Sir Claude Macdonald, the Open Door, and British Informal Empire in China, 1895-1900 0815359586, 9780815359586

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ROUTLEDGE LIBRARY EDITIONS: THE BRITISH EMPIRE

Volume 7

SIR CLAUDE MACDONALD, THE OPEN DOOR, AND BRITISH INFORMAL EMPIRE IN CHINA, 1895-1900

SIR CLAUDE MACDONALD, THE OPEN DOOR, AND BRITISH INFORMAL EMPIRE IN CHINA, 1895-1900

MARY H. WILGUS

R

Routledge Taylor &. Francis Group

LONDON AND NEW YORK

First published in 1987 by Garland Publishing, Inc. This edition first published in 2018 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX 14 4RN and by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 1987 Mary H. Wilgus All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice'. Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN: ISBN: ISBN: ISBN:

978-0-8153-5278-5 (Set) 978-1-351-02850-9 (Set) (ebk) 978-0-8153-5958-6 (Volume 7) (hbk) 978-1-351-12022-7 (Volume 7) (ebk)

Publisher's Note The publisher has gone to great lengths to ensure the quality of this reprint but points out that some imperfections in the original copies may be apparent. Disclaimer The publisher has made every effort to trace copyright holders and would welcome correspondence from those they have been unable to trace.

MODERN

EUROPEAN

HISTORY

Sir Qaudc MacDonald, the Open Door, and British Informal Empire in China, 1895-1900 Mary H. Wilgus

Garland Publishing, Inc. New York and London 1987

Copyright © 1987 Mary H. Wilgus All rights reserved

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Wilgus, Mary H., 1941Sir Claude MacDonald, the Open Door, and British informal empire in China, 1895-1900 / Mary H. Wilgus. p. cm.—(Modern European history) Bibliography: p. Includes index. ISBN 0-8240-7837-3 (alk. paper) 1. Great Britain—Relations—China. 2. MacDonald, Claude Maxwell, Sir, 1852-1915. 3. Great Britain—Foreign relations—1837-1901. 4. China—Relations—Great Britain. 5. China— Foreign relations—1644-1912. 6. China—Foreign economic relations. 7. Eastern question (Far East) I. Title. II. Series. DA47.9.C6W54 1987 327.41051—dc!9 87-26029

All volumes in this series are printed on acidfree, 250-year-life paper. Printed in the United States of America

CONTENTS Chapter I :

INTRODUCTION

Chapter Us

TRADE NOT RULE: 1689-1895

Chapter III:

ENTRENCHMENT AND REACTION: POLICY AND RUSSOPHOBIA

Chapter IV: Chapter V:

1

ANGLO-CHINESE RELATIONS

"GUNBOAT" MACDONALD: SPOT, 1896-1900

6

THE OPEN DOOR 37

BRITAIN'S MAN-ON-THE76

ARTIFICIAL AGENCY OF INFORMAL EMPIRE: SIR ROBERT HART AND IMPERIAL MARITIME CUSTOMS SERVICE

Chapter VI:

PRINCIPAL INSTRUMENTS OF EMPIRE: CONCESSIONS 1895-1900

Chapter VII:

PRACTICAL INFORMAL EMPIRE: AND MINING CONCESSIONS

Chapter VIII:

Chapter IX:

96

RAILWAY 126

LOANS, TRADES, 17O

FRIENDS IN HIGH PLACES: CHINESE COLLABORATION AND INFORMAL EMPIRE, 1895-1900

217

CONCLUSION

255

Endnotes

260

Bibliography

309

Index

318

1

INTRODUCTION John British

A. Gallagher and historians,

incorporating

new

Ronald

define areas

E. Robinson,

imperialism

into

an

two respected

as

a

"expanding economy."

propose that empire is political and economic in determined

not

only

by

They

nature, and "is

organization of

the regions

the orbit of the expansive society, and also by the

world situation in general."1 during the

of

the factors of economic expansion, but

equally by the political and social brought into

method

Such

were Anglo-Chinese relations

eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

merchants from India established

trade

with

Private British

the

Ch'ing empire

during the eighteenth century, and English military supremacy was used to protect

lucrative

obstructive, weak of

the

access

nineteenth to

markets

unnecessary. Gallagher

growth of

companies

Chinese government century. along

the

coast;

political

arms;

how

commercial supremacy,

guaranteed

formal

informal

dynamics:

threatened

by an

during the earlier decades

Intervention

the

Great Britain had

describe

economic and

British

empire.

"the

Robinson and

inter-relation of its

political

and how

English

British rule was

action

aided the

this supremacy in turn

ft

strengthened political influence." To some historians Robinson

and

Gallagher

of

nineteenth

thesis

century

is flawed.

imperialism the

The "imperialism of

2

free

trade"

did

acquisition

or

not

necessarily

military

occupation

Indeed, the informal theme criteria

for

empire.

include of

does not

He

a

formal

dependent

wrote:

"...if

you

imperialism from territorial control

you will always

"...Imperialism

try to divorce

get nowhere. ..."

carries with it the

connotation of the Imperator and of the tradition A

diplomatic

historian

primarily in terms Informal empire, societies

to

British

society

formal

was

After

competition.

Instead,

the

late

if

the

was

Only

dependent

or

by

formal

formal territorial

feasible for

most

that

the

Robinson and Gallagher

possible,

But

nineteenth

was

within

considered. means

necessary. ..."

domination

economically.

economic advantage. . . . "*

threatened

means

informal

when

during

Informal

not

economic

control and a closed economy even China

"...rulers of Europe thought

free trade thrived on an open trade policy.

"...By

annexations

of rule. . . . " 3

by its very nature, did not close its dependent

hegemony

were

explain:

political

foreign

imperialism of when

of

observed:

society.

fulfill William L. Langer's

Langer

continued:

territorial

century? efficient,

Great Britain in Obviously

no.

politically and

s

1S6O

Great

Britain encouraged and supported China's

weak but culturally entrenched Manchu dynasty. for formal rule in such a region. control was cost

effective.

One

There was no need

In China, especially, informal economic

historian observed:

"'informal empire' ... was inseparable from economic and military predominance,

recognizing

and

cooperating

with

indigenous

3 governments in

the East."6

Africa and

British commercial

and military

However,

power had

by the 189O's

European rivals that

challenged England's informal supremacy in China. The

"world

situation"

policy makers had to

had

adapt to

changed

by

1895, and British

circumstances which

pitted "free

trade" imperialism against such formal imperial powers as Russia, France, Germany, and this thesis

Japan.

Using

British

primary materials,

analyzes how Lord Salisbury, Great Britain's Foreign

Secretary, 1895-19OO, maintained England's economic and political hegemony

in

China.

Robinson

policy in the late, as

in

the

and Gallagher explain:

"British

mid-Victorian period, preferred

informal means of extending imperial supremacy rather than direct rule ... the extension

of

Great

door

Britain's

open

served several purposes: force; British

it

utilized

financial,

incorporated, where

British policy

it

the

rule

mercantile,

any

sector

and

last resort."7

a

provided

eliminated

private

was

the means, and it need

for military

to sustain and expand

political

power;

and

it

necessary, specific regional agreements with

France and Russia. By its very nature, the open door policy was one of response rather

than

action,

and

it

was

dedicated man-on-the-spot who could

dependent be

on an aggressive,

controlled

from London.

Sir Claude M. MacDonald, Britain's minister at Peking, 1896-1900, and the Foreign

Office

responded

to

diplomatic

and political

actions of other European powers in China, exposing the policy to political attacks and criticism

by the

English press.

How the

4 public viewed publicized England, weak.

the policy

by

reflected a

Journalists

leaving

the

and

general fear of Russia as

the

impression

news

that

media

in

Salisbury's

Victorian policy was

At Peking, MacDonald, too, held, Russophobic views.

British imperial

problems in

simplistic, narrow

He saw

terms.

But he

applied his militant energies to the maintenance of the open door and Britain's informal empire of free trade in East Asia.8 MacDonald's success of

pro-British,

dispatches

British at of

Chinese

and

imperial theme

at Peking depended on the effectiveness

the

collaborators.

Times,

one

of indigenous

can

study

Ronald

collaboration as

Peking and in England.

collaboration:

Utilizing MacDonald's

"expansive

Robinson's

perceived by the

Robinson defines the function

forces

generated

in industrial

Europe had to combine with elements within the agrarian societies of the outer world to make empire at all practicable."9 companies trained

and came

compradors.

MacDonald

elaborates:

But

British

to depend upon Chinese employees, or needed

policy

makers.

Robinson

"the main source of Afro-Asian collaborators was not

in the export-import sector but among

essentially noncommercial,

ruling

elites."10

oligarchies

and

landholding

scholar-gentry made use of initiate reforms did

not

Britain and

in traditional

materialize

emperor, attempted

quickly

China.

enough,

Those Chinese

other Western

powers to

Modernization, however, and

Kuang

Hsu, China's

radical but fruitless reforms with the advice

from Anglophile counselors.

Viewed through news stories from the

Times and Foreign Office correspondence, the "100 days of reform"

5 were

seen

as

pro-British

"subjected

to

increasing

management of ... forced

their

its

nature.

foreign

internal

internal

with too few cards.

in

without

interference

financial

collaborators

and

to

reform the

political affairs

to play for high stakes

the

interplay by

an

an

empire

of

of

viable

British

diplomatically

protected

understood the

value of indigenous collaboration.

assertive

relations from 1895 through the early opportunity to

concludes:

l1

Great Britain could not have China

Robinson

analyze these

free

trade in companies

man-on-the-spot who

months of

three imperial

Anglo-Chinese 19OO provide an

themes advanced by

Ronald Robinson, John Gallagher, and John S. Galbraith. In order to understand Britain's informal empire in China during the review

the

Britain's

last five historical "expanding

years of

the nineteenth century, one must

background economy."

"'British policy is British

which

brought

China

into

As the younger Pitt commented,

trade.'"12

6

TRADE NOT RULE: ANGLO-CHINESE RELATIONS, 1689-1895 From

their

Anglo-Chinese

inception

in

relations

the

revolved

unimportant commercial area linked British merchants, China's teas. private traders

late

the East

Throughout the

seventeenth

around only

by

century,

trade. a

Into

small

an

number of

India Company forged its success to eighteenth

accepted Manchu

century

the company's

China's closed Canton system of

trade until they found a profitable product and the British ended the East

India Company's

monopoly in East Asia.

involved elsewhere in 1839, the British chief responsibility: when

engaged

in

particular

to

commercial

doors

Again the

too

on its

"a general duty to assist their nationals

legitimate

promote

Not militarily

government acted

enterprises 1

trade."

reluctantly

British government

overseas,

China, to

however,

suit

responded to

and

in

opened her

British merchants. its major task:

"to

make commercial treaties providing the most favourable conditions for their nationals and to support bondholders and others who had legitimate grievances against foreign of these

wars in

governments."2

As a result

the nineteenth century, British firms in China

and policy makers in London created a new

legal framework, based

upon treaty rights, for Great Britain's informal empire in Ch'ing

7 China.

3

Gunboat diplomacy served its purpose, and British commercial supremacy, together with indirect political influence, entrenched English power along the laSOs.

Britain,

industrial

and

China

however,

commercial

during this period. France, Germany,

felt

and

at

the

competition

Peking

pressure on

a

until the

of

European

world-wide basis

The China theater was no exception.

and even

informal commercial

coast

Japan emerged

and political

Sino-Japanese War in 1895,

Russia,

to challenge Britain's

hegemony.

By

the end of the

England's rivals in East

Asia managed

to alter Anglo-Chinese relations and thrust what had been an area of commercial expansion into the European political arena.4 British commercial from

India

and

the

interest East

in

China

emanated originally

India Company.

A private enterprise

chartered by the Crown, the East India Company had a trade in

India and

all competitors. products

from

It was its

East Asia which it successfully guarded from

The company was China

concerned with

monopoly of-

and

in

interested

expansion

territorial aggrandizement

of

in

tea

trade;

and other it was not

or political control.

basically the profit motive which directed the company in

trading

operation

licensed private

in

China.

traders, British

Operationally,

and Indian, to sail to Canton

to buy Chinese products on consignment. cargoes became known as the "country

the company

This trade

in licensed

5

trade."

By the early eighteenth century the East India Company had a permanent agency, or factory,

outside the

walls of

the city of

8 Canton, then for all practical purposes China's only port open to foreign commerce.6 could trade

Only licensed merchants of the

at Canton.

controlled and

In this

manner the

directed commerce

consequently,

between

China

East India Company

between China

and

company trade

and Indian and,

England.

To

tighten

monopoly, a council of company men or "supercargoes" factory at Canton until 1758,

its

staffed the

when a smaller Select Committee was

created from the council to coordinate company activities at that south

China

port.

Control

private company determined conservative

and

and efficiency

to

expand

self-sufficient

its

empire

were essential to a trade

in

an ultra-

which opposed

foreign

7

commerce.

Economically, China manufactured

products

had from

little

interest

England.

in

agricultural earth-bound Chinese

with a

wide variety

production. China

included

manufactured

mostly produced

The

goods,

culture

ethics,

international

estimated

80

of

population percent

high

trade

was

in

a as

still

local industry

quality, were While

was more than

demands.8 rooted

philosophy then

of

farmers.

by family-owned, cottage-type enterprise.

sufficient to supply her consumer

Confucian

growing

generally

not necessarily efficient, Chinese

Chinese

covered a vast

of climatic conditions for

rapidly

an

need for

The eighteen provinces of

China proper and the three provinces of Manchuria geographic area

or

deeply

which

in traditional

further

hampered

conducted by Western nations.

this distinctive Confucian world order, China

In

regarded itself as

9 the Central

Kingdom, and her Manchu rulers of the Ch'ing dynasty

after 1644 represented and interceded for The Central

Kingdom recognized no equals; it had its own Chinese

world order. by

mankind before Heaven.

Chinese territory had been

non-Chinese

barbarians,

conquered several times

including the Manchus, the reigning

dynasty, but the barbarians could govern

only by

imposing their

rule at the top and accepting Chinese culture based on provincial and local rule through the bottom

of

the

Chinese

social

transactions.

as they

Merchants

controlled, and used by those who

were

Kingdom suspicion wanted.

Western traders,

and

her

and

were engaged thus

only in

to be regulated,

understood and

ethics, the scholar-official class. British and

At the

order was the merchant class; a

class regarded as non-productive, exchange

scholar-gentry.9

Confucian

kept Confucian

It is hardly surprising that

far from

the pale

of the Central

tradition-oriented culture, were regarded with

distrust.

The

West

sold

nothing

which China

On the other hand, the ideal Confucian monarch could not

deprive the rest of the world imperial coffers

of China's

of Western bullion.

merchants remained restricted to trade at distant from

China's capital

great bounty,

nor her

As long as uncouth Western Canton, the

port most

at Peking, and as long as business

was conducted by government licensed monopolies or middlemen, the Cohongs,

Ch'ing

China

sold

tribute system

merchants of trade.

teas, silks, and other luxury 10

products to the rest of the British

her world.

thus

encountered

the

rigid

Canton or

China recognized no equals and denied

10

any diplomat or consular

representatives for

Western merchants.

Direct contact between Chinese governmental officials and outside traders was forbidden; the East India Company's agents dealt only with

the

customs

Cohong

at

Canton.

superintendent,

foreigners had

It

called

to leave

was

the

the

factories; muskets

city

walls

Chinese

and

of

directly.

All

were

Westerners were not allowed

Canton;

servants

cannon

Hoppo,

Canton in the summer and were permitted

to return during the trading season. inside

illegal to approach the

for

no women could live in the Westerners

banned

from

were

factory

forbidden;

property; each

merchant had to have permission to leave the trading factories at Canton

for

whatever

reasons.

All

permissions had to be channeled through the same

way that

all commercial

contact,

payments,

the Cohong

and

merchants in

transactions took place.

All

foreigners were subject to China's legal system, which

was based

on

Merchants

collective

responsibility

and brutally executed.

paid various duties and fees upon customs.

These

enough,

from

various

the profit or "squeeze." a

duty

Westerner,

the

was

placed

Canton

Until the 1820s the of trade

products from the West.

on

official

well as

levels

for their

If these regulations were not all

trading

demeaning, mysterious, and

The balance

port as

duties were not stable, fluctuating with demands

upon Cohong merchants share of

entering the

outgoing system

was

ships.

To the

understandably

expensive.11

Canton system

favored her

served China

very well.

because she imported very few

However, she

did export

teas, and her

11 chief

buyer

was

the

East

India

Company.

The United States,

Belgium, and Russia also traded in teas, but by the 182Os Britain imported 3O million pounds through the auspices of the East India Company.

To pay for

silver bullion

to cover

and England. commodity

the teas,

It had

that

no

choice,

brought

her limited

was forced

to ship

what was not paid by imports from India

a

because

profit

seaborne trade restricted to because of

the company

in

Canton

Chinese

London.

and

tea With

silver

was the Western,

entering China

imports, the Canton system was clearly a

boon to the Ch'ing economy and buttressed China's view of her own superiority.12

cultural and political

Through the good offices of the British government, the East India Company attempted to

redress these

trade restrictions.

A

mission headed by Lord MacCartney was sent to Peking in 1793, but it was a complete followed

in

1816.

Castlereagh,

then

representations

failure.

Another,

Pushed

India Company of the

by

Lord Amherst,

by the East India Company, Viscount

Foreign

have

headed

Secretary,

been made

explained:

"repeated

by the Supra Cargoes of the East

difficulties to

which their

trade has for

some time been exposed, by the vexatious proceedings of the local Authorities at commercial

Canton."13

objectives:

Cantonese government; right to

protection guaranteed

listed

Britain's major

from the "injustice" of the

continuity

of

trade

and the

deal with any Chinese merchant; privacy for the company

factory; and Peking

Castlereagh

the

government

privilege either

of by

direct a

British

communication

with the

representative

or by

12

written communication with Ch'ing authorities. to push find

for the

"any

opening of

means

of

Manufactures, among

one or

extending

consumption

people."

mission. Lord Amherst's failure to submit regarded as

any attempts to

status

negotiate

as

tribute states. consular or

14

of

British

Like the MacCartney

at Peking

to what was

the demeaning ritual of the ceremonial kowtow doomed

basis of equality. same

Amherst was

more ports for trade and to

the

the Chinese

Lord

broader

commercial

privileges

on a

Amherst refused to place Great Britain on the Siam,

Nepal,

Indochina,

and

Korea,

China's

The elaborate ritual at Peking and the denial of

diplomatic

representation

entrenched

the

myth of

Chinese power and superiority, and the East India Company did not then attempt to force the

issue.15

In the end, it took the private merchants trade in

and their illicit

opium to terminate the monopoly trade system at Canton.

Agitation by private merchants

in England

ended the

Company's exclusive trade privileges with India. retained its monopoly of

trade with

China and

Bengali opium production and sales in India. traders who

sold

factory handled

on

consignment

three-quarters of

While the Cohong took India's raw tin, saltpeter, Indian opium sold the

its control over

By 1817 the country

commissions

at Canton's

all British imports to China. cotton, lead,

rattan, pepper,

furs, and some rice, the leading import item was

bought by

drug to

for

East India

Yet the company

private Chinese

merchants.

The company

private dealers in India who, in turn, sold to

various company men and private traders

who shipped

the drug to

13

Lintin Island,

outside Canton's

harbor and Cohong Jurisdiction.

Because most merchants bought tea for opium, the to its

East India

factory at

country

traders

the company

and traded in

Company had to send less and less bullion

Canton. made

The

the

Bengali opium

China

trade

monopoly and the

lucrative

without the

British company actually dealing in contraband, but British India was now more closely tied to Chinese commerce and private British merchants.l6 These country traders

used

springboard for

their own

companies which

established

the

East

success.

India

Company

as a

Indeed, some of the private

themselves

at

Canton

could trace

their business to the East India Company.

Jardine, Matheson, and

Company, officially founded in 1852,

its

East India

Company.

Early

had

partners had

origins

been employees such as

Daniel Beale, Dr. William Jardine, James Matheson. used the

privilege of

cargo space

These men had

on company ships for private

trade;they also knew how to circumvent the company's China.

Most

became representatives

India

and

produced 17

India."

They bought the

purchased

India-based company. trade

A rival

lead and traded

By the 1820s such private firms shipped and sold 5,OOO

chests of opium a year. in

monopoly in

of foreign nations.

competitor, Dent and Company, followed Jardine's in opium.

with the

One

Chinese

The balance of trade

Western commerce;

teas

historian

"one-seventh

of

drug from

the

on

consignment for the

maintained total

tipped in

their agents

that

the drug

revenue of British

favor of

British and

the English had found a profitable import item

14 18

China would

buy.

By 1832 the Canton system was a Ch'ing monopoly in name only because

British

traders. Chinese

firms

Using opium

sold

receiving dealers

their ships

bought

opium

to

anchored

the

private

Chinese

Lintin

Island,

at

illegal drug, while Chinese

officials at Canton received, payments to ignore the 1832 Jardine's

violated the

closed port

obvious.

In

system and sent a ship

northward, carrying opium and other products; the venture netted a

large

profit,

Newchwang in traders.

and

1833.

another

Dent

was

sent

and Company

appointed a

an

official

close,

superintendent of

one de jure, the other de

trade.

trade

commercial treaties. Arrow

acquisition. 20

concessions.

at Canton

on

Two monopolies had ended,

facto.

the

system of

War, 1856-186O,

"gunboat diplomacy," to

of

Western

political and

Opium War, 1839-1842, nor the was

produced

trade, it still

fought

political

for

territorial

and

commercial

Great Britain's objectives were influenced by the

affected

Parliament

basis

Neither the

Both

British government

19

most

by

Dr. William Jardine of Jardine, of

the

British military interventions,

expand British

merchants

and control

and

Despite the demise of the Canton

so-called

and

In 1833 the East India Company's exclusive trade with

China came to

took two

Tientsin

followed, as did American

In effect, the Chinese monopoly

had ended.

toward

in

1841,

wrote

Chinese

restrictions

Matheson and to

Lord

and

laws.

Company and member

Palmerston:

"get a

commercial treaty allowing trade 'with the northern ports ... say

15

Amoy, Foochow,

Ningpo, Shanghai

and also Kiaochow if we can get

21

it. ' "

Their desires Nanking, 1842, Bogue, 1843, complaints

became

British

objectives.

The

Treaty of

and its supplemental agreement, the Treaty of the rectified

British

some

of

traders

the

had

commercial

and political

voiced to Lord Palmerston.

In

August 1842 China agreed to abolish the Canton trade system, open five

ports--Amoy,

Foochow,

Ningpo,

British consular representation, pay

an

indemnity,

and cede the

island

of

Hong

Kong

regulations, officials.

contained drawn

15

up

to

1842 treaty.

articles

by

the

restriction

extraterritoriality, the

which

British

of tonnage duties

to

of

trade

replace

the

became

rather

Treaty of commercial

than

Ch'ing

and Alexander

percent ad valorem, "moderate scale"

as

numerous

Matheson.

well

for transit

as

as

well

The

the

the

as

and

five ports,

unstable fees

Jardine's employees, fixed low tariff of 5

ambiguous

duties, were

favor British commercial interests. mercantile

to

In both treaties Great Britain

relied on figures and estimates drawn up by

a

The

most-favored-nation clause, and the use

charged at Canton before the war.

on

The

Included in these rules were stipulations on the role

of British consuls,

Robert Thorn

Britain.22

Great

agreement was more specific and resolved

some problems not clarified in the Bogue

a reasonable tarriff,

allow correspondence with Chinese officials,

supplemental commercial

the

Shanghai, and Canton--with

establish

terminology of

obviously phrased to

Hong Kong's

an imperial role.

new status took One historian

16

emphasized:

"In the commercial settlement the advantage was with

the British

not only

because of their military victory but also

because they had a clear British commerce."

objective

in

mind,

expansion of

Goals were precise because British merchants

with firms in China outlined their needs. one of

the

Formal

empire was not

23

them.

The

Arrow

War

claimed 24

political in

scope.

Peking,

addressed

I860,

settlement.

The

two

treaties, both commercial and

Treaties

grievances

set at

a "moderate

of the

scale."

continued to refuse British and foreign

1858, and

inland transit

Cantonese officials

business rights

in that

issues of opium trade and smuggling were not mentioned

in the previous treaties. evasions,

Tientsin,

left over from the 1842-43

British merchants complained

duties vaguely

city; the

of

especially

internal problem, the

Opium smuggling

during major

the

chaos

Taiping

bred other

attendant

Rebellion

forms of

on

China's

(1850-64) which

devastated many of China's most productive areas in the south and east.25 second rights:

Prime Minister military

action

Lord Palmerston's rested

shall not

British

British Consul."

merchants,

treaties and their legal

Both to Palmerston

trade could not continue unless the

procedures

pronounced his goal for the war: violated was a most

says that

be boarded, and men taken out of them

without application to the to

China's violation of treaty

"We have a treaty with China, and that treaty

British vessels

and

on

defense of Britain's

were

enforced.

Palmerston

"Then I say the right which was

important right--a

right most

important to

17

the

whole

British

commerce

between

commerce which is continually growing."

Hong

Kong

and Canton, a

26

On Britain's side the war meant treaty revision and security with

more

commercial

acquisition.

political

The Treaties of

diplomatic

representation

establishment of a Yamen.

and

Tientsin and for

Chinese

concessions,

of

at

Peking

Foreign

criminal cases

the

Affairs, Tsungli

involving British

as

well

as

nationals were

their own courts; the most-favored-nation clause treaty

ports

were

right to

navigate and that

heavily

Yangtze river

citizens; all to be tried by

was reiterated;

opened--Newchwang, Tangchow, Taiwan,

Swatow, Kiungchow, with Chinkiang to

opened

and

Extraterritoriality was extended to include British legal

Jurisdiction over property ownership

more

land

Peking gave official

Britain

Board

not

trade along populated

open

within

the Yangtze

area

to

a

year.

The

river to Hankow

British

trade; three

ports would open when internal peace was attained.

China legalized the importation of opium.

Inland transit duties

were set at 2 1/2 percent ad valorem, or merchants could continue to use the existing inland duties system. British rights

to purchase

article dealt with

land and property.

Peking confirmed British diplomatic at Peking,

An

The agreement of

representation and residence

opened Tientsin to foreign residence, and allowed the

Catholic church to purchase property in

China.27

formed

foundations for British

the

legalistic

and

informal expansion in China. powers

expected

only

to

commercial

These treaties

D. K. Fieldhouse wrote: police

treaties

"maritime

and agreements with

18

non-European countries, to enforce international policies . . . and in general to provide political

support

imperialism

of

a

for

their

sort

nationals.

This was

... but it was not part of a

project for building empires."•• The Chinese Maritime Customs result of

the internal

Service

of a

customs

official

customs house

fled

by

trading

Western merchants.••

had

nations

been

Ended in 1854, the a

stop-gap measure,

and resented by British and

When Chinese officials

failed to

A

staffed

trading

representatives

of

the

Shanghai—England, France,

and

inspectorate

Chinese

worked

percent tariff. Chinese,

with

the

major United

organized

the

system,

and

three-man board, nations at

States — the foreign

officials

Captain Thomas F. Wade, an

scrupulously honest. from its

create a

customs administration at Shanghai in mid-1854,

Alcock suggested the "foreign inspectorate." by

1853 and

merchants to sign

to pay their lawful tariff.

other

workable, honest

in September

require British

"consular" or provisional system ignored

When the Taiping

for protection, the British consul,

Rutherford Alcock, decided to promissory notes

a direct

British consul's attempt

the tariff provisions of the 184Os.

rebels seized the Shanghai the

as

turmoil caused by the Taiping Rebellion.

The customs service was a product to enforce

emerged

to

collect the 5

Englishman fluent in the

inspectorate

was

The Ch'ing government received high returns

Shanghai customs

house.

In desperate need of a stable

source of revenue, the Manchus recognized the value customs service not subject to traditional "squeeze."

of an honest Organized,

19

supervised,

and

staffed

by

Westerners,

the

service

ultimately be responsible to the Chinese government. Prior

to

the

representatives

settlements

in

China

of

1858

recognized

and

the

would

30

I860,

British

indirect

imperial

potential of the foreign inspectorate.

Sir John Bowring, British

Plenipotentiary,

Governor

Kong,

responsible for

England's

1856,

acknowledged

controlled

and

unwilling at

the

of

Hong

military

the present

additional difficulties by

the

possess upon

of China,

the revenues

embodied

Chinese

moment to

the

intervention

possibilities

administered

and

customs

official

at in

Canton in a

British

service:

"I am

be instrumental in creating

destruction

of

which may

a

hold

we now

not only assist

negotiations but give substantial security for the payment of our claims." British

Bowring viewed the inspectorate as an essential part of commercial

Inspectorate at

policy

in

China:

"abandonment

of

the

the present moment would create difficulties and

be pernicious to our general policy in China. "31 The Manchus appreciated the possibilities

of

administration at

increased

fiscal returns

revenues

all treaty

ports.

under Rule

a

as well

as the

uniform customs

Ten of

the Rules of

Trade, included with the Treaty of Tientsin, created the Imperial Maritime Customs Service to operate at be directed by the was not

by an Inspector-General,

Manchu government. forced to

all Chinese

a British citizen, selected

One historian

accept and

ports and to

emphasized that China

use the foreign inspectorate,

did so out of financial "necessities."

but

What better way was there

20

than for

Westerners to

Another

historian

Manchus, an Chinese.

collect tariffs

stressed

that

alien dynasty,

from Western merchants?

it

to use

was

by

1663.

Robert Hart, an

the

Grand

I.G. until his Maritime

Council

in

Customs

Horatio

Service

Nelson

Lay, was

October I860 and dismissed in

Ulsterman, replaced

retirement in

for the

aliens to help them rule the

The first Inspector-General,

hired

traditional

1907.

became

Lay and

remained as

Under Hart's direction, the China's

first Western-styled

bureaucracy, staffed mostly by Englishmen; it became an effective arm of

British informal

British government

political and

endorsed the

commercial control.

service because, for once since

treaties had been signed, all merchants would pay duties

equally;

chance.

nothing

was

left

to

in the

fine art

bribery,

of balancing,

much for the British capacity to

build an

chicanery, or

From

I860

through

monopoly of the China commercial benefits treaties

economic policy was Other nations

trade.

the

British Other

Ch'ing

trade,

informal empire

companies

on a

had a virtual

Western nations

reaped the

forward policy in China and government

clauses.33 free

and his success says

distinctions."

of Palmerston's

with

most-favored-nation

1885

"a

32

structure of legal concepts and fine

signed

the tariff and

John King Fairbank described the service under Hart:

case study

The

Great and

which

Britain's

China

was

included

world-wide

no exception.

represented at Peking cooperated as a united front

to enforce the very favorable

treaty

arrangements

of

I860 and

worked to secure more open ports and commercial concessions.

But

21

Britain had

an

industrial

and

commercial

head

start.

Early

companies which made fortunes from opium included Jardine's, Dent and

Company,

and

capitalizing on

Gibb,

Livingston

and

Company.

Others

drug profits of the 184Os were Scott Harding and

Company at Hong Kong and the

Sassoons at

Shanghai.

By

1855 in

Hong Kong and the five treaty ports, Britons owned 111 of the 219 firms.

At Shanghai in

their firm

and expanded

coast; their China Indo-China Steam 1881.

1867

Butterfield

and

Swire established

into the shipping trade along the China

Navigation

Company

Navigation Company

competed

American shippers offered stiff rivalry

the 187Os shipping

"practically the of

China

was

whole of in

with Jardine's

for the coastal trade after at first,

but by

the modern coast and river

British

hands."

During

these

twenty-five years Britons placed less emphasis on trade in luxury goods such as opium that brought high profits and poor publicity; instead, British as cottons and

firms began to sell mass consumption items such kerosene

and

investment

goods

such

as ships,

34

armaments, and rails. British

commercial

interests

import/export or shipping; English banks at

the various treaty ports.

encompassed

in

1858

and

another

in

China-centered banking house began

than

financial institutions opened The Chartered Bank of India,

Australia, and China was chartered in 1853; it office

more

opened a Shanghai

Hong Kong in 1859. operations

in

Hong

January of 1865 and at Shanghai in April of that year. a group of leading British merchants in China, the Hong

The first Kong in Formed by Kong and

22 Shanghai

Banking

Corporation

Arthur Bassoon of that By

the

lS7Os aa

British.

all

company was

but

one

one of

its first directors.

of the foreign banks in China were

The Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank made loans to Chinese

authorities as

early as

early as 1877.

It became the

large

published its prospectus in 1864.

loans

before

1875, and

the

to the

Peking government as

Ch'ing dynasty's

major source for

need for international financing after

1895.a6 With

the

growth

institutions at expansion

of

specialist on

of

British

the treaty the

companies

ports and

Maritime

and

financial

with the organization and

Customs

Service

Chinese history observed:

under

Hart,

a

"this was the heyday of

the British treaty system

in China,

the period

the British

China for

commercial exploitation had

finally

'opening' of

become

effective

in

terms

and

exports

facilitated by the Customs Service under Robert Hart."37

Charles

F. Remer, an economic historian, British investments

in China

of

of pay-off when

imports

pointed out

far surpassed

that in

the 1870s

those of the United

States and probably exceeded the investments of all other nations combined.»•

In

1874

Britain

had 40 percent of China's total

foreign trade; by 1877, she still maintained over 1889,

in

percent.

spite

of

increased

3O percent? by

foreign competition, she held 20

Great Britain controlled two major distribution centers

of Chinese trade, Hong Kong and London; when these two cities are used

and

combined

with

British

India

trade,

9O

percent of

China's foreign Imports came from Hong Kong, Indian, and England,

23

and 70 percent of her foreign exports went to those 351

1870s.

By 1894,

of the

areas in the

registered non-Chinese ships leaving

the treaty ports, 85 percent carried British registry. entering China,

4

65 percent

were British bottoms. °

Of ships Britain and

her empire led in opium, cotton fabric, and yarn imports

as late

4l

as 1894. In

the

treaty

ports

British

predominance in trade, investments, 188Os Britons

comprised over

and owned 6O percent paramountcy in

facts that

the ships

for

owned by

that Englishmen

British

Through the

of the foreign citizen

by

1890s.48

the

English

a future viceroy of India, George England controlled

GO percent of

percent of her shipping; Curzon hailed the

China's internal waterways. market

firms

1894 that

and 65

officers, and

the

matched British

shipping.

5O percent

China prompted

Curzon, to write in China's trade

of

population and

goods,

China were served as

commanded by British pilots for shipping on

He saw inland China as awaiting

an unlimited

only British railways and

inland steam navigation; in summary he

wrote:

"we

are standing

on the threshold of Chinese commercial expansion."4J Some of

China's leading scholar-gentry and Manchu officials

accepted British commercial supremacy.

They realized

had to modernize in order to remain intact. of the Ch'ing government, Robert Hart treaties behind

the scenes,

British

officers

as

As a trusted servant

offered advice, negotiated

pushed for a Western-styled academy

to train Chinese diplomats, and advocated with

that China

commanders

a modern

and

Chinese navy

teachers as well as

24

British-built ships. memorandum entitled

He

proposed

its

ideas

curriculum

kuan,

beyond

or

foreign

philosophy had

to

keep

some

of

the

persuade

them

to

remain

Hung-chang, China's to

upgrade

the

English in

as

China.

and

hired

by 1872 chemistry

As early as 1874 Hart

the Chinese crews

in a

In that same

languages

been added.44

ordered British-built gunboats for

1866

Interpreters College,

Westerners to teach mathematics and astronomy; and natural

in

"Observations of an Outsider."

year the government's T'ung-wen expanded

these

navy and planned

teachers if he could

Hart

worked

with

Li

foremost diplomat and conservative reformer,

Chinese

navy.

Hart

promoted

British

ships

produced by Armstrong and Company, though Li became interested in German-built

ships

purchases but highest

by

1880.

Hart

reluctantly

accepted

Li's

pushed for a British naval officer to fill China's

naval

position.

In

this

move

he

was

successful.

Through their trust in Hart personally, and through their respect for the

Customs

Service,

leading

became Britain's collaborators

scholar-officials

in China.

Great Britain had "empire on the cheap." meant

trade

administration

and and

profits

without

military

in effect

43

the

occupation.

Informal supremacy expense British

of

formal

mercantile

interests did not press for formal control in the 1880s; they did desire more open ports and better access to Inland China. 1885 there were no major European firms to that fabled,

allegedly unlimited

accepted, albeit reluctantly, the

compete seriously for

China market. end

to

Before

These merchants

gunboat

diplomacy to

25

enforce

treaty

obligations

British

policy

objectives

dynasty, to

and

more

were

to

concessions.

prop

the

weak Manchu

push for gradual reforms, and to pressure for treaty

revisions advantageous to British firms

British

and merchants

commerce.

to expand

It

was

left to

their trade and increase

markets in China; diplomatic and consular of British

up

From 1872

intervention on behalf

nationals was not regarded as part of the function of

a free trade economy.4 fi This cautious policy proved need

formal

empire.

She

had

extraterritoriality, a weak but to

enforce

the

treaty

Customs

officials,

the 1880s,

renewed their No

longer

other

Western

British

nations

to

want nor

treaty

ports,

Chinese government

houses,

power and

formal empire

senior Ch'ing

with the largest

overall

however, brought change.

interests in

could

to

influenced

commercial

banking

did not

a British Inspector-General of

indirectly

predominant

number of companies, decade of

who

access

still viable

obligations,

Service and

that England

trade.

The

European nations

throughout the world.

diplomats rely on unified action with insure

Chinese

enforcement

of her

international treaties.*7 The 1880s thus brought new problems to British policy makers and merchants

in

China.

Russia,

France,

Germany,

and Japan

provided political and commercial challenges to British supremacy at

Peking

and

threatened

British merchants

China's

periphery.

Commercially,

had little to fear except the future; they had

such a head start that their European competitors could not catch

26 up

without

They could

attempting not

unless China

to

depose

create

British

was invaded

As events unfolded from

formal empires in East Asia.

political

influence

at Peking

and Britain failed to aid the Manchus. 1880

through

1895,

Britain's informal

48

empire came under siege. Russia War.

Her

renewed

her

overland

interest

commerce 49

seventeenth centuries.

in East Asia after the Opium

dated

Imperial

from

the

sixteenth

Russia realized that China's

loss to England in 1842 signaled Manchu weakness the

open

ports

with

increased

Russia's

centuries-old

overland

occupied

with

and

Britain

took the Amur province and Ussuri River, in I860. Urga

and

and

maritime

and interpreted

trade

commerce.

as dangers to

While

China

was

France during the Arrow War, Russia gained

adding to Siberia.

more

territory

east

of the

They signed a treaty at Peking

Russia gained trade concessions with consular rights at Kashgar

in

Central

most-favored-nation clause

Asia.

of the

She

benefited under the

treaties of

1858 and 186O.SO

After the Russo-Turkish War, 1877-78, and the Congress of Berlin, 1878, which denied Bosporus turned to the answer

and

her

Dardanelles

Asia.

In

to her

and

1885 she

need for

access to the Pacific. and Great

secure

access

to

the

Straits

of the

a viable warm-water port, Russia occupied a

a year-round,

Korean port, Lazarev, ice-free harbor with

Korea was China's oldest tributary state,

Britain reacted because she viewed Russia as Britain's

major imperial

threat

Russian warm-water

to

India's

central

Asian

borders; any

port in East Asia posed a potential menace to

27

India.

British ships occupied

entrance to

the Korean

navy and unable to

Gulf.

Port Hamilton, Unwilling

supply land

which guarded the

to challenge Britain's

troops quickly

through Siberia,

Russia withdrew from Korea and waited until the 189Os.a * Russian policy coincided with the growth of French ambitions in Cast Asia. 1844 she rights

France had also benefited from the Opium

signed the that

Catholic

Treaty of

Britain

faith

in

enjoyed

China.

War.

In

Whampoa, which included the same as

well

as

recognition

of the

French forces Joined Britain in the

Arrow War; when military actions ended

and Catholic missionaries

died in Vietnam in 1859, Louis Napoleon seized the opportunity to take Saigon and began China's tributary

French imperial

kingdoms, Indochina.

the Franco-Prussian War, France made it "protectorate" over no direct

action

until

ensuing Sino-French defeat,

and

Indochlnese

that kingdom.

France empire

France

War of

another of

In 1874, after defeat in official and

declared a

Unable to respond, China took

occupied

Hanoi

in

1882.

The

1884-1885 ended with another Chinese

proceeded which

moves against

to

would

establish

her

new

formal

encompass not only Vietnam but

3

also Cambodia and Laos. " French moves south of China and toward

the

Pacific

complicated

Russia's expansion eastward

British informal ascendancy at

Peking and threatened the security of closely

linked

with

that

construct a Trans-Siberian with the

Pacific at

India, whose

of China. railway

Vladivostok.

to

trade was so

Russia announced plans to connect

European Russia

Russian officials and British

28

observers recognized the commercial fact, the

Russian Minister

value

of Finance,

of

the

the

railway

relations. Russian

would

The military

troops

could

hopefully

role

of

river and the Russian navy could rapidly in East Asia. Russian and 1894.

the

reinforce

In

Sergei Witte, based his

policy on peaceful penetration of China by means that

railway.

bring rail

military

of the commerce to

Sino-Russian

line

was pbvious;

bases along the Amur

be supplied

and supported more

83

French strength

gained a boost in East Asia in

The Franco-Russian alliance of that

year was

signed as a

result of European power politics, not mutual designs in China.34 Great

Britain's

policy

appeared "splendid." world

power,

par

combinations more "exposed her

of

"splendid

William L. Langer observed: excellence.

particularly to

the

should

claims of

peaceful objectives, revealed

a

pressure

longer

"England, the of

the new

was inevitable that

precarious."ss

become

no

The size of her empire

attack ... it

position

Asia

felt

than any other power."

England's

East

isolation"

Russian and

In spite of

French ambitions in

traditional need for formal empire; they

could not hope to compete and win on a purely commercial basis.36 While statistics are incomplete, British

supremacy

was

a

fact

C. F. Remer concluded that

in China.

Regardless of events

which took place during the scramble for concessions 1898,

British

firms and

investments remained

Britain controlled 11.7 percent British

citizens

comprised

of China's

32.4

in 1897 and

supreme.

In 1889

total foreign trade;

percent of foreign residents;

29

Britons owned 43 percent of all foreign businesses; British firms controlled shipping.

54.4

37

of

China's

comprised

s

1904. •

Figures

incomplete.

coastal

and

foreign

total

42.5

for

he concluded foreign

percent

French

of

that Russia held

trade

in

1899,

of

the foreign population in

commercial

commitments

are also

as

the

of

19O5.

foreign

In

1899

residents,

Frenchmen

comprised 6.8

8.1 percent of the foreign

firms, and 1.8 percent of coastal and overseas shipping.39 foreign years.

investments In

while

France had an estimated 3.4 percent of China's total

foreign trade percent

China's

economic involvement,

percent

Russians

of

While Reiner' s figures were incomplete on some phases

of Russian 2.2

percent

percentages,

1902 England

Russia's 31.3 percent

Remer

had

to

For

use different

had 33 percent and France 11.6 percent;

came

from

1904

figures.

Because these

years vary, records are not completely satisfactory.

But one can

reasonably surmise that, compared to France and Russia, England's commercial

supremacy

subsequent

scramble

safely

publish

was for

figures

much

higher

concessions.* ° for

1896:

"out

before The

1895

and

the

Economist could

of [Chinese] imports

amounting in all to £33,8OO,OOO, £27,5OO,OOO or fully 81 percent, were from Empire. "*

the United

Kingdom and

other portions of the British

4

Germany and

Japan

offered

paramountcy in

China.

form of trade.

As early as

Hung-chang to

further

challenges

to British

Germany's competition came largely in the

buy German

1SSO Krupp armaments, and

representatives wooed Li later, battleships and

30

gunboats, much

to the

chagrin of

Hart at

the Customs Service.

While by 1902 with growing numbers of German firms and financiers competing,

Germany

investments Wilhelm

in

II,

diplomatic

claimed

China

as

Germany's and

2O.9

percent

compared

with

young,

colonial

total

foreign

Britain's 33 percent.

ambitious

aspirations

of

emperor,

clearly had

world wide, and Germany's

new, large navy needed and wanted secure bases in East Asia.68 Japan posed a different nations

for

trade

purposes,

rapidly after the 186Os. Islands, a recognize chain.

problem.

Late

Japan in

jurisdiction

Determined

not to

open

by Western

and

modernized

seized

the Ryukyu

responded

1871

Chinese tribute kingdom. Japanese

Forced

she

In 1874 China was forced to

over

be treated

that as China

important

island

had been, Japan

established her own imperial goals at Chinese expense, control of Taiwan (Formosa) and Korea.

Her imperial ambitions set the stage

for the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895.'» By 1885 European interest and competition forced a change in British

policy

in

East

Asia.

merchants utilized their further

their

success

French,

consular in

China.

and

German,

diplomatic

These

consular

at

least

as

officials

far

had

as been

officials to

purely commercial

London was concerned. instructed

Russian

tactics introduced a

political element into what had earlier been a arena,

and

to

Since 1872

oversee

treaty

obligations and fulfill their legal duties, but that move did not include open the Foreign

political support Secretary,

for British

merchants.

In 1885

Lord Salisbury, sanctioned diplomatic aid

31

for British firms competing with French and German China.

In

1886

involvement: introduce

the

Bryce

"British

Memorandum extended

representatives

properly-recommended

England's

informal

England far outdistanced

be

subjects

consular

prepared to to

persons,

4

their

supremacy

her

should

British

firms, or Government officials in 1890s

businesses in

districts."'

By the

was under pressure.

While

competitors,

the

future appeared

difficult, and it became necessary to preserve "the status quo as far as possible while obtaining opportunities." The

a

full

Sino-Japanese

status quo in China

War

of

1894-95

and brought

revealed

of

Korea's

Just

politically.

official

how

weak

Soundly

the

Japan

independence, and clashed

with

Jeopardized railway. France, friends.

to

China,

a

much

declared and

Port

Arthur,

designs

military

Britain's Germany

smaller,

but

on

an

indemnity,

an

to

and

the

neutrality

opportunity

Through the efforts of Li

of

pose

Korean

These ambitions

Manchuria

objective

diplomatic

maintained her

the Pescadores, most of the

a separate commercial treaty.

Russian

the war

nation, the Manchu dynasty first turned

with

the

and

Nominally fought over the

by

demanded Taiwan,

peninsula

forefront of

Manchus had become militarily and

defeated

increasingly Westernized

Liaotung

new economic

to the

relationship

to Britain for support, but Britain neutrality.

of

served to threaten the

East Asia

European politics for the next decade. problem

share

fia

Korea

and

Trans-Siberian

provided

Russia,

as China's true

Hung-chang, chief negotiator

32

and

Russia's

new

collaborator,

diplomatic pressure on Japan. Japan and

China was

the

three

The Treaty

signed on

powers

applied

of Shimonoseki between

18 April

1895.

Japan could not

withstand the pressure exerted by these three European

powers in

the so-called Triple Intervention and was forced to withdraw from the Llaotung peninsula in

exchange for

China.

the

On

preserve Taiwan and

the

surface

Chinese

indemnity from

Triple Intervention took place to

territorial

the Pescadores,

a larger

sovereignty,

and Korea

but

Japan received

was declared independent.

Russia's imperial interest in Manchuria, the

Liaotung peninsula,

46

and Korea remained alive. The Sino-Japanese

War thus

altered Anglo-Chinese relations

and British informal political influence at neutrality

Britain

diplomatic

error

Franco-Russian

had

made

which,

in

influence.

what

effect,

Imperially

tripartite powers, British policy China

would

officials;

no

longer

Britain

collaboration.

have

1895 the thus

opened

Through her be

the

a

major

door

for

ambitious than the

makers and

representatives in

reliable

now

have

its

part,

China

opportunity to play one Western

to

less

would

For

Peking.

appeared

power

pro-British to

government

reestablish

Chinese

might appear to have the against

another.

As of

tripartite powers were in the ascendancy at Peking.

became

a

man-on-the-spot to

diplomatic work to

struggle

for

Great

It

Britain's

maintain commercial predominance and

7

political status quo.' For China the war

with

Japan

made

her

dependent

on the

33

political and

financial good-will of the Western nations.

to 1894 the Ch'ing

government

had

managed

incurring large, international debts. the

ever-increasing

honest

and

revenues

efficient

survive without

She had grown to depend on

returned

customs

to

by

Hart's scrupulously

service.

China

had

borrowed

£1,600,000 from the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank in 1877, war in million

1894 produced taels

returned the

in

and

£3,OOO,OOO

Liaotung peninsula,

service

but the

a need for more loans; China borrowed 10.9

1894

in

receipts

for

1895.

When Japan

China needed for new indemnity

payments £16,OOO,OOO which required that the customs

Prior

the

loan be

duration.

A

secured on loan of that

magnitude produced international competition and resulted formation of the Russo-Chinese Bank in November 1895.

in the

Made up of

four French banks and one Russian institution, five-eights of its funding came

from France;

The

government

Russian

considerations

which

three-eights was guaranteed

ranged

the

security and

The war with Japan and

were

China

to

and

China

her political

decades to come. costly

loan

for

political

from railway concessions to secret

treaties to spheres of Influence by 1898. her financial

supplied by Russia.

had to mortgage

freedom of action for the Triple Intervention

Great Britain in both political and

commercial terms.'• From 1895 through 19OO British policy makers, headed by Lord Salisbury's

coalition

man-on-the-spot, Sir basic China

question:

Unionist

Claude MacDonald, how

Cabinet, had to

and

their

contend with the

to maintain commercial and political

34

supremacy as well as contest

had

British

changed

drastically

and

weakened

politically

to

prestige

continued

Ch'ing

France,

when to

rules

change.

dynasty,

Russia,

the

They faced a

obviously

and Germany.

of the

indebted

These men had to

cope with nations demanding regional, closed spheres of Influence as

well

as

to

compete

effectively

from

a

greatly

reduced

political position, for international loans, railway, mining, and commercial concessions in order to maintain the status quo and to soothe

mercantile

demands

and

public

opinion

D. K. Fieldhouse summarized the British position,

at

home.

1895-19OO:

... the political influence of the Powers threatened the general interest of British trade. ... Considerations of the Balance of Power and national commercial interest were, in fact, interdependent; political power in the new context of international rivalry in China meant commercial advantage, and, similarly, commercial advantage was an element in the creation of political 9 power.* In the eighteenth century a backwater area of begun

by

nineteenth

the

East

century,

India the

arena

commercial power struggle. sell in London, the

Company for

in a

China

became,

European

East India

Company and

anti-commercial Manchu regime which to

trade

on

a

refused to accept the and found

in

the

political and

While seeking a profitable product to her country traders

encountered a restrictive trade system at Canton.

ports

British trade

did

not

wish

Enforced by an to

open its

basis of equality, adventurous merchants

commercial restrictions

a product the Chinese would buy.

of two monopolies

Smuggled opium built

viable British companies in China, while it served to destroy the Canton system of trade.

35

Forced to

aid and protect her nationals and their commerce,

two British military interventions established the commercial framework

known as the treaty port system.

War opened some Chinese ports and coerced the to

accept

consular

representation,

most-favored-nation clause, a Kong.

The

Arrow

political and

War

low

produced

The Opium

Ch'ing authorities

extraterritoriality,

tariff,

and

extended

a

British Hong

trade

concessions,

diplomatic representation at Peking, legal importation and

acceptance

Service. the

of

a uniform, British-directed Maritime Customs

for

British

concept of free trade. was

marked

Manchu

Until

by

represented at Peking. weak

of opium,

These two wars were commercially motivated and provided

foundation

system

the

dynasty

mercantile

expansion based on the

the

England's

ISSOs

cooperation British while

among

policy

served

Gunboat diplomacy

because

had

firms

Western nations to

maintain the

advocating gradual reforms and more

commercial concessions. British

the

treaty port

was needed

no longer

commercial supremacy, while British

diplomats had Chinese collaboration. By 1885 European China and

introduced open

free trade area. financial

nations

ascendancy,

in

the

Russia

power and set her Determined not

south. sights on

to be

British

political support

Unable to compete

forcing China to relinquish kingdoms

challenged

into a commercial,

with British

and

France

territory in

supremacy in

mercantile and

expanded

the north

eastward, and tribute

Germany challenged British commercial a secure

naval base

in East Asia.

exploited like China, Japan modernized and

36

set out to create process

which

her own

formal empire

culminated

in

devastating defeat for China. changed.

France,

Russia,

the

at China's

Sino-Japanese

expense, a War

and

a

As of 1895 Anglo-Chinese relations and

Germany

capitalized on British

neutrality and intervened diplomatically to force Japan to return territory taken

during the

debt and had to

rely

granted

for

remained:

to

various

on

political

maintain

reduced political

war with large,

her

China.

international loans

concessions.

commercial

influence at

China plunged into

long-term

Britain's policy

supremacy

Peking.

From

with greatly

1895 through 1900

British informal empire was under siege. Before successfully

1895

British

opened

China

and an advantageous treaty Foreign Secretary

and staff

merchants

and

policy

makers

had

to foreign trade, Western diplomacy, port

system.

After

1895 England's

had to devise a method to keep that

trade open under new, adverse conditions.

37

ENTRENCHMENT AND REACTION: THE OPEN DOOR POLICY AND RUSSOPHOBIA From

1895

through

formulated Great Lord Salisbury

190O

the

third

Britain's China policy.1 had to

develop a

Marquis

of Salisbury

As Foreign Secretary,

policy that

would protect and

maintain England's informal empire in China during those years of greatly increased European Essentially, policy

political

had to

and

economic competition.

be based on the premise that Britain

no longer monopolized informal political influence at Peking. had to

It

be cautious enough not to topple the Manchu dynasty or to

plunge England into a rivals; but

it had

war

with

at the

one

or

more

of

her European

same time to be aggressive enough to

secure British diplomatic prestige and economic hegemony in China in

order

to

satisfy

What emerged in 1898 reflection weapons

of

over

Britain's

mercantile and public opinion in Britain. was

the

Salisbury's military

traditional

so-called cautious

power policy

and

open

door

preference

a

toward

realistic

for

policy:

a

economic

adaptation

of

a greatly weakened Ch'ing

China. Salisbury and his policy met and in China the

during the

policy

suffered

criticism in England.

scramble for from

checked European ambitions

concessions in 1897-1898, but

rampant

Russophobla

and subsequent

Various members of his Cabinet, members of

38

Parliament, and attempted

to

the press

in general

maligned, criticized, and

undermine governmental

policy.

attacks created the impression that Britain's

These

numerous

policy was

a weak

response destined to destroy England's Informal empire in China.* What must be policy;

evaluated,

Britain's

however,

is

the

end

result

of the

commercial and political position in China by

3,900. Desiring to control foreign the government,

Salisbury merged

and Foreign Secretary when coalition

affairs directly

Cabinet

in

leader, he preferred Office to

the highly

Minister.

Salisbury

he

formed

1895.

the

the offices

while leading

of Prime Minister

his Conservative-Unionist

An experienced Conservative party

duties

and

solitude

of

the Foreign

visible, socially

demanding role of Prime

was

inclination

by

natural

a

loner,

physically frail, pessimistic, somewhat neurotic, but nonetheless highly intelligent, circumspect, and do

much

of

Hatfield.

his Then

Foreign 65,

Office

Salisbury

aristocratic. work

began

at his

He

chose to

his country estate, final

ministry

in

ill-health, a situation which necessitated frequent holidays away from London and England. actually

at

the

Despite

height

of

their various

health

and

his political career.

respect of his Cabinet members and action over

his

allowed them

ministries.

the coalition government, Salisbury

age,

he was

He held the

independence of

While he welded together

controlled and

made foreign

a

policy decisions. As

Foreign

Secretary,

Salisbury

had

relatively

little

39

interest In East Asian affairs. established 1870: at

in

the

lB6Os

and

" 'British Interests in

all

events

protection

of

supremacy

and

only

so

He

adhered to

the China policy

reiterated by Lord Clarendon in

China are

strictly commercial, or

far

political

4

commerce.'"

In

retained

political

some

1895

as they may be for the England

had commercial

influence

at

Peking.

Salisbury's policy was to maintain the Ch'ing dynasty and Chinese territorial integrity,

and to

quo.

No Foreign Secretary

land

mass

and

emphasize caution

considered

population

Britain had one India end

adding

and the status

the

vast Chinese

to Britain's informal empire.

did

not

want

and

could

Great

not afford

a

another.

Salisbury

was

potential threat believed

aware

posed

that

of

by

Britain

was

China's

the

political

Russo-French strong

enough

militarily to defend her own world-wide alliances.

He

threatened by India's

maintained

that

European ambitions,

borderlands

were

the

if

alliance,

economically

the

British

Africa, the most

empire

government

Basically,

divert Russo-French and

East Asia.

the opinion that European policy mirrored that

commercial expansion with maintenance and

was

From 1895 through 1897 he did not believe that

was of

of England:

and

Middle East, and

vulnerable.

England's competitors threatened British interests in Rather he

but he

Interests without formal

Salisbury viewed East Asia as an area to German energies.

decay and the

the

Chinese

empire.

Conservative predecessor, Disraeli:

of the Ch'ing

Salisbury agreed with his

"'in Asia there

is room for

40

us all.'"« Unlike

many

aristocracy

in

which

Russophobe.

his he

British

Cabinet, unlike many of the Victorian represented,

Russophobia,

Salisbury

a

general

was

fear

not

a

of Russian

expansion and invasion of India, was a Victorian phenomenon among the middle

class which

nineteenth century. Crimean

War

in

surfaced during the early decades of the

It reached a peak

1853,

and

interests clashed in the Russophobia opinion: by

was

groups

minority

articles, these

reappeared

Middle East

manifestation

outbreak of the

each time Anglo-Russian

and Asia.

of

Simply stated,

imperial Victorian public

an expression of anti-Russian attitudes

certain

voting

a

with the

and

and stereotypes.

British

Throughout

By the

stories,

British

and defense

this

opinion

century and

English

molded

the

and expansionistic images

maintenance

of India's

of

the declining

borders in central Asia.

appeared in

objective was the same:

Britain's literary

check Russian territorial

ambitions and any perceived threats to Britain's vast informal empire

Journal

189Os the negative image of Russia had

Whenever an anti-Russian polemic Journals, the

nineteenth

in derogatory

become as traditional as Ottoman Empire

newspaper

by an educated,

policy makers became aware of

the

incorporated

of Russia

Articulated

numerous

speeches,

culture

British view

citizens.

through

attitudes.

political

of

held in common

formal and

in the East, whether India, Persia, Afghanistan,

7

or China.

While

Salisbury

was

virtually

unique

in

his

lack

of

41

Russophobia,

his

Cabinet

and

Foreign

reflected this culturally entrenched Arthur Balfour

was a

Lord Salisbury. leader of

member of

Balfour was

Office

fear of

the Cecil

the

First

advisors

Russian expansion. Family and nephew of

Lord

of

the Treasury,

the House of Commons, and substituted for Salisbury at

the Foreign Office when his uncle was absent Balfour favored

Cabinet members

British policy in China.• Admiralty;

Lord

Devonshire, Hamilton

President

the

India

because of illness.

who supported a more aggressive

George

Landsdowne,

Lord

at

East Asia. Hicks

staff

Goschen,

Secretary of

the

of

First

Lord

State for War; Lord

Council;

and

Lord George

Office feared Russo-French ambitions in

There were two Unionist Cabinet members.

Beach

was

the

of the

Chancellor

Chamberlain headed the Colonial

of

Sir Michael

the Exchequer, and Joseph

Office.

Of

all of

the Cabinet

members, Chamberlain was the most imperialistic and Russophobic.* George Curzon, 1895 to views.

the Under-Secretary

of the

Foreign Office from

1898, shared Chamberlain's imperialistic and Russophobic Curzon's opinions were already well known because

widely read

1894 book,

Problems of

the Far East.

advocated an aggressive role for British

of his

There Curzon

diplomatic and consular

representatives in China; specifically he wanted these men to use their official positions to apply pressure to Manchu officials on behalf of 1894

book

private British he

depicted Russia

called

for

as China's

commercial ventures in China. closer

Anglo-Chinese

"natural enemy."

In his

relations and

He viewed Russia's

projected Trans-Siberian railway as a direct threat to

China and

42

consequently, a

major menace

to British commercial interests in

East Asia.

Yet despite his aggressive

to

Salisbury's

defend

cautious

views, it

fell to Curfcon

policy

in the House of

China

Commons, 1895-1898.»° Several Foreign Russophobia. permanent

Office advisors

Thomas

H. Sanderson,

under-secretary,

negotiators

and

feared

Francis Levenson

shared Victorian England's a

career

1894-19O8,

their

ambitions

Bertie, assistant

staff member and

distrusted

Russian

in

Asia.* l

central

secretary,

1894-1903, headed

the African and Asian departments; he was avidly anti-Russian and pushed for strong British north China.*

a

actions to

present

to

the

public,

policy could European

government the appearance of an erratic, of these

split the Cabinet

powers, and the Chinese weak policy.

In spite

attitudes, Salisbury was able to maintain the substance

of his traditional commercial approach and to the

advances in

Potentially, these Russophobic views and adverse

opinions about Salisbury's China and

check Russian

drastically altered

to adapt

political conditions

that policy

in China after

1895. After China's loss to Japan in

the Sino-Japanese

War, many

observers predicted the collapse of the Manchu government and the demise of Asia.

Britain's commercial

and political

influence in East

In July 1895 the London Times speculated:

her disintegration contracts nor

that

she

expect their

could

neither

"The process of

implement

observance by others."

Hart, the Inspector-General of the Maritime

ta

her own

Sir Robert

Customs Service, saw

43

dangerous political implications for Britain: are

having

standing."

it

all

In

their

own

way

and

nobody

November 1695 he recorded:

for England to assert herself anyway."

"Russia and France

encourage

Russian

advances

Balfour stated as much in a circulating to

has any

"It's almost too late

l4

Salisbury, however, felt no apprehension. to

else

Indeed, he seemed

in East Asia.

speech given

In February 1896

in response

to rumors

the effect that China was granting Russia a port.

He maintained that Britain did not object to Russia's acquisition of an

ice-free port.

Salisbury replied: advance in

When questioned about Balfour's statement,

"'I would welcome such a result as a distinct

this far

region.'"ta

Salisbury had his reasons.

diplomatic realist, he knew that Great Britain would could

not,

prevent

Russian

expansion

not, Indeed

that far from England's

formal empire; if Russia was occupied in East Asia, she less

Interested

in

Afghanistan

likely to instigate trouble in the Empire.1*

Salisbury believed

and

A

India's

would be

borders and less

Balkan region

of the Ottoman

that Russian expansion, even with

an ice-free port and the Trans-Siberian railway, was commercially motivated, and

British merchants

all Western nations in China.*

could compete effectively with

7

Russia's intentions, however, were ultimate

goal

was

formal

Imperial

more than expansion

economic; her

into Manchuria.

Sergei Witte, Russia's Minister of Finance, chief promoter of the Trans-Siberian railway, Russo-Chinese

Bank,

and a prime mover in the creation of the

wanted

Manchuria

and

to

dominate

north

44

China.

The

Triple Intervention

had provided the opportunity to

remove Japan from the Liaotung peninsula of

Manchuria,

Manchus to

and,

at

Russia.

Russian

gains

China.

Li

the same time, politically obligate the

The

through

next an

Hung-chang

collaborator

for

Russia.

Count

St. Petersburg

official

3

step

but the

Negotiations Peking

Cassini.

on

logical

provided

alliance began secretly in minister,

and further penetration

June

1896

secret

alliance with governmental

for

Sino-Russlan

the

Li

treaty and

to guarantee

powerful

between

The

was

and was

signed

by

the Russian finalized

in

Li

he

while

represented China

at the coronation ceremonies for Tsar Nicholas

II.

one

Li was

paid

million

rubles

as

the

first

of three

installments for his collaborative services.*• Li

received

money

received a dubious Russian very

high

price.

The

and Russia's apparent friendship; China guarantee of alliance

her independence

included:

if

Russia, China, or Korea, the military from both would mobilize;

for a

Japan invaded

Russia and China

any treaties made by one had to be sanctioned by

the other; in the event of war Russia could use all Chinese ports and receive

aid from

allowed to extend the via Heilung-kiang

Chinese authorities; in return, Russia was Trans-Siberian railroad

through Manchuria

and Kirin to Vladivostok; the Manchurian line,

the Chinese Eastern Railroad, would be funded and Russo-Chinese

Bank;

railway

rights included mining concessions

along the right-of-way; during a war use the

Chinese Eastern

managed by the

Russia would

be allowed to

line for troop transport and munitions.

45

The secret alliance

bound

China

to

Russia

for

15

years and

included a provision to allow Russia to negotiate for a port such as Kiaochow, Port Arthur, and/or Dairen.'9 Negotiations or treaties did

not

remain

secret

involving

very

the

Chinese government

long in Peking.

Rumors about the

alliance reached London as early as February 1896. and

again

in

April,

Sino-Russian secret

Curzon

In that month

was questioned in Commons about a

treaty.

He

was

asked

specifically about

railway, commercial privileges, and territorial provisions in the alleged agreement.

In both

Russian ambassador press.

secret

the North

newspaper,

Convention."

between

China Herald,

published

Alleging that

treaty

answered that the

officially denied the rumors published in the

On 18 October

Shanghai

instances Curzon

this

Russia

considerable stir both on the

the

so-called

convention and

China

China, coast

an English-owned

was the and

a

"Cassini copy

of a

article caused in

London.

In

retrospect a Russian historian stated that the North China Herald article of 1896 was basically correct, though incomplete; not a

"fabrication" as

at the time.

It was

it was

claimed by Russian and Chinese officials a "rough

draft," most

likely stolen from

80

the Russian legation at Peking.

The Foreign Office naturally needed confirmation rather than rumor.

In a

cable

to

MacDonald,

Francis

interview with

China's minister to London.

described

treaty

accepted

the by

Li

as:

Hung-chang

"substantially at

Moscow."

Bertie

detailed an

The minister vaguely a He

paper

which was

claimed that the

46

Tsungli Yemen rejected the proposal, but that the Empress Dowager had

sent

"paper."

it

to

the

Committee

Bertie queried:

matter has

regarding the

1

that the

MacDonald sent a lengthy memorandum

a legation

rumors and

Defense which approved the

"Do you think this is true &

gone further?"*

on a meeting between

of

staff member

the Cassini

and Li Hung-chang

Convention.

Li described

the document in the newspaper as a "false Convention published at Shanghai."

But

he verified

for Russia in Manchuria:

that China agreed to railway rights

"He CLi] had had several discussions on

the subject of the railway with Prince Lobanoff and Mr. Witte and they had told him quickly in

order to

was made of convinced

that Russia

ports that

was only

anxious to

be ready for war with Japan." or

an

alliances,

agreement

of

Salisbury's biographers described the "greatest coup. "a3

but some the

the

complete it

Bft

No mention

Foreign

sort

Office was

existed.

Sino-Russian

One of

alliance as

At Peking political ascendancy shifted to

Russia and her ally, France.

Throughout

numerous Russo-French

activities in

their unified efforts

to

weaken

1896 MacDonald reported

various areas

and

replace,

of China and

where possible,

84

English personnel and influence. The Sino-Russian

alliance and

activity at Peking

provided

concessions.

1896

In

the

Salisbury

traditional China policy and

the

increased European political

prelude

to

continued private

the to

scramble for rely

commercial

maintain and expand British influence in China.

on

his

sector to

While Russia had

her Manchurian branchline to the Trans-Siberian railway, interest

47

in railway concessions within mainland China surfaced to increase European competition as did the third Chinese indemnity

loan for

aa

£16, OOO,OOO.

Germany,

however,

refused

informal political influence. on the

murders of

to

In

two German

Germany

lease

concessions

in

pointed out

that Russia

Cassini Convention. the "sick

man" of

The

her prestige,

reported

that port

an editorial

the

event and

as stated in the

the Times

labeled China

Asia and commented that no one could maintain

"for ever the integrity of the Chinese Empire any more of Turkey."

rely on

she capitalized

to protect

Times

had wanted

In

to

of the port and exclusive commercial

Shantung.

66

and

missionaries in Shantung province

Using the excuse

a

time

November 1897

and seized Kiaochow. demanded

use

than that

But the article cautioned:

We cannot remain indifferent to changes which, by their effect upon the Government at Peking, and by the redistribution of naval power in the Far East, may seriously affect the condition under which our commercial supremacy in that part of the world has been created. ... our trade requires the protection of strength held in reserve.87 A

report

from

Vienna

threatened by

a "Far

and Germany.

The Times

warned

that

Eastern triple did not

England's

if

the

commercial and

development political

injuriously affected."*•

of

want Britain

What

to act in haste:

preparing to

events

interests

were

alliance," Russia, France,

"But no time ought to be lost by us in course

interests

in

should the

emerged from

Far

take a firm

show

that

East

our

will be

the Foreign Office

was not viewed as a "firm course," but in reality

it was

a very

43

successful,

positive

traditional

diplomatic

policy:

modification

maintenance

commercial supremacy

of

the

of

Britain's

Manchu

dynasty,

for Britain, and acceptance of leased areas

of economic spheres of

"interests.n

influence or

This approach

became known as the open door policy. Salisbury's

open

Germany

demanded

after

concessions reaction

in

than

door a

lease

Shantung. upon

policy

It

evolved over several months of

was

initiative.

Kiaochow a

policy

Adhering

and

exclusive

based

more upon

the

legalistic

to

framework of the treaty port system and his innate preference for economic weapons over dubious military power,

Salisbury acted on

Britain's strengths in China, still based primarily on commercial supremacy options

fortified increased

by with

international an

economic

treaties. and

His

list of

legalistic approach:

international loans, railway and mining concessions, opening more treaty ports

with trade

concessions, protection

of the Customs

Service dominated by Englishmen, and, if necessary, guarantees to protect

the

Yangtze

predominated. territorial

valley

If these demands partition

Salisbury could

nor

would not

protect

demand leased

where

British offset the

British

vested

territories and

was

British

commercial

successful than

interests,

While some of

others, the

end result

supremacy, increased informal political

influence at Peking, and the maintenance B. C. M. Platt observed:

threat of

attempt to reach

separate agreements with her European competitors. these actions were more

investments

of the

Manchu dynasty.

"In China more than anywhere else, the

49

political

battle

weapons. * .. the

of

expected

never took place; the partition.

the

was

total

Balance of

fought

with

economic

territorial partition of China Power was

decided by economic

nft9

On 22 of

1898

November 1897

new

German

MacDonald at Peking informed Salisbury

demands

on

China.

The

fifth condition,

exclusive rights to build railways and develop mines in Shantung, was unique. with

MacDonald pointed

the

most-favored-nation

treaties. clause

out that

Salisbury

the

clause

instructed:

demand

is

rights

the

British

concession to others. December; he

the

subject

nao

for

Salisbury

Anglo-Chinese

most-favoured-nation

inadmissible. ... the to

a

of

"under

Majesty's Government cannot be given of

this demand conflicted

the

consent abrogation

purpose

continued

of this

in

1895

of

and

continued

to

Salisbury wanted to

China,

Her

of the

making

a

tactic in

instructed MacDonald to warn the Tsungli Yamen that

Britain had objected to exclusive privileges for France

Germans.

of

the

granting

of

object

in China

to such concessions for the

prevent the

territorial partition

exclusive commercial privileges in

specific regions, and the leasing of ports, which

appeared to be J

the first steps toward territorial disintegration. * While using

political pressure to shore up Chinese courage,

Salisbury turned to the summer of

1897 Li

Manchu's

need

for

money.

Hung-chang began negotiations with an English

financial cartel, the Hooley-Jameson Syndicate, for low

interest

loan

During the

for

£16,OOO,OOO.

a long-term,

This sum represented the

50

final payment of China's the negotiations

indemnity to

the Chinese

Foreign Office for help. loan guaranteed

minister at

In a

either by

Japan.

subtle manner

however,

concessions in

were

too

costly,

north China

and the

Li Hung-chang turned

of 1897,

and Russia

Salisbury

guaranteed loan

He

informed

Russian.33

for

the

and enhance

MacDonald

aid

all

railway

After Germany

advantages

of

a British

means to help China and a method to secure

commercial concessions

financial

including

occupied Port Arthur in mid-December

re-evaluated

as a

Russia's political

eventual replacement of Sir

Robert Hart as Inspector-General by a seized Kiaochow

China requested a

the Bank of England or by the British

to Russia and received an affirmative answer. demands,

the course of

London approached the

The Foreign Office refused.28

government.

In

that

China.

the He

British political influence. government

wanted

was "considering"

MacDonald

to stipulate

specific concessions that Britain should request in return for an "entire or partial guarantee.n34 included

foreign

control

MacDonald

sent

a

list which

of specific Chinese revenues, railway

concessions, non-alienation of the Yangtze valley, internal trade concessions, and a new treaty port in southern Manchuria, Dairen, Port Arthur's commercial port.33 she should

accept the

guaranteed loan with those concessions to

Britain, the Manchus rejected lost

neither

Salisbury's received most

political approval, of the

When Russia threatened China if

the

influence MacDonald

British nor

offer.

But England

prestige.

Acting with

threatened,

political concessions

pressured,

and

the guaranteed loan

51

would have

provided.

economic hegemony,

Britain's

the threat

and an aggressive diplomat at

strength

still

lay

with her

of what she had done in the past, Peking

who

had

no

qualms about

general

China policy

36

exhibiting his displeasure. By

early

emerged.

In

January a

1898

by-election

Salisbury's speech

at

East

Manchester

on 10

January, Arthur Balfour explained: ..* It is not primarily a territorial policy. ... We have no present desire to undertake the administration of millions of Chinamen. On the other hand, we are quite conscious of the preponderance of our trade interests in China over those of all other nations ... we are quite determined that those Interests shall not be impaired. He assured

his audience

the German and Russian that

it

was

both

that Britain would not be excluded from areas,

China.

Michael

Swansea:

"this

were closed

reminded

his listeners

expensive and counter-productive to take and

hold territory; he called 37

Balfour

for

Hicks

"freedom

Beach

country must

of

trade

expounded

take care

on

for

these

that not

all" in ideas at

so many doors

upon us that there should not be sufficient doors to

open in their stead."aa MacDonald acted vigorously to remain

open

in

the

Yangtze

valley,

commercial presence and investments not want

territory nor

did

trust

not

ensure

that

the

at

door would

area

where British

predominated.

Salisbury did

exclusive commercial

the %Manchus

the

Peking.

privileges, but he MacDonald

Informed

Salisbury that he had posed this question to the Tsungli Yamen on 9 February:

"the Chinese

Government

were

aware

of

the great

52

importance

that

retention in followed

has

been

Chinese

with

Government, a

the

attached

possession demand:

of

"to

definite assurance

by

Great

the

Britain

Yangtze

communicate that China

to the

region."

He

to her Majesty's

will never alienate

any territory in the provinces adjoining the Yangtze to any other Power,

whether

designation.

naB

under

lease,

mortgage,

or

any

other

MacDonald received the following reply:

... it is out of the question that territory (in it) [Yangtze valley] should be mortgaged, leased, or ceded to another Power. Since H.B.M. Government has expressed its interest (or anxiety), it is the duty of the Yamen to address this note to the British Minister for communication to his Government.* ° Salisbury defended his open Lords when

policy

in

the

"I only want to

assert that

we have

not surrendered

of our Treaty rights. ... there is no effort which this

country will not over-ridden."

make

rather

than

allow

those

rights

exchange for a guaranteed loan, Salisbury summarized the "these concessions

trade with China."*•»

Curzon listed the economic and political concessions

received:

non-alienation

of

foreign the

inland

steam

trade remained

the

in

of

a

navigation,

Yangtze valley, the Inspector-General to

remain British as long as English opening

goal of

were without exception directed

to the object of increasing and freeing the In Commons

to be

In reference to concessions demanded by Britain in

his policy:

Britain

House of

questioned about the dangers to British treaty rights

in China: one lota

door

treaty

port

Hunan

paramount, and

province within two

years.* * The policy

did,

however,

fall

in

one

important aspect.

53

Salisbury

could

not

forestall

leased areas which the

spheres of influence with their

Manchus granted

to Germany

in Shantung,

Russia in

Liaotung, France

in Kwangsi

and Kwangtung, and Japan

in Fukien

province.

that these

nations were negotiating

with the would

Aware

Tsungli Yamen, Salisbury clung to the belief that China

not

lease

countries.4 a

major

Germany

ports

attempted

with

territory

to

protests and opposition when her minister in London Foreign

Office

that

foreign commerce. Arthur was

all

ports

Russia sent

a military

in

her

similar

despondent

44

hardly sincere.

that

his

policy

influence, especially that of Port

Arthur,

notified the

though Port

base, not a commercial port; the Russians

By

treaty port.

Salisbury

could

Russia at

drafted

a

Russia's

March Salisbury accepted

the fact that China had chosen her course of action. and

specific

area would be open to

statements,

had threatened China if Dairen was made a assurances were

to

soften British diplomatic

Pessimistic

not prevent spheres of strategically important

telegram to MacDonald on 23

March: ... inform the Yamen that if Port Arthur is conceded to Russia, H.B.M. will be compelled to consider that Chinese Gov't. acquiesce in the dismemberment of their Empire and that it is useless henceforth for us to mould our own policy or to influence that of other Powers in the direction of preserving its integrity.43 Salisbury, however,

delayed the message, and in the end did

not send it at all.

Rather, he chose to check Russian and German

naval

the

Peking.

presence

in

Gulf

of

Pechihli, the sea approach to

As early as 29 December 1897 Curzon advised Salisbury to

obtain a lease at Weihaiwei, a strategic island naval base in the

54

Gulf of Pechihll occupied by indemnity payment. to counter

European

offered the

Japan

military

island fortress

and

Dairen

to

"The

Government. "

her last

near

Russia.

Peking, China

in February.

On

7

not to

March

first refusal

Salisbury grant Port

he instructed

of the

naval base,

detriment of

that of

her Majesty's

On 25 March he notified MacDonald to proceed with lease

agreement for

of

Weihaiwei,

Port Arthur.

similar

negotiations

for

to

Russia's

lease

This action re-established an uneasy

balance of power in the Gulf of Pechlhli. began

paid

influence of Russia over the Government of Peking

47

official

so

convince China 44

will be so increased to the

an

presence

to Britain

MacDonald that Britain wanted because:

China

Attempting to soothe British ire and perhaps

hesitated, believing he could Arthur

until

the

On 2

extension

April MacDonald

of Hong Kong to include

adjacent areas of mainland China at Kowloon, an area long coveted for economic

reasons.4*

and strategic

this aspect of the open door in the "Her

Majesty's

Government

have

Lord Devonshire defended

House of desired

Lords on neither

5 April:

territorial

acquisitions in China nor even the extension of British influence in

the

Chinese

Government

beyond

such

extensions

and

such

influences as may be necessary for the protection and maintenance of our

commercial position

defense in Commons: ... rich

fruits

in

"it is the

in China."49 a

policy

interests

Balfour used the same

which

has

already borne

of British commerce both as

regards our immediate political interests at Peking."30 By the end of April 1898 the open door policy

emerged fully

55

matured.

It

was

founded

on

the

legalistic framework of the

treaty system, with special emphasis placed of

the

most-favored-nation

Britons could

continue to

closed spheres

clause. trade on

of influence.

on the inviolability

This emphasis implied that a basis

of equality within

Great Britain

did not officially

recognize spheres of influence, but she did admit to a economic

preponderance

modified policy in Britain

did

not

Commons have

interest we have never one; but

or

a

"interest." on

29

April.

sphere

denied.

sphere of

Balfour explained this He

proclaimed that

of influence, but "spheres of

This

distinction may

be a fine

the House will observe that for us not to admit spheres

of interest would have commerce."

He

been

assured

a

most

Commons

fatal

that

policy

for British

Britain would demand and

receive equality of trade rights throughout

China, regardless of

spheres of influence, but that the government would be the "first to admit that this

country has

certain spheres

of interests in

China. "s * Salisbury had

other options open to him.

Firmly opposed to

any radical changes in British policy in China

or her diplomatic

approach to

Europe's alliance

practical

solution

Salisbury

chose

settlements." regard to

He

to

to had

heightening

ease

reached

As far as China was concerned, engage that

adopted a realistic,

competition

in

East Asia.

tensions through individual "regional

Anglo-French rivalry

Great Britain

systems, he

an

agreement

over Burma

with

France with

and southwest China.

the agreement stated:

"France and

any privileges or advantages conceded

56

to either in the provinces of Yunnan and as rests

activities of did

provide

competition

as far

be extended and rendered common to both. ns *

with them,

This agreement did

Szechuan shall,

not

restrict

the

political

and commercial

either country in those provinces of China, but it a

basis

produced

on

which

new

negotiations

could

begin

3J

tensions

in the future.

if

Salisbury

decided to use this approach with Russia. Prior to

November 1897

Anglo-Russian

agreement.

August, but the Kiaochow

Preliminary

negotiations

disrupted

the

Salisbury expressed steps

dragged.

process,

The

and

interest in an

had been taken in German

Russia's

move into Port

Arthur placed more pressure on Salisbury

to reach

In

British

January

1898

he

instructed

the

St. Petersburg, Sir Nicholas Q'Conor, Anglo-Russian

problems.

Q'Conor

minister, Count Muraviev, agreement about 34

tensions.

was

China and

replied

interested

perhaps other

an agreement. ambassador

talks regarding

that in

at

the

some

foreign

kind

of an

areas of Anglo-Russian

In a lengthy dispatch Salisbury offered to negotiate

mutual problems

in China and Turkey.

weak, and both turned to Britain tensions

to reopen

seizure of

between

the

two

Both of these empires were

and Russia,

powers.

But

thereby increasing Salisbury

remained

consistent to his traditional approach: We contemplate no infraction of existing rights. We would not admit the violation of any existing treaties, or impair the integrity of the present empires of either China or Turkey. These two conditions are vital. We aim at no partition of territory, but only a partition of preponderance.33 Britain's

offer

of

a

guaranteed

loan

to

China

with

the

57

stipulation

that

Anglo-Russian

negotiations, and Chinese

is

though

treaty

the

informed

ambiguous.

in April

China,

a

MacDonald:

nst

if

British

an

Central

Government.*

insisted

to seek railroad concessions in the

upon

"the

the authority of

Russia agreed not

Yangtze valley,

and Britain

to compete for railway contracts north of Peking and Wall.

The

settlement

investment

interests

in

Peking

Manchuria

at

to

reached

The final document was very narrow

in scope, dealing only with railways in China.

the Great

were

Attempts to conclude an agreement

dragged on for almost a year.

pledged not

"interchange

MacDonald to reassure

maintenance of the integrity of that Empire and the

atmosphere

continued the

agreement

proposals

S7

disrupted

they are insincere

Salisbury

he instructed

that

port

diplomatic

St. Petersburg, but

government

concerning

made

Salisbury

language at

and their language

the

be

negotiations,

remained amicable. of friendly

Dairen

a

left

railway

intact

private British

concession which connected

Newchwang,

a

treaty

port.

The

Anglo-Russian railway agreement was signed 29 April 1S99.5* In order

to reassure

Weihaiwei was leased, government that

the

Foreign

Britain's lease

way interfere with Germany's in Shantung

Germany of Britain's intentions

province.

Office

of that

notified

after

the German

naval port would in no

paramount Influence

at Kiaochow or

England's sole purpose in the lease of an

island so close to the new

German area

was to

domination" of

government.

The regional settlements

the Peking

served a practical purpose.

They acknowledged

prevent "foreign

that Britain and

58

her European

competitors had areas of economic interests, but at

the same time they agreed that these areas

nominally belonged to

China and did not warrant armed intervention.39 Salisbury's

pragmatic

diplomacy

recognized and utilized the China by

August 1898.

and

the open door policy

political realities

that existed in

It accepted German, French, Russian, and

Japanese spheres of influence, which meant in effect that British investors could

not compete

in those small adhered

to

areas.

equitable

for railways and mining concessions

But

all

of

tariffs,

these

nations

non-preferential

agreed and

transport and

shipping rates, and trading opportunities in all areas The

door

remained

open,

and

the

British investment opportunities in and

most

populous

area

along

been

Kowloon.

secured

through

policy secured the right of central

China,

the richest

the Yangtze River where British

commercial interests predominated had

of China.

already.

its

Hong

Kong's growth

extension on to the mainland at

All treaty ports remained open,

including Newchwang in

Manchuria, with the promise of more in other areas of China. the

policy

territorial

did

not,

integrity

government, made

at

least

because

technically, the

those decisions.

Manchus, The policy

protect not

the

But

Chinese British

did maintain the

Ch'ing dynasty through the scramble for concessions, as Salisbury so aptly described on 9 February 1899: not lie

in our hands. 1 0

Power of China. " implementation

It is still in the hands of the Governing

Between 1895

produced

"The future of China does

far

and 19OO

this policy

and its

more economic concessions in China

59

for British

merchants and

investors than

for any

of the other

European nations.* * Regardless of

its overall success, the open door policy was

not well received by criticism

and

the

Cabinet, many

the

British

impact

public

because

of Russophobia.

Parliament members,

of political

Some in Salisbury's

and the

news media exhibited

this culturally molded attitude toward Russia.

George Curzon, an

unapologetic Russophobe, still did not criticize nor proclaim his views publicly Office.

while serving

as Under-Secretary

to the Foreign

Joseph Chamberlain, however, did make his opinions known

to the

other powers

and to the British public.

His fears about

Russo-French ambitions were made known both

in his

in

Chamberlain's public

his

personal

diplomatic

initiatives.

proclamations, compounded with from England control of

during the

Salisbury's

spring of

foreign policy

speeches and

illness

1898, all

nominally exercised

and absence

but destroyed the by Salisbury and

66

the Cabinet.

As early

as 17 March 1898, Chamberlain's fear of Russia and

his dislike for the open formal

alliance

for

door

policy

Britain.

drove

a

major

threat

to

Apparently with the approval with the

to

promote a

Acting alone, he spoke with the

Japanese minister in London and expressed posed

him

his fears

that Russia

both Britain and Japan in East Asia. of Arthur

Balfour, Chamberlain met

German ambassador to England, Count Paul von Hatzfeldt,

at a private residence on 29 March; there proposed a sweeping Anglo-German alliance.

the Colonial

Secretary

Proceeding on what he

60

believed to be an promoted

his

interested response,

idea

of

an

Chamberlain during April

alliance.

By

the 29th he was in a

position to write to Salisbury to receive official argueds

"as

long

as

Britain

While

aim at

embarrassing

Chamberlain knowledge

proceeded but

returned to

in

without

London at

by

his

his

of China

personal

negotiations

Salisbury's

by Russia and

agreement with Germany."63

a defensive

Balfour

He

retained her isolation, she was

powerless to resist the ultimate control should therefore

sanction.

approval.

initiatives,

with

Balfour's

When

Salisbury

the beginning of May, he had decided that

any alliance with Germany would be too costly to Britain.

He was

willing to reach limited agreements and to work with other powers to ease tensions in China but without a formal alliance.*4 On 13 May 1898 Chamberlain did his major damage to door as maker. a

a viable

policy and

the open

to Salisbury as the foreign policy

During a speech at the Birmingham Town Hall he called for

formal

alliance

with

whose interests are most referred

to

Salisbury's

the

United States or Germany, "Powers

nearly

approximate

attempts

to

to

reach

must have a long spoon.'"

an alternative, but only Chamberlain's Salisbury in member simply

actions

if Great and

an exceedingly

his

own."

He

an agreement with

Russia in very derogatory and Russophobic terms: the Devil

our

"'who sups with

Chamberlain spoke of war as Britain had "Long

Spoon"

awkward position;

a formal ally.*3 speech

placed

a fellow Cabinet

did not publicly criticize the policy of the Prime

Minister and Foreign Secretary.

Salisbury then

had to reassure

61

Russia

that

Britain

was

not

Chamberlain did not make policy. reassured.

contemplating

66

MacDonald

war

and

also

had

that to be

He wired Bertie:

Reuter telegram reports J. Chamberlain to have said that "the situation in China was most unsatisfactory as Great Britain was unable to declare war against Russia without ally." Surely this is incorrect? If so, a correction is desirable as statement will do much harm here. Bertie replied: making war

"He said

against Russia.

an American alliance as Reuter is Russia. No

But he favored a German & still more precaution

resulted.

Salisbury as the chief Zara

a

any intentions of

against

possible danger.

damage

had been done to

nt7

alliance

door.

nothing indicating

But

foreign

S. Steiner

the

policy

maker

maintained

and

that

to

the

disintegrated" and "he [Salisbury] never effectively impression proposing

that

there

different

Foreign Secretary,

were

lines and the

two of

heads

and

the

maintain against all comers that which spite

of

the

Jargon

competent to do so."'• British policy

would be

legal framework of the private Ifl99:

British

trade;

about

a success Treaty of he

"we have only to take

Salisbury remained

nation

to

we possess,

as long

this

we are amply maintain that

as it relied on the

Tientsin and

followed

and we know,

that

continued to

care that

"Judge" his

We know that we shall

isolation,

In August he

checked the

policy proved successful.

China policy "by Cits] results" and added:

in

"Cabinet

the Foreign Office

policy."**

open door

In May he asked his detractors

of

the open

the supremacy of

defense in February

the Treaties

which have

62

been concluded

with us are fully carried out, that the interests

of our nation are duly regarded, and that nothing is by China He

or by

concluded

other nations that

Great

done either

which can compromise the rights."

Britain

had

gained

more

lucrative

7

concessions during 1898 than any other country. ° Parliamentary weaken

further

Clamoring

for

criticism public

a

more

occupation of Chinese

sparked

by

acceptance aggressive

territory

Russophobia served to

of

Salisbury's

policy,

to

check

policy.

including

Russian

actual

advances in

China, Parliament

members contributed to the impression that the

policy

and

was

weak

A. Dilke, a

without

Liberal, berated

positive

direction.

Charles

Salisbury's policy and warned that

promises made by Russia, France, and Germany were matters of form rather

than

substance

with

spheres of influence; he

regard

further

consistently unfriendly

to open trade within their Russia

had been

to Great Britain in East Asia.

argued

that

In April

Dilke lashed out at the policy and displayed his fear goals in

China:

"the

main point

is the dominance of Russia at

Pekin, and the power she possesses to carry out the policy Foreign

at

the

Office

relations, Dilke

moment

she

produced

chooses.

a

or

distinct

alliance

ideas.

with

the

He

appeared

United

E. Ashmead-Bartlett Joined

on

Anglo-Chinese

"examples of imbecility

want of firmness to

States

Dilke and

whole of her

In June 1899 after the

paper

attack:

in the classical sense of the word: n

n7l

command

continued his

of Russian

sanction or

of purpose

some

Germany.7*

sort of Sir

expressed his doubts about

63

the

open

door,

Ruesophobia.

Britain's

"splendid

Isolation,"

and

his own

He favored an alliance with Japan to check Russia:

The aggression of Russia upon Northern China is now completely unveiled. The Cassini Convention is now known to be a reality, and Russia no longer attempts to conceal the fact that she intends to dominate the whole of the populous and fertile regions of Northern China, and to shut out from those regions British influence and British Commerce. He

wanted

Britain

to

seize

Port

Arthur

from

Russia and to

conclude an alliance to protect English interests in China: the

Government

officials

to

going

to

gradually

Northern China

and down

allow spread

Russian

army and Russian

over

Manchuria and

the Liao-tung peninsula to Port Arthur,

and so hold the whole game plague the

the

themselves

"Are

hands?"7J

in their

He continued to

government in Commons in 1898-1899, with his polemics

against the open door and Russia.74 Sir Edward Grey, former Foreign

Secretary,

February 1898, but he that policy.

Under-Secretary and

appeared

to

made

a

as

methods used

treaty

the

test

port

withdrew the

Government of

demand that Dairen

in return for a guaranteed loan:

the

is

watched

and

prestige,

it

will

be

a

most

particularly criticized the Foreign doubted whether

the Government

"the

weighed, and

strength and reasonableness of our

purpose, and if once it does get abroad that the lost

to implement

In April he expressed fears that Great Britain had

action of the British taken

prefer the open door policy in

questioned the

lost prestige because Salisbury be

future Liberal

Government have

dangerous condition."

Office's

methods:

He

"It was

had the energy, mind, and grasp,

64

necessary

to

wield

described

their

that

methods

great as

power

and

influence."

Grey

"drifting" and maintained that the

open door would work only if the British

government promoted the

73

policy strongly and consistently. Other members

of Parliament expressed their distrust of the

policy and of Russo-French designs in China.

As

a voice

in the

House of Commons speaking for various commercial groups with ties to China, Lord Charles Beresford reacted to each in

the

Times

and

questioned

Great Britain could place foreign ministers;

Curzon.

no trust

he pointed

any territory

In April he warned that

in promises

made by Russian

out that these officials used the

excuse that the Russian military acted never returned

rumor published

without orders,

which the

but they

Russian army had taken.

He advocated that Britain train and command Chinese troops to man Weihaiwei. Chambers

After a fact-finding tour of China for the Associated of

Commerce

during

expanded his

ideas on

British control

In June 1899 he explained: to the future? North.

n

Germany,

He and

reorganized according to

the

summer

of

1898,

Beresford

of the Chinese military.

"Now what are the dangers with regard

One is in regard to the position of Russia in the

promoted close Japan Chinese

and

cooperation with continued

military

to

commanded

the United States,

push by

the British

idea

of

a

officers;

Beresford, the greatest threat to China and Britain

in the future was

Russian attempts

to dominate

Peking when the

railways were completed in the north.7 * Others

added

their

negative

opinions about the open door

65

policy Russian

and

Russo-French

policy

in

project too vast,

ambitions

classic

for

expressed

anger

at

"There is no

"We have not moved in

we have

pushed and hustled by other Powers."

described

ambition of Russia.B 7 7

the

7a

One

images:

Salisbury's strategy:

the direction of our own choice;

of Parliament

China.

Russophobic

apparently,

Another criticized

in

moved as

we have been

In February 1899 a member

Russia's

protest

against a

China-based English bank which received a railway concession into Manchuria.79 for

three

Chinese

Parliament's command

papers

affairs

dissatisfaction

numerous on

presented and

criticisms

brought demands

Foreign Office correspondence on in

1898

Russophobia

left

and

1899.

Their

the

impression

that

Salisbury's open door policy was weak and overlooked the policy's overall success rate.•° Parliament's

fears

were

fed

anti-Russian articles in the Times.

Valentine

Morrison

China.

Chirol was the foreign department the

Times

and

numerous

Ernest

Morrison

commented

by

correspondent his subject

imperialism

nineties"

the

"high-priests" of imperialism, was said

to believe

and

Chirol and George

reported on Britain's policy in

biographer described of

critical

editor in

in

Peking.

as "inflicted and

included

Curzon

and

that Russian

London, and Morrison's

with the raging Morrison with the

Chamberlain.

Chirol

and French power in China had

surpassed Great Britain's influence at Peking.*1 Critiques of Britain's general East Asian policy appeared as early as

April 1896 when Russo-Japanese competition erupted over

66

informal

control

passivity in

of

the

Korean

government:

presence of all these momentous events is beginning

to impair her prestige in the East very to

be

the

arbiter

in

consent, none."*

ft

route

Kiaochow.•

By

of

December

harbor but

and

open as

several

door

policy.

England's

In

voice which January

"inveterate

expansion."*4

1898

rival" and

After Russia took

British ships arrived at the military days later,

believed that

Morrison reported that

Russia had pressured Britain to

to return to Port Arthur.

the open door policy. sphere of

Germany seized

influential

remove the ships; he advocated that the British the ships

see for

"The aim of Russia is of necessity territorial

departed several

Chinese officials

Peking when

another

acquisition and not commercial Arthur

Manchuria to

his reports from China's capital fed

added

Morrison described Russia

Port

Off to

away from

Salisbury's

Chirol commented:

undertaken; without her

Russia's railway rumored to terminate at

British Russophobia and criticized

could be

March 1897.

Port Arthur, Morrison was a

England used

Morrison added his Russophobic views after he

arrived in Peking in the

seriously.

all Oriental complications; without her

initiative few important steps

himself

"England, whose

government order

In August Morrison attacked

He promoted the idea that Britain needed a

influence with actual military occupation of that area

as Germany and

Russia

had

done.

He

bemoaned

the

fact that

England had no control over commerce because she did not actively Intimidate China as Russia London, the

open door

did.

To

Morrison and

his editor in

was a weak policy which could not protect

67

British

interests

and

Morrison exhibited

was

thus

indefensible.

In

May

1899

his fear of Russian ambitions and warned that

that nation could not be trusted

to fulfill

her obligations and

promises embodied in the Anglo-Russian railway agreement.•a Chirol initiated

his vigorous

open door in March 1898. could

He not

Russophobic criticism of the

warned the

public

opinion

be

with."

On 26 March he commented:

government that British

ignored nor would it be "trifled

By vacillation in action, combined with a persistent adherence to a theory which it did little to realize, the Government of this country has simply, as the French say, assisted at the carrying out of changes vitally affecting not only our more immediate interests, but our political position and prestige throughout the Far East. This

article

British

advocated

influence

handling

of

the

proclaimed:

a

more

at

Peking.*

British

ships

"That is no way to

nation in the East."

aggressive

6

policy to reassert

Disgusted at

Port

uphold the

with

Salisbury's

Arthur, an editorial prestige of

He demanded that the government develop and

execute a "resolutely" clear policy toward China.17 a

scathing

agreements: statesmen

attack

appeared

"Even the

most

must

assurances."•• alliance. Chirol

refuse,

Reflecting

importance of

in

on

"He

regarding

future

new

of British

Chamberlain's approach,

Chamberlain's [Chamberlain]

Chirol,

and

to put his faith in Russian

international competition,

markets."

promises

credulous

"Long

Spoon"

recognizes

the

a formal speech, immense

and of the possibility

that British trade may be strangled by systematic the

On 26 April

Russian

Incorrigibly

Chirol favored

commented:

a great

exclusion from

too, felt that if Britain remained

63

without formal allies, she would lose China to Russia.'9

Chirol,

like Morrison, believed occupation and exclusive concessions in a designated area were the only ways in China.

90

speech

in

assurances we have paramount

after

"CitJ

had

the

that of

using

influence in those parts of and

St. John

Commons:

importance

Morrison

Chirol

British

gave

a very

the

first

solid

Government

has

realized the

every opportunity to extend our

China

fed

Brodrick

conveyed

really

to us.n9 *

accessible

British Russophobia and preserved the

impression that the open door was a poor protect

British interests

His attacks did not subside, nor did he moderate his

opinions until July 1899 strong

to protect

interests

or

policy which

prestige in China.

could not

However, the

Times was not alone. Numerous Ruesophobic articles appeared in England's literary Journals

throughout

Magazine,

Quarterly

Review.

The

the

Review,

Nineteenth

opinions and proposals German

later

encroachments

1890s.

Contemporary

Century, on

in

how East

and

to

Asia.

theme, while

of Salisbury's China policy. navy; some

demanded a

Review,

Edinburgh Fortnightly

Edinburgh Review offered

deal

names? others-used pseudonyms or left anti-Russian in

Blackwood's

with

Russo-French and

Some writers signed their them unsigned.

Most were

others included scathing critiques Some articles

different, more

called for

a larger

militant foreign policy;

still others called for a greatly expanded formal empire to check Russian expansion in Asia.9*

These articles entrenched the point

of view that Salisbury's China policy

was without

merit and did

69

not

provide

adequate safeguards

to protect Britain's informal

empire in East Asia. In

1896

associated

Demetrius with

Boulger

displayed

Russophobia:

frequent

all

the

symptoms

of

negative

use

stereotypes to describe Russia and her intentions in East Asia.93 Dealing with

Li Hung-Chang's visit to

emphasized that China should danger

came

cautioned:

from

Russia

"Just as the

leading strings,

made the

policy of

to destroy

make her think that she is extends over

be and

Russia in 1896, Boulger aware

Russia is

to keep

safe

because

the

protecting arm." *

great

not

likely

to

Russia's game to protection. In

obtain

make

China in

White Czar

"From Russia she

any hearty assistance. ... It is not

China

powerful

and

independent

of her

M9a

February

1897

critique of Salisbury's Russia

He

He warned of Russia's

overweaning influence at Peking and commented: is

her greatest

her nerve and self-reliance, and to

9

her his

that

Trans-Siberian railway.

posed

to

government for

Henry policy

British

Norman and

interests

ignoring the

unleashed

outlined in

validity of

a

the

China.

blistering

dangers that He blasted the

the Casslni Convention

published in October 1896 and held that Russia's diplomatic coups had been

at British

the hardest

expense:

"Russia's

peaceful victories and

blow to British interests ... I mean, of course, the

control which Russia has secured over destruction of

British predominance

China, and

the consequent

in the Far East."96

Norman

observed that Russian successes meant French gains in south China

7O

as

well.

He

denied

that

he

was a Russophobe and concluded:

"British predominant prestige in the Far the natural

and inevitable

things will be to

bring

East is

development of

the

whole

of

gone, and that

the present state of

China

definitely under

97

Russian protection." An

unsigned

article

in the Contemporary Review reinforced

Norman's theme of Russian success and British weakness a denunciation of Li Hung-chang: Li Hung future

Chang because prospects

he was

depended

"The Russian Minister supported

sure of

solely

article cited Li's private

and added

his man

seeing that his

on Russia's support."••

secretary, Lo

Feng-luh:

The

"'England's

prestige in the East was gone altogether, and that soon she would lose India'."

And Lo predicted:

"'Russia

and China

would rule

the Asiatic world.'."99 Holt

Hallett

added

British Empire in Asia. for the

Chinese, he

his

voice

to

cries

While he displayed his

of doom for the personal dislike

warned that Russia wanted to dominate India

as well as China: Prince Qukhtomsky, the personal friend of the Tsar, had laid stress upon the 'inherent union and gradual confluence of Russia with the East;' and about the same time the Russian General Kamaroff declared in the Sviet, that 'the East, with all its countries, as China, Beloochistan, and even India, are by the will of Providence, destined for the Russian people. ' 1 ° ° In July Russia's

1B9S another new

article warned

railway

system

under

of the

cautioned that these railroads would affect of

India's

central

Asian

borders

military impact of

construction

in Asia.

It

Britain's protection

and her informal commercial

71

power in China. to

Russia:

In Russophobic terms the author compared Britain

"Great

Britain

wishes

to preserve and extend her

commercial and trading interests, Russia to Wherever

the

Russian

flag

autocracy prevails."'°' with

Russia's:

flies,

He

"British

extend her dominion.

there the system of Russian

contrasted British

policy in China

were without territorial ambitions in

China, and desire only the expansion of trade;

the Russians were

looking

dominion

forward

to

the

growth

of

Russian

and the

wl ft

annexation of Chinese territory. °

Even the conservative, commercially motivated Economist fell victim to

Russophobia in 1897-1898.

After Germany took Kiaochow

and Russia moved into Port Arthur, the Economist

took a cautious

approach but

annoyance it is

added:

with Russia."

103

"If

In

there is

January

it

any serious predicted

oppose a British guaranteed loan to China. criticized

British

commercial

fanatically Russophobic

not

placing

blame

on

"It

trust

worthless." policy

as

concluded:

no 103

use But by

"vague,"

June an suffering

"we do not know what

own Government." In

to

July

China

for

Manchuria. 104

Salisbury's

ministers

of

In March the magazine in

to absorb

Journal accused Russia's is

Russia would

being

while at the same time describing Russia

as expansive and determined while

groups

that

of

general

duplicity

Russian

a

is the

policy, the and dishonor:

assurances, if they are

article described from

By April,

lack

the open door

of objectives; it

deliberate plan

of our

106

1899

the

government

appeared

to reply to these

72

Russophobic and highly critical articles in order to adverse

effects

these

had

on

the

policy

According to one historian, St. John Brodrick article, "The Review.*°

7

as

this

on

control

the China

Britain's private

was

chief

an

The

aim

endeavors

never

country

"We

is concerned — any

Yangtze valley, or indeed, any extensive

region into a kind of Egypt."l°•

based

wrote the unsigned

listed what the government did not intend to do:

converting the

Great

makers.

Problem of China," which appeared in the Edinburgh

may dismiss at once--as far

that

its

The author acknowledged public interest in

policy and

idea of

and

counter the

in

issue.

concerned, if Russia should

writer made

it very plain

remained commercial expansion China. As

far

attempt

to

Formal as

governmental

Russian

absorb

aims were

northern China,

Britain would not be alone in her political opposition.*09 Formal alliances

were not

needed; the legalistic framework

of the treaty port system remained exclusive spheres

in effect.

In spite

of the

of influence, British trade remained paramount

over her European rivals and surpassed them in loans, railway and commercial

concessions.»»°

Brodrick

summarized the policy of

March 19QO: ... it is desirable that we should now proceed with a new policy of concentration. It is the policy of the Government, without creating further responsibilities necessitating the employment of a large number of troops, to keep open the waterways of China for our trade, and to secure to British subjects a full share of opportunities to open out China while receiving from all countries the recognition of the principle of the open door. We shall also endeavour to obtain by legitimate pressure from China all those reasonable facilities which it is as much in her interest to give as in ours to obtain. * * *

73

Under

Salisbury's

remained basically and 1900.

leadership

intact during

Britain's

the crisis

empire

years between 1895

From the beginning of his last ministry, Salisbury had

no intentions of embroiling Great Britain European power

politics, and

Until

and

newest area of

the disintegrating Manchu

1898 he viewed China as a region where all powers

could compete commercially, and financial

in the

he opposed any attempts to end her

"splendid isolation" over the bones of empire.

informal

economic

policy on the fact that could out-compete

he never

power. the

all other

lost faith

Salisbury

English

based the open door

private

merchants in

in British

commercial sector

East Asia, even those

who depended on exclusive spheres of influence. The China:

open

door

policy

relied

on

Britain's

commercial and financial supremacy supported by the legal

weight and political power of international and

strengths in

MacDonald

used

these

weapons

traditional policy toward China.

and

Accepting

treaties.

Salisbury

modified

England's

what

Britain could

not prevent, exclusive spheres of influence, Britain secured much more than a small area of China.

Private

guaranteed numerous

mining concessions, the opening

railway and

British investors were

of more inland treaty ports, various lucrative trade concessions, and non-alienation Britain's

sphere

England's strategic ensure

the

Weihaiwei and

of China's of

richest area, the Yangtze valley,

commercial

preponderance.

presence, redress

commercial

growth

of

To

maintain

the balance of power, and

Hong

Kong,

Britain

leased

extended the boundaries of Hong Kong onto mainland

74

China with the Kowloon extension. gains

through

the

use

Salisbury solidified

Britain's

of narrow, regional agreements with her

European rivals. Despite its overall success, the open maligned and to

seemingly

endless

Salisbury's

policy

diplomatic

suffered

at

and

the

press

in

general.

victories.

the

Britain's Russophobes led by Joseph Chamberlain, Parliament,

was much

presented to the public as a weak, aimless reaction

Russia's

Historically,

door policy

hands

of

some members of

Chamberlain's fear of

Russia compelled him to by-pass the Foreign Secretary

and to make

a

His actions

personal

attempt

to

ally Britain with Germany.

damaged Cabinet unity and chief foreign

undermined

policy maker.

Salisbury's

image

as the

The endless critiques in the press,

matched by numerous and vicious attacks by disgruntled Parliament members

who

read

the

impression that the inconsistent

with

Times

policy Great

and

was

literary

a

poor,

Britain's

Journals, left the

vacillating response,

world

power

stature.

In

reality, the open door policy was very successful diplomatically, commercially,

and

politically.

supremacy, continued to trade Manchu

dynasty,

and

Britain

without

enhanced

retained

impunity,

British

commercial

maintained the

political

influence at

Peking in spite of Russo-French and German competition. Much Peking.

of The

Britain's open door

success policy had

order to be effective, and the patient

as

well

as

depended to be

on

her

British representative

persistent

and

diplomat at

vigorously applied in

aggressive.

had to be Sir

Claude

75

MacDonald was an unlikely choice.

76

"GUNBOAT" MACDQNALD: BRITAIN'S MAN-ON-THE-SPOT, 1896-19OO Sir Claude

Maxwell MacDonald was the responsible individual

who implemented Great Britain's China policy MacDonald was by training before

and profession.

China

Africa.

came

school tie

a

unique

by European vanity

by

at

Peking

an

service in

service.

he

made

had

increasingly come

Diplomatists

aristocratic

a

of the old

Foreign Office

that remote area of the world.

He

was

both

in common with

by

Russophobe.

training

During

and

his four

a difficult transition from military

officer to aggressive diplomat. Salisbury's open

demanding unusual

certain attributes

temperament an imperialist and years

which

competition.

favored

foreign

experience he had

In a sense it was a backwater

empire

MacDonald, however, did share career

assignment,

the man-on-the-spot.

generally dlsesteemed

the

to 19OO.

his military and consular service in

area of British commercial under attack

What diplomatic

during

But China was

qualities in

from 1896

not the usual career diplomat but rather a soldier

door policy

He

successfully

followed Lord

and gained praise and respect from

Britain's government, business community, and press.l No biography little is

known of

has

yet

been

his early

written

years.

about

MacDonald, and

He was born to Mary Ellen

Dougan MacDonald and Major General James

Dawson MacDonald

on 12

77

June 1852.

He attended Uppingham and naturally began a military

career after he completed

his education

at Sandhurst.

When he

was 2O, in 1872, he Joined the 74th Highlanders regiment." Virtually nothing Highlanders, but his Africa

in

1882.

is known

military During

the

of his

career

first ten becomes

Egyptian

Khedive, Mohammed Tewfik, and led by

rebellion

Ahmed Arabi,

or immediately following the rebellion MacDonald He

then became

court-martial

MacDonald's

observe

the

rebels.

According to Dufferin:

preoccupied in

MacDonald's

Sir

During

was promoted to

specific

duty

was to

"Major MacDonald was principally

In writing this, Dufferin identified a facet

outlook

which

would

appear again in the China violently clashed with

local inhabitants, MacDonald insisted on a full measure

of punishment for the when

MacDonald saw

proceedings which tried the Egyptian

When British interests openly and

those of

against the

noting the tendency of the court to unduly favour

the prisoners ..."*

years.

visible in

military attache to Lord Dufferin during

Dufferin's tenure in Egypt.

of

more

the Egyptian campaign to suppress the revolt.3

action in

major.

years in the

Evelyn

indigene.

Baring,

Earl

administrator in Egypt in 1884.

He

remained

Cromer, To

became

gain active

military attache chief

British

duty, MacDonald

volunteered to Join the 42nd Highlanders in the Suakin expedition of 1884-1885. El Teb

and Tamai, where he was slightly wounded.

his War Office 1887.3

In this Sudanese campaign MacDonald saw

assignment

in

Cairo

and

action at

He returned to

remained

there until

78

MacDonald's

service

diplomatic career.

to

In 1887

British Agent to Zanzibar.

Dufferin

he was

In

the same

Cromer

led

year he

Territories

was sent

in

west

to Berlin

Africa in

as part of the

British boundary commission charged to establish

in Berlin he came to the attention of to

the

Consul-General.

Oil

River

There he

administrative

ability

borders between

displayed when

Cameroons were

his efforts he was and

St. George

he

as

notable

created

While

MacDonald

Commissioner and organizational and

an effective military

In 1891 the island

of Fernando Po

added to his consular jurisdiction.

awarded the

in

Lord Salisbury.

Protectorate

government for the territory. and the

a

appointed Consul-General and

the German Cameroons and England's Oil River Protectorate.

returned

to

He remained there until he received a

special assignment to the Niger 1889.

and

1892.

Knight Commander

For

of St. Michael

His fighting days, however, were not

over, and in 1895 MacDonald took part in the Brass River Military expedition in west Africa.' Until

1892

MacDonald

recognized, however, career, married.

a

wife

remained

that for

was

Armstrong

of

Robertson

of

background,

the the alien

distant places

were

15th

cultures, not

At the

Regiment

Indian

new

bachelor.

advancement in

helpful.

Ethel Armstrong was

a

Civil

the

age

He doubtless

a foreign service of

4O Sir Claude

daughter

of

and

widow of P. Craigie

the

Service.

Major W. Cairns

Because

of

her

poor accommodations, and travel to to

the

new

Mrs. MacDonald.

In

January 1896 MacDonald formally retired from the British Army and

79

entered the foreign service. Plenipotentiary

to

He was

Peking.

In

appointed British Minister

effect,

Sir

Claude Maxwell

MacDonald became Britain's man-on-the-spot, a career military man now forced to do battle with diplomatic weapons — talk, posturing, bluster, and threats.

Artillery and gunboats were now

viewed as

7

too dangerous in East Asian politics. MacDonald was

not a

popular choice

commented after the fact: was

making

a

bold

"it was

experiment

for China.

felt that in

One source

the Foreign Office

transferring

him to a post

requiring an altogether different order of ability."•

One China

watcher and commentator blasted Salisbury's decision: ... our Legation at Peking became vacant, and the post being one which absolutely demands in its occupier a thorough knowledge of the Chinese character, a profound diplomatic experience, and a certain age in order to secure Chinese respect, a comparatively youthful soldier was appointed to it directly from the Niger Coast Protectorate 1 Words fail to describe such a preposterous appointment as it deserves.• From

Peking

Chinese

Sir

Robert

Maritime

appointment will have

succeeded

Hart,

Customs

badly

by

Inspector-General

Service,

be interesting so

the

recorded:

to watch, treating

for the

"MacDonald's

and those

of us who

Chinese as educated and

civilized ought now be ready to yield the ground to

a man versed

10

in negro methods and ignorant of the East." Regardless of

the adverse

reactions to his assignment, the

Times duly announced MacDonald's appointment on He replaced

Sir Nicholas

the

court

Manchu

St. Petersburg.

and

13 January

1896.

O'Conor who had been asked to leave by who

was

subsequently

assigned

to

MacDonald arrived in Peking on 22 April, 55 days

80

after departing London.

George

him

man

as

"an

elongated

reproachful eyes,

and

Morrison of

of

long,

the Times described

forty-five,

lovingly

with

waxed

a long nose,

thin moustaches."

Morrison elaborated on his impression of MacDonald: military officer rolled out a mile at a time and in

six

foot

lengths.

B11

MacDonald's

reflection of his ability to make decisions, and

he expected

historian commented:

then lopped off

approach was direct, a

quick, if

his decisions

"He was

"the type of

a soldier,

not always prudent, to be

acted on.

One

a man

of action, and

n a

impatient of the subtleties of diplomacy. » Lord Salisbury

had chosen

fill the vacancy at Peking. of Britain's

a soldier

and an imperialist to

MacDonald was aware that the purpose

China policy was the maintenance of the status quo,

which precluded any overt or

rash

aggressiveness

on

his part.

Self-control and caution had to be used in his official capacity, but he could privately appraise eye:

the

situation

with

a military

"to think what could be made of the place--with a free hand

and two companies of red coats (it would not want war) say half a battery

of

artillery--but

the

hand

must

collegues'--but this is an idle dreaml" MacDonald soldier

to

had

that

a of

difficult diplomat.

be

free--no 'chers

13

transition

from

the

role of

In July he undoubtedly received

complaints of treaty violations committed by Chinese officials at Canton

with

regards

to

collection

of likin at that city.

suggested to the Foreign Office that the British Army be seize the

He

used to

likin offices and punish the Cantonese officials.

The

ai Foreign Office drastic.

wired

The

him:

"I

position on

individual

Chinese soil."

drastic tactics would be the best any good

in this

with

are too

it

in

another

our and

"for

directly the

as

a

pretext for

He rationalized why his

we show power greater

amounting, if necessary to force." restraint:

proposals

claim

14

strategy:

country till

plainly that we have discourtesy

your

course you suggest would give a precedent to other

Powers, who would use some seizing a

think

"We

shall never do

the governing body very to

punish act

of

any

act of

discourtesy,

He complained of

powers-that-be saw

his imposed that we MEANT

BUSINESS they would have caved in at once, but directly they find that we

can only

talk, and do nothing, their minds are at rest,

for at talking and doing nothing they can beat us."45 Time direct,

and

experience

physical

energy toward

mellowed

action.

MacDonald's

Rather,

fulfilling

the

preference for

he channeled his aggressive

needs

and

demands

of Britain's

merchants in

China and effectively Implementing Salisbury's open

door policy.

MacDonald's competitiveness and authoritarian style

made

him

very

concessions. Association,

successful He

an

had

been

organized

businesses were centered in political and honor. door

during so group

1898

effective of

China but

economic power

and

British

MacDonald

spoke

in England,

in

scramble for

that

the

China

merchants

whose

who exercised significant held a

While the Association speeches bemoaned policy,

the

dinner in his

Salisbury's open

its defense, emphasizing the

success Englishmen always enjoyed when commercial competition was

82

unencumbered

by

political

MacDonald came to believe: independent, individual,

Intervention.

Salisbury,

"British enterprise in China and self-reliant.

to be enterprise, indeed I may He concluded

Like

say it

must be

The moment it ceases

ceases to

be British."14

that territorial concessions as demanded by France,

Russia, Germany, and Japan during 1897 and 1898 could lead to the disintegration of East Asia.

China and

to the

end of British supremacy in

He might digress and unofficially contemplate

a more

direct method as he did in February 1899: To my mind the whole Chinese question boils down to this--give me an army at Peking (not a Chinese one) but such as one as was encamped in and around Cairo, Sept. 1882 and I (or any body else) will fix up the Chinese question within a year-- ... we will never cure the patient--nothing will but the knife-- ...*7 But a few weeks later when Italy demanded spheres

of

British

support

demands were

Influence

in

for

met, a

a coaling

station and

Cheklang province, he advised against

Italy.

He

new surge

maintained

that

if

Italy's

of territorial concessions could

possibly destroy China.'• MacDonald'B concern for British

interests which

governed Manchu China. believed

was hardly

the

white,

Like

for the

relied on many of

Anglo-Saxon

appointment

referred

"indomitable,

ungracious

race"

Englishmen, he

race superior and the Chinese

Curzon, who

Peking,

the survival of a weakly his fellow

empire a hopeless cause. to

Chinese but rather

to

and

the

"sullen

national character

self-confident and

mantle of a superb

and

paralysing

had supported MacDonald's Chinese

as

resistance

that of

a

stolid . . . wrapped in the

conceit."19

In

July 1896

83

MacDonald wrote:

"No European or civilized Governor or official

would carry on like these people do, and therefore to as a

civilized state

He had little

the Chinese

officials who

is the greatest mistake."

or no respect for the Manchu court or

treat them

80

staffed the Tsungli Yamen and the government at Peking: these old Mandarins over [to Europe] to show

them how

"getting the trick

is done is indeed fantastic--in the first place they wouldn't go, and in the next ever imbued

they did

they would

return more than

with the immense superiority of everything Chinese."

When Germany supported

place if

seized

the

Kiaochow

German

in

demands

November

1897,

he generally

to extract heavy payment for the

missionary lives lost at Chinese hands.8 * MacDonald made no secret of Li

Hung-chang,

collaborator. Office of

China's

I

Li's tendency

hear,

he

promises which

famous

and

diplomat

is

most

distrust for and

Russia's

verbally

attack The

him

led to

that Russia's

"I only hope H.M.G. are on negotiations.