Shanghai Narrative: A Socio-spatial Perspective 9819932602, 9789819932603

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Hai Yu · Huahua Zou

Shanghai Narrative A Socio-spatial Perspective

Shanghai Narrative

Hai Yu · Huahua Zou

Shanghai Narrative A Socio-spatial Perspective

Hai Yu Fudan University Shanghai, China

Huahua Zou Shanghai University of Medicine and Health Sciences Shanghai, China

ISBN 978-981-99-3260-3 ISBN 978-981-99-3261-0 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-3261-0 Jointly published with Tongji University Press Co., Ltd. The print edition is not for sale in China (Mainland). Customers from China (Mainland) please order the print book from: Tongji University Press Co., Ltd. © Tongji University Press 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publishers, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publishers, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publishers nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publishers remain neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore Paper in this product is recyclable.

Acknowledgments

My connection with urban research dates back to nearly thirty years ago when I participated in the Ford Foundation’s sociology program and started offering an “urban sociology” course at Fudan University. I would like to express my deepest gratitude to Prof. Zhang Desheng of the Chinese University of Hong Kong, not only because he was the project’s executor, but also for his thoughtful care and support for all China mainland participants, including myself. It is only natural for the teaching of urban sociology to develop into research on Shanghai. However, my passion for exploring Shanghai largely comes from my innate sensitivity to architecture and space. Like Lewis Mumford, who explored New York City on foot, I never tire of wandering the streets and observing the buildings. One of the reasons I miss my father is because he often took us to various places in Shanghai when I was young. An old photo of us as children in a garden has a background of old architecture that still exists today, just a short distance from the former site of the Shanghai Municipal Council building. My vivid impressions of the central city landscape were likely formed during my adolescence, making me familiar with its texture, rhythm, and charm. Whenever I pass by the old neighborhoods where I once lived, I feel inexplicably moved and realize that my love for the city stems from my youthful experiences. I also enjoy indulging in this subjectivity because cities become more intimate and engaging through our experiences. My formal study of Shanghai began with Tianzifang, and my connection with it is thanks to Zheng Rongfa, the local government official in charge of the area during Tianzifang’s early days, who is also the protagonist Mr. Zheng, repeatedly mentioned in the Tianzifang chapter of this book. In 2007, I was attracted to Tianzifang by its reputation, visited the site, and thoroughly enjoyed it. I wrote about my joy in an article about Tianzifang, in which I also criticized Xintiandi. In contrast to Xintiandi, Tianzifang has grown within a genuine lane space. Regardless of the foreign atmosphere permeating the air, the ambiance is authentically Shanghainese. The narrow, varied alleyways offer a sense of intimacy that is hard to find in most commercial cities. Climbing steep stairs, leaning against the rear window while drinking alcohol or coffee, and gazing at the shikumen balconies opposite, one can’t help but feel a touch of tenderness and emotion, whether a local v

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resident or someone with shikumen living experience. For those who have lived in such neighborhoods, like middle-aged Shanghainese like myself, the nostalgia evoked is something Xintiandi cannot provide. It has the form of old Shanghai but lacks its emotional essence, which cannot be manufactured. Tianzifang has created a cosmopolitan space from a genuine location. Mr. Zheng knew that I was fascinated by Tianzifang and invited me to study it, saying, “You must come and research Tianzifang.” At first, I did not fully understand the significance of Mr. Zheng’s invitation, but when I learned that Tianzifang was developed under his leadership, and that it had survived many precarious situations to eventually thrive, I only regretted not getting involved sooner. My team and I have interviewed Mr. Zheng, along with other key figures of Tianzifang, dozens of times. Workshops on the commercial streets of six cities (Shanghai, New York, Tokyo, Toronto, Berlin, and Amsterdam) and the China-Japan-Korea Urban Renewal Forum have all taken place in Tianzifang. The Tianzifang experience is the Chinese case study for practicing social integration and inclusive cities in the Shanghai Manual: A Guide For Sustainable Urban Development in The 21st Century. 2016 Annual Report sponsored by UN-Habitat and Shanghai Municipal People’s Government. Not only a research site, Tianzifang is also the classroom for my “Shanghai Studies.” The reason why I prefer teaching in Tianzifang is simple: It presents an alternative drama of Shanghai’s urban renewal, gathering ambitious and intelligent entrepreneurs, allowing both Chinese and foreign students to understand Shanghai’s stories. Isn’t the Tianzifang site much cooler than the classrooms on campus? My preference for Tianzifang inevitably involves subjectivity. Over the past five years, Tianzifang has passed its heyday and is transitioning from a creative space to a tourist space. However, whenever I walk through the alleys of Tianzifang among the tourists, I don’t feel annoyed but moved, touched by the entrepreneurs who have created something out of nothing and turned ordinary Shikumen alleys into the most popular “pilgrimage site” for old Shanghai flavor. Without the support of Mr. Zheng Rongfa, my research on Tianzifang would not have its current appearance, and he is the first collaborator I want to thank. Tianzifang research is also teamwork. I would like to thank Prof. Chen Xiangming from Trinity College in the USA and Prof. Zhong Xiaohua from Tongji University in Shanghai, as their contributions are included in the Tianzifang chapter of this book. I would like to thank Prof. Sharon Zukin of the City University of New York, as it was at her New York workshop on urban comparative perspectives that I presented my research on Tianzifang. During a workshop in Amsterdam, I witnessed Zukin’s fieldwork capabilities. This book includes two photos of Zukin conducting interviews in Shanghai, and her enthusiasm for fieldwork has contributed to her renowned research in New York. The Tianzifang commercial street case was eventually included in Global Cities, Local Streets: Everyday Diversity from New York to Shanghai, co-edited by Zukin, Philip Kasinitz, and Chen Xiangming. My other research site is Knowledge and Innovation Community (KIC) Garden in Shanghai. The founder, Liu Yuelai, is a professor in the Landscape Department of Tongji University, possessing exceptional urban landscape design skills. When he devotes himself wholeheartedly to natural education and creating activity spaces

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for children, in my view, his achievements go far beyond just spatial and green, but also social and humanistic. I once shared my judgment on the demonstrative value of KIC Garden at a forum. Our concerns start with the fragmentation, atomization, and closure of urban space, calling for a return to the lifeworld of classical sociology and the living space of classical urban studies. KIC Garden provides a case for rebuilding shared space in the post-alley era. The community center functions, children’s socialization functions, and cultural functions of creating and sharing meaning that the garden plays are hard to find simultaneously in most communities in Shanghai today. This at least shows that the garden, as a model of the lifeworld we define, may still be an ideal. However, this idea stems from the need for human growth, the need for a sense of human existence, the need for people to be close to the land, and the need for goodwill interaction between people, all of which are rooted in the depths of human nature. The living scenes created by the garden are bound to become a demonstration that touches the hearts of more urban dwellers. I am grateful to Liu Yuelai for his full support of my research. And I am witnessing the urban garden he founded, which has grown from a single point to a community, a city, and then developed into a nationwide network. Lu Jie is a senior photographer for Shanghai Pictorial and has documented the city’s changes over the past forty years. Lu Jie’s lens showcases the “Shanghai Revival” that the whole world is talking about. I am grateful to Lu Jie, who generously contributed the necessary images for the chapters in this book. Several chapters of this book were first given as keynote speeches at the ChinaJapan-Korea Urban Renewal Forum and later published in Global Urban Studies, an academic journal sponsored by the Rikkyo Institute for Global Urban Studies in Japan. I would like to thank Prof. Matsumoto and Prof. Mizukami for their thoughtful arrangements, so that my English paper on Shanghai research will be published in the journals hosted by them first. The annual China-Japan-Korea Urban Renewal Forum is held alternately in Shanghai, Tokyo, and Seoul. Therefore, I would also like to thank the two of them, as well as Prof. Wonho Jang of the University of Seoul, who did their best to make the forum lively and fruitful. The original text of this book is in Chinese, and the English version is a translation. The translation of the chapters in this book has spanned ten years. Ms. Xu Yefang is the earliest translator and one of the final proofreaders. In the English work, Ms. Xu is undoubtedly the most significant contributor. I am grateful to Xu Yefang, who is the most professional and responsive member of my team. The final proofreader of this book is Andrew David Field, an American professor at Duke Kunshan University. He has lived in Shanghai for more than a decade and is a highly accomplished Shanghai research expert. I am grateful to Prof. Field, who gladly accepted my invitation and excellently completed the final proofreading of the entire book. The issue of “Chinglish,” which I was once worried about, will undoubtedly not exist. It is an honor for this book to be approved as part of the “Chinese Academic Translation Project” (Project No. 20WSHB014). However, without the proactive initiative and efforts of Yuan Jialin, this book would have had no connection to the National

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Social Science Fund project. As the backbone of the International Department of Tongji University Press, Ms Yuan has handled all publishing matters effectively. Thank you, Yuan Jialin! I would like to believe the Shanghai Narrative is just the beginning of our collaboration, not the end. April 2023

Hai Yu

Introduction

Our narrative begins with the following photo (Fig. 1). At the top of the photo lies the Huangpu River, where Shanghai was opened as a treaty port. It then flows into the East China Sea and finally to the Pacific Ocean. At the bottom of the photo is the Shanghai Racecourse. As the saying goes, “where there are British people, there is horseracing”; the sport could be seen as a typical activity representing the lifestyle of foreigners in Shanghai at that time. Streets connecting the Huangpu River and the Racecourse from east to west define the central area of the public concessions. Much could be told from this photo, for instance, that the Huangpu River represented the treaty port forced to open after the Opium War, that the plot from the Huangpu River to the Racecourse was the initial area of the first foreign concessions in the Chinese territory, and that the daily hustle and bustle and speculations in the Racecourse reflected the everyday presence and influence of the Western institutions and lifestyle in Shanghai. The space from the west side of the Huangpu River to the Racecourse was not only the earliest concession in China, but also the indisputable central area of Shanghai in its modern history. From then on, the urban spatial structure of center-edge division began to be defined by the relationship and distance between the certain place and the concessions. Although the central area of Shanghai kept expanding after changes of different governments and administrations, the position of the concessions as city center has never changed. The difference between the Shanghainese people and the country bumpkins has been more or less defined by the contrast between the concessions and the Chinese territories. This space is also where life and work take place. Known as the central area of the international concessions, it not only boasts of the best stone buildings in Shanghai but also gathers the most common local Shikumen (stone gate building) alleyways. Tycoons and bosses seemed to live in the same central area as insignificant clerks, tram drivers and call-girls did, but essentially in two completely different worlds. People tend to hang out with those who live in the same kind of houses and neighborhoods, and thus, one’s social network is essentially in line with his/her work space and life space.

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Fig. 1 An Aerial-view Photo of the Central Area of Shanghai in the 1940s

Not a single person is seen in this photo, but it’s not hard to imagine it in full crowds. The landscape of the central area and its living space shaped the spatial experience and spatial imagination of its residents, as well as the understandings of their own identities. For clerks taking tram to work, rickshaw pullers running through the city, and foreign bosses sitting in private cars, their conceptions of the city and their mental maps were most likely quite different. This book claims as the Shanghai narrative of social space, combining “narrative” as a historical perspective and “space” as a geographical perspective. This is not something innovative. For instance, in the chapter “Business Streets in Shanghai: Past and Present,” “business streets” define the space where business takes place, while their “past and present” refer to a chronicle narrative, which has been expertise of Chinese historians. However, by adding “social” in front of the word “space,” it provides an account of Shanghai narrative from a new perspective, i.e., the sociospatial perspective. On the one hand, the concept of social space comes from a unique theoretical school, which belongs to Marxist urban sociology and geography in a narrow sense.1 On the other hand, the use of the socio-spatial perspective can 1

Gottdiener, M. and Hutchison, R. 2010. The New Urban Sociology (Fourth Edition). Boulder: Westview Press. p. 97. The socio-spatial perspective (SSP) is discussed in detail in Chap. 4 “Contemporary Urban Sociology.”

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Fig. 2 The Distribution of Shack Settlements in Shanghai in the 1940s. Source Institute of Economics, Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences. 1962. The Development of Shack Settlements in Shanghai (shang hai peng hu qu de yan bian). Shanghai People’s Publishing House (shang hai ren min chu ban she)

emphasize spatial characteristics of the urban space in Shanghai. The method of space, as briefly mentioned above, takes a look at the center-edge structure of the urban space in Shanghai. It is a vertical view with a macro-perspective. The above photo (Fig. 2) is a layout map of shack settlements in Shanghai in the 1940s, showing the outskirts of the concession areas surrounded by shack settlements of Subei people (immigrants from the northern part of Jiangsu Province). From the map, it is not difficult to understand that the center-edge structure of space reflects the center-edge structure of ethnic group distributions. Focusing on the life in neighborhood blocks and alleyways is to discuss space at the mezzo level, which examines whom people interact with, what kind of relationships they have, and how these interactions and relationships affect their life opportunities, all of which take place in spaces of daily interactions. Finally, analysis at the micro-level is also needed, including how people experience their environment, whether they dislike it or feel reluctant to leave, and how they imagine other spaces. In summary, to bring spatial analysis back to urban studies, one can at least take the spatial approach at three levels. At the macro-level, it shall examine spatial location and the relationship between macrosocial processes and important resources (mobilization and accessibility of resources), and study how social factors determine people’s spatial status in cities (traditional issues like residential isolation, etc.) and how the latter affects people’s access to social resources and social status. At the mezzo level, it shall examine the relationship between space and human

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Introduction interaction and study how space affects people’s interaction, interpersonal relationships, access to and dissemination of information, the composition of groups and establishment of other social ties. At the micro-level, it shall tackle with issues related to space and selfidentity (the organizational mode of cognitive maps and self-experiences) and study how space shapes one’s personality and mentality, how people feel the space and respond to the world based on their perception of the external world and meaningful experiences they have accumulated. People’s cognitions, feelings, and experiences of the environment determine whether they hold a positive or negative attitude toward it. It is a permanent dimension of human action, i.e., the subjective meaning of space, to play a role in constructing the picture of one’s life space.2

A historical photo has led us to the spatial approach. Among those who have introduced spatial analysis into urban studies as an academic tradition, Marxist scholars and geographers including Henry Lefebvre, Doreen Massey, Edward Soja, and others have made the greatest contributions. Chapter 1 will go through all the classic theories on social space, to help us learn from Western theories and understand Shanghai, both its past and present. This book tells the story of Shanghai with the socio-spatial perspective, mostly inspired by Lefebvre. It is my belief that Lefebvre’s ideas still have a strong interpretive power on urban practices in China today; hence in the chapters to come, I will continue to draw on Lefebvre’s theories.

2

Yu, H. ed. 2005. Urban Theory: Classic and Contemporary Readings. Shanghai: Fudan University Press. p. 7.

Contents

1

2

Theories on Social Space: Origins and Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1 H Lefebvre: The Production of Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1.1 The Spatial Triad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1.2 The Production of Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1.3 The Socio-spatial Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2 Doreen Massey: Thinking Geographically . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2.1 Thinking from the Geographical Organization of Social Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2.2 Thinking from the Spatiality (Spatialization) of Power Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3 Edward Soja: The Spatiality of Social Being . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3.1 The Two Illusions of Spatial Cognition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3.2 The Trialectics of Spatiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3.3 Spatiality of Social Life . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4 Spatiality/Socio-spatial Imagination and Conceptual Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4.1 The Geographical Pattern of Industries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4.2 Cases of Spatiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4.3 The Agency of Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.5 Neighborhood in Shanghai as Social Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.6 Spatial Power in the Tianzifang Renewal Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.7 An Analysis of Gentrification in the Urban Regeneration of Shanghai . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1 1 1 2 4 6

26 29

Discovering Shanghainese People from the Spatial History of Shanghai . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 Shanghainese Versus Country Bumpkins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 The Concessions and the Shanghainese . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 Socialist Transformation and the Shanghainese . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4 “Shanghai” in the Mental Map of Shanghainese . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

31 32 34 36 38

6 7 10 10 11 14 16 16 17 18 19 22

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2.5

Nostalgia for Old Shanghai: An Urban Identity for Elites not for Common People . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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3

The Spatial Characteristics During the Rise of Shanghai . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 The Geographical Logic of Shanghai’s Rise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 The Space Route of the Revolution and Industrialization . . . . . . . 3.3 The Spatial Strategy of a Global City . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Reference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

45 45 47 49 51

4

The Spatial Narration of Shanghai’s Inner-City Regeneration . . . . . 4.1 Urban Renovation in the 1980s: Experiment and Endeavor Within the Public System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 Shanghai in 1992: From Land Management to Space Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3 The Demonstration and Transcendence of Xintiandi: From the Management of Historical Space to the Creation of Humanistic and Social Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Business Streets in Shanghai: Past and Present . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1 The Past and Present of Business Streets in Shanghai . . . . . . . . . . 5.1.1 Alleyway Neighborhood Business in Hanchao Lu’s Book Beyond the Neon Lights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1.2 The Tradition of Community Business in Shanghai . . . . 5.1.3 The Socialist Reform of Shanghai’s Community Business . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1.4 Reasons for the Rise of Non-public Ownership Business in the Market Economy Reform . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2 An Analysis of Old and New Versions of “Changing Living to Non-living” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3 Tianzifang: Communal Entrepreneurship Based on Community Contexts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3.1 Communal Entrepreneurship Based on Community Contexts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3.2 The Story of Tianzifang Communal Entrepreneurship Based on Community Contexts . . . . . . 5.3.3 The Legitimation of “Changing Living to Non-living” and Its Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4 Minxing Road Business Street: The Arrival Community for Newcomers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4.1 Two Types of “Changing Living to Non-living” on Minxing Road Business Street . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4.2 Minxing Road Business Street and Auchan Supermarket . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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61 65 67 67 68 70 73 74 78 80 82 84 92 96 96 98

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5.4.3

Minjia Convenience Store: A Business Entrepreneurship Benefiting from Institutional Welfares . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99 5.4.4 Fei Duan Liu Chang (FDLC): A Story of Migrant Entrepreneurship to Settle Down in Shanghai . . . . . . . . . 101 5.5 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109 6

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Struggles Over Power and Urban Regeneration Mode in the Tianzifang Experiment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.1 The Tianzifang Experiment: An Attempt to Transend the Dominant Mode of Urban Regeneration Within the System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2 From the Symbolic Power of Cultural Industries to the Discourse Power of Urban Regeneration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3 Key Elements of China’s Dominant Urban Regeneration Mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.4 The Core Discourse of “Tianzifang”: Bringing Social Principles Back to Urban Regeneration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Three-Stage Social Naming of Space in Tianzifang . . . . . . . . . . . 7.1 Bourdieu’s Theories of Social Naming and Classification . . . . . . 7.2 The Three Stages of Naming for Tianzifang . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2.1 From Taikang Road to Tianzifang: From the Secular to the Sacred . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2.2 Naming of an Industrial Space: Cultural Creative Industries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2.3 The Discovery and Naming of a Historical Heritage Space: The Tianzifang Discourse . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Spatial Justice and Equality of Right-of-Way in the Automobile Society . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.1 Transportation Contributes to the Rise of Shanghai . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.2 Spatial Justice and Traffic Order in the Automobile Society . . . . 8.2.1 A Subtype of Social Transition: The Automobile Society . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.2.2 Spatial Anomie in the Automobile Society . . . . . . . . . . . 8.2.3 From Mobility Power to Mobility Hegemony . . . . . . . . . 8.2.4 From Mobility Power to Mobility Arrogance . . . . . . . . . 8.3 Production of Space and the Distribution of Right-of-Way . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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111 115 118 120 125 127 128 129 129 132 134 136 139 140 143 143 145 146 148 149 154

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Contents

Morning Exercises in Parks and Social Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.1 The Spatial Triad and the Theory of Place-Making . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.2 Place-Making in Morning Exercises in Parks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.2.1 Driving Forces Behind the Production of Green Spaces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.2.2 What Kind of Social Forces Are Encouraging More and More Residents to Use Parks? . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.3 The Construction of Meaning for Parks as Social Spaces . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

155 156 158

159 162 165

10 Digital Economy and Interactive Communities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.1 The “Last Kilometer” in the Digital Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.2 Spatial Problems Caused by the New Urbanization . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.3 User-Friendly Spaces and Interactive Communities . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

167 168 169 171 174

11 From Space Production to Community Empowerment . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.1 Production of Space: A Capitalized Urban Development Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.2 Shift in the Spatial Development Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.3 KICG: A Practical Case Study of Community Empowerment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.3.1 Building a Space Accessible and Available to Everyone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.3.2 Representation of Spaces and Place Awareness . . . . . . . . 11.3.3 Experiencing and Shaping the Lived Space . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Chapter 1

Theories on Social Space: Origins and Analysis

1.1 H Lefebvre: The Production of Space Henry Lefebvre is undoubtedly the first to bring up social space theory. With his most widely read, interpreted and disseminated signature work, The Production of Space, Lefebvre brought the concept of “space” back to social analysis, integrated social analysis and spatial analysis into a theoretical tradition, and initiated a powerful movement of western Marxist urban theory and Marxist geography.

1.1.1 The Spatial Triad Let’s start with Lefebvre’s spatial triad, which shall never be ignored when discussing and citing Lefebvre’s theory on social space. In this spatial analysis framework, Lefebvre differentiated between the three concepts of “social practice”, “representations of space”, and “spaces of representation”. Embracing production and reproduction, locations and spatial sets, “social practice” ensures continuity and certain cohesion of social production, and hence is “perceived space”. “Representations of space” refer to practices of describing and discussing spaces by means of languages, signs, codes, images (such as maps) and knowledge, including the relations of production and the order which those relations impose, and therefore belong to the “conceived space”, or in other words, the production of perceivable spatial knowledge. “Representational spaces” refer to space as directly lived through its associated images and symbols (coded or not), and hence the space of inhabitants and users, but also of some artists, writers and philosophers who describe and aspire to do more than describe. This is the realm of “lived space”.1

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Lefebvre [1].

© Tongji University Press 2023 H. Yu and H. Zou, Shanghai Narrative, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-3261-0_1

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The triad includes three spaces, or rather, three different facets of social space. Do note Lefebvre’s rigorous and subtle wording and compare the two different uses of the same noun “space”. In “representations of space”, “space” is used in singular form and “representations” in plural form. Here is the reason. While the object of representations is a space or rather space as an objective entity, the discourses of representations vary from the intellectual discourse of professionals to the everyday discourse of ordinary people. In “spaces of representation”, the use of plural form is not casual, because the spaces imagined, depicted, aspired to (or escaped), and dreamed of by different groups of people include not only spaces that people actually live in, but also fictitious, unreal spaces such as utopia, heterotopia and others. The latter, imaginary spaces, are used either to criticize real spatial practices or marked as the object of new spatial practices. Therefore, “space” used here shall certainly be in plural form. The “spaces” are organized and at the same time in a continuous process of re-organization, revealing a dialectical message of the domination of macro-structures and the resistance of everyday life. The triad of space corresponds to the physical space, discursive space and living space; to the production of physical space, the construction of knowledge of space, and the experience of living space; as well as to different actors such as capitals and states, experts, and users. American urban sociologist Sharon Zukin reframed it as “structured”, “imagined” and “lived” spaces. Zukin based her work on Lefebvre’s original framework, and basically followed his direction and theories. The case studies of this book, such as Tianzifang Business Street, Knowledge and Innovation Community Garden (KICG) and others, will all use this triadic narrative framework of space.

1.1.2 The Production of Space Lefebvre himself also agreed that “to produce space” is an astonishing statement, but he believed that “today, the analysis of production shows that we have passed from the production of things in space to the production of space itself ”.2 “This passage from production in space to production of space occurred because of the growth of the productive forces themselves and because of the direct intervention of knowledge in material production. This knowledge eventually becomes knowledge about space, information on the totality of space.”3 Here the key lies in the understanding of “the growth of the productive forces” and “knowledge about space”.

With regard to productive forces, under the capitalist mode of production, it has to be global and not confined to local markets, thus it is “an economy of flow: the flow of energy, the flow of raw materials, the flow of manpower, the flow of information, and so forth”.4 The capitalist production would then not be entangled with production in a single place, but would incorporate space as a whole into the process 2

Lefebvre [2]. Ibid., p. 285. 4 Ibid., p. 285. 3

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and arrangement of production, i.e., the “spatial arrangement of a city, a region, a nation or a continent”,5 and increase productive forces. The production of space is appeared “in the explosion of the historical city, the general urbanization of society, the problems of spatial organization and so forth”.6 In specific, “the urban fabric, with its multiple networks of communication and exchange is part of the means of production. The city and its various installations (ports, train stations, etc.) are part of capital.”7 Note that Lefebvre sees all the roads, ports and stations which overcome spatial barriers and link places of production as products of space production, which is in line with what he lists in the “spatial practice” as the production of the material base, such as transportation facilities, architectural environments, etc. In other words, the enormous, unobstructed space required by the capitalist mode of production is not a gift from nature but a social product. In the absence of such a space, there can be no capitalist expansion, without which the capitalism cannot survive nor develop. Therefore, Lefebvre argues that, a century after the publication of Marx’s Das Kapital, capitalism has not collapsed as Marx predicted, but has achieved a successful “development” at an immeasurable cost, by means of what we know precisely, i.e., “by occupying space by producing a space”.8 With the above analysis, we can have a better understanding of Lefebvre’s following words, “Since, ex hypothesi, each mode of production has its own particular space, the shift from one mode to another must entail the production of a new space.”9 It is this arrangement of productivity in all spatial directions that has given rise to “the scientific and technical (informational) capacity to treat space on ever more vast levels”, i.e. the knowledge of space.10 Now that we have already understood the capitalist mode of production from which the concept, the production of space, derives, the next question is, what makes the production of space possible? The answer is, to make every spatial element as tradable resource and commodity. “The ground, the underground, the air, and even the light enter into both the productive forces and the products.”11 This inevitably leads to a model of space production that quantifies and commercializes any space in an abstract way, as Lefebvre repeatedly emphasized in The Production of Space that capitalism produces abstract space, in contrast to the social spaces which users take as the lifeworld. “Capitalism and neocapitalism have produced an abstract space that is a reflection of the world of business on both a national and international level, as well as the power of money and the ‘politique’ of state.”12 What is an abstract space? “Capitalist and neocapitalist space is a space of qualification and growing homogeneity, and merchandised space where all the elements are exchangeable and 5

Ibid., p. 285. Ibid., p. 285. 7 Ibid., p. 287. 8 Soja [3]. 9 Lefebvre [1, p. 46]. 10 Lefebvre [2]. 11 Ibid., p. 287. 12 Ibid., p. 287. 6

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thus interchangeable.”13 In the case of spaces in Shanghai, all the measurable and homogenous spaces are nothing but cleared land in the eyes of the dominant urban developers. Where can one find historical landscapes, local contexts, alleyway spaces, or social interactions? Doesn’t the competition between the Taikang Road redevelopment project and the Tianzifang experiment precisely reflect the conflict between production of abstract space and creation of social space? Lefebvre further argued that the shift from capitalist space to socialist space must be accompanied by the creation of new spaces. “A revolution that does not produce a new space has not realized its full potential; indeed it has failed in that it has not changed life itself.”14 Moreover, the new space must be constructed from the bottom up, which implies “a general self-management”. It also means that “the individual has the right to approach a space, as well as the right to urban life as the center of social life and so-called cultural activities, and so forth”; that it will be “overturning dominant spaces, placing appropriation over domination, demand over command, and use over exchange”; and that it is “a space of differences” which encompasses the full range of richness and possibilities of the life.15

1.1.3 The Socio-spatial Analysis The socio-spatial analysis can be summarized in two phrases, i.e., seeing society from space and seeing space from society, or in academic terms as Soja and others have put it, the sociality of space and the spatiality of society. In the words of the British geographer Doreen Massey, “just as there are no purely spatial processes, neither are there any non-spatial social processes.”16 Spatial processes are socially organized, while social processes are deemed to be spatialized. To see society from space, in Lefebvre’s view, one should first of all discard a hollow view of space. Instead, space is a social product, “for space is never empty; it always embodies a meaning”.17 But why is it not easy to see society from space? Because “the postulate of space as an objective and neutral object was retained”, and “it has already been occupied and used, and has already been the focus of past processes whose traces are not always evident in the landscape”.18 That is, one may think that (s)he is entering an objective space, but in fact that space is constructed by past social processes and forces. This is because history has been invisible in the physical form of the space it constructed, and people tend to believe what they are entering is a space “which seems homogeneous, which seems to be completely objective in its pure form”, however, “as we ascertain it, is a social product”. The 13

Ibid., p. 293. Lefebvre [1, p. 54]. 15 Lefebvre [2, pp. 293–294]. 16 Massey [4]. 17 Lefebvre [1, p. 154]. 18 Lefebvre [5]. 14

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illusion of neutrality of space that Lefebvre mentioned indicates that “there is an ideology of space”. Lefebvre made it clear that “space has been shaped and molded from historical and natural elements, but this has been a political process. Space is political and ideological. It is product literally filled with ideologies”.19 As Harvey put it, “we owe the idea that command over space is a fundamental and all-pervasive source of social power in and over everyday life to the persistent voice of Henri Lefebvre.”20 Harvey’s comment helps us to understand Lefebvre’s argument that “space is political”. What can be seen in space in terms of society? Power relations! The French scholar Michel Foucault sees space as a container of power and believes that “a whole history remains to be written of spaces – which would at the same time be the history of powers”.21 Therefore, Lefebvre is in line with Foucault in defining the sociality of space as power relations. The other aspect of the socio-spatial analysis is to see space from society, or to answer the question of what constitutes the spatiality of society. For Lefebvre, to ask such a question is in effect to ask how society exists. There is one question which has remained open in the past because it has never been asked: what exactly is the mode of existence of social relationships? Are they substantial? natural? or formally abstract? The study of space offers an answer according to which the social relations of production have a social existence to the extent that they have a spatial existence; they project themselves into a space, becoming inscribed there, and in the process producing that space itself. Failing this, these relations would remain in the realm of ‘pure’ abstraction – that is to say, in the realm of representations and hence of ideology: the realm of verbalism, verbiage and empty words.22

To discuss the question of the spatiality of society is to discuss the spatialized existence of society in essence. As Lefebvre asserted, “where there is space there is being”,23 which could be said in the other way around and also makes perfect sense, “where there is social being there is social space”. “Social space per se is at once work and product—a materialization of ‘social being’”.24 In fact, all social relations, forces and processes have a spatial existence and appear in spatialized forms. Social space “underpins the reproduction of production relations, property relations (i.e. ownership of land, of space; hierarchical ordering of locations; etc.)”.25 Inequality is a social being of any society, with variations in two aspects: the degree of inequality and the forms of inequality. Social inequalities include inequalities in gender, income, education and so on, all of which are existed and realized in their own spatial forms. For example, gender inequality is linked with the action field of men and women, while the most important factor for income difference is the workplace, and education inequality is inevitably related to the urban–rural distribution of education 19

Ibid., p. 341. Harvey [6]. 21 Foucault [7]. 22 Lefebvre [1, p. 129]. 23 Ibid., p. 22. 24 Ibid., pp. 101–102. 25 Ibid., p. 349. 20

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resources. In turn, spatial inequality itself is a form of social inequality. The spatial structure of the center-edge division in Shanghai, which was formed and inherited from the concessional era, is a spatial order of inequality. It has led to the inequalities in life and identity of the Shanghainese people based on distinctions between the upper and lower corners of the city. The ethnical discrimination in Shanghai, i.e. the discrimination of the Shanghainese against Subei (Northern Jiangsu Province) people is directly related to the shantytowns where Subei people used to dwell in. In the context of Shanghai’s history, shantytowns were synonymous with poverty and backwardness. In the last two decades, with the disappearance of shantytowns, where most Subei people have lived, the discrimination against the community has greatly diminished. This, however, is not a proof of overturning the spatial reason for ethnic inequality but rather a supporting evidence. If ethnic discrimination is caused not only by the place of origin but also by the location of their dwellings, then “a revolution that does not produce a new space has not realized its full potential; indeed it has failed in that it has not changed life itself.”26

1.2 Doreen Massey: Thinking Geographically 1.2.1 Thinking from the Geographical Organization of Social Relations Doreen Massey, emeritus professor of social geography at The Open University in the UK, followed Lefebvre in her interpretation and application of the social spatial approach. She wrote in her widely read and cited book, Spatial Divisions of Labour: Social Structures and the Geography of Production, One of the burdens of this book has been to produce an interpretation of spatial patterns of employment in terms of the geographical organization of the social relations of capitalist economic activities.27

Massey’s ambition indicated the essence of the socio-spatial analysis, which is first of all reflected in its methodology: in the socio-spatial analysis, space is embodied in geographical organization; meanwhile, society is embodied in social relations, and the spatial pattern of employment is analyzed in terms of spatialized social relations or the spatial organization of embodied social relations. So what is the geographic organization that embodies the social relations of economic activities? To put in a simple way, we see managerial departments of companies in London and entity enterprises elsewhere. This is the spatial pattern of labor division, a phenomenon that has been interpreted as the spatial structure of managerial relations determined by a producer-service-dominated economic structure: London concentrates the greatest number of managerial and R&D positions for an easier access to other dominant 26 27

Ibid., p. 54. Massey [4, p. 293].

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positions and services in the economic structure of post-industrial societies, such as finance, design, marketing, etc., while elsewhere sees a concentration of firms with direct producer positions. The spatial pattern of employment cannot be seen as a purely geographical issue, but rather the geographical layout and realization of production relations. Or in Lefebvre’s words, production relations are inscribed or organized geographically. Massey’s point to think geographically and to think about the “spatial pattern of employment” is the same as what Lefebvre has done by bringing back the spatial analysis. Besides the spatial pattern of employment, naturally there are spatial patterns of residence, of consumption, of entertainment, etc. as well, all of which are phenomena that have yet to be analyzed with the social spatial perspective. They are not purely spatial phenomena, but results of social processes that take place in spaces. “In order to understand a pattern, we must go behind it and interpret it in terms of the structures and processes on which it is based. The geography of employment, in other words, can be conceptualized, not only a two-dimensional pattern—as though it were a purely spatial phenomenon—but in terms of the social structures on which it rests and the social processes of which it is outcome.”28 It is most important to go deeper into the specific relation of production and explain the spatial distribution of employment with the relation of production that has determined the distribution of employment (ownership relations, relations between capital and labor, the social location of control, the organization of production, etc.). The relations of production in this context, however, also take place in spaces. Therefore, to think geographically not only means to take the object as geographical, but also to explain its geographical causes, i.e. to analyze the geographical distribution of employment by the geographical organization of the economic activities and relations of production. Most social spatial analyses, with the help of demographic data, factor analysis, remote sensing information and so on, are only about the geographical distribution or spatial differentiation of the population by categories such as occupation, age, household registration, type of building, etc., which fall into the concept of social zones. Massey was not concerned with the classification of social zones, but with the analysis of relations of production in social zones, which are made possible by geography in geographic terms.

1.2.2 Thinking from the Spatiality (Spatialization) of Power Relations “Thinking geographically” reflects a dialectic relationship between social and spatial analysis, as clearly and soundly illustrated in the following text about this sociospatial dialectic. Just as there are no purely spatial processes, neither are there any non-spatial social processes. Nothing much happens, bar angels dancing, on the head of a pin……Substance laws and 28

Ibid., p. 65.

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1 Theories on Social Space: Origins and Analysis analyses of social processes might be different were they to make integral the fact of their necessarily spatial character. It is certainly invalid for geographers to seek to define abstractly spatial processes without reference to substantive content. But it is equally invalid for those in substance disciplines to ignore the fact that the relations they study take place over space and in a geographically-differentiated world.29

Sociology sees class but not space, while geography sees space but not class. In Massey’s view, social analysis without space is as invalid as spatial analysis without society. Thinking geographically is not equal to geographic determinism. Taking geographical mobility as an example, “time and again through the historical development of industry whole sectors have shifted location to escape a well-organized workforce, thereby both lowering labor costs and re-establishing the controlling power of capital over labor—the movement of the hosiery industry in the United Kingdom from London to the midlands from the eighteenth century and of the textile industry in the United States from New England to the south are just two of the better known examples. In these cases, and in some of those given earlier, it is not simple geographical mobility which is at issue but mobility beyond the spatial boundaries of organizational coherence of the employees. Again, ‘space itself’ (in the sense here of separateness, or distance) guarantees no particular outcome. The spatial mobility of capital is pitted against the geographical solidarity of labor. Finally, and implicit in all of these, capital can make positive use, in a way labor cannot, of distance and differentiation.”30 Massey has made it clear that it is not geography per se, but the geographical advantage of capital over labor and the action of using this advantage against the geographical solidarity of labor that has led to the industrial transfer in favor of capital. The relationship between capital and labor, as seen geographically, is clearly not neutral but antagonistic, encompassing the power relation of capital over labor. For these highly unequal geographies31 presuppose the stretching out over space of social relations which embody great power, of direction and control in the case of managerial hierarchies, and of strategic vision and extreme inequality in relation to the labor process, especially in the case of scientific/professional workers…… What is at issue is both the spatiality of this form of power (and spatial form may be part of the construction of that power) and the construction of a power-filled space.32

The text after “what is at issue” in the citation is crucial. The word “spatiality” refers to geographical inequalities that reflect dominant class relations and power relations, as well as the spatialization of these relations and power. The following sentence in the brackets further explains that dominant job relations are realized through spatial forms of occupational distributions, just as dominant power relations are expressed and realized through forms of gender inequality, with spatial patterns participating in the construction of power relations. In the final part of the sentence, 29

Ibid., pp. 50–51. Ibid., pp. 55–56. 31 Note: It refers to the inequality in occupational distribution, with a concentration of managerial positions in some places and only blue-collar positions in others. 32 Massey [4, p. 332]. 30

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it is made even clearer that the construction of space is not neutral in terms of power relations, but rather, it always reflects the intentions and plans of power. In Foucault’s words, the strategy of power is precisely about encompassing the relationship of domination and subordination in the construction of space. To understand the strategy of power, one must pay attention to the strategy of space, where power is deeply hidden and where power relations are least recognizable. Therefore, Foucault argued that all histories are about the history of power and of space. And by seeing things in this way, the political problems we have to face in order to advance towards a more balanced development will change: “The spatial inequality consists not so much in the uneven distribution of jobs of different social types (and thus in some way of geographical ‘equality of opportunity’) but in the removal from some regions, and the concentration in others, of the more powerful, conceptual and strategic levels of control over production.”33 This does not mean that we are not to speak of an uneven distribution of social jobs, rather, one shall not be content with this, as the uneven distribution is only a symptom of spatial inequality. To investigate its causes, one has to go down to the deeper levels of control over production and strategic decisions. It is the spatial arrangement of control that determines the distribution of social jobs, which in turn leads to spatial inequality. Thinking geographically highlights a fact, that is, “‘space’ is not a passive surface on to which the relations of production are mapped, not yet simply a negative constraint (in the sense, for instance, of distance to be crossed). The fact of spatiality is an integral and active condition. In relation to production, spatial form and spatial strategy can be an active element of accumulation. Capital can make positive use of distance and differentiation.”34 By suggesting to think geographically, Massey stresses that space matters. Space is an active factor, which takes part in production, in accumulation, in the construction of power relations, and ultimately, in social construction. This is because space itself is a structure constructed by previous actions and plays a structural role. Here, space can be understood by the use of Bourdieu’s concept of “field”. When one enters a space, s/he also enters into a historically formed, socially prescribed and meaningful structure, and is affected by this structure. “When, for example, a planner-architect like Le Corbusier, or an administrator like Haussmann, creates a built environment in which the tyranny of the straight line predominates, then we must perforce adjust our daily practices.”35 Thinking geographically does not mean to only think geographically, but to be sensitive to the way social relations are geographically organized and unfolded. “A spatial structure of production is not a distribution of jobs but a geography of social relations.”36 In essence, it means to be sensitive to the “spatiality” of society. Therefore, Massey’s conclusion takes us to Soja, a Marxist geographer, who has written most on spatiality. 33

Ibid., p. 332. Ibid., p. 66. 35 Harvey [6, p. 204]. 36 Massey [4, p. 327]. 34

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1.3 Edward Soja: The Spatiality of Social Being 1.3.1 The Two Illusions of Spatial Cognition The core work of Soja can be described as an in-depth interpretation and creative development of Lefebvre’s The Production of Space, by developing spatiality into space ontology, and the spatial triad into the theory of “the Thirdspace”. His loyalty to Lefebvre’s theories as well as the depth of his interpretations are rare. But it would be an understatement to regard him merely as a follower and successor of Lefebvre. By following Lefebvre, he joined in and contributed to a movement of academic shift, a movement to “bring back the spatial analysis”, with the work of Foucault, Massey, Harvey, Giddens and others being the main achievements. The movement was launched in a time when modern theories were so overwhelmingly steeped in history that it almost became an essentially historical epistemology which sought to understand the world primarily through dynamics. As Foucault criticized, “did it start with Bergson or before? Space was treated as the dead, the fixed, the undialectical, the immobile. Time, on the contrary was richness, fecundity, life, dialectic.”37 Soja believes Foucault’s thought-provoking reflections of previous centuries are still relevant today. So unbudgeably hegemonic has been this historicism of theoretical consciousness that it has tended to occlude a comparable critical sensibility to the spatiality of social life, a practical theoretical consciousness that sees the lifeworld of being creatively located not only in the making of history but also in the construction of human geographies, the social production of space and the restless formation and reformation of geographical landscapes: social being actively emplaced in space and time in an explicitly historical and geographical contextualization.38

What are the reasons for the insensitivity to the spatiality of social life? Soja described the double illusions in the perception of space Lefebvre has criticized. One is the illusion of transparency, the inability to see space in society, as if social life could happen on the head of a pin. Spatiality is the way society exists. A relation of production that cannot inscribe itself in space is a pure abstraction; or it is always a representation. The key point is, as Soja saw it, that the illusion of transparency is an illusion in the sense that the representation of space is taken as reality. Everything, including spatial knowledge, is condensed in communicable representations and re-presentations of the real world to the point that the representations substitute for the real world itself……Such subjectivism reduces spatial knowledge to a discourse on discourse that is rich in potential insights but at the same time filled with illusive presumptions that what is imagined/represented defines the reality of social space.39

For Soja, the illusion of transparency takes conceptual spaces as real space, so they do not see the real society, which is full with flesh and body—the body of spatiality. 37

Foucault [8]. Soja [3, pp. 10–11]. 39 Soja [9]. 38

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The second one is the realistic illusion, the inability to see society in space, as if everything we encounter in space is as natural and neutral as it has always been, and has nothing to do with social constructions or human creations. It is an illusion of opacity. Social space tends to be seen as either natural and naively given (the space of the sculptor or architect “working with nature”, the space of the environmental or design determinist); or it is, equally naively, objectively and concretely described (the space of the “geometer”, the spatial systems analyst, the empirical scientist, the determinedly scientific socialist or social scientist, the idiographic historian or geographer).40

Seeing the world we encounter as natural and naively given may sound to have discovered the space, yet, it is not about the spatiality of social life, either. Worse still, the sociality of living space is lost. Distinguishing between space and spatiality is precisely the work that Soja wants to underpin the conceptualization of social spatiality as an ontology of space.

1.3.2 The Trialectics of Spatiality The restoration of the spatial existence of social life leads Soja to the ambition of constructing a social-existential ontology that consists of sociality, historicality and spatiality—the trialectics of being as Soja called it. The loss of critical sensitivity to the spatiality of society is caused by the reduction of trialectics to a binary relationship between historicity and sociality. Spatiality tends to be peripheralized into the background as reflection, container, stage, environment, or external constraint upon human behavior and social action.41

Based on the trialectics of social being, Soja has established a new social ontology. “Here again, however, the third term, Spatiality, obtains a strategic positioning to defend against any form of binary reductionism or totalization. The assertion of Spatiality opens the Historicality and Sociality of human lifeworlds to interpretations and knowledge that many of its most disciplined observers never imaged, while simultaneously maintaining the rich insights they provide for understanding the production of lived space.”42 For the following work, “the emphasis shifts from an existential ontology (statements about what the world must be like in order for us to exist as social being) to a more specific discussion of the epistemology of space (how we can obtain accurate and practicable knowledge of our existential spatiality.”43 Soja continued to borrow Lefebvre’s concepts of the perceived, conceived and lived spaces to discuss the three dimensions of the epistemology of space, and updates with new names of Firstspace, 40

Ibid., p. 64. Ibid., p. 71. 42 Ibid., p. 72. 43 Ibid., p. 73. 41

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Secondspace and Thirdspace. “No one of the three forms of spatial knowledge is given a priori or ontological privilege, but again there is a privileging of the third term, in this case Thirdspace as a means of combating the longstanding tendency to confine spatial knowledge to Firstspace and Secondspace epistemologies and their associated theorization, empirical analyses, and social practices.”44 Firstspace epistemologies focus on what Lefebvre calls “spatial practices” or “the perceived space”, privilege objectivity and materiality, and aim to build a formal science of space. “The human occupancy of the surface of the earth, the relations between society and nature, the architectonics and resultant geographies of the human ‘built environment’ provide the almost naively given sources for the accumulation of (First) spatial knowledge……Firstspace is conventionally read at two different levels, one which concentrates on the accurate description of surface appearances (an indigenous mode of spatial analysis), and the other which searches for spatial explanation in primarily exogenous social, psychological, and biophysical processes.”45 Soja believes that with the use of Geographic Information Systems (GIS), satellite remote sensing technology and big data, geography of today is much closer to becoming a rigorous spatial science than ever, but there are limits in its positivist epistemology, which was developed on the basis of studies on the historicality and sociality of spatial forms. “The social production of Firstspace is treated as a historical unfolding, an evolving sequence of changing geographies that result from the dynamic relations between human beings and their constructed as well as natural environments.”46 Human and social geography seeks to find a starting point for understanding the social production of Firstspace through individual and collective psychologies, or more directly through social processes and practices. “Marxist geographers of Firstspace, for example, explain the material worlds as human geography and geographically uneven development through appeals to class analysis, the labor theory of value, and the evolving historical effects of the interplay between social relations of production and the development of the productive forces.”47 We could find examples of such in other disciplines as well. In search of the origins of spatial material forms, economists would dive into market behaviors, while cultural geographers would look into the free expression of beliefs or human nature. These attempts of explanation, Soja noted, are mostly non-spatial variables, explaining the causal flow from sociality and historicality to spatial practices and constructed forms. “This has resulted in an increasingly rigorous and insightful understanding of how Firstspace is socially produced, as well as a welcome exploration by geographers and other spatial analysts of a wide range of ‘non-spatial’ disciplines and ideas.”48 However, “relatively little attention is given to the causal flow in the other direction,

44

Ibid., p. 74. Ibid., p. 75. 46 Ibid., p. 77. 47 Ibid., p. 77. 48 Ibid., p. 77. 45

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that is, to how material geographies and spatial practices shape and affect subjectivity, consciousness, rationality, historicality, and sociality.”49 That is to say, the Firstspace epistemology has noticed that society matters, however without realizing that space also matters. Only by acknowledging that space is a product of society and that space also shapes and influences society, will the relationship between society and space become a complete dialectic of society and space. Secondspace refers to Lefevbre’s conceived space. “Spatial knowledge is primarily produced through discursively devised representations of space, through the spatial workings of the mind.” For the discursive construction of Secondspace, Soja mentioned a number of special professionals and scholars, including artists, architects, urbanists, geographers, spatial semiologists and design theorists, among others. They are special because Soja gave different definitions to them, such as creative, artistic, utopian, philosophical, etc. They either represent the world with images and words, or design and pursue spatial justice, or reflect on space like Kant, or construct Secondspace as “symbolic spaces”, and so on. Yet regardless how one defines the nature of Secondspace, “in Secondspace the imagined geography tends to become the ‘real’ geography, with the image or representation coming to define and order the reality.”50 To quote Marx’s words, artists and scholars not only want to explain the world, they also want to change or even create it according to their interpretations. The discursive practices in Secondspace belong not only to intellectuals, but also to ordinary people. Soja mentioned the concept of “mental maps”, which refers to “the images of space that we all carry with us in our daily lives”. This is a projection of the external world onto different minds (gender, class, race, etc.), or rather, a spatial picture formed by different conceptions of the external world by different minds, thus resulting in subjective maps of diverse differences. Such as “men’s mental maps are extensive, detailed, and relatively accurate” while women’s are “domicentric” (centered on the home), more compact, less accurate in terms of urban details; or, the poor have highly localized mental maps in contrast to the wealthy, whose mental maps come close to reproducing a good road map from the gas station.51

These subjective representations of cities may seem more real and acceptable to people than an accurate empirical depiction. As Soja commented, “in such illusions of transparency, as Lefebvre called them, Firstspace collapses entirely into Secondspace. The difference between them disappears. Even more significantly, also lost in the transparency of space are its fundamental historicality and sociality, any real sense of how these cognitive imageries are themselves socially produced and implicated in the relations between space, power and knowledge.”52 Thirdspace epistemologies correspond to Lefebvre’s lived space, which combines physical spaces (Firstspace) and mental spaces (Secondspace), but are equivalent to 49

Ibid., p. 77. Ibid., p. 79. 51 Ibid., p. 80. 52 Ibid., p. 80. 50

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neither. Neither the epistemology of not seeing society from space (the illusion of opacity) nor that of not seeing space from society (the illusion of transparency) has any truth in it, because neither purely natural space nor purely psychological space is a real social being. Any actual space is a product of society, a space imposed by power and permeated by ideology, and therefore is a structured space. On the one hand, the lived space is “the dominated—and hence passively experienced or subjected—space”; on the other hand, as the imagination to change existing spatial orders will never extinguish in the lifeworld, it is also “space(s) of resistance to the dominant order arising precisely from their subordinate, peripheral or marginalized positioning”.53 The lived space is not only realistic but also representational, that is, it is the space where possibilities and utopias are expressed and then realized. As Lefebvre wrote, Representational space is alive: it speaks. It has an affective kernel or center: Ego, bed, bedroom, dwelling, house; or: square, church, graveyard. It embraces the loci of passion, of action and of lived situations. And thus immediately implies time. Consequently it may be qualified in various ways: it may be directional, situational or relational, because it is essentially qualitative, fluid and dynamic.54

Such kind of space where infinite possibilities are expressed and realized is called “Thirdspace” by Soja. Lifeworlds (that) are radically open and openly radicalizable; (that) are all-inclusive and transdisciplinary in scope yet politically focused and susceptible to strategic choice; (that) are never completely knowable but whose knowledge non the less guides our search for emancipatory change and freedom from domination.55

1.3.3 Spatiality of Social Life Returning to the lifeworld brings us back to Soja’s social existential ontology, which leads to his theory of spatiality. For Soja, the reconstruction of an existential ontology of sociality—spatiality—historicality is only possible when spatiality, which has long been peripheralized, is put in the center. Soja began by distinguishing space and spatiality. From a materialist philosophical point of view, space denotes the objective form of matter, while spatiality, as socially based, is socially organized and produced artificial space. Soja did not oppose to the materialist view of space itself, but the idea that space is merely a kind of matter has not only profoundly influenced all forms of spatial analysis, but also become a misleading epistemological basis. As criticized earlier in relation to the realistic illusion of space, the naturalistic view of space is completely incapable of imagining “spatiality”. “Space in itself may be primordially given, but the organization, and 53

Ibid., p. 68. Lefebvre [1, p. 42]. 55 Soja [9, p. 70]. 54

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meaning of space is a product of social translation, transformation, and experience.”56 The distinction between space and spatiality lies in whether space is primordially given or socially constructed, but the real question is, how much space is purely and naturally given in the sense of social existential ontology? Without realizing the spatiality of existence, i.e. the intervention of space by human activities, neutral space becomes a camouflage that prevents us from seeing the social forces and mechanisms behind space. As John Berger said, which Soja quoted as often as he could to show his unreserved appreciation, “it is space, not time, that hides consequences from us.”57 What is spatiality? To sum up, “spatiality is socially produced and, like society itself, exists in both substantial forms (concrete spatialities) and as a set of relations between individuals and groups.”58 The following propositions, which he calls “a materialist interpretation of spatiality” in Soja’s major works, contains eight points. (1) Spatiality is a substantiated and recognizable social product, part of a “second nature” which incorporates as it socializes and transforms both physical and psychological spaces. (2) As a social product, spatiality is simultaneously the medium and outcome, presupposition and embodiment, of social action and relationship. (3) The spatio-temporal structuring of social life defines how social action and relationship (including class relations) are materially constituted, made concrete. (4) The constitution/concretization process is problematic, filled with contradiction and struggle (amidst much that is recursive and routinized). (5) Contradictions arise primarily from the duality of produced space as both outcome/embodiment/product and medium/presupposition/producer of social activity. (6) Concrete spatiality-actual human geography—is thus a competitive arena for struggle over social production and reproduction for social practices aimed either at the maintenance and reinforcement of existing spatiality or at significant restructuring and / or radical transformation. (7) The temporality of social life, from the routines and events of day-to-day activity to the longer-run making of history is rooted in spatial contingency in much the same way as the spatiality of social life is rooted in temporal-historical contingency. (8) The materialist interpretation of history and the materialist interpretation of geography are inseparably intertwined and theoretically concomitant, with no inherent prioritization of one over the other.59 Soja’s theory of spatiality is a theory of social space, for spatiality is exactly about the dialectics between society and space: people create social space while social space shapes people; spatiality refers to man-made spaces that are socially organized and 56

Ibid., pp. 79–80. Ibid., p. 93. 58 Soja [10]. 59 Soja [3, pp. 129–130]. 57

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given meanings. Man-made space can be best illustrated by Lefebvre’s trialectics of space. The space building of the Knowledge and Innovation Community Garden in Chap. 11 is an example of spatial practices by social groups, in which space designers conceive the space by building an urban green land as well as a landscape to grow edible vegetables, while farm users experience the space by using it.

1.4 Spatiality/Socio-spatial Imagination and Conceptual Analysis Spatiality or socio-spatial imagination is just like the social imagination of gender. Gender is biological as well as social. It is socially educated and constructed as a gendered role. For example, the role of virtuous wife and mother is not a biological character, but a social one, i.e. it is shaped in a specific cultural context. The imagination of spatiality has to get rid of the physical illusion of space (i.e., space is purely natural) first and then the phenomenological illusion of society (i.e., society is purely cultural). To imagine spatiality, it is necessary to get back to the two points we have repeatedly stressed, i.e., to see society from space and to see space from society. The following cases seek to give an illustration of spatiality (social space), some of which are discussed in great length in dedicated chapters.

1.4.1 The Geographical Pattern of Industries This case is inspired by Massey’s theory. The fact that shoe and laptop factories are located in Kunshan, Jiangsu Province reflects the geographical distribution of industry. Manufacturing industries are concentrated in Kunshan, but producer service industries are mainly based in Shanghai. This is a new spatial form of relations of capital production, in which production and services have a geographical division of labor and are organized through logistical, financial and IT services. This is the spatiality of the globalized production and service economy. It is not a natural arrangement of geography, although there are objective reasons such as appropriate distance. On the one hand, the distance should not be too far between the two places (i.e., Shanghai and Kunshan) so that the costs of production and transport could be reduced; on the other hand, there need to be a certain distance between them to ensure that companies can take the advantage of the lower ground rent. An analysis of the spatiality (socio-spatial analysis) of industrial cluster in Kunshan and the service economy cluster in Shanghai can help us to discover the capital logic of global production chains from the spatial pattern of industries.

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1.4.2 Cases of Spatiality • Space of Shanghai nostalgia Shanghai nostalgia is most evident in the lanes and alleyways of Shanghai. In the name of Old Shanghai nostalgia, the best part of Xintiandi’s conversion is successfully changing Shikumen spaces from residential to commercial use. As over 80% of the total population in Shanghai used to live in lanes and alleyways, it seems very natural to use Shikumen as a nostalgic marker to evoke the collective memory of the Shanghainese people. However, today there are no more residents left in Xintiandi; instead, it’s full of visitors who are mainly foreigners and hipsters. By promoting the selling point of Shanghai’s past prosperity as a metropolis infested with foreign adventures, Xintiandi has intentionally ignored Shanghai as a city of Shikumen and petty urbanites. Are the alleyway spaces in Xintiandi “original” or “natural”? Certainly not. The claimed nostalgic space for the Shanghainese people is in fact a trendy landmark of capital production and the latest symbol of Shanghai’s CBD. Nevertheless, it is also a constructive force as the Xintiandi space is an effort to construct the identity of Shanghai as a global city.60 • Social space of morning exercises Parks in Shanghai are not only serving as a place for morning exercises, but have also produced multiple social impacts and become social spaces where people obtain social interactions and self-affirmation. Likewise, doing morning exercises is more than an activity to bring people health, but also a way for the middle-aged and elderly to enhance their wellbeing and help themselves cope with the shortage of public healthcare resources. On the one hand, with the absence of convenience for interactions between neighbors as it used to be in traditional residential quarters, morning exercising becomes a new way to build social connections and establish new sense of community belonging; while on the other hand, after being marginalized by vast social changes, achievements in health and social interactions through morning exercises also bring new self-identity and affirmation to the exercisers.61 • Urban farm garden Landscape architects work on “nature”, but the planners of Knowledge and Innovation Community Garden (KICG) work on nature as well as on “community”. By turning the public green space into a vegetable and farm garden, they have created a farming space in the city (the perceived space). The KICG organizers are clearly aware that they are making a new space, which is conceived as a new social space that transcends a series of oppositions between observation and participation, consumption and production, city and countryside, experts and ordinary people, etc. (the conceived space). The garden becomes an acquaintance society in the minds of local inhabitants, a social laboratory in the minds of community activists and a playground in the minds of children. As it draws children out of home to do farm work 60 61

See more details in Chap. 2, Part V. “Nostalgia for Old Shanghai”. See more details in Chap. 9.

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or play with other kids, and adults to make community interactions, KICG gradually develops into an interactive community and its spatial existence.62

1.4.3 The Agency of Space Spatiality cannot be analyzed only in terms of social and human agencies and without the agency of spatiality itself. The key of Soja’s arguments on spatiality is to clarify that spatiality is both a product and a producer of society. In what sense can space exert its agency, or play a decisive role? In most cases, the spaces that people enter are structured and meaningful, with a specific distribution of power/rights relations. Bourdieu calls them “fields”—spaces that people take for granted, and that will spontaneously stimulate the habitual perceptions and behaviors of those who enter. For instance, young women entering a bar will easily be aware of their gender roles because they are entering what is defined and practiced as a male space, a place where men go for fun and revelry and are ready to capture women. These definitions are taken as “common sense” in a consumerist society. Women are not conscious of their gender in every context, but some places will naturally evoke one’s gender awareness. Human geography raises the question of the relationship between “how people inhabit space” and “how space inhabits people”. The latter, i.e., the role of space in evoking female gender consciousness, displays the agency of space.63 Spatial agency also works, for example, when one recalls old memories at familiar sight. People do get emotional, but why only at the sight of certain sceneries? Naturally, a particular space is often designed, constructed, maintained and manipulated, but people who enter and consume the space do not see most of these processes; what works on them is the space where they are physically situated, the space that they directly feel and experience, and the space that will respond to and interact with its encounters as if it were alive. Therefore, isn’t it the job of space designers and producers to build and create a space that will spontaneously transmit information and deliver meanings at their absence, and further influence or serve the users? According to Lefebvre, “space is never empty; it always embodies a meaning”.64 It is another matter whether the intentions of designers and builders can be conveyed to space users; nevertheless, once designed and produced, the space that takes its character from people seems to take on a temperament of its own, or even gain a life of its own as a result of use by and dialogue with its users. The more people it encounters, the more relevant this is. Consequently, people often need to go to a place for inspiration, strength and sensibility. In this sense, is it not true that space has the agency to influence and cultivate people? Certainly, one may argue that all kinds of feelings are projection of human hearts, and every individual will have different feelings in the same space, so what really matters is not the space, but the individual. Nonetheless, the fact that every individual feels differently reflects both a difference in the feelings of subjects and in historical encounters of the subjects with the space. The projection 62

See more details in Chap. 9. Probyn [11]. 64 Lefebvre [1, p. 154]. 63

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of mind is not merely an activity of the subject, but a reproduction of the imprint of previous encounters between the individual and the object, i.e., space. Because of these encounters, the spaces in which human activities take place are bestowed with characters and meanings. To cater to the nostalgia of the Shanghainese for Shikumen buildings, it is no problem to have people with no experience of living in Shikumen to take charge of related projects. But in order to impress the Shanghainese, the buildings should well resemble the authentic Shikumen; otherwise no Shanghainese would be struck to recall their old memories in these spaces. Therefore, our emotions do not always “flow” from our heart, but need to be stimulated by “objects” where we used to rest our feelings and emotions. As the encounter with man-made spaces is usually inevitable and frequently brings inspirations to people, man-made spaces play a special role in constructing and shaping the human mind and nature.

1.5 Neighborhood in Shanghai as Social Space In history, Shanghai was not divided into different functional zones. A typical Shikumen neighborhood in Shanghai usually consisted of densely populated residential areas and business streets with many shops. All kinds of institutions related to life and work, including school, church, factory, workshop, hospital, etc., could be found in the neighborhood, and everything one needed for the daily life could be obtained within five blocks in most cases. In other words, apart from one’s own neighborhood block, the daily walking area for a person consisted of the other four blocks around his/her own block. As one block was usually within an area of 150 m (m) by 250 m, the world of everyday life was roughly within a radius of 250–350 m. The map in Fig. 1.1 is taken from The Guide to All Kinds of Businesses in Old Shanghai drawn in 1947. My family lived for 25 years in a three-story building marked as “No. 348 the Chinese Sanatorium” on the northeast corner of the map. I myself spent more than a decade here and was familiar with its surroundings and all the shops, as well as its spatial fabric and the overall layout. Besides, I attended a kindergarten at the north-east corner of the street for two years. Reading through this map carefully today, I have noticed that the business layout remained largely unchanged after 1949, except for some shops that changed their names. In 1956, the building of the “Chinese Sanatorium” was converted to a residential building, and the owner of the property, Shanghai Municipal Health Bureau, allocated a total of eleven apartments from the first to the third floors to cadres and staff working in the health system. People of the highest-ranking received the best apartment on the best floor. My family moved to this area from Hongkou District in the north-east of Shanghai only about ten years after this map was drawn. By that time, the Chinese society had undergone a radical revolution, with a gradual change in every detail of the daily life. However, the space in which we live did not seem to have changed much with the revolution. Let’s take a close look at the alleyway neighborhood in the past to see how rich a social space it used to be, full with people and institutions.

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Fig. 1.1 Neighborhood in Shanghai as social space. Source The Guide to All Kinds of Businesses in Old Shanghai

The whole neighborhood was surrounded by four roads, namely Middle Fuxing Road in the north, Hefei Road in the south, Madang Road in the east and Danshui Road in the west, as shown in Fig. 1.1. The institutions in the neighborhood, including shops, warehouses, factories, schools, hospitals, churches, etc., were located either along the four streets or in the alleyways. Middle Fuxing Road was the major street in this neighborhood, which boasted of 12 shops of various kinds, one hospital, one primary school and one church along its territory of less than 200 m long. The street along Middle Fuxing Road was occupied by various shops except the walls of the hospital, primary school and church, and three entries to alleyways. I still remember the shops on the street because I used to go there frequently to get a haircut, buy fruits and briquettes, repair a kettle, etc. Do note the shop names on the map of 1947: “Qian Senhe Coals”, “Fu Tai Xiang Tobaccos”, “Yi Xin Hairdresser”, “Zheng Xiang Woollens”, “Huang Wanchang Irons and Coppers”, “Zhou Xianwen’s Dentistry”, “Westlake Socks Factory”, and so on. After the founding of the PRC in 1949, most of them were first transformed into joint state-private ownership and later complete state ownership. Only Zhou Xianwen’s Dentistry was kept with its name as one of the few remaining non-public-owned

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businesses in the socialist Shanghai, along with the numerous cigarette and paper shops that dotted in the alleyways all over Shanghai. On Hefei Road in the south, in addition to two entries to the alleyways, there were 22 shops of various kinds, including restaurants, bicycle repair shops, coal shops, tobacco shops, rice shops, sack shops, printing bureaus, soy sauce shops, grocery shops, and so on. Besides, there were several storefronts with names of factories on them, which might be outlet stores to sell products of these factories. Most houses along Madang Road in the east were residential buildings, with three entries leading to the alleyways, where many of my primary and secondary school classmates lived. On this part of the 170-m-long Madang road located a total of 6 shops and offices. There was no shop along Danshui Road in the west, but one alleyway entry, one hospital and one primary school. The seven alleyways in this neighborhood haven’t changed their names till today, including Yu Zhen Li, Dong Sheng Li, Ren Xing Li, Xie Sheng Li, Zhong Ye Li, Jin Shu Li, etc. All these names still sound fresh in the memories of my generation even today. All these alleyways were accessible from all directions. For instance, with the northern entry on Middle Fuxing Road and its southern entry on Hefei Road, Yu Zhen Li was a big alleyway that connected north and south. Most of our playtime in the childhood were spent in these lanes and alleyways. At that time, it was unthinkable for children to stay at home all day, and the alleyways served as a second classroom for children to learn various games and their rules. Therefore, it was in such an environment that children in Shanghai were “socialized”. There were institutions and organizations in the alleyways too, mostly warehouses and factories, including one briquette factory, one woodware factory, one food factory and one golden pen factory; two coal products warehouses, one tobacco factory warehouse, three oil companies, one bookstore, two private clinics, one accounting firm, one primary school, one sports equipment company, one club, and two shops, among the others. In total, there were over sixty institutions in the neighborhood of Fuxing Road by Madang Road, including 47 shops, 4 factories, 3 primary schools, 3 warehouses, 2 clinics, 2 hospitals, 1 club and 1 church. Except government agencies, all other kinds of organizations, from business, service, manufacturing to spiritual ones, could be found in this ordinary neighborhood. My neighbor used to run a clinic in Yu Zhen Li where she rented a couple of rooms with two gold bars. Until the socialist transformation of urban industry and commerce in 1956, this gynecological clinic had provided paid services to the residents of the neighborhood. The doctor provided medical services in a public hospital in the mornings, came to the clinic in the afternoons, and often went out to deliver babies in the evenings. As the dentistry was located at the entrance to Yu Zhen Li, the doctor became a close friend of the wife of the dentist Zhou Wenxian. The two families also became so acquainted that the son of the gynecologist naturally called out the name Zhou Wenxian as soon as he saw the dentist many years later. I can also clearly recall my kindergarten days:

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1 Theories on Social Space: Origins and Analysis The distance from my home to the kindergarten was only 50 m, which only took me 30 steps to cross the road and take a round trip. My grandmother always could not find me after school, because I could be anywhere – on the road, behind the trees or among the children who were chasing each other around the street corners. I ran as fast as I could in the shade of the sycamore trees. The sunshine went through the leaves and swept across my face. The weather was always nice.65

Our memories of the alleyway neighborhood life have not been eroded over the decades. This is not because of how marvelous one’s natural memory is, but because of the great power of collective memories left behind by rich community interactions. In the twenty-first century, the neighborhood of Fuxing Road by Madang Road was demolished in the course of the inner-city regeneration, where Pan Shiyi’s SOHO Fuxing Plaza was built. Only the kindergarten and the church on Middle Fuxing Road were kept. The following block circled in orange in Fig. 1.2 is the exact place where the Madang Road neighborhood, with over sixty institutions and hundreds of households, used to be located. Now, apart from the Fuxing Plaza business complex and the preserved kindergarten and church, there are only two institutions with names on the map: Fuxing Tiandi Centre and the Community Health Service Centre. The original fabric-like spatial texture has been replaced by a large-scaled architectural plan. There is no longer a community called Fuxing Road Madang Road for the little children who go to the kindergarten here; the memories of the kindergarten life are no longer directly linked to the memories of home; the shops of Fuxing Plaza, large or small, with an avant-garde air, attract young hipsters but not a single local resident who used to catch up with fashions on their doorsteps, something that frequently took place in the neighborhood from dawn to dusk. With the rise of large-scale gated communities and business complexes, one can easily find all daily necessities in proximity. Meanwhile, the mixed and diverse social space of the old alleyway neighborhoods is undoubtedly no longer available in large-scale spaces like Fuxing Plaza. What can we learn from the alleyways in the old Shanghai to inspire the micro-transformation of community space that is taking place today?

1.6 Spatial Power in the Tianzifang Renewal Project Tianzifang is a regeneration project that has transformed an old alleyway neighborhood space into a new space for creative industries and fashion consumptions. It is a spatial effort, a minor one that is very different from the major production of spaces in Shanghai over the past thirty years. Despite of this, it is significant enough to develop a new theory of space. With the experience of Tianzifang, we have successfully added another dimension to our analysis of institutions and actors, 65

“Yu Hai: Once Change Starts, There is No Turning Back (zhuan bian yi dan kai shi, bian bu zai hui tou)”, in Li, S. 2017. Forty Years in The Eyes of Seven Individuals (qi ge ren de si shi nian). Wenhui APP. 20,170,601. http://wenhui.whb.cn/zhuzhan/feixugou/20170610/56791.html, Accessed on April 8, 2021.

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Fig. 1.2 Regenerated inner-city blocks with large-scale demolition and construction. Source Google earth

because in the past, powers of an actor usually referred to the intellectual, monetary and organizational power, but rarely spatial power. In fact, in a system where space as a redistributive resource is almost monopolized by the state, it is difficult to find out what role a specific actor can play. With the reform of decentralization and market-oriented urban development, space is regarded as a commodity and resource, which has led to the competition for space, as well as opportunities and benefits that come with spatial status. Meanwhile, various spatial powers have been developed, including the power to dominate, to create, and to make profit, among others. We will illustrate the spatial powers by an analysis of the four key actors in the Tianzifang project. • Mr. Z (leader of the Tianzifang experiment team, Party Secretary of the Subdistrict Government) Because of the state ownership of the land, only the government can decide or change the usage of space. As the leader of the local government who can execute the administrative power in the district on behalf of the government, he enjoyed an official

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position that allowed him to make efforts so as to facilitate the spatial transformation, such as building indoor free market to accommodate street vegetable vendors, leasing and transferring unused factory buildings, insisting on the Tianzifang experiment and resisting the demolition and construction order on the grounds that it would affect the elections, and secretly encouraging and tacitly backing behaviors of “changing living to non-living” (“changing” for short) when the Tianzifang experiment was about to fail in face of tight pressure from the ASE Group (the developer). In particular, the last one reflects Mr. Z’s power to dominate space. As Party Secretary of the sub-district government, his acquiescence to behaviors of “changing” was interpreted as the government position by the local residents and business owners. Normally, after Mr. Z was transferred to another post, he would no longer have an official position in the Tianzifang experiment and would consequently lose his former dominant power. But everyone knew that he was backed by not only the business owners but also hundreds of residents who had made the “changing”, so he was invited to the meeting when the district government decided to terminate the “changing” practice. This is a proof that Mr. Z still possesses some kind of power over the Tianzifang space, a power that Lefebvre refers to as a formal social power to control the space, a power that neither Chen Yifei as an artist, Mr. W as an entrepreneur, or Mr. X as a resident activist possessed. • Chen Yifei It is Chen Yifei’s special ability to discover the charm and value in a plain, ordinary alleyway neighborhood, and furthermore his unique expertise to transform a decaying factory building into an art space that is loved by all. Before coming to Tianzifang, Chen already mastered these skills, which could be defined as aesthetic and creative power over space. But only after Chen was endowed with a control power over the space, could he execute his spatial power to turn decay into magic. Tourists love Tianzifang not because it represents an alternative renewal mode to the large-scale demolition and construction mode, but because they are touched by the charm of the artistic renewal of historical spaces; whereas government leaders of Shanghai love Tianzifang also primarily because it is a product of revival and regeneration of an old alleyway neighborhood. Tianzifang is crowded with tourists every day for its aesthetic charm as well, rather than its political significance in urban development. The Tianzifang experiment has enabled Chen Yifei, Derek Er and others to transform their artistic creativity into a power of spatial re-creation. This power, possessed by visual artists as a scarce power, was given to a full play in the space of Tianzifang under the patronage of Mr. Z, who had the power of spatial domination. As we have learnt, there were constant incidents to suspend this creation in the Tianzifang experiment. It is Mr. Z’s power of spatial domination that has protected Chen’s spatial creativity. • Mr. W (an entrepreneur in Tianzifang) Mr. W is an expert in market economy, as manifested in his success in running a cultural center and a restaurant. When Mr. Z sublet the whole factory to Mr. W, W’s

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marketing skills were immediately made useful in running the space. He invested to refurbish the premises, like any businessman would do; he attended a party in which he realized that foreigners favored old factories and immediately rented them all out until premises were in short supply; he persuaded Chen Yifei to come to Tianzifang and kicked off the experiment of combining the commercial development of historical space with art development. Mr. W had a sense of art; yet his goal was not art per se, but business. His temperament has contributed to his great success in running the Tianzifang space. Despite being a sub-sublessor, Mr. W is in fact the real capitalist who holds all the spatial resources of Tianzifang thanks to a sufficiently long subleasing period. His spatial power is primarily reflected in the control over space by capital, as all his decisions and actions related to space embody the logic of capital. He will never defy the will of capital, although the unrestricted access of capital will eventually drive away genuine artists and enterprising businesses, and ultimately destroy Tianzifang, which was initially emerged because of creative industries. Mr. Z’s spatial power gave Mr. W a piece of space to run business. By liberating the productivity of space, Mr. W is the one who has transformed space into capital; hence, his power is the ability to capitalize space. • Mr. X (the first resident in Tianzifang to change living to non-living) If Tianzifang is regarded as an alternative story of success, it is not surprising that Mr. X, a somewhat disobedient resident in the eyes of the government, took the lead in the practice of “changing living to non-living”. Without Tianzifang, Mr. X would have become a professional petitioner and disobedient activist whom the government had to constantly keep an eye on. The unusual Tianzifang experiment enabled the disobedient Mr. X to stand out and release his spatial power to change his residence into a business. To put it simply, he realized the value of his house and seized the opportunity of the upcoming vibrant business in Tianzifang to improve his own life. Mr. X was not the only one who wanted to improve their lives, but there was definitely a reason for him to become the first one to trial the illegal “changing living to nonliving”. His experience in Xinjiang made him more desperate for a better life than others in the same neighborhood and more unrestrained in his actions. He had more experience in dealing with the government than his neighbors, and was readier and more willing to pay any price. Mr. X instigated a campaign of “changing living to non-living”, and is still helping to find matches between businesses and residents. There is no other “agent” that is more trustworthy than Mr. X. Being a trustworthy “agent” is his power to start and run his own business, which has been protected by the Tianzifang experiment team and has ultimately led to Mr. X’s success. Otherwise he would have been nothing more than an object of government attention, and his action would have been called off as soon as he started the illegal “changing”. Mr. X has successfully cashed in on his own space, and further helped more residents to do so. This power is a result of the commercialization of Tianzifang and the patronage of Mr. Z. It is the alternative experimentation of Tianzifang that has given the various actors—including Party Secretary of sub-district government, artists,

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private businessmen and ordinary residents—the spatial power to make their marks on the space.

1.7 An Analysis of Gentrification in the Urban Regeneration of Shanghai The term gentrification was first coined by Ruth Glass in 1964 to describe changes in the social structure and housing market that she observed in some parts of inner London. One by one, many of the working class quarters of London have been invaded by the middle classes – upper and lower … Once this process of “gentrification” starts in a district it goes on rapidly until all or most of the original working class occupiers are displaced and the whole social character of the district is changed.66

Can gentrification be used to explain the dynamics of spatial reorganization and the changing composition of inhabitants of Shanghai? Before answering the question, let us first clarify the concept of gentrification, which has its origins in the West. According to Ruth Glass, gentrification is also referred to as middle-class gentrification because the former working-class residents living in the centers of major cities have been replaced by middle-class residents during the last thirty to forty years of urban regeneration, with the former working-class neighborhoods becoming middleclass ones. In parallel with the demographic changes, the formerly decaying inner city was restored, renovated and renewed, many luxurious office buildings, hotels and fashion shops were built, and various commercial facilities and services for the middle class were developed, so it was also a renewal process of gentrification. The dynamics of gentrification in the West are discussed with three competing theories. The first one argues that gentrification has its roots in the transition of industrial structures of large cities from manufacturing to service industries, thus transforming a society dominated by labor workers into a society dominated by the new middle class. The second one argues that, as a result of changes in the class composition, the cultural orientations, preferences and work patterns of the new middle class have changed and they prefer to live in the inner city rather than to commute from suburbs to work. The third view claims that the driving force behind gentrification is not the new middle class, but the capital drive of real estate, i.e., the redevelopment, rehabilitation and gentrification of undervalued inner-city properties for profit. In Smith’s words, gentrification represents “a back to the city movement by capital, not people”.67 But whether it is driven by people or by capital, the revival of the inner city continues to push up the housing price. As a result, working-class inhabitants were forced to leave due to high housing price or no manufacturing jobs in the inner city, and their neighborhoods were taken over by the middle class one by one. 66 67

Quoted from Paddison and Ostendorf [12]. Ibid., p. 113.

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The situation in Shanghai looks similar: changes in the industrial layout with the retreating of the secondary industries and developing of the tertiary ones, the burgeoning of producer services, the displacement of alleyway neighborhood dwellers and the arrival of affluent residents, the rise of privatized and market-based services, as well as the inner-city regeneration and gentrification. The theory of gentrification has been used in many articles to analyze the inner-city regeneration in Shanghai.68 However, while it is not inappropriate to use gentrification to describe the results of regeneration, the dynamics, mechanisms and processes of inner-city regeneration in Shanghai do differ from the Western gentrification in many ways. Firstly, in the inner-city regeneration process in Shanghai, the service industry did not emerge before the arrival of the new middle class; on the contrary, the new service industry began to develop after the inner city was vacated by the regeneration. Secondly, the gentrification of the inner-city residents in Shanghai was a state action, meaning that the replacement of residents was not based on every single market transaction by the middle class, but on the collective displacement by the joint efforts of the government and developers. Therefore, gentrification itself could not reflect the changing demographics in Shanghai at all. In the West, gentrification is a state-guided and market-driven process of displacement by individual residents based on their own choices, whereas in Shanghai it is a non-negotiable collective displacement caused by the monopoly of the state and developers over urban construction and urban renewal. Although it is the same that workers and the poor are the ones who eventually move and are replaced by the middle class and the wealthy. Thirdly, the displacement of residents in the Western gentrification process is individually and spontaneously organized, and driven by the market; however, in Shanghai, the displacement of residents is entirely a process of social mobilization, a highly organized action, a social project carried out by the state with its ideological, organizational and legal resources, without which no developer would be able to make any achievement. The ideological resource refers to the rationales for displacement, such as the subjection of individuals and families to the development of the country; the organizational resource includes the system of “two-tier government (municipal and district), three-tier administration (municipal, district and subdistrict) and four-tier network (municipal, district, sub-district and neighborhood)”, in which the neighborhood committee plays the role of a grassroots organization providing information, door-to-door persuasion and other supports. For instance, in order to persuade the residents to be relocated and make way for building the Xintiandi Taiping Lake green space, the district government mobilized its cadres to do the persuasion work from door to door. The legal resource means the conversion of residents’ original leasehold rights of use into private property rights. A raw land is made mature through land replacement or space replacement, i.e., by using state power to move people who used to live in the space so as to give the capital market a mature land that can be developed. The capital is then given the control over space and thereby decides what kind of inhabitants shall be attracted to live or consume in the space. Once gaining control over space, the capital takes the advantage of 68

He [13] and Wang [14].

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differentiated rent to develop the inner city. In Shanghai, the collaboration between state and capital is achieved through land lease, which is rarely seen in the West. Fourthly, since the displacement for urban regeneration is a state project, the resettlement of the relocated residents also becomes a state action. Consequently, a big part of the large-scale housing construction is dedicated to displacement housings, most of which are built on the peripheries of the city. Therefore, the displacement comes with urban sprawl, or urbanization, which is the production of new residential spaces as well as a new zoning and differentiation of spaces. This process does not exist at all in the West either. Fifthly, gentrification in the West does not come with large-scale demolition, although there might be large-scale constructions. In the beginning, gentrification was realized through repairs and renewals of houses in the inner city for the purpose of living. As a matter of fact, one of the characteristics of gentrification is precisely the reuse of old houses through renewal and restoration. As the structures and styles of old houses are favored by the middle class, gentrification also involves the pursuit of a certain cultural identity and lifestyle. Much of the inner-city regeneration in Shanghai has been “to tear down and rebuild”, with Xintiandi as the first case fitting with the Western understanding of gentrification, an attempt that didn’t start until the late 1990s and later gradually attracted more followers. Renewing and reusing old houses becomes a trend in the twenty-first century, which leads to rediscovering the values of old docks, factories, warehouses, workshops, etc. and reusing them. Lastly, in the Western context, even within gentrified areas, some indigenous inhabitants still can choose to stay; whereas in Shanghai, since it took a radical sweeping regeneration model, most buildings were torn down for rebuilding instead of renovation. In the 1980s and early 1990s, it was still possible for residents to move back after the demolition and rebuilding, but it soon became impossible because of the unaffordable price of these newly built luxurious condominium. The real estate developers aim at a capital balance between the investment in land acquisition and the profit gains from property development, which could be achieved only by following the market mechanism to build and sell luxurious condominiums. Therefore, it is impossible for them to accept the return of the indigenous residents. In the West, residents who chose to stay could enjoy the benefits of neighborhood renewal brought about by gentrification. These neighborhoods are considered by some scholars as places for practice of mixed communities. However, since the poor have lost their cultural and social ties, the indigenous residents are culturally and psychologically alienated and marginalized as a result of gentrification of the whole area. In Shanghai, the capital-led gentrification usually means a thorough demolition and clearance; therefore, the spatial relations between different classes and groups of people are more characterized by a differentiation in social space, that is, the discriminatory contrast between the upper and lower corners of Shanghai, a familiar thing to the Shanghainese. The purpose of the above analysis is to understand that the use of imported theories and perspectives requires knowledge of one’s own contexts and, most importantly, of local experiences. Hence, it is a Shanghai-styled gentrification if any, which is different from that of London or New York. Meanwhile, we shall also be aware of

References

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the limit of the gentrification analysis. For Saskia Sassen, the term gentrification does not fully reflect the process of spatial restructuring that has taken place in the inner parts of big cities in the last thirty years. “By the early 1980s, it was becoming evident that residential rehabilitation was only one facet of a far broader process linked to the profound transformation in advanced capitalism: the shift to services and the associated transformation of the class structure and the shift toward the privatization of consumption and service provision. Gentrification emerged as a visible spatial component of this transformation. It was evident in the redevelopment of waterfronts, the rise of hotel and convention complexes in central cities, large-scale luxury office and residential developments, and fashionable, high-priced shopping districts.”69 The Chinese experience of state-led capitalized production of space in its urbanization cannot be merely explained by “gentrification” in the urban regeneration. This is what we have learnt from Sassen’s urban analysis.

References 1. Lefebvre, H. (1991). The production of space (pp. 31–39). Blackwell. 2. Lefebvre, H. (1979). Space: Social product and use value. In J. W. Freiberg (Ed.), Critical sociology: European perspective (p. 285). Irvington Publishers, Inc. 3. Soja, E. W. (2011). Postmodern geographies: The reassertion of space in critical social theory (2nd ed., p. 91). Verso. 4. Massey, D. (1995). Spatial divisions of labor: Social structures and the geography of production (p. 51). Routledge. 5. Lefebvre, H. (1977). Spatial planning: Reflection on the politics of space. In R. Peet (Ed.), Radical geography: Alternative viewpoints on contemporary social issues (p. 341). Maaroufa Press. 6. Harvey, D. (1990). The condition of postmodernity: An inquiry into the origins of cultural change (p. 226). Blackwell. 7. Foucault, M. (1980a). The eye of power. In C. Gordon (Ed.), Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings, 1972–1977 (p. 147). Pantheon. 8. Foucault, M. (1980b). Questions on geography. In C. Gordon (Ed.), Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings, 1972–1977 (p. 70). New York: Pantheon. 9. Soja, E. W. (1996). Third space: Journeys to Los Angeles and other real-and imagined places (pp. 63–64). Blackwell. 10. Soja, E. W. (1985). The spatiality of social life: Towards a transformative retheorisation. In D. Gregory, & J. Urry (Eds.), Social relations and spatial structures (p. 92). Palgrave. 11. Probyn, E. (2002). The spatial imperative of subjectivity. In K. Anderson, M. Domosh, S. Pile, N. Thift (Eds.) Handbook of cultural geography. SAGE. 12. Paddison, R., & Ostendorf, W. (Eds.). (2010). Urban studies: Society, Volume 1: Cities as social spaces (p. 111). Sage. 13. He, S. (2007, November). State-sponsored Gentrification under market transition, the case of Shanghai. Urban Affairs Review, 43(2), 171–198. 14. Wang, S. W. (2011). Commercial gentrification and entrepreneurial governance in Shanghai: Case study of Taikang road creative cluster. Urban Policy and Research, 29(4), 363–380. 15. Sassen, S. (2001). The global city: New York, London, Tokyo (p. 255). Princeton University Press. 69

Sassen [15].

Chapter 2

Discovering Shanghainese People from the Spatial History of Shanghai

It makes good sense to start our Shanghai narrative with the Shanghainese people. After all, cities are created by its dwellers’ undertakings, arrangements, desires and emotions, as well as loyalty and identity. The identity of Shanghainese, a concept closely related to mental space, is formed and developed through the history of Shanghai and its social changes. Consequently, there is an inextricable bond among the spatiality of mind, history and society. As a starting point to the chronological narrative of Shanghai, this chapter will look into the history of the self-identity of Shanghainese. As Emily Honig put it, “Subei people (individuals whose families were originally from the part of Jiangsu Province north of the Yangtze River) were not a people in Subei; they only became Subei people in Shanghai. Ethnicity, in other words, depends upon context.”1 Shanghainese certainly means people of Shanghai, but they become “Shanghainese” only in Shanghai. Therefore, the identity of Shanghainese is also constructed historically and socially, and more specifically, through the history of Shanghai in different periods of time as a migrant city, a city with foreign concessions, a socialist industrial base, and a global city. Let’s start with shrewdness, the most well-known character of Shanghainese, to understand their temperament. As Mu Xin stated, “the Shanghainese run out of all their ingenuity and intelligence in carefully weighing ‘worth or not’ (格算, 不 格算)”.2 Being sharp and pungent, Mu Xin also says, to establish oneself in the metropolis of Shanghai, the most important thing for Shanghainese is to demonstrate “background (牌头), manner (派头) and gimmick (噱头)”. Not to mention the grandiosity of the notables in Shanghai, even the most ordinary Shanghainese would take their relatives and friends from the countryside to the Bund, Nanjing Road and Avenue Joffre (today’s Huaihai Road). All these places used to be foreign concessions, exhibiting international architectures of various styles and displaying 1

Honig [1]. Mu [2]. In Shanghainese dialect, “ge suan” means “worth”. “Worth or not” is a vivid depiction of the fact that Shanghainese people are good at calculating and weighing.

2

© Tongji University Press 2023 H. Yu and H. Zou, Shanghai Narrative, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-3261-0_2

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a scene of feasting and revelry, which literally has nothing to do with the life of ordinary Shanghainese. However, despite of their humble, underclass status, Shanghainese still prefer to define the most dazzling, glamorous and westernized sceneries in the city as the image of Shanghai, and identify with this image which vastly differs from their own daily experiences, thereby obtaining a collective narcissism and self-affirmation unique to Shanghainese. As time changes, the former Avenue Joffre is now renamed as Huaihai Road. But the Shanghainese and their identity with the city have continued. Shanghainese of my generation who were born after the founding of PRC and grew up in the socialist era also enjoy flaunting the Bund and the French Concession to others. Such flaunting almost becomes a preference of the Shanghainese—or even a common problem to a certain extent. What kind of urban spirits does it embody? How is this related to the focus of this chapter, i.e., place identity? What kind of urban forces and processes have shaped the self-image of the Shanghainese? Does this image stay constant or keep changing? Shanghai has gone through three eras in the past 170 years since its opening as a treaty port, namely the late Qing Dynasty, RoC (Republic of China) and PRC (People’s Republic of China). Even in the PRC era, Shanghai has played two distinct roles as a city: a model of the planned economy in the first three decades and a leader of the market economy in the second thirty years, with ups and downs through different times. Therefore, it is imperative to conduct a multi-dimensional analysis including history, society, politics and space, to understand the Shanghainese people and their identity.

2.1 Shanghainese Versus Country Bumpkins For Shanghainese, to classify someone as Shanghainese or non-Shanghainese is the very first thing to do when meeting a new person. By regarding non-Shanghainese as country bumpkins, Shanghainese, therefore, categorizes the fellow countrymen only into Shanghainese and country bumpkins. Shanghainese are usually quite skilled in telling which category one belongs to, and never hesitate to call the non-Shanghainese “country bumpkins”. Ironically, to non-Shanghainese, it is easy to identify Shanghainese as well, not only because the Shanghainese would speak their dialect loudly in public regardless of their surroundings, but also because of the way they dress and behave, their manners, as well as their sensitivity to and pursuit for rationality. In Shanghai, if a bus is too crowded to have the doors closed, passengers will surely join the driver and conductor in persuading those who are stuck at the doors to get off and wait for the next bus; or passengers who fail to squeeze on will give a push to help close the doors. Neither would happen in Beijing. On the contrary, people would just waste time in a stalemate until the next bus arrives, and wait for those blocking off the doors to get off unhurriedly and take the next bus.3 I was admitted to Beijing Normal University in 1978. On the very first day of my arrival, I went to buy some crisp cakes in the university shop. The salesperson first weighed the cakes with a scale, and then 3

This was my personal experience of taking buses in Beijing.

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wrapped them with paper and thread. Seeing her time-and-effort consuming way, I couldn’t help asking why she wouldn’t charge by pieces and prepare paper bags beforehand. The salesperson didn’t answer my question; instead, she asked if I was from Shanghai and told me she had received the same advice from many others, all Shanghainese. I couldn’t understand why such simple advice for improvement was not adopted, meanwhile I was also amazed by Shanghainese students being “so fond of teaching others”. In the eyes of non-Shanghainese, there are “n + 1” types of Chinese, the unique one being Shanghainese. Since Shanghainese tend to call others country bumpkins, this makes it easier for non-Shanghainese to distinguish and assess Shanghainese— needless to say, most of the assessments are negative. By referring to the story of Li Hongzhang in the late Qing Dynasty, Xu Jilin believes that “Shanghainese” and “Chinese” sometimes compose a pair of conflicting concepts. As the story goes, Li Hongzhang highly appreciated Li Pingshu, a local elite in Shanghai, and gave him his highest appraisal by saying that “you are not a typical Shanghainese!” Hence, Xu asserted that the Shanghainese identity is a rather unconventional concept to the Chinese people.4 As a Shanghainese, I have been often commented as “untypical Shanghainese”. I would take it as a compliment, but I could hardly agree with such a denial way to express the recognition of a Shanghainese, because I am also referred to as a typical Shanghainese by many people who earnestly appreciated me. For the rest of Chinese, there are as many reasons to praise and admire the Shanghainese as those to disapprove them. Nevertheless, whether being disapproved or appreciated, the Shanghainese people must be a unique group that draws most jealousy and is most identifiable. In other words, the Shanghainese identity is most evident to both Shanghainese and non-Shanghainese. Why? We shall explore the reasons at great length. It’s difficult to testify when the Shanghainese people started to call nonShanghainese as country bumpkins. Some believe it was in the end of Qing Dynasty, while others say in the early years of Republic of China. In any case, there was a time when people flooding into Shanghai were either foreigners or countrymen. As Wang Anyi depicted the first arrivals of countrymen in Shanghai, “then there came a flock of homeless but vagarious tramps who abandoned their land voluntarily or involuntarily. None of them were good conventional Chinese peasants that had been cultivated by China’s thousands of years of civilization. They had nothing but courage to try their luck in this Paradise of Adventurers.”5 She is right. Adventurers in Shanghai were more than foreign rogues or domestic peasants. According to the most influential mass media in the end of the 19th Century, The Illustrated Lithographer (dian shi zhai hua bao), criminals fled to foreign concessions in order to escape local punishment, offenders of the local morals, people being abducted to Shanghai, refugees of war, and a variety of people seeking for development opportunities could all be found in Shanghai. 4

Xu, J. 2003. “Reflections on the Shanghainese Culture (shang hai wen hua de fan si)”, China Youth Daily—Freezing Point (zhong guo qing nian bao—bing dian), on Nov. 12, 2003. 5 Wang [3].

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The first group of immigrants to Shanghai made their own way through manual labor, business or speculation. Once they cast off their old rustic selves and watched the constant flow of new immigrants into Shanghai, every newcomer became a country bumpkin in their eyes. Annoying as it is of the Shanghainese calling others bumpkins, it somehow reveals the truth. During the first century since Shanghai’s opening as a treaty port, China gradually became a colony or semi-colony, in which a hundred years of turmoil and chaos of war, caused by internal revolts and foreign invasions, languished all businesses, bankrupted the rural areas, and pushed peasants and refugees to flood into “the metropolis of Shanghai” for the hope to survive. Overwhelmed by the bizarre and modern world, these rural people naturally got clueless, and were consequently despised by the Shanghainese who themselves also came from the countryside not long ago. What is magic and fascinating about Shanghai is that, before long these newly arrived bumpkins would also become members of the Shanghainese, and soon it was their turn to reproach new immigrants as “country bumpkins”. People coming to Shanghai would view the city as a land of opportunities regardless of their background. One could always find a way to survive however humble his/her desire was, while ambitious immigrants could also fight a way out to become big shots later. In all cases—successful as tycoons of kerosene, cotton cloth and other industries, or humble as clerks with a meager salary and rickshaw pullers making a living by manual labor—batches and batches of country folks became Shanghainese. “Soon after arriving in Shanghai, the dumbest may get smart, the most honest may get cunning, and the oddest-looking may get pretty. A girl with a running nose can turn into a modern beauty with curly hair, while a single-eyelid and pug-nosed woman might be transformed into a graceful and elegant madam in a few days.”6 Now it seems clear that calling others a bumpkin reflects one’s identification with Shanghai, while being called a bumpkin arouses one’s aspiration for becoming a Shanghainese. By this, the self-image of the Shanghainese is shaped and enhanced. In the next section, we would try to answer the following questions. What kind of forces could quickly and effectively transform a country bumpkin into a Shanghainese? What’s the relationship between the identity of Shanghainese and the city of Shanghai?

2.2 The Concessions and the Shanghainese The modern history of Shanghai started with the establishment of concessions, which has also nurtured the self-image of the Shanghainese and the spirit of the city. Yu Qiuyu, a Shanghainese scholar, noticed that one of the mental characters of the Shanghainese culture is its openness in cultural pursuits originated from its history of encounters with the world.7 Xu Jilin believes that the self-identity of the Shanghainese

6 7

Chen, Y. 1986. “On ‘Shanghai Style’ (shuo ‘hai pai’)”, in Jiefang Daily, on Mar. 5, 1986. Yu [4].

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was established in the process of globalization.8 Tu Weiming defined the Shanghai value as haipai (literally Shanghai Style), meaning a sense of reality (not necessarily with a sense of history), an oceanic perspective (not necessarily with a continental perspective), and a liberal mind to make friends and learn from the world.9 Though the word “concessions” is not mentioned, phrases like “history of encounters with the world”, “the process of globalization” and “oceanic perspective” are all related to the history, development and perspective of the concessions. These scholars did not mention the word “concessions” on purpose, because the concept of concession bears the imprint of colonialism. In the revolutionary discourse, concession means a stigma to the Chinese people. To Sun Yet-sen, leader of China’s republican revolution, the word carried twofold humiliations—loss of sovereignty and inferiority of the Chinese community compared to the concession area in every aspect—of which the latter brought him much more humiliation.10 As Shanghainese scholar Tang Zhenchang believes, the concession area has played the most significant role in making Shanghai and its citizens unique from the rest of China. “Many cities across China had concessions, and Tianjin alone had as many as eight. Why did concessions in Shanghai play the most significant and influential role? The reason lies in the fact that among all the treaty ports, Shanghai drove most of the attention from the western powers. The political structure of executive, legislative and judicial administrations in Shanghai concessions was the most complete and powerful in all similar concessions. In addition, there were many more westerners in Shanghai than in any other treaty port, who invested and established the largest number of enterprises in Shanghai. Therefore, the interests of the westerners were closely bound up with Shanghai, and naturally they exerted most efforts on the development of Shanghai.”11 The western material civilization and municipal services were first introduced to the concession area, and before that things like running water, electric light, telephone, gas, sewage treatment system, fire service, parks, public transportation and others were never heard in Chinese cities. The acceptance of Westerners and concessions by the Shanghainese was above all a result of such experiences. The Shanghainese is widely regarded as the most materialistic people in modern China for good reason. Immigrants came to the concession area either to make a living or to look for new opportunities, and therefore were different from traditional scholar-bureaucrats who were committed to protecting Chinese traditions. The material civilization of Shanghai was the first and foremost reason for Shanghainese to regard themselves superior than country bumpkins from other places. Recognizing the material civilization in the concessions, they gradually came to agree with its culture. Out of curiosity, Chinese people living in the concessions began to dabble in western culture and eventually became enthusiastic about it. The Illustrated Lithographer documented how 8

See Footnote 4. Tu, W. 2004. “Shanghai Value and Globalization (shang hai jia zhi yu quan qiu hua)”, Historical Review (shi lin), 2004 (2). 10 Yeung and Sung [5]. 11 Tang [6]. 9

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keen the Chinese residents in concession were on horse racing, circus and all other sport activities organized by foreigners. On occasions of grand celebrations organized by the concession authorities, like celebrations for the French National Day or the British Queen’s Birthday, all streets were packed and the whole city turned out. In 1893 when the 50th anniversary of the opening of Shanghai as a treaty port was held in the concession area, Chinese businessmen originally from different parts of China took an active part in the celebration, hanging lanterns and parading while beating drums and gongs. In the following year, during Empress Dowager Cixi’s birthday celebration, neither merchants nor common citizens showed the same enthusiasm as that of the year before.12 Yu Qiuyu once commented that the Shanghainese people “worship but do not have blind faith in foreign things”. In my opinion, his comment is too moderate. For at least more than half a century, citizens in Shanghai had neither explicit political awareness nor nationalist appeal. However, on the other hand, it was in the concessions of Shanghai “that for the first time on a large scale there conceived operational mechanisms of modern societies, including market rules, freedom and diversity, public governance, among the others, which were never seen throughout China’s history; and that for the first time on a large scale there fostered awareness of the market, contract, rule-of-law, citizenship and public, all of which were absent among the Chinese population.”13 The prosperity of the concession area, in the view of many critics, was the “Flower of Evil” that bloomed in an inviting way. Nevertheless, for Shanghainese, or most Shanghainese, it was a long-lasting source for their identity, although concessions and related symbols were thoroughly criticized and cleared away as a sign of colonialism and a national humiliation to the state sovereignty after 1949 under the socialist discourse. However, deep in the consciousness of the Shanghainese people, their concession identity and complex have never completely disappeared. As an explicit proof, the Shanghai nostalgia in the 1990s was simply a fancy to its past as a bustling cosmopolitan city.

2.3 Socialist Transformation and the Shanghainese The identity of Shanghainese once mainly came from its history as the first centuryold treaty port. The liberation of Shanghai in 1949 overwrote the life of Shanghainese. As described by Pamela Yatsko, “foreigners left and the local elite fled. New communist rulers rounded up prostitutes, forbade horse racing, and closed cabarets, relegating Old Shanghai’s legendary decadence to history. Political movements aimed at eradicating any vestiges of the city’s former bourgeois lifestyle and capitalist ways shaped a socialist city.”14 The socialist revolution fundamentally transformed the 12

Ye [7]. Xiong [8]. 14 Yatsko [9]. 13

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Shanghainese lifestyle. Its exotic culture, spaces with colonial marks, as well as concessional elements and institutions that used to shape the Shanghainese identity, were all replaced by the revolutionary ideology, as shown in the closure of horse and dog racecourses and the Paramount Ballroom. Gone were the imperialists who used to rule Shanghai, a great number of capitalists, as well as White Russian Émigrés who brought exoticness and romance to the Shanghai concession area. In short, with all elements of former concessions that contributed to the identity of Shanghainese being dissolved and eliminated in the fundamental social revolution, the identity of the Shanghainese had to face a new urban ecology. The socialist urban development strategy essentially changed the original historical path of Shanghai. First of all, Beijing replaced Shanghai’s status as the national economic, trade and financial center after China adopted the planned economy system, although Shanghai remained as the most important industrial and commercial city. Secondly, as China prioritized the development of heavy industry in order to establish an independent socialist industrial system, Shanghai had to readjust its industrial structure from service-and-light-industry-dominated to a comprehensive one prioritizing heavy industry. As a result, the consumption-oriented city gradually turned into a production-oriented one. Finally, under the national strategy of prioritizing hinterland development, development funds were first allocated to support the hinterland. Shanghai, on the other hand, was regarded as “the eldest son” of the People’s Republic of China, and had to make greatest contribution to the state revenue and support the development of the hinterland. Although the socialist transformation redefined the role of Shanghai, its importance to the country endured. In the following part, we will see how the Shanghainese identity continues and changes with a consistent sense of superiority. Since the revolution transformed Shanghai from an unconventional city into an average one in the socialist China, it was naturally expected that the opposition between Shanghainese and non-Shanghainese would gradually disappear. However, on the contrary, the Shanghainese identification with its own city continued in the following three decades of the socialist urban development, and grew even more intensified and self-conscious. How was this possible? Here are the reasons. Firstly, Shanghai was no longer an immigrant city as the planned economy system halted mass migration. Consequently, the city lost its source of dynamics, and ended its history with constant population inflows. As free population flow became stagnated, the regionalism of Shanghainese was solidified and strengthened, unfortunately in a least ambitious way which shaped a self-contented identity. Such an abnormal structuralization of the consciousness of Shanghainese also contributed to their perceived superiority. Secondly, the closure of mass migration was only one-way. With no immigration to Shanghai, Shanghainese were migrating to other parts of China. Like a pawn on the country’s chessboard, Shanghai became a part of the socialist China. The relocation of the Shanghainese was not an individual but organizational behavior as Shanghai’s response to the state’s long-term call to support the hinterland and frontier areas in the era of planned economy. Among all big cities in China, Shanghai sent out the largest number of professionals and factory workers. By reassigning 300 factories and over

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1 million workers and technicians to the hinterland, Shanghai kept a negative population growth for 20 years over the first thirty years after PRC was founded.15 From economy and culture to urban architectures and municipal infrastructure, Shanghainese found the rest of China were all lagging far behind their hometown. Very few Shanghainese would be willing to settle down outside Shanghai. The contrast between the advancement of Shanghai and the backwardness of other places fueled their combined feelings of frustration and superiority—frustrated because of leaving Shanghai, and superior to be a Shanghainese compared with non-Shanghainese, the so-called country bumpkins. The identity of Shanghainese was solidified by those staying in Shanghai, and further enhanced by millions of Shanghainese outside Shanghai. Thus, perceptions of the contrast between Shanghainese and country bumpkins spread nationwide. Thirdly, although Shanghai lost its glories of the old time, it soon gained every reason to be proud again under the new system. In thirty years, the performance of Shanghai’s economy won 10 first places nationally, with its total industrial output accounting for one eighth of the national volume, its export value a quarter, and revenue one sixth. Besides, Shanghai contributed most technical support to the country. Although the arrogance and pride of the Shanghainese naturally invited much jealousy, products made in Shanghai were unexceptionally welcomed by people across the country. During the implementation of socialist justice policies aiming to decrease regional gaps, the consciousness of being a Shanghainese was selfacknowledged and enhanced. As Beijing scholar Yang Dongping put it, for over thirty years, Shanghai remained as a synonym of affluence, prosperity, fashion, modernity, civilization and excellence. “Shanghainese can be found everywhere around the country, always bloated with pride. No matter where they were, you could hear them speak Shanghainese in a loud voice as if no one else were around. People from other parts of China showed respect to the grand tradition of Shanghai and acted modestly around them, but with jealousy.”16 In the transition from a treaty port forced to open by western powers to the socialist Shanghai, Shanghainese displayed high flexibility. “The competence, adaptability, and obedience that Shanghainese had nurtured under foreign occupation served them well under their new Communists masters, helping to turn capitalist Shanghai into a model of state planning.”17

2.4 “Shanghai” in the Mental Map of Shanghainese The identity of Shanghainese has a spatial definition. Non-Shanghainese are called country bumpkins by Shanghainese, and so are people who live beyond the 80 square kilometers of built-up area of Shanghai before 1949. It was in the highly dense and compact inner city that the Shanghainese learnt the civilized urban life of metropolis 15

Shanghai Municipal Statistics Bureau [10]. Yang [11]. 17 See Footnote 14. 16

2.4 “Shanghai” in the Mental Map of Shanghainese

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Shanghai. Everything about modern civilization could be found in the inner city. To the Shanghainese, being out of this urban gravity circle means leaving Shanghai and entering the rural areas. Shanghai has fostered large numbers of urban dwellers or petty urbanites, but the urbanite culture and mentality of Shanghai was bred and grown in Shikumen alleyways in the old concession areas. As Shanghainese scholar Zhu Dake put it, “narrow and cramped as Shikumen buildings are, it is hard to imagine that they have accommodated two thirds of the urbanites of Shanghai, embracing bankrupted capitalists, brokers, small businessmen, craftsmen, petit bourgeois, traditional intellectuals, college students, rural refuges, rogues, dancing girls or prostitutes, and all the evils of the society. They sprawled in the business and geographical center of the city (the concession area), and became a secret cradle to shape the ideologies of the ordinary Shanghainese.”18 One can only find the petty urbanites of Shanghai in the alleyways, and no better place could accommodate them. The stinginess, sensitivity and shrewdness of Shanghainese was born in these extremely confined spaces. “Since Shanghainese dwelled in tiny alleyways, they had to ‘practice Taoist rites in a snail shell’ (a metaphor that refers to a meticulous and enjoyable way of managing everyday life in a compact living space), and fought by all means with neighbors just for one or two inches of space, of which they were mocked and disdained by people around the country. But were Shanghainese to be blamed for their stinginess? The sensitivity and shrewdness of Shanghainese on space display their abilities developed in response to the narrow environment. It is not instinct, but skill.”19 Shanty towns are regarded as “the lower corner” (下只角, meaning the rundown part of the city) or even “the lowest of the lower” by Shanghainese. Although most of them are scattered in downtown districts, not geographically in the rural areas, they are still equal to countryside in the eyes of most Shanghainese. Shanghainese look down upon shanty towns not only for the shabbiness of the area which is regarded as a disgrace, but also for the dwellers in these shanties, Subei people, which is the most discriminated group of all populations in Shanghai and not taken as authentic Shanghainese. The Subei dialect they speak, which is not considered a decent or proper way of speaking, is how Shanghainese would distinguish the group. Therefore, descendants of the Subei people only speak their own dialect at home with family members and neighbors. Once they step out of their shanty towns, they will make every effort to speak Shanghainese dialect and cover up their own accent. Another distinction is their occupation. Subei people were mostly engaged in jobs like dockworker, rickshaw puller, barber, back-rubber and pedicure worker in bathhouses. It is said that immigrants from Jiangnan (South of the Yangtze River), Guangdong and Subei are most powerful in Shanghai,20 and the power of Subei people lies both in its large population and their great strength. In 1949, there were one million Subei people in Shanghai. Over the years, being at the bottom of the society, they have 18

See https://www.douban.com/event/12576337/discussion/27199079/?author=1. Accessed on April 21, 2021. 19 You and Zou [12]. 20 Xiong and Song [13].

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dominated almost all the heavy labor work in Shanghai, and consequently formed the most solidary group to protect themselves against discrimination. Despite of the solidarity, Subei people have never wanted to wear this label as it’s a stigmatized label of identity. Instead, they have always wished to get out of their ghetto and get rid of their identity as Subei people.21 They work hard to learn the Shanghainese dialect and try to speak like a native without any accent. The discrimination of Shanghainese against Subei people is in effect a distinction between “us” and “them”. In Emily Honig’s words, the Subei identity was more of a mirror for the self-definition of non-Subei people (mostly Jiangnan people) in Shanghai, who claimed themselves a Shanghai identity. To be a Shanghai ren (Shanghainese) was to be urbane and sophisticated, in contradiction to the crude and backward natives of Subei.22 During the massive displacement process accompanied with the inner-city regeneration project since the 1990s, millions of Shanghainese urbanites bid farewell to their alleyway neighborhoods—and essentially, to the city of Shanghai, to the urban space that has forged the characters of Shanghainese—whether being envied, hated, praised or imitated, and to the root of their identity. Over a century ago, people left their rural roots to eventually settle down and get rooted in Shanghai as part of the Shanghainese community. In the large-scale population migration within Shanghai in the 1990s, residents of the old Shanghai alleyway neighborhoods had to leave their roots again. It is worrisome that the Shanghainese personalities which they take pride in and their highly distinctive characters would disappear in the process. In terms of space area and facilities, the residential spaces where the Shanghainese people live nowadays are much better than the previous Shikumen buildings. However, with the disappearance of spaces for Shanghainese to flirt, to gossip and to play games, the manners, appearances, styles, faces and gimmicks of the Shanghainese have also consequently lost their audience and bravos. Shanghainese who have moved out of “Shanghai” to the “countryside” will surely form their new self-image and self-imagination, but the old image of Shanghainese that has been familiar to us is doomed to extinction. People who left the city center have already settled down in new urban areas, and lived a much-improved life than that of their parents’ generation. Rarely visiting Nanjing Road, Huaihai Road or People’s Square, they are getting used to Lianhua and Hualian convenience stores adjacent to their home, as well as supermarkets like Auchan and RT-Mart. But even until today, they continue to tenaciously claim themselves living in rural areas, and reluctantly accept with the fact that they are gradually becoming part of countrymen. As their memories of the typical Shanghai alleyway life, Sanyang Food Store (a famous store on Nanjing Road), Xiqu Laodafang (a famous local bakery near Jing’an Temple) and others start to fade away, what kind of Shanghainese could they define themselves? Worse off than some but better off than many? Anyhow, in the new neighborhoods, people will be much less likely, or unlikely, to experience what they used to do in alleyway neighborhoods, namely swaggering through the alleyways, gazing around

21 22

Chen [14]. See Footnote 1.

2.5 Nostalgia for Old Shanghai: An Urban Identity for Elites …

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at the entrance and imitating each other, or conducting social interactions with underlying competition. Today, people no longer compare and compete with neighbors, nor study or follow the trends. As a result, the fashionable and stylish Shanghainese manners disappear, and Shanghainese as a unique identity of a group of people—a group that easily call others country bumpkins—is dying away.

2.5 Nostalgia for Old Shanghai: An Urban Identity for Elites not for Common People As Shanghainese scholar Xiong Yuezhi believes, the continuing and overwhelming trend of the old Shanghai nostalgia since the 1990s is an imagined product reflecting the new wave of China’s urbanization. After all, the old bustling cosmopolitan city provides the main source of the Shanghai identity and interpretation. “Therefore, Shanghai turns into an exotic place for the imagination and reflection of a variety of experiences and emotions”.23 The most widely cited interpretation of “Shanghai Nostalgia” is given by American scholar Hanchao Lu, a former researcher at Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences. According to him, “Old Shanghai” as a kind of nostalgia takes on special meanings. “Unlike nostalgia that in most cases rejects mainstream culture, the nostalgia for ‘Old Shanghai’ is part of it. Unlike nostalgia that usually protests about the present, the nostalgia for ‘Old Shanghai’ celebrates it. Unlike nostalgia that is commonly negative, dispirited and withdrawn, the nostalgia for ‘Old Shanghai’ is positive, spirited, and receptive”.24 The old bustling cosmopolitan city has been reiterated in the account of Shanghai nostalgia. On the one hand, this indicated the fact that thirty years of revolutionary ideology did not sweep off the foreign metropolis culture complex deeply rooted in the consciousness of the Shanghainese. On the other hand, as Xiong Yuezhi stated, “to many old Shanghainese or people with an intense Shanghai complex, the future means the past”.25 However, the nostalgia has been selective, as sharply criticized by Wang Xiaoming, “the nostalgia focused on Shanghai as a foreign metropolis only, but intentionally or unintentionally ignored the Shanghainese petty urbanites in alleyway neighborhoods, workers community on the banks of Suzhou Creek, and ghetto areas of Shanghai”. The ideology of nostalgia has been pre-colonial from the very beginning, without any criticism on colonialism or alertness to post-colonialism. It’s an elite campaign and has little to do with the subject of the identity discussed in this chapter, i.e., the ordinary Shanghainese, who has disappeared from the forefront of the Shanghainese identity in the wave of massive anti-history urban development characteristic of demolishing Shikumen and the alleyway society. Over a generation, voices of the Shanghainese petty urbanites were no longer heard, and these petty urbanites have gradually lost their original characters. Gone were the key factors for 23

See Footnote 13. Lu [15]. 25 See Footnote 13. 24

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the identity of the Shanghainese people—dwellings in the downtown civil space, as well as the uniqueness of the modern civilization for which Shanghainese were inflated with pride. As I wrote in one essay about Shanghai nostalgia: The Shanghai nostalgia, which first appeared in literature, arts, films and TV serials in the 1990s, soon became renowned and popular by the push of Xintiandi, Tianzifang and other projects with a selling point of Shikumen and made its way in the process of innercity renovation and urban landscape design. Nevertheless, I still believe that it is just an elite campaign and has nothing to do with the daily lives of ordinary Shanghainese. Our expectation to revitalize our memories of the city through massive production of alleyway images received no response from the citizens. In the “Old Shanghai nostalgia” aiming to regain or resume the collective memories, the collective has been absent. Why were most people silent about their alleyway life? Was it because they had nothing to say or because no one listened to their past? I feel worried that, with the absence of a folk narrative in the sense of sociography, the Shanghai nostalgia would end up with a “memory revival” of a small number of people, instead of reproducing the collective awareness of the Shanghainese people, which was shaped by the alleyway world. The characters of Shanghainese urbanites probably have already fallen apart.

In a public lecture titled with Chitchats about Shanghainese, the famous Shanghainese painter Chen Danqing mentioned that capitalists, the working class or rogues who can straighten everything out could no longer be found on today’s streets in Shanghai. Without these big shots of the time, Shanghai is no longer the great metropolis as it used to be. To add one more point, without the Shanghainese petty urbanites who easily call others country bumpkins, the so-called “our Shanghai” in the mouths of locals—that continuously remold bumpkins, cherish earnest worldly pursuits, and harbor shrewd calculations—is also gone. The urban identity of the Shanghainese possibly needs to be resumed by a new emerging middle class. Nonetheless, it will inevitably be a different story.

References 1. Honig, E. 1992. Creating Chinese Ethnicity: Subei People in Shanghai, 1850–1980. Yale University Press. p. 9, 131–132 2. Mu, X. (2006). Reflections of Columbia (ge lun bi ya de dao ying) (p. 129). Guangxi Normal University Press. 3. Wang, A. (1996). ‘Shanghai Flavor’ versus ‘Beijing Flavor’ (‘shang hai wei’ he ‘bei jing wei’). In The rootless language: A personal anthology of Wang Anyi Volume Four (piao bo de yu yan: wang an yi zi xuan ji zhi si). Writers Publishing House (zuo jia chu ban she). 4. Yu, Q. (1992). The Shanghainese people (shang hai ren). In A bitter journey through culture (wen hua ku lv). Shanghai Knowledge Press. 5. Yeung, Y. M., & Sung, Y. (Eds.). (1996). Shanghai: Transformation and modernization under China’s open policy (p. 502). The Chinese University of Hong Kong Press. 6. Tang, Z. (2001). Citizenship consciousness and the Shanghainese society (shi min yi shi yu shang hai she hui). In H. Wang & G. Yu (Eds.), Shanghai: The city, society and culture (shang hai: cheng shi, she hui he wen hua). The Chinese University of Hong Kong Press. 7. Ye, X. (2001). The common people culture of Shanghai in ‘the illustrated lithographer’(dian shi zhai hua bao zhong de shang hai ping min wen hua)”. In H. Wang & G. Yu (Eds.), Shanghai:

References

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9. 10. 11. 12.

13.

14.

15.

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The city, society and culture (shang hai: cheng shi, she hui he wen hua). The Chinese University of Hong Kong Press. Xiong, Y. (2011). Possibilities for Shanghai (shang hai de ke neng). In S. Huang (Eds.), Nine chapters for Shanghai: Historical scenes and future blueprints of the wonders in China. East China Normal University Press. Yatsko, P. (2000). New Shanghai: The rocky rebirth of China’s legendary city (pp. 13, 14). John Wiley & Sons (Asia), Inc. Shanghai Municipal Statistics Bureau. (2000). Chapter 2, tables 2–4. In Shanghai statistics 2000 (p. 31). China Statistics Press (Zhong guo tong ji chu ban she). Yang, D. (1994). City monsoon: The cultural spirit of Beijing and Shanghai (cheng shi ji feng: bei jing he shang hai de wen hua jing shen) (p. 312). Oriental Press (dong fang chu ban she). Yu, H., & Zou, H. (2009). The spatial story of Shanghai: From Mao’s time to Deng’s time (shang hai de kong jian gu shi: Cong mao ze dong shi dai dao deng xiao ping shi dai). Green Leaf (Lv Ye), 137(10), 84–90. Xiong, Y., & Song, Z. (2011). Go to Shanghai (dao shang hai qu). In S. Huang (Ed.) Nine chapters for Shanghai: Historical scenes and future blueprints of the wonders in China. East China Normal University Press. Chen, Y. (2007). Urban regeneration as a socialist practice: The transformation of Shantytowns (zuo wei she hui zhu yi shi jian de cheng shi geng xin: peng hu qu gai zao). In T. Lin (Ed.) The contemporary Urban renewal and the change of social space (xian dai cheng shi geng xin yu she hui kong jian bian qian). Chinese Classics Publishing House (shang hai gu Ii chu ban she). Lu, H. (2002). Nostalgia for the future: The resurgence of an alienated culture in China. Pacific Affairs, 75(2), 169–186.

Chapter 3

The Spatial Characteristics During the Rise of Shanghai

Whereas Chap. 2 is about Shanghainese people from the perspective of the spatial history of Shanghai, this chapter and Chap. 4 compose a section focusing on the spatial characters and spatial routes of Shanghai’s history, both of which determined the rise and fall of Shanghai over the past 170 years, as well as the fate of its people, individually and collectively.

3.1 The Geographical Logic of Shanghai’s Rise Each city has its own geographical location defining its unique spatial characters. All prosperous cities in history had their own geographical advantages, such as Venice in the fifteenth century, Amsterdam in the seventeenth, London in the eighteenth and nineteenth, and New York in the twentieth. These advantages differed considerably from each other, but had one thing in common: their premium locations for shipping enabled them to become leading global cities in the capitalist world system. The rise of Shanghai was also a choice of the spatial logic of the Western world system. The British forced China to open its ports with guns, fires and cannons, primarily for the sake of trade. The prosperity of Shanghai after its opening as one of the five treaty ports was essentially due to its geographical advantages—that it is seated in the mouth where the Yangtze River runs into the East China Sea, while also connected to Taihu Lake and the Grand Cannel. Located on the most affluent region in China, Yangtze River Delta, and the central point of China’s coastline, Shanghai is bestowed with easy access to the vast hinterland for trade. As a result, the prosperity of the city heavily depended on the development of the port, as well as on business. During the reign of Emperor Qianlong of the Qing Dynasty (1735–1796), there were 7000 sailors in Shanghai County, and one tenth of the population lived on water transport and related industries. Before the treaty-port era, the Qing Dynasty government had already agreed to lift the ban on maritime trade

© Tongji University Press 2023 H. Yu and H. Zou, Shanghai Narrative, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-3261-0_3

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in Shanghai. According to Volume 1 “Customs” of the “Shanghai County Records” during the reign of Emperor Jiaqing (1796–1820), trade boats from far and near all “came in through Wusong Port, lining up till the southeast corner of the city, one after another, with congested rows of sails and masts, like in a metropolis”. Shanghai of that time had already become the most important port for domestic and foreign trade in Southeast China. Therefore, when the ship Lord Amherst of the British East India Company came northward from Macao to Shanghai via the Huangpu River in 1832, it conducted a thorough seven-day reconnaissance of the waterway of the Huangpu River, as well as the military deployment and customs of the Shanghai area. The British came well prepared because of Shanghai’s advantageous geographic location. After the ship Lord Amherst returned to Britain, its report about Shanghai wrote, “free trade in this region will bring incalculable benefits to foreigners, and especially to the British people.” Walter Henry Medhurst, the British missionary, commented that “despite as a third-class county, Shanghai is the largest commercial center on the east coast of China, close to the affluent region of Suzhou and Hangzhou”.1 These comments on Shanghai were all made before the Opium War. However, in less than a decade after the outbreak of the War, China was forced to open by foreigners with guns and cannons, and trade was the main reason. Among the five treaty ports, Shanghai was the only one to have developed into a first-class metropolis. After the opening as a treaty port, the Bund served as the foreign trade port, while Shiliupu (number 16 dock) was the domestic one. After over ten years, Shanghai overtook Guangzhou and became China’s No. 1 foreign trade port, and kept this status for 130 years. Trade led to the development of all other industries, such as banking, manufacturing and service industries. As described in Li Bai’s famous poet, “A time will come to ride the wind and cleave the waves, I’ll set my cloud-like sail to cross the sea which raves.” The Shanghai style (haipai) depends on sophisticated maneuvers in a world-class open space. Once such space is restricted or lost, Shanghai is bound to lag behind. Therefore, in the first decade of China’s reform and opening-up policy since 1978, Guangdong overtook Shanghai as the No. 1 port for foreign trade due to Shanghai’s lack of openness while the former “rode the wind and cleaved the waves”. By this, I do not mean to repeat the cliché of geographical determinism theory, but to gain a spatial perspective in understanding urban changes and transformations. Shanghai had earned its reputation as “Paris of the Orient”, and this was by no means an overstatement. The Bund, for example, the window to showcase Shanghai’s accomplishment, boasted the longest bar in the world of that time in the Shanghai Club Building (No.2 on the Bund), the financial hub of Shanghai and the Far East— HSBC (No. 12 on the Bund), the most influential foreign daily in the East—NorthChina Daily News (No. 17), the most luxurious hotels in Asia—Exchange Hotel and Sassoon House (No. 19 and 20), Jardine Matheson handling the majority of China’s import and export business (No. 27), and Swire Shipping controlling most of the shipping business in East Asia (No. 13 South Zhongshan Road Number Two).

1

1999. Shanghai General History, Vol. 2. Shanghai People’s Press. p. 359.

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Therefore, as experts observed, every building on the Bund brought together all kinds of information about China and the Far East, making it the hub of the East. The Bund area was Shanghai’s first concession, which introduced municipal infrastructures and services never seen in traditional Chinese cities, such as public transportation, parks, public stadiums, and public libraries. The Chinese community in Shanghai soon began to learn from the infrastructures of the Concessions, and such process became the driving force behind Shanghai’s development. The influence of the West on Shanghai through the Concessions not only made Sun Yat-sen feel the humiliation of losing sovereignty, but also a sense of inferiority, thus inspiring him to learn from the west in order to surpass it. While concessions in other Chinese cities were mostly modest enclaves, in Shanghai they took up more than half of the urban areas, which was larger than the total area of concessions in other Chinese cities. Soon, the Concessions took over to become the real star of Shanghai and the word “concessions” became a synonym for Shanghai, referring to both the Bund occupied by foreign businessmen and Nanjing Road operated by Chinese merchants. The Commercial Press, Zhonghua Book Company, SDX Joint Publishing Company, and many of the most important publishing, educational and cultural institutions in modern China, were all located in the Concessions. Therefore, the Concessions also served as the nation’s cultural, educational and political center, and attracted almost every intellectual aspiring to the new western learning, including the most accomplished politicians, translators, publishers, educators, writers, well-known journalists, masters of ancient Chinese civilization studies, and poets of China’s modern era. Shanghai, with western concessions on its territory, was also the center of the modern Chinese revolution, hosting Sun Yat-sen’s last residence in Shanghai and the site of the First National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC).

3.2 The Space Route of the Revolution and Industrialization The torch of communism lit up in Shanghai sparked off a countrywide revolution in China’s rural area. Twenty-eight years later, the birthplace of the CPC witnessed the arrival of the People’s Liberation Army led by CPC founders, turning a new page in the history of Shanghai. To upgrade the urban space in the new Shanghai, any vestiges of the city’s former bourgeois lifestyle and capitalist ways had to be eradicated, and places like the Race Club had to be transformed. After the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was founded in 1949, it was no longer appropriate for places like the Race Club, which represents colonial culture and concessional lifestyle, to occupy the center of Shanghai. Consequently, the Race Club was abandoned and later converted into People’s Square and People’s park, with the former to assemble and mobilize people for political movements and the latter to serve workers for recreational purposes. The clear ideological differences behind

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this space transformation highlights the politics of space. Yet this was not the patent of revolutionary political parties. Take the history of Yan’an Road’s renaming as an example. After Shanghai’s opening as a treaty port, the Yang King Pang Canal, one of the branches of Huangpu River, was reclaimed into a road and named as “Avenue Edward VII” by the British. It was renamed in 1945 as Chungcheng Road upon the victory of the War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression (The Second SinoJapanese War 1937–1945), and later changed into Yan’an Road after the liberation of Shanghai by the People’s Liberation Army in 1949. The constant change of the road name mirrors the continuous social changes of the city, while unchanged is the determination of every political force in each era to leave its mark on the urban spaces. The socialist revolution brought China with an independent socialist industrialization strategy, and thus vastly changed the city of Shanghai under the spatial strategy of “transforming the consuming city of old China into a producing city of new China”. On the one hand, as the New China shifted into a central planned economy, the geographic layout of the banking industry had to change accordingly. All the national banks set up in Shanghai by the government of Republic of China (ROC) moved to Beijing, where the central government of the PRC is located. As a result, Shanghai lost its status as an international financial center, and the bank buildings along the world-class financial street on the Bund welcomed new owners, and were all converted into office buildings of the Shanghai municipal government. This is clearly not just a functional shift of space but also a political and symbolic one. The Bund was no longer the Wall Street of the Far East. But on the other hand, the national strategy of prioritizing the development of heavy industries also brought Shanghai unprecedented opportunities for industrial development since its opening as a treaty port. In the pre-PRC era, Shanghai’s industrial development was subject to the industrial division and competition of the capitalist world, while the independent economic system of the PRC made it possible for Shanghai to autonomously shift its industrial structure from service-and-light-industries-based to a comprehensive one. This shift in trajectory was clearly indicated in statistics. In the early 1950s, the ratio of light industries to heavy industries was about 4:1, but by the mid-1960s, the ratio had dropped to almost 1:1. Factories and workers’ residential areas for prioritized heavy industries such as iron, steel, electromechanics, chemicals, etc., could not be built in the overcrowded city center and had to be relocated to urban peripheries or suburbs. Hence, the newly-built urban area in Shanghai after the founding of PRC consisted of two diagonal lines that connected industrial and new residential areas, which stretched to Wusong in the northeast, Pengpu in the north, Caoyang in the northwest, Caohejing in the southwest further down to Minhang. For some, the workers’ community built after 1949 could replace Shikumen to be the new landmark of Shanghai. Not all the workers but only the best ones, i.e., the model workers, were qualified to move into these communities. It was an honor to be a worker at that time, and living in the workers’ community was something even greater to commemorate. Consequently, the high-spirited culture of working class being the master of the country, a product of the surging passion for the socialist industrialization, became the new wave of culture in Shanghai.

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Before 1949, Shanghai used to be a city of immigrants, with immigrants accounting for over 70% of the total inhabitants both in the Concessions and the Chinese communities. Immigrants came to Shanghai with dreams and ambitions, bringing endless desires and vitality to the city. Under the planned economy, Shanghai closed its door to immigrants while sending millions of Shanghainese all over the country. This one-way migration policy reinforced the special identity awareness for the Shanghainese people. Whether physically in Shanghai or being relocated to other places to support the local development, they all felt proud—actually much prouder—of being a Shanghainese, because Shanghai contributed the greatest to the country, with one-eighth of its industrial output, one-sixth of its revenue, and one-quarter of its exports. Products of Shanghai were favored by people across the country for their great design and high quality. However, all these facts didn’t lead to the self-affirmation of the Shanghainese people who lost the tradition of openness, nor any positive impressions of the Shanghainese in the minds of people outside Shanghainese, who felt inferior in every way. For a long time, the first impression many Chinese people held towards Shanghai was that its products were adorable but its people were not, which somehow aggrieved and annoyed the Shanghainese. This was more or less due to the one-way migration policy imposed on Shanghai by the central government. The restriction on movement and immigration into Shanghai not only nourished the arrogance of the narrow-minded Shanghainese people, but also failed to change the backwardness of the places where Shanghainese have resettled. In addition, under a system that unilaterally drew on Shanghai’s financial contributions with limited returns, Shanghai was no longer a city of well-rounded development, neither were the lives of its people as glamorous as some Shanghainese boasted. Between 1945 and 1985, Shanghai turned in 350 billion CNY tax revenues to the central government, but only received 1 percent back, 3.5 billion CNY, for its infrastructure constructions. As one can imagine, this small amount of money which was allocated in a span of 36 years, meant nothing more than a drop in the bucket for a megacity with a population growth from 5 to 12 million in the same period. Therefore, it was no surprise that the landscapes of Shanghai had remained unchanged for 40 years.

3.3 The Spatial Strategy of a Global City In 1990s, Shanghai saw a rapid rise again. After a decade of economic stagnancy in the 1980s, the turning point finally came as the city rolled out the most ambitious redevelopment plan since its opening as a commercial port. With a clearly articulated goal to reclaim its status as an international economic, financial and trade center, Shanghai aspired to rank among the world’s most important global cities like New York, London and Tokyo, and re-emerge as a hub city with global economic influence by focusing on high-end services. For this goal, the story of Shanghai’s urban space

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should be thoroughly overwritten. In academic terms, the economic transformation should be supported by as well as be reflected in the spatial restructuring of cities.2 The decade of the 1990s is generally considered to be the “Golden Decade” for Shanghai, which witnessed the greatest change in the form and function of its urban space in the past 160 years since Shanghai was opened as a commercial port. Spaces that were familiar to the Shanghainese people, such as roof stoves where they filled thermo bottles with boiled water, cigarettes and paper stores (i.e., convenience stores) at the entrance of alleyways, grocery stores on street corners, among others, all disappeared with the large-scale demolition of old alleyways. Meanwhile, spaces unfamiliar to the Shanghainese people, such as elevated highway neighborhoods, supermarkets with parking lot, and open green spaces stretching for thousands of meters, have all been constructed over time in the process of urban regenerations. The fundamental principle of the new spatial strategy for the development of Shanghai was to shift from production-oriented to service-oriented, aiming to build a leading economic hub city at the national, Asia–Pacific regional and global levels. Compared to the industrialization period in the 1950s and 60s, Shanghai of today has fewer factories but more office buildings. The industrial spatial transformation consists of two inter-related processes. On the one hand, factories, warehouses, old-styled alleyways and government offices of the industrialization era under the planned economy system have made way for the headquarters economy as well as various service industries including finance, business, entertainment and others. Consequently, as can be seen, some of the old residential housings in Shanghai have been converted into world-class fashion and shopping centers such as Xintiandi, and the Bund has resurged as the financial street and a place for the luxury industry. On the other hand, office buildings, shops and residential buildings have seen the largest increase in urban spaces of renovated or newly-constructed, with a scale of several or even ten times increase, while factories enjoyed the least increase, only slightly more than doubled in twenty years. The transformation of Shanghai’s economic space from production-oriented to service-oriented has been quite impressive. While changes in building functions are physical, changes in space users are social. As three million residents displaced from the city center, the alleyway culture has also evolved into a new community culture so as to fit into the new forms of residential communities. Does this mean that the petty urbanite culture is declining? Once the much-criticized petty urbanites do disappear, it may cause quite some sighs of pity. Moreover, a large number of new Shanghainese started to move into the renewed city center, and a more demographically diverse population of white-collars began to work in the new office buildings. They have created a brand-new human landscape that is not only diverse in dress and hairstyles, but also in ideas, values and accents. In these office spaces, Shanghainese is not the working language; instead, Mandarin and English have taken its place, making Shanghainese a non-common language. Is this an unavoidable cost or proof of Shanghai’s globalization? There may be no onesize-fits-all solution to such phenomenon, but the stories behind the architectures are never just about construction and aesthetics, but also about culture and sociology. 2

[1].

Reference

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As China implements a development strategy to improve people’s livelihood and build a moderately well-off society during its more than three-decades’ reform, the spatial arrangements of architectures have shifted from pro-production to pro-living. The strategy aims to provide higher living standards to millions of ordinary urban families across the country. Consequently, the largest landscape in Chinese cities has become residential-area-oriented urban spaces with integrated shopping malls, public transportation networks and other public facilities. Shanghai’s housing area per capita had been below 4 m for a long time. This number, however, has increased from 5 to 18 m over the past three decades from 1985 to 2015.3 In addition, both home ownership rate and the rate of separate set of apartments have reached 80%, indicating an enormous and substantial improvement in terms of housing space. Many ordinary Shanghainese families no longer need to stay in cramped spaces, but the cost of the improvement is the good location. As a popular saying regarding this process of spatial relocation within the city goes, “residents within the inner ring speak English, those within the middle ring speak Mandarin, and those along the outer ring speak Shanghainese.” The successful implementation of the “housing for all” policy means citizens of Shanghai have accepted the spatialization of social stratification while enjoying the benefits of a substantial increase in living spaces. Furthermore, such high rates of home ownership and separate set of apartments have led to a number of socio-spatial consequences, including the full development of family-centered private space and its psychological pattern, and by contrast, the shrinking of public space and neighborhood interaction. Unfortunately, the proximity of residential spaces has failed in facilitating community participation under this spatial structure. People do need physical improvements of the environment, but accessible spatial scales are in greater needs to facilitate human encounters and interpersonal interactions. Closed urban expressways, gated communities, and plazas that have little interaction with the residential areas, among others, are all jeopardizing the social organic nature of urban space. Community revitalization can be only achieved in a community space that meets human needs and takes the element of people into consideration. Therefore, to restore or reshape social interactions of the environment is not only a spatial condition for community revitalization, but also the essence of environmental renewal.

Reference 1. Chen, X. (Ed.). (2009). Shanghai rising: State power and local transformations in a global megacity, Chapter 8. University of Minnesota Press.

3 Chapter 11 “Living Standards”, 11.3 “Basic Statistics of Urban Households”. Shanghai Statistical Yearbook 2015. http://tjj.sh.gov.cn/tjnj/nje15.htm?d1=2015tjnje/E1103.htm. Accessed on April 6, 2021.

Chapter 4

The Spatial Narration of Shanghai’s Inner-City Regeneration

Focusing on the historical logic of Shanghai’s rise from the perspective of its spatial characters, Chap. 3 reviewed Shanghai’s history since its opening as a treaty port until the reform and opening-up era. This Chapter, moving on to the 1980s, will continue to shed light on the spatial strategy for the inner-city renewal in Shanghai. For the last three decades, most Chinese and foreign literature tend to discuss Shanghai’s urban renewal within Lefebvre’s theoretical perspective—the production of space. Major arguments include state-led pattern of space production, as well as the attempt to define the production of space by concepts of neo-liberalism, gentrification, and consumerism, among others. These arguments have reflected much of the truth, and concluded the Chinese characteristics of the Shanghai experience. A certain judgment, however, is embedded in them, that it is the state and real estate developers that have gained most in this state-led, marketized urban renovation, instead of the public, who were even sacrificed to move out of the city center so as to give way to urbanization and gentrification.1 These arguments are indeed insightful, in that they have conceptualized the Shanghai experience by introducing concepts such as the production of space, gentrification and so forth, together with cutting-edge academic analysis into Shanghai studies. The insight also lies in that they have touched upon the core of the Chinese experience: the state-and-government-led mode. However, if well-developed western concepts are imposed on the Shanghai experience, one would inevitably be bound by concepts and ignore facts. Speaking of the Shanghai experience, two aspects were not elaborated in most discussions or often ignored. On the one hand, analysis on the production of space shall be conducted under a local context, since local knowledge and practices are essential to understand the urban regeneration in Shanghai as a process of the production of space. On the other hand, when commenting on regeneration strategies and goals, most discussions are confined to marketization and gentrification, without or seldom mentioning the goals of improving people’s 1

He [1]; He and Wu [2].

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livelihood. They see market as the sole driving force in the process of regeneration, which is obviously biased. Two major impetuses can be found behind the urban regeneration of Shanghai: (i) the national strategy to build Shanghai into a global center, and (ii) the ideology of the ruling party to improve people’s livelihood. This is not propaganda, but is determined by China’s national conditions. The Communist Party of China (CPC), core of the leadership, could never have had shouldered off its responsibility to serve the people. The purpose of urban renewal to improve people’s living conditions is a part of CPC’s political legitimacy, and hence is well planned and implemented. Shanghai’s dramatic change is aimed to build not only a highly cosmopolitan city, but also a livable one. Under the theme of the production of space, this Chapter would discuss topics including the evolution of the city, changes in concepts, innovations in systems and renovation modes, among others.

4.1 Urban Renovation in the 1980s: Experiment and Endeavor Within the Public System Shanghai’s urban regeneration kicked off in the 1980s, and during that time the strategy of urban development was to transform Shanghai from the nation’s industrial center into its economic center, with the aim to restore Shanghai’s prestigious status in history as a national and international hub of finance and trades. However, the concept of the production of space was neither articulated nor realized in the 1980s for a number of reasons. From the macro perspective, since the strategic focus of the national reform in this period was not in Shanghai and Shanghai’s urban regeneration did not become part of the national strategy, regeneration forces and resources were confined in the local level and within the old institutional frame. Therefore, despite great efforts, Shanghai’s urban regeneration didn’t take shape. More importantly, land resources, on which the production of space relied, were not yet regarded as a commodity, making it difficult to achieve large-scale spatial rearrangement or develop the self-conscious concept of space production. In his book The Production of Space, Henri Lefebvre listed two types of production of space, the production of symbolic space that embodies political legitimacy and cultural tradition, and the production of functional space that meets the needs of specific modes of economic production and life styles.2 Examples of the first type include Haussmann’s renovation of Paris in the nineteenth century as well as the closure and reconstruction of the racecourse in Shanghai. As David Harvey commented on the renovation of Paris, “the more permanent monumentality that accompanied the reconstruction of the urban fabric (the design of spaces and perspectives to focus on significant symbols of imperial power) helped support the legitimacy of the new regime.”3 As for the closure of the racecourse, I once wrote, “the center 2 3

Lefebvre [3]. Harvey [4].

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of the socialist city of Shanghai certainly could not accommodate the racecourse, which represented the colonial culture and concessional lifestyle. Therefore, the abandonment of the racecourse, along with its transformation into People’s Square and People’s Park, with the former to assemble and mobilize people for political movements and the latter to serve workers for recreational purposes, inevitably indicated the politics of space.”4 Examples of the second type can be illustrated by the development of industrial areas and workers’ residential quarters in Shanghai after 1949, which could be categorized as socialist industrial space.5 The two aspects of the production of space are far from equal, instead, according to Lefebvre, the politics of space more or less determines the economics of space. The change of Nanjing Road in Shanghai after 1949 provided a good example. In their studies, Zhen Yang and Miao Xu analyzed how Nanjing Road was transformed from the old metropolis infested by foreign adventurers into a main avenue, under the ideology of “fostering proletarian ideology and eliminating bourgeois one” and the idea to serve the working class.6 The case of Nanjing Road has shown that, the revolutionary ideology, by its nature, was to discard luxuries and ignore consumptions. The proletarian aesthetic standards in essence meant simplification and even over-simplification of aesthetics. Under China’s strategy of replacing consumption-oriented cities with productionoriented ones, the concept of production of urban space was primarily functional. Only landscapes with no decoration, ornamentation or visual effects were regarded as politically correct, except for memorial buildings and spaces, and thus such a strategy would never lead to a positive awareness of space production in terms of landscapes. Moreover, a fully self-conscious concept of space production, one aligned with commercialism and consumerism to achieve social status distinction and reproduction, is fundamentally incompatible with the socialist ideas of equality and justice. As Harvey said, “the accumulation of capital has always been a profoundly geographical affair.”7 In other words, only when land becomes an element of capital circulation, can there be geographic expansion and spatial rearrangement to the fullest extent. Although capital management and leveraging were already seen in China in the 1980s, land was not yet regarded as an element of capital circulation. All urban land was owned by the state and was not a commodity, hence its value and significance as a primary factor of production was not uncovered. As a result, the production of space, directly linked to agrarian relations, was partially understood as productions of residential buildings, roads or various kinds of other physical environments, instead of an integrated concept that incorporates the use of land, quality of space,

4

Yu, H. and Zou, H. (October 2009). “Stories of Space in Shanghai: From the Mao’s Era to the Deng’s Era (shang hai de kong jian gu shi: cong mao ze dong shi dai dao deng xiao ping shi dai)”, Green Leaf (lv ye), 2009(10). 5 See Wang, X. (2008). “Under the Sky of Shanghai (shang hai tian kong xia)”, Xinmin Weekly, 2008(11). 6 Yang and Xu [5]. 7 Harvey [6].

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conscious management of space to achieve both symbolic and commercial values, among others. Without considering capital accumulation, the production of space of the urban regeneration in the 1980s were far from a gentrification process in the sense of neoliberalism, but a practice that maximized the advantages of the planning system and the work unit system, which made great achievements in the production of residential spaces. Improving housing conditions was the top priority for urban regeneration in the 1980s. Official statistics in 1985 showed that one fourth of the total households in the urban area of Shanghai, 470,000 families, were in dire need of housing improvement, with the average living space per capita below 4 m2 . 52% of the total households in Shanghai, 880,000 households, suffered from housing shortage, twice of the national average level of 26%. “Housing difficulty has become the most serious and sensitive issue in Shanghai.”8 Therefore, solving housing problem was listed as the government’s project to improve people’s wellbeing. The problem was solved by a combination of renovation and construction at the same time, with municipal and district governmental bodies as the major force, funded by their revenues. Renovation was carried out in shantytowns, and residents were to move back when the work was finished.9 Newly developed residential areas were constructed outside the city center, such as Quyang in Hongkou District, Zhongyuan in Yangpu District, Tianlin in Xuhui District, and others. As the state was no longer able to undertake the entire task of housing construction in the 1980s, China started to implement a policy that allowed housing construction by the joint efforts of work-units and the state. Therefore, the above-mentioned new residential quarters were built either by the government or by the work-units of the residents. In other words, during the urban housing renovation and construction in the 1980s, neither land nor housing was a commodity, and the major force was the state-ownership system instead of the market. The breakthrough came with the creation of a dominant model, in which work-units raised funds, built houses, and then allocated them to workers as part of their welfare. Thus, this was work-unit based welfare space, rather than gentrified consumption space. The percentage of investment in housing by different investors had changed dramatically between 1980 and 1990. While private companies and public institutions increased the number from 55% in 1980 to 85% in 1990, reaching an average of 75% per year, the number from the government revenues decreased from 45% in 1980 to 15% in 1990, with an average of 25% per year.10 Work-units became the major contributor to the urban housing development in the 1980s, but the concepts of land management and space management were still unknown to both government and work-units.

8 (1999). A General History of Shanghai (shang hai tong shi). Vol. 12. Shanghai People’s Publishing House (shang hai ren min chu ban she). p. 475. 9 See Xu [7]. 10 (1999). A General History of Shanghai (shang hai tong shi). Vol. 12. Shanghai People’s Publishing House (shang hai ren min chu ban she). p. 475.

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4.2 Shanghai in 1992: From Land Management to Space Management The urban regeneration witnessed a new breakthrough in the 1990s. At the macro level, building Shanghai into a global city had become the national strategy, and Shanghai ushered in the new era of joint development across the Huangpu River: the great development of Pudong (east side) and the great regeneration of Puxi (west side). It was then imperative to rearrange the space and invest in infrastructures, since the unchanged landscapes for 40 years, with poorly-maintained old downtown and outdated infrastructure, could no longer live up to the expectation of a metropolis. Efforts in 1980s had greatly ameliorated the housing conditions in Shanghai, and the average living space per capita increased to 6.6 m2 in 1990 from 4.5 m2 in 1980. The improvement, however, was still limited due to institutional and financial constraints. The overall situation of housing shortage was still in dire need of a fundamental solution and a real breakthrough. The milestone finally came in 1992, also regarded as the “Year of 1978” (i.e., Year of Reform) in the history of Shanghai’s urban renewal,11 with a number of significant events listed below. • Deng Xiaoping’s remarks during his inspection tour to Southern China announced the substantial kickoff of the development of Shanghai Pudong District. The joint development across the Huangpu River created a coupling effect between constructions of the new in the East and renovations of the old in the West under an unprecedented scale of urban planning, covering a total area of 500 km2 in Pudong and 360 km2 in Puxi. • The 14th Party Congress of CPC adopted the national strategy to establish Shanghai’s “leading position in the Yangtze Delta region as economic, financial and foreign trade center”. • The 6th Party Congress of CPC of Shanghai announced the renovation plan of 3650,000 m2 shanties in downtown area to be completed by the end of the twentieth century. • Shanghai Urban Construction, Investment and Development Corporation was founded, which invested in and built a number of large infrastructures in Shanghai in the 1990s, including the inner-ring elevated highway, south-north elevated highway, Metro Line 1, Yangpu Bridge, among others. • Foreign investment was first approved into the renovation of historical blocks in the No. 3 Plot of Xietu Subdistrict, Luwan District, setting the basic financing system during the massive urban renewal in the 1990s. • The successful rearrangement of Huaihai Road provided a new model for wholeblock downtown CBD renovations. • Large-scale infrastructure constructions in Shanghai started around the year 1992, including the building of Metro Line 1 (before 1992), the inner-ring elevated highway and Yangpu Bridge (in 1993), etc.

11

Just as 1978 was the first year of China’s reform, so was 1992, the first year of Shanghai’s growth.

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Looking back at Shanghai in 1992, to revive the city became the theme of the year. Land and housing system reforms introduced a state-led marketization mode to urban renewal, and the concept of production of space seemed ready to come out any time. From the challenging renovation within the public system in the 1980s to the large-scale urban renewal driven by the production of space in the 1990s, it was considered as another Golden Decade in Shanghai’s history of development. “City management”, that is, restoring the status of land as a commodity to manage land and space, became a dominant way of urban renewal. Transfer of land use rights with compensation and commercialization of residential houses became the most significant market forces and solved the shortage of funds that had long plagued urban renewal. Old built-up areas were gradually modernized block by block; market and globalization forces (such as brands, producer services, post-industrial urban landscapes, consumerist fashion, etc.) led by foreign investments were allowed to join the creation of urban spaces; suburbs were urbanized to receive the population influx of displaced residents due to urban regeneration; the urban space of Shanghai rapidly expanded and industrial spaces were rearranged to accommodate the trend of de-industrialization and gentrification of the downtown area. The reconstruction of spaces is a prerequisite for any change in industrial strategies. Studies show that Shanghai saw the biggest increase of buildings for office, residential and commercial purposes in the past two decades, with factories at the bottom of the ranking.12 As a matter of fact, the reconstruction and production of urban space is more than the ebb and flow of various buildings, but concerns all aspects of urban development and renewal. For instance, the metro system in Shanghai constitutes not only an underground transportation space woven in downtown area, but also a transportation net that extends to suburbs as the urban population migrates to outskirts. It was of great geographical significance as the city center of Shanghai has extended to an area of over 600 km2 within the outer-ring road from its original area of less than 100 km2 within Zhongshan Road. The scale and intensity of Shanghai’s renewal and development in the 1990s was rarely seen in its 150-year history since Shanghai was opened as a commercial port. 30 million m2 of old blocks, more than half of the built-up area of Shanghai in 1949, were torn down. Meanwhile, 100 million m2 of new residential houses, 2.5 times of the total residential areas of Shanghai in 1980, were built.13 We need to further understand the social geographical context behind these numbers. Large-scale demolition and construction became the dominant mode of urban renewal in the 1990s. As market values of land and space were consciously sought after, very few residents were able to move back to their original neighborhood in the relocation and resettlement project during this period. Large areas of historical blocks disappeared, and millions of residents were displaced mainly to other districts, the majority of whom moved to suburbs or urban fringe. This is an inevitable route of migration caused by transactions of differential land rent. Only in 12

Chen and Zhou [8]. Source: Shanghai Statistical Yearbook 2000; (1999). A General History of Shanghai, (shang hai tong shi). Vol. 12. Shanghai People’s Publishing House (shang hai ren min chu ban she). p. 491.

13

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this way could the multiple goals of business development, urban construction and housing improvement be achieved, as well as the financial balance between development and relocation. Former residents of the downtown area could no longer afford to continue living in downtown which was gradually taken over by corporate chain stores, high-end residences and new residents with compatible purchasing power. Therefore, displacement meant not only changes in places to live, but also in the demographics, and residential and living space, i.e., the production of the social space. Embedded in the production of space were the social differentiation and hierarchization of the quality of spaces. Changes in the social geography of residences reflected the spatial route of urban social mobility: the poor left the inner city to make way for the rich. Although good location in the inner city would cost a fortune, that value did not belong to the residents who used to live on the land. Ordinary people don’t have the concept of rights over the location or certain space, nor could they claim in legal discourse. Since the Shanghainese people had long lived in confined and cramped rooms, they were willing to sacrifice good location for larger living space. They had no other choice anyway. Space of good location means value for the government, but not for the relocated residents. Due to substantial improvement in living conditions, Shanghainese people did not resist relocation and resettlement arrangements without additional compensations for the good location of their original home. As blocks of old neighborhoods disappeared, so were the memories about the city, neighborhood traditions and historical features, all of which were overwhelmed by the excitement of moving into new apartments. It has been clear that in the 1990s people’s understanding of the value of space was limited to the value and differential value of land, while knowledge about the aesthetic, social and historical values of the buildings, neighborhoods and legends on the specific plot was far from sufficient. In short, the production of space was merely a “physical production” that ignored the historical and geographical textures, the value of collective memories of a city, and hence a production of capital appreciation. The pursuit of new spaces revealed a mindset, that is, craving for things big and foreign but disregarding the historical and environmental contexts of the city. The spirit of the 1990s was to achieve “big changes” in old districts and infrastructure. Consequently, to discard the old and introduce the new became the mindset of the time. High-rises were to be built on flat ground, hence on the agricultural fields of Pudong stood out a metropolis. Old and low buildings were to be torn down and replaced with skyscrapers and western-style buildings. The worship for foreign things indicated the vision of the officials in charge of urban renewal in the 1990s. For instance, the goal for the Huaihai Road renovation project was to provide an exotic shopping experience for the vast majority of Chinese people, 95%, who had never been abroad,14 and to build a Ginza (of Japan) in Shanghai. Interestingly, those 14

According to an interview with the person in charge of the Huaihai Road renovation project. Here I would like to cite a few lines of what he said to help understand the ideas and aspirations of those working on urban renovation in the 1990s. “Huaihai Road was to provide services to 95% of the population, people who had no chance to go abroad. Our goal was to create a foreign, exotic place where people could enjoy the feeling of modernization without going abroad. (For the merchants,) you could refuse to sell to people who cannot afford, but don’t tell me that China should be the

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who were responsible for the project had never been to Tokyo before, but this did not hinder their great courage and vision. Despite their worship of foreign things, they did not place blind faith in them. To transform the old city into a new one became a consensus of all administrators, constructors and citizens of that time. Large-scale demolition and construction reflected the mainstream social sentiment of the 1990s, i.e., to transform Shanghai in their hands from a beauty in her old age into an elegant lady in her prime that would be comparable to Tokyo and New York. No wonder said the then Mayor of Shanghai, “how amazing it is that Shanghai witnesses changes every year and transformation every three years!”15 Most revolutionary changes in the urban space of Shanghai took place in the 1990s. I can still vividly recall how a local media reported in high spirits on the disappearance of the last pebble pedestrian road in Shanghai. It reminded me of the construction of the Ring Boulevard (Ringstrasse) in Vienna in the 1860s when the liberals started to take power in Austria. After their accession to power, they rebuilt Vienna according to the values of the middle class in no time, and the Ringstrasse was the flagship program of the urban reconstruction. “Thanks to its stylistic homogeneity and scale, ‘Ringstrasse Vienna’ has become a concept to Austrians, a way of summoning to mind the characteristics of an era equivalent to the notion ‘Victorian’ to Englishmen, ‘Gründerzeit’ to Germans, or ‘Second Empire’ to the French.”16 It is not easy to judge if the renovation of Huaihai Road would be recorded in history like the Ringstrasse Vienna, but we do see the same courage and aspirations from those who designed the renovation plan of Huaihai Road. While we criticize large-scale demolitions and constructions in the 1990s, we should not neglect the theme and sentiment of the time, nor underestimate the longrepressed creativity of the administrators and constructors as well as their earnest hard work in order to accomplish momentous undertakings. Although the great ambition and momentous undertakings of that time could hardly surpass the vision of the western modernism and cosmopolitanism, after all, they were the very vision and outlook of that time.

way as it was in the past. And for people who have no money, you don’t need to buy anything, but you have the right to go around and take a look. You also have the right to take the escalator and elevator, going up and down, and no one could stop you. Without these regenerations, 95% of us would have not known the existence of such a business model in the world. At that time, we didn’t even have a supermarket. We only had counters to sell products, no open shelves at all. We made the change in this context. When I was little, my parents took me to take the escalator, of which I had deep impression. I believe the new generation of children has the same need. If you could take an escalator as you like and free of charge, how could the general public not applaud for that?”. 15 Quoted from an interview with the founder of Shanghai Tianzifang. Another sentence followed, “how amazing it is that Stockholm stays unchanged for a hundred years!”. 16 Schorske [9].

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4.3 The Demonstration and Transcendence of Xintiandi: From the Management of Historical Space to the Creation of Humanistic and Social Space Urban renewal ushered in its new round of historical blocks renovations in the twentyfirst century in a more surging and intricate fashion, targeting the 20 million m2 of substandard houses in downtown which outlived their service time. The underlying principle of urban renewal has shifted from the single solution of large-scale demolition and construction in the 1990s to a combination of demolition, transformation and preservation. The biggest change, though not the most widely seen, was that the concepts of urban preservation and preservation-based development were put into practice, received positive feedback and became a new mode of urban renewal. If we agree that space had become a concept and resource in urban renewal in the 1990s, it was still a concept of quasi-capital which lacked historical bearings, collective memories or community structure. Now Xintiandi, Tianzifang and other preservation-based regeneration projects contributed with these missing components, and hence provided new options for the renewal of historical blocks and created new spatial stories. Both Xintiandi and Tianzifang are located in neighborhoods with houses in deteriorating conditions. According to the urban redevelopment policy, these neighborhoods were not required to be strictly preserved. Numerous neighborhoods of this kind were dismantled in the large-scale renovation process in the 1990s, when people only saw the value of locations in downtown, but not the historical value of the location. In the name of Old Shanghai nostalgia, Xintiandi has shifted the core value of production of space from land management in the 1990s to a comprehensive management style that features the city’s history, culture and collective memories, as well as the production of spatial narration. More importantly, as a business development project in the name of preservation, Xintiandi has substantially sparked off the social awakening and the rising of the awareness for preservation, and practically affected the direction of urban renewal. This has been the true value of Xintiandi. I am not the first one to define Xintiandi as a commercial development project instead of a preservation project of historical blocks, but I firmly agree with this point. To be more precise, Xintiandi is referred to as a so-called preserved historical site, which in essence is created for a wider commercial space rather than for the city of Shanghai. Whether Vincent Lo, founder and CEO of Shui On Group, is genuinely fond of Shanghai Shikumen (stone gate building) or not, he spared no money to create a Xintiandi, which turned out to be a kickoff of his comprehensive regeneration project of the Taipingqiao area. The revenue of Xintiandi later became the source of his following investments in Shanghai. This is a brilliant market mode with a perfect combination of business and history. Instead of refilling money, preservation actually makes money, as is sharply seen through by every mayor who visited Xintiandi. When the officials are willing to modernize the city through preservation-based development, the mode set by Xintiandi might be more persuasive than a hundred of

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experts like Ruan Yisan17 in promoting the preservation of historical buildings and features of the city among decision makers. Critiques of Xintiandi for making profit in the name of preservation are hardly to the point, as Xintiandi has never raised the flag of preservation since the very beginning. Today Xintiandi is well-deserved for all kinds of praises for being an example of preservation. The Public Relations Department of Xintiandi imparts the “pilgrims” around the world on how they use the original bricks and tiles to maintain the historical look of the buildings, as well as how they inject expensive moisture-proof agent imported from Germany into the old Shikumen walls. Although it was not their aim to protect the tens of millions of square meters Shikumen buildings in Shanghai by making an open experiment to be replicated in other places, but only to construct a story of restoration, they are not telling lies, as they do have done these things earnestly and honestly without any slack. Indeed, they spend money to make sure the visitors “see” the original Shikumen with their eyes and readers of the Xintiandi stories “believe in” the originality. These stories have been told to tens of foreign state leaders, and hundreds of Chinese provincial and municipal leaders. The guides would never forget to tell about the moisture-proof agent, the original bricks and tiles, as well as the mosaic floor board in the living room of Xintiandi No. 1 Club. Without these original materials and the sincerity to preserve the originality, how could it be called the legend of Shikumen? Strictly speaking, Xintiandi is a delusional reality. Consumers, however, do not bother to think about it, as they see the reality with their own eyes or they are willing to believe that this is the original Shikumen neighborhood. They believe in the stories and come for various reasons, some for curiosity, and some for nostalgia. In short, Xintiandi’s commercial success by means of Shikumen demonstrated its accomplishment by telling the imaginations of the old Shanghai and stories of Shikumen. The case of Xintiandi also proved the insight of the following observation: “a place is neither good nor bad simply because it is ‘real’ rather than ‘surrogate’ or ‘authentic’ rather than ‘pastiche’—people enjoy both elements, or perhaps, this co-existence does not inevitably impair their experience.”18 More importantly, Xintiandi’s contribution to the features of old Shanghai is not preservation as it claims, but creation. Xintiandi has created the most delicate Shikumen in the history of Shanghai, not only for it cleared off the crowdedness and shabbiness of daily life, but also for it filled fashion elements into the historical form of Shikumen. Shikumen has never been a symbol of Shanghai’s prosperity, nor a sign of “the Oriental Paris” which is often represented by garden villas, expensive apartments and the world architectures exhibition on the bund. Using the legend of Xintiandi’s Shikumen to rebuild Shanghai’s concessional culture and the imagination of its prosperity is a new yet doubtful narration. As Ren Xuefei put it, “the history of Shikumen as dwellings for lower-middle-class tenants through the twentieth century is being carefully erased”.19 But this “imagined” Shikumen did 17

Ruan Yisan, Professor, School of Architecture and Urban Planning, Tongji University, expert in historical and culture heritage preservations. 18 Yang and Xu [5, p. 85]. 19 Ren [10].

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have aroused the urban dwellers’ memories and re-evaluation of Shikumen—a place where we once wished to escape eagerly were actually so nice, and so touching! It evokes our memories of childhood and life in Shikumen, as well as our relationship with the most trivial but provocative life in Shikumen. Our collective memories of Shikumen started from Xintiandi. Last but not least, the commercial success of Xintiandi in the name of preservation has also led to a social trend of concerns for the preservation-based renewal of historical blocks. A number of rules and regulations on urban preservation have been issued one after another, targeting individual buildings first and then to entire areas with historical features. Besides, a great number of similar projects were seen across the country. Commercialism is not the only path for Xintiandi, in other words, commercialized “preservation” can also bring in uncommercialized preservation of culture and life. As repeated critiques point to Xintiandi for not making honest preservations, it actually has inflamed social appeal for authentic preservations. Even if this is not the intention of Xintiandi, it became its real contribution to the new trend and style of urban renovation. The demonstration of Xintiandi has aroused changes in the social atmosphere. Among the decision-makers and implementers of the urban renewal policy, more and more began to take side on preservation-based development. As a result, those who advocate preservation won an advantage over the Tianzifang project, and they even abolished the completed detailed plan of demolition and development. The same group of officials, who used to argue for large-scale demolition and construction, now turned to support preservation-based development. Was this contradictory? Considering the urban renewal history of the past three decades, it was not contradictory at all. The world of the Shanghainese people could be as wide as People’s Square, and as narrow as a lane. It was the collective mindset of the Shanghainese in the 1980s and 1990s to long for a separate apartment, spacious and large rooms, as well as plenty of greens. Therefore, people were desirous and affirmative of the large-scale modernization of urban space since the 1990s. Officials in charge of urban renewal were faced with pressures of people’s craving for separate apartments, crumbling Shikumen buildings due to crowdedness and over exploitation, and the sanitation challenge from millions of close stools. How could one imagine the charm of Shikumen under such a scenario? In the minds of residents who had been plagued by abominable living conditions and officials who were encouraged by the prospect of a brand-new look of the city, would it be possible for them to discover the value of Shikumen? At the time when the great modernization of Shanghai was still very much in the ascendant, there was no climate for Shanghai nostalgia, nor the mood or awareness for nostalgia. As Mayor Han Zheng noted in 2004, “just as exploitation and construction are regarded as development, so are renovation and preservation. Now it is time to talk about preservation.” This statement could also apply to the case of the Ringstrasse. Camillo Sitte criticized the Ringstrasse for its negligence of people’s daily needs and betrayal of the tradition to the exigencies of modern life. But “the impact of Sitte’s communitarian vision of re-humanized urban space had to await a more general aversion to megalopolis than

64

4 The Spatial Narration of Shanghai’s Inner-City Regeneration

prewar Austrian society would produce”.20 Now here came the scenarios that were to bring in changes in feelings, views, aspirations and policies in Shanghai. The disappearance of millions of square meters of substandard houses was one, and the landscape shock and commercial success of Xintiandi, Tianzifang and other projects was another. Although not all Shanghainese became nostalgic, an atmosphere compatible with the preservation of urban contexts did start to emerge. Consequently, Ruan Yisan became much busier and more popular than ever. Stories of urban space are to be continued, just as the knowledge and feelings about spaces of the city continue to evolve. The concept of space production is already well-known to the government officials who can now skillfully employ the concept in newly developed projects. A latest case is Si’nan Mansions, which is not intended to find good buyers for the restored antiques, but to restore and extend the historical space and features. The Mayor wished to create a public space instead of a real estate project serving for a small number of privileged people. However, the Hotel Massenet with its room rate of several ten thousand RMB per night, could only be assessable by high-end clients, not common people. The hotel door only opens for its guests, and this fact provides us with a symbol and clue to understand that commercialist reconstruction of historical spaces has divided the real world to a certain extend but in the meantime upheld historical contexts. “Consumerism, furthermore, not only re-organizes the social spaces of the city; but also divides the people active in these spaces into different groups.”21 According to Bao Yaming, people with no purchasing power are usually marginalized from the city center both psychologically and geographically. Let’s take a review of the mode of space production represented by Xintiandi. The route of renewal for urban development is upgraded from tearing down built-up areas by only focusing on the value of land to preserving and reactivating these areas by realizing its own value. However, without any breakthrough from the commercialorientated urban development, the neighborhoods that have preserved historical and cultural values might still fail to attract residents or cater to the daily needs of the residents, hence lack the value of social life, as well as the vigor and vitality of history and culture. Finally comes the ultimate question, that is, whether preservation merely means to preserve bricks, historical memories and records. Buildings that need to be demolished will be torn down anyway, and at the end of the day we would inevitably ask ourselves, what are we sorry for or what should we cherish? What kind of destruction is the most unbearable loss? The answers to those questions lie in the joys and sorrows, reunion and departure, psychological feelings, and witnesses of lives when we were living in Shikumen; the various inter-personal contacts, interactions and flow of neighborliness within the layout and scale of Shikumen, which makes us feel lost when we are no longer to experience these annoying personal contacts of different sentiments; and the socialization agent and mechanism that Shikumen once offered us to learn about the human nature and develop our personalities in a 20 21

Schorske [9]. Bao [11].

References

65

world of acquaintances. Although houses today provide us with physical comfort and convenience, the human and social scales have disappeared forever, which we truly solace and with which we condole after the destruction of Shikumen. When we rebuild our community today, we shall not only build a world of bricks, but also rebuild the neighborhood structure, social connections and human care we once had in Shikumen neighborhood through the arrangement of new spaces. Only in this way are we still able to keep a thread of the context and flavor of Shikumen, even if we have to tear down those poorly-managed Shikumen buildings. It is the human and social space that needs to be created and maintained in the process of urban renewal.

References 1. He, S. (2007). State-sponsored gentrification under market transition: The case of Shanghai. Urban Affairs Review, 43(2), 171–198. 2. He, S., & Wu, F. (2009). China’s emerging neoliberal urbanism: Perspectives from Urban redevelopment. Antipode, 41(2), 282–304. 3. Lefebvre, H. (1991). The production of space (pp. 31, 39). Blackwell. 4. Harvey, D. (2003). Paris, capital of modernity (p. 205). Routledge. 5. Yang, Z., & Xu, M. (2009). Evolution, public use and design of central pedestrian districts in large Chinese cities: A case study of Nanjing road, Shanghai. Urban Design International, 14, 84–98. 6. Harvey, D. (2000). Spaces of hope (p. 23). Edinburgh University Press. 7. Xu, M. (2004). City contexts: A new Interpretation on the development mode of the historical city centre in Shanghai (cheng shi de wen mai: shang hai Zhong xin cheng jiu qu fa zhan fang shi xin lun), Chapter 4. Xue Lin Publishing House (xue lin chu ban she). 8. Chen, X., & Zhou, Z. (2009). Shanghai rising: State power and local transformations in a global megacity (p. 198). University of Minnesota Press. 9. Schorske, C. (1980). The Ringstrasse, its critics, and the birth of urban modernism. Fin-deSiècle Vienna: Politics and culture (pp. 25–115). Vintage. 10. Ren, X. (2008). Forward to the past: Historical preservation in globalizing Shanghai. City and Community, 7(1), 23. 11. Bao, Y. (2008). Shanghai weekly: Globalization, consumerism, and shanghai popular culture. Inter-Asia Cultural Studies, 9(4), 564.

Chapter 5

Business Streets in Shanghai: Past and Present

This chapter, as well as the following three chapters, will focus on a case study of Tianzifang, with Minxing Business Street in this chapter as a comparative case. The Tianzifang spatial practice has successfully transformed a dilapidated neighborhood into a world-class cultural and creative industrial park by adopting a completely different space production mode from the mainstream ones. Such success was achieved through communal entrepreneurship based on community context without major capital involvements or large-scale displacement. Its value lies in that it has seriously questioned the leading urban regeneration mode by voices within the government, and has genuinely implemented a new mode of inclusive transformation aiming at a better balance between urban cultural contexts, creative industries, resident interests and social justice. Therefore, Tianzifang serves as a perfect fieldwork case for thick description on the theme of this book, social space. Our story begins with the history of business streets in Shanghai.

5.1 The Past and Present of Business Streets in Shanghai As a city “built on the harbor”, Shanghai gained its prosperity due to two major factors—its geographical location and business activities. According to Rhoads Murphey, in the development of Shanghai, geographic logic has played a stronger role than any political argument, just as its trading and commercial functions have been even more important than its industrial development.1 However, the business activities as mentioned by Murphey only refer to inter-port and international trades but doesn’t count retail businesses in the city. Indeed, modern Shanghai started to thrive through business, yet it would be insufficient to conclude that business is the driving force behind Shanghai’s development if community business is not included. 1

Murphey [1].

© Tongji University Press 2023 H. Yu and H. Zou, Shanghai Narrative, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-3261-0_5

67

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5 Business Streets in Shanghai: Past and Present

Shanghai’s population grew from 200,000 at the time of its opening as a treaty port to 5 million a century later. Murphey brilliantly attributed the growth to the huge demand for labor created by the industrial boom, and hence identified population size as the key to Shanghai’s rise. Nevertheless, without the co-development of the city’s retail businesses, millions of migrants could have never been able to settle down in Shanghai, nor could the city center have been sprawling in all directions. It is not necessary for Murphey to take every aspect into consideration, but it is certain that the relationship between migrant settlement and urban growth can be understood through the lens of community business streets. Mu Xin once commented on the aforementioned relationship in the rise of Shanghai. “Indeed, Shanghai has developed a systematic and organic relation between industrial production and market consumption. Besides, millions of people flooded into the city from all over the country, many of whom were affluent and outstanding talents aiming for remarkable achievements, or bold and daring middle-class seeking for success, or small-propertied and non-propertied activists energetically gnashing their teeth and striving for development. Groundbreaking or ribbon-cutting ceremonies were held one after another in new factories, shops, hotels, restaurants, amusement parks, mansions, apartments and villas that were competing for a higher level of modernity and magnificence.”2 Mu Xin tried to discuss the dynamism of millions of migrants from the perspective of an organic relationship between industrial production and market consumption, which explained the rapidly changing landscape of constructions on one side and ribbon-cutting ceremonies on the other. By this, he has offered his insights on how the city’s business promoted urban growth. Speaking of Shanghai’s rapid rise, one’s first impression has always been the dazzling prosperity of its streets and markets. However, the Bund has been under the operation of Chinese and foreign bank tycoons or gurus of the stock exchange market; what really keeps Shanghai, China’s largest migrant city, running are the retail shops embedded in streets all over the city and the ordinary Shanghainese people living in the lanes and alleys. Hanchao Lu provided a precise and genuine account of this in his book Beyond the Neon Lights.

5.1.1 Alleyway Neighborhood Business in Hanchao Lu’s Book Beyond the Neon Lights As indicated in the title Beyond the Neon Lights, Hanchao Lu chose alleyway neighborhood (lilong) instead of Nanjing Road to illustrate Shanghai’s commercial culture because “commerce was not limited to just the city’s commercial districts but rather was an everyday matter ……It was in the extraordinary mixture of residence and commerce that a vibrant commercial culture was born”.3 This arrangement was made mainly because most of residential activities were limited to a few blocks near people’s homes. “Almost all daily needs could be met within walking distance”, and 2 3

Mu [2]. Lu [3].

5.1 The Past and Present of Business Streets in Shanghai

69

Fig. 5.1 The business layout of middle Fuxing road in Shanghai in 1947. Source The guide to all kinds of businesses in Old Shanghai

this convenience of daily life was possible because “living quarters of shopkeepers in the neighborhood served as workplace too… To many residents the few blocks around their homes were what the ‘city’ meant to them”.4 The mixture of business and residential functions has been a norm for alleyway neighborhoods, with shops spreading out along the streets and embedded in various lanes, such as the so-called alleyway hotels and bath-houses. In fact, there are more than just shops. Any kind of institution could have a presence in alleyway neighborhoods, including alleyway factory, alleyway school, and others. The Guide to All Kinds of Businesses in Old Shanghai drawn in 1947 clearly showed all sorts of community businesses based in an alleyway neighborhood. I spent more than a decade of my childhood in a building marked as the “Chinese Sanatorium” in the neighborhood of Fig. 5.1. A detailed description of the distribution of shops, schools, hospitals, churches, and factories along and within this alleyway neighborhood block can be found in Chap. 1. These businesses are so intertwined with community life and thus became an integral part of it. “News and gossip were circulated and spread among neighbors through casual chatting at alleyway corners, in daily morning shopping at a neighborhood 4

Ibid., pp. 14–15.

70

5 Business Streets in Shanghai: Past and Present

food market, in the ‘enjoying the cool’ summer-evening gatherings, or at the hot water service and snack store combination that could be found in most residential neighborhoods.”5 Neighborhood shops become not only places to buy things, but also places where neighbors encounter and interact, or nodes of social networks as Jane Jacobs described in The Death and Life of Great American Cities.6 Finally, for the migrant city of Shanghai, opening a neighborhood shop serves as both the first occupation for many newcomers to start their own businesses and earn a living, and the first home for them to settle down in Shanghai. Hanchao Lu also described this entrepreneurial story combining employment and residence, in which “a man (store owners were mostly men) managed to save or borrow enough money to rent a front unit in a lilong compound; he would then move his family into the second floor and turn the living room into a small store. As Shanghai’s population consisted mainly of migrants from other parts of the country, this living arrangement was obviously efficient: it simultaneously solved the problems of residence and employment.”7 The mixture of business and living in Shanghai’s community business streets reflects “the peasant’s home and farm rolled into one”,8 to which these migrants from the countryside were accustomed.

5.1.2 The Tradition of Community Business in Shanghai By focusing on Shanghai’s community business in Beyond the Neon Lights, Hanchao Lu not only complemented to Murphey’s work on port commerce, but also provided an original reflection on relationships between business and immigration as well as between business and community. Although the book is limited to the lanes and alleys of Shanghai in the early twentieth century, some of the insights on community business are also relevant for understanding the history of Shanghai’s business streets in the first century since its opening as a treaty port. As a city built on harbor, Shanghai’s development was mainly attributed to the opening of its port for trade and commerce, which led to an industrial boom and population growth, and thereby created the prosperity of Shanghai. It’s natural to conclude that commerce, industry and migration are the most important three factors to the prosperity, and here is an account of how they impact the community business. First of all, community business is a main form of entrepreneurship among migrants, not only because the migration wave brought business demands, but also because neighborhood shops could easily provide a place for newcomers to settle down in the city. Most neighborhood shops use downstairs for business purpose and 5

Ibid., p. 21. Jane Jacobs argued that stores to which neighbors are willing to leave their keys become the contact center of neighborhood where frequent social encounters take place. See Chap. 2, Jacobs [4]. 7 Lu [3, p. 244]. 8 Ibid., p.15. 6

5.1 The Past and Present of Business Streets in Shanghai

71

Fig. 5.2 A cigarette and paper store at the entrance of an alleyway in Shanghai

upstairs for residence, or have shops in the front and residences or workshops in the back. Many have only one storefront, including the most typical neighborhood shop—cigarette and paper stores that can be found in almost all alleys in Shanghai (Fig. 5.2). Even though these are in the lowest rank of tiny-scaled shops, the diligent work of the owners “has promoted the expansion of retail shops with the growth of urban areas in Shanghai, and hence has made indispensable contributions to the prosperity of modern Shanghai”.9 In this sense, mostly established by migrants, neighborhood shops serve as an enduring force driving the expansion and prosperity of the migrant city. Secondly, community business is most visible in but not limited to the continuous and enclosed business streets with storefronts along the street, but is also genuinely rooted in community contexts with shops scattered in residential neighborhoods. It features an integration of business and living, or in others words, there is no distinction between living and business. Hence, it has been a common practice to use residences for commercial purpose, which has led to a neighborhood business pattern of business on the ground floor and residence above, as well as a business tradition of alleyway shops and factories. According to Hanchao Lu, in the late 1940s, half of the hotels in Shanghai were located in alleyways.10 The community-contextbased business not only created a dense network of human interaction, but also shaped the personality of the Shanghainese petty urbanites. As Mu Xin described, 9

1999. Shanghai General History (shang hai tong shi), Vol. 4. Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Press (shang hai ren min chu ban she). p. 237. 10 Lu [3, p. 184].

72

5 Business Streets in Shanghai: Past and Present

Fig. 5.3 Billboards of foreign goods and neighborhood shops side by side on the street

“the Shanghainese people run out of all their ingenuity and intelligence in carefully weighing ‘worth or not’”,11 and this most well-known character of Shanghainese, shrewdness, was precisely shaped and developed in the strong business atmosphere of the alleyway neighborhood. Thirdly, although the alleyway life of ordinary urbanites was characterized as self-sufficient local community life, it was closely related with the cosmopolitanism of Shanghai. As China’s leading business center for domestic and foreign trades, Shanghai’s market was flooded with imported foreign goods. Even for the neighborhood cigarette and paper stores, which were most widely distributed in Shanghai and were at the bottom of the business hierarchy, their flourishment was also a result of selling “the so-called five imported goods—matches, oils, cigarettes, candles, and soaps”.12 The cosmopolitanism of Shanghai’s commerce was not only reflected in the glittering neon lights on Nanjing Road, but also written in the advertisement of the American cigarette brand Chesterfield (Fig. 5.3). Migrant entrepreneurship, integration of business and living, and cosmopolitanism of the community business, constitute the three main characteristics of Shanghai’s tradition of community business streets.

11

Mu [2, p. 129]. 1999. Shanghai General History (shang hai tong shi), Vol. 4. Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Press (shang hai ren min chu ban she). p. 237.

12

5.1 The Past and Present of Business Streets in Shanghai

73

5.1.3 The Socialist Reform of Shanghai’s Community Business The founding of People’s Republic of China (PRC) changed Shanghai’s business landscape. The socialist reform of business since the 1950s aimed at limiting private capital and entrepreneurship to achieve public ownership in the industrial and business sectors. Most private enterprises were first transformed into public–private ownership and then into state ownership, and thus commercial outlets were either closed or merged. Table 5.1 shows the shrinking trend of Shanghai business community from the 1950s to the late 1970s when the Reform and Opening-up policy was adopted. As a result of public ownership in Shanghai, larger-scale state-owned department stores, food stores, restaurants and hotels replaced the private ones. But two things remained unchanged. Firstly, the integration of small business and living in the alleyways, especially the integration of factories and dwellings, has not changed; most of the factories stood along Taikang Road Lane 210 still existed until the 1990s, as shown in Fig. 5.4 drawn in 1947. The radical revolution got rid of private entrepreneurship, and imported goods went down from the shelves. However, this did not change the social geography in community business. Secondly, the public ownership movement destroyed private enterprises, restaurants and hotels, but cigarette and paper stores, representing the tradition of grocery stores in Shanghai’s alleyways, survived the Cultural Revolution, which destroyed “the four old things”, namely old ideas, old culture, old habits, and old customs. In an economic system of nearly 100% public-ownership, the existence of private small business was inconceivable. The only reasonable explanation might be that cigarette and paper stores are rooted in the alleyway community. Even during the most radical revolutionary time, as they can bring convenience to residents, they were accepted and survived. This can help us understand why private small business could recover and develop so fast once economic development overtook radical revolution as the priority task. At core, small business rooted in community has a profound tradition in Shanghai. Table 5.1 The numbers of retail shops and restaurants in Shanghai from 1949 to 1978 Year

Number of retail shops and restaurants

The number owned per thousand people

1949

246,000

70.3

1957

129,900

20.5

1962

31,300

4.9

1978

14,900

2.1

Data sources 1999. Shanghai General History (shang hai tong shi), Vol. 12. Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Press (shang hai ren min chu ban she), p. 197

74

5 Business Streets in Shanghai: Past and Present

Fig. 5.4 The street map of Taikang road (drawn in 1947). Source The guide to all kinds of businesses in Old Shanghai

5.1.4 Reasons for the Rise of Non-public Ownership Business in the Market Economy Reform Since the Reform and Opening-up led by Deng Xiaoping in the 1980s, especially since the central government initiated the strategy to adopt market economy system, private enterprises, foreign merchants and foreign investments became accepted again and even encouraged after being banned for several decades. The dominant public ownership economy was converted into a mixed one. The change of ratios of different ownerships in the retail business of Shanghai since 1978 clearly shows that the public sector keeps shrinking and the non-public sector grows steadily (Table 5.2). By breaking down the data above, it is easy to conclude the following important changes: (1) The proportion of state-owned businesses shrank from 73% in 1978 to 5% in 2010; (2) In contrast, the proportion of private businesses has been rising steadily and its sales value increased from 0.35% in 1978 to 4.92% in 1988, all the way to 14.82% in 2008; (3) The public ownership dominance has been overturned by nonpublic ownership. In 1978, the first year of the reform, the total sales value of stateowned and collective-owned business accounted for 99.65% of the total, indicating an absolute dominance of public-ownership. In 2010, the total sales value of stateowned and collective-owned business only accounted for 6.67% of the total, while the total sales value of private-owned, individual and other non-public businesses took up 93.33% of the total.

5.1 The Past and Present of Business Streets in Shanghai

75

Table 5.2 Total retail sales of consumer goods (1978–2010) Year

By type of ownership State-owned

Collective-owned

Private-owned

Individual

Others

Total retail sales of consumer goods

1978

39.50

14.41

0.19

1979

46.47

21.32

0.20

1980

54.01

25.31

0.24

0.87

80.43

1981

56.57

30.28

0.04

0.29

1.55

88.73

1982

56.48

31.39

0.03

0.32

1.58

89.80

1983

63.17

34.55

0.02

0.70

2.24

100.68

1984

75.63

43.80

0.02

1.68

2.59

123.72

1985

102.59

59.49

0.18

6.42

4.71

173.39

1986

111.73

69.06

0.67

8.47

6.91

196.84

1987

123.05

80.38

0.88

11.46

9.48

225.25

1988

161.65

103.84

1.72

14.56

14.06

295.83

1989

176.07

119.97

1.76

16.16

17.42

331.38

1990

179.37

115.59

2.05

16.17

20.68

333.86

1991

200.25

135.30

2.72

18.70

25.09

382.06

1992

247.68

157.56

5.75

22.88

30.95

464.82

1993

250.97

202.05

0.51

41.45

180.94

675.92

1994

249.27

198.56

0.64

65.00

321.29

834.76

1995

247.10

193.03

0.86

76.44

533.54

1050.96

1996

238.54

183.50

30.10

92.64

713.22

1258.00

1997

225.35

173.85

21.83

114.88

899.47

1435.38

1998

210.92

161.70

59.48

126.94

1034.23

1593.27

1999

180.33

141.83

62.77

141.16

1196.24

1722.33

2000

150.09

118.26

496.86

153.57

946.50

1865.28

2001

135.69

105.9

596.21

172.66

1005.91

2016.37

2002

131.91

102.19

699.75

190.66

1079.38

2203.89

2003

133.36

102.68

803.74

208.45

1156.22

2404.45

2004

134.44

102.78

935.44

233.01

1251.24

2656.91

2005

157.98

51.63

814.31

443.31

1512.28

2979.50

2006

178.96

58.48

922.46

502.18

1713.12

3375.20

2007

205.37

67.11

1058.59

576.29

1 965.93

3873.30

2008

242.69

79.31

1250.98

681.03

2323.22

4577.23

2009

263.80

87.08

1438.99

776.37

2607.00

5173.24

2010

306.34

98.29

1739.44

927.42

2999.01

6070.50

Data Resource Shanghai Statistical Yearbook 2011

54.10 0.29

68.28

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5 Business Streets in Shanghai: Past and Present

Moreover, as the massive housing construction began in the 1980s, including municipal displacement housing and work-unit (dan wei) welfare housing, largescale residential areas were built up in places usually 5–11 km away from the city center. The newly-built areas have also witnessed a rapid development of business activities, which could be seen as a mode of urbanization-driven business development. This was the largest round of housing construction since the opening of Shanghai as a treaty port, mainly by enterprises. Therefore, this housing-driven urbanization is also known as work-unit-driven urbanization. Business streets developed in the process of housing construction are quite different from those renovated from those redeveloped during inner-city regenerations, as illustrated in the two cases of this chapter. Therefore, business estates in these newly expanded urban areas were initially owned by state-owned work-units and managed by state-owned companies. But as marketization deepened, various operational entities were introduced. After several rounds of sublease, the ratio of non-public ownership in the operation entities of the business estates gradually increased, until most neighborhood shops in these newly expanded urban areas were privatized. The number of private-owned enterprises is over four times more than that of public owned enterprises, as shown in the latest data of business development in Yinhang Sub-district, where Minxing business street, one of the two cases discussed in this chapter, is located. In particular, private ownership is close to five times of public ownership in wholesale and retail, 17 times in hotels and restaurant, and 40 times in service industries (Table 5.3). In addition, another key factor that has boosted the non-public sector of Shanghai business is the redevelopment of the city center since the 1990s. With the aim to build a global city, improve the city image, restore inner-city communities, redesign industrial spaces, develop high-end business services and improve local fiscal capacity, this massive inner-city restoration and regeneration has demolished 100 million square kilometers of old buildings in 20 years and has relocated 3 million residents, resulting in a new gentrified city center. In the process, old business streets for ordinary people disappeared along with the demolition of Shikumen, and were replaced by highend luxurious shopping malls and boutique stores. Some residential blocks were completely commercialized. For instance, Xintiandi developed by Hong Kong Shui On Land Ltd. and Sinan Mansions developed by Shanghai Yongye Group, are two most typical examples of converting living spaces into business areas, where the tradition of business-and-living integration has been transformed into a comprehensive business community full of shops. This change was certainly not a result of unregulated market transactions only. The “changing living into non-living” (“changing” for short) campaign in the alleyways of former foreign concessions was made through land leasing (like Xintiandi) or property right replacement (like Sinan Mansions), along with strong interventions from the visible hands of the local government. Such high-end business communities are mainly for famous domestic and international brands, therefore, most stores are private businesses. There is no doubt that main players of the inner-city gentrification, guided by the globalization strategy, are private capitals from home and abroad. Even though Tianzifang, one of the two cases in this chapter, is not a product of grand capital with alliance of power, it is still

64

Foreign investment

1913 128

41

0

1

40

68

0

10

58

Data Source Trade and Industry Bureau of Yangpu District (2013)

Total

23

15

90

300

Public-owned

875

15

150

710

186

6

10

170

96

3

11

82

Total Manufacturing Construction Transportation, Wholesale Residential Real warehousing and retail and Estate and postal catering office industry

Industry household

Private-owned 1549

Type

Table 5.3 The industrial structure of merchants in Yinhang sub-district

9

2

2

5

Information transmission, computer services and software

27

0

13

14

Science research, technology services and geological exploration

282

1

7

274

Residential Service industry and other service industries

33

3

16

14

Lease and business service

51

0

13

38

117

19

44

54

Culture, Others sport and culture industries

5.1 The Past and Present of Business Streets in Shanghai 77

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a result of business update of an entire community.13 Meanwhile, it is also accomplished by unregulated, spontaneous collective and private entrepreneurship, which again has contributed to the booming of non-public owned community businesses. Keep in mind that shop owners, whether in Xintiandi or in Tianzifang, are mostly immigrants, foreign or Chinese. Therefore, the three characteristics of the business tradition in Shanghai that we summarized before could also apply to Shanghai’s community business in the globalized context, namely immigrant entrepreneurship, integration of business and living, and cosmopolitanism of the community business. Certainly, although we still use the concept of “community context-based business” to analyze today’s community business streets, the context of the system and actors have been completely different, and shall be reflected in a new narration of a changing era and background. In particular, the gentrification of the inner city in the 1990s along with the massive displacement within the city, are neither irrelevant nor independent from the urbanization process led by Shanghai’s effort to build new towns; instead, there are many correlations. Besides mitigating housing difficulties for work unit employees, the massive construction of residential areas since the 1980s always had a function of accepting relocated residents affected by old town restoration and central area municipal construction projects. In theory, some residents might have been relocated to Yinhang sub-district due to the redevelopment of Xintiandi and Tianzifang. Therefore, the high-end commercialization in Xintiandi and Tianzifang is echoed with the rise of community business streets such as Minxing Street and other communities in new towns. This is also the reason for choosing Tianzifang and Minxing Street as two distinctive examples in this chapter: although they are different in terms of commercial activities, these two geographically separated streets with a distance of more than ten kilometers share some common origins in the mechanism of their formations. Moreover, the narration of how these two streets came into being could help develop new perspectives and paths to understand the regeneration and development of Shanghai in the past twenty years.

5.2 An Analysis of Old and New Versions of “Changing Living to Non-living” In this chapter, we chose Tianzifang business street in the inner city and Minxing Road business street in the newly built urban areas. In both cases, it is observed that the original residential houses were converted into business functions. In a word, prosperity was achieved through “changing living to non-living”. As analyzed in the first part, “changing”, to some degree, is not a new concept but rather a business tradition of Shanghai. The integration of business and living 13

At the same time, the “changing” was possible because of the local government tolerated the residents’ behaviors of rule-breaking. The second part of this chapter will discuss in detail on how this “changing” shaped Tianzifang business street and Minxing Road business street.

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in communities is a result of a gradual process of changing residential houses into stores. For a fast-growing migrant city like Shanghai, Shikumen naturally became the most favored neighborhood settlement due to the rapid increase of migrants. The cheap rent of housing in the alleyways not only attracted people of all walks of life, but also all sorts of business. This was the reason for “changing” in the old days of Shanghai, although no one used the contemporary term “changing living to non-living” at that time. More than half a century apart, the new and old versions of “changing living to non-living” had a fundamentally different driving force for this change. In the old days, market, in particular the real estate market, was the driving force. Therefore, there was no such thing called as “changing living to non-living”. People bought or rent houses to either live or do business at their own wishes. It was all right to either “change living to non-living” or vice versa. Consequently, there was nothing legal or illegal about “changing”. To understand the term “changing” which was legally approved and trialed among limited populations in the early 1980s, it is necessary to explain the socialist public housing system and its practice in Shanghai. Most alleyway houses in the city center of Shanghai went through the socialist reform towards industry and commerce (including real estate) in the 1950s, when houses were turned into state-owned housing and most residents had no ownership of the place they live in. According to Regulations on Public-owned Housing in Urban Areas of Shanghai, “changing living to non-living” and “changing public-owned houses and their affiliated facilities” had to get permission from the house owners, and in this case, they were state-owned property management companies who managed the houses on behalf of the government. During the market reform in the 1980s, self-employed people started to emerge, and an institutional arrangement to “change living to non-living” was made in order to provide self-employed opportunities to a certain group of people. During an interview, a former official who used to work in a district real estate bureau talked about the past and present of the “changing”: Opening stores in the alleys did not happen only in present days. There was a loose period at the early stage of the Reform and Opening-up. The policy was more focused on ‘person’ rather than ‘house’. There was no regulation to decide which houses could be transformed into stores, only a policy that allowed low-income families to apply for opening stores so as to make a living. Later, due to varied standards and difficulties in enforcement, this policy was suspended.14

Though the policy was suspended officially, there were still exceptions in practice. For various reasons, with the introduction of the market economy, the practice of “changing” never ends. People who did the “changing” mostly belong to the lower class. Their self-employment has eased the burden of the government in reality. Legal enforcement to ban this illegal practice would stir hostility from shop owners struggling for a living. Therefore, government officials had to take this into account and usually ended up with letting it be. The illegal practices of “changing” 14

Interview record 20101216Y, interview with a former official of Real Estate Bureau of Luwan District.

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on Minxing Road Business Street were eventually accepted as a de facto, mainly because the government leaned towards people’s livelihood in the dilemma between law enforcement and concerns of people’s livelihood. The “changing” in Tianzifang started as unauthorized individual behaviors. But with local government’s intentional tolerance and protection in order to continue the renewal experiment, the individual behavior quickly spread to the whole street, which then became a new landmark and was eventually legalized. In terms of the two cases of “changing” in this chapter, one is to give tactic consent to the de facto, and the other is to rectify an initially illegal behavior. In either situation, to discuss the merits of “changing”, we could not ignore the role of the government and discuss market only. The legitimacy of the usage change of public-and-private-owned houses came from the government instead of the market. There are both similarities and differences in the stories of how these two business streets—Tianzifang and Minxing Road—have started and developed, as well as in the forces behind their development. However, to explain these driving forces, local institutions and local contexts are indispensable key components, whether in the theoretical frameworks of globalization or urbanization. Among all, “changing living to non-living”, being a practice of local character and typical Shanghai style, is the best manifestation of the local government’s governance logics. The following two parts will look into the two cases of “changing” practices. Through the rising of the two business streets, we could see how business, which used to be the key driving force for Shanghai’s prosperity, interacts with today’s development of Shanghai.

5.3 Tianzifang: Communal Entrepreneurship Based on Community Contexts15 Located in the central old town of Shanghai, Tianzifang features a space texture that stretches along the inner edge of the alleyways, an architectural basis of abandoned factories and old style Shikumen houses, a space usage which integrates business and living, and a business focus on art and cultural industries, fine dining and fashion consumptions. In the 1990s, it was merely an ordinary alleyway in Shanghai, whereas now it has been one of the most famous business streets in Shanghai. The restoration of Tianzifang originates from the debate over two regeneration modes regarding the Taikang Road historical block in Shanghai: one is “the ASE mode”,16 a model 15

* Prof. Xiangming CHEN from Center for Urban and Global Studies, Trinity College, U.S. and Dr. Xiaohua ZHONG from Department of Sociology, Tongji University, China contributed to this part. 16 In 2003, the land where Tianzifang is located in was leased to Taiwan ASE Group for integrated business development. In 2007, Tianzifang Culture and Creative Park was preserved thanks to the resistance of several social parties. However, Shikumen at the frontage was demolished and developed into commercial office buildings, represented by the ASE business complex built in 2010.

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with massive demolition and construction supported by the cooperation of power and capital; the other one is “the Tianzifang mode”,17 a spontaneous community upgrade model which incorporates creativities from both community and administration. The difficult success of Tianzifang was made by “internal challenges to the dominant modes of urban regeneration within the government system, as well as earnest practices of new urban renovation mode that embraces and promotes urban contexts, creative industries, resident interests and social justice”.18 It is never easy to challenge the mainstream model. The conflict became even more acute because of the illegal status of “changing living to non-living”, when the creative experiment starting with abandoned factories developed into commercialization of the entire block as a result of unauthorized lease by alleyway residents. The final turning point came in 2009 when the Tianzifang experiment was justified by both district and municipal governments. The issuance of The Acceptance Process of Residential Housings in Tianzifang Area Temporarily Changing into Integrated Housings by Luwan District Government calmed down the debate on the illegal status of the change. Moreover, the communal entrepreneurship, which was secretly supported by a development team endorsed by lower-level government officials, changed its status from illegal to legal, and Tianzifang finally became a successful old town upgrade model with multiple and innovative significances. “Changing living to non-living”19 in the Tianzifang model therefore became a communal entrepreneurship experience based on Shikumen housing space and its community contexts, as compared to the urban governance model by the enterprising government.

17

In 1999, Tianzifang Creative Industrial Park started with the upgrade and reuse of former alleyway workshops by artists and other cultural industry practitioners. In 2003, the old Shikumen neighborhood as well as its alleyway workshops were included in the ASE project and were about to be demolished. With the insistence of the sub-district official Mr. Z, businessman who initiated the Tianzifang plan, Mr. W and many famous artists, the workshops were kept. In order to preserve the neighborhood with local culture, daily life and collective memories, following the advice of the development team, residents of the Shikumen buildings in the neighborhood started to rent their houses to merchants since 2004. Therefore, Tianzifang developed a gradual business upgrade model with the participation of both social elites and residents, and gradually became a city landmark equally famous as “Xintiandi”. In 2008, The District Government became involved in the management, legitimizing residents’ “changing” practices and working out a series of neighborhood protection and development plans. 18 Yu [5]. 19 “Changing living to non-living” means the owner changes the residential housing for nonresidential uses, such as office work, business, hotel, warehouse and even production and other management activities. If the change is not approved by the relevant government departments, it is an illegal “changing” case. Most “changing” cases in this chapter and in real life are illegal.

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5.3.1 Communal Entrepreneurship Based on Community Contexts The “ASE mode” has been the mainstream in Chinese cities since the 1990s, while the “Tianzifang mode” of old town upgrade with culture elites and grass-root residents as main players was rare not only in Shanghai, but across China as well, because urban development and restoration was “an economic development model led by power and capital, with the aim of land and space efficiency.”20 The wide acceptance of the slogan and strategy of “urban management”21,22 like an enterprise, was a result of such an economic development model. The model is aligned with the strategy and ideology of GDP-centralism, which has been guiding China’s development. More accurately, the model is a reflection and application of GDP-centralism in the urban regeneration process. Here are the main points: first, the government acts like an entrepreneur to run the city, aiming to maximize the space and land profit; and second, real estate developers become strategic partners of the government in the urban development, as shown in the ASE business project in the development of the Tianzifang neighborhood. The renewal of Tianzifang took an utterly opposite model. It was not driven by cooperation between government and business like Xintiandi, nor dominated by stateowned developers like Sinan Mansions. Instead, businesses in Tianzifang were operated in residential housing units leased from individual residents. It has no general plan, where all the opening and closure of shops happen through bargaining between hundreds of shop owners and hundreds of resident landlords. More than 500 out of the 671 households of Tianzifang have already rented their houses to merchants.23 Changing a whole neighborhood from residential area to business area has been the way of commercialization in central Shanghai, represented by Xintiandi and Sinan Mansions. However, it is rather uncommon to have the majority of neighborhood residents as landlords and engaged with direct and critical economic interests of the business street. This is even rare under the new modes of domination by stateowned enterprises or cooperation between government and business. Compared to the mainstream model, Tianzifang has obviously followed an alternative route of social spontaneity, where grass-root residents directly participate in the whole regeneration process and gain direct benefits from their participation. Therefore, we redefine the Tianzifang experiment as “communal entrepreneurship”.

20

Chen [6]. Zhao et al. [7]. 22 Zhang [8]. 23 Data Resource: Interview record in June 2012, with a former employee of Tianzifang Investment and Consulting Corporation, Mr. X, who was also the first in the neighborhood to rent his own house to merchants. 21

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The concept was originated from Western concepts such as social entrepreneurship,24 community-based enterprise25 and collective entrepreneurship.26 It is an entrepreneurship model based on public interests, depending on social capital, taking in community employment and promoting community development. All the characteristics mentioned above are reflected in the Tianzifang experiment. For example, it is small-scale private venture capital rather than big real estate capital that has played a leading role in boosting the community business; the entire Tianzifang neighborhood has been engaged in the communal entrepreneurship; and the business innovation in Tianzifang has revitalized a declining neighborhood and transformed it into the most energetic community in Shanghai. But the most Chinese characteristic in this case is that, the community business in Tianzifang started with illegal practices of “changing” by its residents, and individual “changing” practices soon spread to the entire street with the secret support and protection of the grassroots government that led the Tianzifang experiment. The entire street was attributed for commercialization, promoting cultural innovation, theme restaurants, fashion designs and the gathering of avant-garde shops. Therefore, the so-called “communal entrepreneurship” not only means the participation of the entire community residents, but also reflects the collective accomplishments of joint entrepreneurship by a diverse body of actors. Detailed illustration regarding respective contributions of these actors and mutual cooperation between them will be given later, but before that here we shall return to the fundamental meaning of “community contexts” for communal entrepreneurship. • Examining Community Contexts through Residents Who “Changed Living to Non-living” The illegal entrepreneurship (i.e., renting public-owned housing to earn high rental profits) initiated by indigenous residents sparked the “changing living to non-living” wave in the entire street. The residential area was then changed entirely into a business area (or an integrated community of business and living with a concentration on business). Most indigenous residents therefore changed from mere public-housing tenements to landlords of business community and thus became a stakeholder of the “community market”, or even one of the deciding powers in such a community market, a power that has accomplished a communal entrepreneurship. However, it is the same power that was to threaten and even destroy the Tianzifang business community in the end, which will be discussed later. • Examining Community Contexts through Government that Protected “Changing Living to Non-living” The street-scale illegal “changing” was only possible with the sub-district government’s tacit permission and shielding, which, strictly speaking, was illegal as well. However, in the competition of the two development modes of Tianzifang, the protection of the sub-district government was a strategic behavior for the existence of 24

Gordis [9]. Peredo and Chrisman [10]. 26 Cook and Plunkett [11]. 25

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Tianzifang experiment, aiming to expand the “SOHO mode” of urban regeneration from industrial zones to residential areas and convert residential areas into SOHOs. By this, a larger-scale business community was created, while in the meantime, residents who were never able to participate in the “old reforms” became the direct participants as well as allies of the development team. Moreover, the Tianzifang mode broke the power balance between entrepreneurial developments through government-business cooperation and community business developments through communal entrepreneurship. The disequilibrium indeed became the key-winning factor of Tianzifang communal entrepreneurship. With the higher-level government’s approval and involvement in the development of Tianzifang, the original authority of regulating the spontaneously developed community market, which was granted to the shield provider as a result of illegally defending the illegal “changing” practice, disappeared due to the legitimation of “changing”. This further led to the threatening of community contexts for communal entrepreneurship, which will be discussed later in details. • Examining Community Contexts through Shop Owners that Transformed the Space Landscape of “Changing Living to Non-living” Shop owners were the main enterprising entities in Tianzifang. Even though they agreed on leases with individual residents respectively and managed their own business, the attraction of Tianzifang does not rest on these individual shops. Instead, it comes from the new business environment that preserves rich histories of Shikumen alleyways through gradual “changing”, and the unique atmosphere that integrates living and business, nostalgia and fashion. The enterprising shop owners were first attracted by these characteristics and voluntarily conformed their own business to the entire street’s landscape, so they spontaneously engaged themselves in building up the “changing” environment of the whole neighborhood and in creating a symbolic space that preserves a unified style of the neighborhood. However, the regeneration by the artist entrepreneurs was so successful that Tianzifang became the most crowded and popular place in Shanghai: it was not only packed with customers and tourists, but also chased by fortune-seeking capitals and speculators, to the extent that genuinely creative shops and culture shops are now struggling to survive in Tianzifang—the so-called creative industrial park. This situation will be discussed in the end of this chapter.

5.3.2 The Story of Tianzifang Communal Entrepreneurship Based on Community Contexts Tianzifang was initiated by a group of entrepreneurial artists represented by Chen Yifei, by reusing abandoned alleyway neighborhood factories. When these artists successfully transformed the factories into the increasingly famous “Tianzifang”, it was threatened to be legally demolished due to the Taiwanese ASE renewal project,

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which was invited in by Luwan District Government and was approved by both municipal and district planning. From then on, the conflict on whether to keep Tianzifang or not became sharper and sharper. But now it was a game between the elites: a game between art elites supported by academic and political elites in the subdistrict government, and political elites from higher-level governments. However, when the “ASE Center”, a project designed by the higher-level government, encountered the “Tianzifang integrated community”, an unplanned experiment supported by the lower-level government, the winning party was almost secured within the institutions. Chen Yifei,27 who had built an extensive network with high-ranking government officials, became reluctant to stick to the fight against higher-level leaders for the fate of Tianzifang, even though he would try his best to protect Tianzifang along with other artists. Normally the victory of a competition between elites is determined by the ranks of elites. One key factor behind why Tianzifang survived eventually was the participation of grass-roots residents who accomplished the community-scale communal entrepreneurship. It is also the reason why we have been reiterating that the Tianzifang experiment is an alternative model of socially spontaneous regeneration. Since then, the Tianzifang experiment was transformed from a “duet dance” of elite partnership to a “trio romance” of communal entrepreneurship based on the cooperation between elites and grassroots, i.e., residents, shop owners and the development team with a government background. The story of illegal “changing” started with resident Mr. X.28 We have discussed previously how the “changing” practice took place. Mr. X was one of many residents of alleyway housings who did not own the property rights of the housing units. Once he changed the residential function without authorization, he broke the law. The “changing” in Tianzifang—started by Mr. X—was far from an innovation; it happened in other places too. But the illegal “changing” of the entire street did only happen in Tianzifang, and became a unique communal entrepreneurship that is significant to community revival, thanks to the interaction of all sorts of opportunities and powers. • The Spontaneous Practice of Entrepreneurship by Resident Activists In November 2004, Mr. X rented his own unit to someone for business usage without government authorization, which marked the kickoff of Tianzifang’s “changing” 27

Chen Yifei graduated from Shanghai Fine Arts College. Since he went to the U.S. in 1980, he concentrated on research and creation of Chinese-themed oil paintings. With years of constant hard work, he made outstanding accomplishments and became a world-famous Chinese painter. He opened a studio on Taikang Road in 1990 by the introduction of Mr. W, and played a key role in the physical regeneration of the industry area, in attracting artists and preserving Tianzifang. He passed away in April 2005. 28 Mr. X has lived in Tianzifang since he was born. He answered the national call to aid Xinjiang in the 1960s and returned to Shanghai in 1994. Due to life distress, he rented his house in Tianzifang to a design studio as suggested and introduced by Mr. W in October 2004. He then rented the upstairs house from his neighbor for living. He participated in receiving various groups of leaders visiting Tianzifang. In 2005, he became the main person in charge of Tianzifang Owners Management Committee, and served as a voluntary agent to bridge residents and shop owners. In 2008 when the official management committee was established, Mr. X worked in Mr. W’s investment consulting company, and continued his work as real estate agent and coordinator in Tianzifang area.

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Table 5.4 Statistics on rented houses of Tianzifang Alley

Source Self-made Figure according to interviews, by Zhong Xiaohua

model, with almost all residents as landlords in the end (Table 5.4). Mr. X recalled the day when it was opened: The day of opening was really lively and bustling: Chen Yifei cut the ribbon; the shop owner invited a lion dance team; even though the space was too small to dance. Neighbors all came to watch and applauded.29

Why Mr. X? Because of his burning desire to improve his life, and more importantly, because of his exceptional insight and judgment, and his organizational ability, Mr. X naturally became the pioneer among all residents, whether being proactively involved or passively invited. After cautious planning, Mr. X spent 30,000 CNY to decorate the living room on the ground floor, and made adjustments upon his tenant’s request. By this, an old house of 32 m2 without bathroom brought Mr. X a monthly income of 3500 CNY. He took out 1000 CNY every month and rented a vacant room upstairs from a neighbor to live. Therefore, he could earn 2500 CNY in total every month, which was 7 or 8 times of his pension. In the eyes of his neighbors, Mr. X made a big fortune. Without any more incentives, his neighbors all followed him and rented out their houses. What drove Mr. X to encourage his neighbors to follow him was the fact that the ASE renewal project was about to start soon. As demolishment orders came one by one from upper level to lower level, Mr. X began to realize, “only when more and more neighbors join me to be landlords, would I preserve my 29

Interview Record 20101028X, with Tianzifang resident Mr. X.

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house from being demolished”. As more people sought help from Mr. X, he even put up a board in front of his house, which wrote “Tianzifang Voluntary Agency,” making it clear that he would help bridge the demands between residents and shop owners. Based on rich business resources of his friend Mr. W and his own deep network of contacts in the neighborhood, the bridging work was a great success. In August 2005, then Mayor of Shanghai Mr. Han Zheng and former Vice-Premier of State Council Mr. Li Lanqing came to visit Tianzifang, and Mr. X received them as a resident representative. The leaders intentionally paid a visit to my house. Neighbors came to understand that the government supported the Tianzifang mode, so more and more people came to me for help.30

By 2012, Mr. X’s agency had successfully helped as many as 200 households (and times) to change from living into non-living. In fact, for both shop owners and landlords, Mr. X was probably the most famous and trustworthy person they could get contact with, because Mr. X enjoyed a good reputation for free agent service, and was also the most informed person about Tianzifang. Mr. X is of vital importance for understanding the spontaneous communal entrepreneurship in Tianzifang community. • Grassroot Officials’ Full Protection of Communal Entrepreneurship It was indeed important to have resident activists like Mr. X, but the illegal “changing” would not have spread to the entire street without the support and protection from grassroot official Mr. Z, and the political science of communal entrepreneurship in particular. As we have mentioned before, here is the reason for the success of the massive “changing”: the weaker party in an imbalanced power competition between lower and higher level government officials on urban regeneration models should rely on participation of the public to increase its power; while on the other hand, with support and protection from the lower level government, the public dared to “defy the law” and strived for better living conditions and maximum interests. As a result, the local government forged an alliance with local residents through “changing”. Protecting and even encouraging illegal “changing” was also illegal. However, the Tianzifang development team believed that there would be nothing wrong in implementing the CPC Central Committee’s instruction of “creating conditions to ensure more general public gain property income”. Thus, they were sincerely convinced that even though the tacit permission and protection did not follow regulations, legitimacy still existed. The tacit permission was to encourage spontaneous communal entrepreneurship, not to be laissez-faire in terms of guiding and governing the development of Tianzifang. On the one hand, the Tianzifang development team resisted demolishment orders from the upper level and continued the Tianzifang experiment, while on the other hand, they started to regulate behaviors of shop owners and landlords. The unlawful “changing” granted authority to Mr. Z and the development team over the stakeholders in Tianzifang. Via Mr. W, Mr. Z reminded all landlords of market entry rules, such as the prohibition of footbath stores and the like. Otherwise 30

See Footnote 28.

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the sub-district officials would not defend them when Administration of Industry and Commerce came to interrupt their businesses. Residents were also clearly aware that without support from the sub-district government, they could not obtain rental profits from their illegal “changings”. Therefore, even though shop owners had to negotiate with their landlords individually during the illegal expansion of the business street, the Tianzifang development team was able to execute its regulatory power and control the number and types of business. Or it could be said that spontaneous entrepreneurship in residential areas was not equal to freewheeling anarchism. The development team, rulebreaker in the eyes of the upper level government, was the very legitimate authority representing government in the eyes of residents who were willing to obey the team for their own interests. The coexistence of both high-end creativity and grass-roots vigor in Tianzifang was not entirely an outcome of “laissez-faire”. Without the tacit permission, protection and encouragement from the administrators, the illegal “changing” would have not been able to expand to the whole neighborhood. Similarly, Tianzifang would have ruined its reputation and appreciation among all parties in the society, and lost the battle of unequal rivals, if the development team indulged residents to be manipulated by venture capitals and failed to have a strict selection of business types. • Space Building by Creative Shop Owners Based on Community Contexts The last story is about shop owners, who were the real entrepreneurial entities in Tianzifang. The first group of entrepreneurs were attracted by the comparatively low rent after the “changing”, but certainly by the style and feature of the old neighborhood as well. It was the alleyway space with rich historical information and old Shanghai style that attracted shop owners and young aspiring entrepreneurs with artistic dreams. Their initial motives included the appreciation of Tianzifang atmosphere, fond of historical blocks, and the plan to open shops in Tianzifang. It was no coincidence that shops featured in Old Shanghai image all gathered in Tianzifang. Due to the above reasons, shop owners were all willing to participate in creating a cultural space that aligns with the authentic Tianzifang style. A monthly rent of 3500 CNY was a huge amount of money for Mr. X who only earned 300 CNY a month, but for investors from Japan, France, Taiwan and other overseas regions, a rental of several thousand CNY per month was indeed reasonable and acceptable. Owners of “Urban Tribe” (a clothing store), “Café Dan” and other shops all agreed that the initial rent in Tianzifang was quite reasonable. Interviews with some landlords indicated that rents in the early stage of “changing” were mostly between 2000 and 3500 CNY per month. Yet the reasonable price was only one selling point, and the main attraction of Tianzifang came from its rich values as a unique pace of old Shanghai alleyway neighborhood: Tianzifang has a strong cultural ambiance because its architecture style could not be replicated in other places. It was quite high-end, and many foreigners came here.31

31

Interview Record 20120620J, with the owner of a Japanese Restaurant.

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Whether these shop owners were attracted by the low rent or the high foot traffic, most of them liked the Tianzifang space, and knew that visitors were primarily drawn by its original and authentic alleyway style and Shikumen features. Most shop owners carefully decorated and upgraded the rooms in order to both meet business requirements and preserve Shikumen features. The decorations were generally in tune with the overall environment of the alleyway neighborhood, or could further enhance the atmosphere. Most shop owners, who cherish original creativity, came directly for the alleyway houses. Some of them had Shikumen attachments as they lived in alleyway houses when they were young; some of them were obsessed with the uneven architecture sprawling and various housing types as they were professionals in architecture or planning; and most of them were admirers of regional characteristics combining traditional architecture styles and community vitality. What attracted me in this place are the two corners here, because they are semi-circular, which was rare among architectures of Shanghai, especially Shikumen architectures. Almost all other corners are right-angled; only here you will find two semi-circular corners, which is really rare, particularly for old and new alley architectures or Shikumen. Tianzifang is so small; what makes it a great place was that it gathered various architecture styles within a limited space: old factories, Taiwan-style houses and western-style villas. These all bring people a sense of warmth. This is the most original side of Shanghai. The popularity of Tianzifang is not a coincidence.32

Due to the preference of space, shop owners decorated their shops wholeheartedly, devoting their emotions and experiences. At the same time, because of separate property rights ownership and sub-leasing process, the spatial renovation of various shops was not uniformed, nor accomplished overnight; rather it was achieved gradually and in a diversified way. But they had one thing in common, that they all spontaneously preserved the regional characteristics and historical imprints of the old houses, such as the variegated walls and bricks, old doors and steep stairs, and transformed space characteristics into business values. I built the attic myself. Anyway, the details lie in the lighting. Nothing much to be done for a business space; only the lighting was intentionally designed, and we also tried to integrate the style with the original one. You cannot make a brand-new (space) here; after all, it was an old house.33

Café Dan was established in 2007, with a business scope including hand-made coffee and Japanese food. It is regarded as the oldest and most sought-after shops in Tianzifang. The success of Café Dan can be mostly attributed to the rich history and old alleyway environment with local memories. Café Dan made profit from selling the concept of Shanghai nostalgia, or we could say that customers come to Café Dan for coffee and beer in the pursuit of Shikumen nostalgia. Café Dan sells coffee but more essentially sells spatial experience, which is a gift from the “changing”. Therefore, shop owners who already preferred Tianzifang were more dedicated to transform the 32 33

Interview Record 20120620T, with the owner of a creative restaurant. Interview Record 20120620F, with the owner of a creative decoration store.

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Fig. 5.5 The interiors of Café Dan. Photograph by Yu Hai

space, not only to preserve and display the historical imprints of Shikumen houses, but also to boldly reconstruct the cramped local living spaces into business spaces to meet international aesthetics and demands for fashion consumptions. The owner of Café Dan chose wooden tables and chairs on purpose to match Shikumen old house atmosphere. They paid special attention to the indoor spatial style (Fig. 5.5): We made extra efforts to clean the wall and display the old wall bricks… Your can materialize your own ideas in decorations and the overall style. It is very intriguing.34

People who have been to Café Dan must be deeply impressed by its steep stairs in a Shikumen building (Fig. 5.6). It might be unacceptable in a usual bar to have such steep stairs, but here in a Shikumen building, you can experience and imagine the difficulty and cautiousness when fetching a bucket of water up and down the stairs. For outsiders this brings excitement, while for people who lived in Shikumen before, it makes them feel at home. As the endeavors of Café Dan and other shops have indicated, it was every individual shop owner who gained space disposal right through renting houses from local residents that has been directly engaged in the physical space renovation. The upgrade of space quality further increased the added-values of the Tianzifang redevelopment project. Since those shop owners invested time and money in decoration, 34

Interview Record 20120620D, with the owner of Café Dan.

5.3 Tianzifang: Communal Entrepreneurship Based on Community Contexts

Fig. 5.6 The traditional stairs in Café Dan. Photograph by Zhong Xiaohua

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they were more attached with the fate of the Tianzifang space, in terms of sentimental and economic interests. The shop owners not only operate their own businesses, but also try to fit in the overall symbolic environment of Tianzifang.

5.3.3 The Legitimation of “Changing Living to Non-living” and Its Problems The official establishment of the Tianzifang Management Committee in April 2008 marked the return of administrative authority to the district government in law. A major symbol was legitimizing the “changing” practices of residents and the business operations of shop owners. However, the legitimation was incomplete: legitimizing the “changing” was not established as a regulation, but only written in a document titled The Acceptance Procedure of Temporarily Changing Residential Housings in Tianzifang into Integrated Housings, which meant it was only a temporary arrangement specific to Tianzifang. Although the legalization was indeed an affirmation of the spontaneous communal entrepreneurship, the community contexts for communal entrepreneurship did not continue; on the contrary, it brought a series of consequences that later threatened the community spirit of Tianzifang. First, let’s review the impact of the legitimation of “changing” on residents. The “changing” brought residents with huge business rental profits. For that, they only need to bear a cost a bit higher than the original rent of the public housing. In addition, there was no taxation on the rental income nor regulations to restrict the rental price. In other words, after the legitimation of “changing”, the lessees of public housing units become the actual operating landlords, enjoying rental profits without bearing any obligatory taxation on the operational income. As a result, speculations became popular: residents could hardly resist newcomers with higher bids and the situation gradually became out of control. The inappropriate expectation of business profits encouraged several rounds of speculations and pushed up the rent, making it hard for creative cultural stores to survive. Residents that started the communal entrepreneurship gradually changed their original motive to improve their livelihood into unrestrained pursuit for profits. They became a negative market power, making it difficult to reach any reasonable collective decision to ensure a sustainable development of Tianzifang. Most landlords became rentiers or speculators. The sense of community becomes increasingly slim in an opportunistic market. The “changing” entrepreneurship started as residents’ individual endeavors for self-improvement, but ended up with a huge improper profits from “changing” that began to tear up the community. The disorder and anomie of the leasing market were evident in the changing rentals of a ground-floor room of 24 square meters in 12 years as shown in Table 5.5. The legitimation also changed the government administration towards community commercial activities. When it was illegal, the “unruly” residents acknowledged the authority of the development team in order to secure protection from them,

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Table 5.5 The changing rentals of a ground-floor room of 24 square meters in 12 years

Source Self-made according to interview records, by Zhong Xiaohua

and rarely dared to defy rules that forbade certain types of business; in the meantime, shop owners recognized the team as well so that any decoration that was not consistent with the overall atmosphere would be suspended. After the legitimation, renting became residents’ behavior based on free market contracts. In principle, it was legal for the landlords to sign leasing contracts with any shops on any business scope at any price, and no one could intervene. Residents were no longer afraid of being prohibited by the Administration of Industry and Commerce due to the illegal status of their behavior, which was the main reason why they were willing to obey the Tianzifang development team. Did the newly founded committee have any authority over residents? Yes, but only in terms of property management rules for shops, rather than regulations on business types. Since the “changing” practice became legitimized and there were no legal restrictions on unreasonable unilateral rental raise, what role could the Committee play except for the function of property management? After the legitimation, the function of public administration as most needed by communal entrepreneurships was left blank, including regulations on business types, industry standards and culture requirements (which are essential to a creative industrial park) on market entry, protection of individual shop owners on rental control and progressive rent taxation. The lack of public administration was sure to result in a freewheeling market and expanding capital hegemony. Surprisingly and sarcastically, anarchism appeared in the legitimized Tianzifang. The rent became higher and higher, while the entry standard became lower and lower; as the original creative stores were unable to defeat the impact of plagiarism and soon lost the motive for original creations, more and more stores were open only to sell stall goods wholesaled from small commodity markets. The business street became increasingly popular while the quality of shops and goods became more and more uneven at the same time. Day by day, the street deviated from its position as “for creative industries”:

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5 Business Streets in Shanghai: Past and Present Tianzifang is becoming different from what I thought at first, and customers have changed as well. In the beginning, customers were of better quality, and the ratio of successful deals as well as prices were higher. Now it is different. Frankly speaking, most customers are just onlookers. Everyone sees the trend of Tianzifang: high-price strategy is no longer workable here, as it has already become a tourist spot. Well, you see, as the number of shops grows, it is impossible to ensure that they all sell original products. People are left with an impression that every shop sells wholesaled products. Tianzifang is no longer a community; people no longer have a sense of belonging.35

A fieldwork study of businesses in Tianzifang also revealed negative messages. A survey of 100 shops in March 2009 showed that, 67.85% were unsatisfied with business performance; 71.42% were unsatisfied with business environment; 42.86% were unsatisfied with government service; and 71.43% were unsatisfied with market entry cost. In 2010, the Pottery Workshop (PWS) decided to move out after ten years’ stay in Tianzifang; in 2011, Deke Erh’s (Er Dongqiang) studio reduced half of its office space and started to consider moving to other places; in 2013, Deke Erh finally left Tianzifang where he started his business in Shanghai. It seemed to be another proof of the destiny for cultural industrial parks, just like Shanghai SOHO and Beijing 798, which were protected in the name of art but later taken over by business. The owner of PWS, Ms. Y, who also actively participated in the defense for Tianzifang, said in the interview: “We spared no efforts to preserve (Tianzifang), but our interests are not respected and well considered in the end.”36 In 2016, I conducted a thorough survey of all shops in Tianzifang, which showed a more obvious trend of low-end and homogenized businesses. In the past, more than half of the shops were selling creative cultural products. Today, the percentage of these shops dropped to 2.08%. Clothing shops took the lead with a percentage of 22.92%. Despite of its continued popularity, people came to Tianzifang as tourists, instead of as customers. On public holidays, thousands of visitors strolled in Tianzifang, but very few would buy something. Among all shops, only around a quarter could make a profit. On the other hand, the rent could go as high as 40,000 CNY/month for a shop of 60 m2 . About half of the shops had a contract of no more than one year, while only 18.75% had long-term contracts of over five years. Over 20% were newly opened and had been there for less than one year.37 Through arduous endeavors of communal entrepreneurships, Tianzifang has become a benchmark of inner-city regeneration for Shanghai. Today, nothing but itself could defeat it or overturn it. As we have seen, residents who were proactive enterprising forces are becoming conspirators of market speculations or negative market forces. We have also seen that after the legitimation of “changing”, the official administration failed to preserve culture creativity and communal entrepreneurship in Tianzifang. Tianzifang is losing not only its most important character of creativity, but also its community character, the focus of this part. The secret of Tianzifang’s success lies in the spontaneous creation under the exceptional official protection, which was 35

Interview record 20120620D, with the owner of a hand crafts shop. Interview Record 20120622Z, with the shop owner of PWS. 37 “A Survey of Tianzifang (tian zi fang diao cha ji)”, in Jiefang Daly (jie fang ri bao), March 21, 2016. 36

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to protect social creativity from disturbance and suppression of mainstream models, and to encourage and favor the opening and development of original cultural and creative shops in Tianzifang. However, the two functions were totally unfamiliar and strange to the bureaucratic administrations of the current time. The legitimized Tianzifang business street was taken over by the higher-level government, indicating the dismissing of the previous team that had been leading the development of Tianzifang. The planning and coordinating body in charge of the overall development of Tianzifang no longer exists, replaced by a nominal management committee, which is in essence a property management company. When unrestrained entrepreneurship loosens regulations over capital speculation and over-commercialization, the community spirit of entrepreneurship is also bound to lose. This is what we should learn from the Tianzifang experiment. In the growing popularity of Tianzifang, there might have been buried the seed of self-destruction. In fact, the number of original shops and unique stores has been declining instead of growing. The continuously rising rent is pushing away all these original shops, making Tianzifang less and less attractive. In the end, only chain stores and street vendors could survive. The withdrawal of original shops will result in the disappearance of specific groups: those who enjoyed the atmosphere and appeal of Tianzifang could not stand the new crowded and noisy Tianzifang and were no longer fond of it. When I took participants of a workshop on business streets in six cities to visit Tianzifang in 2011, my colleagues who came with admiration had already expressed their concern on the over-commercialization of the business street. In spite of this, a group of shop owners that stick to the concept of fun is still trying hard to stay in Tianzifang; new entrepreneurs with interesting ideas are fighting to come in and realize their dream of opening up a new world; residents like Mr. X continue to dedicate themselves to voluntarily making contributions to the prosperity of Tfianzifang as before; and some people continue to like Tianzifang and do not hope to see it lose its character by degrading or upgrading it to become a luxury shopping street. New tourists are still fascinated by the style of Tianzifang—charming, popular, and full of potential. Our concern is how to secure a sustainable development of the Tianzifang business street, and how to carry forward its spirit of communal entrepreneurship that was initially rooted in the community, so as to grant players with a piece of promised land in the capital-infested Shanghai, as well as to ensure that both customers and tourists can feel the charm of community and the character of common people in Tianzifang, which are the social and cultural genes that have contributed to the entrepreneurial success of Tianzifang.

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5.4 Minxing Road Business Street: The Arrival Community for Newcomers Migrants are the main characters of this section. There are two kinds of migrants in the story of Minxing Road Business Street. The first kind is people who moved from city center to new town areas like Zhongyuan during the local urbanization and old town gentrification upgrade. Most of them are displaced urban residents as a result of their institutional welfares, and this is also written in their new identities. A small part of them converted their houses into shops in a set of coincidences, and changed from employees of state-owned enterprises into self-employed businessmen. One case in this part is about this kind of local entrepreneurs. The other kind is people from other places, mostly from rural areas, in the hope to make a living and seek for a better life in Shanghai. Our field statistics show that they are the main players of Minxing Road Business Street, operating 95% of the shops on the street. Opening stores targeted at working-class communities is a convenient way to settle down in Shanghai for them. Their stories on Minxing Road are about the communal entrepreneurship of migrants, which aligns with business traditions in Shanghai.

5.4.1 Two Types of “Changing Living to Non-living” on Minxing Road Business Street Located in Zhongyuan area in northeastern Shanghai, Minxing Road is a residential area that was built up in the 1980s. Back then, lack of business facilities in newly built urban areas was almost a universal problem, and Minxing Road started to rise under the call for daily business. Daily business was addressed because residents of the new urban areas were mainly workers and ordinary people rather than the middle class. Under any standard, Minxing Road is an average community business street. Besides, as it is next to the French Supermarket Auchan, shops that have survived on Minxing Road are mostly for daily needs, particularly because big supermarkets have absolute advantages in terms of staple commodities. On the other hand, as labor cost is the main cost for service industries, migrants, especially migrant workers from the countryside, were in a better position in this regard. Therefore, although there were many local residents as shop owners in the beginning, Minxing Road was eventually overtaken by shops run by migrant workers due to cost advantage and market mechanism. Similar to Tianzifang, Minxing Road started with “changing” as well. As more people moved to Zhongyuan area in the 1990s, grocery and convenient stores were opened one after another on the once vacant Minxing Road in order to meet the daily needs of incoming residents. By tearing down street-side walls, many residential housings were changed for non-living uses to accommodate these newlyopened stores. In the beginning, local residents made these changes. Some moved

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here because they were allocated welfare housing by their working units and became the first group of residents in Zhongyuan. For instance, Mr. D, owner of Minjia Convenient Store in the following section, was one of them. Others moved here because of displacement due to municipal infrastructure constructions or inner-city regenerations. These two groups of people were allocated or compensated a flat because of their identities as SOE employees or as displaced Shanghainese citizens. The institutional welfare entailed in these identities is the biggest difference that distinguishes them from migrant shop owners like Mr. C, owner of the barber shop “Fei Duan Liu Chang” (FDLC). Take Mr. D as an example. He was a beneficiary of the massive residential construction in the 1980s. First, as an employee of a state-owned enterprise that took part in the housing construction, he was allocated a flat, which was a substantial welfare to most Shanghainese people. Then he was laid off due to SOE reforms and therefore became eligible for “changing living to non-living” so as to make a living. Finally, because his flat was on the ground floor at the frontage (which is a redistributed welfare), he was able to take the advantage and open a store (which is a compensated welfare). In comparison, the entrepreneurship of immigrants—more specifically migrant workers from countryside such as Mr. C—on Minxing Road, was first based on the real need of local residents for affordable labor services, in which migrant workers from countryside have more advantages providing these services. Moreover, community business was a convenient way for them to settle down in Shanghai, or in other words, a convenient way to become an “urbanite” in Shanghai. The way they settled in Shanghai was quite similar to the entrepreneurial behaviors of the migrants in Shikumen neighborhoods as described by Hanchao Lu, as both integrated business and living. The last reason why migrant workers from the countryside could settle in Shanghai was because they were willing to make a living in a way that local Shanghainese could not fathom. The unfair Hukou (registered household) system deprives migrant workers of—while at the same time offers—opportunities. It is a business model of lower-class people providing services to people of the same class, or more specifically, that of lower-class people with absolutely no institutional welfare providing services to lower-class people with some urban welfare. We wanted to restate that the secret for migrant workers from the countryside to survive in Shanghai is to work in a way that local Shanghainese could not fathom. Here is a simple fact: Mr. D does not have any rental cost as he runs his business at his own home, but Mr. C has to pay the rent before earning profits. The two cases we discuss here fall into two different categories of “changing”: Mr. D’s good time is already gone as an international supermarket has “invaded” the community; Mr. C’s advantages in location and labor are not coming from the system, but from his efforts to meet the needs of lower-class people.

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5.4.2 Minxing Road Business Street and Auchan Supermarket Zhongyuan community of Yangpu District, where Minxing Road Business Street is situated, is located in the northeast of Shanghai. As early as in the 1950s and 1960s, a number of new housing units for workers were built in this area. In the 1980s, massive residential constructions were initiated. Most of the houses were welfare housing invested by SOEs for their employees, and some were governmentinvested housing used to accommodate relocated Shanghainese locals who moved here due to inner-city municipal constructions and old town restorations. In terms of demographic compositions, Zhongyuan new town hosted people benefiting from the work-unit-driven urbanization and the inner-city gentrification. Minxing Road is in the southern part of Zhongyuan area. There are nearly 100 shops along the road, mostly having emerged in the 1990s. 25% of the shops used commercial buildings with private ownership or collective ownership by the workunit. The rest were open in private residences through unauthorized changing to non-living purposes. The shops were either operated by residents themselves or by merchants from other places who rented the rooms from local residents. The “changing living to non-living” behaviors in this case were usually not approved by administrative departments. Currently 95% of shops on the northern side of Minxing Road are operated by migrants from other provinces, mainly engaged in catering, clothing and other life services (details as in Fig. 5.7). Before Auchan Supermarket opened in 1997, there were quite many small convenience stores. However, since the opening of Auchan, many of them closed or changed owners due to lack in competitiveness. If the creativity of Tianzifang Business Street and the artistic entrepreneurs represented the latest articulated cosmopolitanism, the impact of globalization on Minxing

Barber shop, 3% PrinƟng, 3%

Others, 12%

Manicure/toothwash , 4% Restaurant, 26%

Mobile/hardware store, 5% StaƟoner/accessory , 6% Building material/ upholstery , 6%

Clothing, shoes, hats, 23% Grocery, 12%

Fig. 5.7 Business Types and their percentages on Minxing Road (by Zhong Xiaohua)

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Road was reflected indirectly through the “invasion” of popular international supermarkets by changing the business ecosystem and influencing shopping habits and lifestyles of local residents in Zhongyuan area. In fact, the large-scale supermarkets usually settle in communities that are newly built for receiving displaced population due to inner-city gentrification and regeneration. Therefore, the globalization of new urban areas echoes and is related to that of the city center. In this sense, the two business streets, Tianzifang and Minxing Road, share the same roots. Auchan quickly became the business center of Zhongyuan area within a few years, and changed its business landscape. Other community businesses scattered around the core area where the supermarket is located. The two sides of the street were packed with small shops, restaurants and clothing stores, which mainly catered to the needs of the middle-and-lower-class and average families. Many small convenience stores were losing their profits or even closed since the opening of Auchan; by contrast, small businesses that provide daily-life services, operated by migrants from other places, were booming. As shown in the following two cases, the rise and fall of different businesses is determined by the globalization force as represented by multinational supermarkets. “By occupying space, by producing a space”,38 this is what Lefebvre argues on the production of space configuration in the global scale.

5.4.3 Minjia Convenience Store: A Business Entrepreneurship Benefiting from Institutional Welfares Minjia Convenience Store is a grocery store on Minxing Road, close to Baotou Road. The shop owner Mr. D (Fig. 5.8) was born in the 1950s, a high school graduate (Class of 1975), and former employee of Shanghai Fishing Boat Factory (on Fuxing Island). He has three sisters, two of whom went to Heilongjiang Province (in Northeast China) and the other one to Chongming Island (Shanghai Machine Tool Works) during the Rustication Movement (also known as “Up to the Mountains and Down to the Villages”). Since two of the young family members went to countryside as farmers and one went to the factory as a worker to support the national development, he could be exempt and stay in Shanghai by policy. He got married in the end of the 1980s, and was then distributed with a flat on Minxing Road, a welfare from his work unit. In 1990, he became laid off with only a basic salary but no bonus. He left Shanghai to do business with friends, but came back after 2–3 years as the business did not go well. He then opened a grocery store by capping the courtyard outside his flat in 1993, but was very soon disrupted by authorities of his work unit. He claimed that this was his only source of income, “if I were not allowed to run the store, there would be no way for me to make a living”. After negotiations with administrative authorities 38

From Soja [12].

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Fig. 5.8 Interview with Mr. D by the research team. On the left: Mr. D; in the middle: the author; on the right: Sharon Zukin (photo by Li Yifei)

in charge of housing as well as industry and commerce, he went to Yangpu District Housing Security and Administration Bureau, changed the function of his flat from residential to business use (the “changing”), and applied for a business license. He was lucky that the “changing” started to be recognized at that time, so he successfully got the license as he wished. Two to three months after Mr. D started his business, the application access for the “changing” was shut down. As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, every step in the whole process, from obtaining the house to the legal approval of the “changing”, all reveals the institutional welfares that are attached to the identities of local Shanghainese citizen and work-unit employee. Mainly invested by public work-units and state-owned industrial factories, the newly urbanized residential area, Zhongyuan, accommodates houses allocated to the employees of these work-units. Mr. D and other residents are beneficiaries of work-unit driven urbanization, whose living conditions were greatly improved for free. The fact that Mr. D became one of the first individual business owners is also attributed to the compensation policy of SOE reform to reassign employees. The approval of the “changing” was a temporary policy in the background of the massive layoff. Being laid off was a misfortune, however, being allowed to open a store consequently was fortunate. To start business in new communities required two conditions: a business permit and a favorable location for business, both of which were inherent socialist welfares

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of being a member of the work-unit. In the early 1990s when community business was in great shortage, business operations without rental pressures brought shop owners huge amount of income, which was a lot higher than their previous salary. Later, the residents acquired property rights of the public housing at a low price, again thanks to the institutional welfare. With legal business licenses previously obtained, these residents could enjoy a renting profit much higher than the average housing price even if they do not manage the store themselves. With my license, you can sell anything except prepared food in my store. In the beginning, the store sold cigarettes, alcohol, stationary, food and other small items. The business went so well and [I] often had to go to the City God Temple or other wholesale markets to replenish my stock… Life was easier at that time. I paid back the money (around 30,000 to 50,000 CNY) I borrowed for opening the store within six months.39

Breaking walls to open stores by local residents was popular only for a couple of years. With the landing of Auchan, the street gradually became quiet and making a profit was no longer Mr. D’s daily routine: Since the opening of Auchan in 1999, the business became worse and worse. Two to three years later, there’s basically no business. Currently I only sell cigarettes… If the supermarket had not been here, Minxing Road would still be bustling, and business would have been better and easier.40

From the interview we knew that Mr. D had no intention to rent his store to others as he didn’t have any rental pressure. Besides, he was also afraid that his business license would be revoked if he rent it to someone who failed to obey the legal rules of operations. But as many individual business owners with Shanghai citizenship do not want to labor and toil too much, it already becomes a common phenomenon that they rent business sites or stands to migrant workers. It is not only an objective result of market competition, but also a result of differences between locals and migrants in subjective factors including income expectations, lifestyles and work attitudes. In a word, in an incomparable way that no locals could follow, migrants, especially those from the countryside, could make a living in the community they set foot in.

5.4.4 Fei Duan Liu Chang (FDLC): A Story of Migrant Entrepreneurship to Settle Down in Shanghai Migrant workers making a living by opening their own stores, most of whom come from the countryside, are the real main actors of Minxing Road Business Street (Fig. 5.9). Mr. C is the owner of the barber shop “Fei Duan Liu Chang (FDLC)”. He was from Yangzhou, Jiangsu Province and is at his late 30s. He came to Shanghai to work in 2000 when he was 17, with the same dream that his Northern Jiangsu (Subei) fellows 39 40

Interview record 20130328D. See Footnote 38.

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Fig. 5.9 Interview with Mr. C by the research team. From left to right: the author, Mr. C, Sharon Zukin (photo by Li Yifei)

carried over a century ago in the migration wave of “heading to the Great Shanghai”, in hope for a better life. Haircutting, as an expertise for people from Yangzhou, naturally becomes the skill for them to make a living in Shanghai. Interestingly, however, young Mr. C had no skill at all when he first came to Shanghai. He started to learn the skill when he was introduced to a barbershop by his relative. People are always introduced by their fellows from the same native place (for instance, Northern Jiangsu, Jiangxi, etc.) to Shanghai, as this has become a convenient means of the Chinese style migration. Once they arrive in Shanghai, they are usually engaged in certain industries, instead of randomly trying out different occupations. For example, barbershops in Shanghai are mainly run by migrants from Northern Jiangsu; owners of the two to three shops of aluminum alloy doors and windows on Minxing Road are all from Jiangxi Province; while Lanzhou Noodle Restaurant not far away from the street was owned by a Muslim family from Qinghai Province. In a word, the most vivid impression we get from field research is that the route for migrants to enter Shanghai and the industries they settle in are supported either by kinship relations or geographical relations, and oftentimes it is a combination of both so that people can easily build work relations. “Nowhere else in the world is comparable to the riverbanks of Huangpu River.” A widely-popular old saying in Shanghai before 1949, it is less known or said by people of today. However, people have never stopped being attracted by Shanghai

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or coming to Shanghai to make a living ever since the opening of Shanghai 170 years ago, except during the period when the Hukou (household registration) system was strictly implemented to ban the flow between urban and rural areas. Shanghai gained its prosperity through business, but those famous businessmen, no matter how successful they were, were rarely local. This chapter focuses on community business, so let’s take Tianzifang as example. The first batch of entrepreneurs in Tianzifang were mainly non-locals—overseas returnees, immigrants of Hongkong, Macau and Taiwan region, and foreigners. According to the shop owner of House of Teddy, his neighboring shops were mostly opened by foreigners. Even today, over 80% of all shops in Tianzifang are run by non-local shop owners, most of whom are middle classes with good educational background and entrepreneurial experiences. Shop owners with Shanghai background are mostly coming back from overseas or coming from an overseas family. Among all, Chen Yifei was the most famous local Shanghainese. But who could deny the fact that his proposal of transforming Tianzifang into a SOHO was also borrowed from New York? With the opening and development of Pudong since the 1990s, Shanghai started to adopt a strategy of building a global city. New urban development and massive old town restoration are in full swing. Shanghai needs engineers as well as young and strong labor workers. In the wave of Shanghai’s development, Mr. C was one of the migrant workers and entrepreneurs coming to Shanghai. They could provide community residents with catering, haircut, repairing and other services with relative low business cost but largest labor output. New urban communities mainly composed of working class and middle-or-low-income residents usually have a lower entry threshold, and thus give the migrants a better chance to settle down and make a living. Therefore, relatively low price but extra services become the basic and general strategy for Mr. C and other migrants. There are two kinds of newcomers, entrepreneurial migrants and displaced local Shanghainese residents. We have every reason to believe that the success of migrant business owners in newly developed communities that gather middle- and low-income families, is a result of the successful mutual-benefiting model between the two kinds of migrants in the urbanization process. To settle down and be integrated into the city, migrants from other places establish community businesses to satisfy the needs of local migrants in the new community. There are several reasons why newcomers like the owner of FDLC could set foot in the community. First, they provide fair-priced life services that supermarkets like Auchan could not offer. Second, they provide extra free services and therefore have gained the recognition of the residents. I often order fruits from the fruit stand nearby and enjoy the free delivery service offered by the owner. This sort of generous extra service may have become a common practice, but it is indeed invented and provided constantly by migrant entrepreneurs. By incomparable diligence and extraordinarily attentive services, Mr. C and other migrant entrepreneurs have managed to maintain the relatively low-price level on Minxing Road and satisfy the needs of ordinary communities, and furthermore sustained the popularity and prosperity of Minxing Road businesses.

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You mean home delivery service? Yes, we always have that… We have preferential policies for senior citizens since we opened the barbershop. We tried not to charge them. In the very beginning, a full set of wash, haircut and hair-dry costs only 2 yuan; now it costs 5 yuan… We go into the communities as well. We also regularly go to nursing homes. At first, we did everything for free. Then the nursing homes felt indebted to us, so we charge 5 yuan now. 30% to 40% of our customers are residents of nearby communities. Some customers are introduced by other people (relatives and regular customers), for example, 10% of the customers come from Pudong… We have quite a good reputation in Zhongyuan area on the internet (according to comments from relevant websites). Local Shanghainese could not live without migrant workers. The most obvious one is breakfast. If people from other places did not make breakfast, Shanghainese would have no way to live.41

It is not an exaggeration to say that “local Shanghainese could not live without migrant workers”. The following description of the daily routines is a real record of how I rely on migrant workers. Breakfast milk – The milk delivery worker Morning exercises at park – Gardeners Grocery shopping in the market after morning exercises – Vendors Fetching newspapers and letters – The migrant worker wearing post office uniform Lecture at a university – The motor cyclist for the ride from metro station to university Lunch at a restaurant – waiters and waitresses from the countryside Fetching couriers in office in the afternoon – Deliverymen

Despite the success Mr. C and his fellows have achieved in their efforts to be integrated into the communities they serve, under any means, it is still a model of people of lower-levels serving lower-levels, or as said in the beginning of this chapter, “lower-class people with absolutely no institutional welfare providing services to lower-class people with some urban welfare”. Mr. C and the like expect to improve their social status, to equally enjoy the welfare of the city such as education and health care, and to fulfil the ambition of permanently living in Shanghai and becoming Shanghainese citizens. But they could only temporarily set foot in Shanghai, as the urban–rural dual division system hinders them from completely enjoying all the institutional welfares that Mr. D has. Moreover, it takes even longer time to acquire a sense of equality as local Shanghainese, both psychologically and culturally. From my experience, the most prejudiced and intolerant place in Shanghai are Bureau of City Administration and Law Enforcement and local police stations. You will be treated differently if you speak Shanghainese dialect. Whatever the issue is, local Shanghainese could negotiate with them, while people from other places could not.42

41 42

Interview Record 20130327C. See Footnote 41.

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5.5 Conclusions With the title of “Shopping Streets in Shanghai: Past and Present”, this chapter analyzes two shopping streets that grew on the basis of community contexts, which has been the tradition of business streets in Shanghai. Concepts including “entrepreneurship through changing living to non-living”, “migrant entrepreneurship”, “communal entrepreneurship”, “integrated community of business and living” and others have been discussed, as well as the two major processes that have facilitated the development of community businesses: gentrification under the impact of globalization, and urbanization driven by new town development and inner-city regeneration. What are the relationships between these concepts? Let’s start from “changing”, as both business streets started in this way. But not every business street in Shanghai was created in this way, so why shall we focus on “changing”? First of all, this is how the two business streets start to rise. The Minxing Road case is more typical. Most shops in this newly-developed urban area that were open through “changing” still have no business license till today, but they are all tacitly approved and will no longer be punished by authorities. The key point is that, in the planned economy era, private business was considered as spontaneous capitalism and was absolutely prohibited on the grounds of the clear-cut socialism/capitalism division. Therefore, when this political or ideological reason was abolished, regulation of “changing” became a legal issue of with or without a legal business license. Since legal “changing” was just a name, on the conditions that entrepreneurship has been well accepted by the government system and society, there was no way to prevent unauthorized “changing”. Besides, it was usually the vulnerable group, who would have not been able to make a living if not self-sustaining, that changed living to nonliving. Hence, the government’s determination to crack down on illegal “changings” was often shaken by its responsibility to protect people’s livelihood. As a result, the changing practices were tolerated and eventually became a common phenomenon of commercialization of non-commercial areas in newly-developed urban areas. Both the illegal changing practices (by residents) and the nonfeasance (of the government), are against regulations from the point of rule-of-law. But this Chinese-styled “anarchism” has led to the prosperity of business streets in reality, and gained recognition of local residents for mitigating the shortage of business facilities. The story of “changing” can help us understand that the Chinese experiences of non-compliance with rules or of the situational tolerance of such actions are in fact the “rules” behind China’s development. As we see in this chapter, it is the gaming over “changing” that has facilitated the rise of community business streets. In the Tianzifang case, besides inaction, the district government even encouraged and protected the practice in secret. Although its motivation was naturally different from other inactions in general, its situational attitude towards laws and regulations was the same. Even when the “changing” eventually became legal, it was still situational, i.e., only residential houses in Tianzifang were allowed to temporarily change its usage.

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Then comes the next question: what’s the relationship between the prosperity of business streets and migrant entrepreneurship? The answer involves the two different paths that lead to the prosperity of community shopping streets in Shanghai. The first one is capital-driven inner-city regeneration, which has not only revived the business in the city center of Shanghai, but has upgraded it by introducing luxury and highend brands, as represented by Xintiandi, Sinan Mansions, and others. Tianzifang did not take the gentrification mode in the sense of government-business cooperation, but achieved inner-city revival with participation of residents (by changing living to non-living). However, it also became a high-end business street. Such a business innovation, which is mainly about merging SOHOs, cultural and creative industries in communities, cannot be generated in decaying old alleyway communities, or in short, among local residents. Entrepreneurs in Tianzifang were either overseas Chinese artists (such as Chen Yifei, owner of Café Dan, and the like) or non-Shanghainese entrepreneurs with experiences of art or business practices. The second one is urbanization through new town development, where business is developed to meet everyday shopping and service needs of displaced residents who moved out of the inner city. Business streets in new urban areas, even if they were previously run by state-owned work-units or local merchants, would gradually be occupied by migrants, particularly rural migrants, as international supermarkets took over the major market share of large daily necessities. This is due to the obvious cost advantages of their labor services, as well as their work attitudes and way of doing business that very few local business owners could follow even if they were aware. The main question is, why do we use the term “community contexts” to define shopping streets? This question points to the core of Shanghai’s community business tradition. The integration of business and living in community businesses, as summarized in the first part of this chapter, is the original meaning of “community contexts” for shopping streets. The integration of business and living does not necessarily imply the commercialization of the community, but it does suggest that business is community-based. First, community business in Shanghai must be connected with the residential area, not only through the enclosed shops along the street, but also through shops, hostels, barber shops and so forth in the alleyway. It is an internal connection of business and living in the space structure. Such a structured space is a social space of integrated business and living, in which shops are established according to the daily needs of community life, and shop owners are mostly residents of the community. This was the spatial structure of community business in the concessional era, where the ground floor was for business and second floor for living. Today’s layout of business in the front and living in the back reflects the same logic. In this way, the shopping street is more than simply a row of business storefronts, but an interwoven network of business and living and a social space with intensive interactions. Second, community contexts are most visualized in the form of business-living integration: a shopping street is both a commercial place and a lived space at the same time. The fact that it is also a lived space ensures a sustained purchase demand for the business, and provides space resources for new

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shops through “changing”. Therefore, we can assert that the phenomenon of “changing” is surely based on community contexts, and the fact that community business in Shanghai initially started in communities is the chief reason why community business is always interrelated with the “changing”. In these original living spaces, there were budget alleyway shops combining employment and living purposes in the past, and new businesses as a convenient way for migrants to settle down in Shanghai today. In this way, Mr. C and many others have successfully made a living while meeting the needs of local residents. Third, in addition to the physical (integration of business and living) and social (a lived world) dimensions, community business streets also have the imaginary and symbolic dimensions. The first batch of entrepreneurs saw Tianzifang as a neighborhood space with rich historical imprints, and thereby managed to build into an imagined symbolic space and sell it to the public so that people could consume and meet their nostalgic needs. In the end, Tianzifang becomes a scene full of cultural meanings and symbolic values instead of a sheer shopping street to both business owners and consumers/tourists. For business owners, they know clearly that their businesses rely half on their products and half on the space, or more accurately, the imagined space. For consumers or tourists, to visit Tianzifang is mainly—if not all—to satisfy their curiosity and imagination about the alleyway life and atmosphere of the old Shanghai. And for those middle-aged or elder local Shanghainese yearning for the past, Tianzifang is a place where they could rest their memories of the youth and their alleyway complex. Compared with Xintiandi, Tianzifang grew up in a real alleyway space. Despite how much exotic elements it had, the overall atmosphere you feel is full of authentic Shanghainese favor. All the narrow but meandering lanes in the neighborhood give people a sense of kindness and intimacy that is unseen in most business complexes. When you climb up the steep stairs, take a seat leaning against the back window, sip a glass of wine or a cup of coffee, and look at the terrace of the Shikumen building on the other side, anyone would somehow be moved and touched, whether being a local resident or someone with no experience of living in a Shikumen building. For the middle-aged Shanghainese who once lived in an alleyway neighborhood like me, the nostalgia one can find here is what Xintiandi could never offer, because Xintiandi only resembles the appearance of the old Shanghai, but not its emotions and sentiments, which cannot be reconstructed.43

In my eyes, the popularity of Café Dan is exactly because its interior space could stir up the nostalgic sentiments of customers. What about Minxing Road? For most shop owners, it’s both a place where they start their own businesses and live in Shanghai. Local citizens discriminate against them as migrants, especially as migrant workers, in one way or another. Only by imagining the shopping street where they make a living as their own community, could they build up their reputations, trust and networks in a way that no locals could compete, and thereby earn a place in Shanghai. All the migrant shop owners we have visited would kindly offer additional services to their customers or provide voluntary community services whenever possible. Had it not been for their imagination of 43

Yu, H. 2009. “Tianzifang Experiment: The City Renewal Model Superseding the Binary Opposition of a Place (tian zi fang shi yan: chao yue quan qiu—di fang er yuan dui li de cheng shi geng xin mo shi)”, China Ancient City (zhong guo ming cheng), 2009 (7).

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and yearning for a sense of belonging to the community they settle in, it is difficult to understand these kindnesses and good deeds that go beyond business mentalities. With this yearning and imagination, Mr. C and his fellows overcome countless encounters with unfairness and perseveringly stick to their goals, i.e., acquiring Shanghai citizenship for themselves and their family members, and thus create opportunities for their children to receive the same education as locals. For local residents of Minxing Road, their imagination of their communities, including the business street, is naturally not as romantic and nostalgic as that of Tianzifang. However, it is equally meaningful. The biggest difficulty they have overcome is the initial sense of great loss in identity recognition when they first moved here from the city center, i.e., from a Shanghainese to a country bumpkin. Now they have already accepted their new identity as residents of Zhongyuan sub-district. When asked why not going to Nanjing Road or Huaihai Road for shopping, their reply would be: why bother? “We have Auchan here in Zhongyuan, and you can buy everything there. You can also find fruit shops, barbers’ shop, home deco stores right outside the residential quarter. Why should I bother to go to the city center?” In their mind, the community where they could place their affections for home is the one in which they are living now, rather than the alleyways in city center where they used to live. They are now used to shopping in Auchan once a week or several times a week for rice, oil and toiletries. At the same time, they are also used to all the convenient services provided by migrant workers. The constant interactions with these migrant-run shops on a daily basis have fostered and reinforced an identity awareness of the “poor” community. The community awareness of ordinary people in Shanghai has always been internalized in a limited world of life through frequent daily interactions with neighbors and shops. Because of famous places like the Bund and Nanjing Road, Shanghainese people always like to brag about “the Great Shanghai” in front of their guests. To speak the truth, these boasts are more based on imaginations rather than real experiences, and more accurately, on imaginations based on hearsays or dim impressions. What Shanghainese citizens are really familiar with is their own community – alleyways in the past and residential quarters of today. For most Shanghainese, the imagination of community is well-grounded on real life and daily interactions, as the community business tradition of Shanghai took place within walking distance. As a result of Shanghai’s inner-city regeneration, millions of citizens become new urbanites of places that were regarded as suburbs or countryside before. Either local or migrant, shop owners on Minxing Road we interviewed all called themselves as “country bumpkins” in a calm but teasing tone. None of them ever spoke of “the Great Shanghai”. Hence, it might be prudent to conclude that their imagination of the lived space has also been highly localized. As a matter of fact, the spatial distance between residents of Minxing Road and Tianzifang is so huge that even the most well-known vanity of the Shanghainese—that they like to cover up their lives in “lower corners of Shanghai” with imaginations of the “upper corners of Shanghai”—has lost its psychological pattern for regular occurrence in an urban space growing 10 times larger than that of three decades ago.44 44

See Chap. 2: Discovering Shanghainese People from the Spatial History of Shanghai.

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The efforts to explain “community contexts” of business streets in Shanghai with concepts of “structured space”, “lived space” and “imagined space”, also derive from Lefebvre’s theory of the spatial triad. Our aim is to explore what kind of drives and institutional conditions, after the dramatic shrinking of community business in Shanghai caused by the socialist reform and complete state ownership, have led to the re-emergence of Shanghai’s community business and the emergence of private shops dominating community business streets. It is not difficult for us to discover the drives of globalization and urbanization in the development of the two different business streets. But we insist that none of these processes is an abstract force that can function independently at any place. On the contrary, they must be chosen by local systems (e.g., to embrace globalization) or determined by local systems (e.g., to urbanize). Our analysis is highly spatial, i.e. the business streets we discuss are located in communities where people live. Therefore, residential communities and shops are distinctly different form business centers or shopping malls, as they are naturally connected with community. Meanwhile, business communities are not only spatially and functionally structured, such as the integrated structure of business and living, but also economically structured, such as different ownerships of housing (which determines different opportunities and possibilities for business startups), as well as demographically structured, such as the distinction between local residents and migrants. In essence, all these structural factors reflect the structural functions of institutions and governance (except the integration of business and living of historical sites), including the institutional dividend or market rights entailed in the property rights, the unequal status arrangements entailed in the household registration system, and the licensing system for changing living to non-living. By defining structured space in this way, we can understand why both business streets started by changing living to nonliving, why shop owners in these two completely different business streets are mainly migrants, and furthermore, why the Chinese way of local governance by protecting or acquiescing entrepreneurship through illegal “changing” could work and prevail in the Chinese context. After the abolition of the anti-capitalist ideology, people’s livelihood seems to have become a more important reason than legitimacy, which is the reason why “changing” initiated in the lived space to make a better living could be tolerated. Today, to protect people’s livelihood has already become the main ground for the legitimacy of local governments in China, although in many cases words are louder than action. But because of this, the government naturally lacks the determination and justice to punish business startups by which residents find their own way to earn a living.

References 1. Murphey, R. (1953). Shanghai: Key to modern China (p. 203). Harvard University Press. 2. Mu, X. (2006). Reflections of Columbia (ge lun bi ya de dao ying) (p. 119). Guangxi Normal University Press.

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3. Lu, H. (2004). Beyond the neon lights: Everyday Shanghai in the early twentieth century (pp. 16–17). University of California Press. 4. Jacobs, J. (1992). The death and life of great American cities. Vintage Books. 5. Yu, H. (2011). Narrative of historic block renovation in power and concept dimensions—Case of Tianzifang in Shanghai (jiu cheng gen xin xu shi de quan li wei du he li nian wei du—yi shang hai tian zi fang wei li). Nanjing Journal of Social Sciences (nan jing she hui ke xue), 2011(04), 25. 6. Chen, Y. (2008). Crisis of legitimacy and Nationality in Urban development (cheng shi kai fa de zheng dang xing wei ji yu he li xing kong jian). Journal of Sociological Studies (she hui xue yan jiu), 2008(3), 29. 7. Zhao, W., Chen, M., & Zhang, J. (2005). Rethinking the transformation of urban management in China based on the theory of entrepreneurial government (ji yu qi ye jia zheng fu li lun si kao wo guo cheng shi jing ying de zhuan xing). Urban Planning Forum (cheng shi gui hua xue kan)., 2005(02), 55–58. 8. Zhang, T. (2004). Neo-liberalism, city management, city governance, and city competitiveness in China (xin zi you zhu yi, cheng shi jing ying, cheng shi guan zhi, cheng shi jing zheng li). Urban Planning Review (cheng shi gui hua), 2004(05), 43–50. 9. Gordis, J. (2009). On the value and values of Jewish social entrepreneurship. Journal of Jewish Communal Service, 84(1/2), 37–44. 10. Peredo, A. M. & Chrisman, J. J. (2006). Toward a theory of community-based enterprise. The Academy of Management Review, 31(2), 309–328. 11. Cook, M. L., & Plunkett, B. A. (2006). Collective entrepreneurship: An emerging phenomenon in producer-owned organization. Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, 38(2), 421– 428. 12. Soja, E. W. (2011). Postmodern geographies: The reassertion of space in critical social theory (2nd ed., p. 91). Verso.

Chapter 6

Struggles Over Power and Urban Regeneration Mode in the Tianzifang Experiment

In the previous chapter, we have talked about the story of community-based collective entrepreneurship in Tianzifang. It is a genuine innovation within the Chinese public system as its key of success lies in governance innovation at the local level. In this chapter, from the perspective of the local government, one of the main players in this entrepreneurship process, the story of Tianzifang continues, with a focus on the innovative experiment that transcended the mainstream mode of urban regeneration. This experiment reveals the struggle of power and concept in the production of space. Today, as the Shanghai Municipal Government has announced the target of negative growth in urban construction land, the Tianzifang experience, i.e., making use of existing spaces to revitalize dilapidated neighborhoods and protect historical contexts of the city, provides a model for future urban renewal projects.

6.1 The Tianzifang Experiment: An Attempt to Transend the Dominant Mode of Urban Regeneration Within the System Over the past three decades, Tianzifang and Xintiandi, built in old Shanghai Shikumen alleyways, have become two of the most renowned urban regeneration projects in Shanghai, both of which were believed to have an unpromising future in the beginning but are now among the most attractive fashion and creativity centers. They were both developed by big names, for instance, when speaking of Xintiandi, people will naturally think of Vincent Lo,1 the Hong Kong real estate 1

Vincent Lo is the Chairman of Hong Kong Shui On Group. He invested extensively in Chinese mainland from late 1980s, mainly developing building materials, real estates and other businesses in western, southern and eastern China. From 1990, Shui On Group started the development of Xintiandi Project in downtown Shanghai. Completed in 2001, Xintiandi is a leisure pedestrian area of food, business, entertainment and culture built on reconstituted traditional Shikumen architectures © Tongji University Press 2023 H. Yu and H. Zou, Shanghai Narrative, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-3261-0_6

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tycoon of Shui On Group. In order to preserve the outlines and appearances of Shikumen, Lo spent more than 20,000 CNY per square meter on renovation, a price that the most upscale apartment in Shanghai at the time would cost. No wonder his staff claimed that they were “following a crazy general manager doing crazy things”. Some even said Lo were making a bet on Xintiandi. In any case, it was Shui On Group that made Xintiandi a success. When it comes to Tianzifang,2 it is not so easy to identify one person who has played a similar role as Vincent Lo did. Some might name Chen Yifei, who was the first to move his studio to Taikang Road, and transformed this unassuming lane into a much-sought-after spot famous for creative industries with his own public appeal. Unfortunately, he passed away before Tianzifang eventually survived the most difficult time and welcomed its heyday. Some might also mention Huang Yongyu, who invented the name Tianzifang to replace Zhichengfang, an ordinary Shanghai lane on No. 210 Taikang Road.3 However, although many have heard of the name Tianzifang, very few know it is Huang Yongyu who invented it. Certainly many people have contributed to the making of Tianzifang, but without Mr. Z,4 the experiment of Tianzifang would have been aborted half way. While Vincent Lo succeeded in Xintiandi with full support from the government, Z made his way by challenging the government’s displacement and reconstruction project to protect Tianzifang. Tianzifang’s success was not an unintentional result but nudged by people’s initiatives, creativity and courage. It was never certain whether Tianzifang would succeed or not, as it was born with a dim future, and thus its achievement seemed incredible. Its rough experience was a result of internal challenges to the dominant modes of urban regeneration from within the government system, as well as earnest practices of new urban renovation mode that embraces and promotes urban contexts, creative industries, resident interests and social justice. In fact, the government-led demolition and reconstruction campaign of old blocks has always been highly controversial. With historical blocks vanishing in the roar of with unique Shanghainese style. It is also a tourist site displaying the historical and cultural look of Shanghai. 2 The Tianzifang renewal project started from dispelling street venders in 1998, and later leasing inactive neighborhood factories to establish art studios. With the expansion of business to neighboring residential areas, it gradually formed a mixed community pattern of residence, cultural industries and service industries, and became a base for creative works of many artists as well as a landmark habitat of fashion and creative industries in Shanghai. 3 In 2001, after Huang Yongyu, an outstanding artist, visited Chen Yifei’s Art Studio, he named the place Tianzifang. The name is originated from Records of the Grand Historian of China (shi ji), which recorded the most longevous painter in China’s history called Tian Zifang (田子方). Huang used the similar pronunciation, but changed the last character by adding a part of “earth” (土), meaning a piece of land that gathers scholars, artists and designers. 4 Mr. Z was Party Secretary and Director of Dapuqiao Sub-district of Luwan District from 1997 to 2004. Taikang Road Culture Street was created during his term under his initiation and leadership, and later developed into Tianzifang which gathers cultural and creative industries. Since 2002, Tianzifang has been facing the threat of being demolished from time to time. Z went all out in persuading the government to change its plan and keep the Tianzifang project. In 2008, the originally planned real estate project was eventually cancelled in the adjusted plan.

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bulldozers, architects and urban planners disapprove the crude approach that disregards the fabrics of urban space, and sociologists are concerned about social justice in the process. Displacement projects drive away not only people, but also their social relationships, i.e., “the organic nature of displaced residents’ life structure, the legitimacy of their wish for individual, family and neighborhood life, as well as the importance of their identities, all of which were not endowed with sufficient value and meanings of justice”.5 As ordinary residents were relocated from downtown areas to suburbs and city peripheries, they left the inner city to make way for the wealthy class, resulting in gentrification and luxuriation of downtown areas. Many critics point out that this has led to new stratification and polarization of the urban social space, and in the meantime reduced the diversity of urban communities and its demographics, thereby diminishing the appeal of the downtown areas.6 Some overseas scholars have defined Shanghai’s urban redevelopment campaign since the 1990s as market-oriented neoliberalization and gentrification path, which are believed as causes for the rise of Shanghai and rationales for criticism of its lack in sociality and humanity.7 Questionings over the dominant modes of urban regeneration mainly come from academia and media, while different views or schemes within the government are hardly heard of. One possibility might be that there was no disagreement among government officials, since large-scale demolition and reconstruction had been widely accepted as the dominant mode of urban regeneration, as witnessed in cities across China as well as in Shanghai. According to statistics, Shanghai has dismantled 100 million square meters of old buildings and built several times more by the end of 2008. This largescale urban redevelopment campaign started in the early 1990s, during which 3.65 million square meters of run-down neighborhoods were pulled down. In 2010, China’s total land sale revenue amounted to 3 trillion CNY, one third of the annual fiscal revenue. In Beijing and Shanghai, revenue from land transfer accounted for half of their local revenues. Large-scale demolition and construction is well recognized within the government system as it can attain a number of objectives at the same time including infrastructure growth, urbanization, government performance, city image, and urban housing. Speaking highly of developing cities by land leasing system, Stephen N. S. Cheung even attributed the current achievements in China’s economic reforms to the creative utilization of land. “Without land auctions that enable foreign investors who know how to construct buildings to make a profit, there would have never been enough money to develop the city. Support from Beijing is far from sufficient. Shenzhen auctioned off the first piece of land on December 1, 1987, and it has become a

5

Chen [1]. See Fan [2] and Jacque [3]. 7 See He [4], He and Wu [5]. 6

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cosmopolitan with a population of 140 million today. Had not the money from land sales, you would never find a place called Shenzhen on the world map.”8 The second possibility is that there might be different opinions within the government system, but the dominant mode still overwhelmingly marches on in triumph. In the regular encounters and handlings of social conflicts caused by the large-scale demolition and construction mode, grassroots government officials have realized the unsustainable nature of this mode, which intensified the conflicts between government and residents, and was against the central government’s guideline of building a harmonious society. In light of this reality, these government officials hoped to implement urban renewal and renovation in a gradual way and a smaller scale which would show respect for history and care for people’s wellbeing. However, as this ideal mode proposed by the grassroots government officials could hardly bring any scale effect or spatial improvement, it had little chance to be put into serious practice. Although Xintiandi was not a product of the usual mode of large-scale demolition and construction, it was not a preservation project of historical blocks up to the standards of architecture protection experts either. As a matter of fact, its strongest opposition, might come from architecture protection experts. Nevertheless, it has generally taken the dominant mode of urban reconstruction, that is, a government-led mode of government-business cooperation. The government supports the development of historical blocks in a commercialist way and provides investment in infrastructure for urban regeneration projects. The Taipingqiao Greenbelt project and the mobilization of government manpower to relocate residents are two good examples of government-led gentrification of the old city, as Shenjing He argued.9 Even if there is a different plan proposed by lower-level officials that bears much better notions and values, it’s almost impossible to replace the dominant one recognized by the upper-level officials. In this sense, Tianzifang has provided an example of making impossible possible. Today, Tianzifang has been regarded as an official business card of Shanghai. Since 2002, however, the necessity to continue the Tianzifang experiment has caused heated controversy within the government. According to the official plan in 2004,10 today’s most popular commercial neighborhood in old Shikumen lanes would have been entirely torn down to make way for Taiwan ASE Group’s real estate project. Without the persistence and endeavors of the proTianzifang force represented by Mr. Z, Tianzifang would have already stepped off the stage of the history. Its eventual survival was of course a result of the final decision made by the government. It is quite intriguing and difficult to know whether the officials made the decision in reluctance, or simply took the advantage of right time and situation. From the logic of officialdom, it is extremely unusual for a plan submitted by the subordinate to replace its superior’s, not to mention that, in this case, it was 8

Stephen N. S. Cheung, a famous economist who specializes in the fields of transaction costs and property rights. See http://www.aisixiang.com/data/39246.html. Accessed on April 21, 2021. 9 He [4]. 10 In 2004, A Detailed Plan for Xinxinli Area was made, which proposed to develop the neighborhood where Tianzifang is located into a district center of business and office buildings. A land leasehold agreement was also signed with a Taiwanese real estate company.

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an unplanned project submitted by the subordinate overtaking an officially approved one by superior officials. This reversal was indeed very unique. The story that the district government changed its own planning to be in tune with the trend of the times and made a reversal in terms of legitimacy also deserves to be further affirmed and widely spread. The case of Tianzifang is about a struggle over the dominant power in modes. Which concept, mode and values have made Tianzifang? “There was no state funding, but cultural input; no development of the land value, but exploitation of cultural resources; no displacement of residents, but renewal in the urban form and enhancement of urban functions.”11 This mode was called “the Shanghai version of SOHO”12 by Ruan Yisan, a nationwide well-known expert on traditional architecture protection. Whether we can find a same copy or a more advanced version in other places, the Tianzifang case alone has provided abundant experiences and lessons for us to reflect on and learn from.

6.2 From the Symbolic Power of Cultural Industries to the Discourse Power of Urban Regeneration Tianzifang’s renewal started with the transformation of inactive neighborhood factories to develop cultural industries in 1998. Small step as it was, it had important implications for the area, as it provoked further stories. On the one hand, in line with the national strategy, the urban regeneration of Shanghai was also a result of districtlevel competition, since sub-district governments all became active economic agents in the city’s extensive process of old-area redevelopment. On the other hand, due to the Asian financial crisis in 1997, the real estate industry encountered a downturn, with 14 inactive plots of land not in use but “only exposed to sunshine” in Luwan District. Hence, the district government warmly welcomed the sub-district’s suggestion to transform old factories for the use of cultural industries. In this sense, being completely different from the Xintiandi process, Tianzifang found its opportunity amid Shanghai’s “great leap forward” movement and the financial crisis. At that time, no one had a clear vision what Tianzifang—Taikang Road Art Street, to be exact13 —would become. The Xintiandi project team knew its goal well from the very beginning, as it aims to create a world-class business community, another CBD in Shanghai, through the joint efforts by a team of world-leading planners, designers and architects. Ten years later, they succeeded as expected. Tianzifang, 11

Lou, J. 2006. “Creative Shikumen: Shanghai’s New Attempt for Protecting Historical Blocks (chuang yi shi ku men: shang hai bao hu li shi she qu xin chang shi)”, People’s Daily, Sept. 11, 2006. 12 Ruan, Y. 2004. “Protecting SOHO in Shanghai (bao hu shang hai ‘su he’)”, People’s Daily (East China), May 26, 2004. 13 Tianzifang is located on Taikang Road. At the beginning of its renovation, it was officially called Taikang Road Art Street instead of Tianzifang. It has established its own administrative committee, association and other organizations.

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however, with no clear picture of the future, was only regarded as a trial to seek for a breakthrough in the development bottleneck and explore a new way of urban regeneration. Since it was just an experiment, it would be quite natural if it failed. Even for Mr. Z, he had no ambition to build Tianzifang into a new landmark of Luwan District, let alone that of Shanghai. Instead, his ambition did not arise until Tianzifang attracted a number of famous artists who brought in new ideas. After Chen Yifei and Mr. W14 joined the team, Tianzifang began to seek a more aggressive, ideal and unique way of development. With Chen as a master of art and Mr. W as a business expert, their coalition made a breakthrough for the art street. Their capabilities represented the spontaneous creativity of the society. Chen Yifei’s reputation and influence were recognized by both the private and public sector. As the public system began to recognize heroes in the private sector, it also appreciates heroes and capitals in the market, in additional to art and professional heroes as well as cultural capitals. Chen’s presence brought Tianzifang more survival and development opportunities than other development experiments. The strength of Tianzifang came from both the legitimate power of the sub-district government and the spontaneous creativity of the society, offering an alternative way to the dominant urban regeneration and development mode. The dominant way here refers to the capital-intensive development mode that is led by power, in which urban land usage, spatial pattern and demographic composition are determined by capital in accordance with its desire for increment. In comparison, the Tianzifang one is characterized as more intensive in terms of cultural creativity, advanced ideas and historical information. In the absence of financial capital, the initiators of Tianzifang attempted to create cultural capital by developing cultural industries in neighborhood factories. When it finally succeeded in transforming these abandoned factories into an industrial space rich in cultural implications, Tianzifang had not only created cultural and symbolic capitals, but also obtained the discourse power in its dialogues with power capitals, a type of power that is expressed through cultural capital. Tianzifang also had a name change from Taikang Road to Tianzifang, which was an extraordinary experience of social naming, social classification, and sanctification.15 Since TIAN Zifang (田子方) was the first documented painter in Chinese history, the naming of Tianzifang (田子坊) successfully changed something “worldly” into “sacred”. (With similar pronunciation and identical alphabetics, the last Chinese characters of “fang” are different, and the second “fang” mostly refers to places or city subdivision.) According to Bourdieu’s theory, this naming did not only indicate a cultural naming, but also the production of symbolic capital. 14

Mr. W once worked in the culture section of the government, and later quitted to do business. He was introduced to Mr. Z through friends and joined him in the renovation project of Tianzifang. He invited a number of famous artists to be stationed in Tianzifang including Chen Yifei and Deke Erh, and established Tianzifang Investment Co., Ltd., with himself as legal representative and chief designer. 15 The social naming of Tianzifang is a threefold naming process, i.e., naming of the art space, of the industrial space, and of the historical space. This chapter only analyzes the significance of the art space naming. A detailed account of the whole naming process can be found in Chap. 7 “The Three-stage Social Naming of Space in Tianzifang”.

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Note the difference of the naming and classification work between Huang Yongyu and the state authority. The state naming is a kind of symbolic capital allocated by governmental institutions and plays the role of sanctification within the system. Take the National Teaching Achievement Award conferred by the Ministry of Education as an example, since Chinese education institutions are part of the public system, state naming represents reputational capital and symbolic power. But the fame of the art market, creative industries and fashion culture, or in other words, cultural influence, cultural capital and symbolic capital, etc., are usually claimed by socially well-recognized artists. In other words, social naming is more valuable and is much easier to be recognized by the society. Therefore, the importance of Huang Yongyu’s naming shall be never neglected. Such a social naming would not be acknowledged or tolerated by the opposing force of the Tianzifang project, because to acknowledge the name of Tianzifang was to acknowledge the cultural and symbolic powers of the naming. Before 2008, all official files concerning Tianzifang used Taikang Road as its official name. When debating whether to retain the Tianzifang project, leaders who were against the project therefore rebuked Tianzifang for being fake and fictitious, insisting that there was no Tianzifang but only Taikang Road. Mr. Z retaliated that “if Tianzifang were fake, so is Xintiandi. There has only been Taipingqiao16 but no Xintiandi at all”.17 The debate over the authenticity of the name is, in essence, a struggle over symbolic power, cultural power, as well as economic power behind it. Xintiandi represents not only a development mode, but also a new and recognized urban cultural space and a new landmark of the city. What it has approved is not only the legitimacy of the developer’s concept, but also of the government’s urban regeneration schemes and policies. In addition to a cultural success, Xintiandi also represents a business and economic success. Before the Tianzifang project was legitimized, Luwan District took its utmost pride in Xintiandi as the most successful urban renewal project. Hence, both sides threw themselves into the naming debate without any hesitation. Was it just for a name? Certainly not. Underneath the naming debate lies the classification of realities. “The social sciences must take as their object of study the social operations of naming and the rites of institution through which they are accomplished… they must examine the part played by words in the construction of social reality.”18

16

The Xintiandi project was located in Taipingqiao Area in Shanghai, with the full name of “the Taipingqiao Area reconstruction plan”. Xintiandi was a new name for the entertainment, shopping and leisure area after renovation. 17 See interview with Mr. Z, Mar. 12, 2011. 18 Bourdieu [6].

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6.3 Key Elements of China’s Dominant Urban Regeneration Mode As a result of the debate over Tianzifang’s name, the experiment received a boycott, as earlier revealed. The turning point of its development came with the real estate boom in the twenty-first century, when Luwan District settled on developing Tianzifang and its adjacent plot into a new business center. The previous spontaneous development of Tianzifang had to be halted and the conflict over its existence began when the site was to be demolished and rebuilt entirely. A number of issues were highlighted as conflicts deepened. First of all, it is still the government who led the large-scale development through demolition and construction19 ; and under such mode the goal of preservation is to ensure the success of commercialism rather than preservation in the real sense or protection of residents’ benefits. Secondly, although the dominant mode is liberal and market-oriented, it does not equal to market fundamentalist. Instead of pure liberalism, the Chinese way is more aimed at tracking government performance, which is measured either by GDP alone or by urban beautification and greening, with the latter usually of no economic output. For the purpose of urban greening, Shanghai government demolished buildings and bought big trees to create green areas and woods in the city. As a result, the total area of green space in Shanghai has increased several-fold in the past three decades, at the fastest speed among all metropolises around the world. With the sheer pursuit of GDP, to list greening as one of the city’s strategies seems rare and contradictory for a world metropolis. But it is essentially consistent with the GDP pursuit, as both are aimed at government performance. To prioritize economic benefits and to develop landscape without cost-control are both typical Chinese practices. In both cases, however, one of the key performance indicators would certainly include improving people’s livelihoods. Urban redevelopment in the 1980s was neither market-oriented nor GDP-oriented. Improving housing conditions was a major task for the municipal government, which was an inherent requirement of the political monopoly system: i.e., responsibility was also monopolized and could not be transferred to others. In the 1990s, urban redevelopment gained not only resources but also momentum from the marketization process. As it clashed with social values and the goal of improving people’s livelihood, economic development and capital interests outweighed the interests of the residents. Such a social geographical policy of large-scale demolition and construction along with the massive displacement from downtown areas to suburbs and city peripheries, somewhat deviated from the goal to improve people’s livelihood and secure social justice. Nevertheless, people’s livelihood was not entirely neglected, because in reality the government did have improved the housing conditions of local residents, and created property rights for the residents. The municipal government and its officials attributed the improvement to their own achievements, acknowledged its social and moral values, but failed to take full 19

The mode of large-scale development through demolition and construction is what Lefebvre calls “the production of space”. See Chap. 11 for a detailed account.

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account of people’s losses in other values caused by the massive displacement to the suburbs. Such losses include increased inconveniences in terms of public transportation, public services and job opportunities; loss of positive individual experiences and collective memories of the alleyway neighborhood life; the deprived right to live in downtown; the destruction of urban space structure and social fabrics, as well as the disappearance of historical blocks and local contexts. Most officials put material and physical improvement as the priority and do not take overall values into account. More importantly, such a mode of land sale and capital-led downtown development is a perfect solution to the funding shortage, the long-plagued major problem that has restrained the government to meet the needs of improving people’s livelihood and building infrastructures. Therefore, it became a dominant mode, and was internalized as beliefs of the officials. As a result, all the urban local governments across China have embarked on this snobbish urban renewal path, of which the main driving forces are local revenue and local development. Consequently, the urban development took a shift in value orientation from equality to efficiency, from “people-oriented” to “capital-oriented”, with the latter rarely receiving effective check and balance. Since the government is the major beneficiary and operator of this mode, there is slim possibility to engender truly powerful challenges and objections within the government system. Thirdly, although power capital may favor cultural capital, this will not alter the status of cultural elites as the ruled group of the ruling class. This was suggested by Bourdieu, and fits very well with this case.20 Hence, when the authority is determined to cave out of its way, it could say no to the cultural elites, although it is usually to be avoided. In 2004, Chen Yifei launched a campaign for Tianzifang’s survival. With his broad political contacts and social influence, his voice was naturally much greater than those of the small and medium-scaled shop owners in Tianzifang. However, it was not him who achieved the ultimate reversal. From the very beginning, Tianzifang was some kind of “freak”: it was taken charge by government officials and had the legitimacy of state power, but its concept and relying strength mainly came from the society, i.e., the professional, international and market forces. This is also a combination of politics, business and society, but different from the mainstream combination of politics and business, or alliance of powerful authority and capital, which has little or no spontaneous social forces and even less reflection of the wills of the general public. But the former one is featured with both “mainstream” and spontaneous social forces. It is generally recognized that Tianzifang would not have been so creative and enchanting without spontaneous social forces. But Tianzifang would have lacked institutional resources for political legitimacy without local subdistrict government officials in charge of the project and giving a group of artists or market-oriented artists great freedom, as the government could have stopped the experiment at any time—in case it did impede the government’s local development plan.

20

As Bourdieu pointed out, “intellectuals more generally, are a ‘dominated fraction of the dominant class’.” See Bourdieu and Wacquant [7].

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This precisely proves that no matter how much the authority favors culture and professionalism, the Chinese way of authority-led urban development would not like nor accept other forces to be its equal partners and participants. This is the reason for Tianzifang’s survival. Most Chinese officials would neither take the “laissezfaire” attitude towards spontaneous social forces as Mr. Z did, nor be as brave and persevering as Mr. Z to challenge superiors and insist when his superiors called for a stop. This is why Tianzifang succeeded and survived despite so much difficulty. It is perhaps the only one reason—if it has to be confined to one.

6.4 The Core Discourse of “Tianzifang”: Bringing Social Principles Back to Urban Regeneration As a friend of Mr. Z commented, “Tianzifang has lived twice, the past and present. It strived for survival in the past life, and is forced to develop in the present life. It’s like playing the game of contract bridge. At the first glance, you can’t call your own cards into a game, but with several rounds of competitive bidding by opponents, a game is made finally. The Tianzifang game was indeed “lifted” and achieved in the process of demolition and anti-demolition.”21 It is very incisive and witty to use the metaphor of “bidding to game”, which pinpointed the key to Tianzifang’s success—the debate over demolition vs. anti-demolition, and the essence of this debate—a debate over concepts, will be discussed in the following part. The following stories would have rarely happened in government-supported projects, and were even less likely to last for up to four or five years. All the most exciting, intriguing and instructive stories took place during the struggle for the survival of Tianzifang. This was not only a battle between different powers, but also one between different concepts and modes. It was a power struggle, in which conflicts occurred not only within the government itself, but also between the government and the society. Within the public system, Mr. Z held almost no legitimacy at all. The debate on whether Tianzifang should remain actually reflected a competition between a legitimate plan brought up by superior officials which was in line with the overall development blueprint of Luwan District, versus an unplanned, spontaneous experiment initiated by a lower-ranking official. To insist on keeping the Tianzifang project meant not only going against the overall development blueprint, but also impeding the development of Luwan District. If disagreements only existed between the superior and the subordinate, it would be reasonable, legitimate and trouble-free to stop the Tianzifang project. But there were disagreements even within the leadership regarding the fate of Tianzifang, which were intertwined with the power struggle between these officials and were transformed into supporting forces or at least sympathy for Tianzifang. For several 21

See Zhang Jianjun’s article on his blog: Lao Zheng and his Tianzifang (lao zheng he ta de tian zi fang). http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_492698b10100d2nh.html Accessed on April 21, 2021. Zhang was the one who introduced W to Z.

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times, Tianzifang faced the threats of being demolished, but every time it managed to head off the danger eventually. Besides Mr. Z’s persistence, supporting forces as well as checks and balances from within the government system should not be overlooked either. Besides, the power struggle also has its political and societal implications. Though supporting forces for demolition and reconstruction of Tianzifang prevailed within the government, voices against demolition and for the Tianzifang experiment of space transformation predominated on the social side. These voices did not come from ordinary people, but from leading scholars like Ruan Yisan, Zheng Shiling, Li Wuwei and others, and from government newspapers on both central and local levels including People’s Daily, Jiefang Daily.22 The government could neither ignore the voices of the cultural and academic elites, nor neglect those of the mainstream media, which better represent the symbolic power of the system. Since the superiors’ plan has no advantage in terms of knowledge, concept or discourse, this power struggle, according to Bourdieu, was somewhat equivalent to a conflict between the public power represented by the government on the one side, versus the cultural power represented by elites and the public opinion power represented by the media on the other side. If there was no consistent and unified message from the government, a debate between the government and society would be useless. What happened in Tianzifang was more of a concept clash, as both sides were convinced of their own concept and turned a blind eye to the other’s. This also proved that concept was the very agitating, disturbing and inspiring drive for this struggle. The real invention in Mr. Z’s story was to have constructed a “Tianzifang discourse”—to be precise, Mr. Z could not take all the credit himself to construct such a discourse. As early as when Tianzifang was still in its infancy, Zhang Jianjun who was in charge of the renewal project of Huaihai Road contributed a concept of “street and alley economy” to the Tianzifang project, and later another one of “soft renewal” when striving for the government’s support to change its plan and give up hard renewal plan (i.e., demolition and reconstruction) of Tianzifang. A truly impressive discourse and concept building campaign kicked off when Z’s team invited a group of architects, urban planners and economists to Tianzifang for fieldwork and case study, and ended when Ruan Yisan and Li Wuwei introduced and promoted Tianzifang to the public in academic language. Ruan Yisan acknowledged Tianzifang’s renewal plan of preserving old architectures and the historical block, and highly praised the artists for reinventing them and making Tianzifang a place “with rich local features, highlighting the vivid characters of the present time and showcasing the genuine life of the Shanghainese people”. Ruan Yisan knew well of Tianzifang’s situation and had his reasons to worry. “As land interests, previous promises and worldly biases will all hinder the emergence of SOHO in Shanghai (referring to Tianzifang), it is highly possible to be nipped in the bud.”23 Ruan used the title of “Protecting SOHO 22

Between 2003 and 2005, famous architects, urban heritage preservation experts and economic sociologists all wrote articles to discuss and support the Tianzifang project from perspectives of heritage preservation, spatial aesthetics, creative industries and others. 23 Ruan, Y. 2004. “Protecting SOHO in Shanghai (bao hu shang hai ‘su he’)”, People’s Daily (East China), May 26, 2004.

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in Shanghai” to express the common wish of all the experts who love and affirm the concept of Tianzifang. This was a crucial step in Z’s efforts to gain support from the society to protect Tianzifang. As he wrote in a letter to me, “under the guidance of Academician Zheng Shiling, Prof. Ruan Yisan and others, I realized the value of Tianzifang in its physical space and its urban development mode; while with advices from Li Wuwei, Chen Yifei and others, I realized the value of cultural industries in Tianzifang.” Making use of the discourse by academic elites, Mr. Z constructed a meaningful narrative for Tianzifang, a narrative of its legitimacy: the legitimacy of protecting historical blocks and the advanced nature of cultural industry development. Z’s efforts in getting discourse support indicated his political savvy in approaches and concerns, and value concern in particular was the very core of his Tianzifang project. He was encouraged and inspired by President Hu Jintao’s instruction in the report of the 17th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party to “create conditions so that more people can gain property income”, and paraphrased the central government’s discourse into the political legitimacy of the Tianzifang mode to encourage direct participation of residents. Tianzifang’s expansion from “alleyway factories” to “neighborhood for residents” took place under this philosophy. For the sake of the welfare of residents, Mr. Z supported the original inhabitants to lease their houses for business use in order to increase income and create welfare value. By this, he generated a pattern of interests, which planted a hidden political danger that compulsory demolishing was believed to lead to instability and disharmony, a most powerful and dangerous buzz that an official of lower level in hierarchy could create. This was another effort by Z to strive for support from the society, but this time from the bottom of the society instead of social elites, and hence had entirely different political implications. The mainstream ideology always claims to adhere to the interests of the masses and follow the mass line, but specific interests of the masses are defined by grassroot party authorities and governments. Any definition, if not in line with the superior authorities, is doomed to be politically incorrect and hence unbearable by the CPC disciplines. In terms of the concept design and intention, there was no fault for Z to allow residents to participate directly in the urban development project, but when it came to implementation, policy and law, it was inappropriate or even illegal (e.g., the issue of changing living to non-living). Therefore, he had to bear not only the responsibility of decision-making, but also political and legal responsibilities, all of which were hanging above him like the Sword of Damocles that could lead to serious consequences. Very few officials would have been willing to take all risks for a project that would bring them no economic benefits. To find opponents within the system with comparable sentimental, conceptual and moral energy to challenge Mr. Z is quite difficult. Open-minded government officials like Mr. Z who also fear nothing, hold the power of many advanced discourses, and uphold the moral principle to bring benefits to people as well as the passion to explore a sustainable way of urban regeneration, are not likely to bow down unless being succumbed to authority and power hierarchy. Therefore, the final success of Mr. Z did not take place because of good luck; rather, it was the choice of history. At stake were not only concept and moral principles, but also emotions and will. Mr. Z could have failed at any moment, because power was not on his side, and the dominant

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mode was still very prevalent and well-accepted among government officials. But since Mr. Z eventually won, his success must be attributed to a matter of natural justice: i.e., the justice of CPC’s governing principle—to serve the people, and the justice of the human scale in urban development. Let’s get back to the topic of power. In the Chinese context, the ultimate legitimacy must come from organizational powers. Therefore, to justify the legitimacy of Tianzifang, arguments provided by scholars including Ruan Yisan, Zheng Shiling, Li Wuwei and others were far from effective, rather, recognition and acknowledgement by the government were needed. Cultural elites were not alone in favoring Tianzifang, in fact, many higher-ranking officials also liked it. They liked it for many reasons, either to satisfy their own nostalgic feelings, or to endorse a regeneration mode bringing people benefits without causing any disturbance, all of which, even simply for personal appreciation and preference, would also be interpreted as hints and reminders by subordinates, thereby affecting the policy approach of the subordinate officials in charge of the project (Fig. 6.1). Besides, the increasing awareness of historical block preservation, along with the international trend of the SOHO concept and the successful demonstration of Xintiandi, all led to a swing to keep the Tianzifang project. Under these circumstances, the district authority had to consider the appreciation of Tianzifang from higher authorities, to take the authority of academic elites’ discourses and their

Fig. 6.1 Shanghai municipal leaders visiting Tianzifang. Photo by Zhang Yunyun (Mr. Z—first from left in the front row; Chen Yifei—first from right in the front row)

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public influence into consideration, and to act in accordance with the new fashion in Shanghai, such as the renaissance of Shikumen that had softened and changed the existing standpoint. For the development-oriented officials, it is easy to adapt to the perception of a mixed use of historical blocks to exert their historical, commercial and tourist values. The Chinese government authority has its own opinions and logic, and will not succumb to foreign interferences or influences on China’s core political principles. It is however very sensitive to international trends, not only because its urban development follows international trends, but also because such a convergence is crucial to the validity and legitimacy of its governance. Since China’s reform and opening-up policy, to keep pace with international trends has always been one of the sources of Chinese local government’s motivation and legitimacy. Thanks to all the above-mentioned reasons, the turning point finally came. Most people held oppositions before because they didn’t clearly foresee the value and significance of Tianzifang. In their eyes, they only saw the immediate economic value of large-scale demolition and reconstruction and the success of the ASE real estate project. Not until in 2006 did it become obvious that Tianzifang could be made a highlight in the performances of the government leadership and a glorified business card of Luwan District. So what was the big deal if we had to lose several buildings of ASE24 ? In this way the dominant development concept and the alternative renovation concept were finally on the same page. As a result, Tianzifang, the wild child, eventually returned to the embrace of the government. Tianzifang was posted on the official website of Luwan District and presented to the world as “the business card of Luwan”. This is not simply a narration of one individual, but a story of one person and one place, which reveals the most creative and dramatic experiences and lessons in the urban regeneration of Shanghai over the past thirty years. The stories of conflicts mentioned in this chapter was invisible on site. To preserve these historical lanes where old Shanghai street life with fun and calm took place were neither easy nor insignificant but required hardship and efforts. The hard-lived experiences of Tianzifang might discourage many of its followers. As far as I know, quite a number of projects have been under preparation by other districts in order to build their own Tianzifang, but I can hardly be optimistic, because the success of Tianzifang counted on not only Shikumen and Deke Erh, but also a good leader and enthusiast like Mr. Z. As he told me, “with the guidance of Prof. Zhu Ronglin, Zhang Jianjun and some municipal and district leaders, and through my intensive interactions with the residents during the development of Tianzifang, I came to establish a deep understanding of the values and goals that an administration should pursue.” I believe many government officials in Luwan and other districts of Shanghai also share the same concept and values as Mr. Z, but unless they are ready to take risks and pay all prices as Mr. Z did, it is impossible to make another Tianzifang. It is certainly too much to demand bureaucratic officials take the plunge easily, and no one has the right to request so. It is by no means Mr. Z’s wish to make

24

See Zhang Jianjun’s article on his blog: Lao Zheng and his Tianzifang (lao zheng he ta de tian zi fang). http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_492698b10100d2nh.html Accessed on April 21, 2021.

References

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Tianzifang a sole and unique case. Nor would it be of any good for Luwan District and the city of Shanghai. Therefore, it is the major concern and real purpose of this chapter, by a narration of the government actors in the creation of Tianzifang, to discuss whether the spontaneity and creativity of the society, as well as the political and social benefits of residents’ participation, could inspire us to reflect on the gains and losses of the dominant urban development mode and soften the GDP-oriented stance.

References 1. Chen, Y. (2008). Crisis of legitimacy and nationality in Urban development (cheng shi kai fa de zheng dang xing wei ji yu he li xing kong jian). Journal of Sociological Studies (she hui xue yan jiu), 2008(3), 29. 2. Fan, W. (2004). Protection and regeneration of Shanghai Lanes (shang hai li long de bao hu yu geng xin) (p. 39). Shanghai Science and Technology Press (shang hai ke xue ji shu chu ban she). 3. Jacque, P. (Ed.). (2010). Villes: Changer de trajectoire (Regards sur la terre 2010) (Chinese translation: cheng shi: gai bian fa zhan gui ji) (p. 54). Social Sciences Academic Press (she hui ke xue wen xian chu ban she). 4. He, S. (2007). State-sponsored gentrification under market transition—The case of Shanghai. Urban Affairs Review, 43(2), 171–198. 5. He, S., & Wu, F. (2009). China’s emerging neoliberal Urbanism: Perspectives from Urban redevelopment. Antipode, 41(2), 282–304. 6. Bourdieu, P. (1999). Language and symbolic power (p. 105). Harvard University Press. 7. Bourdieu, P., & Wacquant, L. J. D. (1992). An invitation to reflexive sociology (p. 104). University of Chicago Press.

Chapter 7

The Three-Stage Social Naming of Space in Tianzifang

The story of Tianzifang in this chapter focuses on its social naming. In Lefebvre’s triadic framework of space, it falls into the category of the representations of space, or symbolic space, i.e. the construction of a conceptual space or symbolic space that is understandable, shareable and recognizable through the work of discourse building. As a well-known place in today’s Shanghai, Tianzifang was nothing but an ordinary alleyway over a decade ago. More precisely, there was no Tianzifang at all, because it was called Taikang Road at that time. By balancing the needs of resident interests, social justice, creative industries and urban cultural contexts, an inclusive experiment of inner-city redevelopment converted Tianzifang into the most famous brand of the cultural and creative industries in Shanghai, as well as a landmark and cultural business card of Shanghai. Tianzifang was awarded the title of “Famous Shanghai Trademark (regional brand)” by Shanghai Municipal Bureau of Quality and Technical Supervision in 2000, and was listed as one of the first 18 Creative Industrial Agglomeration Areas by Shanghai Municipal Committee of Economy and Informatization in May, 2004. Later, it was also awarded by the Publicity Department of the CPC Shanghai Municipal Committee as one of the first Cultural Industry Demonstration Bases. Since its establishment, Tianzifang has received a number of honors granted by both national and local governments, including China’s Best Creative Industry Park, Shanghai’s Top Ten Fashion Landmarks, Most Influential Brand, among the others. During the 2010 World EXPO Shanghai, Tianzifang was selected as a designated host by the municipal and district governments to receive guests from all over the world. In 2012, it won the Most Popular Industrial Park Award of the “Golden Tripod Award” by the Yangtze River Delta Cultural and Creative Industries Union. The main topic of this chapter is “social naming”, as it is the key strategy for the industrial space of Tianzifang to achieve its tremendous influence from the perspective of brand building. The process of Tianzifang’s social naming can be analyzed from three stages: the naming of an art space by Chen Yifei and Huang Yongyu; the naming of an industrial space by Li Wuwei; and finally, the naming of a historical space by Ruan Yisan.

© Tongji University Press 2023 H. Yu and H. Zou, Shanghai Narrative, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-3261-0_7

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The proposal of this three-staged social naming is made by employing Lefevbre’s framework of symbolic space, as well as Bourdieu’s theories of social naming and classification. While Bourdieu held a social critical view,1 this chapter tries to take a neutral stand in criticism. To put in a better way, it does not focus on Bourdieu’s social critique of discourses in particular, but on seeing social naming as a methodology for theories of social reality construction and social cognition, so as to provide a sociological interpretation of brand building in addition to communicational theories.

7.1 Bourdieu’s Theories of Social Naming and Classification Bourdieu’s theory of social naming includes the following points. Firstly, the social world is not only being what it is, but also being what its agents represent and construct, “a ‘being perceived’, which even if it closely depends on their being, is never totally reducible to this.”2 Therefore, social world realism is bound to be social world representationalism at the same time. Secondly, social representations “do not simply mirror social relations but help constitute them, then one can, within limits, transform the world by transforming its representation”.3 Thirdly, social sciences deal with pre-named, pre-classified realities which bear proper nouns and common nouns, titles, signs and acronyms. “The social sciences must take as their object of study the social operations of naming and the rites of institution through which they are accomplished. But on a deeper level, they must examine the part played by words in the construction of social reality and the contribution which the struggle over classifications, a dimension of all class struggles, makes to the constitution of classes—classes defined in terms of age, sex or social position, but also clans, tribes, ethnic groups or nations.”4 How to understand Bourdieu’s theories of social representation and social naming? Let’s try to understand them from four levels. The first level is how to understand social reality. Unlike the self-sufficiency of natural reality (for instance, as Confucius asked, Does Heaven speak? The four seasons pursue their courses, and all things are continually being produced.), social reality is from the very beginning to be uttered and represented, otherwise there will be no identifiable reality as it cannot be understood or expressed by people. The reality, to people living in it, is a world full of meanings which certainly have their objective origins but have to be

1

As Wacquant summarized the social critiques and political analyses of Bourdieu’s theories of classification and social naming, “Classes and other antagonistic social collectives are continually engaged in a struggle to impose the definition of the world that is most congruent with their particular interests.” See Bourdieu and Wacquant [1]. 2 Bourdieu [2]. 3 See footnote 1. 4 Bourdieu [3].

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uttered and defined by people per se. In short, to name the society is to construct it, and hence to change the naming will in a certain sense change the society. The second level is related to the representation theory. It is the words that name and classify social realities, but not every naming word plays a role in constructing the reality. In Bourdieu’s view, only the official speech of the authorized spokesperson expressing himself in a solemn situation bears the authority of the institution.5 Hence, the key to understand the second level is to look at how and where the language is expressed as well as who delivered such speeches. By this we move to the third level, i.e., to understand the social operations of naming and the rites of institution through which naming is accomplished. Rite means authorization by the institution, either authorizing the language of a certain person or of a certain word. The ultimate goal is not naming itself, but rather to confirm that the naming of the character and order of the reality is accepted and followed by people attending the rite, or more accurately, by people engaging in the social practice. The final level is about political science. According to Bourdieu, social naming draws our attention to the social roles of language, not only in the constitution of social reality, but also in class struggle, as classes are in fact divided by different names. This view on class is very different from that of Karl Marx. On the one hand, it emphasizes the social classification and differentiated struggle of class distinction; and on the other hand, it points out that class distinction is not only an economic concept but also covers non-economic scopes such as culture, symbol, language, etc. The concept I borrowed in this chapter does not refer to Bourdieu’s political-science perspective of class struggle, however, since social naming actually involves debates over legitimacy and different modes, the political insight in this sense shows the inspiration I get from Bourdieu’s work in relation to the theme of this chapter.

7.2 The Three Stages of Naming for Tianzifang 7.2.1 From Taikang Road to Tianzifang: From the Secular to the Sacred The first stage of building Tianzifang as an industrial space brand, or the first stage of social naming, started by the two masters of art, Mr. Chen Yifei and Mr. Huang Yongyu. Tianzifang did not exist before Chen Yifei’s arrival. There was only Taikang Road. The cultural development plan of Taikang Road by local officials started its transformation. It was in the middle of the Asian Financial Crisis, so the government-led real estate development through large-scale demolition and construction encountered obstacles. Thanks to the fact that Taikang Road is located at the edge of Luwan 5

Ibid., p. 109.

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District, the superior government had no objection towards the plan of the district government to use inactive neighborhood factories for developing cultural industries. On the contrast, the proposal was warmly welcomed. Unfortunately, the developers only had visions and dreams but no concrete plans or ideas. Despite all efforts, the cultural neighborhood try-out didn’t get popular as expected. It was not until Chen Yifei’s arrival that Taikang Road, an unknown, ordinary street, was finally turned into Tianzifang, a well-known space for the emerging cultural industry. Tianzifang was a product of globalization and was developed because artists with cosmopolitan vision and New York SOHO concept—represented by Chen Yifei— discovered the aesthetic and historical values of the old alleyway space in Taikang Road. When Chen Yifei was invited to visit Taikang Road for the first time in 1998, he stopped at Lane 210 and lingered on for a long time, acclaiming, “What a great place it is! I have never expected to find such a great place in Shanghai.” At the dinner after the visit, Mr. Chen gave his suggestion on the development of Taikang Road. It should become a place to cultivate/incubate future artists, just like the SOHO area in New York City. SOHO area used to be a place full of abandoned factories but was then transformed into a place for young artists to improve their drawing skills and later evolved into a world-famous art space. We should do something for China’s future young artists, and to ensure a sound development of this place should definitely be high on the agenda.6

In January 2000, Chen Yifei Studio moved to the entrance of Lane 210 Taikang Road, covering over 500 m2 with five sections—an oil painting and sculpture studio, a club, a ceramic studio, etc. Since then, sculptor Xie Jianling, photographer Deke Erh and a number of other artists have all followed and based here. No one but artists who are familiar with the western SOHO concept can have such a vision to discover values from abandoned factory buildings; no one but accomplished artists with a good knowledge of the world’s latest design schools and styles would have the Midas touch to turn inactive factory buildings in local officials’ eyes into a widely appreciated art space. Local residents regarded old factory buildings as an abandoned and useless space. Thanks to the fact that none of the locals had a SOHO-like vision, these factory buildings on Taikang Road that were advertised for leasing received no attention at all. It was no coincidence that most of the early settlers at Tianzifang were famous artists with overseas living experiences. When modernism characterized with largescale demolition and construction was still prevailing in China, the concept of SOHO aimed at conservative reconstruction has matured in the West. Overseas experience together with professional insight made it possible for Chen Yifei and other top Chinese artists to discover the possibility to renew old neighborhoods neglected by the whole nation amid the claims to pull everything down. They noticed the catch of these areas that the locals were unable to see nor bothered to care, and consequently created a most cosmopolitan community from a most localized space. While Chen Yifei’s transformation of the Taikang Road space into a SOHO area or naming it SOHO is a functional event (the artisticalization and aestheticization 6

See Zhang Jianjun’s article on his blog: Lao Zheng and his Tianzifang (lao zheng he ta de tian zi fang). http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_492698b10100d2nh.html Accessed on April 21, 2021.

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of an industrial space) and a kind of spatial practice in Lefebvre’s term, the naming by Huang Yongyu, who renamed Taikang Road as Tianzifang (田子坊) after the first documented painter in Chinese history Tian Zifang (田子方), is sheer social or symbolic. Changing Taikang Road to Tianzifang was an extraordinarily significant experience of social naming, social classification and sanctification. Therefore, the naming of Tianzifang accomplished a process from “the secular” to “the sacred”, successfully distinguishing itself from other urban regeneration projects characterized with large-scale demolition and construction, including the ASE project located one block away. For most people, Tianzifang is a cultural landmark in Shanghai worth paying a visit to, while ASE is nothing more than a bustling place of consumerism. It is Huang Yongyu’s work of naming that has constructed people’s different perceptions of the two locations. According to Bourdieu’s classification theory, Huang has not only renamed a space, but also produced symbolic capital. Note that Huang’s naming was not an official act, therefore had no authority or sanctity as state naming would have. However, the symbolic power of symbolic capitals is not derived solely from state naming or official classification. For instance, the quality management standards ISO9000 and social responsibility standards SA8000 are both accredited by non-governmental third-party agencies, yet they are both international standards with universal symbolic efficacy. Similarly, in the process of spatial renovation and naming, to engage a renowned artist with significant industrial recognition and extensive social prestige has certainly played the role of social “Midas touch”. In essence, the artistic status and cultural prestige represent what Bourdieu calls cultural capital, or cultural power. Therefore, the naming of Tianzifang was by no means to be recognized by those who advocate the demolition plan, because to acknowledge the name “Tianzifang” means to acknowledge the validity of this naming in constructing reality. Hence, when conflicts arose regarding whether to continue the Tianzifang project, district leaders who argued for demolishing insisted that “there is no Tianzifang, only Taikang Road”. To respond, the Tianzifang development team borrowed the logic and replied headon that “if Tianzifang were fake, so is Xintiandi. There has only been Taipingqiao but no Xintiandi at all.”7 Xintiandi was named by the developer, but as a prototype of public–private partnership, it received no objection from the district leadership. After all, it is even labeled as a new mode for the inner-city regeneration, which is based on protection of historical contexts. This mode is a capitalized production of space in nature, however, in the case of Xintiandi, historical space became a capital under the name of historical blocks conservation.8 Therefore, we should look through the debate over the authenticity of the name and realize that the essence of this debate is a struggle over the cultural power, economic power, as well as development mode. Was the authenticity debate around the naming of Tianzifang merely for its name? Of course not, “but it must appear as a naming debate, because the social world is

7 8

See interview with the leader of the Tianzifang development team on Mar. 12, 2011. See Chap. 11, From Space Production to Community Building.

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formed through naming. It is by naming and creating a naming that people construct what in their mind is a new social world and social space.”9

7.2.2 Naming of an Industrial Space: Cultural Creative Industries While Chen Yifei’s cultural industry attracted more art entrepreneurs, it also brought Tianzifang the honor as the birthplace of China’s creative industries. However, the naming of Tianzifang as a creative industrial space has to come from a social scientist. Hence, when the Chinese economist Li Wuwei defined Tianzifang as a creative industrial park, he endowed an irreplaceable identity to Tianzifang, one that is different from any other urban renewal project. The concept of creative industry was introduced by the American urban studies scholar Richard Florida in his book The Rise of the Creative Class. In the global age, some cities enjoy fast growth, while others are decaying. A good example is that power and wealth of Paris keep growing, but in contrast, the ones of Marseille have been declining. So here comes Florida’s question: why some cities thrive, and others stagnate or decline? The key lies in the existence of a creative class. The distinguishing characteristic of the creative class is that its members engage in work with a function to “create meaningful new forms”. The super creative core of this new class includes scientists and engineers, university professors, poets and novelists, artists, entertainers, actors, designers, and architects, as well as thought leaders of modern society such as nonfiction writers, editors, cultural figures, think-tank researchers, analysts, and other opinion-makers. Members of this super creative core produce new forms or designs that are readily transferable and widely useful—such as designing a product that can be widely made, sold and used; coming up with a theorem or strategy that can be applied in many cases; or composing music that can be performed again and again.10 What kind of cities can attract the creative class? Firstly, it would be cities with high amenity that can provide a great variety of lifestyles, as they will attract musicians, painters, technical talents and other innovative people in pursuit of certain lifestyles to live and develop their career. Secondly, the diversity of the city itself is attractive in its nature. A diversified community that features different ethnic groups, ages, sexual orientations and non-mainstream expressions will release a signal that this is a place open to outsiders. Thirdly, originality is an important element to make a city pleasant, enjoyable and of high-quality. Originality has its root in many aspects of the community, including historical architectures, aged neighborhood, musical 9

Yu [4], H. 2011. “Narrative of Historic Block Renovation in Power and Concept Dimensions - Case of Tianzifang in Shanghai (jiu cheng gen xin xu shi de quan li wei du he li nian wei du – yi shang hai tian zi fang wei li)”, Nanjing Journal of Social Sciences (nan jing she hui ke xue). 2011(04). p. 25. 10 Florida [5].

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atmosphere or other cultural traits.11 In contrast to the modernist view that believes a more modern and technological city would be more attractive to innovative artists or art entrepreneurs, we believe, it is the kind of city and neighborhood with a rich history and cultural diversity that makes the best place for the birth of creative industries. In this regard, it is not surprising that Taikang Road got favored by Chen Yifei and other artists. As a matter of fact, the Tianzifang experiment never lacks the most trendy and cutting-edge concept or discourse in the world, since it has been following the New York SOHO area as its example from the very beginning, claiming to “build Shanghai’s SOHO at Tianzifang”. Therefore, when Tianzifang was to be replaced by large-scale demolition and construction project advocated by superior officials and faced its survival crisis, the experimentalists tried to seek for legitimacy from concepts like creative industries that have recently become popular in the west. In 2004, in order to protect Tianzifang, the development team invited the renowned economist Li Wuwei to Tianzifang, who later published an article on People’s Daily, introducing the concept of creative industries to define Tianzifang as an industrial cluster of art workshops, design studios and art galleries. In the article, he started by answering the question of why many cultural and creative industries are clustered in abandoned factories and warehouses. “Not only because of their cheaper rents in early days and convenient locations in the city center, but more importantly, these abandoned factories and warehouses evoke people’s memories of the old days. Their open roof-beam structure is thought-provoking and would easily further contribute to a kind of ‘frame of thought’. In addition, these places are usually open and spacious, easy to be divided and rearranged at will. Hence, they are extremely popular among artists.” Li defined the cultural and creative industry as “an important component of the modern service industry, with strong penetration and dissemination effect. It will penetrate into all walks of life and can greatly enhance the added value of products. The conception, design, modeling, style, decoration, packaging, trademarks, advertising, and other aspects of any product are all legacies of certain cultural attainment, cultural uniqueness and aesthetic sense”. He boldly asserted that “cultural creativity, together with scientific and technological innovation, are two key drivers to enhance the added value and competitiveness of industries. Therefore, the cultivation and development of cultural and creative industries should be an important part of the strategy of invigorating China through science and education”.12 The Tianzifang experiment represents an organic combination of cultural and creative industry and inner-city regeneration, which “can avoid interruption of urban contexts, and protect architectures with historical and cultural values. By blending the elements of history and future, tradition and modernity, east and west, classics and trend, it also enriches the cultural landscape of the city with a fusion of antiquity and modernity. This will not only tremendously accelerate the urban economic development, but also make the

11 12

Yu [6]. Li [7].

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city more attractive, making contributions to the urban prosperity, cultural richness and modern vitality.”13 Tianzifang faced the threats of being demolished for several times, but it managed to head off the danger every single time. Besides the persistence of the experiment team, forces of support from academic elites should not be overlooked either. In 2004, academic leaders such as Li Wufei and Ruan Yisan defended Tianzifang’s industrial and spatial innovations in People’s Daily, Jiefang Daily and other mainstream newspapers at central and local levels, providing discourse advantage to the Tianzifang experiment. When the Tianzifang approach gained applause and support from academic elites, the two strands of institutional power, namely the administrative power represented by the local government and the cultural power represented by the elites, engaged with both conflicts and complements. Li’s work has not only endorsed the Tianzifang experiment, but also, by including the concept of “creative industries” into the government work report of the following year (2005), marked an impact on Shanghai government’s policy and blueprint of the industrial development with a brand-new industry concept. Today, Li Wuwei is regarded as the “father of China’s creative industries”, and this reputation was gained during the Tianzifang case, or more precisely, by defining the Tianzifang entrepreneurship as an experiment of the cultural and creative industries.

7.2.3 The Discovery and Naming of a Historical Heritage Space: The Tianzifang Discourse To renew the inner-city space in a protective way, one must demonstrate the reasons for retaining the old alleyways. Ruan Yisan, a world-renown expert in protecting historical architectures, provided professional arguments for the richness of the historical architectures in the old neighborhood of Taikang Road, thus supporting the view that Tianzifang bears unique symbolic significances and historical values. Similarly, Xintiandi is also a successful old alley renewal project that features conservative renovation. As described in the Shikumen Open House Museum in Xintiandi, “(in Xintiandi,) the old find a place for nostalgia while the young spot fashion and trend. Foreigners regard it as genuine Chinese, while Chinese see foreign cultures from it.” In reality, such comments are more accurate for Tianzifang. Ruan Yisan, who emphasizes that urban regeneration should aim to extend the city’s life rather than to reverse its age, speaks very low of Xintiandi mainly because it lacks “households”. “A little bridge, a flowing stream, and some households are the classic imageries in Chinese poems, therefore, without ‘households’, even the best scenery would lose its poetic flavor.” In my opinion, “ordinary and common street life of Shikumen neighborhoods is absent in Xintiandi because there are no urban dwellers nor real life of the dwellers. That is also the reason why one cannot find the old 13

Li Wuwei’s speech on the 10th Forum on International Culture Industries, http://finance.sina. com.cn/hy/20130105/103714191163.shtml Accessed on April 21, 2021.

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Shanghai taste in Xintiandi, as its old Shanghai locale is consumerist and gentrified, without the authentic local context. It’s a pseudo-Shanghai nostalgia.”14 Prof. Chang Qing from Tongji University also criticized Xintiandi for merely retaining the spatial layout and exterior walls but entirely redesigning the rest, from roof truss, floor to interior space. Most international students taking English-taught courses in Shanghai also prefer Tianzifang to Xintiandi, mainly because of the excessive commercialism in Xintiandi. Xintiandi claims old Shanghai as its selling point. Although local Shanghainese know well enough that Xintiandi is not the old Shanghai they used to live in, it still triggered their best collective memories. Xintiandi has successfully transformed the old alleyways from which they were eager to escape in the past into the most attractive Shikumen landscape since the opening of Shanghai as a treaty port. As a result, the legend of naming Xintiandi as “old Shanghai” has been accepted by the majority. Nevertheless, Xintiandi is a piece of work created after the clearance of essential “old Shanghai”, resembling Shikumen only in its appearance, but lacking the material and life essence inside. In particular, the main characters of Shikumen life have been completely dispersed. Therefore, it is fair for experts to call Xintiandi “a fake antique”, at least in the sense that it brands itself as “old Shanghai”. On the other hand, to recognize the value of Tianzifang does not mean that it is a real antique. In Ruan Yisan’s view, the primary value for protecting historical alleys and lanes lies in the abundant types of Shanghainese residential houses in these areas, as they host the absolute rural-styled local dwellings, old shikumen lanes and alleys that prevailed in Shanghai, new lanes and alleys with modern amenities, and westernstyled villas. In short, it is significantly valuable to preserve and organically renew the lanes and alleys of Taikang Road, even from the point of residence museology. Endorsement for the values of the historical neighborhood of Taikang Road from Ruan Yisan, the national expert in historical city conservation and restoration, was well in line with the social naming of Tianzifang by Huang Yongyu and Li Wuwei, further reinforcing and deepening their work. Highly praised and recognized by artist Chen Yifei and architecture expert Ruan Yisan, Tianzifang has indeed attracted entrepreneurs from all walks of life because of the diversity of architectural spaces in its old alleyways, as well as inspirations for creativity and imagination it could provide. Many shop owners came here for the historical space of Tianzifang alleyways, in appreciation for its sentiment, its atmosphere, its taste and its life. Many people want to learn about the real Shanghai through tangible things. Here one can catch some glimpses of what it was like to live in Shanghai in the 1920s, 30s or even 50s and 60s. Besides, the atmosphere here is quite interesting and is somewhat typical of Shanghai.15

As reiterated in this book, Tianzifang was a product of social naming that has undergone fierce discourse competition rather than a natural evolution of the original Shanghai lane and alley neighborhood. The Tianzifang narrative is innovative in that 14 15

Yu [8]. Interview note 20120620S, with the owner of a clothing shop in Tianzifang.

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it has not only created an authentic old Shanghai space highly recognized by locals, but also constructed a “Tianzifang discourse”. In the early stage of Tianzifang, discourses such as “Taikang Road Art Street” were not effective. After Chen Yifei moved into the old factory in Lane 210 Taikang Road, social naming around Tianzifang started to take effect. Later, historical architecture conservation experts, urban planners and economists joined the alliance and enriched the Tianzifang discourse with academic contents. Finally, Li Wuwei and Ruan Yisan interpreted and disseminated the academic narration of Tianzifang into a public discourse through influential media. With his consistent enthusiasm, Ruan Yisan endorsed the renewal proposal of Tianzifang to retain its original forms but convert its functions, and highly praised the artists for their reuse and re-creation of the spaces. He argued that their creativity “has brought Tianzifang rich local features, highlighted the vivid characteristics of the times, and showcased the genuine life of the Shanghainese people”. Ruan Yisan worried that land interests and worldly biases “will hinder the emergence of SOHO in Shanghai, hence it is highly possible for Tianzifang to be nipped in the bud”.16 His slogan of “protecting SOHO in Shanghai”, just like his gesture when he stood up to protect Zhouzhuang (an ancient water town in the neighboring city of Suzhou), bore much more than a token, but also a solemn mission of carrying on historical heritages. The art elites have created a spatial legend of Tianzifang and turned the secular into the sacred by naming it after the first Chinese painter “Tian Zifang”, while the academic elites have constructed a meaningful discourse narrative for Tianzifang, a narrative of its legitimacy: the advanced nature of developing cultural industries and the legitimacy of protecting historical blocks. This is exactly the significance of the three-stage social naming of the industrial space in Tianzifang. In this book, three chapters have been dedicated to the Tianzifang story to form a multi-dimensional Tianzifang discourse. We have touched upon issues regarding social entrepreneurship and innovation, innovation in local governance and urban regeneration, and academic engagement in brand renewal innovation. Spatial renewal in Shanghai is mostly done in large-scale spatial production and lacks community concerns and social values. The Tianzifang experiment has preserved historical space and created cultural space. As it is now moving towards the creation of tourist space, the inevitable of most SOHOs is most likely to happen on Tianzifang in the future as well. Despite of that, Tianzifang is a spatial text with rich meanings and is worthy of a “thick description”.

References 1. Bourdieu, P., & Wacquant, L. J. D. (1992). An invitation to reflexive sociology (p. 14). University of Chicago Press. 2. Bourdieu, P. (1992). The logic of practice (p. 135). Stanford University Press. 16

Ruan [9].

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3. Bourdieu, P. (1993). Language and symbolic power (p. 105). Harvard University Press. 4. Yu, H. (2011). Narrative of historic block renovation in power and concept dimensions—Case of Tianzifang in Shanghai [jiu cheng gen xin xu shi de quan li wei du he li nian wei du – yi shang hai tian zi fang wei li]. Nanjing Journal of Social Sciences (nan jing she hui ke xue), 2011(04), 25. 5. Florida, R. (2002). The rise of the creative class: And how It’s transforming work, leisure, community, and everyday life (p. 68). Basic Books. 6. Yu, H. (Ed.). (2005). Urban theory: Classic and contemporary readings (p. 319). Fudan University Press. 7. Li, W. 2004. New creation in old factories [jiu chang fang li xin chuang yi]. Peole’s Daily (East China), July 22, 2004. 8. Yu, H. (2009). Tianzifang experiment: The city renewal model superseding the binary opposition of a place [tian zi fang shi yan: chao yue quan qiu – di fang er yuan dui li de cheng shi geng xin mo shi]. China Ancient City (zhong guo ming cheng), 2009(7). 9. Ruan, Y. (2004). Protecting SOHO in Shanghai [bao hu shang hai ‘su he’]. People’s Daily (East China), May 26, 2004.

Chapter 8

Spatial Justice and Equality of Right-of-Way in the Automobile Society

The social space theory is traditionally more about social conflict rather than social harmony in sociology, as it highlights that the distribution of spatial resources, like the distribution of any other socially scarce resources, is unequal and competitive. The conflict over the right-of-way in large cities is precisely about the distribution justice of spatial rights. In China, spatial justice, as well as other justice issues, shall be discussed in relation to the stratification in transitional societies, especially to the spatial stratification resulting from the automobile society. Transportation, as an important public service, has a substantial bearing on the smooth flow of people and goods in the city, the balance of various travel rights, as well as the safety interests, travel accessibility, physical and mental experience of the public. Therefore, transportation concerns more than just traffic problem. For instance, regarding road traffic, should it be increased to meet the rapid growth of private cars, or should it be reduced so as to return roads to the real owners of the city—the pedestrians? These are two different development concepts that will lead to different right-of-way arrangements. I am not the first to call for the “recovery of pedestrian spaces”, instead, it was the theme of the Madrid Pavilion in 2010 Shanghai Expo (Fig. 8.1). As we seek to bring order to road traffic, can’t the Madrid perspective provide us with some insights to rethink the relationship among traffic, rights and order? It is indeed a basic requirement for every citizen to obey traffic rules, but even so, it is not just a matter of personal awareness and behavior to abide by the law. In cities that favor cars over bicycles and pedestrians, is it possible to change the chaotic traffic only by punishing and educating pedestrians? Shouldn’t more money be spent on safer and more convenient pedestrian lanes so that pedestrians don’t have to walk on traffic lanes? To Shanghai, traffic bears even richer meanings and values. Hence, we need a broad perspective to illustrate the theme of transport and Shanghai. Traffic reflects not only the prosperity of a city, but moreover, the order of a city. In an era of automobile society, traffic problems address issues of right-of-way arrangement and

© Tongji University Press 2023 H. Yu and H. Zou, Shanghai Narrative, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-3261-0_8

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Fig. 8.1 Poster in the Madrid Pavilion in 2010 Shanghai Expo (Photo by Yu Hai)

spatial justice. The right to the city, as acclaimed by Lefebvre, includes the right to inhabit, the right to live, the right of residents not to be stripped from their original lives, as well as the right for a city and its residents to refuse being manipulated by external forces (state and capitalist economic drives), and to refuse being displaced to isolated urban fringe from where they used to live (city center)1 ; the right to the city also “implies overturning dominant spaces, placing appropriation over domination, demand over command, and use over exchange”.2 Therefore, putting space users first, as the core of Lefebvre’s imagined “right to the city” that goes beyond the dominance of capital powers, is considered as an agenda of spatial politics.

8.1 Transportation Contributes to the Rise of Shanghai In Chap. 3, we have identified the geographical logic as the primary drive for the rise of Shanghai. The prosperity of the city heavily depended on the development of the port. Shanghai was listed as one of the five treaty ports by the Brits mainly for its rich waterborne transportation network and convenient shipping routes. As 1 2

From Zhu [1]. Lefebvre [2].

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Fig. 8.2 Suzhou Creek in the 1980s (Photograph by LU Jie)

Rhoads Murphey, author of Shanghai: Key to Modern China, wrote in the end of the book regarding the relationship between geography and Shanghai, “The geographic logic of the city’s economic leadership is likely to prove more powerful and more convincing than any political argument. Great cities do not arise by accident, and they are not destroyed by whim. The geographic facts have made Shanghai.”3 It should be added that the geographical advantages have also contributed to Shanghai’s advanced transportation. If the riverbanks of the Huangpu River and Suzhou Creek have made Shanghai an industrial center, its extensive public transportation network boosted Shanghai to become a commercial center and a city of rich civil life. Although taken in the 1980s, the following picture of Suzhou Creek (Fig. 8.2) showed the continual stream of cargo ships on both sides, explicitly telling the secret of Shanghai’s rise. After the founding of the PRC in 1949, Shanghai became the industrial capital of the country, but lost its international position in finance, trade and shipping. “Its focal position for Far Eastern shipping, and its median location between Atlantic Europe and America”4 also lost its value during the Cold War period. Shanghai literally became a local city, retrieving its ambition from the Pacific but meanwhile holding very limited capital to invest on roads and infrastructures of the city. During the three decades from the 1950s to the 1980s, Shanghai’s road area per capita did not increase at all but decreased. For many years the number stayed below 1 square meter. Most of the disposable government funding went to new industrial areas in suburbs, and little was spent on changing urban road conditions. The most widely-criticized 3 4

Murphey [3] Ibid., p. 51.

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public transportation congestion problem occurred in the time when private cars were almost extinct on roads in Shanghai. Among all the provincial-level regions across China, Shanghai was still making the greatest contribution to the country, but it was not an international metropolis any more. It is therefore no longer needed or necessary to build a transportation system to international standards. A great leap in the transportation development marked Shanghai’s revival. The 1990s were known as the Golden Decade for Shanghai’s development. From 1987 to 1994, Deng Xiaoping celebrated every Spring Festival in Shanghai, just to witness its “new look every year and great changes every three years”. Among all the handwritings Deng Xiaoping left in Shanghai, the most well-known and pronounced ones are his inscriptions for the two bridges over Huangpu River, namely Nanpu Bridge and Yangpu Bridge. As Huang Ju, then Party Secretary of Shanghai, summarized the different stages of the 1990s decade, three years were dedicated to road construction, three years to building construction and another three years to environment improvement.5 To implement the national strategy of building an international core city, in the first three years Shanghai started with road constructions, including metro lines, elevated highways and bridges across Huangpu River, connecting not only the two parts of Shanghai divided by Huangpu River, but also the two different “Shanghai”— one as shown on Nanjing Road and the other in the countryside. The significance of transportation to the rise of Shanghai lies in that it has built a road and transportation system capable of handling the needs of a global city and a world hub for people and logistics. Lu Jie’s photograph (Fig. 8.3) below provides a snapshot of the time that witnessed a great leap in the development of transportation infrastructures. For the first time, transport in Shanghai entered a three-dimensional era, with a comprehensive transport network composed of elevated highway, elevated light rails, metros and greatly widened ground trunk lines. Naturally, the achievements made in Shanghai’s Golden Decade have also greatly changed the spatial texture of the city. To a certain degree, the elevated highway that runs through the city from east to west and green belts that stretch for several kilometers on the ground have broken the original organic spatial pattern, disturbed the interaction between people and the surrounding environment, and furthermore affected the accessibility to the ground roads along the elevated highway for non-motor commuters. The mobility of motor vehicles may jeopardize the organicity of the city. The anomie brought by this mobility, although seemingly to be behavior anomie, is actually related to the imbalance of spatial rights arrangement brought about by social transition, more specifically, the transition to an automobile society.

5

Kang [4].

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Fig. 8.3 Elevated highway of Shanghai (Photograph by LU Jie)

8.2 Spatial Justice and Traffic Order in the Automobile Society 8.2.1 A Subtype of Social Transition: The Automobile Society The great leap in road construction development is linked to another important advancement—the commercialization and privatization of automobiles, which leads to a more far-reaching issue—transition to the automotive society. A few years ago, in my article titled with “Spatial Justice in the Transition to the Automobile Society”, I wrote about the issue of spatial justice regarding mobility power and the distribution of right-of-way as more and more families own cars. The current overhauling of traffic rule violations, either by automobiles, non-motor vehicles or pedestrians, is also related to spatial justice caused by the transition to the automobile society. Most discussions about social transition focus on macro levels of economic, political and social institutions. For instance, sociologists pay attention to the transition of social stratification mechanism. On one hand, the old political stratification mechanism in which people’s social status and life opportunities were determined by the political classification of revolution/anti-revolution, has been largely, if not all completely, invalid in the era of reform and opening-up.6 On the other hand, under the system of market competition and market choice, human resources become a 6

See Bian [5].

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kind of capital, and further, a factor for stratification. This contrast of the old and the new explains the distribution principle of scarce resources and the mechanism of social classification in today’s society. In the discourse on new stratification systems, very few scholars discussed the unequal possession of technologies or tools and its relationship to social inequality. For those who did have touched upon this topic, it was still a “byproduct” of other analyses and not considered in the methodology for the analyses of transitional societies. For example, when discussing social stratification, cars are taken into consideration as a consequence of social inequality, but not as an independent social category for the sociological analysis of the automobile society. Can we already start to discuss the automobile society now, or claim that China is becoming an automobile society? A few years ago, I was still a bit hesitant to jump into this conclusion, but I am fully convinced by statistics in Shanghai today. In 2015, the number of private cars in Shanghai exceeded 2 million, about 6.5 million citizens held driving licenses, and the rate of private car ownership was 52 per hundred households. Undoubtedly, Shanghai has already become an automobile city with a large number of private cars (Fig. 8.4). What does the automobile society entail? To talk about automobile society, we shouldn’t regard it as a general concept but as a subtype of the transitional society. China’s transition from a pre-automobile society to an automobile society does not simply involve a technological transition. Instead, technological transition also brings new powers and functions, which require new arrangements of social distribution, management and control of the new powers, and

Fig. 8.4 Private cars on East Zhongshan road number one on the Bund in 1993 (Photo by LU Jie)

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thus lead to problems related to distributions and conflicts of other social rights and interests.

8.2.2 Spatial Anomie in the Automobile Society When analyzing the automobile society, the first concept we introduce is spatial anomie, a special form of anomie that takes place during China’s transition to the automobile society. Anomie, as a classic agenda in sociology, usually occurs during major social transitions, such as the transition from agricultural society to industrial society, or from industrial society to information society. As a subtype of social transition in China since the reform and opening-up, the spatial anomie discussed in this section is caused by consumption revolution and the popularization of domestic automobiles. The space in “spatial anomie” refers specifically to roads. Since the road is the most important public space in cities, its order is not only a matter of traffic efficiency, but also a matter of safety for citizens, which essentially means people’s right to life. In a space that prioritizes automobiles, space security and order depend on traffic signs, signals and a range of tangible facilities, as well as intangible—but more important— traffic rules and regulations, right-of-way distribution, driving and walking ethics, moral rules and others. Spatial anomie means that all of the above-mentioned signs, signals, rules, regulations, ethics, and habits are partially or completely dysfunctional. As a result, pedestrians can no longer correctly predict the consequences of their actions in the road space, and may even encounter unexpected accidents when walking on zebra crossings. It is by no means exaggerating to use the term “spatial anomie”, as anyone may encounter the following in their daily life: regular jaywalking, ignoring speed limit, repeatedly drink-driving or even drunk-driving… Even when traffic police enforced crackdowns on drink-driving and drunk-driving, a great number of drivers turned a deaf ear and continued to break the law.7 The most violent clash of spatial anomie takes place on zebra crossings, where pedestrians are frequently hit by cars. Zebra crossing, the last place where such tragedies shall happen, has unfortunately become a place of grief for pedestrians. It is reported that someone smashed cars with bricks after they run red lights on zebra crossings, and such a violence-against-violence act received extensive sympathy and support. In a society in which both government and citizens uphold the belief in ruleof-law, this case well reflects the public’s inability and helplessness to road anomie, so that in the end they have to accept the demand for the restoration of space order in a radical, non-official way.

In recent years, with the increase of chauffeur service (dai jia, 代驾), the situation has been greatly improved.

7

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8.2.3 From Mobility Power to Mobility Hegemony The term “spatial anomie” only provides a description of the phenomenon. We should further ask, since when did road traffic become so chaotic, and how did the street become a space for anomie? To answer these questions, we shall introduce the second key concept, “mobility” or “mobility power”. Essentially, spatial anomie is technically rooted in the unnatural forces invented by humans to overcome space barriers, as in pre-automobile societies, all the dynamics for travelling through physical spaces are either manpower, animal power, wind power or other natural forces. Most of the imaginations and creations in the human civilization have been linked to efforts to gain greater mobility in space. Take the development of capitalism as an example, as David Harvey puts it, “Innovations dedicated to the removal of spatial barriers in all of these respects have been of immense significance in the history of capitalism, turning that history into a very geographical affair—the railroad and the telegraph, the automobile, radio and telephone, the jet aircraft and television, and the recent telecommunications revolution are cases in point.”8 However, spatial mobility itself does not automatically lead to spatial anomie, as spatial problems occur only when mobility loses social control. As more and more families own cars, ordinary people start to gain the mobility power. This might seem nothing special, but in fact it indicates a great shift from natural force to social power. I use the term “social power” here because greater mobility and larger space possession have always been a privilege of the few, which are not only monopolized, but also systematically manipulated. Today, cars flood into ordinary families and run down all the city roads, which actually reflects the democratization of what used to be the privilege of the powerful class. The vast mobility potential it releases needs to be regulated and controlled by institutional and cultural forces. Mobility becomes a power to anybody who possesses it, a power that can transcends space and overcome difficulties caused by distance, but also can harm others and overcome obstacles at any time. However, these two functions are both technological and instrumental powers, and will not necessarily lead to spatial anomie or social infringement, although the power of mobility will most likely become the hegemony of mobility spontaneously, that is, the pursuit of space privilege and social superiority. We may also call this mobility hegemony a “social power”, as it manifests more than just instrumental authority, but also social authority. This takes us to a social analysis of mobility. The democratization of mobility is first and foremost produced consciously by power and capital. In the transition to the automobile society, power achieves GDP while capital earns profits. This cooperation between power and capital has been further facilitated by globalization and the WTO, as the adoption of global free trade in China has made cars an affordable consumer product for ordinary Chinese households. But it has always been controversial that whether Chinese cities, especially big cities, can withstand the spatial requirements and environmental pressures of the automotive society, and whether “fewer legs but 8

Harvey [6].

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more wheels” can become a sustainable development model and lifestyle in China. The government, however, has taken a laissez-faire strategy towards the automobile industry, therefore, opinions of questioning and opposing the encouragement on household ownership of cars were never sufficiently taken. Consequently, the government has never imposed any restraint on the explosive release of mobility. In other words, the overwhelming expansion of mobility is not natural in itself, but rather socially driven, or more precisely, driven by the alliance of power and capital. Furthermore, mobility power means spatial power in reality, which is realized in space and through occupying more space. Mobility is only relevant under the context of space and right to space. Therefore, mobility is always connected with space and thereby is known as space mobility. The right to space is certainly not a natural right, but a social right, which is, to be precise, a right of social distribution jointly determined by the specific development strategy, ideology, pattern of interests and social structure. In the 1950s and ‘60s, cars could never be privately consumed, not only due to economic and wealth limits, but also because of the development strategy and ideology of that time. In an egalitarian society, private car means immoral affluence, and even a privilege of non-proletariat classes that should be eliminated in the revolutionary ideology. As a result of the economic development as well as the arrangement of equal right-of-way of that time, cities in that period were kingdoms of bicycles. In 1978, the car parc9 of passenger vehicles across the whole nation was only 1.42 million, less than that of a single first-tier city (Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Shenzhen, etc.) in today’s China. With such a limited mobility and an even distribution of right-of-way, there was certainly no spatial anomie caused by the loss of control over mobility that endangers public safety. Today, under the development strategy that encourages and even indulges mobility, cities in China all enthusiastically usher in the automobile era with newly constructed spatial orders. As driveways get wider and wider, more road resources are allocated to ensure mobility and high-speed mobility in particular. With almost everything giving way to automobiles, they have gained the greatest advantages in the new distribution arrangement of right-of-way, which naturally results in the exclusion of pedestrians and cyclists on roads and squeezing of their rights to space. The priority of mobility and mobility power inevitably expand into mobility hegemony, turning pedestrians and cyclists into the vulnerable group. This reveals the social inequality in the transition to the automobile society and the spatialization of the new social stratification mechanism. In Lefebvre’s words, this is the projection of production relation in the automobile society into space, “becoming inscribed there, and in the process producing that space itself.”10

9

Car parc refers to the number of vehicles in use in a region, generally having registered in the area. (https://www.statista.com/statistics/285306/number-of-car-owners-in-china/. Accessed on March 7, 2022. 10 Lefebvre [7].

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8.2.4 From Mobility Power to Mobility Arrogance Mobility hegemony, a product of the new spatial stratification, is also a social cause for nourishing the mobility power. An exaggerated or unrestrained mobility power leads to a mentality of “mobility arrogance”, the third key concept, by which we have coined to explain the psychological mechanism of spatial anomie at the individual level. Previous discussions have focused on the technological as well as social powers of mobility, but in fact, spatial mobility also has a psychological effect on drivers, that is, a sense of power. For human beings, since spatial distance and gravity are the two major limitations for actions, the sense of power brought by automobile technology is first and foremost associated with the ability to overcome space obstacles for free movement. It is a power that comes naturally with the acquisition of mobility, a power over physical spaces which explains the psychological cause for overspeed and street racing. Secondly, having a car is still a symbol of social status in China even today, as for many people, the need for a car is more for the purpose of status than just for transportation. Driving a car enhances one’s social status, powered by the psychological mechanism of self-affirmation or showoff, and therefore, it can be classified as “conspicuous consumption” in sociological terms. In the case of automobile consumption, the flaunting of owning a car is after all often about the mobility power it brings. This explains the reason why the flaunting of mobility will inevitably lead to mobility arrogance if not intentionally restrained. Finally and most importantly, the institutional preference of spatial resources, rights and order for automobiles and the institutional discrimination against nonautomobiles all have an impact on social constructions, that is, dividing the road users into two categories—the advantaged and the disadvantaged, and building up their own sense of belonging and identity awareness. As the biggest and main beneficiary of the new space order, automobile drivers, as members of the mobile group, have been collectively shaped with a privilege, or in other words, the mobility hegemony has in fact been internalized into a mentality of mobility arrogance. The word “arrogance” itself is only a description of an attitude or behavior, and in everyday use refers to a specific attitude of someone who made a specific act. When the “arrogance” is socially shaped and institutionally bred, and later develops into a highly predictable attitude of a certain group, it becomes a special term for social analysis. The term “mobility arrogance” here is to disclose the social category of the micro-level roots for spatial anomie. The collective arrogance of automobile drivers reflects the unrestrained freedom they enjoy, which is a concrete everyday experience of each individual that does not drive. Today, besides encountering all kinds of dangers on zebra crossings, pedestrians also have to bear with reckless drivers that do not stop nor slow down for pedestrians or cyclists. In a word, the arrogance of automobile drivers is not an isolated case, but a phenomenon of collective mentality. So far, our discussion has been centered on mobility. Reflecting the need for disciplines on automobiles, the word “mobility arrogance” is just a slightly more formal way to describe the untamed mobility of automobiles. Due to a number

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of factors including development strategy, right-of-way distribution, space order, conspicuous consumption and others, mobility has been given free rein and developed into mobility hegemony, and is further internalized by automobile drivers as a psychological state of mobility arrogance. Now let’s get back to spatial anomie. It means more than the state of road disorder, loss of security and conflict of interests, but also reflects the social inequality in the right to space which has divided road users into two categories—the advantaged and the disadvantaged. Social stratification on the road is no longer a byproduct of other stratifications but an independent social mechanism, with the spatial anomie of road chaos we see today as its process and result. The transitional power towards the automobile society is what makes road space a competitive resource, and eventually develops a new social mechanism for the distribution and disposal of this resource. It’s not the task of this chapter to discuss whether this transition is historically purposive. Even if we do agree that it is of certain inevitability, the key question is, what shall be the goal of the transition to the automobile society? To tame mobility and achieve automobile power in a space with a human scale, or to give preference to mobility and indulge its automobile power in a space with an automobile scale that squeezes the space for pedestrians and cyclists? After a three-decade development that has released an explosive mobility, China is entering into an automobile society without matching ethics and morality of using automobiles, which more or less explains the reason for road disorder. It is impossible to tame the arrogant mobility by police or self-discipline alone. All the aforementioned analyses aim to make it clear that this is an agenda related to social transition: in order to ensure security and order on the road, it is essential to guarantee social justice of the right-to-space and build social harmony on the road.

8.3 Production of Space and the Distribution of Right-of-Way The right of way is a specific right to space, and the equality of right-of-way is an important manifestation of spatial justice. It is related to the distribution of the right to use roads, including the entitlement and priority, as well as the level of difficulty to be distributed with access opportunity. The distribution of right-of-way, like the distribution of any other social rights, faces the problem of equality and fairness. Even though we cannot pursue an absolute equality in the right-of-way, there is no way to accept an arrangement that places non-motors—the largest group of road users—in a disadvantaged position. The right-of-way arrangement of the current time gives preference to motorized vehicles and discriminates against non-motorized vehicles, pedestrians in particular, which is utterly unequal. We intend to prove the inequality in the distribution of right-of-way by the following statistics. First of all, we must reaffirm that the right to roads is a right which all citizens are entitled with, thus, the distribution of the right should be allotted based on the number

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of citizens not the number of cars. Statistics of travel options of permanent residents in Shanghai shows that riding bicycles and walking rank first (approximately 30% each), followed by taking buses (approximately 20%), driving private cars (approximately 10%) and taking taxis or riding motorcycles (approximately 5% each). Obviously, in reality, it is the non-public motor vehicles that have been distributed the biggest proportion of the right-of-way, rather than bicycles and pedestrians. In addition, the right-of-way should have been allocated based on the road resource usage efficiency of each travel option. Private cars occupy road resources 11 times more than buses and 5 times more than bicycles. In Nanjing, private cars have taken up one fourth of the road resources, leaving only one thirtieth to pedestrians. Looking at the numbers above, we may easily conclude that buses, bicycles and pedestrians should be given the priority of using road resources. However, in reality, walking and bicycling have long been denied the right-of-way they deserve, let alone the priority right. In recent years, although shared bikes are getting more popular and the number of dedicated bicycle lanes and pedestrian sidewalks has increased, the right-of-way allocation that favors motorized vehicles stays unchanged, and motorized vehicles still occupy the most road resources. The unequal distribution of right-of-way could also be observed in walking. People might ask how could walking on the road be restricted? It is true that the restriction does not appear as strict as it does to bicycling, however, the difficulty of “walking on the road” does exist for pedestrians. The right-of-way favors cars, so the roads are getting wider and wider. Most roads in Shanghai used to be no wider than 15 m, but they have been doubled in width nowadays. Roads of over 40-m-wide are no longer exceptional, making crossing the street a daunting task. Due to preference for cars and speed, in many crossroads, pedestrians are blocked for crossing. Instead, they have to climb over a bridge or down through a tunnel, which poses another challenge to the elderly, weak, sick and disabled pedestrians. From 2000 to 2015, the total length of all roads in Shanghai has increased from 6641 to 18,184 km, with an increase rate of 173%. Meanwhile, the total area of roads has increased by 250% in the same period, which indicates the fact that a large amount of area that used to be sidewalks were taken by motor ways. What makes it worse is that many newly widened roads do not have separate bicycle lanes, and as a result, bicycle riders are squeezed onto sidewalks, forcing pedestrians to look over their shoulders even walking on sidewalks. The green transportation concept that became popular in Europe and the United States in the 1990s puts “walking first, bicycles second, and cars last” among all the transportation means except buses. In comparison, the idea of “walking first” has never been a principle in the right-of-way distribution in Chinese cities. Instead of “people-oriented”, the Chinese guideline has always been “vehicle-oriented”, or more precisely, “private car-oriented”. As a matter of fact, cars have virtually unlimited right-of-way compared to bicycles and pedestrians. Even if we count the road area occupied by three cars as equal to that by one bus or one lorry, cars still occupy the most road resources and take up the largest share of right-of-way. However, compared with bicyclers, pedestrians or bus takers, car drivers account for the smallest proportion. Obviously, this is a privilege.

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A great number of articles have compared the advantages and disadvantages of different transportation means in various aspects, including traffic efficiency, energy consumption, environment protection, life style, social justice etc., so there is no need to elaborate more. The question is, why does the distribution still favor private cars and discriminate against bicycling and walking? Does the right-of-way distribution only concern the traffic mode or lifestyle? Or is it related to the development mode of a city? Is there a co-relation between the order of the traffic space and the order of the urban space in a bigger picture? This answer is definitely “yes”. Inequality in the right-of-way is a product of the new urban development mode, a part of the new space production process, and a part of new urban space orders. Therefore, a spatial analysis perspective is required in analyzing the right-of-way distribution. We have discussed the shift of space strategy from socialist industrialization to capitalist space production in various chapters. Today, although the leading force of urban space production and utilization still comes from the state and local governments, spatial strategies, institutional arrangements and ideologies are, nevertheless, quite different from what they used to be. When Deng Xiaoping decided to adopt the reform and opening-up policy, abandoned the slogan of “class struggle as the central task”, and instead implemented a development strategy of focusing on economic development and building a new socialist market economic system, he fundamentally changed the direction and mechanism of the production of urban space. Places and spaces built to meet the needs of growing political movement and mobilization, such as squares and auditoriums, lost their political purposes and were transformed for other uses. Take the People’s Square for example. In the past, it was a politically symbolic “Red Square”, and today, it is a sightseeing spot filled with most symbolic culture elements. Behind the transformation of the new square are the new development strategy and its supporting new ideologies—the strategy that Shanghai is to evolve into the engine and leader of the Chinese economy, as well as an international economic, financial, trade and logistic hub; and new ideologies of GDP centralism, globalism, consumerism, market orientation, etc. Under such strategies, in addition to the development-oriented government, the leading force for the production of urban space also includes business developers. Due to the fact that the majority of citizens are excluded from the strategic planning and decision-making process regarding urban development and regeneration, the urban development in the new times is bound to take “the economic development mode led by power and capital, aiming at more land and space profits”.11 From various aspects such as resources reliance, development engines, urban landscapes and social consequences, this development mode reflects a new space production strategy and new space order. First of all, in the new development mode, land acts as a core resource, while the production of new space aims at maximizing land and space profits. The reason why land and space have become the most dependent resources for development is because state-owned land of a city is the most important resource that the city government is able to manage, utilize, develop and own the usufruct rights to land. 11

Chen [8].

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Such a development mode that heavily relies on land resources will definitely lead to the reliance on business developers, which explains why real estate development has become the leading mode and main driver of China’s urban development. Secondly, the new development mode provides drive for the self-expansion of space. This is because a model of profits based on the production of space requires expansion itself. Moreover, since the limited city land cannot meet the needs of fast development, land acquisition naturally expands to the rural collective land. As property profits from land development become the main drive for space expansion, residential space, without any doubt, becomes the largest commodity in the production of space. As what Wang Xiaoming mentions in his essay, spaces of residencecentered building complexes, as well as the everyday life order with residence and home as the core, could both be understood from this profit-driven model of space production. Thirdly, since the new development mode is driven by land and space profits, the expropriation of land is bound to comply with the “differential rent theory” expecting maximum profits, which later produces new spatial layout and landscape to match the profits of space. After the inner-city is developed into CBD and compatible luxurious condominiums, neighborhood blocks in this super expensive area were torn down to build large green spaces, for the sake of a higher land/space profit by raising the attractiveness of the downtown area. Since the 1990s, Shanghai has witnessed “new look every year and great change every three years”, resulting in a complete change in its spatial layout. The lower corners (xia zhi jiao, meaning less-developed regions) in the past, such as Dapuqiao, and Lujiawan, have become newly established upper corners (shang zhi jiao, meaning well-developed regions). The most ordinary Shikumen buildings and alleyway neighborhoods on Taicang Road and Madang Road were transformed into the most charming fashion hub in Shanghai by real estate developers, with a cultural landscape combining local characters and exotic atmosphere. Unfortunately, one can no longer find its former residents who have been relocated to urban peripheries or suburbs even further away due to changes brought by the new spatial order. Finally, the new development mode has also led to a new social stratification by producing new spatial orders. Urbanization campaigns in the names of inner-city regeneration, urban renewal, urban expansion and so on have been widely questioned and challenged regarding the issue of spatial justice. Millions of local citizens have been relocated from city centers to newly developed urban areas 20–30 km away, discouraged by the marginalization of their new residential spaces. Young generation white collars have to commute between downtown office buildings and their apartments in urban peripheries every day, due to the extremely high housing price in Shanghai. We also have to mention those immigrant workers from other provinces in China, builders of new spaces in Shanghai, who always look exhausted but walk in a hurry under the sky of Shanghai. Yet they do not have the official citizenship of the city and consequently they rarely regard Shanghai as their home. How could previous analyses of the production of space and space order help us to understand the causes for the inequality in the distribution of right-of-way?

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Firstly, the space order built upon drives for land/space profits is an order that is not in favor of the least mobile group of people. Those with the most urgent need for travelling convenience are now forced to move to city edges and have to overcome the travelling difficulties. Being in a disadvantaged position, they ought to be given an equal, or even a preferential right-of-way. However, the travelling difficulties they encounter are caused precisely by the new space order. How to achieve a breakthrough? Apart from being marginalized in space, the displaced residents have also been marginalized in their social status as disadvantages in space lead to limits in job opportunities, as well as in chances of using downtown facilities and enjoying other conveniences. Secondly, the new space production mode aiming at maximum profits by applying the “differential rent theory” will surely lead to an intensive expansion in urban space. As the urban area of Shanghai has been enlarged from within the inner ring to within the middle ring and further the outer ring, the flow of population has been drained to gather around the outer ring. Even though the population density in downtown Shanghai is still higher than that of the newly urbanized suburbs, the population density of the latter has increased significantly from 2005 to 2015, as shown in Table 8.1 which compares the population densities of seven suburb districts in two different years. As the above statistics show, the population density of all suburb districts has increased. The population density in most districts has all witnessed a growth of over three times except Fengxian and Jinshan districts, which indicates that the population is moving to suburbs from city center as urbanization continues. With the growing expansion of the city, there is bound to be a roaring demand for spatial mobility. The “car-centered” transportation mode is mainly, if not merely, derived from such a spatial layout and spatial order. The distance from downtown to the outer ring is usually over 15 km, making the bicycle no longer a convenient way for travel, which explains why motorbikes are riding on a wave of popularity. On the other hand, there is no bicycle lane along the 40-km long middle ring, the boundary between the outer ring and downtown. How could this happen? The space scale has grown at the Table 8.1 A comparison of the population densities of seven suburbs in Shanghai (in 2005 and 2015) District

Population density (2005) Per km2

Population density (2015) Per km2

Minhang District

2220

7465

Jiading District

1149

3378

Jinshan District

894

1362

Songjiang District

863

2906

Qingpu District

674

1804

Nanhui District

1045

Fengxian District

745

Source Shanghai statistics 2006 and 2016

Merged into Pudong New District 1687

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expense of the right-of-way for pedestrians and bicycle riders, as space for sidewalks has also been squeezed by the expansion of motorways. Thirdly, the new spatial order is predominantly produced by power and capital, and ordinary people in the city are generally excluded. “Space orders of different classes are rearranged according to the differential rent theory, in order to achieve an urban development with maximum land and space profits.” This principle will certainly also apply when the right-of-way related to the distribution of traffic resources is concerned. To put in a more accurate way, the inequality in the right-of-way reflects the inequality in the GDP-oriented and business profit-oriented development mode, and the inequality in the traffic spatial order is nothing but one aspect of the inequality in urban spatial orders. Hence, to ensure equality in the right-of-way distribution, a new urban spatial mode is to be awaited. Only when the space production does not aim at profit maximization, but at building a harmonious society, will a peopleoriented, environment-friendly and resource-saving traffic mode be carried out at liberty.

References 1. Zhu, W. (2015). Right to the city: A strategy of re-producing urban space [cheng shi quan li: yi zhong cheng shi chong su de ce lue]. Design Community (zhu qu), 2015(2), 138–147. 2. Lefebvre, H. (1979). Space: Social product and use value. In Freiberg, J. W. (Ed.), Critical sociology: European perspective (p. 294). Irvington Publishers, Inc. 3. Murphey, R. (1953). Shanghai: Key to Modern China (p. 205). Harvard University Press. 4. Kang, Y. (2001). Decoding Shanghai: 1990–2000 [jie du shang hai: 1990–2000] (pp. 124–126). Shanghai People’s Publishing House (shang hair en min chu ban she). 5. Bian, Y. (2002). Chinese social stratification and social mobility. Annual Review of Sociology, 2002(28), 91–116. 6. Harvey, D. (1991). The condition of postmodernity (p. 232). Blackwell. 7. Lefebvre, H. (1991). The production of space (p. 129). Blackwell. 8. Chen, Y. (2008). Crisis of legitimacy and nationality in urban development [cheng shi kai fa de zheng dang xing wei ji yu he li xing kong jian]. Journal of Sociological Studies, 2008(3), 29

Chapter 9

Morning Exercises in Parks and Social Space

In Chap. 1, we listed the creation of an interactive community through morning exercises in parks as an example of imagined social space. As observed, morning exercisers, although not making any contribution to the physical space of parks, use and treat parks as their daily living space, and thereby have converted a neutral public space into a social space full of meanings to themselves. Whenever you walk into a park in downtown Shanghai early in the morning, you’ll see a large number of middle-aged and elderly people doing their morning exercises: brisk walking, backward walking, Chinese fan dancing, flying kites, playing badminton, practicing tai chi, or playing konghou (an ancient plucked stringed instrument). If you try to talk to them and ask about their approaches on fitness keeping, you’ll find many of them are “self-proclaimed experts” who can talk eloquently on his or her own systematic theory of fitness. As they elaborate on the topics, you will realize that their “exercises for physical health” are closely linked to “exercises for mental health”. They are not doing all these exercises alone, but having their own interest groups. For instance, in Gongqing Forest Park, members of Zhongyuan Kite Club, named after Zhongyuan Subdistrict near the park, not only buy necessary equipment together, but also share and exchange skills of flying kites as well as their own philosophies of health, and of course, family gossip. The title of this chapter was inspired by Yunxiang Yan’s essay Of Hamburger and Social Space: Consuming McDonald’s in Beijing, in which Yan tried to examine McDonald’s both as dining restaurants and social spaces where social interactions occur. In addition to providing American style fast-food, it also creates an environment representing American culture. It is the creation of such a social space rather than a simple competition over the taste of fast-foods that becomes the key reason for foreign fast-foods winning over local Chinese ones.1 In this chapter, we will continue to use socio-spatial theory to discuss the various social aspects of morning exercise activities in the parks of Shanghai. With the multiple players of globalization, social 1

Yan [1].

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transition and urban regeneration, besides being a place for morning exercises, parks have produced multiple social impacts and become social spaces where people obtain social interactions and self-affirmation. Furthermore, morning exercises are more than activities to improve health, but also a way for the middle-aged and elderly to enhance their wellbeing and help to cope with the shortage of public health resources. Due to the missing of the previous convenience for interactions between neighbors in traditional residential quarters, morning exercises become a new way to build social connections and establish new senses of community belonging. Moreover, after being marginalized by vast social changes, exercisers also acquire new selfidentity and affirmation by achievements in health and social interactions through morning exercises.

9.1 The Spatial Triad and the Theory of Place-Making Now that we have already become familiar with Lefebvre’s theory of the production of space, in this chapter, the core issue is place making, which refers not only to the creation of physical urban spaces, but also to the construction of meanings of social spaces. According to Lefebvre, the triad of social space, i.e., spatial practice, representations of space and representational spaces, corresponds to three subjective processes: the perceived, the conceived and the lived. The perception of space is about practical activities occurring in physical spaces, while the conception and lived experience of space involve the construction of meanings of social spaces. The trialectics of space provides rich insights on the dialectical interactions between the triad: space affects behaviors but meanwhile is constructed by behaviors as people change spaces to meet their various needs. In the case of morning exercises, the open and accessible parks attract and create different sport communities, while the constant interactions among members of each group successfully convert an open public space into a social space full of meanings. Socio-spatial analyses could be found in all Jane Jacobs’ works, although she never talked about socio-spatial theory in an abstract and systematic way. Instead, she illustrated the various functions of sidewalks apart from its traffic purpose, such as safety, contact, and assimilating children. In terms of safety, why are sidewalks safe? Because on both sides of the street live residents who know each other, and every one of them could provide surveillance upon the street—they monitor potential strangers, spot threats towards children, and make timely responses. To make the neighborhood a safe space, “its essence is intricacy of sidewalk use, bringing with it a constant succession of eyes2 ”. There should be an interrelated system of spaces, including green space that is accessible to everyone, sidewalks where people can linger for a while and make encounters, among others. In this way, interactions that

2

Jacobs [2].

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transcend interpersonal distance and disassociation can develop naturally, just as what we see from morning exercise groups. In his essay A Space for Place in Sociology, Thomas F. Gieryn identified three powers behind the making of places: upstream forces that drive the creation of place with power and wealth; professional practices of place-experts; perceptions and attributions by ordinary people who experience places (and act on those understandings).3 Although morning exercisers in parks do not contribute much to the production of parks as physical spaces, their practices do have created the social (i.e., physical wellness and social interactions) as well as psychological values (i.e., positive experiences and self-affirmation) of the parks as places. In his article Under the Sky of Shanghai, Wang Xiaoming, a scholar from Shanghai, described the rise and fall of urban spaces in Shanghai in the past six decades— which spaces have disappeared while others have risen, and what kind of spatial ideologies have been produced in the process. Every era has its own production of social space at the macro level. For instance, the socialist industrial space in the time of the planned economy was replaced by the architectural space of residence-centric building complexes after the reform and opening-up, which consequently led to an everyday life style with residence and home as its core, as well as a psychological schema that places home in the center of life.4 According to Wang, spaces that gather the largest and most human activities in each era are shaped and produced by the fundamental institutional forces of the day, including ideology and development philosophy—for instance, the state and socialist ideology in the 1950s and 60s, and the development-oriented government and market-oriented developers of today. As parks have become a central place for a growing number of people to participate in collective activities, it is equally important to analyze the powers behind it, its social processes, social forces, as well as the choices and uses of new activity spaces by residents based on the changing urban spaces. Users are the power behind the making of spaces and places, too. As a social product, spaces and places are “endlessly made, not just when the powerful pursue their ambition through brick and mortar, not just when design professionals give form to function, but also when ordinary people extract from continuous and abstract space a bounded, identified, meaningful, named, and significant place”.5 Place-making is intriguing because it mixes the three dimensions of space: material (the perceived), discursive (the conceived), and experiential (the lived).6 I first argued in the book Urban Theory: Classic and Contemporary Readings that, to bring spatial analysis back to urban studies, discussions should be explored at least at three levels: at the macro level, it shall examine the interaction between socioeconomic status and spatial location, including how social status determines people’s spatial status, and how the latter affects people’s access to social resources

3

Gieryn [3]. Wang [4]. 5 See footnote 3. 6 Soja [5]. 4

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and the acquisition of social status; at the mezzo level, it shall examine the relationship between space and human interaction and study how space affects people’s interaction, the composition of groups and establishment of other social ties; at the micro level, it shall tackle with the spatiality of human experiences, and study how space shapes one’s personality and mentality, how people feel the space and respond to the world based on their perception of the external world and meaningful experiences they have accumulated. It is a permanent dimension of human action, i.e., the subjective meaning of space, to play a role in constructing the picture of one’s life space.7 Morning exercises in parks will eventually bring to the exercisers not only physical achievements (health), but also social (community ties) and psychological achievements (self-affirmation), all of which occur in a space that they actively occupy and fill with meanings. To elaborate on the theme of this chapter, i.e., in what sense are morning exercises in parks linked to the making of social space, we need to answer the following questions: which social processes have produced urban green spaces? What social forces are driving more and more residents to parks? And what kind of interactions generate social spaces that are meaningful to morning exercisers? As mentioned above, the three powers behind the making of places are government, professional planners and designers, and users. This study on morning exercises in parks will examine people’s “small acts” in everyday life at macro and mezzo levels. Not all exercises everywhere are associated with social changes, but in the constantly changing Chinese urban society, individuals have to take more responsibility for their own physical and mental health than ever before. In the current transition period where access to institutional benefits is much less than before, morning or evening exercises and other seemingly trivial things as well as the “small acts” at the backstage of personal life may greatly encourage the working class to take and solve health risks in life. Meanwhile, social activities based on the exercises, can be understood as a way for members of these social classes to give specific meanings to their lives and rediscover or create their own identities, through various interpersonal interactions and expressions of meanings.

9.2 Place-Making in Morning Exercises in Parks 9.2.1 Driving Forces Behind the Production of Green Spaces Government is the main actor in the production of green spaces and parks, as they are built with fiscal money. In the past 30 years, Shanghai has seen a rapid growth in green spaces and park areas, as demonstrated by the following numbers: Shanghai invested 43 million CNY in landscape development in 1986, 266 million CNY in 1996, 2.641 billion CNY in 2006 and 3.481 billion CNY in 2015, 80 times compared 7

Yu [6].

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to 30 years ago. The green space ratio in Shanghai increased from 12.4% in 1990 to 22.2% in 2000 and further to 38.5% in 2015. The total area of parks and green spaces rose from 983 hectares in 1990 to 4812 ha in 2000, and reached 18,395 ha in 2015, 18 times more than 25 years ago. Large-scale space production has been the dominant mode of urban regeneration in Shanghai over the past three decades, including a great leap in the production of green spaces, which was driven by a number of reasons. To build a green and ecological city has become a globally accepted concept, and hence the definition of and expectation for the “better city” for to Chinese urban residents. As a result, green space construction has become not only a new performance goal for local governments, but also the major spatial project in the efforts to build a global city. Hence, drivers of green space production include: first, to build a global city, it is imperative to follow the globally accepted concept of green and ecological cities; second, green spaces can best reflect the shift from a production-oriented space production to a consumption-oriented one; third, large-scaled central green space constructions are motivated by the goal for governance performance, of which landscape achievements are most visible and acknowledged. Despite that such a development mode may not be sustainable, the rapid growth of parks and green spaces does greatly facilitate and encourage the residents to use these spaces. Statistics show that, the number of park-visits in Shanghai increased from 84.74 million in 1990 to 136.56 million in 2005 and 222.08 million in 2015.8 Although the number of park visits does not fully reflect the number of morning exercisers, more and more residents do have easier access to more green spaces and parks for morning exercises. These morning exercisers are not producers of the physical space of parks, but parks are turned into spaces for activities and communities by them, just as streets are turned into spaces by pedestrians. Without morning exercisers, the place-making of parks would have lost its most important makers.

9.2.2 What Kind of Social Forces Are Encouraging More and More Residents to Use Parks? (a) Inadequate health care resources—the need for health self-aid and improvement It is easy to understand that people go to parks to improve health conditions. In the Chinese context, however, it is widely criticized that seeing a doctor is becoming more difficult and expensive due to the healthcare reform. Consequently, more and more people are going to the park with the motivation of giving themselves an alternative to the inadequate public health care system, making it a typical Chinese story. At a transitional time when the provision of social security benefits for health care is still swinging between market supply and public goods, those who cannot afford 8

Shanghai Statistics 2016, http://tjj.sh.gov.cn/tjnj/nje16.htm?d1=2016tjnje/E1116.htm. Accessed on April 21, 2021.

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market-standard medical treatments find the responsibility for health care falling on their own shoulders. For the majority of former state-owned enterprise employees, who are now much less protected by the public system than they used to be, morning exercises offer a way to protect themselves. Before the public healthcare system can adequately take care of every individual’s physical and mental health needs, morning exercises also provide the lower and middle classes with a way to cope with health risks falling on their own shoulders. Even if when social security is fully covered in the future, morning exercises will still serve as an effective supplement. In a field survey9 conducted in Shanghai Gongqing Forest Park, out of the 22 respondents (21 with medical insurance), 7 joined morning exercises because of illness. Regarding “the effect of exercises on health”, 8 respondents felt significantly better after morning exercises; 9 felt immune system strengthened and less likely to get sick; 14 felt better in terms of physical strength and energy; 5 chose “weight loss”; and only two people could not give an answer as they said they were not sick at all. In terms of the cost for morning exercises, all respondents found it affordable. The cost for morning exercises is quite low and “much more cost-effective compared with going to hospital”. The cost of buying kites or other sport equipment is considered well-spent. The park is not only a place for people to exercise in the morning, but also has literally replaced the hospital. “Visit the park more frequently and you shall go to the hospital less”, as most said by almost every respondent. Therefore, morning exercises become a way of self-salvation for the exercisers, who create health benefits for themselves. (b) Disappeared traditional Neighborhood—the Need for Social Life Thirty years of large-scale demolition and construction have fundamentally changed people’s living spaces. Urbanites who moved into new areas gained more space, privacy, and well-functioning homes, but at the cost of community interactions in their daily rounds. The inner-city regenerations have allowed people to escape from the entangling relationship with their neighbors huddled in a shared little cooking room, while at the same time they lose intimate friendships and playful chases between kids in the neighborhood, as well as the idle gossips and hidden rivalries between female neighbors. Annoying and hectic as they might be sometimes, when all these interpersonal interactions, kindnesses and animosities are lost, so is the “community” as it literally means. Sharing and appreciation between each other are the main nourishment for individuals to gain a sense of presence and affirmation. Where can we develop the face-to-face interactions that we once had in excess? Gated communities and private condominiums have made it almost impossible for people living in the same community or even in the same building to meet and interact with each other. Where can we find communities that human beings need? Today’s separated, enclosed and fragmented residential spaces have “pushed” people out to parks and green spaces, not only to gain better health, but also to re-establish social contacts. 9

The survey was made between March and April 2007 in Gongqing Forest Park which is located in Yangpu District of Shanghai. The 22 respondents were all regular morning exercisers in the park. All the data used later in this chapter, unless specified, all come from the survey.

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Among all respondents, 8 used to live in Shikumen neighborhoods, where they had a lot of interactions with neighbors as they could visit each other with rice bowl in hand or even before finishing their meal. However, in their current neighborhoods, 13 of the 22 had no interaction with their neighbors, and only five had some limited interactions. As for their fellow exercisers, all the 22 respondents answered that they began to know each other in the park, including people who actually live in the same residential quarter but haven’t met before. 18 out of 22 respondents go to the park every day unless it’s raining or windy, and the remaining four would go every other day. As long as they go there, they could spend a couple of hours together. Considering the very little contact they have with their neighbors, the park has become the main place where their community life takes place. (c) Lost in the Transitional Society—the Need for Self-Affirmation The majority of morning exercisers in parks are middle-aged and elderly people. Among all our respondents, 19 are retired and only one is still in employment. Although this does not represent an average percentage among the whole population, we can draw the conclusion that morning exercisers are mainly middle-aged, elderly and retired people. It is true that the middle-aged and elderly have the most urgent needs for health improvement, while the retired have plenty of time for exercises. But apart from the physical motivation, are there not psychological or spiritual ones that drive them to parks? How to define the social groups of the middle-aged and elderly morning exercisers? Most people have health insurance, so they are not considered the weakest of the society. Neither old age nor retirement means a failure in life, as getting old is a natural process and retirement is an institutional arrangement. However, they are physically and economically inferior, and their opinions are not influential as before. As they have withdrawn from the central stage of busy working life, they begin to feel a sense of loss. All these feelings of inferiority are constantly reminded by their interactions with others, whether being belittled or kindly pitied. When asked “what do you think of the opinions of general public towards the elderly and retired people”, more respondents agreed with the statement that “generally speaking, people think retired people no longer make contributions to the society and hence become vulnerable”. But they also did not forget to cheer themselves up: “now that we are vulnerable and not well protected, we should take better care of ourselves.” Those who did not agree with the statement argued that they “still make contributions, and are spiritually rich”, and “morning exercises are good for spiritual health”, so they should treat themselves better. Whether acknowledging their vulnerability or not, they all take regaining self-affirmation as the motivation and goal of their morning exercises. In fact, morning exercises do generate multifold achievements, including skills of a new sport or more, new friends with the same exercise hobbies, a better attitude and mindset, as well as improved family relationships, all of which undoubtedly bring a positive experience to people who have suffered some physical and mental loss due to old age and retirement, thus enhancing their self-identity with a regained self-affirmation.

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9.3 The Construction of Meaning for Parks as Social Spaces Parks are undoubtedly public spaces, but not necessarily social spaces. A public space is a space that can be shared by all instead of the exclusive use by specific groups. But only when ongoing human interactions take place in a public space which leads to stable community ties, or when social values are created or certain meanings are given to a public space by its users—for instance, Starbucks being seen as a place of decent status, McDonald’s as a place not only to eat American fast food but also to “taste” American culture, a “social space” inscribed with social values and social relations is produced.10 Designers and business operators can certainly produce the space of McDonald’s and build it into a place that symbolizes American culture, but will consumers buy it? Consumers may take hamburger as nothing but a foreign fast-food, and McDonald’s as just a fast-food restaurant instead of a social space to experience American culture. This is exactly the attitude of most Chinese consumers when they go to McDonald’s today. The phenomenon of “tasting” American culture as well as foreign fast-food, as Yunxiang Yan described in Of Hamburgers and Social Space, has become less symbolic after twenty years. This indicates that a place in the symbolic sense exists only in the imagination of its users, and changes from person to person and time to time. Since the sense of a place is subjectively produced by users of the place, it will certainly not be limited to original intention of its designer. Therefore, there will be many more meanings of a place than originally planned by its designer as different users usually have different feelings and interpretations. For instance, McDonald’s conveys a message of gender equality, a special meaning of place most likely developed by female consumers in China. Likewise, the government designs and builds parks primarily for the recreational function; but in reality, morning exercisers give parks additional functions of social security, community interaction and self-affirmation, which is far beyond the intentions of designers and builders. Returning to Lefebvre’s trialectics of space, the process during which morning exercisers construct a meaningful space to them could be seen as the production of the conceived and lived spaces. Methodologically speaking, the making of this place is not accomplished by construction materials through a physical process, but through a psychological, emotional and social-interactional process. It is a process of social construction and construction of meanings for the place, in which morning exercise spaces are taken as places for fitness and social life. This also constitutes the perception and identification of parks by the morning exercisers (Fig. 9.1). In terms of the result, place-making is also a social process. The interactions during morning exercises do not or rarely change the physical environment, but have created a “social space” that is socially meaningful to the participants. As soon as morning exercisers enter the place, they start meaningful interactions and produce shared experiences, with the desire and urge to present themselves. Again, it is driven by a motivation that is social, i.e., a social need to present themselves to their peers for approval. Once they leave the place, there is no longer a “social space” in the same 10

Lefebvre [7].

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Fig. 9.1 Zhongyuan Kite Club in Gongqing Forest Park (Photo by Yu Yi)

sense as described above, but it still remains as a “public space” and can be once again created as a “social space” with the renewed presence of these participants. This proves that the construction of a social space cannot be made once and for all by building a tangible open public space. As an achievement of joined efforts, it depends on the continuous efforts of all the actors. Whether this space exists or not, place is an eternal factor. But what makes it a place where people get social achievements and a sense of belonging is determined by the constant energy and momentum of people, a certain group of people, a group of people with certain social background and social encounters, a group of people who interact with tears, sweat, loyalty and words. The significance of parks as a social space is confirmed by the various social achievements morning exercises bring to the exercisers, including health, security, social life, sports, as well as psychological achievement of self-affirmation. (a) Health Achievement and Self-Made Security and Welfare We have repeatedly stressed that exercising in parks for the purpose of health is one of the most common stories of urban life. But in the context of a shortage in public health care, when the choice is made to “visit parks more frequently” in order to “visit the hospital less”, morning exercises in parks become a significant phenomenon in a transitional society. Its significance lies in the self-salvation of individual residents and a grassroots production of health welfare. Its achievements also go beyond the

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health of the individual exercisers, and include the self-creation of a grassroots social welfare capacity. (b) Achievement in Social Life When people retire or retreat from a busy life for various reasons, they are often disconnected from the interpersonal relationships and busy work life of the workplace, which can lead to what is known as a “retirement crisis”, a crisis caused by lack of focus and social life. Consequently, many people feel a sense of loss and frustration, particularly for some who used to be in leadership positions, as they may experience a much stronger sense of loss caused by differences in welfare and status after retirement. This crisis could be alleviated to a considerable extent through interactions with morning exercise groups. Compared to their previous workplace, there is no conflict over interests nor bureaucratic hierarchy among people in exercise groups. These former leaders have to put aside all the bureaucratic mindset and habits they have developed over the years, otherwise they would not be able to integrate into the groups where life skills matter the most. Such groups function in a healthy way under extremely simple organizational principles. Benefiting from these groups, participants also show their kindness and openness to newcomers. Social contacts through fitness activities, in particular morning exercises in non-consuming places for the middle-aged and elderly, provide a mode of social interaction as a form of compensation and balance for participants from lower classes. (c) Acquisition of New Sport Skills There is a wide range of morning exercises, such as badminton, dancing, kite flying and others. Many people started as beginners and became masters of certain sports after a while. The acquisition of these sport skills not only provides people with physical and psychological pleasures, but also enhances their confidence. People who had been living an unbalanced life find a sense of fulfilment in their lives again. (d) Psychological Satisfaction and the Fulfillment of Self-Identity It is impossible not to see these fitness activities as activities that have been fully imbued with meanings by their participants. One may easily start a conversation with them about their philosophy of life, because this is a way of life that many of them seek as a solution after a period of distress and confusion. If the proposition of “happiness in life” can be simplified as good physical and mental states in every moment, then these low-cost fitness exercisers are either in the process of pursuing happiness or already possessing it. They can eliminate the “source” of misfortune in the everyday life of modern society, that is, quantified comparisons of life between individuals triggered by the monetary economy. Even if they cling to this comparison, they could be still relieved, because modern social life assigns risks to every kind of people—the rich may fail in their investments and fall into poverty, the powerful may be imprisoned for practicing “unwritten rules”, but health mishaps are relatively evenly distributed among people of all walks of life. The morning exercisers believe that they are conducting sufficient “risk management” by living a life with a perseverant, honest and simple attitude, so that they

References

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may not become the most unfortunate in the city. This is the achievement of their individual lives, as well as of their individual personalities. Thus, people who have been marginalized by the public system have reconstructed their moral identity in this milieu, i.e., lower-class laborers and citizens of integrity, diligence and wisdom, as well as participants of and contributors to a certain type of public life.

References 1. Yan, Y. (2000). Of hamburger and social space: Consuming McDonald’s in Beijing. In Davis, D. S. (Ed.), The consumer revolution in Urban China (pp. 201–225). University of California Press. 2. Jacobs, J. (1961). The death and life of Great American cities (p. 52). Random House. 3. Gieryn, T. F. (2000). A space for place in sociology. Annual Review of Sociology, 26, 468, 471. 4. Wang, X. (2008). Under the sky of Shanghai [shang hai tian kong xia]. Xinmin Weekly (Vol. 11). 5. Soja, E. W. (1996). The trialectics of spatiality. In Third space: Journeys to Los Angeles and other real-and imagined place. Blackwell. 6. Yu, H. (Ed.). (2005). Urban theory: Classic and contemporary readings (p. 7). Fudan University Press. 7. Lefebvre, H. (1991). The production of space (p. 129). Blackwell.

Chapter 10

Digital Economy and Interactive Communities

With subheadings of “The Production of Space”, “Thinking Geographically” and “The Spatiality of Social Life”, the first three sections of Chap. 1 summarize the spatial analytical frameworks of Henri Lefebvre, Doreen Massey and Edward Soja, from which one can conclude that the term “space” has always had a materialist basis in social practices. As we enter the information age, the concept of space is used in an even broader sense, for example, the popularity of words like cyberspace, virtual space and etc., suggesting contemporary discussions of social space must incorporate new non-spatial elements, such as the digital economy. While the digital related topic has created a new opportunity for such discussion, our concerns remain with the community spaces made up of people and the interactive communities creating endless possibilities of life. The digital economy, powered by big data, is constantly reshaping the urban landscape and spaces in which we live. Concepts such as “new geographies” have been proposed by some scholars to depict such situations. From the inhabitants’ point of view, however, the most important geographical concept of a city undoubtedly continues to be the neighborhood in which they live. And how the digital economy based on big data will affect today’s urban communities in the long run is their primary concern. Is an interactive community that is physically comfortable and encourages interactions still possible in the era of big data? If yes, what should be done to make it possible? In this chapter, we will apply our knowledge of communities in Shanghai to explore the rationale and practice of spaces for social interactions in the digital age.

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10.1 The “Last Kilometer” in the Digital Economy The reason for linking the digital age to urban space is that the Internet has indeed given rise to controversies about space. William Mitchell argues in his book City of Bits: Space, Place and the Infobahn that the city of the future will be essentially spaceless, “the worldwide computer network—the electronic agora—subverts, displaces, and radically redefines our notions of gathering place, community, and urban life.”1 In his view, since people can communicate, do business and pay bills with anyone at any time on the internet, the importance of a specific space will no longer be substantial. The opposing view believes that, as space is no longer a barrier, people will have greater choices and become more demanding. Only those places that really bring together all the good qualities would attract the talents, and thus become a place where jobs are created and gathered. Besides, only with the gathering of people in space will information and data start to concentrate and further transform the place into an important hub of the Internet, a growth point for the digital economy and a place with economic boost in the Internet era. In other words, the opponents argue that the problem of space or accessibility due to spatial distance will always exist. Although the digital world has no boundaries, creating an illusion that space is no longer a problem, one cannot eat or wear digitally. Once you have chosen the goods, placed the order and paid the bill online, you still need someone to deliver the real products to your actual place and onto your hands. Therefore, the “last kilometer” of the digital economy is made possible only by a logistics system consisting of couriers. In this way, spatial distances still exist and need to be traversed and overcome. As a result, the logistics industry is booming in China today and is projected to keep flourishing in the future. Companies such as SF Express even plan to open digital shops in communities. These “digital community shops” are demonstrating the relationship between the digital economy and interactive communities. Why do we name these community convenience stores opened by logistics companies “digital community shops”? Because the digital community shop, by its very nature, is a product of the digital economy, adapting a new form of “logistics + commerce” that takes advantage of the digital era. Digital community shops do not manufacture but only deliver products. Why could companies open digital shops in communities? Because the huge amount of personal data collected from incoming and outgoing deliveries allows the companies to understand the temperament of individuals and even of the community as a whole by analyzing these data. Consequently, it can complete profiling the consumption demands of the residents through data mining, so as to make sure that their shops cater to the needs of customers instead of having customers look for the right shops. Besides, as it holds the data of everyone’s consumption preferences and life trajectories, it is possible to advertise and deliver tailor-made services to specific customers to meet their needs. Some digital shops claim that their services can be tailor-made to accommodate thousands 1

Mitchell [1].

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of different needs of every single customer. This is somewhat of an exaggeration, but not a glossy advertisement. What makes digital shops different from traditional brick-and-mortar shops is that they no longer have to move all the products into the community merely by connecting to the internet. Indeed as claimed, digital shops have created a new community business model of “a full touch point connectivity”, which is likely to have a strong appeal to residents of today. As a matter of fact, it’s quite easy to conclude who we are, what kind of breakfast habits we have and what social lives we enjoy on weekends by analyzing our readily available consuming preferences and life trajectories through the big data network. It is not difficult to envisage a time in the future when the digital community shop will provide different grocery lists to me and my colleague, who lived in the U.S. for over a decade, because of clearly differentiated understandings of us and especially our habits. Entirely defined by consumptions and experiences, individuals are treated as distinctive samples by big-data algorithm, allowing thousands of consumer goods and services to be brought together to each case. Individuals and their preferences will be the focal point in the age of consumption, and it is the technology of big data that makes it possible. In the current digital age, when consumption demand changed from the previous probabilistic information at the collective level to the current experiential information at the individual level, it is then truly possible for a high degree of matching between information of commercial supply and individual needs of consumers. Moreover, the strength of digital community shops lies not only in their digital advantages, but also in the fact that they have opened their shops in the communities, bringing customized products and services to the doorsteps of thousands of residents. In other words, it is in real communities where the digital economy is ultimately accomplished, which brings us back to the issue of space, or rather, to the “competition for the last kilometer”.

10.2 Spatial Problems Caused by the New Urbanization Why is there a problem of “competition for the last kilometer”? The problem was rooted in the urban development of new spaces and landscapes back in the 1990s. Take Shanghai as an example. Since then, the dramatic changes in Shanghai’s urban space has been driven by the globalization and urbanization strategy of the city and the resulting large-scale spatialization and privatization of housing. Under the strategy to build “a global city”, landscapes in the city center of Shanghai would certainly aim for an upmarket development: high-end business, high-end services, high-end housing and high-end environment. In the case of the renovation project of Huaihai Road (East section), the designers aspired to build a new Huaihai Road comparable to the Fifth Avenue in New York and Ginza in Tokyo, so that residents can enjoy the shopping experience of world-class brand shops without leaving

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the country.2 With such ambition, the east section of Huaihai Road is naturally no longer a place for daily commodities and relatively simple services. Instead of being a “cluster of merchants”, Huaihai Road of today becomes a “shopping destination of brand stores”. Similarly, most of other upmarket business streets in Shanghai are also devoid of simple goods and services that the communities still need, which explains the gap in terms of certain commerce and logistics in the areas within 1 km around CBDs. Let’s also look at the scale. Traditionally—at least until the 1990s—the boundary of city center in Shanghai was defined by Zhongshan Ring Road, which was 10 km long from east to west and 8 km from north to south. At that time, Shanghainese people lived in the so-called “big world” which was a circle with a radius of 3–5 km around People’s Square: a linear distance of 4 km from People’s Square to North Zhongshan Road, the northern edge of the built-up area; 3.5 km to South Zhongshan Road, the southern edge; 1.5 km to the Bund on East Zhongshan Road, the eastern edge; 3.5 km to Jing’an Temple in the west, and 8 km to West Zhongshan Road, the western edge of the city center. In my childhood, if Changfeng Park, located not far from the western side of North Zhongshan Road, was the destination of the school spring or autumn excursion, we would regard it as an excursion to the “countryside”. On the macro scale, the built-up area of 84 km2 , surrounded by Zhongshan Ring Road at the time of the liberation of Shanghai in 1949, has expanded into the current city center of 660 km2 , with the Outer Ring Elevated Highway as its boundary. In terms of space per capita, in the past 65 years, the road area, green space and housing area per capita have respectively increased 17 times, 80 times and 5 times. Today we are living in a brand-new world that is totally different from the old Shanghai. The urbanization of Shanghai today has clearly changed its traditional scale of space: streets have widened from 10 or 15 m to 30 or 40 m; the size of neighborhoods has been tripled or even more; and the built-up areas within which people commute have expanded from a radius of 3–5 km to 10–20 km. One colleague of mine at the School of Social Development and Public Policy at Fudan University even chose to live around the boundary of the city area, Luodian, beside the outer ring road, which is 24 km away from People’s Square and 22 km from Fudan University. Today, people can choose to live, work and play in a central area of 660 km2 and a built-up area of over 2000 km2 , a spatial pattern unprecedented since Shanghai was opened as a treaty port. Consequently, urbanites of today enjoy an unprecedented freedom of spatial choice brought by the new urbanization. However, this freedom is now faced with a new problem, i.e., how to solve the challenge of the exchanges of people, logistics and information flow in large-scale spaces. For example, most of the shopping malls in Shanghai today are built next to metro stations. While one can find some convenience stores within the area of 3 km2 from most metro stations, there are very few smallscaled community shops—and even if there are some, they face greater difficulties than before due to surging cost. Besides, in many real-life situations, either from metro stations to residential quarters or from the residential quarters to the nearest shopping centers, it is hard to solve “the last kilometer” challenge, as it is difficult to 2

See Chap. 4 in this book “The Spatial Narration of Shanghai’s Inner-City Regeneration”.

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meet residents’ basic needs of clothing, food, housing and transport at a lower and more reasonable cost. The novelty of the new urbanization is not only reflected in the enormous scale of space, but also in the privatization of living space, or the “commodification of housing”. A direct consequence of this new urbanization is the marketization of residential services and the shift from open to gated communities. In the past, Shanghai was famous for its well-connected and accessible lanes and alleyways. As a teenager, one of my great pleasures was to walk from one lane to another. The lanes and alleyways were the playground for children and capillaries of the city’s road system. Streets, blocks and neighborhoods were all connected, and thus the various parts of the urban space were also coherently connected. But with the regeneration of the inner city of Shanghai since the 1990s, large areas of alleyway neighborhoods have disappeared and been replaced by large-scale modern residential quarters with access controls due to the privatization of services. The enclosed spaces created by gated communities not only separated urban traffic from community access, but also harmed the organic composition of urban space. As a result, the once compact urban space of Shanghai became inevitably dispersed and fragmented. However, it is interesting to note that, thanks to the new business model combining e-commerce and logistics, the dispersed or pedestrian-unfriendly spaces and spaces that had handicapped people’s commercial behaviors have been easily overcome today. Space seems to have become less important for residents, and people could easily avoid those once annoying and unfriendly spaces. But is it really the case? The “e-commerce + logistics” model has solved the delivery issue of goods and people in certain spaces, thus naturally making it the biggest business opportunity in the current new economy. Yet how can we tackle the issue of community interactions among its residents in physical spaces? Shall we totally forget about community interactions, or shall we rebuild interactive communities in the Internet era with digital communities? Are digital community shops competent to be organizers of new interactive communities when they treat communities and residents as individual samples? Are digital community shops capable to fulfill the requirement of communities to ensure a smooth flow of logistics and inter-personal communications?

10.3 User-Friendly Spaces and Interactive Communities In the current “e-commerce + logistics” model, backstage algorithm has replaced most real-life experiences where we would have visited and encountered many people. For example, if we want to buy a book on an online shop, all we need to do is to type in the title of the book, and a link will appear immediately during the click of the screen, presenting all information related to the book including the cover image, reader reviews and others. The act of purchasing a book, which used to take at least an hour or more in a brick-and-mortar bookstore, can be completed in less than five minutes by online payment now. When we receive the book we have ordered on the same day or the next day, the only real person we see throughout the

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process is the courier who delivers the goods to our doorstep, although we know it must involve a lot of backstage services. The courier has no knowledge of, nor bothers to care, what’s inside the package, and our relation with him/her is merely a relationship between human and goods. In the long run, our experience of buying books will become both rich and poor—rich in the abundance of choices we can get access to in online stores, while extremely impoverished in terms of social encounters with people. If it stays this way all the time, even if we can have a fairly efficient shopping experience, will it satisfy us at all? And how much pleasure can we get from such shopping experiences? The digital economy has transformed individuals into numbers of targeted advertising cases. However, this individualized shopping experience does not take place among a thousand single individuals, but between a thousand individuals and a digital business community shop. There is no human interaction in this process—no common problem to face, no common event to plan, no common plan to implement, and no common experience to share. Perhaps digital community shops have greater ambitions beyond logistical purpose, with higher goals as to facilitate interpersonal contacts and communications in the future. They could, for instance, help establish new communities for people who share the same hobbies such as cooking, driving, floral designing, and so on by taking advantage of the huge logistical data pool. By doing this, they will not necessarily sacrifice their commercial ambitions or interests, because those new interest groups are bound to generate new business opportunities. Only in this way could digital community shops be able to become organizers of rebuilding interactive communities. This is exactly what is being discussed and imagined at the moment, but whether digital community shops could become the new “magnet place” in communities is yet to be seen in practice in the future. Nonetheless, one can never build a vibrant community relying on individualized consuming habit analysis supported by big data, for it must come from interactions between ordinary people like you and me. In fact, our community concerns go far beyond the customization of goods or the unhindered delivery of goods, because people also have a need to show off, such as the conspicuous consumption of clothes, accessories and others. Such kind of conspicuous consumption is not all negative. After all, every individual craves for authentic interactions with others, during which our personality develops from these praises or sarcasm. In other words, one is not born with his/her ego, rather, the ego is developed under the gaze and judgement of others. But where can we show off our attire today? Furthermore, where can we find accessible spaces for dwelling and interaction today in which people can easily take a walk, make encounters, stop and stay, talk to each other and share their life experiences? Here we mean real and physical spaces instead of virtual ones. In terms of how it works on our real humanity, showing off online to people we hardly know is not at all comparable to showing off in front of our classmates, neighbors or close friends. The key difference here is whether people could interact and communicate with others face to face. The American writer Joel Kotkin once said that in the digital age, “the oldest fundamentals of place—sense of community, identity, history, and faith—not only remain

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important, they are increasingly the critical determinants of success and failure.”3 As we come to realize, the decision of the location and products for every digital community shop is not made by brainstorming but based on an actuarial calculation of data about consumer preferences and their life trajectories. But digital community shop can hardly become the organizer and creator of new interactive communities if the values and life circles of community residents are not covered in their algorithms. Ultimately, genuine interactive communities could only develop in spaces where people find it easy to walk, encounter and share. Why shall we emphasize on spaces that are easy for walking? Because only in these spaces, will encounters and sharing take place, will genuine interpersonal interactions happen, and will an articulated sense of place and community develop. We started our discussion with the digital community shop and we shall return to it at the end. It is true that door-to-door delivery is an essential element of high-quality life (i.e., “livability”), which is exactly what digital community shops intend to do and are doing. But real community life, more than anything else, requires a person to get out of the house to experience everything and to share his/her experiences and feelings with neighbors. This is the meaning of interactive community which has been observed again and again in this chapter. Anyone who wants to become an organizer of such interactive communities has to place real interpersonal interactions in a living community at its core. Such communities will not resist but welcome the use of big data; yet it will certainly not center on big data, or more precisely, not on the big data of economic activities. Livable cities require a high density and proximity in logistics, which is what businesses are competing for over the “last kilometer” challenge. It is already bringing an unprecedent positive experience to people by the realization of online shopping and services. But life experiences are much more than consumption of goods and services at the physical level, as people wish to be respected, appreciated, needed and thus recognized by the community on the spiritual level. The focus of this process is not on the relationship between people and goods, but the relationship between people. Therefore, there is an increasing need for intensive and close interpersonal communications, as well as an urban space where people can easily meet and communicate face to face. For Jane Jacobs, those seemingly trivial street encounters are in fact lessons of assimilation. People do need humanistic nourishment, as well as a user-friendly environment to develop and enrich our personalities through real interactions with others. So, will digital community shops of the future be able to digitize community life and at the same time have the organizational ability to make spaces for community interactions more humane? This is an open question, and a question that needs to be explored through practices.

3

Kotkin [2].

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References 1. Mitchell, M. (1996). City of bits: Space, place and infobahn (p. 8). The MIT Press. 2. Kotkin, J. (2001). The new geography: How the digital revolution is reshaping the American landscape (p. 190). Random House

Chapter 11

From Space Production to Community Empowerment

This book begins with Lefebvre’s theory on the production of space, with a localized Shanghai narrative woven throughout all the chapters with a particular focus on the period since the 1980s, during which capitalized production of space has radically altered Shanghai’s socio-geographical landscape, but spatial practices aiming at residential communities are always ongoing. In the last decade, the wind has shifted in the direction of interactive community empowerment practices that are accessible and beneficial to the grassroots. The core principle behind this shift, i.e., to gradually bring the rights to improve and create living spaces back into the hands of residents, is also the very goal of the Marxist socio-spatial ontology. As this shift is a very recent phenomenon, community empowerment practice in Shanghai is also still in its trial period. Nonetheless, as Soja stated, “lifeworlds are radically open and openly radicalizable; … whose knowledge none the less guides our search for emancipatory change and freedom from domination.”1 Hence, we conclude the book with the final chapter about the case of a community garden in Shanghai, not for its perfection but for its demonstrational values, i.e., the significant change in spatial practices from capital logic-dominant to community logic-tolerant. The Knowledge and Innovation Community Garden (KICG) in Shanghai is a public space transformed from a piece of wasteland sited in the middle of multiple adjacent but fence-divided residential compounds (Fig. 11.1). It now becomes an open green area which is composed of footpaths, landscapes, a vegetable patch, a bark-chip paved playground, and a sandbox. It works like a magnet that draws people out of their compounds to get acquainted with neighbors they have no previous contact. Children, as well as their parents, are drawn out of home to plant in the vegetable patch or play in the sandbox; farmers together with customers from near and far, are drawn to join the weekly farmer’s market. Teachers, students, scholars, craftsmen, along with flocks of participants, are drawn to attend a variety of events

1

Soja [1].

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Fig. 11.1 A sketch map of the KICG (By Liu Yuelai, Department of Landscape Architecture, Tongji University)

from nature education classes and regular public lectures to workshops of handicrafts in its indoor space made from container boxes. The community garden is getting so vibrant and has become a magnet space of the neighborhood, or in other words, a community itself accommodating people’s needs for social interactions. As a result, the community garden has played a much bigger role than it was supposed to. Pondering over its implications, we cannot help but to ask why. Why don’t the communities we live in feel like communities? What is missing in those communities? How did the KICG grow into a community with which we love to be engaged? To answer these questions, we have to first reflect on the old models for urban regeneration, and then to explore and invent new ones for an organic urban regeneration.

11.1 Production of Space: A Capitalized Urban Development Model On the very first public seminar hosted at the community garden, the speaker opened his lecture with the statement that “we have made gains in space at the expense of community life”. To understand this statement, we have to start with the big picture of how urban development has evolved in China since the 1990s. In the earlier 30 years of the past six decades, Shanghai had the lowest level of road area, green space area and housing space per capita; worse still, per capita road area declined over the course of those 30 years. In the 1980s, the Shanghai municipal government set housing and transportation as top priorities of the government agenda. After 30 years of efforts since then, per capita road area in Shanghai increased 20-fold, green space area 30fold, and housing space threefold. Consequently, narrow and crammed homes became history and the Shanghainese people began to enjoy decent living spaces. On the other

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side of the coin, however, a great number of gated modern residential compounds have mushroomed on the sites where traditional alleyway neighborhoods used to stand, and millions of inner-city residents have been relocated to newly developed urban regions where new communities are rebuilt. Over 80% of people have become owners of their properties, and about the same percentage of housing are separate apartments. As a result, “in terms of social space, family-centered private space and its corresponding psychological patterns are fully developed, while public spaces and interactions between neighbors continue to diminish”.2 The aforementioned urban regeneration model can be described as “an economic development model driven by power and capital for the aim of land/space benefits”.3 To best understand this model, it is necessary to refer to the production of space theory by Henri Lefebvre as introduced in Chap. 1. Firstly, for the production of space, “land, ground, air, and even light, are all incorporated in the productivity and the product”.4 This also indicates the capitalization of space, as land leasehold becomes the main way to monetize local resources and increase fiscal incomes. From the perspectives of spatial sociology and spatial economics, the capitalization of space means first of all the capitalization of urban spaces, then of historical spaces and of landscapes, and finally of industrial sites, all of which demonstrate the progressive advancement of space capitalization in the context of urban development. The corresponding examples of such are largescale demolition and re-development of old towns, repurposing Shanghai Xintiandi Shikumen blocks as a world-class commercial space, transforming waterfront areas along the Huangpu River from an industrial zone to a consumption experience zone, and converting numerous heritage industrial buildings or warehouses into creativity centers/facilities. Secondly, the production of space does not mean to produce physical spaces only, such as Disneyland Park or Xintiandi, but also to produce necessary spaces for the specific mode of production. Space is no longer simply a place to accommodate a certain mode of production, but also a component of it. As Lefebvre put it, “Since, ex hypothesi, each mode of production has its own particular space, the shift from one mode to another must entail the production of a new space.”5 In this way, the shift from a production-oriented planned economy to a service-oriented economy of the global city requires the production of brand-new spaces. According to Wang Xiaoming, it is a process of shift from socialist industrial spaces to architectural spaces of residencecentric building complexes.6 Yet Wang’s conclusion is far from comprehensive. This new mode of production is linked to the central government’s overall strategy of building Shanghai into a global city. The new mode of production is indicated in spaces including export-oriented industrial parks, CBDs full of the world’s top 500 companies, trunk expressways, crisscross metro lines, world-class deep-water harbor 2

Yu and Zou [2]. Chen [3]. 4 Ibid., p. 49. 5 Lefebvre [4]. 6 Wang [5]. 3

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and airports, large-scale public green space stretching for many kilometers, among others. They have defined the skeleton of urban spaces in Shanghai, but also radically changed its cultural and social landscape. In the recent two decades (1995–2014), 80 million m2 of buildings in Shanghai have been demolished. Most importantly, “the massive demolition is happening not only in the form of bricks and mortar, but also of neighborhood relations built over decades. For those residents moving into new houses, while they have gained comfortable living space and a residence with amenities and privacy, they have lost the social interactions with the community in everyday life.”7 Thirdly, the capitalized production of space generates an abstract space, which reflects the interest of capitals and the “politics” of the state, and only takes abstract or physical characteristics of space into account, such as size, width, area, location, financial gain, etc.8 In contrast to abstract space there is social space, where people live and where all the richness and diversity of life are retained. Lefebvre envisioned that development for the interest of all population would “prevent abstract space from taking over the whole planet and papering over all differences”.9 One of the main scholars of the everyday life practice theory, Michel De Certeau, told two stories about spaces in his book. With a panoramic image of the city from a bird’s eye view, one story goes, “it is the analogue of the facsimile produced, through a projection that is a way of keeping aloof, by the space planner, urbanist, city planner or cartographer. The panorama-city is a ‘theoretical’ (that is, visual) simulacrum, in short a picture, whose condition of possibility is an oblivion and a misunderstanding of practices. The voyeur-god created by this fiction must disentangle himself from the murky intertwining daily behaviors and make himself alien to them.”10 Isn’t the voyeur-god looking down from high above, ignoring and disentangling himself from the real world, an excellent echo to Lefebvre’s concept of “abstract space”? Urban development has profoundly influenced the fate of mass population, however, in the foreground of this movement only land value, financial balance sheets, industrial layout, and compensations in kind or in money for relocated families are taken into consideration. As for neighborhood relations, memories of the past, nostalgic sentiments, childhood friends, none of these spatial experiences and practices in the daily rounds was in the agenda of the making of abstract spaces. As American scholar Richard Sennett complained, the sprawling geographic form of the modern city, the increasing dispersion of dwellings, and the unbridled pursuit of efficiency and speed have all led to the sensory deprivation in space. The crowd today “is assembled in malls for consumption rather than for the more complex purposes of community or political power”.11 “Individualism and the facts of speed together deaden the modern body; it does not connect.”12 Once the body loses contact with the 7

Yu [6]. See footnote 5. 9 Ibid., p. 55. 10 De Certeau [7]. 11 Sennett [8]. 12 Ibid., p. 324. 8

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stone (i.e. the city), human beings’ ability to feel and to connect went numb. Isn’t the space production strategy that prioritizes efficiency, speed and profit undermining people’s sensitivity to the world and their goodwill to others? Before concluding this section, we would like to summarize the following issues regarding interaction and community arising from the capitalized mode of spatial development, so as to understand the significance of community empowerment, in this case made possible by a community garden: (i) the spatial dispersion due to the increase of per capita space resources; (ii) the fragmentation of social spaces due to gated communities; (iii) the segregation of people due to the private ownership of housing; (iv) the lack of spatial interaction between large green spaces and the environment; and (v) harms to human interactions due to the different density of road network and excessive scale of neighborhood, etc.

11.2 Shift in the Spatial Development Model The Knowledge and Innovation Community Garden (KICG) was evolved from “Clover Nature School (Shanghai)” established by a number of young landscape designers. Two additional partners also joined the making of this space, namely the property developer Shui-on Group (brand owner of the Knowledge and Innovation Park) and Yangpu District Bureau of Landscaping and City Appearance. Regardless of their own motivations, all the parties share the same vision, that is, large-scale space production should give way to space creation with humanistic scale, and the capital-and-state driven spatial development should yield to experimental spatial projects led by residents and professional teams. First, from the government perspective, the large-scale production of space will lead to unsustainable social development and spatial resource depletion. In light of this, the CPC Party Secretary of Shanghai set the goal of negative growth in construction land supply.13 The 2016 statistics of land requisition by all districts in Shanghai showed that central districts were running out of land available for demolition.14 The Implementation Measures for Urban Redevelopment in Shanghai enacted since 2015 is applauded by scholars as a milestone marking a new phase of urban regeneration, that is, to seek potential in existing urban layout rather than massive expansions and development. In this document, the concept of “organic urban regeneration” was proposed, with the core of “people-oriented spatial restructuring and community activation”.15 In this context, the Shanghai Municipal Bureau of Landscaping promoted the community greenery autonomous initiatives; to take a step further, 13

http://shzw.eastday.com/shzw/G/20140507/u1ai128767.html. Accessed on April 21, 2021. According to Shanghai Statistic Yearbook (2016), in the three central districts of Xuhui, Changning and Jing’an, housing areas acquired by the government for redevelopment were 0, 6000, and 5000 sqm. respectively; in comparison, the numbers of 2005 were 163,700, 65,200 and 26,000 m2 . respectively. 15 Ma and Ying [9]. 14

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Yangpu District authorized a social organization to design and operate this public green space to provide public services.16 It is indeed an act of innovation, and an act to advance with the trend of times. Second, from the corporate perspective, as a commercial property developer, Shuion Group never believes in constructing buildings only, but in creating communities. The property developer has successfully built a community of vitality and style at Daxue Road, a block for mixed commercial and residential purposes. Shui-on is motivated to support professionals17 to convert this piece of wasteland into a very attractive public space, as it may not only increase the property values, but also create a vibrant place in the Daxue Road community. Third, from the perspective of the Clover Nature School, as a professional organization, it is specialized in landscaping. Its co-founders have rich experiences in municipal landscaping projects, and they have noticed some bad practices, such as large-scale transplanting of mature trees that don’t really fit local conditions, which leads to extravagant landscape design and financial bleeding in years to come just to keep those exotic trees and plants alive.18 Urban greenery projects are meant to benefit the public, but unfortunately they are often implemented as government vanity projects and follow the pattern of large scale production of space. In order to be visible, the greenery projects often tend to be large in scale and exotic in style. How to implement localized landscape? How to ensure a less expensive but more productive and effective landscaping scheme in improving the community environment, particularly in closing the gap between consumption and production, mitigating the divide between urban and rural regions, as well as reconciling the conflict between spectating and engagement? How to introduce natural gardening as part of community life? These questions and corresponding attempts to possible answers are the starting point of this grassroots movement initiated by Clover Nature School in the case of this environmental regeneration project. The community garden experiment described above is not a single case, as micro spatial regeneration experiments have already turned into a trend or movement. For instance, while focusing on artistic creation in large public space, the 2015 Shanghai Urban Space Art Season also paid its attention on design and regeneration of micro spaces. A number of pilot projects were designated, including Clover Nature School’s mini plaza renovation project. In 2015, Shanghai Design & Promotion Center for Urban Public Space was established with micro regeneration high on its agenda. The 22 micro regeneration projects reviewed by the Center in 2016 and 2017 were all about spaces where everyday life takes place, including entrance to residential compounds, lanes and alleyways, central green land, community plazas, villa houses, and street vendor stalls, among others. “A good planner is one who has a deep understanding of community needs.” This is probably the most down-to-earth slogan for space designers in 2016, signaling the change of policy from mass production of space to people-oriented community regeneration. 16

Interview with Yangpu District Bureau of Landscaping and City Appearance, 20170428. Shui-on Group provided seed money to KICG. 18 Interview with the founder of KICG, Mr. L (Interview No. 20170124L). 17

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As a matter of fact, the message conveyed by the KICG case also well indicates the shift of opinions in the international community. In the last decade, urban reports issued by a number of international agencies, such as UN-Habitat, the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, have all accounted space issues as root cause for urban inequality and social divide. In UN-Habitat’s World Cities Report 2016, a chapter is dedicated to “The Widening Urban Divide”, with a focus on the problem of spatial exclusion, listing multiple dimensions of exclusions such as exclusion from socioeconomic space, exclusion from the collective sociocultural space, and exclusion from political space19 ; all these go back to the elite-dominated and exchange values-oriented mode of space production, resulting in the exclusion and segregation of vulnerable social groups and average people. On the UN-Habitat III Conference, Charter of Athens from the 1930s was replaced by The Quito Papers. According to American urban sociologists Sassen and Sennett, the Charter of Athens regards city as a rational machine composed of usable components, which exerts complex planning and administrative controls and aims at maximized efficiency and separation of city functions. By that, it stifles the vitality of the city, disrupts the flow of communications among people, and compromises the social diversity in urban life.20 The mission of The Quito Papers, of which these two scholars have participated in drafting, is to create an open city, a city of dynamics and social diversity. A series of agendas are set out to achieve the mission, one of which is to “support the provision of well-designed networks of safe, accessible, green and quality streets and other public spaces that are accessible to all”, and foster “not-for-profit community initiatives, bringing people into public spaces and promoting walkability and cycling with the goal of improving health and well-being”.21 With the headline “From The Charter of Athens to The Quito Papers”, media worldwide reported the important concepts from UN-Habitat III Congress, which signified the shift of urban strategy from forging growth machine to thriving community life. The reset of the course mentioned above took place about a decade now, but theoretical reflections have never ceased since the publications of Lefebvre’s The Production of Space and David Harvey’s Social Justice and the City in 1970s. In addition to criticizing the capitalization of space production and unbalanced geographical development, works of Marxist urban scholars have also provided guiding principles and interpretations on space schemes that are open to everyone and dominated by resident users. The following two points are most relevant to the KICG case: first, the shift to a people-oriented city must go with the creation of new spaces. “A revolution that does not produce a new space has not realized its full potential; indeed it has failed in that it has not changed life itself.”22 Second, what is the new space like? It is

19

UN-Habitat [10]. http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001072068. 21 2016. New Urban Agenda: Quito Declaration on Sustainable Cities and Human Settlements for All. p.18. http://habitat3.org/wp-content/uploads/New-Urban-Agenda-GA-Adopted-68th-PlenaryN1646655-E.pdf. Accessed on April 21, 2021. 22 See footnote 5. 20

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constructed by a bottom-up rather than top-down approach, which implies that “generalized self-management” is in place, that “the individual has the right to a space, as well as the right to urban life as the center of social life and of so called cultural activities, and so forth”, that it is “overturning dominant spaces, placing appropriation over domination, demand over command, and use over exchange”, and that it is “a space of differences” encompassing all the richness and possibilities of life.23 Although Lefebvre did not exactly use the term “community empowerment”, the above-mentioned arguments all point to such a concept. We need to get back to De Certeau’s theory that community life is site-specific, accessed by foot, and within walking distance. It is a point made in De Certeau’s second story about space, and is also the main argument of this chapter on the community garden space. Sennett is dissatisfied that the modern city has deprived people of their sense of space, while De Certeau believes walking is the most direct and primitive way for people to get in touch with space. “Their story begins on ground level, with footsteps. They are myriad, but do not compose a series. They cannot be counted because each unit has a qualitative character: a style of tactile apprehension and kinesthetic appropriation. Their swarming mass is an innumerable collection of singularities. Their intertwined paths give their shape to spaces. They weave places together. In that respect, pedestrian movements form one of these ‘real systems whose existence in fact makes up the city.’ They are not localized; it is rather that they spatialize”.24 What do we learn from de Certeau’s stories about walking in the city? Everyday life is made by people walking and moving around, meaning that a city without sidewalks or being highly unfriendly to pedestrians could become hostile to people’s everyday life. During a walk, people are sensually active and responsive to the surroundings, hence the practice of walking is defined not by quantity but by quality, which includes not only the quality of the action (i.e., walking) but also that of the surroundings. What’s the relationship between walking and space? A walk takes place in space, and a walker is also reshaping and inventing space. “Thus the street geometrically defined by urban planning is transformed into a space by walkers.”25 It also makes good sense that “the pedestrian movements form one of these ‘real systems whose existence in fact makes up the city’”. Please note what pedestrians have put together is not just a city system, but one of the real systems of the city, implying that a street still seems a street but no longer a real space in people’s everyday life if the conditions of walking are lost. Returning to a walking-friendly world, to create user-oriented spaces and start “imagining spaces for the human body which might make human bodies aware of one another”,26 is the very purpose of the community garden to empower the residents so as to improve and build their living spaces.

23

Lefebvre [11]. See footnote 10. 25 Ibid., p. 117. 26 See footnote 11. 24

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11.3 KICG: A Practical Case Study of Community Empowerment By creating an urban farmland on a piece of wasteland and converting a farmland into a public space accessible and available to everyone, the KICG is dedicated to both space building and community empowerment. Capitalized production of space is harming community life by making so many instances of “space of conspicuous consumption, celebrating commodities rather than civic values. It became the site of ‘spectacle’ in which people are reduced from active participants in the appropriation of space to passive spectators.”27 With planting and gardening as the starting points, the core philosophy of the community garden is to build a community public space so as to further restore and reshape the relations among community members as well as the relationship between individuals and the community, and finally achieve the transformation from the “vanity project” style space production to the user-oriented space building. Specifically, the building of the KICG involves three dimensions: space building, discourse delivery, and community empowerment. The three-dimensional philosophy can be traced back to “the triad of the perceived, the conceived, and the lived” in Lefebvre’s space theory: “spatial practice” refers to the creation of a perceptible space; “representations of space” refer to the formation of comprehensible knowledge about the space; and “spaces of representation” refer to space as directly lived by its users, including how they feel about the space and how they imagine the space they aspire.28 Lefebvre’s theory provides a narrative framework, but the values of the narration derives from the principles mentioned at the end of part II of this chapter, i.e., to restore people’s capabilities to be aware of, to make sense of, and to be creative on our lived space.

11.3.1 Building a Space Accessible and Available to Everyone Intending to create an open and friendly space shared by everyone, the design of the KICG, covering around 2000 m2 , is centered on four used containers as its indoor space and stretches to outdoors on two sides. A rain shed attached to the door is placed where the indoor and outdoor space meets. Flanked by benches and potted plants, neighbors can sit and relax outdoors in rainy days even if the indoor space is closed. There is a patch of rice patty and a mini wetland on the left side, and a vegetable garden on the right side. A little further away from the containers there are a few ring-shaped wooden chairs for people to rest and linger. A thoughtfully-designed walking lane connects all parts of the garden, showing people the way to and from different sections. Moreover, a gravel path is paved along the bamboo fence, with a 2-to-3-m-wild belt of wild flower beds between the gravel bath and the main road, so 27 28

Harvey [12]. See footnote 5.

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that people can enjoy watching the garden work in the vegetable patch as they pass by. The path is designed to make it easier for people to observe and watch, or even to encourage such observations by creating a comfortable environment, namely for passersby to observe vegetables being planted and for adults to watch their children play. All these interactions and engagements have brought energy and vitality to the community park. In Jan Gehl’s words, “many large and small possibilities … are attached to the opportunity of being in the same space as and seeing and hearing other people”; “people and human activities attract other people. People are attracted to other people. They gather with and move about with others and seek to place themselves near others. New activities begin in the vicinity of events that are already in progress.”29 To describe the community garden as a people-centric space is not accurate enough, as it is essentially a children-centric space. Children learn and grow by playing games. In the outdoor area, a sandbox and a playground paved in soft bark chips are designed for children to wander around with barely any limits, because it is believed that their footsteps could take them to get to know the world. The sandbox is right next to the containers so that the grownups can keep an eye on the youngsters. Here “returning to the walking world” means returning to a safe world where children can walk and run about with no restrain. For that purpose, the path in the community garden area is paved in gravel. The “one-meter” vegetable patches for leasing are barred with low wooden fencing with a little gate of child size. All these designs are consistent with the vision of the founders, which is to create an edible landscape in the heart of the city by offering nature education and natural gardening to children. It is far more than just a piece of green land for the eye. The sandbox, trampoline and vegetable garden would instinctively attract children as well as their parents or caretakers following their steps. In this way, a children-centric space by design can evolve into a public space accessible and available to everyone (Fig. 11.2).

11.3.2 Representation of Spaces and Place Awareness As the conceptual framework made by professionals is a process of social naming for the community garden, the place awareness of the community garden users directly relates to their spatial recognition. The purpose of creating the community garden is not only about space awareness, but also about knowledge and concept. American urban sociologists Sharon Zukin and others use the term “conceptual space” to interpret Lefebvre’s “representation of spaces”. Taking the shopping street as an example, “the conceptual space is the one we visualize when we think of the shopping street”,30 and it reflects, replicates and represents the common interest of a social group. The interpretation by Zukin and others has extended Lefebvre’s original concept, because the “conceptual space” 29 30

Gehl [13]. Zukin et al. [14].

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Fig. 11.2 “The Sandbox Generation” in the KICG (Photo by: Liu Yuelai)

contains much more than spatial knowledge by scholars, and also place awareness by ordinary people. While the conceptual framework made by professionals is a process of social naming for the community garden, the place awareness of the community garden users is directly related to their spatial recognition. The KICG organizers knew from the beginning that they were creating a new space, a new social space transcending a variety of contradictory relationships between observation and participation, consumption and production, urban and rural, experts and ordinary people, and so on. They believe creating such a new space is possible, because the society itself owns the power to create, and the land itself has the force of life. As one of the founders said: Community empowerment is a bottom-up process that leverages various social forces and resources by self-organization, self-governance and self-development, while nature empowerment reveals the power that lies within land and the nature itself. The empowerment project has demonstrated power of life, and power that children have within. It is not necessarily a perfectly constructed or utilized space, but it is powerful enough so that individuals don’t have to rely on authorities. Instead, by observing the land and its natural output, people come to realize that they can rely on themselves, on their own hands and minds, so as to eventually get rid of consumerism.31

The creativity of the society and the life force intrinsic to land are the sources of power shown in this space regeneration project, and it also well defines the nature of the KICG project. The conception of the community garden has gradually grown into a systematic and profound knowledge framework through a series of academic seminars. In 2016, KICG hosted eight public lectures, gathering speakers with different professions 31

Quote from the founder of KICG, Mr. Liu’s PPT.

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from various countries and regions, including university community development researcher (Prof. Yu Hai), community empowerment leader in Chinese Mainland and Taiwan (Lin Te-fu), founder of Intermediate Technology in South Korea (Kim Seongwon), founder of “Life is Peace” in Japan (Takashi Masaki), international food policy researcher (Qiu Cheng), founder of local community mutual association (Wu Nan), and others. One can tell the topics are highly diversified and forwardlooking from their titles, yet every talk had its focus on the relationship between the community garden and the overall community space, attempting to interpret and disseminate the know-how and normative concepts of community empowerment. Peculiar terms were coined from these seminars such as “Urban garden”, “Community Garden”, “Co-managed Landscape”, “Interactive Community”, “Society of Acquaintance”, “Sandbox Generation” and so on. These newly-coined terms also reflect the values they carry, including environmental-friendly and sustainable urban ecology, organic urban regeneration, an educational environment conducive to children’s development, active making of the lived world, and more. Such concepts to define the community garden are being spread beyond the classroom via audience and media, and are further influencing and shaping the general public’s awareness and recognition of the community garden. By looking at the following topics designed by the KICG for children’s nature classes and activities, one can easily understand that it aims for more than teaching techniques of natural gardening. Topics includes “Farming and Reading Club Report: in the February Drizzle, We Sowed in the Ground, and Wrote Poems for the Spring Breeze”, and “Nature Class Report: Plants Rainbow, Towards a More Beautiful Sky in Shanghai”. By defining the community garden, describing the spatial qualities of the garden, and explaining the interpersonal relationship and the relationship between human and nature through activities at the KICG, all of these narratives reflect the efforts to conceptualize the community garden space. Consequently, the nature education for children also cultivates their place awareness and social education. The place awareness of the community garden by residents and passersby also constitutes to a theme of spatial representation, but their spatial picture comes more from their spatial perception and activities. They could easily gain positive spatial experiences and perceptions when an open and vibrant space appears in their community which is full of greens, fun and various “farming”-related activities. For residents of the upscale neighborhood adjacent to the community garden, compared with luxurious and splendidly-decorated clubs, “the KICG is exactly what we want”.32 According to full-time staff members of the KICG, when the garden first opened in July 2016, there were rarely any visitors to the garden. However, “nowadays with weekly updated events, at least 20 families would come and hang out in the garden every day from Monday to Friday if weather permits; even on rainy days, there will be several to over a dozen families. On weekends, people would keep coming to the garden and (we) don’t set a limit.”33 Daxue Road, a street only a block away from KICG, was known as a place of petit bourgeoisie sentiment, but it took almost a 32 33

Interview record 20160911Z, interview with Ms Z, a resident of the neighborhood next to KICG. Interview record 20170413J, interview with Ms J, a KICG staff.

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decade for people to establish such place awareness. In contrast, KICG has become an iconic project in less than a year. What’s the difference? Daxue Road is simply a public space for consumption, while KICG is a user-centered public space that is in continuous making. From place awareness to place recognition, then to community cohesion, the key lies in how much the users have reclaimed the power to initiate the making of their lived world.

11.3.3 Experiencing and Shaping the Lived Space In the beginning of the chapter, an assertion was put forward that the community garden is becoming a magnet place in the surrounding communities. Here is an onsite observation I took on April 15, 2017 as a proof. 14:00 A five-year-old mixed-race little girl, who lives in a nearby residential compound, follows about 20 older children (about 7–8 years old) to their gardening class in the vegetable patch organized by the KICG. They plant vegetables, grind beans, and look for clovers. A Shanghainese grandma comes to the garden with her two-year-old grandson in baby stroller, finds a place near the door of the container, and sits on her own portable stool. 14:40 A dog named “Wonder” and his lady owner come to the garden. The mixed-race girl and a two-year-old boy come to play a ball game with the dog. Meanwhile at the right corner of the garden a workshop is in progress, where an American teacher is guiding some 20 young students how to compost. 15:30 Dog Wonder and his lady owner leave for the Farmer’s Market nearby. Five kids and their parents from the neighborhood come to the vegetable patch, fetch watering cans from the shed and start to water the vegetables. The families do not know each other well, but the kids get along very soon and start to work together. 17:00 It is the peak time of the day at the garden. A 12-year-old girl just finished her after-school training class and arrives at the garden with her mother. They get off their shared bicycles and rush to their “one-meter” vegetable patch. The father of the mixed-race little girl goes into the container room, pours himself a cup of water, drinks it up, washes the cup and puts it back to where it was.

What can we interpret from this observation log? First, the KICG is a farm, a workshop and a paradise for kids. Sennett mourned about people’s space sensory deprivation in the contemporary time. Is it possible that kids play and learn in a community garden like this would grow into adults who will be more sensitive and friendly to the environment and the human beings? What sociologists really care about is whether the sandbox, bark chips, plants, playmates are necessary factors for children’s social and educational environment. Second, the KICG is a place for field training. Want to learn how to compost? You can do it right there next to compost

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piles. Training here is practical that involves both mind and body. Third, the KICG is a place for social interactions. Here you will find endless reasons for people to meet and interact: planting together, playing games together, shopping together… Fourth, the KICG is also a miniature society of acquaintance. It has made itself a home for community members, so that people just walk into the room and find a cup to drink water just like what they usually do at home. More interpretations could be made. But the most important thing is to revisit the teachings of de Certeau: it is the footsteps that have transformed the planned streets into space; and similarly, it is the everyday interactions that have transformed the garden into a lived space so dear to hearts of the neighbors. Green space is often made to serve the ornamental purpose to people; but in the KICG, passive consumers are turned into active workers/makers. According to the French scholar Guy Debord, the spectacle is able to subject human beings to itself. “The attitude which it demands in principle is passive acceptance which in fact it already obtained by its manner of appearing without reply, by its monopoly of appearance”.34 The spatial practice in the KICG has turned a passive acceptance of spectacle into a participatory spectacle. The key to its success is that the space and spectacle here is no longer a product of capital but a product of creativity and working, and consequently, people are no longer spectators but actors, no longer slaves of spectacle but makers of their own community space. Taking the planting and gardening maintenance in the KICG as an example, the tenant families must take full responsibility of the “one-meter vegetable patch” including planting, fertilizing, regular watering and so forth. There is no designated caretaker of the flowers, vegetables and fruits in the public areas of the garden, as it tries to attract more citizens and children to participate or work as volunteers with the concept of “shared governance and shared benefits”. Some families drive over on the weekend, while some nearby residents bring their children regularly and “have made it as a routine”. Participation in these plantings and maintenance is not about labor, but about work, active work for the improvement of one’s own living space. Instead of doing all the labor work for community residents, the KICG aims to facilitate such processes by providing tools and technical guidance. Most tools in the garden are small tools suitable for children. The management style here is also open and “trust-based”—tools are hung on the walls, and users are encouraged to clean the tools after use and return to their original place. Fertilizers and pesticides are not used here. Instead, residents are encouraged to make their own compost under the guidance of the KICG staff. In this way, the participation of residents goes through the whole process, combining the recycling of household waste with the cultivation in the community garden. It is the living space of the garden where the situation of such combination is taking place over and over again. A shared concern for the farm and a sense of place start to develop when the children’s first thought after school is to water the garden, when the elderly who used to walk their dogs elsewhere begin to include the garden as a regular stop, and when the neighborhood residents begin to care about the financing of the garden by saying

34

Debord [15].

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“the sustainable development of the KICG relies on the financial balance”.35 “I’ve followed the development of the garden since its first day. I always unconsciously walk to the garden, and so does my kid. We feel very comfortable here. It’s a natural feeling—you don’t need to say anything. Therefore, as soon as the KICG launched the “one-meter vegetable patch” programme, we applied for one, not for the vegetables, but for the ownership of a piece of one-meter land.”36 One young mother often “hangs out” in the KICG with her 7-year-old son. “I feel so lucky to have a community garden like this near my home. It’s simple but full of fun for kids! It’s incredibly joyful for them to loosen a bit of soil, water the plants, observe their flowers and fruits grow to full size, and eat the potatoes they plant. As parents, we love such kind of down-to-earth activities and hope our children can learn how to give and gain.”37 According to scholars of phenomenological geography, the “sense of place” comes from a full understanding of the place, an understanding of what they are as a product of human purpose and a meaningful context for human activity, or a profound and unconscious recognition of local identity. As the community garden is still young, even if its neighbors have developed a sense of place, it would be neither sophisticated nor subconscious. However, it is fair to say that people are getting engaged in meaningful activities here in the community garden, forming positive feelings or attachment to it, or even identifying it as part of their own community. Therefore, the fostering of sense of place is entailed in all spatial efforts, from large-scale space production to community empowerment. In terms of the KICG case, through its practiced, perceived and lived spaces, the relationship between people and land is rebuilt, the bond among community members is reconnected, the kindness and mutual trust between us and others are reconstructed, and ultimately, the empowerment of community and the sense of belonging to the community are reassured. Since the 1990s, the urban regeneration model in Shanghai has been dominated by large-scale and capitalized production of space, in which urban spaces, historical spaces as well as landscapes have all been taken as capital. The production of space best interpreted how urban space was utilized as a growth machine, and witnessed the change from “production in space” to “production of space”. The urban regeneration driven by space production unleashed the productivity of land in downtown areas, greatly improved the quality of space in the old town, established a new framework of urban space, and mitigated the severe shortage of living space for average Shanghai citizens. Nevertheless, this kind of large-scale space transformation interrupted the human scale of community structure, damaged the diversity of everyday life, deprived people of the capacity to sense the space, and obstructed the opportunity of free communication in such space. In most cases, residents are no longer makers of their own life, but merely spectators of a spectacle society and consumers of a materialized world. People have enjoyed gains in space at the expense of community, improvement in their spatial environment at the expense of the social 35

Interview record 20160911Z. Interview record 20170416L, interview with Ms L, resident of the neighborhood near KICG. 37 Interview record 20170416X, interview with Ms X, resident of the neighborhood near KICG. 36

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environment, greater accessibility to far-reaching places at the expense of a walkingfriendly and talking-friendly neighborhood, and a growing number of shopping malls at the expense of public spaces for people to meet and greet. The challenges we are facing today is precisely what large-scale production of space has brought: how could we integrate and reconstruct fragmented spaces into interactive places? How could we move out of the stranger society and rebuild communities of acquaintance? Large-scale production of space will probably not come to a full stop in the near future, but it is not sustainable as spatial resources are already running low. The shift from production of space to life space has already commenced; a consensus to change the efficiency-first development model and create a people-oriented community has been reached by the government, enterprises, residents and social organizations. At a time when bottom-up micro-spatial regeneration is flourishing in local communities of Shanghai, the KICG experiment offers special values, in response to the shift from The Charter of Athens to The Quito Papers, reflecting the change from treating cities as rational machines to advocating building open, sharing, inclusive and participatory cities. The KICG brings back footpaths to pedestrians, the fun of gardening to urbanites, labor work to classrooms, games and playing to children, interactions to neighbors, productiveness to everyday life, and more. All of these are achieved by integrating the macro-scale urban advancements with micro-scale everyday life improvements, aiming to resolve the conflict between observation and creation, the divide between urban and rural, the distinction between experts and ordinary people, the separation between production and consumption. In short, by introducing nature education and natural gardening activities, it breaks down the isolation of people resulting from the capitalized production of space in the past decades. The organizers of the KICG believe that it is possible to change the way of space building, because both the society and the land per se have the power to create. What people have to do is to make up their mind and take the initiatives to create and improve living spaces; to be more specific, let the children, their parents and family members, and every community member take initiatives. This is exactly what we have learned from the case of KICG.

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