzai Mubaiwa, aspiring councilor, ward 23) Twitter is free on most Zimbabwe networks for example on Econet. The use of fewer characters also affords most people to engage casually. The most influential Zimbabwe political actors are on Twitter than Facebook. (APA activist) I am not sure I would say it was more vicious on Twitter than on any other platform. In my view, because of the word count limitation on Twitter, a person’s views become less diluted by the number of words, and the same thing said on Facebook in a lengthy post just seems much more direct on Twitter. (Noah Manyika, Build Zimbabwe) It was indeed vicious on Twitter. On one side the MDC was assisted by functionaries of the fallen G40 cabal on their attack of ZANU-PF. Though we as ZANU-PF recognized the impact of social media on elections … we did not rely much on it as we followed the other traditional methods of campaign. The battle was so vicious because it was a contest for political space on the cyberspace. (Tendai Chirau, ZANU-PF Youth League)

Overall, it is arguable from the foregoing that there was a vicious battle between the MDC Alliance and ZANU-PF supporters on Twitter. The situation was made worse by the recruitment of volunteer cyber-troops and bots with the sole purpose of discrediting each other ahead of the heavily contested plebiscite. Compared to the 2013 elections, the July 2018 elections saw the heavy use of Twitter and WhatsApp groups to spread fake news and cyber-propaganda. Although Twitter does not reach the masses in Zimbabwe, it is the only social media platform where opinion makers are hyper-active and accessible.

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Conclusion This study has concluded that political parties and candidates in Zimbabwe used a wide array of traditional and digital platforms during the July 2018 elections. In a way, this confirms the basic argument of the communicative ecology approach that situated actors make use of technological, social and discursive layers (Hearn & Foth, 2007). These three layers are intricately interwoven and mutually constitutive, having the potential to influence the development of the other. This also suggests that in any given context political parties, candidates and voters can possibly deploy all the various layers of the media ecologies rather than single-media technologies (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012). These traditional and digital technologies allowed political actors an opportunity to interact and mobilize their voters to go out and vote. This chimes with previous studies, which shows that political parties in Zimbabwe and Zambia have started to incorporate a range of traditional, popular and digital media platforms in their campaigns (Mare, 2018; Ndlela, 2015; Willems, 2016). Despite the digitization of electoral campaigns in the global North, this study argues that traditional campaign strategies like rallies, songs, door-to-door canvassing, word of mouth and mass media are still very popular in Zimbabwe. These are still popular in rural and peri-urban contexts where access to the internet is limited. Facebook live broadcasting, WhatsApp groups and Twitter provided an alternative space to reach out to urban and diaspora voters. This enabled political parties and candidates to campaign online; to communicate with the electorate, media institutions and the wider public; and to receive direct feedback through posts and comments from voters. Citizen campaigners also produced and shared photos and video footage during the July 2018 elections. Sponsored Facebook and Twitter adverts were also used to attract higher numbers of “likes” while adverts on online news websites encouraged prospective voters to vote for certain presidential candidates. However, the upsurge of fake news and cyber-propaganda created an untenable situation, which threatened to undermine the credibility and fairness of electoral processes in Zimbabwe. Fake news made it difficult for the electorate to assess the candidates’ manifestos and promises. Cyber-propaganda ended up drowning out the truth and in some cases manufactured “unnecessary illusions”. As Moyo (2018) observes, this can potentially cloud the electoral field, and even jeopardize the entire process. This means that there is an urgent need to put in place measures to guard against the abuse of social media and bots to subvert democratic

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processes. There is also a need for digital media literacy so that citizens can appreciate the power of the internet, content and the role of insidious political and economic actors that are behind certain websites and social media platforms. Further research must focus on the nexus between fake news, cyber-propaganda and electoral campaigns in Zimbabwe.

Notes 1. In November 2017, the military staged a “soft coup” that forced Robert Mugabe to step down, paving the way for the ascendency of Emmerson Mnangagwa to the position of President. 2. It denotes “the context in which communication processes occur” (Hearn & Foth, 2007, p. 9). This approach is concerned with the various types of media or communication spaces and tools which are available to communities and that people use in a specific geographical area (Tacchi, Slater, & Hearn, 2013). As Hearn and Foth (2007) put it, there are various layers, which constitute media ecologies: discursive (themes or content of both mediated and unmediated communication), technological (ICTs, TV, radio) and social (community meetings, informal networks, institutions). Far from being disconnected, these layers are intricately interrelated and mutually constitutive. 3. Myzimbabwe.co.zw (14 June 2018). 23 candidates to contest Zimbabwe’s 2018 watershed presidential elections. Retrieved from https://www.myzimbabwe.co.zw/news/25979-updated-23-candidates-to-contest-zimbabwes2018-watershed-presidential-elections-see-final-list.html 4. The Independent (1 July 2018). Independent candidates expose fissures in parties. Retrieved from https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2018/07/ 01/independent-candidates-expose-fissures-in-parties/ 5. EU EOM Zimbabwe Harmonised Elections 2018 Final Report. October 2018. https://cdn5-eeas.fpfis.tech.ec.europa.eu/cdn/farfuture/4oA6Nz1VZuz_ CU9oHsm1dkLdmSSO-jhl8H_altt88n0/mtime:1539116530/sites/eeas/ files/eu_eom_zimbabwe_2018_-_final_report.pdf

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CHAPTER 9

Social Media and Elections: A Case of Botswana, Lesotho and Eswatini Maxwell V. Mthembu and Carolyne M. Lunga

Introduction The purpose of this chapter is to examine social media usage during elections in Botswana, Lesotho and Eswatini (BOLESWA). Social media have provided unprecedented opportunities for direct dialogue and interaction between politicians and citizens. Social media also give a platform to voices that are marginalised in the mainstream media, allowing for freedom of expression and challenging the status quo. Social media have facilitated political communication with communities that parties were struggling to reach (Masilo & Seabo, 2015, p. 111). While this may be the case in various countries across Africa, there has been very little adoption of social media in Eswatini in the elections of September 2018, with political parties continuing to be banned since April 12, 1973. Botswana’s 2014 and Lesotho’s 2017 elections saw the adoption of social media, especially Facebook, in the campaign process. Attempts by the Lesotho government to shut down the Internet were visible as it sought to limit freedom of

M. V. Mthembu (*) • C. M. Lunga University of Eswatini, Kwaluseni, Eswatini e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 M. N. Ndlela, W. Mano (eds.), Social Media and Elections in Africa, Volume 1, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30553-6_9

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expression, oppositional discourses and the mobilisation of citizens against the ruling elite. This chapter analysed elections in Botswana, Lesotho and Eswatini and argues that while social media has been embraced in election processes across Africa, Eswatini exhibits a different story, with most of the campaigns still on the ground and very little usage of social media due to various factors. Eswatini is small geographically, and this makes it easy for one to move from one area to another for campaigning. Cultural methods of meeting such as sibaya (cattle kraal) are dominant, and these provide a forum for villagers to talk about their problems. Kuper (1972) and Mthembu (2018, p.  75) posit that sibaya is an open-air arena used for national gatherings and the performance of royal rituals. This arena is located at the official residence of the Queen Mother (Mthembu, 2018). Participants in this space are from urban and rural areas. Worth noting is that a larger percentage of the population reside in rural areas, which have no connectivity, and these people lack the skills to be online. Similarly, in Botswana, the kgotla is a traditional system of meeting which serves as a forum for policy formulations and decision making, including political and economic developmental activities and judiciary on litigations (Moumakwa, 2010, p. 3). Each tribe has several kgotlas, and these provide platforms for villagers to interact and consult on various issues at village level (ibid.). This platform is important for the large numbers of people residing in rural areas that do not have access to the Internet and, therefore, cannot participate online. The kgotla system, however, has been criticised for being dominated by chiefs and members of the royal family such that there is no real participation and debate by ordinary citizens. Moumakwa (2010) argues that decisions at the kgotla are predetermined by tribal leadership and disseminated to the people. In Lesotho, “the pitso or open-air assembly is used by the principal chiefs to consult the people, and the lekhotla or court of village elders is the venue for settling minor disputes” (Kingdom of Lesotho n.d.). However, the pitso is criticised for not representing a platform for effective deliberation and engagement as traditional leaders use it to communicate predetermined decisions (M.  Thabane, personal communication, March 10, 2019). The absence of political parties in Eswatini means that politicians carry out personal campaigns and thus strongly believe in physical meetings with community members who they can easily access. Cell phone usage via short messaging service (SMS) and calls was also common in the previous elections. Botswana and Lesotho have embraced social media in the campaign process which were used to attract followers, particularly those in

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urban areas. The processes are not without problems, as government interference is rampant, and women, people living with disabilities and rural dwellers continue to be marginalised. The rise of the Internet and social media provides further avenues and possibilities for participatory citizenship, with citizens actively involved in creating and sharing information and knowledge (Elchahabi & Gallagher, 2015). Papacharissi (2002) argues that new technologies provide information and tools that may extend the role of the public in the social and political spheres. New media platforms are hailed for being inclusive and for empowering citizens who were previously marginalised in the mainstream media which is fundamental in the strengthening of democracy, especially in relation to elections. For example, the way that candidates interact with citizens and do their campaigns has changed. Political mobilisation on social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter has become a common feature where elections have taken place. Social media is also playing a key role where provision of information regarding elections is concerned. Voters turn to Facebook and Twitter for information updates and new developments on political candidates. Electoral commissions in some countries in Africa and other continents have also embraced social media to engage with citizens on issues related to the electoral processes which has huge implications on transparency. Civic groups have also enhanced their activities through the adoption of social media. The adoption of social media in elections has, however, not been without challenges. For example, the rise in disinformation through the posting and sharing of fake news poses a huge threat to democracy. Several Internet and democracy scholars question how citizens can make informed decisions when they are continually bombarded with fake news. In Africa and in the globe as a whole, challenges of access still limit participation on this deliberative space. The elderly, the illiterate and the poor have limited or no access to these resources. Data costs are out of reach for most youths, especially those who are of school-going age and are unemployed. In the three countries under review, there is also exclusion due to lack of capabilities. Though some people may have access to the Internet on their phones, a major deterrent could be the lack of capabilities to navigate their way through this medium. Though the digital public sphere provides an opportunity for dialogue, many citizens in the developing countries are excluded from full participation. The exclusionary nature of this sphere means that citizens continue to rely on the traditional media

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which, unfortunately, is subject to manipulation by governments. The use of social media is still a domain of a few in Botswana, Lesotho and Eswatini. Some governments have expressed their concern about these online platforms despite the fact that only a few people have access to the Internet in the three countries. The introduction of social media in some countries was portrayed negatively by some governments. For instance, in Eswatini, the late former Prime Minister Sibusiso Barnabas Dlamini vilified Facebook because it was being used by some citizens in urban areas to condemn unpopular decisions taken by the government. In 2014, the government of Botswana raised concern about “irresponsible journalism” and “irresponsible citizenship” as social media users, particularly the young, expressed their political views on Facebook (Jotia, 2018, p. 268).

Botswana, Lesotho and Eswatini: Political Systems Botswana, Lesotho and Eswatini are regarded as sister countries. This is because the three countries were under one colonial administration, and they were called High Commission Territories up until they attained independence. Botswana and Lesotho got independence in 1966, and Eswatini gained independence from British rule in 1968. They have been referred to as South Africa’s hostages (Halpern, 1965) because of their total economic subordination to South Africa over the years (Crush, 1981). Though Botswana’s economy is now stronger and its currency is no longer pegged to the rand, Lesotho and Eswatini are still heavily dependent on their neighbour, South Africa. Developments which take place in South Africa, be they political or economic, have a direct bearing on Lesotho and Eswatini. Botswana is a multiparty democracy and has a unicameral parliament, the National Assembly, which is advised by the House of Chiefs. Since independence in 1965, Botswana has had about 11 general elections. In 2014, there were three political parties that contested the general election, namely, the ruling Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), the Botswana Congress Party (BCP) and the Umbrella for Democratic Change (UDC). The BDP emerged victor despite having lost some ground in this election. The BDP has dominated Botswana’s politics since independence in 1965. In Lesotho, 27 of the 30 political parties registered with the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) contested the National Assembly elections of June 3, 2017. Since attaining independence in 1966, the country has

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gone  through a number of political systems: a multiparty democracy (1966–1970), a one-party state (1970–1986), military dictatorship (1986–1993) and the return of multiparty democracy (Moholi, 2015, p.  2). In a space of five years, Lesotho has had three general elections—2012, 2015 and 2017—because of the volatility in the political leadership. The failure to have a political party winning elections with an outright majority resulted in a compromise between political parties to form a ruling coalition. However, the coalition governments were rocked by internal strife because of disagreements between the parties and defections. In 2017, for instance, the incumbent prime minister’s All Basotho Convention (ABC) got 51 seats, falling short of the 61 seats required for a party to form a government (Masondo, 2019). Consequently, the party had to form a coalition government with the Alliance of Democrats (nine seats), Basotho National Party (five seats) and the Reformed Congress of Lesotho (one seat) (Masondo, 2019). Lesotho has a bicameral parliament, the Senate and the House of Assembly. The Kingdom of Eswatini’s parliament comprises the Houses of Assembly and Senate. Elections in Eswatini were first held in 1964, which were contested by six political parties including the king’s party, Imbokodvo National Movement (INM). INM, formed in the same year, participated and emerged victorious. According to Simelane (2010), this was an indication that the traditionalists led by the king were on the brink of inheriting power from British rule. The country held its second elections in 1967, on the eve of independence which saw a number of political parties contest the elections: INM, Ngwane National Liberatory Congress (NNLC), Swaziland Progressive Party (SPP), the Swaziland United Front (SUF) and the United Swaziland Association (USA). In 1972, the country again went to the polls. During these elections, the dominance of the INM continued; however, this time around, they lost three seats to the opposition, the NNLC. The INM perceived these developments as a threat to the prevailing status quo culminating in the revocation of the independence constitution in 1973, which banned all political parties. From then on, all executive, legislative and judicial powers were vested in the king. The Swaziland Order of 1992 ushered in voter registration, the secret ballot and the direct election of representatives from the constituencies. This was, according to Motsamai (2012), the genesis of the two-step primary and secondary elections under which the 2018 polls were held.

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Eswatini is a monarchy ruled by a King who has absolute powers. Eswatini’s parliamentary system is based on a traditional system of Tinkhundla (constituencies). This system of governance was introduced in 1978 by a King’s Order-in-Council. An inkhundla (singular for ­tinkhundla), a siSwati name for constituency, was originally a single or a grouping of chiefdoms devised by King Mswati II in the mid-nineteenth century for administrative and military mobilisation. According to Hlatshwayo (1992), the king revived the traditional system of tinkhundla in the 1940s as part of his revival of the regimental system. The tinkhundla now serve as electoral and development centres for the provision of public services (Dlamini, 2016). Under this non-party system, representatives to parliament are supposed to come from the tinkhundla. Communities vote for individuals to represent several chiefdoms under a single inkhundla. The eventual winner becomes a member of parliament for that particular inkhundla. Currently, there are 59 tinkhundla after they were increased from 55 in 2018 on the eve of the general elections. Under this system elections do not change the leadership or the governance system but are reduced to a ritual carried out every five years. Leadership positions and policies are not contested but remain forever in the hands of the king, princes, and traditional chiefs. (Simelane, 2010, p. 21)

Under this system, campaigning is banned in the primary elections. Primary elections involve voting at chiefdom level, and the winner in every chiefdom, under an inkhundla, then competes in what is known as the secondary elections. The eventual winner is the one who represents that inkhundla in parliament for five years. According to Section 87(5) of the Constitution, campaigning is banned on the basis that nominees are chosen within their chiefdoms based on their credibility, and therefore there is no need for them to campaign. Campaigning for a seat in parliament prior to the secondary elections is conducted in designated areas and under the watchful eye of officials representing the Elections and Boundaries Commission (EBC). Prospective Members of Parliament (MPs) who made it in the primary elections can campaign in the various chiefdoms that make up that inkhundla. Posters and other paraphernalia can be distributed during this period.

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Restrictions on Press Freedom in Botswana, Lesotho and Eswatini The media as channels of communication are the lifeblood of the democratic process. Free media continue to be considered key in influencing political discourse during elections (Elchahabi & Gallagher, 2015). Such media foster transparency and freedom of expression including the dissemination of important electoral information in order for citizens to make informed decisions (Elchahabi & Gallagher, 2015; Kopanang, 2007). However, government interference and influence of advertising on content, including a lack of professionalism, have hindered mainstream media from effectively playing this role. Dahlgren (2006) notes that factors that define the freedoms and constraints on mainstream media revolve around issues of political economy, ownership, control, regulation and issues of their financing as well as the legal frameworks. The three countries under study demonstrate that public media promotes government policies, censorship is rife and government critics are restricted to access the media (Jotia, 2018; Kopanang, 2007; Rooney, 2012). Social media thus provides an alternative platform by those previously marginalised from participating in government media.

Social Media and Elections in Botswana, Lesotho and Eswatini Of the three countries under study, Botswana and Lesotho demonstrate an increasing usage of the Internet and social media in their day-to-day activities. By December 2017, the data were as follows: 27.7% for Lesotho, 39.6% for Botswana and less than one-third for Eswatini (Africa User Stats and Population, 2018). The trend in the BOLESWA countries is that Facebook seems to be the dominant social networking site. According to Africa Usage and Population Statistics, by December 2017, there were 830,000 Facebook users in Botswana, 310,000  in Lesotho and 170,000 in Eswatini. Lesotho According to the Media Institute for Southern Africa (MISA), Facebook is the most dominant social media platform in Lesotho for exchange of

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information. MISA notes that Facebook is a platform which played a ­critical pivotal role in influencing the political agenda of the 2017 elections (MISA, 2017). The Commonwealth Observer Group, which monitored the 2017 national assembly elections, observes that the use of social media in the dissemination of information and as a dialogical space for deliberating political issues is gaining popularity. Such deliberations are on Facebook, Twitter and WhatsApp. According to MISA, social media is favoured because it enables greater freedom of expression, despite the challenges it presents with respect to inaccuracy. In terms of fake news, nothing was noted during the elections. It was also noted that the youth are more active on this platform (The Commonwealth Observer Group, 2017, p. 14). The Commonwealth Observer Group also noted that the campaigns saw the active participation of youths and women and that offline campaign strategies such as flyers, posters and mobile billboards were also used and rallies were held peacefully (The Commonwealth Observer Group, 2017). Mats’atsa (2016) notes that there were 33 politicians and aspirants who had Facebook accounts in the elections held in 2015. Some of them had more than one account. Updates on the pages varied. Only a few updated their pages on a daily basis. Political parties in Lesotho also have a presence on social media. According to Mats’atsa (2016), although there were 13 political parties that had Facebook accounts, their authenticity cannot be verified. Some of the parties had more than one account. For instance, the All Basotho Convention boasted of seven accounts, followed by the Democratic Congress (DC) and the Lesotho People’s Congress party with four accounts each. Gwagwa (2017) notes that in July 2016, Pakalitha Mosisili’s DC government proposed to close down social media as it felt that government secrets were being published without consent, but the Lesotho Telecommunications Authority, which is the regulator, backed down. Two Facebook administrators of a group known as Count Down to Elections 2015, 2016 or 2017 were arrested because sensitive government information was released in this group (Mohloboli, 2016). Gwagwa (2017, p. 5) argues that censorship of the Internet stifles freedom of expression, particularly through the silencing of dissenting voices. McDevitt (2017) states, for instance, that Lesotho’s attempts to stifle Internet access in the lead-up to the elections follow in the footsteps of several other African states, including Ethiopia and Gabon, among others, which all shut down Internet access, in whole or in part, leading up to or during their own elections in 2016.

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Botswana In the 2014 elections in Botswana, political parties embraced social media in their political campaigns. Like in the other two sister countries, the use of traditional media was limited to the government, in this case, the ruling BDP. Opposition parties have struggled to find a voice in the media, especially on state-owned entities like the Radio Botswana and Botswana TV which favour the ruling government. As argued by Jotia (2018), state media in Botswana is under tight control. It is worth noting that as national broadcasters, these media have a wider reach, and without access to them, opposition parties struggle to disseminate information to prospective voters. According to Masilo and Seabo (2015), social media presence offers political parties an alternative space for political communication, thus creating more avenues for political discourse. The advantage of the new media spaces was the lesser cost compared with traditional media adverts, which were rather costly. Not only that, they were free from state interference and gatekeeping. Social media offers citizens a public space where there is an exchange of information and views on issues of paramount importance, especially with regard to governance and democracy (Mthembu, 2009, p.  124). Ndlela (2007, p.  328) argues that the new technologies including the Internet are “transforming the communicative spaces that facilitate the various public spaces in Africa”. Social media is such a space. It avails alternative platforms enabling citizens the dialogical space to deliberate socioeconomic and political issues (Jotia, 2018). Radio and newspapers were such a platform in countries like Botswana, prior to the introduction of radio and newspapers (Jotia, 2018). A report by observers of the Botswana elections in 2014 stated: While the IEC can be commended for the sensitisation exercise they conducted and especially the use of technology to disseminate information during the 2014 election period, it goes without saying that there is still room for improvement. For example, the IEC website was down most of the time especially in the months preceding October, making it difficult to get any electoral related information. (Kenya Human Rights Commission, 2014, p. 5)

The report by the Commission states that the downside was that the website used English rather than Tswana, which is the dominant language, and thus discriminated against those who do not know English.

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The dissemination channels and formats also discriminated against persons with disabilities, especially those who are visually impaired. Further, the electorate that did not have the Internet and a smartphone were also discriminated against since they were not able to access the information posted on the IEC website and Facebook page (Kenya Human Rights Commission, 2014, p. 5). Makala (2014) cited by Masilo and Seabo (2015) argues that the Internet still remains elitist as such overreliance on this medium excludes prospective voters who do not have access to it. The Freedom in the World report on Botswana reveals that an official at the Ministry of Defence, Justice and Security stated in an interview that the government would be drafting an amendment to the Cyber Crime Act to increase the monitoring of social media for fake news and defamation  (Freedom House, 2018a). Civil society leaders expressed concern that any new social media legislation could result in a crackdown on freedom of expression. Eswatini Whereas in the developed countries and other developing countries, social media has been used to mobilise voters, the same cannot be argued in the Eswatini context. Political parties remain banned since April 12, 1973. Under the tinkhundla system of governance, a person who is voted MP represents the inkhundla where that individual was elected. The majority of the emaSwati population is found in rural areas. According to the Swaziland Population and Housing Census of 2007, the total population was 1,018,449. Of this figure, 77.9% (793,156) is rural and 22.1% (225,293) urban (Kingdom of Swaziland, 2007). Access to the Internet is not ubiquitous in comparison to mobile telephony. Even with regard to mobile telephones, voice communication still remains dominant because many people lack the skill to access the Internet on their phones. In addition, there are limitations in new media capabilities resulting in them not making use of the full potential of mobile phones. According to the Freedom in the World report  2018, constitutional rights to freedom of expression are severely restricted including monitoring of personal communications as well as social media (Freedom House, 2018b). The number of WhatsApp users continues to grow; however, the cost of data is high in comparison to other southern African countries. The aforementioned circumstances have resulted in those running for office not utilising social media but relying on below-the-line advertising and word of mouth for campaigning. This was facilitated also by the small geographic

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size of the country. A4 size posters were mostly used and put on cars, retail outlets and other strategic places. In very few cases where WhatsApp was used to campaign for office, SMSes were sent out to voters to support certain candidates. Newspapers were also used by prospective MPs to reach out to voters. Campaigning on television and radio is almost non-existent, yet radio is the most dominant medium in the country. According to regulations introduced by the Eswatini Broadcasting and Information Service (EBIS) in 2013, members of parliament are banned from making public announcements using radio. Any intention to make announcements must be sanctioned by a chief and that document should have an authentic stamp from the chiefdom. There were campaign strategies such as food distribution, hampers, feasts, cash payments, donations of various nature given to members of constituencies including the elderly people and campaigning at church services. Both the daily newspapers, the Times of Swaziland and the Swazi Observer, were drawn to these events which they reported extensively. The EBC has a website and no presence on social media. The website has very little information. It has no sign that it is interactive as there is no leave a comment section or links to social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter. Contact numbers and an email address can be seen on the site. During the elections, Chief Gija Dlamini, chairman of the EBC, and other commissioners, was covered mostly in the traditional media addressing issues related to the electoral process.

Gender and Social Media A discussion of political communication on social media is incomplete without a focus on the participation of women in this sphere. In the political arena, Botswana currently has only five female MPs in a 63-seat parliament. In Lesotho, out of 120 parliamentary seats, only 26 women secured seats. Of the 26, only 8 were elected from constituencies, and the remainder made it through proportional representation (Matope, 2017). According to Matlho (2012), Section 47(2)(b) of the Constitution states that political parties shall “arrange the candidates in order of preference from top to bottom, with a female or male candidate immediately followed by a candidate of the opposite sex; and (c) include equal numbers of women and men”. In the 2018 parliamentary elections in Eswatini, only 2 women were elected as opposed to 57 men. This was better than 2013, where only one woman was elected despite a campaign that was running in the country

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known as “Votela Make”—translated as vote for a woman—in addition to the encouragement by His Majesty King Mswati III that women join the elections. The Freedom of the World 2018 on Eswatini reveals that the rights of women are restricted as both civil and customary law treat women as dependents of their fathers or husbands, and societal discrimination further impairs their access to education. Although women have full political rights in Botswana, cultural factors limit their participation, and their interests are not necessarily addressed by elected leaders in areas such as employment and to being voted to public office. Freedom in the World report on Lesotho 2018 reports that while the constitution guarantees political rights for all, women are discouraged from running for office by social norms. For this reason, women remain underrepresented in the parliament; following the 2017 elections, 23% of seats are held by women, down from 25% previously. Although women constitute a majority in Lesotho, they remain at the periphery of mainstream politics (Viljoen & Nsibirwa, 2006, p. 352). The representation of women is evidence of exclusion in all three countries. The patriarchal nature of the BOLESWA countries suggests that women are not favoured to hold political office. This is despite the fact that in all three countries women are in the majority. However, only a few enter parliament through the election ticket but only make it through legislations that call for their inclusion in the event that few have been voted to the parliament. It could be argued, therefore, that if women are marginalised in mainstream politics, their participation in online political spaces is likely to be minimal in the context of BOLESWA. Women in the three countries are conspicuous by their absence from not only politics but also the social networking sites. A study on the coverage of women in Lesotho in the 2017 elections revealed that lack of capabilities in new media resulted in the minimal use of social media platforms by female candidates (MISA, 2018).

Challenges of Social Media Adoption in Elections Numerous challenges have impacted social media participation in the countries under discussion. The size of the BOLESWA countries, their population and the cost of accessing the Internet are some of the factors that have impacted the use of social media as a dialogical space. For instance, the geography of Eswatini makes most parts of the country easily accessible. Culturally, in all three countries, the ways of meeting in the chiefdoms are still much of a culture such as the kgotla in Botswana, the

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pitso in Lesotho and sibaya (cattle kraal) in Eswatini. Not only that, political rallies are still dominant in Botswana and Lesotho. The cost of accessing the Internet is on the high side. For instance, the Internet connection in Botswana by comparison with other countries in Africa and the region is relatively high (Mothobi, Chair, & Rademan, 2017). The study by Mothobi et al. concludes that among the BOLESWA countries, Lesotho performs well despite the fact that data prices in the country have been increasing, but the cost of 1GB data is still far less than in Botswana and Eswatini (Mothobi et al., 2017, p. 7). In Eswatini, the prices have been increasing (Mothobi et al., 2017) especially prior to the introduction of a second cellular service provider. The high cost of data excludes many citizens from participating in the deliberative online spaces. There are many other needs that compete for the meagre income that people have, and data is certainly not a priority. This makes the traditional meeting structures in the chiefdoms, face to face, and rallies have an appeal to most citizens. The digital divide is another contributory factor. Telecommunications companies have rolled out their infrastructure where there is greater return for investment. Rural areas are, for instance, neglected. In Lesotho, about 83% of rural dwellers are not connected to the Internet (Mothobi et al., 2017, p. 3). Not only is this a problem unique to rural areas, even in urban areas, some people do not have access to the Internet (Gillwald & Mothobi, 2017). The absence of smart phones and lack of skills on how to maximise the opportunity availed by such phones to communicate render them useless. Empowerment on capabilities and reduction of costs of access could be a springboard for an increase in the use of this online sphere.

Conclusion This chapter has demonstrated that social media could be an ideal platform for dialogue and political communication; however, many citizens in the BOLESWA countries are still excluded. The exclusion emanates from the high cost of accessing the Internet and the inaccessibility of this platform to many, especially in rural areas. The lack of skills to make meaningful use of the Internet is also another major setback for online participation. The chapter shows that in Lesotho and Botswana, Facebook does not replace traditional campaign approaches but rather serves to augment them. Eswatini politicians rely mainly on offline strategies which involve meeting people in their chiefdoms and posters. The political system in

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Eswatini makes it difficult for politicians to campaign on social media because the majority of the constituencies are in rural areas where there is minimal access to the Internet. In this chapter, we also argue that governments are still fond of controlling the traditional media, ensuring that divergent views are not propagated by restricting access to the opposition. This is evident in Botswana and Lesotho where the leading parties have been accused of denying opposition parties access to state media. Eswatini, on the other hand, despite the proscription of political parties, still ensures that prospective politicians show allegiance to their chiefs, which explains why they were banned from national radio because this was perceived a threat to the traditional leaders’ authority at the chiefdom level. The control of traditional media is fertile ground for fake news to spread unabated on social media platforms regarding politicians and political parties. We conclude that the political systems in the three countries are varied. Botswana seems to have some stability compared to Lesotho where the political situation is volatile. There are already cracks in the ruling party, All Basotho Convention, almost two years after the 2017 elections. The fact that Lesotho is a constitutional monarch has limited the powers of the king, and it is a direct contrast to Eswatini where King Mswati III enjoys absolute powers. In essence, if social media is to be embraced extensively in the political space in the three countries, the cost of accessing the Internet will have to be greatly reduced, infrastructure rolled out in rural areas and ordinary citizens empowered with the requisite skills to maximise the potential of the Internet as a dialogical sphere.

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CHAPTER 10

Social Media and Elections in Uganda: The Case of Bobi Wine and the Arua Primary Elections Hannah Muzee and Andrew Osehi Enaifoghe

Introduction Robert Kyagulanyi Ssentamu, popularly known as Bobi Wine, is a musician, entrepreneur, philanthropist, and most recently turned politician. Born on 12 February 1982 in Mpigi District, south-west of Kampala, the capital of Uganda, Bobi Wine grew up in the slums of Kamwokya in Kampala, a place that saw the birth of his music career. To support his then struggling music career, Bobi Wine engaged in an assortment of odd jobs that included collecting edible grasshopper for sale, mud brick making, painting, and working as a porter at building sites. Bobi Wine’s first musical break came with his “Akagoma” hit meaning “the drum,” which played

H. Muzee (*) School of Management and Entrepreneurship, Kyambogo University, Kampala, Uganda A. O. Enaifoghe Department of Public Administration, University of Zululand, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa © The Author(s) 2020 M. N. Ndlela, W. Mano (eds.), Social Media and Elections in Africa, Volume 1, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30553-6_10

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on radio and in a number of nightclubs around Uganda. Through the musical genre of reggae/dancehall, Bobi Wine has been able to produce music that could communicate a message to people especially the poor where he comes from (ProfileAbility, 2018). Bobi Wine has very often used his music to speak against injustices in Uganda’s society and he has proven to be incorruptible by the current regime. For instance, while many famous musicians backed President Yoweri Museveni’s reelection, Bobi Wine refused to join in, an act construed by many as signifying his later active role in politics. Given that Bobi Wine is referred to as ghetto president by people living in the slums of Kamwokya, which is an area where his heart is, it is not surprising that he managed to sail through the by-elections of Kyadondo East Constituency, Central Uganda, in 2017. Bobi Wine, an independent candidate, rose and succeeded to defeat candidates from the ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM) and the opposition to emerge as the winner. This win is what launched him into mainstream Uganda politics and made him a formidable opposition candidate. Subsequently, Bobi Wine was involved in major controversial political events such as the unpopular lifting of the presidential age limit, the social media tax in July 2018, where he locked arms with activists and marched the streets of Kampala protesting the social media tax, including campaigning against the president and the ruling party in the parliamentary by-elections (Olewe, 2018). The chapter hence focuses on the parliamentary by-elections where candidates that were backed by Bobi Wine won, most especially the 14 August 2018 by-election in the north-western town of Arua. Prior to the Arua elections, Bobi Wine had beaten Museveni’s NRM party and one other major opposition party, that is, Besigye’s Forum for Democratic Change (FDC), in the eastern Ugandan districts such as Jinja and Bugiri (Olewe, 2018). The events in Arua, a northern town close to Uganda’s border with the Democratic Republic of Congo, which included an attack on the presidential motorcade and the subsequent arrest of Bobi Wine, instead further lunged him into the spotlight. In the Arua by-election, Bobi Wine went head to head with the president over the contested seat, a seat that was won by Kassiano Wadri who was a candidate backed by Bobi Wine. Using the backing of his people power slogan and social media mobilization, Bobi Wine spoke to the needs of the people, rallying them (especially young people) and encouraging them to take charge of their destiny (Allison, 2018).

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While Bobi Wine is not the only politician to make use of social media platforms such as Facebook, his sudden impact in the limelight of Uganda’s political space and his popularity as a musician make him an interesting public figure to follow online. In the run-up to the 2016 elections, social media platforms were used by former Prime Minister John Patrick Amama Mbabazi to announce his bid to run for presidency and also to engage with the public via a social media campaign (i.e. #AskAmama). By the 2016 election period, President Museveni and opposition candidate Amama Mbabazi had the top ten Twitter profiles in Uganda with a combined total of over 300,000 followers. The presidential elections revealed the importance of social media in election campaigns. Even social media platforms such as Twitter didn’t yield substantial influence on actual elections results; they are looked at by social media skeptics as an elitist tool. Kamp (2016), for example, views it as an open door that has been subsequently exploited by the next generation politicians and political parties in Uganda to constructively engage party members. In relation to Uganda’s electoral democracy, during the by-elections the people in Arua had assembled to support Kassiano Wadri, who was contesting in a parliamentary by-election, which he won later. Subsequent events in the area, which included an attack on the presidential convoy, led to Wine’s confinement and an enraged attack on the National Resistance Movement (NRM) government. In social media, #FreeBobiWine became the hymn around the world. Demonstrations in Kampala saw the police using live ammunition, tear gas, and another flood of arrests. In retaliation, President Museveni used his own blog to give an account of the events and justify the actions of the government as warranted in order to “protect” ordinary citizens (Mail & Guardian, 2018). In three separate posts, he pointed the finger at Bobi Wine for instigating “unlawful” protests and lauded the security powers for their reaction. The influence of social media and its potential as an electoral mobilization and engagement tool are a testimony to its steady growth (Miniwatts Marketing Group, 2018; NITA Uganda, 2018). Similarly, it is hence not a surprise that social media enjoyed a growth rate of 47.400% by 2017; the number of Facebook subscribers also increased to 260,000 out of 19,000,000 internet users in a country with a population of 44,270,563 (ibid.). Statistics also show that the majority of internet users (19.5%) are in urban areas compared to a not too distant number (7.1%) in rural areas, with the majority being young voters (ibid.). Thus, whereas Bobi Wine’s social media engagements seem to have added an additional flair to the

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influence of social media on electoral democracy, this is not in isolation given the steady growth of internet access in the country and its use mainly by young Ugandans, which has created a fertile ground for the influence of social media on electoral democracy. Consequently, prior to the Arua parliamentary by-elections in August 2018, Bobi Wine took to social media to drum up support for Kassiano Wadri, one of the contestants and an independent candidate, against the candidates Bruce Musema of the FDC and Jackson Lee Atima of the NRM in a written communication entitled: “My Message to the People of Arua.” In his speech, Bobi Wine referred to Kassiano Wadri as an elder and thus the most suitable of the five candidates to represent Arua district in parliament. Bobi Wine didn’t relent to remind the youth that the onus was upon them to liberate the country and that it was not a battle of political parties but rather a struggle between the oppressed and the oppressor. He argued that if the youth were to win the presidential election in 2021, the victory would begin in Arua by defeating the ruling party, the National Resistance Movement (NRM), at the ballot (Bobi Wine, 2018). Bobi Wine’s pleas for the masses to unite against the oppression of the current ruling government is what initially gave birth to the “People Power” Movement in Uganda. Bobi Wine’s successes in Arua and previous parliamentary elections in Jinja and Bugiri have been viewed as an embarrassment to the regime. In all these elections, Bobi Wine played a leading mobilization and campaign role and hence propelled the People Power Movement to the political limelight (Mail & Guardian, 2018). Bobi Wine presents a formidable resistance against the regime and he has also demonstrated the power of social media in political mobilizations. This has excited the youth who are disillusioned with the way the NRM government has mismanaged most of the country’s resources and plunged the country into an economic abyss. Bobi Wine speaks in a language that the youth understand and most of them seem to agree with his message. This chapter, therefore, specifically employs a deliberative democratic lens in analyzing citizens’ social media responses in relation to Bobi Wine’s social media mobilization campaign in the Arua elections. Whereas citizens have taken to political conversations and discussion on social media platforms, the question is to what extent do citizens’ social media deliberations enhance democracy in a country where free speech and freedom of expression are continuously curtailed.

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Deliberative Democracy and the Ugandan Context Even when political deliberation has been confined to parliamentary/legislative structures, the core and essence of deliberation are similar to what now happens on social media networking sites such as Facebook, Twitter, and WhatsApp. In the case of Bobi Wine and the Arua election, the problem largely lies in how to offset the ruling party at whatever cost. Citizens, therefore, discussed the common problem with the aim of reaching a consensus on how they would eventually liberate themselves from oppression under the NRM regime as Bobi Wine popularly refers to it, thus constituting “deliberative politics.” Stromer-Galley (2007) argues that deliberation is a process where not only politicians but also ordinary citizens engage in reasoned opinions expressed on either a social or a political issue with the aim of identifying and evaluating solutions to the common problem. In order to achieve consensus, participants in any deliberative environment need to listen to all other opinions before forming any general conclusions. For the case of social media, reading thoroughly each other’s threads and posts, learning from and engaging with alternative viewpoints, constitutes pillars that contribute to deliberative democracy (Hickerson & Gastil, 2008). In this regard, not only do participants need to actively engage with and listen to each other, deliberative democracy also rests on the intuitive ideal of justification of arguments and reasoning among equal citizens (Cohen, 1989). Thus, while citizens actively engage on social media platforms and debate on any issue, they need to be committed to justifying their reasons and arguments so as to achieve consensus and arrive at a resolution for mutual problems. Since society is polarized, adequate justification, according to Gutmann and Thompson (2004), provides a mechanism for dealing with disagreements especially when it comes to a difference in political opinions. Deliberative democracy, according to Cohen (1989), is based on pluralism; participants have diverse preferences, convictions, and ideals concerning the conduct of their own lives, and hence consensus or change of conviction can only happen in an environment that allows one to weigh the justifications of others. Aside from the aforementioned elements, social media and citizenry deliberations tend to also capture the core of deliberative democracy as highlighted by Cohen (1989) which include an independent, ongoing, and indefinite association and engagement of members. This is unlike

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parliamentary structures where deliberations may be indefinitely postponed. Social media provides for an indefinite/long-term continuance of deliberation over a particular issue. Hence, the commitment of members to free deliberation provides the basis for future inferences (Carpini, Cook, & Jacobs, 2004). In Uganda, like in other African countries, legislative or governmental issues are a game for powerful elites with very limited citizen involvement except at the voting stage. Therefore, deliberative democracy, especially through social media platforms, affords citizens the opportunity to not only enhance democracy but criticize institutions that don’t live up to the normative standards of governance or democracy (Chambers, 2003; Sporndli, 2003). Thus, Dahlgren (2006) argues that it’s more than likely that the internet will enhance democracy by alleviating its ills. Therefore, public online deliberations make it possible for citizens to participate in a country’s political environment by providing their opinions with regard to policy decisions. Additionally, for Uganda social media has proven to be an effective tool for opposition mobilization and for those antagonistic to the ruling party. To this end, in an attempt to curb the upsurge of social media, the government’s response has been the imposition of social media tax and the prosecution of users on various grounds, some of which are politically motivated. One such example is the prosecution of a government critic, Dr. Stella Nyanzi, accused and remanded to prison for social media misuse and cyber harassment of the president in contravention to international law and Uganda’s constitution (Rukundo, 2018). Nevertheless, the avenue that social media has opened up for citizens’ deliberation cannot be ignored. The question, however, lies in the extent to which these social media debates contribute to deliberative democracy in the country. Not only does social media offer an avenue for conversation and argumentation over politics in the country, it also contributes to a change of attitudes and persuasion on the basis of a strong and better argument (Steiner, Bachtiger, Sporndli, & Steenbergen, 2004). Social media provides favorable conditions for participation, association, and expression but it is not void of a negative influence as a result of divergent views arising from partisan inclination and group composition. These affect the quality of deliberation and deliberative democracy (Steiner et al., 2004; Tschentsher, Bachtiger, Steiner, & Steenbergen, 2009). These shortcomings, according to Steiner et  al. (2004), can be mitigated by following the tenets of the ideal type of deliberative politics. Such tenets include the characteristics of free participation at an equal level,

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whereby each participant is free to speak, act, question, introduce an ­assertion, express their approaches, desires, and needs without any internal or external coercion; truthfulness, in which deliberative politics requires that participants remain true to their assertions and only change them due to a better argument; adequate justification of their claims by participants based on cognitive reasons that have a universal appeal. This universal appeal requires a reference to the common good and thus participants should discuss the well-being of the community with empathy as well as respect where participants are willing to listen to each other and treat each other with genuine respect. More so, it also requires that participants are able to yield a better argument. These characteristics serve as the core for deliberative democratic discussions and thus this chapter aims to examine the extent to which social media online platforms discussion in Uganda meet these requirements.

Theoretical Literature Review The discourse on deliberative politics in a democratic dispensation still proceeds with the benefits and demerit marks of this political methodology, particularly in developing territories of the global south. This is where majority rule of democracy structures is to a great extent dysfunctional or useless including in Uganda. In some of these regions, the vote-based system of democracy has not taken profound root. In Africa, the majority rule system of democracy has been undermined by various factors including divisions caused by socio-cultural and more so political elements. Components that undermine deliberative undertakings far and wide incorporate winning force differentials and social imbalances at different levels of the general public (Dryzek, 2000). Democratic governments in the global south are besieged by ethnic, religious, and intensified polarization that undermines the sanctity of democracy (Cornwall & Gaventa, 2001). Such difficulties have made it hard to build up a manageable and logical structure for assembling, planning, and executing a compelling deliberative vote-based system of democracy. Because of increasing division, social imbalances, and the inadequacy of majority rule forms of democracy in developing countries in present-day Africa, social orders are basic. Understanding the elements would create a reflection that is handy and gainful in addressing the deficiencies in these social orders. This need turns out to be significantly more essential for social orders that veer along religious, ethnic, and social affiliations.

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Various social orders within a given society, in contrast to their ­homogenous partners, manage extraordinary difficulties in merging law-based practices. The primary assessment for isolated social orders in the societies is the manner by which to initiate a compelling and practical deliberative culture amidst a multitude of undermining components. The general assumption of contemporary writing on deliberative politics and practice contends for a universalist standardizing structure (Chambers, 2003; Dryzek, 2000, 2005). Nonetheless, the universalist methodology does not mull over different socio-cultural and political subtleties that may influence the deliberative procedure, particularly in non-­ Western settings like Africa. The supposition has been that a Western neoliberal political culture is a precondition for effective deliberative practice across the globe (Ziwoya, 2012). Noticeable in the deliberative hypothesis or theories is the absence of understanding among researchers in the improvement of a practical deliberative system, particularly for different social orders in the global system. Nevertheless, a few researchers see consultation as a basic leadership process while others comprehend it as information creation. Most researchers look thoughtful at the basic leadership in the decision-making process and strategy with the desire for a choice as the last item (Bohman & Rehg, 1997; Dryzek, 2000; Gutmann & Thompson, 1996). This method disregards other basic components of assessment, for example, epistemology and understanding the current issue, spaces, and positions from which members connect one another (Cornwall & Shankland, 2013; Gaventa, 2002). In regard to question of thought particularly in non-western settings and in relation to the system of administration of democracy in various social orders, this chapter highlights the importance of information generation to the decision making procedures in basic leadership. It is essential to distinguish and give the theoretical meaning of “deliberative majority rule government of democracy” that will be utilized in this chapter. This definition is imperative as it serves to feature a portion of the vital positive and standardizing Western components of reflection that could be adjusted to local situations, including Uganda and other African states. For some time, researchers kept on differing on a typical reasonable meaning of deliberative vote-based system of participatory democracy. Macedo (1999) noticed that the expression “deliberative majority rules system of participatory democracy” does not mean a statement of faith with a basic arrangement of center cases.

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The individuals who look to propel the reason for equitable thought don’t collectively concede to what the majority rule of democracy is or how it ought to be encouraged. In the event that this absence of a brought together definition and a way to deal with the deliberative vote-based system in a participatory democracy is such an issue in the Western systems of democracy, it creates confusion in rising vote-based systems of the global south. Starting with democracy, for example, in Africa and particularly in Uganda, legislative issues are still a game dominated by powerful individuals and largely implemented by weak and frail foundations (Ziwoya, 2012). The academic contrasts in conceptualizing a deliberative majority rule system of government present huge difficulties for insightful investigation of thoughts, in both Western and non-Western settings. One of the difficulties presented is the means by which to configure and think about what will center around particular components of deliberative procedures—for example, what can be designated “shared learning,” instead of a basic leadership with a decision-making center, which is customarily expected of thoughtful deliberation. The meaning of deliberative democracy as perceived in this chapter is the efforts made by citizens to respectfully accord reasonable and justifiable meaning to their thoughts, arguments, and positions during discursive sessions. This alignment is basic in revealing more insight into the expansiveness of deliberative hypothesis, and, in turn, making a practical interpretation of deliberative hypothesis. Strict procedural definitions, for example, those supported by Habermas (1996), lie toward one side of the limitation continuum or field. Procedural conceptualizations of contemplative deliberation expect that for “perfect” consultation to follow, there must exist a definitive characterized or planned arrangement of conditions that starts from the selection of members to the motivation for consideration (Bachtiger, Niemeyer, Neblo, Steenbergen, & Steiner, 2009). Basic leadership with decision-making procedures, as a normal result, is a noteworthy part of an intensely prohibitive theoretical classic meaning of consideration. On the opposite end of the continuum, there are less excessive rational definitions. This reasonable methodology, supported by Habermas and Cohen (Bachtiger et al., 2009), provides some room with respect to how systems can be adhered to with the end goal to expand benefits— investigation and learning results—from the procedure. Researchers have ­characterized consultation regarding its takeoff from different con-

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ceptualizations of the majority rule system of government (Bohman, 1998; Carpini et  al., 2004; Gutmann & Thompson, 1996, 2004). Fearon (1998) saw that, in the mid-1980s, details of the deliberative perfect ideal were against the collective voice and the key conduct advanced by casting a ballot and dealing. He additionally noticed that the perfect quality of deliberation over focused cooperation was set up by propelling contentions concerning the unmistakable reliability of the procedure. Rather than a straightforward settlement or bartering balance, consultation goes for looking for comprehension among all members in the basic leadership process that has all the earmarks of being more profitable. Gutmann and Thompson (1996, 2004) propose four qualities of a deliberative vote-based system of democracy. These qualities include space for a reason-giving prerequisite, the openness of the reasons to all members, the improvement of a compulsory result, and the nearness of a dynamic procedure. All the while, deliberators are relied upon to substantiate contentions that are worthy of free and equivalent residents in the quest for reasonable terms of participation. The last characteristic in the conceptualization is that consideration ought to be a continuous procedure, perceiving that a substantial support to build up a coupling result at one point can be invalid at some other point. Clearly, in this methodology, it is a component that accommodates the flawed idea of consultation particularly when different factors are having an effect on everything. Jean-Benoit (2014) submits that deliberation must help contemplated contention in support of or restriction to issues. Dialog ought to produce accord or give space to differences to be commonly settled through dynamic reflection on close to home or institutional qualities, suspicions, and bases for contentions. The last stipulation was that deliberation in the open undertakings should influence public approach in quantifiable terms, for example, particular results through refined and more prominent in viability, and more extensive city commitment. The interaction between this deliberative idea and the ordinary substances of political disparity and foul play are dependent on gender and sexual orientation, ethnic connection, economic well-being, social status, and religion in social orders of the societies. For example, Uganda has created exclusion fears that some scholars think will essentially move the awkward nature of result-arranged majority rule originations into another

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space of elitism (Ziwoya, 2012). This emphasizes the inspiration for the basic examination of Uganda’s deliberative system of participatory ­democratic settings through the use of social media platforms. However, different players, both legislative and non-administrative or governmental organizations, are occupied with different sorts of subject participation incorporating consultation in Uganda. Since there are distinctive arrangements and ways to deal with contemplative democracy and deliberations, an extensive assessment of epistemic capacities, the sort of importance citizens make of the deliberative and popularity-based system of democratic procedures in Uganda, is required. At present, a couple of far-reaching investigations of deliberative strategies in Uganda, and undoubtedly the global world, exist. According to Gastil and Black (2008) a methodical examination of the structure, process, talks and result of participatory events is necessary to comprehend the qualities, shortcomings and shifted effects of the procedures. Thus, in this chapter the focal point of argument is on the immediate proportions of thoughts and deliberative politics and their result on consultation in settings, for example, Uganda. While most governments in the developing scene particularly Africa are keeping their doors open for public participation in governance, these “welcomed spaces” are becoming instilled with many elements, such as power and social-cultural influence or political contrasts. Consequently, they have instead curtailed and monitored public participation, hence creating an opening for internet-based deliberations. As noted by Atton (2002), the internet rather than being just a mere method of communication has become a weapon for activists and disenfranchised individuals. Through the internet, disenfranchised people can escape some of the constraints of repressive governments and structures since the internet provides a free space for dissemination of ideas and information. The internet and various information communication technologies provide a fertile ground for community mobilization, knowledge construction, and political action. Hence, social media as a present-day alternative media offers space for democratic communication to people normally excluded from media production. Through its characteristics of participation and reflexivity, social media provides a space that encourages exchange of ideas, rejection, and grounding of notions with the aim of gaining consensus on a particular cause.

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Method and Materials A qualitative content analysis method was adopted in this study which allows researchers to make sense of written materials or documents that may be available either in public or in private purview (Mogalakwe, 2006). The latter definition recommends that researchers determine the applicability of the documents that they consult on the basis of their significance to the study. Furthermore, Dey (2005, p.  105) argues that “in textual analysis, the criteria for selecting documents, or for focusing on particular extracts, should reflect the issues on which the researcher is seeking evidence.” This method made it possible for the researchers to explore the influence of social media platforms in the enhancement of political participation through citizens’ deliberative democracy in Uganda in this study. This chapter, however, focuses on Bobi Wine’s speech to the Arua people and the ensuing comments on Facebook. His message attracted over 1543 comments (Bobi Wine, 2018). This chapter, therefore, utilizes Steenbergen, Steiner, Bachtiger, and Sporndli’s (2003) Discourse Quality Index (DQI) elements to assess how well these social media deliberations of this speech were in accordance to Habermas’ discourse on ethics. The DQI index codes speech in legislative structures under seven dimensions of participation, level of justification, the content of justification, respect for groups, respect for demand, respect for counterarguments, and constructive politics. The analysis in this chapter, however, is centered on three general areas of reasoning; they include the justification offered by the speaker, in accordance with the common good requirement, do they refer to a source to support their arguments, and are they in line with the topical areas under discussion; respect, that is, whether the participants respond to each other with respect whether they disagree or agree, express empathy with groups affected in the discussion; and consensus, that is, whether participants suggest proposal that could be used to gain consensus (Mendelberg, 2013; Stromer-Galley, 2007). These elements form the basis of deliberative democracy and are used to determine the extent to which social media discussion on Bobi Wine’s Arua speech fulfilled the tenets of deliberative democracy.

Reason and Justification The main message in Bobi Wine’s Arua Facebook written communication was mainly a call to the youth to unite and take on the mantle of liberating the country. He also made a point to note that the youth would have to

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collaborate with some of the elders because they needed their wisdom, hence his support for Kassiano Wadri in the Arua election. Some of the commentators agreed that “it was a strong message that shouldn’t be restricted to the people of Arua but should also go to the people of Uganda at large. We need one another to fight for our rights.” But when it came to the nitty-gritty of the speech and his call to the youth, many thought that he should have then supported the youth over Kassiano Wadri who had been in the office for a long period of time. “You always talk about change why not allow others to rule Arua.” “Remember when you (Bobi Wine) ran for election, you said the narrative has changed and now young people are claiming their space. It will be disappointing to see you as the representative of the new generation following after the old folks.” One, however, noted that “If we are only advocating for change that counts out the elderly then, we are … just selfish and our children will count us out too,” thus arguing that the youth in Uganda needed the elders’ wisdom and everyone who was willing to be part of the struggle. In addition, others noted that he seemed to encourage the infighting within the opposition by supporting one candidate over the others. “So long as the common people are powerless, our votes won’t count and Museveni will rule for life. Now see opposition is fighting against opposition” (Bobi Wine, 2018). These statements of reason in response to Bobi Wine’s speech reflect a suppression of self-interest for the sake of the common good characteristic of deliberative environments (Mansbridge et al., 2010; Roger & Schaal, 2013). Goold et al. (2012) argue that the deliberations of public problems are done more with a concern for the political community (common good element) rather than self-interest orientation. Thus, the more the citizens thought and spoke with reference to the general Ugandan community and group interests of the less advantaged groups such as the youth and the elderly, the more it was in keeping with deliberative democracy and thus expressed the deliberative nature of this online debate.

Respect In reference to respect, whereas there were a few disagreements and differing views, most of the threads under Bobi Wine’s Facebook post revealed a considerable level of respect among the commentators. As noted earlier, some responses disagreed with Bobi Wine’s choice of Kassiano Wadri claiming, “This Wadri is not of our generation wallahi. The man is too old and has been in parliament for long.” This thread was

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replied to by another who noted: “He might be old but very active, remember him in the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) of the 8th parliament?” Even though some respectfully expressed their disagreement with his message and actions—“now between Musema and Kassiano who represents the youth? … I think it’s high time you practice what you preach if you say it’s time for the youth then show your support for the youth”—some supporters of Bobi Wine and the People Power Movement were not so kind with the nay-sayers. In one thread, someone was told to “breath in and out before asking because it’s like they were arguing with anger … their question needed some editing.” Others were being labeled Museveni’s supporters and thus their opinion was not welcome on Bobi Wine’s page, “those who just comment without understanding your ideology are Museveni’s materials we shall dispose them soon.” When one commentator referred to Bobi Wine as an opportunist, he was rudely asked why he didn’t “leave his account and saved himself from a headache and sleepless nights?” and another argued “Don’t be carried away by this Euphoria my friend … So long as the people of Uganda are still powerless, their votes at Presidency level will not count” (Bobi Wine, 2018). Deliberative democracy assumes that participants will not only listen to each other but also treat each other with respect (Steiner et al., 2004). This requires that participants should also be accommodative, respectful, and mindful of the views of others (Cunningham, 2002). Since deliberative democracy brings people with a different outlook on sensitive issues together, mutual respect for each other and equality among participants increase the likelihood that disagreement is moved toward consensus.

Constructive Politics (Consensus) Even when some Facebook threads showed that not everyone bought into Bobi Wine rhetoric, other threads were in support of Bobi Wine’s message and a call for the youth to action “They only see negatives about him but we see positives. ‘If a ganja smoker can realize my pain, bad roads, lack of drugs in the hospitals, insecurities, the absence of jobs etc. then I am ready to be led by that ganja smoker than a normal person who can’t fight for the good of the nation but for themselves.’ It’s time for the youth to take over … let’s show them the power of the people.” They further noted that “one doesn’t need to be a bush general [referring to President Museveni]

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to lead people of Uganda to the promised land of good governance, democracy and freedom.” The threads too noted that “the youth must wake up and realize it’s high time they started ruling and deciding for themselves” and thus encouraged Ugandans to “be firm … and stand on the right side for the good of the nation and the coming generation” (Bobi Wine, 2018). These and other Facebook threads demonstrated the ability of citizens to engage with alternative viewpoints of all with the aim of achieving consensus (Hickerson & Gastil, 2008). The platform created by social media provides an open political agenda where citizens are free to present and exchange their opinions in a bid to seek consensus and hence in the process promote deliberative democracy (Wheatley, 2003). As noted, consensus as one of the main objectives of deliberative democracy is achieved amidst an array of self-interests, moral disagreements, broad talking perspectives that allow for the recognition of differences among people and focus on educating one another about one’s true interests. Through reason-­giving, citizens are able to unanimously agree on a way forward (Cunningham, 2002; Thompson, 2008).

Conclusion This study therefore examined the extent to which social media political debates on platforms (i.e. Facebook among others) promote deliberative democracy in Uganda. The chapter is set amidst a wave of social media censorship and free speech infringements in Uganda and the rise of the new opposition leader Bobi Wine and musician who has exploited the power of social media and music as a political tool for communication and mobilization. This chapter further presents the façade of democracy in Uganda depicted by frequent persecution, suppression, and arrest of political opponents. Nevertheless, the newfound power of the internet and social media has provided citizens with an outlet and space to express their concerns and debate alternatives to oppression amidst repressive measures by the government like the social media tax. Concerning deliberative democracy, even when it’s unlikely that citizenry debates on social media because of lack of moderation will adhere to some of the tenets of deliberative democracy theory such as respect and reasoned argumentation, the threads under Bobi Wine’s Arua speech (with the exception of a few) revealed the contrary. Ugandan citizens were able to express their interests respectfully on social media and provided

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adequate justification for their argumentation in a bid to seek consensus, thus proving the importance of social media as an avenue for political deliberation and a tool to enhance public political deliberation and deliberative democracy. It also revealed the power of social media as an effective mobilization and engagement tool during elections and the threat it poses to physical or traditional mobilization campaigns in any democratic political setting.

References Allison, S. (2018). Bobi Wine, Uganda’s “Ghetto President”, Upstages the Real Head of State. Retrieved April 14, 2019, from Mail & Guardian website: https://mg.co.za/article/2018-08-22-00-bobi-wine-ugandas-ghettopresident-upstages-the-real-head-of-state Atton, C. (2002). Alternative Media. London: SAGE Publications. Bachtiger, A., Niemeyer, S., Neblo, M. A., Steenbergen, M., & Steiner, J. (2009). Disentangling Diversity in Deliberative Democracy: Competing Theories, Their Blind Spots and Complementarities. Journal of Political Philosophy, 18(1), 32–63. Bobi Wine. (2018). My Message to the People of Arua. Retrieved from https:// web.facebook.com/www.bobiwine.ug/posts/my-message-to-the-peopleof-ar uabrothers-and-sisters-i-come-here-today-after-thi/ 10157674347653012/?_rdc=1&_rdr Bohman, J. (1998). The Coming of Age of Deliberative Democracy. The Journal of Political Philosophy, 6, 400–425. Bohman, J., & Rehg, W. (1997). Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Carpini, M.  X. D., Cook, F.  L., & Jacobs, L.  R. (2004). Public Deliberation, Discursive Participation and Citizen Engagement: A Review of the Empirical Literature. Annual Review of Political Science, 7, 315–344. https://doi. org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.7.121003.091630 Chambers, S. (2003). Deliberative Democratic Theory. Annual Review of Political Science, 6, 307–326. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.6.121901. 085538 Cohen, J. (1989). Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy. In The Good Polity (pp. 17–34). Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd. Cornwall, A., & Gaventa, J. (2001). From Users and Choosers to Makers and Shapers: Repositioning Participation in Social Policy (IDS Working Paper). Brighton: Institute of Development Studies. Cornwall, A., & Shankland, A. (2013). Cultures of Politics, Spaces of Power: Contextualizing Brazilian Experiences of Participation. Journal of Political Power, 6, 309–333.

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Cunningham, F. (2002). Theories of Democracy. London: Routledge. Dahlgren, P. (2006). The Internet, Public Spheres and Political Communication: Dispersion and Deliberation. Political Communication, 22(2), 147–162. https://doi.org/10.1080/10584600590933160 Dey, I. (2005). Qualitative Data Analysis. London: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group. Dryzek, J. (2000). Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Dryzek, J. (2005). Deliberative Democracy in Divided Societies: Alternatives to Agonism and Analgesia. Political Theory, 33(2), 218–242. Fearon, J.  D. (1998). Domestic Politics, Foreign Policy and Theories of International Relations. Annual Reviews Political Science, 33(2), 218–242. Gastil, J., & Black, L. W. (2008). Public Deliberation as the Organizing Principle for Political Communication Research. Journal of Public Deliberation, 4. Retrieved from http://services.bepress.com/jpd/vol4/iss1/art3 Gaventa, J. (2002). Introduction: Exploring Citizenship, Participation and Accountability. IDS Bulletin, 33(2), 1–11. Goold, S. D., Neblo, M. A., Kim, S. Y. H., Vries, R. D., Rowe, G., & Muhlberger, P. (2012). What Is Good Public Deliberation. Hasting Center, 42(2), 24–26. https://doi.org/10.1002/hast.29 Gutmann, A., & Thompson, D.  F. (1996). Democracy and Disagreement. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Gutmann, A., & Thompson, D. F. (2004). What Deliberative Democracy Means. In Why Deliberative Democracy? (pp.  1–29). Princeton: Princeton University Press. Habermas, J. (1996). Between Facts and Norms Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy. London: MIT Press. Hickerson, A., & Gastil, J. (2008). Assessing the Difference Critique of Deliberation: Gender, Emotion and the Jury Experience. Communication Theory, 18, 281–303. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2885.2008.00323.x Jean-Benoit, A. (2014). Participatory Democracy and Citizen Participation: Reflection on a Promising Concept and Its Practical Application. Revue Francaise D’Administration Publique (RFAP). Caim.info.International Edition. Kamp, M. (2016). Assessing the Impact of Social Media on Political Communication and Civic Engagement in Uganda (pp. 1–98). Retrieved from Konrad Adenauer Stiftung website: www.kas.de/Uganda/en Macedo, S. (Ed.). (1999). Deliberative Politics: Essays on Democracy and Disagreement. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Mail & Guardian. (2018). Bobi Wine, Uganda’s “Ghetto President”, Upstages the Real Head of State. Retrieved November 2, 2018, from https://mg.co.za/ article/2018-08-22-00-bobi-wine-ugandas-ghetto-president-upstages-thereal-head-of-state

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Mansbridge, J., Bohman, J., Chambers, S., Estlund, D., Follesdal, A., Fung, A., et al. (2010). The Place of Self-Interest and the Role of Power in Deliberative Democracy. The Journal of Political Philosophy, 18(1), 64–100. https://doi. org/10.1111/j.1467-9760.2009.00344.x Mendelberg, T. (2013). Political Deliberation. In Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology (2nd ed.). Oxford University Press. Miniwatts Marketing Group. (2018). Internet User Statistics for Africa (Africa Internet Usage, 2018 Population Stats and Facebook Subscribers). Retrieved November 27, 2018, from Internet World Stats website: https://www.internetworldstats.com/stats1.htm Mogalakwe, M. (2006). Research Report: The Use of Documentary Research Methods in Social Research. African Sociological Review, 10(1), 221–230. NITA Uganda. (2018). National Information Technology Survey 2017/18 Report (pp. 1–274). Kampala, Uganda: NITA Uganda. Olewe, D. (2018). Bobi Wine: The Pop Star Seeking “People Power.” Retrieved April 14, 2019, from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-45195664 ProfileAbility. (2018). Bobi Wine. Retrieved April 14, 2019, from https://profileability.com/bobi-wine/ Roger, L., & Schaal, G. S. (2013). The Quality of Deliberation in Two Committees of the European Parliament: The Neglected Influence of the Situational Context and the Policymaking Stage. Politics and Governance, 1(2), 151–169. https://doi.org/10.12924/pag2013.01020151 Rukundo, S. (2018). “My President Is a Pair of Buttocks”: The Limits of Online Freedom of Expression in Uganda. International Journal of Law and Information Technology, 26, 252–271. https://doi.org/10.1093/ijlit/eay009 Sporndli, M. (2003). Discourse Quality and Political Decision: An Empirical Analysis of Debates in the German Conference Committee (No. SP IV 2003-101; pp. 1–36). Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10419/49593 Steenbergen, M., Steiner, J., Bachtiger, A., & Sporndli, M. (2003). Measuring Political Deliberation: A Discourse Quality Index. Comparative European Politics, 1, 21–48. https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.cep.6110002 Steiner, J., Bachtiger, A., Sporndli, M., & Steenbergen, M. (2004). Deliberative Politics in Action: Analyzing Parliamentary Discourse. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Stromer-Galley, J. (2007). Measuring Deliberation’s Content: A Coding Scheme. Journal of Public Deliberation, 3(1), 1–37. Retrieved from http://www.publicdeliberation.net/jpd/vol3/iss1/art12 Thompson, D. F. (2008). Deliberative Democratic Theory and Empirical Political Science. Annual Review of Political Science, 11, 497–520. https://doi. org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.11.081306.070555

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Tschentsher, A., Bachtiger, A., Steiner, J., & Steenbergen, M. (2009). Deliberation in Parliament: Research Objectives and Preliminary Results of the Bern Center for Interdisciplinary Deliberation Studies (BIDS). Legisprudence “Legislation and Argumentation.” Wheatley, S. (2003). Deliberative Democracy and Minorities. European Journal of International Law, 14(3), 507–527. Ziwoya, F. (2012). Deliberation as an Epistemic Endeavor: Ubuntu and Social Change in Malawi’s Political Ecology (Unpublished dissertation). Retrieved from https://etd.ohiolink.edu/

CHAPTER 11

Intra-Party Election Campaigns in Ghana: An Analysis of Facebook Use Akwasi Bosompem Boateng, Donal Patrick McCracken, and Musara Lubombo

Introduction The provision and availability of information, communication and engagements between political parties and electorates is an essential part of the democratic process. This enhances relationships by enabling citizens to give feedback, responses and inputs for shaping the political agenda. However, the context of political communication has significantly changed since the turn of the millennium. The advancement of information and communication technologies has ushered in a digital era that has impacted competitive democracies globally in many ways. With increasing internet use by citizens, participatory communication platforms, such as Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, MySpace, Wikipedia, Flickr and YouTube, among other social media platforms, are now popular on the web. The breakthrough in social media has revolutionised election campaigns for political

A. B. Boateng (*) • D. P. McCracken • M. Lubombo Centre for Communication, Media & Society, Howard College Campus, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 M. N. Ndlela, W. Mano (eds.), Social Media and Elections in Africa, Volume 1, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30553-6_11

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parties across the world as they are trying to keep up with this changing environment by deploying social media to their benefit. This chapter examines how the two major political parties in Ghana— the New Patriotic Party (NPP) and the National Democratic Congress (NDC)—appropriated social media particularly during their 2018 intra-­ party elections for national executives. It explores the question of whether the deployment of social media platforms in these internal electoral processes is improving political communication and engagements with citizens. In this regard, it attempts to establish if social media can be a cause for any concern or as a new technological gift that can be appropriated as a useful tool for advancing a political agenda, interactions, relationships and winning elections. The chapter begins by providing an overview of political communication in the digitalised and social media era. This leads to a discussion on the challenges that political parties encounter with particular regard to misinformation, conspiracy and fake news on social media. This is followed by a conclusion and suggestions for optimising the potential of social media in democracy, electoral processes, political communication and engagements in Ghana. Against this backdrop, this chapter proposes technology appropriation for relationship management and advancement of political agenda.

The Changing Context of Political Communication While there are disagreements with respect to the definition of political communication, its goal is to “articulate problems, proposing and debating solutions, explaining the subsequent policy and implementation to citizenry and officials” (Hahn, 1998, p.  2). Central to this view is the understanding of political communication as seeking to promote mutual informational interactions between political actors who are connected by their relations to power, rivalry and cooperation (Sobkowiak, 1996). This conjures different forms that political communication can take, namely interpersonal, participative and receptive (Emmer, Füting, & Vowe, 2006). While the interpersonal form of political communication entails talks and opinions on political issues in co-presence or via one-to-one or perhaps one-to-many media platforms including telephone, chats and emails, among others (Emmer et  al., 2006), participative political communication encompasses public political engagements consisting of voting, demonstrations and signing petitions, among others (Emmer et al.,

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2006). As its name suggests, receptive political communication conjures any means by which people use the media for information about politics (Emmer et al., 2006). The concept of political communication thus entails any form of communication activities undertaken by political actors to achieve political objectives. Traditionally, communication about activities of political actors has been through the news media, editorials and political discussions (Kamau, 2014). Main functions include electioneering where political organisations help voters to make their choices, mobilise citizens to participate in elections, recruit and train political candidates and promote political interests, as well as form governments and opposition groups in a democracy (Strömbäck & Kiousis, 2011). Several scholars have conducted some studies regarding political communication in Ghana as compared to other countries (Asah-Asante, 2015; Debrah, 2005; Gyampo, 2017; Yankah, 2004). They note that political communication in Ghana has been in the form of interviews in the media where political actors market and advertise their programmes and policies (Debrah, 2005). Political parties also use manifestoes in elections to explain their political intentions to galvanise support from the electorate in Ghana (Debrah, 2005). Newspaper review programmes as well as serial calling into political programmes and talk shows in traditional news media have become common means of political communication (Yankah, 2004); advertisements (Oye, 2009) and press conferences and public rallies (Asah-Asante, 2015), among others, have also transformed political communication in Ghana’s democracy. Other mechanisms such as ideology (Heywood, 2007), slogans, songs, gestures and the creation of communication teams of political parties and propaganda to spread messages and influence behaviours to poll votes in elections are popular practices in Ghanaian politics (Asah-­ Asante, 2015). With the emergence of new forms of technology and communication tools, the use of social media has now become an important electoral campaigning tool given its features. Social media differ from traditional or industrial media in quality, reach, frequency, usability, immediacy and permanence (Gyampo, 2017). Crucially, social media operates in a multidimensional communication system involving many source dimensions and many receivers unlike traditional media that operates under a linear transmission model with one source to many receivers. However, there are still questions on how these new technologies are transforming political communication, democracy and electoral processes in Africa, and whether

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social media contributes to democracy in the Global South. There is increased acceptance that such platforms have redefined the way governments engage the citizenry, with some scholars asserting that social media platforms influence the perceptions, views and actions of individuals whose opinions have traditionally been influenced by information from traditional forms of media (Kamp, 2016). Social media continues to spread because its utility is supported by new trends and developments in technology and because of the improvement in knowledge and skills of social media users. This is especially true as new and many forms of online contents, platforms and websites continue to emerge. Political parties are thus trying to keep up with this changing environment by attempting to implement social media to their benefit. However, since social media influences many people globally, its spread is a challenge to undemocratic environments. In reaction to the social media effects on democracy, political leaders, especially in Africa, attempt to control their usage, particularly in elections. In the specific case of Africa, other issues regarding lack of access to the internet especially in rural areas impede the spread of social media to a wider public sphere (Kamp, 2016). With the advent of social media, the trend of political communication is transforming into political public relations (Strömbäck & Kiousis, 2011). This means that communication in politics is changing from the “press-agentry; public information; and two-way asymmetrical” forms of engagements into mutual benefits through the “two-way symmetrical” approach (Grunig, 2001; Grunig & Grunig, 1992; Grunig & Hunt, 1984). In “press-agentry” political parties largely focus on seeking opportunities for publicity in the media to churn out messages in making them popular (Grunig & Hunt, 1984, p. 5). Political parties use “public information” to send out truthful and objective information about their activities to put them in good light in public (Grunig & Hunt, 1984, p. 5). Inasmuch as the “two-way asymmetrical” communication gives consideration to the interests of the public, input of stakeholders are not elicited through conversations and feedback (Grunig & Hunt, 1984, p. 5). In this case, political parties rely on research activities and public opinions to address the interests of stakeholders. The development of interactive communication tools particularly social media platforms and their spread into engagements and relationships are transforming political communication from passive one-way and two-way asymmetric approaches into win-win situations in the “two-way symmetric” approach (Grunig, 2001; Grunig & Grunig, 1992; Grunig &

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Hunt 1984), with much emphasis on exchange and input via feedback. This implies that political parties have to give stakeholders and the public more space through innovative interpersonal communication platforms, such as social media. There is no doubt that with increased internet penetration and social media communication platforms throughout the world, the electorates in democratic systems could access a number of messages and news sources directly and provide feedback in the form of conversations and interactions (Volders, 2013). This implies that social media platforms offer political stakeholders the independence and freedom to select news and messages they receive and send as well as contribute to contents. However, their appropriations differ amongst users based on their personal needs and possibilities which are presented by the various social media platforms. For example, while users of Twitter could use the channel’s features to keep track of issues under discussion, news and updates, Facebook provides its users the opportunity to stay in touch with other individuals and establish relationships (Volders, 2013). In assessing the role of social media in politics, Beciu (2011) and Mayfield (2008) suggest a number of political functions and features of these new tools. These include communication and openness; campaigning and fundraising; participation and connectedness; mobilisation; engagement and conversation; and community and commonality (Beciu, 2011; Mayfield, 2008). Fake News: The Bane of Social Media Social media are popular, fast and convenient platforms, breaking the news and spreading information among politically active and citizens. Therefore, as an outcome of the uncontrolled and unrestricted freedom as regards social media communication, users of these platforms have applied them in political communication and activities in many ways that have far-­ reaching repercussions. Social media has three types of repercussion consisting of “offensive online behaviours; negative media attention; and limited resources” that are involved in the political appropriation of social media (Kalsnes, 2016, p. 5). Highly offensive online behaviours on social media platforms of political parties and politicians put them at risk, giving these political actors additional responsibilities as news editors in their attempt at moderating comments from users of these channels (Kalsnes, 2016). Therefore, political parties could block some individuals from

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accessing their social media accounts, or perhaps delete comments from users that are not favourable for parties and citizens (Kalsnes, 2016). One critical issue that has become the bane of social media is fake news. Describing it as information divorced from reality, Waisbord (2018) indicates that fake news is not new. However, there is a surge in issues as regards the question of truth and reality that are presented by the emergence of fake news in the 2016 elections in the United States (Waisbord, 2018). It denotes new forms of propaganda; thus news and information are deliberately created and spread to trick or perhaps influence public opinions (Gross, 2017; Sismondo, 2017). Fake news is fabricated information which mimics news as well as affects the existing public beliefs and perceptions to influence electoral behaviours especially on social media in electoral contests in many countries (Waisbord, 2018). It has been witnessed in different contexts in the United States through blogs and other forms of social media to mainstream and traditional media. However, the use of fake news by Trump in 2018 attracted huge press attention to his political advantage. As a result, other political parties and politicians are using fake news as a trump card to drum up public support in different contexts. The currency of fake news has spread to other parts of the world where political parties and politicians have taken advantage of the trend in contemporary news to dismiss press and media critics (Erlanger, 2017). These happenings are not different from what is happening in the Global South especially Africa.

Facebook Usage in Ghanaian Politics There is increasing scholarship interest in how social media are used in politics in Ghana (see Atengble, 2014; Dankwah, 2016; Dzisah, 2018; Gyampo, 2017; Tettey, 2017). In his study on political parties and social media in Ghana, Gyampo (2017) discusses a number of ways by which political parties in Ghana deploy social media to advance their political interests in their attempt at capturing power. Ghanaians are using social media for political purposes because they have developed an interest in engaging and seeking feedback from political parties, governments and politicians. From the findings of his study, Gyampo (2017) notes that political parties, especially the New Patriotic Party and the National Democratic Congress, use social media in several ways. These include their use for communicating organisational policies and positions on key issues, discussing and soliciting public opinion on topical issues of national importance, mobilising support and party membership, as well as fundraising (Gyampo, 2017).

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Facebook and WhatsApp are the two most dominant mechanisms of social media common in Ghana (Gyampo, 2017). During the 2016 general elections, presidential and parliamentary candidates used virtual space and social media platforms to prosecute their political campaigns and promote civic engagements and meaningful participation (Gyampo, 2017). Using social media, political candidates stated their positions regarding issues while canvassing for votes online. In the presidential race, the two main contenders, Nana Akufo-Addo and John Dramani Mahama, used social media channels especially Facebook and Twitter for their campaign activities (Penplusbytes, 2017). Apart from political leaders, civil society organisations in Ghana particularly the Coalition of Domestic Elections Observers (CODEO) used social media effectively to educate the public about political participation and other electoral issues (Hadji, 2016). A notable flagship initiative by the Coalition (CODEO) in 2016 was the establishment of an online blog for the Ghana election project, dubbed “Ghana Decides” to encourage participation in electoral processes by the citizenry (Hadji, 2016, pp.  84–85). The political activities and engagements on social media platforms in Ghana show how the opportunities from those new channels are changing the political lives and communication spaces of institutions and citizens. This emphasises how important it is for political actors to appropriate social media platforms as cost-effective avenues for political communication and engagements, given their real-­ time and interactive features for reaching out to stakeholders. Facebook enables political parties in Ghana to advance their agenda in various ways. For example, the importance of social media is highlighted by officials of the New Patriotic Party and National Democratic Congress, who note that “Facebooking” offers them the chance to engage with many young people. Given that there are many youths on social media particularly Facebook, it has become necessary for political parties and politicians to create and maintain their presence on such platforms to attract the public and electorates (Kamau, 2017). In this regard, political parties establish that Facebook as a form of social media networking gives them direct control over contents to influence the perceptions, attitudes and behaviours of their members, stakeholders and the public for political goals and especially in elections. These acknowledgements by party officials are consistent with previous research conducted by Bond et  al. (2012) and McLeod and Shah (2009) regarding the impact of social media on politics. These scholars indicate that Facebook provides free, uncontrolled and unrestricted avenues for political parties to manipulate their messages with respect to their activities, policies and programmes to

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suit the interests of the public and electorates. This is especially true during elections because Facebook has become open-avenue to inform and engage the public, as well as mobilise supporters for electoral processes and campaigns in Ghana. Against this backdrop, Facebook communication is changing how political parties in Ghana relate to the public by getting stakeholders and citizens much closer to them. This is because it provides them the chance to directly engage and gather feedback through interactions and conversations. This supports the claim by Halpern and Gibbs (2013) that Facebook enhances relationships and connects users with accessible profile information to promote active and sociable discussions, which consequently facilitate mobilisation and organisation in politics (Gonçalves, 2014). Generally, the significance of “Facebooking” in political communication in Ghana, as officials of parties acknowledge, is embedded in its capability of sustaining interactions, conversations and relationships with the public on the site. Political parties use Facebook for providing information to the public as well as for other activities especially during elections in the form of announcements, vetting, monitoring and declaring winners in polls, among others.

Findings and Discussion Political parties in Ghana particularly the New Patriotic Party and the National Democratic Congress are appropriating social media communications to connect and allow people to connect with them, as well as provide information. These political parties recognise the utility of social media particularly Facebook, as they have established profile accounts and walls that have large followings on the pages. The New Patriotic Party has over 437,800 followers of its Facebook page while the National Democratic Congress has over 81,670 followers of its wall. This is consistent with the assertion of Kearney (2017) that social media including Facebook promote the exchange and sharing of information that includes the update of profiles, message posting and responding to comments, and also chatting and liking posts. During its internal party elections in July 2018, the New Patriotic Party communicated seven times through multimedia formats such as text, audio and video. Together, the posts which had different communicative purposes (see different content categories in Table 11.1) attracted 995 likes and 88 comments and the posts were shared 43 times. This is close to half of the posts by the National Democratic Congress

4 4

2 3

– –

– –

1 –

Question and answer sessions

Interactive chats

News Press release

Policy statements

Interactive chats

Information provision

Content categories

Source: Fieldwork Research Data (2018)

NPP NDC

Political parties Multimedia

– –

4 12

– –

Response to Pictures Audio enquiries content

Table 11.1  Categories of Facebook content of the two political parties

– 2

Video content

– –

Specific voter segments

– 2

Opponents

Targeted campaigning

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which posted 18 times during its national congress and internal party elections in November 2018. These posts attracted 1797 likes and 121 comments and 190 posts were shared by the followers. Functionally, both political parties use Facebook for the purposes of public information, as opposed to the usage for the promotion of direct engagements, interactions and two-way symmetric communications. Inasmuch as users of Facebook, especially political parties and politicians, are motivated by influence goals to extend their engagements through opinion-seeking and interactive approaches in the form of political posts and follows (Kearney, 2017), the New Patriotic Party and the National Democratic Congress are not using the platform for interaction goals. It can be concluded from how the two political parties communicate and post relevant messages to enhance their images and impressions on Facebook that these parties have some desire for interactive engagements. However, their inability to exchange coherent information to conversationally and politically engage and manage stakeholder expectations via interactions prevents the political parties from achieving relational resource goals that exist in the forms of personal rewards and emotional support, as well as other sources of gratifications that emerge from interactions (Kearney, 2017). This is because they are not specifically concerned about “interaction-­ specific related forces”; hence they do not focus on the expectations of their stakeholders and individuals, or perhaps they have not been able to use social media to engage people to perceive them positively through political engagements and interactions, eventually resulting into political posts and likes on the Facebook site (Kearney, 2017). The relational resource goals entail the interest to access the potential rewards and benefits of promoting mutually beneficial relationships with other users and friends on Facebook. In respect of this, the political parties and politicians have not taken advantage of the political power and potentials of Facebook in promoting mutually beneficial engagements and relationships with other political actors and users especially followers on the site because they neither interact nor converse nor respond in the form of feedback to messages and comments which are posted by their stakeholders. The political parties rely on Facebook as a public information tool largely for spreading information and messages to stakeholders and the general public. Practically, these parties are not using Facebook for sustainable engagements and conversations, as their focus of attention has been on traditional news media using passive communication in reaching

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out to political stakeholders. This means that these political parties in Ghana are more interested in hegemonic use of communication to capture political power rather than in giving priority to direct engagements, interactivity and conversations in their communication with stakeholders. This demonstrates how these parties relegate the instrumental goals of using social media in politics, which posit the use of Facebook as a tool for involving stakeholders and users in the political expressions to issues and messages that are discussed on the platform (Kearney, 2017). By using social media for information, connecting with other people and users of the site and allowing followers on the site to connect with them, political parties recognise the utility or usefulness of Facebook, as the parties have profile accounts with many numbers of followers. However, political parties fail to interact on Facebook as a social networking site. Hence, Facebook is not used to address the grievances and challenges of their stakeholders because they do not interact, converse or give feedback or perhaps take the responses and comments to their posts, as well as the messages and issues from their stakeholders to their Facebook walls and pages as serious to address. Many factors challenge political parties in their engagements and relationship building on Facebook and other forms of social media. A number of drawbacks, such as the lack of technical infrastructure, particularly the internet, social media illiteracy, cyber-crimes and impersonation, among others, are impediments to social media communication of the political parties. However, the political parties enumerate fake news, disinformation and misinformation as the major bottlenecks to “Facebooking” activities. Political parties recount fake news and polemics as the major threats to activities on Facebook, as in many cases criminals clone their accounts on the site to post false information that is not from their sources for mischief and propaganda. These challenges are similar to issues in the studies of Wasserman and Madrid-Morales (2018), Waisbord (2018) and Kalsnes (2016) that highlight the problem of fake news, disinformation and misinformation as challenges discouraging users of social media from using these interactive platforms for communication engagements. Considering the foregoing, the end for which political parties in Ghana use Facebook include the presentation of individuals, especially party members and followers, making updates of postings and drumming up support for the achievement of party activities and leadership especially in elections. This implies that political stakeholders do not directly influence the activities, programmes and debates on Facebook as regards electoral

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processes because Facebook usage by political parties in Ghana is unilateral, which does not favour or promote conversations and interactions. The political parties are particularly appropriating social media including Facebook for one-way passive communication, rather than two-way symmetrical communication and engagements with stakeholders to enhance interactions and address issues as a way of establishing and managing relationships with stakeholders, which this chapter proposes for adoption in political communication. The two-way symmetrical model and approach to communication enable political parties to gather the views of stakeholders on critical issues affecting stakeholders that need to be addressed. The lack of interactions and conversational engagements on Facebook makes it difficult for political parties to adopt the two-way symmetrical way of communication, as Grunig and Hunt (1984) and Strömbäck and Kiousis (2011) suggest for political public relations. In this regard, the communication practices that this study observes is inconsistent with this framework because the New Patriotic Party and the National Democratic Congress are not directly engaging and relating with their stakeholders in terms of feedback on the input and comments from the public. This challenges the ability of the parties to nurture mutually beneficial relations for the promotion and achievement of their political agenda. In other words, political parties are merely creating identities by profiling their organisations, members and leaders on Facebook. This study explores ways by which political parties use social media, such as Facebook, for setting and advancing political agenda especially in intra-party elections. Inasmuch as these political parties post information and activities on Facebook to draw the attention to information and stories they see as prominent about their activities for the public and stakeholders to know and think about (McCombs & Shaw, 1972), they perform agenda-setting functions. The fact that parties are able to select from many issues and determine which of those items are to be posted on their Facebook pages demonstrates how the political parties are circumventing traditional news media to present their political and news agenda to the public and recipients. On the Facebook site there are no intermediaries and gatekeepers to either restrict or control their information, unlike traditional media. In this regard, the New Patriotic Party and the National Democratic Congress are engaging stakeholders on Facebook in agenda setting through interactive, uncontrolled and unrestricted public space. This could promote mutually beneficial relationships, agreements and support from stakeholders of political parties for the achievement of

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agenda especially in elections. The agenda-setting roles of the parties in this case go beyond the media in the sense that the traditional media outlets do resort to information and messages that parties put forward as agenda on Facebook and social media. This study concurs with the claim by Gyampo (2017) that political parties in Ghana are aware of the usefulness and importance of social media especially Facebook, WhatsApp and Twitter, among others, as avenues they could use to communicate their party positions and policies on political and socio-economic issues. However, this study contradicts the assertion that parties are communicating their party policies on key issues on Facebook (Gyampo, 2017) as shown in the content category (see policy statements, Table 11.1). The parties have not attached significant importance to social media because they do not have the outfits with the requisite and professional staff and understanding of political public relations to manage social media communication as a serious rather than an ad hoc activity. The findings of this study are consistent with that of Gyampo (2017) who reinforces that social media provides an opportunity for people who cannot contribute to radio discussions during their “phone-in sessions” in the traditional media. However, considering the categorisation as shown (see interactive chats, question and answer sessions and response to enquiries in Table 11.1), political parties are not engaging stakeholders and users on Facebook in discussions, as well as soliciting voices and opinions regarding matters affecting the country and their parties, as Gyampo (2017) highlights in his study. It is especially true that social media provides millions of people, supporters and undecided voters avenues for expressing their opinion or voice their views as regards national issues in the form of discussions and conversations. This is different in the case of political parties in Ghana. For the 17 days sampled for each of the two political parties, the New Patriotic Party posted one interactive chat. The National Democratic Congress did not post any interactive chat. This could be because many of the communication officials of the political parties have neither communication training nor public relations skills to appreciate the need for conversations through interactive chats on social media to advance relationships and electoral processes. The data by this study from respondents demonstrates that political parties are using social media in their organisation of members and for mobilisation of support. This is similar to Gyampo’s (2017) findings that

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political parties in Ghana mobilise support and members on Facebook pages as an interactive platform for registering members and potential members nationwide. Given the categories in Table  11.1 (see specific voter segments and opponents), these political parties do not particularly use Facebook for target campaigning, hence limiting their abilities in using this social media platform to woo potential supporters and voters. During the 17 days sampled during the internal election of the two parties, the New Patriotic Party did not post any message that targeted specific voter segments nor did its opponents. This is not especially different from the National Democratic Congress that posted no message targeting specific voter segments but made two posts against its political opponent. From the above, it can be seen that political parties focus on the use of social media for information provision particularly news and press releases and multimedia. The New Patriotic Party posted four news items and two press releases during the sampling period. On the other hand, the National Democratic Congress posted four news items and three press releases. Their multimedia posts are in the form of pictures and videos. The New Patriotic Party posted four pictures and no video content. The National Democratic Congress posted 12 pictures and 2 video contents. Given the data gathered in the study, these political parties focus on traditional forms of communication through television and radio because many of their supporters and stakeholders are in rural locations without access to the internet. More so, most of these supporters and stakeholders are not literate to make use of social media. Hence, political parties adopt ad hoc attitudes towards Facebook and social media communication, which is evident in the insignificant number of posts during their intra-party elections. This study particularly posits that Facebook is a unique social media site for advancing the agenda of political parties given that it allows them to exercise control over the content and direct provision of information via postings and interactions with stakeholders and the public. These promote feedback on subjects and issues that political parties deem to be important and topical for citizens and stakeholders to know, discuss and think about (McCombs & Shaw, 1972). However, the minimal use and lack of interpersonal engagements in the form of interactions, conversations and discussions on social media by these political parties prevents them from achieving their agenda through Facebook.

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Conclusion This chapter sheds new light on the debate about the effect of social media on political communication and electoral processes in Africa, particularly how political parties appropriate Facebook in intra-party elections in Ghana. The spread and usage of social media and Facebook in Ghana have increased as political parties are exploring new and interactive avenues to engage political stakeholders and remain abreast with technological trends. These social media platforms have numerous advantages as compared to the traditional forms of media, which include cost-effectiveness and efficiency, as well as direct or interpersonal engagements and interactivity. In this sense, traditional media outlets are no longer the main sources and intermediaries between political parties and stakeholders as these actors are able to communicate and exchange messages directly with no control, restriction or interruption from the traditional news media, hence circumventing their traditional role in agenda setting. This enhances the quality of communication, given that political communication stakeholders are able to quickly send and respond to issues of mutual interests and benefits through social media. These platforms including Facebook are promoting engagements and interactions for mutual understanding and beneficial relationships between political parties and their stakeholders. This critical question addresses how social media, especially Facebook, has transformed communication into two-­ way symmetric engagements and interactions that foster mutually beneficial relationships between stakeholders in politics and democracy in Africa, particularly Ghana. In addressing this issue, this chapter examines how political communication and public relations promote democracy in the era of social media. This is because political communication and electoral processes thrive on the nature of the political system which exists in a specific country (Drageset, 2014). To this end, political parties have to embrace the usage of social media especially Facebook as a popular social networking site to engage and build mutually beneficial relationships with stakeholders. With political stakeholders now interested in making inputs and obtaining feedback in the public sphere, political parties in Ghana have to consider the combination of all the models of communication and public relations (Grunig, 2001; Grunig & Grunig, 1992; Grunig & Hunt, 1984) to achieve their political agenda and objectives especially at elections. However, the

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political parties have not given critical attention to two-way symmetrical ­communication and engagements as a means of extending mutual relationships via conversations with stakeholders. They have focused on passive transmission of messages, hence making it difficult for them to explore the political capital of social media in elections. The minimal use and insignificant number of posts by the New Patriotic Party and National Democratic Congress on Facebook in their 2018 national executive elections demonstrate that political use of social media is still in its infantile stages in Ghana. The political parties do not have enlightened communication policies to improve “Facebooking” and generally social media as interactive tools for communication, engagement, relationship management and mobilising support in elections. The data and statistics in this study confirm a lack of drive by political parties to make use of social media in generating excitement and controversy, as well as debates and denouncing their opponents, as shown in Table 11.1 (content categories). Therefore, political parties require professional communication and public relations tact for improved use of social media especially for drawing more support in elections.

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Index1

A Agenda-setting theory, 16, 133 Algorithm power, 9, 14–16, 19 Algorithms, 9, 10, 13–32 Analytics-driven journalism, 29 Anglo-American scholarship, 47, 52 ANTIC, 126 Anti-foundationalist view, 41 Arab Spring, 3, 7, 98, 119, 120, 131 Assumptions of equivalence, 53 Automated communications, 14, 23 Automated programs, 21 B Biya, Paul, 120, 121, 128, 133, 136, 138–141 Botswana, 10, 177–190 C Cambridge Analytica (CA), 23, 24, 30–32, 44

Cameroon, 4, 6, 10, 45, 119–142 Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement (CPDM), 128, 139 Cameroon Telecommunications (CAMTEL), 123–126 Campaign communication, 149, 154 Campaign methods, 9 Campaigns, 2–11, 14, 16, 19–25, 27, 29–32, 40, 45, 62, 64, 66, 69, 71, 72, 76, 90, 106, 108–111, 113, 115, 121, 126, 129, 133, 134, 136, 139–141, 147–149, 151, 155–166, 168, 169, 171–173, 177–179, 182, 184, 185, 187, 189, 190, 197, 198, 210, 215, 221, 222 Case selection, 40, 49–51 Case studies, 45, 48, 50–51, 53 Chamisa, Nelson, 76–78, 82, 85, 87, 88, 91, 152, 153, 160, 161, 168 Citizen participant, 98 Comparative, 10, 39, 40, 42, 43, 46, 47, 50–54

 Note: Page numbers followed by ‘n’ refer to notes.

1

© The Author(s) 2020 M. N. Ndlela, W. Mano (eds.), Social Media and Elections in Africa, Volume 1, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30553-6

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Comparative research, 40, 46, 48, 49, 51–52 Content analysis, 121, 135, 206 Cyber-propaganda, 161, 165–173 Cyberspace, 170–171 Cyber-troops, 156, 161, 168, 171 Cyber-utopianism, 5 D Data-driven campaigns, 31 Data protection, 17 Deliberation, 6, 178, 184, 198–200, 203–207, 210 Deliberative politics, 199–202, 205 Democracy/democracies, 2, 5, 6, 8–10, 14, 24, 27, 30–32, 40, 46, 51, 52, 72, 81, 82, 97, 98, 100, 102, 103, 105, 106, 110–115, 122, 128, 135, 136, 142, 148, 149, 179–181, 185, 197–210, 215–218, 229 Democratic participation, 6, 98–101, 103 Democratic processes, 21, 26, 101, 102, 105, 107, 110, 119, 140, 167, 172, 183, 215 Democratisation/democratization, 2, 8, 61, 63, 66, 92, 101, 114, 147 Different and similar systems, 49 Digital activism, 46, 121 Digital divide, 46, 51, 52, 189 Digital media, 5, 9, 10, 28, 105, 147–149, 151, 155–165, 167, 172, 173 Digital media ecologies, 15 Digital public sphere, 5, 46, 82, 92, 179 Digital technology, 14, 29, 92, 148, 172

E Echo chambers, 26–28 EdgeRank algorithm, 16 Election cycles, 21, 44 Elections, 1–11, 13–32, 44, 45, 47, 61–72, 75–93, 97–115, 119–142, 147–173, 177–190, 195–210, 215–223 Elections Cameroon (ELECAM), 127 Electoral systems, 8, 149–151, 153 Electorates, 8, 19, 46, 63, 101, 104, 107, 109, 128, 129, 133, 135, 136, 139, 142, 148, 154, 156–159, 162–164, 172, 186, 215, 217, 219, 221, 222 Empowerment, 5–7, 189 Equivalence, 52, 53 Equivalence, methodological, 40, 52–53 Experimentation, 41, 47 F Facebook algorithm, 16–18, 23 Face-to-face campaigns, 46 Fake accounts, 20, 21 Fake news, 9, 18, 21–26, 29, 46, 112, 113, 129, 130, 161, 165–173, 179, 184, 186, 190, 216, 219–220, 225 Filter bubbles, 26 Foundationalist view, 41 G Gatekeeping, 15, 185 Ghana, 3, 10, 11, 45, 97–115, 215–230 Globalization, 45 Glocalization, 45, 53

 INDEX 

H Hacking, 130, 131 Hashtag, 3, 62, 66, 83, 85, 86, 88–90, 92, 110, 161 Hate speech, 114, 122, 130, 132, 140 Hybrid media system, 7, 147–173 I Information and communication technologies (ICTs), 2, 6, 14, 39, 46, 120, 122–127, 130, 134, 142, 151, 173n2, 215 Information, transmission of, 40 Innovation, methodological, 41 Internet, 2–6, 23, 25, 27, 46, 51, 52, 62, 63, 65, 81, 97, 99, 100, 105–107, 115, 122, 123, 126–127, 130–136, 154, 157, 160, 161, 164, 172, 173, 177–180, 183–186, 188–190, 197, 198, 200, 205, 209, 215, 218, 219, 225, 228 Internet services, 45, 64, 123 Invisibility, 10, 15, 16, 20 K Kamto, Maurice, 121, 131, 136, 138–141 Kenya, 1–3, 9, 20, 21, 24–26, 31, 32, 112, 113, 115 L Lesotho, 3, 9, 10, 177–190 Libii, Cabral, 138, 139 M Marketing, political, 46, 72, 109 Mass communication, 1, 41, 42, 104, 115

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MDC, 77, 86, 88, 89, 91, 152, 160, 171 Media landscape, 9, 97, 136, 148, 165 Media, political uses of, 230 Memory, 83–84, 91, 92 Misinformation, 18, 22, 28, 111–114, 216, 225 Mnangagwa, Emmerson, 68, 69, 72, 76–78, 82, 85, 86, 89–92, 150, 152, 153, 156, 157, 161, 173n1 Mobile phones, 2, 3, 62, 123–126, 133–135, 154, 159, 186 Mobile Telephone Network (MTN), 123–125 Mobilization, 7, 8, 45, 46, 82, 101, 103, 106, 114, 115, 157, 159, 163, 178, 182, 196–198, 200, 205, 209, 210, 219, 222, 227 Mobilizing tool, 98, 105–107 Multimedia, 65, 98, 115, 222, 228 Muna, Akere, 122, 138, 139 N Newsgathering, 28, 29 Nextel, 123 O Offline debates, 85 Online debates, 207 Orange, 123–125 P Parameters for comparision, 44, 48, 51, 53 Participation, 6–9, 21, 46, 61, 64, 66, 82, 97–115, 124, 129, 139, 141, 142, 157, 178, 179, 184, 187–189, 200, 204–206, 219, 221

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Participatory politics, 80, 81 Philosophical influences on early research, 41 Photography, political use of, 47 Polarized pluralist model, 154 Political communication, 2–5, 8, 18, 39, 61, 63, 65, 66, 75, 100, 102–104, 107–110, 115, 149, 177, 185, 187, 189, 215–222, 226, 229 Political mobilization, 6, 7, 98, 100, 104, 106–112, 114, 179, 198 Political processes, 8, 40, 119, 130, 132 Politics, 1, 6, 8, 11, 14, 20, 31, 32, 40, 41, 45, 47, 52, 61–64, 66, 68–70, 72, 75–81, 85, 86, 92, 105, 106, 130, 133, 148, 150, 154, 162, 167, 180, 188, 196, 200, 206, 208–209, 217–222, 225, 229 Popular Front for Development (PFD), 122 Positivism, 41 Postcolonialism, 42, 92 Post-voting, 128–130, 134, 136 Presidential elections, 4, 10, 31, 62, 64, 66–71, 97, 98, 119–142, 152, 197, 198 Press freedom, 183 Pre-voting, 128–130, 134, 136, 139 Principles, 10, 40, 49–51, 108 Privacy rights, 43, 46 Public information, 218, 224 Public sphere, 5, 25, 81, 82, 85, 86, 92, 103, 119, 162, 218, 229 R Recommendation engines, 15, 19 S Social bots, 19–23 Social Democratic Front (SDF), 128

Social media, 2–11, 13–32, 43, 46, 47, 61–66, 68, 70, 76–78, 80–82, 92, 93, 97–115, 119–142, 147–149, 154, 156, 159–163, 165–167, 169–173, 177–190, 195–210, 215–222, 224–230 Socioeconomic factors, 46 Statistical Package for Social Scientists (SPSS), 136 Surveillance laws, 43, 46 Swaziland, 3, 10 T Technology Acceptance Model (TAM), 132, 133 Technology, advances in, 42 Third age, 42 Time, comparisons across, 43 Tolerance, political, 46 Transnationality, 45 Trends, emerging, 44, 45, 51 Troll factories, 21 Twitter, 3, 7–10, 13, 16, 18–22, 24, 28, 29, 46, 62–72, 75–78, 81–83, 86, 88, 90–93, 98, 100, 109–111, 113, 115, 119–122, 132, 134–136, 138, 139, 149, 154–156, 158–165, 170–172, 179, 184, 187, 197, 199, 215, 219, 221, 227 Twitter algorithm, 18–19 Two-way asymmetrical, 218 U Uganda, 4, 10, 62, 70, 71, 111, 112, 115, 195–210 Unintended consequences, 130–132 Universalism, 14, 52 Unstructured journalism, 30 Uses and gratifications (U&G), 98, 104, 132, 134

 INDEX 

V Violence, 4, 23–25, 67, 68, 83, 86, 88, 89, 91, 92, 111, 112 Virtual ethnography, 156 Visibility, 10, 15, 16, 20, 23, 130 Voters, 6–8, 16, 24, 26, 27, 30–32, 46, 63, 64, 72, 75, 78, 97–99, 102, 106–108, 111, 119, 121, 127–130, 133, 135, 136, 139, 141, 142, 148, 151, 153, 156–164, 168, 170–172, 179, 181, 185–187, 197, 217, 227, 228 Voters, analysis of, 99 Voting, 6, 7, 66, 87, 99, 100, 106, 111, 128–130, 134, 136, 139, 162, 182, 200, 216

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Z Zimbabwe, 4, 7, 10, 25, 27, 29, 45, 62, 64, 69, 88–90, 114, 115, 147–173 Zimbabwe African National Union-­ Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), 27, 29, 77, 78, 82, 84, 86–92, 150, 152, 153, 155–161, 163, 166–171 Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC), 81, 84, 86–92, 150, 153, 155, 162, 168