Slavs in Post-Nazi Austria: Carinthian Slovenes and the Politics of Assimilation, 1945–1960 9781474258906, 9781474258937, 9781474258913

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Slavs in Post-Nazi Austria

Slavs in Post-Nazi Austria Carinthian Slovenes and the Politics of Assimilation, 1945–1960 Robert Knight

Bloomsbury Academic An imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc

LON DON • OX F O R D • N E W YO R K • N E W D E L H I • SY DN EY

Bloomsbury Academic An imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc 50 Bedford Square London WC1B 3DP UK

1385 Broadway New York NY 10018 USA

www.bloomsbury.com BLOOMSBURY and the Diana logo are trademarks of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc First published 2017 © Robert Knight, 2017 Robert Knight has asserted his right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as Author of this work. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publishers. No responsibility for loss caused to any individual or organization acting on or refraining from action as a result of the material in this publication can be accepted by Bloomsbury or the author. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. ISBN: HB: 978-1-4742-5890-6 ePDF: 978-1-4742-5891-3 ePub: 978-1-4742-5892-0 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Knight, Robert, 1952- author. Title: Slavs in post-Nazi Austria : Carinthian Slovenes and the politics of assimilation, 1945-1960 / Robert Knight. Description: London ; New York : Bloomsbury Academic, an imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc, 2017. | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2016025267| ISBN 9781474258906 (hardback) | ISBN 9781474258920 (ePub) Subjects: LCSH: Slovenes–Austria–Carinthia–History–20th century. | Slovenes–Cultural assimilation–Austria–History–20th century. | Slovenes–Civil rights–Austria–History–20th century. | National socialism–Social aspects–Austria–History–20th century. | Acculturation–Political aspects–Austria–History–20th century. | Cold War–Social aspects–Austria–History. | Carinthia (Austria)–Ethnic relations–History–20th century. | Austria–Ethnic relations–History–20th century. | BISAC: HISTORY / Europe / Austria & Hungary. | HISTORY / Modern / 20th Century. Classification: LCC DB290.7 .K56 2017 | DDC 305.8918/40436609045–dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2016025267 Cover design: Adriana Brioso Cover image © Kärntner Landesarchiv/Veterans of Carinthia’s Abwehrkampf (Defensive Struggle) marching on 10 October 1960. Typeset by Integra Software Service Pvt. Ltd.

To Ruth and Andrew with all my love

Contents Acknowledgements Note on Slovene List of Abbreviations

ix x xi

Introduction 1 Urban Jarnik’s plea 1 Assimilation and politics 2 Liberal values and post-Nazi society 3 Education politics 4 Germans, Slovenes and ‘Windish’ 5 1

Assimilation and Coercion 9 Nationalizing politics, 1880–1918 9 Ethnic politics in the first Austrian Republic, 1918–38 12 Exclusion and assimilation in the racial state, 1938–45 19

2

Provincial Politics, 1945–7 27 From the Third Reich to the Second Republic 27 Slovene participation 29 In defence of the Carinthian Heimat 37 British wind-down, Viennese arrival 41 Bilingual education under pressure 48

3

Cold War Politics, 1947–9 53 The Carinthian border in London and Moscow 53 Calm and agitation 57 Agreement deferred 61 Minority protection 66 Attacking Slovenes, courting Nazis 72

4

Lobbying against Slovene, 1949–57 77 The campaign for ‘parental rights’ 77 Three federal targets 80 Wedenig’s salvage attempt 89 Sovereignty against Slovene? 95

viii 5

Contents The Demolition of the Bilingual Primary School, 1957–9 107 Wedenig’s ‘somersault of death’ 107 Federal abdication 110 Postscript 119

Conclusion 123 Anti-Slovene continuity 123 Post-Nazi society 124 Austria and the international context 126 The dramatization of the Yugoslav threat 128 Liberal values after Nazism 128 Appendix: Bilingual Primary School and Census Results in Southern Carinthia, 1945–60 131 Notes 147 Sources and Bibliography 208 Index235

Acknowledgements This book could not have been completed without the help of friends, colleagues and professionals. In particular I wish to thank Elisabeth Barker, Tom Barker, Dušan Biber, John Boyer, Ulfried Burz, Harry Byrom, Bill Deakin, Teodor and Meta Domej, Darinka Drnovšek, Gertrude Enderle-Burcel, Brigitte Entner, Michaela Föllner, Gerda and Katja Fras, Michael Gehler, Heimo Gruber, Andrea Hackel, Ernst Hanisch, Peter Huemer, Neville Ireland, Rudi Jeřábek, Boris Jesih, Otho Luthar, Avguštin Malle, Walter Manoschek, Florian Menz, Sabina Mihelj, Lorenz Mikoletzky, Charlotte Natmeßnig, Alfred Ogris, Gernot Ogris, Peter Pirker, Janko Pleterski, Karl Pleyl, Paul Ramage, Oliver Rathkolb, Denny and Mary Russinow, Colienne Schwarzenberg-Meran, Valentin Sima, Fritz Stadler, Janez Stergar, Gerald Stourzh, Karl Stuhlpfarrer, Arnold Suppan, Peter Tropper, Peter Vodopivec, Jera Vodušek-Starič, Wilhelm Wadl, Donald Watt, Friedrich Weckerlein, Mark Wheeler, Peter Wilkinson and Christa Zöchling. My special thanks go to Valentin Sima, Jill Lewis, Peter Logan and Evan Bukey and an anonymous reviewer for kindly commenting on earlier drafts. Last but not least I gratefully acknowledge the financial support I have received from the University of London (Central Research Fund), the University of Loughborough,  the Austrian Federal Ministry of Science and Reseach, the British Council, the British Academy (Elisabeth Barker Fund) and the Slovene Academy of Sciences.

Note on Slovene German and Slovene place names of villages and towns in the area covered by the 1945 bilingual school decree follow Pavel Zdovc, Slovenska krajevna imena na avstrijskem Koroškem: Die slowenischen Ortsnamen in Kärnten (Ljubljana: Slovenska akademija znanosti in umetnosti, 2010). Other place names are aligned to current state borders, for example, Klagenfurt and Villach, Ljubljana and Maribor. Where German translations of Slovene press articles come from the monthly reports sent from the Carinthian Security service (Sicherheitsdirektion) to the Federal Interior Ministry, the newspaper source is placed in brackets. Other translations from Slovene are by the author with indispensable help from Sonja Köllich, Meta Suk, Ksenia Slabe and Olivia Hellman. Hvala Lepa!

List of Abbreviations AC

Advisory Committee (Konsultativer Landesausschuss)

ACA

Allied Commission for Austria

ADG

Archiv der Diözese Gurk (Klagenfurt) (Archive of the Diocese of Gurk)

AdR

Archiv der Republik (Archive of the Republic)

AINV

Arhiv Inštituta za Narodnostna Vprašanja (Archive of the Institute for Ethnic Studies)

ALCO

Allied Council (of the Allied Commission for Austria)

ARS

Arhiv Republike Slovenije (Archive of the Republic of Slovenia)

AVA

Allgemeines Verwaltungsarchiv (General Administrative Archive)

BE

British Element

BHM Bezirkshauptmannschaft BHS

Bund Heimattreuer Südkärntner (League of Loyal Southern Carinthians)

BKA AA

Bundeskanzleramt, Auswärtige Angelegenheiten (Federal Chancellery, Foreign Affairs)

BM

Bundesminister (Federal Minister)

BMF

Bundesministerium für Finanzen (Federal Finance Ministry)

BMI

Bundesministerium für Inneres (Federal Ministry of the Interior)

BMU

Bundesministerium für Unterricht (Federal Ministry for Education)

BÖS

Bund Österreichischer Slowenen (League of Austrian Slovenes)

CFM

Council of Foreign Ministers

CIR

Consolidated Intelligence Report

xii

List of Abbreviations

DCQ

Documents on the Carinthian Question

EXCO

Executive Committee (of the Allied Commission for Austria)

FO

Foreign Office

FPÖ

Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (Freedomite Party of Austria)

FRUS

Foreign Relations of the United States

FSIR

Fortnightly Security and Intelligence Report

FSS

Field Security Section

ISB

Information Service Branch

JWIS

Joint Weekly Intelligence Summary

KdM

Kabinett des Ministers (Cabinet of the Minister)

KHD

Kärntner Heimatdienst (Carinthian Heimat Service)

KLA

Kärntner Landesarchiv (Klagenfurt) (Carinthian provincial archive)

KLR

Kärntner Landesregierung (Carinthian provincial government)

KLT

Kärntner Landtag (Carinthian Provincial Diet)

LAD

Landesamtsdirektion (Provincial Administration Directorate)

LB

Lagebericht (Situation Report)

LSR

Landesschulrat (Carinthia) (provincial school council)

MRP

Ministerratsprotokolle (Cabinet minutes)

NÖLA

Niederösterreichisches Landesarchiv (Lower Austria provincial archive)

NR

Nationalrat (Parliament)

NSKS/RK

Narodni Svet Koroških Slovencev/Rat der Kärntner Slowenen (National Council of Carinthian Slovenes)

ÖB

Österreichische Botschaft (London) (Austrian Embassy)

OMV

Oddelek za mejna Vprašanja (Department for the Border Questions)

ÖStA

Österreichisches Staatsarchiv (Vienna) (Austrian State Archive)

List of Abbreviations

xiii

ÖVP

Österreichische Volkspartei (Austrian People’s Party)

PID

Periodical Intelligence Digest

PKLR

Provisorische Kärntner Landesregierung (Provisional Carinthian provincial government)

Pol

Abteilung Politik (Political Department of Austrian Foreign Ministry)

PolDiv

Political Division (of Allied Commission for Austria, British Element)

Polrep

Political Report

PWB

Psychological Warfare Branch

PNOO

narodnoosvobodilni odbor (Regional National Liberation Comittee)

SD

State Department

SiDion

Sicherheitsdirektion (Security Directorate)

SPÖ

Sozialistische Partei Österreich (Socialist Party of Austria)

SPZ

Slovenska Prosvetna Zveza (Slovene Cultural League)

SZA

Statistisches Zentralamt (Central Statistical Office)

SZI Slovenski Znanstveni inštitut (Slovene Scientific Institute) TNA

The National Archives, London

VD

Verfassungsdienst (Constitution Service of Federal Chancellery)

VdU

Verband der Unabhängigen (League of Independents)

VGA

Verein für die Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung (Society for the History of the Workers’ Movement)

WdU

Wahlverband der Unabhängigen (Electoral League of the Independents)

w/e

week ending

WSIR

Weekly Security Intelligence Report

ZSO

Zvesa Slovenskih organizacij na Koroškem/Zentralverband Slowenischer Organisationen in Kärnten (Association of Slovene Organisations in Carinthia)

Introduction

Urban Jarnik’s plea In 1826 the Slovene poet and philologist Urban Jarnik compared Carinthia’s Germanization to a ‘stream … formed by natural causes going back centuries’. Every century the boundary between German and Slovene had moved southwards at the rate of ‘an hour’s walk’. Jarnik concluded that this process had been natural, the result of migration, intermarriage and ‘practical life’ among the Germans. It had happened ‘through the free will of the people’.1 Over the following century Jarnik’s comment would be much cited. To some German Carinthian writers it was key testimony of the harmonious nature of German–Slovene interaction. The fact that the essay was published in German in the provincial history journal Carinthia I seemed to underscore the point. After the 1920 plebiscite ensured – with a 60:40 majority – that nearly all of the part of southern Carinthia closest to Yugoslavia would join the new Austrian Republic Arthur Lemisch, the provincial administrator (Landesverweser) hailed the outcome as the fulfilment of Jarnik’s prediction. It was a result in which neither ‘trickery nor pressure’ had played any part and the same approach should now be adopted to educate the 15,279 people who had voted for Yugoslavia. This ‘Carinthian work’ should be done with ‘German culture and Carinthian moderation (Gemütlichkeit)’. Those who had been ‘seduced’ into voting for Yugoslavia would have to be returned to Carinthiandom (Kärntnertum) within the next generation.2 Nearly thirty years later, sitting in a Yugoslav cell, the former Carinthian Gauleiter Friedrich Rainer also turned to Jarnik. With almost academic detachment he explained past ethnic interaction in the area as a natural process of give and take: Germans had gained in Carinthia but lost in the adjacent areas of Carniola (Krain) and Southern Styria. For Rainer this harmony had only changed when the partisans arrived, which had forced him to resort to sharper repression.3 He did not mention that this had included not just brutal measures against partisans and the civilian population but the deportation of over 50,000 Slovenes from the Operation Zone Adriatic Littoral (Operationszone Adriatisches Küstenland) as part of a wider plan for ethnic ‘reconfiguration’. The use of Jarnik, first by Lemisch and then Rainer, can be seen as milestones along a disastrous route of ethno-national radicalization. Jarnik’s vision was pressed into

2

Slavs in Post-Nazi Austria

service not just to legitimize and naturalize past assimilation and German domination but to justify the repression of any Slovenes who resisted it. But in both cases the cooption of Jarnik missed his key message – a heartfelt plea for national linguistic and cultural cohabitation. Underpinning it was Jarnik’s call for the exercise of political will to hold up – or even reverse – Germanization.4 Jarnik accepted that this would not be easy but he clearly thought the alternative – that the Slovene language could completely disappear from Carinthia – almost too appalling to contemplate: he asked rhetorically if it ‘should be wished that it completely die out in the province’. His own answer was clear: not only would this outcome bring no advantages; there were ‘many political grounds which speak more for the preservation than the suppression (Verdrängung) of the Slovene language’.5 The main purpose of this book is to explore these ‘political grounds’ in the fifteen years following the collapse of the Third Reich. Although this context is of course far removed from Jarnik’s world, his plea still provides a relevant starting point. It raises the broad question of the extent to which political will could or should be used to foster Slovene language and culture in an overwhelmingly German-speaking society. As this study hopes to make clear, the answer given by many Carinthians was ‘as little as possible’. The historiography of Carinthia and the Carinthian Slovenes has largely focussed on issues of sovereignty and in particular the territorial dispute with Yugoslavia over southern Carinthia. The border struggles following the First World War and the 1920 plebiscite have also dominated many interpretations of the period following the Second World War.6 By contrast the post-war politics of assimilation have been relatively neglected. That also applies to the rise, decline and fall of the 1945 bilingual school system despite – or because of – the controversies surrounding it.7 In many accounts it is marginalized, ignored or, as in a recent account, overshadowed by a familiar narrative of Yugoslav threat and Slovene betrayal.8 This study seeks to correct this perspective and move the subject to a more prominent position in Carinthian and Austrian historiography. In doing so it also hopes to contribute to the continuing debate about Austria’s position as a successor society of the Third Reich.

Assimilation and politics As a historical reconstruction this book cannot engage deeply in current controversies about assimilation, multiculturalism and minority rights, but neither can it ignore them completely. My starting point is Ernest Gellner’s well-known argument that a homogenized national culture is necessary for a modern society to function. Gellner’s modernizing analysis of nationalism – almost the direct opposite of Jarnik’s harmonious view – leaves little or no room for minority language and culture. According to Gellner, to achieve full citizenship ‘one must either assimilate into the dominant High Culture, or change the political boundaries so as to ensure that one’s own culture becomes the defining one in the newly emerging unit’.9 The assimilation of national or ethnic minorities is not something which the state can or should impede. Its role is to act as the ‘protector … of a culture and the maintainer of … [an] inescapably homogenous and standardising educational system’.10

Introduction

3

Gellner’s account has been criticized for conflating different aspects of modernization into a single transition which, as Robin Okey argues, leads to an ‘over-glib’ picture of the complexity of the Habsburg Empire.11 Similarly, on a theoretical level Brendan O’Leary has criticized it for failing to allow enough room for intermediate possibilities between the poles of assimilation and secession.12 Alternative institutional arrangements like devolution, power-sharing, federation or ‘cantonalization’ are barely discussed. Most importantly here, Gellner does not consider whether political will of the kind Jarnik called for can mitigate or counteract the homogenizing pressures of modernity. Whether it should do so brings us into contentious normative issues of cultural identity and rights. Can the recognition of difference and the requirements of equality be reconciled?13 Should the state do more than ensure a level playing field and guarantee non-discrimination for members of a minority? Here Will Kymlicka and others have criticized classical liberal assumptions. They argue that in ethnically diverse societies the state should not be ‘difference-blind’ but actively support the cultural rights of minorities in order to take into account structural factors which disadvantage its members.14 In a powerful counterblast Brian Barry has reasserted and reformulated the egalitarian argument against the claim of minorities for ‘special treatment’. In order to protect individuals, he proposes an ‘egalitarian liberalism’, by which the state had an obligation to intervene to stop particular cultural practices of minorities. In the case of education, that might mean ensuring that children are equipped to prosper in the world outside their minority culture. Barry concludes inter alia that competence in a single majority language is a prerequisite of democratic interaction.15 Several of Barry’s concerns resonate in this study: the ‘tyranny’ – real or alleged – of minority leadership over individual members, the disadvantages incurred through learning a second language and the lower relative life-chances of those who fail to assimilate. Yet, Barry neglects the scenario which is highly relevant here, where members of a minority are subject not just to homogenizing, modernizing pressure from the state – or parts of it – but also from a dominant ethnic lobby whose values may be neither democratic nor egalitarian. Significantly, his main examples of minority leaders demanding collective rights in order to maintain the minority collective identity against the state come from the United States (e.g. the Amish, Pueblo Indians). This leads to a broader problem of Barry’s argument, at least for a historian: its lack of historical contextualization.

Liberal values and post-Nazi society The historical context of this study is the fifteen-year period following the collapse of Nazi rule. In Carinthia the Nazi regime radicalized an ethnic conflict which had its roots in the late Habsburg monarchy. It had throughout been marked by a basic structural asymmetry which meant that, as Arnold Suppan puts it, the minority laboured under multiple social, economic and psychological disadvantages.16 The way that Nazi rule successfully built on this provides the starting point for any normative consideration of whether the post-war state was to be ‘difference-blind’ towards the minority. In other words, the fact that between 1938 and 1945 the Nazi state sought to eliminate all

4

Slavs in Post-Nazi Austria

trace of Slovene culture, language and collective identity cannot be detached from a discussion of how the post-Nazi state treated that minority. Here James Tully’s critique of liberalism in a post-imperial context provides a relevant insight. Tully argues that a ‘constitutional association whose members view the disappearance of the cultures of other members with moral approval or moral indifference, and who treat other cultures with condescension and contempt, destroys the self-respect of those members’. In that event ‘the ability of those citizens to exercise their individual freedom and autonomy in constitutional negotiations, civic participation and private life is undermined’.17Mutatis mutandis Tully’s ‘post-imperial’ New Zealand provides a useful analogy for the study of post-Nazi Carinthia. A society where the repressive power of a powerful state was harnessed to force members of a minority to assimilate might reasonably expect the state which replaced it and claimed to be its antithesis to move beyond neutrality and non-discrimination.18 This does not make its failure to do so a matter for moralizing condemnation, but it does suggest that the readiness (or lack of it) to scrutinize these ‘liberal’ assumptions is an appropriate benchmark for assessing what Carinthia (and Austria) learnt from National Socialism. It also suggests that despite the shadow of the Nazi state and the genocidal consequences of the ascription of ethnic (racial) identity, the ostensibly liberal ‘principle of affirmation’ (Bekenntnisprinzip), and the related application of ‘subjective criteria’ to determine ethnic identity, needs to be integrated into a consideration of the ‘ethnicization’ of politics.19 In the context examined in this book individual autonomy and freedom of choice are not neatly separate from dissimilation and racism, but enmeshed with it. Structural asymmetries of power can undercut the freedom of individual decisions and hence undermine the democratic validity of ‘subjective criteria’. The pressures on individual Slovenes to declare themselves to be German turned public or semi-public acts like signing petitions, completing a census return or registering a child for language instruction into tests of allegiance to the Heimat. The problematic point about this much discussed and protean term is not the notion of an identification with the local, familiar or traditional per se – it is the mobilization of loyalty and aggression for a Heimat which is imagined as exclusively German.

Education politics It is not hard to see why schooling is one of the most contested arenas of ethnic politics or why it became a prime target of ethnic lobbying.20 Minority leaders saw it as a way of correcting structural imbalances,21 and for the more ambitious, as enhancing the identity and self-esteem of members of the minority by fostering its written (‘high’) language and encouraging upward social mobility.22 In Cisleithanian Austria (literally ‘the area this side of the river Leitha’) primary education was made compulsory and transferred from the control of the church to secular authorities in 1872. As literacy levels increased language instruction became a central bone of contention. In Carinthia the dominant utraquistic (‘dual language’) school fostered Germanization, relegating Slovene to a transitional medium until German alone could be used as the sole language of instruction.23 At secondary level

Introduction

5

Slovene instruction was largely limited to those training for the priesthood. On the German side the importance placed on education was illustrated by Lemisch’s call of 1920 on school officials – alongside home and church – to ensure that Slovenes became loyal members of Carinthia. Here Jarnik’s ‘natural process’ had to be reinforced by the state.24 But there was also a long tradition of German Carinthian hostility to the imperial state. The foundational document was the 1867 Basic State Law (Staatsgrundgesetz), whose famous Article 19 (3) laid down parity for all ‘languages customary in the province’ but added the rider that there should be no ‘coercion in learning of a language’. In Carinthia (as in the Czech lands) this caveat was interpreted as a ‘ban on coercion’ which placed parental decisions centre stage. It also helped obscure many other non-state sources of coercion on parents. Admittedly, disputes raged about the interpretation of Article 19, and in particular much legal ink was spilt about whether it was remained valid after the end of the Habsburg Empire. The debate continued into the Second Republic when the article was directed against the bilingual school system in southern Carinthia. The use of the power of the state to strengthen the minority in resisting assimilatory pressure was attacked not just as unwarranted coercion by the federal authorities but as a breach of a fundamental, historically legitimated legal principle. A central element in the dispute was an appeal to ‘parental rights’, that is, the claim that parents had an inalienable right to choose the language in which their children were to be educated. The concept might at first sight appear to reinforce the rights of individual parents (and their children) against the kind of coercion by the minority leadership which Barry warns against. It also seems to fit into Protestant or anti-clerical assertions of the freedom of individual conscience against the Catholic Church. But in the Carinthian context individual choice was so closely tied to the question of loyalty to the Heimat that individual freedom was overshadowed by collective pressure. AntiSlovene lobbying (not necessarily from parents themselves) saw the ‘parental body’ (Elternschaft) as a vanguard of a German Carinthian collective. As will be seen, the right of parents then became effectively reduced to the ‘right’ to deprive their children of later opting for the parents’ own language and culture.

Germans, Slovenes and ‘Windish’ Carinthian ethnic politics has generally been seen as a relationship between two distinct, bounded groups: a German majority and a Slovene minority. Recent scholarship has provided good arguments for being sceptical about this conceptualization. For example Rogers Brubaker’s critique of the ‘groupism’, which pervades the much recent literature on nationalism, argues that it misunderstands national or ethnic groups ‘as a substantial entity to which interests and agency can be attributed’.25 He argues that ethnic politics should not be seen as a conflict, in which leaders represent the demands of ‘their’ respective groups, but as a process through which leaders foster group cohesion and identity, and mobilize support. Ethnic politics then becomes as much about constructing group identities as about combatting real or imagined

6

Slavs in Post-Nazi Austria

ethnic enemies. Assimilation itself no longer appears as a shift in ethnic ‘reality’ but as a rhetorical and political construction process; it involves first drawing up notional ethnic borders and then patrolling them by applying ethnic labels, employing the rhetoric of fear and threat and, last but not least, by playing the ethnic ‘numbers game’.26 In a similar sceptical vein some historians have begun to look at those who were – for a variety of reasons – uninvolved in national construction work. Recent work by Pieter Judson, Jeremy King and Tara Zahra has proposed the category of ‘national indifference’.27 This concern not to take national categorizations for granted has underlined the fluidity and contingency of national categorization, and reinforces the by now widely held view that ‘thinking nationally’ was a learnt way to understand the world, not something natural and inevitable. However, it is more difficult, and even contradictory, to see ‘national indifference’ as a political stance or even a group designation in its own right. And while indifference may indeed be one response to national polarization, it is difficult to see it as a choice.28 At any rate the main story of nationalism in Central Europe surely remains the progressive shrinking of nonnational space and with it the possibility of indifference, agnosticism or indecision. As fences were erected in order to corral individuals, sitting on them became increasingly painful. Most importantly here, in Carinthia, ‘groupist’ politics continued well after Nazi rule. There was one exception: the attempt in October 1945 to introduce bilingual education in over 100 primary schools of Southern Carinthia. At least in principle, this meant by-passing national group categorizations and avoided the requirement to make an either–or choice between German and Slovene. Its rise, decline and fall is at the centre of this study. One central and contentious group construction in Carinthian ethnic politics is that of the ‘Windish’.29 Despite the ‘tripartite’ understanding which the label seems to imply – giving ‘Windish’ parity with German and Slovene – its function was to strengthen the polarization of ethnic politics between German and Slovene. THe shifting and contradictory usages of the term have often muddied the waters, but three basic overlapping meanings can be distinguished. First, ‘Windish’ was used essentially (as in Jarnik’s time) as a synonym for ‘Slovene’. That also conveyed the derogatory connotation of inferior, lower-class or uneducated, which intensified as national conflict involved competition between different claims to ‘high culture’. ‘Windish’ was then seen as a language (or dialect) which was good enough for oral communication between cow hands but little else. Second, a ‘sociological’ understanding identified the ‘Windish’ as the wealthier or more entrepreneurial Slovenes (‘village bourgeoisie’) who assimilated as they improved their social standing. That this process was far from ‘neutral’ – much less an expression of an individual free decision – is shown by the psychological costs which were often incurred. The most problematic was the frequent ‘overcompensation’ by those who sought to assimilate. Slovene nationalists condemned them as ‘national renegades’, or nemčurji; other contemporaries referred them as national ‘hotheads’ (Heißsporne). More neutrally, Dietmar Larcher calls them ‘radical assimilants’, who sought to overcompensate for past stigmatization by being more German than the Germans.30 That leads to the third, ‘pseudo-positive’, use of the label, which was meant to upgrade the ‘Windish’ to parity with German and Slovene, and thus reduce the putative size of the Slovene minority and delegitimize Slovene

Introduction

7

leaders. Though the precise nature of these ‘Windish’ was elusive, it was clear that their imputed affinity to German culture, and their loyalty to Carinthia, placed them alongside Carinthian Germans.31 But whether understood ethnically, culturally or linguistically the basic paradox of ‘the Windish’ remained: their (self-appointed) leaders and German champions demanded collective rights for a group whose main collective characteristic as the wish to cease to be a collective. The politics of assimilation, as will be seen, was less a campaign by ‘the Germans’ against ‘the Slovenes’ than as a project of assimilated and assimilating Slovenes, in alliance with some Carinthian Germans to make Carinthia exclusively German.

1

Assimilation and Coercion

Nationalizing politics, 1880–1918 In the three decades before the First World War Carinthia experienced some of the ethnic conflict seen elsewhere in the Habsburg Empire.1 The primacy of German in the province can be traced back to the period before 1526 when Carinthia became a duchy under the Habsburg crown. It was first challenged in the 1848 revolutions, as a burgeoning South Slav nationalist movement presented demands for all Slovenes to be united in one administrative unit under the imperial crown. The way Slovene nationalism was embedded in Catholicism was encapsulated by the comment of Bishop Anton Martin Slomšek that ‘the holy faith’ should be ‘the light’ but the mother tongue was ‘the key to the salvation of the nation’.2 In this perspective German – and bilingualism – was a dangerous step towards both liberalism and sin.3 For Slovenes seeking to avoid both, only the priesthood offered a prospect of status and upwards social mobility. Apart from a handful of lawyers and doctors the leadership of the minority in Carinthia was dominated by priests and curates (Kaplane). Though a liberal movement did emerge in the late 1860s and organized mass open-air meetings (Tabors) the church soon reasserted its grip. Slovene nationalist priests like Stefan Singer, who stood up for the use of Slovene in church services (including funeral services), came under fire as ‘rabble-rousing clerics’ (Hetzpfaffen).4 An important strand of German liberalism built on long-standing hostility to the imperial crown and Catholic Church which went back to resistance to the counter-reformation and the cultivation of ‘secret protestantism’. In the sharpening national struggle liberals felt confident they were ‘on the right side of progress’ and cultivated an ‘emotive sense of historical roots and values’.5 A crucial dichotomization was established through which the liberal camp became identified as German and the clerical as Slovene.6 Slovene leaders proved ill-equipped to cope with the challenges of ‘modernity’, for examples the railway lines which opened up Slovene-speaking areas to a larger market and brought German-speaking tourists into the area.7 The deep agricultural depression of the 1870s forced many agricultural workers to migrate to Carinthia’s towns, to Graz, Vienna or overseas to North America.8 Nevertheless the overall Slovene challenge to German dominance, though more muted than in neighbouring Carniola and Styria, seemed threatening enough to foster a sense of existential insecurity in German elites. The province’s German identity appeared under threat from an enemy which was

10

Slavs in Post-Nazi Austria

described variously as reactionary, wily, implacable, powerful and primitive.9 German ‘resistance’ also adopted the same kind of racialized social Darwinist language as other German national networks and a similar ‘uncompromisingly and aggressively radical nationalism’.10 Much Carinthian German activism was centred on the two main towns of the province, Klagenfurt and Villach: in the largely Slovene-populated south of the province there were strongholds in the administrative or economic centres like Völkermarkt/Velikovec and Ferlach/Borovlje. These urban centres were also economic magnets for the population of the hinterland. Outside the area they were often romanticized as missionary outposts, spreading Teutonic progress.11 Nationalist leaders on opposite sides also made much of the wider geopolitical purpose of their work; the building – or blocking – of a German corridor to the Adriatic.12 To the most radical pan-Germans this tied in with their rejection of ‘small Germany’. The Habsburg dynasty was seen as nationally unreliable, doing deals with the Slav enemy and even guilty of treason.13 Resentment reached a climax in the late 1890s, when a conservative–Slav coalition introduced language concessions in the Czech lands, triggering the ‘Badeni crisis’. In Carinthia the Pan-German League for Carinthia (Verein der Alldeutschen für Kärnten) (founded in 1902) called for Greater Germany and the removal of the dynasty. National conflict steadily eroded the space for indifference. In a series of textbook confrontations scholarly blows were exchanged over archaeology and medieval history, and in April 1914 differences over the interpretation of the medieval installation ceremony at the Prince’s Stool (Herzogstuhl) in the Zollfeld/Gosposvetsko polje erupted into violence.14 The disputes which raged over the etymology of place names boiled down to conflicting claims about who had ‘arrived first’.15 In many villages conflict broke out over the language used in sermons, weddings, funerals and the inscriptions on gravestones, often pitting the Slovene priest against the German-speaking school teachers, who Friedrich Ludwig Jahn hailed as ‘a brave soldier of progress’.16 Other points of national contention were the language of public administration and court proceedings and the public sphere as a whole – including coffee adverts.17 After 1880, contrary to the desire of the imperial government for apolitical, neutral data, the decennial censuses became another battlefield. They were also bulletins from the front line which provided ‘a formal measure of each nation’s relative gains and losses’.18 The question they posed – about the ‘language of everyday use’ (Umgangssprache) – reinforced the process of Germanization but also told a clear story of steady Slovene decline.19 Slovene speakers for the bilingual part of Carinthia recorded in the census, declined from over 100,000 in 1880 to 66,463 thirty years later.20 In what Tara Zahra calls the struggle for the ‘souls of the nation’ primary education was clearly also crucial.21 Organizations like the German School Association (Deutscher Schulverein) (1880) and the Association South March (Verein Südmark) (1889) sought to penetrate into Slovene-speaking rural areas. Against them the Slovene leader Andreas Einspieler, in the spirit of Slomšek, described the school as ‘a daughter of the church’: if the priest was the right hand the primary teacher should be the left hand. The school was ‘a gift of God, so long as it is catholic and completely well-behaved’.22 Slovene cultural politics was led by the conservative Hermagoras Society (Družba sv.

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Mohorja, refounded in 1860) and later the more militant Slovene School Association (Slovensko Solško Društvo), which aimed to promote Slovene education ‘on Catholic national foundations’.23 The legal framework for school politics in the ‘Cisleithanian’ half of the Habsburg Empire was laid down in 1867 by the Basic State Law (Staatsgrundgesetz) and the 1869 Imperial Primary School Law (Reichsvolksschulgesetz). Control of education (apart from religious education) was transferred from the church to the secular authorities, who decided which type of school should be set up after hearing ‘those maintaining the school’, that is, the parish, district and provincial school councils. In Carinthia these were dominated by the socially superior Germans or assimilating Slovenes. ‘Nationality schools’ (Nationalitätenschulen) could be established where enough parents wanted one, but Article 19 (3) of the Basic State Law, though laying down the principle of equality of all ‘languages customary in the province’, also stipulated that this should not involve ‘coercion in the learning of a language’. The paragraph was to feature in many later national disputes, with non-dominant national groups using the first part to back their claims while dominant groups invoked the second to influence parental choices.24 In Carinthia the ‘utraquistic’ school became the basic model. It was seen by Slovene leaders – with good reason – as a ‘one-way track’ towards Germanization.25 There was no parity of provision or esteem between the two languages; though instruction was given in both languages at the start, the space assigned to Slovene was progressively reduced and then removed. When Slovene leaders appealed to Vienna (Administrative Court, Education Ministry) their cases became part of a complex thicket of litigation which threatened to paralyse the imperial judicial administration. But as Gerald Stourzh has shown, the understanding which the Administrative Court showed for the minority was far from the slogan of a ‘dungeon of the nations’. It certainly conceded more to Slovene litigants than the province’s German elites considered acceptable.26 As a ‘striking antagonism’ developed between the Education Ministry and the provincial educational authorities court judgements from Vienna in favour of the minority were often resisted or ignored.27 From the 1880s the dominance of old-style German liberals was eroded from several directions. The Farmers’ League (Bauernbund), renamed Land League (Landbund) in 1919, was founded in 1886 to represent the interests of larger farmers, timber merchants, corn traders and cattle-dealers. Its support in southern Carinthia came from more prosperous assimilating Slovenes, who opposed church influence and saw German culture as socially superior and economically attractive. Leaders of the Slovene People’s Party (Slovenska Ljudska Stranka) responded with bitter attacks on them as ‘Germanizers’ (Nemčurji) or ‘renegades’, but with only two representatives in Landtag (provincial diet) they had little clout. After the introduction of universal male suffrage in 1907 they gained strength through the party, garnering the votes of those in the lower rungs of the agrarian ladder: smallholders, farm labourers and forestry workers, and in the 1910 elections they secured the votes of about 71 per cent of the Slovenespeaking population.28 This mobilization triggered alarm in the German national newspaper Freie Stimmen, which wrote soon afterwards that if electoral boundaries were not redrawn to reduce Slovene representation Carinthia would be divided by a

12

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‘perpetual unsurmountable Slavic Border wall, cutting off German Austria from the German Mediterranean, from the Adriatic’.29 The extension of the suffrage also brought the Social Democrats into representative politics. In principle they stood aloof from nationalist polarization. Nationalism was condemned as a capitalist diversion to distract the workers from their real (class) interests and the vision of progress and emancipation. But in practice socialist progress was often predicated on the recruitment and assimilation of Slovenes from rural areas. In the 1905 election campaign the Slovene leader Franc Grafenauer was faced by an alignment of Social Democrats with German nationals, based on shared anti-clericalism and dismissal of Slav culture.30 The Social Democratic newspaper Volkswille referred to ‘Windish’ in terms which were hardly less derogatory than those of the Freie Stimmen.31 Judson’s broad conclusion that the ‘guardians of the nation’ (and its critics) ‘largely failed to nationalise its populations’ appears over-optimistic here.32 Nationalist polemics sharpened further with the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Balkan Wars. In 1914 the lawyer Janko Brejc polemically compared German dominance in Carinthia with conditions in an Ottoman ‘Wilajet’ (province).33 In return the Deutscher Volksverein condemned this as an unwarranted ‘slander’ on the Carinthian Heimat and attacked Brejc as an outside troublemaker, stirring up an otherwise tranquil Slovene population. It was also argued that the Slovene spoken in Carinthia was closer to German than ‘high Slovene’ and that there had been an extensive ‘blood mixing’ between Germans and Carinthian Slovenes.34 After the outbreak of the First World War the Carinthian authorities locked up several Slovene leaders – above all priests – on suspicion of subversion. As elsewhere in the monarchy they overreacted – while some clearly saw the war as a welcome opportunity to cut Slovene leadership down to size.35 Grafenauer was arrested on flimsy charges of sedition and sentenced to five years in prison by a military court. Nevertheless only a small part of the Slovene population showed sympathy with the Serbian cause. THe 1917 ‘May declaration’ issued by the South Slav parliamentary group (Club) of the House of Representatives (Abgeordnetenhaus) in Vienna in favour of the union of all Slovenes (under the monarchy) was supported by the Slovene clergy (104 priests signed) and gained around 19,000 signatures. But the counter-mobilization of ‘loyal’ Slovenes, backed by the Carinthian authorities, was more successful.36 With the centre paralysed and war weariness growing the empire finally imploded in November 1918. On 11 November, one day before the Republic was declared in Vienna, the provincial assembly (Landesversammlung) in Klagenfurt proclaimed a new republican constitution for the province.37

Ethnic politics in the first Austrian Republic, 1918–38 In the Austrian ‘residue’ which emerged out of the collapse of the Habsburg empire the calculus of assimilation shifted significantly to the disadvantage of the Carinthian Slovenes. Instead of central institutions, which had in part maintained a balance between dominant and non-dominant nationalities, German was now the language of the overwhelming majority and enshrined as the language of the state.38 The

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incentive to assimilate in order to seek employment, market chances or educational opportunities was also clearly now much greater. Equally important was the manner in which the new Carinthian border was established.39 Simplifying the complex events between 1918 and 1920, three different border-drawing principles can be distinguished: ethnicity, history and selfdetermination.40 In sending in troops to occupy southern Carinthia in December 1918 the government of the new Yugoslav Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes discounted past assimilation in preference to criteria which were basically ethnic, if not racial: a Slovene was ‘anyone who has Slovene blood in their veins’.41 In February 1919 it claimed an area of about 3,400 km2, or roughly one third of the total area of the province, with a population of around 200,000.42 Against this, the Carinthian Provincial Committee (Landesausschuss) stated on 25 October 1918 that the province was ‘indivisible’ within its historical borders. Carinthia’s history, including the harmonious assimilation of its Slovene population, was seen as a confirmation of its German identity. But historical criteria were not enough to deal with the reality that Slovenes lived in southern Carinthia, and Carinthian German leaders therefore looked to the principle of national self-determination. Many of them clearly imagined the nation which was to exercise it as Greater Germany, although they tended not to say this publicly because of the Allies’ opposition to an Anschluss.43 Self-determination was implemented on 10 October 1920. After a decision by the ‘Big Four’ in Paris a plebiscite was held in the part of southern Carinthia which was contiguous with the border with Yugoslavia (Zone A), including an area of 1,705 km2 (622 square miles) and 51 parishes. Although the population (about 72,000) included roughly twice as many Slovene as German speakers, only 40 per cent of voters (15,279) opted for Yugoslavia.44 In other words over 10,000 Slovene speakers decided to join an overwhelmingly German-speaking Austria.45 Arnold Suppan gives four main reasons for this preference: the experience of mistreatment by Yugoslav (Serbian) authorities and troops, the need of Slovene farmers to keep access to markets in Klagenfurt and Villach, the expectation of better welfare provision in Austria (and the fear of conscription into a South Slav army) and Slovene self-identification as Carinthian. In this ranking, ‘historical consciousness’, though important, came after more instrumental motives. More recently Hänisch and Wilscher have estimated that about 66 per cent of farmers and agricultural workers (especially those close to the border) supported Yugoslavia, while workers and employees contributed up to 30 per cent of the pro-Austrian vote. They also show that the erosion of Slovene national support had started before the 1911 elections.46 But it is hard to see much ‘national indifference’ given the turnout of nearly 95 per cent in October 1920.47 One police report of December 1918, cited by Ulfried Burz, spoke of ‘a degree of indifference’ in areas south of the Drau but it is striking that it contrasted this to the Germanophilia (Deutschfreundlichkeit) of urban populations. The clear implication was that indifference referred to an agrarian population which had not (yet) been mobilized.48 On the eve of the plebiscite the Landtag made a solemn commitment to maintain the minority’s ‘linguistic and national individuality now and for all time’ and promote ‘the same spiritual and economic blossoming as that enjoyed by the German inhabitants

14

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of the province’.49 This may have led Slovenes who voted for Austria to believe that their language and culture would be compatible with membership of the new state. Other pro-Austrian Slovenes probably took German dominance for granted and were unaffected by the official pledge. Nevertheless it stands as a benchmark statement that the state could – if it so decided – move beyond ‘neutrality’ or non-discrimination to the positive cultivation of minority culture.50 Perhaps the most controversial aspect of the 1920 plebiscite concerns the causal chain between the military conflict and the decision by the victorious Allies in Paris to hold it in the first place.51 In general they were not much more ready to listen to the pleas of the defeated Austrian enemy than to those of Germany. The fact that on this occasion they did so, seemed to many German Carinthians more than just contingent or fortuitous; the readiness of the improvised local militia to fight – and in 270 cases die in fighting– the superior Serbian forces and thus alert the Allies to the national problem in the area was hailed as the expression of a deeper Carinthian destiny. That destiny now seemed sealed by the blood shed in the cause and the defenders of the border had defied the odds stacked against them to overcome the indifference of the outside world. Although the ebb and flow of the conflict ended with the Serb occupation of Klagenfurt in May 1919, the final outcome – the maintenance of Carinthian unity – could therefore be interpreted as a triumph of Carinthian military valour. The values of the ‘front experience’ became part of a quasi-religious redemptive event. There was also a strong anti-Viennese aspect to this narrative; the indifference or treachery of the Viennese state government (Staatsregierung) also had supposedly been overcome. The Social Democratic leaders, in particular Chancellor Karl Renner and Julius Deutsch, were accused of having left the province in the lurch in its hour of need.52 This was a kind of Dolchstoß legend (i.e. the stab in the back) but it differed from the broader pan-German one in having a ‘happy end’ – the fatal blow was averted. Its pan-German dimension was also anticipated by Lemisch himself on 11 November 1918, when he called on Carinthia to make its contribution to the resurrection of the German Reich ‘from misfortune to fortune’.53 One of the most effective myth-makers was the redoubtable Hans Steinacher. He had grown up in Bleiberg-Kreuth, had worked as a school teacher before the war, and became the organizer of the pro-Austrian propaganda campaign (Landesagitationsleitung). Important though Carinthia was to him it was only one part of a wider fight back by Deutschtum which stretched from Upper Silesia to the ‘Prussian Rhineland’. Later it took him to the politics of the Sudetenland (as head of the League for Germandom abroad [Verband für das Deutschtum im Ausland]), Nazi Party membership and the Wehrmacht occupation of Norway.54 In 1920 he clearly believed that the future of Carinthia and Austria lay with Greater Germany and, like Lemisch and many others, saw the plebiscite result as a green light for the Germanization of southern Carinthia.55 Police and civil servants, including teachers, were to ensure that Slovene speakers who had voted for Yugoslavia were ‘educated’ to become loyal members of a German province. Some Slovene leaders were pressurized into leaving for Yugoslavia.56 Another important aspect of the Lemisch ‘mission’ concerned real estate. Building on pre-war foundations, an extensive network of organizations, which was centred on the Carinthian real estate brokerage organization (Kärntner Bodenvermittlungsstelle),

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provided finance to buy up the farms of debt-ridden Slovene farmers. It saw its duty as ensuring that ‘home soil stays in hands which loyal to the Heimat or is moved into them’.57 Those Slovenes who had voted for Austria were not considered a problem – their readiness to assimilate was taken for granted.58 In the struggle for interpretative supremacy of the border dispute military and militaristic accounts gained ascendancy. Carinthian Social Democrats, who were politically strong at first, were steadily pushed aside by German national antidemocratic groups. Who took control of the Carinthian Heimat Service (KHD) and moulded the commemorations of the plebiscite on 10 October.59 The Social Democrats, insisting that the workers’ councils had been real backbones of Carinthian resistance to Yugoslavia, left the KHD (renamed the Carinthian Heimat League) in 192460 and boycotted subsequent anniversary ceremonies. Though they rejoined the ceremonies in 1930 they were forced on the defensive. One of their most important leaders Hans Lagger warned that militarists and others were ‘falsifying and distorting the true picture of the Abwehrkampf and the plebiscite with all kinds of fairy tales, fables and legends’.61 German Carinthian scholars and writers helped sustain some of these legends.62 For example the ethnologist Georg Graber provided a narrative of inferior Slovenes happily accepting the blessings of superior German culture.63 But perhaps the most influential German national intellectual was the historian and director of the Provincial Archive Martin Wutte. For decades he fought a ‘spiritual Abwehrkampf ’ with enormous energy and formidable but tendentious scholarship, underpinned by a veneration of provincial identity and an unwavering belief in German superiority.64 As a member of the Austrian Delegation at the Paris Peace Conference, he had made the case for Carinthia’s historical boundaries. In 1926 he interpreted the outcome of the plebiscite as a popular wish for an Anschluss.65 Although Wutte was part of a wider ‘turn’ towards racial and ethnic (völkisch) scholarship, his interpretations retained an element of choice – albeit the choice between acknowledging German superiority and treason to Carinthia.66 In his discussion of the 1923 census results, for example, he conceded that the term race (Rasse) might be justified by the situation in Vienna, where the influx of ‘east Jews’ meant that merely ‘registering a religious affirmation was inadequate for establishing the numbers of ‘race Jews’. But he feared that in the context of Germanization the ‘ambiguity’ of the term ‘race’ would muddy the waters.67 Similarly he condemned the Yugoslav attempt to ‘reclaim’ members of its German minority as ‘Germanized Slavs’ as being based on ‘nonsensical and inproducable (unerbringbar) marks of ancestry and race’.68 But in his 1927 brochure ‘Deutsch – Windisch – Slowenisch’ he moved closer to racial thinking. In his construction of the ‘Windish’ as an Ersatz nationality69 ‘common descent’ was admittedly only one of six factors determining their nationality, but it received more space than the others.70 Wutte concluded that the ‘Carinthian Slovenes’ had intermixed with Germans for much longer than the ‘Slovene Carniolans’. Largely on the basis of place and family names he concluded that both Germans and Slovene had emerged through ‘a mixing of both nations’. Urban Jarnik and natural Germanization were also deployed here. But Wutte also cited the views of the socialist leader and theorist Otto Bauer about ‘transitional areas’ in order to make the case that ‘there is probably hardly any Slovene who has not more or less German blood in his

16

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veins, and … many of them possess more German than Slovene’. Last but not least he cited recent ‘scientific’ investigations of skull shapes and other physiological indications (eye colour, hair and height). He took the mixture of two types – Dinaric and NordicGermanic – as evidence of the long intermixture and close racial relationship of Germans to Carinthian Slovenes. Taken together all these factors justified labelling the latter ‘Windish’. The clear implication was that Slovenes who did not want to accept assimilation were not authentic Carinthians.71 To many Social Democrats, who emerged from the first post-war election (1919) as the strongest party in the province (42.4 per cent of the electoral roll),72 the ‘panGerman revolution’ seemed to offer the only route out of economic malaise. In July 1921 (after losing heavily in the elections) their leader, Governor Florian Gröger, told the Landtag that despite the Allied ban on the Anschluss he looked forward to the ‘day of joy when Austria and Germany would merge’.73 Hellwig Valentin argues that support for the Anschluss – along with anti-Semitism and anti-clericalism – was a key ideological bridge between socialists and German nationalists.74 In 1924 the Carinthian party put forward an autonomy proposal which pursued the Landtag’s 1920 pledge.75 It proposed that a Slovene ‘People’s Community’ (Volksgemeinschaft) be established as a ‘corporation in public law’ with an elected executive (National Council) and a register (Kataster), in which all Slovenes would be entered.76 The proposal was influenced by Austro-Marxist ideas of ‘personal autonomy’ as well as the idea of ascription of ethnic identity contained in the 1905 ‘Moravian compromise’.77 It was also designed in the hope of obtaining better treatment for the German minority in Yugoslavia as a quid pro quo for granting autonomy to Carinthian Slovenes.78 But after lengthy negotiations it foundered on the question of how membership of the minority should be decided. The proposal to base registration on individual affirmation of ethnic identity appeared to Slovene leaders as a confirmation of previous Germanization and likely to isolate the nationally conscious core who were able or willing to ‘stand up and be counted’. Their counter-proposal was that a Slovene National Council should have the power to send all children to Slovene schools in areas under their authority. The Council would thus be able to overrule parental wishes or, in the perspective of the Slovene leader Franc Petek, to have children learn Slovene ‘whether their parents were courageous or not’.79 But for the ‘German parties’ this was a denial of ‘parental rights’, and an attempt to reverse the plebiscite result. The negotiations collapsed amid mutual recriminations. The Social Democrats rejected the Slovene proposal because they feared it would hand control over the minority to a leadership which they considered to be reactionary, and clerical. They noted the support given to the Christian Socials by the Slovene People’s Party (Koroška Slovenska Stranka/Kärntner Slowenische Partei).80 The gulf between socialist leaders (many of them from Slovene backgrounds) and clerical critics of the modern world like Valentin Podgorc and Rudolf Blüml widened.81 On the other side Vinzenz Schumy, the assimilated Slovene leader of the Landbund, told the chief executive of the KHD Alois Maier-Kabitsch that he was happy at the failure of the talks.82 Both saw that the key to Germanizing the population was to offer Slovenes a ‘choice’ which would separate them from their nationally conscious leaders.

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In provincial elections the Slovene People’s Party attracted around 10,000 Slovene voters and regularly ended up with two seats in the Landtag.83 On Dirk Hänisch’s estimate only 40 per cent of Slovene speakers voted for the party in 1930, while 24.3 per cent voted Social Democrat.84 Catholic priests remained the backbone of Slovene cultural life in the villages but here too the power of the party began to erode.85 In several acrimonious confrontations Slovene priests tried to rally their parishioners against German national pressure. But as well as facing attacks from their ‘national’ opponents’ they were subject to the discipline of the church authorities.86 In Carinthia as a whole the Christian Socials remained weak with less than 20 per cent of the vote and unable to counter what Wilhelm Wadl has called a ‘tacit anticlerical coalition’.87 Austria’s deepening economic crisis estranged Carinthia’s German elites from Vienna, which was blamed for the fall of prices and loss of key export markets (e.g. for the timber industry). Its legitimacy was further eroded in 1933, when Dollfuss imposed his authoritarian constitution and moved towards an ‘austro-fascist’ regime. In February 1934 the German national provincial governor (Ferdinand Kernmaier) was replaced by decree by the Christian Social Sylvester Leer.88 Above all the Nazi Party profited from the crisis, having already established itself more solidly in Carinthia than almost anywhere else in Austria. (An electoral pact with the Landbund led to the election of its first Landtag seat as early as 1921.) The party’s dynamic, dramatic public choreography and flexible stance allowed it to tap into a range of discontentments, including the frustrations of a younger generation who felt they had ‘missed out’ on the war. Its resistible rise was based particularly on support in Protestant areas of upper Carinthia, in the railway hub of Villach and the provincial capital Klagenfurt.89 In 1930 as part of the ‘Schober bloc’ it challenged its two German national rivals (Großdeutsche Volkspartei [Greater German People’s Party] and the Landbund), and gained 17.9 per cent of vote.90 In May 1931 it gained 19.7 per cent of the electoral roll in elections for the Klagenfurt town council, coming second after the Social Democrats.91 Then it began to encroach into agrarian areas but (apart from Völkermarkt/Velikovec) made little headway in southern Carinthia. As far as Slovene policy was concerned there was little to choose between the Nazis and its rivals. Like them it glorified Carinthia’s salvation from the dark days of 1918–20, warned in apocalyptic language of ‘Slav encroachment’ and invoked the ‘borderland mission’ of resistance to resist ‘Serbophile irredenta’. However, the Nazi solution was more radical; only Nazi Greater Germany could offer the necessary protection against the South Slav threat.92 After the Nazi seizure of power in Germany, Nazi activism intensified and became more terroristic, including bombings and assassinations, until June 1933, when it was forced underground. Soon afterwards in July 1934 came the putsch attempt which killed Chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss and in Carinthia came closer to success than anywhere else, apart from Vienna. Attacks over the following years cost forty-seven lives and injured seventy-three persons,93 and the illegal Nazi Party steadily gained support among Carinthia’s economic and administrative elites. Before the Anschluss, nearly a quarter of Carinthia’s teachers joined the party or were members of the Nazi teacher’s organization, making them a ‘cornerstone’ of the ‘Nazi movement’.94 Carinthian Nazis were also heavily involved in the infighting which was such a prominent feature of the Austrian Nazi Party; two rising SS stars, Hubert Klausner and

18

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Friedrich Rainer, opposed the Austrian leader (Josef Leopold). Together with Odilo Globocnik they formed the core of a distinct Carinthian network within the party. It would hold together after the Anschluss and in the depths of the Holocaust.95 By 1936 the cracks in Carinthia’s anti-Nazi dam were becoming visible.96 The ‘July Agreement’ between Austria and Germany, along with its appended ‘Gentleman’s agreement’, gave the illegal Nazi Party and its supporters special protection, led to the release of thousands of imprisoned Nazis and classified Austrian-German disagreements as an ‘internal German matter’. Carinthian German national elites began to reinsure themselves against regime change by supporting the illegal Nazi Party. Nazi members were emboldened to openly flout the authorities.97 Meanwhile south of the Karawanken some nationalist revisionists in Slovenia were blinkered enough to be encouraged by the Nazi progress. Some intellectuals and students in Ljubljana and Maribor had been unable or unwilling to accept the outcome of the 1920 plebiscite as definitive.98 As well as criticizing the Yugoslav government for tactical errors newspapers (and choirs) lamented the ‘Slovene blood’ of those suffering.99 Some succumbed to the fantasy that the destruction of the Austrian state by Nazi Germany would also bring closer the ‘reunion’ of ‘Slovene Carinthia’ with the mother nation. Some Carinthian Slovene leaders apparently cherished similar hopes.100 The Yugoslav government itself sheltered thousands of illegal Nazis and SS members of the ‘Austrian legion’ in camps close to the Carinthian and Styrian border. When the Yugoslav foreign minister Milan Stojadinović visited Berlin early in 1938, he made it clear that Yugoslavia would regard an Anschluss as an internal German matter.101 In 1937 the Slovene Cultural League drew up a balance sheet of Austrian treatment of the minority since the plebiscite. The author (probably Valentin Podgorc) castigated the tendency to condemn as traitors those Slovenes who had done no more than vote for their nationality (Volkstum) in 1920. He also presented extensive arguments for linguistic and national tolerance, based on theology and canon law, and concluded that the existing school system had damaged language, which was the ‘soul of the Volk’. Carinthian primary schools had ‘thrown out’ the mother tongue and should not be called ‘utraquistic’. His final plea was that ‘little Austria can have no more interest in assimilating this fragment of a national minority with force and injustice’.102 The 1934 census result helps explain Podgorc’s concern: it recorded a drop in the number of Slovene speakers since 1923 from 34,650 to 24,857.103 Admittedly the Carinthian Slovenes also enjoyed some favours from the authoritarian regime of the Patriotic Front (Vaterländische Front), and the Slovene Cultural Association declared their support for Dollfuss’s vision of Austrian renewal based on the cultivation of their mother tongue.104 Three Slovene representatives (supposedly representing the peasant ‘estate’ and the church) sat in the corporatist Landtag.105 But minority leaders were also viewed with suspicion or impatience in Vienna. While some officials in Vienna criticized the prejudice, they faced were seen by others as national ‘loudmouths’ (Schreier) who were ‘trying artificially to generate a form of national irredentism and are seeking and partly finding support in Yugoslav Slovenia’.106 In the end, Rumpler and Burz conclude that – aside from economic and antiSchuschnigg motives – Carinthia’s borderland identity, the prospect of ‘liberation’ from Vienna and arrival the lap of ‘Mother Germania’ were a central explanation for

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Nazi success.107 Many who were not Nazis hailed the Anschluss as the fulfilment of the task left unfinished twenty years earlier.108 They would doubtless have agreed with the German national (now Nazi) Ferdinand Kernmaier that ‘the Anschluss’ had ‘fulfilled the meaning of the Carinthian defensive struggle’.109 By the time the Wehrmacht and SS arrived in Klagenfurt, and well before Herbert Klausner was installed as the first Nazi Gauleiter, the Nazi grass roots had already seized control.110

Exclusion and assimilation in the racial state, 1938–45 The jostling for power and position which followed the Anschluss was as frenetic in Carinthia as elsewhere in Austria and the campaign to maximize the ‘Yes’ vote in the plebiscite which followed, involved a similar mix of intimidation, propaganda and euphoria.111 For the returning members of the Nazi ‘Austrian Legion’ and the party members emerging from illegality it was also a time for settling scores.112 In the first wave of arrests leading members of the Carinthian Vaterländische Front were sent to Dachau. Some of them, like Felix Hurdes, would play prominent parts in the post-war People’s Party (ÖVP).113 One leading socialist leader, Anton Falle, would die in Dachau just before the end of the war. Other socialists, driven by their hatred of the Schuschnigg regime, welcomed its successor. They included Ferdinand Wedenig, who would become provincial governor in 1947. He declared that ‘the workers were happy to finally be united with the great brother empire’.114 In August 1944 he too was sent to Dachau (to be released just before its liberation in April 1945). The most prominent Slovene to be arrested was Vinko Poljanec, who died in August 1938 from the effects of his treatment by the Gestapo. But on the whole, until the referendum was in the bag repression of the minority was limited. Slovenes were brought on side with a mixture of blandishments and intimidation and could vote on the same basis as ‘Aryans’. Their long-term prospects were less promising. Shortly before the Anschluss Alois Maier-Kaibitsch, head of the Kärntner Heimatbund, had explained his strategy to Arthur Seyss-Inquart; the Slovene hard core was to be separated from the rest and ruthlessly dealt with. He opposed shifting from ‘the right of parents’ to ‘so-called objective characteristics’ because that would risk ‘forcible reslovenization’, and the negation of the plebiscite result.115 Here assimilation trumped ‘racial science’. Maier-Kaibitsch swiftly amassed an impressive portfolio of positions which placed him at the centre of minority policy. The ‘assurances’ he gave to Slovene leaders were laced with menace; they had to understand that there was no place for their past irredentism. THat might have been understandable in the Ständestaat but it had no place in the ‘new Germany’. Since the Nazi Party had no wish for revenge and provided the Slovene attitudes to the Reich government was ‘decent’ (including the avoidance of political activity by priests) they had nothing to fear.116 Soon afterwards the two Slovene leaders, Franc Petek and Joško Tischler, declared their support for the new order. They even claimed to see shared ideological ground with the regime.117 Recalling Hitler’s 1934 declaration to the Reichstag that he respected the ‘völkisch

20

Slavs in Post-Nazi Austria

rights of other peoples’ as well as his recent rejection of the notion of ‘Germanization’, they deduced that the Slovene minority would have their place in a state ‘which gets its whole strength from blood and soil’.118 Whether this was naïve, opportunistic or merely desperate, it clearly underestimated the flexibility – or incoherence – of Nazi ideology, which could easily encompass both racial dissimilation and the coercive assimilation of those who, on other occasions, were deemed racially inferior.119 In the plebiscite Slovenes supported the Anschluss as solidly as other Austrians. Once it was out of the way120 the Nazi threat became clearer. At first Maier-Kaibitsch assumed that most Slovenes would embrace the ‘blessings of German culture’ and that manifest coercion would therefore not be much needed. The important point was to separate the bulk of Slovenes from their leaders by applying ‘subjective criteria’ and ‘parental wishes’.121 That was to start at pre-school level with German Kindergartens. The Gau school director Ernst Dlaska anticipated that if they did their job Carinthia’s primary schools would not need to give instruction in ‘Windish’ (i.e. Slovene) because parents would want to have it in German.122 Shortly afterwards Maier-Kaibitsch told Slovene leaders that if they continued to consider objective characteristics as decisive that would mean ‘the liquidation of this Sloveenedom (Slowenentum), which I consider chauvinistic’.123 Among those dismissed or exiled was Janes Starc, a former Slovene member of the provincial Diet and deputy head of the Slovene Cultural League.124 In March 1939 Tischler was transferred from his teaching post in Villach and banished to Bregenz because of his ‘provocative behaviour’.125 By 1941 over sixty-six Slovene priests had been forced to leave their parishes.126 Those declared to be ‘enemies of people and state’ were liable to be expropriated, imprisoned and deported. Slovene agricultural cooperatives were absorbed by their German competitors.127 Though some Slovene was still being taught in schools – to the outrage of the Nazi ‘grass roots’ – by March 1939 fifty out of seventy-eight ‘utraquistic’ schools had become purely German-medium schools.128 At this stage Nazi policy still accepted the fiction of the ‘Windish’. The 1939 census distinguished ‘Windish’ both as a linguistic and ethnic (national) category: 43,179 speakers declared they had some knowledge of Slovene or Windish language, and only 7,715 were prepared to take the risk of being counted as Slovenes;129 a Windish ‘representative’ was even sent to the Reichstag in Berlin.130 For many Slovenes the possibility of self-identifying as Windish and joining the ‘People’s Community’ was an offer they could hardly refuse.131 In police reports for 1941 and 1942 the mood of the Slovene population was often described as ‘quiet, depressed (bedrückt) or withdrawn’.132 These attempts to survive in dangerous times were less heroic than some later glorifications of ‘national liberation struggle’ but neither were they necessarily signs of ‘national indifference’. By the start of the war Nazi rule was well entrenched. There had been a rapid fall in unemployment, rural hardship was alleviated by measures like the debt cancellation and the building of social housing seems to have benefitted many working-class families.133 The remnants of opposition – mainly communist – were silenced or cowed as their networks were penetrated and destroyed.134 Membership of the Nazi Party increased steadily up to 1942 and remained stable thereafter.135 German national elites also – with few exceptions – supported the regime. One much discussed figure, Martin Wutte, was close enough to Nazi ideology to make

Assimilation and Coercion

21

a substantial contribution.136 Together with other scholars he contributed to the megalomaniac academic project ‘Handbook of Borderland and Foreign Germanness’ (Handwörterbuch des Grenzlands- und Auslandsdeutschtum), including an attempt to establish an ‘objective’ basis for the distinction between Slovene and Windish.137 As before, he stressed that previous Germanization had not been an ‘artificial product of a coercion’ or the product of the recent past but was a ‘natural result of historical development and the geographical situation of the province’.138 He included some anti-Semitic barbs in his denunciation of Viennese treachery139 but it seems unlikely that he favoured a comprehensive racial categorization of the southern Carinthian population.140 It is unclear what came of the ‘detailed racially scientific investigations of the population of Carinthia’ which, according to the Handbook, were ‘still taking place’.141 The invasion of Yugoslavia in April 1941 brought hubris. Now that foreign policy constraints were removed, exciting vistas opened up. Hitler’s famous order in Maribor to ‘make this land German again’ resonated with those who had long cherished the utopia of a Slovene-free Carinthia.142 But more ambitious plans for the ‘recovery’ of ‘lost’ territory and a racial ‘reconfiguration’ of the region had already been drafted before the invasion.143 Wutte and his colleagues celebrated the return of the ‘lost’ Miess valley (Miestal/Mežiška Dolina) in the name of Carinthian unity.144 They strongly supported the Germanization of ‘Upper Carniola’ (Oberkrain) as German Kulturboden (cultural soil), reversing their earlier ‘proof ’ that the separation of Carinthia from Carniola had been the natural wall separating German from Slav. A collection of essays on the Oberkrain adapted the familiar narrative of peaceful interaction between a lower ‘Windish’ and a higher German to the new situation: Carniolan land was essentially German, with a population of largely Slavicized Germans. Everywhere in Upper Carniola’s medieval history of settlement there were ‘rich traces of German blood and German life’; even in the Middle Ages it had already been ‘to a large extent German “national soil” (Volksboden) and completely German cultural soil, which, as ethnography teaches us particularly, had kept its German stamp up to the present’.145 However, Wutte does seem to have found it increasingly hard to square his narrative of harmonious, consensual interaction between Slav and German with the naked brutality of Nazi rule. The appointment of Friedrich Rainer as Gauleiter in November 1941 brought Wutte closer to the regime in a personal sense (Rainer had been his student) and gave him an opportunity to express his concerns directly.146 For Rainer a Germanized Carinthia was a detail in his larger megalomanic project. Towards the end of 1941, Nazi grand strategy converged with local initiatives to resettle German farmers from the Kočevje/Gotschee and from South Tirol and the Kanal valley, who had ‘opted’ for the Reich.147 On 15–16 April 1942, 917 Slovenes from 171 families largely selected on the basis of their (actual or potential) political dissent were summarily removed and transferred to camps in the centre of the Reich. Their farms were seized and transferred to the ‘resettlers’.148 The manifest violence of this deportation shocked many locals. Some of them (including Nazi Party members) tried to get individuals exempted, arguing that they had been mistakenly identified as hostile to the Nazi state and its policy of Germanization. As one gendarmerie report put it, ‘the deported farmers were in fact

22

Slavs in Post-Nazi Austria

much closer to being Germanised than those elements who have migrated here from Carniola or southern Styria’.149 In the end even Himmler decided that many of the deportees ‘possessed enough German blood to be converted into Germans’. Some might even be permitted to settle in the East, the cradle of future German prosperity.150 Shortly after the deportations Maier-Kabitsch described the situation of Carinthia’s Slovenes less in terms of race than of ‘choice’; they could either join the German Volk or suffer the consequences; stubborn Slovene nationalists (in his eyes blindly procommunist) were to be suppressed and no more Slovene (Windish) was to be spoken. That also meant that the ‘Windish’, having served their purpose as a ‘transitional people’, could now go: they were ‘simply Germans and for the Slovenes there can be no more room here’.151 He also addressed those Germans he considered too complacent or tender-hearted; they had imagined that ‘without us doing anything [the Slovenes] would be swept away by the power of the Reich’ and after 1941 had been ‘resting on the laurels of 10 October 1920’.152 This may well have been aimed at Wutte and his account of the ‘Windish’ as emerging harmoniously from Carinthia’s history and somehow combining elements of blood, will (courage) and loyalty. Maier-Kaibitsch’s brusque dismissal made manifest the coercion which Wutte’s edifice was designed to conceal. While much of the internal decision-making in Nazi Carinthia remains obscure, it is clear that although further mass deportations were avoided – or at least postponed – the goal of Germanization remained a core goal. And Carinthian scholars continued to be implicated in the project.153 At the official opening of the Institute for Carinthian Province Research (Institut für Kärntner Landesforschung) in October 1942 Rainer spoke warmly of Wutte as he awarded him the Carinthian prize for scholarship.154 But he also stressed that there would be no let-up in Germanization. It would proceed ‘in the good old National Socialist way’ and would ‘offensively bring the solution of the problem in the mixed language area in the shortest possible time with all our energy and with deployment of the concentrated strength of Carinthian Germandom’.155 Making Carinthia ‘purely German’ would need the ‘carriers of best German blood and hardest National commitment’. Assimilation was open to those who were ‘German by volition’ (deutsch in ihrem Wollen). But mere external conformity was not enough. Those others whose ‘national Slovene stubbornness’ stopped them listening to the ‘voice of blood’ would be ruthlessly punished. With an intensification of its efforts the party would be able to achieve the ‘final removal of “the so-called Carinthian question”’.156 There is no evidence that Carinthia’s elites – with the possible exception of the writer Friedrich Perkonig – were disturbed at the prospect of the complete disappearance of Slovene.157 Wutte apparently did, however, try to exploit his personal relationship with the Gauleiter to plead for a less brutal route towards it which would avoid ‘extermination, deportation and resettlement’.158 The Slovenes should be treated more ‘generously’ because the Germans’ overwhelming superiority meant that Germanization could be given time to work. Avoiding ‘abrupt’ measures and reverting to the earlier approach of ‘understanding, trustworthy treatment’ would bring fulfilment of the Führer’s Maribor command.159 The idea of a ‘soft Germanization’ can also be seen in Wutte’s magnum opus on ‘Carinthia’s struggle for freedom’, an enlarged edition of his earlier study, enriched

Assimilation and Coercion

23

by the new archival sources from Belgrade and which, as the forward coyly put it, had now been made ‘available’. Wutte’s basic understanding of Germanization had changed little. Race and blood – in all its ambiguity – played its part but Wutte was more concerned to stress ‘affirmation’ and downgrade language as a determinant of national identity.160 Perhaps the most obvious addition was his promotion of the military factor. The Abwehrkampf was no longer merely a ‘proof ’ of a pre-existing ethnic reality but a creative act of heroism.161 The ‘spiritual Abwehrkampf ’ had complemented the ‘armed struggle’; it had exposed the reality of the situation but at the same time the truth of its findings was demonstrated by military success.162 In this respect Wutte’s publication resembled those of two other veterans of the defensive struggle, Siegmund Knaus and Hans Steinacher.163 Steinacher’s self-promoting memoir hailed the ‘German sword’, which had defeated the South Slavs in 1918–20 and reunited Austria to Germany in 1938. Now would now win the war. Like Maier-Kaibitsch he looked forward to the ‘final ethnic absorption of the Windish’. These accounts, and digested versions in press articles and school material, drummed the idea of German superiority – whether understood racially or culturally, or both, into the younger generation.164 Admittedly, as the course of the war turned against the Reich doubts began to mount about the effectiveness of the ‘German sword’. Especially after the Italian surrender in September 1943 pressure increased for a broader-based anti-Bolshevik mobilization. Rainer, in his new position as chief comissar (Oberster Kommissar) of the operational zone of the Adriatic Littoral, apparently recognized this. Together with Globocnik, now head of police in Trieste, he started to boost conservative and anticommunist Slovenes, playing them off against the Italians.165 This was certainly a more intelligent policy than the blanket reprisals favoured by the Wehrmacht commander General Kübler.166 But in other respects Rainer remained as blinkered as ever and it is hard to see him as a proponent of ‘ethnic diversity’.167 Indeed the removal of any need to defer to Mussolini now opened up the prospect of achieving the old dream of a German Adriatic. The new phase in German policy deepened the civil war in Slovenia, which was intertwined with the communist-led insurgency. The Liberation Front (Osvobodilna Fronta [OF]) had begun to be more active in Carinthia in summer 1942. By the following spring they had penetrated into the area around Eisenkappel/Železna Kapla and into the Rosental.168 Their task was not easy, given the ruthless repression and the continued support for Nazi rule among sections of the population. Carinthian Slovenes too did divide neatly between Nazi collaborators and resistance fighters. Plenty of Catholics remained suspicious of the communist Liberation Front and were unconvinced by the language of ‘national liberation’.169 Some were alienated by the Partisans’ contribution to the spiral of violence and counter-violence.170 Overall as one partisan leader, Dušan Pirjevec-Ahac, put it at the start of 1944, ‘the masses in Carinthia were not yet ready for the battle’. He also complained that even where their national consciousness was strong they continued to follow ‘reactionary’ Catholic leadership.171 Peter Pirker argues that its partisan activity became increasingly dependent on (British) airdrops.172 After a major clash in Črna/Schwarzenbach in August 1944 the OF command scaled down its operations, partly in order to husband resources for the end of the war and the looming territorial dispute.173

24

Slavs in Post-Nazi Austria

Yet this does not alter the fact that Slovene resistance, which had cost hundreds of lives in Carinthia, was the most effective military challenge to Nazi rule within the territory of the Reich.174 Elsewhere in Carinthian society more diffuse ‘resistance’ – in the sense of relative immunity to Nazi values (Resistenz) – can be seen in the Catholic Church.175 Chief Vicar (Kapitularvikar) Andreas Rohracher for example protested against the deportations of April 1942.176 Yet it is hard to see this as part of a spectrum of Carinthian objections to Nazi rule or the acts of ‘spiritual Carinthia’.177 Far from being representative the church was a beleaguered institution, undermined by confiscations and repression and anticlerical propaganda.178 The decline in church weddings and the numbers leaving the church (19,500 between 1938 and 1945) show that the campaign had some success.179 Later, reflecting in Yugoslav captivity Rainer commented disparagingly that ‘the so-called resistance movement’ had ‘hardly manifested itself ’. Apart from communists and Slovenes, there had been no significant resistance and ‘until the 7 May I had the situation under control’.180 On this point at least, his claim is backed by the weight of available evidence.181 The most prominent resistance came from those communists who had survived the first wave of Gestapo repression. Some joined the ranks of the OF but the relationship between the two was tense. Franklin Lindsay, an American Office of Strategic Services (OSS) officer attached to the partisans in Slovenia, even judged that the Austrian Freedom Front (Österreichische Freiheitsfront, ÖFF) was ‘largely a notional organisation and under the control of the Yugoslavs’.182 Shortly before the collapse of the Nazi regime Ernst Kaltenbrunner described the political and security situation in Carinthia as ‘better’ than in the neighbouring, ‘rather disturbed’ Styria. In discussing possible obstacles to a last-ditch stand he made no mention of resistance.183 Equally striking, the only group which the chief Carinthian administrator, Meinrad Natmeßnig, labelled a resistance movement in May 1945 was communist.184 They were also the only group which was excluded from the ‘Executive Committee’ which he proposed to negotiate with in the closing hours of the Nazi regime.185 Nazi repression can explain some of this.186 But fear alone cannot explain how morale apparently survived despite the evidence that the war was being lost; for example the bombing of Villach und Klagenfurt in autumn 1944, which killed an estimated 1,200 civilians and caused considerable damage.187 One explanation is that the population was cushioned from the impact of the worsening supply situation, which did not become a full-blown crisis until after the war was over. In summer 1945 the nutritionist Mervyn Pyke concluded from an (admittedly brief) survey merely that the food situation, ‘while not yet critical’, was ‘by no means satisfactory’. Two months later the diet in Spittal and Villach was ‘dangerously meagre’ and in Villach the official daily intake was only 1,400 calories (1,600 in Klagenfurt) but it was still as high as 3,000 in some rural areas.188 Some of the ideational bonds which helped the regime survive were probably similar as elsewhere in the Reich. for example the ‘Führer myth’, and the hope for victory through the Wunderwaffe. When it came to scenarios of revenge the Yugoslav partisans may have been more prominent than the wider fear of ‘World Jewry’.189 Last but not least the German Carinthian Heimat continued to provide some with motivation in the last spring of the war.190 By then the parallels with the Abwehrkampf,

Assimilation and Coercion

25

repeatedly hammered home in Nazi propaganda, gained a superficial plausibility (so long as the memory of the Wehrmacht crossing the border in a southerly direction was suppressed). On 4 May the aged Martin Wutte offered his services to the Gauleiter in defense of the province.191 And in the regime’s dying hours Maier-Kaibitsch went round Klagenfurt trying to organize a ‘second Abwehrkampf ’.192 The Abwehrkampf was also the main point of reference for Rainer when negotiations with Carinthian politicians began at his villa on 6 May. He ‘assumed’ that its principles would be included in the new post-Nazi order. The politicians reassured him that they had always stood by the principle of ‘a free and undivided Carinthia’. Rainer then proposed that a ‘League of defenders of the border’ be mobilized in defence of the border. This should be organized in a way that would avoid the charge of being ‘a camouflaged SA or something similar’. Nazi members would need to be swiftly integrated simply because they were ‘the best Abwehrkämpfer’ who would be lost if they were spurned by the new power-holders. Here too the politicians were accommodating. Hans Piesch, the Social Democrat leader, assured him that only the Nazi party district leaders (Kreisleiter) were unacceptable as ‘fighters’ (for the border); only Nazis who had violated the law would be punished and this would be publicly stated. No one would be punished purely on the ground of party membership: ‘we will not prosecute Party members for their party membership but only implement personnel changes, and these won’t be done quickly’. Rainer then promised that the fighting forces of the party would not oppose the new regime and announced that he himself wished to help to preserve the unity of Carinthia and the ‘moderate’ treatment of party members duly featured in the three key public statements of the transition, published on 9 May 1945: Rainer’s valedictory radio speech, Natmeßnig’s public statement and the first published declaration of the new government.193 By then – after a final attempt to negotiate his pension arrangements – Rainer had taken to the hills.194 For all Rainer’s fantasies – according to one report he resolved to reject any offer to support the British if it meant being assigned a Jewish advisor!195 – he was correct in anticipating two central tropes of post-Nazi discourse: the helpless small party member requiring compassion and forgiveness and the indispensable activist, without whose energy and ability Carinthian society could not survive or be rebuilt. He was also right on another key point: the ‘idea of the Abwehrkampf ’ was still alive and kicking. It was sustained by an assumption of the inferiority of Slovene language, culture and race. A generation of children had passed through an education system designed to make them ‘fully valued members of the German nation right from their childhood and from their parental houses’.196 An American OSS report noted in July 1945 that ‘in the view of many German-Carinthians [the minority] deserved and continues to deserve no better fate than absorption into the superior German community’.197 Even the comprehensive military defeat of Nazi Germany only partly dented the message of German superiority. According to one post-war report the impact of Nazi policy had been so ‘massive’ (kolossal) that today children of Slovenes ‘refuse to speak, let alone learn Slovene, even when ordered to by their parents’.198 The problem was not just lost linguistic knowledge; it was the continued stigmatization of Slovene. In August 1945 a member of the parish church council (Pfarrkirchenrat) in Maria Wörth/Otok, ‘himself of Slovene descent’, saw no point in reintroducing Slovene into the church

26

Slavs in Post-Nazi Austria

since ‘everyone would understand German, but a good proportion of Church-goers didn’t understand Slovene’.199 A year later the priest, Thomas Ulbing, who had been forced to leave his parish reported from Gottestal/Skočidol that ‘German is understood by nearly everyone, Slovene by almost no-one any more. And yet 70 per cent are of Slovene descent’.200 By contrast another returning priest reported from Maria Elend/ Podgorje that only about ten families could not speak Slovene, but added that if there was a referendum 90 per cent would want German as their language.201 At a meeting of the OF Youth League the police reported (and derided) the fact that only 3 out of 105 spoke ‘high’ Slovene, the others speaking ‘Windish’. One participant had asked to be allowed to speak in dialect.202 These attitudes contrasted starkly with the self-confident mood of the victorious Slovene partisans. Hope for a new world was fused into an inflated optimism about Slavdom and the ‘new Yugoslavia’. Activists waved the banner of national liberation in the heart of the German Heimat. One youthful activist later recalled, ‘we were terribly cheeky and self-confident. We thought the world belonged to us’.203 Territorial revision appeared the continuation of the national liberation struggle. It is important to recognize that this self-confidence – or triumphalism – only affected a part of the Slovene minority. The ethnic politics which followed is difficult to understand unless it is recognized that it was from the start deeply divided; attempts to simplify the range of individual decisions and life stories into a straightforward narrative of Carinthian loyalty, or national liberation was itself part of post-war politics. Carinthia as a whole did not seem to be a society on the verge of collapse in summer 1945.204 One British report concluded that alongside those who felt sincere pleasure at the liberation ‘a large proportion of the people is now anti-Nazi, but not because Nazism was bad, only because it failed’.205 A week after the end of the war, Villach housewives indicated their expectation of continuity when they demanded the British army newspaper for free since they had already paid their subscription to the Gau newspaper at the start of the month.206

2

Provincial Politics, 1945–7

From the Third Reich to the Second Republic The first Carinthian provisional government broadly reflected the spectrum of Carinthian German politics, although apparently it had no Nazi Party members apart from Natmeßnig (who attended its first meeting). The designated governor Hans Piesch (originally from Silesia) had been a school headmaster in Villach before becoming Social Democrat mayor of the town.1 Two years later it became known that he been a middle-ranking official of the National Socialist Teachers League (NS-Lehrerbund). Other evidence suggests that he worked in a ‘Race Office’ which ‘dealt with the expropriation of Jews and the confiscation of their property’ and in a ‘resettlement office’ in Carniola.2 Overall it seems that he was probably no more than a medium-sized cog in the provincial administration but had adapted to National Socialism without too much difficulty.3 Despite his early support for the Anschluss, Ferdinand Wedenig, who succeeded Piesch as governor in 1947, had a clearer anti-Nazi profile including imprisonment in Dachau.4 He was also unusual among Carinthian politicians in not only speaking warmly of Slovene culture but even on occasion speaking it in public (he had a Slovene-speaking mother)5, for example in his inaugural speech and in a broadcast on 10 October 1948.6 The conservative members of the government included opponents and victims of Nazism (e.g. Sylvester Leer, Alois Karisch (later deputy governor) and Ignaz Tschurtschentaler)7 as well as supporters like Hans Amschl, who after first losing his job as an attorney after the Anschluss but had later worked in Klagenfurt as a state prosecutor (Staatsanwalt).8 Stefan Tauschitz, a prominent Landbund leader, had supported the Anschluss as a diplomat in the Austrian embassy in Berlin but was later pensioned off by the Nazi regime.9 After playing an important part in the negotiations leading to Rainer’s departure he was arrested by the British and interned.10 Tauschitz, like Hans Ferlitsch and Josef Glantschnig, was a Landbund leader with a Slovene background. Another, perhaps even more important Landbund figure was the former vice-chancellor Vinzenz Schumy. Little is known about his activities in the Third Reich though his biographer records that he declined to apply for membership of the Nazi Party.11 Though not in the Carinthian government he soon became an influential figure in Carinthian and national politics and was instrumental in moving the People’s Party in a more anti-Slovene direction.

28

Slavs in Post-Nazi Austria

It is not easy to judge how committed these politicians had been to the Nazi project or how disillusioned they may have become as its failure became clear. Evaluation is not helped by the doctored or embellished autobiographies which were routinely produced and often told dramatic stories of courageous resistance or harsh persecution.12 But overall the picture hardly confirms Wilhelm Wadl’s view that ‘nearly all’ members of the government had suffered political persecution or that in May 1945 a successful ‘resistance movement’ seized power.13 In fact it is precisely the lack of a shared resistance experience which plausibly explains the absence of an anti-Nazi consensus among the first post-war generation of Carinthian politicians. By contrast, memories and resentments from the conflicts before the Anschluss remained strong and divisive. They can be seen in early disagreements about appointments, for example the case of Paul Suppanz, who as state prosecutor had successfully called for the death sentence for the socialist leader Kollman Wallisch in 1934.14 The fact that people like Suppanz had subsequently suffered persecution at the hands of the Nazis hardly made up for this in the eyes of the socialists. As one British report put it, ‘even men like [Ignaz] Tschurtschentaler, who have been through Dachau and are recognised as proven anti-Nazis, are still compromised by the political ideas they represented between 1934 and 1938’.15 Conversely, an early provincial conference of the Socialist Party of Austria (Sozialistische Partei Österreichs, SPÖ) resolved that those who ‘may have been members of the NSDAP and who were not extremists under Dollfuss and Schuschnigg’ would be allowed to join the party as ‘supporting members’.16 Rather than a unifying ‘spirit of the camp’ (Geist der Lagerstrasse) it was the Carinthian Heimat which provided a pervasive idiom and frame of reference across the political spectrum. From the start it helped blur the normative boundary between democracy and Nazi rule. The case of Natmeßnig, the pivotal figure of the transition of power, illustrates the point. Having been included in the first provisional government as provincial director of administration, he was arrested by the British and interned.17 Only a month later his old employer (the Klagenfurt Gewerbe- und Handelsbank) pushed for his release, arguing that ‘as a leading Bank director he was able to put his great knowledge and abilities in the service of the economy of Carinthia’. In the Carinthian government, Amschl and Ferlitsch noted ‘that Natmeßnig had been outstandingly efficient and had been motivated in his activities by the point of view of the possible advancement of provincial interests’. Service to the province was thus ‘depoliticized’ and detached from Nazi rule. Admittedly this did not go unchallenged, with objections coming from the former Christian social politician Hans Grossauer and the communist Josef Hanny (Hanni). Nevertheless it was decided to request Natmeßnig’s release from Military Government.18 His supporters included Vinzenz Schumy. When he was released after eighteen months it aroused ‘strong public feeling’ at what was seen as ‘a purely political wangle’.19 Natmeßnig returned to his bank and later became a local councillor in Velden/Vrba and active in the anti-Slovene Südmark and Kärntner Heimatdienst.20 This and other cases soon exposed the Carinthian government to outside attack. It came in particular from the communist press, the Liberation Front (OF) and Yugoslavia. Clearly concerned, Piesch urged his colleagues to ensure that the ‘democratic principle was asserted everywhere in public life’. As far as denazification

Provincial Politics, 1945–7

29

was concerned he argued not only that the task had already effectively been completed but that it had been done more effectively in Carinthia than anywhere else in Austria or ‘the whole German area’. Therefore ‘the criticism which is already being levelled, that Carinthia still has a Nazi administration with a democratic head, has to be deflected’.21 Piesch’s inflated claim about Carinthian resistance has recently been taken up by some historians without it becoming become any more plausible.22 As party politics restarted after twelve years, denazification itself – and exemptions from it – became a prime site of party patronage. The Socialist Party was quick to exploit the governorship to gain an early competitive advantage. Its target was to recruit 40,000 members (nearly 10 per cent of the population!). By the end of 1945 the party’s highest pre-war figure of 21,553 (1929) had been overtaken.23 A key figure in this process was the head of the Carinthian administration (Amtsdirektor) Karl Newole. In line with Piesch’s assurance to Gauleiter Rainer he reassured Bishop Rohracher early on that only ‘illegals’ would be dismissed.24 Later he estimated that 80 per cent of Nazi members would be classified as ‘harmless’.25 In September 1945 he pronounced himself ‘more than satisfied with the progress of de-Nazification’.26 But some of those reinstated or confirmed were far from ‘harmless’ small Nazis. Valentin Meierhofer, for example, another Landbund politician and a veteran of the Abwehrkampf, as head of the Nazi provincial farmers’ organization had been closely involved in the expropriation of Slovene farmers.27 In September 1945 he was appointed to the Indemnification Committee.28 Another well-publicized case was Sepp Stotter, who had been in charge of the Carinthian Department of Agriculture, Economics and Labour.29 He was later dismissed by the Federal Denazification Commission but then reinstated and put in charge of the Provincial Agriculture Department.30 These and other causes célèbres show that networks of friendship and dependence were able to survive and adapt to the new party system.31 Mitigation or exemption from denazification penalties mutated into rehabilitation and in many cases career advancement. As with Natmeßnig, past service to the Heimat – irrespective of the nature of the regime – became a standard defence. Equally common was the assumption that resistance to a Slav threat was at the heart of that service.

Slovene participation The Carinthian expectation that the British would be ready to deal with the body they found in situ proved correct. Jack Nicholls, the senior British diplomat on the scene, described the provisional government as ‘precisely the sort of reasonably representative security-checked body’ the Foreign Office had wanted to see as a first step towards the re-establishment of full democracy in Austria; overall it was a ‘reasonably solid firm and anxious to cooperate with us’. Piesch himself was ‘genuine and not too clever’ (Nicholls clearly thought both traits equally valuable).32 In view of the information about Piesch which later came to light, Nicholls’s faith in British vetting processes seems complacent, to say the least. So does the view of his superior, William Mack, that Piesch was ‘universally recognised as a reliable anti-Nazi’.33 There was a fleeting worry that the ‘Piesch party’ might be ‘suspect to a large degree owing to it having

30

Slavs in Post-Nazi Austria

been formed before our arrival’ but it was brushed aside: it had in effect already been recognized by Military Government and there would be ‘confusion if we now go back on this’. It was decided to approve the committee as an interim solution ‘until popular wishes become clearer’.34 Compared to this key decision the downgrading of the provisional government to the status of the Advisory Committee (Konsultativer Landesausschuss) and the limitation of its members to advisory functions, frustrating though it was to them, had little practical significance.35 The head of Military Government, Colonel Donald Smith, signalled that the ‘demotion’ was only temporary – in the event after only five weeks the committee was upgraded to the status of a (provisional) government.36 More importantly, Smith assured the committee that he had ‘complete confidence’ that Piesch understood ‘our’ problems and was ready to collaborate in tackling them. He announced his wish to ‘enlist’ Piesch ‘in order to achieve through his advice the best possible implementation of administrative measures’.37 The way was thus open for ever-closer collaboration between Carinthian politicians and the British authorities. The decision to endorse Piesch also reflected an underlying political and logistical imperative: to work with the grain of Carinthian society and not against it. Though this may not have been clear in the first post-war summer, in the medium- and long-term British personnel shortages (and domestic pressures to demobilize) limited the scope of their ambition. The fact that collaboration was easier – and cheaper – than coercion weighed more than the grandiose panoply of rights granted to a victorious army by the 1907 Hague Convention. But even if more resources had been available a complex society like Carinthia could not be directed at the point of a bayonet. The experience of even the most coercive occupation regimes was that they needed local collaborators, their knowledge, expertise and connections. In Carinthia the relationship between the occupier and the occupied, even in the first post-war phase, soon began to look more like a rather cosy cohabitation than ‘total control’.38 Admittedly British intelligence (Field Security Section and Public Safety) officers were also keen to implement the far-reaching schemes for dismissal, arrest and internment, which had been laid down by US and British military planners. But these ambitions soon also came up against their inherent limits; lack of local knowledge and understanding of how Nazi rule functioned made it difficult or impossible to assess the mass of claims and counter-claims they faced. Others parts of Military Government were in any case much more concerned with solving the administrative problems of relief and reconstruction, including the looming food crisis, than assessing levels of complicity. They judged – probably correctly – that their task would be hampered by denazification.39 Neither British security nor its administrators were prepared to work with the Slovene OF.40 On 19 May it had constituted itself under the auspices of Yugoslav forces as the ‘Regional People’s Liberation Committee’ (Pokrajinksi narodnoosvobodilni Odbor [PNOO]).41 For Nicholls they were ‘purely Slovene irredentists’. There could be no recognition of a body which supported border revision.42 Even if Austria’s borders were still technically yet to be finalized and the occupation zones were still unagreed (until the Control Agreement was signed by the four occupying powers on 4 July) British opposition to redrawing the frontier was adamant.

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The British did, however, want to fill one obvious gap in the committee – its lack of a Slovene representative. That was done initially by appointing Thomas Suppanz, a farmer with limited political experience.43 In other respects the British were sympathetic but vague. Colonel Smith hoped that any proposals would be presented (via Piesch) since Military Government ‘placed particular significance’ on the minority; they realized that the Slovenes had suffered ‘quite a lot of injustice’ and would therefore welcome ‘any suggestions in this respect’.44 In the course of the following months British involvement did not deepen. Their basic ignorance was shown in some inept decisions, for example the flat rejection of the request to re-establish the Slovene Cultural League.45 Some admiration for Tito and the partisans for having defeated the Wehrmacht had apparently survived the confrontation of May but there was also plenty of anti-communist feeling, as well as dismissive and racist attitudes to Slavs. Overall British officers often seemed happier socializing with socially superior Carinthian Germans, regardless of their past activities. It also helped if they were female; one report referred to the ‘rule of female interpreters’.46 British decision-makers saw many of these interactions through the prism of ‘Munich’. Tito’s policy towards Carinthia (and Greece and Triest) appeared to be following the model of Hitler’s Sudeten policy. The core lesson which the West thought it had learnt was that making concessions to predatory neighbours was counterproductive.47 Yet the analogy – apart from the dubious equation of Tito with Hitler – diverted attention from the specificity of the situation, and led to a perverse reversal; Carinthian Germans – including many who had supported the Nazis – were compared to the ‘plucky Czechs’ who had resisted Hitler, while the leaders of the Liberation Front, who had fought the Nazi attempt to eliminate their language and culture, were seen as latter-day Henleins.48 Even if the British did not completely ignore German nationalism they tended to see only its geopolitical dimensions, that is the danger of a revival of pro-Anschluss sentiment, and largely ignored the strength of anti-Slovene prejudice.49 In any case assimilation was assumed to be the best way to stabilize ethnically divided societies. That implied that the task of the state was limited to ensuring neutrality and a level playing field. Democracy in Austria was to be restored through outlawing ‘discrimination against individual Austrians on grounds of race or religion’.50 Yet there was also a pragmatic counter-argument: the best way to defuse irredentism was to accommodate the minority.51 In its first session the provisional government seemed to accept this logic when, in an admittedly largely symbolic act, it revoked the 1942 deportation and promised ‘appropriate compensation’ for the expropriation which had accompanied it.52 As well as principles of morality and justice Piesch also made clear that there was a tactical consideration: taking the initiative would preempt ‘outside bodies from giving them instructions’.53 Whether he meant Yugoslavia or the British, his basic point was clear: ‘reasonable concessions’ would take the wind out of the sails of the government’s critics.54 But what was reasonable? Piesch and his colleagues needed to find Slovenes who were likely to agree with their own understanding. On 26 May Piesch reported that he had been talking to Slovenes who ‘want nothing to do with the Tito people’ (he did not

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say who). The ‘confusion in the Slovene camp’ made it all the more important that the government did ‘what justice demands’. He mentioned specifically the reconstruction of the parish councils on the basis of the 1932 electoral situation and the energetic implementation of redress (Wiedergutmachung) for Slovene deportees. He saw ‘no objection’ to the reestablishment of the Slovene Cultural League and the agricultural cooperatives.55 A fortnight later the government issued a declaration ‘for settling the Slovene question’. It gave an assurance of justice and expressed admiration for the ‘heroic liberation struggle of the Yugoslav people’. It hoped that Slovene loyalty to the Austrian state would continue to be compatible with love of Slovene nationality (Volkstum).56 It also promised a reversal of the ‘artificial infiltration’ of south-east Carinthia by Reich Germans, the restoration of utraquistic schools and the use of both languages in public office.57 Details were yet to be determined,58 but the proposal for education shows how limited the government’s ambitions were. Piesch reported that the Slovenes he had spoken to had agreed to the restoration of the pre-Anschluss utraquistic schools while stipulating that this time it would have to be ‘implemented honestly’. He did not explain how this new honesty would be ensured and his suggestion that decisions would be taken at parish level, would hardly bring to an end the pre-war ethnic trench warfare which had steadily eroded the position of Slovene. Perhaps most striking was Piesch’s assumption that the situation created by eight years of Nazi policy was the new ethnic status quo. There was no question of reversing it; indeed Piesch appeared more exercised about those children of what he called ‘purely German minorities’ who did not understand Slovene; they would need to be taught separately. Those whose Slovene language was deemed too poor could be exempted.59 Similarly, in a later discussion with Bishop Joseph Köstner, Piesch and Newole spoke as if German was an endangered language.60 These assumptions were rudely challenged by the Liberation Front. Trying to regain the initiative after the humiliation of Yugoslav withdrawal at the end of May, it began a campaign of agitation and ethnic consciousness-raising.61 This may have reflected the realization that support for the Yugoslav cause in Southern Carinthia was patchy at best. It was also meant to counteract what many in the OF saw as an enemy which was as dangerous as Nazism – the Catholic Church – and the deferential attitude which it was seen as encouraging. OF activists were told to stir the people up in all fields, including that of culture. We must shake the people out of their outworn Carinthian traditions and inspire them with a new spirit, going beyond the bounds of narrow-minded Slovenedom.62

One important site of this culture war was the adaptation of Slovene traditions of amateur theatricals (Igre) to the agitprop of National Liberation. For example in a first performance of the popular play Miklova Zala (Mikl’s Zala) the sufferings of the eponymous heroine in Turkish captivity were transposed to the present. Instead of liberation from Turkish captivity it closed with the joyful anticipation of freedom under the protection of ‘the hero Tito’.63 Church leaders had been shocked by the communist seizure of power in Ljubljana. It decided to give refuge to Gregorij Rožman, archbishop of Ljubljana, who had given

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ecclesiastical support to General Rupnik’s collaborationist regime. Rohracher even asked a senior British officer if British troops might not move south against the new communist regime!64 Thousands of refugees and defeated soldiers flooded over the mountains into Carinthia, and heightened the crisis. They were equally unwelcome to the Carinthian as to British leaders. The Carinthian government hoped to divert them before the British authorities made their decision to deport them.65 Nearly all the 10,000 Slovene Domobranci whom the British then handed over (and a much larger number of Croats) were summarily killed. Those who remained were put in Displaced Persons camps; while some hoped to start a new life by moving overseas, others went into a slow depressive decline as they waited for resettlement. A few of those who stayed in Carinthia worked for the fall of communist power in their home country.66 As the hostility of the new Yugoslav state was made even clearer by the expropriation of church property, Slovene church leaders made clear their complete opposition to secession.67 The veteran Valentin Podgorc, for example, dismissed the idea as a ‘political wild goose chase’. Slovenes should support ‘books for our people, good newspapers and good moral entertainment which will make our people aware of modern immoralities like the cinema’.68 He focussed on the practical side of reconstruction, above all the restoration of Slovene agricultural cooperatives.69 The attitude of the church leadership as a whole also needs to be seen in the context of the battering the church had taken in the Third Reich. Nazi rule had shown how effectively anti-clerical attitudes could be mobilized against them. Most leaders accepted that there could be no return to pre-war political Catholicism based on the 1934 Concordat.70 They wanted to minimize friction with politicians and avoid the charge of interference in politics. That did not stop them fighting for church interests – whether over education or the restitution of property – or opposing what they saw as the evils of modern materialism and moral decline. But the protection of Slovene language and culture was at best a secondary concern and was not worth expending the church’s limited capital on. In the end the question of which language was used to preach God’s word was a practical not a religious issue.71 ‘Supernature’ had a higher value than nature.72 Slovene priests who returned to their parishes from internal exile soon experienced this prioritization and found they could expect little support from their superiors if they tried to reintroduce Slovene into church services.73 Particularly vigorous resistance was organized by People’s Party leaders, Hans Ferlitsch and Albin Petschnig (Petschnik).74 In parallel with its efforts to counter church influence the OF tried to gain a foothold in Carinthian institutions.75 That did not mean any dilution of the demand for secession. At the end of June when the OF presented a series of demands to the Advisory Committee. In peremptory language it called for an increase in Slovene representation in both civil administration and all public bodies of the province, as well as the ‘abolition of the Nazi element’. It also demanded an increase to a minimum of two Slovene representatives on the Advisory Committee and in the Commission for Redress (Wiedergutmachung): the Carinthian Slovenes had fought against Nazism in order to join the mother state of Yugoslavia and were an ‘integral part of the victorious peoples of Yugoslavia’. In their view the current situation was ‘not definitive’.76

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After meeting the signatories of the memorandum Piesch reported back to the committee that he had reaffirmed the government’s ‘unyielding standpoint that this part of the province is Carinthia and hence belongs to Austria’; he had also queried the level of Slovene support for border revision, arguing that ‘in the partisan struggle, which had been fought jointly by Slovenes and Germans [sic], the question of the annexation of part of Carinthia was not even raised, [and] the goal was the destruction of Fascism and nothing else’. Piesch then called for Carinthia’s borders to be defended more assertively; a countermovement had to be started, based on those ‘Slovenes, who don’t identify with the politics of the Slovene Party’.77 Piesch was strongly endorsed by two assimilating Slovenes: Hans Ferlitsch and Josef Glantschnig. For Ferlitsch the 1920 plebiscite and the indivisibility of Carinthia were unshakeable points of reference; the government’s ‘honest will to address earlier mistakes’ meant there was no need for these extreme demands; they were intended to ‘sow disturbance in the population and confuse them’. Ferlitsch agreed that ‘if the gentlemen don’t drop these demands we’ll have to look round for others and prove to these gentlemen that what they want is unacceptable to us.’78 Glantschnig referred to himself as ‘a Slovene, a member of the pro-German Slovenes without fanaticism and chauvinism’. He also noted that ‘our Slovenes’ – not ‘we Slovenes’! – had been ‘spared to a much greater degree than Slovenes in Upper Carniola and in Styria’. In other words assimilation involved an acceptance of the realities of power. Yet Glantschnig’s resistance to Slovene cultural rights went deeper than this prudential consideration. He could not support the OF demands about education (and economics) because the evidence from earlier controversies (about setting up a Slovene school in St Ruprecht near Völkermarkt/Šentrupert pri Velikovcu) was that ‘the Slovenes don’t even want the Slovene School’. In the space of his comments Glantschnig thus shifted from a self-definition as a moderate Slovene to a non-Slovene interpreter of Slovene wishes. He himself had learnt German in school in Völkermarkt/Velikovec, had earlier called himself a ‘pro-German (deutschfreundschaftlicher) Slovene’ (in 1911) and later (1927) a ‘Windish’.79 Piesch was also supported by other members of the government, including the communist Josef Hany (Hanni).80 The ‘non-party’ member Julius Santner (responsible for business), outlined the economic objections to a partition of the province, proposed setting up an institution similar to the Heimatdienst – ‘in the good sense of the word’ – in order to ‘enlighten the population in the former Zone A once more about the impossibility of a division of the province’. Piesch took up the suggestion with enthusiasm. It was time to ‘take counter action’ (zum Gegenzug antreten). The suggestion of ‘creating a movement which includes all elements loyal to Carinthia and Austria and a counterweight to the demands for tearing away (Losreissung) of provincial territory’ was ‘very worthy of consideration’. That would not mean pursuing a Nazi policy or restarting the battle within the Slovene population; ‘this kind of policy had already brought no good’. But there was an urgent need ‘to enlighten the people about what is going on, that if they didn’t bestir themselves the question would be decided along Yugoslav lines over their heads’. He thought the idea of ‘a kind of Heimatdienst’ was worth serious consideration. This would have to be discussed with the British, and supported by all parties to express unity of will while avoiding any impression of ‘chauvinistic politics

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of any kind’. After a further condemnation of the OF from Newole, who described the signatories as ‘lunatic nationalists’ and called it a scandal (Schande) that a ‘minority of a minority’ was ‘resorting to these methods’, the discussion ended. This exchange (which was hardly evidence of a ‘optimistic calm attitude’)81 has some puzzling aspects. In particular it is hard to see why a confirmation that the OF supported border revision should cause so much surprise. More understandable is the reaction to Thomas Suppanz, the Slovene representative on the committee, who had also signed the OF demands. Suppanz had already shown that he was not dependable by querying Piesch’s proposal to restore ‘utraquistic’ schools.82 Now Piesch (clearly with no need of prior permission from the British) unceremoniously sacked him.83 The Carinthian counter-strategy had in fact already started a week before, when Rudolf Cefarin was appointed ‘to work on matters arising from the Slovene question’. Cefarin, who had a Slovene background and had been a press official under Schuschnigg, now began organizing publications against secession. He was probably involved in the publication of three well-produced scholarly brochures, which were sent to the state government and occupying powers (see below); another brochure was later printed in Vienna under the rhetorically titled ‘Carinthia – A problem?’ Its conclusion was that Carinthia should not be a problem because the 1920 plebiscite had been a legally definitive settlement (a res judicata). It skated over Carinthian participation in Nazi rule but argued that earlier Slovene pleas for objective criteria were ‘a sort of early edition of the Nuremberg racial laws’.84 Suppanz’s position was given to Joško (Josef) Tischler, when he arrived back from his banishment in Vorarlberg. On 24 July he was appointed as a member of the Advisory Committee and given special responsibility for minority policy.85 Almost immediately he took energetic action in organizing relief for Slovene deportees returning from Germany, and pushing for the return of their farms and compensation.86 But it was his proposal for primary education in southern Carinthia which was a genuine innovation: the first three years were to be taught in German and Slovene on an equal basis.87 Only in the fourth school year would German become the sole language of instruction, but Slovene would still remain a compulsory subject. It would also continue to be compulsory for children at secondary schools. Giving Slovene parity with German was contentious enough in a society where its inferiority was widely taken for granted. The new scheme diverged not only from the previous ‘utraquistic school’88 but from the past ‘groupism’ of Carinthian ethnic politics (including the Slovene concern to establish their own Slovene schools).89 It bypassed altogether the dispute between objective and subjective criteria. Initially Tischler may have wanted an assessment of ‘what language the child actually speaks’ but the final version rested on the principle of the common good; like Switzerland Carinthia was ‘a country inhabited by two nations … its inhabitants have in principle the duty to master both of the provinces languages’.90 As in Switzerland, ‘the state interest must prevail over the individual interest’.91 Tischler thought Carinthian society had been severely damaged by Nazi rule but now ‘the German-speaking Austrians will be brought to understand their Slovene compatriots through a knowledge of their language, literature and culture’.92 The overall aim was described not inaccurately – in one British report as an attempt to

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reverse the impact of assimilation by ‘national rehabilitation’ for those Slovenes ‘who forget their Slovene origin under pan-German pressure’.93 On 16 August the Provincial Government agreed to the proposal in principle but it is clear that there was resistance.94 Though the official record provides few details it is likely that much of the opposition came from Ferlitsch and other assimilating Slovenes in the People’s Party.95 Some was voiced, albeit in coded form, when the government met at the start of October.96 The discussion covered three broad areas: first, there were pedagogical concerns about the burden which bilingual teaching would place on children. Ferlitsch feared that the progress of children from Slovene to German would be endangered if Slovene children were not able to master enough German. He expected that ‘the difficulties in mastering the German language which had existed before would re-emerge when these children arrive in secondary school’. He also feared opposition from parents and wanted ‘to avoid us being reproached at a later stage if such children are to fail in the secondary school or in being accepted into the Grammar school for linguistic reasons’. Strikingly, Ferlitsch did not relate ‘coercion’ to recent Nazi policy but to the obstacles faced by Slovene parents who wanted their children to learn German. Though he deferred to the ‘experts’ in the end it is unlikely that he was persuaded. Second, there were concerns about the practicalities of implementation, above all the shortage of competent teachers. Tischler’s suggestion of using Slovene priests to fill the gap was rejected by Piesch (the church authorities felt the same way).97 Another solution was to employ refugees who had fled from Yugoslavia. Newole thought this was essential, though he anticipated British objections to employing them in the ‘Prohibited Frontier Zone’ next to the border. The most important point for Ferlitsch was the ‘principle’ of employing ‘the province’s own children as teachers’. This was a foretaste of later attacks on Yugoslav teachers as unreliable elements and battles over the appointments of German national teachers. Third, there was the question of where the new bilingual regime should actually be applied. On 15 October Tischler presented a proposal which he claimed he had reached after consulting ‘the great language map of Martin Wutte’.98 Citing the doyen of German Carinthian historiography was presumably intended to disarm criticism.99 But there was still plenty of scope for disagreement, as the exchange over the tourist resort of Velden/Vrba showed.100 When Piesch asked if ‘any Slovene children at all would register there’ it seemed that he had not yet grasped the main point of the proposal – its universality. In response Tischler returned to the general good: ‘after all it is beneficial if the German children learn the second language of the province in the school’. Similarly Wedenig argued that ‘even if only a very small percentage of the population use the Slovene language … we have an interest that our children can also master the second language of the province. This will abolish national differences and create the necessary understanding’. Piesch then also came round and described ignorance of Slav languages in the Habsburg monarchy as ‘a misfortune for the Germans’. The current situation meant that it ‘could only be an advantage for the Germans to speak a Slav language’ since a second Slav language – presumably meaning Russian – could ‘if necessary be acquired more easily’. Last but not least, linguistic knowledge was ‘the best means’ of ‘detoxifying ethnic life’. Velden/Vrba remained on the list, though other

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parishes (Pustritz/Pustrica, Lavamünd/Labot) were excluded. So were other villages, after petitions were sent to the government. They included Maria Saal, (Gospa Sveta) the prime symbolic site of Slovene national identity.101 The new school measure was formally agreed at the end of October. Next to the core provisions there were some important flanking measures: the provision of textbooks (a major problem when paper was in such short supply); an effective school inspectorate and, perhaps most important, teacher training.102 Clearly much of its prospects rested on the long-term commitment of Carinthian politicians. Some seemed unequivocally in favour. On 3 October for example Piesch had hailed the new law as evidence of the good will which had governed their actions from the start. He assured Tischler that the same spirit would govern its implementation.103 A month later Newole told a press conference in Vienna that making children learn ‘both languages of the Province’ would mean that ‘after the end of seven years every inhabitant of this area will be able to speak both languages’.104 The socialist newspaper, the Neue Zeit, described the new system as an escape from the ‘revolting’ pressurizing of parents, and attacked the claim of those who were ‘stuck in the past’ (ewiggestrigen) that parental rights should be the main consideration.105 But opposition had clearly not disappeared. The need to deal with it made the long-term presence of Tischler (or another Slovene leader) in Klagenfurt’s corridors of power all the more important. A glimpse of the kind of political realignment this might have brought was shown when Tischler and SPÖ leaders agreed on the appointment of the socialist Hans Lagger to the post of provincial school inspector for primary and secondary school.106 Tischler also blocked the appointment of teachers in Völkermarkt/ Velikovec who ‘as well-known Nazis are not acceptable to the Slovenes’ and called for a ‘decisive influence’ to be given to the ‘Slovene representative in the provincial government’ in appointments to the bilingual school. It was agreed that ‘the representative of the Slovenes in the Landtag’ should be heard when it came to appointments in the mixedlanguage area.107 However, Ferlitsch earlier hinted at a rather different scenario when he called the proposal ‘superfluous’. Piesch too questioned Tischler’s assumption that there would be always a Slovene representative in the government.108 In the event Tischler left the government only days after the school decree was agreed and never returned.

In defence of the Carinthian Heimat Several aspects of the éclat which ended Tischler’s membership of the Carinthian government remain unclear. But the available evidence points to two main causes: the hostility of the OF leadership to Tischler’s reformist path and the British attempt to keep the OF agitation under control. That became more difficult when it was announced that national and provincial elections would be held on 25 November. Tischler had diverged from the OF as soon by joining the Carinthian government in the first case without consulting with them109 and his reformist agenda, however radical, fitted badly with its revolutionary secessionism. For partisan leaders like Karel PrušnikGašper it offered no more than ‘slightly bigger crumbs’ from the German-Carinthian table.110 For the OF the education offered in Carinthia was seen as the ‘continuation of

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education in a Nazi spirit’ and they urged Slovene parents to send their children to be educated in Ljubljana.111 Any return to the pre-war Slovene People’s Party would mean reviving a party of ‘national traitors and pro-fascists’.112 Relations can hardly have been improved when Tischler attended a wreath-laying ceremony to commemorate the dead of the Abwehrkampf on 10 October. Although he used the occasion to recall ‘Slovenes and Yugoslavs [who] had also given their lives in the cause’, his presence at this central site of German Carinthian memory must have outraged OF activists.113 In Ljubljana Tischler and his ally Vinko Zwitter were considered to be dangerous reactionaries.114 Tischler declared that he was fighting the election in order to pursue ‘collaboration with the existing political parties’.115 He thought the Slovene Party should be ‘basically unpolitical, in that it will include every Slovene from the Communist worker to the Catholic priest’.116 That was far from the rhetoric of National Liberation, but in the end Tischler did join forces with the OF to apply for Allied permission to fight the election. Election meetings, adorned with Marxist slogans and pictures of Lenin, Stalin and Tito, heard not just appeals for increased Slovene representation and more effective denazification but also calls for secession and national liberation. Tischler also stressed Slovene resistance to Nazism and strongly attacked People’s Party leaders for having supported it. As the election date approached OF leaders, and the Slovene Communist Party leadership, seem to have decided that fighting the election would harm their cause. It was unlikely that the OF would get more votes than the Slovene People’s Party had in the First Republic (between 9,000 and 10,000 votes) and even less likely that they would exceed the 16,000 who had voted for Yugoslavia in the 1920 plebiscite. In any case participation could be interpreted as ipso facto legitimizing the existing border. For precisely these reasons both British and Carinthian authorities favoured OF participation. Under Tischler the party would be an ‘integrating rather than a disintegrating factor’, since (unlike Franc Petek) he ‘was the chief protagonist for a policy of union of the areas of Slovene minority in Kärnten and Austria’. Military Government reported to the British political division in Vienna that the likely ‘international and racial … tenor’ of the party was an unavoidable result of the existence of any minority. A refusal to allow Tischler to fight the election would aggravate the Slovenes’ ‘inferiority complex … and cause unrest and criticism’. It would also be anachronistic and illogical to deny them access to power through free elections after having supported their representation in the government through co-option. Representation would integrate the Slovenes, the majority of whom wished to ‘remain Kärntner first and Slovene second’.117 However, the British authorities in Vienna also stipulated that the party pledge itself not to make the border question ‘an election issue’.118 British Military Government interpreted this as binding the Slovene Party ‘not to work for any modification of the existing Austrian-Yugoslav frontier’.119 OF leaders in their turn – deliberately or not – saw it as a demand to cease to call for unification ‘at any time’, which would have been tantamount to disavowing their whole raison d’être.120 At first Tischler refused to sign, and when the British then suspended the OF as a party announced ‘his intention of retiring into private life’.121 Three days later, after being reassured that the commitment applied to the election campaign only, he apparently changed his mind. He signed after obtaining the ‘concession’ that the other four party leaders had to make the same commitment, and, at least according to a British report, did so ‘cheerfully and agreeably’.122

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At this point the OF leadership disowned Tischler and he did resign, admitting only that he had made a ‘formal mistake’ in failing to consult the party leadership.123 The OF then withdrew from the elections, protesting that the British stipulation ‘was a demand for the Slovene people to cut themselves off from their mother people and deny and forget the heavy and bloody sacrifices of the liberation struggle’.124 When urged by British diplomats to reverse the decision Petek explained ‘that his party was not interested in the forthcoming elections’ and had decided not to participate.125 The Yugoslav government called for the elections to be suspended in the area since the Slovenes now had ‘no opportunity of voting for their own list’. It also protested against the anti-Slovene attitude of the Carinthian parties and officials and called for the removal of pan-German and Nazi elements.126 Soon afterwards the Belgrade press pointed out that participation in the election would be ‘tantamount to a recognition of Austria’s right to the territory’.127 It is understandable that Tischler later called the Slovene failure to contest the elections a ‘historical mistake’.128 His departure ended the brief experiment of Slovene participation in the Carinthian government and decades of marginalization followed.129 On the other hand the participation of one or more individual Slovene leader was unlikely on its own to change the direction of Carinthian politics. At any rate the immediate electoral effect of the OF withdrawal was to give the SPÖ a clear run in southern Carinthia. Dirk Hänisch estimates that it gained 33 per cent of Slovene voters (compared to only 15 per cent for the ÖVP, and 19 per cent for the communists).130 However (as Hänisch himself cautions), this estimate sheds little light on the relationship between voting patterns and Slovene assimilation.131 Overall the SPÖ did best in the urban centres in the area (a 3,167 increase from the eight largest towns of the area), while in smaller villages Slovenes were more likely to vote for the People’s Party – unless they followed the OF’s call to boycott the elections altogether. An estimated 22 per cent failed to vote at all.132 In Carinthia overall the SPÖ gained 10 per cent more votes than in 1932 and emerged from its pre-war electoral ghetto to win half the thirty-six seats of the Landtag.133 Piesch was confirmed as governor and Carinthia became Austria’s only ‘red’ province. It seems clear that this success was due to the support of a significant segment of German national opinion, which thought the People’s Party too clerical and it also included those Nazis who ignored the voting ban which had been imposed on them, together with their relatives. Some of those who had changed ‘from Red to Brown’ after 1934 now changed back.134 Another important result of Slovene non-participation was that in southern Carinthia the Communist Party performed relatively strongly, or at least avoided the débacle the party suffered elsewhere (its share of the vote nationally was only 3.4 per cent) and gained three places in the Landtag. While the SPÖ could claim to represent most of the Slovene population on the basis of the voting figures, the KPÖ – in particular the Slovene Johann Kazianka – were the most ready to criticize the government’s minority policy and the continued influence of Nazism. Leaving aside the paradox of MarxistLeninists voicing the concern of an agricultural and largely Catholic constituency, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that much communist criticism was more accurate than the statements of the two main parties.135 Nevertheless in the Landtag its impact was limited,136 and its spokesmen tended to be either ignored or derided as the voice

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of Stalin and – at least until the 1949 Cominform split – Belgrade. In addition the relationship between the OF and the communists was never free of suspicion.137 While OF leaders complained that the communists were not supporting secession, the latter were constantly on the prowl for signs of ‘petit bourgeois nationalism’ in the ranks of the OF. Boosted by electoral success the SPÖ became more resistant to OF demands; the discourse of regret and redress was steadily displaced by talk of majorities and minorities, electoral support and representation – or lack of it. An early example of this was Piesch’s comment to an OF delegation at the end of 1945; he told them that they were no more ‘a minority in the minority’ and warned them that a committee was to be formed ‘from the far stronger group of Carinthian Slovenes, which clearly declares itself for Carinthia’; its role would be to take part in consultation of ‘all questions affecting the Slovene minority in Carinthia’. The OF could either join the process or be ignored.138 Finding Slovene leaders who were ready to join the government was no longer such a priority. Instead Rudolf Cefarin organized the ‘counter-action’ against the OF. Assimilating and assimilated Slovenes were the key targets and early in 1946 a ‘League of Austrian Slovenes’ (Bund Österreichischer Slowenen/Zveza Avstrijskih Slovencev; BÖS) was set up. The task of this ‘anti-OF’139 was to ‘enlighten’ and mobilize the southern Carinthian population about the danger of border revision. They had to demonstrate to the world that the existing borders had majority support.140 Though the ‘Windish’ label was avoided it is clear that most of its leaders (like Albin Petschnig) were ‘anti-Slovene Slovenes’. Some like Heinrich Lueger had no Slovene background at all141 while the League’s demand for minority rights was a tactical mimicry of an assertion of ethnic identity. Interestingly, it claimed to support bilingual education and did not publicly call for a return to the ‘principle of affirmation’. However, it proposed that ‘objective criteria’ should be applied by a commission of ‘two Slovenes of the League with Slovene as their mother tongue’ visiting villages to establish who was a Slovene.142 Its other main purposes were, firstly, to collect public declarations of loyalty to the province from the Slovene population143 and, secondly, to counter OF attempts to gain representation on parish councils, now being re-econstituted.144 The effect of the latter struggle is hard to judge precisely, but the broad outcome was clear: a majority of mayors in southern Carinthia – perhaps as many as fifty-two out of eighty – were members of the League or close to the SPÖ.145 In the sharpening conflict the ‘guardians of the nation’ and their irredentist enemies sometimes seemed to mirror each other. Both portrayed themselves as beleaguered underdogs. Both sought to mobilize and often intimidate the uncommitted, apolitical or indifferent by warning that secession, and a Yugoslav invasion, were imminent. Yet the basic power asymmetry between the two sides should not be overlooked and behind its revolutionary bravado OF morale was brittle. An internal assessment in June 1946 for example could find no evidence (apart from in the border village of Zell-Pfarre/Sele) of satisfactory progress, and stressed the need for ‘politically educating and disciplining them [i.e. OF supporters] democratically’. The young people ‘who were not hostile to us, who are uninterested or show fear and nervousness towards us’ had been influenced by ‘much lying counterpropaganda’. The lack of working-class support was seen as a particular problem. In Ferlach/

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Borovlje and Feistritz/Bistrica v Rožu in particular they had to be approached with caution. Finally in the characteristic Stalinist idiom of self-criticism it concluded that ‘though we certainly acted [i.e. in amateur theatricals], sang and danced … we fell behind in our organisational work’.146

British wind-down, Viennese arrival In addition to mobilizing potential supporters, agitators on both sides looked for outside support. For the OF that meant asking for propagandistic and logistic support from Yugoslavia but also getting maximum publicity for its complaints in the Yugoslav (especially Slovene) press and in the Allied Council in Vienna.147 A report of a clash between OF activists and anti-communist Yugoslav DPs in St Kanzian/Škocjan at a performance of Checkhov’s Three Sisters even reached the pages of Pravda.148 Early in 1946 the propaganda effort was extended to London. There, in the context of the Italian Peace Treaty, Yugoslavia first put forward its claim to southern Carinthia territory, which it claimed was inhabited by about 130,000 Slovenes and ‘only about 80,000 German-speaking people, of whom the majority are Germanized Slovenes’. The rest, it claimed, were ‘Austrian Germans, mostly officials and their families brought into this province during recent years.’149 The League of Loyal Slovenes directed its propaganda to both the British authorities and the Austrian government. In a series of dramatically worded reports Cefarin’s Minority Office warned that a Yugoslav invasion was imminent and that the loyal population felt abandoned by the outside world and was on the point of despair.150 One report warned that ‘in particular the returning soldiers are joining together in order to undertake their own protection and that of the loyal population and to ward off the attacks of the foreign invaders’.151 The British response to these pleas needs to be understood against the wider background of their occupation policy. As pressures to cut back increased the British were looking for ways of reducing their role. That meant handing over responsibility to the Austrian federal and provincial authorities. The British commitment to influencing, much less moulding, the development of Austrian society had never been substantial but now it dwindled further. That was most obvious in the scaling down of denazification. Even though the withdrawal was dressed up as an increase in Austrian participation in order to overcome acknowledged deficiencies, its effect was clearly to extend further the scope for party political patronage. The first steps were also taken towards emptying internment camps in Weissenstein and Wolfsberg. Attempts at the ‘reeducation’ of Nazis were half-hearted and most who reemerged, far from being influenced by ‘brainwashing’, were unabashed as well as resentful. As one Austrian report put it, the university-educated (Akademiker) were ‘as coarse, vulgar, egoistical and ruthless as in their heyday’.152 The releases included prominent figures like Adolf Funder, who, along with two other leading Nazi figures, were handed over to Austrian jurisdiction in February 1946. On the orders of Hans Amschl (who had moved from the first Carinthian government to become state prosecutor in Graz), he was swiftly released.153

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As British involvement lessened Carinthian politicians became more outspoken in their complaints about it. Piesch, for example, used a common child-rearing metaphor in writing to the British chief of civil affairs that ‘no child learns to walk if he is always carried’ and appealed for less interference.154 Paul Jobst, government member for finance and ‘denazification supremo’, was blunter: British ‘tutelage’ should be ended. The British role in the dismissals procedure was downgraded.155 Jobst, whose contacts included Funder, was himself a good example of what one British observer called the role of ‘political jobbery’ in denazification.156 As for minority policy, Military Government continued to observe from the sidelines – except when it seemed likely to lead to public disorder. They had accepted both the initial Carinthian proposal to return to utraquistic school as well as Tischler’s radical departure from it. There is certainly no evidence of any British attempt to ‘force’ the measure onto Carinthia, a myth which was constructed later by Carinthian politicians seeking to evade political responsibility for it.157 There were two partial exceptions. The first was William Carling, an official of the Education Division, who supported the bilingual school against its critics. He wrote an article in the conservative Volkszeitung which concluded in ‘a deliberately optimistic strain’ that the way was now ‘open for full recognition of the right of the Slovene minority and for full implementation of the generous bilingual teaching decree’.158 But – even after being doctored – the article triggered angry readers’ reactions, which rather undermined this conclusion. They included attacks on ‘a policy which will lead to the annexation of Carinthia by Yugoslavia’.159 A second, more important, exception was Gerald Sharp, who had arrived from Graz at the start of 1946 as a major in the Psychological Warfare Branch. His job was to run a Slovene language newspaper, Koroška Kronika (Carinthian Chronical), and Slovene radio broadcasts.160 Sharp, probably uniquely in British Military Government, acquired ‘a smattering of Slovene’. He also attempted to understand minority perspectives. With a small staff of Yugoslav émigrés he tried to turn the newspaper into a platform for Slovene culture, by publishing for example extracts from the work of Ivan Cankar and other Slovene classics.161 As he began to forge a relationship with Tischler, he too criticized the League of Loyal Slovenes for being a tool of the provincial government and calling on Slovenes to ‘deny their membership of the Slovene nation’.162 Although the newspaper clearly rejected secession and was attacked by the OF, Sharp’s left-liberal politics, including the perception of Yugoslavia as a wartime ally, put him increasingly at odds with British policy. His superiors became increasingly nervous.163 The newspaper also outraged some Carinthian politicians and civil servants, who called for it to be charged with treason.164 However, neither Carling nor Sharp had much impact on British policy. Almost as a matter of principle OF complaints were not taken seriously, much less investigated by British HQ in Vienna. One Austrian diplomat recorded that the British authorities in Vienna ‘had given up trying to get to the truth in the confusion of mutual accusations’ and ‘now paid no more attention to these issues’.165 But standing aside meant effectively endorsing the existing status quo. After Peter Wilkinson (Director of British Political Division) travelled down to Carinthia to investigate, he reported that – apart from a few malcontents – the minority had little reason to complain about their treatment.

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Support for secession was very limited and nothing was to be gained from getting deeper into Carinthian politics.166 What remained was the military concern to maintain law and order at the border. In particular British attempts to enforce a 25-kilometre ‘Prohibited Frontier Zone’ led them to arrest suspected OF couriers, confiscating their propaganda material and arresting and interrogating activists. That sometimes had its comic side, as when the British failed to find propaganda material in the nappies of Luka Sienčnik’s baby.167 But law and order could also lead to fatal results, as when a British sentry challenged the OF activist Amalija Oraže and, when she failed to stop, shot her dead.168 Trying to calm things down might potentially affect agitation on both sides of ethnic politics. Simson, the senior Military Government officer, warned ‘both Slovene parties’ that ‘provocation and intimidation and unnecessary political activity generally’ must be ‘kept under control’. If they were not controlled, ‘a conflagration might ensue which would have serious repercussions.’169 The Working Committee (Arbeitsausschuss) for southern Carinthia was told to stop collecting signatures in favour of the existing border. The petition was ‘inopportune’ because it would provoke a counter-petition from the OF; in any case it was unnecessary because the OF was a ‘completely lost cause’ (Simson estimated their support at around 25 per cent of the Slovene population). Further proof was superfluous.170 For similar reasons the British were sceptical about German Carinthian warnings of Yugoslav invasion.171 Some Carinthians fitted this response into the Carinthian narrative of abandonment, expressing fears that the British were about to ‘abandon’ southern Carinthia. Carinthian German appeals were also directed to Vienna, as the capital began to reenter provincial politics. Its return was far from a ‘reconquest’ or the reversal of what had followed the Anschluss seven years before, but neither was it as harmonious as Robert Kriechbaumer’s metaphor of ‘love at second sight’ suggests. In neither province nor capital had Nazi rule brought the kind of collective learning process which might in theory have led to the burying of hatchets. It is difficult to understand post-war minority policy without recognising these persisting tensions.172 Admittedly in Carinthia the Anschluss was indeed ‘dead’ as a project or at least anaesthetized for the foreseeable future.173 But the reservoir of mutual mistrust provincial resentment of the capital, which had also been fostered by Nazi propaganda, was far from dry.174 In May 1945 there was an early attempt by conservative politicians and communists in Vienna to shift provincial politics in a more anti-Nazi direction. Piesch was to be replaced by Otto Zhuber, a former Christian Social politician and lawyer, and Heimatschutz leader from Völkermarkt/Velikovec, who, after imprisonment in Dachau, had apparently joined the Austrian Freedom Front.175 He was supported by some antiNazi conservatives, like the shadowy Raoul Bumballa and probably Heinrich Wildner, chief civil servant in the Ballhausplatz (the Austrian foreign ministry).176 At the other end of the spectrum he was supported by the communist Franz Honner, who made no secret of his distaste for the government which had been formed in Carinthia ‘under the patronage of the old regime’.177 Zhuber was planning to implement a radical purge of leading Nazis.178 But his attempted ‘coup’ soon fizzled out and he was sidelined.179 One reason Zhuber failed was the British boycott of the Renner state government. It had been set up in April under Soviet auspices in Vienna and was seen in Western

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capitals as a puppet regime, similar to those installed in Eastern Europe. Until the boycott began to crumble in the late summer the Carinthian government was able to act largely unimpeded from the capital. That also meant they did not need to implement the ‘Vienna model’ of denazification (Verbotsgesetz) with its identification of illegal Nazis and public display of registration lists.180 But, well before the Renner government was officially recognized by the Allied Council in October, unofficial contacts with the capital increased. One earlier visitor was Ferdinand Graf, former head of the Carinthian Chamber of Agriculture under Schuschnigg, then a prisoner in Dachau and now a rising star in the People’s Party. He was highly critical of the number of prominent Nazis he found at liberty and, in some cases, in office. He reportedly told the head of security services that ‘In Carinthia it is just like the Nazi days. All the “Illegale” [i.e. members of the illegal Nazi party before the Anschluss] are still in their jobs and there are plenty of Nazis riding round in cars. But we shall soon put that straight, if necessary without you’.181 He singled out the cases of the timber and banking magnates Funder and Jakob Hasslacher (who at this point had not yet been arrested).182 Like Graf he criticized the numbers of Nazi gendarmes and police as well as the ‘pro-fascist attitude of numerous district commanders’. Although he noted that things were better in Carinthia than Styria, he nevertheless estimated that ‘about 160 gendarmes and about 50 policemen in Klagenfurt and Villach are considered to be Nazis’.183 After the general elections on 25 November this kind of criticism continued, but became more muted. In the first session of the new parliament on 20 December the new chancellor, Leopold Figl, another Catholic victim of Nazism, proclaimed the advent of a ‘new revolutionary Austria’; whatever this meant it clearly implied the removal of Nazis from positions of influence. Figl also called for the restoration of Carinthia within its ‘old’ (i.e. 1937) borders.184 And his New Year’s message to Carinthians not only defended Carinthia’s territorial integrity but also included a pointed warning against any return to the time when the border province had been a ‘political football for radicalisms’. In future ‘aggressions of any sort at all must disappear for ever’. Graf was more explicit: he attacked ‘the many big-shots who had betrayed and denied Austria before 1938 and especially between 1938 and 1945 and were carrying on living as if there had been no 1945 and no rebirth of our eternally young Austria’.185 Partly in response to allied pressure Figl also set up a committee to implement swift radical purges in the upper echelons of the civil service. The prospect triggered alarm bells in Klagenfurt. Newole forecast dire consequences: 67 per cent leading ‘legally qualified civil servants of the political and general administration’ had already been removed, but now a further 9 per cent would have to go.186 The danger of this kind of a purge was countered by invoking the Yugoslav threat. In the perspective of the endangered Heimat denazification appeared not just an attempt (whether fair, effective or neither) to deal with individual involvement in National Socialism but as a weapon in the hands of the province’s enemies. The point seemed reinforced every time Yugoslavia or the OF attacked the failings of denazification in general or singled out an individual prominent Nazi who was still in post. Portraying these attacks as the defamation of Carinthia by outsiders, subversives or traitors, also helped reinforce a sense of collective resentment. Piesch for example

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attacked the allegation that Carinthia was ‘a Nazi paradise’ which was being served up for breakfast in ‘all possible radio broadcasts’.187 Paul Jobst attacked those who defamed Carinthia as a ‘brown province’.188 In the press he expressed outrage that politicians were being attacked as Nazis because they were simply doing their democratic job. One veteran Slovene socialist had been labelled a Nazi ‘merely because … he had refused to join the Liberation Front’; in reality members of the government had risked their lives as resistance fighters and as a result had suffered in Nazi prisons and concentration camps. In fact, these men offered ‘a complete guarantee under all circumstances that national differences will be supressed and the rights of the minority guaranteed’.189 When the Carinthian government expressed the ‘urgent wish’ for federal support, there was a clear subtext: the pressure to denazify was helping the enemies of province. Government’s plea to Vienna was heard most sympathetically by SPÖ leaders. In part this was a matter of basic party solidarity with the only socialist-led administration outside the capital. That had been indicated the previous summer when Chancellor Renner happily repeated Piesch’s inflated assessment of the government’s resistance achievements.190 Soon afterwards Vice-Chancellor Adolf Schärf had played the border card for his party when he revealed to an election meeting in Klagenfurt that Stalin had given a ‘guarantee’ of the existing Austro-Yugoslav border to Renner.191 Another important example was Oskar Helmer, who, as Interior Minister, was responsible for implementing much denazification, including that of the police. His general attitude was one of scepticism bordering on cynicism, but he also articulated the wider resentment at Allied ‘tutelage’. That did not mean he was blind to Nazi activity, when it threatened Austria’s new party system.192 But individual Nazis who were ready to accept the new order via membership of the Socialist Party could be speedily reintegrated with few questions asked.193 Conversely, Slovene complaints of repression were merely the ‘old game’ in which ‘every detail is blown up out of proportion’.194 He was particularly protective in defending ‘his’ police. OF criticism was the work of subversives who were campaigning against Austria, blowing up trivial ‘fair ground stories’ into major incidents.195 In March 1946, Helmer and Schärf travelled down to Carinthia. On arrival Helmer declared that there was no intention of hampering the minority in their ‘habits and customs’ so long as these did not run counter to the attitudes of the majority population (Staatsvolk). The federal government would support the aspirations of the particular minorities but only ‘insofar as they can be made acceptable to the generality (der Allgemeinheit)’. The Slovenes could not assert any special claims as victims of Nazi rule since Austrians ‘north of the Drau’ – whether speaking German or not – had also suffered in ‘Nazi dungeons, concentration camps, gas chambers or gallows’. As for Slovene, Helmer conceded – in a strikingly negative formulation – that ‘there was no harm’ in speaking another language but insisted that the hearts of those who did ‘must beat for Austria, that was the measure of assessment’.196 In Völkermarkt/Velikovec and other towns in southern Carinthia the two socialist ministers were (apart from some intermittent heckling) received enthusiastically.197 (Ferdinand Graf was given no more than a supporting role.)198 In Bleiburg/Pliberk, Helmer met a delegation of ‘Loyal Slovenes’ and received their ‘declaration for Austria’.199 Speaking to a large meeting in the Social Democrat stronghold of Ferlach/

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Borovlje, Schärf contrasted the OF with other minorities (Czechs in Vienna and the Burgenland Croats, who had been ready to live in peace). According to him there had been a ‘thousand-year history of harmony’ between ‘us German-speaking Austrians’ and the Carinthian Slovenes, which had only ended when National Socialism had ‘forcibly separated’ people. Otherwise ‘we in Austria always get on with national minorities, whether Slovenes or others, and unless dissent is sown from outside, we will cooperate with everyone, including the Slovenes’. He too questioned the Slovene claim to a special experience of Nazi persecution, distinct from those of ‘the German people’, and closed with an appeal for calm to ensure the unity of the province.200 The socialist Neue Zeit described the meeting as an affirmation (Bekenntnis) in favor of peaceful cohabitation between ‘German and Windish-speaking populations’. But the use of the ‘Windish’ and the traditional slogan of the headline ‘Carinthia, free and undivided’ made clear the kind of collaboration it had in mind; loyalty equated to assimilation while Slovene national consciousness was tantamount to irredentism. Similarly, in Eberndorf/Dobrla vas Piesch rejected any ‘special treatment’ for Slovene ‘population groups’; there was no Austrian responsibility for Nazi persecution, under which ‘we all, and not just the Slovenes have suffered’. Recent disturbances had been caused by a small group of Slovene chauvinists, mainly from outside the province. Piesch knew ‘this game from Hitler’; Carinthians were tolerant but there were limits. They would no longer tolerate it if ‘the quiet, peace-loving population of the mixed language area is terrorised and put under pressure’. He concluded that ‘those who do not feel comfortable here could go south’.201 Back in Vienna, Helmer reported enthusiastically about his visit, describing it as a great success for ‘the Austrian state idea’. The province had shown its loyalty and most of the population had greeted the ministers’ visit as a ‘liberation’ (Befreiung). They had reassured ‘those circles, who had already believed they had been abandoned by the Austrian government’. His message of reassurance was not limited to southern Carinthia; it was also about Upper Carinthia ‘where there used to be a strong Nazi stance’. There the population ‘of every colour’ was standing by Austria and had welcomed the fact that the federal government was concerned about them.202 However Helmer’s report was greeted sceptically by the ÖVP foreign minister Karl Gruber. Apart from party political differences, the reason was that this kind of mobilisation at the border risked undermining Austria’s nascent foreign policy of demarcating the country as sharply as possible from Nazi Germany and German nationalism. One aspect of this was to reestablish diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia (currently making little headway). Anything which suggested that anti-Slovene feeling was still influential in Carinthia was suspect in the Ballhausplatz. One (junior) diplomat wished the Carinthians would show ‘more restraint in this respect’. He interpreted the establishment of the League of Austrian Slovenes as meaning that ‘this part of the Slovenes are expected to renounce their own cultural and linguistic life and find it in German cultural events’. In Carinthia both Nazi attitudes and German national attitudes were ‘still very marked’.203 Even more dangerous in the eyes of the diplomats was any suggestion that there might be territorial claims against Yugoslavia. That disappointed the hopes of some Carinthians (including Newole) that a ‘reasonable’ redrawing of the border would include transferring the Miess valley (which had been

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ceded to Yugoslavia in 1919 but ‘returned’ to the Reich in 1941).204 Others like Vinzenz Schumy were also pushing for the ‘return’ of Maribor basin. In spring the following year, an anonymous committee of ‘experts’ (probably including Schumy) asked for not just the basin but also the Miess valley (and Dravograd [Unterdrauberg]) as an ‘urgent demand’.205 The familiar narrative was of a German ‘civilising mission’ going back to Charlemagne. Embarrassingly the brochure pushing for this was printed by the official state printing press. It was duly attacked in Belgrade and disowned by the Austrian government. The Federal Chancellery stressed to provincial governments, Styria and Carinthia, that foreign policy was exclusively the competence of the Foreign Ministry.206 Mobilisation of Carinthian German emotions also threatened to undermine the attempt to prove the depth and strength of Austrian resistance, as shown by the collection of documents published under the title Red White Red Book – Justice for Austria! Far from being projected as key examples of Austrian resistance as sometimes claimed, Carinthian Slovene partisans were no more than a footnote to it. Ironically it took up earlier Austrian communist accounts that the mixed Austrian Yugoslav partisan had overcome initial Slovene mistrust and restored their faith in Austria.207 All this helps explain why Karl Gruber was distinctly lukewarm when Helmer reported to cabinet on his visit to Carinthia. He asked him to ensure that ‘the police measures to suppress the Slovene Anschluss movement didn’t overshoot the mark’. Otherwise problems might arise, not just with the Yugoslavs but also with the occupation authorities. Helmer countered robustly: the responsibility for stirring up trouble lay with outsiders.208 But Gruber’s concern about international repercussions was given credibility in June at the Paris Peace Conference. The Soviet foreign minister Vycheslav Molotov argued that Austria was still vulnerable to Nazi and pan-German influence and therefore a discussion of restoring its sovereignty was premature.209 It was clearly not allayed by the evidence that, from slowing down the spiral of confrontation – or ‘calming’ a disturbed population – the ministerial visits were followed by further clashes and demonstrations.210 Piesch’s warning was attacked by the Yugoslav press,211 and a group of OF supporters marched through Klagenfurt, singing Slovene songs near the seat of Military and provincial government.212 The government told the British that it was no longer prepared to accept this kind of ‘provocation’ and would introduce tougher police checks and punishment of foreigners.213 When these were applied a fortnight later, on the fourth anniversary of the 1942 deportations there was a further clash. At a meeting in a Klagenfurt cinema Prušnik-Gašper stated that ‘annexation’ to Yugoslavia was only a question of time. After shouting slogans of antifascist unity, and supporting Tito and Stalin, he sarcastically dismissed the ‘wise words of visiting non-Carinthians and non-natives (nicht-Bodenständigen)’.214 On leaving the cinema a group of Slovenes, without permission to demonstrate, faced police roadblocks. Those who tried to breach them were met with fire hoses and forty-two demonstrators were arrested.215 British reports put most of the blame for the clash on the ‘irresponsible leaders’ of the OF for misleading the meeting but they also criticized the Austrian police for showing ‘excessive zeal’ and inexperience.216 The cycle continued on 24 May when Tito’s birthday was celebrated, and OF activists celebrated with bonfires in the hills and fireworks.217

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In the course of months of agitation and counter-agitation a new ‘terms of trade’ between Carinthia and the capital began to emerge. Carinthian politicians no longer needed to demonstrate that they had learnt from the mistakes of Nazi rule. Rather it was for national leaders to show that they had learnt from the mistakes of 1918–19 and would not again leave the province in the lurch. Instead of ‘Carinthia’ having to report what it was doing to remove Nazis from positions of power, ‘Vienna’ had to show that it was protecting the province. When Cefarin sent another report (supposedly from ‘a department of the Yugoslav interior ministry’) on preparations for an imminent Yugoslav invasion, it was taken seriously enough to be discussed in Cabinet. Helmer stressed the government’s duty to stand by the Carinthians, though he was also concerned about the lawlessness of Displaced Persons in the area (including Yugoslavs).218 Gruber doubted if Yugoslavia would currently risk a coup de main and called for tact to avoid providing any grounds for justified complaints.219 But caution was becoming increasingly difficult to express in public. So was ÖVP criticism of Carinthian denazification. For example in April Ferdinand Graf complained privately to Chancellor Figl that former Nazi members were still sitting in positions of power and influence. In Villach ‘very many party members, even Illegals were apparently still active in leading positions’ of the town’s administration (Magistrat).220 Graf was also concerned that Cefarin and the Minority Office were making ‘all too much noise’ in a way which was damaging the cause more than helping it, but he did not go public.221

Bilingual education under pressure One year after the end of Nazi rule, Carinthian socialist leaders recalled the risks they had run in toppling the ‘Satrap Rainer’, as Newole called him, not forgetting to mention that the main burden had fallen on the socialists. Piesch repeated the claim that by contributing to its own liberation Carinthia had led the way down the path envisaged by the Allies. It therefore deserved special consideration.222 Politicians were also concerned to broaden the circle of victimhood.223 At a special session of the Landtag Piesch recalled, alongside Allied soldiers, not just those ‘Austrians and Carinthians who had fought against Nazism’ but also those ‘who had to bear arms against their will’.224 That may have resonated with those who had lost their loved ones in the war and were looking for narratives which would give their death some meaning. Compared to them the ninety-five people who had been seized and killed by the partisans in southern Carinthia in summer 1945 were a much smaller group. The case of these, labelled ‘kidnapped’ (Verschleppte), had been taken up by politicians of both main political parties early in 1946225 and they soon became central to the postNazi discourse of recrimination. Beyond their individual life stories or careers (about which little was said), their fate came to stand for the constancy of the savage Slav communist threat and its defilement of the province. Their victimhood also reinforced the inclination to separate partisan responses to Nazism from Nazi rule itself.226 A much larger group of ‘victims’ were those subject to denazification – or under threat from it. One year after the end of Nazism ‘functional’ arguments in favour of their speedy reintegration, whether based on the economic need to harness them for

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reconstruction or on the danger to democracy of alienating influential individuals, were still widely aired, especially as the economic situation worsened. But former Nazis were also becoming increasingly moralized as victims. The ‘misled Party comrade’ (Parteigenosse) and his or her sufferings – whether real and alleged – became a central trope of journalism and politics. Church leaders contributed their part with calls for Christian forgiveness and the exercise of humanity. One group of particular significance for ethnic politics was primary school teachers in southern Carinthia.227 Having been pillars of German nationalism and Nazi rule they were now supposed to help turn Hitler youth into citizens. Piesch, himself a former head teacher, recognized their importance early on when he called for ‘root and branch’ reform of the school system.228 But before long, like others, he started bandying figures around in order to demonstrate not only that the reform had been successful but that it had gone too far, to the point that the future of democracy itself was at risk.229 The actual figures he and others cited are almost impossible to verify, but it may be worth citing one set, which has a priori more plausibility since it was not intended for the public. Julius Heinzel, the provincial school inspector (Landeschulinspektor), who had been a headmaster in Klagenfurt before the Anschluss, told a conference of provincial inspectors in February 1946 that out of a total of 2,325 evaluated teachers working in primary and secondary schools 546 had been dismissed, 521 had been ‘left in post with a year’s probation who were being closely observed’, 573 were on probation and had been transferred (Bewährungsfrist und versetzt) while 685 had been left in post. He gave a higher proportion for dismissals from middle schools. These figures were clearly not insignificant but caution is also needed in interpreting them; for example, Heinzel made no mention of ‘Reich Germans’ who had fled from their places of work. Neither did he consider those teachers who fled to Carinthia from occupied Yugoslavia, where many had spearheaded Nazi Germanization.230 At any rate the SPÖ offered an effective route for reinstatement and rehabilitation through membership of the League of Socialist Graduates (Bund Sozialistischer Akademiker).231 Overall the career structure of teaching – with its stress on probation, evaluation, promotions and transfers – probably reinforced the dependence or vulnerability of teachers who were liable to denazification penalties. As the 1945–6 school year came to an end, calls to reverse or revise dismissals grew louder. Piesch now told visiting delegation of British MPs that ‘far too many teachers had been dismissed’. He added that ‘if he had the responsibility he would re-instate 25 per cent of them’.232 In southern Carinthia denazification was closely bound up with the future of bilingual schools. Some teachers had early on spearheaded resistance to the bilingual school, including conducting ‘school strikes’. In Gallizien/Galicija for example children (according to Carling) ‘had all come into school, asked to be excused, and disappeared through windows adjoining the lavatory’. The mayor explained that the children had themselves been responsible for the strike because they ‘hated Slovene and refused to be taught in it’ and ‘anyway they only spoke the Windish dialect’. The teacher, Thomas Kordesch, was accused of redistributing Nazi textbooks and dismissed.233 The provincial government ordered further investigation into background of the school heads and teachers in other centres of opposition (including Velden/Vrba).234 Overall, Carling reported, there was ‘considerable ignorance’ about the new order among teachers who

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‘refer contemptuously to “Windish” … and while often prepared to use it as a means are not prepared to teach it with the end in view of encouraging the learning of Slovene as a literary language’.235 Nevertheless some education officials did try to make the new bilingual system work. Heinzel saw the bilingual school as ‘redress’ for Nazi persecution.236 He was supported by Lorenz Just, inspector for bilingual schools, and a small group of teachers.237 At a teachers’ conference in Rosegg/Rožek Just blamed teachers for alienating children from Slovene and called for them to be put in touch with ‘the rich and valuable’ Slovene literary tradition; the Slovene nation in Carinthia would have to stop being hermetically sealed off from the main Slovene side. He also warned teachers not to use ‘Windish’, which was a ‘term of abuse’. In April the provincial school council (Landeschulrat) officially banned the use of the label in official communications.238 But other parts of in the administration were reluctant to take on the opponents of the bilingual school. Some including many in the police clearly agreed with them. Even the police official who reported on Heinzel’s meeting with teachers made little secret of where his own sympathies lay: the loyal population rejected the introduction of Slovene language instruction as ‘an undemocratic Diktat because no process had been undertaken to establish popular wishes to ascertain the ethnic situation’. The new system had replaced Nazi Germanization by ‘panslavism of a no less radical kind’. Its ‘arbitrary and superficial way’ brought ‘the danger of allowing a completely false picture of the will of the people (Volk) especially when the teachers are Tito supporters’.239 The provincial school council in its turn blamed the police for having Just observed ‘by incorrigible teachers, who then present completely distorted reports’.240 Rudolf Cefarin, the head of the Minority Office, also clearly sympathized with the view that bilingual schools were the start of the slippery slope to secession. He clearly agreed with those teachers who warned of ‘the danger of making important concessions to the Carinthian Slovenes without guarantees’. His own preference was to return to the pre-war utraquistic system, with decisions made at parish level on the basis of ‘parental rights’. He also noted, in a sideswipe at Tischler’s ‘Swiss model’, that because in Carinthia the border was in dispute the situation there was different from the Swiss canton of Graubünden/Grisons.241 Labelling teachers who backed bilingual teaching ‘Titoist’ became a standard response to criticism. Incongruously, it was sometimes directed against Slovene teachers who had fled Yugoslavia precisely because it was now communist.242 Some teachers were denounced for having spoken only ‘broken German’ or for greeting with Dober dan in preference to Grüss Gott.243 Carling reported that the teachers who tended to be attacked were ‘the best ones available, indeed almost the only ones who are carrying out the bi-lingual teaching scheme in the spirit as well as in the letter’. In those cases ‘the provincial government’ had shown itself ‘weak and vacillating’ whereas ‘no criticism was made of teachers who neglect the Slovene side of the bi-lingual teaching in favour of the German side and who content themselves with sporadic teaching of a Carinthian Slovene dialect’.244 At the end of the 1945–6 school year forty-one Yugoslav nationals were told to reapply for their jobs. The financial constraints from the Education Ministry clearly played a part in this,245 but politics was probably also involved.246 Yet Carling’s overall assessment at the end of May 1946 was still cautiously optimistic:

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51

on the whole … the bilingual system has proved remarkably successful, when it is considered what a revolutionary measure it was at the time, and what difficulties and prejudices stand in the way of its proper fulfillment.247

Other British reports were less hopeful.248 One saw the basic problem in elementary education as the absence of ‘a positive doctrine to replace Nazism; there is an absence of enthusiasm in putting forward anything really constructive’.249 Clearly the writer did not feel it was the British job to fill any vacuum and the reduction in their role was formalized in the Second Control Agreement signed by the four occupation powers at the end of June 1946. One of the few remaining ‘primary tasks’ assigned to the Allies was ‘the institution of a progressive long-term educational programme designed to eradicate all traces of Nazi ideology and to instil into Austrian youth democratic principles’.250 Almost nothing came of this and at the end of 1946 the British line on denazification in four-power discussions was redefined as the application of ‘sagacious negligence’.251 What of the bilingual school itself? Piesch still endorsed it publicly but strikingly saw it as a final settlement not the start of a process; it corresponded perfectly to ethnic conditions in the ‘mixed language area’. He also argued that other obligations arising from Nazi persecution had been met: Slovene cooperatives and cultural life had been restored and the deportees, despite shortage of funds, had been given what they required.252 He showed no interest in reviving the earlier relationship with Tischler (or finding alternative, nationally conscious Slovenes to deal with). The other side of the estrangement was Tischler’s move away from the SPÖ. He criticized the creation of the League of Austrian Slovenes, calling its leaders ‘well-known Slovene haters and friends of Maier-Kaibitsch’.253 And it was presumably no accident that he chose the columns of the conservative Volkszeitung to identify himself as ‘a Slovene and a Carinthian’.254 Though he remained in the OF he warned against provoking clashes with the police and was also clearly sceptical about the likelihood of border revision; the decision was one for a future Peace Conference. Whatever was decided ‘we will still have to consider … the fact that Austria and Yugoslavia are and will continue to be geographical neighbours’.255 This scepticism is hard to square with a recently drawn picture of Tischler as an ardent and devious secessionist.256 On the other hand that critical view certainly echoes some contemporary police reports including one that Tischler had ‘crept into the Miess Valley without permission to attend an OF meeting and attacked the Austrian government and the Carinthian authorities in the wildest terms’. Another reported him as speaking for the OF about its cultural work at a secret meeting in the Jauntal/Podjuna.257 Perhaps Tischler’s last serious attempt to regain influence was the proposal for a farreaching autonomy statute for southern Carinthia which he put forward in May 1946. A Slovene National Council (Narodni Svet) would have extensive administrative and legislative powers, including the right to have representatives to the Landtag and in the Carinthian government, and to appoint senior district civil servants (Bezirkshauptleute) in the area ‘in agreement with the governor’. The German population would have the right to opt out but their exclusion, which was to be recorded in a register (Kataster), would be based on their mother tongue and their status would be checked annually

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by officials of the autonomous districts.258 The proposal echoed the abortive 1925 autonomy proposal, but also suggests that Tischler had shifted his grounds from the previous autumn. At any rate he seems to have moved away from the common interests of German and Slovene in the area towards a greater degree of separation. Ethnic identity was now apparently to be based on ‘objective’ criteria in the form of language assessment, validated by the Slovene authorities. Yet Tischler still wanted to get away from talk of minorities and majorities, since in terms of the sacrifices made in the Third Reich, Slovenes were far from being a minority. Negotiations should take place between ‘two parts with equal rights and of equal value, with neither side giving or taking but on the basis of duties and rights being justly distributed’.259 Last but not least he wanted to exclude the ‘tactical Slovenes’ of the League from discussions since they ‘had done no service to Slovene culture’ and had in the past ‘even declared themselves to be Germans’.260 Apart from Gerald Sharp, Tischler’s proposals gained little support.261 Piesch clearly had no wish to start negotiations.262 Newole (writing to Sharp) was also hostile and provided a deep-rooted historical diagnosis of the minority’s problems. They went back to the ‘political original sin’ which had been committed in the 1848 and had handed the leadership of the minority to ‘a primitive clerisy’ that had been meant the start of a ‘national suicide'. 263 Tischler’s marginalization was compounded by the direction of school policy. He gave vent to his feelings about this in a long letter to the Education Ministry, describing schools in South Carinthia as ‘centres of Germanisation’ as they had been under Maier-Kaibitsch; the bilingual school was only being fully implemented in 10 out of 110 schools, the provincial school council was blocking the introduction of Slovene text books, teacher training was being undermined and religious instruction was still being given in German only. Tischler’s jaundiced conclusion was that ‘this time, as always’ provincial power-holders had ‘only been interested in political manoeuvring rather than in settling the school situation in a way which was even only partly just’.264 The provincial school council conceded much of Tischler’s case; by way of explanation or justification it listed the difficulties the bilingual school had faced: opposition from part of the population, the lack of qualified teachers, opposition from some teachers and lack of suitable teaching material. It also referred to opposition organized by ‘former Nazis in economically influential positions’ and to a spirit (Geist) which it traced back to around 1890, for which ‘bilingual education was tantamount to Slovenisation’. A ‘small part of the teaching body’ was also being ‘misused’ by the same policy of ‘national irreconcilability’. Nevertheless the Council rejected Tischler’s description of the schools as centres of Germanization as ‘not tenable’. The unsettled border situation and Anschluss propaganda were creating an atmosphere of high tension, which was having an unpleasant impact on the school. The school administration was ‘honestly trying to make the school work’.265

3

Cold War Politics, 1947–49

The Carinthian border in London and Moscow On 14 January 1947 the Deputies of the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, USA, Britain and France gathered in London to negotiate treaties for Germany and Austria. The German treaty was clearly a peace treaty, to be negotiated between the victorious ‘United Nations’ for the defeated Third Reich but Austria’s position was more ambiguous. That reflected not just uncertainty over how to interpret the Anschluss and the country’s status in international law – somewhere between an occupied and liberated country – but also its still contested collective identity.1 In a society where many still thought of themselves as Germans and some still saw merit in aspects of Nazism the project of demarcating Austria from Nazi Germany was a ‘work in progress’. This was nowhere more evident than in the borderland provinces of Carinthia and Styria; decades of ethnic conflict, reinforced by seven years of intense Nazi propaganda, had helped make ‘the Slav’ appear the implacable enemy of ‘the German’. Yugoslavia’s claim to 2,470 km2 of southern Carinthian territory, with a population of about 180,000 (as well as a part of Styria), was liable to reinforce this interpretation.2 By contrast the perception of Austrians which underpinned the Yugoslav territorial claim (and the demand for 150 million dollars in reparations) was not ambivalent at all; it was, in essence, that in war and occupation Austrians had generally behaved little differently from Germans, and sometimes worse. Here at least Tito’s view, as reported in the News Chronicle, was probably fairly representative: ‘Austrians will always remain Germans’ and would ‘take part with Germany in any war Germany might start’.3 The scholarly version of this was the history of unremitting German-Austrian domination told by the Slovene historian Bogo Grafenauer. He referred to three Austrias: Habsburg Austria, the ‘German Austrian Republic’ and – as the culmination – Hitler’s Austria. His central points of reference were the German invasion in 1941 and the occupation of Yugoslavia while the breaks of March 1938 and May 1945 were downplayed.4 Similarly the Yugoslav foreign minister Sergij Vilfan argued that Austria should receive no greater consideration in the peace settlement than Germany.5 The Anschluss had been the result of ‘strong Austrian-own [sic], pan-Germanist, expansionist and aggressive in fact, Nazi tendencies’. Thereafter Austria had been a component part of the Nazi war machine, fully supporting the Nazi policy of enslavement not only as the result of the Anschluss, which had destroyed her

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In the war Austria had been ‘the most highly trained and active exponent of German aggression, especially with regard to the Yugoslav peoples’; Austrian complicity in war crimes showed how the country had ‘remained in this war faithful to her agelong role as the vanguard of German imperialism’. To support their case the Yugoslav government sent a list of prominent Austrian Nazis and alleged war criminals (including Martin Wutte) and claimed that 61 out of the 63 officials (including the Civil Administration in ‘Upper Carniola’) and 3,062 out of 4,433 war criminals, including those responsible for massacres at Kragujevac and elsewhere, had been Austrian.6 Carinthia’s transition to democracy also came under attack. Vilfan called the events of May 1945 the ‘best illustration of the thesis that the continuity of the Germanising policy in Carinthia and Austria is essentially Nazi in character’.7 Fran Zwitter expanded the point in a brochure with the rhetorical title: To destroy Nazism or reward it? His conclusion was that since the end of the war Nazism had been rewarded and the only way to destroy it was to redraw the border.8 Then came a carefully laid ambush on Hans Piesch, who was part of the Austrian delegation in London. The evidence against him may have been less than conclusive but it was embarrassing enough for the British and Austrian authorities. After further information emerged (which was kept out of the press) Piesch resigned as governor.9 Even more embarrassing evidence that another more junior member of the Austrian delegation, Kurt Waldheim, had been an intelligence officer on the staff of General Löhr (Army Group South-East) did not emerge for another forty years.10 The Yugoslav delegation backed up its claims with a mass of orographic, historical, geographical, geological and economic detail.11 One core assumption about ethnicity was that a century of Germanization had alienated thousands of Carinthian Slovenes from their ‘essential’ national identity; going back to the unofficial census of Count Czoernig in 1848 (adjusted upwards by the use of church records to compensate for anti-Slovene bias), the Yugoslav delegation arrived at a figure of 120,000–130,000 Slovenes and Croats in Carinthia and Styria (and only 60,000 Germans). Vilfan concluded that ‘the largest part of Slovene Carinthia is, from an ethnical point of view, completely Slovene’.12 Waldheim reported to Vienna that Vilfan’s ‘quite extraordinarily excessive figure’ had caused ‘general astonishment’.13 The idea of national self-determination played almost no part in the Yugoslav case. Though Vilfan did not challenge the actual voting figures of the 1920 plebiscite he described the struggle which had preceded it as a contest between two unequal partners. Above all, developments since then invalidated it and made its reversal ‘an obvious duty, both on moral grounds and on grounds of principle’.14 Any validity it might have once had ‘had been destroyed by Austrian policy from 1921 to 1938’.15 Slovene resistance to German occupation had amounted to a ‘plebiscite of blood’ or ‘a plebiscite of the rifle’.16 The implication that ‘German-Austrians’ had forfeited their right to self-determination may well have been sustained by wider Allied post-war decision-making, not least the border changes and population transfers of ethnic

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Germans sanctioned at Potsdam. But Kardelj also extended his point to those Slovenes who had assimilated to German culture or had collaborated, stating that ‘whenever the oppression of a people is concerned, there are always people who betray their own people or remain passive’. In Carinthia, he continued’ a certain small percentage of people bowed to the oppressors or even betrayed their people [or] … remained passive under the pressure of terror or fear, whereas the remaining portion of the people fought in the past as well as the present, made terrible sacrifices and did everything possible for liberation from the AustroGerman yoke.17

The Austrian rebuttal centred on the 1920 plebiscite; the delegation argued that it had been fairly conducted, internationally supervised and recognized as a definitive settlement (a res judicata). The restoration of Austria’s 1937 borders had been implicit in the 1943 Moscow ‘Declaration on Austria’ and confirmed by the Allies’ post-war border decisions.18 The argument was closely tied in with the ‘victim thesis’ – that is the claim that since the Austrian state had been deprived of its agency, the re-established Second Republic could not be held responsible for Nazi misdeeds in Yugoslavia (or anywhere else). In any case only a ‘very slight minority’ of Austrians had voluntarily joined Hitler’s war machine and in Yugoslavia Austrian members of the Wehrmacht had been ‘popular among the population because of their humane behaviour’. Participation in war crimes ‘contradicted the Austrian national character’.19 (The socialist Arbeiterzeitung had dismissed the Yugoslav denunciation of Austrian war criminals as a ‘smear campaign’ [Stimmungsmache].)20 It was in any case outweighed by those who had fought for Austria’s liberation. In tune with Austrians’ pacific character Austria had no interest in territorial expansion of any sort.21 As for ethnicity, in contrast to Yugoslavia’s ethnic essentialism, the Austrian delegation argued that a long peaceful interaction between (German) Austrians and Slavs had resulted in a natural assimilation so any attempt to ‘go back to ultimate ethnical origins’ would be ‘unreasonable’. The proper approach was ‘to discover to what nation and culture an Austrian inhabitant considers himself [sic] to belong’.22 A description comparing Yugoslav use of ‘objective criteria’ with the Nuremberg decrees was replaced in the final version by a reference to them being ‘in contrast with the Austrian character’.23 The discussions which followed need not be examined in detail here. They consumed plenty of time and paper but were peripheral to the negotiations. For Western governments what mattered most was a basic strategic point: Austria had been re-established as a barrier to a future German national revival and since the elections of November 1945 had shown itself to be solidly anti-communist. Especially given the fragility of its economy it should therefore be supported against Soviet pressure. Regardless of the recent Nazi past it was time to move on. As the British deputy foreign minister Lord Hood put it, rather than raking over Austrian (or Carinthian) behaviour under Nazi rule it made more sense to look forward and establish ‘peaceful relations in the future’.24 The comment was presumably aimed at the Soviet deputy foreign minister Fedor Gousev, who had tried to pin down the Austrian foreign minister Karl Gruber over the Austrian ‘responsibility’ mentioned in the 1943 ‘Declaration on Austria’. In

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similar vein Soviet diplomats and journalists attacked Gruber and the West for the failings of denazification.25 Whether Soviet policy really was (still) aimed at turning Austria communist, as Wolfgang Mueller has argued, is debatable; but it clearly saw little advantage in supporting an Austrian government which in less than two years had morphed from a Soviet protégé into a de facto junior Western ally.26 In any case the Soviet government saw Yugoslavia’s claims as no more than a useful bargaining chip. In January 1945 Stalin had thought them ‘unreasonable’.27 Three months later, as confrontation with the West loomed, he had favoured restoring Austria’s 1938 borders and by 1947 he clearly had little reason to bolster Tito by supporting them. The pattern of Soviet tactics over the following two years strongly suggests that Stalin was ready to come to a deal if the price seemed right. In spring 1947 that price was calculated primarily in economic terms, above all relating to German external assets in Austria; when a satisfactory deal was within reach the Carinthian chip could be cashed in.28 This was fairly clear to Western and Austrian observers at the time. Even before negotiations started Gruber predicted that Soviet backing for Yugoslavia ‘was not likely to be very intensive’29 and saw no need to be ‘all too pessimistic’.30 After the first round of talks in London, he concluded that there was no ‘serious danger’ the continued disagreement over the border was no more than a ‘blemish’.31 On the other hand the intensification of the East–West conflict made any agreement less likely. On 15 March 1947 Truman defined a new phase of Western policy. In the Manichean terms of his speech both Carinthia and Austria as a whole could easily be seen as ‘resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures’. Soviet demands for ‘German external assets’ also appeared evidence of wider strategic ambitions, aimed at establishing an extraterritorial enclave in eastern Austria which could serve as a springboard for taking over the whole country. These fears were compounded by the uncertainty about which assets were actually at stake. The US delegation (largely supported by Britain and France) opposed concessions while Austrian diplomats argued that any Soviet danger could be more easily countered once their occupation forces had left. Tensions between Austrian and US diplomats increased and as Austrian pleas for more ‘flexibility’ were rejected tempers began to fray.32 At this point the border question re-emerged. On 18 April the Austrian and Yugoslav foreign ministers presented their cases again, without adding much that was substantially new. Shortly afterwards (22 April) Molotov dropped a heavy hint that he was ready to do a deal. He asked if acceptance of Austria’s 1937 borders ‘would prevent Austria and Yugoslavia coming to an agreement over frontier rectification at a future date’. When he was told that it would not, he declared this to be ‘of great importance’.33 Behind the scenes he asked the Yugoslav delegation to agree to reduce their territorial claim, or if necessary abandon it altogether.34 The speed of Kardelj’s response shows that Belgrade had already been preparing a fallback position. It reduced the territorial demand to a border ‘rectification’ involving the area surrounding the power stations of Schwabegg/Žvabek and Lavamünd/Labot; that was an area of only 210 km2, with a population of about 10,000 (according to the 1934 census). A further fallback position involved the transfer of only 63 km2 (3,150

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57

inhabitants) around the power stations and ‘in the final resort’ no more than joint control of the power stations, which, as Kardelj pointed out, had been built by forced labour under Nazi rule. This focus on the power stations rather than the territory south of the Drau (where there had been a small majority for Yugoslavia in 1920) points to the priority of economic over ethnic calculations in Yugoslav policy. At the same time the Yugoslav delegation had drafted a proposal for extensive minority protection. A treaty article and a fifteen-clause autonomy statute for southern Carinthia was also ready.35 These three elements: minimal or no territorial adjustment, hydroelectric power and minority protection might not have brought agreement on the treaty as a whole in 1947. But they do show that it was not a substantive disagreement or Western resistance to implacable Yugoslav territorial ambitions – which prevented agreement on the border.

Calm and agitation Shortly before the treaty talks began Gruber told officials in Vienna that ‘the most important thing was that in Carinthia complete calm reigned’.36 He clearly saw a threat to it from the OF but in Carinthian German mobilization was also a problem. It reflected the logic that the population in southern Carinthia was ‘disturbed’ (beunruhigt) and needed to be reassured. Yet the form that reassurance took – demonstrations, petitions and resolutions – tended to increase precisely the disturbance it was supposed to be counteracting. At a solemn session of the Carinthian Landtag on 28 January the public face of calm unity was nevertheless maintained. Speakers invoked the achievements of the Abwehrkampf and reiterated the democratic legitimacy of the 1920 plebiscite.37 Behind this public display politicians were manoeuvring and intriguing. Some were haunted by a fear, not of an imminent Yugoslav invasion, but of being outflanked by their political opponents on the ‘national question’. An early example came when Carinthian ÖVP leaders, led by Schumy and Karisch, met the foreign minister in Vienna and published a resolute communiqué affirming their resolve to not surrender a single square metre of Carinthian territory. Back in Klagenfurt they heard Piesch object that this had made the border question ‘a politically one-sided, purely party political affair’. On this occasion Karisch apologized.38 The next day the SPÖ press reported the demand of socialist members of the Federal Council (Bundesrat) that the foreign minister declare that Carinthia would not be abandoned.39 In the mobilization over the border itself the two opposed campaigns continued to feed off each other. For both it was essential to believe, and give the impression, that the border hung in the balance. Lack of diplomatic agreement was grist to their mills. Conversely, as Figl put it after the end of the London negotiations, if the border had been settled there ‘efforts on both sides would have been deprived of further nourishment’. He blamed the Yugoslav government for fabricating or exaggerating incidents, some of which were provoked by the gangs of lawless DPs. It was important to face them with calm.40 But Figl apparently also saw that the sense of crisis was sustained by the German Carinthian ‘guardians of the nation’ as well as their Slovene

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opponents. One report, from the Head of Provincial Police Stossier, warned that the OF was planning to use incidents to trigger a call for Yugoslav intervention. In the Ballhausplatz, Wilder described this as ‘hardly likely to be based on real facts’ (though he still forwarded it to the Austrian delegation in London).41 Stossier’s own commitment to the defence of Carinthia was clear; the call to keep the province ‘free and undivided’ was no empty slogan but ‘a fervent wish and a profession which burns inside every Carinthian and every Austrian’. Numerous demonstrations of loyalty had shown not only the baselessness of the Yugoslav claims but also given the public’s verdict on the ‘treacherous elements and their patrons’. The earlier ‘undeniable indifference’ towards political events had now been replaced by ‘lively participation’.42 OF activists for their part thought it was time for a ‘final push’. Franc Primožič, the main OF organizer, called for an intensification of efforts; supporters should publicly proclaim their Slovene identity, display a Slovene presence in the public sphere and confront their enemies as Nazis; amateur theatricals would have to give way for more immediate tasks – demonstrations, Slovene slogans and meetings.43 At the same time cultural activities like choral singing should still be exploited, with ‘protest acts’ taking place at the end of concerts.44 The directives on Slovene language suggest the size of the task: language courses were to receive priority, reading circles were to be set up to study the OF newspaper Vestnik and thus ‘immediately remedy the weakness in Slovene language and counteract the sins of the past’. Mothers were to practice Slovene with their children and if they could not activists were to step into the breach.45 Another important part of the OF campaign was to get public commitments from non-communist Slovenes. Tischler was the most prominent example. In February he told a mass meeting at St Jakob/Šentjakob v Rožu that the outcome of the 1920 plebiscite had been based on a pledge which had not been fulfilled. It had been invalidated by the Germanization and Nazi oppression which had followed and by the sacrifices of Slovenes who had resisted.46 Piesch denounced Tischler to the education minister Hurdes; he passed on information about his alleged wild attacks on the Austrian government the previous summer in the Miess valley ‘so you know who you are dealing with’.47 Tischler’s criticism of school policy reached Moscow. The Education Ministry, conceding much less than the provincial school council had done, either rejected his particular criticisms or argued that the practical issues were in the process of being dealt with. It also flatly rejected the description of primary schools as ‘Germanization centres’.48 On the contrary it cited, the bilingual school as evidence that Carinthia’s post-war government had trodden ‘completely new paths’.49 Tischler then became more outspoken, accusing Hurdes of having being complicit in Germanization before the Anschluss as when he had been a Carinthian school inspector.50 In Moscow, Gruber dismissed his comments, conceding only some ‘shortages of teachers and books’.51 Then Tischler’s accusation that Gruber had distorted his ‘minimal claims’ was cited by Ljubljana radio and published in a protest telegram to Kardelj. Tischler’s standing in Vienna, particularly with Hurdes, never recovered. THe fact that no legal grounds could be found for prosecuting him for treason or even dismissing him from his teaching post in Klagenfurt only increased the minister’s frustration.52

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Another key OF target was the Slovene clergy.53 A petition signed by fifty priests was sent to Moscow. It concluded that it was ‘high time that the Slovene Carinthians rid themselves of denationalization and that cruel Germanisation is stopped’. The signatories declared that they had lost confidence in Austrian and Carinthian promises and were not ‘moved by propaganda spreading horrid news about Yugoslavia’. The precondition for peace was ‘a solid linguistic boundary’ based on state frontiers, which would end the pressure upon the Carinthian Slovenes ‘for good’. The only salvation for ‘Slovene Carinthia’ lay in union with Yugoslavia; there was not even one Secondary or Elementary school in the country, that would in the least correspond to the needs of the Slovene Carinthians and prevent the direction of children into German spheres exclusively, where there would be no future for our youth.54

The circumstances in which the priests’ signatures were collected were immediately challenged, with the authorities claiming that the priests had been tricked into signing. But even if the figure of 50 was inflated, it still suggested considerable support, and certainly enough support to expose the church to unwelcome attacks for disloyalty to Carinthia.55 Senior clerics clearly felt under pressure and the bishop warned that if they did not show their colours they would be reproached for failing to support the fatherland. He also gave a theological argument for loyalty, which went back to the fourth commandment (‘Honour thy father and thy mother’). Discipline was apparently reasserted over the following months. At the end of the year Figl reported to the Cabinet that ‘the bishop and all the priests of Carinthia have expressed their loyalty to Austria in a petition’.56 Towards the end of the Moscow conference provincial agitation reached a crescendo. The OF’s failure to make inroads into working-class areas (criticized in Ljubljana) led to a shift of tactics: a backlash had to be provoked which would show that the environment in which they lived was deeply hostile to all Slovenes. OF youth league supporters were told (according to a Carinthian police report) to ‘directly provoke’ and report every response to Moscow.57 In addition there were clearly many disgruntled demobilized soldiers on both sides who were itching for a fight. The fight came at the start of April in Eisenkappel/Železna Kapla; around 200 OF activists accompanied by a photographer marched through the town centre, carrying Yugoslav flags and portraits of Tito and shouting slogans. A hostile crowd of about a thousand gathered, fighting broke out and four German Carinthians and nine OF members (including Karl Prušnik-Gašper and his father) were arrested. The Austrian police blamed the OF58 while the OF claimed that their treatment proved their complaints about Austrian repression. The British security report criticized the OF for provoking the clash but also reported the ‘bestiality’ of the response; a ‘pogrom’ had taken place in which the loyalists (Heimattreue) had attempted to lynch the heavily outnumbered OF; the clash had ‘for the first time revealed the Kärntner Treue [sic] in their true strength’.59 An Austrian police report also concluded that if the police had allowed the anger of the population free rein, ‘there would be no more OF left in the mixed language area of Carinthia because the loyalist population would have taken matters into their own

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hands’.60 Following the clash British authorities banned the public display of flags and a British military court sentenced nine OF and one ‘loyalist’ activist to prison sentences ranging from two weeks to four months.61 Yugoslav protests were duly sent to Moscow but had no noticeable effect.62 Clearly this was far from the calm which Gruber and others in Vienna had wanted. At the same time national politicians were also aware of the advantages of playing the border card. Adolf Schärf clearly was when he linked the rejection of the Yugoslav claim to the dominant position of the SPÖ in southern Carinthia. This successfully pre-empted Chancellor Figl just as the latter was setting out for London to speak for the whole country.63 For Helmer there were also budgetary gains to be made from border insecurity. He argued that the strain on the Carinthian police and gendarmerie made a financial boost essential. He also proposed another ministerial visit to ‘strengthen the resistance of the population which is loyal to the state and to calm the people’. At the same time he tried to deflect diplomatic objections by stressing that this should take place ‘all without any great song and dance’. He concluded defensively that ‘at all events the population was very unsettled and the Ministry of the Interior is being blamed’. His (Carinthian) State Secretary Ferdinand Graf backed him and returned to the Abwehrkampf: Carinthia should not ‘once again’ get the feeling it was being left in the lurch, it was important ‘not to repeat the mistakes which had been made after the First World War’. Helmer took up the ball: if they were supported by the Federal Government the Carinthians could not say that they had been let down by Vienna and that they ‘have to protect themselves like they did in 1918-19’.64 As the Moscow talks headed towards breakdown Foreign Minister Gruber also began to see the attraction of the border card. Facing criticism at home, including calls for his resignation, he explained the breakdown of talks as part of Austrian resistance to an existential threat to ‘the borders and our sovereignty’. He told journalists that he would refuse to sign any treaty which did not recognize the 1937 borders. That brought praise from the Volkszeitung, for whom Gruber’s statement was a sign ‘of how much the unity of Carinthia has become close to the heart of all Austrians’. This was ‘a significant difference to 1919’.65 When he spoke to US diplomats he complained that the German assets question was the ‘wrong issue’ on which to break off talks. He presumably meant that it was too complex and ambiguous for the Austrian public to understand the Western position. By contrast the defence of the imperilled frontier had an obvious, visceral appeal.66 He explained to Ernest Bevin that he would rather be able to base the responsibility on the Yugoslav frontier claims, as to which he would have the whole Austrian population behind him, than on German assets where there would always be a minority to contend that the matter could, and should have been settled bilaterally.

Bevin objected that this ‘might be difficult since Molotov himself had indicated that he did not intend to press this uncompromisingly’.67 Gruber could hardly disagree with this assessment: he himself told his officials that German assets had been the key issue on which Russians were not prepared to budge whereas ‘the Russians have never considered really dividing Carinthia’; the US Secretary of State Marshall had confirmed that Molotov was ready to ‘give way on the Carinthian question’.68

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Yet in Gruber’s public account the endangered Carinthian border took centre stage.69 In the parliamentary debate on the Moscow conference he put it at the head of remaining obstacles to agreement; in future decades people would not ask if Austria was occupied half a year longer but rather ‘if we had been active and decisive in the defence of our vital interests’. Despite their criticisms of Gruber’s failure to return with an agreement on a treaty the SPÖ followed suit. Paul Speiser confirmed that the border was ‘probably the most important question of all’. He declared to loud applause that the socialists opposed the sacrifice of any territory whatever.70 A few weeks later Schärf returned to Stalin’s ‘guarantee’ at a party conference in Klagenfurt.71 On the ÖVP side Graf had already reaffirmed the message that ‘all Austria’ was standing by Carinthia.72 The reverberations from Moscow continued in the province at the end of April when the Volkszeitung reported that the ‘opaque’ rumours circulating had triggered ‘a considerable disturbance’ in southern Carinthia.73 At the start of May, Wedenig and his ÖVP counterpart Alois Karisch decided to tour the area, calling on everyone to keep their nerve and disregard (unspecified) foreign newspaper and radio reports.74 Neither the newspapers nor the politicians pointed out that some of the disturbance had originated from ministers themselves. For example Gruber’s warning in Moscow against accepting a compromise (supposedly aimed at the Western powers)75 had added to ‘the atmosphere of excitement’ in the border area.76 But the dynamics of antiSlovene mobilization could not easily be reversed. Police Director Stossier himself discussed soon afterwards the organization of a ‘counter-partisan movement, some of whom were former SA personnel. With 500 men ‘a major action could be organised'.77

Agreement deferred In June 1947 Aleš Bebler (Yugoslav deputy prime minister) repeated the Yugoslav compromise proposal. This time it was made directly to Francis Noel-Baker, a British junior minister, who was in Belgrade on other business. Bebler argued that since the two power stations had been built by the Germans for German war purposes, ‘their return to Yugoslavia was not only a simple matter of justice but would be a proper satisfaction in lieu of reparations’.78 Charles Peake, the British Ambassador in Belgrade, concluded that ‘there was some prospect that Carinthia can be settled without tears’.79 The reason it was not, had less to do with Yugoslavia’s determination to get its pound of Carinthian flesh than with growing Western resistance to evacuating Austria. Western concerns expressed in Moscow increased in the course of the summer of 1947 as communist parties tightened their grip on power in Hungary, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet zone of Germany. As discussion of the Marshall Plan started the propaganda war intensified. In the autumn communist parties left government coalitions in Austria, as well as in Italy and France. To many Western policy-makers the communist threat to Austria seemed as great as to its neighbours. The main difference – apart from the weakness of the Austrian communist party – was that the quadripartite occupation regime brought a Western counterweight to the Soviet occupation. Some Western policy-makers now looked to West Germany and the Trizone as a possible model for Austria and there was even some consideration of the economic viability of a

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western Austrian ‘headless tadpole’.80 Austrian leaders were no less suspicious of Soviet and communist intentions than their Western counterparts but they also had to face a population and press which was growing increasingly discontented with economic hardship and the continued occupation. At this point an agreement on Carinthia might have increased the pressure on the West to give ground on the central substantive area of disagreement, German external assets. That probably explains why Bebler’s proposal was ignored and why Western diplomats showed no interest at all in exploring it in the Austrian Treaty Commission, which worked throughout the summer in Vienna trying to investigate ‘the concrete facts’ of the disputed Treaty articles. Instead the West sought not just to maintain the disagreement but to pin responsibility for it on the Soviet side. As the British report put it, the Soviet deputy was ‘led into a grudging declaration of support for [the] Yugoslav claims in their full, original form’. He added that ‘due publicity will be given to this’.81 The Carinthian press was duly outraged at a report that the Soviet Union considered the Yugoslavia’s claims ‘insignificant’. On the basis of this ‘misunderstanding’ the Neue Zeit complained that ‘what may appear insignificant to Mr Novikov means the basis for Carinthia’s existence’.82 By the time talks resumed in London in December 1947 East–West disagreement over Germany had hardened. For the West continuing negotiation on a Treaty threatened to delay or derail West German reconstruction. ‘Selling’ the disagreement to the public was now as important as making the new policy work. Similarly the way the disagreement was spun over Austria was now the central concern. As one British diplomat put it, ‘the reaction of the Austrian people to a possible failure of the conference could be very substantially influenced by the press coverage’.83 The reaction would clearly be more difficult to steer, if Yugoslavia presented a reduced territorial proposal. A claim which was limited only to ‘border areas, which even on Austrian figures, have Slovene majorities’ would be ‘not without danger’.84 A smaller claim or no claim at all would be even more problematic. In the event the London CFM ended without any discussion of Carinthia. But a chink of light did appear at the last minute over the core issue of German assets after French deputy Paul Cherrière floated a new idea: effectively a Western (US) buyout of Soviet claims. The Soviet negotiators did not reject it out of hand85 and over the following weeks showed signs that they might be ready to accept it as an alternative to an enclave in Eastern Austria. On 12 February Austrian communist leaders were told in Moscow that the party might have to fend for itself without the backing of the Soviet occupation authorities. They clearly found the prospect disturbing.86 But Western leaders found it hard to take this evidence of a Soviet shift at face value. And even if it was genuine, the prospect of evacuating Austria seemed highly risky, given the lack of any Austrian army and the weakness of its police force. By the end of March 1948 they were therefore looking for ways of adjourning talks ‘on some pretext or other’.87 But finding a pretext became more difficult when Soviet negotiators dramatically reduced the total sum they demanded for German assets.88 Sam Reber, the US deputy foreign minister, concluded gloomily that ‘it could no longer readily be assumed that Soviets will not accept conditions which we have stipulated essential for

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Austrian independence’.89 In Washington soon afterwards Ludwig Kleinwächter, the Austrian ambassador, reported his strong impression that the US delegation’s ‘most urgent task’ was to shift the blame for the ‘hoped-for failure of the talks’ onto the Soviet Union.90 The Carinthian border dispute allowed the West to snatch disagreement from the jaws of compromise. The Yugoslav government played its part: rather than returning to their earlier proposal they demanded an area of 1,920 km2 (with a population of about 150,000).91 The Yugoslav press also resumed its attacks on German nationalism and Nazi continuities in Carinthia and Austria: in addition to Austrian participation in the war and invasion and Rainer’s handover of power in May 1945 and Austria’s resistance record, the Yugoslav representative even brought up Wedenig’s ‘early’ release from Dachau (in April 1945!). Figl reported to Cabinet with injured bafflement that the Yugoslav memorandum about Austrian involvement in war crimes was based on fabrications and stemmed from an ‘abysmal hatred’.92 The incoherence of the Yugoslav position was also shown by its simultaneous presentation of a proposal for minority protection (discussed below). Soviet diplomats were clearly taken aback by both the tone and the contents of the Yugoslav statement; one tapped his forehead to indicate its insanity.93 Yugoslavia’s stance needs to be seen against the backdrop of its rapidly deteriorating relations with Moscow.94 The Yugoslav delegation went to London with a sense that it ‘was dangerous to lean out of the window’.95 A few months later Andrei Zhdanov would denounce Yugoslav behaviour over Carinthia as ‘quite impermissible not only for Communists but simply for any honest and decent person, communist or not’; Carinthia was a prime example of Yugoslavia’s ‘politicking and trickery’; by ‘making only a very insignificant concession’ even though they had ‘behind the scenes, promised considerably greater concessions to the British and French’ they had ‘pushed the USSR into defending territorial demands … which went considerably beyond what they themselves were making’. This had ‘put the USSR in a false position’.96 Leaving aside the irony of Zhdanov playing the offended moralist, his basic point was accurate enough; Western diplomats now accused the Soviet Union ‘of unwillingness to reach agreement with them’. The British deputy pressed his Soviet colleague and ‘finally elicited’ from him the statement that some frontier rectification was necessary. Reber then chose to interpret this as a Soviet insistence that a border revision was a conditio sine qua non for negotiations and declared that ‘he would not bargain over Austria’s frontiers’. The talks were adjourned sine die.97 When Bevin explained the adjournment soon afterwards to a delegation of visiting Austrian parliamentarians he adopted the idiom of a ‘guardian of the nation’; he had felt he ‘was acting in the spirit of the Austrian people’ and had told his deputy that ‘whatever the delay, whatever the trouble, we must not surrender an inch’.98 Unlike the break-up in Moscow this time there was no real disagreement between Austrians and Americans.99 Gruber thought that ‘the timing [of the break-down] had been quite admirable and that it had been fully concerted with himself and with the Austrian experts’. He did, however, complain that it had not been adequately spun: ‘not nearly enough publicity had been given to the reasons for the rupture and we had

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missed an admirable chance of putting the Russians “on the spot”’.100 Back in Vienna he told his colleagues – quite misleadingly – that ‘now it is only a question of the Russians’ attitude’.101 The dramatization of the border was also played out on the provincial stage. Governor Ferdinand Wedenig and Alois Karisch returned to Klagenfurt as saviours of the Heimat. For the Neue Zeit the demonstration of support which greeted them recalled the ‘fateful days of the years 1919 and 1920’. Carinthians were once again faced by a ‘fateful decision’ and once again they were responding with a demonstration of determination, unity and self-sacrifice. Recalling his own experience in a workers’ militia in 1919, Wedenig declared that for the second time in his life he had ‘taken part in the struggle for our homeland Carinthia’. He also expressed optimism that the loyalty of the Carinthians and the acceptance by the world of the justice of their claims ensured that their cause would prevail; Carinthia’s stance was shared not just by the rest of Austria but also by the Western Allies. Anyone who tried ‘to rob the soil of the Heimat, violate the Carinthian territory or dares to undermine the sacred rights of the Heimat would find us ready for anything’.102 Chancellor Figl’s view was less dramatic: Carinthian participation had been necessary not for substantive but ‘for optical and political reasons’; it was ‘valuable to the Carinthians when they see that their people are being sent to the treaty negotiations’.103 By the time treaty talks resumed the following February the international climate had eased slightly with the Berlin crisis past its peak. The West signalled that it was ready to discuss a settlement of German assets on the lines of the ‘Cherrière plan’. That made it more difficult than before to present Carinthia as a make-or-break issue. On the other hand the Cominform dispute, which was now in the public gaze, complicated matters; the Yugoslav leadership was accused by the Kremlin and communist parties (including the Austrian) of revisionism and nationalism of the ‘wrong’ (that is petit bourgeois) variety.104 As the row became more vitriolic, the Soviet government was reluctant to expose itself to the charge of ‘abandoning’ the Carinthian Slovenes and tried to leave the initiative to the Yugoslav delegation.105 The Yugoslav government for its part needed to improve relations with the West (including Austria) and bolster its domestic support.106 But if there was to be a compromise it should be proposed by Moscow. Returning to London, Bebler declared that ‘if there was to be no solution it would be better in so far as public opinion in Yugoslavia was concerned to maintain the full territorial claim’.107 He returned to the two hydroelectric power stations, and again mooted the idea of an autonomy statute.108 But in the official sessions he renewed his attacks on the Austrian (Carinthian) Nazi legacy, although he tried to soften their impact, telling Gruber in private that ‘the severity of his tone had been meant for public opinion’.109 Gruber’s concerns about his own public opinion also helped keep the border dispute at the front of public attention. In a press statement he called for ‘a solemn parliamentary resolution … in order to rule out once and for all any thought of a compromise in the border question’.110 The Carinthian and Austrian public read yet again that the border was the ‘core question’.111 Soon afterwards Gruber made a ‘decisive declaration’ calling for the immediate end to the occupation and ‘immediate recognition of the borders’.112 This may have been aimed at pre-empting a Western concession over the border (although there is little evidence that one was on the cards),113 but his critics at home,

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like Vice-Chancellor Schärf, thought he was losing his nerve and risking another breakdown. Figl defended the declaration as ‘diplomatese’ but had to concede that ‘it had certainly had a disruptive effect … the language sounded like an ultimatum’.114 Politicians in Carinthia were less critical. The provincial government declared its readiness to hold another plebiscite, supervised by the UN, to show that there was now a much larger majority in favour of Austria than in 1920.115 Once again Wedenig and Karisch flew to London. This time, as Wildner cynically recorded in his diary, ‘the respectable Carinthian bigshots’ found time for a three-day pleasure trip to Paris.116 On their return to Klagenfurt, Wedenig sought to outflank his opponents with an address to the Landtag; he declared that ‘Austria’s fight and Carinthia’s fight for its rights is not and cannot be a matter for any party’.117 Not for the first time the lofty rhetoric of unity was accompanied by some old-fashioned politicking. Wedenig’s travelling companion and political opponent Alois Karisch complained bitterly to Gruber of the governor’s ‘highhanded, unscrupulous partisan approach’.118 For the SPÖ Neue Zeit on the other hand the bourgeois circles in Carinthia have hitherto considered the struggle for the Heimat to be their political monopoly and sought to make political capital from it. They consider the fact that the Carinthian question is now no longer part of their party political brand as an incursion into their domain.119

One obvious way for the Carinthian ÖVP to fight back was to enlist the prestige of the People’s Party foreign minister Karl Gruber.120 He was invited to the province and told enthusiastic crowds in Bleiburg/Pliberk, Lavamünd/Labot and Ferlach/ Borovlje that ‘we will never haul down the red-white-red Flag from the Karavanken’. The Volkszeitung reported that Ferlach/Borovlje was living ‘in the spirit of 1919-20’.121 The central theme of the border drama – that the fate of the border was yet again (or still) hanging in the balance – was reinforced once more when Gruber told an ÖVP conference soon afterwards that Austria was determined to ‘resist any attack on its borders by every means’.122 His chief civil servant Heinrich Wildner, as usual, was more matter-of-fact: the border was simply a trump card which the Soviet Union wanted to retain as long as possible for their struggle against Tito.123 In the summer of 1949 the cast of the drama was extended by the arrival of the US deputy Sam Reber in Austria. In Vienna he heard a passionate appeal from President Renner, who stressed that the Carinthian border was inviolable.124 Renner seems to have taken Gruber’s public statements at face value or perhaps – consciously or not – wanted to refute the myth that the state government which he had headed thirty years earlier had ‘left the province in the lurch’. Reber himself seemed to be reprising the role of the American colonel Sherman Miles when he travelled to Carinthia. Thirty years earlier Miles had reported widespread Slovene opposition to joining Yugoslavia. Now Reber told journalists in the shadow of the Karawanken that he ‘saw that the people of Southern Carinthia want to stay with Austria’.125 On 16 June 1949 the four Foreign ministers met in Paris and agreed a deal. In return for Western concessions over German external assets, leading to a global buyout to the tune of 150 million dollars, the Soviet Union agreed that Austria should be reestablished within the borders of 1 January 1938.126 At the same time they instructed

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their deputies to work out a clause to protect Austria’s Slovene and Croat minorities. The Carinthian Landtag gave solemn thanks and the Volkszeitung declared that the day of the settlement would go down as a historical date in the history of the Austrian Second Republic; for Carinthians it would be ranked only just behind the 1918–19 ‘sacrificial fight for liberation as a second date of the victory of unity and freedom of the Province’.127 Gruber, returning in triumph to Vienna,128 told the Cabinet laconically that the Soviet foreign minister Vyshinsky ‘had not shown any particular interest whatever in this question. The Russians had above all stuck to putting forward their own interests’.129

Minority protection Two months after the Paris agreement the deputy foreign ministers agreed on a fivepoint article for the protection of Austria’s Slovene and Croat minorities. The text of the article, which (with one minor change) became Article 7 of the Austrian State Treaty, has been much discussed by lawyers, historians and politicians. But the focus of what follows here has not aroused much interest: the yawning gap between the diplomatic discussions of minority protection and the Carinthian environment in which any protection would have to be implemented. If evidence had played a role in policy-making the increasingly beleaguered position of the Carinthian Slovenes would surely have loomed larger in the diplomats’ deliberations. Instead, it will be argued, the situation ‘on the ground’ was overlooked, misunderstood or deliberately ignored. This was reflected in the outcome; Article 7 was vague on several points and on one of the most vulnerable aspects of the minority’s position – bilingual education – completely silent. There is some evidence that the Austrian government would have been more ready to make concessions in 1947 than two years later,130 though it is probably pointless to speculate about whether an earlier discussion might have yielded an outcome which was more favourable to the minority. But another point should be stressed: outside Slovenia Yugoslav interest in the Carinthian Slovenes was strictly limited. Of course Yugoslav communists were well aware of what Kardelj had once called a ‘particular Slovene sensitivity’ about Slovenes living beyond the existing state borders, although this applied more to Italy (Julian March [Venezia Gulia], Gorizia and Trieste) than Carinthia.131 As already seen, the Yugoslav government was unwilling or unable to push for the extensive protection proposals they had originally prepared for the 1947 Moscow CFM.132 The following year they made no mention of bilingual education, at all merely referring to the ‘right to elementary instruction in Croat or Slovene written language’.133 A year later, in February 1949 Bebler (still ignoring bilingual education) did finally propose an autonomy statute for southern Carinthia.134 The model he cited was the agreement which Gruber had negotiated in 1946 with the Italian foreign minister de Gasperi on South Tyrol. He flattered and pleaded with Gruber: ‘look what you brought home from Paris for the South Tyroleans’.135 But the dispute with Moscow apparently stopped him going into detail or making concessions ‘under the eyes of the Cominform’.136 After a final plea for at least the ‘fiction of rectification’ (of the border) for the Yugoslav government ‘to show their people’, Bebler left London empty-handed.137

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By now OF activists were in complete disarray. In April 1947 after the failure in Moscow Tito had described the chances of getting everything Yugoslavia asked for as ‘poor’138 and some doubts were expressed in the ranks of the OF. One member wondered about the wisdom of ‘pursuing a campaign which might later be unsupported by Yugoslavia’. But Franc Zwitter swept this aside, focussing instead on Tito’s qualification that ‘in time all his demands would be met’.139 At the end of 1947 conservative Slovene leaders, under Tischler and Vinko Zwitter, finally split off. An acrimonious dispute developed which had ideological and religious roots but also included more mundane issues like the alleged misallocation of building materials.140 OF leaders continued to be harried by the Carinthian authorities, supported by the British. After PrušnikGašper gave a polemical speech at the unveiling of a monument for eighty-three dead partisans in St Ruprecht/Šentrupert he was sentenced to a year in prison. Though his language could be seen as incendiary his only real offence, as one British official noted tartly, had been ‘saying rude things about the occupying authorities’. (He was released after six months on health grounds).141 The Cominform dispute further sapped morale: one OF activist complained that he now had ‘absolutely no idea what’s going on any more’.142 Austrian communists denounced the Yugoslav Communist Party and the OF as ‘counter-revolutionary’ and attacked its territorial claim as an expression of petit bourgeois nationalism.143 In Ljubljana, Boris Kraigher, secretary of the Slovene Communist Party, reported that the situation in Carinthia in particular had worsened after ‘our best activists had to withdraw’. Initiative and combativeness had been lost and he conceded that ‘we have previously neglected these problems to some degree and we didn’t give them enough help’. Kraigher was then given the task of defending Yugoslavia’s Marxist-Leninist credentials against the charge of revisionism. Part of his case was to argue that the mobilisation of the urban working class was not more important than that of the villages than in the villages. He also attacked the Austrian communists for having failed to support Yugoslavia’s territorial claim.144 The Austrian communist, responded with a warning to the OF; opposing them in the forthcoming Austrian elections would amount to going over to the ‘imperialist bloc’.145 These increasingly vitriolic exchanges could not disguise the fact that the OF had gone down a blind alley – or been taken down one. When this was confirmed at the Paris CFM in June 1949 most of the animosity of OF members seems to have been directed towards the Soviet government for having ‘sold us for 150 million dollars’. But there was also bitterness towards Yugoslavia, which ‘only demanded sacrifices and sacrifices which are today in vain’.146 Mirt Zwitter even conceded that Tischler might have been right in 1945 when he had wanted ‘to take part in elections, to take over the parishes to have representatives in the Landtag etc’.147 Apathy and resignation spread and a ‘wasting sickness’ took hold.148 In this situation a transition to normal party politics was clearly not going to be easy, either psychologically or politically. In January 1949 Prušnik-Gašper reportedly told a meeting that the OF should abandon the idea of annexation and instead should fight for workers’ rights. Yet a few months later he still declared that ‘Slovene Carinthia’ was ‘never closer to freedom’.149 In April Petek spoke in Belgrade of his dream of living ‘in the free Homeland of Yugoslavia’.150 Nevertheless the OF, renamed as the Democratic

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Front of the Working People (Demokratična Fronta Delovnega Ljudstva) applied to be recognized as a political party and, after negotiating some administrative barriers, was given approval. By contrast, for Tischler and other Catholic conservative Slovenes electoral participation was not in itself a problem. But the chance of their party recovering any political influence was slight. Tischler was seen in Vienna as no less dangerous to Austrian interests than his Titoist counterpart Fran Petek and his rift with the OF hardly changed that.151 Nor did his hope that his new political party would reject ‘exaggerated Nationalism’ cut any ice among ministers and officials.152 In Vienna Tischler himself remained persona non grata.153 Here the ‘religious Cold War’, including the Vatican’s threat of excommunication for any Catholic who was a member of a communist organization seemed to reach its limits.154 At any rate shared anti-communism and Catholicism were evidently not enough to bring Slovene leaders close to other Catholic conservative politicians. At the end of 1947 Tischler also lost his only British ally when Gerald Sharp was dismissed from the British administration. Contacts between the two seem to have continued, however. Soon afterwards Tischler and his supporters used the columns of the Koroška Kronika to propose minority protection on the model of the Gruberde Gaspari agreement; in a specified area members of the minority would enjoy special rights. Membership was to be established through a combination of subjective and objective criteria ‘such as mother tongue, plebiscite, declaration of guardians or trustees etc’. Tischler clearly hoped to influence the impending diplomatic discussions in London. Meanwhile Sharp, back in England, delivered his swansong to Carinthia in the form of a long unsolicited memorandum to the Foreign Office. It was a fundamental critique of German national and Nazi forces in Carinthia and concluded that it was imperative to continue international supervision of the minority after the end of the occupation. 155 The proposal was completely at odds with the direction of British policy, and although it caused some officials a brief pause for thought the existing line of laissez-faire was swiftly reasserted.156 With Sharp gone there was little chance of anyone with first-hand knowledge introducing too much reality into diplomatic discussions of the minority. The claim by Marjoribanks that ‘experience of over nearly four years’ had convinced them that ‘no sort of autonomy was required by the Slovene population in Carinthia’ should therefore be taken with a pinch of salt.157 So should his assertion that British authorities had been in ‘close touch’ with a range of Slovene figures. Both those he named (Miha Rigel and Franc Primožič) had been thorns in the flesh of the British authorities and Rigel had been arrested by them at least once.158 British laissez-faire clearly reflected their view that Austria was a Western bastion under threat from the Soviet Union. It also implied that the ‘mission’ of the 1943 ‘Declaration on Austria’ was now accomplished. If there was a danger to Austrian democracy it came from the demoralization incurred through continued occupation and its exploitation by subversive communists supported by the Soviet authorities. By 1949 Western security concerns had been allayed to the point where an agreement on the treaty and four-power evacuation, in combination with the rebuilding of Austrian internal security forces, seemed acceptable. Threats to democracy from the far right hardly entered into consideration. At the same time Slovene rights were ‘securitized’,

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that is judged not as part of the legacy of Nazi rule but in relation to a possible Yugoslav threat to the Austrian state.159 Bebler saw this when he mooted the idea of autonomy to Ernest Bevin. Bevin’s response was direct: ‘it was easy to see through the Yugoslav game. If their claim were granted they would try to foment trouble in the Slovene area’.160 The same suspicion of collective minority rights was evident in the new international legal order.161 The Austrian government was happy to endorse Western hostility to additional minority protection. The only brief glimpse of a different path came in February 1948 when the Carinthian SPÖ responded quite positively to the idea of autonomy as floated by the Koroška Kronika. The Neue Zeit called for talks to be conducted by both sides free ‘from all nationalist extremism’ on the basis of democracy and in an atmosphere of ‘mutual trust and respect, moderation and good will’.162 Soon afterwards Wedenig wrote to Interior Minister Helmer, suggesting a redrawing of boundaries in order to form a new Rosental/Rož district (Bezirk). Though this was still based on the principle of profession (with Wedenig estimating the number of ‘affirming Slovenes’ at 15,000–30,000) it included other proposals which might have made it more acceptable to Slovene leaders, such as guarantees for the use of Slovene in courts and public offices, and for the appointments of Slovene to a certain number of senior posts in the Carinthian administration.163 Helmer’s reply is not known but is unlikely to have been positive. At any rate Wedenig did not refer to it when he wrote to Foreign Minister Gruber in July 1948. His letter amounted to an appeal for cross-party support of the minority against growing German national pressure: if the minority was not given more rights it would ‘be bound to feel increasingly that they had only been granted concessions under the force of circumstances and that they would then be returned to what was effectively a condition of being without rights’.164 That did not mean Wedenig felt much sympathy for the OF, whom he described as ‘completely incorrigible’. But he saw the real threat both in terms of foreign policy and a ‘domestic disturbance’ as lying elsewhere. If the ÖVP carried on in its current German national direction it would mean ‘struggle against the bilingual school, struggle against everyone who declares himself [sic] to be a Slovene, whether he is for or against Austria and … the continuation of an impossible Germanising policy’. The trend among teachers, officials and others in ‘the mixed language area’ was preventing the foundation of a democratic Slovene alternative to the OF. He also issued a thinly veiled threat; if no cross-party agreement was reached the SPÖ might also be ‘forced’ to move in a German national direction. It would be more than easy for the socialists to ‘blow into the same horn’ (in das gleiche Horn zu stoßen) in order to gain electoral advantage; his attempts to resist the trend was putting him in a difficult position inside his own party.165 Wedenig was also clearly not averse to driving a wedge between the People’s Party in Carinthian and the less anti-Slovene leaders of the party in Vienna if he could. But his support for the bilingual school as an instrument of social and ethnic harmony seems genuine enough. He told British officials that ‘for many years to come the main object of the government must be to ensure that as many citizens of the mixed-speaking area as possible are bilingual’.166 For his chief civil servant, Karl Newole, by contrast, the bilingual school was a futile attempt to turn the clock back.167 He was also not immune to the attractions of a Carinthia without Slovenes, and forwarded to the Ballhausplatz

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an unofficial American suggestion that ‘the Slovenes’ could be sent back (Rücksiedlung) by paying $1,000 for each person transferred. That would mean that both ‘the problem of money and of the minorities would be solved’ and the territorial question could be decided in favour of Carinthia.168 Newole’s broader historical perspective can be seen when he attacked Yugoslavia’s minority proposal the following year because it failed to take account of the changes which had taken place since the 1910 census. In the intervening time, he argued, there had been ‘two world wars and above all two Yugoslav invasions of Carinthia which have both undoubtedly harmed the Slovene cause through their brutality and ruthlessness’.169 In any case Gruber was clearly unimpressed by the idea of cooperating with an SPÖ provincial governor against the German national wing of his own party.170 And when British officials gingerly broached the role of Hans Steinacher, the German national activist who had returned to Carinthia from a British POW camp the year before, Ferdinand Graf vigorously defended him; not only was he ‘entirely unincriminated’ (unbelastet) ‘owing to the great reputation which he enjoys among the more national elements in Carinthia, the People’s Party would deem it most unwise to take any action against him at a time when elections are in sight’.171 By the time Austrian policy-makers came to discuss minority protection at the start of 1949 Steinacher’s ally Vinzenz Schumy was at the heart of discussions. He strongly resisted any suggestion that the minority could be given a corporate legal status.172 Similarly the Carinthian ÖVP feared that autonomy would ‘necessarily mean the violation of the German population [sic] which is loyal to state and Heimat’.173 The conservative Presse added a Cold War angle to the idea of autonomy. It described the Carinthian border as part of the ‘protective wall (Schützwall) against the world of total coercion, in the criticism and condemnation of which all peoples, from Vienna to San Francisco are united’. The proposed autonomy statute threatened to breach that wall.174 There was also a basic consensus in Vienna that nothing was needed which went beyond the existing constitution and the provisions of the Treaty of St Germain. In the Landtag Wedenig now rowed back from his earlier accommodation, noting merely that his party had never intended to oppose ‘justifiable demands’.175 Piesch added that ‘administrative autonomy’ had never been envisaged by the socialists.176 The main reason why, despite this mixture of hostility and indifference, any minority protection clause was in the end included in the treaty was an indirect one: the Soviet government wanted to minimize its exposure to Yugoslav attacks. That explains why it’s proposal was so closely modelled on the earlier Yugoslav one.177 It included a ban on the activities of organizations whose aim was the ‘denationalization’ of the Slovene or Croat minorities (but still ignored bilingual education).178 But Yugoslav leaders now also saw the border issue as a weapon in the Cominform dispute; mainly in order to shore up their domestic support it was decided to ‘exploit Carinthia in order to expose further the revisionism of the Soviet Union’.179 Secure in the knowledge that they would not actually be discussed the Yugoslav government was free to put forward much more far-reaching ‘demands’ including constitutional changes, revised boundaries to form a new district administration (Bezirkshauptmannschaft) based in Rosegg/Rožek and a census based on ‘objective’ criteria of ethnic identity (it did not specify which). Seven thousand copies of these demands were printed as a brochure.180 In London, Zarubin,

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the Soviet deputy, referred to the Yugoslav proposal ‘with evident contempt’ and made clear that there was no Soviet interest to go beyond granting ‘minimum rights’.181 When the Austrian envoy Braunias met Kardelj and Bebler in Belgrade shortly afterwards, he reported that neither ‘had spent even a single word on minority protection of Slovenes and Croats’.182 The remaining disagreements within the Austrian government – and between it and the West – concerned tactics: how much had to be conceded in order to secure agreement? Foreign Minister Gruber wanted to seal the deal as quickly as possible.183 The education minister Hurdes resisted; he feared both the costs of granting extensive education rights and possible knock-on effects ‘on the Czech and other minorities in Lower Austria, Vienna and Burgenland’. He also feared that the Soviet proposal would oblige the state to provide mother tongue instruction ‘without exception for every Slovene and Croat child’ (emphasis in original). The Soviet proposal for ‘a number of middle schools’ paid for the state also seemed ‘rather too extensive’.184 For Hurdes the disproportionately large number of Slovenes on the lower rungs of the social ladder was not something to be corrected through educational provision at secondary level; it was a reality which led him to the conclusion that Slovenes needed less provision at the higher level.185 But what Hurdes saw as a dangerously open-ended commitment seemed as a positive advantage to the foreign minister; its imprecision would allow minority protection to be implemented as restrictively as possible by the administration.186 In combination with the ‘requisite implementation orders’ a ‘questionnaire’ (Befragung) of the population could take place. This tied in well with the anti-Slovene dynamics of Carinthian politics and its exploitation of the ‘subjective criteria’ to exert pressure on individual Slovenes.187 A last-minute autonomy proposal was also submitted by Tischler and the national People’s Council (Narodni Svet). It was swiftly rejected by diplomats as ‘tantamount to an extra government’.188 But Tischler and a delegation were allowed, perhaps surprisingly, to present their proposals in person to the chancellor. Government ministers were – or claimed to be – outraged. Helmer called Tischler a ‘traitor who ought to be locked up’. Hurdes complained that he could not be expected to receive the traitor. Figl’s ‘defence’ was that it would be unwise to refuse to talk to him after he had been received by the Allied commissioners: ‘we can’t endanger the State Treaty through this question’.189 In fact the occupation powers were no more sympathetic than Austrian ministers. One British official had seen the Paris decision as releasing the Austrians from the necessity of ‘actually pandering to the Slovene minority in order to strengthen their case against Yugoslav demands’.190 The British embassy in Vienna concluded that ‘both the left and right-wing Slovene politicians seem to be living in an entirely unreal world if they think that their proposals have any chance of being seriously considered by the treaty-making powers’.191 In the final phase of discussion Western diplomats concentrated on watering down anything which might be used to infringe Austrian sovereignty or imply a Slovene collective identity.192 They were also ready to drop the proposal to restrict protection to areas where a ‘considerable proportion’ of Slovenes or Croats lived, as well as the term ‘linguistic minority’. The result, as Gruber had hoped, left plenty of scope for the application of ‘subjective criteria’, even if did not specifically mention them. It also

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contained nothing to maintain the bilingual school system, which had been dismissed shortly before by one British official as merely ‘an effective window-dressing’193 and little to deter against those campaigning to demolish it.194 After some verbal jousting over definitions of nations and nationality the diplomats reached agreement in almost dizzying speed. Gerald Stourzh has referred to the ‘high level of abstraction’ of the discussions, but they could be also be seen, less charitably, as a confirmation of how little interest in the minority there was among the diplomats.195 When Tischler and his supporters read the text they responded that the protection it offered was ‘not sufficiently precise and leaves too much to the good will of the Austrians’.196

Attacking Slovenes, courting Nazis Support among Carinthian politicians for the bilingual school had started to ebb almost as soon as was agreed in October 1945. But Austria’s diplomatic position made open opposition difficult. The Carinthian government’s five-point declaration of January 1947 noted lukewarmly that bilingual education had been introduced ‘in all parishes, even where only a fraction of the population has Slovene as a mother tongue’.197 The ÖVP set the pace in overtly anti-Slovene politics by appointing Hans Steinacher, as their special borderland adviser. He then set up a League of Loyal Southern Carinthians (Bund Heimattreuer Südkärntner), whose meetings were described (by a British observer) as ‘increasingly reminiscent of pre-war Nazi gatherings’. One at Griffen/Grebinj was attended by an estimated crowd of 6,000.198 Steinacher’s progressive rehabilitation was an important part of the People’s Party attempt to win over those Nazi and German national voters who had been disenfranchised in 1945. Anni Köstinger, one of several prominent female supporters of Steinacher, stressed that the League was cross-party (she also wrote for the Neue Zeit).199 Steinacher himself soon showed he was far from being an obedient ÖVP loyalist. Party politics were a means to an end, which he once described with characteristic immodesty as the revival of the ‘national cause’ from the ‘disaster’ it had suffered in 1945.200 Central to this was the vision of a ‘purely German’ Carinthia and ‘final settlement (endgültige Bereinigung) of the Nationality question’. He thought one way to this would be an ‘amicable exchange of the Yugoslav-minded population of Carinthia’. By contrast he opposed all collective minority rights and described the idea of autonomy as ‘like a stake boring into the flesh of the Austrian State’.201 In Völkermarkt/Velikovec, one of the main centres of anti-Slovene agitation, a ‘Parents’ Council’ was established. Though its legal basis was shaky202 it started to bombard local and national politicians with protests and petitions to abolish the bilingual school.203 According to a British report Steinacher was the ‘instigator of the whole operation’.204 Ferlitsch, Glantschnig and others, who in 1945 had only accepted the bilingual school through gritted teeth, now began to voice their discontent more openly.205 But in Vienna open attacks on the bilingual school still seemed ‘distinctly inappropriate’, and so they had to be encoded.206 One code was two-edged praise. For example Ferdinand Graf declared that the bilingual school was ‘worthy of imitation by the

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whole world’ but noted at the same time (in response to OF attacks) that if there was any repression in Carinthia it could only be that of the ‘German-speaking’ population, which ‘for the sake of dear peace is being forced to allow their children to learn Slovene instead of a world language’.207 Similarly, when Gruber praised the bilingual school at the London CFM soon afterwards he also implied that it had actually gone too far.208 But foreign policy constraints still stopped the Carinthian ÖVP from pursuing overtly anti-Slovene initiatives like their proposal to remove all Slovene street signage and ban the use of Slovene in government offices and schools. Karisch explained to Chancellor Figl in July 1948 that the proposals would ‘greatly increase the chances of the provincial party’ but Figl, suspecting an intrigue against him, apparently blocked the move.209 The decision by the Allied Council in May 1948 to admit ‘less incriminated’ Nazis to the franchise opened the gates to a series of increasingly frenetic manoeuvres and negotiations.210 Both main parties sought either to woo German national and Nazi voters directly, in the case of part of the ÖVP leadership, or in the case of the SPÖ divert them into a new ‘fourth party’. These manoeuvres are sometimes summed up as an ‘unworthy courting’ of former Nazis, but for Carinthia the term seems misleading if it implies a first lapse from anti-Nazi idealism into Realpolitik. In fact Carinthian (and much of Austrian) party politics had been implicated from the outset in networks of patronage and lobbying for Nazi support; individual votes as well as expertise and financial support seemed too important to ignore. The electoral arithmetic was not complicated; the number of ‘less incriminated’ Nazis was around 40,000 or around 20 per cent of the 1945 electorate.211 At their 1949 provincial party conference the SPÖ now claimed credit for their ‘leading part in the restoration of around 700 less incriminated teachers’.212 For its part the Carinthian ÖVP urged former Nazis to join the party, ‘which has always favoured an amnesty’.213 It recruited former Nazi bigwigs like Moritz Czeitschner (former mayor of Velden/Vrba) who denounced the ‘wrongs’ done to the victims of denazification.214 But there was also some opposition within the People’s Party which came to the surface when a secret deal directly with influential Nazi leaders at Oberweis was leaked to the press by Karl Gruber. Fritz Bock (president of the ÖVP Association of Political Persecutees) warned Hurdes that the kind of deal which Ferlitsch and others were advocating for Carinthia would mean ‘allocating seats to former Nazis, liberals and Landbund members who would not normally vote for the People’s party’. Bock thought that Ferlitsch was too concerned to recruit ‘elements who actually could never belong to us and could mean an immense danger’.215 Bock, and others like him, were placed on the defensive as the bidding war intensified. The targets were described in one British report as returning ‘prodigal sons’.216 Many of the sons (and some daughters) were soon demanding second helpings of fatted calf. Countervailing reminders of Nazi criminality were becoming more infrequent. The few remaining war crimes trials illustrated the widespread blockage of consideration of Nazi crimes. For example the major international trial of SS guards at the Loibl Pass sub-camp (Nebenlager) ended in a life sentence for the camp commander Sigbert Ramsauer. Then a campaign for clemency began. It was based on the argument that Ramsauer had committed ‘euthanasia’. It received support from church leaders and a ‘veritable Who’s Who’ of the Carinthian People’s Party.217

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Soon after the end of this trial Alois Maier-Kaibitsch also came to court. His case had potentially much more far-reaching political implications since it highlighted the interpenetration of Nazism and German nationalism.218 The court heard evidence for the defence from Schumy, Ferlitsch and Natmeßnig. Schumy told the court that there was a clear distinction between the national reconciliation, which he claimed to have always favoured and the mistaken Nazi policy of deportation. On the other side OF witnesses like Mirt Zwitter, the editor of Vestnik, sought to show that Carinthia’s elites had supported Maier-Kaibitsch and the Heimatbund. Zwitter declared that ‘People who were decisive in the Slovene question are still sitting in decisive positions’.219 Maier-Kaibitsch was found guilty and given a life sentence.220 The outcome was hailed in the conservative Volkszeitung as evidence of the Austrian rejection of ‘national Chauvinism’.221 But this line was too defensive for Schumy. Clearly incensed, he complained to Figl that the court had provided a platform for the enemies of Carinthia: instead of tendentious reports about Maier-Kaibitsch the press should focus on Yugoslav misdeeds, including the kidnappings of summer 1945. A week later the Volkszeitung duly switched tack, attacking the OF for having the cheek to talk of a ‘policy of force’ (Gewaltpolitik) when German-speaking children were now being forced to learn Slovene and the German-speaking population of Yugoslavia was not even allowed to listen to a German sermon. It also attacked the trial judge, Karl Kugler, for giving the OF a platform.222 No more major Carinthian figures were put on trial but there was one ‘near-miss’: the timber magnate Adolf Funder. When Karl Kugler ordered his rearrest in summer 1948 a major political tussle began.223 Kugler was attacked by Schumy and according to British reports the Carinthian ÖVP, with the exception of Alois Karisch, ‘appear to have made Funder’s case their own’.224 Amschl ordered Funder’s immediate release on 24 November 1948 and a long-simmering conflict between him and the head of the British Legal Division Sir Alfred Brown boiled over. Brown, who had become increasingly dissatisfied with Amschl’s relaxed attitude towards neo-Nazi activity and the prosecution of former Nazis, made a determined effort to get Amschl dismissed for ‘the deliberate prostitution of the administration of justice’. But his superiors were more concerned not to ‘overdo the “governess” attitude’.225 In the end Amschl was sent on ‘sick leave’ and returned to municipal politics in Graz (where he became ÖVP deputy mayor).226 THis hardly solved the problems of the Austrian justice system which the case had exposed. Evidence from phone taps showed that Paul Suppan, the first public prosecutor in Klagenfurt, had congratulated Amschl for having successfully getting the proceedings against Funder dropped. Amschl allegedly responded that ‘it was difficult but in the end it went OK’ (es ist schwer aber doch gegangen). Ferlitsch was reported as commenting that ‘justice has to be a servant of politics and follow the wishes of the politicians’.227 Now Kugler came into the firing line; he was accused of communist sympathies, professional misconduct and breaches of the Criminal Procedure Code.228 If the Funder case had indeed become, as one British report wrote, a ‘test of strength between the anti-Nazi and pro-Nazi factions in Carinthian and Austrian jurisdiction’, it was the latter which came out on top.229 In Carinthia ethnic and personnel politics intersected. On the one hand the employment of former Nazis as teachers was, as an official in the Education Ministry

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noted, ‘the most important root of the repeated complaints and school demands of Slovene circles’.230 On the other hand for German Carinthian activists the dismissal or transfer of teachers had weakened the defence of the Heimat. Steinacher complained that the loyal teachers of southern Carinthia had been worse affected than anywhere else in Austria. Socialist attacks were paralyzing ‘many valuable loyal Carinthians in their struggle for the Heimat and State’. The bilingual ‘coercive instruction’ of 1945 had been a Trojan horse, leading to the replacement of many loyal teachers by Slovene nationalist, and in many cases foreign, teachers. He concluded that the ‘illegal school decree’ must end as quickly as possible by legislation, or if that took too long, by administrative action (auf kaltem Wege).231 In an intercession with Karl Gruber by Anni Köstinger, whose husband had been reinstated as headmaster in Eberndorf/Dobrla vas in the teeth of communist and Slovene attacks, described two other teachers as ‘highly decent people through and through’. She added pointedly that both were striving to resist the temptations of the SPÖ ‘which points out that the colleagues who are protected by the SPÖ are now already back in school service’.232 Many similar battles were fought in the following decade over the appointments of teachers especially head teachers and inspectors. In June 1949 after further manoeuvring permission was given for an ‘Electoral League of Independents’ (Wahverband der Unabhängigen, WdU) to contest the elections. In theory that meant the SPÖ’s tactic of diverting votes had defeated the ÖVP attempt to agree an electoral pact with leading Nazis. But it soon became clear that both main parties were vulnerable. Far from being flattered by the politicians’ blandishments, many former Nazis were fuelled by a strong sense of resentment at their loss of status, employment and pension provisions.233 While some clearly entered the two main parties to resume career paths, others fed on the resentment they felt towards those they held responsible for ‘discriminatory’ denazification. One Villach police report noted the radical mood at WdU meetings, including calls for revenge and even hopes for a new war.234 Another described a mixture of confidence and vengefulness: some were looking forward to ‘the day when we will be back in power after these 4 years of suffering’.235 By contrast victims of National Socialism were battling against the tide of public and published opinion. For example, when the socialist leader Hans Lagger sought to explain the ‘truth about Dachau’, he was clearly on the defensive. He hoped plaintively that his testimony would act as a ‘firm dam’ against the words of ‘certain circles’ that ‘everything which was said about the concentration camps was simply not true’.236 The threat of Carinthia’s ‘Slovenization’ and the importance of resisting it were taken as read by most WdU supporters. That may explain why the first attempts to make an electoral issue of it in 1949 came not from their leaders but from the two main parties. The socialist Neue Zeit launched a frontal attack which portrayed Steinacher and Tischler as twins in extremism and accused the ÖVP as ‘zigzagging’ between the German nationalism of the former and the clerical nationalism of latter; by contrast the SPÖ rejected the chauvinism and racism ‘on both sides’. This claim to evenhandedness was followed by a reminder of the contribution of social democracy to the Abwehrkampf. Wedenig himself claimed both that he had stood in the front line in 1919 and more recently had resisted the partisans in May 1945.237 The party rejected both

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the notion of ‘a German master-race’ and any claim for ‘particular merits of the Slavs over other peoples’. Socialists wanted ‘no kind of national repression, whether from the German or the Slovene side’. Though Nazi repression was not ignored altogether it was ‘balanced’ by the criticism of the claim that in May 1945 ‘the Slavs were termed a noble and victorious race, and the Germans denied their rights’. But its criticism of Tischler was both more concrete and more polemical than that of Steinacher. The newspaper’s support for bilingual education was also distinctly half-hearted. Rather than defending, much less praising it, it sought to spread responsibility for it to the other side, ‘until the final settlement in the State Treaty bilingual schools have been introduced and everyone’s democratic rights secured’. The measure had been a necessary and indeed patriotic act in the crisis of the 1945 but in the long term would need to be revised.238 Steinacher’s response was to attack the SPÖ for the ‘incomprehension’ it had shown through its history ‘of its task of ethnic völkisch protection’: the ‘notorious Socialist School decree’ was a prime example. He also derided Wedenig’s claim to the laurels of an Abwehrkämpfer. At the same time he appealed to ‘you men in North and upper Carinthia to “remember us at the border”: don’t be splitters’.239 The Neue Zeit now played the anti-Slovene card against the ÖVP. The ÖVP’s dealings with Tischler were supposedly causing great disturbance within ‘the loyal population’ and showed that it was seeking votes ‘at any price’ including those who had ‘only recently committed treason against Carinthia’.240 The WdU did outstandingly well in the elections. At 20.5 per cent (51,812 votes) its share of the vote cast was nearly twice the party’s national average and gave them eight seats in the Landtag.241 Yet the results in southern Carinthia also showed how limited the party’s appeal was242 outside urban centres like Völkermarkt/Velikovec243 with its self-image as a beleaguered German outpost.244 The SPÖ gained almost as many votes from former Nazis as the VdU but its overall share of the vote went down from 49 per cent to 41 per cent.245 Both Slovene parties did poorly: the Christian People’s Party (Krščanska Ljudska Stranka) gained 4,617 votes (1.8 per cent of the provincial electorate) while the Demokratična Fronta Delovnega Ljudstva (DFDL) gained only 2,077. The Neue Zeit declared that the election result, like the 1920 plebiscite, had ‘completely clarified both the ethnic as well as the political situation of the minority’.246 In more measured tones Wedenig told the new Landtag that the SPÖ also represented those who saw themselves as Slovenes; the 1 per cent who had supported irredentism were ‘mainly people who had been led astray’.247 Shortly afterwards he repeated that the bilingual school had been agreed only as an interim measure ‘in consideration of the political situation of 1945’. Once the State Treaty came into force the schools could be properly dealt with ‘democratically’; that would include giving parents the right to be consulted but not necessarily decide. Wedenig also praised the high quality of teaching, which allowed the Slovene children to learn German ‘wonderfully’ and denied that it involved forcing ‘the Germans’ to learn Slovene. But in any case, as a nation at the border they needed to know two (or more) languages.248

4

Lobbying against Slovene, 1949–57

The campaign for ‘parental rights’ In the new triangular party politics which followed the 1949 elections the VdU acted as a ginger group to keep the People’s Party on its anti-Slovene toes. Soon after election day the party replaced its ‘liberal’ leadership with three German national hardliners: Otto Scrinzi, Erwin Holzer and Alfons Vallon.1 They sometimes traded insults with the ÖVP in the Landtag – about complicity in National Socialism on the one hand and in the Dollfuss-Schuschnigg regime on the other – but their differences over the bilingual school were wafer thin.2 Both agreed, for example, that many Slovene teachers – especially those who had come from Slovenia – were potential traitors and should be replaced by those whose ‘civic reliability’ was ‘beyond doubt’ (as Alois Karisch put it).3 And early on in the new Landtag the VdU and ÖVP groups joined forces to call for the immediate abolition of the bilingual school.4 Hans Steinacher’s intervention with foreign minister Karl Gruber shortly afterwards sheds light on the aims and tactics of the developing anti-Slovene lobby. He warned Gruber of the danger of the ÖVP being outflanked by the VdU while articulating the ‘growing bitterness’ of loyal population supposedly at the end of its tether. The core requirement for any new school law was a clear separation of Slovene from ‘Windish’. That was to be achieved by the application of the ‘principle of affirmation’ at the parish level, which could be presented as a ‘generous accommodation’ of the minority. Here it was crucial to break the resistance from the ‘pan-Slav Slovene leaders’ – on this point ‘no compromise whatever’ could be considered. Steinacher anticipated that the proposed change would result in German-only schools in a large majority of parishes, leaving only two to four ‘purely Slovene schools’ and a small number of ‘mixed language schools’. The latter would not be bilingual Slovene-German schools on the Tischler model but, following the pre-war utraquistic model, would progress from ‘WindishGerman’ to full German instruction.5 Steinacher’s comments confirms an important point, which is sometimes overlooked: the German national language of choice was instrumental. Both ‘the principle of affirmation’ and ‘parental rights’ – the two central themes of the antiSlovene campaign of the following decade – were not values in themselves but means to an end: a homogenous German Carinthia. Despite the formal retention of an option for bilingual education parents were to be confronted as far as possible with

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an either/or choice between Slovene and German. That choice would be heavily weighted towards German, not only because of the obvious structural incentives of overwhelmingly German speaking society but also because of the stigmatization of Slovene. These ‘parental rights’ had very little to do with defending the conscience of individual parents against the state. Instead they implied a parental collective which would act as a representative or vanguard of a German Carinthia. In many villages that function mirrored the role of the socially better-placed assimilating Slovenes. They thought that loyal parents were – or should be – the macrocosm of the province, or nation. Steinacher even suggested that parents had a ‘right of self-determination’.6 One reason why ‘parental rights’ were such an effective slogan was that they resonated across the political spectrum. The wider educational context was the unresolved difference over the role of the Catholic Church in education and, linked to this, the status of the 1934 Concordat. THe church itself, broadly supported by the ÖVP, invoked parental rights in order to maintain Catholic education. Though it was not seeking to restore all aspects of 1934 Concordat the church needed state financial support and asserted the right of Catholic parents to insist that their children received a Catholic education. Some ÖVP leaders spoke of parental rights as fundamental, even sacred. Hurdes spoke of the party’s commitment to educational freedom and opposition to Marxist materialism and ‘levelling down’ (Gleichmacherei).7 In the SPÖ this raised long-standing fears that parents would be exposed to the unwarranted influence of priests. At the same time there was a strong socialist attachment to the idea that individual non-observant or atheist parents had the right to exercise their individual conscience, by exempting their children from religious education. In this complex religious and ‘national’ arguments for parental rights did not necessarily map neatly onto each other; for example VdU spokesmen, though strongly favouring parental rights in language education, also criticized Catholic schools for their social divisiveness, in terms which were close to those of the SPÖ.8 Especially in the towns and the ‘protestant’ areas of Upper Carinthia, outside the area of bilingual schools anti-clericalism could clearly still act as an effective ‘ideological bridge’ between socialists and German nationalists.9 On the other hand Heinrich Drimmel, chief civil servant (Generalsekretär) of the Education Ministry and later ÖVP minister, told Carinthian teachers that he endorsed the principle of parental rights in the ‘national’ context. He would allow ‘German-speaking children [sic] to be absent from Slovene instruction’, even if it resulted in children being exempted from religious instruction.10 Carinthian socialist leaders seemed divided. For example Hans Sima defined ‘the democratic state’ as ‘a community of all the state’s citizens without distinction of language, race and confession’. But he insisted that instilling values was the task of the state, not the church, so separate Catholic schools (beyond the payment of the wages of teachers of religion) should not be supported; ‘parental rights’ were guaranteed through the ballot box, not through the votes of parents at particular schools. As for bilingual schools, the existence of linguistically mixed areas should be accepted as a reality. Compromise and sacrifices from both sides were needed in order to achieve ‘an unconditional unity’ and peace.11 Another socialist leader, Julius Lukas, seemed less willing to question parental rights. Although he criticized their misuse for ‘political games’ he accepted that they are a ‘primordial’ right’.12 Governor

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Wedenig himself sometimes clearly supported the idea of replacing the bilingual school with a democratic regulation involving asking parents (Elternbefragung), but on other occasions he seemed to accept that there might be an argument for the state to overrule parental wishes in the interest of the common good; he argued, in a socialist historical perspective, that the school as an institution could be seen as being ‘in itself coercion (Zwang)’ and had earlier opposed parents, who were themselves under economic pressure to have their children contribute to the household income.13 Here he seemed to agree with Tischler that parents had a right to be ‘partners in education’ (Erziehungspartner) but not ‘school partners’ (Schulpartner).14 But he did not draw any systematic conclusions about the structural pressures on parents, much less see any parallels with the constraints on the freedom of choice of workers and employees in the labour market. Neither he nor other SPÖ leaders seemed interested in pursuing Tischler’s point that ‘the prevailing conditions’ made a free democratic decision impossible for the Slovenes who are economically dependent and socially weaker’.15 In the end arguments about parental rights also shed light on the psychological blockages of post-Nazi society, and the way Carinthians – specifically Carinthian parents – were turned into victims. If the Nazi Germanization of Carinthia was recalled, it was not as a warning about the danger of state coercion of the minority, but as a weapon, to be deflected or, preferably, used. For example a unanimous resolution passed – on New Year’s Eve 1949 – by Bleiburg/Pliberk town council condemned the bilingual school as both ‘illegal and pedagogically wrong’ because of the burden it imposed on children, and then described the coercion it involved as ‘unworthy of a democratic state and certainly just as wrong as when the attempt had been made under the Nazi regime to make everything German overnight’.16 A similar protest to the Ballhausplatz from Völkermarkt/Velikovec Parents Association asserted that Wedenig’s policies were promoting a ‘slavicizing of the Homeland’. Its leader, Elizabeth Kuhinka, claimed to speak not just for all the parents of the public primary school in Völkermarkt/Velikovec but ‘presumably also of the whole mixed language area of Carinthia’.17 On the basis of a poll of parents she claimed that 95 per cent were in favour of ‘purely German instruction’. She concluded that the demand for immediate change came from an overwhelming majority of ‘completely local, German and Windish people’. Strikingly, she was irritated by the residual pro-Slovene 5 per cent, which, she explained, came ‘mainly from DPs from Yugoslavia and other foreigners’.18 In the same vein the VdU protested in outrage that ‘the wishes of 90,000 Southern Carinthians to be freed of bilingual instruction were being ignored’.19 Majoritarian democratic assumptions thus morphed into expectations of unanimity, and ‘parental rights’ shifted from a focus on individual freedom to the right of all parents ‘to freely determine the mother tongue of their children’.20 The Völkermarkt/Velikovec resolution was part of the VdU’s build-up to the March 1950 local elections.21 Yet the results of this (and subsequent) elections did not support the assumption that there was a popular groundswell against bilingual education. The VdU share of the vote dropped slightly to 18.16 per cent (8,000 fewer votes) and (after an increase in dues) membership dropped. The majority of its 476 new local councillors (and a handful of mayors) came from parishes well outside the area of

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the bilingual school.22 The SPÖ recouped some of the ground it had lost the previous October.23 In Völkermarkt/Velikovec, however, it lost its absolute majority of seats to the benefit of three VdU councillors.24 The electoral performance of the VdU in southern Carinthia was therefore only a part of the story, and perhaps not the most important one. The campaign against the bilingual school was supported in villages where VdU support was negligible and the SPÖ was dominant. For example the SPÖ mayor of St Jakob im Rosental/Šentjakob v Rožu, where the VdU won only one council seat, led a delegation of the ‘German parties’ to Wedenig to protest against bilingual instruction and demand the transfer of the incumbent Slovene teacher.25 Similar protests came from the SPÖ stronghold of Arnoldstein/Podklošter as well as from other small towns.26 The spokesmen of some villages with substantial Slovene-speaking populations also joined the campaign. Here and elsewhere the anti-Slovene lobby was firmly embedded in the provincial mainstream. Even though Tischler’s Christian Social Party had won four seats on the St Jakob council it was unable to stop the pressure in the village to abolish the school. Like the pro-Yugoslav DFDL (Demokratična fronta delovnega ljudstva) it could only lobby from the sidelines. On a range of issues, from the establishment of an office for ethnic questions in Klagenfurt27 to personal decisions like the appointment of a provincial school inspector, they were marginal.28 Perhaps the most important example was the way their repeated calls for a Slovene grammar school were put on the back burner, ignored or ‘mislaid’.29 Not surprisingly Slovene leaders were also kept well in the dark about the progress of discussions to abolish the bilingual school system.30

Three federal targets To deflect the pressure on the bilingual school Wedenig decided to lead a three-party delegation to Vienna. The outcome of the meeting with Chancellor Figl in January 1950 was hailed by the VdU as an agreement to change abolish the bilingual school and thus ‘good news from Vienna for Southern Carinthia’.31 Alois Karisch (ÖVP) complained that the VdU’s ‘incorrect behaviour’ had breached their agreement not to play politics with the issue. Figl himself described the VdU report as ‘100% the contrary of what had been discussed’; the reality was that ‘we have taken account of the State Treaty negotiations and can’t get ourselves involved in national [i.e. German national] tendencies’. However, Figl did not question the VdU’s claim that 87 per cent of those asked wanted an end to bilingual instruction.32 As well as complaining about the VdU the Carinthian ÖVP was under increased pressure to compete with it in the defence of German Carinthia. Here the party’s occupation of two key ministerial positions – Education and Foreign Affairs – was a double-edged sword; while the Carinthian party could claim to have an ‘inside track’ to ministerial decision-making it was also liable to be blamed for the government’s (real or alleged) failure to act. The foreign minister Karl Gruber had already signalled movement in the 1949 election campaign when he defined the ‘principle of affirmation’ as meaning ‘the human

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being (Mensch) himself should decide which people he belongs to’. In contrast to the past two years he now declared that it was a ‘democratic principle, that the parents decide which schools their children should go to’.33 That did not mean that either he or his officials had much – or any – ideological sympathy for German nationalists; there are plenty of disapproving or regretful comments in the ministry files to the contrary. But their resistance was gradually eroded. One reason was that, as State Treaty diplomacy entered the doldrums after 1950, the danger of international repercussions seemed less acute. Ministry lawyers responded to Steinacher’s intervention (discussed earlier) by confirming that the draft Treaty article contained no requirement to continue the existing set-up. One official even argued that a law based on parental rights would ‘certainly be more in line with the wording of the Treaty draft than the existing system’.34 The VdU claim that they had been told in Vienna that there were no longer any foreign policy objections to ending the bilingual school may therefore have contained a grain of truth.35 Yet a blatant policy U-turn would clearly be embarrassing or – in diplomatic language – ‘impracticable’ (untunlich).36 Harold Caccia, the British ambassador in Vienna, even thought a change in the law might ‘lead to serious accusations of bad faith’.37 He was probably more concerned about the impact on Yugoslavia, which the West (and Austria) was now edging closer towards, than on the Soviet Union. The thirtieth anniversary of the Carinthian plebiscite in 1950 provides a useful litmus test not just for Austrian-Yugoslav relations but also for federal politicians’ attitudes towards the anti-Slovene lobby in Carinthia. Several months earlier Karl Braunias, the Austrian envoy in Belgrade, expressed his concern at the damage which might be done by ‘so much porcelain being smashed in Carinthia’.38 As well as attacks on the bilingual school he may have had in mind the campaign for a special amnesty for veterans of the Abwehrkampf who had been classified as ‘incriminated’ Nazis. In effect that meant that service to the province in 1918–19 would expunge responsibility for any misdeeds committed twenty years later. But perhaps the more fundamental point was not this eccentric causality but the nonchalance it revealed about the Nazi misdeeds. In stark contrast the fight against bilingual education was sacralized by reference to the sacrifices of the Abwehrkämpfer and the obligations they meant for the next generation.39 Three years earlier Piesch had actually proposed dropping the 10 October celebrations as a Carinthian holiday in order to ‘avoid reopening old wounds’.40 Now the Carinthian SPÖ turning the commemoration against the ÖVP, attacking Carinthian employers’ organization for refusing to make the day a paid holiday. In the Landtag it was left to the solitary communist member Kazianka to try to bring Nazism back into the discussion, but his criticism was easily countered with derisive references to his support for Stalin and the Soviet cause.41 The jubilee was also about money. Citing the precedent of 1930 Wedenig applied to Vienna for special economic support to the tune of 165,743,000 shillings, to be spent on public works projects in the former ‘Zone A’ (where the 1920 plebisicte had been held). He argued that it would bring investment into a peripheral and relatively under developed region and at the same time recognize Carinthia’s special position within the Austrian federation.42 The Finance Ministry was predictably unenthusiastic43 while other ministers, with the chancellor in the lead, greeted the request with sheer disbelief. In the Cabinet discussion which followed the ‘Carinthian exceptionalism’, which over

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the previous five years had been endorsed or fostered in Vienna, now came in for some (cautious) criticism. Figl recalled that other provinces (Burgenland and Styria) also had jubilees, Helmer added Lower Austria and Gruber, brought up Vorarlberg ‘because she remained with us’. Graf found these comparisons ‘more than inappropriate’ because ‘in Carinthia fighting [Kämpfe] and a plebiscite took place’: State Secretary Graf: We can’t now suddenly start downplaying Carinthia. Federal Chancellor: There can be no question of downplaying. I must protest against this expression. State Secretary Graf: Lower Austria and Vorarlberg cannot be used for the purposes of comparison. BK: … I just think that 165 Million is too much and there are other parts of Austria, which have to be considered. The parishes in Lower Austria don’t have it easy either. State Secretary Graf: Have the Carinthians done nothing?

After some more exchanges Graf conceded that the ‘Carinthians themselves will’ hopefully recognise that the level of their demand can’t be taken seriously: What they want above all is a generous construction grant. We won’t be able to stop them making as big a ballyhoo as they can either. Granted – in the official speeches moderation must reign. The correct line has been adhered to for months. Only individual VdU representatives have misled (verleitet) the others to make statements which were not appropriate. On no account are representatives of the VdU to be included …

Gruber then brought up relations with Yugoslavia, which were ‘improving daily’ and could develop into ‘an atmosphere of trust or perhaps even friendly relations’. There was no need to crow over the ‘losers’ and aggressive anti-Yugoslav rhetoric should be avoided. He would try to cool down the ‘hot-heads’ when he went to Klagenfurt the following day. But any intervention would only be ‘in a sense’ (nur im gewissen Sinn) and would not mean having to ‘cancel the celebration’.44 It is not clear what Gruber said in Klagenfurt but VdU leaders were apparently not involved in the official speeches. Furthermore the police reported that before the commemoration VdU protests against the bilingual school were a ‘downright fiasco’; most of their planned meetings had to be cancelled for lack of interest.45 On 10 October itself Figl made a coded appeal not just for ‘love and loyalty to the Austrian fatherland’ but also the ‘discipline and trust’ without which Carinthia ‘would not have achieved victory’ in 1920.46 Ten million schillings of special assistance was promised (although the Finance Ministry continued to resist).47 Braunias reported with evident relief from Belgrade that despite some critical articles in the Yugsolav press ‘the 10th October had been got over with well’. The celebrations had received less prominence than the international football match played two days before.48 That was probably as much a reflection of the Yugoslav government’s priorities as of their satisfaction with the treatment of the Carinthian Slovenes (or the shock of

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being defeated 7–2 by Austria in a football international). In fact over the following years Yugoslav politicians showed marked reluctance to look too closely into minority politics. Far from calling for a commitment to maintain the existing bilingual school (as Braunias had proposed to Vienna)49 they took at face value his misleading reassurance that ‘a revision of the school system would not affect the rights of the Slovene population’.50 THe Yugoslav Foreign Ministry limited itself to minor criticisms about the way the school was being implemented, apparently overlooking or not taking seriously the vociferous campaign to abolish it altogether.51 In Ljubljana there were more concerns than in Belgrade but there too they were outweighed by wishful thinking that the forces of ‘progress’ (mainly located in the Carinthian SPÖ and Wedenig in particular) would prevail. For example the modest SPÖ gains in the 1954 local elections were taken as evidence that ‘despite all wishes to the contrary Carinthian soil is not suitable for chauvinistic seed’.52 More critical analyses from Lojze Ude (director of the Ljubljana Institute for Border Questions), including a warning of German national influences within the Carinthian SPÖ, were rejected as chauvinist and were given less weight than the emollient reports from Mitja Vošnjak, the first Yugoslav consul in Klagenfurt.53 When Wedenig next asked the Ballhausplatz to support the bilingual school against its critics he was given a new line: there was no ‘international obligation’ to maintain the existing ‘coercive utraquistic primary school instruction’; there was therefore also no objection to a change ‘provided that the rights of the Slovenes to appropriate primary instruction in their language’ were fully observed. Though a change would certainly provoke the protests of ‘certain Slovene circles’ and would be unwelcome to some Western countries the damage would be less than in calmer times. Improved relations with Yugoslavia meant there would probably only be a slight upset (Verstimmung) while the ‘international situation’ – presumably a reference to the Korean War which had broken out shortly before – meant that a matter of purely local significance would probably hardly be noticed. In short, a revision of the primary school system no longer seemed ‘impracticable’.54 Wedenig protested that this represented a 180-degree reversal of the previous line and meant ‘yielding to nationalist demands’; he added that Steinacher and his loyalist supporters were much weaker in southern Carinthia than was assumed.55 But Gruber denied that there had been any change. He rejected any misuse of foreign policy for ‘domestic agitation by one side or another’; far from being artificial the agitation against the school showed that was a real problem, though one which would have to be decided in Carinthia itself.56 To avoid foreign policy repercussions he proposed that any change in the school system should not be made by legislation or issuing a decree but by taking ‘the administrative route’ which would if possible avoid attention (Aufsehen).57 Wedenig, by contrast, continued to see the single village school as the best way of allowing Slovene- and German-speaking children to mix. and tried to rally support for it among teachers.58 He complained (to the British) that the campaign against the school was a ‘vote-catching measure of the ÖVP and VdU’, which threatened his policy of conciliation. He continued that ‘the great advantage of the school was that it brings the children of both communities together, instead of throwing stones at each across the street, which become more lethal missiles when they grow up’.59 In April 1951 he appealed to Figl, as a fellow anti-Nazi Austrian patriot, to curb Carinthian ÖVP’s People Party leaders’ flirtation with the VdU. He

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cited Hans Ferlitsch as having declared at a recent election meeting not just that ‘the German is the best soldier in the world’ but that the war had been fought because ‘the Germans were imprisoned and broken out’.60 According to Wedenig the comment had been strongly applauded by the Nazis in the audience. It is unclear how Figl responded. While the Ballhausplatz was clearly an important gatekeeper for any revision of the bilingual school, formal responsibility lay with the Education Ministry. In 1945 its officials had seemed more concerned about the financial burden of additional payments to bilingual teachers than any wider issues, whether political or educational.61 The idea that German was not the only possible language of instruction in the reestablished Austrian education system was not seen then as eccentric. Indeed it was consistent with the mixture of Marxist-Leninism and Austrian nationalism proposed by the communist Ernst Fischer, who in 1945 was briefly State Secretary for People’s Enlightenment (Volksaufklärung).62 At first sight the bilingual school also seemed fit with the Catholic Austrian nationalism of Fischer’s successor, Felix Hurdes. But Hurdes also seems to have developed doubts about the reintroduction of Slovene into church services after being advised by Alfred Verdross, the eminent constitutional lawyer. According to Verdross collective minority rights had no basis in the Treaty of St Germain and individual members of a minority did not have a duty to bow to the will of a minority’s leadership.63 These legal arguments rumbled on over the following years. They turned both on the interpretation of the Treaty of St Germain and, even more, Article 19 (3) of the 1867 Basic State Law (Staatsgrundgesetz). To summarize the sometimes opaque discussion, Leo Kövesi in the Education Ministry argued that the article was no longer applicable because the multinational empire had been replaced by an overwhelmingly Germanspeaking society.64 At least potentially, this undercut the idea that the ‘ban on coercion’ was still a valid constitutional principle, which, had allegedly been breached by the introduction of compulsory bilingual education in 1945. Edwin Loebenstein, the leading lawyer in the federal chancellery’s constitutional service (Verfassungsdienst), disagreed.65 He concluded that ‘coercion’ was outlawed in favour of parental rights but also that these rights had to be enforced irrespective of the numbers involved. The detail of this disagreement is less important here than its relevance for Carinthia’s politics of assimilation. Loebenstein was, perhaps unintentionally, more in line with the Carinthian anti-Slovene lobby than Kövesi. But in the end both sides of the argument seemed more than a little divorced from the realities of Carinthian politics. In any case from at least 1948 the assumptions of Educational Ministry officials clearly implied the end of the bilingual school system. The ÖVP draft education bill, which was published in 1948, for example, was clearly based on ‘parental rights’. It envisaged minority (not bilingual) schools, based on registration by those parents or guardians who were ready to declare themselves to be members of the minority. The threshold to be crossed before a school could be set up was taken from the Treaty of St  Germain – ‘a relatively considerable figure’.66 In the interest of getting agreement on the State Treaty officials defined this in percentage terms.67 To this extent they had already discarded the idea of universal bilingual instruction in southern Carinthia even before the submissions from the Carinthian ÖVP were presented. Yet some officials clearly had more sympathy for the minority than the politicians. One referred

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not just to the state’s ‘moral duty’ to educate members of the minority to a high level in its language and literature but also to the need to give a proportion of Austria’s German-speaking young people a knowledge of Slovene.68 The senior official Heinrich Peter thought it was incomprehensible from a pedagogic point of view that parents in the border region in particular and in a province with a not exactly insignificant Slovene minority want to keep their children from learning Slovene out of pure national fanaticism.

He added that ‘knowledge of this language also means the possibility of penetrating the mentality of the Slovene minority and the Slovene population which borders Carinthia and would be a factor for international understanding which could not be underestimated’.69 Officials tried to soften the anti-Slovene thrust of the ÖVP plan; for example they proposed lowering thresholds for the establishment of a bilingual school from 30 per cent to 10 per cent. Objecting that this would be contrary to democratic principles Karisch descended from the lofty invocation of rights: if the higher threshold was not retained a school might be designated bilingual on the basis of only 8 or 10 children. That would lead to the establishment of many more bilingual schools (30–35 compared to 12) and, he argued, would mean no real change in the current situation: ‘the population’ of southern Carinthia would still feel that it was being violated by a minority. Individual freedom or parental choice had disappeared. Equally revealing was the Carinthian ÖVP’s response to the ministry’s proposal for more than 6 hours, German instruction to be part of the syllabus; the danger of education ‘in the Slovene spirit’ would be increased if Slovene schools were seen by parents as providing German as well as Slovene. To avoid this the number of hours should be reduced.70 Once again a key tactic of the anti-Slovene lobby emerged clearly: any choice should be posed as a stark either/or decision between German and Slovene and the Slovene option should be made as unattractive as possible. The exchanges between the Education Ministry and the Carinthian ÖVP amounted to a ‘back channel’ through which the latter evidently hoped to be able to gain credit for the revision or, better, abolition of the bilingual school. THey differed little from the VdU on the substance and once more joined them in calling in the Landtag for the immediate end of the school.71 The other more public front to the campaign was in parliament, where Hurdes, who was in any case a prime target of the VdU, faced a series of questions from Helfried Pfeifer, the VdU’s legal spokesman. One asked him to call on the Carinthian government to immediately suspend the ‘illegal’ (rechtswidrig) school decree, or if the Carinthian government would not do so, to ask the constitutional court to suspend it, and instruct the relevant local authorities to instigate a parental poll.72 Hurdes prevaricated with a mixture of legalism and dubious contemporary history; since the decree had been passed in 1945, before the Law for the Transition of the Federal Constitution (Bundesverfassungsüberleitungsgesetz) had come into force, it was part of ‘occupation law’ under the terms of the 1907 Hague Convention and therefore outside the Austrian legal order. This meant that – despite its ‘illegality’ – it could not simply be suspended by decree. A replacement would need a Carinthian law

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and a corresponding federal law to be passed in coordination.73 Whatever the legal merits of this argument its political point was clear: it downplayed the Carinthian role in agreeing the bilingual school in a way which fitted well into Carinthian politicians’ attempts to shift responsibility away from them onto to the occupation power.74 On the educational aspects of bilingual education, the education minister was strikingly reticent; the issues were ‘not yet completely clarified’, and although he referred to pedagogical experts who thought that a ‘thoroughly satisfactory pedagogic success is attainable in the context of the current educational regime’, he did not make any effort to defend – much less support – bilingual education itself. Yet the Carinthian school inspectors, who were presumably the experts he had in mind, consistently reported in positive terms about the teaching benefits it brought. Their concerns were about the disruption caused by the campaign against it. In 1952 for example they warned that politically motivated protests were being orchestrated in order to ‘create a precedent to abolish the decree’.75 Hurdes also complained about the ‘vehement and often very emotional and subversive criticism and propaganda’. But he undercut his own point by simultaneously dismissing Slovene complaints about a threat to the minority as ‘completely baseless’.76 And he blocked Slovene proposals to strengthen the school institutionally by establishing a special Slovene minority office. Tischler’s ‘very rabble-rousing’ broadcast from Ljubljana was clearly still a raw memory and Hurdes thought he ‘ought to be thrown out of public service’. He was echoed by Figl, who described Tischler’s activities as verging on high treason; he added that in any case his legitimation was very weak and concluded that he was trying to get some of the plebiscite grant of 10 million schillings, ‘and that he may be able to do some business and secure himself a post’. On Graf ’s suggestion, Tischler’s request was ‘filed away’ (ad acta gelegt).77 It was not therefore surprising that the Slovene leaders were kept in the dark about the discussions to revise the bilingual school.78 Wedenig himself was only officially informed by the education ministry in October 1951. No mention was made of the involvement of the ÖVP. Instead the latest draft was disingenuously referred to as no more than a ‘consultative draft’ (Referentenentwurf) designed to serve as a ‘basis for discussion’ prior to a decision which would need to be taken in Carinthia.79 The ‘coincidence’ that both foreign and education policy were in ‘black’ (i.e. ÖVP) hands made them more open to German national lobbying via the Carinthian ÖVP. By contrast a third target of lobbying, the Central Statistical Office (Statistisches Zentralamt, SZA), in principle stood above party politics. Its job was to provide state and society with reliable, neutral data. In reality of course it had been inextricably entangled in ethnic politics since 1880 when censuses had first asked about ‘language of every day use’ (Umgangssprache).80 Once data, as communicated by heads of households to census counters, were published, they acquired the nimbus of unassailable objectivity and as a result became tests of political strength as much as linguistic surveys. One Carinthian ÖVP politician spoke of a ‘linguistic affirmation’.81 Amtsdirektor Newole, more realistically, called an option for Slovene in the census ‘a political not a linguistic affirmation’.82 The possibility of involving minority leaders in Austria’s first post-war census had been mooted by Yugoslavia in 1948, but, though not rejected out of hand, was

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not pursued.83 Perhaps even more important was the way the question was framed. Returning to the earlier questions about the ‘language of everyday use’ broadened the context from family and home to the world of work, where German was more likely to dominate.84 According to the official definition this meant the language which respondents speak ‘in their usual (normal) interaction, that is in intercourse with their family, surroundings and in their occupation’.85 More significantly, it was decided to include ‘Windish’ as a linguistic category, both on its own and in permutations with Slovene or German. This was a striking turnaround from 1946 when the use of the term in official communications had been banned by the provincial school council. Now the pseudo-affirmative use of the term – denoting ‘loyal assimilating Carinthian Slovene’ – was increasingly taken up by the anti-Slovene lobby. It was useful precisely because it was imprecise; sometimes it was a matter of individual character attributes (loyalty, dynamism), sometimes a collective ethnic or racial identity.86 Sometimes the ‘Windisch’ seemed to be an honourable ancient tribe, at other times no more than an ‘element’. For some Slovene ‘radical assimilators’ the label also seemed to fulfil a basic psychological need: to be on the superior and more powerful ‘German side’ while remaining ‘authentically’ rooted in the Heimat. Kuchinka for example saw both German and Windish people as ‘deeply rooted in the soil’.87 Steinacher even criticized the derogatory usage of the term as the ‘degradation’ of the Windish to a ‘corrupted Slovene’ identity. For Vinzenz Schumy – to his Slovene critics the most prominent ‘renegade’ – the ‘Windish label reflected an unavoidable law of nature according to which “the stronger conquers the weaker goes under”.88 They were a third “fluctuating” group’ which ‘speaks Slovene in the family but otherwise adheres to the cultural circle of German speaking Austrians’. Schumy also included a racial dimension, describing them as the product of centuries of blood mixing with Carinthian Germans; in terms of blood and skull type the ‘Windish’ were closer to the Carinthian Germans than to the Carniolan Slovenes.89 Labelling this group ‘Carinthian Slovenes’ muddied the waters further, but Schumy did not think that those Slovenes who were not ‘Windish Slovenes’ were real Carinthians. Through all this fog the political usage of the label was clearly visible; by reducing the putative size of the minority it would undermine the legitimacy of the Slovene leadership. As one Ballhausplatz official put it, the point was ‘to divide the minority into two parts in order to implement their Germanisation more easily’.90 For their champions and self-appointed leaders the ‘Windish’ were crucial to undermining the ‘Sloveneness’ (Slovenität) of southern Carinthia.91 The decision to include Windish in the census (as a linguistic category) – in no fewer than 8 permutations! – was therefore highly significant. It appears to have been made by the interior minister Oskar Helmer, in response to lobbying from the VdU.92 Wedenig was responsible for its implementation within the province but, given his view that ‘Windish’ was simply a dialect of Slovene, he seems unlikely to have supported it.93 Slovene objections were ignored.94 The diplomatic objection, that for the sake of further development of Austrian-Yugoslav relations it was inopportune to ‘introduce’ the distinction between Slovene and Windish speakers, came far too late to make any difference.95 The introduction of the ‘Windish’ label into the census increased the potential for pressure to be exerted on Slovene-speakers to demonstrate their loyalty. It is hard to

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say how much manifest or indirect coercion was then actually applied. It should also, of course, be noted that allegations of impropriety by census officials were strenuously denied and that, as far as is known, no legal or disciplinary proceedings followed.96 At any rate the range of different possible aggregate sums almost guaranteed a battle over interpretation. At one end of the scale the census recorded 7,707 Slovene monoglots, at the other end – the inclusion of every permutation except German monoglots – a figure for the minority of 42,095.97 The first row came when provisional results were published in May 1951 in the official Kärntner Landeszeitung. In line with the provisional summary, it recorded 13,712 Slovene and 8,822 ‘Windish speakers’. Outrage followed from the anti-Slovene lobby.98 The Volkszeitung demanded to know ‘why the declarations of the Windish have disappeared’. Read properly, ‘the figure of those who declared themselves to be Windish, German-Windish or Windish-Deutsch was so large that it exceeded that of those who only declared themselves to be Slovene’; an arbitrary bureaucratic decision had elevated the number of Slovenes by 18,000– 20,000.99 The VdU Landtag group followed in the same vein: ignoring the ‘careful differentiation between German-Windish and Slovene’ was to distort a ‘reality which was not just historic but also ethnographic and and ethnological’ (ein ethnographischer und volkskundlicher Tatbestand).100 There was some resistance to these complaints in Vienna. After consulting a Slavist at Vienna University, the Statistical Office insisted that Windish was a dialect and related to Slovene in the same way as Viennese and Tirolean were to German; the offending summary page by the SZA had been the standard Austria-wide format for Germans and non-Germans. But the office also promised that its definitive publication would include all ‘the different linguistic subgroups which had political significance in mixed language areas’.101 The following year it tried to accommodate both sides, arguing that it made sense to take the first language given by bilingual speakers, but also reproducing all permutations ‘in photographic accuracy’ (Treue). Within the group of Slovene-speaking bilinguals it distinguished between two roughly equally subgroups: 11,218 Slovene-German bilinguals (5,330 Windish-German and 5,888 Slovene-German) and 11,316 Slovene speakers (aggregated from Slovene, Windish, Slovene-Windish and Windish-Slovene).102 The last figure was the one most frequently cited by German nationalists in the following years in order to show how small the minority ‘really’ was (especially when compared to 28,000 ‘Windish’).103 The Statistical Office later conceded more ground when it published a ‘league table’ of 38 villages which were meant to have Slovene-speaking populations of 10 per cent or more, producing an aggregate Slovene-speaking population of 19,476 (out of a total of  64,604).104 While it conceded the minor distortion arising from its decision to subsume (some) Windish-speakers under Slovene-speakers105 it ignored a more important point: the categorizing of hyphenated pairs (German-Slovene, SloveneWindish etc.) under the first language given. The assumption of both Interior Ministry and the Central Statistical Office was that ‘someone who put German first and gives a minority language as a second language does not want to be counted as part of the minority’.106 This was debatable, to put it mildly. No such ranking had been mentioned in the official guidance and Slovene leaders themselves had called on their supporters to enter both languages without specifying any particular order.107 The statistical

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consequences were significant – 10,944 ‘Deutsch-Windish’ and 8,617 ‘GermanSlovene’ were included as a subgroup of German-speakers.108 On that basis there were only 22,534 Slovene-speakers. In this ‘numbers game’ some more important points were lost sight of – the census failed miserably to fulfil its basic purpose of supplying accurate data about language usage in southern Carinthia. The range of possible interpretations made it virtually useless for policy-makers. An even more important point was that, even the highest possible aggregate figure of 42,095 substantially underestimated the number of Slovene-speakers.109 The extent of the underestimate is naturally hard to determine. Josef Schöner, a leading diplomat with a good knowledge of Carinthia, put the figure for those of ‘broadly of Slovene stock’ at around 60,000.110 Karl Newole thought the number of Slovene-speakers was much higher; in the case of the village of St Kanzian/ Škocjan he contrasted the census figure of 422 Slovene-speakers out of a total population of 2,651 (15.9 per cent) to his personal experience that there was practically no farmer there who did not speak Slovene.111 Three years later he broadened this point when he estimated the number of those with a ‘Slav language of daily use’ (slawischer Umgangssprache) at between 80,000 and 85,000.112 Strikingly, neither Schöner nor Newole showed any interest in explaining the discrepancy. Schöner noted merely that ‘in practice’ not more than 20,000 would claim to be Slovene while Newole was mainly concerned to question the legitimacy of the two Slovene parties. Neither asked why so many Slovenes felt unwilling or unable to register their actual linguistic competence to the census authorities.

Wedenig’s salvage attempt When Slovene leaders found out at the end of 1951 how far discussions to abolish the bilingual school had gone they were shocked. The Slovene Cultural League was ‘disturbed’ by the ‘raw ruthlessness’ with which all their objections to parental rights, the ‘Windish’ and the ‘subjective criteria’ had been brushed aside; the draft law was ‘an expression of that mentality which portrayed Germanisation as a natural necessity, like the cruel law of nature according to which “the stronger destroys the weaker”’. The League retreated to the extent of accepting that some exclusions from bilingual instruction could be made but called on them to be based not on parental declarations but on linguistic assessment.113 Tischler’s National Council (Narodni Svet) appealed to Chancellor Figl to exercise ‘a really Austrian tolerant spirit … which in the central European area would be a bridge to other national cultures’. Young people needed to be brought up as Austrians, not as members of a German cultural circle; apart from the prohibitive cost of setting up three different types of school, the proposed change would confront children with another fait accompli, while parental declarations would bring disruptive local, national and international politics into the school. THe alternative was to implement the 1945 school decree properly, in the interest of ‘a peaceful neighbourly cohabitation of both ethnic groups’. Last but not least, religious instruction without the mother tongue ‘was irreconcilable with the fundamental principles of the Catholic religion’.114 The ministry’s reply to Tischler was as disingenuous as that to Wedenig:

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all officials had done was to provide a ‘template’ for further discussion and decisions which would have to take place in Carinthia.115 In trying to mobilize opposition to the proposed change Catholic Slovene leaders had little support from the SPÖ. Wedenig seems to have found it easier to talk with leaders of the ‘pro-Tito’ DFDL – whatever he thought of their politics. He also supported more cross-border cultural contacts (operas and choirs) with Slovenia.116 But the Neue Zeit continued to locate itself equidistantly from Slovene and German nationalist extremism, represented by ‘Gospod Tischler’ and ‘Herr Steinacher’; both were depicted walking ‘arm in arm’ with the People’s Party.117 Especially after the replacement of Blasius Blatnik by Hans Paller in November 1954 the newspaper’s language became more polemically anti-Slovene. Before the Anschluss, Paller had been editor of the German national Freie Stimmen.118 One Villach police report ascribed his appointment to an organized ring of former Nazis and Reich Germans in the SPÖ. It stated that some of them ‘basically have not changed and only belong to the SPÖ for the purpose of self-advancement or with the goal of a planned infiltration’.119 The charge cannot be verified on the basis of the available evidence but it is clear that the party was now intent on recouping the votes it had lost to the VdU in 1949. The rationale that the party was ‘turning Nazis into citizens’ may have applied in some cases but the ‘Slovene question’ suggests that adaption went in both directions; as the party’s ranks were swollen by former Nazi members the leadership’s support for the bilingual school steadily ebbed away.120 In 1952 the party leadership signalled that it was ready to reduce the number of bilingual schools. The negotiations which began in Vienna the following year included national and provincial leaders from the two main parties. Steinacher (who had just been elected vice-president of the Carinthian People’s Party) was part of the ÖVP ‘team’. No Slovenes were included.121 The SPÖ raised their ‘offer’ of schools to be excluded from 24 schools to 28. That would have left out the urban centres of Völkermarkt/ Velikovec, Arnoldstein/Podklošter, Ferlach/Borovlje and Velden/Vrba, where much of the opposition was concentrated. Overall, according to Wedenig’s estimate (which was based on the 1951 census), the population covered by the bilingual school would be reduced by 38.7 per cent.122 On the other hand the People’s Party, excluding all Windish permutations apart from ‘Slovene-Windish’ and ‘Slovene-German’, demanded that 58 schools be dropped. In the course of negotiations they reduced this to 41 schools (or 54 per cent of the overall population of the area). That left a difference of only 13 schools between the two sides.123 One probable reason why this fairly narrow gap was not bridged was the ÖVP’s fear of being criticized for weakness on the ‘national question’. Steinacher did his best to reinforce this by calling for the VdU to be included in the talks as ‘the third German Party’.124 And he ensured that differences about the ‘Windish’ emerged as an important marker of the difference between German nationalists (inside and outside the ÖVP) and supporters of a grand coalition compromise. Steinacher, Newole sarcastically reported, described ‘all Windish as German and himself as spokesman of the Windish and all Lower Carinthia’. When Newole queried Steinacher’s right to speak in the name of the ‘Windish’ there were some bad-tempered exchanges. In general, Vice-Chancellor Adolf Schärf was far from sympathetic to minority aspirations, opposing a Slovene middle

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school because it could educate ‘intellectual workers of a chauvinistic tendency’125. But he also objected that it would be ‘expensive’ ‘to cultivate the Windish nation against the Slovenes’.126 He was supported by Karl Gruber, who had just returned from his first official visit to Belgrade,127 and now argued that ‘a Windish nation couldn’t suddenly be invented’.128 At this point (according to Newole), Steinacher ‘revealed his pan-German colours’ and was ‘slapped down rather energetically’ by Gruber.129 Newole reported that ‘the gentlemen of the clerical wing are cursing Steinacher at the top of their voices’.130 The Neue Zeit gloated that the Foreign Minister had ‘boxed the ears’ of the rabblerousers.131 Meanwhile Karisch accused the SPÖ of trying to drive a wedge between the federal and provincial ÖVP and thus shifting responsibility for the breakdown onto Gruber.132 However, it is important to note that Gruber was not opposed in principle to ending the bilingual school. But he wanted any revision to be swift and unobtrusive, preferably through administrative action rather than legislation or decree.133 In the end he differed only marginally from Newole’s ‘realist’ view that assimilation was an inevitable result of progress and ‘in the long run the Slovenes in Carinthia could not be saved’.134 However steady, unobtrusive assimilation was not what the anti-Slovene lobby wanted. They craved a public confrontation ending in victory. From that point of view the failure of the two coalition parties to reach a deal usefully kept the issue usefully alive into the next round of (provincial) elections in February 1953. In the run-up to them the press attacks on Wedenig – from the VdU Neue Front to the Graz-based Kleine Zeitung – intensified. The Neue Front asked if Tito was now ruling the Carinthian SPÖ; Ferdinand Graf all but accused Wedenig of being a Yugoslav agent.135 Shortly before election day the town council in Völkermarkt/Velikovec demanded the immediate suspension of bilingual instruction and the parents’ organization called for a ‘school strike’.136 Wedenig attacked the organizers for bringing politics into the classroom and called for reason and peace. He also derided the notion of a ‘Windish nation’, which had been invented ‘at a beer table in a backroom bar in Sittersdorf ’ (Žitara vas).137 Yet his defense also moved onto the terrain of the school’s opponents: it had been a necessary part of what he called Carinthia’s ‘second Abwehrkampf ’.138 Soon afterwards he used a parental questionnaire as a pretext for reducing Slovene teaching in the town’s two secondary schools from three hours to one. The threadbare legal justification was that there was a ‘school space emergency’. Education Ministry officials condemned the proposal as a concession to nationalist bigotry, which ignored parents who were not part of the majority and would create disturbance among the children.139 But they accepted Wedenig’s fait accompli. The 1953 election results did not prove – any more than preceding ones – that the ‘national question’ was a vote-winner. The Carinthian SPÖ recouped some of the ground it had lost in 1949, gaining nearly 20,000 more votes and increasing its share of the vote to 48.2 per cent of the total votes cast.140 With 18 seats in the Landtag Wedenig’s position as governor was secure.141 In southern Carinthia the socialists were probably helped by the endorsement by the DFDL). Only about 44 per cent of those who had supported the VdU in 1949 stuck with them. According to Dirk Hänisch the SPÖ gained about 25 per cent of the disaffected voters and the People’s Party gained only 21 per cent.142 In Carinthia as a whole VdU support dropped to 16.9 per cent

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of the vote.143 In the bilingual area it remained as weak as ever.144 In Völkermarkt/ Velikovec the SPÖ gained ground at the expense of the People’s Party and regained control of the town council.145 Wedenig hailed the results as a demonstration of the ‘political maturity’ of Carinthian electors who had refused to believe the accusations against him.146 He told the Landtag that its task was now to find a final solution to the Carinthian school question which would satisfy both national groups ‘who love our land as their homeland Heimat’. The SPÖ then returned to their compromise offer.147 As well as bilingual education being dropped from about a quarter of the schools of the area, parents would be able to withdraw their child from the fourth year of bilingual instruction.148 Wedenig called for a ‘sober discussion’ instead of a ‘beer tent atmosphere’.149 Later in the year he chaired a discussion which include representatives of the three main political parties, inspectors and teachers and minority leaders. The latter conceded that there were some problems with the extent of the existing area but rejected census figures and ‘parental rights’ as a basis for a revision. In Naš Tednik Tischler recalled the history of ethnic conflict which the bilingual school had been intended to put an end to, and appealed for mutual understanding.150 The draft law agreed by the Carinthian government at the end of 1953 listed 70 schools where bilingual instruction was to be retained.151 About 7,000 children would continue to receive bilingual instruction as well as parallel classes for Slovene pupils at a state middle school (Mittelschule) in Klagenfurt.152 The sober seven-page exposition of the bill’s rationale (Motivenbericht) certainly avoided the ‘atmosphere of the beer-tent’. But it also reflected the anti-Slovene direction of Carinthian politics; the bilingual school was presented not as a response to Nazi persecution but as a necessary temporary concession to outside pressure. It also criticized Slovene leaders for being unyielding and showed sympathy for the objections of ‘Germans’ to having to learn Slovene. On the other hand it cited the highest possible census figure of 42,095 for those who ‘somehow’ spoke Slovene and described the ‘Windish’ as Slovenes who viewed their nation of origin as inferior and as a result became ‘national hot-heads’ (Heißsporne), overstating their new national allegiance out of a feeling of inferiority. Overall, assimilation was a natural process which should not be blamed on the Austrian state but could be explained by the relatively low total of Slovene speakers, the lack of Slovene statehood and the late development of Slovene national consciousness; the 1920 plebiscite had been the expression of a clear choice by the Carinthian population. The report concluded that the objections of ‘the Germans’ to their children having to learn a language spoken by so few people was partly overridden by the need to learn the ‘neighbour’s language’. This led to the pragmatic conclusion that it made sense to end bilingual education in those areas where only a ‘negligible proportion of the population, could be expected to learn in Slovene’. On 10 December the Carinthian government agreed to forward the draft law to Vienna as the first step in coordinating with the federal legislation.153 Almost at once the proposed law came under attack. The Nationale Liga, a splinter political party to the right of the VdU (supported in their zone by the Soviet authorities), denounced it as the product of a pro-Slovene governor and called on the national camp to unite against the threatening ‘Slovenization’ of the province.154 The conservative newspaper Salzburger Nachrichten dismissed the proposal as ‘out of the question’

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because it failed to recognize parental rights.155 From the ‘other’ direction the Slovenski Vestnik criticized it a ‘strange mixture of scientific and historical facts … and completely untenable scientific theories and historical forgeries’.156 The National Council denounced the proposal to cut ‘nearly half ’ of the bilingual area, although it concentrated its main fire on the pro-Yugoslav DFDL and its electoral pact with the SPÖ.157 Perhaps most important was the reaction in Belgrade. When the Yugoslav foreign minister Koča Popović visited Vienna in November 1953 he had expressed his hope that the minority could act as a bridge rather than a barrier between the two countries neither side had wanted a discussion about them.158 Now he indignantly contrasted the friendly reception he had been given with the Carinthian proposal.159 The Slovene press denounced it as a ‘substantial mutilation’160 and Bebler warned that any reduction in bilingual provision would be ‘a cloud in the sky’ of relations between the two countries.161 The Yugoslav government also noted that the impending Berlin CFM made this a ‘highly unsuitable’ moment for reducing bilingual provision. The proposal would mean ‘not just a severe worsening of the cultural basis of the Slovene minority in Carinthia but also the danger of a deterioration of the recently improving relations between the two countries’.162 As the Yugoslav government doubtless realised, it was a sensitive point in Austria’s State Treaty diplomacy. After four years of near-paralysis the four foreign ministers were about to reconvene in Berlin, and with Stalin dead Soviet foreign policy towards Germany and Austria seemed to be moving in a more accommodating direction. In Vienna there were hopes that the treaty could be decoupled from the German question. This chance of agreement, however slight, could not be risked by a hostile Yugoslav intervention. Figl (who had replaced Gruber as Austrian foreign minister) asked the new education minister Ernst Kolb to avoid anything which might mean blowing up the school question into ‘a big affair’ just before or during the Berlin conference, ‘which was so important for us’.163 In particular, as one junior official ineptly but revealingly put it, the prospect that Yugoslavia might demand a reaffirmation of the educational status quo would put Austria in an awkward position since ‘we could presumably not declare our intention of curtailing the currently existing rights of the minorities, however justified the grounds for it might be’.164 If a change in the bilingual school was necessary, then Slovene opinion should be placated by consulting minority leaders; even a small reduction of the list of schools to be removed would be useful to gain credit with Yugoslavia.165 At the same time officials concluded – on the mistaken assumption that the new proposal was based on ‘parental rights’ – that blocking it would mean continuing ‘language coercion for German-speaking children’. That ‘would be bound to lead to serious difficulties within Carinthia’s German population and not least give the right-wing opposition party an enormous boost’. After some desultory legal discussion the Carinthian proposal was first put on ice, then shelved.166 It took nearly a year for the ministry to respond formally: it ruled that legal and political objections meant it was not advisable (ratsam) to proceed with it.167 By now Heinrich Drimmel, the conservative Catholic who had been the chief civil servant in the Education Ministry for several years, had taken over as minister. He called for Carinthian parties to avoid ‘overhasty and surprising solutions’; the 1945 decree had to be respected as ‘a legally valid part of the internal Austrian legal order’ until it was properly

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amended or replaced.168 Wedenig, seemingly stung, reviewed the exchanges of the previous four years and then forwarded without comment a new proposal from the Carinthian ÖVP which returned to ‘parental rights’.169 Further legal and procedural objections come from the ministry, which meant that there would be no change in place for the 1955–6 school year.170 The Carinthian People’s Party secretary Vogl-Boekh complained to Drimmel that ‘all these ifs and buts had repeatedly delayed a solution’. He added darkly that ‘our friends from the mixed language Zone are really getting very impatient’.171 Wedenig’s proposal was the last serious attempt to salvage the principle of universal bilingual education. Though it would have reduced the scope of Slovene instruction, the reduction would have been much smaller than what actually emerged in September 1958. Yet a consideration of the provincial context suggests that even if it had become law the anti-Slovene campaign would hardly have stopped. It is hard not to conclude that Wedenig’s basic assumption – or hope – that ethnic politics could be defused through rational discussion and judicious concessions was over-optimistic.172 The possibility of isolating a minority of nationalist activists (or ‘hotheads’) from the mainstream was undermined by the reality that the former, though far from being as representative of Carinthia as they claimed, were firmly embedded in the province’s culture and value system. The agitation in Völkermarkt/Velikovec illustrates the point. Slovene instruction there (as in other towns like Arnoldstein/Podklošter, Grafenstein/Grabštanj and Velden/Vrba) had de facto already been reduced to almost nothing. According to Wedenig only 15 children were now receiving it. The campaign against it there nevertheless continued unabated. Perhaps Wedenig was right that it was led by ‘perfectly unqualified people, who have been empowered neither by a political party nor by a non-existent Parental association, who have placed themselves at the top of the movement’.173 Nevertheless their activism was sustained by the town’s selfidentification as a German bulwark. In 1953 the 700th anniversary celebration of the town’s history was told as an epic of resistance to foreign threat – from Turks to South Slavs; partisan actions during and after the Second World War fitted well into this scheme.174 In a similar vein the Kleine Zeitung published a series of articles under the heading of the ‘bloody border’ which portrayed the partisans as savages motivated by a combination of blind hatred and Bolshevik ideology; at the end of the war ‘the horrors were just beginning’.175 The memorial to eighty dead partisans erected in St Ruprecht’s churchyard (Völkermarkt/Velikovec) clearly disrupted this narrative. Ten years after the war its anti-fascist iconography – three partisans in heroic poses pointing southward – as well as the dedication (in Slovene) ‘to those fallen in the war against Fascism’ (Padlim za svobodo v borbi proti) fašizmu was at odds with the town’s dominant culture. In September 1954 after a hostile press campaign, it was blown up. The journalists who had campaigned against it made no secret of their satisfaction.176 The Unterkärntner Nachrichten explained that ‘the hatred which had been mounting in the loyal population for years reached for explosives’.177 The police showed little interest in tracking down the culprits and none were found. In Slovenia there was press criticism and concern about the direction of Carinthian politics, but when the Maribor newspaper Večer published strong criticism of the ‘contemptible act’ it received a public reprimand.178

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The Austrian controversy about the form which any rebuilt monument should take also revealed some deeper fissures in Austria. To the Kleine Zeitung the proposal to restore it with the original inscription was comparable to Yugoslavia setting up a heroes’ monument (Heldendenkmal) for their fallen comrades, ‘who at the end of the day also fought for a Fatherland’.179 Of course identification with the dead Wehrmacht soldiers reflected the widespread painful bereavement of many Austrians, but these apolitical or anti-political feelings were given a political steer by the veterans organizations and their publications.180 Like the Völkermarkt/Velikovec monument the bilingual school was a reminder of German defeat and a period when German nationalists were put on the back foot, or in Schumy’s words were being ‘pushed around’ (die Geschobenen).181 Any defense of it as a measure of redress for Nazi persecution would incur political costs. The new education minister, Heinrich Drimmel, experienced this at first hand when he visited Klagenfurt at the end of 1954. What had been intended as an initial fact-finding visit turned into a baptism of fire. There were demonstrations and school strikes (in Velden/Vrba, Grafenstein/Grabštanj and Gurnitz/Podkrnos) and no fewer than 26 delegations. There were also (weaker) counter-demonstrations from Slovenes. Tischler and Valentin Inzko told the minister that most of the agitation came from areas where bilingual instruction had either never been enforced or enforced so badly ‘that it’s not even possible to talk of bilingualism let alone language coercion’.182 Back in Vienna, Drimmel noted ‘with regret’ that ‘unfortunately in Carinthia nothing has been learnt on both sides from the lessons of two world wars’. He also warned that any ‘inept and ill-considered treatment of this question could do great damage for all Austria’; but the current situation was acceptable to neither Germans nor Slovenes.183 In the Ballhausplatz, Josef Schöner commented in a similar vein: the mood in Carinthia was ‘so tense (stickig), that no party dares give expression to the voice of reason!’. He singled out socialist officials who ‘had contributed with gusto’ and concluded that the SPÖ had no right to accuse the People’s Party of stirring things up (Aufputschung).184 Schöner explicitly exempted Wedenig from his criticism but he may well have had the socialist Neue Zeit in mind. Its response to Drimmel’s cautionary words had been to accuse ‘Vienna’ not just of delaying a settlement but of working hand-in-glove with the Slav enemy.185 It also attacked Yugoslav support for Carinthian Slovenes, denounced Yugoslav repression and raised fears of Slovene expansion: the ÖVP campaign against Carinthia’s ‘Slovenization’ was criticized not for being wrong but for being inauthentic (unecht) because the party was itself implicated in selling real estate to Slovenes.186 ÖVP ministers in Vienna had been ‘removing every stone from the path, on which Belgrade could founder and thus had no interest in a swift solution to the school question’.187

Sovereignty against Slovene? In the weeks of hectic diplomacy which followed Molotov’s speech to the Supreme Soviet on 8 February 1955 and ended with the signature of the State Treaty three months later, minority protection was not an issue. Apart from one minor change the

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final text of Article 7 was identical to that agreed in August 1949.188 In addition Article 5 confirmed the 1937 border while Article 26 gave Yugoslavia the right to dispose of Austrian property, rights and interests on its territory. Most attention has since focussed on the implementation of Article 7 in respect of bilingual place names (which was hardly discussed at the time)189 while in the discussion of its educational provisions the relationship to the end of bilingual primary education in southern Carinthia three years later has been strangely neglected. Above all the glaring contradiction between the professed aim of protecting the Slovene (and Croat) minorities and the dramatic reduction in the number of children being instructed in Slovene has been largely ignored.190 The broad explanation proposed here is that the anti-Slovene dynamic of provincial politics which had been building over the previous decade received a further boost from the end of the occupation and the restoration of Austrian sovereignty. The State Treaty, though clearly an important part of the political, legal and administrative context, was secondary. There was of course a range of disagreements about how Article 7 should be implemented. But an important preliminary point to make is that there were no significant international obstacles to a minimalist, anti-Slovene interpretation. The four signatory powers certainly did not provide any. They were as uninterested in Austrian minority policy in May 1955 as they had been in August 1949, probably more so. Western governments shared the Austrian government’s view that minority protection was a hostage to fortune, which could give Yugoslavia an excuse for making trouble. They would have been happy to see it dropped. Molotov too made no secret of his government’s indifference.191 If anyone even registered the growing German national pressures on the Slovenes, they did not make a link to protecting them. On the other hand Soviet policy, now seeking to ‘normalize’ relations with Belgrade, did indirectly come into play. In the end Austrian hopes of having the Article 7 removed as a piece of ‘old furniture’ were frustrated because Molotov argued that any change would require that Yugoslavia be consulted.192 That would have brought further delay and might even have led to an awkward Yugoslav demand to have the bilingual school guaranteed in the Treaty.193 The article therefore stood and became a part of international law. But the international political context makes it understandable that Austrian diplomats saw no reason to ‘make a big deal of it’.194 This assessment was confirmed by the attitude of the four heads of mission in Vienna who until January 1957 had residual powers (under Article 34) to intervene to ensure implementation. An impassioned memorandum submitted to them by Slovene and Croat minority leaders shortly before the cut-off date went unheard and probably unread.195 Yugoslavia was an exception, but only a partial one. Although it gained a new legal status in November 1955 by acceding to the Treaty and becoming an ‘associated power’ there was little sign of increased interest in Belgrade. The main interest of the Yugoslav state security police in Austria (aside from economic espionage) was in gathering intelligence its émigré or exiled enemies and sometimes assassinating them.196 But the Carinthian construction of the Yugoslav threat was robust. It included fears of real estate acquisitions through Slovene cooperatives (which the federal

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government promptly granted 2 million schillings to counteract).197 There was alarm about Yugoslav support for Slovene acquisitions in the timber industry, and about Yugoslav subsidies for Slovene cultural activity. A good-will visit by the Carinthian Chamber of Labour was seen as evidence of the ‘subterranean alliance between the OF and Carinthian Socialists’;198 a Slovene ball patronized jointly by Wedenig and the Yugoslav consul Vošnjak was taken as revealing the ‘true face of the SPÖ’.199 The police also made their contribution: in August 1954 for example Villach police reported fears that the purchase of a house and an office by Slovene organizations in the town, despite it being in ‘clearly non-Slovene territory’, might herald future ‘massive territorial demands against Austria'.200 Yugoslav concern about Slovene rights, however tentative, were taken as evidence of a renewal of territorial claims.201 The growing number of illegal border crossers from Yugoslavia was another source of alarm, even though its main cause was clearly Yugoslavia’s dire economic state and high unemployment. Here the fuzzy line between economic and political motivation was given a Carinthian twist as suspicions that economic migrants were masquerading as political refugees was complicated by the fear that subversive elements could be fraudulently claiming to be economic migrants in order to subvert Carinthia.202 Against this mixture of half-truths, exaggeration and invention, contrary evidence – whether in the form of a Cabinet investigation,203 or a report in Die Presse that ‘Tito’s infiltration is not happening’ – seemed to have little impact.204 The restoration of Austrian sovereignty brought more freedom to those who wanted to maintain and exploit these fears. Many of their networks had clearly survived informally after the collapse of National Socialism but now they could operate more openly. A clutch of associations were founded to defend German Carinthia from the threat of ‘Slovenisation’. One with particular historical resonance, the Kärntner Schulverein Südmark, was set up only a week after the signature of the State Treaty. At its inaugural meeting its chairman Walter Lakomy described its task as blocking excessive Slovene demands based on Article 7. Another speaker, Albin Huss, described the new freedom as a good sign for facing the new tasks of the border area: the free decision of the parents over bilingual education was a ‘minimum demand’. The provincial government had to act ‘in accordance with the Carinthian approach (nach Kärntner Art)’. Alfons Vallon, a VdU politician and chief editor of the Kärntner Nachrichten, argued that for educational work (Erziehungsarbeit) educators were needed who ‘have a German heart and do not themselves cock an eye over the border’.205 The organization issued a protest about the huge burden imposed by Article 7 and concluded that the Austrian government should interpret it in the most restrictive possible manner.206 Huss’s comment makes a wider point, which has been rarely discussed: the tradeoff between gains in sovereignty and the relaxing of constraints on far-right activism. When the boost given to the latter is included in the equation, the famous declaration by Chancellor Figl that ‘Austria is free!’ appears in a rather new light. Huss was not the only one to welcome the opportunity for greater anti-Slovene ‘resistance’. The prominent anti-Slovene ÖVP politician Wolfgang Mayrhofer, for example, anticipated that laws could now be passed in areas which had been ‘deep frozen’ since 1945: one of them was ‘the Carinthian school question’.207 At the same time the restoration of sovereignty clearly also made obsolete earlier warnings that attacks on the bilingual

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school might imperil agreement on the State Treaty. The legalistic argument that the existing system had been part of ‘occupation law’ also fell by the wayside. Before the State Treaty the VdU had complained with patriotic indignation that Education Minister Hurdes had ‘taken refuge in the more than shameful argument that the school order was occupation law and thus stood outside the valid Austrian legal and constitutional norms’.208 Now, unsurprisingly, the Kärntner Nachrichten argued that ‘there was no occupation any more so neither was there any occupation law’.209 The defensive idiom in which the school had been justified for so long could not simply be reversed; the implementation of Article 7 was now portrayed as a necessary sacrifice or burden, which had been required for reasons of international politics or international opinion. In the absence of positive public endorsements of the school210 two central elements of the anti-Slovene lobby became unchallenged ‘common sense’ – ‘parental rights’ and the ‘principle of affirmation’. Mayrhofer even argued that ‘when read closely’ Article 7 affirmed ‘parental rights’.211 In January 1957 another historical name returned – the Kärntner Heimatdienst (KHD). At its first meeting Walter Lakomy explained that its job was to make up for the failure of the state to counteract the exaggerated demands of Slovene organizations. The first KHD board had representatives of the ÖVP and FPÖ only but claimed to be non-partisan, and its next task echoed SPÖ policy, to implement a plebiscite or ethnic census, which would establish ‘who affirmed him or herself to Slovenehood’.212 A third new foundation, the League of Carinthian Windish (Bund der Kärntner Windischen), duplicated and reinforced much of the activism of the others (and associations like the Kärntner Landsmannschaft)213 but it also had a special task: representing a group of ‘at least 28,000’ Windish.214 In this aim the League was clearly a continuation of earlier associations like the BÖS. It contained the same contradiction inherent in mimicking an ethnic identity. The league’s chairman Valentin Einspieler (ÖVP) seemed unusually clear-cut when he referred to the group as a nationality (Volkstum).215 But Erich Silla was less confident at the foundation meeting and cast doubt on the whole project, fearing that it might create confusion in Vienna. He also warned that the League would be unlikely to recruit many members, because the ‘so-called’ Windish who saw themselves as ‘loyal Carinthians’ would be scared off by the label.216 In other words, the negatively connotated ‘Windish’ risked getting in the way of the ‘pseudo-positive’ ‘Windish’ brand. In the event Silla’s fears proved groundless, and by the time he appeared before a parliamentary sub-committee in Vienna in January as the official Windish representative he seems to have recovered his self-confidence (discussed later). On any common-sense understanding these organizations and individuals were seeking to do precisely what Article 7 (5) was supposed to prohibit – ‘to deprive the Croat or Slovene population of their identity and rights’.217 Wedenig later claimed to have advised against allowing the KHD to be established as an association (Verein) because it was ‘certainly very strongly imbued with Nazi ideas’.218 But once the KHD was authorized there was clearly no political appetite to enforce a ban or challenge it in the courts.219 The German national historian Viktor Miltschinsky could therefore state with little fear of contradiction that in Austria no organizations with the aims outlawed by Article 7 ‘existed at all’.220 Another relevant part of the State Treaty was

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Article 9, which required ‘the dissolution of Nazi organisations’. As far as Carinthia was concerned this article was also largely a dead letter.221 It certainly did not inhibit those anti-Slovene activists who had been Nazis, including Einspieler,222 Lakomy,223 Vallon, Jordan and many others.224 In Austria as a whole of the 1947 Verbotsgesetz was now effectively dismantled and remaining war criminals were released and amnestied.225 In October 1955 a police report recorded that ‘former Nazis’ were now claiming that ‘they have won after all, since they are regaining their positions in office and other important positions’.226 Yet triumphalism was often accompanied by a sense of resentment and betrayal; sometimes this was directed at the corruption of the party system and encompassed both the genuine scandals of the Proporz system and parliamentary democracy itself. Another common topos was the gulf between truth and hypocrisy, the latter was identified not just with the ‘betrayal’ committed by the victorious Western powers at Yalta and Postdam, but also with the more pliant party comrades who were accused of ‘selling out’ by joining the two main parties. Last but not least hypocrisy was tagged to the anti-fascist values of Austria, as a country which simultaneously honoured resistance fighters and courted former Nazis (including themselves). Whether as disgruntled outsiders or more or less integrated citizens the German national and Nazi right continued to portray itself as a beleaguered underdog. This self-image was fostered by the fact that the State Treaty did undoubtedly stimulate a spate of activity by Slovene organizations as well.227 The police noted with alarm Slovene ‘active propaganda’ including ‘isolated cases of Slovenes demanding an interpreter at the authorities even though they are capable of speaking German’.228 The two competing Slovene organizations managed to sink their differences to the extent of presenting a joint memorandum. It included demands for increased provision of Slovene school books and teacher training and the establishment of a Slovene school inspectorate. Overall it argued that minority protection should strengthen Slovene individual and group identity, supporting ‘Austrian citizens of Slovene ethnicity, both for the ethnic whole and for the individual’. It was a matter of equity that both nations within the area of 1945 bilingual education decree should speak both languages of the province. It also called for a proportionate representation in all public bodies, from cooperative associations, agricultural and forestry chambers to public radio, and returning to the earlier proposal for a nationality office (Volkstumsreferat).229 The Slovenski Vestnik hoped that the recognition of Slovene in the public sphere would give bilingual instruction a rationale it had hitherto lacked.230 Soon afterwards the editor of the Slovenski Vestnik, Rado Janežič, demanded to be able to use Slovene in a district court in Klagenfurt. Since he spoke excellent German the demand was seen in ‘loyal circles’ as a ‘provocation’.231 The chances of fulfilling even a part of these demands receded after the 1956 general election. The results suggested once again that it was not the suppression of the population of southern Carinthia which was at stake but the perceptions of those living outside it.232 But overall the FPÖ, which in Carinthia had emerged relatively painlessly out of the ruins of the VdU, lost only a few votes and one Landtag seat233. Most importantly, the SPÖ now showed signs of taking a more accommodating line towards it.234 In his inaugural address to the Landtag Wedenig put much less emphasis on the need for Carinthian initiatives over the school. He had already made clear that

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the Carinthian government had no intention of taking ‘any initiative at all’ and was awaiting for instructions from Vienna.235 Now he blamed the federal government and by implication the ÖVP education minister for delaying a settlement.236 At the same time the Neue Zeit noted the general ‘law’ that the assimilation of minorities in border areas was inevitable and Carinthian Slovenes could not expect to be an exception.237 After its assurance that ‘the minority shall and will not suffer any injustice’ came the inevitable ‘but’ – the minority should not assume that it could ‘force its will on the majority’. In order to implement Article 7 a vote was needed in the ‘relevant villages’.238 The FPÖ leader Hubert Knaus also hinted at a new flexibility towards the SPÖ: he announced that his party was ready to embrace a ‘modern’ solution to the minority question and he attacked the use of parental rights by the People’s Party as mere sloganizing which had delayed a settlement.239 He declared himself ‘agnostic’ about whether the decisions should be made by individual parishes, all members of the minority or an ethnic census.240 Meanwhile the federal government took some first tentative steps towards implementing Article 7. Education Minister Drimmel was given the task – or poisoned chalice – of implementing its educational provisions (the justice minister was responsible for the provisions on administration and courts).241 He started with a strong statement of constitutional propriety. Minority education would be placed on a ‘fundamental, comprehensive and single legislative basis’: the first step would be a federal law which would demarcate the areas of responsibility (Kompetenz) for federal and provincial authorities – while the former would be charged with the primary school syllabus (Lehrplan) the latter would be responsible for establishing exactly where Slovene, German and Slovene (‘utraquistic’) would be the language of instruction. The Carinthian government would be able to choose whether to lay down general conditions under which schools would be determined or draw up a specific list of parishes for inclusion.242 This left much open – not least the position of the ‘Windish’ – but made clear that the ‘subjective criteria’ should be the basis of minority definition.243 Perhaps equally important for Drimmel was the idea of devolution, as both a democratic principle and a practical policy; those closest to the ground should determine how the education law was implemented. This also had the obvious practical merit of handing the political hot potato back to Klagenfurt. Drimmel’s plan was apparently supported by Chancellor Raab.244 But Ferdinand Graf was incensed by it and successfully scuppered it at a Cabinet meeting (from which Drimmel seems to have been absent). Drimmel later complained that his carefully worked out plan had been summarily ‘shredded’.245 Further decision-making on the education issue (and the use of Slovene in courts) was transferred to a new subcommittee to be chaired by the ex-Chancellor (now foreign minister), Leopold Figl.’246 At the same time lobbying for the immediate abolition of the bilingual school continued. One delegation from four Gailtal parishes saw Drimmel and was told ‘emphatically, unmistakably and repeatedly’ that the new situation created by the State Treaty required a new plan. Primary school law must be made by the people who lived in the province. Instead of the ministry imposing a solution it should be a matter of the ‘free play of forces, in the sense of the federalism which was always being demanded’ under the ‘responsibility of the province’.247

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Drimmel experienced some of these forces at first hand shortly afterwards in Klagenfurt. A hundred irate demonstrators organized by the Schulverein blocked the minister’s path as he entered his hotel and demanded a meeting. Ferdinand Graf had to step in to act as a broker. The police noted with evident relief that despite expressions of discontent there was no violence or loud threats. Yet the language of the demonstrators was aggressive enough: Hermann Metnitz, the mayor of Bleiburg/Pliberk, demanded the abolition of ‘compulsory Slovene language instruction’ by 16 January 1956. If not, ‘the parental body (Elternschaft) would be forced to instigate a school strike’.248 On this occasion Metnitz had overreached himself and the bilingual school was still in place the following October when the ministerial committee formally heard Carinthian opinion.249 The consultation sheds important light on the state of Carinthian ethnic politics; it also showed that Drimmel’s basic principle of devolution made little sense in such a conflictual situation. The minister introduced his proposal for a choice between three types of school – German, Slovene or mixed – stressing that there should be ‘no coercion whatsoever’ on parents to send their children to the Slovene or mixed school. However, it would be for Carinthian legislation to decide whether to lay down a general rule or list specific villages where Slovene or mixed language schools were to be set up.250 Later – in apparent contradiction – Drimmel stated that if the province of Carinthia decided to have no utraquistic schools at all, the federal government would not object. Now he shifted the locus of devolution from the province as a whole to its parishes, making the optimistic argument that ‘the formation of the will of local communities was decisive in order to achieve a relatively calm coexistence of the population groups’. In response Wedenig did not oppose parental rights directly but rejected as disruptive decision-making based on either petitions or parental polling (Befragung). Parental rights depended on the prior establishment of ‘ethnic reality’. That was a matter for the (federal) state, which had to be prepared to take responsibility. He added that there was no current danger of ‘the German population’ being Slovenized. On the other hand, even if the legitimate needs of the minority for protection were satisfied, ‘a small group of discontented irredentists will remain with a committed Slovene intelligentsia at their head’. For the ÖVP Ferlitsch made clear that the ‘tripartite option’ had never been a serious goal. He opposed the inclusion of the option of mixed language or ‘utraquistic’ school with the disingenuous explanation that ‘Carinthia hadn’t had the best experience with them’ and ‘even the Slovene minority’ had not been satisfied with them. Hans Rader (FPÖ) agreed with Wedenig that annual parental questioning would bring discord (Zwist) between the German population and the minority. The key question was to establish ‘where the minority begins and where it ends’. Showing a striking loss of interest in individual parental rights he now argued that the school issue was an ‘all-Carinthian’ one but decision-making should be made by parish councils, in which ‘after all the voice of the parents is decisive’.251 Overall all Carinthian speakers (including representatives of the Catholic and Protestant churches) endorsed ‘parental rights’ to some extent. But the second day of the enquiry also showed clearly how politicized the concept was. The prominent ÖVP anti-Slovene activist Wolfgang Mayrhofer appeared as the representative of the parents!252 He repeated some well-rehearsed arguments; parents had a natural right not

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just to decide the language of instruction but their children’s language itself. This right benefitted both majority and minority; it had also been exercised in the monarchy and was so important that the financial concerns raised by Wedenig should play no role. A federal law should guarantee a vote of parents ‘in the smallest units’.253 The other ‘parental representative’ was the SPÖ mayor of Völkermarkt/Velikovec, Martin Hosp. He urged the minority to be less suspicious of the state and proposed what may have been intended as a fusion of objective and subjective criteria – the ‘objective establishment of affirmation by way of choice’. Then came the school inspectors, who were significantly weaker in supporting the school than they had been. Their doubts did not come from pedagogic concerns about bilingual education per se but from the problems caused for teachers by the sustained campaign against it.254 For the first time in many years Slovene leaders (Tischler and his Titoist counterpart Mirt Zwitter) were also heard. Tischler tried to return to the ‘spirit of 3 October 1945’; then the school had been seen as the only alternative to Nazi repression, had been endorsed by all political parties and praised by Education Ministry officials as well as the Austrian foreign minister. Then he pointed to the elephant in the room: the implementation of minority protection had somehow mutated into a discussion about how much Slovene educational provision should be cut; yet Article 7 ‘had been created to protect the rights of i.a. the Slovene minority not to cut them’. Tischler appealed to those present to make it a model for ‘shared coexistence’. Before the enquiry closed Mirt Zwitter protested that the participants wanted ‘to rob the minority of all its rights’. Figl indignantly denied the charge. Yet it is hard to resist the conclusion that the platform given to Tischer and Zwitter was largely pro forma, mainly designed to deflect Yugoslav criticism. Slovene leaders had been heard but not listened to. Soon afterwards the new rapprochement between SPÖ and FPÖ bore its first fruits in the Landtag Minority Committee, which included both Mayrhofer and Einspieler (the head of the ‘Windish’) and was chaired by the sole FPÖ member, Knaus.255 Revealingly, Knaus later described the committee’s task as ‘not just to represent the interests of the minority’, which the minority in any case did ‘in an insistent and effective way’, but to ‘both observe the interests of the minority and realise the interests of the majority’.256 In December 1956 the committee passed a resolution calling for a clear distinction to be made between schools (or streams) with German and those with Slovene as their language instruction.257 A minority school should only be set up when there was a minimum number of registered pupils (in line with the provisions of the general school law) (Pflichtschulerhaltungsgesetz). SPÖ members may have thought that this wording was still compatible with bilingual education, whether on the basis of census results or parish council votes.258 But Knaus clearly did not and confidently declared that the committee had rejected ‘bilingual instruction in the schools of Carinthia’.259 The 1945 decree was declared to be without any legal effect although its supposed breach of ‘parental rights’ was not mentioned. Perhaps the most important marker for the future direction of ethnic politics was the committee’s call for an ethnic census (Minderheitenfeststellung) as a precondition for establishing where Slovene should be used as an official language and in place names (paragraph 3); this was to be based on the starkly polarizing question, ‘Are you a Slovene, yes or no?’ (The ‘Windish’ were now ignored.) A particular parish would be deemed to have a mixed population when at

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least 30 per cent replied that they were (in the case of the use of Slovene language the threshold of 30 per cent was to be applied to each district court area [Gerichtsbezirk]). Since, as one diplomat pointed out, ‘hardly a single district court area’ would meet the threshold, this would mean the ‘paralyzation’ of Article 7.260 But this part of the resolution was also the starting gun for a political marathon which would end nearly two decades later in the débacle of Bruno Kreisky’s 1976 ‘special census’ (Volkszählung der besonderen Art).261 The committee’s resolution was soon widely cited by FPÖ spokesmen as the united view of ‘Carinthia’.262 Its assumption that the size and location of the minority had to be ‘objectively’ established before it could be protected became widely accepted (outside the Slovene minority) as basic common sense. In reality it was a victory for the anti-Slovene lobby. Far from being self-evident as Drimmel complained in 1955, there had been ‘not a trace of a law establishing the size of the minority’.263 Perhaps sensing that they were losing the initiative, Carinthian ÖVP leaders now asked Drimmel for concessions which would demonstrate their ‘national’ credentials. In line with the polarizing language of the Landtag committee the choice of primary school should be reduced to an either/or decision between German and Slovene; that meant giving less leeway to the provincial government and giving the crucial decisions to the ‘school provider’ (Schulerhalter) in the parishes. In the name of devolution Drimmel agreed, thus effectively redefining devolution to mean shifting decisionmaking from Klagenfurt to the parishes, on the grounds that the latter were ‘more in line with the actual situation’.264 But ÖVP fears of being outmanoeuvred in Klagenfurt continued. Mayrhofer and Maier (editor of the Volkszeitung and party secretary) warned Drimmel of ‘those circles around Wedenig and Newole, who continue to support the maintenance of the existing situation for reasons of party political tactics, that is in order to gain the “Tito-communist” votes for the socialists’. Parental choice should be limited to the alternative of Slovene or German. That would mean that only in the border parish of Zelle/Sele with its ‘compact Slovene population’ was there any likelihood of a Slovene majority.265 At this point, if not before, Drimmel may have realized that the interest of his Carinthian colleagues in freedom of choice was highly selective. He wrote angrily in the margin of Maier’s next letter to him that it contained a ‘contradiction!’266 Echoing Tischler’s comment – consciously or not – he also noted tartly that ‘it would be difficult to support a new regime which was abolishing the further viability of the bilingual primary school, after the State Treaty has only just once more guaranteed the nonGerman minority a degree of qualified protection’.267 Legal problems about leaving too much scope to the province were also raised by government lawyers; any changes had to be consonant with international law and if they were not there was a possibility of an embarrassing outside intervention.268 Given the attitude of the outside world that was not perhaps very likely; nevertheless it led officials to try to limit the possibility of provincial authorities deviating or delaying the establishment of minority schools. The lawyers also wanted to state explicitly the basic principle that all children whose parents wanted it would – as far as possible – receive instruction in ‘a primary school appropriate for the Slovene minority’.269 The compromise formula which eventually emerged tried to steer a course between these legal concerns and the political pressures to narrow down any real

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choice: while no pupil would be forced to visit a school in which he or she would use Slovene, all Slovene children would ‘where possible’ be able to visit a Slovene or bilingual primary school. This formula ‘did not exactly proclaim the bilingual school but on the other hand did not make it impossible either’.270 For the Education Ministry this compromise seemed too prescriptive, threatening to make the principle of devolution ‘almost ineffective again’.271 On the other hand the Carinthian ÖVP was also unhappy because the bilingual option had been retained and this meant a concession to ‘the standpoint of the Slovenes’. Nevertheless in February 1957 the party seemed, however grudgingly, to accept it.272 Two months later the federal cabinet approved a draft law on minority schools and sent it to the Carinthian government for final agreement.273 But the ‘local forces’ were as divided as ever. The provincial government accepted the law in principle but added five reservations. One was that consultation with minority representatives would be the responsibility of the federal not the provincial government. Another was that any extra financial burden incurred by setting up additional schools was to be borne by Vienna. The provincial government also tried to pass the buck back to Vienna over establishing where the minority ‘really’ lived; since the 1951 census had failed to provide reliable information an ‘ethnic referendum’ (Volksbefragung) in the relevant parishes was needed.274 Though ÖVP members of the Carinthian government were presumably party to this response, its ‘Borderland Committee’ took a harder line when it met in Völkermarkt/Velikovec at the start of July. It complained about the ‘incomprehensible delay’ in passing a new primary school law and warned darkly that if the old system were still in place at the start of the following school year there would be ‘undesirable conflicts’. The further twist clearly irritated Drimmel; he complained to Maier that the Carinthian People’s Party had now ‘practically terminated’ what had been agreed in February. The ÖVP members of the Carinthian government had not even informed Carinthian representatives in the Nationalrat of the Carinthian government’s decision. Expecting loyalty from the SPÖ would be like ‘demanding beef from an ox’, but Drimmel was now starting to wonder if he could expect it from Carinthian ‘party friends’ either. To the minister the differences between the February agreement, the Carinthian government decision and the borderland committee suggested ‘not a double-based but a triple-based policy, aggravated by the failure of the right hand to know what the left hand was doing’.275 Nevertheless, the ministerial committee decided to submit the draft law to Cabinet, and apart from holding one press conference avoid public discussion as far as possible.276 Drimmel’s irritation may also have reflected the attacks he had been subjected to for another key decision – approval to establish a Slovene federal grammar school (Bundesgymnasium). Here there was no constitutional requirement for the minister to consult with the provincial government and, in contrast to the primary school, Article 7 was fairly unambiguous. The decision meant that a demand which minority leaders had been making since 1945 was finally met.277 In that decade a frequently heard official reason – or excuse – for not responding had been that demand would be too low for a grammar school to be viable.278 Behind this lurked the opposite fear – that the school would be too successful and would nurture an anti-Austrian

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Slovene elite or, in Adolf Schärf ’s words, create ‘intellectual workers of a chauvinistic inclination’.279 Perhaps giving too much credence to the 1951 census figures, Drimmel shared the pessimistic forecasts of the school’s likely intake for the first year, which he estimated at only 87 out of 3,738 children.280 Yet he did prove fairly tough in resisting pressure from the Südmark and kindred organizations who attacked the school as a ‘gratuitous’ gift to the minority.281 At the same time he tried to ‘sell’ the Slovene grammar school as a way of ending compulsory Slovene instruction for ‘German’ pupils from the bilingual area. In September 1957 the school opened its gates (on the premises of the Realgymnasium Klagenfurt) with Tischler as its first headmaster. Soon after the first pupils started their education there the federal government published its proposal for primary education.282 At the start it defined the minority as those citizens who affirmed their membership of it and laid down that no pupil could be made to attend a school in which he had to use Slovene or study Slovene as a compulsory subject. At the same time all pupils whose parents wanted special primary education were, as far as possible, to receive it. As well as schools with German as the language of instruction there would be two other types of school: (a) those with Slovene instruction only and (b) those with both German and Slovene. The Neue Zeit hailed the bill as meaning that ‘Slovene coercive teaching has fallen’ and attacked Yugoslav protests as outrageous and unwarranted interference.283 When Slovene leaders complained they had not been consulted, Education Ministry officials put them firmly in their place: ‘of course not all statements, which after all – as in every other bill – are often diametrically opposed, could be taken account of ’.284 The continuities with National Socialism experienced by Slovenes in their everyday interactions were also not allowed to impinge on federal decision-making. On the contrary it was Slovene objections to the ‘subjective principle’ which were criticized as potentially racist. When the Yugoslav cultural attaché Valenčak urged the merits of a territorial principle, Education Ministry officials suggested that the only democratic alternative to the ‘principle of affirmation’ was the ‘Nazi Ancestors pass’ (Ahnenpass). They responded to the argument that parental decisions might be influenced by German national pressure in their everyday life by stating that this was a ‘meta-legal matter’ which could not be solved by legislation but only by educating young people ‘to [display] national tolerance’. Officials clearly did not see this kind of education as part of their remit. Instead the Slovenes were treated with infantilizing sympathy: their ‘worries’ (Besorgnisse) ‘were only psychologically comprehensible by the shock which they had suffered between 1938 and 1945’. But these ‘preconditions could not be the basis for the Austrian state’.285 In short, Slovene experiences of Nazi persecution, far from being representative of Austria’s role as the ‘first victim of Hitlerite aggression’, were dismissed as marginal or even pathological.

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The Demolition of the Bilingual Primary School, 1957–9

Wedenig’s ‘somersault of death’ At the end of April 1957 Walter Wodak, the Austrian ambassador in Belgrade, advised the foreign policy makers in the Ballhausplatz that the minority question should be settled ‘quickly and finally … so that the row can be got over with in one go’. Wodak thought it unlikely that in the long-term Yugoslavia would allow a change in the school system to get in the way of the improvement of relations between the two countries.1 Officials in Vienna added that ‘a rapid as possible implementation’ of the new school law should go hand-in-hand with the full implementation of the rest of Article 7. Any delay would undoubtedly bring unpredictable complications. Domestic pressures meant that the existing system was now ‘not acceptable’ so the main task was to persuade the outside world ‘that the protection of the minority does not mean that the majority, is forced to instruct its children in the language of the minority’ (emphasis in original); Slovene protests could safely be ignored, as could the ‘small group’ opposed to all concessions to the minority, but any change would need to be made at the most favourable psychological moment, be swiftly implemented and be in line with all the obligations arising from Article 7. Chancellor Raab’s planned visit to Belgrade would be an ideal occasion for him and Tito, both realist politicians (Realpolitiker) to seal a deal. In a passing nod to financial reality, though showing substantial ignorance of the reality of Carinthian politics, officials also anticipated a ‘generous tripartite system’ with additional costs paid by the federal government.2 In the event Raab’s Belgrade visit did not take place, but the Yugoslav government’s initial response to the ‘Drimmel draft’ seemed to confirm Wodak’s diagnosis in that it expressed sorrow as much as anger.3 Bebler warned once more of the ‘harmful consequences for the good neighbourly relations between the two countries’.4 Undersecretary Iveković complained lamely that his government had ‘imagined’ that the principles of the 1945 law would form the basis of any new legislation.5 But when the Yugoslav foreign minister Popovič met Bruno Kreisky in Vienna soon afterwards he showed little desire to ‘escalate the issue’ and the meetings of the newly established Austro-Yugoslav mixed commission went ahead as planned.6 Austrian officials concluded that while Yugoslav concerns were ‘understandable in an emotional sense’ (gefühlsmässig) they were legally inadmissible since there was no legally constituted

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Yugoslav minority in Austria. Austria’s concern was to secure the fundamental rights of all its citizens, whether of the minority or the majority; last but not least, they added that minority representatives had already been consulted in parliament.7 These responses also show how far anti-Slovene assumptions had now entered the Austrian mainstream and were presented as self-evident truth. For example officials argued that there was an ‘Austrian parent body’ which had always strongly protested against the coercion of the 1945 decree. The decree itself had always been an ‘emergency solution’ and would now be replaced by a system which would give every Slovene child the chance to receive Slovene instruction. Most importantly, assimilating or assimilated Slovenes, if they were not called ‘Windish’, were often relabelled as ‘German’. This skated over the circumstances of assimilation and allowed the anti-Slovene campaign to be portrayed as group resistance against forcing ‘children of German tongue … to learn a foreign language’. This was supposedly in contravention of both the rules of the United Nations and the Austrian federal constitution. The Yugoslav view that Article 7 required the maintenance of the existing status quo was dismissed as ‘completely wrong’; the Yugoslav protest had caused astonishment and surprise, and its purpose was ‘incomprehensible’.8 In a similar vein an Education Ministry official agreed that it was ‘positively nonsensical and completely unjustified to apply minority protection provisions to the German-speaking population’.9 Another stated confidently that the ‘principle of affirmation’ was ‘generally recognised as the most just principle’.10 At the end of 1957 discussion shifted to parliament which, Austrian officials assured Yugoslav diplomats, was now discussing the law in a ‘most serious manner’.11 The Subcommittee of the Education Committee scrutinizing the bill was chaired by Walter Weißmann, a Carinthian ÖVP politician who was one of the most prominent opponents of the bilingual school.12 When Slovene representatives were invited to speak to the committee, they proposed that within the area of the 1945 decree minority protection should apply to the minority ‘as such’. They also agreed – as a sign of ‘goodwill’ – that five schools could be dropped (Slovene was in any case hardly taught there any more).13 Neither proposal was seriously discussed and the Slovene testimony was then ‘balanced’ by that of the two ‘Windish’ leaders, Einspieler and Silla.14 Nevertheless, the committee did bring one new, perhaps surprising, development; common ground began to emerge between Max Neugebauer, the SPÖ education spokesman, and the ÖVP minister Drimmel. Neugebauer focussed in particular on the smaller villages, where separate schools would be not just divisive but also a heavy financial burden; he proposed to retain bilingual schools in villages with a population under 2,000 (regardless of parental decisions).15 Recalling his own roots in Silesia, he even suggested that a ‘language of instruction’ in a primary school need not always be German.16 His proposal was not supported by the Carinthian SPÖ members of the committee, presumably because it undercut their argument in favour of an ‘ethnic referendum’.17 But Drimmel did see some merit in it. Even though this might mean, as he put it, ‘distancing himself on several points from his political friends’, he argued that ‘this kind of reconciliation policy had always paid off ’.18 Like Neugebauer he went back to the monarchy for support, citing the 1905 ‘Moravian compromise’ (as well as the abortive 1916 Bukowina compromise). This may have been meant more as general support for the desirability of compromise than a specific proposal to return to national registers (Kataster). Drimmel also returned

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to Tischler’s original Swiss model. There ‘three great nations’ had made concessions to the Rhaeto-Romansch population ‘from a natural conviction of justice’, a position which did not correspond to their size. Last but not least he praised the Slovenes’ ‘marked sense of Heimat’ while the cultural and economic superiority of the German ‘part’ meant they ‘were in no danger at all’. As he had anticipated, Drimmel’s Carinthian ‘friends’ saw things differently. For them the core problem was not lack of choice, it was the very idea of Slovene being taught in Carinthian schools. In their dental metaphor the issue would not be resolved by the removal of the most infected teeth since it would not counteract the basic poison (Grundgift).19 That was Slovene. One basic disadvantage which Drimmel faced in effectively countering this kind of view was a result of his own ministry’s inaction over the previous decade and its conspicuous lack of interest in the pedagogics of bilingual instruction. THe assumption that bilingual instruction was an ‘excessive burden’ on children had gone unchallenged.20 Several years earlier his predecessor, Hurdes had described the arguments about it as ‘inconclusive’ but there had been no further investigation since then.21 In 1955, after another positive Carinthian inspectors’ report, Peter had noted that ‘as long as bad will from one or the other side does not disrupt the (doubtless inherently difficult) work in the bilingual schools, an entirely satisfactory educational success can – with good will – be achieved there too’.22 Goodwill was not, however, in plentiful supply in Carinthian politics. Weißmann, who was not brimming with it himself, condemned bilingual instruction not as an injustice but as a ‘farce’.23 In some schools that was beginning to become a self-fulfilling prophecy. The contrary insight in the Education Ministry was that there were advantages in the bilingual school in terms of the development of personality and ‘in the development of the human being’. But this came far too late to have any impact.24 So did Drimmel’s belated instruction to his officials to investigate the pedagogic implications of retaining bilingual schools in a particular area. The experts’ initial conclusions echoed the school inspectors’ reports: if the undeniable difficulties created by the opposition to bilingual education could be overcome there was no evidence of a general decline in standards and there were positive advantages in respect of school achievement.25 But politics not pedagogy was driving education policy. When it became clear that no new law would be in place for the start of the next school year the blame game intensified. Bolstered by a constitutional court ruling, the Carinthian government asked Vienna to ensure that any new law, in including provision for an ethnic plebiscite, was ready in time for the new school year. Education Ministry officials rejected this as an attempt to shift the blame for delay onto them.26 For his part Weißmann blamed secret socialist deals with ‘Tito-communist’ Slovenes for the failure to reach agreement.27 Ferdinand Graf followed suit though he was later himself blamed by Neugebauer for having vetoed an agreement. The latter concluded that ‘we had counted our chickens before they were hatched’ (wir hatten die Rechnung ohne den Wirt gemacht).28 As the arguments continued some Carinthian politicians seemed increasingly ready to cut the Gordian knot.29 Both main parties advocated ‘transitional arrangements’ which would make bilingual instruction impracticable.30 One ÖVP idea was for the minister to suspend the ‘ominous’ school order by decree while also laying down a threshold figure for registration. Drimmel flatly rejected this as a ‘blatant contravention

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of the constitution, which would of course not be acceptable’.31 Then came a ‘proposal ad absurdum’: the bilingual decree should be enforced as strictly as possible so as to provoke such a backlash that it would lead to a challenge in the constitutional court. Even Graf rejected this as demagogy. ÖVP leaders agreed that if the bill could not be revived, they would have to wait until the political situation in Carinthia pushed the socialists into passing the new law.32 At the end of the 1957–8 school year there were more school strikes. One ‘parental representative’ told the Kleine Zeitung that it was ‘a new form of the Abwehrkampf ’. A more extensive action was to be prepared for the start of the new school year.33 In response the provincial government, on the initiative of the SPÖ, called for the ‘transitional measures’ to be introduced which would ‘relax’ the bilingual teaching in 36 schools.34 The Volkszeitung rejected this on the grounds that it would perpetuate the ‘language terror’ in the 57 schools remaining.35 Heribert Jordan and Valentin Einspieler convened a small meeting in Eisenkappel/Železna Kapla. Attendance was by invitation only. About 15 parents came but the SPÖ mayor who wanted to attend on behalf of a Slovene family had to leave. The meeting resolved to take further action.36 The next day there were ‘strikes’ in Hermagor, St Stefan im Gailtal/Štefan na Zilji, St Paul/Šentpavel na Zilji, Vorderberg/Blače, Görtschach/Goriče and Mellweg/Melviče. More were announced for the end of the month.37 In Vienna, Drimmel tried to stick to his constitutional guns – insisting that change could only come through legislation38 – but Wedenig was fast losing control of events. Earlier in 1958 his leadership of the party had been directly challenged by the ‘dissident’ president of the Chamber of Labour (Arbeiterkammer), Paul Truppe.39 Although the challenge had been seen off Truppe had clearly tapped into a pool of disgruntlement of which the bilingual school was one element. He had cited it as an example of how out of touch with the rank and file the party leadership had become and claimed that 80 per cent of party members were against it.40 Wedenig did not attend the crucial meeting of the Carinthian government on 5 September (according to one report he was on holiday!). He was replaced by his deputy, Matthias Krassnig, and a ‘loosening’ of bilingual instruction was then announced.41 On 22 September Wedenig issued a decree allowing parents to apply for their children to be ‘freed’ from bilingual instruction.42 The legal basis was flimsy – a paragraph in the 1905 School and Instruction Order, according to which exemptions from singing, sketching, physical education (craft for girls) and garden work could be made on health grounds.43, 44 In the Presse Hubert Feichtelbauer wrote that Wedenig had ‘long ceased to be in charge of the school question’, having been replaced by ‘a circle which clearly distances itself from his pro-Tito stance’.45 In another report the same newspaper called Wedenig’s move a ‘somersault of death’.46

Federal abdication At a stroke the ‘Wedenig decree’ shifted the basis of bilingual instruction from universal provision for all primary school pupils in southern Carinthia to parental

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decision-making. In broad terms this change had of course been widely anticipated for several years, and in several schools it had already been introduced de facto. But quite apart from the substance of the change, the improvised, ramshackle and chaotic way it was implemented was the diametrical opposite of the considered, constitutional change which Drimmel and officials had always insisted on.47 Only a few years earlier one official had warned that annual registration would create ‘a continual two sided national movement’ and this ‘continual unrest’ should be avoided for domestic political and pedagogic reasons and in respect of Austria’s ‘foreign policy status’ since ‘even the appearance of a violation of the minority must be avoided’.48 But the problem went far beyond the way Wedenig’s decree was implemented or its doubtful legality. The tumultuous events it triggered laid bare the core problem of the ‘principle of affirmation’ or the application of ‘subjective criteria’ in a situation where power was distributed asymmetrically. In the weeks which followed Slovene parents were ‘persuaded’, cajoled and pressurized into withdrawing their children from bilingual instruction. The evidence of intimidation presented by the Slovene organizations in November is corroborated by the available archival evidence.49 It clearly shows that any notion of free individual (parental) decision-making had gone out of the window. Apart from local politicians and activists local politicians three main groups were involved: teachers, other civil servants (not least the police) and local bigwigs, especially employers. Some parents were presented with completed deregistration forms and asked to sign. Some parish councils pre-paid the required 6 schilling stamp duty (Stempelmarke) out of their budgets. In Völkermarkt/Velikovec (as the head teacher of the boys’ secondary school Karl Wit later recalled) representatives of the parents’ organization distributed deregistration forms to children as they left school.50 Much of the campaign was organized in the towns and carried into the villages. In Bleiburg/Pliberk, Hermann Metnitz, landowner, mayor and leading light of the KHD, demanded over the radio that ‘our majority nation have the same rights as the Slovene minority possesses’.51 Metnitz was himself accused of using his economic muscle to enforce deregistration, threatening not to buy potatoes from farmers whose children were not deregistered. But the charge could not be corroborated and the police took no further action.52 Heinz Plankenauer, head master in Ludmannsdorf/Bilčovs, was accused of telling children that those who continued to learn Slovene would have to walk to the neighbouring school in Köttmansdorf/Kotmara vas.53 Only 75 out of 163 children continued with bilingual instruction.54 In Köttmannsdorf/Kotmara vas itself the headmaster Thomas Kordesch had shown his attitude as far back as 1945, when he had been dismissed for instigating a school strike (but was subsequently reinstated).55 Only 25 out of 158 pupils in his school continued with bilingual instruction. The involvement of Heribert Jordan, the secretary of the KHD, went much further than his own school in Tainach/Tinje (where 132 out of 141 pupils were deregistered). In St Stefan an der Gail/Štefan na Zilji the head teacher, Hermann Petschauer, put the change in his own historical perspective during the 10 October plebiscite commemoration when he told children that from 1 November the school would ‘again’ be German (Petschauer had been a teacher in the same village in 1939).56 One villager later recalled that ‘they came and said now we must be for German’.57 All 152 pupils were deregistered.

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In the remote single-class school of Bärental/Zavrh the landowner and employer Maresch and his chief gamekeeper ensured that all 17 children, who hardly understood German, were withdrawn from Slovene instruction. The police reported that the parents’ association had asked Maresch’s employee to deliver the deregistration forms to parents directly (with prepaid stamps) while his assistant had ‘helped’ parents by filling in their children’s names. All parents declared that they had signed of their own free will and the Slovene priest had failed to dissuade them. The investigating commission from the Education Ministry noted four months later that the population feared giving evidence of the threats because ‘they are constantly in fear of bullying (Schikanen) and harm from their employer’ (see below).58 Slovene leaders rightly called this ‘a crass example’ of what ‘free will really looks like’.59 A few teachers attempted resistance but had little success. In Göriach/Gorje for example two teachers were attacked by a group of parents for promoting the ‘Slavicising of the parish’. All 51 pupils of the school were deregistered.60 In Mieger/Medgorje, a Slovene teacher of religion was alleged to have ordered anyone who did not pray in Slovene ‘to leave the class or go to Germany’.61 Assuming this was correctly reported it had little effect – all bar 13 children (out of 99) were withdrawn from bilingual teaching. The Volkszeitung blandly reported that this outcome was due to those parents who spoke ‘the ancient honourable Windish’ and had been ‘completely uninfluenced’ in making their decision.62 Some priests or mayors who were prepared to put their heads over the parapet had more success. In Moos/Blato for example, the mayor had for some time encouraged the use of Slovene both for daily greetings and place names. That had prompted FPÖ complaints and led to a sensationalist report in the German magazine Stern titled ‘Red Sun over Carinthia’.63 Now 122 out of 164 children in the three schools of the parish remained registered for bilingual instruction, though this was still significantly less than the 151 Slovene speakers recorded by teachers three years earlier (out of 177).64 In Sittersdorf/Žitara vas, where the 1951 census had recorded only 295 German monoglots (out of a population of 1,895) the priest (Christian Srienz) urged parents to reverse their decision to withdraw their children. In the end only 24 out of 123 pupils were not deregistered.65 But priests who tried to stiffen Slovene parents’ resolve risked being disciplined by the diocesan authorities.66 In some cases they and their congregation were confronted by another group of Slovene parents backed by village bigwigs.67 The charges of pressure and intimidation cannot all be verified here and the exact degree of coercion involved is hard to assess (an oral history investigation might find out more). It should also be recalled out that no criminal or (as far as is known) disciplinary proceedings followed. But that is less proof that nothing untoward happened than evidence of the widespread fear of giving evidence among socially and economically vulnerable parents, based on the well-founded belief that most of the police were thoroughly biased against them. One police report among many show that they had a point: The weight of Slovene agitation is currently directed against the German protection societies, who are being given the sole blame (Schuld) for the distasteful situation

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in this area, consciously ignoring the fact that the whole German-speaking and Windish population of Southern Carinthia is demanding the abolition of the coercive teaching.68

The failure to prosecute may also have reflected what an Education Ministry official called their ‘catastrophic ignorance’ in believing that they were only entitled to intervene in criminal cases ‘on the basis of complaints’.69 In short the police claim that ‘tangible evidence of criminal activity could not be established’ needs to be taken with a large pinch of salt. The point is reinforced by the way the police responded after Wedenig – in another improvisation – issued a decree allowing parents a chance to change their minds and reregister.70 Now, it was argued, it would not be opportune to investigate the ‘mutual accusations’ since that would bring ‘an escalation of differences and a mounting press campaign’.71 In other words, having tolerated disruption from anti-Slovene agitation for years the police now declined to intervene to mitigate its successful outcome on the grounds that it would be disruptive. The Carinthian security director Odlasek abandoned any pretence of police neutrality when he offered to provide evidence to the Vicar General Josef Kadras to support disciplinary action against priests who had urged parishioners not to deregister their children. Yet there had been no suggestion of criminal activity.72 Wedenig himself was disturbed enough by police inaction to write or inspire an article in the Neue Zeit which, highlighting the Bärental/Zavrh case, asked if the security directorate (Sicherheitsdirektion) was asleep on the job.73 The police were so annoyed that they considered legal action against the newspaper – until it emerged that the provincial governor was behind the article. Wedenig then complained directly to Odlasek; Slovenes had been intimidated to the point that they would not dare to make a complaint.74 He referred to the case of a teacher who had been accused of bullying seven children who had broken the school ‘strike’ (in July) to the point that they refused to go to school any more. Yet the preliminary police investigation had found no basis for a prosecution.75 Wedenig’s frustration was not just caused by the failure of some Slovene parents to resist pressure but also at the readiness of others to reinforce it. He gave vent to his feelings soon afterwards at the opening of a new school building in Heiligengrab/ Božji grob. In German and Slovene he called on Slovene parents to stand up for their own language and not to deprive their children of it. He declared himself baffled by Slovene-speaking parents who withdrew their children from Slovene instruction; they did not realize what an ‘injustice they were doing to their children and what they were taking away from their children’. He added that all those who had kept their common sense must be aware that Carinthian Slovenes were also Austrians. His personal view was that the school decree of 1945 had been both sensible and suitable: he could not imagine that Slovene parents would excuse their children from Slovene classes and stressed the injustice that they were doing them, especially as the more languages you know, the more cultures you can get to know. In all communities the mother tongue is a precious commodity. For this reason, he added, parents should not let themselves be influenced by the ‘hurrahs’ and ‘heils’ of those who provoke them and not to succumb to the pressure of the stronger.

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Wedenig added that anyone who had exerted economic pressure should be strictly called to account: ‘it was necessary to help one’s fellow man not to crush him. All Carinthians are equal regardless of language and have the same rights to life’. After Wedenig’s speech was reported in the Slovenski Vestnik the Kleine Zeitung picked up the story, asking indignantly why, if he was right, the governor was not ensuring that the alleged wrongdoers were prosecuted for intimidation.76 As for the Neue Zeit, though it did publish a selection of readers’ letters, which broadly balanced the protests at deregistration with the opponents of the school, it failed to report the speech at all.77 The outcome of campaign left Slovene leaders in disarray. They called Wedenig’s decision one of the ‘most fateful decisions in minority policy since the Second World War’.78 The small Slovene communist ‘Unity’ (Enotnost) group accused the governor of having signed a warrant for their ‘national death’ and called for resistance. It argued – probably more in hope than conviction – that ‘knowledge of languages is a capital, which cannot be confiscated’.79 Vinzenz Zwitter also spoke of the ‘disgrace’ (Schande) of many Slovenes deregistering their own children.80 Both Slovene organizations called on the federal government to suspend Wedenig’s decree. They rejected the proposal for a minority census (Minderheitenfestellung) on the grounds that it would be impossible to hold one which was objective. They also attacked the ‘Windish theory’ as ‘unscientific’ and aimed at splitting the minority. A satisfactory solution could only be achieved by including the minority in decisionmaking.81 They appealed for support from Vienna. But in the capital the main concern was to move on as swiftly as possible. When news of the deregistrations first reached the Education Ministry officials tried not get involved. Heinrich Peter described the events as local altercations (Reibereien), which were being distorted or falsified; they were mainly more personal conflicts although they did show how ‘close (stickig) and emotional’ the current atmosphere was.82 Even the ‘extraordinary’ outcome in the Bärental school was not a matter the school authorities but for the police.83 As the evidence of intimidation mounted, officials grasped at the spurious idea of equivalence, noting that there had been strong agitation on both sides but no case providing a basis for prosecution.84 Peter again deplored German national polemics which lacked ‘any kind of understanding and any tolerance for the position of the Slovene minority’ but added the customary correcting ‘balance’ – the ‘malice’ (Gehässigkeit) they displayed ‘could only be compared with the expressions of the Slovene organisations when they crusade against German speaking efforts’.85 Some displaced their frustration onto Wedenig and his ‘unlawful decree’ (gesetzwidrig). Drimmel called it an ‘arbitrary measure, which has obviously exceeded the jurisdiction of the provincial school committee’ and which had led to ‘a series of legal and pedagogic problems which were likely to further disturb the population’. Wedenig defended his decision by pointing to the ‘exigency’ (Zwangslage) in which parents and children had been placed by ‘an extensive hounding (Hetze) by press, associations and demonstrations’ but he also blamed ministerial inaction.86 To the Ballhausplatz what mattered most now was the possible international fall-out. There was none from the four State Treaty signatory powers: one British official thought

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that the bilingual school had in any case only been intended as ‘window dressing’.87 Western liberal newspapers were more critical, especially Viktor Meier, the veteran correspondent of the Neue Zürcher Zeitung.88 In Belgrade and Ljubljana the reaction was a mixture of shock and anger at the ‘unexpected blow’. That may also have reflected embarrassment at the inaccuracy or complacency of past diplomatic assessments.89 The Yugoslav government suspended their participation in the ‘mixed commissions’, which had just started working on a range of bilateral issues.90 Nevertheless, Walter Wodak, the Austrian ambassador in Belgrade, though critical of Wedenig’s action, was as confident as ever about the long-term future of bilateral relations. He dismissed Yugoslav protests as either synthetic – aimed primarily at extracting maximum economic concessions over disputed former Austrian property – or a reflection of an inferiority complex; it was essential to avoid any appearance of making concessions on the property issue because of ‘something like a “bad conscience” over the school question’.91 However mistaken Wedenig’s decree had been, it had cut the Gordian knot and ‘the world had not collapsed’. It should now be possible to move towards a more honest relationship between the two countries.92 Soon afterwards Wodak reported that the Yugoslav authorities were now ready for a rapprochement, provided they could bring the ‘provocateurs’ (Scharfmacher) in Ljubljana to their senses.93 Bruno Kreisky (deputizing for Figl as foreign minister) was also robust when he met the Yugoslav ambassador; ‘purely personally’ he could not understand what the Yugoslavs actually wanted; their current behaviour ‘was really not designed to improve mutual relations.’ Wedenig’s decree had ‘been aimed precisely at maintaining the existing system’; he had even expected that it would have been judged by the Yugoslavs ‘as a positive contribution to mutual understanding’, and that neither Slovenes nor Germans should be forced to be taught in a foreign language any more than Catholics could be forced to attend religious instruction with Protestants (and vice versa).94 Chancellor Raab was equally forthright, though in a different way. He reportedly told the Yugoslav ambassador that the best evidence for the well-being of the minority ‘was the fact that its Slovenes weren’t fleeing from Austria, but fleeing from Slovenia into Austria’.95 The Yugoslav protest was rejected ‘in the strongest terms’.96 The Carinthian Slovene protest memorandum was noted and ignored.97 Some of this was bluster which hid doubts. One diplomat for example timidly queried the Carinthian police findings, observing that it could not ‘be completely ruled out that some influence on the parents is indeed present’.98 Later the Ballhausplatz was ready to accept internally that there ‘may have been some inadequacies’.99 The lawyers in the chancellery recalled in self-justification that three years earlier they had advised that speedy action should be taken to implement all the provisions of Article 7, including official language and place names.100 Some sympathy was also expressed for Yugoslav’s geo-strategic vulnerability to the Soviet Union, which had increased after recent attacks from Moscow.101 In parliament politicians on both sides of the coalition also wanted to draw a line under recent events. In a grand survey of education and the national question from the monarchy to the present Max Neugebauer described the previous summer as a missed opportunity (which he blamed on Ferdinand Graf); though he summarized Yugoslav allegations of coercion he made no judgement on their accuracy nor any criticism

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of either Carinthian SPÖ or Wedenig. His personal view was that there should be some form of ‘utraquistic’ school for the sake of peace, especially in smaller villages, combined with an ethnic ballot to establish where it was needed.102 It was left to the communist Ernst Fischer to bring up what had actually happened. His account was more accurate than much of the press reporting but the anti-communist consensus of the grand coalition ensured that his comments – like those of his fellow communist Kazianka in Klagenfurt – were easily brushed aside.103 When Drimmel came to speak he gave no hint of any doubts about the legality of Wedenig’s decree. He referred to the deregistration as a ‘ballot’ (Abstimmung) and even saw it as welcome evidence of Wedenig’s conversion to the ‘principle of affirmation and personality’. Earlier he had referred to the special obligation Austria had as the only Western country which ‘sheltered’ a Slav minority.104 Now that the difference between the two parties had been removed the way was open to a federal solution. The draft law prepared by his ministry guaranteeing collective rights of national linguistic and religious minorities in a spirit of ‘true freedom’ was an example which the rest of the world could follow.105 After further Yugoslav protests the government turned to a classical bureaucratic instrument – an official commission.106 It consisted of three senior Education Ministry officials107 and was given the brief to address the pedagogic issues raised by the new situation. Clearly the idea of Vienna investigating the situation was not in itself eccentric, but this investigation was an improvisation, not part of rational policymaking. As was made quite clear from the outset, the job of this commission was not to question the new status quo. The stable door was to stay unlocked and the bolted horse to be allowed to roam freely.108 Nevertheless, the commission, which inspected 36 schools (112 classes) in 11 days, provided many important insights into the consequences of the ‘Wedenig decree’.109 Before officials left Klagenfurt they heard praise from Wedenig for the now-defunct bilingual school system; it had been ‘the route to a common satisfaction of both ethnic groups’. He also explained that he had only moved away from it ‘under coercion’. Even Ferlitsch conceded that some pressure had been applied, though he thought it had only amounted to a few percentage points. After visiting only four schools the commission began to question some of its own assumptions. Firstly, it was struck not just by the ‘useful methods’ of the teachers but also the ‘receptiveness’ (Aufgeschlossenheit) of the pupils, which it took as evidence that they had not been inhibited by bilingual instruction. Secondly, it noted obliquely that ‘the deregistrations were only very indirectly connected to the actual state of linguistic membership’. In several cases ‘no sensible use had been made of parental rights’. The result was that many class teachers were now teaching classes where only a small minority was still registered for Slovene. Many of those who were now meant to be taught only in German knew too little German to be taught effectively. Though it was meant to focus on education the commission could hardly ignore politics altogether. It gingerly edged towards the explanation which was staring it in the face; the deregistration figures ‘had less to do with linguistic realities than with the activities of the local national political groups’. The continuing tensions between parents, teachers and children themselves were also manifest when the commission

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visited. One boy returned home and according to Slovenski Vestnik, reported in a state of high excitement: Mother, mother, a commission came to the school today. There were six gentlemen. One of them, a long thin man, asked us in German if we spoke Windish. Quite a few of us stood up; and he asked again; ‘So who else understands Windish?’ And a few stood up again.

The report continued that the teacher in the same village had told the commission before they entered the class that ‘everyone was German’ there. Citing examples of teachers supporting Germanization the newspaper reported a teacher’s question, which hinted at the pressures some teachers were also under: ‘Is it right that a teacher has to be a member of the Schulverein Südmark in order to be recognized as loyal to the Heimat?’110 There were clearly also tensions within families. In Haimburg/Vovbre a six-year-old child declined to answer in Slovene because his mother did not allow it. Here only 11 children out of a total of 136 were still registered for bilingual instruction although three years before teachers had recorded forty children as Slovene-speaking.111 Back in Vienna the commission stressed the diversity and complexity of the situation. It reported that in many schools bilingual education had brought positive, even excellent pedagogic results; it stressed the importance of having a single village school as a point of integration, which could act as ‘a unifying link for both parts of the population’.112 This echoed the views of Wedenig (and Tischler) but also makes clear that most of the earlier talk of a choice between two or three different schools had been beside the point. It was clear that there would be little or no demand for a school which taught in Slovene only and the proposal to make it the only alternative to a German school had been designed precisely for that reason. The commission bestowed high praise on most teachers for their efforts to cope with the situation. The younger teachers, who had been trained since the war, were singled out for their efforts. Since there was no going back, future progress would depend on their commitment. Innovative teaching, special teacher training and possibly extra hours were seen as the way forward. But there was also a hint that in future too, pedagogics might not be enough in the face of determined political opposition; it recommended that in ‘any future system the influencing of parental decisions about ethnic identity and school language should be strictly punished’.113 When Peter reported back in Vienna to a newly constituted coalition subcommittee, he further toned down the negative implications of what the commission had seen; adjusting to the new system was a transitional stage but dividing children by setting up schools was ‘undesirable and largely impracticable because of geography and patterns of settlement’. His colleague Kövesi interpreted the discrepancy between deregistration and ethnicity with spurious even-handedness, as if significant numbers of German children were now receiving Slovene instruction. After the committee welcomed the report it was back to the parliamentary education subcommittee. Its main task now was to adjust the wording of the ‘Drimmel draft’ to the new facts which had been created.114 The explicit inclusion of the ‘principle of affirmation’ was replaced by a statement that parental choice was to be expressed by

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registration of a child at the start of primary education. But this was only meant to be an interim solution, pending the holding of a minority census (Minderheitenfeststellung). Until then the area of the 1945 bilingual decree was retained (despite FPÖ objections) as the area where the annual registration would take place.115 The only suggestion that anything untoward might have taken place was a recommendation that in the future precautions would be taken ‘against any pressure in the exercise of parental rights’.116 The proposal to punish the exercise of illegitimate influence on parents was not pursued. After further, increasingly desperate, Yugoslav protests officials gave some last-minute thought to mitigating the ‘subjective principle’ or even postponing the legislation, but that was rejected as impracticable at such a late stage.117 The diplomats were left with the task of damage limitation. In a nine-page briefing paper the Ballhausplatz described the new law as a compromise between Yugoslav protests and ‘right wing radical circles in Carinthia’. It was ‘obvious’ that a compromise would not please everyone. But the fact that it had been passed before the impending national elections showed the government’s wish to move to better relations with Yugoslavia.118 Unlike the Yugoslav government or the Carinthian Slovenes, the Catholic Church was consulted. The outcome was a loosening of the link between Slovene language and religious instruction. Bishop Kadras reasoned that because most Carinthian Slovenes would be likely to work in Austria, not Yugoslavia, they needed German to continue to take part in religious life (the option of speaking both was not considered). He did not, admittedly, share the German national view that those children who had been deregistered were German. But he could find no sound theological reason for not supporting assimilation. Religious instruction was to be brought in line with the outcome of overall deregistration.119 Despite parliament’s imminent dissolution – or because of it – the debate on the law on 19 March was marked by the spirit of consensus. Walther Weißmann (Carinthian ÖVP) returned to the Abwehrkampf and 1920 plebiscite. He ignored the German invasion of Yugoslavia and portrayed the 1942 deportation as a regrettable but relatively harmless response to partisan activity. The previous autumn’s events were no more than ‘a change of the legal position’. On the SPÖ side Neugebauer noted with satisfaction that the situation in southern Carinthia had now calmed down and even claimed that the ministerial commission had found no evidence of tension. Admittedly, he also praised the 1945 bilingual school for pedagogic and social reasons and regretted that his earlier proposal to save it at least in smaller parishes had failed, because of the absence of ‘national peace’. But he still hoped for the necessary ‘peace and tolerance’ to make the new law succeed. The harmonious mood was disturbed only briefly when the communist leader Johann Koplenig linked the pressures applied to Slovene parents and the construction of the ‘Windish’ to Nazi persecution and the deportation of Slovene families in 1942. The FPÖ spokesman Helfried Pfeifer, after pointing out several genuine legal blemishes and drafting weaknesses, complained of being sidelined by the two main parties. Adolf Hawarlik closed the debate for the ÖVP. As well as stressing the benefits of the new law for the minority he gave a summary of the commission’s findings which

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removed it even further from the harsh reality of the recent confrontation. The fact that attacks came from both the communists and the FPÖ showed that the law was following the correct middle way. In his peroration Hawarlik called for tolerance and reconciliation between majority and minority at the border as a step towards a united Europe. Those who would hinder the growing together (Zusammenwachsen) of peoples into a larger family of nations (he did not specify which) would be out of step with world history and ultimately seal their own downfall. The proposed law was ‘a mosaic stone in the longed-for picture of future peace’.120

Postscript Even if Newole’s estimate of 80,000–85,000 for the total number of ‘Slav speakers’ in Carinthia was exaggerated (though it is hard to see why it should have been) it is clear that a massive assimilatory shift took place in autumn 1958. The outcome was confirmed in August 1959 when parents could actively choose to register their children for bilingual instruction or not. By 1963 the total number of registered pupils dropped to 1,673.121 The 1961 census also confirmed the assimilatory trend. Apart from a handful of parishes, it showed a marked decline in the number of declared bilinguals.122 Depending on the interpretation of the declared ‘Windish’ speakers it gave the number of those speaking Slovene as between 14,003 and 25,472.123 In subsequent accounts the coercion of the deregistration campaign was largely airbrushed out. The process started by officials and politicians at the end of 1958 was continued by politicians and historians. A first step was to take the deregistration figures as objective evidence of how small the minority ‘really’ was and conclude that Slovene leaders had massively exaggerated its size.124 The SPÖ moved to a similar position, only hinting at doubts by demanding that any future ethnic census would have to be orderly, secret and free of intimidation. Nevertheless, Ralf Unkart, Newole’s successor as Carinthia’s chief civil servant, was happy to call the deregistration campaign ‘a kind of minority census’.125 Some historians have followed suit. For example Stefan Karner, though mentioning the role of the Kärntner Heimatdienst, sees the organization as responding to the pressure of ‘thousands of parents’ and ignores altogether the pressure applied on Slovene parents to deregister.126 This skewed perspective is consistent with his lack of interest in the paragraph of Article 7, which was supposed to stop ‘the activity of organizations whose aim is to deprive the Croat or Slovene population of their identity and rights’. In one account by Karner (and Peter Ruggenthaler) the stipulation is simply excised.127 Another recent Carinthian account did not even consider Wedenig’s decree and its aftermath to be a ‘key date’ of Carinthia’s post-war ethnic history.128 One of the oddities of the German nationalists’ discourse of perpetual threat was that it could not always accommodate its own triumph, at least in public. Instead its attention shifted to the vestiges of the 1945 school ‘territory’ still included in the law and to the need to establish the ‘real’ size of the minority for a final settlement. It now focussed on the privileges supposedly enjoyed by those children who were still registered for bilingual instruction, the disproportionate burden on taxpayers

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of supporting their teaching and the disadvantage incurred by the rest. These children were now increasingly labelled ‘non-Slovene’, ‘German-speaking’ or simply ‘German’.129 The subjective mode morphed into the objective. The fact that Slovene was still being taught in any Carinthian schools meant that there was still work to be done. In October 1960 there was nevertheless time for celebration to mark the fortieth anniversary of the Carinthian plebiscite. Those whom Karl Gruber had planned to dampen down ten years earlier were now in the ascendant. One indication was that Wedenig favoured the inclusion of the loyal (heimattreu) organizations in order to prevent any ‘nonsense’ (Unfug).130 By contrast the requests from Slovene leaders to exclude ‘rabble-rousers’ (Hetzer) fell on deaf ears and their own hopes of being included foundered on FPÖ-led protests, notwithstanding Wedenig’s declared wish to include the whole province.131 Overall responsibility for organizing the celebrations was given to Franz Koschier, the chair of the Carinthian Heimatwerk whose career demonstrated his life-long commitment to eliminate Slovene – not just in Carinthia but beyond its borders. As a leading school administrator in occupied Carniola and head of the teacher training institute in Kranj he had been at the heart in the Nazi attempt to make the area German. Part of that job had been to organize the pulping of Slovene books.132 It is therefore hard to see how his appointment could be squared with Wedenig’s claim that those in charge of the commemoration were guarantees that it would take place ‘in a dispassionate way’.133 The official guidelines did admittedly called on organizers in the villages and towns to exercise restraint, avoid ‘false Heimat jingoism’ (Heimattümelei) and set aside ethnic (and other) differences for the sake of unity. But in the main ceremony ethnic differences were absent only in the sense that there was almost no indication that a Slovene minority even existed. The official slogan of ‘making Carinthia more beautiful’ made no mention of either Slovene literature or popular culture.134 There were no Slovene contributions to the ‘great picture book of the Heimat’.135 The illustrated commemoration of the celebrations included a solitary caption about the festive folk costume of ‘our Slovene and German country people’ in the Lower Gail Valley. By contrast there were pictures of the drilled ranks of the KHD marching through Klagenfurt.136 Hans Steinacher took a leading role in the march, and published a shortened, thinly anonymized version of his 1943 Sieg in Deutscher Nacht. While the title was changed and much was edited out the basic message was unchanged. Like the earlier work it closed with a poem by Paul Hatheyr thanking God for saving Carinthians and allowing them ‘to remain free on our earth’.137 The democratic aspect of national self-determination was not ignored altogether but it was overshadowed by the celebration of the soldierly courage and loyalty of the Abwehrkämpfer. And the distinction between the sacrifices of 266 Carinthian dead of 1918–19 and that the 33,000 ‘fallen Carinthians’ of the two world wars was thoroughly blurred.138 Steinacher’s associate, Karl Fritz, a former SS officer who was now in the ÖVP, declared – with all the authority of the eye-witness – that ‘without the Abwehrkampf there would have been no plebiscite’. This unprovable slogan was to become a central claim of some Carinthian historiography over the following decades.139

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Two days before the official celebration 2,500 German national fraternity students, including members of the FPÖ academic associations (Akademikerverbände) and fraternity delegations from West Germany, marched through Klagenfurt in a traditional festive gathering (Festkommers). Next to the fate of the German minority in South Tyrol the ‘defense’ of German Carinthia had been one of their burning causes.140 On the day itself, a huge crowd (estimated at 100,000) gathered to see the march-past. The marchers included not just Heimat associations of southern Carinthia dressed in full folk costume but also the ‘welfare’ branch of the SS veterans (‘Kameradschaft IV’), some of whom retained the swastika on their medals.141 In his speech Wedenig did mention Carinthians of ‘both languages’ though not, at least according to the Neue Zeit report, the word ‘Slovene’.142 The paper also reported that Vinzenz Schumy had made an appeal for more understanding to Carinthia’s two ‘indigenous nations’ (bodenständige Nationen); understood in context this clearly meant Germans and ‘Windish’ and the Neue Zeit’s interpretation that Schumy had meant Germans and Slovenes was either over-optimistic or disingenuous.143 Chancellor Julius Raab’s message spoke of the preservation of Slovene ethnicity and identity. But it was addressed to those ‘Slovene friends’ who had proved their loyalty in 1920 by supporting Austria.144 The next day he made clear what this meant for practical politics when he promised a speedy passage for the ‘Law for the Determination of the Minorities’ (Minderheitenfeststellungsgesetz). That would bring the ‘final settlement of the relationship between the German and Windish-speaking Carinthians and the Slovene minority’.145 When he had spoken to the Landtag on 8 October Adolf Schärf, now Austrian president, recalled the 1920 Landtag pledge. But far from reminding the assembly of the Carinthian commitment to nurture Slovene culture and identity, he cited Ferdinand Kernmaier in support of his belief that the democratic principles on which Austrian democracy was based guaranteed that the will of the Slovene population would be ‘undisguisedly expressed’. This reference to the anti-clerical Landbund politician, who had been elected provincial governor with the support of Carinthian Social Democrats before being deposed by Dollfuss, did not need much decoding. Neither did Schärf ’s lack of interest in Kernmaier’s further career as a member of the illegal Nazi Party and loyal servant of the Third Reich (and member of the Reichstag). Schärf concluded that through ‘cooperation not antagonism’ Carinthians and Austrians could become masters of their own fate.146 On 10 October itself he declared that Carinthia had given the world an example of just and humane solutions of border and minority problems.147 Soon afterwards the Yugoslav foreign minister Koča Popović came to Vienna for talks with his opposite number, Bruno Kreisky. Relations between the two countries seemed to be on the mend. Some months before Kreisky had given an assurance that Austria would show good will in responding to Slovene wishes (e.g. for support in building a grammar school building); he also gave a positive twist to the view that assimilation was inevitable: we cannot stop certain historical processes but nothing should be done by the Austrian state to accelerate these processes. Quite to the contrary, we want to help create institutions which will alleviate the minority’s own life and enable the conservation of the minority.

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This, he affirmed, was a moral as well as a political duty.148 Popović’s perspective was rather different: he thought minority policy should be ‘consciously anti-assimilationist, and aimed at maintaining the ethnic character of these minorities’. Whether or not his claim, that this reflected an official Yugoslav view that the presence of minorities brought ‘an enrichment of the life of our state’, was correct, it clearly implied a more interventionist understanding of the role of the state than the neutrality implied by Kreisky’s comment. A concrete example of the difference between the two politicians was shown when Popović also asked Kreisky whether more could not be done to curb the activities of anti-Slovene organizations in Carinthia. Kreisky pointed out the limits of the authorities’ powers to act under the Law of Association (Vereinsgesetz) but assured Popović that the security authorities were being ‘strictly instructed so that everything is done to avoid pressure’.149 It is hard to imagine a less convincing comment on either Carinthian ethnic politics or Carinthian policing of it.

Conclusion

The Minority School Law of March 1959 has sometimes been seen as a constitutionally solid foundation stone for for Austria’s later minority policy.1 In reality it involved the Austrian parliament retroactively legitimizing an illegal provincial fait accompli, which had been forced on the Carinthian governor by anti-Slovene activists, many of them former supporters of National Socialism. The explanation for this outcome put forward in this study can be summarized under five headings.

Anti-Slovene continuity The campaign against bilingual education was underpinned by a ‘utopian’ vision – a Carinthia ‘purged’ of Slovene language and culture. The vision was not just the preserve of a small group of extreme German nationalists; it was shared by many others, including some who may not have hankered after National Socialism after its abysmal failure but still clung to the belief that Germans were culturally and perhaps racially superior to Slavs. Some of these attitudes were also shared by those Slovenes who self-identified as ‘Windish’ and sought to ‘over-assimilate’. Seven years of Nazi rule had strongly reinforced the stigmatization of Slovene. To effectively counter this deep-seated prejudice probably required the extensive, long-term involvement of the state and in particular the education system. There is no shortage of reasons why this kind of solution did not emerge in post-Nazi Austria. Yet in October 1945 – to offset the temptations of determinism – an alternative path towards it was glimpsed when a proposal for a new bilingual primary education system in southern Carinthia was agreed by the provisional Carinthian government. Introducing universal compulsory bilingual instruction in the southern Carinthia was meant to bypass earlier conflict about ethnic membership and identity, which had been based on the ‘groupist’ assumption that two distinct, bounded national or ethnic collectives were locked in an inevitable confrontation. As an alternative, the bilingual school system rested on the principle of the common good, stemming from Tischler’s insight that the social and moral fabric of Carinthia had been severely damaged by National Socialism. Introducing parity for German and Slovene instruction in over a hundred primary schools was a radical break with the earlier ‘utraquistic’ school. For

124

Slavs in Post-Nazi Austria

supporters of the Nazi regime it was an affront, a reversal of their value system, as well as a humiliating reminder of military defeat. The strong opposition which the new system faced from the outset is one reason to be sceptical about whether it really was evidence (as the Austrian government put it) that the Carinthian government had embarked on a ‘completely new path’. Yet it is still worth recalling those prominent (non-Slovene) figures, including Ferdinand Wedenig and Hans Lagger in the SPÖ, education officials like Julius Heinzel and Lorenz Just, as well as many hard-working teachers, who tried hard to make it work. However, once Tischler left the Carinthian government in November 1945 the political backing for the school in the province began to ebb away. The SPÖ turned to the idiom of the German Carinthian Heimat in combination with a narrow ‘majoritarian’ understanding of democracy, while the leadership of the Slovene Liberation Front went for broke and followed the Yugoslav and Slovene government down the blind alley of secession. The space between the identification of Carinthia as exclusively German on the one hand and the pursuit of secession to Yugoslavia on the other, all but disappeared. As it did, the polarization between the loyal and the treacherous was reasserted. It was not just a response to the perceived Yugoslav (Slovene) threat but also central to party politics; politicians’ fears that they might be outflanked by more German national competitors meant that options for dialogue and negotiation were closed off and a political culture of intolerance reinforced. In May 1949 the mere appeal by the Neue Zeit to avoid chauvinism was enough to prompt a denunciation for disloyalty from the Volkzeitung; it was an insult to the border population since there were only two kinds of people – ‘the loyal and the treacherous’.2 Over time those who tried to resist this kind of black-andwhite scheme were either forced to adapt (like Ferdinand Wedenig) or marginalized (like Joško Tischler).

Post-Nazi society Discussion of the continuities from Nazi to post-Nazi society has often been blocked by Carinthian outrage that the province should be defamed as a ‘brown province’.3 Some of the outrage has seemed protesting too much, using the label as an Aunt Sally to defend the illusion of collective provincial impeccability. The central point here concerns the defeat of Nazi Germany and the aspiration of post-war Allied policy to denazify the society they occupied. The failures of US and British denazification in Germany and Austria, which have now been extensively researched, stemmed from over-schematic measures of arrests, dismissals and internment which could not be effectively implemented from above. But the Carinthian case also shows how those local collaborators with both the knowledge needed for any effective purge and the political will to implement it were soon marginalized. There were a range of reasons for this, including Slovene support for secession. Instead the British authorities, in line with their overall policy of treating Austria more leniently than Germany, went for the more convenient option of working through the Carinthian politicians they found in situ when they arrived. Exemption from denazification and the patronage of the re-established party system

Conclusion

125

soon became inextricably intertwined. Subsequent British attempts to correct the situation by making denazification procedures more effective merely increased the role of local elites and thus strengthened what one British report called the ‘jobbery’ of party politics.4 In stark contrast to this pragmatic and sometimes cynical wheelerdealing, a highly moralized public discussion developed, which turned the ‘Nazi question’ into a ‘denazification question’. It asked in emotional tones how the injustice and inhumanity inflicted on the mass of supposedly misled ‘small’ Nazi Party members could be alleviated or ended. Much of this was visible elsewhere in Austria and in the western zones of Germany. But in the early 1950s a significant divergence between Austria and the Federal Republic began to emerge. In Austria the Western Allies now considered the democratizing mission of the 1943 ‘Declaration on Austria’ to have been successfully completed; the only significant threat to Austrian democracy was judged to come from the communists and their Soviet backers. In Carinthia the British ‘light touch’ meant that by the 1950s rest and recuperation at the Wörthersee drove out any remaining ambitions to ‘turn Nazis into democrats’. Unlike in West Germany, where, as Norbert Frei has shown, the American and British authorities continued to monitor and on occasion intervene against far right and neo-Nazi attempts to influence mainstream politics, both Carinthian parties were highly permeable. Instead of the ‘normative demarcation’ which, Frei argues, separated the conservative right from far right extremism5 much of Carinthian politics was marked by a ‘normative fuzziness’. Far from being stigmatized, many of the core values which had sustained National Socialist rule were able to enter the body politic. In Carinthia the idiom, values and associated mythologies of the German Heimat were a key point of entry. By the late 1950s a gap between Carinthia and the Western ‘community of values’ with which the Austria state identified was visible for those who cared to look. One small but illuminating example was the experience of Leo Hillmann (Charles Kennedy), a former SOE agent and Viennese Jew, who came to Carinthia for his annual summer holiday. He was greeted by an anti-Semitic barrage from the Unterkärntner Nachrichten. The newspaper attacked him as an ‘oppressor and slave-trader’ for his work at the Wolfsberg internment camp: by allowing the extradition to Yugoslavia of alleged war criminals he had shed ‘best Carinthian blood’.6 The influence of Nazi values could also be seen in the annual gatherings at the Ulrichsberg, which as well as honouring the fighters of the Abwehrkampf validated the Wehrmacht and Waffen-SS as a part of the anti-Bolshevik defence of Europe.7 Nazi crimes were covered by a rich sauce of unilateral forgiveness towards the West, anticommunism and pan-European sentiment.8 The ‘defence’ of the West was intertwined with an ongoing mission to defend Carinthia against the threat of ‘Slovenization’. Implicitly, and sometimes explicitly, crimes committed in Nazi counterinsurgency operations were justified by the deeds and misdeeds of Yugoslav partisans. The partisan kidnappings of Summer 1945 were used to offset and neutralize the Nazi deportations of 1942.9 Acknowledgement of other Nazi crimes could be blocked in a similar way. One revealing Carinthian response to the 1956 trial of the Viennese police officer (Ordnungspolizisten) involved in mass shootings in Poland was to contrast it with the failure to punish those responsible for ‘countless murders committed after the end of the war in Lower Carinthia’.10 Equally revealing was the plea for clemency from the

126

Slavs in Post-Nazi Austria

son of one Carinthian perpetrator, who cited the heroism his father had shown twenty years earlier as a seventeen-year-old patriot fighting the ‘Serbian invaders’.11 For some the fight against the bilingual school provided a way of coming to terms with the reality of German defeat. As West Germany began to revive, and German rearmament became likely it was possible to conclude, as Heribert Jordan did, that the outcome of the war ‘was still to be decided’; he added that ‘the German Volk in Austria’ and beyond the borders was still ‘a young Volk and will fight to regain its place in the sun’.12 Others found consolation in the belief that Western leaders had, albeit belatedly, ‘come to their senses’ and realized that they had been wrong to ‘appease’ communist leaders – Tito as well as Stalin. But that still left open the question of what could be done: the Oder-Neisse line and the ‘tripartite’ division of Germany began to look increasingly solid, and the ‘exclusion’ of Austria from Greater Germany was not likely to be reversed within the foreseeable future. But the abolition of compulsory Slovene instruction in southern Carinthia was a concrete, realizable goal. Here at least a German victory could be won and the world which had been turned upside down in 1945 could be partly restored. From German national student corporations to German national networks the bilingual school, like the fate of the German (Austrian) minority in South Tyrol became a substitute for a frustrated Weltpolitik.13 In this activism there was little sign of the ‘discrete silence’ which, according to Herman Lübbe, made possible West Germany’s transition to democracy. Even those former Nazis who kept the ‘flame alive’ and condemned others (including VdU or FPÖ leaders) for ‘selling out’ were unlikely to be ostracized.14 Like Oskar Kraus, the former Nazi mayor of Villach, they may have felt bitter about the way things had turned out, but they could still hold their heads up high.15 Much later, in the early 1970s Kreisky, now chancellor, attempted to implement the provisions of Article 7 on bilingual place names and found himself confronted by well-organized, determined German Carinthian resistance. In October 1972 around 200 bilingual village signs erected by the Carinthian government were removed overnight. The action was christened euphemistically and militaristically the ‘storm on the place names’ (Ortstafelsturm). Kreisky himself was nearly lynched by a mob in Klagenfurt and was the target of antiSemitic abuse. He conceded privately that ‘we may have underestimated some Nazi tendencies in Austria’.16

Austria and the international context The abdication of the Austrian federal executive and legislature can of course be understood, even justified, in pragmatic terms. The judgement that the government in Vienna could not afford the political cost of confronting the German national forces of the province in defence of a small Slav minority was not fanciful. Yet it is also important to see that this ‘realist’ calculation was itself the outcome of a particular interpretative prism which diverged substantially from Austria’s post-war victim myth. The fear of the strength of centrifugal forces which had helped destroy the Austrian capitals had not been cured by an anti-Nazi educational process or a bout of ‘love at second sight’. They still seemed strong enough in Vienna to have to be accommodated rather than confronted. They were

Conclusion

127

also exploited by either partner of Austria’s Grand Coalition. Without political leadership from Vienna or a readiness to build anti-Nazi alliances within the province across the party divide, those in Carinthia loyal to ‘Austria’ (österreichtreu, as they were termed in police reports) were progressively weakened while those who called themselves ‘loyal to the Heimat’ (heimattreu) asserted a political and discoursive hegemony. The basic normative ‘terms of trade’ established early on between province and capital meant that instead of ‘Carinthia’ having to demonstrate its anti-Nazi credentials or its Austrian identity, national politicians found themselves having to convince ‘the province’ that they had learnt their lesson and unlike in 1918–9 were standing by the province. They were well aware that support for the federal government in Carinthia had crumbled well before the Anschluss in the face of the illegal Nazi Party and its powerful supporters. To the outside world the culture of exoneration and apologia in Carinthia (and elsewhere in Austria) hardly registered. Most Western views combined indifference and incomprehension in the tradition of Neville Chamberlain’s distaste for the ‘far away’ Sudetenland. When a British official visited the province in summer 1956 and met the Villach district administrator he noted merely that his views were ‘all fairly commonplace, tending to the more extreme German point of view’. As for the Schulverein Südmark it was merely ‘an old-established pro-Teutonic collection of professors and provincial savants with no political significance’.17 Western indifference – or hostility – to minority rights was also reinforced by international legal documents, from the United Nations Universal Declaration (1948)18 to the European Convention on Human Rights (1950). And as seen, the Austrian State Treaty itself (Article 7) was also vaguely worded or – in the case of bilingual education – completely silent.19 Nevertheless the normative isolation of post-Nazi Carinthia, or Austria as a whole, should not be overstated. Neither were hermetically sealed. Concern about the possibility of a negative international reaction to anti-Slovene activity remained a factor in political calculations and a potential point of reference for a more pluralist, tolerant, self-critical politics. It was cited, for example, by the constitutional lawyers in the Federal Chancellery, as well as those like Wedenig who sought ways to escape from the spiral of confrontation. There were alternative European visions from that conjured up at the Ulrichsberg. The Catholic conservative version is certainly also open to criticism where it moved towards a vision of a re-ethnicized European order, as Samula Salzborn has argued.20 But it could also point to a more pluralistic treatment of the minority than the ‘hollowed out liberalism’ embodied in the ‘right of affirmation’ and the spurious freedom of ‘subject criteria’. Some versions of Catholic anti-communism certainly implied greater toleration of minority identity than was shown by Carinthian German nationalism. Heinrich Drimmel for example called the treatment of the Carinthian Slovenes a test case of the West’s claim to be morally superior to communism. Even Ludwig Weiß, one of the most prominent opponents of the bilingual school, seemed alarmed enough by the forces which had been unleashed in autumn 1958 to caution that the Council of Europe would be particularly concerned about how the Slovenes (as part of the wider Slav cultural world) were being treated; it should be made clear that ‘nationalist tendencies on both sides’ had not aggravated the situation.21

128

Slavs in Post-Nazi Austria

The dramatization of the Yugoslav threat Much of the polarization of Carinthian politics rested on the construction or inflation of a South Slav threat. As has been argued here, Yugoslavia’s attempt between 1945 and 1947 to have the Carinthian border redrawn in its favour was real enough, but it was also significantly exaggerated, dramatized and exploited. In May 1945 Yugoslav forces attempted to effectively annex southern Carinthia. Their legal justification was thin and it should not be forgotten that if they had succeeded many people would have been forced to live under a harsh dictatorship; others would almost certainly have been ‘ethnically cleansed’ or summarily executed. But the more important point for the subsequent politics of assimilation is that once Yugoslav troops were forced to withdraw at the end of May 1945, the likelihood of a forcible annexation receded and then virtually disappeared. Despite a constant stream of alarmist rumours, and later tendentious journalism and flawed historiography, no hard evidence has yet emerged that the Yugoslav or Slovene state ever seriously planned to invade Carinthia.22 There are more convincing explanations of Yugoslavia’s border diplomacy than an implacable (and irrational) desire to grab Carinthian territory. First, the contingencies of Cold War diplomacy and then tensions between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union helped keep the border question open after April 1947, well after the Yugoslav government had effectively given up hope of asserting its claim. Austrian and Western politicians also played their part in inflating the issue, using it to engineer a breakdown of negotiations in May 1948. That helped maintain the illusion in Carinthia that the fate of the border continued to hang in the balance right up to the point in July 1949 when the pre-Anschluss border was confirmed. Thereafter, far from being aimed at seizing or subverting southern Carinthia, Yugoslav policy was marked by a mixture of indifference and wishful thinking about the strength of ‘progressive forces’ in Carinthia. Neither Belgrade nor Slovenia was in a position to stop – or even predict – the strength of anti-Slovene forces in Carinthia. In September 1958 they observed events impotently from the sidelines. In the end Carinthia’s perception of a Yugoslav threat, sometimes romanticized and misunderstood as a specific Carinthian ‘primeval angst’ (Urangst), had less to do with Yugoslav policy than the the dynamics of antiSlovene lobbying. Like their Slovene opponents German national activists had a clear interest in exaggerating the likelihood of a border revision; they too were concerned to mobilize the ‘nationally indifferent’ and over time did so. But the playing-field for the two lobbies was not level; it was tilted to the advantage of the guardians of the Heimat.

Liberal values after Nazism The Nazi ‘racial state’ in Carinthia had not rested on dissimilation and exclusion alone. It also incorporated decades of coercive assimilation. Even under National Socialism the language of individual choice and parental rights did not disappear. Carinthian Slovenes were still ‘invited’ to demonstrate that they were, as Gauleiter Rainer put it,

Conclusion

129

‘German in their volition’ (Deutsch in ihrem Wollen), and many tried to do so. In postNazi Carinthia the language of individual choice was attached to ideas of democratic freedom and parliamentary democracy, but it was still a path to the same goal as under Nazi rule: a homogenously German Carinthia. Both the ‘principle of affirmation’ and the campaign for ‘parental rights’ were used as instruments to achieve this. The construction of the ‘Windish’ mixed both individual traits and collective features.23 Sometimes the ‘Windish’ were also understood as racially close to German Carinthians. For example Erich Silla argued in the Landtag that past mixing of blood made ‘the Windish’ quite different from Slovenes; the fact that a small elite spoke Slovene ‘could no more make the mass of Windish Slovene than Indians or Zulu kaffirs could be made English simply because their intelligentsia spoke English’. Because of past miscegenation no one could say what blood flowed in their veins.24 Herbert Knaus argued, no less strangely, that Windish identity was formed by both will and descent; he explained that the ‘Windish’ were the product of past intermarriage, which had taken place ‘without coercion or influence’ but out of ‘the need to decide in favour of the larger part of the population’.25 Confused or not, these comments clearly implied that there were no real Slovenes in Carinthia at all, but only, at best, Slovenized Windish. In a similar vein Wolfgang Mayrhofer claimed that ‘viewed racially, there is no minority at all in Carinthia, we’re all Carinthians and nothing else’.26 On the other hand, Valentin Einspieler had no doubt that the Windish, which he claimed to represent, were a nationality (Volkstum).27 Regardless of these differences it is clear that even though ‘racial science’ was no longer taught or learnt many clearly still thought that the ‘the voice of blood’, as FPÖ Hans Rader put it, was clearly crucial.28 Aside from racialism it is striking how Social Darwinist assumptions were present across the political spectrum. For example the diocesan authorities counselled the Slovene clergy to submit to the stronger secular authorities,29 while Bishop Köstner explained to Slovene priests with brutal frankness that instead of trying to save Slovene speakers ‘who are doomed to die’, they should let them ‘rest in peace’.30 Some Social Democrat thinking was a modernizing, anti-clerical variation of this. Even Wedenig assumed that Slovenes would assimilate and ‘after a given time disappear altogether’. Although he also argued that precisely because assimilation was inexorable the majority population could afford to be ‘generous’, he did not think anything should be done to hold up the process.31 Newole saw the minority less generously, as fatally priest-ridden and reactionary. He viewed the bilingual school system as a pointless attempt to turn the clock back and concluded that ‘in the long run the Slovenes could not be saved’.32 His view that ‘a democratic state cannot force anyone to declare themselves in favour of anything’ might at first sight look like a liberal rejection of state coercion. Yet it led him to conclude that individual Slovenes, not least Slovene parents, had to stand up against other forms of state coercion, irrespective of their social and economic position and unsupported by the state. They simply needed to have ‘the courage to make an affirmation’ (Bekennermut).33 In this logic not only were the Slovenes bound to disappear but the days of the Windish were also numbered. Their departure from what Albert Reiterer calls ‘the waiting-room for final assimilation’ would not be mourned by their one-time champions.34 Even at the founding meeting of the Windish League, Valentin Einspieler

130

Slavs in Post-Nazi Austria

had explained that, because there was no written Windish language, the future would be a decision between ‘national Slovene’ and ‘Austrian-German’.35 *** In post-Nazi Carinthia the arguments for fostering Slovene culture did not outweigh the pressures exerted on them to assimilate. In James Tully’s terms many Carinthians continued to view the prospect of the final disappearance of Slovene culture from Carinthia ‘with moral approval or moral indifference’.36 In this context state ‘neutrality’ translated into blindness, not just towards asymmetries of power and the structural advantages of dominant over non-dominant ethnicities but also towards the difference between supporters of National Socialism and its victims. In February 1957 Joško Tischler, who consistently sought to return to Jarnik’s ‘political grounds for the preservation of the Slovene language’ and link them with practical education policy, published a collection of documents entitled The Language Question Today and One Hundred Years Ago. It illustrated the long process of Germanization in Southern Carinthia but also the gulf between the hopes raised in 1945 and what had happened since.37 At the end of the year, speaking at the traditional Slovene gathering in the Rosental, Tischler returned to the subject. He lamented the alienation of children of Slovene-speaking families from the culture and language of their parents. Like Jarnik before him, he observed the damage done by outward migration as he listed the costs – financial as well as cultural – to the ‘general progress of our people’. The police summary of the Naš Tednik report called the speech ‘remarkable’, but nevertheless stopped at the point when Tischler cited Yugoslavia’s well-known slogan supporting its post-war territorial claim: ‘we are demanding nothing foreign, only what is ours’. That suggested that Tischler was making the case for secession, whereas in fact he lamenting the long-term cultural and educational damage done to the Carinthian Slovenes. The last two paragraphs make this clear and, as a reminder of what might have been, seem a fitting way to close this study:38 What was the basic principle of the bilingual school? Through our own experiences during the Second World War we all, I believe, came to the conviction that many of the horrors that occurred in our villages were not decided upon or decreed from Berlin, Vienna, and not really from Klagenfurt, but were instead born out of hatred in the village and the parish. Since the ethnic struggle erupted in south Carinthia, the land was divided into two hostile camps. This struggle inflicted serious wounds everywhere. We wanted to heal these old wounds, not only among the old, but also among young people, that is why with the bilingual school we built a bridge that is meant to tie our countrymen into a fraternal relationship, to offer them the opportunity to get closer to one another, and to enrich each other spiritually in the encounter. We also want our children to be brought up as honest citizens, without them having to renounce their kin in the process. We all have to contribute our share to the common good, which is also after all the precondition for the good of each individual. This common good can be reached only through peaceful coexistence, mutual respect, and forgetting the bitter past. May our children be spared the suffering of our fathers!39

App e ndix

Bilingual Primary School and Census Results in Southern Carinthia, 1945–60

B 1951–2 No. of pupils3

Parish1 School catchment2

C 1951 No. of non-German monoglots in parish4

D E 1951 1955–6 Per cent of Per cent of non-German Slovenemonoglots in speaking parish5 pupils6

F 1959 (March) No. of pupils registered for bilingual instruction/total pupils in school7

G H 1959 1961 (March) Per cent of Per cent of non-German pupils registered monoglots in for bilingual parish8 instruction

132

A POLITICAL DISTRICT

POLITICAL DISTRICT HERMAGOR EGG/BRDO

833

59.2

24.0

84

3/71

4.2

Mellweg/Melviče

68

8/56

1.7

St Paul an der Gail/Šentpavel na Zilji*

47

0/48

0

ST STEFAN AN DER GAIL/ ŠTEFAN NA ZILJI St Stefan an der Gail/Štefan na Zilji*

N/A 153

VORDERBERG/BLAČE Vorderberg/Blače

0.5

285 329

0

0/57

0

3/50

0

54.8

5.8

62

GÖRTSCHACH/GORIČE

0/152

58.4

1.9

Görtschach/Goriče POLITICAL DISTRICT KLAGENURT LAND FEISTRITZ IM ROSENTAL/ BiSTRICA V ROŽU Feistritz im Rosental/Bstrica v Rožu

809 106

47.3

19

20.1 14/93

15

Appendix

Egg/Brdo

A POLITICAL DISTRICT

B 1951–2 No. of pupils3

Parish1 School catchment2

C 1951 No. of non-German monoglots in parish4

D E 1951 1955–6 Per cent of Per cent of non-German Slovenemonoglots in speaking parish5 pupils6

F 1959 (March) No. of pupils registered for bilingual instruction/total pupils in school7

G H 1959 1961 (March) Per cent of Per cent of non-German pupils registered monoglots in for bilingual parish8 instruction

Bärental/Zavrh

20

93

0/17

0

Suetschach/Sveče

55

43

13/58

22.4

Gurnitz/Podkrnos*

66

7/78

8.9

Ebental/Žrelec

288

17.1

4.4

1,085

20.7

14.4

219

FERLACH/BOROVLJE Ferlach/Borovlje*

381

24/32873

29/353

0.8

Kappel an der Drau/Kapla ob Dravi

132

9

17/128

13.3

Waidisch/Bajdiše

44

38

23/33

69.7

UNTERFERLACH/ MEDBOROVNICA*

461

47.3

25.9

Glainach/Glinje

35

61

20/26

76.9

Göltschach/Golšov*

42

63

2/31

6.4

GRAFENSTEIN/GRABŠTANJ 197

9.0

1.1 8

2/165

1.2

133

Grafenstein/Grabštanj*

155

Appendix

EBENTHAL/ŽRELEC

B 1951–2 No. of pupils3

Parish1 School catchment2

HÖRTENDORF/TRDNJA VAS 92

St Jakob an der Strasse/ Šentjakob pri Celovcu

144

MARIA WÖRTH/OTOK Maria Wörth/Otok

WINDISCH BLEIBERG/ SLOVENJI PLAJBERK

210

17.3

620

69.9

G H 1959 1961 (March) Per cent of Per cent of non-German pupils registered monoglots in for bilingual parish8 instruction

213

8.5 40.4

90 762

60.7

740

45.6

137

KÖTTMANNSDORF/ KOTMARA VAS Köttmannsdorf/ Kotmara vas

3.8

69

KEUTSCHACH/HODIŠE Keutschach/Hodiše

30

F 1959 (March) No. of pupils registered for bilingual instruction/total pupils in school7

112

WEIZELDORF/SVETNA VAS St Johann im Rosental/ Šentjanž v Rožu

D E 1951 1955–6 Per cent of Per cent of non-German Slovenemonoglots in speaking parish5 pupils6

81.4

73/103

70.9 27.7

32 472

55.4 47.6

60

167

31/56

28/162

17.3 75.0

Appendix

Hörtendorf/Trdnja vas

C 1951 No. of non-German monoglots in parish4

134

A POLITICAL DISTRICT

A POLITICAL DISTRICT

B 1951–2 No. of pupils3

Parish1 School catchment2

C 1951 No. of non-German monoglots in parish4

D E 1951 1955–6 Per cent of Per cent of non-German Slovenemonoglots in speaking parish5 pupils6

Windisch Bleiberg/ Slovenji Plajberk

97 673

Ludmannsdorf/Bilčovs

182

Loibltal/Brodi

21

ST MARGARETHEN IM ROSENTAL/ŠMARJETA V ROŽU St Margarethen im Rosental/ Šmarjeta v Rožu

880

Maria Rain/Žihpolje* Mieger/Medgorje

106

64.4 91

83/168

49.4

83

22/24

91.7

76.7

33.8

60 103

10.8

805

91.5

77

MIEGER/MEDGORJE

84.6

82.9

126

MARIA RAIN/ŽIHPOLJE

33/39

G H 1959 1961 (March) Per cent of Per cent of non-German pupils registered monoglots in for bilingual parish8 instruction

Appendix

LUDMANNSDORF/ BILČOVS

F 1959 (March) No. of pupils registered for bilingual instruction/total pupils in school7

20/121

16.5 9.1

15

1/68

1.5 75.0

83

13/99

13.1

135

B 1951–2 No. of pupils3

Parish1 School catchment2

Pischeldorf/Škofji Dvor

G H 1959 1961 (March) Per cent of Per cent of non-German pupils registered monoglots in for bilingual parish8 instruction

49

10.8

274

52.1

1.6

2.0

63

Reifnitz a W See/Ribnica*

112

SCHIEFLING AM SEE/ ŠKOFIČE

31/53

58.5

NIL 588

141

ŠENTTOMÁŽ /SANKT THOMAS

88.8 91

38.9

33.7 53

35/163

21.5

55 72

TECHELSBERG//TEHOLICA

122

Techelsberg/Teholica

222

Timenitz/Timenica

77

6.5

1.6

Appendix

Radsberg/Radiše

St Thomas am Zeiselberg/ Šenttomaž

F 1959 (March) No. of pupils registered for bilingual instruction/total pupils in school7

134

RADSBERG/RADIŠE

Schiefling am See/Škofiče

D E 1951 1955–6 Per cent of Per cent of non-German Slovenemonoglots in speaking parish5 pupils6

68

POGGERSDORF/POKRČE Poggersdorf/Pokrče

C 1951 No. of non-German monoglots in parish4

136

A POLITICAL DISTRICT

A POLITICAL DISTRICT

B 1951–2 No. of pupils3

Parish1 School catchment2

VIKTRING/VETRINJ

D E 1951 1955–6 Per cent of Per cent of non-German Slovenemonoglots in speaking parish5 pupils6

F 1959 (March) No. of pupils registered for bilingual instruction/total pupils in school7

G H 1959 1961 (March) Per cent of Per cent of non-German pupils registered monoglots in for bilingual parish8 instruction

91

Viktring/Vetrinj

283

Wabelsdorf/Vabnja vas*

52

4.2 1/53

964 108

[Zell-Winkel/Kot]9 UNTERFERLACH

1.9

94.6

94.6 100

86/87

98.9

94

30/30

100

461

47.2

25.5

493

9.4

4.5

562

20,7

Appendix

ZELL OB FERLACH/Sele Kot Zell ob Ferlach/Sele

C 1951 No. of non-German monoglots in parish4

POLITICAL DISTRICT VILLACH LAND ARNOLDSTEIN/ PODKLOŠTER Arnoldstein/Podklošter*

389

WERNBERG/VERNBERK Damtschach/Domačale

164

AUGSDORF/LOGA VAS St Egyden an der Drau/Šentilj EMMERSDORF/SMERČE

949

0.9

10/184

5.4

36/136

26.5

2.6

48.6

154 76

3/329

25.2

3.7

137

B 1951–2 No. of pupils3

Parish1 School catchment2

C 1951 No. of non-German monoglots in parish4

D E 1951 1955–6 Per cent of Per cent of non-German Slovenemonoglots in speaking parish5 pupils6

F 1959 (March) No. of pupils registered for bilingual instruction/total pupils in school7

G H 1959 1961 (March) Per cent of Per cent of non-German pupils registered monoglots in for bilingual parish8 instruction

St Georgen im Gailtal/ Šentjurij*

89

5/92

5.4

Kerschdorf im Gailtal/Črešnje*

23

13/20

65.0

Thörl-Maglern/Rute pri Vratih*

113

5/83

6.0

361

53.9

22.6

Feistritz a.d. Gail/Bistrica na Zilji

91

15/87

17.2

Fürnitz/Brnca*

143

31/165

18.8

Gödersdorf/Vodiča vas*

118

14/117

12.0

HOHENTHURN/STRAJA VAS

272

27.3

18.0

Görriach/Gôrje

52

4/51

7.8

Gottesthal/Skočidol

146

0/132

0

ST JAKOB IM ROSENTAL/ ŠENTJAKOB V ROŽU St Jakob im Rosental/Šentjakob v Rožu

2607 193

62.8

44.3 69/179

38.5

Appendix

FEISTRITZ AN DER GAIL/ BISTRICA NA ZILJI

138

A POLITICAL DISTRICT

A POLITICAL DISTRICT

B 1951–2 No. of pupils3

Parish1 School catchment2

KÖSTENBERG/KOSTANJE Köstenberg/Kostanje

C 1951 No. of non-German monoglots in parish4

450

D E 1951 1955–6 Per cent of Per cent of non-German Slovenemonoglots in speaking parish5 pupils6

1296 174

Mallestig/Malošče

135

LEDENITZEN/LEDINCE

484

5.9 21/151

13.9

21/150

14.0

23/95

24.2

24.9

15.2

38.1

27.7

Ledenitzen/Ledince

124

34/112

30.4

St Leonhard bei Siebenbrünn/ Šentlenart pri Sedmih studencih*

198

24/173

13.9

LIND OB VELDEN/LIPA PRI VRBI Lind ob Velden/Lipa pri Vrbi*

15.8

328

16.9

132

MARIA GAIL/MARIJA NA ZILJI Maria Gail/Marija na Zilji*

201

145

Appendix

Latschach am Faakersee/Loče

G H 1959 1961 (March) Per cent of Per cent of non-German pupils registered monoglots in for bilingual parish8 instruction

40.6

149

FINKENSTEIN/BEKŠTANJ

F 1959 (March) No. of pupils registered for bilingual instruction/total pupils in school7

5.4 15/110

13.6 8.6

18/122

14.8

139

B 1951–2 No. of pupils3

Parish1 School catchment2

St Niklas an der Drau/ Šmiklavž ob Dravi

C 1951 No. of non-German monoglots in parish4

D E 1951 1955–6 Per cent of Per cent of non-German Slovenemonoglots in speaking parish5 pupils6

66

ROSEGG/ROŽEK

F 1959 (March) No. of pupils registered for bilingual instruction/total pupils in school7 2/65

213

G H 1959 1961 (March) Per cent of Per cent of non-German pupils registered monoglots in for bilingual parish8 instruction 3.1

32.4

13.3

108

13/118

11.0

Maria Elend/Podgorje

88

15/97

15.5

Rosenbach/Podrožca

144

20/125

16.0

Saak-Nötsch/Čače-Čajna*

141

1/122

0.8

Velden a. W. See/Vrba *

x

1.3

Appendix

Rosegg/Rožek

VELDEN am WÖRTHER SEE/VRBA

1.2

402

15/313

4.8

POLITICAL DISTRICT VÖLKERMARKT BLEIBURG/PLIBERK Bleiburg/Pliberk

186

15.9

649

46.9

245

DIEX/DJEKŠE

140

A POLITICAL DISTRICT

19.1 26

30/151

19.9 24.3

Diex/Djekše

125

57

11/89

12.4

Grafenbach/Kneža [pri Djekšah]

35

43

1/36

2.8

A POLITICAL DISTRICT

B 1951–2 No. of pupils3

Parish1 School catchment2

EBERNDORF/DOBRLA VAS

2020

Eberndorf/Dobrla vas

216

Edling/Kazaze

102 280

D E 1951 1955–6 Per cent of Per cent of non-German Slovenemonoglots in speaking parish5 pupils6

161

G H 1959 1961 (March) Per cent of Per cent of non-German pupils registered monoglots in for bilingual parish8 instruction

47.8

33.8 68

32/189

16.9

78

27/112

24.1

20.1

279

GALLIZIEN/GALICIJA

F 1959 (March) No. of pupils registered for bilingual instruction/total pupils in school7

20.1 63

73/235

31.1

80.1

11.3

Gallizien/Galicija

104

25

3/98

3.1

Abtei/Apače

23

95

7/19

36.8

Möchling/Mohliče

69

73

4/54

7.4

St Georgen am Weinberg/ Šentjurij na Vinogradih*

55

0

1/43

2.3

GLOBASNITZ/GLOBASNICA Globasnitz/Globasnica

974/978 187

89

1043

34.7

154

GRIFFEN/GREBINJ

Appendix

EISENKAPPEL/ŽELEZNA KAPLA Eisenkappel/Železna Kapla

C 1951 No. of non-German monoglots in parish4

83.7 85

90/136

66.2 8.7

59

46

6/49

12.2

Griffen-Markt/Blato pri Grebinju

325

17

0/258

0

141

Greutschach/Krčanje

B 1951–2 No. of pupils3

Parish1 School catchment2

HAIMBURG/VOVBRE Haimburg/Vovbre

C 1951 No. of non-German monoglots in parish4

D E 1951 1955–6 Per cent of Per cent of non-German Slovenemonoglots in speaking parish5 pupils6

323

19.9

1348

85.8

152

MOOS/BLATO

F 1959 (March) No. of pupils registered for bilingual instruction/total pupils in school7

G H 1959 1961 (March) Per cent of Per cent of non-German pupils registered monoglots in for bilingual parish8 instruction 15.7

26

11/147

7.5 80.9

101

100

62/87

71.3

Rinkenberg/Vogrče

83

77

35/52

67.3

Kömmelgupf/Komeljski Vrh

20

100

25/25

100

304

49.2

26.1

St Kanzian/Škocjan

201

34

35/176

19.9

St Primus im Jauntal/ Šentprimož v Podjuni

97

98

42/98

42.9

Klein St Veit/Mali Šentvid Vìd*

62

0

0/56

0

Kühnsdorf/Sinča vas*

193

12

13/183

7.1

FEISTRITZ OB BLEIBURG/ BISTRICA PRI PLIBERKU St Michael ob Bleiburg/Šmihel pri Pliberku

1690 179

83.6

65.8 83

107/156

68.6

Appendix

Heiligengrab/Božji grob

ST KANZIAN/ŠKOCJAN

142

A POLITICAL DISTRICT

A POLITICAL DISTRICT

B 1951–2 No. of pupils3

Parish1 School catchment2

St Michael a. d. Gurk/Slovenji Šmihel*

C 1951 No. of non-German monoglots in parish4

D E 1951 1955–6 Per cent of Per cent of non-German Slovenemonoglots in speaking parish5 pupils6

NIL 576

G H 1959 1961 (March) Per cent of Per cent of non-German pupils registered monoglots in for bilingual parish8 instruction

2

0/52

0

21.4

11.8

Mittertrixen/Srednje Trušnje

108

14

17/73

23.3

St Margarethen ob Töllerberg/ Šmarjeta pri Velikovcu

83

75

3/55

5.5

91

6/32

18.8 41.4

LEIFLING/LIBELIČE Bach/Potok

762

74.3

50

LOIBACH/LIBUČE

694

Appendix

WAISENBERG/VAŽENBERK

F 1959 (March) No. of pupils registered for bilingual instruction/total pupils in school7

N/A

54.6

46.9

Neuhaus/Suha

59

80

24/58

Oberloibach/Zgornje Libuče

106

72

42/105

40

St Margarethen ob Bleiburg/ Šmarjeta pri Pliberku

35

85

47/47

100

143

B 1951–2 No. of pupils3

Parish1 School catchment2

ST PETER AM WALLERSBERG/ŠENTPETER NA VAŠINJAH

C 1951 No. of non-German monoglots in parish4

898

134

RUDEN/RUDA

797

Ruden/Ruda

F 1959 (March) No. of pupils registered for bilingual instruction/total pupils in school7

G H 1959 1961 (March) Per cent of Per cent of non-German pupils registered monoglots in for bilingual parish8 instruction

63.1

20.2

49

33/140

23.6

107

20

8/93

8.6

Untermitterdorf/Srednja vas

75

38

21/63

33.3

Lippitzbach/Lipica

28

7

3/19

15.8

SITTERSDORF/ŽITARA VAS

32.5

1595

50.8

24.3

84.4

51.9

Sittersdorf/Žitara vas

106

61

24/123

19.5

St Philippen bei Sonnegg/ Šentlipš v Podjuni

87

95

15/70

21.4

SCHWABEGG/ŽVABEK Schwabegg/Žvabek

426 77

91.9*

N/A 95

36/53

67.9

Appendix

St Peter am Wallersberg/ Šentpeter na Vašinjah

D E 1951 1955–6 Per cent of Per cent of non-German Slovenemonoglots in speaking parish5 pupils6

144

A POLITICAL DISTRICT

A POLITICAL DISTRICT

B 1951–2 No. of pupils3

Parish1 School catchment2

TAINACH/TINJE Tainach/Tinje*

C 1951 No. of non-German monoglots in parish4

71

D E 1951 1955–6 Per cent of Per cent of non-German Slovenemonoglots in speaking parish5 pupils6

1381

G H 1959 1961 (March) Per cent of Per cent of non-German pupils registered monoglots in for bilingual parish8 instruction

11.2

140

VELLACH/BELA

F 1959 (March) No. of pupils registered for bilingual instruction/total pupils in school7

6.8 12

9/141

6.4

74.0

60.6

26

85

11/15

73.3

Ebriach/Obirsko

38

100

39/42

92.9

Leppen/Lepena

51

100

50/50

100

Remschenig/Remšenik

11

100

12/15

80.0

VÖLKERMARKT/ VELIKOVEC

287

8.5

Appendix

Bad Vellach/Bela

2.3

Völkermarkt/Velikovec I (Knaben)*

237

8/200

4.0

Völkermarkt/Velikovec II (Mädchen)*

219

9/159

5.7

*  Schools proposed for removal from bilingual instruction under the draft Carinthian law of December 1953.

145

146

Appendix

Notes for Appendix 1 Verordnungsblatt für das Schulwesen in Kärnten 1946, Stück 1, Jänner 1946 etc. (Erlass des Landesschulrates vom 9. November 1945 an die Bezirks- und Stadschulräte betreffend Neugestaltung der zweisprachigen Volksschulen). 2 LSR für Kärnten, Statistik der Schulen des zweisprachigen Gebietes in Kärnten; Stand vom 1. Oktober 1951 (Schuljahr 1951/52), in VGA, Schärf PP, 4/144 (Material zur Kärntner Schulfrage). 3 Ibid. 4 Total parish population minus German monoglots, others and unknowns. Ergebnisse der Volkszählung vom 1. Juni 1951 nach Gemeinden: Kärnten: die sprachliche Gliederung nach den Eintragungen in den Haushaltungsbogen (Vienna: SZA, 1952). 5 Ibid. 6 ‘Amtlich geführten Stand’. Memorandum der Kärntner Slowenen zur Schulfrage, 15 November 1958 (Fischer, Das Slowenische, 207–8). 7 Stand des zweisprachigen Unterrichtes (Gesamtübersicht), Verordnungsblatt für das Schulwesen in Kärnten, March/April 1959 (Klagenfurt, Landeschulrat Kärnten) III/IV, 33–5. 8 Total parish population minus German monoglots, others and unknowns. Die Zusammensetzung der wohnbevölkerung Osterreichs nach allgemeinen demographischen und kulturellen Merkmalen (Volkszählungsergebnisse 1961) (Vienna: SZA, 1964) Heft 13, Table 19. 9 School founded October 1953.

Notes

Introduction Urban Jarnik, Andeutungen über Kärntens Germanisierung: Ein philologischstatistischer Versuch (with a study and notes by Bogo Grafenauer) (Klagenfurt: Drava, 1984), 90. Unless otherwise stated all translations from German are by the author. 2 Lemisch speech to Provincial assembly (Landesversammlung) 25 November 1920, cited by Helmut Rumpler, ‘Die nationale Frage im Spannungsfeld von kärntnerischem Landespatriotismus, österreichischem Staatsbewusstsein und völkischem Nationalismus 1918–1938’, in Kärnten und Wien. Zwischen Staatsidee und Landesbewusstsein, ed. Helmut Rumpler and Claudia Fräss-Ehrfeld (Klagenfurt: Hermagoras and Heyn, 2005), 23–4. 3 Friedrich Rainer, ‘Über die Kärntner Slowenenfrage’ (interrogation report (Vernehmungsniederschrift); Arhiv Republike Slovenije [ARS], 1589, Kraigher PP, Box 10 (folio 49.676). 4 Grafenauer, ‘Jarnik’s “Andeutungen” und ihr Stellenwert in der Forschung zur Germanisierung der Slowenen in Kärnten’, in Andeutungen über Kärntens Germanisierung, ed. Jarnik, 112–13; Theodor Domej, ‘Urban Jarniks Stellung in der slowenischen Sprach- und Kulturgeschichte’, in Urban Jarnik, Romantik, Nationalismus und Panslawismus in Kärnten, ed. Wilhelm Baum (Klagenfurt: Kitab, 2009), 207. In general Miroslav Hroch, Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1992). 5 Jarnik, Andeutungen, 66. 6 For useful surveys see Helmut Rumpler, ‘Forword’, in März 1938 in Kärnten: Fallstudien und Dokumente zum Weg in den ‘Anschluß’, ed. Helmut Rumpler (unter Mitarbeit von Ulfried Burz) (Klagenfurt: Kärntner Druck- und Verlagsgesellschaft, 1989), 7–13; Hellwig Valentin, Susanne Haiden, Barbara Maier ed., Die Kärntner Volksabstimmung 1920 und die Geschichtsforschung: Leistungen, Defizite, Perspektiven (Klagenfurt: Heyn, 2001). 7 For two important exceptions see Theodor Domej, ‘Der Konflikt nach dem Krieg: die Kärntner Slowenen 1945–1949’, in Austria Slovenica Die Kärntner Slowenen und die Nation Österreich, ed. Andreas Moritsch (Klagenfurt: Hermagoras, 1996), 86–165; Svila Tributsch, ‘Der Konflikt um die zweisprachige Schule in Kärnten von 1945 bis 1959’, in Aussiedlung – Verschleppung – nationaler Kampf, ed. Stefan Karner and Andreas Moritsch (Klagenfurt: Hermagoras and Heyn, 2005), 79–97; Robert Knight, 1

148

Notes

‘Schule zwischen Zwang und Verantwortung. Britische Besatzungsmacht, Kärntner Politik und die slowenische Minderheit 1945–1959’, in Österreich unter alliierter Besatzung 1945–1955, ed. Alfred Ableitinger, Siegfried Beer and Eduard Staudinger (Vienna: Böhlau, 1998), 531–58. 8 Alfred Elste and Wilhelm Wadl, Titos Langer Schatten: Bomben- und Geheimdienstterror im Kärnten der 1970er Jahre (Klagenfurt: Verlag des Kärntner Landesarchivs, 2015). 9 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983). 10 Ibid., 110. 11 Robin Okey, The Habsburg Monarchy c.1765–1918. From Enlightenment to Eclipse (London: Palgrave, 2001), 284. 12 Brendan O’Leary, ‘Ernest Gellner’s Diagnoses of Nationalism: A Critical Overview, or, What Is Living and What Is Dead in Ernest Gellner’s Philosophy of Nationalism?’, in The State of the Nation: Ernest Gellner and the Theory of Nationalism, ed. John Hall (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 63. 13 David Ingram, Group Rights: Reconciling Equality and Difference (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000). 14 Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995), 113. 15 Brian Barry, Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 16 Arnold Suppan, Die Österreichischen Volksgruppen: Tendenzen ihrer gesellschaftlichen Entwicklung im 20. Jahrhundert (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1983), 10. 17 James Tully, Strange Multiplicity. Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 190. 18 Mark Mazower, The Nazi Empire: Nazi Rule in Occupied Europe (London: Penguin, 2008); Birth Kundrus, ‘Regime der Differenz: Volkstumspolitische Inklusionen und Exklusionen im Warthegau and im General-gouvernement 1939–1944’ in Volksgemeinschaft. Neue Forschungen zur Gesellschaft des Nationalsozialismus, ed. Frank Bajohr and Michael Wildt (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 2009), 105–22. 19 See Gerald Stourzh, ‘Ethnic Attribution in Late Imperial Austria: Good intentions, Evil Consequences’, in The Habsburg Legacy: National Identity in Historical Perspective, ed. Ritchie Robertson and Edward Timms (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1995), 67–83.The word ‘Bekenntnis’, with its strong religious (Lutheran) overtones is translated variously as ‘confession’ or ‘profession’, but ‘affirmation’ usefully conveys the sense of a declaration made in the public sphere. I am grateful to Felix Schulz on this point. 20 Hannelore Burger, Sprachenrecht und Sprachgerechtigkeit im österreichischen Unterrichtswesen 1867–1918 (Vienna: Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1995), 42–6; Andreas Moritsch, ‘Nationalität und Schule. Überlegungen am Beispiel Kärntens’, in Nationen, Nationalitäten, Minderheiten: Probleme des Nationalismus in Jugoslawien, Ungarn, Rumänien, der Tschechoslowakei, Bulgarien, Polen, der Ukraine, Italien und Österreich 1945–1990, ed. Valeria Heuberger, Othmar Kolar, Arnold Suppan and Elisabeth Vyslonzil (Vienna: Oldenbourg, 1994), 249–58. For a legal discussion see Peter Novak, Der Rechtsschutz der slowenischen Minderheit in Österreich vor dem Hintergrund des neuen völkerrechtlichen Minderheitenschutzes (Klagenfurt: Hermagoras, 2006), 164–9. 21 Okey, Habsburg Monarchy, 287–8. 22 See E. Glyn Lewis, Bilingualism and Bilingual Education (Oxford: Pergamon, 1981), 6–12.

Notes

149

23 Although the terms were often used synonymously the ‘utraquistic’ school is different from the 1945 ‘bilingual’ school system, in which – in principle – both languages have equal status. ‘The bilingual school’ here refers to the 1945 regulation that school instruction in a specific number of primary schools and ‘secondary schools’ (Hauptschulen) in southern Carinthia took place in both German and Slovene (regardless of parental preferences). 24 Rumpler, ‘Nationale Frage’, 23–4. 25 Pieter Judson, Guardians of the Nation. Activists on the Language Frontier of Imperial Austria (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006); Andreas Moritsch ed., Vom Ethnos zur Nationalität. Der nationale Differenzierungsprozeß am Beispiel ausgewählter Orte in Kärnten und im Burgenland (Vienna: Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, 1991), 11–13. 26 Florian Menz, Johanna Lalouschek and Wolfgang Dressler, ‘Der Kampf geht weiter’: Der publizistische Abwehrkampf in Kärntner Zeitungen seit 1918. Eine sprachwissenschaftliche Analyse von Vorurteilen und Feindbildern (Klagenfurt: Drava, 1989). 27 Jeremy King, Budweisers into Czechs and Germans. A Local History of Bohemian Politics, 1848–1948 (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2003); Judson, Guardians; Tara Zahra, Kidnapped Souls. National Indifference and the Battle for Children in the Bohemian Lands 1900–1948 (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 2008). 28 See Stourzh, ‘The Ethnicizing of Politics and “National Indifference” in Late Imperial Austria’, in Stourzh, Der Umfang der österreichischen Geschichte. Ausgewählte Studien 1990–2010 (Vienna: Böhlau, 2011), 283–323. 29 On the ‘Windish’ (placed in inverted commas throughout) see i.a. Suppan, Volksgruppen, 165–6; Ralf Unkart, Gerold Glantschnig and Alfred Ogris, Zur Lage der Slowenen in Kärnten. Die slowenische Volksgruppe und die Wahlkreiseinteilung – eine Dokumentation (Klagenfurt: Verlag des Kärntner Landesarchivs, 1984), 41ff; Andreas Moritsch, ‘Das Windische – eine Nationale Hilfsideologie’, in Problemfelder der Geschichte und Geschichtsschreibung der Kärntner Slowenen/Problemska Polja zgodovine in zgodovinopisja Koroških Slovencev, ed. Moritsch (Klagenfurt: Hermagoras, 1995), 15–39; Tom Priestly, ‘Denial of Ethnic Identity: The Political Manipulation of Beliefs about Language in Slovene Minority Areas of Austria and Hungary’, Slavic Review 55, no. 2 (Summer 1996): 364–98; Klaus Ottomeyer, Ein Brief an Sieglinde Tschabuschnig: Kriegsfolgen, Vergangenheitsbewältigung und Minderheitenkonflikt am Beispiel Kärnten (Klagenfurt: Drava 1988). 30 Dietmar Larcher, ‘Soziogenese der Urangst’, in Klaus-Börge Boeckmann et al., Zweisprachigkeit und Identität (Klagenfurt: Drava, 1988), 47–63; Ottomeyer, Brief. 31 Martin Wutte, Deutsch – Windisch – Slowenisch (Klagenfurt: Kärntner Heimatbund, 1927).

Chapter 1 1

On the Carinthian Slovenes in the monarchy see Janko Pleterski, Slowenisch oder deutsch? Nationale Differenzierungsprozesse in Kärnten (1848–1914) (Klagenfurt: Drava, 1996), 184–7; Suppan, Volksgruppen, 137 ff; Andreas Moritsch, ‘Nationale Ideologien in Kärnten’, in Kärntner Slowenen/Koroški Slovenci 1900–2000, ed. Moritsch (Klagenfurt: Hermagoras, 2000), 17–18.

150

Notes

2 Slomšek (from German translation) in Moritsch, ibid., 13. 3 Burger, Sprachenrecht, 28; Okey, Habsburg Monarchy, 289. 4 Berta Luschin, ‘Pfarrer Stefan Singer und “die Kirschblütenzeit der slowenischnationalen Bewegung” am Vorabend des Ersten Weltkrieges’, in Eliten und Nationwerdung. Die Rolle der Eliten bei der Nationalisierung der Kärntner Slovenen/ Vloga elit pri narodovanju Koroških Slovencev, ed. Tina Bahovec (Klagenfurt: Hermagoras, 2002), 300–14. 5 Okey, Habsburg Monarchy, 283–4. 6 Pleterski, Slowenisch oder deutsch? 146; see also Hanns Haas and Karl Stuhlpfarrer, Österreich und seine Slowenen (Vienna: Löcker and Wögenstein, 1977), 16. 7 Julia Schmid, Kampf um das Deutschtum: Radikaler Nationalismus in Österreich und dem Deutschen Reich 1890–1914 (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2009), 90–2. 8 Wilhelm Wadl, ‘Zur Entwicklung des Nationalitätenkonfliktes bis zum Jahre 1918 – historische Voraussetzungen’, in Der 10. Oktober 1920: Vorgeschichte – Ereignisse – Analysen, ed. Alfred Ogris (Klagenfurt: Verlag des Kärntner Landesarchivs, 1990), 15–16. 9 See Robert Kann, A History of the Habsburg Empire 1526–1918 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), 338–42. 10 Rumpler, ‘Nationale Frage’, 11; Schmid, Kampf, 16. Werner Drobesch, Vereine und Verbände in Kärnten (1848–1938): Vom Gemeinnützig-Geselligen zur Ideologisierung der Massen (Klagenfurt: Geschichtsverein für Kärnten, 1991). 11 Suppan, Volksgruppen, 42–4; Schmid, Kampf, 88–9; Eduard Staudinger, ‘Die Südmark. Aspekte der Programmatik und Struktur eines deutschen Schutzvereins in der Steiermark bis 1914’, in Geschichte der Deutschen im Bereich des heutigen Slowenien 1848–1941/Zgodovina Nemcev na območju današnje Slovenije 1848–1941, ed. Helmut Rumpler and Arnold Suppan (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1988), 139. Robert Chickering, We Men Who Feel Most German: A Cultural Study of the Pan-German League, 1886–1914 (Boston: George Allen and Unwin, 1984). 12 Moritsch, ‘Nationale Ideologien in Kärnten’, 19–20. 13 Rumpler, ‘Nationale Frage’, 10–16. 14 See Hans-Dietrich Kahl, ‘Der Mythos vom Zollfeld/Gosposvetsko polje’, in Karantanien Ostarrichi – 1001 Mythos, ed. Andreas Moritsch (Klagenfurt: Hermagoras, 1997), 51–92; also Annette Kehnel, ‘The Power of Weakness: Machiavelli Revisited’, Bulletin of the German Historical Institute London 33, no. 2 (2011): 3–34. 15 See Alfred Ogris, ‘Zur Geschichte der Kärntner Ortsnamenforschung’, Österreich in Geschichte und Literatur 20, no. 2 (1976): 81–92. 16 Cited by Thedodor Domej, ‘Schule und Lehrerschaft bei der Nationalisierung der Kärntner Slowenen’, in Eliten und Nationwerdung, 110–11. On German school lobbies see Bernhard Perchinig, ‘Wir sind Kärntner und damit hat sich’s …’ Deutschnationalismus und politische Kultur in Kärnten (Klagenfurt: Drava, 1989), 65 ff; Werner Drobesch, ‘Der Deutsche Schulverein, 1880–1914’, Geschichte und Gegenwart 12, no. 4 (1993): 195–212; Staudinger, ‘Südmark’, 131–54; Burger, Sprachenrecht, 25–36; Judson, Guardians, 43–4; Janko Pleterski, ‘Die Slowenen’, in Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848–1918, ed. Adam Wandruszka and Peter Urbanitsch (Vienna: Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1980), 818. 17 See Luschin, ‘Pfarrer Stefan Singer’, 265–320. 18 Judson, Guardians, 27; Emil Brix, Die Umgangsprachen in Altösterreich zwischen Agitation und Assimilation (Vienna: Böhlau, 1982), 13–17; Pleterski, Slowenisch oder Deutsch? 324–6, 414–15. Wolfgang Göderle, Zensus und Ethnizität: Zur Herstellung

Notes

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von Wissen über soziale Wirklichkeiten im Habsburgerreich zwischen 1848 und 1910 (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2016). 19 See Emil Brix, ‘Die zahlenmässige Präsenz des Deutschtums in den südslawischen Kronländern Cisleithaniens 1848–1918. Probleme der Nationalitaätenstatistik’, in Geschichte der Deutschen, ed. Rumpler, 43–62; Dominique Arel, ‘Language Categories in Censuses: Backward- or Forward-Looking?’ in Census and Identity: The Politics of Race, Ethnicity and Language in National Censuses, ed. David Ketzer and Dominique Arel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 101. 20 Suppan,Volksgruppen: 42–3 (1920 boundaries). 21 Zahra, Kidnapped Souls. For school politics in Carinthia see Albert Reiterer, Doktor und Bauer, Ethnischer Konflikt und sozialer Wandel. Die Sozialstruktur der slowenischen Minderheit in Kärnten (Klagenfurt: Drava, 1986), 14; Suppan, Volksgruppen, 141; Maria Kurz, Zur Lage der Slowenen in Kärnten. Der Streit um die Volksschule in Kärnten (1867–1914) (Klagenfurt: Kärntner Geschichtsverein, 1990), 97; Domej, ‘Schule’, 109–11. 22 Cited by Domej, ‘Schule und Lehrerschaft’, 97. 23 Josef Till, ‘Kirche und Geistlichkeit als Faktoren der “Nationalisierung”’, in Eliten und Nationwerdung, 176; Pleterski, Slowenisch oder Deutsch?, 384; Moritsch, ‘Nationale Ideologien in Kärnten’, 9–28; Drobesch, Vereine und Verbände, 34–8. 24 Haas and Stuhlpfarrer, Österreich und seine Slowenen, 20–4; in general Kann, Habsburg Empire, 338–42. 25 Burger, Sprachenrecht, 62–3, 100, 124; Gerald Stourzh, ‘Die Gleichberechtigung der Volksstämme als Verfassungsprinzip 1848–1918’, in Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848– 1918: Die Völker des Reiches, ed. Adam Wandruszka and Peter Urbanitsch (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1985), 1,147; Haas and Stuhlpfarrer, Österreich und seine Slowenen, 14, 16–24. Moritsch, ‘Nationalität und Schule’, 250–2; Haas and Stuhlpfarrer, Österreich und seine Slowenen, 17–24; Domej, Schule, 85–116, esp. 102–8; Theodor Domej, ‘Das Schulwesen für die Bevölkerung Südostkärntens’, in Kärntner Slovenen/Koroški Slovenci’ 1900–2000, ed. Andreas Moritsch (Klagenfurt: Hermagoras, 2000), 32; Kurz, Lage. 26 Stourzh, ‘Gleichberechtigung’; Burger, Sprachenrecht, 78–9; Okey, Habsburg Monarchy, 200. 27 Burger, Sprachenrecht, 124. 28 Pleterski, Slowenisch oder Deutsch?, 380–1; Suppan, Volksgruppen, 138–41; Perchinig, Wir sind Kärntner, 39 ff. 29 Freie Stimmen, 15 April 1911, cited in Pleterski, Slowenisch oder Deutsch?, 425. 30 Pleterski, Slowenisch oder Deutsch?, 386–7. 31 Ibid., 455. 32 Judson, Guardians, 5. 33 Janko Brejc, Aus dem Wilajet Kärntens (Klagenfurt: Katholisch-politischer und landwirtschaftlicher Verein für die Slowenen in Kärnten/Katoliško-politično in gospodarsko društvo za Slovence na Koroškem, 1913). 34 Moritsch, ‘Das Windische’, 24. 35 Haas and Stuhlfparrer, Österreich und seine Slowenen, 23ff; Arnold Suppan, Jugoslawien und Österreich 1918–1938: Bilaterale Aussenpolitik im europäischen Umfeld (Vienna: Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, 1996), 933–4; Martin Moll, ‘Vom Mitbürger zum Staatsfeind. Die Behandlung der Kärntner und Steierischen Slovenen im Ersten Weltkrieg’ in Die Kärntner Volksabstimmung 1920 und die Geschichtsschreibung, ed. Valentin, Heiden and Maier, 284.

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36 Pleterski, ‘Die Slowenen’, 817; Suppan, Volksgruppen, 142. 37 Wadl, ‘10. Oktober’, 22; Rumpler, ‘Nationale Frage’, 13–14. 38 Hanns Haas, ‘Die Rechtliche Lage der Slowenischen Volksgruppe Kärntens nach Saint-Germain’, in Kärnten: Volksabstimmung 1920, 178–9; Novak, Rechtschutz, 164–9. 39 For historiography see i.a. Helmut Rumpler, ed., Kärntens Volksabstimmung 1920. Wissenschaftliche Kontroversen und historisch-politische Diskussionen anläßlich des internationalen Symposions (Klagenfurt: Kärntner Druck- und Verlagsgesellschaft, 1980); Valentin, Haiden and Maier, Die Kärntner Volksabstimmung. 40 See Tom Gullberg, State, Territory and Identity. The Principle of National SelfDetermination, the Question of territorial Sovereignty in Carinthia and Other PostHabsburg Territories after the First World War (Turku: Åbo Akademi University Press 2006). 41 Brejc cited in Suppan, Österreich und Jugoslawien, 492. 42 Populated by 114,000 German and 82,000 Slovene speakers (Suppan, ‘Kärntner Volksabstimmung’, 104). 43 Rumpler, ‘Nationale Frage’, 12; Hellwig Valentin, Nationalismus oder Internationalismus? Arbeiterschaft und nationale Frage mit besonderer Berücksichtigung Kärntens 1918–1934 (Klagenfurt: Verlag des Geschichtsvereines für Kärnten, 2000), 70–6. 44 Based on the 1910 census there were about 49,000 Slovene-speakers and 22,800 German-speakers; see Wadl. Three border areas – the Miess valley, Mießtal, Miestal/ Mežiška Dolina, Seeland/Jezersko and the Kanaltal/Kanalska dolina (including Tarvis/Tarvisio/Trbiž) – were not included in the plebiscite area, the first two having been ceded to Yugoslavia, the last to Italy. This amounted to 8 per cent of the province’s territory and about 6 per cent of its population. See Ulfried Burz, ‘Historiographische Bruchlinien zwischen Wien und Kärnten. -Dokumente zur “Abwehrkampf ”’, in Die Kärntner Volksabstimmung 1920 und die Geschichtsforschung, ed. Valentin, Haiden and Maier, 113–50. 45 Dirk Hänisch and Heidi Wilscher, ‘Wahlverhalten der Volksgruppen in Kärnten 1907–1945’, in Nationale Frage und Öffentlichkeit, ed. Werner Drobesch and Augustin Malle (Klagenfurt: Hermagoras and Heyn, 2005) 97–103, estimate that 13,500 Slovene monoglots voted for Yugoslavia while 12,900 either voted to stay with Austria, failed to vote or cast invalid votes. 46 Hänisch and Wilscher, ibid., estimate that in the 1911 elections ‘non-voters’ amounted to a third of the Carinthian electorate and over 25 per cent in Slovene strongholds. 47 Wadl, ‘Kärntner Volksabstimmung’, 178–9 (table 2); Suppan, Jugoslawien und Österreich, 603, 639. 48 Klagenfurt Police report (14 December 1918) cited by Burz, ‘Historiographische Bruchlinien’, 120. 49 Cited by Rumpler, ‘Nationale Frage’, 23–4. 50 Text in Suppan, Österreich und Jugoslawien, 635; see Alfred Ogris, ‘Kärntens Tag’, 54, 112 (facsimiles); Rumpler, ‘Nationale Frage’, 23–4; Haas and Stuhlpfarrer, Österreich und seine Slowenen, 49. 51 See i.a. Kärnten – Volksabstimmung – 1920 (Vienna: Löcker, 1981); Rumpler, Kärntens Volksabstimmung 1920. 52 For a German Carinthian interpretation see Neumann, Abwehrkampf und Volksabstimmung in Kärnten 1918–1920 (Klagenfurt: Verlag des Kärntner Landesarchivs, 1970), 17–37; for critical views see Hanns Haas, ‘Die Wiener

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Regierung und die Frage Kärnten 1918–1920’, in Kärnten – Volksabstimmung – 1920 29–56; Suppan, Jugoslawien und Österreich, 620; Hellwig Valentin, ‘Kärnten 1918– 1920: von Wien in Stich gelassen?’, Carinthia I 189 (1999): 449–80. 53 Rumpler, ‘Nationale Frage’, 15. 54 Ulfried Burz, Die nationalsozialistische Bewegung in Kärnten (1918–1933): vom Deutschnationalismus zum Führerprinzip (Klagenfurt: Kärntner Landesarchiv, 1998), 51–2. 55 Suppan, Volksgruppen, 149 f; Suppan, Österreich und Jugoslawien, 1229; and Karl Stuhlpfarrer, ‘Deutsche Volkstumspolitik in Kärnten nach der Volksabstimmung’, in Kärnten – Volksabstimmung – 1920. Wissenschaftliche Kontroversen und historischpolitische Diskussionen anläßlich des internationalen Symposions Klagenfurt 1980, ed. Helmut Rumpler (Klagenfurt: Kärntner Druck- und Verlagsgesellschaft, 1981), 326–35; Karl Stuhlpfarrer, ‘Volksabstimmungsfeiern und Geschichtsbild’, in Kärnten – Volksabstimmung 1920, 13–25; Hans Haas, ‘Fortschritt und Deutschtum. Kärntner Sozialdemokratische Slowenenpolitik in der Ersten Republik’ in Bewegung und Klasse, ed. Gerhard Botz, Hans Hautmann and Helmut Konrad (Vienna: Europaverlag, 1978), 315. 56 Haas and Stuhlpfarrer (Österreich und seine Slowenen, 41) and Theodor Domej (‘Schule und Lehrerschaft’, 111–13) stress the coercion this involved, while Alfred Ogris places more weight on voluntary motives (‘Kärnten 1918–1920: Bilanz der wissenschaftlichen Diskussion zwischen zwei Jubiläen 1970–1980’, in Kärntens Volksabstimmung, 392–7); Suppan (Österreich und Jugoslawien, 751) includes both. 57 Burz, Die Nationalsozialistische Bewegung, 55. 58 Thomas Barker, The Slovene Minority of Carinthia. New York: Columbia University Press, 1984, 175–6; Rumpler, ‘Nationale Frage’, 23–4. 59 Haas and Stuhlpfarrer, Österreich und seine Slowenen, 42. 60 See Robert Kluger, ‘Politische Gedenktage und die Kärntner Presse (1918–1945)’, in Politische Festtagskultur in Kärnten: Einheit ohne Einigkeit?, ed. Ulfried Burz and Heinz-Dieter Pohl (Klagenfurt: Hermagoras and Heyn, 2005), 27–8. 61 Hans Lagger, ed., Abwehrkampf und Volksabstimmung in Kärnten 1918–1920 (Klagenfurt: Verlag der sozialistischen Landesparteileitung Kärntens, 1930), 5–6. Valentin, Nationalismus, 110, 175; Kluger, ‘Politische Gedenktage’. 62 On another controversial figure, the writer Joseph Perkonig, see Klaus Amann, ‘Der “Wort-Führer” Kärntens’. Josef Friedrich Perkonig, und der “Anschluß”, in Rumpler, März 1938, 32–55; Rumpler, ‘Landespatriotismus’, 72. 63 Cited by Kluger, ‘Politische Gedenktage’, 32. 64 Martin Wutte, Kärntens Freiheitskampf, 1918–1920 (verbesserter Neudruck der zweiten umgearbeiteten und vermehrten Auflage von 1943) (Klagenfurt: Verlag des Geschichtsvereins für Kärnten, 1985), 7; see Michael Fahlbusch, Wissenschaft im Dienst der nationalsozialistischen Politik? Die ‘Volksdeutschen Forschungsgemeinschaften’ von 1931–1945 (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1999); Ulfried Burz, ‘Martin Wutte (1876–1948). Ein Kärntner Historiker und die Janusköpfigkeit in der nationalen Frage’, in Österreichische Historiker. Lebensläufe und Karrieren 1900–1945, vol. 2, ed. Karel Hruza (Vienna: Böhlau, 2012), 201–61. 65 Martin Wutte and Oskar Lobmeyr, Die Lage der Minderheiten in Kärnten und in Slowenien (Klagenfurt: Kollitsch, 1926), 5–6; Rumpler, ‘Nationale Frage’, 18–19, 40. 66 On the 1923 census see Gudrun Exner, Josef Kytir and Alexander Pinwinkler, eds, Bevölkerungswissenschaft in Österreich in der Zwischenkriegszeit (1918–1938): Personen, Institutionen, Diskurse (Vienna: Böhlau, 2004), 170–2.

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67 Martin Wutte, ‘Die Sprachlichen Verhältnisse in Kärnten nach der Volkszählung von 1923 mit 1 Karte’, Carinthia I 114 (1923): 87–100; Haas and Stuhlpfarrer, Österreich und seine Slowenen, 50; Martin Fritzl, ‘Für Volk und Reich und Deutsche Kultur … Die ‘Kärntner Wissenschaft’ im Dienste des Nationalismus (Klagenfurt: Drava, 1992), 54. 68 Wutte and Lobmeyr, Lage, 20. On the Yugoslav census see Mitja Ferenc and Božo Repe, ‘Die deutsche Minderheit in Slowenien in der Zwischenkriegszeit’, in Slovensko-avstrijski odnosi v 20. stoletju/Slowenische-österreichische Beziehungen im 20. Jahrhundert, ed. Dušan Nećak, Boris Jesih, Božo Repe, Ksenija Škrilec and Peter Vodopivec (Ljubljana: Oddelek za zgodovino Filozofske Fakultete, 2004), 163–4. 69 Moritsch, ‘Nationale Ideologien in Kärnten’, 21–5; Priestly, ‘Denial’, 393; Haas and Stuhlpfarrer, Österreich und seine Slowenen, 50–1. 70 The six were: (1) common territory and state, (2) identity position in the present and Lebensgemeinschaft, (3) common descent (gemeinsame Abstammung), (4) shared historical past, (5) shared culture and (6) shared religion. 71 Wutte, Deutsch – Windisch – Slowenisch, 8–9; Rumpler, ‘Landespatriotismus’, 41–3. See also Christian Promitzer, ‘The South Slavs in the Austrian Imagination’, in Creating the Other. Ethnic Conflict and Nationalism in Habsburg Central Europe, ed. Nancy Wingfield (New York: Berghahn 2003), 183–215. 72 Elste and Hänisch, Kontinuität, 174 (table 3.1). 73 Speech 9 July 1921 cited in Rumpler, ‘Nationale Frage’, 28. 74 Valentin, Nationalismus, 243–76; also Pleterski, Slowenisch oder Deutsch?, 402, 468; Suppan, Volksgruppen, 142. 75 Valentin, Nationalismus, 329–55. 76 On §3 of the proposal see Valentin Einspieler, Verhandlungen über die der slowenischen Minderheit angebotene Kulturautonomie 1925–1930. Beitrag zur Geschichte der Slowenen in Kärnten (Klagenfurt: Verlag des Geschichtsvereines für Kärnten, 1976), 107–31; Haas and Stuhlpfarrer, Österreich und seine Slowenen, 53–66; Rumpler, ‘Nationale Frage’, 40–1. 77 Andreas Moritsch, ‘Deutschkärntnerische Großmut: das Angebot einer Kulturomie an die Kärntner Slowenen (1925–1930)’, in Kärntner Jahrbuch für Politik (Klagenfurt: Hermagoras, 1996), 125–43. 78 Suppan, Österreich und Jugoslawien, 250, 831 ff; 991–2; Haas and Stuhlpfarrer, Österreich und seine Slowenen, 64. 79 Einspieler, Verhandlungen, 129, 139–40. 80 Hänisch and Wilscher (Wahlverhalten, 132, table A1) estimate that 27.8 per cent of Slovene-speaking voters supported the social democratic SDAP while 29.9 per cent voted Christian Socials. 81 See Tina Bahovec, ‘Die Kärntner Slovenen 1930–1941’, in Die Kärntner Slovenen 1900–2000. Bilanz des 20. Jahrhunderts, ed. Andreas Moritsch (Klagenfurt: Hermagoras, 2000), 235–62, 238–9; Wilhelm Wadl, ‘Beiträge zur Geschichte der Christlich-sozialen Partei in Kärnten’, Carinthia I 181, (1991): 400. 82 Valentin, Nationalismus, 355; Suppan, Österreich und Jugoslawien, 866. 83 Karel Smolle, ‘Die Kärntner Slowenen und die österreichischen politischen Parteien’, in Kärntner Slowenen, ed. Moritsch, 216–18; Suppan, Jugoslawien, 758. 84 Hänisch and Wilscher, ‘Wahlverhalten’, 113, 119–20. 85 Bahovec, ‘Kärntner Slovenen’, 243, note 29. 86 Haas and Stuhlpfarrer, Österreich und seine Slowenen, 42–4; Haas, ‘Rechtliche Lage’, 181; Suppan, Österreich und Jugoslawien, 758–9, 831–9; Domej, ‘Schule’, 111–13. 87 Wadl, ‘Beiträge’, 400.

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88 Rumpler, ‘Nationale Frage’, 26–39. 89 Burz, Nationalsozialistische Bewegung, 62, 115–32. 90 Rumpler, ‘Vorwort’, März 1938. 91 Dirk Hänisch. ‘Politische Herkunft und Sozialprofil Nationalsozialistischer Wähler in Kärnten 1923 bis 1932’, in Auf dem Weg zur Macht: Beiträge zur Geschichte der NSDAP in Kärnten von 1918 bis 1938, ed. Alfred Elste and Dirk Hänisch (Vienna: Braumüller, 1997), 130–3. 92 Ulfried Burz, ‘Der Wille der Lehrerschaft ist der Wille des Volkes’. ‘Bildungspolitische Zielsetzungen und Aktivitäten der nationalsozialistischen Bewegung in Kärnten’, in Zur Geschichte des österreichischen Bildungswesens. Probleme und Perspektiven der Forschung, ed. Elmar Lechner, Helmut Rumpler and Herbert Zdarzil (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1992), 414. 93 Rumpler, ‘Nationale Frage’, 59, 70; see Dušan Nećak, Die österreichische Legion II. Nationalsozialistische Flüchtlinge in Jugoslawien nach dem mißlungenen Putsch vom 25. Juli 1934 (Vienna: Böhlau, 1996); Elste, ‘Illegale NSDAP’, 269–83; Hans Schafranek, Sommerfest mit Preisschiessen. Die unbekannte Geschichte des NS-Putsches im Juli 1934 (Vienna: Czernin, 2006); Christian Klösch, Des Führers heimliche Vasallen: Die Putschisten des Juli 1934 im Kärntner Lavanttal (Vienna: Czernin, 2007). 94 Burz, ‘Wille’, 498–514. 95 See Radomir Luža, Austro-German Relations in the Anschluss Era (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), 29–31, 34–5; Maurice Williams, For Gau, Volk and Reich, Friedrich Rainer and the Paradox of National Socialism (Klagenfurt: Verlag des Geschichtsvereines für Kärnten, 2005); Siegfried J. Pucher, ‘… in der Bewegung füwhrend tätig’. Odilo Globocnik. Kämpfer für den ‘Anschluß’. Vollstrecker des Holocaust (Klagenfurt: Drava, 1997); Bertrand Perz, ‘The Austrian Connection: SS and Police Leader Odilo Globocnik and his Staff in the Lublin District’, Holocaust and Genocide Studies 29 (2015): 400–30. 96 See Helmut Rumpler, ‘Der nationale Dammbruch nach dem Juliabkommen des Jahres 1936’, in März 1938, ed. Rumpler, 81–96. 97 See Rudolf Freisitzer, ‘Der Beginn des NS-Terrors’, in März 1938, ed. Rumpler, 212–46 and Ulfried Burz, ‘Die Machtergreifung durch die NSDAP in Kärnten’, in ibid., 81–96. 98 See Alfred Ogris, ‘Anschlußideen in Kärnten während der Zwischenkriegszeit (1918– 1938)’, in Das Jahr 1938 in Kärnten und seine Vorgeschichte. Ereignisse – Dokumente – Bilder, ed. Wilhelm Wadl and Alfred Ogris (Klagenfurt: Verlag des Kärntner Landesarchivs, 1988), 28, note 62. 99 Rumpler, ‘Nationale Frage’, 23; Wutte and Lobmeyr, Lage, 10; Janez Stergar, ‘Der Klub der Kärntner Slowenen in Ljubljana’, in Kärnten und Slowenien – ‘Dickicht und Pfade’, ed. Stefan Karner and Janez Stergar (Klagenfurt: Hermagoras and Heyn , 2005), 329–35. 100 See Rumpler, ‘Nationale Frage’, 62. 101 Suppan, Österreich und Jugoslawien, 423–4; Nećak, Die österreichische Legion II. 102 Slowenischer Kulturverband [Valentin Podgorc], Die Kärntner Slowenen in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart. Grundsätzliches zur Minderheitenfrage (Klagenfurt, Selbstverlag des: Slowenischen Kultur-Verbandes, 1937). 103 From 10.1 per cent to 6.6 per cent of the population of the province. See Suppan, Volksgruppen, 18, 48, 163–8; Suppan, Österreich und Jugoslawien, 683, 798–800, 809– 12; Tom Priestly, ‘The Slovene Minority Population in Carinthia and Styria in 1927: Some New Data’, Österreichische Osthefte 39 (1997): 263–78; Haas and Stuhlpfarrer, Österreich und seine Slowenen, 67.

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104 Bahovec, ‘Kärntner Slovenen’, 247–8. 105 Theodor Veiter, Die Slowenische Volksgruppe in Kärnten. Geschichte, Rechtslage, Problemstellung (Vienna: Reinhold, 1936), 169. 106 Suppan, Österreich und Jugoslawien, 881–2. 107 Rumpler, ‘Der nationale Dammbruch nach dem Juliabkommen des Jahres 1936’, 81–96 and Ulfried Burz, ‘Die Machtergreifung’, in März 1938, 14–31. 108 Stuhlpfarrer, ‘Volksabstimmungsfeiern’, 16; Armin Wallas, ‘Großdeutsche Hoffnungen: Die Berichterstattung der Freien Stimmen 1938’, in März 1938 in Kärnten, ed. Rumpler, 57, 80; Kluger, ‘Politische Gedenktage’, 28, 61–64. 109 Cited in Wadl, ‘Volksbefragung’, 77–8. 110 Wilhelm Wadl, “Volksbefragung”, nationalsozialistische Machtergreifung, Anschluß und “Volksabstimmung” in ‘Kärnten’, in Das Jahr 1938 in Karnten, ed. Wilhelm Wadl and Alfred Ogris, 41–62. Gerhard Botz, Die Eingliederung Osterreichs in das Deutsche Reich. Planung und Verwirklichung des politisch-administrativen Anschlusses (1938 -1940) (Vienna: Europa, 1988); Erwin Schmidl, Marz 1938. Der deutsche Einmarsch in Österreich, 3rd edn (Vienna: Bernard and Graefe, 1987), 117–19. 111 Wadl, ‘Volksbefragung’, 41–87. 112 Klösch, Heimliche Vasallen, 172–80. 113 Rumpler and Burz, März 1938, 294–329; Hurdes was released in April 1939 but rearrested in September 1944 and sent to Mauthausen. Ferdinand Graf and Alois Karisch were also arrested. Wilhelm Wadl and Alfred Ogris (Das Jahr 1938 in Kärnten, 69–72, 396) estimate that 400 people were arrested after 11 March. 114 Ogris and Wadl, Das Jahr 1938, 78, 219 f. 115 Maier-Kaibitsch report to Seyss-Inquart (27 December 1937) cited in Rumpler, ‘Dammbruch,’ 267–70. 116 Haas and Stuhlpfarrer, Österreich und seine Slowenen, 80; 117 Maier-Kaibitsch, ‘Bedeutsame Erklärungen zur Slowenenfrage’, in Ogris and Wadl, Das Jahr 1938, 221 (facsimile). Haas and Stuhlpfarrer, Österreich und seine Slowenen, 78; see Valentin Sima, ‘Die Kärntner Slowenen unter nationalsozialistischer Herrschaft. Vom “Anschluss” zur Aussiedlung’, in NS-Herrschaft in Österreich 1938–1945, ed. Emmerich Tálos, Ernst Hanisch and Wolfgang Neugebauer (Vienna: Verlag für Gesellschaftskritik, 1988), 363–8; Ogris, ‘Anschlussideen’, 37–9; Petek’s account (German tr.) in Wadl and Ogris, Das Jahr 1938, 364–75. 118 Koroški Slovenec, 30 March 1938, Slovene appeal signed by Tischler and Petek (facsimile with German translation) in Ogris and Wadl, Das Jahr 1938, 399–401; Petek and Tischler to Bürckel, 2 May 1938, cited by Haas and Stuhlpfarrer, Österreich und seine Slowenen, 77. 119 Michael Burleigh and Wolfgang Wippermann, The Racial State, Germany 1933–1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); John Connelly, ‘Nazis and Slavs: From Racial Theory to Racist Practice’, Central European History 32, no. 1 (1999): 1–34; Mazower, The Nazi Empire, chap. 7. 120 Wadl, ‘Volksbefragung’, 86–7; Theodor Domej, ‘Das erste Jahr der Kärntner Slowenen unter dem Hakenkreuz’, in Der ‘Anschluss’ und die Minderheiten in Österreich/‘Anšlus’ in manjšine v Avstriji, ed. Avguštin Malle and Valentin Sima (Klagenfurt: Drava, 1989), 66–88. 121 Kutschera to Bürckel, 2 May 1938 cited in Haas and Stuhlpfarrer, Österreich und seine Slowenen, 77. 122 Haas and Stuhlpfarrer, Österreich und seine Slowenen, 80.

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123 Ibid., 78; Theodor Veiter, Das Recht der Volksgruppen und Sprachminderheiten in Österreich (Vienna: Braumüller, 1970), 307. Tischler to Upper Provincial Court (Oberlandesgericht) Graz, 30 May 1946, AINV, OMV, Box 21. 124 Rumpler and Burz, März 1938, 304. 125 Haas and Stuhlpfarrer, Österreich und seine Slowenen, 83. 126 Avguštin Malle, ‘Verfolgung, Ausweisung, Versetzung. Zur Situation der slowenischen Priester in Kärnten während des Nationalsozialismus’, in Österreichs Kirche und Widerstand 1938–45, ed. Jan Mikrut (Vienna: Dom, 2000), 171–207, 197; Sima, ‘Kärntner Slovenen’, 364–7; see also the post-war report in Peter Tropper, Kirche in Gau: Dokumente zur Situation der katholischen Kirche in Kärnten von 1938 bis 1945 (Klagenfurt: Carinthia, 1995), 41–6. 127 Avguštin Malle, Alfred Elste, Brigitte Entner, Boris Jesih, Valentin Sima and Heidi Wilscher, Vermögensentzug, Rückstellung und Entschädigung am Beispiel von Angehörigen der slowenischen Minderheit, ihrer Verbände und Organisation (Munich: Oldenburg, 2004), 341–52. 128 See Haas and Stuhlpfarrer, Österreich und seine Slowenen, 81; Suppan, Volksgruppen, 173, 361–79, espec. 374–6; Domej, ‘Das erste Jahr’; Avguštin Malle, ‘Koroški Slovenci in Katoliška Cerkev v času nacisma’, in Narodu in državi sovražni: Pregon Koroških Slovencev 1942/Volks- und staatsfeindlich: Die Vertreibung von Kärntner Slowenen 1942, ed. Malle and Valentin Sima (Klagenfurt: Drava and Hermagoras, 1992), 85–132. 129 Veiter, Recht, 345 ff; the figure is aggregated from 14,088 Slovene monoglots, 8,305 Windish monoglots, 13,173 speakers of German and Windish and 7,613 speakers of German and Slovene. 130 Wadl, ‘Volksbefragung’, 87. 131 See Theodor Domej, ‘O ponemčevanju južne Koroške za časa nacizma in odmevninah (1938–1942)’, in Narodu, 210–31, esp. 230–1; Sima, Vertreibung, 141–2. 132 See Narodu, 417–72. 133 See Stefan Karner, ‘“… Des Reiches Südmark”. Kärnten und Steiermark’, in NSHerrschaft in Österreich, 457–86; Karner, Kärntens Wirtschaft 1938–1945. Unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Rüstungsindustrie (Afterword by Albert Speer) (Klagenfurt: Magistrat, 1976), 265 ff. 134 Meldt report to Reich Justice Minister, 8 June 1940, in NS-Justiz in Österreich: Lageund Reiseberichte 1938–1945, ed. Wolfgang Form and Oliver Uthe (Münster: Lit, 2004), 121. 135 See Gerhard Jagschitz, ‘Von der “Bewegung”’ zum Apparat: Zur Phänomenologie der NSDAP 1938 bis 1945’, in NS-Herrschaft, 487–516, for figures up to May 1943 (34,699). 136 Burz, ‘Wutte’, 240–61. 137 See Fahlbusch, Wissenschaft, 149, 152, 331–7; Willi Oberkrome, ‘Geschichte, Volk und Theorie. Das “Handwörterbuch des Grenz- und Auslanddeutschtums”’, in Geschichtsschreibung als Legitimationswissenschaft 1918–1945, ed. Peter Schöttler (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkampf, 1997), 104–27; Carl Peterson, ed., Handwörterbuch des Grenzlands und Auslandsdeutschtum/Hand Dictionary of Border and Foreign Deutschtum (Breslau: Hirt, 1939). 138 For Wutte’s contribution see Handwörterbuch, 564. 139 See Rumpler, ‘Nationale Frage’, 18–22.

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140 See Wutte’s short critical note on Robert Routil’s ‘anthropological’ investigations before the Anschluss (Robert Routil, Die Völker und Rassen auf dem Boden Kärntens, Klagenfurt: Kollitsch, 1937) in Carinthia I 128, (1938): 149. On other Carinthian scholars see Michael Wedekind, ‘The Sword of Science: German Scholars and National Socialist Annexation Policy in Slovenia and Northern Italy’, in German Scholars and Ethnic Cleansing (1919–1945), ed. Ingo Haar and Michael Fahlbusch (New York: Berghahn, 2005), 110–38. 141 See Handwörterbuch (599); Nachtrag Kärnten, IV Bevölkerung 5 Rassenkunde, 5 April 1940, published 1939–40. 142 The order was cited by Siegfried Uibereither (Chef der Zivilverwaltung in der Untersteiermark) in the Marburger Zeitung, 29 April 1942; see Tone Ferenc, ed., Quellen zur nationalsozialistischen Entnationalisierungspolitik in Slowenien 1941–1945: Viri o nacistični raznarodovalni politiki v Sloveniji 1941–1945 (Maribor: Založba Obsorja, 1980), 51, note 4. 143 Sima, ‘Vertreibung’, 143–4; Wedekind, ‘Sword’; Tone Ferenc, ‘The Austrians and Slovenia during the Second World War’, in Conquering the Past: Austrian Nazism Yesterday and Today, ed. Fred Parkinson (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1989), 207–16. 144 Haas and Stuhlpfarrer, Österreich und seine Slowenen, 86; Günter Schödl, ‘Ideologische und aussenpolitische Vorgeschichte zur NS-Slowenenpolitik’, in Rumpler and Suppan, Geschichte der Deutschen, 287–98. The term ‘Upper Carniola’ (Oberkrain) was introduced in January 1942, see Ference, Quellen, dok 193. 145 Martin Wutte, ‘Zur Siedlungsgeschichte des südlichen Vorlandes der Karawanken’, Carinthia I 131 (1941): 30; ‘Foreword’ to Viktor Paschinger Martin Wutte and Georg Graber, Oberkrain (Krainburg [Kranje] 1942). Wilhelm Neumann, ‘Martin Wutte und sein Urteil über die nationalsozialistische Slowenenpolitik in Kärnten und Krain aufgrund seiner Denkschrift vom 19. September 1943’, Carinthia I 176 (1986): 9–41, 12; Wedekind, ‘Sword’, 110–38. For a defence of Wutte see Wilhelm Neumann, Preface to Wutte, Kärntens Freiheitskampf, 1918–1920, XXII. 146 Sima, ‘Kärntner Slowenen’, 374–6. 147 See Karl Stuhlpfarrer, Umsiedlung Südtirol 1939–1940 (2 vols) (Vienna: Löcker, 1985). 148 Haas and Stuhlpfarrer, Österreich, und seine Slowenen, 80; Dokumentation des Österreichischen Widerstandes, ed., Erzählte Geschichte (Vienna: Österreichischer Bundesverlag, 1990); Sima, ‘Vertreibung 1942’, in Malle and Sima, Narodu, 135–6; Stefan Karner, ‘Die Aussiedlung von Kärntner Slowenen 1942’, in Aussiedlung – Verschleppung – Nationaler Kampf, ed. Stefan Karner and Andreas Moritsch (Klagenfurt: Hermagoras and Heyn, 2005), 21–51; Brigitte Entner and Avguštin Malle, eds, Die Vertreibung der Kärntner Slowenen/Pregon koroških Slovencev 1942 (Klagenfurt:Drava, 2012); Brigitte Entner and Valentin Sima, eds, Zweiter Weltkrieg und ethnische Homogenisierungsversuche im Alpen-Adria-Raum/Druga svetona vojna in poizkusi etnične homogenizacije v alpsko-jadranskem prostoru (Klagenfurt: Drava 2012); Sima and Malle, Narodu, 277–365. 149 Gendarmeriebericht Eisenkappel, 24 August 1942, in Narodu, 466. 150 Valdis O. Lumans, Himmler’s Auxiliaries: The Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle and the German National Minorities of Europe 1933–1945 (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press: 1993), 177; Sima, Vertreibung, 156–7; Himmler decree, 25 August 1941, in Ferenc, Quellen, 232–3; Peter Longerich, Heinrich Himmler: A Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 619–20.

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151 Ferenc, Quellen, 455–6; Barker, Slovene Minority, 198; Michael Wedekind, Nationalsozialistische Besatzungs- und Annexionspolitik in Norditalien 1943 bis 1945: Die Operationszonen ‘Alpenvorland’ und ‘Adriatisches Küstenland’ (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2003); Rolf Wörsdörfer, Krisenherd Adria 1915–1955. Konstruktion und Artikulation des Nationalen im italienisch-jugoslawischen Grenzraum (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2004), chap. IV. 152 Ferenc, Quellen, 454–5; Sima, Vertreibung, 189–92. 153 Wedekind, ‘Sword’, 117. 154 Fahlbusch, ‘Wissenschaft’, 311, 672–3. Burz, ‘Wutte’. 155 Wedekind, Nationalsozialistische Besatzungspolitik, 395. 156 Ferenc, Quellen, 563–5 (note 2). 157 Sima, Vertreibung, 187. 158 Grundgendanken, 16 November 1942, in Neumann, ‘Wutte’, 34; See also Wutte, ‘Kärntens Reichsaufgabe in Volkstum im Südosten’, November 1942, cited in Haas and Stuhlpfarrer, Österreich und seine Slowenen, 85. 159 See Sima, Vertreibung 1942, 182; Wedekind, Nationalsozialistische Besatzungspolitik, 396. 160 Wutte, Kärntens Freiheitskampf, 69. 161 See Burz, Nationalsozialistische Bewegung, 18; Wutte, Kärntens Freiheitskampf, 236; Alfred Ogris, ‘Der 10. Oktober 1920 – Kärntens Tag der Selbsbestimmung im Rückblick der wissenschaftlichen Diskussion seit 1945’, Carinthia I 180 (1990): 824. 162 Wutte, Freiheitskampf, 571. 163 Hans Steinacher, Sieg in deutscher Nacht: Ein Buch vom Kärntner Freiheitskampf (Vienna: Wiener Verlag, 1943); Siegmund Knaus, Freiheitskämpfe in Deutschösterreich (part 1) (Berlin: Mittler, 1941). 164 NS-Lehrerbund, ed., Lehrstoffverteilung für die Kärntner Grundschule (Klagenfurt: Leykam, 1941);Valentin Sima, ‘Die Vertreibung von Kärntner Slowenen 1942: Vorgeschichte, Reaktionen und Interventionen von Wehrmachtstellen’, in Narodu, 133–211, esp. 192–206. 165 Karl Stuhlpfarrer, Die Operationszonen ‘Alpenvorland’ und ‘Adriatisches Küstenland’ 1943–1945 (Vienna: Hollinek, 1969), 58–65, 152. 166 Ibid.; Wörsdörfer, Krisenherd, 430–2. 167 Williams, Gau, 157. 168 See Thomas M. Barker, Social Revolutionaries and Secret Agents: The Carinthian Slovene Partisans and Britain’s Special Operations Executive (Boulder: Columbia University Press, 1990), 59; Josef Rausch, Der Partisanenkampf in Kärnten im Zweiten Weltkrieg (Vienna: Heeresgeschichtliches Museum, 1979). 169 Wilkinson report reprinted in Barker, Social Revolutionaries, 92; Peter Wilkinson, Foreign Fields: The Story of an SOE Operative (London: I.B. Tauris 1997), 169. 170 Meissner report, 27 January 1943, Thierack (Reichsminister der Justiz) to Kaltenbrunner, 11 February 1943, Jaeger Report, 4–6 March 1943, in NS-Justiz und politische Verfolgung in Österreich 1938–1945, Analysen zu den Verfahren vor dem Volksgerichtshof und dem Oberlandesgericht Wien, ed. Wolfgang Form, Wolfgang Neugebauer and Theo Schiller (Munich: Sauer, 2006), 158, 435–6, 441–2, 767–84. 171 Janez Stergar, ‘“Sredina” koroških Slovencev v času narodnoosvobodilnega boja’, Zgodovinski Časopis 43, no. 3 (1989): 393–404; see also Karel Prušnik-Gašper, Gemsen auf der Lawine. Der Kärntner Partisanenkampf (2nd ed) (Klagenfurt: Drava, 1984), 95–6; Franklin Lindsay, Beacons in the Night. With the OSS and Tito’s Partisans in Wartime Yugoslavia (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993), 196–7; Bogdan Ston Mohor, Luna: Od koroškega partizana do političnega zapornika

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v Bileči/Vom Freiheitskämpfer in Kärnten zum politischen Gefangenen in Bileča (Klagenfurt: Drava, 2007). 172 Peter Pirker, ‘Paradoxes of an Intervention: British Subversive Politics towards Austria and Partisan resistance in the Austrian-Slovene Borderland, 1938–1945’, Journal of Contemporary History (2016), http://jch.sagepub.com/content/ early/2016/04/19/0022009416634448.full.pdf+html (accessed June 2016). 173 Barker, Social Revolutionaries, 31, 43, 52. 174 Marjan Linasi, Die Kärntner Partisanen. Der antifaschistische Widerstand im zweisprachigen Kärnten unter Berücksichtigung des slowenischen und jugoslawischen Widerstandes (Klagenfurt: Hermagoras, 2013) estimates that more than 600 partisans were killed. Wolfgang Neugebauer (‘Widerstand und Opposition’, in NSHerrschaft, 546) refers to more than 500 fallen Slovene fighters. 175 On the distinction between Widerstand and Resistenz, see Tim Kirk, ‘Nazi Austria: The Limits of Dissent’, in Opposing Fascism: Country. Authority and Resistance in Europe, ed. Kirk and Anthony McElligott (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 133–49. 176 See Peter Tropper, ed., Kirche im Gau: Die Diozöse Gurk im Dritten Reich (Klagenfurt: Carinthia, 1995); Haas and Stuhlpfarrer, Österreich und seine Slowenen, 86; Alfred Ogris, ‘Der kirchliche Protest aus Klagenfurt gegen die Aussiedlung von Kärntner Slowenen im Jahre 1942’, Carinthia I 182 (1992): 441–53. 177 Ibid., 441–54, 443, 453. 178 Irene Bandhauer-Schöffmann, Entzug und Restitution im Bereich der Katholischen Kirche (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2004), 98–153. 179 Tropper, Vom Missionsgebiet, 333. 180 Rainer, ‘Über die Kärntner Slowenenfrage’, ARS, 1589, Kraigher PP, Box 10; Williams, Gau, 191–206. 181 E.g. August Walzl, Gegen den Nationalsozialismus. Widerstand gegen die NSHerrschaft in Kärnten, Slowenien und Friaul (Klagenfurt: Carinthia, 1994); Walzl, Kärnten 1945. Vom NS-Regime zur Besatzungsherrschaft im Alpen-Adria-Raum (Klagenfurt: Carinthia, 1985). 182 Lindsay, Beacons, 153. 183 Kaltenbrunner report, 1 May 1945 cited in Karl Stadler, Österreich 1938–1945 im Spiegel der NS-Akten (Vienna: Herold, 1966), 405; Siegfried Beer, ‘Kärnten im Frühsommer 1945. Drei Berichte und Analysen des amerikanischen Geheimdienstes OSS zu Politik, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft in einem britisch-besetzten Bundesland’, Carinthia I 177 (1987), 426 (R and A Report 19, Johnson, 6 July 1945) [translation back into English]. 184 See Meinrad Natmeßnig, ‘Erinnerung an die Geschehen Kärntens in den Tagen des Zusammenbruches Großdeutschlands, den schwersten Tagen in der Geschichte des Deutschen Reiches und den schicksalsschwersten Tag meines etc meines Heimatlands’. Slovenski Znanstveni Inštitut/Slovene Scientific Institute, Klagenfurt, C, XII. 185 Williams, Gau, 198; Elste, Parteiensystem, 156–63. 186 See Wilhelm Baum, Die Freisler-Prozesse in Kärnten, Zeugnisse des Widerstandes gegen das NS-Regime in Österreich (Klagenfurt: Kitab, 2011). 187 Siegfried Beer, Stefan Karner, Thomas Kraut and August Tropper, Der Krieg aus der Luft. Kärnten und Steiermark 1941–1945 (Graz: Weishaupt, 1992), 162, 197; Wadl and Ogris, Das Jahr 1938, 396; Wadl, Das Jahr 1945, 15. 188 Mervyn Pyke to Hughes, 14 July 1945 (‘Nutrition in Carinthia 18–24 July’). TNA, FO 1020/1452; Wilhelm Wadl, Das Jahr 1945 in Kärnten: Ein Überblick (Klagenfurt:

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Verlag des Kärntner Landesarchivs, 1985), 23; David Hunt, On the Spot: An Ambassador Remembers (London: P. Davies, 1975), 5. 189 For discussions of popular attitudes see Ernst Hanisch, Gau der guten Nerven: Die nationalsozialistische Herrschaft in Salzburg 1938–1945 (Salzburg: Anton Pustet, 1997); Evan Bukey, Hitler’s Austria: Popular Sentiment in the Ostmark 1938–1945 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2000). 190 Rausch, Partisanenkampf, 13; Prušnik-Gašper, Gemsen, 135–6. 191 Wutte to Rainer, 4 May 1945, facsimile in The Slovene Carinthia/Slovenska Koroška (Belgrade: Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1946); PKLR1, 15 May 1945, KLA, LAD I; see Neumann, forword to Wutte, Freiheitskampf, XVIII–XIX. 192 Hermann Gruber, Die Jahre in der Politik (Klagenfurt: Carinthia, 1982), 35. 193 Kärntner Zeitung, 8 May 1945 (Kärnten – ein freies Land Österreichs!); Natmeßnig, ‘Erinnerung’. 194 See Elste et al., NS-Österreich, esp. parts 2.1 and 4. 195 Natmeßnig, ‘Erinnerung’; Karl Newole, Neue Zeit, 9 May 1946 (‘Wie der Satrap Rainer gestürzt wurde’). 196 Ferenc, Quellen, 563–5, 572–4; Haas and Stuhlpfarrer, Österreich und seine Slowenen, 86. 197 Beer, ‘Kärnten im Frühsommer’ (R and A Report 19, Johnson, 6 July 1945), 426. 198 Anonymous report (‘Kärnten’), 13 September 1946, Niederösterreichisches Landesarchiv, Figl PP, Ö144. 199 Provisor Maier (Maria Wörth/Otok) to Ordinariat, 4 August 1945, Gurk Diocesan Archive (ADG), Alphabetische Ablage (Militaria), Box 25. 200 Thomas Ulbing (Gottestal/Skočidol), 27 June 1946 ADG, Alphabetische Ablage, (Militaria) Box 25. 201 Johann Hornböck, Report 23 January 1946, ADG, Kadras PP, Folder VII. 202 SiDion LB March 1947, ÖStA, AdR, BMI, 26.125-2/47. 203 DÖW, Spurensuche, 379. 204 Lutz Niethammer, Peter Brandt and Ulrich Borsdorf, eds, Arbeiterinitiative 1945: antifaschistische Ausschusse und Reorganisation der Arbeiterbewegung in Deutschland (Wuppertal: Hammer, 1976), 164–175. 205 Joint Weekly Intelligence Summary (JWIS) 5, 3 August 1945, TNA, FO371/46611/ C4833. 206 Kärntner Nachrichten, 17 May 1945 (Villach – mit englischen Augen gesehen).

Chapter 2 1

2 3

See Elste, Parteiensystem, 21–35; Matthew Berg, ‘Die SPÖ und die Praxis der Entnazifizierung’, in Entnazifizierung zwischen politischem Anspruch, Parteienkonkurrenz und Kaltem Krieg. Das Beispiel der SPÖ, ed. Maria Mesner (Vienna: Oldenbourg, 2005), 152–4. Mack to Bevin, 14 March 1947, TNA, FO371/63958/C4437; see Robert Knight, ‘Britische Entnazifizierungspolitik 1945–1949’, Zeitgeschichte 11 (1983/4): 295–6. E.g. Julius Lukas (junior), the son of the veteran Social Democrat leader of the same name, party number 7.597.933, Bundesarchiv Berlin (Berlin Document Center), Personal file Lukas. Wolfram Enzfelder had worked as a journalist for the Gau newspaper the Kärntner Grenzruf’.

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Alfred Elste and Wilhelm Wadl, Titos langer Schatten. Bomben- und Geheimdienstterror im Kärnten der 1970er Jahre (Klagenfurt: Verlag des Kärntner Landesarchivs, 2015); see Wedenig ‘Lebenslauf ’, June 1954, ÖStA, AdR, BKA, Präsidium 3062-PrM/54. 5 KLT 16, 19 December 1951, 106–11. See also Valentin, Nationalismus, 310. 6 See Polrep, October 1948, TNA, FO1007/336; Pichler, ‘Gedenktage’, 210; Wedenig KLT 165, 20 December 1956. 7 Werner Drobesch, ‘Die Geschichte der Kärntner ÖVP 1945–1994’, in Volkspartei – Anspruch und Realität: Zur Geschichte der ÖVP seit 1945, ed. Robert Kriechbaumer and Franz Schausberger (Vienna: Böhlau, 1995), 527–57; Dieter Binder, ‘“Rescuing the Christian Occident” and “Europe in us”: The People’s Party in Austria’, in Christian Democracy in Europe since 1945, ed. Michael Gehler and Wolfram Kaiser (London: Routledge, 2004), 139–54. On Karisch see Freisitzer, ‘Beginn’, 6, 216, 295; Alfred Elste, ‘Die Illegale NSDAP (1933–1938)’, in Auf dem Weg zur Macht. Beiträge zur Geschichte der NSDAP in Kärnten von 1918 bis 1938, ed. Alfred Elste and Dirk Hänisch (Vienna: Braumüller, 1997), 213, 219, 230. Rumpler, ‘Dammbruch’, 16; Gabriela Stieber, Consolidated Intelligence Reports. Psychological Warfare Branch, Military Government Kärnten 1945 bis April 1946. Eine Quellenedition zur Geschichte der britischen Besatzungszeit in Kärnten. (Klagenfurt: Verlag des Kärntner Landesarchivs, 2005) (henceforth CIR), 183 (3 October 1945). 8 Cabinet 141, 8 January 1949, Figl I ÖStA, AdR, BKA. 9 See Nevile Henderson, Failure of a Mission 1937–1939 (London: Putnam, 1940), 127. 10 See Intelligence Organisation (Military Government) to Political Representative, Vienna, 7 March 1946, TNA, FO1020/1090. 11 Ursula Benedikt, ‘Vinzenz Schumy (1878–1962): eine politische Biographie’. Vienna University PhD 1966, 235. See also Schumy’s bland memoirs (‘Lebenserinnerungen II Teil’), IfZ, Vienna, Schumy PP, DO212. 12 See Political Intelligence Department, Austrian Personalities, 6 August 1945, TNA, FO1007/337. 13 Wadl, Kärnten 1945, 84. 14 Stieber, CIR, 176 (26 September 1945). 15 Ibid. 16 Stieber, CIR 1, 19 July 1945, CIR, 90–1; Eduard Blatnik, ‘Die sozialistische Partei Österreichs- Landesorganisation Kärnten vom Ende des zweiten Weltkrieges bis zur Unterzeichnung des Staatsvertrags 1955’, Klagenfurt University Diplomarbeit 1981, 128. 17 Walzl, Kärnten 1945, 249. 18 Advisory Committee (AC), 5, 20 June 1945, KLA, LAD I. 19 Civil Affairs Villach to HQ (BE) Land Kärnten, 8 March 1947, TNA, FO1020/2831. 20 For details see Natmeßnig, ‘Erinnerungen’, SZI, C, XII. 21 AC 5, 20 June 1945, Kärntner Landesarchiv [KLA], LAD I. 22 See Wadl, Das Jahr 1945, 7, 29–30. 23 Stieber, CIR (19 September 1945), 161–2; Wadl, Das Jahr 1945, 119; Blatnik, ‘Sozialistische Partei’, 19; Elste, Parteiensystem, 65–8. 24 Conversation 11 June 1945, ADG, Militaria 25 (Vorsprachen) 45. 25 Stieber, CIR (3 October 1945) 182. See also Wilhelm Wadl, ‘Kärnten’, in Entnazifizierung im regionalen Vergleich, ed. Walter Schuster and Wolfgang Weber (Linz: Archiv der Stadt Linz, 2004), 254. 26 Stieber, CIR, 148 (12 September 1945). 4

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27 Stossier report, 18 September 1945, TNA, FO1020/2821. 28 Malle et al., Vermögensentzug, 153–4. For OF protests, Stieber, CIR, 147 (12 September 1945); OF Memorandum to Allied Council, 25 January 1946. Documents on the Carinthian Question (DCQ), (Belgrade: Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia, 1948), 205. In Maierhofer’s defence see Ogris (‘Kirchlicher Protest’, 443–4) and August Walzl, ‘Reaktionen auf die Aussiedlung von Kärntner Slowenen’, Carinthia I, 182 (1991): 455–6. 29 See PID Austrian Personalities 79, 16 March 1946, TNA, FO1007/338. 30 WSPD 34, 9 March 1946, TNA, FO1007/298. 31 Other prominent cases included Bruno Klos (or von Kloss), who denied any membership of the NSDAP (Polrep May 1946, TNA, FO1007/335); DCQ, 201, ÖStA, AdR, BKA, Entnazifizierung Kärnten, Box 22, 23 January 1946, and Karl Prah, who had been an official in Ptuj (Pettau) before becoming district head (Bezirkshauptmann) in Völkermarkt/Velikovec (Questionnaire, 24 January 1946), ÖStA, AdR, BKA, Entnazifizierung Box 22; DCQ, 205. 32 Nicholls to Hughes (ACABE) Rome, 21 May 1945, TNA, FO1020/977. 33 Mack to Political Division, 6 June 1945, TNA, FO371/46649/C3322. 34 Nicholls to Hughes (ACABE) Rome, 21 May 1945; Hughes to Nicholls, 26 May 1945; Nicholls to Hughes, 26 May 1945, TNA, FO1020/977. 35 For accounts which overstate the significance of the change see Walzl, Kärnten 1945, 266–7 and Wadl, Das Jahr 1945 in Kärnten: Ein Überblick (Klagenfurt: Verlag des Kärntner Landesarchivs, 1985), 254. 36 This second provisional Carinthian government, which was recognized by the British on 25 July (PKLR 2) is distinguished here from the (first) provisional government (PKLR 1) which was established on 7 May and the Advisory Committee (AC) (Konsultativer Landesauschuss) which lasted from 6 June–25 July 1945; the first elected Carinthian Government (KLR) was constituted after the November elections on 10 December 1945. 37 Smith speech (German translation), KLA, LAD/Diverses I and AC 2nd (opening) session, 8 June 1945, KLA, LAD I. 38 See Gerald Stourzh, ‘Totale Kontrolle; Die Regierung Renner, die Anfänge der Regierung Figl und die Alliierte Kommission für Österreich, September 1945 bis April 1946’, Archiv für österreichische Geschichte 125 (1966): 321–42; Günther Bischof and Josef Leidenfrost, eds, Die bevormundete Nation. Österreich und die Alliierten 1945–1949 (Innsbruck: Haymon, 1988); Manfried Rauchensteiner, Stalinplatz 4: Österreich unter alliierter Besatzung (Vienna: Steinbauer, 2005), 45–106. 39 See Robert Knight, ‘Denazification and Integration in the Austrian Province of Carinthia’, Journal of Modern History 70, no. 3 (2007): 572–612. 40 Foreign Office Research Department, ‘The Frontiers of Austria’, 18 February 1944, TNA, FO371/40598/U2331. 41 For a discussion of the meeting based on Slovene communist sources, see Domej, ‘Konflikt’, 101–2; also Malle, ‘Position’, 494. 42 Jack Nicholls to Mack, 19 May 1945, TNA, FO371/46609/C2858 (emphasis in original). Nicholls to Hughes 21 May 1945, FO1020/976; see Domej, ‘Konflikt’, 102, Dušan Biber, ‘Yugoslav and British Policy towards the Carinthian Question, 1941– 1945’, in The Phoney Peace. Power and Culture in Central Europe 1945–9, ed. Robert Pynsent (London: University College Press, 2000), 100–12. 43 PKLR 1 10, 26 May 1945, KLA, LAD I; Domej, ‘Konflikt’, 104. 44 AC 2nd session, 2, 8 June 1945, KLA, LAD I [translation back into English].

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45 Janko Ogris, Vinzenz Zwitter, Johann Mikula to Military Government, 18 July 1945, AINV, OMV, Box 19. DCQ 52, 117; SMGO Kärnten, 17 October 1945, TNA, FO1020/1001. 46 N.A. (Josef Schöner), Report on Carinthia, 15 January 1946, ÖStA, AVA, Schöner PP, E1773:21. 47 See Gerald Hughes, The Post-war Legacy of Appeasement: British Foreign Policy since 1945 (London: Bloomsbury, 2014). 48 Anne Lane, Britain, the Cold War and Yugoslav Unity 1941–1949 (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2011) (rev. ed), 102–3. 49 Mack to Troutbeck, 22 March 1946, TNA, FO371/55391/C3690. 50 General draft Directive of Austria in the Post-Surrender Period, Annex II, TNA, CAB 87/67. 51 See Joint Weekly Intelligence Summary 6, 10 August 1945, TNA, FO371/46611/ C5138. 52 PKLR 1, 1st session, 8 May 1945, KLA, LAD I. On expropriation and restitution see Malle et al., Vermögensentzug, 434; Brigitte Entner, ‘Zwischen Integration und Ausgrenzung: Kärntner SlowenInnen und britische Bestzungspolitik bis zu den Novemberwahlen 1945’, in Von Neuem. Die Kärntner Slowenen unter der britischen Besatzungsmacht nach 1945. Zeitzeugen, Beiträge und Berichte, ed. Lipej Kolenik et al. (Klagenfurt: Drava, 2008), 18–19. 53 PKLR 1, 10th session, 26 May 1945, KLA, LAD I. 54 AC 7th session, 27 June 1945, KLA, LAD I. 55 PKLR 1, 10th session, 26 May 1945, KLA, LAD I. 56 AC 3rd session, 13 June 1945, KLA, LAD I. Text in Veiter, Recht, 330–1; Haas and Stuhlpfarrer, Österreich und seine Slowenen, 89–90; Domej, ‘Konflikt’, 104. 57 CA 3rd session, 13 June 1945, KLA, LAD I; Erklärung der provisorischen KärntnerLandesregierung zur Frage der nationalen Minderheit in Kärnten, ‘Material zur Kärntner Frage’ (ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, II-pol 1266/1945); Gertrude Enderle-Burcel and Rudolf Jeřábek, eds, Protokolle des Kabinettsrates der Provisorischen Regierung Karl Renner 1945 (vol. 2) (Horn: Berger, 1999), 86–94. 58 AC 3rd session, 13 June 1945, KLA, LAD I. 59 PKLR 1, 10th session, 26 May 1945, KLA, LAD I. 60 Newole, 17 August ‘1945’ Cited by Frankl, 1945, 265. see also Karl Heinz Frankl, ‘1945 - Ein Jahr der Wende für die Katholische Kirche in Kärnten?’, in Kirche im Gau: Dokumente zur Situation der katholischen Kirche in Karnten von 1938 bis 1945, ed. Peter G. Tropper (Klagenfurt: Carinthia, 1995). 61 See Joint Weekly Intelligence Summary (JWIS) 6, 10 August 1945, TNA, FO371/46611/C5138. 62 ‘Tito Propaganda in the Frontier Area of Carinthia’, CIR 29, 4 February 1946 (Annex A) TNA, FO1007/298 (omitted in Stieber, CIR, 378); Domej, ‘Konflikt’, 143–4. 63 Stieber, CIR, 344 (16 January 1946); Thomas Busch and Brigitte Windhab, Jelka: aus dem Leben einer Kärntner Partisanin (Eisenkappel: Drava, 2009), 111–16. 64 Rohracher Smith meeting, 11 June 1945, ADG, Alphabetische Ablage, Militaria, Box 25. 65 At its second session on 9 May the provisional Carinthian government resolved in response to the news of a stream of Croatian refugees: ‘if possible to keep them from the border’; KLA, LAD I; on the controversies over the British handovers of anti-communist Yugoslavs and Cossacks, see Robert Knight, ‘Harold Macmillan and the Cossacks Was There a Klagenfurt Conspiracy?’ Intelligence and National

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Security 1/2 (1986): 234–55; Nikolai Tolstoy, The Minister and the Massacres (London: Hutchinson, 1986); Anthony Cowgill, Thomas Brimelow and Christopher Brooker, The Repatriations from Austria in 1945: The Report of an Enquiry (2 vols) (London: Sinclair-Stevenson, 1990). 66 John Corsellis and Marcus Ferrar, Slovenia 1945: Memories of Death and Survival after World War II (London: I.B.Tauris, 2010). 67 Stieber, CIR, 158 (19 September 1945). 68 Stieber, CIR, 292 (13 December 1945). 69 Malle et al., Vermögensentzug, 402–19. 70 See Maximilian Liebmann, ‘Freie Kirche im freien Staat. Heinrich Drimmel und die Stellung der Kirche in Österreich’, in Demokratie und Geschichte: Jahrbuch des Karl von Vogelsang Instituts zur Erforschung der Geschichte der christlichen Demokratie in Österreich, ed. Helmut Wohnout (Vienna: Böhlau, 2007), 195–207. 71 Enquiry to the Holy See, March 1960, ADG, Kadras PP VII (Rom), 265. 72 Draft reply (Heinzel), 8 October 1957, ADG, Kadras PP, Folder VIII (Rechtliche). 73 Frankl, ‘1945’, 262 -5. 270; Ordinariate of the Prince Bishop, order nr 14, 15 May 1945, cited in Tropper, 748–73. 74 Stieber, CIR, 164 (19 September 1945), 181 (3 October 1945); Andreas Moritsch, ‘Der Nationale Differenzierungsprozess am Beispiel ländliche Gemeinden Südkärntens’, in Vom Ethnos zur Nationalität, ed. Moritsch, 76; see also petitions in ADG, Alphabetische Ablage, Box 25 (Militaria); Kadras PP, Folder VII (Rechtliche Darstellungen). See also Frankl, ‘1945’, 264; CIR 15, 31 October 1945, TNA, FO1007/297. 75 Lojze [Ude] to Cvit = [Fran Zwitter], 2 August 1945, AINV, OMV, AS 1589, folder 80; OF memorandum, 18 July 1945, in Avguštin Malle, ed., Janko Ogris, Življenje in Delo (Klagenfurt: Drava, 2001), 220–1. See also Domej, ‘Konflikt’, 105. 76 Memorandum to MG, 27 June 1945 (Vinko Zwitter, Tone Butej, Ivan Schleicher, F. Petek, T. Suppanz, Janez Weiß), DCQ, 81–3; Janko Ogris, 211–19. Text partly printed in Gabriela Stieber, Die Briten als Besatzungsmacht in Kärnten 1945–1955 (Klagenfurt: Verlag des Kärntner Landesarchivs, 2005), 299. 77 AC 8th session, 27 June 1945, KLA, LAD I. 78 AC 8th session, 27 June 1945, KLA, LAD I. 79 Pleterski, Slowenisch oder Deutsch? 417; Domej, ‘Schulwesen’, 50. 80 On Carinthian communists and the border see Domej, ‘Konflikt’, 102. 81 As suggested by Claudia Fräss-Ehrfeld, ‘“Die Kärntner Frage” im Jahr 1945’, in Neue Fakten zu Staatsvertrag und Neutralität, ed. Alois Mock, Kurt Steiner and Andreas Kohl (Vienna: Politische Akademie, 1987), 191. 82 PKLR, 1, 3rd session, 13 June 1945, KLA, LAD I. 83 AC 8th session, 27 June 1945, KLA, LAD I. 84 AC 7th session, 22 June 1945, KLA, LAD I; Provincial Government of Carinthia, Carinthia, A Problem? (Vienna: Österreichische Staatsdruckerei, 1945). 85 PKLR, 2, 1st session, 25 July 1945, KLA LAD I. 86 Malle et al., Vermögensentzug, 140–67; see PKLR 2, 3rd session, 30 July 1945, PLR II 5, 8 August 1945, PKLR 2, 7th session, 17 August 1945, KLA, LAD I. 87 Ten secondary schools (Hauptschulen) were also covered by the decree. In 1952–3 they had 2,297 pupils attending. Outside the primary school area, bilingual instruction was given in secondary schools in Hermagor, Villach and Klagenfurt. 88 Wilhelm Neumann (‘Das nationale Problem aus deutschkärntner Sicht’, in Kärnten, von der deutschen Grenzmark zum österreichischen Bundesland, seit 1945, ed. Helmut

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Rumpler (Vienna: Böhlau, 1998), 464) wrongly implies that Tischler supported the restoration of the utraquistic school, as called for in the government declaration. 89 Burger, Sprachenrecht, espec. 25–31. 90 Newole to Piesch, Amschl, Tschofenig [the three party leaders] 3 August 1945, published in Josef Tischler, Die Sprachenfrage vor 100 Jahren und heute (Klagenfurt: Rat der Kärntner Slowenen, 1957), 25–6; see also Tischler’s account in Zvest Domu, Narodu in Bogu: 40 let Narodnega sveta koroških Slovencev 10 let smrti dr. Joška Tischlerja (Klagenfurt: Hermagoras, 1989), 175. 91 Stieber, CIR, 229 (8 November 1945). The source was given as ‘Slovene circles’. 92 JWIS 9, 31 August 1945, TNA, FO371/46651/C6377. 93 PolRep, June 1946, TNA, FO1007/335. 94 PKLR 2, 6th session, 16 August 1945, KLA, LAD I. 95 Stieber, CIR, 138 (5 September 1945); CIR, 128 (22 August 1945). See also the alternative proposal based on the principle of profession (Statement, Stellungnahme) n.d., in ÖStA, AdR, BKAA AA, ÖBL, Box 10. 96 PKLR 2, 3rd session, 3 October 1945, KLA, LAD I. The following quotes come from this record. 97 Frankl, ‘1945’, 272; PKLR 1, 7th session, 15 May 1945, KLA, LAD I; Stieber, CIR, 206 (24 October 1945). 98 PKLR 2, 14th session, 15 October, KLA, LAD I. 99 Tischler was probably referring to the Kärntner Heimatatlas (Martin Wutte, Viktor Paschinger and Franz Lex) (Vienna: Österreichischer Bundesverlag für Unterricht, Wissenschaft and Kunst, 1925). 100 The 1910 census had only recorded 155 Slovene speakers there compared to 680 German speakers. See Veiter, Recht, 338; Suppan, Jugoslawien und Österreich, 483. 101 PKLR 2, 14th session, 15 October 1945, PKLR 2, 17th session, 31 October 1945, KLA, LAD I. See list of schools in appendix. 102 Decree of the Provincial School Council/Erlass des Landeschulrates vom 9. November 1945, Zl. 9406, published i.a. in Tischler, Sprachenfrage, 25–6. Veiter, Recht, 701. 103 PKLR 2, 13th session, 3 October 1945, KLA, LAD I. 104 Carinthian government press conference, 1 November 1945, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-45/1724; see also Domej, ‘Konflikt’, 110. 105 Neue Zeit, 11 November 1945 (Die Kärntner Slowenen). 106 Stieber, CIR, 208 (24 October 1945); PKLR 2, 14th session, 15 October 1945, KLA, LAD I. 107 PKLR 2, 17th session, 31 October 1945, KLA, LAD I. 108 PKLR 2, 13th session, 3 October 1945, KLA, LAD I. 109 Stieber, CIR, 107 (8 August 1945); 137 (5 September 1945); Domej, ‘Konflikt’, 107, note 77. 110 Prušnik-Gašper to Ude, 1 August 1945, AINV, OMV, 80. 111 OF to British MG, 3 August 1945, AINV, OMV, Folder 19. British intelligence reported that thirty-five children from the Rosental had been receiving tuition at various schools in Carniola; see Stieber, CIR, 284 (5 December 1945). 112 Domej, Konflikt, 118; Stieber, CIR, 228 (8 November 1945). 113 Stieber, CIR, 197 (17 October 1945). Domej, ‘Konflikt’, 117–18; Zvest, 156–8. 114 See Meeting of Central Committee, Slovene Communist Party, 9 December 1945, in Zapisniki Politbiroja CK KPS/ZKS 1945–1954, ed. Darinka Drnovšek (Ljubljana: Archive of the Republic of Slovenia, 2000), 50; Report by Pavleš Žaucer, 22

Notes

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December 1945 (meeting of 13 December 1945 with Petek, Sienčnik and Gašper), ARS, 1589, CK ZKS III, box 36. 115 Simson to PolDiv, 17 October 1945, TNA, FO1020/1001 (reporting Piesch’s views). 116 Stieber, CIR, 205–6 (24 October 1945), also appendix A, OF application to ALCO, 21 September, 213–16. 117 Clarke (SMGO HQ Land Kärnten) to Political Division ACA, 17 October 1945, TNA, FO1020/1001. 118 MG to Tischler, 17 October 1945, DCQ, 89–90. 119 BE Vienna to MG HQ, Kärnten, 30 October 1945, TNA, FO 1020/1001. 120 The first version (DCQ, doc 39) stated: ‘we will NOT at any time claim, demand, or make suggestion, or reference concerning any revision or modification of the existing AUSTRIAN-YUGOSLAV frontier’. In the final version (doc 42) this was changed to ‘we will NOT at any time claim, demand or make any suggestion or reference in public meetings or propaganda concerning any revision or change or modification of the existing AUSTRIAN-JUGOSLAV frontier, or any other frontier, until the Peace Conference, or such earlier time as the British Commander-in-Chief may determine’. Slovene text in Slovenski Vestnik, 8 November 1946 (Iz novejše zgodovine koroških Slovencev). See also Malle, ‘Die Position der Kärntner Slowenen im Nationalitätenkonflikt’, in Rumpler, Kärnten seit 1945, 498. 121 Summary of interview, 2 November 1945, TNA, FO1020/1001. 122 Simson to ACABE, POLDIV, 9 November 1945, TNA, FO1020/2822. 123 PKLR 2, 18th session, 14 November 1945, KLA, LAD I. 124 OF to MG, 6 November 1945, DCQ, doc 43. 125 Meeting, 14 November 1945, TNA, FO371/46682/C8529. 126 Yugoslav Note, 7 November 1945, TNA, FO371/46682/R19557. 127 British Embassy, Belgrade to PolDiv, 20 November 1945, TNA, FO1020/1001. Domej, 121. 128 See Zvest, 176; Domej, ‘Konflikt’, 125. 129 Suppan, Volksgruppen, 180; Avguštin Malle, ‘Konfrontation mit den ehemaligen Verbündeten: Betrachtungen zur Haltung der britischen Besatzungsmächte in den ersten Jahren nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg’, in Von Neuem, 52–3. 130 Elste and Hänisch, Kontinuität, 238 (table 8.6), who estimate 22 per cent did not vote while 10 per cent were excluded as ‘incriminated’ Nazis; in 1932 only 21 per cent of Slovenes had voted Social Democrat. 131 Elste and Hänisch (Kontinuität, 228, note 36) define Slovene problematically as the 22,534 Slovene and Windish speakers recorded in the 1951 census. 132 See Elste and Hänisch, Kontinuität, 233, table 8.3. 133 Ibid., 174 (table 3.1); from 31.5 per cent in 1930 to 42.8 per cent of the electoral roll. 134 Elste and Hänisch, Kontinuität, 186 (table 4.5) estimate that in areas which had a strong German national vote in the 1921 elections the SPÖ achieved 35.8 per cent of the roll compared to their average of 34.9 per cent. They performed only slightly below average (31.6 per cent compared to 32.6 per cent) in areas which had been dominated by the Landbund. 135 See e.g. Otto Langbein, ‘`Zur Kärntner Slowenen-Frage’, Weg und Ziel 6 (1947): 402–16. 136 Kazianka was outnumbered on the Landtag minority committee by the six socialists and three ÖVP assimilating Slovenes (Josef Glatschnigg, Hans Ferlitsch and Albin Petschnig). The British report reprinted by Stieber, CIR, 319, wrongly assigns

168

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Petschnig to the committee and omits two members: Wilhelm Luschin (SPÖ) and Hans Ferlitsch (ÖVP). 137 Domej, ‘Konflikt’, 102; Elste, Parteiensystem, 159. 138 KLR 2, 21–22 December 1945, KLA, LAD I. 139 Domej, ‘Konflikt’, 147. 140 Meeting 13 May 1946, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, Pol-46/Österreich 3/110.162-112.112. 141 On Heinrich Lueger’s black market activities see Polreps, February and June 1946, TNA, FO1007/335; Diary of Political Developments w/e 29 June 1946, TNA, FO 371/55232/C8181. 142 Cited in Ralph Aichelburg, ‘Geschichtliche Entwicklung des zweisprachigen Unterrichtes an den Pflichtschulen in Kärnten unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des Zeitraumes von 1945 bis zum Minderheiten-Schulgesetz 1959’ (Diplomarbeit, Klagenfurt University, 1985), 51. 143 Domej, ‘Konflikt, 147–51. For the League’s programme see Stieber, CIR, 292; and appendix B (declaration) 301–3; CIR 27, Stieber, CIR (23 January 1946), 355; Neue Zeit, 1 February 1946 (Tagung des Bundes Österreichischer Slowenen). 144 On Eisenkappel/Železna Kapla see Weekly Security Intelligence Report (WSIR) 31, 15 February 1946, TNA, FO1007/305; Stieber, CIR (24 February 1946), 395–6; WSPD 40, 21 April 1946, Stieber, CIR, 442. KLR 11th session, 6 March 1946, KLA, LAD I; CIR 26, Stieber, CIR, 349 (16 January 1946); LR 3, 10 January 1946, KLA; Wadl, Das Jahr 1945, 63. 145 Meeting of OF delegation with Simson and Piesch, 4 March 1946, SZI, Fond C, Folder 9; Neue Zeit, 24 January 1947 (Unterdrückte Slovenen?). Two exceptions were the border villages of Zell/Sele and Globasnitz/Globasnica. 146 SiDion Weekly Report, 41, 8 June 1946 (Report by Mohor, OF), ÖStA, AdR, BMI, 123.260-2/46. 147 E.g. OF Memorandum to ALCO, 25 January 1946, TNA, FO1020/1077; DCQ, 93–6. Like other OF communications this was referred back to the British authorities without discussion. 148 WSIR 28, 18–24 January 1946, TNA’, FO1007/305; Stieber, CIR, 367 (30 January 1946); Volkswille, 26 January 1946 (St Kanzian wie in der Nazizeit’); Cabinet 5, 29 January 1946, Enderle-Burcel, MRP Figl I, vol. 1, 116. 149 Memorandum of the Government of the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia on the Question of the Frontier between Yugoslavia and Austria (CFMD (46) 37).23 February 1946. 6, TNA, FO945/829. 150 Cefarin PWE, 27 January 1946, TNA, FO1020/1112. ‘Tito Propaganda in the Frontier Area of Carinthia’, CIR 29, 4 February 1946 (Annex A), TNA, FO1007/298. 151 Cefarin, 27 January 1946, TNA, FO1020/2821. 152 Cited in Stieber, CIR (26 January), 347. 153 See file on Amschl, TNA, FO1020/2478. The others were head of the Gestapo in Klagenfurt, Heinrich Berger, and the industrialist Franz Hasslacher. Press release, SiDion (Stossier) 8 February 1946, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-48/Österreich 3/112.413-116.750. 154 Piesch to Simson, n.d. [February 1946], KLA, LAD, Berichte II. 155 KLR 5, 23 January 1946, KLA, LAD; Stieber, 348–9, 360, 16 January 1946 and 23 January 1946. On Jobst’s connections see Stieber, 5 (3 June 1945), 45 (appendix B). 156 Report on Tour of Kärnten, 4 January 1946, TNA, FO1020/2033. 157 See Knight, ‘Schule zwischen Zwang’, 531–58. 158 Volkszeitung, 3 May 1946 (Carling, Fortschritte in der zweisprachigen Schule): Carling Memorandum, 29 April 1946 and covering note 3 May 1946, TNA,

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FO1020/1077; Volkszeitung, 28 June 1946 (Der Zweisprachige Unterricht in Kärnten). 159 Education Division, Monthly Report, May 1946, TNA, FO1020/2619. 160 Sharp to Controller Information Services Branch, 21 May 1946, TNA, FO1020/1112. 161 Avguštin Malle, ‘Britische Presse – Medienpolitik gegenüber den Slowenen in Kärnten nach 1945’, Medien und Zeit 5 (1990): 10–18; Robert Knight, ‘A no-win situation? Gerald Sharp and British policy towards the Carinthian Slovenes’, in Widerstand gegen Faschismus und Nationalsozialismus im Alpen-Adria-Raum/Odpor proti fašizmu in nacizmu v alpsko-jadranskem prostoru, ed. Brigitte Entner, Augustin Malle and Valentin Sima (Klagenfurt: Drava, 2011), 84–96. 162 Sharp to Newole, 21 May 1946, TNA, FO1020/1112. 163 Nicholls minute, Wilkinson to Sharp, 2 June 1946, TNA, FO1020/1112. 164 District Administration Völkermarkt/Velikovec to Carinthian Sicherheitsdirektion, 13 April 1946, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA/pol-46/Österreich 3/110.162-112.114. 165 Von Ewarth, 9 February 1946, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-46/Jugoslawien 9/110.314110.324. 166 Robert Knight, ‘Peter Wilkinson and the Carinthian Slovenes. A Report from April 1946’, in Zbornik Janka Pleterskega, ed. Otho Luthar and Jurij Perovšek (Ljubljana: Založba ZRC, 2003), 427–42. 167 RK interview with Luka Siencnik , 19 July 1983. 168 The official certificate stated that the sentry shot three times when she failed to stop at his warning; 21 August 1946, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-46/Österreich 3/110.162112.611; see also TNA, FO1020/2822; RK interview with Luka Sienčnik, 19 July 1983. 169 Stieber, CIR, 377–8 (4 February 1946). 170 Meeting 13 May 1946, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-46/Österreich 3/110.162-112.112. 171 For example the report of a Yugoslav secret police (OZNA) ‘Carinthia Division’ (Koroško-Odred) aimed exclusively at dealing with Southern Carinthia was filed with a covering reference to an ‘alleged organization to take over Carinthia’; ‘Landesführung der OZNA nr XI, 15 April 1946’, TNA, FO1020/2905. Stieber, Briten (365–7) reproduces a facsimile of the report but not the qualification. 172 Robert Kriechbaumer, ‘Liebe auf den zweiten Blick – die Länder und der Bund 1945’, in Liebe auf den zweiten Blick. Landes – und Österreichbewusstsein seit 1945, ed. Kriechbaumer (Vienna: Böhlau, 1998), 15–46. 173 Ogris, ‘Anschlußideen’, 28, note 62. 174 Rumpler, ‘Nationale Frage’, 26 ff. 175 On Zhuber see Austria report 7, 18 June 1945, Stieber CIR, 57; März 1938, ed. Rumpler, 297; Erwin Scharf, Ich hab’s gewagt mit Sinnen: Entscheidungen im Antifaschistischen Widerstand: Erlebnisse in der politischen Konfrontation (Vienna: Globus, 1988), 82, 83. 176 Wildner diary 16 May 1945. ÖStA, AVA, Wildner PP, E1791:17. Oliver Rathkolb, ‘Raoul Bumballa, ein politischer Nonkonformist 1945. Fallstudie zur Funktion der O-5 im Widerstand und der Parteienrestauration’, in Unterdrückung und Emanzipation. Festschrift für Erika Weinzierl. Zum 60. Geburtstag, ed. Rudolf Ardelt, Wolfgang J.A. Huber and Anton Staudinger (Vienna: Geyer, 1985), 295–317. 177 KRP 8, 22 May 1945, Enderle-Burcel, MRP ,111. 178 Josef Schöner, Wiener Tagebuch 1944–5, ed. Eva-Marie Csáky, Gerald Stourzh and Franz Matscher (Vienna: Böhlau, 1992), 79. 232. See also Nicholls to Hughes (Rome), 23 May 1945, TNA, FO1020/976; Nicholls to Hughes (Rome), 23 May 1945, TNA, FO1020/976; Gruber, Jahre, 45; Drobesch, ‘Die Geschichte der Kärntner ÖVP, 529.

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179 PKLR 1, 10th session, 26 May 1945, KLA, LAD I; see also Wadl, Das Jahr 1945, 58. 180 Stieber, CIR, 54 (18 June 1945); Wadl, ‘Kärnten’, 251–2. 181 Periodical Intelligence Digest [PID] 16, 16 January 1946, TNA, FO1007/289. 182 On Funder’s timber and fibreboard firm, which became the third-largest timber firm in the Third Reich, see Karner, Kärntens Wirtschaft, 266; see also PWB Austria Report 8, Annex III, Stieber, CIR, 70. Alfred Elste, Kärntens braune Elite (Klagenfurt: Hermagoras, 1997), 156, note 679. 183 CIR 18, 22 November 1945, TNA, FO1007/297. Honner’s comments are omitted by Stieber, CIR, 265, on the grounds that they deal with ‘overall Austrian subjects, primarily party politics without a direct connection to Carinthia’! 184 Figl speech, 21 December 1945, in Der Weg zur Freiheit und Neutralität, Dokumentation zur österreichischen Aussenpolitik, ed. Eva-Marie Csáky (Vienna: Österreichische Gesellschaft für Außenpolitik und internationale Beziehungen, 1980), 60–1. 185 Volkszeitung, 4 January 1946 (Leopold Figl, Neujahresgruß an die Kärntner); (Es muss noch viel geschehen). 186 KLR 7, 8 February 1946, KLA, LAD I. 187 Neue Zeit, 19 March 1946 (Kärnten frei und ungeteilt). 188 KLR 5, 23 January 1946, KLA, LAD I; see also Stieber CIR, 348–9, 360 (16 January 1946 and 23 January 1946). 189 Neue Zeit, 10 March 1946 (Das ‘braune’ Kärnten?); Die Neue Zeit, 18 March 1946 (Paul Jobst: Sozialistische Einigkeit in Südkärnten). 190 Moser report, 16 July 1945, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, 1266-pol/45; Gertrude EnderleBurcel, Rudolf Jeřábek and Leopold Kammerhofer, Protokolle des Kabinettsrates der Provisorischen Regierung Karl Renner 1945, vol. 2 (Session 19, 24 July 1945) (Vienna: Berger, 1999), 86–7l. 191 Stalin’s letter referred to his ‘concern for the independence, integrity and prosperity of Austria’; see Adolf Schärf, Österreichs Erneuerung 1945–1955. Das erste Jahrzehnt der Zweiten Republik (Vienna: Verlag der Wiener Buchhandlung, 1955) (fascimile opposite page 49); Enderle-Burcel, KRP (Renner State Government Cabinet 13, 20 June 1945), 248–50. 192 Cabinet 5, 29 January 1946, Enderle-Burcel, MRP Figl I, vol. 1, 115–16. 193 See Wilhelm Svoboda, Die Partei, die Republik und der Mann mit den vielen Gesichtern. Oskar Helmer und Österreich II. Eine Korrektur (Vienna: Böhlau, 1993), 51 ff. 194 WSIR 28, 18–24 January 1946, TNA, FO1007/305; CIR 28, 30 January 1946, Stieber, CIR, 367; Volkswille, 26 January 1946 (St Kanzian wie in der Nazizeit); Cabinet 5, 29 January 1946, Enderle-Burcel, MRP Figl I, vol. 1, 116. 195 Several of these were collected and translated by the Minority Office and sent to Vienna; ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-47/Österreich 3/110.162-111.558 (Berichte aus Kärnten). 196 Neue Zeit, 16 March 1946 (Kärntens Minderheit und Südgrenze). 197 According to a British report (Stieber, CIR, 417–18 (23 March 1946)) the ministers spoke to crowds of some 500 at Ebendorf/Dobrla vas and Eisenkappel/Železna Kapla and 8,000–10,000 in all. 198 Cabinet 12, 12 March 1946, Enderle-Burcel, MRP Figl I, vol. 1, 347. 199 Neue Zeit, 19 March 1946 (Kärnten frei und ungeteilt). 200 Neue Zeit, 19 March 1946 (Verstaatlichung – Zukunft Österreichs). 201 Neue Zeit, 19 March 1946 (Kärnten frei und ungeteilt).

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202 Cabinet 14, 26 March 1946, Enderle-Burcel, MRP Figl I, vol. 1, 394–6. 203 Von Engerth, 9 February 1946, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-46/Jugoslawien 9/110.314 –110.324. Manfried Rauchensteiner (‘Die Folgewirkungen von Abwehrkampf und Volksabstimmung’, in Kärnten Volksabstimmung 1920, 355) omits von Ewarth’s comments on the Carinthians. 204 Kärntner Landesesrgierung, Denkschrift betreffend die endgiltige Anerkennung der auf dem Vertrag von Stain-Germain (1919) und den Ergebnissen der Kärntner Volksabstimmung (1920) beruhenden Grenze zwischen Österreich und Jugoslawien, 12 September 1945; Kärntner Landesregierung, Memorandum Nr 2 betreffend die Unmöglichkeit der von Jugoslawien beanspruchten Draugrenze, Klagenfurt, 12 September 1945; Wildner note, 23 September 1945, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, 1251-pol 45, Box 5. 205 Gebiets- und Wirtschaftsfragen der Untersteiermark, ed. committee of experts (einem Kommitee Sachkundiger Personen) (Vienna: Österreichische Staatsdruckerei, 1946). Stenographische Protolle, V. Gesetzgebungsperiode, 23 May 1946, 268–9. 206 See Cabinet 19, 7 May 1946, Enderle-Burcel, MRP Figl I, vol. 2, 71, note 30. 207 Österreichische Bundesregierung, Rot-Weiss-Rot Buch Gerechtigkeit für Österreich! Darstellungen, Dokumente und Nachweise zur Vorgeschichte und Geschichte der Okkupation Österreichs (nach amtlichen Quellen) (part 1) (Vienna: Österreichische Staatsdruckerei, 1946), 144–5. 208 Cabinet 14, 26 March 1946, Enderle-Burcel, MRP Figl I, vol. 1, 394–6. 209 See Stourzh, Einheit, 51. 210 Major Dickenson (PWB) British Unit No. 2, 5 April 1946, TNA, FO1020/2890. 211 SiDion Weekly Report 41, 8 June 1946, ÖStA, AdR, BMI, 123.260-2/46 (German translation of article in Maribor newspaper Vestnik, 5 April 1946). 212 WSPD 37, 30 March 1946, TNA, FO1007/298. 213 KLR 13, 28 March 1946, KLA, LAD I: Piesch to Senior Military Government Officer, 25 March 1946, TNA, FO1020/2822. 214 Text of speeches (German translation by the Carinthian Minority Office) in ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-46/Österreich 3/110 162–111.507. 215 Security Director Report, 15 April 1946,. TNA, FO1020/2890; Koroška Kronika, 26 April 1946 (Hinter den Kulissen des 15 April); Busch, Jelka, 103–4. 216 Stieber, CIR, 440–1 (21 April 1946). 217 See SiDion LB 3 June 1946, ÖStA, AdR, BMI, 123.260-2/46. 218 Cefarin Report (confidential), 6 May 1946, ÖStA, AdR, BKA 888 Pr/46; Cabinet 19, 7 May 1946, Enderle-Burcel, MRP Figl I, vol. 2, 68–71. 219 Cabinet 19, 7 May 1946, Enderle-Burcel, MRP Figl I, vol. 2, 68–71. 220 Graf to Figl, 26 April 1946 BMI, ÖStA, AdR, BKA, Entnazifizierung Box 22; see also Stieber, CIR, 419 (23 March 1946). Volkszeitung, 4 January 1946 (Es muss noch viel geschehen); Volkszeitung, 17 March 1946 (Massenversammlung von Vertrauenspersonen) WSPD 36, 23 March 1946, TNA, FO1007/298; on Villach see Polrep, January 1946, TNA, FO1007/335 and Lisa Rettl and Werner Koroschitz, Ein korrekter Nazi: Oskar Kraus: NS-Oberbürgermeister von Villach; Kärntner Erinnerungsk(r)ämpfe (Klagenfurt: Drava, 2006). 221 Graf to Gruber, 13 December 1946, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-46/Österreich 9-15/105.441-106,58547 (Staatsvertrag Beilagen); see also FSS, 7 January 1947, TNA, FO1020/1212. 222 Neue Zeit, 9 May 1946 (Karl Newole, Wie der Satrap Rainer gestürzt wurde). 223 See Brigitte Bailer, ‘They Were All Victims: The Selective Treatment of the Consequences of National Socialism’, in Austrian Historical Memory and National

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Identity, ed. Günter Bischof and Anton Pelinka (New Brunswick: London, 1997, 103–15. 224 Report on 8 May ceremony (Liberation of Austria), 24 June 1946, ÖStA, AdR, BKA, 1085-Pr/46. 225 Wolf et al., Question to Federal Chancellor, 21 December 1945, 1/J Supplement to Parliamentary Correspondence (Beiblatt zur Parlamentarische Korrespondenz). 226 Brigitte Entner, ‘Vergessene Opfer? Die “Verschleppten” vom Mai 1945 im Spiegel regionaler Geschichtspolitik’, in Kärnten liegt am Meer. Konfliktgeschichte/n über Trauma, Macht und Identität, ed. Wolfgang Petritsch, Wilfried Graf and Gudrun Kramer (Klagenfurt: Drava and Heyn, 2012), 423–34. 227 The figures for the whole of Carinthia from the Landeschulrat for 1 June 1945 were 1,925 out of 2,756 directors and teachers (27 February 1946), ÖStA, AdR, BMU, II-a 3-01790/46 (Box 2066). The figure does not appear to include Anwärter (‘candidate members’) of the Nazi party. 228 PKLR I 9, 23 May 1945, KLA, LAD I. 229 PKLR II 9, 5 September 1945, KLA, LAD I. See Tschofenig’s criticism KLT 15, 1 April 1947; see also KLT 8, 24 September 1946 and Wadl, Das Jahr 1945, 71. 230 Education Ministry Conference, 25 January 1946, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 702/46. 231 Wolfgang Neugebauer and Peter Schwarz, Der Wille zum Aufrechten Gang. Offenlegung der Rolle des BSA bei der gesellschaftlichen Integration ehemaliger Nationalsozialisten (Vienna: Czernin, 2005), 85–6 : Wadl, Kärnten, 262–3; Doris Sottopietra and Maria Wirth, ‘Die Länderebene der SPÖ’, in Entnazifizierung in Österreich, ed. Mesner, 113–23; Knut Lehmann-Horn, Die Kärntner FPÖ 1955–1983: Vom Verband der Unabhängigen [VdU] bis zum Aufstieg von Jörg Haider zum Landesparteiobmann (Klagenfurt: Carinthia, 1992), 56. 232 Polrep, June 1946, TNA, FO1007/335. 233 KLR 2, 21–22 December 1945, KLA, LAD I. 234 The ten parishes were Arnoldstein/Podklošter, Bleiburg/Škofji Dvor, Gallizien/ Galicija, Pischeldorf/Škofji Dvor, Poggersdorf/Pokrče, St Michael ob der Gurk/Slovenji Šmihel, St Stefan in Gailtal/Štefan na Zilji, St Martin am Techelsberg/Teholica, Velden/ Vrba and Viktring/Vetrinj. KLR 2, 21–22 December 1945, KLA, LAD I. 235 Carling, 8 December 1945, TNA, FO1020/2818; the other schools he reported on were Sittersdorf/Žitara vas, Eisenkappel/Železna Kapla, Abtei/Apače and St Margareten/Šmarjeta; Stieber, CIR, 306–7 (19 December 1945); Carling (Education Division) to Taylor, 8 February 1946, TNA, FO1020/2821; Heinzel report, KLR 2, 21–22 December 1945, KLA, LAD I. 236 Heinzel report to meeting of provincial school inspectors, 25 January 1946, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 702/46. 237 Just was appointed bilingual school inspector on 10 January 1946 (KLR 3, 10 January 1946, KLA, LAD). 238 Erlass des LSR vom 10. April 1946 (nr 2829), Landeschulrat Verordnungsblatt für das Schulwesen in Kärnten, 1946 Mitte April. 239 SiDion (Staatspolizei) weekly report 44, 17 July 1946 17–8, ÖStA, AdR, BMI, 123.260-2/46. 240 LSR, Stand der zweisprachigen Schule am 1. Oktober 1946, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, ÖB London, Box 3. 241 Stieber, CIR, 364–6 (23 January 1946). 242 SiDion Weekly Report 44, 17 July 1946 17–8, ÖStA, AdR, BMI, 123.260-2/46.

Notes

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243 Material aus Klagenfurt, Beilage XX, ÖStA, AdR, n.d. [January 1946] BKA AA/ ÖBL/Box 3, f. 773–6. On Jenkor, headmaster of Köttmannsdorf/Kotmara vas, see Education Division Monthly Report, May 1946, TNA, FO1020/2619 Diary of Political Developments, No. 29, w/e 29 June 1946, TNA, FO371/55232/C8171. On Aichholzer see KLR 15, 10 April 1946, KLA, LADI; SiDion (Staatspolizei) Weekly Report 41, 8 June 1946, ÖStA, AdR, BMI, 123. 260-2/46. On Franz Aichholzer, head teacher in Latschach/Loče who had supported the Yugoslav cause in 1920, see Domej, ‘Schule’, 112–13; Suppan, Österreich und Jugoslawien, 835, note 341. 244 Carling Statement, 22 June 1946; Sharp to Controller ISB, 29 April 1946 (Annex I), TNA, FO1020/1112. 245 Education Division Fortnightly Letter 2, 31 August 1946, TNA, FO1007/363. 246 See LR 34, 24 July 1946, KLA, LAD; Polrep, July 1946, TNA, FO1007/335; OF Bezirksauschuss Borovlje/Ferlach to Civil Affairs, 20 November 1946, SWI, Fond D, File 7; LSR Heinzel to OF, n.d. (copy), SWI, Fond C/File 8. 247 Education Division Monthly Report, May 1946, TNA, FO1020/2619. 248 Diary of Political Developments, No. 29, w/e 29. June 1946, TNA, FO371/55232/ C8171. 249 Education Division Report May 1946 cited by Stieber, Briten, 244. 250 Second Control Agreement (London: His Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1946). 251 Knight, ‘Britische Entnazifizierungspolitik 1945–1949’, 295. 252 Carinthian Landtag, Solemn session, 8 May 1946, KLA, LAD I. 253 See Stieber, CIR, 333 (9 January 1946); Stoll (Amt der Kärntner Landesregierung) to Tischler, 15 March 1946 (copy); Tischler to Amt der Kärntner Landesregierung, 23 March 1946, ARS, 1931/1182. 254 Volkszeitung, 19 March 1946 (Josef Tischler, Zur Lage der Slovenen in Kärnten). 255 See speeches at the deportation memorial ceremony on 14 April 1946 (German translation) in ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-II/Österreich 3/110 162–111.507. Stieber, CIR (7 April 1946), 429. 256 Wadl and Elste Titos Langer Schatten, 112–13. 257 See police weekly report 41, 8 June 1946, ÖStA, AdR, BMI, 123.260-2/46. 258 Sharp to Controller ISB 26 May 1946 (appendix III: Selbsverwaltung des slowenischen Volkes in Kärnten) TNA, FO1020/1112. 259 Tischler, 25 May 1946, appendix IV (Grundlagen für eventuelle Besprechungen) TNA, FO1020/1112; see also Malle, ‘Britische Presse- und Medienpolitik’, 17. 260 Tischler, ‘Grundlagen’. 261 Sharp Tischler talk, 31 October 1946, TNA, FO1020/2823. 262 Piesch to Sharp, 14 May, KLA, LAD Berichte II. 263 Newole to Sharp 23 May 1946, TNA, FO1020/1112. 264 SPZ to BMU, 4 August 1946 Objection (Einspruch gegen den Widerstand der Landeschulbehörde gegenüber der Durchführung der Schulverordnung der Kärntner Landesregierung vom 31. Oktober 1945, verlautbart am 11. November 1945), Folder 21. 265 LSR to BMU, Stellungnahme des LSR zum Einspruch des Slovenischen Kuturverbandes, n.d., AINV, OMV, Folder 21; Tischler, Zvet, 160. Elsewhere the Council stated that bilingual teaching was in force fully in 77 primary schools out of 104, partly into 20 and not at all in 8 (Stand des zweisprachigen Schulwesens in Kärnten am 1. Oktober 1946), ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, ÖBL, box 3.

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Chapter 3 1 2

3 4 5 6

7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19

20

See Peter Thaler, The Ambivalence of Identity: The Austrian Experience of NationBuilding in a Modern Society (Indiana: Purdue University Press, 2001). See Gerald Stourzh, Um Einheit und Freiheit. Staatsvertrag, Neutralität und das Ende der Ost-West-Besetzung Österreichs 1945–1955 (4th ed.) (Vienna: Böhlau, 1998), 63–70, 134–8, 147–9, 155–61; Arnold Suppan, ‘Jugoslawien und der österreichische Staatsvertrag’, in Der österreichische Staatsvertrag 1955: Internationale Strategie, rechtliche Relevanz, nationale Identität, ed. Suppan, Stourzh and Mueller (Vienna: Böhlau, 2005), 431–74. News Chronicle, 18 April 1947 (Interview with Tito). Bogo Grafenauer, The National Development of the Carinthian Slovenes (Ljubljana: Znanstveni Inštitut, Oddelek za mejna vprašanja, 1946). Yugoslav Statement (Vilfan), 22 January 1947, TNA, FO371/63965/C9303; Deputies 21, 17 February 1947, TNA, FO371/63952/C2724; Yugoslav memorandum, 18 February 1947, TNA, FO371/63956/C3213. Yugoslav Statement, 22 January 1947, TNA FO371/63965/C9303; Memorandum of the Government of the Federative People’s Republic of Yugoslavia on Slovene Carinthia and the Burgenland Croats, Belgrade, 1947; The Question of 200,000 Yugoslavs in Austria – The Slovene Carinthia and the Burgenland Croats (Belgrade: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1947). On the role of Austrian soldiers in massacres in Kraljevo, Kragujevac and Kalávrita, see Walter Manoschek and Hans Safrian, ‘Österreicher in der Wehrmacht’, in NS-Herrschaft, 331–60. Vilfan statement, 22 January 1947, TNA, FO371/63965/C9303. Fran Zwitter, To Destroy Nazism or to Reward It? An Aspect of the Question of Slovene Carinthia (Belgrade: Yugoslav Institute for International Affairs, 1947). Yugoslav notes, 30 January and 18 February 1947, DCQ, 31, 32; Mack to Bevin, 14 March 1947, TNA, FO371/63958/C4437; on Piesch see Knight, ‘Entnazifizierungspolitik’, 295–6. On Yugoslav tactics over Waldheim, see Robert Herzstein, Waldheim: The Missing Years (New York: Arbor House, 1998), 193–4. Memorandum of the Government of the Federative People’s Republic of Yugoslavia (Belgrade: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1947). Vilfan statement, 22 January 1947, TNA, FO371/63965/C9303. Waldheim telephone call, 22 January 1947, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-47/ Staatsvertrag/105.005-105.307; Stourzh, Einheit, 70. Vilfan statement, 22 January 1947 (CFM/D/47/12) TNA, FO371/63965/C9303. Joint hearing (Vilfan and Gruber), 17 February 1947, TNA, FO371/63965/C9303. See Domej, ‘Konflikt’, 123; Suppan, Volksgruppen, 180. Press Digest, Moscow, 6 April 1947, TNA, FO371/64046/C5781. Figl speech to Deputies, 30 January 1947, cited in Stourzh, Einheit, 69. Gruber statement, 18 April 1947, Csáky, Weg, 138–40. English version in Michael Gehler, ed., Karl Gruber: Reden und Dokumente 1945–1953: Eine Auswahl (Vienna: Böhlau, 1994), 24, 166–8. CFM 31, 17 April 1947 (Hearing of Yugoslav and Austrian representatives) FO371/63961/C6226/22/3; (Ethnic Situation in Carinthia), 18 April 1947, C6216/22/3. Arbeiter-Zeitung, 28 January 1947 (Jugoslawische Stimmungsmache gegen Österreich).

Notes

175

21 CFM Deputies 12, 31 January 1947, TNA, FO371/63949/C1731; Austrian Memorandum, 6 February 1947 (Annex M, Attitude of the Austrian People towards the German Occupant and Austria’s Contribution to Her Liberation); Yugoslav memorandum concerning the responsibility of Austria for her participation in the Nazi aggression, 24 February 1947, DCQ, doc 79. 22 Gruber statement, 18 April 1947, in Eva-Marie Csáky, Weg, doc 54, 138–9. 23 Draft Memorandum on Austro-Yugoslav relations etc. ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-47/ Staatsvertrag/105.005-105.139. 24 CFM Deputies 22, 15 February 1947, TNA, FO371/63953/C2723. 25 Stourzh, Einheit, 84, note 48. 26 See Wolfgang Mueller, Die sowjetische Besatzung und ihre politische Mission in Österreich (Vienna: Böhlau, 2005). 27 See Ivo Banac, ed., Diaries of Georgi Dimitrov 1933–1949 (New Haven: Yale, 2003), 353. 28 For a recent account of Soviet intentions based on Soviet sources, which differs in some significant respects from that given here, see Peter Ruggenthaler, The Concept of Neutrality in Stalin´s Foreign Policy, 1945–53 (Lexington: Lanham, 2015). 29 Interministerial conference, 4 January 1947, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, ÖB London (Diverses) Box 4. Ruggenthaler’s account (Concept, 104–112) obscures this point and generally overstates the level of Soviet support for Yugoslavia while underplaying their readiness to come to agreement on Austria. 30 Cabinet 51, 7 January 1947, Enderle-Burcel, MRP Figl I, vol 4, 241. See also Cabinet 63, 14 April 1947, MRP Figl I, vol. 5, 35; Cabinet 64a 17 April 1947, MRP Figl I vol. 5, 35; 404. See also Gruber, Liberation, 104; Aleš Bebler, Cez drn in Strn. Spomini (Koper: Lipa – ZTT 1981), 120. 31 Cabinet 57, 18 February 1947, Enderle-Burcel, MRP Figl I, vol. 5, 5. See Stefan Karner and Peter Ruggenthaler, ‘“Eine weitere Unterstützung der jugoslawischen Gebietsforderungen bringt uns in eine unvorteilhafte Lage.” Der Artikel 7 des österreichischen Staatsvertrags als diplomatischer Kompromiss’, in Aussiedlung – Verschleppung – nationaler Kampf, ed. Stefan Karner and Andreas Moritsch (Klagenfurt: Hermagoras and Heyn, 2005), 99–118, here 99. 32 See e.g. Wildner Diary, 17 April 1947, ÖStA, AVA, E1791:17. 33 UK delegation (Moscow) to FO, 22 April 1947, TNA, FO800/439 (Bevin PP); Gruber, Liberation, 104. 34 CFM, 2nd Informal Meeting, 21 April 1947, TNA, FO371/65041/CE1878. 35 Kardelj (Moscow) to Vyshinksy, 20 April 1947, reprinted in Note of the Soviet Government to the Yugoslav Government, 29 August 1949, Supplement to New Times (Moscow), No. 37, 7 September 1949, 6; Stourzh, Einheit, 82–4; ARS, AS1529, Kraigher PP, Box 10, Draft ‘Article 10’ (Klavzula o mirovni pogodbi z Avstrijo) and a 15-clause ‘Draft autonomy statute for southern Carinthia’; Domej, ‘Konflikt’, 131–2. On the power stations see Markus Purkhart, ‘Die Draukraftwerke’, in NSZwangsarbeit in der Elektrizitätswirtschaft der ‘Ostmark’ 1938–1945, ed. Oliver Rathkolb and Florian Freund (Vienna: Böhlau, 2014), 199–230. 36 Interministerial Meeting, 4 January 1947, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-47/105.005– 105.139, ÖB London, Box 3. 37 Festsitzung des Kärntner Landtages, 28 January 1947, Klagenfurt 1947 (illustrated brochure). 38 Volkszeitung, 12 December 1946 (Kein Quadratmeter Kärntens wird aufgegeben); KLR 50th session, 18 December 1946, KLA, LAD 1.

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39 Neue Zeit (Graz) 19 December 1946 (Keine Auslieferung Kärntens an Tito). 40 Cabinet 57, 18 February 1947, Enderle-Burcel, MRP Figl I, vol. 5, 5. 41 Stossier, Wildner to Schmid, London, 24 January 1947, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA,pol-47/ Staatsvertrag /105.005–105.352; SiDion LB January 1947, ÖStA, AdR, BMI, 139.492. 42 SiDion LB January 1947, ÖStA, AdR, BMI, 26.125-2/47. 43 Bundespoliziekommissariat Villach to SiDion Kärnten, 31 January 1947 (forwarded to Austrian delegation, London 8 February) ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-47/ Staatsvertr-ag/105.005-105.56. 44 See request for Slovene choir performances to be completed with protest acts, AINV, OMV, 80. 45 Bundespoliziekommissariat Villach to SiDion Kärnten, 31 January 1947, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA,pol-47Staatsvertrag/105.005-105.56. 46 Fortnightly Security and Intelligence Report 25, 2 February–15 February 1947, TNA, FO1007/320; Slovenski Vestnik 14 February 1947 (Na veličastnem zborovanju v St Jakobu je ljudstvo manifestiralo svojo priklučitveno voljo). 47 Piesch to Hurdes, 20 February 1947, ÖStA, AdR, BMU/15.239/47. 48 BMU an SVZ, 13 January 1947 AINV – OM/Fasc 21 (BMU 48134/46). 49 Interministerial conference, 4 January 1947, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, ÖB London, Box 3 (105.005–105.139). 50 Slovenski Vestnik, 31 January 1947 (Dokumenti Govorijo). 51 Gruber hearing, CFM 33 (Plenary Session), 18 April 1947, TNA, FO371/63962/ C6216/C6289. 52 Schwendenwein, Transcript of Ljubljana radio broadcast, 20 April 1947, German translation (Schwendenwein) AdR, BKA, Präs 1348; Cabinet 68, 13 May 1947, MRP Figl I, vol. 6, 11–12, 50; Slovenski Vestnik 25 April 1947 (Primeren odgovor na trditve dr Gruberja v Moskvi); Cabinet 166, 19 July 1949, Figl I ÖStA, AdR, BKA; Drimmel to Chaloupka, 7 November 1950; Chaloupka to Drimmel, 8 November 1950, ÖStA, AdR, BKA, Präs 4826. 53 See FSIR 25, 2-15 February 1947, TNA, FO1007/320. 54 ‘Memorandum of the Slovene Priests of Carinthia to the Council of Foreign Ministers, Celovec (Klagenfurt)’, 3 February 1947 [English version], DCQ, 128–31. Slovenski Vestnik, 7 March 1947 (Slovenski duhovniki na Koroškem za priklučitev k FLRJ). 55 The diocesan authorities referred to only twenty-seven signatories in Stossier to BMI, 22 April 1947, Bishop Köstner to Figl, 2 May 1947, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-47/ Österreich 3/106.707–106.707; Gurk Diocese, Quinquennial Report to Vatican, 1948, ADG, Romana; Frankl, 1945, 267, note 82; Suppan, Volksgruppen, 182; Peter G. Tropper, ‘Die Diözese Gurk. Neue Aufgaben in einer neuen Welt’, in Kärnten seit 1945, ed. Rumpler, 710–11; Malle, ‘Katholische Kirche’, 754–7. 56 Special Consistorium Meeting, 3 December 1947, ADG, Alphabetische Ablage, Staat und Kirche, Box 3 (Kärnten-Österreich); Karisch to Figl, 4 December 1947, Hurdes PP, DO298, IfZ, Cabinet 91, 9 December 1947, ÖStA, AdR, BKA. 57 Report on Meeting of the Youth League for Slovene Carinthia (Jugendbund für slov. Kärnten), SiDion LB March 1947, ÖStA, AdR, BMI, 26.125-2/47. 58 BMI to BKA AA, 14 April 1947, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA/pol-47/Staatsvertrag/ 105.005-106.602. The account by Wolfgang Mayrhofer-Grüenbühl (‘Sturm in Eisenkappel im Jahre 1947’, Carinthia I 185 (1995): 263–7), who was deputy Bezirkshauptmann and later ÖVP politician and activist in the Kärntner

Notes

59 60 61 62

63 64 65 66 67 68 69

70 71 72 73 74

75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84

177

Heimatdienst, is tendentious. See also Erzählte Geschichte, 380–1; DCQ, docs 67–68; Jelka, 109–10. FSS Eisenkappel, 16 March 1947, TNA, FO1020/1214. SiDion, Politischer Lagebericht, 17 April 1947, ÖStA, AdR, BMI, 26.125-2/47. SiDion LB March 1947, ÖStA, AdR, BMI, 26. 125-2/47. Yugoslav note to British government, 3 April 1947, DCQ 68, 151–2; OF protest to CFM, 28 March 1947, DCQ, doc 70; Yugoslav protest, 2 April 1947, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-47/Staatsvertrag/105.005–106.360; Yugoslav government to CFM, Moskau, 15 April 1947, TNA, FO371/64058/C5909 and C5977. OF protest to the Allied Council, 29 March 1947, ALCO/P(47)52. Arbeiter-Zeitung, 28 January 1947 (Vizekanzler Dr. Schärf über die Londoner Verhandlungen); Wildner Diary, 27 January 1947, ÖStA, AVA, E1791/17, Cabinet 57, 18 February 1947, Enderle-Burcel, MRP Figl I, vol. 5, 8. Volkszeitung, 20 April 1947 (Der große Parteitag der ÖVP); see also Neue Zeit, 19 April 1947 (Kein Vertrag ohne Südkärnten). Taktischer Verlauf der Moskauer Konferenz, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-47/ Staatsvertrag/105.005–106.845. Bevin Gruber talk, 24 April 1947, TNA, FO371/63962/C6348. Meeting in BKA, 29 April 1947, ÖStA, AdR BKA AA, pol-47/ Staatsvertrag/105.005-107.166. Meeting in BKA, 29 April 1947, ÖStA, AdR BKA AA, pol-47/ Staatsvertrag/105.005-107.166. See also Gesamtbericht über den Verlauf der Moskauer Konferenz, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-47/Staatsvertrag/105.005-107.166; Protokoll über die Besprechung im BKA, AA am 29. April betreffend die Moskauer Konferenz, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA/pol-47/Staatsvertrag/105.005-107.166; Wildner diary, 29 April 1947, ÖStA, AVA, E1791:17. Gruber’s speech to parliament, 7 May 1947, in Csáky, Weg, 140. Neue Zeit, 20 May 1947 (Stalin garantierte die Südgrenze). Volkszeitung, 4 May 1947 (Ganz Österreich steht zu Kärnten). Volkszeitung, 29 April 1947 (Grenzgerüchte). Neue Zeit, 25 April 30 April 1947 (Die Wahrheit wird siegen!); SiDion LB April, 2 May 1947, ÖStA, AdR, BMI, 26.125-2/47; BMI report, 29 April 1947, BKA AA, pol-47/Jugoslawien 9/105.002-106.904. See also meeting in BKA, AA, 29 April 1947, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-47/Staatsvertrag/105.005-107.166. Meeting in BKA, AA, 29 April 1947, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-47/Staatsvertrag/ 105.005-107.166. FSIR 31, 27 April–10 May, TNA, FO1007/320. Investigation of Austrian counter Partisan Movement, 8 July 1947; telephone intercept of Stossier Jörg phone call, 3 July 1947, TNA, FO1020/1215. Noel-Baker Bebler talk, 14 June 1947, TNA, FO371/64047/C11016. Peake to FO, 17 July 1947, TNA, FO371/67414/R8241. See Marjoribanks, 8 August 1947, TNA, FO371/63985/C10520. Mack to FO, 23 September 1947, TNA, FO371/64101/C12783. Neue Zeit (Graz), 23 September 1947 (Für Abtrennungen von Kärnten). Schöner to Gruber, 1 October 1947, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-49/ Staatsvertrag/105.005-109.826. Schmid to Gruber, 15 November 1947, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-47/BKA AA/pol47/Staatsvertrag/105.005–110.627. My earlier argument (‘Die Kärntner Grenze

178

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und der Kalte Krieg’, Carinthia I 175 (1985): 323–40 ) that Yugoslavia was probably considering demanding the ‘Drau border’ should be revised. 85 See Stourzh, Einheit, 116–21; Bischof, Leverage, 109–10. 86 Stourzh, Einheit, 113 ff; Zhdanov meeting with Koplening and Fürnberg, 13 February 1948, (English tr.) Csaba Békés, László Borhi, Peter Ruggenthaler and Ottmar Traşcă, The Soviet Occupation of Romania, Hungary and Austria 1944-451948-9 (Budapest: Central European Press, 2015), 346–52. Both Mueller (Mission, 194–8) and Ruggenthaler (Concept, 108–18) fail, albeit in different ways, to take sufficient account of this and other evidence that Soviet Union was seeking to end its occupation of Austria in spring 1948. 87 Marjoribanks, 22 March 1948, TNA, FO371/70396/C2426. 88 Kleinwächter report, 3 April 1948, cited by Stourzh, Einheit, 121. 89 Reber to Marshall, 14 April 1948, United States Department of State, Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) 1948, vol. I, 1495 (http:// digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/FRUS.FRUS1948v02). 90 Kleinwächter to Gruber, 4 May 1948, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-48/Staatsvertrag 1/110.201-113.381. 91 Yugoslav Memorandum, 26 April 1948, TNA, FO371/70433/C3325; Bebler statement, 28 April 1948, TNA, FO371/70434/C3375l. 92 Cabinet 109, 27 April 1948; ÖStA, AdR, BKA. 93 Gruber, ‘Liberation’, 149–55; Karner and Ruggenthaler, ‘Weitere Unterstützung’, 105; Arnold Suppan, ‘Das Ringen um die Erfullung der Minderheitenschutzbestimmungen in Karnten/Borba za izpolnitev določil o zaščiti manjšine na Koroškem’, in Der Staatsvertrag von Wien 1955–2005: Die Kärntner Perspektiven, ed. Hellwig Valentin, Peter Karpf and Udo Puschnig (Klagenfurt: Amt der Kärntner Landesregierung, 2005), 156–75. 94 For a recent discussion see Svetozar Rajak, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union in the Early Cold War: Reconciliation, Comradeship, Confrontation, 1953–57 (London: Routledge, 2010), 9–15. 95 Verbal communication to the author by Professor Janko Pleterski (then a junior member of the Yugoslav delegation), 3 May 1987; Silvio Pons, ‘The Twilight of the Cominform’, in The Cominform: Minutes of the Three Conferences 1947/1948/1949, ed. Giuliano Procacci (Milan: Fondazione Giangiacomo Feltrinelli, 1994). 531, 533. 96 See Hans Kohn, Robert Bass and Elizabeth Marbury, eds, The Soviet-Yugoslav Controversy 1948–58: A Documentary Record (New York: Prospect, 1959), 13–35. 97 Deputies 110, 6 May 1948, TNA, FO371/70434/C3679; Reber to Marshall, 6 May 1948, FRUS 1948, vol. II, 1502; see Stourzh, Einheit, 136–8. 98 Bevin talk to Parliamentary Union, 26 May 1948, TNA, FO465/2, 62–3. 99 See Stourzh, Einheit, 123, 128–9. 100 Wilkinson to Marjoribanks, 11 June 1948, TNA, FO371/70411/C4648; see also Gruber, Liberation, 193 ff; Stourzh, Einheit, 135–8. 101 Cabinet 111, 11 May 1948, Figl I, ÖStA, AdR, BKA. 102 Neue Zeit 6 May 1948 (Kärnten bleibt frei und ungeteilt); see also Unterkärntner Nachrichten 7 May 1948 (Zwischen Hoffen und Bangen). On the discourse of threat see Florian Menz et al., Der Kampf, 111–17. 103 Cabinet 109, 27 April 1948, Figl I, ÖStA, AdR, BKA. See also Wildner note of phone call to London, 22 April 1948, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, KdM, Box 9, 100.276-100.279. 104 Boris Kraigher, Über die Unstimmigkeiten in der slowenischen nationalen Frage (Klagenfurt: POOF, July 1948), 2.

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105 Karner and Ruggenthaler, ‘Weitere Unterstützung’, 100–4, cite a Soviet account of a meeting on 7 January 1949 (wrongly referring to a Yugoslav claim to ‘the whole of Carinthia’); Politbureau resolution 67, 17 January 1949, in Die Rote Armee in Österreich: Sowjetische Besatzung 1945–1955, Dokumente/Krasnaja Armija v Avstrii. Sovetskaja okkupacija 1945–1955. Dokumenty, ed. Stefan Karner, Barbara Stelzl-Marz and Alexander Tschubarjan (Vienna: Oldenbourg, 2005), 737–8, doc. 159; see also Peter Ruggenthaler, ‘Warum Österreich nicht sowjetisiert wurde’, in Rote Armee, 712; Wolfgang Mueller, ‘Gab es eine “verpasste Chance”? Die Sowjetische Haltung um Staatsvertrag 1946–1952’, in Der österreichische Staatsvertrag, ed. Suppan, Stourzh and Mueller, 101. 106 Gruber’s (oral) report to Cabinet of a conversation with Kardelj, Cabinet 129, 19 October 1948, Figl I, ÖStA, AdR, BKA. 107 Marjoribanks Bebler talk, 15 February 1949, TNA, FO371/76436/C1519. 108 Marjoribanks, 11 February 1949, TNA, FO371/76436/C1355; Reber to Acheson, 12 February 1949, FRUS 1949, vol. III, 1073–4; see also Leitmaier, 18 February 1949, AdR, BKA AA, pol-49/Staatsvertrag 2c/80.797-81.388. 109 Gruber Bebler talk, 1 March 1949, Alfons Schilcher, Österreich und die Großmächte, Dokumente zur österreichischen Außenpolitik (Salzburg: Geyer, 1980), 73, 81–3; see also Gruber to Figl, 3. March 1949, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-49/Staatsvertrag 2c/80.797-87.664. 110 Gruber to Figl, 12 February 1949, cit. Schilcher, Österreich, 78–81. Wiener Zeitung, 22 February 1949 (Grenzen müssen unangetastet bleiben). 111 Volkszeitung, 8 March 1949 (Außenminister Dr. Gruber: Grenze ist Kernfrage in London). 112 Gruber Statement, 10 March 1949, TNA, FO371/76475/C2094; Csáky, Weg, 202; Volkszeitung, 11 March 1949 (Sofortiges Ende der Besetzung); 113 However, at a meeting with the other Western deputies on 16 February, Marjoribanks did raise the possibility of ceding the power stations ‘as a final solution of the whole question’, but this was rejected as probably unnecessary and in any case ‘precluded by the firm declarations of principle which the Austrian government had made on numerous occasions on the frontier question’, Western Deputies Meeting, 16 February 1949, TNA, FO371/76436/C1398. 114 Cabinet 149, 15 March 1949, Figl I, ÖStA, AdR; see also Wildner Diary, 10 March 1949, ÖStA, AVA, E1791:18. 115 KLR special session, 2 March 1949, KLA, LAD I. 116 Wildner Diary, 8 March 1949, ÖStA, AVA, E1791:18. 117 KLT 32, 15 March 1949, 129–33; Neue Zeit, 16 March 1949 (Unbeugsam für Kärntens Recht). 118 Karisch to Gruber, 17 March 1949, NÖLA, Figl PP, O144. 119 Neue Zeit, 18 March 1949 (Kärntner Frage und Politik). 120 KLT 32, 15 March 1949, 144–5; Volkszeitung, 16 March 1949 (‘Kärnten dankt Dr. Gruber’); Neue Zeit, 16 March 1949 (Unbeugsam für Kärntens Recht); Volkszeitung, 17 March 1949 (Kärntner Frage keine Parteisache). 121 Volkszeitung, 30 April 1949 (Grenzvolk unter Rot-Weiss-Rot). See also Polrep, April 1949, TNA, FO1007/336; Wildner Diary, 2 May 1949, ÖStA, AVA, E1791; 18. 122 Volkszeitung, 21 May 1949 (Parteitag der ÖVP in Wien). 123 Wildner Diary, 20 March 1949, ÖStA, AVA, E1791:18. 124 Reber to State Department, April 1949, FRUS 1949, III, 1087; Stourzh, Einheit, 148. 125 E.g. Volkszeitung, 20 April 1949 (Reber sieht das Grenzland).

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126 In addition, Article 21 ruled reparations out but retroactively sanctioned Yugoslav confiscations of Austrian property (Article 27, 2). 127 Volkszeitung, 22 June 1949 (Die letzte Etappe). 128 Wildner Diary 21 and 22 June 1949, ÖStA, AVA, E1791:18. 129 Cabinet 162a, 23 June 1949, ÖStA, AdR, BKA. 130 Interministerial Liaison Meeting, 4 January 1947, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 0980/III/10 19/47. 131 Kardelj to Tito, 14 December 1942, Jesen 1942; Korespondenca Edvarda Kardelja in Borisa Kidriča (Ljubljana: Institute of Contemporary History, 1963), doc. 207. 132 Kardelj to Vyshinsky, 20 April 1947, first published in Soviet Note of 11 August 1949 (Supplement to New Times 34, 17 August 1949, 1–3); Domej, ‘Konflikt’, 131–2. 133 Seven-point proposal, 26 April 1948, TNA, FO371/70433/C3325; German translation in Stourzh, Einheit, 136. Schmid to BKA AA, 14 April 1948, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-48/Staatsvertrag 2/112.613-112.614. 134 Bebler Reber meeting, 12 February 1949, FRUS 1949, vol. III, 1074. Bebler Statement to Deputies, 112, 24 February 1949, TNA, FO371/76474/C1638. 135 Gruber Bebler talk, 1 March 1949, Schilcher, Österreich, 81–3; see also Gruber to Figl, 3 March 1949, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-49/Staatsvertrag 2c/80.797-87.664. 136 Fitzroy Maclean to Gruber, March 1949, AdR, BKA AA pol-59/(Staatsvertrag). See also Reber to Secretary of State, 10 March 1949, FRUS, 1949, vol. III, 1079–80. 137 McNeil Bebler talk, 3 March 1949, TNA, FO371/76437/C2031. 138 Times, 5 June 1947 (Yugoslav Claim to Carinthia). 139 JFIS 35, 15–30 June 1947, TNA, FO371/63975/C9758; see also SiDion LB July 1947, ÖStA, AdR, BMI, 26.125-2/47; see Avguštin Malle, ‘Die Position der Kärntner Slowenen im Nationalitätenkonflikt’, in Kärnten seit 1945, ed. Rumpler, 497. 140 See Peter Fantur, Der Christliche Kulturverband bei den Kärntner Slowenen im Wandel der Zeit (Innsbruck: Tyrolia, 1992), 99–102; Tischler, Zvest, 154–8. 141 Mair, 18 November 1947, TNA, FO1020/1216; Polrep, 5 July 1948, TNA, FO1007/336. Rettl, PartisanInnen denkmäler, 147–51. Prušnik-Gašper, Gemsen, 389–91. 142 SiDion LB August 1948, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-48/Jugoslawien 9/110.061116.806. See Ivor Banac, With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985). 143 Otto Langbein, ‘Einige theoretische Bemerkungen zur Frage der Kärntner Slowenen’, Unser Weg, June 1948; Friedl Fürnberg, Volkstimme, 28 November 1948 (Wohin geht Jugoslawien?); SiDion LB August 1948, annex (KPÖ flyer), ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-48/Österreich 3/110.061-116.806. 144 Politburo meeting 14 February 1948, in Drnovšek, Zapisniki Politbiroja, 101; 5. 145 SiDion report (Stossier), 2 March 1949, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-49/Jugoslawien 9/80.369-83.190. 146 Haderlap Diary, 21 June 1949, AINV, OMV/27; Janez Stergar, ‘Die jugoslawischen Gebietansprüche ab 1945 und deren schrittweise Rücknahme’, in Der Staatsvertrag von Wien 1955–2005. Die Kärntner Perspektiven (Klagenfurt: Amt der Kärntner Landesregierung, 2005), 96. 147 Haderlap Diary, 2 January 1949, AINV, OMV/27; PolRep, January 1949, TNA, FO1007/336. 148 SiDion LB March and July 1949, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-49/Jugoslawien 9/80.36985.126. 149 Haderlap Diary, 12 June 1949, AINV, OMV/27.

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150 Braunias to BKA AA, 19 April 1949, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-49/Jugoslawien 9/80.369-83.106 (Braunias translation). 151 Cabinet 91, 9 December 1947, Figl I, ÖStA, AdR, BKA; Karisch to Figl, 4 December 1947, IfZ Hurdes PP, DO298, Wedenig to Köstner, 6 December 1947, ADG, Alphabetische Ablage, Staat und Kirche, Box 3 (Kärnten-Österreich). 152 SiDion LB July 1949, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-49/Jugoslawien 9/80.369-86.807; ÖStA, AdR, BMI, 24451-2/49. 153 Avguštin Malle, ‘Z Odporom Preziveti – in Kaj Potem?’ in Moritsch, Problemfelder, 139–40. 154 See i.a. Owen Chadwick, The Christian Church in the Cold War (London: Penguin, 1992), 62–7; Dianne Kirby, ed., Religion and the Cold War (London: Palgrave, 2003). 155 See Knight, ‘Sharp’, 84–96. 156 Mair report, 1 October 1948, TNA, FO371/70466/C8318. 157 FO to Vienna (Deputies 127), 4 March 1949, TNA, FO371/76475/C1998; UK statement, 12 March 1949, TNA, FO371/76476/C2175. 158 Deputies 135, 16 March 1949, TNA, FO371/76475/C2476. 159 Inis Claude, National Minorities. An International Problem (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1955), 69. 160 Bevin Bebler conversation, 18 February 1949, TNA, FO371/7636/C1520; Volkszeitung, 22 February 1949 (Eine neue Finke Belgrads). 161 Asbjørn Eide, ‘The Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities’, in The United Nations and Human Rights, A Critical Appraisal, ed. Philip Alston (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 220. See also Samuel Salzborn’s powerful but one-sided anti-ethnic discussion, Ethnisierung der Politik: Theorie und Geschichte des Volksgruppenrechts in Europa (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2005). 162 Koroško Kronika, 5 March 1948 (Južna Tirolska – Južna Koroška (South Tyrol – Southern Carinthia)); Neue Zeit, 16 March 1948 (Autonomiestatut für die Slowenen?). Before Treaty negotiations had started Piesch had stressed that any ‘autonomy’ could only be personal rather than territorial (for example a ‘cultural chamber’). Piesch to Figl, 13 December 1946, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA,pol-47/ Staatsvertrag/105.115-105.086; Enderle-Burcel, MRP Figl I, vol. 4, 219, note 28; also Fräss-Ehrfeld, ‘Bundeskompetenz’, 94. 163 Fräss-Ehrfeld, ‘Rolle’, 109. 164 Wedenig to Gruber, 10 July 1948, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-48/Österreich 3/115.805-115.840. 165 Ibid. 166 Chancery, British Legation Vienna to FO, 26 November 1948, TNA, FO371/70466/ C9924. 167 Mair Report (The Slovene Minority in Carinthia), 1 October 1948, TNA, FO371/70466/C8318. 168 Newole to Gruber, 14 May 1948, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-49/Staatsvertrag 2/112.613-113.993. Newole later reported that the plan had come from an unnamed American source via the Rektor of an Austrian Hochschule; Newole to Leitmaier, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-49/Staatsvertrag 2/112.613-113.993. 169 Newole memorandum, 12 August 1949, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-1949/ Staatsvertrag 2c/80.797-86.397, 10. 170 Gruber to Wedenig, 5 August 1948, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-49/Österreich 3/115.805-115.840.

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171 Chancery, British Legation, to FO, 26 November 1948, TNA, FO371/70466/C9924. 172 Gruber to Marjoribanks, 26 February 1949, TNA, FO371/7649/C1710 (12 point proposal). 173 Graf to Gruber, 16 February 1949, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-49/Staatsvertrag 2c/80.797 174 Die Presse, 27 February 1949 (Nicht blüffen lassen). 175 KLT 32, 15 March 1949, 132, 147. See also Wedenig interview with Arbeiter-Zeitung, 13 March 1949; Ferdinand Wedenig, ‘Kärnten und der Staatsvertrag’, Zukunft, 4 April 1949, 98. 176 See KLT 32, 15 March 1949, 135. 177 Stourzh, Einheit, 151, note 96. Vyschinsky initially agreed (on 16 June) to Bevin’s proposal to merely record Austria’s duty to protect its minorities. 178 Soviet proposal 1 July 1949 (English tr.), TNA, FO371/76444/C5527. German translation in Stourzh, Einheit, 156. 179 Slovene Communist Party Central Committee Meeting, 24 June 1949, Drnovšek, Zapisniki Politbiroja, 163. See Domej, ‘Konflikt’, 137. 180 ‘Zahtove’ (demands), 23 July 1949; SiDion report, July 1949; AdR, BKA AA, pol-49, Jugoslawien 9/80.369–86,807; Mates (Yugoslav ambassador, London) to Deputies, 28 July 1949, TNA, FO371/76481/C6104. 181 Schmidt to BKA AA, 29 July 1949, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-49/Staatsvertrag 1/80.019-85.871. 182 Braunias to Gruber, 15 August 1949, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-49/Österreich 10/86.654-86.655. 183 Cabinet 162a, 23 June 1949, Figl I, ÖStA, AdR, BKA. See also Vollgruber (Paris) to BKA AA, 3 July 1949, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-49/Staatsvertrag 2c/ Autonomie/80.797-85.107: Cabinet 166, 19 July 1949, Figl I, ÖStA, AdR, BKA; Stourzh, Einheit, 160–2. 184 Cabinet 164, 5 July 1949, ÖStA, AdR; BKA AA to Austrian delegation, London, 3 July 1949 (Tel: 89,040), ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-49/Staatsvertrag (Autonomie) (Box 121). 185 Hurdes cabinet paper (BMU 32.517/49), Cabinet 166 (Beilage D), ÖStA, AdR. 186 BK AA, Cabinet motion, (with hand-written note ‘not submitted, delivered orally’), ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-49/Staatsvertrag 2c/81.733-85.485; see also Stourzh, Einheit, 157–8, note 112. 187 Fräss-Ehrfeld, ‘Bundeskompetenz’, 115, misreads Hurdes’s objections as evidence of ‘a considerable atmospheric difference’ from the ‘strenuous actions of all three Carinthian parties in those years’. 188 Memorandum, Tischler (RKS) 12 July 1949, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-49/ Staatsvertrag 2c/80.797-85.653; Leitmaier, 17 July 1949, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol49/Staatsvertrag 2c/80.797-85.653. 189 Cabinet 166, 19 July 1949, Figl I, ÖStA, AdR, BKA; Leitmaier to Coreth (Austrian Delegation London) 19 July 1949, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-49/Staatsvertrag 2/80.019-85.367. 190 Chancery to FO, 18 July 1949, TNA, FO371/70445/C5947. 191 Chancery to FO, 25 July 1949, TNA, FO371/76445/C6190. 192 British draft article 7bis, paras 1 and 2, 16 August 1949, TNA, FO371/76482/C6521; German text in Stourzh, Einheit, 156–7. 193 British Liason Officer report 7 July 1949, Giachardi (Foreign Office Research Department) 30 July 1949, TNA, FO371/76445/C5947.

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194 Stourzh, Einheit, 159; FO to British Embassy Vienna, 22 August 1949, TNA, FO371/76483/C6702. 195 See Stourzh, Einheit, 160. 196 Civil Liaison British Zone, Monthly letter August 1949, TNA, FO1007/285. 197 KLT, 28 January 1947, Klagenfurt 1947. 198 Volkszeitung, 30 June 1948 (Die Lüge von Slowenisch-Kärnten); Mair Report (The Slovene Minority in Carinthia), 1 October 1948, TNA, FO371/70466/C8318. 199 FSIR 28, 16–29 March 1947, TNA, FO1007/320. 200 Lothar Höbelt, Von der vierten Partei zur dritten Kraft: die Geschichte des VdU, (Graz: Leopold Stocker, 1999), 57; Polrep, 12 February 1949, TNA, FO1007/336. 201 Steinacher memorandum, n.d. (forwarded by Schumy to Gruber), 13 March 1948, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, ÖB London, Box 10 (Varia). Population exchange was put as an alternative solution to a limited autonomy. See also Völkermarkt Bauernbund, 3 March 1949, AdR, BKA AA, pol-49/Staatsvertrag (Autonomie folder), Box 121; Volkszeitung, 26 February 1949 (Ist das Slowenenverfolgung?). 202 BHM Völkermarkt/Velikovec to SiDion Kärnten, 25 May 1949, ÖStA AdR, BKA AA/pol-49 Staatsvertrag 2c/80.797-84.187. 203 See Minute, 10 April 1948, AdR, BMU, 25.495/1948. 204 Education Division Monthly Letter, April 1948, TNA, FO1007/364. 205 Höbelt, VdU, 48. 206 Steinacher to Gruber, 11 May 1949; Gruber to Schumy, 27 July 1949, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-49/80.797-85.784: Schumy to Gruber, 9 August 1949, (attacking Steinacher (‘Antiquierte Minderheitenpolitik und österreichischer Staatsvertrag’) ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA/pol-49/Staatsvertrag/80797-86.244. 207 Volkszeitung, 6 December 1947 (Wahrheit und OF Dichtung). 208 Gruber statement, 28 February 1949, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-49/Staatsvertrag 2/112 613–113.285. 209 Wildner Diary, 24 July 1948, ÖStA, AVA, Wildner PP, E1791:18. 210 See i.a. Oliver Rathkolb, ‘NS-Problem und Gründung des VdU’, in Verdrängte Schuld – Verfehlte Sühne: Entnazifizierung in Österreich 1945–1955, ed. Sebastian Meissel, Oliver Rathkolb and Klaus-Dieter Mulley (Vienna: Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, 1986), 80–4; Manfried Rauchensteiner, Die Zwei: Die Große Koalition in Österreich 1945–1966 (Vienna: Bundesverlag, 1987), 128–41; Svoboda, Helmer, 98–107; Thomas Albrich, ‘Die Linken für die Rechten: Labour Party, SPÖ und die “Vierte” Partei 1948/49’, Zeitgeschichte 17 (1990): 432–51; Höbelt, VdU, 37–62; Lehmann-Horn, FPÖ, 54–5. 211 The number of votes cast in October 1949 was 267,272 compared to 204,641 in 1945; Hänisch (Kontinuität, 176–7) estimates that 18.6 per cent of the 1945 electorate or 44,268 had been excluded as ‘belastete’ (including those defined in the Austrian legislation as both belastete and minderbelastete). 212 SCHAG (Schulpolitische Arbeitsgemeinschaft) (headed by inspector Julius Heinzel) Report to 4th Provincial Party Conference, 1949, cited in Blatnik, ‘Sozialistische Partei’, 49. See also Niederacher, ‘Die öffentliche Rede über Entnazifizierung’, 53. 213 PolRep, June 1948, TNA, FO1007/336. 214 Kärnten Polrep, 5 July 1948, and PolRep, 10 Dezember 1949, TNA FO 1007/336. Czeitschner was appointed district secretary of the ÖVP Arbeiter und Angestellten Bund (ÖAAB) in Villach. See Elste, Kärntens Braune Elite, 35–44. On his earlier career see Burz, Nationalsozialistische Bewegung, 170–2; Elste, ‘Stationen’, 32, 43–5, 70–3.

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215 Bock to Hurdes, 21 January 1949, IfZ, Vienna, Hurdes PP, DO 379. 216 Polrep, 5 July 1948, TNA, FO1007/336; see also Polrep, 6 August 1948, TNA, FO1007/336. 217 See Lisa Rettl and Peter Pirker, ‘Ich war mit Freuden dabei’: Der KZ-Arzt Sigbert Ramsauer – eine österreichische Geschichte (Vienna: Milena, 2010), 272–85. 218 SiDion report, 3 January 1947, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-48/Österreich 3/112.413116.750. 219 Yugoslav transcript of proceedings, 22 October 1947, copy, AINV, OMV Fasc 21; Kugler to BKA AA, 3 December 1947, AdR, BKA AA, KdM, 100.918. The witnesses for Maier-Kaibitsch included Vinzenz Schumy and Richard Wanner; see Österreichiche Zeitung, 30 October 1947 (Verschleppung des Maier-KaibitschProzesses zwecks Entlastung des Angeklagten). See FSIR 44, 26 October–8 November 1947, TNA FO1007/320. 220 Maier-Kaibitsch was found guilty of ‘significant participation’ (massgebliche Beteiligung) in the deportations and of high treason as an illegal Nazi. He was sentenced to life imprisonment, but was released early on grounds of ill health. See Alfred Elste, Michael Koschat and Hans Filipič, NS-Österreich auf der Anklagebank (Klagenfurt: Hermagoras, 2000), 59–65; FSIR 44, 26 October–8 November 1947, TNA FO1007/320. 221 Volkszeitung, 4 November 1947 (Österreich gab ein Beispiel). 222 Schumy to Figl, 25 October 1947, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, KdM, 100.824-K/47; Volkszeitung, 12 November 1947 (Die andere Seite). 223 The charges under Articles 8,10, 11, 12 Prohibition Law (Verbotsgesetz) and Article 8 War Crimes Law (Kriegsverbrechergesetz, KVG) related to his support of the illegal Nazi Party. See Polreps 6–9, August to November 1948, TNA, FO1007/336; Brown to Gerö, 17 February 1949, TNA, FO371/76433; A de B Hamilton (ACABE) to Brown, 1 December. 1948, TNA, FO1020/460; FSIR 24, 19 January to 1 February 1947, TNA, FO1007/320. 224 See British Aide Mémoire (Annex B), TNA, FO371/76433/C1481. 225 Galloway to Kirkpatrick (FO) (January draft), TNA, FO1020/460. The phrase was not included in the final version sent on 16 February. 226 Brown to High Commissioner Galloway, 9 February 1949, TNA, FO1020/460. 227 Cabinet 141, 18 January 1949, Figl I, ÖStA, AdR, BKA. 228 Question by Schumy, Brunner, Matt and fellows, 14 July 1949, ÖStA, AdR, BKA, Pr/M/49, 3908; Beiblatt zur Parlamentskorrespondenz 5. Beiblatt 380/J. 229 Polrep 6, August 1948, TNA, FO1007/336. 230 See also Peter, 2 August 1948, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 44.448/48. 231 Steinacher memorandum (‘Kritische politische Wertung der Schulfrage in Südkärnten samt Folgerungen’) 6 May 1949, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-49/ Staatsvertrag 2c/80.797-83.944. 232 Köstinger (BHS) to Gruber, 29 September 1949, ÖStA, AdR, KdM, 70.313 – K/49. Gruber replied that the result of investigations (Erhebungsergebnisse) was being awaited. 233 See Polrep, 5 July 1948, TNA, FO1007/336. 234 SiDion Villach, LB December 1948, ÖStA, AdR, BMI, 24451-2/49. 235 Polrep, 5 July 1949 and 19 September 1949, TNA, FO1007/336. 236 Hans Lagger, Die Wahrheit über Dachau (Klagenfurt: Opferfürsorgereferates der SPÖ für ehemals politisch Verfolgte, 1950), 3. On Lagger see Wilhelm Wadl, ‘Kärnten 1945: Dramatischer Umbruch und schwieriger Neubeginn’, in

Notes

237 238 239 240 241 242

243

244 245 246 247 248

185

Johannes Grabmayer, 8. Mai 45 – Ende & Aufbruch: Wendepunkt der Kärntner ArbeiterInnenbewegung (Klagenfurt: Kammer für Arbeiter und Angestellte für Kärnten, 2015), 78–82. Neue Zeit, 25 September 1949 (Zwischen Dr. Steinacher und Dr. Tischler). Neue Zeit, 28 September 1949 (Die Sozialisten zur Slowenenfrage). Volkszeitung, 4 October 1949 (Kärntens Grenze fordert Einigkeit).Viktor Reimann, Die Dritte Kraft in Österreich (Vienna: Molden, 1980), 161; Lehmann-Horn, FPÖ, 55. Neue Zeit, 5 October 1949 (Landesverräterstimmen für die ÖVP). See also Neue Zeit, 7 October 1949 (Steinacher, Tischler und Co.). Österreichisches Statistisches Zentralamt, Die Nationalratswahlen vom 9. Oktober 1949 (Vienna: SZA, 1950). A total of 248,834 votes were cast out of an electorate of 267,272. According to the Carinthian Security Directorate (LB January 1950), out of around 2,000–2,500 VdU members registered in Carinthia about 1,000 came from Klagenfurt and Villach. The VdU also did well in district capitals with strong German national and Nazi traditions like Spittal (1,176 out of 4,374 votes) and St Veit (1,129 out of 5,609). In the bilingual area the VdU won over 10 per cent of the electoral roll in 20 parishes, with more than 20 per cent in Völkermarkt/Velikovec (25.1 per cent), Velden/Vrba (25 per cent), Köstenburg/Kotmara vas (22.6 per cent) and Emmersdorf (22.1 per cent). Neue Front, 17 August 1950 (Wünsche von 90.000 Südkärntnern Mißachtet). According to Hänisch (table 5.17) 37 per cent of VdU voters had been excluded as incriminated in 1945 (the ÖVP figure was 21 per cent). Neue Zeit, 18 October 1949 (Die slowenische Minderheit nach der Wahl). KLT 1, 14 November 1949, 19. KLT 2, 21 Dezember 1949, 101–2.

Chapter 4 1 2

3 4

5

SiDion LB September 1949, ÖStA, AdR, BMI, 24.451-2/49-SiDion LB April 1950, ÖStA, AdR BMI, 30.344-2/50; Polrep, 23 January 1950, TNA, FO1007/336. Lehmann-Horn, FPÖ, 65. Polrep, 23 January 1950, TNA, FO1007/336; VdU Landtag group memorandum (signed Scrinzi) n.d. (forwarded by Wedenig to Gruber, 6 December 1950, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-51/Österreich 10/132.407-131.116). See Christian Schaller, ‘Parteien und Wahlen in Kärnten’, in Parteien und Wahlen in Österreichs Bundesländern 1945–1991, ed. Herbert Dachs (Vienna: Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, 1992), 88. KLT 2, 20 December 1949; Elste and Hänisch, Kärntner Parteiensystem, 139–40. KLT 2, 20–21 December 1949; SiDion LB March 1950, ÖStA, AdR, BMI, 30.3442/50. See also Österreichische Allgemeine Zeitung (Carinthian supplement), 12 February 1950 (Südkärnten will keinen Sprachenzwang) and 10 February 1950 (Es geht um das Elternrecht); Lehmann-Horn, FPÖ, 63. Steinacher (Borderland Office) to Gruber, 19 January 1950, Beilage A (‘Entwurf für die sprachliche Neuregelung der Schulverhältnisse in Südkärnten’); Beilage B

186

Notes

(‘Erwägungen zur schwebenden Neuregelung der sprachlichen Schulverhältnisse in Südkärnten’). ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-50/Österreich 10/120.077-120.671. 6 Steinacher, ‘Grenzlandamt memorandum’. Domej, ‘Konflikt’, 111. 7 Der Kärntner Lehrer, 1–2 (January–February 1951) (Das Ringen um eine bessere Zukunkft). 8 KLT 19, 21–22 December 1955, 253–8. 9 Valentin, Nationalismus, 243–5. 10 Der Kärntner Lehrer, IV/1 January–February 1950 (Der ‘Ideengehalt’ eines Sozialisten); Der Karntner Lehrer, VI, 5 May 1952 (Gegen Zwang und Monopole). On Drimmel and the church see Liebmann, ‘Freie Kirche’, 195–207. 11 KLT 16, 19 December 1951, 94. 12 KLT 19, 21 December 1955, 241. 13 KLT 13, 17 December 1957, 356. 14 Wedenig to Drimmel, 14 March 1955, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 41.340/55. 15 SPZ declaration, 9 December 1954, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 94.398/54. 16 Leopold Loike (mayor of Bleiburg/Pliberk) to BMU, 30 January 1950, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 7251/50. 17 Kuchinka to Gruber, 26 December 1949, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-50/Österreich 10/120.077–123.086-pol/50 (BMU, 35469/50) (emphasis added). 18 Kuchinka to Chief district administrator Wagner, 7 March 1950, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 125465/50; Kuchinka to Gruber, 17 April 1950, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 35469/50 (ad 120.077–125.465-pol/50); Wedenig to Kuchinka, 18 March 1950; Kuchinka to Wedenig, 27 March 1950; Vollgruber (BKA AA) to Hurdes, 14 July 1950, 120.077 ad 125.465-pol/1950 (BMU, 35469/50). 19 Neue Front, 17 August 1950 (Wünsche von 90.000 Südkärntnern Mißachtet); KLT 6, 1 August 1950, 267. 20 Maier (ÖVP Carinthia) to Drimmel, 9 July 1957, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 71.836/57. 21 See Figl’s comment in Cabinet 195, 7 March 1950, Figl II, ÖStA, AdR. 22 See Lehman-Horn, FPÖ, 64. 23 SiDion LB May 1950, ÖStA, AdR, BMI, 30.344-2/50. See also Polrep, 23 January 1950, TNA, FO1007/336. 24 Volkszeitung, 14 März 1950 (So wählten die Gemeindewahlen in Kärntner); the results in Völkermarkt were VdU 3 seats (378 votes), ÖVP 4 (550), SPÖ 7 (668). In Bleiburg the seats were VdU 2 (110 votes), ÖVP 6 (266), SPÖ 4 (182); see also Lehman-Horn, FPÖ 339. 25 SiDion LB August 1950, ÖStA, AdR, BMI, 30.344-2/50. According to the Volkszeitung, 14 March 1950 (So wählten die Gemeindewahlen in Kärnten) the SPÖ had 8 seats, the Slovene Christian People’s Party 4, the Left Block 1, and People’s Party 2. 26 Arnoldstein/Podklošter council had 3 ÖVP seats (474 votes), 10 SPÖ (1,515) and 2 VdU (64) with 1 Linksblock seat (237). See also SiDion LB February 1953, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-53, Östereich 10/316.413-318.455. 27 On the proposal for a central office for ethnic questions (Zentrale Behörde für Volkstumsfrage) see NS 18 December 1949, ÖStA, AdR, BKA Präs, 93-PrM/50; Cabinet 187, 3 January 1950, Cabinet 224, 7 November 1950, Figl II, ÖStA, AdR, BKA. 28 Minute 27 October 1950, ÖStA, AdR, BKA, 4871/PrM/5027. 29 NSKS (Tischler) to Gruber, 28 February 1950, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-50/ Österreich 10/120.077–129.418. SPZ 18 July 1947, BMU reply, 22 August 1947, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 6.827/47 on 48.143/46; Jugendverband, 12 July 1948, ÖStA, AdR,

Notes

187

BMU, 44.448/48; see also Education Division Monthly letter, February 1948, TNA, FO1007/364. 30 See Gruber to Tischler, 6 March 1950, which removed a reference to referring to the new law, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-50/Österreich 10/120.071. 121.320. 31 Österreichische Allgemeine Zeitung, 24 February 1950 (Gute Botschaft für Südkärnten aus Wien). 32 Volkszeitung, 23 February 1950 (Unkorrektes Verhalten in der Südkärntner Schulfrage). Volkszeitung, 25 February 1950 (Neuregelung der Südkärtner Schulfrage). Figl II, Cabinet 195, 7 March 1950, ÖStA, AdR, BKA. For Scrinzi’s own account see Otto Scrinzi, Politiker und Arzt in bewegten Zeiten (Graz: Stocker, 2003), 218 ff. 33 Volkszeitung, 27 September 1949. 34 Department 5 Pol, 30 January 1950, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-50/Österreich 10/120.671-121.320. 35 Neue Front, 27 July 1950 (Noch immer Deutsch und Slowenisch). 36 Vollgruber (BKA AA) to Hurdes, 14 July 1950, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 35469/50. 37 Caccia (British Embassy Vienna) to FO, 13 September 1950, TNA, FO371/84946/ C6574. 38 Braunias to Gruber, 4 March 1950, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-50/Jugoslawien 2/120.228-122.117; Figl II Cabinet 196, 14 March 1950, ÖStA, AdR, BKA. 39 KLT 6, 1 August 1950, 217–20, 267–9. 40 Piesch speech to the League for the United Nations in Neue Zeit, 14 February 1947 (Ein Beitrag des guten Willens); see Haas and Stuhlpfarrer, Österreich und seine Slowenen, 94. 41 KLT 5, 8 May 1950, 31–41. 42 Figl to Wedenig, 22 April and 10 May 1950; Wedenig to Figl, 20 May 1950, ÖStA, AdR, BKA, 2.385, Pr- 1a/1950; Wedenig to Figl, 5 June 1950, ÖStA, AdR, BKA, 2850, Pr- 1a/1950. 43 Margarétha (BMF) to Figl, 6 May 1950; Figl to Wedenig, 9 September 1950, ÖStA, AdR, BKA, 2.117, Pr- 1a/1950. 44 Figl II, Cabinet 211, 11 June 1950, ÖStA, AdR, BKA. 45 SiDion LB September 1950, 14–5, ÖStA, AdR, BMI, 30.344-2/50. 46 Wiener Zeitung, 8 October 1950 (Kärnten frei und ungeteilt); similarly Die Presse, 8 October 1950 (Kärntens Feiertage); Die Presse, 11 October 1950 (Festlicher Tag in Klagenfurt). 47 Figl to Margarétha, 24 January 1951 (draft) ÖStA, AdR, BKA, 14-Pr 1a /1951. 48 Braunias to Gruber, 15 October 1950, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-50/Österreich 10/120.077-128.437. See also Braunias to Gruber, 10 November 1950, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-50/Österreich 10/120.077-129.137. 49 Memo, 4 August 1950, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-50/Österreich 10/120.077-126.327. 50 Braunias to Gruber, 9 March 1950, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-50/Österreich 10/120.077-121.674. 51 Suppan, Österreich und Jugoslawien, 453–5; Aufzeichnungen über die Verhandlungen etc., 2 July 1952, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-52/Österreich 10/147.185-152.959; Repić Aide-Mémoire, 24 July 1952, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol -52/Österreich 10/147.185-154.147. 52 SiDion LB March 1954, ÖStA, AdR, BMI, 30.000-2/54 (Slovenski Poročevalec). 53 See Slovenski Vestnik, 13–16 March 1952 (Koroški Slovenci in Nacionalizem); see also Ude to Boris Kraigher, 24 December 1952, and 30 December 1952 (Informacija), 19 May 1955, Ude to Primožič, 12 March 1953; ARS-1589, Kraigher PP, box 11.

188

Notes

54 Wedenig to Gruber, 6 December 1950; Gruber to Wedenig, 22 January 1951, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-51/Österreich 10/132. 407–131.116; Wedenig to Gruber, 28 February 1951; Gruber to Wedenig, 3 April 1951, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-51, Österreich 10/132.407-133.941. Draft Cabinet paper, 28 February 1951, BMU 10.817/51; BKA AA note, 1 March 1951, Figl II, Cabinet 239, 6 March 1951, ÖStA, AdR, BKA; Hurdes to Gruber, 19 February 1951, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-51/ Österreich 10/132,407–132,935; see also unsent draft Cabinet paper, 6 January 1951, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-51/Österreich 10/132.407-131.116. 55 Wedenig to Gruber, 6 December 1950; Gruber to Wedenig, 22 January 1951, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-51/Österreich 10/132.407-131.116; Wedenig to Gruber, 28 February 1951, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-51/Österreich 10/132.407133.941. 56 Gruber to Wedenig, 2 April 1951, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-51/Österreich 10/132.407-133.941. 57 Zechner to Schärf, 28 July 1952; Newole to Schärf, 5 August 1952, VGA, Schärf PP, 4/144 (zu Zl 155.084-pol/52). 58 Tischler, Sprachenfrage, 36. 59 Monthly Civil Affairs report (Carinthia and Styria) April 1950, TNA, FO1007/285. 60 Wedenig to Figl, 10 April 1951, NÖLA, Figl PP, O144 For ÖVP denial see Volkszeitung 4 April 1951 (Wer übt Verrat an der Heimat?). 61 Lagger to Staatsamt für Volksaufklärung, 12 December 1945, enclosing a copy of the law and an accompanying decree, 6 January 1946, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 12.525/45. 62 On the mythology of the ‘Unterrichtsprache’ see Robert Knight, ‘Education and National Identity in Austria after The Second World War’, in The Habsburg Legacy: National Identity in Historical Perspective, ed. Ritchie Robertson and Edward Timms (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1994), 178–95. 63 Gertraud Putz, Die Kärntner Slowenen und die Kirche, Ein Beitrag zu den kulturellen Rechten ethnischer Minderheiten (Salzburg: Internationales Forschungszentrum für Grundfragen der Wissenschaften, 1982), 199–200. 64 Leo Kövesi, ‘Das österreichische Schulrecht’, in Die österreichische Schule 1945–1975 – 125 Jahre ‘Erziehung und Unterricht’, ed. Othmar Spachinger, Hans Speitzer and Karl Sretenovic (Vienna: Österreichischer Bundesverlag, 1975), 15–16. 65 See Loebenstein to BMU, 23 October 1951; Kövesi memorandum, 3 November 1952, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 71669/51. 66 BMU, Entwurf des Bundesministeriums für Unterricht für ein Schul- und Erziehungsgesetz (Vienna: Österreichischer Bundesverlag, 1948) (§ 25). See draft Carinthian law and handwritten amendments to paras 25–21 (written without BMU involvement), 4 April 1949, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-49/Österreich 3/82.821-82.821. 67 See Leitmeier note, 23 February 1949 (Alternativ-Vorschlag, auf den zurückzugehen wäre, wenn es sich als absolut notwendig erweist), ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-49/ Staatsvertrag (Autonomie), Box 121, 8; Hurdes to BKA AA (Leitmeier), 23 February 1949, ÖStA, AdR, BMU 8695/49. 68 Heinrich Peter (Department 18), 29 August 1952, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 582/51. 69 Heinrich Peter, 29 January 1953, Kolb to Wedenig, 3 February 1953, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 25.491/53; BMI, Information, 29 January, 5 February 1953, 316.266-316.877 and 317.112/317.117. 70 Karisch to Hurdes, 28 April 1950, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 24.003/50; Karisch to Hurdes, 26 July 1950, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 36.636/50. 71 ÖVP and VdU motion (draft school law), KLT 12, 10 July 1951.

Notes 72

189

Question from Pfeifer, Scheuch (Hermann) Gruber et al., 14 February 1951, Supplement to Parliamentary Correspondence, 55th supplement, Answer to question (Anfragebeantwortung), 8 March 1951, 218/J; Kövesi, 23 February 1951, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 9.911/51. 73 Peter, 5 March 1950, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 7.251/51; Wedenig to Figl, 17 August 1950, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 582/51; BMU, 28 August 1950, Hurdes to Figl, 27 September 1950, 27 October 1950 (draft); Hurdes to Wedenig, 2 November 1950, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 48.373/50. 74 BMU to Newole, 22 February 1951, AdR, BMU, Zu 9911/51; VdU question (17 May 1951, 260/J); Neue Front, 26 May 1951 (Neuregelung der Schulsprachenfrage in Kärnten). 75 Annual inspection report. Provincial school inspector for compulsory schools in Carinthia (extract), ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 29.084/53, 1955–6, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 26.097/57. 76 Ministerial reply, 6 August 1951, 273/AB zu 260/J, Beiblatt zur Parlamentskorrespondenz. 77 Figl II, Cabinet 224, 7 November 1950, ÖStA, AdR, BKA; Figl to President Renner (draft), 8 November 1950, ÖStA, AdR, AdR, BKA, 4.827/PrM 50. 78 See the Ballhausplatz redraft of its response to Tischler, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol50/Österreich 10/120.077-129.418; Gruber to Tischler, 6 March 1950, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-50/Österreich 10/120.671-121.320. 79 Statement on wishes of Landesrat Karisch, 5 October 1951, draft (version J); 16 October 1951, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 49.744/51; Hurdes to Wedenig, 6 October 1951, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 36.636/51. 80 See Brix, Umgangsprachen; King, Budweisers, 58–9; Matjaž and Vladmir Klemenčič, Die Kärntner Slowenen und die zweite Republik; zwischen Assimilierungsdruck und dem Einsatz für die Umsetzung der Minderheitenrechte (Klagenfurt, Hermagoras, 2010), 107–10. Göderle, Zensus, 138. 81 Voegl-Burkh (ÖVP Kärnten) to Gruber, 30 May 1952, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-52, /Österreich 10/130.368-130.368 82 Newole to Leopold Zechner, 2 September 1952, VGA, Schärf PP, 4/144. There were 635 Deutsch-Windisch and 247 Deutsch-Slowenisch speakers. 83 Point 7 (Stourzh, Einheit, 136); the Interior Ministry response BMI (Graf) to BKA AA, 28 April 1948, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-48/Staatsvertrag 2/113.613-112.978 pol/48 Annex A, did not comment on the proposal to ask about the ‘Muttersprache’. 84 Though it was less unfavourable to the minority than the question of the 1934 census, see Suppan, Volksgruppen, 44, 49. Klemenčič and Klemenčič, Kärntner Slovenen, 44–52; Suppan, Österreich-Jugoslawien, 683–5. 85 Kärntner Gemeindeblatt (Stück 6, 72. Jahrgang) Erlass 27 vom 8 Mai 1951 Ordentliche Volkszählung am 1. Juni 1951 (Landeshauptmann) Zl.6981-2/1951, 76. Gruber to Helmer, 13 April 1951, Helmer to Gruber, 27 April 1951, ÖStA, AdR, pol51/Österreich 10/131,048–134.354 and 135.401. 86 Appendix B (‘Erwägungen zur schwebenden Neuregelung der sprachlichen Schulverhältnisse in Südkärnten’) Landesleitung der ÖVP (Steinacher) to Gruber, 19 January 1950, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-50, Österreich 10/120.077-120.671; Kuhinka to Gruber, 17 April 1950 (copy) AdR, BMU, 35469/50. According to a security report of 23 October 1948, Kuhinka had been a Nazi party member from March 1938 until 1943 when she was excluded for protesting against the deportation of a Slovene from the parisch of Diex/Djekše. ÖStA, AdR, BMU 82.567/48.

190 87

Notes

Kuchinka to Gruber, 17 April 1950 (copy), ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 35.469/50 (ad 125.465pol/50). 88 Schumy memorandum, n.d., [April 1948] ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, ÖB London. 89 Vinzenz Schumy, Kampf um Kärnten, Einheit und Freiheit (Vienna: Göschl, 1950), 19–21. 90 Fischer, 19 June 1952, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-52/Österreich 10/147.185-152.017. 91 Memorandum from an unnamed ‘expert on the Carinthian question’ forwarded by VdU to Gruber, 8 December 1950 (and by Schumy to Helmer and Graf), Leitmaier, 14 December 1950, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-50/Österreich 10/120.077-129.818. 92 Gruber to Helmer, 13 April 1951, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-51/Österreich 10/131.048-134.354. Helmer’s reply to Gruber, 27 April 1951, (131.048-135.401), denying any knowledge of a VdU intervention prompted a marginal comment of ‘that’s rich!’ (‘das ist doch stark!’). 93 See Wedenig’s comments, KLT 16, 19 December 1951, 110; and Pleterski, Souveränitat, 65. 94 SiDion LB January 1952, ÖStA, AdR, BMI, 50.998-2/51 (Paul Zavcer, Slovenski Poročevalec, 14 December 1951). 95 Information, Fischer (Abt 5 Pol), 30 June 1952, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-52/ Österreich 10/-147.185-152.017. See also Loebenstein (VD), 26 June 1952, ÖStA, AdR, BKA, 88.558-2a/52; Newole to Schärf, 5 August 1952, VGA, Schärf PP, 4/144. 96 SiDion LB June 1951, ÖStA, AdR BMI, 50.998-2/51. For allegations from the London-based association of free Slovenes (Slovenska Pravda) against MayrhoferGrüenbuhl (translation BMU) see ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 71.049/51; Yugoslav AideMémoire (extract), presented on 24 July 1952, AdR, BKA AA, pol -52/Österreich 10/147.185 – zu Zl 154.147; SPZ to Kolb, 23 June 1953, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 57.021/53. 97 See Pleterksi, Souveränität, 203; Klemenčič and Klemenčič, Kärntner Slowenen, 113, incorrectly give 7,707 as the aggregation of Windish, Windish-Slovene, SloveneWindish and Slovene, and also fail to include the highest aggregate figure. 98 Kärntner Landeszeitung (29), 17 May 1952; SZA, Volkszählungsergebnisse 1951 Heft 4 (Vienna: SZA, 1952), 3. On page 14 it did, however, record 15 permutations including three subgroups: 448,345 Germans (including German-Slovene and German-Windish), 13,712 Slovene and 8,822 Windish. The aggregate figure in Ergebnisse der Volkszählung vom 1. Juni 1951 nach Gemeinden: Kärnten: die sprachliche Gliederung nach den Eintragungen in den Haushaltungsbogen (Vienna: SZA, 1952) showed 3,885 ‘others’, leaving 22,534. 99 Volkszeitung, 20 May 1952 (Wer hat die gezählten windischen Landsleute zu Slowenen gestempelt?); Volkszeitung, 22 May 1952 (Nochmals die Windischen und die Volkszählung). 100 VdU question, Rader, Strießnig, Leitgeb, Scrinzi, Egger, KLT 22, 15 July 1952. 101 Jagoditsch to Zimmermann (President, SZA), 9 June 1952; Zimmerman to Gruber, 26 June 1952 (summary, 11 June 1952) ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-52/Österreich 10/147.185-152.017. 102 SZA, Ergebnisse der Volkszählung vom 1. Juni Textband (Vienna: SZA, 1953) (Übersicht 75). 103 E.g. Walter Lakomy and Heribert Jordan (Kärntner Schulverein Südmark) to BKA, 3 October 1955 (ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 60. 728/55); SiDion LB April 1957, ÖStA, AdR, BMI, 37.0000-2a/57.

Notes

191

104 SZA, Ergebnisse der Volkszählung vom 1. Juni Textband (Volkszählungsergebnisse 1951-Heft 14) (Vienna: SZA, 1953) Übersicht 77, 36–7, 39. Only 12 had a Slovenespeaking majority. Failing to consider ‘German-Slovenes’ as Slovenes excluded 13 villages. 105 SZA, Ergebnisse der Volkszählung vom 1. Juni 1951 (Tabellenband 1 (Demographischer Teil)), No. 12 (Vienna: SZA, 1953), table 4. 106 ÖSZ, Ergebnisse der Volkszählung vom 1. June 1951 (Vienna: SZA, 1953), 34. 107 SiDion Kärnten LB June 1951, ÖStA, AdR, BMI, 50.998-2/51; Pleterski, Souveränität, 59, 203; Klemenčič and Klemenčič, Kärntner Slowenen, 116. 108 SZA, Ergebnisse der Volkszählung vom 1. Juni 1951 Textband (Vienna: SZA, 1953), 37, table 77. See also Suppan, Volksgruppen, 18–19 (Table), 56. 109 Pleterski, Souveränität, 59. 110 Wallinger Schöner talk, 9 July 1956, TNA, FO 120/1143. 111 Newole to Zechner, 2 September 1952, VGA, Schärf PP, 4/144. There were 635 ‘Deutsch-Windisch’ and 247 ‘Deutsch-Slowenisch’ speakers. 112 Meeting in Klagenfurt, 24 August 1955, ÖStA, AdR, AVA, Schöner PP, AVA, E/1773: 326. 113 SPZ to Wedenig, 14 December 1951, VGA, Schärf PP, 4/144. 114 NSKS to Figl, 20 November 1951, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 40.071/52. 115 Kolb to Tischler, 11 March 1952, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 40.071/52. 116 Werner Weilguni, Österreichisch-Jugoslawische Kulturbeziehungen 1945–1989 (Vienna: Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, 1990), 22–3. 117 Neue Zeit, 18 February 1953 (Unbeirrte Haltung Wedenigs). 118 On Paller see Wallas, ‘Grossdeutsche Hoffnungen’, 149–51; Theo Venus, ‘Kontinuitäten und Brüche in der sozialdemokratischen Tagespresse un im Journalismus 1938 bis 1945’, in Mesner, Entnazifizierung, 237–8. 119 SiDion LB (Villach), December 1954, ÖStA, AdR, BMI, 30.000 2/54. 120 E.g. KLT 12, 10 July 1951, 89–90 (Motion by Tranig, Scheiber Sima et al.). Wedenig to Hurdes, 15 October 1951, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 73.011/51. 121 Gertrude Enderle-Burcel, ed., Adolf Schärf: Tagebuchnotizen des Jahres 1952 (Innsbruck: StudienVerlag, 2010), 40; Newole to Schärf, 5 August 1952, VGA, Schärf PP, 4/144. 122 See Wedenig to Kolb, 19 September 1952; Karisch to Kolb, 17 September 1952, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 82.898/52. 123 According to Wedenig (to Kolb 19 September 1952), the ÖVP reduction was from 70 per cent to 54 per cent of the population. 124 Schärf note of talk with Waldbrunner, 23 July 1952, Enderle-Burcel, Schärf, 181. 125 Meeting of 16 July 1952, Schilcher, Österreich, 90–2; Enderle-Burcel, Schärf, 177. 126 Party discussion, 16 July 1952, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-54, (Berlin), Box 302. 147.185-155.084. 127 See Slovene memorandum, 11 October 1955, in Gero Fischer, Das Slowenische in Kärnten. Bedingungen der sprachlichen Sozialisation, eine Studie zur Sprachenpolitik (2nd ed) (Klagenfurt: Hermagoras, 1980), 195–200; Volkzeitung, 19 June 1952 (Gutes Echo fur Gruber in Belgrad). 128 Newole to Schärf, 5 August 1952, VGA, Schärf PP, 4/144. Enderle-Burcel, Schärf, 162. 129 Newole to Schärf, 1 August 1952, VGA, Schärf PP, 4/144). 130 Newole to Schärf, 5 August 1952, VGA, Schärf PP, 4/144.

192

Notes

131 Neue Zeit, 24 January 1953 (Kärntner Schulfrage kein Politikum!). 132 Karisch to Kolb, 17 September 1952, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 82.898/52. 133 Enderle-Burcel, Schärf (26 June 1952); Zechner to Schärf, 28 July 1952, VGA, Schärf PP, 4/144. 134 Meeting, 16 July 1952, Enderle, Schärf, 177; Schilcher, Österreich, 90-2. 135 Neue Front, 31 January 1952 (Regiert Tito die Kärntner SPÖ?); Neue Front, 17 February 1952 (Wedenigs jugoslawische Sondermission); Neue Zeit, 18 February 1953 (Unerhörte Verdächtigung Wedenigs durch Graf). 136 BMI Information, 5 February 1953, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-53/Österreich 10/316.266-317.112. The head teacher of the secondary school, Karl Witt, was an SPÖ candidate for the Landtag. 137 Neue Zeit, 24 January 1953 (Kärntner Schulfrage kein Politikum!); Neue Zeit, 30 January 1953 (Jeder nationale Hass muß abgebaut werden). 138 Neue Zeit, 11 January 1953 (L.E.T., Friede in Kärnten). 139 Wedenig to Kolb, 2 February 1953, Heinrich Peter, 2 February 1953 (copy for Zeissl, 29 January 1953) Kolb to Wedenig, 3 February 1953, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 25.491/53; BMI, January, 5 February 1953, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-52/Österreich 10/316.266317.112. 140 From 101,146 to 122,245 on roll which increased from 267,272 to 285,615. 141 18 seats/versus 11 ÖVP, 9 VDU and 1 KPÖ; Lehmann-Horn, ‘Parteien’, in Rumpler, Kärnten, 244–5; Elste, ‘Kärntner Parteinsystem nach 1945’, ibid., 151–6. 142 Hänisch (Kontinuität, 214) estimates that 11 per cent of SPÖ voters had voted for VdU in 1949 while 25 per cent of VdU voters had voted for SPÖ in 1953 (21 per cent shifted to the ÖVP). 143 Lehmann-Horn, FPÖ, 69. 144 According to Lojze Ude (Einige Kommentare zu den Kärntner Landtgswahlen, Naši Razgledi, 22 February 1953; translation in ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-53/Jugoslawien 6/318.474 321.038), the VdU vote in the bilingual area was 11.89 per cent of votes cast. 145 The SPÖ gained 843 votes (42 per cent of votes cast), compared to 669 (36 per cent) in 1949; the ÖVP vote declined from 657 to 599 (36–27 per cent of roll), while the VdU vote increased from 483 to 493. 146 Neue Zeit, 3 March 1953 (Wedenig in Völkermarkt). 147 KLT 1, 17 March 1953, 33. 148 Kolb to Karisch, 11 June 1953; Karisch to Kolb, 31 July 1953, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 51.230/53. 149 Neue Zeit, 13 May 1953 (Sitzung der Kärntner Landesregierung). 150 SPZ to Kolb, 23 June 1953, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 57.021/53; Kleine Zeitung, 7 October 1953 (Deutsche Kärntner werden nicht gefragt!): Naš Tednik Kronika 15 October 1953 (Na Pravi Poti); Tischler, Sprachenfrage, 40–3. 151 Draft Law, § 1. 152 Based on 1951–2 school statistics (6,873). The schools where children would now be taught in German only were listed, and the population of the area which would cease to have bilingual schools was given as 38.7 per cent of the total (38,297 out of 98,942). 153 Wedenig to Kolb, 16 December 1953; Kolb to Wedenig, 23 December 1953, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 90.673/53; Wedenig to Kolb, 5 January 1954 (enclosing offprint of the Kärntner Landeszeitung, 18 December 1953), Motivenbericht zum Gesetzentwurf and Gesetzentwurf, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 24.879/54; see also Barker, Slovene Minority, 228–9.

Notes

193

154 SiDion LB January 1954, ÖStA, AdR, BMI, 30.000-2/54. 155 Salzburger Nachrichten, 20 December 1953 (Wedenigs Neues Schulgesetz indiskutabel); Salzburger Nachrichten, 29 January 1954 (Umstrittenes Kärntner Schulgesetz). 156 SiDion LB January 1954, ÖStA, AdR, BMI, 30.000-2/54 (Slovenski Vestnik 15 January 1954). 157 SiDion LB January 1954, ÖStA, AdR, BMI, 30.000-2/54 (Naš Tednik-Kronika, 14 January 1954). 158 Bruno Kreisky, Im Strom der Politik: der Memoiren zweiter Teil (Vienna: Kremayr and Scheriau, 2000), 364. 159 Wodak to Figl, 15 January 1954, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-54/Österreich 10/140.683 – 141.158; Schöner Vučinić talk, 25 November 1953, ÖStA, AdR, pol-53/BKAA AA, Österreich 10/317.474-325.602. 160 SiDion LB January 1954, ÖStA, AdR, BMI, 30.000-2/54 (Slovenski Poročevalec 29 December 1953 and 3 January 1954). 161 Austrian Embassy Belgrade to BKAA, 9 January 1954, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA (Berlin folder) (140.749 pol/1954). 162 Vučinić Schöner talk, 8 January 1954, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA (Berlin folder), pol-54/ Österreich 10/140.604-140.683; see also Schilcher, Österreich, Document 48. 163 Figl to Kolb, 20 January 1954 (140.860), ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 24.879/1954; Schöner, 23 January 1954, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-54/International 2a/140.733-141.129. 164 Wildmann, 5 February 1954 (confidential), ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-54/Österreich 10/140 683–141.245. 165 Schöner to BMU, 4 March 1954, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 36.051/54. 166 Meeting, 25 January 1954, ÖStA, AdR, BKAA AA, pol-54/Österreich 10/140.683141.227. BMU record (ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 24.879/54); Loebenstein (VD), 8 January 1954 (138.020-2a/1953), ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-54/Österreich 10/317.474330.150. 167 Drimmel to Wedenig, 14 December 1954, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 94.398/54. 168 Ibid. 169 Wedenig to Hermann Gruber, 4 February 1955; Vogl-Boekh to Drimmel, 21 February 1955; Wedenig to Drimmel, 14 March 1955; Wedenig to Hermann Gruber, 4 February 1955, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 41.340/54. 170 Loebenstein (VD) to BMU, 13 May 1955, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 56.245/55. 171 Vogl-Boekh to Drimmel, 13 May 1955, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 56.856/55. 172 See Neue Zeit, 20 January 1953 (Zur Kärntner Schulfrage), which argued that if his proposals had been accepted there would have been ‘no more differences at all’. 173 LSR Report for 1955–6 School Year, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 26.097/57; Wedenig to Drimmel, 20 January 1955, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 25.873/55. 174 Rettl, Partisan/Innendenkmaler, 153–4. 175 Ibid., 154–5; SiDion, 18 August 1953, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-53/Österreich 10/316.111 – 324.002 176 Malcolm to Eden, 16 October 1953, TNA, FO371/103795/CA1822/1. 177 Rettl, Partisan/Innendenkmaler, 60. 178 German translations, Austrian Legation, Belgrade, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-54/Österreich 10/317.474 – 324.396; Večer, 11 September 1953 (Eine verabscheuungswürdige Tat österr. Nazis); Slovenski Poročevalec, 13 September 1953 (So eine Schreibweise gehört nicht in unsere Zeitung). 179 Cabinet 68, 9 November 1954, Raab I, ÖStA, AdR, BKA.

194

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180 Reinhold Gärtner and Sieglinde Rosenberger, Kriegerdenkmäler. Vergangenheit in der Gegenwart (Innsbruck: Österreichischer StudienVerlag, 1991). 181 Schumy to Karl Gruber, 13 March 1948, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, ÖB London (box 10). 182 SPZ Declaration, 9 December 1954, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 94.398/55. Drimmel’s speech in Der Kärntner Lehrer, 1–2 December 1954. 183 Drimmel to Wedenig (draft), 14 December 1954, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 94 398/55. See Wedenig to Drimmel, 17 February 1955, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 34329/55. SiDion LB December 1954, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-55/Österreich 10/319.102–219.762; Drimmel’s account to the Yugoslav ambassador Vucinic, 22 January 1955, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-55/Österreich 10/319102-319.502. 184 Schöner (marginal note) 20 February 1955, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-55/Österreich 10/319.102-319.973. 185 Neue Zeit, 10 December 1954 (Die Schulfrage ist Bundessache). 186 E.g. Neue Zeit, 12 December 1954 (Tito und die Kärntner Schulen). 187 Neue Zeit, 13 February 1955 (Angst vor einem Schulgesetz); Wedenig to Drimmel, 20 January 1955: Drimmel to Wedenig, 29 January 1955, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 25.873/55. 188 THough small, the change did indicate the anti-Slovene direction of Austrian politics. It softened the stipulation that curricula (Schullehrpläne) were to be ‘examined’ (überprüft) to a requirement that they merely be ‘revised as far as necessary’ (soweit als notwendig revidiert). Austrian diplomats claimed credit for achieving the change; Interministerielle Besprechung, 18 May 1955, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 56.654/55. 189 For first legal discussions see Constitutional Service (Verfassungsdienst), Aidemémoire, 13 May 1955, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 56,245/55; for later legal discussion see i.a. Felix Ermacora, Grundriß der Menschenrechte in Österreich (Vienna: Manz, 1988), 242–55; Franz Matscher, ‘Die Minderheitenregelungen im Staatsvertrag’, in Der österreichische Staatsvertrag 1955: Internationale Strategie, rechtliche Relevanz, nationale Identität, ed. Arnold Suppan, Gerald Stourzh and Wolfgang Mueller (Vienna: Böhlau, 2005), 791. 190 E.g. Matscher, ‘Minderheitenregelungen’, 800–1. 191 Stow, 7 March 1953, TNA, FO371/103794/CA1741/1. 192 Meeting in Kremlin, 12 April 1955, in Stourzh (Austrian and Soviet records) Einheit, 628, note 30, 637–8, fn 53–55. On Soviet-Yugoslav relations see Rajak, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, 110–26. 193 Wodak to BKAA, 31 December 1954, ÖStA, AVA, Wodak PP, E1785:9; BKAA memo, 26 January 1955, cited by Suppan, Österreich und Jugoslawien, 466; see Erich Bielka, ‘Österreich und seine volksdemokratischen Nachbarn’, in Die Ära Kreisky. Schwerpunkte der Österreichischen Außenpolitik, ed. Erich Bielka, Peter Jankowitsch and Hans Thalberg (Vienna: Europaverlag, 1983), 195–231, here 211. 194 Meeting, 22 September 1955, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 83.853/55; Draft Cabinet paper n.d., ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 88.213/55; Raab I, Cabinet 110, 15 November 1955, ÖStA, AdR, BKA. 195 Association of Slovene Organisations, National Council, Croat Cultural Association, Submission to four heads of mission, 14 January 1957, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-57/ Österreich 10/215.453-215.879; Heppel (Vienna) to Young (FO), 1 February 1957, Young, 8 February 1957, TNA, FO 371/130313/RR1821/1. 196 See the secret report of a Yugoslav defector, 24 June 1957, ÖStA, AVA, Schöner PP, E1773:333.

Notes

195

197 Raab I, Cabinet* 22 December 1953, ÖStA, AdR. At the end of 1953 the federal government granted 3 million schillings for financial support for real estate purchases by purchasers who were ‘Austrian-minded’ (österreichisch gesinnte) (ÖStA, AdR, Cabinet, 22 December 1953. 198 Braunias to Gruber, 31 December 1951, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-52/Jugoslawien 2/146.127-146.257; Volkszeitung, 20 March 1951 (SPÖ gegen Elternrecht in Südkärnten). 199 Kärntner Nachrichten, 3 March 1954 (Das wahre Gesicht der SPÖ). 200 LB August 1954, SiDion Villach ÖStA, AdR, BMI, 30.000-2/54. 201 SiDion LB January 1952, ÖStA, AdR, BMI, 50.000-2/52. 202 See SiDion LB April 1956, ÖStA, AdR, BMI, 50.000-2/52. 203 Report on allegations of penetration of the Carinthian timber industry by the firm Slovenijales, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol -53/Österreich 10/320 829 – 322.105; ÖStA, AdR, KdM 300.369, K/53. 204 Die Presse, 22 July 1956 (Südkärnten: Titos Infiltration findet nicht statt). 205 Report on the founding meeting of Schulverein Südmark, Bundespolizeidirektion Klagenfurt (Eckrieder), 20 May 1955 (copy); Information, 1 June 1955, ARS 1489, Kraigher PP, box 1182 (Splošna politična poročila Koroška, 1955–1963); Alfred Laggner, ‘Zur Geschichte des Deutschnationalismus in der Kärntner Landespolitik’ (PhD, Vienna University, 1981), 94: Martin Fritzl, Der Kärntner Heimatdienst: Ideologie, Ziele und Strategien einer nationalistischen Organisation (Klagenfurt: Drava, 1990), 111. 206 Kärntner Schulverein Südmark (Walter Lakomy and Heribert Jordan) to BKA, 3 October 1955, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 60.728/55 and BMU, 89.072/55. 207 Mayrhofer, ‘Staatsbewußtsein im Kärntner Grenzland’, Der Kärntner Lehrer, IX (September–October 1955). For Tischler’s response see, Tischler, Sprachenfrage, 51–4. 208 Kärntner Nachrichten, 22 January 1955 (Zur Kärntner Schulfrage, von einem Abgeordneten der WdU) (italics added). 209 Kärntner Nachrichten, 6 April 1956 (Kärntner Schulprobleme – wir wir sie sehen!). See also BMU to LSR, 17 February 1956, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 32.162/56. 210 E.g. Die Furche (37), 11 September 1954 (Erich Menninger-Lerchenthal, ‘Österreich und seine Slowenen’), and other articles in a series on the Carinthian Slovenes. 211 KLT 1, 1 June 1956, 59–60. 212 SiDion LB January 1957, ÖStA, AdR, BMI, 37.000-2a/57. 213 The Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Südkärnten was formed in February 1956 out of the Verein ‘Edelweiß’, Akademischer Kärntner Verein, Akademische Landsmannschaft Kärnten and Die österreichische Landsmannschaft, Kärntner Abwehrkämpfer-Bund. See SiDion Villach LB November 1956, ÖStA, AdR, BMI, 50.000-2/55. 214 SiDion LB April 1957, ÖStA, AdR, BMI, 37.000-2a/57. 215 KLT 5, 17–20 December 1956, 145 (Windish was placed in inverted commas in the minutes). 216 SiDion LB April 1957, ÖStA, AdR, BMI, 37.000-2a/57; Meeting, 22 September 1955, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 83.853/55 (referring to the so-called Windish). See also 43.114/1955 (Satzungen für Verein Bund der Kärntner Windischen); BKA, Cabinet paper (draft) AdR, BMU, 88.213/55. 217 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 217, 231, https://treaties.un.org/doc/ Publication/UNTS/Volume%20217/v217.pdf (accessed 12 December 2014). On the implementation of paragraph 5 see i.a Novak, Rechtschutz, 251–5; Pleterski, Souveränität, 184–6; Matscher (‘Minderheitenregelungen’, 799) states ambiguously that ‘there had been no occasion – or no occasion was ever seen by the responsible authorities – to take action on the basis of paragraph 5’ (emphasis added).

196

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218 Wedenig to Kreisky, 19 November 1959, ÖStA, AVA, Schöner PP, E1773:333. He also claimed, implausibly, that he would never have authorized the Schulverein Südmark if he had known that it was the revival of the older organization of the Deutscher Schulverein Südmark, see Information, 1 June 1955, ÖStA, AdR, Schöner PP, E1773:333; Laggner, Geschichte, 30. 219 See Meeting, 22 September 1955, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 83.853/55. 220 Viktor Miltschinsky, ‘Missbrauch der Minderheitenschutzbestimmungen’, Aula 6, no. 4 (January 1956). 221 State Treaty Article 9, United Nations, Treaty Series. 222 See biographical details in Fritzl, Kärntner Heimatdienst, 124–34. 223 On Lakomy see Elste, ‘Vereine als Vorfeld der Parteien’, in Rumpler, Kärnten, 311, note 74; Rumpler, ‘Kärntner Landespatriotismus’, 55. 224 Alfred Elste, Michael Koschat and Paul Strohmaier, Opfer Tater, Denunzianten: Partisanenjustiz’ am Beispiel der Verschleppungen in Karnten und der Steiermark Mai/Juni 1945: Recht oder Rache? (Klagenfurt: Hermagoras, 2007), 303–4; Laggner, ‘Geschichte’, 130. 225 Claudia Kuretsidis-Haider and Winfried Garscha, ‘War crime trials in Austria’, http://www.doew.at/cms/download/a184m/en_war_crime_trials.pdf (accessed 12 September 2014); Thomas Albrich and Wilfried Garscha, Holocaust und Kriegsverbrechen vor Gericht: Der Fall Österreich (Innsbruck: Studienverlag, 2006). 226 SiDion LB October 1955, ÖStA, AdR, BMI, 50.000-2/55. 227 SiDion LB July 1955, ÖStA, AdR, BMI, 50.000-2/55 (Slovenski Vestnik, 1 July 1955). 228 SiDion LB September 1955, ÖStA, AdR, BMI, 50.000-2/55. 229 NSKS/RKS and ZSO, Memorandum: To the Federal Government of the Republic of Austria, 11 October 1955, TNA, FO371/124117/RR1822/1. German version in Fischer, Das Slowenische 194–200. On Slovene negotiations preceding the memorandum see Mirko Bogotaj, Die Kärntner Slowenen. Ein Volk am Rand der Mitte (2nd ed.) (Klagenfurt: Hermagoras, 2008), 169-71. 169–71. 230 SiDion LB July 1955, ÖStA, AdR, BMI, 50.000-2/55; SiDion LB January 1956, ÖStA, AdR, BMI, 50.0000-2/55. 231 SiDion Villach, LB Jan 1956, ÖStA, AdR, BMI, 25.000-2/56. 232 SiDion LB March 1956, ÖStA, AdR, BMI, 25.000-2/56. 233 See Lehmann-Horn, FPÖ, 85–9, 247. The FPÖ vote fell by around 1,000 votes, 42,053 to 40,420 votes (approximately 1.5 per cent of the share of the vote compared to 16.6 per cent in 1953). They gained 5 seats in the Landtag (down from 6). The SPÖ increased its votes by 5,761 to 128,494 and retained half the seats in the Landtag. The ÖVP gained one seat (from 11 to 12) and a total of 89,996 votes. The communist ‘left block’ (Linksblock) lost over 2,000 votes but kept one seat. The biggest gains were made by the ÖVP which had one more member (12), FPÖ 5 (Communist and Left socialists 1). Wedenig’s position was still unchanged in arithmetical terms as the SPÖ had 18 out of 36 members. 234 SiDion LB June 1956, ÖStA, AdR, BMI, 25.000-2/56. See also Barker, Slovene Minority, 222. Lehmann-Horn, FPÖ, 94, 98. 235 Schöner memo, 24 August 1955 (324.442 pol-55), ÖStA, AVA, Schöner PP, E1773: 333. 236 KLT 1, 1 June 1956, 36. 237 Neue Zeit, 3 June 1956 (Für Volksabstimmung in der Schulsprachenfrage). 238 Neue Zeit, 17 June 1956 (Schulprachenregelung nicht ohne Abstimmung!).

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239 KLT 1, 1 June 1956, 54 (Knaus). SiDion LB January 1956 AdR, ÖStA, BMI, 25.000-2/56. 240 KLT 1, 1 June 1956. 241 Internal meeting in BMU (Drimmel), 13 September 1955, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 82.654/55. 242 Meeting in BKA, 22 September 1955, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 83.853. 243 Draft BMU paper, 4 October 1955 (Implementation of Article 7), ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 88.213/55; final version Raab, 18 October 1955, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 99.161/55. 244 Loebenstein to BMU, 2 January 1956, BMU to BKA AA, 24 February 1956, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 105.525/56; Graf to Schöner, 12 October 1955 (with attached memorandum), Graf to Schöner, 3 November 1955, ÖStA, AVA, Schöner PP, E1773:80; Graf draft proposal, 14 November 1955, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 98.615/55. Raab I, Cabinet 110, 15 November 1955, ÖStA, AdR, BKA. 245 Drimmel, Resolution of Ministerial Committee, 25 April 1956, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 53.647/56. 246 Loebenstein to BMU, 2 January 1956, BMU to BKA-AA, 24 February 1956, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 105.525/56. 247 Drimmel (Meeting with delegations from Egg/Brdo, Görtschach/Goriče, St Stefan an der Gail/Štefan na Zilji, Vorderberg/Blače), 29 November 1955, ÖStA, AdR 101.066/1955; BMI Information, 19 December 1955, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 107.482/55 and 25.327/56; see also Volkszeitung, 27 June 1956 (Fort mit dem Sprachenzwang). 248 Information, Bundespolizeidirektion Klagenfurt, 19 December 1955, 18 December 1955, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 107.482/55; Kleine Zeitung, 21 December 1955 (Südkärnten wartet nur bis 15. Jänner). 249 For both sessions on 16 and 17 October there are notes of the meeting as well as more detailed minutes, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 108.254/56. 250 Ministerial Committee, 11 October 1956, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 108.254/56; Neue Zeit, 12 October 1956 (Schulfrage vor das Ministerkommitee). 251 Minutes, 17 October 1956, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 108.254/56. 252 Lehmann-Horn (FPÖ, 97) understandably but incorrectly describes Mayrhofer as speaking for the Carinthian ÖVP. 253 But see also ÖVP Landesparteileitung Kärnten to Drimmel, 11 August 1956, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 85.060/56. 254 See Peter minute, 16 February 1955, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 31.554/55. 255 The other SPÖ members were Karl Witt (Völkermarkt secondary school head master), Hans Pawlik, Leo Lukas and Rupert Poscharnig. 256 KLT 25, 10 July 1959, 182–3. 257 Wedenig to Drimmel, 7 January 1957 (attaching letter from Sereinig (President of Carinthian Landtag) to Wedenig, 14 December 1964), ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 27.901/57. 258 See Die Neue Zeit, 29 September 1957 (Befragung der betroffenene Bevölkerung). 259 KLT 13, 17 December 1957, 324–5. 260 Interministerial Committee, 6 May 1957, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-57/Österreich 10/219.103-219.9651. 261 See Wolfgang Petritsch, Bruno Kreisky – Die Biographie (St Pölten: Residenz, 2010) 208–12. 262 Pfeifer, Zechmann et al., question, 13 März 1957, 13. Beiblatt zur Parlamentskorrespondenz (104/J); KLT 9, 10 May 1957 (Motion Knaus, Silla, Huber). State Secretary BMI to Drimmel, 29 May 1957, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 62767/57 SiDion; LB April 1957, ÖStA, AdR, BMI, 40.000-2A/57.

198

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263 Memo, Education committee subcommittee, 26 June 1958, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 69.400/58. 264 Figl to Drimmel, 10 December 1956; Drimmel to Figl, 3 January 1957, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 25.411/56. 265 Maier (Volkszeitung) Klagenfurt to Drimmel, 18 January 1957, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 32.425/57. 266 See Maier to Drimmel, 18 January 1957, and Drimmel’s marginal comments ‘interference in the provincial government,’ ‘so it is utraquistic school!’ ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 32.425/57. 267 Meeting, 26 January 1957, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 32.425/57. 268 Loebenstein, 7 March 1957 [104.993-2a/57]; BMU reply to BKAA,12 March 1957, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 41.959/57; Loebenstein, 18 March 1957, 45.013/57; Ministerial committee, 3 April 1957 and 8 April 1957, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-57/Österreich 10/219.103 – 218.866; ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-57/Österreich 10/219.103-219.961. 269 BKA Statement 3 January 1957, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 25.411/57. 270 Meeting, 26 January 1957 (Minderheiten Schulgesetz für Kärnten), sixth draft, 26 January 1957, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 32.425/57. 271 BMU to BKAA, 12 March 1957, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 41.959/57. 272 Provincial committee of ÖVP Kärnten to Drimmel, 13 February 1957, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 37.837/57. 273 Figl to Wedenig, 9 April 1957 (copy), ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 50.385/57; §9 envisaged Slovene language schools ‘in addition to the existing bilingual school’. 274 Wedenig to Figl, 14 June 1957 (with attached statement of the Carinthian government, 11 June 1957); Wedenig to Figl, 9 July 1947 (238.826-VR/57). On court language see ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 74.419/57. 275 Drimmel to Maier, 12 July 1957, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 71.836/57. SiDion Kärnten LB July 1957 (Slovenski Vestnik, 12 July 1957). 276 Ministerial Committee, 23 July 1957 (239.097-VR/57), ÖStA, AVA, Schöner PP E1773:333; Cabinet 10 September 1957; ÖStA, BKA. 277 PLR 13, 3 October 1945, KLA, LAD I. 278 Suppan, Volksgruppen, 198–9. Graf Cabinet paper, 4 September 1956, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 85.060/56; Franz Sagaischek (ÖVP) to Drimmel, 1 September 1956, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 83.136/56. 279 Meeting of 16 July 1952 in Schilcher, Österreich, Document 49. 280 Bundespolizeidirektion to BMI, 16 May 1957, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 61.096/57. In 1956/7 only 87 Slovene children out of a secondary school population of 3,738 were officially learning Slovene as a subject. 281 SiDion Kärnten, LB April 1957, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 62.767/57. 282 After approval by the Ministerial Committee (10 September) the proposal was sent to the Nationalrat. Government bill for a minority school law for Carinthia (Nr 288 der Beilagen zu den Sten Protokollen des Nationarates VIII GP). Archiv des Nationalrats, www.parlament.gv.at (accessed 10 July 2014); Kövesi, 19 November 1957, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 97.589/57; Cabinet conclusions, 19 November 1957, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 101.553/57. 283 Neue Zeit, 12 September 1957 (Slowenisch-Zwangsunterricht gefallen!); Neue Zeit, 29 September 1957 (Belgrad und die Kärntner Schulfrage) (Brantl). 284 Kövesi note, 19 November 1957, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 97.589/57 (Erläuternde Bemerkungen zum Entwurf des Minderheitenschulgesetzes). 285 Meeting Valenčak Kövesi (BMU) and Angstner (BKA AA),12 February 1958, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 34.817/58.

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Chapter 5 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

21

22

Wodak to Haymerle, 30 April 1957, ÖStA, AVA, Wodak PP, E1785:66. Statement on implementation of Article 7, BKA AA, 6 July 1957, 1957, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 74.419/57. Borba, 25 September 1957 (translation Angster) BKA AA, 16 October 1957, ÖStA, BMU, AdR, BMU, 91.533/57. British Embassy Belgrade to FO, 28 September 1957, TNA, FO371/130313/RR 1821/9C. Austrian Embassy Belgrade to BKAA, 11 October 1957, AA, ÖStA, AVA, Schöner PP, E1773:333. BKA AA to BMU, 28 September 1957, (copy) ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, Pol/57/ Österreich 10/224.842-224.842. Kirchschläger to Kövesi, 24 March 1958, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 45.331/58. Bericht 10 March 1958, appendix A: Yugoslav declaration ‘Das Minderheitenproblem’; appendix B: Entwurf einer österreichischen Erklärung, appendix (D 1 und D 2), ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 45.331/58. Haymerle (BKA AA) to BMU, 28 September 1957; BKA decree to heads of mission in London, etc., 28 September 1957, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 88.473/57. Frenck (BMU) to BKA AA, 9 November 1957, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 91.533/57. BMU Memorandum, February 1957, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 32.575/58. Kirchschläger to Kövesi, 24 March 1958 (appendix), ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 45.331/58 The subcommittee had five members from the two main parties and one from the FPÖ. Minute, February 1958, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 32.575/58; see Report for school year 1955/56, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 82.570/58. Minute, 19 February 1958, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-58/Österreich 10/544.507544.870. Nationalrat 65, 19 March 1959, 4, 135. Meeting, 20 May 1958, Weißmann to Maleta, 30 May 1958, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 65.753/58; Wedenig, LT 13, 17 December 1957, 357–8. Report of subcommittee, 5 March 1958, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-58/Österreich 10/544.507-546.650; ÖVP Provincial Party directorship, to Drimmel, 27 January 1958, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 31.875/58. Meeting of subcomittee 26 June 1958, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 69.400/58. ÖVP group, Education Committee, 26 June 1958, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 66.917/58. Meeting of subcomittee 26 June 1958, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 69.400/58. ÖVP group on Education Committee, 26 June 1958, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 66.917/58. E.g. submission from Waisenberg/Važenberk, St Margarethen ob Töllersberg/ Šmarjeta pri Velikovcu, 18 December 1955, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 25.327/56; see Silla in KLT 13, 17 December 1957, 321; also Viktor Miltschinsky, Kärnten, Ein Jahrhundert Grenzlandschicksal (Vienna: Österreichische Landsmannschaft, 1959), 38–9. KHD 14 January 1958 copy of submission to ÖVP, SPÖ and FPÖ, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 28.555/58; BKA AA to KHD, 29 January 1958, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-58/ Österreich 10/544.507-545.184. In September 1955 the constitutional lawyer Stefan Verosta had proposed that the Education Ministry ask someone with the necessary language skills to investigate the situation; see draft minute of 22 September 1955 meeting, ÖStA, AdR, BKA VD, 96.952 2a/55. Peter, 16 February 1955, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 31.554/55.

200

Notes

23 Weißmann to Maleta, 30 May 1958; Neugebauer, Memorandum, 30 May 1958, ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, pol-58/Österreich 10/544.507-549.754. 24 Meeting of subcommittee, 26 June 1958, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 69.400/58. 25 Lang (Zum Leistungsbild der zweisprachigen Schule), 31 July 1958, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 77.396/58 [emphasis in original]. 26 The constitutional court ruled on 19 March 1958 that ‘establishing the size of the minority’ was a matter for the federal government. See Loebenstein (BKA – VD) to BMU, 18 December 1957, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 106.528/57 [126.230-2a/57]. Wedenig to Raab, 21 April 1958, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 53.902/58. Peter, 30 April 1958, Loebenstein to BMU, 8 May 1958, AdR BMU, 57.474/58. BK AA, 13 May 1958, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-58/Österreich 10/548.978-548.978/; Raab to Wedenig, 14 May 1958; Wedenig to Raab, 16 May 1958, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 56.991/58. Kärntner Nachrichten, 9 May 1958 (Minderheitenregelung fällt in die Kompetenz des Bundes), BKA. 27 Die Presse, 8 March 1958 (Das gestohlene Jahr). 28 Neue Zeit, 19 April 1958 (Wann kommt das Kärntner Schulgesetz?); Volkszeitung, 4 May 1958 (Doppelspiel mit dem Kärntner Schulgesetz); Volkszeitung, 8 May 1958 (Die Komödie um das Schulgesetz); Neue Zeit, 21 May 1958 (Wedenig, Raab und das Schulgesetz); NRat Sten Prot, 3 December 1958. 29 ÖVP group, Education Committee, 26 June 1958, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 66.917/58. 30 The proposal by the SPÖ parliamentary group (led by Hans Herke) was that no grade would be needed for children with German mother tongue, Slovene would not be compulsory at the higher level (Oberstufe) and pupils from bilingual primary schools would not be obliged to attend instruction in secondary and middle schools. Initiativantrag (Herke et al.) Nationalrat, 25 May 1958, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 69.552/58. 31 Maier to Drimmel, 17 May 1958, Drimmel to Maier, 23 May 1958, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 60.051/58. 32 Discussion in the ÖVP parliamentary group, 27 May 1958, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 69.552/58. 33 Mayer (State Police) Information, 5 September 1958, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 83.914/58. The calls came from Griffen/Grebinj, Bleiburg/Pliberk, Loibach/Libuče and Eisenkappel/Železna Kapla. See Fritzl, Kärntner Heimatdienst, 64–9. 34 Mayer (State Police) Information, 5 September 1958, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 83.914/58; LSR telegram to BMU, 5 September, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 83.137/58; see also Kärntner Landeszeitung, 12 September 1958, which lists 29 schools. 35 Volkszeitung, 6 September 1958 (Sprachterror soll an 57 Schulen bleiben?). It gave the total as 107 schools. 36 SiDion Kärnten to BMI, 29 September 1958, AdR, BMU, 90.679/58. 37 Stapo Report (BMI), 15 September 1958, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 85.761/58. 38 Drimmel to Wedenig, 6 September 1958, Drimmel Cabinet paper, 9 September 1958, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 83.137/58: Drimmel to Maier, 15 September 1958, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, (box 2130). 39 Elste and Hänisch, Kontinuitat, 72–5; Neue Zeit, 4 March 1958 (So wählten die Kärntner Gemeinden). 40 SiDion Kärnten LB July 1958, ÖStA, AdR, BMI, 37.000-2/48, 2–3. 41 Kärntner Landeszeitung, 12 September 1958 (Lockerung des ZweisprachenUnterrichts). 42 Regelung des zweisprachigen Unterrichtes in Kärnten (LSR 4.337/58) in Fischer, Das Slowenische, 205–6. 43 Minute, 27 September 1958, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 87.488/58.

Notes

201

44 Drimmel to Wedenig, 6 September 1958, Drimmel Cabinet Paper, 9 September 1958, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 83.137/58; Drimmel to Maier, 15 September 1958, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, box 2130. Folio 373 verso–374 and verso; Report of Ministerial inspection in Carinthia from 20 to 31 January 1959/Protokoll über die vom 20 bis 31 Januar 1959 in Kärnten stattgefundene Ministerialinspektion (hereafter ‘Commission protokoll’), ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 36.251/59 (Box 1863). 45 Die Presse, 24 September 1958 (Hubert Feichtelbauer, Dornenvolles Kärntner Schulproblem). 46 Die Presse, 11 October 1958 (Ausweg im Salto Mortale). 47 KLT 13, 17 December 1957, 354 (Wedenig); Wedenig to Figl, 17 August 1950, Hurdes to Wedenig, Kärnten, 2 November 1950, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 48.373/50, 82.898/52. Meeting in BMU, 25 January 1954, 24.879/54. 48 Kövesi minute, 2 July 1955, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 56.856/55. 49 Carinthian Slovene Memorandum on School Question, presented to Chancellor Raab on 17 November 1958, ÖStA, AdR, BKA, 9.993-PrM/58 (Fischer, Slowenische, 201–25). 50 KLT 21, 17 December 1958, 294–5. 51 Enotnost Special edition, 23 September 1958 (German tr. Schulstreik und Demokratie), ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 90.678/58. 52 SiDion Kärnten to BMI, 6 November 1958, Frenck memo, 14 December 1958, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 108 283/58; Memorandum, Fischer, Das Slowenische, 211. 53 Fischer, Das Slowenische, 213; see also Moritsch, ‘Ländliche Gemeinden’, 90–2. 54 Commission protokoll, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 36.251/59, 19, 21. 55 See KLT 15, 1 April 1947, 158–9; see criticism in Tischler, Zvet, 177. The 1951 census showed 874 German monoglots in a parish population of 1624. 56 Moritsch, Vom Ethnos zur Nationalität, 78. 57 Astrid Eichwalder, ‘Geschichte der Katastralgemeinde St Stefan im Gailtal von 1830 bis in die zweite Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts. Sozial-wirtchaftliche Entwicklung und Nationaler Differenzierungsprozess’ (Diplomarbeit, Klagenfurt University, 1988), 168; Klemenčič and Klemenčič, Kärntner Slowenen, 121–2. 58 Commission protokol, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 36.251/59, 13. 59 Fischer, Das Slowenische, 211. 60 Commission protokoll, 8. The 1951 census had recorded 27 per cent who were not German monoglots as living in the parish. 61 Commission protokoll, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 36.251/59, 14. 62 Volkszeitung, 18 October 1958, 15 cited in Memorandum, Fischer, Das Slowenische, 207. 63 FPÖ question, KLT 12, 19 November 1957; Der Stern, 21 December 1957 (Rote Sonne über Kärnten), 174–5; Slovene Memorandum, Fischer, Das Slowenische, 208. See Meeting of NSKS and ZSO, 23 June 1957, Bundespolizei Klagenfurt, 25 June 1957 to BMI, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 74994/57. 64 The 1951 census recorded 85.8 per cent non-German monoglots in the parish of Moos/Blato. In Heiligengrab/Humec 62 out of 87 children continued to be registered for bilingual instruction. 65 SiDion Kärnten report, 14 October 1958, Peter, 22 October 1958, ÖStA, AdR BMU, 108.283/58. 66 SiDion Kärnten to BMI, 29 September 1958, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 90.679/58. 67 Reports on Gottestal/Skočidol and several other examples can be found in ADG, Kadras PP, Folder VII.

202

Notes

68 Bundespolizeidirektion, September 1958 (extract), ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 21.998/58. The exceptions are some reports from Villach, which criticize the intolerance and assertiveness of the heimattreu and Nazis and regrets the weakness of the österreichtreu. 69 SiDion Kärnten to BMI, 6 November 1958; Frenck BMU, 14 December 1958, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 108.283/58; SiDion LB October 1958, ÖStA, AdR, BMI.37.000-2a/58. 70 Provincial School Council Decree, 27 October 1958, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 4.964/58 in Fischer, Das Slowenische, 224–5. Only 225 children made the switch back. 71 SiDion Kärnten Report on complaint by (Primož) Luznik, 14 October 1958; Kövesi, 22 October 1958, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 93.909/58; SiDion Kärnten LB October 1958, ÖStA, AdR, BMI, 37.000-2a/58. 72 Odlasek (SiDion Kärnten) to Kadras, 7 October 1958, ADG, Kadras PP, VIII. See Tropper, Kirche im Gau, esp. 243–5. 73 Neue Zeit, 3 October 1958 (Schläft die Kärntner Sicherheitsdirektion?); BMI Information, 3 October 1958, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 90.458/58. 74 Wedenig to Odlasek, 27 October 1958, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 108.283/58. 75 Si Dion to BMI, 6 November 1958, 14 December 1958, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 108.283/58. 76 Slovenski Vestnik, 14 November 1958 (Vsi Koroški so enaki in imajo enake pravice); Kleine Zeitung, 15 November 1958 (Im Mittelpunkt: Bauern und Slowenen); see Ernst Fischer in Parliament, 5 December 1958, Sten Prot, VIII legislative period 71st period, 3335. 77 Neue Zeit, 15 October 1958 (Tribüne des Lesers). 78 Slovenski Vestnik, 26 September 1958 (Mi smo za politiko mirnega sožitja!). 79 ÖStA, AdR BMU, 90.678/59, 7 October 1958, Enotnost, special issue 23 September 1958. 80 SiDion, 2 December 1958 (Bauernwirtschaftsbund), ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-58/ Österreich 14/557.816-557.816. See also the comments by Franc Zwitter, SPZ annual meeting, 3 December 1959, Information BMI, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 115.799/59. 81 Fischer, Das Slowenische, 214. 82 Peter, 22 October 1958, ÖStA, BMU, 108.283/58. 83 SiDion Kärnten to BMI, 29 September 1958, Peter, 9 October 1958, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 90.679/58. 84 BMU to BKA, 2 December 1958, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 104.455/58. 85 Peter, 11 September 1958, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 83.225/58. 86 BMU to LSR, 29 September 1958, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 87.488; LSR to BMU, 6 October 1958, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 91.038/58; BMU to LSR, 6 October 1958, ÖStA, AVA, Drimmel PP, E1734: 129 protest by Slovene parents St Jakob/Št Jakob protest, 22 September 1958; Peter, 26 September 1958, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 87.641/58. 87 Chancery Vienna to FO, 17 October 1958, TNA, FO371/126887/TY1741/6. Heppel to Addis (FO), 21 November 1958, TNA, FO 371/136633/RR1821/1. 88 Manchester Guardian, 12 October 1958 (Austria and Yugoslavia at odds); New York Times, 16 November 1958; Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 19 October 1958 (Viktor Meier, Die Kärntner Slowenen zwischen Österreich und Jugoslawien); 28 November 1958 (Die Wiener Politik und der Kärntner Schulstreit); 21 April 1959; Walther Weißmann response, 10 May 1959, Viktor Meier reply, 4 July 1959. 89 Conversation Drimmel and Repič (head of Yugoslav delegation to mixed commission) and Joze Zemljak (Yugoslav ambassador), 19 September 1958, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-58/Österreich 10/544.507-554.680. 90 Yugoslav Note verbale, 4 October 1958; Cabinet 93, 7 October 1958, ÖStA, AdR.

Notes 91

203

Wodak to BKA AA, 4 October 1958, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-58/Österreich 10/554.680-554.920. 92 Wodak to Figl, 8 October 1958. ÖStA, AVA, Wodak PP, E1785/75. 93 Wodak to AA, 11 October 1958, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-58/Österreich 10/544.50 –555.162. 94 BKAA to Wodak, 4 October, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-58/Österreich 10/554 680554.920; Yugoslav Note, 4 October 1958; Austrian reply, 8 October 1958; ÖStA, AdR, BMU 94.093/58 [ad 554.921]. 95 The comment was relayed to Wodak by Undersecretary Prica, 16 October 1958, Archive of the Bruno Kreisky Foundation (box Jugoslawien 1). 96 Raab II, Cabinet 93, 7 October 1958, ÖStA, AdR, BKA; Wodak to BKA AA, 11 October 1958, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-58/Österreich 10/544 507–555.162. 97 Memorandum der Kärntner Slowenen zur Schulfrage, 15 November 1958; Cabinet 98, 18 November 1945, ÖStA, AdR, BKA. 98 BKA AA minute, 10 October 1958, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-58/Österreich 10/544.507-555.038. 99 Yugoslav protest note, 3 November 1958, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-58/ Österreich 10/544.507-556.239; Austrian reply, 8 November 1958. Cabinet 97, Resolution, 11 November 1958, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 10.350/58 (appendix C) (556.417-Pol/58). 100 Loebenstein, 15 October 1958, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-58/Österreich 10/544.507ad 556.684 [43.590-2a/58]. 101 Information, 17 November 1958 (Abteilung Pol), ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-58/ Österreich 10/556.684-pol/58. 102 See Neugebauer, Sten Prot NR, Shorthand minutes of Parliament, 7th legislative period, 71, 3 December 1958. 103 See also Kazianka in the Landtag, KLT 21, 17 December 1958, 197–207. 104 Subcommittee of Education Committee, 26 June 1958, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 69.400/58; ÖVP group meeting, Education Committee, 26 June 1958, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 66.917/58 (folio 197). 105 Volkszeitung, 9 November 1958 (Budgetauschuss), Parliament 7th legislative period 71, 5 December 1958, 3346. 106 Raab II, Cabinet 97, 11 November 1958, ÖStA AdR BKA. Cabinet committee for the implementation of Article 7, 12 November 1958, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 103.501/58. Information, 17 November 1958 (for ministerial committee), ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-58/Österreich 10/544.507-556.684. 107 The three were Dr Heinrich Peter (Referent for pedagogics in primary and secondary schools), Dr Leo Kövesi (Referent for legislative school affairs) and Dr März (Referent for personnel issues of primary and secondary school teachers). They were accompanied by provincial school inspectors in Haselbach, as well as the respective district school inspectors. 108 Summary minutes, coalition committee, 16 January 1959, 22 January 1959. ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 28,248/59. 109 Commission protokoll, 27, which described 23 of these as German-Slovene; 7 Slovene-German; 3 were equally German and Slovene and 2 were German. The criteria for the selection of schools are not clear beyond the statement by the commission that it was based on ‘pedagogic conditions and the weather’. 110 See Slovenski Vestnik, 29 January 1959 (Rož, Podjuna, Zilja … venec treh dolin).

204

Notes

111 Comission protokoll, 15. The 1951 census recorded 1,304 out of 1,628 inhabitants as German monoglots. Slovene Memorandum (Fischer, Das Slowenische, 208) gave a registration figure for Haimburg/Vovbre of 11 out of 147 and pointed out that in 1955–6, 40 Slovene-speaking children had been recorded. 112 Commission report (Bericht über die Inspektion des zweisprachigen Schulwesens im Bundesland Kärnten), ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 33.149/59 [emphasis in original]. 113 Commission report, point 11, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 33149/59. 114 Coalition committee – Subcommitee for Carinthian minority school question/ Koalitionsauschuss-Unterauschuss für die Kärntner Minderheitenschulfrage, 3 February 1959, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 28.248/58. 115 An explicit reference to it was dropped after ÖVP objections, the final version (§10 para 2) referred to parishes in which bilingual instruction was given at the start of the 1958–9 school year. 116 Information, 12 March 1959, ÖstA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-59 /Jugoslawien 2/236.324– 239.076. Information, 18 March 1959, ÖStA, AdR, pol-59, Österreich 10/236.164239.272; Zemljak Raab talk, 15 March 1959, ÖStA, AdR BKA AA, pol-58/Österreich 10/236.164-239.165. 117 3 February 1959 Coalition committee, 3 February 1959, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 28.248/58. Zemljak Figl, Drimmel, Pittermann meeting, 16 March 1959; Zemljak Raab talk, 16 March 1959, AdR, BKA AA, 45.750/59; Zemljak Figl talk, 17 March 1959, BMU, 26.843/59 (pol-59/Jugoslawien 2/239.218). 118 Annexes, 19 March 1959, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-59/Jugoslawien 2/236.324 239.359; information, 12 March 1959, AdR, BKA AA, pol-59/Jugoslawien 2/236.324–239.076. 119 Kadras to Gottfried Heinzel, 9 February 1959, ADG, Kadras PP, IX; Kövesi to Kadras, 26 February 1959; Kadras to Kövesi, 2 March 1959, AdR, BMU, 40.254/59. Tropper, ‘Diözese’, 712; Malle, ‘Katholische Kirche’, 766. Final version in Unkart, Glantschnig and Ogris, Lage, 386; information, 18 March 1959, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-59/Österreich 10/236.164-239.272;/Jugoslawien 2/239.272-236.124. 120 NR, 7th Legislative Period, 85th session, 19 March 1959, 41114–45, here 41145; Text (Minderheitenschulgesetz für Kärnten); BGBl 101, 19 March 1959, http://www.ris. bka.gv.at/Dokumente/BgblPdf/1959_101_0/1959_101_0.pdf (accessed 1 November 2015). 121 Out of a total of 11,188. See Gesamtübersicht, ADG, Alphabetische Ablage. The figure declined to 1,472 by 1986–7. 122 See SZA, (Volkszählungsergebnisse 1961 Heft 13: Die Zusammensetzung der Wohnbevölkerung Östereichs nach allgemeinen demographischen und kulturellen Merkmalen (Vienna: SZA, 1964), table 19. The official census figures for ‘selected parishes’ were 2,246 and 3,479, respectively. There was a slight increase of Slovene monoglots from 7,707 to 7,986 (Austrian nationals). 123 Janko Pleterski, ‘Die Volkszählung vom 31. März 1961’, in Pleterski, Souveränität, 205; Klemenčič and Klemenčič, Kärntner Slowenen, 107–30. 124 E.g. Loebenstein (VD) to BMAA, 12 March 1964, ÖStA, AdR, BMfAA, 68.634, 140.658-2/64. 125 Unkart, Lage, 35. For more convincing assessments see Otmar Höll, ‘Das Minderheitenproblem in den österreichische-jugoslawischen Beziehungen – Ein historischer Exkurs’, in Österreich-Jugoslawien Determinanten und Perspectiven ihrer Beziehungen, Forschungsberichte des österreichsichen Institut fûr Internationale Politik, ed. Otmar Höll (Vienna: Braumüller, 1988), 205–52, 227–8; Barker, Slovene

Notes

126 127 128 129

130 131 132 133 134 135 136

137

138 139 140

141

205

Minority, 233–9; Gerhard Baumgartner and Bernhard Perchinig, ‘Vom Staatsvertrag zum Bombenterror: Minderheitenpolitik in Österreich seit 1945’, in Österreich 1945-1995: Gesellschaft – Politik – Kultur, ed. Reinhard Sieder, Heinz Steinert and Emmerich Tálos (Vienna: Gesellschaftskritik, 1995), 515. Stefan Karner, ‘Kärnten im 20. Jahrhundert: Verwerfungen, Narben, Hoffnungen’, in Rumpler, Kärnten, 38–9. Karner and Ruggenthaler, ‘Unterstützung’, 109–10. It re-emerges, uncommented, on page 115. E.g. n.a. Ein Kärnten: die Lösung (Klagenfurt: Heyn, 2012), 59. For the next phase of school politics, see i.a. Reinhold W. Oblak, Machtpolitik macht Schule: Ausgrenzung und Ghettoisierung der slowenischen Volksgruppe am Beispiel der zweisprachigen Volkschule in Kärnten (1984–1988) (Klagenfurt: Drava, 1990); Vladimir Wakounig, Der heimliche Lehrplan der Minderheitenbildung, Die Zweisprachige Schule in Kärnten (Klagenfurt: Drava, 2008); Peter Gstettner, Zwangshaft Deutsch? Über falschen Abwehrkampf und verkehrten Heimatdienst. Ein friedenspädagogisches Handbuch für interkulturelle Praxis im ‘Grenzland’. (Klagenfurt: Drava, 1988). Meeting in Klagenfurt, 8 November 1959, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-59/Österreich 10/136.164-249.808. KLT 28, 14–17 December 1959, 299–300; Motion of Rader, and others, KLT 1, 30 March 1960, 26–7. See Ferenc, Quellen, 171–89, 295, 431–2. Janko Messner, ‘open letter to Maria Pink’; Franz Koschier an Janko Messner’, in Ein Kärntner Heimatbuch, ed. Janko Messner (Vienna: Europaverlag, 1986), 286–92. KLT 28, 14–17 December 1959, 299. ‘Aufgaben der Gemeinden im Kärntner Volksabstimmungs-Gedenkjahr 1960’, Kärntner Gemeindeblatt 81, 4 (2 June 1960), 61–2. Neue Zeit, 12 October 1960 (Das grosse Bilderbuch der Heimat). Franz Koschier and Hans Piuk, eds, Kärnten Frei und Ungeteilt. Landesfeier 10. Oktober 1960 (Klagenfurt: Verband für Kultur- und Heimatpflege Kärntens, 1960), 141 (‘Die Untergailtaler Tracht, das Festkleid unserer slowenischen und deutschen Landsleute’). F.X. Holder [Hans Steinacher], Daß Kärnten eins und frei bleibe. Zur 40. Wiederkehr der Kärntner Volksabstimmung (Klagenfurt: Kollitsch, 1960), 113. On Steinacher’s pan-German activism see Walter von Goldendach and Hans-Rüdiger Minow, ‘Deutschland erwache!’ Aus dem Innenleben des staatlichen Pangermanismus (Berlin: Dietz, 1994). Neue Zeit, 4 October 1960 (Totengedenken auf dem Ulrichsberg); Walter Fanta and Valentin Sima, ‘Stehst mitten drin im Land’ Das europäische Kameradentreffen auf dem Kärntner Ulrichsberg von den Anfängen bis heute (Klagenfurt: Drava, 2003). Volkszeitung, 12 October 1960 (An der Grenze nicht Bunker, sondern Kultur!). See above all Neumann, Abwehrkampf und Volksabstimmung. SiDion LB August and September, October and November 1960, ÖStA, AdR, BMI, 30.000-2a/60. See Bernhard Weidinger, ‘Im Nationalen Abwehrkampf der Grenzlanddeutschen’. Akademische Burschenschaften und Politik in Österreich nach 1945 (Vienna: Böhlau, 2015). Police estimates were 60,000–70,000; the Volkszeitung of 12 October 1960 (10. Oktober in Tag der Heimatliebe) referred to ‘at least’ 100,000. For communist attacks

206

142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149

Notes see Volkswille, 13 October 1960 (Verschweigen hilft nichts). Wahrheit und Volkswille, 27 August 1960; Christian Pichler, ‘Politische “Gedentage”’, 219–22. Neue Zeit, 12 October 1960 (Gewaltiges Bekenntnis zur Heimat). Neue Zeit, 10 October 1960 (Ing Vinzenz Schumy: Verständigung tut Not!). Volkszeitung, 8 October 1960 (Österreich grüsst Kärnten). Volkszeitung, 12 October 1960 (Wir bleiben bei Österreich!). KLT 5, 9 October 1960, 10. Neue Zeit, 12 October 1960 (Der Welt ein Beispiel). Kreisky Popović meeting, 17–19 March 1960, 35, ÖStA, AdR, BMfAA, pol-1960/ Österreich 10/70.489-73.830. Meeting, 26 November 1960, ÖStA, AdR, BMfAA, pol-60/Jugoslawien 2/88.929.

Conclusion 1

For a recent unfortunately tendentious example see Claudia Fräss-Ehrfeld, ‘Die Befriedung des slowenischen Volksteils geht vor allem Kärnten an (Wedenig 1949)’, in Zählen Minderheiten?-Volksgruppen zählen!, ed. Peter Karpf, Thomas Kassl, Werner Platzer and Udo Puschnig (Klagenfurt: Amt der Kärntner Landesregierung, 2011), 27–37, here 30. 2 Volkszeitung, 4 May 1949 (Ist Heimatreue Chauvinismus?). 3 See Neue Zeit, 10 March 1946 (Paul Jobst, Das Braune Kärnten). 4 Report on Tour of Kärnten, 4 January 1946, TNA, FO1020/2033. 5 Norbert Frei, Adenauer’s Germany and the Nazi Past: The Politics of Amnesty and Integration (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002). 6 Peter Pirker, Subversion deutscher Herrschaft. Der britische Kriegsgeheimdienst SOE und Österreich (Vienna: Vienna University Press, 2012), 509–10. 7 See Achim Trunk, Europa, Ein Ausweg. Politische Eliten und Europäische Identität in der 1950er Jahren (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2007). 8 On the campaign for a monumental memorial to the war dead, which started in 1953, see Fanta and Sima, Ulrichsberg. 9 Entner, ‘Vergessene Opfer?’, 423–35. 10 SiDion Klagenfurt LB July 1956, ÖStA AdR, BMI, 25.000-2/56. However, it was later reported from Villach that the evidence of the inhumane details removed the initial sympathy, SiDion Villach LB July 1956, ÖStA, AdR, BMI, 25.000-2/56. See Thomas Geldmacher, ‘Wir als Wiener waren ja bei der Bevölkerung beliebt’. Österreichische Schutzpolizisten und die Judenvernichtung in Ostgalizien 1941–1944 (Vienna: Mandelbaum, 2002), 162. 11 Ferdinand Graf to Drimmel, 29 May 1956 (enclosing copy of letter from Franz Pernek to Graf), ÖStA, AVA, Drimmel PP, E/1734: 50. 12 Heribert Jordan, ‘Gedanken um den Pflug’, Kärntner Bauernkalendar, 1953, p. 39. 13 See von Goldendach and Minow,‘Deutschland erwache!’. For one example see Burschenschaft Olympia, Worte und Bilder: Zur Erinnerung zur Hundertjahrfeier der Burschenschaft Olympia in Wien im Jahre 1959 (Vienna: Eigenverlag, 1959), 145–8. 14 Hermann Lübbe, ‘Der Nationalsozialismus im deutschen Nachkriegsbewußtsein’, Historische Zeitschrift 236 (1983): 579–99. 15 E.g. on the former mayor of Villach Oskar Kraus see Rettl and Koroschitz, Oskar Kraus, 219.

Notes

207

16 Wolfgang Petritsch, Bruno Kreisky Die Biographie (St Pölten: Residenz, 2010), 210. For Kreisky’s own (less critical) account see Im Strom der Politik. Der Memoiren zweiter Teil (Berlin: Siedler, 1988), 196–210. 17 Bullard report, 15 June 1956, TNA, FO120/1143. 18 Eide, ‘Sub-Commission’, 220. 19 See Council of Europe meeting 9–18 October 1958; Council of Europe, Report of Legal Committee, 19 April 1959, paras 9–16; Neue Zeit, 17 June 1961 (Kärntner Slowener beschwerte sich beim Europarat). 20 Salzborn, Ethnisierung der Politik. 21 Volkszeitung, 5 October 1958 (Europa und die Kärntner Sprachenfrage). 22 See the secret report of a Yugoslav defector, 24 June 1957, ÖStA, AVA, Schöner PP, E1773: 333, which revealed Yugoslav aims. The only exception was the contingency plan to enter Carinthia as a route to northern Italy if a general war did break out. 23 E.g. Mayrhofer KLT 13, 17 December 1957. 24 KLT 21, 17 December 1958 (Silla, 227); SiDion LB August 1957, ÖStA, AdR, BMI, 37.000-2a/57 referred to a population ‘with Windish strain’ (mit windischem Einschlag). 25 KLT 13, 17 December 1957. 26 Ibid. 27 KLT 5, 17–20 December 1956, 145. ‘Windisch’ is placed in inverted commas in the minutes. 28 Hans Rader, Wir rufen die Jugend Europas! Kärntner Grenzland: Jahrbuch (Wolfsberg: Ploetz, 1959). 29 See Bishop Köstner’s response to Slovene criticism, March 1960 Question to the Holy See, ADG, Kadras PP (Rom). 30 Malle, ‘Katholische Kirche und Kärntner Slovenen’, 748–73, here 752. 31 KLT 13, 17 December 1957. 32 Meeting of 16 July 1952, Schilcher, Österreich, dokument Nr 49, 90 -2 Enderle-Burcel, Schärf, 177. 33 Newole to Kreisky, 28 October 1960, ÖStA, AdR, BMfAA, pol-60/Jugoslawien 270.971-287.618; Newole to Wodak, 11 November 1960, ÖStA, AdR, BMfAA, pol-60/ Jugoslawien 2/70.971-86.855-6/60; for a limited insight into Newole’s assimilationist assumptions (including his suspicion of Slovene women’s attachment to traditional ethnic and religious ties) see Karl Newole, Die Grundlagen der Demokratie (Graz: Buchverlag, 1946), 22–3, 26. 34 Reiterer, Doktor und Bauer, 155. 35 SiDion LB April 1957, ÖStA, AdR, BMI, 37.000-2a/57; Meeting, 22 September 1955, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 83.853/55 (referring to ‘the so-called’ Windish. See also 43.114/1955 (Satzungen für Verein Bund der Kärntner Windischen); BKA, draft cabinet paper, ÖStA, AdR, BMU, 88.213/55. 36 Tully, Strange Multiplicity, 190. 37 Tischler, Sprachenfrage. 38 SiDion LB December 1957, ÖStA AdR, BMI, 37.000-2a/57. 39 Naš Tednik Kronika, 5 December 1957 (Spoznavanje in sožitje) (Getting to know each other and coexistence).

Sources and Bibliography Archives The National Archives, Kew (TNA) Foreign Office, General Political Correspondence (FO371). British Embassy Vienna (FO143 and FO120/1143). Control Commission for Germany and Austria (FO938–945). Control Office for Austria (FO1007). Allied Commission for Austria, British Element (FO1020). Ernest Bevin papers (FO800). War Office, Field Security Section (WO170).

Bundesarchiv, Berlin Document Center (BDC) Personal Files Hans Steinacher. Julius Lukas (junior).

Österreichisches Staatsarchiv Vienna (ÖStA) Archiv der Republik (AdR) Bundeskanzleramt Auswärtige Angelegenheiten (BKA AA) 1945 (after July 1959 Bundesministerium für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten (BMfAA) Abteilung Politik (pol-II) Kabinett des Ministers (Cabinet of the Minister) (KdM) Österreichische Botschaft (Austrian Embassy), London

Bundeskanzleramt, Präsidium Entnazifizierung Sonderkomission 1946-7

Ministerrat (MRP) Figl I (20 December 1945 to 8 November 1949) Figl II (8 November 1949 to 28 October 1952) Figl III (28 October 1952 to 25 February 1953) Raab I (2 April 1953 to 14 May 1956) Raab II (29 June 1956 to 12 May 1959) Raab III (16 July 1959 to 3 November 1960)

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Staatsamt für Volksaufklärung, Unterricht und Kultursangelegenheiten (1945) Bundesministerium für Unterricht (BMU) Abteilung 10 (Juristisch-administrative Angelegenheiten) Abteilung 18 (Pädagogische Angelegenheiten der Volks- und Hauptschulen)

Bundesministerium für Inneres (BMI) Allgemeines Verwaltungsarchiv (AVA)Nachlässe Heinrich Drimmel (E1734) Josef Schöner (E1773) Heinrich Wildner (E1791) Walter Wodak (E1785)

Verein für die Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung, Vienna Adolf Schärf PP

Stiftung Bruno Kreisky, Vienna Jugoslawien I

Institut für Zeitgeschichte, Vienna (IfZ) Felix Hurdes PP Vinzenz Schumy PP

Archiv des Nationalrates, Vienna Stenographische Protokolle des Nationalrates (1945-1960) Parlamentskorrespondenz (1945-1960) Unterrrichtsauschuss (1957-9)

Niederösterreichisches Landesarchiv (NÖLA) Sankt Pölten Leopold Figl PP

Kärntner Landesarchiv (KLA) Klagenfurt Landesamtdirektion (LAD) I Provisorische Landesregierung 1 (7 May – 6 June 1945) Konsultativer Landesauschuss (6 June – 25 July 1945) Provisorische Landesregierung 2 (25 July – 10 December 1945) Landesregierung (10 December1945-19 October 1949) Berichte I, II

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Arhiv Republike Slovenije, Ljubljana (ARS) Central Committee of the Slovene Communist Party Kraigher PP Kardelj PP Sekretariat zu Notrenje Zadeva

Archiv Instituta za Narodnostna Vprašanja (AINV) Ljubljana Oddelek za Mejna Vprašanja (OMV) Znanstvenega Inštituta

Written and Oral Communications Michael Cullis. Drago Druškovic. Hans Herke. Josef Guttenbrunner. Gerald Sharp. Luka Sienčnik. Peter Wilkinson. John Winterton. Jack Winterton. Frank Pakenham.

Main Newspapers and Periodicals Kärntner Nachrichten 1945–50. Kleine Zeitung.

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Index Note: Page numbers with ‘n’ in the index refer to notes in the text. Abwehrkampf (Defensive Struggle) 15, 23–5, 29, 60, 75 achievements of 57, 76 commemoration of 38, 81, 125 Adriatic Littoral 1, 23 Adriatic Sea 10, 12 Advisory Committee 33 agitprop 32 agrarian population 11, 13, 17 agricultural cooperatives 20, 32, 33 agricultural depression, 1870s 9 Allied Council 41, 44, 73 Allies British electoral policy 38 denazification policy 51, 53–76 First Control Agreement 30 opposition to Anschluss 13, 16, 47 post-war border decisions 53–76 Second Control Agreement 51 Western fears of Soviet Union 61–2, 63 Amschl, Hans 27, 28, 74 Anschluss 13, 15, 16–20, 27–8, 31–2, 43–4, 47, 49, 52–4, 58, 90, 127, 128, 158 n.140 anti-Bolshevism 23, 125 anti-clericalism 5, 12, 16, 17, 24, 33, 78 anti-communism 31, 41, 55, 68, 116, 125, 127 anti-fascism 47, 94, 99 anti-Nazism 18, 26, 27, 28, 29, 43–5, 73, 74, 83, 126–7. See also denazification anti-Semitism 16, 21, 125, 126 anti-Slovene lobby 5, 27, 28, 31, 39–40, 46, 54, 61, 69, 71, 72–6, 77–105 aims and tactics of 77 and Austrian sovereignty (federal government) 95–105 federal politicians’ attitudes towards 80–95

international reaction to 126–7 parental rights 77–80 Vienna negotiations 57, 60, 66, 80–95 Arnoldstein/Podklošter 80, 90, 94 ‘Aryans’ 19 assimilation assumption of 31, 91 and coercion 5, 9–26, 87, 128–30 and exclusion 19–26 ‘natural’ 2, 55, 92, 121 and politics 2–3, 6–7, 84, 128 rhetoric of 6–7, 31, 34 asymmetries of power 3, 4, 40, 111, 130 Austria economy 17, 55 foreign ministry (Ballhausplatz) 43, 46–7, 58, 70, 79, 83–4, 87, 95, 107, 114–15, 118 foreign policy 46, 53–76, 93, 102 implementation of Article 7 100 jurisdiction of 41 London/Moscow CFM negotiations 53–76 Moscow Declaration on, 1943 55–6, 125 police/police reports 13, 14, 20, 26, 44–5, 47, 50–1, 58–62, 75, 82, 89, 90, 94, 96–7, 99, 101, 111–15, 125, 127, 130 anti-Nazi resistance by 47, 63 restoration of democracy 31 restoration of sovereignty 95–105 Soviet policy towards 93 Tito’s view of Austrians 53 and war crimes 54, 55, 63 and Yugoslav relations 46–7, 81, 82–3, 86–7, 107–8, 128 Austrian Communist Party 61, 67 Austrian justice system 74 Austrian State Treaty

236 Article 7 66, 96–8, 100, 102–4, 107–8, 115, 119, 126, 127 Article 9 99 Article 26 96 Article 34 96 signature of 95, 97 Austrian Treaty Commission 62 Austro-Marxism 16 autonomy 4, 16, 51–2, 57, 64, 66, 68–72, 181 n.162, 183 n.201 Badeni crisis 10 Balkan Wars 12 Ballhausplatz. See Austria, foreign ministry Bärental/Zavrh 112, 113, 114, 133 Barry, Brian 3, 5 Basic State Law, Article 19 (3), 1867 (Staatsgrundgesetz) 5, 11, 84 Bauer, Otto 15 Bebler, Aleš 61–2, 64, 66, 69, 71, 93, 107 Belgrade 22, 39–40, 47, 56–7, 61, 67, 71, 81–3, 91, 93, 95–6, 107, 115, 128 Berlin 18, 20, 27, 130 Berlin Council of Foreign Ministers, 1954 93 Berlin crisis 64 Bevin, Ernest 60, 63, 69 bilingual place names 96, 126 bilingual school/instruction advantages of 109 Austro-Yugoslav discussions 107–8, 115–17, 121–2 Ballhausplatz’s role 84, 114–15 basic principle of 130 British view of 114–15 campaign against 72–6, 77–105, 109, 112–14, 124 Carinthian five-point declaration of 1947 72 and census results, 1945–1960 131–46 demolition of 72, 80, 83, 89, 103, 107–22 deregistration campaign 111–12, 114, 116, 119 Drimmel’s proposal 101, 103–4 federal abdication 110–19, 126–7 federal grammar school 104–5 legal and procedural objections 93–4 legal arguments 84, 85–6, 103–4

Index and minority rights 102–5 1945 decree 89, 93–4, 99, 102, 107–8, 113, 118, 123, 149 n.23 1953 draft law 92–3 1956 committee resolution 102–3 1957 draft law 104 and parental rights 77–80, 101–3 press reports on 76 reduction of 90, 92, 93, 94, 192 n.154 revisionist discussions 84–6, 89–95 school strikes of 1957–8 110 in secondary schools 35–7, 49, 91, 111, 149 n.23, 165 n.87 State Treaty diplomacy/provisions 76, 80, 81, 84, 93, 95–105, 107, 114–15, 127 teachers’ resistance 112 Wedenig’s decree and its aftermath 110–22 Wedenig’s proposals 79, 80–1, 83–4, 89–95 Yugoslav criticisms and protests 83, 93, 105, 115–18 Blatnik, Blasius 90 Bleiberg-Kreuth 14 Bleiburg/Pliberk 45, 65, 79, 101, 111, 140 Blüml, Rudolf 16 Bock, Fritz 73 Bolshevik ideology 94 Borderland Committee (of Carinthian ÖVP) 104 Braunias, Karl 71, 81–3 Bregenz 20 Brejc, Janko 12 Britain, and Cold War politics 53–76 British intelligence 30 British Legal Division 74 British occupation authorities 26 and bilingual education system 51 boycott of Renner government 43–4 control of OF agitation 37, 43 criticism of 42, 43 deficiencies of 30, 31, 41 denazification efforts 124–5 and election of 1945 38–9 and food crisis 30 limited ambitions of 30 maintenance of law and order at the border 42, 43 and pan-German attitudes 53

Index and Slovene attitudes 30–1, 42–3, 67 spending cuts 41 withdrawal of 41–4, 68, 96 Brown, Alfred 74 Brubaker, Rogers 5 Bukowina compromise, 1910 108 Bumballa, Raoul 43 Bund der Kärntner Windischen (League of Carinthian Windish) 98 Bund Heimattreuer Südkärntner (League of Loyal Southern Carinthians) 72 Bund Österreichischer Slowenen/Zvesa Avstriskih Slovencev (BÖS, League of Austrian Slovenes) 40, 42, 46, 51, 52, 98 Bund Sozialistischer Akademiker (League of Socialist Graduates) 49 Bundesverfassungsüberleitungsgesetz (Law for the Transition of the Federal Constitution) 85 Burgenland Croats 46, 71, 82 Burz, Ulfried 13, 18 Cabinet, Austrian 48, 59, 63, 66, 82, 97, 100, 104 Caccia, Harold 81 Cankar, Ivan 42 canon law 18 cantonalization 3 Carinthia adaptation of Slovene traditions 32 compared with Switzerland 35, 50 debate on 1947 Moscow conference 61 ‘defamation’ of 39, 44–5, 124 domestic concerns about border dispute 64–5 economic support to 81, 82 explanations for Nazi success in 17–19 German as official language 12–13, 14 Germanization in 1–2, 9–26, 27–9, 41, 49–50, 52, 54, 58, 79, 117, 130 historiography of 2, 36, 120, 128 hostility of post-war Yugoslav state 33, 63 impact of economic crisis 17 liberal values, post-Nazi 3–4, 9, 128–30 nationalizing politics, 1880–1918 9–12 Nazi continuities in 45, 46, 48, 63, 64, 105, 123–4

237

Nazi rule and its impact 3–4, 19–26, 35, 44, 48 struggle for freedom 19–26, 32, 34, 39, 64–5, 75, 130 Tito’s policy towards 31 transition to democracy 25, 28, 54 Yugoslav misdeeds in 74, 125 Yugoslav refugees in 33, 36, 41, 48, 49, 50, 97 Yugoslav threat 2, 6, 17, 29, 44, 48, 60–1, 68–9, 96–7, 124, 125, 128 Carinthia, history of Austro-Slovene ethnic conflict British control of agitation 42, 43 during Nazi regime, 1938–45 19–26, 27–9 during First Republic, 1918–38 12–19 ‘groupism’ 5–6, 35, 123 during Habsburg Empire, 1880–1918 9–12, 32 intermixture of Germans and Slovenes 15–16 polarization of 6, 12, 124, 128 scholarship on 5–6 during Second Republic, 1945–47 29–48 Carinthia, provisional provincial government and British collaboration 30–1, 47 and church leaders 32–3 criticism of 28–9, 31 declaration for settlement of Slovene question 32 and denazification 28–9, 41–8 and economic crisis 48–9 five-point declaration 72 linguistic policy 32 Nazi persecution of politicians 27–8 new bilingual system under pressure 48–52 new education policy, proposals and implementation 32, 35–7, 89 OF demands 33–5 party politics 29, 46, 72–3 request for federal support 45 resistance movement 28, 29 SPÖ party conference, 1949 73 Tischler’s role 35–9 Carinthia I (journal) 1

238 Carinthian Chamber of Agriculture 44 Carinthian Chamber of Labour 97 Carinthian ‘exceptionalism’ 82 Carinthian Provincial Committee (Landesauschuss) 13 Carling, William 42, 49–51 Carniola 1, 9, 21–2, 27, 34, 54, 87, 120 Catholic Church/Catholicism/Catholic anti-communism and 23, 32–3, 38, 68, 127 Concordat of 1934 33, 78 conservative politicians 68, 93–4, 127 criticism of 78, 129 decline in membership/attendance 24 diocesan authorities’ counsel 129 education and religious instruction 10–11, 78, 89–90, 115, 118 exiled priests 33 freedom of individual conscience 5 Nazi hostility to 9 ÖVP support for 78 and parental rights 101 resistance to Nazism 24 and Slovene nationalism 9, 17, 33, 84 Vatican’s threat of excommunication 68 victims of Nazism 44 Cefarin, Rudolf 35, 40, 41, 48, 50 census of 1848 54 of 1880 10, 86 of 1910 70, 152 n.44 of 1923 15 of 1934 18, 56–7 of 1939 20 of 1951 88–90, 92, 104–5, 112 of 1961 119 Central Europe 6, 89 Chamberlain, Neville 127 Charlemagne 47 chauvinism 20, 34–5, 46, 74, 75, 83, 91, 105, 124 Chekhov, Anton 41 Cherrière, Paul 62, 64 Christian Social Party 16–17, 28, 43, 80 cinema 33, 47 Cisleithania 4, 11 clemency 73, 125–6 Club (South Slav parliamentary group) 12 Cold War politics, 1947–49

Index anti-Slovene dynamics 72–6 London/Moscow CFM negotiations 53–61 minority protection 66–72 obstacles to CFM agreement 61–5 Paris agreement, 1940 65–6 support for Nazis 72–6 Western hostility to minority protection 69, 70–1 Cominform split, 1949 40, 64, 66–7, 70 concentration camps 45, 75. See also specific camps Concordat of 1934 33, 78 constitutional court 85, 109–10 Council of Europe 127 counter-reformation 9 Criminal Procedure Code 74 Črna/Schwarzenbach 23 Croat minorities 66, 70, 96 Czechoslovakia 5, 10, 61 Czechs 31, 46, 71 Czeitschner, Moritz 73, 183 n.214 Czoernig, Count 54 Dachau 19, 27, 28, 43, 44, 63, 75 debt cancellation 20 de Gasperi, Alcide 66, 68 Demokratična Fronta Delovnega Ljudstva (Democratic Front of the Working People) 67–8, 76, 80 denazification 30, 38, 41–2, 51 discriminatory 75 end of 28–9 exemptions from 29, 124–5 failures of 44–5, 56, 124 Heimat perspective on 44 ÖVP criticism of 48 ‘victims’ of 29, 48–9, 73 ‘Vienna model’ of 43–4 Department of Agriculture, Economics and Labour 29 deregistration campaign 111–19 Deutsch, Julius 14 Deutscher Schulverein (German School Association) 10 Deutscher Volksverein 12 devolution 3, 100, 101, 103–4 Displaced Persons (DPs) 33, 41, 48, 57, 79 Dlaska, Ernst 20 Dollfuss, Engelbert 17–18, 28, 77, 121

Index Domej, Theodor 153 n.56 Drua, river 13, 45, 52 Dravograd (Unterdrauberg) 47 Drimmel, Heinrich and anti-Slovene lobby 78, 93–5, 100– 1, 103–5, 107–11, 114, 116, 127 ‘Drimmel draft’ education law 107, 117–18 idea of devolution 100–1, 103 support of Tischler’s Swiss model 108–9 Družba Svet Mohorja (Hermagoras Society) 10–11 Eastern Europe 44 East–West conflict 56, 62 Ebendorf/Dobrla vas 46, 75 Education Committee 108 education system. See also bilingual school/instruction antagonism between authorities 11 appointment of teachers 36, 37, 75 attacks on teachers (denazification penalties) 49–50, 73, 75 on Catholic foundations 10–11, 89 criticism of 52, 72, 75 German as sole language of instruction 4, 35, 84, 105 legal framework 5, 11 Nazi policy 32, 36 OF demands/views on 34, 37–8 opposition to Tischler’s proposal 36, 37, 52 Piesch’s proposal/reform 35, 49 and police 50 Einspieler, Andreas 10 Einspieler, Valentin 98, 99, 102, 108, 110, 129–30 Eisenkappel/Železna Kapla 23, 59, 110, 141 elections of 1905 12 of 1910 11 of 1911 13, 152 n.46 of 1919 16 of 1921 16, 17, 167 n.134 of 1930 17 of 1931 17 of 1932 32, 39 of 1945 37–41, 44, 45, 55, 67, 83, 163 n.36

239

of 1949 75, 76, 77, 80–1, 90 of 1950 79–80 of 1951 84 of 1953 91–2 of 1954 83 of 1956 99 ethnicity, border-drawing principle 13 ethnography 21, 88 European Convention on Human Rights, 1950 127 euthanasia 73 expropriation 27, 29, 31, 33 Falle, Anton 19 Farmers’ League (Bauerbund). See Land League far-right activism 68, 97, 125 Fascism 17, 34, 38, 44, 94 Federal Council (Bundesrat) 56 Federal Denazification Commission 29 federalism 100 Feichtelbauer, Hubert 110 Feistritz/Bístrica v Rožu 41 Ferlach/Borovlje 10, 40–1, 45–6, 65, 90, 133 Ferlitsch, Hans 27–8, 33, 34, 36, 37, 72, 73–4, 84, 101, 116 Figl, Leopold anti-Nazi stance 44 and anti-Slovene lobby 80, 82, 83–4, 86, 93, 97, 100, 102, 115 and Cold War negotiations 57–8, 60, 63–5, 71, 73, 74 and Graf relationship 48 First Republic, 1918–38 12–19 First World War 2, 9, 12, 60 Fischer, Ernst 84, 116 Foreign Office, UK 29, 68 former Nazis claims of 99 employment of 73, 75, 90 in influential positions 48, 52, 72–6, 99, 126 prosecution of 74 as ‘victims’ 49 votes from 76 France. See also Paris Peace Conference delegation at London Conference of 1947 53, 56, 62–3 Frei, Norbert 125

240 Freie Stimmen (newspaper) 11, 12, 90 Freiheitliche Partei Österreich (FPÖ, Freedomite Party of Austria) and anti-Slovene lobby 118–21, 126 electoral performance of 99–100 in KHD board 98 Fritz, Karl 120 ‘Führer myth’ 24 Funder, Adolf 41, 42, 44, 74 Gallizien/Galicija 49, 141 Gau newspaper 26 Gau school 20 Gellner, Ernest 2–3 Germanization 1–2, 4, 11, 15–16, 21–3 and Nazi oppression 21–2, 54, 58, 79 and new bilingual system 50 and plebiscite result 14 primary schools as centres of 58 ‘soft’ 22 teachers supporting 49, 117 of Upper Carniola (Oberkrain) 21 German language census data 88, 89 as endangered language 32 everyday use of 87 as medium of instruction 4–5 statistical debates 88–9 German minorities/Germans agitation 59, 126 American OSS report on 25 attitudes of 46 and British personal relationships 31 children of lacking understanding of Slovene 32 compared to Czechs 31 defence of 37–41, 75, 80, 97, 121, 124, 128–9 as ‘Germanized Slavs’ 15 historiography 36 hostility to the imperial state 5, 9, 14 Piesch’s view of 32 warnings of Yugoslav invasion 43, 48, 57–8 vs. ‘Windish’ 129 in Yugoslavia 16 Germanophilia (Deutschfreundlichkeit) 13 German superiority 15, 23, 25 Germany/German Allied occupation of 61–2, 125

Index annexation of Austria in 1938 23 defeat of 25, 124 denazification, failure of 124 external assets issue 56, 60, 62, 64, 65 July Agreement 18 and London CFM (December 1947) 53, 62 post-war division of 126 rearmament 126 rise of Nazi power 17 Slovene deportees from 35 Soviet policy towards 61–2, 93 transition to democracy 126 Gestapo 19, 24 Glantschnig, Josef 27, 34, 72 Globocnik, Odilo 18, 23 Göriach/Gorje 112, 138 Gorizia 66 Görtschach 110 Gottestal/Skočidol 26 Gousev, Fedor 55–6 Graber, Georg 15 Graf, Ferdinand 44, 45, 48, 53, 60, 61, 70, 72–3, 82, 86, 91, 100, 101, 109, 110, 115 Grafenauer, Bogo 53 Grafenauer, Franc 12 Grafenstein/Grabštanj 94, 95, 133 Grammar school (Bundesgymnasium) 36, 80, 104–5, 121 Graubünden/Grisons 50 Graz 9, 41, 42, 74, 91 Greater Germany 10, 13, 14, 17, 126 Greece 31 Griffen/Grebinj 72, 141 Gröger, Florian 16 Grossauer, Hans 28 Großdeutsche Volkspartei (Greater German People’s Party) 17 groupism 5, 6, 35, 123 Gruber, Karl and anti-Slovene lobby 77, 80–3, 91, 93 appeal in Vienna 57, 60, 66 and Carinthian ethnic and personnel politics 75 concerns over Yugoslav 48, 61 criticism of 55–6, 60, 64–5 and de Gaspari agreement 66, 68 London/Moscow talks 55–6, 58, 60–1, 63–5, 71–2, 73

Index and Paris Peace Conference 47 and principle of affirmation 80–1 and Wedenig relations 69, 120 Gurnitz/Podkrnos 95, 133 Haas, Hanns 153 n.56 Habsburg Empire collapse of 5, 12 ethnic conflict in 9–11 ignorance of Slav languages in 36 and ‘parental rights’ 102 unofficial census, 1848 54 Hague Convention 30, 85 Handwörterbuch des Grenzlands- und Auslandsdeutschtum (‘Handbook of Borderland and Foreign Germandom’) 21 Hänisch, Dirk 13, 17, 39, 91 Hanny (Hanni), Josef 28, 34 Hasslacher, Jakob 44 Hawarlik, Adolf 119 Heiligengrab/Božji 113, 142 Heimat (homeland) allegiance to 4–5, 15, 24–6, 28, 87, 92, 109, 117, 127, 128 defence of 37–41, 75 ‘slander’ on 12 Heinzel, Julius 49–50, 124 Heldendenkmal (heroes’ monument) 95 Helmer, Oskar 45–8, 60, 69, 71, 82, 87 Hermagor 110 high culture 2, 6 Hillmann, Leo (Charles Kennedy) 125 Himmler, Heinrich 22 historical consciousness 13 history, border-drawing principle 13 Hitler, Adolf Maribor command 21, 22 myth of Wunderwaffe 24 speech to the Reichstag 19–20 Sudeten policy 31 war machine 53–4, 55 Holocaust 18 Holzer, Erwin 77 Honner, Franz 43 Hood, Lord 55 Hosp, Martin 102 housing 20 Hungary 61

241

Hurdes, Felix 19, 58, 71, 73, 78, 84, 85, 86, 98, 109, 156 n.113, 182 n.187 Huss, Albin 97 illegal Nazis 17–18, 44, 121, 127, 184 n.220, 184 n.223 Indemnification Committee 29 Institut für Kärntner Landesforschung (Institute for Carinthian Province Research) 22 Interior Ministry 45, 48, 69, 87, 88 intermarriage 1, 129 international politics 89, 96, 98, 126–7 Inzko, Valentin 95 irredentism 18, 19, 30, 31, 40, 46, 76, 101 Italian Peace Treaty 41 Italy communist parties 23, 61 1943 surrender of 23 Tito’s policy towards 31 Yugoslavian claims 41, 66 Iveković, Mladen 107 Jahn, Friedrich Ludwig 10 Janežić, Rado 99 Jarnik, Urban 1–3, 5–6, 15, 130 Jews 15, 27, 125 Jobst, Paul 42, 45 Jordan, Heribert 99, 110, 111, 126 Judson, Pieter 6, 12 Julian March/Venezia Gulia 66 July Agreement, Austro-German 18 Just, Lorenz 50, 124, 172 n.237 Kadras, Josef 113, 118 Kaltenbrunner, Ernst 24 Kanal valley 21 Karawanken 18, 65 Kardelj, Edvard 55–8, 66, 71 Karisch, Alois 27, 57, 61, 64, 65, 73, 74, 77, 85, 91, 156 n.113 Karner, Stefan 119 Kärntner Heimatbund 19 Kärntner Heimatdienst (Carinthian Heimat Service, KHD) 15–16, 28, 98, 111, 120 Kärntner Landeszeitung 88 Kärntner Landsmannschaft 98 Kärntner Nachrichten (newspaper) 94, 97, 98, 125

242 Kärntner Schulverein Südmark 97 Kazianka, Johann 39, 81, 116, 167 n.136 Kernmaier, Ferdinand 17, 19, 121 King, Jeremy 6 Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes 13 Klagenfurt arrival of the Wehrmacht and SS 19 bilingual instruction in 92, 105, 116 bombing of 24 district court in 99 election campaign in 44–5 food situation in 24 Nazis in 44 protests in 10, 44, 47, 82, 95, 100–1, 126 Serb occupation of 13, 14 Tischler’s role in 37, 58, 80 Yugoslav consul in 83 Klausner, Hubert 17–18, 19 Kleine Zeitung (newspaper) 91, 94–5, 110, 114 Kleinwächter, Ludwig 63 Knaus, Hubert 100, 102, 129 Knaus, Siegmund 23 Kočevje/Gotschee 21 Kolb, Ernst 93 Koplenig, Johann 118 Kordesch, Thomas 49, 111 Korean War 83 Koroška Kronika (newspaper) 42, 68, 69 Koschier, Franz 120 Köstinger, Anni 72, 75 Köstner, Joseph 32, 129 Köttmansdorf/Kotmára vás 111 Kövesi, Leo 84, 117 Kragujevac massacre 54 Kraigher, Boris 67 Krassnig, Matthias 110 Kreisky, Bruno 103, 107, 115, 121–2, 126 Kremlin 64 Kriechbaumer, Robert 43 Krščanska Ljudska Stranka (Christian People’s Party) 76 Kübler, Ludwig 23 Kugler, Karl 74 Kuhinka, Elizabeth 79, 87 Kymlicka, Will 3 Lagger, Hans 15, 37, 75, 124 laissez-faire 68

Index Lakomy, Walter 97, 98, 99 Land League (Landbund) 11, 17 Landtag (provincial diet) new 76, 77 1920 pledge 13–14, 16, 121 representatives in 11, 17, 18, 37, 39–40, 51, 67, 76, 88, 91–2, 99 sessions 48, 57, 65–6, 70, 81, 85, 99–100, 129 Landtag Minority Committee 102, 103, 167 n.136 ‘language of everyday use,’ official definition 87 Larcher, Dietmar 6 Lavamund/Labot 37, 56, 65 Leer, Sylvester 17, 27 Lemisch, Arthur 1–2, 5, 14 Lenin, Vladimir 38 Leopold, Josef 18 liberal values and post-Nazi society 3–4, 128–30 Lindsay, Franklin 24 Ljubljana and bilingual school issue 83, 115 communist power in 32–3, 67 and plebiscite 18 radio 58, 86 Ljubljana Institute for Border Questions 83 Loebenstein, Edwin 84 Löhr, Alexander 54 Loibl Pass sub-camp 73 London Council of Foreign Ministers, 1947 53–76 Lübbe, Herman 126 Ludmannsdorf/Bilčovs 111, 135 Lueger, Heinrich 40 Lukas, Julius 78–9 Mack, William 29 Maier-Kabitsch, Alois 16, 19, 20, 22–3, 25, 51, 52, 74, 184 n.220 Maria Elend/Podgorje 26, 140 Maria Saal 37 Maria Wörth/Otok 25, 134 Maribor 18, 21, 22, 47, 94 Marjoribanks, James 68, 179 n.113 Marshall, George 60 Marshall Plan 61 Marxism 16, 38, 78

Index Marxism-Leninism 39, 67, 84 May declaration, 1917 12 Mayerhofer, Wolfgang 97, 98, 101–3 medieval history 10 Mediterranean 12 Meier, Viktor 115 Meierhofer, Valentin 29 Mellweg/Melviče 110, 132 memorials 94–5 Metnitz, Hermann 101, 111 Middle Ages 21 Mies valley (Miestal/Mežiška Dolina) 21, 46–7, 58 Miklova Zala(Mikls Zala) 32 Miles, Sherman 65 Military Government, British 28, 30–1, 38, 42–3 Miltschinsky, Viktor 98 minority rights collective 69, 72, 84 diplomatic discussions of minority protection 66–72 Western indifference/hostility to 127 mixed language areas/schools 22, 46, 51, 59–60, 69, 77, 79, 88, 94, 101 modernization 2, 3, 129 Molotov, Vycheslav 47, 56, 60, 95–6 Moos/Blato 112, 142 Moravian compromise, 1905 16, 108 Moscow Council of Foreign Ministers, 1947 53–76 Moscow Declaration on Austria, 1943 55–6, 125 Mueller, Wolfgang 56 multiculturalism 2 Mussolini, Benito 23 Narodni Svet. See National Council Naš Tednik (newspaper) 92, 117, 130 National Council (Narodni Svet) 16, 51, 89, 93 Nationale Liga 92 ‘national indifference’ 6, 13, 20 nationality (Volkstum) 18, 32, 98, 129 nationality office (Volkstumsreferat) 99 Nationality Schools (Nationalitätenschulen) 11 national registers (Kataster) 108 National Socialism. See also Nazi Party

243

collapse of 97, 123 complicity in 44, 77 continuities with 105 impact of 4, 22, 27, 46, 123–4 supporters of 123, 130 and values of 125, 128 victims of 75, 130 Natmeßnig, Meinrad 25, 27, 28, 29, 74 Nazi Party 14 and economic crisis 17 explanations for success of 17–19 illegal members 17–18, 44, 121, 127, 184 n.220, 184 n.223 membership/members 20, 21, 25, 29 Nazi regime brutality of 21–4, 27–8 collapse of 24, 25, 97 deportation policy 74 farmers’ organization 29 incriminated Nazis 73–4, 81 influence of core values 125 neo-Nazi activity 74, 125 war crimes/war criminals 73, 99, 125 Yugoslav support 23–4 Neue Zeit (newspaper) 37, 46, 62, 64, 65, 69, 72, 75, 76, 90, 91, 95, 100, 105, 113, 114, 121 Neue Zürcher Zeitung 115 Neugebauer, Max 108–9, 115, 118 Neugebauer, Wolfgang 160 n.174 neutrality 4, 14, 31, 113, 122, 130 Newole, Karl assimilationist assumptions of 91, 207 n.32 attack on Yugoslavia’s minority proposal 70 condemnation of the OF 35 criticism of bilingual school system 69 and employments of refugees 36 minority census 119 and minority rights 52, 70, 86, 129 and Nazi regime 29 and new bilingual education regime 36–7, 48, 69, 89–91 and Yugoslav territorial claims 46 News Chronicle 53 New Zealand 4 Nicholls, Jack 29–30 Noel-Baker, Francis 61 non-discrimination 3, 4, 14

244

Index

Norway, Wehrmacht occupation of 14 Novikov, Nikolai 62 NSDAP 28 NS-Lehrerbund (National Socialist Teachers League) 27 Nuremberg decrees 35, 55 Oberweis 73 ‘objective criteria’ 35, 40, 52, 55, 68, 70 occupation law 85, 98 Odlasek, Franz 113 Ogris, Alfred 153 n.56 Okey, Robin 3 O’Leary, Brendan 3 Orajže, Amelia 43 Österreichische Freiheitsfront (ÖFF, Austrian Freedom Front) 24, 43 Österreichische Volkspartei (ÖVP, Austrian People’s Party) 19, 46 anti-Slovene initiatives 72–3, 75, 84–5, 95 Association of Political Persecutees 73 criticism of 75, 76, 95 draft education bill 84–5 and parental rights 78, 84 party politics 72 Osvobodilna Fronta (OF, Liberation Front) 23, 31 and British control 30, 37, 43, 59–60 and communist relationship 38, 39–40 contrasted with other minorities 46 criticism of 34–5, 41, 45, 67, 74 demands of 33–5, 40 demonstrations by 47–8, 51, 57–9, 73 efforts to counter church influence 33 election campaign and withdrawal, 1945 37–9 petition to Moscow conference by priests 59 press reports 42, 74 rise of 23 and Soviet relations 67 SPÖ counter-actions against 40–1 and Tischler relations 37–9, 51, 58 views on education system 34, 37–8 Youth League 26, 58 and Yugoslav relations 41, 58, 67 Paller, Hans 90 parental rights breach of 102

campaign for 5, 37, 50, 77–80, 84, 92–3, 100, 118, 128–9, 129 denial of 16, 89, 94, 101 and liberal values 128–9 new proposal based on 93–4 and principle of affirmation 98 and State Treaty, Article 7 81, 98 Tischler’s view 78 Parents’ Council 72 parish councils (Gemeinderat) 25, 32, 40, 101, 102, 111 Paris Peace Conference of 1919 13, 14, 15, 47 of 1949 65–6, 67, 71 party politics 29, 41, 46, 57, 65, 67, 72, 73, 77, 86, 103, 124, 125, 170 n.183 Peake, Charles 61 Perkonig, Friedrich 22 Petek, Franc 16, 19, 38, 39, 67–8 Peter, Heinrich 85, 109, 114, 117 ‘petit bourgeois nationalism’ 40, 64, 67 Petschauer, Hermann 111 Petschnig (Petschnik), Albin 33, 40, 167–8 n.136 Pfeifer, Helfried 85, 118 Piesch, Hans anti-Nazi claim 29–30 and British involvement 31–4 proposal to restore utraquistic schools 35, 36–7 and provincial politics 27–37, 39–40, 42–52, 54, 57, 58, 70, 81 and Rainer relations 25 Pirjevec-Ahac, Dušan 23 Pirker, Peter 23 place names, etymology disputes 10, 96, 102, 112, 115, 126 Plankenauer, Heinz 111 plebiscite, 1920 2 campaign behaviour 19 commemorations of (10 October) 15, 81, 111, 120–1 controversial aspect of 14 decision to hold 13 democratic legitimacy of 56 non-acceptance of 18 outcome of 58 result 1, 14, 19 Steinacher’s view of the result 14 Wutte’s interpretation of 15

Index Podgorc, Valentin 16, 18, 33 Pokrajinksi Narodno Osvobodilna Odbor (PNOO, Regional People’s Liberation Committee) 30 Poland, mass shootings 125 polarization 6, 12, 102, 103, 124, 128 police/police reports 13, 14, 20, 26, 44–5, 47, 50–1, 58–62, 75, 82, 89, 90, 94, 96–7, 99, 101, 111–15, 125, 127, 130 ‘policy of force’ (Gewaltpolitik) 74 Poljanec, Vinko 19 Popovič, Koča 93, 107, 121–2 Potsdam Conference 55, 99 POW camps 70 power stations on Drau/Drava river 56–7, 61, 64, 179 n.113 Pravda (newspaper) 41 press Belgrade 39 Carinthian 62, 114 collaboration efforts 46 and communism 28, 116 and denazification 49 disputed Treaty articles 62 escalation of 113 and Nazi 45 as platform for Slovene culture 42 against secession 35, 42 Slovene 93, 94 Yugoslav 41, 47, 63, 82 Presse (newspaper) 70, 97, 110 Primožič, Franc 58, 68 principle of affirmation (Bekenntnisprinzip) 40, 77, 80–1, 98, 108, 111, 116, 118, 129 pro-Austrian propaganda campaign (Landesagitationsleitung) 14 Prohibited Frontier Zone 36, 43 Proporz system 99 Protestant/Protestantism 5, 9, 17, 78, 101, 115 Provincial Agriculture Department 29 Provincial Archive 15 Provincial School Council 11, 50, 52, 58, 87 Prušnik-Gašper, Karel 37, 47, 59, 67 Psychological Warfare Branch, British 42 Pustritz/Pustrica 37 Pyke, Mervyn 24

245

Raab, Julius 100, 107, 115, 121 race/racism 4, 75–6, 129 Wutte’s construction of 15–16 Rader, Hans 101, 129 radio broadcasts 25, 42, 45, 58, 61, 99, 111 Rainer, Friedrich (Gauleiter) 1–2, 17–18, 21–5, 73, 128–9 Ramsauer, Sigbert 73 real estate, Carinthian brokerage organization 14–15, 96–7 Realpolitik 73, 107 Reber, Sam 62–3, 65 reconstruction policy 30, 32, 33, 49, 62 Red White Red Book – Justice for Austria! 47 rehabilitation 29, 36, 49, 72 Reichsvolksschulgesetz (Imperial Primary School Law), 1869 11 Reiterer, Albert 129 religious education 11, 14–15, 33, 52, 67, 68, 78, 89, 115, 116, 118, 148 n.19 Renner, Karl 14, 43–5, 65 repression 1–2, 19, 23–4, 45, 59, 73, 76, 95, 102 revisionism 18, 64, 67, 70 Rhineland, Prussian 14 Rigel, Miha 68 right-wing groups 71, 92, 93, 118, 125 Rohracher, Andreas 24, 29, 33 Rožman, Gregorij 32–3 Rosegg/Rožek 50, 70, 140 Rosental/Rož 69 Ruggenthaler, Peter 119 Rumpler, Helmut 18 Rupnik, Leon 33 Russian language 36 Salzborn, Samuel 127 Salzburger Nachrichten (newspaper) 92–3 Santner, Julius 34 Schärf, Adolf 45–6, 60–1, 65, 90, 105, 115, 121 Schober bloc 17 Schöner, Josef 89, 95 School and Instruction Order, 1905 110 Schumy, Vinzenz 16, 27, 28, 47, 57, 70, 74, 87, 95, 121 Schuschnigg, Kurt 18–19, 28, 35, 44, 77 Schwabegg/Žvabek 56, 144

246 Scrinzi, Otto 77 Second World War 2, 94, 114, 130 self-determination 13, 54, 78, 120 Seyss-Inquart, Arthur 19 Sharp, Gerald 42, 52, 68 Silesia 14, 27, 108 Silla, Erich 98, 108, 129 Sima, Hans 78 Simson 43 Singer, Stefan 9 Sittersdorf/Žitára vás 112, 144 Slomšek, Anton Martin 9, 10 Slovenes. See also ‘Windish’ active propaganda and demands 99 anti-communist 23 and Article 7 provisions 100 compensation for deportees 31, 32, 35 corporate legal status of 70 cultural rights 23, 34 definition of Slovene 13 deportation of 21–2, 24, 31 diplomatic discussions on minority protection 66–72 expropriation of 29, 31 loyalty to the Austrian state (loyalists) 32, 34, 40, 45, 58–60 opposition to Yugoslavia 65 police atacks on 47 pro-German 34 resistance and protests by 23–4, 34, 38, 44–5, 47, 54, 58 victims of Nazism 46, 75, 105 Slovene Communist Party 38, 67 Slovene Cultural Association 18 Slovene Cultural League 18, 20, 31, 32, 89 Slovene Domobranci 33 Slovene language. See also ‘Windish’ ban on use of 73, 101 Basic State Law, Article 19 (3) 5 books 49, 120 census data 18, 20, 88, 89, 166 n.100 in church services 9, 25–6, 33, 84 decline in number of speakers 2, 10, 18, 26, 36 directives on 58 in district courts 99 impact of Nazi policy 22, 25–6, 32, 50 Jarnik’s view 2 official slogan 120

Index parental rights to have children learn 5, 11, 16, 20 Podgorc’s concern 18 protection of 33, 130 and religious instruction 5, 118 statistical debates 88–9 stigmatization of 25–6, 32, 78, 123 treatment of in the school system 4–5, 18, 20 Slovene press 41, 93 Slovene School 16, 34, 35, 77, 85, 99, 101 Slovenia civil war in 23 cross-border cultural contacts 90 nationalist revisionists in 18 partisans in 24 press criticism of Carinthian politics 94 refugees from 77, 115 support for Nazi rule 18, 23 Slovenska Ljudska Stranka (Slovene People’s Party) 11, 16, 17, 33, 38 Slovenski Vestnik (newspaper) 93, 99, 114 Slovensko Solško Društvo (Slovene School Association) 11 Smith, Donald 30–1 social Darwinism 10, 129 Social Democrats and assimilation 129 autonomy proposal 16 and commemorations of the plebiscite 15 and elections 12, 16, 17 support of 121 and workers’ councils 15 South Slavs 9, 12, 13, 17, 23, 94, 128 South Tyrol 21, 55, 66, 121, 126 Soviet Union foreign policy 47, 53–76, 93 German invasion of 53 London/Moscow CFM negotiations 53, 55–6, 63 and 1949 Paris agreement 65–6 occupation of Austria 61–2, 178 n.86 revisionism of 70 and Yugoslav relations 70, 115 Sozialistische Partei Österreich (SPÖ, Socialist Party of Austria) 28 anti-Slovene lobby 78–83, 90–105, 108, 110, 116–19, 124 dominance of 60

Index electoral performance of 39–40, 76, 80, 82, 90, 91 membership target 29 press reports 57, 65 Tischler and 37, 51 Speiser, Paul 61 Spittal 24 Srienz, Christian 112 Stalin, Joseph 38, 40–1, 45, 47, 56, 61, 81, 93, 126, 170 n.191 Starc, Janes 20 state printing press 47 Statistisches Zentralamt (SZA, Central Statistical Office) 86, 88 Steinacher, Hans anti-Slovene lobby 72, 75–8, 81, 87, 90–1, 120 and British officials 70, 72 criticism of 75, 76 intervention with Gruber 77, 81 memoir of 23 minority protection discussions 70 and pro-Austrian propaganda campaign 14 Stern (magazine) 112 St Jakob im Rosental/Šentjakob v Rožu 80, 138 St Jakob/Šentjakob v Rožu 58 St Kanzian/Škocjan 41, 89, 142 Stojadinović, Milan 18 Stossier, Josef 58 Stotter, Joseph 29 Stourzh, Gerald 11, 72 St Paul/Šentpavel na Zilji 110 street signage, proposed removal of Slovene 73, 126 St Ruprecht/Šentrupert 67 St Stefan im Gailtal/Štefan na Zilji 110 Stuhlpfarrer, Karl 153 n.56 Styria 1, 9, 18, 22, 24, 34, 44, 47, 53, 54, 82 ‘subjective criteria’ 4, 20, 35, 68, 71, 89, 100, 102, 111 Sudetenland 14, 127 Südmark 28, 105 suffrage, introduction and extension of 11–12 Suppan, Arnold 3, 13 Suppanz, Paul 28, 74 Suppanz, Thomas 31, 35 Switzerland 35, 50, 109

247

Tainach/Tinje 111, 145 Tauschitz, Stefan 27 theatricals, amateur (Igre) 32, 41, 58 theology 18 Third Reich 2, 27–8, 33, 52, 53, 121 Three Sisters (Chekhov, play) 41 timber industry 11, 17, 44, 74, 97, 170 n.182 Tischler, Joško (Josef) and OF 37–9, 51, 68 autonomy proposal 51–2, 71 banishment of 20, 35 British support for 42, 68 criticism of 38, 51, 52, 68, 75, 76, 124 criticism of school policy 52, 58, 130 election campaign and withdrawal, 1945 37–9, 67, 68 and Gerald Sharp relations 68 and Hurdes relationship 58 and minority protection policy 102 National Council (Narodni Svet) 89 and ÖVP 76 and Piesch relationship 36, 37, 51, 58 proposal for primary education 35–7, 50–1, 77, 78, 130 resignation from Carinthian government 37, 124 and SPÖ 37, 51 support for the new order 19 Tito, Joseph 31–2, 38, 47, 50, 53, 56, 59, 65, 67, 90–1, 97, 102–3, 107–10, 126 Treaty of St Germain 70, 84 Trieste 23, 31, 66 tripartite system 6, 101, 105, 107 Truman, Harry S. 56 Truppe, Paul 110 Tschurtschentaler, Ignaz 27, 28 Tully, James 4, 130 Ude, Lojze 83 Ulbing, Thomas 26 Ulrichsberg 125, 127 unemployment 20, 97 United Nations 53, 65, 108 United Nations Universal Declaration, 1948 127 United States 3 and Cold War politics 53–76 denazification efforts 124, 125

248

Index

Office of Strategic Services (OSS) 24, 25 Slovene migration to 9 Unity (Eotnost), Slovene communist group 114 universal male suffrage 11–12 Unkart, Ralf 119 Unterkärntner Nachrichten (newspaper) 94, 125 Upper Carniola (Oberkrain) 21, 34, 54, 120, 158 n.144 Upper Silesia 14 urban centres 10, 39, 76, 90 utraquistic schools 4, 11, 18, 20, 32, 35, 42, 50, 77, 83, 100–1, 116, 123, 149 n.23, 166 n.88 Valenčak 105 Valentin, Hellwig 16 Vallon, Alfons 77, 97, 99 Vaterländische Front (Patriotic Front) 18, 19 Vatican 68 Večer (newspaper) 94 Velden/Vrba 28, 36–7, 49, 73, 90, 94, 95 Verband der Unabhängigen (VdU, Electoral League of Independents) anti-Slovene lobby 77–105 criticism of 77 election campaign 75 electoral performance of 76, 79–80, 90 support for ‘parental rights’ 78 Verbotsgesetz, 1947 44, 99 Verdross, Alfred 84 Verein der Alldeutschen für Kärnten (PanGerman League for Carinthia) 10 Verein Südmark (Association South March) 10 Vestnik (newspaper) 58, 74, 93 Vienna Allied Council 41, 44 British authorities in 27–52 and Cold War politics 53–76 denazification model 43–4 Education Ministry 11 House of Representatives (Abgeordnetenhaus) 12 Nazi rule, impact of 43 re-entry into provincial politics 43 Vienna University 88

Vilfan, Sergij 53, 54 Villach bombing of 24 food situation in 24 German activism in 10, 44, 48, 75 Nazi continuity in 26, 90, 97, 126, 127 rise of the Nazi party 17 Vogl-Boekh, Paul 94 Völkermarkt/Velikovec 10, 17, 34, 37, 43, 45, 72, 76, 79–80, 90–2, 94–5, 102, 104, 111 Völkermarkt/Velikovec Parents Association 79 Volkswille (newspaper) 12 Volkszeitung (newspaper) 42, 51, 60, 61, 65, 66, 74, 88, 103, 110, 112 Vorarlberg 35, 82 Vorderberg/Blače 110, 132 Vošnjak, Mitja 83, 97 Vyshinsky, Andrei 66 Wadl, Wilhelm 17, 28 Waffen-SS 125 Waldheim, Kurt 54 Wallisch, Kollman 28 war crimes 54–5, 63, 99, 125 war crimes trials 73–4 Wedenig, Ferdinand 19, 27, 36, 63 accusations against 91–2 and bilingual school policy 69, 79, 83 and British relations 83 press attacks on 91 view of ‘Windish’ 87 Wehrmacht 14, 19, 23, 25, 31, 55, 95, 125 Weiß, Ludwig 127 Weißmann, Walter 108, 109, 118 Weissenstein internment camp 41 Weltpolitik 126 West Germany 61–2, 121, 125–6 Wiedergutmachung (Commission for Redress) 33 Wildner, Heinrich 43, 58, 65 Wilkinson, Peter 42 ‘Windish’ ban on use of 50, 87 implications of 6–7, 87, 129 inclusion of as linguistic category 87–8 loyalists 98 Nazi view of 20 vs. Slovene 77, 87, 88, 90, 92, 108

Index statistical debates 88–9 Wutte’s understanding of 15–16, 20–1, 22 Wit, Karl 111 Wodak, Walter 107, 115 Wolfsberg internment camp 41, 125 Working Committee (Arbeitsausschuss) 43 world language 73 Wutte, Martin 15, 20–3, 25, 36, 54 Yalta Conference 99 Yugoslavia attempted occupation of southern Carinthia, 1945 128 autonomy statute proposal 51, 57, 64, 66, 69–71 and Carinthia border issue 2, 13, 41, 46–7, 53–7, 97, 128 and Carinthian election of 1945 39 criticism of government in 18 economic condition 97 émigrés 42, 96 foreign ministry 18, 53–76, 83, 93, 107, 121

249 German invasion of, 1941 21 interior ministry 48 legal status, 1955 96 London/Moscow CFM negotiations 54–61, 63 May declaration, 1917 12 Nazi misdeeds in 54, 125 occupation of 49, 53 partisans in 24 press 47, 63, 82 responses to Nazism 48 and Soviet tensions 115, 128 support for Nazi rule 18, 47 threats to Austria 68–9, 96–7, 124 treatment of German minority in 16 Western resistance to 61

Zahra, Tara 6, 10 Zarubin, Vasily 71 Zell-Pfarre/Selo 40 Zhdanov, Andrei 63 Zhuber, Otto 43 Zwitter, Franc 54, 67 Zwitter, Mirt 67, 74, 102 Zwitter, Vinzenz (Vinko) 38, 67, 114