Smuggling and Trafficking of Migrants in Southern Europe: Criminal Actors, Dynamics and Migration Policies [1 ed.] 1529222532, 9781529222531

Citation preview

Damián Zaitch, Utrecht University

Stefano Becucci is Associate Professor of Sociology in the Department of Social and Political Sciences at the University of Florence.

This book provides a contemporary overview of migrant smuggling and trafficking in Southern Europe, focusing on Spain, Italy and Greece. It considers how criminal players increase such activity and investigates institutional and structural constraints to legal migration in Southern Europe. Migrant workers satisfy the need for a cheap workforce to sustain Southern Europe’s economy, and laws to counter irregular migration alter smuggling routes and expose migrants to forms of exploitation upon reaching their destination. Revealing institutional, economic and criminal factors, the book explains the persistence of migrant smuggling and trafficking.

S M U G G L I NG A ND TRA FFI C KI NG OF MIGRANTS IN SOUTHERN EUROPE

“Stefano Becucci’s timely work into the urgent issue of migrant smuggling and trafficking in Southern Europe is a crucial read on challenges that demand immediate attention and action. From criminal actors to migration policies, the book dissects the pressing issues at the forefront of today’s agendas.”

STEFANO BECUCCI

ISBN 978-1-5292-2253-1

9 781529 222531

B R I S TO L

bristoluniversitypress.co.uk

SMUGGLING AND TRAFFICKING OF MIGRANTS IN SOUTHERN EUROPE ______

CRIMINAL ACTORS, DYNAMICS A N D M I G R AT I O N P O L I C I E S

______

S T E FA N O B E C U C C I

SMUGGLING AND TRAFFICKING OF MIGRANTS IN SOUTHERN EUROPE Criminal Actors, Dynamics and Migration Policies Stefano Becucci

First published in Great Britain in 2024 by Bristol University Press University of Bristol 1–​9 Old Park Hill Bristol BS2 8BB UK t: +​44 (0)117 374 6645 e: bup-​[email protected] Details of international sales and distribution partners are available at bristoluniversitypress.co.uk © Bristol University Press 2024 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN 978-​1-​5292-​2253-​1 hardcover ISBN 978-​1-​5292-​2254-​8 ePub ISBN 978-​1-​5292-​2255-​5 ePdf The right of Stefano Becucci to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved: no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission of Bristol University Press. Every reasonable effort has been made to obtain permission to reproduce copyrighted material. If, however, anyone knows of an oversight, please contact the publisher. The statements and opinions contained within this publication are solely those of the author and not of the University of Bristol or Bristol University Press. The University of Bristol and Bristol University Press disclaim responsibility for any injury to persons or property resulting from any material published in this publication. Bristol University Press works to counter discrimination on grounds of gender, race, disability, age and sexuality. Cover design: Andrew Corbett Front cover image: Alamy/​Tyron Mott Bristol University Press use environmentally responsible print partners. Printed and bound in Great Britain by CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon, CR0 4YY

To Paola Monzini, whom we miss as a friend and researcher

Contents List of Figures and Tables Acknowledgements

vi viii

1 Introduction 2 Theoretical Frameworks on Migrant Smuggling 3 Irregular Migration Towards Southern Europe 4 Trafficking of Migrants for Sexual and Labour Exploitation 5 In Search of Explanations

1 11 33 84 131

Appendix Notes References Index

152 155 156 186

v

List of Figures and Tables Figures 2.1 2.2 2.3 3.1 3.2

3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.9 3.10 3.11 3.12 3.13 3.14 3.15

The hierarchical organizational model The network of criminal networks A network made up of individuals Number of migrants landing in Spanish territories (1999–​2021) All migrants landed compared with migrants in the Canary Islands and the Balearics and the peninsula (1999–​2021) Migrants landing in the Canary Islands (1994–​2021) Main routes from West Africa to the Canary Islands Migrants landing in the Balearic Islands and the Spanish peninsula (2002–​2021) Main points of departure and landing from the western Mediterranean Sea to Spain Migrants landing in Spain (2014–​2021) Migrants landing in Italy (2014–​2021) Migrants landing in Italy (2008–​2021) Migrants landing in Italy grouped by macro area of origin (2008–​2021) Main routes to North Africa and points of embarkation towards Italy Migrants landing in the main southern Italian regions (2008–​2021) Migrants landing in Greece (2014–​2021) Migrants apprehended at the Greek land border (2014–​2021) Main routes from Asian countries to reach Greece

vi

31 32 32 34 35

36 37 43 44 47 47 48 53 54 56 72 74 76

List of Figures and Tables

Tables 3.1 4.1 4.2

Results of questions migrants were asked during the interviews 64 Victims of trafficking in Spain, Italy and Greece –​sexual and 89 labour exploitation and other purposes (2011–​2020) Top ten nationalities of victims and offenders of human 103 trafficking for sexual exploitation in Spain (2021)

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Acknowledgements Many people have contributed to this volume in different ways. First, friends and colleagues. Some viewed the editorial proposal, others read the manuscript, while others provided material and contacts that have proved to be very useful: Paolo Ceri, former professor of Sociology at the University of Florence; Ernesto Ugo Savona, former professor of Criminology and founder of the Joint Research Center on Innovation and Crime (Transcrime); Dina Siegel, director of the Criminology department at the Willem Pompe Institute for Criminal Law and Criminology of Utrecht University; Alexandras Dobryninas, director of the Criminology Institute of Vilnius University; Felia Allum, professor of Comparative Organized Crime and Corruption at the University of Bath; Andrea Gimenez-​Salinas, Professor of Criminology at the Comillas Pontifical University of Madrid; Elisa Garcia, professor of Criminology at the University of Malaga; and Christina Zarafonitou, professor of Criminology at the University of Panteion. Magistrates and prosecutors: Giovanni Pio Luciano Melillo, National Anti-​ Mafia Prosecutor; Giovanbattista Tona, judge at the Court of Caltanissetta; Lina Trovato and Giuseppe Bonomo, prosecutors of the District Anti-​Mafia Directorate of Catania. Police officers: Felix Duran Garrido, head of the Civil Guard’s National Anti-​Human Trafficking Unit; Inspector Ivan D’Anna of the Palermo Police; and Giovanni Giudice, high officer of the Ancona Police. Officers of the Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Heracles Moskoff, Angeliki Serafin and Theodora Gianni. María Rodríguez Caro of the Spanish Commission for Refugees in Seville. Members of civil society organizations: Javi Cano and Concepcion Recuero of the Don Bosco Foundation; Helena Gómez de León Sánchez-​Arjona of the NGO Arcobaleno; Isabella Escalante of the Somaschi Foundation; Nicoletta Ulivi and Roberto Macrì of the Santa Rita Foundation; Georgios Alexopoulos and Nora Giannakaki of the NGO Symplexis. Arman Saberi, friend and IT ‘wizard’. The migrants who agreed to be interviewed. Agnese Desideri, my research assistant; and the graduates of my Sociology and Sociology of Migration courses for their help in collecting the viii

newgenprepdf

Acknowledgements

material: Francesco Chiellino, Emma Festini, Irene Tosi, Giuliana Giudice and Isabella Ranieri. Rebecca Tomlinson, Grace Carroll and Becky Taylor of Bristol University Press for their help and patience. Finally, Laura Sieni, who helped me to collect statistical data. My heartfelt thanks go to all these people, without whose invaluable help the volume would not have seen the light; nonetheless, as author, I take responsibility for the content contained herein.

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Introduction ‘A sea between lands, enclosed by its lands’ is how Fernand Braudel (1949) begins his powerful book La Méditerranée et le Monde méditerranéen à l’époque de Philippe II . The secular civilizations of the distant past are now immersed in the global world, making the Mediterranean seem ever smaller. Braudel’s volume sparked my interest in learning more about Spain, Italy and Greece. These Southern European countries have some common characteristics. First, they share a similar geographical configuration, with long coasts bordering the Mediterranean and facing North Africa at the same time. Second, they become arrival destinations for migrants in addition to Northern European countries. A classic resource for sociological research on migratory processes in Europe, Immigrant Workers and Class Structure in Western Europe by Stephen Castles and Godula Kosack (1973), analyses four countries in Northern Europe, while Southern countries appear to be places of emigration. In a long history of emigration dating back to the second half of the 19th century, these countries became places of immigration between the 1970s and 1980s. This phenomenon initially involved Italy and Spain, and then Greece in the following decade (Huntoon, 1998; IMEPO, 2004; Einaudi, 2007). In the 1980s, there were few foreign people in Southern European countries. However, as evidence of how national context was changing, the first laws governing their entry date back to that period: 1985 for Spain, 1986 for Italy and 1991 for Greece (Guarneri, 2005; Einaudi, 2007). The presence of foreigners would gradually increase in the following decades, so much so that the countries of Southern Europe tended to align with those of Northern Europe. In 2017, according to Eurostat data, foreign people (EU and non-​EU citizens) in Spain represented 12.9 per cent of the population, 10 per cent in Italy and 11.2 per cent in Greece (CES, 2019). With regard to non-​EU citizens specifically, at the end of 2021, there were just over 3.5 million holders of residence permits in Italy, 3.8 million in Spain and almost 700,000 in Greece (IDOS, 2022; INE, 2022; HR, 2022). While there are significant similarities in terms of the overall migratory trend, 1

Smuggling and Trafficking of Migrants in Southern Europe

these countries differ somewhat when it comes to the origins of the foreign communities. In Italy, the five most numerous non-​EU foreign communities come from Morocco, Albania, China, Ukraine and India (IDOS, 2022). In Greece, they come from Albania, Georgia, China, Pakistan and Ukraine. In Spain, referring to 2017, they came from Venezuela, Morocco, Colombia, Honduras and Brazil (HR, 2022; CES, 2019). The second characteristic uniting the countries of Southern Europe is the importance of the informal economy. According to some estimates, in Greece it was worth 30 to 45 per cent of the gross national product in the early 2000s; then, in 2015, it accounted for 26.5 per cent (Lazaridis and Koumandraki, 2007; Betti and Manzo, 2023). In Spain, it accounted for around 25 per cent in the first decade of the 2000s. In Italy in 2021 it was 10.5 per cent (Stobart, 2010; ISTAT, 2022). The third common feature is the existence of an industrial structure based on small and medium enterprises. Taking 20 employees as a reference, 92.5 per cent of Italian companies and 96.8 per cent of Greek companies fall below this threshold, while companies with fewer than ten employees have made up 94 per cent of all Spanish companies in the last decade (Castillo and Calle, 2012; Betti and Manzo, 2023). A further element in common is the systematic use of amnesties to bring irregular migrants out of illegality, whether they had arrived illegally or fallen into irregularity because they were no longer able to meet residence permit renewal requirements. The first immigration laws mentioned earlier paved the way for a long series of regularizations. With the first measures, Italy regularized 116,000 people, and Spain 38,000. The first regularization in Greece took place in 1997 and allowed 372,000 migrants to emerge from illegality (IMEPO, 2004; Einaudi, 2007; Conejero Paz, 2012). Within the background outlined, the examination of the smuggling and trafficking of migrants in the countries of Southern Europe represents an interesting case study because it combines various dimensions –​on the one hand, highly criminal aspects linked to the management of smuggling and trafficking, and, on the other, migration policies and the economic context within which migrants find their place. Before going any further, however, it is worth mentioning which aspects are considered here. There are different types of smuggling (IOM, 2018): smugglers who offer services to migrants in exchange for money, self-​smuggling (when a person independently organizes their own journey) and ‘altruistic smuggling’, which takes place when someone helps a migrant person, for example by offering food and accommodation without payment. The focus of this book is on the first type of smuggling for two reasons: first, smuggling implies a migrant handing over money in exchange for a service from the smugglers; second, the activity is based on a certain degree of organization, from loose to more structured forms. The specific focus of the volume is smuggling organizational patterns. 2

Introduction

Moreover, the volume analyses irregular immigration by sea. The term ‘irregular immigration’ means that migrants arrive in Southern European countries without following a formal procedure to enter legally. They are not, however, clandestine. This appellation is often used in public debate to avoid distinguishing between those who leave their country to escape persecution of various kinds and those who instead decide to leave, free from specific constraints, in search of a better future. In any case, the expression is wrong. A clandestine migrant –​for example one who enters a state by crossing the land border at night –​does everything to hide their presence. Migrants who leave by sea, by contrast, do not hide their presence. Due to the dangers posed by sea crossings, for example travelling in crowded and precarious boats, these migrants do what they can to be intercepted by search and rescue personnel.

Research questions, methodology and sources The research began by asking the following questions: What is the difference between the smuggling and trafficking of migrants? What is the current extent of these phenomena in Southern European countries? What are the organizational methods underlying both the smuggling and trafficking of migrants? What economic and institutional factors drive these two phenomena? In some cases, these questions required further specification. For instance, the organizational methods of smuggling and trafficking are understood within a continuum: on the one hand, organizations structured internally according to hierarchical criteria, and, on the other, network organizations. What main routes do smugglers follow to lead migrants to Southern European countries, and how have these routes changed over time? With regard to trafficking, what forms and strategies of enslavement do traffickers resort to in order to subjugate their victims to sexual and labour exploitation? What recruitment methods do traffickers use and what transnational network do they rely on to achieve these ends? Where possible, the analysis took into account some quantitative indicators. When examining the routes, for example, we traced the main hubs of irregular immigration –​the places where routes originating from several countries converge. Depending on the case, new routes extended from the same hubs towards certain transit, and subsequently destination, countries. In this sense, the most representative case is migratory routes from sub-​Saharan countries to North Africa and from there to Southern Europe. For instance, Agadez in Niger was for several years the main hub from which routes to Algeria or Libya were deployed. The indicator for identifying the convergence points of different routes was the estimated number of migrants passing through them in a given time frame. These are quantitative estimates based on information taken from reports drawn up by 3

Smuggling and Trafficking of Migrants in Southern Europe

researchers who carried out on-​site investigations, along with information disclosed by Frontex, the European agency in charge of combating irregular immigration, based on satellite surveys of the movement of vehicles and people. This information was integrated with the results of interviews with migrant people. A comparison spanning about a decade, from 2014 to 2021, highlighted changes to the smuggling migratory routes as well as the corresponding main transit crossroads in order to identify the main factors underlying these changes, which are largely attributable to the measures put in place by transit countries to hinder the movement of migrants. Another indicator to which particular attention was paid was the cost of travel –​how much migrants pay smugglers in exchange for their services. This cost depends on many factors, one of which, as for other goods, is the relationship between supply and demand. Since these activities are prohibited by law, other aspects influence the cost of the trip. First of all are the controls put in place by the law enforcement agencies responsible for combating irregular immigration. The more effective the controls, the higher the prices for the service due to smugglers having to take into account the higher risk of being intercepted by the law enforcement agencies. Second is the danger of the journey. The more dangerous the journey is for migrants, to the extent that they could lose their lives, the lower the price they have to pay the smugglers. This is the case, for example, for sea voyages in small boats with iron hulls that leave Tunisia for Italy. Their small size and the materials they are built from mean that they can easily capsize, causing the deaths of the people on board. A sub-​Saharan migrant would pay several hundred euros to reach the Sicilian coasts in such a boat, while a migrant arriving on a Calabrian coast in a sailing ship run by an experienced skipper would pay up to €6,000, as a magistrate from the District Anti-​Mafia Directorate of Catania reported. Finally, the cost of the trip is also affected by the organizational configuration assumed by the smugglers. The creation of oligopoly or monopoly positions for the benefit of some criminal groups that manage the business of irregular immigration could easily translate into dumping ‘policies’ in order to oust other illicit competitors from the market who do not belong to the dominant cartel. In light of these, many aspects influence the cost of the services offered by smugglers. In order to answer all the questions mentioned, we referred to various sources, from qualitative interviews with experts in their field and migrant witnesses, to specialist literature on smuggling and trafficking. Over forty experts were interviewed, belonging to various institutions, from prosecutors to police officers who deal with smuggling and trafficking, to asylum commissions that examine migrants’ requests for international protection, to NGOs (humanitarian non-​governmental organizations) that provide services to asylum seekers and trafficked victims. In addition, 42 migrants of various nationalities were interviewed. The interviews, both with experts and 4

Introduction

migrants, lasted for varying amounts of time depending on the case, from 20 minutes to an hour and a half. Most of the migrant people interviewed were chosen on the basis of indications from NGOs about who might be willing to be interviewed. In other cases, however, we met non-​EU foreigners or asylum seekers in person who had recently arrived in Southern European countries and agreed to be interviewed. This was the case, for example, in Greece, while the writer was staying in Athens and on the island of Lesvos, as well as in Spain, during a trip to Madrid, Malaga, Granada and Sevilla. At times, the meetings with migrants were not easy. The ideal characteristics of an interviewee were having recently arrived in a Southern European country and being willing to report on their travel experience. This would allow us to acquire updated information on the departure and transit context, and it would avoid involuntary errors on the part of the interviewee, such as confusing different stages of the journey because the reported facts dated back to, for example, some years ago. In addition, carrying out interviews face to face, without other people, creates the best conditions for fostering an empathetic relationship with the interviewee. These conditions were not always met. The first obstacle to overcome was the migrant person’s potential mistrust towards a stranger. This distrust would generally increase if the interviewees were waiting to receive the result of their application for international protection. For example, if a meeting with the asylum commission to decide whether to grant international protection had already been held, the interviewees were more willing to report their travel experiences, and even more so if they had already obtained a positive response from the commission. Two episodes highlight the difficulties encountered during the interviews. The first took place in a reception centre for asylum seekers in Prato, near Florence. The head of the centre tried for about 30 minutes to convince two people, one from Mali and the other from Liberia, to be interviewed. Just as we were about to give up, they agreed. The individual interviews lasted an hour and a half each. The two interviewees reported their migratory experiences characterized by violence by the border police and fraud and theft perpetrated against them by smugglers. The second episode concerned another reception centre for asylum seekers, also in Prato. The Nigerian boys chosen by the centre manager had arrived on the Sicilian coast a few months ago and were later assigned to the Prato centre from there. The Nigerians spoke pidgin, which mixes local language terms and broken English. For this reason, the interviews had to be carried out in the presence of a cultural mediator. Ultimately, these interviews were of little significance because the interviewees, probably because they had just arrived in Prato, did not trust the operators of the centre nor the writer. Furthermore, the presence of two centre operators at the interviews, together with the interpreter, hindered the possibility of establishing a close relationship with the interviewees, the 5

Smuggling and Trafficking of Migrants in Southern Europe

main condition that needs to be met for them to report their life story with little hesitation.

The distinction between smuggling and trafficking From a legal point of view, smuggling pertains to violation of the laws that regulate the entry of foreign people into a state, while trafficking is a violation of human rights and can also take place within the state where the victim resides. More specifically, migrants arriving on the coasts of Southern Europe are considered to be involved in smuggling. They agreed a travel cost with the smugglers, which can correspond to the entire service covering the migratory journey from the country of origin to travel by sea. In other cases, smugglers offer transport services that only include some stages of a migrant’s journey. On the contrary, victims trafficked for sexual or labour exploitation usually do not pay any travel costs. This is the responsibility of the trafficking organization. Once the victim has reached the destination, the traffickers require them to pay off the travel debt through their exploitation in the sex market or in the production of goods for customers. Naturally, the sum requested from the victim is far higher than the transport costs incurred by the traffickers. There are also other differences. One concerns the type of relationship between the migrant and the smuggler on the one hand, and between the migrant victim and the trafficker on the other. In the context of smuggling, the migrant turns to the smuggler to receive a specific service in exchange for money. Once the service has been completed, the relationship between the migrant and the smuggler no longer has any reason to exist. It ends when the two parties have achieved the expected result: the performance of a service in exchange for money. In the context of trafficking, on the other hand, the victims, even if they turn to the traffickers themselves, are systematically deceived to convince them to emigrate. Traffickers offer victims attractive and well-​paid jobs in the destination country. Even if the victims are aware that they are being directed to the foreign sex market, they are unlikely to have precise knowledge of the actual exploitation conditions to which they will be subjected. Indeed, the anti-​trafficking protocol linked to the 2000 United Nations Convention on Transnational Crime specifies that the victim’s consent to exploitation is not relevant (UN, 2000c). Even if the victim does consent, this does not mean the traffickers will avoid criminal prosecution. As victims represent an opportunity for future enrichment, the relationship between victims and traffickers will continue in the destination country. In this sense, smuggling and trafficking are distinguished by their different purposes. The aim of the former is to exchange a service for money, whereas, in the latter, the trafficked persons themselves become the object of sale among traffickers for exploitation purposes. 6

Introduction

A second difference between the two phenomena concerns the use of violence. In smuggling, the violence exercised by smugglers against migrants essentially has two purposes: to ensure that the service offered to the migrant is successful, and to prevent the smugglers from being intercepted by law enforcement agencies. In a relationship between migrant and smuggler where there is a power asymmetry in favour of the latter, violence is always possible. However, its purpose is to ensure the safety of the smuggler first and foremost and then the migrant, to whom a specific service is offered. As some research reports indicate, migrants crossing land borders at night to enter a European territory may be beaten by smugglers or left to their fate if they are unable to remain in groups (Mandic, 2017; Mishra et al, 2020). In other cases, if the migrant does not pay or has no money, they are mistreated (Majidi, 2018). Although these are reprehensible actions, the use of violence is intended to reduce the danger of being intercepted by the border police. By contrast, in trafficking, violence becomes the fundamental resource used to subjugate victims. The exploiters use it to establish the rules of total submission of the victim. But there are other reasons why traffickers systematically resort to violence. In countries where irregular immigration is rife, smugglers can enjoy social legitimacy. Potential migrants, aware that there are few opportunities in their country, turn to smugglers as they see no other possibility of emigrating abroad. For their part, smugglers can consider themselves benefactors, as their services allow thousands of people to emigrate. By omitting the aspect where they profit from their activity, they develop their own rationalizations in order to justify their behaviour in positive terms. While this is true for smugglers, it can hardly be true for traffickers. Now that slavery is no longer legally recognized, the slavers of the third millennium do not enjoy social legitimacy. This is also why they resort to violence to subjugate their victims. A further difference is that the two phenomena seem to have different dynamics. Smuggling is driven directly by migrants who turn to smugglers because, in most cases, they do not see viable alternatives to overcome the obstacles posed by migration policies. Trafficking, on the contrary, is driven by the clients of sexual services and by consumers who purchase goods deriving from the intensive exploitation of people reduced to slavery conditions (Williams, 1999). In summary, smuggling implies voluntariness and consent on the part of the migrant. Migrant people choose to use the services offered by the transporter organization, while trafficked people can be solicited, deceived with false promises or even kidnapped. Migrant people establish an agreement, as customers, whereby they use the services offered by the transporter organization. Trafficked people do not have this choice and are forced in many cases to submit to the decisions imposed by others. In smuggling, therefore, consent tends to prevail over violence, while in trafficking, abuse 7

Smuggling and Trafficking of Migrants in Southern Europe

and the annulment of the victim’s will are specific markers of the relationship between migrant and trafficker. These characteristics of the two phenomena can overlap in practice (Kleemans and Smit, 2014; Salat, 2022). This happens, for example, when migrants are sold to traffickers without their knowledge by the transporters they have engaged, or when migrants are forcibly taken from smugglers by criminal groups in order to subject them to exploitation. Often, as we will see in the following chapters, it is only possible to ascertain whether a migrant has become a victim of trafficking during the journey when they arrive at their destination.

The structure of the book The book seeks to provide an updated, informative and theoretical ‘picture’ of migrant smuggling and trafficking in Southern Europe. More specifically, Chapter 2 critically examines the specialized literature on smuggling. Two criteria were taken into account to select the literature: its importance from an analytical and theoretical point of view, and the reporting of first-​hand information based on qualitative or quantitative empirical research. The analysis outlined two main theoretical models related to smuggling: business and social. The first relates smuggling to an economic rationality criterion based on a cost-​benefit evaluation of the choices of each social player in the relationship: smugglers and migrants. The opposite model emphasizes the importance of the social dimension. Migrant smuggling fits within forms of solidarity found in migratory diasporas. Starting with their own community in departure places, migrants come into contact with intermediaries and smugglers belonging to their network of compatriots. The relationships of trust between smugglers and migrants influence the economic exchanges between the two. In short, the prevalence of the social dimension among the actors involved demonstrates that it is too limited to consider smuggling only from an economic point of view. Once the critical aspects of both models have been highlighted, the following part of the chapter proposes a new smuggling model that draws on organized crime literature. It proposes an interpretative framework based on the forms of organization that can be detected in the management of smuggling. At one end are more structured organizations of a hierarchical type, while reticular organizations are located at the other. The final part of the chapter considers the possible combinations between these two extreme poles and provides some corresponding examples applied to smuggling. Chapter 3 follows a linear development broken down into the following aspects: the analysis of migrant arrivals by sea in Southern European countries over a period of time that varies from country to country based on the availability of official statistical sources (from 2002 to 2021 for Spain, from 2008 to 2021 for Italy and from 2014 to 2021 for Greece); the main routes 8

Introduction

used by smugglers by land and sea to Spain, Italy and Greece; identification of the main hubs and the prices charged by smugglers to take migrants along the various migratory routes; the policies to combat irregular immigration implemented by Southern European countries; and, finally, the effects of these policies on the alteration of migratory routes. With regard to this last aspect, the starting point of the analysis was to consider the Mediterranean as an integrated area –​with continuous interconnections between the countries of North Africa on the one hand and the destination countries for migrants in Southern Europe on the other. In this sense, policies implemented against a migratory route from one of the European countries can shift arrivals by sea towards the closest European country. As far as Spain and Italy are concerned, the statistics relating to arrivals by sea largely confirm this hypothesis. The agreement signed in the summer of 2017 between the Italian government and the Tripoli government of the time contributed, on the one hand, to fewer departures from Libya, while, on the other, it led to an increase in migrant arrivals in Spain. Although the data tends to corroborate this hypothesis, we must consider that other factors in the migrants’ departure countries may have played an autonomous role in increasing arrivals to Spain. Moreover, we must not forget that both migrants and smugglers are continuously updated on the feasibility of following certain routes rather than others. Through word of mouth or communications via social media networks, information about which routes to follow circulates among them in real time. Chapter 4 looks at migrant trafficking in Spain, Italy and Greece. The first part reports on the estimates of trafficking victims subjected to sexual and labour exploitation on a global scale. To this end, only estimates taken from research reports referring to the calculation method used to identify the number of trafficked persons were examined. These values were compared with the actual number of victims of trafficking ascertained based on information from institutional reports published by the US State Department, the European Commission and Eurostat –​the latter for Spain, Italy and Greece. The second part of the chapter focuses on an analysis of the sexual services market and the related forms of exploitation of the trafficked victims. It also highlights the changes that took place within Southern European countries in the last decades of the 20th century. According to different entities, the sex markets in these countries were marked by significant internal changes, namely the gradual disappearance of native women engaged in prostitution, and increased numbers of foreign women arriving. New foreign exploiters have also appeared, leading to a change in sexual exploitation victims, from that of single individuals to organized groups. The analysis of the criminal groups involved in sexual exploitation considers, from a theoretical point of view, the organizational models previously identified for smuggling. The final part of the chapter instead analyses the labour exploitation to which migrants are subjected. 9

Smuggling and Trafficking of Migrants in Southern Europe

As paradigmatic examples of exploitation, the agricultural and clothing production sectors have been examined. Finally, Chapter 5 focuses on the institutional, economic and criminal factors that, each in their own way, account for the forms of sexual and economic exploitation faced by migrant people in Southern European countries. The rules governing the entry and stay of migrants in these countries contribute to the risk of them falling into illegality, thus increasing their social vulnerability. Today’s manufacturing organizations, based on the model of just-​in-​time production and flexible work, in turn weakens workers’ rights. Migrants, who are more vulnerable and socially weak, suffer disadvantage and economic exploitation conditions more than the natives. In short, Spain, Italy and Greece face a structural contradiction: the migration policies that seek to combat irregular immigration for security and political purposes conflict with the countries’ need for a migrant workforce to be employed in their production systems. Finally, we look at the background factors that contribute to an increase in new forms of slavery, including the role played by transnational organized crime. These criminal groups, in line with the economic globalization process, have expanded their criminal networks well beyond each national state.

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2

Theoretical Frameworks on Migrant Smuggling According to Max Weber, each social phenomenon –​ when closely examined –​involves a chain of endless factors that are all potentially relevant and lead researchers to establish causal connections to explain it. Weber (2001: 176) maintained that: ‘The number and type of causes that have determined any individual event is in fact always infinite, and there is no characteristic inherent in the things themselves that allows us to isolate a part of them to be taken into consideration alone’. (By individual event, Weber means an extremely broad variety of social phenomena, from individual to macro phenomena such as capitalism.) Given the endless configurations of reality and the countless interlinked causes of an event, the only way for a social researcher to avoid falling into the chaos of specific and countless explanations is to build up an ideal type based on a unilateral accentuation of one’s point of view. From the social researcher’s perspective, Weber’s ideal type should summarize the essential characteristics of the social phenomenon examined with coherent logic. In these terms, based on a unilateral accentuation of some aspects, the researcher must consider the subject worth investigating. In this regard, the value of the ideal type is essentially as a heuristic tool that can be used to compare it with the real phenomenon in order to understand how and whether reality has followed the logical expectations. Based on these assumptions: ‘There is not absolutely “objective” scientific analysis of culture … or of social phenomena independent of special and “one-​ sided” viewpoints according to which –​expressly or tacitly, consciously or unconsciously –​they are selected, analysed and organized for expository purposes’ (Weber, 2001: 170). Taking this premise into consideration, the literature on migrant smuggling contains three different perspectives from which to analyse this phenomenon. The theoretical frameworks presented are the business model, the social system and the organizational crime model. 11

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The business model versus the social system The first framework is based on an economic perspective. The development of this point of view can be traced to the seminal work by John Salt and Jeremy Stein (1997 and Salt, 2000) who describe smuggling and trafficking as ‘an intermediary part of the global migration business facilitating the movement of people between origin and destination country’ (Salt and Stein, 1997: 467). These authors however do not clearly conceptualize the analytical differences between smuggling and trafficking and refer to both phenomena with interchangeable meanings, pointing to ‘our concept of trafficking in migrants as an international business, involving the trading and systematic movement of people as “commodities” by various means and potentially involving a variety of agents, institutions and intermediaries’ (Salt and Stein, 1997: 471). Frequent reference in their paper to terms such as ‘business, costs and benefits’ recalls the basic principles of economics as a useful perspective to analyse the smuggling of migrants. This implies that the different players involved in this activity are considered as ‘rational actors’, although the authors do not explicitly use this expression. In this international business, three actors play a role: governments, which develop migration policies in an attempt to control irregular immigration; agents, meaning the organizations involved worldwide in managing smuggling activities; and the migrants themselves. The participation of these three players could be understood in terms of profit and loss accounts. Governments need to revise their migration policies to increase the efficiency and efficacy of the regulatory migration system in order to establish a contractual relationship between migrants and the state. The contractual relationship seeks to improve migration regulation in terms of costs and benefits for the host nation so as to establish a better equilibrium, which would consider difficulties and related losses in order to counter irregular immigration and deliver economic benefits deriving from accepting migrants into its national territory. The state’s purposes should be achieved by invoking an agreement –​a contractual relationship as defined by Salt and Stein (1997) –​based on the typical judiciary tool of a contract between the would-​be migrant and the hosting national authority. The second actor is the agent, ranging from illegal to legal entrepreneurs. The latter, for instance, might be taxi drivers, people who provide food and accommodation to migrants on the move, and travel operators involved in this international business. All such players are attracted to this work due to the high economic expectations relating to the international migration business. The third player is the migrant person who, based on the available information collected, decides to undertake irregular migration to a new country after having evaluated the expected costs and benefits. In short, Salt and Stein introduced a new perspective of analysing migrant smuggling as 12

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an international business, the principal drivers of which are based on the economic motivations of all the players involved in the market. A different viewpoint is provided by several authors who argue that migrant smuggling should be considered a ‘social system’ with its own distinct characteristics that cannot simply be reduced to the economic motivations of the players (Herman, 2006; Collyer, 2007; Zhang, 2007; Triandafyllidou and Maroukis, 2012; Mandic, 2017; Maher, 2018). The expression ‘social system’ has different meanings in sociological thought. According to James Coleman, whose definition includes a broader variety of social phenomena, the social system ‘could be small, as a dyad [two people] or big as a society or a world-​system’ (Coleman, 2005: 14). Talcott Parsons, on the other hand, considers the social system as complex conceptual patterns along a continuum of variables ranging from ascriptive to attributive. Within a process of social change towards modernization, the prevalence of attributive variables should progressively involve human personality, social structure and culture (Parsons, 1996). From broader to very specific definitions, the social system is defined as ‘a complex of social positions or roles played by individual or collective subjects who interact through behaviours, actions, specific activities … within regulative norms or other types of tie which limit the behaviour’s variety of a subject towards others [belonging to the same social system]’ (Gallino, 2006: 589). In general terms, any kind of relatively structured group could be analysed as a social system. The essential requisite of a social system, however, is that the specific interactions among the people that belong to it are more intense, significant and distinct than the relationships they have with those outside it. For our purposes, the social system is made up of three elements: the migrant, the smuggler and the people who gravitate towards them, for instance their compatriots. In this regard, we refer to some empirical-​ based research from authors who emphasize the link between migrants, smugglers and the community to which both belong. The following research demonstrates the importance of the compatriot network in which a migrant is embedded. Emma Herman (2006) analysed a survey carried out in 1997 on 2,262 migrants provided by the Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute and Eurostat. The people studied came from Morocco and Senegal, headed for Spain, and Egypt and Ghana, bound for Italy. One third of the migrant people interviewed declared that they had no ties in the country of destination prior to their departure, half had weak ties (friends or non-​ relatives), while a minority had stronger familial ties (relatives). Those with strong ties declared that, before departing, they had received a great deal of help from people abroad through their personal network. This ranged from financial support to arranging the necessary visa and/​or passport, information about admission regulations to offers of a job in the family business. Migrants who only had weak ties were the least likely to receive help, while those 13

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with strong ties did much better. More specifically, migrants with strong ties were more likely to enter the new country through regular channels than migrants with weak ties. The point here is that the social capital at the disposal of the potential migrant represented by their personal network abroad reduces the cost and risk of irregular emigration. Neglecting this aspect means not considering the role played by relatives and compatriots in the migration process. As noted by Herman (2006: 199): ‘these “intermediary agents” have no place in the business model, as their rewards are not of a (direct) monetary nature’. In 2004 and 2005, Michael Collyer (2007) conducted 142 interviews with migrant people in Morocco and Ceuta, a Spanish territory within the state of Morocco. The people interviewed came from Bangladesh and various sub-​Saharan countries. The main finding worth reporting is that there were two different migration systems. The first was described by sub-​Saharan migrants, the greater part of whom were young males travelling alone who were assisted step by step in finding the right contacts (smugglers or others) to help them cross the border from their country of origin into Morocco. Only some of them had already decided to travel to Europe, namely those who had pillars of support, such as relatives or compatriots, in a European country. The others did not originally plan to reach Morocco or Europe and reported that they had no specific destination in mind. Rather, they had contacts with other people on the move and, based on the information received, decided to head for Morocco. Due to journey-​related difficulties and dangers, the migrants searched for the support of a wider community of compatriots. The second migration system was uncovered by interviewing Bangladeshi people in an emergency centre for migrants in Ceuta. All the Bangladeshi migrants had paid a single price for their entire journey from Bangladesh to Ceuta. They had been handed over from one smuggler to another and were provided with shelter in different accommodations along the route –​so-​ called safe houses that migrants are not allowed to leave –​and were finally transported by jet ski to Ceuta where they were told they had reached Europe. Not only was the travel cost for these migrants significantly different from that for those from sub-​Saharan countries, but the emigration of Bangladeshis to Europe was originally planned by their families, who chose the relatives most suited to undertake the trip. Compared with those from the sub-​Saharan counties, the community network in which the Bangladeshi migrants were embedded reflected a different smuggling system as well as a specific journey plan to reach Europe. Having studied human smuggling worldwide, paying particular attention to ‘developing’ and Westerns countries, Sheldon X. Zhang (2007) points out that, very often, people’s decisions to move abroad are related to the connections they might have in the destination country. This is the case, for 14

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instance, for Chinese people from the province of Fujian and Mexican people headed to the USA, most of the latter arriving from central-​western Mexican states. In this sense, human smuggling follows established connections between compatriots already settled abroad and potential migrants in the country of origin. This restricts ‘the business of human smuggling to regions where such populations can be found’ (Zhang, 2007: 91). In other words, Zhang claims that the phenomenon of human smuggling would be analysed as a social system embedded within each community of migrants of the same nationality or of the same geo-​dialectal origin, as is the case of the Chinese. Migrant communities situated along the human smuggling route provide ‘solidarity’ points to help smugglers manage their compatriots from the country of origin to the final destination abroad. These solidarities, involving both social and financial dimensions, are established by several types of player and service. The latter consist of temporary shelters, food and, in broader terms, infrastructures for the transit of migrants. Ethnic ties, namely sharing the same cultural patterns as members of a distinct social group, make it more likely that unwritten social agreements among the parties involved in the human smuggling will be respected. Moreover, Zhang is one of the first authors to raise the issue of how smugglers should be considered. In this regard, he referred to the example of Chen Chui Ping, known in the New York City Chinese community as Sister Ping. In 2006, she was sentenced by a New York federal court to 35 years in prison for smuggling thousands of Chinese people from Fujian to the USA, hostage taking, money laundering and laundering ransom money. However, her clients and many Chinese smugglers who knew her considered her to be a ‘goddess who helped her fellow villagers in and around her hometown seek a better life in America, looked after her clients’ welfare, charged fair prices, and loaned money to her clients with generous terms’ (Zhang, 2007: 79). Continuing the select literary review, in their book Migrant Smuggling, Anna Triandafyllidou and Thanos Maroukis (2012) conducted 94 interviews with migrants and smugglers: 50 were people from African countries and the others from Bangladesh, Afghanistan and Pakistan. All the interviewees arrived in Greece or the Greek islands through Turkey. The main point to note is that smugglers who organized the journey from Pakistan, Bangladesh and Afghanistan came from within the migrant communities. The migrants asked their relatives and people they trust to find smugglers or brokers before starting the journey. The relationship between the migrant and broker was based on trust. They knew each other because they came from the same local community. Another figure that played a role in the smuggling organization was the guarantor/cashier who took money from the migrant and handed it over to the smuggler once the migrant had reached their final destination. Moreover, the travel costs and requested payment methods changed according to specific favourable circumstances when the smuggler 15

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and migrant knew each other, and likewise for guarantor and smuggler. So, the smuggling line along different national borders was deployed through people belonging for the most part to the same community. This was true for Pakistani smugglers settled in Greek cities who organized travel to Greece for their compatriots. In these terms, the migrant, the guarantor and sometimes the smuggler shared the same cultural patterns based on trust, reciprocal obligations and unwritten social agreements. Similar aspects emerged from research on the Balkan route by Danilo Mandic (2017), who conducted 123 in-​depth interviews and a survey with Syrian refugees temporary sheltered in Jordan, Turkey, Greece, Serbia and Germany. The great majority of the Syrian people had come into contact with smugglers hanging out in public spaces, such as parks, railway stations and ports in the transit countries, while others made contact with smugglers through recommendations made by Syrian friends, family members or other migrants. The interviews reveal that information circulated by word of mouth on an ethnic kinship basis. In addition, the Syrian people were generally very positive about their relationships with the smugglers, justifying them as forms of solidarity due to sharing religious, ethnic or familial ties. The findings obtained by Stephanie Maher (2018), who interviewed 170 repatriated migrants during her 18-​month research project in Senegal between 2011 and 2014, were along the same lines. Most of the people interviewed knew the smugglers who organized their journey, while others, a minority, came into contact with them through intermediaries such as friends and relatives. The interviewees gave positive reports about the smugglers, who the author prefers to call ‘handlers’. In these terms, ‘journeys were frequently negotiated within close-​knit communities among people who already knew each other. Most migrants were familial with their handlers and were more likely to call them sama guy (my friend) rather than criminal’ (Maher, 2018: 39). From a theoretical standpoint, the social system model involves network analysis, a research perspective that started at the Rhodes-​Livingstone Institute in Manchester in the 1940s. An analysis of African societies revealed the inadequacy of the structural-​functionalism paradigm developed by anthropologists between the 19th and 20th centuries. According to Alfred Radcliffe-​Brown, anthropologists would focus their attention on the form of the social groups and communities and identify norms, values and standardized behaviours in order to construct a whole system of functionally integrated parts (Piselli, 2001; Merton, 1957). This approach, taken from research on small communities, proved that all its limits applied to the big heterogenous African societies that had been subjected, via colonialism, to intense destructuralization processes. The main structuralism-​functionalism concept that each system was made up of interdependent parts tending towards equilibrium, with the focal point on corporate players acting 16

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according to norms devoted to the reproduction of the social system, was replaced by a focus on bonds in social human relationships and conflicts within the society. The people’s role was analysed on the basis of the real behaviour of players instead of considering it in terms of internalized established principles which the actor (‘ego’ in the conventional sociological language) must accomplish. In addition, the network analysis considers individuals and their relationships instead of each aggregate part of the social system taken as a whole. This new perspective pays special attention to the types of bond existing among people, situational processes and the informal social dynamics of human relationships. J.A. Barnes, in his research on a Norwegian community of fishermen and peasants, was the first to use the concept of a network characterized by a system of relationships that tied people with different intensities. Barnes stated (1954: 43): I find it useful to speak of a social field of this type as a network. The idea I have of it is that of a set of points some of which are joined by lines. The points in the image represent individuals, sometimes groups, while the lines indicate which people interact with each other. The network relationship is based on a transitive property. If individual A has a social tie with individual B, and the latter with C, there is high probability that A could establish contact with C. Contact between A and C will depend on the strength of the ties among all the people involved in the network and on the spatial configuration of the network itself. Similarly, ‘the bonds between two individuals are important not only in themselves but also as parts of the social network in which they are immersed. Each bond gives network members indirect access to all those with whom their dyadic partners are conjoined’ (Wellman, 2001: 36). For our specific purpose, the authors’ point of view based on the smuggling social system emphasizes the close-​knit bonds among migrants, such as kinships and familial ties, rather than weak ties such as acquaintances. Moreover, the former ties frequently occur between people of the same community. As observed by Herman (2006), these ties represent potential opportunities for would-​be migrants to find trustworthy contacts with whom to undertake the smuggling journey. So, the more potential migrants are embedded in networks made up of close ties, the more they will be able to use their personal network for migratory purposes. Migrants’ close-​knit ties are essential for the emigration process as well as getting help in the destination country. Moreover, migrant smuggling is characterized by other elements based on the social system model. People with the same social attributes influence each other’s relationships. J. Clyde Mitchell (2001) points outs 17

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that aspects such as age, gender, ‘race’ or ethnicity are ‘role-​signs’ that have meaning for social players. These attributes, according to Mitchell (2001:18): can be considered, by the actors, as perceptions that have particular consequences for their behaviour towards people who exhibit these attributes … Each of the numerous potential role-​signs that an actor can show in a given social situation will be determined, to a considerable extent, by the way the actors in that situation define it. In situations where the smuggler and migrant share the same social attributes and define them positively, their relationship is not only based on an economic bargain but it also gives rise to forms of reciprocal obligation. In this regard, the nature of the exchange within the network can be differentiated into three analytical categories: the circulation of information among people; providing each other with various forms of aid; and normative meanings. The latter means, more specifically, establishing mutual expectations regarding behaviour geared towards cooperation among the players involved in the exchange. This would have been the case, for instance, in Zhang’s story about relationships between the female Chinese smuggler and her compatriots brought illegally into the USA. This implied a special relationship between the smuggler and her clients. Smuggled migrants would have received favourable conditions that were nonetheless intertwined with safeguarding the smuggler’s economic interests. In a relationship that was far from a mere economic exchange, the smuggled migrants had a very different opinion of Sister Ping from that of the US justice authorities.

Critical points and aporias Summarizing the main characteristics of the two theoretical frameworks, the first perspective categorizes the behaviour of all players involved in the activities as those who make decisions accordingly to a rationale paradigm aimed at obtaining profit and benefits for their actions. This applies first to criminals and then to migrants. Although this follows a principle of rationality, an aspect implicitly present in the business model, the role of the migrant is to a large extent neglected. Leaving aside the fact that all players, including migrants, aim to make the best choice according to the available information, the agency of the migrant is not provided for at all. A migrant’s capacity to select one smuggler over another has no room in the business model. Coherently with this lack of agency on the part of migrants, Salt and Stein (1997) claim that smugglers and traffickers are able to create a new geography of international migration. So: ‘Evidence suggests that 18

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traffickers increasingly determine the choice of migrants’ destination and the route taken’ (Salt and Stein, 1997: 474). Salt and Stein assume that the relationship between smugglers and migrants is based on a deep asymmetry of power that favours the former, and this is generally true considering the illegal circumstances under which the migrant’s journey takes place. Once the migrant person has embarked on the journey across different countries, they become increasing dependent on the smuggler. Regardless of whether or not the smuggler uses violence, the former’s power inevitably increases as the latter does not know the country or likely the language or people in the areas they are travelling through. However, the migrant’s dependency changes according to the specific situation they are in, for instance travelling along routes that are more dangerous than others. In any case, this does not mean that migrants have no choice, albeit always within limited possibilities, of which smuggler to use. Rather, a migrant has more agency when dealing with brokers or smugglers from their own community. As noted, the price of the smuggler’s service cannot simply be reduced to a market exchange because other social factors intervene. Trust between the migrant and the smuggler, including the price the migrant is asked to pay for the journey, depends firstly on such social factors and only secondly on economic ones. For instance, the smuggler’s reputation as a trustworthy person is much more relevant than the price they charge for the service. These aspects, namely how to find the smugglers and how trustworthy they are, are just as relevant the more smuggling is embedded within the social fabric of a community. These factors, however, are barely taken into consideration in the business model. The social system model also has some critical points. According to the research results presented earlier, migrants and smugglers interact with people of the same social circle and prevalently engage in one-​to-​one communication. However, this kind of relationship works well when the smuggling migratory chain has particular traits: on the one hand, it is based on limited numbers of exchanges among smugglers (that is, the migrant encounters few smugglers during the journey), and, on the other, the migratory routes are relatively short, for instance crossing the border of one state into another. But what happens when the migratory routes, for several reasons, become longer and longer and require the crossing of several states for thousands of miles? Under these conditions, the chain of trust between migrants and smugglers becomes weaker and weaker. Some researchers (Maher, 2018: 48) have recognized that: as travelers move across the Sahara, handlers with high degrees of social proximity are less involved in getting people to their final destination. 19

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Instead, handlers may transfer their passengers to a colleague at the next point of transit, usually at the border, or simply leave migrants to negotiate the next leg on their own. In similar terms, as noted by Mandic (2017: 37) with regard to the Balkan route from Turkey to Germany: ‘there is evidence for the decline of “One Stop Shop” smuggling. Namely, whereas the trailblazers reportedly relied on a single criminal organization, their followers encountered a Route that is inhospitable to this possibility’. This inhospitality means that, if the migrant needs to deal with different smuggling organizations along the route, the original chain of trust between the migrant and smuggler tends to fall apart. As a Syrian interviewee reported about his Turkish smuggler (Mandic, 2017: 37): He didn’t call us for three weeks after we gave him the money! [imitating] Don’t worry, tomorrow. He said in Greece his partner will wait for us, and nothing. Bandits! That’s why today people use six, seven, eight smugglers for the full travel. You need to start again, each contact. So, when the smuggling migratory chain is fragmented because a single smuggling organization is unable (or does not want) to manage the migrant’s entire journey, the relationship between migrant and smuggler, although originally based on trust and reciprocal knowledge, very likely changes with new smugglers. In terms of theoretical assumptions, the social system model –​whether explicitly said or not –​assumes that trust between migrants and brokers/​ smugglers is a relevant aspect of the smuggling agreement. At the same time, the economic exchange between these players is embedded within a broader social network at community level, where it reflects informal reciprocal obligations and expectations. As these theoretical assumptions are confirmed by empirical research on migrant smuggling, this activity could gradually lose its criminal aspect, to be replaced, from the smuggler/​ migrant’s point of view, by behaviour that is socially legitimized by the migrant community as a whole. This point of view reflects the awareness of scholars who do not risk cultural ethnocentrism based on the explicit or implicit use of their own cultural categories of judgement. This raises the open question of whether migrant smuggling, once it has been qualified as a socially legitimized activity, could be included in the criminal domain or not (Triandafylliduo and Maroukis, 2012). Against this background, some authors, as a reaction to the negative stereotypes of smugglers represented by mass media, politicians and law enforcement agencies, prefer to use the term ‘facilitators’ instead (Sanchez, 20

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2017, 2020; Achilli, 2018). In this regard, we could recall the old diatribe dating back to the Middle Ages between Nominalists and Realists. The former asserted that our categories of thought used to name and classify the world identify things and make them understandable according to the categorial system used. Conversely, the latter claimed that the world has its own reality and essence regardless of the names used to categorize it. However, without going into aspects of epistemology and the theory of knowledge domains, all of us, from scholars to ordinary people, are aware that ‘names mark things’ and that language, developing new terms and new metaphors, has the capacity to create new ‘realities’. So, describing smugglers as ‘facilitators’, which is a broader category of people covering those who sell services to migrants in exchange for money and those who help them without expecting any economic benefit, tends to decriminalize the act of smuggling. Depicting smugglers as facilitators is first and foremost a way of reacting against the negative connotations of the term in public debate. Whereas, based on empirical research information, this ‘cultural operation’ is properly justified in order to demystify mainstream discourse that depicts smugglers as only responsible for smuggling migrants, law enforcement strategies to militarize borders against irregular migrants would appear to be a ‘neutral’ choice (Maher, 2018). We also need to be aware, however, that any definition or term used in research to describe social phenomena means explicitly or implicitly choosing one meaning over another. Having explained the main critical points relating to the business and social system models, the following section examines a different theoretical interpretation based on organized crime literature in order to provide more insights on migrant smuggling.

Organizational crime models of smuggling The third model is called ‘organizational crime’ because it is based on the elaboration of a partial alternative perspective from which to analyse smuggling. It is also worth saying that literature on migrant smuggling only partially represents the theoretical perspectives mentioned earlier. In effect, research on migrant smuggling has not defined any clear theoretical boundaries, so, in the research, there are usually overlapping aspects referring to business, social systems and organizational crime smuggling models. For instance, in researching the business model, we could focus on the financial flows of money in smuggling, but, at the same time, we might discover that migrants use the hawala system to pay smugglers, which is an ancient payment method implying strong relationships of trust. Hawala consists of money transfers between two people through a third party outside the institutional banking system. Used in ancient times by Arab traders to avoid being robbed by marauding gangs, hawala relies on trust, leaves no traces and does not necessarily involve the physical transfer of money. As 21

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revealed through research on Somali and Afghan people, migrants and smugglers are both given a guarantee by a broker who takes the money and gives the smuggler only a code which then allows them to be paid when the migrant has reached their destination (Majidi, 2018). Moreover, Catherine Lamour and Michel Lamberti (1973: 56) describe a much more elaborate example of hawala used in drug trafficking in South East Asia, managed by Chinese merchants: It is very difficult to follow their financial operations: they have a very special trading technique, typical of the Chinese overseas, whether they are traffickers or not. A delivery is rarely paid for in cash or by bank check. The courier of the goods may receive in Bangkok, for example, a piece of paper the size of a postage stamp written by Mr. Wang authorizing him to ask Mr. Chiang, a person born in the same region, for a sum of x thousand dollars; maybe this Chiang has nothing to do with opium or heroin trafficking, and is quietly a grocer or manager of a restaurant in Singapore, New Delhi, London or Paris; but, upon seeing Mr. Wang’s piece of paper, he will hand over the requested sum, if necessary he will borrow it. Several months later, he will be able to pay for a delivery of pickled fish to his Asian supplier with a slip of cash-​in paper in the name of Mr. Wang of Bangkok. All that said, the organizational crime model has a different starting point from the other two models discussed. The focus here is to analyse the forms of organization set up for migrant smuggling, taking suggestions from literature on organized crime and economics applied to criminal markets. This model asks different questions. For instance, once it is assumed that smuggling must be considered a crime according to the joint protocol to the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, the question becomes not whether the smuggler is a criminal player, but rather what is their role and function within the migrant smuggling market. The focus is not on analysing this activity within the scope of relationships between people belonging to the same community, but rather asking if and what effects such relationships, once established, could have on the organizational structure of smuggling. In this regard, the ties that exist among smugglers could be considered an extra resource to offset the structural uncertainty typical of any kind of illegal activity (Lupsha, 1986). More specifically, specialized literature on migrant smuggling contains different organizational models (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 2001; Williams, 2001; Staring, 2008; Achilli, 2016; Campana, 2018; UNODC, 2018).

Hierarchical organization The first crime organization is based on a hierarchical model (Figure 2.1 at the end of the chapter). Here, there is a specific hierarchy that establishes 22

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different roles and functions among criminal players. For instance, in the country of departure, there are people involved in the recruitment of migrants, those employed in organizing their transportation, those who receive the migrants’ money and those who –​if the criminal group has its own connections in the destination country –​help the migrant people to integrate into the host society. The distinctive aspect of this model is essentially that the smuggling organization is based on a unique organization whose members share some kind of internal ties, be they generally strong, such as ethnic or familial ties, or less strong, such as mere economic interests among criminal players. On occasion, the hierarchical organizations are able to manage and supervise all migrants’ journeys, from the country of origin to the destination in a European country. This was the case for Chinese migrants smuggled to Italy from the 1990s to the 2000s. As several judiciary investigations carried out by Italian law enforcement revealed, criminal groups from the Fujian and Zhejiang provinces offered migrants an all-​inclusive journey from China to Italy (Becucci, 2006; CNEL, 2011). However, control over the migrants’ entire journey, despite the good performance of the criminal, was not a specific characteristic of the hierarchical model; first because the existence of an internal hierarchy pertains to the criminal group itself, and second because smugglers who are organized differently might still be able to control the migrants’ entire journey. Some authors claim that the hierarchical model recalls mafia-​like organizations, pointing out that smuggling migrant organizations cannot be included in the mafia category (Zhang, 2007; Sanchez, 2020; Triandafillydoud and Maroukis, 2012). First, we need to define conceptually what ‘mafia organization’ means. An analysis of the specialized literature from Western countries reveals not only a plurality of definitions of mafia, but these definitions frequently conflict with each other (Kleemans, 2014). For instance, some authors point out the existence of exclusive memberships based on secrecy and brotherhoods, while others consider mafia organizations as a system selling private protection in social contexts marked by a structural problem of trust (Paoli, 2003; Gambetta, 1992; Varese, 2011), and other authors depict mafia associations as brokers able to connect the legal and illegal sides (Sciarrone, 2011, 2019). Limiting the discussion here to summarizing the main theoretical perspectives on mafia organizations useful for analyzing migrant smuggling, Joseph Albini (1972) defines the Italo-​American Mafia –​conventionally called La Cosa Nostra (LCN) to differentiate it from the Sicilian Cosa Nostra –​ as a system of small independent groups whose leaders exercise patronage over a variety of people directly or indirectly related to the criminal group’s core. Albini interprets LCN as a form of power based on a patron-​client system, not significantly different from other relationships where the patron 23

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grants favours to clients in exchange for power, social recognition and economic benefits. Conversely, Donald Cressey (1969) depicts LCN as a criminal organization made up of hierarchy, internal rules, secrecy, functional division among members and a compartment structure capable of insulating the leaders in top positions from the members. Cressey claimed that LCN’s main strength was its centralized organization and division of roles, incorporating within itself business and government functions. These specific features, according to Cressey (1969: 110), assimilated LCN to US bureaucratic organizations: Cosa Nostra exists independently of its current personnel, as does any big business or government, and Cosa Nostra goes on despite complete turnover in the personnel occupying the various positions making up the organization. If a president, vice-​president, or some other functionary resigns or dies, another person is recruited to fill the vacant position. No man is indispensable. Organization, or ‘structure’, not persons, give Cosa Nostra its self-​perpetuating character. Cressey’s model received several criticisms. First, the assimilation of LCN to bureaucratic organizations was considered unfit to provide insight into its internal criminal dynamics. For instance, rivalries and conflicts among mafiosi were caused by members in senior positions to increase their power and wealth; the same rules that govern the criminal organization were exploited (or not respected) as an opportunity to increase one’s standing in the criminal association. Second, the depiction of LCN as a top national criminal confederation able to exercise control over the main illegal market and so powerful as to put US democracy at risk was criticized. This kind of representation, rather than realistic, was considered as a sort of sounding board of the law enforcement agencies, whose real purpose was to justify themselves in order to acquire ever more resources and power in society. Other perspectives on the Italo-​American Mafia point out that this criminal association provides illegal goods and services, positioning it within the broader spectrum of entrepreneurial activities, even if illegal in nature. In this regard, the focus is on criminal markets depicting more structured forms of organized crime as synonymous with illegal enterprise (Smith, 1975, 1978, 1980; Reuter, 1983). Illegal businesses are considered ‘an extension of legitimate market activities within areas normally prohibited by law –​ beyond existing regulatory limits –​in order to pursue profits in response to a latent demand for illicit goods’ (Smith, 1975: 335). Defining criminal organizations as illegal businesses means also considering their positions within illegal markets. In this regard, a contribution comes from Thomas Schelling (1967) who analysed the characteristics of illegal enterprises from an economic 24

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standpoint. He pointed out that illegal enterprises can acquire a different position in illegal markets according to their availability of scarce resources –​ such as violence and good connections to corrupt public officers –​and neutralize the activities of law enforcement agencies. Given these favourable conditions, the illegal enterprise can use violence and its connections to acquire a top position in illegal market management. Applying basic economic rules to criminal markets, Schelling identified illegal enterprises that occupy monopolistic or oligopolistic positions or that operate within open illegal markets. Monopolistic or oligopolistic illegal enterprises are able to manage illegal markets from a more profitable position through violence and the availability of privileged information and corruption, while those lacking these special resources are positioned at the bottom of this hypothetical pyramid. As a last useful perspective for our analysis, we recall the distinction made by Alan Block (2005) through his research on criminal dynamics in New York City from 1930 to 1950. He identifies two forms of criminal organization: the first is the enterprise syndicate; the second is the power syndicate. In line with American literature outlining the entrepreneurial nature of organized crime, the former essentially provides illegal goods and services to customers, while the latter involves racketeering. The power syndicate extorts people, including illegal enterprises if the criminal group is powerful enough in terms of violence and connections with the legal sphere of the society to do so. In light of these suggestions, we define a mafia organization in these terms: a criminal group based on a hierarchical structure with a division of roles and functions, whose members are tied by some form of bond and whose main resources are violence, neutralization of law enforcement activities, and financial availability to increase its power and rooting in the social context where the criminal association is present. Moreover, the patron-​client system suggests that, once applied to relationships among smugglers, it is always an asymmetric situation that establishes an intrinsic advantage to one party –​the leader –​over the others. Cressey’s criminal perspective, several aspects of which have been rightly criticized, is useful to understand the role of specializations within the criminal organization and how the chain of command works. Lastly, the availability of a scarce resource such as violence, pointed out by Block and Schelling, helps us to better identify the role of more organized criminal groups involved in migrant smuggling.

Network model The second form of criminal organization comes from the network analysis applied to the illegal domain (Figure 2.2). If a hierarchy could be depicted 25

Smuggling and Trafficking of Migrants in Southern Europe

as a sole organization made up of members occupying positions on different layers, each one corresponding to a different portion of power and decision-​ making ability, the network is organized differently. Each point represents a cluster of individuals. The main difference between the hierarchical model and the network model is that the latter is made up of different organizations (that is, groups), with each one functionally cooperating in the smuggling activities. We call this organizational configuration a network of networks, which can be extended to different degrees according to the geographical breadth of the physical positions of all contact points. These contact points are based on clusters (groups) of individuals. Moreover, where there is a tie between two clusters (some individuals belonging to cluster 1 are tied to some individuals in cluster 2), we could presumably expect, as recalled by Barry Wellman (2001: 44), that ‘all members of one cluster are linked to all members of the other through the bonds that unite the two clusters’. This likely happens due to the social relationship proximity that is characteristic of the clusters’ spatial configuration. Social ties among people belonging to the same criminal group and among clusters could be based on various criteria, ranging from stronger to weaker bonds, although criminal networks tend to be based on loose ties (Williams, 2001; Savona, 2010). The main difference between the hierarchical criminal model and those based on criminal networks is that the latter are usually based on loose bonds and the former on strong ones. Criminal players operating within a network are deemed to follow business-​oriented behaviour due to their weaker ties, going from stable to ad hoc participation in criminal matters with other players. We talk about ad hoc participation on the assumption that there are no other bonds among players apart from potential profit expectations. Then, when circumstances change and negatively influence the criminal players’ expectations, there are no incentives to maintain the collaboration with other criminal groups. It should be remembered, however, that, from a theoretical organizational standpoint, there is only a slight difference between the hierarchical and network models because all networks always include a certain level of internal hierarchy (Campana, 2016). In other words, both models are on a continuum with different levels of organizational complexity. In these terms, as the number of people belonging to a network increases to match the extent of the criminal affairs, we can expect the internal organization of the network to become more and more hierarchical. Moreover, if we consider more specifically the definition of mafia organizations opted for here, not only the hierarchical dimension but also the use of violence, the availability of capital and the neutralization of law enforcement operations could be considered other dimensions of the same continuum. Violence, financial availability and the corruption of public officers are scarce resources, so criminal groups that have these precious assets at their disposal are able to augment their criminal calibre. 26

Theoretical Frameworks on Migrant Smuggling

In this regard, to demonstrate what it means to have a huge amount of financial capital, we refer to the main events that enabled Sicilian Cosa Nostra to assume a pre-​eminent position in international drug trafficking, a criminal market structured on very significant different levels: tendentially oligopolistic at the top, while open to local competitors at the bottom, corresponding to selling drugs at street level (Rubin, 1973; Arlacchi and Lewis, 1990; Lepri, 1993). Up until the mid-​1960s, members of Sicilian Mafia did not hold top positions in the international drug market. It was largely dominated by the so-​called French Connection, whose routes passed through France and whose main players were the Marseille clan in the importation of heroin from South East Asia, Turkey and the Middle East. According to reports by Antonino Calderone, a former member of a Cosa Nostra family from Catania, before the Sicilian mafiosi devoted themselves to international heroin trafficking they were not doing very well: ‘when they started getting out of jail, around 1968, the leaders of Italian Cosa Nostra were almost all starving … [Salvatore Riina, head of the Corleonesi] cried when he told me that his mother could not go to talk with him [in prison] … because he could not pay for her train ticket’ (Arlacchi, 1992: 86). At that time, tobacco smuggling was the most important illegal business in which Sicilian Cosa Nostra was involved. Although the profits were significant, the main market expansion limits were the scarce availability of merchant ships and safe ports in which to land and, above all, the lack of capital available to each clan to buy an entire load of cigarettes (Arlacchi, 1988). Within a few years, however, the situation changed significantly to the advantage of the Palermo mafia families. The availability of capital to invest in international drug trafficking originated from large-​scale infiltration in the city building sector during the 1960s under the direction of Vito Ciancimino, who was affiliated with Cosa Nostra and the first councillor and then mayor of the city (Santino and La Fiura, 1990; Tranfaglia, 2001). Mafia families were also able to seize a substantial part of the state funding provided to Sicily under the solidarity fund (Arlacchi, 1983). All that said, the synergistic use of violence, access to capital and the corruption of public powers enables a criminal group to increase its criminal affairs. To the extent that this happens, we can expect the criminal group to move along between the two poles of the continuum. In this case, the direction of change is from a network-​based organization towards a more hierarchical structure. In other words, organizational change allows the group, thanks to a better division of criminal labour in terms of the roles and functions carried out by everyone, to internalize the cost of some transactions that were previously outsourced. For example, according to some judicial investigations into Camorra clans dating back some years, the use of affiliates in the transportation of money from Italy to Venezuela to pay for a batch of drugs made it possible to significantly 27

Smuggling and Trafficking of Migrants in Southern Europe

reduce the transaction costs. Using a courier from outside the group would have resulted, according to the statements of the Neapolitan traffickers themselves, in ‘a very high transport price, in the order of 3–​4% of the amount transported’ (Tribunal Naples, 2001: 27). More recently, a Nigerian courier who brings money from western countries to Nigeria takes 6 per cent of the transported capital (Scialdone, 2023). In short, we assume that each cluster has a vertical criminal dimension ranging from a specific power hierarchy, chain of command and division of criminal labour to much less elaborate forms along these lines. At the minimum level, there is a criminal leader who manages and gives orders to those further down the chain. The criminal group has internal flexibility in the sense that each member could perform different duties, for instance from driving boats loaded with migrants to organizing the recruitment of new clients to be transported. When the group has a very low organizational profile, the leader usually adopts a relationship with the people lower down based on a patron-​client system. In this regard, we refer to the story by Luigi Achilli (2018) of a Syrian smuggler who had around 30 people operating under him in the Turkish city of Elgar. Abu Hamza, the Syrian smuggler, considered himself to be a good Muslim because he helped his compatriots to flee from Syria and enabled them to reach Greece. As reported by Achilli (2018: 86): The smuggling groups that I met were also made up of ‘freelancers’ –​ individuals who participated occasionally. My informants maintained that these were often locals who provided peripheral services to ensure that the smugglers could operate undisturbed. This was evident with Abu Hamza and his group. While his closest collaborators were mostly Syrian refugees who explained their involvement in the group as a consequence of their ethical commitment to helping their fellow Syrians, a broader nebulous of people –​mainly locals –​flowed around this inner circle. These people played a number of roles –​spotters who would provide specific information about the presence of the authorities, drivers who would take the customers to the nuqta [the spot], or landowners who would rent a piece of land near the shore to be used as a departure point. Abu Hamza did not consider these people part of his ‘family,’ but freelancers who were paid for each service delivered. Abu Hamza compensated his closest collaborators differently: ‘I give them around 1500 euro each month, but this is an average. … If they need more money to send to their families back home, I give them more. I am like a father to them. The relationships between clusters (criminal groups) are not usually horizontal (Wellman, 2001). The reason for this is that ties among 28

Theoretical Frameworks on Migrant Smuggling

clusters are normally asymmetric as the available resources, whether they be organizational capability, violence, capital or protection from law enforcement operations, are distributed unevenly. However, an organization change within a cluster tending towards a hierarchical set-​ up does not imply a change in the relationships between all the clusters. This does not happen unless some conditions are in place: first, not until common participation in the same criminal market is broken by the clusters, where each one is functionally indispensable to carry out the illegal affairs; second, not until all the clusters share the same criminal vision based on business-​oriented behaviour. Under these conditions, all criminal players benefit from maintaining cooperation among themselves instead of engaging in conflicts. In other words, the relationships among clusters are not likely to change until all players involved in management of the same criminal market act as an enterprise syndicate instead of a power syndicate.

Network of individuals The third organizational system is represented by a network made up of single individuals (Figure 2.3). In this case, each individual makes up a node of the network and provides a functional contribution to managing the illegal activity. Ties among smugglers in the network could be strong or weak. As we have already said, we assume that strong ties are based on some bonds such as kinship, while weak ties mean being motivated exclusively by profit. Although, theoretically, we could consider that some forms of asymmetry exist among smugglers, the relationships among them tend to be horizontal due to the very simple structure of the network. The quality of ties among people in the network reflects a different way of conducting the illegal businesses. As previously seen for the social system model, strong ties between smuggler (or broker) and migrant due to their same social context implies an exchange that is not only reducible to an economic aspect but also reflects some forms of social obligation and reciprocal expectation. Bearing this in mind, we could expect that, in smuggler networks where people are tied by strong bonds, the relationship between them will not be based merely on profit and nor will it be occasional. Conversely, weak ties among single smugglers will correspond to a business-​oriented and opportunistic relationship. Hypothetically, there could be multiple combinations among the three organizational crime models described. Let’s try to contextualize these models using some examples, first concentrating on a network of single smugglers (Figure 2.3). In this kind of network, specific expertise in smuggling has usually developed. This is the case of passeurs bringing migrants from one state border to another along familiar trails known to people who live in 29

Smuggling and Trafficking of Migrants in Southern Europe

the area. Another example is a network specialized in producing counterfeit documents to introduce migrants into a new state by plane. In theory, it could be assumed that this network would be able to offer multiple services to migrants according to the extension and potential expertise provided. However, the very low-​level organizational profile makes it difficult for people in the network to offer multiple services to migrants because each individual/​node usually has a limited number of skills at their disposal. So, in general terms, the smaller the network the more specialized services it will offer migrants. Another example refers to a hierarchical cluster that collaborates with other loose cluster organizations, such as the case of Syrian smuggler Abu Hamza (a combination of Figures 2.1 and 2.2). There could be a hierarchical criminal group that occupies a monopolistic or oligopolistic position in a certain territory. This area could represent, according to the different geographical circumstances, a migrant smuggling hub as it is at the intersection of several migrant routes. Based on the resources listed earlier, this criminal group has been able to control the territory by positioning itself as the top management of the hub. At the same time, it has stable business relationships with other groups located in other areas, inside or outside the same country, along the migrant route. The business carries on as usual among the different criminal groups as long as no changes occur. Such changes could involve some factors that, from an analytical standpoint, are broken down into two categories: endogenous factors –​inside the criminal groups, or exogenous factors –​outside the group. Regarding the former factors, as long as migrant smuggling increases and the criminal relationships among the groups, even based on significant asymmetries, are business oriented and functionally geared towards managing the migrants’ entire route, no changes are likely to happen. This smuggling system could undergo upheavals if the more powerful criminal group (in the hierarchical hypothesis) decides to expand its control over migrant routes managed by other criminal partners, imposing less favourable business conditions or establishing some forms of racketeering on them. In these terms, the more powerful criminal groups act as a power syndicate instead of an enterprise syndicate. Exogenous factors, on the other hand, are often the main reason that the relationships among the clusters could be significantly altered, for instance the introduction of new laws in the transit migration countries establishing more severe punishments for migrant smuggling and, overall, the presence of military forces committed to countering smugglers and migrants along the route. As the migrant routes extend for thousands of kilometres, the presence of law enforcement at one or more points along the route to counter smuggling would result in a change to the smugglers’ network. Any such change could cause the partial or total opening of 30

Theoretical Frameworks on Migrant Smuggling

new routes, thereby completely altering the original configuration of the smuggler network. Some smugglers will cease to be able to use the previous routes as they become too risky or simply impracticable due to police patrols, while new smugglers will have the opportunity to break into the market once the routes have changed. Long migratory routes can be easier to break at some points with patrolling police, but, at the same time as the route is longer, it can offer various alternative paths for smugglers to bypass surveillance by the authorities. So, the existence of long migratory routes broken at some points due to law enforcement surveillance has a contradictory effect: on the one hand, it forces smugglers to evade the authorities’ control by establishing new routes, and, on the other, it can result in a new configuration of the smuggler network. The new routes cause some alliances among smugglers to fail, while other alliances are established.

The main characteristics of the three organizational crime models Figure 2.1: The hierarchical organizational model

Note: A single organization whose access to non-​members is decided by those occupying the top positions. • A system of rules, symbols and cultural traditions reflecting the identity of the members belonging to this organizational model. • There is a criminal division of labour: each member tends to occupy different roles and manage different functions. • According to a member’s position within the hierarchical structure, they also have a specific share of power and decision-​making ability. Source: Adapted from UNODC (2018)

31

Smuggling and Trafficking of Migrants in Southern Europe

Figure 2.2: The network of criminal networks B

A

A

D

B

C D

C

C D

B A

Note: Everyone has a link with other people belonging to their group (or cluster). • The ties among people belonging to the same cluster may be strong or weak. • The criminal roles of people within the same cluster may be specific or general; each person could play multiple roles or not, depending on the extension of the criminal organization and the extent of the criminal business. As the volume of activity increases, the internal organization in terms of people’s specific roles can be expected to develop. • Groups are related to each other through links between people belonging to the network of networks. • The criminal labour division is functionally broken down into clusters. • The relationships among clusters are asymmetrical. • The ties among clusters are generally business oriented. Source: Adapted from Wellman (2001)

Figure 2.3: A network made up of individuals A

B

C

Note: Everyone is related to others in the network based on the role they play. • The network tends to have a horizontal configuration and offer specialized illegal services. • Ties among smugglers belonging to the network are tendentially weak, although they could also be strong, for instance an individual network based on kinship bonds. • Except for the existence of stronger ties among smugglers, the participation of each person in the network is generally business oriented and may be occasional. Source: Adapted from Wellman (2001)

32

3

Irregular Migration Towards Southern Europe This chapter first examines the specific situation of irregular immigration by sea to Spain, Italy and Greece, and then goes on to summarize the situation in all three Southern European counties. More specifically, the analysis covers the following aspects: the number of migrants landed in the three European countries; the main routes followed by migrants to reach Mediterranean countries in the European Union; policies to counter irregular immigration; and the migrant smuggling system.

Irregular migrants arriving in Spain Here we report official data on migrants that have arrived in Spain in recent decades taken from the website of the Spanish Ministry of the Interior. Landing data is divided into three different geographical areas: the Canary Islands; the Balearics and the Spanish peninsula; and Ceuta and Melilla, two Spanish territories in Morocco. No information about nationality is provided. To compensate for this lack of detailed information, we referred to other sources, such as UNHCR, Frontex and some Spanish research centres. Taking these limitations into consideration, we provide data on migrants who arrived by sea and then we report statistical information for each Spanish geographical area. Figure 3.1 shows the total number of migrants who landed in Spain from 1999 to 2021. In 1999, the number was very low (4,859 people), with an average of 17,185 migrants per year in the two decades, and eightfold growth from 1999 to 2021 (40,100). In recent years, the nationalities of most migrants arriving in Spain were Moroccan and Algerian, followed by nationals from some sub-​Sharan countries. In 2020, for example, Algerians represented 40 per cent of all arrivals, Moroccans 20 per cent, Malians 13 per cent, Guineans 8 per cent and Senegalese 5 per cent (Statista, 2020). Moreover, as shown in Figure 3.1, the arrivals line shows significant oscillations. In the first section, 33

Smuggling and Trafficking of Migrants in Southern Europe

Figure 3.1: Number of migrants landing in Spanish territories (1999–​2021)

Number of landed migrants

60,000 50,000 40,000 30,000 20,000 10,000

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021

0 Year

Source: Adapted from the Spanish Ministry of the Interior (1999–​2021)

from 1999 to 2003, there was continuous growth, then, between 2004 and 2005, the number of arrivals dropped. In 2006, arrivals reached a peak of 39,180 and then started to decrease again until 2010 when there were 3,632 arrivals. A relatively stationary period followed, with some thousand migrants per year until 2016 when their number once again started to increase. Save for 2019, when there were 26,103 arrivals, the number rose to a peak in 2018 of 53,004, followed in 2020 by 40,385, then in 2021, it was 40,100 (28,930 in 2022). The first pointer to shed light on the line’s great oscillation comes from arrivals to the Canary Islands on the one hand and the Balearics and peninsula on the other. In Figure 3.2, we have overlapped the arrivals considering all landed migrants, migrants who reached the Canary Islands, and those who arrived in the Balearics and peninsula. As Figure 3.2 shows, arrivals in the Canary Islands in 2006 accounted for the great majority of all landed migrants in the year. According to data from the Government Delegation in the Canaries, of the 39,180 migrants who arrived there, 16,215 came from Senegal, followed by Gambia (3,627), Mali (3,418), Ivory Coast (1,696) and Morocco (1,225) (Godenau and Hernandez, 2008). Those who landed in the Canary Islands in 2006 represented 80.9 per cent of all migrants who reached Spain by sea. The peak in 2018 was due to arrivals to the Balearics and the peninsula, with 50,527 migrants, corresponding to 95.3 per cent of the total that year. More specifically, from 2010 to 2019, the great majority of migrants who landed in Spain arrived in the Balearics and the peninsula. In 2019, this ‘big area’ saw 21,863 migrants, 83.8 per cent of the total. More recently, arrivals to the Balearics and peninsula decreased in 2020 to 16,560 (41.0 per cent), 34

Irregular Migration Towards Southern Europe

Figure 3.2: All migrants landed compared with migrants in the Canary Islands and the Balearics and the peninsula (1999–​2021)

Number of landed migrants

60,000 50,000 40,000 30,000 20,000 10,000

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021

0 Year All landed

Canary Islands

Balearics and peninsula

Source: Adapted from the Spanish Ministry of the Interior (1999–​2021)

while, in the Canary Islands, the number increased to 23,271 (57.6 per cent). A very similar situation happened in 2021 when 17,341 migrants arrived in the Balearics and peninsula (43.2 per cent), while the rest were, for the most part, made up of landings in the Canary Islands: 22,316 people (55.7 per cent). Arrivals by sea to Ceuta and Melilla had little influence on the total number of migrants, going respectively from the highest percentage of 5.9 in 2019 to the lowest of 1.1 in 2021. So, the marked oscillation of arrivals by sea in the period shown in Figure 3.1 is due to higher and lower numbers of migrants arriving in the Canary Islands and, alternatively, the Balearics and peninsula. In the two decades analysed, when one landing trajectory decreased, the other increased, while, in 2020 and 2021, both tended to have similar quotas of landed migrants. So, attempting to shed light on the oscillation of the two Canaries and Balearics lines in Figure 3.2 means accounting for the majority of migrants who landed in Spain. First of all, we analyse the migratory route towards the Canary Islands, and then the route to the Balearics and peninsula.

Along the Atlantic Ocean route to the Canary Islands The Canary Islands are close to Western Sahara. El Aaiún, the nearest Western Sahara city in a line-​of-​sight trajectory to Las Palmas de Gran Canaria is around 250 kilometres away, while the distance from Tarfaya in Morocco to Fuerteventura is around 120 kilometres, and from Dakar to Las Palmas in 35

Smuggling and Trafficking of Migrants in Southern Europe

Figure 3.3: Migrants landing in the Canary Islands (1994–​2021)

30,000 25,000 20,000 15,000 10,000 5,000 0

1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021

Number of landed migrants

35,000

Year

Source: Adapted from the Spanish Ministry of the Interior (1994–​2021)

Tenerife around 1,600 kilometres. Figure 3.3 shows migrant arrivals in the Canary Islands from 1994 to 2021. In 1994, ten migrants landed in the Canary Islands, then, in the following years the number increased until reaching a peak in 2006. Thereafter, Canary Islands arrivals gradually decreased to 425 in 2017; then, from 2019 onwards, arrivals rose to 23,271 in 2020 and 22,316 in 2021. The main routes to the Canary Islands start from several points in Mali, such as Sikasso and Bamako, and Kumasi in Ghana towards Kayar, and other localities along the Senegal coast where migrants board vessels bound for Tenerife (Gatti, 2017; Maher, 2018). In addition, there are routes from Dakar heading to the islands of Sal and Sao Vicente in Cape Verde and later to the Canary Islands; and routes from the cities of Mbour and Thiaroye on the Senegalese coast and from the Gulf of Guinea, always heading to Tenerife (Carling, 2007; Godenau and Hernandez, 2008; Enriquez de Salamanca, 2022). Another point of departure is in Nouadhibou in Mauritania, headed to Tenerife. From Morocco, the main departure areas for Fuerteventura are close to El Aaiún and Tarfaya (see Figure 3.4). Senegalese smugglers use small pirogues, usually used for fishing, to transport migrants offshore, and later they are moved to grandes pirogues, which are more suitable for longer and more dangerous navigation in the Atlantic Ocean. Alternatively, migrants arrive in Mauritania to be embarked from these coasts, since it is a shorter distance to the Canary Islands than from Senegal (Maher, 2018). According to Vasiry, a migrant from Gambia interviewed in November 2021 at a reception centre for asylum seekers in Granada, the journey from Dakar to Tenerife took nine days. Given the distance and that the islands are in the Atlantic, smugglers do not use small boats such as 36

Irregular Migration Towards Southern Europe

Figure 3.4: Main routes from West Africa to the Canary Islands

Italy Spain Spain Balearics sea ean

r ran

dite

Me

Tunisia Tunisia Morocco Morocco Canary Islands El Aaiún Tarfaya

Libya Libya

Algeria Algeria

Western Western Sahara Sahara Mauritania Mauritania Nouadhibou Mali Mali Cape Verde Cape Verde Gambia Gambia Guinea-Bissau

Kayar Dakar Mbour Thiaroye Senegal Senegal

Bamako Sikasso

Guinea Guinea Sierra Sierra Leone Liberia Liberia

Ivory Ivory Coast Coast

Niger Niger

Burkina Burkina Faso Faso Benin Benin T Ghana o Ghana g o

Nigeria Nigeria

Kumasi Cameroon Cameroon

Source: Adapted from Simoncini (2004); Carling (2007); Collyer (2007); Godenau and Hernandez (2008); Herbert (2016); Gatti (2017); Maher (2018); Enriquez de Salamancas (2022)

pateras (wooden boats) or Zodiacs (inflatable boats), and instead they usually use small or medium-​sized fishing boats, as Vasiry reported. Vasiry, 17 years old and from a rural area close to Bakau, was living with his mother while his father was settled in Dakar. They agreed that he would 37

Smuggling and Trafficking of Migrants in Southern Europe

leave for Spain. He left Gambia in October 2020 and reached Dakar having autonomously crossed the border between Gambia and Senegal travelling by bus. Once in Dakar, he asked some compatriots for information on where he could find a boat to reach the Canary Islands. He paid around €400 in local currency to a Senegal smuggler to be embarked in a fishing boat. He waited for around two weeks in a village close to Dakar until the boat was to be full of people. Once it was filled with 125 people, the boat left port during the night under the guide of a Senegal captain. The migrants were only allowed to take water and some food with them. Four days after starting the journey, the fuel ran out and the helmsman made a call to be rescued by Spanish authorities. The moment the helmsman saw the coastguard approaching, he threw away his satellite mobile, pretending to be one of the migrants. Although Vasiry refused to talk specifically about the captain or what happened to him, in this case it was the helmsman’s duty to drive the boat for the smuggler organization (Appendix 74). After the 2006 peak in arrivals to the Canary Islands, the Spanish authorities took action to counter irregular immigration from along the West African coast. The government implemented new targeted measures to combat the issue and improved the systems of control already in place against smugglers and irregular migrants along areas of the Spanish territory. In early 2002, the Spanish authorities implemented satellite surveillance with the SIVE (Sistema Integrado de Vigilancia Exteriora), which first became operative in the Algeciras coastal area, in Andalusia, and was then extended in 2006 to around 500 kilometres of the Spanish coast. In 2012, the SIVE covered all Spanish south-​eastern coasts, from Girona to Huelva, including the Balearics and Canaries. The latter was covered by satellite surveillance in 2006, firstly part of Lanzarote and then, in the following two years, all of the Canary Islands (Spanish Ministry of Interior, 2010). This surveillance system is based on three features: radar stations scattered along the Spanish coasts, control centres where police units monitor the movement of people and means of transport at sea using cameras and radars, and interception units equipped with helicopters, ground vehicles and patrol boats ready to intervene when they receive the order from the control centre (Lòpez-​Sala, 2009). In 2006, at Spanish request, Frontex, the European agency devoted to countering irregular immigration to the EU, started patrolling the western coasts of Africa, with the military support of Spain and other member states, as part of the so-​called Hera operation, a military patrolling (Jegen, 2020). Furthermore, in 2003 the Moroccan parliament approved a law that gave the police more power to counter irregular immigration and smugglers. Morocco finally approved the main requests presented in the 1999 EU-​ Morocco action plan that had been rejected previously by the Morocco government. In 2004, the new Spanish government, led by Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, improved relations with Morocco. The following year, Moroccan 38

Irregular Migration Towards Southern Europe

military forces were trained and equipped by Spanish police officers as part of an EU-​funded project to patrol potential departure areas of the north and west Sahara towards the Canary Islands (Collyer, 2007). In 2006, as the number of migrants arriving in the Canary Islands increased, the Spanish Ministry of the Interior built a new internal division called Direciòn General de la Relaciones Internaciones y Extranjera to establish relations with states such as Mauritania, Senegal, Algeria and Morocco where would-​be migrants could depart from (Spanish Ministry of Interior, 2012). In 2013, the EUROSUR (European Border Surveillance System) became active. Its duties included supporting and coordinating the sea surveillance systems along the southern EU borders. That same year, Spain began the interconnection between the SIVE and the Portuguese SIVIC (Sistema Integrado de Vigilancia, Comando y Control), and, in 2016, these two satellite surveillances became fully integrated (Spanish Ministry of Interior, 2016). The efforts made by Spain and Frontex to counter smugglers and irregular migration along the Atlantic route were significant in terms of funds and human resources. For instance, in 2008, Frontex doubled its budget from €12 million to 24 million in order to patrol the West African coasts. Spain increased its number of customs officers from 10,239 in 2003 to 16,375 in 2010 (Spanish Ministry of Interior, 2010). The estimated cost to partially implement the SIVE according to the territorial area covered in 2008 was around €300 million (Lòpez-​Sala, 2009). After the peak in 2006, the implementation of several measures against smugglers and irregular migration produced results in terms of the numbers of migrants landing in the Canary Islands. From 2007, for more than a decade, arrivals decreased with the lowest number of 425 in 2017. Then, the following year, arrivals through this sea route started to increase again: 1,236 in 2018, 2,687 in 2019 and strong growth in 2020 and 2021 at 23,271 and 22,316. In 2020, the migrant people that reached the islands were mainly from the Maghreb regions (at 51 per cent, mainly from Morocco), 19.5 per cent from Mali, 11.5 per cent from Senegal, 7 per cent from Ivory Coast, and 6 per cent from Guinea. In line with this data, in the early months of 2022, the Canary Islands received 14,875 migrants, whose top three nationalities were Moroccan, Guinean and Senegalese (Spanish Ministry of Interior, 2022; Frontex, 2022). The oscillation of migrants arriving in the Canary Islands is related to two aspects. The first is that increased surveillance and patrolling of the Atlantic along the West African coasts had a twofold effect. On the one hand, it discouraged smugglers and migrants from taking this route due to the higher risk of being intercepted by police units; on the other hand, military patrol resulted in displacement towards other migratory trajectories in order to reach Southern Europe, from the Atlantic to land paths through African countries and the Sahara Desert (Maher, 2018). 39

Smuggling and Trafficking of Migrants in Southern Europe

The second explanation of why a consistent increase was recorded in 2020 and 2021 has multiple aspects. First, any kind of migration control measure implemented by Frontex and EU member states along European borders may help to intercept migrants and smugglers but have very little effect on curbing the causes of migration. Second, the EU strategy based on encouraging origin and transit countries to share the burden of countering irregular emigration has had ambivalent effects. For instance, the first migration agreement between Morocco and Spain dates back to 1992. However, up until 2004, Morocco only accepted its own compatriots while refusing any other migrants (in large part from sub-​Saharan countries) who had reached Spain via Moroccan territories (Simoncini, 2004). The Moroccan government used the emigration issue as a bargaining chip to receive more economic aid from Spain and the EU, leaving migrants to travel through the country, or blocking them, depending on the economic benefits it could obtain. More recently, a renegotiated agreement between Spain and Morocco that came into force in 2017 guaranteed renewed involvement of the Moroccan government in countering the departure of irregular migrants by sea in exchange for economic support from Spain and the EU. However, the participation of Morocco’s police force in fighting irregular departures raises questions about safeguarding human rights and compliance with the 1951 Geneva Convention for those aiming to apply for refuge as an asylum seeker in an EU state. As reported by a Spanish NGO, in September 2022 a migrant was killed and another three were wounded by Moroccan police who fired several shots at a migrant boat to successfully abort its departure from Tarfaya to the Canary Islands (Maleno, 2022). In Senegal and other sub-​Sharan countries from which people emigrate to Spain, the situation is similar to that of Morocco (Godenau and Hernandez, 2008). The year after the 2006 Canaries ‘crisis’, Senegal signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Spain that established circular migration from the two countries. The agreement allowed entry into Spain for around 2,000 Senegalese people to work in the agriculture sector for a period of three years. However, the programme came to an end after just a few months due to favouritism in the selection of people by the Senegalese authorities and those selected lacking experience in that domain. A second programme permitted the arrival in Spain of some dozen Senegalese citizens, but it was terminated prematurely because most remained as ‘overstayers’ in Spain instead of returning to their country within the agreed time frame (Jegen, 2020). Following a pattern already established with other third countries, in 2005, European institutions requested that Senegal introduce a new law to punish smuggling and trafficking in human beings, according to the joint protocol of the 2000 UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. In the same period, together with Mauritania, Cape Verde, Portugal 40

Irregular Migration Towards Southern Europe

and Spain, Senegal was a partner in the Seahorse operation funded by the EU Commission between 2004 and 2006 to establish coordination among coastguards in order to counter irregular migration (Casas-​Cortes et al, 2016). However, the EU goal of achieving more effective collaboration with Senegal did not go smoothly. In 2012, the new Senegalese government refused to accept the readmission agreements signed with the EU and other member states some years before (France in 2006 and 2008; Spain in 2006 and 2007; Italy in 2008). The government declared that it would not accept any more forced returns, a question which is still open (  Jegen, 2020). Third countries that the EU requested to stem irregular emigration from their territories have other primary interests. First, the Maghreb and sub-​ Saharan countries received most of their economic aid from abroad through migrants’ remittances. In 2020, migrants’ remittances to Morocco amounted to 6.5 per cent of GDP, Egypt 8.1 per cent, Gambia 22.7 per cent, Mali 5.7 per cent, Ghana 6.1 per cent, and Senegal 10.5 per cent (World Bank, 2021). In addition, stricter regulations on people travelling through sub-​ Saharan countries put at risk free movement among African countries that are members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Senegal, with other sub-​Sharan countries, signed the ECOWAS agreement in 1975, the principles of which are based on the free movement of people and goods among state members.1 Furthermore, in Senegal, emigration represents not only a source of hard currency and valuable financial aid for local development, but many ordinary people perceive it positively as an opportunity to improve their social status (Jegen, 2020). Against this background, the rise in the number of migrants who landed in the Canary Islands in 2020 and 2021 could be partially explained by the worsening socio-​economic conditions in Senegal in recent years, the country representing one of the main sources of migration to the Canary Islands. The joint effects of climate change, overfishing in coastal areas, the recent drop in tourists due to the Covid-​19 pandemic, and the availability of hundreds of fishing boats all contribute to renewed migration from the country. In these last decades, the Senegalese shoreline has retreated by an average of 1 to 2 metres per year (Bakhoum et al, 2017). According to some estimates, coastal retreat and flooding have affected high numbers of the population: around 3 million people in 2000, and 8 million people will be affected by 2030, in particular those living in low-​lying areas below 10 metres (Neumann et al, 2015). In a country of around 18 million inhabitants, where the agriculture sector employs 60 per cent of the active population and living conditions in rural areas are still characterized by a high level of poverty affecting more than half of families, the effects of climate change can be particularly severe (AICS, 2021). In 2016, the fishing sector represented around 3 per cent of GDP, directly employing 58,200 workers (Belhabib et al, 2015a, 2015b; Diedhiou & Yang, 2018). The growth in global fishing 41

Smuggling and Trafficking of Migrants in Southern Europe

demand together with the arrival in the 1970s of foreign fishing boats –​most from EU countries, China, Russia, Taiwan and South Korea –​using the industrial fishing system along the western coasts of Africa have resulted in the gradual depletion of catches in an area that, some decades ago, was one of the richest in the world (Enriquez de Salamanca, 2022). The Covid-​19 pandemic did not have severe effects in Senegal from a health standpoint. According to data from the World Health Organization (2022), since the outbreak of the virus in 2020 up until September 2022, Senegal reported 88,339 people infected and 1,968 deaths (WHO, 2022). However, between 2020 and 2021 tourism decreased drastically worldwide, affecting all West African countries. According to the UN World Tourism Organization, which provides data by macro region only, in 2020, sub-​ Saharan Africa experienced a 72 per cent drop in international tourism arrivals. In 2021, the negative trend continued with –​73 per cent compared with pre-​pandemic 2019 (UNWTO, 2022). As for Senegal, according to some estimates, the tourist sector represented 2.2 per cent of GDP in 2017 (Enriquez de Salamanca, 2022). The increase in new emigration by sea to the Canary Islands from Senegal and other West African countries is due to several factors, such as climate change, the decline in tourism related to the Covid-​19 pandemic and overfishing. The latter reduced the capture of fish and the number of local fishermen, leading some to divert their activities to the smuggling business, which is much more profitable than fishery. Offshore patrolling by Frontex and EU member states’ coastguards acts as a deterrent to smugglers and would-​be irregular migrants, but the only efficient system of stemming migrant departures is to obtain the collaboration of countries where migrants come from. Senegal is reluctant to accept the forced return of its citizens and probably to truly cooperate as well, as EU member states would want to stem irregular migration from its coasts (Adam et al, 2020; Jegen, 2020). The main reason that countries do not fully collaborate is related to divergent interests among Western and ‘developing’ countries, with the former willing to exchange measures against irregular emigration for economic aid, while the latter draw a significant part of their wealth from the remittances of their compatriots abroad.

From Morocco and Algeria to the south-east Spanish coast The Balearic Islands are roughly midway between the West African coast and the south-​east coast of Spain, in the Mediterranean Sea. Palma, the capital of Majorca, is 315 kilometres away from Algeria. Official Spanish data on migrants who arrived in the Balearics and the peninsula refers to all migrants landed in a long coastal area, ranging approximately from 42

Irregular Migration Towards Southern Europe

60,000 50,000 40,000 30,000 20,000 10,000

06 20 07 20 08 20 09 20 10 20 11 20 12 20 13 20 14 20 15 20 16 20 17 20 18 20 19 20 20 20 21

05

20

04

20

20

20

20

03

0

02

Number of landed migrants

Figure 3.5: Migrants landing in the Balearic Islands and the Spanish peninsula (2002–​2021)

Year

Source: Adapted from the Spanish Ministry of the Interior (2002–​2021)

Cádiz, on the south-​west Spanish coast close to the Strait of Gibraltar, to the Alicante province in the north. Figure 3.5 shows the number of migrants landing in the Balearic Islands and the peninsula. Between 2002 and 2016, arrivals remained relatively low: in 2002, they were 6,795, and 7,490 in 2016. In 2017, landed migrants numbered 20,611; the following year, 50,527. From 2019 to 2021, they decreased to 21,863 (2019), 16,560 (2020) and 17,341 (2021). The significant increase in migrants started in 2016 compared with the previous year, reaching a peak in 2018, after which the trend decreased again. Since the 1990s, Moroccan and sub-​Saharan migrants have attempted to reach the Spanish coast along the Strait of Gibraltar. The main embarkation points are Tangier, Mesnana, Al Hoceima, Tétouan in Morocco; Melilla; and Aïn Témouchent in Algeria (Carling, 2007). From Algeria, Algerian and sub-​Saharan migrants travelling along the coast, cross the Moroccan border around Maghnia and head to Nadar or Tangier where they attempt to enter Ceuta or Melilla or, alternatively, to reach the Spanish coast by pateras or Zodiac inflatables (Simoncini, 2004; Herbert, 2016). Migrants land in Tarifa, a Spanish city 15 kilometres from Morocco, or along the south-​ eastern peninsula from the Strait to Almería (see Figure 3.6). Since the late 1990s, the smuggling market along the Strait of Gibraltar has flourished. Several systems are used to reach Spain. Migrants hide under the axles of trucks, with thousands of people and vehicles crossing back and forth from Morocco to Spain on a daily basis. By sea, migrants travel by night in boats loaded with 30–40 people from Tangier or Al Hoceima to the Spanish coast, paying around €750 each to the smugglers. Moroccan drivers leave the migrant people along the coast between Tarifa and Cádiz. The migrants then hide in the woods and wait for sunrise, when people living in Spain, compatriots or locals, lead them to the cities of Almería or Murcia. With 43

Smuggling and Trafficking of Migrants in Southern Europe

Figure 3.6: Main points of departure and landing from the western Mediterranean Sea to Spain

Spain

Cádiz Cadiz Tarifa

Strait of Gibraltar Tangier Mesnana

Almeria Almería

Melilla Ceuta Tétouan Al Hoceima

Morocco

Aïn Ayn Témouchent Temouchent Maghnia

Algeria

Source: Adapted from Simoncini (2004); Carling (2007); Herbert (2016)

the division of functions and services, smugglers managing sea travel from Morocco contact their counterparts in Spain who find employment for migrants in the local agricultural sector (Simoncini, 2004; Carling, 2007). Travel costs from inland cities in Morocco to the Spanish coast are around €1,500 per person, including the sea journey by patera, with an additional €300 to €800 to reach Almería or Murcia by private car (Simoncini, 2004). More recently, smugglers operating between the Moroccan and Algerian coasts ask from €1,400 to €3,000 per person for travel to Almería. The costs depend on the means of transport: migrants pay less to travel in small wooden boats loaded with people; the price is much higher for faster boats. Smugglers operating in this area are mostly Moroccan and Algerian, who initially transported cannabis resin between North Africa and Spain but now use their connections to smuggle people (Herbert, 2016). The story of a migrant interviewed at an asylum seeker centre in Seville in November 2021 provides some first-​hand information on the smuggling system during the land journey from Africa to Spain. Ayub, a 28-​year-​old man, left Guinea in 2016 and arrived in Spain one year and two months later, in October 2017. He travelled from Guinea to Mali by public transport, and then continued the journey to Algeria in a pickup truck, paying around €150 to a local smuggler who left him and others some kilometres before the Algerian border. Having successfully entered Algeria autonomously, Ayub spent five months in the country doing different jobs. Aware that the situation in Algeria was becoming increasingly difficult, he decided to cross 44

Irregular Migration Towards Southern Europe

the Moroccan border in an attempt to reach Spain. At the border, however, he was beaten by Moroccan police and imprisoned for some weeks. Upon release, he tried again, this time successfully thanks to the help of a local smuggler who he paid €200. Some weeks later, near Ceuta, Ayub found a Zodiac ride to the Spanish coast with another 30 migrants. He paid €200 because he had negotiated the trip with the Moroccan smuggler, but, as he reported: “for the trip you could pay up to €2,000” (Appendix 75). Other systems to enter Spain are to reach Ceuta and Melilla by sea, swimming at night along the Moroccan coast and hoping not to be identified by Spanish and Moroccan coastguards patrolling the area. Conversely, entering by land has become much more difficult since the 1990s when the Spanish authority built tall border fences around the two territories, at Ceuta in 1993 and Melilla in 1996 (Lòpez-​Sala, 2009). These barriers were reinforced in 1999 with a double razor-​wire fence (Collyer, 2006). Nevertheless, migrants periodically attempt to overcome the fences in small groups or by assaulting the barriers with hundreds of people. According to official information, in 2014 there were around 19,000 attempts to overcome the barriers of Ceuta and Melilla; then, in 2015 these attempts decreased by 68 per cent in Ceuta and 78 per cent in Melilla (Spanish Ministry of Interior, 2014, 2015). Recently, press sources reported attempts at the Ceuta border in February 2017 and at Melilla in June 2022. At dawn on 17 February 2017, around 800 migrants, all young males from sub-​Saharan countries, stormed the Ceuta ‘wall’ at four different points. After a big brawl with agents of the Civil Guard, nearly 500 of them managed to break through and enter European territory, shouting, “Freedom, freedom” because, once they had put their feet on Spanish soil, they could apply for international protection as asylum seekers (Scavo, 2017). In Melilla, on 25 June 2022, around 2,000 migrants tried to overcome the barriers. Most failed because of the harsh intervention of the Moroccan police that caused the deaths of around 30 migrants (Angosto and Sanchez, 2022). As an individual choice to reach the Spanish enclaves, in 2005, the usual cost to overcome the barrier of Ceuta was around €1,200 (Collyer, 2006). More recently, according to reports by a migrant from Mali who was interviewed in 2017 in an emergency centre for asylum seekers in Tuscany, the cost to corrupt Moroccan police and enter Ceuta was around €2,500. However, as the interviewee reported, “there was no certainty because rumours said that Moroccan police did not respect the agreement after receiving the money” (Appendix 62). Due to the risk of paying policemen for nothing, the migrant interviewed at first tried to overcome the Ceuta barriers with others, but the police broke his leg in the attempt. Some months later, he decided to leave Morocco for Libya, where he thought it would be easier to embark for Italy. In 2016, he went to the North African coast and crossed the Moroccan-​Algerian border around Maghnia and later Tunisia, 45

Smuggling and Trafficking of Migrants in Southern Europe

embarking around Tripoli for the Sicilian island of Lampedusa, where he arrived at the end of that same year. Close to Ceuta and Melilla there are several makeshift migrant camps. One is in the Bel Younes wood, outside Ceuta, and other spontaneous camps are in the forests of Mount Gourougou, outside Melilla, and on the outskirts of cities such as Casablanca, Rabat, Fès, Meknès and Marrakech. Migrants live in very hard, precarious conditions in these camps, without water and electricity, periodically subjected to raids by the Moroccan police who dismantle the camps (Mixed Migration Centre, 2022). Those identified as ‘irregular’ by the Moroccan police are led to the southern border with Western Sahara or to the detention centre in Oujda, close to the Algerian border, where migrants are held for six months before they are freed and can try again to enter Ceuta and Melilla via Morocco. Some migrants reported being removed to the Algerian border twice or more (Simoncini, 2004; Collyer, 2006, 2007; Carling, 2007). Like ‘The Game’ for migrants in spontaneous camps between Bosnia-​Herzegovina and Croatia attempting several times to reach the EU along the Balkan route, it is the same for those around Ceuta and Melilla (Minca and Collins, 2021). However, most sub-​ Saharan migrants around the Spanish enclaves do not have enough financial resources to get a patera to Spain, nor real possibilities to get to Ceuta and Melilla. So, they are trapped in a sort of limbo with no reasonable solutions, while always subject to arrest as irregular migrants by Moroccan police forces (Mixed Migration Centre, 2022). The implementation of new measures to stem the arrival of migrants to the EU creates changes on routes followed by migrants who in turn try to overcome the new obstacles. The introduction of the SIVE along the Strait of Gibraltar resulted, as a first effect, in the extension of places where smugglers operated from North African countries, as well as the extension of points on the Spanish coast where migrants landed. Moreover, the increase in arrivals along the Balearics and peninsula route could be due to the temporary halt in departures from Libya. This was probably the case in 2017 when the Italian government signed a new agreement with Tripoli’s political leadership to stop the departure of migrants from Libya. In this regard, we find a coherent coincidence in statistical data concerning migrants landing in Spain and Italy. Figures 3.7 and 3.8 show the trends of the number of migrants who arrived in Spain and Italy by sea. The data suggests that migrants (and consequently smuggling operations) moved from one North African country to another as a place of embarkation according to the highest chance of success in reaching Southern Europe. With all the limitations related to any kind of qualitative research, this hypothesis is evidenced by interviews with migrants who arrived in Italy up until 2017 (Montesperelli, 2009). Some of those interviewed travelled from Morocco and Algeria to Libya because they thought they would have 46

Irregular Migration Towards Southern Europe

Figure 3.7: Migrants landing in Spain (2014–​2021)

Number of landed migrants

60,000 50,000 40,000 30,000 20,000 10,000 0

2014

2015

2016

2017 2018 Year

2019

2020

2021

2020

2021

Source: Adapted from the Spanish Ministry of the Interior (2014–​2021)

Figure 3.8: Migrants landing in Italy (2014–​2021)

Number of landed migrants

200,000 180,000 160,000 140,000 120,000 100,000 80,000 60,000 40,000 20,000 0 2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

Year

Source: Adapted from the Italian Ministry of the Interior (2014–​2021)

a greater chance of reaching Europe. In some cases, they tried to overcome the Ceuta barriers without success, while for others, their situation in Algeria deteriorated so they decided to reach Europe via Libya. However, this only partly explains why there has been a recent increase in Spanish arrivals by sea. As is true for sub-​Saharan West African countries, other factors specifically related to the countries of emigration could affect migration by sea to Spain. This is the case of Morocco, the main departure place for irregular migrants arriving in Spain. As pointed out by some recent research, the increase in arrivals to Spain also relates to political decisions implemented in Morocco, such as the reintroduction of compulsory military service, the severe drought 47

Smuggling and Trafficking of Migrants in Southern Europe

of 2017 and growing frustration regarding the expectations of young people who are then pushed to try their luck abroad (González Enríquez, 2019).

Irregular migrants arriving in Italy To provide a preliminary overview of irregular immigration, Figure 3.9 shows the number of migrants landing in Italy from 2008 to 2021. In 2008, 36,951 migrants arrived by sea. In 2009 and 2010 their numbers significantly decreased, to 9,573 and 4,406. The reason for this marked reduction is twofold: most migrants that reached Italy at that time came from Libyan shores; and, in 2007, the Italian Ministry of the Interior, under a centre-​left coalition government, signed an agreement with Libya. With this agreement, Libya committed to counter migrant departures from its coasts in exchange for significant financial aid from Italy. The memorandum of understanding planned to establish operation centres and systems to monitor irregular migration shared by Italy and Libya, as well as the deployment of Italian military units in Libyan waters close to the coast. In exchange, Italy provided financial compensation of several million euros to restore the damage caused by Italian colonialism in the first half of the 20th century and promised a commitment to the construction of a highway crossing the whole of Libya (Vassallo Paleologo, 2008). When the Italian government changed in mid-​2008 and a centre-​r ight alliance came to power, the agreement was completed by the new prime minister Berlusconi, and its effects came into force in 2009 with a marked reduction in the number of migrants arriving in Italy from Libyan shores. Figure 3.9: Migrants landing in Italy (2008–​2021) 200,000

Number of landed migrants

180,000 160,000 140,000 120,000 100,000 80,000 60,000 40,000 20,000 0

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 Year

Source: Adapted from the Italian Ministry of the Interior (2008–​2021)

48

Irregular Migration Towards Southern Europe

In 2011, however, North African countries underwent significant upheavals in the wake of the Arab Springs, including Libya. The social uprising there led to the killing of the dictator Gadaffi and the outbreak of civil war. Again in 2011, a military conflict broke out in Syria between the Al-​Assad regime and opposing military groups. With the eruption of civil war in Syria, and the militia of the so-​called Islamic State also active within the country, around 12 million Syrians abandoned their homes, with most finding refuge abroad. According to estimates by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, around 7 million people were hosted in neighboring countries or reached EU countries (UNHCR, 2016). In 2011, migrant arrivals in Italy numbered 62,692. The following year they dropped to 13,267. The lower number of migrants arriving from Libya in 2012 was due to the fact that the civil war meant that potential migrants could not travel safely, and Libyan smuggling organizations had difficulty operating. From 2013 onwards, however, an increasing number of migrants landed in Italy, reaching a peak of 181,436 in 2016. The following year, the number decreased again, to 119,269. More recently, there were 11,471 in 2019 and 67,477 in 2021. The reasons for the great oscillation in the number of arrivals from 2017 are mainly twofold. One relates to the internal Italian context, while the other involves a new agreement between Italy and Libya. In 2016, the issue of migrant arrivals in Italy reached a peak, not only in terms of the number compared with previous years but also public debate due to the increasing difficulty for the national government to host migrants in emergency asylum seeker centres. Under Italian law, the asylum seeker system is divided into two categories: CAS (emergency reception centres) and SPRAR (reception system for refugees). The CAS function as initial reception centres placed under the direction of prefectures managed by the Ministry of the Interior. The latter manages the entire hosting process, from preparing calls for tenders to choosing the site within Italy to host migrants. The SPRAR, on the other hand, provides more stable forms of reception under the direction of mayors. The SPRAR was based on a deal made in 2016 between the Italian National Association of Municipalities (ANCI) and the Ministry of the Interior. With the aim of distributing migrants throughout the national territory using the SPRAR, the agreement stated that municipalities should collaborate on a voluntary basis, and the number of migrants within the municipal area must not exceed the quota of 2.5 per 1,000 residents. The deal did not work, however, because a large number of municipalities refused to host migrants. So, the Italian government’s request to other EU countries to redistribute asylum seekers was met by resistance (in August 2017, only 7,200 migrants were transferred from Italy to other EU countries); and most of the municipalities –​5,400 out of around 8,300 –​ did not welcome migrants in their territory (ANCI et al, 2017). 49

Smuggling and Trafficking of Migrants in Southern Europe

Right-​wing parties at national and local level mobilized against hosting migrants. The refusal to welcome new migrants also came from some left-​wing municipalities as they had already exceeded the agreed migrant quota. At the same time, some anti-​migrant municipalities in the north of the country issued administrative rules under which citizens living in the municipality were not allowed to willingly host asylum seekers in their homes without the permission of the mayor. In a paroxysmal social climate of vetoes where local administrators and citizens’ committees protested against the arrival of a few dozen migrants in their municipality, in June 2017 the Ministry of the Interior highlighted that new places were needed, at least 20,000 more than the 200,000 estimated to that point, otherwise, as the press reported, ‘we will make tents in the cities’ (la Repubblica, 2017). Against this background, the centre-​left coalition in charge at national level took some decisions to reduce the number of migrant arrivals. In June 2017, the government approved a new code of behavior for NGOs operating in the Mediterranean Search and Rescue Area. The new discipline had stringent rules for NGOs: turning off transponders and using light flares to be more easily identified by migrant boats were banned; NGO ships must have the authorization of the Italian coastguard before rescuing migrants at sea and would also be required to take police officers on board. While the official purpose was to ensure order and efficiency in rescue operations, the aim rather seemed to be to control NGOs and prevent them from approaching Libyan waters, implicitly favouring the arrival of new migrants on the Italian territory. During the tug-​of-​war between some NGOs who refused to sign the new code and the government, the latter threatened to block the arrival in Italian territory of NGOs flying a foreign flag so that they could not disembark new migrants (Il Mattino, 2017). The ‘disciplining’ of NGOs by the government, together with warning shots fired by the Libyan coastguard at a Spanish NGO that was likely operating at a safe distance from the coast, saw NGO ships, after the summer of 2017, abandon their search-​and-​rescue operations because, they argued, the minimum security conditions were no longer guaranteed (La Stampa, 2017). Moreover, in July 2017, the Italian government signed a new agreement with Al-​Sarraji, the president of the Government of National Accord (GNA), later recognized as a legitimate representative of Libya by the EU although the GNA was only the representative of a military coalition in Tripoli opposed to the Tobruk parliament allied to Ali-​Haftar’s Libyan National Army. The new agreement, as already envisaged in previous ones, affirmed cooperation to support Libyan security and military institutions in countering migrant departures for Italy. It planned to set up a Libyan coastguard to which the Italian government would provide means and financial resources and train personnel to stem irregular emigration and intercept migrants at sea and then bring them back to Libya. It also sought to complete the border control 50

Irregular Migration Towards Southern Europe

system in southern Libya and had, inter alia, some very ambitious goals such as ‘eliminate the causes of irregular immigration’ (ICMPD, 2019: 62). However, as we have already seen for Spain and Morocco, this type of agreement raises strong doubts about legitimacy, as preventing migrants from reaching EU countries does not respect their right to appeal for international protection under the 1951 Geneva Convention (il manifesto, 2017). Leaving aside this fundamental aspect, the Italian government achieved its aim of significantly reducing the number of arrivals: compared with the previous year, at the end of 2017, the official statistics recorded a 34 per cent drop in migrants arriving on Italian coasts. The lower number of arrivals in 2018 was due to both the blocking of departures from Libya and a new centre-​r ight government policy (Five Star Movement and the League) that aimed to counter, by any means, the arrival of new migrants. From March 2018 to August 2019, the period in which this coalition was in power, the League’s Minister of the Interior inaugurated the season of ‘closed ports’, denying landing on the Italian coasts to ships that had rescued migrants at sea. Some of the most striking events in this regard included the case of the NGO ship Sea Watch, with 53 migrants on board, which was denied docking for two weeks when its captain, Carola Rakete, decided to land in Lampedusa in June 2019, forcing a blockade and colliding with an Italian coastguard patrol boat while manoeuvring. There were also the cases of the Diciotti and Gregoretti, ships respectively belonging to the Italian navy and coastguard. The former, which had rescued a few dozen migrants at sea, was forced to stay in the port of Catania for a few days awaiting permission to disembark its passengers. Permission was eventually granted thanks to the intervention of the Sicilian judiciary because some migrants required urgent medical assistance. The Gregoretti, which rescued 131 migrants at sea in the Maltese search-​and-​rescue area on 25 July 2019, suffered the same fate until it too was given permission to dock by a local judge (la Repubblica, 2019; Ansa, 2019). In August 2019, the fall of the government saw the end of the closed-​ports policy. This change to openness occurred when a new political coalition based on the Five Star Movement and the Democratic Party was in power, from September 2019 to February 2021.2 This coalition was in turn replaced by a government formed through broad agreements among several allied political parties, led by the technocrat prime minister Mario Draghi, who did not change the open-​ports policy for NGO ships rescuing migrants in the Mediterranean Sea. From 2019 to 2021, migrant arrivals increased as most departures to Italy left from Tunisia and Egypt instead of Libya, where the block on departures was still in place. At the same time, the Covid-​19 pandemic introduced lockdowns and restricted movement in both departure and transit countries on the African continent. This led to a decrease in migrant arrivals in Italy. For instance, the GNA in Libya closed its land and air borders for two weeks in March 2020, 51

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then, in April 2020, the Algerian government increased surveillance and patrol of its 3,200 kilometre borders with Niger, Mali and Libya. In April 2020, Niger also implemented a strict lockdown, giving mandate to military forces to establish checkpoints in the country to ensure compliance (Bird, 2020). Anti-​Covid measures decided by African states were an unpredictable obstacle to the smuggling of migrants and irregular emigration. In this regard, in March 2020, a convoy of smugglers and migrants travelling with a military escort through Niger to Libya, having arrived in Madama, the closest Nigerian city to the Libyan border, was sent back to Agadez as the Nigerian border was closed (Bird, 2020). In addition, while African borders had been relatively easy to cross before the pandemic, thanks to corrupt border police, when the restrictions were imposed it became difficult to get through them. However, limitations on the movement of people related to the pandemic on the African continent only lasted a few months, so smuggling activities were only temporarily affected. As revealed by an IOM report (2022), from March to November 2020, 80 per cent of African countries introduced restrictions at country-​by-​country level, while, for those travelling outside Africa, stricter limitations remained in place until June 2021. In any case, measures to counter the pandemic only temporarily impacted the arrival of migrants in Italy. Over the course of 2022, until 22 November, arrivals numbered 94,341, with Tunisians and Egyptians representing 19 per cent and 21 per cent of all arrivals (Italian Ministry of Interior, 2022). As regards the countries migrants come from, Figure 3.10 shows data grouped according to different macro areas: North Africa –​Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt; sub-​Saharan countries –​all other African countries; Middle East –​Syria, Palestine and Turkey; Asia –​Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, Bangladesh; Eastern Europe –​all non-EU countries that belonged to the former Soviet Union. Migrants from the sub-​Sahara region reached the highest number compared with other areas in the period 2014 to 2017. In the following years, the greatest number came from North Africa. In 2014, the top migrant countries were Syria (42,333) and Eritrea (34,329). In 2015, the top two were Eritrea (39,534) and Nigeria (22,455), while Syria ranked sixth with 7,448. In 2016, the top two countries were Nigeria (37,551) and Eritrea (20,718). In 2017, the top two were Nigeria (18,158) and Guinea (9,701); then, in 2018, Tunisia (5,244) and Eritrea (3,320). In 2019, Tunisia (2,654) and Pakistan (1,180); in 2020, Tunisia (12,978) and Bangladesh (4,141); in 2021, Tunisia (15,671) and Egypt (8,576).

Along the central Mediterranean route to reach Italian territory Sub-​Saharan migrants come from western states such as Senegal, Gambia, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Ghana, Mali, Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Mali and the 52

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Figure 3.10: Migrants landing in Italy grouped by macro area of origin (2008–​2021) 180,000 Number of landed migramts

160,000 140,000 120,000

NAC SSC AC MEC EEC

100,000 80,000 60,000 40,000 20,000

21

20

20

19

20

18

20

17

20

16

20

15

20

14

20

13

20

12

20

11

20

10

20

09

20

20

20

08

0

Legend: NAC: North African countries SSC: Sub-Saharan countries AC: Asian countries MEC: Middle Eastern countries EEC: Eastern European countries Source: Adapted from the Italian Ministry of the Interior (2008–​2021)

Central African Republic, and eastern ones such as Sudan, Eritrea, and Somalia. Except for 2010, the countries listed were present from one to several times in the rankings of the top ten nationalities of migrants landing in Italy in the period 2008 to 2021. Including migrants from other continents, the top ten nationalities represent the highest percentage of all migrants arriving in Italy, from a minimum of 71 per cent in 2017 to the highest value of 92 per cent in 2012, comparing all migrants landing each year. Migrants departing from African countries located in the western sub-​ Saharan area take a number of routes as reference points, following cities from south-​west African states to the north, heading towards Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia or Libya. The main routes run through Mali and Algeria, while others go through Niger and Libya (see Figure 3.11). The first route crosses the cities of Bamako, Timbuktu and Taoudenni in Mali heading towards Mauritania (and later to the Canary Islands or Morocco) or Algeria, or it goes from Bamako to Gao in Mali, Timiaouine, Tamanrasset and Djanet in Algeria, heading towards the Algerian or Tunisian coasts. Reference points for other routes are the city of Ouagadougou in Burkina Faso, or Kano in Nigeria, both heading towards Tahoua, Agadez and Assamaka in Niger and later Algeria, or through Toureyet, Dirkou and Madama in Niger and later 53

newgenrtpdf

Figure 3.11: Main routes to North Africa and points of embarkation towards Italy

Algeri Algeri

Tunis Tunis Syria

Tunisia Tripoli Tripoli

Morocco Canary Islands

Sebha Sebha

Algeria Djanet Djanet

54

Western Sahara

Mali Cape Verde Gambia

Dakar Dakar Senegal

Libya

Egypt

Saudi Arabia

Tamanrasset Tamanrasset

Taoudenni Taoudenni

Mauritania

Iraq

Tobruk Tobruk

Madama Timiaouine Timiaouine Madama Dirkou Dirkou Assamakka Assamakka Agadez Agadez Toureyet Toureyet

Timbuktu Gao Gao

Niger Tahoua

Chad

Eritrea

Sudan

Khartoum Khartoum

Bamako BamakoOuagadougou Kano Kano Burkina Guinea Benin Faso T Nigeria Sierra Ghanao g Ivory Ghana Leone South Sudan o Coast Central Republic of Africa Liberia Cameroon

Ethiopia

Source: Adapted from ISPI (2015); Raineri (2016); Frontex (2016); Herbert (2016); Gatti (2017); MEDU (2019); Tinti (2022); Fereday (2022)

Smuggling and Trafficking of Migrants in Southern Europe

Spain

Irregular Migration Towards Southern Europe

to Tunisia or Libya. The latter is also a point of embarkation for migrants coming from eastern Africa. Until some years ago, the eastern route from the Horn of Africa for migrants coming from Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia meant crossing the Arabian Peninsula, Syria, Turkey and eventually reaching Greece by land or sea. This earlier route, which allowed migrants to avoid journeys in the African interior via the Sahara Desert, was largely redirected towards Sudan and Libya, with a view to eventually reaching the Italian territory. The main reasons for this shift relate to the outbreaks of civil war in Syria in 2011 and Yemen in 2015, and the construction of a 230-​kilometre wall between Israel and the Sinai Peninsula. All these recent events make migrants’ journeys more dangerous and the likelihood of reaching the EU through Middle Eastern countries more uncertain. Migrants from the Horn of Africa cross the desert passing through Khartoum in Sudan and, after reaching the Libyan city of Sabha, they head towards the embarkation points around Tripoli (ISPI, 2015; Raineri, 2016; Frontex, 2016; Herbert, 2016; Gatti, 2017; MEDU, 2019, Tinti, 2022; Fereday, 2022). It should also be noted that the places mentioned, in terms of the direction migrants take through states and the embarkation points on the African coasts, are the only main migrant crossing points that emerged from both documentary research and personal interviews conducted with migrants in Italy from 2017 to 2022. In effect, local changes along the route, such as police patrols or the presence of military rebel groups, cause the displacement of the original route, with smugglers and migrants attempting to overcome the new obstacles. In these terms, the places mentioned should be considered main trajectory lines that do not include all existing routes followed by migrants to reach North African countries. Once migrants have arrived in Algeria, Tunisia and Libya, the main coastal departure points are Annaba and El Kala in Algeria, Bizerte, Monastir, Mahdia, Sfax and Djerba Island in Tunisia, and the areas between Ras Ajdir and Tripoli along the Libyan coast, with special points in Zuwarah, Zawiya and Misurata for migrants coming from West Africa, while those from East Africa embark for Italy near Tobruk (Herbert, 2022; Horsley and Gerken, 2022). The migrant embarkation points from Algeria head to the island of Sardinia, those from Tunisia and Libya to the Sicilian islands of Lampedusa and Linosa, while migrants departing from Egypt, specifically from Alexandria, head for Calabria and Apulia (Herbert, 2016; Italian Ministry of Interior, 2021). So, migrants land not only in the Sicilian islands, but they also take longer and more dangerous sea routes to Sardinia, and to Calabria and Apulia. As shown in Figure 3.12, since 2013 the number of migrants arriving in southern Italian regions other than Sicily has been growing, although the latter still receives the most arrivals by sea. In 2014, 22,673 migrants landed in Calabria; then the peak was reached in 2016, with 31,450, before decreasing to 11,664 in 2021. In 2015 and 2016, 5,451 and 9,078 migrants 55

Smuggling and Trafficking of Migrants in Southern Europe

Figure 3.12: Migrants landing in the main southern Italian regions (2008–​2021)

Number of landed migrants

140000 120000 100000 80000 60000 40000 20000 0 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 Year Calabria

Apulia

Sardinia

Sicily

Source: Adapted from the Italian Ministry of the Interior (2008–​2021)

arrived in Sardinia before the numbers decreased in more recent years to 1,720. In Apulia, the highest number of arrivals was in 2014, with 17,565 people. In more recent years, numbers have decreased to 1,920 in 2020 and 3,264 in 2021. In addition, in several cases, the migrants’ nationalities and their place of landing correspond. In other words, migrants frequently come from the same country of origin and depart roughly from the same North African country. Considering this aspect, the most evident data concerns migrants that arrived in Sardinia: of the 5,193 people who landed on the island from 2018 to 2021, 4,298 were Algerians, that is 82.7 per cent. Moreover, of the 7,913 migrants who landed in Apulia in the same period, the top five migrant nationalities were Pakistani (2,017), Iraqi (1,502), Iranian (1,194), Afghan (589) and Egyptian (490), corresponding in total to 73.8 per cent of all migrants landing in the region in that period. As for Calabria, the concentration in terms of nationalities is more polarized: the top five were from Iraq (4,145), Iran (3,972), Egypt (3,470), Afghanistan (2,420) and Pakistan (1,704), amounting to 84 per cent of the 18,695 people who landed in the region. Also in this case, most migrants who landed in Calabria arrived via the sea route along the eastern Mediterranean, probably having departed from Egypt. As for Sicily, where the total arrivals from 2018 to 2021 numbered 104,444, the correspondence between the migrants’ nationality and place of departure is more unclear. When compared with other southern Italian regions, there was not the same concentration of nationalities, nor the corresponding sea route followed by migrants. The top ten nations were Tunisia (36,139), 56

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Bangladesh (12,340), Ivory Coast (7,914), Eritrea (6,515), Egypt (6,046), Sudan (5,028), Guinea (4,178), Morocco (3,425), Mali (2,942) and Nigeria (2,557), corresponding to 83.3 per cent of all migrants who arrived in the Sicilian islands. We can infer from data on arrivals to Sicily that Libya and Tunisia are likely to be the North African countries from which most migrants departed for Italy by sea. Moreover, Tunisia has recently became a place of embarkation for thousands of people (in 2018, 5,230 Tunisians arrived on the Sicilian coasts; in 2021, the number was 15,468), while Libya is still the main hub country for migrant departures, not only for those from sub-​Sahara but also North African ones close to Libya, such as Morocco and Egypt. All that said, let us look more specifically at the most significant migrant experiences collected through interviews with sub-​Saharan migrants crossing Libya to reach Italy. Gabriel, a 26-​year-​old Liberian, left his country in October 2015, during the Ebola outbreak, in an attempt to resolve his serious health problems abroad. On 20 February 2016, after five months of travel, he arrived in Lampedusa and was subsequently directed to an emergency centre for asylum seekers in Prato, Tuscany. His personal tale follows. Vignette 1: Gabriel With the money I had saved, I took a bus from Monrovia to go to Guinea. When you cross the border, you can enter if you have ID, but the police always ask for money. The amount changes, it depends on the type of document you have, if you have a passport you pay €5, if you have an identity card 10–​15, while if you don’t have documents you can even pay €30–​40. I stayed in Guinea for a few weeks, then I took another bus to reach Mali. There were about 50 people on the bus. When I arrived in Bamako, I tried to look for a job, but I saw that it was very difficult –​ there was a crisis. In the city I met a boy from Mali. I explained to him all the health problems I had, and he told me that he could host me. Then, after four to five days, I was getting more and more sick –​I had severe pain in my stomach. At that point I decided to leave Africa to go to Europe, to a country where I could seek medical help. I wasn’t thinking only of Italy but of any other European country where they could care for me. At that point I asked for information in a parking lot in the city where the cars that go to Burkina Faso leave from. I met a local who was able to help me and could take me across Burkina Faso to Niger. There were about 50 people in the truck we were travelling in. On the border with Burkina Faso, the police asked for money to enter and made a dozen boys get off the truck because they couldn’t pay. If the police think you are headed to Libya and you don’t pay what they ask you they take you to a room and beat you until you contact relatives to send you money. Then you go with the policeman to pick up the money where you had it sent and then they set you free. The means of transport 57

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you travel on is not waiting for you, so you have to look for another passage by asking the truck drivers who cross the border. Arriving in Agadez, Niger, from then on it’s all deserted. From then on up to Libya it was hell. I stayed in Agadez for a few weeks in a house on the outskirts of the city with other Africans. For fear of being robbed, we went out in small groups to look for food and contacts to continue the journey. Together with others we found Libyan transporters who for about €500 each took us to the city of al-​Gatroun in Libya. We were 34 people in a pickup. The drivers were two Libyans around 18 to 20 years old. They put long sticks on the outer edges of the pickup to load as many people as possible. For the trip, I bought two cans of water of five litres each, while to eat I brought a type of food that is used in West Africa called gari made from cassava and peanuts. When you wet it, it swells and then you eat it. This is the food you can take with you on the trip. It took us five days to cross the desert and during the journey one of the sticks broke and three people flew off the vehicle. The pickup did not stop, the drivers never wait for you, it can be the end of your life. Out of the 34 people we started with, 31 arrived at the destination. I have seen so many things that I cannot forget. The first during a break. I asked to go pee and found three people who were dead, stiff. I and those who were with me dug and covered the bodies with sand, when the driver saw us he told us that we had to do everything quickly, in 15 to 20 minutes, because we had to leave. Arriving in al-​Gatrun, we were divided into different groups, when you pay they don’t give you any receipts, the smugglers said that I didn’t pay and I had my first time in prison there even though I had already paid the previous smugglers to get to Tripoli. The prison was a house on the outskirts of al-​Gatrun. Eighteen of us entered, and while inside we found a dozen people already detained. After a week in prison, many started calling their families to get money sent. I didn’t have anyone who could help me, so I didn’t pay even though I still had some hidden money with me. After ten days, three of us remained locked up in the prison house. One of us died because he was sick. I was also sick, but I had a friend there, who I met in prison, who went out of his way to support me. After the boy’s death, the jailers must have thought that we really didn’t have money and they released us. The jailers were not Libyan police or military –​they were criminals in civilian clothes with weapons. We went out and walked down the street, so I thought I shouldn’t be afraid any more otherwise I wouldn’t have made it. I saw a boy who was also sub-​Saharan. I speak several West African languages, I speak English, French and five dialects. This boy was from the Ivory Coast. When I spoke to him in his local dialect he thought that I was from the Ivory Coast, he took us to his house. His brother was involved in the transport of migrants from al-​Gatrun to Tripoli. He was in contact with Libyan transporters –​the transporters know each other and keep in touch by telephone. They transport people as is the case for the transport of drugs: there are those who take you from point A and then take you to point B and so on to your final destination. 58

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On 6 March 2016, if I remember correctly, we arrived in Tripoli. In Tripoli we went to a house in the name of the brother of the Ivorian person I had met. In this house we found about 30 people. There I saw that not all smugglers are bad –​some of them had good hearts. They saw that my situation, due to my health problems, was very different from that of the others. So, I was put in the first group to embark for Italy, even if I spent almost a month there before leaving. There are houses on the outskirts of Tripoli near the coast where you can stay. I paid $600 for the trip by sea in a rubber dinghy. The drivers of the dinghy were the migrants themselves. If, for example, they want to send 150 people away, the smugglers ask the migrants which of them can drive the rubber dinghy. In the group I was in, a 14-​year-​old Senegalese boy raised his hand and said he knew how to drive the dinghy. We looked at him with concern because he was too young. Some of us started insulting him, without knowing that he was actually very good at driving the dinghy as he did. The smugglers train migrants what to do when they are at sea and when they spot the rescue ship. The driver mixes with the others and no one has to say that he was driving the raft. Perhaps the driver has not paid for the trip, although I am not able to say for sure. Anyway, when we go near the sea to leave, everyone has already paid for the trip, only then can you leave Tripoli. If they arrest you on the way to the beach and you have already paid for the trip, you go to jail and if you manage to get out you have to pay again. If someone arrives there and changes his mind, they let you go, but if you want to leave again, you have to pay another time. Those who organized the trips were Libyan soldiers –​ they were dressed like them. It took us a day of sailing before arriving in international waters. The journey was very difficult, it was very cold. In international waters, a ship with a German flag rescued us. Then they took us on an Italian Red Cross ship which led us to Lampedusa. (Appendix 61)

Amadou departed from Bamako in Mali in September 2016 and arrived in Italy in June 2017. Vignette 2: Amadou From Bamako I travelled by truck with others to Gao, a city in the north of Mali. The problems started in Gao, because from there to the first city in Algeria beyond the desert there are transporters who organize illegal trips. I travelled by truck with 40 other people. The trip lasted around 30 days. In Kidal, still in Mali, we were stopped by a military group that wants the north of the country to be independent. To continue the journey we each had to give them €15. They let us off the truck and those who didn’t pay were beaten and searched to see if they had money. We were beaten with guns, one boy had an arm broken, another a leg. I had some money, but I didn’t want to give it to them, so I tried to hide it, but they found it and I was beaten too. Then we called our parents to send us more money. 59

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We stayed two days in Kidal without eating and drinking. Due to the clashes between opposing military groups, in Kidal there were UN soldiers, but they did nothing. In the prison where I was, I could see them –​they were less than 200 metres from me –​they saw us too, but they said they couldn’t do anything. Ours was not a real prison, we were incarcerated inside the town hall. The mayor was not there. These separatist military groups were in charge. After paying we were released. We resumed the journey by finding another truck driver who abandoned us about 5 kilometres from the border with Algeria. The Algerian military rejected us. They said we were going to Algeria to steal their women. They are Muslims. I am also Muslim, but there is a problem of racism between Arabs and African Black people, even if we are all Muslims. The Algerian military forced us to undress to see if we had money so they could rob us. Nobody had any money and we got rejected. But I think we would have been rejected even if we had had money to give to the police. At that point we walked back to reach a small village in Mali where we spent a few days. From there I called a friend in Bamako. Before leaving Mali, I had some savings that I left him, so I called him to send money to me. We came back to Gao, where we restarted the journey towards Algeria, this time we were guided by transporters who took us in a pickup to Tamanrasset. The journey from Gao to Tamanrasset took a month, and overall I paid around €200 to several transporters. I stayed in Tamanrasset for a week because I ran out of money. I called a friend who lives in Algiers, and he sent me some money. He is a friend from Mali with whom I went to elementary school, when I left he had already been established in Algiers for two years. He worked as a labourer on construction sites. I stayed in Algeria for five months, I worked on construction sites as a labourer –​ that is the work that all Blacks do in Algeria. My boss paid me around €8 per day. Every Thursday they gave us a weekly salary. Anyway, it was like I was in prison, I slept on the construction site. I never went out for fear of police checks. Once the police did a check and arrested me because I was illegal, but my boss intervened immediately and I was freed. However, the situation was becoming increasingly difficult due to police checks, so I decided to go to Morocco to reach Ceuta and Melilla, but I was stopped by Moroccan police. So I decided to go back to Algiers to reach Europe through Libya. From Algiers to the Libyan border I travelled in a small van with other guys, the driver dropped us a few kilometres from the Libyan border and from there we continued on foot. When we arrived in Libya we found a new transporter who took us to Tripoli. We were ten people travelling in a van. We were stopped once by the Libyan police and to continue the journey we had to pay. At one point, the driver took the wrong turn and we ended up in the hands of another group of soldiers, so we had to pay a second time. As soon as we arrived in Tripoli, we were immediately arrested by the police and taken to a room where we were 70 people in all. We stayed for two months. The jailers asked each one of us for €300 to get out of the prison. Whoever paid was let out. Those who could not pay, like me, were taken out of the city to a villa with a garden. They put us 60

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in a large pit dug in the sand, while others were locked up in containers. With me, in this great pit, there were another 70 people. They gave us a piece of bread a day to eat and a glass of water. For eight days we stayed in this pit, covered at the top by plastic, where it was very hot. In the villa there were armed civilians who controlled us, including Blacks from Niger who watched us along with the Libyans. Then, one night, other people like us arrived. At that point, they let us out and took us to the sea. They made us board but as soon as the boat started the engine broke down. The transporters replaced the engine. The boat was driven by a boy from Cameroon that I had met during the period of imprisonment in Tripoli. They forced us to leave without paying for the trip –​I don’t know why.3 There were people who left against their will. I didn’t pay. I was with two friends from Mali, and they too told me that they had not paid for the trip. Those who organized the departures were Libyan soldiers together with armed civilians. I heard that there was a general who had many boats at his disposal and could send hundreds of people a day to Italy. The voyage with the boat lasted three days and three nights. We were about 150, and a woman died during the journey. On the fourth day of travel, we were rescued by an Italian navy ship, which took us to Augusta in Sicily, where I arrived on June 2017, then I was transferred to this centre in Prato. For the whole trip from my house to Italy, I spent one million Mali francs, which is about €1,400. (Appendix 62)

Eddy, 29 years old from Ivory Coast, reached Italy on 2 February 2016 (Appendix 57). He started his journey in 2015, arriving in Gao. He did not have any contacts with smugglers, so he asked someone how to get a lift to reach Algeria. He paid €400 to travel for a week in a pickup with another dozen people. However, the smugglers he had trusted led him to a house beyond the Algerian border where they stole everything from him. At the railway station in the Algerian city of Ghardaïa, he knew someone who organized journeys to Libya. Eddy reported: ‘Guys do that work –​they are there at the station to wait for people who come from Mali, Ivory Coast and Guinea. When people like me arrive without any money, they pick them up and take them to their house. The time I stayed in the house I had to pay €20 a month to sleep in a room with other people. The guy I met found me a job as a labourer and gave me the contact of another one who organized trips to Libya. Every month he arranged for a lot of people go to Libya. I paid around €200 to reach Libya, but there is no fixed price, I negotiated the price. The travel was problem-​free. In fact, once we crossed the Libyan border, the boy who arranged my trip from Algeria had already called someone before getting where we needed to go –​he has a boy in 61

Smuggling and Trafficking of Migrants in Southern Europe

every city. He calls and says, “There are three people to pick up. You go straight to the agreed place to wait for them, then a new car arrives which picks you up to restart the journey.”’ With other people, Eddy was taken from Tripoli to a house close to the sea that he could not leave. After a week, the Libyans said, “Tonight you have to go.” He did not pay for the embarkation because the man from Algeria had already done everything. At 4 am, with around 150 to 200 people, he departed by sea to reach Sicily in a big boat driven by one of them. David, 24 years old, left Ivory Coast in September 2015 and arrived in Italy in August 2016 (Appendix 58). According to him, “From the Ivory Coast to Burkina Faso, it is not a problem to travel because it is like in Europe, like when an Italian goes to France. The problem is the military on the border with Niger. They ask for money.” He paid them €20. “If you don’t pay, they make you stay there for half a day, then, if they see that you have no money, they let you go.” Once he arrived in Agadez, David took a pickup with 30 people on board to cross the Sahara. It took six days of travel to reach Libya. In the house where he was taken just beyond the border, the Libyan police arrived and stole his money. “If you say you do not have money, they will beat you with a long stick”. After this, the transporters called other people. The person who came to pick them up said to one of the drivers, “Your boys were lucky because they risked being kidnapped by a criminal gang. If they take you, they treat you like a slave.” Then they transported the group of migrants to a house near Sebha. When they arrived, a local came and said he needed five to six workers. “If you say no, the boss will call the police who come to arrest you. I worked for three months in a date field without getting paid.” David reported that he did not pay for the trip from Agadez to Tripoli because he had already paid about €1,000 in advance to a friend of his called Bakery from the Ivory Coast. Bakery speaks Arabic and lives in Tripoli. He is actually a mediator who goes to Mali to look for people who want to emigrate. He charges them in advance and organizes the trip through his contacts with transporters. Near Tripoli, Bakery came to pick David up. Later, David was taken to a house near the sea that was called the white house. In reality, it was a house without a ceiling in which David and 100 other people were kept under surveillance by armed guards: ‘You couldn’t speak with the Libyans. When there is a problem, they use force. If they tell you to do something, it is better to obey because otherwise they will shoot you. When you make someone angry, they beat you, but even when they are happy, you can be beaten. With women, it’s different. They are kept separate from men. When they 62

Irregular Migration Towards Southern Europe

want a woman, they take her by force even if she refuses. Later I would hear her cry. Always like this; every day like this.’ A few weeks later, David was embarked for Italy with 140 other people. After a day of travel, the boat began to take on water and the migrants tried to plug the leak with their clothes. Fortunately, shortly afterwards they were spotted by a helicopter and then by a rescue ship. To provide an overview of the interviews with migrants from sub-​Saharan countries, Table 3.1 summarizes the aspects that emerged. The main questions migrants were asked were: • • • • • • • •

Did you have to pay the border police to enter a new country? Did you suffer violence or witness violence against other migrants? Were you robbed? Did the organizers of the irregular immigration respect the agreements made at the start? Were you arrested or segregated during the journey? Were you exploited for labour? Are ar med gangs or soldiers involved in the management of irregular immigration? Are there ties between the organizers of irregular immigration?

The last column in the table shows the total cost of the journey incurred by the migrant from their country of origin to Italy.

Smuggling organizations along the Sahara routes to Libya In light of the interviews with migrants as well as literature on migrant smuggling along African routes towards Italy, several suggestions emerged concerning different means of transport, travel costs for migrants, the dangers they encounter on the route towards North African countries, and how migrant smuggling is organized. From sub-​Saharan countries to Niger, migrants travel without necessarily seeking the help of smugglers. They usually use bus lines which cross ECOWAS states. There are several regular means of transport to reach Agadez in Niger, departing, for instance, from Dakar in Senegal, Gao in Mali, Abidjan in Ivory Coast, and Lomé in Togo. The cost of regular public transport to reach Agadez ranges from €4 to 120 according to the different departure cities (Frontex, 2015; Fereday, 2022). Although migrants can move freely within ECOWAS states, at each border checkpoint encountered, the police have a large margin of discretion on how to deal with migrants, from asking for extra money to imprisoning them for extortion purposes 63

Smuggling and Trafficking of Migrants in Southern Europe

Table 3.1: Results of questions migrants were asked during the interviews Migrant’s A origin country Nigeria

B

C

1

Cameroon

1

1

Gambia

1

1

Somalia

D

E

1 1

1

I

J 1

1

1,000 1,500

1

1 1

1

7,300

1

1 1 1

Nigeria Nigeria

H

1,000

1

Nigeria Gambia

G

1 1

Senegal Nigeria

F

1 1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1,000

1

1,200

1

1,500

1

1,500

1

1,000

1

1,900

Nigeria Nigeria Cameroon

1

Benin

1

1

1

1

1

Ivory Coast

1 1

1

1

Ivory Coast Ivory Coast

1 1

1

1

1,100

1 1

1

1 1

1

1

1

1

Gambia Guinea

1

Mali

1

1

1

Gambia

1

1

1

1

1

Liberia

1

1

1

1

1

11

14

9

5

10

Total

1

1

1

1

1

1,000

1

1,500

1 1 6

1,200

1

1

1

1,000

1

1

1

1,000

7

8

15

Legend: A: B: C: D: E: F: G: H: I: J:

Money requested from policemen Violence against the migrant or witnessed by the migrant Migrant robbed Agreement not respected by the smugglers Migrant arrested or segregated Labour exploitation Gangs involved in the smuggling Soldiers involved in the smuggling Ties among smugglers Total cost of travel in Euro

Note: There are some reasons for the empty boxes on each line. For instance, regarding violence, the migrant might not have wanted to answer. As for ties between smugglers, the migrant was not able to answer. Referring to the cost of the journey, the migrants did not remember how much they had paid (in the case of journeys from one country to another, payment is usually made in the local currency and it was not always possible to be completely accurate about the total costs) or did not want to answer the question.

64

Irregular Migration Towards Southern Europe

to allow them to continue the journey. Violence against migrants is not only used by criminal gangs or rebel groups but also by soldiers or militia. Many interviewees were subjected to violence or had to work under slavery-​ like conditions, exploited in date harvesting, other agricultural work and construction. This happened when they reached Algeria or Libya. It seems anything can happen, especially in Libya. Faced with armed gangs or Libyan military forces, the only thing migrant people can do is obey without answering back. In Libya, it was reported, “they no longer have a heart, they have iron” (Appendix 43). As revealed in several reports, going through Libya means a higher probability of being subjected to violence or other forms of abuse (Andersson, 2014; IOM, 2019; FIDH, 2021). According to a survey conducted in 2019 of 1,689 migrants in Niger and Mali, 60 per cent of all respondents experienced one or more forms of trafficking along the migratory route. The most widespread form of abuse was to be detained (54 per cent), followed by kidnapping (32 per cent), forced labour (11 per cent), slavery (7 per cent), sexual abuse (4 per cent) and organ trafficking (3 per cent). For these, Libya ranked first as the country with the highest risk of forced labour, slavery, kidnapping, sexual exploitation and organ trafficking followed by Niger, Mali and Algeria; while the latter ranked first for being detained (Malakooti, 2019). From north Niger, there are two main system to cross the Sahara. The first, as we have seen, relies on paying professional smugglers who take migrants to Libya. Provided that the smugglers respect the agreements, the migrants travel in crowded pickups and take about one week to cross the desert. The second system consists of trucks whose drivers usually travel back and forth along the desert routes to import and export different goods. Migrants who do not have enough money to travel in pickups choose this means of transport. The migrants travel with other people on the truck, which takes around one month to cross the desert due to the various stops related to the driver’s business (Maher, 2018; Tinti and Westcott, 2016). In this case, there are no specific forms of smuggling organization. Rather, the smugglers are minor entrepreneurs who have decided to expand their official business to transport migrants across the desert routes. These kinds of transporters, who can be defined both as official entrepreneurs and on-​demand smugglers, manage their activities autonomously, establishing the conditions and transport prices along the routes towards North African countries directly with the migrants. As they are not part of a professionally organized group devoted to migrant smuggling, they enter and exit the business according to the economic opportunities at the time and the risks that the activity implies. While armed organized smugglers impose their conditions through the use of violence, truck-​driver smugglers do not represent a specific danger to migrants. They are usually involved in short trips or trips where the potential risks along the journey are low. In addition, 65

Smuggling and Trafficking of Migrants in Southern Europe

as we can infer from the interviews with migrants, smugglers who are not connected to counterparts on the other side of the borders leave migrants close to the borders instead of taking them to Algeria or Libya. Most migrants, 15 out of 22 interviewed, reported that the “transporters know each other and keep in contact with each other via mobiles”. Smugglers meet in agreed meeting places where migrants are passed from one transporter to another. This can happen at the crossing points of state borders from the countries of departure to hubs along the sub-​Saharan route to North Africa: some Nigerian and Cameroonian migrants paid for the entire trip from their country to the embarkation points in Libya, relying on different transporters who knew each other. This information from the migrants interviewed apparently contradicts other information: most of them paid for just a section of the journey each time and then stopped in the transit places while they were waiting to get more money to resume the journey. Moreover, almost all migrants paid the cost of embarkation directly to the Libyan organizers of the journeys. In effect, two forms of payment for the journey to Libya were possible: the ‘full package’ or step-​ by-​step payment along the route up to payment for boarding in Libya, which in most cases was excluded from the ‘all inclusive’ service (Pastore et al, 2006; de Haas, 2007; Monzini, 2008; Raineri, 2016; Campana, 2018; Kam Kah, 2019). The different methods of payment, for the most part partial payments, and the long stops in transit places that can drag on for several months, suggest that there are poor ties within the smuggler network. In fact, only some interviewees from Nigeria and Cameroon said it had taken them two to three months to reach Italy from their country, while all the others reported having spent a minimum of six months or over a year. However, the journey from the country of origin to the places of embarkation for Italy takes a long time, often because the migrants are systematically robbed by criminal gangs or soldiers along the way or betrayed by unreliable smugglers (Darme and Benattia, 2017; GITOC, 2018). Having no more money to continue the journey is one of the main reasons that forces migrants to stop in transit places. On the one hand, paying for travel step by step means that migrants do not have reliable relationships with the smugglers and as a precaution they prefer not to pay for the full journey at the outset. On the other, it means that there are many smugglers in the irregular migration market. Those who have connections with others are likely to seem trustworthy from a migrant’s point of view, while those who do not are likely to be opportunistic smugglers. This latter category also includes smugglers who are not trustworthy because they are ready to betray and sell the migrants, so they act as both smugglers and criminals. Paying for migratory travel at each step of the way is not only the most reasonable choice for migrants, but is also a way to deal with crossing countries such as Libya where there are dangers from the presence 66

Irregular Migration Towards Southern Europe

of criminal groups as well as official and unofficial militia who can abuse migrants. In line with the information already referred to concerning the likelihood of migrants falling victim to some forms of trafficking, some estimates claim that, after the 2011 Gaddafi dictatorship, there were around 1,600 military groups operating in the country (FIDH, 2021). As for the specific cost to reach Italy from sub-​Saharan countries, those who arrived in Italy in 2013/​14 from the Horn of Africa countries paid sums of around €7,000, including €2,000 for boarding in Libya (Appendix 46); Eritreans, depending on the European country chosen as their final destination, paid up to €8,000 (Reitano, 2015). Those from West African countries south of the Sahara have significantly lower travel costs, ranging from $300 to 1,000 (from Senegal to Libya), while the cost for shorter journeys, corresponding to the crossing of the Sahara from Agadez in Niger to Sebha in Libya, is around €400 if the trip is by pickup, or around €100 by truck. The interviews conducted with migrants arriving in Italy between 2015 and 2017 reveal that their travel costs were an average of €1,300 each: €900 to €1,000 for the journey by land from countries such as Mali, Nigeria, Ivory Coast and Ghana and €400 to embark from Libya for Italy. One aspect that emerged time and again in the research is that Syrian refugees paid between $2,000 and $2,500 each to board from Libya, while sub-​Saharan migrants paid $800 to $1,000. The former travelled on the deck of the boat; the latter in the hold, a much more dangerous place in the event of a shipwreck (Micallef, 2017; Reitano and Tinti, 2015). The significantly higher cost for Syrian refugees is probably due to the fact that, between 2013 and 2014, they represented the largest component of migrants leaving Libya and, at the same time, were those with the most money available. Over the years, travel costs for migrants from the sub-​Saharan area have significantly decreased. In the early 2000s, the price of the trip was around $3,500. In 2006, just the embarkation from Libya to Italy cost from €1,200 to €2,000 (Coluccello and Massey, 2007; Monzini, 2008). In recent years, boarding from Libya went from $1,000 to $1,500 in 2013/​14, $250 to $350 in 2015/​ 16, down to $60 to $90 each in the summer of 2016 in some areas on the west coast, such as Zawiya, Zuwarah and Sebratha (ISS, 2017; Micallef, 2017). The dramatic reduction in boarding costs was determined not only by the lower numbers of Syrian refugees but also by the decision of the militia involved in migrant smuggling to expel other competitors from the market. Below a certain threshold, in the order of 500 Libyan dinars per migrant (about $60), the profit margin would have been so low as to push many independent smugglers out of the market (Micallef, 2017). Since the start of the civil war in Libya in 2011, the management of irregular immigration in the country has significantly changed. During the dictatorship, the regime followed an instrumental policy on irregular immigration. On the one hand, Colonel Gaddafi used the departure of migrants from the 67

Smuggling and Trafficking of Migrants in Southern Europe

Libyan coasts as a bargaining tool to obtain economic aid from Italy. On the other hand, irregular immigration was left to be managed by tribal groups potentially averse to the regime: tolerance of their trafficking of goods and people was requested in exchange for support for the dictatorship (Howard, 2018; Shaw and Reitano, 2014). Furthermore, there were close links at various levels between the army, police and smugglers. The agreement between smugglers and police consisted of intercepting one in every three convoys arriving, for example, from the eastern part of Libya through the Sahara. Migrants were brought to detention centres on the border with Sudan, where they were beaten until they contacted their families for money to be released. They would then restart their journey with the interested help of the smugglers and the real possibility of being deported to previous prisons by the Libyan authorities (Carsetti and Triulzi, 2009). At that time, and this still happens today, migrants could travel from the southern border of Libya to the embarkation points on the coast several times before finally being able to reach Italy by sea and apply for international protection. Although collusion also occurred in the past between segments of the Libyan police forces and smugglers, the fall of the Gadaffi regime in 2011 in many ways marked a watershed in the management of illegal immigration: it led to a phase of social turbulence characterized by a sharp fall in the state’s power. In 2013, the militia that rose up against the regime refused to hand over their weapons to the Government of National Accord (GNA), the new political authority represented by the Parliament of Tripoli. The GNA incorporated the revolutionary militia, without however having effective control over them, so the militia kept their power over the cities of the west coast of Tripoli (Porsia, 2016). In addition, Ali-​Aftar, former-​general of the Gaddafi regime and supported by the Tobruk parliament, launched a military offensive against the Tripoli government in 2014, dragging the country into a new civil war. In the south of Libya, an area historically involved in various types of trafficking along the trans-​Saharan routes, tribal groups such as the Tebu and Tuareg have local powers (the former in the south-​east on the border between Niger and Chad; the latter in the south-​west between Tunisia and Algeria) that have become greater than ever in order to manage the areas in which they are historically located (Tinti and Westcott, 2016; Kushminder and Triandafyllidou, 2019). Libya is divided into three different areas of influence: those under the control of the National Liberation Army (NLA) of Ali-​Aftar (Tobruk and Cyrenaica on the north-​east coast), those under the control of the GNA (Tripolitania, corresponding to the north-​west coast) and the Fezzan (a large central area of the Sahara) controlled by local communities organized by clans and tribal affiliations, such as the Tebu (allies of the NLA), the Tuareg (allies of the GNA) and the Awlad Suleiman (allies of the Tuareg) (Acconcia, 2015; Del Monte, 2019). 68

Irregular Migration Towards Southern Europe

From 2013 to around 2017, the arrival of migrants along the routes crossing Agadez (Niger) and Sebha (Libya) increased significantly. Some estimate that, in 2013, at least 3,000 people a week passed through Agadez, and, in the following years until October 2016, a total of 170,000, while 40,000 are thought to have passed through the city of Kufra, on the eastern side of Libya, in 2014 (Tinti and Westcott, 2016; Raineri, 2016). Another estimate based on movements traced by satellite observations claims that between January 2014 and March 2016 the total number of people movements ranged from 5,000 to 17,000 per week arriving in and departing from Agadez (Frontex, 2016). Together with passing migrants, the foreign population of the sub-​ Saharan area in Libya before 2011 must also be taken into account, which numbered around two million people, some of whom decided to leave the country due to growing uncertainty about the domestic situation (Sorensen, 2006). According to some estimates, income from the immigration business amounted to €978 million in 2015, 3.4 per cent of Libya’s GDP (Adaora and Chukwuma, 2019). The consistent increase in the numbers of people intending to emigrate from Libya, together with the substantial impunity enjoyed by smugglers after the fall of the Gaddafi regime, has led to the development of a real economy based on irregular migration. Smugglers have invested in means of transport, both motor vehicles and boats, personnel specialized in managing land transport across the Sahara, and reception and parking facilities for migrants in the travel hub areas. The establishment of a migration-​based industry has had further significant consequences. First of all, in areas of the country where smugglers have local ties, such as in the south for populations belonging to the Tebu and Tuareg, they acquired their own social legitimacy, becoming part of the government of local communities and redistributing the migration profits in the form of ‘welfare’ for the local population (health services, education and access to credit) (Shaw and Reitano, 2014; al-​Arabi 2018). In addition, the higher demand for smuggling has helped to strengthen the networks in the north and south of the country, one involved in sea transport, the other in land transport (Kushminder and Triandafyllidou, 2019). Some observers ascribe the connection between smugglers in the north and south of the country to the fact that many of them met in prison in 2009, when Gaddafi, to demonstrate to the Italian government his good intention to fight irregular migration, ordered the imprisonment of several thousands of them. These smugglers later fled the prisons during the civil war of 2011 (Porsia, 2016; Micallef, 2017). This situation, together with the drive to establish a link between criminal networks in the north and south, has been facilitated both by the anarchy into which Libya has fallen and the need for smugglers to develop stable forms of collaboration to manage the increasing flow of migrants headed to the coast. In order to organize migrant convoys of dozens of vehicles (from 50 to 80 pickup trucks, each 69

Smuggling and Trafficking of Migrants in Southern Europe

with 30 migrants aboard), it is essential to have adequate infrastructures –​ financial resources, means of transport, drivers and surveillance personnel, places to park and boats to be used once the migrants reach the coast (Tinti and Westcott, 2016). The connection between the criminal networks of the Fezzan and those on the coast developed over time with the entry of the militia into the migrant smuggling business. The circulation of many weapons from 2011 onwards and a non-​existent justice system in much of Libya led to a serious security problem, inducing the smugglers to enter into agreements with the militia, who are the only ones that could guarantee the smugglers some form of security (Shaw and Mangan, 2014; Kam Kah, 2019: Noria Research, 2019). The militia play an indirect or direct role in the smuggling business. The former is predatory and consists of requiring smugglers, at each checkpoint under their control, to pay a certain amount of money, from $150 to $250 for each vehicle transporting migrants (Tinti and Westcott, 2016; Kam Kah, 2019). The latter involves the military escorting convoys of migrants and managing the entire business in partnership with the smugglers (GITOC, 2018). This happens especially when smugglers and militia share the same ‘ethnic’ and linguistic origin, such as Tebu and Taureg, and govern their respective local communities (al-​Arabi, 2018). The transnational expansion of the routes (between the countries of the sub-​Saharan area towards Libya) and the inclusion of militia in the management of migrant smuggling have led to the development of a private protection industry that has significantly reduced the operational prospects of individual smugglers. The latter have not disappeared: there are still single drivers in pickups or trucks carrying migrants on short routes, but those who enjoy the protection of the militia have acquired a dominant position in the migration business at the expense of individual smugglers. To summarize, the smuggling of migrants in Libya has gone through different phases. During the dictatorship, smugglers were subject to vigilant control by the regime, which drew political advantages from them. The aftermath of the revolution signalled a new phase that allowed a multitude of subjects to enter the immigration business. The third phase, from 2013/​14 to around 2017, had a new vertically structured organization and benefitted smugglers with several resources: connections with recruiters as middlemen located in the migrants’ countries of departure, financial resources, personnel to be hired to run the operations and, last but not least, the protection of the militia (ISS, 2017; DRI, 2019). The last phase started with the 2017 Italy-​GNA agreement. Funds from Italy and the EU aimed at countering irregular migration have likely broken the common convergence of interests between smugglers/​militia in the Fezzan and on the Libyan coast. In order to gain access to finance and build 70

Irregular Migration Towards Southern Europe

a reputation as loyal defenders of the order, some militia leaders have turned their interests to the management of migrant detention centres throughout Libya. These centres, within which violence and extortion against migrants are almost systematic, are run by three types of armed group: those who receive a salary from the Ministry of Defence and are fully integrated into the institutional system of the political power in Tripoli; those that affiliate themselves with the Tripoli government but are actually independent; and those that are completely independent from the government (Malakooti, 2019; UN, 2019). For the most part involved in the past in migrant smuggling, these armed groups act as centre managers, and some of them have continued to maintain contact with the smugglers (ISS, 2017; DRI, 2019). In addition, the Libyan Arab Armed Forces (the former Libyan National Army), led by Khalifa Haftar, in 2018 started its expansion in the Fezzan and Tripolitania that culminated the following year in the attack of Tripoli airport, plunging the country into a new civil war. Haftar’s failed attempt to conquer the airport gave rise to a new political phase that led to the constitution of a new government –​the Government of National Unity (GNU) –​made up of all previous rival factions of Tripoli and Tobruk. Faced with unstable peace, the new government targeted smugglers in some internal crossroad areas such as Bani Walid, and on the coasts, such as Zuwarah and Zawiya (Horsley and Gerken, 2022). The constitution of a united government apparently gave more power to Libyan institutions to take steps to change the country’s ominous international reputation as a country involved in smuggling migrants where, inter alia, human rights are not respected. However, as shown by data on recent arrivals to Italy, migrant departures from Libya to Sicily have increased since 2019, although the Libyan coastguard blocked and returned 10,076 and 24,282 migrants to its territory in 2020 and 2021 (Horsley and Gerken, 2022). The great instability within the country makes Libyan institutions unable to affirm the monopoly of violence at national level. Against this background, institutions are de facto obliged to accept the presence of militia and therefore do not enforce laws. This happens particularly in areas of the country where interests are linked to irregular immigration involving the participation of smugglers, militia and local community leaders.

Irregular migrants arriving in Greece Before providing a preliminary overview of the number of migrants landing in Greece, it is worth saying that, according to sources collected by Greek police and the Ministry of Maritime Affairs, the system of collecting data on migrants arriving in the country has changed over the years, so, the available data does not allow a comparison (Triandafyllidou and Maroukis, 2012; Bilger et al, 2015). For this reason, here we have reported more recent 71

Smuggling and Trafficking of Migrants in Southern Europe

Figure 3.13: Migrants landing in Greece (2014–​2021) 900,000

Number of landed migrants

800,000 700,000 600,000 500,000 400,000 300,000 200,000 100,000 0 2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

Year

Source: Adapted from UNHCR (2023)

and comparable data available on the UNHCR website which has provided statistical information from 2014 to 2021 broken down into sea and land borders, knowing that sea arrivals mainly correspond to migrants intercepted between Turkey and Greece, while land borders correspond to migrants arriving from all the countries bordering Greece. Figure 3.13 shows the numbers of migrants landing in Greece from 2014 to 2021. In 2014, 41,038 migrants reached Greece by sea. The following year, the number rose 20 times, to 856,723. That year marked the so-​called European crisis of refugees, in which member states were urged to take action to deal with higher numbers of migrants arriving in the EU area. According to Frontex (2019), 1,822,177 irregular migrants reached the EU in 2015, with 788,363 arriving over land and 1,033,814 by sea. Of the latter, 83 per cent arrived in Greece. Faced with an increase in migrant arrivals, EU institutions and states reacted in two ways. First, some states announced they were willing to host asylum seekers, mostly Syrians fleeing the war, while others were much more cautious. In September 2015, Germany, a country sensitive to this issue, announced that it was ready to host asylum seekers arriving in Southern Europe and share them among other member states. The then president of the EU Commission encouraged other EU members to agree with the German proposal. Some countries, such as Austria, France, Sweden and Spain, accepted the proposal, while others did not, or were only prepared to share the burden of the influx of migrants and refugees under certain conditions. For instance, Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia opposed hosting asylum seekers, saying that the burden of sharing should be voluntary. 72

Irregular Migration Towards Southern Europe

Second, as part of a joint action plan, the EU promoted an agreement with Turkey, signed in October 2015 and finalized in March 2016. Under this agreement, irregular migrants arriving in the Greek islands from Turkey after 20 March 2016 must be returned to Turkey. Migrants who did not apply for international protection in Greece, or those whose application was unsuccessful, must be returned to Turkey at the expense of the EU. In addition, for each Syrian returned to Turkey from the Greek islands, another Syrian in Turkey would be resettled in an EU member state. Moreover, the EU Commission asked the Turkish government to implement new actions to improve surveillance and patrol to counter migrant arrivals to the EU. In exchange, the EU agreed to speed up the visa liberalization process for Turkish citizens to enter the EU and initially allocated €3 billion to compensate Turkey for assisting refugees and asylum seekers hosted in its territory, and a further €3 billion by the end of 2018 (Özmenek Çarmikly and Kader, 2016b). This agreement was renewed in 2021, giving Turkey €6 billion to counter irregular migration towards the EU and financial support to host almost four million refugees in the country. However, the new agreement was signed after the Turkish president had reproached the EU commission for not providing his country with enough help. So, likely with a view to getting a much better deal with the EU, in February 2020, President Erdoğan declared that the country would not stop any more migrants from reaching Europe. Thereafter, the Turkish authorities opened the border in the province of Edirne, along the Greek border crossing point of Kastanies, inducing thousands of migrants to head for Greece (Europol, 2020). The Greek police reacted to the massive attempt to overcome the border by pushing back migrants who, for some weeks, were blocked between the Turkish and Greek armies until most of them returned to Turkey, which had meanwhile restored the border controls (Cicciù, 2020, 2021). After the EU-​Turkey agreement, arrivals by sea to Greece sharply decreased: from 173,450 in 2016 to 4,331 in 2021. In 2022, they increased to 12,758 (UNHCR, 2023). As Figure 3.14 shows, a few thousand migrants who were apprehended arrived in Greece by land from 2014 to 2016; then, from 2017 to 2019, their numbers increased, peaking at 18,014 in 2018, before dropping to a few thousand again in recent years. The land border between Greece and Turkey is around 206 kilometres, and, for the most part, follows the Evros river. Since 2012, Greek authorities have built 12.5 kilometres of fences along the river and set up a surveillance system comprised of helicopters and thermal cameras to identify migrants crossing the border (Bilger et al, 2015). In addition, in August 2021, the Greek government built a new 28-​kilometre wall along the Evros that, according to the plans of the Greek authorities, will become longer, using EU funds to construct a new wall of 80 kilometres (Caragnano, 2022). 73

Smuggling and Trafficking of Migrants in Southern Europe

Figure 3.14: Migrants apprehended at the Greek land border (2014–​2021) 20,000 Number of landed migrants

18,000 16,000 14,000 12,000 10,000 8,000 6,000 4,000 2,000 0 2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

Year

Source: Adapted from UNHCR (2023)

The two main ways of reaching Greece by land and sea through Turkey are probably related (Yildiz, 2020). The building of fences along the Evros river, completed in 2014, could have led to a change in the number of arrivals from land to sea, with the flow redirected towards Lesvos, the Greek island some miles off the Turkish coast (Koutsomplias and Iliadis, 2018). However, as shown in Figures 3.13 and 3.14, the number of migrants intercepted along the Greek land and sea borders followed a different trend after the 2016 EU–Turkey agreement, until 2018. Along the land border, migrants crossing increased between 2016 and 2018, while in the same period migrants landing decreased. However, since 2019, migrants arriving both by land and sea have decreased, probably due to the stronger Turkish controls to counter irregular migration towards Greece. Migrants apprehended crossing the Greek land border totaled 5,982 in 2020 and 4,826 in 2021. A similar decrease was seen for the maritime border, with the number of migrants arriving by sea declining from 9,714 in 2020 to 4,331 in 2021. Given its position as a transit country between Asia, the Middle East and Europe, Turkey played an active role in countering irregular migration. There were stricter surveillance and patrols by Turkish police along the national borders, Turkey built a wall between it and Syria, and, in January 2016, new visa requirements were introduced for Syrians wanting to enter the country. The new Turkish policy to stem irregular immigration resulted not only in the apprehension of around 10,000 smugglers between 2018 and 2019, but also a huge increase in irregular migrants. In 2015, the latter numbered 146,485, and then, in 2019, this figure increased to 454,662, 45 74

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per cent of whom were from Afghanistan and 15 per cent from Pakistan (Toktas and Selimoglu, 2012; Yildiz, 2020). Moreover, the gradual closing of the Balkan route contributed to redirecting the migrants towards other routes. In an initial phase, between 2014 and 2015, Eastern European and non-​European countries, such as FYROM and Serbia, set up temporary reception camps for migrants and then let them transit towards the nearest border. In the second half of 2015, however, ever more restrictive measures were introduced for the entry of new migrants. The first country to take drastic measures in this sense was Hungary, whose prime minister ordered the construction of a barbed-​wire fence along the border with Serbia and the presence of the army to garrison the territory, and passed laws that meant prison for migrants who entered Hungary illegally. These measures saw the migratory pressure shift from Hungary to Croatia: from September to December 2015, over 460,000 people passed through Croatia. The organizational difficulties in managing the new and sudden flow of migrants into the country, together with growing concern in national public opinion, drove the Croatian government to introduce entry restrictions: only Syrian, Afghan and Iraqi citizens –​according to the government the only people potentially interested in obtaining international protection –​were allowed to enter Croatia and then travel on to Slovenia, while others were sent back to Serbia (Caritas, 2016). The restrictive measures introduced in Hungary, which were strengthened in early 2017 with the construction of a second wall, had the twofold effect of redirecting the migrant land route towards Croatia and subsequently Slovenia and, at the same time, expanding the implementation of restrictive measures in these two countries, which in turn built barriers on their southern borders. Bulgaria, also affected by the arrival of migrants following the Hungarian blockade, implemented the same measures on the border with Turkey, and from March 2016, FYROM sent anyone who was not Syrian, Afghan or Iraqi back to the Greek border, while, in some cases, as reported by an Italian NGO operating on site, it would suddenly close its own border with Greece due to ‘technical problems’ (Caritas, 2016; Vindola-​Padros et al, 2021). In May 2019, the EU, through its Commission, established a collaboration agreement with Albania –​also affected by the arrival of migrants following the blockade on the Macedonian border with Greece –​on the basis of which the presence of agents belonging to Frontex in the Albanian territory was planned to counter illegal crossings to the EU (Quercia, 2017; IDOS, 2019).

Along the eastern Mediterranean towards Greece Most migrants arriving in Greece come from Asian countries such as Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq and Iran. As for North Africa, they are mainly Egyptian, while others come from the Middle East, especially Palestine and 75

newgenrtpdf

Figure 3.15: Main routes from Asian countries to reach Greece

Thessaloniki

Ağri Balikesir Van Turkey Izmir Turkey

Athens Lesvos Lesvos

Kabul

76

Tehran Iran Iran

Cairo

Pakistan Pakistan Karachi

Egypt Egypt

Hajer Dorar Khartoum Sudan Sudan

Afghanistan Afghanistan Islamabad

Eritrea Geza Keren

Addis Ababa

Source: Adapted from Triandafyllidou and Maroukis (2012); Bilger et al (2015); Yildiz (2020); Whittle and Antonopoulos (2020)

Smuggling and Trafficking of Migrants in Southern Europe

Edirne Istanbul

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Syria (Triandafyllidou and Maroukis, 2012; Bilger et al, 2015). During peak arrivals in 2015, most people arriving in Europe were Syrian (la Repubblica, 2015). More recently, in 2022, migrants also arrived from the Horn of Africa countries, such as Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia and Eritrea, and from other sub-​Saharan countries, such as Congo, Cameroon, Guinea and Gambia (UNHCR, 2023). The prevalent migrant smuggling trajectories (as shown in Figure 3.15) run through Turkey due to its geographical position as the main crossroads between European, Middle Eastern and Asian countries. Accordingly, Turkey is the main entry point both by land and sea for migrants attempting to reach the EU from the eastern side of the world. Starting out from their own countries, Pakistani, Afghan and Iranian people arrive beyond the border between Turkey and Iran in the Turkish cities of Van, Ağri and Doğubeyazit. They reach Istanbul and later Edirne to enter Greece by the Evros river, which separates these two countries. Following this land path, the main Greek city used as a transit point is Thessaloniki in the north (Appendix 41). From there, migrants head towards Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia towards more coveted Northern European countries (Bilger et al, 2015). Alternatively, the other main direction of travel runs from Istanbul through Balikesir, Aydin and later to south Turkish embarkation points around Izmir for Lesvos, Samos and Chios, the closest Greek islands to Turkey (Siegel, 2019; Yildiz, 2020). The second main direction of travel comes from sub-​Saharan countries such as Eritrea, Ethiopia and Sudan. Migrants start their travel from the Eritrean city of Geza Keren or from Addis Ababa in Ethiopia heading to Khartoum and Hajer Dorar in Sudan and later to Egypt to find an embarkation point to reach Greece or Italy (Whittle and Antonopoulos, 2020). In order to provide some personally collected information, a few interviews with migrant people conducted in Greece in June 2022 follow. In 2020, Monib, a 28-​year-​old man from Pakistan, decided to leave his country as he was accused of having committed some crimes. He reports that he was wrongly accused and that the real reason relates to a public demonstration in his city in which he participated as a member of a political party opposed to the government. During the protests, there were clashes with the police and people were injured, so, after this event, someone reported him to the police who accused him of violent assaults. In the city of Peshawar, close to the border with Afghanistan, Monib met a compatriot he trusted and with whom he agreed to be taken across the Iranian border. He travelled for some days by car with four other people and paid €1,500 to his compatriot. Approaching the border, they got out of the car and continued the trip by walking along mountain paths led by an Afghan smuggler guide who had connections with the Pakistani driver. Once they had crossed the Iranian border, the driver came to pick them up at an agreed place already established with the passeur. 77

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On the outskirts of Teheran, in what Monib referred to as a big house, he waited for some weeks before getting a lift to Turkey. He reported that some people there had connections with transporters. The latter would come to the house to ask the migrants where they wanted to go: Turkey, Bulgaria or Greece. Monib found a Kurdish driver who he paid €2,500 to take him to Istanbul, traveling in a small van with other people. Once they got close to the Turkish border, as before, they proceeded on foot led by a local guide and were later taken by the same smuggler beyond the Turkish border. From Istanbul to Edirne province, close to the Greek border, Monib used public transport and walked until he arrived at a makeshift camp with other migrants along the Evros river. At night, with other people in a small boat, he crossed the river to get to Greece and was later brought to Thessaloniki, a trip for which he paid €3,000 including for the boat. In November 2021, he reached Athens by train. Some months later he applied for international protection and was still waiting to hear whether his application had been successful when we met. In all, his travel from Pakistan to Greece cost €8,000, including the price to stay in the different places he crossed while waiting for the new smugglers. During his journey, once his money ran out, he asked relatives in Pakistan, as well as some friends living in Germany and France, to send him the money he needed (Appendix 83). In the centre of Mytilene, I met Hasan, a 22-​year-​old Afghani man who was attempting to sell lighters and paper towels to crowds of tourists in Lesvos, the closest Greek island to Turkey and affording a view of the Turkish coast across the sea. Hasan decided to go abroad because the living conditions in the rural area where he lived were getting worse and worse. He saw no future if he remained in his country, so, in agreement with his family, he travelled to the Baluchistan region between Afghanistan and Iran. Once there he found some local people who took him over and beyond the Iranian border. As an irregular migrant, he was arrested by Iranian police who put him in prison for two months. After he was released, he travelled to Tehran where he worked illegally for six months at a car wash, just long enough to get some money to restart his journey to Europe. Thanks to some compatriots who found him a contact, he got a lift to Southern Turkey from some truck drivers. He travelled with other people hidden in a narrow room inside the truck compartment. Each time the truck stopped, he waited for the agreed signal from the drivers –​three knocks on the truck’s metal side –​to get out. After a few months in Turkey, he found close to Izmir a point of embarkation to Lesvos. After spending almost two years travelling and €5,000, he eventually reached the island, where he applied for international protection and was still waiting for the outcome. His intention was not to stay in Lesvos, but to reach Italy (Appendix 80). 78

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Smuggling organizations along the eastern route According to the information collected, there are two systems of migrant smuggling towards Greece. The first is managed by small groups of smugglers who organize short trips, for instance as passeurs between Afghanistan, Iran and Turkey. Local smugglers work in small groups and act as independent players, offering specialized services such as the crossing of specific state borders. In this case, migrants always pay the smugglers on a step-​by-​step basis. Eritrean people, for example, heading towards Egypt and then on to Italy or alternatively to Greece found trusted people within their local communities through word-​of-​mouth recommendations with whom to organize their travel. In addition, the main smuggler payment system was based on ‘pay as you go’ (Whittle and Antonopoulos, 2020). Conversely, the second system is based around smugglers who are connected with each other all along the migrant’s trajectory. This is the case, for instance, of Bangladeshi people, Indians from the Punjab region and Iraqis who find potentially trustworthy people such as brokers and middlemen within their local communities. These people represent the first line of the smuggling chain and function as a trait d’union between potential migrants and smugglers (Icduygu, 2004). The broker or guarantor asks the migrant to pay a certain percentage for the service. The fee for the money to be safeguarded and handed over to the smuggler once the migrant arrives in the destination country is around 3 per cent (Triandafyllidou and Maroukis, 2012). In this case, the migrant pays the guarantor the full travel costs in advance and receives a code certifying the agreement made, which, at the same time, acts as a reference for the smuggler. When smugglers are transnationally related, migrants travel with their guides/​drivers by different means of transport and then, once they arrive close to the border, the migrants get out and walk along mountain paths guided by a smuggler. Once they have crossed the border, the migrants are picked up by other smugglers. To the extent that there is trust between the smugglers and migrants, with or without the intervention of brokers, some smuggling modus operandi allow migrants to include more than one attempt to cross the border in the price. This was the case for Pakistani migrants who had at least three paid attempts to cross the Iranian border (Bilger et al, 2015). As for sea travel from Turkey to Greece, the main hubs are located in southern Turkey around Izmir. From the Turkish coast, smugglers organize travel towards the Greek islands of Samos, Chios, Kos and Lesvos (UNHCR, 2023). During high numbers of arrivals in Greece in 2015, the island of Lesvos received more than 200,000 migrants (Siegel, 2019). According to recent qualitative research based on migrant interviews, most of those who landed in the Greek islands turned to smugglers (Siegel, 2019; Yildiz, 2020). Even those who had the right to apply as asylum seekers, as they were Syrian, 79

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or those who could apply for familial reunification used smugglers. Migrant people would ask smugglers for help instead of following legal channels for several reasons: for instance because the procedure to be recognized as a refugee was too long, or, similarly, the same procedure was considered too restrictive. As is known, the EU Dublin agreement foresees that a migrant should apply for international protection in the first EU state of arrival, and only once they have been recognized as a refugee can they move to another EU state. For this reason, people try to reach the chosen country with the help of smugglers instead of staying for a long time in the first EU country of arrival while they wait for the outcome of their asylum application. In other cases, the family reunification application requires certain wage and housing criteria to be met that the applicant is not able to satisfy, so they prefer to pay a smuggler to call their relatives (Yildiz, 2020). Similarly to land travel, sea crossings between Turkey and Greece are based on the two payment systems already described, depending on the connections between smugglers and their ability to offer an all-​inclusive package or a single sea trip. The former varies according to both the country of origin and the destination, whether counterfeit documents are used and the means of transport. For instance, in the last decade, travel from the Horn of Africa to Cairo by plane and through Turkey to the Greek islands cost around €2,000; from Yemen to the same destination around €3,000; and from sub-​Saharan countries by plane to Turkey and later Greece €2,000 (Triandafyllidou and Maroukis, 2012). Sea travel from the Turkish shores to the Aegean islands, in 2015, cost around €1,000 to €1,200 to reach Lesvos, when the number of arrivals on the Greek islands was high (Appendix 40; Özmenek Çarmikli and Kader, 2016a). More recently, however, the price to Lesvos dropped to €300 to €350 (Siegel, 2019). The reduction in sea travel prices was due to lower demand for smuggling services to reach Greece from Turkey. The reason why Greece has become less attractive as a transit country is probably related to migrants expecting to spend too much time there before formally acquiring the chance to move to more coveted EU countries. In addition, the Balkan route via Greece has not only become more difficult due to the barriers put up by eastern EU countries, it has also become more expensive for migrants who sought the help of smugglers (Yildiz, 2020).

A comparative analysis This concluding section aims to provide a comparative overview of the Mediterranean routes used to get to Southern European countries, broken down into western, central and eastern ones. The comparison considers the different forms of organizational crime models (hierarchical, network of networks and network based on single individuals). Most smuggling organizations fall into two categories: the network of networks and individual 80

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networks (Figures 2.2 and 2.3). This is the case, for instance, of smuggling organizations acting in Spain across the Strait of Gibraltar or along the broader Spanish coast across the western sea route. Those who organize migrant smuggling work together in small groups offering migrants different kinds of services, from transport in small boats departing from the Moroccan coast to a variety of services including picking up migrants once they arrive in Spain so they can be inserted into the national irregular labour market. In these terms, different smugglers are functionally interrelated and cooperate with each other to find migrants jobs and accommodation as well as offering transport by sea. The smugglers are local people, based on the Moroccan and Spanish coasts, or foreigners lured by the increasing economic benefits and with interpersonal relationships of trust built up year by year among people settled along the two Mediterranean shores. The organization of smuggling is similar on the eastern routes, through which migrants are brought from Turkey to Greece by land or sea. Along this route, we did not find evidence of conflicts among smugglers or forms of hierarchical organizations able to centralize the migrant smuggling activities. Several smuggler groups cooperate with each other to control the entire journey made by migrant people from Asian countries to Turkey and then from Turkey to Greece. Smuggler groups are connected to each other without there being centralized units that control other players involved in the smuggling. Prevalently business oriented, smuggler criminal groups establish reciprocally advantageous relationships on both a temporary and permanent basis. As for the central route towards Italy, all smuggling organizations discussed in Chapter 2 are found here. For departures from Tunisia, the smuggling system reproduces the same configuration found along the western and eastern routes, from the collaboration between various criminal groups to the single group that offers transport services on single routes. As we have already seen, since 2018, arrivals from Tunisia to Italy have increased (Frontex, 2019). Until 2021, people departing from the Tunisian shores were almost exclusively Tunisians; then, in 2022, there were also sub-​Saharan migrants. Smugglers transported from 70 to 100 people in fishing boats and fast inflatables, but recently they have used iron boats that are more unstable and precarious at sea (Herbert, 2022; Palazzolo, 2022). The smuggler networks involved are largely made up of Tunisians and Italians. They have operational centres in the embarkation places and units based in Sicily (Italian Ministry of Interior, 2022). On the Tunisian side, smugglers are former fishermen who have switched to this more profitable business, while, on the Italian side, Italians and Tunisians provide logistical support to migrants once they reach the Sicilian coast. In November 2022, an investigation carried out by Italian police led to the arrest of 12 people. Among them were Tunisians settled in Caltanissetta (Sicily) who organized trips to bring migrants to 81

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Italy in small, fast vessels, while some Sicilian farmers provided places where migrants were temporarily hosted (Palazzolo, 2022). With respect to Libya, there are two organizational smuggling systems. The first is based on cooperation among different criminal groups, as we have already seen for the other sea routes. This is the case of Eritrean smugglers who organize journeys for their compatriots from Eritrea and Sudan thorough the Sahara, and, once the migrants have reached Libyan shores, onward travel by sea to Sicily. Foreign smugglers collaborate with their Libyan counterparts, the former recruiting and acting as guarantors for their compatriots, while the latter manage departures from Libya. In addition, Eritrean smugglers in Libya were also able to organize migrants’ trips to some European countries such as Germany and Sweden once the migrants arrived on Italian shores (Appendix 4). Along with foreign smugglers having a certain autonomy, some features of the second smuggling system in Libya fall under the hierarchical model. In 2011, when the Gadaffi dictatorship came to an end, the irregular migration market was populated by players ranging from small to large criminal groups. From 2013, a progressive system of verticalization emerged in the country’s irregular migration market. Some evidence for this comes from the huge number of smuggled people crossing the Sahara Desert towards Libya, as well as the establishment of infrastructure in terms of hubs, main routes, vehicles and personnel employed in this business. For instance, several dozen pickup trucks travelled in convoy transporting hundreds of migrants to the Libyan shores, and an economy based on smuggling migrants grew year by year. There were those who provided smugglers and migrants with ‘safe houses’ as pit-​stop areas before continuing their travel, and maintenance and repair services for transport vehicles. There was also an economic benefit for local communities in the transit hubs where a number of locals were involved in the wider business of irregular immigration, such as home owners renting rooms to migrants and shopkeepers selling them goods. Other evidence demonstrating the shift towards a centralized smuggling market was the drop in the price of travel by sea from Libyan shores to Italy. Offering a price under a certain threshold, namely $60 to $90 per passenger, was a way of casting small smugglers out of the market. At the same time, the involvement of militia in migrant smuggling facilitated an oligopolistic configuration of the irregular migrant business, which benefited criminal groups able to resort to violence. In an increasingly unstable and unsafe Libyan society where the monopoly of violence was no longer under state control, militia involved in migrant smuggling have acquired more power, formally supporting the official government or its rivals. Criminal groups as well as militia, both using and imposing violence, have determined a shift towards more centralized forms of managing human smuggling. So, smugglers who had the support of militia acquired a strategic competitive 82

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advantage over smugglers who lacked such contacts. At the same time, militia could ally themselves with smugglers sharing a quota of the ill-​gotten profits with them or, alternatively, imposing a racket on them, acting as a power syndicate instead of an enterprise syndicate. The oligopolistic management of migrant smuggling based on cooperation among smugglers and militia was in place until 2017/​18. After this period, the shared economic interests of Fezzan and north Libyan smugglers were interrupted by external and internal changes in the country. As we have already seen, the main external factor was the 2017 agreement between Italy and the GNA, the main effect of which was to create a new business to counter irregular migration. Some of the smugglers and militia operating in the north of the country found it more convenient in economic and reputational terms to switch from managing smuggling to countering it, becoming the new proponents of order and legality. The second change was determined by the establishment of a new Libyan government that involved all parties in conflicts. After the unsuccessful attempt by Haftar’s army to conquer Tripoli airport in 2019, more favourable conditions were created for an agreement between the conflicting parties, paving the way for the establishment of the new government (GNU). Although the power balance among all parties involved was highly precarious and uncertain, this situation allowed Libyan institutions, to a certain extent, to take action against criminal smuggling groups. It is also worth mentioning that there are some indications that Libya has recently lost its role as a crossroads country along the central Mediterranean route. Agadez, the closest Niger city to the Libyan border, is no longer the main transit migration hub as it was some years ago. Since 2019, another hub has emerged in the city of Tahoua, where, according to some estimates, 350–700 migrants departed weekly for the Algerian city of Tamanrasset (Fereday, 2022). The shift to the Tahoua hub, and heading to Algeria instead of Libya, was due to the patrol campaign by the Niger government in 2016 to counter smuggling in Agadez. This partial shift from Libya to Algeria as a departure country was also caused by migrants who feared the dangers and violence in Libya as well as the risk of being intercepted by the Libyan coastguard once their sea journey had begun.

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4

Trafficking of Migrants for Sexual and Labour Exploitation This chapter analyses the different forms of migrant trafficking in the three focus Southern European countries. According to the literature, as well as the joint protocol to the 2000 UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, there are different forms of trafficking in human beings (UN, 2000c). In analytical terms, they come under the following categories: trafficking for sexual or labour exploitation, forced criminality, forced begging, forced marriage and organ removal. Since the first two are far more widespread than the others, we shall focus on sexual and labour exploitation. The chapter is organized into different sections. The first presents the estimated data of victims of trafficking in human beings (THB) and evidence in terms of official data worldwide, referring to EU countries as well as Spain, Italy and Greece. The second focuses on the sex market in Southern Europe, with particular reference to the different sex-​worker segments of sexual exploitation and THB victims. The third examines the criminal players involved in the trafficking of migrants for sexual exploitation. The modus operandi of each criminal organization is outlined, both in terms of the forms of enslavement of trafficked migrants and the management of sexual exploitation. In this respect, the three organizational criminal models discussed in Chapter 2 are applied to analyse criminal players. The final part analyses some economic sectors where severe forms of labour exploitation and slavery-​like work conditions are widespread.

Estimates of victims of trafficking and official evidence Over the years, many estimates and much empirical evidence of trafficked people worldwide have been produced. Several national and international institutions have been collecting data for some decades. These include, among others, the US Department of State, United Nations Office on Drug and Crime (UNODC), International Organization for Migration 84

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(IOM), European Commission and the International Labour Organization (ILO). These organizations regularly publish reports and data on trafficked people. To give a general overview of data on trafficked people, the main point concerns the distinction between the estimated number of trafficked people and the evidence, namely ascertained cases of trafficking. The second point is strictly related to the applied methodology used to formulate some estimates instead of others. The final aspect is the geographical area of the three European countries of Spain, Italy and Greece. As for the estimated number of trafficked people, one of the first institutions to release data years ago on possible victims worldwide was the US Department of State. In some reports published at the beginning of this millennium, the estimated victims of both sexual and labour exploitation rose from 700,000 to 4 million in 2002, 800,000 to 900,000 in 2003 and 600,000 to 800,000 in 2004 (quoted in Kelly, 2005). These estimates, regardless of their plausibility, were rightly criticized as they did not provide any methodological explanations as to why the US institution reported this number of trafficked people worldwide (Kelly, 2005; Albanese, 2007). Further problems were raised when scholars, willingly or unwillingly, used circular quotations estimating the number of trafficked people that were not actually based on any methodological details. Circularity occurs, for instance, when scholar A draws estimations from scholar B who had quoted the data from scholar C who formulated the estimation without providing evidence or detailed methodological explanations of how that figure was obtained. In this case, as noted by some scholars who conducted detailed analyses of data on this topic, the result is that the estimations ‘tend to reinforce themselves’ although such formulations were not convincing (Jahic and Finckenauer, 2005: 31). Among the studies that calculated the number of THB victims worldwide, research by the ILO refers to surveys concerning several countries (ILO et al, 2022). First, the report adopted an earlier definition of ‘forced labour’ dating back to the 1930 ILO Convention. Forced labour is ‘all work or service which is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and for which the said person has not offered himself voluntarily’, with this definition establishing some exceptions such as impositions requested by military or civil authorities placed on soldiers or citizens as well as court rulings against convicted people (Belser et al, 2005: 7). Thus, forced labour refers to coercion exercised through the threat of psychological or physical violence against a person so they agree, against their will, to provide labour or any other kind of service that benefits the offender. A variety of penalties are established to overcome the victim’s will, for instance the threat of non-​payment of wages owed, the seizure of identity documents and a threat to report the person’s illegal status to the authorities, deceiving the victim with false promises, as well as using explicit violence. So, this conceptual definition encompasses a variety of human-​trafficking phenomena, ranging from slavery-​like practices 85

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to debt bondage for sexual or labour exploitation, forced marriage and forced crime, as well as forced begging and the removal of organs. The methodology is based on 68 national surveys. The surveys were carried out from 2017 to 2021 with 77,914 sample respondents corresponding to a total of 628,598 people. The number of people in forced labour conditions (both economic and sexual exploitation) was 27.6 million worldwide (ILO et al, 2022). Broken down into five big geographical areas, 4.1 million people were estimated to be in forced labour in Europe and Central Asia, while, in other areas, the numbers were higher, with 15.1 million in Asia and the Pacific, followed by 3.8 million in Africa, 3.6 million in the Americas, and 0.9 million in the Arab states (ILO et al, 2022). Two interesting aspects should be noted. First, compared with a 2017 ILO report (quoted in ILO et al, 2022), the estimated number of people in forced labour rose from 24.9 million to 27.6 million, and this increase was entirely due to privately imposed forced labour. In other words, this worldwide growth was not related to forced labour imposed by authoritarian states but by private actors. Second, more than half of forced labour (52 per cent) in the 2017–​2021 surveys occurred in either upper-​middle-​income or high-​income countries. Third, migrant workers were more likely to end up in forced labour than nationals, representing 14 per cent of all adults exploited worldwide both for sex and labour, while the risk for citizens was 4 per cent (ILO et al, 2022). That said, let us look at the THB data officially recognized by some institutions that regularly release such information. Since 2012, the US Department of State has collected data on THB victims from different sources, mainly US embassies, government officials, NGOs and international organizations, as well as reports and academic journals. The 2019 report released data on THB prosecutions and convictions and identified victims from 2012 to 2018, covering a broad range of geographical areas and almost all states in the world. According to the report, in 2018, 11,096 people were prosecuted for THB crimes and 7,481 were convicted, while there were 85,613 victims, with 11,009 in labour exploitation. In the seven-​year period considered, the total number of recorded victims was 464,639, with 106,051 exploited for labour, corresponding to 22.8 per cent. The total number of people prosecuted in the same period was 89,849; among them, 5,991 for labour exploitation, 6.7 per cent of the total prosecutions, while 45,268 people were convicted, with 2,968 involved in labour exploitation, corresponding to 6.6 per cent of the total number convicted. In addition, the 2021 UNODC report, based on the official statistics of detected cases of trafficking in human beings from 148 countries in the world, reported a different number of victims. Between 2016 and 2018 (including some states that provided data for 2019), a total of 49,032 victims were detected. In this regard, there is a discrepancy between the US and UNODC reports, which could be explained by the different sources used 86

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as well as the different reporting methods, with the US report considering the data year by year, while the UNODC report considered some years together. In the 27 EU states, 14,145 victims were registered from 2017 to 2018, almost three quarters of whom were female and the remaining quarter male (European Commission, 2020). Moreover, 49 per cent of the victims were EU citizens, while 34 per cent of all victims were identified in their own EU member state. As for people who had been in formal contact with the police and criminal justice system, 11,788 were suspected or cautioned, while 6,163 were prosecuted and 2,426 convicted. According to the EU report, most traffickers were EU citizens: ‘Nearly half of the suspects (50%) prosecuted (39%) and convicted (50%) were EU citizens registered in their own country of citizenship’ (European Commission, 2020: 7). After this general overview of THB victims and offenders worldwide and at EU level, some aspects become apparent. First, the huge discrepancy between the estimates reported by ILO and the official statistics on ascertained THB victims. In this regard, official statistical data from police officers directly represents the ability of national law enforcement authorities to uncover crimes, while the official data only indirectly reflects the extent of the crimes actually committed (Bandini et al, 1991). Any kind of illegal behaviour involves a certain quota of hidden crime, which means crimes that are not discovered by the police. This quota is referred to as the ‘dark number’ and is usually based on the type of crime. If the crime is serious, for instance a murder, the dark number is presumably almost irrelevant, while it is potentially very high if the crime is a theft that results in little damage to the victim. Moreover, police statistics have another limitation, namely the fact that law enforcement agencies can decide to prosecute certain crimes rather than others (Kitsuse and Cicourel, 1963; Chapman, 1968; Becucci, 2014). This aspect relates to the analytical distinction between proactive and reactive police behaviour. Proactive means that police officers are mobilized by an internal input from the police body or political authority that decides which priority crime issues should be investigated. Reactive means that police officers’ input to act comes from the victims. In social contexts where labour and sexual exploitation is tolerated by society, such as debt bondage involving minority groups and lower marginal social layers in some Asian or Latin American countries, THB victims rarely become aware of their conditions or have real opportunities to denounce their exploiters. This is the case, for instance, with coke and other farm production in Brazil where workers are employed under servitude-​like conditions, in Pakistan in brick production and in India where traffickers and entrepreneurs use children in granite quarries, not to mention trafficked women in the sex market in Thailand and Cambodia (Becucci and Massari, 2003; USDOS, 2019). Second, not only do the official THB victims represent a small minority, but very few people are prosecuted and convicted worldwide. As reported in 87

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US Department of State data (2019), from 2012 to 2018, fewer than 90,000 people were prosecuted for THB crimes, and only half of them were convicted. Overall, these small numbers show that the likelihood of being caught by law enforcement agencies is very low. This suggests that traffickers and exploiters enjoy some form of protection, perhaps because they can corrupt civil servants and police officers, or because they are embedded in social contexts that safeguard them from penal laws. This general impunity enjoyed by traffickers and exploiters is particularly evident when analysing prosecutions and convictions for labour exploitation worldwide, although this activity is found in large economic sectors in both developed and developing countries. Third, as shown by the EU Commission data quoted earlier (2020) concerning offenders, trafficking is mainly a criminal activity deployed within a country instead of crossing states. For victims, the same characteristic emerges because, globally, most victims are detected in the country of which they are citizens. ‘In 2018, over half of victims whose citizenship was reported were detected in their own country’ (UNODC, 2021: 54). So, while migrant smuggling is a process that involves more than one state, trafficking is a crime that is prevalently, but not exclusively, perpetrated at national level. To conclude this overview, let us look at the official data on this domain for the Southern European countries and their laws on the process of recognizing THB victim status. Table 4.1 sets out the official Eurostat (2022) data on THB victims for sexual, labour exploitation and other purposes. The latter category includes the remaining forms of trafficking, such as organ removal, forced marriage, forced crime and forced begging. According to data from the Italian Observatory Against Trafficking (the organization that collects information in agreement with the Department for Equal Opportunities at the Prime Minister’s Office), in 2021, 698 victims were identified, of whom 477 were women, 201 men and 20 transgender. Of those, 456 were victims of sexual exploitation and 169 of labour exploitation. The nationality most represented was by far Nigeria (379). The second was Pakistan (59), followed by Morocco, 28, Ivory Coast, 26, Senegal, 22 and so on (Observatory Against Trafficking, 2021). In Greece, according to the Greek National Centre for Social Solidarity, in 2021, there were 157 victims, of whom 111 were women and 46 men. The African continent was the most represented, with 108 victims, all from sub-​Saharan countries (except Morocco), followed by Asian countries, with 21 victims, while the other 28 were from the EU and countries outside the EU. Of these victims, 85 were sexually exploited, 48 suffered labour exploitation, and 20 were involved in begging exploitation, 19 of whom were minors (NRM, 2022; Moskoff and Serafeim, 2022). According to a report by the Intelligence Centre against Terrorism and Organized Crime (CITCO, 2022) of the Spanish Ministry of the Interior, 88

newgenrtpdf

Table 4.1: Victims of trafficking in Spain, Italy and Greece –​sexual and labour exploitation and other purposes (2011–​2020)

Year

Sex

Italy Labour

Other

Sex

Greece Labour

Other

Sex

Labour

Other

89

2011

234

0

0

1,024

208

328

N/​a

N/​a

N/​a

2012

125

0

0

1,536

434

661

69

16

9

2013

264

N/​a

N/​a

N/​a

N/​a

N/​a

N/​a

N/​a

N/​a

2014

153

N/​a

N/​a

N/​a

N/​a

N/​a

N/​a

N/​a

N/​a

2015

133

134

N/a

501

65

215

77

25

48

2016

148

25

20

523

64

292

76

61

36

2017

155

58

7

585

127

346

75

3

16

2018

128

94

16

572

61

293

80

15

21

2019

294

192

37

354

392

95

96

23

48

2020

160

99

10

210

289

40

75

21

76

Total

1,794

602

90

5,305

1,640

2,270

548

164

254

Note: N/​a =​information not available. Source: Adapted from Eurostat (2022)

Trafficking of Migrants for Exploitation

Spain

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in 2021, there were 136 victims of sexual exploitation and 51 for labour exploitation. Most victims of sexual exploitation were from Latin America (88) and Romania (16), while labour exploitation victims were mainly from Central and South America (35) and North Africa (8). As shown by the data referring to the period 2011–2020 in Table 4.1, there is a marked difference between the number of sexual and labour exploitation victims. In various years, the latter represent around a third compared to the former. The reason for the higher number of sexual exploitation victims than labour exploitation victims is not necessarily because the former is more widespread than the latter, or because of the victim’s awareness of being exploited and their willingness to collaborate with the criminal justice system. One possible reason is the fact that prostitution –​ especially on the street –​ creates greater social alarm, which pushes the political authorities and law enforcement agencies to investigate sexual exploitation rather than labour exploitation. The latter, occurring in secluded spaces in urban/​industrial or isolated rural areas, has much higher social tolerance (Cheliotis, 2017; Correa da Silva and Cingolani, 2021). So, the reason for a higher number of sexual than labour exploitation victims recorded in Spain, Italy and Greece is probably because mass media, politicians and law enforcement agencies pay much more attention to prostitution (and then crime-​related sexual exploitation) than labour exploitation. With regard to the procedure for recognizing foreign THB victims, the legal systems in Spain, Italy and Greece seem to play a significant role in defining the number of victims. All three countries have ratified the joint protocol to the 2000 UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime into their national legislations: Spain in 2009; Italy in 2010 and Greece in 2014 (GRETA, 2019). This ratification recognized the crime of THB and established additional punishment for those convicted. Together with greater punishment for THB, each state set up services to host victims and a variety of alerts to identify potential victims. The main actors called upon to identify potential victims in this first phase are NGOs, law enforcement agencies and institutional commissions tasked with scrutinizing migrants’ requests for international protection. Once a victim’s personal story has been accepted as reliable, the person is included in the national reception system for THB victims.

Spain Before being officially recognized as a victim, Spanish authorities give the person a reflection period of 90 days within which to accept or reject the new status. Article 59 of the Ley Organica 4/​2000 states that, after that

90

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time: ‘the victim may be provided, at their option, with an assisted return to their country of origin or residence and work authorization for exceptional circumstances, either in response to their cooperation for the purposes of the investigation or the criminal actions or taking into account their personal situation’. Although the choice to cooperate with the criminal justice system seems to be left to the victim, in reality it is the police –​the authority responsible for making such decisions –​who grants the residence permit on the condition that the victim reports their exploiters. This is confirmed by the sources collected as well as a personal interview with an employee of the Comisión Española de Ayuda al Refugiado (De Perez, 2015; Ayuntamiento de Sevilla, 2016) (Appendix 35). However, this requirement cannot always be met when the victim does not trust the Spanish authorities or if they are afraid of retaliation against themselves or their families in the home country (Marcu, 2008). Moreover, this practice goes against the main guidelines established at international level according to which the victim is considered first and foremost a subject of rights and not a mere tool to fight traffickers. These rights include the option not to cooperate with the justice system without being penalized for this choice (UN, 2014; OSCE, 2019; NRM, 2021).

Italy Conversely, since Law 286 was established in 1998, the Italian protection of THB victims does not require them to denounce their traffickers. According to this special provision, conventionally called ‘Art 18’ corresponding to the article Law 286, there are two ways for illegal THB victims to obtain legal status. The first route is judiciary and requires the victim to denounce the traffickers. The second is a social path that does not require victims, recognized as such, to cooperate with the judiciary system. In both cases, however, the victim receives a temporary residency permit that will subsequently be extended after positively concluding a social reintegration programme at the designated reception facility. In turn, the social protection permit will be converted into a work or study visa according to the period of study or for a maximum of two years’ work (Italian Ministry of Labour and Social Policy, 2022). In this respect, it is worth mentioning that some research conducted in the early 2000s analysing the implementation of the Italian protection system found that some police headquarters –​which have the authority to issue the social protection visa under Art 18 –​adopted a strict and discretional interpretation, only granting it to victims who collaborated with the judiciary system (Nicodemi, 2007). More recently, the same critical remarks have been levelled at the Italian authorities by some NGOs working with THB victims (USDOS, 2019).

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Greece In Greece, the authority that recognizes the status of THB victims is the prosecutor. The process provides for an initial reflection period of three months (five months for minors), leaving the victims to decide whether or not to cooperate with the criminal justice system. Regardless of their involvement in criminal proceedings as a witness, the victims will be guaranteed protection and a one-​year residence permit that entitles them to access the labour market. When the first-​year residence permit expires, it can be renewed for two years at a time, providing that criminal proceedings regarding the victim continue. Otherwise, if criminal proceedings are not pending, the residence permit can be renewed for one year (NRM, 2021). Like the Italian system, Greece provides an alternative path to the penal one for THB victims to obtain a residence permit. However, if the victims do not cooperate with the criminal justice system, they will be given a residence permit with a shorter duration, unless they find a job within this period and then have the opportunity to regularize their status for a longer period.

Sex market laws in Southern Europe Southern European countries govern their national sex market differently. Spain and Italy abolished the state brothels system in 1934 and 1958. Before then, brothels were registered officially as places of prostitution and the state derived economic benefit from legalized prostitution. Either due to morality issues or awareness that brothels segregate and marginalize women, the two countries decided to abolish this form of prostitution, which was the only one permitted at the time. However, after the abolition, neither Spain nor Italy legitimized prostitution as professional work, leaving sex workers in limbo (Becucci and Garosi, 2008; De Perez and Vermeulen, 2015). Since then, prostitution has not been prohibited, as long as the sex worker is not a minor and it is their choice, while exploitation and aiding and abetting exploitation are punishable by law (Martínez-​Vallvey and Mellado-​Segado, 2019). The lack of recognition of specific rights for sex workers has had twofold effects. First, it created weak conditions for sex workers before facing any kind of sexual exploitation. Second, it highlighted the regulation of prostitution at local level, paving the way for municipalities to establish rules ranging from stricter regulations to prohibition. An example of the former is Bilbao, a city in the Basque country, which allows nightclubs to be used for prostitution under certain conditions. Municipalities can issue a permit to open a brothel if there is no other nightclub providing prostitution services in the same district. A contrasting example is the introduction in some Spanish and Italian cities of municipality ordinances 92

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prohibiting prostitution in their territory and fining both sex workers and clients (Ayuntamiento de Sevilla, 2017; Salazar Benítez, 2019; Bontempelli, 2009; TAMPEP, 2009). Moreover, Italian law does not issue permits to manage any kind of indoor space used for prostitution, nor do local administrations have the power to issue licenses for such purposes. In Italy, indoor prostitution is not allowed on the assumption that the owner or manager of the building where prostitution occurs could be accused of sexual exploitation or of aiding and abetting sexual exploitation. While this rule is practical when it comes to prostitution in nightclubs or salles de message, police investigations into prostitution in apartments are abandoned if there is no evidence of sexual exploitation. This was the case of some Romanian women who each year rented an apartment in Florence for three months where they would prostitute themselves and return home once the planned period was up (Appendix, 13–​15). Greece, on the other hand, has not abolished ‘state brothels’ since they were institutionalized in 1834. The Greek state tolerates prostitution provided that the premises is licensed and sex workers undergo regular health checks. Before the regulation was reformed in 1999, a permit to manage a brothel was only issued if certain conditions were met. There could not be more than 12 brothels in the same urban area or more than one brothel in the same block. In addition, the brothel could not be close to a church, school, hospital, kindergarten or public square (Pajnik et al, 2015). Only unmarried Greek women over 21 years old could apply, and applications were to be submitted to the police headquarters. If the application was successful, the applicant was considered a sex worker (charactirismeni, meaning classified) and was obliged to undergo health checks every two weeks (Lazaridis, 2000). The new Law 2734 in 1999 introduced same changes to the previous regulations: the age limit for women applying to open a brothel was lowered to 18, and permit applications had to be submitted to the municipality on the basis of the same requirements listed earlier. Moreover, outdoor prostitution was declared illegal (Riga, 2003). Formally, the law does not provide for the role of brothel madam who traditionally welcomes clients and introduces them to prostitutes. The law assumes that this task is performed by the same woman who applied for the licence to operate as a sex worker. This is to prevent third parties from profiting from sex workers. Without specific investigations or the collaboration of sex workers, however, it is difficult to prove that some people working at the brothel are acting as sexual exploiters. In addition, as confirmed by an interview conducted in Athens with an NGO operator dealing with trafficking issues, the limited number of permits provided by law to open a legal brothel does not meet the sex market demand. As a result, indoor brothels are opened without complying with the law, and sex workers also work on the street (Appendix 41). 93

Smuggling and Trafficking of Migrants in Southern Europe

Different forms of prostitution The offer of paid sexual services differs according to where it is exercised –​ indoors or outdoors –​and the presence (or absence) of criminal players who exploit prostitution. The first dimension pertains to how sex workers recruit their clients and where the sexual/​money exchange takes place. The second dimension relates to the sex worker’s degree of autonomy. Those who act without any form of constraint have full autonomy. On the contrary, trafficked and exploited sex workers will have much less autonomy from either the client and the exploiter. So, minimum coercion corresponds to maximum autonomy for the sex worker, and maximum coercion exercised on the sex worker corresponds to the minimum level of personal autonomy (Carchedi, 2000). Trafficked women tend to have no personal autonomy. As for the different forms of prostitution, some sex workers operate on the street or in other public open areas where they recruit their clients, even if the sex/​money exchange could take place indoors. Another form takes place indoors, from the initial contact with the client to the performance of sex. This can happen in a variety of different venues, from apartments to nightclubs, hotels and salles de message to brothels. When the exchange occurs in places used for other purposes, it is usually referred to as masked prostitution, for instance in salles de message and nightclubs, where women are officially employed as masseuses, bartenders, dancers, entertainers and waitresses. Conversely, when prostitution is permitted in brothels or other indoor venues, it is regulated according to the provisions established by national laws or administrative regulations, as we have already seen for Spain and Greece. Outdoor prostitution is mainly based on standard services: the hustling that takes place quickly and implies a less demanding psychological relationship with the client compared with indoor prostitution. In general, this form provides for the highest number of sexual relations with clients, with an average that can fluctuate, according to the material consulted, from a few sexual relations per day to 20 (Sanchis and Serra, 2011; Tribunal Catania, 2019). The autonomy of sex workers with regard to the client is, in general terms, broad. The rules governing sex/​economic exchanges follow a logic according to which the sex worker should be able to grant the minimum while taking the maximum. Each action, from groping to any specific requests made by the client, should be translated into monetary compensation, being careful not to give more than that previously established (Corso and Landi, 1998; Uba and Monzini, 2007). During the negotiation and in the subsequent completion of the sexual relationship, it is not the client who governs the situation but the woman, who only apparently makes him believe she is under his control. In this sense, some female sex workers say: ‘The client is a wolf, but the prostitute (speaking of the prostitute who is 94

Trafficking of Migrants for Exploitation

a professional, not the drug addict or a poor child who arrives there for the first time), the prostitute in the end has longer teeth’ (Tatafiore, 1998: 23). Therefore, with reference to professional prostitutes, there are some basic rules that govern sexual relations: in addition to normally requiring the use of a condom, it is a widespread practice not to kiss clients because this is seen as a sign of excessive intimacy that could jeopardize the impersonal exchange on which the mercenary relationship is structured. Regular customers are aware of this and do not normally make this type of request. Conversely, indoor prostitution implies greater commitment on the part of women, even in the case of the same services as provided on the street. In nightclubs, where there are private rooms, the phase of approaching and choosing a specific woman can be relatively long compared with ‘excited’ bargaining on the street. In such moments, where several women sit next to a group of men consuming drinks, the prostitutes make themselves available to soft sexual approaches such as hugs and groping which, as a rule, take place later in street prostitution once the negotiation is concluded. This is the case of the so-​called Spanish ‘plaza system’ –​official or unofficial places where prostitution takes place. In areas on the border with France, Palma de Mallorca and other big cities, such as Malaga, Madrid and Asturias, women can find jobs in such clubs for a few weeks, where the owner offers the sex workers accommodation and food and takes a fee from the price of the service (Oso Casas, 2010). When clients come to the clubs, there should always be women available. Mixing their job and private life, the women working at clubs usually spend their free time, amounting to short breaks during the day, watching TV and preparing themselves for the following evening with clients (Ribeiro and Sacramento, 2005). Again in Spain, prostitution in flats is directed by a maitresse who introduce clients to prostitutes. Generally open 24 hours a day, the women do not live in the flat and, in agreement with the management, they spend half a day or some hours inside, so they can combine this work with their ‘official’ life (Oso Casas, 2010). In Greece, the most widespread form of masked prostitution happens in bars, nightclubs and striptease places that apparently maintain an official appearance of legality (Papanicolaou, 2008). In high-​end prostitution, the ‘escorts’ have the highest degree of autonomy when it comes to the behaviour to be adopted with clients. If they have their own website, they usually recruit clients via veiled, indirect sexual messages. The web page outlines the girl’s hobbies and lifestyle and any information that indirectly conveys the type of clientele the escort would prefer. Here the ‘seductive’ simulation on which the relationship between client and prostitute is based, which is hasty or non-​existent in the street, has an air of verisimilitude, even though both parties understand it is mere role-​playing. For these women, the commitment made in the relationship with the client could be particularly relevant. However, 95

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there is a limit in terms of encounters, since these sex workers have fewer clients than street prostitutes. These women choose to be prostitutes and are not generally subjected to forms of exploitation, nor must they respect specific limitations with customers, except for those they establish themselves. This form of prostitution, which promotes online sex offers, also includes webmasters who collect different kinds of sexual ads. Here, the language is sexually explicit as are the pictures shown on the website (Bredy et al, 2014). Assuming that each form of prostitution has an element of autonomy for the workers involved, what makes a difference is whether they are trafficked or not. A trafficked sex worker is in an inferior position to that of her exploiter. The same is true in the sex worker/​client relationship due to the pressure put upon the woman by the exploiter, regardless of the form of prostitution. For instance, trafficking and sexual exploitation can happen via websites that promote sexual ads. Some indicators that a third person is controlling the sex workers are: the same person responds to different telephone numbers; the ads have a very similar structure and language and the ads only propose in-​call services. The latter could be a sign that the sex workers would be unable to leave the place where they are (Becucci and Garosi, 2008; Giommoni and Ikwu, 2021). The institutional context where the sex/​money exchange takes place plays a role in terms of constraints on different types of exploitation. Laws in themselves, from abolitionism to regulation, do not prevent sexual exploitation per se, and making indoor prostitution legal, for example, could create the conditions under which women become dependent on the nightclub or brothel. Once a woman has agreed to work at a nightclub where prostitution takes place, she must accept the internal ‘rules’ decided by the owner, or leave the workplace if she can. Other forms of constraints to the detriment of sex workers come from increased interconnection between online and offline domains. In the virtual environment, sex workers promote themselves through website managers, while in the latter they perform sex in masked prostitution venues. In Greece, there seems to be a centralized connection between website managers and club owners: both these players have notably increased their power over sex workers (Pajnik et al, 2015). Having outlined the forms of prostitution, the next section points out the main changes that have occurred in the sex market. Before doing so, however, some data is provided on the number of sex workers in Southern Europe and the corresponding prices for each form of prostitution. It is also worth noting that the sex worker estimates are based on sources that rarely indicate the method used to calculate these figures. So, the latter are taken only as an indicative measure of the extent we are talking about for each country. The number of sex workers in Spain ranges from 80,000 to 100,000, while the price for sexual services is around €2,000 for high-​end 96

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prostitution, €60 to €200 for both clubs and apartments and €25 for street sex (Sanchis and Serra, 2011; Meneses-​Falcón and Urio, 2021). In Italy, according to surveys carried out by NGO operators, in 14 of the 20 Italian regions in the early 2000s, there were an estimated 17,500 to 22,700 street sex workers, while the ratio between these sex workers and those forced to prostitute themselves was seven to one (Carchedi, 2008). More recently, the estimated number of sex workers in Italy rose from 75,000 to 120,000, while the prices are in line with the Spanish sex market. A high-​end escort could command €2,000 to €3,000 per day or weekend spent with a client; in an apartment the price is around €100 to €150, while street sex workers ask a few tens of euros (Giovanni XXIII, 2017; Tribunal Catania, 2019; Becucci, 2019). In Greece, the estimated number of sex workers is around 18,000. In the early 2000s, the price for an escort contacted through an agency was around €300 (Emke-​Poulopoulos, 2001). More recently, sex market prices seem to have fallen after the 2008 economic crisis which greatly affected the country. According to sociologist and criminologist Grigoris Lazos, in 2012 a prostitute working in a brothel could ask €40; in 2017, the price had dropped by half (Coviello, 2018).

Changes to the sex market Since the 1980s and 1990s, the sex markets in Southern Europe have undergone significant changes. First and foremost, these changes were strictly related to the arrival of foreigners in national sex markets that, until then, had prevalently been populated by indigenous sex workers. This change took place in parallel with the these countries becoming an ever-​more-​popular destination for migrants. In Italy, a change occurred in the 1980s with the consistent arrival of transsexuals and foreign women from various countries and the gradual decrease in the numbers of local women involved in the sex market. These changes were first seen in street prostitution. Italian women have gradually abandoned working outdoors because, on the one hand, the general improvement of the country’s socio-​economic conditions has discouraged generational turnover and, on the other, this form of prostitution is affected in particular by turnover resulting from intense work rhythms and the dangers of being on the street. Older native sex workers continued to practise, but in apartments, which were considered safer places, often relying on regular customers they had met during their previous outdoor activities (Corso and Landi, 1998). Streets and pavements in Italian cities traditionally occupied for decades by local women have become populated by foreigners. Foreign women began to arrive in Italy in the 1980s and 1990s mainly from Eastern Europe, especially Bosnia and Slovenia, due to the fall of the 97

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Berlin Wall and the break up of Yugoslavia and ensuing conflicts. In the same period, Nigerian women from Lagos and Benin City appeared in Italy thanks to collusion between the trafficking organizers and staff of the Italian embassy in Nigeria (Pisano, 2002; Albano, 2003). The third significant arrival was of young Albanian women. Lastly, women came from the countries of the former socialist bloc, mainly Ukraine, Moldova, Bulgaria, Russia and Romania and, to a lesser extent, from Asian countries, especially China, and North Africa, from Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria (Carchedi, 2000, 2004). There was a similar change in both Spain and Greece due to the arrival of foreign sex workers who partially replaced the local prostitutes. In Spain, in the 1980s and 1990s, women arrived from Latin America, in particular Brazil, Colombia and the Dominican Republic; from sub-​Saharan countries, especially Nigeria; and from Eastern Europe, from Russia, Romania and the former Yugoslavia (Arella et al, 2006; Piscitelli, 2011; Shelley, 2014). Brazilian women flew to Portugal, where they did not require an entry visa, and from there travelled to Spanish cities such as Barcelona or Madrid (Ribeiro and Sacramento, 2005). Similarly, women from former Spanish colonies such as Bolivia and Costa Rica could enter the country without a visa. By law, they could stay as a tourist for 90 days, although most of those employed in the sex industry remained longer, becoming overstayers. In the early 2000s, a local sex worker replacement process was underway. In Barcelona, for instance, there were estimated to be 3,000 sex workers performing services on the street and in clubs and apartments, 67 per cent of whom were foreigners (Arella et al, 2006). In Greece, at the end of the 1980s, Philippine women were the first to arrive and were mainly engaged in domestic or sexual services, followed by Albanian and African women, especially Nigerans (Emke-​Poulopoulos, 2001; Lazos, 2002). With the fall of the Soviet Union, Bulgarian, Russian and Ukrainian women kept the Hellenic sex industry alive. In the late 1990s, there were an estimated 10,400 women involved in the sex market, including official and illegal brothels, apartments, nightclubs, salles de message and the streets, 4,300 of whom were Greek and 6,100 foreign (Lazaridis, 2000). Along the same lines, a report published in 2009 by TAMPEP, a European network made up of NGOs and sex workers fighting for their rights, released estimates of the presence of migrant sex workers in Southern Europe. In Spain and Italy, migrant sex workers were estimated to make up 90 per cent of the entire sex worker population in 2008, while, in Greece, the foreign component was estimated to be 73 per cent (TAMPEP, 2009). Alongside the transformation of sex worker populations, another change occurred to the organization of sexual exploitation. Exploiters shifted from being single exploiter-​lovers to variously organized criminal groups. In these terms, sexual exploitation significantly changed in intensity and organizational modus operandi compared with the past. Until the 1980s, at 98

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least in Italy, a country for which we have more information, the testimonies of native prostitutes say that, where such exploitation occurred, it was mainly based on an ambiguous, pseudo-​sentimental relationship between the pimp and the prostitute. These testimonies relegate the role of the exploiter-​lover to the background of the prostitute’s daily work (Anonima, 1979; Blumir and Sauvage, 1980). The presence of trafficked women and foreign criminal groups managing sexual exploitation significantly changed the sex market. The trafficked women are subjected to the requests not only of their ‘protector’ but also of the criminal group to which the exploiter belongs (Arella et al, 2006; Tribunal Catania, 2019). If they don’t accept the exploiter’s power over them, these women are subjected to heavy retaliation, which can also involve family members in their country of origin. This can happen because exploiters are part of transnational trafficking networks involving both the country of origin and the destination country of the victim. In Italy, when a woman returns from working the street, she can be brutally beaten because she has not brought back enough money. In Greece, trafficked women work 12 hours a day, while the exploiters leave them 30 per cent of the money they earn, and from this amount they have to subtract the cost of food and lodging (Becucci and Garosi, 2008; Emke-​Poulopoulos, 2003). Compared with the past, another important change is the continuous movement of women within the sex market (Lazos, 2002). For instance, a client attending a Chinese salle de message in Florence two or three times per month confirmed that the women change every 20 days (Appendix 27). The great mobility of sex workers involves both the street and indoor prostitution. In Spain, the time the women will spend at the nightclubs is agreed in advance with the manager and it is usually a few weeks. This allows the manager to continuously renew his sexual offers, while the woman, if illegal, can keep a low profile, being seen as little as possible and remaining in one location for a short time only (Emke-​Poulopoulos, 2001; Ribeiro and Sacramento, 2005; Marcu, 2008; TAMPEP, 2009). In Athens, women employed in brothels are continually moved from one place to another, from Greece to Cyprus and Middle Eastern countries, leaving them no real opportunity to establish meaningful relationships with the local social context (Lazaridis, 2001). In addition, the continuous displacement of women responds to the functional needs of criminal organizations involved in exploitation. By changing locations often, both the women and the exploiters reduce the risk of being intercepted by police carrying out checks, while trafficked women struggle to establish relationships of trust with clients or other people who could help them escape the exploitation. Compared with the past, when prostitutes played a social role –​although frequently stigmatized –​ contemporary prostitution has become mobile, and the anonymity and 99

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social isolation of migrant sex workers prevail. Trafficked women, whose status in their new country is irregular, often resort to numerous aliases to hide their identity, symbolizing by doing so their lack of social ties to the context where they are living.

Recruitment, transportation and insertion of victims into the new society Traffickers use several victim recruitment strategies for sexual exploitation (Aronowitz, 2009; Campana and Varese, 2016). They lure new victims through deceit and attractive offers. They promise work as a dancer, waitress or bartender to women set to become victims of sexual exploitation (Lazaridis, 2001). Once the victims arrive in the destination country, the situation does not correspond to the promises made. Another recruitment system involves explicit proposals to work as prostitutes in the sex market in the destination country, promising that the debt for the journey will be quickly repaid. Even if the woman knows what her occupation in the host country will be, she does not understand the true conditions she will encounter as a sex worker or the time required to repay the debt. The third method is essentially kidnapping. In terms of approaching victims and broader behaviour put in place by traffickers, there are different modalities. ‘Lover-​boy’ recruitment consists of establishing a fictious sentimental relationship with the woman and leading her abroad. Only when she arrives at the destination does the ‘boyfriend’ show his true intentions, forcing her into prostitution with brutal methods (Becucci and Massari, 2003; Villacampa and Torres, 2015). Other systems are based on circulating information through newspaper and website ads (Marcu, 2008). The latter has become ever more widespread in recent decades, in parallel with the general development of new technologies. Online recruitment conveys tempting offers promising well-​paid jobs abroad (Sykiotou, 2007). Fake companies searching for fashion and artists’ models and fictitious marriage agencies can throw baits to lure new victims. The IT recruitment system tends to reproduce the old tools based on press reports, but with some substantial differences. New technologies have the capacity to reach a large number of potential victims. Moreover, traffickers can easily make explicit proposals to work in the sex market due their capability to hide themselves through website ads. Direct online contact is the first approach, however, and then a personal meeting between the trafficker and victim is set up (Di Nicola et al, 2017). Another recruitment method consists of identifying potential victims through personal contacts that traffickers have within their own social circles at local level. This approach also includes ‘smiling trafficking’, which consists of forcing THB victims to recruit new people in their community 100

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with the promise of being released if they are successful (Zervos, 2015). In both personal and impersonal approaches, the traffickers offer to pay their victims’ travel costs to reach the country abroad, and this condition could be particularly tempting, together with the promise, upon arrival, of finding a job that would allow migrants to earn much more money than they could if they had stayed in their home country. The means of transport vary according to the contacts that traffickers have in both the country of origin and at the victim’s destination. Non-​ EU citizens reach Southern Europe by different routes and several means of transport, for instance by plane landing directly in cities in Spain, Italy or Greece. In order to bring victims to destination countries on scheduled flights, traffickers usually engage in forms of corruption with the authorities of the departure or destination country. This choice of transport also means that traffickers must be able to obtain counterfeit documents in order to overcome increasingly strict controls on people put in place in EU countries. For years, these controls have been delegated to airlines, which are responsible for checking in advance the correctness of people’s travel documents, not to mention that police officers stationed at airports pay particular attention to people travelling to Europe from developing countries. Recently, however, most trafficked migrants arrive in Southern Europe via the land and sea routes currently used for smuggling migrants analysed in Chapter 3. NGO operators interviewed in Italy, Spain and Greece confirm that more and more trafficked women from sub-​Saharan Africa reach Southern Europe by sea, while Asian trafficked people could first travel by air and later by land and sea. In parallel to the increasing use of smuggling routes to Southern Europe, traffickers use these services as they are much more economically viable than making victims travel by plane, although the victims would be exposed to several risks during the journey (Tribunal Catania, 2019). In terms of both recruitment and victims entering the host country, traffickers and victims often share the same ethic background, culture and mother tongue (Aronowitz, 2009; Arhin, 2016). This information comes from La Strada, a European NGO network operating in several EU countries. According to La Strada, 80 per cent of THB victims were recruited and later sold to traffickers by someone very close to them (Vlachova, 2005). Moreover, in 13 per cent of the 489 cases of trafficking recorded worldwide, the victim’s partner was the trafficker, so it is likely that victim and trafficker had the same nationality (UNODC, 2021). This tends to occur not only in the initial recruitment phase but also in the subsequent phase relating to the insertion of victims into the national sex markets of Southern European countries (Stoecker, 1998). Evidence of this comes from analysing 221 THB criminal law cases concerning Spain from 2011 to 2019, where the top nationalities of the defendants were Nigerian (24.9 per cent) and 101

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Romanian (23.5 per cent), while the third included criminal associations formed between Spanish nationals and foreigners (23 per cent). Similarly, the most numerous victims by nationality were from Romania (58) and Nigeria (57) (Salat, 2022). Some logical reasons pertaining to the peculiarities of trafficking support this. Except for the recruitment system based on kidnapping, all other trafficking systems require the victim to trust the trafficker in order for the operation to get off the ground (Arhin, 2016). While smuggled migrants usually have ad hoc relationships with the people organizing their travel to Southern Europe, trafficked migrants have much higher expectations of their recruiters due to the promise of getting a foothold in the labour market once they reach their destination. In this respect, there is probably a much higher energy investment for THB victims who trust their traffickers than the situation between migrants and their smugglers. While the former expects to find a job and accommodation abroad given the trafficker’s promise, the main purpose of the latter is to arrive in the desired country. Once the smuggled migrant has arrived, the relationship between the smuggler and migrant usually ends. Against this background, sharing the same culture and language helps potential victims to trust the traffickers, and, at the same time, makes it easier for traffickers to overcome their victims’ potential mistrust. In addition, from the trafficker’s point of view, the victim represents a human commodity to be exploited once they have arrived in the destination country, not to mention that the trafficker has anticipated the victim’s travel costs. For these reasons, traffickers tend to control all the trafficking phases, made up of recruitment, transportation and the insertion of victims into the host country. From an empirical standpoint, however, there are exceptions, for instance when traffickers delegate local smugglers to transport victims from their country of origin to the destination or when victims are sold to another criminal group before they arrive at the promised destination. These possibilities suggest that the same trafficking organization does not control victims from the time of their recruitment to inclusion in the new society or that the trafficking lines have not been developed along the THB victim’s entire journey. That said, other evidence regarding Greece and Spain points to the relevance of traffickers and victims sharing the same nationality, while no information is available for Italy as neither the Department of Equal Opportunities nor the Observatory Against Trafficking collect information on offenders. As for Greece, 96 of the total 157 THB victims registered in 2021 reported that they were recruited in their country of origin (NRM, 2022). As for Spain, some evidence relates to the third THB phase corresponding to the inclusion of migrants in the host society. Table 4.2 shows the top ten nationalities in 2021 of both victims and people arrested for THB sexual exploitation in Spain. The first column reports the number 102

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Table 4.2: Top ten nationalities of victims and offenders of human trafficking for sexual exploitation in Spain (2021) Sex victims’ nationality

No.

Arrested people’s nationality

No.

Colombia

49

Colombia

36

Paraguay

18

Paraguay

16

Romania

16

Romania

10

Venezuela

13

Venezuela

11

Brazil

8

Brazil

9

Spain

5

Spain

73

Nigeria

4

Nigeria

4

Honduras

4

Portugal

8

Uruguay

4

Uruguay

5

2

China

Peru Of the total victims

90.4%

Of the total arrested people

10 88.7%

Source: Adapted from CITCO (2022)

of THB victims in descending order, while the order of offenders has been changed simply to make it easier to note the correspondence between the first and second column. As shown, the victim’s nationality frequently matches that of the offender. As for offenders, the only nationalities not included in the top ten victim nationalities are Portugal and China. However, China is listed below the top ten nationalities on the victim list, while Portugal does not appear in the 24 THB victim nationalities, nor does Honduras appear on the list of offenders. Moreover, we repeated the same exercise for the previous years, from 2017 to 2020, and found, except for some smooth variations, the same correspondence between the victims’ and offenders’ nationalities for sexual exploitation. In light of this data, we could say that, the more trafficking from the country of origin to the destination country develops, the more this process will be structured as a social network centred around sexual exploitation. At the same time, the trafficking process has social characteristics that involve a multitude of actors, well beyond the victims and recruiters. This last characteristic is evident when it comes to the trafficking of Nigerian women to Southern Europe to work as prostitutes, a phenomenon that dates back to the 1980s or 1990s, depending on whether we are talking about Spain, Italy or Greece. An analysis of judicial proceedings in Italy shows how the victims’ families in Nigeria knew what their girls would do once they arrived in Europe. In other cases, Nigerian women expected to become prostitutes,

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although neither the recruiters nor the victims’ parents ever mentioned this ‘job’ to be done in Italy (Becucci and Garosi, 2008). More specifically, a recent investigation carried out by the Anti-​Mafia District Directorate of Catania (Sicily) shows the social dimension of trafficking. On the request of Nigerian traffickers based in Italy, several people were involved in the trafficking process: trafficked girls and their parents, recruiters and the parents of the exploiters (the latter based in Italy). Before starting the journey, the girl is subjected to a propitiatory ritual to bind her to the criminal organization. Not only must the girl attend the ritual but her parents too, and they must all swear that the agreements made with the trafficker should be honoured. Moreover, when problems arise, specifically the fact that the trafficked person does not want to leave the migrant host centre in Sicily, the parents of the exploiters in Nigeria put pressure on the girl’s family to remind her that her duties must be respected. When a woman who had already started working as a street prostitute decided to escape her exploiter, the latter asked other trafficked women in Italy for information on how to trace the girl’s parents in Nigeria. In another case, to solve a conflict between a trafficked woman engaged in prostitution in Germany and her exploiter in Italy on the amount of the travel debt owed to the latter, the families of both in Nigeria were involved to find a solution (Tribunal Catania, 2019). Aside from small trafficking criminal organizations based mainly on familial ties –​an aspect that will be analysed in the following section –​what other implications can we draw from the reported episodes? First, when trafficking becomes a social phenomenon in the country of origin, it is increasingly difficult to hide the real occupations of trafficked women in the destination country. Second, recruitment systems based on violence, such as kidnapping, become less important compared with the advantages of veiled or open proposals made to woman to prostitute themselves in the new country. As pointed out, a loose compatriots’ network centred on prostitution develops. In turn, this established social network means that the relationships founded within it can be used as resources for both the exploiter and the trafficked woman, although the latter has the role of exploited sex worker. In other words, the more the social dimension of trafficking grows and the more open the recruitment proposals become, the more the future victims will be attracted by the opportunity of emigrating while knowing that they will prostitute themselves in European countries.

Sexual exploitation: foreign and national criminal players The analysis focuses on the organizational structure deployed by traffickers. According to the information collected, we refer where possible to the 104

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three models already discussed, namely hierarchical structures or networks (Figures 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3). Furthermore, the modus operandi of each foreign criminal organization is outlined, both in terms of the forms of enslavement of trafficked migrants and the management of sexual exploitation. Sometimes, we found correspondence between the broader geographical area of origin of the exploiters and their criminal modus operandi. However, this correspondence is not to be understood as an explanatory variable of the criminal phenomenon under examination. If this were the case, we would probably fall into the epistemological errors of methodological nationalism (Beck, 2003). As is known, methodological nationalism considers the nationality of origin of the criminal actors as an explanatory variable of the criminal behaviour itself. A point of view of this type could only be tautological and misleading. Rather, the examination of criminal groups according to their different origins is firstly to be understood as a description of different modus operandi that can emerge from the analysis. Secondly, the more the criminal activity gravitates around a compatriots’ network, the more their internal relationships translate into social capital, in terms of resources and criminal opportunities, available to people sharing the same network. In these terms, as already pointed out by James Coleman (2005: 390), not only is the social capital embedded into all social relationships, but it ‘is created … when the relations among persons change in ways that facilitate actions’.

Nigerian organized crime Sexual exploitation by Nigerian players gravitates around a network made up almost entirely of people belonging to the country of origin. This applies to both criminal actors and women in prostitution. These criminal associations can recruit new women, accompany them during the trip and finally direct them in the destination cities towards exploitative compatriots in Southern Europe. From an organizational standpoint, there are two types of trafficker. The first is based on small groups who operate according to ties of friendship and kinship, mostly within the country of departure, where there are figures associated with them who recruit young women (Tribunal Catania, 2019, 2021). The second is based on criminal organizations that have all the characteristics of mafia associations. Organizations such as Black Axe, Maphite and Eiye have affiliation rites, precise internal hierarchies and functions and command lines corresponding to the role performed by each member (Becucci, 2022). These criminal associations are called ‘secret cults’ due to the clandestine nature that characterizes them with respect to unaffiliated ones and the use of various esoteric rites. They were originally established in the 1960s as student associations in various universities in Nigeria, and then transformed into criminal organizations in the 1980s 105

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and 1990s (Rotimi, 2005; Ezeonu, 2014; Bergson, 2016; Ifra, 2019). Secret cults are dedicated, among the various criminal fields, to international drug trafficking and the sexual exploitation of young compatriot women. Through various judicial investigations carried out in the last decade, the existence of Eiye has been ascertained in both Italy and Spain, while the other secret cults mentioned have also been established for years in Italy (UNDOC, 2021; Tribunal Palermo, 2017; Tribunal Turin, 2016, 2018; Appendix 31). As for Greece, no evidence of the presence of secret cults has been collected, even though, for some decades, Nigerian women there have been subjected to sexual exploitation by other compatriots (UNODC, 2021; Lazos, 2002; Moskoff and Serafeim, 2022). Whether they be secret cults or small groups based on networks, these two types of criminal organization rely on mamans in order to exploit the victims. The mamans form and maintain relationships with the exploited girls, involving domination and ambiguous protective attitudes, according to a logic that either punishes or rewards. When the secret cult is involved in the organization of sexual exploitation, the maman acts as a front woman, while, behind her, the cult manages the exploitation. In this case, the cult directly controls the sexual exploitation and receives a percentage of the profits from the maman. In the absence of a ‘formal’ decision to participate in this business, the individual members of the secret cult exercise indirect control over the mamans through their close relationships with them. As a former member of the Maphite reported in a judiciary proceeding carried out in Italy (Tribunal Turin, 2018: 118): Many mamans are the wives of Maphite affiliates and have places where they prostitute girls; for these places, the joints, they pay a sum of money which, through their husband, is turned over to the Maphite. In practice, the Maphite controls areas of the territory where Nigerian prostitution occurs. Control over the girls starts with their departure from Nigeria. As mentioned, they are subjected to a juju ritual (a variant of voodoo) and must sign an agreement on the basis of which, once they have arrived in Southern Europe, they undertake to compensate the criminal organization with substantial sums (Métraux, 1971). The ritual consists of a few basic steps. The girl gives her underwear, some pubic hair, locks of hair and pieces of fingernail to the maman. At the end of the ritual, these are collected in a bag with bone powder and the name of the girl written on it. The bag, which is kept by the maman or the sorcerer who performed the ritual, symbolizes the bond between the girl and her exploiter (Becucci and Massari, 2003; Arella et al, 2006). The purpose of these is to ensure that the women respect the agreements entered into with the trafficking organization. These systems 106

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of coercion are based on animistic beliefs held in certain areas of Nigeria, particularly in the state of Edo, from where girls involved in the sex market in Southern Europe emigrate (Morniroli, 2003; Aghatise, 2004; Carling, 2006; Akor, 2011; Meneses-​Falcon et al, 2019). These are religious practices that have broad appeal among the local population, for example in everyday life to ratify an agreement between parties that has no criminal purpose (UNICRI, 2004). In this specific case, however, they are exploited by the traffickers to subjugate the victims. Until about a decade ago, the travel debt that trafficked women had to pay fluctuated between €50,000 and €80,000, whereas today it is around €20,000 to €40,000 (DIA, 2007; Tribunal Catania, 2019; Rizzotti, 2022; Appendix, 18 and 28). There are two reasons for the reduction in travel debt: a possible decrease in the income of traffickers deriving from sexual exploitation, and the use of new, less expensive routes to bring trafficked women to Europe. In fact, until the early 2000s, Nigerian women flew to European airports to reach their destination in Southern Europe. In the last ten years or so, however, traffickers have brought women by land and sea along the irregular immigration routes examined in Chapter 3. As shown by recent proceedings by the District Anti-​Mafia Directorate of Catania, in 2017, the total cost for traffickers to bring a woman to Italy ranged from €1,400 to €4,000, while the woman might be charged with a debt bondage from €20,000 to €25,000 (Tribunal Catania, 2018, 2019). Exploiters in Italy had close contacts with compatriots in Libya. The latter, called ‘connection men’, had lived in the Arab country for years and were in close contact with Libyan smugglers. At the request of the exploiters in Italy, the connection men organized and supervised the women’s journeys from Agadez to the embarkation point near Tripoli. The initial part of the trip was organized by recruiters in Nigeria. In this first phase, the women travelled in groups of two or three people in cars driven from Kano to Agadez, where they were handed over to the Libyan smugglers. Throughout the journey, up to embarkation in Libya, the women were accompanied by a member of the criminal organization, the ‘trolley man’, whose task was to supervise them and to solve any problems that might arise during the journey. Once at the destination, the girl would know the true nature of the requested services. The maman would explain that she is the girl’s only point of reference. In a recently recorded conversation between a maman and a woman traveling to Italy, the former gave the latter the following advice: ‘She is your mom. You have to behave yourself; you mustn’t change your attitude. Do not accept advice from others because Europe is full of bad people’ (Tribunal Catania, 2018: 5). The exploiter has an advantage because the social relationships of exploited girls revolve around their compatriots who experience similar situations. The mamans and the criminal organizations that manage the exploitation 107

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receive an amount from each woman, usually around a few thousand euros a month, up to the settlement of the debt, which amounts to some tens of thousands of euros. In addition, there are other costs to be charged to the girl: the rent of the ‘joint’ (the location where the prostitution is carried out), corresponding to a few hundred euros a month, the cost of accommodation, meals, condoms and a gift given to the maman when the debt is paid off. All expenses are paid by the trafficked girl and are managed directly by the mamans, who exercise a wide margin of discretion over the expenditure. Even if everything goes smoothly, it can take a girl several years to free herself from exploitation. The sexual exploitation of Nigerian women is reproduced over time, as the victims in turn become exploiters. In this regard, sexual exploitation represents an anomalous scale of social mobility, thanks to which social groups lacking legitimate opportunities for advancement can improve their economic conditions through illicit means (Bell, 1953; Merton, 1957). The reasons why victims participate in the reproduction of the exploitation system vary. First and foremost, for about 30 years now, a migratory network gravitating around prostitution has been consolidating between departure areas in Nigeria and destinations in Southern Europe. This acts as an incentive not only for the traffickers but also for the victims who can take this path to seek a better future abroad. This is largely thanks to the successful messages of mamans who, having made their fortune abroad, flaunt their wealthy status at home, thereby triggering a process of emulation by vulnerable young women (Siegel, 2012). Furthermore, reproduction of the exploitation system responds to a perverse logic according to which the victim is psychologically and materially compensated by making newcomers suffer the punishments they had to undergo. It is as if each exploited woman thinks, ‘first it was my turn, now it’s their turn’. As they move through the process that leads them to become exploiters, their self is restructured. Paraphrasing Edwin Lemert (1967), they pass through different phases of their deviant identity. First, they suffer discrimination and stigmatization linked to their condition as prostitutes, then move to a subsequent phase corresponding to conscious acquisition of the social role held. Freed from debt after a few years, these women come to positively evaluate the economic advantages of prostitution. The prostitution network is a form of social capital, thanks to which exploited women, once freed from debt, have the contacts to attract new victims from Nigeria. This social capital translates into an advantage first and foremost for the exploiters and, secondly, for the exploited women, provided that they are able to pay off the debt and become mamans in turn. Some form of social capital restricted to mamans also exists. In this regard, judicial investigations carried out in Italy have revealed that forms of mutual financial aid among mamans have existed for years. According to this system, each member assigns a share of her profits to a common fund which, in 108

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rotation, remains available to each participant. In this way, each exploiter is protected from any unforeseen events, such as the escape of trafficked girls or their repatriation by the police, as well as having funds to entice new girls into prostitution (Tribunal Naples, 2003). These forms of financing, based on mutual trust among participants, are part of a broader system of mutual aid existing in Asian and West African countries as well as their migrant communities abroad. For instance, some Chinese people have forms of mutual aid called rotating credit associations, which are forms of social capital that can facilitate the pursuit of economic purposes to benefit the people sharing the same migratory network (Geertz, 1962; Massey et al, 2009). From this point of view, given the difficulties migrants have in accessing credit through banks, with mutual financial aid foreign entrepreneurs can access the initial capital needed to open a business. Any form of social capital depends on the purpose for which it used, and it can be used for illicit purposes, as is the case of the sexual exploitation of Nigerian women by their compatriots.

Eastern European organizations Criminal groups from Eastern Europe, such as Albania, Romania, Bulgaria and Russia, that are engaged in sexual exploitation mostly have the following characteristics. They are made up of a relatively small number of individuals, usually from a few to a dozen. They can be connected by ties of kinship or friendship, for example siblings, cousins or people who already knew each other in the country of origin and subsequently have had the opportunity to reconnect in the destination country (Antonopoulus and Winterdyk, 2005; Becucci and Garosi, 2008). The second factor is that these groups do not have a precise internal hierarchy, or an internal functional specialization, in the sense that all members have interchangeable roles. Nor do they have stable territorial roots. When the members realize they are under the attention of the police, the whole criminal group quickly moves to another place. In this sense, they are closer to a gang than a mafia group. According to the theoretical distinction developed in Chapter 2, they come under the network organizational model. Another characteristic is that European Eastern criminal groups resort to violence as the main tool to force trafficked women into prostitution (Lazos, 2002; Marcu, 2008; Giménez-​Salinas Framis, 2016; Vinagre and Domínguez, 2016; Salat, 2022). These criminal organizations mainly focus on street prostitution even if, based on the connections they may have with the owners of nightclubs and brothels, they can supply the latter with women to be used in indoor prostitution. Each exploiter of the criminal group has some kind of property right over the women personally procured, for instance by using the lover-​boy system or by buying women from other traffickers. How the exploited women are 109

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to be managed is jointly decided by the criminal group, but the individual ‘owner’ of the woman has an exclusive right to decide her fate, for example when it comes to making decisions that may endanger her life, as in the case of having to procure an abortion with rudimentary means. This exclusive relationship between the exploiter and the prostitute is associated with group logic according to the operational needs of the moment. Members support each other when it comes to controlling exploited women. When one of them is arrested, the group guarantees legal assistance and financial support. In Italy, in the last two decades, there have been some changes in terms of both recruitment and sexual exploitation methods. In the emerging phase of the exploitation system –​the first half of the 1990s –​the girls involved were mostly compatriots of the exploiters. For example, Albanian women arrived in Italy irregularly on rafts that left the Albanian ports of Valona and Scutari to reach the coast of Apulia, while some young Albanian women arrived in Italy accompanied by their fiancés (Motta, 2001). Having reached their destination, they were forced into prostitution with particularly brutal and violent methods. Subsequently, the traffic networks expanded. Eastern European exploiters travelled to countries such as those of the former Yugoslavia, where they could ‘purchase’ Russian, Ukrainian and Moldovan women from local traffickers to be included in the Italian sex market. These women had left their home countries with the help of a friend or acquaintance, then were left in a hotel waiting to be picked up by new traffickers. Only then did they discover that they had been sold to a new trafficker. The analysis of judicial proceedings for trafficking and sexual exploitation in the 1990s and early 2000s highlights the violence and brutality used against these women as a main tool to affirm total submission that binds them to their exploiters (Becucci and Massari, 2003; Becucci and Garosi, 2008). In this respect, according to some evidence from the last decade, violence against prostitutes working on the street has decreased (Antonopoulos et al, 2019). Some interviews conducted in 2021 with members of the police’s anti-​exploitation unit confirm this trend. There are cases of sexually exploited women who, over time, have found some sense of balance with their exploiter based on sharing the profits deriving from street work (Appendix, 13–​15). In a broader sense, the exploiters probably preferred to establish some form of complicity with the exploited women, leaving them some of the profits of their prostitution. From an initial predatory pattern aimed at accumulating more and more profits until the victims are ‘used up’, Eastern European exploiters shifted to using less violence and searching for profit-​ sharing ‘agreements’ –​of never more than 50 per cent –​between exploiter and prostitute. The are some reasons why exploiters have chosen this strategy to continue sexual exploitation. First, increased police controls on street prostitution have made it more dangerous for exploiters to watch over ‘their’ women. 110

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These controls started in 2008 during the season of zero tolerance when the right-​wing government in Italy approved new laws under which mayors could approve ordinances to safeguard urban decorum and safety, overcoming previous restrictions. Between August 2008 –​when the new law was implemented –​and March 2009, the National Association of Municipalities counted 600 new ordinances issued by mayors. Among them, the top category regarded the ban on prostitution in the municipality (16 per cent), followed by restrictions on alcohol consumption (14 per cent), vandalism (10 per cent), and begging (8 per cent) (Bontempelli, 2009). With the increased risk of being identified by law enforcement agencies, exploiters sought to establish an agreement with the women to avoiding being reported. In addition, the new measures established by article 18 of Law 286 in 1998 played a part in this direction. According to official data, from 2010 to 2021, around 5,000 trafficked people were freed from the exploitation system through the judicial and social routes (Eurostat, 2022). It is also worth mentioning another aspect, which does not concern Italy alone. The entrance of several former Soviet Union states into the EU in the mid-​2000s allowed women from Eastern Europe to move freely within the EU without the risk of becoming trafficking victims. At the same time, exploited women belonging to these new EU countries gained a status of legality, thereby acquiring more negotiation power with their exploiters because they no longer risked expulsion from Italy as they would have when their status was irregular. In line with this, research analysing trafficking for the sexual exploitation of victims from Bulgaria pointed out the reduction in traffickers’ violence against victims with the elimination of visa restrictions for Bulgarian citizens in EU countries (Petrunov, 2014). While these changes concerned Italy in the context of street prostitution managed by exploiters from Eastern Europe, there is no evidence to confirm similar changes in Spain and Greece. On the contrary, in light of the information collected and the interviews conducted, violence is the main means by which exploiters from Eastern Europe reaffirm their dominion over trafficked women working in the sex market in Greece and Spain (Lazaridis, 2001; Lazos, 2002; Marcu, 2008; NRM, 2022) (Appendix, 32–​35). Within the exploitation system outlined, forms of ‘internal mobility’ –​ concerning a criminal career –​for women who prostitute themselves are scarce, if not impracticable. Unlike the Nigerian system, where there is a transition from exploited prostitutes to mamans, here the clear predominance of men in the management of prostitution relegates women permanently to a subordinate role. Thanks to a privileged relationship with the leaders, exploited women might enjoy the trust of the criminal group. They instruct the new prostitutes on how to behave with clients and keep the money collected during the day by all the women for the criminal group, so the 111

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latter is replaced in its daily control of women working on the street (Becucci and Garosi, 2008; Meneses-​Falcon et al, 2019).

Chinese criminal organizations Criminal organizations dedicated to sexual exploitation operate mostly within communities of compatriots abroad. Thanks to the connections formed between them, they carry out exploitation in several cities within the same country. For example, over the last decade, various police operations have brought to light the existence of interconnected groups of Chinese exploiters who ran apartments and salles de messages in various cities in central-​northern Italy. Collaborations between Chinese and Italians also emerged. The former deal with the management of prostitution, while the latter provide logistical support, identifying the lodgings and acting as frontmen for the signing of rental contracts (Gruppo Interforze, 2005; DIA, 2009). In other cases, however, small groups of pimps manage massage parlors and apartments used for prostitution locally. While both systems exist, some indirect signals suggest that the management of prostitution based on connections between criminal groups is the prevailing modality. In this regard, there is great mobility among women engaged in prostitution, who remain for no more than a few weeks in a specific place and then move on. Furthermore, Chinese criminal groups manage brothels or are permanently employed by the brothel managers to defend them against attacks by potential robbers. All this suggests that those involved in sexual exploitation could have ties with Chinese mafia associations. In Italy, these criminal organizations have been able to strongly influence the social-​economic fabric within compatriots’ settlements in several cities (Becucci, 2016, 2018). Trafficked women mostly arrive in Europe on a tourist visa and remain in the destination country beyond the period allowed by the entry permit. In this regard, a 2004 agreement between the EU and China provides facilities for Chinese citizens wishing to travel to European countries on tourist visits. The issuance of this type of visa is subject to certain conditions. The visa must be requested by a minimum of five people and applicants are required to present a round-​trip air ticket and a travel itinerary of the places the group wishes to visit. This agreement with the EU has liberalized, albeit under certain conditions, tourist visas from China; a country where there is a middle class of several hundred million people who can support the European tourism market. Agreements of this type can easily be exploited by trafficking organizations, as well as individual groups of irregular migrants, who can legally reach European countries through this channel. Regardless of how they travel, trafficked women are tied to the debt contracted with the criminal organization that advanced the travel costs. They have to repay a travel debt of several tens of thousands of euros to the 112

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traffickers. These women are kept segregated inside the prostitution venues, under the domination of the exploiters. Where the recruitment of Chinese prostitutes is based on consent, the women receive compensation from the pimps’ organization, which generally corresponds to around 20–40 per cent for each sexual performance (Mazzesi, 2006; Tribunal Udine, 2003). In more recent cases, again referring to central and northern Italy, women prostituting in nightclubs would receive €200 from a client with whom they spent the entire evening. The club managers took a fee of €30 per customer. Hotel prostitution had much higher rates, from €150 to €500, with 50 per cent going to the organizers of the sexual services (Tribunal Prato, 2019). These areas of indoor prostitution almost exclusively had Chinese clients. Prostitution took place within the Chinese settlements in Italy and the owners of hotels used as prostitution venues were Chinese. By contrast, massage rooms were mostly frequented by local customers –​Italian, Spanish and Greek (Becucci, 2016; Meneses-​Falcon et al, 2019). Massage rooms are usually located outside Chinese communities and are managed by individual owners, while the cost for the customer, at least as far as Italy is concerned, ranges from €30 to €70 per service. In the context of Chinese prostitution, these indoor arrangements are influenced by cultural criteria, by which prostitution outdoors and visible to all is disapproved of by compatriots (Light, 1977). Since prostitution is mostly indoors, the possibility of discovering forms of trafficking and sexual exploitation depend on both the ability of the police to implement targeted controls and the collaboration of victims.

Latin American organizations Mostly present in Spain, organizations from South and Central America have a molecular structure, mainly based on small transnational networks. They have connections between Spain and the victims’ countries of origin, such as Brazil, Colombia, Paraguay, Venezuela and the Dominican Republic. Women destined for the sex market mostly provide prostitution in nightclubs and brothels. Their presence in Spain reflects, in a broader sense, the arrivals of migrants from Latin America, who prefer Spain among the European countries because of the linguistic and cultural consonance deriving from previous colonial ties. The main recruitment methods used by traffickers are based on the lover-​ boy system, as well as on tempting job promises that then do not correspond to reality. In other cases, there are explicit proposals to carry out sex work. In the latter case, as we have seen for other countries, even women aware that they will work in the sex industry in Spain are rarely aware of the actual conditions they will have to comply with once they arrive (Vinagre and Domínguez, 2016). 113

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For women from Paraguay, the Dominican Republic and Brazil, the travel debt ranges from €3,000 to €10,000. Once they arrive in Spain, the traffickers steal their documents under a pretext and, until they have paid off the debt, they are forced into prostitution (Pérez Freire, 2014; De Perez and Vermeleun, 2015). Depending on the conditions in which the woman finds herself, it may take many months or a few years before she can pay off the debt to the criminal organization that brought her to Spain. Latin American women arrive at a Spanish airport with a tourist visa or they enter with false work contracts as dancers, waitresses or cleaners in private homes. In other cases, probably with the aim of arousing less suspicion upon landing, they fly to airports in other European countries and then travel to Spain by train and bus (Meneses-​Falcon et al, 2019). The main destinations of Latin American women are the chains of legal or illegal brothels found in various Spanish cities such as Madrid and Bilbao and towns along the border between Spain and France (Andreu, 2013; Meneses-​Falcon, 2021). In the context of prostitution in nightclubs, the freedom and autonomy of foreign women depend on some basic elements related to how they were recruited by the exploiters’ organization: first, whether they are aware of the type of work that will be required of them –​when they have been deceived, the exploiters resort to violence to force them into prostitution; second, having contracted a travel debt with the trafficking organization that brought them to Europe (Zaitch, 2002). Even if they know what they will have to do, they will be forced to continue in prostitution until they have paid off the debt. Finally, another relevant aspect concerns the legality or illegality of foreign women, that is, the possibility for them to move freely in the territory of the host country or, on the contrary, to be easily blackmailed by the exploiters for fear of being repatriated if identified by the police.

Collaboration between local and foreign criminals in sexual exploitation The forms of prostitution carried out in nightclubs and other indoor venues involve a type of organization with different functional figures. At the top, there are those who manage the venue –​one or more owners –​and the recruiters follow, then, in a secondary position, the controllers of the women employed inside. The managers establish the rules of behaviour for the girls, the types of service provided and prices to be paid by customers. Together with them, in a top position, there may be a female figure, the maitresse, who enjoys the trust of the manager. She deals with arranging sexual services for customers and, above all, maintains close relationships with the group of girls. Whether they live inside the nightclub or elsewhere, the maitresse spends most of her time with the girls to supervise them and solve their problems.

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The recruitment of foreign women mostly relies on criminal players from other countries. More rarely, they are Greek, Spanish and Italian with direct contacts in the countries of origin of the women subjected to sexual exploitation. Collaborations between nightclub managers and recruiters operating in the foreign country can be based on relatively structured and time-​tested methods, such as agencies, which post adverts in periodicals and on websites to recruit women to the sexual services market in Southern Europe. In other cases, the nightclub managers or their intermediaries abroad send the women the money necessary to obtain the documents to be shown at the border to justify their entry into the chosen European country on a tourist visa. For these women, who can stay up to three months in Europe, the managers usually settle the sums due at the end of the period of stay to discourage them from leaving the nightclub prematurely. Sexual services can take place inside the premises, in private rooms, or outside, in which case the prostitute goes out with the client. Compared with the substantial revenues benefitting the managers, the prostitutes’ earnings are significantly lower and are based on the agreement with the owner of the nightclub. Women can receive a monthly salary of around €800. In addition to this basic salary, there is a quota for the private rooms held, in the order of about €20, while the client pays the manager from €50 to €100 euros (Becucci and Garosi, 2008). The role of host-​country exploiters in indoor prostitution is prevalent in comparison with that of foreigners. As nightclub owners and brothel managers, native exploiters are more involved in sexual exploitation than foreigners (Emke-​Poulopoulos, 2001; Papanicolaou, 2008; Zervos, 2015; Pajnik et al, 2016). In fact, without their contribution, it would be very difficult to place trafficked women in clubs and brothels. An example of this is the previously reported number of Spanish people arrested in 2021 for sexual exploitation trafficking: 73 out of a total of 205 people in Spain (CITCO, 2022). One of the biggest cases of trafficking and sexual exploitation in Spain was called ‘Carioca’ by the national press, with the first investigations dating back to 2009. The Carioca system involved a network of several legal brothels in Galicia, with around 100 defendants, including some policemen, and 400 women subjected to forced prostitution. The trafficked women were mostly from Venezuela, Colombia and Brazil and were brought in by the owner of the brothel network through recruiters in their home countries. The women had to work continuously in the brothels. If they did not comply, they were fined a few hundred euros each. Those who arrived in Spain thanks to the advance payment of travel costs by the criminal organization had to prostitute themselves until they had paid off a €5,000 debt (Andreu, 2013; Silvia, 2022).

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Italy is the only country of those examined here where indigenous mafias exist. This does not mean that a variety of organized criminal associations are not present in Spain and Greece (Sands, 2007; Giménez-​Salinas Framis, 2013; Antonopoulos, 2014; Kazyrytski, 2017). However, Italy has long-​ established mafia associations in several areas of the country where they can exercise control of the social fabric (Ciconte, 1996; Becucci, 2003; Gratteri and Nicaso, 2009; Calderoni, 2014; Vaccaro and Palazzo, 2015; Dagnes et al, 2020). Against this background, we have to ask how they are involved in the trafficking of migrants for sexual exploitation purposes. In reality, Cosa Nostra, ’Ndrangheta and Camorra are not interested in this type of criminal market for a variety of reasons. First, a cultural orientation persists in criminal organizations such as Cosa Nostra and ’Ndrangheta according to which sexual exploitation is considered a highly reprehensible activity. In this regard, we have the testimonies of informers of Cosa Nostra who reported that some people would not be affiliated with the organization because it was rumoured that they were involved in prostitution. These potential candidates were refused despite having fathers and brothers who were already members of the organization (Arlacchi, 1992). This cultural opposition applies to Cosa Nostra and ’Ndrangheta, but not to Camorra, which was involved in sexual exploitation in the 1970s and 1980s (Lamberti, 1992; DNA, 2005). If anything, however, the Camorra, like the other Italian mafias, has long been more interested in illicit markets that are much more profitable than sexual exploitation (Barbagallo, 1999). These markets include drugs and the management of public procurement at national and local level thanks to the complicity of entrepreneurs colluding with criminal organizations (Sciarrone, 2011, 2019). In traditional mafia settlement areas in Southern Italy, however, mafia organizations do implement indirect forms of control over sexual exploitation. Evidence of this has been found for years in the area between Caserta and Naples (the Campania region), where Camorra groups extort foreign criminal players involved in street prostitution (DIA, 2003). According to a similar logic, ’Ndrangheta families in the province of Crotone have allowed criminal groups from Eastern Europe to exploit prostitution. The exchange for ’Ndrangheta was to buy at a favourable price drugs imported by foreign groups to Italy (Macrì, 2004). More recently, a similar situation emerged in some neighborhoods of Palermo where Nigerian criminal groups are involved in the local drug market and sexual exploitation. In the popular district of Ballarò, in the heart of the city of Palermo, various buildings –​called connection houses –​used for drug dealing and prostitution have been discovered in recent years. Attended by African clients, these connection houses were rented by mamans and members of Nigerian secret cults (Tribunal Palermo, 2017). According to the police investigators and the magistrates who instructed the judicial proceedings against Nigerian crime present in Palermo, no evidence has 116

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emerged of an agreement between Cosa Nostra and Nigerian cults (Appendix, 1–​4). However, it is difficult to believe that Cosa Nostra has tolerated these criminal activities in the centre of Palermo without receiving anything in return, such as a percentage of the profits or the payment of a bribe.

Severe labour exploitation and trafficking of migrants When it comes to trafficking for the purpose of labour exploitation, some initial clarifications must be made. It is only minimally possible to detect the presence of trafficked migrants. In this sense, the wide discrepancy between estimates and confirmed cases of workers in slavery-​like conditions tells us how much the phenomenon is largely submerged. For this reason, our analysis focuses on severe labour exploitation. However, the intensive exploitation of the labour force is not necessarily considered to be migrant trafficking as there is not always a form of coercion obliging the worker to submit to those specific working conditions. From a phenomenological standpoint, serious economic exploitation corresponds to a broader whole within which migrant trafficking takes place. Severe exploitation is based on long working days, no days off during the week and daily wages well below the minimum. Sometimes the line between severe labour exploitation and slave labour can be blurred, even though the employer does not implement coercive measures that bind the worker. For instance, a method used by employers (or their intermediaries) consists of leaving a large number of working days unpaid even though they have already been completed. Although there is no explicit coercion, this system induces the worker to continue working, believing the promise that sooner or later they will be paid provided they do not leave the workplace. The economic sectors in which trafficked migrants are mostly present are agriculture, construction, personal care services, catering, raw material extraction, fishing and manufacturing, particularly of apparel (Richards, 2004; Ronda-​Pérez and Moen, 2017; Fouskas et al, 2019; UNODC, 2021; ILO et al, 2022). These areas, in which forms of THB are frequently detected, require further specification. They must not be understood as exclusive sectors of trafficking nor as economic sectors that, per se, give rise to the victimization phenomena we are dealing with. In other words, these sectors, like any other production field, can give rise to migrant trafficking provided that some basic characteristics are found within them, with the following the most relevant: • The intensive use of labour as the main aspect of the production process, because the introduction of machinery would not be possible due to the type of activity carried out or it would not bring about significant economic advantages compared with the costs. Examples of sectors of 117

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this type are domestic and care services and the agricultural cultivation in greenhouses where only manpower can be used. In other cases, the introduction of technology is discouraged due to the plots of land used for cultivation not being large enough to justify the use of expensive agricultural machinery. This refers especially to small farms, managed on a family basis, which in certain periods of the year make substantial use of external labour to avoid the deterioration of the product. • Manufacturing production characterized by low-​entry thresholds for entrepreneurs who want to enter that production sector, for example clothing production for which technological equipment is reduced to a minimum. To produce clothing, only modest starting capital is required to purchase a machine to cut fabrics and one or more sewing machines to put the garment together. • Methods of recruiting the workforce that do not follow principles of transparency and correctness established by the laws in force. This is the case of intermediaries who negotiate with entrepreneurs over hiring the workforce, regularly appropriating a portion of the salary that should be due to the worker. Furthermore, private agencies may recruit personnel to be placed in businesses of various types. Workers must accept long working days and low wages. A share of the worker’s salary goes to the agency that recruited him or her. Here too, as in the case of the intermediary, the private agency can acquire this share only once the first salary has been paid or, alternatively, each time the worker is paid by the employer. The latter case mostly occurs when the intermediary between the company and the worker is not only concerned with finding a job for the worker, but also establishes a salary with the employer that does not correspond to that actually received by the worker. The gangmaster or agency standing between the business owner and the workforce takes a share of the daily salary earned by the worker. In this situation, these players are not limited to recruiting the workforce for the business; on the contrary, they interface in all respects between the firm and the worker. Furthermore, in cases of serious labour exploitation, the workforce payment system is not based on hours worked but on piecework production. This system is common in agriculture and manufacturing. In the most serious cases of exploitation, gangmasters control workers in the workplace by imposing very heavy work rates with threats and retaliation. The methods of hiring workers can be the most varied, ranging from completely illegal forms of employment to others that are only apparently legal. Among the latter, employment contracts are stipulated in which the worker is hired for only a few hours a day, when, in reality, they work many more hours. In other cases, the entrepreneur issues the worker with documentation stating that the monthly salary is in line with that of the 118

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production sector in which the worker is employed. However, once the salary has been received, the worker is obliged to return part of it to the employer in cash. In addition, there are other apparently legal methods of hiring, such as seasonal migrants who are brought in from abroad through networks of traffickers in Southern European countries. These migrants enter as seasonal workers, obtaining a temporary contract from the agriculture employer, even if the contract does not correspond with reality. Trapped in debt servitude to the trafficking organization that brought them in, seasonal migrants are subjected to severe labour exploitation until they have paid off their travel debt. This section deals with some specific economic sectors, such as agriculture and clothing production, for which qualitative information was personally collected. The purpose is to highlight the serious forms of labour exploitation that lurk within these economic areas. More specifically, attention is focused on the hourly wages of workers, trafficking organizations, and, finally, the dynamics of exploitation to which migrants in these labour markets of Southern European countries are subjected.

Agriculture Italy In Italy, according to official statistics based on active employment contracts, in 2020, there were around 900,000 workers employed in the agricultural sector, with the percentage of foreigners as 18.5 per cent (Macrì, 2022). The most updated estimate drawn up by the National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) of the number of irregular workers in agriculture refers to 2019, according to which there were 224,000 irregular workers. The latter are found in almost all Italian regions, but in significantly high numbers in five regions of central and south Italy. Lazio, Campania, Calabria, Apulia and Sicily have percentages of between 40 and 60 of irregular migrants, while other regions, such as Tuscany, Piedmont, Lombardy, Veneto, Sardinia and Molise, are in the lower band, between 20 and 30 per cent (De Gregorio and Giordano, 2022). Even considering the irregularity across the country, some areas exemplify the presence of serious forms of labour exploitation, which is associated, in some cases, with human trafficking. For instance, in Calabria there are the two slums of Rosarno and San Ferdinando, in the province of Reggio Calabria. Both are many kilometres from their respective population centres and are places where several thousand people arrive to work in the citrus harvest, which begins in November and ends in March (Reckinger, 2020). In August 2019, together with some volunteers from a local NGO, we visited these areas where we met a few dozen migrants who, although it was not the harvest period, had decided to stay. They worked in the fields for €20 a day. In the Rosarno camp, the migrants were housed in metal containers made available by the municipal administration. There were 18 119

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containers in which no more than three or four people could sleep. In the winter, when migrants from all over Italy arrived for the harvest, the camp housed from 250 to 400 people. These makeshift homes lacked heating, running water and electricity. Moreover, the whole area outside the camp was surrounded by piles of garbage at least one metre high. The state of abandonment in which the place was found was such as to wonder how these people could live in those conditions. The slum of San Ferdinando, about 10 kilometres away from that of Rosarno, was destroyed by a fire in February 2019 that killed a Senegalese worker (Omizzolo, 2020). The shanty town had been replaced by Red Cross tents that housed about 200 people. The last place we visited in the same area was a ruined house where 25 people had taken refuge. Here too, they were migrants from the sub-​Saharan area, almost all Senegalese and Ghanaian. A generator provided electricity, while people had to get water in cans from a petrol station five kilometres away from the ruin they used as a home. Many of these people had been in Italy for many years. As we were told, they moved from one region to another in search of seasonal jobs: in the autumn to Trentino Alto Adige for apple picking, in the summer to Campania for tomatoes and in the winter to Calabria for citrus fruits. Wages were higher in the north than in the south of Italy: from €30 to €35 in Trentino to €20 to €25 in Calabria for 10 to 12 hours of daily work. In any case, both in the north and south of Italy, wages were below the contractual standards in agriculture (for a general agricultural worker about €7 per hour for eight hours a day). This was linked to these people being hired irregularly (or with fictitious contracts that did not correspond to actual work hours) and were paid not for the hours worked but on the number of crates of fruit and vegetables harvested during the day. Another place similar to those visited personally is in Borgo Mezzanone in the province of Foggia (Apulia). In this area, several thousand sub-​Saharan migrants had already been present for some years, and, more recently, about a thousand workers of Roma origin from the city of Silven in Bulgaria have settled there. They live with their families in slums in the same conditions as just described. They are hired by gangmasters for daily wages of up to €25 for a 12-​hour day. They are mostly seasonal workers who stay in the Apulian province for a few months during the harvesting season, then return to Bulgaria during the winter. The gangmasters are both local and Bulgarian (both Roma and non-​Roma). They establish the daily wages with the local employers, after which they deduct from the workers’ wages a portion corresponding to the cost of the mediation. Depending on where they come from, gangmasters take part in the system of exploitation of the workforce in different ways. The Italians place the manpower in the local agricultural enterprises, while the Bulgarian 120

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gangmasters, in agreement with their contacts in the departure areas, recruit the workers and supervise them during their work (Sforza, 2017; Carchedi, 2018a). Borgo Mezzanone in the municipality of Manfredonia is just one of the most recent cases of exploitation of agricultural labour in Apulia. A decade or so ago, other research had already highlighted the exploitation of Polish workers in slavery-​like conditions. In 2005, a year after Poland’s entry into the EU, local recruiters convinced young Poles to move to the province of Foggia to work in the tomato harvest. The promise was that they would earn €50 a day –​an attractive figure compared with wages they could get at home –​and that they would have to pay €200 for the cost of travel, accommodation and food during the work period. When they arrived at their destination, the Polish gangmaster immediately made it clear that he demanded more money, to sleep in tents and ruined houses and to transport them to the harvest fields, for a piece rate of €3 for each case of tomatoes. Furthermore, as the migrant people discovered on their first day of work, the tomato ‘crate’ was a box weighing three quintals (300 kg). Placed in isolated areas close to harvest fields, deprived of passports, and without knowing where to turn for help, a few hundred Polish people suffered physical and psychological violence by the gangmasters. These acted as the armed wing defending the interests of the entrepreneurs. In agreement with the latter, the gangmasters paid the workers directly. From the daily pay, the gangmasters subtracted their intermediation fee, and the cost of accommodation and minibus transport. In addition, the gangmasters had developed a system that further exploited the workers: they always left weeks or months of work days unpaid, guaranteeing the workers the minimum amount of subsistence money, so that if they quit, they would lose their back pay. A system of exploitation made up of social and cultural isolation and physical and psychological violence put in place by the gangmasters continued for a few months in 2005, until some workers found the strength to turn to the honorary consul of Poland. He was a local Italian entrepreneur and got in touch with the authorities in Poland, arousing the attention of the Polish press to the serious episodes of labour exploitation taking place in Apulia. The intervention of the Polish authorities, the uproar aroused by the press and the opening of investigations by Italian prosecutors managed to disrupt, in 2006, the network of traffickers that operated between Poland and Puglia (Leogrande, 2008). It was, however, an interruption for Polish workers only. In the 1990s, the main foreign communities employed in agriculture in the province of Foggia were North Africans and Albanians. After the events relating to the Polish workers, labour exploitation mostly concerned Romanians and Bulgarians (Carchedi, 2018a). Other forms of intensive labour exploitation (and human trafficking) in Italy have emerged around the city of Latina, in the Lazio region. Labour 121

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exploitation concerned migrants from Punjab, a state in north India on the border with Pakistan. Among a plurality of trafficking organizations operating between Punjab and Italy, various functional roles make up these criminal associations, each with its own tasks. In India, there are recruiters and state officials, while in Italy, sponsors, gangmasters, agricultural producers and various professional figures operate. In the country of origin, the recruiters select the migrants willing to leave, establish the price of the trip and, depending on the case, accompany the migrants along the migratory path. Corrupt officials, in turn linked to recruiters, provide migrants with entry visas to Europe. Furthermore, politicians and local administrators tolerate irregular immigration in the departure areas, both because it reduces unemployment and because, once the migrants reach their destination, they send their relatives economic aid in the form of hard currency (Garha, 2020). On the Italian side, the sponsor anticipates part or all of the cost of the migrant’s journey. The sponsors are compatriots who have lived in Italy for a long time, sometimes enjoying a certain prestige within the community because they are the ones who interact with local institutions. In any case, these are people who know the local context and have established trusting relationships with farmers in the area. These farmers, in turn, fall into two groups. In the first are those who, through sponsors and gangmasters, recruit the manpower to be employed on their agricultural property. In the second group are agricultural producers who, in agreement with the sponsor, contribute to the financing of the migrant’s arrival. Once the migrant has been hired, these producers subtract, in the form of work performance, the obviously increased share of money that they spent on the migrant’s journey (Omizzolo and Carchedi, 2016). Associated with the business owners and sponsors are Italians who provide their services as professionals, such as public employees, accountants, notaries, lawyers, trade unionists and, in some cases, members of the police (Omizzolo, 2020). These professionals produce the necessary documentation to give migrants fictitious employment contracts, thanks to which they can avoid problems with the authorities. Moreover, trade unionists, labour inspectors and corrupt law enforcement officers provide a safety net for the organizers of trafficking. Finally, there are the gangmasters, both Italian and Punjabi. They interact with farmers, organize teams of workers and supervise them during their work. The gangmasters behave more like foremen, limiting themselves to spurring on the workers rather than exercising systematic violence against them. Overall, this type of human trafficking is not coercive. In the country of origin, it feeds on a relationship between recruiters and migrants according to the patron-​client model that we have seen in the previous chapters qualifying some forms of irregular immigration. In this sense, migrants from Punjab who arrive in Italy via these trafficking networks might be grateful to those who have organized their journey because they have had the opportunity to 122

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seek their fortune. The travel debt that they must pay varies according to the social relationships within the community in which each migrant is inserted. In any case, with increased controls in the destination countries of Southern Europe, the cost of the journey for the migrant has grown significantly. Until a few years ago, the debt was equal to ₹3–​400,000 (100,000 rupees correspond to approximately 1,200 euros), but today it has more than doubled from ₹800,000 to ₹1,200,000 (Garha, 2020). In Italy, the migrant fits into the network of compatriots, maintaining a relationship of subjection and gratitude with the sponsor. The sponsor is the one who places the migrant at the local farm but is also the main point of reference for any need that has to do with the host society (Omizzolo, 2017). The absence of coercion, the lack of knowledge of the national rules governing the workforce, and reference to the labour standards of the country of origin are all factors that make it difficult for these migrants to become aware of the severe exploitation to which they are subjected. Until they have paid the travel debt, they live in great difficulty, then, once the debt has been paid off, in the most serious cases of exploitation, they can work 15 to 16 hours a day for a monthly salary of €800 to €1,000. As far as Italy is concerned, we have reported only the most striking cases of serious labour exploitation that have occurred in recent years. As mentioned, there are no Italian regions that are not involved, consistently or in a minor way, in the intensive exploitation of agricultural work (Osservatorio Placido Rizzotto, 2018, 2022). A further overview of irregularities in the agricultural sector can be found in the checks carried out by labour inspectors (INL, 2022). In 2021, 117,608 companies were inspected. The controls took various aspects into account: irregular or partially irregular employment of the workforce and non-​compliance with social security regulations and devices to protect against accidents at work. The economic sectors in which the inspections took place were divided into agriculture, industry, construction and services. Overall, 15,150 workers were found without any employment contract, of whom 739 had no visa permit. The inspections were conducted in the tertiary sector (52 per cent of the total) and to a lesser extent in other economic areas (construction: 30 per cent; industry: 11 per cent and agriculture: 7 per cent). The agricultural sector had the highest rate of undeclared workers for the number of farms inspected: for every 100 farms controlled, 88 undeclared workers were discovered (INL, 2022). Spain In Spain, agricultural production includes about one million enterprises that employ about two million people according to some estimates (Chesney et al, 2019). Similar to Italy, the labour exploitation of foreigners in agriculture occurs across the country, but some areas have a greater concentration of 123

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workers employed in seasonal harvesting. The Andalusia region, with its 7,000 hectares dedicated to agriculture, is one of these (Turi, 2018). The local economies of Almeria, Huelva and El Ejido are largely based on the production of fruit and vegetables. In the countryside around Almeria, several thousand migrants reside in slums waiting to be hired to work in the fields. They are mostly workers from North Africa, sub-​Saharan Africa and Latin America. In El Ejido, approximately 9,000 agricultural companies have, for years, adopted intensive methods of greenhouse production of fruit and vegetables (Stobart, 2010). In Huelva, 40,000 to 60,000 people arrive each year for the strawberry picking season. It is mostly a circular migration of Moroccans and Romanians, who then return to their homelands at the end of the harvest period. Between the 1990s and 2000s, the Spanish government established agreements with Morocco and Romania to recruit seasonal workers. Romania’s entry into the EU and the global economic crisis of 2008 led the Spanish government to interrupt the temporary recruitment programmes for seasonal workers. In the following years, Spanish agricultural companies directly recruited Romanian workers by placing advertisements on their websites. Another, more informal, recruitment channel was based on appointing local migrants to recruit other compatriots in their country of origin. Like gangmasters in Italy, these recruiters acted as an intermediary between agricultural producers and foreign workers, taking a share of the worker’s monthly salary (Molinero-​Gerbeau et al, 2021). The exploitation of labour hides behind the false promises made by producers. Farmers promise seasonal migrants decent housing, working hours and acceptable wages, in the order of €40 for seven hours’ work a day. Once they arrive at their destination, however, the migrants discover that they are to live in shacks without water or electricity, and that foremen force them to work many hours, until they drop, in exchange for a few tens of euros. Moroccan women, who are preferred over their male compatriots because they are considered meeker, are also subjected to abuse and violence (Turi, 2018; Rye and Scott, 2018; Correa da Silva and Cingolani, 2021). Other areas of Spain where seasonal workers periodically gather are found in Catalonia, in the cities of Girona and Lleida, areas where the fruit picking season runs from July to September. According to some estimates, around 7,000 workers arrive in Lleida every year (Molinero-​Gerbeau et al, 2021). In order to provide an overview on a national scale, we report the outcome of the inspections carried out by Spanish authorities in workplaces, specifying that a breakdown by economic sector is not provided. In 2021, the authorities subjected 5,218 companies to checks, including 13,836 workers within them. The top five autonomous communities subjected to the highest number of inspections were: Andalusia (1,224 inspections), Catalonia (798), Valencian community (671), Balearic Islands (589) and Aragon (315). Finally, in addition to the number of victims of trafficking for labour purposes already 124

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reported (see Table 4.1), the outcome of workplace checks identified 514 severely exploited workers, mostly uncovered in Andalusia (254), Catalonia (79) and Murcia (67) (CITCO, 2022). Greece In Greece, various episodes that have occurred in recent years testify to serious forms of exploitation of migrants in agricultural work. In this regard, the Manolada area, belonging to the Ilia prefecture in the west of the country, is where 90 per cent of the entire national strawberry output is grown (Kukreja, 2021). During the harvest season, this area hosts around 4,000 migrants. The work takes place in greenhouses, which get very hot in the summer. Migrant workers are deprived of protection from the chemical agents used to cultivate the products, and they work about ten hours a day in exchange for wages ranging from €23 to €28 (Papantoniou-​Frangouli et al, 2011). As in Italy, gangmasters directly recruit the workforce for local farmers. These gangmasters are both Greek and foreign. Here, as in the cases we have already seen, the gangmasters not only place the manpower according to the requests of the agricultural producers, but they are the only ones who deal with the latter. The producers pay the gangmasters based on the work done by the team of workers and subsequently it is the gangmaster who pays the workers. Workers have been subjected to harassment and violence by the gangmasters to induce them to work harder. Not only that, various systems were put in place to ensure that workers did not leave the site. Under pretexts or with violence, they were deprived of their passports. In addition, the gangmasters did not pay regularly, always leaving weeks or months of arrears. At the same time, the workers were obliged to stock up on food at shops indicated by the local farmer, where they could receive food on credit. Not only were the prices higher than in other shops but, as a result, workers ended up getting more and more into debt. After all the expenses owed for sustenance, transport to the fields and the percentage owed to the gangmaster, in the end the migrants worked for negligible monthly wages in the order of €300 (Papadopoulos et al, 2018). The social composition of the workers employed in this area has changed over time. At the turn of the 1990s and the first decade of the 2000s, the predominant foreign communities were Albanian, Romanian and Bulgarian. Recently, Asian migrants, in particular from Bangladesh, have been employed in the seasonal strawberry harvest (Kukreja, 2021). There are a few reasons for the change in the composition of foreign labour in the fields of Manolada. First of all, Albanian migrants, the first to arrive in Greece during the 1980s and 1990s, have found new and more profitable job opportunities over time (Lazaridis and Koumandraki, 2007). 125

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Bulgarians and Romanians initially arrived in Greece as seasonal workers in the early 2000s, through recruitment agreements established with their respective countries of departure. Later, with their countries’ entry into the EU, these seasonal workers preferred to go to countries where they could get better wages. Thus, Asian migrants, the latest arrivals in the Greek territory, and socially weaker, have made themselves available to cover the workforce demand in this area. Similar forms of exploitation are found in Argos, in the prefecture of Argolis, an area largely dedicated to the production of oranges and lemons. During the harvesting season, from November to March, this area welcomes 2,000 workers. In a similar way to the case in Manolada, Albanians and Romanians previously employed in the collection of citrus fruits have been replaced, for reasons already mentioned, by pickers from Pakistan. These then, in agreement with the agricultural producers, play the role of foremen, recruiting a new workforce from within their network of compatriots. The work is very hard. The pickers are paid a quarter of a euro for each case of fruit weighing 17 kilogrammes. Only by working at a frenetic pace for 10 to 12 hours a day is it possible to achieve a daily wage of €23 (Kukreja, 2021). Finally, we report some data on the inspections carried out by the anti-​ trafficking unit of the Greek police. This unit has two operational bases, one in Athens and one in Thessaloniki, plus 12 branch offices in various cities. From 2012 to 2017, the anti-​trafficking unit carried out 1,426 inspections, checking 5,984 people overall and issuing charges of various types to 46 people (USDOS, 2019). However, the scarce human resources available for inspections, together with the fact that this unit is largely dedicated to combating sex trafficking, suggests that human trafficking for labour exploitation remains a largely underground phenomenon (Avdela, 1997; Chryssochoou, 2014; Angeli, 2017).

Textile sector: Chinese migrants In textile production, forms of trafficking occur for the purpose of economic exploitation. However, some clarifications need to be made in this regard. The first concerns the type of production. When we talk about textiles, we are referring to the production of clothing more than the production of fabric itself. In fact, as mentioned earlier, opening a clothing manufacturing company does not require large investments or specific professional skills. The opposite is true to produce fabric, which requires both specialist know-​how and large investments for the purchase of expensive machinery (Becucci, 2017). The second clarification concerns the fact that our focus is on the exploitation that takes place within migratory circuits made up of compatriots, where the producer usually hires his own compatriots as employees, as is the case, for example, for people from China. 126

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In the relationship between employer and employee, the informal dimension far exceeds the formal one. This means, for example, that the employee can receive a formally correct pay cheque that in fact corresponds to a number of hours of work well below those actually performed. In other cases, pay documentation certifies that the employer will pay social security contributions, but this expense item, based on an ‘agreement’ between the employer and employee, is charged to the latter. On the other hand, the company owner can help the worker with requests that have nothing to do with the employment relationship. For instance, the firm owner might help an employee with family reunification by bringing over his wife from the country of origin. The company owner, who has usually been in the new country for a longer time, makes his network available to the employee. The relationship between the entrepreneur and his compatriot employees is informal and characterized by mutual aid. Against this background, serious forms of labour exploitation arise. More specifically, with reference to the entrepreneurship of Chinese citizens abroad, the labour exploitation of employees by Chinese owners is largely based on the consent of the workers (Rastrelli, 2018a). Undoubtedly there is a need on the part of the worker, but the entrepreneur rarely exercises forms of violence to force heavy work rhythms on the employees. Rather, working for a compatriot implies advantages for the worker. In this regard, it is widespread practice in China and in emigration countries for the entrepreneur to offer, along with work, accommodation to their employees. In addition, working in the manufacturing company of a compatriot allows employees to learn a craft that they can later put to good use by setting up their own small firm. Among the various professional activities, becoming a laoban –​setting up one’s own business –​is considered a sign of prestige within Chinese communities overseas. This goal can be achieved after a few years of working in a manufacturing company for a fellow countryman. Moreover, irregular immigration from China to Southern European countries is often based on an agreement in China between the members of smugglers’ organizations and the migrant people. Usually, the agreed amount for the trip requires 50 per cent payment upon departure, and the remaining part is paid when the migrant arrives at the destination. Chinese smugglers’ organizations can manage and supervise migrants’ entire journeys to Southern European countries even if they rely on non-​Chinese smugglers in the intermediate states on the route (Becucci, 2016). When they arrive in the chosen European city, the migrants find relatives and acquaintances who help to pay off the travel debt to the smugglers (Rastrelli, 2018a). After that, they work hard not only to pay back any loans they received but also to make their own way as entrepreneurs (Ceccagno, 2017).

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Does this mean then that there are no forms of forced labour within Chinese communities in Europe? There are, but they are mostly related to some initial conditions. The first is that the migrant, from the time of departure, has been deceived by the smugglers. Instead of taking them to their destination, the smugglers might have sold them to human traffickers who enslaved them. The second is that, during the migratory journey, the migrant is kidnapped by criminal gangs or other smugglers. Kidnappers demand a ransom from the family to free the hostage. If the negotiation is unsuccessful, the migrant is sold to entrepreneurs who make them work in slavery-​like conditions. The third possibility lies in the close connection between Chinese entrepreneurs abroad and Chinese criminal organizations involved in human trafficking. Through the latter, entrepreneurs obtain a low-​cost labour force to be exploited intensively. These three possibilities exist, but, compared with the overall number of Chinese migrants who have arrived irregularly in Southern European countries in recent decades, they are quite rare. By way of example, we report some statistical information from Italy concerning Chinese citizens accused of both irregular immigration and THB. This information is taken from the archives of the Italian police when the writer was writing a report on Chinese crime in Italy (CNEL, 2011). Although this is not recent statistical information, it is reported to highlight how relevant the phenomenon of irregular immigration is compared with THB. In the period 2004–2010, 28,464 Chinese citizens were reported for various violations of the immigration law (Legislative Decree 286 of 1998). Of this total, 5,329 were reported for organizing illegal immigration, and 2,470 for irregular employment of the workforce. Finally, as regards the crime of trafficking (enslavement and trade in human beings), 136 Chinese citizens were reported in the same period (CNEL, 2011). So far, we have talked about irregular Chinese immigration and the main payment methods by which migrant people arrive in Europe. Yet, some signs, at least for Italy, indicate that the countries of Southern Europe are probably no longer so attractive for Chinese citizens, while China, thanks to its growing economic development, now offers better business opportunities itself. A sign in this direction comes from a series of interviews carried out with migrants in 2022 in Tuscany. We interviewed eight asylum seekers from Asia living in reception centres between Florence and Prato (Appendix, 66–​73). Almost all the interviewees worked without a contract for a period of months or a few years at Chinese fast-​fashion firms in Prato. The jobs consisted of tasks that did not require any specific technical preparation, such as cutting threads from clothes and packing the garments for shipping. A Pakistani man at a Chinese company reported that he worked 12 hours a day, seven days a week in exchange for a salary of €900 a month. The testimonies of other interviewees employed by Chinese 128

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entrepreneurs are along the same lines: long working days with no weekly rest for monthly salaries ranging from €900 to €1,000. The intensive use of the workforce is one reason why Chinese entrepreneurs can produce clothing at competitive market prices. Located in a low-​quality production segment, they manage to carve out slices of the market thanks to the economic exploitation of their employees (Dei Ottati, 2013). The aspect worth highlighting here, however, is that these entrepreneurs reproduce forms of exploitation that originally relied on fellow countrymen. Today, in the absence of the turnover of a Chinese workforce, they take on migrants of other nationalities.

Concluding remarks: enslavement strategy The main system to force trafficked people to accept the demands of their exploiters is violence. Years ago, while researching trafficking in Italy, among the several criminal proceedings analysed, was a broad investigation carried out by the Anti-​Mafia District Directorates of Brescia and Genoa, which involved around 150 exploiters operating in several Italian cities (Becucci and Garosi, 2008). Mainly Albanian, they forced compatriot women to prostitute themselves on the street. The victims’ testimonies reported that they were systematically beaten when they returned home to their exploiters. Sometimes, the reason for resorting to violence against the women was that they did not get money enough at the end of a day’s work. In other cases, they were beaten because they did not have what the exploiters considered to be the right attitude with clients. So, in some cases, it was possible to identify specific reasons why these women were subjected to violence, but it was not always possible to understand. After reading all the 1,200 pages of the proceeding, the real reason eventually became clear (Tribunal Brescia, 2000). First and foremost, violence was the tool to establish the rules governing the relationship between victim and exploiter. The latter, like modern slavery, no longer has the legal, cultural or moral support it had until the 19th century, when slavery was an institution recognized and legitimized by many European countries. Deprived of any social legitimacy, contemporary slavers resort to violence as the main way to make their victims obedient and meek and willing to accept all their demands. In these terms, modern slavery combines ancient methods based on violence with a marked propensity for capitalist accumulation, typical of contemporary societies. Another aspect that greatly facilitates the submission of victims is their social, physical and linguistic isolation (Arhin, 2016). This isolation is combined with dependency on their exploiters for contact with the social environment beyond their daily occupation. The exploiters interpose and control all of the victims’ needs, for instance a medical examination for a 129

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female prostitute, or her need for medicine. The following story of a girl previously exploited by Nigerian mamans clearly reveals how relevant is the isolation to which victims are subjected (Maragnani and Aikpitanyi 2007: 55–​56): Don’t think girls are friends just because they’re all in the same misery. Forget it. The maman does not want friendships to arise in the house, because it is the dangerous beginning of solidarity and of possible rebellion. At home we never talk, because she has ears everywhere. You can never trust anyone, not even your roommate, because maybe she does it on purpose to gain your confidence and then goes to the maman to snitch. So then she gets better treatment. And even in the street there are spies who check if the girls are chatting. Especially for the new ones, control is strict. Those who still have doubts, who are ashamed, who don’t know how to do it, they are controlled more. The maman always gets to know everything. Social isolation and dependency on exploiters also occur in labour exploitation (Fanizza, 2020). The workers live in hovels without electricity or running water, far from population centres, with no contacts but work colleagues and gangmasters. The workers need the gangmasters for everything: to bring them to the farms, as well as to get food. Based on a contribution imposed by the gangmasters, the latter take the workers to the nearest chosen grocery store. A Polish worker recruited in his country to work in agriculture in Apulia reported his condition (Leogrande, 2008: 101): When we arrived, we didn’t know a single word of Italian … I didn’t know where we were staying. We were in the open countryside every day, not in the city, in an inhabited centre … So, without knowing the language, without knowing where we were, [subjected to constant threats by gangmasters] it is obvious that nobody moved. A friend and I said to each other, let’s stay here until the food supplies run out, let’s see if they pay us at least a part. In conclusion, any identity process, and therefore awareness as an individual, does not take place on a hypothetical mental level, but, on the contrary, is to be understood as the result of a set of relationships in which the subject is embedded (Becker, 1963; Berger and Luckmann, 1966; Lemert, 1967). The system used by exploiters to isolate their victims is intended to prevent the latter from becoming aware of the unfair conditions they are in with respect to their dominators.

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5

In Search of Explanations The emergence of new forms of slavery highlights how ‘modernity’ and the processes of modernization tend to be contradictory, far from constituting progressive change towards more advanced forms of development and social organization. Progress is marked by setbacks, rollbacks and non-​linear transitions. Indeed, as we have shown, contradictory phenomena coexist within the ‘rich’ countries of Europe. On the one hand, Europe has achieved some of the best standards in the world, then, on the other, general social and economic progress coexists alongside widespread practices of sexual and labour enslavement. Considered erroneously outdated, new forms of slavery find their place within the broader processes of globalization. In this regard, this final chapter aims to identify the main forces driving the social phenomena examined in the book. In Southern Europe, these factors are, in order: restrictive migration policies, market forces aimed at introducing flexibility and deregulation into the workplace and, lastly, organized crime, which in turn plays its part in increasing both migrant smuggling and trafficking.

Migration policies in Southern Europe The immigration policies of Spain, Italy and Greece have some common aspects. First and foremost, from the 1970s until the early 2000s these countries systematically resorted to procedures for the mass regularization of migrants. From 1985 to 2005, Spain held six amnesties that allowed 1,258,600 migrants to change their illegal status. In Italy, from 1985 to 2002, there were six regularizations for a total of 1,433,100 migrants, while Greece held two amnesties, from 1997 to 2001, involving 722,000 migrants. To make a comparison with Northern European countries, in the same period, Belgium approved three regularizations involving 65,500 migrants, France four benefitting a total of 262,800 people, and the United Kingdom two for 2,200 migrants (Pastore, 2006). Greece approved two new amnesties in 2005 and 2007 that concerned a few hundred thousand migrants (Ambrosini, 2018). 131

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These amnesties show that the receiving countries had not successfully managed the legal arrival of migrants under their own institutional procedures. In addition, measures of this type have consequences: they attract new migrants. From the moment the amnesties are announced until they are promulgated, migrants illegally residing in other European countries can travel to the country that announced the new measure. Moreover, the large number of applications means long response times on the part of state institutions. Faced with hundreds of thousands of applications, the bureaucratic structures of the state implement formal controls rather than ascertaining the reliability of the documentation submitted (Scagliarini, 2001). At the same time, these provisions give rise to illegal practices that seek to ensure the applicant meets the requirements necessary to take advantage of the amnesty. The 2002 amnesty in Italy, for which 750,000 applications were submitted, highlighted these aspects. Response times were long as the examination of all the applications was only concluded at the end of 2004. The amnesties fuelled illegal practices involving various players, from homeowners who provided fictitious rental agreements, to entrepreneurs who guaranteed false employment contracts (Rastrelli, 2018b). In 2008, the Southern European countries signed a document promoted by the European Council reaffirming some common commitments regarding immigration and asylum. The member states undertook not to approve new generalized amnesties. Spain and Greece lived up to this commitment, but Italy promulgated two new regularizations in 2009 and 2012 that allowed approximately 400,000 migrants to change their illegal status (Ambrosini, 2018). In 2020, during the Covid-​19 pandemic, Italy approved a new regularization limited to domestic workers, caregivers and agricultural labourers in order to bring these workers out of irregularity. The government was expecting around 690,000 applications –​corresponding to the estimated number of irregular foreign workers in those sectors –​but only 220,000 applications were received. According to interviews with migrants conducted by Human Rights Watch (2020), the cost of a fictitious work permit could be as much as €7,000. Another common aspect is that the laws strictly regulate the entry of people from non-​EU countries. These people have no concrete alternatives to irregular entry. The phenomenon of migrants arriving by sea on the coasts of Southern Europe has increased, in particular from 2014 to today. Many of them, although not all, apply for political asylum once they arrive in Spain, Italy or Greece. Under EU rules, applicants can only apply for international protection once they have arrived in a European country. Furthermore, to enter legally they need an entry visa issued by the European consular authorities in their own country, and, for this to be granted, applicants must meet specific requirements, such as having a return flight ticket and being able to demonstrate that they have the means to stay 132

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in Europe. In addition to the difficulty of satisfying these conditions, the consular authorities can still refuse to grant an entry visa. Thus, migrants who anticipate the practical impossibility of reaching Europe legally often turn to smugglers instead. Then, once they have arrived in Europe, they apply for international protection. Work visas represent the main channel for arriving in Europe legally. Within the annual entry quotas, Southern European countries provide a number of entry methods for work. The first involves a direct call to a foreign worker by an entrepreneur or family offering an employment contract. The call must take place remotely, since the future worker must be in their own country at the time. But who would hire someone without first meeting them in person? Not to mention that, as required by the regulations in Italy and Spain, entrepreneurs seeking foreign workers should apply first to the employment offices in their own country to ascertain that there are not already unemployed citizens available who could satisfy the need (Carrasco et al, 2008; PON FSE, 2010). Once this procedural step has been overcome, the employer must apply to the consular authorities to specifically hire that person. This mechanism is complicated though, and it does not work. It is often the case, however, that the worker is already in the country where they seek employment, in this example, Spain. Once the hiring has been agreed with the employer, the future worker, in this example, from Senegal, returns to their country to await the call, made by the employer to the Spanish embassy in Senegal, and thereafter returns to Spain. To improve the remote calling system, the institution of the sponsor was set up in Italy. This figure acts as an intermediary between job supply and demand, connecting employer and future worker. The latter comes to Italy with an entry visa ‘for work reasons’ that must be converted into a real work contract within a few months. Entry via sponsor had a low quota of up to a maximum of 15,000 applications per year. The system was effective and lasted from 1998 to 2002. As an operator of the Community of Sant’Egidio, an NGO that has branches in various developing countries, told the writer at the time: “the system worked so well that, as soon as the annual quotas opened, within a month the maximum limit of admissions through this channel was reached”. In 2002, the centre-​r ight coalition in government approved a new immigration law (189/​2002) still in force, which abolished the sponsor system. The main argument put forward by members of the political parties in power was that such a system helps to drive irregular arrivals because the sponsor can also be a foreign entrepreneur. So, they claimed, these people would have used this system to fraudulently bring their compatriots to Italy. The second way to enter by work visa is based on the EU blue card, which is not included in the annual entry quotas. This work visa has existed since 2012 and is aimed at workers with a university degree, seen as skilled 133

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workers, such as those called to work in IT in Germany (Doomernik and Jandl, 2007). The blue card visa is subject to the regulations of the member country. In Italy, if the employment contract is open-​ended, these workers receive an entry visa for two years; otherwise, they have a shorter visa based on the duration of the employment contract. This type of entry has so far involved a small number of visas. As an example, in 2021 in Italy, there were 1,400 workers with fixed-​term contracts holding blue cards (Nanni, 2022). From 2013 to 2020, 81,066 visas were granted via the blue card system in all EU countries. Among the top ten countries that have used this system the most, Germany is in first place with 51,815 visas, while Bulgaria is in last place with 913. Italy, with an average of 266 annual visas, issued 2,131 blue cards in the period considered, while Spain and Greece are not in the top ten (Di Pasquale and Tronchin, 2022a). The third method is fixed-​term entries for seasonal jobs. As seen in the Chapter 4, Southern European countries have used this system for years specifically to satisfy requirements for seasonal jobs in the agricultural and tourism sectors. The system has existed since the 1990s (Hoggart and Mendoza, 1999). In general, the entry quotas for seasonal work were a few hundred thousand migrants or a few tens of thousands, depending on the year. For Spain, the collective management system –​so called because individual companies or groups of companies can propose a minimum number of ten applications –​formally includes both seasonal and permanent jobs, but this recruitment method has mostly been used for seasonal workers. In any case, since the beginning of the international financial crisis in 2008, which also involved European countries, the entry quotas of seasonal workers have significantly decreased. In 2020, the Covid-​19 pandemic further restricted these quotas, and they have only recently been expanded. In Spain in 2007, for example, a total of 250,000 workers (seasonal and non-​seasonal) were called from abroad, but only 6,700 were called in 2010 (PON ESF, 2010). In Italy, in the last six years, 30,000 foreign workers each year have benefitted from this type of entry, while a 2021 government decree provided for the entry of around 69,700 foreign workers, of which 40,000 were seasonal (Di Pasquale and Tronchin, 2022b). A further aspect worth highlighting is that national laws establish a rigid line between permission to enter for work and permanence in the country. Leaving aside those migrants who have been legally residing for some years and have thus obtained a long-​term residence permit, all the others are required to submit a renewal request. The residence permit is linked to the employment contract. For example, in Italy, from 2002 onwards, a migrant only has six months (one year with the previous Law 286/​1998) within which to renew the residence permit. This means finding a new employment contract within a few months, otherwise the permit will not be renewed and the person’s status will become illegal (Huntoon, 1998). For a 134

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series of reasons that will be discussed in the following paragraphs, the work permits that migrants can obtain are mostly fixed term, thereby creating the conditions for them to be systematically subjected to the possibility of falling into illegality. It is no surprise then, with regard to the countries of Southern Europe, that there are those who speak of the institutional precariousness of migrant people, if not the actual institutionalization of irregularity (Baldwin-​ Edwards, 1997; Cornelius, 2004; Calavita, 2005). To account for this risk, different types of employment contracts held by foreigner people in Italy are discussed here. In 2021, 1,547,631 non-​ EU citizens had an employment contract. Of these, 370,882 workers had a permanent contract, 1,046,704 a fixed-​term contract, while 36,538 had an apprenticeship contract, 13,156 a collaboration contract, and 80,351 had various forms of contract (‘work training contract’, ‘contract of job placement’ and so on) (Manieri, 2022). So, 66.7 per cent of the total had fixed-​term contracts, without mentioning that other types, such as apprenticeship contracts, do not necessarily turn into permanent contracts. According to official data, in 2021, there were 5,193,669 foreign people in Italy, amounting to 8.8 per cent of the total population (Nanni, 2022). Among them, 3,561,540 were holders of residence permits, while 1,219,700 people had temporary residence permits, 34.2 per cent (Di Sciullo, 2022). The latter quota, which includes various types of visas (work, study and so on), partly overlaps with holders of fixed-​term work permits (1,046,704 people). Among non-​EU citizens, those with a temporary residence permit and at the same time a temporary employment contract risk falling into illegality if they are unable to find a new job within a short time. Other elements also contribute to the rebuilding of the quotas of irregular migrants over time. Many of those who have recently arrived by sea have applied for international protection. Some of those whose application is rejected remain in the country nonetheless, while others try to reach countries in Northern Europe. Some estimates report that, both in Greece and Italy, there are about half a million irregular migrants (Floros and Jorgensen, 2020; Blangiardo and Ortensi, 2022). Spain and Greece have introduced some legal corrective measures to deal with the presence of irregular migrants over time. Italy, on the other hand, has not changed the basic principle that establishes a rigid correspondence between residence permit and work contract, except for approving regularization measures limited to some economic sectors in recent years. In 2006, Spain established a regularization system for illegal migrants called Arraigo (rootedness) (Aguilera Izquierdo, 2007; CES, 2019). It can be social or occupational. The former allows migrants to regularize themselves if they can demonstrate that they have been in the country for three years, that they have had an employment contract for at least one year and that they also have family relationships with other foreigners (a spouse or children) 135

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residing in Spain. The second requires the foreigners to have been in the country for at least two years and to demonstrate that they have had an employment relationship (not necessarily an employment contract) for at least one year (PON ESF, 2010). In Spain, unlike Italy and Greece, foreigners can enroll in the municipal registers even if they are illegal. This gives them access to health and educational services but not to a regular employment contract, which is associated with a residence permit (Larramona, 2013). In any case, the system based on social and employment elements has allowed a significant number of migrants to regularize their position. From 2009 to 2017, 4,844,427 residence permits were issued. Out of the total, 11 per cent of non-​EU foreigners regularized themselves through ‘rootedness’, while in 2017, 85 per cent of the 312,319 residence permits issued for various reasons were obtained this way (CES, 2019). In 2016, the Greek government introduced an amendment to immigration law 4251/​2014, according to which irregular migrants can remain in the country provided they find a new job. This provision, called the Ergosimo voucher, concerns both migrants who were unable to renew their residence permit due to losing their job and those who are fully illegal. The conditions are very strict. An applicant can find a job contract for a maximum of six months and only in specific sectors such as agriculture, domestic work and textiles. As if that were not enough, these fixed-​term contracts oblige the worker to stay in a specific area of the country, pending a possible further renewal of another six months, which would enable them to avoid expulsion (Floros and Jorgensen, 2020). On the one hand, this measure allows irregular migrants to avoid forced repatriation, but, on the other, it forces these people into an extremely precarious position. Furthermore, the measure establishes a power asymmetry in favour of the employer over the worker. If the latter does not accept the required working conditions, which can be seriously exploitative, they can be expelled from the country. The final aspect concerns the policies put in place to combat irregular immigration. They are internal and external control tools. The former are controls implemented within the national territory to identify irregular migrants; the latter are measures to prevent migrants from reaching the national territory. Southern European countries favour external over internal controls (Triandafyllidou and Ambrosini, 2011). As highlighted in Chapter 4, inspections carried out in the workplace are inadequate to reduce the widespread phenomenon of migrant labour exploitation. There is substantial tolerance of undeclared work by the governments. Thus, hundreds of thousands of people who find themselves in conditions of legal weakness and social vulnerability accept harsh working conditions. Beyond the political declarations against irregular migrants, the serious exploitation to which migrants are subjected is tacitly accepted because it benefits companies who 136

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take advantage of a large reservoir of available workers (de Haas, 2008; Perna, 2020; Papanicolaou and Antonopoulos, 2022). As shown in Chapter 2, the governments of Southern Europe have invested many resources in external controls against the arrival of migrants by sea. With the support of European institutions, Spain, Italy and Greece rely on countries such as Morocco, Libya (recently also Tunisia) and Turkey. Spain has had a collaboration agreement with Morocco for some time, while, in November 2022, Italy renewed a previous agreement with Libya established in 2017. Due to tensions with the Turkish president Erdoğan, who has claimed some Greek islands, Greece left it to the EU to negotiate a collaboration agreement with Turkey to prevent migrants from reaching Greek territory. In addition, in recent years there has been an authoritarian drift in North African countries, to which Turkey is not exempt. After the downward spiral of the 2011 Arab Spring, these countries do not guarantee the respect of migrants’ human rights. The most striking case is Libya. Both the UN and NGOs have repeatedly drawn attention to the serious human rights violations against migrants in the country (MEDU, 2017; UN, 2023a). Thus, the governments of Southern Europe de facto accept the violation of human rights in the countries to which they have outsourced the control of their borders. By doing so, they participate in a general trend that criminalizes migrants. In this regard, the UN (2018: 18) has pointed out that: The primary cause for the massive abuse suffered by migrants in all regions of the world, including, torture, rape, enslavement, trafficking, and murder, is neither migration itself, nor organized crime, or the corruption of individual officials, but the growing tendency of States to base their official migration policies and practices on deterrence, criminalization and discrimination, rather than protection, human rights and non-​discrimination. Governments justify the collaboration agreements with the states of North Africa in order to combat smuggling and human trafficking to the apparent advantage of migrants. However, without making any distinction between smuggling and trafficking, these arguments do not consider at least two aspects. The first is that, increasingly, it is not the smugglers who drive the boats but the migrants themselves (Siegel, 2019). Furthermore, the driver of the boat is only the last link in a much larger chain. The second is that the first victims of these policies are, again, the migrants themselves, who are deprived of the right to access the protections established by international conventions. Restrictive policies are the first cause of irregular immigration. They make smugglers more professional; and more professional means pushing them to acquire new skills to overcome the obstacles erected by the introduction of new measures (Triandafyllidou and Maroukis, 2012). When the risk of being 137

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intercepted by the police grows, smugglers adopt new operational protocols to preserve their safety, often increasing the danger for migrants who rely on their services. Furthermore, becoming more professional also means opening new routes by land or sea to bypass the authorities. So, establishing agreements with transit and departure countries to block the arrival of migrants contributes to the expansion of the routes managed by smugglers. And, again, greater controls result in higher costs for the services offered to migrants, creating an incentive for new smugglers to enter the irregular immigration business. Finally, migrants’ choices are increasingly limited. The more difficult it is to undertake the migratory journey on their own, the more they are forced to rely on smugglers. Then, the higher the risk of being intercepted by the police, the more power the smugglers have over the migrants. All that said, let us also examine the influence of the production system and neoliberalism leanings on increasing practices of severe labour exploitation.

The post-​Fordism model, market deregulation and labour exploitation The transition from Fordism to Post-​Fordism took place between the 1970s and 1980s. Borrowing its name from the automobile industry founded in Detroit by Henry Ford, this type of production organization had some distinctive aspects. The large manufacturing factory was its driving force. The production process was marked by assembly-​line times. The internal organization was characterized by a plurality of hierarchical levels, within which each worker had to perform certain tasks. For instance, during the 1960s, Italian automotive manufacturer Fiat had 14 hierarchical levels within it, each of which could only take decisions with the consent of the higher level (Revelli, 1995). This organization system was based on the large-​scale production of standardized goods (Gallino, 2000). The goods produced by the factory were mostly for the national market. European governments, through appropriate fiscal policies and public funding, supported national industry to the detriment of foreign companies operating in the same production segment. The high management costs of the Fordist enterprise were offset both by economies of scale and an ever-​expanding consumer market. Industrial workers enjoyed protections, from job security and the potential for adequate wages, up to plausible career prospects (Gallino, 2001b) A full employment trend and a public welfare system allowed a large portion of the population, from the growing middle class to the working class, to support the domestic goods demand (Accornero, 1997). Two opposing forces faced each other: a combative and well-​organized labour movement on the one hand, and national business associations on the other. However, substantial fixed investments in machinery, financial benefits for 138

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large companies and industrial production aimed mostly at the domestic market meant that there was a complementarity between capital and labour. Zygmunt Bauman (2002: 57), describing the Fordist period, stated that: ‘In its heavy stage, capital was as nailed to the ground as the workers it hired’. In essence, these two forces at play needed each other for the Fordist system to persist. Rather than being a mere productive model, it had specific social implications due to its inclusive capacity to guarantee economic development and social cohesion (Trigilia, 2023). The implicit social pact of the Fordist system consisted of keeping wage growth and profit growth together. At the same time, the welfare state operated as a driving force for the redistribution of wealth ‘ensuring a dynamic balance between conflicting interests’ (Marazzi, 1998: 43). It is no coincidence that the emphatic expression Les Trente Glorieuses is often used when referring to the period from the end of the Second World War to the 1970s. The first signs of change appeared in the 1970s. The 1973 oil crisis, following the Arab-​Israeli war, marked a setback in economic expansion in Western European countries. In 1979, the then president of the Federal Reserve Bank (Fed) inaugurated a new monetary policy to increase interest rates in order to counter inflation. Following the neoliberal recipe advocated at the time by Milton Friedman, an economist at the University of Chicago, the president of the Fed considered inflation as a pure monetary phenomenon, free from social implications. The rise in interest rates soon led to a 20 per cent increase in the cost of money. According to some economists, these decisions ratified the end of the Keynesian policies aimed at supporting full employment and domestic consumer demand (Marazzi, 1998). Also in those years, Margaret Thatcher in the UK and Ronald Reagan in the USA introduced a long phase of economic policies centred on the principle according to which the capitalist market would find its own self-​ regulation without the need for policy regulations. Policies focused on austerity in public budgets, the privatization of public services and the liberalization of goods and capital were considered the most suitable measures to counter low growth rates and growing unemployment (Stiglitz, 2002). Thanks to the contribution of new technologies, companies changed their internal organization, moving from the previous hierarchical model to a reticular one (Gallino, 2007). The latter is made up of companies operating on a global scale that fragment the production process by relying on chains of smaller companies located in a variety of countries. Together with the reduction of the internal organizational structure, companies increasingly produced according to the effective demand for goods in the market. In other words, the just-​in-​time production model prevails, which requires companies to intercept consumer demand as soon as possible (Marazzi, 1999). The centre of gravity of the production system shifted from the producer to the consumer. While firms previously planned production on the basis of 139

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their own forecasts, it is now ‘the customer who tells the producer exactly what they must manufacture’ (Gallino, 2000: 18). Structural changes within companies imply a significant reorganization of the workforce. The latter, it is argued, must adapt to the new organization of production. In the context of Southern Europe, in Italy, the progressive deregulation of the labour market began in the 1990s and continued in the following decades. Law 196/​1997 establishes the legitimacy of hired work –​someone can work for one company even if they have been hired by another. In 2001 and 2003, new regulations were approved according to which fixed-​term employment contracts can be repeated without limits. The only condition is that there must be a break of 20 days between one contract and another for the same person (Gallino, 2007). In 2015, the ‘jobs act’ established a dualism between two types of workers. Those who have already been hired for an indefinite period follow a different legal regime from that of new hires. The latter, despite having a permanent contract, can be fired by the company in exchange for financial compensation (Rizza et al, 2023). All in all, the wide range of employment contracts can be divided into the following categories: part-​time contracts, rental contracts (applicable to individuals or groups of workers), para-​subordinate contracts (in the sense that the worker is formally self-​employed but tends to be economically dependent on one company), intermittent work contracts and occasional services. In Italy, according to some calculations, in the mid-​2000s, there were 5 to 6 million flexible workers, while 5 million were employed in the underground economy (Gallino, 2007). Spain has followed a similar path to Italy in terms of labour flexibility and, if anything, the deregulation process was even more accelerated. Since the 1980s, with the socialist prime minister Felipe González in government, several forms of flexibility have been introduced in the labour market. In the early 1990s, 30 per cent of the workforce was employed on fixed-​term contracts (Rizza et al, 2023). From 2011 to 2018, with the leadership of Mariano Rajoy of the Popular Party, worker protections were further reduced. On the one hand, new exceptions were established that prevented companies from signing national contracts with various production sectors, while, on the other, the economic compensation payable by companies that fired workers for discriminatory reasons decreased. Finally, although the government of the socialist Pedro Sánchez ushered in a turnaround, fixed-​term work has risen significantly in recent decades (Santelli, 2022; M. Galliano, 2023).1 From 1987 to 2017, the number of part-​time workers in Spain increased from 620,000 to 2,773,000, while workers with fixed-​term contracts went from 1,224,000 to 4,185,000 (Arrizabalo et al, 2019). Greece, like Spain and Italy, follows the same path of job insecurity. Various legislative interventions followed between the 1990s and 2000s, from the introduction of part-​time work in 1990 to hired work in 2010 (Mattoni and Vogiatzoglou, 2014). 140

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The changes outlined so far have further implications. First, the demand for goods is subject to ups and downs, marked by possible sudden peaks and falls. Businesses must be able to intercept demand when it occurs. If they cannot, they face economic losses. For instance, a shoe or clothing manufacturer, which has inventories, can hardly expect to sell the warehouse stock in the following season because, in the meantime, consumer demand will be focused on new models. Hence the systematic reduction of inventories. Second, companies are subject to constant streamlining, which means reducing the fixed management costs associated with employed personnel and planned short-​term development strategies. The reduction of fixed costs allows companies to deal with international competition. It is worth remembering here, however, that companies are asked to follow self-​contradictory guidelines. On the one hand, they must reduce management costs, and, on the other they must be able, at the appropriate time, to consistently expand their production capacity to intercept market demand just in time. In addition to the reticular model we have mentioned, more concretely, companies have resolved the contradiction they are faced with in three different ways. Depending on the case, they can be alternative or complementary methods. In any case, these answers seek to transfer the entrepreneurial risk deriving from an environment –​the goods market –​ which is uncertain and unpredictable. The first consists of relocating the entire production process, or a part of it, outside the national territory to countries where a cost reduction can be obtained. This concerns the cost of the workforce as well as other expenditure items, such as more advantageous taxation or lower costs deriving from environmental damage related to that type of production. The second method is to outsource the production process. In the past, companies, especially larger ones, tended to internally incorporate most stages of the production process, from the transformation of the raw material to the final product; today, on the contrary, they delegate ever more significant parts of the production process to smaller companies. Finally, the third method is based on making use of a new workforce when needed and then firing it once it is no longer useful. This method gives rise to the need for a wide range of forms of temporary employment. In addition, current production processes are characterized by a further aspect. As noted, the labour market has been segmented since the 1970s (Piore, 1979). Segmentation means the distribution of professional jobs by strata that have low levels of communication with each other. In this regard, imagine a staircase, where on the level of each step there are workers with different expertise and duties: an IT engineer is placed in a segment of the labour market where they are not in competition with other workers, for instance cleaners. In this framework, migrants tend to fill the spaces of the labour market that are unattractive to the local population (Solé and Parella, 2003; Ambrosini, 2005; Lazaridis and Koumandraki, 2007; Trellu, 2021). 141

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In Italy, for example, based on an analysis of employment data collected over the last ten years, 18 per cent of foreign workers are employed in construction, 19 per cent in the hospitality sector and 38 per cent in services, which also includes household and care work. In Spain, in 2018, 34 per cent of regular migrant workers were employed in the agriculture, construction and hospitality sectors (Panichella, 2022; CES, 2019). Due to their socially weaker condition compared with the natives, migrants are willing to do the three D jobs: dirty, dangerous and demanding (Abella et al, 1995). Similar forms of workforce replacement have been recognized for some time in the field of domestic and care work. Some scholars speak of a global care chain (Pedraza, 1991). This expression indicates a structural turnover of the workforce in this sector. On the one hand, women in advanced countries increasingly enter the world of work with full rights, while, on the other hand, this process of female emancipation gives rise to a demand for new jobs in the domestic and care fields, which are filled by migrants (usually women). Replacement of the workforce can be detected in various occupational fields in European countries. Here it is important to underline that the segmentation of the labour market essentially concerns the workers and not companies. For the latter, exactly the opposite is true. Firms are characterized by a process of functional interdependence between two very different entrepreneurial typologies. Firms that invest in personnel training and technological innovation find themselves increasingly interacting with labour-​intensive firms, that is, firms that systematically resort to an intensive use of the workforce thanks to which they are able to maintain their production position on a national and international scale. A few examples of this are some established shoe and sportswear brands. These companies employ teams of researchers and specialized technicians to create new prototypes to launch on the market, such as sports shoes that give better performances for speed or long-​distance running. Once subjected to checks, the new model is sent to production, relying on companies in developing countries where the cost of labour is lower than in the country where the model was designed. Other similar cases concern, for example, the creation of bags by renowned global brands. Here too, once the new model has been designed, its production is delegated to labour-​intensive companies. An example is the production of bags in Chinese workshops between Florence and Prato. The Chinese subcontractors receive a modest amount of euros to assemble the material supplied by the client-​brand company, while the final sale price in the fashionable streets of the major Italian cities, from Via Montenapoleone in Milan to Via Tornabuoni in Florence, was around €800. A further example of functional interdependence between companies with highly qualified personnel and labour-​intensive ones can be found in the context of an emerging sector such as artificial intelligence. Qualified personnel are needed to develop computer programs based on complex 142

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algorithms, after which a considerable amount of information must be carefully entered in order to train the AI program and enable it to self-​learn. To this end, there are data taggers, a true example of the Fordist workers of the past. In China, these workers spend many hours a day in confined spaces selecting information based on pre-​established operational protocols and manually assigning labels to the analysed material (Pieranni, 2020). Functional interdependence between firms with very different types of worker mainly occurs through chains of contracts and subcontracts. These chains allow larger companies to engage smaller companies to carry out part of the production process. This method is employed in several economic sectors (Sassen-​Koob, 1991; Castells and Portes, 1991). Generally speaking, the more the chain of economic actors that make up the same production line is extended, the more we can expect the workforce at the far end of the chain to be subjected to serious forms of exploitation. Other examples of exploitation are foreign workers hired by temporary employment agencies in Greece to work in the tourism sector or carry out care work (Maroukis, 2016). In Italy, as recent judiciary proceedings have revealed, Bengali and Eastern European workers were employed by subcontractors in the maintenance of shipyards in some Italian ports (A. Galliano, 2023). There has also been the accusation of illegal hiring and labour exploitation against the management of the Italian branch of two well-​ known international logistics giants. These big companies, relying on a few thousand fictitious cooperatives, subcontracted the driving service without paying the social security costs of workers (Serra, 2023). Also in Italy was the case of a book printer, a national leader in the sector, whose managers were involved in judicial proceedings in 2021 for trafficking migrants for labour exploitation. The smaller companies, managed by Pakistani owners, employed Pakistani workers in conditions similar to slavery to provide the leading company with the book packaging service (Lavorgna, 2022). Returning more specifically to the areas covered in Chapter 4, the institutional mechanisms that facilitate labour exploitation in agriculture can effectively appear to be legal. In this case, agencies or cooperatives, through contracts, lend their workforce to agricultural enterprises for seasonal harvesting (Carchedi, 2018b). Here, unlike the illegal employment of workers through gangmasters, these are work services that formally comply with the criteria established by law. However, since the contract awarded to the cooperative provides for too small profit margins, it appears the only way to extract additional value is by not respecting the labour contract of the workers. Another mechanism –​which in this case applies to all economic sectors –​ is double-​reduction auctions. The auctions are organized in these terms: the entity requesting the service announces an auction by setting both a base price and execution times to carry out the requested work. Having accepted 143

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the proposals of the various proponents, the entity shortly thereafter opens a second auction that starts from the lowest price and the shortest times offered in the first auction. Thus, the enterprise that wins the auction will have to further reduce the cost and execution times. The use of irregular but apparently legal work in agriculture allows producers to reduce the cost of labour by at least 40 per cent (Franciosi, 2022). In this regard, we report the testimony of a Chianti wine producer from Tuscany (Carchedi, 2018b: 197): The bottles of wine we sell cost us around 6 euros each and we have to resell them at least double the price to meet the contractual wages, while our direct competitors sell a bottle for 7–​8 euros each, how is that possible? The land is the same, the production procedures are almost the same, as well as the commercial strategies. These costs are only possible by paying the workers half and even a third of the expected sum, that is 4–​5 euros per hour, obviously without social security contributions … Or paying them even less, even 3 euros per hour, when they are teams which arrive directly from abroad through companies specialized in this new business. The agricultural production sector is characterized by oligopoly positions that benefit both product purchasing centres and large-​scale commercial distribution (Gallino, 2000). The asymmetry between agricultural producer and commercial distributor becomes even more relevant when the purchasing centres in turn create their own brands through which they expand control of the production chain, from the purchase to the commercial distribution of the products (Fanizza, 2020). In short, market modalities and institutional mechanisms exert strong pressure on entrepreneurs to underpay and exploit their workforce. The same applies to Chinese entrepreneurs involved in clothing production. There is great pressure within these firms to produce at very low prices. In the area between Florence and Prato, in Tuscany, where there are a few thousand Chinese companies involved in fast fashion production, the wholesale price of a women’s skirt is €5, while a coat ranges from €25 to €30. In turn, retailers will be able to resell the skirt for €20 to €25, and the coat for €70 to €80, still an attractive price for the average consumer (Becucci, 2017). Over time, this area has become a real hub for the production of low-​cost clothing for buyers from central and northern Italy as well as from various European countries. Labour exploitation goes hand in hand with the expansion of the ‘informal economy’, a term used to refer to economic activities with two characteristics: they are not involved in criminal profits, for instance from drug trafficking, and their transactions are not recorded, thereby escaping institutional control (Castells and Portes, 1991). The informal economy 144

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accounts for a considerable share of the national wealth of Southern European countries. According to some estimates, it accounts for 30 to 45 per cent of the gross national product in Greece, about 25 per cent in Spain, while, in Italy, the most recent estimates are around 10.5 per cent (Stobart, 2010; Lazaridis and Koumandraki, 2007; ISTAT, 2022). The formal economy is closely related to the informal one. These two economic segments are increasingly intertwined. The serious economic exploitation to which migrants are subjected is part of the general trend towards precariousness in the world of work. An alternative interpretation considers that the growth of the informal economy and the precariousness of work are necessary solutions to overcome institutional rigidities no longer in line with the needs of companies operating in the global scenario (Castells and Portes, 1991; Maroukis et al, 2011). Yet, according to Karl Polanyi (1944), the more the market takes over society, the more it destroys ‘the human and material substance of society’ until it jeopardizes democracy (also Beck, 2000; Gallino, 2012). The fragmentation of production processes and the precariousness of work weaken the collective action of workers in defence of their rights. Working flexibility can translate into better professional opportunities, depending on the professional skills and economic and relational resources of each individual, but, for those who lack these resources, precariousness rather translates into an apparent form of independence without any effective autonomy of choice (Ceri, 2003). In this sense, asymmetries between employer and employee lead the latter to accept working conditions of serious exploitation in the absence of viable alternatives (UNODC, 2021). Before moving on to examine the role played by organized crime in both smuggling and trafficking, there is one last aspect worth noting. The Covid-​ 19 pandemic has made many European citizens experience first-​hand how important state aid and public health systems are in times of acute social crisis. Despite this, we fear we are not wrong in saying that the neoliberal belief that personal success and failure must be traced back to exclusive individual responsibilities persists in collective social representations. In other words, if an individual has been successful in life, the merit can only lie with them. Similarly, if a person finds themselves in conditions of social discomfort and vulnerability, the fault must lie with them. Within this cultural background, how entrepreneurs perceive the vocation of doing business has probably changed too. Not very long ago, there were examples of entrepreneurs paying attention to the social implications of their business. These included Adriano Olivetti, in Italy, who manufactured typewriters. When his company was in crisis in the 1950s, he was advised to lay off 500 workers and reduce production. Instead, Olivetti fired many senior executives, hired 700 new salesmen and lowered the prices of the machines, ushering in a new phase of development for the company. Beyond the hagiography, Olivetti considered 145

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the dismissal of workers as an extreme choice which had to be opposed in every possible way (Gallino, 2001a, 2001b). Today’s way of doing business seems to be very different. To account for this, we quote a certain Albert J. Dunlop, a well-​known dépeceur (head cutter), namely one who buys companies on the stock exchange in order to break them up and sell the most valuable parts to the highest bidder: ‘The company belongs to the people who invest in it, not to the employees, suppliers, or even the place where it is located’ (Bauman, 1999: 9). If this is the prevailing attitude in the business world, there is continuity between those who operate according to the ‘principles’ just mentioned and those who subject workers to serious forms of exploitation. The former and the latter are united by considering the workforce a mere commodity, to be discarded as soon as it is no longer needed. The former implement entrepreneurial choices without transgressing the laws in force, while the latter, on the contrary, contravene them. However, both feel entitled, by the current cultural climate, to fire workers or heavily exploit them. This cultural legitimation gives rise, as testified by the interviews conducted with migrants employed in the Chinese fast-​fashion firms in Prato, to the alternative, posed to those who seek work: “if you accept these conditions, fine, otherwise nothing to do”. But the same can be said for agricultural producers who hire irregular workers and subject them to serious forms of exploitation.

Transnational organized crime The acceleration of the exchange of goods and capital favoured by the globalization process and technological evolution has gone hand in hand with the expansion of illicit markets. Drugs, weapons and human beings represent the most profitable criminal markets for organized crime (Palmisano, 2010). In the mid-​1990s, migrant trafficking, including a whole series of services, from transport to the placement of victims in the new country up to their exploitation, was worth between $5 billion and $7 billion per year worldwide (IOM, 1994). After about two decades, the International Labour Organization estimated worldwide profits from sexual and labour exploitation of $99 billion a year, of which $46.9 billion was in developed countries (ILO, 2014). Against this background, organized crime has become increasingly transnational. It is not only that a criminal organization founded in a certain country establishes criminal branches in other countries. For instance, as regards Italian mafias, the ’Ndrangheta has long since expanded its range of action into Germany and Australia, while the Sicilian Cosa Nostra has maintained close relations with La Cosa Nostra in the USA since the first decades of the last century (Petacco, 1983; Vigna, 2001; Lupo, 2008). Rather, when referring to transnational crime, we mean that different 146

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organizations, such as Italian mafias and criminal associations of other countries, establish mutually beneficial agreements through which they can manage illicit markets on a global scale. Collaboration between criminal players in different countries creates multifunctional operational hubs, in the sense that the same relational network can serve several purposes, such as international drug trafficking and the laundering of ill-​gotten profits. The global growth of economic transactions –​the butterfly’s wing beat whose effects have repercussions on the other side of the world –​is accompanied by a parallel movement of illicit transactions, the ‘dark’ side of globalization. In this sense, the process of the internationalization of crime has taken on forms and intensities that were not easily foreseeable until a few decades ago. In view of all this, the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime signed in Palermo in 2000 reflects the changes that have taken place in the world of crime (UN, 2000a). Faced with crime that has expanded its range well beyond national borders, states need to have more effective tools at their disposal to combat it. The transnational characteristics of organized crime make judicial cooperation based on bilateral agreements between states less appropriate than in the past. In this sense, the most effective way is to give national law enforcement agencies operational tools capable of countering criminal organizations active in the global scenario. For law enforcement agencies to be effective, they must contextually operate in several countries, following the entire network on which the transnational criminal group relies. Furthermore, the UN Convention provides a common legal framework for states to prevent criminal organizations from taking advantage of legislative gaps in one or more countries in which they operate. The definition of a transnational crime group adopted by the Convention is very broad and includes a variety of organizational forms, from hierarchical to reticular (UN, 2000a). A transnational criminal group commits crimes that have consequences for at least two states. So, these are crimes that, from the outset, can be committed in more than one country, such as international drug trafficking, or crimes that, although perpetrated in a single country, nevertheless have consequences for others. An example is the counterfeiting of goods whose production is entirely carried out within national borders but whose effects are felt in other countries because the goods are sold on foreign markets through legal commercial distribution channels. Two protocols are associated with the Convention, one dedicated to smuggling, the other to migrant trafficking (UN, 2000b, 2000c). The first protocol repeatedly recalls the need to respect the human rights of migrants. Smuggling is sanctioned, but, at the same time, it is stated that migrants cannot be held responsible for this activity (UN, 2000b). Furthermore, the infliction of inhuman and degrading treatment on migrants by smugglers is an aggravating circumstance. Moreover, if a signatory state adopts measures to combat smuggling by sea, it is also required to ensure the on-​board 147

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safety of migrants and their humane treatment (UN, 2000b). Another important aspect concerns the fact that all the measures put in place to combat smuggling cannot conflict with the 1951 Geneva Convention and the related 1967 Protocol, both concerning protections granted to refugees (UN, 2000b). The human trafficking protocol establishes, among other things, that the victim’s consent to the exploitative practices to which they are subjected is considered irrelevant to the crime perpetrated (UN 2000c). Each signatory state is required to provide victims with protection, assistance and forms of compensation for the damage suffered (UN, 2000c). Finally, the protocols make room for prevention, asking the signatory states to launch information campaigns on the dangers associated with smuggling and trafficking and, above all, to address the social and economic reasons that drive many migrants to leave their country. As of April 2023, almost all countries in the world (189) have ratified the Convention and the two UN protocols (UN, 2023b). However, this does not mean that smuggling and trafficking have decreased. As we have attempted to show throughout this book, these phenomena have increased substantially in recent decades. Twenty years have passed since the Convention and the protocols entered into force in 2003. Little or not enough has been done to overcome the social and economic factors that drive several hundred thousand people each year to leave their country, legally or otherwise, in search of a better future abroad. In the last 50 years, migrants have increased. In 1970, there were 84,460,125 corresponding to 2.3 per cent of the world’s population. In 2019, they numbered 271,642,105 –​3.5 per cent of the world’s population (IOM, 2022). Indeed, for any legal instrument to be effective, it must be supported by political will. As we saw in Chapter 3, the developing countries from which citizens emigrate have divergent interests with respect to European countries, the places the migrants aim to reach. For the former countries, emigration has some political and social advantages. It is a way to reduce tensions and social discontent that could put political leaderships that sometimes enjoy little democratic legitimacy at risk. In addition, the remittances sent by migrants to their families at home constitute a considerable aid to national development. In this regard, in 2017, the remittances from developed to developing countries totalled $466 billion, while development aid that year amounted to $146 billion (Cesareo, 2019). Further problems exist, both in departure and reception countries. Regarding the former, once the transnational smuggling and trafficking networks are consolidated, the possibility of eradicating them depends on judicial cooperation between states. To achieve this, political will is needed not only on the part of the receiving states but also of the sending ones. Smugglers and traffickers often enjoy political protection in the departure countries or rely on corrupt officials. In addition, some transit areas between 148

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sub-​Saharan countries and North Africa function as hubs and derive significant economic benefits from irregular immigration involving entire local communities. Without offering a legal alternative, it will be difficult to eradicate smuggling in these communities. As said, rules in Southern European countries establishing a rigid link between the residence permit and employment contract do not provide institutional mechanisms for migrants to avoid illegality. These laws contribute to the creation of social minority conditions for migrants over time. The severe labour exploitation to which they are subjected is favoured by their condition of social vulnerability.

Conclusions Just as this book was nearing completion, another tragedy at sea occurred. On 26 February 2023, a boat of 180 people that had departed from Izmir in Turkey ran aground a hundred metres from the shore near the Calabrian town of Steccato di Cutro, in the province of Crotone. The high sea waves that slammed into the vessel quickly tore it to pieces, killing 65 adults and 30 children, while the survivors, mostly Afghan, Iranian, Pakistani, Somali and Palestinian, were hosted in the nearest reception centre (Del Porto, 2023). The survivors said that, having seen the nearby mainland, they thought they were safe; instead, many of them died due to the rough sea and the lack of rescue. A fisherman, among the first to rush to the beach, said: “You could see corpses everywhere. Along the beach where the boat broke up, there were dozens of bodies one after another. And many were children, boys. A terrible scene” (Candito, 2023). Twenty-​three hours before the sinking, the boat had been reported by Frontex to the Italian authorities. A patrol boat of the Italian Finance Police set off in search, but had to return to port after a few hours due to the rough sea. Many have wondered why the Italian coastguard, responsible for sea rescue and with boats capable of dealing with difficult sea conditions, did not immediately intervene. Hence the accusations against the right-​wing government in office since September 2022 of not having done enough to avoid such a tragedy (Ziniti, 2023a). A month after the event, some journalistic investigations highlighted that, since 2019, in the absence of specific indications, the Finance Police, which has police and control duties, is involved first rather than the coastguard, which is in charge of rescue (Ziniti, 2023b). This tragic event brings to mind other shipwrecks. A boat that left the Albanian coast with 120 people on board was rammed on 28 March 1997 by an Italian navy corvette near the Otranto canal, in Apulia. There were 34 survivors. It was probably an unwanted clash on the part of the navy, even if the rules of engagement decided by the Italian government of the time clearly indicated that boats coming from Albania and carrying irregular migrants had to be stopped and taken back to the departure harbors (Leogrande, 2011). 149

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Another shipwreck occurred on 6 May 2011 near the Libyan coast, where 650 people died. On 3 October 2013, a boat was wrecked in the vicinity of the Isola dei Conigli, a verdant islet close to the main island of Lampedusa. Of the 368 victims, 360 were from Eritrea, and eight were from Ethiopia. Less than a week later, on the night of 11 October, another shipwreck occurred in Lampedusa in which 250 people died (Leogrande, 2022). According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR, 2023), from 2015 to 2022, 22,858 people died or went missing at sea trying to reach Southern Europe. Shipwrecks give the Mediterranean a bad record. It has, for years, become a sea of death for tens of thousands of people. Yet, it seems that we have learned nothing from all this, except to witness confirmation of ‘the globalization of indifference’, the effective expression used by Pope Francis in 2018 at a meeting with ambassadors at the Vatican State to encourage them (and us) to change our attitude in the face of the tragedies that affect mankind. So, what can be done? First, it would be necessary to strengthen the humanitarian corridors –​ which today involve only a few thousand people –​for migrants who find themselves in North African countries (Genoviva, 2023). They are segregated in detention centres or are in any case ‘trapped’ in the sense that they have no viable alternative but to leave for Europe. Once they have crossed the Sahara and arrived in the countries of North Africa, going back would prove to be as risky as the journey already made. They then find they can no longer stay in the current country because racism and violence against them has grown. Many migrants interviewed during the research reported that “Libyans are racists. They are Muslims like us, but they hate Africans”. In addition, finally, Tunisian president Kais Saied claimed in February 2023 that sub-​Saharan migrants constitute a threat to the country (Mugombozi, 2023; Martinelli, 2023a, 2023b). Expanding the humanitarian corridors means that the receiving European states would take charge of the care of these people until, once properly trained, they find work in the national job market. Migrants already residing in Southern European countries need access to political rights, detaching the right to vote from an entitlement of citizenship as is the case –​although limited to local political elections –​for foreign resident EU citizens in a country of the EU. In Spain, Italy and Greece, there are over eight million non-​EU foreigners legally present, most of whom have a long-​term residence permit acquired after years of being in the country.2 In the history of European countries, political rights have preceded social ones. Between the 19th and 20th centuries, the popular classes gained political rights, while social rights were fully recognized after the Second World War with the institution of welfare systems (Marshall, 2002). By not following this sequence, migrants have acquired the latter, while the former are yet to come. Social rights, as Maurizio Ambrosini (2005) points out, are 150

In Search of Explanations

intrinsically weak. Not only because they do not allow the full exercise of citizenship but because, depending on the political majority in government, they can be revised and new limitations imposed so that those who held them until yesterday could be deprived of them tomorrow. Granting political rights to migrants who have been resident in Southern European countries for five years would mean recognizing the full legitimacy of citizenship to these people and not, as is the case now, making the right to vote conditional on the acquisition of citizenship, which has difficult requirements to meet because the applicant must have had regular and continuous presence in the host country for ten years. Separating citizenship from political rights would also make it possible to overcome the obstacles set up by countries –​China, among others –​that do not allow their citizens to acquire dual citizenship. Above all, these measures would establish the premise for migrants living in Southern European countries to undertake a path of social emancipation towards greater awareness of their rights, which are denied every time one of them is forced or induced to accept heavy forms of exploitation. All this, in perspective, would mitigate the racist and discriminatory impulses carried forward by the openly anti-​migrant parties present within each European country. Once this change has been made, perhaps these parties too would be induced to review their positions. Today, on the contrary, it is easy to hold an extremist position towards migrants, who do not have their own public voice. Feeding identity anxieties and fears by leveraging the xenophobic impulses of the electorate seems to be productive from a political point of view, but takes steps away from a more just society. Accepting that people are subjected to labour and sexual exploitation builds a border between ‘us’ and ‘them’, between those who live privileged lives compared with those who are in a hard, subordinate position. It also means the privileged renouncing their humanity, because remaining indifferent to the suffering of another human being inevitably means renouncing one’s humanity. In this sense, any advance in terms of rights cannot be limited to one party, but, on the contrary, must involve the entire community, regardless of the geographic origin of the people concerned. It must also be recognized that the systems implemented so far to discover and reduce the phenomenon of labour and sexual exploitation have not brought appreciable results. Migration is one of several challenges that Europe must face. Whether national governments and European institutions are capable of implementing choices respecting human rights in line with the cultural and ideal heritage of Europe remains to be seen.

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Appendix List of people interviewed (Italy, Spain and Greece) Non-migrants 1. Prosecutor, District Anti-​Mafia Directorate, Palermo, 20 September 2020. 2. Prosecutor, District Anti-​Mafia Directorate, Palermo, 20 September 2020. 3. Police officer, Palermo, 30 September 2020. 4. Police officer, Palermo, 30 September 2020. 5. Prosecutor, District Anti-​Mafia Directorate, Catania, 10 May 2022. 6. Prosecutor, District Anti-​Mafia Directorate, Catania, 23 August 2022. 7. Prosecutor, District Anti-​Mafia Directorate, Naples, 11 June 2020. 8. Prosecutor, District Anti-​Mafia Directorate, Naples, 11 June 2020. 9. Prosecutor, District Anti-​Mafia Directorate, Florence, 10 November 2021. 10. Prosecutor, District Anti-​Mafia Directorate, Florence, 10 November 2021. 11. Prosecutor, Prato, 12 March 2019. 12. President of asylum seeker committee, Florence, 10 December 2019. 13. Police officer (task force against sexual exploitation), Florence, 18 November 2021. 14. Police officer (task force against sexual exploitation), Florence, 18 November 2021. 15. Police officer (task force against sexual exploitation), Florence, 18 November 2021. 16. Prosecutor, District Anti-​Mafia Directorate, Turin, 14 April 2019. 17. Prosecutor, District Anti-​Mafia Directorate, Milan, 22 July 2021. 18. Judge, member of the local asylum seekers committee, Milan, 27 July 2021. 19. Police officer, Milan, 24 July 2021. 20. Representative of NGO that hosts trafficked Nigerian women, Florence, 18 June 2019. 21. Representative of NGO that hosts trafficked Nigerian women, Florence, 20 November 2019. 22. Representative of NGO that hosts asylum seekers, Prato, 15 June 2019. 23. Representative of NGO that hosts asylum seekers, Prato, 20 June 2019. 24. Representative of NGO that hosts asylum seekers, Prato, 25 June 2019. 152

Appendix

25. Representative of NGO that hosts trafficked Nigerian women, Prato, 15 July 2019. 26. Journalist of Famiglia Cristina (Italian weekly newspaper), 9 December 2021. 27. Client of sex workers, Florence, 30 November 2018. 28. Representative of NGO that hosts trafficked Nigerian women, Milan, 15 July 2021. 29. Representative of NGO involved in search-​and-​rescue operations at sea, Palermo, 22 September 2020. 30. Representative of NGO involved in search-​and-​rescue operations at sea, Palermo, 22 September 2020. 31. Member of the Guardia Civil, Madrid, 10 November 2021. 32. Representative of Hellenic unit against trafficking (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Athens, 20 December 2022. 33. Representative of Hellenic unit against trafficking (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Athens, 20 December 2022. 34. Representative of Hellenic unit against trafficking (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Athens, 20 December 2022. 35. Member of asylum seeker committee, Seville, 22 December 2022. 36. Member of NGO Foundation Don Bosco, Granada, 24 November 2021. 37. Member of NGO Foundation Don Bosco, Granada, 24 November 2021. 38. Member of NGO Foundation Don Bosco, Granada, 24 November 2021 39. Member of NGO Foundation Don Bosco, Seville, 26 November 2021. 40. Member of NGO, Lesvos, 16 June 2022. 41. Member of NGO, Athens, 22 June 2022.

Migrants 42. Nigeria, male, 25 years old, Prato (Tuscany), 20 April 2019. 43. Cameroon, male, 33 years old, Carlopoli (Calabria), 27 June 2019. 44. Pakistan, male, 28 years old, Badolato (Calabria), 14 August 2017. 45. Gambia, male, 26 years old, Riace (Calabria), 9 August 2019. 46. Somalia, male, 27 years old, Badolato (Calabria), 12 August 2017. 47. Senegal, male, 19 years old, Badolato (Calabria), 14 August 2017. 48. Nigeria, male, 19 years old, Monasterace (Calabria), 10 August 2017. 49. Nigeria, male, 20 years old, Monasterace (Calabria), 10 August 2017. 50. Gambia, male 19 years old, Monasterace (Calabria), 3 August 2017. 51. Nigeria, male, 19 years old, Prato (Tuscany), 8 July 2017. 52. Nigeria, male 20 years old, Prato (Tuscany), 8 July 2017. 53. Nigeria, male, 19 years old, Prato (Tuscany), 8 July 2017. 54. Nigeria, male, 28 years old, Badolato (Calabria), 7 August 2017. 55. Cameroon, female, 29 years old, Riace (Calabria), 13 August 2017. 56. Benin, male, 34 years old, Prato (Tuscany), 25 April 2019. 153

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57. Ivory Coast, male, 29 years old, Carlopoli (Calabria), 24 June 2019. 58. Ivory Coast, male, 24 years old, Prato (Calabria), 15 June 2019. 59. Ivory Coast, male, 31 years old, Carlopoli (Calabria), 26 June 2019. 60. Gambia, male, 29 years old, Carlopoli (Calabria), 18 June 2019. 61. Liberia, male, 26 years old, Prato (Tuscany), 19 July 2017. 62. Mali, male, 28 years old, Prato (Tuscany), 19 July 2017. 63. Guinea, male, 32 years old, Prato (Tuscany), 10 July 2019. 64. Gambia, male, 23 years old, Florence, 15 June 2022. 65. Gambia, male, 28 years old, Florence, 10 August 2017. 66. Pakistan, male, 22 years old, Prato (Tuscany), 18 July 2022. 67. Afghanistan, male, 24 years old, Prato (Tuscany), 10 July 2022. 68. Pakistan, male, 25 years old, Prato (Tuscany), 3 July 2022. 69. Pakistan, male, 25 years old, Prato (Tuscany), 5 July 2022. 70. Pakistan, male, 26 years old, Florence, 8 July 2022. 71. Bangladesh, male, 24 years old, Prato (Tuscany), 20 July 2022. 72. Pakistan, male, 27 years old, Florence, 22 July 2022. 73. Pakistan, male, 29 years old, Florence, 24 July 2022. 74. Gambia, male, 17 years old, Granada, 24 November 2021. 75. Guinea, 28 years old, Sevilla, 3 November 2021. 76. Mali, male, 27 years old, Malaga, 20 November 2021. 77. Iran, male, 32 years old, Malaga, 19 November 2021. 78. Iran, male, 27 years old, Malaga, 19 November 2021. 79. Pakistan, male, 26 years old, Lesvos, 20 June 2022. 80. Afghanistan, male, 22 years old, Lesvos, 20 June 2022. 81. Somalia, male, 29 years old, Athens, 24 June 2022. 82. Sudan, male, 26 years old, Athens, 24 June 2022. 83. Pakistan, male, 28 years old, Athens, 26 June 2022.

154

Notes Chapter 3 1

2

3

The Economic Community of West African States brings together 15 countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Ivory Coast, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-​Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. The new centre-​left wing government officially allowed NGO ships to disembark in Italian harbours. However, according to some interviews held in person in Sicily with some NGO personnel active in rescuing migrants, people were stopped in the harbours and had been there for months waiting for the Italian coastguard’s permission to take to the sea (Appendix 29 and 30). This information also comes from a survey by MEDU (2017). The reason why the migrant did not pay could be related to the smugglers’ need to have room for other migrants at their worksite or, alternatively, an increase in departures could be used as a political pressure on Southern European governments.

Chapter 5 1

2

On 29 May 2023, the socialist government resigned and called new political elections for August. The calculation was made considering the most up-​to-​date sources from national institute sites: there were 3,830,917 non-​EU foreigners in Spain on 1 January 2022 (citizens of North America were excluded) (INE, 2022). In Italy, at the end of December 2021, there were 3,561,540 (IDOS, 2022). In Greece, at the end of January 2022, there were 686,519 non-​EU citizens regularly residing in the country (HR, 2022).

155

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185

Index References to figures appear in italic type; those in bold type refer to tables.

A Achilli, Luigi  28 Afghanistan  migrants from  22, 56, 75 as a route  77, 78, 79 smugglers from  15 Africa  African migrants  15 and anthropological research  16–​17 and Covid-​19  42, 52 free movement in  41 migrants travelling to Italy  53 routes to North Africa for Italy  54 Sahara routes to Libya  63–​71 Agadez, Niger  3 agency  18, 19, 38, 97, 118 agricultural work  44, 62, 65, 119–​26, 143, 144 number of workers in Greece  125–​6 number of workers in Italy  119 number of workers in Spain  123–​4 see also labour exploitation AI data tagging work  142–​3 Albania  2, 75 agricultural workers  125 Albanian traffickers  129 women from  98, 110 Albini, Joseph  23 Algeria  3, 33, 43, 53, 55, 83 route to Spanish coast  42–​8 women from  98 Al Hoceima  43 Almería  43, 124 amnesties/​regularizations  2, 131–​2 Andalusia  124 animistic beliefs  107 anthropological research  16–​17 Arab Springs  49, 137 Argos  126 Arraigo  135–​6 Asia, migrants from  75, 81, 88, 98, 125–​6 asylum seekers  4, 5, 36, 45, 57, 132 centres for  49

lengthy legal process  79–​80 opposition to hosting  72 Austria  72 automobile industry  138 B Balearic Islands and Spanish peninsula  33, 34, 35, 42 migrants landing in  43, 43 Balkan route  20, 46, 75, 80 Bangladesh  agricultural workers from  125 migrants from  14, 52, 57, 79 Barnes, J.A.  17 Bauman, Zygmunt  139 Belgium  131 Bel Younes wood  46 Berlusconi, Silvio  48 Block, Alan  25 blue card  133–​4 boats  4, 36–​7, 43, 50, 81 and NGO rescue operations  51 Bolivia  98 book packaging services  143 border walls and fences  45, 55, 73, 75 Borgo Mezzanone  120–​1 Bosnia  46, 77, 97 Braudel, Fernand  1 Brazil  2, 113 forced agricultural labour  87 women from  98, 115 brothels  92, 93, 94, 96, 109, 114–​15 Bulgaria  75 agricultural workers from  120, 121 migrant workers from  125–​6 women from  98, 111 Burkina Faso  52, 53, 57 C Cádiz  43 Calabria  119–​20 Calderone, Antonino  27

186

INDEX

Cambodian sex market  87 Cameroon  77 Camorra  116 Campania  120 Canary Islands  33, 34, 35 Atlantic Ocean route to the  35–​42 Fuerteventura arrival points  36 numbers and nationalities of arrivals  39 Cape Verde, departure points in  36 cars and trucks  43, 44, 65, 78 Casablanca  46 Castles, Stephen  1 Central African Republic  53 Ceuta and Melilla  14, 33, 35, 43, 46 border fences  45 China  2, 15 Chinese migrants to Italy  23 Chinese textile workers  126–​9, 142, 144 criminal organizations  112–​13 hawal payment in  22 sex workers from  98 Ciancimino, Vito  27 citizenship  150–​1 climate change, effects of  41 closed ports policy  51 clothing production  118, 119, 126–​9, 144 Clyde Mitchell, J.  17–​18 coastguards  38, 41, 45 coercion  85, 94, 107, 117, 122 Coleman, James  13, 105 Collyer, Michael  14 Colombia  2, 113, 115 colonialism  16–​17 colonial ties  98, 113 Italian payments to Libya  48 compatriot network  13, 14, 15, 128 and sex work  104, 105 Congo  77 consent  67, 113, 127, 138, 148 construction work  55, 60, 65, 117, 123, 142 corruption  25, 27, 45, 57, 63, 68, 148 of professionals  122 Cosa Nostra  27, 116–​17, 146 Costa Rica  98 Covid-​19  42, 132, 134, 145 impact on smuggling  51–​2 Cressey, Donald  24, 25 Croatia  46, 75, 77 cultural patterns/​ties  15, 16, 101–​3 Czech Republic  72 D Dakar departure points  36 dangers of travel  4, 14 dangerous routes  19 in North African  63 data tagging work  142–​3 debt bondage  86, 87, 101, 104 travel debt  107–​8, 112, 114, 119, 123

dependency on exploiters  19, 129, 130 deregulation  140 displacement of sex workers  99 documentation  13, 74, 91, 111, 112, 132, 135 blue card  133–​4 counterfeit documents  30, 80 entry visas  133, 134 fictitious contracts  118–​19, 120, 122, 127 passport seizure  121, 125 residence permits  91, 92, 134 seizure of  85 tourist visas  114, 115 see also employment domestic and care services  118 Dominican Republic  113 double-​reduction auctions  143–​4 Draghi, Mario  51 drug trafficking  22, 27, 44, 106, 116, 146, 147 Dunlop, Albert J.  146 E Eastern European countries  75 criminal organizations in  109–​11 women in sex work  97–​8 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)  41, 63 economic issues  12, 139 aid received by host countries  40 aid to Libya  48 benefits of irregular migration  69, 82, 149 informal economies  2, 145 just-​in-​time production  139, 141 post-​Fordism and deregulation  138–​40 remittances  41, 42, 122, 148 education services  136 Egypt  75, 77 departure points in  55 migration to Italy  51–​2 migration to Sardinia  56 migration to Sicily  57 and remittances  41 employment  60, 138, 146 agencies  118, 143 deregulation  23 employment contracts  134–​5, 140 by family  13 labour market changes  140–​4 entry visas  133, 134 environmental damage  141 Erdoğan, President  73, 137 Ergosimo voucher  136 Eritrea  52, 53, 57, 77, 79 escort sex work  95–​6 Ethiopia  77 ethnic ties  15, 16, 101–​3 European Union  85, 88, 124, 126, 137 amnesties/​regularizations  132 asylum hosting plan  72 blue card  133–​4

187

SMUGGLING AND TRAFFICKING OF MIGRANTS IN SOUTHERN EUROPE

border controls  38–​40 and Chinese tourist visas  112 Dublin agreement  80, 132 economic aid to Libya  70 economic aid to Morocco  40 Eurostat  13, 88 EUROSUR  39 and forced labour estimates  87 Frontex  4, 33, 38, 72–​4, 75 and Libya  50–​1 migration policies  46, 72, 132 quota systems  49–​50, 72 and Romania  124 Seahorse operation  41 seasonal workers  126 and Senegal  40–​1, 46 trafficking from E.Europe  111, 121 and Turkey agreements  73–​4, 137 Evros river  73–​4, 77 F factory organization  138–​9 families  complicit in sex work  103–​4 family reunification  80, 127 family ties  13–​14, 16, 17, 29 journeys planned by family  14 small family farms  118 Fezzan  70 finance  from family/​friends  13 financial flows  21 guarantor/​cashier  15, 22, 79 monetary policy  139 mutual aid  109 fishing  42, 81 fixed-​term contracts  134, 140 food and shelter  2, 15 forced criminality  84, 86 forced marriage  84, 86 forced returns  41, 75 to Turkey from Greece  73 Ford, Henry/​post-​Fordism  138–​40 France  72, 131 free movement  41, 63 Friedman, Milton  139 friendship ties  105, 109 Frontex  4, 33, 72–​4, 75 coastal surveillance and patrolling  38 fruit and vegetable production  124 citrus harvest  119–​20, 126 strawberry harvest  125 tomato harvesting  120, 121 Fujian, China  15, 23 FYROM  75 G Gadaffi, Colonel  49, 67–​8, 69, 82 Gambia  34, 41, 52, 77

gangmasters  118, 120, 121, 122, 130, 143 Geneva Convention 1951  40, 148 Georgia  2 Germany  20, 72 and blue card system  134 Ghana  36, 41, 52 globalization  131, 139, 146, 147 Government of National Accord (GNA)  68 government policies and migration  see policies, migration Greece  16, 81, 102, 105, 137 agricultural exploitation  125–​6 amnesties/​regularizations  2, 131, 136 border with Turkey  73 eastern Mediterranean migrant route  75–​9 economy in  2 foreign populations  1–​2 foreign sex workers  98 irregular migrants arriving in  71–​5 labour force changes  140 migrant landings in  72 migrants from Asian countries  76 migrants to Greek islands  79 number apprehended at land border  74 number of migrants  73, 74 number of sex workers  97 sex work in  93, 95, 96 smuggling organizations  79–​80 trafficking victims in  88, 92 greenhouses  118, 125 guarantor/​cashier  15, 22, 79 Guinea  33, 44, 52, 77 departure points  36 H handbag production  142 hawala payment system  21–​2 health services  136 Herman, Emma  13, 14, 17 Herzegovina  77 hiring and firing culture  146 Honduras  2 Horn of Africa  55, 67, 77 host nations, costs and benefits  12 housing/​living conditions  46, 119–​20, 121, 124, 130 hubs, migrant  3, 30, 39, 66, 69, 79, 82, 147, 149 Huelva  124 humanitarian corridors  150 human rights  33, 40, 71, 72, 137, 147 Hungary  72, 75 I Immigrant Workers and Class Structure in Western Europe  1 imprisonment  58, 60, 63, 68 India  2, 79 forced labour in  87 trafficked agricultural workers  122

188

INDEX

individualism  145 informal economies  2, 145 inspections  123, 124, 136 interception units  38–​9 International Labour Organization (ILO)  85, 86, 146 International Organization for Migration (IOM)  84 Iranian migrants  56, 75, 77, 78, 79 Iraqi migrants  56, 75, 79 Islamic State  49 isolation  121, 129–​30 Israel  55 Istanbul  77 Italo-​American Mafia/​La Costa Nostra (LCN)  23–​4 Italy  81, 105, 137 agreements with Libya  46, 48–​9, 50, 70, 83 agricultural exploitation  119–​23 amnesties/​regularizations  2, 131–​2 Chinese migrants in  23, 128 Chinese sex workers in  112–​13 closed ports policy  51 economy in  2 employment contracts  134–​5 foreign population  1–​2 foreign sex workers  97 labour force changes  140 and mafia organizations  116 migrants arriving in  48–​52 migrants landing in  47, 48 NGO code of behaviour  50 number of sex workers  97 numbers of migrants  49 opposition to hosting  49–​50 organized crime in  146–​7 origin of migrants by country  52 origin of migrants by region  53 routes through Africa to Italy  54–​6 sex work in  92–​3, 110–​11 sponsors in Italy  133 trafficking victims  88, 91 see also Sicilly Ivory Coast  34, 52, 57 J just-​in-​time production  139, 141 K kidnapping  65, 100, 128 kinship ties  105, 109 Kosack, Godula  1 L labour exploitation  6, 65, 85, 117–​19, 129–​30 agricultural work  119–​26 construction work  55, 60, 65, 117, 123, 142

effects of sub-​contracting  143 inspections  123, 124, 126 recruitment  124, 126, 134 segmentation of workforce  141–​2 textile work  126–​9 trafficking for  84 of Western workforces  138–​44 worldwide estimates of victims  86 see also organizational crime labour intensive work  117 labour market changes in the Western world  140–​4 La Cosa Nostra (LCN)  23–​4, 146 Lamberti, Michel  22 Lamour, Catherine  22 Lampedusa  46, 55 land borders  79 land paths  39, 45 laoban  127 La Strada  101 Latin American organizations  113–​14 law enforcement  30 neutralization of  25, 26 left-​wing views of immigration  50 Lemert, Edwin  108 Lesvos, number of migrants in  79 Libya  agreements with Italy  9, 46, 48–​9, 50, 70, 83 blocking of route  51–​2 economy based on migration  69, 82 human rights violations in  137 migrant travel experience in  57–​8, 60–​2 new government  83 organizational crime models  82–​3 routes through  55 routes to  3 Sahara routes to Libya  63–​71 violence in  65, 68 women trafficked from  107 logistics services  143 lover-​boy system  99, 113 M Macedonia  77 mafia-​like organizations  23–​5, 105, 112, 116 Maghnia  43 Maher, Stephanie  16 maitresse  114 Majorca  42 Mali  departure points  36 migrants from  33, 34, 39, 41, 52, 57, 65 route through  53 mamans  106, 107, 108 Mandic, Danilo  16, 20 Manolada area  125 Maroukis, Thanos  15 Marrakech  46

189

SMUGGLING AND TRAFFICKING OF MIGRANTS IN SOUTHERN EUROPE

massage parlours  94, 112, 113 Mauritania, departure points in  36 media  20 men  14, 88 forced labour victims  87 management of prostitutes  111–​12 see also labour exploitation Mesnana  43 Mexican migrants  15 Middle East  75 migrant camps  46, 78 migrant communities  15 migrant detention centres  71 migrant experiences  57–​9, 59–​61, 61–​3 migration, value of  69, 149 benefits of hubs  82, 149 economic aid  40, 48 remittances  41, 42, 122, 148 migration policies in Southern Europe  see policies, migration migration routes  see routes military forces and militia  30, 60, 64, 82 collusion with smugglers  70 EU patrols  38–​9 in Libya  48, 50, 59, 61, 65, 67 mobility of workers  112 modern slavery  129–​30 characteristics of  117–​18 forces behind  131 Moldova  98 money laundering  15 Morocco  2, 14, 33, 34, 41, 81 agreements with Spain  38–​9, 40 conditions in  47 departure points  36 police violence in  46 route to Spanish coast  42–​8 seasonal agricultural workers  124 women from  98 N Nadar  43 National Liberation Army (NLA)  68 neoliberalism  145 Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute  13 networks  13, 16–​17, 17, 25 new technologies  139 New York  Chinese Community in  15 criminal organizations in  25 NGO’s  4, 75, 93, 97, 101, 119, 137 sea rescue operations  50, 51 Niger  65 Nigeria  52, 53, 66, 88 Nigerian sex workers  98, 103–​9 nightclubs  92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 109, 114–​15 Northern Africa, embarkation points in  46 Norwegian community study  17

O oil crisis  139 Olivetti, Andriano  145 organizational crime  hierarchical organization  22–​5, 31 on the Mediterranean routes  80–​3 network model  25–​9, 32, 109–​10 network of individuals  29–​31 organizational crime models  21–​30, 84 and sex market  98–​9 and sex trafficking  104–​17 transnational organized crime  146–​9 organ removal  65, 84, 86 P Pakistan  52, 143 agricultural workers for Spain  126 Pakistani migrants  2, 16, 56, 75, 77, 87 Palestine  75 Palma  42 Paraguay  113 Parsons, Talcott  13 payment methods  15, 21–​2, 66 ‘pay as you go’  79 personal network  13 Philippines, women from  98 piece work  118, 120, 121, 126 Ping, Chen Chui  15 Poland  opposition to hosting  72 Polish agricultural workers  121 Polanyi, Karl  145 police  46, 55, 60, 62, 68, 90–​1, 138 control centres  38 and forced labour estimates  87 killing migrants  40 Moroccan violence and corruption  45 and prostitution  110 violence  45, 57 policies, migration  4, 7, 9, 12, 33, 39–​41, 46 Libyan agreements  46, 48–​9, 50, 70 in Southern Europe  131–​8 Turkey agreements  73, 137 political rights  150–​1 Pope Francis  150 Portugal  103 Prato asylum centre  5 prisons  69, 75 production, large-​scale  138 professional jobs  141 prostitution  92–​3, 97, 108, 109 cultural opposition to  116 different forms of  94–​7 prices charged  113 street prostitution  90 Punjabi agricultural workers  122 Q quota systems  49–​50, 72

190

INDEX

R radar stations  38 Radcliffe-​Brown, Alfred  16 reciprocal obligation  18, 20, 29 recruitment  3 and criminal gangs  23, 28 kidnapping  65, 100, 128 for labour exploitation  124, 126, 134 for sexual exploitation  100–​4, 110, 113, 115 relationships  between migrants and smugglers  6 and social dynamics  17–​18 religious ties  16 relocation of industry  141 remittances  41, 42, 122, 148 remote calling system  133 residence permits  91, 92, 134 Rhodes-​Livingstone Institute  16 rights  human rights  40, 71, 137, 147 political and social rights  150–​1 right-​wing views of immigration  50, 51 rituals  106 Romania  agricultural migrants from  109, 121, 124, 125, 126 women from  90, 93, 98, 102 Roma people  120 Rosarno  120 routes  3, 138 African routes to Italy  53–​6 from Asian countries to Greece  76 Atlantic Ocean route to the Canary Islands  35–​42 eastern Mediterranean to Greece  75–​9 long migratory routes -​changes in  30–​1 Mediterranean route to Italy  52–​7 from Morocco and Algeria to Spanish coast  42–​8 Sahara routes to Libya  63–​71 from West Africa to Canary Islands  37 Russia, women from  98 S Sahara Desert  40, 55, 62 routes to Libya  63–​71 Salt, John  12–​13, 18–​19 Samos  77, 79 Sardinia  55, 56 satellite surveillance  38, 39, 69 Schelling, Thomas  24–​5 sea, immigration by  3, 43, 44, 72, 74, 79, 80 controls against  137 search and rescue operations  50, 51, 63 sea tragedies  51, 149–​50 seasonal agricultural migrants  119, 120, 124, 134, 143

Sea Watch  51 secret cults  105, 116 Senegal  16, 33, 34, 40–​2, 52 agricultural workers for Spain  40 climate change and overfishing  41 departure points  36 Serbia  75 sexual exploitation  6, 63, 65, 114 brothels  92, 93, 94, 96, 109, 114–​15 changes in sex market  97–​100 collaboration with local criminals  114–​17 Eastern European sex workers  109–​11 foreigners displacing locals  97–​8 massage parlours  94, 112, 113 mobility of workers  99 Nigerian sex workers  105–​9 number of sex workers in Southern Europe  96–​7 prostitution  90, 92–​7, 109, 113, 116 recruitment for sexual exploitation  100–​4, 110, 113, 115 sex market laws  92–​3 trafficking for sexual exploitation  84–​92 via websites  98 see also organizational crime shipyards  143 shoe production  142 Sicily  and the mafia  27 number of migrants  55, 56–​7, 119 smugglers in  81 SIVE (satellite surveillance)  38, 46 skilled workers  134 slavery  modern slavery  117–​18, 128–​30 slavery-​like conditions  7, 10, 65, 84, 110, 121, 143 Slovakia  72 Slovenia  as a route  75 women from  97 slums  119, 120 small and medium enterprises (SME’s)  2 smuggling migrants  2, 38 business model of  12, 18–​19 different roles of smugglers  22, 23 individuals as a network  29–​31 reputation and trustworthiness  19 small and local smugglers  81 smugglers or ‘facilitators’  20–​1 smuggling organizations  79–​80, 137 social system of migrant smuggling 14–​18, 20 theoretical frameworks of  11 and trafficking  3, 6–​8 truck-​driver smugglers  65 see also organizational crime social legitimacy  7, 20, 69 soldiers  see military forces and militia

191

SMUGGLING AND TRAFFICKING OF MIGRANTS IN SOUTHERN EUROPE

Somalia  21, 53, 77 Southern European countries  changes in sex market  97–​100 irregular migration to  33 migration policies in  131–​8 number of sex workers in  96–​7 number of trafficked victims  84–​92 and seasonal migrant workers  119 sex market laws in  92–​3 similarities of  1–​2 victims of trafficking  89 see also Greece; Italy; Spain Soviet Union, former countries of  52, 98, 111 Spain  72, 105, 137 agricultural exploitation  123–​5 amnesties/​regularizations  2, 131 ‘Carioca’ case  115 coastal surveillance and patrolling  38–​9 economy in  2 foreign populations  1–​2 foreign sex workers  98 increase in sea arrivals  47 irregular migrants arriving in  33–​5 labour force changes  140 and Latin American sex workers  113–​14 migrants landing in  47 nationalities of traffickers and victims  103 number of sex workers  96–​7 regularization system  135–​6 sex work in  92, 95 victims of trafficking  90–​1 see also Balearic Islands and Spanish penisula; Canary Islands; Ceuta and Melilla; Strait of Gibraltar sponsors in Italy  133 Stein, Jeremy  12–​13, 18–​19 Strait of Gibraltar  81 satellite surveillance  46 smuggling market  43 structural-​functional paradigm  16 sub-​Saharan countries  3, 41, 47, 63, 66, 67, 150 agricultural workers for Spain  120 migrants from  14, 33, 43, 52, 77, 81 and tourism  42 women from  98, 101 Sudan  53, 55, 57, 77 surveillance and patrolling  38, 46, 52, 73 Sweden  72 Syrian refugees  16, 49, 52, 55, 67, 72, 74, 77 and the drugs trade  28 T Tahoua  83 Tangier  43 Tarifa  43 taxation, advantageous  141 Tebu  68, 69, 70

Tenerife, arrival points in  36 Tétouan  43 textile work  126–​9 Thailand, sex market in  87 Thatcher, Margaret  139 Thessaloniki  77 ties in destination country  13–​14 tobacco smuggling  27 Tobruk  55 tourism, decline in  41, 42 tourist visas  114, 115 trafficking  6 cultural ties with victims  101–​3 number of victims  84–​92 patron-​client model  122 prosecutions for  87–​8 recognizing victims  88–​9 recruitment for sexual exploitation  100–​1 for sexual and labour exploitation  84–​92 transgender victims  88 transporting victims  101 and the use of violence  7, 109, 110, 111, 114 value of migrant trade  146 victim protocol in UNTOC  148 see also organizational crime transnational organized crime  146–​9 transporters  65–​6 travel costs  4, 6, 14, 15, 19, 123 from Afghanistan to Greece  78 ‘all-​inclusive’ journeys  66 of boat from Senegal to Canary Islands  38 of Chinese migrants  127 corruption payments at Ceuta  45 to Italy from sub-​Saharan countries  67 land and sea to Greece  80 from Morocco and Algeria to Spanish coast  43–​4 from Pakistan to Greece  78 sponsors in Italy  122–​3 see also debt bondage travel plans  14 ‘all-​inclusive’ journeys  23 involving many smugglers  20 length of journey  19, 66 and migrant communities  15 Triandafyllidou, Anna  15 tribal groups  68 Tripoli  46, 54 trust  5, 15–​16, 17, 66 and the hawala system  21 Tuareg  68, 69, 70 Tunisia  boats from  4, 51 as a route  55, 81 trafficked women from  98 Tunisian migrants to Italy  53 Tunisian migrants to Sicily  57

192

INDEX

Turkey  agreements with EU  73, 137 geographical position  77 as migrant route  15, 20, 55, 72, 79–​80, 81 role in countering migration  74 as trafficked drugs route  27 Turkish migrants in Italy  52 U Ukraine  migrants from  2 trafficked women from  98 United Kingdom, amnesties/​ regularizations  131 United Nations  Convention against Transnational Organized Crime  6, 22, 40, 84, 86, 147 Office on Drug and Crime (UNDOC)  84 UNHRC  33, 72 United States of America  15, 25, 84 Chinese and Mexican migrants  15 economic policy  139 forced labour estimates  86 Sister Ping conviction  15 V Venezuela  2 trafficked women from  27, 113, 115 victims of trafficking  6, 91–​2, 94, 96, 148 violence  19, 27, 57, 59, 62, 83, 86 by border police  5 and corruption  26 and criminal organizations  25 and labour exploitation  121, 124 in Libya  65, 68, 71, 82 and modern slavery  129 in Morocco  45

against trafficked women  109, 110, 111, 114 and trafficking  7 visas/​passports  see documentation W war  49, 55, 67, 68, 69 weapons trafficking  146 Weber, Max  11 websites, sex work via  96 welfare state  138–​9, 145 Wellman, Barry  26 Western Sahara  35, 46 women and girls  in Asian sex market  87 Nigerian sex workers  105–​9 as property  109–​11 treatment of sex workers  99 victims of trafficking  88, 94 see also labour exploitation; sexual exploitation working conditions  121, 125, 136 deregulation  140 inspections of  123, 124, 126, 136 long working days  117, 118, 123, 124, 127 low wages  117, 118, 120, 121, 125, 126 piece work  120, 121, 126 precarious work  145–​6 unpaid wages  85, 117, 125 work visas  133 Y Yemen, civil war in  55 Yugoslavia  97, 110 Z Zhang, Sheldon X.  14–​15, 18

193