Simone Luzzatto’s Scepticism in the Context of Early Modern Thought (Maimonides Library for Philosophy and Religion, 7) 9004694250, 9789004694255

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Simone Luzzatto’s Scepticism in the Context of Early Modern Thought

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Maimonides Library for Philosophy and Religion General Editor Giuseppe Veltri (Universität Hamburg)

Managing Editor Sarah Wobick-Segev (Universität Hamburg)

Editorial Board Jonathan Garb (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem) Racheli Haliva (Shandong University) Yehuda Halper (Bar-Ilan University) Warren Zev Harvey (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, emeritus) Christine Hayes (Yale University) Julie Klein (Villanova University) Yitzhak Y. Melamed ( Johns Hopkins University) Stephan Schmid (Universität Hamburg) Josef Stern (University of Chicago, emeritus) Sarah Stroumsa (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, emerita) Irene E. Zwiep (Universiteit van Amsterdam)

volume 7

The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/mlpr

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Simone Luzzatto’s Scepticism in the Context of Early Modern Thought Edited by

Giuseppe Veltri Michela Torbidoni

leiden | boston

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Cover illustration: Venice Ghetto Tree © Felicita Sala, 2015. The image is part of the documentary: Il Ghetto di Venezia, 500 anni di vita (500 years of the Jewish Ghetto of Venice) made by tangram film in cooperation with arsam international and cerigo films. With kind permission from: Carolina Levi. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Veltri, Giuseppe, editor. | Torbidoni, Michela, editor. Title: Simone Luzzatto's scepticism in the context of early modern thought / edited by Giuseppe Veltri Michela Torbidoni Description: Leiden ; Boston Brill, [2024] | Series: Maimonides library for philosophy and religion, 2666-8777 ; volume 7 | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: lccn 2024000039 (print) | lccn 2024000040 (ebook) | isbn 9789004694255 (hardback) | isbn 9789004694262 (ebook) Subjects: lcsh: Luzzatto, Simone, -1663. | Judaism–Italy–Venice–History–17th century. | Jewish philosophy–Italy–Venice–History–17th century. Classification: lcc bm755.l83 s56 2024 (print) | lcc bm755.l83 (ebook) | ddc 181/.06–dc23/eng/20240109 lc record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2024000039 lc ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2024000040

Typeface for the Latin, Greek, and Cyrillic scripts: “Brill”. See and download: brill.com/brill‑typeface. issn 2666-8777 isbn 978-90-04-69425-5 (hardback) isbn 978-90-04-69426-2 (e-book) doi 10.1163/9789004694262 Copyright 2024 by Giuseppe Veltri and Michela Torbidoni. Published by Koninklijke Brill nv, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill nv incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Nijhoff, Brill Schöningh, Brill Fink, Brill mentis, Brill Wageningen Academic, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Böhlau and V&R unipress. Koninklijke Brill nv reserves the right to protect this publication against unauthorized use. Requests for re-use and/or translations must be addressed to Koninklijke Brill nv via brill.com or copyright.com. This book is printed on acid-free paper and produced in a sustainable manner.

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Contents Notes on Contributors vii Introduction

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part 1 The Relationship to Ancient Scepticism What Kind of (Sceptical) Work is Simone Luzzatto’s Socrates? Josef Stern

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Sextus Empiricus’s Works as Guideline for Simone Luzzatto’s Socratic Ignorance 43 Michela Torbidoni

part 2 Apologia and Apologetics Apologetic Strategies, Scepticism, and Empiricism in Simone Luzzatto’s Works 81 Giuseppe Veltri Simone Luzzatto’s Scepticism in Light of Medieval Jewish Apologetics Fabrizio Lelli

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part 3 Wisdom and Jewish Tradition “Everyone is Free to Decide to Investigate Every Kind of Discourse” Simone Luzzatto’s Lettera Approbatoria to The Revealer of Secrets (1640?) by Samuel ha-Kohen da Pisa Lusitano 125 Anna Lissa The Image of King Solomon in Simone Luzzatto’s Writings Warren Zev Harvey

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part 4 Political and Economic Views Simone Luzzatto’s Political Thought: Between Reason of State, Scepticism, and Jewish Political Tradition 171 Guido Bartolucci Simone Luzzatto’s View on Jewish Ritual and Its Social Functions: A Consideration of His Sceptical Thought in the Intellectual Context of His Age 190 Mina Lee Simone Luzzatto’s Appraisal of Prudence Giuseppe Veltri and Anna Lissa

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Varieties of Mercantilism: Simone Luzzatto and the Economic Role of the Jews in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries 228 Luca Andreoni “Seek the Peace of the City to which I have exiled you” in Simone Luzzatto and Menasseh ben Israel, with Azariah de’ Rossi behind the Scenes 249 Myriam Silvera Index of Names and Subjects

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Notes on Contributors Michela Torbidoni is interim professor of Jewish philosophy at the Institute for Jewish Philosophy and Religion at Universität Hamburg. Her research focuses on early modern Jewish thought and on Spinoza’s reception within Italian and French philosophical circles during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. She is the coeditor and translator of Simone Luzzatto’s Socrates, or On Human Knowledge (2019; with Giuseppe Veltri) and the author of the monograph Acosmismo come religione. G. Gentile and P. Martinetti interpreti di Spinoza (2019). Luca Andreoni is a researcher in economic history at the Università Politecnica delle Marche, Ancona. His publications include the books I conti del camerlengo. Finanza ed economia a San Marino fra Sette e Ottocento (2012) and “Una nazione in commercio.” Ebrei di Ancona, traffici adriatici e pratiche mercantili in età moderna (2019). Josef Stern is the William H. Colvin Professor of Philosophy (Emeritus) at the University of Chicago. He works on a range of topics from medieval Jewish and Arabic philosophy to contemporary philosophy of language. His most recent books are The Matter and Form of Maimonides’ Guide (2013) and Quotations as Pictures (2021). Fabrizio Lelli teaches Hebrew language and literature at the Sapienza University of Rome. His research focuses on the philosophical and mystical literature of late medieval and early modern Italian Jews. Among his publications are an edition of Yohanan Alemanno’s Hay ha-ʿolamim (1995) and Giovanni Pico e la cabbalà (2014). Mina Lee is a PhD candidate in humanities and sociology at the University of Tokyo. She is the author of “Leone Modena’s Magen ve-Herev and the Reformation Era” (in Japanese) published in the Journal of the Kyoto Association of Jewish Thought 12 (2021).

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Warren Zev Harvey is a professor emeritus of Jewish thought at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He is the author of many studies on Jewish philosophy, including Physics and Metaphysics in Hasdai Crescas (1998). He is also an emet Prize laureate in the humanities (2009). Myriam Silvera teaches the history of Judaism at the University of Palermo. She is the coordinator of a ba in Jewish studies offered by the Union of Italian Jewish Communities affiliated to the Italian Rabbinical College. She has edited Jacques Basnage’s Corrispondenza da Rotterdam (2000) and volume 1 of Isaac Orobio de Castro’s Prevenciones Divinas contra la vana idolatría de las Gentes (2013). Guido Bartolucci is an associate professor of early modern history in the Department of History and Cultures at the University of Bologna. His work focuses on Christian interest in the Jewish tradition between the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries. He has published a book on the Hebrew Republic model in the European thought of the sixteenth century, and he has also worked on the origin of Christian Kabbalah in the fifteenth century and on the life and political thought of the Jewish physician David de’ Pomis. His current research interest is the influence of the Jewish political tradition on Christian thought, particularly within the debate between Calvinist and Lutheran scholars during the seventeenth century. Anna Lissa is an associate professor of Jewish and Hebrew literature at Université Paris 8. She is the coeditor and translator of Simone Luzzatto’s Discourse on the State of the Jews (2019; with Giuseppe Veltri). Giuseppe Veltri was a professor of Jewish studies at Martin Luther University Halle-Wittenberg from 1997 to 2014. Since 2014, he has been a professor of Jewish philosophy and religion at Universität Hamburg. He is the editor-in-chief of several series published by Brill, De Gruyter, and Paideia. Since November 2010, he has also been a professor (h.c.) of comparative religious studies at the University of Leipzig, and he has been the director of the Maimonides Centre for Advanced Studies in Hamburg since 2015. His fields of research are Jewish cultural history, Jewish philosophy in the Renaissance and early modern period, magic, and biblical tradition and translations. Among his publications are Il Rinascimento nel pen-

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siero ebraico (2020); an edition and translation of Simone Luzzatto’s Discourse on the State of the Jews (2019; with Anna Lissa) and Socrates, or On Human Knowledge (2019; with Michela Torbidoni); L’ebraismo come scienza. Cultura e politica in Leopold Zunz (2019; with Libera Pisano); Alienated Wisdom: Enquiry into Jewish Philosophy and Scepticism (2018); and Renaissance Philosophy in Jewish Garb (2009).

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Introduction Simone Luzzatto (ca. 1583–1663) is the first Jew of the early modern period who, under the banner of scepticism, put forth new political and philosophical ideas, helping to make Judaism an integral part of society.* As is well known, scepticism was fodder for intellectual debates in early modern times, whether in the field of theology or in other areas of human interest, and its inner complexity was commensurate with the great challenges of the era, including new geographic discoveries, scientific advancements, and the new critical approach to Holy Scripture. In this context, ancient sceptical tools were employed in different ways in the philosophical discussions of modern thinkers. Despite the great progress made in research on sceptical thinking, it remains a pioneering field of investigation, especially when it comes to the relationship between scepticism and Judaism.1 The Greek concept of skepsis plays a great role within Jewish tradition, a prime example being the Talmudic art of teaching and learning, which entails continually raising doubts about what the teacher thinks and says. According to the midrashic collection, the Mekhilta of Rabbi Ishmael, there are four types of pupil: “the wise, the wicked, the simple, and the one who doesn’t know how to ask.”2 While the pupil who has no questions is the most disappointing, the wise pupil is the one who knows how to ask the toughest questions. In the Talmudic and subsequent periods, the goal of learning was to ask the rabbi the (right) question that forces him to find the weak point in his argument. There is no dogmatic doctrine at the core of studying the Torah, and the goal of Talmudic learning is not to memorise but to question what the teacher says. The topic of scepticism in Judaism has already been examined in biblical studies. The book of Ecclesiastes was an object of discussion in rabbinic antiquity because of its contradictions and cryptic criticism towards the same tenets of Judaism. Human beings emerge as insignificant, God’s work as futile, and all existence as pure vanity: “As a whole mankind, like nature, is subjected to the * Parts of this introduction were previously published in Giuseppe Veltri, Alienated Wisdom: Enquiry into Jewish Philosophy and Scepticism (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2018). We would like to thank De Gruyter for their kind permission in allowing the author to republish this material here. 1 See Giuseppe Veltri, Alienated Wisdom: Enquiry into Jewish Philosophy and Scepticism (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2018). 2 Giuseppe Veltri, “Freche Schüler vs. gescheite Rabbinen. Die Kunst des Lernens im antiken Judentum,” in Meister und Schüler in Geschichte und Gegenwart. Von Religionen der Antike bis zur modernen Esoterik, ed. Almut-Barbara Renger (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2012), 135–145.

© Giuseppe Veltri and Michela Torbidoni, 2024 | doi:10.1163/9789004694262_002-

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law of aimless toil, of motion leading back to the starting point.” (Eccl 1:3–4) Sceptical is the attitude of Ecclesiastes towards the teachings of Judaism concerning God, the world, human beings, and the notion of time,3 and in the past few decades, scholars have started a new debate on whether this biblical book should be included in the history of scepticism itself.4 As scepticism is so essential to the Jewish epistemological understanding of reality, as well as to Jewish sources and systems of knowledge, it is rather surprising to note that it has long been under-represented in international research on Jewish philosophy.5 As an example, the entry of Alvin J. Reines in both the old and new editions of the Encyclopaedia Judaica only refers to the question of the unreliability of reason by quoting Judah Halevi and Ḥasdai Crescas on the inadequacy of the Neoplatonic and Aristotelian conception of the knowledge of physics and metaphysics as naturally acquired6—a standpoint uncritically adopted by the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.7 Although Reines’s article mentions the important studies of Saul Horovitz, he does not include them in his outline of Jewish scepticism. In an essay from 1912, Horovitz addressed the study of Jewish scepticism as an important objective of medieval philosophy; in a book published in 1915, he returned to the topic and underlined the acquaintance of medieval Muslim and Jewish authors with scepticism.8 The neglect of Horovitz’s contribution to Jewish philosophy9 is all the more regrettable as he introduced the concept of a “sceptical (under)cur3 See Robert H. Pfeiffer, “The Peculiar Skepticism of Ecclesiastes,” Journal of Biblical Literature 53, no. 2 (1934), 100–109. 4 See James L. Crenshaw, “The Birth of Skepticism in Ancient Israel,” in The Divine Helmsman. Studies on God’s Control of Human Events. Presented to Lou H. Silberman, eds. James L. Crenshaw and Samuel Sandmel (New York: ktav Publishing House, 1980): 1–19; Bernon Lee, “Towards a Rhetoric of Contradiction in the Book of Ecclesiastes” (PhD diss., University of Calgary, 1997); William H.U. Anderson, “What is Skepticism and Can it Be Found in the Hebrew Bible?” Scandinavian Journal of the Old Testament 13, no. 2 (1999): 225–257. 5 See Jack Goody, “A Kernel of Doubt,” The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 2, no. 4 (1996): 667–681. 6 Alvin J. Reines; “Skepsis and Skepticism,” in Encyclopaedia Judaica, vol. 18, 2nd edition, eds. Michael Berenbaum and Fred Skolnik (Detroit: Macmillan, 2010): 657–658. 7 Charles Bolyard, “Medieval Skepticism,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://plato​ .stanford.edu/archives/spr2013/entries/skepticism‑medieval/ (accessed 3 May 2018). 8 Saul Horovitz, Über den Einfluss der griechischen Philosophie auf die Entwicklung des Kalam (Breslau: Th. Schatzky, 1909); Saul Horovitz, “Über die Bekanntschaft Saadias mit der griechischen Skepsis,” in Judaica. Festschrift zu Hermann Cohens siebzigstem Geburtstage, eds. Ismar Elbogen, Benzion Kellermann, and Eugen Mittwoch (Berlin: Bruno Cassirer, 1912): 235–252; Saul Horovitz, Der Einfluss der griechischen Skepsis auf die Entwicklung der Philosophie bei den Arabern (Breslau: Th. Schatzky, 1915). 9 On the impact of Horovitz in recent studies of Arabic philosophy, see Carmela Baffioni, “Per l’ipotesi di un influsso della scepsi sulla filosofia islamica,” in Lo scetticismo antico. Atti del Convegno organizzato dal Centro di Studi del pensiero antico del cnr, Roma 5–8 no- 978-90-04-69426-2 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/08/2024 08:21:13PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

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rent” (skeptische Geistesströmung),10 referring to ideas and tropes that survive as fragments in various authors’ texts and within movements of sceptical interest. Only since the 1990s have new inquiries concerning the role of scepticism appeared within the field of Jewish studies. Among the first scholars of note are the contributions of Aryeh Botwinick,11 who emphasised the role of negative theology in the development of sceptical thought, and of Josef Stern, who explored the question whether Maimonides was a sceptic.12 There have also been some studies on Jewish scepticism related to Uriel da Costa,13 Francisco Sanchez and his conversion to Judaism,14 and Solomon Maimon.15 Furthermore, we should note the studies on religious (or rational) and linguistic criticism (Eliezer of Eilburg),16 on the forms of doubt,17 on literary genres, and on conversion strategies.18

10 11 12 13 14

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vembre 1980, vol. 1, ed. Gabriele Giannantoni (Naples: Bibliopolis, 1981), 417–434; Josef van Ess, Die Erkenntnislehre des ʿAḍudaddīn Al-Īcī. Übersetzung und Kommentar des ersten Buches seiner Mawāqif (Frankfurt: Universität Frankfurt Habilitations-Schrift, 1964; Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1966); Horovitz, Über den Einfluss; and Horovitz, Der Einfluss der griechischen Skepsis, 21–112. Horovitz, “Über die Bekanntschaft Saadias,” 239. Aryeh Botwinick, Skepticism, Belief, and the Modern: Maimonides to Nietzsche (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997). Josef Stern, The Matter and Form of Maimonides’ Guide (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013). Sanford Shepard, “The Background of Uriel Da Costa’s Heresy: Marranism, Skepticism, Karaism,” Judaism 20 (1971): 341–350. On Francisco Sánchez and whether he converted from Judaism to Christianity, see Elaine Limbrick’s introduction to Sánchez, That Nothing is Known, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 6; see José Faur, “Sánchez’ Critique of Authoritas: Converso Skepticism and the Emergence of Radical Hermeneutics,” in The Return to Scripture in Judaism and Christianity. Essays in Postcritical Scriptural Interpretation, ed. Peter Ochs (New York: Paulist Press, 1993), 256–276; see Martin Mulsow, “Skepticism and Conversion to Judaism. The Case of Aaron d’Antan,” in Secret Conversions to Judaism in Early Modern Europe, eds. Martin Mulsow and Richard H. Popkin (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 123–182. Nathan Rotenstreich, “The Problem of the ‘Critique of Judgment’ and Solomon Maimon’s Scepticism,” in Harry A. Wolfson Jubilee Volume on the Occasion of His Seventy-Fifth Birthday, vol. 2, ed. Saul Lieberman (Jerusalem: American Academy for Jewish Research, 1965), 677–702. See Joseph Davis, “The Ten Questions of Eliezer Eilburg and the Problem of Jewish Unbelief in the 16th Century,” The Jewish Quarterly Review xci, no. 3–4 (2001): 293–336; Joseph Davis, “The Ten Questions of Eliezer Eilburg,” Hebrew Union College Annual 80, (2009): 173–244. Gideon Freudenthal, “The Remedy to Linguistic Skepticism. Judaism as a Language of Action,” Naharaim—Zeitschrift für deutsch-jüdische Literatur und Kulturgeschichte 4, no. 1 (2011): 67–76. See Martin Mulsow, “Skepticism and Conversion to Judaism. The Case of Aaron d’Antan.”

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The state of the research into Jewish scepticism has changed decisively since the foundation in 2015 of the Maimonides Centre for Advanced Studies (mcas) at the University of Hamburg thanks to the generous financial support of the German Research Foundation (Deutsch Forschungsgemeinschaft). The main goal of mcas consists in exploring the various manifestations of scepticism in Judaism, and obviously not as an isolated phenomenon but in the context of the philosophical and theological discussions with Christian and Islamic thinkers. This new season of research has made possible the proliferation of a stimulating debate between Jewish Studies and other fields that had expanded their research context and allowed fruitful interdisciplinary comparisons. The research into Jewish scepticism has made giant strides, and a rich amount of books, articles, and essays has been published on these themes since the beginning of mcas’s scientific work. Much of the most recent research on Jewish scepticism has been inspired by the works of the early modern Venetian Rabbi Simone Luzzatto, the first in the history of Jewish thought to declare himself a sceptic and follower of the New Academy. In his apologetic–political work, Discourse on the State of the Jews (1638), Luzzatto wrote: “Political matters are full of alterations and contingencies, and in this Discourse, I intended that I would follow the probable and the plausible, just as a new academician would, and not as a mathematician who follows the absolutely demonstrable and undeniable.”19 Although Luzzatto was well acquainted with axiomatic systems,20 demonstrably consistent because of their absence of contradiction by their very definition, he nevertheless believed that this kind of logic was unable to delve into human or political matters, for which he considered the probable to be more suitable. Some time ago Luzzatto’s scepticism already caught the attention of scholars like David Ruderman and Ariel Viterbo,21 whose important research initiated a fruitful debate on the Venetian rabbi in the context of early modern Jewish 19 20

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Simone Luzzatto, Discourse on the State of the Jews—Bilingual Edition, ed., trans., and comm. Giuseppe Veltri and Anna Lissa (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2019), 79. References to Luzzatto’s acquaintance with science may be found throughout his books. See especially Luzzatto, Socrates, or on Human Knowledge—Bilingual edition, ed., trans., and comm. Giuseppe Veltri and Michela Torbidoni (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2019), 68, 158, 233– 234. It is relevant to point also to Yoseph Delmedigo’s Sefer Elim, in which he praised Luzzatto as one of the very few among the contemporary Jews who was well versed in mathematics and science; see on this Isaac Barzilay, Yoseph Shlomo Delmedigo (Yasher of Candia). His Life, Works, and Times (Leiden: Brill, 1974), 42, 312. David B. Ruderman, “Science and Skepticism. Simone Luzzatto on Perceiving the Natural World,” in Ruderman, Jewish Thought and Scientific Discovery in Early Modern Europe (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1995), 153–184; Ariel Viterbo, “Socrates in the Venetian Ghetto” [Hebrew], ma thesis, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1996 and

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studies and sceptical thinking. In recent years, Giuseppe Veltri and his team have further investigated the role of scepticism within Luzzatto’s thought,22 made new discoveries,23 and published a new Italian edition of Luzzatto’s works.24 However, only thanks to the very recent publication of the first English edition of his writings, printed in July 2019,25 was a new stage in the study of Luzzatto launched, and his thinking is now increasingly being noted in the scholarship. This has been evidenced by the synergetic work and intense intellectual exchange achieved at the first international conference on Luzzatto’s scepticism, which took place in September 2019 at mcas. The impressive results achieved by both renowned and young scholars in the fields of Jewish religious and philosophical studies has made this collected volume possible. The volume plots out an original path along which to understand Rabbi Luzzatto’s scepticism by pointing to the various facets that being a Jewish sceptic implied in seventeenth-century Italy. The following contributions together portray the many branches of Luzzatto’s scepticism and the intense transfer of political, economic, social, and religious ideas that this philosophical trend fostered. With its focus on scepticism, this volume aims to build upon the research of scholars such as Abraham Melamed, Benjamin Ravid, David Ruderman, and Bernard Septimus, whose contributions remain milestones in the study of Luzzatto’s works.26 By point-

22 23

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Ariel Viterbo, “Socrate nel Ghetto: lo scetticismo mascherato di Simone Luzzatto,” Studi Veneziani 38 (1999): 79–128. Simone Luzzatto, Filosofo e rabbino nella Venezia del Seicento, ed. Giuseppe Veltri (Rome: Aracne, 2015). Giuseppe Veltri, Gianfranco Miletto, and Guido Bartolucci, “The Last Will and Testament of Simone Luzzatto (1583?–1663) and the Only Known Manuscript of the Discorso (1638). Newly Discovered Manuscripts from the State Archive of Venice and the Marciana Library, Venice,” European Journal of Jewish Studies 5 (2011): 125–146. Simone Luzzatto, Scritti politici e filosofici di un ebreo scettico nella Venezia del Seicento, ed. Giuseppe Veltri (Milan: Bompiani, 2013). Luzzatto, Discourse; Socrates. See Abraham Melamed, “The Myth of Venice in Italian Jewish Thought,” in Italia Judaica. Atti del i Convegno internazionale. Bari 18–22 maggio 1981 (Rome: Ministero per i Beni Culturali e Ambientali, 1983), 401–413; Melamed, “Simone Luzzatto on Tacitus. Apologetica and Ragione di Stato,” in Studies in Medieval Jewish History and Literature, vol. 2, ed. Isadore Twersky (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984), 143–170; Melamed, The Philosopher-King in Medieval and Renaissance Jewish Political Thought (New York: State University of New York Press, 2003); Benjamin Ravid, “The Venetian Context of the Discourse,” in Luzzatto, Discourse, 256–257; Ravid, “Biblical Exegesis à la Mercantilism and Raison d’état in Seventeenth Century Venice: The Discorso of Simone Luzzatto,” in Bringing the Hidden to Light: The Process of Interpretation. Studies in Honor of Stephen A. Geller, eds. Kathryn Kravitz and Diane M. Sharon (Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns, 2007), 169–182;

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ing out the value of scepticism in Luzzatto’s thought in the context of his time, we are able to extend and deepen our understanding of crucial aspects of his political and economic views. The volume guides the reader through four sections meant to highlight the most important questions related to Luzzatto’s writings. The first of them is devoted to exploring the sources of Luzzatto’s scepticism. Here we ask in which ways Luzzatto’s Socrates can be considered a sceptical work. Josef Stern explores this question through Luzzatto’s use of equipollence, suspension of judgement, ataraxia, the sceptic’s eudaimonia, and the roles played by the probable and by nature. Michela Torbidoni’s essay examines the extent to which Socrates’s complex architecture may be considered to be shaped on the basis of Sextus Empiricus’s Outlines of Pyrrhonism and inspired by his Against the Mathematicians. The second section of this volume explores how the new figure of Socrates, as moulded by Luzzatto, harmonises the plea for knowledge with a sceptical attitude. Giuseppe Veltri offers a detailed enquiry into Luzzatto’s new Socratic apology, shedding light on his strategical use of concepts like relativity, necessity, and the idea of truth, which underly Luzzatto’s sceptical project. What are the similarities between Luzzatto’s Socrates and the portrayal of him provided by Judah Halevi in his philosophical–apologetic Kuzari? Fabrizio Lelli answers this question by proposing a new way to interpret Luzzatto’s Socrates, stressing its close relation to Jewish apologetic discourses and to the medieval Arabic interpretations of ancient Greek philosophy. The third section is devoted to the forms of wisdom that emerged from Luzzatto’s writings and explores his connections to the Jewish tradition. Anna Lissa’s essay examines the nature and boundaries of Luzzatto’s quest for knowledge by focusing on a still little known work of the rabbi: the Letter of Approval that introduces Samuel ha-Kohen da Pisa Lusitano’s The Revealer of Secrets Ravid, “‘A Republic Separate From All Other Government:’ Jewish Autonomy in Venice in the Seventeenth Century and the Translation of the Libro Grande” [Hebrew], in Thought and Action: Essays in Memory of Simon Rawidowicz on the Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of His Death, eds. Alfred A. Greenbaum and Alfred L. Ivry (Tel Aviv: Tcherikover and Haifa University Press, 1983), 53–76; David B. Ruderman, Early Modern Jewry: A New Cultural History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011); Ruderman, Essential Papers in Jewish Culture in Renaissance and Baroque Italy (New York: New York University Press, 1992); Ruderman, Jewish Thought and Scientific Discovery in Early Modern Europe (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995); Ruderman, “Science and Skepticism”; Ruderman and Shmuel Feiner, eds., Early Modern Culture and Haskalah: Reconsidering the Borderlines of Modern Jewish History [Simon Dubnow Institute Yearbook, vol. 6] (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2007); Bernard Septimus, “Biblical Religion and Political Rationality in Simone Luzzatto, Maimonides and Spinoza,” in Jewish Thought in the 17th Century, eds. Isadore Twersky and Bernard Septimus (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987), 399–433.

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(Venice, 1656). The appendix presents, for the first time, the complete English translation of this text. The nature of wisdom in Luzzatto’s thinking is the core of Warren Zev Harvey’s investigation, focusing on the figure of King Solomon, “the wisest of all human beings” (1Kgs 5:9–11). Through the biblical passages mentioned in Luzzatto’s Discourse and Socrates, Harvey outlines the political and economic wisdom embodied by Solomon, and explains how it may be related to the sceptical and scientific wisdom represented by Socrates in the context of Luzzatto’s works. The last section of this volume is entirely devoted to political and economic arguments put forth by the Venetian rabbi. Although these two aspects of Luzzatto’s thought have been the most discussed, scepticism has allowed scholars to explore new paths and approach these topics from other perspectives. In this last section of the volume, Guido Bartolucci critically analyses some of the previous studies’ results on Luzzatto’s political position, especially as it concerns the tradition of raison d’état. Thanks to the use of the “probable” in politics, Bartolucci shows the great impact of scepticism on Luzzatto’s political theories and its radical meaning in the context of Jewish Venetian society. The social and political functions of Jewish rituals within Luzzatto’s Discourse are at the core of Mina Lee’s essay. Through an original comparison with Montaigne’s and Bacon’s views on religion, she analyses the apologetical arguments advocated by Luzzatto. Lee refers to the rabbi’s debate on the different bonds that connect human beings, which vary on the basis of rituals, humanity, and natural morality. Furthermore, this essay examines the extent to which Luzzatto’s scepticism may have championed not only the political security and social contribution of Jewish rituals, but also universal social harmony. This section on the political views of the rabbi is further nuanced by the contribution of Giuseppe Veltri and Anna Lissa, which provides an overview of one of Luzzatto’s responsa, which authorized travelling by gondola on Shabbat. Through this example, they introduce the reader to Luzzatto’s original conception of prudence, showing the impact of his scepticism as he turned prudence into an essential political virtue. Luca Andreoni’s study sheds new light on Luzzatto’s economic tenets. Through a comparison of the economic theories of Luzzatto with those of Giovanni Botero, Antonio Serra, and Thomas Mun, Andreoni presents a cohesive and comprehensive framework of the cultural arrangements which distinguished Luzzatto’s view of mercantile activities. The correlation between political mercantilist economy in early modern states and the utilitarian acceptance of Jews viewed as an economic resource for the financial welfare of the society is also the focal point of Myriam Silvera’s contribution. This essay focuses on a popular biblical quote from Jeremiah 29:7 and the use made of this verse by Luzzatto and by Menasseh ben Israel, highlighting the

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extent to which these authors drew inspiration from Azariah de’ Rossi. Silvera’s enquiry sheds light on the originality of these authors’ interpretations: while traditional Jewish exegesis considers this passage a mere requirement of obedience, in Luzzatto’s and Menasseh’s views it becomes a source of arguments in favour of a dynamic and fruitful exchange between Jews and Christians in society. This collection of essays shines new light on the intimate relationship between Luzzatto’s sceptical thinking and an era marked by paradoxes and contrasts between religious devotion and scientific rationalism, as well as between rabbinic-biblical Jewish tradition and the open tendency towards engagement with non-Jewish philosophical, literary, scientific, and theological cultures. Moreover, this volume shows that Luzzatto’s scepticism must be seen as a response to the profound crisis of traditional reference points which had affected Western society since the beginning of the sixteenth century. Religious division, the ensuing wars, the expansion of geographic boundaries, and the consequent encounter with other cultures undermined the solidity of traditional values. Seventeenth-century scepticism was one of the many intellectual responses to this new era: “Luzzatto, like some other philosophers of this time, used scepticism as a means to measure his reality and to question human knowledge.”27 However, his originality lies in the fact that he took part in this new trend as a Jew. His scepticism made his apologetic arguments in favour of the economic and social role of the Jews in Venice very peculiar and at the same time extremely persuasive to the Christian audience. His Discourse must be considered a masterpiece in this sense, and its reception in the history of political thought confirms this. However, as is evident from his Socrates, sceptical thinking was also his way to approach dogmatic knowledge in its many forms: from gnoseology to politics, to religion. The universal level on which he applied his sceptical investigation of alleged human certainties seems to give rise to doubt also regarding the Jewish religious tradition to which he belonged. The essays collected here provide enough evidence of the many allusions to this problematic issue scattered throughout his writings. We hope that this volume will help continue the renaissance in studies on Simone Luzzatto’s philosophical legacy. Many questions remain open, and we expect that this volume will promote the study of early modern scepticism and will motivate new, fruitful enquiry on Luzzatto and his intellectual frame-

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Guido Bartolucci, “Simone Luzzatto’s Political Thought: Between Reason of State, Scepticism, and Jewish Political Tradition,” in this volume.

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work. Furthermore, we are confident that this publication will have a strong impact on the still-pioneering research into Jewish scepticism; Luzzatto’s writings must be considered an essential tile in this composite cultural mosaic and a significant contribution to help disentangle the knots of the still unresolved concept of Jewish philosophy itself.

Bibliography Anderson, William H.U. “What is Skepticism and Can it Be Found in the Hebrew Bible?” Scandinavian Journal of the Old Testament 13, no. 2 (1999): 225–257. Baffioni, Carmela. “Per l’ipotesi di un influsso della scepsi sulla filosofia islamica.” In Lo scetticismo antico. Atti del Convegno organizzato dal Centro di Studi del pensiero antico del cnr, Roma 5–8 novembre 1980, vol. 1, edited by Gabriele Giannantoni, 417– 434. Naples: Bibliopolis, 1981. Barzilay, Isaac. Yoseph Shlomo Delmedigo (Yasher of Candia). His Life, Works, and Times. Leiden: Brill, 1974. Bolyard, Charles. “Medieval Skepticism,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Accessed 3 May, 2018. http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2013/entries/skepticism​ ‑medieval/. Botwinick, Aryeh. Skepticism, Belief, and the Modern: Maimonides to Nietzsche. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997. Crenshaw, James L. “The Birth of Skepticism in Ancient Israel.” In The Divine Helmsman. Studies on God’s Control of Human Events. Presented to Lou H. Silberman, edited by James L. Crenshaw and Samuel Sandmel, 1–19. New York: ktav Publishing House, 1980. Davis, Joseph. “The Ten Questions of Eliezer Eilburg and the Problem of Jewish Unbelief in the 16th Century,” The Jewish Quarterly Review xci, no. 3–4 (2001): 293–336. Davis, Joseph. “The Ten Questions of Eliezer Eilburg,” Hebrew Union College Annual 80 (2009): 173–244. Ess, Josef van. Die Erkenntnislehre des ʿAḍudaddīn Al-Īcī. Übersetzung und Kommentar des ersten Buches seiner Mawāqif. Frankfurt: Universität Frankfurt HabilitationsSchrift, 1964; Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1966. Faur, José. “Sánchez’ Critique of Authoritas: Converso Skepticism and the Emergence of Radical Hermeneutics.” In The Return to Scripture in Judaism and Christianity. Essays in Postcritical Scriptural Interpretation, edited by Peter Ochs, 256–276. New York: Paulist Press, 1993. Freudenthal, Gideon. “The Remedy to Linguistic Skepticism. Judaism as a Language of Action.” Naharaim—Zeitschrift für deutsch-jüdische Literatur und Kulturgeschichte 4, no. 1 (2011): 67–76.

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Goody, Jack. “A Kernel of Doubt.” The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 2, no. 4 (1996): 667–681. Horovitz, Saul. Der Einfluss der griechischen Skepsis auf die Entwicklung der Philosophie bei den Arabern. Breslau: Th. Schatzky, 1915. Horovitz, Saul. Über den Einfluss der griechischen Philosophie auf die Entwicklung des Kalam. Breslau: Th. Schatzky, 1909. Horovitz, Saul. “Über die Bekanntschaft Saadias mit der griechischen Skepsis.” In Judaica. Festschrift zu Hermann Cohens siebzigstem Geburtstage, edited by Ismar Elbogen, Benzion Kellermann, and Eugen Mittwoch, 235–252. Berlin: Bruno Cassirer, 1912. Lee, Bernon. “Towards a Rhetoric of Contradiction in the Book of Ecclesiastes.” PhD diss., University of Calgary, 1997. Limbrick, Elaine. That Nothing is Known. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988. Luzzatto, Simone. Discourse on the State of the Jews—Bilingual Edition. Edited, translated, and commented by Giuseppe Veltri and Anna Lissa. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2019. Luzzatto, Simone. Filosofo e rabbino nella Venezia del Seicento. Edited by Giuseppe Veltri. Rome: Aracne, 2015. Luzzatto, Simone. Scritti politici e filosofici di un ebreo scettico nella Venezia del Seicento. Edited by Giuseppe Veltri. Milan: Bompiani, 2013. Luzzatto, Socrates, or on Human Knowledge—Bilingual edition. Edited, translated, and commented by Giuseppe Veltri and Michela Torbidoni. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2019. Melamed, Abraham. “The Myth of Venice in Italian Jewish Thought.” In Italia Judaica. Atti del i Convegno internazionale. Bari 18–22 maggio 1981, 401–413. Rome: Ministero per i Beni Culturali e Ambientali, 1983. Melamed, Abraham. The Philosopher-King in Medieval and Renaissance Jewish Political Thought. New York: State University of New York Press, 2003. Melamed, Abraham. “Simone Luzzatto on Tacitus. Apologetica and Ragione di Stato.” In Studies in Medieval Jewish History and Literature, vol. 2, edited by Isadore Twersky, 143–170. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984. Mulsow, Martin. “Skepticism and Conversion to Judaism. The Case of Aaron d’Antan.” In Secret Conversions to Judaism in Early Modern Europe, edited by Martin Mulsow and Richard H. Popkin, 123–182. Leiden: Brill, 2004. Pfeiffer, Robert H. “The Peculiar Skepticism of Ecclesiastes.” Journal of Biblical Literature 53, no. 2 (1934), 100–109. Ravid, Benjamin. “Biblical Exegesis à la Mercantilism and Raison d’état in Seventeenth Century Venice: The Discorso of Simone Luzzatto.” In Bringing the Hidden to Light: The Process of Interpretation. Studies in Honor of Stephen A. Geller, edited by Kathryn Kravitz and Diane M. Sharon, 169–182. Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns, 2007. Ravid, Benjamin. “‘A Republic Separate From All Other Government:’ Jewish Auton-

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omy in Venice in the Seventeenth Century and the Translation of the Libro Grande” [Hebrew]. In Thought and Action: Essays in Memory of Simon Rawidowicz on the Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of His Death, edited by Alfred A. Greenbaum and Alfred L. Ivry, 53–76. Tel Aviv: Tcherikover and Haifa University Press, 1983. Ravid, Benjamin. “The Venetian Context of the Discourse.” In Luzzatto, Discourse, 243– 274. Reines, Alvin J. “Skepsis and Skepticism.” In Encyclopaedia Judaica, vol. 18, second edition, edited by Michael Berenbaum and Fred Skolnik, 657–658. Detroit: Macmillan, 2010. Rotenstreich, Nathan. “The Problem of the ‘Critique of Judgment’ and Solomon Maimon’s Scepticism.” In Harry A. Wolfson Jubilee Volume on the Occasion of His SeventyFifth Birthday, vol. 2, edited by Saul Lieberman, 677–702. Jerusalem: American Academy for Jewish Research, 1965. Ruderman, David B. Early Modern Jewry: A New Cultural History. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011. Ruderman, David B. Essential Papers in Jewish Culture in Renaissance and Baroque Italy. New York: New York University Press, 1992. Ruderman, David B. Jewish Thought and Scientific Discovery in Early Modern Europe. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995. Ruderman, David B. “Science and Skepticism. Simone Luzzatto on Perceiving the Natural World.” In Ruderman, Jewish Thought, 153–184. Ruderman, David B. and Shmuel Feiner, eds. Early Modern Culture and Haskalah: Reconsidering the Borderlines of Modern Jewish History. [Simon Dubnow Institute Yearbook, vol. 6.] Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2007. Septimus, Bernard. “Biblical Religion and Political Rationality in Simone Luzzatto, Maimonides and Spinoza.” In Jewish Thought in the 17th Century, edited by Isadore Twersky and Bernard Septimus, 399–433. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987. Shepard, Sanford. “The Background of Uriel Da Costa’s Heresy: Marranism, Skepticism, Karaism.” Judaism 20 (1971): 341–350. Stern, Josef. The Matter and Form of Maimonides’ Guide. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013. Veltri, Giuseppe. Alienated Wisdom: Enquiry into Jewish Philosophy and Scepticism. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2018. Veltri, Giuseppe. “Freche Schüler vs. gescheite Rabbinen. Die Kunst des Lernens im antiken Judentum.” In Meister und Schüler in Geschichte und Gegenwart. Von Religionen der Antike bis zur modernen Esoterik, edited by Almut-Barbara Renger, 135–145. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2012. Veltri, Giuseppe, Gianfranco Miletto, and Guido Bartolucci. “The Last Will and Testament of Simone Luzzatto (1583?–1663) and the Only Known Manuscript of the

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Discorso (1638). Newly Discovered Manuscripts from the State Archive of Venice and the Marciana Library, Venice,” European Journal of Jewish Studies 5 (2011): 125–146. Viterbo, Ariel. “Socrate nel Ghetto: lo scetticismo mascherato di Simone Luzzatto.” Studi Veneziani 38 (1999): 79–128. Viterbo, Ariel. “Socrates in the Venetian Ghetto” [Hebrew]. ma thesis, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1996.

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part 1 The Relationship to Ancient Scepticism

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What Kind of (Sceptical) Work is Simone Luzzatto’s Socrates? Josef Stern

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What Makes a Work Sceptical?

In the Preface to their new bilingual edition of Rabbi Simone (Simhah) Luzzatto’s Socrates, or on Human Knowledge, the editors and translators, Giuseppe Veltri and Michela Torbidoni, refer to it as “the first sceptical treatise of the early modern period to be written by a Jew.”1 In a similar vein, David Ruderman proposes that Socrates be “examined as a primary text in the history of Jewish scepticism from Ecclesiastes to Santob de Carrion, Sanchez, La Peyrère, Spinoza, and beyond.”2 The title of this essay, “What Kind of (Sceptical) Work is Simone Luzzatto’s Socrates?,” is meant to raise the question whether and in which sense Socrates is a “sceptical” work, as these distinguished scholars claim, putting the term “sceptical” in parentheses in order not to beg the question. One can at least imagine other possibilities. The parade of opinions across the stage of Socrates has the anthological feel of a theatre of ideas. Is it possible that Luzzatto simply employs a sceptical scenario—and his dramatisation of the trial of Socrates—as a literary device in order to present, albeit critically, a comprehensive range of scientific and philosophical theories and doctrines on various topics, both ancient and more recent, in order to educate an audience of Jews uninformed by science and philosophy? After all, were one to follow up on all of the references to ancient, medieval, and early modern sci-

1 Simone Luzzatto, Socrates, or on Human Knowledge—Bilingual edition, ed., trans., and comm. Giuseppe Veltri and Michela Torbidoni (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2019), vii. A very early draft of this material was delivered at an atelier on Simone Luzzatto’s Socrates at the Maimonides Centre in Hamburg in 2017 and a full draft at the conference “Simone Luzzatto’s Scepticism in the Context of Early Modern Thought” in September 2019. I wish to thank the participants at both for their comments and criticism. Special thanks to Michela Torbidoni for editorial guidance and to Evelien Chayes for substantive comments on and criticisms of the penultimate version of this paper, which greatly improved it. 2 David B. Ruderman, “Science and Skepticism: Simone Luzzatto on Perceiving the Natural World,” in Jewish Thought and Scientific Discovery in Early Modern Europe (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), 153–184, esp. 172. Ruderman is clearly working with a very broad notion of scepticism if he includes Spinoza. See also Ruderman’s reference to Luzzatto’s “radical skepticism” (183). On Luzzatto’s knowledge of ancient scepticism, see 173.

© Josef Stern, 2024 | doi:10.1163/9789004694262_003

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ence and philosophy, as attested in the editors’ superb footnotes, one would have completed a full curriculum. One might add in support of this idea that, despite or alongside its emphasis on uncertainty, the culmination of the book is not equipollence (isostheneia), suspension of judgement (epochē), or the indifference of tranquility (ataraxia), the sceptic’s brand of happiness (eudaimonia), but an impassioned plea for knowledge, or enlightenment, in order to combat folk superstition and impiety. To fight that war, certainty, or apodictic knowledge, is not necessary but, rather, engagement in the very activity of constant, never-ending enquiry into science and philosophy. Recognition that there is no final answer to ultimate scientific questions is the true corrective to ignorance and superstition. But in an ironic twist, this motif—never-ending enquiry—might nonetheless explain why Socrates should be counted as a sceptical work: the original meaning of “sceptic” was one who engages endlessly in enquiry without ever coming to rest by endorsing a final dogmatic conclusion. There is a second reason why Socrates might be called a sceptical work, although it is not the usual way in which we think of scepticism. This lies in its novel depiction of the sceptic embodied in the figure of Socrates, who not only challenges the authority of knowledge and reason but also threatens the political authority and social order of the polis. The Socrates of Socrates is the sceptic as a political counterfigure. This combination is new. Plato’s Socrates was perceived as a gadfly upsetting the polis and social order, but he was not really a sceptic. The Hellenistic sceptic was a sceptic but not a political rebel: his life of appearances required him to be a law-abiding citizen who conforms to or at least acquiesces to the laws of the state. So, by presenting Socrates both as a sceptic and as a political and social critic, Luzzatto presents us with a new characterisation of the sceptic. Insofar as Socrates is a defence of this depiction of Socrates, it makes a case for this new political role for the sceptic. However, neither of these first two reasons to consider Socrates a sceptical work are the standard epistemological criteria philosophers use to classify or judge a work to be sceptical. The question I wish to pursue is whether Socrates is a sceptical work in the classical Academic or Pyrrhonian senses, which would be the senses of the term with which Luzzatto was presumably familiar in his early modern context given the renewed interest in Cicero and Sextus. Looking to these ancient schools of scepticism, there are two criteria by which to judge whether a work is or is not sceptical. One is to determine whether the work lays out the classical sceptic’s way of life that aims to achieve his brand of happiness, tranquillity (ataraxia), or freedom from the anxiety created by the dogmatist’s drive to achieve knowledge. According to the sceptic’s dogmatist, the objects of our senses, sensible appear-

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ances, are constantly conflicting and therefore require an indubitable criterion to choose among them—a criterion that the sceptic counters is not to be had. Furthermore, the sceptic argues that the scientific theories that are in turn proposed to reconcile conflicts among sense impressions in fact lead to more conflicts, because for every theoretical doctrine one can find an equally compelling opposite. Therefore, given that equipollence of opposite claims results from rational enquiry and the quest for knowledge, the only rational option for the enquirer is to suspend judgement, epochē. But ironically, that very suspension of judgement, withdrawal from the drive to acquire knowledge, leads to ataraxia, tranquillity, or peace of mind, the sceptic’s species of the genus of happiness that the dogmatist had sought to achieve through the acquisition of knowledge. If the work shares a programme like this, if it advocates such a way of life, this is one reason we might call it sceptical. The second test to determine whether or not a work is sceptical does not focus on the shape of its overall programme, its way of life. The criterion is whether or not the work employs the sceptic’s characteristic methods, tropes, or modes in order to counter dogmatic positions, regardless of whether or not they put the enquirer into a state of equipollence that ultimately leads to epochē. That is, are the techniques of argumentation employed in the work drawn from the classical sceptic’s repertoire of arguments, tropes, or modes, regardless of whether or not they serve the sceptical purposes for which they were originally designed? I will begin with this second criterion. Does Luzzatto employ sceptical tropes in the Socrates to achieve equipollence (isostheneia)? The question is not whether there are references to Sextus’s or Cicero’s uses (or to Diogenes’s descriptions) of the tropes to mount equipollent arguments. That Luzzatto does often enough. But does he himself employ these sceptical methods of argumentation? Yes; here are some examples. Luzzatto lays out in great detail philosophical and scientific theories, ancient and contemporary, to show where they differ and disagree in order to create the overall impression that there always has been, is at present, and always will be endless disagreement among theorists, among whom there is no resolution that would establish who really holds the true account. In ancient terms, this is the argument from diaphōnia, the first of the Agrippean modes: the presence of endless irresolvable disputes or disagreements as evidence of the lack of knowledge. Luzzatto also explicitly employs the trope from relativity—the conflict of appearances between different species of animals, between different individuals within the human species, across variations of senses, and in different circumstances, from different positions and at different times, and also in different states of mind—madness and normality. Hence, appearances never reveal

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what truly exists or the reality independent of its relation to something. One example concerns objects of sense perception: Thus, I often doubted that an object which seemed to be many things was actually any of those things it looked and appeared to be. Therefore, I considered that since the external objects may be represented in infinite ways, none of their appearances that we perceive displays their essences.3 Elsewhere Luzzatto elaborates on the relativity of perceptions to the representations that the intellect imposes on them, both enlisting Protagoras in the sceptical tradition and anticipating Kant’s rejection of perceptions bare of all conceptual form: There is no object represented to the intellect that does not assume the aspect and appearance that the intellect itself provides and suggests. Therefore, everything that is perceptible only exists because our mind gives it a form and appearance. This complies perfectly with what our Protagoras used to say: that a human being is the measure both of things [that are to the extent that they] appear to him in the world and also of those things which are not to the extent that they do not appear to him. The same [thing] happens to the objects that we apprehend […] we are used to believing, perhaps mistakenly, that those manifestations of external objects that we see are their true images, while in fact, we are their original cause, since most of them come from us. Furthermore, the objects participate in producing them by ejecting them and sending them back to us, like mirrors that reflect the images of the object in front of them. However, the ejected simulacra differentiate and diversity from one another in accordance with the different conditions, figures, and compositions of these mirrors.4 A curious, repeated feature in a number of Luzzatto’s adaptations of classical tropes is his personification of the tropes, positing one or more homunculi in the mind of the agent. For example, a well-known trope argues, first, that knowledge requires a criterion to decide among competing hypotheses, claims, or sensible appearances and, second, that there cannot exist a self-certifying criterion, leading to an endless regress of criteria. In the next two passages, Luzzatto personifies the criterion in the persons of “wise men” or “judges”: 3 Luzzatto, Socrates, 129. 4 Luzzatto, 45. See also Luzzatto, 217.

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Yet if we do not want to assign so important a matter as the acknowledgement of the truth to the reckonings of plebeians, but rather to the opinion of the wisest and most learned people, nevertheless it would not be very helpful for solving this question, because we should first acknowledge the identity of these wise men to whom we must refer in acknowledging the truth. Therefore, we should verify whether those who put themselves forward as judges are wise or ignorant. Certainly, this decision should not rest with the common people and the plebeians, since they have already been dismissed from this duty. However, if one were to entrust the wise men with such a task, even they should be evaluated in order to recognize and test their ability to carry out such an election. Thus, one can continue to infinity.5 Stopping at the example I have adduced, we should rigorously establish in the court of our internal memory a custodian responsible for its administration who would exercise the function of a judge and remember the classification order of the relics of these apprehensions. It would follow from this that this internal chancellor or librarian should have an excellent memory, otherwise he would turn out to be incompetent at this task and thus we would have to look for another custodian of his memory, and this would continue to infinity. In that case, we would have to appoint innumerable chancellors and custodians.6 The implicit argument in both of these passages is that if one wants to prove (by way of a criterion or some other demonstration) that one appearance (memory) should be assented to as opposed to another, one must provide a second proof (criterion, etc.) that the first proof (criterion, etc.) is indeed a true proof—obviously leading to an impossible task—producing an infinite regress of proofs (criteria, etc.). So not only should one not arbitrarily prefer one appearance (memory) over another; one cannot even choose one over another on the basis of a purported proof or another criterion. What is interesting is not only Luzzatto’s use of this Pyrrhonian argument, but also that he employs political and judicial figures in place of the epistemological notions of a proof or criterion: the social class differences between the plebes and wise men in the first passage, and the court scenario in the second.7 This, in turn, 5 Luzzatto, 103. 6 Luzzatto, 203. 7 See Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism, eds. Julia Annas and Jonathan Barnes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 1.121–122.

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raises the question whether Luzzatto’s use of figurative language here is for literary purposes solely, to make the argument more vivid and accessible, or whether it is meant to conceal an irresolvable philosophical objection. As we shall see, the issue whether sceptical objections should be presented exoterically or esoterically—revealed or concealed—is a live controversy in Socrates. Luzzatto also employs the personification of arguments by inner homunculi to generate arguments from diaphōnia. Consider the following passage: I thought that a similar thing occurred with the deliriums of frenetics once they had become sane again. In addition to this, what made me incline to this opinion was to realize that although we recognize the fallacy of some of our assertions, which are evidently refuted, nevertheless there is still someone in us who obstinately persists in asserting them, without being inclined to reject or refuse them. Hence, when we travel in a chariot or ship, it appears to us, although falsely, that the trees or coasts are moving and becoming distant from us.8 This passage occurs in the context of a discussion of whether there is one ruler—the intellect—of human mental activities or multiple rulers or mental powers that generate different, conflicting opinions. Socrates notes that we often form “false illusions” when we are asleep but then “demolish them” when we wake up. Likewise, in the quoted passage, he says that the “deliriums of frenetics,” or madmen, are rejected as false when the subjects become sane. However, he then adds that there are some beliefs that we know are false but nonetheless accept despite that knowledge. For example, when we move in a vehicle, it nonetheless appears to us—that is, we nonetheless entertain the opinion—that we are stationary and immobile and that it is the world we see outside the vehicle that is moving—despite our knowledge that this appearance is false. From this, Socrates concludes that, in addition to the inner homunculus that knows that the appearance is false, “there is still someone in us,” a second homunculus, who assents to it. No matter how well the one knows the appearance to be false and can causally explain why things nonetheless appear as they do, the one simply cannot disabuse the other of its false appearance-opinion: Although we are aware and informed of the cause of this illusion, nevertheless there remains I could not say what kind of obstinate asserter

8 Luzzatto, Socrates, 217.

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inside us who opposes this disillusion and warns us to persevere in error. I gathered from this that the one who acknowledges the mistake and the one who obstinately agrees with it are not the same [person], but that they are different and do not communicate their own concepts and opinions to one another.9 Thus there is no one ruler of our mental activities; instead there is endless disagreement among the faculties, diaphōnia, that cannot but lead to the kind of equipollence that gives rise to epochē. Indeed Luzzatto presents us with a vivid depiction of what it is like to be in a state of isostheneia or equipollence: Yet as a spectator of these fights and contentions agitating my mind, I was so struck by the opposing instances that all of them were equally advancing that, judging all of them to be of similar and equal value, I could not decide to which of them I should give my assent and to which of the opponents it would be worthwhile to concede the priority. Thus, with such an abundance of reasons, I was not allowed to hold on to any of them […]. Then, because of this perplexity, I was prevented from developing the proposed debate, since I always had to suppose the cognition of some of these opponents before that of the others. Likewise, I could not apply myself to all of them at the same time, since their own diversity opposed it: indeed, it was impossible that only one faculty at once could pursue different speculations.10 Finally, scattered through Socrates, there are roughly twenty references to epochē, suspension or withholding of judgement or assent, perhaps the defining feature of classical scepticism. Most of these references are found either in the opening section entitled “Subject,” in the “Charge against Socrates,” in the opening pages of “Socrates’s Defence,” and in Plato’s closing speech.11 There are also a couple of references in the exchanges with Hippias and Timon, including one by Hippias. But the suspension of judgement is almost completely absent from the main, central part of Socrates in which Socrates critically reviews competing scientific and philosophical theories and doctrines on the range of topics he addresses. In none of those cases does Socrates culminate his actual practice

9 10 11

Luzzatto, 219. Luzzatto, 73. See Luzzatto, 31, 41, 45, 47, 49, 115 (where Socrates says he learnt to withhold judgment from Gorgias), 381, 399, 433 (two references, one by Hippias), 471 (by Timon in his own speech), 473, 479, and 485 (two references in Plato’s closing speech).

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of enquiry with suspension of judgement. He may mention epochē not infrequently, but very rarely does he use it. Similarly, ataraxia, or tranquillity, the sceptic’s species of eudaimonia, or happiness, the result of epochē, is not entirely absent from Socrates, but it also does not have the prominence one would expect in a sceptical work. In fact, in the one passage where Luzzatto gives a striking depiction of such a state, it does not follow from an act of epochē but from a general recognition that one has no knowledge to speak of.12 At the end of his discussion of human prudence, Anaxagoras argues that given the divine predetermination of human actions, “prudence’s every attempt to oppose this will turn out to be vain and ridiculous. Therefore […] we cannot take action.”13 With this impasse, Socrates simply announces that “here ended the discussion” without responding to the argument. But he then continues—and this is his bottom line—by saying that our knowledge both “of our own matters” and of “external and foreign objects” is thereby blocked by the “dense obscurity of ignorance,” from which he concludes: This was the end and goal of my long and difficult journey, and my fatigued and exhausted mind had arrived at this point. There had occurred to me that which usually happens to a wayfarer who was rich when he left his home, yet became poor by the end of his road following a robbery during the journey. Likewise, at the beginning of my digression, I considered myself rich in many doctrines, but once I undertook a new journey to acquire more of them by coming across very skilful men, I was stripped of all knowledge. Hence, poor and miserable at the end of my mental path, I found myself lacking in all knowledge. Yet this did not sadden me at all and I did not regret it, because thanks to this misfortune and loss, I had freed myself from the fear that was continuously haunting [my mind]; namely, the doubt I had had that oblivion would surreptitiously steal this precious treasure. However, as my mind was now released, I was not troubling myself with as much restless culture as before […]. I was not worried about my losses, since I was like a mendicant who does not feel dismayed by encountering a rapacious thief, but on the contrary, dances and celebrates as his poverty makes him feel secure.14 12

13 14

See, however, Luzzatto, 363, where Cratylus tells Socrates, after finishing his critique of knowledge, “to cease and desist from this desiring to know” in order to avoid the “torments” of cognition. In its deepest sense, epochē, is the surrender of the very desire to know. Luzzatto, 397. Luzzatto, 399.

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Like the condition of tranquillity in which the classic sceptic “finds himself” after epochē, here Socrates describes the state he finds himself in, or that happens to him, as a result of losing all knowledge after sustained enquiry. Because he no longer possesses any knowledge claim he might forget, or that might be attacked and refuted by a sophistic critic, he no longer suffers from the fear and anxiety that he has not yet attained true knowledge and the worry that either he might forget what he thinks he knows or that what he thinks he knows might yet be exposed as being untrue, and hence, not knowledge. If unhappiness is the result of an insatiable drive to know more and more and of the fear that what one believes one knows might turn out to be counterfeit, then surrendering that drive for knowledge and giving up any claims to possessing knowledge ipso facto will eliminate the source of unhappiness and thereby restore one’s happiness.15 To sum up, the characteristic features of a sceptical life or programme all individually make stage appearances in Socrates: particular tropes, epochē, and tranquillity. Nonetheless, their individual occurrences do not add up to a life structured by engagement in the tropes as a means designed to lead to the suspension of judgement whose upshot is tranquillity—the classical sceptic’s life. Thus Socrates satisfies the second criterion for a sceptical work but not the first. Each of the tropes, epochē, and tranquillity take on a life of their own even apart from the sceptical way of life as a whole. This may mark an important stage in the history of scepticism, in which the tropes become actors in their own right, tools to be recruited for epistemological purposes. But this returns us to our original question: in what sense is Socrates a sceptical work?

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Socrates as Scepticism or Critical Philosophy?

Luzzatto offers us a few hints about his aim in writing Socrates. On the cover page, he announces its intention to show “how deficient human understanding can be when it is not led by divine revelation.” This would suggest that the book is a work of fideism, the doctrine that humans cannot achieve knowledge through the resources of their intellect and natural reason exclusively and instead must avail themselves of divine revelation and faith.16 The role of scep-

15

16

Compare Maimonides’s description of R. Aqiba in Pardes in Guide of the Perplexed i.32; see Josef Stern, The Matter and Form of Maimonides’ Guide (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013), 86–90. For such an interpretation, see Michela Torbidoni, “The Italian Academies and Rabbi Simone Luzzatto’s Socrate: The Freedom of the Ingenium and the Soul,” in Yearbook of the

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ticism, then, is to delineate the limits of humans’ natural intellectual powers in order to incline them to belief in revealed, extra-intellectual, superhuman divine mysteries. Yet, while this appears on its cover page, within the actual text of the book we only once find anything this strong. In the introductory letter, “To the Benign Reader,” Luzzatto writes: The purpose of this work is not to defend a lazy and pretentious ignorance […] but a modest and discreet one […]. Socrates confutes human knowledge, but not that [knowledge] which is inspired and instilled by a superior mind, and he comes to this consideration by acknowledging that the weakness of our innate understanding makes us pliant to the sentiments and testimonies of the Holy Scripture.17 This statement curiously anticipates David Hume’s fideism at the end of the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (1779): “A person, seasoned with a just sense of the imperfections of natural reason, will fly to revealed truth with the greatest avidity […]. To be a philosophical sceptic is, in a man of letter, the first and most essential step toward being a sound, believing Christian.”18 Now, it may be surprising to read that the pagan Socrates believed that by demonstrating the weakness of his intellect, he opened himself to “the sentiments and testimonies of the Holy Scripture.” Perhaps all Luzzatto means, as we shall next see, is a more general theistic idea that does not appeal specifically to revealed religion, for example, “I gathered from this only the acknowledgement of our miserable state when it is not enlightened by a superior mind.”19 In this spirit, for the rest of the work, Socrates’s god is neither a pagan nor a revealed deity but a non-revelational god of the sort found in philosophical theism. As Socrates says in his final defence: For it is sufficient for my defence that you observe the public and private reasonings that I have always delivered concerning the reverence due to

17 18 19

Maimonides Centre for Advanced Studies, ed. Bill Rebiger (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2017), 71–94, esp. 71, 87, 93. Among the Jewish thinkers and philosophers with whom one would assume Luzzatto was acquainted, Judah Halevi is closest to the classical fideist. However, there is no reference to Halevi in Socrates. For an excellent recent discussion of Halevi’s fideism, see Ehud Krinis, Judah Halevi’s Fideistic Scepticism in The Kuzari (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2020). Luzzatto, Socrates, 29. David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 129–130. Luzzatto, Socrates, 225.

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the first and worthiest cause, which moves and rules everything. Indeed, I have always promulgated that the cognition that one has of it and the veneration that is due to it come not only from subtle and wide-ranging deductions, but were also given to us along with milk by Nature itself. Hence, it follows that the human mind is so inclined and favourably disposed to religion and divine worship that if it were deprived of such a pursuit, he would not be very different from brute animals […]. And if I sometimes took a position against the ignorant by reprehending them for their ridiculous superstition or degenerate religion, I was not then attempting, as the Giants did, to expel Jupiter from the sky, but rather trying to remove those despicable concepts which disfigured the beauty and grace of the true religion in their minds. Therefore, I have often solemnly said to those who were truly prudent that they must protect themselves from the infection of superstition, an epidemic and serious disease of the people. They [must] be aware that often the religion of the vile common people is abominable blasphemy for wise men and that the true temple of God is in the wise man’s mind, where He is adored through offerings of love and sacrifices of veneration.20 We will return to Luzzatto’s attack here on superstition and popular religion, but in order to get a better sense of Luzzatto’s aim for the work as a whole, I want to focus first on his claim that “Nature”—that is, something hardwired into the human natural make-up as opposed to “subtle and wide-ranging deductions”— is the source of our limited knowledge of the Deity, or First Cause, and His veneration. Luzzatto constructs a close-knit complex of conceptual connections among nature, the deity, the limitations of our intellects, the “superior light” that guides our limited reasoning, the probable, and morality. The moral virtues are “the daughters of the probable” and “the legitimate grandchildren of Nature itself.”21 Nature is also what illuminates our mind by the superior light and corrects our human reasoning, leading us to the deity. Hence, the “inclination and disposition to religion and divine worship” is what makes a mind “human” as opposed to “brute,” that is, what expresses the person’s true nature. Let’s try to unpack these connections. I begin with the “superior light.” Comparing himself to an “expert doctor,” Socrates opens his defence, stating that his “task is to demonstrate that our minds cannot apprehend anything stable, constant, and indubitable when they are not led by superior light.”22 20 21 22

Luzzatto, 479–481. Luzzatto, 479. Luzzatto, 47–49.

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However, unlike the fideist’s divine light, or Augustine’s inner light, Luzzatto’s superior light or illumination leads—and thereby supplements rather than replaces—the natural mind or intellect, whose limitations and weaknesses Socrates exposes. Even Timon, who is more critical of the intellect and more damning of the dangers of human reason than Socrates, sees the “superior light” as “leading” “reckless [human] wisdom”: Rather, I believe that there occurred to philosophy the same thing that often occurs within the practice of medicine, namely that when it undertakes to chase the degenerated humours away from the sick person whom they are harming, it also [ends up] detruding life itself along with them. Likewise, this reckless wisdom, when it is not led by superior light, dispels religion itself while believing that it is destroying superstition.23 Still more significant, in the same passage that opens his defence (cited above), Socrates goes on to identify “the superior light” that leads or guides him with the “light of the probable”: “You must not believe that I am abandoning the actions of my life into the hands of frenzied Chance, but you should know that my guide is the light of the probable, which is the North Star in my journey through life.”24 In order to explain this last connection, let’s turn to the last sections of Socrates. Following the passage in which Socrates describes how his loss of knowledge afforded him some tranquillity, Socrates faces a new dilemma: Once I had found myself in this state concerning the cognition of the truth, convinced to suspend and withhold my assent and not to dispense it by chance, I began to have some doubts about whether to spread my hesitation and perplexity. Thus, as it was always my principle to direct all my actions in favour of the common and universal good of humankind, I began to consider whether it would be a profitable decision to publicly discredit our alleged knowledge by showing its mistakes and deficiencies, or rather whether it would be beneficial for humankind to hold it in high esteem, because disclosing the truth does not always fit or adjust it to our interests.25

23

24 25

Luzzatto, 445; emphasis mine. It is an important question, which I have not seen discussed in the (relatively small) secondary literature on Luzzatto’s Socrates: whether views expressed by Socrates’s interlocutors should also be attributed to Luzzatto, assuming that Socrates himself does speak for the author. Luzzatto, 49. Luzzatto, 399.

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The question Socrates now faces is not that of scepticism per se but whether he should publicly reveal his scepticism or conceal it from the public—whether or not “to broadcast the weakness of our understanding”?26 Socrates’s concern is not so much the danger of scepticism for society but which alternative is more beneficial or profitable for “the common and universal good of humankind.”27 Thus Luzzatto reinvents the sceptic as a benefactor of humankind; the only question is how best to benefit society. To resolve this dilemma, Socrates turns to Hippias and Timon, “the sages of the day, in looking for their opinion on whether it would be beneficial or harmful to the masses to show the weakness of our knowledge.”28 It probably comes as no surprise that the two great thinkers disagree between themselves, holding apparently polar opposite positions, which puts Socrates in another apparent situation of isostheneia or equipollence. However, there is a difference. This problem—whether or not to publicly disseminate scepticism—is a practical one about what to do, not a theoretical question for science about what is true reality or what to believe or about whether or not we have knowledge or belief with certainty. The climactic question for Luzzatto is not about knowledge or scepticism per se, but about whether scepticism should be esoteric or exoteric, reserved for the intellectual elite or open to the community at large. And the differences of opinion between Hippias and Timon are as much a difference in their personalities and their respective relations to their societies as they are a disagreement over the very wisdom of revealing or not revealing the inadequacy of the human intellect. But as important, notwithstanding appearances—that is, despite the appearance of disagreement Luzzatto wants to convey—a closer look at what Hippias and Timon actually say shows that they are not far apart. Hippias advises Socrates not to publicise scepticism. Nature, “our greatest teacher and director, […] suggests lessons to us that are sufficient to make us happy,”29 that is, moral and political wisdom, and furthermore, has “provided us with cognition of that very eminent cause which disposes and directs the whole to the best aim, […] a supreme cause,”30 that is, God. But unlike Nature, 26

27 28 29 30

Luzzatto, 401. Ruderman, in his “Science and Skepticism” (175–178), interprets the Hippias–Timon exchange as a debate between a dogmatic sophist and a sceptic over nature and knowledge, ignoring Luzzatto’s explicit statement (quoted in the text) that the issue is whether scepticism should be exoteric or esoteric, publicly revealed or concealed. See also 178n99 for his harsh criticism of Melamed, which could equally well be levelled against his own reading. Luzzatto, Socrates, 399. Luzzatto, 401. Luzzatto, 425. Luzzatto, 427.

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philosophy—and it is not entirely clear what Hippias means by this term— stoicism or, perhaps, scepticism?—has no role in providing moral and political wisdom. The primary function of philosophy, or wisdom, is negative: “to remove and eradicate a useless and excessive fecundity” and, in particular to destroy “damned and wicked impiety [… and] refute mad superstition”; only after that did wisdom “induce sage men to have due respect for the Supreme Author and Architect.”31 So “speculation and observation of Nature’s course”32 is one thing, philosophy another. Furthermore, even if wisdom by “speculating on mundane things”33 leads us to recognise that “one might still not achieve anything certain because the truth is not attainable or accessible to us,”34 Hippias tells Socrates that it would not be wise to advertise this lack of certainty, that is, his scepticism, because it would deprive humans of “the delight they achieve from contemplating the universe.”35 In sum, for Hippias (1) Nature provides political and moral wisdom, (2) philosophy serves primarily to counter superstition and impiety although it can also lead us to recognition of the deity, and (3) no human may possess certainty or real knowledge of truths. It is this lack of certainty, “discrediting its knowledge”36 that Hippias counsels Socrates not to reveal. Why deprive people of “the most sincere and lasting pleasure they own”?37 In other words, as bad as their epistemic state is, why make it worse and ruin people’s last remaining source of enjoyment? Timon, who is in favour of publicising scepticism, denies “that the world is a public school or academy where one learns the precepts of morality and rudiments of politics” and “that natural philosophy opens the path to religion and piety.”38 This is to say that Nature is not a source of political or religious wisdom. Philosophy, as we quoted him saying earlier, like medicine, often does more harm than good, destroys the true as well as the false. Nonetheless, even while Timon attacks philosophical theories of justice, morality, friendship, politics, and virtues, he concludes that: if an uncontaminated intellect ended up in my forsaken dwelling—not at all corrupted by foreign doctrines, but as it was when it was made by the

31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38

Luzzatto, 427. Luzzatto, 427. Luzzatto, 427. Luzzatto, 429. Luzzatto, 429. Luzzatto, 429. Luzzatto, 429. Luzzatto, 445.

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sincere hands of Nature—and preserved those first seeds of human reason that it provided, it would taste my pleasant urbanity and my grateful courtesy, indeed distant from pretences and deceptions.39 Philosophy and dogmatic scientific theories may have corrupted the human mind and prevented it from deriving wisdom from nature, but if we could somehow recover our natural innocence, an “uncontaminated intellect,” we could deduce all sorts of truths. Thus, Timon’s advice to Socrates is twofold. On the one hand, he should “communicate to humankind […] the weakness of their understanding, and thus […] warn them to withhold their assent and suspend their judgment.” On the other, he need not worry that by publicising the demolition of corrupted reason he will “debase” and “deny all authority to the human mind.” The corrupted intellect—“corrupted by curiosity for immoderate knowledge and quibbling investigation”—will be “replaced by the majesty of Nature, which will lead the way more decorously towards the good and remove the evil.”40 In sum, both Hippias and Timon agree that Nature, either in an ideal, innocent state or as it actually is, can teach political and moral wisdom, and both admit that this wisdom does not achieve the certainty demanded of true scientific knowledge. Where they differ is only over the question whether Socrates should emphasise the one or the other, hence, reveal or conceal the sceptical side. Of the two positions, Hippias’s and Timon’s, Socrates said he “inclined towards Timon.”41 “Inclining” is not assent to the truth of something but a much weaker kind of attraction, leaning toward it, following the more probable. However, Timon’s view is just a preamble to Socrates’s own conception of the proper way of life: I warned my close friends that they should follow the guidance of the probable for actions connected to the purpose of life, as it is not obstinate or quibbling, but adaptable to opportune necessities, and more executive than discursive. In the practice of moral life, it has not deviated much from the first seeds that Nature instilled in our minds, since if it does not grasp the truth, at least it does not encounter insane contumacy or mad obstinacy […]. [It] would be absurd if the dictate of the probable

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Luzzatto, 445. Luzzatto, 471. Contrast this depiction with Ruderman, “Science and Skepticism,” 178, according to whom Timon’s position can be “easily identified with the Pyrrhonian argument.” Luzzatto, 473.

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was not instilled in humankind, [which was] created with so much skill and mastery […]. It is indeed like a sign along its path, which shows them the good they must follow and the evil they must avoid. Yet one must rather consider that this same Nature tacitly whispers to us and shows us, through invisible signs, what should be followed and avoided […]. This is that genius which my slanderers argued that I revere and adore like a demigod.42 Here Socrates recommends that we “follow the guidance of the probable for actions connected to the purpose of life.” There are two ways to understand the “guidance of the probable.” The first is to take it to be, more or less, Sextus Empiricus’s idea of ordinary living by appearances without dogmata or beliefs, that is, passively acquiescing to one’s sensory impressions; reacting to one’s appetites, pains, or the instincts one finds oneself experiencing; and following the customs and practices of one’s community—in all cases, without endorsing, assenting, or committing oneself to their truth or to the claim that the appearance is what really exists. Support for this reading is that Socrates apparently enumerates Sextus’s other conditions for “the governance of nature” or how one ought to live without belief: (1) “neutrality and the middle way,”43 that is, a kind of metriopatheia, or moderation of emotions and appetites; (2) common, conventional moral virtues that are intuitively “right”—independently of a moral theory;44 and (3) the practices of popular, civic, communal institutional religion which he perfunctorily and “religiously” observes but not because he believes they are theologically true.45 However, there is a big difference between Sextus’s life of appearances without belief and what Socrates is recommending. For Sextus a life of appearances is an everyday accommodation but not the true happiness that a human can achieve, which he reserves for the ataraxia, or tranquillity, that follows epochē and constitutes his brand of eudaimonia. As we saw earlier, Socrates mentions ataraxia, the freedom from anxiety over the fear of loss, refutation or forgetfulness, only once, albeit at the end of his life’s journey, but the life of the probable is his “North Star,” his “guide” to what is good and to the happiest achievable life. Socrates’ recommendations are also not Descartes’s “provisional morality” at

42 43 44 45

Luzzatto, 475. Luzzatto, 477. See Luzzatto, 479. Luzzatto, 479. At the Sceptical Atelier on Simone Luzzatto’s Socrates organized on 22– 24 May 2017 at the Maimonides Centre for Advanced Studies of Hamburg University, Emidio Spinelli suggested this Sextian reading of Luzzatto.

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the end of the Discourse on Method (1637), precisely because Descartes’s morality is provisional. This suggests a second way to understand Socrates’ idea of “the guidance of the probable.” In the previous quotation, Socrates clearly distinguishes between “actions connected to the purpose of life” and intellectual grasp of the truth, between the “executive” and the “discursive,” or, as we would say, the realms of the practical and the theoretical. The probable has only to do with action, the executive, and the practical. You might think that the probable and the certain are two points on one continuum, differing only in degree. But Socrates immediately goes on to argue that the probable is not an approximation to certainty: Yet if one asked me what degree of certainty this probable may achieve, and objected by saying that if we were prevented from achieving the sincere truth, how could one say that the probable at least resembles the truth? Since the original and the like are hidden and inapprehensible, there is no way to affirm what else is similar and conformable [to the truth]. A painter who does not know Pericles will never paint his portrait. To these objections, I would answer that I am not aware of the degree of certainty that may be obtained by the probable as far as the exact truth is concerned, or how it may present it to us, since it is not informed of it. However, I certainly believe that it is profitable and extremely salutary, since it comes from the hands of Nature, which is more solicitous to help us through its effects than to indoctrinate us through disciplines, and experience teaches us that those actions which we understand the less because of their continuous use are carried out more quickly. Yet when we attempt [to understand] them through discourse, we act with difficulty, and not without mistakes. Hence, it must be sufficient for us to feel that Nature gives us the impulse for these actions, although we are not aware of why or how.46 Socrates argues that no one who does not know the standard or conditions in virtue of which certainty is achieved can claim that the probable resembles, conforms to, or approximates it. If I am not acquainted with Socrates, and cannot recognise him, how can I paint a picture of Socrates that looks like or resembles him? Instead, Socrates argues, regardless of whether the probable is or is not certain-like—which we will never know—what gives the probable its power is that it is profitable and effective in moving us to act “since

46

Luzzatto, 477.

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it comes from the hands of Nature.” Nature, through the force of the probable, impels us to act. Here Socrates, and with him Luzzatto, is drawing a sharp distinction between two realms: theōria and praxis. In the realm of theōria, certainty is both the aim and standard for knowledge and understanding, and whenever he mentions certainty, he is talking theōria, science, and truth.47 In the realm of praxis, or action, it is not that certainty cannot be achieved but rather that it has no proper place; it is a mistake to look for it. The standard, what guides deliberation, is the probable. The probable here more or less plays the role it played for the Academic sceptic Carneades, who offered it in response to the apraxia objection, the Stoic argument against the sceptics that they render action impossible. According to the Stoics, the criterion of assent and judgement, including the judgement to act, is the “cataleptic,” self-evident and therefore indubitable, cognitive impression. According to the sceptics, there are no such impressions. Hence, the Stoic objection concludes, the sceptic, without such impressions and the beliefs verified by them, can never judge or act. In response, Carneades proposed that what moves people to act are probable impressions (from probabilis, that which lends itself to or invites approval, Cicero’s Latin for the Greek pithanon, persuasive), not cataleptic impressions. And because the cataleptic is unnecessary, even if we cannot achieve such an impression, nothing is lost. Now, some later figures among the Academic sceptics wanted to extend the probable to dogmata and beliefs as a substitute for the unobtainable self-evident cataleptic impressions that afford certainty. But Socrates/Luzzatto instead employs it precisely to demarcate the two different realms: theōria and praxis. Certainty guides and is the criterion of belief about the real and the true or knowledge, but the probable serves as the criterion of action and gives rise to normative or moral virtues—recall that moral virtues are the “offspring of the probable.”48 Indeed, not only is certainty unnecessary for action; in the practical realm, ignorance is often better than knowledge: “experience teaches us that those actions which we understand the less because of their continuous use are carried out more quickly […] when we attempt [to understand] them through discourse, we act with difficulty, and

47

48

Certainty as an aim and standard for knowledge is not found in Aristotle and only emerges in the Middle Ages, first among the Arabs and then among the Jews and Christians. For the Pyrrhonists belief in or assent to is always to what is real as opposed to appearance; for Aristotle the aim and standard of knowledge is episteme, or causal explanatory understanding produced by assent to the necessarily true conclusion of a causal explanatory demonstration; and, finally, for Descartes clearness and distinctness and indubitability become the marks of knowledge. Luzzatto, 479.

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not without mistakes.”49 Instead of certain knowledge, Socrates directs us to “feel” the “impulse” given to us by Nature, though we know not “why or how.” This feeling seems to be more active than the passive acquiescence to impressions that Sextus admitted. Luzzatto is directing us to attend and listen to our natures: Don’t ask too many theoretical questions about how nature works. Just pay attention to its signals. There is a parallel distinction between suspending judgement between competing beliefs and suspending judgement between rival actions, one that I believe Luzzatto exploits in Plato’s closing argument in Socrates’s trial. In the realm of theoretical enquiry, to suspend judgement is to hold back from assenting to or committing oneself to either of (at least) two competing beliefs or assertions, a commitment that would entail that one is responsible for the truth of one’s assent. It is not an assertion of neutrality but of withdrawal, disassociation, detachment, and disavowal of epistemic responsibility. On the other hand, when Plato suggests to the court that it should “follow the same rule regarding [Socrates] that he adopts in judging the things that appear to him: namely that just as he [Socrates] withholds his assent, so will we suspend our judgment concerning him,”50 he is suggesting something very different. It is one thing to suspend judgement among alternative propositions, another to choose not to perform any among alternative actions. When we suspend judgement with respect to a proposition, we endorse neither it nor its contrary or contradictory. In contrast, when we suspend acting on something, we ipso fact do not act, or we act in an opposite way—especially when it comes to commissions versus omissions, say, convicting or acquitting (or failing to convict). Therefore, by suspending judgement, and especially by suspending judgement until there is more evidence, the court does take a position: to suspend judgement that Socrates is guilty is for all practical purposes no different from acquitting him. To be sure, the action of the court also gives rise to ambiguity—whether he is truly acquitted or simply not yet convicted—and the decision is one that makes no one happy. But my main point is to underscore the disjointedness of theory and practice. Where do we acquire our apprehension or knowledge of the probable? According to Luzzatto/Socrates, it is “implanted” in us by Nature, and, as I suggested earlier, it is identical to the “superior light” in the mind. In the long history of illuminationist theories of knowledge, the inner light is almost always concerned with truth, hence, theōria. Luzzatto’s inner superior light is practical

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Luzzatto, 477. Luzzatto, 485.

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and something like a natural faculty hardwired into the human mind. When Socrates asks Cratylus to “inform [him] about the condition of this probable that is so profitable and salutary for life,” he replies that: the probable was nothing other than that instantaneous glimmer arising in us [allowing us] to distinguish between good and evil. As it appears in our minds without being agitated or corrupted by vehement and prolific discourse, it will result as clear and limpid to the whole of humankind, if it is not obscured and hidden by our laboured quibbles. That which occurs to the probable also occurs with the effusion of wine: namely, that the first [of the wine] that flows from the jar is pure, while that which one finds at the bottom of the vase is revolting and turbid. This is what happens as far as the good is concerned, namely, that the first light that appears to us must be considered to be closer to the truth, while the final effort and exercise of the mind dispels and loses it.51 Here Luzzatto depicts the probable like a flash of light, a glimmer, that spontaneously “arises” in the human mind as an immediate insight into good or evil. In its natural, innocent state, this grasp of the probable is evident “to the whole of humankind,” that is, there is no room for disagreement: “the first light that appears to us” is always “closer to the truth” and it is only because of discursive reasoning, “vehement and prolific discourse,” that “agitates” and “corrupts” the first, pure intuition of the good that we lose this immediate natural apprehension of the good/evil. Indeed, the more one discursively reflects on the good apprehended by the glimmer of the probable, the more it is “obscured and hidden by our laboured quibbles.” In short, Luzzatto’s power of probable glimmer or insight is sharply opposed to the intellectual and discursive faculties; the more we abandon the latter and let the probable work on its own, untainted by subtle reasoning, the truer its instincts for the good. Recall that the primary role of philosophy in Socrates is to combat superstition and impiety. This marks a shift from the Discourse on the State of the Jews, which assigns to biblical religion the primary role to fight the war against superstition, a view that, Bernard Septimus has argued, Luzzatto adopts from Maimonides.52 Here, in the Socrates, that negative task of biblical religion is assigned to philosophy, that is, not to revelation or a revealed religion. The supe51 52

Luzzatto, 369–371. Bernard Septimus, “Biblical Religion and Political Rationality in Simone Luzzatto, Maimonides, and Spinoza,” in Jewish Thought in the Seventeenth Century, ed. Isadore Twersky and Bernard Septimus (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987), 399–415.

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rior light that reveals the probable that in turn discerns the good and guides one’s life is also a natural power in each person, one dedicated to action and the practical. Likewise, Socrates’s divine-like daemon turns out to be the natural faculty of the probable. Thus Luzzatto is never a fideist arguing for supernatural revelation from the weakness and uncertainty of human reason. Rather, given the limitations of the human intellect to acquire certainty and apodictic knowledge in theōria, Luzzatto makes practical virtue and good action (including observance of public religious practices) the telos of a human life. If this is on the right track, Luzzatto’s Socrates should not be read as a work in the tradition of ancient scepticism but, to anticipate Kant, as a work of critical philosophy: in place of the unobtainable certainty of theoretical knowledge, the best human life is one neither of intellectual perfection nor of tranquillity but of practical action for the good of humanity.

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Is Socrates’s impresa a Key to Unlock Its Identity?

With this background, I want to close this paper with some speculative remarks about the striking image on the cover page of Socrates, to see whether it can throw some light on our question: what kind of work is Socrates? The engraved image depicts a silkworm emerging from its cocoon, two little black dots of eyes staring directly at us, wings outstretched, and two small wings emerging from its head like the antennae of an extraterrestrial creature in a science fiction film. Above the worm, a motto on a banner proclaims “L’Ordito Lacero” which is translated as either “I Lacerate the Weft” or “The Lacerated Weft.”53 This image and motto belong to a unique art form known as the impresa (literally, “device,” “endeavour,” something like an exercise; plural: imprese) literature that was created by the academies that emerged in early modern Italy as intellectual institutions independent of the universities. As Evelien Chayes writes, “the impresa was a literary genre […] meant to summarily apprehend, to encapsulate, the life of the person or persona represented,”54 that is, the traits either of an individual member in an academy or of the academy itself. Descended from the heraldic signs of court culture and coats of arms, an impresa consisted of the name of the individual; a motto in Greek, Latin, or Hebrew; an engraving of a non-human figure, often a bizarre, ridiculous animal or natural creature; and 53 54

Evelien Chayes has pointed out to me that the translation “lacerated” requires that lacero be read as an abbreviation of lacerato. Evelien Chayes, “Crossing Cultures in the Venetian Ghetto. Leone Modena, the Accademia degli Incogniti and Imprese Literature,” Bollettino di italianistica 2 (2017): 62–88, esp. 67.

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an explanation in prose or poetry. The impresa on the cover page of Socrates contains (1) the persona-name “Simone Luzzatto, Venetian Jew” (and “Venetian Jew” may be a stereotypical label like “Parisian lifestyle” rather than a factual description, that is, “A Jew residing/born in Venice”); (2) the ridiculous engraved image, the silkworm emerging from its cocoon; (3) the motto “L’Ordito Lacero”; and (4) the explanation: “A Book That Shows How Deficient Human Understanding Can Be When It Is Not Led by Divine Revelation.”55 The Venetian academy, or intellectual circle, at whose meetings Luzzatto was “probably present” was the Accademia degli Incogniti, founded by Gianfrancesco Loredan, which met from circa 1628 till Loredan’s death in 1661 and brought together Christians and Jews from the Ghetto, including Rabbi Leon Modena (who himself had a musical academy in which he collaborated with Salomone Rossi), the poet Sara Copia Sullam (whose own salon may have been a precursor to the Incogniti), and other rabbis who were invited to debate and attend, such as Salomon Ḥai de Serval, Isaiah ben Eliezer Ḥayyim Nizza—and Luzzatto.56 A natural place to look, then, for an explication of the impresa of Socrates would be in the literature produced by the Incogniti and other contemporary Academicians. In his encyclopedia The Theatre of Imprese (Teatro d’imprese), a compilation of imprese, their images, and mottos, published in 1623, Abbot Giovanni Ferro lists the silkworm among the engraved images of imprese. According to Michela Torbidoni, Ferro describes the silkworm: as a small worm, the maker of a very fine weft in which it remains rashly imprisoned […] [O]nly after many days of captivity does the silkworm emerge [and, depending on how] one interprets the cocoon […] as a grave or as a cradle […] this act of freeing itself might either be seen as a rising again or as a rebirth. [Because] the silkworm’s new form is that of a butterfly […] this insect is a most suitable metaphor for the human soul,

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Throughout this section I am much indebted to the scholarship of Evelien Chayes; see her “Crossing Cultures”; “The Creation of Modernity in the Accademie: Bridging Literature, Philosophy and the Occult,” in Officine del nuovo. Sodalizi fra letterati, artisti ed editori nella cultura italiana fra Riforma e Controriforma (Atti del Simposio internazionale, Utrecht 8– 10 novembre 2007), eds. Harald Hendrix and Paolo Procaccioli (Manziana: Vecchiarelli, 2008), 469–477; and “Language of Words and Images in the Rime degli Academici occulti 1568: Reflections of the Pre-conceptual?,” in Language and Cultural Change. Aspects of the Study and Use of Language in the Later Middle Ages and the Renaissance, ed. Lodi Nauta (Leuven: Peeters, 2006), 149–171; see Torbidoni, “Italian Academies.” For further references to the impressive scholarship on the impresa, see the notes in these articles. See Chayes, “Crossing Cultures,” 70–75. The quoted phrase about Luzzatto is found on 75.

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compelled to remain within the body and then, after its death, becoming free to fly up to the sky thank to the Platonic wings of truth and good.57 To begin with, it should be noted that Ferro’s account incorrectly takes the silkworm’s cocoon, which is unwound to make silk, to be a weft which is either the widthwise threads or yarn used in weaving or an article of woven fabric. The lacerated weft in Luzzatto’s motto should not, then, simply be identified with the cocoon depicted in his image. Ferro also thinks that the silkworm is transformed into a butterfly. In reality the silkworm is the caterpillar of a (domestic) silk moth, the bombyx mori, often found on mulberry trees (their preferred food); a silkworm belongs to a different species from a butterfly but both belong to the one order of Lepidoptera. Unfortunately, we cannot interpret Luzzatto’s impresa image of the silkworm along Ferro’s lines—namely, to symbolise the immortal soul liberated from the body—because it does not fit what Luzzatto says about the soul in the text of Socrates. The soul is identified with “the principle of things” which in turn is identified with the intellect, “the supreme magistrate,”58 and Socrates uses the three terms “intellect,” “soul,” and “the principle of things” more or less interchangeably, drawing conceptual relations among them. For example, when investigating “the nature of the soul’s [emphasis mine] essence,” Socrates says he “encountered the same difficulties that had already arisen when dealing with the ancient principles of things [emphasis mine] […] indeed the author asserted the soul to be like their asserted principles of things.”59 And some of the theories of the soul he enumerates are explicitly theories of the intellect. The last of these theories of the soul/intellect/principle of things is that it is “an immortal essence dwelling in the body.”60 But Socrates far from endorses this last opinion. Instead, he argues that the endless, irresolvable disagreement among the theories and schools over the soul/intellect/principle “demonstrates the scale of the deficiency of our understanding in acknowledging its own

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Torbidoni, “Italian Academies,” 79–80, especially n36. As Torbidoni explains, this view is based on Marsilo Ficini’s account of the Platonic myth of the soul or mind as a charioteer and was a recurring theme in discussions of the Incogniti. See also Chayes, “L’Accademia degli Incogniti: tra Talmud e Kabbalah,” in Oltre le mura del Ghetto: Accademie, scetticismo e tolleranza nella Venezia barocca, Giuseppe Veltri and Evelien Chayes (Palermo: New Digital Press, 2016). Chayes shows that the image of the two wings of the soul, harking back to Ficini, was popular in many Venetian academies where the topic of the soul/intellect was frequently discussed, thus explaining why it is so prominent in Academicians’ discorsi. Luzzatto, Socrates, 213. Luzzatto, 213. Luzzatto, 215.

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essential nature.”61 Once again, this is the sceptical trope diaphōnia. But if one’s soul/intellect is what one really is, the true self, this is to say that Socrates’s bottom line is that all we know is that we do not know ourselves, as Socrates famously interpreted the Delphic imperative “Know thyself.” Such knowledge, or lack thereof, is hardly the basis for the immortality of the soul. Proofs of immortality generally proceed by establishing a perfection achieved by the soul in virtue of which it is immortal. Luzzatto’s argument demonstrates the imperfection of our souls and intellects precisely because we do not know even ourselves, let alone “the most hidden and remote causes of the universe.”62 In sum, if we take the image in the impresa of Socrates to express the idea of the immortality of the soul, that is simply not a thesis defended or affirmed in the work itself. Nor is it evident what the immortality of the soul might have to do with the motto “I Lacerate the Weft” or “The Lacerated Weft.” If we interpret the weft (which, to repeat, is not a cocoon) as the fabric of knowledge, or perhaps of authoritative received knowledge, that Socrates tears apart through his sceptical questioning, then it would be reasonable to interpret the motto to express Luzzatto’s “commitment to sceptically deconstructing any assumed knowledge and dogmatic belief built up by the human intellect, like the weft made by the silkworm.”63 That is, the “I” in the motto “I Lacerate the Weft,” is Luzzatto, or Socrates, or the sceptic, who dissects and tears apart bodies of purported knowledge—and whose only knowledge is to know that he knows nothing. But this still does not explain the ridiculous image. Let me end with a conjecture. Evelien Chayes has pointed to Kabbalistic themes in writings of the Incogniti, which is not surprising because it is well known that the classic texts of the Jewish mystical tradition and, in particular, the Zohar, were seriously studied in Venice.64 Now, the most famous silkworm in Jewish literature and thought 61 62 63 64

Luzzatto, 215. Luzzatto, 215. Torbidoni, “Italian Academies,” 81. See Chayes, “Crossing Cultures,” 85–86; Veltri and Chayes, Oltre le mura del Ghetto, 47– 146 for references to Kabbalah; on Kabbalah in Venice, see also Ruderman, “Science and Skepticism,” 160; Yaacob Dweck, The Scandal of Kabbalah: Leon Modena, Jewish Mysticism, Early Modern Venice (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011); Howard Adelman, Rabbi Leon Modena and the Christian Kabbalists (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1985), 727– 730; Boaz Huss, “The Anthological Interpretation: The Emergence of Anthologies of Zohar Commentaries in the Seventeenth Century,” Prooftexts: A Journal of Jewish Literary History 19 (1999): 1–19; Yona Dureau, “Venise et Safed: un lien kabbalistique du messianisme européen au xvie siècle,”Littérature et prophéties: Littérature et prophéties à la Renaissance 4 (2000): 65–89. (I am indebted here to Evelien Chayes for correspondence and for directing me to this literature.) We also have much evidence that many kabbalistic texts were

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is that of the Zohar i:15a.65 The context is “In the Beginning” (Parāšat bĕreʾšît), but what is created is not the heaven and earth but bînah, which is emanated by ḥokhmah under the impulse of keter, the Ein Sof. Commenting on the word “Zohar, Radiance!” which is both the name of the book and the term that signifies the process of emanation, the author of the Zohar writes: Sowing seed for its glory, like the seed of fine purple silk wrapping itself within, weaving itself a palace, constituting its praise, availing all […]. With this beginning (reʾšît), the unknown concealed one created the Palace. This palace is called elohim, God. The secret is: With Beginning ____ created elohim.66 That is, the ineffable unknown keter or Ein sof (symbolised by the ellipsis “____”) with, or employing, ḥôkmah (“Beginning”) as its instrument, created elohim, the palace of bînah. Commenting on this passage, Daniel Matt, the contemporary English translator of the Zohar, notes: “As the silkworm spins a cocoon out of its own substance, so ḥôkmah, the point of beginning, expands into the palace of bînah.”67 Here in the Zohar, the figure of the silkworm is an image of a constructive and expansive process of knowledge creation and the birth of understanding: the source of knowledge, ḥôkmah, emanates itself into an encompassing, comprehensive, indeed comprehending palace, bînah, which it fills and swells.68 If this is Luzzatto’s prooftext for his image, he also radically reinterprets it. The Hebrew word bînah recalls hītbônnenût, contemplation, especially of nature, and the deep understanding that enables one to infer what is implied from general principles, mēvîn davar mi-tokh davar: applying premises to draw conclusions, especially practical directives how to act. Indeed the Safed Kabbalist Moses Cordovero took bînah to be the source

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published by the presses of Venice in the seventeenth century. In sum, although it was surely controversial—with sympathizers if not advocates like Eliezer Ḥayyim Nizza and perhaps even Luzzatto, and with critics like Leon Modena—kabbalah had a live presence in seventeenth-century Venice. The Zohar: Pritzker Edition, 12 Volumes, trans. and comm. Daniel C. Matt (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004). The Zohar, 111. Matt also cites a passage in the Midrashic collection Genesis Rabba 21:5 that compares “the locust whose garment is of itself,” whose wings are his garment, to the wings of an angel that are his clothing. The archaic root is byn or bn. For the meaning of bînah in the Zohar and kabbalistic literature, see Matt’s introduction to The Zohar, vol. 1 and Moshe Idel, Kabbalah: New Perspectives (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), 140, 198.

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of ethics. Thus the palace of bînah encompasses practical knowledge. Now, the silkworm, among all insects, is an artisan, a producer of the raw materials of silk, and hence, of clothing—the most elegant, best garments—a paradigmatic human artefact. The knowledge of the silkworm is practical knowledge, ethics, the knowledge of good and evil manifest in the clothing Adam and Eve created after eating of the Tree of Knowledge. Thus the motto and image of Luzzatto’s impresa complement each other. With one hand, Luzzatto cum Socrates lacerates, cuts up, and tears through philosophical and scientific theories, the products of pure intellect, demonstrating the limits of human understanding. With the other hand, he offers us a model of practical knowledge drawn from the innocent contemplation of nature, from knowledge of how to act. Perhaps this might also serve as a non-fideistic explication of the explanation “A Book That Shows How Deficient Human Understanding Can Be When It Is Not Led by Divine Revelation.” If this divine—or natural—revelation, like Socrates’s daemon, is not supernatural but the inborn, hardwired grasp of the probable, practical knowledge that guides action, Luzzatto’s impresa affirms the primacy of the knowable practical over the unknowable theoretical.69

Bibliography Adelman, Howard. Rabbi Leon Modena and the Christian Kabbalists. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1985. Chayes, Evelien. “The Creation of Modernity in the Accademie: Bridging Literature, Philosophy and the Occult.” In Officine del nuovo. Sodalizi fra letterati, artisti ed editori nella cultura italiana fra Riforma e Controriforma (Atti del Simposio internazionale, Utrecht 8–10 Novembre 2007), edited by Harald Hendrix and Paolo Procaccioli, 469– 477. Manziana: Vecchiarelli, 2008.

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In closing I should note that it is striking, as Evelien Chayes also mentions (personal communication), how very little explicit mention or even allusion to any subject or source identifiably Jewish or rabbinic there is in Socrates despite the fact that it is written by a well-known, learned rabbi. Perhaps this reflects its intended audience, although we know almost nothing about why Luzzatto wrote the book and under what circumstances. Chayes suggests (personal communication) that Socrates’s turn to probability and the primacy of the practical in the face of the limitations of the intellect and theōría may reflect the rabbinic focus on performance of the commandments and Halakah. Perhaps, but it should also be remembered that some rabbinic figures, most notably Maimonides, who is arguably an influence on Luzzatto (Septimus, “Biblical Religion”, see above n52), see theōría and intellectual perfection rather than the practical and Halakhah as the essential core of the Torah and rabbinic Judaism. The question deserves more exploration.

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Chayes, Evelien. “Crossing Cultures in the Venetian Ghetto. Leone Modena, the Accademia degli Incogniti and Imprese Literature.” Bollettino di italianistica 2 (2017): 62–88. Chayes, Evelien. “L’Accademia degli Incogniti: tra Talmud e Kabbalah.” In Oltre le mura del Ghetto: accademie, scetticismo e tolleranza nella Venezia Barocca, Giuseppe Veltri and Evelien Chayes, 47–119. Palermo: New Digital Press, 2016. Chayes, Evelien. “Language of Words and Images in the Rime degli Academici occulti 1568: Reflections of the Pre-conceptual?” In Language and Cultural Change. Aspects of the Study and Use of Language in the Later Middle Ages and the Renaissance, edited by Lodi Nauta, 149–171. Leuven: Peeters, 2006. Dweck, Yaacob. The Scandal of Kabbalah: Leon Modena, Jewish Mysticism, Early Modern Venice. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011. Dureau, Yona. “Venise et Safed: un lien kabbalistique du messianisme européen au xvie siècle.” Littérature et prophéties: Littérature et prophéties à la Renaissance 4 (2000): 65–89. Hume, David. Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993. Huss, Boaz. “The Anthological Interpretation: The Emergence of Anthologies of Zohar Commentaries in the Seventeenth Century.” Prooftexts: A Journal of Jewish Literary History 19 (1999): 1–19. Idel, Moshe. Kabbalah: New Perspectives. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988. Krinis, Ehud. Judah Halevi’s Fideistic Scepticism in The Kuzari. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2020. Luzzatto, Simone. Socrates, or on Human Knowledge—Bilingual Edition. Edited, translated, and commented by Giuseppe Veltri and Michela Torbidoni. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2019. Maimonides, Moses. Guide of the Perplexed. Translated by Shlomo Pines. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963. Ruderman, David B. “Science and Skepticism: Simone Luzzatto on Perceiving the Natural World.” In Jewish Thought and Scientific Discovery in Early Modern Europe, edited by Ruderman, 153–184. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995. Septimus, Bernard. “Biblical Religion and Political Rationality in Simone Luzzatto, Maimonides, and Spinoza.” In Jewish Thought in the Seventeenth Century, edited by Isadore Twersky and Bernard Septimus, 399–415. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987. Sextus Empiricus. Outlines of Scepticism, edited by Julia Annas and Jonathan Barnes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. Stern, Josef. The Matter and Form of Maimonides’ Guide. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013. Torbidoni, Michela. “The Italian Academies and Rabbi Simone Luzzatto’s Socrate: The Freedom of the Ingenium and the Soul.” In Yearbook of the Maimonides Centre for Advanced Studies, edited by Bill Rebiger, 71–94. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2017.

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Veltri, Giuseppe and Evelien Chayes. Oltre le mura del Ghetto: Accademie, scetticismo e tolleranza nella Venezia barocca. Palermo: New Digital Press, 2016. The Zohar: Pritzker Edition, 12 Volumes. Translated and commented by Daniel C. Matt. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004.

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Sextus Empiricus’s Works as Guideline for Simone Luzzatto’s Socratic Ignorance Michela Torbidoni

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Introduction

Although Luzzatto’s Socrates focuses on the state of rational knowledge alone, as is evident from the great amount of ancient and modern Greek doctrines listed there, the wisdom derived from the biblical tradition frames the entire work; David Ruderman has already pointed out that the balanced and simple sentences of the biblical passages mark the boundaries of the alternating and complex doctrines of human science, even though the latter constitute the main body of the work.1 Divine revelation delimits the boundaries of truth, beyond which begins the sphere of the probable, of doubt, which Luzzatto entrusts to Socratic investigation. It may be interesting to note that the figure of Socrates emerging from Luzzatto’s book, and which he easily reshapes by attributing to him all the characteristics of the sceptical sage,2 seems to find similarities neither with the sophist Socrates of Aristophanes, nor with the moralist depicted by Xenophon—although the latter had enjoyed greater fortune, especially in the Renaissance,3 in particular in the libertine milieu with which Luzzatto certainly had contacts.4 The constant references to themes and characters of Platonic dialogues (in the marginalia that guide the reading there are also direct 1 David B. Ruderman, “Science and Skepticism: Simone Luzzatto on Perceiving the Natural World,” in Jewish Thought and Scientific Discovery in Early Modern Europe, ed. Ruderman (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), 163–164. 2 On the figure of Socrates in Luzzatto’s thinking see Michela Torbidoni, “Socratic Impulse, Secular Tendency, and Jewish Emancipation: A Comparison between Simone Luzzatto and Moses Mendelssohn,” in Yearbook of the Maimonides Centre for Advanced Studies, ed. Yoav Meyrav (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2019), 11–29. 3 On Socrates’s reception history see Donald R. Morrison, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Socrates (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Michael Trapp, ed., Socrates from Antiquity to the Enlightenment (New York: Routledge, 2016). 4 See Giuseppe Veltri and Evelien Chayes, Oltre le mura del ghetto: Accademie, scetticismo, tolleranza nella Venezia barocca (Palermo: New Digital Press, 2016); Michela Torbidoni, “The Italian Academies and Rabbi Simone Luzzatto’s Socrate: The Freedom of the Ingenium and the Soul,” in Yearbook of the Maimonides Centre for Advanced Studies, ed. Bill Rebiger (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2017), 71–94.

© Michela Torbidoni, 2024 | doi:10.1163/9789004694262_004

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reminders of the Sophist and Charmides of Plato) suggest that Luzzatto was well acquainted with Plato’s philosophy and that he may have drawn inspiration from his dialogues to delineate a Socratic figure suitable for the success of his work. The character represented by the rabbi is in fact a dialectical Socrates, devoted to self-searching and well aware of the limits of human knowledge, as Socrates emerges also from the early Platonic dialogues. As in the Apology, from which the rabbi’s work has evidently taken shape, Luzzatto’s Socrates begins by defending himself against the same accusations brought against him by Aristophanes in The Clouds, in which he was considered a sophist, a promoter of a dangerous relativity of opinion, and a supporter of the study of nature. As in the Platonic work, Luzzatto’s Socrates, right at the start, underlines his lifelong application to the examination of himself and of what knowledge is. Moved by the same biting irony of the Platonic Socrates, Luzzatto’s Socrates questions his interlocutors, refuting their opinions and concluding in most cases without finding any satisfactory answers. Luzzatto skilfully plays with irony and dissimulation as a way to fuel a general sense of uncertainty and a sceptical atmosphere. The doubt is methodologically applied to phenomenal reality without affecting the essence or truth of things. This phenomenalist scepticism, according to which human knowledge is limited to the sphere of appearance, without denying the existence of things’ reality, must be dated back to Sextus’s Outlines of Pyrrhonism. The pattern followed by Luzzatto’s Socrates was indeed strongly inspired by Sextus’s work: the ten tropes lead his enquiry through the subjectivity of human perception, a source of continual illusion, or the inconstancy of the state of the whole up to the final acknowledgement of the inscrutability of any object by itself. Like Sextus, Luzzatto’s Socrates is convinced that the suspension of judgement (epochē) is the correct attitude towards the world, because every statement is subject to irreconcilable conflicts (diaphōnia). Equipollence, which demands the suspension of judgement which they believe restores peace of mind or tranquillity (ataraxia), reigns in every enquiry that sceptics undertake. This essay aims to investigate Luzzatto’s acquaintance with Sextus Empiricus’s writings, that is, one of the fundamental and most widespread sources of early modern scepticism. As Richard Popkin pointed out, only after the publication of Sextus Empiricus’s works, and most of all after the example of Montaigne, did the interest in scepticism go hand in hand with a real awareness of its philosophical scope.5 This paper intends to show that, like Montaigne’s

5 Richard H. Popkin, The History of Scepticism: From Savonarola to Bayle (New York: Oxford Uni-

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work, Luzzatto’s thought is also characterised by a revitalisation of Sextus’s Outlines and a serious philosophical commitment to sceptical issues. The present study will focus on the recurrence of Sextus’s Outlines of Pyrrhonism within Luzzatto’s Socrates, or on Human Knowledge6 (1651) in order to show to which extent the famous ten tropes have affected the development of his arguments. In the rabbi’s work, a clear homage to the writings of Sextus can be found not only in the method, but also in the variety of images and metaphors that populate his narrative fabric. For this reason a part of this contribution will also deal with Sextus’s second surviving work, Against the Mathematicians, whose rich biographical repertoire seems to be recalled within Luzzatto’s characterisation of some significant figures in his Socrates. Through his Socrates, Luzzatto proceeds through the opinions or dogmata on the nature of things and the instruments of knowledge defended by different philosophical schools, showing how they tend to refute each other because of the equal force of contrary reasons. Following the more general line of not denying or affirming anything, he subjects everything to examination and doubt. The suspension of judgement, professed by Socrates in Luzzatto’s work, constitutes the ultimate goal of a series of arguments that recall, in form and structure, the famous ten tropes of Sextus. As is well known, the ten tropes are arguments developed in order to deny any form of thought stemming from any kind of dogmatism. Some of the ten tropes refer to the subjective perception of individuals, others to the varying states of things, hence their different qualities, and the unfathomable condition of the object itself. Some others refer to what Francis Bacon called “idols of the theatre” and, as in Bacon, they constitute a significant pars destruens. The final part of this paper will argue in favour of the possibility to read this overall pars destruens, designed in the light of Sextus’s works, as meant to pave the way for a pars construens, and will discuss to which extent Socrates, the most restless mind in Western culture, must be considered a key figure of Luzzatto’s project.

versity Press, 2003), 47–48; José Raimundo Maia Neto, “Le probabilisme académicien dans le scepticisme français de Montaigne à Descartes,” Revue philosophique de la France et de l’étranger 138, no. 4 (2013): 467–484; John C. Laursen and Gianni Paganini, eds., Skepticism and Political Thought in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2015). 6 Simone Luzzatto, Socrates, or on Human Knowledge—Bilingual edition, ed., trans., and comm. Giuseppe Veltri and Michela Torbidoni (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2019).

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The Object as an Image Reflected by Our Senses: Socrates’s Dialogue with a Mirror Maker

The first trope of Sextus’s Outlines focuses on the variety of perceptions7 in the spheres of sight, hearing, smell, and taste in animal and human worlds and on how the different organic configurations fuelled these differences. Through the metaphor of mirrors he clarifies his view: It is likely, then, that those animals (such as goats, cats and the like) which have slanting and elongated pupils, should view existing objects differently and not in the same way as animals with round pupils suppose them to be. Mirrors, depending on their differing constructions, sometimes show external objects as minute (e.g. concave mirrors), sometimes as elongated and narrow (convex mirrors); and some of them show the head of the person reflected at the bottom and their feet at the top.8 Sextus turns his attention to a relevant aspect, namely that “we shall not be able ourselves to decide between our own appearances and those of other animals, being ourselves a part of the dispute and for that reason more in need of someone to decide than ourselves able to judge.”9 Luzzatto’s Socrates revives the same analysis of senses as Sextus’s Outlines. As I have already underlined, in the rabbi’s work we find the common sceptical intent to undermine every opinion traditionally accepted as true, promoting a relativism not of being but of appearing: “I said that anyone who propounds to judge beautiful things should always state this with a cautious ‘as it appears to my senses.’”10 Luzzatto’s statement recalls the following passage from Sextus’s work: “I shall be able to say how each existing object appears to me, but for these reasons I shall be forced to suspend judgement on how it is by nature.”11 Like Sextus’s, Luzzatto’s scepticism also weakens any possibility of tracing a single path to the truth and at the same time promotes the idea that each object has as many appearances as there are differences in the dispositions of our sensory organs:

7 8 9 10 11

Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism, eds. Julia Annas and Jonathan Barnes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 13. Sextus, 15. Sextus, 17. Luzzatto, Socrates, 163. Sextus, Outlines, 22.

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From the aforementioned observations, I drew the belief that one may find various manners of sensory faculties in the field and range of Nature, not only very different from ours, but also more exact. Therefore, it also seems easier to me to think that every object may have infinite appearances and qualities in conformity with the connection and relationship that it might have with the different and countless varieties of senses. This produces dissimilar appearances of the same thing according to the different dispositions of the sensory organs, since they change because of the various structures, configurations, compositions, and positions of these sensory organs.12 The influence that physical alterations and other signs of bodily disturbances can exert on our sensory organs also plays a crucial role in debating this matter. In this regard, Luzzatto reports the case, already discussed by Sextus, of someone who, suffering from jaundice and according to the opinion of the time, saw the surrounding world as yellow: “The yellow-coloured humour hidden in the eyes of those affected with jaundice makes all visible external things appear this colour, and if they were not warned by others of their infirmity being the cause of their error, they would constantly judge them to be yellow.”13 Luzzatto stressed the issue of the relativity of perception by the comparison with the animal world,14 which upsets the commonly accepted parameters of human conduct: Although external light is commonly a medium of colours for animals, nevertheless it blinds bats, and darkness rather allows them to see. Likewise, daily experience demonstrates the same to us concerning the other senses: one may behold that absinthe seems to be very bitter to our palate, while it is of a pleasant flavour to [those of] other animals. While salt irritates us, it turns out to be highly delightful to sheep, and likewise sugar is very tasty to us and entirely unpleasant to them. While we completely abhor excrement and carcasses, the dog, although it has a fine sense of smell, is not irritated by them; on the other hand, musk, civet, and amber are very fragrant and pleasant to us and not delightful to it. Music pleases our ears above all, while it is not remarkable to the hare, although its hear-

12 13 14

Luzzatto, Socrates, 127. Luzzatto, 95. On this topic see Anna Lissa, “La zooantropologia scettica nella visione luzzattiana del gran teatro del mondo,” in Filosofo e rabbino nella Venezia del Seicento. Studi su Simone Luzzatto, ed. Giuseppe Veltri (Ariccia: Aracne, 2015), 91–182.

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ing surpasses [that of] any other animal. Concerning this, it is also said that the tarantula, the vilest insect, appreciates the melody and harmony of a voice without receiving instruction from any teacher or practising any delightful discipline. Since foods are naturally very insipid but then easily absorb flavours, clothes originally lack colour in themselves but can then easily be dyed any colour, and we—if we are not already in love with someone—show ourselves to be equally well-disposed to all people, I also deemed the same regarding this matter. Thus, I often doubted that an object which seemed to be many things was actually any of those things it looked and appeared to be. Therefore, I considered that since the external objects may be represented in infinite ways, none of their appearances that we perceive displays their essences.15 Sextus, in the first trope, focused especially on those animals in which not only perception but also virtue surpassed human excellence, as the case of the dog which is known not only by its sense of smell, but also by the sense of justice with which it shows affection to its benefactors and aggression against strangers.16 Through this example Sextus also polemicises against those dogmatists, in this case the Stoics, who defended the superiority of human beings above the animal world based on the assumption that they were the only ones who could perfectly reflect the light of the Logos.17 By analogy with Sextus, Luzzatto never defines animals as unreasonable, but he praises their sensory and rational excellence: There are some vile animals which are endowed with a much greater sensory faculty than ours, to such an extent that we could state that their [senses] are indeed different from ours. A dog distinguishes a friend from a stranger with its sense of smell, and just as it uses this in travelling, so we [use] reason to direct our path. This also happens for nearly every kind of fish and bird, which, in crossing wide seas, arrive at the intended place without any mistakes, even while lacking instruments such as quadrants, magnets, and geographic and hydrographic maps.18 The results of this comparison with the animal world lead Socrates to a dialogue with a mirror maker. Like in Sextus’s work, there are many references to 15 16 17 18

Luzzatto, Socrates, 127–129. Sextus, Outlines, 19. See Giovanni Reale, Il pensiero antico (Milan: Vita e Pensiero, 2001). Luzzatto, Socrates, 123.

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mirrors in Luzzatto’s Socrates, clearly increased by an advanced knowledge due to the new optical studies of Athanasius Kircher.19 The mirror maker, who appears in the plot of Socrates at this point, is a controversial figure. The craftsman agrees with the Socratic idea that the representation of the objects reflected in the mirrors varies according to their surface, which can be of many kinds. However, he adds a new element to this, namely his belief in the existence, alongside the infinite number of irregular mirrors, of “a single plane surface” capable of faithfully reflecting the “true” image of the object. According to the mirror maker it can be deduced from the observation of the surface of mirrors that there is only one truth and that human beings, endowed with perfect sensory organs, are its sole repository because of the privileged position they have been assigned in this world: And just as there are infinite species of curved and irregular mirrors, so there is only one plane one. Hence, I would consider that something similar happens with the sensations: since great Nature took so much care in forming and constituting human beings, placing us in the middle of the universe as the only spectators of its beauty, it is thus reasonable to believe that it must have provided us with such exact and excellent faculties and organs that, like plane mirrors, they sincerely show us the true qualities of external things. Furthermore, the sensory organs of brute animals, which we see as being different to those of humankind, look like curved, bent, and irregular mirrors.20 According to the craftsman, our sensory organs, like plane mirrors, can only report truthfully and accurately the image of external objects. The thesis put forward by the craftsman is immediately rejected by Socrates’s arguments aimed at showing the natural weakness of human senses. The mirror maker is a figure that probably took shape in Luzzatto’s imagination on the basis of the similar polemic of Sextus against the Stoics, but that certainly recalls a dogmatism that at Luzzatto’s time could not be limited to Stoicism alone, but should be extended also to the instances of Christian anthropocentrism. The mirror maker, interpreter of the Ptolemaic-Scholastic conception, presents the human mind as a plane surface capable of a faithful reflection of the truth. The debate with the mirror maker points to a significant change of perspective in the process of dismantling the medieval scholastic vision of knowledge

19 20

See Athanasius Kircher, Ars magna lucis et ombrae (Rome: Ludovici Grignani, 1646), x, 2. Luzzatto, Socrates, 131.

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in favour of a new modern view. This revolution was also achieved by the refinement of mirror-making techniques from the end of the fifteenth century, especially in Lorraine and Venice. The invention of glass mirrors favoured clearer and sharper vision than the metal ones that had been widely used for several centuries.21 In spite of the advancement of the understanding of the mechanisms of vision during the modern age, mirrors began to be accepted as the symbol of illusion, of the world’s deception. That the reflected image, from that moment on, was so real reinforced the sense of bewilderment that the sight of the self, as another, began to entail. Mirrors thus came to lose their metaphysical meaning in a certain sense, favouring instead a modern reflection on the illusory nature of life and the world. The image reflected in mirrors participates in the decomposition of being and appearing, which in parallel fuels the Pyrrhonian crisis and thus the spread of doubt in the sphere of knowledge. Socrates’s opposition to the mirror maker’s argument thus reveals his closeness to this new perspective, opened up by modernity with the decline of the anthropocentric conception of the cosmos in the face of the astronomical discoveries of Copernicus and Galilei. Behind the figure of the mirror maker there is the optimistic assimilation of human cognitive capacities to the plane surface of the mirror, which thinkers such as Bacon had also accepted, albeit in the sense of a hoped-for hypothesis. Among Bacon’s ambitions put forth in his Novum Organum22 there was also that of restoring a genuine, human vision of nature, eliminating the curvatures of a subjective perception of reality like that of irregular mirrors’ surfaces. On the contrary, Luzzatto’s polemic, coherent with the sceptical tendency of his time, always remained within the limits of criticism against the excellence of human capacities, promoting the idea of a knowledge capable of revealing “a truth,” the human one. Luzzatto is evidently affected by the breakdown of the distinction between being and appearing, but as a rabbi he seems to be mostly willing to show the illusions and falsehoods deriving from it only in the empirical sense.

21

22

On the history of mirrors see Debora Shuger, “The ‘I’ of the Beholder. Renaissance Mirrors and the Reflexive Mind,” in Renaissance Culture and Everyday, eds. Patricia Fumerton and Simon Hunt (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999), 21–41; Sara J. Schechner, “Between Knowing and Doing: Mirrors and Their Imperfections in the Renaissance,” Early Science and Medicine 10, no. 2 (2005): 137–162. Francis Bacon, Novum Organum ii, 13. See Gustavo Bontadini, Studi di filosofia moderna (Milan: Vita e Pensiero, 1996) 75–76.

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3

Criticism of Five Senses: The Debate with the Blind Man Crito

The doubt staged in Luzzatto’s work arises not only from the comparison with the animal world, but also from the aforementioned blurring between being and appearing that affects the knowing subject. The rabbi has certainly been inspired by the second and third tropes of ancient scepticism, according to which “depending on the different dominance of the humours, the appearances too become different.”23 And this, according to Sextus, would explain why one will desire and avoid different or contrary things. Sextus’s tropes aim to show the impossibility of grasping the external object in itself, because it appears only through the filter of our perceptions, which vary according to our internal conditions and those of the external object. Sextus’s argument pays particular attention to the different sensory perceptions produced by interacting with the same object, a diversity that also leads him to doubt that perception can really be limited to the five senses commonly accepted. Luzzatto, in accordance with Sextus’s view, alludes to the human presumption that sensory experiences that do not fall within the category of our five senses are impossible, and therefore that the object can also have qualities unknown to us: I beheld that the common people considered these senses to be five [in number], namely eyesight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch. However, I greatly doubted that they would be sufficient in themselves to inform us of all the conditions and appearances of things external to us. I furthermore judged ridiculous those who daringly claimed to infer this quintet from the amount of kinds of sensible things, as if they might make themselves known and manifest to us through other ways and means than the senses; some other times, they became forgetful of their own doctrine and mutually deduced the number of sensible things from that of the senses. Yet leaving aside their instances and their weak argumentation, I considered it very daring to state that the aforementioned five senses were sufficient to inform us about all the conditions of the external things, because we cannot conceive of some sensible things which are unknown to us, nor of other means of perception which we do not have, yet nevertheless, we recklessly try to state that they are impossible.24

23 24

Sextus, Outlines, 22. Luzzatto, Socrates, 117.

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That the object is perceptible only through the five senses is one of those human convictions that Sextus compares to the state of someone who, deaf or blind from birth, is inclined to believe that only the other senses he possesses really exist.25 Sextus’s example has probably provided Luzzatto with a new, essential track for the further development of his narrative: the rabbi, after having expressed his doubt concerning the actual number of human senses, narrates Socrates’s encounter with Crito, who denies the sense of vision. This character, presented as blind from birth, personifies an interesting interlocutor who was responsible for increasing Socrates’s doubt concerning common human beliefs: Crito’s arguments are meant to show the difficulties and absurdities of all theories of vision known to him and consequently also the randomness of the number of our senses: Crito’s argument, so obstinate and persistent against the eyesight, instilled a great suspicion in my mind: as he considered it impossible that the eyesight, one of the greatest senses that we have, could be counted in the catalogue of things, so it might also happen that we could find many other ways of perceiving, although we cannot have cognition of them. And there were other probable clues which persuaded me of this. There are some vile animals which are endowed with a much greater sensory faculty than ours, to such an extent that we could state that their [senses] are indeed different from ours.26 Motivated by Crito’s discourse, Socrates starts to reflect on the excellence of animal sensory perceptions, on the fact that even plants have senses, and finally on the “wonderful qualities of the magnet,” considered to be part of the animal category because it is endowed with a “sensitive soul.” And he concludes that the forms of sensory perception in nature are innumerate and that it cannot be reduced to our five senses: From the aforementioned observations, I drew the belief that one may find various manners of sensory faculties in the field and range of Nature, not only very different from ours, but also more exact. Therefore, it also seems easier to me to think that every object may have infinite appearances and qualities in conformity with the connection and relationship that it might have with the different and countless varieties of senses.

25 26

See Sextus, Outlines, 187. Luzzatto, Socrates, 123.

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This produces dissimilar appearances of the same thing according to the different dispositions of the sensory organs, since they change because of the various structures, configurations, compositions, and positions of these sensory organs.27 The blindness of Crito functions to deconstruct the alleged cognitive perfection deriving from the correct functioning of the five senses, and above all from sight. Luzzatto’s Socrates puts into question the foundation of scholastic wisdom, and from the analysis of the sense of sight, which occupies a role of primary importance in his work, one may grasp this rupture. The priority of vision, as certain testimony of knowledge, formed the basis for Greek gnoseology, which sealed the cognitive power of seeing in the same Greek language in which the verb eidō (to see) has its aorist oida, which takes on the meaning of knowing resulting precisely from “having seen.”28 During the early modern era the sceptical doubt, fostered in part by the spreading of ancient scepticism’s texts and the works of, to name but a few, Galilei, Descartes, and Locke, undermines this certainty. Luzzatto’s Socrates is further evidence of this rupture between the real world and the representation of the senses. Through the critique of sensory perception, Luzzatto promotes a phenomenological scepticism that encloses human beings within the limits of their cognitive possibilities.

4

The Illusions of the Subject: Socrates Argues with “the Panderer” Diotima

The state of the subject perceiving the object, that is, whether they are drunk, delirious, sick, in love, awake or asleep, and also the position, the place or the distance, which characterise the moment of perception, are the topics of fourth and fifth tropes of Sextus. His Outlines greatly affected the Socratic investigation in this regard as well, as is evident by the way the rabbi showed the mistakes and illusions of sight that are due to the state of the subject when they perceive something. By underlining the relativity of the concept of “beauty,” limited in Luzzatto’s work to what appears as such to the one who sees, the rabbi introduces Socrates’s dialogue with Diotima regarding what love is. With 27 28

Luzzatto, 127. See Giorgio Stabile, “Teoria della visione come teoria della conoscenza,” in Dante e la filosofia della natura. Percezioni, linguaggi, cosmologie, ed. Stabile (Florence: sismel– Edizioni del Galluzzo, 2007), 9–29.

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clear reference to Plato’s Symposium, whose myth of Eros was very popular from the Renaissance onwards,29 the figure of Diotima appears to refute the Socrates’s theses. Luzzatto ironically accentuates this aspect and has her get mad at Socrates, whom she holds responsible for having reduced love to a purely ephemeral experience because of his critical analysis of sight. In Luzzatto’s plot Diotima argues against Socrates in the following way: Do you not realise that you have seriously offended me? As the delightful and the beautiful usually torment lovers, they normally anxiously turn to me in order to gain them, and generously reward me for my industry. Indeed, you have persuaded them that they only exist in their eyes; that roses put together with lilies—I mean the beauty of colours—and the grace resulting from symmetrical members dwell only in their eyes when they are in love. They [i. e., the eyes] are the makers of that beauty that they [i. e., the lovers] falsely believe to be found in their beloved women, whom they try to possess and enjoy with so much work and effort. Furthermore, [you have persuaded them] that the object of love must be considered lucky rather than beautiful, because it has encountered a visual organ which, through its beneficial qualities, has made it attract the love of others.30 Diotima’s discourse on love in Plato’s Symposium, which sought to show the relationship of contrariety, and not contradiction, that linked the terms beautiful and ugly,31 left a deep mark on the rabbi’s work. Luzzatto’s critique of sight has been shaped by the original argument of Diotima, who had described love as something intermediate between beauty and ugliness, stressed the value of the desire for beauty, from which the different forms of love originate, and finally turned her attention to the aspiration to the true idea of beauty. However, the rabbi demolishes this famous sapiential figure by referring to her each time with the appellative “panderer” and introducing her in this way: “Dio29

30 31

See Eugenio Garin, La cultura filosofica del Rinascimento italiano. Ricerche e documenti (Florence: Sansoni, 1992); Ernest Cassirer, The individual and Cosmos in Renaissance Philosophy, trans. and intro. Mario Domandi (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010); Christopher S. Celenza, “The Platonic Revival,” in The Cambridge Companion to Renaissance Philosophy, ed. James Hankins (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 72– 96. The role played by the topic of Platonic love within the Jewish philosophical tradition of the Renaissance is also relevant here; see on this the well-known Dialoghi d’amore of Judah Leon Abravanel (Leone Ebreo), published posthumously in 1535. Luzzatto, Socrates, 165. See Plato, Symp. 201e.

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tima, who had gained high esteem in our city thanks to the art of panderism, or procuring, as we prefer to say.”32 Luzzatto makes it evident in her speech that she feels offended by Socrates’s examinations and that her services, meant to heal lovers from their torments, are “generously rewarded” and are basically just deception. It emerges first that she is self-absorbed: Oh Socrates, you seem to be very different than I expected you to be in my mind, and I would never have believed that you might be so ungrateful to me. Indeed, I communicated and revealed to you the most hidden secrets of my art, which must arouse love in humankind, calm hatred, and bring enemy souls back together; and thanks to such learning and exercises, you have gained so much esteem in your republic as to reach the highest authority. Nevertheless, by now denying this great benefit, you are attempting to take away from me that little profit that I earn every day from my profession.33 Then Diotima reproaches Socrates for having awoken lovers from their illusions, and by doing so she implicitly confesses the deception her skills rely on. The so-called arte lenonia, or panderism, has been treated by Cornelius Agrippa in his The Uncertainty and Vanity of Arts and Sciences (1530) in chapter sixtyfour: Now because that by the advice, assistance, and perswasion of Pimps and Bawds, both Whores and Whoremongers commit their mutual Follies; Let us discourse a little concerning their Subtleties and Devices; […] so much the more powerful, as being guarded with the Artillery of many other Arts, and Experience besides: so much the more pernicious, that while it makes use of other Arts and Sciences, whatever there is of poyson in any Art or Science, that this worshipful Vocation wholly sucks to itself; out of which it weaves those Snares, that not like Spiders Cobwebs take the Flies, but let go the stronger Birds; nor like the strong toils of Hunters catch the bigger Beasts of Chace, and let go the less; but such strong Nooses and Bands, that no Maid, no Virgin, no Woman, never so silly, never so prudent, never so constant, never so obstinate, never so bashful, never so fearful, never so confident, but will at length lend a willing ear to a Bawd, & be insured with her perswasions.34 32 33 34

Luzzatto, Socrates, 163. Luzzatto, 165. Henry Cornelius Agrippa, The Vanity of Arts and Sciences (London: Samuel Speed, 1676), 197.

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Agrippa accused many arts and sciences of supporting panderism, pointing to grammar, poetry, rhetoric, history, medicine, and so on, and finally mentioning also the role of “Astrologers, Palmistry, Gypsies, Fortune-tellers, Dreamexpounders, Witches, and Conjurers, an innumerable tribe of Assistants to Pandarism, [who] by a kind of Divine Imposition of their Fallacies upon the disturbed Fancies of Youth, bring unlawful Amours to perfection, contrive and finish most wicked and abominable Marriages, and are they be well knit together, dissolve them by and by into most heinous Adulteries.”35 Agrippa’s account, which is part of a broader meditation on the rubble of Christian society and the cultural crisis of the Renaissance, helps in interpreting Luzzatto’s general aim, which was to show the inconsistency of dogmata established by the history of philosophy over the centuries and the limits that their authority has imposed on free and critical enquiry. By targeting the notion of beauty defended by Diotima, Luzzatto did not address his scepticism to Platonic thought in itself, but (probably) to the Christian Neoplatonism that had found its greatest exponents in the school of Marsilio Ficino and Giovanni Pico della Mirandola. Luzzatto’s criticism may thus be explained as an opposition against the original belief in human value and greatness that had been celebrated from the Renaissance. Luzzatto here delivers his polemical blows by ridiculing the figure of Diotima as a symbol of the sapiential authority that Renaissance Neoplatonic thinkers36 had helped to establish as dogma. The rabbi thus shows that he takes sides against an optimistic dogmatism that placed human beings one step away from divine perfection, in a privileged position with respect to all other creatures and not subjected to chance like the others. Luzzatto begins and develops his entire discussion by insisting on the distance that separates humans from divine perfection, as is evident from his criticism of human perception and judgement, which he so often presents as blurred and incapable of grasping reality. The discussion with Diotima on “beauty” turns to examining the phenomenon of light’s reflection on the object and the consequent variety of colours 35 36

Luzzatto, Socrates, 201. For example, Marsilio Ficino, De Amore (1484); Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, Commento alla canzone d’amore di Girolamo Benivieni (1486). See “Marsilio Ficino,” in Cambridge Translations of Renaissance Philosophical Texts–Moral Philosophy, ed. Jill Kraye, vol. 1, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 29–36; Eugenio Canone, “Il ‘senso’ nei trattati d’amore: Ficino e la fortuna del modello platonico nel Cinquecento,” in Sensus– sensatio, Atti del viii Colloquio Internazionale del Lessico Intellettuale Europeo, Roma, 6–8 gennaio 1995, ed. Massimo L. Bianchi (Florence: Olschki, 1996), 177–198; Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, De hominis dignitate. Heptaplus. De ente et uno e scritti vari, ed. Eugenio Garin (Florence: Vallecchi, 1942).

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obtained. In agreement with Sextus’s view, “position” also plays a major role in determining the diversity of our perception in Luzzatto’s enquiry. Luzzatto borrowed the image of the dove’s neck from the examples given in Sextus’s fifth trope. It is interesting to note that in Socrates the figure of the dove’s neck is placed side by side with phenomena known only to modern science: “Yet the opinion of the most erudite and reasonable wits is that there are definitely some temporary colours which endure as long as they are illuminated by light, such as those appearing in a rainbow, a triangular prism, or a dove’s neck.”37 In this passage Luzzatto refers to the phenomenon of optical diffraction obtained through the use of a triangular prism, an effect known to scholars and alchemists of his time, and also related to the studies on rainbows.38 In Luzzatto’s Socrates ancient and modern wisdom coexist side by side throughout the work, crowding the mind of the reader, who is thus overwhelmed by the products of human science created over the course of several centuries. However, while Sextus’s scepticism leads to the equal reliability of opposing judgements, Luzzatto, strengthened by the scientific progress of his time, openly refutes some proved falsities of ancient and medieval wisdom. As Ruderman has already noted, there is a profound analogy between Luzzatto and Montaigne in this regard.39 The juxtaposition of modern discoveries with the theories of antiquity consistently reinforces Luzzatto’s scepticism, but in a precise direction: he expressly “denies” some ancient and medieval views, and instead applies the sceptical method to modern science contemporary to him. His approach to human wisdom reveals a new historical sensibility and the awareness that even the more refined products of human understanding are always temporary and thus confined to the scientific advancements of each epoch.40

37 38

39 40

Luzzatto, Socrates, 167. See on this topic Paolo Mancosu, “Acoustics and Optics,” in Early Modern Science (The Cambridge History of Science, 3), eds. Katherine Park and Lorraine Daston (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 596–631. See Ruderman, “Science and Skepticism,” 174–175. See Michela Torbidoni, “What does Philosopher à l’antique Mean to Simone Luzzatto? The Sceptical Variation within the Quarrel of the Ancients and the Moderns,” in Luzzatto, Socrates, 530–541.

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From the Theories of Vision to Astronomy: Comparing Ancient and Modern Wisdom

In both Sextus’s and Luzzatto’s arguments, special attention has been paid not only to the state of the knowing subject, but also to the condition of the perceived object. As we will see in this section, Luzzatto’s critical approach to ancient theories of vision and of astronomical knowledge is supported by the idea that it is impossible to know the external object in its purity. The same view has been expressed by Sextus in his sixth trope: “Since no existing object makes an impression on us by itself but rather together with something, it is perhaps possible to say what the mixture is like which results from the external object and the factor with which it is observed, but we cannot say purely what the external existing object is like.”41 The thesis of the unfathomability of the object is corroborated in Luzzatto’s text by numerous examples taken both from the work of Sextus and from modern science. The quantitative and constitutive relationship of the elements that make up objects is the origin of the confusion that follows the perception of external reality. Like in Sextus’s writing, in Luzzatto’s work the topic is discussed through the examination of the phenomenon of chromatic variations. However, while Sextus limited himself to reporting a few examples that show how the greater quantity of a given material could be responsible for the final colouring, Luzzatto instead presents more precise interpretative hypotheses of the colour phenomenon: One may establish from this that all colours universally are reflected light and that they are merely ejected by a certain position and configuration of fixed corpuscles, which permanently constitute all bodies. For if colours were something different, one would not easily deduce how light was necessary to make them appear to the eyes. This is probably the reason why the authors of this opinion suppose that there are some tiny corpuscles on the surfaces of objects, made in many different ways according to the various subjects where they are. These corpuscles, in encountering the light, reflect it in different ways and cause the diversity and variety of colours [that are] visible to us. Therefore, there were some who considered the colour black to be generated by the encounter of light with a tiny congeries of small solid spheres and an empty inter-sphere. However, the white colour was [believed to be] composed of an aggregation

41

Sextus, Outlines, 32.

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of many empty spheres and a full interstice, as it appears in the case of water, which appears to be white once it is turned into foam.42 Luzzatto’s words reveal the overcoming of Aristotelian-scholastic theories of colours, which conceived them as real qualities and so constitutive of bodies themselves, and as showed by the light and not as produced by it.43 It must be stressed that the study of colours was of great interest in the seventeenth century thanks to the works of Robert Boyle, René Descartes, and Isaac Newton;44 and it was precisely at this time that light became the primary object of optical studies, contrary to the classical conceptions that saw our eyes as the true and only thing responsible for sight, while light was merely a means of vision. Thus where modern physical optics essentially dealt with the study of light, ancient optics dealt only with vision, excluding light from such theoretical investigations. Luzzatto’s Socrates offers the reader a detailed overview of ancient and modern models of vision, and a comparison between them. Among them the rabbi mentioned the Platonic45 and Stoic46 views, which consider sight as a fire that originates in the eye and emerges from it and mixes with daylight; he furthermore referred to the Aristotelian conception of light as a vehicle or simple catalyst of sight.47 In addition to these, Luzzatto quotes the most ancient theories of vision, some of which, known since the Homeric age, conceived sight as an “effluvium of visual rays going out of the eye and then coming to the object.”48 The rabbi also recalls the atomists’ theory, then radicalised by Epicurus and finally taken up in the first half of the first century bce by Lucretius, whose On the Nature of Things is constantly quoted throughout Socrates. This materialistic conception of vision through copies or simulacra detaching from the objects recurs in Lucretius’s work, which states that these images, upon entering the eyes, are visually felt in a similar way to how we feel form with our hands.49 In this way sight would be nothing more than a kind of touch.

42 43

44 45 46 47 48 49

Luzzatto, Socrates, 167. Robert Boyle, “Experiments and Considerations Touching Colours,” in The Works of Robert Boyle, vol. 1, ed. Michael Hunter and Edward B. Davis (London: Pickering and Chatto, 1999– 2000), 56. On the studies on colours in early modern time see Paolo Mancosu, “Acoustics and Optics,” 626–629. See Plato, Tim. 45b2, 45d, 67c4, 67d, 67e9, 68a–b, 68d. See Cicero, Nat. d. 1.36; Cicero, Acad. 2.126. See Aristotle, De an. 418a–419b. Luzzatto, Socrates, 93. See Lucretius, De Rerum Natura 4.230–238.

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Luzzatto also tackles an issue intensely debated by the Stoics, namely the difference between the image of the object impressed on the eye and that which is detached from the object. Stoic philosophers had taken care to specify that the imprint the image leaves on the eyes was a double imprint, that is, a negative one and a positive one, due to the hollow and the relief, like the imprint left by a seal on wax. Luzzatto, with an evident reference to this discussion, wrote: And in addition to this, who would not behold another remarkable problem, namely that the image departing from the object and entering the eye should produce a different shape in it from that of the object? We experience that the protrusions of a seal, when it is pressed into wax, become recesses. However, the recesses of the former turn out to be protrusions and projections in the latter. Hence, this should also happen for the impressions of the images dreamt by the authors of this opinion.50 Luzzatto’s examination opposes ancient theories of vision, presented as fanciful theses, to modern optics. However, through the character of Gorgias, the rabbi defines as “the least insane opinion” the vision that is performed in the recesses of the eye. In this way he refers, without explicit quotation, to the principles of Euclid’s geometric optics. This is the earliest treatise that has been passed to us on optics, studied throughout antiquity, in the Middle Ages, and at the beginning of modernity, and is still the basis of geometric optics today. The use of Euclidean science is made clear by the following expression: “the visual organ perceives nothing other than the radial tip of a cone sent by the object.”51 The conception according to which the figure is perceived by visual rays understood as a cone, having its base in the object and its tip in the eye, in fact constitutes the second postulate of Euclid’s Optics. In the first three postulates of the Optics, Euclid laid the foundations of the theory that systematised the doctrine of visual rays: he described the generation of the visual cone, cited by the rabbi in his Socrates, as a divergence of straight lines or visual rays that, starting from the eyes and heading outwards, form a cone whose vertex is located in the eye and whose base is formed on the boundaries of the visible objects. Luzzatto was certainly well acquainted with Euclidean studies; and this is not surprising considering that they were largely taken up by Galilei himself at the end of the sixteenth century. Euclid’s Optics, which was printed in Florence for the first time in the vernacular,52 is the first logical and geometrical 50 51 52

Luzzatto, Socrates, 121. Luzzatto, Socrates, 97. Euclid, Prospettiva (Florence: Stamperia Giunti, 1573).

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elaboration on the science of vision, and its importance is mainly due to the role it played in astronomical studies.53 Luzzatto’s use of a modern scientific method becomes more evident as he applies this study of optics to the examination of astronomical theories: only a few in the classical Greek world, for example Ptolemy and Strabo, had hinted at this relationship, though without making it a real object of study. Only in the modern age, thanks to Kepler, do we see a real application of optical studies to improve astronomical observations. Luzzatto, as Ruderman has underlined,54 exhibits a remarkable familiarity with contemporary science and with the latest discoveries in astronomy: it is no coincidence that the rabbi alludes to Galilei’s telescope as “that illustrious instrument”55 that showed the falsities delivered by ancient science. Luzzatto’s work is engaged in a criticism of the Aristotelian-scholastic doctrine that ran through most of the modern treatises on knowledge. The rabbi compares the products of Aristotelian philosophy with the scientific discoveries that, from the sixteenth century onwards, began to shake up medieval traditional knowledge. Evidently having read Galilei’s Sidereus Nuncius (1610), Luzzatto is endowed with the tools to disclose the falsity of Aristotle’s astronomical conceptions, and a detailed synthesis of the results obtained from the observation of the moon, planets, and sun demonstrates it.56 The discoveries of modernity thus help Luzzatto to outline a complex structure aimed at dismantling every certainty. However, he does not seem to be interested in showing which opinion is the truest, but rather in displaying the diversity that exists between them, a sufficient condition to prove that a similar diversity exists between the appearance and the true reality of the object. To state that the opinions about the perception of objects are different—for example, that perception is caused by the emission of rays from the eyes, by the common interaction of them with light, through simulacra, and so on— becomes a way of refuting the possibility of grasping the truth of an object through human knowledge alone. To admit that there are different opinions on the subject is to recognise at the same time a multiplicity of representations of the perceived object itself.

53 54 55 56

See on this Mancosu, “Acoustics and Optics.” See Ruderman, “Science and Skepticism.” Luzzatto, Socrates, 157. Luzzatto, 307–309.

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Sceptical Relativism and the Retaliation of the Authority’s Voice

The relativism defended by Luzzatto may be framed in the scheme of the sceptical tropes too; more precisely, it is the eighth trope of Sextus which has given particular attention to the issue of relation and its effectiveness in unhinging the foundations of any dogmatic knowledge: The eighth mode is the one deriving from relativity, by which we conclude that, since everything is relative, we shall suspend judgement as to what things are independently and in their nature. It should be recognized that here, as elsewhere, we use “is” loosely, in the sense of “appears,” implicitly saying “Everything appears relative.”57 The element of relativity, with respect to both the judging and the judged, is, after all, the leitmotif of all Sextus’s arguments and the ultimate sense of the sceptical tropes. Sceptical relativism undermines the concept of the absolute, investigates the notions of signifier and signified, of similar and dissimilar, and shows how different opinions confirm it is not possible to know the object as it “is” or its real nature, but only as it “appears.” Now, in light of Sextus’s approach, we can see how Luzzatto has accepted and reworked such a concept in his treatise without fear of damaging the notion of the absolute. The concept of relation, which originated in Aristotelian metaphysics and became the prince of ancient scepticism, reappeared, clarifying its meaning in the field of gnoseology, especially in the seventeenth century, when the spread of the method of doubt accentuated its subjectivistic scope. In fact, the question of relativity appears in Luzzatto’s discussion on what knowledge is: from the very first pages of Socrates the definition of knowledge as the result of the relationship between the knower and the knowable condemns knowledge to the status of mere relation. It is described as an offspring born of the union and match of the knower and the knowable, and thus endowed with a feeble and weak condition.58 Luzzatto, by insisting on the fact that our knowledge of things is reduced to representations of them, ends up radicalising the subjectivity of the cognitive moment. Luzzatto understands the absurdity of the search for “what knowledge is” and he compares it to “a marine wave which, coming on the heels of the one that precedes it, never catches up; and when that wave strikes the shore,

57 58

Sextus, Outlines, 35. Luzzatto, Socrates, 71.

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the one before it has already broken and ebbed away. The same indeed occurs to our knowledge when it undertakes to attain cognition of knowledge itself.”59 The gnoseological consequences of the concept of relation are expressed by Luzzatto through the figure of Cratylus, who states: According to my consideration, each of your attempts concerning this subject will indeed turn out to be vain, and I am astonished that you do not emend yourself instead of reprimanding others. Indeed, you should remember the first difficulties concerning knowledge, caused—in your opinion—by objects, senses, and the intellect looking for precedence above knowledge in your examination. Moreover, as you were ignorant of what objects, senses, and the intellect are, you must have judged it to be equally impossible to find out what knowledge itself is. Likewise, it would be impossible for us to acknowledge what love is if we were forbidden to apprehend what the lover and the lovable are, as they are the basis and foundation of love. Furthermore, since knowledge is a relation and connection between the knower and the knowable and there are many difficulties encountered in understanding relation, knowledge consequently also remains entangled and obscured. Besides, how do you attempt to comprehend knowledge through knowledge itself? Don’t you realise that, like the unfortunate Ixion, you are going in circles? Why must the knowledge which judges the previous knowledge be itself also exempt and free from being examined? Yet if the second knowledge is examined by the third, why is this one also not [examined] by the fourth, and so on to infinity?60 Cratylus therefore invites Socrates to suspend his investigation about knowledge and to be content to embrace the probable, considered as an “instantaneous glimmer” that directs human beings in distinguishing good from evil, while reason is held responsible for depraving its original purity: “that which occurs to the probable also occurs with the effusion of wine: namely that the first [of the wine] that flows from the jar is pure, while that which one finds at the bottom of the vase is revolting and turbid.”61 The absence of certain knowledge and the debate towards our gnoseological relativity leads Luzzatto’s work to the same ancient sceptical conclusion, namely to “landing on the probable, which, although it is not like the secure harbour of the truth, which belongs 59 60 61

Luzzatto, 71. Luzzatto, 361. Luzzatto, 369–371.

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only to God, at least it is such that we may stop and anchor there.”62 The probable represents a dimension in which to pause and find momentary respite “from the stormy wavering occurring to us in this troubled life.”63 Luzzatto’s declaration of scepticism does not shake any form of religious belief; Luzzatto shrewdly allows doubt to invade the human dimension alone, and the truth defended in its uniqueness continues to be that “which belongs only to God.”64 While Sextus’s discourse had overturned the concept of absolute, reducing it to pure ethical and gnoseological relativism,65 Luzzatto, although in line with the concept of relativity proposed by the ancient sceptical tradition, saves the absolute, God, subtracting him from the possibilities of doubt. The ninth and tenth tropes still focus on the notion of relativity; the ninth examines the impact on human perception of the continuity or sporadic nature of the way a thing or event manifests itself. According to Sextus, it is on the basis of these factors that we are used to attributing a precise value to phenomena and objects: Since, therefore, the same objects seem now striking and valuable, now not, depending on whether they impress us frequently or rarely, we deduce that we will no doubt be able to say what each of these things appears like given the frequency or rarity of the impressions they make on us, but we will not be able to state baldly what each external existing object is like.66 In Luzzatto’s work, this reference to the frequency of a phenomenon is directly related to the consequences it may have both on our judgement of the value of something and on the way we conceive it to be true or real. In other words, this aspect of Luzzatto’s work is meant to pursue the final goal of demonstrating how a human definition of truth is only relative to human perceptions and is not based on any absolute criteria. The constituted social order and human customs waver because of the sceptical arguments promoted by Luzzatto’s Socrates, and many of the char62 63 64 65

66

Luzzatto, 369. Luzzatto, 369. Luzzatto, 369. See Sextus, Outlines, 35–36: “We can also conclude in particular that everything is relative, in the following way. Do relatives differ or not from things which are in virtue of a difference? If they do not differ, then the latter are relatives too. But if they do differ, then, since everything which differs is relative (it is spoken of relative to what it differs from), things in virtue of a difference will be relative.” Sextus, 37.

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acters staged in his work rebel against them. Luzzatto well defines the contrariety expressed by known philosophers, as the voice of authority, of the so-called ipse dixit. The entire Socrates may be considered as a direct face-toface between reason and authority: this is depicted in the speech of “imprisoned Reason,”67 who claims to be freed from the jail in which his daughter Authority had forced him to stay. Socrates’s battle against dogmatic knowledge embodies Luzzatto’s response to the crisis affecting consciences during the seventeenth century: through Socratic enquiry the rabbi developed a sharp criticism against ancient dogmatic theories in favour of intellectual freedom. Socrates’s deconstruction of traditional human knowledge produces retaliations throughout the whole work: the voice of authority is embodied first of all by Pythagoras and Aristotle, who are intent on defending their fame established over the centuries; then authority is represented by Diotima, who, as mentioned above, accuses Socrates of waking lovers from their dreams of love and undermining her sapiential authority based on human illusions, fears, and frenzies. Furthermore, authority is embodied by Critias, introduced by Socrates as “one of the cruellest and most inhuman of the thirty tyrants, and especially ungrateful to me, his preceptor.”68 The tyrant does not hesitate to condemn Socrates for his factious speeches that were detrimental to all those tenets at the basis of the social order. Socrates is called “malicious” by Critias and considered worthy of strict punishment as would befit a “night arsonist”: Indeed, you are not like a thief, who harms others in the course of looking for what is useful for himself. As you are endowed with wicked talent and pernicious instinct, you only wish to harm other people. Indeed, through vain and quibbling arguments, you have undertaken to deprive gold of its brilliance and beauty, mother of pearl of its grace, and the glittering of gems of its high consideration and esteem; you are trying to persuade others that they are vain appearances and apparent manifestations, which, in the absence of light and an encounter with the visual faculty, fade and disappear, and thus gold and jewels turn into mean coal or dark bodies. Not only does your purpose offend the private [sphere], but the public [one] will also be extremely threatened, because the treasures preserved in the treasury for emergencies will become worthless.69

67 68 69

See Luzzatto, Socrates, 5–8. Luzzatto, Socrates, 169. Luzzatto, 171.

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Socratic ambition is thus defined by Critias as vile and harmful, as that of an “arsonist.” This figure, recalled by the tyrant in its generality, actually appears from the very first lines of Socrates’s accusation, which explicitly state the similarity between Socrates and Erostratus, the person responsible for setting fire to the famous Ephesian temple dedicated to the goddess Artemis, thus causing its destruction: “Socrates the Athenian, motivated, like the arsonist of the famous temple of Ephesus, by intemperate and pungent ambition, has attempted to demolish the admirable building of human doctrine devised and erected by eminent Antiquity.”70 Socrates shows the fictitious value of treasures, commonly held in high consideration as an instrument of power and control in human society, and in this way he unhinges the whole political and social edifice cleverly built on such vanity. It is no coincidence that he is compared to the fraudulent person who became famous for having destroyed one of the seven wonders of the world according to Greek and Latin historians. Socrates is thus guilty of demolishing the wonder of the world, showing its inconsistency, disclosing the mystery of the great theatre it represents. From the relativity of the values of human goods Luzzatto moves, like Sextus also did, to the relativity of morality; but what especially emerges from the last trope is the absence of a unique concept of moral behaviour. Through a rich variety of examples, Sextus demonstrated that morality is a product of the laws, customs, and beliefs of each population, such as in this case: “Among us it is unlawful to marry your own mother or sister; but the Persians— especially those of them thought to practice wisdom, the Magi—marry their mothers, Egyptians take their sisters in marriage. […] Chrysippus in his Republic expresses the belief that fathers should have children by their daughters, mothers by their sons, and brothers by their sisters. Plato asserted even more generally that women should be held in common.”71 Luzzatto’s acquaintance with Sextus’s Outlines has been originally discovered thanks to two passages72 of his Discourse in which he directly mentioned his name. In one of them he discussed the incestuous customs of Egyptians 70 71 72

Luzzatto, 41. Sextus, Outlines, 196. Luzzatto, Discourse on the State of the Jews—Bilingual Edition, ed., comm., and trans. Giuseppe Veltri and Anna Lissa (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2019), 215: “This is the doctrine he affirms in his Letters, which involves a great application of mind and a great force of intellect to apprehend a thing as pure, genuine, and stripped of the commingling of relation and motion, for every object is burdened and wrapped up in these. This is what Sextus Empiricus demonstrated, i.e., that every phenomenon and object is mixed and involved in five kinds of relations.”

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and Persians, recalling the opinion of the Stoic Chrysippus on this matter, and at the same time referring to Sextus as a source: The Egyptians, who were by no means barbarians but in fact passed on many doctrines to the Greeks, took their sisters for wives, and the Ptolemaic kings set an example [of this habit] to the common people. The Persians, who enjoyed dominion over Asia and the subjugation of Greece, passed to a higher level of turpitude, permitting sons to wed their own mothers. Chrysippus, the propagator of Stoic philosophy, claimed that he was responsible for the reform of the human race, and yet he remained indifferent in the face of such a detestable practice; on the contrary, by means of some of his reasoning he sought to describe it as almost honest, as one can read in the books of Sextus Empiricus.73 It is worthwhile to underline that, although in Luzzatto’s Socrates the Outlines of Pyrrhonism has evidently moulded the structure of the arguments, the name of Sextus is never mentioned and there is only one clear reference to his work which, in fact, recalls this same passage: “the Persians observed that the infamous concubinage between sons and their mothers even occurred among irrational animals. The Egyptians drew [the practice] of lying with their very sisters from these brutes, and you, Socrates, while you were raving, seriously referred to them in order to establish the community of wives and sons in your republic.”74 The relativity of customs and laws, which plays a meaningful role in Luzzatto’s philosophical meditation, was symptomatic of a new sceptical awareness that originated from the study of the ancient world in the early modern era and of the new challenges of modern times caused by recent geographic discoveries and scientific revolutions. The great variety of human laws and customs may be considered the common thread also of Montaigne’s famous Essays, as is evident from the fascinating gallery of images presented there. As already noted by Popkin, “in both of these newly found worlds Montaigne discerned the relativity of man’s intellectual, cultural, and social achievements, a relativity that was to undermine the whole concept of the nature of man and his place in the moral cosmos.”75

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Luzzatto, Discourse, 157. Luzzatto, Socrates, 445. Richard H. Popkin, The History of Scepticism, 44.

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Socrates’s Dialogue with Gorgias “the Nihilist”

Socrates does not only provide evidence of Luzzatto’s acquaintance with Sextus’s Outlines of Pyrrhonism, but also with his Against the Mathematicians, a work that, since the fifteenth century, had caught the attention of many scholars as an encyclopedia of knowledge and classical thought.76 One reason to think that Luzzatto made use of the wide repertoire of biographical and doctrinal information collected by Sextus is the long argumentation developed by Gorgias. Socrates’s exchange with the Greek sophist is one of the longest and richest dialogues of the entire work. However, the Gorgias appearing here is not the one of the Platonic dialogue named after him, which is mainly dedicated to the analysis of rhetoric, but the Gorgias handed down in history by Sextus: the sage who first undermined the reality of being by insinuating a form of scepticism into Greek philosophical culture. This is clear from the way in which Luzzatto introduces the rhetorician into the Socratic discourse: Gorgias of Leontini, famous not only for the abundance and diffuseness of his universal eloquence—[which was] sufficiently flexible and indifferent to even defend two contradictory opinions—but also for the study of genuine wisdom, arrived in our city. Among his other undertakings, what had made him famous was the conquest of ens that he had attempted and his reduction of it to nothingness.77 Gorgias, also known by the epithet “the Nihilist,” was the author of a treatise titled On Nature or the Non-Existent, a work that had enjoyed wide fame in antiquity, but which has unfortunately been lost. The most complete compendium of this work has been handed down by Sextus in his Against the Mathematicians,78 more precisely in the seventh and eighth books titled Against the Logicians. Luzzatto, in his Socrates, reveals in a brief line that the subject that will engage Gorgias and Socrates is actually taken from the writings of the Greek sophist. Socrates, assailed by doubts about the nature of being, questions the sage who, aware of the complexity of such a discussion, explicitly invites 76

77 78

See on this Luciano Floridi, “The Diffusion of Sextus Empiricus’s Works in the Renaissance,” Journal of the History of Ideas, 56, no. 1 (1995): 63–85; Walter Cavini, “Appunti sulla prima diffusione in Occidente delle opera di Sesto Empirico,” Medioevo 7 (1977): 9. Luzzatto, Socrates, 75. An overview of Gorgias’s lost work has been transmitted by the pseudo-Aristotelian treatise On Melissus, Xenophanes, Gorgias. See on this Jaap Mansfeld, “De Melisso Xenophanes Gorgia: Pyrrhonizing Aristotelianism,” in Rheinisches Museum für Philologie. Neue Folge, vol. 131 (Bad Orb: J.D. Sauerländers Verlag, 1988), 239–276.

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Socrates to read his works: “I would be dwelling on it too much if I told you the opposing reasons for this speculation now; therefore, I refer you to my writings, whereof I believe you will be fully satisfied concerning this matter.”79 That Luzzatto actually read and appreciated specifically this work of Gorgias emerges, in the first place, from the faithfulness of the debate between Socrates and Gorgias to the argumentations of Gorgias’s On Nature or the Non-Existent and, in the second, from the answer Socrates himself gives at the end of their dialogue: The conversation between Gorgias and me ended here. It laid the first foundations in my mind for the withholding of judgment, so defamed by my opponents and harshly accused now by Your respectable court, but praised and commended by that most wise Gorgias. Thus, following Gorgias’s argument, I found myself affected and disposed in this way, and as I was not following the usage of wise men at that time, I indulged in my own weak knowledge by proposing in my mind to leave aside any speculation and to sentence myself to indolent leisure and voluntary ignorance. The memory of the wise teachings of the prudent Gorgias persuaded me to do this.80 Socrates welcomes Gorgias’s speech and presents him as one of the figures who most inspired his sceptical orientation. The adherence to the suspension of judgement promoted by the argumentation of the “most wise Gorgias,” and therefore to a more general sceptical attitude, is shared only by a small number of voices that respond in a satisfactory way to the Socratic questioning. The sceptical value of the Greek sophist’s work On Nature or the Non-Existent is celebrated in the dialogue between Socrates and Gorgias, staged by Luzzatto by recalling its essential passages: namely that nothing exists and even if something did exist, it would not be comprehensible to human beings, and finally, even if it were admitted that something can be comprehended, it would certainly be incommunicable to others.81 Precisely this sceptical meaning that Luzzatto attributes to Gorgias’s argumentation leaves no doubt regarding the source that inspired this dialogue. Compared to the way Gorgias’s views are represented in the pseudo-Aristotelian On Melissus, Xenophanes, Gorgias, the version of them handed down in Sextus’s work is clearly re-interpreted in favour of a sceptical interpretation of 79 80 81

Luzzatto, Socrates, 75. Luzzatto, 115. See Sextus, Math. vii.65 (Against the Logicians).

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Gorgias’s writing. Hans Newiger’s interpretation of Gorgias may be applied to the way Luzzatto represents him as well: Gorgias is a nihilist on a gnoseological level and a sceptic and relativist from a gnoseological and linguistic point of view, as he affirmed the impossibility and incommunicability of knowledge.82 A closer link to Sextus’s text is given by the pessimistic flavour of Gorgias’s relativism in Luzzatto’s narration. The pages that Sextus dedicated to Gorgias’s thought are part of a precise investigation aimed at exploring the different opinions of dogmatic philosophers concerning the existence of a criterion of truth. Among the names of those who had rejected the hypothesis of the existence of such a criterion, Sextus includes not only Gorgias but also Protagoras, but where Gorgias is (re)valued for the consistency of the way he denied the existence of the principle of truth, Protagoras, who belongs to the class of detractors of this principle, is criticised by Sextus for the way in which he arrives at this denial. Protagoras in fact promoted a positive relativism, which recognised the truth of every opinion or impression. In this way, Protagoras came to deny the existence of one criterion of truth because he had to consider every relative position as true.83 The same attitude may also be found in Luzzatto’s Socrates, where Protagoras is introduced as the master of a relativism that confidently places human beings as the measure of all things: Therefore, everything that is perceptible only exists because our mind gives it a form and appearance. This complies perfectly with what our Protagoras used to say: that a human being is the measure both of things [that are to the extent that they] appear to him in the world and also of those things which are not to the extent that they do not appear to him. The same [thing] happens to the objects that we apprehend: we wrongly consider our robes and coverings to be the source of that heat which, on the contrary, derives from ourselves and is merely reflected in them and sent back to us. Hence, we are used to believing, perhaps mistakenly, that those manifestations of external objects that we see are their true images, while in fact, we are their original cause, since most of them come from us.84 Luzzatto claims to follow the same direction as Protagoras’s thesis that human beings are the measure of all things, namely towards a positive relativism that 82 83 84

Hans J. Newiger, Untersuchungen zu Gorgias’ Schrift “Über das Nichtseiende” (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1973). See Sextus, Math. vii.60–63. Luzzatto, Socrates, 45.

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denies the existence of one truth. Luzzatto, like Sextus, makes use of Protagoras’s optimistic assumptions in order to pessimistically turn them and show the inconsistency of our beliefs as well as of the trust in our perceptions. The rabbi’s aim is to deny the existence of a human criterion of truth, and thus relativity becomes functional to support this thesis. As mentioned before, beside the character of Gorgias other figures are to be considered emblematic for the success of the sceptical project staged by Luzzatto. We will limit ourselves here to indicating only the names of these key voices, leaving their analysis to a possible future work: they are Crito, Anaxagoras, Cratylus, Hippias, Timon,85 and Plato. These figures take on a precise meaning in the work, orienting the narrative and suggesting useful guidelines for the interpretation of Luzzatto’s thought. Socrates’s sceptical logic proceeds through the opinions of the thirty-one characters who follow one another in the text. Socrates deals with philosophers and politicians who have distinguished themselves in history for their doctrine or their deeds. With some of them the dialogue is intentionally requested by Socrates because of the great fame that accompanies their names, with others it seems to be casual and motivated rather by their desire to take part in the conversation. One can exclude the hypothesis that Luzzatto’s scepticism is expressed only through the figure of Socrates or that his could be the direct voice of the rabbi; rather it seems more plausible to think that through the character of Socrates and his interlocutors Luzzatto wanted to reconstruct the evolution and maturation of a sceptical point of view. The whole text is basically a very detailed excursus describing the way Socrates achieves the suspension of judgement on human knowledge. In this excursus the few aforementioned characters play a significant role because they are regarded favourably by Socrates. Socrates’s sceptical thinking seems to evolve through listening to them and examining the theses expressed by these important interlocutors, the first of whom is Gorgias. The numerous other characters that appear on the Socratic scene on the one hand seem to satisfy the rabbi’s desire to show the instability of human knowledge and therefore the inconsistency of its foundations, and on the other hand they also seem to respond to a scenic strategy of the work that would help the author in eclipsing opinions that he would like to reserve only for the prudent reader.

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On the role of Hippias and Timon see Ruderman, “Science and Skepticism,” 169–172.

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Conclusion

Luzzatto’s adherence to the principles of scepticism follows Sextus’s logical schemes and the structure of Socrates’s arguments suggests that the skeleton of the complex architecture of this work is based on Sextus’s Outlines, a precise compendium of sceptical philosophy in three books, and that the discourse is also guided by his Against the Mathematicians, a treatise against ancient philosophers’ dogmatism. Luzzatto therefore seems to have shared with Montaigne the idea of a re-evaluation of the philosophical scope of Sextus’s thought, to be achieved through a careful study of the questions raised by sceptical philosophy. Socrates’s evident coherence with the principles of ancient scepticism allows us to consider it a true homage to the fashion and intellectual needs of the time: it responds to the new challenges of the era marked by the dismantling of the Aristotelian-scholastic tradition and by the new chasm of uncertainty that this implied. Following the doubt that runs through every branch of traditionally accepted knowledge, a human being stripped of every doctrine finds himself naked before God and nature. Luzzatto’s adherence to the strategy of Sextus’s thought reveals how carefully the rabbi has remained faithful to the path originally traced by Montaigne: Luzzatto is determined to pursue the sceptical outcomes to which the continuous comparisons with the animal world, the incessant disagreements between philosophers, the criticisms of the gnoseological process, and in particular of the senses, inexorably lead. All that remains to the sage is to celebrate ignorance and the consequent suspension of judgement. As Popkin has already pointed out, with Montaigne, and we can add with Luzzatto as well, we are still in the context of an epistemological and “constructive” scepticism typical of the Pyrrhonian crisis. Luzzatto, like Montaigne, highlights the limits of his own scepticism: it penetrates and overturns human truths, but does not intend to touch divine truth, and indeed recognises that it alone has the merit of being able to illuminate the human mind. However, at the time a declaration of religious fideism certainly did not shield an author from suspicion and criticism. Montaigne’s faith did not spare the author from the doubt that behind his Christian scepticism lay a radical rationalism. In order to better understand the “constructive” role of scepticism within Luzzatto’s Socrates, it may be worthwhile to consider the simultaneous presence of two speculative concerns in Luzzatto’s writing which challenge the readers. The epistemological scepticism performed by reviving Sextus’s tropes may be considered a consistent pars destruens which paves the way for the proposal contained in a pars construens. The uncertainty disseminated throughout

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the book generates a sense of loss which creates bonds between human beings rather than separating them. Doctrine, social wealth, beauty, custom, religious ceremonies—that is, the major sources of human division—are, in Luzzatto’s treatise, all subjected to doubt, and the human being ends up being stripped of all his convictions that are opposed to God and nature. Indeed, the universality that Luzzatto’s thinking aims to achieve is not atheistic, but is rather a theistically inspired religiosity which does not need any particular creed. Specifically, the final part of his Socrates shows that in his view, proper religious behaviour conforms to reason, is universal, and is against superstition and degenerate beliefs: For it is sufficient for my defence that you observe the public and private reasonings that I have always delivered concerning the reverence due to the first and worthiest cause, which moves and rules everything. Indeed, I have always promulgated that the cognition that one has of it and the veneration that is due to it come not only from subtle and wide-ranging deductions, but were also given to us along with milk by Nature itself. Hence, it follows that the human mind is so inclined and favourably disposed to religion and divine worship that if it were deprived of such a pursuit, he would not be very different from brute animals. I have never despised or omitted [to perform] ceremonies or institutions ordered by our city for the observance of religion, but I have always publicly offered sacrifices in accordance with the rites of my homeland, in appropriate places, at the right moment, and in a legitimate manner. And if I sometimes took a position against the ignorant by reprehending them for their ridiculous superstition or degenerate religion, I was not then attempting, as the Giants did, to expel Jupiter from the sky, but rather trying to remove those despicable concepts which disfigured the beauty and grace of the true religion in their minds. Therefore, I have often solemnly said to those who were truly prudent that they must protect themselves from the infection of superstition, an epidemic and serious disease of the people. They [must] be aware that often the religion of the vile common people is abominable blasphemy for wise men and that the true temple of God is in the wise man’s mind, where He is adored through offerings of love and sacrifices of veneration.86 Although Luzzatto’s opinion is presented very prudently in this passage, it is nevertheless evident that he deploys reason as the true temple of God. Only 86

Luzzatto, Socrates, 478–479.

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there, in his opinion, does true religion seem to find shelter from “the infection of superstition” and “abominable blasphemy.” Luzzatto’s conception of nature is intended to increase this common ground shared by human beings: his sceptical Socrates promotes a naturalistic morality based on nature as a “lover of equality” able to provide humankind with a profitable tool that should be the only reliable guide through life, namely, the probable,87 described as coming directly “from the hands of Nature.” Luzzatto portrays a sort of genealogy in which nature must be considered the true source of moral values: You must not even doubt that in discrediting its own judgement and accusing it of falsity, the court of conscience attended by the human mind would be debased and lacking in authority, because it will be replaced by the majesty of Nature, which will lead the way more decorously towards the good and remove the evil.88 Moral virtues are indeed, according to Luzzatto’s Socrates, “daughters of the probable,” and thus “legitimate grandchildren of Nature itself.”89 Nature is thus an impersonal entity free of any traditional features, which therefore offers Luzzatto a solution to the dizzying results of his free enquiry into dogmatic knowledge. Luzzatto’s focus on nature seems to continue to fulfil his attempt to bring the discussion to a universal level. According to him, humanity must be conceived “not as something abstracted and excluded from universal Nature, but as something included in it that should comply with it and be ably ruled by it like the other mundane things.”90 Luzzatto’s arguments concretely erode dogmatic beliefs as a source of separation and division in society and indirectly put forth the premises of unity and equality among human beings, namely, the acknowledgement of what he had already defined as the “human community” in his Discourse. In his view, this larger community shares the uncertainty of knowledge and beliefs as the only possible certainty and may rely only on a natural morality based on the probable and on the faith in God, which dwells in the mind and not in religious ceremonies, securing itself from any form of degener87

88 89 90

Luzzatto’s reference and use of the notion of probable points to another important source of his scepticism, namely the Academic scepticism of Carneades, whereof Cicero’s Academics is the chief source. On this see Charles B. Schmitt, Cicero Scepticus. A Study of the Influence of the Academica in the Renaissance (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1972) and Carlos Levy, Cicero academicus. Recherches sur les Académiques et sur la philosophie cicéronienne (Rome: École Français de Rome, 1992). Luzzatto, Socrates, 470–471. Luzzatto, 476–477. Luzzatto, 306–307.

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ation. In this way, Luzzatto constructed an indirect apologetic discourse which fosters tolerance and extends the borders of the concept of community by creating a new space for more acceptance of social and religious pluralism. Luzzatto could develop this pars construens only thanks to the Greek Socrates. For Luzzatto speaking through Socrates becomes a way to make his philosophical view reach a wider readership and reflects his wish to be seen only as far as his intellectual value is concerned. Luzzatto shares with a long tradition the portrait of Socrates as a free thinker and free speaker beyond any boundaries; he celebrates his critical attitude towards degenerated forms of beliefs, against superstition, in favour of a spirituality deeply rooted in reason and natural morality. According to him the figure of Socrates implicitly becomes a means of fostering his struggle for Jewish emancipation. Socrates embodies the sceptic who inquires and demolishes every certainty, causing the apparently solid castle of beliefs, established as undoubtable certainties over the centuries, to collapse. From the ruins of this, his sceptical Socrates leads the way to a common ground based on natural morality and a faith in God which, in order to maintain its integrity and avoid blasphemy, can only be celebrated in the mind and not with external ceremonies. Through the figure of Socrates and Socratic dialogue, Luzzatto seems thus to achieve not only the goal of saving religion from degenerated forms of beliefs, but also that of fostering critical and free enquiry into dogmatic traditional knowledge and furthering one’s self-knowledge in dialogue with others. Socrates therefore becomes a means of overcoming the borders of religious division and preparing the ground for a larger community; he was thus a medium for removing Judaism’s particularistic features and instead stressing its universal content. Most of all, the Greek philosopher embodies the cultural role of philosophy and “secular” knowledge within the framework of Judaism, namely, “the emergence of a group of intellectuals who gave priority to such study, at least in their private lives, over the traditional Halakhic focus of the rabbinic élite.”91

Bibliography Agrippa, Henry Cornelius. The Vanity of Arts and Sciences. London: Samuel Speed, 1676. Aristotle. On the Soul. Parva Naturalia. On Breath. Translated by Walter S. Hett. Loeb Classical Library 288. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957.

91

See Daniel H. Frank and Oliver Leaman, eds., History of Jewish Philosophy (London: Routledge, 1997), 4.

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Bacon, Francis. The New Organon. Edited by Lisa Jardine and Michael Silverthorne. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Bontadini, Gustavo. Studi di filosofia moderna. Milan: Vita e Pensiero, 1996. Boyle, Robert. “Experiments and Considerations Touching Colours.” In The Works of Robert Boyle, vol. 1, edited by Michael Hunter and Edward B. Davis. London: Pickering and Chatto, 1999–2000. Canone, Eugenio. “Il ‘senso’ nei trattati d’amore: Ficino e la fortuna del modello platonico nel Cinquecento.” In Sensus–sensatio, Atti del viii Colloquio Internazionale del Lessico Intellettuale Europeo, Roma, 6–8 gennaio 1995, edited by Massimo L. Bianchi, 177–198. Florence: Olschki, 1996. Cassirer, Ernest. The individual and Cosmos in Renaissance Philosophy. Translated and introduced by Mario Domandi. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010. Cavini, Walter. “Appunti sulla prima diffusione in Occidente delle opera di Sesto Empirico.” Medioevo 7 (1977): 1–20. Celenza, Christopher S. “The Platonic Revival.” In The Cambridge Companion to Renaissance Philosophy, edited by James Hankins, 72–96. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods. Academics. Translated by Harris Rackham. Loeb Classical Library 268. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1933. Euclid. Prospettiva. Florence: Stamperia Giunti, 1573. Floridi, Luciano. “The Diffusion of Sextus Empiricus’s Works in the Renaissance.” Journal of the History of Ideas, 56, no. 1 (1995): 63–85. Frank, Daniel. H. and Oliver Leaman, eds. History of Jewish Philosophy. London: Routledge, 1997. Garin, Eugenio. La cultura filosofica del Rinascimento italiano. Ricerche e documenti. Florence: Sansoni, 1992. Kircher, Athanasius. Ars magna lucis et ombrae. Rome: Ludovici Grignani, 1646. Kraye, Jill, ed. Cambridge Translations of Renaissance Philosophical Texts–Moral Philosophy, vol. 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. Laursen, John C., and Gianni Paganini, eds. Skepticism and Political Thought in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2015. Levy, Carlos. Cicero academicus. Recherches sur les Académiques et sur la philosophie cicéronienne. Rome: École Français de Rome, 1992. Lissa, Anna. “La zooantropologia scettica nella visione luzzattiana del gran teatro del mondo.” In Filosofo e rabbino nella Venezia del Seicento. Studi su Simone Luzzatto, edited by Giuseppe Veltri, 91–182. Ariccia: Aracne, 2015. Lucretius. On the Nature of Things. Translated by William H.D. Rouse, revised by Martin F. Smith. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1924. Luzzatto, Simone. Discourse on the State of the Jews—Bilingual Edition. Edited, commented, and translated by Giuseppe Veltri and Anna Lissa. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2019.

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Luzzatto, Simone. Socrates, or on Human Knowledge—Bilingual edition. Edited, translated, and commented by Giuseppe Veltri and Michela Torbidoni. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2019. Maia Neto, José Raimundo. “Le probabilisme académicien dans le scepticisme français de Montaigne à Descartes.”Revue philosophique de la France et de l’étranger 138, no. 4 (2013): 467–484; Mancosu, Paolo. “Acoustics and Optics.” In Early Modern Science (The Cambridge History of Science, 3), edited by Katherine Park and Lorraine Daston, 596–631. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. Mansfeld, Jaap. “De Melisso Xenophanes Gorgia: Pyrrhonizing Aristotelianism.” In Rheinisches Museum für Philologie. Neue Folge, vol. 131, 239–276. Bad Orb: J.D. Sauerländers Verlag, 1988. Morrison, Donald R., ed. The Cambridge Companion to Socrates. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011. Newiger, Hans J. Untersuchungen zu Gorgias’ Schrift “Über das Nichtseiende.” Berlin: De Gruyter, 1973. Pico della Mirandola, Giovanni. De hominis dignitate. Heptaplus. De ente et uno e scritti vari. Edited by Eugenio Garin. Florence: Vallecchi, 1942. Plato. Lysis. Symposium. Gorgias. Translated by Walter R.M. Lamb. Loeb Classical Library 166. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1925. Plato. Timaeus. Critias. Cleitophon. Menexenus. Epistles. Translated by Robert G. Bury. Loeb Classical Library 234. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1929. Popkin, Richard H. The History of Scepticism: From Savonarola to Bayle. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003. Reale, Giovanni. Il pensiero antico. Milan: Vita e Pensiero, 2001. Ruderman, David B. “Science and Skepticism: Simone Luzzatto on Perceiving the Natural World.” In Jewish Thought and Scientific Discovery in Early Modern Europe, edited by Ruderman, 153–184. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995. Schechner, Sara J. “Between Knowing and Doing: Mirrors and Their Imperfections in the Renaissance.” Early Science and Medicine 10, no. 2 (2005): 137–162. Schmitt, Charles B. Cicero Scepticus. A Study of the Influence of the Academica in the Renaissance. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1972. Sextus Empiricus. Against the Mathematicians. Translated by Robert G. Bury. Loeb Classical Library 291. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1935. Sextus Empiricus. Outlines of Scepticism. Edited by Julia Annas and Jonathan Barnes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. Shuger, Debora. “The ‘I’ of the Beholder. Renaissance Mirrors and the Reflexive Mind.” In Renaissance Culture and Everyday, edited by Patricia Fumerton and Simon Hunt, 21–41. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999. Stabile, Giorgio. “Teoria della visione come teoria della conoscenza.” In Dante e la

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filosofia della natura. Percezioni, linguaggi, cosmologie, edited by Stabile, 9–29. Florence: sismel–Edizioni del Galluzzo, 2007. Torbidoni, Michela. “The Italian Academies and Rabbi Simone Luzzatto’s Socrate: The Freedom of the Ingenium and the Soul.” In Yearbook of the Maimonides Centre for Advanced Studies, edited by Bill Rebiger, 71–94. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2017. Torbidoni, Michela. “Socratic Impulse, Secular Tendency, and Jewish Emancipation: A Comparison between Simone Luzzatto and Moses Mendelssohn.” In Yearbook of the Maimonides Centre for Advanced Studies, edited by Yoav Meyrav, 11–29. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2019. Torbidoni, Michela. “What does Philosopher à l’antique Mean to Simone Luzzatto? The Sceptical Variation within the Quarrel of the Ancients and the Moderns.” In Socrates, Or On Human Knowledge—Bilingual edition. Edited, translated, and commented by Giuseppe Veltri and Michela Torbidoni, 530–541. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2019. Trapp, Michael, ed. Socrates from Antiquity to the Enlightenment. New York: Routledge, 2016. Veltri, Giuseppe, and Evelien Chayes. Oltre le mura del ghetto: Accademie, scetticismo, tolleranza nella Venezia barocca. Palermo: New Digital Press, 2016.

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part 2 Apologia and Apologetics

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Apologetic Strategies, Scepticism, and Empiricism in Simone Luzzatto’s Works Giuseppe Veltri

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Introduction

According to some scholars, Luzzatto’s Discourse on the State of the Jews (1638) falls into the category of the apology or “modern” apologetics of Judaism in Venice.*1 Because of my special research interest focused on sceptical strategies, it is worthwhile to explain some concepts surrounding the field of apology/apologia in modern (English) language. The terms “apology,” “apologia,” and “apologetics” seem to philologically include the same concept, but philology does not play the decisive role here. Today the English word “apology” means “the act of declaring one’s regret, remorse, or sorrow for having insulted, failed, injured, harmed or wronged another.”2 “Apologia” derives from the same Latin word, apologia, and means what the Greek coinage apologia in substance addresses: “verbal defence, speech in defence.” The first literary and philosophical occurrence known to me is the Apologia of Socrates. By contrast, “apologetics” is systematic argumentative discourse in defence of a doctrine/religion, as every dictionary confirms.3 The method of defence in apologetics may be similar to that of apologia, but the goal is very different. Apologetics may have a missionary objective to convert people to the “true” religion, the “right” doctrine, while an apologia is primarily a defence designed to convince the judge of one’s innocence in opposition to a prosecutor’s argu-

* Parts of this chapter were previously published in Giuseppe Veltri, Alienated Wisdom: Enquiry into Jewish Philosophy and Scepticism (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2018); Veltri and Anna Lissa, Discourse on the State of the Jews: Bilingual Edition (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2019); and Veltri, “Apologetic, Empiricism, and Sceptical Strategies in Simone Luzzatto,” in Yearbook of the Maimonides Centre for Advanced Studies, ed. Bill Rebiger (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2019), 67–88. We would like to thank De Gruyter for their kind permission in allowing the author to republish this material here. 1 See Francesca Trivellato, “Jews and Early Modern Economy,” in The Cambridge history of Judaism, Volume 7: The Early Modern World, 1500–1815, eds. Jonathan Karp and Adam Sutcliffe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 161. 2 Quoted from Mihaela Mihai, “Apology,” Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, accessed 3 May 2018, http://www.iep.utm.edu/apology/. 3 See, for example, https://www.britannica.com/topic/apologetics (accessed 3 May 2018).

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ments. The goal is to reach at least an equipollence of arguments. At any rate, an apologia is by no means an apology; it is not a remorseful speech or a term acknowledging wrongful or offensive action, and it must also be properly located in the realm of jurisprudence and in philosophical, rhetorical, and dialectic discussions. Further, it is well known that in an accusatorial process the task of the defendant is to try to abate every charge of the accusation by using an arsenal of rhetorical tools, adducing evidence, (accurate) testimony, and (alleged or consistent) proof: all strategies in order to undermine the claim and argument of the (state) prosecutor. At this point, I would like to confine myself only to written apologias, emphasising that writings in defence of individuals or (political, religious, ethnic) groups against the charges of the majority or the ruling powers are called apologia because they are defending their own point of view, behaviour, or identity, which are different from that of the majority. The strategies involved in apologia and apologetics are similar: to produce evidence to counter the adversary, to reduce an accusation to a self-contradiction, and to disavow the charges, removing all legitimacy and plausibility from the construction of the prosecutor’s indictment. Luzzatto adopts this strategy for dismantling the accusation that the Jews are unsuitable to Christian society due to their identity as a different ethnic group and religion. He does not repeat ancient and traditional arguments of antiquity and (messianic) legitimacy in favour of the Jews, but he refers to the experiential, empirical argument of the socially cohesive nature and economic usefulness of the Jews of Venice. It is of course well known that empiricism and scepticism are not the same philosophical movement; however, they use very similar strategies and base their arguments on pragmatic facts based on experience. A few words and notations should be addressed towards the topic of experience as a philosophical concept both of empiricism and scepticism.4 The question of similarity between the two Greek schools is very old and goes back to Sextus Empiricus. Nevertheless, there is more. The discussion of whether Sextus, author of the main sources on ancient scepticism, was an empiricist or not, as some ancient sources suggest,5 does not obscure the fact that ancient empiricism did not admit a dogmatic vision of healing in its methods. Sextus

4 See Emidio Spinelli, “L’esperienza scettica: Sesto Empirico fra metodologia scientifica e scelte etiche,” Quaestio 4 (2004): 25–43. 5 See Alan Bailey, Sextus Empiricus and Pyrrhonean Scepticism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 93–99; Roderick M. Chisholm, “Sextus Empiricus and Modern Empiricism,” Philosophy of Science 8, no. 3 (1941): 371–384.

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recognises some validity to their strategies when he affirms in his Outlines of Pyrrhonism that “some say that the sceptical philosophy is the same as the Empiric school in medicine. But you must realise that if this form of Empiricism makes affirmations about the inapprehensibility of unclear matters, then it is not the same as Scepticism, nor would it be appropriate for Sceptics to take up with that school.”6 Although he seems to counter medical empiricism, he does seem to accept the medical method: They might rather adopt, as it seems to me, what is called the Method; for this alone of the medical schools seems to practise no rashness in unclear matters and [the empiricist school] does not presume to say whether they are apprehensible or inapprehensible, but it follows what is apparent, taking thence, in line with Sceptical practice, what seems to be expedient.7 Independent from the question of the goals of and approach to medicine, Sextus cannot negate the fact that empiricism and scepticism adopt very similar tactics.8 Both of them back their strategies with experience (empeiria), a medical attitude of general significance and one used by the sceptic to argue for, for example, linguistic scepticism. To abate the grammarian’s dogmatic vision of the “natural significance” of words, he bases his criticism on the experience with the “barbarians” and comments, “if nouns exist ‘by nature’ and are not significant in each instance by reason of convention, then all men ought to understand the speech of all, Greeks that of barbarians and barbarians that of Greeks and barbarians that of (other) barbarians. But this is not the case; therefore, nouns are not ‘naturally’ significant.”9 The argument used here is from experience (that of the barbarians and the Greeks), not from the realm of logic or metaphysics. Also well-known is his argument about the moral(s) of society: every people has different moral standards, ergo there is no common morality “by nature.” Furthermore, the idea of morality “by nature” can be nothing but treacherous for the dogmatic because of the experience of good and bad, or in his words: “For those who hold the opinion that things are good or bad by nature are perpetually troubled. When they lack what they believe to 6 Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism, eds. Julia Annas and Jonathan Barnes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 62. 7 Sextus, 63. 8 It is not my intent here to deal with every aspect this topic involves. I refer the reader to the detailed study of Emidio Spinelli, “Sextus Empiricus,” in Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques, ed. Richard Goulet (Paris: cnrs éditions, 2016): 265–300; on empiricism, 279–282. 9 Sextus Empiricus, Against the Professors, trans. Robert G. Bury (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1949), 86–87 (Math. vii.144–145).

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be good, they take themselves to be persecuted by natural evils and they pursue what (so they think) is good.”10 Empiricism as a school and as a medical practice is not confined to ancient philosophy and medicine; it has a long history in the Middle Ages, Renaissance, and early modern period. Beginning with the schools of Roger Bacon and William of Ockham in the Middle Ages, its apex occurred in the late Renaissance with Machiavelli and Guicciardini. From the De rerum natura iuxta propria principia (On the Nature of Things According to Their Own Principles; 1586) of Bernardino Telesio and Michel de Montaigne’s “Of Experience”11 to Francis Bacon empiricism experienced new modes of transmission and discussion. Luzzatto’s acquaintance with it may derive from his study of Pierre Gassendi, a very probable source of his writing and perhaps a favourite read.12 Additionally, Francis Bacon was one of the sources of Luzzatto’s attitude towards the sciences, and most plausibly his first address for the doctrine of induction. Francis Bacon is often indirectly quoted in the Discourse, as I have demonstrated elsewhere.13

2

Luzzatto’s Strategies of Relativity

Concerning the strategies of Luzzatto, it is valuable to foreground some observations before we handle them in detail. In the Discourse, the rabbi uses some strategies to abate dogmatic principle (read: main, current, and influential opinions). The reader may be sceptical about my approach to Luzzatto’s language of scepticism and relative strategies. While it is true that the tropoi (figures of speech) are indirect, they are the basic elements of the Socrates, as Michela Torbidoni has demonstrated,14 and, in the Discourse, the rabbi directly

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Sextus, Outlines, 10; see also 11. See Michael Frede, “The Sceptic’s Beliefs,” in The Original Sceptics: A Controversy, eds. Myles Burnyeat and Michael Frede (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997), 22. Michel de Montaigne, “Of Experience,” trans. Charles Cotton, 1588, in Quotidiana, ed. Patrick Madden, 13 September 2006, accessed 1 August 2021, http://essays.quotidiana.org/​ montaigne/experience/. See Simone Luzzatto, Scritti politici e filosofici di un ebreo scettico nella Venezia del Seicento, ed. Giuseppe Veltri in cooperation with Anna Lissa and Paola Ferruta (Milan: Bompiani, 2013), lxxx. Giuseppe Veltri, “Economic and Social Arguments and the Doctrine of the Antiperistasis in Simone Luzzatto’s Political Thought: Venetian Reverberations of Francis Bacon’s Philosophy,” Frühneuzeit-Info 23 (2011): 23–32. See the essay of Michela Torbidoni in this volume.

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quotes Sextus Empiricus twice, on both occasions from the tropoi, which I would call strategies of scepticism. In the first quotation, he speaks of moral scepticism, attacking Tacitus’s calumny “to defame the Jewish Nation,” which painted the Jews as dissolute in their carnal impulses: “and although as a race, they are prone to lust, they abstain from intercourse with foreign women; yet among themselves nothing is unlawful.”15 Luzzatto adds: But if this refers to the customs of the Jews, it could not be further from the truth, since there has never been a nation more restricted regarding carnal relationships than the Jews. The Egyptians, who were by no means barbarians, but in fact passed on many doctrines to the Greeks, took their sisters for wives, and the Ptolemaic kings set an example [of this habit] to the common people. The Persians, who enjoyed dominion over Asia and the subjugation of Greece, passed to a higher level of turpitude, permitting sons to wed their own mothers. Chrysippus, the propagator of Stoic philosophy, claimed that he was responsible for the reform of the human race. And yet he remained indifferent in the face of such a detestable practice; on the contrary, by means of some of his reasoning he sought to describe it as almost honest, as one can read in the books of Sextus Empiricus.16 The argumentation is highly imperative here: Luzzatto’s defence of Jewish custom neither takes into consideration the (im)morality of an act commanded by the God of the Jews (to refrain from intercourse with foreign women), thereby avoiding a return to the argument of a heteronomous moral act, nor does he found it on a morality based on “nature.” He infers the immorality from the discrepancy with the high esteem in which other peoples in the world community (Egyptians and Greeks) were held despite their incestuous and lascivious customs. With reference to the above listed sexual practices, Luzzatto states that the moral code of the Jews is more restrictive than that of Egyptians and Greeks—yet they are judged as “barbarians” despite their probity. This is not a dogmatic argument, but a strategy taken from experience grounded in moral scepticism and relativism. The Sextian argument against natural morality was very similar: he quoted several examples of different customs in decisive moral acts like sexuality, which differed among Romans, Greeks, Indians, and so on—

15 16

Tacitus, Hist. 5.5, 5.7–8, 3.183. Simone Luzzatto, Discourse on the State of the Jews—Bilingual edition, ed., trans., and comm. Giuseppe Veltri and Anna Lissa (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2019), 157.

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an argument rooted in a multifaceted approach to law and custom.17 Luzzatto emphasises a particular element: the high esteem in which some cultures were held despite their even more radical differences in morality, for example, the Egyptians enjoy our elevated cultural esteem despite their flagrant (according to our standards) immorality. The second direct quotation is more complicated because he, speaking of the phenomenon of the Kabbalah, associates the ten principles (the sefirot) and their flux with some ideas of the Platonic system of object and motion. He concludes: Plato, however, adhering in part to the said opinion, yet in a calmer manner, was not satisfied with entirely denying the existence and permanence of the being of whatever thing. For he conjectured that beyond the apprehension of our senses there were some firm and fixed substances. [According to his view,] these substances need neither a confrontation nor a relation to others, and thus could have a stable and firm existence in themselves. Furthermore, these [substances] were the origins of those apprehensions that we perceive and could be called shadows and unsubstantial appearances. This is the doctrine he affirms in his Letters,18 which involves a great application of mind and a great force of intellect to apprehend a thing as pure, genuine, and bared of the commingling of relation and motion. For every object is burdened and wrapped up in these. This is what Sextus Empiricus demonstrated, i.e. that every phenomenon and object is mixed and involved in five kinds of relations. Proceeding in his examination, he even demonstrated that it is almost impossible to grasp anything about objects other than their relation. This thing [the relation] would be so feeble and slight that the Stoics, and after them the Nominalists, negated its existence, [by saying that] it was chimerical and imaginary, or even better, verbal.19 The reference to Sextus in confirming a Platonic view of the system of ideas and their relations is tricky, because Sextus negates the existence of all fixed and firm substances. It is enough to refer here to Outlines of Pyrrhonism 3.3: Now, since some of the Dogmatists say that god is a body, others that he is incorporeal, some that he is anthropomorphic, others not, some in space, 17 18 19

Sextus, Outlines, 196–197. Luzzatto probably refers to the seventh letter of Plato. Luzzatto, Discourse, 215.

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others not—and of those who say that he is in space, some say that he is within the universe, others that he is outside it—how shall we be able to acquire a conception of god if we possess neither an agreed substance for him nor a form nor a place in which he is?20 But that is only one side of the question because Luzzatto connects the theory of the sefirot to Plato’s world of substances. Besides the tradition of this theory, already examined by Moshe Idel,21 Luzzatto’s strategic aspect cannot be concealed: fixed substances have a firm existence in themselves and therefore cannot be apprehended if not in their shadowy and unsubstantial appearances. According to Luzzatto’s rendition of Sextus “every phenomenon and object is mixed and involved in five kinds of relations.” He concludes “that it is almost impossible to grasp anything about objects other than their relation.” As Emidio Spinelli wrote to me, Luzzatto may be referring to the sceptic Agrippa here. Sextus reported Agrippa’s tropoi,22 among them that of relativity, in his Outlines.23 The confusion has probably resulted, I suppose, because Agrippa’s five modes are quoted by Sextus, as mentioned before. Yet, as Spinelli comments, Sextus also speaks of relativity in Outlines 1.38– 39 as a hierarchical submission of all tropoi to it. In Outlines 1.140, he expressly affirms, “So, since we have established in this way that everything is relative, it is clear then that we shall not be able to say what each existing object is like in its own nature and purely, but only what it appears to be like relative to something. It follows that we must suspend judgement about the nature of objects.”24 Ancient authors convey that Pyrrhonians were also relativists,25 but an assimilation of their thoughts is not without problems, as Annas and Barnes maintain.26 The pros ti of relations/relativity is also a topic of Stoic philosophy, as Luzzatto notes, which introduces or sustains the insubstantiality of relation

20 21

22 23 24

25 26

Sextus, Outlines, 144. Moshe Idel, “Jewish Kabbalah and Platonism,” in Neoplatonism and Jewish Thought, ed. Lenn E. Goodman (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 332–333. He explains that Isaac Abravanel speaks of the sefirot as Platonic ideas and “separate universal forms.” Yohanan Alemanno also speaks of the sefirot as the primordial ideas of Plato. See Sextus, Outlines, 40–43, “The Five Modes.” Emidio Spinelli, Questioni scettiche. Letture introduttive al pirronismo antico (Rome: Lithos, 2005), 32–33. Sextus, Outlines, 36. See also Julia Annas and Jonathan Barnes, The Modes of Scepticism: Ancient Texts and Modern Interpretations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 129. Annas and Barnes, 97. Annas and Barnes, 98.

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in the cases of verbal definitions, as “father” is a father so long as he has a child, as Simplicius says in his commentary on Aristotle’s Categories.27 Luzzatto likes to demonstrate that a precise analysis of relations results in the conclusion that we cannot grasp the object of anything. His goal is to negate the dogmatic assertion of the existence of Plato’s substances and, in this way, the sefirot. From given relations we cannot infer a given substance. It is important here to realise that sceptical strategies are at work in the Discourse, especially because Luzzatto considers himself in step with Sextus’s scepticism, although he defines himself as a New Academician and not a Pyrrhonian. In the following section I will present some sceptical strategies present in Luzzatto’s work, all of which are based on experience and achieved in history and society. Nevertheless, I suppose that Luzzatto is also using the tropoi, or strategy, of Sextus and Agrippa, using it as a political tool for describing, defending, and apologising for the Jews of Venice. I will select the political strategies of relation/relativity, recess, and necessity, and end with the argument concerning the “nude truth.” Agrippa and Sextus agree—as I discuss above—that things are together by virtue of their relation and not due their nature. We will return to this idea with reference to usury. Here I would like to stress that the “relationship” between the elements of society is the backbone of its political structure, as well as of Luzzatto’s commitment to the apologia. The presence of the Jews in Venice is due to their integration into every part of its fabric and life. Integration is not the deprivation of their factuality as Jews (that is, conversion) but the recognition of their very clear position in society. This participation is not substantial but relative to the “state of the Jews in Venice.” Luzzatto’s political thesis in the first part of the Discourse is simple and, at the same time, temerarious: Venice can put an end to its political decline, he argues, by offering the Jews a monopoly on overseas commercial activity. This proposal recommends itself because the Jews are “well suited for trade,” far more so than others (such as “foreigners”). The rabbi opens his argument

27

For the sources, see Annas and Barnes, 134–135: “But when it is observed not in virtue of an internal difference but solely in virtue of its relation to something else, it will be a thing somehow in relation to something. Sons and people on the right require certain external things for their subsistence. That is why, even if no change takes place in themselves, a man may cease to be a father when his son dies and someone may cease to be on the right when what was next to him has changed position.” The interpretation of Annas and Barnes does not take into account the oral element of Stoic discourse. See also Stephen Menn, “Simplicius on the ‘Theaetetus’ (“In Physica” 17,38–18,23 Diels)”, Phronesis, 55, no. 3 (2010): 255–270.

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by recalling that trade and usury are the only occupations permitted to Jews. Within the confines of their historical situation, the Venetian Jews became particularly adept at trade with partners from the East. This talent could be put to use by the Venetian government for maintaining—or, more accurately— recovering its political importance as an intermediary between the East and the West. Luzzatto was the first to define the role of the Jews on the basis of their economic and social functions, disregarding the classic categorisation of Judaism’s (privileged?) religious status in world history. Luzzatto prefaces his treatise with an introduction, ostensibly intended to provide a theoretical outline of the political and economic aspects of his subject, a reflection also of his vision of the customs and ways of life followed by the Jews of the Diaspora. In this introduction to the “whole” tractate, he deals, in fact, with only one issue: the status of the Jews of Venice and their economic situation, which is, in turn, the topic to which the entire first part of the Discourse is devoted. Luzzatto clearly states his central thesis right from the outset: the ancient people of the Jews, present today in the illustrious city of Venice, are, in their constitution and way of life, a “fragment” of God’s original creation.28 Nobody, he claims, can contest the position that Venetian Jews are a “reward” (emolumento) to the city of Venice and that they constitute an integral part of the common populace.29 The rabbi of the Ghetto of Venice avails himself of the fragment metaphor: the Jewish community of Venice is a Democritean atom in the Milky Way of the Venetian res publica.30 Although the rabbi has serious doubts as to the cosmological value of Democritus’s philosophy, he seems to accept its usefulness as a source of metaphor: “This opinion was condemned, but because the two philosophers asserted the casual coupling of small bodies, not because of the absurdity of the conception.”31 The primary purpose of his treatise is not to celebrate the antiquity of the Jews but rather to present some of the advantages they bring to the state. He considers the Jewish people an integral part of city of Venice or, better, of the entire world. The function of the Jews, he claims, is similar to that of the atoms of Democritus that populate the “Lower World,”

28 29 30 31

Luzzatto, Discourse, 11: “it is a common consensus among men that this People once took [its] form of government and its institution of life from the Supreme Opifex.” Luzzatto, 12–13. Luzzatto, 12–13. Luzzatto, 12–13. Luzzatto seems to refer to a criticism of atomistic theory, which was introduced into European intellectual circles by Gassendi. On Gassendi and scepticism, see Richard H. Popkin, The History of Skepticism from Erasmus to Spinoza (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979).

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which, in turn, feeds the sun, the moon, and the other stars with its vapour— a Stoic idea. In this sense, every kingdom on the earth is comparable to the galaxy.32 The metaphors he uses to describe the composition of society serve to draw attention to two specific points: that every element of society, and in particular of Venetian society, should be fully integrated as a prerequisite to their contribution to the welfare of the whole. That is also the logic of the human body, as Luzzatto expressly indicates, citing indirectly the fable of Agrippa:33 So too, when our stomach suffers from lack of food, it subsists on humours from our other limbs, with their subsequent pains and ailments.34 [But when the opposite occurs, and there is] an abundance of nourishment, not only does our stomach stop the plundering, it also allows its own nourishment to circulate to other parts of the body. Similarly, the preponderance of duties and the taxation of pack animals not only releases the people from the burden of high taxes and contributions—which they would be obliged to pay for the needs and requirements of the prince— [but it also implies that] they [the very same people] profit from an abundance of public money.35 In the sixteenth century, the metaphor of the stomach becomes more specific. In 1612 Francis Bacon writes in his Of Empire (Essay 11): For their merchants, they are vena porta; and if they flourish not, a kingdom may have good limbs, but will have empty veins, and nourish little. Taxes and imposts upon them, do seldom good to the king’s revenue; for that that wins in the hundred, he leeseth in the shire; the particular rates being increased, but the total bulk of trading, rather decreased.

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See Francis Bacon, Essay 19, “Of Empire”: “Princes are like to heavenly bodies, which cause good or evil times; and which have much veneration, but no rest. All precepts concerning kings, are in effect comprehended in those two remembrances: memento quod es homo; and memento quod es Deus, or vice Dei; the one bridleth their power, and the other their will.” On the classical origin of the idea, see A.I. Ellis, “Some Notes,” The Classical Review 23 (1909): 246–247. See Livy, History of Rome 2.32. Medical beliefs dating back to Galen; see Rudolph E. Siegel, Galen’s System of Physiology and Medicine: An Analysis of His Doctrines and Observations on Bloodflow, Respiration, Humors and Internal Diseases (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1993). Luzzatto, Discourse, 15.

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Luzzatto substantially agrees with Bacon. Taxes on imports and exports are lethal for an economy because they lead to a decrease in trade volume. In the end, the state treasury will end up with little more than usual. In addition, there is a moral aspect that should also be taken into consideration: the state should avoid imitating the ancient Romans who “ultimately imposed taxes on human excrement […] and even disgraceful and obscene operations such as these helped enrich the treasury.” In contrast to this depravity on the part of the ruling power, the Republic of Venice “has the custom of imposing taxes only on the industry of men, and not on their lives; to punish their vices, and not to profit from them.”36 We have here, then, the principal ingredients of Luzzatto’s political theory: 1) the Jews of Venice are an integral part of the republic; 2) their function in commerce is vital and can be of true benefit only if the taxes imposed remain limited, since the taxes on imports and exports have a lethal effect on the general economy; 3) the Republic of Venice was founded on pragmatic ideas. We can add that Luzzatto—if using the sceptic tropos of relativity—argues that the relation of the Jews to La Serenissima is a profitable one and that changes to this relation (that is, their expulsion from Venice) would also change the “state” of the Jews in Venice, and perhaps also of Venice itself. Another application of the political strategy of relation/relativity can be found in chapter 12 of the Discourse, in which Luzzatto addresses the criticism of the Jewish presence as voiced by three different groups: religious zealots, politicians and statesmen, and the common people. The religious zealots claim that toleration of a religion that differs from the official faith is contemptuous; politicians argue that there is no utility to tolerating a diversity of religions in the same city, both because of the possibility of sacrilege and because of the bad example that one group may set for the remainder of the population; and the common people simply believe and repeat any calumny and false slander invented out of hatred for the Jewish nation. In response to the religious zealots, Luzzatto notes that the Pope himself admitted Jews into the city of his own residence, and that they have been living there for over 800 years. To the politicians he offers a very detailed response, stressing the physical separation between Jews and Christians, which is reinforced by Jewish law, according to which ritual contact and sexual relations with non-Jews are prohibited, as is proselytism. As for the crime of usury practised by the Jews—he adds that it is only tolerated by their laws rather than

36

Luzzatto, Discourse, 15.

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expressly permitted, referring indirectly to Francis Bacon. As for the denunciations of the common people, Luzzatto responds: Truth alone is harsh, and not very pleasing, whereas falsity is admired and delightful. The former is subjected to the occurrence of events; the latter free and wandering. The former is produced by the action of the object that impressed it in our mind, while the latter depends upon human judgments, and as if it were our offspring, we harbour loving affection to it.37 He then deals more specifically with the calumny of the Jews having been unfaithful, and with their purported friendship with pirates. Contrary to what his opponents maintain, Luzzatto describes the Jews as a harmonious part of society, living in reciprocal sympathy with their neighbours in keeping with the will of God, who “decreed that all humankind should live together in mutual friendship. Every human being should regard himself or herself as a citizen of one republic.”38 Religious differences, as he points out in chapter 14, are by no means a good reason for war.39 The perspicacious reader recognises here a typical strategy of referring to the successful integration of Jews into the Venetian city and their utility under the sky of La Serenissima. The reason given is not a dogmatic reference to the revelation on Sinai, but rather the activity of the Jews, originating in historical necessity. Their success is dependent on the conservation of their status as Jews as well as their utility for Venice;40 that is, the key for the Jews’ integration into Venetian society is to fill and to continue to fulfil the social position they already hold, a kind of political “recess ad infinitum.”

3

Strategy of Necessity, or How to Explain Regress ad infinitum Politically

Luzzatto uses a typical political-economic category, “necessity.” Necessity as a political-economic category must not be confused with the Aristotelian logical

37 38 39

40

Luzzatto, 117. Luzzatto, 123. Luzzatto, 133–135. See also Isaac Abravanel, Commentary on the Later [or, Former] Prophets [Hebrew] (Tel Aviv, n.d.), 9, and Johann Maier, Kriegsrecht und Friedensordnung in jüdischer Tradition (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2000), 403. On both categories during the Renaissance, see Paul-Erik Korvela, “The Machiavellian Reformation. An Essay in Political Theory” (PhD diss., University of Jyvaskyla, 2016), 119–120.

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concept of necessitas.41 It does occur in sceptical philosophy: necessity is the reason, according to the sceptical philosophy of Sextus, to suspend every judgement.42 The context of Sextus’s use is totally different, but Luzzatto’s use of necessity is very similar: to search for the major cause of necessity would regress to an analysis of animals, which do not possess reason. Luzzatto indirectly refers to regress to the causes of the situation of the Jews, because necessity is the situation into which humans are born and to which man can positively react, or in Luzzatto’s wording: The majority of men deplore the fact that nature has encumbered them with obligations and necessities in greater abundance than other animals who are deprived of reason. But these men have no legitimate grounds to complain, because poverty and necessity are the true incentives that result in the invention and discovery of the most worthy and excellent arts that so ennoble the human race.43 The proverb mater artium necessitas, “necessity is the mother of invention,” has a long tradition. In the Middle Ages, it was an operative concept of the political tradition, used in conjunction with other political terms such as virtus and fortuna.44 There is, of course, a common use of the proverb which probably first appeared in print in 1519 in the Vulgaria of William Horman, “a book of aphorisms for the boys of the schools to learn by heart.”45 Yet numerous individuals and intellectuals were acquainted with this proverb and its inherent politicalphilosophical meaning. One such person was Leonardo da Vinci.46 The cate-

41

42 43 44

45

46

Lambert Marie de Rijk, Aristotle: Semantics and Ontology. Philosophia Antiqua, vol. 91, no. 1 (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 569; Nathanael Stein, “Causal Necessity in Aristotle,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 20 (2012): 855–879. Sextus, Outlines, 42–43. Luzzatto, Discourse, 47. On this triad, see Felix Gilbert’s chapter “Fortune, Necessity, and Virtù” in his Machiavelli and Guicciardini: Politics and History in Sixteenth-Century Florence (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), 191–200. It is very difficult to locate the origin of the proverb. Recent works refer it to Curtius Rufus’s Historia Alexandri Magni 4.3.24: “Efficacior omni arte imminens necessitas”; see Hubertus Kudla, ed., Lexikon der lateinischen Zitate. 3500 Originale mit Übersetzungen und Belegstellen, 3rd edition (Munich: Beck, 2007), 1439. I think that there is no precise Latin quote, but for its Latin sapiential tradition, see all the proverbs on “necessity” quoted in Hoyt’s New Cyclopedia of Practical Quotations, rev. Kate Louise Roberts (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1922), 559; see also the collection of examples of this phrase at http://www.phrases​ .org.uk/meanings/necessity‑is‑the‑mother‑of‑invention.html (accessed 3 May 2018). “La necessità è tema e inventrice della natura, e freno e regola eterna,” in Augusto Mari-

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gory of necessity, however, did not become a political category with clear-cut criteria until Machiavelli’s opus,47 to which Luzzatto most likely refers. According to the rabbi of Venice and in agreement with the generally accepted history of the Jews since the Middle Ages, trade and moneylending were the only occupations permitted to the Jews. This historical necessity engendered in the Venetian Jews a highly developed capacity for these occupations. Consequently, they were considered by Luzzatto potentially capable of assisting the Venetian government in maintaining, or, to be historically more accurate, recovering, a position of political equilibrium between the East and the West. To put this briefly with respect to a very intriguing aspect of the political life of the Jews in Venice: the Discourse was published in 1638 in a period in which the political power of Venice was beginning to wane. His philosophical work Socrates, published in 1651, expressly refers to the Turkish threat against Crete and to the war in which Venice was involved. Hence, Luzzatto tried to offer the Governor of La Serenissima a political-economic prescription to restore the vital trade of Venice by offering the Jews more economic and social freedom. Bacon’s conviction was that “it is against nature for money to beget money,”48 echoing an Aristotelian-Thomistic conviction.49 However, that is only a superficial read of Bacon’s analysis, vision, and inferences. An in-depth study of Bacon’s conception of usury reveals a more complex attitude which, as we shall see, is similar to that of the rabbi of Venice. Bacon is adamant in his opposition to usury, and it should be borne in mind that this activity as perceived by Luzzatto and Bacon was not only the act or practice of lending money at an

47

48

49

noni, ed., Scritti letterari di Leonardo da Vinci (Milan: Rizzoli, 1974), 7. See the very interesting philosophical evaluation of the maxim in Carl von Prantl, “Leonardo da Vinci in philosophischer Beziehung,” Sitzungsberichte der königlichen bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (Munich: Akademische Buchdruckerei, 1886), 17. On the use of necessitas in Machiavelli, see Friedrich Meinecke, Machiavellism: The Doctrine of Raison D’État and its Place in Modern History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957). Francis Bacon, Essay 41, “Of Usury” (1625); see William Shakespeare, The Merchant of Venice 1.3: “Antonio. Or is your gold and silver Ewes and Rams? Shylock. I cannot tell, I make it breede as fast.” See Francis Bacon, The Essays or Counsels, Civil and Moral, ed. Brian Vickers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 94. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (London: R.T. Washburne, 1918), 330–340, reprinted in Roy C. Cave & Herbert H. Coulson, A Source Book for Medieval Economic History (Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Co., 1936; reprint, New York: Biblo & Tannen, 1965), 182. Walter S.H. Lim, “Surety and Spiritual Commercialism in The Merchant of Venice,” Studies in English Literature 50, no. 2 (2010): 355–381, esp. 371.

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exorbitant rate of interest, but rather simply the practice of lending money at any rate of interest at all.50 However, Bacon was well aware of the advantages of such activities. In his Of Usury, he enumerated the advantages and disadvantages of usury, including the danger of capitalisation: “The fourth [disadvantage of usury is], that it bringeth the treasure of a realm, or state, into a few hands. For the usurer being at certainties, and others at uncertainties, at the end of the game, most of the money will be in the box; and ever a state flourisheth, when wealth is more equally spread.”51 Luzzatto also refers to an ideal situation of greater equality, always desired but never attained. He states: “However, the aspiration to a rigorous reduction of one’s possessions to a moderate size has been considered a desirable undertaking to this day, but it is hardly ever practised, especially with regard to the equal distribution of moveable assets and cash. Whenever this was attempted with real estate, the result was, for the most part, unsuccessful.”52 Bacon’s position is in fact very pragmatic. Whoever thinks that one can lend money without profit belongs ipso dicto in the realm of utopian dreamers: It is a vanity to conceive, that there would be ordinary borrowing without profit; and it is impossible to conceive, the number of inconveniences that will ensue, if borrowing be cramped. Therefore, to speak of the abolishing of usury is idle. All states have ever had it, in one kind or rate, or other. So as that opinion must be sent to Utopia.53 Luzzatto also refers to Thomas More’s Utopia as concretisation of the “ingenious republics” (machinate repubbliche) of Socrates and Plato, where the distribution of goods was the chief element of their political thought.54 Bacon

50

51 52 53

54

See Benjamin Ravid, “Money Lending in Seventeenth-Century Jewish Vernacular Apologetica,” in Jewish Thought in the Seventeenth Century, ed. Isadore Twersky and Bernard Septimus (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987), 257–283, esp. 262. Bacon, “Of Usury.” Luzzatto, Discourse, 65. See Kate Aughterson, ed., The English Renaissance: An Anthology of Sources and Documents (London: Routledge, 1998), 548; Robert Appelbaum, Literature and Utopian Politics in Seventeenth-Century England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 4. See Luzzatto, Discourse, 59: “If prudent legislators and civil government planners had not wisely and carefully divided the multitude of men into various groups and different classes, they would resemble a greater deformity than the ancient chaos imagined by the poets. Socrates and Plato already established this partitioning as the organising principle of their policies in the commonwealths they conceived. The modern inventor of Utopia similarly kept to this structural organisation of society, and so did all other statesmen. In

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sums up his opinion on the reintegration of usury, stating that it should be reserved for a small group under government control, for “it is better to mitigate usury, by declaration, than to suffer it to rage, by connivance.”55 In his response to some criticisms of moneylending, made by both philosophers and statesmen, Luzzatto uses the same argument as advanced by Bacon, focusing on the stimulus generated by the moneylenders: Usury should be judged in the same way, as a sin continuously damned, but practised in every time and place. Two great incentives contribute to its increase: the need of the borrower, who has to pay the amount of usury, and the insatiable greed of the lender who receives it. Both incentives actually stem from our human fragility. If such a transgression were not committed by a Jew, there would be no lack of others who would practise such a contemptible profession through greater extortion of the poor and needy, thereby reducing the number of [Jewish] usurers. […] I do not say this to defend such actions, but merely to demonstrate that such an enormous transgression, like some others, is not an essential prerogative of the Jews, as many presume to assert, but rather an accidental result of the strictness of the life and conditions of the time.56 The reader acquainted with sceptical strategies will have already recognised the argument against an essential property of the Jews (“is not an essential property of the Jews”; also see Sextus’s usage of “by nature”) and the recurrence of the strategy of infinite regress as a factual relation used in political discourse: if agent A1 does not do a practice P, there will be an A2 who will do P. The argument does not presuppose that A1 (or any An) directly causes P; the relation between An and P is purely accidental. The only experienced fact is P; the agent A who produces P is only accidental and therefore the supply of agents is theoretically infinite: it leads to An.

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the same way, Aristotle [too,] in the first [book] of his Politics, employed all of his energy in reordering and correcting the divisions made by those two great masters of mankind.” Bacon, “Of Usury.” Luzzatto, Discourse, 113–115.

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97

Moral Scepticism, or Stoic Teaching in Sceptical Dress: The charakteres

Chapter 11 of the Discourse marks the beginning of its second part. Luzzatto begins by observing, with Socrates, that the human being is nothing but “a multiplicity of different animals, wrapped around each other and entangled within themselves.”57 Luzzatto refers to letter 113 of Seneca’s Ad Lucilium, in which he purposely mentions the Stoic doctrine of the manifold or animal soul in human beings, because virtues can only be animal in nature: virtutes esse animalia.58 The statement virtutes esse animalia probably goes back, according to the Stoic fragments, to Chrysippus.59 Luzzatto wishes to find a philosophical connection to affirm that the human soul is a mixture. He indirectly cites the theory of “homoiomerous parts” by Anaxagoras (in the version of Aristotle),60 that is to say, the theory of the principles or roots of cosmological anthropological compositions forming a mixture in the body: It was Anaxagoras who denied the generation of natural things, and he assumed that the world was made out of a jumbled mass that was composed of all things. Thus, he believed that everything was connected and joined to everything. This opinion was deemed absurd. Had he ever suggested something similar of the human soul, his opinion might have been met with greater applause by the sages. For if one were to carefully con57

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Luzzatto, 95: “[Socrates] announced that he did not know whether there was but one animal dwelling in his soul or a multiplicity of different animals, wrapped around each other and entangled with themselves.” Seneca, Lucil. 113.3: “Animum constat animal esse, cum ipse efficiat ut simus animalia, cum ab illo animalia nomen hoc traxerint; virtus autem nihil aliud est quam animus quodam modo se habens; ergo animal est. Deinde virtus agit aliquid; agi autem nihil sine impetu potest; si impetum habet, qui nulli est nisi animali, animal est. ‘Si animal est’ inquit ‘virtus, habet ipsa virtutem.’ Quidni habeat se ipsam? quomodo sapiens omnia per virtutem gerit, sic virtus per se. ‘Ergo’ inquit ‘et omnes artes animalia sunt et omnia quae cogitamus quaeque mente conplectimur. Sequitur ut multa millia animalium habitent in his angustiis pectoris, et singuli multa simus animalia aut multa habeamus animalia.’ Quaeris quid adversus istud respondeatur? Unaquaeque ex istis res animal erit: multa animalia non erunt. Quare? dicam, si mihi accommodaveris subtilitatem et intentionem tuam. Singula animalia singulas habere debent substantias; ista omnia unum animum habent; itaque singula esse possunt, multa esse non possunt.” Hans F. von Arnim, ed., Stoicorum veterum fragmenta, vol. 3 (Stuttgart: Tuebner, 1964), 75; Stobaeus Ecl. 64.18, 65.1; see also Thomas G. Rosenmeyer, Senecan Drama and Stoic Cosmology (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 96. Aristotle, On Coming-to-be and Ceasing-to-be 314a18: https://faculty.washington.edu/smco hen/320/anaxag.htm (accessed 3 July 2023).

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sider the impulses of the soul, one would witness the appearance of a universal mixture of infinite things.61 Luzzatto’s main objective is not so much a contemplation about the composition of human personality, but rather a discussion of the theme of virtue and vice in human beings. What follows is in fact a long passage on virtues and their obverse as individual characteristics in different moments and different locations: The courage to risk one’s life often arises from the fear produced by vulgar whispers and murmurs. Fabius could be mentioned as an example of the opposite tendency, for he was half-hearted when attacking Hannibal but brave in scorning the plebs who spat at him. Hence, the covetous desire to prolong life and to enjoy its pleasures by placing weak but durable satisfactions before vehement and brief ones makes us temperate and moderate. Thus Socrates, in Plato’s Phaedo, unravels the great secret of morality by arguing of the moderates that “it is a kind of licentiousness that has made them moderate,” and thus they are “brave through fear and cowardice”; similarly, Solomon in Ecclesiastes states in accordance with the Hebrew: “Again, I considered all labour and all excelling in work, that it is a man’s rivalry with his neighbour.” This means that the vulgar virtues are jealousy, competition, and emulation, which men have towards their neighbours, which leads to a confusion of virtues with vices.62 Pleasure, the main target that is so appealing to our soul, is always mixed with its opposite, pain, as Plato demonstrates in his Philebus. Thirst and hunger are the greatest stimuli for our taste. Tragic plays disturb us and lead to our indignation against the tyrants. Nonetheless, we feel a secret itching and hankering for pleasure that greatly tempts and enraptures us. The Jews translate pleasure with the term ‫תענוג‬, stemming from the verb ‫ענה‬, which means “distressing pain,” to denote the aforementioned combination.63 Homer praised the impetuous agitation of ire as being full of joy and sweetness. In the same way, jealousy was born from the fervour of love, and from thence hatred. As Tacitus said of Mount Lebanon: “[it] is in fact a 61 62 63

Luzzatto, Discourse, 95. Luzzatto, 95–97. Luzzatto, 97.

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marvel, for in the midst of the excessive heat its summit is shaded by trees and covered with snow.” Alexander, famed both for his victories and for the virtues of his soul, was so full of pity for Darius and his women, and yet he was so relentless towards Parmenion and Cleitus, who placed the rule of the world in his hands, and so cruel towards Callisthenes, his teacher. Julius Caesar, ferocious and inhuman in Pharsalia, was in contrast merciful towards Marcellus and indulgent towards Brutus, his murderer. Nero, a monster of humanity, at times regretted knowing how to write when he had to write death decrees for delinquents. And yet he did not mind exercising it [i.e., this prerogative] against his mother, and his teacher Seneca. He was a friend of virtue and learning, but he hated these attributes in others. For this reason, Lucan, the wittiest poet that ever lived, lost his life. During the time of the cruel proscription ordered by the Triumvirate, faith, charity, and gratitude took leave of the most eminent and wellcomposed minds of the Republic, and were to be found in neither fathers nor sons, nor brothers. Then these virtues took refuge in the debasement of slaves and the obscenities of prostitutes. One of these prostitutes suffered the severest tortures, for she did not want to betray her mischievous friends. Socrates found ignorance precisely when his wisdom had reached its peak. Thus, the Oracle acknowledged him to be the wisest man. Gentleness, when a little irritated, becomes indomitable pride, and this, managed with dexterity, changes into gentle and pliable affability.64 The careful reader has probably recognised part of the catalogue of the second book of Aristotle’s Rhetoric: pleasure–pain, rage–meekness, friendship–hate, fear–courage, shame–shamelessness, compassion–disdain, envy–emulation. This list has a particular purpose: to demonstrate the multifaceted dimensions of the human soul. In the words of Socrates: The internal image of our soul is composed of a mosaic that appears to form a single idea. Upon approaching it, however, one sees that it is made up of various fragments of cheap and precious stones put together. In the same way our soul is, for the most part, composed of different and discrepant pieces, each of which on various occasions takes a distinct appearance. Thus, the description of a single man’s nature and condition is a very arduous and difficult endeavor. It is even more difficult and arduous to relate all of his actions to a single rule and idea.

64

Luzzatto, 97–99.

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Hence, many authors happened to have written about the nature of dogs, horses, and falcons and have discussed their customs and conditions with great exactness. But very few have dealt with man, and when they have, they have done so only fleetingly. The one who has done so better than anyone else is Theophrastus, Aristotle’s disciple. He set this undertaking aside for the last years of his life, when he was an octogenarian. He then compiled a historical treatise in which he wrote down his observations regarding aspects of the human soul. Only a fragment of the work exists, the rest having been destroyed by the injuries of time.65 Luzzatto refers here to Theophrastus of Eresos, author of Charakteres, a series of characterisations of the human soul. Angelo Ambrogini, nicknamed Poliziano, translated the first fifteen characters into Latin. These characters were published in Basel in 1532 by Andreas Cratander and did not feature Poliziano as the translator.66 They were published again, this time with Poliziano’s name, in Paris in 1583 by Frédéric Morel. Already in 1552 an edition of these works by Aldo Manuzio, with eight more characters added, had appeared thanks to the efforts of Giovanni Battista Camozza. In 1599 a second edition, titled Caratteri, was published in Leiden, including five more characters (21–28). This edition was discovered by Isaac Casaubon and copied once more by Marquard Freher. In 1620, Ansaldo Cebà67 published an Italian version of the first fifteen characters, probably without taking into consideration Manuzio’s edition, possibly because he was too young to know of it. In any case, he does not use the 1552 edition. Cebà’s book was, however, present in Venice, as the ancient catalogue of the Marciana Library reveals. This publication most likely circulated even in the Venetian Ghetto because at that time Cebà, a priest, had an epistolary love affair with a famous poet of Jewish origins, Sara Copia Sullam, whom I have previously discussed.68 The Venetian rabbi’s objective is now evident: referring not only to Aristotelian rhetoric or to Theophrastus’s composition, he underlines a very popular rhetorical device of that time: the use of typical characters of seventeenth-

65 66

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Luzzatto, 99. My source for this paragraph was: Andreas Cratander, I caratteri Morali di Teofrasto, ed. Augusto Romiti (Florence: Sansoni, 1899), which is the critical edition of the Greek text with Italian translation and notes. Ansaldo Cebà, I Charatteri morali di Theofrasto interpretati per Ansaldo Cebà. Al Cardinale Federigo Borromeo (Genoa: Pavoni, 1620). See Giuseppe Veltri, Renaissance Philosophy in Jewish Garb: Foundations and Challenges in Judaism on the Eve of Modernity (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 226–247.

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century theatre.69 This representation of the affects of the human soul, and of its different characters, was a sign of distinction in a century of comedies and tragedies performed and sung on the stage. It was exactly the abovementioned Cebà who published a detailed commentary to accompany Theophrastus’s text. Something which does not escape the attentive reader is that emphasising the theatrical character of the human soul also means negating objective responsibility: everyone is an actor on the theatrum mundi (the world theatre) stage, always playing with one’s passion or its reverse.

5

Conclusion: On Reluctant and Nude Truth

At the end of this essay, of which the intent is to illustrate only some aspects of the Discourse, I would like to focus on a key concept of Luzzatto’s apologia of Jewish life in Venice: the “reluctant and nude truth.” Just at the beginning of the small treatise, the rabbi ventures to present an image of Judaism that goes beyond prejudices and atavistic hatred. It is specifically addressed to the “cultori dell’invita verità.” Exactly what is meant by this expression, which was used in the dedication, is not clear at first sight. Earlier translators have preferred to consider it as a misprint and to amend the text to “invicta verità” (unconquerable truth). There is, however, no need to change the wording of the text, which in translation sounds: I dare to bring this work, neglected and stripped of ornate diction, to your noble attention, while indeed being aware that lovers of reluctant Truth [in Italian: cultori dell’invita verità] appreciate simplicity. For [this reluctant truth] takes the greatest delight in [its] very nakedness. I do not claim undeserved favour from you, nor extorted applause, as I recognize how unworthy and unmerited it would be; but I plead for the most candid and honest judgment of the issues discussed.70 The concept of “reluctant truth” fits very well into Luzzatto’s political system. Lovers of the “reluctant/unwilling” truth accept it, regardless of the form in which it may be propagated. In Luzzatto’s own words:

69 70

See Silvia Carandini, Teatro e spettacolo nel Seicento (Rome: Laterza, 1990). Luzzatto, Discourse, 5. A similar parallel appears in Francis Bacon, The New Organon, 14: “For a naked mind is the companion of innocence and simplicity, as once upon a time the naked body was.”

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Therefore, with the smallest amount of talent that the Divine Majesty has granted me, I brought myself to compose a concise but truthful account of this Nation’s principal rites and most commonly shared opinions, which are not in conflict with those that are universal. In performing this task, I tried with all my might, even though I belong to the same Nation, to abstain from any sympathy or passion that could make me deviate from the truth. Thus, I hope to meet the minds of my discerning readers, who, free from any prejudice or troubled judgment, are not willing to follow the vulgar custom of only approving and favouring happy and fortunate individuals, and always damning the abased and afflicted. Rather, with upright judgment, they will want to make a balanced evaluation of the words my imperfection has dictated to me. I will dwell no longer on this ancestry, on its unmixed blood, which has existed for such a long period of time, on the persistence of its rites and beliefs, or on its unyielding endurance during times of oppression. I will merely add an exposition concerning some of the profits that the Jewish Nation living in the illustrious city of Venice has brought to [that city]. With this, I do not intend to offer any ambitious estimate of profits and gains; rather I only wish to demonstrate that this Nation is anything but a useless part of the general population of this city.71 The author’s commitment to his truth should not hide the fact that Luzzatto is not speaking of the Aristotelian principle of noncontradiction, but of the political perception of that condition. His intention is to provide as neutral a portrait of the Jews as possible, describing their presence in Venice and the (economic) advantages they bring. Although himself a member of the Jewish “nation,” a pars in causa, he will nevertheless maintain his impartiality. In return for his unbiased presentation of the argument, he expects his readers to form their opinion on the subject without prejudice. The expression “nudity of the truth” is very intriguing. The reader of Luzzatto was acquainted with the concept of nuda veritas from Horace,72 but also with its contradictory nature. For the nudity was, obviously, tantamount to purity and simplicity but also implied a lack of defences. The Florentine painter Sergio Botticelli recreated the Calumny of Apelles, inspired by a lost painting of the Greek painter Apelles, the story of

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Luzzatto, Discourse, 7. Horace, Odes and Epodes, ed. Paul Shorey and Gordon J. Laing (Chicago: Benj. H. Sanborn, 1919), 1.24: cui Pudor et Iustitiae soror / incorrupta Fides nudaque Veritas / quando ullum inveniet parem?

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which has been reported or perhaps invented by Lucian.73 According to him a slanderer, a rival of Apelles, accused the painter of revolt in front of King Midas, which he then depicted in his painting as follows: On the right sits a man with long ears almost of the Midas pattern, stretching out a hand to Slander, who is still some way off, but coming. About him are two females whom I take for Ignorance and Suspicion. Slander, approaching from the left, is an extraordinarily beautiful woman, but with a heated, excitable air that suggests delusion and impulsiveness; in her left hand is a lighted torch, and with her right she is holding a youth by the hair; he holds up hands to heaven and calls the Gods to witness his innocence. Showing Slander the way is a man with piercing eyes, but pale, deformed, and shrunken as from long illness; one may easily guess him to be Envy. Two female attendants encourage Slander, acting as tire-women, and adding touches to her beauty; according to the cicerone, one of these is Malice, and the other Deceit. Following behind in mourning guise, black-robed and with torn hair, comes (I think he named her) Repentance. She looks tearfully behind her, awaiting shame-faced the approach of Truth. That was how Apelles translated his peril into paint.74 In the depiction of Botticelli, the truth is naked, a nakedness which can have three possible meanings: 1) purity and simplicity, which causes or is caused by innocence; 2) lack of defence; and 3) extreme difficulty in catching an adversary (for example, in the Olympic games). While the first and the second possibilities are expressions of weakness and “imbecility,” which literally means incapability of fighting and defending oneself, the third one is almost the reverse, revealing the “sceptic” attitude of a bodily description. Back to the picture: a very similar “translation” of a process of judgement into a piece of theatre has been presented by Luzzatto in his Socrates, where the theatrical figures of Defamation, Suspicion, Ignorance, Fame, and Custom (as ministers of Authority/Slander) appear.75 In another passage of the Socrates, he 73 74 75

See Rudolph Altrocchi, “The Calumny of Apelles in the Literature of the Quattrocento,” Modern Language Association 36, no. 3 (1921): 454–491. Henri W. Fowler and Francis G. Fowler, eds., The Works of Lucian of Samosata (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1905). See Simone Luzzatto, Socrates, or on Human Knowledge—Bilingual edition, ed., trans., and comm. Giuseppe Veltri and Michela Torbidoni (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2019), 35: “Yet, as soon as the traitor [i.e. Authority] had achieved so noble a rank and become impudent through the simple obedience and easy credulity of the stupid folk, she began conspiring against me. Felony went so far that it chased me out of my royal seat and brought and relegated me

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comes back to the comparison between truth and nudity.76 Here he is dealing with the consequences of his attitude to his enquiry “concerning the cognition of the truth, convinced to suspend and withhold my assent.”77 His hesitation and perplexity lead him “to consider whether it would be a profitable decision to publicly discredit our alleged knowledge.”78 Disclosing the truth, he maintains, does not always fulfil our interest, like the nudity of our body, although “the members were masterly constructed by excellent Nature, so often it turns out to be indecent that the truth should appear to vulgar people without any ornament.”79 The truth of cognition is like nudity, appreciated by lovers but also likely considered indecent by common people. The indirect reference is obviously to Genesis 3 and the creation of the feeling of shame in seeing nudity after the primordial sin. For Luzzatto, this indecency is a feeling of vulgar people, provoked by the nudity of the truth. This indecency can also prompt scepticism concerning the effectiveness of the decision to “publicly discredit our alleged knowledge.” That is an extreme aspect of the sceptical attitude: to be sceptical about one’s own scepticism. It also contains the additional idea that scepticism can be politically dangerous.

Bibliography Abravanel, Isaac. Perush al neviʾim aaronim (Tel Aviv, n.d.) Altrocchi, Rudolph. “The Calumny of Apelles in the Literature of the Quattrocento.” Modern Language Association 36, no. 3 (1921): 454–491. Annas, Julia, and Jonathan Barnes. The Modes of Scepticism: Ancient Texts and Modern Interpretations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. Appelbaum, Robert. Literature and Utopian Politics in Seventeenth-Century England. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

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to a dark and lonely prison. Hence, as I have indeed lost my freedom, it was forbidden to have intercourse with my favourites and thus I became infertile and sterile […] Indeed, she came so far only by means of sumptuous cloths, authoritative bearings, frowning, intimidating glances, furrowing its brows, concise and ambiguous words, brief and reluctant conversations, contemptuous and delusory manners, […] as well as everything attributed and connected to her by deceitful Fame and confirmed by obstinate Custom, both of them promoters of its acclaims and commendations.” See Luzzatto, 399–401. Luzzatto, 299. Luzzatto, 299. Luzzatto, 399–401.

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Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism. Edited by Julia Annas and Jonathan Barnes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Shakespeare, William. The Merchant of Venice. Accessed 18 January 2023. http://shakespe are.mit.edu/merchant/full.html. Siegel, Rudolph E. Galen’s System of Physiology and Medicine: An Analysis of His Doctrines and Observations on Bloodflow, Respiration, Humors and Internal Diseases. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1993. Spinelli, Emidio. “L’esperienza scettica: Sesto Empirico fra metodologia scientifica e scelte etiche.” Quaestio 4 (2004): 25–43. Spinelli, Emidio. “Sextus Empiricus.” In Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques, edited by Richard Goulet, 265–300. Paris: cnrs éditions, 2016. Spinelli, Emidio. Questioni scettiche. Letture introduttive al pirronismo antico. Rome: Lithos, 2005. Stein, Nathanael. “Causal Necessity in Aristotle.”British Journal for the History of Philosophy 20 (2012): 855–879. Tacitus. Histories: Books 4–5. Annals: Books 1–3. Translated by Clifford H. Moore and John Jackson. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1931. Trivellato, Francesca. “Jews and Early Modern Economy.” In The Cambridge history of Judaism, Volume 7: The Early Modern World, 1500–1815, edited by Jonathan Karp and Adam Sutcliffe, 139–167. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018. Veltri, Giuseppe. “Economic and Social Arguments and the Doctrine of the Antiperistasis in Simone Luzzatto’s Political Thought: Venetian Reverberations of Francis Bacon’s Philosophy.” Frühneuzeit-Info 23 (2011): 23–32. Veltri, Giuseppe. Renaissance Philosophy in Jewish Garb: Foundations and Challenges in Judaism on the Eve of Modernity. Leiden: Brill, 2009.

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Simone Luzzatto’s Scepticism in Light of Medieval Jewish Apologetics Fabrizio Lelli

Delle lettere hebraiche quasi affatto si è perduta la semenza, perché, non più essendo in uso, rarissimi ne seminano; e certo con grave vergogna pubblica, che dagli huomini non sia ambita quella lingua, con la quale havendo parlato Iddio, le ha data tanta riputatione. traiano boccalini, De’ ragguagli di Parnaso1

… Thus the language of the people of Israel has been exiled from within the Jews themselves […] the language lays impoverished in a corner, and has become stranger and foreigner among us, the Jews, whereas Italian is understood well. judah del bene, Seats of the House of David [Kissĕʾot lĕ-vêt Dāvīd]2

∵ In Simone Luzzatto’s (ca. 1583–1663) days, the renaissance of Italian scholarly academies3 induced intellectuals to draw inspiration from past authoritative knowledge to merge philosophy, rhetoric, and poetry in their literary produc-

1 Traiano Boccalini, De’ ragguagli di Parnaso (Venetia: Giovanni Guerigli, 1617), Centuria i, Ragguaglio ix, 108. “The seed of the Hebrew letters has been almost completely lost, because, as they [the letters] are no longer in use, it [the seed] is very rarely sown; that a language of so high a reputation (being God’s idiom) is no longer coveted by men is certainly a serious collective shame.” [Author’s translation] 2 My translation of Judah Del Bene’s (ca. 1615–1678) Seats of the House of David (Kissĕʾot lĕvêt Dāvīd, Verona: Rossi, 1646, ii, ix, f. 24r), relies on Giuseppe Sermoneta’s Italian version in his “Aspetti del pensiero moderno nell’Ebraismo italiano tra Rinascimento e età barocca,” in Italia Judaica: “Gli ebrei in Italia tra Rinascimento ed Età barocca” (Rome: Istituto Poligrafico dello Stato, 1986), 27n23. 3 See Giuseppe Veltri and Evelien Chayes, Oltre le Mura del Ghetto. Accademie, Scetticismo e Tolleranza nella Venezia Barocca (Palermo: New Digital Press, 2016).

© Fabrizio Lelli, 2024 | doi:10.1163/9789004694262_006

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tions, mainly composed in the Tuscan language.4 Rhetoric being both the art of providing the most diverse readers with the most different subjects and the discipline that aims to convince by means of juridical discourse, its ultimate models could be derived from late antique (mainly second-century ce) works that had been rediscovered in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.5 Like their classical models, Renaissance authors adapted a fictitious apologetic genre to epic and tragic patterns in order to emphasise the pathos and arouse the sentiments and passions of the readers while displaying moral contents.6 Against such a background, Italian authors made frequent use of the “Parnassic” genre. Fictitious journeys to Mount Parnassus, in their multiple expressions, had enjoyed appreciation since the late Middle Ages, but thrived in the seventeenth century, especially following the example of Traiano Boccalini’s (1556–1613) De’ ragguagli di Parnaso (Newssheet from Parnassus). Unlike the erudite and static late medieval lists of classical authorities, seventeenthcentury works display a variety of characters that were sketched following diverse literary patterns, one of the most common being the prose satire. Boccalini’s De’ ragguagli, first published in Venice in 1612–1613, is a light and fantastic satire on the deeds and writings of illustrious intellectuals. The author imagines the Greek god Apollo judging the merits of those who turn to his poetic tribunal seeking justice.7 By means of the satirical device, judicial rhetoric became a way to make a narrative more dynamic.8 It is against such a stylistic background that, for instance, the material contained in the miscellaneous work generally known as Codice di Giulia Solinga (Giulia Solinga’s Codex), was assembled in early seventeenth-century Venice.9 The plot in the Codice focuses on an assembly of the most important poets of the past—from Greek antiquity to the Italian Renaissance. The gathering of the prestigious authors takes place on Mount Parnassus, like in Boccalini’s De’ ragguagli. The participants, who express their views in contemporary high Tuscan language and follow Petrarchan poetic models, aim to defend the Venetian Jewish poet Sara Copia Sullam

4 See Pierantonio Frare, “Poetiche del Barocco,” in I capricci di Proteo. Percorsi e linguaggi del Barocco (Rome: Salerno editrice, 2002), 41–70. 5 See Brian Vickers, “Rhetoric and Poetics,” in The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy, eds. Charles B. Schmitt and Jill Kraye (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 717–745. 6 See Luigi Firpo, “La satira politica in forma di ragguaglio di Parnaso,” Atti della Accademia delle Scienze di Torino (ii classe di Scienze Morali, Storiche e Filologiche) 87 (1952–1953): 197–247. 7 See Hugh Chisholm, “Trajano Boccalini,” in Encyclopaedia Britannica 4, 11th ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1911), 105. 8 See Federica Cappelli, “Parnaso bipartito nella satira italiana del Seicento (e due imitazioni spagnole),” Cuadernos de filología italiana, 8 (2001): 133–151. 9 Ms. Venice, Biblioteca Civico Museo Correr, Cicogna 270 (olim 206).

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(ca. 1592–1641), who had been charged with plagiarism by one of her past protégés, the poet Numidio Paluzzi (d. 1625). The core of the work is the apology of Sara Copia, who pleads not guilty in front of a tribunal of the highest poetic authorities of all times. The atmosphere is both solemn and mythical: against the obviously fictitious setting that constitutes the satiric background of the plot, the various speakers never seem to attain any decisive conclusion. Everything is dubious and subject to criticism.10 Within the same Venetian milieu, a similar trial opens Luzzatto’s Socrates (first printed in Venice in 1651), a work that the author defines as a “serio-ludic exercise” (esercizio serio-giocoso)11 thus stressing his adherence to Boccalini’s work and the satiric genre of his times.12 Luzzatto’s work is introduced by a letter that magically sets the action in Apollo’s sanctuary of Delphi, not far from Copia’s or Boccalini’s Parnassus. However, instead of poets, the debate here is attended by philosophers. Among them, Pythagoras and Aristotle are considered as the major authorities, like Virgil and Dante for Sara Copia.13 Most of the philosophers maintain that Socrates should be given the opportunity to take the floor and to plead innocent. Like Sara Copia in her defence, in his apology Socrates draws upon contemporary sceptical views, though many assumptions are grounded in past sources of knowledge that were still held as authoritative and cherished by contemporary non-Jewish culture. Luzzatto’s treatise is written in Italian14 to be accessible to the academic milieu of the author, and for this reason it is fraught with quotes from the most revered intellectuals that were part of contemporary educational strategies. It is obvious that the choice of the language was closely connected with the sources that Luzzatto wanted to take into account and targeted a trans-Italian and not only Jewish academic audience, like Giulia Solinga’s Codex. 10

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See Umberto Fortis, La “Bella Ebrea.” Sara Copio Sullam, poetessa nel ghetto di Venezia del ‘600 (Turin: Silvio Zamorani, 2003); Don Harrán, Jewish Poet and Intellectual in Seventeenth-Century Venice: The Works of Sarra Copia Sulam in Verse and Prose, Along With Writings of Her Contemporaries in Her Praise, Condemnation, or Defense (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009). Simone Luzzatto, Socrates, or on Human Knowledge—Bilingual edition, eds., trans., and comm. Giuseppe Veltri and Michela Torbidoni (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2019). See, e.g., in Boccalini, De’ ragguagli, 10, Dedicatory to Cardinal Borghese: “scherzando sopra le passioni et i costumi degli huomini privati non meno che sopra gl’interessi e le attioni de’ principi grandi” (joyfully playing about passions and habits of private individuals, no less than about interests and deeds of great princes). See, e.g., Boccalini, De’ ragguagli, Centuria i, Ragguaglio v, where the most illustrious contemporary and past Italian literati discuss the virtues of the Venetian government. On the criticism of such an attitude within Jewish milieus in Luzzatto’s day, see the quote from Judah Del Bene (and its Boccalini parallel) that introduces this essay.

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Referring to sources external to Jewish speculation in order to support Judaism was certainly not an innovation of Luzzatto. Already in previous centuries, and especially in Italy, Jewish scholars overtly drew upon non-Hebrew works for composing their own doctrinal treatises, sometimes making explicit mention of the non-Jewish authors and sometimes just turning their words into Hebrew without pointing out who their actual sources were. A case in point was that of Judah Abravanel, better known as Leone Ebreo (ca. 1460–ca. 1530), who wrote his Dialoghi d’amore (Dialogues on love), a philosophical treatise, in Italian.15 Both Abravanel and Luzzatto addressed the colleagues of their scholarly milieus by means of a common literary language and by drawing on the most common motifs of the academic debate of their generations: Leone Ebreo’s philosophy of love is replaced by Luzzatto’s mathematical and scientific analysis. However, as we may assume from its long subtitle, Socrates is A book that shows how deficient human understanding can be when it is not led by divine revelation (Opera nella quale si dimostra quanto sia imbecile l’humano intendimento, mentre non è diretto dalla divina rivelatione). From this perspective, Luzzatto’s discourse can be deemed rooted in the long-lasting tradition of medieval Scholasticism that was still popular in seventeenth-century Italy and that animated the debates of contemporary academies. Let us think, for instance, of the debate on the immortality of the soul held by Sara Copia in the Venetian ghetto.16 When compared to Italian Jewish authors of previous generations—such as Yohanan Alemanno (ca. 1435–ca. 1506),17 Abraham Farissol (1452–ca. 1528),18 Abraham Jagel (1553–1623),19 or Leon Modena (1571–1648)20—Luzzatto does not seem to be aiming to impress a Jewish audience with non-Jewish knowledge that had to be grounded in the biblical and rabbinic tradition; Luzzatto seems instead to

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On the academic readers of Leone Ebreo’s work, see Fabrizio Lelli, “Intellettuali ebrei e Accademia Pontaniana: alcune considerazioni alla luce di due recenti pubblicazioni,” Sefer Yuhasin 5 (2017): 159–169. See note 10. Similar philosophical themes are tackled in Hebrew by Judah Del Bene’s work The Seats of the House of David (Kissĕʾot lĕ-vêt Dāvīd); see Sermoneta, “Aspetti del pensiero moderno nell’Ebraismo italiano,” 29. See Fabrizio Lelli, “The Role of Early Renaissance Geographical Discoveries in Yohanan Alemanno’s Messianic Thought,” in Hebraic Aspects of the Renaissance. Sources and Encounters, eds. Ilana Zinguer, Abraham Melamed, and Zur Shalev (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 192– 210. See David B. Ruderman, The World of a Renaissance Jew: The Life and Thought of Abraham ben Mordecai Farissol (Cincinnati: Hebrew Union College Press, 1981). See David B. Ruderman, A Valley of Vision: The Heavenly Journey of Abraham ben Hananiah Yagel (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990). See David Malkiel, ed., The Lion Shall Roar: Leon Modena and His World (Jerusalem: The Hebrew University Ben-Zvi Institute, 2003).

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parallel his contemporary non-Jewish colleagues who debated on the boundaries of human knowledge from a mathematical viewpoint and used traditional rhetorical tools to discuss scientific issues. However, despite his major use of those sources, he seems to conceal many hints at the most traditional works of Jewish literature in his discourse.21 Many of the topics at stake in Luzzatto’s work had already been taken into account by Italian Jews since the end of the fourteenth century, and their differing views were often endowed with an apologetic connotation. Sometimes, drawing upon non-Jewish subjects would contribute to a better understanding of disciplines that, originally Jewish, had allegedly been stolen by the pagans. In the eyes of their coreligionists, adhering to such doctrines meant restoring, at least in part, what had been lost in antiquity.22 A similar attitude appears, for instance, in the author’s beautiful introduction of the Book of the Righteous (Sēfer ha-yāšār), a Midrashic collection of biblical stories whose earliest extant printed version was published in Venice in 1625.23 The Venetian edition contains two different forewords, the first one of the editor, and the second of the author, both claiming that the book was a very ancient text that had been taken from Jerusalem to Spain after the destruction of the Temple in the year 70ce. The same book was so precious that the king of Egypt, Ptolemy, was persuaded that it was the authentic Hebrew scripture. The editor draws inspiration from the humanist passion for the rediscovery of ancient literary treasures, and evidently uses the second-century bce Letter of Aristeas to support the authority of the book he is publishing. In other words, an ancient apologetic text written in Greek is used here to foster the circulation of a Hebrew book among Renaissance Italian Jews.24 In previous generations,

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In the same context of Jewish scholarly receptiveness to conceptual themes issued from non-Jewish thought, Abraham Cohen de Herrera’s (1570–1635) Puerta del cielo should also be taken into account. See Giuseppa Saccaro Battisti, “La cultura filosofica del Rinascimento italiano nella Puerta del cielo di Abraham Cohen Herrera,” in Italia Judaica: “Gli ebrei in Italia tra Rinascimento ed Età barocca” (Rome: Istituto Poligrafico dello Stato, 1986), 295–334. On the traditional motif of the loss or theft of ancient Jewish wisdom, see, e.g., Giuseppe Veltri, Alienated Wisdom: Enquiry into Jewish Philosophy and Scepticism (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2018), 21–42. See Sēfer ha-yāšār, ed. Yoseph Dan (Jerusalem: Mosad Bialik, 1986), 37–42. See Fabrizio Lelli, “Una risposta ebraica all’umanesimo cristiano: il ‘Sefer ha-yašar’,” in Proceedings of the Conference Lectures on Philo, 10–12 October 2012, Florence–Rimini, The Theological Faculty of Central Italy and Shemah Institute for Jewish Studies, Florence, (forthcoming). Azariah de’ Rossi (ca. 1513–1578) shared an analogous attitude towards the humanists’ rediscovery of antiquity; see Giuseppe Veltri, “The Humanist Sense of History and the Jewish Idea of Tradition: Azaria de’ Rossi’s Critique of Philo Alexandrinus,” Jewish Studies

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a Jewish thinker such as Elijah Ḥayyim of Genazzano, active in late fifteenthcentury Tuscany, complains about his colleagues’ fascination with non-Jewish knowledge in the following terms: If only they had kept quiet forever, what a great deliverance for us! But many have been wounded by them and struck dead, their hearts twisted into error by speculation on alien customs. They were not thoughtful. They lacked the wit and judgment to ask this question: “Was the Law not hewn from a holy Place? How can human intellect suffice to understand secrets that are higher than any syllogism?”25 In Genazzano’s treatise, titled Delightful Epistle (Iggeret ḥămûdôt), the rational arguments of contemporary Jewish philosophers, mainly from the Iberian Peninsula, are the object of a violent attack. This notwithstanding, the concern with Platonism that was common among Tuscan fifteenth-century philosophers aroused the interest of Genazzano; for him, the lesson that could be learnt from ancient classical authorities became the basis of a thorough rethinking of contemporary Judaism. Thus, in his Epistle, Genazzano criticised a contemporary Jewish interpretation of the doctrine of soul transmigration (gīlgûl ha-nešāmôt), but grounded his understanding of the subject in the words of Pythagoras and Numenius of Apamea—cherished by the contemporaneous Marsilio Ficino and Giovanni Pico della Mirandola.26 In other words, to strengthen rabbinic authority on complex theological issues such as the doctrine of metempsychosis, Genazzano quoted non-Jewish sources while rejecting the Jewish interpretation provided by such authorities as Joseph Albo or Isaac Abravanel, who enjoyed a wide renown in late fifteenth- and early sixteenth-century Italy. Almost at the end of his apology, Luzzatto’s Socrates exclaims: Excellent judges, this is what I discussed with friends and people close to me and whence there follows towards me the almost universal hatred of all classes of people nowadays. Only now am I experiencing how true the

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Quarterly 2, no. 4 (1995): 372–393; Giuseppe Veltri, Renaissance Philosophy in Jewish Garb (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 73–96. See Eliyyah Ḥayyîm ben Binyamin da Genazzano, La lettera preziosa (Iggeret ḥămûdôt), ed. Fabrizio Lelli (Florence, Nîmes: Giuntina, 2002), 135–136. See Genazzano, La lettera preziosa, 152–154. See also Fabrizio Lelli, “Pico, i Da Pisa e ’Eliyyà Ḥayyim da Genazzano,” in Giovanni Pico e la cabbalà, ed. Fabrizio Lelli (Florence: Olschki, 2014), 93–120.

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saying of our Pericles was, namely that in factions and wars, neutrality and the middle way were almost always harmful to the one who followed them; indeed, he ends up being unfriendly with both factions and often bitterly hated by them. Undoubtedly the same has happened to me: I am hated by the learned ones, because I despised their admired wisdom, and likewise, I am not a friend of the masses, who do not defend me now because I did not approve of their blind and coarse ignorance.27 One of the most interesting elements of Luzzatto’s modern reading of the ancient philosopher is that, for the Venetian author, Socrates was an intellectual who supported persuasive arguments that would address both intellectuals and ordinary people. The art of rhetoric, used also to convey messages of faith to an intellectually variegated audience, was one of the reasons that led to the revival of the ancient art of speech, also among Jewish fifteenthand sixteenth-century authors, and to its use in contemporary apologetics.28 If scripture itself could be deemed “a mostly rhetorical work” (opus rhetoricum maxime) and biblical prophets were compared to ancient orators, rhetoric could be used also to address the faithful in religious communities. The combination of this conception with the birth of a new, more secular education was common among fifteenth-century Italian Jews. The most significant example of such an intellectual trend was the scholarly production of Judah Messer Leon (ca. 1420–1497), an itinerant teacher and an Aristotelian philosopher, who was mainly celebrated for his treatise of biblical rhetoric, The Book of the Honeycomb’s Flow (Sēfer nōfet ṣûfîm).29 One of Messer Leon’s most brilliant disciples was the already mentioned Yohanan Alemanno, who wrote in the introduction to his encyclopaedic treatise titled The Immortal (Ḥāy ha-ʿôlāmîm) that the ancient priests in the Temple of Jerusalem used a simple and easily understandable language: for the education [of the people], by using words revealing the parts of the things, pronounced in the word itself, in their language, in their names […] thus [the people] will not toil in vain to verify their arguments and judgements by means of proofs that are understandable only to scholars, since such a verification will be heavy for them, they will not bear

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Luzzatto, Socrates, 477. See Yohanan Alemanno, Ḥāy ha-ʿôlāmîm (L’immortale). Parte i: la Retorica, ed. Fabrizio Lelli (Florence: Leo S. Olschki, 1995), 29–55. See Judah Messer Leon, The Book Of The Honeycomb’s Flow, Sēpher Nōpheth Ṣūphīm, ed. and trans. Isaac Rabinowitz (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983).

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it and they will despise it without attaining real understanding […] it is well known that Pythagoras, who lived in the days of the prophets, when teaching his disciples a scientific topic, did not allow them to search its causes at the beginning of their investigation; he taught them the sciences, not the causes, and only at a second stage he would reveal their causes to them. It is right on this subject that our masters, of blessed memory, used to say: “First repeat and then understand.”30 For Alemanno, Pythagoras, like Socrates for Luzzatto, could be adopted into the speculative system of traditional Jewish thought, on the condition that the relations of the ancient philosophers with Judaism be stressed. As in the case of Genazzano, ancient Greek philosophers strengthened rabbinic authority. The traditional rhetorical weapons used in contemporary apologetics to fight against non-Jews are here used within a Jewish milieu. From this perspective, I wonder whether we might compare the role of Luzzatto’s Socrates with Alemanno’s Pythagoras or Genazzano’s Pythagoras or Numenius. It seems to me that every time there was a decisive impact of external influences on Jewish thought, Jewish thinkers stressed the significant role of ancient nonJewish thinkers who were somehow part of the chain of the prisca theologia tradition.31 The dream of a common universal knowledge was very ancient. It was a way to demonstrate a close link between different systems of speculation that were valued outside of Judaism and the more traditional Judaic doctrines. If this reading is correct, it follows that despite the overall change of scientific and speculative categories in late Renaissance European thought and the new rhetorical trends of late sixteenth-century literature, in the early modern era Jewish authors still continued to follow in the footsteps of an established tradition by constantly comparing their own categories with those common among contemporary non-Jewish intellectuals.32 If Pythagoras, as portrayed by Alemanno and Genazzano, was a priscus theologus in the Ficinian sense, a sup-

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Alemanno, Ḥāy ha-ʿôlāmîm, 70; 102–103. See Fabrizio Lelli, “Prisca Philosophia and Docta Religio. The Boundaries of Rational Knowledge in Jewish and Christian Humanist Thought,” Jewish Quarterly Review 91 (2000): 53–100; Moshe Idel, Kabbalah in Italy: 1280–1510. A Survey (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011), 164–176. Moshe Idel, “Differing Conceptions of Kabbalah in the Early 17th Century,” in Jewish Thought in the Seventeenth Century, eds. Isadore Twersky and Bernard Septimus (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 137–200; Moshe Idel, “Major Currents in Italian Kabbalah between 1560–1660,” in Italia Judaica: “Gli ebrei in Italia tra Rinascimento ed Età barocca” (Rome: Istituto Poligrafico dello Stato, 1986), 243–262; Sermoneta, “Aspetti del pensiero moderno nell’Ebraismo italiano.”

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porter of rhetoric, and at the same time a mediator of ancient truths that had been revealed by God to Abraham, Luzzatto’s Socrates was a sceptical thinker who drew upon rational arguments to deal with traditional faith in the eyes of Jews and non-Jews. Indeed, Luzzatto’s Socrates—I mean the chief character of his dialogue—is no different from the idealised Socrates portrayed by medieval Jewish philosophers who mentioned him in their apologetic works. We are not surprised that, at the beginning of the fourteenth century, right at the time of the flourishing of a variegated array of Kabbalistic traditions in Western Europe, Socrates could be depicted in the garb of a mystic, a Kabbalist who devoted his life to contemplation and self-seclusion from the material world: To whom may we compare those very rare individuals, like Socrates, that chose deliberately to separate their soul from materiality and to withdraw into a more spiritual state of existence? Only they who are endowed with such a depth of heart may realize that only by means of a similar sort of contemplation of the supernal entities will they attain the complete comprehension of the first form.33 This Hebrew passage appears in Joseph ibn Shem-Ṭob’s (d. 1480) interpretation of Averroes’ Epistle on Conjunction (Iggeret ha-dĕvēqût), a treatise that enjoyed wide circulation among medieval Jewish thinkers who meant to strengthen Kabbalistic assumptions on an Averroist basis.34 It is against a similar background that, already in the twelfth century, Judah Halevi (ca. 1075–1141) mentioned Socrates in his own Kuzari (Sēfer ha-Kûzārî). From the very beginning of Halevi’s treatise, Socrates is mentioned along with other ancient scholars. He appears in the first address of the philosopher to the king of the Khazars, who has invited him to a debate with three representatives of the monotheistic faiths: There are spiritual forces, detached from matter, but eternal like the Prime Cause, and never threatened by decay. Thus the soul of the perfect man and that Intellect become one, without concern for the decay of his body or his organs, because he becomes united to the other. His soul is cheer-

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Moshe Idel, “Hitbodedut: On Solitude in Jewish Mysticism,” in Einsamkeit. Archäologie der literarischen Kommunikation, eds. Aleida and Jan Assmann (Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 2000) vi, 208. See [Averroes], Epistle on the Possibility of Conjunction with the Active Intellect by Ibn Rushd with the Commentary of Moses Narboni, trans. Kalman Bland (New York: The Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1982).

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ful while he is alive, because it enjoys the company of Hermes, Asclepius, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle; nay, he and them, as well as everyone who shares their degree, and the Active Intellect, are one thing. This is what is called allusively and approximately Pleasure of God.35 According to the Rabbi—one of the philosopher’s interlocutors in The Kuzari—Socrates was a sort of self-secluded man, who loved solitude: Philosophers and scholars also love solitude to refine their thoughts, and to reap the fruits of truth from their researches, in order that all remaining doubts be dispelled by truth. They only desire the society of disciples that stimulate their research and retentiveness, just as he who is bent upon making money would only surround himself with persons with whom he could do lucrative business. Such a degree is that of Socrates and those who are like him. There is no one nowadays who feels tempted to strive for such a degree, but when the Divine Presence was still in the Holy Land among the people capable of prophecy, some few persons lived an ascetic life in deserts and associated with people of the same frame of mind. They did not seclude themselves completely, but they endeavoured to find support in the knowledge of the Law and in holy and pure actions which brought them near to that high rank.36 The self-seclusion (hitbôdĕdût) from the material world is one of the highest attainments of the ecstatic mystic and of the righteous man who follows the path of the law but aims to approach the divine by means of a philosophical education.37 According to Halevi, the intellectual goal of men like Socrates was no different from the intellectual askesis of a mystic of his own generation. We find this conception expressed in similar terms in the fourteenth-century commentary written by Moses of Narbonne (Narboni) on Abū Bakr ibn Ṭufayl’s (1105–1185) philosophic novel Ḥay ibn Yaqẓān. Moses of Narbonne addresses an intellectual audience that was familiar with Maimonidean thought.38 His work was especially popular in fifteenth-century Italy among Italian Jews who

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Judah Halevi, The Kuzari (Kitab al-Khazari): An Argument for the Faith of Israel (New York: Schocken Books, 1964), 37–38. Halevi, The Kuzari, 135–136. See Moshe Idel, The Mystical Experience in Abraham Abulafia (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987); Idel, “Hitbodedut,” 190–212. See Maurice R. Hayoun, La Philosophie et la Théologie de Moïse de Narbonne (1300–1362) (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1989).

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were interested in merging Neoplatonic motifs, Kabbalah, and Maimonidean speculation, and its fame was revived in the early seventeenth century.39 In his commentary we read that: Some of the most recent interpreters have blamed the “pious Socrates” for his total lack of sanctity, due to the fact that he could not distinguish between a learning destined to scholars and an education addressing the mass. I am referring to the man that practiced hitbôdedût in the pôlîs, and that, despite his mature nature, could not attain in his soul the actual treasure of God and the prophets, since he considered a mad and a wise man equal.40 This passage is of the utmost importance, as Socrates appears as a “pious” wise man, who lived in old times and who practiced hitbôdĕdût—and here Moses of Narbonne seems to ground his interpretation in previous literature, such as Judah Halevi’s Kuzari. At the same time, he lets us know that the motivation of Socrates’s accusation should lay in the apparent lack of distinction between different levels of education. The mass cannot be taught according to the models targeting the elite. This topic, discussed by Moses Maimonides (1135–1204), was central to Yohanan Alemanno’s thought. And it is right in the latter’s The Immortal—where Socrates appears as a model along with Pythagoras—that Alemanno stresses his decision to follow a didactic approach that addresses both lower and upper intellectual classes. In humanist terms, Alemanno’s education should target everyone: if the masses have been abandoned in a state of ignorance, the fault lies with the scholars, maintains Alemanno in the introduction to his treatise.41 There he compares scholars to great eagles whose wings do not allow the light of the sun to reach the eyes of the lower creatures who are obliged to walk in darkness.42 Socrates appears two more times in the Kuzari, towards the end of the conclusive address of the Rabbi. In both passages Halevi draws upon the authority of Socrates to mark the difference between rational and religious arguments: We cannot blame philosophers for missing the mark, since they not only arrived at this knowledge by way of speculation, and the result could not 39 40

41 42

See Alemanno, Ḥāy ha-ʿôlāmîm, 46–48. Cited in Ilai Alon, Socrates in Mediaeval Arabic Literature (Leiden: Brill, 1991), 20–21, 59; Gitit Holzman, “Knowledge and Conjunction in the Thought of R. Moshe Narboni,” Kabbalah. Journal for the Study of Jewish Mystical Texts 7 (2002): 136 (Hebrew). See Alemanno, Ḥāy ha-ʿôlāmîm, 72, 110. Alemanno, 65–66, 89–90.

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have been different. The most sincere among them speak to the followers of a revealed religion in the words of Socrates: “My friends, I will not contest your theology, I say, however, that I cannot grasp it; I only understand human wisdom.” These speculative religions are as far removed now as they were formerly near.43 The Rabbi later insists on the higher level of prophecy with respect to philosophy: If what philosophers know of the matter were true, they would surely acquire it, since they discourse on the souls and prophecy. They are, however, like ordinary mortals. As regards human wisdom, they indeed occupy a high rank, as Socrates said: “O my people, I do not deny your knowledge of the gods, but I confess that I do not understand it. And for me, I am only wise in human matters.” Philosophers justify their recourse to speculation by the absence of prophecy and divine light.44 This was also Judah Halevi’s Socrates, a man of extraordinary knowledge who doubted about religion. I wonder whether in the seventeenth century, at a time when Halevi’s Kuzari was held in especially high esteem,45 Luzzatto’s sceptical Socrates was still shaped after this medieval model. We have seen that Socrates was depicted as a mystic who practiced self-seclusion from human society or a good teacher who could address different audiences. The figure of Socrates could be easily adapted to varying trends of thought and could be used in Jewish intra-communitarian apologetic discourse, either to strengthen the superiority of the Jewish tradition or as external evidence that allowed Jewish scholars to confirm rabbinic authority. From a Jewish viewpoint (and especially in the context of the major circulation of Lurianic forms of Kabbalah in seventeenth-century Italy46) this issue can be associated with that of the “rationale of the commandments” (taʿamê ha-mītṣwôt), which enjoyed a special favour among Italian Jews, especially in the context of Maimonidean criticism and the Christian interpretations of the Jewish theosophical Kabbalah during the Renaissance.47 Such an interpretation, which can certainly be useful to better define Leon Modena’s thought,

43 44 45 46 47

Halevi, The Kuzari, 218. Halevi, 272–273. See Sermoneta, “Aspetti del pensiero moderno nell’Ebraismo italiano.” See Idel, “Major Currents in Italian Kabbalah.” See Idel, Kabbalah in Italy, 117–127, 227–235.

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was undeniably popular in Luzzatto’s intellectual milieu. The multi-layered reading of explicit and implicit Hebrew (subtextual) sources in the Socrates may contribute to digging out hitherto hidden aspects of Luzzatto’s speculation set in the scholarly Jewish and non-Jewish intellectual milieus of his time.

Bibliography Alemanno, Yohanan. Ḥāy ha-ʿôlāmîm (L’immortale). Parte i: la Retorica, edited by Fabrizio Lelli. Florence: Leo S. Olschki, 1995. Alon, Ilai. Socrates in Mediaeval Arabic Literature. Leiden: Brill, 1991. [Averroes]. Epistle on the Possibility of Conjunction with the Active Intellect by Ibn Rushd with the Commentary of Moses Narboni. Translated by Kalman Bland. New York: The Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1982. Bergmann, Judah. “Sokrates in der jüdischen Literatur.”Monatschrift für Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judentums 80 (1936): 3–13. Boccalini, Traiano. De’ ragguagli di Parnaso. Venetia: Giovanni Guerigli, 1617. Cappelli, Federica. “Parnaso bipartito nella satira italiana del Seicento (e due imitazioni spagnole).” Cuadernos de filología italiana 8 (2001): 133–151. Chisholm, Hugh, “Trajano Boccalini.” In Encyclopaedia Britannica 4. 11th ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1911: 105. Genazzano, Elijah Ḥayyim ben Binyamin da. La lettera preziosa (Iggeret ḥămûdôt). Edited by Fabrizio Lelli. Florence–Nîmes: Giuntina, 2002. Firpo, Luigi. “La satira politica in forma di ragguaglio di Parnaso.” Atti della Accademia delle Scienze di Torino (ii classe di Scienze Morali, Storiche e Filologiche) 87 (1952– 1953): 197–247. Fortis, Umberto. La “Bella Ebrea.” Sara Copio Sullam, poetessa nel ghetto di Venezia del ’600. Turin: Silvio Zamorani, 2003. Frare, Pierantonio. “Poetiche del Barocco.” In I capricci di Proteo. Percorsi e linguaggi del Barocco, 41–70. Roma: Salerno editrice, 2002. Halevi, Judah. The Kuzari (Kitab al-Khazari): An Argument for the Faith of Israel. New York: Schocken Books, 1964. Harrán, Don. Jewish Poet and Intellectual in Seventeenth-Century Venice: The Works of Sarra Copia Sulam in Verse and Prose, Along With Writings of Her Contemporaries in Her Praise, Condemnation, or Defense. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009. Hayoun, Maurice R. La Philosophie et la Théologie de Moïse de Narbonne (1300–1362). Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1989. Holzman, Gitit. “Knowledge and Conjunction in the Thought of R. Moshe Narboni.” Kabbalah. Journal for the Study of Jewish Mystical Texts 7 (2002): 111–173 (Hebrew).

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Idel, Moshe. “Differing Conceptions of Kabbalah in the Early 17th Century.” In Jewish Thought in the Seventeenth Century, edited by Isadore Twersky and Bernard Septimus, 137–200. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1986. Idel, Moshe. “Hitbodedut: On Solitude in Jewish Mysticism.” In Einsamkeit. Archäologie der literarischen Kommunikation. Edited by Aleida and Jan Assmann. vi, 190–212. Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 2000. Idel, Moshe. Kabbalah in Italy: 1280–1510. A Survey. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011. Idel, Moshe. “Major Currents in Italian Kabbalah between 1560–1660.” In Italia Judaica: “Gli ebrei in Italia tra Rinascimento ed Età barocca,” 243–262. Rome: Istituto Poligrafico dello Stato, 1986. Idel, Moshe. The Mystical Experience in Abraham Abulafia. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987. Lelli, Fabrizio. “Intellettuali ebrei e Accademia Pontaniana: alcune considerazioni alla luce di due recenti pubblicazioni.” Sefer Yuhasin 5 (2017): 159–169. Lelli, Fabrizio. “Pico, i Da Pisa e ’Eliyyà Ḥayyim da Genazzano.” In Giovanni Pico e la cabbalà, edited by Fabrizio Lelli, 93–120. Florence: Leo S. Olschki, 2014. Lelli, Fabrizio. “Prisca Philosophia and Docta Religio. The Boundaries of Rational Knowledge in Jewish and Christian Humanist Thought.” Jewish Quarterly Review 91 (2000): 53–100. Lelli, Fabrizio. “The Role of Early Renaissance Geographical Discoveries in Yohanan Alemanno’s Messianic Thought.” In Hebraic Aspects of the Renaissance. Sources and Encounters, edited by Ilana Zinguer, Abraham Melamed, and Zur Shalev, 192–210. Leiden: Brill, 2011. Lelli, Fabrizio, “Una risposta ebraica all’umanesimo cristiano: il ‘Sefer ha-yašar’.” In Proceedings of the Conference Lectures on Philo, 10–12 October 2012, Florence–Rimini, The Theological Faculty of Central Italy and Shemah Institute for Jewish Studies, Florence, forthcoming. Luzzatto, Simone. Socrates, or on Human Knowledge—Bilingual Edition. Edited, translated, and commented by Giuseppe Veltri and Michela Torbidoni. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2019. Malkiel, David, ed. The Lion Shall Roar: Leon Modena and His World. Jerusalem: The Hebrew University Ben-Zvi Institute, 2003. Messer Leon, Judah. The Book Of The Honeycomb’s Flow, Sēpher Nōpheth Ṣūphīm, edited and translated by Isaac Rabinowitz. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983. Saccaro Battisti, Giuseppa. “La cultura filosofica del Rinascimento italiano nella Puerta del cielo di Abraham Cohen Herrera.” In Italia Judaica: “Gli ebrei in Italia tra Rinascimento ed Età barocca,” 295–334. Rome: Istituto Poligrafico dello Stato, 1986. Sēfer ha-yāšār. Edited by Yoseph Dan. Jerusalem: Mosad Bialik, 1986. Sermoneta, Giuseppe. “Aspetti del pensiero moderno nell’Ebraismo italiano tra Ri-

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nascimento e età barocca.” In Italia Judaica: “Gli ebrei in Italia tra Rinascimento ed Età barocca,” 17–35. Rome: Istituto Poligrafico dello Stato, 1986. Ruderman, David B. A Valley of Vision: The Heavenly Journey of Abraham ben Hananiah Yagel. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990. Ruderman, David B. The World of a Renaissance Jew: The Life and Thought of Abraham ben Mordecai Farissol. Cincinnati: Hebrew Union College Press, 1981. Torbidoni, Michela. “Socratic Impulse, Secular Tendency, and Jewish Emancipation: A Comparison between Simone Luzzatto and Moses Mendelssohn,” In Yearbook of the Maimonides Centre for Advanced Studies, edited by Bill Rebiger, 11–29. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2020. Veltri, Giuseppe. Alienated Wisdom: Enquiry into Jewish Philosophy and Scepticism. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2018. Veltri, Giuseppe. “The Humanist Sense of History and the Jewish Idea of Tradition: Azaria de’ Rossi’s Critique of Philo Alexandrinus.” Jewish Studies Quarterly 2, no. 4 (1995): 372–393. Veltri, Giuseppe. Renaissance Philosophy in Jewish Garb. Leiden: Brill, 2008. Veltri, Giuseppe, and Evelien Chayes. Oltre le Mura del Ghetto. Accademie, Scetticismo e Tolleranza nella Venezia Barocca. Palermo: New Digital Press, 2016. Vickers, Brian, “Rhetoric and Poetics.” In The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy, edited by Charles B. Schmitt and Jill Kraye, 717–745. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.

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part 3 Wisdom and Jewish Tradition

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“Everyone is Free to Decide to Investigate Every Kind of Discourse” Simone Luzzatto’s Lettera Approbatoria to The Revealer of Secrets (1640?) by Samuel ha-Kohen da Pisa Lusitano Anna Lissa

1

Introduction

Among the few Hebrew texts Simone Luzzatto authored and that have come down to us there is a Letter of Approval (Epistola Approbatoria) that introduces the book of Samuel ha-Kohen da Pisa Lusitano called The Revealer of Secrets: An Explanation of Difficult Passages that are in the Ecclesiastes and also a Complete Explanation of the Book of Job Whole-hearted and Upright, and one that Feared God, and Shunned Evil. And also a Correct Hint about the Commandment of the Red Heifer.1

1 Samuel ha-Kohen da Pisa Lusitano, Ṣafnat paʿneaḥ: Beʾur ketuvim zarim še-ba-sefer Qohelet w-ken beʾur kolel ba-sefer ʾIyov tam we-yašar we-sar mi-raʿ. We-ʿod remez nakon ʿal miṣwat Parah Adumah (Venice: Commissaria Vendramina, Giovanni Martinelli, 1656), 2b–4a. The English translation of all the biblical passages and the transliteration of the names of biblical characters are taken from the jps Bible available at http://www.mechon‑mamre.org/p/​ pt/pt0.htm. If not otherwise indicated, the English translation of the Babylonian Talmud as well as the transliteration of the names of the rabbis are taken from Isidore Epstein, ed., Babylonian Talmud, 36 vols. (London: Soncino Press, 1936–1952). This article marks another step of a journey which for me began in summer 2010 in Halle, when Prof. Veltri asked me to translate Simone Luzzatto’s letter in order to prepare an application for a dfg Research project about the Venetian rabbi. I have been honoured, afterwards, to be included in this project, which has allowed me to appreciate the deep roots from which Jewish modernity—and with it Modern Hebrew literature, my original field of research— stemmed. Therefore, I cannot but express my most sincere gratitude to Prof. Veltri, maître et ami, for all the work we did together in Halle and in Hamburg at the Maimonides Centre for Advanced Studies. I am also very thankful to the many colleagues and friends I had the possibility to meet while working at the Centre and who helped me with clever insights and inspiring suggestions while I was working on this article, among them Prof. Raheli Haliva, Prof. Asher Salah, Prof. Carsten Wilke, and Dr. Martina Mampieri. Finally, I am very thankful to Dr. Michela Torbidoni, who organized the conference about Luzzatto in 2019 and to Dr. Sarah Wobick-Segev who has taken such good care of the editing process of this book.

© Anna Lissa, 2024 | doi:10.1163/9789004694262_007

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It is a short text punctuated with Talmudic quotes in which Simone Luzzatto discusses a much debated issue: did Job deny the resurrection of the dead? While displaying his Talmudic knowledge and taking sides with his friend Samuel ha-Kohen by maintaining that Job did not deny the resurrection of the dead, Luzzatto also reasserts his interest in the acquisition of knowledge and the fact that everyone must be free to acquire whatever knowledge he may desire according to his own abilities. The Letter, and indeed the whole book, must be read and examined against the backdrop of the debate about the immortality of the soul as a principle of faith, which had become very lively during the first half of the seventeenth century, even inflaming and likely to result in excommunication, as was the case for Uriel da Costa, who was banished by the rabbis of the Venetian community.2 Nonetheless, even if one takes this debate into account, many issues remain unclear, especially where the identity of Samuel ha-Kohen and the publication history of his book are concerned. In his Letter, Luzzatto, while displaying his Talmudic knowledge and taking sides with his friend Samuel ha-Kohen, also reasserts his interest in the acquisition of knowledge and the fact that everyone must be free to acquire whatever knowledge they may desire according to their own abilities.

2

A General Survey of The Revealer of Secrets

2.1 The Author and the Publication Date Almost nothing is known about Samuel ha-Kohen da Pisa Lusitano, whose only preserved Hebrew book currently available to us is The Revealer of Secrets. The name of the author appears on the front page of the book as follows: “From me the Young Samuel ha-Kohen da Pisa Lusitano.” In the poem that introduces the book, Jacob ben Moses Levi labels him “a new one who came but lately,”3 which may refer to his origin or to the fact that he recently came up with a new interpretation of the Holy Scripture. Simone Luzzatto gives some further information about Samuel ha-Kohen in the very first lines of his Letter, and he kindly calls him “Samuel Kohen Sephardi generous and noble among the chiefs and the leaders of the Holy community of Venice.” Thus, Luzzatto confirms the Sephardi origin of his friend and, if his compliment is not an amiable over-

2 See Giuliano Tamani, “Il commento di Šemuʾel Ha-Kohen Da Pisa al capitolo terzo di Qohelet,” in Non solo verso Oriente—Studi sull’ebraismo in onore di Pier Cesare Ioly Zorattini, 2 vols., ed. Maddalena del Bianco Cotrozzi, Riccardo di Segni and Marcello Massenzio (Florence: Olschki, 2014), vol. 1, 431–433. 3 Samuel ha-Kohen, The Revealer of Secrets, s.p.

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statement, he also reveals that Samuel ha-Kohen was a prominent member of the Venetian Jewish community. Ludwig Blau confirms this, attesting he was a parnas of the Venetian Jewish community, although without giving further details.4 The front page of The Revealer of Secrets gives information about the place and publication date of the book, by specifying that it had been printed in Venice during the month of Sivan of the year 1656, “on Behalf of the Commissaria Vendramina, by the hand of Giovanni Martinelli” (“be-miṣwat haqommissariya Windramina ʿal-yad Yoʾanni Martinelli”) As Giuliano Tamani pointed out, the reference “Con Licenza de’ Superiori” is absent.5 The book has been known to scholars for a long time. They agree about the Portuguese origin of the author, some of them claiming that he was born in Lisbon. The publication date has been reconsidered several times, especially because the manuscript had been completed by 1640 and published in 1656, possibly because of Samuel ha-Kohen’s choice of subjects.6

4 Leon Modena, Kitve ha-Rav Yehudah Aryeh Mi-Modena hoṣaʾatim le-ʾor be-paʿam ha-rishonah ʿal pi kitve yad be- British Museum, ed. Ludwig Yehudah Blau (Budapest: Avraham Alkalay and sons, 1906), 161n4. 5 See Tamani, “Il commento di Šemuʾel Ha-Kohen,” 433n9 and for the annexed bibliography about the book, 434n10. 6 See Johann Christoph Wolf, Bibliotheca Hebraea, Vol. 1 (Hamburg: Christiani Liebezeit, 1715), 1206, entry nr. 2092, who states that the book has been printed in 1661. According to Giovanni Battista de’ Rossi, Samuel ha-Kohen was from Portugal and the book had been printed in 1650. Among the subjects treated, De’ Rossi points out the discussion in chapter 1, about whether or not the third chapter of Ecclesiastes denies the immortality of the soul, and the discussion in chapter 9, about whether or not Job denied the immortality of the soul, the providence, and the resurrection. Giovanni Battista de’ Rossi, Dizionario storico degli autori ebrei e delle loro opere, 2 vols. (Parma: Dalla Reale Stamperia, 1802), vol. 1, 93. Elias Haim Lindo states that he was “a native of Lisbon, […] one of the most profound Talmudists of his age; he wrote The Revealer of Secrets, a commentary on part of Ecclesiastes.” Elias Haim Lindo, The History of the Jews of Spain and Portugal, from the Earliest Times to Their Final Expulsion from Those Kingdoms, and Their Subsequent Dispersion; with Complete Translations of all the Laws Made respecting Them during their Long Establishment in the Iberian Peninsula (London: Longman, Brown, Green & Longmans, 1848), 369. Graziadio Hananel Nepi (Neppi) and Mordecai Samuel Ghirondi, Toledot gedole Yiśrael we-geʾone Yiṭaliya (Trieste: Tipografia Marenigh, 1853), 327–328; also known as the Neppi-Ghirondi. Isaak Markus Jost also states that Samuel ha-Kohen was from Portugal and gives a quick overview of the subjects treated in the book: whether Ecclesiastes denied the immortality of the soul and whether Job denied the providence and the resurrection of the dead. Isaak Markus Jost, Geschichte des Judentums und seiner Sekten, vol. iii (Leipzig: Dörffling und Francke, 1859), 227. Moritz Steinschneider corrects the printing date given by Wolf and gives the printing year 1656, as stated on the cover of the book. He also mentions the fact that Leon Modena (dead in 1648) was the author of some of the poems put at the beginning of the book and that Simone Luzzatto wrote the

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As far as the publication date is concerned, the book’s entry available in the catalogue of the Bibliography of the Hebrew Book states: “In establishing the printing year the bibliographers got confused. Yet it seems that the book had been written before the year 1640, see the pages 10–11, and printed that same year.”7 As it happens, the pages 10v–11r of The Revealer of Secrets are the last ones of paragraph 3 (pages 9r–11r), whose subject is “Investigation about whether the Christians will die after the coming of our Messiah or not and [about the fact] that we are now [living in the age of] the end of the days.” Indeed, at the pages 10v–11r, Samuel ha-Kohen undertakes the calculation of how many years remain until the end of the days and concludes that he and his contemporaries are living in the age of the end of the days. The calculation itself is not relevant for the purposes of this article, but it is of great consequence to stress that while making this calculation, he gives a hint about the period, if not the year, when he was possibly writing: “we are now [living] in [the age of] the end of the days that now in this moment we are finding ourselves on the sixth day, and already more than a third of this day has passed, […] since there still lack six hundred years to complete the sixth thousand.”8 For Samuel ha-Kohen one day is one thousand years long and the end of the days will come when the sixth thousand will be completed. When he was writing, six hundred years were still lacking to complete the sixth thousand and more than a third of the sixth day had passed. The whole calculation is an approximation since he says “more than a third” and yet not a half, so one could approximately say that the year 1640 ce (or 5400 on the Hebrew calendar) is the terminus ante quem for the composition of The Revealer of Secrets. This date is confirmed by the fact that in the year 1640 Samuel ha-Kohen published the Discourse of Samuel Coen da Pisa. An explanation of some diffiEpistola Approbatoria. Moritz Steinschneider, Catalogus Librorum Hebraeorum in Bibliotheca Bodleiana (Berolini: Typis Ad. Friedlander, 1852–1860), column 2433, entry 7049. Joseph Zedner gives 1640 as a publication date, although followed by a question mark. Joseph Zedner, Catalogue of the Hebrew Books in the Library of the British Museum (London: Wertheimer, Lea, 1867), 679. Marco Mortara, Mazkeret Ḥakame Iṭaliyah Indice Alfabetico dei Rabbini e Scrittori Israeliti di Cose Giudaiche in Italia con Richiami Bibliografici e Note Illustrative (Padova: Premiata Tipografia Editrice F. Sacchetti, 1886), anastatic reprint: Indice Alfabetico dei Rabbini e Scrittori Israeliti di Cose Giudaiche in Italia con Richiami Bibliografici e Note Illustrative, ed. Cesare Saletta (Bologna: Arnaldo Forni, 1980), 50: “Pisa Samuel (Coen), Portoghese: Venezia? Sec. xvii.” In this essay, I am using Forni’s anastatic reprint. Marvin Heller, The Seventeenth Century Hebrew Book—An Abridged Thesaurus, 2 vols. (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 1, 770–771. 7 The catalogue of the Bibliography of the Hebrew Book, s.v., accessed 9 February 2021, http://uli​ .nli.org.il/F/L4G7B143T4MR7J1I3NKI1TTQUTDBB9HY7GVSXKC1TLVAA51ECP‑55454?func=f ull‑set‑set&set_number=005170&set_entry=000093&format=999. 8 Samuel ha-Kohen, The Revealer of Secrets, 10v–11r.

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cult passages in the Ecclesiastes chapter 3, extracted from a Discourse I wrote about the difficult passages from the same Ecclesiastes and from the book of Job (Discorso di Samuel Coen da Pisa. In dichiaratione de alcuni versi difficili nell’Ecclesiaste, cap. 3. cavati da un Discorso del medesimo fatto sopra li versi difcultosi nell’istesso Ecclesiaste, e del libro di Giob). The book was published in Venice on the 31 March 1640, by the printer Giovanni Calleoni, and is sixteen pages long.9 Thus, The Revealer of Secrets had been written and completed by 1640 and was published sixteen years later for reasons that must still be brought to light by further archival research. This also implies that, as far as Simone Luzzatto is concerned, his Letter has been probably written during the years when he was working on his Discourse on the State of the Jews, published in 1638,10 or perhaps a little afterwards, and before the publication of Socrates, or on Human Knowledge (1651). It is also worthwhile to notice that Samuel ha-Kohen published his booklet at Giovanni Calleoni’s printing house, who had previously published Luzzatto’s Discourse in 1638. 2.2 The Text and Its Reception The Revealer of Secrets is thirty-three pages long recto/verso. The page numbers appear on the second page of Luzzatto’s letter and they begin with 3r. Several poems introduce the text. The book is divided into fourteen chapters (simanim): chapters 1–7 (pages 5r–18v) are dedicated to the interpretation of several passages of the Ecclesiastes, chapters 8–13 (pages 19r–29v) deal with the interpretation of the book of Job, and chapter 14 (pages 30r–33r) discloses the correct hint about the commandment of the red heifer. The last page, 33v, contains an index of all the paragraphs with the subjects discussed in them.11 This is not the appropriate context to enter into a comprehensive analysis of the book, it is however essential to provide an overview of its main subjects, particularly those concerning the interpretation of the book of Job. In fact, Samuel ha-Kohen raises several pivotal issues. In the sections focused on Ecclesiastes, he explores topics such as the immortality of the soul, the coming of the Messiah, and the culmination of times. In the chapters dedicated to Job, he revisits the subject of the immortality of the soul and delves into discussions about faith in God’s general providence and in the resurrection of the

9 10

11

A partial transcription of the text with an introductory analysis has been published by Tamani, “Il commento di Šemuʾel Ha-Kohen.” Simone Luzzatto, Discorso circa il stato degl’Hebrei (Venezia: Giovanni Calleoni, 1638); Luzzatto, Discourse on the State of the Jews—Bilingual Edition, ed., trans., and comm. Giuseppe Veltri and Anna Lissa (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2019). For a detailed overview of the subjects see appendix 2.

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dead. Notably, Samuel ha-Kohen does not appear to aim for a philosophical rational demonstration of these matters; instead, he treats them as principles of faith.12 Therefore, he presents interpretations of Ecclesiastes and the book of Job that showcase how these texts affirm and uphold the truth of these principles simultaneously. Despite the existence of various problematic or sceptical interpretations, he argues that they do not contradict or cast doubt on these principles in any way. The title of the first chapter of The Revealer of Secrets already sheds light on Samuel ha-Kohen’s approach and subsequent conclusions: “Explanation of the verses of the Ecclesiastes chapter 3:18 ‘I said in my heart: it is because of’ etc. up to 3:21 ‘Who knoweth the spirit of man’ etc. that he does not doubt the immortality of the soul but only labels the wicked quadruped animals.”13 In fact, he writes his commentary in order to wipe away every possible doubt concerning the fact that King Solomon, author of the book, denied the immortality of the soul in Ecclesiastes 3:18–21. According to the author’s argument, certain individuals have misused these passages to bolster their wicked belief that there is no justice after death and that both humans and animals share the same fate. They exploit these verses to rationalize their indulgent and immoral way of living. However, the author emphasises that the wise Solomon did not hold such a belief when he composed the verse. In fact, the Holy Scriptures attest that quadruped animals only have a sensitive soul (ruaḥ ḥiyyuni) that is destroyed with the body, while man has a divine soul (ruaḥ elohi) that survives the death of the body and is like the divine and eternal image (dmut elohi) as it is confirmed in Ecclesiastes 12:7 “And the dust returneth to the earth as it was, and the spirit returneth unto God who gave it.” The author contends that, based on these assumptions, one should interpret the term “quadruped animals” used by the wise Solomon as referring to the wicked individuals who commit acts akin to the brutish behaviour of quadruped animals (maʿaseh behemah) against their fellow human beings. It seems probable that the issue of the denial of the immortality of the soul in general, and especially in relation to the book of Ecclesiastes, must have been very important for Samuel ha-Kohen, which explains his choice to open his 12

13

For an overview of the philosophical rational demonstrations of the immortality of the soul and the dogmatic approach to the subject see Alessandro Guetta, Italian Jewry in the Early Modern Era—Essays in Intellectual History (Boston, MA: Academic Studies Press, 2014), chapter 8: “The Immortality of the Soul and Opening up to the Christian World,” 153–184. I translate the original Hebrew behemah with quadruped animals in order to remain consistent with the Samuel ha-Kohen’s Italian translation “animali quadrupedi” in his Discourse, 2 “quadrupedi,” 4 “animali quadrupedi.”

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commentary by dealing with it. This is also confirmed by the fact that while he waited—or perhaps had to wait—until 1656 to publish the complete Hebrew version of The Revealer of Secrets, he chose to publish precisely this first chapter in the aforementioned Italian translation in 1640.14 In the second part of the book, after having taken sides with those who maintain that Job existed and after having identified him with “Iob son of Issachar son of Yaacov” (chapter 8, 19r), Samuel ha-Kohen devotes chapter 9 (20v–22v) to “Job’s patience and [about the fact] that he did not deny the Providence, the immortality of the soul nor the resurrection of the dead.” Thus, the author opens the discussion with a commentary of Job 1–2, arguing that despite the greatest number of afflictions that befell upon him at the same time “Job did not sin with his lips,”15 and “this is the finest praise given to Job”16 in the Bible. In fact, he goes on, as opposed to the saying of Ecclesiastes “Surely oppression turneth a wise man into a fool,”17 Job, who was most oppressed and crushed because of Satan’s groundless accusations, “remained silent, [and] this is the reason why the writing praises him [by saying] and in all this Job did not sin with his lips.”18 As for the words Job uttered in chapter 3, when he cursed the day he was born, Samuel ha-Kohen brings forth several examples of other prophets, such as Jeremiah, who bitterly complained about their lot and concludes: And if such righteous people not to see themselves in distress asked to die and Jeremiah cursed the day he was born, what would the righteous Job do with all the troubles and sorrows that suddenly came upon him and why had he not the right to complain and to say all that he said in chapter 3, without that in his words there is not even the smallest insult against the Heaven, Heaven forfend?19 At this point the author gets into the real heart of the matter: the demonstration that Job did not deny the immortality of the soul, the resurrection of the dead, and general providence. He begins with the resurrection of the dead and takes as a starting point Job 7:9: “As the cloud is consumed and vanisheth away, so he that goeth down to the grave shall come up no more.” He explains this verse by resorting to Job 21 where, he argues, one can understand that only the wicked

14 15 16 17 18 19

See section 2.1. Job 2:10. Samuel ha-Kohen, The Revealer of Secrets, 20v. Eccl 7:7. Samuel ha-Kohen, The Revealer of Secrets, 21r. Samuel ha-Kohen, The Revealer of Secrets, 21r.

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go down to the grave to come up no more. As for Job 14:12,20 he interprets it as referring to “the death in this world that involves all the living beings without any natural remedy.”21 Then, he switches to Job 14:19–2022 and explains that Job meant that human hope is lost after death since the soul leaves this world and its natural life is over, which, he concludes, does not undermine nor shed doubt on its immortality. Despite the reassertion of the faith in general providence, in the immortality of the soul, and in the resurrection of the dead, Samuel ha-Kohen must have been conscious that his book was likely to be criticised. Indeed, in the “Introduction of the Author,” he mentions that besides his commentary on Ecclesiastes and Job, he will make references to some other interpretations along the way. He does not provide further details, implying that these interpretations are somewhat related to the ongoing discussion but may not be directly connected to it. Finally, he concludes his introduction by addressing a warning to his readers, and eventually to his potential attackers as well: And behold it is not unknown to me that no upright thought [can] occur in the heart of a man to innovate the explanation of our Torah, may it be exalted, that will not tarnish the eye of those who look upon our Masters of blessed memory, the ancients [as well as] the last ones. But on this [point] I have especially held my mind steady that if I am the one who did not see them and did not hear them, this will happen since maybe I will deserve to share the view of the great ones and this will make me praiseworthy and admirable and will rejoice my heart in [the name of] the Lord //and if I will not know and among my words will be found something [that is] opposite to the words of someone among them, [let] the reader be well aware that I did not intend to disagree [with them], heaven forfend, because all their words and all their sayings are always a crown on my head//.23 The fact that the book became the subject of debates already among Samuel ha-Kohen’s contemporaries is confirmed by Samuel Aboab’s (1610–1694) reac20 21 22 23

“So man lieth down and riseth not; till the heavens be no more, they shall not awake, nor be roused out of their sleep.” Samuel ha-Kohen, The Revealer of Secrets, 21v. “19. So Thou destroyest the hope of man. 20. Thou prevailest for ever against him, and he passeth.” Samuel ha-Kohen, The Revealer of Secrets, “Introduction of the Author”, s.p. The lines between the double slashes // are absent in the text of the “Introduction of the Author” published in Modena, Kitve ha-Rav Yehudah, 161–162.

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tion to it. He confirms to have seen the manuscript of The Revealer of Secrets and to have tried to convince the author not to publish it: Concerning what you Sir hinted about the innovations [suggested in] the commentaries of Ecclesiastes and Job, whether he existed and was created or [was] a parable, there has been someone who wrote this very book and called it The Revealer of Secrets, “and if he said that, what could we say about ourselves?”24 Woe to this generation that has had such a lot in its days and long will be for me the time that this sorrow will stay inside me bound deep in my bones! At the moment that same book has been shown to me in the handwriting of its author, I have alluded to my sorrow in my answer to him, to prevent him from printing it.25 Aboab expressed his sorrow without providing specific reasons, he mentioned both Ecclesiastes and Job in general and the specific issue concerning the actual existence of Job. However, the entry about Samuel ha-Kohen in the NeppiGhirondi reports that Aboab criticised Samuel ha-Kohen and suggests a possible reason for the criticism, which is Samuel ha-Kohen’s involvement in calculating the end of days and the coming of the Messiah, which Aboab does not mention. In this context, the Neppi-Ghirondi suggests that Aboab disagreed with or disapproved of attempts to make precise calculations about the timing of the end of days and of the coming of the Messiah, as it might be seen as contradicting the perspective of Maimonides on these matters.26 Perhaps Cecil Roth’s argument may offer a further clue, as he says that Samuel Aboab represented a reaction in the direction of extreme traditionalism to Leon Modena and Simone Luzzatto, who both, by the way, had approved and supported Samuel ha-Kohen’s book.27 Finally, the suggestion in the Neppi-Ghirondi seems to be at variance with a more recent remark of Isaia Sonne. On 6–8 February 1935, he examined the bibliographic and documentary material available in the library and in the archive of the Jewish community in Padua, and he found a copy of The Revealer of 24 25

26 27

See b. Ber. 31a. Samuel Aboab, Devar Shmuel (Venice: Vendramina, 1702), 15r, Sheʾelah 37 adressed to Yehosef Meliryia. About Samuel Aboab see Meyer Kaiserling, “Samuel Aboab,” The Jewish Encyclopaedia, accessed 22 February 2021, https://www.jewishencyclopedia.com/articles/​ 344‑aboab#anchor16; Alfredo Ravenna, “Aboab, Samuele,” Dizionario biografico degli italiani (1960), accessed 22 February 2021, https://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/samuele‑abo ab_(Dizionario‑Biografico)/. See Neppi and Ghirondi, Toledot gedole Yiśrael, 327–328. See Cecil Roth, Venice (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1930), 231–236.

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Secrets, about which he commented that “because of its rationalism [the book] was in greater part destroyed and the copies are very rare.”28 Although Sonne does not provide any further information about this alleged “rationalism,” he says that the destruction of the book was a deliberate decision and act.

3

Simone Luzzatto’s Letter of Approval

Simone Luzzatto’s letter is three and a half pages long (2b–4a). After having declared his admiration for the commitment of Samuel ha-Kohen to the interpretation of the Holy Scriptures in general and of the book of Job in particular, the author praises his friend’s interpretative efforts—“you laboured and you found a word fitly spoken.” Next, he states that he is writing this Letter because Samuel ha-Kohen requested it of him and specified the subject that he wanted him to address: And [as] I have also been ordered by you, sublime leader, I shall give you my brief opinion [about] what I conclude concerning a sentence well known to everyone, [attributed] to our Rabbis of blessed memory, that Job denied the resurrection of the dead, whether it is a correct opinion or an isolated opinion and it is not suitable to rely on it.29 Therefore, the choice of the subject, Job’s alleged denial of the resurrection of the dead, did not lie with Luzzatto but with Samuel ha-Kohen, who might have had a specific interest in the issue and possibly also a reason to demand support from a friend. To vindicate Job’s righteousness and the orthodoxy of his opinions Luzzatto takes as a starting point Job 7:9, as Samuel ha-Kohen did, but instead of explaining it by resorting to other biblical passages he directs his attention towards the Talmudic discussion, more precisely towards the first

28

29

Isaia Sonne, “Relazione sul materiale bibliografico—documentario della Comunità Israelitica di Padova in base ad un esame effettuato nei giorni 6–8 febbraio 1935,” Contemporanea, accessed 22 February 2021, https://www.cdec.it/progetti‑editoriali/isaia‑sonne‑e‑la​ ‑relazione‑sul‑patrimonio‑bibliografico‑e‑archivistico‑delle‑comunita‑israelitiche‑italia ne/relazione‑sui‑tesori‑bibliografici‑delle‑comunita‑israelitiche‑italiane/. All the inventories of Isaia Sonne have been made available online there by the Centro di Documentazione Ebraica Contemporanea. About Isaia Sonne and his inventories see Stefania Roncolato, ed., Il patrimonio bibliografico e archivistico delle Comunità israelitiche italiane Ovvero, la Relazione di Isaia Sonne—Note a margine (Milan: Cdec, 2020). See appendix 1.

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chapter of the tractate Bava Batra, “The Partnership,” in which, at the pages 15r– 16v, several issues concerning Job are discussed: And it is known to your very Honourable Excellency that this sentence is to be found in the chapter “The Partnership,” as it is stated there: “As the cloud is consumed and vanisheth away, so he that goeth down to the grave shall come up no more.” Raba said that [this] teaches that Job denied the resurrection of the dead.30 Luzzatto revisits the Talmudic dispute concerning Job’s righteousness. In this debate, some sages defended Job’s character, while others regarded him as a rebel. Luzzatto takes the side of those who defended Job, supporting the view that he was righteous. His reasoning is simple and straightforward because, he argues, Job’s alleged rebellion and denial of the resurrection of the dead contradicts the internal coherence of the whole story for several reasons: first of all, at the end of the book God reprimands Job’s friends and acknowledges that Job spoke things that are right. To support this view, he mentions the muchdiscussed comparison between Job and Abraham based on the major issue of fear of God inspired by love, as was the case with Abraham, and fear of God inspired by fear of punishment, as was allegedly the case with Job according to some Talmudic sages.31 Luzzatto takes sides with those who, like Rabbi Yohanan, maintained that greater praise was accorded to Job than to Abraham,32 because the ten trials of Abraham are equivalent to Job’s sufferings. As for the idea that Job denied the resurrection of the dead because of his many sorrows, this is an argument deprived of logical foundations because the resurrection of the dead does not result from nor depend on the sufferings of the righteous as [is the case with] complaining about the providence that is caused by the suffering of the righteous and the prospering of the wicked. On the contrary, the belief in the resurrection of 30 31

32

See appendix 1. See Nahum N. Glazer, Essays in Jewish Thought (Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 2009 [1978]), chapter 7 “‘Knowest Thou …’ Notes on the Book of Job,” 82–92, chapter 8 “The God of Abraham and the God of Job: Some Talmudic-Midrashic Interpretations of the Book of Job,” 93–108, chapter 9 “The Book of Job and its Interpreters,” 109–134, and annexed sources; Ephraim E. Urbach, Ḥazal, pirqe emunot we-deʿot (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1969), translated by Israel Abrahams as The Sages—Their Concepts and Beliefs (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979), chapter 14 “Acceptance of the Yoke of the Kingdom of Heaven,” 400–419, and annexed sources. See appendix 1.

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the dead comes to repair the injustice that is visible according to the prevailing opinion in the matters of this world. And if we suppose that Job denied the resurrection of the dead, this happened to him most certainly because of his mistaken opinions not because of his many cares and his anger.33 Yet, as Luzzatto had already demonstrated above, Job’s opinions were not mistaken. Furthermore, the argument in favour of Job’s rebellion contradicts God’s word about him being “whole-hearted and upright, and one that feared God, and shunned evil” and would make Satan triumphant in his challenge against God. In the end, Luzzatto argues, there is a dispute between the tannaim and amoraim about Job’s righteousness, and Raba is particularly strict since he accuses Job of having denied both the resurrection of the dead and the providence. Luzzatto, however, cannot find a well-founded reason to condemn Job. Furthermore, as far as Job 7:9 is concerned he reasserts Samuel ha-Kohen’s interpretation: Job was not denying the resurrection of the dead but was merely asserting the consequences of the natural fact of dying, and in the Holy Scriptures there are many occurrences that maintain the fact that death brings about the abandonment of this world. Approaching the letter’s conclusion, Luzzatto suggests that Job may have “said something that was not correct at the moment of his sorrow and of his anger.” However, this does not imply that he denied the concept of providence; rather, it reflects that, during his undeserved suffering, Job expressed complaints to God, which is not uncommon for various prophets, as also argued by Samuel ha-Kohen.34 Until the final lines of the letter, Luzzatto’s arguments consistently stay within the boundaries set by the Talmudic text. However, just before reaching the concluding lines of the letter, he shifts his attention to a subject that holds significant importance in his Italian writings and will continue to do so—namely, the pursuit and acquisition of knowledge: And it is also by virtue of the mercy of God and of His goodness towards His creatures that He allowed them to investigate and to study the way He governs the world and the comparison of His ways in this honourable order. […] And just as the freedom of choice stems from the will, man will incline towards what appeals and what he agrees upon, so that every

33 34

See appendix 1. See section 2.2.

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man is completely free [4a] to decide according to the individual level [of learning] to acquire knowledge and to investigate all kinds of discourses according to their wishes.35 Indeed, the acquisition of knowledge has held immense importance for Luzzatto, not only on an individual level but also for the Jewish community as a whole. He valued both Jewish and non-Jewish knowledge, recognising the significance of intellectual growth and understanding in both spheres. Furthermore, he recognised the importance of understanding and applying knowledge in the realm of politics and governance, emphasising the value of both theoretical and practical expertise. Luzzatto was not just a rabbi; he was also a well-educated intellectual with a wide range of interests, including philosophy and literature, and had a notable talent for mathematics.36 In his pursuit of knowledge, he sought to make time for both Torah studies and what he refers to as “the other studies,” indicating his commitment to secular learning as well. Currently, I am occupied with other matters. I solemnly pledge, in the name of the Eternal, that I am fully engrossed in these studies, leaving no room even for a brief hour of interruption. After Sukkot, I assure you that I will wholeheartedly engage in the study of our sacred Torah, as Your Honor kindly encouraged me to do. Presently, my time is constrained, but I am committed to dedicating myself to the Torah as soon as I have the opportunity.37 To confirm the depth of Luzzatto’s immersion in his “other studies,” one need only consider that he is primarily renowned for his Italian works, the Discourse and the Socrates. Neither of these works pertains to rabbinics, and in the case of the Socrates, there is scarcely anything inherently Jewish except for its author.38 David Ruderman considers Simone Luzzatto together with Leone Modena and

35 36

37 38

See appendix 1. Josef Delmedigo praised his knowledge of mathematics. See Benjamin Ravid, “Biblical Exegesis à la Mercantilism and Raison d’État in Seventeenth-Century Venice: The Discorso of Simone Luzzatto,” in Bringing the Hidden to Light: The Process of Interpretation. Studies in Honor of Stephen A. Geller, eds. Kathryn F. Kravitz and Diane M. Sharon (Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns, 2007), 169–186, esp. 169. Simone Luzzatto, “Letter,” in Jacob Heilbronn, ed., Naḥalat Yaʿaqov (Padua: Gasparo Crivellari, 1622), 41v–42r (my translation). See David B. Ruderman, Jewish Thought and Scientific Discovery in Early Modern Europe (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), 153–154.

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Joseph Delmedigo “three intriguing individuals”39 whose religious beliefs and intellectual commitments remain difficult to fathom given the contradictory and even contrary works they left behind.40 However, it is worth considering Luzzatto’s perspective within the context of Counter-Reformation and baroque Italy, a period characterised by intellectual, social, and political changes. This era was often referred to as the age of “honest deception” (dissimulazione onesta), as exemplified by Torquato Accetto’s treatise Della dissimulazione onesta (1641), where truth was concealed within oneself.41 During this time, the literary metaphor of theatrum mundi, which acknowledged the world as a stage where individuals played their roles, reflected the growing awareness that reality could be as transient as a theatrical illusion, just like in a theatre, where people could conceal their true thoughts and beliefs. This shifting, deceptive reality, with all its contradictions, became increasingly elusive for human reason to comprehend. It had become intricate and misleading, presenting different facets to human apprehension.42 According to Luzzatto, knowledge is not absolute but rather probable. In terms of challenging authority, he adopts a Pyrrhonian sceptical stance, while in the realm of human action and politics, he embraces a probabilist approach. Scholars have explored the possibility that he was a fideist, maintaining the Maimonidean view that involves the intervention of providence.43 Personally, whenever practical political action is involved, I am inclined to view him as closer to early modern probabilists like Juan Caramuel. These probabilists, despite being members of religious orders, firmly believed that while God served as the source and origin of the laws governing humanity, a complete understanding of God remained beyond human grasp.44 Luzzatto asserts a similar idea in the Discourse: “With regard, then, to their [the Jews] study of humanistic learning, not only are no prohibitions to be found among them,

39 40 41 42

43

44

Ruderman, Early Modern Jewry (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 6. Ruderman, Early Modern Jewry, 2–5. Torquato Accetto, Della dissimulazione onesta, ed. Salvatore Silvano Nigro (Turin: Einaudi, 1997). For the metaphor of theatrum mundi in Luzzatto’s Italian works see Anna Lissa, “Jews on Trial and Their Sceptical Attorney: Philosophic Scepticism and Political Thought in Simone Luzzatto’s Italian Works,” in Luzzatto, Discourse, 313–316. See the discussion of Baer’s fideist interpretation of Luzzatto in Giuseppe Veltri, “ ‘Identity of Essentiality of the Jewish People:’ The Diaspora and the Political Theories of Simone Luzzatto in the Jewish Thought of the 20th Century,” Civiltà del Mediterraneo 12, nos. 23– 24 (June–December 2013): 149–180; Ruderman, Jewish Thought, 183. About Caramuel and probabilism see the classical study of Dino Pastine, Juan Caramuel: Probabilismo ed enciclopedia (Florence: La Nuova Italia, 1975).

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but also the Jews hold it to be a legal precept to dedicate themselves to the contemplation of natural things, in order to obtain a probable knowledge of the grandeur of God.”45 Therefore the Jews are allowed to pursue knowledge also outside of the boundaries of Jewish traditional texts. In fact, despite his scepticism regarding the attainability of well-founded knowledge, Luzzatto maintained a strong conviction that the pursuit of knowledge was essential. This belief was particularly relevant and significant for the Jewish people, as the learned individuals among them had successfully garnered the support of princes who offered protection to Jewish communities within their domains. Certainly, the Jews, finding themselves in their present state of subjection and having no freedom whatsoever apart from applying their minds to study and doctrine, should devote themselves to these with all their skill and industry. They should be aware of the fact that the unity of dogmas, the patronage granted by the princes, and the protection from so much oppression were obtained over such a long period of time, humanly speaking, from the learning of a virtuous few. They acquired credibility and authority under those who ruled, since they were deprived of all other means of aspiring to the favours and graces of the great in any other way. [The Jews] should [therefore] rest assured that if they were to lack appreciation deriving from their command of [liberal] letters and the esteem of the virtuous, they would incur a considerable decline and a more despicable oppression than they have ever endured in the past.46 The acquisition of knowledge, therefore, is not only a noble and dignified occupation but also a political instrument—and ultimately a matter of survival for the Jewish communities in general and for the Venetian Jewish community in particular, as the incident of 1936–1937, which lies at the origin of the composition of the Discourse, had proved.47

4

Conclusion

Consistent with the metaphor of theatrum mundi and the contradictory, deceptive nature of reality and individuals, I cannot avoid emphasizing the inherent 45 46 47

Luzzatto, Discourse, 225. Luzzatto, 225. See Benjamin Ravid, “The Venetian Context of the Discourse,” in Luzzatto, Discourse, 243– 274.

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contradiction in Samuel ha-Kohen de Pisa’s work. On one hand, the author strives to remain in line with what he considers the orthodoxy of faith and religious beliefs. On the other hand, he is supported in his effort by a group of rabbis and intellectuals who were more open to the developments of the modern culture of that time. Indeed, the life and thought of Samuel ha-Kohen deserve further investigation, in absence of which only a few tentative conclusions can be drawn about him and the reasons that moved him to devise his exegesis of Ecclesiastes and Job. Although The Revealer of Secrets most probably originated in the abovementioned general debate about the immortality of the soul that was stirring emotions during the first half of sixteenth century, the influence of other authors still awaits to be brought to light. Similarly, the knowledge of Samuel ha-Kohen’s origins and vicissitudes could shed some light on the general conception of the book, especially when one considers his attention to the issues of the wicked, the Diaspora, and the suffering of the Jewish people, as well as his interest in the calculation of the end of the days. He declares to be Portuguese (Lusitano); perhaps he was a New Christian who escaped Portugal, came to Italy, and made his way to Venice after having resided in Pisa? Yet, since at the moment the baptismal name he might have used in Portugal and among Christians is unknown, this remains difficult to prove. Nonetheless, such vicissitudes could have influenced his way of seeing the world, so to speak, and thus the choice of the subjects he discussed in The Revealer of Secrets.48 Regarding Luzzatto, in his letter of approval, he demonstrates his Rabbinic knowledge and skill in handling Talmudic questions. However, all of his talents are directed toward one belief: that everyone has the right to explore and examine all kinds of discussions according to their own knowledge and abilities. Does this also imply that his esteemed friend, Samuel ha-Kohen, is free to investigate the question of the immortality of the soul as he wishes and sees fit? Luzzatto does not explicitly state this. He leaves it to the discerning reader to decide. These two different personalities, who were friends despite all the different interests they might have nurtured, are but further testimony and evidence of the variegated and heterogeneous people whose paths crossed in the streets

48

Gaspar Soares declares in 1634 to the Lisbon Inquisition: “no guetto de Veneza estauão cinco mil portuguezes de uarias terras, e os mais delles desta cidade” (“In the ghetto of Venice, there were five thousand Portuguese from various lands, and most of them were from this city”) (antt, Inquisição de Lisboa, proc. 11305, fol. 25r, accessed 16 March 2021, https://digitarq.arquivos.pt/details?id=2311494). I am especially thankful to Prof. Carsten Wilke for bringing this to my attention.

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(calli) of Venice, La Serenissima, both inside and outside the Ghetto, and who made it the special city it was at the time.

Appendix 1: Translation of Simone Luzzatto’s Letter of Approval with Annexed Sources [2v] Magnanimous wise Stock of ancestry and virtue, generous and noble among the chiefs and the leaders of the Holy community of Venice his Excellency the Rabbi Samuel Kohen Sephardi may his Rock protect and sustain him Your noble soul has longed for and craved to study and to investigate the interpretation of the Holy Scriptures, particularly to take delight in the words of Job that, in the eyes of those who have known the matters of religion, are difficult to explain and to accurately get to the bottom of their profound contents. Behold,49 you laboured and you found “a word fitly spoken,”50 as I understood from your appealing writings. And [as] I have also been ordered by you, sublime leader, I shall give you my brief opinion [about] what I conclude concerning a sentence well known to everyone, [attributed] to our Rabbis of blessed memory, that Job denied the resurrection of the dead, whether it is a correct opinion or an isolated opinion and it is not suitable to rely on it. Behold, [as] my soul is bound to the soul of your Excellency with ties of love by the means of his commandments, I hastened to fulfil your valuable request. And it is known to your very Honourable Excellency that this sentence is to be found in the chapter “The Partnership,”51 as it is stated there: “As the cloud is consumed and vanisheth away, so he that goeth down to the grave shall come up no more.”52 Raba said that [this] teaches that Job denied the resurrection of the dead. Until here [are the words of Raba]. There is no doubt that this decree alarms the ear of those who listen to it in many ways, for how is it possible that a man, of whom it is said in the Holy Spirit that he was “whole-hearted and upright, and one that feared God, and

49 50 51 52

Ps 51:8. Prov 25:11. Talmud Bavli, Order “Neziqin,” Tractate “Bava Batra,” first chapter “The Partnership.” Job 7:9. Also quoted in b. B. Bat. 16a.

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shunned evil,”53 on whom God, may He be blessed, testified that there was no one like him in the whole Land whether [he lived] in the days of Abraham, or in the days of Israel’s slavery in Egypt, or in the days of “the judging of the judges,” or “among those who returned from the [Babylonian] Exile,” or “in the time of Ahasuerus,” or “in the time of Jacob and married Dinah the daughter of Jacob,” according to the different opinions of our Rabbis of blessed memory,54 and that he was even bestowed the prophecy as it is known at the end of his book, [how is it possible that a man] with all these merits would have denied the resurrection of the dead, [a sin of such gravity] that for such a man there will be no part in the world to come and he will be counted as one who maintains that the Torah is not from Heaven and a heretic (epiqoros).55 And what is more difficult is that God reprimanded Job’s friends and grew angry at them because they did not speak to Him things that are right as Job did.56 And if he denied the resurrection of the dead, how is it possible that he spoke things that are right, while his friends deserved a punishment because they got angry with him [and accused him of having] evil opinions and mistaken thoughts? And to someone who says [3r] that Job spoke things that are right at the end of his discourse, with the exception of a passage that God, may He be blessed, reproached him for, and concluded his discourse by saying “Wherefore I abhor my words, and repent, seeing I am dust and ashes,”57 one must answer that this is not possible at all. In fact, if he erred in general, while he was discussing with his friends, before that God, may He be blessed, spoke to him and then, according to the opinion of Raba, he denied the resurrection of the dead, that is a cornerstone of the principles of religion, why did God grow angry against Job’s three friends who declared that he was in the wrong? Did this not happen at the moment when Job was completely in the wrong and deserved to be openly rebuked?58 And what is their transgression and what is their sin! Is it possible that a man reprimanded for his blemish is punished when, after-

53 54 55

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Job 1:1, 8. Luzzatto is referring to the discussion of the rabbis about the generation to which Job might have belonged in b. B. Bat. 15b. See m. San. 10:1: “And these are the ones who have no portion in the world to come: He who maintains that the resurrection of the dead is not a biblical doctrine, that the Torah was not divinely revealed, and an epicoros.” See also b. ʿAbod. Zar. 18a. Concerning the resurrection of the dead as a biblical doctrine see b. Sanh. 91b. Concerning the Torah as divinely created see b. Sanh. 99a. Job 42:7. Job 42:6. See Prov 27:5.

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wards, he repents for the sin and for his mistaken opinions? And in addition to all this, it also seems that the sentence of Raba disagrees with the opinion of Rabbi Yohanan. As it is [reported] there in the Gemara, Rabbi Yohanan said “Greater praise is accorded to Job than to Abraham. For of Abraham it is written, ‘For I know that thou fearest God’ [Gen 22:12], whereas of Job it is written, ‘That man was perfect and upright and one that feared God and eschewed evil’ [Job 1:1].”59 In addition to the sentence of Levi, it is said there that “both Satan and Peninah had a pious purpose [in acting as adversaries]. Satan, when he saw God inclined to favour Job said, ‘Far be it that God should forget the love of Abraham.’”60 From this, it would seem that Job was more perfect than Abraham according to the opinion of those sages, and if he denied the resurrection of the dead how is it possible to come up with such a thing? And to this one must not answer that he denied the resurrection of the dead because of his suffering and grief, and that therefore he deserved to be forgiven,61 because Abraham was tested with ten trials and he succeeded with them all. And the abandoning of Ur of the Chaldees and the binding of Isaac are equivalent to the sufferings of Job. Furthermore, it is not possible to answer by arguing that he denied the resurrection of the dead because of his suffering, because the resurrection of the dead does not result from nor depend on the sufferings of the righteous, as [is the case with] complaining about the providence that is caused by the suffering of the righteous and the prospering of the wicked. On the contrary, the belief in the resurrection of the dead comes to repair the injustice that is visible according to the prevailing opinion in the matters of this world. And if we suppose that Job denied the resurrection of the dead, this happened to him most certainly because of his mistaken opinions, not because of his many cares and his anger. And furthermore, according to the literal meaning of the Scriptures it seems that Satan’s intention was to make known and public62 that Job was not righteous and perfect in his faith and in his opinions as God, may He be blessed,

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60 61

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b. B. Bat. 15b. However, see also Adin Steinsaltz’s more literal translation in: Adin Steinsaltz, Koren Talmud Bavli The Noé Edition, vol. 27 Tractate Bava Batra Part One (Jerusalem: Koren Publishers, 2016), 85: “That which is stated about Job is greater than that which is stated about Abraham.” b. B. Bat. 16a. See b. B. Bat. 16b: “Job speaketh without knowledge, and his words are without wisdom. Raba said: This teaches that a man is not held responsible for what he says when in distress.” The word appears to have been partially deleted in the Hebrew text.

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testified about him. And when sorrows came upon him all the weakness of his purity and of his honesty would become evident. For this reason he [Satan] wanted to try him. And if Job denied the resurrection of the dead because the sorrows came upon him, Satan, so to speak, would have been triumphant and God, may He be exalted, would have been defeated, since [Job] did not hold fast in his determination and did not persevere in his righteousness. And [this] also seems to imply that the opinion of Raba is substantially the opinion of that same tanna who brought forth the above[mentioned] Gemara: “There was a certain pious man among the heathen named Job, but he [thought that he had] come into this world only to receive [here] his reward, and when the Holy One, blessed be He, brought chastisements upon him, he began to curse and blaspheme, so the Holy One, blessed be He, doubled his reward in this world so as to expel him from the world [3v] to come.”63 And some tannaim [namely] Rabbi Eliezer, Rabbi Yehoshua ben Karcha, and Rabbi Natan disagreed with him [Raba] without [having to resort to] “there are those who say.” And among the amoraim who dispute about this [there are] the tannaim Rabbi Yohanan and Rabbi Eliezer, as it is explained there. And also about the issue of the providence, Raba was very strict with Job, judging him according to the scale of his sins. But Abaye came back to his merit. And the Gemara concludes there that this is a disagreement among the tannaim. As it is [reported] there [in the Gemara]: “The earth is given into the hand of the wicked.” Raba said “Job sought to turn the dish upside down. Rabbi Joshua said to him: Job was only referring to the Satan.”64 And even though we keep in our hands: “Abaye and Raba, [the] Halakhah [is decided] according to the opinion of Raba”65 it is possible that this was said about the social laws66 and the laws of the Torah. In addition, some tannaim and some amoraim kept on defending Job, as I have shown. And 63 64

65 66

b. B. Bat. 15b. The passage must be quoted here in full, since Rabbi Joshua is actually answering to Rabbi Eliezer. b. B. Bat. 16a: “In all this did not Job sin with his lips. Raba said: With his lips he did not sin, but he did sin within his heart. What did he say? The earth is given into the hand of the wicked, he covereth the faces of the judges thereof; if it be not so, where and who is he? Raba said: Job sought to turn the dish upside down. Abaye said: Job was referring only to the Satan. In all this did not Job sin with his lips. The same difference of opinion is found between Tannaim: The earth is given into the hand of the wicked. Rabbi Eliezer said: Job sought to turn the dish upside down. Rabbi Joshua said to him: Job was only referring to the Satan.” Tosefta to b. Moʾed Qat. 23a. By “social laws” (dinim) Luzzatto is referring to the laws applied to the sons of Noah, see b. Sanh. 56a: “Our Rabbis taught: seven precepts were the sons of Noah commanded: social laws; to refrain from blasphemy; idolatry; adultery; bloodshed; robbery; and eating flesh cut from a living animal.”

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also the expression “wanted” (biqqesh) is not decisive, as [was the case with] Reuben and Solomon who wanted to do and did not.67 Indeed to one who says: “As the cloud is consumed and vanisheth away, so he that goeth down to the grave shall come up no more” it must be answered that [this passage] does not compel to say that Job denied the resurrection of the dead because he only spoke about a natural and ordinary situation assigned to man in this world. And rightly spoke the psalmist King David, may the peace be upon him, “The dead praise not the Lord, neither any that go down into silence,”68 for he did not deny the miraculous resurrection with this sentence. And likewise “Shall the dust praise Thee? Shall it declare Thy truth?”69 And likewise for “For the nether-world cannot praise Thee, death cannot celebrate Thee; they that go down into the pit cannot hope for Thy truth,”70 and like these there are countless [occurrences] in the Holy Scriptures. And with regard to providence, it is possible that he said something that was not correct at the moment of his sorrow and anger. And as your Honourable Excellency reported about our father Abraham, may the peace rest upon him, “shall not the Judge of all the earth do justly?”71 And as [Moses,] the lord of the prophets, may the peace rest upon him, considered the opinions of this people “neither hast Thou delivered Thy people at all.”72

67

68 69 70 71 72

See b. Šabb. 55b: “R. Samuel b. Nahman said in R. Jonathan’s name: Whoever maintains that Reuben sinned is merely making an error,” b. Šabb. 56b: “R. Samuel b. Nahmani said in R. Jonathan’s name: Whoever maintains that Solomon sinned is merely making an error […]. Then how do I interpret, For it came to pass, when Solomon was old, that his wives turned away his heart? That is [to be explained] as R. Nathan. For R. Nathan opposed [two verses]: It is written, For it came to pass, when Solomon was old, that his wives turned away his heart, whereas it is [also] written, and his heart was not perfect with the Lord his God, as was the heart of David his father, [implying that] it was [merely] not as the heart of David his father, but neither did he sin? This is its meaning: his wives turned away his heart to go after other gods, but he did not go. But it is written, Then would Solomon build a high place for Chemosh the abomination of Moab? That means, he desired to build, but did not.” See also David’s case: b. Šabb. 56a: “R. Samuel b. Nahmani said in R. Jonathan’s name: Whoever says that David sinned is merely erring, for it is said, And David behaved himself wisely in all his ways: and the Lord was with him. Is it possible that sin came to his hand, yet the Divine Presence was with him? Then how do I interpret, Wherefore hast thou despised the word of the Lord, to do that which is evil in his sight? He wished to do [evil], but did not.” Ps 115:17. Ps 30:10. Isa 38:18. Gen 18:25. Exod 5:23.

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“If flocks and herds be slain for them, will they suffice them? Or if all the fish of the sea be gathered together for them, will they suffice them?”73 And God, may He be exalted, reprimanded him and said “Is the Lord’s hand waxed short?”74 etc. And the Psalm attributed to Ethan the Ezrahite75 “overfloweth all its banks”76 with lamentations and complaints about God, may He be blessed, as if He were not faithful to His word and to what He said. And Jeremiah, because of the complaint about the fact that “some righteous men prosper some wicked men prosper,”77 wanted to give a judgement full of reprimand upon God, may He be blessed, like that prophet who used his tongue78 by himself about the issue of Zedekiah and Nebuchadnezzar “and he gave judgement upon him.”79 And Habakuk “went too far in testing the attribute”80 when he said “Therefore the law is slacked, and right doth never go forth; for the wicked doth beset the righteous; therefore right goeth forth perverted.”81 And “And makest men as the fishes of the sea, as the creeping things, that have no ruler over them?”82 Because sometimes the prophets spoke according to the common opinion among human beings and according to the opinion of the multitude and nothing other than this. And it is also by virtue of the mercy of God and of His goodness towards His creatures that He allowed them to investigate and to study the way He governs the world and the comparison of His ways in this honourable order. And as the prophet Isaiah, may the peace rest upon him, said: “Put Me in remembrance, let us plead together; declare thou, that thou mayest be justified.”83 And just as the freedom of choice stems from the will, everyone will incline towards what appeals and what they agree upon, so that everyone is completely free [4a] to decide according to the individual level [of learning] to acquire knowledge and to investigate all kinds of discourses according to their wishes.

73 74 75 76 77

78 79 80 81 82 83

Num 11:22. Num 11:23. Ps 89:39–53. Josh 3:15. See b. Ber. 7a. See Jer 12:1: “Right wouldest Thou be, o lord, were I to contend with Thee, yet will I reason with Thee: Wherefore doth the way of the wicked prosper? Wherefore are all they secure that deal very treacherously?” See Jer 23:31: “Behold, I am against the prophets, saith the lord, that use their tongues and say: ‘He saith.’” Jer 52:9. b. Ned. 32a. Hab 1:4. Hab 1:14. Isa 43:26.

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It is really good and upright to interpret in favour of Job [by arguing] that he spoke things that are right about “the testimony of the Lord is sure”84 and [things that are] in agreement with the Holy Scriptures and in harmony with the opinion of the great majority of our holy Rabbis. And “on me may the righteous put his head at rest,”85 since in vindicating Job he “finds grace and good favour in the sight of God and man.”86 And let this be sufficient and even redundant for the beauty of the description of his intellect and of the credit of his opinion. From me and by me, faithful in my affection for you and always praying for your health The young Simone Luzzatto

Appendix 2: The Complete Index of The Revealer of Secrets

Page

Chapter Title

1r 1v 2r 2v–4r 4v 5r–6v

1

6v–9r

2

9r–11r

3

11r–12v

4

84 85 86

A poem from Leon Modena. A poem from Jacob ben Moses Levi. A poem from Yehoshua Avraham Calimani. A poem from Moses ben Jacob Treves. A poem from Jacob ben Abraham Shalom of blessed memory. Letter from Simone Luzzatto. Introduction of the author. Explanation of the verses of Ecclesiastes 3:18 “I said in my heart: ‘it is because of’ ” etc. up to 3:21 “Who knoweth the spirit of man” etc., that he does not doubt the immortality of the soul but only labels the wicked beasts. About Ecclesiastes 4:1 “But I returned and considered” up to 4:17 “for they know not that they do evil,” about some troubles that passed and some troubles that will be in the time of our Messiah, whom the wise [Ecclesiastes] calls “the child, the second” (Ecclesiastes 4:15). Investigation about whether the Christians will die after the coming of our Messiah or not and [about the fact] that we are now [living in the age of] the end of the days. What will happen after the resurrection of the dead and that God will renew his world in a way that [it] will become angelic.

Ps 19:8. Rashi on Gen 28:11. Prov 3:4.

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12v–14v

5

14v–17r

6

17r–18v

7

19r 19r–20r

8

20v–22v

9

22v–25r

10

22v–26r

11

26v–27v

12

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13

30r–33r 33v

14

Verses in which the wise [Ecclesiastes] explained the three ages that we are not [allowed to] investigate: the past, the present, and the future. The past and the present will be discussed here. Ecclesiastes 8:1 “Who is as the wise man” and so on, that Ecclesiastes anticipated the destruction of the Temples and the troubles that were coming, and that all our opinion stems from the jealousy and from the sects that were there [at that time] as Isaiah said in chapter 53. Ecclesiastes 11:1 “Cast thy bread upon the waters” etc. up to 11:10 “for childhood and youth are vanity,” about the future time and he [Ecclesiastes] warns us about generous charity. Explanation of some verses of Job and some general [remarks] about the whole book. The genealogy of Job, and that he was Iob son of Issachar son of Yaacov [Genesis 46:13]. Job’s patience and [about the fact] that he did not deny the Providence, the immortality of the soul, or the resurrection of the dead. About the answer of God to Job 38–40 it will be demonstrated that God, may he be blessed, did not get angry at him, instead He taught him wisdom and His wonders, and the explanation of the [label] animals [applied to] the wicked like Nebuchadnezzar, Pharaoh, Sennacherib, and others like them. The hint of Leviathan [Job 40:25–32] about the war of Gog and Magog and [about the fact that] God showed to Job His ways, the wisdom, and the knowledge. About Job’s answer to God and [about the fact] that he did not sin with his words, and [about the fact that] God informed him in advance about Satan’s charge and about the end of his sorrows, and that we will suffer because of the iniquity of our fathers. Moses our master, peace be upon him, wrote the book of Job as an ethic teaching for the sons of Israel who suffered the slavery during the exile in Egypt that happened because of the iniquity of the selling of Joseph and also the duration of this exile, may God improve its end, as he did with the exile in Egypt. God, may He be blessed, exculpated Job at the end of the story. A correct hint about the commandment of the Red Heifer. Subjects of the chapters and what is discussed in them.

Bibliography Aboab, Samuel. Devar Shmuel. Venice: Vendramina, 1702. Accetto, Torquato. Della dissimulazione onesta. Edited by Salvatore Silvano Nigro. Turin: Einaudi, 1997. De’ Rossi, Giovanni Battista. Dizionario storico degli autori ebrei e delle loro opera, 2 vols. Parma: Dalla Reale Stamperia, 1802. Epstein, Isidore, ed. Babylonian Talmud, 36 vols. London: Soncino Press, 1936–1952. Glazer, Nahum N. Essays in Jewish Thought. Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 2009 [1978]. Guetta, Alessandro. Italian Jewry in the Early Modern Era—Essays in Intellectual History. Boston, MA: Academic Studies Press, 2014. - 978-90-04-69426-2 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/08/2024 08:21:13PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

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Ha-Kohen da Pisa Lusitano, Samuel. Ṣafnat paʿneaḥ: Beʾur ketuvim zarim še-ba-sefer Qohelet w-ken beʾur kolel ba-sefer ʾIyov tam we-yašar we-sar mi-raʿ. We-ʿod remez nakon ʿal miṣwat Parah Adumah. Venice: Commissaria Vendramina, Giovanni Martinelli, 1656. Heilbronn, Jacob, ed. Nahalat Yaʿaqov. Padua: Gasparo Crivellari, 1622. Heller, Marvin. The Seventeenth Century Hebrew Book—An Abridged Thesaurus, 2 vols. Leiden: Brill, 2011. Jost, Isaak Markus. Geschichte des Judentums und seiner Sekten, Vol. iii Leipzig: Dörffling und Francke, 1859. Kaiserling, Meyer. “Samuel Aboab,” The Jewish Encyclopaedia. Accessed 22February 2021. https://www.jewishencyclopedia.com/articles/344‑aboab#anchor16. Lindo, Elias Haim. The History of the Jews of Spain and Portugal, from the Earliest Times to Their Final Expulsion from Those Kingdoms, and Their Subsequent Dispersion; with Complete Translations of all the Laws Made respecting Them during Their Long Establishment in the Iberian Peninsula. London: Longman, Brown, Green & Longmans, 1848. Lissa, Anna. “Jews on Trial and Their Sceptical Attorney: Philosophic Scepticism and Political Thought in Simone Luzzatto’s Italian Works,” in Luzzatto, Discourse, 311– 358. Luzzatto, Simone. Discorso circa il stato degl’Hebrei. Venezia: Giovanni Calleoni, 1638. Luzzatto, Simone. Discourse on the State of the Jews—Bilingual edition. Edited, translated, and commented by Giuseppe Veltri and Anna Lissa. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2019. Modena, Leon. Kitve ha-Rav Yehudah Aryeh Mi-Modena hoṣaʾatim le-ʾor be-paʿam harishonah ʿal pi kitve yad be- British Museum. Edited by Ludwig Yehudah Blau. Budapest: Avraham Alkalay and sons, 1906. Mortara, Marco. Mazkeret Ḥakame Iṭaliyah Indice Alfabetico dei Rabbini e Scrittori Israeliti di Cose Giudaiche in Italia con Richiami Bibliografici e Note Illustrative. Padova: Premiata Tipografia Editrice F. Sacchetti, 1886. Anastatic Reprint: Indice Alfabetico dei Rabbini e Scrittori Israeliti di Cose Giudaiche in Italia con Richiami Bibliografici e Note Illustrative, edited by Cesare Saletta. Bologna: Arnaldo Forni, 1980. Neppi, Graziadio Hananel and Mordecai Samuel Ghirondi. Toledot gedole Yiśrael wegeʾone Yiṭaliya. Trieste: Tipografia Marenigh, 1853. Pastine, Dino. Juan Caramuel: Probabilismo ed enciclopedia. Florence: La Nuova Italia, 1975. Prosperi, Adriano. “Confessione e dissimulazione,” Les Dossiers du Grihl, no. 2 (2009). Accessed 14 March 2021. https://doi.org/10.4000/dossiersgrihl.3671. Ravenna, Alfredo. “Aboab, Samuele,”Dizionario biografico degli italiani (1960). Accessed 22 February 2021. https://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/samuele‑aboab_(Dizionario​ ‑Biografico)/.

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Ravid, Benjamin. “Biblical Exegesis à la Mercantilism and Raison d’État in SeventeenthCentury Venice: The Discorso of Simone Luzzatto,” in Bringing the Hidden to Light: The Process of Interpretation. Studies in Honor of Stephen A. Geller, edited by Kathryn F. Kravitz and Diane M. Sharon, 169–186. Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns, 2007. Ravid, Benjamin. “The Venetian Context of the Discourse,” in Luzzatto, Discourse, 243– 274. Roncolato, Stefania, ed. Il patrimonio bibliografico e archivistico delle Comunità israelitiche italiane Ovvero, la Relazione di Isaia Sonne. Note a margine. Milan: Cdec, 2020. Roth, Cecil. Venice. Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1930. Ruderman, David. Early Modern Jewry. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010. Ruderman, David. Jewish Thought and Scientific Discovery in Early Modern Europe. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995. Sonne, Isaia. “Relazione sul materiale bibliografico—documentario della Comunità Israelitica di Padova in base ad un esame effettuato nei giorni 6–8 febbraio 1935,” available online at Contemporanea. Accessed 22 February 2021. https://www.cdec.it/​ progetti‑editoriali/isaia‑sonne‑e‑la‑relazione‑sul‑patrimonio‑bibliografico‑e‑archi vistico‑delle‑comunita‑israelitiche‑italiane/relazione‑sui‑tesori‑bibliografici‑delle‑ comunita‑israelitiche‑italiane/. Steinsaltz, Adin. Koren Talmud Bavli The Noé Edition. Vol. 27, Tractate Bava Batra Part One. Jerusalem: Koren Publishers, 2016. Steinschneider, Moritz. Catalogus Librorum Hebraeorum in Bibliotheca Bodleiana. Berolini: Typis Ad. Friedlander, 1852–1860. Tamani, Giuliano. “Il commento di Šemuʾel Ha-Kohen Da Pisa al capitolo terzo di Qohelet,” in Non solo verso Oriente—Studi sull’ebraismo in onore di Pier Cesare Ioly Zorattini, 2 vols., edited by Maddalena del Bianco Cotrozzi, Riccardo di Segni, and Marcello Massenzio, vol. 1, 431–442. Florence: Olschki, 2014. Urbach, Ephraim E. Ḥazal, pirqe emunot we-deʿot. Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1969. Translated by Israel Abrahams as The Sages—Their Concepts and Beliefs. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979. Veltri, Giuseppe. “‘Identity of Essentiality of the Jewish People’: The Diaspora and the Political Theories of Simone Luzzatto in the Jewish Thought of the 20th Century,” Civiltà del Mediterraneo 12, nos. 23–24 (June–December 2013): 149–180. Wolf, Johann Christoph, Bibliotheca Hebraea, Vol. 1 Hamburg: Christiani Liebezeit, 1715. Zedner, Joseph. Catalogue of the Hebrew Books in the Library of the British Museum. London: Wertheimer, Lea, 1867.

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The Image of King Solomon in Simone Luzzatto’s Writings Warren Zev Harvey

1

Introduction

The biblical figure cited most by Rabbi Simone Luzzatto (1583–1663), both in his Discourse on the State of the Jews (1638)1 and in his Socrates, or on Human Knowledge (1651),2 is King Solomon. He is cited more than Abraham, Moses, David, Isaiah, or any other prophet or king. He is often quoted as a source for political wisdom, and his views are sometimes said to concur with those of Plato, Aristotle, Tacitus, or other classical authors. On occasion the views cited in his name are in conversation with those of Machiavelli and other Italian thinkers. Like Socrates (Plato, Apol. 20e–21a), Solomon was called “the wisest of all human beings” (1Kings 5:9–11). In Luzzatto’s writings, both Solomon and Socrates represent wisdom, but the two are not identical; there are differences between them. For example, Solomon’s wisdom is more political and pragmatic, and Socrates’s more scientific and sceptical. Who, in Luzzatto’s eyes, is the wisest of all human beings? Luzzatto’s dialogue Socrates is of course about Socrates, but, as Giuseppe Veltri observes, it “begins and ends” with quotations from the Book of Ecclesiastes, traditionally attributed to Solomon.3 It begins with Ecclesiastes 9:16–18 and ends with Ecclesiastes 7:29. It begins with King Solomon and ends with King Solomon.4 As David Ruderman put it: “With the gentle and discreet hand of a polished writer, [Luzzatto] artistically situates the lengthy and convoluted reflections of the Greek sages of his dialogue between the two unadorned poles

1 Simone Luzzatto, Discourse on the State of the Jews—Bilingual edition, ed., trans., and comm. Giuseppe Veltri and Anna Lissa (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2019). In quotations the translation may be modified. 2 Luzzatto, Socrates, or on Human Knowledge—Bilingual edition, ed., trans., and comm. Giuseppe Veltri and Michela Torbidoni (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2019). In quotations the translation may be modified. 3 Giuseppe Veltri, Alienated Wisdom: Enquiry into Jewish Philosophy and Scepticism (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2018), 233. 4 Luzzatto, Socrates, 26–27, 470–471.

© Warren Zev Harvey, 2024 | doi:10.1163/9789004694262_008

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of Hebraic sagacity spoken by the biblical king.”5 However, before examining the four or five references to King Solomon in Luzzatto’s Socrates, let us first survey the thirteen references to him in his earlier work, the Discourse.

2

Discourse

1.

“All the rivers run into the sea, yet the sea is not full, unto the place whither the rivers go, thither they go again.” (Eccl 1:7) The first reference to King Solomon in the Discourse is only an allusion. It is a paraphrase of Ecclesiastes 1:7. The paraphrase is used to explain the effect of foreign traders on the local economy: This can be compared to the sea, where all rivers meet […] and yet the sea always maintains the same level of water, without increase, since it redistributes the waters it receives back to the sources […] of the rivers. In the same manner, the influx of foreigners from various regions neither alters nor enriches cities, since with the continuous backward flow, the money acquired is transferred to the places from which these foreigners originated.6 As the rivers run into the sea and the sea into the rivers, so foreign money enters and exits the city. However, as opposed to these transient foreign traders who do not contribute to the economic growth of Venice, Jewish traders, Luzzatto explains, remain in the city and contribute to its prosperity. 2. “When goods increase, they are increased that eat them.” (Eccl 5:10) The second reference in the Discourse to the wisdom of King Solomon is to Ecclesiastes: It is also an unquestionable fact that the abundance of trade stimulates consumption, particularly of [luxuries] […]. In this case, the saying of Solomon in Ecclesiastes is absolutely true: “When goods increase, they are increased that eat them.” [Eccl 5:10] […] Because of the abundance of merchandise imported by the Jews, sales and consumption increased and generated additional customs revenue for the prince [= al Prencipe].7 5 David B. Ruderman, Jewish Thought and Scientific Discovery in Early Modern Europe (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), 163–164. 6 Luzzatto, Discourse, iii, 32–33. See “Introduction,” 14–15. 7 Luzzatto, iii, 42–43. Like Machiavelli, Luzzatto sometimes spells this word as “Prencipe.”

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Jewish traders in Venice increased the abundance of luxuries, which led to the increase of purchases and of the accompanying taxes. Supply creates demand, and the Jews created the supply and the consequent prosperity. The Jews, Luzzatto argues, have been good for Venice and good for the prince. The allusion to Ecclesiastes 5:10, like that to Ecclesiastes 1:7, exemplifies the wisdom of Solomon in the science of economics. 3.

“The rich and the poor meet together, the Lord is the Maker of them all.” (Prov 22:2) The third reference to the words of King Solomon in the Discourse concerns economic justice and equality. Luzzatto writes boldly: The best most cautious politician has the duty of ensuring that the wealth and resources of the city are divided and distributed among the citizens into suitable mathematical proportions according to the rules dictated by distributive justice. […] As Aristotle states in Book v [Chapter 8] of the Politics [1308b 16–17]: “Especially should the laws provide against anyone having too much power, whether derived from friends or money.” […] As Solomon stated in Proverbs, chapter 22 [verse 2]: “The rich and the poor meet together, the Lord is the Maker of them all.” It is as if he meant to say that the rich person and the poor person […] join [combinano = combine] together just as dryness encounters humidity […] and finally merges with it. [This] results from divine providence, which aspires to alter [alterare = transform] the state of human beings.8 Here Solomon is cited as agreeing with Aristotle concerning distributive justice. However, where Aristotle wrote that justice and equality must be ensured by “the laws,” Solomon, according to Luzzatto’s exegesis, teaches that they are ensured by divine providence [la Divina Providenza]. Economic and social equity is ensured by divine providence. This, according to Luzzatto, is the meaning of Solomon’s words: “the Lord is the Maker of them all.” Here, again, in the third allusion, Luzzatto underscores King Solomon’s economic wisdom and social justice—and he asserts that Solomon’s wisdom and justice reflect divine providence. This seems to mean that they reflect the wisdom and justice inherent in the universe.

8 Luzzatto, vii, 64–65.

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4.

“In the multitude of people is the king’s glory, but in the paucity of people is the fear of poverty [mĕḥittat rāzôn].”9 (Prov 14:28) The fourth reference in the Discourse to the words of King Solomon concerns the economic advantage of having a large population: There is the dignity [il decoro] of the prince [il Principe] that results from the numerousness of his subjects, in accordance with the saying of the wise man [il savio = Solomon], in Proverbs, chapter 14 [verse 28]: “In the multitude of people is the king’s glory, but in the paucity of people is the fear of poverty” [mĕḥittat rāzôn = timor emacritudinis] [Prov 14:28]. This reading accords with the Hebrew text. The highly learned Rabbi Levi [ben Gershom = Gersonides (1288–1344)] explains the word rāzôn [in the sense of poverty and famine]. [T]he greatness and royal majesty result from having a large number of subjects, but a small population leads to fears of poverty and shortages […]. The ignorant [i volgari] believe that a greater population brings about shortages and poverty. On the contrary, the abundance of people increases the earnings [which leads to more buying and selling, i.e., prosperity].10 The simple reading of Proverbs 14:28 is thus: a large population is the king’s glory, a small one his disgrace. Gersonides had understood Solomon’s words in a military sense: if there is a large population, the king can field a mighty army and defend his land; if there is a small population, he will have an inadequate army, be defeated, and his people will suffer poverty and famine. Luzzatto appropriates Gersonides’s understanding of fear of poverty (mĕḥittat rāzôn), but prefers an economic interpretation. His economic rule that a large population encourages prosperity and a small one causes destitution is decidedly his own contribution—although he attributes it to King Solomon, “the wise man” (il savio). Here again, in his fourth allusion to Solomon in the Discourse, the emphasis is on the king’s economic wisdom.

9

10

The phrase mĕḥittat rāzôn is usually translated as “the ruin of the prince,” reading rāzôn as if it were rōzen (prince). Luzzatto understands rāzōn to be derived from rāzeh (thin). See the following note. Luzzatto, Discourse, viii, 72–73. See Gersonides, Commentary on Proverbs (printed in standard rabbinic Bibles), ad loc.: “The glory of the king is that he has a multitudinous nation, for in them he will be strong against those who rise up against him. However, if his nation is few in number, he will have a fear [mĕḥittah] that there may ensue poverty and famine [rāzôn ve-kakaš] if someone should engage him in war.”

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5.

“The rich man’s wealth is his strong city, the [prince’s] fear of the poor [mĕḥittat dallîym] is [because of] their poverty.”11 (Prov 10:15) The fifth reference in the Discourse to the words of King Solomon concerns the status of the poor: Princes [i principi] are used to paying generously for the […] obedience of the people. A hungry population […] does not know what the fear of rulers is. Therefore Augustus, the excellent ruler […] and conqueror […] did, as Tacitus has written: “Augustus won over the soldiers with gifts, the populace with cheap corn, and all men with sweets of repose.” [Ann. 1.2.1] And in Proverbs, Solomon illustrates […] the nature of wealth and poverty when he states in chapter 10 [verse 15]: “The rich man’s wealth is his strong city, the fear of the poor is [because of] their poverty.” This is the translation in harmony with the Hebrew text. [Solomon] attributes to wealth only […] the protection of those who possess it—just as in chapter 18 [verse 11], where he adds that wealth is like a well-fortified wall [ḥōmâh nisgabâh] […] To poverty, however, he […] concedes the threat of attack […] for [poor people do not need] to fear danger nor the loss of anything. This is the reason why they need to be satisfied with more care and effort—or to be strictly repressed.12 Solomon, as Luzzatto interprets him, agrees here with Augustus and Tacitus: the poor have nothing to lose, and thus are dangerous—and must be either bribed or subdued. The rich are not a threat. They keep to themselves, satisfied and sated; they hide behind their high walls, not seeking revolutions. The opinion Luzzatto attributes to Solomon is anti-Machiavellian. In a famous passage in the Discourses, Machiavelli wrote: “A well-ordered republic ought to keep their treasury rich and their citizens poor” (e gli loro cittadini poveri).13 Machiavelli’s view, I think, represents the general medieval wisdom: kings usually feared the nobles more than they did the peasants. However, Jewish experience taught the opposite: the massacres of the Jews were often the work of the

11 12 13

The second half of this verse is usually translated: “the ruin of the poor [mĕḥittat dallîym] is their poverty.” Luzzatto, Discourse, ix, 84–85. Niccolò Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy, trans. Leslie J. Walker and Brian Richardson (New York: Penguin Books, 1963), 1.37 (see 2.19, 3.16, 25). See also Julie L. Rose, “Keep the Citizens Poor: Machiavelli’s Prescription for Republican Poverty,” Political Studies 64 (2016): 734– 744. But see Machiavelli’s curious exegesis of Luke 1:53 (see Psalms 107:9) at Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy, 1.26.

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poor, not the nobles. This was at least the case for the 1391 attacks on the Jewish communities of Spain according to Rabbi Ḥasdai Crescas’Epistle to the Jews of Avignon.14 In any case, Luzzatto’s fifth allusion to Solomon in the Discourse reinforces his image as a wise man in the science of economics. In addition, it explains his view that economic equality for all citizens is not only just, but advantageous to the prince. For Luzzatto’s Solomon, economic egalitarianism goes hand and hand with Realpolitik. A prince who agrees with Luzzatto and not with Machiavelli will fear the poor, and—out of his own cold self-interest— he will pursue economic policies that seek to end poverty. Luzzatto may be seen here as arguing against Machiavelli on Machiavellian grounds. Retired Israeli General Giora Eiland was recently interviewed on Israeli radio. Why, he was asked, does the Hamas in Gaza persistently fire missiles into Israel, while Hezbollah in Lebanon remains quiet—even though they have a superior missile capability? His answer: Gaza is poor and has nothing to lose; Lebanon has a wealthy class with much to lose.15 This analysis corroborates Luzzatto’s view as opposed to Machiavelli’s. 6.

“I considered again all labour and all excellent work, that it is [the result of] a man’s jealousy [qīnʾâh = invidia] of his neighbour.”16 (Eccl 4:4) The sixth reference to King Solomon in the Discourse concerns his putative agreement with Socrates on a moral question. Luzzatto writes: Socrates, in Plato’s Phaedo [68d–69a], reveals the great secret of morality by arguing with regard to moderate people, “it is a kind of licentiousness that has made them moderate,” and they are “brave through fear and cowardice.” Similarly, Solomon in Ecclesiastes states in accordance with the Hebrew: “I considered again all labour and all excellent work, that it is [the result of] a man’s jealousy of his neighbour.” [Eccl 4:4]17 In other words, according to Solomon, as Luzzatto reads him, a person acts in an excellent way because of jealousy. Solomon is interpreted so as to agree 14

15

16 17

The Hebrew text can be found in Eisenmann, Esti and Warren Zev Harvey, eds. Or ha-Shem mi-Sefarad: Ḥayaw, poʿolo wa-haguto šel rabbi Ḥasdai Crescas (Jerusalem: Zalman Shazar Center, 2020), 54–66. The interview took place in early September 2019. See “Blue Flag and Gaza,” editorial, Jerusalem Post, 16 November 2019, https://www.jpost.com/opinion/blue‑flag‑and‑gaza‑60 8046. The second half of this verse is usually translated: “that it is a man’s rivalry [qīnʾâh] with his neighbor.” Luzzatto, Discourse, xi, 94–97.

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with Socrates’s “great secret of morality.” Moral acts very often have immoral motives. In this passage from Ecclesiastes, as Luzzatto understands it, Solomon is portrayed as soberly distinguishing between moral conduct and its frequently amoral motives. Solomon’s ethics is not based on naïve ideals or illusions, but on a realistic analysis of typically selfish human motives. It is not deontological, but rather cynical or perhaps pragmatic. 7.

“And Solomon had […] fourscore thousand that were hewers in the mountains.” (1Kgs 5:89; see 2Chr 2:1) The seventh reference to King Solomon in the Discourse is to a passage in 1 Kgs 5:89 that illustrates the abundant resources devoted to the building of the Temple in Jerusalem. Solomon conscripted eighty thousand hewers of wood. This ability to conscript large civilian and military forces reflects Solomon’s wisdom, but the conscription also shows the exceeding importance the Jews assigned to the service of God. “The Jews,” remarks Luzzatto, “were more sumptuous [sontuosi] in the building of temples to God than any other nation.”18 8.

“And Solomon offered for the sacrifice of peace-offerings […] two and twenty thousand oxen, and a hundred and twenty thousand sheep” (1 Kgs 8:63; see 2Chr 5:6; 7:4–5). The eighth reference to King Solomon in the Discourse appears in the same passage as the seventh, and serves to illustrate the sumptuousness of the service of God in the Jerusalem Temple: “Victims were numerous, as one reads in the history of Solomon,” and song and music were highly developed by the Levites.19 The sumptuousness of the service of God in Solomon’s Temple reflected not only the nation’s piety but also its economic success. 9.

“Wherefore is there a price in the hand of a fool to buy wisdom, seeing he hath no understanding?” (Prov 17:16) The ninth reference to King Solomon in the Discourse concerns his proverb about the fool who wanted to buy wisdom. Luzzatto writes: The world resembles a great market. God dispenses some coins [for human beings] to buy that which is displayed […]. The most current [coins] are prudence [la prudenza] and strength [la fortezza] […]. True religion [la vera religione] is that which begs from God an abundance of [those]

18 19

Luzzatto, xv, 168–169. Luzzatto, xv, 168–169.

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coins. For without this abundance, one cannot hope to achieve anything important. Solomon, in Proverbs, chapter 17 [verse 16] [asks]: “to what advantage does a fool possess riches, seeing he hath no understanding?” That is, the fool overthrows the order of commerce, since wisdom is the means [emphasis mine] to attain riches, but riches are not [emphasis mine] the price or the currency for obtaining wisdom.20 Wisdom is a “means” to riches, but not vice versa. Wisdom can get you money, but money cannot get you wisdom. Luzzatto’s exegesis of Solomon’s parable is original. According to its simple meaning, money in the hands of a fool is worthless, since he does not know what to do with it. According to Luzzatto’s reading: money cannot buy wisdom, and only a fool thinks it can. Note: according to the simple reading of the verse, money is not limited in its power. According to Luzzatto’s reading, money is limited: it cannot buy wisdom. Luzzatto’s Solomon has great economic wisdom, but also knows that the power of money is limited. 10. “And God said unto [Solomon]: Because thou hast asked this thing [that is, wisdom], and hast not asked for thyself long life, neither hast thou asked riches for thyself, nor the life of thine enemies […] behold I have given thee a wise and an understanding heart […]. I have also given thee that which thou hast not asked, both riches and honour.” (1 Kgs 3:11–13; see 2Chr 1:11–12) The tenth reference to King Solomon in the Discourse concerns his request, before ascending to the throne, that God grant him wisdom. Luzzatto explains it as follows: [Solomon] himself was no less practical than theoretical. In fact, when he deliberated over assuming the leadership over the kingdom of the Jews, he asked God for the coin of wisdom, with which he then acquired anything that was obtainable: “And God said unto Solomon: Because thou hast asked this thing [that is, wisdom], and hast not asked for thyself long life, etc.” “I have also given thee that which thou hast not asked, both riches and honour, etc.” [1Kgs 3:11–13; see 2 Chr 1:11–12].21 According to Luzzatto, Solomon had what Aristotle called “practical wisdom.” He knew that from a practical point of view, if one has wisdom, one potentially

20 21

Luzzatto, xv, 174–175. Luzzatto, xv, 174–177.

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has riches, honour, and everything else. Here Luzzatto’s Solomon expresses a pragmatic attitude towards wisdom. Wisdom is not only good in itself (theōría), but it is also a precious means to attain practical things (práxis). Wisdom has cash value, as the American pragmatists used to say. 11. “Through knowledge shall the righteous be delivered.” (Prov 11:9) The eleventh reference in the Discourse to the words of King Solomon is about the liberating power of knowledge. Luzzatto writes: [It is] stated in Proverbs, chapter 11 [verse 9]: “Through knowledge [daʿat = sapientia] shall the righteous be delivered [ yēḥālēṣû = liberabuntur].” That is, the just will be saved by means of their knowledge and prudence [scienza e prudenza]. And even though [the verse] should have said that they will be saved by the merit of justice and good actions [emphasis mine], it mentions knowledge […]. God grants us a reward for the good and just actions we carry out [emphasis mine].22 Although God rewards good and just actions, it is knowledge and prudence that enable us to perform them. Luzzatto understands the verse as follows: “Through knowledge, which leads to good deeds, shall the righteous be delivered.” Again, Luzzatto’s Solomon focuses on the practical value of science. And again, a pragmatic teaching emerges: the cash value of knowledge is good deeds. The just will be liberated not by faith, but by science and prudence, which lead to good deeds. This adage is very much Maimonidean (for example, Guide of the Perplexed iii.8).23 It is also the theme of Spinoza’s Ethics, Part v. 12. “It is the glory of God to conceal a matter, but the glory of kings is to search out a matter.” (Prov 25:2) The twelfth reference to King Solomon concerns esoteric teachings. Luzzatto writes: Therefore, I believe, Solomon correctly stated: “It is the glory of God to conceal a matter, but the glory of kings is to search out a matter.” [Prov 25:2] This passage [means] […] that it is honourable […] that the intimate mysteries of God and of true religion [la vera religione] remain concealed 22 23

Luzzatto, xv, 176–177. See Maimonides, The Guide of the Perplexed, trans. Shlomo Pines (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), 435: human form (the mind) equals the free individual; human matter (the body) equals the slave.

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[…] from the ignorant masses [dell’ignaro volgo]. As Virgil states: “procul, O procul este, profani!” [Away! Away! O profane ones!] […] Thus, it is proper for princes [i principi] and monarchs to investigate […] the inward nature of things in such a way that with their authority […] they can direct the people towards true religion.24 Here, again, Luzzatto gives a new reading to a Solomonic dictum. The usual interpretation of this dictum, found in Rashi and other commentators, is that the ways of God are mysterious, but the ways of a king should be open to inspection and criticism by all.25 Luzzatto, however, understands the dictum as referring to Plato’s doctrine of the noble lie (Republic 3.414b–415d). The secrets of religion should be concealed from the vulgar, and it is the responsibility of a philosopher-king, like Solomon, to study the nature of things, and instruct the vulgar according to their capacity. The prince is thus the authorised teacher of religion. In interpreting Solomon as teaching the doctrine of the noble lie, Luzzatto does not cite Plato, Averroes, or Maimonides, but Virgil. The political wisdom of Luzzatto’s Solomon should be understood here in the light of Leo Strauss’s research on esoteric and exoteric speech. 13. “Then spoke Solomon: The Lord hath said that He would dwell in the thick darkness.” (1Kgs 8:12; see 2Chr 6:1) The thirteenth and final reference to King Solomon in the Discourse concerns the “thick darkness” of revelation. Luzzatto writes: As Solomon stated at the consecration of the Temple: “The Lord hath said that He would dwell in the thick darkness.” [1 Kgs 8:12; see 2 Chr 6:1] […] In this regard, there is a clear statement in the Holy Scripture relating to the promulgation of the Law at Mount Sinai, where it is said of the people: “and the people stood afar off.” […] But it is said of the legislator: “Moses drew near unto the thick darkness where God was.” [Exod 20:17] Now, the prince [= il Principe] must behave in the same way with his people.26

24 25

26

Luzzatto, Discourse, xv, 178–179. See Virgil, Aen. 6.258–259. See Rashi, Commentary on Proverbs (printed in standard rabbinic Bibles), ad loc.: “When you inquire into the glory of kings or sages […] you should investigate the reason for [every] matter, but when you inquire into the Secret of the Chariot, the Secret of Creation, or the ḥuqqim [i.e., statutes for which no reasons are given, e.g., the prohibitions of eating pork or wearing linsey-woolsey], you should not investigate […] but conceal.” Luzzatto, Discourse, xv, 178–181. See Maimonides, Guide iii.9, 436–437.

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Solomon’s teaching, as reported by Luzzatto, refers again to the philosopherking, and to the Platonic-Averroean-Maimonidean distinction between the philosophers and the multitude. While the multitude must keep its distance from the secrets of religion, the philosopher-king, or the philosopher-kinglegislator, that is, il Principe, has the responsibility to draw near to the thick darkness in which God dwells. Necessary for the prince, the knowledge of la vera religione is proscribed for the people. Luzzatto certainly would have agreed with Machiavelli’s description of Moses as a principe whose “great tutor” was God.27 We may now sum up King Solomon’s image in Simone Luzzatto’s Discourse: Solomon was a philosopher-king, dedicated to justice and equality for all. He concentrated on practical wisdom, not theoretical wisdom. He was interested in economics and held that increased supply leads to prosperity. He was a pragmatist, who saw wisdom as a means towards good ethical behaviour and financial prosperity. As a philosopher-king, he was concerned about educating and controlling the multitude. Needless to add, the views of Solomon that are reported in the Discourse are not always based on a literal reading of scripture, but often on Luzzatto’s creative, original, and highly insightful philosophic exegesis. Now, let us turn to the Socrates.

3

Socrates

1. “Then said I […] Wisdom is better than weapons of war.” (Eccl 9:16–18) The first citation of King Solomon in the Socrates concerns the fundamental importance of wisdom [ḥŏkmâh = sapientia]. It appears towards the beginning of Luzzatto’s “Epistle Dedicatory to the Most Serene Prince of Venice, Francesco Molino, and to the Most Excellent Council.” Luzzatto addresses them: Indeed, the majesty of the Venetian Republic, whereof Your Serenity is glorious prince, and Your Excellencies are the most illustrious and wisest counsellors, has clearly shown, with remarkable evidence, that Solomon’s saying, “Then said I: Wisdom is better than weapons of war,” [Eccl 9:16– 18] can be considered true at all times, and above all in this tumultuous time [of] a most grievous war […]. Thus, in the last seven years, we have 27

Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince, ed. and trans. Mark Musa (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1964), ch. 6. See also ch. 18, where Chiron the Centaur is said to have been “the tutor” of many ancient principi.

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experienced that violence, despite being armed with great strength, may be weakened and defeated by constant and mature prudence [la prudenza].28 Luzzatto refers here to the war of Crete between Venice and the Ottoman Empire (1649–1669). The victories of the smaller Venetian forces over the larger Ottoman forces proved, in Luzzatto’s opinion, the wise adage of Solomon: wisdom is superior to weapons of war. The wise will defeat the strong; the prudent will defeat those with superior weapons. In this opening passage from the Socrates, as in the several passages we saw in the Discourse, Luzzatto praises the pragmatic value of wisdom. 2.

“There are three things which are too wonderful for me, yea, four which I know not: the way of an eagle in the air, the way of a serpent upon a rock, the way of a ship in the midst of the sea, and the way of a man with a young woman.” (Prov 30:18–19) The second quotation from King Solomon in the Socrates appears in the “Epistle to the Benign Reader.” Luzzatto explains why he has decided to write this book: It is commonly considered that to pass through this world without leaving any traces would be a vain and useless journey. And Solomon, [in his description] in Proverbs [30:18–19] of the four things that do not leave any traces in their passage, includes the snake, which slithers over hard stones, an animal that is not only useless, but also extremely harmful […] to humankind. Called by Nature to walk this mundane path, I deemed it appropriate to leave a trace on it, even though I believe that after a short while, the passage of others will spoil it or time will erase it. Nevertheless, I do not care much about this, because I will have done my duty.29 The simple meaning of Solomon’s dictum has been debated among the commentators. In what sense are these four things mysterious or amazing? According to one interpretation, the eagle, the snake, the ship, and the lover quickly and secretly disappear from one’s vision, apparently into nowhere.30 Luzzatto, 28 29 30

Luzzatto, Socrates, 26–27. Luzzatto, 28–29. E.g., Rashi, Commentary on Proverbs, ad loc.: “I don’t know where they went, for they quickly hid themselves from my eye.”

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however, follows Gersonides, who believed that the four leave no trace, no imprint.31 The snake leaves “no trace” in the world, and Luzzatto does not want to be “useless” like the snake. He wants to leave an imprint, even if it not a lasting one. That’s why people write books: to leave a trace, to make a difference, to be useful. 3.

“And, behold, there met him a woman with the attire of a harlot, and wily of heart,” etc. (Prov 7:6–21; see also 6:26). The third allusion to the words of King Solomon is indirect. It is to the parable of the harlot based on Proverbs 6 and 7. The parable is developed by Maimonides in his Guide of the Perplexed. According to this parable, there are three principles—matter, form, and privation—and matter is symbolised by the harlot, who constantly switches partners. Maimonides cites Solomon’s Proverbs, and says it distinguishes between two women: the harlot (7:6–21; see 6:26) and the woman of valour (31:10–31). He remarks that the view identifying matter and form with the female and male is found in “Plato and his predecessors” (see Tim. 51a), but his unmentioned source is Aristotle, who not only identified matter and form with the female and male, but also added a third principle: privation (see Phys. i.9.192a).32 Luzzatto’s Socrates says: Aristotle, although young […] maintained there were three […] principles of natural things: privation, which precedes anything newly generated […], the matter in which it is produced, and the form which […] perfects its being. This position lacks a solid foundation […]. Privation, in my opinion […] is nothingness itself.33 Timon, Socrates’s sceptic interlocutor, adds: According […] to Aristotle [and] many of his supporters, [matter] forges [an] alliance […] with a form. It nevertheless draws close to it only for a short time […] [L]ike an infamous harlot, matter […] prostitutes itself. These despisers of friendship [i.e., the aforementioned Aristotelians] […] do to their friends what one usually does with clothes, namely, to have many of them, [and] alternate between an infinite number of them.34

31 32 33 34

Gersonides, Commentary on Proverbs, ad loc.: “they do not leave an imprint.” Maimonides, Guide, 13–14, 43, 355–356, 433–434. Luzzatto, Socrates, 56–57. Luzzatto, 444–445.

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In his allegorical identification of the harlot with matter, Luzzatto appropriates Maimonides’s ontological interpretation of Solomon’s portrayal of the harlot, but both of his characters, Socrates and Timon, criticise the AristotelianMaimonidean theory. According to one, the distinction between “privation” and “nothingness” is unconvincing; according to the other, the view of matter as a harlot leads to antisocial behaviour. 4.

“Get wisdom, get understanding”; “The beginning of wisdom is—get wisdom … [and] get understanding!”; “How much better is to get wisdom than gold!” (Prov 4:5,7; 16:16) The fourth reference to King Solomon, like the third, is an indirect allusion. The allusion is to the view taught in Proverbs that “getting wisdom” is of the highest value. Luzzatto’s Socrates reports having convinced Plato to renounce his doctrine of ideas: Plato […] confessed […] he could finally release himself […] from the mistakes that he had considered true and infallible doctrines […]. He realized that the highest degree reached by human wit was “to have got rid of folly” and not “to get wisdom.” [Prov 4:5,7; 16:16] He promised me that in the future he would become a critical censor of his own knowledge.35 The view attributed here to the reformed Plato is consistent with Socrates’s celebrated sceptical dictum that he is wiser than everyone else because he knows he knows nothing (Apol. 21d). However, it may be that Luzzatto agrees with Solomon that getting wisdom is the beginning of wisdom. 5.

“God made the human being upright, but they have sought out many inventions.” (Eccl 7:29) The fifth and final reference to King Solomon in the Socrates comes in the words of Timon, the sceptic. He says: I indeed sought to lead them [the people] to that condition of excellence which an illustrious man, neither born in Greece nor educated in our customs, had already expressed in his divine warnings: “God made the human being upright, but they have sought out many cogitationes.” [Eccl 7:29] Nor did he end up by accident in a grammatical discord by saying first “the human being” [ha-ʾadam = hominem], singular, and then “they” [hēmmâh = ipsi], plural. Rather, he did this with supreme prudence 35

Luzzatto, 250–251.

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[= la prudenza]. Indeed, he meant that the human being came from the hands of God or Nature His servant [di Iddio overo dalla natura sua serva] […] not only righteous, but […] in agreement with himself [i.e., singular]. Yet as he was then corrupted by curiosity for immoderate knowledge and quibbling investigation, he became divided in himself, plural [emphasis mine], and in disagreement with himself.36 Here Timon, the Greek sceptic, cites Solomon, the Hebrew king, who, although not Hellenic, is nonetheless “illustrious.” Human beings are naturally righteous, friendly, and agreeable. Only sophistic quibbling has corrupted them, making them cavillous, contentious, and quarrelsome. Solomon teaches that human beings were created good by God, but have sought out many divisive thoughts. The natural, God-given state of humankind is intelligence, peace, harmony, and unity. But human beings have sought out many quibbles and distorted thoughts. Solomon’s Hebrew wisdom is simple and true, not convoluted, complicated, or sophistic. The dictum of Solomon quoted by Timon is echoed by Luzzatto’s Socrates: [I]t is sufficient for my defense that you observe [my] public and private […] reverence [for] the First Cause […], which moves and rules everything […]. I have always promulgated that the cognition one has of it and the veneration due to it come not only from subtle […] deductions, but were also given to us along with [our mother’s] milk by Nature itself […]. The human mind is so […] disposed to religion that if deprived [of it], it would not be very different from brute animals.37 Luzzatto’s Socrates and his Solomon would probably agree with the goal of the Socrates as enunciated in its subtitle: “a book that shows how deficient human understanding can be when it is not led by divine revelation.”38

4

Conclusion

What may we conclude about Luzzatto’s Solomon—and about the relationship of his Solomon to his Socrates? And what may we conclude about Luzzatto himself? 36 37 38

Luzzatto, 470–471. Luzzatto, 478–479. Luzzatto, 24–25. In the original Italian: “opera nella quale si dimostra quanto sia imbecile l’humano intendimento, mentre non è diretto dalla divina revelatione.”

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Ariel Viterbo argued that Luzzatto’s Socrates was “the intellectual autobiography of the author.”39 Now, it is indeed tempting to identify the Socrates of the Venetian ghetto with his Socrates of Athens. Even so, it is usually not a wise policy to presume that authors can be confidently identified with the views of their protagonists—like Plato with the views of his Socrates, Judah Halevi with those of his Jewish Scholar, Judah Abravanel with those of his Philone, or Kierkegaard with those of his Johannes de Silentio. Luzzatto surely identified at least partially with his Socrates. However, as we have seen, he also clearly identified with his Solomon. Indeed, in Luzzatto’s creative and skilled philosophical interpretations of Proverbs and Ecclesiastes, it is often difficult to distinguish between Solomon and him. Sometimes Luzzatto’s Solomon seems to be more Luzzatto than Solomon. Therefore, we may ask: with which wise man does Luzzatto identify more: Socrates, the sceptic, or Solomon, the pragmatist? This is a difficult question with no easy answer—but if I had to give one, I would say he identifies a bit more with the pragmatist Solomon. One might perhaps say that the pragmatist is a sceptic fortified with sober political prudenza. Luzzatto was in fact compared to Solomon in a 1622 poem by Leon Modena (1571–1648), his rabbinic colleague and rival. Modena’s comparison alluded to 1 Kgs 5:11 (see 1Chr 2:6): “For he [Solomon] was wiser than all men: than Ethan the Ezrahite, Heman, Calcol, and Darda, the sons of Mahol.” Modena, in his poem, described Luzzatto as: “wise as Heman, Calcul, and Darda.”40 When Michela Torbidoni showed me Modena’s poem a few years ago, she asked me if I thought he was praising Luzzatto or making light of him. This is the question the Jews in Venice were probably debating after Modena read his poem in public. On the one hand, he graciously compared his rival to the renowned wise men, Heman, Calcol, and Darda. On the other hand, he neglected to say he was as wise as Ethan the Ezrahite. Moreover, he wrote “wise as Heman, Calcol, and Darda,” and not “wiser than Heman, Calcol, and Darda.” He was as wise as them, but, unlike Solomon, he was not wiser than them. It would have been so easy for Modena to change one Hebrew letter and write “mē-Hēmān” (than Heman) instead of “kĕ-Hēmān” (as Heman). It would not have ruined the rhyme, although admittedly it would have slightly disturbed

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Ariel Viterbo, “Socrates in the Venetian Ghetto” [in Hebrew] (ma thesis, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1996), 80. See also his “Socrate nel Ghetto: lo scetticismo mascherato di Simone Luzzatto,” Studi Veneziani 38 (1999): 79–128. Simon Bernstein, ed., Diwān le-Rabbi Yehudah Aryeh mi-Modena (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1932), 73, 119: / ‫ ִבְּשׁמוֹ ְלֵבית לוָּצאטוֹ ְונוֹ ַדע‬/ ‫ַאלּוּף ְל ִיְשׂ ָרֵאל אוֹר ְוִשְׂמָחה‬ ‫ ִמן ָהֲא ָדָמה ַﬠד ָהַﬠ ְרבוּת‬/ ‫ָחָכם ְכֵּהיָמן ַכְּלכֹּל ְו ַד ְר ַדּע‬

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the metre. Modena was stingy in his praise of his rival, but we do not have to accept his reservations about him. We can conclude that Rabbi Simone Luzzatto may have been a sceptic like his Socrates; he was certainly a pragmatist like his Solomon; and, above all, he was a supremely wise man like them both.

Bibliography Bernstein, Simon, ed. Diwān le-Rabbi Yehudah Aryeh mi-Modena. Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1932. “Blue Flag and Gaza.” Editorial. Jerusalem Post, 16 November 2019. https://www.jpost​ .com/opinion/blue‑flag‑and‑gaza‑608046. Eisenmann, Esti and Warren Zev Harvey, eds. Or ha-Shem mi-Sefarad: Ḥayaw, poʿolo wa-haguto šel rabbi Ḥasdai Crescas. Jerusalem: Zalman Shazar Center, 2020. Luzzatto, Simone. Discourse on the State of the Jews—Bilingual edition. Edited, translated, and commented by Giuseppe Veltri and Anna Lissa. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2019. Luzzatto, Simone. Socrates, or on Human Knowledge—Bilingual edition. Edited, translated, and commented by Giuseppe Veltri and Michela Torbidoni. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2019. Machiavelli, Niccolò. Discourses on Livy. Translated by Leslie J. Walker and Brian Richardson. New York: Penguin Books, 1974. Machiavelli, Niccolò. The Prince. Edited and translated by Mark Musa. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1964. Maimonides, Moses. The Guide of the Perplexed. Translated by Shlomo Pines. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963. Rose, Julie L. “Keep the Citizens Poor: Machiavelli’s Prescription for Republican Poverty.” Political Studies 64 (2016): 734–744. Ruderman, David B. Jewish Thought and Scientific Discovery in Early Modern Europe. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995. Veltri, Giuseppe. Alienated Wisdom: Enquiry into Jewish Philosophy and Scepticism. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2018. Viterbo, Ariel. “Socrate nel Ghetto: lo scetticismo mascherato di Simone Luzzatto.” Studi Veneziani 38 (1999): 79–128. Viterbo, Ariel. “Socrates in the Venetian Ghetto” [Hebrew]. ma thesis, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1996.

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part 4 Political and Economic Views

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Simone Luzzatto’s Political Thought: Between Reason of State, Scepticism, and Jewish Political Tradition Guido Bartolucci

1

Introduction

The rediscovery of the thought of Sextus Empiricus and the revival of the work of Cicero led, from the first half of the sixteenth century onwards, to a rethinking of some of the traditional principles of political philosophy, which had already been shaken not only by the work of Machiavelli but also by the events that had transformed Europe in the wake of the Protestant Reformation. Authors such as Montaigne and Charron, for example, found in the philosophy of Sextus and Cicero useful tools to address the crisis into which French society had fallen after the Wars of Religion.1 The political implications of scepticism, then, should be regarded as a current of political thought in the early modern period on a par with other traditions such as reason of state and Tacitism.2 From this perspective, it seems logical to argue that the philosophers and thinkers of this period who can be considered sceptical, that is, who recognised in such a philosophy an indispensable tool for interpreting the reality that surrounded them, have used the same tools to interpret the political organisation in which they lived. This assumption, however, does not seem to have entered into the interpretation of the thinking of Simone Luzzatto. Whereas all the rest of his work has been recognised as profoundly influenced by the philosophy of Sextus and

1 John C. Laursen, The Politics of Skepticism in the Ancient, Montaigne, Hume, and Kant (Leiden: Brill, 1992); John C. Laursen and Gianni Paganini, eds., Skepticism and Political Thought in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2015); Spartaco Pupo, Lo Scetticismo politico. Storia di una dottrina dagli antichi ai giorni nostri (Milan: Mimesis, 2020); Anna Maria Battista, “Nuove riflessioni su Montaigne politico,” in Politica e morale nella Francia dell’età moderna, ed. Anna Maria Lazzarino del Grosso, (Genoa: Name, 1998), 249–291; Domenico Taranto, Pirronismo ed assolutismo nella Francia del ’600. Studi sul pensiero politico dello scetticismo da Montaigne a Bayle (1580–1697), (Milan: Franco Angeli, 1994). 2 See Peter Burke, “Tacitism, scepticism, and reason of state,” in The Cambridge History of Political Thought 1450–1700, eds. Mark Goldie and James Burns (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 477–498.

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Pyrrho, the analysis of his political views seems to have been entirely unaffected by it. He developed important political views in both his works; the main question is whether a link can be established between his political statements and his well-known sceptical philosophy, or whether his attitude to politics is independent of his philosophical ideas.3 As has been shown in some studies, Luzzatto made use, especially in his Discourse on the State of the Jews, of the lexicon and political theories of Tacitus, Machiavelli, and Botero, which were sources (not exclusively) of debate on the reason of state in the seventeenth century. The complete separation of politics and morality, the use of laws and justice to educate the people, and the use of force as a necessary means of government are just a few statements mentioned in Luzzatto’s work, but sufficient to confirm his agreement with this current of European political thought.4 References to the reason of state theory would have the function, in line with Luzzatto’s intentions, of explaining the usefulness of the Jewish presence within the Venetian Republic. To this consideration the Jewish philosopher adds a second point, namely the exaltation of the monarchical institution: this was in line with the literature on the reason of state and, in particular, with the references to the quality of prudence that the ruler had to have in order to preserve and enrich his realm.5 In numerous pages of the Discourse, then, Luzzatto highlights this model, using figures from the Jewish tradition such as Moses or Solomon as examples, recognising their role not only as philosophers and rulers, but also, especially for the former, as lawgivers who had governed the people in the best way through

3 Simone Luzzatto, Discourse on the State of the Jews—Bilingual Edition, ed., trans., and comm. Giuseppe Veltri and Anna Lissa (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2019); Luzzatto, Socrates, or on Human Knowledge—Bilingual Edition, ed., trans., and comm. Giuseppe Veltri and Michela Torbidoni, (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2019). On the life and work of Simone Luzzatto see Giuseppe Veltri, ed., Filosofo e rabbino nella Venezia del Seicento. Studi su Simone Luzzatto con documenti inediti dall’archivio di Stato di Venezia (Rome: Aracne, 2015); Veltri, Alienated Wisdom. Enquiry into Jewish Philosophy and Scepticism (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2018), 213–264. 4 Abraham Melamed, “Simone Luzzatto on Tacitus. Apologetica and Ragione di Stato,” in Studies in Medieval Jewish History and Literature, vol. 2, ed. Isadore Twersky (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984), 143–170; Vasileios Syros, “Simone Luzzatto’s Image of the Ideal Prince and the Italian Tradition of Reason of State,” Redescriptions. Yearbook of Political Thought and Conceptual History 9 (2005), 157–182. 5 Luzzatto seams to link this idea to an image that was dear to the Jewish tradition, namely the philosopher-king. See Abraham Melamed, The Philosopher-King in Medieval and Renaissance Jewish Political Thought (New York: State University of New York Press, 2003), 167–174; Syros, “Simone Luzzatto’s Image of the Ideal Prince,” 159–168. Melamed maintained that Luzzatto’s view of the philosopher-king represents the transition from the acceptance of the medieval model to its rejection.

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their laws.6 Many examples of such political reasoning can be found in the Discourse, which is an apologetic work and in which the author’s voice is clearly discernible. More complex is the case of Socrates, where the dialogic structure obscures, or makes it difficult to distinguish, the true position of the author. Indeed, in this work both affirmations of the statements of the Discourse and harsh criticisms can be found, such as, for example, the categorical rejection of the model of the philosopher-king.7 The different positions presented in the two works, especially concerning politics, reveal an apparent contradiction in Luzzatto’s thought that has to be investigated.

2

The Probable and the Sceptical in Political Thought

In Socrates, or on Human Knowledge, published in 1651, thirteen years after the Discourse, the Venetian rabbi describes Socrates’s very long and complex investigation of the many different philosophical and political positions with the aim of showing the weakness of reason.8 Having reached the end of his enquiry, Socrates, finally convinced of the limitation of humankind, must decide whether or not to alert other people. He therefore consults Hippias and Timon, who give him two opposing opinions: the first suggests that he should not reveal it to the people, while the second advises that he should spread it. In discussing their reasons, two different (and contrary) political positions emerge. Hippias advocates the possibility of learning the best techniques for running society by observing nature. He states: From speculation on heavenly motions, human prudence has learned the best way to administrate the republic. Indeed, through them [i.e., the heavenly motions] it has observed that the fair reason of state must not only take the public utility into account and rigorously demand the requested common profit from the government ministers, but that it must also allow them to take something for their own advantage with moderate connivance.9 6 Luzzatto, Discourse, 174. 7 See Luzzatto, Socrates, 466–467. 8 On this work see Veltri, Alienated Wisdom, 233–264; Michela Torbidoni, “What does Philosopher à l’antique Mean to Simone Luzzatto? The Sceptical Variation within the Quarrel of the Ancients and the Moderns,” in Luzzatto, Socrates, 530–541; David B. Ruderman, “Science and Skepticism: Simone Luzzatto on Perceiving the Natural World,” in Jewish Thought and Scientific Discovery in Early Modern Europe, ed. Ruderman (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), 153–184. 9 Luzzatto, Socrates, 404–405.

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The passage explicitly mentions the keywords of the lexicon of the reason of state: “fair reason of state,” “public utility,” and “human prudence.” Hippias goes on to analyse in a very schematic way the correspondence between the various forms of state, especially the monarchy, and the movement of the heavenly bodies.10 If we limit ourselves to these statements, we could argue without doubt that Luzzatto is an advocate of the reason of state. But the last part of the treatise develops two opposing discourses, and Hippias’s statements are indeed criticised in Timon’s argument. Timon says: Besides, I cannot find pursuit, which causes more offence to civil prudence than the experience and acquaintance that the human mind has with the things produced and ruled by Nature, and above all with the celestial bodies. These are ruled with constant and uniform order, while human matters, on the contrary, are always variable, and the will handling them is more changeable than Proteus. It is always afflicted by changeable desires, intemperate loves, fanatical fear, insane hope, furious hatred, and others affects upsetting it. Therefore, a man accustomed to the contemplation of the natural things turns out to be indeed inept in treating civil matters, and above all those who are experts in mathematical sciences [are of this type]. Indeed, they search for firm demonstration of things, but they cannot advance beyond probable conjectures [emphasis mine] within urban matters.11 Timon acknowledges an essential difference between nature and politics. While the former, nature, moves according to regular and constant laws, the latter, politics, is absolutely unpredictable and immeasurable. Timon also offers a solution to the political organisation of humans by asserting that only the probable could be a useful tool to guide them.12 The last part of the work, therefore,

10 11 12

Luzzatto, 406–407. Luzzatto, 436–437. Timon also adds an interpretation of nature that should help men in their political organization. Luzzatto, 467: “However, if the guide of our panting and fatigued understanding turns out to be so doubtful and uncertain in pointing to the final goal of our endeavours, it would be better to omit such quibbling doctrines and to return ourselves to Nature’s arms. Thanks to its tacit impulses and hidden faintly cultivated seeds, it turns out to be as much a pedagogue and mentor for us as it is a producer and nourisher. Thus, according to my inference, a man who has been disciplined by it will, as rapidly as possible, become fair in judging, blameless in choosing, and innocent in acting, and always coherent and in agreement with himself.” I will come back to this interpretation of nature in the following pages.

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presents Socrates with two different political positions, and the second contradicts the ideas associated with the reason of state, which should be Luzzatto’s political thought based on his Discourse. Where then is the real Luzzatto’s position to be found? In the thought of Hippias, who agrees with the view recurring in some parts of the Discourse and reiterates the main themes of the reason of state tradition, or in the position of Timon, who rejects any possible construction of general (and rational) rules for the government of the state? Thankfully some clues to figuring out Luzzatto’s real thought in this regard are provided by his own works, Socrates and Discourse. The first appears at the end of Socrates, when Socrates himself, after hearing the opinions of Hippias and Timon, decides to take the latter’s advice and then reveal to his fellow citizens the uncertainty of knowledge and the inadequacies of reason. But Socrates, aware that this message will bring problems for the social organisation of the people, proposes the following solution: I warned my close friends that they should follow the guide of the probable [emphasis mine] for the actions connected to the purpose of life, as it is not obstinate and quibbling, but adaptable to opportune necessities, and more executive than discursive. In the practice of moral life, it has not deviated much from the first seeds that Nature instilled in our mind, since if it does not grasp the truth, at least it does not encounter insane contumacy and mad obstinacy. One must hence consider that great Nature was [on the one hand] most propitious to human beings in granting them material organs so close to perfection through which they could easily achieve the common customs of life, but [on the other hand] it turned out to be less liberal in providing them with rules thanks to which they could easily guide the course of life itself.13 In this passage the themes presented by Timon recur: the probable (the “probable conjectures”) as the only instrument of guidance in common life, and the imitation of nature. That the probable was the instrument by which Socrates/Luzzatto thought to navigate the reality surrounding him was evident from the very first pages of the dialogue, where Luzzatto reiterated that the Greek philosopher’s position tended towards the opinion of Timon and the probable.14 This concept also reappeared in the middle of the work, when Socrates discussed the principles of knowledge with Cratylus. The latter, at the

13 14

Luzzatto, 475. Luzzatto, 32, 44.

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end of his discourse, had extolled the probable as the only defence against the storms that beset life, and said that it was easy for man to know because it was one of the things necessary for his life, although Socrates had then commented that the probable might be useful for the knowledge of external things rather than for human affairs.15 The same principles, explicitly connected to politics, are found in a passage of Luzzatto’s Discourse. In the eighth consideration, he writes: “Political matters are full of alterations and contingencies, and in this Discourse, I intended that I would follow the probable and the plausible [verisimile], just as a new academician would, and not as a mathematician who follows the absolutely demonstrable and undeniable.”16 Luzzatto clearly recognises the sources of his political thought: the New Academy and the concepts of the probable and resembling the truth (“plausible”). He thus bases his political ideas on clear sceptical principles. But this is not enough. The comparison between the passages of the Discourse and those of Socrates helps us to understand what lies behind Luzzatto’s description. In particular, as far as the definition of the probable is concerned, it is possible to trace his reflections back to those early modern works that were influenced by the thought of the New Academy and of Cicero.17 The constant reference to Cicero, then, and, in the Discourse, the citation of the New Academy, allow us to look closely at Luzzatto’s relationship to sceptical philosophy as well. While there is no doubt that the Venetian rabbi was very familiar with the texts of Sextus Empiricus, which he often cites in his works, the reference to the lexicon of the New Academy may indicate that he was also engaged with this version of scepticism. Just about the time Luzzatto was writing his works, there was an overwhelming return of interest in New Academy thought, especially in France.18 15 16 17

18

Luzzatto, 368–371. Luzzatto, Discourse, 79. On the development of the idea of probable in Cicero’s thought, starting from Arcesilaus and Carneades, see Carlos Levy, Cicero academicus. Recherches sur les Académiques et sur la philosophie cicéronienne (Rome: École Français de Rome, 1992), 276–277; James Allen, “Academic Probabilism and Stoic Epistemology,” The Classical Quarterly 44, no. 1 (1994): 85–113. On the fortune of Cicero’s work in the Renaissance see Charles B. Schmitt, Cicero Scepticus. A Study of the Influence of the Academica in the Renaissance (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1972). See for example José Raimundo Maia Neto, “Le probabilisme académicien dans le scepticisme français de Montaigne à Descartes,”Revue philosophique de la France et de l’étranger 138, no. 4 (2013): 467–484; Neto, “Academic Skepticism in Early Modern Philosophy,” Journal of the History of Ideas 58 (1997): 199–220; Sébastien Charles and Plinio Junqueira Smith, eds., Academic Scepticism in the Development of Early Modern Philosophy (Cham: Springer, 2017).

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Authors such as Pierre Charron, François de La Mothe Le Vayer, and Michel de Montaigne recovered the concepts of the probable and resembling the truth (verisimile).19 The use of these sources helped these writers to temper their criticisms of reason and of the values of the society in which they lived. For Charron, for example, the notion of the probable was useful in building up his image of the sage. The sage strives for an ideal which does not conform to any particular doctrine but is intended to preserve the cohesion and integrity of the mind. To this end, he is not allowed to choose and decide between different opinions but is forced to suspend judgement and choose the most probable. From a political point of view, this means that political action cannot be based on past or present experience, because it is itself founded on uncertain and contradictory human events.20 The end of Socrates seems to point to this vision: Luzzatto is aware that human organisation rests on foundations that cannot be rationally understood, but lest the community fall apart the moment this truth is revealed, he adds that the compass must be the probable. In other words, the sceptical sage cannot retreat into suspension of judgement and thereby contribute to the crumbling of the foundations of human society, but he can promote an organisation based on the most probable choices. Within this frame his definition of nature also finds its place. As we have seen, after introducing the notion of the probable, he discusses the objection that we cannot be sure that it is useful for living a righteous life because we cannot compare it to the real, which is completely inaccessible to us.21 Luzzatto then argues that there is a link between the probable and nature that has always benefited man through experience. The virtues, then, according to Luzzatto’s Socrates, are grandchildren of the probable and daughters of nature, linked to those seeds that it has instilled in humankind and that discourse and reflection on it have gradually corrupted.22 19

20

21 22

In the Apology of Raimond Sebond Montaigne criticised the New Academy, and especially the notions of the probable and resembling the truth (verisimile). See Neto, “Le probabilisme académicien dans le scepticisme français,” 474. For Charron see José Raimundo Maia Neto, Academic Skepticism in Seventeenth-Century French Philosophy. The Charronian Legacy 1601–1662 (Cham: Springer, 2014). On Charron’s political thought see Anna Maria Battista, Alle origini del pensiero politico libertino. Montaigne e Charron (Milan: Giuffrè, 1979). Anna Maria Battista pointed out that French political thought influenced by scepticism, as in the case of Montaigne and Charron, was a greater novelty than the influence of Machiavelli’s work. Whereas the Florentine secretary had separated political action from morality, Montaigne and Charron went further and undermined the foundations on which morality itself rested. See also Assolutismo laico, ed. Anna Maria Battista, trans. and notes Diana Thermes (Milan: Giuffrè, 1990). Luzzatto, Socrates, 474–475. See Luzzatto, 476: “Yet if one asked me what degree of certainty this probable may achieve,

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The reference to nature thus serves Luzzatto to better specify the meaning he wishes to give to the notion of the probable. Indeed, he claims that he does not know the precise meaning of this term and is aware of the difficulties of asserting something like truth without direct knowledge. Luzzatto introduces the argument of the artist who cannot paint the figure of Pericles without ever having seen him. The passage seems to echo the criticism in Augustine’s Contra Academicos, who used the example of the impossibility of establishing the resemblance of a son to his father without knowing the latter’s appearance.23 But he could also have in mind the same critique made by Montaigne in his Apology.24 Luzzatto countered these objections with the concept of nature and the relationship between the probable and the natural seed. Through this development, which departs from the thought of the New Academy, he attempts to give value to his own idea of a government of society based on the probable. Behind his interpretation, an element of Cicero’s thought can be discerned. The Roman philosopher had not only embraced the use of the probable, but had added to it, in works such as the Tusculanae Disputationes, a conception of nature clearly influenced by Stoic thought, but which served to legitimise the use of the probable itself.25 A similar combination of Stoic nature and sceptical

23 24 25

and objected by saying that we were prevented from achieving the sincere truth, how could one say that the probable at least resembles the truth? […] To these objection, I would answer that I am not aware of the degree of certainty that may be obtained by the probable as far as the exact truth is concerned, or how it may present it to us, since it is not informed of it. However, I certainly believe that it is profitable and extremely salutary, since it comes from the hands of Nature, which is more solicitous to help us through its effects than to indoctrinate us through disciplines, and experience teaches us that those actions which we understand the less because of their continuous use are carried out more quickly.”; 479: “I was accused of having attempted to destroy moral virtues. Yet this is very far away [from what I said], because I proclaimed them the daughters of the probable, the legitimate grandchildren of Nature itself.” On this passage from Luzzatto and the link between nature and virtues see Torbidoni, “What Does Philosopher à l’antique Mean to Simone Luzzatto?,” 536–540. See Augustine, Acad. 2.16. See note 19 above. See for example Cicero, Tusc. 2.2.5: “Nos qui sequimur probabilia nec ultra quam id quod veri simile occurrit, progredi possumus, et refellere sine pertinacia et refelli sine iracundia parati sumus.” 3.1.2: “Quodsi talis nos natura genuisset, ut eam ipsam intueri et perspicere eademque optima duce cursum vitae conficere possemus, haut erat sane quod quisquam rationem ac doctrinam requireret. Nunc parvulos nobis dedit igniculos, quos celeriter malis moribus opinionibusque depravati sic restinguimus, ut nusquam naturae lumen appareat. Sunt enim ingeniis nostris semina innata virtutum, quae si adolescere liceret, ipsa nos ad beatam vitam natura perduceret. Nunc autem, simul atque editi in

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doubt also appears in the work of Pierre Charron. While we do not know if he was a source for Luzzatto, his work allows us a glimpse of the experiments that were taking shape in the rest of Europe at the time the rabbi published his work, and that gave a new image to scepticism in general and academic scepticism in particular.26 The part that the probable had to play in the organisation of the political commonwealth, however, remains unspoken. Immediately after presenting his reflections, in fact, Socrates/Luzzatto defends himself against the accusation of wanting to subvert the religion of the city. From this point he begins an account of his own relationship to public religion, articulated in three points. First, he never wanted to openly criticise the cults of the city before the people, but to correct some of their superstitions; second, he always supported the patriotic rites and the ceremonies associated with them; and, third, he added that the true temple of God is the soul of the sage, marking a distinction between the religion of the people, the city, and the sage.27 If we read these passages in political terms, we recognise some statements that characterise the political discourse of authors who used sceptical philosophy in this period, such as Charron. The role of the sage is no longer present in the government of the city and the state, philosophy is completely useless precisely because the art of governing is based on the probable, and therefore the freedom of thought that exemplifies the sage is not expressed in an open critique of society, but is completely internal, private, while outwardly one must obey the laws and institutions of the state in which one lives.28 If, then, the principles of Luzzatto’s political thought are sceptical, that is, they call into question the faculties of reason, then we cannot confine it within the borders of the reason of state. The references to this theory in the Discourse are functional to the defence of the role of Jews within the city of Venice and the Christian community in general: they are all connected to practical politics,

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lucem et suscepti sumus, errorem suxisse videamur. Cum vero parentibus redditi, dein magistris traditi sumus, tum ita variis imbuimur erroribus, ut vanitati veritas et opinioni confirmatae natura ipsa cedat.” On this work and its complex structure, which combines different philosophical approaches, see Levy, Cicero, 445–494. On Charron’s view of nature see Neto, Academic Scepticism, 13n5. See, for example, Pierre Charron, Of Wisdom. Three books, trans. George Stanhope (London: R. Bonwicke, 1707), 58: “By all which it is plain that Nature is set to signify that Universal Reason and Equity, which is given for a Light to our Minds and is both of that vast comprehension, as to contain under it the Seeds of all kind of Virtue, Probity and Justice.” Luzzatto, Socrates, 478–481. For Charron’s political thought and his philosophical justification see Taranto, Pirronismo ed assolutismo nella Francia del ‘600, 63–105.

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but they cannot be seen as the only part of Luzzatto’s political doctrine. In the two passages mentioned above, and especially in the use of the term “probable,” he shows that he wants to go beyond this model and introduce a sceptical view of politics. In other words, he, like other authors of the same period, wants to reclaim a new way of doing politics, far from its illusions. But attitudes to scepticism also varied according to the sources referred to. The rabbi of Venice knew the works of Sextus very well, but when he had to think through the eyes of Socrates about the relationship between scepticism and the organisation of society, he chose other texts, such as Cicero, and offered a reading very similar to that of other authors of his time.29

3

Scepticism and the Jewish Political Tradition

Simone Luzzatto was not only a philosopher, but also a Jew and a rabbi. What influence did his political views have on his conception of the Jewish political tradition, if he had one? The question is legitimised by the fact that some scholars have associated his work with Jewish interest in Venetian institutions.30 As is well known, at least two eminent Jewish thinkers of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries devoted passages of their works to this subject: one is Isaac Abravanel, in his commentary on the book of Exodus, and the other is the Jewish physician David de Pomis, in a speech in the vernacular for the benefit of the city of Venice.31 The two authors, proceeding almost in parallel, interpret Exodus 19 in a political way, comparing the institutions described by Jethro to Moses with those of the city of Venice. De Pomis thus adds praise of the Sanhedrin, as Maimonides had described it in the Mishneh Torah and compared it to the Venetian Senate, reinforcing the parallel between Jewish institutions as described in the biblical and post-biblical tradition and the aristocratic repub-

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For a discussion of the probable in Luzzatto’s works see also Anna Lissa, “Jews on Trial and Their Sceptical Attorney: Philosophic Scepticism and Political Thought in Simone Luzzatto’s Italian Works,” in Luzzatto, Discourse, 311–358, esp. 337–340, 349–352. Abraham Melamed, “The Myth of Venice in Italian Jewish Thought,” in Italia Judaica. Atti del i Convegno internazionale. Bari 18–22 maggio 1981 (Rome: Ministero per i Beni Culturali e Ambientali, 1983), 401–413. Benzion Netanyahu, Don Isaac Abravanel, Statesman and Philosopher (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1968); Cedric Cohen-Skalli, Don Isaac Abravanel. An Intellectual Biography (Waltham, MA: Brandeis University Press, 2020); Guido Bartolucci, “Venezia nel pensiero politico ebraico Rinascimentale: Un testo ritrovato di David de’ Pomis,” Rinascimento, 44 (2005): 225–247; Alessandro Guetta, Italian Jewry in the Early Modern Era (Boston: Academic Studies Press, 2014), 86–87.

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lican model of Venice. There is no doubt that they wrote an apologetic homage to the city that hosted them, but their works could also be seen as a result of a theoretical discussion about the best model of government.32 Luzzatto did not present such an overt apology of the city of Venice, but he did develop a political discourse that, rather than imitating the republican theory of the Italian Cinquecento, has a broader meaning associated with defending the utility of the Jews within the boundaries of the republic. Although Luzzatto does not devote part of his work to an analysis of Mosaic political institutions or to a comparison between the Jewish tradition and Venice, in one passage we can find a very specific reflection on the question of the relationship between politics and Judaism. In the sixteenth consideration of the Discourse he addresses the question of the role of the secular sciences within Judaism and of Jewish doctors. The latter are divided into three classes: the rabbis and talmudists, the philosophical theologians, and the kabbalists. Whereas the first and the third are easily recognisable, the second class is more complex: they are, according to Luzzatto’s definition, “those who by joining human reason with the authority of the divine word, have endeavoured to expound upon Scriptures with a harmonious application of both.”33 Among these Luzzatto counts Philo of Alexandria, Flavius Josephus, Moses Maimonides, Joseph Albo, and Ḥasdai Crescas. After finishing his account of the various Jewish philosophers, Luzzatto discusses the authority which their works and thought had enjoyed among the Jews. He writes: The Jews are respectful to the above-mentioned learned men as far as opinions and dogmas pertaining to the articles of their religion are concerned. [They also rely on them] as far as morality and ways of conversing and behaving in society and civil life, with whatever people or nation, are concerned. Although the Rabbis have said things about such matters that have not confirmed the present condition, they hold that these words should not be considered inalterable and eternal laws. [In fact, the Jews] deem them uncorrupted relators of ceremonial observations, not prophetic legislators for all posterity, especially for the things that pertain to human affairs, which are subject to such contingencies and variations and which depend upon an alterable infinity of circumstances. Their [the rabbis’] civil law is not legally binding nor mandatory, for [the rabbis]

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See for Abravanel Cohen-Skalli, Don Isaac Abravanel, 138–155. Luzzatto, Discourse, 203.

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themselves have taught that every pact, voluntary constitution, and convention in civil matters has [the power] to dissolve any of their rulings.34 Here Luzzatto discusses the role of politics within the Jewish tradition.35 He maintains that only the religious tradition handed down by the rabbis and researched by theologians is to be followed; everything else, and especially the civil (that is, political) tradition, is to be disregarded precisely because it is accidental. Because the rest of philosophy, including political philosophy, is subject to corruption and change, so the works of philosopher-theologians have no authority. Among the authors mentioned are central figures in the history of the interpretation and reorganisation of Jewish law, such as Moses Maimonides and Joseph Albo. This principle becomes, in the hands of the sceptical Luzzatto, a tool to show that the adaptation of the political thought of the various authors by the peoples and nations in and among which they lived was based on the idea that only the probable is a useful tool to govern the people, as he had argued at the end of Socrates. This idea, as we have seen, implies a radical questioning of political organisation, not only of the state or the republic, but also of Jewish communities and the authoritative principles on which they were based. In other words, just as Abravanel or de Pomis, in glorifying Venetian institutions, also clarified their political beliefs, which were probably linked to their political experiences, Luzzatto, in describing the human limit of Jewish political organisation in the Diaspora, also had in mind the Jewish communities of his time. One possible hypothesis is that Luzzatto is referring to events that affected the Jewish community of Venice in those years. The case is well known: in 1631,

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Luzzatto, 203: “Alli predetti sono ossequenti gli Hebrei nelle openioni e dogmi pertinenti alli articoli della religione, come anco circa la moralità e modo di conversare e di portarsi nel consortio humano, e vita civile con qual si sia gente e natione, che si bene li rabbini havessero in tal materia detto alcuna cosa che non si confermasse al stato presente, tengono che non si deve osservare come legge inalterabile, e sempiterna, supponendo ch’habbiano scritto come conveniva al stato e condizioni di quelle genti ne quali erano dispersi, giudicandoli incorrotti rapportatori dell’osservationi cerimoniali, non profetici legislatori della loro posterità, massime in quello appartiene alli affari humani sottoposti a tanta contingentia, e varietà, e che dipendono da una alterabile infinità di circostantie.” Luzzatto discussed the political condition of the Jews in Diaspora also in the Discourse. See Luzzatto, 232–240. See also Luzzatto, 237, where Luzzatto maintains that, even though the Jews have been dispersed for more than 1600 years, they maintained their customs and beliefs. He also mentions the condition of the Jews in Poland, Russia, and Lithuania, which “allow the free judgment of all differences and controversies, both civil and criminal, that occur within the Nation.” See Vasileios Syros, “Mercati ex Machina: Economic Prosperity and Decline in Early Modern Jewish Thought,” Republic of Letters 6, no. 1 (2018): 13–14.

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Giovanni Morosini, avogador del Comun, discovered that the Jews had statutes forbidding their members to address the Venetian magistrates under penalty of excommunication.36 The affair drew the attention of the Lagoon authorities to the administrative organisation of the Universitas of the Jews and the magistrates who ran it, especially through the translation of the statutes from Hebrew into the vernacular, in which Luzzatto himself was probably involved. While the reading of the so-called Libro Grande had alarmed the Venetian government, which believed it had discovered a separate republic within its own borders, the reasons that had triggered the affair lay in internal tensions within the Jewish community and, above all, in the questioning of the authority of those who ran it.37 The issue of administrative autonomy has been debated for decades within studies of the Jewish presence in Europe and the Ottoman Empire. The most controversial issue has always been the value attached to this autonomy, that is, whether, especially on the legal level, decisions made within the community, for example by rabbinical courts, were considered valid within the Universitas, or whether, in case of a negative decision, Jews would also turn to external courts or institutions. Indeed, Jewish authorities, both secular and rabbinic, were aware that despite efforts to keep the boundaries between internal and external jurisdiction clear, the danger that many Jews would cross this line was not only theoretically high but also concretely present in many communities. In addition, in sixteenth-century Italy there was a profound change in the selfgovernment of the Universitates Hebraeorum. There is evidence in the rabbinic literature of the period that in some cities, such as Bologna, the institutions that governed the community were transformed, in some cases leading to conflict between different power groups. This change, perhaps not unrelated to the massive Sephardic emigration, had undoubtedly weakened the certainties of the autonomous government of the communities. It perhaps helped to develop a recourse to Christian law in this area as well, in order to strengthen the role of the representatives and thus reduce the risk of some members of the community who appealed to the authorities under whom they lived.38 The autonomy 36

37 38

Benjamin Ravid, “The Venetian Context of the Discourse,” in Luzzatto, Discourse, 256–257; Ravid, “‘A Republic Separate From All Other Government:’ Jewish Autonomy in Venice in the Seventeenth Century and the Translation of the Libro Grande” [Hebrew], in Thought and Action: Essays in Memory of Simon Rawidowicz on the Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of His Death, eds. Alfred A. Greenbaum and Alfred L. Ivry (Tel Aviv: Tcherikover and Haifa University Press, 1983), 53–76; David Joshua Malkiel, A Separate Republic. The Mechanics and Dynamics of Venetian Jewish Self-Government, 1607–1624 (Jersualem: Magnes Press, 1991). See Malkiel, A Separate Republic. See Robert Bonfil, Rabbis and Jewish Communities in Renaissance Italy (New York: Littman

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of these institutions often clashed, on the one hand, with the willingness of state institutions to restrict such practices, which in certain cases were recognised as true acts of lèse-majesté; on the other hand, the sheer weakness of intra-Jewish institutions had often led some members of the community, dissatisfied with the judgements of the courts or convinced that they had been wronged, to appeal to the Christian magistrates. It is possible, then, that Luzzatto’s thought was not exclusively theoretical, but was intimately connected with a debate that was concretely concerned with the organisation of the community and the conflict over the basis of the legitimacy of its authority. To this we should add that these tensions were also related to the consideration that it was precisely in Venice, after the Venetian Interdict (1605–1607), that the question of the jurisdiction of political and religious affairs was (first) raised. One of the protagonists of the debate about the statutes of the community was a disciple of Paolo Sarpi, Fulgenzio Micanzio, who was commissioned by the Republic to examine the documents. The friar drafted an opinion defending the way the Jewish community administered itself, stressing that the government of the Jews belonged to the spiritual sphere (like that of the Church) and that civil jurisdiction, on the other hand, remained firmly in the hands of the Venetian authorities.39 When Luzzatto limits the political tradition represented by the philosophical theologians to the time and place in which it arose, he separates it from any connection with the sacred writings and Mosaic revelation. He argues that “the Jews are respectful to the above-mentioned learned men as far as opinions and dogmas pertaining to the

39

Library–Oxford University Press, 1990); Elisheva Carlebach, “The Early Modern Jewish Community and Its Institutions,” in The Cambridge History of Judaism, vol. 7, eds. Jonathan Karp and Adam Sutcliffe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 168–198; Jacob Katz, Tradition and Crisis. Jewish Society at the End of the Middle Ages (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2000), 63–112; David B. Ruderman, Early Modern Jewry. A New Cultural History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 59–98. See also Andrea Yaakov Lattes, “Aspetti politici ed istituzionali delle comunità ebraiche in Italia nel Cinque-Seicento,” Zakhor. Rivista di Storia degli Ebrei d’Italia 2 (1998): 21–37; Bernard Dov Cooperman, “Theorizing Jewish Self-Government in Early Modern Italy,” in Una Manna buona per Mantova. Ma Tov le-Man Tovah. Studi in onore di Vittore Colorni per il suo 92° compleanno, ed. Mauro Perani (Florence: Olschki, 2004), 365–380; Cooperman, “Political Discourse in a Kabbalistic Register: Isaac de Lattes’ Plea for Stronger Communal Government,” in Beʾerot Yitzhak. Studies in Memory of Isadore Twersky, ed. Jay M. Harris (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), 47–92; Cooperman, “Ethnicity and Institution Building among Jews in Early Modern Rome,” Association for Jewish Studies 30, no. 1 (2006): 119–126. See Malkiel, A Separate Republic, 42–53. For Micanzio’s text see Malkiel, 239–255. It should be noted that Micanzio used a rabbi from the community, whose identity is not known, to write his opinion. Malkiel assumed it was Leon Modena (see Malkiel, 53–54).

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articles of their religion are concerned,” and in this he seems to adopt the idea already expressed by Micanzio, that the authority governing the Jewish community should be confined to matters in spiritualibus, while everything else should be under the authority of the secular magistrates of the republic. His political thought and its association with scepticism, therefore, were probably not only part of a theoretical discussion about the limits of human reason, but were also impacted by and had an impact upon Jewish Venetian life.

4

Conclusion

Both in Socrates’s last section and in the Discourse’s discussion of the Jewish political tradition Luzzatto reached the same conclusion. Thanks to the concepts of the probable and resembling the truth (verisimile), borrowed from the sceptical New Academy, he shaped his political thought based on principles which need to be constantly questioned and adapted to historical contingencies. His sceptical conclusion must be seen as a response to the profound crisis of traditional reference points which had gripped European society since the beginning of the sixteenth century. The religious division of Europe and the subsequent wars and encounters with new peoples and continents had, on the one hand, profoundly undermined traditional values, and, on the other, they exacerbated the clash of opposing truths. During the seventeenth century the intellectual reactions took different forms depending on the time and place in which individual thinkers lived. Scepticism was one of those reactions that found its scope in such a historical context by challenging the foundations of any dogmatic view. Luzzatto, like some other philosophers, used scepticism as a means to measure his reality and to question human knowledge. However, we cannot label Luzzatto as a sceptical thinker only towards the wisdom of non-Jews and leave aside the role of Jewish tradition within his thought. In this respect, we could take up the words of Joseph Stern, who defined Socrates as a philosophical work of a Jew, but not an expression of Jewish philosophy.40 Yet, if we accept that his sceptical view towards the political organisation of society in general, as it is presented at the end of his Socrates, may also be applied to the community to which he belonged, namely the Venetian Jewish community, then it is possible to change one’s mind on this issue.

40

Joseph Stern, “Luzzatto’s Socrates and the History of Jewish Philosophy,” Filosofia Italiana. Filosofia Ebraica in Italia xv–xix secolo 1 (2020), 28.

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According to Luzzatto, sceptical philosophy cannot be limited to speculative musings meant to explore the capacities of human reason; it was also a way of criticising the society in which he lived, and his questioning the role and power of the Jewish magistrates in the ghetto is a proof of this. The concepts of the probable and resembling the truth (verisimile), as well as his idea of a politics depending on the contingencies of time and space, gave Luzzatto the chance to rethink the same political Jewish tradition. In conclusion, we may agree with the opinion that his thought cannot be acknowledged as an expression of Jewish philosophy, but we cannot deny that his writings play a significant role within the history of the relationship between Judaism and scepticism.41

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41

See Veltri, Alienated Winsdom.

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Charron, Pierre. Of Wisdom. Three books. Translated by George Stanhope. London: R. Bonwicke, 1707. Cicero, Marcus Tullius. Tusculanae Disputationes. Edited by Carl Friedrich Wilhelm Müller. Leipzig: Teubner, 1903. Cohen-Skalli, Cedric. Don Isaac Abravanel. An Intellectual Biography. Waltham, MA: Brandeis University Press, 2020. Cooperman, Bernard Dov. “Ethnicity and Institution Building among Jews in Early Modern Rome.” Association for Jewish Studies 30, no. 1 (2006): 119–126. Cooperman, Bernard Dov. “Political Discourse in a Kabbalistic Register: Isaac de Lattes’ Plea for Stronger Communal Government.” In Beʾerot Yitzhak. Studies in Memory of Isadore Twersky, edited by Jay M. Harris, 47–92. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005. Cooperman, Bernard Dov. “Theorizing Jewish Self-Government in Early Modern Italy.” In Una Manna buona per Mantova. Ma Tov le-Man Tovah. Studi in onore di Vittore Colorni per il suo 92° compleanno, edited by Mauro Perani, 365–380. Florence: Olschki, 2004. Guetta, Alessandro. Italian Jewry in the Early Modern Era. Boston: Academic Studies Press, 2014. Katz, Jacob. Tradition and Crisis. Jewish Society at the End of the Middle Ages. New York: Syracuse University Press, 2000. Lattes, Andrea Yaakov. “Aspetti politici ed istituzionali delle comunità ebraiche in Italia nel Cinque-Seicento.” Zakhor. Rivista di Storia degli Ebrei d’Italia 2 (1998): 21– 37. Laursen, John C. The Politics of Skepticism in the Ancient, Montaigne, Hume, and Kant. Leiden: Brill, 1992. Laursen, John C. and Gianni Paganini, eds. Skepticism and Political Thought in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2015. Levy, Carlos. Cicero academicus. Recherches sur les Académiques et sur la philosophie cicéronienne. Rome: École Français de Rome, 1992. Lissa, Anna. “Jews on Trial and Their Sceptical Attorney: Philosophic Scepticism and Political Thought in Simone Luzzatto’s Italian Works.” In Luzzatto, Discourse, 311– 358. Luzzatto, Simone. Discourse on the State of the Jews—Bilingual edition. Edited, translated, and commented by Giuseppe Veltri and Anna Lissa. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2019. Luzzatto, Simone. Socrates, or on Human Knowledge—Bilingual edition. Edited, translated, and commented by Giuseppe Veltri and Michela Torbidoni. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2019. Malkiel, David Joshua. A Separate Republic. The Mechanics and Dynamics of Venetian Jewish Self-Government, 1607–1624. Jersualem: Magnes Press, 1991. Melamed, Abraham. “The Myth of Venice in Italian Jewish Thought.” In Italia Judaica.

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Atti del i Convegno internazionale. Bari 18–22 maggio 1981. 401–413. Rome: Ministero per i Beni Culturali e Ambientali, 1983. Melamed, Abraham. The Philosopher-King in Medieval and Renaissance Jewish Political Thought. New York: State University of New York Press, 2003. Melamed, Abraham. “Simone Luzzatto on Tacitus. Apologetica and Ragione di Stato.” In Studies in Medieval Jewish History and Literature, vol. 2, edited by Isadore Twersky, 143–170. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984. Netanyahu, Benzion. Don Isaac Abravanel, Statesman and Philosopher. Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1968. Neto, José Raimundo Maia. “Academic Skepticism in Early Modern Philosophy.” Journal of the History of Ideas 58 (1997): 199–220. Neto, José Raimundo Maia. Academic Skepticism in Seventeenth-Century French Philosophy. The Charronian Legacy 1601–1662. Cham: Springer, 2014. Neto, José Raimundo Maia. “Le probabilisme académicien dans le scepticisme français de Montaigne à Descartes.”Revue philosophique de la France et de l’étranger 138, no. 4 (2013): 467–484. Pupo, Spartaco. Lo Scetticismo politico. Storia di una dottrina dagli antichi ai giorni nostri. Milan: Mimesis, 2020. Ravid, Benjamin. “‘A Republic Separate From All Other Government:’ Jewish Autonomy in Venice in the Seventeenth Century and the Translation of the Libro Grande” [Hebrew]. In Thought and Action: Essays in Memory of Simon Rawidowicz on the Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of His Death, edited by Alfred A. Greenbaum and Alfred L. Ivry, 53–76. Tel Aviv: Tcherikover and Haifa University Press, 1983. Ravid, Benjamin. “The Venetian Context of the Discourse.” In Luzzatto, Discourse, 243– 274. Ruderman, David B. Early Modern Jewry. A New Cultural History. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010. Ruderman, David B. “Science and Skepticism: Simone Luzzatto on Perceiving the Natural World.” In Jewish Thought and Scientific Discovery in Early Modern Europe, edited by Ruderman, 153–184. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995. Schmitt, Charles. Cicero Scepticus. A Study of the Influence of the Academica in the Renaissance The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1972. Stern, Joseph. “Luzzatto’s Socrates and the History of Jewish Philosophy.” Filosofia Italiana. Filosofia Ebraica in Italia xv–xix secolo. 1 (2020): 13–33. Syros, Vasileios. “Mercati ex Machina: Economic Prosperity and Decline in Early Modern Jewish Thought.” Republic of Letters 6, no. 1 (2018): 1–21. Syros, Vasileios. “Simone Luzzatto’s Image of the Ideal Prince and the Italian Tradition of Reason of State.”Redescriptions. Yearbook of Political Thought and Conceptual History 9 (2005): 157–182. Taranto, Domenico. Pirronismo ed assolutismo nella Francia del ’600. Studi sul pensiero

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politico dello scetticismo da Montaigne a Bayle (1580–1697). Milan: Franco Angeli, 1994. Torbidoni, Michela. “What Does Philosopher à l’antique Mean to Simone Luzzatto? The Sceptical Variation within the Quarrel of the Ancients and the Moderns.” In Luzzatto, Socrates, 530–541. Veltri, Giuseppe. Alienated Wisdom. Enquiry into Jewish Philosophy and Scepticism. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2018. Veltri, Giuseppe, ed. Filosofo e rabbino nella Venezia del Seicento. Studi su Simone Luzzatto con documenti inediti dall’archivio di Stato di Venezia. Rome: Aracne, 2015.

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Simone Luzzatto’s View on Jewish Ritual and Its Social Functions: A Consideration of His Sceptical Thought in the Intellectual Context of His Age Mina Lee

1

Introduction

Simone Luzzatto’s Discourse on the State of the Jews (1638) is one of the earliest works that presents Jewish apologetics from a perspective beyond theology. Luzzatto wrote it to advocate for the rights and status of the Jewish residents in Venice, calling for tolerance towards them. In 1636, the Merceria robbery occurred, and a few Jews were suspected of being involved in helping to conceal valuable products; as a result, all the Jews in Venice were threatened with expulsion.1 We take into consideration these urgent circumstances under which Luzzatto’s Discourse was written. This book consists of eighteen “considerations” (or chapters); the first ten considerations discuss the utility of the Jews to the Venetian economy, which had already started to decline at that time, and the last eight counter the various kinds of slander against Jews. Luzzatto opposes the derogatory image of the Jews held by religious zealots, politicians, and ordinary people, claiming that Tacitus’s view of the Jews is unfounded and false, distorted by hatred against them. In his considerations, on the one hand Luzzatto tries to undermine criticism and slander against Jews by demonstrating the difficulty in creating a clear and definite picture of them because of their diversity and changeability. On the other hand, however, he repeatedly emphasises that Jews’ adherence to ancient laws and rituals was one of their stable character traits. This is the classic image of the Jews which Christians historically exaggerated and criticised. They depicted Jews as blinded by an expired covenant, hence unable to see the new light of Christianity.2 In the Christian world the customary epithet of stubbornly holding to the old tradition was often invoked in laws restricting behaviours of the Jews and decrees of their expulsions, even though its usage was only symbolic in many cases. 1 Leon Modena, The Autobiography of a Seventeenth-Century Venetian Rabbi: Leon Modena’s Life of Judah, ed. and trans. Mark R. Cohen (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 249–250. 2 Paola Tartakoff, Conversion, Circumcision, and Ritual Murder in Medieval Europe (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2019), 52.

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Luzzatto’s use of this stereotype in his apologetic work suggests that it did not negatively affect the current political status of Jews living in Venice, but might rather be seen as an asset. In the early modern era, certain Christian Hebraists found advantages in the immutability of Jewish teaching, which is probably why he did not need to speak against this stereotype. However, it remains unclear how the emphasis on the tenacity of Jewish ritual worked in his political apology. His Discourse needs to be viewed not in a polemical context of Christians versus Jews, but in relation to the new interest in the political role of religion. This paper discusses Luzzatto’s view on Jewish ritual, mainly focusing on the significance of its historical continuity and the advantages of applying this perspective to his apology. He does not rely on religious authority to establish the significance of their rituals; instead, he explains it through their social functions and historical evidence. To clarify his idea of Jewish ritual, I will first examine his idea of the two social functions of Judaism, particularly its specific rituals and universal morality, and compare it to one of Luzzatto’s references, Francis Bacon’s Essays. Then I look at Luzzatto’s concepts of change and unchangingness, where I note similarities to Michel de Montaigne’s views. Luzzatto’s Discourse focuses on the practical relevance of ritual, such as its social role in human history, rather than on its philosophical and theological account. His demonstration of how Jews preserved their ancient practice does not show a lack of sceptical attitude in admitting their stereotypical image, but is rather based on his empiricism, as he argues in favour of an empirically founded study of human history.

2

Social Function of Ritual: A Comparison with Francis Bacon

2.1 Luzzatto’s View of Ritual The fourteenth consideration is entitled “Although the Jewish People Had a Religion Different from the Others, They Were not Allowed to Wage War on Their Neighbours for This Simple Reason.” Jewish otherness comes from their religion, and Luzzatto must counter the accusation that the existence of this different religion, namely Judaism, brings Venetian society into crisis: The commonality of religion is the greatest bond and most tenacious tie that keeps humanity united. Even that heathen said “life is upheld by religion.” And the most learned and most eloquent Jew Philo wrote: “The chain which binds indissolubly the goodwill which makes us one is to honour the one God.” This does not mean that for this reason the Jews consider all

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those outside of the observance of their rites or [outside of] assent to their particular beliefs thence completely free and unbound in terms of any obligation to humanity or reciprocal amity. For they believe that there are different degrees of connections among men. To the same extent, [they also believe] that within one nation the obligations of compassion must be subordinated among them: the love of self obtains first place, followed by blood ties, and lastly by the amity between citizens. They therefore believe that foreigners and aliens belonging to a different religion share the common ground of humanity that hence binds them to observing the precepts of natural morality and to having some cognition of a superior cause.3 Luzzatto starts his argument with the important role of religion as a bond between individuals and then describes “different degrees” of connections in human society. Jews are united under their religion through the practice of rites and beliefs, while they relate to people who do not share their rites by observing a general obligation to humanity and natural morality, reflecting broader connections. His argument in this chapter intends to prove that although the Jewish “nation”4 indeed has a different religion from the rest of society, Jews maintain good relations with non-Jews based on their common humanity. Luzzatto describes human society as a harmonious organism using the metaphor of the human body,5 in which every organ, with its specific role, complements one another to contribute to the health of the body as a whole. Likewise, Jews are a harmonious part of the whole Venetian society; therefore, they should not be expelled on account of their specific religion. Over the following paragraphs, Luzzatto repeatedly discusses the two types of bond, the one between Jews and the one between Jews and non-Jews: 3 Simone Luzzatto, Discourse on the State of the Jews—Bilingual edition, ed., trans., and comm. Giuseppe Veltri and Anna Lissa (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2019), 134–135. 4 The term “nation” developed along with the increase of international moving by individuals, such as students and merchants. See Jean Favier and Caroline Higgitt, Gold & Spices: The Rise of Commerce in the Middle Ages (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1998), 116–121. It did not have a strong ethnic connotation yet, but referred to a group from a certain region who shared the customs and rules of their home country. 5 Giuseppe Veltri shows that this metaphor might be influenced by Bacon, who uses a parallel metaphor in his Of Empire. See Giuseppe Veltri, Alienated Wisdom: Enquiry into Jewish Philosophy and Scepticism (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2018), 222. Montaigne has a similar view on government: “A government is like a structure of different parts joined together in such a relation that it is impossible to budge one without the whole body feeling it.” Michel de Montaigne, The Complete Works: Essays, Travel Journal, Letters, ed. Donald Murdoch Frame (New York: A.A. Knopf, 2003), 104.

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First, I do not find in the Scripture that God ever commanded the Jews to endeavour or strive to force their own beliefs onto the souls of their neighbouring peoples in order to introduce their specific rites. Yet He ordered and commanded them to instruct these people in some general beliefs such as His omnipotence, wisdom, grandeur, clemency, and justice.6 […] In another passage, the Psalmist says: “O have faith in the Lord, call upon His name; make known His doings among the peoples,” meaning that they should narrate and explain the activities of God and the effects of His justice. In another section, concerning specific rites in Psalm 147 [it is said]: “He declareth His word unto Jacob, His justice and His ordinances unto Israel. He hath not dealt so with any nation; and He did not reveal them His ordinances.”7 […] Nowhere [in Scripture] is it written that in the past any city of the Gentiles was flooded for not observing the Jewish rites or for any specific disbelief, but only for not following the natural impulses of reason and humanity.8 […] And consistently with this sentiment, the subsequent verse logically proceeds by saying “Moses commanded us a Law,” as if suggesting that the love and compassion of God extended universally to all mankind. But the favour of the Law was at that time granted only to the Jewish people.9 In his detailed discussion of both kinds of bond, we can find a contrast in their natures. The bond between Jews is described in terms of external behaviours, constructed by observing a set of shared ritual practices, as he often uses the word “rites.” Luzzatto seems to consider it as the law formally commanded by God through the “ordinances.” By contrast, the other bond—the bond based on humanity and natural morality—is described as an interior faith in certain articles, such as God’s nature and activities. Moreover, it is characterised in more spiritual terms as a “natural impulse of human reason” or the “recognition of divine nature,” and seems to be universally embraced by humanity as a manifestation of God’s love. All four of the above quotations are interpretations of biblical verses, from which he argues that the commandments for the Jewish people and those for non-Jews are different, just as the reasons for punishment are. He explains Judaism’s attitude towards non-Jews: Jewish teaching does not require their 6 7 8 9

Luzzatto, Discourse, 134–135. Luzzatto, 136–137. Luzzatto, 136–137. Luzzatto, 142–143.

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neighbours to observe the same rituals, but only to follow the precepts of general human morality. He further discusses that Judaism does not deny the faith of non-Jews so long as they do not perpetrate “crimes and transgressions committed against human equity and morality.”10 He even admits that new converts to Judaism are not always required to uphold all Jewish laws, as seen in the example of Naaman.11 We can find a similar explanation in the thirteenth consideration, after Luzzatto clarifies that the objective of the Mosaic Law is to foster harmony among all of humanity: “[Malachi] does not say that we are united in one cult and worship, which would be the proper argument for inducing a good relationship only among the Jews. Instead, he argues with very convincing and general reasons for the reconciliation of all men.”12 Luzzatto interprets the biblical verses from a humanist perspective, highlighting their social functions in binding individuals at various levels and maintaining overall social stability. These two types of teaching derived from the Bible seem to be one of the focal points of his views on Judaism.13 Throughout the thirteenth and fourteenth considerations, he repeatedly contrasts the commandments given to the Jewish people with those for non-Jews. Luzzatto emphasises the universal aspect of biblical teaching, which aims to bring all of humanity together in harmony through mutual amity,14 to refute the slander that the presence of the Jews in Venice causes social friction. However, his indirect but fundamental purpose is to shield Judaism from the criticism of being solely focused on specific rituals. To this aim, he explains that their specific rituals do not have a negative impact on the Venetian social order by stressing their limited application to Jews, and seeks to demonstrate

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Luzzatto, 138–139. Luzzatto, 140–141: “Naaman, after his conversion to God because his disease had been cured, procured from the Prophet certain dispensations, namely the permission to kneel to the idols while he was in the company of the king.” Luzzatto, 122–123. Alessandro Guetta deals with three early modern Italian Jewish thinkers—Simone Luzzatto, Abraham Portaleone, and David de Pomis—and clarifies that this concept of Jewish religion with specific national rituals, but open to all of humanity, developed in this period. See Alessandro Guetta, “Ebraismo come nazione e come religione universale. Forme del pensiero ebraico in Italia ’500 e ’700,” Italia: Studi e ricerche sulla storia, la cultura e la letteratura degli Ebrei d’Italia 19 (2009): 23–42. Luzzatto, Discourse, 122–123: “But the Law of God promulgated by Moses provides for and attends to the entirety of our species. God created nature so that all the parts of the world would be kept together in harmonious concert and governed by mutual sympathy. In the same way, He decreed that all humankind should live together in mutual friendship. Every human being should regard himself or herself as a citizen of one republic.”

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that the Jewish faith inherently encompasses both a universal belief system and the foundations for peaceful coexistence with individuals of other religions. As I will discuss below, while Luzzatto explores further the classical dichotomy between the particular and the universal to differentiate the two types of bonds—that among Jews and that between them and non-Jews—it becomes evident that he approaches these social connections from various perspectives to clarify how necessary Jewish ritual is for both society and humanity as a whole. 2.2 Bacon and Luzzatto on Ritual Luzzatto regards ritual as a kind of law that encourages or forbids action,15 although the Jews accept it of their own free will.16 Though Jews will be punished if they transgress the law, they voluntarily submit themselves to its restrictions and nothing compels them to follow it. As we have seen above, he considers ritual as a vital factor in uniting a people. Moreover, he believes in the significance in distinguishing rituals across different “nations.” Referring to the Jews in the Ottoman Empire, he mentions the shared ritual of circumcision between Jews and Muslims as follows: “One might suggest that the shared rite of circumcision would lead to a peaceful relationship, but this is not true, since experience teaches that people who have some rites in common and others that are dissimilar get along less well than those whose practices are absolutely distinct and separate.”17 In other words, rituals have a role of demarcating the boundaries that distinguish one nation from another. If different nations share some of their rituals, such a commonality is liable to destroy the boundaries and thus threaten their relationship. Therefore, Luzzatto’s argument is meant to show that the practice of different rituals brings not discord but peace to a society. Religious difference does not pose a problem for maintaining social harmony so long as different groups practice different rituals.18

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Luzzatto, 46–47: “furthermore, they are also burdened with families, since their rites forbid celibacy to them.” Luzzatto, 110–111: “in particular the observance of the Jews regarding the many foods that they are not permitted to eat according to their rites.” See Luzzatto, 138–139, where he explains that Jews voluntarily chose to obey the law after Joshua exempted them from its burden. Luzzatto, 236–237. Some studies on the discourses on religion and ritual reveal that it was common in the seventeenth century to regard rituals as creating a stable link between peoples and as a means to distinguish one people from others. As early anthropologists collected the various rituals and customs of various tribes, they assumed national unity based on cultural differences. One of the axes used to classify nations was religion and ritual: the boundary of different ritual systems was also regarded as the boundary of nations. See on this Mar-

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The idea that different rituals do not cause conflict was also found in the writings of the contemporary English philosopher Francis Bacon. As Anna Lissa has pointed out,19 the fourteenth consideration is probably influenced by Bacon’s “On the Unity of Religion,” chapter 3 of book 3 of his Essays. Luzzatto begins this consideration with phrases that recall Bacon. According to Bacon, discord and division are not caused by ritual but by belief: Religion being the chiefe Band of humane Society, it is a happy thing, when it salfe, is well contained, within the true Band of Unity. The Quarrels, and Divisions about Religion, were Evils unknowne to the Heathen. The Reason was, because the Religion of the Heathen, consisted rather in Rites and Ceremonies; then in any constant Beleefe.20 His statements reflect the social division in Western Europe at that time, which he saw as being caused by the detailed pursuit of faith. The pursuit of ritual, on the contrary, never brings about social division in his eyes. Bacon’s views on ritual remain unclear, as he does not take the discussion of ritual any further. Instead, he warns against the uniformity of belief and the obsession with minutiae. In other words, for Bacon, the focal point of religion as the primary bond of human society is belief. Some studies situate Bacon at a turning point of the shift in the concept of ritual. In detailing the process of the separation of faith and practice in early modernity and the diminishing importance of the latter, Talal Asad places Bacon’s “Of Simulation and Dissimulation,” chapter 6 of book 3 of his Essays, in the early stages of this change. At issue is Bacon’s distinction between the real and the figurative. The external practice deviates from what it is assumed to symbolise and occasionally represents something divergent from its actual content. In this context, the inner significance holds greater reliability, and emphasis should be placed on it rather than on its outward representation.21 Therefore, for Bacon, it is the beliefs that have to compromise and unite, not the rituals.22

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garet T. Hodgen, Early Anthropology in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1964). Anna Lissa, “Jews on Trial and Their Sceptical Attorney: Philosophic Scepticism and Political Thought in Simone Luzzatto’s Italian Works,” in Luzzatto, Discourse, 331. Francis Bacon, The Essayes or Counsels, Civill and Morall, ed. Michael Kiernan (Clarendon: Oxford University Press, 2000), 11. See Talal Asad, Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 65–68. This distinction between the diversity of superficial practices and the single essence

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In Bacon’s image of unity, we can find some degree of similarity with Luzzatto’s idea of social harmony. Bacon distinguishes between uniformity and unity. The former is an attempt to make everything the same, down to the minor differences, and Bacon argues that it should be avoided because it leads to partisanship and division. It is the latter, unity, that society should strive to achieve. Bacon illustrated his idea of unity with the image of a garment made of many different colours, yet united. The words “Christ Coat, indeed, had no seame: But the Churches Vesture was of divers colours,”23 parallels Luzzatto’s image of a people united by different rituals but harmonised by the link of civil love— although here Bacon argues against the discord of beliefs, not of rituals. Thus, the fourteenth consideration of Luzzatto’s Discourse shows that he accepted, to a certain extent, Bacon’s view on religion. However, there are also some significant differences between them. For Luzzatto, rituals have more positive functions than for Bacon. Although Bacon admits religion as the “chief band,” he also considers it a cause of social division, unless it is “well contained within the true band of Unity.”24 In contrast, Luzzatto regards religion as a social bond in itself. It unites one nation firmly, distinguishes one from another, and leads to social harmony. Moreover, Bacon claims that one should not pursue uniformity, because it is extreme and will bring discord within the Church or a society, and he rejects it as a worthy goal. Luzzatto, on the other hand, repeatedly emphasises the uniformity of Jewish rituals among various countries, holding it in high regard as supporting “charity and hospitality towards any member of their Nation.”25 Indeed, we have to take into account the different scopes of their arguments: for Bacon, it suffices to argue on the basis of Christian society alone, without needing to consider those outside it, while Luzzatto must bear in mind the Jewish community as well as the non-Jewish world around it. Once we accept Bacon’s influence on Luzzatto, the difference

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behind them was gradually spreading while the concept of rite changed during the early modern period. As the diversity of rituals in the Christian world became apparent, and as rituals became increasingly localised in missionary work in the non-Western world, rites became either out of step with central church teaching or ethically distant from the inner faith. See on this Gita Dharampal-Frick, “Revisiting the Malabar Rites Controversy: A Paradigm of Ritual Dynamics in the Early Modern Catholic Missions of South India,” in The Rites Controversies in the Early Modern World, eds. Ines G. Županov and Pierre Antoine Fabre (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 129. These views support the early comparative religion perspective that the one true faith appears historically in various forms. It was the inner faith that counted, and Bacon may have thought that differences in its manifestations did not matter. Bacon, The Essayes, 13. Bacon, The Essayes, 11. Luzzatto, Discourse, 101.

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in their concepts of the religious bond highlights the pivotal importance of its function for social order and its uniformity among Jews in Luzzatto’s thought. I will return to the significance of uniformity in later discussions. In Luzzatto’s focus on the social role of religious rituals one can find a point of view that shares similarities with Machiavelli’s Discourses on Livy,26 which judges Roman religion and Christianity from its political dimension, and with discourses on “civil religion” in the early modern period.27 The idea of civil religion was used by some ethnographers and missionaries to indicate the various religions rediscovered in human history and discovered in the East, in countries such as India and China. They were interested mainly in the political aspects of religion and in its role in supporting a stable society. This concept allowed scholars to depart from the theological value-judgement of religions and enabled them to compare religions to analyse their function in a society. It also led to the tolerance of other rituals than those of the Church. Scholars and missionaries explained the plurality of ritual systems as different forms of one natural religion. Various civil religions found in Asia, which did not fit the traditional category of revealed religion or idolatry, were regarded as manifestations of one true natural religion, and its teachings were thought to be embedded in human reason. Luzzatto’s discussion on the social role of ritual may have been influenced by contemporary narratives of civil religion. It is possible that he was aware of the shift in the argument about religions from theological to social and political reasonings, which helped foster an atmosphere of religious tolerance. It should be noted, however, that his concept of religion differs in some ways from the idea of natural religion. Although the bond with non-Jews based on natural human reason and morality seems similar to the concept of natural religion, Jewish ritual is not described as one form of it. Rather, Luzzatto explains that both Jewish ritual and the teaching of human reason were commanded by God in the Bible; there is no natural teaching which appears without revelation. Some studies already revealed28 Luzzatto’s scepticism towards the possibility of learning lessons about civil life from nature, which he expressed in his Socrates: 26

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Niccolò Machiavelli, Machiavelli’s Discourses on Livy: New Readings, trans. Diogo Pires Aurélio and Andre Santos Campos, Thinking in Extremes, volume 4 (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2022), 34–39. For the concepts of civil religion and natural religion in the early modern period, see Guy G. Stroumsa, A New Science: The Discovery of Religion in the Age of Reason (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010) and Županov, The Rites Controversies in the Early Modern World. David B. Ruderman, Jewish Thought and Scientific Discovery in Early Modern Europe (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1995), 153–184.

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because of the limitations of human comprehension and the inscrutability of natural phenomena, none will acquire knowledge of social behaviours solely through the observation of nature.

3

Preservation of Ritual: Comparison with Montaigne

3.1 Tenacity of Ancient Rituals in Apologetic Argument As some studies have pointed out,29 one of the main purposes of the Discourse is to break down the fixed image of the Jews in Western Europe. In the eleventh consideration, Luzzatto describes the human soul as a mixture of various fragments of cheap and precious stones that form a mosaic. His argument aims at the suspension of judgement, suggesting it is impossible to define the character of a human, and still less their Jewish characteristics: The internal image of our soul is composed of a mosaic that appears to form a single idea. Upon approaching it, however, one sees that it is made up of various fragments of cheap and precious stones put together. In the same way our soul is, for the most part, composed of different and discrepant pieces, each of which on various occasions takes a distinct appearance. Thus, the description of a single man’s nature and condition is a very arduous and difficult endeavour. It is even more difficult and arduous to relate all of his actions to a single rule and idea.30 His sceptical argument about the impossibility of judging one’s nature is used to show that one cannot define the inner nature of the Jewish people. This stands as his primary argument against the practice of stereotyping Jewish people. However, in later chapters he presents his argument in their defence by relying on a particular stereotypical image of the Jews. Luzzatto admits that it is their tenacious observance of rituals and dogmas that defines one of their stable characteristics: Nonetheless, should someone still wish to investigate the universal habits [they share], one could say that they are a Nation of a fainthearted, cow-

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Lissa, “Jews on Trial and Their Sceptical Attorney,” 352–356; Giuseppe Veltri, “Colpa individuale e pena collettiva. La dottrina dei caratteri,” in Filosofo e rabbino nella Venezia del Seicento. Studi su Simone Luzzatto con documenti inediti dall’Archivio di Stato di Venezia, ed. Giuseppe Veltri (Ariccia: Aracne, 2015), 73–89, Veltri, Alienated Wisdom, 213–233. Luzzatto, Discourse, 98–99.

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ardly, and half-hearted spirit, incapable in their present situation of any political government, preoccupied with their particular interests, quite— if not completely—unaware of their universal ones. Their parsimony amounts to avarice. They greatly admire antiquity, and yet they are quite unobservant of the present course of things. Many of them are coarse in their customs, rarely applying themselves to studying or to learning languages. According to other people, they have a tendency to an exaggerated scrupulousness when observing their own laws.31 According to Luzzatto, the Jewish people are single-mindedly interested in observing their ancient laws, and show no interest in contemporary politics. Such a claim undermines the suggestion that Jews could pose a political danger to society. By emphasising their wholehearted focus on their own traditions, Luzzatto highlights their lack of involvement in political matters. Not only Jewish indifference but their powerlessness in politics was demonstrated in the eighteenth consideration, the last chapter of this book. Luzzatto explains the history of Jewish dispersion around the Mediterranean world and writes that “the Jewish Nation did not experience such mutations and changes”32 just due to the very fact of their dispersion. In this consideration he preferred to liken the Jews “to a pliant and flexible reed that yields to every violence and therefore remains intact” rather than to evoke Balaam’s comparison of them to a “ceder which, while being resistant to storms and the vehement blowing of the winds, is often ultimately uprooted.”33 He furthermore wrote that dispersion made “them deferential to their superiors.”34 After tracing the situations of Jews in various countries, he states in the very last part of the book: “The opinions and dogmas of this entire Nation, so divided, torn apart, and split up, are uniform; the ceremonial rites are the same, and only slightly dissimilar with regard to some non-essentials.”35 Luzzatto regards their dispersal as the primary factor behind the enduring preservation of their rituals and simultaneously as the reason why they have never posed as a substantial or menacing force within a society. The evidence for his counterargument against the slander of Jews is their actual history. In his apologetic argument for avoiding their expulsion from Venice, Luzzatto intends to show that the Jewish rituals will

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Luzzatto, 100–101. Luzzatto, 232–233. Luzzatto, 235. Luzzatto, 235. Luzzatto, 238–239.

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never bring Venetian society into trouble, as they have never before, nor have they done so anywhere else, and should not be used as grounds for their expulsion. The same explanation for the tenacity of Jewish ritual appears in the sixteenth consideration. In this chapter, Luzzatto classifies the three types of Jewish knowledge: that of rabbis and the Talmudists, that of philosophers, and that of the Kabbalists. Luzzatto remarks that the knowledge that the rabbis have of Jewish rituals and ceremonies has not changed since the ancient period: All Jews assented to these sages in every place and at all times, strictly following their instruction as to the fulfilment of rites and precepts, and especially ceremonials. For these observances are based on immediate visual perceptions and are therefore evident and not subject to change over the course of time. Thus the Jews deeply believe what these rabbis report about what they carefully observed with their own eyes as being carried out by their ancestors. In fact, the Jews believe the rabbis to be the trustworthy and sincere reporters of the rites and ceremonies executed in ancient times.36 Here he explains how Jewish ritual could remain fixed throughout history, being based as it was on observation and “visual perception.” His belief in these visible actions draws our attention, as it stands in stark contrast with the invisible intricate mosaic image of a person’s inner nature, as mentioned above.37 According to Luzzatto, the human soul, whose image cannot be defined as fixed, is unstable because it is the result of theoretical and often contradictory arguments, while a system of behaviours, which is based upon empirical observation, remains stable over time. Moreover, he does not seem to treat the findings of rabbis as authoritative because they are rabbis, but because the rabbis had based their initial conclusions on empirical and observable facts. In contrast, in the explanation of the next type of knowledge, philosophy, Luzzatto shows that the concept of morality and human behaviours in society and civil life differs across different times and places, depending on the conditions or the environment. According to him, philosophers are scholars who “join human reason with the authority of the divine word”38 in harmony. After dealing with several important Jewish philosophers, he states: 36 37 38

Luzzatto, 200–201. For the unstable character of human being in Luzzatto’s argument, see also Lissa, “Jews on Trial and Their Sceptical Attorney,” 352–356. Luzzatto, 293.

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The Jews are respectful to the above-mentioned learned men as far as opinions and dogmas pertaining to the articles of their religion are concerned. [They also rely on them] as far as morality and ways of conversing and behaving in society and civil life, with whatever people or nation, are concerned. Although the rabbis have said things about such matters that have not confirmed the present condition, they hold that these words should not be considered inalterable and eternal laws. [In fact, the Jews] assume that they wrote in an appropriate manner with regard to the state and condition of those people among whom [the rabbis] were dispersed.39 Here, one can find the discrepancy between the constancy of Jewish rituals throughout various historical eras and diverse regions and the transformation of civil laws over time. Although he emphasises the social function of morality and civil laws to support the social harmony, as discussed before, Luzzatto did not consider them to be inalterable and eternal. This perception of unstable morality cannot be justified through his sceptical attitude, but must be seen as a sign of his relativism: the idea that objects cannot be defined in their essence but only in relation to one another.40 As we saw before in the metaphor of society as a human body, Luzzatto thinks that a society consists of communities that each have a specific role to help maintain social harmony. Moreover, the function and civil behaviour of every component—of every community—is defined by its relations to the rest of the society. From this perspective, he argues that moral laws are a result of human teaching and that they cannot be considered as immutable; rather, they are subject to alteration based on the circumstances. 3.2 Montaigne’s Concept of Stability: Unchangingness Luzzatto’s contrast of the unstable human soul with stable public rituals, with his emphasis on the preserved ancient ritual, shows a certain similarity with the ideas of Montaigne, illustrated in his Essays: Now from the knowledge of this mobility of mine I have accidentally engendered in myself a certain constancy of opinions, and have scarcely altered my original and natural ones. For whatever appearance of truth there may be in novelty, I do not change easily, for fear of losing in the

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Luzzatto, 208–209. Veltri, Alienated Wisdom, 217–224.

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change. And since I am not capable of choosing, I accept other people’s choice and stay in the position where God put me. Otherwise I could not keep myself from rolling about incessantly. Thus I have, by the grace of God, kept myself intact, without agitation or disturbance of conscience, in the ancient beliefs of our religion, in the midst of so many sects and divisions that our century has produced.41 Montaigne contrasts the reliance on the old religion, which has remained stable for many centuries, with the fragility of the individual who becomes unstable without it. He portrays himself as liable to instability and “agitation and for this reason tries to anchor himself in laws and customs.”42 His contrast of the unstable private with the stable public is the reverse of the Stoic conception of the steady private and transient public. It shows a similar picture to Luzzatto’s discrepancy between an undefinable inner nature of Jews and unchanged Jewish rituals. In addition, Montaigne’s evaluation of old religions as providing stability also reminds us of Luzzatto’s idea of the practice of Judaism. Montaigne lived in the midst of a radical change of French society, and, being aware of the existence of various systems of behaviours of different sects, he places his trust in the old one, the Catholic Church. Luzzatto similarly suggests that in the context of changing moral laws and civil behaviours, Jewish law preserves its ancient form and thereby serves as the most reliable law to ensure social peace. Both of their arguments are not based on theory, but on the experience of history. It remains unclear if Luzzatto was familiar with Montaigne’s work or not. However, some scholars have suggested Montaigne’s possible influence on Luzzatto by showing several parallels between the two.43 The complete Italian translation of Montaigne’s Essays, having been published in 1633–1634 in Venice, was already available at the time Luzzatto supposedly wrote the Discourse.44 Montaigne and Luzzatto have similar attitudes to change, but with certain differences. The aim of Montaigne’s argument is to stabilise one’s individual 41 42

43 44

Montaigne, The Complete Works, 428. See John Christian Laursen, The Politics of Skepticism in the Ancients, Montaigne, Hume, and Kant (Leiden: Brill, 1992), 94–124. On the similarity between Montaigne and Luzzatto regarding the idea of inconstant human nature, see Lissa, “Jews on Trial and Their Sceptical Attorney,” 336. See Ruderman, Jewish Thought, 174; Lissa, “Jews on Trial and Their Sceptical Attorney,” 335. See Paul van Heck, “Montaigne in Italia: un curioso esemplare della traduzione Di Girolamo Canini,” Neophilologus 98, no. 4 (1 October 2014): 557–564, https://doi.org/10.1007/​ s11061‑014‑9384‑6. For the timing Luzzatto wrote Discourse, see Benjamin C.I. Ravid, “The Venetian Context of ‘The Discourse,’” in Luzzatto, Discourse, 255–258.

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inner life amidst ceaseless change, and in light of this aim the old religion functions better than more recent ideas. He regarded change as unreliable for preserving stability and as something which may corrupt his knowledge. However, he does seem to accept the inevitability of change. He even values the possibility of change to create freedom and adaptation.45 On the other hand, Luzzatto’s contrast between the tenacity of Jewish rituals and the transformation of moral laws relates to his argument about their social role. From this perspective, he is more pessimistic about change, seeing it as, at least potentially, degrading and harmful. In the sixteenth consideration, before he discussed the three types of Jewish knowledge, he gives his view on change: Many accuse time of being a ravenous consumer of everything, and especially of the hard work of men of letters. I would not call it such a rapacious thief, but rather regard it as something that unrestrainedly adds dead weight to pure and sincere antiquity. One could compare it to the sea, which submerges and engulfs some lands and brings sandy and marshy soil to others, rendering them unnavigable and inaccessible by sea, blocking the ports and silting up the recesses. In the same way, time completely erases the memory of some facts and amplifies others by embellishing them with ornaments and implausible and mendacious additions; continuing with the example of the sea, it has been said that just as it submerges heavy things and keeps light ones afloat, so time weighs down and destroys firm doctrines, transmitting only those that are less important and insubstantial.46 Because we lose parts of the memory of some facts and add meaningless things, and because the valuable is easily forgotten, it is almost impossible to uncover the ancient and original knowledge after such a long time has passed. With the same metaphor of sinking valuable things in the water as Bacon used, Luzzatto describes the difficulty of keeping the original teaching pure. Luzzatto uses this metaphor of the sea to put forth another argument in support of his community. He wrote that “the zeal of their own religion restrained them from committing themselves to humanist branches of knowledge, because of the suspicion that unbridled curiosity might lead them to erroneous opinions and wicked assertions.”47 According to him, Jewish indifference to humanist

45 46 47

See Laursen, The Politics of Skepticism, 120. Luzzatto, Discourse, 194–195. Luzzatto, 193–195.

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studies should not be judged negatively because this attitude serves to preserve their pure teaching from contamination by errors and wicked ideas, and more, as he expressed in the above-mentioned metaphor, it is not possible talk about a proper advancement of learning in science, philosophy, arts etc. over time. In Luzzatto’s emphasis on the historically unchanged nature of Jewish rituals and on their uniformity between various regions, one may find—as I mentioned before—an attitude similar to that of early modern ethnographers who compared various customs and rituals across different societies. In order to explain the diversity of rituals discovered in the non-European world, they developed several theories of difference, one of which was the theory of diffusion. This theory assumed the uniformity of original Adamic culture as presented in the book of Genesis and its worldwide diffusion, arguing that spiritual fall happened when the culture moved from one land to another. If a religion preserved its original nature and had uniform rituals and customs, it was believed to be morally good. Differences of rituals between various societies, on the contrary, were regarded as the result of the instruction of evil.48 However, Luzzatto never judged the tenacity of Jewish ritual as absolutely good; rather, his argument can be better understood when viewed in close connection to the notion of “the probable,” as Anna Lissa has pointed out. Luzzatto’s Socrates deals with the incapacity of human intellect and the suspension of its judgement. As human knowledge is not reliable, judgement based on it should be suspended. However, for practical social life we must make some judgements, even in such an uncertain condition, and here, our decisions or actions should be guided by the likely of probable. The probable, however, cannot be known itself. “The probable can only be sketched out by resorting to empeiria, i.e., experience of past and present things, as Machiavelli taught, and empirical knowledge, as Bacon taught. […] The probable cannot be defined and must be agreed upon by examining each and every individual case in each and every moment of human history.”49 Therefore, it can be said that Luzzatto presents the history of the immutability of Jewish ritual as the basis for an analysis that allows us to reach the probable. If one learns from history, Jewish ritual appears more certain than any other custom, including the laws of civil behaviour.

48 49

See Hodgen, Early Anthropology, 254–263. Lissa, “Jews on Trial and Their Sceptical Attorney,” 350–351.

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Conclusion

This paper attempted to relate Luzzatto’s view on ritual to his sceptical thought. His empiricist attitude towards the social function of ritual and its history suggests commonalities with the thinking of certain early modern intellectuals and with epistemological perspectives of the comparative religions in this period. He appears to employ contemporary arguments regarding the practical function of a traditional religion, as advocated by Bacon and Montaigne, but does not discuss either its potential to cause divisions or its function for individuals. Rather, he emphasises the social significance of the uniformity and unchanged nature of their rituals—ideas which were also central in contemporary arguments about the variety of religions. His objective in defending their rituals is to show that the Jewish settlement in Venice and their observation of religious ritual have never threatened the peace of Venetian society, but instead even supported it. The classic image of the church—that Jews blindly cleave to their ancient rituals and are more concerned with practice than with inner spirituality— becomes in Luzzatto’s reading an advantage in defence of the status of Jewish practice when it is moved from the theological to the social context of religion. Luzzatto’s Discourse is not a religious polemic, but a political argument which pursues social stability and harmony against the early modern background of the recognition of the historical change of societies and ongoing social divisions. Luzzatto utilises an empirical argument and suspends judgement on philosophical and theological matters to emphasise that, as Jewish rituals remained unchanged and pure over time throughout the Jews’ dispersion, the same ancient rituals may provide a society with greater stability than civil and moral laws, which are subject to change based on circumstances and may contain errors. In his Discourse, Luzzatto’s scepticism might be an attempt to make “the probable” a guiding principle for the social human life. According to Luzzatto, Jews are no longer the witness of ancient times, but instead an exemplar for sustaining human society over the long term. Among the various human social rules, which changed historically, losing their original purity and adding superfluous ideas, the unchanged Jewish ritual is put forth as the most reliable path towards a harmonious society that humans, commanded by God, may achieve.

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Bibliography Asad, Talal. Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993. Bacon, Francis. The Essayes or Counsels, Civill and Morall. Edited by Michael Kiernan. Clarendon: Oxford University Press, 2000. Dharampal-Frick, Gita. “Revisiting the Malabar Rites Controversy: A Paradigm of Ritual Dynamics in the Early Modern Catholic Missions of South India.” In The Rites Controversies in the Early Modern World, edited by Ines G. Županov and Pierre Antoine Fabre, 122–142. Leiden: Brill, 2018. Favier, Jean. Gold & Spices: The Rise of Commerce in the Middle Ages. Translated by Caroline Higgitt. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1998. Guetta, Alessandro. “Ebraismo come nazione e come religione universale. Forme del pensiero ebraico in Italia ’500 e ’700.” Italia: Studi e ricerche sulla storia, la cultura e la letteratura degli Ebrei d’Italia 19 (2009): 23–42. Heck, Paul van. “Montaigne in Italia: Un curioso esemplare della traduzione Di Girolamo Canini.” Neophilologus 98, no. 4 (1 October 2014): 557–564. https://doi.org/10​ .1007/s11061‑014‑9384‑6. Hodgen, Margaret T. Early Anthropology in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1964. Laursen, John Christian. The Politics of Skepticism in the Ancients, Montaigne, Hume, and Kant. Leiden: Brill, 1992. Lissa, Anna. “Jews on Trial and Their Sceptical Attorney: Philosophic Scepticism and Political Thought in Simone Luzzatto’s Italian Works.” In Simone Luzzatto, Discourse on the State of the Jews—Bilingual Edition. Edited, translated, and commented by Giuseppe Veltri and Anna Lissa, 311–358. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2019. Luzzatto, Simone. Discourse on the State of the Jews: Bilingual Edition. Edited, translated, and commented by Giuseppe Veltri and Anna Lissa. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2019. Machiavelli, Niccolò. Machiavelli’s Discourses on Livy: New Readings. Translated by Diogo Pires Aurélio and Andre Santos Campos. Thinking in Extremes, volume 4. Leiden: Brill, 2022. Modena, Leon. The Autobiography of a Seventeenth-Century Venetian Rabbi: Leon Modena’s Life of Judah. Edited and translated by Mark R. Cohen. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988. Montaigne, Michel de. The Complete Works: Essays, Travel Journal, Letters. Edited by Donald Murdoch Frame. New York: A.A. Knopf, 2003. Ravid, Benjamin C.I. “The Venetian Context of ‘The Discourse.’” In Simone Luzzatto, Discourse on the State of the Jews: Bilingual Edition, edited, translated, and commented by Giuseppe Veltri and Anna Lissa, 243–274. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2019.

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Ruderman, David B. Jewish Thought and Scientific Discovery in Early Modern Europe. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1995. Stroumsa, Guy G. A New Science: The Discovery of Religion in the Age of Reason. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010. Tartakoff, Paola. Conversion, Circumcision, and Ritual Murder in Medieval Europe. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2019. Veltri, Giuseppe. Alienated Wisdom: Enquiry into Jewish Philosophy and Scepticism. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2018. Veltri, Giuseppe. “Colpa individuale e pena collettiva. La dottrina dei caratteri.” In Filosofo e rabbino nella Venezia del Seicento. Studi su Simone Luzzatto con documenti inediti dall’Archivio di Stato di Venezia, edited by Giuseppe Veltri and Paola Ferruta, 72–89. Ariccia: Aracne, 2015.

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Simone Luzzatto’s Appraisal of Prudence Giuseppe Veltri and Anna Lissa

1

A Renowned and Yet Undiscovered responsum

Among the few Hebrew works of Luzzatto available to us we especially miss a responsum often mentioned—but never literally quoted—that authorised travelling by gondola on Shabbat.* We know that this responsum existed because Isaac Lampronti mentions it in his Paḥad Yiṣhaq (The Fear of Isaac) under the entry “Ship” (Sfinah).1 After having discussed some legal cases related to ships, Lampronti explores the possibility of allowing travel from one side of the canal to the other on a small or bigger ship on Shabbat, a subject that, in Venice, had particular relevance. In general, Lampronti writes, whatever the dimension of the ship, whether small or big, according to the halakhic precept, “it is not appropriate to allow to travel by it from one side of a stretch of water to the other in order to complete a minyan, nor to blow the shofar, nor for a collective prayer.”2 However, he adds, there are some judges (posekim) who give their permission, among them there is the Venetian Rabbi Simone Luzzatto: And the great Rabbi Simone Luzzatto, master of Justice in the city of Venice, wrote a complete and clear responsum to demonstrate that on Shabbat it is allowed to travel from one side of the canal to the other one, and he submitted the responsum to the excellent small council, in the presence of all the great Rabbis living there in those days. After [careful] consideration, they came to the conclusion that the responsum was not acceptable nor was it to be made public and they answered him [Luzzatto] that even though the strength of a permissive ruling is preferable

* Parts of this chapter were previously published in Giuseppe Veltri and Anna Lissa, Discourse on the State of the Jews: Bilingual Edition (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2019). We would like to thank De Gruyter for their kind permission in allowing the author to republish this material here. 1 Isaac Lampronti, Paḥad Yiṣḥaq Otiyyot A–B (Venice: Stamperia Bragadina, 1750); Otiyyot G– Ḥ”z (Venice: Stamperia Bragadina, 1753); Otiyyot Ḥ”t–Ṭ (Venice: Stamperia Bragadina, 1798); Otiyyot J–L (Regio: Tipografia della Societa, 1813); Ot M s.e. (Livorno: 1850). The entry “Sfinah” is in vol. 7, 57a–59b. If not otherwise indicated the English translation of the biblical passages is based on jps Bible available at http://www.mechon‑mamre.org/p/pt/pt0.htm; the English translation of the Babylonian Talmud is based on Isidore Epstein, ed., Babylonian Talmud, 36 vols. (London: Soncino Press, 1936–1952). 2 Lampronti, Paḥad Yiṣḥaq, vol. 7, 58b.

© Giuseppe Veltri and Anna Lissa, 2024 | doi:10.1163/9789004694262_011

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and [such strength] is the strength of wisdom it is never in the way of prudence to allow things that look forbidden to mass of the people.3 Lampronti does not give further information about the responsum, such as when Luzzatto wrote it or how Lampronti learnt about it even though it was supposed to remain a restricted issue (“nor was it to be made public”). However, if one has to rely on the rabbis’ answer, Luzzatto might have based his argument on the Talmudic principle of koaḥ dheteraʾ ʿadif 4 (in other words, the strength of a permissive ruling is preferable5 or, more literally, the power of permissibility is preferable) because the prohibition may simply be too easy a solution for a legal problem stemming from a lack of precise knowledge. In other words, a prohibition may simply be the result of a lack of specific knowledge, while a responsum that allows something demonstrates the more sophisticated reasoning skills and knowledge of its author. Furthermore, Luzzatto’s responsum was not an isolated case; instead it shared some similarities with some responsa of Moses ben Abraham Provençal and Leon Modena in terms of their innovative approaches.6 Nonetheless, for our purposes, the rabbis’ response is particularly interesting as it contrasts wisdom (ḥokhmah) with understanding (tevunah), representing being wise versus being reasonable. Rashi’s commentary on Exodus 31:3 interprets wisdom as something a person learns from others and makes his own, and interprets understanding as “understanding a matter by one’s own intelligence deducing it from the things one has already learned,” which therefore seems to imply a major intellectual activity. However, within the context of this responsum, the rabbis seem to attribute a more practical and political meaning to tevunah, referring to the ability to be reasonable and prudent. Therefore, allowing something that is perceived as forbidden by the general population could set a dangerous precedent, leading people to believe they are entitled to request even more forbidden things. A halakhic discussion is turned into a political issue the rabbis settled by resorting to political thought the principles of which had been codified already in the rabbinic age. The Christians were also familiar with these principles, at least from the time when the Jew Paul developed the doctrine that takes into account the potential scandal caused

3 Lampronti, vol. 7, 58b. 4 Talmud Babli Eiruvin 72b. 5 For the translation of this passage see also Adin Steinsaltz, Koren Talmud Bavli The Noé Edition, vol. 5: Tractate Eiruvin Part Two (Jerusalem: Koren Publishers, 2013), 105. 6 See Umberto Fortis, “L’impegno culturale di rabbini italiani nell’età dei ghetti (1550–1750): un profilo,” La rassegna mensile di Israel 73, no. 3 (2007): 52.

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by granting permission. According to this doctrine, permission can be transformed into prohibition when assessing its political risk.7 Nonetheless, while the idea of scandal is still related to the moral realm, the rabbis dismissed Luzzatto’s responsum because inspiring the common people to ask for more forbidden things could ultimately undermine their own power. Their decision stems from the will to preserve their own power, an issue that was considered crucial and compelling in the seventeenth century.

2

Luzzatto and Prudence

Naturally, Luzzatto was familiar with the concept of prudence and must have understood the rabbis’ message clearly and unmistakably. Furthermore, the survival of the Venetian Jewish community required dealing prudently with the political authorities on the one side and being well aware of the principles of political prudence the authority resorted to in dealing with the Jews on the other. During Luzzatto’s time, prudence underwent a significant transformation, moving away from its association with religious and spiritual matters. In Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, prudence (phronesis) is conceptualized and defined as an intellectual virtue of practical reason that is directed towards action. It is the capacity to accurately discern what is good for oneself and for humanity in general, necessitating knowledge of the general concept of the good as well as the specific means and skills required to attain such goodness. Prudence is typically attributed to individuals who hold the responsibility of managing a household and to politicians.8 During the Middle Ages, Thomism regarded prudence as an intellectual virtue that resided within the domain of wisdom, enabling humans to discern actions that would bring them closer to God from those that would hinder their progress. As a moral virtue, prudence assists individuals in living according to reason, both in theory and practice. As a virtue, prudence offers guidance to individuals seeking spiritual fulfilment and happiness, and to politicians aiming to establish a realm populated by righteous subjects where the common good is attained.9

7 Paul resorts to it in 1Cor 8:13 and Rom 14:21. 8 Aristotle, Eth. nic., 1140a24–b10, vi, 5. For a discussion of prudence in Aristotle’s thought see the classic Pierre Aubenque, La prudence chez Aristote avec une appendice sur la prudence chez Kant (Paris: Puf, 2014 [1963]); Domenico Taranto, Le virtù della politica, Civismo e prudenza tra Machiavelli e gli antichi (Naples: Bibliopolis, 2003), 31–37. 9 See Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica (iia iiae Qu. 47–56). For the English translation see

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Humanists, followed by Machiavelli, broke away from this interpretive approach, which was primarily focused on the spiritual realm and eternal matters. Instead, they emphasized the significance of the unpredictable and transient nature of human existence. They redefined prudence, devoid of any ethical purpose, as a virtue adopted by merchants who employ it to effectively manage their businesses. Machiavelli considers it a virtue allowing individuals to avoid whatever may be detrimental for themselves and to pursue whatever may be good for them.10 The purposes of prudence, and especially the idea of good, have shifted fundamentally from the metaphysical sphere towards the individuals and their life in the material world, with the full range of situations they may find themselves involved in. Prudence helps the individuals to calculate and balance the benefits and the inconveniences in order to achieve their aim. In the public and political sphere prudence entails the ability to foresee the possible problems necessity may cause and having the skill and the courage to take the most suitable and adequate measures to overcome the difficulties.11 When Luzzatto was writing his Discourse, he was well aware that Machiavelli’s time, especially the republican experiment in Florence, was over and done with. The monarchies of Europe, and the Venetian oligarchic system with them, were moving towards the emergence and consolidation of absolutism.

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Thomas Aquinas, The “Summa Theologica” of Thomas Aquinas, 22 vols. literally translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province (London: R. & T. Washbourne; New York: Benzinger, 1911–1925), vol. 10, “Treatise on Prudence and Justice,” 1–100. Niccolò Machiavelli, The [Golden] Ass, viii, 37–42, in Niccolò Machiavelli, The Chief Works and Others, 3 vols., trans. Allan Gilbert (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1989), vol. 2, 770: “I shall begin with prudence, an excellent virtue, through which men magnify their excellence. They know best how to apply this virtue who, without instruction, for themselves see how to pursue their own wellbeing and to avoid distress.” The current discussion of prudence and its transformation during the Renaissance and early modern era relies on Harvey C. Mansfield, Machiavelli’s Virtue (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996 [1966]), 38–45; Gennaro Sasso, Machiavelli. Storia del suo pensiero politico (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1981); Eugene Garver, Machiavelli and the History of Prudence (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987); André Tosel, ed., De la prudence des anciens comparée à celle des modernes. Sémantique d’un concept, déplacement des problématiques. Annales Littéraires de l’Université de Besançon, 572 (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1995); Domenico Taranto, Le virtù della politica; Giulio Ferroni, Machiavelli o dell’incertezza La politica come arte del rimedio (Rome: Donzelli editore, 2003), 87; Alexander Fidora, Andreas Niederberger, and Merio Scattola, eds., Phrônesis–Prudentia–Klugheit: Das Wissen des Klugen in Mittelalter, Renaissance und Neuzeit. Il sapere del saggio nel Medioevo, nel Rinascimento e nell’età moderna (Porto: Fédération des Instituts d’Études médiévales, 2013), and annexed sources and bibliography. See Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince, chapter 25 “Fortune’s Power in Human Affairs and How Can She Be Forestalled,” in Machiavelli, The Chief Works and Others, vol. 1, 89–92.

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Accordingly, he pays homage to the tradition of the Laus Venetiarum (Praise of Venice) by comparing Venice to Rome and inclining in favour of the former, but he is also aware that the Jews had to find a place in a state that was all but republican. The Venetian government was distancing itself from the tolerant inclinations it had had in Isaac Abravanel’s time12 and was shifting to a form of oligarchic absolutism, which was going to adjust itself to the upcoming European absolutism. In these new times, as Francesco Guicciardini stated, “Cornelius Tacitus teaches those who live under tyrants how to live and act prudently; just as he teaches tyrants ways to secure their tyranny.”13 This is the Tacitus that is quoted and discussed by Tacitist authors who wrote anti-Machiavellian literature. In a few words, since Machiavelli had asserted the waning of the traditional medieval politics that combined Christian ethics with political action, the Jesuits approved the usage of Machiavellian political advice as long as the princes used it to preserve the state and the Christian religion at the same time.14 Machiavellian thought pours into Counter-Reformation thought and goes through essential modifications. Among the Jesuit authors who approved and disseminated this approach is Giovanni Botero (1544–1617), a “gesuita d’intelletto,”15 which means that he possessed the intellectual qualities or characteristics typically associated with Jesuits. In his book The Reason of State (Della ragion di stato),16 originally published in 1589, Botero describes the reason of state as the whole set of tools conceived and used in order to estab12

13

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16

See also Veltri’s perplexities about the Laus Venetiarum in the Discourse in Giuseppe Veltri, Renaissance Philosophy in Jewish Garb: Foundations and Challenges in Judaism on the Eve of Modernity (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 216–219. Francesco Guicciardini, Maxims and Reflections (Ricordi), trans. Mario Domandi (Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1970), “Maxim 18,” 45. See also “Maxim 13,” 44: “If you want to know what the thoughts of tyrants are, read in Cornelius Tacitus the last conversations of the dying Augustus with Tiberius.” For this passage, see Giuseppe Toffanin, Machiavelli e il “Tacitismo.” La “Politica storica” al tempo della controriforma (Naples: Guida Editori 1972 [1921]), chapter 4, “Machiavelli e la controriforma,” 87–105. Toffanin, Machiavelli, 100. See also Luigi Firpo, “Introduzione” in Giovanni Botero, Della ragion di stato con tre libri. Delle cause della grandezza delle città due Aggiunte e un Discorso sulla popolazione di Roma, ed. Luigi Firpo (Turin: utet, 1948), 21; Giovanni Botero, The Reason of State, ed. Robert Bireley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), the 1948 Italian edition and the English translation are the reference works used in this essay. For Botero’s influence on Luzzatto’s concept of the development of cities in the Discourse, see Riccardo Bachi, “La dottrina sulla dinamica della città secondo Giovanni Botero e secondo Simone Luzzatto.” Atti della accademia nazionale dei lincei 8 [1946 (1947)]: 369–378. Giovanni Botero, Della ragion di stato libri dieci con tre libri delle cause della grandezza e magnificenza delle città (Venice: Gioliti, 1589).

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lish, to enlarge, and above all to preserve political power, and he specifies that the preservation of power is the most difficult purpose to attain. Prudence is counted among the prince’s virtues, and it is not discussed from a theoretical point of view; instead it is turned into positive practical and empirical prudential tenets the prince must abide by. Among these tenets, there is the preservation of religion. In fact, he writes: “Religion is as it were the mother of every virtue. It renders subjects obedient to their prince, courageous in campaigns, bold in times of danger, generous in time of scarcity, alert to every necessity of the republic because they know that, in serving their prince, they render service to God whose place he holds.”17 Although it is labelled “the mother of every virtue,” religion becomes above all a tool for power (instrumentum regni) that “renders subjects obedient to their prince.” Another prudential tenet that enhances the subjects’ obedience is abstaining from sudden changes and preferring “old things to new and the quiet to the upsetting because this is to place the certain before the uncertain and the secure before the dangerous.”18 Thus, the preservation of the state involves the preservation of ancient order, laws, and customs, since “nothing is more hateful in governments than to change things which have acquired esteem through their antiquity.”19 This tenet is much more important when religious matters are involved: I shall conclude with the advice Maecenas gave to Caesar Augustus: Do honour—he says—God always, in accordance with the ancient laws, and make sure that the others do the same; regard with contempt and punish those who introduce innovations in divine matters, do this not only out of respect for the gods, since those who disrespect them will never care much about anything else, but especially because those who alter religion will also push the others to make changes in other matters; hence conspiracies, seditions, and conventicles are born; such things are unsuitable for the princedom.20 17 18 19 20

Botero, The Reason of State, 64. Botero, 43. Botero, 50. In the original Italian, the passage appears in the Second Book at the end of paragraph 15 “Of Religion,” but it appears not to have been included in Botero, The Reason of State, 61; therefore we have translated it. See Botero, Della ragion di Stato, 136–137: “Farò fine con il consiglio dato da Mecenate ad Augusto Cesare: Onora – di ce – Dio perpetuamente, conforme alle leggi antiche, e fa che gli altri facciano il medesimo; odia e gastiga quelli, che faranno novità nelle cose divine, e ciò non solo per rispetto agli dèi, i quali però chi sprezza non farà mai conto d’altra cosa, ma perché quelli, che alterano la religione, spin-

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State and religion are bound together in a two-way bond: the altering of the former involves the altering of the latter, and vice versa. When this is the case the position of the Jews becomes ipso facto problematic. The fact that the Jews are included in this advice is beyond doubt, since Botero sets the subjects who belong to the Holy See apart from those who belong to a sect, and for him Judaism is a sect.21

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The Discourse, or How to Survive in a Tacitist World

The occasion that prompted the writing of the Discourse has been properly clarified and established: it is related to the Merceria robbery, in which the Venetian Jews Grassin Scaramella and Sabbadin Cattelan were involved.22 The “incident” happened in the years 1636–1637, and the connection with the Discourse has been recently established following the discovery of a draft manuscript of the work that includes the general introduction as well as the first three considerations.23 On that occasion, Luzzatto pleaded in defence of the Venetian Jewish community in danger of being expulsed, thereby demonstrating his ability and prudence in dealing with the Venetian government. The initial ten considerations of the Discourse can be interpreted through the lens that views Venice as a modern, nearly secularised state, where decision-making is rooted in the principles of the seventeenth-century mercantile economy. Indeed, Luzzatto argues, the Venetian government had displayed its political prudence when, for example, it has imposed “an additional import and export duty of three per cent […] on foreigners who traded with the West.”24 Yet the most prudent choice is to preserve the Jewish community in Venice because of their commercial skills and the taxes they pay. To sup-

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gono molti all’alterazione delle cose, onde nascono congiure sedizioni e conventicole; cose poco a proposito per il principato.” Botero, The Reason of State, 6. See Moshe A. Shulvass, “A Story of the Misfortunes which Afflicted the Jews in Italy” [Hebrew], Hebrew Union College Annual 22 (1949): 1–21; Benjamin Ravid, “The Venetian Context of the Discourse,” in Simone Luzzatto, Discourse on the State of the Jews— Bilingual edition, ed., trans., and comm. by Giuseppe Veltri and Anna Lissa (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2019), 243–274, esp. 250–255. Giuseppe Veltri and Guido Bartolucci, “The Last Will and Testament of Simone Luzzatto (1583?–1663) and the Only Known Manuscript of the Discorso (1638). Newly Discovered Manuscripts from the State Archive of Venice and the Marciana Library, Venice.”European Journal of Jewish Studies 5 (2011): 125–146. Luzzatto, Discourse, 29.

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port his argument, Luzzatto resorts to all the data about commerce and the taxes the Jews pay that are available to him, displaying his knowledge of the matter.25 If “this extremely prudent and just Republic inclined to yield and provide a protected residence and shelter for the [Jewish] Nation in such a noble and illustrious city of trade,”26 it has had the most prudent and well-founded reasons. Such reasons are presented and explained in detail in eight considerations: first of all, there is the mercantile activity, with the taxes and the whole economic spin-off related to it; such activity should be the prerogative of the Venetian Jews, because they are not allowed to practice other professions. Second, unlike other foreigners, they will never be able to bring their profits away from Venice, since they have no homeland and no ships of their own. Since they have no homeland, they will prove to be most obedient and faithful to Venice and deprived of the military force required for a rebellion. A further and even better confirmation of Venetian political prudence is to be found in the opening of three loan banks handled by the Jews to “respond to the needs and solicitations of the poor with an interest rate of only five per cent per year.”27 In other words, in Luzzatto’s Discourse the presence and economic activities of the Jews in Venice are completely legitimate, especially according to Botero’s prudential tenets. Their mercantile activities provide a remarkable income for La Serenissima, and they are obedient and defenceless, because they have no homeland, and have no military ambitions whatsoever. They are useful and harmless politically, but when it comes to religion they may be considered a potential threat, and Luzzatto is well aware of that problem: Three kinds of people argue against and antagonise the Jewish Nation: religious zealots, politicians and statesmen, and the common and vulgar people. The zealots claim that it is contemptuous of their own religion to allow those who do not practise the commonly approved religion into the state. One can easily respond that they should moderate the zeal of their pious minds because they can see and observe that the supreme leader of the Christian religion admits Jews into the city of his own residence and that they have been there for more than eight hundred years. In that city, they have an established space and permanent residence, and they are governed and ruled with the greatest justice and charity. […] Politicians say that it is not beneficial to tolerate a multitude of religions in the same city both because of the scandal and the bad example 25 26 27

For an updated discussion of this subject see Ravid, “The Venetian Context,” 259–274. Luzzatto, Discourse, 9. Luzzatto, 87.

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that one group makes for another, as well as the dissent, disunity, and hatred that can arise among the inhabitants of the city.28 While it is very easy to provide an exhaustive and final answer to religious zealots by appealing to the authority of the Pope, who tolerates the Jews in Rome, the answer to the politicians requires a more elaborate reply. Luzzatto knows that the politicians and the statesmen are those who follow Machiavellian advice in a Catholic Church-approved version, that is, the Tacitists, and he counters their arguments with solid evidence and reasons. First of all, there is no possibility of scandal or bad example whatsoever, since Jews and Christians will not and cannot mix, because they are not allowed to live together, because Jews communicate infrequently with Christians, because Jewish law forbids many foods, and because carnal relationships are also forbidden by Jewish law and by the laws of the prince. The same is true about the possible risk of dissension and sedition. Furthermore, a Jew is much more worried about survival than about spreading his own religion: A Jew, as a result of the conditions of the times and in compliance with his principal religious laws, is alien to any thought of propagating and spreading his religion. He worries solely about overcoming his own urgencies and needs. Moreover, he does not aspire in any way to improve his condition in a universal sense. And if he should try, his actions would undoubtedly receive the most severe punishment, since the matter would be referred to the magistrates.29 The claim that the Jews do not aspire to improve their condition in a universal sense has more than one implication. In fact, it comes back to the issues discussed in the fifth consideration, where Luzzatto focuses on the promptness of the Jews in obeying, which stems from the fact that they live dispersed around the world in the aftermath of the loss of political independence and military power after the Roman conquest.30 In the fifteenth consideration, “Considering Various Objections Brought Forward by Cornelius Tacitus against the Ancient Jewish People, and Their Resolu-

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Luzzatto, 109. Luzzatto, 111. See Luzzatto, 193. Concerning Luzzatto’s idea of Diaspora see Giuseppe Veltri, “ ‘Identity of Essentiality of the Jewish People’: The Diaspora and the Political Theories of Simone Luzzatto in the Jewish Thought of the 20th Century,”Civiltà del Mediterraneo 23–24, n.s. (2013):249–269.

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tion,” Luzzatto expands his attack against Tacitism by debunking all the slander Tacitus spread about the Jewish people in the fifth book of his Histories. For the sake of brevity, we shall not dwell on all Tacitus’s slander and all Luzzatto’s counterarguments, but only on the most substantial ones for the purposes of our essay. The first slander, Luzzatto writes, concerns the consecration of a donkey’s head in the inner chambers of the Holy Temple of Jerusalem. He quotes Tacitus’s passage and then explains it: That is, [he claims that] when the Jews were wandering the desert, a place deprived of water and therefore dominated by thirst, they eventually came upon a flock of wild donkeys. From this, Moses inferred that a spring must be near. Thus he followed [the flock] until he discovered the desired water. The water restored the people and quenched their thirst. As a consequence, and to remember such a propitious event, they consecrated an effigy or skull of [one of] these animals, which was ultimately preserved in the inner chambers of the Temple.31 With a move of a consummate strategist, Luzzatto mentions almost en passant that this slander has already been confuted by the Christian apologist Tertullian, as if it were universally known and acknowledged.32 Then, he adds that “the Scripture makes no mention of this event, which shows that the story is untrue,” as if he wanted to imply that one can obviously doubt the writings of a heathen historian, but not the word of scripture. Finally, he switches to a sceptical confutation of the slander. First of all, it must be noted that Luzzatto’s counterargument is introduced by and punctuated with sceptical phrases—“But let me tell you what my intuition suggests, in the form of a conjecture—without persisting in asserting it too tenaciously,”33 “it could very well be,”34 and so on. Then, he turns the alleged adoration of the donkey’s head into a custom based on a usage sanctioned and approved by scripture: “I have observed in the Holy Scripture that many things such as the means and instruments of miracles or victories were commemorated and consecrated in holy places in memory of divine favours.”35 He subsequently finds the origin of this custom in a biblical story:

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Luzzatto, Discourse, 153. See Luzzatto, Discourse, 153: “Tacitus’s lies about these events have already been identified by a number of sages, in particular by Tertullian.” Luzzatto, 155. Luzzatto, 155. Luzzatto, 155.

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It could very well be that the donkey’s head relates to Samson, the strongest of men and a distinguished leader of the Jews. Having defeated a thousand Philistines with a donkey’s jaw, Samson became extremely thirsty. He turned to God, and from the jaw sprang forth a great abundance of water, which he drank and which restored him, as recounted in the book of Judges, chapter 19. An effigy of a donkey’s jaw with water pouring from it was placed in the Temple in commemoration of this most valorous feat, where everything occurred miraculously and not by means of simple human strength.36 In Luzzatto’s interpretation superstition plays no role, as it did in Tacitus’s. There is no adoration of a donkey’s head, but only the custom, approved by scripture, of preserving objects related to Samson’s ancient glorious feat. This custom has possibly been misunderstood because of the ceaseless changes and upheavals of human fortunes: “Subsequently, after the fortune of the Jews had changed, that monument of glory became little more than a joke, mocked by foreigners, and it gave rise to the fable that donkeys had led the Jews to the source of water.”37 The entire argument is essentially sceptical since, according to Sextus Empiricus, a “custom or usage (there is no difference) is a common acceptance by a number of people of a certain way of acting, transgressors of which are not necessarily punished.”38 When opposed to another custom, law, or dogmatic opinion, there appears to be so much divergence in objects that “we shall not be able to say what each existing object is like in its nature, but only how it appears relative to a given persuasion or law or custom and so on.”39 The preservation of the effigy or skull of the donkey in the Temple is only a custom or habit, and as such it has no more and no less authority than the other customs. Furthermore, ancient scepticism encounters early modern scepticism when Luzzatto mentions the change of fortune that is among the main themes of the latter; it will suffice to think of the role fortune and its vagaries play in Montaigne’s Essays.

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Luzzatto, 155, 157. Luzzatto, 157. Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism, eds. Julia Annas and Jonathan Barnes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 37. Sextus, Outlines, 40.

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Prudence in the Socrates

Tacitism, and more specifically Botero’s arguments, will surface once again at the end of the Socrates, or on Human Knowledge, where political prudence is discussed. When Socrates concludes his discussion with Cratylus, who has finally proved to him that it is impossible to obtain knowledge with solid foundations and has invited him to trust the probable, he undertakes a new examination in search of the criteria to follow in ordinary life. Prudence is the first criterion he puts under examination, and Pericles is the first politician he consults. The resort to Pericles creates an intertextual relationship with Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics,40 where prudence—practical wisdom— is the skill to decide which things are good or bad for human beings, a skill with which Pericles was endowed. Yet Luzzatto’s Pericles is not interested in the distinction between good and bad. He has turned into a Tacitist, and as such, when he answers the question whether prudence is needed more to conquer or to keep a state, he has no doubt about the fact that a prince will need more prudence to keep it: “Pericles strongly maintained that prudence was more valuable in maintaining it, adducing that well-known saying it is more difficult to retain than to create provinces; they are won by force, they are secured by justice. This is almost the same as they are won by fortune, they are secured by prudence.”41 This approach to prudence creates an intertextual relation with Botero’s The Reason of State, book i, chapter 5 “Which is the Greater Work, to Expand or to Conserve a State,” where the author concludes that “he is more admired who acquires than he who conserves” and quotes the same passages from Florus: “it is more difficult to retain than to create provinces; they are won by force, they are secured by justice.”42 Socrates, however, is not satisfied with Pericles’s answer—who, after all, did not give a clear definition of prudence—and moves on in the discussion, leaving Tacitism aside. The discussion of prudence unfolds from page 236 to page 255 of the original Socrates published in 1651.43 Several characters, philosophers and politicians

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Aristotle, Eth. nic. 6.5 (1140b7–b10). Luzzatto, Socrates, or on Human Knowledge—Bilingual edition, ed., trans., and comm. by Giuseppe Veltri and Michela Torbidoni (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2019), 371. Botero, The Reason of State, 8: the translation of Florus’s passages has been omitted in the English edition. See Botero, Della ragion di stato, 60, for the details of Florus’s source. See also Luzzatto, Socrates, or on Human Knowledge—Bilingual edition, ed., trans., and comm. by Giuseppe Veltri and Michela Torbidoni, 368–397. All the English quotes are taken from this edition.

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alike, follow each other, and each of them gives his own definition of prudence. Protagoras’s definition goes back to Thomas Aquinas’s definition drawn from Aristotle: The prudence that you are seeking is the helmsman of human life; [it is the] Pole Star by means of which we must guide the development of our actions. It is the moderator, or rather the queen, of moral virtues, the charioteer of human affects; it is that which reins in [our excesses] when we live in comfort and which supports us through adversity. By maintaining the mind in balance, it does not allow it to make vain insults or vile outbursts, rendering it cautious and always circumspect in deliberating, as well as courageous in any undertaking.44 Yet, Socrates rejects this definition, labelling it “pretentious discourse,”45 and he does the same with Pericles’s second definition of prudence as the memory of past events that instructs about the present and allows one to take measures for the future: I was not searching for the cognition of particular things, as he had mentioned during his speech, but that I was simply seeking the proper image and formality of prudence that made it distinct and different from the other doctrines and faculties. Therefore, to say that it reminds us of past things and instructs us concerning the present ones was too general, indeterminate, and undefined.46 As he already did in the Discourse, where he was searching for the true image of the Jewish people,47 here Luzzatto/Socrates is looking for the proper image of prudence. Therefore, he wants to know “what prudence consisted in and

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Luzzatto, Socrates, 373. For the sources see Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics, trans. by C.I. Litzinger O.P. (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1962), Book vi, Lecture 4 “Prudence”; Summa Theologiae, iia iiae Qu. 119 A. 3 ad 3; Thomas Aquinas, The “Summa Theologica,” vol. 12, 165: “Prudence is chief among the moral virtues”; Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae Supplementum, Qu. 2 A. 4; Thomas Aquinas, The “Summa Theologica,” vol. 18, 111: “Now, in all the moral virtues, the first mover is prudence, which is called the charioteer of the virtues.” Luzzatto, Socrates, 373. Luzzatto, 373. See Anna Lissa, “Jews on Trial and their Sceptical Attorney, Philosophic Scepticism, and Political thought in Simone Luzzatto’s Italian Works,” in Luzzatto, Discourse, 311–358.

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what its peculiar function and proper task concerning human matters were.”48 Accordingly he rejects other definitions of prudence involving deception, such as looking for personal profit while pretending to aim at the public interest, or having the ability to appear to the public different from what one truly is. Cleinias’s definition—“to know which activity, task, and function every person is inclined and called to do by Nature, as well as to get an exact measurement of our self-sufficiency”49—is also rejected since, whereas it is possible to have some self-knowledge, it is impossible to have a precise knowledge of other people’s dispositions. Alcibiades’s definition—“a way of acting in accordance with reason, namely that it suggested that we follow good things and dissuaded us from evil ones, and that the good consisted of the virtuous middle located and set between the depraved extremes”50—is found wanting, especially because Socrates wants to know what civic and public prudence is, and is not interested in the moral discourse. Paradoxically, the knowledge of public and civic prudence appears unattainable precisely because it concerns human matters. Anaxagoras’s words summarise the problem clearly: If you, Socrates, consider that according to Democritus, Chance agitates the whole, then prudence would be enacting a great temerity if it supposed to predict what mad and insane Chance intended to dispose in the future. Yet if the order of things (as I believe) depends on the decrees of the Divine Mind, [then] the whole of what is going to happen has already been successfully made and completed once before, [and] therefore prudence’s every attempt to oppose this will turn out to be vain and ridiculous.51 In his Italian works Luzzatto mentions Democritus several times,52 and he appears to be familiar with Machiavelli, who was one of the earliest transcribers

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Luzzatto, Socrates, 375. Luzzatto, 385. Luzzatto, 391. Luzzatto, 397. However, he would not be the only Jewish intellectual to be interested in atomistic philosophy: see, for example, Tzvi Langermann, “Yosef Shlomo Delmedigo’s Engagement with Atomism: Some Further Explorations into a Knotty Problem,” in Jewish Culture in Early Modern Europe. Essays in Honor of David B. Ruderman, ed. Richard I. Cohen, Natalie B. Dohrmann, Adam Shear, and Elchanan Reiner (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2014), 124–133.

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of Lucretius’s De rerum natura53 and whose works were known both by Montaigne and Bacon, who in turn were known by Luzzatto.54 As a matter of fact, to Democritus/Machiavelli/Montaigne, Luzzatto is indebted for his ideas about chance, fortune, and necessity. In The Prince, a whole chapter is focused on fortune—“Fortune’s Power in Human Affairs and How She Can Be Forestalled.” For Machiavelli, fortune or chance plays a pivotal role. Its power, however, is not boundless, and it can be controlled; provisions can be made in order to limit the damages it can do,55 and the knowledge of human affairs both past and modern can help. Luzzatto’s fortune, on the other hand, seems to have an almost unlimited power, especially in the Discourse where the Jews are concerned.56 In addition, in the Socrates Socrates claims that it is impossible to acquire knowledge of human affairs “which for the most part are upset and turned upside down by mad Chance.”57 Thus, in Luzzatto’s time there were no provisions which could really counter fortune anymore; the only thing that men could do when confronted with it was to behave as Socrates did. At the beginning of his defensive speech, the philosopher states rather proudly that “throughout all my life, I have demonstrated to others that I am courageous and unafraid of dealing with the adversities of fortune.”58 Against this backdrop, prudence seems to fade away and to become a vain thing, precisely as Montaigne wrote in his Essays (i, xxiv): “So vain and worthless is human wisdom [prudence]: despite all our projects, counsels and precautions, the outcome remains in the possession of Fortune.”59 In the Socrates,

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56 57 58 59

See Alison Brown, “Lucretius and the Epicureans in the Social and Political Context of Renaissance Florence,” I Tatti Studies 9 (2001): 11–62; Brown, The Return of Lucretius to Renaissance Florence (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010), especially 68–70 and annexed bibliography; Stephen Greenblatt, The Swerve: How the Renaissance Began (London: Vintage, 2012); Robert J. Roecklein, Machiavelli and Epicureanism—An Investigation into the Origins of Early Modern Political Thought (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2012). For a discussion of Luzzatto’s knowledge of these authors see Giuseppe Veltri, “Economic and Social Arguments and the Doctrine of the Antiperistasis in Simone Luzzatto’s Political Thought: Venetian Reverberations of Francis Bacon’s Philosophy?” Frühneuzeit-Info 23 (2011): 23–32; Lissa, “Jews on Trial,” 354–356. See Machiavelli, The Prince, in Niccolò Machiavelli, The Chief Works and Others, vol. 1, 90: “Nonetheless, in order not to annul our free will, I judge it true that Fortune may be mistress of one half our actions but that even she leaves the other half, or almost, under our control.” See Luzzatto, Discourse, 27, 51, 67, 125, 157. Luzzatto, Socrates, 375. Luzzatto, 45. The original French has “prudence,” here translated with “wisdom.” For the English trans-

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at the end of the discussion, a clear definition of prudence appears as unattainable as a definition of human knowledge has been. Therefore, in the businesses of life one can only follow the probable, which is adaptable to human exigencies and can be used according to the requirements of each and every specific situation to establish the difference between what is good or bad for human beings, a difference that can only be considered temporarily valid: Indeed, he [Cratylus] said that the probable was nothing other than that instantaneous glimmer arising in us [allowing us] to distinguish between good and evil. As it appears in our minds without being agitated or corrupted by vehement and prolific discourse, it will result as clear and limpid to the whole of humankind, if it is not obscured and hidden by our laboured quibbles.60 The probable is only an intuition, and as such it cannot be known or defined. Such an attempt would immediately expose itself to the criticism of the sceptical method. The only thing Luzzatto can do is to state what the probable is not: I warned my close friends that they should follow the guidance of the probable for actions connected to the purpose of life, as it is not obstinate or quibbling, but adaptable to opportune necessities, and more executive than discursive. In the practice of moral life, it has not deviated much from the first seeds that Nature instilled in our minds, since if it does not grasp the truth, at least it does not encounter insane contumacy or mad obstinacy. […] Likewise, it would be absurd if the dictate of the probable was not instilled in humankind, [which was] created with so much skill and mastery, destined to travel the world as well as the rocky and most turbulent sea. It is indeed like a sign along its path, which shows them the good they must follow and the evil they must avoid.61 The probable does not aspire to be fixed and imprisoned in the form of a knowledge that is valid for all eternity. It only offers a provisional knowledge, valid for the time being and able to deal with the necessities of the moment. In other words, this knowledge is under the control of time and human history. Accord-

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lation see Michel de Montaigne, The Complete Essays, trans. and ed. by Michael Screech (London: Penguin Books, 1993). Luzzatto, Socrates, 369. Luzzatto, 475.

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ingly, the probable cannot be defined and must be agreed upon by examining each and every individual case in each and every moment of human history. For this same reason the probable eludes the control of the principle of authority.

5

Conclusion

In Luzzatto’s time, prudence was still a much-debated topic, conceived less as a moral virtue and more as a political virtue. Although we still lack the complete text of Luzzatto’s responsum about the travelling by gondola on Shabbat, we do catch a rather clear glimpse of the principle that inspired the rabbis’ answer to him, which is very close to—if not the same as—Botero’s prudential tenet to avoid innovations in the religious sphere because such innovations might eventually inspire if not seditious thoughts then at least the idea to ask for more freedom from religious restraints and therefore from rabbinic authority. Luzzatto himself was a rabbi, and yet his countering of the Tacitist prudential tenet in defence of the Jewish people in the Discourse and his definition of prudence as the ability to abide by the probable and to always be pliable to different human contingencies tell us more about his spiritual freedom—even though he did not ask for an amelioration of the situation of the Jews in Venice. Perhaps he was aware that such a request might have proved itself not prudent, since neither he nor the Venetian Jews had enough political power to support and advocate such a request.

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Mansfield, Harvey C. Machiavelli’s Virtue. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996 [1966]. Montaigne, Michel de. The Complete Essays. Translated and edited by Michael Screech. London: Penguin Books, 1993. Ravid, Benjamin. “The Venetian Context of the Discourse.” In Luzzatto, Discourse, 243– 274. Roecklein, Robert J. Machiavelli and Epicureanism—An Investigation into the Origins of Early Modern Political Thought. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2012. Sasso, Gennaro. Machiavelli. Storia del suo pensiero politico. Bologna: Il Mulino, 1981. Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism. Edited by Julia Annas and Jonathan Barnes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. Shulvass, Moshe A. “A Story of the Misfortunes which Afflicted the Jews in Italy” [Hebrew]. Hebrew Union College Annual 22 (1949): 1–21. Steinsaltz, Adin. Koren Talmud Bavli The Noé Edition, vol. 5: Tractate Eiruvin Part Two. Jerusalem: Koren Publishers, 2013. Taranto, Domenico. Le virtù della politica, Civismo e prudenza tra Machiavelli e gli antichi. Naples: Bibliopolis, 2003. Toffanin, Giuseppe. Machiavelli e il “Tacitismo.” La “Politica storica” al tempo della controriforma. Naples: Guida Editori, 1972 [1921]. Tosel, André, ed. De la prudence des anciens comparée à celle des modernes. Sémantique d’un concept, déplacement des problématiques. Annales Littéraires de l’Université de Besançon, 572. Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1995. Veltri, Giuseppe. “Economic and Social Arguments and the Doctrine of the Antiperistasis in Simone Luzzatto’s Political Thought: Venetian Reverberations of Francis Bacon’s Philosophy?” Frühneuzeit-Info 23 (2011): 23–32. Veltri, Giuseppe. “‘Identity of Essentiality of the Jewish People:’ The Diaspora and the Political Theories of Simone Luzzatto in the Jewish Thought of the 20th Century.” Civiltà del Mediterraneo 23–24, n.s., (2013): 249–269. Veltri, Giuseppe. Renaissance Philosophy in Jewish Garb: Foundations and Challenges in Judaism on the Eve of Modernity. Leiden: Brill, 2009. Veltri, Giuseppe, and Bartolucci, Guido. “The Last Will and Testament of Simone Luzzatto (1583?–1663) and the Only Known Manuscript of the Discorso (1638). Newly Discovered Manuscripts from the State Archive of Venice and the Marciana Library, Venice.” European Journal of Jewish Studies 5 (2011): 125–146.

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Varieties of Mercantilism: Simone Luzzatto and the Economic Role of the Jews in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries Luca Andreoni

1

Introduction

This essay intends to offer a comparative perspective on several of the economic concepts expressed by the Venetian Rabbi Simone Luzzatto (ca. 1583– 1663) in his Discourse on the State of the Jews (1638),1 which were understandable within the context of coeval economic thinking during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and were shared by other authors as well.2 As Riccardo Bachi highlighted in one of his pioneering studies, Luzzatto’s Discourse was written in an attempt to analytically explain the reasons for the economic situation in which the Venetian Jews operated.3 Bachi has already clearly stated that there was a close correlation between the political mercantilist economy in early modern states and the acceptance of Jews, who were considered to be an economic resource; from a utilitarian perspective: states that relied on mercantile activities carried out by the Jews became more prosperous. Although some aspects of Bachi’s interpretation have been criticised, by the expression “mercantilist semitic politics,”4 he was actually defining a category that is still valid

1 Simone Luzzatto, Discourse on the State of the Jews—Bilingual edition, ed., trans., and comm. Giuseppe Veltri and Anna Lissa (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2019). This essay was made possible by scholarships from the ReIReS network (Research infrastructure on Religious Studies) and Transnational Access to Special Collection, funded by the European Union’s Horizon 2020 Program, which allowed me a research stay at the Maimonides Centre for Advanced Studies (mcas) and the Institut für Jüdische Philosophie und Religion of the University of Hamburg. I thank the director of mcas, Giuseppe Veltri, as well as Gadi Luzzatto Voghera, Libera Pisano, Asher Salah, Michela Torbidoni, and Adelino Zanini for discussing my research on various occasions. Bianca Bosman, Marina Stronati, and Sarah Wobick-Segev have helped to translate the essay into English. The responsibility for what is written is mine alone. 2 Germano Maifreda, From Oikonomia to Political Economy. Constructing Economic Knowledge from the Renaissance to the Scientific Revolution (Farnham: Ashgate, 2012). 3 Riccardo Bachi, “La dottrina sulla dinamica delle città secondo Giovanni Botero e secondo Simone Luzzatto,” Atti della Accademia Nazionale dei lincei. Rendiconti classe di scienze morali, storiche e filologiche 343, no. 11–12 (November–December 1946): 376. 4 Abraham Melamed, “Simone Luzzatto on Tacitus: Apologetica and Ragione Di Stato,” in Studies in Medieval Jewish History and Literature, vol. 2, ed. Isadore Twersky (Cambridge, MA:

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today, with some adjustments, when we need to give an explanation for the evolution of economic events involving the Jews in the Mediterranean basin.5 Benjamin Ravid, in his seminal and fundamental studies, placed the Discourse in the political and economic context of the time, thus successfully deciphering both concrete references and contemporary economic realities, as well as making room for the autonomous considerations forwarded by the Venetian rabbi.6 The economic convictions of Luzzatto fall within the framework of a more political, philosophical, and religious vision, which has since then been the subject of historiographical studies. This essay intends to dwell upon such convictions through a comparative investigation. In fact, during the years in which Luzzatto wrote his Discourse, other writers, too, put pen to paper , investigating in somewhat different ways the same sectors dealt with by Luzzatto. Among these, the names of Giovanni Botero (1544–1617), Antonio Serra (1550/1560– after 1617), and Thomas Mun (1571–1641) stand out. There is quite a considerable amount of literature on these authors, and there is no way we can analyse all the studies dedicated to them.7 The aim of the essay is not to go looking for quotations from other authors. It is, furthermore, not a question of tracking down what cannot be found in the writings of the Venetian rabbi, which are permeated with implicit and explicit inferences, ranging from clearly classical to biblical and Jewish, including even modern Harvard University Press, 1984), 143n2. A balanced perspective on the importance of Bachi’s work is found in Giuseppe Veltri, “Identità nell’essenzialità. Il concetto luzzatiano di diaspora secondo Yitzhak Baer e Riccardo Bachi,” in Filosofo e rabbino nella Venezia del Seicento. Studi su Simone Luzzatto con documenti inediti dall’Archivio di Stato di Venezia, ed. Veltri (Rome: Aracne, 2015), 307–331. 5 Bachi, “La dottrina,” 377; Bachi, Israele disperso e ricostruito. Pagine di storia e di economia (Rome: La Rassegna Mensile d’Israel, 1952), 59–66. Jonathan Israel, European Jewry in the Age of Mercantilism, 1550–1750 (Portland: Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 1998), 46 uses the expression “philosemitic mercantilism” and reconstructs the policies of the Italian states in this regard (35–52). On this context, more generally, see Guillaume Calafat, “L’indice de la franchise: politique économique, concurrence des ports francs et condition des Juifs en Méditerranée à l’époque moderne,” Revue historique 686, no. 2 (2018): 275–320. 6 Among the many and important works by Benjamin C.I. Ravid on the subject, see Economics and Toleration in Seventeenth Century Venice: The Background and Context of the Discorso of Simone Luzzatto (Jerusalem: Central Press, 1978) and “The Venetian Context of the Discourse,” in Luzzatto, Discourse, 243–274. 7 Two recent syntheses: Alessandro Roncaglia, “The Heritage of Antonio Serra,” in Antonio Serra and the Economics of Good Government, eds. Rosario Patalano and Sophus A. Reinert (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 299–314 and Mark Blaug, ed., The Early Mercantilists. Thomas Mun (1571–1641), Edward Misselden (1608–1634), Gerard de Malynes (1586–1623) (Aldershot: Elgar, 1991).

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political considerations. It is also not my endeavour to place the phenomenon of mercantilism in a historic perspective, which historiography invites us to consider with caution, nor to operate (or update) a taxonomy of the authors.8 We should rather bear in mind that some classical analytical studies show a close correlation between Giovanni Botero and Simone Luzzatto,9 as has already been shown in the case of Antonio Serra and Luzzatto. In the second case, Giuseppe Veltri, first, and then Johnathan Karp, left footprints to follow.10 In line with these studies, we shall hence attempt to broaden Luzzatto’s considerations within the context of economic concepts on the wealth of states, thereby identifying the specific place carved out by Luzzatto for the Jewish minority. In Luzzatto’s Discourse, the social aspect seems to be central. Mercantile dynamics are guided by cultural arrangements. This interpretation can be illustrated by and is coherent with the apologetic approach of the Venetian rabbi. Confronted with the threat of expulsion—the outcome of an “epidemic”

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The bibliography on the subject is impressive. For a critical framing, see besides the classic Eli F. Heckscher, Mercantilism, trans. Mendel Shapiro (London: Allen & Unwin, 1934), 2 vols.; Aldo De Maddalena, “Ripensando alle origini del mercantilismo,” in Studi in onore di Armando Sapori (Milan: Cisalpino, 1957), vol. 2, 951–965; Lars Herlitz, “The concept of mercantilism,” Scandinavian Economic History Review 12 (1964), no. 2: 101–120; Antonio Maria Fusco, “Antonio Serra: un mercantilista?” Annali della Fondazione Luigi Einaudi 15 (1981): 157–159; Lars Magnusson, Mercantilism. The Shaping of an Economic Language (London: Routledge, 1994); Alessandro Roncaglia, La ricchezza delle idee. Storia del pensiero economico (Rome: Laterza, 2003), 51. On the relationship between Giovanni Botero and Simone Luzzatto, see Bachi, “La dottrina,” which rather emphasises the analogies, while Lea Campos Boralevi focuses on the differences in the dynamic conception of the city in “La città nel Discorso di Simone Luzzatto,” in Le ideologie della città europea dall’Umanesimo al Romanticismo, ed. Vittorio Conti (Florence: Olschki, 1993), 260. See also Cristiana Facchini, “The City, the Ghetto and Two Books. Venice and Jewish Early Modernity,” Quest. Issues in Contemporary Jewish History 2 (October 2011): 32–33. Giuseppe Veltri, “Alcune considerazioni sugli ebrei e Venezia nel pensiero politico di Simone Luzzatto,” in Percorsi di storia ebraica. Fonti per la storia degli ebrei in Italia nell’età moderna e contemporanea, Atti del Convegno internazionale (Cividale del Friuli–Gorizia, 7–9 settembre 2004), ed. Pier Cesare Ioly Zorattini (Udine: Forum, 2005), 254; Giuseppe Veltri, Renaissance Philosophy in Jewish Garb. Foundations and Challenges in Judaism on the Eve of Modernity (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 208; Giuseppe Veltri, “Saggio introduttivo,” in Simone Luzzatto, Scritti politici e filosofici di un ebreo scettico nella Venezia del Seicento, ed. Giuseppe Veltri, with Anna Lissa and Paola Ferruta (Milan: Bompiani, 2013), xlv; Jonathan Karp, The Politics of Jewish Commerce. Economic Thought and Emancipation in Europe, 1638–1848 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008), 23; Jonathan Karp, “Can Economic History Date the Inception of Jewish Modernity?” in The Economy in Jewish History. New Perspectives on the Interrelationship between Ethnicity and Economic Life, eds. Gideon Reuveni and Sarah Wobick-Segev (New York: Berghahn Books, 2011), 39n20.

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criminal accusation—the author, in this text, tends to emphasise the central role of Jews within the dynamics of mercantilism, with the purpose of demonstrating the importance of their continued presence.11 To get a better idea of this journey, we shall ponder the different concepts regarding geographic space (section 2). Then we shall move to an analysis of the role played by foreign trade and discuss how trade in general functioned in order to determine its influence on the economic position of a state (section 3). In conclusion, we shall present some considerations (section 4).

2

Venice, or Rather, the Centrality of the Location?

The effect of physical location on the economic status of a city (or a state) was already long ago expressed by Giovanni Botero. In his famous work on the greatness of cities, Botero tackles the issue of the benefits of the location in terms of “fertility of the land” and of its “convenience” (also for transport).12 Setting aside the aspects of “fertility” and “convenience for transport,” by “convenience,” Botero means that a location allows people to carry out trade, or better, that it is suitable for “exporting the goods of which they have a surplus, or importing those that they lack.”13 This location would constitute an intermediary site between two opposing ones, but not simply as a point of transition but rather as an element which is part of two opposite conditions (“it partakes in the trade as an intermediary and draws profit from these extremes. […] it mediates between the extremes”).14 In short, it represents an element of coexistence which determines the balance between two opposites.15 In so doing, Botero makes a distinction between a “necessary” city and a “useful” one. The former constitutes an obligatory stop on an itinerary that nevertheless has no connection with the context, that is not necessarily part of the two opposites, and hence does not represent a binding and searched-for element of connection for the populations that live along this trajectory. The example given by Botero is that of the Alps surrounding Italy: though people 11 12 13 14 15

For the complex events related to the composition of the Discourse, see Veltri, “Saggio introduttivo,” xxxvii–xliv. Giovanni Botero, On the Causes of the Greatness and Magnificence of Cities, trans. and introd. Geoffrey Symcox (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012), 17–18. Botero, On the Causes of the Greatness, 17. Botero, 17. On the doctrine of antiperistasis, see Giuseppe Veltri, “Economic and Social Arguments and the Doctrine of the Antiperistasis in Simone Luzzatto’s Political Thought: Venetian Reverberations of Francis Bacon’s Philosophy,” Frühneuzeit-Info 23 (2011): 23–32.

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from every nation cross over these mountain chains, there are no big cities. The “useful” city indicates an urban agglomerate capable of setting up a reciprocal rapport of dependence on the surrounding area, which is the result of the balance between the demand and offer of commodity: “It is not enough, therefore, for the site to be necessary, in order to render a city great; besides that, it must be useful to the neighbouring peoples as well.”16 The examples referred to above all are Genoa and Venice, as they “both mediate between extremes; they are not just transit-points.”17 Both Italian cities act as “warehouses” and “stores,” much like Lisbon and Antwerp.18 Antonio Serra’s paradigms are similar in interpretation. As has been affirmed, “the revolutionary nature”19 of Serra’s Short Treatise emerges and is placed within a political, economic, and religious context, as Serra postulated a new economic theory, which, though springing from classical and contemporary schemes of the time, nevertheless represents an autonomous and unusual analysis. In it, the position of Venice is used as a paradigmatic example to illustrate the underlying reasons for the economic success of a city.20 The importance of the geographic position is described, in the terms used by Serra, as one of the “proper accidents,”21 or better, the specific features of some cities that cannot be possessed or reproduced by each political structure. These are either an agricultural surplus or geographic position. From proper accidents “common accidents” can be distinguished, which, added to or intersecting the proper ones, give origin to the economic greatness of a state.22 The geographic position, in fact, is supposed to be the basis of flourishing mercantile activity, which would lead to an abundance of money in a city.23 The importance of the location, “a powerful occasion for, and almost a cause of, vigorous trade,” can be measured in relation to “other kingdoms and parts of the world,” referring to the mediating role played by some cities, primarily Venice.24 16 17 18 19

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Botero, On the Causes of the Greatness, 18. Botero, 18. Botero, 18. Sophus A. Reinert, “Introduction,” in Antonio Serra, A Short Treatise on the Wealth and Poverty of Nations, trans. Jonathan Hunt, ed. Sophus A. Reinert (London: Anthem, 2011), 17. Serra, A Short Treatise, 119. Serra, 119. Serra, 119; the four common accidents that Serra talks about are the role of manufactures, enterprising population, extensive trade, and effective government. See Serra, 125: “it goes without saying that where there is extensive trade there are bound to be large quantities of money, for trade cannot be carried on without money, which is its very raison d’être.” Serra, 119.

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This lagoon city—explains Serra—maintains a privileged position not only in Italy, “but in the whole of Europe, because of its geographical position.”25 The proof would be the fact that all the goods that are imported from Asia to Europe pass through Venice, from where they are distributed to other places, and similarly all the goods that are exported from Europe to Asia pass through Venice. An enormous amount of trade is generated by this exportation of so many goods to so many places. In this Venice is favoured by its geographical position. It is conveniently placed with respect to Asia for imports to Europe, and with respect to Europe for exports to Asia. It is also very well placed with respect to the rest of Italy, for most of the country’s rivers flow into the Adriatic, which facilitates the transporting of goods to many places. Moreover, it is situated as it were on the hip of Italy, not too distant from either the head or the tail, which is also convenient for transportation.26 However, the suitability of the position, according to Serra, is not only the consequence of geographic determinants. The role of manufactures, too, is strategic in making a city central to trade directives, entailing benefits in terms of money.27 Simone Luzzatto, though seeming to implicitly refer to these two writers’ views, who influenced other aspects of his thought,28 interprets the issue of location in a different way. This theme comes to the surface in various parts of his work. Above all, when he reports on the opinion of some detractors according to whom the intensity of trade in Venice is not caused by the merchant role played by the Jews, but by other contingencies: “the true factors that allowed merchandise and trade to flourish were the admirable location of the city, the convenience of the seaport, the vicinity of navigable rivers, the proximity of Germany, the freedom of life, the security of the merchandise, and the abundance and perfection of the arts.”29 Luzzatto argues against this interpretation, but without delegitimising the overall role of the city in determining the “course of human affairs.”30 25 26 27 28 29 30

Serra, 125. Serra, 125–127. Serra, 127; Rosario Patalano and Sophus A. Reinert, eds., Antonio Serra and the Economics of Good Government (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016). As demonstrated by historiography; see footnotes 9 and 10 above. Luzzatto, Discourse, 19. Luzzatto, 21. Campos Boralevi had already focused on this passage (“La città,” 257–258); however, she proposes an overall interpretation that is partly different from the one advanced here (see also footnote 37).

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Further on, the importance of geographic position for explaining economic phenomena is reiterated through the example of England, but from a different point of view. Here location is evoked to explain the different effects of economic policies, and specifically of the customs policies enacted:31 [One must consider] the position of the [British] Island, which nature placed as the site of dominion over the Western and Northern seas. The absolute control and dominion that these two queens32 exercised in all ports and trading posts of the kingdom facilitated and indeed opened the way for such a fortunate outcome. The same could not happen so easily here in Italy, since the ports are controlled by different princes and powers. Should any of these make conditions difficult for foreigners and exclude them from the competition, the latter would immediately be welcomed by others elsewhere with extensive and ample privileges. Furthermore, not even one [14v] maritime city in Italy would have a population disposed to make up for the lack of foreign maritime trade. Therefore, the consequences in that city would be almost a complete cessation of commerce. This did not occur in the Kingdom of England because of the multiplicity of cities and populations disposed to this practice, making the entire island appear almost as a single, continuous maritime city.33 Reversing the position taken by Antonio Serra, Luzzatto demonstrates the tricky landlocked formation of the Italian coastline, seen from the Venetian point of view. Competition between maritime cities would prevent practising eventual restrictive measures with regard to foreign merchants, such as redefining authorised privileges and more burdensome customs policies. Competition from neighbouring maritime cities, to which the merchants would turn, would make such an attempt be in vain, even counterproductive.34 Luzzatto explicitly 31 32 33 34

Ravid, Economics and Toleration, 61. Mary i and Elisabeth i Tudor. Luzzatto, Discourse, 37. On this topic see Bernard D. Cooperman, “Venetian Policy Towards Levantine Jews and Its Broader Italian Context,” in Gli Ebrei e Venezia. Secoli xiv–xviii, Atti del Convegno internazionale (Venezia, 5–10 giugno 1983), ed. Gaetano Cozzi (Milan: Edizioni Comunità, 1987), 65–84; Benjamin Ravid, “A Tale of Three Cities and Their Raison d’état: Ancona, Venice, Livorno and the Competition for Jewish Merchants in the Sixteenth Century,” Mediterranean Historical Review 9 (1991–1992): 138–162; Benjamin Arbel, “Jews in International Trade. The Emergence of the Levantines and Ponentines,” in The Jews of Early Modern Venice, eds. Robert C. Davis and Benjamin Ravid (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 73–96.

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lingers over the importance of the position of a city in relation to trade directives in the third consideration: It is worth reflecting on the fact that since the route towards the West is in the hands of foreigners, this results in the greatest disadvantage for the city, since Italy is situated in such a way that ships coming from the West first unload cargo at Genoa, which has expanded its maritime trade in the last few years. Afterwards, the ships land at Livorno, Civitavecchia, Naples, Messina, Ragusa, Ancona, and [only] finally Venice, if they need to rapidly sell off the remainder of their merchandise, since Venice is the last Christian port. Nor has the relief from the burdensome new tax on raisins somehow succeeded in remedying this shortcoming. Especially when the merchandise are unloaded in Livorno and Genoa, they are distributed throughout the entirety of Lombardy, Piedmont, and the bordering Alpine regions, and likewise throughout Romagna and the Marche of Ancona. Thus, the more the merchandise that abounds in these ports, the greater their scarcity in Venice.35 Luzzatto’s argument about the importance of the location of the city is more analytical compared to that of Botero and Serra. Trade is at the centre of his focus, though not in relation to directives and trends, but in relation to who conducts the trade, in other words, the operators. Since trade in the West was already in the hands of Northerners (“forestieri”36), Venice is not located “conveniently,” as the merchants’ itinerary would first pass by Genoa and many other Italian ports which represented the cornerstones of a competitive trade network. The Venetian rabbi seems to have inherited some of the interpretative categories from Botero, even though he did not fully agree with the results obtained by him, and from Serra he inherits his general reasoning paradigm, though adding to it converse conclusions. The rabbi assigns an important role to location, which can turn out as either a hindrance or a business catalyser in relation to other political and social conditions, just as Serra spoke of it—as mentioned above—as being “almost a cause,” supporting it with his considerations on manufactures.37

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Luzzatto, Discourse, 41. Luzzatto, 41. Campos Boralevi, “La città,” 258, recalling Luzzatto’s quotation from the Thucydides (“it is certain that men produce fortunes and not vice versa”; Discourse, 53), affirms that for the Venetian rabbi “it is contrary to a deterministic conception, and in particular to this type of geographic-agrarian determinism” (my translation). In this article, I tend to propose a

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Luzzatto proposes his consideration to his readers and, particularly, to the Venetian decision-makers: neither an abstract collocation nor an ideal definition effectively exist. The suitability of a location is measured against the effective trend of trade flows in a specific time frame and in relation to the operators who are responsible for the outcome. Hence, Luzzatto turns around the prevailing interpretation of Venice as having an ideal location. With the aim of defending the economic role played by Venetian Jews, this is a way to undermine the opposite theory, that is, the theory postulated by those who believe that the place itself generates trade; in reality, according to Luzzatto, it is the Jews who are supposed to play a crucial role in this. Venice, then, would appear to be not only “useless,” using Botero’s taxonomy, but also “unnecessary.” The barycentre of trade is mobile; and likewise, the interdependent network can vary, as other centres can provide supplies to the cities surrounding Venice. Using Botero’s categories, Luzzatto reaches opposite conclusions: “As for claiming that without the trade of the Jews the same merchandise in the same quantities would nonetheless arrive in Venice, because there the obligatory distribution to the surrounding provinces still would exist, this is not necessarily the case in Italy, as already demonstrated above.”38 In this interpretation, the economic situation plays a decisive role. Luzzatto faced an unfolding crisis, a situation quite unlike the conditions under which Botero was writing—namely, the “Indian summer” of the Italian economy.39 Nevertheless, of remarkable relevance to Luzzatto is his main concept of the role assigned to merchants as active agents, which in mercantile terms means an increase in wealth.40 Notwithstanding both Botero and Serra, several causes are conducive to the economic success of cities and states; it cannot simply be settled as a geographic issue, as it involves a mercantile and industrial dimension. According to Luzzatto, the role of merchants is immediately called into question, to explain both the economic destiny of Venice and that of the Jews.

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partially different interpretation. The geographic condition appears rather, in Luzzatto’s interpretation, an unavoidable element, but is in itself not sufficient to explain the economic dynamics. Luzzatto, Discourse, 43. Carlo M. Cipolla, Before the Industrial Revolution. European Society and Economy, 1000– 1700, trans. Christopher Woodall (London: Routledge, 1993), 243. The interpretation of the Italian decline in the seventeenth century has been the subject of extensive debate. Here we refer only to Paolo Malanima, “The Long Decline of a Leading Economy: gdp in Central and Northern Italy, 1300–1913,” European Review of Economic History 15, no. 2 (2011): 169–219. Boralevi, “La città,” 256.

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Virtuous Imports

In the first half of the seventeenth century, a concept began to prevail in European thought according to which foreign trade was strategic to the economic success of states. Specifically, the English debate took on a more paradigmatic role.41 Reconstructing the genesis and the development of this idea does not fall within the scope of this essay.42 My intention here is to only underline how Luzzatto’s consideration can be fitted into this context, including its peculiar features. Antonio Serra, who developed an original and innovative theory, proposed a reading of the trade balance which not only concerned the “current account” of merchandise but also the “capital account.”43 According to Serra, the Kingdom of Naples exported a surplus of foodstuffs but imported multiple manufactures and consumption goods, which caused an outflow of capital, also due to, among other things, financial services.44 In line with this approach, for Serra, the intermediary role played by the city of Venice is specifically relevant. If it were to be true, then, as Serra declares, that manufacturing activities and trade reciprocally produce beneficial effects and are dependent on each other, the crux of the issue would lie in re-exportation activities. The earnings obtained from the sale of foodstuffs, that is, goods produced autonomously by a kingdom, are limited: “not much trade is generated in a country by exporting its own commodities, and any money that results is due to the proper accident of a domestic agricultural surplus rather than to the common accident of extensive trade.”45 Merchant traffic will have the desired effect (an increase of the quantity of money and the enrichment of the state), to the extent that “it consists in

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44 45

Eric Roll, Storia del pensiero economico (Turin: Einaudi, 1954; first edition London: Faber and Faber, 1934), 65–96; Roncaglia, La ricchezza delle idee, 49–54; Erik S. Reinert, “Giovanni Botero (1588) and Antonio Serra (1613): Italy and the Birth of Development Economics,” in Handbook of Alternative Theories of Economic Development, eds. Erik S. Reinert, Jayati Ghosh, and Rainer Kattel (Cheltenham: Elgar, 2016), 20. For a comparison between the English debate and Neapolitan economists, see Annalisa Rosselli, “Early Views on Monetary Policy: The Neapolitan Debate on the Theory of Exchange,” History of Political Economy 32, no. 1 (2000): 61–62; Lilia Costabile, “External Imbalances and the Money Supply: Two Controversies in the English ‘Realme’ and in the Kingdom of Naples,” in Antonio Serra and the Economics of Good Government, eds. Rosario Patalano and Sophus A. Reinert (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 166–190. This description in modern terms is due to Enzo Grilli, Antonio Serra (Rome: Luiss University Press, 2006), 57; see also Fusco, “Antonio Serra,” 168–169 (which recalls how Joseph A. Schumpeter already noticed this innovative trait of Serra’s thought); Costabile, “External Imbalances,” 169. Grilli, Antonio Serra, 56. Serra, A Short Treatise, 125.

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importing the commodities and manufactured products of foreign countries and exporting them to other foreign countries.”46 And in this, again, the importance of location, discussed in the previous section, came into play: experience shows that “all the goods that are imported from Asia to Europe pass through Venice, from where they are distributed to other places.”47 In reality, in the years of Serra’s activity as a writer, matters were not exactly like this. The centrality of Venice’s position partially and gradually declined while other Italian Mediterranean cities gained more importance, above all Leghorn (Livorno) in Tuscany.48 This was demonstrated, among other elements, by the great interest nurtured by English merchants in trade in that city. The operators of the Levant Company, who enjoyed a trade monopoly over Venice but not with other Italian ports, would often gladly travel to the Tuscan business hub.49 It was to be just one of these operators, Thomas Mun, who was to be the inspirer of a renewal in economic thought.50 In his idea of “balance of trade” the decisive role of foreign trade is obvious, with the difference that it is here formulated in a more articulate and exhaustive way, as a continual flow of merchandise and capital, driven by foreign demand. Here the emphasis is placed, just as Serra did, on national manufactures. On the one hand, the key role played by foreign demand emerges as the principle driving force for the wealth of a state;51 on the other hand, Mun emphasises the reciprocity in trade transactions: while domestic consumption is to be kept under control, they are however, not to be eliminated, since they stimulate the flow of capital which is in the hands of foreigners, who otherwise would not have the means to purchase

46 47 48

49

50 51

Serra, 125. Serra, 125. Fernand Braudel and Ruggiero Romano, Navires et marchandises à l’entrée du port de Livourne (1547–1611) (Paris: Armand Colin, 1951); Renato Ghezzi, “Il porto di Livorno e il commercio mediterraneo nel Seicento,” in Livorno 1606–1806: luogo di incontro tra popoli e culture, ed. Adriano Prosperi (Turin: Allemandi, 2009), 268–282; Jean-Pierre Filippini, Il porto di Livorno e la Toscana, 1676–1814, 3 vols. (Naples: Edizioni scientifiche italiane, 1998); Corey Tazzara, The Free Port of Livorno and the Transformation of the Mediterranean World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017). The thesis of the unstoppable and significant economic decline of Venice has been revised by the most recent historiography. Maria Fusaro, Political Economies of Empire in the Early Modern Mediterranean. The Decline of Venice and the Rise of England, 1450–1700 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 269–271. Fernand Braudel, Civiltà materiale, economia e capitalismo (Turin: Einaudi, 1981; first edition Paris: Armand Colin, 1979), ii, 192, 195, 442. See also footnotes 7 and 34. Joyce Oldham Appleby, Pensiero economico e ideologia nell’Inghilterra del xvii secolo (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1983; first edition Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), 46.

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English merchandise.52 In his work A Discourse of Trade (1621), he reacts to the objections against English trade in the East and against the role played by the East India Company, of which Mun was to be one of the directors. He here asserts the need to let capital out (in the form of financial capital—namely English currency), which would create more profit through re-exportation to other countries.53 The concept was to be taken up again and further delved into in the fourth chapter of his celebrated work England’s Treasure by Forraign Trade, written in 1622, but only published in 1664 by his son.54 Notwithstanding many differences,55 an echo of Mun’s considerations appears in the Discourse by Luzzatto. Discussing the factors for attracting trade in a city, Luzzatto suggests three elements as being well known to the mercantile world:56 the importance of a mercantile fleet (for those “who owned ships were masters of trade”57), the central importance of merchants who travel from place to place, in this way making “friendships and contacts,”58 and, last of all, the role played by capital: “by sending one’s capital to various places, and thereby inviting and inducing others to reciprocate and to have their own riches sent to the city.”59

52 53

54 55

56 57 58 59

Appleby, Pensiero economico e ideologia, 46. Thomas Mun, A Discourse of Trade, from England unto the East-Indies Answering to Diverse Obiections which are Usually Made Against the Same (London: Nicholas Okes for Iohn Pyper, 1621), 19, http://name.umdl.umich.edu/A07886.0001.001. Thomas Mun, England’s Treasure by Forraign Trade by Thomas Mun (London: Thomas Clark, 1664; New York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1965), 14–19. Mun does not have the concept of money as a fluid that feeds the entire social organism (Germano Maifreda, L’economia e la scienza. Il rinnovamento della cultura economica fra Cinque e Seicento [Rome: Edizioni di storia e letteratura, 2010], 203, who quotes Lynn Muchmore, “A Note on Thomas Mun’s England’s Treasure by Forraign Trade,” The Economic History Review 23, no. 3 [1970]: 501), which from Davanzati reaches Hobbes (Francesco Boldizzoni, “L’anatomia politica di Bernardo Davanzati: prospettive sul pensiero economico del Rinascimento,” Cheiron: materiali e strumenti di aggiornamento storiografico 42 [2004]: 73–93), but which also crosses Luzzatto’s thoughts (Karp, The Politics of Jewish Commerce, 23), also through Francis Bacon (Veltri, “Economic and Social Arguments,” 26). On the conception of nature in Luzzatto and its uses, see David B. Ruderman, Jewish Thought and Scientific Discovery in Early Modern Europe (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), 153–184. On the medieval roots of these concepts (and metaphors), see Giacomo Todeschini, Come l’acqua e il sangue. Le origini medievali del pensiero economico (Rome: Carocci, 2021). See also Ravid, Economics and Toleration, 68–70. Luzzatto, Discourse, 51. Luzzatto, 51. Luzzatto, 51.

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With regards to this third element, though formulated in a very synthetic manner compared to Mun’s standpoint, the idea of a virtuous reciprocity in the economic flow emerges. The merchant from London underlines the importance of the centrality of the merchant’s fleet in particular, as he responds to the accusation made against the East India Company that it would not support England’s war-time needs; he rather establishes a connection between the mercantile companies and trade activities implicitly.60 However, the focus of Luzzatto’s consideration falls on the second aspect, in other words, on the more personal mercantile activities. The merchant and his social placement is at the centre.61 As he further writes: There is no doubt that the wandering and transference of people is one of the main incentives of trade. And even though one certainly cannot deny that the mildness of the air and the location of the countries are of great importance for commerce and trade, the strongest incentive seems to be that people come either of their own free will or because they feel enticed to do so.62 Luzzatto tends to describe this situation as of historic significance, even for that era too, but one which nevertheless is idealistic, especially when speaking of temporary “wandering.” The idea behind the “pilgrim” merchant that wanders from land to land was in fact a reality that had been in part overcome, at least as far as the Adriatic basin was concerned, also by virtue of the multiplicity of financial instruments available. Even though over sixty years had passed since the Venetian rabbi wrote his Discourse, Rafael Coen, a Jewish merchant from Ragusa, clearly exemplified what was meant. Following an accusation of not having fulfilled his tax duties to the local community of Ancona, he writes that “there is no reason that the merchant should behave like a sailor.”63 What 60

61

62 63

“In trade of Merchandize our Shippes must goe and come, they are not made to stay at home; Yet neuerthelesse, the East-India companie are well prepared at all times to serue his Maiestie, and his Kingdomes, with many warlike prouisions, which they alwayes keep in store.” (Mun, A Discourse of Trade, 31). The bibliography on the role of the social organization of merchant operators is substantial, starting with the theses of Karl Polanyi and Max Weber. For a recent discussion, with new data on the French case, see Arnaud Bartolomei, Matthieu de Oliveira, Fabien Eloire, Claire Lemercier, and Nadège Sougy, “L’encastrement des relations entre marchands en France, 1750–1850: Une révolution dans le monde du commerce?” Annales. Histoire, Sciences Sociales 72 (2017), no. 2: 425–460. Luzzatto, Discourse, 51. “Non è raggione, che il mercante deba fare dà marinaro” (asr, cbg, ii, aa 166, letter of Raffael Coen to the pope Clement xi, Ragusa, s.d., but 1702). Rafael had been accused by his

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is intended here is relative anachronism: the mobility of merchants has certainly not been abolished, but neither is it to be considered so crucial. It is no coincidence that the circulation of information (to name just one element) assumes a relevant role during the modern era,64 in addition to the use of financial instruments which permit capital to circulate even without merchants.65 Conversely, the innovative elements in the considerations of Serra and Mun actually take complete charge of aspects concerning the circulation of capital in the commercial trend, again confirming the increasing importance they held in the economy of the time. This relative gap is, in part, a revelation. Luzzatto underlines the specific contribution of some social groups, specifically the Jews. As he wrote in the fourth consideration of his Discourse: “one can conclude that some trade and business transactions are connected to the presence of the Jews. Such activities are necessarily dependent upon their industriousness, inventiveness, connections, and practices, and without their residence in the city, this kind of trade would be lost, or would go elsewhere.”66 Within this frame, Luzzatto’s explanation of the pacifying character of trade is clear: it is through the personal relationships trade entails that a friendly settlement of eventual conflicts could be reached. An assertion that, as already brought to notice by historiography, has hardly ever found acknowledgement in reality.67 It is neither essential to presuppose a certain direct correspondence nor a first-hand knowledge of Thomas Mun’s work as far as Simone Luzzatto is con-

64

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66 67

co-religionists from Ancona of evading the taxes due to the Universitas of the Jews of the city for the goods that passed from Ragusa to Ancona without their legitimate owner. See Luca Andreoni, “Una nazione in commercio.” Ebrei di Ancona, traffici adriatici e pratiche mercantili in età moderna (Milan: Franco Angeli, 2019), 235n35. Pierre Jeannin, “La diffusion de l’information,” in Fiere e mercati nella integrazione delle economie europee, sec. xiii–xviii (Atti delle Settimane di Studi e altri Convegni, 32), ed. Simonetta Cavaciocchi (Florence: Le Monnier, 2001), 231–262. Raymond De Roover, “The Organization of Trade,” in The Cambridge Economic History of Europe, vol. 3: Economic Organization and Politics in the Middle Ages, eds. Michael M. Postan, Edwin E. Rich, and Edward Miller (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963), 42–118; Francesca Trivellato, The Promise and Peril of Credit. What a Forgotten Legend About Jews and Finance Tells Us About the Making of European Commercial Society (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019), 19–35. Luzzatto, Discourse, 55. The idea of trade as friendship was taken over by Aaron Kitch, Political Economy and the States of Literature in Early Modern England (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009), 122–123. On this point see Ravid, Economics and Toleration, 55 and 55n54, who points out that Luzzatto’s statement is not supported by evidence, as the wars between Venice and the Ottoman Empire would show that the intense trade between the lagoon city and the Porta should have been averted.

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cerned. (Neither is it impossible, as one can demonstrate to what extent the English merchant enjoyed indirect contacts with the lagoon city.68) Noteworthy here is how the discussion on economic concepts served to construct two different models of trade, which were linked both to particular historic experiences and to the specific purposes of the writers of the two texts. Although Mun does not explicitly mention it in his text but alludes to it as being of secondary importance, the privileged role of the company comes out anyhow.69 Whereas, according to Luzzatto, it is the role of the single merchant that is most evident. This is quite obvious in the Venetian context and in light of the thesis that the Venetian rabbi intends to uphold: the key role of trade, which was central to the economic fortunes of the city, was a key role assumed pre-eminently by the Jews—and hence a justification not to expel them.

4

Conclusion

As has been noted, the attention paid by Christian scholars to the Jewish world during the seventeenth century and the pragmatic and mercantilist approach of the states towards the Jews developed simultaneously.70 In the existing literature, one link has been singled out, namely the one between Jewish thought and republicanism—one of the prevailing ideas in modern political thought— which was widely spread during the seventeenth century.71 The choice made in 68

69

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71

Fusaro, Political Economies, 233, 271; Raymond De Roover, “Thomas Mun in Italy,” Bulletin of the Institute of the Historical Research 30, no. 81 (1957): 85. A first point on Thomas Mun is mentioned by Bernard. D. Cooperman in the debate reported in Gaetano Cozzi, ed. Gli Ebrei e Venezia. Secoli xiv–xviii, Atti del Convegno internazionale (Venezia, 5–10 giugno 1983) (Milan: Edizioni Comunità, 1987), 197. On the cultural relations between England and Venice, the bibliography is substantial. Here I refer only to Zera S. Fink, “Venice and English Political Thought in the Seventeenth Century,” Modern Philology, 38, no. 2 (1940): 155–172; Stefano Villani, “Gli Incogniti e l’Inghilterra,” in Gli incogniti e l’Europa, ed. Davide Conrieri (Bologna: Emil di Odoya, 2011), 233–276. Mun’s writings on trade had originated precisely from the intent to defend the young East India Company from the accusations of exporting British currency and cracking the state treasury. In the Discourse, the reference to the Company is explicit in the answer to the second objection (31ss). Israel, European Jewry, 46; more in general, Francesca Trivellato, “Jews and the Early Modern Economy,” in The Cambridge History of Judaism, vol. 7: The Early Modern World, 1500– 1815, eds. Jonathan Karp and Adam Sutcliffe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018): 139–167. Adam Sutcliffe, “The Philosemitic Moment? Judaism and Republicanism in SeventeenthCentury European Thought,” in Philosemitism in History, eds. Jonathan Karp and Adam Sutcliffe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 67–89. On the link between Jew-

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this essay was not to go along the main path of this itinerary to investigate these themes: to search for the Hebrew sources of the political and economic policies of Christian thinkers, which then were to have a link to and impact on the effective policies adopted by the states.72 Neither has there been any attempt to go along this path in the reverse direction, to search for the grounds of Luzzatto’s considerations. Instead, the aim has rather been to emphasise some distinctive traits of Luzzatto’s elaborations on economic matters, with specific reference to the key role played by the Jews in mercantile activities. With the purpose of carrying out this investigation, we moved through a comparative analysis of some writers, who at times were geographically, in time, and in concept quite distant from Luzzatto. This comparison, though, was necessary to be able to understand some of the authoritative positions on these matters and, through these, to be able to fully appreciate the reasons behind the specific path Luzzatto has traced in his Discourse. In so doing, as we moved along the traces suggested by the existing historiography mentioned above, I have endeavoured to demonstrate how Luzzatto’s economic convictions could hardly be summarised within the existing frames of reference. Though references to and replicas and echoes of the economic concepts that prevailed in the 1630s are not lacking, Luzzatto’s considerations cannot be easily framed within a single paradigm of thought in terms of economic matters. The multiplicity of the quotes and sources (from classical writers to the modern ones, from holy scriptures to theological texts) testifies to this. Nevertheless, one of the leitmotifs in his economic thought, which emerges from the two examples mentioned in sections 2 and 3, seems to be that of tracing economics back to the key role of the merchant, notably that of

72

ish political sources and models and republican thought, see Lea Campos Boralevi, “Per una storia della Respublica Hebraeorum come modello politico,” in Dalle ‘Repubbliche’ elzeviriane alle ideologie del ’900. Studi di storia delle idee in età moderna e contemporanea, eds. Vittor Ivo Comparato and Eluggero Pii (Florence: Olschki, 1997), 17–33; Lea Campos Boralevi, “Classical Foundation Myths of European Republicanism: The Jewish Commonwealth,” in Republicanism. A Shared European Heritage, vol. 1: Republicanism and Constitutionalism in Early Modern Europe, eds. Martin Van Gelderen and Quentin Skinner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 247–261; Guido Bartolucci, La repubblica ebraica di Carlo Sigonio. Modelli politici dell’età moderna (Florence: Olschki, 2007); Guido Bartolucci, “Carlo Sigonio and the Respublica Hebraeorum: A Re-evaluation,”Hebraic Political Studies 3, no. 1 (2008): 19–59. On the link between intellectual debate and public policies in the seventeenth century and on the subject of maritime jurisdiction, see Guillaume Calafat, Une mer jalousée. Contribution à l’histoire de la souveraineté (Méditerranée, xviie siècle) (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 2019).

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the Jewish merchant.73 The latter was seen as a figure framed within a precise social arrangement—which was legitimised even by the same key role being attributed to himself74—embodied by the apologetic intent that animates his Discourse.

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Boralevi, “La città”, 254–260. On the reproposal of the scheme of juridical inferiority and on the claim of the submissiveness of the Jews, see Karp, The Politics of Jewish Commerce, 26.

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Sutcliffe, Adam. “The Philosemitic Moment? Judaism and Republicanism in Seventeenth-Century European Thought.” In Philosemitism in History, edited by Jonathan Karp and Adam Sutcliffe, 67–89. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011. Tazzara, Corey. The Free Port of Livorno and the Transformation of the Mediterranean World. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017. Todeschini, Giacomo. Come l’acqua e il sangue. Le origini medievali del pensiero economico. Rome: Carocci, 2021. Trivellato, Francesca. “Jews and the Early Modern Economy.” In The Cambridge History of Judaism, vol. 7: The Early Modern World, 1500–1815, edited by Jonathan Karp and Adam Sutcliffe, 139–167. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018. Trivellato, Francesca. The Promise and Peril of Credit. What a Forgotten Legend About Jews and Finance Tells Us About the Making of European Commercial Society. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019. Veltri, Giuseppe. “Alcune considerazioni sugli ebrei e Venezia nel pensiero politico di Simone Luzzatto.” In Percorsi di storia ebraica. Fonti per la storia degli ebrei in Italia nell’età moderna e contemporanea, Atti del Convegno internazionale (Cividale del Friuli–Gorizia, 7–9 settembre 2004), edited by Pier Cesare Ioly Zorattini, 247–266. Udine: Forum, 2005. Veltri, Giuseppe. “Economic and Social Arguments and the Doctrine of the Antiperistasis in Simone Luzzatto’s Political Thought: Venetian Reverberations of Francis Bacon’s Philosophy.” Frühneuzeit-Info 23 (2011): 23–32. Veltri, Giuseppe. “Identità nell’essenzialità. Il concetto luzzattiano di diaspora secondo Yitzhak Baer e Riccardo Bachi.” In Filosofo e rabbino nella Venezia del Seicento. Studi su Simone Luzzatto con documenti inediti dall’Archivio di Stato di Venezia, edited by Veltri, 307–331. Rome: Aracne, 2015. Veltri, Giuseppe. Renaissance Philosophy in Jewish Garb. Foundations and Challenges in Judaism on the Eve of Modernity. Leiden: Brill, 2009. Veltri, Giuseppe. “Saggio introduttivo.” In Simone Luzzatto, Scritti politici e filosofici di un ebreo scettico nella Venezia del Seicento, edited by Giuseppe Veltri, with Anna Lissa and Paola Ferruta, xix–lxxxix. Milan: Bompiani, 2013. Villani, Stefano. “Gli Incogniti e l’Inghilterra.” In Gli incogniti e l’Europa. Edited by Davide Conrieri, 233–276. Bologna: Emil di Odoya, 2011.

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“Seek the Peace of the City to which I have exiled you” in Simone Luzzatto and Menasseh ben Israel, with Azariah de’ Rossi behind the Scenes Myriam Silvera

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Introduction

In this essay, taking as my starting point certain pages of the fifteenth consideration of Simone Luzzatto’s Discourse on the State of the Jews,1 I will examine in particular the significance that the theme of Jewish prayers for non-Jews came to acquire—not only in Luzzatto’s Discourse, but also in the writings of Azariah de’ Rossi and Menasseh ben Israel. What will become evident above all is the way in which the theme of prayer invoking the well-being of the “Other,” and in particular of the authorities who regulate public life, is deployed in defence of the Jews at the political level, and the considerable currency it comes to enjoy in situations in which Jews had to defend their rights of residence in various geographic contexts and felt the need to emphasise their social and moral good character and assert the value of their cultural and economic contribution to the local community as a whole. The focus of attention will be the injunction contained in Jeremiah 29:7 and transmitted in God’s name to those exiled to Babylon in 598 bce: “Seek the peace of the city whither I have caused you to be carried away captive, and pray unto the Lord for it, for in the peace thereof shall ye have peace [Hebr.: shalom].”2 Specific biblical passages not infrequently 1 The English edition from which I cite here is: Simone Luzzatto, Discourse on the State of the Jews—Bilingual Edition, ed., trans., and comm. Giuseppe Veltri and Anna Lissa (Berlin: De Gruyter 2019). The original edition is Simone Luzzatto, Discorso circa il Stato de gl’Hebrei et in particolar dimoranti nell’inclita Città di Venetia (Venice: appresso Gioanne Calleoni, 1638) [hereafter Discorso, with folio numbers from that edition]. Also still relevant is the new Italian edition of the Discorso and of Socrate overo dell’humano sapere in Simone Luzzatto, Scritti politici e filosofici di un ebreo scettico nella Venezia del Seicento, ed. Giuseppe Veltri with the collaboration of Anna Lissa and Paola Ferruta (Milan: Bompiani, 2013). 2 This verse is preceded by an invitation to “build ye houses”, “plant gardens […] take ye wives and beget sons and daughters”: The English Bible: King James Version (New York: Norton & Company, 2012). The title of my article is inspired by this last version (in its first part) and by the version edited by The Jewish Publication Society, 1917 (in its second part). For discussion of the word shalom in this passage, see, for example, Regina Willi, Les pensées de bonheur de Dieu pour son peuple selon Jr 29. Un témoignage de l’espérance au temps de l’exil (Lugano: Facoltà di Teologia di Lugano, 2005), 185–216.

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attain a special resonance at particular moments of Jewish history, coming to be interpreted in a fresh light in response to contingent circumstances; and we can certainly affirm that, in the early modern period, Jer 29:7 was invoked to confirm the Jews’ unrestricted potential to fully integrate themselves into the social and political fabric of their places of habitation. Luzzatto comes to Jeremiah’s exhortation in the course of his refutation of Tacitus’s criticisms directed at the Jews, which sat uneasily with his general esteem for the Roman historian. He expresses himself in the following terms: “When referring to the origins and customs of the Jews, he [Tacitus] failed in this task, deviating from his usual self, because of the mendaciousness with which he mixed [his narration].”3 Encapsulated in the concisely rendered Italian phrase “si rese diverso da se stesso” (deviating from his usual self) is at once both Luzzatto’s admiration for Tacitus as a political thinker and his profound dissent in the face of the calumnies levelled by him at the traditions and customs of the Jews. In the words of Abraham Melamed, who has analysed the relationship of Luzzatto to Tacitus’s thought, Luzzatto can be regarded as the foremost Jewish Tacitist. Like many of his contemporaries he admired Tacitus, “among the earliest masters of civil government.”4 As a Jew, however, Luzzatto had to cope with the Tacitean libels against Judaism. He had to somehow resolve the apparent contradiction between his admiration of Tacitus the historian and political thinker and his rejection of Tacitus the Antisemite.5

3 Luzzatto, Discourse, 151. The original text reads as follow: “nel riferire l’origine e costumi degli Hebrei tralignò e si rese diverso da se stesso, per le mendacità che vi mescolò.” (Discorso, 57v) In addition to the studies by Abraham Melamed that I cite below, see Anna Margaretha Alida Hospers-Jansen, Tacitus over de Joden: Hist. 5, 2–13 (Groningen: J.B. Wolters, 1949); Louis H. Feldman, “Pro-Jewish Intimations in Tacitus’ Account of Jewish Origins,” Revue des Études Juives 150 (1991): 331–360. See also René Bloch, “Tacitus’ Excursus on the Jews through the Ages: An Overview of Its Reception History,” in Oxford Readings in Classical Studies: Tacitus, ed. Rhiannon Ash (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 377–410. 4 Discourse, 151. The original text reads: “frà i primi Maestri del Governo Civile.” (Discorso 57v). 5 Abraham Melamed, “The Perception of Jewish History in Italian Jewish Thought of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries: A Re-examination,” in Italia Judaica: Gli ebrei in Italia tra Rinascimento e Età barocca (Rome: Ministero per i Beni Culturali e Ambientali, 1986), 152. See also, more specifically, Abraham Melamed, “Simone Luzzatto on Tacitus: Apologetica and Ragione di Stato,” in Studies in Medieval Jewish History and Literature, vol. 2, ed. Isadore Twersky (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984), 143–170; republished in Abraham Melamed, Wisdom’s Little Sister: Studies in Medieval and Renaissance Jewish Political Thought (Boston: Academic Studies Press, 2012), 305–334.

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It was precisely on account of his admiration for the political Tacitus that Luzzatto chose, according to Melamed, to respond in specifically political terms to the charges laid against the Jews, turning such claims on their head by testimony testifying to the wisdom and propriety of Jewish civic conduct.6 Luzzatto begins from an awareness that the image of the Jews presented in the Tacitus’s Historiae risks being “detrimental to all believers of the Holy Scripture—like a rock that will shipwreck weak spirits among the believers.”7 He applies himself, therefore, to the answering of seven criticisms that Tacitus makes regarding Jewish rites and customs; among these I might mention the presumed cult of the head of a donkey8 and the explanation for the origin of the prohibition upon pork in a leprosy epidemic that had supposedly once afflicted the Jews.9 Also on Luzzatto’s list of Tacitean objections, however, was the internal solidarity of the Hebrews, associated with a hostile odium said 6 Melamed, “Perception,” 152: “This Luzzatto attempted to do by proving that precisely from a Tacitean point of departure, specifically that of ‘reason of State’, the Roman historian would have come to a philosemitic conclusion had he only understood the real political motives behind the religion and customs of the Jews.” See Melamed, “Simone Luzzatto,” 158: “Luzzatto comes to bury Tacitus the antisemite by means of praising Tacitus the master of reason of state.” 7 Discourse 151. The original text reads: “E giudicando io che questo suo racconto, e giuditio, circa l’origine e riti della natione, prestandoli fede, non poco detrimento potesse apportare a tutti gli credenti della Sacra Scrittura, et esser scoglio di naufragio agli spiriti deboli nella fede, ho stimato esser opera d’alcun pregio […] confutare l’imposture in tal proposito da lui finte.” (Discorso 58r) Melamed justifiably treats as problematic this claim as to the “damage” it might cause to the Jews, pointing to the scarce attention paid to these particular Tacitean arguments from the sixteenth to the seventeenth centuries, and disregarded even by the antiJewish polemical literature of the period. Tacitus’s accusations may thus have served as a “screen” for the antisemitism of Venice at the time, while, on the contrary and in positive terms, esteem for the “political Tacitus” acted as a cover for admiration of Machiavelli. See, on this last aspect, Melamed, “Simone Luzzatto,” 146: “When it was too dangerous to quote the wicked Machiavelli directly—after his being banned by the papal index during the counterreformation—he appeared in Tacitean disguise.” 8 Tacitus, Hist. v, 3.2; for the English translation, Tacitus, Histories, Books 4–5. Annals, Books 1–3, trans. Clifford H. Moore and John Jackson (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1931). For the vast literature with regard to the cult of the donkey, see the comprehensive note at Discourse, 153n235. See also Bezalel Bar Kochva, “An Ass in the Jerusalem Temple: The Origins and Development of the Slander,” in Josephus’ Contra Apionem: Studies in Its Character and Context with a Latin Concordance to the Portion Missing in Greek, eds. Louis H. Feldman and John R. Levison (Leiden: Brill, 1996), 310–326; Flavius Josèphe, Contre Apion, ed. Théodore Reinach, trans. Léon Blum, int. and not. Sylvie Anne Goldberg (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2018), 162n47. 9 Tacitus, Hist. v, 4.1–4. On the various explanations of an anti-Jewish hue for the Jewish abstinence from pork, see Peter Schäfer, Judeophobia: Attitudes toward the Jews in the Ancient World (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), ch. 3.

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to be nurtured by them vis-à-vis other peoples.10 While Luzzatto’s refutation of this point might recall the arguments presented in the foregoing thirteenth consideration, entitled “The Ancient Mosaic Law Decreed That Generosity and Kindness Must be Practised towards All Humankind,”11 it differs insofar as his analysis of relations between Jews and the followers of other religions now concentrates on one aspect in particular: the connections of the Jews to the political and social contexts of the countries in which they reside; that is, his concern is to examine their everyday behaviour—as it emerges out of their own traditions—within the cities, countries, and kingdoms they inhabit; to focus upon their concept of civic and political loyalty.

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The High Priest’s Tunic

In response to Tacitus’s imputation of hostility to the Jews, Luzzatto constructs an elaborate argument, progressively enriched by citation of a variety of antique sources, having as their common point of reference, as we have observed, Hebrew prayer. The sequence of the passages selected by Luzzatto appears to suggest a progression from the universal to the particular: from the high priest’s prayer for the entire universe, to the Jewish benedictions directed at the emperors, to the augury for the well-being of the cities in which the Jews had come to dwell. It is Luzzatto’s intention to contrapose to Tacitus “the authority of our Philo, who was no less erudite or learned than him”; the two men were, furthermore, “almost contemporaries, for Philo lived under Caius Caligula and Tacitus was born in the time of Caius Caligula’s successor, Claudius.”12 Recourse to the thought of Philo of Alexandria permits Luzzatto to broaden and extend the range of possible beneficiaries of Hebrew prayer, for the description of the high priest’s tunic in On the Special Laws makes of it “a copy of the universe, a piece of work of marvellous beauty to the eye and the mind.”13 The symbolism of 10

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Tacitus’s assertion is quoted as follows: “And [they are] always ready to show compassion, but toward every other people they feel only hate and enmity.” (Discourse, 165) Discorso, 63r: “et quia apud ipsos fides obstinata misericordia in pro[m]ptu, sed adversus omnes alios hostile odium.” Luzzatto, Discourse, 123. The original reads: “Considerazione xiii: Che la Legge antica mosaica instituì che si dovesse usar carità verso tutto il genere umano.” (Discorso, 46r–51v). Luzzatto, Discourse, 165. The original reads: “gli voglio contraponere l’autorità del nostro Filone non minor di lui d’eruditione, e dottrina, e si può dire quasi a lui coetaneo, havendo vissuto sotto Caio Caligola e Tacito nato a tempo di Claudio che gli successe.” (Discorso, 63r). Philo, On the Special Laws, trans. Francis H. Colson, in Philo in Ten Volumes, vol. 7, 97–607

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the tunic is threefold. It indicates, firstly, that the high priest is worthy of universal nature—that is, morally sound; and secondly, that in his prayer he has the whole world as a “fellow-ministrant.” The third meaning is then implicit in the second, and Luzzatto places emphasis upon it by reproducing in its entirety the relevant passage from Philo: “Among the other nations the priests are accustomed to offer prayers and sacrifices for their kinsmen and friends and fellow-countrymen only, but the high priest of the Jews makes prayers and gives thanks not only on behalf of the whole human race but also for the parts of nature, earth, water, air, fire.”14 As distinct from other peoples, who pray exclusively for their friends, relatives, or fellow citizens, the high priest might be said to pray for all peoples and for nature in its entirety, as represented in his garment by the four elements. The argument is further enhanced by a brief allusion to Flavius Josephus, who likewise affirmed the universality represented by the priestly garment.15 The accusation of exclusivity levelled at the Jews by Tacitus thus meets with its first confutation.

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Cyrus, Darius, and Alexander the Great

Certain figures of the non-Jewish world placed in government over the Hebrews seem, moreover—so Luzzatto’s argument continues—to have been aware of the universal significance of Hebrew prayer, dedicating particular

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(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968), 155. The discussion of the high priest’s tunic begins at paragraph 82 of book 1, and continues to paragraph 97. Luzzatto, Discourse, 165. The original reads: “est tertium huius sacrae vestis misterium non praeterve[u]ndum silentio, nam alii sacerdotes, tantum pro familiaribus amicis civibusque solent rem divinam facere, at Iudaeorum Pontifex, non solum pro toto humano genere, verum etiam pro naturae partibus terra, aqua, aere, igne precatur” (Discorso, 63r–v). Luzzatto uses Sigismundus Gelenius’s Latin version, Philonis Iudaei, summi philosophi, ac scriptoris eloquentissimi, Operum quotquot ad hunc diem haberi potuerunt, tomus alter, interprete Sigismundo Gelenio, Ioanne Christophorsono, et Ioanne Voeuroeo (Leiden: apud Gulielmum Rouillium, 1561), De monarchia, ii.180. For the quotation in English: Philo, On the Special Laws, 155. The editors of the bilingual edition of the Discourse rightly identify the reference to Flavius Josephus in a passage from the Jewish Antiquities (iii.184): “The high-priest’s tunic […] signifies the earth, being of linen, and its blue the arch of heaven, while it recalls the lightnings by its pomegranates, the thunder by the sound of its bells. His upper garment, too, denotes universal nature, which it pleased God to make of four elements.” Josephus, Jewish Antiquities, Books i–iv, trans. Henry St. John Thackeray (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978), 405.

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attention to Jewish places of worship, and requesting that they themselves be included in prayer, assured of its beneficial effects. This line of argument is exemplified by Luzzatto with an extract from the sixth chapter of Ezra, which testifies to Darius’s confirmation of Cyrus’s decree with regard to the rebuilding of the Temple of Jerusalem. The Discourse cites in particular verse 10: “Similarly, one finds in the book of Ezra, chapter 6, that, according to the decree of Darius about daily offerings, the king’s revenue must be used to support and rebuild the holy altar of Jerusalem, explaining such munificence as follows: ‘That they may offer sacrifices of sweet savour unto the God of heaven, and pray for the life of the king, and of his sons.’”16 Cyrus and Darius thus placed their trust in Hebrew prayer, which means of course that they cannot have thought or even imagined that the Jews might despise other nations. “And if Tacitus’s claim about so great a spite and hostility growing between the Jews and other nations is true,” writes Luzzatto, “how ingenuous would it have been for Darius to endow the Temple with gifts and support those people who were accustomed to insulting and cursing other nations instead of welcoming them?”17 And here we are referred once more to Josephus’s Jewish Antiquities, attention being directed on this occasion to Alexander the Great, who refused to acquiesce in the destructive proposals of the Samaritans and who demonstrated his respect for the God of Israel by himself going up to the sanctuary to perform sacrifices to the Lord, under the guidance of the high priest.18 As Luzzatto writes, “Alexander the Great similarly demonstrated—with gifts as well as respect and reverence—how profitable it was for him to have the God worshipped by the Jews favourably disposed to him by the prayers of the high priest.”19

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Luzzatto, Discourse, 165; Discorso, 63v: “Il simile si trova nel libro d’Esdra capitolo 6 ch’havendo raccontato il decreto di Dario per l’offerte quotidiane, che si dovevano soministrare delle facoltà reggie al sacro altare di Hierusalem, rende la ragione di tal munificenza, offerent oblationes Deo coeli, orentque pro vitae Regis, et filiorum Regis.” Luzzatto makes use of the Vulgata clementina: see comments by the editors of the Discourse, Giuseppe Veltri and Anna Lissa, in “Remarks,” vii. Discourse, 165; Discorso, 63v: “E se fosse vero il detto di Tacito che tanto livore, et inimicitia, vertiscono fra gli Hebrei et altre nationi, che grande semplicità sarebbe stata quella di Dario, arricchire di doni quel Tempio, e prestar conmodità a quella gente, ch’invece di benedire, hanno per costume l’esacrare, e blasfemiare l’altre nationi?” Josephus, Jewish Antiquities xi.336, in Josephus, Jewish Antiquities, Books ix–xi, with an English translation by Ralph Marcus (London: Heinemann, 1958), 477: “he [Alexander] gave his hand to the high priest and, with the Jews running beside him, entered the city. Then he went up to the temple, where he sacrificed to God under the direction of the high priest, and showed due honor to the priests and to the high priest himself.” Luzzatto, Discourse, 166–167; Discorso, 63v: “Et Alessandro il Grande non solo con offerte

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The Well-Being of the Jews and of Their City of Residence

The argument that rests on Israel’s prayer for ruling authorities, expressed by means of the high priest’s intercession, concludes by moving, via citation of Jer 29:7, to Jewish appeals for the well-being of the city of Babylon to which the Hebrews had been exiled. Luzzatto writes: The prophet Jeremiah, in the name of God, admonished the people when they were subjugated by the Chaldeans and ordered them to pray to God for health and tranquillity in the city of Babylon, which was the capital city of the kingdom of the Chaldeans: “And seek the peace of the city whiter I have caused you to be carried away captive, and pray unto the Lord for it, for in the peace thereof shall ye have peace.”20 If for Luzzatto, on the one hand, the prayer urged by Jeremiah might be considered a “slave prayer”21—note, for example, his emphasis on the Hebrew people’s submission to the Chaldeans at the time—it is also perfectly possible for it to assume another dimension in his thought, open-ended and more dynamic, freed from the specific actual context of the city of Babylon to encompass any city inhabited by the Jews and chosen by them. The passage from Jeremiah could, in other words, be applied to Venice and to Jewish relations with that city. We might well venture to assert that, when he addresses the utility of the Jewish presence in Venice, Luzzatto does not depart fundamentally from the

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regali, ma con il rispetto, e riverenza dimostrò quanto gli pareva esser giovevole l’havere il Dio adorato dagli Hebrei propitio e favorevole per mezzo degl’imprecationi del magior sacerdote, come narra Gioseffo nel libro d’Antichità, benché di nascita hebreo sincerissimo, et alieno d’ogni passione.” Discourse, 167. The original reads: “Et Hieremia profeta per nome d’Iddio admonì al popolo soggiogato da Caldei, che dovesse implorare Iddio per la salute, e tranquillità della città di Babilonia capo del regno de Caldei, et quaerite pacem civitatis ad quem transmigrare vos feci, et orate pro ea ad Dominum, quia in pacem illius, erit pax vobis.” (Discorso, 63v–64r) On Luzzatto’s use of the Vulgata clementina, see note 16 above. See the contemporary reading of the passage proposed by Rabbi Riccardo Di Segni: “perché voi possiate essere tranquilli e prosperare, la città che vi ospita deve essere in pace, non avete nulla da guadagnare dall’instabilità, anche se vi trovate nella terra di chi ha sconfitto la Giudea e vi ha portato in esilio e quindi adoperatevi per la sua pace” (“that you might be peaceful and prosper, the city you reside in must be at peace; you have nothing to gain by instability, even if you find yourselves in the land of those who defeated Judaea and carried you into exile, and so, strive for its peace.”), in “Preghiamo per l’Italia. Ma risparmiamoci pericolose forzature” [Let us pray for Italy. But let’s not risk overdoing it], Pagine ebraiche 6 (June 2015), 23.

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terms of Jeremiah’s exhortation. The peace and tranquillity of the city guarantee the peace and tranquillity of the exiled Hebrews (in Babylon), says Jeremiah; Luzzatto maintains that, in the well-being of the Jews, understood as prosperity and the flourishing of enterprise, lies the well-being of the city (Venice).22 The parallel might appear to involve an inversion of the relation of cause and effect, assigning as cause in the first instance the prosperity of the city, and in the second, the prosperity of the Jews. The analogy becomes much closer, however, when we take into account too Jeremiah’s preceding exhortation, which, while it solicits from the exiles prayers for the city, also tells us that the Jews have spiritual commitments in order that the city might attain wellbeing. They should thus be able to enjoy the fruits of the city’s prosperity, to be beneficiaries of a favourable situation resulting in part from their own collaboration.23

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See, for example, the introduction to Luzzatto, Discourse, 13: “I would judge it neither a bold nor a dissonant proposition to say that the Jews have offered some considerable profit to the illustrious city of Venice. Likewise, the proposition that they should be considered part and parcel of the city’s common population should not be offensive to the delicate sentiment of even the most scrupulous of souls.” The original text reads: “Che gli Hebrei arrecano alcun considerabile emolumento all’inclita città di Venetia, e che parimente si possono connumerare fra le portioni integranti del comun popolo di lei, stimarei non fusse propositione sì temeraria, e disonante, che offender potesse il delicato sentimento delli animi ancor scropolosissimi.” (Discorso, 7r) See Giuseppe Veltri, “Introduzione: Vita e scritti di Simone Luzzatto,” in Filosofo e Rabbino nella Venezia del Seicento: Studi su Simone Luzzatto con documenti inediti dall’Archivio di Stato di Venezia, ed. Giuseppe Veltri (Ariccia: Aracne, 2015), 25–26: “Luzzatto è concentrato su un problema che per lui resta fondamentale: inserire e legittimare la presenza ebraica nel contesto politico, sociale e culturale del tempo a Venezia, e soprattutto dare a questa legittimazione un fondamento stabile, che si basi su una conoscenza veritiera del popolo ebraico.” (“Luzzatto is focused on a problem that for him remains fundamental: the integration and legitimation of the Jewish presence in the political, social, and cultural context of the times in Venice, and above all the establishment of this legitimation on a secure foundation, based upon a genuine knowledge of the Jewish population.”) As far as Luzzatto is concerned, his comparison between foreign and Jewish merchants is effective testimony of the way in which the well-being of the Jews contributes to the well-being of the country, or, in terms more properly his own, how the commercial enterprise of the Jews is of fundamental “usefulness” (utilità) to the city’s economy. See the third consideration in Discourse, 33–41: the Jews, once wealth has been produced, do not then take it out of the country in which they have acquired it, unlike foreigners, who at a given moment in life, having reached a certain age, return to their home countries. But see also the second consideration, esp. 12r, and the eighth consideration, 31r. On the evocation of this theme by the chiefs of the Jewish community of London, writing to the House of Commons in 1689, see David S. Katz, The Jews in the History of England 1485–1850 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 163.

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Luzzatto and Azariah de’ Rossi

To recap, the sources drawn upon by Luzzatto to refute the supposition of Jewish hostility towards those who do not belong to the Jewish religion are the following, in order: Philo, Flavius Josephus, again Philo, the sixth chapter of the book of Ezra, again Flavius Josephus, and, to conclude, our passage from Jer 29:7. Luzzatto proceeds, as noted above, from the universality of peoples for whom the Jews—through their high priest—pray, to the particularisation of their intercessory prayer for rulers. Before him, Azariah de’ Rossi (ca. 1511–ca. 1578) had worked in the opposite direction in his Meʾor ʿEnayim (The Light of the Eyes), where, beginning from Jer 29:7, he dwelt initially upon the importance attributed by famous emperors to the Jewish religion and the benefits that might be derived from it, and concluded by extending his argument to Jewish prayers for all the peoples of the universe as a whole. Azariah’s concern with the exhortations of Jeremiah leads him first to refer to them in the title to his chapter 55: “How the Jews Follow the Prophet’s Injunction and Ancestral Custom to Pray Constantly for the Welfare of Those Who Govern Them. And in Our Present Exile They Pray That God Should Grant Peace and Tranquility to All Nations.”24 He proceeds to examine a strikingly vast array of sources both within and beyond the Hebrew biblical canon, among them Baruch 1:10–12, and passages from the first and second books of the Maccabees;25 then the sixth chapter of Ezra; certain narratives from the tractate Yoma;26 a maxim from the Pirkei Avot;27 Philo’s On the Special 24

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Azariah de’ Rossi, The Light of the Eyes, trans. from the Hebrew with an introduction and annotations by Joanna Weinberg (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001), 657– 660. On Azariah himself, among the various studies by Weinberg, see esp. Joanna Weinberg, “The Quest for Philo in Sixteenth-Century Jewish Historiography,” in Jewish History: Essays in Honour of Chimen Abramsky, ed. Ada Rapoport-Albert and Steven J. Zipperstein (London: Peter Halban, 1988), 163–187; also Salo W. Baron, “Azariah de Rossi’s Historical Method,” in History and Jewish Historians: Essays and Addresses, eds. Arthur Hertzberg and Leon A. Feldman (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1964), 205– 239, which is a revised translation of a study originally published in two numbers: “La méthode historique d’Azaria de Rossi,” Revue des Études Juives 86, no. 172 (1928), 151–175 and 87, no. 173 (1929), 43–78; Robert Bonfil, “Some Reflections on the Place of Azariah de’ Rossi’s Meʾor Enayim in the Cultural Milieu of Italian Renaissance Jewry,” in Jewish Thought in the Sixteenth Century, ed. Bernard Dov Cooperman (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983), 23–48; Giuseppe Veltri, “The Humanist Sense of History and the Jewish Idea of Tradition: Azaria de’ Rossi’s Critique of Philo Alexandrinus,” Jewish Studies Quarterly 2 (1995), 372–393. Respectively 1Macc 7:33, and 2Macc 3:2. b. Yoma 69a. m. ʿAvot 3:2; See the conclusion of this essay.

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Laws and On the Embassy to Gaius; Flavius Josephus’s Jewish Antiquities, The Jewish War, and Against Apion; Eusebius’s Preparation for the Gospel; and The Josippon.28 Azariah’s discussion proceeds up to the prayers for ruling authorities that, in his own time, were recited in the synagogues of a number of Jewish communities.29 A comparison between Meʾor ʿEnayim and the Discourse reveals clearly the debt Luzzatto owes to Azariah. While the former’s arguments are more concise and he cites fewer sources, we should observe in particular the specific association made by both authors between Jer 29:7 and Ezra 6:8–10,30 and even with the same passage from Philo’s On the Special Laws, in which the restricted ambit of non-Jewish prayer is contrasted with high-priestly universalism.31 It should be noted with regard to the two great witnesses to the Judaism of the earliest years ce, Philo and Josephus, that in the context of the fifteenth consideration, which is of interest to us here, On the Embassy to Gaius is not cited, and neither is Against Apion nor The Jewish War.32

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Eusebius, Praep. ev. 8.2 (pg 21:618). As regards The Josippon, we are concerned with book 3, ch. 16; see note 42 below. These sources will be examined in large part when I will discuss the relationship between Azariah and Menasseh ben Israel below. De’ Rossi, Light, 664: “There is the custom practiced in certain communities to recite a blessing for their rulers and all those connected with government.” Menasseh discusses this prayer at greater length: see note 54 below. De’ Rossi, 661: “Now in the book of Ezra, we are told that Darius the king ratified Cyrus’s written decree, and that at the expense of the king … let them give daily without fail … sacrifices to the God of heaven and pray for the welfare of the king and his sons.” De’ Rossi, 663. A number of observations could be made with regard to the use made by Luzzatto and by Azariah of Josephus’s Jewish Antiquities. Insofar as can be ascertained, both of them drew upon book xi: Azariah when he refers to the ratification by Darius of Cyrus’s decree (Antiquities xi.16–18), and Luzzatto to evoke the admiration expressed by Alexander the Great for the temple and its cult (Antiquities xi.331). Azariah too takes note, immediately after his reference to the ratification, of Alexander’s respect for the sanctuary, with reference not, however, to Josephus, but to folio 69a of the tractate Yoma in the Babylonian Talmud and to the Megillat Taʿanit (on this last text, see De’ Rossi, Light, 661n4, and note 40 below). Once one has traced the steps of Luzzatto’s use of The Light of the Eyes, it would be interesting, by contrast, to dwell a while on the differences between the sources cited in this particular context, as well as to analyse whether certain of Azariah’s quotations may have been deliberately ignored by Luzzatto. I limit myself here to a couple of conjectures: would reference to the Maccabees perhaps have been out of place in the Discourse, wherein Luzzatto insists repeatedly on the passivity of the Jews, which makes them loyal and obedient subjects? And could reference to the accusations Apion levelled against the Jews, and which were re-evoked by Josephus, perhaps have added weight in some degree to the Tacitean objections?

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Azariah de’ Rossi and Menasseh ben Israel: Comparing the Use of the Same Sources

The debt owed by Menasseh ben Israel to chapter 55 of Meʾor ʿEnayim is even greater than Luzzatto’s. Jer 29:7 reappears several times in the Humble Addresses […] in Behalfe of the Iewish Nation and in the Vindiciae Judaeorum ( Justice for the Jews), two works by Menasseh closely bound up with his mission dedicated to the re-establishment, after their expulsion back in 1290, of the Jews in England.33 This is well known to have been a high-level diplomatic initiative; at stake was the future of a substantial portion of the Jewish Diaspora, in search of new dwelling places in which to settle. It was necessary to present the best possible image of the Jewish people, demonstrating their upright behaviour in the social sphere—in relations with the non-Jewish world, their respect for the law, and their ability to guarantee order within their own communities; in the economic sphere—in maintaining honest conduct in commercial affairs and restraint from competition with their fellow citizens; and, above all, in the political sphere—in their respect and love for, and loyalty towards, their governors. In his defence of all these values, Menasseh frequently relies on the Jeremianic prayer “for the peace of the city,” following in the footsteps of Azariah. This becomes especially evident in the Vindiciae Judaeorum, where we find associated with Jer 29:7, as they had been in Luzzatto’s Discourse, the text from Ezra 6:10 and the extract from Philo’s On the Special Laws. In this case, however, Menasseh does not follow Luzzatto, who had inspired a great many of the considerations contained in the Humble Addresses;34 rather, draw-

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Menasseh ben Israel, “To His Highnesse the Lord Protector of the Commonwealth of England, Scotland and Ireland the Humble Addresses of Menasseh ben Israel, a Divine, and Doctor of Physick, in Behalfe of the Iewish Nation” and Menasseh ben Israel, “Vindiciae Judaeorum, or a Letter in Answer to certain questions propounded by a noble and Learned Gentleman, wherein all objections are candidly and yet fully cleared,” in Menasseh ben Israel’s Mission to Oliver Cromwell, Being a Reprint of the Pamphlets Published by Menasseh ben Israel to Promote the Re-admission of the Jews to England 1649–1656, ed. Lucien Wolf (London: Macmillan, 1901), 73–103 and 105–147, respectively. For but two examples from among the copious literature on the expulsion from England, see in particular Barnett D. Ovrut, “Edward i and the Expulsion of the Jews,” The Jewish Quarterly Review 67, no. 4 (1977): 224–235, and Karen Barkey and Ira Katznelson, “States, Regimes, and Decisions: Why Jews Were Expelled from Medieval England and France,” Theory and Society 40, no. 4 (2011): 475–503. See Benjamin Ravid, “How Profitable the Nation of the Jews Are: The Humble Addresses of Menasseh ben Israel and the Discorso of Simone Luzzatto,” in Mystics, Philosophers and Politicians, eds. Jehuda Reinharz and Daniel Swetschinski (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1982), 159–180.

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ing upon Meʾor ʿEnayim, he recovers in large part the citations given by Azariah that Luzzatto’s concise treatment had dispensed with. The reference to Jer 29:7 is thus expanded through the narration of numerous episodes recounted in sources from the ancient world. The kernel of both authors’ argument lies in the sacrifices offered by the high priest, in antiquity, in honour of the emperors. In order to appreciate the various implications contained within this theme, we might distinguish between sources that bear witness to a sacrifice carried out, or about to be carried out, and sources that draw attention to the manner of use of the theme of sacrificial offerings for the benefit of the ruling authorities, as a form of defence in the face of imminent threats to the survival of the sanctuary. In one case, therefore, the testimony is of an event; in the other, the reference to the event serves a precise objective, and to an extent an “apologetic” one. Certain verses of the first book of Baruch, which displays numerous textual links with the book of the prophet Jeremiah,35 might be considered to exemplify the first case; it recounts how the exiles in Babylon, having collected a sum of money according to their possibilities, sent it to Jerusalem, with the instruction to pray “for the life of Nebuchadnezzar and of his son.” Azariah reports the episode as follows, not failing to underline the extraneousness of the book of Baruch to the Hebrew biblical canon: And in the first book of his disciple Baruch which was accepted by the Christians, but not by us, it is made clear that those Jews who had been the first to be exiled with Jeconiah collected contributions from everybody which they sent to the rest of the people who had stayed in Jerusalem with the high priest. The gifts were dispatched with the following message: “We send you money with which you should pay for burnt offerings and incense […] and pray for the life of Nebuchadnezzar king of Babylon and for the life of Belshazzar his son that their days on earth should be like the days of heaven. And that we shall serve them many days and be in receipt of their kindness.”36 35

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For the book of Baruch, see La Bible d’Alexandrie: Baruch, Lamentations, Lettre de Jérémie. Traduction du texte grec de la Septante, intro. and notes Isabelle Assan-Dhôte and Jacqueline Moatti-Fine (Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 2005), 45–77; and Karina Martin Hogan’s introduction to the book in The Jewish Annotated Apocrypha, new revised standard version, ed. Jonathan Klawans and Lawrence M. Wills (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), 315–316. De’ Rossi, Light, 661; for the complete cited passages, see The Jewish Annotated Apocrypha, Baruch 1:10–12: “Here we send you money: so buy with the money burnt offerings and sin offerings and incense, and prepare a grain offering and offer them on the altar of the Lord

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As Joanna Weinberg has observed, in citing Baruch 1:10–12 Azariah omitted some parts; Menasseh, repeating the citation, mirrors the omissions of his predecessor: In the first Chapter of Baruch, the disciple of Jeremiah, we find that the Iewes, who were first carried captive into Babylon with Iechonias, made a collection of money, according to every ones power, and sent it to Jerusalem, saying, Behold, we have sent you money, wherewith ye shall buy offerings, and pray for the life of Nebuchadnezzar, and for the life of Baltasar his sonne, that their dayes may be upon earth as the dayes of heaven, and that God would give us strength, and lighten our eyes, that we may live under their shadow, that we may long do them service, and find favour in their sight.37 There is, nevertheless, one short phrase, ignored by Azariah, that Menasseh quotes directly from the book of Baruch: the exiles’ request for help from the Lord to cope with their situation: “that God would give us strength, and lighten our eyes, that we may live under their shadow.” In these few words, then, Menasseh presents a more complex vision of the context as a whole, stressing the difficult and problematic situation of the exiles, for some of whom praying for Nebuchadnezzar could not have been easy, while for others, inspired by hopes of imminent redemption, the response to exile would be one of rebellion, perhaps even in league with the king’s enemies. The custom of sacrifices in honour of the ruler that Baruch confirms—albeit permitting a glimpse of the exiles’ distress—is expressed in the words of the faithful who take the task upon themselves. Further confirmation of the sacrifices is provided by the passage from Ezra (6:9–10) discussed above, but in this case it is the rulers themselves who express their approval of the sacrifices and trust in their efficacy. This text, as we have seen, is common to Luzzatto and Azariah, but is similarly employed by Menasseh.38

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our God; and pray for the life of King Nebuchadnezzar of Babylon, and for the life of his son Belshazzar [sic], so that their days on earth may be like the days of heaven. The Lord will give us strength, and light to our eyes: we shall live under the protection (in the shadow) of King Nebuchadnezzar of Babylon, and under the protection of his son Belshazzar, and we shall serve them many days and find favor in their sight.” Menasseh, Vindiciae, 129. Vindiciae, 129: “Neither was this service [to honor emperors with particular sacrifices] ever entertained unthankfully, as appears by the decree of Cyrus, Ezra 6.3 [sic; i.e., Ezra 6:9– 10] where also Darius commands that, of the Kings goods, even of the tribute, expences should be forth-with given unto the Elders of the Iewes etc. and that which they had

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When Sacrifices Can Have a “Good Use”

The bulk of the quotations that Menasseh takes from Azariah concentrate on one argument in particular, based on the theme of sacrifices that are made in honour and for the benefit of sovereigns, and thus amount to a just and valid motive to reject attempts to demolish or desecrate the Temple. Indeed, various episodes recounted by him tell of how, faced with imperial potentates or their direct subordinates who were told to destroy that sacred site, the Jews reaffirmed that it was precisely there that good omens and prayers for the rulers found expression. The Jews’ loss of the Temple, therefore, would constitute a loss also for its attacker, deprived from then on of the well-wishing formulas that by custom were pronounced within its walls. But let us note which sources are employed here by Azariah—and by Menasseh in his wake. First is the Megillat Taʿanit (Scroll of Fasting), at chapter 9, devoted to the twenty-first day of the month of Kislev,39 where it is related that Alexander the Great, about to undertake the destruction of the Temple at the instigation of the Samaritans, was dissuaded from doing so by a delegation from the Sanhedrin, who, presenting themselves before him, told him, “These people [the Cutheans, or Cuthites] want to destroy the place where we pray for Thee and for the health of Thy kingdom.”40 Azariah, attributing this statement to Simeon the Just (Shimon ha-Zaddik, protagonist of the first part of the tale), enhances its emphasis: “Is it possible that those Cutheans can mislead you into destroying the place where we pray for you and for the preservation of your kingdom?” And we find the same emphasis in Menasseh, who inverts the first and second elements of the argument: “[T]his is the place, where we pray unto God for the welfare of your self, and of your kingdome, that it may not be destroyed, and shall these men perswade you to destroy this place?”41

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need of, both young bullocks, and rammes, and lambs for the burnt-offerings of the Lord of heaven, and wheat, salt, wine, and oyl, etc. that they might offer sacrifices of a sweet savour, unto the God of heaven, and pray for the life of the King, and of his sonnes.” See note 16 above. As Joanna Weinberg points out, Azariah errs in dating the event to the twenty-fifth day of Kislev. The same error is repeated by Menasseh ben Israel. I consulted the text available at https://www.sefaria.org; the English translation is mine. On the Megillat Taʿanit, see Solomon Zeitlin, “Megillat Taanit as a Source for Jewish Chronology and History in the Hellenistic and Roman Period,” The Jewish Quarterly Review 10, nos. 2–3 (1919): 237–290. Menasseh, Vindiciae, 128. Menasseh seems, however, to have consulted the original source, in which the instigation for destruction seems to have come from persons present at the scene—“these men”—who only later are named as “Kutim.” Observe too how Menasseh specifies that the Jews are merely intermediaries in their prayer before the Lord God.

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From The Josippon Azariah then takes the appeal of the priest Onias, when Heliodorus, Seleucus’s general, is proceeding towards Jerusalem with the intention of seizing the Temple’s treasure: “My lord and prince, it is surely against your best interest to damage this place in which we pray daily on behalf of the king, his children, and friends that God should continue to grant them peace and quiet.”42 This episode is also cited by Menasseh, although he conflates it with the overall design for the destruction of the sanctuary: “In Josephus Gorionides lib. 3. cap. 16 we may read, that [when] Heliodorus Generall to Selencus [sic], came to Jerusalem with the same intent, Onias the High-priest, besought him, not to destroy that place, where they prayed to God for the prosperity of the king, and his issue, and for the conservation of his kingdome.”43 A further source held in common by our two authors is chapter 7 of the first book of the Maccabees: there it is narrated that when the general Nicanor, on the orders of King Demetrius, in his turn incited by Alcimus, was preparing to besiege Jerusalem, certain priests and ancients came before him to avert the attack, by bearing witness to the sacrifices that they offered to God for the health of the sovereign. Azariah writes: In the first book of Maccabees, there is the description of how Demetrius king of Greece sent his general Nikanor against the Jews at the instigation of the wicked Alcimus who had tried without success to get appointed as high priest. He [Demetrius] was met on Mount Zion by some of the priests and members of the Sanhedrin who in the course of their appeals drew his attention to the sacrifices and burnt offerings that were offered for the welfare of the king.44 42

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De’ Rossi, Light, 662. See note 28 above. Azariah seems to have had available four different editions of The Josippon, and to have carefully compared them: the Constantinople edition of 1510; the Venetian one of 1544 (which, he wrote, was a copy of the former); a German edition; and one printed by Abraham Conat, probably the earliest, which appeared in Mantua, possibly in 1475 or 1480 (see De’ Rossi, 332 and 332n86 and n87). I have only been able to consult the last of these (Biblioteca Vaticana, Stamp. Ross. 62 and Stamp. Ross. 2179), which is not subdivided into books and chapters; while I have found the subdivision used by Azariah, and the correspondence of the quotation above, only in a later Latin translation: Joseph ben Gorion, Josippon sive Josephi Ben-Gorionis Historiae Judaicae Libri Sex. Ex Hebraeo Latine vertit, praefatione et notis illustravit Johannes Gagnier (Oxonii: E Theatro Sheldoniano, 1706). To compare the same episode as related in a modern Hebrew edition, see Joseph Ben Gorion, The Josippon ( Josephus Gorionides), ed. with an introduction, commentary, and notes David Flusser (Jerusalem: Mossad Bialik, 1980), 61–62. See also Sefer Yosippon: A Tenth-Century History of Ancient Israel, trans. and intro. Steven B. Bowman (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2023). For the same episode, Azariah also refers to 2Macc 3:7 and to 4Macc 4:1–14. Menasseh, Vindiciae, 128–129. De’ Rossi, Light, 662. - 978-90-04-69426-2 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/08/2024 08:21:13PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

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Menasseh cites the episode more concisely, placing it immediately after the reference to the Megillat Taʿanit: “The like we find in the first book of the Maccabees, cap. 7. 33 and in Iosephus in his Antiq[ities] lib. 12. cap. 1745 when Demetrius had sent Nicanor the Generall of his army against Jerusalem, the Priests, with the Elders of the people went forth to salute him, and to shew him the sacrifice which they offered up to God for the welfare of the King.”46

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Menasseh ben Israel’s Own Interpretations

Menasseh does not limit himself, however, to generous use of the sources quoted by Azariah; for, in referring to the exhortations of Jeremiah, he comes up with new and original interpretations, investing these with a particular resonance in response to the circumstances confronting him. In his Humble Addresses, in preparation for his journey to London,47 Menasseh listed the benefits brought by the Jews to the countries in which they are made welcome, examining the advantages from an economic point of view—“How Profitable the Nation of the Iewes are,” in the words of the title of the first chapter—and with respect to their civic and political loyalty— “How Faithfull the Nation of the Iewes are,” as the title of the second chapter has it. In expounding both of these arguments, Menasseh owes a great deal to Luzzatto’s Discourse, as is clearly shown by the detailed comparative table 45

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See Josephus, Jewish Antiquities xii.406–407. It seems likely that Menasseh used the Spanish translation of the work: Iosepho Flavio, Los veynte libros de Flavio Iosepho de las Antiguedades Iudaycas (Antwerp [Anvers]: En casa de M. Nucio, 1554). Menasseh, Vindiciae, 128. What happened subsequently—that is, that Nicanor ridiculed what was said by the ancients—is not reported by our authors; see 1 Macc 7:33–34 (The Jewish Annotated Apocrypha): “After these events [the hard-fought combat between the troops of Judah and those of Nicanor] Nicanor went up to Mount Sion. Some of the priests from the sanctuary and some of the elders of the people came out to greet him peaceably and to show him the burnt offering that was being offered for the king. But he mocked them, and derided them, and defiled them and spoke arrogantly.” See esp. Katz, Jews in the History of England, 108–144; David S. Katz, Philo-Semitism and the Readmission of the Jews to England 1603–1655 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982); Jonathan Israel, “Menasseh and the Dutch Sephardic Colonization Movement of the MidSeventeenth Century (1645–1657),” in Menasseh ben Israel and his World, eds. Yosef Kaplan, Henry Méchoulan, and Richard H. Popkin (Leiden: Brill, 1989), 139–163; Sina Rauschenbach, Judentum für Christen. Vermittlung und Selbstbehauptung Menasseh ben Israels in den gelehrten Debatten des 17. Jahrhunderts (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2012; trans. Corey Twitchell as Judaism for Christians: Menasseh ben Israel (1604–1657) [Lanham: Lexington Books, 2019]), 209–245; Steven Nadler, Menasseh ben Israel Rabbi of Amsterdam (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2018), 159–217.

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drawn up by Benjamin Ravid.48 The problem remains—this too is addressed by Ravid—of why Menasseh at no point specifically cites either the Discourse or its author; a problem that, in Ravid’s opinion, can be explained by the hypothesis that Menasseh on no account wished to promote in England the “Venetian model” for regulating the presence of the Jews,49 finding his inspiration instead in the more extensive and secure rights acquired by the Jews in the United Provinces.50 Much in the manner of Luzzatto, Menasseh quotes the example of a variety of countries in which the Jews have found a welcome; towards these, he adds, the Jews have a profound sense of gratitude, which is also expressed in prayer: “for on every Sabbath or festival Day, they everywhere are used to pray for the safety of all kings, Princes and Commonwealths, under whose jurisdiction they live, of what profession-soever.” Invocations to perform such pledges of good fortune are to be found, he says, both in the written Torah, at Jer 29:7, and in the Talmud, in the tractate Avodah Zarah.51 To clarify his account, Menasseh describes the position occupied by such prayers within the synagogal rite, and provides an illustration of their content: the Bible reading having been concluded, and prior to the blessing of the faithful, the celebrant recites aloud 48 49

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Ravid, “How Profitable,” 167–172. Ravid, 168: “There is one plausible explanation for the omission of the name of Luzzatto in the Humble Addresses, an explanation which derives from the differences in living conditions between the Jews of Venice and those of Amsterdam”; and 170: “Quite probably, Menasseh ben Israel was not anxious to draw attention to the specific conditions of the Jews of Venice with their ghetto segregation, compulsory unprofitable state-controlled pawn shops, and far more extensively enforced civic disabilities, including the prohibition on owning real estate,” and “Above all, the Jews of Amsterdam specifically, and those of Holland in general, were not subject to the insecurity of charters valid for specific limited periods, charters that always required renegotiation and renewal.” The proposals presented by Menasseh, in French, to the Whitehall Conference were published in The Publick Intelligencer 12 (17–24 Dec. 1655), 191–192, and in Mercurius Politicus 289 (20–27 Dec. 1655), 5842–5848. I have consulted the document in English: The Proposals of Menasseh ben Israel, Oxford, Bodleian Library, mss Rawlinson C 206, f. 107r–v. The scheme, which envisioned conditions for the Jews more favourable even that those they enjoyed in Amsterdam, anticipated the following: readmission to the territory of England with the same rights as native citizens of the country; an oath taken by the chiefs and generals of the army to defend the Jews on every occasion; the right to public synagogues in England and in the other countries subject to its dominion; freedom of worship; the establishment of a Jewish cemetery; autonomous internal jurisdiction for the community that would be founded; and freedom to trade without restriction as to the type of goods. Menasseh then proposed that an official be nominated specifically to welcome the new arrivals and make them swear loyalty to England, and requested the immediate revocation of whatever ordinances there might be against the Jewish nation. b. ʿAbod. Zar. 4a; see note 69 below.

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(such that all can hear and respond “Amen”) the following blessing:52 “He that giveth salvation unto Kings, and dominion unto Lords, he that delivered his servant David from the sword of the Enemy, he that made a way in the Sea, and a path in the strange waters, blesse and keep, preserve and rescue, exalt and magnify, and lift up higher and higher our Lord.”53 At this point, Menasseh brings in a variation introduced in order to adapt the prayer to suit whichever may be the “political referent” of the moment: “and then he [the celebrant] names the Pope, the Emperour, King, Duke, or any other Prince.” The prayer, composed from a wide variety of biblical sources,54 combined with reverence towards the country’s authorities, reasserts or reaffirms Jewish hopes of redemption: The King of Kings defend him in his mercy, making him joyfull, and free him from all dangers and distresse. The King of Kings, for his goodness sake, raise up and exalt his planetary star, and multiply his dayes over his Kingdome. The King of Kings for his mercies sake, put into his heart, and into the heart of his Counsellers and those that attend and administer to him, that he may shew mercy unto us, and unto all the people of Israel. In his dayes and in our dayes, let Iudah be safe, and Israel dwell securely, and let the Redeemer come to Israel, and so may it please God. Amen.55

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Menasseh, “To His Highnesse the Lord Protector,” 92: “With a loud voice he [the Minister of the Synagogue] blesseth the Prince of the Country under whom they live, that all the Iewes may hear it, and say Amen.” Menasseh, Humble Addresses, 92. As Di Segni observes (“Preghiamo per l’Italia”), the prayer, entitled “hanoten teshuʿa lamelakhim” (“he who gives salvation unto kings”), still in use in a number of communities in Europe and the United States, is a concatenation of various biblical citations: for instance, Ps 144:10 with Isa 43:16, while the conclusion quotes Jer 23:6 and Isa 59:20. On the “esoteric” meaning of the prayer, retrievable from, for example, the context of the forty-third chapter of Isaiah (the fall of Babylon), from which verse 16 is extracted, or from the partial quotation of Ps 144:10, see Barry Schwartz, “‘Hanoten Teshua’: The Origin of the Traditional Jewish Prayer for the Government,” Hebrew Union College Annual 57 (1986), 113–120. Considerable space is devoted to Menasseh’s version by Simeon Singer, “The Earliest Jewish Prayers for the Sovereign (1899–1901),” Transactions of the Jewish Historical Society of London 4 (1903), 102–109. The text should be compared with the one in the prayer book in use in Amsterdam in 1649 (= 5409), which I have not so far traced; however, I compared the English text with a mss copy, Ets Haim 48 E 61, made in Recife by Jehudah Machabeu in 1650 [5410]. However, these prayer books most likely follow the model of the siddur published in Venice in 1552, also known as the Ana b’Koah, from which I take the original Spanish text of the prayer for rulers—see Isaac ben Shem tov Cavallero, Orden de Oraciones segundo el uso ebrèo en lengua ebraica y vulguar español: Traduzido por el dotor Isac fijo de Dom

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In the Vindiciae Judaeorum, too, where we have identified considerable influence from Azariah, Menasseh makes an original and personal contribution to the explication of Jer 29:7. In the first section of the work, he relates an occurrence dating to the spring of 1651, when the English judge and politician Oliver St John,56 in the course of a diplomatic mission to the United Provinces, had paid a visit to the synagogue in Amsterdam, where he had encountered a warm welcome, accompanied by prayers and other singing. Menasseh introduces his description of this distinctive occasion by reference specifically to Jer 29:7: The Lord, blessed for ever, by his prophet Jeremiah chap. 29. 7 gives it in command to the captive Israelites that were dispersed among the heathens, that they should continually pray for, and endeavour the peace, welfare and prosperity of the city wherein they dwelt, and the inhabitants thereof. This the Iewes have always done, and continue to this day in all their Synagogues, with a particular blessing of the Prince or Magistrate, under whose protection they live. And this the Right Honourable my Lord St. Iohn can testifie; who when he was Embassadour to the Lords the States at the united Provinces, was pleased to honour our Synagogue at Amsterdam with his presence, where our nation entertained him with musick […] and also pronounced a blessing […] upon the whole Common-wealth of England.57 It was surely most convenient for Menasseh, finding himself on English soil in order to champion the readmission of the Jews to that country, to be able to call none other than a native political authority as witness to Jewish obser-

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Sem tob Cavallero (Venice [Venecia], 1552), 151–153: “A quel que da salvacion a los reies, y podestad alos principes, y su Reino Reino infinito, el escapan a David su siervo de espada mala, aquel que puso en la mar carrera, y en aguas tempestuosas estrada, el bendiga, y guarde, y conserve, y ayude, y exalte, y engrandesca, y prospere en sumo grado al nuestro Señor el Rei reies de los reies, con sus piedades lo guarde y conserve, y de todos peligros y daños lo libre el Rey reies de los reies con sus piedades [altecera?] y prosperara estrella de su pianeta, y prologara dias sobre su reinado: el Rei reies de los reies por sus piedades ponga en su coraçon (y en coraçon de todos sus ministros) gracia para bien hazer con nos y con todo Israel, en sus dias y en nuestras dias sea salvo Iehuda y Israel repose con quietud: y verna a Cion redemidor, y asi sea su voluntad y diràn Amen.” On this figure, see William Palmer, “St John, Oliver,” in Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, vol. 48 (2004), 634–640. St John, together with Walter Strickland and with John Thurloe as secretary, had been appointed to discuss the terms for an Anglo-Dutch alliance or union, which failed to materialize. Menasseh, Vindiciae, 111.

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vance of the injunctions of Jeremiah. In addition, the account of the visit served to highlight how strong the hopes of the faithful of Amsterdam were, already in 1651, with regard to the establishment of a Jewish community in London. Worthy of note, moreover, is the context in which Menasseh relates the event: the section of the Vindiciae, that is, devoted to a refutation of the charge of ritual murder. Thus, just as Luzzatto invoked Jer 29:7 in order to reject an accusation made against the Jews (their presumed enmity towards their neighbours), so Menasseh resorts to the same text to answer this other—and much more grievous—charge. The indictment no longer concerns a generalised hostility towards the non-Jewish world, but rather a hostility that assumes the concrete form of lethal acts committed against Christian children, whose blood supposedly was used for ritual purposes.58 Here Menasseh, having posited the prohibition against killing in the Judaic tradition, and likewise that against the consumption of human blood,59 re-evokes a series of circumstances, occurring at various periods of history, in which the libel had been speciously promoted.60 Thus the exhortations contained in the letter of Jeremiah, and the actual instance of the prayer intoned in the synagogue in 1651, play their part in

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This section was clearly conceived as a response to the renewal of this and other objections on the part of the opponents of the readmission of the Jews to England, in concomitance with the discussions about this matter by the Whitehall Commission. For the accusations, see William Prynne, A short demurrer to the Jewes long discontinued remitter into England. Comprising an exact chronological relation of their first admission into, their ill deportment, misdemeanors, condition, sufferings, oppressions, slaughters, plunders, by popular insurrections, and regal exactions in; and their total, final banishment by judgment and edict of Parliament, out of England, never to return again: collected out of the best historians. With a brief collection of such English laws, Scriptures, as seem strongly to plead, and conclude against their readmission into England, especially at this season (London, 1656). On this publication, see Lionel Ifrah, “Un sommet de la littérature antijuidaïque: Le ‘Demurrer’ de William Prynne,” in Les textes judéophobes et judéophiles dans l’Europe chrétienne à l’époque moderne, ed. Daniel Tollet (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2002), 135–189; and Avrom Saltman, The Jewish Question in 1655: Studies in Prynne’s “Demurrer” (Ramat Gan: Bar Ilan University Press, 1995). Menasseh, Vindiciae, 108: “It is utterly forbid the Iewes to eat any manner of bloud whatsoever, Levit. Chapter 7.26 and Deuter. 12 [12: 16] where it is expresly said “vekhol dam” (Hebrew), And ye shall eat no manner of bloud, and in obedience to this command the Iewes eat not the bloud of any animal. And more than this, if they found one drop of bloud in an egge, they cast it away as prohibited.” On the accusation of ritual murder, see, for example, Ruggero Taradel, L’accusa del sangue: Storia politica di un mito antisemita (Rome: Editori Riuniti, 2002) (for the Vindiciae of Menasseh, see 169–173).

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the overall economy of this chapter. Menasseh writes, indeed: “if we are bound to study, endeavour, and sollicite, the good and flourishing estate of the city where we live, and the inhabitants thereof, shall we then murder their children, who are the greatest good, and the most flourishing blessing that this life doth indulge to them[?]”61 Jeremiah 29:7 is cited once more in the Vindiciae in order to refute the accusation taken from Sixtus of Siena “that every Iew—in obedience to the Talmud—thrice a day, curseth all Christians, and prayeth to God to confound and root them out, with their Kings and Princes.”62 Menasseh singles out a passage from the Hebrew liturgy that may have given rise to Sixtus’s erroneous interpretation: There is in the daily prayers a certain Chapter where it is thus written, laMumarim etc. that is, For Apostates, let there be no hope, let all Hereticks be destroyed, and all thine enemies, and all that hate thee, let them perish. And thou shalt root out the kingdome of pride forthwith, weaken, and put it out, and in our dayes.63

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Menasseh, Vindiciae, 111. Menasseh, 125; see Sixtus Senensis, Bibliotheca sancta a F. Sixto Senensi, ordinis praedicatorum, ex praecipuis catholicae ecclesiae autoribus collecta, et in octo libros digesta (Leiden: ad Carolum Pesnot, 1575), liber secundus, 142: “Index errorum aliquot, quos ex innumeris stultitiis, blasphemiis et impietatibus Thalmudici operis collegimus”; 144, paragrafo “Adversus charitatem et humanitatem”: “Statuimus, ut quilibet Iudaeus ter in die blasphemet omnem Christianorum gentem, ac Deum precetur, ut confundat, exterminetque ipsam cum regibus et principibus suis; atque hoc maximè faciant sacerdotes Iudaeorum in synagoga ter quotidie orantes, in odium Iesu Nazareni. Ordine primo, tractatu primo, distict 4.” Sixtus’s reference is clearly to the tractate Berakhot in the Jerusalem Talmud (“Perachot” in the Vindiciae). See y. Ber. 4.3, where, incidentally, in the course of the sages’ debate concerning the total number of blessings of the Amidah (18), the placement of the birkat ha-minim “blessing [read, its opposite] of the sectarians” also happens to be discussed, its institution dating, again according to the sages, to a later period, in Yavne. Menasseh, Vindiciae, 125. The literature on birkat ha-minim is very extensive, and discussion is frequently resumed; the classic account is Ismar Elbogen, Jewish Liturgy: A Comprehensive History (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1993), 31–34 (the first German edition was printed in 1913; the first Hebrew version in 1972); William Horbury, “The Benediction of the Minim and Early Jewish-Christian Controversy,” The Journal of Theological Studies 33, no. 1 (1982): 19–61; Ruth Langer, Cursing the Christians? A History of Birkat HaMinim (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012); Simon Claude Mimouni, Les Chrétiens d’origine juive dans l’antiquité (Paris: Albin Michel 2004), esp. 60–71, “La question du min” and 71–92, “La Birkat ha-minim.”

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Since Menasseh interprets mumarim to mean “apostates” and “heretics” within Judaism, however, specifying which sects in particular it refers to, the possibility of applying the term to Christians is excluded:64 This whole Chapter speaketh nothing of Christians originally, but of the Iewes, who fell in those times, to the Zaduces, and Epicureans, and to the Gentiles, as Moses of Egypt saith, Tract. Tephila, cap. 2. For by Apostates and Hereticks are not to be understood all men, that are of a diverse religion, or heathens, or Gentiles, but those renegado65 Iewes, who did abrogate the whole Law of Moses, or any Articles received thence; and such are properly by us called Hereticks. Wherefore it speaketh nothing of Christians, but of the fugitive Iewes, that is, such as have deserted the standard, or the sacred Law.66 Menasseh emphasises again that, far from cursing the faithful of other religions, the Jews pray in their synagogue for all peoples, and in that place declare their gratitude to the rulers of the countries that have welcomed them, always in obedience to the injunctions of Jer 29:7. He himself refers at this point to the text of the prayer that he had quoted in his Humble Addresses.67

9

Prayer, Exile, and Home

The diverse sources and arguments that we have so far examined, assembled with intelligence by Azariah de’ Rossi and re-evoked in part by Luzzatto and then by Menasseh ben Israel, constitute a “broadened” exegesis of Jer 29:7. They strike us above all as a commentary ideally adapted to the times in which these authors lived, demonstrating the manner in which it is possible for the Jews to maintain a dynamic and constructive relationship with the environment in which they have their dwelling. It should, on the other hand, be observed that the traditional interpretation of the passage takes the exegesis in a very different, distinctly more restrictive,

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Langer, Cursing the Christians?, claims to have found the term mumarim only in the Vindiciae. This is clearly a hispanism. Menasseh, Vindiciae, 125–126. The internal reference is to the Mishneh Torah of Maimonides, “Order of Prayers.” The term “fugitive,” incidentally, might well be considered appropriate to those Jews who embraced early Christianity. Menasseh, 128.

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direction, rendering the exhortation of Jeremiah a barely tolerated necessity deriving from the immediate circumstances of the Hebrew people’s exile. To quote Michael Walzer, “The prophet does recommend a political as well as a material accommodation to the conditions of captivity,”68 an acquiescence in the condition of slavery, therefore, predicated upon the absence of any alternative. Going beyond its contextualisation within a circumscribed temporal horizon, whereby Jeremiah’s exhortation is interpreted as an appeal not to rebel against Babylonian dominion, a further orientation “narrowing” the wider horizon of Jer 29:7 is represented by linking its exegesis to the famous maxim of Shmuel found at Bava Qamma 113a (Babylonian Talmud): “Dinaʾ de-malkhutaʾ dinaʾ,”—“The law of the kingdom is the law.” Why should an expression of good wishes in the form of a prayer for the city or its rulers come to be associated with the need for obedience to its laws? Prayer leaves space for the subject—for the spirituality of the individual; the law bends the subject to the regulations it dictates. This move, from prayer, which might even license spontaneity, to the static dimension of obedience, is certainly deserving of careful analysis. This, perhaps, is how the recommendation in Pirkei Avot 3:2 should be interpreted: we should pray for the peace of the kingdom (malkhut), since were it not for the fear that authority arouses, humankind would destroy itself: “Rabbi Hanina, the deputy of the priests […] said: ‘pray for the peace of the government, for, except for the fear of that, we should have swallowed each other alive.’”69 We can note here precisely the shift from “prayer” to “respect for the law,” since fear vis-àvis the government substantially resolves into observance of, or respect for, its laws. Michael Walzer continues, “Seek the peace of the city is a political maxim, but what it suggests is a very limited political agenda.”70 Only in early modern times, and in markedly different political conditions, does this appeal gain a creative and dynamic quality, as exemplified by the authors here discussed. These writers interpreted Jer 29:7 as a constructive means by which to defend 68 69

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Michael Walzer, In God’s Shadow: Politics in the Hebrew Bible (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), 119. I cite the translation by Robert Travers Herford, Pirke Aboth, The Ethics of the Talmud: Sayings of the Fathers, 2nd ed. (New York: Schocken Books, 1962), 64–65. According to Herford, since Rabbi Hanina apparently lived in the first century ce, the “government” to which he alludes can be none other than that of the Roman empire. The image of violence between human beings resurfaces in b. ʿAbod. Zar. 4 and is represented by the struggle between large fish and small fish: “Parallel ,” in b. Ned. 28a. The analogy between humankind and fish derives from Hab 1:14. Walzer, In God’s Shadow, 120.

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the integration of the Jews into their respective local environments; an integration no longer considered a course dictated by force majeure, but rather a choice inspired by the wish to make the cities in which they resided “their own.” It is a wish that calls to mind what Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi aptly characterised as “the dialectics of exile and domicile”: Without losing sight of any of its manifestly negative aspects, the fact is that on the whole Jews not only adapted to the conditions of exile but often flourished within it materially and spiritually, while managing to preserve a vivid sense of their distinctive national and religious identity […]. What I propose is that it is simultaneously possible to be ideologically in exile and existentially at home.71

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Index of Names and Subjects Aboab, Samuel 132–133 Abraham 135, 142–143, 145, 147, 151 Abravanel, Isaac 113, 180, 182, 213 Abravanel, Judah (Leone Ebreo) 111 Agrippa, Cornelius 55–56 Agrippa, Menenio Lanatus 87–88, 90 Albo, Joseph 113, 181–182 Alcibiades 222 Alemanno, Yohanan 111, 114–115, 118 Alexander the Great 253–254, 262 Alighieri, Dante 110 amoraim 136, 144 See also tannaim Anaxagoras 22, 71, 97, 222 Apelles 102–103 Apollo 109–110 Aquinas, Thomas 221 Aristophanes 43–44 Aristotle 32n47, 61, 65, 97, 100, 110, 117, 151, 158, 163, 221 Nicomachean Ethics 211, 220 Politics 153 Rhetoric 99–100 Augustine 26, 178 Augustus 155, 214 Averroes 116, 160 Bacon, Francis 45, 50, 84, 90–92, 94–96, 191, 195–197, 204–206, 223 Bacon, Roger 84 Balaam 200 Baruch, book of 257, 260–261 Boccalini, Traiano 108–110 Botero, Giovanni 172, 213–216, 220, 225, 229–232, 235–236 Botticelli, Sergio 102–103 Boyle, Robert 59 Chalcol 166 See also Ethan the Ezrahite; Heman; Darda Calleoni, Giovanni 129 Camozza, Giovanni Battista 100 Caramuel, Juan 138 Carneades 32 Casaubon, Isaac 100

Cattelan, Sabbadin 215 See also Merceria, robbery of; Scaramella, Grassin Cebà, Ansaldo 100–101 chance 56, 222–223 See also fortune Charron, Pierre 171, 177, 179 Chronicles, books of 157–158, 160, 166 Chrysippus 66–67, 85, 97 See also stoicism Cicero 16–17, 32, 171, 176, 178, 180 Cleinias 222 Coen, Rafael 240 Copernicus, Nicolaus 50 Copio Sullam, Sara 36, 100, 109–111 Cordovero, Moses 39 Costa, Uriel da 126 Cratylus 34, 63, 71, 175, 220, 224 Crescas, Ḥasdai 156, 181 Critias 65–66 Crito 51–53, 71 Cyrus the Great 254, 258n30–31, 161n38 da Vinci, Leonardo 93 David, King 151 Darda 166 See also Chalcol; Ethan the Ezrahite; Heman Darius, king of Persia 254, 258n30–31, 261n38 de’ Rossi, Azariah 249, 257–264, 267, 270 del Bene, Judah 108, 110n14, 111n16 Delmedigo, Joseph 137n36, 138 Demetrius, King 263–264 Democritus 89, 222–223 Descartes, René 30–31, 32n47, 53, 59 Diotima 53–57, 65 Ecclesiastes, book of 1–2, 15, 98, 125, 127, 129–133, 140, 151–153, 156–157, 161, 164, 166 Eliezer ben Hyrchanus 144 See also tannaim, amoraim Empiricism 82–84, 205 medical school 83

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278 Empiricus, Sextus 17, 30, 33, 44–48, 51–53, 57–58, 62, 64, 66–72, 82–83, 85–88, 93, 96, 171, 180, 219 first trope 46–50 second and third tropes 51–53 fourth and fifth tropes 53–57 sixth and seventh tropes 58–51 eighth trope 62–64 See also relativity and relation ninth and tenth tropes 64–67, 86 See also relativity and relation Epicurus 59 Erostratus 66 Ethan the Ezrahite 146, 166 See also Chalcol; Darda; Heman Euclid 60 Eusebius 258 Exodus, book of 160, 180, 210 Ezra, book of 254, 257–259, 261 Farissol, Abraham 111 Ferro, Giovanni 36–37 Ficino, Marsilio 56, 113 fideism 23–24n16, 35, 40, 72 Florus 220 fortune 219–220, 223 See also chance Freher, Marquard 100 Galilei, Galileo 50, 53, 60–61 Gassendi, Pierre 84 Genesis, book of 104, 205 Genazzano, Elijah Ḥayyim of 113, 115 Gersonides 154, 163 Gorgias 60, 68–71 Guicciardini, Francesco 84, 213 Habakuk 146 Ḥai de Serval, Salomon 36 Halevi, Judah 116–119 Heliodorus (chancellor of Seleucus) 263 Heman 166 See also Chalcol; Darda; Ethan the Ezrahite Hippias 21, 27–29, 71, 173–175 Horace 102 Horman, William 93 Hume, David 24

index of names and subjects ibn Shem-Ṭob, Joseph 116 ibn Ṭufayl, Abū Bakr 117 ignorance 16, 22, 24, 32, 69, 72, 99, 103, 118 immortality of the soul 111, 126, 129–132 Isaiah, prophet 146, 151 Italian academies impresa (endeavour) 35–37 Incogniti 36, 38 Loredan, Gianfrancesco 36 Jagel, Abraham 111 Jeremiah, book of 131, 146, 249–250, 255– 257, 260–261, 264, 267–271 Job, book of 126, 129–136, 140–145, 147 See also resurrection of the dead Josephus 181, 253–254, 257–258, 264 Kabbalah 118–119 sefirot 86–88 Kant, Immanuel 18, 35 Kepler, Johannes 61 Kings, books of 151, 157–158, 160, 166 Kircher, Athanasius 49 La Mothe Le Vayer, François de 177 Lampronti, Isaac 209–210 Leon, Messer Judah 114 Libro Grande 183 Locke, John 53 Lucian 103 Lucretius 59, 223 Lusitano, Samuel ha-Kohen da Pisa 125– 136, 140–141 Maccabees, books of 257, 263–264 Machiavelli, Niccolò 84, 151, 155–156, 161, 172, 198, 205, 212–213, 217, 222–223 necessity 92–94, 212, 214, 223 The Prince 152, 154, 156, 160–161, 213, 223 Maecenas 214 Maimonides 34, 118, 133, 138, 160, 163–164, 180–182 Manutius, Aldus 100 memory 19, 204, 221 See also time Menasseh ben Israel 249, 259–273 Merceria, robbery of 190, 215 See also Scaramella, Grassin; Cattelan, Sabbadin

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index of names and subjects Messiah 128–129, 133 Micanzio, Fulgenzio 184–185 Midas, King 103 mirrors 18, 46, 48–50 Modena, Leon 36, 111, 119, 127n4, 132n23, 133, 137, 166–167, 184n39, 210 Montaigne, Michel de 44, 57, 67, 72, 84, 171, 177–178, 191, 192n5, 202–203, 206, 219, 223 More, Thomas 95 Morel, Frédéric 100 Moses 145, 151, 160–161, 172, 180, 193–194 Mun, Thomas 229, 238–242 Narbonne, Moses of (Moses Narboni) 117– 118 Nathan the Babylonian 144–145 See also tannaim; amoraim Nature 25, 27–33, 47, 49, 73–74, 162, 165, 173–175, 177–179, 198–199, 222, 224, 253 natural philosophy 28, 74 natural morality 33, 74–75, 85, 177, 192– 193 Nebuchadnezzar 146, 260–261 Newton, Isaac 59 Nicanor (general) 263–264, 264n46 Nizza, Isaiah ben Eliezer Ḥayyim 36, 39n64 nuda veritas 101–102 Numenius of Apamea 113, 115 Ockham, William 84 Onias (priest) 263 Paluzzi, Numidio 110 Parnassic genre 109–110 See also Boccalini, Traiano Pericles 31, 114, 178, 220–221 Philo of Alexandria 181, 191, 252–253, 259– 261 philosopher king 160–161, 172n5, 173 philosophical theism 24–25, 74–75 Pico della Mirandola, Giovanni 56, 113 Plato 16, 21, 33, 43–44, 59, 66, 71, 86–88, 95, 117, 151, 164, 166 Apology 44, 81, 151, 164 Charmides 44 Phaedo 98, 156 Philebus 98 Republic 160

279 Symposium 54 Sophist 44 Timaeus 163 Poliziano 100 Pomis, David ben Isaac de 180, 182 prisca theologia 115 Protagoras 18, 70–71, 221 Proteus 174 Provençal, Moses ben Abraham 210 Proverbs, book of 153–155, 157–159, 162–164, 166 providence 129, 131–132, 135–136, 138, 144– 145, 153 prudence 22, 157, 159, 162, 166, 172–174, 210– 216, 220–225 Psalms, book of 193 Ptolemy 61 Ptolemy, king of Egypt 112 Pythagoras 65, 110, 113, 115, 118 Rashi 147n85, 160, 162n30, 210 reason of state 171–175, 179, 213–214, 251n6 religion biblical 34–35 civil and natural 24, 198 instrumentum regni 214–215 true 25, 73–74, 81, 157, 159–160 Reuben 145 resurrection of the dead 126, 129–132, 134– 136, 141–145 See also Job, book of Rossi, Salomone 36 Samson 219 Sarpi, Paolo 184 Scaramella, Grassin 215 See also Cattelan, Sabbadin; Merceria, robbery of Scepticism Academic 32, 176–178, 185 Agrippean modes 17, 87–88 apraxia 32 disagreement among theories (diaphōnia) 17, 20, 38, 44 equipollence of opposite claims (isostheneia) 16–17, 21, 27, 44, 82 experience (empeiria) 83, 205 See also Empiricism

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280 moderation of emotions (metriopatheia) 30 ordinary living by appearances 30 probable (pithanon) 25–26, 29–35, 63– 64, 74, 174–180, 182, 186, 205–206, 220, 224–225 Pyrrhonian 19, 32n47, 138 Pyrrhonian crisis 50, 72 regress ad infinitum 18–19, 93, 96 See also necessity relativity and relation 17, 18, 53, 62–67, 84–88, 91, 202 resembling the truth (verisimile) 176– 177, 185–186 suspension of judgement (epochē) 16– 17, 21–23, 30, 33, 44–45, 62, 69–71, 87, 177, 199, 205 tranquillity (ataraxia) 16–17, 22–23, 26, 30, 44 Seneca 97, 99 Senensi, Sixtus 269 Serra, Antonio 229–238, 241 simulacra (theory of) 18, 59, 61 Socrates 16, 20–22, 24–40, 43–57, 63–69, 71, 74–75, 95, 97–99, 113–119, 151, 156–157, 163–166, 173, 175, 177, 179–180, 220–223 daemon 30, 35, 40 Solomon, King 98, 130, 145, 151–167, 172 St John, Oliver 267 Stoicism 28, 31–32, 48–49, 59–60, 85–87, 90, 97, 178, 203 virtutes esse animalia 97 Strabo 61 Strauss, Leo 160 superstition 16, 25–28, 34, 73–75, 219

index of names and subjects Tacitus 85, 98, 151, 155, 172, 190, 213, 217–219, 250–254 Talmud 126, 140, 210 Avodah Zarah, tractate 265 Bava Batra, tractate 134–136 Bava Qamma, tractate 271 Pirkei Avot, tractate 257, 271 Yoma, tractate 257 tannaim 136, 144 See also amoraim Telesio, Bernardino 84 Tertullian 218–219 tevunah 210 See also prudence theatrum mundi 101, 138–139 Theophrastus Characters 100–101 time 204 See also memory Timon 21, 26–29, 71, 163–165, 173–175 Universitates Hebraeorum usury 88–89, 91, 94–96

183

Virgil 110, 160 Xenophon 43 Yehoshua ben Karcha 144 See also tannaim; amoraim Yohanan ben Zakkai 135, 143–144 See also tannaim; amoraim Zedekiah 146 Zohar 38–39

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