Shaping Peacebuilding in Colombia: International Frames and Spatial Transformation 9781529211726

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Shaping Peacebuilding in Colombia International Frames and Spatial Transformation CATALINA MONTOYA LONDOÑO



Series Editors: John Heathershaw, University of Exeter, UK, Shahar Hameiri, University of Queensland, Australia, Jana Hönke, University of Bayreuth, Germany and Sara Koopman, Kent State University, USA Volumes in this cutting-edge series move away from purely abstract debates about concepts and focus instead on fieldwork-based studies of specific places and peoples to demonstrate how particular spatial histories and geographic configurations can foster or hinder peace, security and development. Available now Gender and Citizenship in Transitional Justice Everyday Experiences of Reparation and Reintegration in Colombia By Sanne Weber Unarmed Civilian Protection A New Paradigm for Protection and Human Security Edited by Ellen Furnari, Randy Janzen and Rosemary Kabaki Navigating the Local Politics of Peacebuilding in Lebanese Municipalities By Hanna Leonardsson Precarious Urbanism Displacement, Belonging and the Reconstruction of Somali Cities By Jutta Bakonyi and Peter Chonka Post-Liberal Statebuilding in Central Asia Imaginaries, Discourses and Practices of Social Ordering By Philipp Lottholz Doing Fieldwork in Areas of International Intervention A Guide to Research in Violent and Closed Contexts Edited by Berit Bliesemann de Guevara and Morten Bøås Surviving Everyday Life The Securityscapes of Threatened People in Kyrgyzstan Edited by Marc von Boemcken, Nina Bagdasarova, Aksana Ismailbekova and Conrad Schetter For more information about the series and to find out how to submit a proposal visit bristoluniversitypress.co.uk/ spaces-of-peace-security-and-development



Forthcoming Trajectories of Governance Citizenship, Violence and Contested Order in Peripheral Cities of Latin America By Viviana García Pinzón Memory Politics after Mass Violence Attributing Roles in the Memoryscape By Timothy Williams International Advisory Board Rita Abrahamsen, University of Ottawa, Canada John Agnew, University of California, Los Angeles, US Alima Bissenova, Nazarbayev University, Kazakhstan Annika Björkdahl, Lund University, Sweden Berit Bliesemann de Guevara, Aberystwyth University, UK Susanne Buckley-Zistel, Philipps University Marburg, Germany Toby Carroll, City University of Hong Kong Mick Dumper, University of Exeter, UK Azra Hromadžić, Syracuse University, US Lee Jones, Queen Mary University of London, UK Louisa Lombard, Yale University, US Virginie Mamadouh, University of Amsterdam, Netherlands Nick Megoran, Newcastle University, UK Markus-Michael Müller, Free University of Berlin, Germany Daniel Neep, Georgetown University, US Diana Ojeda, Xavierian University, Colombia Jenny Peterson, The University of British Columbia, Canada Madeleine Reeves, The University of Manchester, UK Conrad Schetter, Bonn International Center for Conflict Studies, Germany Ricardo Soares de Olivera, University of Oxford, UK Diana Suhardiman, International Water Management Institute, Laos Arlene Tickner, Del Rosario University, Colombia Jacqui True, Monash University, Australia Sofía Zaragocín, Universidad San Francisco de Quito, Ecuador For more information about the series and to find out how to submit a proposal visit bristoluniversitypress.co.uk/ spaces-of-peace-security-and-development

SHAPING PEACEBUILDING IN COLOMBIA International Frames and Spatial Transformation Catalina Montoya Londoño

First published in Great Britain in 2023 by Bristol University Press University of Bristol 1–​9 Old Park Hill Bristol BS2 8BB UK t: +​44 (0)117 374 6645 e: bup-​[email protected] Details of international sales and distribution partners are available at bristoluniversitypress.co.uk © Bristol University Press 2023 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN 978-​1-​5292-​1170-​2 hardcover ISBN 978-​1-​5292-​1171-​9 ePub ISBN 978-​1-​5292-​1172-​6 ePdf The right of Catalina Montoya Londoño to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by her in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved: no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission of Bristol University Press. Every reasonable effort has been made to obtain permission to reproduce copyrighted material. If, however, anyone knows of an oversight, please contact the publisher. The statements and opinions contained within this publication are solely those of the author and not of the University of Bristol or Bristol University Press. The University of Bristol and Bristol University Press disclaim responsibility for any injury to persons or property resulting from any material published in this publication. Bristol University Press works to counter discrimination on grounds of gender, race, disability, age and sexuality. Cover design: blu inc Front cover image: Alamy/Sipa US Bristol University Press use environmentally responsible print partners. Printed and bound in Great Britain by CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon, CR0 4YY

To Jonathon, Emma and Daniel

Contents List of Figures and Tables List of Abbreviations About the Author Acknowledgements

viii x xiv xv

Introduction 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

1

Theoretical Assumptions: Framing Projections in International Scenarios Spatial Framing and Methodological Choices Peacebuilding Efforts in Colombia: National Agendas and Management of International Cooperation Peacebuilding Efforts in Colombia: Bilateral and Multilateral Cooperation Local Views Regarding International Actors International Actors’ Framing of Peacebuilding Spaces International Actors’ Framing of Peacebuilding Agendas

18 35 51 71 92 109 125

Conclusion

142

Appendix 1: Peacebuilding Agendas Appendix 2: International Actors’ Framing of Peacebuilding Agendas References Index

152 159 180 257

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List of Figures and Tables Figures 2.1 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4

Number of online-​subsidy communications per year, per actor Departments with the greatest percentages of No votes Departments with the greatest percentages of Yes votes International cooperation funding received by Colombia International cooperation funding alignment with key APC areas (percentages) Broader agendas in online subsidies (all actors included) Percentage of subsidies linked to international actors’ agendas Number of subsidies per Colombian department Number of departments mentioned by international actors

50 54 55 66 68 126 127 128 129

Tables 3.1 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 6.6 6.7 6.8 6.9 A.1 A.2 A.3 A.4 A.5 A.6 A.7

Geographical distribution of international cooperation 69 2014–​2018 and 2019 USA negative comments in targeted sub-​national places 111 USA positive comments in specific sub-​national places 113 Canada negative comments in specific sub-​national places 114 EU negative comments in specific sub-​national places 116 EU positive comments in specific sub-​national places 117 UN negative comments in specific sub-​national places 119 UN positive comments in specific sub-​national places 121 MAPP/​OEA negative comments in specific sub-​national places 123 MAPP/​OEA positive comments in specific sub-​national places 124 Countries’ agendas, number of subsidies and percentages 159 IOs’ agendas, number of subsidies and percentages 160 USA: specified spaces linked to broader agendas 162 Canada: specified sub-​national spaces linked to broader agendas 164 Sweden: specified sub-​national spaces linked to broader agendas 165 UK: specified sub-​national spaces linked to broader agendas 165 EU: specified sub-​national spaces linked to broader agendas 166 viii

List of Figures and Tables

A.8 A.9 A.10 A.11

UN: specified sub-​national spaces linked to broader agendas World Bank: specified sub-​national spaces linked to broader agendas IDB: specified sub-​national spaces linked to broader agendas MAPP/​OEA: specified sub-​national spaces linked to broader agendas

ix

168 174 174 175

List of Abbreviations ANDI ANIF ANT APC ASCAMCAT AUC CCJ CERAC CINEP/​PPP CMH CNMH CNR CONAMIC CONPES CSDI CSSF DDR DEA

Asociación Nacional de Empresarios de Colombia (National Business Association) Asociación Nacional de Instituciones Financieras (National Association of Finance Institutions) Agencia Nacional de Tierras (National Land Agency) Agencia Presidencial de Cooperación (Presidential Agency for Cooperation) Asociación Campesina del Catatumbo (Farmers’ Organization of Catatumbo) Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (United Self-​Defences of Colombia) Comisión Colombiana de Juristas (Colombian Commission of Jurists) Centro de Recursos para el Análisis de Conflictos (Resource Centre for the Analysis of Conflicts) Centro de Investigacion y Educacion Popular/Programa Por la Paz (Centre for Research and Popular Education/ Peace Programme) Centro de Memoria Histórica (Centre for Historical Memory) Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica (National Centre for Historic Memory) Consejo Nacional de Reincorporación (National Reincorporation Council) Comisión Nacional de Mujeres Indígenas de Colombia (National Commission of Indigenous Women in Colombia) Consejo Nacional de Política Económica y Social (National Council of Economic and Social Policy) Colombia Strategic Development Initiative Conflict, Stability and Security Fund disarmament, demobilization and reintegration Drug Enforcement Administration x

List of Abbreviations

Dejusticia EEAS EEUU ELN ENCI ERG ETCR EU FAO FARC

FCO FLIP FTA GBV GDP GMH HR HRF IACHR ICC ICMP ICRC IcSP ICTJ IDB IDP IHL INCORA INDEPAZ IOM

Centro de Estudios de Derecho, Justicia y Sociedad (Centre of Studies for Law, Justice and Society) European External Action Service Estados Unidos (United States of America) Ejército de Liberación Nacional (National Liberation Army) Estrategia Nacional de Cooperación Internacional (National Strategy for International Cooperation) Ejército Revolucionario Guevarista (Guevarist Revolutionary Army) Espacios Territoriales de Capacitación y Reincorporación (Territorial spaces for training and reincorporation) European Union Food and Agriculture Organization Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia and Fuerza Alternativa Revolucionaria del Común (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, Alternative Revolutionary Forces of the Common People) Foreign and Commonwealth Office (UK) Fundación para la Libertad de Prensa (Foundation for Press Freedom) free trade agreement gender-​based violence gross domestic product Grupo de Memoria Histórica (Group of Historical Memory) human rights Human Rights Fund Inter-​American Commission on Human Rights International Criminal Court International Commission on Missing Persons International Committee of the Red Cross Instrument contributing to stability and peace International Center for Transitional Justice Inter-​American Development Bank Internally displaced population International Humanitarian Law Instituto Colombiano de la Reforma Agraria (Colombian Institute for Agrarian Reform) Instituto de Estudios para el Desarrollo y la Paz (Institute of Studies for Development and Peace) International Organization for Migration xi

Shaping Peacebuilding in Colombia

JEP KFOR LGBT LTA MAPP/​OEA NATO NGO OCHA OCLAE ODA OEA/​OAS OECD OEI OHCHR ONU PATR PDET PMI PNCTR PSVI PTN SDG SIDA SIVJRNR

Justicia Especial para la Paz (Special Jurisdiction for Peace) NATO mission in Kosovo lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender Lugares Transitorios de Acogida (Transitory places for underage combatants) Misión de Apoyo al Proceso de Paz/​Organización de Estados Americanos North Atlantic Treaty Organization non-​governmental organization United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Organización Continental Latinoamericana y Caribeña de Estudiantes (Continental Latin American and Caribbean Organization of Students) Official development assistance Organización de Estados Americanos/​Organization of American States Organisation for Economic Co-​operation and Development Organización de Estados Iberoamericanos para la Educación, la Ciencia y la Cultura (Organization of Iberian-​ American States for Education, Science and Culture) The (UN) Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights Organización de las Naciones Unidas (United Nations) Planes de Acción para la Transformación Regional (Territorial transformation action plans) Planes de Desarrollo con Enfoque Territorial (Development plans with territorial focus) Plan Marco de Implementación (Framework plan for implementation –​of the peace agreement) Política Nacional de Consolidación y Reconstrucción Territorial (National Policy of Consolidation and Territorial Reconstruction) Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict Initiative Puntos Transitorios de Normalización (Transitory points or places for Normalization) (United Nations) Sustainable Development Goal Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency Sistema Integral de Verdad, Justicia, Reparación y No Repetición (Comprehensive System of Truth, Justice, xii

List of Abbreviations

SNARIV TJ UK UN UNASUR UNDP UNESCO UNHCR UNICEF UNIFEM UNMIK UNODC UNSC US(A) USAID WFP ZDE ZEII ZRC ZVTN

Redress and Non-​Repetition) Sistema Nacional de Atención y Reparación Integral a las Víctimas (National System of Attention and Comprehensive Redress to Victims) transitional justice United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland United Nations Unión de Naciones Suramericanas (Union of South American Nations) United Nations Development Programme United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees United Nations Children’s Fund United Nations Development Fund for Women United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime United Nations Security Council United States (of America) United States Agency for International Development World Food Programme Zonas de Desarrollo Empresarial (Business development zones) Zonas Estratégicas de Intervención Integral (Strategic zones of comprehensive intervention) Zonas de Reserva Campesina (Peasant farmers’ reservations) Zonas Veredales Transitorias de Normalización (Normalization transitory zones in Veredas)

xiii

About the Author Catalina Montoya Londoño is Senior Lecturer in International Relations, Director of the MA in Politics and International Relations and Director of the Archbishop Desmond Tutu Centre for War and Peace Studies at Liverpool Hope University (UK). Her main research interest is in the field of political communication, including media-​state relationships, communication, conflict and peace and international relations. Her previous books include Los Cercos del Debate sobre Restitución de Tierras (The Boundaries of the Debate on Land Restitution) with Maryluz Vallejo Mejía (Bogotá: Editorial Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, 2017), Framing Event-​Driven News: The promotion of the US agenda in the Colombian armed conflict (Bogotá: Editorial Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, 2011) and Alianzas entre Medios de Comunicación y Organizaciones de la Sociedad Civil: Balances y Propuestas para Fortalecer la Democracia y los Derechos Humanos en América Latina (Alliances Between Media and Civil Society Organizations to Strengthen Democracy and Human Rights in Latin America) (Bogotá: Editorial Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, 2010).

xiv

Acknowledgements I would like to thank Liverpool Hope University and my colleagues in History, Politics and International Relations for their support during the preparation of this book. While the university provided me with resources to carry out and disseminate my research in academic conferences and events, my colleagues Neil Ferguson, Danny Rye, Michael Holmes, Rob Busby, Kate Mattocks and Stephen McLoughlin took the time to comment on my research project. Many thanks also to my colleagues at the Archbishop Desmond Tutu Centre for War and Peace Studies, for their encouragement and space to discuss the progress of my work. I am also grateful to the Pro-​ Vice-​Chancellor for Research Office for their support through schemes such as the UG summer research scholarships (2022) and VC PhD research scholarships (2022) as these attracted BA and PhD students to the line of research proposed by this book. My gratitude also goes to the Peace and Reconciliation Network of the Association of Commonwealth Universities, the Colombian Embassy in the UK, the Latin American Studies Association LASA and the Conflict Research Society (CRS). Their research conferences and events gave me the opportunity to present and receive feedback at different stages. I would also like to thank Judith Large in the CRS for her support, and Professor Tony McGrew, whose invitation to the research seminar series at the Center for the History of Global Development in Shanghai University provided encouragement and insightful questions in the last stages of the research. My deepest thanks also to Eamon Gilmore, Ambassadors Nestor Osorio Londoño and Antonio José Ardila for sharing their insights about the Colombian peace process in events I organized for the Archbishop Tutu Centre for War and Peace Studies at Liverpool Hope University, and the Colombian Embassy staff for accepting my invitations to share their perspective. They provided me with insights and perspectives that enrich this work. An earlier version of this work was published in the journal Latin American Policy, whom I am indebted to for granting me the permission to use some of the material for this book.

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newgenprepdf

Shaping Peacebuilding in Colombia

Finally, special thanks to Zoe Forbes and Stephen Wenham from Bristol University Press, Helen Nicholson from Newgen Publishing and all of those who reviewed my proposal and first draft of the book for their invaluable comments in improving my work, but above all, I want to thank my family, whose love, patience and unconditional support made this book possible.

xvi

Introduction On an early morning during a visit to my grandparents, I looked through their shop located in a rural area of the Antioquia department in Colombia. While sipping my coffee, I noticed some men sitting in the centre square abusing a man with learning difficulties. They kept shouting insults for about half an hour without anybody intervening. I asked my grandad what was going on and he just looked at me and said, ‘desocupados mija’ (people without anything better to do) and went back to his shop. Three years after the peace agreement had been signed, it struck me that the silence and tension that had dominated that space had been replaced (although not for long) by people feeling free enough to exchange insults. This had been a disputed municipio (municipality) during the height of the Colombian conflict between guerrillas and right-​wing paramilitaries, and, although most of my extended family lived in cities, the potential fate of this rural town and my grandparents was always present for all of us. To my dismay, most of my family voted against the peace agreement, but I was uneasy about the discourse in political circles of the two Colombias: one that knew the conflict directly, and one who did not and did not care. I knew how much we all cared, and how many families and people around us had real ties of love with a countryside devastated by violence even if divided over the best way forward. Still, that duality, that disconnection built in the political discourse between the countryside and the developed urban Colombia as an axis of the conflict intrigued me, and was well illustrated by António Guterres in a declaration in January 2018 when he said: I saw the duality of the country, a developed Colombia as we see here in Bogota. Being in Bogota could be like being in New York, London, or Paris. You see a developed country with a vibrant economy, an active civil society, a country with one of the longest democratic traditions in the world, a country that has seen tremendously successful development processes. On the other hand, I recall visiting Chocó [department], where I saw an entirely different Colombia, where the State is nowhere to be seen. Therefore, we must recognize that this is not only a peace-​building process. (Guterres, 2018) 1

Shaping Peacebuilding in Colombia

Beyond the hyperbolized nature of this statement about Bogotá, given its comparative level of development and quality of life in relation to the other global cities mentioned (Mendoza Pena, 2018) and the challenging experience of living and working in the city for average Colombians like myself, it struck me that there was something in that political construction of our geography that played a functional role in peacebuilding efforts and deserved a further exploration. This is, in a nutshell, what motivates my writing of this book. The Colombian conflict has been described as the longest conflict in the Western hemisphere. It morphed, according to the Group of Historical Memory (GMH, 2013), from partisan violence between conservative and liberal factions in the mid-​20th century to a low-​intensity conflict involving the Colombian state and left-​wing guerrillas during the Cold War, and then, by the last decades of the 20th century, consolidated the presence of right-​wing paramilitaries, drug traffickers and organized criminal groups. At its core, the degraded conflict developed mainly in the countryside in response to the drive for appropriation of land and resources and the limitation of democracy in the shape of grave human rights violations against the civil population. By the time the peace talks started between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in 2012, there were estimates of 220,000 deaths, 1,982 collective assassinations or massacres, 16,346 selective assassinations, 10,189 victims of anti-​personnel mines, 27,023 kidnappings, 25,007 disappearances, 1,754 victims of sexual violence, 6,421 children and adolescents recruited to armed groups, and 5,700,000 victims of forced displacement (GHM, 2013). By 2016, the year the peace agreement was signed, Colombia remained the country with the second-​highest number (after Syria) of internally displaced people (IDP), with 7.7 million (UNHCR, 2017). The overall number of registered victims accounted by the Colombian Government Victims’ Unit from the end of the 20th century up to 2022 is 9,328,449. Between 1996 and 2000, it was 2,054,454; increasing to a peak of 3,565,752 between 2001 and 2005; then decreasing to 2,225,962 between 2006 and 2010; 1,815,843 between 2011 and 2015; and 989.180 between 2016 and 2020 (Red Nacional de Información, 2022). Homicides have been steadily on the increase, particularly in rural areas since 2016, mainly due to the re-​accommodation of other armed actors in spaces left by FARC (World Bank, 2022). Meanwhile, dissidents of FARC have remained active, amounting to an estimated 2,400 fighters in 23 groups around the country (WOLA, 2020). Between 1964 and 2016, the Colombian NGO Indepaz calculated that the Colombian government spent COL$179,000 million in the war, equivalent to 2.8 per cent of its GDP of 1990–​1998 and between 3 to 4 per cent of 2

Introduction

2000–​2016 (Otero Prada, 2016). Colombia also attracted the greatest amount of multilateral peacebuilding intervention in the Western hemisphere, with five multi-​funds led by the Colombian government in partnership with international organizations (APC, 2016), a UN Verification Mission and an OEA Mission for the Peace Process (Smit, 2021). Colombia became the greatest recipient of official development assistance (ODA) in the region between 2016 and 2020 (OECD, 2020).

What this book is about This book explores how key countries and international organizations (IOs) promoted geographically targeted peacebuilding efforts in Colombia between November 2016 and February 2019 through online subsidies. This was a key transitional period for peacebuilding in Colombia, marked by the signature of a revised peace agreement on between the government of President Juan Manuel Santos and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and its ratification in Congress on 30 November 2016. Following three previous unsuccessful negotiations since 19831 (García-​Peña, 2007), these talks resulted in FARC giving up arms and turning into a political party, changing the meaning of their acronym to Alternative Revolutionary Forces of the Common People, and then to the Party of the Commons. President Juan Manuel Santos received the Nobel Peace Prize in December 2016 as recognition from the international community for the efforts towards peace. UN Secretary General António Guterres remarked that, in a context of more new conflicts and nowhere-​near solutions for old ones, Colombia’s peace process was ‘of fundamental symbolic importance in the world’ (Guterres, 2018). With substantial international support, the Santos administration also embarked in peace talks with the National Liberation Army (ELN), while implementing the peace agreement with FARC in 2017.

Administration changes This period was also marked by the 2017 presidential campaigns and the first six months of the formation of a new government in Colombia after right-​wing president and opponent of the peace process Ivan Duque took office in August 2018. His party, the right-​wing Democratic Centre, capitalized on its successful campaign against the peace accords, which, in alliance with other conservative sectors, resulted in the popular rejection of the peace agreement by a narrow 50.2 per cent margin at the beginning of October 2016, forcing the Santos government to negotiate a revised version

1

1983–​1987, 1991–​1992 and 1998–​2002. 3

Shaping Peacebuilding in Colombia

of the agreement that considered the opposition objections. The campaign against the peace process and the plebiscite results propelled the presidential campaign of Ivan Duque in 2017 and his subsequent election in June 2018. Thus, the faith of the peace agreement implementation was left in the hands of a government who had campaigned relentlessly against it.

Online subsidies Online subsidies are daily information items published on official websites of countries and IOs, including news stories, speeches, fact sheets, press releases and press conference statements. They provide formal and controlled access to institutional and governmental information, perspectives and goals, saving time, space and costs for news media and other interested stakeholders (Ting Lee and Lin, 2015). Drawing on a review of existing research on the area, Ting Lee and Lin (2017, p 2) assert that: Press releases and other targeted public relations material play a significant role on the production of news and enable the strategic transfer of organizational views through public relations-​practitioner defined attributes (e.g. organizational message, reputation and talking points) into media coverage and public opinion. … Public relations efforts of governments have a positive impact on the quantity and quality of news coverage. Online subsidies are both a public relation and a journalistic tool aimed primarily at media, but also stakeholders and interested audiences who can access this information online without cost. They allow the daily framing of events, policies and broader issues, proposing what is at issue and how to think about it. They are also a key instrument for the practice of mediated public diplomacy efforts (Entman, 2008), that is, communications directed at media to indirectly influence public attitudes and opinions about, for example, peacebuilding and cooperation towards that aim. This work focuses on how key international actors involved in cooperation with the Colombian g​ overnment f​ ramed Colombian space(s) and promoted agendas linked to peacebuilding efforts through online subsidies. Accordingly, the book foregrounds the importance of digital mediated public diplomacy and, within it, the generation of meaningful narratives about space transformation for cementing peacebuilding agendas. Questions include those around which spaces were prioritized by international actors in their daily communications, how those spaces were explicitly labelled and defined with negative and positive references, and which agendas were foregrounded in relation to targeted places of peacebuilding intervention. Through these questions, this work assesses 4

Introduction

to what extent differing frames regarding space transformation and peacebuilding promoted by key international actors reflected consensus, complementarity, dissent or dispersion in the background of two Colombian governments that were opposed on the peace process, and the implications for consolidating the peacebuilding initiatives of the former government of Juan Manuel Santos.

International actors: antecedents and focus The international community had been a historical presence regarding peacebuilding efforts in Colombia since the administration of Julio Cesar Turbay (1978–​1982) (Cepeda Ulloa, 2012). During the 1990s, countries including Venezuela, Mexico, Spain, Germany, Norway and Cuba hosted peace negotiations in their territories with left-​wing guerrilla groups (Agudelo Taborda and Riccardi, 2019). Then, by the end of the decade, a more diversified and structured participation took place in the administration of President Andres Pastrana (1998–​2002). Pastrana’s ‘Diplomacy for Peace’ policy sought international support both in the failed peace talks with the left-​wing guerrillas of FARC (from 1998 to 2002) and the strengthening of the Colombian security forces (Plan Colombia), although, in practice, unprecedented US military aid for Plan Colombia dominated this period. Key international actors during the 2000s were the USA and the EU, with agendas of cooperation geared, for the USA, towards state building, military strengthening, counter-​drugs and counter-​insurgency as materialized in Plan Colombia, and, for the EU, towards the peace process, civil society and institutional strengthening. Between 1998 and 2016, the USA provided 59.7 per cent of ODA in Colombia –​equivalent to US$11,904.2 million –​ 83.5 per cent of which was directed to military assistance for counter-​drugs and counter-​insurgency programmes (US$11,840 million), and 16.5 per cent (US$2,342 million) directed to state strengthening for justice, victim support and humanitarian assistance. Meanwhile, the EU and its members came second as sources of ODA during these years, providing 30.2 per cent of ODA, equivalent to US$6,021 million. Assistance was directed towards structural peace, counter-​drug-​trafficking, alternative development, humanitarian aid, institutional strengthening, human rights and social development (Gómez Quintero, 2007; Moreno, 2009; Barreto Henriques, 2014; García, 2015a; Castañeda, 2017; Beittel, 2019; Agudelo Taborda and Riccardi, 2019). Other important actors in the 2000s were the UN system, the Organization of American States (OAS), the Inter-​American Development Bank (IDB), Switzerland and Norway, along with some 25 countries and the Vatican. These actors mostly supported peace talks, institutional strengthening, development and humanitarian initiatives in a decade that marked a 5

Shaping Peacebuilding in Colombia

convergence between anti-​terrorism and anti-​insurgency policy under the leadership of President Alvaro Uribe (2002–​2010). This administration denied the existence of the armed conflict and so the political character of left-​wing guerrillas, bringing the government in line with the US war against terrorism but at greater odds with actors such as the EU and the UN. In addition, the Uribe government sought a closer alignment of international cooperation with presidential aims and programmes, prioritizing security and the military management of the armed conflict (Bouvier, 2012; Cepeda Ulloa, 2012; GMH, 2013; Cano Linares, 2013; Betancourt Vélez, 2015; Cujabante Villamil, 2016; García Duque and Casadiego, 2021). The subsequent administration of Juan Manuel Santos (2010–​2018) changed the anti-​terrorist rhetoric of his predecessor by recognizing the existence of an armed conflict and the agrarian issue at the heart of it, and the need for negotiations with left-​wing guerrillas, as well as the need to redress victims to bring peace. Thus, international cooperation became aligned with preparing Colombia for a post-​conflict scenario, giving way to a greater international convergence, including between the USA and the EU (Agudelo Taborda and Riccardi, 2019; García Duque and Casadiego, 2021). The Colombian government’s greater multilateral approach involved international support in the peace process with FARC as it learned from previous negotiations and experiences in other parts of the world. Cuba hosted the talks and, along with Norway, provided guarantors and witnesses to the process. The Norwegian People’s Aid supported the initiative on de-​ mining. Sweden also supported negotiations, facilitating contacts between the government and FARC and being part of the delegation accompanying the negotiations. Chile and Venezuela acted as observers accompanying the process. In all, 26 countries acted as friends of the process with a subgroup of ten conforming a facilitating commission. The Red Cross (ICRC) facilitated the transport of guerrilla negotiators, attended preparatory meetings and provided support during the negotiations. The US Obama administration, the EU and Germany sent peace envoys and set up funding, a US ‘Peace Colombia’ funding plan, and an EU trust fund for peace. The Unión de Naciones Suramericanas (UNASUR) formed part of the delegation for the peace negotiation. The Vatican, Spain, Portugal, the UK and France became important allies in the process. The UN Secretary General and other UN representatives accompanied the talks and renegotiation of the agreement, established a post-​conflict fund and sent a verification commission for the implementation of peace. The UNDP (Development Programme) and UN Women provided support for negotiations, and the Women’s International Democratic Federation also accompanied the talks, taking a gender perspective. Other countries from South and Central America that accompanied the process included Ecuador, Mexico, Chile, Bolivia, Uruguay, Venezuela, Brazil, Argentina and Peru. In 6

Introduction

addition, the peace talks made provisions for international advisors for both sides of the table, including experts from the UK, Israel, El Salvador and the USA providing lessons from other parts of the world and ideas to face dilemmas as the process went on (Barreto Henriques, 2014; Santos, 2019; Fundación Compaz and Royal Norwegian Embassy in Colombia, 2022). During the implementation stage of the peace accords with FARC, key countries and IOs supporting Colombia included the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, which provided technical support for the verification of the peace implementation, and former presidents of Uruguay and Spain, appointed as international verifiers of implementation along with the UN Verification Mission. Other countries and organizations accompanying and supporting the implementation included the USA, the EU, Via Campesina, UNDP, UNESCO, OHCHR, UNHCR, UNODC, UNASUR, OCLAE, OEI, ICRC, ICMP, Switzerland, Sweden, Netherlands, Institute for Multiparty Democracy, the Carter Center, ICTJ, the Global Commission on Drug Policy, UN Women, the Special Representative of the Secretary General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, and the Women’s International Democratic Federation (Fundación Compaz and Royal Norwegian Embassy in Colombia, 2022). In its 2016 report, during the year the peace agreement was finally signed and the country was preparing for the transition to a post-​conflict scenario with FARC, the Presidential Agency for Cooperation (APC) identified, in descending order, the USA, EU, Canada, Sweden and the UK as the main donors for peacebuilding, along with four post-​conflict multi-​funds that began their operations to support Colombia’s transition after the peace accords, including the UN Post-​conflict Fund, the World Bank Fund for Peace and Post-​Conflict, the IDB Sustainable Colombia Fund and the EU Trust Fund for Colombia. Such financial architecture reflected a commitment to multilateral peacebuilding and international coordination to transition to post-​conflict in Colombia. During the next four years, the UK and Canada registered most of the resources for the UN fund; the UK, Norway and Germany jointly became the main donors for the IDB fund, and the EU trust funding mainly came from the European Commission followed by countries such as Germany, Holland Italy and Spain; while Sweden and the World Bank were the key donors for the World Bank fund (APC, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019). This book focuses on key Western donors for peacebuilding in Colombia, including the USA, Canada, Sweden and the UK, as well key IOs including the Mission for the Peace Process of the Organization of American States (MAPP/​OEA), as well as the actors leading the multi-​funds for peace established in Colombia: the UN, EU, World Bank and IDB. These were the countries recognized by the government as the main donors for peacebuilding in 2016 and the organizations leading the newly established 7

Shaping Peacebuilding in Colombia

post-​conflict multi-​funds (APC, 2016) and UN Verification Mission and MAPP/​OEA peace-​process support (Smit, 2021), and they continued to be important through the transition years explored in this work (APC 2017, 2018, 2019). Other actors were also key in peacebuilding efforts more broadly, including Germany, Norway2, Holland, Spain and Italy. However, given the qualitative nature of the assessment attempted, a narrower focus was chosen for the period explored that could still capture an interesting story about the role of multilateral mediated public diplomacy for peacebuilding, the contribution of online subsidies as public information tools in this endeavour, and the spatialized nature of peacebuilding narratives used to promote post-​conflict transition. At the same time, IOs and countries were chosen, rather than NGOs and the private sector. Although the importance of NGOs and the private sector in international cooperation and peacebuilding has undoubtedly increased during the last two decades internationally and in Colombia in particular (García Duque and Casadiego, 2021), study of them would need frameworks beyond those provided by this work. This study captures an important story about cooperation by focusing on IOs and countries, as, during the Santos administration, most of the peacebuilding cooperation was geared towards development and humanitarian assistance3, provided mainly by public sector institutions, that is, official agencies, local and national governments (García Duque and Casadiego, 2021), and organized under multi-​funds led by IOs.

Relevance The 21st century has witnessed an increase in international community peacebuilding efforts through multilateral operations and coordinated approaches (Schneckener, 2016; Smit, 2019, 2021), as well as the integration of media in recognition of its strategic role in supporting peace

2

3

For example, Norway and Germany became key donors after 2018. Norway was listed among the top five contributors for peacebuilding in 2018, along with the EU and UN funds, Sweden and the EU (APC, 2018). In addition, Norway and Germany were reported among the five top contributors alongside the actors chosen for the research in 2019 regarding governmental frameworks linked to peacebuilding: UNSDG 16, National Development Plan, Territorial Stabilization, and the Implementation of the Peace Agreement Framework related to victims’ redress and political participation (APC, 2020). The modalities of cooperation are taken by García Duque and Casadiego (2021, p 2378) from the OECD definition. Development is defined as cooperation ‘by official agencies, local and state governments … that a) promote economic development and welfare in developing countries; b) are concessional in nature and convey a grant element of at least 25%’. Humanitarian cooperation alleviates ‘some type of humanitarian emergency or life-​threatening crisis’, including food, health and sanitation in situations of internal displacement. 8

Introduction

operations (Alleyne, 2008; Egleder, 2012; Lehmann, 2015; Bratić, 2016). Although online subsidies have been institutionally acknowledged since the end of 1990s as an important tool in peacebuilding efforts, virtually no academic work has focused specifically on information subsidies by countries and international organizations for mediated public diplomacy on peacebuilding cooperation. An important exception in this regard is Egleder’s (2012) pioneering book about the media activities of the international missions KFOR and UNMIK and their contribution to peacebuilding in Kosovo, using the framework of peace journalism. The author documented the increasing awareness and recognition of the potential of news media in post-​conflict scenarios by the UN and NATO since 1990. The 2003 Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations described the political and operational need for an effective public information campaign. Information would help to build support for the peace mission among target audiences, including local and international media, local populations and donor communities, as well as to de-​escalate conflict by becoming a trusted source of information counteracting hostile or irresponsible media (cited by Egleder, 2012, p 2). At the same time, NATO’s understanding of the contribution of its own media in post-​conflict environments was reflected in its doctrine of ‘psychological operations’ to ‘foster cooperation with NATO forces and international organizations’ aimed at ‘the restoration of peace and security.’ For PsyOps officers in KFOR, providing media products with ethical standards that could serve as an example to local media was essential in contributing to the de-​escalation of violence (cited by Egleder, 2012, p 3). Accordingly, the production of information by actors engaged in peacebuilding has been recognized as having the potential to harness the credibility of their missions, the support and cooperation of elites and publics of targeted countries and other international stakeholders. At the same time, it has been attributed with the capacity to counteract negative tendencies of news coverage accustomed to report on conflict, reinforcing positive accounts of a peace process. Drawing on a study of Oslo, Israel-​Jordan and Northern Ireland peace processes, Wolfsfeld (2004) and Wolfsfeld et al (2008) assert that news media plays a generally negative role in peacemaking scenarios due to embedded journalistic values of immediacy, drama, simplicity and ethnocentrism. Wolfsfeld stated the centrality of news media as ‘a reference point for elites, journalists, and the broader public to monitor a peace process’, raise or lower the public standing of antagonists during negotiations and as an instrument by political actors to achieve their goals (2004, pp 221–​223). Such a role, for Wolfsfeld, heightened the importance of elites’ institutional preparation and ability to provide public warnings about crises, promote and contextualize events according to long-​term perspectives, avoid the exaggeration of 9

Shaping Peacebuilding in Colombia

successes, provide ‘optimistic visions of the future’ and ‘lower expectations concerning when to expect a breakthrough’ (2004, p 229). Understanding the power of online subsidies in this way is in line with an emerging interest in the role of digital communication technologies for social change and specifically for peace (Firchow et al, 2017). In line with Wolfsfeld’s insights about the potential of news media for peace and the potential role that elites can play in providing context and long-​ term perspectives, this work focuses on online institutional newsrooms. Such newsrooms are aimed at providing daily context, counteracting disinformation, and providing in-​depth information and understanding of the peace process as well as the role institutions and countries are playing in peacebuilding more broadly for news media. Social media has not been assessed in this work, since, although attracting a greater academic interest in recent years (for example, Bratić, 2016; Ayaz Naseem and Arshad-​Ayaz, 2020; Bjola and Zaiotti, 2021) and increasingly used by countries and organizations to directly engage with broader publics, it is a more informal, direct and personalized form of communication aimed primarily at self-​reputation and coordination and, arguably, more in line with the negative peace-​making values of personalization and immediacy. Accordingly, social media is used to shape national or organizational images, promote self-​legitimation, respond to crises, provide public services, signal intentions and facilitate engagement with stakeholders. (Bjola and Zaiotti, 2021). In addition, recent research has shown that, while social media platforms such as Twitter tend to follow news media (Rogstad, 2016), online subsidies are rather followed by news media (Ting Lee and Lin, 2017). This book brings together the strengths of international relations and political communication studies to address the inclusive and constructive public engagement of international stakeholders in peacebuilding efforts after the signing of the agreement with FARC. In contrast to existing studies on Colombia focusing on one country’s framing projection and mediated diplomacy (Montoya Londoño, 2011; Dießelmann and Hetzer 2015), this work is inspired by the emerging interest on multi-​stakeholder public diplomacy (Yang et al, 2012; Ting Lee and Lin, 2015, 2017; Höglund and Orjuela, 2016) and dynamics of multilateral framing by different international actors supporting Colombia’s peace efforts. In doing this, rather than following traditional assumptions about a monolithic Western-​liberal peacebuilding narrative, this work explores the concert between international community narratives and potential differences despite the high degree of coordination attempted in the peace process. In addition, this work adopts a constructivist view of public diplomacy. In contrast to studies focusing on public diplomacy as a liberal tool of soft power for reputational gains or leadership, or realist tool of propaganda 10

Introduction

and manipulation, the book explores if and how public diplomacy can serve agendas of the commons such as building identities, agendas, norms and structures in a multi-​stakeholder environment (Proedrou and Frangonikolopoulos, 2012; Zhang and Chinn Swartz, 2009; Zhang, 2019), in this case, for peacebuilding (Mac Ginty and Firchow, 2016; Ateş and Barut, 2018). Alleyne (2008, p 176), for example, in discussing UN peace efforts in Guatemala, asserts the importance of a constructivist outlook as it ‘elevates the importance of UN public information work because it is through public information that the UN seeks to discursively construct new societies.’ Accordingly, a constructivist look stresses the importance of understanding communicative efforts to discursively support the transformation of identities, values and norms with regard to peace through public information efforts, in this case online subsidies. It is argued in this book that international actors promote peacebuilding agendas in targeted places of intervention. To grasp this process, the notion of spatial framing is proposed, as international actors imagine spaces of peacebuilding transformation and project values and priorities through which transformation of violent dynamics occur. The notion of spatial framing acknowledges the importance of socially constructed spaces in shaping peacebuilding practices. Framing involves the selection and organization of perceived aspects of reality to communicate preferred meanings in support of political agendas (Entman, 1993, 2003, 2008; Gamson, 1989), thus contributing to ‘the social construction of meaning’ (Gamson and Modigliani,1989, p 2) about, in this case, peacebuilding. Frames have been studied mainly in relation to events, issues and political actors (Entman, 2003; D’Angelo and Kuypers, 2010), but not regarding space. However, recent literature on peacebuilding and space call attention to the geographical dimension of peace transformation. This literature usefully suggests that peacebuilding and space constantly constitute and transform each other (Chojnacki and Engels, 2016; Flint, 2005; Flint and Kirsch, 2011). The book takes inspiration from emerging works in the fields of peacebuilding and space as well as geography and peacebuilding, which have recognized the role of meaning attributed to places for peacebuilding practices, although mainly from an anthropological perspective. In line with those works, the key role of socially constructed spaces to legitimize and advance peacebuilding practices is recognized (for example, McConell et al, 2014; Ide, 2017; Björkdahl and Kappler, 2017). At the same time, insights about the spatial nature of peace and its different meanings at different scales (from the local to the global), places and times and for different groups are acknowledged (Kobayashi, 2009; Koopman, 2014; Megoran, et al 2014; Courtheyn, 2018) and explored in this work. In line with those insights, the notion of spatial framing in mediated diplomacy is proposed; that is, the selection and promotion of targeted 11

Shaping Peacebuilding in Colombia

places of intervention through the selection and organization of perceived aspects in the reality of conflict (and transformation) of such places ranging from the local to the national. Thus, spatial framing implies the narrative construction of meaningful spaces for peacebuilding transformation and the communication of preferred meanings about what is at issue in those spaces, their process of transformation, and the peacebuilding agendas and actors at different scales of agency, from the local to the international. Accordingly, the book focuses on the discursive characterization of places and agency, as peacebuilders actively and strategically re-​signify the meaning of places that are transitioning from conflict to peace (Björkdahl and Kappler, 2017) and permeate the governance of post-​conflict places with institutional logics that give sense to practices and orders in social settings (Bátora et al, 2021). The question guiding this book is how international community actors characterized Colombia and targeted places as spaces of peacebuilding transformation, thus empowering agency from the local to the global in advancing peacebuilding agendas.

Methodological approach Drawing on framing analysis of online information subsidies using NVivo software, this work examines how international community cooperation in Colombia promoted agendas linked to geographically targeted peacebuilding efforts. A selection of 694 online subsidies in English and Spanish published by the countries and organizations in the news sections of their official web pages directly linked to peacebuilding in Colombia was made between November 2016 and March 2019. The assessment was mainly qualitative to capture nuances promoted by the actors chosen for the analysis, although some quantitative trends were offered in which the unit of analysis was the subsidy, in terms of the presence or absence of attributes in the information rather than how many times the attribute appears in a single item (Holsti, 1969).4 Questions included: Which spaces were prioritized? How were those spaces explicitly labelled and defined with negative (what is at issue) and positive (ideal transformations) references? Which agendas regarding development, governance, security provision, negotiation and implementation of the peace agreement or human rights were foregrounded in relation to targeted places of peacebuilding intervention?

4

Such a method, according to the author, improves reliability of findings, as it is easier to confirm with an external coder whether an attribute is present in an item rather than how many times it appears. In addition, the repetition of a given attribute within a sentence, paragraph or item does not change the tally. 12

Introduction

To guarantee the authenticity of the official communications analysed, online subsidies were retrieved only from official and institutional online newsrooms rather than secondary web pages or sources. In addition, all the available communications mentioning peacebuilding in Colombia were chosen, to guarantee the representativeness of the purposive sample, and searches into the sample were conducted from 2017, to gather as many subsidies as possible. As this was a single-​authored work with a mainly qualitative orientation, no independent coders were hired for statistical reliability tests. Instead, the reader will find a more in-​depth qualitative exploration of spatial framing and documentary research into policies and narratives at the (inter)national level relevant to the discussion that this book proposes. Documentary research was also carried out to gain a broader understanding of peacebuilding efforts by the Colombian government and key differences between the administrations of Juan Manuel Santos and Ivan Duque. These included national development plans during both governments and reports by APC and the Office of the Comptroller General. In addition, 903 official subsidies related to peacebuilding and international cooperation published between November 2016 and March 2019 were reviewed in the news section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Colombia5 to identify differences between the governments regarding the promotion of their international engagement linked to the peace process (developed in Chapter 3). Documentary analysis of publicly available official reports explored how key international actors were involved in peacebuilding efforts through the main peacebuilding areas under evaluation in the framing analysis: political negotiation and implementation, economic development, governance, security provision and human rights. Research on official reports was allowed to contextualize policy, implementation and institutional views (Burnham et al, 2008) regarding support for peacebuilding in Colombia (explored in Chapter 4). A review of other key stakeholders in Colombia was carried out, including Democratic Centre Party articles campaigning for the rejection of the peace accords in the 2016 plebiscite and Ivan Duque official web pages as a Candidate6 (developed in Chapter 3), FARC’s official communications, civil society actors –​ such as intellectuals and academics –​ and some representative NGOs’ institutional reports and articles (developed in 5

6

145 published in 2016, 428 published in 2017, 299 published in 2018, and 31 published between January and March 2019 (at cancilleria.gov.co/​newsroom/​news). 37 communications published on ivanduque.com in 2017 and 2018, one article published in the Democratic Centre Facebook account in 2016 and an article published in the newspaper El Tiempo by party representatives in 2016 as part of the ‘No’ campaign in the referendum. 13

Shaping Peacebuilding in Colombia

Chapter 5). Such exploration helped to assess levels of support regarding the role of international actors in peacebuilding during the period explored in this work. This selection does not do justice to the dense network of state and civil society organizations involved in peacebuilding, but allows some insight into contrasting national views about the role of international actors. Exploring their views was important, as NGOs do have a role in building bottom-​ up normative consensus regarding peacebuilding, human rights, human security and government accountability thanks to their greater access to civil societies and international actors (Richmond, 2005). In addition, the research opted for NGOs’ reports rather than online subsidies, given the organizations’ vocation of informed public discussion in the production of structured reports to contribute to public debate and policy in their areas of action.

Organization of the book Chapter 1 offers an overview of the emergent body of literature that has focused on the issue of frame projection in international scenarios, using concepts such as public and mediated diplomacy. It starts by introducing the notion of framing, public and mediated diplomacy, as well as online information subsidies as a key strategy linking traditional and contemporary practice. Subsequently, the chapter discusses what is known about the potential of mediated public diplomacy and online subsidies for peacebuilding, beyond national interests and image building. Key arguments put forward in this chapter are that public diplomacy can be understood in a constructivist fashion when countries and organizations strive to use communication to promote a public good, such as peace, by counteracting negative public opinion regarding peacebuilding efforts and harnessing international credibility and civil society support more broadly, Also, the chapter argues that online information subsidies are a key instrument for the practice of public mediated diplomacy that can potentially contribute to the promotion of peacebuilding transformation. Chapter 2 explains the contribution of studies on ‘peacebuilding and space’ and ‘political geography and peacebuilding’ to the notion of peacebuilding and the proposition made in this book that countries and IOs promote peacebuilding agendas in targeted spaces of intervention. To grasp this process, spatial framing is key, as international actors promote an image of those spaces and project values and priorities through which transformation of violent dynamics will occur. The chapter explains how spatial framing was carried out and points to some initial observations about the sample. Chapter 3 compares peacebuilding efforts carried out by the Colombian governments of Juan Manuel Santos and Ivan Duque based on documentary 14

Introduction

evidence, and the role of the plebiscite in October 2016 in propelling the campaign and election of Ivan Duque as president. It establishes key governmental agendas in Colombia, including peace negotiations with illegal armed actors and peacebuilding agendas in targeted places within Colombia. In addition, the chapter compares the management of international cooperation for peacebuilding by the Santos and Duque administrations based on official reports. This allows a deeper appreciation of the differences and similarities in the governments at a key period for the implementation of the peace agreement. Chapter 4 summarizes how key international actors have been involved in peacebuilding efforts, drawing from official reports and documentation of the actors studied. It starts by describing cooperation agendas of countries under evaluation (USA, Canada, Sweden and UK), and then summarizes multilateral efforts through the post-​conflict multi-​trust funds set up to aid the transition to peace by the UN, World Bank and IDB. In addition, the chapter summarizes the role of MAPP/​OEA to monitor and provide support to the peace process. The chapter points to relevant antecedents to international actors’ cooperation and outlines their priorities and agendas during the period studied. Furthermore, it reflects on how each actor privileged a particular approach regarding liberal peacebuilding based on secondary sources. Chapter 5 focuses on national positioning regarding international actors in Colombia. It describes other key stakeholders in Colombia, including FARC, expert commentators, academics and local NGOs working on human rights, development and peacebuilding, including Somos Defensores, Dejusticia, CINEP/​PPP and Indepaz. How these actors publicly supported, differed from or questioned the role of international actors in peacebuilding and their promotion of space transformation, and whether they maintained an engagement with peacebuilding, is assessed to appreciate some features of the national debate on international efforts. Chapter 6 explores which departments, (sub-​)regions, cities and municipalities were foregrounded in international actors’ online subsidies and how those spaces were explicitly labelled and defined with negative and positive references. Negative comments suggested and how certain places (specified and not) were understood and promoted as problematic places subject to intervention. Positive references illustrated how the international community generated aspirational images of peacebuilding at different scales of intervention. Chapter 7 offers a comparative look at the ways in which international community framed peacebuilding agendas of intervention linked to national and local spaces. In other words, it examines how each community actor foregrounded agendas in targeted spaces for peacebuilding intervention. Agendas explored included development, governance, human rights, 15

Shaping Peacebuilding in Colombia

peace process implementation and security. Agendas were related to recommendations for action, information about activities or strategies carried out and expressions of either support or concern and condemnation in online subsidies. The latter were included in the analysis as they reflected the desire for something to be addressed (agenda setting) and an explicit call for (state) action. The Conclusion summarizes the key arguments of the work and their implications in the light of preceding literature in the area. In addition, the book reflects on the implications of the work for thinking more broadly about the role of multilateral public diplomacy in local peacebuilding and the ways in which further work may contribute to future research in this area.

Limitations and contribution of the work This book does not explore the whole range of international state and non-​ state actors contributing to peacebuilding in Colombia, but choses instead to focus on some important states and IOs during the period of transition explored, seen as helpful for illustrating some complexities embedded within the liberal peacebuilding narrative and the place of spatial framing in it. Rather than looking into the whole range of digital public diplomacy efforts (including social media, transmedia campaigns, infotainment, gaming and other interactive projects), the book assesses online subsidies published in news sections. This allows the exploration of online information subsides as a key mediated public diplomacy strategy for agenda and frame-​building processes in cementing political agendas in international scenarios. Thus, it acknowledges the ways in which international actors supported peacebuilding through daily communications to the press and other interested actors. Such communications provide greater context and understanding than social media may allow through the promotion of a spatially rooted transformative narrative in line with international donors’ own priorities. Although, in an age of social media, appealing to journalism may seem out of fashion and avoidable, whomever is still interested in democracy and the international prevalence of its fundamental values should keep an eye on journalism and those who are still aiming to contribute to news media discourse. The book does not account for social consequences of international framing or how international framing may have been systematically adopted or received by media outlets and audiences in Colombia. In terms of the framing process, the focus of this book is on elite framing as reflected in online subsidies rather than other aspects of the framing process (including deep cultural frames, news media or audiences’ frames more broadly). These processes would require studies looking into cultural meanings, media content and public opinion outside the scope of this exploration. However, questions about the sustainability of international framing efforts 16

Introduction

have been partially tackled in approaching the framing of peacebuilding by some key national sectors to detect possible divergences and convergences regarding international community participation and interpretation of space transformation. In this case, a constructivist understanding of online public diplomacy has been privileged in terms of the construction of identities, interests, values, norms, structures and peace as a common good (Zhang and Chinn Swartz, 2009, Proedrou and Frangonikolopoulos, 2012, Zhang, 2019). This book will be of interest to academics in the areas of political communication, international relations, digital diplomacy, public mediated diplomacy, peacebuilding and space, and geography and peacebuilding, as it engages with the contributions these fields can make in the understanding of multilateral cooperation and peacebuilding in the Colombian case and potentially other processes, and it advances knowledge regarding international community peace discourses. In addition, the book speaks to practitioners in the areas of international cooperation, peacebuilding, public diplomacy, public relations and institutional journalism, as it highlights the relevance of public information, and in particular online subsidies, for the promotion of peacebuilding in concert with other international stakeholders in the Colombian case and beyond. The book is relevant for practitioners of countries undergoing peace processes that are seeking or receiving international support in framing peacebuilding mechanisms and implementation of peace processes, and who would like to know more about the role of public information in enhancing these agendas.

17

1

Theoretical Assumptions: Framing Projections in International Scenarios This chapter offers an overview of literature focusing on frame projection in international scenarios, its relation to the notions of public and mediated diplomacy and potential for peacebuilding. It starts by introducing framing, public and mediated diplomacy and online information subsidies. Subsidies are a key frame-​building strategy that link traditional and contemporary diplomatic practice with media and public opinion in an indirect fashion. The chapter goes on to discuss the potential of mediated public diplomacy and online information subsidies for peacebuilding that extends beyond national interests and image building. The chapter argues that public diplomacy can be understood as constructivist when countries and organizations strive to use communication to promote a public good, such as peace, by counteracting negative public opinion of peacebuilding efforts and by harnessing international credibility and civil support more broadly. In addition, online information subsidies are seen as a key instrument for the practice of public mediated diplomacy that can potentially contribute to the promotion of peacebuilding transformation.

The notion of framing Framing is understood in this work as a process of selection and organization of perceived realities to communicate preferred meanings that support political agendas and attempt to foster social consensus among stakeholders and society at large. Scholars have identified frames in mental and cultural frameworks used to interpret realities (Goffman, 1974; Gitlin, 1980; Entman, 1993), messages promoted by individuals and groups in line with such interpretations, meanings located in texts and the media (frame building), and audiences’ frames (or frame setting), based on people’s own 18

Theoretical Assumptions

mental frameworks, values and preferences in the reception of media frames (Entman, 1993; Scheufele, 1999 and 2000; D’Angelo, 2018). They form competing discourses on policy issues constantly updated in the light of new events by individuals, media, public opinion and the broader culture, contributing to ‘the social construction of meaning’ (Gamson and Modigliani, 1989, p 2), social consensus and individual understandings and responses (Scheufele, 1999 and 2000). In framing, actors select, highlight and make connections between aspects of perceived realities to promote their preferred interpretations and advance their own agendas (Entman, 1993, 2003, 2004). The resulting frame is ‘a central organizing idea for making sense of relevant events and suggesting what is at issue’ (Gamson, 1989, p 157). It includes clusters of ‘facts and judgements’ (Entman, 1993, p 52) embedded in rhetorical devices and symbolic devices such as examples and depictions, as well as reasoning devices that suggest causes, consequences and principles (Gamson and Modigliani, 1989). At the same time, argumentative devices suggest definitions of events, causal links or responsibility inferences and treatment recommendations supported on principles or moral evaluations aimed at giving advantage to those promoting frames and their interests (Entman, 1993, 2003, 2004). Frames can be either ‘substantive’, when promoting argumentative devices centred on issues or events, or procedural, when centred on actors’ ‘technique, success, and representativeness’ (Entman, 2004, pp 5–​6). Much framing research explores the ways in which politicians, issue advocates and stakeholders engage with journalists and other media professionals to communicate their preferred meanings of events and issues (D’Angelo and Kuypers, 2010). Accordingly, political actors, interest groups and stakeholders promote their frames in media outlets; the latter with their own organizational, structural, ideological, professional and normative frameworks and expectations about audience preferences. In asking how key international organizations and countries promoted geographically targeted peacebuilding efforts in Colombia between November 2016 and February 2019 through online subsidies, this book focuses on this aspect of the framing process. Media professionals, in turn, use their own ‘schematas’ for understanding, selecting and organizing incoming information, and present their own frames aimed at their audiences as a result (Gitlin, 1980, pp 6–​7). Media frames convey messages to audiences in a variety of audio-​visual, written and online formats that contextualize happenings, issues or actors according to established narratives, such as news stories (D’Angelo, 2018). This process has been identified as ‘frame building’, and entails frames produced by media as the result of such encounters between actors promoting frames and media professionals (Scheufele 1999 and 2000). In that sense, framing can also be 19

Shaping Peacebuilding in Colombia

understood as ‘a strategy of constructing and processing news discourse or as a characteristic of the discourse itself ’ (Pan and Kosicki, 1993, p 57). To study online subsidies published by international actors in newsrooms of their official websites is to focus on their contribution to the frame-​ building processes. Online subsidies are aimed at media outlets primarily, but are also accessible to interested audiences and stakeholders who might want a first-​hand account of institutional views and actions on a particular issue, as newsrooms publish open-​access information through their official web pages (Ting Lee and Lin, 2017). Unlike social media, which engages more directly with audiences in a personalized fashion (Bjola and Zaiotti, 2021), institutional newsrooms engage with journalists and media outlets, informed audiences and stakeholders interested in more in-​depth information. They do so by publishing information daily through news stories, press releases and briefings, statements and other news-​friendly formats. Researchers have asserted the significant role that press releases and other public information material play in the production of news and the quantity and quality of news coverage (Ting Lee and Lin, 2017). This can be illustrated in the Colombian case studied, as some pieces were published in the institutional newsrooms of international community as well as mainstream media, showing institutional newsrooms’ direct input to media outlets (for example, Bohórquez Contreras, 2016; Semana, 2016a; El Tiempo, 2017a and b; El Espectador, 2017a and b, 2018a; Gómez, 2017; Osorio Granados, 2017; Lebleu, 2017). Such an international dimension of framing can usefully be captured by the notions of public (mediated) diplomacy, explored in turn.

Frame projection in international scenarios: public and mediated diplomacy A relatively recent body of literature has focused on frame projection in international scenarios related to notions of public and mediated diplomacy. Actors carrying out public diplomacy efforts to influence foreign public attitudes and opinions include state and state-​sanctioned actors (L’Etang, 2009; Yang et al, 2012; Sevin, 2015), international organizations, corporations and advocacy groups (L’Etang, 2009), private individuals and groups (Snow, 2009), and actors at national and supranational levels pursuing a variety of agendas, such as political dialogue, trade, investment, civil society links, alliances and conflict (Melissen, 2007). Public diplomacy is broadly defined as the ways in which state and non-​ state actors engage with foreign actors and audiences to (in)directly advance the image, interests, foreign policies and international relations of their countries. The origin of the term is attributed to Edmund Gullion (cited in Cull, 2009, p 19): 20

Theoretical Assumptions

Public diplomacy … deals with the influence of public attitudes on the formation and execution of foreign policies. It encompasses dimensions of international relations beyond traditional diplomacy; the cultivation by governments of public opinion in other countries; the interaction of private groups and interests in one country with another; the reporting of foreign affairs and its impact on policy; communication between those whose job is communication, as diplomats and foreign correspondents; and the process of intercultural communications. Public diplomacy has been seen as a process of communication that promotes understanding of a nation’s identity, ideas, goals and policies and the needs and ideas of its people (Tuch, 1990; Leonard et al, 2002), or as a strategic tool to advance a country’s interests. Regarding the latter, Nye (2008) defines it as a tool of soft-​power projection to attract, shape preferences and co-​opt other countries in the direction of a country’s interests and agenda by promoting its cultural assets, political values and policies, and building long-​term relationships with foreign publics. Similarly, Gregory (2008) understands public diplomacy as a communication instrument to interpret, manage relationships and influence other cultures in the functions of (non) state actors’ interests through short-​term news, mid-​term campaigns, and long-​term engagement. Public diplomacy, then, is a broad term encompassing short-​and long-​ term strategies, such as monitoring public opinion, daily communication with the press, international broadcasting and efforts to shape the regulatory information environment. It also includes the promotion of cultural assets, targeted campaigns promoting ideas or issues through credible messengers, citizen exchange programmes and academic initiatives such as conferences, scholarships and training. In addition, public diplomacy entails shared projects with sectors of targeted countries and cultivation of long-​term relations with key individuals and groups locally and internationally. These might include diaspora communities and migrants (Yun and Toth, 2009), non-​governmental and civil s​ociety actors within countries originating public diplomacy efforts (Pisarka, 2016) and governments, media, IOs and INGOs, who become referees of public d​ iplomacy efforts (Nye, 2008; Cull, 2008). Besides shaping public opinion and perceptions of shared interests and relationships, public diplomacy aims to influence public debate though the promotion of issues (agenda-​setting) and their framing in foreign media and public debates to make policy options more plausible (Sheafer and Gabay 2009; Sevin, 2015). Regarding the latter, public diplomacy has been broadly located within the process of frame building, as political actors attempt to promote themselves and their frames in foreign media, audiences and decision-​makers (Sheafer et al, 2018). 21

Shaping Peacebuilding in Colombia

Some authors have drawn a distinction between public and mediated diplomacy, the latter being a shorter-​term and more circumscribed practice aimed at media to understand and/​or reach international audiences. Gilboa (2008, p 58), for instance, distinguishes ‘between public diplomacy, where state and nonstate actors use the media and other channels of communication to influence public opinion in foreign societies; media diplomacy, where officials use the media to investigate and promote mutual interests, negotiations, and conflict resolution.’Gilboa, 1998; 2001; 2002, quoted by Gilboa 2008, p.58) Entman (2008, p 88–​89) proposed the concept of ‘mediated public diplomacy’, which differed from the concept proposed by Gilboa in being ‘shorter term and more targeted efforts using mass communication (including the internet) to increase support of a country’s specific foreign policies among audiences beyond that country’s borders’, through the control of foreign media frames. More recently, for Golan (2013, pp 1251–​1252), public diplomacy encompasses short-​and medium-​term mediated public diplomacy, medium-​and long-​term nation branding and country reputation and long-​term relational public diplomacy. Specifically, while public diplomacy is understood, based on a soft-​power approach, as a ‘government-​to-​citizen engagement’, mediated public diplomacy is a ‘government-​to-​citizen engagement’ using global news and social media. In these definitions, traditional and digital, mainstream and alternative, and local, national and global media are instrumentalized by public diplomacy practitioners in understanding international publics and promoting frames that function to advance their countries’ images and agendas. Mediated public diplomacy has also been understood more broadly as a process of transformation of diplomacy itself, not only in the adoption of communication technologies, but in the importance given to the advancement of meanings and representations in its daily practice. Accordingly, the mediatization of public diplomacy is identified by Pamment (2014) as part of the transformation of diplomacy itself, since it embeds communication technologies in its daily practice through ‘semiotic and normative coalition building’ and coordination with other actors including organizations and stakeholders (p 253). Mediatization encompasses ‘placing pressure on actors to negotiate issues and identity salience in new ways [agenda building]; to coordinate and negotiate over codes and norms for representation within different mediated environments; and to strategically manage identities, messages and representational modalities within objective-​ led campaigns’ (p 277). The process and conditions of success in framing taking place in mediated public diplomacy are depicted by Entman (2008, pp 95–​97) as a ‘cascading network activation model’. The cascade symbolizes frame-​building processes by state and non-​state actors (private, media and the public) to a targeted country’s leaders and media, followed by the trickling down of such frames 22

Theoretical Assumptions

from the media to the public, and feeding back to media and the target nation’s leaders. For Entman and other authors (such as Fahmy et al, 2012), the success of mediated public diplomacy depends, on the one hand, on the degree of receptivity, cultural congruence and favourability of frames promoted among the targeted nation, and, on the other, on the by the level of motivation, support and domestic power of targeted elites, as well as their strategies in promoting positive frames that are carrying out mediated public diplomacy. Similarly, Sheafer and other authors observe that international frames have a better chance of reception and acceptance by journalists and countries if these are newsworthy and culturally close; that is, with similar democratic and religious values and interests, reflected in their positions on international issues (Sheafer and Gabay, 2009; Sheafer and Shenhav, 2009; Sheafer et al, 2013; Sheafer et al, 2018). Other authors have pointed out that public diplomacy efforts transcend one country’s framing projection into another country and are, in fact, a more complex enterprise involving broader calculations about the positioning of countries in relation to competitors. Yang et al (2012, p 654), for example, propose that public diplomacy is driven by multi-​polar rather than dyadic thinking. Countries carrying out public diplomacy efforts to enhance their image and manage relationships in competitive contexts use communication strategies and media for ‘soft balancing’; that is, counterbalancing other countries’ dominance and symbolic influence without challenging them militarily. At the same time, Sheafer and others point out that, for countries at the receiving end of public diplomacy efforts, the similarity of values fostering success in framing projection is relative not only to the country leading the efforts, but to international competitors. Thus, journalists from a targeted county implicitly decide which country is culturally closer, facilitating a greater projection of public diplomacy efforts of one international competitor over another (Sheafer and Gabay, 2009; Sheafer et al, 2018). This work focuses on mediated public diplomacy linked to the projection of frames by international community actors in Colombia. So far, research in Colombia has focused on one international actor framing projection in Colombia (Montoya Londoño, 2011), or Colombia’s efforts internationally (Dießelmann and Hetzer, 2015). This work acknowledges, in line with the works reviewed, that the projection of international frames involves multilateral calculations beyond dyadic projections from one actor vis-​à-​vis the targeted country (Colombia in this case), and that their success is relative to political, media and public culture in Colombia. Accordingly, it examines international-​community-​promoted peacebuilding agendas during two Colombian administrations opposed on the peace process, and in a highly polarized political culture, as demonstrated by the results of the plebiscite in October 2016 and the presidential elections of 2018. The following pages explore digital information subsidies as a key tool for frame building directed 23

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to the media and the public, which constitutes the basis of this research on mediated public diplomacy and peacebuilding.

The digital landscape and information subsidies Some authors have pointed to the effects of globalization more generally, and digitalization specifically, on the understanding and practice of mediated public diplomacy. Manor (2019), for example, points to a gradual digitalization of public diplomacy that results in fragmentation of publics and greater dialogue and engagement at distance. At the same time, it has prompted the ‘secularization and tailoring of knowledge’, in the sense that, ‘whereas traditional print and broadcasting media maybe said to “push” information out to the public, the contents of websites and social media must be “pulled” by individuals looking for specific information’ (Pamment, 2013, p 27). For public diplomacy practitioners, digitalization has prompted several transformations, including: first, greater competition among a wider range of actors over public attention and framing of countries, issues and events, either through traditional media outlets or circumventing media altogether (Manor, 2019; Bjola and Zaiotti, 2021; Bjola and Manor, 2022); second, a more transparent, immediate, open, inclusive, prone-​to-​listening, decentralized, collaborative and dialogical use of communication with publics and stakeholders (Pamment, 2013; Iosifidis and Wheeler, 2016; Manor, 2019; Bjola and Zaiotti, 2021; Bjola and Manor, 2022); third, a more emotional, personalized, visual, micro-​storytelling and narrative style among public diplomacy practitioners aimed at generating reputation, recognition, engagement and understanding of events by the audiences (Hedling, 2020; Manor, 2019; Bjola and Zaiotti, 2021); fourth, an increase in platforms for dissemination and exchange of information through e-​ bulletins, web pages and social media (Iosifidis and Wheeler, 2016; Bjola and Zaiotti, 2021). Despite these trends, there are observed limitations to the degree of digitalization of governmental public diplomacy: low level of dialogue (Manor, 2019), controlling and centralizing communication management (Iosifidis and Wheeler, 2016) and prevalence of a propagandistic intent (Pamment, 2013). In addition, there are differing levels of digitalization between governments, depending on how countries are positioned in the international system and in the host countries, the level of newsworthiness and prevailing journalistic culture in host countries, and their own financial resources and levels of development of alternative communication channels for communication outside mainstream media (Archetti, 2012). Consequently, rather than a linear process, the digitalization of public diplomacy seems to combine traditional and innovative practices 24

Theoretical Assumptions

and technologies with hierarchical and horizontal forms of mediated communication. Accordingly, mediated public diplomacy combines strategies such as the use of public relations firms, advertising, information subsidies, op-​eds, broadcasting, online and digital media and social media platforms (Arif et al, 2014; Albishria et al, 2019). Information subsidies are traditionally defined in public relations literature as ‘controlled access to information at little cost or effort to the person receiving the information’ (Gandy, 1982, quoted by Curtin, 1999, p 54) and at greater cost to the producer (Pamment, 2013). Such information is ‘pre-​ packaged’ for internal and external publics and the media, and contain frames about organizations, actions and viewpoints, either in response to public reactions, events, or media coverage (reactive), or, proactively, in the recognition of the organization’s public impact (Zoch and Molleda, 2009). More broadly, Sweetser and Brown (2008) define information subsidies as information and media access to sources and places provided by public affairs personnel that contribute to the agenda-​building process. Observers point out that economic constraints on media newsgathering practices and a profit-​driven market have resulted in a greater reliance by the media on information subsidies since the 1980s, although professional journalistic values prompt for direct access to sources (Curtin, 1999; Sweetser and Brown, 2008). Still, information subsidies have lower costs with regard to newsgathering practices and research for media outlets while increasing the potential of mediated public diplomacy to influence agenda and frame-​building process of media outlets, stakeholders and the wider public (Zoch and Molleda, 2009; Jungblut, 2017; Ting Lee and Lin, 2017). In relation to media, Ting Lee and Lin (2017, p 2), on the basis of a literature review of research in the area, point out that information subsidies such as news releases, conferences and statements ‘play a significant role in the production of news and enable the strategic transfer of organizational views through public relations-​practitioner defined attributes (e.g., organizational message, reputation, and talking points) into media coverage and public opinion.’ Moreover, as key mediated public diplomacy strategies, online subsidies can potentially transcend news media influence, as they become publicly accessible to publics and stakeholders with internet access: In a recontextualized public diplomacy landscape, online newsrooms, with governments and foreign ministries providing statements online and making them accessible to their publics and other stakeholders –​ not only to journalists, can help remove news middlemen to expand on source-​direct communication in place of mediated communication for a new form of public diplomacy that is not limited to influence seeking in the news media. (Ting Lee and Lin, 2017, p 3) 25

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Although for authors such as Albishria et al (2019), online subsidies’ agenda-​ building potential is still comparable with that of traditional information subsidies, information subsidies remain a key communication strategy for agenda and frame-​building processes among public diplomacy practitioners that have transcended their analogous form and adapted to the possibilities of digital platforms offered by the internet. Accordingly, it is assumed in this work that digital information subsidies are a key frame-​building tool for mediated public diplomacy. The following pages explore its potential for peacebuilding.

Mediated diplomacy’s contribution to peace: beyond national interests and image building International relations’ theories that underpin understandings of public diplomacy offer insights about public diplomacy variants that potentially serve peace agendas beyond strategic self-​interest or interstate relations. Accordingly, some authors (Yun and Toth, 2009; Zhang and Swartz, 2009; Sevin, 2015; Pisarka, 2016; Zhang, 2019) distinguish between realist, liberal and constructivist variants of public diplomacy. A ‘realist’ notion of public diplomacy is closer to propaganda and manipulation, as it pursues a strategic and instrumental use of communication and engagement with external publics to influence governments in the direction of state interests, power and national security, in a context of international anarchy, competition, and conflict. A ‘liberal’ understanding of public diplomacy fosters countries’ soft power and influence through public and cultural relations. It engages cooperatively with a myriad of international and transnational actors to enhance a country’s attraction and credibility among foreign publics and generate an enabling environment for the country’s policies. Public diplomacy in this light actively promotes rational dialogue, compassionate ethics, harmony of interests and cooperation between state and non-​state actors, such as IOs and NGOs through norms, rules and procedures benefiting leadership. Alternatively, a ‘constructivist’ public diplomacy emphasizes the roles of interaction and communication in the construction of identities, interests, values, norms, structures and the international system more broadly. Public diplomacy efforts, in this view, are carried out by state and non-​state actors through collaboration and engagement with local and international actors. Its aim is to redefine identities, generate supranational identities, affect perceptions and relationships, find common ground, address international challenges and contribute to global public goods, including peace. Zhang and Swartz (2009) and Zhang (2019) observe that the notion of public diplomacy has been traditionally closer to (neo)realism and soft-​power thinking (liberalism), as it has been linked to the states’ cultivation of image 26

Theoretical Assumptions

and nation-​branding internationally, the promotion of mutual understanding favourable to countries’ agendas and the promotion of national interests. However, in the face of the growing need for international cooperation to face global challenges (such as climate change, health, hunger, financial instability, conflict, insecurity and human rights violations), a constructivist notion of public diplomacy to protect global public goods becomes even more relevant, as practitioners serve their own interests through the advancement of the common good (Zhang, 2019). Similarly, Proedrou and Frangonikolopoulos (2012) propose that public diplomacy should engage in a context of ‘polylateral diplomacy’ with international publics around transnational issues that threaten global populations. A strategic discursive dimension of public diplomacy that incorporates understanding of foreign publics and global civil society, engaging with critiques and reflecting on policies, is needed to explain policies and their contribution to global public goods. Such a discursive dimension has the potential to enhance the efficiency, transparency and legitimacy of foreign policies.

Public diplomacy and potential for peace in interstate conflicts The potential for peace in relation to public diplomacy has tended to be discussed so far by researchers in terms of interstate rather than intrastate conflicts. Such incipient body of literature has explored public diplomacy’s role in interstate conflicts by bringing about coexistence, improving strained relations or fostering cooperation between countries. First, public diplomacy is attributed with the potential to foster trust and counteract negative elite and public opinion in other countries. Such an aim is pursued through state-​led direct communication with foreign publics or by fostering people-​to-​people communication indirectly (Hughes, 2007; Rough, 2011), or through citizen-​initiated communication that keeps communication channels open and counteracts interstate enmity discourses (Kumar and Semetko, 2018). More broadly, public diplomacy is attributed with the potential to foster the prevention or mitigation of intercultural hostilities between Eastern and Western elites and peoples (Ateş and Barut, 2018). Second, public diplomacy can potentially facilitate meaningful dialogue, collaboration and engagement on issues between different countries, such as human rights, when frames promoted by different countries are congruent (Ting Lee and Lin, 2015 and 2017). Third, public diplomacy can complement diplomatic peace-​process and interstate agreements in harnessing civil-​society support and pressure vis-​à-​vis elites working towards peace (Handelman, 2012; Darnton, 2020). From a constructivist perspective, 27

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Darnton (2020, pp 1–​2) observes that, since interstate protracted conflicts ‘are driven by perceptions, identity, ideology, ideology, anger, or mistrust’, public diplomacy aimed at transforming identities, narratives and perceptions can potentially open spaces for conflict resolution and and enable cooperation towards a range of acceptable outcomes. However, appealing to publics to engage governments in peace might be limited by intra-​governmental divisions, inconsistency or lack of coordination over international diplomatic engagement, as well as a low level of response from other governments to domestic pressure (Darnton, 2020). But, can mediated public diplomacy contribute to peacebuilding agendas in countries with internal conflicts targeted for multilateral international cooperation? Is it possible to think about mediated public diplomacy’s contribution to peace as a public good beyond interstate relations interests and agendas? The literature mentioned earlier offers some insights that, hypothetically, could be applicable to a scenario of targeted peacebuilding efforts in intrastate conflicts. First, the use of public diplomacy by international actors could potentially foster cooperation with elites and publics of the targeted countries for peacebuilding purposes, by fostering the credibility of international community members as mediators and contributors in peacebuilding within the country targeted for these efforts. Second, public diplomacy could facilitate a constructive engagement and cooperation of different international actors (countries and international organizations) through the promotion of mutually congruent messages. Third, international public diplomacy could potentially open spaces for conflict resolution and harness civil society support and willingness to pressure for peace outcomes from domestic elites, depending on the level of receptiveness of such elites towards peace initiatives and civil society pressure. The following pages develop the insights offered by research on multilateral peacebuilding and mediated public diplomacy.

Multilateral peacebuilding in intrastate conflicts and mediated public diplomacy Peacebuilding is defined broadly as a range of efforts, activities or actions by state and non-​state actors, at a local, national, regional and global level, aimed at reducing the possibility of a society relapsing into violent conflict and towards a positive, sustainable and durable peace through transformation in economic, social and political structures (Boutros-​Ghali, 1992; Paris, 1997; Björkdahl et al, 2016; Campbell, 2018; Caplan, 2019). Both the reduction of violence and the transformation of societal structures have been linked to negative and positive notions of peace. Johan Galtung (1969, pp 170, 183) defined negative peace as ‘the absence of personal 28

Theoretical Assumptions

violence’ committed by actor(s) over other(s), and positive peace as the ‘absence of structural violence’ linked with social justice and development. Thus, peacebuilding tackles social inequality in the distribution of power and resources, as well as inequalities based on social cleavages that fuel conflict (Björkdahl et al, 2016; Galtung, 1969; Campbell, 2018). The notion of a structural peace was acknowledged before Galtung’s positive peace formulation from the early 20th century by activists and writers concerned with injustice and emancipation against arbitrary forms of power-​ generating violence. For Jane Addams (2002), narrating the opposition to the First World War by the Women’s Peace Party in the USA, the struggle was not only to limit armaments and oppose militarism (negative peace), but also to promote democratic control of foreign policy, concert of nations instead of balance of power, women’s suffrage, youth education and the elimination of economic causes of war. Addams (2007) also recognized the notion of negative peace as the embodiment of old-​fashioned, inadequate ideas of peace rooted in nationalism, militarist values and an Anglo-​Saxon tendency to ‘govern all peoples by one standard’ (p 28). She advocated peace based on dignified human labour, social justice and socio-​economic welfare, industrial progress, internationalism, better life conditions for migrant communities, children and women, and women’s political participation through franchise. Mahatma Gandhi (2008), in the context of the Indian civil resistance against British rule, identified the defence of possessions as the root of violence. Accordingly, the renounce of possessions and equal distribution of wealth according to natural needs were preconditions for non-​violence that had to be brought about by personal transformation of capitalists into trustees for workers and by non-​violent struggle.1 Martin Luther King (2018), in the context of the US civil rights campaign in his letter from Birmingham Jail in 1964, distinguished between ‘a negative peace which is the absence of tension’, in which unjust conditions may be accepted, and ‘a positive peace which is the presence of justice’, in which ‘all men will respect the dignity and worth of human personality’ (pp 13–​14). Besides these early writings providing greater content to positive peace in context, some contemporary authors have criticized Galtung’s notions of peace. For Koopman (2014, p 112), Galtung’s notions are not ‘defined by what is not rather by, as King defined it, the presence of justice and life-​affirming values and structures.’ They have also been labelled as under-​theorized, vague, too broad to measure (Loyd, 2012; Courtheyn,

1

‘Question box’, Harijan, 9 February 1942; ‘Equal distribution’, Harijanbandhu, 24 August 1940; Harijan, 25 August, 1940; ‘My notes’, Navajivan, 21 October 1928; Young India, 15 November, 1928; ‘Questions and answers’, Young India, 26 March 1931; Speech at a meeting of village workers, Napur’, Harijan, 1 March 1935. 29

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2018; Themnér and Ohlson, 2014 quoted by Penu and Essaw, 2019) and unsustainable (Penu and Essaw, 2019). In addition, Galtung’s notions have been deemed counterproductive as a liberal and state-​centred interpretation that can be imposed (Penu and Essaw, 2019), and which obscures and reinforces repression and unequal power relations of patriarchy, racism, classism and exploitation embedded in modern liberal peace and overlooks the violence embedded in gender inequalities and its effects in predisposing societies to war (Courtheyn, 2018; Daley, 2014). The liberal notion of peace is summarized by Selby (2013) as a discourse of a shared, global, liberal framework and a hegemonic paradigm. Liberal peace affirms liberal social and political structures and processes as the best way to build a sustainable peace after war, through democratization and marketization. Political structures include democratic features of ‘multi-​party elections, good governance, human rights provisions, the development of a limited but functional state and the empowerment of civil society’ (p 61). Economic structures relate to neo-​liberal characteristics of privatization, deregulation of capital markets, fostering of international trade and reduction of state subsidies. Liberal peace is normatively rooted in liberal peace theories developed by authors such as Kant and Doyle and principles of liberal democracy and internationalism. It is understood to be carried out by a plurality or supra-​and sub-​national actors, including intergovernmental organizations and NGOs, under UN leadership. Furthermore, while the global arena is understood as the elite, consensus-​making site for peacebuilding, the local is understood as the place for implementation of peacebuilding through a variety of methods, ranging from military, economic and cultural to coercive, in different degrees. In that sense, it is thought as a discrete and dominant activity for ending war to which peace agreements are subordinated to. Some authors point out that peacebuilding activities can occur at any point before, during or after conflict, blurring bureaucratic lines with peacekeeping (Caplan, 2019), peacemaking, human-​r ights promotion and humanitarian aid, state-​building and development (Pugh, 2013; Campbell, 2018). In addition, peacebuilding might include delivery of services in all areas of governance (for example, security, justice and the rule of law, economic governance and employment, development and infrastructure); conflict management and mediation; disarmament; civil administration’ delivery and monitoring of elections; financial and humanitarian aid; repatriation of refugees and promotion of social trust and cohesion, as well as legitimacy and trust between governments and populations (Paris, 1997; Pugh, 2013; Campbell, 2018). Firchow (2018, p 6), in particular, calls such structural interventions in communities and the provision of security, humanitarian aid, development, health, education, conflict resolution, justice and governance support ‘big-​P Peacebuilding’; whereas efforts directed towards enhancing 30

Theoretical Assumptions

local ‘agency and the transformation or building relationships with normative goals of peace’ are the ‘small-​p peacebuilding’ approach. Schneckener (2016) points to an increase in the 1990s and 2000s of internationally sponsored peacebuilding along liberal principles in terms of international actors, resources and consensus in the emphasis on security, institutions, rule of law, democratic and socio-​economic development among international organizations. In this process, the international community negotiates its own priorities and agendas with other international actors and with local actors. Critical literature in peacebuilding along liberal principles has tended to emphasize problematic and complex interactions between global and local actors in peacebuilding through a local-​turn approach and related concepts, such as hybridity (Boege et al, 2008; Boege et al, 2009; Mac Ginty, 2011; Jarstad and Belloni, 2012; Laffey and Nadarajah, 2012; Richmond and Mitchell, 2012) and friction (Tsing, 2005; Björkdahl and Höglund, 2013; Millar, 2013 and 2016; Björkdahl et al, 2016; Höglund and Orjuela, 2016). In addition, authors in the field of political geography have contributed to a critical understanding of peace as either a place-​specific process for the transformation of the social order through collective organization, or the mechanisms to resist such transformations by those in power (Loyd, 2012; Williams et al, 2014; Lederach, 2020; Macaspac and Moore, 2022). Accordingly, peace is plural and situated, as different groups in different places at different scales and times will embrace a distinct notion of peace (Loyd, 2012; Koopman, 2014; Megoran et al, 2014: Courtheyn, 2018; Macaspac and Moore, 2022). Consequently, as a practice and discourse, peace can be imposed on populations through violence or contested by populations through (non)violent struggles and social-​movement solidarity networks (Megoran et al, 2014: Courtheyn, 2018; Macaspac and Moore, 2022). This makes peace and violence mutually constitutive, intertwined (Loyd, 2012; Koopman, 2011; Courtheyn, 2018) and in a continuum (Penu and Esaw, 2019), rather than two oppositional notions. From this perspective, critical geographers (Dalby, 2014; Daley, 2014) take a critical view of liberal peacebuilding, as it can entail a violent top-​down transformation of society following neoliberal globalization logics including militarism, patriarchy, racism, and homogenization. In practice, for these authors liberal peace can further marginalization, new cycles of violence and insecurity for populations, as it detaches from local meanings of peace. However, differences and interactions between global actors themselves have been largely overlooked or dismissed altogether in critiques about liberal peacebuilding paradigms and practices. Mac Ginty and Firchow (2016) for example, based on an analysis of top-​down (media, academics, policy makers, spokespeople) and bottom-​up narratives and understandings of conflict based on research in South Sudan, South Africa, Uganda and Zimbabwe, 31

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observe that the material power of liberal peace is ‘the most prominent of internationally sponsored pace making and peace building’ (p 310). In their analysis, the hegemonic narrative unleashed by liberal peace names conflicts and actors and legitimizes the right of intervention in the global North, as well as the political and economic models that come with it. Top-​down actors share a sense of entitlement and a technocratic, academic and homogenizing approach to contexts of intervention, which often override rather than relate to the everyday narratives of those experiencing conflicts on the ground. Such top-​down narratives overlook international organizations, tend to be apolitical and gendered and aware of crime and the ‘precariousness of neoliberalism’ in daily lives. As Ryan (2013, p 32) has noted, ‘there is a need to be cautious in characterizing peacebuilding practice since 1988 as “liberal” in an uncritical manner’ as ‘it underestimates differences of approach within the liberal paradigm’ among actors such as the EU, USA and UN, as well as emerging powers such as China, Russia or others in the global South. Equally, Schneckener (2016) warns that, although international coordination and consistency are invoked frequently as being of paramount value in peacebuilding practice, the search for autonomy among peacebuilders and the differentiated rationales for action among decision-​makers and fieldworkers often leads to the opposite outcome, and ‘incoherence is a “resource” often welcomed by political actors –​not only by external peacebuilders themselves, but more so by local actors who know how to take advantage of incoherent policies’ (Schneckener, 2016, p 11). In addition, Schneckener points out that the binary categories of the international and the local remain under-​ theorized given the plurality of actors and ‘constellations’ of interaction between them (p 12). Following this rationale, this book acknowledges such international constellation and the potentially different agendas at play in the construction of peace.

Communication and peacebuilding through information subsidies Communication in peacebuilding has been linked to the promotion of frames about peace through information material issued by organizations that are directly involved in peace efforts. Broadly, media has been integrated by intergovernmental and non-​governmental agencies with peacebuilding work after the Cold War (Bratić, 2015 and 2016). There has been an institutional recognition of the strategic role of communications in supporting UN peace operations since the 1990s (Alleyne, 2008; Egleder, 2012; Lehmann, 2015), as well as in organizations such as NATO (Egleder, 2012). In pioneering research about NATO’s (KFOR) and the UN’s (UNMIK) printed, radio and TV media products between 1999 and 2008 in Kosovo, 32

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Egleder (2012) explores whether journalistic media products by these organizations were in line with peace journalism criteria and public relations strategic communications’ principles as well as their overall contribution to inter-​ethnic reconciliation and peace. Findings show that, although UNMIK matched peace journalism closer than KFOR, both failed to provide context and causes for the inter-​ethnic conflict. In addition, KFOR was more successful in producing media in a strategic way following public-​ relations principles, including understanding of target audiences and media and formulation and operationalization of a strategy, whereas UNMIK was more ad hoc. Although public reception of institutional messages in both cases was mediated by factors such as ‘social and educational background or the influence of opinion leaders’ (Egleder, 2012, p 271), Egleder shows an institutional recognition of the importance of media for peacebuilding purposes on the part of NATO and the UN, as well as the potential strengthening of institutional communication when adopting peace-​journalism principles for peacebuilding purposes. Such institutional communication can enhance the credibility of peacebuilders, foster cooperation among national and international actors, elites and stakeholders, and reinforce positive accounts of peace; counteracting a journalism that is accustomed to conflict through the adoption of peace-​journalism principles. Lynch (2015) describes the development of scholarly research and practice on peace journalism since the 1990s, as rooted in a constructivist perspective that emphasizes the role of language, knowledge and meaning in fostering conflict. Accordingly, scholars such as Galtung and Ruge in the 1960s and Lederach and Dorling were key in the development of peace journalism, since they recognized the role of symbolic violence –​the normalization, justification or overlooking of injustice and belligerence in supporting structural violence that fuels conflict. Peace journalism seeks to: provide a deeper understanding of conflicts in terms of the backgrounds behind escalation, the contexts and participants’ voices, interests and goals, and perpetrators and victims from all sides; foster justice through unveiling excesses and cover-​ups by actors involved; and be proactive in foregrounding stories of peace and initiatives for conflict resolution (Egleder, 2012; Shinar, 2007, p 200 quoted by Lynch, 2015). Peace journalism also makes visible what warring parties have in common, promotes non-​violent and non-​adversarial responses to conflict and caution, understanding, cooperation and reconciliation initiatives (Egleder, 2012; Bahador, 2015; Howard, 2015; Lynch, 2015). Peace journalism supports the understanding of media’s potential more broadly, in terms of deconstructing images of enemies that are portrayed in a dehumanizing and Manichaean light. Accordingly, media can generate more positive narratives of humans with individual stories worthy of empathy and legitimacy, highlighting similarities rather than differences (Bahador, 2015). 33

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As Taylor (2015) has pointed out, ‘frames used by the media will shape public perceptions of the root causes, solutions, and the roles of the different actors in the peace process. The media matters, and the quality of information disseminated in a post-​conflict country has repercussions for peace’ (p 179). Gadi Wolfsfeld (2004; Wolfsfeld et al, 2008), based on research on peace processes in Oslo, Israel-​Jordan and Northern Ireland, foregrounds the potential role of institutional communication to counteract the generally negative role that news media plays in peacemaking due to embedded journalistic values of immediacy, drama, simplicity and ethnocentrism. Since news media constitutes a tool for achieving political goals and is a reference point for political actors and the public to monitor the progress of peace processes and the standing of antagonists (Wolfsfeld, 2004), institutional preparation and skill becomes essential in pursuing peacemaking goals. Such skill entails timely public warnings about crises, the promotion and contextualization of events according to long-​term perspectives, refrain from exaggeration of successes, promotion of ‘optimistic visions of the future’ and ‘lower expectations concerning when to expect a breakthrough’ (Wolfsfeld, 2004, p 229). In sum, these insights point to the potential of institutional newsrooms to provide daily context that counteracts the conflict reporting and negative values that guide other forms of media for the promotion of views and discourses of peace embedded in international community cooperation in Colombia as well as the role those institutions and countries play in peacebuilding more broadly. This book aims to explore how countries and institutions promote peacebuilding agendas through institutional journalism, but circumscribes the analysis to online subsidies produced in institutional newsrooms. It looks at international actors in concert, rather than in an isolated fashion. Online subsidies are both a public-​relations and a journalistic tool, as they provide pre-​packaged and controlled access to institutional information and can also circumvent media all together for publics and stakeholders, are produced in line with journalistic standards in institutional online newsrooms and contribute to the positioning of organizations that create the subsidies as well as the agenda-​building process regarding peacebuilding. In line with precedent literature, three propositions have been made here. First, public diplomacy can be understood in a constructivist fashion when countries and organizations strive to use communication to promote a public good such as peace. Second, online information subsidies are a key instrument for the practice of public mediated diplomacy and can potentially link the practice of peace journalism and public diplomacy in the promotion of peacebuilding transformation. Third, the promotion of peacebuilding happens in a multilateral environment with differing degrees of coordination among the countries and international organizations involved. 34

2

Spatial Framing and Methodological Choices This chapter summarizes contributions from peacebuilding literature that have incorporated geographic notions as well as critical geography scholarship engaging with peacebuilding. Both recognize the importance of space as a key dimension in peacebuilding, in which practices and discourses shape differing notions of peace. Drawing on this literature, it is argued in this book that international actors promote peacebuilding agendas in targeted spaces of intervention. To grasp this process, the notion of spatial framing is proposed, as international actors imagine those spaces and project values and priorities through which transformation of violent dynamics occur. Spatial framing recognizes the role of socially constructed spaces in shaping peacebuilding practices. The chapter offers relevant definitions of different geographic and administrative spaces that are discussed by international actors. Then, how spatial framing was carried out through online subsidies is explained, alongside some general observations about the sample. In line with works on peacebuilding and space, this book recognizes the key role of socially constructed spaces to shape peacebuilding practices. At the same time, it takes inspiration from political geography literature portraying peace as interpreted in different ways by different actors in different spaces, scales and times (Megoran et al, 2014). Derived from these insights, the book asks how relevant peacebuilding places and scales of action –​from the local to the national –​are promoted discursively by international actors involved in peacebuilding efforts through the notion of spatial frames.

Peace studies and space The spatial focus of peacebuilding studies was inspired by writings in philosophy and geography in the 1990s that proposed a notion of space that went beyond political action. Accordingly, scholars in conflict and peacebuilding started to question how the interaction of actors and ideas 35

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at different scales from the local to the global influenced conflict and peacebuilding, how agents and spaces in places of conflict and peace constituted each other, and how the material and symbolical nature of spaces related to power dynamics (Brigg and George, 2020). These ideas formed part of the local turn in peace studies in the 2000s, led by authors such as Volker Boege, Michael Brown, Thania Paffenholz, Roland Paris, David Chandler, Beatrice Pouligny, Susanna Campbell, Roger Mac Ginty and Oliver Richmond. The local turn critically assessed top-​down peacebuilding interventions and called for the understanding of hybrid peacebuilding dynamics between global and local scales of agency, and local meanings and ownership of peace. Since 2016, authors such as Annika Björkdahl, Susanne Buckley-​Zistel, Stefanie Kappler, Johanna Mannergren Selimovic, Lisa Strömbom, and others, have called for a spatial turn in peace and conflict studies. These authors are interested in spatially grounded and contested meanings, practices and power relations embedded in peacebuilding dynamics across different scales (Brigg and George, 2020; Macaspac and Moore, 2022). For Brigg (2020), the spatial turn in peace studies foregrounds the importance of places and localities where social relations materialize, the mutual constitution between spaces and societies –​as individuals produce places by making sense of places –​and the recognition of those excluded from peacebuilding policy, decentring the analysis from nation states through the notion of scales. Accordingly, dynamics of peacebuilding and space are socially and mutually constituted and in constant transformation (Flint, 2005, Kirsch and Flint, 2011, Chojnacki and Engels, 2016). As social agents transform geographical places into meaningful social spaces, and materialize their meanings about spaces in particular places, conflict and peacebuilding dynamics become evident in community practices, inclusive or exclusive interactions and discursive platforms of enmity or encounter, and common meanings (Björkdahl and Kappler, 2017). In particular, the level of agreement in discourses about spaces can facilitate or hamper peacebuilding efforts as it affects interactions between ‘conflict’ parties and peacebuilding actors (Ide, 2017). ‘Spaces’ are understood in peace studies engaging with geography as the ‘imaginary counter-​side of material place’ as people make sense and use places every day. Spaces foster inclusive or exclusive social relations and interactions, identities and violent or peaceful agency, and thus, the production of spaces through social practices and narratives is contested and political. The result is a continuum between conflict and peace spaces marked by the reinforcement or transformation of power (Kirsch and Flint, 2011, Flint, 2011, Björkdahl and Buckley-​Zistel, 2016; Björkdahl and Kappler, 2017). Symbolic spaces shape, and are shaped by, physical ‘places’, defined as geographical locations with a range of scales from the local to the global. 36

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Places are material and social realities that are defined in relation to identities and a sense of security and belonging. They produce, and are produced by, socio-​political and power dynamics and people’s inclusive or exclusive practices (including discursive practices) and experiences (Flint, 2005; Flint, 2011; Björkdahl and Kappler, 2017; Björkdahl and Buckley-​Zistel, 2016; Ide, 2017). At the same time, space is constituted through a web of ongoing interactions at different scales from the individual to the global (Brown, 2020). ‘Scale’ is defined as a contextual setting for social processes where actors, including peacebuilding agencies, construct ‘identities of governance’ at sub-​and supra-​national levels, ranging from the local to the global (Flint, 2005, p 7). Consequently, processes and agents ‘can be located according to their scale of operation’ (Björkdahl and Buckley-​Zistel, 2016, p 5, Björkdahl and Kappler, 2017, p 4). Scales are contentious, subject to negotiation and interpretation and part of political conflicts and peacebuilding. Accordingly, actors frame ‘scales of meaning’ not only about identities and roles, but also about problems, causes, solutions and actions that are located in the local, national or global realm (Engels, 2015; Chojnacki and Engels, 2016; Ide, 2017,). Conflict and peacebuilding are thus multi-​layered, as they operate at different scales linked to socio-​political structures that interconnect and constitute each other (Björkdahl and Buckley-​Zistel, 2016). Flint (2005, p 7) points out that the analysis of scale allows appreciation of ‘opportunities and constraints for local action … the role of agency in creating broader structures … and the interaction of many processes’ at different scales, thus appreciating the articulations between zones of conflict and peace (Flint and Kirsch, 2011). In relation to international actors’ targeted promotion of peacebuilding, Bátora et al (2021, pp 116–​117) foreground the involvement of ‘institutional logics governing particular boundary spaces’ in peacebuilding spaces where social interactions occur. International actors create and organize spaces to impact interaction patterns in post-​conflict societies alongside more independent, community-​led spaces emerging through local interaction. This means that post-​conflict spaces are permeated by institutional logics that are ‘different from those underpinning a particular conflict’, thus legitimating behaviours, reaffirming difference among communities and inviting both peaceful and conflictive behaviours and interactions.

Critical geography and peacebuilding Critical geographers have engaged with questions around peace since the late Cold War (Kobayashi, 2009) and the late 1990s, as they drew from critical theory, post-​colonialism and feminism to criticize geography’s traditional focus on war and conflict, and proposed a distinct contribution in the field 37

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regarding the question of peace (Koopman et al, 2021). Since the 2010s, critical geographers have engaged with peacebuilding, with authors such as Joshua Inwood and James Tyner, Nick Megoran, Phillipa Williams and Fiona McConnell proposing the development of a notion of positive peace and moving the field towards a greater focus on local experiences of peace at community level (Macaspac and Moore, 2022). Peace is defined as ‘a spatial process and a political discourse, which manifests in diverse ways across time, space and culture’ (Courtheyn, 2018, p 742). Peace is situated, that is, shaped, by the spaces in which it takes place (Williams et al, 2014; Koopman, 2011 and 2014) and made by people and relations occurring in those spaces (Koopman, 2014). Since places affect dynamics of inclusion and exclusion, protection and control of populations and the discourses and solutions promoted (Vogel, 2018), places are ‘lived social constructs and bearers of political identities and ideologies’ (Vogel, 2018, p 433). Accordingly, peacebuilding entails the transformation of people’s identities linked to places, relationships (Shimada, 2014; Bregazzi and Jackson, 2018) and ‘the ideas of place that underpin conflict’ (Shimada, 2014, p 165). In addition, it involves understanding the extent to which peace is inclusive of difference and addresses ‘spatialized inequalities’ (Koopman, 2020, p 1). While space for critical geographers is a ‘relational definition … as constituted and constitutive of power’, places are ‘dynamic spaces shaped by distinct cultural and historical meanings’, where social processes are grounded, allowing the exploration of ‘peace practices, frameworks, and outcomes’ in specific socio-​temporal contexts (Macaspac, 2022, p 6). Places are defined as ‘differentiated bounded portions of geographic space in which social relations and events occur, and which are organized, related and experienced at different scales, from the bodily to the global’ (Williams et al, 2014 p 19). Both definitions link with understandings of space and place for peacebuilding scholars engaging with these notions as imaginary and physical counterparts respectively and embedded in social relations. Scale is an important notion in critical geography that engages in peacebuilding. Scale ‘refers to the spatial patterns of social processes that are often organized through the popular rubric of a cascading hierarchy from the individual (micro) to global (macro)’ (Macaspac, 2022, p 5). Scale helps to understand ‘the complex sets of discourses through which conflict is initiated, sustained, and resolved, from local conflicts to global international geopolitics’ (Kobayashi, 2009, p 822). It also helps to appreciate top-​down and bottom-​up dynamics, ‘interactions and relationships between different actors’ (Macaspac, 2022, p 5). These definitions link with peace studies scholars’ understanding of scales as contextual settings for interactions and agency. Macaspac and Moore (2022, p 5) observe that peacebuilding and geography studies have engaged in questions of geography and peace in a parallel fashion 38

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rather than a mutually engaged scholarship. However, common ground lies in ethnographic research about ‘spatial conditions, behaviours and perspectives that shape everyday dynamics of peace and conflict.’ Although this book does not engage with ethnography studies or questions around community situated understandings and practices of peace, it does take inspiration from key insights in both traditions. First is the suggestion of global agency as part of the scales intervening in peacebuilding as it interacts with agency at other national and sub-​national scales in places targeted for peacebuilding. Second is the symbolic nature of peacebuilding spaces and the role of international and other actors in making sense of places to legitimize and give shape to particular views of situated peacebuilding practices. Peace in that sense can be seen not only as a process, but also as a discourse with material consequences in the practices of peace. Such discourse refers to people’s identities and relationships linked to places and to ideas of place that underpin conflict. Third is the contested nature of peacebuilding spaces, as the meanings promoted by international and other actors might be more or less inclusive, contested in relation to local dynamics and, in consequence, more or less capable of addressing dynamics inequality and violence or, in practice, generating new ones. This book uses these theoretical insights on looking at peacebuilding via the ways in which international actors establish a transformative narrative about spaces and scales of agency through the framing of online subsidies. The notion of spatial framing is proposed as it recognizes the role of socially constructed spaces in shaping peacebuilding practices. Framing involves the selection and organization of perceived aspects of reality in order to communicate preferred meanings about what is at issue, causes, consequences and principles in support of political agendas (Entman, 1993, 2003, 2004; Gamson, 1989; Gamson and Modigliani, 1989), thus contributing to ‘the social construction of meaning’ (Gamson and Modigliani,1989, p 2) about, in this case, peacebuilding. Although frames had been studied mainly in relation to events, issues and political actors’ representativeness or legitimacy (D’Angelo and Kuypers, 2010; Entman, 2004), a notion of spatial framing contributes to the understanding of peacebuilding through the ways in which actors make sense and promote preferred meanings about spaces and their transformations as part as peacebuilding agendas. From this perspective, spatial framing involves the selection and promotion of targeted places of intervention through the organization of perceived aspects in the reality of conflict (transformation) in places ranging from the local to the national. Thus, spatial framing implies the narrative construction of meaningful spaces for peacebuilding transformation, that is, the communication of preferred meanings about what is at issue in those spaces, their process of transformation and through which peacebuilding agendas and actors act at different scales of agency. 39

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This book examines differences among international community actors regarding the characterization of such peacebuilding spaces and scales of agency, at local, departmental, (sub-​)regional or national levels, through their online subsidies. The work explores which spaces (cities, regions or municipios) are prioritized and how scales are constructed by international actors. How are those spaces explicitly labelled and defined with negative (what is at issue) and positive references (ideal transformations)? Which agendas (political negotiation, economic development, institutionalization and the rule of law, security provision or reconstruction of social fabric) are foregrounded in relation to targeted places of peacebuilding intervention? What visions of situated peace emerge from these narratives? How inclusive are these visions and to what extent do they address inequalities embedded in conflict dynamics?

Notions of space in Colombia This section offers relevant definitions of different geographic and administrative spaces for the promotion of peacebuilding in Colombia that are used by national and international actors. Geographically, Colombia has six major regions with distinct geographic and cultural characteristics. The Amazon region, dominated by the Amazon rainforest occupies 40 per cent of the territory and hosts about 200 Indigenous reservations. The Andean region occupies the highlands of the country and extends through ten departments from the south-​east to the north-​west of the country, being the most populated, urbanized and socio-​economically developed in the country. The Caribbean region is on the Atlantic coast, extending through seven departments, with a variety of ecosystems from coasts and valleys to deserts and snow mountains. Orinoquía region is home to four departments dominated by the Orinoco River and the Colombian planes. The Pacific region extends through four departments, with a prevalence of Afro-​Colombian and Indigenous populations in one of the most humid environments on the continent. Finally, the island region is sometimes mentioned as a distinct region, including the most important islands in the Pacific and the Atlantic region1 (Jáuregui Sarmiento, 2021; Avila, Quiñoles et al, 2022).

1

Departments in the Amazon Region include Caquetá, Putumayo, Amazonas, Guainía, Guaviare, and Vaupés. The Caribean Region includes Atlántico, Bolívar, Cesar, Córdoba, La Guajira, Magdalena and Sucre. The Andean Region includes Antioquia, Boyacá, Caldas, Cundinamarca, Huila, Norte de Santander, Quindío, Risaralda, Santander and Tolima. Departments in the Orinoquía include Meta, Arauca, Casanare, and Vichada. The Pacific Region includes Cauca, Nariño, Chocó, and Valle del Cauca. Islands include San Andrés, Providencia, and Santa Catalina (Avila Quiñones et al, 2022). 40

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Administratively, the Colombian constitution establishes that the country is a ‘unitary republic, decentralized and with autonomy of their territorial entities’ (Article 1, Constitución Política de la República de Colombia, 1991). Autonomous territorial entities including 32 departments, five special districts, 1101 municipalities, and 817 Indigenous territories serving purposes of political administration, management of resources and participation in national income (Article 286 of the Constitución; DANE, nd; OECD, 2016). Departments are the main administrative units in Colombia, in charge of planning economic and socio-​economic development (DANE, nd; Article 298 of the Constitución). Each of 32 departments has its own executive (led by a governor), legislative and judiciary representatives and its own capital city (MEN, nd). The Capital District of Bogota ‘has its own status, giving the city similar power to those of departments’ (OECD, 2016). Departments are subdivided into 1101 municipios (municipalities), five of which are categorized as ‘special districts’, led by a major and a council (OECD, 2016).2 Municipalities have fiscal, political and administrative autonomy to provide public services, infrastructure development, organization of the territory and promotion of community participation in development planning (DANE, nd). Some departments, given the high number of municipalities, have recognized other administrative units including (sub-​)regions (with common cultural or geographic features), districts or provinces with urban centres from where it is possible to administer a group of municipalities (MEN, nd). In relation to municipalities, departments: ‘exercise administrative functions of co-​ordination and intermediation with the municipalities. Municipalities also provide services such as electricity, urban transport, cadastre, local planning and municipal police. They are classified as being “certified” or “non-​certified” for the provision of certain competences (such as health, education, water, and sanitation)’ (OECD, 2016). Territorial entities smaller than municipios include veredas and corregimientos. Corregimientos are administrative subdivisions in the rural area of a municipality with a population centre agreed by a municipal council to facilitate citizen participation and provision of services (Article 117, Senado de la República de Colombia, 1994a, DANE, nd). Corregimientos are formed by a group of veredas, which are small, rural settlements generally formed around rural roads (Mendoza Morales, 2011). The 1991 Colombian constitution also established Indigenous territories of collective property set up by the Colombian government and governed by Indigenous councils and department governors (Article 329 of the Constitución). According to OECD (2016), there are ‘817 Indigenous

2

The term ‘municipalities’ has been adopted in this book as this is the translation used by OECD and online subsidies in English by the international actors researched. 41

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territories, home to 1.4 million inhabitants.’ At the same time, the constitution mandated Congress to establish a law to recognize collective territories of Afro-​Colombian communities occupying land in the Pacific lowlands owned by the state in areas to be delimited by the law (Transitory Article 55 of the Constitución, developed in Law 70, 1993). Broadly, territories are referred to in the political discourse as rural areas away from Bogotá. They have played a central role in the understanding of the dynamics of contemporary conflict and peacebuilding. The peace agreement between the Colombian government and FARC proposed the notion of ‘territorial peace’, with territory meaning ‘a socio-​historical scenario with social and cultural diversity, in which the communities –​men and women –​ play a leading role in defining the improvement of their living conditions and in defining the country’s development within a vision of rural integration’ (Gobierno de la República de Colombia y FARC EP, 2016, p 10). Control over territory, people, resources and their circulation are at the heart of the Colombian conflict, making human-​r ights abuses, dispossession and forced displacement from territories a war strategy. The Group of Historical Memory (GMH, 2016) observed that the Colombian armed conflict developed mainly in the countryside from the drive for control over territory, appropriation of land and (il)legal resources and electoral power and the limitation of democracy in the shape of grave human-​r ights violations against the civilian population. Victimization and dispossession, according to the report, was both a goal and part of the war strategy. The Truth Commission (Comisión para el Esclarecimiento de la Verdad, 2022) confirmed this assessment by describing how different actors based their power in dispossession of civilians and the armed dispute over territories driven by insurgent, counter-​insurgent, drug-​trafficking, capital-​laundering, economic and extractivist motives. Violent control over territories affected mainly the rural poor, women, Indigenous and Afro-​Colombian populations, and allowed the consolidation of businesses, including gold and oil, and a neoliberal model of development (Olarte-​Olarte and Wall, 2012; Koopman, 2014, 2020). For Koopman (2021), these dynamics are underpinned by a colonial and racist mind-​set that pushes for capitalist development and modernity in non-​white lowlands. Territory has been also at the heart of institutional designs of conflict transformation, although with different connotations for stakeholders participating in the peace process. Cairo et al (2018), observe that, in the peace agreement, the Development Plans with Territorial Focus (Planes de Desarrollo con Enfoque Territorial, PDETs) were the instrument for achieving territorial peace through democratic plans developed with communities and institutions at the local level. However, the connotation of territory had been different for peace negotiators (decentralization and institutional strengthening), government representatives (institutional developments for 42

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asserting equal rights), FARC (sustainable peace) and security forces (rural citizen security provision) (Cairo et al, 2018). Still, this was the first peace accord that acknowledged the different effects of the conflict in different populations (Koopman, in Cairo et al, 2018) and the importance of territorial planning and communities’ autonomy to foster peace (Montoya Arango, in Cairo et al, 2018). The peace agreement highlighted participatory territory planning, positive peace and a differential approach with reference to women and LGBT populations in a country with stark class, patriarchal and regionalized racial bias (Koopman, 2020). Criticisms of the notion of territory in the implementation of the peace agreement include it being a container of resources and property, whose development is conditioned by its integration to urban areas, following the traditional opposition between rural peripheries and urban centres that had guided configuration of the nation-​state since the 19th century. Accordingly, the agreement highlights the need for territories to be institutionalized by the state, overlooking the role that cities play in the conflict, including urbanization via forced displacement and the use of urban areas by militias, and therefore the need to rethink relations between urban and rural areas to overcome conflict dynamics (Piazzini Suarez, in Cairo et al, 2018). Second, as in the case of Afro-​Colombian communities in the Pacific lowlands during the early 1990s, even if territorial community rights of ownership and autonomous administration are granted, forced displacement and paramilitary violence are still triggered by governmental concessions to mining (gold) and agricultural companies (palm oil), as well as illegal developments of coca production and fumigation state responses (Oslender, in Cairo et al, 2018). Although the 1991 constitution granted territorial rights to Indigenous and Afro-​Colombian communities, these have continued to suffer the greatest levels of socio-​economic exclusion, poverty, war and racial discrimination inherited from a colonial mind-​set (Koopman, 2021). In other words, recognition of territorial rights through legislation in Colombia has not been enough to stop violent strategies to control it. Third, as Olarte-​Olarte (2019, p 27) observes, while for the High Commissioner for Peace the focus was to acknowledge specific territorial dynamics in the implementation of the agreement and their inclusion as marginalized places in development, social movements have foregrounded ‘local territorial planning’ that is inclusive of environmental justice and restoration against armed confrontation and development projects. Olarte-​ Olarte points out that the strengthening of the riot police in response to increasing socio-​environmental conflict in Colombia during the negotiation and implementation of the peace agreement has consolidated a notion of territory functional to specific forms of productivity and extractive development, thus reframing territorial peace into territorial pacification through force and criminalization of local opposition. Such reframing, for 43

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the author, presents investment and natural exploitation of territories as a precondition of peace, hiding the social conflict and injustice that permeates that option and muting alternative visions of development and environmental sustainability of territories. As these critical assessments of territory in relation to conflict and the peace process show, territory has been important in spatial understandings of the country and its development planning, and has been a contested notion at the roots of the Colombian conflict and agendas of peaceful transformation. Other relevant spaces generated institutionally and promoted by international actors were peasant farmers’ reservations (ZRC), and spaces for demobilization, including Transitory Places for Underage Combatants, Transitory Zones in Veredas for Normalization (ZVTN) and Transitory Points of Normalization (PTN) which then became Territorial Spaces for Training and Reincorporation (ETCR). Farmers’ reservations –​Zonas de Reserva Campesina (ZRC) –​were created under Law 160 in 1994 (Senado de la República de Colombia, 1994b). The overall purposes of this law were to improve income opportunities for rural peasants and vulnerable populations, counteract concentration of land, improve management of rural resources and agricultural production, regulate the adjudication of government-​owned land favouring poor farmers and create Reserve Zones for farmers to foster smallholding rural property. Article 80 of Chapter 13 of the law defined ZRC as geographic areas selected by the Colombian Institute for Agrarian Reform (INCORA) according to agricultural, ecologic and socio-​economic regional features in zones of colonization or in government-​owned land. However, the law also gave INCORA the power to define business development zones (ZDE), favouring specialized agricultural and livestock businesses. The Decree 1777 of 1996 (Ministerio de Agricultura y Desarrollo Rural, 1996) defined the goal of ZRC as fostering and stabilizing the peasant economy, thus generating peace and social justice. Specific goals for these areas included the controlled expansion of the agricultural frontier, counteraction of land concentration, fostering of sustainable development for farmers and colonists, regulation and adjudication of government-​owned wasteland privileging vulnerable populations, generating integral human development, territorial and political planning, and improving spaces of political concertation between the state and rural communities (Article 2.14.13.2.). The decree also added national parks’ buffer zones and forest reserves as potential zones for ZRC (Article 2.14.13.1.). In addition, the decree emphasized concerted state action with rural communities in fostering financing or co-​financing plans and programmes geared towards sustainable development. The Mission of Support to the Peace Process of the OAE, as well as the UN, accompanied the initiative by the National Land Agency (ANT) to call different state institutions present in the ZRC of the Valley of the Cimitarra River (since October 2017) to facilitate inter-​institutional 44

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coordination in response to the role of ZRC in the implementation of the peace agreement. In its role of monitoring the peace process, OEA’s 11th semester report warned about potential social, economic and environmental conflicts in ZRC due to clashing interests between different interests and actors present in these territories historically unattended by the government (MAPP/​OEA, 2016). Later, in its 22nd and 23rd reports, the organization warned about conflicts between peasants, Indigenous and Afro-​Colombian populations over increased settlements and ZRC applications by peasants in Afro-​Colombian or Indigenous collective land either recognized or in process of recognition (MAPP/​OEA, 2019). Territorial Spaces for Training and Reincorporation (Espacios Territoriales de Capacitación y Reincorporación, ETCR) replaced the Transitory Rural Zones for Normalization to FARC ex-​combatants (Zonas Veredales Transitorias de Normalización, ZVTN) that were abolished in August 2017 through Article 3 of Decree 1274 of July 2017 (ARN, 2019). ZVTN and PTN were temporary areas established in the final peace agreement with the purpose of facilitating the surrender of weapons and preparation of ex-​combatants for social, political and economic civilian life (Gobierno de la República de Colombia y FARC EP, 2016). ZVTN, then, were created through Law 1779 of 2016 and Decrees 2000 to 2026 of 2016 and Decree 150 of 2017 to guarantee the ceasefire and surrender of weapons, and to start the process of preparation for the reincorporation of FARC ex-​combatants (Presidente de la República de Colombia, 2017b; Minsalud, 2017). ETCR were created through Decree 1274 of 2017 (Presidente de la República de Colombia, 2017a) as two-​year spaces subject to modification, prorogation or termination by the national government, and regulated through Decree 2026 of 2017 (Presidente de la República de Colombia, 2017b). The purpose of the ETCR was the development of activities destined to the social, economic and productive reincorporation of FARC ex-​combatants accredited by the High Commissioner for Peace and missional activities in neighbouring communities (Presidente de la República de Colombia, 2017b; ARN, 2019). The UN supported the ETCR and neighbouring communities through the post-​conflict multi-​fund and activities focused on water provision, sanitation, health, nutrition, sexual and reproductive health, mental health, GBV prevention, prevention of children and youth drug addiction, infrastructure, technical assistance and capital for productive projects and income generation, studies of ETCR territories and reconciliation projects between ex-​combatants and communities through sports and arts projects (ONU, 2017a, 2018a, 2019a). Transitory Places for Underage Combatants (LTA) were conceived as part of the peace agreement between the Colombian government and FARC-​ EP as places near ZVTN, to attend, protect, redress and reincorporate children and teenage ex-​combatants. LTA formed part of the governmental 45

Shaping Peacebuilding in Colombia

programme Camino Diferencial de Vida (Different Life Routes) for the reincorporation of underage combatants, the reestablishment of their rights and the support of their life projects away from the armed struggle, under the leadership of the Presidential Council for HR and the National Reincorporation Council (CNR). The first step in this programme was the move and reception of minors recruited as combatants to LTA, followed by diagnosis of their needs and the implementation of integral plans of attention, redress and reincorporation (Procuraduría General de la Nación, 2020). Through the UN post-​conflict multi-​fund, UNICEF and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) supported LTA by adapting spaces for this purpose and accompanying underage combatants in their transfer to LTA (ONU, 2017a) and providing psychosocial, family and community support to underage combatants in their places of residence, as well as skills training and financing of productive projects for this population (ONU, 2018a).

The analysis A first step in the research involved a word-​frequency search with stemmed words in NVivo, which identified the most frequently used words in all the online communications. Subsequently, the most frequent words and cognates that referred to places relevant to our study at international, national and local levels were chosen for a closer textual analysis. Accordingly, those words were examined in context, coding positive and negative references in relation to such places. In addition, the analysis identified, with the help of word search in NVivo, the number of subsidies in which the international actors studied referred to Colombian departments. For this search, stemmed words were used (such as Antioquia, Antioqueño) and each reference was examined to check that it responded to the context (for example, Córdoba the department rather than a last name). This search allowed mapping of which departments were foregrounded in general, and by each international actor in the sample. Through framing analysis, the most important frame functions (Entman, 2003 and 2004) promoted by countries and organizations were identified in online subsidies regarding peacebuilding agendas in Colombia. These included problem definitions or ‘defining effects and conditions as problematic’ (Entman, 2004, p 5) through negative depictions of places. Accordingly, through the NVivo database, words relating to place were identified and then their broader context was reviewed to code positive and/​ or negative comments linked to such spaces. Positive references made to places of intervention illustrated how the international community generated aspirational images of success and positive values for national, departmental, regional and local spaces of intervention. Conversely, negative comments suggested how international community actors defined what was at issue 46

Spatial Framing and Methodological Choices

at national and local levels and how actors converged or differed in the priorities given to places and how these were understood and promoted as problematic places subject to intervention. Also, remedies or peacebuilding actions proposed or endorsed were explored through situated agendas of political negotiation, guarantees for human rights, economic development, governance and security provision (Appendix 1). Mentions made by international actors to agendas about national and local places in terms of policy recommendations, activities or strategies were identified, as well as expressions of concern and condemnation, particularly in the face of killings of human-​r ights defenders and social leaders. Regarding the latter, explicit expressions of concern and condemnation were included as these reflected the desire for something to be addressed (agenda setting), rather than just defining an issue as such, and in condemnation, international actors took a direct position that implied a call for action. Overall, framing analysis of spaces and agendas was useful to compare potential similarities and differences in international actors’ targeting of peacebuilding spaces and approaches to peacebuilding through agendas of development, governance, human rights, negotiation and security. Through the analysis of framing of peacebuilding by the international actors involved, and closer to Ting Lee and Lin (2015 and 2017), (in)congruent framing around peacebuilding was identified using thematic analysis. A congruent framing of the peace process would confirm Mac Ginty and Firchow (2016)’s observation of a homogenizing Western approach to contexts of intervention. An (in)congruent framing would support Ting Lee and Ling (2015 and 2017), Schnekener (2016) and Höglund and Orjuela (2016), for whom incoherence and international divisions in peacebuilding and transitional justice are a likely scenario and one that is used strategically and/​or mirrored locally. A textual analysis identified links of space descriptors that were found in the frequency search to different agendas, including references to socio-​ economic development, governance, human rights, peace processes and security. A particular theme could reflect more than one agenda, so all the relevant agendas relating to a theme (paragraph or sentence) were coded. In that sense, categories were not mutually exclusive as, for example, an actor could mention in the same sentence the need to provide security against illegal armed actors and the strengthening of human rights in vulnerable populations. Accordingly, the coding acknowledged all of the agendas alluded to by international actors in a non-​exclusive fashion and the places linked to those agendas at national, regional, departmental or local level. All these categories emerged in the coding itself rather than being predetermined, so the coding would be as close as possible to the voice of international actors themselves. The subcategories within the broader 47

Shaping Peacebuilding in Colombia

categories of socio-​economic development, governance, human rights, peace process and security are, admittedly, grouped in an arbitrary way in order to simplify and facilitate the analysis, but there is permeability between them, as, for example, transitional justice could be understood in principle to come under human rights or the strengthening of justice (governance). However, these categories offered a way to approach differences in the agendas promoted by actors at national and local levels in a systematic fashion (Appendix 1).

The sample Framing analysis focused on online information subsidies (694 items) published in English (172 subsidies), Spanish (515 items) and both languages (seven items) in online newsrooms of institutional web pages, since the countries and organizations studied issued online subsidies in either language. The types of subsidies included pieces such as news stories, statements, press briefings, speeches, fact sheets and memorandums produced in institutional newsrooms. The search for the sample focused on the period between November 2016 and March 2019 for all the actors included. For the USA (107 subsidies), the search targeted the News and Events section of the US Embassy in Colombia, the White House web page, and USAID Colombia web page Newsroom section (fact sheets about the work of USAID in the country) and News and Information section (news and information, press releases, congressional testimonies, speeches and fact sheets, and Frontlines magazine). For the UK (29 subsidies), the web pages included the Colombia and UK section of the UK Embassy in Colombia and Gov.uk with all news and statements related to Colombia. For Canada (33 subsidies), the search focused on the Media section of the Canada Embassy and the Prime Minister’s Office. For Sweden (32 subsidies), the search focused on the Swedish Embassy in Colombia, the Press Room section of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the PM’s Office and the government agency for cooperation –​SIDA –​web pages.3 The search in organizations involved in post-​conflict multi-​funds included the web page of the EU (71 subsidies) and the Press and Media section of the European External Action Service web page, as EEAS manages relations and partnerships between the EU and non-​EU countries. The Inter-​American

3

For the USA: https://​co.usemba​ssy.gov/​es/​, https://​www.usaid.gov/​colom​bia/​newsr​oom, https://​www.usaid.gov/​news-​info​r mat​ion. For the UK: https://​www.gov.uk/​world/​ colomb​ ia/n ​ ews; For Canada http://w ​ ww.canad​ aint​ erna​ tion ​ al.gc.ca/c​ olomb​ ia-c​ olomb​ ie/, https://​pm.gc.ca/​eng/​news; For Sweden: https://​www.gov​ernm​ent.se, https://​www. sida.se, https://​www.swede​nabr​oad.se/​es/​embaj​ada/​colom​bia-​bog​otá. 48

Spatial Framing and Methodological Choices

Development Bank (www.iadb.org) (17 subsidies) in the news section was filtered by Colombia and Sustainable Colombia and a further selection was made of subsidies in the web page Sustainable Colombia managed by the Presidential Agency for Cooperation (APC). For the World Bank (12 subsidies), the search focused on the ‘All News’ section of the World Bank and World Bank Colombia web pages for subsidies published about Colombia within the period of study related to our topic. For the UN (287 subsidies), the search covered the UN Colombia web page and the web page of the multi-​fund. For MAPP/​OEA (106 subsidies), the search focused on its News Centre subsections, Official Communications and the section News and Stories of Peace.4 The actors who used online subsidies to a greater extent to promote news and views about peacebuilding in Colombia were, in descending order the UN, followed by the USA, OAE and the EU. These countries and organizations published the greatest number of online subsidies during the period of study, in contrast to the World Bank, IDB and the UK, who made less use of this communication tool to promote their actions and views. The distribution of the sample in the period studied can be seen in Figure 2.1. In general, for most of the actors (except for the UK and IDB), 2017 saw the greatest number of online communications published. In that sense, most of the efforts to promote international efforts and views by most of the actors studied through online subsidies focused on the first year of implementation of the peace process. These had decreased by the time of the installation and first months of the new government, arguably, when the international community could have played a greater role in the face of an incoming government whose campaign was based on opposition to the peace process. In addition, most of UK’ subsidies were published in 2016, reflecting that country’s efforts in the run-​up to the signing of the peace agreement. In the case of the IDB, most of its publications took place in 2018, reflecting the implementation of the Sustainable Colombia multi-​fund. The NVivo database identified in the subsidies collected general features, including date, title, author, type of event reported (conferences/​summits, ceremonies, statements/​determinations, programmes/​projects, official visits, appointments officials), type of online communication (news story/​press release, statement, fact sheet, speech, press briefing) and language (English, Spanish). The most common types of subsidies overall were news stories

4

For the EU: http://​www.eeas.eur​opa.eu. For IDB: https://​www.iadb.org/​es/​notic​ias, https://w ​ ww.iadb.org/​en/​news, http://​www.col​ombia​ sost​ enib​ le.apcco ​ lomb​ ia.gov.co/p​ re​ nsa. For the World Bank: https://w ​ ww.worldba​ nk.org/​en/​news/​all. For the UN: https://​ naci​ ones​ unid​ as.org.co https://​www.fond​oonu​col.org/​. For MAPP/​OEA: https://​www. mapp-​oea.org/​notic​ias/​comu​nica​dos/​, https://​www.mapp-​oea.org/​notic​ias/​notas/​. 49

Shaping Peacebuilding in Colombia

Figure 2.1: Number of online-​subsidy communications per year, per actor 160

Number of online subsidies

140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0

USA

EU

Canada Sweden 2016

2017

UK 2018

UN

IDB

World Bank

OEA

2019

Source: Author’s own elaboration from NVivo database

(432 pieces), followed by official statements (143), fact sheets (55) and speeches (46). News stories were also the dominant type of publication for all actors except Sweden, for whom most communications were speeches (13, followed by nine news stories). The database identified the type of event that online subsidies focused on, including official visits to Colombia by representatives of the countries and organizations studied, or visits by Colombian government representatives abroad related to peacebuilding efforts (94 subsidies in total). Also seen were high-​profile events including conferences, summits or ceremonies (88); initiatives involving the actors studied, including programmes, projects or activities (373); statements, declarations or determinations (128); reports of calls between officials (six in total –​five reported by the USA and one by Canada); and publications related to appointments of officials (five). Overall, most subsidies focused on programmes or projects by the actors studied, and this was the case as well for the USA (54), EU (29), Canada (20), UN (172), IDB (16), World Bank (11) and MAPP/​OEA (57). Meanwhile, most subsidies by Sweden (18) and the UK (13) focused on high-​profile events.

50

3

Peacebuilding Efforts in Colombia: National Agendas and Management of International Cooperation This chapter presents an overview of the peacebuilding efforts by the governments of Juan Manuel Santos and Ivan Duque between 2016 and 2019. It uses governmental reports and those from the Office of the Comptroller General reports along with online subsidies issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It establishes key governmental agendas in Colombia including peace negotiations held with illegal armed actors and peacebuilding agendas in targeted places. In addition, the chapter compares the management of international cooperation by the two administrations. Continuities in the approaches of both governments include, first, the emphasis on state-​building and services provision; second, the depoliticization of political violence associated with the killings of social leaders and human-​ rights defenders by placing the blame in organized crime groups; and third, the aligning of national state projects to international narratives, priorities and support. The Duque administration, however, actively opposed the peace agreement and the transitional justice provisions left by the preceding Santos government, as well as its more comprehensive approach to the war against drugs. Instead, it favoured a more traditional punitive approach, which latter was nuanced in the face of international pressure. The Duque administration placed a greater emphasis on the provision of security against illegal organizations and state-​building than key structural calls suggested in the peace accords. At the same time, the Duque government attempted to fulfil its promise of reforming the peace agreement during the period observed (Dulce Romero, 2020) and lagged in its implementation during his administration (Díaz, 2019; Kroc Institute 2019 and 2020). At the same time, Duque did continue the peacebuilding policies related to security, 51

Shaping Peacebuilding in Colombia

justice and the protection of human rights followed by his predecessor and was keen in advocating a formal commitment with the implementation of the agreement during the period studied. There was, however, a decrease in the channelling of international funds for peacebuilding purposes in the Duque administration.

Approaches to peace For the Santos administration, peace meant guaranteeing the rule of law and security, improving access and efficiency of justice mechanisms and promoting respect for human rights and transitional justice (DNP, 2011a). After the re-​election of Juan Manuel Santos as president for a second term in 2014, the consolidation of peace became a central goal. The National Development Plan of 2014–​2018 placed at the centre of its strategy structural reforms to consolidate negotiations with guerrillas, as well as the sustainability of eventual accords. The plan described three Colombias: an urban, modern and productive one, with access to institutional and justice services; one with incipient development in goods and services; and a rural Colombia in remote areas with weak state and justice provision, socio-​economic underdevelopment, the presence of armed actors and illegal economies. Decreasing the gap was key for any progress to be made in the country in the direction of peace (DNP, 2015c). As a result of the peace agreement, 170 municipalities were prioritized for Development Programmes with Territorial Focus (PDET) (Decree 893 of 2017). These municipalities were described as being more affected by violence, underdevelopment, lack of institutional efficiency and high proportion of victims compared with the national average.1 The Duque administration’s National Development Plan 2018–​2022 (DNP, 2019b) defined peacebuilding as the result of a culture of legality cemented by security and justice. ‘Legality’ implied the rehabilitation of the rule of law and access to justice all over the country, the provision of security and order (and within it, HR guarantees), democratic participation and social dialogue, stabilization in strategic zones and attention and redress

1

These municipalities were in the departments and sub-​regions of Cesar, La Guajira and Magdalena (Sierra Nevada/​Perijá region), Bolivar and Sucre (Montes de María Region), Córdoba (South), Norte de Santander (Catatumbo region), Bolívar and Santander (Sur de Bolívar region), Arauca, and Antioquia (Bajo Cauca and Nordeste Antioqueño region). Chocó; Cauca and Valle del Cauca (Pacífico medio, Alto Patía and Norte del Cauca regions), Tolima (South); and Nariño (Pacífico and Frontera nariñense regions) in the west. Meta and Guaviare (Macarena and Guaviare regions), Caquetá (Cuenca del Caguán and Piedemonte Caqueteño regions) and Putumayo in the south of the country (FIP, 2018). 52

Peacebuilding Efforts: National Agendas

to victims. Through Law 1941 of 2018, the National Security Council was authorized to declare strategic zones of intervention (ZEII), beyond the 170 municipalities targeted for PDET, in regions affected by criminality where the national security could be at risk. In those zones, the government could reinforce the rule of law and security measures, along with social services, either articulating strategies in areas with PDET or in new zones.

The peace process with FARC While both Santos and Duque governments pursued Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programmes to dismantle illegal armed groups, they fundamentally disagreed on political negotiation with left-​wing guerrillas. The Santos government conducted peace talks with FARC in Cuba from 4 September 2012, and the parties reached an agreement on 24 August 2016. However, the agreement was rejected in a plebiscite on 2 October 2016 by 50.21 per cent of voters. According to the National Civil Registry (Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil, 2016a and b), the No vote was higher in the planes and Andean departments of Casanare (71.14 per cent), Norte de Santander (63.92), Meta (63.58), Antioquia (62), Huila (60.77), Quindío (60.13) and Tolima (59.71). In contrast, the Yes vote was higher in the departments of Chocó (79.76 per cent), Vaupés (78.05), Cauca (67.39), Putumayo (65.50), Nariño (64.81), Sucre (61.88) and La Guajira (61.14), as shown in Figures 3.1 and 3.2. The Democratic Centre Party, which led the campaign against the peace process and the No campaign in the plebiscite, was formed in 2012, against the announcement of peace dialogues with FARC. The party campaigned actively against the peace process by re-​signifying the peace policy as the ‘Santos Peace’: one that exacerbated terrorism, insecurity, impunity and conflict, and legitimized political persecution against FARC’s enemies, including ex-​president and leader of the Democratic Centre Party Alvaro Uribe Vélez and his entourage (Caicedo Atehortúa, 2016). The Democratic Centre Party identified the Santos administration as a socialist government turning the country into a new Venezuela, with FARC as land-​g rabbers disguising its power pretentions behind the peace agreement, and land being claimed by ‘false victims’ supported by NGOs at the service of the territorial expansion of FARC, while businessmen and landowners involved in land restitution claims were occupants in good faith victimized by the state (Vallejo Mejía and Montoya Londoño, 2017, p 195). ‘Santos Peace’, it was said, sent the wrong message that violence and criminality brought political and economic dividends including the expropriation of land from legal owners and honest rural businesspeople. It awarded guerrilla fighters with undeserved political participation in Congress and government as well as the right to dictate 53

Shaping Peacebuilding in Colombia

Figure 3.1: Departments with the greatest percentages of No votes Departments with high 'No' vote, percentage

51.37

71.14

Source: Author’s elaboration based on ‘Departments with the Greatest percentages of No support’ (Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil, 2016a)

policy against drug trafficking (FARC being drug barons themselves) and agrarian development. The accords would create a parallel justice (Special Jurisdiction for peace) which would give FARC immunity for crimes against humanity and links with illegal economies, did not oblige them to tell the truth or surrender their property and weapons, while punishing citizens and security forces that had actively fought FARC in the past. In sum, the peace agreement equated to the triumph of criminals over the state and the rule of law (Centro Democrático, 2016, Duque Marquez et al, 2016). In an interview, the head of the No campaign and member of the Democratic Centre Party, Juan Carlos Vélez, stated that ‘this was the 54

Peacebuilding Efforts: National Agendas

Figure 3.2: Departments with the greatest percentages of Yes votes Departments with high 'Yes' vote, percentage 50.66

79.76

Source: Author’s elaboration based on ‘Departments with the Greatest percentages of Yes support’ (Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil, 2016b)

cheapest and most effective campaign in a long time’ and explained that the core strategy was the mobilization of popular indignation with financial support of the private sector. According to Vélez, the campaign received COL$1,300 million from 30 companies and 30 individuals, and social networks were key to post messages. Highly targeted messages to the middle and high classes talked about impunity, the injustice of electoral inclusion of guerrillas and tax reform, while lower classes received messages focused on losing their subsidies to FARC while honest workers would have to fend for themselves. Propaganda about Colombia turning into Venezuela was heavily disseminated in regions such the Atlantic coast, while Cauca received messages centred on victims (Ramírez, 2016). 55

Shaping Peacebuilding in Colombia

Messages circulated by Democratic Centre through social media during this time also played heavily on the unpopularity of Santos by comparing him with the governments of Venezuela and Cuba (‘castrochavismo’), his weakness in negotiating with FARC (‘surrender’, ‘no +​Santos’), and the supposed assault of family values included in the accords expressing patriarchal and anti-​LGBT bias (Gómez-​Suárez, 2016; Koopman, 2020). For ex-​president Santos (2019), this social media campaign was a key factor in the results, along with tropical storm Matthew (as it affected turnout on the Atlantic coast, supportive of the agreement) and the relentless opposition of ex-​president Álvaro Uribe. Certainly, the popularity of President Santos and FARC relative to the Democratic Centre and ex-​president Álvaro Uribe Vélez (senator and leader of the party) was a significant factor in the results. Dávalos et al (2018) point out that Santos was elected for his second term with a weaker majority against his rival from the Democratic Centre Party, Oscar Iván Zuluaga (with 48 per cent of the vote), and had a divided Congress. In addition, while the popularity of Santos had fallen to 29 per cent and FARC’s popularity remained low, the popularity of ex-​president Álvaro Uribe, was 52 per cent at the time of the plebiscite. Accordingly, support for Álvaro Uribe in previous elections and for Democratic Centre more broadly was a key predictor of the No vote. Foundation Ideas for Peace argued at the time that, in fact, the plebiscite reproduced the results of the presidential elections in 2014 between Santos and Zuluaga, except the political machinery in regions supportive of Santos made fewer efforts to mobilize voters, particularly on the periphery, resulting in a decreased turnout (Álvarez Vanegas and Garzón Vergara, 2016). Building on the geography of the vote, some authors point out that the No vote was prevalent in places with higher unemployment, dense populations and developed urban centres in the Andean region, except Bogotá (the yes vote won with 56.07 per cent). Contrastingly, the Yes vote prevailed on the Caribbean coast, in places most affected by armed conflict, with high numbers of victims (outside the Andean core), where multidimensional poverty, lack of state presence and lack of connection with market centres was higher, and in racialized regions with high Afro-​Colombian and Indigenous populations –​in the Pacific lowlands and south of Colombia (Álvarez Vanegas and Garzón Vergara, 2016; Dávalos et al, 2018; Santos, 2019; Koopman, 2020). After the referendum results, the government proceeded to renegotiate the accord with FARC and the main representatives behind the No campaign: senator and former president and Álvaro Uribe and representatives of his party (including Iván Duque, Óscar Iván Zuluaga and Carlos Holmes Trujillo); 80 representatives of churches, including evangelical and Christian pastors and politicians; the private sector including ANDI and ANIF; members of the Conservative Party, including former president Andrés 56

Peacebuilding Efforts: National Agendas

Pastrana and members of his political team and Martha Lucía Ramírez; and former Attorney General and member of the Society of Saint Pius X, Alejandro Ordoñez; among others (Fundación Compaz and Royal Norwegian Embassy in Colombia, 2022), who went on to occupy key positions in the government of Ivan Duque after 2018. The government and FARC signed a revised version of the peace agreement on 24 November 2016, ratified by Congress on 30 November. President Juan Manuel Santos received the Nobel Peace Prize on 10 December 2016 as recognition from the international community for his efforts towards peace. UN Secretary General António Guterres remarked that, in a context of more conflicts and lack of solutions to existing ones, Colombia’s peace process was ‘of fundamental symbolic importance in the world’ (Guterres, 2018). The Santos government used international support to shield the peace process and counteract internal dissent − particularly from the Democratic Centre Party that was leading the campaign against the accords. In December 2016, the Ministry of Foreign Relations reported the visit of President Santos and the Minister of Foreign Relations María Ángela Holguín to Europe to receive the Nobel Peace Prize, officially create the EU Trust Fund for Colombia and receive the Lamp of Peace Award from the Sacred Convent of Assisi. During the Nobel Prize ceremony, Santos asserted that the announcement of the prize, four days after the rejection of the peace agreement in Colombia, was ‘a gift from heaven’ as it gave impulse to his dialogue efforts with the opposition and made possible a revised peace agreement approved in Congress at the end of November (Cancillería, 2016). In May 2018, during Santos’ last visit to Europe, the president reassured the international community that the peace process was irreversible, as sanctioned by the constitutional court. It represented a state commitment with the international community and nobody wanted to go back to the ‘horror of war’ (Cancillería, 2018f). In his first official visit to the USA after the election of President Trump, in a speech for the Atlantic Council, President Santos also warned of the possibility that the peace agreement was going to become the ‘war horse’ in the forthcoming presidential elections in Colombia, insisting that peace was not a president’s or government’s project, but a project for the future of Colombia (Cancillería, 2017d). In doing so, the president was countering efforts by the Colombian opposition leading the No campaign to side with the newly elected US president against the peace agreement (Miles, 2017; Ordoñez and Kumar, 2017) and gain ground in the presidential campaign. After the meeting between the Colombian and US presidents, the Ministry of Foreign Relations in Colombia reported Trump’s praise of the peace efforts, his support for Colombia’s anti-​drug strategy and commitment to tackle drug trafficking (Cancillería, 2017e). During the inauguration of 57

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the Colombian Congress for 2017–​2018 and 2018–​2022, President Santos warned that the peace process was a moral obligation of the state with the international community and the UN Security Council, victims of the armed conflict and the future of Colombia (Cancillería, 2017f and 2018g). Again, the international community was reaffirmed in its role of supporting the president in managing national opposition to the agreement. The Santos government designed a framework for the implementation of the peace agreement and commissioned the Kroc Institute to monitor its implementation. In 2018, the National Department of Planning reported the inclusion in the financial system of 21,000 rural farmers through a programme of substitution of illicit crops, the formulation of the Plan for Regional Transformation with projects for 170 municipalities prioritized, the start of 1,283 infrastructure works in 52 municipalities included in the PDET, and the implementation of the Special Jurisdiction for Peace as a mechanism to facilitate transitional justice (DNP, 2017, 2018, 2019a). The Special Jurisdiction for Peace was part of the final peace agreement, prompting the creation of a comprehensive system of truth, justice, redress and non-​repetition for the victims of the armed conflict. Its aim was to generate a voluntary mechanism for transitional justice to judge the most serious crimes committed by ex-​members of illegal armed groups and state security forces in the context of the armed conflict before 1 December 2016 (Gobierno Nacional and FARC-​EP, 2016). The Santos administration also created ‘Fund Colombia in Peace’ in 2015, a framework to improve institutional coordination, financial efforts, geographical targeting of interventions and monitoring of the national and international investment for peacebuilding. In 2018, the government approved the Document of the National Council for Economic and Social Policy (CONPES 3932) to provide guidance about resources needed for financing the peace agreement and articulate it with the National and Territorial Development Plans up to 2034. As presidential candidate, Ivan Duque vowed to reform the peace agreement and the Special Jurisdiction for Peace created within that framework. Accordingly, he proposed to tackle the surge of coca production by making eradication compulsory rather than voluntary: make drug trafficking a crime subjected to ordinary justice rather than a related political crime included in transitional justice, while guaranteeing independent military justice. The conditions required FARC’s political participation and engagement with the law in facing truth and justice regarding its crimes and links with drug trafficking, and surrendering weapons and profits from such activities in order to redress victims. Duque actively supported the capture and extradition of FARC commander and peace negotiator Jesus Santrich over links with drug trafficking as well as any member of FARC continuing with criminal activities. In addition, Duque opposed any negotiation with 58

Peacebuilding Efforts: National Agendas

the ELN (National Liberation Army) without international supervision, and established times and the group halting attacks and criminal activities as a precondition.2 Once elected, the Duque government was keen to reassure the international community of its intentions to implement the peace agreement, with adjustments. Minister of Foreign Relations Carlos Holmes Trujillo affirmed in several international meetings that Colombia would continue with the application of the agreement, but with modifications that would guarantee a ‘great national agreement’ (for example, Cancillería, 2018i) and portrayed international concerns as ‘mistaken international expectations’ (Cancillería, 2018m). Modifications sought to the peace agreement were presented by the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the European Parliament Commission of Foreign Affairs, including a) drug trafficking ceasing to be a political crime, thus not subject to amnesty; b) forced eradication of illicit crops; c) severe sanctions for FARC members in Congress with undeclared patrimony; d) exclusion from Congress for FARC representatives responsible for crimes against humanity (Cancillería, 2018o). The government of Ivan Duque continued its engagement with international donors who had supported the peace process and extended the mandate of the UNSC for the verification of the peace agreement with FARC until September 2019. In the UN General Assembly and the Security Council, President Duque and the Minister of Foreign Relations reassured the international community of their commitment to continue the implementation of the peace agreement and, in particular, the process of Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) with FARC, strengthening, for example, economic reintegration mechanisms. However, they warned that the government would prosecute those engaged in drug trafficking and crime in the light of the increase in illicit crops and its fuelling of organized crime. In addition, the president exposed the fragility of budgets’ ability to comply with all the commitments made by the previous government as well as the institutional fragility of a complex architecture which had not advanced in the achievement of all the goals regarding peace (Cancillería, 2018h, j, k, l). To put the point about resources in perspective, Carrero (2019) discusses the budgetary limitations in both the Santos and Duque administrations. The budget proposed by Santos to implement the agreement was insufficient in the light of recommendations by organizations such as ANIF, Fedesarrollo, Bank of America and the Office of the Comptroller General. The total resources projected for 15 years were equivalent to 0.7 per cent of GDP,

2

This summary is taken from a review of campaign online subsidies of the presidential campaign at Ivanduque.com (2017a, b; 2018a–​ai). 59

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when expert estimates recommended between 2.8 and 3.5 per cent of GDP annually. Carrero quotes reports from the Office of the Comptroller General showing not only a growing deficit in the budgetary projections of the Implementation Framework Plan between 2017 and 2019, but also the lack of a discrete chapter claiming the funds for implementation of the peace agreement in the Duque National Development Plan, as was institutionally required. The Office of the Comptroller General (Contraloría General de la Nación, 2017, 2018, 2019) showed that the initial budgetary projections for the financing of the peace agreement were COL$129.4 billion between 2017 and 2031, equivalent to 0.9 per cent of GDP or 0.7 per cent if the Law of Victims and Land Restitution was included. However, the Office noted that the government proposed this through budgetary redistribution rather than new resources, without clarity about how to obtain new resources, thus it was less than was needed. In 2019, the Office warned that the National Development Plan decreased resources for points 1 (rural reform), 2 (political participation) and 4 (illicit drugs) of the peace agreement and increased them for point 5 (victims). In addition, in no year of implementation did the government spent the budget programmed: it presented a deficit of 60 per cent in 2017, 53 per cent in 2018 and 48 per cent in 2019. Despite these budgetary limitations, the Kroc Institute (2019) confirmed a continuation of the Agreement’s implementation (68 per cent of commitments at any stage of implementation) in 2017 and 2018 and incorporation of its commitments in the policies of the new administration. The following year, the Kroc Institute (2020) reported that the implementation of the peace agreement up until 2019 had 25 per cent of commitments fulfilled, most of them related to short-​term disarmament and institutional architecture for peace. Advances in rural reform were visible in the PDET and the land registry process but fell behind in service provision in the countryside. Political participation advanced in terms of civil society involvement in the design of national development plans, campaigns to vote in elections and greater space for social organizations in media outlets, but lagged in democratic participation in representative politics, political reform and guarantees for social mobilization. Advances regarding the end of the conflict were evident in reincorporation and immediate incentives for ex-​ combatants after demobilization, but wider, long-​term support was needed for economic independence and security guarantees for ex-​combatants, as well as civil society inclusion in the definition of security-​guarantees policy. Issues around illicit drugs, delays in substitution programmes, murders of community leaders and lack of civil society participation in policy design undermined civil-​society confidence. Although institutions in charge of truth, justice, redress and non-​repetition started their operations and led participation processes for victims, FARC still needed to make a greater 60

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contribution with regard to the truth. Also, the System of Comprehensive Attention and Redress to Victims needed better coordination in territories, and collective redress did not advance as expected. Finally, in relation to implementation, verification and endorsement, consensus was greater on technical aspects rather than substantive ones such as the legislative agenda and security guarantees for ex-​combatants. Looking at the temporal horizon of the implementation, the Kroc Institute reported that 33 out of 88 commitments scheduled between 2017 and 2019 were completed, most relating to disarmament and reincorporation. The ones pending (62 per cent) referred to widening democratic participation and formalization, access to land, participative rural development, early interventions in the National Programme for Crop Substitution and comprehensive redress outside the national system of truth, justice redress and non-​repetition.

Peace process and the ELN The Santos government and left-​wing guerrillas from the National Liberation Army (ELN) signed an agreement for peace talks on 30 March 2016 (Gobierno Nacional and ELN, 2016). Negotiations began on 7 February 2017 and a ceasefire was announced on 4 September until 12 January 2018. The government welcomed the support of the UNSC to ‘verify compliance with the temporary, bilateral, national ceasefire with the ELN’ (Cancillería, 2017g). However, the final year of the Santos administration was marked by the resumption of hostilities and lack of concrete results in the negotiation attempts with the ELN. Contrastingly, the Duque administration proposed to subject any future negotiation with illegal organized armed groups to a concentration in limited geographical spaces and with complete cessation of criminal and terrorist activities (in line with Law 418 of 1997), international supervision and defined times (Cancillería, 2018l and o; DNP, 2019b). After the attack perpetrated by the ELN National Police Academy in Bogotá on 17 January 2019, the Minister of Foreign Relations called a meeting of the diplomatic body accredited in Colombia to report on the incident, condemn the terrorist actions and call on ELN to stop violence and hand in all people kidnapped by the guerrilla group (Cancillería, 2019a). Such proposals controverted the peace agreement with FARC, justified the suspension of negotiations with the ELN in 2019 and affected the prospect of future negotiations with illegal armed groups.

Security The Santos and Duque administrations coincided in fighting illegal armed groups and sources of finance, confronting illegal mining and clearing 61

Shaping Peacebuilding in Colombia

territories from anti-​personnel mines. Both aimed at strengthening the capacity of security forces, local administrations and, in the case of anti-​personnel mines, promoting education on the risks of mines for populations affected (DNP, 2011b, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015a, b, c, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019a, 2020). The point of contention was the fight against drugs. The Santos government campaigned actively to change the punitive focus in favour of public health, human rights and alternative development. It promoted this view in scenarios such as the 6th Summit of the Americas in 2012, the Nobel Prize ceremony in 2016, the 60th Session of the UNODC Commission on Narcotic Drugs, and the 61st Period of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) (Cancillería, 2016, 2017a, b, 2018c, d). On 9 May 2015, President Santos announced the suspension of aerial spraying of glyphosate –​the chemical that had been used to fight illicit crops in the country since the government of Julio Cesar Turbay (1978–​1982). The rationale was the warning against its damaging health effects by the Ministry of Health based on national and international studies, particularly from the WHO (Ministerio de Salud y Protección Social, 2015). The decision was backed by resolution 1214 of 30 September 2015 (ANLA, 2015), ordering the suspension of fumigations in the country. At the same time, the Administrative Unit for Territorial Consolidation implemented strategies of alternative development to protect vulnerable populations, such as conditioned aid, food security, support for productive projects and work schemes including the Forest Ranger Families for Prosperity. The government also prioritized manual eradication and the seizing of illegal drugs and the raw materials for their production with the support of the security forces (DNP, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019a). However, production of coca increased during the Santos administration. According to the UNODC World Drug Report, coca bush cultivation increased by 30 per cent between 2013 and 2015, returning to the level reported in 2011, and then another 17 per cent by 2017. For the UNODC, this was because of farmers’ perceptions of lower risks of aerial spraying and possibilities of benefiting from alternative development schemes after peace negotiations with FARC, as well as material circumstances including droughts affecting licit crops and a rise in coca leaf prices (UNODC, 2017a and b). In November 2017, the Ministry of Foreign Relations announced the signing of a ‘historical agreement’ with UNODC to strengthen illicit crop substitution and alternative development in Colombia (Cancillería, 2017h). The following year, during the visit of US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson to Colombia, President Santos stressed the shared responsibility of both countries in the fight against drugs, including US demand and law-​enforcement and substitution efforts to control drug production and trafficking (Cancillería, 2018b). Ivan Duque’s distance from the Santos administration was evident in proposals of a constitutional reform to exclude narco-​trafficking and 62

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kidnapping as political crimes, contradicting the peace agreement. For his government, ‘the dismantling of the policy against [illegal] crops and the adoption of a justification discourse, added to mistaken measures in public policy increased the hectares of coca’ (DNP, 2019b, p 63 [translated by the author]). In addition, the president announced his intention of returning to aerial spraying of illicit crops on September 2018 (Redacción Política, 2018). For the Minister of Foreign Relations, Holmes Trujillo, Colombia had lost leadership in multilateral scenarios given its position on the war against drugs; something that the Duque administration aimed to correct with UNSC support (Cancillería, 2018m and n).

Development The Santos administration embarked on a plan of reconstruction and development of targeted areas to counteract illegal armed actors through the improvement of local state capacity, public-​services provision, rule of law, community participation and socio-​economic reconstruction (training and income generation). Such focus was reflected in programmes such as the National Policy of Consolidation and Territorial Reconstruction (PNCTR) (Unidad Administrativa para la Consolidación Territorial, 2014), the PDET programmes, targeted support by the Department for Social Prosperity, New Territories for Peace (with EU support) and the CONPES 3867 strategy for post-​conflict institutional preparation and investment (CONPES 3867, 2016; DNP, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019a). The Duque government privileged stabilization with a greater emphasis on law enforcement. It reported work on eradication of coca crops either voluntary or assisted by security forces in municipalities prioritized by the PDET and fostering development through the production of high-​quality cultural products, restructuring of water services and waste management, assistance in agricultural improvements, provision of internet services in all municipalities and updating of land registry (DNP, 2020). The Agency of Territorial Renovation (PATR) gathered community initiatives for regional transformation to link them with the institutional offerings. Regarding redress, the government reported actions in assisting productive projects of families with favourable restitution sentences and employment opportunities for victims. In addition, the government reported technical assistance for 63 PDET municipalities on topics related to internal control and the design of plans for territorial administration.

Justice and human rights Both Santos and Duque governments developed initiatives to implement local justice and conciliation services, as well as improving land registry 63

Shaping Peacebuilding in Colombia

services to better guarantee rights over land ownership, a key source of rural conflict. In addition, the Santos government promoted the creation of a National System of Human rights and International Humanitarian Law (Decree 4100 of 2011) to improve institutional coordination and monitoring, as well as citizen education, which continued during Duque’s administration (DNP, 2011a, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015a, b, c, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019a, 2020). The Santos administration promoted improvements to transitional justice measures through the 2012 reform of the Law of Justice and Peace (Law 975 of 2005), sanctioned in the context of previous peace talks with right-​wing paramilitaries to extend prison times for perpetrators not cooperating with justice. In addition, the government sanctioned Law 1448 of Victims and Land Restitution in 2011 for the redress of victims of the armed conflict. Regarding the latter, the Democratic Centre Party led the opposition against the Law of Victims and Land Restitution on the grounds that it revived class hatred and stigmatization against rural businessmen, disincentivized investment and promoted unfair expropriation against landowners. In their view, the Law victimized owners who had purchased land in good faith in favour of false victims and illegal occupiers linked to guerrillas interested in taking over geo-​strategic spaces in the country –​such arguments fed the No campaign in the 2016 plebiscite (Vallejo Mejía and Montoya Londoño, 2015, 2017; Montoya Londoño and Vallejo Mejía, 2016). Once in power, the Duque government vowed to ‘update’ and ‘adjust’ Law 1448, following an evaluation of its implementation, fight against the use of victims as a political and stigmatization tool and foster historical memory processes to enhance legality rather than justify violence (DNP, 2019b). The latter seemed to counteract Democratic Centre’s perceived weight given to victims of land dispossession by right-​wing paramilitaries linked to private-​sector interests in the implementation of Law 1448, as well as memory processes overlooking victims of left-​wing guerrilla groups. Constitutional reform during the Santos administration in 2012 also provided the legal framework to implement transitional justice in the context of the peace process, with FARC benefiting from demobilized combatants’ and victims’ rights to truth, justice and redress. Territorial action plans for redress to victims were promoted at departmental level, as well as initiatives for access to truth, collective processes of historical memory and the creation of HR archives led by the Centre for Historical Memory (CMH) with the participation of communities and demobilized populations (DNP, 2011a, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015a, b, c, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019a). Duque’s national development plan (DNP, 2019b) proposed to overcome victims’ vulnerability, first, by moving from aid to security and poverty alleviation, aligning assistance with the social policy for the rest of the population, and with defined criteria to remain or exit such programmes; second, by redressing victims with resources from the perpetrators, local 64

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administrations and the government itself; and third, by building the Museum of Historical Memory and the Human Rights Archive, with the museum providing technical assistance to the National System of Attention and Comprehensive Redress to Victims (SNARIV) and the Comprehensive System of Truth, Justice, Redress and Non-​Repetition (SIVJRNR). In addition, the government requested the entities of SNARIV and the Unit for Land Restitution to contribute to the implementation of restitution and economic independence and integration of victims to the community. A major issue for the government was the killing of FARC ex-​combatants, human-​r ights activists and social leaders. In the face of international pressure, the first reaction of the Santos government was to deflect the issue. The Colombian ambassador to the UN stated that it was not possible to generalize that the killings were related to the victims’ defence of human rights or perpetrated by successors of paramilitary organizations (Cancillería, 2017c), blaming transnational criminals instead and calling for international co-​ responsibility and support (Cancillería, 2018e). However, both the Santos and Duque administrations were keen to show their proactiveness in tackling the issue and reassure the international community, while blaming mostly criminal bands. Reported strategies in this direction for the Santos government were the sanctioning of Law 1426 of 2010 aimed at tougher sentences for crimes against journalists and HR activists; the reinstating of the National Commission of Security Guarantees for Human Rights, Social and Community Leaders to discuss prevention and protection plans; improvements to the System of Prevention and Alert for Rapid Reaction at territorial level; and individual protection schemes (DNP, 2011a, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015a, b, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019a; Cancillería, 2018a). Meanwhile, the Duque administration presented the framework of Pact for Life and for the Protection of Social Leaders and Human Rights Defenders, to implement early warnings and mechanisms of protection and prevention as well as sanctions to perpetrators. In addition, Decree 2137 of 2018 created an inter-​sectorial commission for institutional strengthening to protect social leaders, human-​r ights defenders and journalists (Cancillería, 2018l and o). The situation deteriorated, however, despite international reassurances. The report of the Secretary General on the UN mission in Colombia stated that, since the signing of the peace agreement in November, 85 FARC ex-​combatants had been killed, and OHCHR verified the killings of 163 social leaders and human-​r ights defenders, with a total of 454 cases reported (UNSC, 2018). By the end of 2019, the UN report on the mission in Colombia stated that 2019 had seen the highest number of killings of former combatants: 20 homicides, compared with 65 in 2018 and 31 in 2017: ‘The total number of killings has now reached 173, in addition to 14 disappearances and 29 attempted homicides’ (UNSC, 2019, p 8). Regarding 65

Shaping Peacebuilding in Colombia

Figure 3.3: International cooperation funding received by Colombia US$ million

800 700 594 600

583

713

663 635

576 530

517 500

313

400 300 200 2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

Source: Adapted from MRE, 2019; APC, 2018, 2020

social leaders, the report highlighted that, since the signature of the peace agreement, OHCHR ‘has verified 303 killings of human rights defenders and social leaders, 86 of which (including 12 women) occurred in 2019’ (UNSC, 2019, p 9).

Governmental coordination of international cooperation The graph in Figure 3.3 shows the reported total cooperation received by Colombia from 2011 to 2019. During the first term of President Santos, the cooperation increased between 2011 and 2013 and decreased between 2014 and 2015, the period of transition between the first and second terms of the Santos government. Then, cooperation increased sharply in comparison with the first term, particularly between 2016 and 2017, when the peace agreement was signed and during the first year of its implementation. In 2018, the year of the transition between the Santos and Duque administrations, APC (2018) registered its sharpest fall. According to the Duque administration, this was due to the invitation of Colombia into the OECD (MRE, 2019). The highest increase happened in 2019; according to the Duque government, due to remaining migratory and peace implementation challenges and the World Bank classification of the country as middle-​high income with important development challenges. The government also justified the increase of funds on increases in the reporting of international cooperation, APC’s initiatives and activities carried out 66

Peacebuilding Efforts: National Agendas

with donors and clearly established governmental priorities in the National Development Plan of 2018 to 2022, which allowed donors to identify early areas of demand (APC, 2020). The Santos administration created the Presidential Agency for Cooperation (APC) in 2011 to coordinate the demands for and offers of cooperation in the country (APC, 2015) and designed the 2012–​2014 National Strategy for International Cooperation (ENCI), in which the government aligned international cooperation with the goals of the National Development Plan. The principal areas of cooperation between 2012 and 2014 were, in descending order: governability; victims, reconciliation and HR; equal opportunities; economic growth; environment; and risk management (APC, 2012, 2013, 2014). During its second term, the Santos administration gave international cooperation a more explicit role in peacebuilding in its National Development Plan of 2014–​2018. Accordingly, it could support the transition to peace ‘by accompanying its fast implementation and the structural transformations needed to make it sustainable, given the international community’s strong presence, resources, technical skills, trustworthiness in the territories and know-​how to contribute to an innovative peace process’ (DNP, 2015c, p 43). APC prioritized peacebuilding, sustainable rural development and environmental sustainability as the key areas for international cooperation. In 2015, the Fund Colombia in Peace (CONPES 3850, 2016) was designed by APC and the National Department of Planning to manage all the post-​ conflict trust funds created to support the transition to peace. In 2017, APC reported the approval of the strategy for collecting non-​reimbursable resources for post-​conflict initiatives from funds led by the EU, UN, World Bank and IDB (APC, 2015 and 2017). Figure 3.4 shows the percentages of international cooperation funding aligned to peacebuilding, rural development and environment during the second term of the Santos administration. The greatest percentage of international funding was directed towards peacebuilding, with the highest level in 2016, and then decreasing for 2017 and 2018. Meanwhile, the Duque administration envisioned security cooperation to help recover Colombia’s ‘lost leadership’ in the fight against illegal drugs and international and local crime, the consolidation of strategic zones of comprehensive intervention, the development and security of the country’s borders and state provision for Afro-​Colombian and Indigenous communities. The government also stated that, following the legislative act of 7 July 2016 for the implementation of the peace agreement, 4.1 billion pesos had been allocated for the implementation of the peace agreement (DNP, 2019b and c). The National Strategy of International Cooperation, prepared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, APC and the National Department of Planning, 67

Shaping Peacebuilding in Colombia

Figure 3.4: International cooperation funding alignment with key APC areas (percentages)

Percentage

100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

69

48 34 31 18

30

24

15

42 25 18

3 2015

2016 Peacebuilding

2017 Rural development

2018 Environment

Source: Author’s elaboration from APC, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018

identified the following challenges: first, a significant fall in international cooperation from 2017 to 2018; second, poor coordination facilities between international actors and international, national and local actors within Colombia, fostering dispersion, duplication of efforts and lack of impact; third, the geographical concentration of international cooperation according to ‘security in the territory, local institutional capacity, and the sustainability of their actions’ (particularly, in Antioquia, Meta and the south-​west of the country), overlooking other territories with an elevated level of demand. A further challenge was the poor coordination among sectors and territories to articulate demands to international actors, generating further dispersion and duplication of efforts (MRE, 2019, pp 24–​30). Table 3.1 shows a comparison of the geographical distribution of international cooperation between 2014 and 2019. While there was an overall decrease in the funds received, Meta, Cauca and Nariño and Valle del Cauca kept their positions in the first, second and third tiers respectively in terms of resources channelled. Changes were evident in Antioquia, moving down to the second tier by 2019, while Caquetá, Norte de Santander, Chocó, La Guajira, Arauca, Putumayo, Boyacá, Cesar, Vichada and Bogotá received greater priority. In a subsequent analysis for 2019, APC (2020) identified the percentages of cooperation directed nationally to peacebuilding as well as to the specific departments concentrating the greatest percentages of international cooperation for this purpose, in line with different governmental frameworks for cooperation: the United Nations Development Goal (UNDG) of Peace (16.52 per cent of all the goals); the National Development Plan (27.13 per cent of all the components); stabilization in the National Strategy for 68

Peacebuilding Efforts: National Agendas

Table 3.1: Geographical distribution of international cooperation 2014–​2018 and 2019 2014–​2018

2019

Department

US$ million Department

US$ million

Antioquia and Meta

130–​362.7

Caquetá, Meta, and Norte de Santander

14.1–​278.8

Cauca and Nariño

97.9–​130.4

Nariño, Chocó, La Guajira, Arauca, Antioquia, Cauca, and Putumayo

10.5–​14.0

Valle del Cauca

6.6–​97.8

Valle del Cauca, Boyacá, Cesar, Vichada and Bogotá, D.C.

7.1–​10.4

Rest of departments except Quindío and Amazonas

1–​7

Putumayo, Caquetá, 3.3–​6.5 Tolima, Chocó, Córdoba, Sucre, Bolívar, Atlántico, Santander, Norte de Santander Remaining Departments

1–​3.2

Source: Adapted from MRE, 2019; APC, 2019

International Cooperation (20.01 per cent of all the components); and the Framework Plan for Implementation of Peace Agreement (PMI) (39.3 per cent of international cooperation). The departments with the highest percentage in cooperation funds (first tier) for all these frameworks were Antioquia, Caquetá, Norte de Santander, Meta, Nariño and Cauca. Regarding the PMI, the component of rural reform received 23.87 per cent of cooperation and the departments with the highest percentage of cooperation were Antioquia and Meta. This was followed by victim redress (5.96 per cent), mainly in Meta, Caquetá and Norte de Santander; political participation (3.95 per cent), mostly in Valle del Cauca; end of conflict (2.19 per cent), mainly in Antioquia, Meta and Cauca; illegal drugs (1,72 per cent), mainly in Cauca; and implementation of the peace agreement (1.63 per cent), mainly in Nariño, Cauca, Valle del Cauca and Chocó (APC, 2020). In that sense, the administration of Ivan Duque managed to diversify, to an extent, the departmental budgetary emphasis of overall cooperation of the previous government that had been on Antioquia, Meta, Cauca, Nariño and Valle del Cauca, by including Norte de Santander and Choco. Nevertheless, overall funding was less for all these departments in comparison with the previous government. By 2019, the new government defined five areas for international cooperation: territorial stabilization, which included reintegration 69

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of ex-​combatants, substitution of illicit crops, PDET and a national multipurpose cadastre system; rural development; environmental sustainability; entrepreneurship and productivity; and tackling the migration crisis from Venezuela. However, APC reported that only 43.7 per cent of international cooperation destined to support the peace process was in fact directed to PDET zones. Prioritized subregions included Montes de María region (Bolívar), Caguán Basin and Caquetá foothills (Caquetá), Macarena (Guaviare) and the pacific and Nariño frontier (APC, 2019, 2020; MRE, 2019). Overall, APC’s analysis of international cooperation’s alignment with different governmental frameworks during 2018 and 2019 (APC, 2020) shows that peacebuilding decreased as a governmental priority in comparison with the previous administration. Emphases were placed on inequality reduction (39.33 per cent), followed by peace (16.52 per cent) in the alignment of international cooperation with UNDG; and similarly, equality (38.96 per cent), followed by peacebuilding (27.13 per cent) in relation to the National Development Plan. Regarding the National Strategy of International Cooperation, most of the funds were aligned to the migration phenomenon from Venezuela (38.25 per cent), followed by peace and territorial stabilization (20.01 per cent). The Office of the Comptroller General (Contraloría General de la Nación, 2019) reported that, although international funding was maintained between 2017 and 2018 in the Duque administration’s National Development Plan, these resources were not channelled through Fund Colombia in Peace, which had been created initially for this purpose. Moreover, according to the report, territorial governments felt that they were not consulted for those interventions –​traditionally focused on training programmes –​and that such programmes were developed in the most populated areas of municipalities where the local governments were based, targeting the same groups of population with the same thematic contents, which affected the sustainability of the programmes and their impact on governance in the long run. The following chapter describes the roles and agendas of the international actors explored regarding peacebuilding in Colombia.

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4

Peacebuilding Efforts in Colombia: Bilateral and Multilateral Cooperation This chapter summarizes how the USA, Canada, Sweden, UK, UN, EU, World Bank, IDB and MAPP/​OEA have been involved in peacebuilding efforts in Colombia. It starts by describing the cooperation agendas of the countries under evaluation, and then summarizes the multilateral efforts made through the post-​conflict multi-​trust funds set up to aid the transition to peace. In addition, the chapter explains the role of the MAPP/​OEA in monitoring and providing support to the peace process. The chapter points to relevant antecedents in the international actors’ cooperation agendas and outlines their priorities and agendas during the period studied. The chapter also reflects on how each actor privileged a particular approach to liberal peacebuilding.

The USA ‘Plan Colombia’ was implemented in the first decade of the 2000s by the Colombian government and US officials to strengthen the military for counter-​drug and counter-​insurgency purposes and, in a marginal proportion, to aid socio-​economic development. Since 2008, this has given way to a progressive nationalization and reduction of US assistance to pre-​ Plan Colombia levels.1 At the same time, the second decade of the 20th century saw a closer-​to 50/​50 balance between socio-​economic and military aid (Rojas, 2012; GMH, 2013; Beittel, 2012, 2017, 2019). The follow-​up to Plan Colombia, the National Consolidation Plan, was announced initially in 2007 by the Uribe administration and relaunched in

1

From US$700 million in 2008 to US$556 million in 2011 (Beittel, 2012). 71

Shaping Peacebuilding in Colombia

2010 by the Santos administration (as the National Plan for Consolidation and Territorial Reconstruction). The plan combined provision of security, counter-​narcotics, institutionalization or strengthening of state institutions and provision, and development in vulnerable areas where violence converged with the presence of illegal groups and drug trafficking. The inter-​agency programme Colombia Strategic Development Initiative (CSDI), which included USAID, the US state and justice departments and the US Military Group, assisted with counter-​drug, military, police and justice strengthening as well as socio-​economic development in areas targeted for consolidation. In 2010, the USA also brought back a 1960s strategy called Peace Corps, facilitating US youngsters’ voluntary work in Colombia. In 2016, the USA was reported to be the main contributor to peacebuilding (47 per cent of the total), according to the Presidential Agency for Cooperation (Beittel, 2012, 2017, 2019; USAID, 2013; Rojas, 2013; APC, 2016). Funding for Colombia decreased from 2012 until 2017, and then increased until 2019 to support the peace agreement implementation.2 The Obama administration appointed peace envoy Bernie Aronson to the peace process and co-​sponsored the UN Verification Mission (UNSC Resolution 2261, 2016a). The USA participated in post-​conflict planning and transition through assistance in institutional strengthening, HR and provision for Afro-​Colombian and Indigenous populations and development. The Peace Colombia programme, introduced in 2016, focused on counter-​drug measures, institutional strengthening, security, DDR, attention for victims and development assistance. In addition, USA and Norway led the Global Demining Initiative for Colombia and were joined by the EU, Spain, Sweden, Slovenia, Canada, Argentina, Chile, Mexico, Uruguay, South Korea and Japan. At the same time, USAID priorities included supporting the transition to peace through institutional strengthening and accountability in rural areas; reconciliation among victims, ex-​combatants and citizens; inclusive rural economic growth and environmental resilience (Beittel, 2017, 2019; White House, 2016; USAID, 2014, 2020). 2017 was the first year of the implementation of the peace agreement and the first year of Donald Trump as US president, while presidential election campaigns were underway in Colombia. On 14 April 2017, a secret meeting was organized by Republican senator Marco Rubio (opposed to the peace agreement) between President Trump and former Colombian presidents Álvaro Uribe (Democratic Centre Party) and Andrés Pastrana

2

US Assistance for Colombia by the US State Department Foreign Aid Account decreased from US$379.1 million in 2012 to US$293.1 million in 2016 and then increased to US$384.3 million in 2017 to US$418.1 million in 2019 (Beittel, 2019). 72

Peacebuilding Efforts: Cooperation

(Conservative Party) in Mar-​a-​Lago, Florida. The meeting allowed the Colombian politicians to air their objections to the peace agreement and its reformist, governmental counter-​drug approach. This meeting took place before any official meeting had been held between President Santos and President Trump (Miles, 2017, Ordoñez and Kumar, 2017). Months later, President Trump threatened to decertify Colombia regarding counter-​drug efforts (Trump, 2017) and would, two years later, refer to President Duque as a ‘good guy’ who ‘has done nothing for us’ (White House, 2019). The US government pressed Colombia to return to aerial fumigation and requested extradition of members of FARC participating in the peace process, some as negotiators aspiring to political representation, including Raul Santrich3 (Borda Guzmán and Gómez, 2017; Office of National Drug Control Policy, 2019; Wintour and Gayle, 2019; Beittel, 2019; White House, 2020; US Department of Justice, 2018). Extra funds approved by US Congress during 2019 were justified in the light of counter-​drug and security enhancement in rural areas (Lowey, 2019). By 2019, the USA was the main contributor to the Pact for Peacebuilding in the Colombian National Development Plan, and the main contributor to the components of rural reform and the verification and endorsement of the Implementation Framework Plan (APC, 2020). Overall, the US agenda had a focus on the need to curb drug-​trafficking and the consolidation of the Colombian state in targeted areas of the country. While the arrival of President Barack Obama at the White House in 2009 had marked a more multilateral, supportive and balanced approach between coercive, socio-​economic, and humanitarian aid for Colombia, the Trump administration from 2017 returned to a greater emphasis by the executive on law enforcement and the war against drugs, to the detriment of FARC’s trust in the process. Following Richmond et al’s (2011) frameworks for liberal peacebuilding, the US approach tilted towards a more institutional model of liberal peacebuilding that enhanced top-​down security to create a liberal state with some elements of a more orthodox liberal peacebuilding model geared towards strengthening democratic institutions and governance frameworks. Similarly, for Agudelo Taborda and Riccardi (2019), US aid overall between 1998 and 2016 tilted more strongly towards a negative and liberal notion of peace in prioritizing the elimination of enemies of the Colombian state as well as its strengthening and liberal consolidation; a focus essentially maintained during the Obama and Trump administrations between 2016 and 2019.

3

The ‘wanted’ list included Raul Santrich, Marlon Marin, Armando Gómez (aka El doctor) and Fabio Simon Younes for drug-​trafficking charges. 73

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Canada According to the Embassy of Canada in Colombia, the country had been involved in development cooperation for 40 years, with C$40 million contributed per year on average and support of around 70 projects by 2020. During the first decade of the 2000s, Canada sold 33 military helicopters to the USA, which were redirected to Colombia (Canadian Dimension, 2001), established a defence attaché in 2001 to train Colombian military personnel, lobbied for the reform of the mining code in favour of foreign investors –​which was detrimental for artisanal and local miners –​and financed the liberalization of the telecoms sector, opposed by trade unionists who campaigned against it. Canada also signed a free trade agreement (FTA) with Colombia in 2008, and due to HR concerns, an agreement was signed in 2011 that required both countries to issue annual HR reports on measures under the FTA in both countries (Gordon, 2010; Pontón Deluquez, 2015; Government of Canada, 2019a, 2020). The stated emphases of Canada’s peacebuilding cooperation in Colombia during the 2010s were human rights, inequality and poverty in conflict-​ affected areas, and vulnerable populations, particularly women, children and Indigenous and Afro-​Colombian peoples. Official development assistance (ODA) for humanitarian purposes that had been given to Colombia since 2012, according to available statistical reports, increased from C$4.04 million in the financial year 2012/​13 to C$8.18 million in 2018/​19. Over the same period, bilateral ODA increased from C$31.68 million to C$71.77 million; multilateral ODA from C$3 million to C$25.56 million; and Canadian federal programmes and other official assistance from C$971.41k to C$2.77 million. At the same time, the Colombian government reported Canada as the second-​highest contributor to peace in 2016, the second contributor to the rural development component of the Implementation Framework Plan in 2019, and a top contributor to the UN Trust Fund for Post-​Conflict (DFATD, 2013, 2014, 2015b, 2016b, 2017b, 2018b, 2019b; APC, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020). Canadian international assistance through Global Affairs Canada included four relevant components: first, the Bilateral Development Programme, focused on children’s education, income generation for women and natural resources management; second, humanitarian assistance, centred on political support,4 and high-​level HR consultations with government, civil society

4

Canada held the presidency of the G24 subgroup on HR in Colombia until 2014, and afterwards co-​chair of the subgroup on HR of the donors’ groups in Colombia, chair of the International Cooperation Gender Roundtable in Colombia. The G24 is a group of countries promoting HR in Colombia. 74

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and international humanitarian agencies; third, the Peace and Stabilization Operations Programme (since 2005), aimed at assisting HR, transitional justice, mine clearance, security-​sector reform, the Women Peace and Security Agenda and the UN multi-​fund; fourth, the Anti-​Crime Capacity Building Programme (since 2009) to fight against illicit drugs and people trafficking, as well as support for UNODC and OEA work in this area (Government of Canada, nd, 2019a, 2020). During the first term of the Santos administration, Canada’s ODA to Colombia included supporting, along with UNDP, young people’s employability and entrepreneurial skills in areas affected by conflict. Assistance was also given for reporting HR violations and advocacy work for the Colombian state’s reparations of HR victims, and funding for local initiatives on strengthening the rule of law and transitional justice. In addition, since 2014, Canada had assisted rural cooperatives and financial institutions in conflict areas (DFATD, 2015a, 2017a). During Santos’ second term, the Canadian government invested an estimated C$85,078,113 in 15 projects (Government of Canada, nd), including generation of knowledge on GBV, access to justice by Indigenous and female peasant farmers and peace transitions in alliance with research institutes and think tanks such as the Institute for Integrated Transitions and Fundación Ideas para la Paz. It provided training for HR defenders including children, women in mining and agricultural communities, and the National Commission of Indigenous Women in Colombia (CONAMIC), in alliance with NGOs including Equitas, United Church Canada and Conciliation Resources. Canada also supported access to education and a gender-​sensitive curriculum in conflict areas, entrepreneurship for rural women, and humanitarian assistance to victims. The country assisted transitional mechanisms including SIVJRNR, and the National Centre for Historic Memory (CNMH) in the establishment of the truth commission (with UNDP), as well as the training of Colombian officials in compensating children (with NGO Plan International Canada). Support for security was reflected in: de-​m ining activities (with OAS and the Halo Trust); technical assistance to the Colombian government in the management of natural resources, the extractive sectors and community consultation and relations (with the Canadian development consultancy Alinea); support for the national army transition to a post-​conflict scenario (with the Network of Security and Defence of Latin America); and the funding of voluntary counsellors to increase legal community capacity to protect HR (with Lawyers without Borders Canada). Finally, multilateral support was given to the international electoral observation mission for the October 2016 plebiscite; two police officers for the UN mission in Colombia to monitor the implementation of the peace agreement; and contributions to the 75

Shaping Peacebuilding in Colombia

UN multi-​partner trust fund with IOM and MAPP/​OEA (Government of Canada, nd; DFATD, 2016a, 2017a, 2018a). In the transition between the Santos and Duque administrations, Canada’s ODA for 2018/​19 continued to prioritize rural development, leadership and education for women and young people in post-​conflict areas; the implementation of UNSC Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (with the Global Network of Women Peacebuilders) and support to the UN multi-​partner trust fund in DDR, transitional justice for victims (women, children and LGTB communities), and anti-​personnel-​mine clearance, with six projects at an estimated value of C$6,981,868. Partners for projects included the International Centre for Transitional Justice, Pembroke College, UNICEF, UNDP and Inter Pares (DFATD, 2019a; Government of Canada, nd). Canada’s reported cooperation privileged the protection of the civil and economic rights of vulnerable sections of society, particularly women and children (Feminist International Assistance Policy). At the same time, it focused on strengthening political and economic inclusion of marginalized groups, gender-​sensitive security and justice provision and a multilateral system with the ability to address peace and security challenges (Government of Canada, 2022) including Sexual Gender Violence (SGV) and mine-​ clearance. Canada’s peacebuilding was essentially in line with UN frameworks and transformation to a more pragmatic, bottom-​up and encompassing approach to peacebuilding by the second part of the 2010s, while maintaining elements of a constitutional model of peacebuilding (Richmond et al, 2011). Accordingly, the country assisted with democratic and governance structures, consensus at elite level and security provision, while being sensitive to local ownership, participation and justice (the latter closer to a civil peace model). Given the history of economic interests in market liberalization, access to Colombian resources during the 21st century (particularly mining), the signing of the FTA, and the backlash of anti-​neoliberal and community movements against those interests on account of HR abuses and forced displacements (Gordon, 2010), peacebuilding and human rights support could be interpreted as at least partly reactive to the violence generated by Canadian investment in market development.

Sweden Between 2003 and 2013, Sweden prioritized the promotion of a ‘broad-​ based peace … to address the causes of the conflict and build sustainable peace’ (MFA, 2002, p 4). The country channelled financial and technical cooperation through Swedish and Colombian NGOs, the Church, the Ombudsman’s Office, media outlets and, internationally, through the UN system, MAPP/​OEA, EU, IDB and World Bank. Cooperation areas included 76

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socio-​economic and political inclusion, including in peace negotiations; strengthening of the rule of law, democracy, good governance; humanitarian action and the promotion of HR and International Humanitarian Law in vulnerable populations affected by the conflict (MFA, 2002, 2009). According to the Colombian government, Sweden was among the top five contributors for peacebuilding in 2016 and 2018, the second main contributor to the Implementation Framework Plan, and the main contributor, along with the World Bank, to its post-​conflict multi-​ fund (APC, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020). According to the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA, 2020), Sweden had provided about US$30.37 million to Colombia by 2019 (0.54 per cent of the total aid given by Sweden internationally). The largest Swedish agency providing aid was SIDA (US$28.24 million), and most of the aid was focused in the sector of civilian peacebuilding, conflict prevention and resolution (US$8.04 million). Between 1998 and 2009, Sweden provided approximately US$151.73 million in aid, and between 2010 and 2020, its contributions amounted to US$342.16 million (SIDA, 2020).5 Specific projects6 during the Santos presidency and before the signing of the peace agreement with FARC on civilian peacebuilding (2010–​2015), conflict prevention and resolution in Colombia entailed support from Swedish and Colombian NGOs and grassroots organizations, international organizations such as MAPP/​OEA, the UN and the World Bank, the Colombian Ombudsman’s Office, the National Commission for Reparation and Reconciliation in Colombia, and local media, including El Malpensante magazine. Areas of cooperation included evaluation and research regarding peacebuilding policies, support for negotiations with FARC and DDR; and strengthening transitional justice, land restitution legal support, victim redress, and vocational training for young victims of the conflict. In addition, Sweden worked towards strengthening civil society organizations, offered training in women’s participation in peace processes (following UNSC Resolution 1325), facilitated regional meetings for territorial peacebuilding, promoted reconciliation and peace culture among young people and businesses’ contribution to peace through the ‘Emprender Paz Award’ (SIDA, 2020). Between 2016 and 2020, Sweden projected a budget of SEK950 million to support implementation of the peace agreement. It provided SEK920 million through SIDA to support ‘sustainable peace and human security’ including

5

6

SIDA’s aid increased from US$25.21 million in 2010 to US$38.07 million in 2014. In 2015, SIDA’s aid increased from US$26.11 million to US$35.18 million in 2017, and then decreased to US$30.37 million in 2019 and US$25.59 million in 2020 (SIDA, 2020). SIDA Openaid database reported 38 ongoing activities in 2010, 19 in 2011, 13 in 2012, 18 in 2013, 14 in 2014, and 13 in 2015 (SIDA, 2020). 77

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social dialogue, HR, transitional justice, sustainable economic development, public services provision, prevention of gender-​b ased violence and promotion of women and young people’s participation in the peace process. Meanwhile, a provision of SEK30 million was made through the Folke Bernadotte Academy to enhance women’s participation in the peace process, strengthening conflict prevention and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) among civil society and public institutions, and improving the security sector’s respect for the rule of law, gender equality and HR. Overall, Sweden promoted environmental, peaceful, democratic and gender-​equality-​driven development, favouring the most marginalized populations in the country ‘through active participation in the EU’s aid coordination.’ In addition, development aid assisted peace negotiations between the government and ELN left-​wing guerrillas, and helped to enable the participation of women and marginal groups in the peace process (MFA, 2016; SIDA, 2017a, 2018). Specific projects7 between 2016 and 2019 on civilian peacebuilding, conflict prevention and resolution in Colombia involved contributions to international and local partners8 for local peacebuilding, including: a) observation of DDR; b) support for civil-​society-​led peace by strengthening participation and regional meetings for territorial peacebuilding, and training on the implementation of UNSC Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security; c) start-​ups and seed-​capital investments in conflict regions (Peace Fund) as well as strengthening of business development (Facility Hub) and peace (Emprender Paz Price) capacities; and d) legal support for land restitution, the SIVJRNR system and vocational education for young victims of the conflict (SIDA, 2020). This vision was maintained between 2017 and 2022, and included conflict prevention and resolution; human security; empowerment and inclusion of women, children, youth and other marginalized groups; sustainable state-​building and peacebuilding (MFA, 2017a). Overall, Sweden privileged a multilateral endeavour that supported not only global governance structures but also civil-​society organizations in Sweden and Colombia that were involved in peace. Sweden was in line with a notion of civil peace in privileging bottom-​up approaches, social

7

8

SIDA’s Openaid database reported 24 ongoing activities in 2016, 18 in 2017, 16 in 2018, and 12 in 2019 (SIDA, 2020). International partners included: the UN Multi-​Partner Trust Fund, UN resident coordination office, UN Mission in Colombia, UN Verification Mission in Colombia, World Bank Multi-​Donor Trust, UNDP, IOM, MAPP/​OEA, Church of Sweden, Kristna Fredsrörelsen, Folke Bernadotte Academy and Diakonia. Locally, Sweden supported organizations such as the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace, Fundación Ideas para la Paz and Asociación Nacional de Usuarios Campesinos. 78

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welfare and justice (Richmond et al, 2011), by tackling HR and inclusion of marginalized groups, using a broad-​based political dialogue, support for transitional justice, DDR and sustainable development as structural conditions to overcome cycles of violence, in line with the pragmatic turn of the UN during the second part of the 21the century (De Coning, 2018).

The United Kingdom British Foreign Policy towards South and Central America pursued greater engagement in the region during the second decade of 2010 in the context of what was called the ‘Canning Agenda’. Before then, Britain had ended military aid to Colombia (which had increased from £120,000 in 2003/​ 04 to £190,000 in 2007/​08) in 2009 due to HR concerns linked to the Colombian military. The aid had provided military hardware, intelligence, counter-​narcotic and counter-​insurgency support, as well as de-​mining and training for the army (Pallister et al, 2003; Brodzinksy, 2009; House of Commons, 2008). Before Brexit, those relations were, to a great extent, mediated by the EU, but after leaving the EU, Britain was guided by its goal of establishing a ‘Global Britain’ (Mills, 2018). The UK was among the top contributors for peacebuilding in 2016, and, by 2019, was one of the top two contributors of political participation in the Implementation Framework Plan. In addition, from 2016 to 2020, the UK was among the top contributors towards the UN and IDB post-​conflict multi-​funds (APC, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020). The UK’s Foreign Office (FCO) reported that, between 2010 and 2014, the UK Embassy work focused on the creation of a national policy on HR and a HR centre in Colombia. As president of the G24 HR group, the UK supported the strengthening of protection of HR organizations and defenders and Afro-​Colombian and Indigenous communities as president of the G24 HR group9. The UK worked on the implementation of the 2012 Preventing Sexual Violence Initiative (PSVI). It also supported the engagement of businesses with HR in the context of the FTA negotiated between Andean countries and the EU in 2010 (signed in 2012) through the implementation of UN Guiding Principles on Businesses and HR in Colombia. The UK, along with the Norwegian Refugee Council and OEA, assisted the state response to internally displaced populations (IDPs) and their capacity to defend their rights to land and justice. The UK was also active in the defence of freedom of expression through support for journalists, for example. It supported the Association for the Prevention of Torture and

9

The G24 is a group of countries promoting HR in Colombia, including the UK (FCO, 2014, p 180) 79

Shaping Peacebuilding in Colombia

worked with the UN towards the prevention of child recruitment to armed groups. In addition, the UK promoted free and fair elections through support for the elaboration-​of-​r isks maps used to detect electoral irregularities by the Electoral Observation Mission (FCO, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015). From 2015 onwards, the UK set up various funds for Colombia, including the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF) and the Human Rights Fund (HRF). The CSSF provided more than US$50.9 million between 2015 and 2019 to support sustainable peace, including: a) authoring the mandate of the UN mission for the peace process at the UN Security Council; b) access to economic opportunity, security and justice in conflict-​affected territories; c) support to the Rapid Response Plan, the Implementation Framework Plan, and the Special Jurisdiction for Peace, including projects for the reconstruction of rural areas affected by armed conflict, anti-​personnel-​mine clearance, and support to victims through UN and EU trust fund contributions; and d) promotion of knowledge exchanges regarding post-​conflict transformation in Northern Ireland. Meanwhile, the HRF provided approximately US$2.6 million between 2018 and 2020 for: a) legal assistance and protection measures against violence for HR defenders and communities; b) prevention of sexual violence, access to justice, countering gender stereotypes, and healthcare for victims; c) research on modern slavery in the region; and d) promotion of girls’ education and ‘enrolment in non-​traditional professions’ (British Embassy Colombia, 2019, p 13). Projects during the second Santos term continued; first, in tackling violence against ex-​combatants, human-​r ights defenders and social leaders through work with the EU and the UN, a media campaign, training for HR defenders in advocacy and self-​protection, monitoring cases of violence, and promoting strengthening of the state response and coordination, including the Attorney General’s Office and the security sector through the CSSF. Second, the UK promoted the Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict Initiative (PSVI) by creating a network of victims and professionals across five regions in 2015; working with the state and civil society sectors to counter stigma over the victims, report cases and pursue justice; and assisting the Colombian government in justice and protection measures through socializing the International Protocol to End Sexual Violence in Conflict and funding UN experts through CSSF. Third, the UK funded the creation of a governmental national action plan on business and HR for ‘mining and energy sectors’, published in 2015, whose implementation from 2016 was to tackle illegal mining and encourage companies to use legitimate processes to address the counterproductive local effects of their activities. At the same time, it funded a project, which ended in 2018, to engage the private sector in truth and transitional justice. In addition, the UK supported the EU Conflict Minerals Regulation in 2017 to prevent imports of materials 80

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extracted from conflict zones (FCO, 2016a, 2017a, 2018a, 2019a; CSSF et al, 2018, 2019; HM Government, 2017). Regarding the support for the peace process and its implementation, the CSSF reported multilateral contributions of £10.33 million in 2018 and £6.1 million in 2019. The UK contributed to the UN and EU post-​ conflict trust funds (ODA £4.11 million in the 2017/​18). The UK also supported proposals for the suspension of FARC from the EU list of terrorists’ organizations and contributed to the UNSC Special Political Mission on peacebuilding in Colombia and the Peacebuilding Fund. Assistance aimed at strengthening state capacity in the peace process and its implementation was given by a) supporting governmental communications to inform about the state of negotiations; b) promoting reform of the police and the army; c) strengthening the rule of law in areas previously controlled by FARC; d) strengthening protection and capacity-​building for ex-​combatants and HR defenders; e) supporting national and local development plans through the enhancement of community participation; f) increasing access for victims to the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP) and the Truth Commission; g) countering deforestation in conflict-​affected areas through a project involving ex-​combatants in eco-​tourism and sustainable farming; and h) supporting crop-​substitution initiatives. Regarding reconciliation, the UK promoted workshops in reconciliation initiatives and HR with civil society and faith groups, legislators, and Northern Irish political party representatives; as well as meetings between ex-​combatants and communities (FCO, 2016a, 2017a; 2018a, 2019a; HM Government, 2017; 2018, 2019; CSSF et al, 2017, 2018, 2019). The UK’s overall approach to peace was framed in the UN development goal of promoting just, peaceful and inclusive societies. According to the Independent Commission for Aid Impact, although the UK did not use ‘peacebuilding’ as an operational term, programmes have been aimed at tackling drivers of conflict and close to UNSC Resolution 2282 of 2016, defining peacebuilding as a goal and a political process aimed at building a common vision of society, taking into account the needs of segments of the population and preventing outbreak, escalation, continuation and recurrence of conflict using a range of political, HR and development programmes and mechanisms (ICAI, 2022). Such orientation was also multilateral, aimed at strengthening state peacebuilding and transitional justice mechanisms and civil society participation in them, HR protection for vulnerable populations, prevention of GBV, and improving businesses HR standards. Regarding the latter, it maintained features of a constitutional peace in promoting a partly top-​down, partly bottom-​up liberal peacebuilding that enhanced state structures and capabilities for the transitioning to post-​conflict, at the same time as enabling civil ownership in the enhancement of those structures (Richmond et al, 2011). 81

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The EU and the Trust Fund for Post-​Conflict The European Union’s peacebuilding efforts in Colombia began during the failed peace process between the government and FARC at the end of 1990s, focusing on supporting the civilian population, alternative development, human rights and IHL, and a resolution of the armed conflict through the Peace Laboratories (2002–​2012). These emerged from the rejection of Plan Colombia and its militaristic emphasis, and instead channelled ODA to the Colombian government and civil society organizations in support of civilian-​led programmes of development and peace in strategic regions affected by armed conflict. Between 2002 and 2007, the European Union invested €1.5 billion in the stated goal of tackling the root causes and humanitarian consequences of conflict and in fostering trade. Alternative development, governance, HR, citizen participation, victims’ rights, and trade were prioritized during this time and also in the 2007–​2013 strategy for Colombia (Gómez Quintero, 2007; Moreno, 2009; Cano Linares, 2013; Barreto Henriques, 2014; García, 2015a, 2015b; European Commission, 2007, 2011, 2016a and b, 2018; Castañeda, 2017). The 2014–​2017 Multiannual Indicative Programme for Colombia aimed at ‘phasing out bilateral cooperation in the country under the Development Cooperation Instrument’, thus ‘consolidating results from previous interventions’ (EEAS and EC, 2014, p 1). The main areas were local development and institution-​building (€53.6 million, equivalent to 80 per cent of the budget) to close the cycle of peace laboratories and successor programmes by transferring implementation to (local) government public planning and policy in conjunction with civil society. In addition, was sustainable trade and investment, which, in conjunction with the FTA signed with Colombia in 2013, sought to strengthen standards in labour, sustainable production, corporate social responsibility, policy, infrastructure and the development of the private sector (€10 million, 15 per cent). The European Commission (2016a and b) reported support operations for ‘rural development policy’ (€70 million), ‘local sustainable development’ (€20 million) and ‘regional competitiveness’ (€30 million) between 2012 and 2016. Regarding the peace process, political support materialized in the appointment of Eamon Gilmore as peace envoy in 2015, who met regularly with Colombian stakeholders. Areas of cooperation included rehabilitation of ex-​combatants, rural reform and a special investigation unit for the Office of the Attorney General against organized crime. At the same time, the EU contributed to national programmes of rural development by the ministries of agriculture, environment and trade; the Instrument for Stability and Peace (IcSP) for rapid-​response programmes; de​mining; education for the armed forces on peace; demobilization of children; access to justice at local level; and the European Trust Fund for Post-​Conflict (European Commission, 2018). 82

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Between 2016 and 2019, the EU, particularly its Trust Fund for Post-​ Conflict, was consistently reported among the top peacebuilding donors in Colombia. The Trust Fund (begun in 2016) was devised as a tool by the Development Cooperation Instrument to support the implementation of the peace agreement, post-​conflict stabilization and rural development in Colombia (European Commission, 2016b, 2018; EU, nd, 2017a and b). Although the initial expectation for the fund was €300 million, its budget increased from €86.475.519 in 2017 to €117.9 million in 2019, with seven projects approved in 2017, 14 in 2018 and six in 2019. The areas covered by the projects included rural development (technical assistance, productivity, income-​generation and resilience) and reincorporation of ex-​combatants, with a transversal focus on gender and HR. Specifically, support was provided for sustainable local development, organizations helping producers and women with income-​generation, initiatives between public and private sectors, formalization of land, green growth, food security, administrative strengthening of the state in local areas, civil participation (particularly women) in governance, and socio-​economic support for reincorporation considering aspects such as gender, ethnic background, and disabilities (APC, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020; EU, 2017a and b, 2020). In 2016, 2018 and 2019, the EU and the EU Trust Fund were reported by the Colombian government as among the main contributors for peacebuilding (APC, 2016, 2018, 2020). The EU focused on political support for the peace process, and the Trust Fund for facilitating the implementation of the agreement, particularly in aspects related to institutional strengthening and rural development (in line with the first point of the peace agreement). For Richmond et al (2011, pp 450–​452), the EU ‘follows the UN liberal peacebuilding/​state building project as outlined in Agenda for Peace, the Millennium Development Goals, Responsibility to Protect and the High-​ Level Panel Report’ and a third-​generation liberal peacebuilding framework ‘in which the Westphalian sovereign state, security, rights, the market and the rule of law are priorities.’ From a critical perspective, Agudelo Taborda and Riccardi (2019) have pointed out that the model has not fundamentally challenged the international reliance of Colombia on primary goods and cheap labour, nor affected sectors of the FTA including rural farmers and Black and Indigenous populations –​whose victimization and forced displacement has been driven by, among others, the interests of European transnational mining, energy and agro-​industrial companies over their territories.

The United Nations As proposed by various authors (Cepeda Ulloa, 2012; Bouvier, 2012; Fawcett, 2012), the first decade of the 21st century marked uneasy relations between the Colombian government and the UN. The UN appointed a 83

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Special Adviser to the Secretary General for International Assistance to Colombia in 1999, Jan Egeland. With an informal mandate, he advocated for a political solution of the conflict. Unfortunately, his work was done in a context marked by increasing distrust and escalation of hostilities between the Colombian government and left-​wing guerrillas, as well as mutual criticism between the Colombian government and the UN in Colombia. Although there were UN programmes and agencies operating in the country, the UN was not formally invited to participate in the peace processes with the guerrillas, led by Andrés Pastrana, until two weeks before the definitive end of the dialogues with FARC. In the 2000s, the government of Álvaro Uribe did not recognize the existence of the armed conflict, instead embarking on an anti-​terrorist campaign, and the UN declined to participate in the peace process between the Colombian government and right-​wing paramilitaries under the umbrella of United Self-​Defences of Colombia (AUC), making its role in Colombia limited during that decade. The UN system in Colombia between 2008 and 2014 prioritized socio-​ economic and sustainable development, strengthening of democratic institutions, and peace, allocating US$123,967,063 towards these aims. Specifically, the UN reported work with national and international actors on development and peace programmes and peace laboratories, as well as support for local reconciliation, transitional justice, peace processes, coordination of humanitarian aid, and work on conflict-​driven recruitment of children, land mines, sexual violence, and gender issues. Agencies present in Colombia included UNICEF, UNDP, UNODC, OCHA, WFP, IOM, UNIFEM, UNHCR, UN-​Habitat, and OHCHR (UN System Colombia, 2007). The agreed framework for UN assistance between 2015 and 2019 focused on peacebuilding and sustainable development in collaboration with the government and civil society, prioritizing regions with marginalized populations and seeking coordination at local, departmental and national levels. The framework coincided with the 2015 report of the advisory group of experts on the UN’s Peacebuilding Architecture (Rosenthal, 2015) who recommended a notion of ‘sustaining peace’ at the core of the UN work, encompassing prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, post-​conflict recovery and reconstruction. Under the pillars of peace, development, and HR, peacebuilding was aimed at prevention of conflict and relapsing to conflict, reconciliation and a common vision of society by fostering an ‘inclusive national ownership’ across all levels of society, and with a gender perspective through the implementation of UNSC Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security. This vision of sustaining peace was endorsed by Resolutions A/​RES/​70/​262 and S/​RES/​2282 of 2016 and subsequent Secretary General reports on peacebuilding and sustaining peace that called for greater coherence, complementarity and flexibility in intergovernmental support while maintaining a gender focus (UNGA, 2016; UNSC, 2016a; 84

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UN Secretary General, 2018, 2019). De Coning (2018) described this turn as part of a broader global trend towards an adaptative move from liberal interventionism and externally driven peacebuilding to a more pragmatic (multipolar) peacebuilding approach based on nurturing countries’ socio-​ political capacities and cohesion to sustain peace. In support of the request made to the UN by the Colombian government and FARC in 2016 to establish an observer mission for the implementation of the peace agreement, the UNSC adopted Resolution 2261 of 25 January 2016 to establish a political mission for the ‘monitoring and verification of the laying down of arms, and a part of the tripartite mechanism that will monitor and verify the definitive bilateral ceasefire and cessation of hostilities.’ The UN Verification Mission was extended every year between 2016 and 2019 and presented trimestral reports on the state of the implementation of the peace agreement and the UN mission work. In addition, the UNSC also adopted Resolution 2381 on 5 October 2017 (UNSC, 2017) to ‘participate as the international component and coordinator of a monitoring and verification mechanism’ of the ceasefire agreed between ELN and the Colombian government. The coordination was requested by both parties on 29 September 2017, but was part of the failed peace process attempted with that guerrilla group. The expected results of UN intervention in Colombia included: first, the reduction in violence through supporting the Colombian government in peace pedagogy programmes with the participation of young people, women, Afro-​C olombian and Indigenous groups; greater access to municipal, restorative and transitional justice; and alternatives to illicit crops; second, the strengthening of inclusive governance through civil-​ society participation in socio-​economic development planning at local level, transparent elections, strengthening of local governments’ efficiency and accountability, as well as the national system of HR for the provision of community services; third, the strengthening of local and national capacities for the transition to peace and implementation of peace accords through support in the design and implementation of national mechanisms for peace, stabilization and women’s participation, and institutional strengthening for such implementation; fourth, the re-​establishment of rights for victims and support for land restitution through overcoming the vulnerability of this population, support for SIVJRNR processes and land restitution attending to cultural, gender, ethnic and age differences (República de Colombia and Naciones Unidas, 2015). Initially, the UN estimated a total of US$634,432,501 for peacebuilding in Colombia. The Trust Fund for Post-​Conflict was launched in February 2016 and mobilized a total of US$87,029,345 in its first phase (2016–​2018) and US$39,018,709 in its second phase (2018–​2022) by December 2019 (APC, 2019; Appendix 2), shorter than initial expectations. The overall 85

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top contributors to the fund, between 2016 and 2019, in descending order, were the UK, Norway, Germany, the Fund for the Consolidation of Peace, Canada and Sweden (ONU, 2019a). In the first phase of the Trust Fund, 24 projects were approved in 2016, and 25 projects in 2017, in 345 conflict-​affected municipalities. The funds supported the socialization of the peace agreement with the private sector and different civil society groups as well as the improvement of citizens’ perception of the state and security provision. Funds also assisted the creation of the institutional infrastructure for the implementation of the peace agreement, which included international verification of the agreement along with national institutions of implementation including the SIVJRNR, JEP and the commission for the verification of the agreement implementation (CSIVI). In relation to victims, assistance was aimed at improving access to justice, redress and participation of women and victims in peacebuilding. The Trust Fund supported ex-​combatants’ socio-​economic inclusion in territories through de-​mining and productive initiatives. In addition, assistance covered socio-​economic, infrastructure and institutional reconstruction of territories (APC, 2018, 2019; ONU, 2016a, 2017a, 2018a, 2019a). By December 2018, the fund had carried out projects in 379 municipalities, and the government and UN agreed to mobilize a second phase of the Trust Fund from 2020 to 2022 (a total of US$61.1 million). In 2019, the fund contributed to 21 projects in peacebuilding (US$11.7 million) and sustainable development (US$4.3 million), completing 130 projects in 423 municipalities. It supported high-​r isk investments in PDET municipalities and neighbouring areas of reincorporation of ex-​combatants in seven regions affected by conflict and poverty. Accordingly, projects focused on socio-​ economic and political reincorporation of ex-​combatants, participation of women and civil society in SIVJRNR, de​mining, institutional strengthening and stabilization and communication of the stabilization process aimed at reconciliation. In 2018 and 2019, the UN Trust Fund was reported by the Colombian government as a top contributor of peacebuilding (APC, 2018, 2019, 2020; ONU, 2018a, 2019a).

The World Bank The World Bank, between 2010 and 2014, prioritized the promotion of measures to protect the assets of displaced people (IDPs) and inform land-​restitution policy, including Law 1448. This line of work generated information systems about IDP assets; the training of more than 2,000 officials nationally and locally in protection measures and registering rural land; and the generation of 50 publications on forced displacement and protection of land. By 2012, the World Bank reported three grants from the Peace and Conflict Fund and one from its successor after 2012, the State and 86

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Peacebuilding Fund, for analysis of land reform and sustainable management of extractive industries. By 2014, the stated priorities were strengthening the capacity for planning and carrying out rapid early interventions and technical assistance to the institutions created for implementing the peace agreement, as well as land reform, collective reparations and land restitution for IDP within the framework of the Law for Victims and Land Restitution (World Bank, 2010, 2011, 2013, 2014). The World Bank Trust Fund for Peace and Post-​Conflict (2014–​2020) mobilized a total of US$7,100,000 by 2019. It also received contributions from the Embassy of Sweden, aiming at improving access to information, global experiences, and financing for post-​conflict in areas such as collective redress for victims, social infrastructure and DDR programmes. The fund, under the umbrella of the State and Peacebuilding Fund (SPF), aimed at ‘supporting the peace process and victims’ reparation in Colombia’ (APC, 2015, 2016, 2018, 2019; World Bank, 2016). Specifically in 2015, the World Bank reported US$4 million from the SPF to protect IDP assets and land restitution and reform, for collective reparations, strengthening knowledge services and institutional capacity for post-​conflict planning as well as rapid-​impact projects in municipalities. During 2016, the fund continued its focus on strengthening capacities at national and local level for collective reparations, economic compensation, land restitution, reconciliation, and non-​repetition guarantees. It also provided technical assistance for a cadastre to map IDP and generate a rapid response to planning and stabilization post conflict, as well as knowledge generation geared towards protecting IDPs’ land and assets, through seminars and reporting to the constitutional court (World Bank, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2019). In 2017, the Presidential Agency for Cooperation (APC) reported a project of collective redress carried out through the Unit for the Attention and Comprehensive Reparation of Victims. The following year, the World Bank received an extra US$600,000 from the Swiss government (for a total of US$7,100,000 registered resources) to advance land registry and achieve the implementation of 69 collective redress measures of social reconstruction. The organization also piloted a project in 2018 to analyse contracts in extractive industries and designed guidance notes to prevent conflict with communities through a participatory process. In addition, grants assisted the country in analysing, designing policy and strengthening the institutional framework to tackle, in a coordinated fashion, the increase in migration from Venezuela from 2018 to 2020, which ‘constitute[d]‌important stressors for fragility and violence, given the context of inequality, vulnerability and exclusion that already exists in these areas.’ (World Bank, 2019 p 16) By 2019, the fund reported US$360,000 and it was extended until 30 September 2020. In 2019, the government reported the IDB’s ‘Sustainable Colombia’ 87

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fund as a top contributor in the tackling illegal drugs component of the Framework Plan of Implementation of the Peace Agreement (World Bank, 2018; APC, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020). Overall, for the World Bank, ‘preventing fragility, conflict and violence is central to reducing poverty and achieving shared prosperity’ (World Bank and UN, 2018, p xi), so peacebuilding ‘seeks to develop the socio-​economic conditions that foster peaceful, stable and sustainable development’ (World Bank, 2016, p 20). The World Bank was in line with the UN’s ‘sustaining peace’ agenda and conflict prevention and in fostering development for peace at the same time as making peace a pre-​condition of development through the mapping and protection of IDP assets and redress. In terms of the support offered to Colombia, the World Bank seems closer to a constitutional model of liberal peace, in that the weight was placed in improving institutional capacity for victims’ redress and land governance within a democratic framework in a consensual fashion (Richmond et al, 2011).

The Inter-​American Development Bank The IDB trust fund ‘Sustainable Colombia’ (planned for 2017 to 2032) mobilized US$19,658,355 paid out in 2018 and US$17,228,209 available in 2019. It was aimed at supporting projects to promote environmentally sustainable rural development and local capacities in line with the sustainable development goals (SDGs) in 170 municipalities affected by conflict and rich in biodiversity, with contributions mainly from Norway, Sweden and Switzerland. The IDB fund formalized the first projects of technical cooperation in 2018 for US$7,040,000 (APC, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, IDB, 2018; FCS, 2019). Specifically, the themes of the fund included climate-​change mitigation and adaptation, care for vulnerable populations, alternative development, rural infrastructure, land-​use planning, environmental services, recovery of mining and illicit crops areas, strengthening local institutions, national parks and protected areas, and promotion of ‘silvopastoral and agroforestry systems’ (Doherty-​Bigara, 2015, p 8). In 2019, APC reported the approval of the Annual Operative Plan for US$17.8 million. The reported beneficiaries were populations in 277 rural municipalities prioritized by the national government, with four projects in 2018 on emission reduction due to deforestation, monitoring of agricultural and silvo-​pastoral systems, restoration of ecosystems in the Serranía de la Macarena national park, and strengthening of forest governance. By 2019, projects included sustainable rural development and environmental conservation and strengthening of local capacity for management of projects and territorial innovation. At the same time, there were projected investments 88

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on institutional strengthening, Indigenous and Afro-​Colombian capacities as well as economic alternatives against deforestation (APC, 2019; FCS, 2019). Sustainable Colombia aimed to promote ‘environmental and socio-​ economic sustainability with an emphasis on municipalities affected by the armed conflict’ (IDB, 2019, p 8) and was embedded in the overall IDB strategy for 2019–​2022 of transforming Colombia into a high-​income country with social mobility (IDB, 2019). The IDB aligned with the UNDGs and aimed at economic development through tackling environmental degradation in conflict-​affected municipalities, with an emphasis on climate-​change mitigation and adaptation, restoration of ecosystems, forest governance, alternative development and environmental and economic rural planning. Accordingly, its support was closer to a liberal constitutional model of peacebuilding (Richmond et al, 2011) in terms of improving institutional capacity and environmental governance for sustainable development with consent and local ownership.

MAPP/​OEA The Mission of Support to the Peace Process (MAPP) in Colombia started its activities in 2004, thanks to an agreement between the Organization of American States (OAS/​OEA) and the Colombian government, which was materialized in Resolution CP/​RES.859 (1397/​04). Between 2004 and 2010, MAPP/​O EA, in coordination with the Inter-​A merican Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), monitored the peace process between the Colombian government and the right-​wing paramilitaries under the umbrella organization AUC, the exploratory talks between the government and the ELN guerrillas in 2005, and the DDR process of AUC and the Guevarist Revolutionary Army (ERG) guerrillas. MAPP/​ OEA also monitored the implementation of Law 975 (2005) to facilitate truth, justice and reparation for victims, including the incipient land restitution process as well as continued regional activities against the violence and insecurity by armed and criminal groups (MAPP/​OEA, 2019b and c). Between 2010 and 2019, the mission received support, not only from OAS member states, but also from countries including Sweden, Switzerland, Germany, Ireland, UK, France, Spain, Portugal, Norway, the Netherlands, Turkey, South Korea, Japan, Thailand, the EU and IOM. In 2010, the Santos government ratified the role of the Mission in monitoring and supporting the peace process in Colombia. During Santos’ first term, MAPP worked in consultation with IACHR. The Mission assisted: governmental restitution and formalization of land and protection of land claimants and victims under the Justice and Peace Law; the strengthening of DDR mechanisms and inter-​institutional coordination; the gathering of civil-​society input; and 89

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providing advice to state organisms in support for the Law for Victims and Land Restitution sanctioned in 2011 (MAPP/​OEA, 2019c and d). The mandate of MAPP/​OEA was extended by the Santos government in 2014 until January 2018. The Mission continued to work in consultation with the IACHR in monitoring community perceptions of insecurity, DDR and transitional justice mechanisms. With EU funding, MAPP/​OEA evaluated the development of the prioritized zones by the government in its peace policy and accompanied the National Panel on Guarantees for Human Rights Defenders and Social Community Leaders to establish an action plan to protect this population. In relation to DDR, the Mission helped the Attorney General’s Office to increase legal security in prosecutions of illegal armed groups, potential collective prosecutions and referral to reincorporation. It also supported the Ministry of Interior in institutional support for former prisoners and their return to their territories under the Justice and Peace Law. MAPP/​OEA supported Indigenous tribes’ initiatives to build care plans for ex-​combatants belonging to those communities. It also followed the implementation of the peace agreement with FARC, including addressing insecurity in rural areas left by FARC, victims’ redress, participation in the peace process by civil society and local authorities, and DDR. The organization supported the coordination of autonomous justice mechanisms for Indigenous populations alongside the state and transitional justice systems through the National Table for Interjurisdictional Coordination. In addition, the Mission facilitated spaces of dialogue between the government and local actors on illicit-​crops substitution in the departments of Putumayo, Meta, Guaviare and Caquetá, and provided support and training in mechanisms for justice and participation to ‘Community Action Boards, community leaders and student representatives’ (MAPP/​OEA, 2019c and d). In 2017, the mandate of the Mission was extended by the Colombian government until 2021. It continued monitoring the situation of the failed peace process with ELN and the implementation of the peace agreement with FARC, including the Special Jurisdiction for Peace, as well as crop-​ substitution policy and dynamics of social unrest and (in)security in the territories. In addition, MAPP/​OEA monitored the consolidation of Strategic Zones for Comprehensive Intervention to implement PDET and mitigate violence and assist in the election of the Working Group of Effective Participation for Victims (MAPP/​OEA, 2019d). Overall, OAS support focused on monitoring the peace process, facilitating inter-​institutional coordination and dialogue between communities and institutions on security, DDR, and victims’ truth, memory, participation and redress with a gender, ethnic and age focus in territories affected by the armed conflict (MAPP/​OEA, 2022). At the same time, the organization promoted trust, coexistence and reconciliation 90

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towards a peace culture and peaceful resolution of conflicts. Going back to Richmond et al’s (2011) peacebuilding models, OAS approached constitutional and civil peacebuilding models in supporting state and civil society mediation, while at the same time promoting social justice and rights for the civilian population.

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Local Views Regarding International Actors This chapter summarizes how key stakeholders in Colombia, including FARC, academics and local NGOs perceived the international community’s peacebuilding efforts in Colombia. Key local actors within Colombia maintained a critical view of the Duque administration’s commitment to peace, pointing to its lack of substantive engagement as well as the negative role of the US Trump administration in the peace process. They also pointed to the structural violence caused by an extractive model of (il)legal development that contradicted territorial autonomy, traditional subsistence models and rights to land. The following pages look at how FARC, the academic community and some important civil-​society actors challenged key official narratives in the peace process around international cooperation, essentially maintaining a commitment with the process, and defending a supportive role of the international community in it. FARC is examined as the main actor in peace negotiations with the Colombian government during the period of study.1 The online magazine Razón Pública’s section ‘Conflict, Drugs and Peace’ was accessed, and 31 articles written by academic community and expert commentators referring directly to the role of international community in the peace process were selected for the review. RazónPública.com was chosen as a not-​for-​profit and non-​partisan digital magazine, founded in 2008, which publishes short articles by academics and public intellectuals aimed at non-​ academic audiences. Reports produced by some reputed NGOs and think tanks, individually or in coalition, in which the role of the international community regarding

1

Studied were 233 communications through the organization’s official websites, Farc-​ep.co and Partidofarc.com.co: 26 published in 2016, 107 in 2017, 85 in 2018, and 15 between January and March 2019. 92

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the peace process was discussed directly during the period of study were reviewed as well. Somos Defensores, CINEP/​PPP, Indepaz, and Dejusticia had important roles in monitoring the progress of the peace process (Palou, 2019) and a high visibility in Colombian public debates. Somos Defensores2 is a non-​governmental programme of protection for human-​r ights defenders, created in 1999 and currently made up of a coalition including Indigenous tribes (MINGA), Benposta Nación de Muchachos (Benposta Nation of Children) and the Colombian Commission of Jurists (CCJ). CINEP/​PPP3 is a Jesuit programme of research and popular education created in 1972 for the strengthening of civilian fundamental human rights, sustainable development, and peace. It is also part of the Technical Secretariat of the International Verification Component of the Peace Agreement, along with CERAC (Resource Centre for the Analysis of Conflicts). The Institute of Studies for Development and Peace –​Indepaz4 –​is an NGO created in 1984 for research, education, strengthening of youth and Indigenous participation and the promotion of multi-​stakeholders’ dialogue regarding peace, security and economic development. Dejusticia5, the Centre of Legal and Social Studies, is an NGO focused on promoting the strengthening of the rule of law and human rights in Colombia and the global South.

FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) A review of online subsidies published on the web pages of FARC during the period of research shows FARC’s critical view regarding the slow implementation of the peace agreement during the Santos government despite believing in its commitment to the process. FARC denounced nationally and internationally the boycotting of the agreement by Ivan Duque’s government and the Colombian Attorney General Nestor Humberto Martínez in favour of impunity and the maintenance of the status quo. The organization also condemned the role of the Trump administration in derailing the process in favour of the war against drugs and the Colombian government’s agenda, and it called on other international actors, such as the UN and International Criminal Court (ICC), for their support and solidarity in keeping the process alive.

2

3

4

5

Four annual reports relevant to the period of study (2016, 2017, 2018, 2019) were accessed via https://​somo​sdef​enso​res.org/​info​r me-​anual-​1/​. Three relevant publications and reports were accessed via the CINEP/​MPP web page www.cinep.org.co/​public​acio​nes/​en/​. Seven relevant publications and reports were accessed via Indepaz Ediciones web page https://​inde​paz.org.co/​inde​paz-​edicio​nes/​. Four relevant reports were found via Dejusticia Publications and Reports web page at www.dej​usti​cia.org/​como-​tra​baja​mos/​public​acio​nes/​public​acio​nes-​infor​mes/​. 93

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Killings of social leaders and human-​rights defenders The killings of FARC ex-​combatants and social leaders was a key concern for FARC from the signing of the peace agreement onwards. Communications6 condemned the killings of individual leaders and their families and called on the government and international community, including the UN, for their support, solidarity and action in condemning and dismantling paramilitary organizations. FARC explained killings as a ‘gun plan’ against popular leaders all over the country, orchestrated by people in power reluctant to lose their privileges, and carried out by successors of paramilitarism. In February 2018, FARC announced the suspension of its political campaigns due to attacks and violence against its candidates in different parts of the country and the lack of security guarantees from the state (FARC, 2018b). The organization alerted the Colombian government, the UN verification mechanism and international community about hostile actions by Colombian military forces in areas of demobilization. In addition, FARC also condemned killings of ex-​combatants by the left-​wing guerrillas of ELN and requested security guarantees by the national government and solidarity from the international community. Despite the attacks by ELN members, FARC defended the continuation of peace dialogues. The Colombian government did not identify organizations responsible for FARC killings as paramilitaries, preferring instead to call them criminal organizations. This narrative was consistent with governmental efforts made during the administration of Álvaro Uribe (2002–​2010) to demobilize right-​wing paramilitaries (AUC) through political negotiation, which, according to the official line, put an end to these organizations. Contrastingly, FARC insisted on the links between those unleashing violence against ex-​ combatants and social leaders with former paramilitary organizations and groups in power, as they were fundamentally opposed to their inclusion in the political fabric of the country. Thus, FARC reasserted the political character of the perpetrators and their links to parts of the country’s establishment.

Implementation of the agreement on the ground FARC denounced poor conditions for demobilization and reintegration on the ground. The group called for national and international support regarding the lack of infrastructure and unfit conditions in areas receiving FARC combatants at the start of the DDR process, while governmental officials were publicly praising their advanced state of construction (FARC, 2017c, d, e, f, g).

6

FARC, 2016 (all), 2017b, f, h–​m, o, r, s, 2018a and b, 2018f, g, m, n, 2019a; CNR, 2018; ETRC Juan Carlos Castañeda, 2018. 94

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FARC also condemned the lack of fulfilment of commitments regarding legal security and amnesty for ex-​combatants –​ as FARC members were still in prison or being imprisoned –​and their lack of economic security and access to land and productive projects. In the face of this situation, FARC called on the government to fulfil its commitments and requested the international community to act in solidarity with the peace process (Jiménez, 2017; CNR, 2018; FARC, 2017p, 2018d and n). Although FARC recognized and thanked international funds for the implementation of the peace agreement, it pointed out how limited they were. According to the organization, €90 million offered by the EU or $100 million offered by the UN were enough for only one productive project, which represented an objective problem for implementation. Accordingly, FARC called for a fast route to finance the peace implementation by restructuring state and private sector contributions, and without taxing middle and poorer sectors of the population.

Calls for the reform to the peace process by the opposition FARC criticized attempts to reform the peace agreement as it had already been approved by Congress and the disruption reflected a concert of enemies of reconciliation who aimed to destroy the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP) in order to protect those who indirectly supported or financed right-​ wing paramilitaries and feared the truth. In that context, FARC called for the implementation of the peace agreement not to turn into a renegotiation (FARC, 2017f). The election of President Ivan Duque was interpreted by FARC as a neoliberal government supported by backward forces interested in blocking any attempt of reconciliation or benefiting the working classes. In its view, Duque represented a right-​wing government aligned with the transnational right and the USA, which privileged security and left a gap between its rhetoric and its actions regarding the peace agreement. The Duque government also showed a continuation of favouring the extractive economies, finance sectors and agro-​industry that would deepen inequality and cause conflicts from the territorial expansion of such an economic model. It was a ‘mediocre’ and ‘decadent’ project sustaining itself on an invented and magnified enemy and on lies about the peace agreement and its implementation. Indications of this were projects that benefited big businessmen replacing peace agreement projects on rural reform, the fact that the new Minister of Defence announced policies contrary to the agreement on voluntary substitution of illegal crops, and the lack of fulfilment of commitments regarding economic conditions and security for ex-​combatants (FARC, 2018h and n). 95

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FARC did not accept the Duque government’s position, which was defended internationally, that were no resources for implementation and that this was a problem inherited from the Santos administration, which had made agreements without having any means for financing them. That argument, in FARC’s view, could not justify extinguishing the flame of peace through budget and financial suffocation. In addition, the peace agreement, FARC insisted, was not for benefiting FARC ex-​combatants, but for a structural change in Colombia (FARC, 2018j and n). A legal battle also took place regarding the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP). FARC sent an open letter to the UN Secretary General and the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (Londoño, 2017a and b) opposing a constitutional sentence (C-​17) that declared as unconstitutional some of the dispositions of the JEP and made it non-​compulsory for state officials and those responsible for serious crimes to submit to the JEP, leaving their cases in the hands of ordinary justice, thus fostering impunity, according to FARC. In the meantime, the articles approved by the Senate made the JEP dependent to ordinary justice rather than an independent body, excluded state officials from justice, allowed for the extradition of FARC members, prevented magistrates involved in the defence of human rights to be JEP magistrates, and allowed candidates involved in right-​ wing paramilitarism to run for public office, contradicting the spirit of the peace agreement. Once JEP and SIVJRNR were legally set, FARC publicly denounced the undue interference of the Director of Public Prosecutions, Nestor Humberto Martinez-​Neira, with their implementation by, for example, harassing those in charge of structuring the defence system in the JEP and calling on Congress to reform the JEP and the peace agreement (FARC, 2018i and k, 2019b). FARC also denounced the attempts to reform the JEP by the Democratic Centre Party in Congress through legislative initiatives that were contrary to the peace agreement. It called for the solidarity of the international community, including the UN System and the ICC, with the peace process in Colombia (FARC, 2018l). Moreover, FARC condemned President Duque’s objections to the JEP once the constitutional court declared it enforceable. For FARC, such objections were coming from the Director of Public Prosecutions in alliance with the US Drug Enforcement Administration, ex-​president Álvaro Uribe, and his party Democratic Centre, to which President Duque belonged. Such objections had a political rather than legal character and were aimed at shredding the peace agreement and avoiding justice for their participation in the armed conflict. For FARC, Colombia was not being governed from the Nariño Palace, but from the Democratic Centre Party in Congress led by Álvaro Uribe, who was directing a campaign to destroy the peace agreement and SIVJRNR (FARC, 2019b and c). 96

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Extradition to the USA and the war against drugs Another issue placing FARC at odds with the Colombian government and the USA was the extradition of their members for their links with drug trafficking, which, FARC had affirmed, did not go beyond taxing coca in areas of production. FARC published an open letter to his extradited leader Simon Trinidad –​after Barack Obama refused to grant a presidential pardon during his last days in office –​in which the group expressed its sense of deception, indignation and sadness, comparing Obama’s decision with a Roman emperor’s thumbs-​down gesture in the colosseum. FARC interpreted Trinidad’s extradition as a scapegoat for the Bush and Uribe governments and stressed its many unsuccessful requests to free the guerrilla leader through the peace negotiations (FARC, 2017a). The organization kept calling for the freedom of Trinidad and other FARC members in prison abroad (for example, CNR, 2018; FARC, 2018d). When FARC’s leader and peace negotiator Jesus Santrich was captured following orders from the Attorney General’s Office and requested for extradition in connection with drug trafficking by the USA, FARC demanded for Santrich not to be the trophy to give to President Trump on his visit to Colombia. FARC condemned the involvement of the Attorney General and his attempts to derail the JEP, and the collaboration of his office with the US government to continue the war against drugs, ‘behead’ the political direction of FARC’s party and prevent the participation of FARC in politics. For FARC, this arrest was an indication of the submissiveness of Colombian institutions to US interests, in this case, to damage FARC’s image and derail the implementation of the agreement’s provision on illegal drugs. Such provision was funded in a social policy different from the ‘traditional’ war against drugs. FARC asserted that the accusations against Santrich were false and politically motivated and called for ex-​combatants not to give in to this provocation and justify the continuation of war in Colombia. They also called on the Colombian government to fulfil its commitments to the peace agreement and free Santrich immediately. In addition, they demanded that the US government contributed to the consolidation of peace in Colombia by suspending operations destined to hamper broader legal and political participation in Colombia. Shortly afterwards, FARC rejected media reports linking Ivan Marquez, another FARC leader and elected senator, with drug trafficking. Marquez ended up deserting FARC and announcing his return to the armed struggle in August 2019 (FARC, 2018c, d, e, j; 2019b; Torrado, 2019). FARC’s Nacional Political Council also published a statement opposing Ambassador Kevin Whitaker’s accusation of FARC not fulfilling its peace agreement commitments on drugs but presenting criminals associated with drug trafficking as FARC members for amnesty, the later accusation voiced by the Attorney General in Colombia. Whitaker said this an interview with 97

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the Colombian newspaper El Tiempo, in the context of Trump’s threat to decertify Colombia in the war against drugs (White House, 2017c). In the interview, the ambassador affirmed that FARC was incentivizing farmers to grow coca crops and would remain on the list of terrorist organizations until it fulfilled its obligations by providing information about drug-​trafficking networks as established in the peace agreement. In addition, the ambassador voiced accusations by the Attorney General about FARC, including drug traffickers on the list of members subjected to JEP. Whitaker affirmed that the USA would request extradition of criminals involved in drug trafficking regardless of who they were (Peña, 2017). For FARC (2017n), the ambassador’s declarations represented undue interference, were incorrect, and placed obstacles to the peace process and reincorporation of FARC. The ambassador was mistaken, as the USA could not blame FARC for not fulfilling commitments that were not in the peace agreement. Also, the communication asserted that the ambassador lied when saying that FARC was incentivizing rural farmers to grow coca crops, as FARC had, in fact, been inviting communities to substitute crops in meetings with peasants, which government representatives, including President Santos, had also attended. Rather than blackmailing Colombia with desertification, the USA, in FARC’s view, had to show results in the prosecution of money laundering, stop the flow of chemical precursors to the periphery and help to finance alternative developments agreed with rural communities. Thus, in FARC’s view, the USA should show actions rather than rhetorical posturing about the failed war on drugs aimed to reposition the failed policy of aerial interdiction and fumigation. FARC called on the Colombian government not to give in to US pressure to unleash forced eradication and reduction of resources, which would only increase territorial conflict. FARC (2017k, p, q) condemned repressive policies –​introduced in response to US pressure –​against peasants growing coca, including repression, prosecution and jail, as well as the maintenance of fumigation and forced eradication, and despite signed agreements of voluntary substitution. For FARC, such policies had only brought internal displacement and death to people in territories claiming for integral solutions to this issue. In sum, these communications suggest a strong opposition to US foreign policy in Colombia and FARC’s appeal to the international community to maintain its support for the implementation of the peace agreement, against the government’s policies and manoeuvring against the process.

Academic and expert commentators A review of the online magazine Razon Publica.com –​dedicated to publishing academics’ and researchers’ short articles aimed at broader audiences –​shows 98

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a critical view of the US anti-​drug policy, seen at odds with the peace agreement and the peace process more broadly. Academic commentators also criticized the Duque administration and conservative sectors within Colombia for their international engagement regarding peacebuilding and undermining of the peace process more broadly.

Implementation of the peace agreement on the ground Positive perceptions of the international community’s role in negotiations between left-​wing guerrillas and the Colombian government included the Nobel Peace Prize awarded to President Santos, referred to as fostering commitment with peace among Colombians (Patiño and Hernandez, 2017). Also, the UN and its verification missions were judged as very important for the peace process with left-​wing guerrillas in controlling disarmament and boosting legitimacy of the process, protecting ex-​ combatants, social leaders and HR defenders, and maintaining a ceasefire between ELN and the government. The UN Verification Mission, and international community more broadly, stressed the costs to the Duque administration of not implementing the agreement and taming its reformist impulses. At the same time, the international community supported the peace process by integrating the challenges of peacebuilding to their agendas, for example by connecting PDET territories to UNDG (Romero, 2017; Rouvinski, 2017; Zuluaga, 2018; Palou, 2019; Suárez and Zarama, 2021). Academics warned about the importance of fulfilling the peace agreement for Colombia’s international standing. For example, Vargas (2017) stressed the importance of implementing the JEP in the face of current legislation and congressional debates that slowed down the implementation to avoid the ICC’s intervention in Colombia.7 Nasi (2019) explained the selective implementation and ambivalence regarding the peace agreement in the Duque administration as the result of the contradiction between the Democratic Centre Party’s opposition to the agreement and the danger in losing the support and funding of the international community for this and future negotiations. The academic community was critical about Colombian international engagement regarding the peace process with the ELN. The Duque administration’s response to the ELN attack against the General Santander National Police School in Bogota on 17 January 17 2019 was criticized,

7

Colombia has been referred to the ICC due to the ‘false positives’ scandal about members of security forces killing civilians and presenting them as guerrillas killed in combat to obtain benefits. 99

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as the government breached protocols for negotiation with the guerrillas by requesting Cuba to extradite the ELN negotiators to Colombian authorities. The government justified its request on the basis that protocols were negotiated by the previous –​Santos –​administration. Commentators (Betancur Restrepo, 2019; Zuleta, 2019b; Trejos et al, 2021) pointed out that international protocols were the state’s rather than government’s commitments and the request for extradition placed Cuba, hosting the talks, in an unnecessarily difficult position as peace guarantor. This undermined Colombia’s international credibility and future requests for international support in peace negotiations. Such breaching of protocols in negotiations with the ELN was explained as a function of US pressures against drug trafficking and the Maduro regime in Venezuela, as well as the opposition to the peace process by Duque’s political allies.

Comments on extradition and the war against drugs Experts were critical of the traditional US prohibitionist and punitive approach to the war against drugs reflected in policies of fumigation and forced eradication that were promoted by conservative sectors within the US, the military (Guerra Rincón, 2017), and the Trump administration, fostered by reports that, in the view of academics, did not grasp the full picture of drug production in Colombia and its impact in the USA. First, the methodological and financial weakness of the UNODC 2017 report and the lack of understanding about the drug market in this and US reports more broadly was criticized in Razón Pública (Uribe 2017a), as figures came from country reports without clear historical progression, methodology or consistency and were affected by a decrease in funding; transferring costs to countries themselves to produce the data. Second, political motivations biased reports against FARC and their political participation in counter-​drug policy. For Durán (2017), the threat of decertification made by Trump was ideologically motivated by conservative sectors, including the Attorney General Jeff Sessions who defended a hard stance against drugs, as well as William Brownfield, Secretary of the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, who distrusted FARC and wanted to exclude the guerrilla group from counter-​drug policy and efforts. Third, against the political link made by US officials between the peace process and an increase in coca production, academics asserted that the increase in coca production in fact occurred earlier than negotiations and before fumigation was suspended, and was due to structural drivers, such as the presence of armed actors, lack of services and community expectations in the peace process, and the drug market itself (Durán, 2017, 2018; Uribe, 2017a). 100

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Fourth, a link was made in the DEA 2017 National Drug Threat Assessment between the increase in coca production and an increase in US deaths related to cocaine consumption. Academics asserted that the reports in fact showed that US deaths were caused by opioids (including synthetic ones such as Fetanyl produced in the US and diverted from the pharmaceutical industry to the illegal market) rather than cocaine, the latter showing a decreasing trend in deaths since 2006 (Uribe, 2017b, Vargas, 2018). Academics predicted that the reports, particularly by the DEA and Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs would weaken US support for the peace. The consequences would likely be a defunding of peace-​agreement implementation and an increased emphasis on the security and military components of US aid to Colombia, to the detriment of long-​term development and human-​welfare strategies. The latter would be reflected in an increase in US pressure to follow fumigation and forced eradication of crops for quick results, as well as the extradition of FARC ex-​combatants linked with the drugs trade, in contradiction to the peace agreement (Isacson, 2017a and b; Durán, 2017; Uribe, 2017b; Molano Cruz, 2018; Vargas, 2018). Researchers also predicted that this change of attitude by the US government would likely be followed by the Colombian government despite structural reform being promoted through the peace agreement. In that sense, Colombian governments traditionally followed the US punitive approach and, although President Santos made reformist attempts of voluntary substitution and an international conversation about drug policy reform, he was still within traditional lines of aligning with Washington, promoting the peace process as a tool in the solution of drug trafficking and re-​establishing high-​level dialogues with the USA, and joining NATO (Durán, 2017; Zuleta, 2018; Molano Cruz, 2018). Moreover, the return to a punitive strategy from Washington would provide a breathing space and foster the agenda of right-​wing sectors in Colombia opposed to the peace agreement, such as the Attorney General, Nestor Humberto Martínez. It would produce Colombian presidential candidates more in line with US policy and actively closing ranks with the USA, as proved to be the case with Iván Duque (Durán, 2016; Guerra Rincón, 2017; Isacson, 2017a; Zuleta, 2018; Molano Cruz, 2018). In following traditional US lines, for Durán (2019), President Duque accepted to be judged on short-​term actions, aggravating Colombia’s subordination to the USA and promoting failed strategies to tackle drug trafficking. The threat of extradition and its negative consequences for the peace process materialized with the detention in April 2018 and request of extradition by the USA of FARC’s ex-​combatant, peace negotiator and elected Congressman Jesus Santrich. This event, for academic commentators, 101

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was organized by DEA and Attorney General Martinez in Colombia. It was driven by an agenda of returning to fumigation and forced eradication in Colombia shared with US Attorney General Loretta Lynch. According to commentators, DEA and the Attorney General set up Santrich using an agent provocateur undercover, which was against Colombian legislation forbidding the state to induce criminal actions. Commentators argued that the Attorney General represented regressive sectors against the peace agreement and actively undermined the competence of the JEP. Consequently, the extradition affair weakened the institutional structure for the implementation of the peace agreement, and, in particular the JEP, increased insecurity for demobilized populations who were aspiring to political participation and undermined the state’s credibility for future peace negotiations (Benavidez, 2018; Medina, 2018, 2020; Calderón, 2018; Zuleta, 2019a). Academics were strongly critical of both securitization strategies and punitive solutions, including fumigation and forced eradication. Drawing on official reports, academics showed that neither Plan Colombia nor fumigation had produced an actual decrease in coca production or trafficking beyond symbolic gestures of the country’s commitment to the war against drugs, and coca production could restart after fumigation had taken place if market and structural conditions were in place. In addition, forced eradication only exacerbated conflicts and violent clashes with farming communities in which pacts of substitution had already been made, further alienating FARC ex-​ combatants from the peace process (Guerra Rincón, 2017; Durán, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2020; Palou, 2018). Spaces left by FARC were spaces of illegal economies and violence that could be colonized by other illegal groups, including ELN guerrillas, FARC dissidents and criminal organizations, prompting further militarization under a punitive approach. Although there was not a consensus on legalization of coca production as a viable alternative, commentators agreed that it was through long-​term policies of substitution and increased investment in rural development that effective attempts could be made to tackle the roots of illegal economies in a sustainable way (Guerra Rincón, 2017; Thoumi, 2017; Durán, 2016, 2018).

NGOs Reports selected for this exploration were those produced by reputed NGOs and think tanks, including Somos Defensores, CINEP/​PPP, Indepaz and Dejusticia, individually or in coalition, in which the role of the international community regarding the peace process was discussed. In general, while NGOs praised the role of the international community in supporting human rights and social leaders, as well as substitutions as an alternative way of combatting the drugs trade, they were generally critical of the role of the 102

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USA in the war against drugs and of international investors and companies for overlooking territorial autonomy and steering conflict.

Killings of social leaders and human-​rights defenders NGOs praised the role of the international community in monitoring violence against HR and social leaders and calling on the Colombian state for their protection, but criticized the use of US military aid in steering a counter-​insurgency war, as well as multinational companies and international economic actors investing in energy and extractive projects against community consent, which lay at the roots of the violence against this population. NGOs had traced violence against human-​r ights and social activists since the end of the 1990s in the context of the armed conflict, fostered by a counter-​insurgent focus by the security forces that hindered effective state responses. Although violence against leaders had been recognized formally at state level and in the constitutional court since 1997, the state had failed to protect this population (Indepaz et al, 2017). Security forces had been bolstered by US military aid since the end of the 1990s, and, although such support balanced forces against guerrillas, it fostered a militarization in society and the state linked with HR violations (ASCAMCAT et al, 2018). This trend continued with the Duque administration. For Somos Defensores, the Duque government ignored the political and legal instruments created by the peace agreement to protect social and human rights leaders, instead militarizing PDET areas under the ‘Zones Future’ programme to tackle violence against leaders and illicit economies (Somos Defensores, 2019, 2020). Such preferences ignored pacts already made with those communities, steering further conflict and making this population more vulnerable, considering the increasing involvement of security forces in the violence against leaders (Muñóz Murillo, 2020). Similarly, a coalition of NGOs noted that the Duque administration, following the US government’s counter-​drug priorities, was dismantling key structural reforms of the peace agreement, favouring remilitarization, paramilitary takeover of areas left by FARC, and conflict with communities (ASCAMCAT et al, 2018). NGOs and think tanks praised the international community’s role in monitoring the violence against community leaders and giving public support to their work, while calling on the Colombian government to guarantee their security. NGOs also praised international community’s campaigns, awards, meetings and events advocating for HR and social leaders protection. International actors included the UN (OHCHR), OAE (IACHR), the EU, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Germany, UK, Canada, USA and France (Indepaz, et al 2017; Somos Defensores, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020; Muñóz Murillo, 2020). 103

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Somos Defensores (2018) asserted that international pressure caused greater proactiveness by the Attorney General’s Office regarding investigations of violence against HR leaders, albeit that impunity in prosecutions was still around 90 per cent (Somos Defensores, 2019). International pressure also fostered the reactivation of the National Commission of Security Guarantees under the Duque administration, although with a weaker advisory mandate (Somos Defensores, 2019). The NGO also referred to the importance of the Declaration on Human Rights Defenders, adopted by the General Assembly in its Resolution 53/​1 44, as a normative point of reference for the recognition and protection of these people (Somos Defensores 2018). In this regard, Somos Defensores praised the visit to Colombia and recommendations made by the UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders, Michel Forst, in 2018 (Somos Defensores, 2019). However, the NGO pointed out that his recommendations were not only opposed by the Duque administration, but it blocked any subsequent visits by the Rapporteur. In this regard, the NGO criticized the Duque administration’s negationist discourse and hostility to UN agencies including OHCHR and UNDOC who called out the difficult HR situation for social leaders (Somos Defensores, 2020). NGOs reported an increase in killings of social leaders from 2016 to 2019 (Indepaz et al, 2017; ASCAMCAT et al, 2018; Rozo Ángel and Ball 2019; Muñóz Murillo, 2020), although the real figures tend to be higher than the ones reported by these organizations, the Ombudsman’s Office and OHCHR (Ball et al, 2018). The victims were mainly Indigenous, Afro-Colombians, peasant leaders and community-​action board members (Juntas de Acción Comunal) (Indepaz et al, 2017; ASCAMCAT et al, 2018). Although violence happened all over the country, most killings happened in the departments targeted by the government and international community for peacebuilding, demobilization and PDET development (Indepaz et al, 2017; ASCAMCAT et al, 2018; Muñóz Murillo, 2019). These areas had in common: first, being mentioned in the Early Warning System for human rights violations and displacement; second, in these areas, social leaders had supported the peace agreement in the 2016 plebiscite and then its implementation, as well as crop substitution, land-​restitution policies and legal figures of territorial administration such as peasant reservations, threatening traditional power structures with structural change; third, these were highly militarized areas with a strong presence of paramilitarism and illegal economies (mining, coca production and transport routes), against a backdrop of strong social mobilization against illegal economies, extractive mining and energy projects (Indepaz et al, 2017; ASCAMCAT et al, 2018); fourth, these

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areas witnessed a military re-​accommodation of organizations of FARC dissidents, ELN guerrillas, and other armed groups after the peace agreement (Ball et al, 2018). For these NGOs, the Colombian government depoliticized the crimes, attributing them mainly to organized criminal groups, illegal economies and personal motives. They coincided in that paramilitarism and ‘dirty wars’ (with unknown perpetrators) played dominant roles in the violence relative to other perpetrators such as left-​wing guerrillas and dissidents, security forces and organized crime organizations (CINEP/​PPP, 2016; Indepaz, 2016; González Posso, 2017; Indepaz, et al, 2017; ASCAMCAT et al, 2018; Sánchez León and Marín López, 2017; Somos Defensores, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020). Although the emergence of paramilitarism was linked to the state’s counter-​insurgency policies since 1965, NGOs described contemporary paramilitarism –​after the demobilization programme in the 2000s –​as more grounded in economic interests and territorial control, although institutional links with political, military and business authorities persisted (Indepaz, 2016; González Posso, 2017), particularly in regions such as Urabá (Antioquia), Tumaco (Nariño) and Mapiripán (Meta) (ASCAMCAT et al, 2018). Paramilitaries, in the view of the NGOs, ‘exercise territorial control, have a command structure, use a counterinsurgent language in support of mega-​projects and multinationals as well as their model of progress’ in alliance with state, political, security, land-​owning and (inter)national business sectors (Indepaz et al, 2017, pp 26, 30 [translated by the author]). Reports described paramilitary violence as contributing to forcefully change traditional social fabrics and break social resistance to mining, energy (hydroelectric) projects and agro-​industry since the 2000s (ASCAMCAT et al, 2018). And although there was enough evidence of the confluence of armed actors and economic interests in Colombian territories, Dejusticia noted that the focus of transitional justice had been paramilitaries themselves rather than the actors financing them (Sánchez León and Marín López, 2017). The violence was linked, on the one hand, to the protection of structures of political and territorial control against democratizing attempts driven by the peace agreement and, on the other, to the appropriation of land and resources and the protection of extractive economic models and mega-​ projects of infrastructure and energy against communities’ and leaders’ assertions of territorial autonomy and opposition to those projects. These were economic projects in which multinational and international companies were invested, along with local (il)legal economic actors (Indepaz, 2016; González Posso, 2017; Indepaz et al, 2017; Sánchez León and Marín López, 2017; ASCAMCAT et al, 2018; Ball et al, 2018).

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The war against drugs On the one hand, NGOs were critical of the US promotion of fumigation and forced eradication, and (inter)national companies’ and investors’ roles in furthering exogenous models of development based on agro-​exporting, mining, tourism and energy projects at the expenses of communities (Moreno, 2016; González Posso, 2016; Arenas García et al, 2018; González Posso et al, 2018). On the other, NGOs praised the role of the UN system and related organizations (including UNDP, UNODC, FAO and OIM) in supporting crop substitution, in particular, UNODC as guarantor and mediator in the substitution programme against the harassment of their officials by FARC dissidents and the lack of security conditions in some areas of the country (Arenas García et al, 2018). Regarding the role of the USA, NGOs pointed at Colombia’s traditional emphasis on offer reduction and criminalization of the weakest links in the drug business: farmers and consumers (Fescol et al, 2018). Mama Coca and Indepaz asserted that Colombia had followed fumigation strategies since 1978, prompted by the USA. Fumigation had been functional to the US development of its agro-​chemical and defence industry, having in Colombia a captive market for the companies Dyncorp, Monsanto, Bell Textron and Sikorsky (Moreno, 2016). Moreover, fumigation was linked to counter-​ insurgent strategies functional to capitalist development and modernization through ecological destruction and displacement of populations practised in other countries such as Vietnam, El Salvador and Guatemala (Glassman, 1992, quoted by Moreno, 2016). The promotion of fumigation was reinforced by US reports about the increase in drug production in Colombia in order to keep the Colombian government ‘on track’, and was implemented regardless of its human, environmental and agricultural productivity costs, and ignoring Colombian laws restricting pesticides and its effects in fuelling conflicts with communities and the armed conflict more broadly (Moreno, 2016). For example, DEA’s 2017 National Drug Threat Assessment ignored the low level of interdiction in the USA compared with Colombia and Mexico, as well as the lack of financial regulation of illegal profits and money coming from the drug trade in the USA; 70 per cent of which entered the US formal economy (González Posso, 2018). Despite the Santos administration’s suspension of fumigations and making some efforts towards the peace agreement commitments regarding crop substitution and development, implementation was lacking, as the government continued criminalizing the weakest links in the market (farmers and consumers) and using punitive measures of forced eradication. This offered opportunities for narco-​traffickers to tie vulnerable populations tighter to the market (González Posso, 2018). 106

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For NGOs, both fumigation and forced eradication, far from reducing drug production, steered violence, forced displacement, food and health insecurity and environmental damage and fostered conflict between the state and communities (Fescol et al, 2018; Arenas García, 2018). At the same time, official indicators of success focused on law enforcement efforts rather than actual impacts on illegal economies (Fescol et al, 2018). NGOs advocated voluntary crop substitution as agreed in the peace accords, with international support accompanied by the protection of territorial and human rights and endogenous development of populations against exogenous models of development, as these were exclusive (Fescol et al, 2018; Arenas García et al, 2018) and appropriated territory and resources through armed control of populations (González Posso 2016, 2018; González Posso et al, 2018). Voluntary substitution, a report noted, was in line with UNDP focus on prevention and social development along with a development and human-​rights focus in anti-​drug policy (Fescol et al, 2018; González Posso, 2018).

Former combatants and civil society take on international actors This survey of alternative voices regarding the implementation of the peace agreement shows that, for FARC, academic commentators and NGOs, the peace agreement offered opportunities to transcend from a peace that focused on silencing FARC’s arms to making structural transformation of territories targeted for implementation, generating structural conditions for peace. The issues that local actors legitimized and further appealed to international community for support for, included pressure on the Colombian government to fully implement the peace agreement and make calls against the killings of community and HR leaders and FARC ex-​combatants, as well as using voluntary substitution as a solution in the illegal drug trade. Conversely, these actors were critical of the US role in the war against drugs, as it pressurized the Colombian government to follow a counterproductive punitive approach that was not only at odds with the peace agreement regarding key policies including extradition, fumigation and forced eradication, but also likely to reproduce conflict dynamics in communities in the long run. In addition, the US approach strengthened the hand of sectors within Colombia that were spoilers of the peace agreement. The Colombian state was subject to procedural and substantial criticism in this review, not only for the lack of political will and implementation of the peace agreement − the latter particularly shown in the Duque administration − but also for its take on transforming rural geographies through private-​ sector, (inter)national investment and exogenous development models, the prioritizing of military over human security and the lack of protection for 107

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activists, FARC ex-​combatants and communities. These actors denounced that the geographical transformation of territories, even guided by a peacebuilding framework, entailed violence in which civilian populations and territorial sustainability were the main losers, despite the good intentions expressed in the targeting of territories for peace and development.

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6

International Actors’ Framing of Peacebuilding Spaces This chapter offers a comparative look at the ways in which countries and international organizations framed spaces of intervention at local, departmental, (sub-​)regional or national scales. It explores which spaces were prioritized and how they were labelled with explicit negative and positive references. Broadly, negative comments included the presence of armed conflict, criminality and illegal actors and economies. International actors also highlighted HR violations against segments of the population, gender inequality and violence and the presence of anti-​p ersonnel mines. Inequality was also foregrounded, particularly between urban and rural areas, and the latter’s lack of civil access, poverty, poor agricultural productivity and water management, low environmental resilience, deforestation, lack of economic opportunities and investment and weak governance, state services and infrastructure. Positive comments included Colombia as a model of democracy, innovation and leadership regarding the peace process post conflict. The country’s social capital was also praised as entrepreneurial, diverse, culturally rich and resilient, and with social organization capacities regarding peace. Colombia’s status as an upper-​middle-​income country was also highlighted, as well as its urban development, great biodiversity and economic potential for carbon capture, exploration, tourism, agro-​industry, oil, mining and energy extraction, and economic investment. The chapter shows that, first, positive and negative comments were related to international actors’ agendas, as geographic scales were treated more as containers of issues and comments were similar across different scales. Secondly, major cities such as Bogotá, Medellín or Cartagena were more positively framed than smaller cities (Barrancabermeja, Tumaco, San José del Guaviare, Mocoa), municipalities and rural areas (Statista, 2020). The latter were treated as spaces with little governance, a presence of illegal economies and violence, and that were in need of development. 109

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Such characterization signalled development preferences and reinforced a normative duality between rural and urban spaces, as well as a commitment to those that could functionally link and interact in international markets as a precondition of peace. Regarding positive depictions of major cities, the exceptions were Canada, who identified violence and criminality within city areas, and MAPP/​OEA, who identified the vulnerable zones in Cali (in Valle del Cauca), for example. Positive comments were also directed to broader geographic regions in terms of their biodiversity, investment and development potential; as well as to spaces for reincorporation of ex-​c ombatants, which facilitated both economic development and reconciliation.

The USA Negative comments (43 online subsidies, 98 references in NVivo) At the national level, Colombia was labelled by the USA as the largest producer of cocaine and the source of 92 per cent of the seized cocaine in the USA. Cocaine production was referred to as at a record-​high, and a source of violence, crime, corruption and victimization of US and Colombian children, families and communities. USAID also talked about 38 per cent of Colombia’s territory being affected both by illegal mining and illicit coca cultivation, and referred to Colombia as the largest mercury polluter per capita worldwide due to gold mining (Embajada de EEUU en Colombia, 2017a, 2018e; White House 2017a and b; White House and ONDCP, 2018a and b; USAID, 2018b; US Embassy in Colombia, 2018a). Regarding non-​specified spaces, USAID alluded to the persistent poverty gap between the country’s rural and urban areas with deep inequalities more evident in rural regions linked to the conflict. Rural areas and territories were described as not sharing the country’s GDP growth, with rates of poverty nearly four times higher than in urban areas, and marginalized, ‘poor, conflictive and neglected’ and ‘plagued by illegal economies, violence and underdevelopment’ (USAID, 2017a and i, 2018e). Rural areas, territories, regions and municipalities were also described as conflict-​affected or devastated by the historical, long-​standing and protracted armed conflict. Rural areas were characterized as under-​ served and neglected, while departments and municipalities had weak state presence and accountability, little coordination between central and local institutions and poor services and justice provision. For example, USAID (2017q) referred to departments in conflict-​affected regions lacking ‘resources for effective institutions’ and ‘unable to meet many justice-​related needs.’ At the same time, it referred to municipalities as ‘under-​staffed, unable to offer basic services … with weak transparency 110

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Table 6.1: USA negative comments in targeted sub-​national places Scale

Specific place mentioned

Comment

Departments

Antioquia, Córdoba, Tolima, Cauca, Nariño, Meta, and Caquetá

Conflict affected.

Arauca

Critically affected by violence.

Cauca and Meta

Wide gender gaps and armed conflict.

Nariño

Threat of continued kidnappings.

Montes de María, Cauca, Catatumbo and Bajo Cauca, coffee-​g rowing regions

Conflict affected.

Tropical dry forests

Only 8 per cent of tropical dry forests remain and only 5 per cent of that area is protected.

40 municipalities

Conflict affected.

19 municipalities in Antioquia, Córdoba, and Nariño

High levels of poverty and violence linked with guerrilla, paramilitary, criminal and narco-​trafficking.

Barrancabermeja, Apartadó, San José del Guaviare and Montería

Critically affected by violence.

(Sub-​)regions

Municipalities and smaller cities

Sources: USAID, 2017d, f, g, m, n, o, p, t, 2018a; US Embassy in Colombia, 2018b

and accountability’ and lack of institutional coordination between national and regional institutions to design and implement programmes (USAID, 2017t, 2018h). Online subsidies also foregrounded the informality of households in rural areas and territories; HR violations occurring with impunity; an unchecked illegal economy and armed actors; and their remote, ‘outlying’, ‘far-​flung’ and ‘off-​limits’ nature. Rural areas and territories were described as under-​served by financial services and foreign investment, which constrained growth, particularly in the agricultural sector, and having high concentrations of vulnerable groups such as Indigenous populations.1 Negative comments made in online subsidies remained consistently similar across sub-​national scales, including departments, regions or municipalities, either broadly or with reference to specific places, as Table 6.1 shows.

1

See: Embajada de EEUU en Colombia, 2017b, 2018a and b; White House, 2017b; USAID, 2016, 2017a, f, g–​r, t, u, v, y, 2018c–​h, m. 111

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Positive comments (22 online subsidies, 36 references in NVivo) Some US communications2 referred to Colombia as an example and model of hope for the hemisphere on account of its democratic tradition of free and fair elections and freedom of association and expression. The country was praised as a model in its irreplaceable leadership and governmental efforts towards peace –​reflected in the Nobel Peace Prize –​greater prosperity, strengthening of legal markets; addressing HR concerns and combating drug trafficking. As a result, Colombia was described as enjoying greater stability, decreasing poverty and fewer murders, kidnappings and forced displacements. Colombia was also praised as one of the most, even the second-​most, biodiverse country in the world –​important not only locally but globally, as ‘a gift to the world’ (USAID, 2018k). Accordingly, online subsidies signalled the economic potential of Colombia’s biodiversity in terms of water and energy provision, undeveloped oil and natural gas, carbon storage and investment from the carbon market for climate-​change mitigation. In addition, Colombia was characterized as a growing upper-​middle-​income country with a sophisticated financial system, ‘enormous potential’ domestically and internationally, and as a ‘diverse and culturally rich nation’ (USAID, 2017w). Non-​specified sub-​national spaces were ‘home to resilient communities and entrepreneurial human capital’ (USAID, 2017i, 2018e), dynamic and sophisticated urban centres (USAID, 2017a) and post-​conflict areas (USAID, 2017g). Table 6.2 shows comments made with regard to specified places in the sample, as a function of their political and economic significance.

Canada Negative comments (11 online subsidies, 23 references in NVivo) Canada highlighted Colombia as one of the most dangerous countries to be a HR defender or a journalist, with high levels of violence against women, and one of the most affected/​contaminated by anti-​personnel mines in the world. In addition, communications mentioned Colombia’s power struggles among non-​state actors, and pressure on basic services due to Venezuelan migration (Embajada de Canadá, 2017c; Government of Canada, 2017a, 2018a and b; Zikmundova and Lebleu 2017). Regarding sub-​national spaces, subsidies referred to non-​specified regions with limited state presence and significant challenges despite some progress towards peace and stability. Also, communications mentioned regions, rural areas and zones that were most affected by armed conflict. Rural

2

See: Embajada de EEUU en Colombia, 2018b, c, d; USAID, 2017a, b, f, g, s, w, x, y; 2018i–​l; US Embassy in Colombia, 2018a. 112

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Table 6.2: USA positive comments in specific sub-​national places Scale

Specific place mentioned

Departments Cauca, Meta Santander Regions

Cities

Comment Important for the implementation of the peace agreement, ethnic diversity. Leading producer of Cacao in Colombia.

Amazonian forest, inter-​ Resource-​r ich. Andean valleys, and Pacific lowlands Orinoquía

Next agricultural frontier.

Magdalena river basin

Country’s main watershed, ‘home to 77 per cent of Colombia’s population’ and producing 80 per cent of Colombia’s GDP, 75 per cent of its hydraulic energy and 70 per cent of its agriculture.

Bogotá, D.C.

‘Great and historic city’ (near where Batalla de Boyacá took place - k​ ey to Colombian and regional independence), city where the conference that gave birth to the OAS took place; with prestigious universities preparing Colombian and world leaders.

Santa Marta

A lot of potential with tourism and economic activity based on the ports.

Sources: USAID, 2017a, c, d, t, y; 2018k; Embajada de EEUU en Colombia, 2016, 2018a

areas were characterized by pervasive poverty, violence, HR abuses and trafficking of illegal drugs (Embajada de Canadá, 2017a, b, c; Government of Canada, 2018b). In addition, Canada referred to ‘anti-​personnel mines and unexploded artefacts that clutter the country’s mountains and countryside’, and highlighted the municipalities most affected by anti-​personnel mines (Government of Canada, 2017a; Embajada de Canadá, 2017a). Similarly, negative comments made to specified departments, regions, and cities, by name or number of places (as shown in Table 6.3), highlighted those most affected by armed conflict, poverty, anti-​personnel mines and violence against women. In addition, the comments referred to violence and crime in urban areas that had been marked for assistance.

Positive comments (4 online subsidies, 5 references in NVivo) Canada highlighted Colombia as undergoing a historic peace process, as a growing middle-​income country with great economic and agricultural potential (Gobernación General de Canadá, 2017; Government of Canada, 113

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Table 6.3: Canada negative comments in specific sub-​national places Scale

Specific place mentioned Comment

Departments

Caquetá

Weak or absent state education provision.

Five departments (not specified)

Most mine contaminated.

Four regions (not specified)

The poorest/​most impoverished.

Catatumbo

Violence and conflict affected.

Tumaco

Violence against women above national average due to ‘illegally armed people, drug traffickers and high unemployment that continues to plague the area’. One of the cities (most) affected by the internal armed conflict.

17 biggest cities in the country

Places within the cities where violence and crime are affecting the most vulnerable population.

Regions Cities

Sources: Embajada de Canadá, 2017a, c, d; Embassy of Canada, 2018; Government of Canada, 2017b and c, 2018a and b

2018b; Embajada de Canadá, 2017c). Ambassador Marcel Lebleu referred to Colombia as a country that had changed from the difficult situation of the 1990s in terms of its security, growing cities, a more attractive economy for Canadian investors, growing tourism with high potential, more direct flights between Canada and Colombia, and positive changes in society and its institutions (Lebleu, 2017).

Sweden Negative comments (8 online subsidies, 18 references in NVivo) Sweden referred to Colombia as a once conflict-​r idden nation, with peace under challenge, with the highest rate of journalists murdered annually since the early 2000s, and with many challenges remaining and differences between regions and social groups. Regarding sub-​national spaces, communications referred to conflict-​affected regions, areas or zones, and regions left behind ‘in terms of social services and income opportunities’ (Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2016, 2017b and c, 2018b and c; SIDA, 2017b and c; Embajada de Suecia, 2019).

Positive comments (3 online subsidies, 4 references in NVivo) Online subsidies referred to peace in Colombia ‘taking root’, and Colombia as an important inspiration to the world, travelling ‘far on its path towards 114

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peace.’ In addition, Colombia was described as a model of women’s involvement in reconciliation and peacebuilding (Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2017d, 2018a and c). Communications did not refer to sub-​national spaces in an explicitly positive fashion.

The United Kingdom Negative comments (13 online subsidies, 28 references in NVivo) The UK foregrounded Colombia as one of the most mine-​affected countries in the world (FCO, 2016b), and a very violent and geographically challenging country, with criminal bands and ELN guerrillas roving around (Schipanni, 2016). Regarding sub-​national spaces, UK subsidies made general references to issues at different scales, without a great deal of distinction between them. Communications referred to regions and areas most affected by conflict or former conflict areas; vulnerable areas or regions most affected by poverty or with poor medical facilities; isolated, remote or off-​grid regions and areas; and biodiverse regions with difficult access to due to its internal armed conflict.3 The only specified place was Medellín, described as ‘once derided for being the murder capital of the world’ (DIT, 2016b).

Positive comments (11 online subsidies, 32 references in NVivo) At national level, online communications4 referred, first, to Colombia as coming a long way towards consolidating the peace process, a great success story, an example to the world, a beacon of hope to the world and a post-​ conflict Colombia. Second, the UK made references to Colombia as the second-​most biodiverse nation, mega-​diverse or with vast diversity and ‘one of the most unexplored and biodiverse regions of the world’ (Republic of Colombia and the UK, 2016). Third, online subsidies praised Colombia’s sound economic performance and management, sustained and fast growth, economic dynamism, status as the fourth-​largest economy in Latin America, business-​friendly orientation and potential for British investors. For example, officials praised the country as ‘home to some of the continent’s leading businesses, from retail to construction to aviation’ (FCO et al, 2016b); ‘a land of commercial opportunity’, with 17 trade agreements, seven investment agreements in place and a GDP larger than Ireland’s (DIT and Fox, 2016). 3

4

See: BEIS and Hurd, 2016; DIT, 2016a; FCO, 2016b, 2018b, 2019b; FCO and Ahmad, 2017; FCO et al, 2016b, 2018; FCO and Rycroft, 2018; Healthcare UK et al, 2016; Tibber, 2016; Republic of Colombia and the UK, 2016; Semana, 2016c. See: BEIS and Hurd, 2016; DIT and Fox, 2016; FCO, 2017b; FCO and Duncan, 2018; FCO and Rycroft, 2018; FCO et al, 2016a, 2016b; FCO and Rycroft, 2018; Healthcare UK et al, 2016; Miscioscia, 2016. 115

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At sub-​n ational level, communications referred to post-​c onflict or recovering-​from-​conflict areas (FCO and Duncan, 2017; FCO et al, 2018). Specifically, Medellín was mentioned as an innovation capital (DIT and Fox, 2016), and Cartagena was praised by UK companies’ representatives as ‘one of the most fascinating Colombian cities on the Caribbean coast’, with ‘lively citizens, delicious gastronomy and booming trade, together with its tourist activity and bustling cargo port’, and the most important tourist city in the country (Mugica, 2016, p 63; Semana, 2016a, p 74).

The European Union Negative comments (20 subsidies, 33 references in NVivo) At a national level, EU subsidies referred to the violent 50-​year armed conflict affecting Colombia, which destabilized the country, caused 200,000 deaths and the internal displacement of 5 million people (EEAS, 2016a). Regarding sub-​national spaces, communications referred indistinctively to non-​specified regions, zones, rural areas and territories (most) affected by armed conflict, illegal activities or violence. At the same time, subsidies referred to marginalized and vulnerable regions, zones and areas where people have struggled to meet basic needs (EEAS, 2016a and b, 2017b, i, j, l, 2018a, b, c, d, e, f, g). Table 6.4 shows specific places mentioned, in line with these comments. Other comments about non-​specified sub-​national spaces included rural zones being high risk, sensitive or difficult for social leaders and their communities; the unequal access to rent for men and women; and the distant nature of rural zones and territories. Official communications also referred to territories affected by weak presence of the state and poor delivery of public services (EEAS, 2016a, 2017c, e, g, h). Table 6.4: EU negative comments in specific sub-​national places Scale

Specific place mentioned

Comment

Departments/​ territories

Cauca, Valle, Chocó and Meta

Marginal territories affected by conflict.

Caquetá

Very affected by the internal armed conflict.

12 departments

Sensitive regarding human rights.

205 municipalities where protected areas (environmentally) have been secured

Highest poverty rates.

Municipalities

Sources: EEAS, 2017a, g, h, i, o, p

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Table 6.5: EU positive comments in specific sub-​national places Scale

Specific place mentioned

Comment

Department

Caquetá

Rich in local initiatives of social development, inclusion and reconciliation; with agricultural potential and ecological and touristic value.

Municipalities

Bolívar, Roldanillo, La Unión, Toro, Argelia, El Dovio y Trujillo (north of Valle)

Varied and quality fruit and vegetable production, important natural hydric network and available potable water system.

Sources: EEAS, 2017f and 2017p

Positive comments (9 subsidies, 13 references in NVivo) The EU highlighted Colombia as a country moving forward through the peace process, in a historical moment of consolidation of peace, and its peace process as an example for other places in the world; a post-​conflict Colombia of peace and reconciliation. At the same time, communications referred to areas of the country where the war had ended. The economic potential of non-​specified sub-​national spaces was also highlighted by communications referring to areas of the country rich in natural resources, or cities and municipalities with (high) tourism potential (EEAS, 2017d, i, k, m, n, 2018e and f). Table 6.5 shows positive comments made in relation to specified places, highlighting local peacebuilding initiatives and agricultural and tourism potential.

The United Nations Negative comments (68 subsidies, 109 references in NVivo) At a national level, the UN presented a Colombia not in peace; divided or hit by the armed conflict, forced displacement of millions from homes in its countryside, and, after Afghanistan, the country with the greatest number of anti-​personnel mines in its territory. Communications also pointed at the country suffering the impact of the presence of hundreds of thousands of people leaving Venezuela, and the presence and expansion of widespread coca crops. Regarding its economy, comments noted that Colombia only used a fourth of its cultivable agricultural land, had contrasting very developed and very abandoned areas, and was one of the most unequal countries in South and Central America in terms of land distribution (ONU and FAO, 2017a; ONU, 2017f and aa, 2018b, c, d, e, q, r, s, t, y). One communication pointed out that recruitment for illegal armed groups in 32 departments 117

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of Colombia (so, all of them) related to low economic indicators; social marginalization; presence of illegal economies, activities and zones of transit; intrafamily and sexual violence; absence of family, group and institutional positive references; lack of access to institutional services and training, work and participation opportunities (ONU, 2018ae). At sub-​n ational level,5 communications referred to non-​specified regions, zones, places, areas, zones, territories and municipalities that were vulnerable and (most) harmed, impacted or affected (historically) by violence, conflict and war. In connection with this, online subsidies mentioned diverse regions and places affected by people’s lack of human rights, including poor access to health and threats and lack of guarantees for social leaders, HR defenders and members of community organizations, as well as for children and teenagers vulnerable to recruitment to illegal armed groups. At the same time, communications pointed to regions, territories and national border zones affected by drug trafficking and an increase in coca crops. In addition, online subsidies pointed broadly to rural areas and zones being affected by underdevelopment: with few economic alternatives, far inferior opportunities in comparison with cities, lack of access to education and health, and reproduction of structural conditions for hunger. The latter included ethnic exclusion, gender inequality, lack of access to land and productive assets, the rural-​urban gap and territorial inequality, and lack of social services. Communications also referred to the (most) remote or far-​away rural areas and territories or villages (aldeas) that had difficult access and lack of institutional presence, without specifying places. Table 6.6 shows comments made regarding specified places, in line with the overall comments.

Positive comments (29 subsidies, 48 references in NVivo) Positive comments6 referred to Colombia as an example and of fundamental importance for the world and other countries in conflict due to its peace process, women’s participation in it and the most advanced legislation for IDPs worldwide, along with its willingness to reconstruct along principles of conviviality, tolerance and reconciliation. Similarly, communications mentioned sub-​national spaces including territories and zones that were previously affected by conflict as places of peace, hope or with an opportunity 5

6

See: ONU, 2016b and c, 2017b–​e, i–​l, r–​w, ac–​ae, ag–​ah, 2018b, d–​g, i, k, q, s, u, v, w, ab, ac, ah, aj, ak, am–​ar, 2019b, c, d; ONU and FAO, 2017a and b; ONU et al, 2018; UN News Centre, 2018a and c. See: ONU, 2017d, f, h, k, l, q; 2018b, c, g, q, t, w, y, an; 2019 f, and g; ONU and FAO, 2017a and b; UN News Centre, 2018b. 118

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Table 6.6: UN negative comments in specific sub-​national places Specific place

Comment

Departments

Chocó

Humanitarian emergency and increase in violence, critical security situation. Highest rate of females under 14 with children. A peripheric Colombia where the state is not present.

Nariño

One of the most affected departments for threats and lack of guarantees for social leaders, HR defenders, and members of community organizations. The most affected for the increase in coca crops.

Nariño and Cauca

Communities still lack fundamental guarantees two years after the peace agreement with FARC.

22 departments

Conditions of poverty, historic marginalization, lack of institutional presence in their rural zones.

Pacific coast

One of the regions most affected by forced displacement.

Catatumbo

One of the regions still in situation of violence where communities still lack fundamental guarantees two years after the peace agreement with FARC.

Tumaco (Nariño)

Port city, armed conflict has torn communities apart and there is still a long path to peace.

Mocoa (Putumayo)

One of the Colombian cities with greatest density of displaced population.

(Sub-​)regions

119

Cities and municipalities

María la Baja (Bolívar), Montañita Part of the 170 municipalities prioritized, are highly affected by conflict, and characterized by extreme poverty, (Caquetá), El Tambo (Cauca), institutional and administrative weakness, illicit crops, and other illegal economies. Istmina (Chocó), Chaparral (Tolima)

Administrative spaces

La Victoria (Ipiales, Nariño)

For years people lived with fear of the atrocious episodes of violence and many were forced to displace. Now non-​state armed actors dispute for La Victoria as an enclave for illicit economies, drug production and trafficking, with low institutional presence, and HR violations including murders, land grabbing and recruitment of children and youngsters.

Mandé (Antioquia)

More than a decade ago, armed combat did not allowed access. Today there is no potable water, no roads, the river is three days away from the closest town and the town centre is two and a half days by mule.

ETCR Monterredondo (Miranda, Cauca)

Was for decades a recurrent witness of the armed conflict in Colombia.

Sources: ONU, 2016b, 2017h, l, q, s, 2018a, g, i, l ac, ah, aj, 2019g; ONU et al, 2018

International Framing of Peacebuilding Spaces

Scale

Shaping Peacebuilding in Colombia

to move on, transform and construct the country of reconciliation and peace, and leave conflict behind. Online subsidies talked about the country as moving towards a prosperous, modern and developed Colombia or one with very developed areas. It was praised for its vibrant economy, an active and hospitable civil society, successful development projects and being one of the oldest democracies in the world. Colombia was also labelled as one of the most biodiverse countries in the world, the only one in the region with more than 50 per cent of natural forests in its territory, and unique, with more than 300 types of ecosystem and thousands of flora and fauna species, many of which could not be found in other places. At the same time, the UN foregrounded its great potential to expand its agricultural area –​without affecting its forests –​ transforming the countryside into a world-​food pantry. Table 6.7 shows similar positive comments about specified places, including administrative spaces for demobilization of ex-​combatants that were created in the context of the peace agreement.

The World Bank Negative comments (5 online subsidies, 8 references in NVivo) World Bank communications pointed to Colombian poverty due to its armed conflict –​higher than the Latin American average, as well as its vulnerability to external shocks. Also, Colombian inequality was highlighted as one of the greatest in the region, with historical disparities between urban and rural areas. Online subsidies mentioned regions affected by conflict or underdevelopment, remoteness and being ‘shut out of government services’ (World Bank, 2017). Regarding the environment, communications referred to the low productivity of water management in Colombia compared with OECD countries, its high level of deforestation –​the size of Belgium over the last 25 years –​and its vulnerability to climate change, with high-​r isk areas for natural disasters (Banco Mundial, 2016, 2017a, 2018b).

Positive comments (6 online subsidies, 15 references in NVivo) At national level, the World Bank praised Colombia as a world example of the process of land restitution, and unique case in the world in prevention of scalation of forced grab and abandonment of land conflicts (Banco Mundial, 2018b). Also, Colombia was described as one of the ‘top economic performers in Latin America’, with ‘sound macroeconomic management’, a resilient economy, sustained growth and ‘one of fastest poverty reduction rates in the region’ (World Bank, 2018b). At sub-​national level, online communications described the Orinoquía region as the ‘last agricultural frontier’, with the potential to serve as a food 120

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Table 6.7: UN positive comments in specific sub-​national places Scale

Specific place

Comment

(Sub-​)regions

La Mojana (Sucre)

Beautiful part of Colombia (environment).

Amazon rainforest

Extremely important, not only a local resource but for all human beings, the lungs of the Earth.

Bogotá, D.C.

World City of Peace (Nobel Peace Prize award). Very developed, at the same level with New York, London or Paris.

Cities

Cartagena

City of HR (award).

Cities/​ municipalities

Amalfi, Angostura, Anorí, Belmira, Carolina del Príncipe, Don Matías, Entrerríos, Gómez Plata, Guadalupe, San Pedro de los Milagros, Santa Rosa de Osos, and Yolombó (Antioquia)

Associative capacity of its population.

Administrative spaces

Transitory places for the reception of underage combatants, (LTAs)

Safe spaces for the generation of opportunity and trust.

ECTR Monterredondo (Miranda, Cauca)

Very different from previous decades of conflict: with food supplements, high feeders, industrial fences and laying hens rather than military gear and armament.

ETCR in Meta and Caquetá and adjacent parks Tinigua, Picachos and Macarena

Beautiful waterfall in the Caño Rojo trail. One of the most beautiful and biodiverse zones in the world.

Sources: ONU, 2017s, t, 2018a, h, j, k, 2019d, e, f; ONU and CINU, 2017; ONU and UNICEF, 2017

source or a food basket for Colombia and the world, with ‘precious forests, water sources and biodiversity’ and more than 100 mammal species and 700 species of birds (World Bank, 2018a, Banco Mundial, 2018a). In addition, one online subsidy referred to the positive transformation of Medellin from being, three decades ago, one of the most violent cities in the world where nobody wanted to travel (blacklisted), and with an internationally recognized drug cartel and hitmen (sicarios). Today, Medellin had become a ‘model city’ of urban development, one of the most innovative cities on the planet –​‘inclusive, vibrant, competitive’ –​which won the 121

Shaping Peacebuilding in Colombia

City of the Year prize from the Wall Street Journal and Citi Group in 2013, experienced decreased violence and lower homicide rates than the country’s average, and where one of its formerly most dangerous neighbourhoods, Comuna 13, had become a tourist destination (Banco Mundial, 2017b).

The Inter-​American Development Bank Negative comments (8 online subsidies, 9 references in NVivo) At the national level, IDB communications highlighted Colombia as a country with high levels of deforestation, and social problems (BID, 2017a and c). At sub-​national level, the IDB referred broadly to territories affected by poverty (BID, 2018a). Online subsidies also mentioned zones, areas and territories, as well as specific municipalities and cities as affected by violence and the armed conflict, including Acandí, Carmen del Darién (Chocó), Tumaco (Pacific and Nariño border), Buenaventura (mid-​Pacific) and Mutatá (Urabá Antioqueño) (BID, 2018a and b; Colombia Sostenible, 2018a, b, c). In addition, the IDB characterized the capital city of Mocoa (Putumayo) by its geographical isolation, social, environmental and economic vulnerability, and diverse problems of infrastructure and urbanization (BID, 2017b).

Positive comments (4 online subsidies, 4 references in NVivo) At the national level, communications highlighted post-​conflict Colombia; the country as a pioneer in innovation where initiatives placed it at the same level of the highest-​income countries in the world, and one of the most rich and biodiverse countries in the world (BID, 2017a and d; Colombia Sostenible, 2018b). Regarding sub-​national spaces, communications referred to the department of Cauca and the city of Mocoa indistinctively as having the possibility of serving as a reference of social and economic post-​conflict development (BID, 2017b).

MAPP/​OEA Negative comments (29 online subsidies, 48 references in NVivo) At national and sub-​national levels, including regions, territories, zones and local places, communications7 referred to those (most) affected by the presence or entrenchment (for many years) of armed conflict, violence and criminality. These included territories historically controlled by FARC, subject to violent dynamics for the control of illicit economies

7

See: Caracol Radio, 2018; El Espectador, 2017, 2018a and b; El País, 2017; El Tiempo, 2017c; MAPP/​OEA, 2016b, 2017a, b, d, e, g–​n; 2018a, b, c, e. 122

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Table 6.8: MAPP/​OEA negative comments in specific sub-​national places Scale

Specific place

Comment

Departments

Norte de Santander

Violence makes journalism difficult.

Valle del Cauca

Greatest number of aggressions to social leaders and HR defenders as well as presence of ELN and FARC guerrillas and social conflicts.

Guaviare, Meta and Caquetá

Presence of FARC dissidents.

Guaviare, Nariño and Chocó

The most complex zones for the presence and disputes among illegal armed actors.

Arauca, Caquetá, Cauca, Córdoba, Putumayo, Chocó y Meta

Some of the most distant and conflictive regions in the country.

(Sub-)regions

Cities

Urabá Antioqueño Bajo Cauca Antioqueño

Territorial disputes for the control of illicit crops and mining.

Catatumbo

Historical presence of FARC and ELN guerrilla organizations. A region of war and conflict, with populations in constant fear, a geostrategic country border of interest and dispute zone for active illegal armed groups, a region with poverty, lacking basic services and opportunities, with an inhabitant describing themselves as the forgotten sons of Colombia, and where the press restricts its work due to violence. One of the most complex zones because of its violence and the presence of non-​ demobilized EPL guerrillas. Historically framed by the armed conflict and in a serious situation.

South-​west Colombia

Most affected by conflict.

Zones of the Pacific corridor

Scenarios of dispute among illegal armed actors with a great risk for the population.

Cali

Vulnerable zones.

Municipalities Alto Baudó, Truandó and Armed confrontations between guerrillas Salaquí (Chocó) and criminal bands for mobility routes towards the Pacific. Sources: Bohórquez Contreras, 2016; El Espectador, 2018b; El Tiempo, 2017a, b, c; MAPP/​OEA, 2016f, 2017a

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and disputes among armed actors, or zones with harassment and threats by residual illicit groups, paramilitaries or FARC dissidents. In addition to the presence of armed conflict, communications referred to (the most) remote and isolated rural areas and territories, with a weak or non-​existent state presence, multiple, long-​term social demands, and where consolidating the perception of peace changing daily lives has not been possible. Table 6.8 shows comments made to specified places in which the presence of armed actors is the dominant feature that was highlighted across different scales.

Positive comments (9 subsidies, 11 references in NVivo) At national level, one of OEA’s communications referred to Colombia as transiting a hopeful path. At sub-​national level, subsidies mentioned non-​specified key zones for post-​conflict and territories free of FARC, armed conflict and war. At the same time, one OEA communication praised farmers’ reservations (ZRC) as important for the recognition of territorial rights of thousands of peasants (Bohórquez Contreras, 2016; Caracol Radio, 2018; MAPP/O ​ EA, 2017f, 2018d). Table 6.9 shows positive comments made regarding specified places coinciding with some of the broad comments identified.

Table 6.9: MAPP/​OEA positive comments in specific sub-​national places Scale

Specific place

Comment

Departments

Cauca

Social organization capacities beyond doubt.

Putumayo

Wide extractive petroleum activity.

South of Córdoba and Bolívar, Bajo Ariari (in the South of Meta department), Catatumbo, and the mountain range and coast of Nariño

Key post-​conflict zones.

Catatumbo

Geostrategic border area, rich in fertile areas and mining resources.

Cali

Pivot for post-​conflict.

(Sub-)regions

Cities

Sources: El Espectador, 2018c; El Tiempo, 2017a and c; MAPP/​OEA, 2016f

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7

International Actors’ Framing of Peacebuilding Agendas This chapter offers a comparative look at the ways in which the international community prioritized peacebuilding agendas of intervention linked to national and local spaces. In other words, it examines how each international actor foregrounded agendas in targeted spaces for peacebuilding intervention, using examples from online communications to illustrate some of the broader trends observed. Agendas were linked to recommendations for action, information about activities or strategies carried out, and expressions of support, concern or condemnation in online subsidies. The latter was included in the analysis as it reflected the desire for something to be addressed (agenda setting) and a call for state action (see Appendix 1 for a description of agendas).

Overall trends Figure 7.1 shows the overall number of subsidies found per agenda. Most communications referred to development, followed by peace process, security, governance and HR agendas. Regarding development, in particular, most subsidies referred to social fabric (159), followed by economic development and food security (141), environment (65) and media and communication (13). In relation to the peace process, specifically, most subsidies referred to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) and recruitment prevention (122), followed by negotiation and implementation of the peace agreement (119) and transitional justice (TJ) (66). Concerning security, most subsidies included comments on monopoly of force (113), followed by tackling illegal economies (55) and de-​mining (21). In terms of governance, most online subsidies referred to institutionalization and the rule of law (108), followed by infrastructure and social services (62) and land governance (46). Regarding human rights, most communications mentioned HR alongside

125

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Figure 7.1: Broader agendas in online subsidies (all actors included) 268 249

Development

Peace process

161

156

Security

Governance

143

Human rights

Source: Author’s elaboration from NVivo database

humanitarian aid (89), followed by security guarantees for HR defenders (62) and against gender-​based violence (22). Figure 7.2 compares actors using percentages of subsidies linked to different agendas per total of subsidies for each actor’s total subsidies. In other words, it shows which actors focused the greatest percentage of their online subsidies to comments in support of each agenda, in comparison with other actors. In general, the US, EU, IDB and World Bank foregrounded socio-​economic development; Canada and the UK, security agendas; Sweden, the UN and OAS, aspects related to the peace process. Comments around human rights were not identified as a theme in either the World Bank or IDB subsidies, and the latter organization did not refer directly either to the peace process or security dynamics. In comparison with other actors, the IDB and the World Bank focused the most on socio-​economic development; OAS and the UN on peace process dimensions; the UK and Canada on security. The World Bank and OAS, on strengthening governance; and OAS and UK on human-​r ights agendas. Figure 7.3 shows the overall number of subsidies mentioning each of the Colombian departments. Taking the overall sample, it is clear that Antioquia, Cauca, Nariño, Chocó and Meta were the departments that concentrated most of the online subsidies’ attention from the international actors explored in the pacific region and limits between the Orinoquía and Amazon regions. 126

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Figure 7.2: Percentage of subsidies linked to international actors’ agendas 5.6

14.0

29.6

14.1

11.2

39.4

40.6 18.2

19.7 18.7

21.2

127 USA

20.56

41.4

48.1

16.67 17.65

44.60

58.33

31.0

24.1

36.8

22.65

27.6

36.8

28.1

31.0

34.9

Sweden

UK

OAS

18.82 83.33

50.7 36.4

EU

Canada

Development Source: Author’s elaboration from NVivo database

16.67

76.47 28.1

6.1 43.9

9.4

31.1

Governance

Human rights

32.75

UN

Peace process

IDB

Security

World Bank

International Framing of Peacebuilding Agendas

29.0

21.9

Shaping Peacebuilding in Colombia

Figure 7.3: Number of subsidies per Colombian department

20 13 12

20

10 32

28

10

75 61

2

3

38 75

26

21 6

3

7

5

22 52

9

1 22

68 35

2

36

5

Source: Author’s elaboration from NVivo database

Figure 7.4 shows the number of departments mentioned by the actors analysed. The UN mentioned the most departments in the overall sample, followed by OAS, USA and EU. These were also the actors with more references to sub-​national spaces. In comparison with other countries, the USA referenced all the agendas and covered a greater scope of (sub-​)regions, departments, municipalities and cities. Meanwhile the UN, OAS and EU 128

International Framing of Peacebuilding Agendas

Figure 7.4: Number of departments mentioned by international actors 30 26

25

17 14 7

World Bank

IDB

Canada

UK

EU

USA

OAE

UN

3

1 Sweden

9

Source: Author’s elaboration from NVivo database

communications referred to all agendas in (sub-​)regions, departments, cities, municipalities and smaller territorial subdivisions (veredas, corregimientos, city areas) and specified Indigenous and Afro-​Colombian territories, demobilization areas, PDET (UN), national parks (UN, MAPP/​OEA), and peasant reserves –​ZRC (MAPP/​OEA). Conversely, Sweden and the World Bank mentioned the fewest number of departments, and sub-​ national spaces tended to be limited to broader regions, main cities and a few targeted municipalities.

The USA The USA foregrounded development and security agendas, including development of the economy and food security, tackling illegal economies, and strengthening social fabric (Table A.1, Appendix 2). Regarding economic development and illegal economies, online subsidies referred to various programmes for improving skills, financial and physical infrastructure and entrepreneurial capacities in rural areas using private investment and public-​private partnerships to generate alternative sources of income away from illegal crops, for example in the cacao and coffee industries. In addition, USAID supported a ‘Land and Rural Development Program’, a pilot approach to reduce time and costs associated with securing land titles and 129

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strengthen governmental funding for rural development in Bolivar, Sucre, Cesar, Cauca, Tolima and Meta (Embajada de EEUU en Colombia, 2018f; USAID, 2017k, l, u). Tackling illegal economies also involved support to the Colombian security forces through donations of equipment (for example, boats and helicopters), training and infrastructure for manual eradication and counter-​drug operations, as well support for a Fusion and Operations Centre (CEFOP) in Caucasia (Antioquia) for the integration of police operations. In addition, USAID promoted the programme ‘Artisanal Gold Mining’ for strengthening legislation and government capacity to formalize small-​scale artisanal gold mining in Chocó and Antioquia (Embajada de EEUU en Colombia, 2017d and e, 2018a; USAID, 2018b). In relation to social development, communications pointed to rural development initiatives as contributing to a rebuild of social fabric, along with other programmes engaging in rural education and educational exchanges. Examples of the latter included the volunteering scheme ‘Peace Corps’ to support English teaching in schools in Caribbean departments of La Guajira, Magdalena, Bolívar and Atlántico; the programme ‘English for Girls’ in the Amazon; the programme ‘Ser +​Maestro’ (Be +​Teacher) to train school teachers in Antioquia in English as a second language and citizenship education; and ‘Force 100,000 in the Americas’ to promote educational exchanges in higher education between US and Colombian universities geared towards knowledge sharing applied to peacebuilding initiatives (Embajada de EEUU en Colombia, 2017c and e, 2018g and h). Regarding specific places linked to broader peacebuilding agendas in US communications (see Table A.3, Appendix 2), in relation to other countries in the sample, the USA covered a greater scope of agendas and sub-​national spaces including (sub-​)regions, departments, municipalities and cities specified in online subsidies. Online communications seemed to focus, to a greater extent, on municipalities and smaller territorial subdivisions in the department of Antioquia, in comparison with other departments where the focus on sub-​regions or main cities tended to prevail. This was related to programmes such as ‘Antioquia free from Coca’, which offered a multi-​pronged approach including institutional support and security and income-​generating initiatives to tackle illegal economies (Embajada de EEUU en Colombia, 2017e). In addition, spaces were linked to more than one peacebuilding agenda. For example, Orinoquía was mentioned in relation to both the promotion of development and governance. Accordingly, the region was targeted for environmental conservation and agro-​industry development –​including the necessary infrastructure to support it, under the USAID programme ‘Natural Wealth’, which also covered Bolívar, Sucre, Cesar, La Guajira, Casanare and Vichada (USAID, 2017s). In addition, departments including Córdoba, 130

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Tolima, Cauca, Antioquia, Nariño, Guaviare, Chocó, Arauca, Caquetá and Meta attracted promotion of all the broader agendas. The exceptions were Magdalena river basin and the Caribbean, as well as the departments of Casanare and Vichada, linked only to the promotion of environmental development agendas with an emphasis on state-​led governance (via the ‘Natural Wealth Programme’) and the environmental adaptation capacity of the Magdalena River (USAID, 2017x). The only agendas unrelated to specific sub-​n ational spaces were the development of media and communication (in rural Colombia), protection for community leaders and HR defenders, and negotiation and implementation of the peace process. Online subsidies referred to several municipalities, departments or regions linked to the protection of community leaders and HR defenders, and ethnic territories (Afro-​Colombian and Indigenous) in relation to agendas of developing social fabric, security land governance and restitution, and the negotiation and implementation of the peace agreement.

Canada Canadian communications foregrounded development and security agendas, including strengthening of social fabric, and mine clearance, followed by monopoly of force and HR assistance regarding GBV (Table A.1, Appendix 2). Regarding social fabric, communications promoted model initiatives to generate Wikipedia profiles of Colombian women leaders in Bogotá, the appointment of a girl from Tumaco as Ambassador for a day to celebrate International Day of the Girl in Bogotá, as well as funding for improvements to the education system in Caquetá. Communications related to anti-​ personnel mines included the Global De​mining Initiative for Colombia and the Halo Trust in Meta and ten affected municipalities, and assistance to survivors with Handicap International. In addition, recognition of the work of local organizations and promotion of the rights of landmine victims was carried out through the CaMINA Award. Regarding monopoly of force, communications foregrounded support for UN peacekeeping activities, military reform, police training and capacity-​building in 17 Colombian cities. A GBV agenda involved highlighting stories of survivors and fostering recognition for leaders working for women’s rights. For example, communications mentioned a media project involving 15 GBV survivors in Tumaco (Nariño) for the campaign ‘Now is Not the Time to be Silent’, presented during Colombia’s National Day of Journalists; the Human Rights Leader Award to acknowledge organizations and projects working for women’s rights; and sex education in schools of four of the poorest regions (Embajada de Canadá, 2017a, b, c; Embassy of Canada, 2018; Government of Canada, 2017a and b, 2018a and c, 2019b; PM of Canada, 2017). 131

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In relation to specific places linked to broader peacebuilding agendas in Canadian online subsidies, first, explicit references focused on south-​west Colombia in the departments of Nariño, Valle del Cauca, Putumayo and Chocó; Orinoquía departments of Meta and Caquetá; and the north-​east Andean department of Norte de Santander and sub-​region of Catatumbo. Second, (sub-​)regions, departments and key cities were foregrounded instead of municipalities and smaller territorial subdivisions. Third, sub-​national places such as the departments of Nariño, Valle del Cauca, Caquetá and Meta were targeted for more than one peacebuilding agenda, but places like Bogotá (social fabric) and Santander, Tolima and Norte de Santander (de-​ mining) were related to one agenda only (Table A.4, Appendix 2). Canadian communications did not refer to the development of media and communication, illegal economies or the protection of HR activists and social leaders. Online subsidies made vague references to municipalities, departments and regions, without mentioning them directly, regarding improvements in monopoly of force, de-​mining, GBV and DDR and recruitment prevention. In addition, unspecified mentions of ethnic territories (mainly afro-​Colombian) were also made in relation to GBV agendas.

Sweden Swedish online subsidies foregrounded support for the negotiation and implementation of the peace process and monopoly of force (see Table A.1, Appendix 2). Communications stressed the importance of the peace agreement for socio-​economic inclusivity in Colombia, highlighted support for Colombian institutions, including the High Commissioner for Peace and the Ministry of Post-​Conflict, and international ones, including the four post-​ conflict multi-​funds, the UN Peace Fund and the UN Verification Mission. Communications also praised the inclusion of the gender perspective of the peace agreement, the leadership of women and women’s organizations and the need to explore the role of men and women in the peace agreement implementation (Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2017e, 2018a; Samuelsson, 2017; SIDA, 2017b). Communications related to monopoly of force advocated ‘reforming the security sector to increase civilian insight and control’ and supplementing military operations with development initiatives (Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2017b). They also called for UN verification of security guarantees for FARC ex-​combatants and governmental security provision in conflict-​affected areas (Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2017d). In addition, online subsidies praised women’s roles in negotiating local ceasefires, thus improving local security across the country (Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2018d). However, communications referred more generally about towns and villages or conflict-​ affected areas than specific departments or sub-​national spaces. 132

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In relation to specific places that were mentioned linked to broader peacebuilding agendas (Table A.5, Appendix 2), first, communications did not refer to de​mining or specified any sub-national spaces w ​ ith regard to agendas of environmental development, institutionalization, GBV and peace process. Second, explicit references focused on the department of Magdalena on the Caribbean coast and La Secreta municipality, located in that department, linked to agendas of economic development and food security as well as land governance and restitution, as Sweden supported a project of rural development implemented by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) with displaced populations included in the land restitution programme (SIDA, 2017b). At the same time, Bogotá was linked both to media and communication development and human rights and humanitarian aid agendas linked to Swedish support for the Bogotá-​ based Foundation for Press Freedom (FLIP) (Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2016). Online communications referred to non-​specified places, including numbers of municipalities, departments and regions in relation to agendas of land governance and restitution.

The United Kingdom UK communications foregrounded security and development agendas, including monopoly of force, the strengthening of the economy and food security as well as the support of infrastructure and social services (Table A.1, Appendix 2). Online subsidies also expressed a concern about the expansion of illegal activities, competition for territorial control and lack of security guarantees for FARC ex-​combatants, particularly in the Pacific region, calling on the Colombian government to properly resource its strategy for security guarantees, while praising its efforts against illegal groups across the country and supporting the work of the UN Verification Mission in this regard. Subsidies also mentioned UK support for security provisions through its Conflict Security and Stability Fund (CSSF), training and expertise for Colombian security forces in peacekeeping, assistance of the National Crime Agency to the Colombian police and the Office of the Attorney General. The latter included intelligence exchange, monitoring and financial and technical support and expertise against drug-​trafficking activities (Allen, 2018; FCO, 2016b, 2018b; MoD and Fallon, 2016; Semana, 2016a). Agendas of economic development highlighted: UK investment in Colombia’s cities, including in the oil and gas sector in Barranquilla; UK export finance of up to £1 billion ‘support for UK trade with Colombia’; a Lloyds of London office in Bogotá; ‘Prosperity Fund’ support for British companies’ infrastructure projects in Colombian cities, railway regeneration, agricultural exports and insurance; and a Savills’ 133

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contract for choosing the brands included the new shopping centre in Cartagena La Serrezuela. At the same time, support for infrastructure and social services was reflected in investment for UK companies’ provision of railways, clear water, renewable electricity, and medical facilities in rural areas, and planning advice in cities like Montería about planting native trees along main roads (DIT, 2016; DIT and Fox, 2016; FCO et al, 2016b; FCO, PM’s Office and Boris Johnson 2016; Martínez, 2016; Semana, 2016c). In relation to specific places mentioned that were linked to broader peacebuilding agendas (Table A.6, Appendix 2), first, specific sub-​national places included departments in the Caribbean region (Bolívar, Sucre, Atlántico, Magdalena and Córdoba), the Pacific region (Valle del Cauca, Cauca, Nariño and Chocó), and the Andean region (Antioquia, Caldas, Tolima, Santander and Cundinamarca). Second, institutionalization and infrastructure and HR and humanitarian-​aid agendas made up the greater number of departments mentioned. Regarding the latter, the UK promoted the respect of human rights among UK companies, lobbied for the protection of HR activists, and supported the prevention of sexual violence (Gnecco, 2016). Third, most sub-​national places mentioned included departments rather than municipalities or smaller territorial subdivisions. Fourth, some places were linked to more than one agenda, for example Bogotá, Antioquia, Bolívar (and its capital city Cartagena), Atlántico (and its capital Barranquilla) and Valle del Cauca. Others were discussed in relation to only one agenda, including the departments of Sucre, Cauca, Nariño, Chocó and Norte de Santander (HR and humanitarian aid); the Amazon region (environmental development), the Pacific region (monopoly of force), the railway line between La Dorada and Santa Marta (infrastructure) and Tolima (strengthening social fabric). Online subsidies did not make specific references to sub-​national places regarding media and communication development or land governance and restitution. References to Colombia nationally included de​mining, institutionalization (along with rural areas), implementation of the peace agreement and transitional justice. Vaguer references to numbers of municipalities, departments or regions, without mentioning them directly, were made in relation to infrastructure and social services, development and food security, illegal economies, DDR and recruitment prevention and GBV. Communications also mentioned rural roads in relation to provisions of infrastructure and civic services. Regarding administrative spaces created by the Colombian government for peacebuilding, the UK mentioned zones for demobilization, former FARC areas, areas for reintegration and 60 municipalities in relation to DDR, economic development and tackling illegal economies.

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The European Union EU communications foregrounded support for economic, food-​security and social-​fabric development in line with the first point of the peace agreement on comprehensive rural reform (Table A.2, Appendix 2). The EU promoted financial support for the Colombian state that would be geared towards rural development policy, regional competitiveness and sustainable development, with international allies including FAO and Cooperativa Mondragón (from Spain), and national ones such as the network of local development agencies –​ Red Adelco. Programmes in rural areas assisted environmentally sustainable local production and marketing initiatives, innovative start-​ ups, formalization and increased local agriculture and manufacturing for export within the framework of the free trade agreement between EU and Colombia. Communications referred to support of productive projects such as empowering socio-​economically peasant associations, afro-​Colombian, Indigenous, women, young people, and ex-​combatants in demobilization and reincorporation spaces. Besides these projects, subsidies mentioned support for the development of social fabric reflected in scholarships to study medicine in Cuba for victims and ex-​combatants (EEAS, 2016, 2017b, f, g, j, l, m, q, r, s, 2018f and h). In relation to specific places linked to broader peacebuilding agendas, first, EU subsidies targeted places across all the sub-​agendas identified in the study, and communications referred to departments in the Caribbean, Pacific, Andean, Orinoquía and Amazon regions, covering a broad scope of sub-​ national spaces. Accordingly, communications referred to departments, (sub-​) regions, municipalities, smaller territorial subdivisions (veredas, corregimientos), Indigenous reservations, settlement areas next to rivers and spaces for demobilization (ZVTN and ETCR). Second, development concentrated mostly on departments and smaller territorial spaces in comparison with other agendas; specified demobilization spaces were distinctively linked to peace-​process agendas, and Indigenous reservations were linked to HR ones. Third, most departments, except for Huila (protection for HR defenders and community leaders), were linked to more than one peacebuilding agenda (Table A.7, Appendix 2). Less specific references to numbers of municipalities, departments or regions were made in relation to sub-​agendas of economic development and food security, environmental development, social fabric, institutions and the rule of law, land governance and restitution, human rights and humanitarian aid, DDR and recruitment prevention. In addition, while non-​specified ethnic territories and the zones of the peace-​agreement implementation were broadly related to human rights agendas, ZVTN and ETCR for demobilization were mentioned in relation to the DDR and prevention of recruitment agenda. 135

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The United Nations UN communications foregrounded support for DDR and recruitment prevention through UN representatives and the UN Verification Mission (see Table A.2, Appendix 2). This included monitoring the disarmament of FARC, the demobilization process of adults and children (with UNICEF), the reintegration process and security guarantees for ex-​combatants and communities –​condemning violence against ex-​combatants and calling for their protection. Subsidies also mentioned support for projects in partnership with international and local agencies aimed at fostering community trust in reintegration areas (including Indigenous territories) and preventing child recruitment through participation in peacebuilding and reconciliation initiatives (ONU, 2016e, 2017t, u, aa, 2018f, j, e, af). Online subsidies also reported on the support given through the UN multi-​fund in partnership with international and local agencies for primary education and job-​skills training in reintegration areas, including Indigenous and afro-​Colombian communities. For example, training was offered in crafts and design and technology, environmental conservation and tourism (with Norway), health care, food security and production and marketing of agricultural and livestock products (with FAO), as well as de-​mining. At the same time, communications highlighted community initiatives in reintegration areas involving the promotion of culture and sports (ONU, 2016d, 2017w, 2018m, n, p, u, x, z, ar). Regarding specific places mentioned that were linked to broader peacebuilding agendas in UN communications, online subsidies linked specific places to all the agendas observed in this study. In relation to other international actors in the sample, communications offered a more detailed account of sub-​national spaces including (sub-​)regions, river basins, cities, municipalities, smaller territorial subdivisions, Indigenous and afro-​ Colombian territories and administrative spaces for demobilization. Most departments were linked to more than one peacebuilding agenda, except for Caldas (economic development and food security), Vichada (transitional justice), Casanare (recruitment prevention) and Quindío (social fabric). Conversely, Antioquia, Cauca and Nariño were mentioned more heavily with regard to territories and administrative spaces for all the agendas in comparison with other departments (see Table A.8, Appendix 2). UN references to numbers of municipalities, departments or regions, without mentioning them directly, were made in relation to all the broader agendas, and, more specifically: economic development and food security, social fabric, media and communication, provisions of infrastructure and civic services, institutions and the rule of law, GBV, HR and humanitarian aid, community leaders and HR defenders, DDR and recruitment prevention, negotiation and implementation of the peace process, transitional justice, 136

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monopoly of force and the fight against illegal economies. Administrative spaces created for DDR were related to the agendas of economic development and food security, environmental development and social fabric; governance agendas of infrastructure and social services and institutionalization, GBV, DDR and implementation of the peace agreement; and security agendas of monopoly of force and de​mining. PDET municipalities were mentioned in relation to economic development and food security, social fabric,1 institutionalization and the rule of law, GBV, HR and humanitarian aid, implementation of the peace process and transitional justice. Indigenous territories were linked to agendas of institutionalization and the rule of law, HR and humanitarian aid, DDR, transitional justice and monopoly of force.

The World Bank Communications by the World Bank focused on development agendas, including economic and environmental development (see Table A.2, Appendix 2). Communications reported World Bank loans, technical expertise and knowledge exchange to support governmental capacity for land governance, updating of land information systems and budget management for development in rural areas (Banco Mundial, 2016); green growth in river transportation, energy and natural resources including water provision in the Pacific region (Banco Mundial, 2017d); fiscal sustainability and competitiveness in non-​extractive private sectors to help diversify the economy (Banco Mundial, 2017c); and reduction of vulnerability to disasters. At the same time, communications mentioned the Trust Fund contribution to conservation in the Amazon and cattle ranching (World Bank, 2018b), grants for the development of sustainable agriculture and carbon capture projects in the Orinoquía region (Banco Mundial, 2018 and World Bank, 2018b), and support for business leaders’ adoption of sustainable development goals including conservation of water resources (World Bank, 2017). Regarding specific places linked to broader peacebuilding agendas in the World Bank communications, in relation to other international organizations in the sample, they covered a limited scope of sub-​national spaces, mainly centred in Antioquia, the main cities of Bogotá (disaster risk management and reduction of vulnerabilities in public buildings) and Medellín (knowledge exchange regarding its development model for other Latin American cities) in the Andean region, South Pacific departments of Cauca, and Nariño (improvements in river navigation, water and sewage services) and the Orinoquía region (sustainable development of agricultural

1

The UN also linked media and communication work to PATR regions belonging to PDET municipalities. 137

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capacity and carbon capture). Most spaces were linked to more than one peacebuilding agenda, including Orinoquía and the Amazon (environmental conservation, economic development and food security). The exceptions were Cauca and Nariño, related to one broader agenda of infrastructure and civic-​services provision (river navigation, potable water, sewage) (see Table A.9, Appendix 2). World Bank communications did not refer to development of media and communication, DDR and recruitment prevention, tackling illegal economies or de-​mining. Regarding social fabric, HR, security or negotiation and implementation of the peace agreement, communications referred obliquely to Colombian territories and regions. Land governance and restitution and transitional justice were only linked to Colombia as a national space.

The Inter-​American Development Bank The IDB focused mainly on environmental development (see Table A.2, Appendix 2), by mentioning credits and support for environmentally sustainable oil production, early-​warning systems against flooding, climate change mitigation and adaptation of infrastructure in Mocoa Putumayo (BID, 2017b). Online subsidies also reported the promotion of environmentally sustainable development in PDET municipalities through the recovery and preservation of natural resources and income generation from sustainable rural production (BID, 2017c). At the same time, the Sustainable Colombia Fund was mentioned in terms of fostering ecotourism, reforestation, enhanced forest governance and sustainable development in PDET municipalities (BID, 2018a). The Fund also assisted the REDD+​+​Programme in Chocó that included Afro-​Colombian and Indigenous communities, restoration of ecosystems in Serranía de la Macarena national park, and carbon emissions monitoring (BID, 2018c). Regarding specific places linked to broader peacebuilding agendas, IDB communications covered departments in the Andean, Orinoquía and South Pacific regions, highlighting (sub-​)regions, departments, key cities, ethnic communities, roads and the Serranía de la Macarena national park. Only Putumayo was linked to more than one broader peacebuilding agenda, as the IDB supported the reconstruction of the city of Mocoa after landslides and river flooding caused by heavy rain in 2017 destroyed significant part of its infrastructure. The IDB aimed to support reconstruction of buildings, water and sewage infrastructure, relocating homes outside risk areas and promoting private investment, sustainable development and the improvement of road links with Ecuador for product commercialization (BID, 2017b). Otherwise, infrastructure was linked to country roads in Huila and Putumayo, and development was mentioned regarding the rest of places mentioned, 138

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including Bogotá, Cali and Pereira, targeted for a social impact bond to employ poor and displaced people in those cities (Table A.10, Appendix 2). IDB communications did not make specific references regarding social fabric, media and communication, land governance and restitution, HR, the peace process or security agendas. Non-​specified references to places were made regarding provision of infrastructure and social services (rural and country border roads), institutionalization (zones affected by conflict), economic development and food security and environmental development (PDET municipalities).

MAPP/​OEA MAPP/​OEA communications foregrounded support for the negotiation and implementation of the peace agreement, the development of social fabric and the support for institutionalization or strengthening the presence and administrative capacity of the state (Table A.2, Appendix 2). In the context of peace negotiations with the ELN and the implementation of the peace agreement with FARC, communications reported on the OAS mandate of monitoring territorial dynamics in 127 municipalities and 15 departments where FARC had demobilized but there was a presence of illegal armed actors. Online subsidies also condemned violence against social leaders, calling for justice and state protection of leaders and communities. Other communications reported on the work of the organization accompanying civil-​society processes, history and memory initiatives, HR, support of peace negotiations with the ELN and implementation of the peace agreement with FARC. The OAS Mission fostered meetings with local government representatives, female ex-​combatants and social leaders to discuss their participation in the peace process with the ELN and challenges in the implementation of the peace agreement with FARC, including PDET planning (MAPP/​OEA, 2016b, d, e, 2017i, n, p, r, t, v). Regarding social fabric, communications mentioned OAS’s accompaniment and support for civil-​society peacebuilding initiatives, as well as work fostering dialogue between civil society, state and security forces with regard to peacebuilding and coexistence. OAS highlighted training for social leaders on territorial peacebuilding, and for school staff and students on HR, IHL and peacebuilding. Support was also mentioned for Community Action Boards (Juntas de Acción Comunal) and Indigenous communities, advocating for the protection of the latter’s territorial rights, redress, political autonomy and participation. Communications also referred to assistance in projects of reconciliation involving female ex-​combatants, victims and residents in vulnerable communities. In addition, statements denounced violence against Community Action Boards, peasant, Indigenous and other social leaders, 139

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calling on the state for their protection (MAPP/​OEA, 2016c, 2017c, e, q, s, 2018f and h). The support for strengthening the presence and administrative capacity of the state was highlighted in terms of fostering dialogue between communities and institutions for post-​conflict planning in PDET municipalities, including Indigenous communities and ZRCs. Also, OAS mentioned briefings on security, governance, participation and media needs in 60 municipalities of 16 departments, offering recommendations to the Colombian government for post-​conflict planning (along with the EU), as well as on infrastructure and the social conditions in the prisons of Chocó department. Communications supported strengthening the Community Action Boards in managing local systems of justice and conciliation with the support of local HR organizations. In addition, subsidies advocated for greater judiciary and institutional presence, as well as state-​led prevention measures against violence from illegal armed actors. Furthermore, OAS highlighted its role in organizing regional gatherings to foster inter-​jurisdictional coordination between Indigenous, ordinary and transitional justice in the context of the implementation of the peace agreement (MAPP/​OEA, 2016f, 2017o, u, v, 2018c, d, g). Regarding specific places mentioned linked to broader peacebuilding agendas, MAPP/​O EA communications covered a broad range of departments in all the Colombian regions, including the insular region (San Andrés), which other actors did not mention, the latter in relation to the organization’s support of Community Action Boards. Communications also referred to (sub-​)regions, departments, cities, municipalities and smaller territorial subdivisions, Indigenous communities and administrative spaces, including farmers’ reserves (ZRC) and demobilization zones (ZVTN and PTN). More detailed references to local and Indigenous territories were found for Nariño, Chocó and Putumayo, in which all the agendas converged. Most departments were targeted for more than one agenda, except Boyacá, Santander, Quindío and Arauca (negotiation and implementation of the peace process), La Guajira (HR agendas supporting community leaders and HR defenders, HR and humanitarian aid), Vichada and Casanare (monopoly of force), Amazonas (inter-​jurisdictional coordination) and Tolima (transitional justice) (Table A.11, Appendix 2). Communications did not make specific references to places regarding de-​ mining. References to numbers of municipalities, departments or regions, without mentioning them directly, were made in relation to developments in media and communication, institutionalization and the rule of law, negotiation and implementation of the peace process, monopoly of force and illegal economies. Communications also referred broadly to country border areas regarding monopoly of force; mining municipalities regarding illegal economies; and ethnic territories (Indigenous and afro-​descendant) 140

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in relation to development (social fabric), the peace process (negotiation and implementation of the peace agreement) and security agendas (support for monopoly of force and against illegal economies). PDET municipalities and farmers’ reserves (ZRC) were also mentioned regarding governance agendas of infrastructure and civic services, institutions and the rule of law, negotiation and implementation of the peace process and support against illegal economies. ZVTN and PNT demobilization areas were linked to governance agendas of infrastructure and civic services, as well as institutions and the rule of law.

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Conclusion This book has explored how key international organizations and countries promoted geographically targeted peacebuilding efforts in Colombia between November 2016 and February 2019 through online subsidies. The work has captured this international dimension of framing under the notions of public mediated diplomacy, particularly in the exploration of online subsidies published in countries’ and international organizations’ web pages. The question guiding the work was to what extent the different frames regarding space transformation and peacebuilding promoted by key international actors reflected consensus, complementarity, dissent or dispersion, against the background of two Colombian governments opposed to each other over the peace process, and the implications of that for consolidating the peacebuilding initiatives of the government of Juan Manuel Santos. The short answer to this question is that, for the most part, consensus and complementarity were dominant features in the frames promoted by international actors in consolidating the presence of the state in targeted areas of the country as well as the institutional architecture post conflict. This did help to consolidate the peace agreement of the Santos government by legitimating the project as a state-​(rather than government-​) led multilateral intervention project, thus prompting Ivan Duque’s incoming government to continue its implementation. It is important to note, however, that some of the departures from the peace agreement by the Duque administration were in line with the US Trump administration and its turn to a more traditional focus in the war against drugs. International community members overall were weaker in confronting some key drivers of the structural violence denounced by local actors, including the counterproductive punitive approach of the war against drugs, neoliberal development that was at odds with territorial autonomy, and denounced political and institutional links to killings of HR activists and ex-​combatants all over the country. Chapter 3 showed that there were important differences between the Santos and the Duque administrations despite convergence on: a) promoting DDR; b) fighting illegal armed groups, illegal mining and violence 142

Conclusion

against social leaders and HR activists (understood as apolitical violence committed by criminal gangs) through law enforcement mechanisms; c) clearing territories from anti-​personnel mines; and d) strengthening local authority capacities and services for the provision of justice, land registry and development programmes. Despite these commonalities, Duque’s political party fundamentally disagreed on negotiations with left-​wing guerrillas as, in its view, it legitimized and advantaged illegal groups and gave them unfair rights to political participation. Once in power, Ivan Duque vowed to reform the peace agreement and the transitional justice mechanism (JEP) while presenting itself internationally as fulfilling the implementation and achieving a more inclusive agreement. As shown in Chapter 5, the government sought to reassure the international community about the continuation of the implementation of the peace agreement and the alignment of Colombia with international development, counter-​drugs, and human rights priorities. Although the government extended the UN Verification Mission and continued its commitment to DDR, there was no inclusion of a discrete chapter on a national development plan’s budget to implement the peace agreement, as institutionally required; and fewer international resources were channelled for peacebuilding purposes, as shown in Chapter 3. In addition, the Duque administration attempted reforms to the transitional justice mechanism and returned to the promotion of a more punitive approach to the war against drugs. The latter advocated forced eradication, extradition for FARC members suspected of drug trafficking, treatment of drug trafficking as an ordinary crime not subject to transitional justice, and the return of fumigation of coca crops with glyphosate. These reforms responded to US’s concerns about increased coca production in Colombia and the opioid crisis in the USA. Duque’s government also suspended the negotiations with ELN left-​wing guerrillas –​initiated by Santos –​after the attack by the ELN Police Academy in Bogotá on 17 January 2019. As shown in Chapter 5, FARC, and civil society actors explored, maintained a critical view of the Duque administration’s lack of substantive commitment to the peace agreement. At the same time, local actors were critical of the negative role of the Trump administration in the implementation of the agreement by its prioritizing of a traditionally prohibitionist and punitive war-​against-​drugs agenda, reflected in pressure for fumigation, forced eradication and extraditions. They also warned against the structural violence and steering of conflict caused by international investors and companies pushing for an extractive model of development in rural territories –​legal and illegal –​against territorial autonomy, traditional subsistence models and rights to land, which were at the roots of the violence against this population. In addition, local actors asserted the political element of the killings of ex-​combatants, civic and HR leaders by identifying former right-​wing 143

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paramilitary groups and groups in power as perpetrators, as they were fundamentally opposed to FARC’s inclusion in political life and community organizations’ assertion of territorial rights against development projects. In the light of this background, four propositions are put forward in this book. 1) Public diplomacy can be understood in a constructivist fashion when countries and organizations use communication to promote a public good such as peace, by counteracting negative public opinion regarding peacebuilding efforts, fostering cooperation and harnessing international credibility and civil-​society support more broadly (Chapter 1). Peace efforts were carried out in a highly polarized environment reflected by the rejection, by a slight margin, of the peace agreement in the October 2016 plebiscite. This cemented the popularity of the right-​wing Democratic Centre Party, which led the opposition against the accords during the presidential campaign and saw its candidate Ivan Duque triumph in the 2018 elections with a promise to reform the agreement (Chapter 3). Meanwhile, the international community gave Juan Manuel Santos the Nobel Peace Prize and the Lamp of Peace Award by the Sacred Convent of Assisi and launched the EU multi-​fund at a critical time for the renegotiation of the revised peace agreement and its approval in Congress. International community representatives asserted the fundamental importance of the agreement for the world, as it turned Colombia into a positive example for the resolution of other armed conflicts (Chapter 6). At the same time, countries including the USA and Sweden and organizations including the EU, UN and MAPP/​OEA highlighted the importance of support for the peace process within Colombia through statements and projects geared towards the development of media and communication with regard to peace (Chapter 7). Online subsidies reported on collaborative projects and strategies between organizations’ countries and non-​state international and local actors, raising the stakes of defecting from the agreement (Chapter 7). In addition, Santos used international support to shield the peace process against domestic opposition as a state rather than a government commitment with the international community (Chapter 3). As most of the online subsidies were published during 2017 (Chapter 2), arguably, international online communications served to reaffirm international support for the peace agreement in the context of highly divisive presidential campaigns around the peace process. In fact, once Ivan Duque was elected, his administration made efforts to reassure the international community about its intentions to implement the agreement ‘with adjustments’, taming some of the most radical language used during the campaign, even if paying lip service or still actively opposing parts of the accord during his administration (Chapter 3). The role of the international community was evidenced in local actors’ praise of international support for the negotiation and implementation of the 144

Conclusion

agreement, alternative substitution of coca crops, and calls to put pressure on the Colombian government for the protection of HR activists, social leaders and ex-​combatants. They also called on international community support for the protection of the JEP mechanism against the Duque administration’s manoeuvring, and stressed the importance of fulfilling the peace agreement for Colombia’s international standing (Chapter 5). 2) Online subsidies can be a key instrument for the practice of public mediated diplomacy and can contribute to the promotion of peacebuilding transformation. Online subsidies have been described as a public-​relations and journalistic tool that provides controlled access to official information, perspectives, talking points and agendas for media outlets and other interested stakeholders, saving time and costs for the recipients. They are also an instrument of public-​diplomacy efforts for indirectly influencing public attitudes and opinions about peacebuilding and cooperation by enhancing the credibility of peacebuilders and the support and cooperation of elites and publics of targeted countries and other international stakeholders. The latter is done by counteracting the negative tendencies of news coverage accustomed to reporting on conflicts, reinforcing positive accounts of a peace process, warning about crises, denouncing structural drivers of conflict, and promoting longer-​term views, victims’ voices, conflict-​resolution initiatives, justice, non-​violent responses and common ground among opponents (Chapter 1). Online subsidies were used more profusely by the UN, USA, MAPP/​ OEA and the EU to disseminate views and agendas regarding peacebuilding efforts in Colombia, mainly through news stories about programmes and assistance as well as official statements. In 2018, international cooperation funds had their sharpest drop in the period studied, which might also explain the fall in communications in relation to the number of online subsidies published 2017 (Chapters 2 and 3). Nevertheless, online subsidies reinforced positive accounts of peace, by providing information about national and international collaborative efforts towards that aim. As examples of media and political penetration, some news stories and opinion columns by high-​ level officials in Canada and MAPP/​OEA were published in the official web pages studied and in Colombian media outlets (Chapter 6). Also, the fact that IDB communications about ‘Sustainable Colombia’ were partially promoted through the Presidential Cooperation Agency (APC) website in Colombia, rather than solely reported on by the bank through its official website, shows a degree of collaboration between the international organization and the Colombian government regarding communication efforts about peacebuilding (Chapter 2). Through online subsidies, organizations including MAPP/​OEA and the UN warned about humanitarian crises and violence against vulnerable communities and social leaders, and called for governmental protection while 145

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fulfilling their roles of monitoring the peace process and its implementation. Countries and organizations also published positive reports of projects that benefited victims’ voices and stories, and foregrounded conflict-​resolution initiatives and common ground among victims, ex-​combatants and communities. Furthermore, by reporting on the development of DDR programmes, online subsidies helped to de-​escalate the image of FARC as an enemy, and presented positive stories of space transformation through cultural, economic and reconciliation projects (Chapter 7). However, international promotion of peacebuilding in Colombia was perhaps more weighted towards institutionalization and state provision than strengthening the democratic hand of civil-​society actors in their challenge to development models and interventions that were at odds with many vulnerable communities in targeted areas (as exposed by civil-​society actors in this exploration). In that sense, international actors promoted income-​generating projects and programmes geared towards connecting rural Colombia with national and international markets under a sustainable development framework, as well as state-​led monopoly of force against illegal armed actors, as a path to peace (Chapters 6 and 7), despite local denouncements of the violence against vulnerable communities that was rooted precisely in those dynamics (Chapter 5). Regarding the killing of ex-​combatants, social leaders and HR defenders, online subsidies by international actors converged with the Colombian state in blaming illegal armed actors and promoting a law-​enforcement response. Such emphasis might have obscured local civil-​society sectors attributing responsibility to right-​wing paramilitary structures and elite sectors (Chapter 5), perhaps missing an opportunity to place further pressure on the Colombian state and expose the potential structure behind new cycles of violence, particularly against ex-​combatants, HR activists and social leaders. 3) The promotion of peacebuilding happens in a multilateral environment with differing degrees of coordination among the countries and international organizations involved. There has been an increase in internationally sponsored peacebuilding efforts since 1990, through cooperative approaches and agendas, and the emergence of a dominant, liberal, peacebuilding paradigm promoted internationally among donors and institutions such as the EU, OECD, World Bank, and regional development banks. Against this background, some authors suggest that different approaches by international community actors within the liberal paradigm become sources of inconsistency and incoherence that are often welcomed and taken advantage of by external and local actors (Chapter 1). This book has attempted to show how online mediated diplomacy regarding peacebuilding, and certainly in the case of Colombia, has been a complex enterprise transcending one country’s framing projection and involving a broader range of international actors, with agendas that 146

Conclusion

complement each other most of the time. Convergent agendas promoted by international actors during the period included strengthening of the social fabric post conflict, increasing the capacity of the state for security, justice and services provision and strengthening of DDR and mine clearance. In addition, they promoted sustainable rural development, human rights, transitional justice, land restitution and humanitarian assistance for victims and vulnerable populations, as well social engagement and support in the implementation of the peace agreement (Chapters 4 and 7). When individual actors are considered, the USA, EU, IDB and World Bank stressed socioeconomic development in a greater number of their subsidies; Canada and the UK, security agendas; and Sweden, the UN and MAPP/​ OEA, aspects related to the peace process. In comparison with other actors, the IDB and the World Bank were the actors who focused the most on socio-​ economic development; MAPP/​OEA and the UN, on peace process dimensions; the UK and Canada, on security; the World Bank and OAE, on strengthening governance; and OEA and the UK on human rights agendas. In addition, Antioquia, Cauca, Nariño, Chocó and Meta were the departments most mentioned in online subsidies by these actors (Chapter 7). For the most part, the promotion of frames by international actors in this work was complementary and reflected a consensus regarding the implementation of the peace agreement linked to state-​building, services and security provision, market development, and human rights in areas targeted by the Colombian government for demobilization and post-​ conflict development. For example (Chapters 4 to 7), the EU and MAPP/​ OEA supported the strengthening of local justice and inter-​jurisdictional coordination post conflict. The USA, Canada, UK, EU, UN and MAPP/​ OEA promoted the strengthening of the state against illegal economies and actors. Canada and Sweden highlighted security reform and adaptation to a post-​conflict environment. The USA, Canada, UK, EU and the UN promoted mine clearance in Antioquia, Meta, Caquetá and Norte de Santander, the Catatumbo sub-​region and DDR spaces. The USA, the UN and the World Bank targeted Orinoquía for sustainable agro-​industrial development with the aim of the region becoming a food pantry for the world. In addition, the UK, IDB and World Bank promoted the tackling of deforestation and provision of infrastructure in targeted areas of the country such as the Colombian South Pacific. All the countries studied, along with the EU and UN, linked productive projects to peacebuilding in PDET and DDR spaces. Moreover, actors including Canada, Sweden and the UK converged in the promotion of HR, while Canada and Sweden highlighted women’s leadership and rights. Overall, the international community actors studied were on board to aid the transition of Colombia to a post-​conflict scenario in a multilateral fashion (Chapter 4). First, the countries studied contributed to the organizations 147

Shaping Peacebuilding in Colombia

and multi-​funds observed regarding peacebuilding in Colombia. Second, the actors observed were in line with international frameworks including UN development goals, the Global Demining Initiative, the UN Women, Peace and Security Agenda (WPS), Prevention of Torture, Guiding Principles on Businesses and HR, and the Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict Initiative. Third, most of the countries and organizations seemed closer to a constitutional, liberal peacebuilding approach (Richmond et al, 2011), as they assisted the strengthening of democratic and governance structures for security, justice, sustainable development and human-​rights provision post-​conflict with local consent and ownership in areas prioritized by the government for post-​conflict transition. Despite the similarities, the USA was noticeably closer overall to an orthodox, liberal peacebuilding approach (Richmond et al, 2011), as assistance prioritized a rather top-​down state-​building strategy guided by the war against drugs (in the National Consolidation Plan) and a monopoly of force. Actors incorporating more clearly a civilian model of peacebuilding overall included Sweden, the UN and MAPP/​OEA, as they foregrounded strategies to enhance bottom-​up participation in the peace process and its implementation (Chapter 4). Important divisions became evident, however, with the Trump administration in 2017, marked by a return to a punitive approach in counter-​ drug strategies in contrast to the human-​security approach maintained by actors such as the UN and the EU. In this instance, it is possible to confirm insights regarding the dangers of affirming a Western, liberal peacebuilding narrative in an uncritical manner, as a closer look reveals differences in approach within liberal paradigms and incoherence on the ground that offered advantages for peace spoilers and other stakeholders (Ryan, 2013; Schneckener, 2016), as was the case with the Democratic Centre Party, Ivan Duque’s presidential campaign and subsequent administration. 4) International actors promote peacebuilding agendas in targeted spaces of intervention. To grasp this process, the notion of spatial framing has been proposed, as international actors imagine those spaces and project values and priorities through which transformation of violent dynamics will occur. The notion of spatial framing is based on the concept of framing prevalent in political communication studies as well as insights about the links between spaces, scales and peacebuilding from studies of peace and conflict and political geography. Thus, spatial framing entails the narrative construction of meaningful spaces for peacebuilding transformation and the communication of preferred meanings about what is at issue in those spaces, their process of transformation, and through which are communicated peacebuilding agendas and actors at different scales of agency from the local to the international (Chapter 2). 148

Conclusion

To grasp this process, this book has explored which spaces were prioritized by international actors in their daily communications, how those spaces were explicitly labelled and defined, with negative and positive references, and which agendas were foregrounded in relation to places targeted for peacebuilding intervention, including, for example, ‘Antioquia free of coca’, security in Norte de Santander and Catatumbo as a disputed territory for illegal armed groups, Orinoquía as the ‘last agricultural frontier’ and ‘food pantry’ for the world, or biodiversity in the Amazon as a ‘gift’ and ‘resource’ to the world (Chapters 6 and 7). The international community promoted peacebuilding agendas in the spaces targeted by both Colombian administrations for post-​conflict territorial development (Chapter 6). Positive and negative comments regarding these spaces corresponded to the extent to which they fulfilled development targets. Consequently, online subsidies resulted in some degree of homogenization across different scales (regional, departmental, municipal and so on) and places were treated more as containers of issues, which justified the dynamics of intervention. Negative framing of targeted places for peace transformation stressed, first, low state presence, civic services and infrastructure; second, the presence of social and humanitarian scars of conflict, illegal markets, actors and related violence, insecurity and lack of HR protection for populations and leaders; third, the prevalence of poverty, marginalization, lack of income opportunities and inequality in comparison with urban areas, aggravated by the isolation produced by the infrastructure and geography, lack of access to biodiversity, low productivity of water management and agricultural production and high deforestation. But transform these spaces into what? Well, positive framing of Colombian spaces foregrounded the efforts made by the state in justice and human rights through relevant legislation, the indicators of a decrease in violence, as well as governmental efforts against illegal actors and markets. In addition, positive depictions foregrounded spaces where there was social engagement in peacebuilding, and economic potential for expansion, including biodiversity, mining, agriculture, energy and tourism. A normative duality was reinforced in international actors’ communications regarding major cities such as Bogotá, Medellín and Cartagena, seen as embodying development and peacebuilding goals on the one hand, and smaller cities, municipalities and rural areas, seen as rich in resources and development potential but lacking in governance, landlocked for development and hosting armed conflict and illegal economies. Regarding positive depictions of major cities, the exceptions were Canada, which identified violence and criminality within city areas linked to security assistance, and MAPP/​OEA, which referred to Cali’s vulnerable zones. In addition, broader geographic regions were also positively framed in terms of their natural resources and development potential, and DDR spaces were 149

Shaping Peacebuilding in Colombia

praised for facilitating economic development and reconciliation through income-​generation projects. The ex-​combatants and civil-​society actors explored in this work drew attention to ‘Gordian knots’ in the implementation of the peace agreement, including the tackling of illicit economies, protection of ex-​combatants, social leaders and human-​r ights defenders and the development and security policies of targeted areas. These themes challenged the government with substantial issues regarding development and security strategies, governance and the practice of democracy beyond the formal implementation of the peace agreement. The EU, MAPP/​OEA and UN were the actors most clearly identifying this issue with specific places in Colombia, showing the high recurrence of violence in Indigenous territories (Appendix 2). However, most of the actors were vaguer in discussing the issue as national or not linking it to specific spaces. In the light of the door opened by the peace agreement and the ongoing recurrence of this violence, sustained pressure and international dialogue on these issues would certainly contribute to a more sustainable peacebuilding in the country. Issues such as the war against drugs, killings of ex-​combatants and HR activists and conflicts caused by development projects go beyond the integration of territories with potential (inter)national markets and the strengthening of state institutions, monopoly of force and service provision. These issues evidence the modes in which the state resolves social conflicts by establishing patterns of governance and interaction with places to be integrated in its own maps. In relation to the evidence presented in this book, it would be possible to argue that projects of geographic transformation also entail the transformation of social relations between state and society. Thus, beyond transforming targeted spaces in sustainable development places, what runs underneath is a transformation in social relations and governance. If a government insists on reinstating traditional practices of governance over conflict areas, it stagnates the possibility of breaking cycles of violence and their geographic transformation. This would limit international community members to a normative counterweight based on monitoring the results of their own investments. And, although such monitoring may be useful in taming the most counterproductive instincts of an administration, it would also be limited for achieving sustainable development and peace in the most abandoned communities and territories targeted for intervention that are still subject to socio-​economic exclusion and violent assertions of security and development. As stated in the Introduction, this book has taken a limited approach in exploring the contributions of some key countries and international organizations to the implementation of the peace agreement, and the contribution that online subsidies, as part of mediated public diplomacy efforts, can make to the promotion of peacebuilding. In an age of social 150

Conclusion

media and personalized communication, it is vital to keep an eye on how institutions continue to feed news media and stakeholders as part of their communication strategies to promote public understanding and support for peace. Furthermore, drawing on international relations, political communication, geography and peacebuilding scholarship, this book foregrounds the idea that international peacebuilding is a spatially rooted project of geographical transformation, rather than an abstract, value-​r idden formulation along the lines of liberal peace. Paying attention to how spatial framing operates in concert can provide valuable clues for practitioners and scholars alike on constructive or potentially counterproductive dynamics for tackling structural drivers of conflict, as well as the added weight that the international community can place on conflict transformation. Future works can advance on this perspective not only by incorporating a wider range of peacebuilding actors in contextual explorations (countries, IOs, NGOs, the private sector and so on), but also by gathering systematic evidence –​of frame-​building dynamics, but also of reception and adoption of international frames in context.

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APPENDIX 1

Peacebuilding Agendas Socio-​economic development Economic development and food security Rural development, trade and investment This included the reporting of activities on strengthening state and financial institutions for reform, policy and credit provision; community training, technical assistance and investment in entrepreneurialism and productive projects (agriculture, cattle raising, clothing, traditional crafts, tourism, creative industries and so on), income generation, food security and commercialization and exporting of products. These activities were in line with the first point of the peace agreement on rural reform with a territorial focus, as well as inequality reduction between rural and urban areas, improving food production and security within Colombia and the world, and to improve investment, trade and competitiveness.

Environment and development Climate change and green growth for populations in environmentally sensitive areas affected by poverty and the armed conflict This included activities on strengthening environmental law enforcement, ecotourism, sustainable use of biodiversity, conservation, forestry governance, conservation and reforestation; protection of vulnerable ecosystems, management of water resources, sustainable development projects, monitoring of CO2 at community level, climate-​change adaptation and resilience, and scientific exploration of biodiverse areas that were previously inaccessible due to the armed conflict.

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Social fabric Coexistence, reconciliation, recognition, empowering and social inclusion of vulnerable groups (Indigenous, children and young people, people with disabilities, LGBT communities) and gender equality Activities included support for projects in education inclusion and improvement, sports, women’s recognition and empowerment, protection of vulnerable children, reconciliation, dialogue and culture of peace, leadership training, peace pedagogy, participation and local democracy.

Media and communications The role of media and communication for development and peace This included activities that supported socialization of community projects at national level, media competition and awards, financial support for community media, training of journalists and community-​media personnel, calls for state protection of media personnel against violence, support for the role of media and journalism in the promotion of gender equality and financial assistance for ethnic communication collectives.

Governance Infrastructure and social services Provision of infrastructure and public goods and services These included roads, water, electricity, energy, housing, sanitation, recreational spaces, communications and connectivity, as well as productive infrastructure for the generation and strengthening of markets. The provision of social services encompassed nutritional services, medical facilities, health, education and schools.

Institutionalization and the rule of law State and institutional presence in rural areas This included institutional reform, policy formulation and implementation, effective public spending and financial management, fiscal sustainability, fight against corruption, inter-​institutional coordination between agencies and levels of government at national and local level and democratic governance. The international community also promoted improvements to mechanisms for community participation and empowerment through Community Action Boards, civil-​society organizations, communities and Indigenous councils, as well as inclusive rural development planning and increasing capacity of administrations at municipal level for dialogue, 153

Shaping Peacebuilding in Colombia

citizen input and conflict management and resolution. The rule of law entailed improvements in the justice system, including access to justice by vulnerable populations, strengthening penal, Indigenous, rural and local justice, and improving coordination between Indigenous, ordinary and transitional justice systems.

Land governance, restitution and formalization Land management and planning, formalization of land and updating of cadastral systems The international community aimed to accompany the Colombian government in improving legal protection of ethnic territories and community-​owned land, offer support in land conflicts and formulation of policy to manage territorial conflicts in environmentally sensitive areas, as well as relocation of communities internally displaced by violence, land restitution and redress and adjudication of land owned by the state.

Human rights Gender-​based violence Empower women in vulnerable areas Activities included offering counselling and fostering their public voice and recognition, support organization processes and agendas in the defence of women’s rights against violence. Also included were the promotion of sexual and reproductive health education for young people, mental and physical healthcare for victims of GBV, and prevention of and protection against violence for sexual workers; activities towards the improvement of the state’s prevention and attention strategies for GBV victims, as well as strengthening law enforcement mechanisms against GBV.

Human rights and humanitarian aid Public awareness of human rights and the rights of children and young people, women, Indigenous, afro-​Colombian populations and rural communities affected by conflict International Organizations also warned the government about humanitarian crises and violence in the population (for example, displacements and kidnappings) and reported support for victims and organizations against forced disappearances and violence against journalists. In addition, promoted activities included those providing aid after natural and humanitarian crises, setting up or maintaining human rights offices, reinforcing the work of Colombian institutions (such as the Ombudsman’s office) in their 154

APPENDIX 1

humanitarian work, as well as trade unions, and promoting dialogue between communities and businesses about human rights.

Human-​rights defenders and social leaders Monitoring and condemning violence against leaders Activities included promoting public awareness about their work, and calling on the government to protect them against violence. The international community reported support to human rights offices working for this population, strengthening their work through training events, improving mechanisms of monitoring violence against this population and promoting public participation in the search for solutions against the threats endured by activists.

The peace process Disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and prevention of recruitment Accompanying and promoting FARC’s disarmament process and assisting demobilization of children and teenagers. The international community reported visiting FARC’s Territorial Spaces of Training and Reincorporation and other ex-​combatant spaces (including prisons) to hear about their processes, issues and projects. Also noted were the promotion of spaces of inter-​institutional coordination and projects to improve health, education, land acquisition, security, gender equality, reconciliation, entrepreneurialism, the environment and housing in spaces of reincorporation. Assistance was given in de-​stigmatization campaigns for communities associated with different armed actors, and promotion of dialogue between demobilized populations and communities for reconciliation. Improvement of health services and support for training and cultural initiatives in those communities was also seen. Promotion of security guarantees was encouraged for demobilized populations and communities in areas of reincorporation and for ex-​combatants attempting to participate in the political process. Support was given for ex-​combatants’ producers’ associations, commercialization of their products and food security, as well as economic opportunities for ex-​combatants and surrounding communities regarding finance and credit, clearance of anti-​personnel mines, ecotourism and entrepreneurial projects. Regarding prevention of recruitment, the international community promoted access to and improvement in the quality of education for vulnerable children and teenagers, campaigns to prevent recruitment in schools, projects to foster children and teenagers’ leadership in peace promotion initiatives, and sport, education, technology and recreational activities. 155

Shaping Peacebuilding in Colombia

Negotiation and implementation The revised peace agreement between the Colombian government and FARC and its implementation, including the first point of integral rural development International Organizations gave support for Colombian institutions in charge of the peace policy and the participation of civil society in the local implementation of peace, including women, Indigenous and ethnic populations and civil society organizations. Assistance was given to monitoring the implementation of the peace agreement. In addition, there was international support for negotiations between the Colombian government and ELN guerrillas, and for a ceasefire and monitoring of humanitarian conditions on the ground, including condemnation of violence against the civilian population. Encouragement was given for participation and dialogue between local authorities and civil-​society organizations, involving women, Indigenous and ethnic groups, rural communities, ex-​combatants and victims in the negotiations.

Transitional justice Inter-​institutional coordination, policy design and implementation, and initiatives of truth, reconciliation, protection and redress for victims Support was given for the design of the JEP as a transitional justice mechanism emerging from the peace accords with FARC, the strengthening of the justice sector, improvements to jail conditions, and the harmonization between ordinary, Indigenous and transitional justice mechanisms. International community also promoted the monitoring and support of land restitution projects and victims’ collective and individual redress, psychosocial and health services, and participation; strengthening of victims’ organizations public engagement, capacities, networks and self-​protection skills. Support was given for collective redress of communities affected by anti-​personnel mines and armed conflict, including economic compensation, cultural activities, infrastructure improvements and history and memory projects. Socialization and guidance regarding the process of redress among civil society and victims was promoted, including in Indigenous and ethnic communities, along with facilitation of dialogue between communities, victims and government institutions regarding redress and victims’ conditions, and monitoring of cases of forced disappearance and support for collective redress.

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Security Monopoly of force Financial and technical assistance for post-conflict security Activities included the deployment of international security forces to support peacekeeping operations. The international community gave financial and technical assistance, including training, advice and capacity-​building support to the Colombian security sector and the Office of the Attorney General for post-​conflict reform and security provision in rural and urban environments. It monitored and reported on the Colombian government’s efforts in security conditions for communities, HR defenders and social leaders, including cases of forced displacement, kidnapping, terror attacks, social violence and armed conflict, and the presence of and disputes among illegal armed actors and criminal organizations. Public condemnation was made of violence against security forces, ex-​combatants, ethnic and rural communities, Community Action Boards, human-​rights defenders and social leaders, journalists, children, teenagers and other population groups. Calls were made to the government for improvements in its institutional presence and prevention, protection, investigation and security guarantees for those affected. Reporting was also made of civil-​society initiatives to deter violence and improve local security for their communities.

Mine clearance Clearing territories of anti-personnel mines This involved financial support for organizations clearing territories of anti-​personnel mines; training of women and former combatants in mine clearance; support for victims of landmines, including health, rehabilitation and psychosocial services; and mine education for vulnerable communities.

Illegal economies Fight against illegal drugs and mining Activities included crop substitution prevention, substitution and eradication programmes involving local organizations, women and ex-​combatants. In addition, International Organizations called on and advised the Colombian government to increase its presence and effectiveness against illegal economies, security provision for vulnerable communities and management of biodiverse areas vulnerable to illicit groups. Support was given to law enforcement agencies for interdiction of drug trafficking, including training and equipment. There was promotion of the socialization of governmental plans against illicit crop substitution and facilitation of community dialogue, 157

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negotiation and initiatives around crop substitution, with governmental support. Monitoring was made of illegal economies’ expansion and the presence and competition of illegal armed groups around these economic activities. Economic support was given for the formalization of mining, strengthening of financial institutions for the provision of rural credit, and the development of economic alternatives, value chains and commercialization of products for communities transitioning away from illegal economies.

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Tables of International Actors’ Framing of Peacebuilding Agendas Agendas, number of subsidies and percentages (of total subsidies per actor) Table A.1: Countries’ agendas, number of subsidies and percentages Sub-​agendas

Number of subsidies and percentage* USA

Canada

Sweden

UK

Economy and food security

26 (24.3%)

5 (15.2%)

5 (15.6%)

8 (27.6%)

Social fabric

25 (23.4%)

10 (30.3%)

5 (15.6%)

3 (10.3%)

Environmental

8 (7.5%)

2 (6.1%)

2 (6.3%)

5 (17.2%)

Media and communication

2 (1.9%)

0

1 (3.1%)

0

Total: Development

47 (43.9%)

12 (36.4%)

9 (28.1%)

9 (31%)

Illegal economies

26 (24.3%)

0

1 (3.1%)

3 (10.3%)

Monopoly of force

11 (10.3%)

6 (18.2%)

7 (21.9%)

12 (41.4%)

De​mining

4 (3.7%)

9 (27.3%)

0

1 (3.4%)

Total: Security

31 (29%)

13 (39.4%)

7 (21.9%)

12 (41.4%) (continued)

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Table A.1: Countries’ agendas, number of subsidies and percentages (continued) Sub-​agendas

Number of subsidies and percentage* USA

Canada

Sweden

UK

Institutionalization

17 (15.9%)

1 (3%)

4 (12.5%)

4 (13.8%)

Infrastructure

15 (14%)

1 (3%)

1 (3.1%)

7 (24.1%)

Land governance

7 (6.5%)

1 (3%)

4 (12.5%)

0

Total: Governance

20 (18.7%)

2 (6.1%)

9 (28.1%)

8 (27.6%)

Transitional justice

9 (8.4%)

4 (12.1%)

4 (12.5%)

2 (6.9%)

DDR and recruitment prevention

5 (4.7%)

2 (6.1%)

5 (15.6%)

5 (17.2%)

Negotiation and implementation

4 (3.7%)

3 (9.1%)

7 (21.9%)

6 (20.7%)

Total: Peace process

15 (14%)

6 (18.2%)

13 (40.6%)

9 (31%)

Human rights and humanitarian aid 8 (7.5%)

1 (3%)

1 (3.1%)

1 (3.4%)

Gender-​based violence

5 (4.7%)

6 (18.2%)

1 (3.1%)

2 (6.9%)

Human-​r ights defenders

3 (2.8%)

0

2 (6.3%)

6 (20.7%)

Total: Human rights

12 (11.2%)

7 (21.2%)

3 (9.4%)

7 (24.1%)

* Percentage of the total of subsidies for each country Source: Author’s elaboration from NVivo database

Table A.2: IOs’ agendas, number of subsidies and percentages Sub-​agendas

Number of subsidies and percentage* EU

UN

WB

IDB

MAPP/​OEA

Economy and food security

29 (40.8%)

53 (18.5%)

7 (58.3%)

4 (23.5%)

3 (2.8%)

Social fabric

20 (28.2%)

59 (20.6%)

5 (41.7%)

1 (5.9%)

32 (30.2%)

Environmental

12 (16.9%)

19 (6.6%)

6 (50%)

10 (58.8%)

1 (0.9%)

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Table A.2: IOs’ agendas, number of subsidies and percentages (continued) Sub-​agendas

Number of subsidies and percentage* EU

Media and communication 2 (2.8%)

UN

WB

IDB

MAPP/​OEA

5 (1.7%)

0

0

3 (2.8%)

Total: Development

36 (50.7%)

94 10 13 37 (32.75%) (83.33%) (76.47%) (34.9%)

Illegal economies

1 (1.4%)

13 (4.5%)

0

0

11 (10.4%)

Monopoly of force

1 (1.4%)

47 (16.4%)

2 (16.7%)

0

26 (24.5%)

Demining

3 (4.2%)

3 (1%)

0

0

1 (0.9%)

Total: Security

4 (5.6%)

59 2 0 (20.91%) (16.67%)

33 (31.1%)

Institutionalization

6 (8.5%)

39 (13.6%)

5 (41.7%)

2 (11.8%)

30 (28.3%)

Infrastructure

4 (5.6%)

26 (9.1%)

4 (33.3%)

0

3 (2.8%)

Land governance

8 (11.3%)

8 (2.8%)

3 (25%)

1 (5.9%)

15 (14.2%)

Total: Governance

14 (19.7%)

54 7 3 39 (18.82%) (58.33%) (17.65%) (36.8%)

Transitional justice

1 (1.4%)

27 (9.4%)

1 (8.3%)

0

18 (17%)

DDR and recruitment prevention

8 (11.3%)

86 (30%)

0

0

11 (10.4%)

Negotiation and implementation

16 (22.5%)

41 (14%)

1 (8.3%)

0

37 (34.9%)

Total: Peace process

21 (29.6%)

128 (44.6%)

2 0 (16.67%)

51 (48.1%)

Human rights and humanitarian aid

9 (12.7%)

46 (16%)

0

0

23 (21.7%)

Gender-​based violence

1 (1.4%)

5 (1.7%)

0

0

2 (1.9%)

HR defenders

7 (9.9%)

21 (7.3%)

0

0

23 (21.7%)

Total: Human rights

10 (14.1%)

65 0 (22.65%)

0

39 (36.8%)

* Percentage of the total of subsidies for each international organization Source: Author’s elaboration from NVivo database

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Specified spaces linked to broader agendas Table A.3: USA: specified spaces linked to broader agendas Development (all agendas)

Security (all agendas)

Governance (all agendas)

(Rural) Colombia

Peace process (all agendas)

Human rights (GBV, HR and humanitarian aid)

Colombia

Pacific lowlands, Amazon (forest), inter-​Andean valleys Orinoquía, Caribbean, Magdalena river basin

Orinoquía

Cundinamarca

Cundinamarca

Bogotá, D.C.

Bogotá, D.C. Magdalena

(Santa Marta)

(Santa Marta)

Sierra Nevada

(Fundación)

(Chibolo)

Bolívar (Cartagena)

(Cartagena, Carmen de Bolívar) Sucre (Ovejas) (San Rafael)

Montes de María

(Sincelejo)

Montes de María

Atlántico (Baranoa, Usiacurí)

(Barranquilla)

(Barranquilla)

Cesar La Guajira (Riohacha) Córdoba South of Córdoba

(Montería), South of Córdoba Tolima

(Chaparral), Cañón de las Hermosas, South Tolima

South Tolima

162

(Chaparral, Ataco, Planadas)

APPENDIX 2

Table A.3: USA: specified spaces linked to broader agendas (continued) Development (all agendas)

Security (all agendas)

Governance (all agendas)

Peace process (all agendas)

Huila

Human rights (GBV, HR and humanitarian aid) Huila (Neiva)

Cauca North Cauca

(Popayán), North Cauca

Antioquia (Medellín)

(Medellín)

(Yondó [Barbacoas], Nechi [El Sapo]), floodplains, wetlands

(Medellín, Caucasia, Cáceres)

(Cáceres, Briceño, Ituango, Valdivia, Tarazá, Caucasia)

(Apartadó)

Bajo Cauca región Valle del Cauca

Valle del Cauca

(Cali)

(Buenaventura)

(Cali, Buenaventura)

Nariño (Tumaco)

(Pasto, Tumaco)

Santander (San Vicente del Chucurí)

Santander (Barrancabermeja)

Norte de Santander Catatumbo

Norte de Santander

Catatumbo

(Cúcuta)

Chocó (Quibdó)

(Quibdó) Guaviare (San José del Guaviare) Arauca (Arauca) Caquetá (Florencia) Meta (Villavicencio) (Puerto López) (continued) 163

Shaping Peacebuilding in Colombia

Table A.3: USA: specified spaces linked to broader agendas (continued) Development (all agendas)

Security (all agendas)

Governance (all agendas)

Peace process (all agendas)

Human rights (GBV, HR and humanitarian aid)

Casanare Vichada Amazonas (Leticia) Putumayo

Putumayo (Mocoa)

Note: Bold – departments; parentheses – cities and municipalities; square brackets – smaller territorial subdivisions; italic – (sub-)regions Source: Author’s elaboration from NVivo database

Table A.4: Canada: specified sub-​national spaces linked to broader agendas Development (social fabric, environment)

Security (de​mining, monopoly of force)

Governance (infrastructure, institutions, land governance)

Peace process Human (TJ, DDR, rights negotiation and (GBV) implementation)

Colombia South-​west of Colombia Bogotá, D.C. Valle del Cauca (Buenaventura) Nariño (Tumaco)

Nariño (Tumaco)

Caquetá

Caquetá Putumayo Meta Chocó (Quibdó) Norte de Santander (Catatumbo) Santander Tolima (Chaparral)

Note: Bold – departments; parentheses – cities and municipalities; italic – (sub-)regions Source: Author’s elaboration from NVivo database

164

APPENDIX 2

Table A.5: Sweden: specified sub-​national spaces linked to broader agendas Development (all agendas)

Governance (institutions and the rule of law, land governance and restitution)

Peace process (all agendas)

Human rights (HR and humanitarian aid)

Colombia Magdalena (La Secreta) Bogotá, D.C.

Bogotá, D.C.

Note: Bold – departments; parentheses – municipalities Source: Author’s elaboration from NVivo database

Table A.6: UK: specified sub-​national spaces linked to broader agendas Development (economic, food security, environmental, social fabric)

Governance (institutions, infrastructure)

Security (all agendas)

Human rights (all agendas)

Peace process (negotiation and implementation, TJ)

Colombia Amazon region

Pacific region

Cundinamarca Bogotá, D.C. Antioquia (Medellín)

Antioquia

Bolívar (Cartagena) Atlántico (Barranquilla) Tolima Sucre Magdalena (Santa Marta, Ciénaga) Córdoba (Montería) Caldas (La Dorada) Valle del Cauca (Cali)

Valle del Cauca (continued) 165

Shaping Peacebuilding in Colombia

Table A.6: UK: specified sub-​national spaces linked to broader agendas (continued) Development (economic, food security, environmental, social fabric)

Governance (institutions, infrastructure)

Security (all agendas)

Human rights (all agendas)

Peace process (negotiation and implementation, TJ)

Cauca Nariño Chocó Norte de Santander Railway line La Dorada, Caldas to Santa Marta, Magdalena Note: Bold – departments; parentheses – cities and municipalities; italic: – (sub-)regions Source: Author’s elaboration from NVivo database

Table A.7: EU: specified sub-​national spaces linked to broader agendas Development (all agendas)

Governance (all agendas)

Human rights (all agendas)

Peace process Security (all agendas) (all agendas)

Colombia Amazon, Caribbean region Bogotá, D.C.

Bogotá, D.C. Atlántico

(Barranquilla, Canal del dique) Bolívar (Cartagena) Chocó (Bahía Solano, Nuquí y Juradó), North Chocó

Indigenous territory Emberá Katío Valle del Cauca

Valle del Cauca

(Cali) (Buenaventura, Bolívar, Roldanillo, La Unión, Toro, Argelia, El Dovio and Trujillo), North Valle del Cauca

(Bolívar, Roldanillo, La Unión, Toro, Argelia, El Dovio y Trujillo)

(Quibdó), Atrato River

(Buenaventura)

166

North Valle del Cauca

APPENDIX 2

Table A.7: EU: specified sub-​national spaces linked to broader agendas (continued) Development (all agendas)

Governance (all agendas)

Human rights (all agendas)

Peace process Security (all agendas) (all agendas)

Cauca (Popayán, Inzá, (Inzá, Páez, Páez, Totoró, Totoró) Guapi), South Cauca, Alto Patía región, Tierradentro

Cauca North Cauca

Tierradentro

Putumayo (Puerto Guzmán)

(Mocoa, Puerto Guzmán)

Putumayo (Mocoa)

Arauca (Tame) Meta

Meta

(Villavicencio, Mesetas, Puerto Rico, San Juan de Arama and Vistahermosa), La Macarena

(Mesetas [ZVTN Buenavista])

Caquetá

(Mesetas [Santa Helena])

Caquetá

(Florencia, San Vicente de Cagüán [Balsillas]) Guaviare River basins, Guaviare and Guayabero rivers

Guaviare

Guaviare

Córdoba (Montería, Indigenous territories Zenu, Cerro Matoso in Montelibano) Antioquia (Medellín, Dabeiba [ETCR Llanogrande])

(Urabá)

(Dabeiba [ETCR Llanogrande])

(Orejón)

Nariño (Tumaco [ETCR La (Policarpa) Variante])

(Tumaco [ETCR La Variante]) (continued) 167

Shaping Peacebuilding in Colombia

Table A.7: EU: specified sub-​national spaces linked to broader agendas (continued) Development (all agendas)

Governance (all agendas)

Human rights (all agendas)

Peace process Security (all agendas) (all agendas)

Cesar (Valledupar, La Paz [ETCR San José de Oriente])

(La Paz [ETCR San José de Oriente])

La Guajira (Fonseca [ETCR Pondores])

La Guajira (Fonseca [ETCR Pondores]) Boyacá

(Tibasosa) Santander Magdalena Medio1 Huila Note: Bold – departments; parentheses – cities and municipalities; square brackets – smaller territorial subdivisions; italic – (sub-)regions Source: Author’s elaboration from NVivo database

Table A.8: UN: specified sub-​national spaces linked to broader agendas Development (all agendas)

Governance (all agendas)

Human rights (all agendas)

Peace process (all agendas)

Security (all agendas)

Colombia Amazon forest

Pacific, south and south-​east regions

Cundinamarca

Cundinamarca

(Bogotá, D.C., Subachoque)

(Bogotá, D.C.) Boyacá (Nobsa, Paipa, Sogamoso y Tibasosa)

1

Magdalena Medio region is included in the departments of Antioquia, Bolívar, Boyacá, Cesar and Santander 168

APPENDIX 2

Table A.8: UN: specified sub-​national spaces linked to broader agendas (continued) Development (all agendas)

Governance (all agendas)

Human rights (all agendas)

Peace process (all agendas)

Security (all agendas)

(Apartadó, Peque, Itagüí, Bello, Andes, Urrao [Mandé], Emberá Indigenous community in reserves Nusidó and El Llano, Frontino, Ituango [ETCR Santa Lucía], Vigía del Fuerte [ETCR Vidrí], Dabeiba [ETCR Llanogrande], Turbo)

(Peque, Apartadó), Bajo Cauca

Antioquia (Medellín)

(Medellín)

(Amalfi, Angostura, Anorí, Belmira, Carolina del Príncipe, Don Matías, Entrerríos, Gómez Plata, Guadalupe, San Pedro de los Milagros, Santa Rosa de Osos, Yolombó, Briceño, Turbo, Frontino, Vigía del Fuerte [ETCR Vidrí], Dabeiba [ETCR Llanogrande]), North and north-​ west Antioquia

(Briceño, Urrao [Mandé], Ituango [ETCR Santa Lucía]), Bajo Cauca

(Apartadó, Cáceres [veredas Anará, San Francisco, Bejuquillo, El Tigre, Ponciano, Alto Tamaná, Campanario and El Calvario]), Bajo Cauca

Córdoba (Montería) (Indigenous territories Zenú, Emberá Katío, Cerro Matoso in Montelibano)

(Tierra Alta)

Quindío Caldas Risaralda

Risaralda

(Río Sucio)

(Pereira, Pueblo Rico [New Area of Reincorporation NAR Santa Cecilia) Santander

Santander

(Bucaramanga)

(Barrancabermeja) Magdalena Medio region

(continued) 169

Shaping Peacebuilding in Colombia

Table A.8: UN: specified sub-​national spaces linked to broader agendas (continued) Development (all agendas)

Governance (all agendas)

Human rights (all agendas)

Peace process (all agendas)

Security (all agendas)

Norte de Santander Cúcuta (Tibú [ZVTN Caño Indio], La Gabarra) Catatumbo Tolima

Tolima

(Planadas)

(Ortega, Planadas)

Huila

Huila (Neiva) (San Luis)

Magdalena

Magdalena

(Pueblo Bello), Sierra Nevada Atlántico

Atlántico (Barranquilla)

(Neighbourhood San José Barranquilla)

Bolívar (Cartagena) (San Basilio de Palenque)

(Santa Rosa del Sur [Buenavista])

Sucre

Sucre

La Mojana

La Mojana

(Santa Rosa del Sur [Buena Vista])

Cesar (Valledupar) (Aguachica, Astrea, La Paz [ETCR San José de Oriente], Tamalameque)

(Valllledupar)

(La Paz, Manaure, Aguachica, Astrea, Tamalameque)

(Aguachica, Astrea, La Paz [Tierra Grata ETCR San José de Oriente], Tamalameque,)

170

APPENDIX 2

Table A.8: UN: specified sub-​national spaces linked to broader agendas (continued) Development (all agendas)

Governance (all agendas)

Human rights (all agendas)

Peace process (all agendas)

Security (all agendas)

La Guajira (Fonseca, Mingueo, Dibulla, San Juan del Cesar, Uribia)

(Fonseca [ETCR Pondores])

Fonseca [ETCR Pondores]

Caquetá

Caquetá

(Florencia)

(Florencia) (San Vicente del Caguán [ZVTN Miravalle], Puerto Rico, Montañita [ETCR Agua Bonita])

(Puerto Rico, ETCR Agua Bonita)

Arauca (Arauca) (Fortul) Meta (Villavicencio) (Mesetas, Granada) (Mesetas, [three ETCR] Granada) near Tinigua, Picachos and Macarena National Parks in Meta and Caquetá

(Villavicencio) (PDETs, [ETCRs])

Guaviare ([ETCR Colinas ‘Jaime Pardo Leal’])

(Vista Hermosa [ZVTN/​ETCR La Reforma/ La Cooperativa], Mesetas [ZVTN La Guajira, ZVTN Buenavista], Yari-​La Macarena [Yari]) Guaviare

(Miraflores [Barranquillita], PDET, [ETCR])

(San José del Guaviare [ZVTN/​ETCR Colinas])

(San José del Guaviare, Miraflores [Barranquillita])

Vichada Casanare

(continued)

171

Shaping Peacebuilding in Colombia

Table A.8: UN: specified sub-​national spaces linked to broader agendas (continued) Development (all agendas)

Governance (all agendas)

Human rights (all agendas)

Chocó

Peace process (all agendas)

Security (all agendas)

Chocó

(Quibdó, Urabá, Bojayá, Riosucio, Carmen del Darién [ETCR Brisas and surrounding communities of Camelias and Iguanas]), Vigía del Fuerte sub-​region

(Quibdó, ethnic territories, river basin Truandó in Riosucio municipality, river basin Domingodó, Nuquí, Alto Baudó y Medio San Juan, Litoral del San Juan, Lloró, Alto Baudó, north-​east border)

(Quibdó, Tadó, Carmen del Darién [ETCR Brisas] Litoral del San Juan, Lloró, Alto Baudó, Domingodó)

(Quibdó, Río Sucio, Truandó river basin, Domingodó river basin, coast of San Juan, Lloró, Alto Baudó, Domingodó)

(Cali, Buenaventura [Bajo Calima], Roldanillo, La Unión, Palmira, Florida, Pradera)

(Buenaventura, [Bajo Calima])

(Buenos Aires [ZVTN El Ceral/​La Elvira], Caldono [ZVTN/​ETCR San Antonio de los Monos], New Point of Reincorporation NPR de Argelia, Timbiquí [Indigenous Reservation Calle Santa Rosa, Las Peñas, Unión Málaga, La Sierpe], Cajibío

(Timbiquí [Santa Rosa Reservation  -​ community of Peñas, Casa Grande in La Sierpe, Unión Málaga, López de Micai, Buenos Aires]), Alto Naya

Valle Del Cauca (Cali, Buenaventura, Pradera, Florida y Palmira)

(Cali, rural zones of Buenaventura [Bajo Calima], Pradera), Alto Naya, Naya River Cauca (Popayán)

(Almaguer, La Vega, Argelia, Caldono, la Rejoya, Totoró, Cajibío [Los Ángeles, La Meseta, Santa Bárbara and La Floresta], Buenos Aires [San Ignacio], Santander de Quilichao, Totoró)

(Buenos Aires, Timbiquí [Las Peñas community belonging to Indigenous reservation Calle Santa Rosa, Unión Málaga, and La Sierpe])

(Timbiquí [cabildo de La Sierpe, Las Peñas, Calle Santa Rosa])

172

APPENDIX 2

Table A.8: UN: specified sub-​national spaces linked to broader agendas (continued) Development (all agendas)

Governance (all agendas)

Human rights (all agendas)

Peace process (all agendas)

Security (all agendas)

[Los Ángeles, La Meseta, Santa Bárbara and La Floresta], Miranda [ETCR Monterredondo]) Nariño (Pasto, Ipiales [La Victoria], Guachucal, Yacuanquer, Albán, Consacá, Taminango, San Lorenzo, Cumbitara, Leiva, Rosario, Policarpa, Tumaco [ETCR La Variante ‘Ariel Aldana’], Barbacoas, Ricaute), Colombia-​Ecuador border

(Tumaco, Leiva, Cumbitara, Policarpa and El Rosario), Pacific coast and foot of the mountain in the coastal region –​coastal foothills

(Pasto, Ipiales, Guachucal, Yacuanquer, Albán, Consacá, Taminango, San Lorenzo, Cumbitara, Leiva, Rosario, Policarpa y Tumaco [Santa Barbara de Iscuandé and El Pital in rural zones of Tumaco], Awá y Eperara Siapidara territories, Olaya Herrera, ethnic territories), mountain range

(Pasto, Ipiales [La Victoria], Santa Barbara de Iscuandé [Los Domingos], El Chaco, Leiva, Cumbitara, Policarpa, El Rosario, Tumaco [El Pital, ZVTN La Variante, ZVTN Betania, ETCR La Variante ‘Ariel Aldana’])

Guainía

Guainía

Vaupés

Vaupés

(Pasto, Francisco Pizarro, Tumaco [San Pedro del Vino, Santa Barbara de Iscuandé and El Pital]), coastal ethnic territories

Putumayo (Mocoa [Nueva Esperanza])

(Mocoa)

(Mocoa, Puerto Asís [ZVTN La Pradera])

(Mocoa)

Note: Bold – departments; parentheses – cities and municipalities; square brackets – smaller territorial subdivisions; italic – (sub-)regions Source: Author’s elaboration from NVivo database

173

Shaping Peacebuilding in Colombia

Table A.9: World Bank: specified sub-​national spaces linked to broader agendas Development (economy and environment)

Governance (all agendas)

Peace process (transitional justice)

Colombia Orinoquía, Amazon, Pacific

South Pacific

Bogotá, D.C. Antioquia (Medellín) Cauca Nariño Note: Bold – departments; parentheses – cities: italic – (sub-)regions Source: Author’s elaboration from NVivo database

Table A.10: IDB: specified sub-​national spaces linked to broader agendas Development (economic, food security, environmental)

Governance (infrastructure and social services) Colombia

Pacific region and forests Bogotá, D.C. Antioquia (Mutatá) Valle del Cauca (Cali, Buenaventura) Risaralda (Pereira) Meta Serranía de la Macarena national park Putumayo (Mocoa) Road: Ecuador border Huila Road: Neiva-​Mocoa-​Santana Chocó (Afro-​Colombian and Indigenous communities in Acandí, Carmen del Darién) Note: Bold – departments; parantheses – cities and municipalities; italic – (sub-)regions Source: Author’s elaboration from NVivo database

174

APPENDIX 2

Table A.11: MAPP/​OEA: specified sub-​national spaces linked to broader agendas Development (economic, food security, environmental, social fabric)

Governance Human rights Peace process (all agendas) (all agendas) (all agendas)

Security (monopoly of force, illegal economies)

Colombia Pacific region, south-​west Colombia

Pacific region

Bogotá, D.C. Boyacá (Duitama) La Guajira Indigenous territory Wayúu Santander (Barrancabermeja) [Farmers’ reserves ZRC] Valle del Río Cimitarra2 Norte de Santander (Cúcuta, Ocaña, Tibú [la Gabarra])

([Versalles, ZVTN Caño Indio])

(El Tarra, San Calixto, Hacari, Teorama, Convención, Sardinata, Tibú [La Gabarra], Ocaña)

(Ocaña, El Tarra, San Calixto, Hacari, Teorama, Convención, Sardinata, Tibú), [Filogringo, San Pablo, Mesitas, La Primavera, Barí Indigenous territory]

(continued)

2

Valle del Río Cimitarra includes municipalities in the departments of Antioquia (Yondó, Remedios), Sur de Bolívar (Cantagallo, San Pablo) and Santander (corregimiento Ciénaga del Opón in Barrancabermeja) 175

Shaping Peacebuilding in Colombia

Table A.11: MAPP/​OEA: specified sub-​national spaces linked to broader agendas (continued) Development (economic, food security, environmental, social fabric)

Governance Human rights Peace process (all agendas) (all agendas) (all agendas)

Security (monopoly of force, illegal economies)

(Catatumbo) Antioquia (Frontino, Anorí, Yondó Ituango, El [Jabonal Bagre, Zaragoza) y Puerto Matilde]

(Cáceres, Tarazá, El Bagre and Zaragoza)

(Medellín, Anorí)

Bajo Cauca

(Ituango, Cáceres, Tarazá, Caucasia, Frontino) Bajo Cauca, Urabá antioqueño

Quindío Tolima Córdoba

Córdoba

(San José de Uré, [Indigenous territories Zenu, ethnic communities])

(San José de Uré)

Bolívar

Bolívar

Sur de Bolívar, [ZRC Arenal and Morales, San Jacinto Comunity Council Eradio Ariza]

[ZRC de Arenal y Morales], (PDET municipalities)

Sur de Bolívar

Valle del Cauca (Cali)

(Buenaventura)

(Cali, Jamundí)

(Cali, Buenaventura)

Cauca (Popayán) Alto Patía and North Cauca

(Popayán [El Vergel, El Pedregal], Santander de Quilichao), coastal region

176

(Santander de Quilichao), Baja Bota Caucana

(Tambo, Algeria, Piamonte), Alto Patía, north of Cauca, Baja Bota Caucana

APPENDIX 2

Table A.11: MAPP/​OEA: specified sub-​national spaces linked to broader agendas (continued) Development (economic, food security, environmental, social fabric)

Governance Human rights Peace process (all agendas) (all agendas) (all agendas)

Huila

Security (monopoly of force, illegal economies) Huila

(Yaguara)

(Neiva)

(Yaguara)

(Quibdó, Carmen del Darién, [Jiguamiandó community council, Embera Katío tribe of Uradá in Jiguamiandó reservation], Alto Baudó [Indigenous territory Embera Dóbida]) Darién Chocoano

(Quibdó, Murindó, Carmen del Darién in river basin river Jiguamiandó, [Indigenous territories Embera Katío and Uradá Jiguamiandó reservation])

(Pasto, Tumaco -​ [community council Alto Mira y Frontera], Los Andes Sotomayor, Policarpa, Cumbitara,

(Pasto, Tumaco [El Restrepo, territory of community council Alto Mira and Frontera],

Chocó (Quibdó, Alto Baudó, Pie de Pató, Medio Baudó [Puerto Meluk])

(Quibdó, Alto Baudó [Pie de Pató] y Medio Baudó [Puerto Meluk], Carmed del Darién [Indigenous reservation Embera Katío Tahami in Alto Andágueda, Cocomopoca, Cocolatu, river basin Jiguamiandó Indigenous reservation Embera Katío-​Uradá Jiguamiandó])

(Quibdó, Carmen del Darién, river basin Jiguamiandó, Indigenous reservation Embera Katío in Uradá Jiguamiandó, Riosucio, Lloró, Alto Baudó, Medio Baudó and El Litoral del San Juan, Darien region, Indigenous population Embera Dóbida in reservation Catru, Dubasa, Ancoso in municipality Alto Baudó) Nariño

(Tumaco, Samaniego, Pasto)

(Pasto Samaniego, Chachaguí, Tumaco)

(Pasto, Iscuandé, Tumaco [vereda El Restrepo vereda El Tandíl, community

(continued)

177

Shaping Peacebuilding in Colombia

Table A.11: MAPP/​OEA: specified sub-​national spaces linked to broader agendas (continued) Development (economic, food security, environmental, social fabric)

Governance Human rights Peace process (all agendas) (all agendas) (all agendas)

council Alto Mira and Frontera, Awá territories]), Pacific region

Security (monopoly of force, illegal economies)

El Rosario y Leiva, Ipiales [Cofanía Jardines de Sucumbíos], Barbacoas, Ricaurte, Iscuandé)

Ipiales [Cofanía Jardines de Sucumbíos], Chachaguí, Andes [Sotomayor], Policarpa, Cumbitara, Leiva, El Rosario)

(Mocoa, Piamonte y Puerto Guzmán, [Indigenous reservation Buenavista of ZioBain tribe, Puerto Asís, community council], Valle del Guamuez [Villa Arboleda], Orito [Awá Indigenous reservation], Puerto Caicedo, San Miguel, Villagarzón)

[Reservation Buenavista of ZioBain Indigenous tribe], Puerto Asís, Awa Indigenous territories in Puerto Asís, Puerto Caicedo, Valle del Guamuez, San Miguel, Villagarzón y Orito, Puerto Guzmán)

Putumayo ([Resguardo Buenavista –​ Indigenous reserve ZioBain], Puerto Asís, Valle del Guamuez, Mocoa)

(Valle del Guamuez [Community council Villa Arboleda, El Placer], Puerto Asís [Indigenous reservation Buenavista of ZioBain tribe], PDET municipalities, Villagarzón [Inga Indigenous communities]

(Mocoa, Puerto Asís [Indigenous territory ZioBain, AfroColombian territories])

Caquetá (Belén de los Andaquíes, El Doncello)

(El Paujil)

(Florencia, Belén de los Andaquíes, [Puerto Torres and San Luis])

178

(Belén de los Andaquíes [Puerto Torres and San Luis]

APPENDIX 2

Table A.11: MAPP/​OEA: specified sub-​national spaces linked to broader agendas (continued) Development (economic, food security, environmental, social fabric)

Governance Human rights Peace process (all agendas) (all agendas) (all agendas)

Security (monopoly of force, illegal economies) Vichada Casanare

Meta

Meta

([Sikuani South Meta Indigenous reservation Caño Ovejas]​ Mapiripán) Guaviare (San José del Guaviare) Arauca (Arauca, Arauquita, Tame, Fortul, Saravena) Guainía Amazonas Cesar Atlántico (Barranquilla) San Andrés

San Andrés

Note: Bold – departments; parentheses – cities and municipalities; square brackets – smaller territorial subdivisions; italic – (sub-)regions Source: Author’s elaboration from NVivo database

179

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USAID (2017c) Afro-Colombian Leadership and Scholarship Program, 7 March, available at: www.usaid.gov/​sites/​defa​ult/​files/​docume​nts/​1862/​ AfroColombianLeadership​Scho​larh​ip_​F​acts​heet​_​030​717.pdf [accessed 28 November 2019]. USAID (2017d) Inclusion for Community Development Programme, 7 March, available at: www.usaid.gov/​docume​nts/​1862/​inclus​ion-​commun​ ity-​deve​lopm​ent-​prog​ram-​fact-​sheet [accessed 28 November 2019]. USAID (2017e) Overcoming Gender-​Based Violence Activity, 7 March, available at: https://​2012-​2017.usaid.gov/​sites/​defa​ult/​files/​docume​nts/​ 1862/​OGBV_​F​actS​heet​_​030​717.pdf [accessed 28 November 2019]. USAID (2017f) Rural Finance Initiative, 7 March, available at: www.usaid. gov/​docume​nts/​1862/​r ural-​fina​nce-​ini​tiat​ive-​f act-​sheet [accessed 28 November 2019]. USAID (2017g) Environment Office, 14 March, available at: www.usaid. gov/​sites/​defa​ult/​files/​docume​nts/​1862/​ENV_​F​acts​heet​_​030​917.pdf [accessed 28 November 2019]. USAID (2017h) Trade Union Strengthening Project II, 14 March, available at: www.usaid.gov/​docume​nts/​1862/​trade-​union-​streng​then​ing-​prog​ram-​ ii [accessed 28 November 2019]. USAID (2017i) Producers to Markets Alliance, 29 March, available at: www. usaid.gov/​docume​nts/​1862/​produc​ers-​mark​ets-​allia​nce [accessed 28 November 2019]. USAID (2017j) Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihoods Initiative –​ Northern/​Southern Regions, 3 April, available at: www.usaid.gov/​docume​ nts/​1862/​consol​idat​ion-​and-​enhan​ced-​live​liho​ods-​ini​tiat​ive-​north​erns​ outh​ern-​regi​ons [accessed 28 November 2019]. USAID (2017k) Investing for Peace, 3 April, available at: www.usaid.gov/​ sites/d​ efau ​ lt/fi ​ les/​docume​nts/​1862/​Investi​ngFo​rPea​ce_​Fa​ ctS​heet​_0​ 40​317. pdf [accessed 28 November 2019]. USAID (2017l) Land and Rural Development Programme, 3 April, available at: www.usaid.gov/s​ ites/d​ efau ​ lt/d​ ocumen ​ ts/​ [accessed 28 November 2019]. USAID (2017m) Support to the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Colombia, 31 May, available at: https://​2012-​2017.usaid.gov/​sites/​defa​ult/​files/​docume​nts/​1862/​ OHCHR_​Fact​Shee​t_​0.pdf [accessed 28 November 2019]. USAID (2017n) Human Rights Activity, 19 June, available at: www. usaid.gov/​docume​nts/​1862/​drg-​human-​r ig​hts-​activ​ity-​hra [accessed 28 November 2019]. USAID (2017o) Programme Alliances for Reconciliation, 19 June, available at: www.usaid.gov/​docume​nts/​1862/​r io-​prog ​ram-​allian​ces-​rec​onci​liat​ ion-​par-​fact-​sheet [accessed 28 November 2019].

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256

Index References to figures appear in italic type; those in bold type refer to tables. References to endnotes show both the page number and the note number (72n2) A Academic community in Colombia  98–​102, 143–​44 Alternative development  5, 62, 82, 88–​9 APC (Presidential Agency for Cooperation)  7, 13, 49, 66–​8, 70, 72, 87–​88, 145 APC funding areas and international cooperation  68 C Canada  7, 15, 48, 50, 72, 74–​6, 74n4, 86, 103, 110, 112–​14, 126–​27, 129, 131–​32, 145, 147, 149 Canada number of departments mentioned  129 Canada number of online subsidies per year  50 Canada number of subsidies and percentages  159–​60 Canada percentage of subsidies linked to agendas  127 Canada specified places linked to broader agendas  164 Canadian negative comments in specific sub-​national places  114 Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF)  80–​1, 133 D Demining,  6, 72, 75, 76, 80, 132, 131, 140, 147–​48, 157 Demining linked to sub-​national spaces, Canada  164 Demining mentioned in online subsidies by countries  159 Demining mentioned in online subsidies by IOs  161

Development  1–​3, 5, 8, 8n3, 12–​13, 15, 24, 29–​31, 40–​44, 47–​48, 52, 61, 63, 66–​ 67, 71–​72, 74, 76, 78, 79, 81–​82, 85–​6, 88–​9, 93, 101–​02, 106–​09, 120–​22, 125–​ 26, 129–​36, 138–​39, 141–​44, 146–​49, 152–​53, 156, 158 Development, area of cooperation  68 Development as a percentage of all the comments by all actors  127 Development linked to sub-​national spaces, Canada  164 Development linked to sub-​national spaces, EU  166–​68 Development linked to sub-​national spaces, IDB  174 Development linked to sub-​national spaces, MAPP/​OEA  175–​79 Development linked to sub-​national spaces, Sweden  165 Development linked to sub-​national spaces, UK  165–​66 Development linked to sub-​national spaces, UN  168–​73 Development linked to sub-​national spaces, USA  162–​64 Development linked to sub-​national spaces, World Bank  174 Development mentioned in EU positive comments for sub-​national places  117 Development mentioned in online subsidies (all actors)  126 Development mentioned in online subsidies by countries  159 Development mentioned in online subsidies by IOs  161 Development Programmes with Territorial Focus, PDET)  52–​3, 58, 60, 63, 70, 86, 90, 99, 103–​04, 129, 137–​41, 137n1, 147

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PDET mentioned by MAPP/​ OEA  176, 178 PDET mentioned by UN  171 Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR)  44–​5, 53, 59, 72, 76–​9, 87, 89–​90, 94, 125, 132, 134–​38, 140–​43, 146–​47, 149 DDR linked to sub-​national spaces, Canada  164 DDR linked to sub-​national spaces, EU  167–​68 DDR linked to sub-​national spaces, MAPP/​OEA  175 DDR linked to sub-​national spaces, UN  169–​73 DDR mentioned in online subsidies by countries  160 DDR mentioned in online subsidies by IOs  161 Duque, Ivan (Duque Government or Administration)  3–​4, 6, 8, 13–​5, 51–​4, 56–​61, 63–​7, 69–​70, 73, 76, 92, 95–​6, 99, 101, 103–​04, 107, 142–​45 E ELN (National Liberation Army)  3, 59, 61, 78, 85, 89–​90, 94, 99–​100, 102, 105, 115, 139, 143, 156 ELN mentioned in MAPP/​OEA negative comments for sub-​national places  123 European Union (EU)  5–​8, 8n2, 32, 48–​50, 57, 63, 67, 72, 76, 79–​83, 89–​90, 95, 103, 116–​17, 126–​29, 135, 140, 145–​48, 150 EU negative comments in specific sub-​national places  116 EU number of departments mentioned  129 EU number of online subsidies per year  50 EU number of subsidies and percentages  160–​61 EU percentage of subsidies linked to agendas  127 EU positive comments in specific sub-​ national places  117 EU specified places linked to broader agendas  166–​68 F FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and Alternative Revolutionary Forces of the Common People)  2–​3, 5–​7, 10, 13, 15, 42, 43, 45, 53–​62, 64–​5, 73, 77, 81–​2, 84–​5, 90, 93–​98, 100–​08, 122, 124, 132–​34, 136, 139, 143–​44, 146, 155–​56 FARC mentioned in UN negative comments for sub-​national places  119 FARC mentioned in MAPP/​OEA negative comments for sub-​national places  123

Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)  106–​117, 133, 135–​36 Food security  62, 83, 125, 129, 133–​39, 152, 155 Food security linked to sub-​national spaces, IDB  174 Food security linked to sub-​national spaces, MAPP/​OEA  175–​79 Food security linked to sub-​national spaces, UK  165–​66 Food security mentioned in online subsidies by countries  160 Food security mentioned in online subsidies by IOs  160 Framing and framing analysis  4, 10–​14, 16–​4, 35, 39, 46–​8, 142, 146 Spatial framing, definition  11, 12–​14, 16, 35, 39, 148–​49, 151 G Gender Based Violence (GBV)  45, 75–​6, 81, 126, 131–​34, 136–​37, 154 GBV linked to sub-​national spaces, Canada  164 GBV linked to sub-​national spaces, USA  162–​64 GBV mentioned in online subsidies by countries  160 GBV mentioned in online subsidies by IOs  161 Governance  12–​3, 15, 30, 37, 47, 48, 70, 73, 76–​8, 82–​3, 85, 88–​9, 109, 125–​26, 130–​31, 133–​35, 137–​41, 147–​50, 152–​54 Governance linked to sub-​national spaces,  175–​79 Governance linked to sub-​national spaces, Canada  164 Governance linked to sub-​national spaces, EU  166–​68 Governance linked to sub-​national spaces, IDB  174 Governance linked to sub-​national spaces, Sweden  165 Governance linked to sub-​national spaces, UK  165–​66 Governance linked to sub-​national spaces, UN  168–​73 Governance linked to sub-​national spaces, USA  162–​64 Governance linked to sub-​national spaces, World Bank  174 Governance mentioned as a percentage of all the comments by all actors 127 Governance mentioned in online subsidies (all actors)  126 Governance mentioned in online subsidies by countries  160

258

Index

Governance mentioned in online subsidies by IOs  161 H Human Rights (HR)  47–​8, 52, 62–​6, 67, 72, 74–​82, 74n4, 79n9, 84–​5, 90, 93–​4, 96, 102–​04, 107, 109, 111–​13, 118, 125–​26, 131, 133–​40, 143, 147–​9, 154–​55 HR as a percentage of all comments mentioned by all actors  127 HR linked to sub-​national spaces, Canada  164 HR linked to sub-​national spaces, EU  166–​68 HR linked to sub-​national spaces, MAPP/​ OEA  175–​79 HR linked to sub-​national spaces, Sweden  165 HR linked to sub-​national spaces, UK  165 HR linked to sub-​national spaces, UN  168–​73 HR linked to sub-​national spaces, USA  162–​64 HR mentioned in EU negative comments for sub-​national places  116 HR mentioned in online subsidies (all actors)  126 HR mentioned in online subsidies by countries  160 HR mentioned in online subsidies by IOs  161 Human Rights defenders and social leaders  47, 65–​6, 75, 80–​81, 90, 93–​4, 99, 103–​04, 107, 112, 118, 126, 131–​32, 134–​36, 140, 142–​43, 145–​46, 150, 155, 157 Human rights defenders and social leaders mentioned in MAPP/​OEA negative comments for sub-​national places  123 Human rights defenders and social leaders mentioned in online subsidies by countries  160 Human rights defenders and social leaders mentioned in online subsidies by IOs  161 Human rights defenders and social leaders mentioned in US negative comments for sub-​national places  119 I Inter-​American Development Bank (IDB)  5, 7, 15, 49–​50, 67, 76, 79, 88–​89, 122, 126, 138–​39, 145, 147 IDB number of departments mentioned  129 IDB number of online subsidies per year  50 IDB number of subsidies and percentages  160–​61 IDB percentage of subsidies linked to agendas  127

IDB specified sub-​national spaces linked to broader agendas  174 International Organization for Migration (IOM)  46, 76, 78n8, 84, 89 L Land restitution  89–​90, 104, 120, 131, 133–​ 35, 138–​39, 147, 154, 156 Land restitution linked to sub-​national spaces, Sweden  165 N National Development Plan  8n2, 52, 60, 64, 67–​8, 70, 73 Non-​governmental organizations, Colombia  2, 15, 93, 102–​08, 143–​44, 146 O Obama, Barak and Obama Administration  6, 72–​3, 97 Online subsidies  3–​4, 8–​17, 19–​20, 25–​6, 34, 39, 40, 41n2, 46, 48–​51, 93, 110–​15, 118, 120, 122, 125–​26, 129–​34, 136, 138–​39, 142, 144–​47, 149, 150 Broader agendas in online subsidies (all actors included)  126 Number of online-​subsidy communications per year, per actor  50 Organization of American States, Peace Mission (MAPP/​OEA)  3, 5, 7–​8, 15, 49–​50, 75–​9, 78n8, 89–​91, 110, 113, 122, 124, 126, 128–​29, 139–​41, 144–​45, 147–​50 OAS, Peace Mission or MAPP/​OEA negative comments in specific sub-national places  123 OAS, Peace Mission or MAPP/​OEA number of departments mentioned  129 OAS, Peace Mission or MAPP/​OEA number of online subsidies per year  50 OAS, Peace Mission or MAPP/​ OEA number of subsidies and percentages  160–​61 OAS, Peace Mission or MAPP/​OEA percentage of subsidies linked to agendas  127 OAS, Peace Mission or MAPP/​OEA positive comments in specific subnational places  124 OAS, Peace Mission or MAPP/​OEA specified sub-​national spaces linked to broader agendas  175–​79 P Peace Agreement  1–​4, 7, 8n2, 12, 15, 30, 42–​3, 45, 49, 51–​4, 59, 60–​1, 63, 65–​7, 69, 72–​3, 75, 77, 83, 85–​8, 90, 93–​9, 101–​07, 120, 125, 131–​32, 134–​35, 137–​45, 147, 150, 152, 156

259

SHAPING PEACEBUILDING IN COLOMBIA

Peace agreement mentioned in UN, negative comments for sub-​national places  119 Peace agreement mentioned in USA positive comments for sub-​national places  113 Peace process  3–​10, 13, 15, 16, 23, 27, 34, 42, 44–​5, 47–​9, 53–​61, 64, 67, 70, 72–​73, 78, 80–​5, 87, 89–​90, 92–​3, 95–​6, 98–​102, 109, 113, 115, 117–​18, 125–​6, 131–​33, 135–​37, 139–​41, 142, 144–​48, 155–​56 Peace process linked to sub-​national spaces, Canada  164 Peace process linked to sub-​national spaces, EU  166–​68 Peace process linked to sub-​national spaces, MAPP/​OEA  175–​79 Peace process linked to sub-​national spaces, UK  164 Peace process linked to sub-​national spaces, UN  168–​73 Peace process linked to sub-​national spaces, USA  162–​64 Peace process linked to sub-​national spaces, World Bank  174 Peace process mentioned in online subsidies (all actors)  126 Peace process mentioned as a percentage of all comments by all actors  127 Peace process mentioned in online subsidies by countries  160 Peace process mentioned in online subsidies by IOs  161 Peacebuilding, definition  28–​32 Peacebuilding, area of cooperation  p 68 Peacebuilding, communication  32–​34 Plebiscite, peace  4, 13, 15, 23, 53–​7, 64, 75, 104, 144 Public Diplomacy  4, 8–​14, 16–​18, 20–​8, 34, 144–​45, 150 Public mediated diplomacy  14, 17, 18, 34, 142, 145

Security linked to sub-​national spaces, IDB  174 Security linked to sub-​national spaces, MAPP/​OEA  175–​79 Security linked to sub-​national spaces, UK  165–​66 Security linked to sub-​national spaces, UN  169–​73 Security linked to sub-​national spaces, USA  162–​64 Security mentioned by UN in comments related to sub-​national spaces (negative)  119 Security mentioned in online subsidies (all actors)  126 Security mentioned in online subsidies by countries  159 Security mentioned in online subsidies by IOs  161 Sweden  6–​8, 15, 48, 50, 72, 76–​9, 86–​9, 103, 114–​15, 126, 129, 132–​33, 144, 147–​48 Sweden broader agendas in online subsidies  126 Sweden number of departments mentioned  129 Sweden number of online subsidies per year  50 Sweden number of subsidies and percentages  159–​60 Sweden percentage of subsidies linked to agendas  127 Sweden specified places linked to broader agendas  165

S Santos, Juan Manuel and Santos Government or Administration  3, 5–​6, 8, 13–​5, 51–​3, 56–​9, 61–​7, 72–​3, 75–​7, 80, 89, 90, 93, 96, 98–​101, 106, 142–​44 Security  6, 9, 12–​4, 16, 26, 30–​1, 37, 40, 43, 47–​8, 51–​3, 60–​5, 67–​8, 72–​3, 75–​8, 80, 83–​4, 86, 90, 93–​5, 101, 103–​07, 125–​26, 129–​34, 136–​41, 147–​50, 157–​158 Security as a percentage of all comments by all actors  127 Security linked to sub-​national spaces, Canada  164 Security linked to sub-​national spaces, EU  166–​68

T Transitional Justice  47–​8, 51–​2, 58, 64, 75–​ 81, 84–​5, 90, 105, 125, 134, 136–​8, 140, 143, 147, 154, 156 Transitional justice linked to sub-​national spaces, World Bank  174 Transitional justice mentioned in online subsidies by countries  160 Transitional justice mentioned in online subsidies by IOs  161 Trump, Donald and Trump Administration  57, 72–​3, 92, 93, 97, 100, 142–​43, 148 U United Nations (UN)  5–​9, 11, 15, 30, 32–​3, 44–​6, 49–​50, 57–​9, 61, 65, 67–​8, 74–​81, 83–​6, 88, 93–​6, 99, 103–​04, 106, 117–​21, 126–​29, 131–​33, 136–​37, 143–​45, 147, 150 UN negative comments in specific subnational places  119 UN number of departments mentioned  129

260

Index

UN number of online subsidies per year  50 UN number of subsidies and percentages  160–​61 UN percentage of subsidies linked to agendas  127 UN positive comments in specific subnational places  121 UN specified places linked to broader agendas  168–​73 United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF)  46, 76, 84, 136 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)  6–​7, 75–​6, 78n8, 84, 106–​07 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)  7, 62, 75, 84, 100, 106 United Nations Secretary General (UNSG)  3, 6, 57, 65, 84–​5, 96 United Nations Security Council (UNSC)  58–​9, 61, 63, 76–​8, 80–​1, 84–​5 United Nations Verification Mission  3, 7–​8, 72, 78n8, 85, 99, 132–​33, 136, 143 United Kingdom (UK)  6–​7, 15, 48–​50, 79–​81, 79n9, 86, 89, 103, 115–​16, 126, 127, 129, 133–​34, 147 UK number of departments mentioned  129 UK number of online subsidies per year  50 UK number of subsidies and percentages  159–​60 UK percentage of subsidies linked to agendas  127 UK specified places linked to broader agendas  165–​66

United States Agency for International Development (USAID)  48, 72, 110, 129–​30 United States of America (USA)  5–​7, 15, 29, 32, 48–​50, 57, 71–​3, 72n2, 95, 97–​8, 100–​1, 103, 106, 110–​11, 113, 127–​31, 143–​45, 147–​48 USA negative comments in targeted subnational spaces  111 USA number of departments mentioned  129 USA number of online subsidies per year  50 USA number of subsidies and percentages  159–​60 USA percentage of subsidies linked to agendas  127 USA positive comments in specific subnational spaces  113 USA specified places linked to broader agendas  162–​64 W World Bank  7, 15, 49–​50, 66–​7, 76–​7, 78n8, 86–​8, 120–​22, 126, 129, 137–​8, 146–​47 World Bank number of departments mentioned  129 World Bank number of online subsidies per year  50 World Bank number of subsidies and percentages  160–​61 World Bank percentage of subsidies linked to agendas  127 World Bank specified sub-national spaces linked to broader agendas  174

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