Seriatim: The Supreme Court Before John Marshall 9780814738573

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Seriatim

Seriatim The Supreme Court before John Marshall

EDITED B

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Scott Douglas Gerber

New York University Press NEW YOR K AN

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NEW YOR K UNIVERSIT

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New Yor k an d Londo n

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Copyright © 199 8 b y New Yor k Universit y All rights reserve d Library o f Congres s Cataloging-in-Publicatio n Dat a Seriatim : the Suprem e Cour t befor e Joh n Marshal l / edited b y Scot t Douglas Gerber . p. cm . Includes index . ISBN 0-8147-3114-7 (clot h : alk paper ) 1. United States . Supreme Court—History . 2 . Judges—Unite d States—Biography. 3 . Judicial review—Unite d States—History . 4. La w an d politics—History . I . Gerber, Scot t Douglas , 1 9 6 1 KF8742.S47 199 8 347.73'26—dc21 98-905 6 CIP New Yor k Universit y Pres s book s ar e printed o n acid-fre e paper , and thei r bindin g material s ar e chosen fo r strengt h an d durability . Manufactured i n the United State s of Americ a 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2

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For George Athan Billias, who represents what the profession is supposed to be about.

Contents

Preface ix 1 Introduction : Th e Suprem e Cour t befor e John Marshal l 1 Scott Douglas Gerber 2 "Honour , Justice, and Interest" : John Jay' s Republican Politic s an d Statesmanshi p o n th e Federal Benc h 2 Sandra Frances VanBurkleo

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3 Joh n Rutledge : Distinction an d Declensio n 7 James Haw

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4 Deconstructin g Willia m Cushin g 9 Scott Douglas Gerber

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5 Jame s Wilson: Democratic Theoris t an d Supreme Cour t Justice 12 Mark D. Hall

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6 Joh n Blair : " A Saf e an d Conscientiou s Judge" 15 Wythe Holt

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7 Jame

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s Iredell : Revolutionist, Constitutionalist , Juris t 19 Willis P. Whichard

8 Willia m Paterson : Smal l States ' Nationalist 23 Daniel A. Degnan, SJ.

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e Verdict o n Samue l Chas e an d Hi s "Apologist " 26 Stephen B. Presser

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viii Contents 10 Olive r Ellsworth : " I have sough t th e felicit y an d glory o f your Administration " 29 William R. Casto

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11 Hei r Apparent : Bushro d Washingto n an d Federal Justice i n the Earl y Republi c 32 James R. Stoner, Jr.

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Editor's Note 351 Contributors 353 Index 355 About the Editor 362

Preface

The Founder s o f th e America n regim e wer e trul y remarkabl e men . George Washington, John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, John Marshall—these ar e the familiar name s of men wh o establishe d a for m o f governmen t tha t toda y serve s a s a model fo r muc h o f th e world . Ther e wer e othe r grea t me n o f th e Founding, me n wh o ar e no t a s wel l know n bu t who , nevertheless , made major contribution s to America's form of government. This volume of essay s examines te n o f thes e men ; individuals wh o serve d o n the U.S. Supreme Court before John Marshall, and who have suffere d undeserved obscurit y a s a result. This book grew out o f two o f my intellectual passions: the first, in the history of the American Founding ; the second, in an interdiscipli nary approach to scholarship. Although much has been written abou t the American Founding, little has been done to examine the history of the earl y judiciary , particularl y a s i t existe d befor e Joh n Marshall . With respec t t o interdisciplinar y scholarship , m y tim e spen t i n th e academy has convinced me that, unfortunately, mos t scholars prefer a traditional single-discipline approach. The contributors to the present collection hol d otherwise . W e believ e i t i s mor e fruitfu l t o examin e American histor y from a variety of perspectives. In the spiri t o f interdisciplinar y scholarship , eac h contributo r wa s given free rei n on how to approach he r or his particular justice . Each was asked, however, to provide a brief biographica l sketc h of the justice and , mor e importantly , t o analyz e th e contribution s h e made t o American law and politics in general and to the Supreme Court in particular. Thes e relativel y unknow n justices , a s shal l b e seen , con tributed a great deal . It i s hoped tha t thi s focu s o n th e justice s wh o serve d befor e Joh n Marshall will help correct the impression tha t the Supreme Court apix

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peared full-blow n wit h Marshal l lik e Athen a fro m th e forehea d o f Zeus. Certainl y i t shoul d explod e th e myth tha t th e concep t o f judi cial revie w bega n wit h Marbury v. Madison (1803) , which , thoug h well known t o b e false, continue s t o b e perpetuated b y innumerabl e nodding scholars. Indeed, this volume is exploratory i n nature and, it is hoped, will provoke scholars to research the early Court more carefully tha n they have in the past. All bu t tw o o f th e essay s wer e writte n specificall y fo r thi s collec tion. Sandr a VanBurkleo' s essa y abou t Joh n Ja y an d Da n Degnan' s essay abou t Willia m Paterso n first appeare d i n somewha t differen t form i n th e Journal of the Early Republic an d th e Seton Hall Law Review, respectively . Permissio n t o reprin t the m i s gratefull y ac knowledged. Mark Hall , a friend an d classmat e fro m graduat e school , was th e only contributor I knew befor e thi s project began . Mark ha d writte n his dissertation—since publishe d a s a book—on James Wilson's lega l and political philosophy, so Mark was an obvious choice to write the Wilson chapter . I then identified , wit h Mark' s help , th e leadin g au thorities o n th e othe r justice s t o b e considere d an d I wrote t o thes e authorities t o as k i f the y woul d b e willin g t o writ e a n essa y abou t their particula r justice . All agreed / Non e o f th e prospectiv e author s knew who I was when I requested thi s substantial commitmen t fro m them. Consequently , I credit my 10 0 percent succes s rate to a share d enthusiasm fo r th e subjec t o f thi s volume. The essay s reflect thi s en thusiasm. I thank eac h o f th e contributor s fo r hi s o r he r fine work , and fo r th e kindnes s an d patienc e the y al l hav e show n m e o n this , and other , matters. Grateful acknowledgmen t i s made to th e Earhar t Foundation, t o Florid a Coasta l Schoo l o f Law , and t o th e Universit y of Toled o Federalis t Societ y an d th e Stranaha n Nationa l Issue s Forum fo r thei r suppor t o f thi s project. I also want t o than k th e ad ministration an d staff o f the Social Philosophy an d Policy Center (especially Mar y Doilsaver ) fo r thei r assistanc e i n helpin g thi s volum e see the ligh t o f day , and m y editor an d frien d Nik o Pfund , th e direc *No on e no w livin g ha d writte n anythin g o f substanc e o n tw o o f th e justice s I wante d to include, William Cushin g an d Bushro d Washington. I asked politica l theorist Jim Stoner , author o f a fine book o n th e influenc e o f th e common la w o n th e Founding, i f he would b e willing to write on one of the two. Jim picked Washington. I was "lef t with " Cushing . (Wh y I place quotation mark s aroun d "lef t with " i s made clea r i n my Cushin g essay. )

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tor o f Ne w Yor k Universit y Press , fo r bein g s o supportiv e o f it . Fi nally, I would like to thank Georg e Athan Billias , a great early American historia n an d a n eve n bette r huma n being . The academ y woul d be a bette r place—th e kin d o f plac e i t i s suppose d t o be—i f ther e were mor e peopl e i n i t lik e "Mr . B. " I a m prou d t o cal l hi m m y mentor. S. D.G. Hampton, Virgini a

Chapter 1

Introduction The Supreme Court before John Marshall Scott Douglas Gerber

The Pre-Marshall Court in the American Mind Students of judicial institutions i n recent years have come to appreci ate more than eve r that to understand an y court we must understan d its origins. 1 Nowher e i s thi s mor e correc t tha n i n th e cas e o f th e Supreme Cour t becaus e th e origin s o f tha t institutio n ar e s o closel y identified wit h one justice—John Marshall. This holds true no matte r what one thinks of Marshall. For those who hold Marshall in high esteem—and mos t scholar s toda y d o exactl y that—th e stud y o f th e Court prior to 180 1 makes more plain the stamp Marshall place d o n the institution . Fo r thos e wh o vie w Marshal l les s heroically—a s d o several contributors in this volume—studying the pre-Marshall Cour t reveals what the institution might have been like had Marshall not accepted the nomination t o b e chief justice . Jumping ahea d two centuries to the present—and som e three hun dred fifty page s t o th e en d o f thi s book—a n examinatio n o f th e Supreme Cour t befor e John Marshal l reveal s much o f interest to stu dents of the institution. Marshallphiles will note, for example , the absence o f th e institutiona l voic e Marshall' s leadershi p wa s abl e t o I thank Mar k Hal l fo r hi s contribution s t o thi s essay ; Todd Ellinwoo d fo r hi s researc h assistance; an d Georg e Billias , Bil l Casto , Chuc k Hobson , Wyth e Holt , Stev e Presser , Ji m Stoner, and Sandr a VanBurkle o fo r thei r suggestion s fo r makin g i t better. An earlier versio n was presented a t the 199 6 meeting of the Northeastern Politica l Science Association. I thank the participant s o n th e "Element s o f Judicia l Culture " panel—Joh n Brigham , Nanc y Kas sop, Jeffrey Morris , Suzann e Samuels , an d Grie r Stephenson—fo r thei r enthusias m abou t this project .

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provide—an institutiona l voic e that ha s bee n absen t fo r muc h o f th e twentieth centur y a s well. 2 Those wh o vie w Marshal l les s heroicall y will find in these pages, by contrast, that, among other things, judicial review—the Court's most important power in the American system of constitutional government—was understood b y the early justices, was argued fo r b y them, and was practiced b y them. The conventional wisdom is, of course, that the Supreme Court became a n importan t institutio n onl y afte r Marshall' s arriva l an d th e opinion rendere d i n Marbury v. Madison (1803) . It is not exactl y accurate to say that the pre-Marshall Court has been completely ignored by student s o f th e judicia l process , bu t mos t scholar s o n th e subjec t stress the Court's lack of significance. Bernard Schwartz, for instance , concludes i n A History of the Supreme Court (1993 ) tha t "th e out standing aspect of the Court's work durin g its first decade was its relative unimportance." 3 Similarly , George Lee Haskins an d Herber t A . Johnson comment in their 198 1 volume in the Holmes Devise History of the Suprem e Cour t tha t th e Cour t wa s a "relativel y feebl e institu tion durin g the 1790s , too unimportant t o interest the talents o f tw o men who declined President Adams' offer o f the position of Chief Justice, i t . .. acquire d in . .. a few years' time, and largely under the guiding hand o f John Marshall , more power tha n eve n the framers o f th e Constitution ma y have anticipated." 4 Ther e i s also the following ob servation b y Robert G . McCloskey i n The American Supreme Court (1960), arguabl y th e mos t importan t boo k eve r writte n abou t th e Court: It is hard for a student of judicial review to avoid feeling that American con stitutional history from 178 9 to 180 1 was marking time. The great shado w of John Marshall , wh o becam e Chie f Justic e i n th e latte r year , fall s acros s our understandin g o f tha t first decade ; and i t has therefore th e qualit y o f a play's opening moments with minor characters exchanging trivialities while they an d th e audienc e awai t th e appearanc e o f th e star. 5

There ar e countles s othe r example s o f th e pre-Marshal l Cour t being trivialized by law professors, historians, and political scientists. 6 Invariably, scholars point out that Robert H. Harrison never served as an associate justice after h e was confirmed, an d that William Cushin g declined elevation from associat e to chief justice. Similarly, Charles C. Pinckney, Edwar d Rutledge , Alexande r Hamilton , an d Patric k Henry—significant statesme n i n the 1790s—refuse d t o b e appointe d

Introduction 3

to th e Court , an d severa l me n wh o wer e appointe d resigne d t o accep t other positions . Mos t notabl e amon g th e latte r group , John Rutledg e left th e Cour t afte r tw o year s to becom e chie f justic e o f the Sout h Car olina Cour t o f Commo n Pleas , an d Joh n Jay , wh o spen t par t o f hi s Supreme Cour t tenur e servin g a s ministe r t o Grea t Britain , resigne d from th e Cour t t o becom e governo r o f Ne w York , an d late r refuse d reappointment t o th e Court . After notin g th e difficult y o f staffin g th e earl y Suprem e Court , scholars usuall y mentio n i n passin g a fe w cases , suc h a s Hay burn's Case (1792) , Chisholm v. Georgia (1793) , Ware v. Hylton (1796) , Hylton v. United States (1796) , an d Colder v. Bull (1798) , an d the n hurry o n t o discus s related Marshal l Cour t opinions . While som e ma y hesitate fo r a momen t t o addres s Chisholm v. Georgia, thos e wh o d o typically emphasiz e tha t thi s decisio n wa s overturne d i n 179 8 b y th e Eleventh Amendment. Finally , many scholar s cite the absence o f a separate Suprem e Cour t buildin g a s evidenc e tha t th e earl y Cour t lacke d prestige. 7 There hav e bee n scholars , o f course , wh o recognize d tha t th e earl y Court ha s bee n neglected . Edwar d S . Corwin , fo r one , i n hi s 191 9 book abou t Joh n Marshall , wrote : The pioneer work o f the [pre-Marshall ] Suprem e Court in constitutional in terpretation has , for al l bu t specia l students , falle n int o somethin g lik e ob scurity owin g t o th e luste r o f Marshall' s achievement s an d t o hi s habi t o f deciding case s without muc h referenc e t o precedent . Bu t these earl y labor s are by no means insignificant, especiall y since they pointed the way to som e of Marshall' s mos t strikin g decisions. 8

Unfortunately, Corwi n faile d i n hi s lon g an d distinguishe d caree r t o fill this ga p i n th e literature . A fe w scholar s hav e begu n t o challeng e th e ide a tha t th e Suprem e Court becam e importan t onl y whe n Joh n Marshal l arrived . Th e multivolume ongoin g projec t documentin g th e activit y o f th e earl y Court edite d b y Maev a Marcu s an d others , an d Marcus' s edite d collection o f essay s o n th e Judiciar y Ac t o f 1789 , hav e bee n o f grea t assistance i n thi s regard. 9 Als o wort h notin g i s Willia m R . Casto' s The Supreme Court in the Early Republic: The Chief Justiceships of John Jay and Oliver Ellsworth (1995) . Casto , wh o contribute s an essa y abou t Olive r Ellswort h i n thi s volume , make s a n impor tant contributio n wit h hi s boo k b y presentin g a compellin g theor y

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as t o wh y th e pre-Marshal l Cour t i s ofte n viewe d negatively . A s h e puts it : Society in the late twentieth century—particularl y politica l society—i s usu ally viewe d primaril y i n term s o f conflict s o f value s an d interests . . . .Th e abiding them e o f th e earl y Suprem e Court , however , wa s precisel y t o th e contrary. Th e Cour t sough t t o suppor t th e politica l branche s o f th e ne w federal government , no t t o oppos e them. 10

According t o Casto , "Thoug h th e justices occasionall y resorte d t o constitutional interpretation , thei r primar y objectiv e wa s t o bolste r and consolidate the new federal government. " Th e label of "medioc rity" attache d t o th e pre-Marshall Court , h e concludes, "i s probabl y due t o th e direc t conflic t between th e moder n judicia l paradig m o f conflict an d the early Court's paradigm o f support." 11 Insights from Biography Although a few scholars have begun to pay attention to the pre-Mar shall Court, 12 much work remain s to be done. One fruitful approac h is to examin e th e contributions pre-Marshal l Cour t justice s made a s individuals to American law and politics. After all , one does not need to subscribe to the psychological an d sociological tenets of legal realism to recognize that an y court, including the Supreme Court , i s first and foremos t compose d o f individuals. 13 The biographica l approac h to the pre-Marshall Court is particularly appropriate, given that most of that Court' s busines s took plac e while the justices were riding cir cuit. Seriatim: The Supreme Court before John Marshall was designed with a multiple biographical methodology i n mind. The te n pre-Marshal l Cour t justice s (thi s numbe r exclude s th e largely unknown Thoma s Johnson an d Alfre d Moore ) ar e worthy o f study becaus e o f thei r impressiv e credential s an d activ e involvemen t in America's founding. O f the ten, three signed the Declaration o f Independence, si x wer e member s o f th e Federa l Conventio n o f 1787 , and six were prominent members of their state ratifying conventions . Besides thes e credentials , seve n serve d i n th e Continenta l Congress , eight had held prior judicial posts, and all served in state governments in som e capacity . Two , Olive r Ellswort h an d Willia m Paterson ,

Introduction 5

cowrote the Judiciary Act of 1789 , which helped to shape the institution of the Court . As the first president, George Washington had the unique opportu nity to nominate an entire Supreme Court. He took this responsibility seriously an d regarde d "th e du e administratio n o f Justic e a s th e strongest cement of good government." Consequently , he sought "th e fittest characters to expound th e laws and dispens e justice." 14 In hi s classi c stud y o f th e politica l histor y o f th e appointmen t process, Henr y J . Abraha m identifie s seve n criteri a employe d b y Washington t o choose Supreme Cour t justices: (1) suppor t an d advocac y o f th e Constitution ; (2 ) distinguishe d servic e i n the Revolution ; (3 ) activ e participatio n i n th e politica l lif e o f stat e o r na tion; (4) prior judicial experience on lower tribunals; (5) either a "favorabl e reputation wit h hi s fellows" o r persona l tie s with Washingto n himself ; (6 ) geographic suitability ; (7 ) love o f country. 15

The resul t wa s a numbe r o f impressiv e appointees . Th e nation' s first Court was composed o f John Jay of New York, John Rutledge of South Carolina , William Cushin g of Massachusetts, James Wilson of Pennsylvania, Joh n Blai r o f Virginia , an d Rober t H . Harriso n o f Maryland. Th e origina l si x justices neve r me t togethe r a s the Court , however. O n hi s way to th e inaugura l session , Harrison fel l ill , so ill in fact that he resigned his post without eve r having sat on the Court . While Harrison's resignation is sometimes used as evidence to indicate that the early Court lacke d prestige, it should b e noted tha t hi s death two months late r indicate s the severit y o f hi s sickness. Harrison wa s replaced b y James Iredell of North Carolina . In 179 1 the Suprem e Cour t los t a second member , John Rutledge , who resigne d t o becom e chief justic e o f the Sout h Carolin a Cour t o f Common Pleas. After Sout h Carolinians Charles C. Pinckney and Edward Rutledge had bot h declined, Washington offere d th e position t o Thomas Johnso n o f Maryland . Althoug h Johnso n accepted , h e re signed withi n tw o years . Willia m Paterso n o f Ne w Jerse y wa s the n named t o succeed Johnson. Chief Justic e Joh n Ja y wa s nex t t o leav e th e Court , resignin g i n 1795 afte r bein g electe d governo r o f Ne w York . Washington' s deci sion t o replace Jay with John Rutledge—wh o ha d expresse d a desir e to return to the Supreme Cour t a s chief justice—led t o an embarrass -

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ing series of events. Rutledge's was a recess appointment, an d durin g the recess he attacked th e Jay Treaty with suc h vitriol that hi s confir mation b y the Senate was unlikely at best. Indeed, the Federalist-con trolled Senat e considered Rutledge' s assault on the treaty tantamoun t to treason an d rejected hi s appointment b y a vote of 1 0 to 14 . Washington turne d t o Patric k Henr y t o fill the center chair , bu t Henr y de clined the nomination. William Cushing was then nominated and confirmed as the nation's third chief justice. About a week later, Cushing, citing advance d ag e an d il l health , resigne d hi s promotio n an d re turned to his position as the Court's senior associate justice. Finally, in 1796 Olive r Ellsworth o f Connecticu t becam e chief justice , a post h e held for a full fou r years . The yea r 179 6 wa s als o whe n Joh n Blair' s resignatio n fro m th e Court becam e effective . Washingto n offere d Blair' s sea t t o Samue l Chase of Maryland, the converted Antifederalist , wh o accepted. Two years later James Wilson died in office, becomin g the first justice to do so. After Joh n Marshal l ha d decline d a n invitatio n t o serv e as an associate justice , Wilson' s sea t wa s filled b y hi s forme r la w student , Bushrod Washington o f Virginia. James Iredel l die d th e followin g yea r an d wa s replace d b y Alfre d Moore, a fello w Nort h Carolinian . Moor e serve d fou r year s o n th e Court bu t with little distinction. Finally, in 1800, in a letter sent fro m France wher e h e was servin g a s a special envoy , Chie f Justic e Olive r Ellsworth resigne d fro m th e Court . Joh n Adam s quickl y nominate d John Jay, who was confirmed b y the Senate. Jay refused t o serve, however. The chief justiceship then fell to Adams's secretary of state, John Marshall o f Virginia , wh o ha s sinc e acquire d th e reputatio n a s th e "greatest" Suprem e Court justice in American history. 16 The difficult y Washington , an d t o a lesse r exten t Adams , ha d i n staffing th e Suprem e Cour t i s stressed b y those wh o dismis s th e sig nificance o f th e pre-Marshal l Court . A t a minimum, thi s perspectiv e ignores th e hardship s face d b y th e earl y justices , suc h a s illnes s an d circuit riding. 17 More substantially, it overlooks the important contri butions to American law and politics made by the early justices, both on circuit , where mos t o f thei r judicia l busines s wa s conducted , an d before the y arrive d a t th e highes t cour t i n th e land , wher e thei r re spective efforts i n the founding o f the American regim e were tremendous.

Introduction 7

Scholars hav e lon g appreciate d th e valu e o f studyin g individua l Founders whe n tryin g to discer n th e character o f th e early America n republic. The scores of volumes an d paper s projects o n John Adams , Alexander Hamilton , Thoma s Jefferson, Jame s Madison , John Mar shall, and George Washington, among others, all testify to this fact. In a rea l sense , Seriatim pick s u p wher e Stephe n B . Presse r lef t off . Presser, who contributes a n essa y about Samue l Chas e to the presen t collection, demonstrate d i n his provocative book , The Original Misunderstanding: The English, the Americans and the Dialectic of Federalist Jurisprudence (1991) , th e valu e o f examinin g th e individua l pre-Marshall Cour t justices—i n Presser' s case, Chase—for dispellin g the myth of Marshall's apotheosis. 18 This said, the point of Seriatim is not that Marshall was not a force in American law and politics. There is, after all , a difference between revisionism an d fiction. Rather , Seriatim is designed to put an end to the claim to unequivocal dominatio n by Marshall o n early American jurisprudence . John Marshall's Apotheosis Recently, I reviewed for th e Journal of American History tw o new biographies o f Joh n Marshall . Bot h books , Charle s F . Hobson's The Great Chief Justice: John Marshall and the Rule of Law (1996 ) an d Jean Edward Smith's John Marshall: Definer of a Nation (1996), 19 ar e welcome addition s t o scholarshi p an d I sa y s o i n m y join t review. 20 Unfortunately, however , bot h book s perpetuat e th e myt h tha t Mar shall i s "Th e Fathe r o f th e Court " an d "Th e Juris t Wh o Starte d I t All." To make the point more directly, these two books were twice reviewed together prior to my joint review, and the quoted titles to these reviews demonstrat e dramaticall y th e impressio n th e book s leav e o n readers.21 Gordon S . Wood is the author o f the review titled "Th e Father o f th e Court." 22 I f one of th e greatest livin g early American his torians ca n defaul t t o cliche s abou t th e earl y Suprem e Court , the n clearly more work need s to b e done on the origins of the Court . Given th e suppositio n tha t John Marshal l i s unduly credite d wit h almost everything significant t o spring from th e early Supreme Court , the question that must be asked is this: Why is Marshall glorified? Th e answer to this question is not as clear as one might think. Hobson, ed-

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itor o f The Papers of John Marshall, wrote the following respons e t o a query from m e in which I speculated that Marshall's apotheosis was the handiwork o f Albert J. Beveridge' s politically inspire d biograph y of 1916-1919 : Marshall's greatnes s was recognized lon g befor e Beveridge . At his death i n 1835 he had a reputation a s a great statesman, i f not alway s free fro m con troversy. John Adam s i n 182 5 wrot e t o Marshal l tha t i t wa s "th e prid e o f my life that I have given to this nation a Chief Justice equal to Coke or Hale, Holt o r Mansfield. " Joh n Quinc y Adam s entere d thes e words i n his diary , a few days after Marshal l died: "John Marshall... wa s one of the most eminent me n tha t thi s countr y ha s eve r produced. " Marshall' s colleague , Joseph Story , delivere d a memorabl e eulog y o f th e chie f justic e tha t won derfully capture s th e essenc e o f Marshall' s greatness . Now , i t i s tru e tha t post-Civil Wa r nationalis m enhance d Marshall' s standin g an d tha t Bev eridge wrote in that context—attempting t o make Marshall into a symboli c hero o f Am[erican] nationalism , lik e Lincoln. Hop e thi s helps. 23

Help it does. There is, however, a difference between bein g a great politician and a great judge* Othe r scholars offer a far more partisanoriented account of Marshall's deification tha n Hobson does. R. Kent Newmyer, th e dea n o f judicia l biographers , answer s th e questio n a s follows: The process o f glorification wa s launched wit h Alla n Magruder's worship ful biograph y i n 1890 ; i t gaine d momentu m wit h th e Marshal l Da y cele bration of 190 1 (the outcome of which was a three-volume collection of encomiums compile d b y John F . Dillon); an d i t culminate d wit h Alber t Bev eridge's The Life of John Marshall ( 4 vols. , 1916-1919 ) an d Charle s Warren's The Supreme Court in United States History ( 2 vols., 1922). With prodigious documentatio n Beveridg e unabashedly celebrate d th e victory of light (conservativ e nationalism ) ove r darknes s (Jeffersonia n states ' right s agrarianism). And, b y sheer forc e o f emphasi s an d pervasiv e romanticism , his work raise d Marshal l abov e th e Court , depictin g hi m a s th e epi c her o of America n nationalism . Warren' s histor y wa s mor e scholarly , mor e bal *It is difficult t o deny that Marshall was a great politician. Only a great politician could do what Marshall did in Marbury: Announce that the Jefferson administratio n was wrong to withhold the judicial commissions in question and that courts could issue writs to compel public officials t o do their prescribed duty—but that the Supreme Court had no power to issue such writs in the case at bar because the portion of the Judiciary Act of 178 9 that gave the Court the power to do so was unconstitutional. In short, a showdown with the Jefferson administratio n wa s avoided, bu t Marshal l stil l was able to "reaffirm " th e Court' s power of judicial review.

Introduction 9 anced, an d mor e generous i n spreading th e glory to includ e Marshall's col leagues bu t showe d th e sam e preference fo r conservativ e nationalism. 24

Finally, Presser emphasizes—in hi s typically provocative fashion — more recen t events : Th e nee d fo r "liberal " academic s t o us e Mar shall's "suppose d greatness " t o "legitimize " th e ras h o f post-193 7 "liberal" Suprem e Cour t decisions . Presser explains : "Liberal" cour t critics since the early 1920 s an d 1930 s had argue d tha t th e Supreme Court's job was to accommodate th e Constitution t o the changin g economic an d socia l need s o f th e country . I t seem s more tha n coincidenta l that a t abou t th e tim e th e court s wer e frustratin g implementatio n o f Ne w Deal legislation, scholar s bega n lavishl y to praise John Marshal l fo r hi s fa mous decisions . . . . Similarly, whe n libera l academic s praise d th e Warre n Court's expansiv e interpretation s o f th e Bil l o f Right s an d th e Fourteent h Amendment t o protec t th e victim s o f educational , political , an d economi c discrimination, mor e volume s appeare d apotheosizin g Marshall. 25

Whatever one' s position regardin g the pedigree o f John Marshall' s apotheosis, as far a s the conventional wisdom is concerned, Marshal l still casts a long shadow—a n eclipse—acros s th e histor y o f th e earl y Supreme Court . Nowher e i s thi s mor e apparen t tha n i n th e debat e over the origins of judicial review in America. The "Myth" of Marbury v. Madison (1803) Scholars hav e appreciate d fo r som e tim e tha t Marbury v. Madison was not sew n fro m whol e cloth. 26* From Si r Edward Coke' s opinio n in Dr. Bonham's Case (1610) , t o Jame s Otis' s speec h agains t th e Writs o f Assistanc e (1761) , t o a serie s o f pre-federa l Constitutio n state-court cases, 27 t o Federalist no . 78 , ther e exis t a hos t o f pre Marbury precedent s for judicia l review. More to the point, the essays that constitut e Seriatim revea l tha t virtuall y ever y membe r o f th e pre-Marshall Cour t playe d a n importan t rol e i n establishin g th e *Marshall himself acknowledged as much. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cr.) 137, 176 (1803) . Moreover, Presiden t Jefferson, wh o cam e to resen t Marbury, wa s no t take n aback b y the judicial-review aspect s of the decision. (Jefferson believe d that the Court, as well as the president and Congress, had the right to pass on the constitutionality of matters before it.) Rather, he resented Marshall's obiter dictum that Marbury was entitled to his judicial commission.

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Supreme Court' s powe r o f judicia l review— a powe r tha t i s synony mous t o thi s da y wit h Joh n Marshall' s mos t famou s opinion. 28 In deed, man y o f th e justice s champione d judicia l revie w lon g befor e they were appointed t o the Court. My essay on William Cushing , fo r example, suggests that eve n before independenc e was declared Cush ing wa s chargin g gran d jurie s i n Massachusett s tha t court s ha d th e authority t o declar e act s o f Parliamen t unconstitutional , whil e Wythe Hol t describe s ho w Joh n Blai r participate d i n a t leas t thre e early case s involvin g judicia l revie w i n Virginia. Furthermore , Willi s Whichard point s ou t tha t Jame s Iredel l articulate d o n severa l occa sions befor e th e Constitutio n wen t int o effec t perhap s th e mos t so phisticated argumen t fo r judicia l review offered durin g the Foundin g (an argumen t wit h whic h Marshal l wa s almos t certainl y familiar). 29 James Ha w reveal s that , despit e fighting har d i n th e Federa l Con vention o f 178 7 to protec t th e powe r o f stat e courts , John Rutledg e both expecte d an d supporte d federa l judicia l review , an d Willia m Casto demonstrate s tha t Olive r Ellswort h endorse d th e concep t o f judicial revie w a t th e Connecticu t ratifyin g convention . As sitting justices, the individuals wh o precede d John Marshal l t o the Suprem e Cour t continue d t o advocat e judicia l review . Th e best known example s o f thi s ar e Willia m Paterson' s jur y charg e i n Wan Home's Lessee v. Dorrance (1795 ) and Samuel Chase's jury charge in the trial o f James Callende r (1800) . As Daniel Degnan' s essa y abou t Paterson and Presser's about Chas e suggest, these jury charges helped to pav e th e wa y fo r publi c acceptanc e o f judicia l review . Similarly , Mark Hal l demonstrate s i n hi s James Wilson essa y tha t Wilso n pre sented th e cas e fo r judicia l revie w i n hi s famou s la w lecture s o f 1790-1792—lectures tha t influence d generation s o f America n lawyers. Students of the Court, moreover, are remiss if they fail to appreciate, as Father Degna n an d Cast o describ e i n their respectiv e essays, tha t th e Judiciary Ac t o f 1789 , whic h Paterso n an d Ellswort h cowrote whe n the y wer e servin g i n th e Senate , authorize d federa l courts t o revie w decision s fro m th e states ' highest court s i f the y in volved certain federal questions . The justice s wh o compose d th e Suprem e Cour t befor e Joh n Mar shall did more than simply advocate judicial review, they practiced it . Barely a year had passed since the establishment o f the federal court s when Chie f Justic e John Jay an d Associat e Justice Willia m Cushing , on circuit, declared several states' laws unconstitutional. There is also

Introduction 1 1

Ware v. Hylton (1796) , i n whic h Justice s Chase , Cushing , Paterson , and Wilson , sittin g togethe r a s the Suprem e Court, 30 struc k dow n a Virginia statut e o n the ground tha t i t was inconsistent wit h a federa l treaty and , hence, the supremacy claus e of the Constitution. 31 More over, James Stoner points out in his essay about Bushro d Washingto n that Washington , wh o wa s accuse d i n a widel y repeate d remar k o f being littl e mor e tha n a doubl e fo r Marshall—a n accusatio n tha t Stoner rejects—asserte d i n Cooper v. Telfair (1800 ) tha t th e Cour t possessed the power o f judicial review. 32 The pre-Marshall Cour t justices exercised judicial review over fed eral law as well. As Holt's and Hall's essays describe, the first clear occasion i n whic h thi s occurre d wa s Hay burn's Case (1792), wherei n Justices James Wilson an d John Blair , on circuit, declare d th e Invali d Pensioners Act of 1792 unconstitutional. The Court as a whole, in the then-unreported United States v. Yale Todd (1794) , appear s t o hav e concurred wit h Wilson' s an d Blair' s position. 33 Perhap s mos t impor tant, in Hylton v. United States (1796) the Court reviewed a congressional ta x o n carriage s t o determin e whethe r th e ta x wa s constitu tional. The Cour t conclude d tha t i t was, but th e justices nevertheles s recognized their power to declare otherwise. Indeed, Hall reports tha t when John Wickham , th e counsel fo r th e government, offere d a t th e circuit level to address the issue of judicial review, Justice Wilson told him to sit down and be quiet because the issue had "com e before eac h of th e judge s i n their differen t circuits , an d the y al l concurred i n th e opinion" tha t th e Cour t coul d declare congressiona l statute s uncon stitutional. More examples o f pre-Marbury incident s o f judicia l revie w coul d be discussed, 34 bu t i t shoul d b e clea r b y no w tha t th e pre-Marshal l Court justices understood th e concept of judicial review, that they ar gued for it, and that they practiced it. There is also abundant evidenc e that Marshall was both fully awar e of and substantially influenced b y these earl y precedents . Presse r suggests , fo r example , tha t Marshal l was i n the audienc e whe n Samue l Chas e delivere d hi s jury charg e i n the Callender trial, an d tha t Marshal l late r adopte d som e o f Chase' s language i n hi s Marbury opinion . Similarly , Whichar d advise s tha t Marshall's opinio n i n Marbury dre w upon Iredell' s well-known writ ings on judicia l review . Finally , I surmise i n my essay abou t Cushin g that Cushin g and/o r Paterso n probabl y mad e Marshal l awar e o f th e early Court's precedents o n judicial review.

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An "Interdisciplinary Conversation" All of this said, Seriatim is important not only because it provides new information abou t th e substantiv e contribution s mad e t o America n law and politic s b y the pre-Marshall Cour t justice s bu t als o becaus e of wha t th e collectio n say s abou t th e metho d o f studyin g th e earl y American republic . Law , history , an d politica l scienc e ar e al l repre sented i n the collection, an d eac h o f these separat e discipline s i s represented by a diversity of methodological (as well as ideological) viewpoints. By including essays from a variety of methodological perspec tives, Seriatim aspires to move research on the American Founding in new directions. The five la w professor s amon g th e contributor s consis t o f one , Wythe Hol t (wh o als o i s trained i n history) , who emphasize s social , political, and economi c events ; a second, Justice Whichard, wh o uti lizes the descriptive techniques o f biography; a third, Daniel Degnan , who employs the doctrinal focus of traditional legal analysis; a fourth, Stephen Presser, who combines the melding of biography, political science, and intellectual history (in the tradition of J. G. A. Pocock) with the fervor o f a polemicist; and a fifth, William Casto , who highlight s the psychologica l aspect s o f individua l lega l an d politica l behavior . Karl Llewellyn , wh o lon g ag o urge d academi c lawyer s t o emplo y more social science methods, would b e pleased. 35 Two o f th e contributor s teac h primaril y i n histor y departments . The first, Sandra VanBurkleo, attempts to locate her subject within the context and languages of his particular historical moment. She identifies relationships between th e subjec t an d th e prevailin g intellectua l currents, socioeconomi c developments , an d politica l climat e o f th e time, much as Holt does from the legal academy (albeit without Holt's Marxist orientation) . The second, James Haw, approaches hi s justice through th e descriptiv e an d narrativ e metho d o f a "traditional " his torian. Last, but it is to be hoped not least, the three political scientists also approach thei r justice s i n divers e ways . Althoug h Mar k Hal l an d James Stone r bot h utiliz e th e metho d o f politica l theory , Stoner' s Straussian orientatio n give s hi s essa y a flavo r differen t fro m tha t o f Hall's. My essay on Cushing is more disparate still: It employs deconstruction a s a methodological approach .

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3

In short, the contributors to Seriatim are engaged in an "interdisci plinary conversation " i n th e bes t sens e o f tha t phrase. 36 Althoug h none of the contributors (th e editor included ) ar e methodologists, le t alone philosopher s o f science , w e al l shar e a commitmen t t o bot h methodological self-consciousnes s an d methodological pluralism . We value methodological self-consciousness becaus e those who fail to pay attention t o metho d ar e almos t alway s i n th e gri p o f a prevailin g methodology. (Here , we are paraphrasing John Maynard Keynes's famous retort that those who dislike theory or claim to do without it are simply i n the grip o f a n olde r theory. ) W e value methodologica l plu ralism becaus e a prevailin g methodolog y migh t no t b e th e "best " methodology, let alone the "perfect " methodology . A comparison between perhap s th e tw o mos t diametricall y oppose d methodologie s represented in Seriatim will illustrate why we take methodology so seriously.37 In his chapter o n John Rutledge , James Haw employ s the method ology o f a "traditiona l historian, " writin g descriptive , narrativ e his tory i n relatively narro w terms . More tha n anythin g els e it is , in th e words o f Arthur M . Schlesinger , Sr. , "th e busines s o f the historian t o find, collect, classify, an d apprais e dat a relatin g to the past." 38 Haw' s essay on Rutledge, with its painstaking attention to archival material s and myria d ne w discoverie s abou t thi s controversia l membe r o f th e pre-Marshall Court , is a testament to the continuing vitality and relevance of good "old-fashioned " history . By contrast, m y chapte r o n Willia m Cushin g employ s on e o f th e most popular—and controversial—methodologie s o f the postmoder n age; "namely, " deconstruction . Wher e Ha w seek s to provid e "new " information abou t Joh n Rutledge' s contribution s t o America n la w and politics, I attempt to reverse and resituate the "existing " concep tual prioritie s upo n whic h th e variou s ordering s an d evaluation s o f William Cushin g and, consequently, o f John Marshall , thrive. Can student s o f th e earl y America n judiciar y lear n fro m decon struction a s well as from traditiona l history ? fro m politica l theory a s well as from doctrina l legal analysis? from psycholog y as well as fro m social, political, and economic considerations? from the melding of biography, politica l science , an d intellectua l histor y a s wel l a s fro m "unadulterated" biography ? fro m a Straussian orientatio n a s well as from a Marxis t orientation ? W e hop e th e reade r wil l grappl e wit h

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these questions. A brief preview of the essays that follow may provide some assistance i n this regard. The essays, written b y the leading au thorities o n the particular justice s a t issue, appear i n the order o f th e justices' respective appointments t o the Supreme Court . The Findings Sandra VanBurkle o explore s i n her essa y relationships betwee n Joh n Jay's intellectua l "system"—tha t is , his systemati c politica l an d eco nomic philosophies—and hi s conception o f the Supreme Court' s rol e in government. Unlike some of Seriatim's contributors, she challenges the notio n tha t Jay' s jurisprudenc e (and , fo r tha t matter , hi s bench ) can best be understood b y tightening the links between Jay and Mar shall—that is , by rendering th e federal judicia l experienc e mor e con tinuous an d homogenous . That approach , sh e contends, is unacceptably Whiggish. Jay has to b e understood o n his own terms, as both a product an d a n architect o f the early phases of the American Revolu tion. Firs t an d foremos t a diplomat , Jay ha d i n min d a federa l judi ciary quit e unlik e th e syste m refashione d an d consolidate d b y Joh n Marshall after 1801 . To draw straight lines between past and present , to rub out strang e and abandoned practices , VanBurkleo thinks, is to impoverish th e presen t b y eliminatin g a n importan t par t o f th e re public's past . Thus , sh e introduce s a certai n amoun t o f distanc e be tween Jay an d Marshall : Jay was extremel y important—bu t no t a s a harbinger o f Marshall . Rather , hi s now mostl y archai c vision o f fed eral practice offer s rip e opportunities fo r comparativ e stud y an d cul tural-historical enrichment . James Haw describes John Rutledge' s distinguished career . He was a lawyer , colonia l an d stat e legislator , membe r o f th e Continenta l Congress, governor o f Sout h Carolin a durin g mos t o f the War o f In dependence, chancellor an d late r chief justic e of South Carolina , del egate to the Federal Conventio n o f 1787 , and associat e justice of th e Supreme Cour t o f the United States . Haw discusse s how a t the Con stitutional Convention Rutledge advocated a mixed republic in which gentlemen woul d gover n i n th e publi c interest , an d sough t t o safe guard th e interest s o f Sout h Carolina . But , Ha w suggests , Rutledg e was willing to compromise repeatedly to achieve a more effective cen tral government . Rutledge' s mos t importan t contributions , Ha w be -

Introduction 1 5

lieves, were chairin g th e Committe e o f Detail , an d helpin g t o secur e the enumeratio n o f congressiona l powers , th e necessar y an d prope r clause, and safeguard s fo r th e deep South on the slave trade an d tax ation o f exports. Haw characterize s Rutledge' s judicia l philosoph y a s bein g quit e conservative. Rutledg e believe d tha t judge s shoul d follo w estab lished legal constructions unles s the legislature clearly changed them . Occasionally, however , h e allowe d equitabl e o r politica l considera tions t o influenc e hi s rulings . Hi s servic e o n th e federa l benc h wa s too brie f t o permi t an y majo r contributio n there , Ha w concludes . From 179 2 throug h 1795 , his dee p menta l depressio n produce d er ratic behavio r that , combine d wit h hi s outspoke n oppositio n t o th e Jay Treaty , le d th e Senat e t o rejec t Rutledge' s nominatio n a s chie f justice i n 1795 . Consequently , mor e tha n an y o f th e justice s chron icled i n Seriatim, th e vas t majorit y o f Rutledge' s contribution s t o American la w an d politic s occurre d independen t o f hi s Suprem e Court service . My essa y o n Willia m Cushin g endeavor s t o disrup t th e conven tional wisdom tha t Cushin g is but a footnote i n the text o f America n history. Instea d o f viewin g Cushin g a s th e Da n Quayl e o f th e earl y American republic—i n othe r words , a s a n intellectua l lightweigh t who rose to power through famil y an d political connections—I argu e that Cushing contributed much to American law and politics (perhap s as much a s John Marshall) . My deconstructio n o f Willia m Cushin g reveal s tha t h e playe d a leading role in Massachusetts in, among other things, abolishing slavery and securing ratification o f the federal Constitution . Cushin g also had a grea t dea l t o d o wit h th e developmen t o f judicia l revie w i n America and, most importantly, with establishing the "textualist " ap proach t o lega l interpretation—a n approac h fo r which , lik e judicia l review itself , Joh n Marshal l ha s bee n give n undu e credi t ove r th e years. Mark Hal l explains i n his essay on James Wilson tha t whil e man y students o f th e earl y America n republi c kno w abou t Wilson' s exten sive contributions to the framing an d ratification o f the Constitution , few ar e aware o f the quality o f hi s political thought. I n fact, Hal l ar gues tha t onc e Wilson' s politica l theor y i s understood , hi s contribu tions at the Constitutional Conventio n an d on the Supreme Court fal l readily into place.

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Hall makes clear that central among Wilson's political ideas was his belief that all individuals possess natural rights that must be protected by government. Contrary to many of his contemporaries, Wilson contended tha t thoroughl y democrati c institution s provid e th e bes t pro tection fo r bot h minorit y an d majorit y rights . A s a result , h e sup ported th e direct , popula r electio n o f representatives , senators , an d executives. His democrati c theor y als o informe d hi s view o f federal ism, leadin g hi m t o b e a consisten t nationalist . Ye t Wilso n di d no t hold a naive faith i n the people, as indicated b y his support fo r coun termajoritarian check s suc h a s judicia l review . Hal l attempt s t o rec oncile Wilson' s suppor t o f thes e check s wit h hi s democrati c theory , and ultimatel y conclude s tha t Wilso n wa s th e foremos t advocat e among the Founders of a strong and democratic government that also protects minority rights. Wythe Holt characterize s John Blai r as a wealthy, well-connected , and influential merchant, planter, legislator, and lawyer from the powerful Tidewate r aristocrac y wh o wa s a n importan t leade r o f secon d rank whe n Virginia joine d mos t o f the colonies in the drive for inde pendence. Blai r won reput e servin g o n Virginia' s highest court s and , as a member of the Constitutional Conventio n an d Virginia's ratifica tion convention, he silently aided the formation o f a new governmen t for th e new nation. Holt's essa y demonstrate s that , a s a membe r o f th e first Suprem e Court, Blai r cautiousl y bu t steadil y i n action s an d opinion s showe d himself t o b e a staunch Federalis t an d a supporter o f the mercantile oriented, wea k ne w centra l government , imperile d fro m withi n b y agrarian an d democrati c dissen t an d fro m withou t b y imperialisti c European powers . He was, however, neither a profound write r no r a leader o n th e Court . But , Holt insists , the prope r criterio n b y which to assess the Court's opinions in the perilous 1790s is their political ef fectiveness in persuasively upholding the power, authority, and respect of th e governmen t whil e excitin g n o dismemberin g discontent ; an d the prope r gaug e o f it s member s i s their courag e an d consistenc y i n supporting th e new Constitution an d it s constituted government . O n both o f thes e measures , th e amiable , safe , conscientiou s Joh n Blai r ranks a t th e top , Hol t concludes , becaus e hi s clea r pronouncement s empowering the government were phrased narrowly so as to provoke no animosity , eve n thoug h h e wa s th e onl y souther n justic e consis tently to support Federalis t positions.

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7

Willis Whichard explain s tha t James Iredel l came to America a s a British officia l t o b e th e comptrolle r o f custom s i n Edenton , Nort h Carolina. Iredell studied la w under Samue l Johnston, a politically influential lawyer , an d acquire d th e reputation o f a superior lawyer . In his mos t significan t cas e a s counsel , Whichard reveals , Iredell advo cated the concept of judicial review. He also championed i t in a series of sophisticated letter s and essays. Whichard demonstrate s ho w Iredel l becam e a leading essayis t fo r the American cause in the Revolution an d a bellwether fo r th e Federalist force s i n the effor t t o ratif y th e federa l Constitution . Iredel l an swered Georg e Mason' s objections , le d othe r literar y efforts , an d served as floor leade r for the Federalist forces at the initial North Car olina ratification convention . When that convention failed t o approv e the Constitution , Iredel l continue d hi s endeavors unti l a second con vention ratifie d th e document . Presiden t Washingto n rewarde d Iredell's effort s b y appointin g hi m t o th e Suprem e Court . Whichar d suggests that the grasp of constitutional question s Iredell displayed in promoting ratification wa s the foremost reaso n fo r th e appointment . Whichard maintain s that Iredell' s most significan t opinio n wa s his dissent i n Chisholm v. Georgia. In that cas e Iredell took th e positio n that a citizen o f on e stat e coul d no t su e anothe r state . The Elevent h Amendment incorporate d Iredell' s positio n int o th e Constitution . Iredell spent most o f his Court year s traveling the circuits. He led ef forts to terminate or reduce the travel but, Whichard reveals, those ef forts wer e largel y t o n o avail . Hi s wor k o n circui t undermine d hi s health, and he died after a near-decade o f service. Daniel Degnan reminds us that William Paterson was a member of the Constitutiona l Conventio n an d autho r o f th e Ne w Jersey , o r small-states, plan . Despit e hi s advocac y o f th e right s o f th e smalle r states, however, Paterso n prove d t o b e a consisten t nationalist . A s a member o f th e first Senate , Paterso n wa s a principa l coauthor , wit h Oliver Ellsworth, of the Judiciary Act of 1789 . The first nine section s of th e act , establishing th e federal distric t an d circui t courts , were in Paterson's handwriting . Paterson serve d o n th e Suprem e Cour t fro m 179 3 to 180 6 where , Father Degnan argues, his work was a continuation o f his work in the convention an d th e Senate . Fo r Paterson , priz e captur e o n th e hig h seas evoked the plenary power o f the national governmen t i n foreig n affairs. Th e nationa l powe r t o tax , h e believed , wa s no t t o b e nar -

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rowly constrained. Stat e laws were to be tested b y the new Constitu tion, a s wer e stat e cour t decision s o n th e issue . Congress ha d th e power t o abolis h federa l court s (a s wel l a s t o establis h them) , al though judges would lose their positions. Practical contemporary construction was dispositive. Perhaps most interesting, Father Degnan suggests , is that Paterso n issued in a circuit court case one of the most striking early statement s of th e doctrin e o f judicia l review : "Wha t i s a Constitution ? I t i s th e form o f government, delineate d b y the mighty han d o f the people, in which certain first principles of fundamental law s are established. . . . [E]very ac t o f th e Legislature , repugnan t t o th e Constitution , i s ab solutely void. " T o Paterson , Fathe r Degna n concludes , thes e princi ples forme d a straigh t lin e fro m th e Constitutiona l Conventio n an d the first Senat e throug h th e foundation s lai d b y th e earl y Suprem e Court. Was Samuel Chase , the onl y Suprem e Cour t justic e ever to b e impeached, a partisan bull y unfit t o sit on the bench (a s his Jeffersonia n tormentors insisted), or was he unfairly attacke d for seekin g to maintain th e rul e o f la w whe n i t wa s unde r partisa n assaul t (a s th e de fenders a t his trial before the Senate maintained)? While most historians ar e prepared t o conced e Chase's obviou s brilliance , his hair-trig ger temper and his obduracy led one recent historian—Seriatim's ow n William Casto—flatl y t o declar e that Chase' s appointmen t wa s "on e of the most regrettable nomination s i n the Court's history. " In 199 1 Stephe n Presse r publishe d hi s boo k The Original Misunderstanding, a summatio n o f fiftee n year s o f work , t o argu e tha t Chase should b e regarded a s one of the greatest o f the early Suprem e Court justices , an d someon e wh o articulate d a visio n o f constitu tional la w more i n keeping with the Framers' origina l understandin g than di d John Marshall . Presser's boo k intrigue d historian s an d aca demic lawyers, who had quit e different response s to his thesis and t o Samuel Chase . I n hi s essa y i n thi s volume , Presse r revisit s Chase' s contributions t o America n la w an d politics , respond s t o hi s critics , and explore s som e o f th e tension s facin g scholar s writin g lega l his tory.* * Readers wil l notice tha t Presser' s essa y i s structured differentl y tha n th e other s i n th e book. Becaus e Seriatim essentiall y pick s u p where Presse r lef t of f wit h hi s earlier wor k o n Chase, we thought readers might find i t interesting to see why Presser did what he did ther e and wha t th e reaction t o hi s work ha s been .

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William Cast o approache s hi s essay o n Olive r Ellswort h a s an as sault upo n anachronisti c preconception s tha t man y scholar s hav e about the Founding generation. Specifically, Cast o argues that there is a tendency to emphasize the secular aspects of political life in the early republic an d t o deemphasiz e th e religious dimensions . Cast o als o insists that our late-twentieth-century preconception s of the proper rol e of judges in political life has distorted our analyses of judicial conduct in the earl y American republic . The concep t o f separatio n o f power s and th e idea l o f judicia l aloofnes s fro m politica l controvers y hav e changed substantiall y ove r the past twenty years, Casto maintains. 39 Casto use s Ellswort h a s a n archetyp e t o illustrat e tw o points . Ellsworth was a thoroughgoing religionist who viewed his public and private activitie s through th e lens of Calvinism . The point i s not tha t Ellsworth's religio n cause d hi m t o ac t i n differen t ways—althoug h Casto suspects that i t did. Instead, Cast o believe s that Calvinis m wa s the organizin g philosoph y o f Ellsworth' s lif e an d tha t h e an d other s like hi m canno t b e understoo d i f hi s fait h i s marginalized . Wit h re spect t o hi s judicia l conduc t i n th e earl y republic , Chie f Justic e Ellsworth i s depicted a s one who was deeply involved in the nationa l politics o f th e lat e 1790s . Cast o believe s that Ellswort h viewe d him self not so much as a judge but, rather, as an active participant in public life who happened t o b e a judge. Finally, in his essay on Bushrod Washington, James Stoner makes a powerful cas e fo r viewin g Washingto n a s a bridg e betwee n th e pre Marshall Cour t an d the more famous Marshal l Court . Consequently , Stoner explode s th e myt h tha t Washingto n an d Marshal l shoul d b e viewed, as William Johnson onc e charged, as "one Judge." Stoner argues that though Bushrod Washington lived in the shadow of two great men—his uncle George Washington and his friend o f fifty years, John Marshall—he was an independent man who left hi s mark on federal justice and helped make possible the extraordinary unity of the Marshall Court . (Thi s latter achievemen t is yet another fo r whic h Marshall receive s undu e credit. ) Educate d i n la w b y Georg e Wyth e and James Wilson, distinguishing himself a t an early age on the Richmond bar, Washington was appointed t o the Court by John Adams in 1798. From the start, his jurisprudence is characterized b y respect fo r legislative authority, a sense of exact justice, and a certain moderation . Stoner makes it clear that althoug h Washingto n i s largely overlooke d today, he was a highly respected judg e in his own day .

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A Word Is Worth a Thousand Pictures This, then, is what is chronicled in the essays that follow. Before readers are left t o enjo y th e essays, it might b e useful fo r m e to sa y a fe w words abou t wh y th e collectio n i s title d Seriatim (Lati n fo r "sever ally" or "i n series"). As judicial process scholars probably know, the practice in English appellate courts is for al l of the participating judge s to write, and deliver orally, individual opinions explaining their views on a case. This process is known as "seriatim" opinion writing. (The seriatim custom originated in the jury-charge practice of the common-law courts.) Seriatim opinio n writin g wa s als o th e practic e use d i n earl y American appellate courts—th e U.S . Supreme Cour t included—before , tha t is , John Marshall becam e chief justice. When John Marshall was appointed chief justice in 1801, he put an end to the practice of seriatim opinion writing. Chief Justice Marshall did so because he believed that the Supreme Court's "powe r and prestige" woul d b e enhanced i f i t spok e wit h a "singl e voice." 40 To tha t end, Marshal l establishe d th e practic e o f a singl e "opinio n o f th e Court"—almost alway s signed , a t leas t i n th e earl y day s o f hi s chief justiceship, by Marshall himself 41—that woul d reflect the views of the Court as an institution and be recorded and reported to the public. As with any collaborative product, however, this new practice meant that differences amon g th e justice s wer e adjuste d internall y and , conse quently, hidde n fro m publi c view . Althoug h thi s wa s plainl y Mar shall's intention , th e en d o f seriati m opinio n writin g mean t tha t th e contributions of individual justices were difficult, i f not impossible, to discern. This , w e suspect , goe s a lon g wa y towar d explainin g wh y Marshall ha s com e t o eclips e i n th e conventiona l wisdo m th e othe r justices of the early Suprem e Court . An d this, we believe, is unfortu nate. In short , th e collectio n i s titled Seriatim fo r thre e reasons : (1 ) because th e justice s wh o compose d th e Suprem e Cour t befor e Joh n Marshall functioned, fo r th e most part, an d spoke , almost always , as individuals, (2 ) becaus e w e aspir e t o dispe l th e myt h tha t th e earl y Court becam e significan t onl y whe n Marshal l arrived , an d (3 ) because w e hop e t o sugges t somethin g o f th e dram a i n whic h th e pre-Marshall Cour t justice s performe d thei r importan t duties . T o make th e poin t eve n mor e directly , a goo d boo k titl e capture s th e

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essence o f wha t th e autho r endeavor s t o accomplish . Th e titl e Seriatim doe s tha t fo r us .

NOTES

1. See , for example , Rogers M. Smith , "Politica l Jurisprudence, The 'Ne w In stitutionalism', an d the Future of Public Law," American Political Science Review 82 (Marc h 1988) : 89-108 . 2. See , for example , Thoma s G . Walker , Le e Epstein , an d Willia m J . Dixon , "On th e Mysteriou s Demis e o f Consensua l Norm s i n th e United State s Suprem e Court," journal of Politics 5 0 (Ma y 1988) : 361-89 . Se e als o Byro n R . White , "Dear Colleagues " letter , reprinte d i n 50 9 U.S.—Par t 3 (preliminar y print ) (1993), vi-vii . 3. Bernar d Schwartz , A History of the Supreme Court (Ne w York : Oxfor d University Press , 1993) , 33. 4. Georg e Lee Haskins an d Herber t A . Johnson, Foundations of Power: John Marshall, 1801-15 (Ne w York: Macmillan, 1981) , 7 . 5. Rober t G . McCloskey, The American Supreme Court (Chicago : Universit y of Chicag o Press, 1960), 30. Sanford Levinso n update d thi s classic tome i n 1994 . 6. See , for example , G. Edward White , The American Judicial Tradition: Profiles of Leading American Judges, enlarge d ed . (Ne w York : Oxfor d Universit y Press, 1988) , 7-34 . 7. See , fo r example , Car l Bren t Swisher , American Constitutional Development (Boston : Houghton Mifflin , 1943) , 98-101 ; Fre d Rodell , Nine Men: A Political History of the Supreme Court from 1790 to 1955 (Ne w York : Rando m House, 1955) , 3-72 . Several historie s o f th e Suprem e Cour t ar e les s guilt y o f trivializin g th e pre Marshall Cour t tha n ar e others, but eve n those works d o not examin e the contributions of the individual justices in any depth. See generally Julius Goebel, Jr., Antecedents and Beginnings to 1801 (Ne w York : Macmillan , 1971) ; Charle s War ren, The Supreme Court in United States History, rev . ed., vol . 1 (Boston: Little , Brown, 1926) , 31-168; David P . Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The First Hundred Years, 1789-1888 (Chicago : Universit y o f Chicag o Press , 1985), 1-58 . Th e increasingl y popula r encyclopedia-styl e biographica l collec tions o f th e Suprem e Cour t ar e to o basi c t o b e o f muc h us e t o scholars . See , fo r example, Clar e Cushman , ed. , The Supreme Court Justices: Illustrated Biographies, 1789-1993 (Washington , D.C.: CQ Press , 1993); Leon Friedman an d Fre d I. Israel , eds. , The Justices of the United States Supreme Court: Their Lives and Major Opinions, rev . ed. , 5 vols . (Ne w York : Chelse a House , 1995) ; Melvi n I . Urofsky, ed. , The Supreme Court: A Biographical Dictionary (Ne w York : Gar land, 1994) .

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8. Edwar d S . Corwin, John Marshall and the Constitution: A Chronicle of the Supreme Court (Ne w Haven: Yale University Press, 1919), 17-18 . This insight is especially rare in books about Marshall , which tend to emphasize the inadequac y of th e Cour t tha t precede d his . See, for example , Albert J. Beveridge , The Life of John Marshall, vol . 3 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin , 1919) , 120-21; Leonard Baker , John Marshall: A Life in Law (Ne w York: Macmillan, 1974) , 363-64 . 9. Maev a Marcu s e t al. , eds. , The Documentary History of the Supreme Court of the United States, 1789-1800, 5 vols , t o dat e (Ne w York : Columbi a University Press , 1985-) ; Maev a Marcus , ed. , Origins of the Federal Judiciary: Essays on the Judiciary Act of 1789 (Ne w York: Oxford Universit y Press , 1992) . Marcus's Documentary History render s largel y obsolet e Georg e Lankevich' s more limite d collection . Se e Georg e J . Lankevich , ed. , The Federal Court, 1787-1801 (Millwood , N.Y. : Associated Facult y Press , 1986) . 10. Willia m R . Casto , The Supreme Court in the Early Republic: The Chief Justiceships of John Jay and Oliver Ellsworth (Columbia : Universit y o f Sout h Carolina Press , 1995) , 247. 11. Ibid. , 247 , 213. 12. I n addition to the work o f Marcus and the previous and continuing effort s of the contributors t o the present volume, see also Stewart Jay, Most Humble Servants: The Advisory Role of Early Judges (Ne w Haven : Yal e Universit y Press , 1997). 13. Se e J. W . Peltason , "Suprem e Cour t Biograph y an d th e Stud y o f Publi c Law," i n Essays on the American Constitution: A Commemorative Volume in Honor of Alpheus T Mason, ed . Gottfrie d Dietz e (Englewoo d Cliffs , N.J. : Pren tice-Hall, 1964) , 215-27. 14. Lette r fro m Georg e Washington t o John Rutledge , 29 Septembe r 1789 , in Marcus, Documentary History, vol . 1 , 20-21. Presiden t Washingto n wrot e simi lar letters to all his nominees. See James R. Perry, "Supreme Cour t Appointments , 1789-1801: Criteria , Presidentia l Style , and th e Pres s o f Events, " Journal of the Early Republic 6 (Winte r 1986) : 371, 374. 15. Henr y J . Abraham , Justices and Presidents: A Political History of Appointments to the Supreme Court, 3 d ed . (Ne w York : Oxfor d Universit y Press , 1992), 71-72 . Fo r a detaile d discussio n o f Washington' s an d Adams' s appoint ment processes , se e Perry , "Suprem e Cour t Appointments , 1789-1801, " 371-410. 16. See , for example , Abraham, Justices and Presidents, 81 , 412-14. 17. Numerou s letters exist from differen t justice s complaining about the oner ous dut y o f circui t riding—especiall y i n th e Souther n Circuit . See , fo r example , Marcus, Documentary History, vol . 1 , 731-32 ; vol . 2 , 126 , 132 , 288-90 , 344 ; vol. 3, 240. 18. Se e Stephen B . Presser, The Original Misunderstanding: The English, the

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Americans and the Dialectic of Federalist Jurisprudence (Durham : Carolin a Aca demic Press, 1991) . 19. Charle s F . Hobson, The Great Chief Justice: John Marshall and the Rule of Law (Lawrence : University Pres s o f Kansas , 1996) ; Jean Edwar d Smith , John Marshall: Definer of a Nation (Ne w York : Henry Holt , 1996) . 20. Se e Scott D . Gerber , Boo k Review , Journal of American History 8 4 (Sep tember 1997) : 658-59 . 21. Se e als o Herber t A . Johnson , The Chief Justiceship of John Marshall, 1801-1835 (Columbia : University o f Sout h Carolin a Press , 1997) . 22. Gordo n S . Wood, "Th e Father of the Court," New Republic, 1 7 February 1997, 38-41 . Se e also Mar k Miller , "Th e Jurist Wh o Starte d I t All," Wall Street Journal, 1 0 December 1996 , A20. 23. E-mai l lette r fro m Charle s F . Hobson t o Scot t D . Gerber , 2 9 Septembe r 1995 (lette r i n my possession) . 24. R . Ken t Newmyer , The Supreme Court under Marshall and Taney (Ar lington Heights, 111.: Harlan Davidson, 1968) , 20-21. Se e also letter from Willia m E. Leuchtenbur g t o Scot t D . Gerber , 1 8 Novembe r 199 5 ("I t i s no t m y impres sion, thoug h Chuc k Hobso n shoul d kno w a goo d dea l more , tha t Marshal l ha d the reputatio n h e doe s toda y i n the 19t h Century . H e wa s see n the n a s consider ably mor e o f a n embattle d Federalis t an d a champion o f certai n interests." ) (let ter i n my possession) . 25. Presser , The Original Misunderstanding, 172 . 26. See , fo r example , Gordo n S . Wood , "Th e Origin s o f Judicia l Review, " Suffolk University Law Review 2 2 (Winte r 1988) : 1293-30 7 (arguin g tha t th e origins o f judicia l revie w ar e t o b e found i n the colonial period) . 27. Th e state-court cases are Josiah Philips's Case (Va., 1778), Holmes v. Walton (N.Y. , 1780) , Commonwealth v. Caton (Va. , 1782) , Rutgers v. Waddington (N.Y., 1784) , The Symsbury Case (Conn., 1785) , Trevett v. Weeden (R.I. , 1786) , and Bayard v. Singleton (N.C. , 1787) . There i s considerable debat e i n th e schol arly community abou t th e statu s o f thes e earl y cases . 28. See , fo r example , Davi d G . Barnum , The Supreme Court and American Democracy (Ne w York : St . Martin's Press , 1993) , 3- 9 (emphasizin g Marbury v. Madison)-, James Q . Wilso n an d Joh n J . Dilulio , Jr., American Government: Institutions and Policies, 6t h ed . (Lexington , Mass. : D . C . Heath , 1995) , 42 0 (same). See also Smith, John Marshall, chapte r 13 . Of course, there have been specific studie s o f judicia l revie w ove r th e years, particularly b y historians, tha t rec ognize that Marbury ha s been overemphasized. See , for example , J. M. Sosin, The Aristocracy of the Long Robe: The Origins of Judicial Review in America (West port, Conn. : Greenwoo d Press , 1989) . My poin t i s simply tha t th e conventiona l wisdom i s still to the contrary—and tha t th e role the pre-Marshall Cour t justice s played i n the origin s o f judicia l revie w has bee n largel y overlooked .

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29. Se e also William R. Casto, "James Iredell and the American Origin s of Judicial Review," Connecticut Law Review 2 7 (Winte r 1995) : 329-63. 30. Iredel l ha d bee n on e o f th e judge s i n th e lowe r circui t cour t tha t adjudi cated th e case. Consequently, h e did no t participat e i n the Suprem e Court' s deci sion. H e di d tak e th e unusua l step , however , o f readin g int o th e recor d hi s thoughts o n th e matter . 31. Ellsworth , wh o wa s no t servin g o n th e Suprem e Cour t a t th e tim e Ware was decided , voice d hi s agreemen t wit h th e decisio n i n Hamilton v. Eaton, 1 1 F. Cas. 336 , 340 (C.C.D.N.C . 1796) . 32. Se e also the seriatim opinion s o f Justices Chase, Paterson, an d Cushin g i n Cooper v. Telfair, 4 U.S . ( 4 Dall. ) 14 , 18-2 0 (1800) , a s wel l a s Pennhallow v. Doane's Administrators, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 5 4 (1795) . 33. Yale Todd wa s cite d i n United States v. Ferreira, 5 4 U.S . (1 3 How. ) 4 0 (1851). Maeva Marcu s suggests , bu t doe s no t conclude , tha t th e Suprem e Cour t ruled that Yale Todd's pension was invalid becaus e the judges of the circuit court s wrongly interprete d th e statut e t o allo w the m t o ac t a s commissioner s an d hea r claims. See Maeva Marcus , "Judicia l Revie w i n the Earl y Republic, " i n Launching the "Extended Republic": The Federalist Era, ed . Ronald L . Hoffman (Char lottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1996) , 41 n.54. Marcus, in an earlier essay written with Rober t Teir, suggests, but again doe s not conclude, that the Suprem e Court i n Yale Todd declare d th e statute unconstitutional . Se e Maeva Marcu s an d Robert Teir , "Hayburn's Case: A Misinterpretatio n o f Precedent, " Wisconsin Law Review (July-Augus t 1988) : 527, 531 n.25. John Marshal l himself—an d i n Marbury v. Madison, n o less—mad e not e o f another unreported case , Chandler v. Secretary of War (1794), in which the Cour t appears t o hav e invalidate d a n executiv e act . Se e Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. ( 1 Cr.) 137,17 2 (1803 ) (discussin g the case). Susan Low Bloch and Marcus suggest , but onc e again d o not conclude , that Chandler wa s decide d o n othe r tha n consti tutional grounds. See Susan Low Bloch and Maeva Marcus , "Joh n Marshall' s Selective Use of Histor y i n Marbury v. Madison," Wisconsin Law Review (March April 1986) : 301 , 31 5 n.54 . Bu t se e Gordo n E . Sherman , "Th e Cas e o f Joh n Chandler v . The Secretar y o f War, " Yale Law Journal 1 4 (Ma y 1905) : 431, 43 7 (arguing tha t Chandler wa s decide d o n constitutiona l grounds) . Bloch an d Mar cus maintai n tha t Marshal l manipulate d precedent s suc h a s Chandler t o ge t hi s desired politica l resul t i n Marbury. Se e Bloch an d Marcus , "Joh n Marshall' s Se lective Use of Histor y i n Marbury v. Madison," 301-37 . 34. Fo r more , see Marcus, "Judicia l Revie w in the Early Republic," 25-53 . 35. Se e Karl Llewellyn , "Lega l Traditio n an d Social Scienc e Method— A Re alist's Critique," in Essays on Research in the Social Sciences, ed. Leverett S. Lyon, Isador Lubin, Lewis Meriam, and Philip G. Wright (Washington , D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1931 ; repr., Port Washington, N.Y. : Kennikat, 1968) , 89-120 . 36. Thi s phras e wa s coine d b y historia n Pete r S . Onu f i n a refreshin g essa y

Introduction 25 criticizing hi s fello w historian s o f th e America n Foundin g fo r attemptin g t o de fend histor y agains t "alie n disciplines. " Se e Pete r S . Onuf , "Reflection s o n th e Founding: Constitutiona l Historiograph y i n Bicentennia l Perspective, " William and Mary Quarterly 4 6 (Apri l 1989) : 341-75. 37. O n the importance o f methodology i n legal history, see G. Edward White , Intervention and Detachment: Essays in Legal History and Jurisprudence (Ne w York: Oxfor d Universit y Press , 1994) . 38. Arthu r M. Schlesinger, "History : Mistress and Handmaid," i n Lyon et al., Essays on Research in the Social Sciences, 139 . 39. Here , readers wil l b e reminded o f th e thesi s o f Casto' s super b tome , The Supreme Court in the Early Republic. 40. Henr y J. Abraham, The Judicial Process: An Introductory Analysis of the Courts of the United States, England, and France, 6t h ed . (Ne w York : Oxfor d University Press , 1993) , 199 . 41. Haskin s an d Johnson mak e a n interestin g cas e for th e possibility tha t th e opinion o f the Court wa s delivered, bu t no t necessaril y written, b y the senior justice who participate d i n the case. Give n tha t Marshal l wa s bot h chie f justic e an d rarely absent, thi s tended t o b e Marshall. Se e Haskins an d Johnson, Foundations of Power, 382-8 7 (discussin g thi s subject , a s well a s the mor e genera l subjec t o f the transitio n fro m seriati m opinio n writin g t o institutiona l opinio n writing) . Casto maintain s tha t Marshal l merel y solidifie d a custom—usin g institutiona l rather tha n seriati m opinions—tha t Ellswort h initiate d durin g hi s chie f justice ship. See Casto, The Supreme Court in the Early Republic, 110-11 .

Chapter 2

"Honour, Justice, and Interest 55 John Jay's Republican Politics and Statesmanship on the Federal Bench Sandra Frances VanBurkleo

In 1779 , at th e heigh t o f th e Dean e controversy , Richar d Henr y Le e pronounced John Jay a "Tory friend" an d "Mercantil e Abettor" masquerading a s a republican. 1 Lee' s remarks wer e unusuall y sharp . But a good many others harbored simila r reservations and, in the rarefie d atmosphere of American Revolution studies , such criticisms die hard. Scholars expect a great deal of founding fathers , an d Jay consistentl y falls shor t of the mark. As a result, readers find one-dimensional car icatures o f Jay's politica l thought , values , and objective s tha t merel y perpetuate or deny the allegations of eighteenth-century critics. David Hackett Fischer , fo r example , onc e sketched a nostalgic, slightl y pa thetic "conservativ e idealist " permanentl y flawed b y King' s Colleg e monarchism and by yearnings for a bygone ancien regime. In this rendition, Jay rejected hi s own historical moment, devolvin g with James Kent an d Georg e Cabo t int o a n Ol d Guar d reactionary . Other s de scribe a n abrasiv e "realist " fro m Ne w Yor k mor e take n wit h th e China trad e tha n wit h Blackston e o r Locke , for who m politica l an d legal discours e functione d mainl y a s window dressing . An d Richar d Morris, afte r decade s o f invaluabl e researc h an d editing , essentiall y turned th e stereotype o n its head. Transformed int o a relatively affa ble patriot and closet democrat roughly equal in stature to John Mar An earlier version o f this essay appeared unde r th e same title in Journal of the Early Republic 4 (Fal l 1984) : 239-74. Portion s ar e reprinte d b y permission . Th e autho r wishe s t o thank Edwar d M . Wise for valuabl e editoria l help .

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shall,2 Morris's Jay steadily advanced the American cause by means of shrewd diplomac y an d b y prescientl y anticipatin g th e Marshal l Court's economic nationalism as well as its pivotal victory in Marbury v. Madison. 3 Put differently , politica l an d constitutiona l historians—unlik e for eign relation s scholars , who hav e manage d t o avoi d interpretiv e ex tremes4—cling t o time-honore d caricature s o f a bored , boring , an d often incompeten t chie f justic e an d a n insubstantia l Suprem e Cour t between 178 9 an d 1795 . T o som e extent , thi s unflatterin g portrai t originates i n th e fac t o f a limite d bod y o f persona l writing , a n un forthcoming ma n behin d th e pen, an d a cryptic lega l record: a t critical moments , th e historica l recor d simpl y fall s silent . Bu t tw o addi tional factor s shap e th e narrative : lawyer-historian s brin g exactin g technical an d practica l standard s t o bea r o n Jay' s la w practic e an d management o f th e hig h court , i n th e process reinforcin g traditiona l skepticism; an d scholar s traine d i n histor y greatl y prefe r Joh n Mar shall (or, for that matter, the more pragmatic Hamilton and Madison), if onl y becaus e Marshall' s charmingl y darne d stocking s an d chat s with th e newsbo y pla y bette r o n th e lectur e circui t tha n d o Jay' s starched cuff s an d mannere d gran d jur y charges. For these and othe r reasons, constitutiona l historian s hav e bee n conten t t o dismis s Jay' s tenure a s a n embarrassin g laps e i n a n otherwis e distinguishe d com mon-law tradition . Among constitutional historians, the long Marshallian shado w has been particularl y damaging . Ja y mos t assuredl y wa s no t Marshall ; Morris's views aside, historians hav e yet to forgiv e hi m for failin g t o be affable , flexible , an d devote d t o th e Suprem e Cour t fo r it s ow n sake. Jay wa s undeniabl y cantankerou s i n dealing s wit h legislators . His informa l advisor y opinion s an d ope n partisanshi p see m t o flou t the ide a o f a n autonomous , apolitica l federa l judiciary , an d hi s brusque departur e fo r diplomac y i n 179 4 withou t first resignin g th e chief justiceship annoys even Morris. Most important, Jay did not secure th e all-importan t revie w powe r aroun d whic h Marshal l fash ioned a recognizably modern , uniquel y American appellat e practic e after th e "midnigh t judges " episode , i n th e proces s insulatin g th e Court fro m th e mor e egregiou s inroad s o f wha t Jay calle d "politica l grubs." 5 Hence, scholar s typicall y portra y th e Ja y Cour t a s th e Marshal l Court writ small—a primitive, amorphous prelude to the durable con-

28 S A N D R A F R A N C E S V A N B U R K L E O

solidations pursue d afte r Jefferson' s election . Withi n thi s Whiggis h framework, Jay' s aspiration s a s chie f justic e hav e bee n deduce d no t from reconstruction s o f hi s intellect bu t fro m th e us e made b y nineteenth-century jurist s o f Ja y Cour t decisions . Historian s imply , i n other words, that Jay must have intended to lay foundations fo r whatever the high court finally became, and faile d miserably . Rober t Mc Closkey, fo r instance , compare s th e Cour t befor e 180 1 t o a "play' s opening moments with minor characters exchanging trivialities," candidly conceding tha t th e "grea t shado w o f Joh n Marshal l . . . fall s across ou r understanding. " Charle s Haine s onc e pointe d t o "un promising beginnings"; a classic textbook treats the years before Mar shall's arriva l i n fou r pages . And Morri s basicall y employ s th e sam e yardstick, arguin g succes s an d doctrina l kindrednes s i n th e plac e o f failure an d pale imitation. Had Jay accepted John Adams's invitatio n to retur n t o th e Cour t i n 1801 , he concludes, Marshall' s finest stat e papers "woul d ver y probably hav e bee n written b y Jay, whose views Marshall s o completely shared." 6 Yet John Jay's view s were entirel y hi s own, molded befor e al l else by the exigencie s o f revolution. When Washington signe d Jay's com mission as chief justice of the United States in September 1789 , the republic was situated differently an d more precariously than it would be a dozen years later. Economic distress seemed to portend th e nation' s early demise , especiall y i n competitio n wit h deepl y skeptica l Euro pean empires. A theoretically promising frame o f government was untried; vagu e constitutiona l languag e surroundin g th e Court' s rol e i n governance—made more explosive with the addition of contested sections in the 1789 Judiciary and Process Acts—invited Anti-Federalist s to dismantle what Washington called the "keystone " o f federalism. 7 Indeed, criticisms ofte n see m to b e well founded. Befor e 1795 , the Supreme Court' s caseloa d wa s thin , it s member s frustrate d an d dis consolate, an d wha t Ja y calle d it s "Facilitie s o f usag e an d Habit " mostly unspecified . Withou t immediat e institutiona l antecedents , th e entire federa l judiciar y lacke d legitimac y an d cam e t o b e humiliate d all to o easil y b y congressiona l adoptio n o f th e punitiv e Elevent h Amendment in 1798. 8 The chief justice, moreover, has been dismissed as a "trifling " studen t o f domesti c la w whose cour t escape d medioc rity (when it did) largely because James Wilson and other imaginativ e associates share d th e bench . Again , whe n measure d agains t moder n standards, such charges see m plausible. Jay produced n o scholarshi p

"Honour, Justice, and Interest" 2 9

more extensiv e tha n gran d jur y charge s an d brie f Federalist essays. His apprenticeship an d privat e practice were relatively insubstantial , and hi s judicial experience in New York befor e 178 9 was fleeting. 9 But appearance s mislead . Jay's vision o f th e Suprem e Court' s rol e in government differe d i n severa l respect s fro m moder n conception s of th e institution's rol e in federated government . Thi s is exactly a s it ought to be. Unlike Marshall, Jay superintended a wholly untested judiciary, supported onl y in part b y colonial antecedents . His chief justiceship, moreover, coincided with a particularly volatile phase of revolutionary process—the period immediatel y afte r forma l adoptio n o f a conteste d (som e thought illegal ) fram e o f government . I n addition , Jay's intellectual and professional inclinations , while well suited to the day and to his own conception o f judicial responsibility, were sweepingly internationalis t (i n Morris' s view , "continental") 10 rathe r tha n inward turnin g o r provincial , philosophi c rathe r tha n lawyerly , or ganic and hegemonic rather than mechanical and pluralist. Within his elegant, symmetry-seekin g intellectua l "system, " Ja y merge d Hig h Federalist legalis m an d politica l conservatis m wit h free-tradin g eco nomic liberalism; for thi s rigidly principled man , and for man y of his friends, conservativ e republicanis m an d Smithia n politica l econom y coexisted quite peaceably, bound together by an encompassing frame work o f moralizing, stabilizing public law. This collection of unfamil iar association s surel y represent s no t a watered-dow n prelud e t o grandeur bu t a n alternative jurisprudentia l schem e boun d u p tightl y in the reality of an unfinished, highl y unstable revolution . The Road to Reluctant Patriotism John Jay' s yout h prefigure d th e man . Th e eldes t so n o f th e wealth y Peter an d Mar y Va n Cortland t Jay , whos e ancestr y wa s partl y Huguenot, John followe d th e path dictate d b y his parents' lofty posi tion within the New York mercantile community. After privat e tutor ing, he entered King's College (now Columbia University) to study the classics, natura l science , publi c law , philosophy , an d politica l econ omy. Jay came to the law in his final year a t the college, and the n (a s was customary among gentlemen) primarily as preparation fo r publi c service. H e graduate d wit h honor s an d too k u p a n apprenticeshi p (again, as was customary) wit h th e eminent New Yor k Cit y attorne y

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Benjamin Kissam ; as assistant to chief cler k Lindley Murray, he soon chafed unde r piles of tedious copy work. When city lawyers struck in support of the Stamp Act protest in 1765, Jay happily fled to the fam ily estate i n Rye, New York . There, he buried himsel f i n philosophy , public law, and th e classics; two years later, King's College rewarde d these efforts wit h a master o f arts degree. By all reports, Jay was a successful lawyer . In 1766, two years afte r his return to Kissam's office, he gained admission to the New York bar and opene d a New Yor k Cit y law offic e wit h hi s schoolmate Rober t Livingston, Jr. Jay leavened wor k wit h upper-clas s diversions : debat ing clubs, the exclusive Dancing Assembly, and conservative state political groups. In 1769 , he accepted his first public office a s a commissioner charge d wit h settlin g a New York-Ne w Jerse y boundar y dis pute; five year s later , Jay' s brigh t professiona l an d socia l prospect s allowed marriag e t o th e wellbor n Sara h (o r Sally ) Va n Brug h Liv ingston. But, even as the couple exchange d vows , American citie s rumble d with rebellious talk abou t th e Intolerable Acts and Georg e Ill's abrogations of his coronation oath . Jay initially resisted independence ; he helped formulat e th e conciliatory Oliv e Branch Petitio n o f 177 4 an d seriously considered expatriation a s an alternative to treason. But, by 1775, th e ever-loude r transatlanti c screamin g matc h abou t bot h th e constitutional status of the colonies and the merits of an Anglo-American economic partnership exerted a powerful attraction . Jay, after all , held advanced degree s in political economy and public law, including the law of nations; he feared, too, that the crown no longer could protect colonial trade and property. Intellectual challenges aside, familia l and clas s interests—responsibl e onl y i n par t fo r Jay' s nervousnes s about imminen t publi c disorder 11—led hi m t o remai n i n th e Ne w World. Jay served the cause initially in state political groups and then in the First an d Secon d Continenta l Congresses . Fo r th e moment , h e sus pended hi s half-burie d Calvinis m an d deep-seate d skepticis m abou t republican fait h i n voluntarism an d perfectibility: perhap s American s were capable o f self-government . Durin g thes e tumultuou s years , he even parted ways occasionally with moderating colleagues in the New York congressiona l delegation : hi s championshi p o f th e Gallowa y Plan for colonial economic unification, for instance, as well as his strident suppor t fo r nonimportatio n agreement s a s a membe r o f Ne w

'Honour, Justice, and Interest" 3 1 York's radica l Committe e o f Sixty , se t hi m sharpl y apar t fro m man y of hi s friends . A t th e sam e time , he sa t o n stat e Committee s o f Corre spondence an d Safety , synchronizin g intracolonia l protest s an d pro viding a semblance o f government a s the Britis h magistrac y collapsed . Jay helpe d draf t th e Ne w Yor k stat e constitution ; unti l 1779 , h e als o served (erraticall y an d withou t distinction ) a s chief justic e o f th e Ne w York superio r court . Onl y a fe w day s afte r h e arrive d i n Philadelphi a to serv e a s a Ne w Yor k delegat e t o th e genera l government , member s of th e ne w Congres s electe d Ja y presiden t o f tha t body . Shortl y after ward, h e became ministe r plenipotentiar y t o Spain ; a scant three year s later, h e wen t t o Europ e wit h fou r othe r commissioner s t o negotiat e what woul d becom e th e Pari s Peac e Treat y wit h Grea t Britain . These wer e traumati c experiences . Almos t a t once , Ja y conclude d that hi s original , gloom y assessmen t o f th e republica n character — and, mor e generally , America n prospect s fo r succes s withi n a decen tralized confederation—ha d bee n appallingl y accurate . A s a wea k quasi-executive i n Congress, Jay helplessly presided ove r what h e too k to b e th e disintegratio n o f th e confederation . Wher e othe r me n sa w growing pains , Jay perceive d mora l deca y an d th e los s o f securit y i n liberty. American s engage d i n th e inventio n o f moder n politica l par ties an d i n a celebratio n o f nascen t capitalis m wer e entirel y awar e o f the divisive , self-intereste d qualit y o f thei r activities ; Clintonian s an d other "moder n men " regularl y pointe d t o a n emergin g polit y an d economy accessibl e t o Everyman . Ja y detecte d wha t Gordo n Woo d might cal l a n "assaul t o n aristocracy" 12 an d it s traditiona l monopol y of publi c culture . Everywhere , republican s seeme d t o embrac e o r tol erate mora l degeneracy , demagoguery , disdai n fo r law , extrem e "lev elling," disastrou s logjam s i n Congress , th e fetterin g o f diplomats , drifts o f worthles s pape r currency , an d tooth-and-nai l competitio n among th e state s fo r tradin g privileges . I n Europe , Ja y personall y guaranteed repaymen t o f wa r loans ; privately , h e despaire d o f soci ety's capacit y fo r virtu e an d Congress' s abilit y t o navigat e th e rapid s between independenc e an d nationhood . H o w coul d diplomat s per suade European s o f republica n integrity , h e wondered, whe n th e peo ple's representative s embrace d ignoble , self-destructiv e practice s an d policies? Thus, scholar s hav e ampl e groun d t o conten d tha t Jay , well befor e the ink drie d o n the Judiciary an d Proces s Acts, steadily rowed agains t the republica n current , o r a t leas t agains t th e democratizing , sociall y

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transformative par t of that current. Jay was keenly aware of instabil ities lurking i n those "sof t ambiguou s moments" 13 afte r ratification . In his own words , the problem a t hand wa s to discover , within lega l and political limits, how the new federal judiciary—and especially the Supreme Court—migh t bes t provid e "du e suppor t t o th e nationa l government" in pursuit of "great and obvious principles of sound policy."14 Becaus e th e mai n tas k wa s establishment rathe r tha n expan sion o r innovation , Jay' s understandin g o f suc h term s a s "du e sup port" o r "grea t an d obviou s principles" merit s close attention . Ho w did h e imagin e prope r relation s betwee n polity , economy , an d law ? Toward wha t end s di d th e ne w federa l governmen t move , an d through whom ? Ho w migh t th e high court advanc e thos e end s mos t effectively? Jay's Political Economy and Jurisprudence in the Crucible of Revolution Jay's political and jurisprudential "system " blended an extremely conservative domesti c politic s wit h libera l economi c theory , th e latte r very narrowly construed. With Adam Smith and other political economists, Jay conceived of liberalism primarily as a blueprint for stable , global commercia l development , predicate d upo n th e existenc e o f moral domestic societies in advance of economic exchange. 15 He also distinguished between politica l citizenshi p a s define d b y individua l nations an d th e broader , mor e significan t membershi p o f American s and European s i n a transnational economi c community. To facilitat e the emergenc e o f a harmonious "ban d o f brethren " i n North Amer ica, Jay urged internal centralization, reliance upon a few enlightene d statesmen, and strict attention to federal law—the embodiment of reason and divine morality—in orde r to secure both forms o f citizenshi p against the evils inherent i n all people. Without thes e safeguards, Jay predicted swif t declin e into the immorality an d greed so "natural " i n human societies. 16 Imbedded i n Jay's politica l though t wa s a stingin g critiqu e o f th e basic tenet s o f Revolutionar y idealism . Thes e disagreements , whic h Jay presse d steadfastl y fro m th e Revolution' s earlies t moment s through retirement, originated i n an unusually blea k and remarkabl y static assessmen t o f huma n nature . Hi s expression s o f doub t abou t

"Honour, Justice, and Interest" 3 3 perfectibility, an d the n abou t th e merit s o f voluntaris m o r adherenc e to the popular will , vacillated betwee n moderatio n an d stridenc y wit h changing circumstances. During "Season s o f general Heat Tumul t an d Fermentation" suc h a s wartim e o r diplomati c crises , hi s anxietie s in tensified; hi s view s softene d appreciabl y wit h th e prospec t o f a strengthened "nationa l Head " afte r 1787 . Bu t shiftin g coloration s barely maske d a n essential , unremittin g gloo m abou t th e motive s o f politicized American s an d abou t "democratical " experimentatio n i n an untutore d postcolonia l societ y wrenche d to o suddenly—tha t is , in violation o f th e law s o f natura l socia l development—fro m Britis h im perial moorings. 17 Jay's existentia l depressio n flowe d partl y fro m pietism . A devote d Anglican, he nevertheless remaine d consciou s fo r a lifetime o f his fam ily's Hugueno t origins ; indeed , hi s notoriou s admiratio n o f Grea t Britain reflecte d considerabl e gratitud e tha t hi s forebear s ha d bee n provided "a n Assylum. " Ol d Testamen t an d apocalypti c imager y punctuated hi s prose, alongside pointe d analogie s betwee n publi c an d private salvatio n o r state s of grace. Jay als o participated activel y in religious an d antislaver y societies , fo r th e persistenc e o f slavery—a n "inconsistent . . . unjus t and , perhaps , impious " blemis h upo n sup posed libertarians—powerfull y reinforce d th e convictio n tha t civi c virtue coul d onl y b e "draw n t o a point, " afte r whic h improvemen t was unlikely. 18 Only a handful escape d Jay's obloquy , an d commo n folk , t o who m he frequentl y impute d bestia l qualities , wer e th e leas t favore d o f all . As earl y a s 1777 , h e ha d bee n alarme d b y a potentiall y savag e "Pub lic," admonishin g hi s frien d Gouverneu r Morri s t o sen d soothin g "Paragraphs" t o colleague s servin g o n th e Ne w Yor k Counci l o f Safety fo r mas s distribution : "Th e Peopl e suspec t th e wors t [when ] . . . w e sa y Nothing . Thei r Curiosit y mus t b e constantl y gratified , o r they wil l b e uneasy. " Similarly , Ja y admire d Pennsylvania' s experi ments wit h manufacture s t o alleviat e unemploymen t an d unrest , o n the groun d tha t brea d an d abundan t wor k migh t kee p ordinar y citi zens "eas y an d Quiet. " Whe n "Fello w Mortal s ar e bus y an d wel l fed," Ja y theorized , "the y forge t t o complain." 1 9 By the mid-1790s, Jay had dispense d wit h rhetorica l caution . Steel y resignation replace d th e relativel y benig n assertio n tha t ma n wa s a "degraded creature, " o r tha t humankin d wa s guide d mor e b y "con veniences tha n b y principles." N o longe r woul d h e entertai n fantasie s

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about an "ag e of reason, prior to the millennium"; nor would he "believe on e wor d of " th e "modern " suggestio n tha t appetit e coul d b e subordinated t o "righ t reason. " I n 1797 , Ja y wa s console d b y th e knowledge tha t "ever y scourg e o f ever y kin d b y whic h nation s ar e punished"—perhaps th e sam e "Evil s inseparabl e fro m Humanity " identified som e twent y year s before—wer e unde r th e "contro l o f a wise an d benevolen t Sovereign. " Whe n Judg e Peter s hinte d i n 181 5 that th e peopl e alway s mean t well , Jay waste d littl e ink : "Th e wor d people, yo u know, applies to all the individual inhabitants o f a country." The portion that "mea n well never was, nor until the millennium will be, considerable." 20 Also b y th e mid-1790s , Ja y routinel y divide d th e polit y int o "Politicians" an d "Citizens. " Th e forme r encompasse d legislativ e demagogues, "pharisaica l patriots, " an d th e "lowe r Clas s o f Mankind" wh o blindl y followe d thes e charlatan s towar d Jacobin ism.21 "Citizens, " o n th e othe r hand , include d sober , contemplativ e statesmen wh o refuse d t o contriv e " a sho e tha t woul d fit ever y foot," a s wel l a s tha t smal l portio n o f th e electorat e wit h courag e enough t o suppor t them . Virtu e wa s inborn : som e me n possesse d i t from birth , other s di d not . An d thos e wh o di d no t sometime s pre tended otherwise , posin g a s statesme n i n legislativ e chambers . Jay' s conclusions wer e essentiall y genetic : th e "imprope r arts " o f assem blymen reflecte d th e fac t tha t "creature s wil l ac t accordin g t o thei r nature, an d i t would b e absurd t o expec t tha t a man wh o i s not up right, will ac t lik e on e who is." 22 With politicians, Jay was unsparing. These were "me n raised fro m low Degree s . . . rendere d gidd y b y Elevation, " wh o typicall y con sulted "prevailin g fashions " rathe r tha n "th e utility o f their good s t o those who are to wear them." Worse, pernicious "levelling principles" and self-serving campaign promises spawned violence after the French example. Jay therefor e hope d t o circumscrib e th e influenc e o f "me n without Characte r [or ] Fortune " unti l virtu e ha d bee n disseminate d more broadly through educatio n an d exposure to law, or until a centralized governmen t migh t b e perfected. 23 Wit h th e possibilit y o f a new Constitutio n afte r 1787 , Jay speculate d abou t gradua l improve ment among politicians over several generations. Ultimately, however, he resigne d himsel f t o a successio n o f barbarian s whos e "artifices, " pandering, an d "irascibl e passions " woul d b e containe d fo r a tim e through th e "strenuou s effort s o f th e wise. " Onl y i n anothe r worl d

Honour, Justice, and Interest" 3 5

might "al l book s an d historie s an d error s . . . b e consumed, " an d "truth . . . rise and prevail and b e immortal." 24 Unfortunately, wisdom was a scarce resource, and typically the special province of executives or jurists who came to office withou t pop ular election . Jay associate d politica l debt s an d localis m with incom petence: the furthe r remove d a man migh t b e fro m hi s constituency , the les s likel y corruptio n o r pettiness . Th e fac t o f electio n thu s aroused th e Ne w Yorker' s suspicions , whil e nominatio n assuage d them; an d federa l appointee s wer e les s tainted an d mor e gifte d tha n their counterpart s i n th e state s b y virtu e o f selectio n fro m a n ex panded pool. It followed that the general government would be "more wise, systematical , an d judicious " tha n loca l governments , fo r ther e would be no "want of proper persons." Unsullied by the "necessity of the Case," this self-selecting "elect " someho w had to retain what Ed ward Rutledg e calle d "th e Staf f unti l American s demonstrate d "whether they could govern themselves." At stake was republican survival, and Jay was worried. Th e sam e sensitivitie s tha t separate d th e wise from mer e politicians also encouraged disillusionment in the face of public abuse, for th e "Residue, " as Jay dubbed the majority, rarel y mustered "Honest y o r Spiri t enoug h openl y t o defen d unpopula r Merit," thereb y routing talented bu t weary statesmen. 25 From this pessimistic bedrock, Jay's posture toward Britain and his restrictive domestic politics followed logicall y and inexorably. In fact , both were little more than a n elaboration o f a favorite maxim : "For titude founded o n Resignation." His reluctant but diligent patriotism, for example , originate d les s i n a firm preferenc e fo r independenc e than i n perceptions o f an intractable emergency in political economy . Jay had preferred Britis h citizenship at least through 1775 , despite serious misgiving s abou t th e empire' s performance . Hi s shif t t o th e cause, while facilitate d b y deeper associatio n throug h marriag e wit h the Livingsto n family , crystallize d primaril y wit h mountin g evidenc e of th e crown' s inabilit y t o protec t distan t propert y an d t o guarante e trade—the "grea t an d weight y reasons " underlyin g al l politica l unions.26 Yet these decisions did no t alte r Jay's fascination wit h Britis h civilization or with imperial governance. While drafting th e Olive Branch Petition, he yearned for a speedy restoration of peace without "furthe r Effusion o f Blood, " confessin g tha t h e woul d b e "hurt " b y th e de struction o f Englan d an d b y los s o f acces s t o "th e Prosperit y o f th e

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Empire no w ren t b y unnatural Convulsions." 27 A decade afte r inde pendence, h e stil l urge d American s t o preserv e cultura l an d tradin g channels establishe d durin g lon g centurie s o f Britis h tutelage . Th e crown's ability to suppress provincial violence through centralizatio n fascinated him, 28 an d h e fretted constantl y abou t exclusio n fro m th e world's mos t extensiv e commercia l network , eagerl y anticipatin g a "liberal Alliance " wit h Londoners . Th e rebellio n an d it s storm y af termath, he thought, were unseemly escalations of a necessary squabble between paren t an d talente d child . Even in the throes o f war, Jay contemplated a retur n t o Britis h dominatio n "wit h Horror " an d would "risqu e al l fo r Independence" ; bu t tha t poin t settled , h e en couraged the swift extensio n of "advantageou s commercial Terms." 29 Years later , John Adam s complaine d tha t th e Revolutio n ha d no t been sustaine d b y "suc h characters " a s Jay an d th e Morrises—thos e irksome Ne w Yorker s wh o castigate d th e public' s potentia l fo r "virtue" an d s o cast doub t upo n th e Revolution' s mai n engines . H e was both right and wrong. Jay certainly deplored the creation of a decentralized commonwealt h guide d b y unfettere d congressiona l "politicians" and by emasculated executiv e departments—a structur e dangerously dependen t upo n th e "public " metamorphosing instantl y into "citizens. " H e detecte d mischie f i n the notio n tha t mos t Ameri cans would sacrific e short-ter m gai n fo r th e greate r good , an d mor e than a littl e Frenc h romanc e i n "levelling. " Mor e important , h e dreaded th e constructio n o f a n isolated , introverte d ne w imperia l economy, tied fatall y t o collectiv e decisio n makin g an d t o a n unreal izable, undesirable self-sufficiency. 30 In short , whil e Ja y disagree d wit h mos t o f th e assumption s an d strategies propelling Revolutionary politics, he did not reject the possibility that independen t republica n citizen s might behav e virtuously . He denied onl y the universality o f virtue i n the "Public " an d thu s it s reflection i n th e mind s an d labor s o f legislators . I n Jay's estimation , virtue resided mainly in a very few statesmen then held in check by the new Congress, which dramaticall y reduce d it s value to society . Criticisms were urgent: if pie-eyed republican schemes prevailed, unity and prosperity—the fundamenta l "objects " o f nationhood—woul d b e sabotaged.31 Jay's "firs t wish " fo r th e new nation was domestic unification—a n internal, primaril y politica l object . Unit y wa s basi c an d altogethe r critical; without it, property and persons might never be secure. At the

'Honour, Justice, and Interest" 3 7 same time , unit y wa s onl y a firs t ste p ont o th e worl d stage , an d s o a penultimate objec t e n rout e t o Jay' s ultimat e goal : prosperity . Ja y knew that a disunited natio n woul d b e denied membershi p i n a globa l community, havin g faile d t o achiev e th e "characte r o f ON E GREA T NATION." An d th e structur e bes t suite d t o unity' s achievemen t an d maintenance, give n republica n imperfections , wa s a "stron g govern ment" o f decisive federal institution s an d law s "abl y administered" b y a wis e minority. 32 These sentiment s emerge d a s earl y a s 177 6 i n respons e t o wartim e disorders: the nee d fo r "goo d an d wel l ordere d Governments " t o pre vent "tha t Anarch y whic h alread y to o muc h prevails, " h e tol d Alexander McDougall , mus t b e "inculcated. " Bu t "Anarchy " per sisted afte r independence ; an d th e Confederacy , Ja y feared , wa s a sorry pla n indeed . I n 1777 , h e allowe d onl y tha t th e genera l govern ment "augur s well, " wanl y concedin g tha t a n indifferen t constitutio n was "bette r tha n none. " A s atomizatio n seeme d t o continue , Jay' s anxieties proliferated . H e bega n t o calculat e th e odd s fo r an d agains t complete collapse , griml y anticipatin g whic h "Partie s an d Faction s will arise , t o wha t Object s b e directed , . . . an d wh o wil l b e th e vic tims." Hi s frustration s deepene d appreciabl y whil e negotiatin g th e peace fo r a n unhelpfu l Congres s an d a s secretar y fo r foreig n affair s after 1783 . Chaos a t hom e plainl y threatene d th e safet y an d tranquil ity o f Ne w Worl d citizens . Bu t i t als o marke d republican s a s unreli able and violent . The mar k o f Cain , i n turn, introduce d untenabl e dis advantages i n dealing s wit h Europeans , wit h who m American s wer e obliged t o compet e o n th e hig h seas , and fro m who m th e republi c ab solutely require d grant s o f respec t an d lega l standing. 33 This fres h awarenes s o f diplomati c complexity , combine d wit h Jay's considerabl e disdai n fo r legislators , soo n produce d bruta l de nunciations o f congressiona l bickerin g an d immobilization . Th e sec retary's complaint s wer e legion : h e decrie d th e states ' "impatienc e o f government," whic h encompasse d loca l resistanc e t o congressiona l taxation; a n insatiabl e rag e fo r propert y i n th e fac e o f nationa l hard ship; and a reckless "desir e of equality i n all things." Jay also deplore d government's failur e t o prevent India n attacks , chronic absenteeis m i n Congress, procrastinatio n ove r debts , an d th e absenc e o f a "conti nental, nationa l spirit. " Pointin g t o a n empt y treasur y "thoug h th e country abound s i n resources," h e bemoane d "disappointmen t t o ou r creditors [and ] disgrace to our country"—conditions tha t spok e to th e

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"want o f goo d governmen t t o guar d goo d fait h an d punis h viola tions." 34 The origin s o f publi c apath y towar d unification , Ja y argue d i n 1788, were cultural . American s ha d agree d t o a confederation mor e "paternal and persuasive than coersive and efficient" afte r centuries of colonial dependency, during which affairs o f state such as war, peace, and commerc e ha d bee n "manage d fo r u s an d no t b y us. " Republi cans therefore responde d t o crisis times with passivity and ignorance . What migh t b e done ? Durabl e unification , Ja y explained , typicall y proceeded fro m "constitutiona l coersion , o r . . . the dictate s o f rea son." Th e forme r wa s unavailable , an d American s i n thei r presen t condition wer e deaf t o reason . Stopga p strategies seeme d equall y fu tile: even a unifying wa r woul d b e lost a t th e hand s o f congressme n whose hono r an d authorit y decaye d almos t daily . Within thi s "won derful syste m of government," Jay told fellow Ne w Yorkers, "almos t every national object . . . [is] unprovided for." 35 Th e secretary sense d "some crisis"; he was "uneasy and apprehensive; more so than durin g the war. " An d Shays' s Rebellio n wa s a terrifying omen : "Th e insur rection i n Massachusetts i s suppressed," h e fussed, "bu t th e spiri t of it exists." 36 Jay toyed with the idea of constitutional reform— a gran t of necessary power s s o tha t Congres s migh t bette r regulat e commerc e an d "general concerns"—bu t quickl y fastene d upo n a more drasti c rem edy. Unification, a s well as the liberation o f the nation's "ables t men " from legislativ e constraints, could no t b e achieved withi n a defectiv e frame of government; no amount of tinkering would save the day. The single mos t glarin g defec t wa s th e "grea t mistake " o f a multifunc tional Congres s ben t upo n reducin g "bi g men into littl e ones." Powers to make and execute law, Jay admonished Jefferson, shoul d neve r be vested in "on e an d the same body of men," no t onl y because confusion woul d eventuate but also because legislators could hide behind one another. Whenever assemblie s divid e "blam e an d credit, " h e explained, "to o little falls o n each man." 37 Nor shoul d a reorganize d Congress b e grante d decisiv e powe r i n pursuit o f crucia l "object s o f state. " I n 1776 , Edwar d Rutledg e wanted t o allo w "n o mor e Powe r tha n what' s absolutel y necessary " in order to retain executive autonomy; Jay pursued th e same strateg y in a differen t context . Otherwise , h e late r explained , th e "executiv e business o f sovereignty " woul d b e "bu t feebl y done." 38 Wit h othe r

"Honour, Justice, and Interest" 3

9

Federalists, Jay recommende d a departmenta l syste m o f governmen t composed o f thre e forma l branches . Quit e separately , though , h e imagined two competing blocs of power—an informal coalition of executives and judges pitted against legislative excess. Laws then woul d be "expounde d i n on e sens e an d execute d i n th e sam e manner, " al lowing th e Unite d State s t o mov e alon g "unifor m principle s o f pol icy." Collaborators , i n othe r words , coul d "harmonize , assimilate , and protect the several parts," guaranteeing "mutua l participation i n commerce, navigation, an d citizenship." 39 For Jay and othe r Hig h Federalists, anarchical deca y was far mor e likely tha n despotis m o r ministeria l tyranny ; indeed , h e migh t hav e welcomed a parliamentar y arrangemen t wit h properl y autonomou s ministries. Jay ma y well have associate d executiv e licens e with roya l prerogative, an d modele d hi s informal allianc e afte r customar y rela tions betwee n th e King-in-Parliament an d th e courts a t Westminster ; whatever th e case might be , he lacked th e patience an d tast e fo r fur ther experimentation , particularl y wit h legislator s a t th e helm . "Th e most perfec t Constitutions , th e bes t Governments , an d th e wises t Laws are vain," Jay told grand jurymen i n 1790 , "unless well administered an d wel l obeyed. " Tim e an d again , Ja y mad e clear , ofte n i n tropes borrowed from Englis h law practice, that adherence to the rule of la w ensure d freedom : fidelity t o la w wa s no t "unfriendl y t o Lib erty," or at least to "tha t Libert y which is really inestimable. [0] n th e Contrary, nothin g bu t a stron g Governmen t o f Laws , irresistabl y bearing down arbitrary power & Licenciousness can defend i t against those two formidabl e Enemies . Let it b e remembered," h e added fo r good measure , that civi l Libert y consist s no t i n a Righ t t o ever y Ma n t o d o jus t wha t he pleases—bu t i t consist s i n a n equa l Righ t t o al l th e Citizen s t o have , enjoy, an d t o do , i n peac e Securit y an d withou t Molestation , whateve r the equa l an d constitutiona l law s . . . admi t t o b e consisten t wit h th e public Good .

A scant three years later, in the emergency atmosphere accompany ing Washington's Neutralit y Proclamation , Ja y mad e th e poin t a bi t differently, contendin g tha t relianc e upo n la w necessaril y increase d when men claimed extraordinary freedom . The more free the people are, the more strong and efficient ough t their Gov ernm[en]t t o be ; and fo r thi s plai n Reason , tha t i t i s a more arduou s Tas k

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to make and keep up the Fences of Law &C Justice about twenty Rights tha n about five or six ; 8t becaus e i t i s more difficul t t o fenc e agains t &c restrain men wh o ar e unfettered, tha n me n who ar e i n Yokes &C Chains. 40

Jay augmente d thi s judge-led , law-boun d "balanc e o f power " against popula r an d congressiona l licentiousnes s wit h hars h circum scription of state power—a schem e reminiscent of the old New Jersey Plan.41 Again inspire d b y British practice , Jay conceived o f the state s as extraordinaril y wea k administrativ e fiction s existin g a t federa l pleasure. As he told Adams , " I would hav e the m [states ] considere d . . . i n the same light in which counties stand to the States," as constitutionally dependen t "district s t o facilitat e th e purpose s o f domesti c order an d goo d government." Adamantl y oppose d t o the creation of new states—whethe r throug h subdivisio n o r i n frontie r area s wher e "white savages" compared unfavorably with "tawny ones"—Jay even recommended that key state officials b e nominated by the general government. Thes e choice s spok e t o la w enforcemen t that , h e thought , would no t "alway s accor d o r b e consistent" withou t strengt h a t th e center, a s muc h fro m th e "variet y o f independen t courts " a s fro m "different loca l laws and interests. " Jay similarl y applaude d th e construction o f centralized court s a s a hedge against "[l]aw s dictate d b y the Spirit of the Times not the Spirit of Justice." 42 Zeal fo r constitutiona l revisio n (an d fo r expande d prerogativ e powers fo r agent s o f th e executiv e branch ) increase d dramaticall y wherever Jay perceived a threat to diplomatic efforts. Prosperity—hi s ultimate "objec t o f state"—require d confrontation s wit h ancient , well-defended imperia l powers , an d successfu l interactio n wa s doomed, h e knew , withou t a t leas t th e appearanc e o f interna l har mony. Jay was obsessed with Congress' s dubious respectability in Europe and persuaded as well that circumstances could only deteriorate, for experienced mercantilists were not obliged to deal with upstart republicans inhabitin g a n unstabl e polity . Ja y feare d tha t American s would soo n wav e "FAREWELL , A LONG FAREWELL " t o unreal ized prosperity , an d tha t friendl y nation s the n willin g t o embrac e a "great and powerful" Americ a would be forced to retreat. "Whateve r may b e ou r situation, " h e warne d i n a Federalist essay , "whethe r firmly united . . . o r split into a number o f confederacies, certai n it is, that foreign nations will know and view it exactly as it is; and they will act towards us accordingly[.]"

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1

If they se e that ou r nationa l governmen t i s efficient an d wel l regulate d . . . our resources and finances discreetl y managed—our credi t re-established — our peopl e . . . united , the y wil l b e muc h mor e dispose d t o cultivat e ou r friendship [I] f they find us destitute of an effectual government.. . wha t a poor , pitiful figure wil l America mak e i n their eyes !

And, when he finally addressed republican grand juries on the Eastern Circuit i n 1790 , Jay hammere d away—rathe r obsessively , give n th e nature o f th e case s pending—a t th e peril s o f ba d fait h i n foreig n af fairs, notabl y (bu t not only ) in meeting treaty obligations. 43 These preoccupations reflecte d Jay' s unhappy year s as a diplomat statesman. While laboring after 178 1 to secure peace with Britain, he had been nettled and occasionally mortified b y Congress's poor credi t and shoddy intelligence procedures, but his exertions in the foreign af fairs office betwee n 178 3 and 178 9 were frustrated mor e directly an d constantly.44 Internationa l agreements , h e insisted, shoul d b e negotiated onl y by private statesme n guide d b y conscience an d b y the ster ling principle s o f internationa l law . "Larg e assemblies, " sai d Jay , "often misunderstan d . . . the obligation s o f character , honour , an d dignity, and wil l collectively d o o r omi t thing s which individua l gen tlemen i n private capacitie s would no t approve. " Congress was public, raucous, and sluggish ; diplomacy required discretio n an d "imme diate despatch. " An d transien t lawmaker s wer e il l qualifie d fo r th e "attainment o f those grea t objects " tha t ha d t o b e "steadil y contem plated i n al l thei r relation s an d circumstances. " T o relegat e foreig n policy to petty politicians hounded b y voters and limited by their ow n character wa s to court economic and diplomati c disaster . O n on e occasion, Jay sarcasticall y announce d that , i f force d t o choose , he preferred th e "Enterprise , Activity and Industr y o f private Adventurers " to the "Lukewarmnes s o f Assemblies," fo r "Publi c Virtue" was "no t so active as private Love of Gain." 45 The term "lukewarmness " capture d severa l complaints abou t leg islative lassitude , th e majority' s unaccountabl e fascinatio n wit h dis closure, an d th e myopi c qualit y o f congressiona l economi c policy . It mattered littl e whether shortcoming s flowe d fro m huma n frailtie s o r the clumsines s o f politica l process ; European s sa w onl y th e conse quences and would b e alienated accordingly . Here , Jay again offere d pointed analogie s betwee n publi c an d privat e morality . Fraud , rude ness, and insolence , he counseled, woul d no t onl y "degrade and dis~

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grace nations & Individuals , but also expose the m to Hostility & in sult." Nationa l "indiscretions, " h e wrot e i n a n uncommonl y fran k jury-charge draft, "hav e given Occasion to many Wars." On the other side, fair dealing and a harmonious polity encouraged peace and prosperity. Indeed , amon g th e jus t cause s o f war , Jay liste d treat y viola tions, which he associated with French influence, craven state governments, and, b y 1795 , indebted speculator s wh o preferre d "spoi l an d plunder" t o "patien t industr y an d honest gains." 46 Jay particularl y fulminate d agains t violation s o f th e Definitiv e Treaty wit h Britai n an d o f th e compact s supportin g Revolutionar y War debts. His own promises underpinned many such agreements. Of greater moment , however , were nationa l "honour , justice , and inter est." Time and again , he advocated broade r power s of "coersion " s o that administrator s an d judge s migh t enforc e thes e "mos t salutar y and constitutional objects. " Jay also pleaded fo r a moratorium upo n new loans until old debts had been cleared. He chided Congress for its inattention t o the obligations o f nationhood, a s opposed t o the mor e pleasurable right s an d privileges. 47 Wit h Washington , h e suspecte d that disadvantageou s politica l entanglement s flowe d inevitabl y fro m dependence upo n th e "charit y o f our friends " an d the "merc y o f ou r enemies"; in 1793, he feared a s well that the "Man or the Nation who eludes the payment of Debts, ceases to be worthy of further Credit." 48 If lingering debts threatened health y relations with the French an d Dutch, violations of the Paris Peace Treaty directly affected a n AngloAmerican rapprochement . Th e president' s alar m parallele d Jay's : "I f you tel l th e Legislatur e the y hav e violate d th e treat y o f peace, " h e wrote, "the y will laugh in your face . What, then , is to b e done?" Jay chose mora l an d politica l instruction . Treaties , h e sai d i n variou s ways, were "onl y another name for a bargain." Stat e evasions of lawful debts had not surprised Jay. As early as 1783, he predicted that designing debtors would try to undermine the treaty's unpopular fourt h article, whic h promise d paymen t fo r wartim e contract s o r confisca tions o f Loyalis t property . Bu t continue d belligerenc e no w partoo k "more o f vengeance tha n o f justice," Jay argued , fattenin g stat e coffers a t the expense of the nation's long-term interests. 49 Jay therefor e joine d othe r Federalists i n th e struggl e agains t ob structionism in the states, simultaneously apologizing to friends in Europe. I n 1786 , Lafayett e learne d o f Congress' s regrettabl e disarray ; Jay als o assure d Britain' s Lor d Lansdowne , fro m who m Ja y begge d

"Honour, Justice, and Interest" 4 3

abundant "goo d nature, " that constitutional letharg y and the lack of "temper and liberality" among republicans would be remedied swiftl y by honorable men. 50 The secretary campaigned tirelessly against "discriminations inconsisten t wit h th e treat y o f peace " throug h whic h worthy me n ha d bee n deprive d o f citizenshi p an d property . Afte r 1789, these efforts continue d fro m th e bench. Repeating his warnings about obligation s an d duties , Chie f Justic e Ja y admonishe d Ameri cans to abid e b y "treatie s Conventions , an d th e lik e compacts." Jus t as "in private Life a fair and legal Contract between two Men, cannot be annulled nor altered b y either without th e Consent of the other, so neither can Treaties between Nations." By 1794, he had begun to discourage Britis h acquaintance s fro m investment s i n America n enter prise. New sequestratio n measures , h e tol d them , theoreticall y wer e "improper" an d therefor e unlikely , bu t when presse d fo r assurances , he "decline d to give any." 51 Stern exhortation s abou t publi c morality , politica l harmony , an d "effective Power " i n th e hand s o f statesme n coexiste d wit h equall y fervent pleas for liberalized trading relations. Jay's prescription for the nation's economy, which superficially resemble d James Wilson's Commonwealth o f Nation s fantasy, 52 reste d upo n sophisticated , shrew d analyses o f th e strategi c weaknesse s o f th e Unite d State s an d o f it s "natural wealth , value , and resources. " Economi c succes s seeme d t o depend entirel y upo n "breaking ] th e ice " wit h England . Wit h Wil son, Adams, and others , Jay envisioned a "bas e system" 53 of reciprocal trade agreements—firs t wit h Britain' s competitors , whos e friend ship was strategically usefu l i n the struggl e agains t Britis h mercantil ism, if a limited avenu e to great wealth, and then with England itself. Jay probabl y hoped , too , tha t publi c mobilizatio n aroun d th e prospect of collective financial gain might spur unification, shoul d political tactics fail. 54 Jay distinguished , then , betwee n undesirabl e dependencie s accom panying th e statu s o f debtor—whic h h e dubbe d "dependenc e fo r friendship," an d whic h necessitate d a ver y dangerou s for m o f grati tude—and mutua l respec t betwee n autonomou s tradin g partners . This health y dependenc y wa s couched , no t coincidentally , i n th e equalizing trope s o f contrac t law . Jay clearl y sa w the republic's glar ing militar y an d financial inequality ; lega l fiction shielde d statesme n and trader s alike , facilitatin g independenc e "i n th e mos t extensiv e sense." American s coul d b e "hones t an d gratefu l t o ou r allies, " Ja y

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noted wryly , "bu t . . . think fo r ourselves." 55 Earl y agreement s wit h France, Spain, or Russia serve d as a tempting carrot to dangle befor e the British crown whil e Americans exploite d distan t port s i n relativ e safety. It was in the "interes t o f all Europe," Jay advised the Spanish , to joi n republican s i n "breakin g dow n th e exorbitan t power " o f a n empire he openly lionized an d just as plainly wished to befriend, cut ting th e "sinews " o f Britis h monopol y powe r whil e maximizin g un equaled acces s to world markets. 56 Well before th e Paris peace, Jay had rejected th e related notion s of self-sufficiency an d protectionism, perceiving that economi c isolatio n and th e mindles s replicatio n o f a n Ol d Worl d empir e provide d fals e security. By 1783, these insights fed mounting concern an d irritation . When Benjami n Vaugha n an d other s resisted a "nugatory " reciproc ity during the peace negotiations while also defending a favorable bal ance o f trad e fo r th e British , Jay rathe r haplessl y threatene d a n op posing navigation act . Two years later, his fears ha d no t diminished . The Englis h "expec t muc h fro m th e trad e o f America, " h e wrot e Adams, yet "pu t it out of our power to pay. . .. I wish most sincerel y that credit was at an end." Reciprocit y an d direc t exchange, he speculated, would defus e belligerenc e betwee n nation s with share d inter ests: "one cannot enrich herself without enriching the other," creatin g a peaceable "natura l connexion." 57 These "connexions " furthe r allowe d a n undercapitalize d Americ a to evolve industrial capacities, without contrivance or frenzy, o n firm agrarian foundations . Ja y distruste d "unnatural " preoccupation s among Hamiltonians and others with domestic manufactures. Havin g laboriously calculate d populatio n increases , agricultura l production , wage levels , and lan d availabilit y i n Europ e an d Nort h America , h e concluded, wit h man y othe r economists, 58 tha t th e Ne w Worl d en joyed significan t advantage s i n agricultur e tha t laborer s recognize d and woul d pursue . Hence , Jay foresa w severa l generation s o f smal l farmers primaril y in an ever-expanding "Northern Hive" exchangin g foodstuffs an d other staples for capital-intensive European goods. "So great is the extent of country," he expounded, "an d s o inviting to settlers, that labo r wil l very long remain to o dea r t o admi t o f consider able manufactures. " . . . [W]hen the poor . . . gain affluenc e b y tilling the earth , they will refus e the scant y earning s whic h manufacturer s . . . offe r them . [Thus ] export s

"Honour, justice, and Interest" 4

5

from Americ a wil l consis t o f ra w material s whic h othe r nation s wil l [process] a t a cheaper rat e . . . [yielding for] th e American State s . . . actual wealth.59

Put differently, interna l unification combine d with "natural " agrar ianism promise d reconciliatio n wit h Britai n an d prosperit y i n th e place o f cripplin g indebtedness. 60 Jay' s correspondent s i n th e Ol d Country frequentl y empathized . Lansdown e though t tha t hi s coun trymen shoul d b e "deepl y interested " i n America' s "prosperit y an d reputation"; an d Ja y heape d prais e upo n thes e "larg e an d libera l views" that applie d t o the "futur e a s well as the present . . . interests of the nation." 61 Significantly, Jay also contemplated a universal "fel low citizenship " fo r republican s an d European s alike , in the proces s elevating economi c communit y ove r it s politica l counterpart . Ho w greatly woul d i t "redoun d t o th e happines s a s well a s honou r o f al l civilized people," he suggested, "wer e they to consider and treat each other like fellow-citizens; each nation governing itself as it pleases, but each admittin g other s t o a perfec t freedo m o f commerce. " Towar d that end , he cautioned Jefferson agains t perpetuatin g "ancien t preju dice" i n agreement s wit h France—th e "fencing " an d "guarding " s o characteristic o f mercantilism—hoping instea d tha t "al l the commer cial privileges" of Frenchmen might b e exchanged fo r thei r America n equivalents. Fro m th e vantag e poin t o f illegitimat e revolutionaries , these wer e useful , cann y suggestions . Bu t the y als o betraye d Jay' s dogged internationalism—a fram e o f reference no t share d entirel y by proponents o f a self-regenerating Fortres s America. 62 The Supreme Court as Diplomatic and Moral Umpire While awaiting Jefferson's retur n fro m Franc e in 1789 , Jay served simultaneously a s secretar y o f stat e an d chie f justic e o f th e Unite d States. This professiona l dualis m wa s bot h circumstantia l an d char acteristic, for Jay the jurist was primarily an d inseparabl y a diploma tist. Historians o f the Jay Cour t ofte n decr y these bifurcated interest s and credentials , bu t Washingto n foun d the m uniquel y compatibl e with American need s an d prioritie s i n 1789. 63 Fro m Jay' s poin t o f view, the ne w Suprem e Cour t seeme d a peculiarly invitin g foru m fo r the cultivatio n o f domesti c unity , equitabl e trad e relations , an d a

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working alliance between executives and judges. The chief justice's experience an d prejudice s ha d convince d hi m tha t "nation s an d Indi viduals injur e thei r essentia l Interest s i n proportio n a s the y deviat e from order. " H e therefor e eagerl y pursued "for m . . . strength orde r and harmony " (i n 1793 , he called i t "nationa l Regularity" ) throug h rigorous exercise of the Court's relatively uncontested original and exclusive jurisdictions. Few strategies hel d a s much promis e fo r th e realization o f a "due Distribution o f Justice." 64 Before 1789 , Jay had argue d repeatedl y tha t a "du e Distribution " required cooperation between executives and jurists, whether through a council o f revision, as in New York, 65 or , to borro w Georg e Washington's term, through the well-orchestrated "Interpretatio n an d Execution" o f federal laws . Consultation surel y strengthened th e author ity of a few good men against throngs of legislators, and coordinatio n in advanc e o f publi c actio n prevente d potentiall y damagin g impres sions o f indecisio n o r disagreemen t i n hig h places . Bu t enlightene d statesmanship fo r Jay als o implied a certain freedo m fro m structura l constraints. Th e end s o f governance , afte r all , transcende d momen tary politica l assignment ; institutiona l attachment s wer e vehicle s toward those ends, not objects in themselves as legislators might have it. The autonom y o f gentlemen-lawyer s an d executiv e agent s therefor e was essential, and their curtailment o r confinement treacherous. 66 For thes e reasons , Jay freel y provide d informa l advic e t o kindre d spirits throughout hi s federal judicia l caree r whil e staunchl y denyin g a formal advisory role for the Court itself. He also abruptly and freel y abandoned th e bench when he perceived that national "objects " were best pursue d elsewhere . Jay's advisor y offering s range d broadly , re flecting hi s eclectic expertise. In 178 9 an d 1790 , for instance , Washington asked for assessment s of the "rea l situation" in foreign affairs , the state of the judiciary, and general matters. Hamilton similarl y requested an d receive d advic e o n numerou s subjects : congressiona l powers in Indian relations, trading rights, fortress an d post-road construction, currenc y regulation , th e legalit y o f loca l commercia l laws , and the propriety of an executive proclamation durin g Pennsylvania's Whiskey Rebellion. On the other hand, Jay steadfastly refused t o bulldoze formal boundarie s betwee n federal departments : in a 1792 New York circuit court hearing on a writ of mandamus in Hay burn's Case, to give the best-know n example , he defended th e separation o f pow ers by refusing t o allo w federal court s to pass judgment, a s an ac t of

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7

Congress seemed to require, on claims of invalid pensioners; the decision (reinforce d i n 1794 , to give one example amon g several , by suggestive language in Glass v. The Sloop Betsy) ease d the way for later , strident attempt s t o claim a n implie d powe r t o evaluat e act s of Con gress for constitutionality. 67 Jay's decisio n t o accep t a specia l diplomati c assignmen t i n 179 4 capped severa l year s o f increasin g frustration . Th e "essentia l inter ests" o f th e Unite d States , a s Ja y define d the m i n 1793 , coincide d neatly with two aspects of federal law : the Constitution, case law, and acts of Congres s that shape d "th e Conduc t o f the Citizen s relative t o our ow n natio n & people, " an d th e law of nation s treating behavio r "relative to foreign Nations & their Subjects." 68 Indeed, without law's presence, Jay could no t have supported fre e trade . At every juncture, legal principle ordere d an d moralize d a n otherwis e anarchi c market place. The chief justice fixed his fondest hope s upon this convergenc e of objec t an d federa l jurisdiction . A t lon g last , statesme n possesse d formidable tools toward unification an d prosperity—even without the more elusive , politicall y explosiv e implie d revie w powers . Leader s could establis h thi s ne w machiner y wit h dispatc h an d mov e fro m strength thereafter ; i n Jay's words , "Orde r usuall y succeed s Confu sion" within adequat e structures. 69 Or s o h e hoped . Ja y cautione d Hamilto n agains t excessiv e forc e during the debt-assumption controversy : the less panic and noise, the better. Victory over unruly republicans demanded stealthy "exertion" ; neither violenc e nor passiv e "reflection " woul d do . The federal plan , after all , mirrored th e "desig n o f Providence" ; political heres y coul d be defeate d legall y an d elegantl y b y simpl y enforcin g ne w rule s an d shoring u p conteste d o r poorl y articulate d jurisdictions , includin g a federal commo n law of crime. 70 While riding circuit, Jay doggedly instructed untutore d juryme n i n the rudiments o f citizenship an d effec tive government. An d he was heartened b y early acquiescence to fed eral judicia l authorit y i n Rhod e Island , Ne w York , an d elsewher e i n scattered bu t politicall y charge d dispute s involvin g th e Pari s treat y and admiralt y jurisdiction. 71 A direct statement abou t the subordination o f states to the nation , however, awaite d th e Ja y Court' s confrontatio n wit h Georgi a afte r 1792 in the fateful Chisholm v . Georgia. The circumstances underly ing the debacl e ar e well known: Chisholm , a Carolinia n an d th e ex ecutor o f one Farquhar, sough t stat e performance o f a Revolutionar y

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War contract through the Court's original diversity jurisdiction—tha t is, the jurisdictio n grante d federa l court s wheneve r noncitizen s sue d states. An d Georgi a returne d th e summons , claimin g sovereig n im munity from federa l process . Unfortunately, th e concept o f state suability in federal courts was no less controversial in 1792-1793 than it had bee n befor e passag e o f the 178 9 Judiciary Act. 72 O n it s face, th e situation plainl y addresse d whethe r Jay' s "firs t wish " migh t b e achieved throug h federa l law : if "nationa l Regularity " resulte d fro m "Attention an d Obedienc e t o thos e Rule s an d principle s o f Conduc t which Reason indicates and which Morality an d Wisdom prescribe, " then Georgia' s refusa l t o appea r subverte d Jay' s pla n fo r unificatio n spearheaded b y federal executive s and judges. 73 Jay's associate s behave d predictably . Al l except James Iredel l con firmed Georgia's subordination t o the nation, declaring the venerable doctrine o f sovereig n immunit y inappropriat e i n a republic . Wit h James Wilson, Attorney Genera l Edmun d Randolp h articulate d a vision of the states as administrative fictions that coincided almos t per fectly with Jay's sentiments. In a curiously wistful, nonlegalisti c opin ion, th e chie f justic e ha d onl y t o agree . Sai d Randolph , th e Unite d States was no longer a "Government o f supplication"; an d the states, given increase d nationa l "energy, " wer e merel y "assemblage s o f . . . individuals" liabl e t o proces s an d t o "diminution s o f sovereignty , a t least equal to the making of them defendants." Woul d not the natio n be useless if a "pleasure to obey or transgress with impunity should be substituted i n the place of . . . laws"?74 But, fo r Jay , Chisholm's significanc e extende d beyon d thes e ques tions. At issue was Georgia's constitutional right to resist federal judicial power in a dispute involving the Paris peace, and thus to invite renewed conflict wit h Britain and fresh castigatio n o f Americans in Europe. As went the sanctity of treaties, Jay feared, so went the republic's reputation. In 1792 , the Cour t als o heard argument s in Brails fordv . Georgia, a sui t i n equity involvin g sequestere d Loyalis t property . Th e amoun t had become the object o f an injunction, and , against the advice of his colleagues, Jay urge d a continuanc e o f th e restrainin g orde r s o tha t Georgia's voluntar y presenc e i n Brailsford migh t b e exploite d i n Chisholm. Bot h Randolp h an d Ja y perceive d connection s betwee n state suability and abrogations o f the Paris peace through permanen t sequestration and renunciation. The attorney general, for instance, re-

'Honour, Justice, and Interest" 4

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ferred suggestivel y i n Chisholm t o th e fearsom e implication s o f im munity fo r publi c safety . "Th e Federa l hea d canno t remai n un moved," h e opined , amidst thes e shock s t o th e publi c harmony . Ar e no t peac e an d concor d among th e state s tw o o f th e grea t end s o f th e Constitution ? T o b e consis tent, [my ] opponent s . . . must say , that a stat e ma y no t b e sue d b y a for eigner.—What? Shal l the tranquility o f our country b e at the mercy of every State? . . . [Why] may no t th e measure b e the same , when th e citizen o f an other Stat e i s the complainant ?

Did not th e immunity doctrin e los e "hal f o f it s force" whe n Georgi a willingly an d crassl y appeare d i n Brailsford —that is , when th e stat e benefited fro m a n appearance? 75 Jay's opinion leaves little doubt that, in his estimation, the Georgi a cases wen t beyon d garden-variet y disagreement s abou t federa l an d state power , ultimatel y reachin g bot h o f hi s "objects. " Befor e 1789 , he recalled, th e confederate d state s becam e "amenabl e t o th e la w of nations," and it was "their interest as well as their duty" to be so constrained. Amazingly , American s stil l resiste d th e mora l an d politica l imperatives o f nationhood—notably, thei r collectiv e responsibility t o harmonize an d elevat e the "conduc t o f each state, relative to the la w of nations, and the performance o f treaties." Rather against hope, Jay wished tha t th e "Stat e o f Societ y wer e s o far improved , an d th e Science of Government [s o perfected] tha t the whole nation could in the peaceable cours e o f law , b e compelle d t o d o justice. " But , i n 1793 , such improvement seeme d increasingly remote. Jay could onl y repea t that obedience , uniformity, an d scrupulosit y were fundamental t o republican survival—tha t the y were "wise . . . honest [and ] useful." 76 The outcry after Chisholm an d the related march toward constitu tional limitatio n completel y shattere d Jay' s ever-diminishin g fait h i n the high court's political and diplomatic utility. In December 1792 , the Georgia assembl y ha d resolve d no t t o b e boun d b y a n unfavorabl e court ruling; when the decision came down, a grand jury formally presented a grievance to Governo r Telfair , wh o i n turn urge d passage of a statute (adopte d two weeks later) affirming th e state's sovereign immunity. O n Marc h 18 , Massachusett s lawmaker s i n specia l sessio n commenced a drive to secur e congressiona l adoptio n o f wha t woul d become th e Elevent h Amendment , makin g i t impossibl e fo r federa l marshals an d judge s t o summo n state s a s defendants . Virgini a con -

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demned Ja y fo r attackin g stat e sovereignty ; Georgian s toye d wit h hanging federal officers , shoul d they again try to force a state appear ance. State concerns were not groundless. If allowed t o stand, Chisholm probably rendered depleted state treasuries vulnerable to the claims of war suppliers and Loyalist "traitors"; it was plain, too, that Jay hoped to forc e severa l state s t o ea t humbl e pie . O n Februar y 20 , 1793 , process had been returned an d the state ordered to appear a t the next term in Oswald v . New York. At virtually the same moment, the high court awarde d a subpoena i n Grayson et al. v. Virginia; five months later, when federal judges granted William Vassal (a Loyalist victim of the Massachusett s confiscatio n statute ) a subpoena , Governo r Han cock delivere d a speech warning hi s countrymen o f the perils of run away judicial federalism . Hence, the flood of anti-Cour t sentimen t leadin g to constitutiona l amendment. Jay had little trouble finding the door: with his Court ef fectively close d afte r 179 3 t o th e resolutio n o f Europea n financial claims, he quickly transferred hi s efforts int o personal diplomacy an d eventually int o support fo r a mixed internationa l commission . In the year o f his exit, the chief justic e had bee n able in The Sloop Betsy t o decry France' s us e o f it s America n consu l a s a priz e agent , thereb y shoring up the precarious United State s claim o f sovereignty , and hi s dissent o n circui t i n Ware v. Hylton (wel l befor e th e 179 6 Suprem e Court rulin g o n th e case ) anticipate d th e Ellswort h Court' s affirma tion o f the republic's obligatio n t o abide b y the terms of treaties. But such opportunities were few and, in the wake of Chisholm, th e political lesson was painfully clear : "objects o f state" were not yet "far be yond the reach" o f licentious men. Jay's resignation thu s symbolized kee n disappointment , and , fro m the poin t o f vie w o f hi s colleague s maroone d o n a sinkin g federa l bench, th e situatio n coul d onl y ge t worse . O n Februar y 14 , 1798 , when the Eleventh Amendment took effect , th e Supreme Court clerk , David Caldwell , sprea d ove r the minute boo k a pathetic lis t of case s (including, perhaps ironically, the nettlesome Brailsford) dismissed o r discontinued fo r wan t o f jurisdiction. 77 Ha d th e benc h bee n "o n it s proper footing," Jay later explained, "ther e is no public Station that I should prefer.... I t accords with my Turn of mind, my Education an d my Habits." Give n Jay's priorities, however, th e hig h cour t wa s useless, especially when confronte d wit h multipl e o r contrar y vision s of

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what the polity ough t to look like—a n eventualit y fo r whic h Jay, unlike the author o f Federalist No. 10, made inadequate provision. 78 Plainly, Jay's "tur n o f mind" di d not lie with the relatively tedious, incremental creatio n o f a traditio n i n domesti c law , wit h politica l process, o r wit h th e constructio n o f judicia l stat e papers ; indeed , h e may wel l hav e assumed tha t a Cour t operatin g unde r rule s largel y borrowed fro m King' s Benc h shoul d issu e English-style , nonexposi tory opinions . Whatever th e case might hav e been , Jay's min d gravi tated towar d "systems " an d far-reachin g "objects, " no t t o th e rela tively staid , circumscribe d worl d o f lega l researc h an d writing . Ar guably, he also had develope d a taste for th e spotlight, which federa l courts rarely attracted. For these and other reasons, he finally branded the federal judiciar y a "defective" departmen t without sufficien t "en ergy, weight an d dignity " t o provide that "du e support " upo n whic h the republic's future seeme d to depend. 79 After 1794 , Jay resolved ane w "t o see things as . . . they are, to estimate them aright, an d t o ac t accordingly"—a reassertio n o f "Forti tude founde d o n Resignation. " H e the n presse d hi s positio n o n th e debt questio n relentlessl y throug h diplomacy . Apparently neithe r Jay nor Washington perceive d conflic t betwee n servic e as a "privat e gen tleman" o n diplomatic assignmen t an d a s chief justice: the envoyshi p to Jay was simpl y a necessary, if personally inconvenient , exercis e of duty an d expertise . Th e presiden t grante d hi s envo y virtuall y a fre e hand wit h unpai d debts . Jay, he recalled , ha d bee n "personall y con versant" wit h negotiator s i n Paris, served a s foreign affair s secretary , and witnesse d "wha t ha s passe d i n ou r [federal ] courts " respectin g confiscated property . Few men could claim so much. 80 And fewe r stil l wer e s o determined . England , Jay warned , woul d surely "insis t tha t Britis h debts , s o fa r a s injure d b y lawfu l impedi ments, should b e repaired by the United States, by decision of mutua l commissioners." H e expecte d disapprobation , withou t whic h h e would have been "agreeabl y disappointed" ; h e also hoped to ease his conscience. "Shoul d th e treat y prov e . . . beneficial," h e announced , "justice will finally be done. If not, be it so—my mind is at ease." In a revealing letter , Ja y (wh o ha d bee n nominate d i n absenti a b y Ne w York Federalists to run fo r governor ) tol d Randolph tha t the debt-related Sixt h Articl e addresse d "tha t justic e an d equit y whic h judicia l proceedings may, on trial, be found incapabl e of affording," fo r a neutral commission coul d d o "exactl y what i s right." Anxiet y an d ange r

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shared th e stag e wit h Jay' s conscience : a s th e contes t ove r th e Ja y Treaty rage d i n Congress , an d o n th e ev e of hi s electio n t o th e Ne w York governorship , h e marvele d a t th e insatiabl e appetite s o f scoundrels i n legislativ e chambers , worryin g alou d i n a lette r t o hi s old frien d Washingto n tha t rejectio n o f th e treat y woul d agai n "pu t the Unite d State s i n th e wrong, " damagin g "honour , engagements , and importan t interests"—amon g them , th e "further extension o f commerce."81 The Judge as Arbiter of "The Common Good" How should scholars characterize Jay's republican politics and statesmanship? First , th e nation' s first chie f justic e wa s no t reactionary , crassly self-interested, o r politically liberal in any modern sense. John Jay despised pluralism. He was neither fluent i n nor comfortable wit h the language of "rights." With Joseph Story and other conservative legalists, he emphasized duties and obligations; but, more clearly in Jay than i n others , the la w o f contrac t i n it s severa l manifestation s (pri vate, constitutional, an d international ) organize d hi s legal and political consciousness, sometimes t o th e exclusion o f al l else. In 1793 , to give one example, he told Chesapeak e freeholder s that , whil e republicans were "governe d onl y b y Laws . . . o f ou r ow n making, " thos e laws represente d "Rule s fo r regulatin g th e Conduc t o f Individuals , and ar e establishe d accordin g to , &C i n pursuanc e o f tha t Contract , which eac h Citize n ha s made wit h th e Rest , and al l with each . He is not a good Citizen," said Jay emphatically, "who violates his Contract with Society ; and whe n Societ y execut e thei r laws , they d o n o mor e than wha t i s necessary to constrain Individual s to perform tha t Con tract, o n th e du e operatio n an d observanc e o f whic h [t]h e commo n Good &C welfare o f the Community depends." Toward what ends did this contract—th e embodimen t o f th e ol d Englis h righ t t o law—as pire? Its "object," sai d Jay, was to "secur e to every man what belong s to hi m a s a membe r o f th e nation , an d b y increasing th e commo n Stock o f Prosperity, to augmen t th e Value of his Share in it. Most essentially therefor e i s it the Dut y an d Interes t o f u s all, that th e Law s be observed an d irresistably executed." 82 For Jay, then , th e rul e o f la w wa s a "Fence " between civilizatio n and barbarism, a mighty engine capable of instilling a divine spark in

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ordinary men, a guarantor o f liberty as entrepreneurs scramble d afte r wealth, an d th e scaffoldin g aroun d whic h American s woul d erec t a national reputatio n an d lastin g prosperity . Ja y di d no t devolv e sud denly int o politica l cynicis m i n th e mid-1780s , a s di d a goo d man y other Federalists . Instead , h e wa s consistentl y "stif f i n hi s self-right eousness,"83 disdainfu l o f wha t Ralp h Lerne r ha s calle d "th e New Model Man," 84 an d suspiciou s o f republica n enchantment s wit h mediocrity, majoritarianism , an d publicity . A consummate diploma tist, Ja y neglecte d hi s ow n ar t wit h legislator s an d adversaries . H e feared unrul y commoner s an d nervousl y charte d th e cours e o f Ja cobinism i n Europe , assiduousl y guardin g th e prerogative s o f th e "best Men " wh o alon e could rescu e America fro m it s "presen t Con dition." And Jay no doubt lacked a fluid political imagination; amidst a revolution jerry-built from bit s and pieces of British legalism, Lockean liberalism , Whi g oppositionism , an d post-Grea t Awakenin g Protestantism, h e move d primaril y fro m ancien t history , politica l economy, the law of nations, and scripture—choices that betray a certain remoteness from th e society at hand. 85 Jay's grim view of human natur e underla y al l that h e believed an d became: for mos t o f his life, he rejected th e presumption o f goodnes s (or at least human perfectibility ) fro m whic h political liberalism pro ceeds. Lindley Murray said of the young Jay that he had bee n notable for "stron g reasoning powers, comprehensive views, indefatigable ap plication, an d uncommo n firmness o f mind" ; nowher e di d Murra y note Jay's optimism , empathy , o r grea t goo d humor . I n midlife , an d partly i n response t o th e trauma o f revolution , Jay's intellectua l pro clivities crystallized into a sophisticated but rigidly legalistic variant of republicanism roote d firmly i n existentia l despai r an d staunchl y op posed t o the twin doctrine s o f perfectibility an d voluntarism . Fe w of the Founder s preferre d greate r distanc e fro m th e "Public, " devalue d the general will so completely, and stressed the perils of lawlessness so constantly. In the end, Jay even distrusted himself, handing over prosperity, his ultimate object , t o Go d an d internationa l law—th e closes t approximation o f godl y wisdo m availabl e t o humankind—fo r safe keeping. "[W]ho made the Laws of Nations?" he asked rhetorically in the year of the Georgia cases. "The answer is he from whos e will proceed al l mora l Obligations , an d whic h will i s made know n t o u s b y Reason o r Revelation." A t home, unification behin d a supreme man made la w migh t suffice , but , i n dealing s wit h Europeans , wher e

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traders an d politian s migh t succum b t o temptatio n o r wher e publi c displays of dirty laundry might lead to war, there would be "no Judge but the great Judge of all." 86 In eighteenth-centur y understandings , thes e wer e eminentl y con servative ideas , bu t the y wer e no t precisel y reactionary . Whil e Ja y preferred Cour t t o countr y politics , hi s "system " fel l easil y withi n the broa d spectru m o f Revolutionar y discourse . Unlik e Ol d Guar d curmudgeons, Ja y foun d republica n form s plausible , i f regrettabl y optimistic an d poorl y implemented . And , unlik e Hamilton , Ja y ful somely embrace d importan t element s o f economi c liberalism , cham pioning fre e trad e an d agrarianis m a s avenue s t o nationa l standin g and wealth . B y 1776 , h e ha d embrace d th e necessit y o f indepen dence—grudgingly, t o b e sure , an d n o doub t a s muc h t o conserv e wealth a s to advanc e republica n liberty , bu t nonetheles s irrevocably . Thereafter, b y articulatin g contrar y "objects, " tactics , an d institu tional arrangement s amon g peer s fa r mor e responsiv e i n 178 7 tha n earlier, Ja y becam e a constructiv e participan t i n revolutionar y change an d th e embodimen t o f th e marriage—apparen t i n a goo d many Founders—betwee n free-tradin g liberalis m an d politica l cor poratism, th e whole mad e saf e fo r waywar d republican s wit h lavis h doses o f law . Jay's emphasis upo n globa l commerc e an d "independenc e fo r friendship" a s a mai n objec t o f domesti c unificatio n differe d appre ciably fro m Marshall' s priorities ; t o a grea t extent , th e federa l judi ciary rose to power after 180 0 by turning inward, away from Europ e and the law of nations toward the American hinterland an d bodies of domestic law . Jay propose d a "comprehensive" 87 rathe r tha n intro spective syste m o f politic s an d law—a n organi c whol e conspirin g slowly an d fitfull y unde r la w towar d a collective , ultimatel y globa l state of grace. Jay hoped, too, that thi s homogenizing proces s woul d be supervised b y wise, wellborn statesmen . To both domesti c and in ternational spheres , h e assigne d separat e allegiance s an d "objects. " But these memberships an d goal s were unequally weighted an d intri cately joined: at every turn, domestic political economy supporte d it s more importan t internationa l counterpart . Th e shee r delicac y o f thi s balancing act generated considerabl e apprehensio n i n Jay: "I t canno t be too strongly impressed on the Minds of us all," he tautly instructe d several gran d jurie s i n 1790 , "ho w greatly ou r individua l Prosperit y depends o n ou r nationa l Prosperity ; an d ho w greatl y ou r nationa l

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Prosperity depend s on a well organized vigorou s Government , rulin g by wise and equal Laws, faithfully executed." 88 The particular urgencie s underlyin g these remarks ha d diminishe d appreciably b y 1801 , but, i n 1789 , n o agend a seeme d t o touc h th e public good more directly. Jay's plan therefore represente d mor e tha n the selfish agitations of an Empire State capitalist. To ignore economic and strategi c weaknesses , Jay thought , wa s t o invit e Jacob's ba d us e of Esau' s weakene d condition, 89 fo r brav e assertion s abou t a repub lic's inevitable prosperit y straine d har d agains t histor y an d agains t a very thorny reality. To Jay's mind, an omnipresent la w ensured mora l judgment and moral action among republicans predisposed as a group to selfishness, licentiousness , and evil : when Alexander Hamilto n ad vocated manipulatio n o f electio n return s i n 180 0 t o defea t Thoma s Jefferson, Ja y quietly wrote off bot h Hamilton an d Federalism. Better to sacrifice part y an d individuals than to leave high moral ground. 90 To modern eyes , Jay's value s ca n see m outmode d an d reprehensi ble. Thes e reactions , however , ofte n reflec t impatienc e wit h faile d imagination—to mak e matter s worse , o n th e losin g sid e o f history . Scholars kno w ho w th e stor y cam e out , an d s o tend t o demonstrat e "the inevitability of the evolution they describe."91 Federalists like Jay and Marshall indeed shared a uniform vocabular y of legalism and nationalism. Bu t th e meanings , shadings , an d prioritie s conveye d through languag e necessaril y varied accordin g to the speaker an d hi s context. Jay clearl y infuse d suc h term s a s "nation " o r "federa l law " with meaning s tha t reflecte d hi s ow n intellect , experience , an d read ing of republican circumstance . As Morris onc e noted , a campaign t o secur e controversia l revie w powers in the 1790s would have been foolhardy; on circuit, moreover, Jay's colleagues quietl y an d steadil y hammere d awa y a t th e possibil ity, carrying the idea of judicial purview over congressional acts as far as political opponent s allowe d i t to b e carried. 92 Fo r the Cour t itself , Jay mostly had in mind other objectives. More pressing by far was national establishmen t withi n reliable , respected structures—labor s fo r which Jay's "turn of mind," broa d interests, and nonspecialized state craft wer e especially well adapted. I n the absence of a guiding "Ligh t of Experience, " Jay's colleague s hammere d ou t rule s an d procedure s appropriate t o a n unrealize d appellat e practice— a thankles s tas k i f ever ther e wa s one . Simultaneously , th e chie f justic e trie d t o solidif y an allianc e wit h th e executiv e branch , fearin g wit h Hamilto n tha t a

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bench wit h "neithe r Forc e no r Will , bu t merel y judgment " woul d soon collapse. 93 He als o explore d th e Court' s potentia l a s a n agenc y of "honour , justice , an d interest " agains t incipien t evil . Laboring t o sensitize republicans to the perils of their chosen form o f government , he concluded by 1794 that citizens still refused a very difficult bu t critical discipline, and that he could not secure a permanent state of grace for hi s countrymen throug h federa l courts . Privately, h e awaite d th e millennium; a s a statesman , h e pursue d "grea t an d obviou s princi ples" elsewhere. Arguably, thes e idea s constitute a n alternativ e conceptio n o f idea l relations between polity , economy , an d la w rathe r tha n a prelude t o modernism. Scholar s ma y rightl y decid e tha t Ja y lacke d geniu s an d political generosity, that he was a poor excus e for a n appellate judge, and tha t hi s "system " wa s to o fragil e an d to o tightl y boun d t o con text to wear well. But similar complaints hav e not prevented engage ment with the likes of Roger Taney or Chancello r James Kent, whose ambiguities an d illiberalis m hav e bee n absorbed , i f no t entirel y for given. And, i n the decad e afte r ratification , Jay' s professional style — so much a part o f an oracular tradition i n judgeship 94—was commo n enough. More important , an d scholarl y approva l aside , meaningfu l com parisons wit h late r practic e depen d upo n a n initia l gran t o f serious ness. The desir e to provid e consisten t standard s throug h la w agains t which republicans might measure moral progress, for example, or the idea tha t politica l wor k transcend s constituencie s an d institutions , both giv e pause. At the least , John Jay's vision increase s the distanc e between 178 9 and 1801 , clarifying an d complicating our understand ing o f ho w th e thir d branc h cam e t o occup y moder n ground . Eve n Jay's champion , Richar d Morris , sa w clearl y tha t Jay wa s a produc t (as are we all) of his historical moment; he only failed t o see that, in a cultural an d perhap s social-psychologica l sense , Marshall' s momen t was ligh t year s remove d fro m th e terror s an d thrill s o f 1789 . Sai d Morris in 1967, John Jay's "tireles s effort t o endow the national government wit h energy , capacity , an d scop e . . . attes t t o hi s vision , courage, an d tenacity . I t remaine d fo r other s t o spel l ou t th e safe guards fo r individua l libertie s an d th e limitatio n o n nationa l powe r . . . essential to the maintenance o f a democratic society." 95

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1. Quote d i n Gordon Wood , The Creation of the American Republic (Chape l Hill 1969) , 420. 2. Davi d Hacket t Fischer , The Revolution of American Conservatism (Ne w York 1965) , 7-10 , esp . 8 . See also Georg e Vellew, John Jay (Bosto n 1890) ; Mer rill Jensen , The New Nation (Ne w Yor k 1950) , 13-14 , 365-366 , an d passim ; Frank Monaghan , John Jay, Defender of Liberty (Ne w Yor k an d Indianapoli s 1935); Gottfried Dietze , The Federalist (Baltimor e 1960) , 105-111; Jack Rakove , The Beginnings of National Politics (Baltimor e 1979) , 53-56 ; th e biographica l sketch i n Donal d L . Smith , John Jay: Founder of a State and Nation (Ne w Yor k 1968); Herber t Johnson , John Jay, 1745-1829 (Albany , N.Y . 1970) , an d "Joh n Jay: Lawye r i n a Tim e o f Transition , 1764-1775, " University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 12 4 (Ma y 1976) , 1260-1292 . Se e als o th e biographica l detai l i n commentaries o f William Jay i n The Life of John Jay: Selections from His Correspondence and Miscellaneous Papers ( 2 vols., New York 1833) , esp. Vol. 1,1-68, a collectio n tha t Willia m overzealousl y edite d t o protec t hi s father' s reputation , and i n Richar d B . Morris's introductio n t o John Jay, The Making of a Revolutionary: Unpublished Papers, 1745-1780 ( 2 vols., New Yor k 1975) , Vol. I, 1-26 , cited hereafte r a s Morris , Unpublished Papers. Amon g Morris' s interpretiv e works art John Jay, the Nation, and the Court (Bosto n 1967) ; The Peacemakers (New York 1965) ; Seven Who Shaped Our Destiny (Ne w York 1973) , ch. 5; "Th e John Ja y Court : A n Intimat e Profile, " Journal of Contemporary Law, 5 (Sprin g 1979), 163-179 ; "Th e America n Revolutio n Come s t o John Jay," i n Jacob Jud d and Irwi n Polishook , eds. , Aspects of Early New York Society and Politics (Tar rytown, N.Y . 1974) , 96-117 ; an d th e mor e recen t (an d slightl y les s positive) ac count, "Joh n Jay : Aristocra t a s Nationalist, " i n Morris , Witnesses at the Creation: Hamilton, Madison, Jay, and the Constitution (Ne w Yor k 1985) . Milto n Klein accuratel y summarize d scholarl y attitude s i n his review o f Morris' s editio n of Jay's papers, American Journal of Legal History, 2 1 (Oct . 1977) , 365-369. See also Morris' s Forging of the Union, 1781-1789 (Ne w Yor k 1987) , i n whic h h e weaves Joh n Ja y a s a diplomatis t an d statesma n int o th e fabri c o f th e framin g decade far more persuasively than in earlier, somewhat straine d accounts. See also Sandra VanBurkleo , "Joh n Jay," i n Melvin Urofsky , ed. , Supreme Court Justices: A Biographical Dictionary (Westport , Conn . 1995) , 263-269 . 3. O n th e powe r t o revie w act s o f Congress , se e Mar buryv . Madison, 1 Cranch 13 7 (1803) . See also Robert Lowr y Clinton , Mar bury v. Madison and Judicial Review (Lawrence , Kans . 1989) , an d Sylvi a Snowiss , Judicial Review and the Law of the Constitution (Ne w Have n 1990) . 4. Fo r negative , positive , an d compromis e positions , se e Samuel Bemis , Jay's Treaty: A Study in Commerce and Diplomacy (Ne w Yor k 1923) ; Morris, Peacemakers-, an d Jeral d Combs , The Jay Treaty (Berkele y 1970) . Alexande r De -

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Conde's Entangling Alliances (Durham , N.C . 1958 ) supplie s additiona l detai l about Jay's diplomatic career . 5. Ja y t o Judge Lowell , Feb. 29, 1796 , in Henry P . Johnston, ed. , The Correspondence and Public Papers of John Jay ( 4 vols., New York 1891) , IV, 204-205. Hereafter cite d a s Johnston, Jay Papers. Th e expectatio n o f moder n attitude s to ward separatio n o f power s an d professiona l specializatio n lead s Morris t o argu e that Jay's failure t o resign was a well-intended "lapse " that provided a dangerou s precedent fo r "overstepping " separatio n o f powers ; John Jay, 92-93 . Morris' s edition o f unpublishe d papers , unlik e Johnston's ol d edition , preserve s th e origi nal spelling , punctuation , an d capitalization , bu t i t doe s no t includ e al l o f Jay' s writings. Few attempts hav e bee n made her e to reconcile differin g editoria l prac tices. Wher e possible , I rel y o n th e transcription s i n Maev a Marcu s e t al. , eds. , Documentary History of the United States Supreme Court, 1789-1800 ( 5 vols, to date, New Yor k 1985-) . Cite d hereafte r a s Marcus, Documentary History. 6. Rober t McCloskey , The American Supreme Court (Chicag o 1960) , 30 ; Charles Grov e Haines, The Role of the Supreme Court in American Government and Politics, 1789-1835 (Ne w York 1960) , 124; Alfred Kelly , Winfred Harbison , and Herma n Belz , The American Constitution (6t h ed. , Ne w Yor k 1983) , 164-167; and Morris , John Jay, 69 . See also Morris, "Intimat e Profile, " wherei n Jay is portrayed a s a typical "nationalis t chie f justice " who sough t review power s without adequate support. He also links Jay's views on judicial autonomy to Mar shall's, primaril y becaus e o f Jay's resistanc e t o forma l advic e i n Hay burn's Case and Sloop Betsy, 2 Dallas 409 (1792) , Jay an d Associat e Justices to Washington , July 20,1793, in Johnston, Jay Papers, III, 486-489. On formal parallel s betwee n Jay and Marshall i n the use of syllogism or nationalist language , see Morris, John Jay, 56-60 , 70,102, or G . Edward White, The American Judicial Tradition (Ne w York 1976) , 25, 27-30. 7. Georg e Washingto n t o Jay , Oct . 5 , 1789 , i n Johnston , Jay Papers, III , a t 378. 8. Charg e to the Grand Jury of the Circuit Court for the District of New York , April 12 , 1790 , i n Marcus , Documentary History, II , 27 . O n th e Elevent h Amendment, se e Willia m Guthrie , "Th e Elevent h Articl e o f Amendmen t t o th e Constitution o f th e Unite d States, " Columbia Law Review, 8 (Mar . 1908) , 183-207, whic h shoul d b e rea d alongsid e Clyd e Jacobs' s mor e sensitiv e The Eleventh Amendment and Sovereign Immunity (Westport , Conn . 1972) , an d compared wit h Julius Goebel, History of the Supreme Court of the United States: Antecedents and Beginnings to 1801 (Ne w Yor k 1971) , esp . 736-741 , whic h i s hostile t o Jay . Se e als o Jacobs , "Prelud e t o Amendment : Th e State s Befor e th e Court," American Journal of Legal History, 1 2 (Jan . 1968) , 19-40 , an d Loui s Jaffe, "Suit s Agains t Government s an d Officers : Sovereig n Immunity, " Harvard Law Review, 7 7 (Nov . 1963) , 1-39 . 9. Goebel , History of the Supreme Court, 552 an d 729-733 , also credits Ja y

Honour, Justice, and Interest" 59 with initiatin g th e "lamentabl e standard s o f America n judicia l historiography. " On Jay' s Federalist contribution s an d th e acknowledgmen t amon g contempo raries o f diplomati c expertise , se e Douglas s Adair , "Th e Authorshi p o f th e Dis puted Federalis t Papers, " William and Mary Quarterly, 1 (Jan . 1944) , 97-122 , (Apr. 1944) , 235-264, esp . 246. For Washington's acknowledgment , se e Instructions a s Envoy Extraordinary , 1794 , in Johnston, ed. , Jay Papers, IV , 14. 10. Morris , John Jay, 100 . 11. I attribut e Jay' s unremittin g anxiet y abou t th e characte r o f "th e peopl e out o f doors " a s muc h t o Calvinis m a s t o class ; other s disagree , thoug h n o on e (me included) ha s pursued thi s questio n rigorously . 12. Gordo n Wood , The Radicalism of the American Revolution (Ne w Yor k 1992), 271 . Interestingly, Woo d seem s t o attribut e th e ol d gentry' s decline—a t least i n the North—to capitalis t expansio n an d (possibly ) t o th e triumph o f mid dling over monied classes: "With the weakening and disappearance of older form s of patronage, with the expansion o f commerce an d the fluctuating redistribution s of wealth , wit h th e sprea d o f pape r mone y an d th e widening commercia l oppor tunities fo r plai n an d 'middling ' me n everywhere , th e gentry' s positio n i n north ern societ y becam e mor e an d mor e anachronistic. " Ibid . 13. Bernar d Bailyn , Education in the Forming of American Society (Ne w York 1960) , 14 . Legal scholars too ofte n conside r that the Revolution ende d wit h ratification, whic h help s explain unhistorica l reading s o f judicia l motivation s be fore 1801 . For the periodization o f Revolutionary proces s adopted here , see John Howe, "Republica n Though t an d th e Political Violence of the 1790's, " American Quarterly, 1 9 (Summe r 1967) , 147-165 . 14. Ja y t o John Adams , Jan. 2 , 1801 , in Johnston, ed. , Jay Papers, IV , 285. 15. O n relationship s betwee n Smith' s economi c an d mora l philosophy , se e Donald Winch , Adam Smith's Politics (Cambridge , Eng . 1978) , o r Rober t Nis bet, History of the Idea of Progress (Ne w Yor k 1980) , esp . 187-193 , arguin g that Smith' s precep t o f "natura l liberty " i n th e marketplac e arise s a s easil y fro m "prepolitical socia l bonds " a s fro m a n "invisibl e hand " divorce d fro m th e polity. 16. Federalis t Nos . 2 an d 4 , i n Jacob E . Cooke , ed. , The Federalist (Middle town, Conn . 1961) , 9, 22. Hereafter cite d a s Cooke , Federalist. 17. Ja y t o Washington , Apr . 2 1 , 1779 , i n Morris , Unpublished Papers, I , 586-587. 18. Ja y to Gouverneur Morris , Apr. 29,1778, ibid., 476; Jay to Richard Price , Sept. 27 , 1785 , Jay t o Washington , Jun e 27 , 1786 , i n Johnston, Jay Papers, III , 168-169, 205. Also se e Jay t o R . Lushington , Mar . 15 , 1786 , ibid., 185-186 ; o r Jay to Robert Livingsto n an d Morris , Apr. 29, 1777 , and t o Egbert Benson , Sept . 18,1780, in Morris, Unpublished Papers, 1,401, 823 . Jay's religiosity is never disputed; e.g. , Morris , John Jay, 12 , 86 . 19. Ja y t o Morris , Jul y 2 1 , 1777 , Ja y t o Alexande r McDougall , Dec . 23 ,

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1775, in Morris, Unpublished Papers, I , 423, 213. In addition , se e Jay t o Wash ington, Apr. 22, 1779 , and t o Sara h Jay, June 22 , 1775 , ibid., 586 , 154 . 20. Ja y t o Washington , Sept . 2 1, 1788, in Johnston, Jay Papers, III , 360; Jay to Lindle y Murray , Aug . 22, 1794 , to Willia m Vaughan , Ma y 26 , 1796 , to Ben jamin Rush , Mar . 22 , 1797 , an d t o Judg e Peters , Mar . 14 , 1815 , ibid. , IV , 52 , 215-216, 226 , 387 . Wit h othe r Federalists , Ja y advocate d popula r sovereignt y while distinguishin g betwee n lega l an d socia l equality , an d s o coul d sa y that , while republicans were intractibly unequal in social terms, the "only source of just authority" wa s "the People"; Ja y to Washington, Jan. 7,1787, ibid. , Ill, 229. For "Evils inseparable fro m Humanity, " se e Jay to Sarah Jay, Mar. 25, 1777, in Mor ris, Unpublished Papers, I, 382 . 21. Federalis t No . 2 , i n Cooke , Federalist, 8 ; Edwar d Rutledg e t o Jay , Jun e 29, 1776 , an d Jay' s reply , July 6 , 1776 , i n Morris , Unpublished Papers, I, 281 , 28In, wherei n h e say s Rutledge' s idea s "parallel " hi s own ; Jay t o Judg e Peters , Mar. 14 , 1815 , in Johnston, Jay Papers, IV , 387. On Jacobinism, see , e.g., Jay t o Washington, Marc h 6 , 1795 , ibid., 162-171 . 22. Ja y t o Willia m Vaughan , Ma y 26 , 1796 , an d t o Washington , Feb . 25 , 1795, Johnston, Jay Papers, IV , 216, 161. 23. Ja y t o Washington , Apr . 2 1 , 1779 , an d Rutledg e t o Jay , June 29 , 1776 , in Morris, Unpublished Papers, I , 586, 281; and Jay to Franci s Hopkinson, Mar . 29, 1786 , i n Johnston , Papers, III , 187-188 . I n th e sam e vein , se e Rutledg e t o Jay, Dec . 25 , 1778 , Jay t o Morris , Apr . 29 , 1778 , i n Morris , Unpublished Papers, I , 516, 475; and Jay t o Washington , Jan. 7 , 1787 , i n Johnston, Jay Papers, III, 227 . 24. Ja y to Judge Lowell , Feb. 29, 1796 , to Pete r Van Schaack , July 28, 1812 , and t o Washington, Feb . 25, 1795 , in Johnston, Jay Papers, IV , 204, 361 , 161. 25. Federalis t Nos. 2 and 3 , in Cooke, Federalist, 11-12,15,17 ; Jay to Washington, Sept. 21,1788, in Johnston, Jay Papers, III, 361; Rutledge to Jay, June 29, 1776, Jay t o Phili p Schuyler , Dec . 11 , 1777, an d Ne w Yor k Conventio n t o Joh n Hancock [Jul y 10] , 1776, in Morris, Unpublished Papers, I , 281, 453, 291. 26. Ja y t o Sara h Jay, Mar . 25 , 1777 , i n Morris , Unpublished Papers, I , 382 , and Federalis t No. 2, in Cooke, Federalist, 12 . On "resignation " an d "duty, " se e also Ja y t o Rober t Livingston , Jan . 6 , 1776 , i n Morris , Unpublished Papers, I, 223; Jay t o Sara h Jay, Apr. 15 , 1794 , an d t o Lindle y Murray , Aug . 22 , 1794 , i n Johnston, Jay Papers, IV , 3, 51. 27. Proof s tha t th e Colonie s D o No t Ai m a t Independenc e [afte r Dec . 11 , 1775], and Jay to Alexander McDougall , Oct . 17 , 1775, in Morris, Unpublished Papers, I , 199 , 172 . On "lastin g Union," se e Jay to John Vardill , Sept . 24, 1774 , and Draf t o f th e Oliv e Branc h Petition , June 1775 , ibid., 137 , 152-154 , urgin g unification t o secur e "Harmon y . . . Wealth an d Power. " 28. See , e.g., Federalis t No. 5 , in Cooke , Federalist, 23-24 . 29. Ja y t o Morris , Apr . 29 , 1778 , i n Morris , Unpublished Papers, I ,

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1

475-476. Morri s characterize s Ja y mor e positivel y a s a "pruden t revolution ary"; John]ay, 3 . 30. Se e Wood, Creation, 419-421 , wher e Ne w Yorkers ' criticism s ar e virtu ally equated wit h self-interest . 31. Fo r national "objects, " se e Federalist Nos . 2 an d 3 , in Cooke , Federalist, 12-15. Jay als o associate d unit y wit h safety . 32. Ja y t o Judge Lowell , Ma y 10 , 1785 , and t o Washington , Jun e 27 , 1786 , in Johnston , Jay Papers, III , 143 , 205. Fo r th e Lowel l lette r capitalizations , se e William Jay's commentary i n Letters of John Jay, I , 190 , and Fran k Monaghan' s discussion o f Johnston's version , John Jay, 282 , 454 a t not e 6 . 33. Ja y t o Alexande r McDougall , Apr . 11 , 1776 , t o Jame s Duane , Dec . 14 , 1777, and t o Washington, Apr . 2 1, 1779, in Morris, Unpublished Papers, I , 254, 454, 586. In the last, Jay scratched ou t a phrase suggestin g that th e people lacke d "wisdom." Th e bes t sourc e for detail s about Jay's difficulties wit h Congres s afte r 1783 remains Johnston, Jay Papers, III , 104-378 ; on difficultie s befor e then , se e Morris, Peacemakers, passim . Misgiving s abou t collectiv e decisio n makin g i n maritime or economic affairs emerge d early . See, e.g., Jay to Washington, Apr. 26, 1779, in Morris, Unpublished Papers, I , 587-588 . 34. Ja y to Governo r Livingston , July 19 , 1783, to Thomas Jefferson, Oct . 27, 1786, to Adams , Feb. 2 1, 1787, and t o Jefferson, Nov . 3 , 1787 , in Johnston, Jay Papers, III, 55, 212 , 235, 260. On congressional absenteeism , see Jay to Jefferson , Jan. 9 , 1786 , and t o Jacob Read , Dec . 12 , 1786 , ibid., 178 , 222. 35. Repor t t o Congres s o n a Joint Lette r fro m Adam s an d Jefferson, Ma y 29 , 1786, an d Addres s t o th e Peopl e o f th e Stat e o f Ne w York , Sprin g 1788 , ibid. , 198-199,298-301. 36. Ja y to Washington, June 27 , 1786 , and t o Jefferson, Apr . 24, 1787 , ibid. , 204, 244 . O n rebellio n an d feebl e government , se e Jay t o Adams , Nov . 1 , 1786 , to Willia m Carmichael , Jan. 4 , 1787 , an d t o Jefferson, Feb . 9 , 1787 , ibid. , 214 , 225, 232 . 37. Ja y t o Governo r Livingston , July 19 , 1783 , to Adams , Feb . 2 1, 1787 , t o Washington, Jan . 7 , 1787 , an d t o Willia m Vaughan , Ma y 26 , 1796 , ibid. , Ill , 55, 234 , 227 ; IV , 216 . Als o se e Ja y t o Jefferson , Aug . 18 , 1786 , ibid. , Ill , 210-211. 38. Rutledg e t o Jay, June 29 , Nov. 24, 1776 , in Morris, Unpublished Papers, I, 281, 322; Jay t o Washington, Jan. 7 , 1787 , in Johnston, Jay Papers, III , 227. 39. Here , Jay echoe d othe r Hig h Federalists . See , e.g., Jay t o Jefferson, Aug . 18, 1786 , in Johnston, Jay Papers, III , 210-211, an d Gordo n Wood' s discussio n of competin g conception s o f "worthiness, " constitutiona l decay , an d separatio n of powers, in Creation, 471-518 . But see also Jay's extreme recommendation s t o Washington, Jan. 7,1787, i n Johnston, Jay Papers, III , 227, concerning life tenur e for senator s and annual election for House members, presumably to conserve wisdom an d rou t ou t demagoguery . O n collaboration , advisor y councils , an d th e

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royal prerogative , se e Federalis t No . 4 , i n Cooke , Federalist, 20 ; Address t o th e People of the Stat e of New York , Spring 1788 , and Jay to the Chevalie r d e Bour going, Aug. 29, 1788 , and t o Washington, Jan. 7 , 1787 , in J o h n s t o n , /^ Papers, III, 316, 355-356, 227 . 40. Charg e t o th e Gran d Jur y o f th e Circui t Cour t fo r th e Distric t o f Ne w York, April 12 , 1790 , and Charg e t o th e Gran d Jury o f th e Circui t Cour t fo r th e District o f Virgini a [Richmond] , Ma y 22 , 1793 , i n Marcus , Documentary History, II , 28, 30 , 390 . O n crown-cour t relations , se e J. H . Baker , Introduction to English Legal History (Londo n 1971) , 39-50 , o r S . F . C . Milsom , Historical Foundations of the Common Law (Londo n 1969) , 74-87 . Charle s Warre n tie d Jay's notio n o f cooperatio n t o partisa n politics , The Supreme Court in United States History ( 2 vols. , Bosto n 1926) , I , 85-112 . O n mixe d an d departmenta l government, se e Wood , Creation, 197-256 . Par t o f Jay' s preferenc e fo r Britis h forms spran g from hatre d o f the "forme r arbitrar y government" o f France, which was "dreadful" ; hi s visio n o f vigorou s executiv e an d judicia l powe r include d strict adherenc e amon g statesme n t o th e rul e o f law . Se e Jay t o Rober t Goodlo e Harper, Jan. 19 , 1796 , in Johnston, Jay Papers, IV , 200-201. Se e also Federalis t No. 3 , in Cooke , Federalist, 15 . 41. Wood , Creation, 159 , 472-473 ; Marti n Diamond , "Wha t th e Framer s Meant b y Federalism, " i n Rober t Goldwin , ed. , A Nation Of States (Chicag o 1974), 31-33; and Jay's allusion to Washington, Mar. 16,1786 , Johnston, Jay Papers, III , 186-187 . 42. Ja y t o Washington , Jan. 7 , 1787 , to Adams , Oct . 14 , 1785 , to Jefferson , Dec. 14 , 1786 , to James Lowell , May 10 , 1785 , and t o Adams , May 4 , 1786 , in Johnston, Jay Papers, III , 228, 172 , 224, 143 , 195 ; Federalist No . 3 , in Cooke , Federalist, 15 ; and Jay to Washington, Apr. 21,1779, in Morris, Unpublished Papers, 586 . 43. Federalis t Nos . 2 an d 4 , i n Cooke , Federalist, 13 , 22-23; Charg e t o th e Grand Jury o f th e Circui t Cour t fo r th e Distric t o f New York , April 12 , 1790 , in Marcus, Documentary History, II , as a t 29 . Se e also Jay's Addres s t o th e Peopl e of th e Stat e o f Ne w York , Sprin g 1788 , assertin g tha t disorde r "alienate d th e minds of men everywhere . . . fro m republica n forms" ; Jay to Washington, Jan. 7 , 1787; to Adams, July 4, 1787 , suggesting authority stron g enough t o ensure "na tional security and respectability"; and Report to Congress on a Joint Letter fro m Adams and Jefferson, Ma y 29,1786, regretting that problems of the United State s were "commo n conversatio n i n Europe. " Johnston , Jay Papers, 394 , 313-315 , 319,228,248,198. 44. Morris , Peacemakers, passim . 45. Ja y t o Washington , Jan . 7 , 1787 , i n Johnston, Jay Papers, III , 226-227 ; Federalist No . 6 4 [63] , in Cooke , Federalist, 434 ; Jay speakin g befor e Congress , in Wood, Creation, 96 . 46. Draf t o f John Jay's Charge to the Gran d Jury o f th e Circui t Cour t fo r th e

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3

District o f Virginia [befor e Apri l 22,1793], in Marcus, Documentary History', II , 362 (muc h o f which wa s muted i n the final version delivere d i n Richmond, ibid. , 380-391); Jay t o James Duane , Sept . 16 , 1795 , in Johnston, Jay Papers, IV , 193; Federalist No . 3 , i n Cooke , Federalist, 14 . Fo r late-lif e musing s abou t a n im mutable mora l la w "give n b y th e Sovereign " an d mutabl e "ordinances " tha t could no t contradic t God' s law , se e Jay t o Joh n Murray , Jr. , Apr . 15 , 1818 , i n Johnston, Jay Papers, IV , 403-419 . Thi s Calvinis t framewor k comporte d wel l with hi s favore d "individual-nation " analogy , whic h i n tur n wa s reinforce d b y readings i n natura l la w an d th e la w o f nations . Fo r th e imager y couche d i n reli gious language , se e Jay t o Rev . Dr . Thatcher , Ma y 26 , 1796 , ibid. , Ill , 481 , an d IV, 215. 47. Ja y t o Jefferson, Jul y 14 , 1786 , i n Johnston, Jay Papers, III , 207. O n in debtedness, se e Report t o Congres s o n a Joint Lette r fro m Adam s an d Jefferson , May 29 , 1786 , and Jay t o Jefferson, Dec . 14 , 1786 , ibid., 198 , 223. On Jay's in volvement i n early agreements, see Jay to Floridablanca, June 22, 1780 , and Joh n Adams, Extrac t fro m a Journal, Nov . 3 , 10 , 1782 , i n Jare d Sparks , ed. , Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution (1 2 vols. , Bosto n 1830) , VI , 465-466, 468-470 , VII, 325. 48. Draf t o f John Jay's Charg e t o the Gran d Jury a t . . . Virginia [befor e Apri l 22, 1793] , in Marcus , Documentary History, II , 360 ; Lette r t o Congres s incor porating a letter to the Count de Vergennes, Sept. 22,1780, in Sparks, Diplomatic Correspondence, VII , 384 . 49. Ja y t o Governo r Livingston , July 19 , 1783 , and Washingto n t o Jay, Aug. 15, 1786 , i n Johnston , Jay Papers, III , 55, 209 ; an d Federalis t No . 6 4 [63] , i n Cooke, Federalist, 437 . Th e Definitiv e Treat y o f Peac e i s reprinte d i n Morris , Peacemakers, 461-465 . Se e also John Adams' s paralle l sentiments , Extrac t fro m a Journal, Nov. 10,1782 , in Sparks, Diplomatic Correspondence, VI , 473. On sequestration, see Goebel, History of the Supreme Court, 722-759 , or Morris, John Jay, 73-102 . 50. Ja y to th e Marquis d e Lafayette, June 16 , 1786 , and t o Lor d Lansdowne , Apr. 20,1786, bu t also see Jay to Lansdowne, Apr. 16,1786 , in Johnston, Jay Papers, III , 192 , 202, 190 . 51. Ja y t o Adams , Feb . 2 1, 1787 , ibid. , Ill , 234-235 , IV , 140 ; Charge t o th e Grand Jury o f th e Circui t Cour t fo r th e District o f Ne w York , April 12 , 1790 , in Marcus, Documentary History, II , 29; Jay to Edmun d Randolph , Nov . 19 , 1794 , in Johnston, Jay Papers, IV , 140 . Activ e o n revolutionar y committee s o f safety , Jay did no t sanctio n Loyalism , yet he was troubled b y harsh treatmen t o f me n o f merit. Se e Jay t o Adams , Sept . 6 , 1785 , ibid., Ill , 166 . 52. Jay' s paper s d o no t confir m a direc t Wilsonia n influence , bu t th e tw o served togethe r i n Congres s an d o n th e hig h court . Althoug h Wilson' s assump tions wer e mor e "democratical " tha n Jay's , structura l similaritie s i n th e argu ments of the two men are striking, as is a shared belie f that the law of nations em -

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bodied divinity. See Arnaud Leavelle , "James Wilson and the Relation of the Scottish Metaphysics to American Politica l Thought," Political Science Quarterly, 57 (Sept. 1942) , 394-410; Mary Delahanty , The Integrationist Philosophy of James Wilson (Millwood , N.Y . 1978) ; Charle s Smith , James Wilson, Founding Father, 1742-1798 (Chape l Hill 1956) ; Robert McCloskey, ed., The Works of James Wilson ( 2 vols., Cambridge, Mass. 1967) . 53. Joh n Adams, Extract from a Journal, Nov. 3,1782, i n Sparks, Diplomatic Correspondence, VI , 466. 54. Ja y t o Washington , Mar . 6 , 1795 , i n Johnston , Jay Papers, IV , 170 , o r Jay's Lette r t o Congress , Nov. 6 , 1780 , in Sparks , Diplomatic Correspondence, VII, 358 . O n revolutionar y diplomati c theory , se e Greg g Lint , "Th e America n Revolution an d th e La w o f Nations , 1776-1789, " Diplomatic History, 1 (Win ter 1977) , 20-34, which identifies "enlightened " though t but not shrewdness, and J. H . Hutson , "Intellectua l Foundation s o f Earl y America n Diplomacy, " ibid. , 1-19. 55. Ja y t o Willia m Greene , Mar . 4 , 1783 , i n Johnston , Jay Papers, III , 33 ; Adams to Robert Livingston , Oct. 31,1782, quoting Jay and agreein g with "sen timents an d systems" ; Sparks, Diplomatic Correspondence, VI , 437, 473-474 . 56. Lette r t o Congress , 1780 , i n Sparks , Diplomatic Correspondence, VII , 247, 272-274 . O n unit y agains t Britain , se e Jay t o Lafayette , Jul y 15 , 1785 ; o n long-term economic prospects, see Jay to Jefferson, Apr . 24,1788, and to Adams, Sept. 5,1785; o n China , see Jay to President o f Congress , Jan. 20,1786; in Johns t o n , / ^ Papers, III , 161 , 165, 180 , 326-327 . 57. Ja y t o Benjami n Vaughan , Mar . 28 , 1783 , to Adams , Sept . 6 , 1785 , an d to Jefferson, Jan . 9 , 1786 , Feb. 9,1787, i n Johnston, Jay Papers, III , 34-35,165 , 178-179, 231-233; Letter t o Congress , 1780 , in Sparks, Diplomatic Correspondence, VII , 275-276 . 58. Usefu l studie s of political economy includ e J. E. Crowley, This Sheba, Self (Baltimore 1974) ; Drew McCoy, The Elusive Republic (Chape l Hil l 1980) ; Mer rill Peterson , "Thoma s Jefferso n an d Commercia l Policy , 1783-1793, " William and Mary Quarterly, 2 2 (Oct . 1965) , 584-610; Joyce Appleby, "Th e Socia l Ori gins o f America n Revolutionar y Ideology, " Journal of American History, 6 4 (Mar. 1978) , 935-958; John R . Nelson, Jr., "Alexande r Hamilto n an d America n Manufacturing: A Reexamination, " ibid. , 65 (Mar . 1979) , 971-995 ; Dre w McCoy, "Republicanis m an d America n Foreig n Policy : James Madiso n an d th e Political Econom y o f Commercia l Discrimination , 178 9 t o 1794, " William and Mary Quarterly, 3 1 (1974) , 633-646; Ralph Lerner , "Commerc e an d Character : The Anglo-America n a s a New-Mode l Man, " William and Mary Quarterly, 26 (1979), 3-26 ; Joyce Appleby, Capitalism and a New Social Order: The Republican Vision of the 1790s (Ne w Yor k 1984) ; Cath y Matso n an d Pete r Onuf , A Union of Interests: Political and Economic Thought in Revolutionary America (Lawrence, Kans. 1990) ; and, fo r intersection s betwee n commercia l an d interna -

Honour, Justice, and Interest" 65 tional law , Pete r Onu f an d Nichola s Onuf , Federal Union, Modern World: The Law of Nations in an Age of Revolutions (Madison , Wis . 1993) . 59. Federalis t No . 5 , in Cooke , Federalist, 26 , an d Lette r t o th e Presiden t o f Congress, May 26 , 1780 , in Sparks , Diplomatic Correspondence, VII , 247. 60. Interestingly , Jay' s agrarianis m seem s t o hav e lacke d th e mora l preoccu pations s o muc h a par t o f republica n agrarianism . H e imagine d wealt h produc tion, no t seedbed s o f republica n virtue , althoug h h e woul d no t hav e objecte d t o the latter . Se e generall y McCoy , Elusive Republic, an d (fo r a late r period ) Joh n Ashworth, Agrarians and Aristocrats: Party Political Ideology in the United States, 1837-1846 (Londo n 1983) . O n thi s score , Jay wa s ever y inc h th e mod ernist. 61. Lansdown e to Jay, Sept 4,1785, and Jay to Lansdowne, Apr. 20,1786, i n Johnston,/#;y Papers, III , 189,193. See also Jay to Jefferson, Apr . 24, 1788 , ibid., 326-327. 62. Ja y t o Lansdowne , Apr . 20 , 1786 , t o Jefferson , Apr . 24 , 1788 ; t o Lafayette, Apr . 26 , 1788 ; an d Addres s t o th e Peopl e o f th e Stat e o f Ne w York , Spring 1788 ; ibid., 193-194 , 314 , 327-328 . Additionally , se e Federalis t Nos . 3 and 4 , in Cooke , Federalist, passim . 63. Washingto n t o Jay , Oct . 5 , 1789 , an d Instruction s t o Envo y Extraordi nary, May 6 , 1794 , in Johnston, Jay Papers, III , 378-379, IV, 14. 64. Draf t o f John Jay's Charg e t o th e Gran d Jury o f th e Circui t Cour t fo r th e District o f Virgini a [befor e Apr . 22, 1793] , in Marcus , Documentary History, II , 359; Jay t o Washington , Apr . 2 1, 1779, and Ja y t o John Vardill , Ma y 23 , 1774 , in Morris, Unpublished Papers, 587 , 131 . Before 1798 , federal court s possesse d original an d exclusiv e jurisdictio n i n suit s t o whic h th e Unite d State s wa s party , in admiralty , i n suit s touchin g consul s an d ministers , an d i n litigatio n betwee n states o r a stat e an d noncitizens . Se e Goebel , History of the Supreme Court, 552-721. 65. Morris , John Jay, 12 . Jay's support fo r thi s council has been viewed a s evidence o f hi s eagernes s t o garne r implie d power s o f review , bu t a n advisor y rol e is conceptually distinc t fro m th e abilit y t o negat e congressiona l legislatio n afte r the fact . 66. Georg e Washington t o the Justices of the Supreme Court , Apr. 3, 1790, in Marcus, Documentary History, II , 2 1. 67. Washingto n t o Jay , Jun e [?] , 1789 , Nov . 19 , 1790 ; Ja y t o Washington , Nov. 13,1790, to Alexander Hamilton, Nov. 28,1790; and Hamilton to Jay Sept. 3, 1792 , in Johnston, Jay Papers, III , 369, 409, 405-408, 410, 446-447. Se e also Jay's draf t o f Washington's neutralit y proclamation , ibid. , 474-477 . 68. Joh n Jay' s Draf t o f th e Charg e t o th e Gran d Jur y o f . . . Virginia [befor e Apr. 22, 1793] , in Marcus, Documentary History, II , 360. 69. Ja y to Georg e Read, Dec. 12 , 1786, an unpublishe d lette r quote d i n Mor ris, John Jay, 26-27.

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70. Judge-mad e criminal law exercised at the federal leve l held obvious appea l for Jay, whose visio n o f a stable polit y depende d upo n swif t punishmen t o f way ward citizens , particularly whe n the y threatened lawfu l government . I n addition , Jay had tried crimes against government whil e serving on New York's Committe e of Safet y ( a job tha t h e foun d distasteful) , an d hel d fort h a t lengt h i n grand jur y charges afte r 179 0 a s to ho w an d wh y th e republi c migh t enforc e crimina l sanc tions. A recent stud y o f Jay's las t reporte d case , U.S. v . Joseph Ravara, confirm s his interes t i n thi s murk y jurisdiction ; se e Joh n Gordo n III , "United States v . Joseph Ravara: 'Presumptuou s Evidence' , 'To o Man y Lawyers' , an d a Federa l Common Law of Crime," in Maeva Marcus, ed., Origins of the Federal Judiciary: Essays on the Judiciary Act of 1789 (Ne w York 1992) , 106-172 . 71. Ibid. ; Jay t o Washington , Jan. 7 , 1787 , in Johnston, Jay Papers, III , 226. Early ruling s include d Oswald v . New York, 2 Dalla s 401 , 415 (1792 , 1793) , o r Van Staphorst v . Maryland, 2 Dalla s 401, 402 (1792 , 1793) . The Court' s docke t is described i n Goebel, History of the Supreme Court, appendices , and (mor e usefully an d painstakingly ) i n Marcus , Documentary History, I , Par t 1 ("Appoint ments and Proceedings"). On the importance of circuits as vehicles for instructio n about th e ne w federation , an d als o a s a focu s fo r judicia l energie s befor e 1795 , see Ralph Lerner , "Th e Suprem e Cour t a s Republican Schoolmaster, " i n Philip B. Kurland, ed. , Supreme Court Review (Chicag o 1967) , 127-180 . 72. Chisholm v . Georgia, 2 Dalla s 41 9 (1793) . Se e als o Doyl e Mathis , "Chisholm v . Georgia: Backgroun d an d Settlement, " Journal of American History, 5 4 (Jun e 1967) , 19-29 , correcting factua l error s i n earlier accounts . O n th e Judiciary Ac t an d it s conteste d sections , se e essay s an d bibliograph y i n Marcus , Origins of the Federal Judiciary, an d Wilfre d Ritz , Rewriting the History of the Judiciary Act of 1789: Exposing Myths, Challenging Premises, and Using New Evidence, ed . Wythe Hol t an d L . H. LaRu e (Norma n 1990) . 73. Ja y t o Jame s Lowell , Ma y 10 , 1785 ; Draf t o f Joh n Jay' s Charg e t o th e Grand Jury o f . . . Virginia [befor e Apr . 22, 1793] , in Marcus, Documentary History, II , 359-360. O n Jay' s involvemen t wit h Oswald , Va n Staphorst , an d othe r creditors, se e Harol d Syrett , ed. , Papers of Alexander Hamilton (26 vols. , Ne w York 1961-1979) , VI , 567-569; an d John Adams' s descriptio n o f meetings , Ex tract fro m a Journal, Octobe r 3 1 through Novembe r 15 , 1782, in Sparks, Diplomatic Correspondence, VII , 465-475. 74. Chisholm v . Georgia, 2 Dalla s 419 , 422-42 3 (1793) . A t 424-425 , Ran dolph argue s tha t state s exis t onl y fo r "domesti c purposes. " Fo r th e politic s un derlying James Iredell' s dissent , se e Jeff Fordham , "Iredell' s Dissen t i n Chisholm v. Georgia: It s Political Significance, " North Carolina Historical Review, 8 (Apr . 1931), 155-167 . 75. Georgia v . Brailsford, 2 Dalla s 402 , 41 5 (1792 , 1793) , an d Chisholm v . Georgia, 2 Dallas 419,422-425,473-474 (1793) . The long-continued Brailsford case reappeared o n the Suprem e Cour t docke t i n 179 8 t o b e dismissed i n light of

"Honour, Justice, and Interest" 67 the Eleventh Amendment; se e note 77. O n Brailsford a s a struggle mainly agains t judicial nationalism , se e Haines , Role of the Supreme Court, 93-104 ; an d o n Georgia's severa l hig h cour t encounters , se e Doyl e Mathis , "Georgi a befor e th e Supreme Court, " American Journal of Legal History, 1 2 (Apr . 1968) , 112-121 . 76. Chisholm v . Georgia, 2 Dallas 409 , 478-479 (1793) . 77. Marcus , Documentary History, I , Part 1 , 304-305. 78. Federalis t No. 6 4 [63] , in Cooke, Federalist, 437 , and Jay to Washington , Apr. 30, 1794 , in Marcus, Documentary History, I , Part 2 , 747 . 79. Ja y t o Adams , Jan . 2 , 1801 , i n Johnston , Jay Papers, IV , 285 . Unlik e Madison, Ja y coul d no t relinquis h th e idea l o f organi c homogeneit y achieve d through law , eschewin g wha t Gordo n Woo d call s "mechanica l device s an d in stitutional contrivances " throug h whic h Federalist s supposedl y hope d t o contai n revolutionary "socia l forces, " withou t a clea r objec t i n min d beyon d contain ment; Wood, Creation, 428 , 475-476. Fo r Jay, law encompasse d bot h substanc e and structure ; th e la w o f nation s especiall y carrie d withi n i t virtuall y flawles s principles that , i f heeded , eventuall y woul d mak e publi c moralit y actua l an d universal. Thus, while la w serve d hegemoni c purposes , Jay's syste m als o was or ganic an d educative—and , i n it s way, progressive ; h e coul d no t embrac e th e no tion o f machiner y impose d fo r it s ow n sak e withou t abandonin g th e possibilit y of socia l redemption . Thi s impass e ma y explai n hi s existentia l despai r afte r 1795. 80. Instruction s a s Envo y Extraordinary , Ma y 6 , 1794 , an d Ja y t o Lindle y Murray, Aug. 22, 1794 , in Johnston, Jay Papers, IV , 14, 51. See also Jay t o Joh n Hartley, Jan . 8 , 1795 , and , o n resignatio n an d duty , Ja y t o Sara h Jay , Apr . 15 , 1794, ibid. , 3 , 153 . The notio n tha t statesmen' s wor k migh t b e limite d t o labo r undertaken withi n particula r institution s ha d no t ye t take n hold , eve n amon g proponents o f departmentalize d government ; int o th e 1790s , Jefferson an d oth ers di d th e sam e thing , holdin g politica l an d diplomati c post s a t th e sam e mo ment. 81. Ja y t o Washington , Aug . 5 , 1794 , t o Rufu s King , Nov . 19 , 1794 , t o Ed mund Randolph , Nov . 19 , 1794 , and t o Washington, Mar . 6 , 1795 , ibid., IV, 45, 136, 140 , 170-171 . O n treat y negotiations , se e Combs , Jay Treaty, esp . his dis cussion o f th e mixed commission , 151-155 . 82. Charg e t o th e Gran d Jury o f the Circui t Cour t fo r th e District o f Virgini a [Richmond], May 22 , 1793 , in Marcus, Documentary History, II , 390-391 . 83. Fischer , Revolution in American Conservatism, 10 . 84. Ralp h Lerner , "Commerc e an d Character : Th e Anglo-America n a s a New-Model Man, " William and Mary Quarterly, 26 (1979) , 3-26 . 85. Ja y t o Georg e Read , 1786 , quote d i n Morris , John Jay, 27. O n republi canism an d Federalis t object s i n 1787 , se e early discussion s (and , i n som e cases , texts epitomizin g th e so-calle d "republica n synthesis" ) suc h a s Wood, Creation; Bernard Bailyn , Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge ,

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Mass. 1967) ; th e lon g introductio n i n Jack Greene , ed. , Reinterpretation of the American Revolution (Ne w York 1968) ; two classi c articles b y Robert Shalhope , "Toward a Republican Synthesis : The Emergence o f an Understanding o f Repub licanism i n America n Historiography, " William and Mary Quarterly ', 2 9 (Jan . 1972), 49-80 , an d "Republicanis m an d Earl y America n Historiography, " ibid. , 39 (Apr . 1982) , 334-356 ; Joh n Murrin , "Th e Grea t Inversion , o r Cour t versu s Country . . . , " i n J. G . A . Pocock , ed. , Three British Revolutions: 1641, 1688, 1776 (Princeto n 1988) ; and a special issue of the American Quarterly (Fal l 1985) , ed. Joyce Appleby. For recent attempts to marry republican an d liberal discourses, to declar e the m irreconcilabl y divorced , o r t o pronounc e republicanis m a n out moded idea , see Milton Klei n et al., eds., The Republican Synthesis Revisited: Essays in Honor of George Athan Billias (Worcester , Mass. 1992) ; Isaac Kramnick , Republicanism and Bourgeois Radicalism: Political Ideology in Late EighteenthCentury England and America (Ithac a 1990) , esp. ch. 9 ; Joyce Appleby, Liberalism and Republicanism in the Historical Imagination (Cambridge , Mass . 1992) ; Scott Douglas Gerber , To Secure These Rights: The Declaration of Independence and Constitutional Interpretation (Ne w Yor k 1995) , Par t I ; and (fo r allegation s of bankruptcy ) Danie l Rodgers , "Republicanism : Th e Caree r o f a Concept, " Journal of American History, 7 9 (1992) , 11-38 . These works als o contain exten sive bibliographic information . 86. Draf t o f John Jay's Charg e t o th e Gran d Jury a t . . . Virginia [befor e Apr . 22 1793] , in Marcus, Documentary History, II , 361-362. Cf. Stephe n Presser, " A Tale o f Tw o Judges, " Northwestern University Law Review, 7 3 (Mar.-Apr . 1978), 48-52 . 87. Federalis t No . 2, in Cooke , Federalist, 8 . 88. Joh n Jay's Charg e t o th e Gran d Jur y o f th e Circui t Cour t fo r th e Distric t of New York , Apr. 12 , 1790 , in Marcus, Documentary History, II , 30. Jay deliv ered essentiall y th e sam e charg e o n circui t i n Massachusetts , Connecticut , an d other easter n states . 89. Lette r t o Congress , Sept . 22 , 1780 , i n Sparks , Diplomatic Correspondence, 384 . 90. Fo r a brief accoun t o f th e episode, see Morris, John Jay, 100-101 . 91. Joh n Noonan , Jr., Persons and Masks of the Law (Ne w York 1976) , 163. On Whiggis h representatio n i n legal-historica l studies , see Robert Gordon , "Re cent Trend s i n Lega l Historiography, " Law Library Journal, 6 9 (Nov . 1976) , 462-468, esp . 465 ; "Introduction, " Law and Society Review, 1 0 (Fal l 1975) , 9-55; an d "Historicis m i n Legal Scholarship," Yale Law Journal, 9 0 (Apr . 1981) , 1017-1059. Se e also Harry Scheiber' s od d suggestio n tha t constitutiona l history , unlike it s private la w counterpart, ha s bee n more o r les s impervious t o criticism ; "American Constitutiona l Histor y an d th e Ne w Lega l History : Complementar y Themes in Two Modes," Journal of American History, 6 8 (Sept . 1981), 337-350 . For additiona l essays , se e Kermi t Hall , ed. , United States Constitutional and

"Honour, Justice, and Interest" 6

9

Legal History, Vol . I , Main Themes in U.S. Constitutional and Legal History (New Yor k 1987) . 92. Morris , John Jay, 86 . The Court' s cumulativ e experienc e o n circui t wit h the review question can b e tracked fairl y easil y in Marcus, Documentary History, II, "Th e Justices on Circuit. " O n thi s question an d others , the Documentary History i s indispensable . 93. Joh n Jay's Charg e t o th e Gran d Jur y o f th e Circui t Cour t fo r th e Distric t of Ne w York , Apr . 12 , 1790 , i n Marcus , Documentary History, II , 27 ; an d Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 78, in Cooke, Federalist, 523 . On procedura l innovation, se e Goebel's decidedly unappreciative History of the Supreme Court, passim. 94. White , American Judicial Tradition, 2 - 3 . 95. Morris , John Jay, 102 .

Chapter 3

John Rutledg e Distinction and Declension James Haw

John Rutledge was a tall and imposing figure. His long, powdered hair ran back from a large forehead that set off his "dark piercing eyes, and firm mouth." An aloof, dignified bearin g revealed the pride of a South Carolina lowcountr y (coasta l plain ) aristocrat . Normall y polit e an d courteous, Rutledg e ha d a tempe r an d coul d las h ou t i n anger . On e French commentato r characterize d Rutledg e i n 1788 , with som e ex aggeration, a s "th e mos t eloquen t ma n i n the United States , but als o the proudest an d most imperious." 1 On the South Carolina bench , Chancellor Rutledg e personified au thority. "Thoug h ordinaril y patien t an d alway s impartial, his temper sometimes took fire, and brok e ou t without muc h check. . . . 'Court , jury, and audience quailed before him, when he assumed his gubernatorial air.' " Rutledg e ha d a thoroug h knowledg e o f th e law , bu t hi s greatest asse t a s a jurist was his ability quickl y t o grasp al l the questions an d implication s raise d b y a complex case , put the m i n prope r perspective, and penetrate to the heart of the issue. 2 This facil e min d wa s joine d t o a n ardent , uneas y temperament . Rutledge mad e u p hi s mind rapidl y an d preferre d quick , decisiv e action.3 H e gre w impatien t wit h prolonge d debate . Rutledge' s orator y reflected hi s personality. He was a speaker whose torrent of vehement rhetoric rushe d hi s listeners alon g to th e desire d conclusion . Charle s Cotes worth Pinckne y describe d Rutledge' s speec h a s "stron g an d ar gumentative, and remarkable fo r clos e reasoning." 4 70

John Rutledge 7

1

If John Rutledg e wa s a prou d aristocrat , hi s gentilit y wa s o f th e freshly minte d colonia l variety . Hi s Englis h ancestor s ha d settle d i n Ireland i n th e seventeent h century. 5 A n uncle , lawye r Andre w Rut ledge, emigrate d t o Sout h Carolin a aroun d 173 0 o r 1731 . H e quickly achieved professional success , married a wealthy widow, an d won electio n t o th e Common s Hous e o f Assembly . H e ros e t o leadership o f th e countr y party , whic h defende d th e interest s o f th e colony i n clashe s wit h th e roya l governor , an d attaine d th e pos t o f speaker. Andrew' s brother , Dr . Joh n Rutledge , followe d hi m t o Charleston a fe w year s late r an d als o achieve d prominenc e i n th e Commons House . In 173 8 the doctor marrie d hi s brother's fourteen year-old stepdaughter , Sara h Hext, who was heiress to a sizeable for tune. Th e first o f thei r seve n children , Joh n Rutledge , wa s bor n i n 1739.6 Rutledge began his education at home and with tutors, then turned at an early age to the law. His legal education starte d in his Uncle Andrew's office an d continued unde r prominent attorne y James Parson s after Andre w Rutledg e die d i n 1755 . H e the n attende d th e Middl e Temple in London and gained admission to the South Carolina ba r in January 1761. 7 Professional succes s cam e quickly . Rutledg e handle d mor e civi l suits tha n an y othe r lawye r i n Sout h Carolina' s Cour t o f Commo n Pleas during the period 1761-1774 . He was equally successfu l i n the colony's othe r courts . Estimate s o f Rutledge' s lega l incom e durin g these year s rang e fro m £1,00 0 t o mor e tha n £2,00 0 sterlin g pe r annum, a level that fe w America n colonist s achieve d i n an y occupa tion. Th e proceed s o f hi s plantation s adde d t o hi s fortune , bu t lan d speculation an d famil y responsibilitie s t o hi s brothers draine d hi s resources. I n 176 3 h e marrie d Elizabet h Grimke , wit h who m h e ha d eight children who survived infancy. 8 Rutledge served in the Commons House of Assembly from 176 1 to 1775. As early a s 176 2 he emerged a s a leader o f the country party. 9 A firm defender o f loca l right s an d legislativ e prerogatives, Rutledg e opposed th e Stamp , Townshend, an d Te a Act s i n th e legislature , th e Stamp Act Congress, public meetings, and the courts, but was not involved in extralegal crowd activity. Like most Americans before 1774 , he believe d tha t Britai n shoul d regulat e colonia l trad e an d mak e broad polic y for th e empir e bu t shoul d no t ta x th e colonies o r inter fere in their local affairs .

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Rutledge considered the extension o f vice-admiralty jurisdictio n i n the colonie s "th e mos t enormou s o f an y [grievance ] Whatever. " H e spoke fro m persona l experience , havin g bee n a n attorne y fo r Henr y Laurens i n severa l celebrate d case s i n 176 7 an d 176 8 tha t resulte d from "custom s racketeering " b y venal crown officers . Rutledg e wo n the suits in which he was involved and successfully sue d a customs of ficer for damage s in one of them. 10 Rutledge wa s amon g Sout h Carolina' s representative s t o th e Firs t Continental Congress i n 1774 . Thoug h firm i n defens e o f colonia l rights, he wanted to avoid placing unnecessary obstacles in the way of reconciliation wit h Britain . Event s caused Rutledg e t o suppor t mor e radical measures at the Second Continental Congress in 1775 , but he continued t o hop e fo r reconciliation . H e apparentl y rejecte d Parlia ment's powe r ove r th e colonie s completel y b y Ma y 1775 , acknowl edging onl y th e king' s authority . B y October , th e dissolutio n o f th e colonial governmen t i n Sout h Carolina , an d risin g chao s ther e an d elsewhere, cause d hi m t o advocat e new , temporar y government s based o n th e people . Havin g secure d Congress' s consent , h e lef t Philadelphia t o la y th e resolutio n befor e Sout h Carolina' s Secon d Provincial Congress. 11 When tha t bod y me t i n Februar y 1776 , Rut ledge served on the drafting committe e that wrote the new state constitution. Th e nineteenth-centur y historia n Georg e Va n Santvoor d credited hi m wit h primar y responsibilit y fo r creatin g th e document . There is, however, no contemporary evidenc e of his (or anyone else's) contribution beyon d the fact that he wrote the preamble. Rutledge ultimately accepte d independenc e a s a necessit y bu t remaine d a reluc tant rebel to the last. 12 In the meantime , the ne w Genera l Assembl y ha d electe d Rutledg e president o f Sout h Carolina . Highlight s o f hi s administratio n wer e successful defense s o f Charleston against a British attack from th e sea in June 1776 , and of the frontier agains t the Cherokee. 13 Rutledge resigned as president in March 1778 , in protest against the legislature' s approval of a new state constitution. His principal objections were to the elimination o f the president's veto, and t o direc t popular electio n of stat e senator s b y paris h an d district , instea d o f havin g th e lowe r house choos e the m a t large . These changes , he feared, woul d alte r a mixed governmen t to o muc h i n the directio n o f democracy . Thoug h Rutledge di d no t detai l hi s objection s t o democracy , h e probabl y shared a common contemporar y vie w that turbulence , injustice , an d

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susceptibility to the wiles of demagogues had frequently resulte d fro m that for m o f government i n the past. I n any case, he did no t wan t t o give th e upcountr y (piedmont ) increase d influenc e i n stat e govern ment at the expense of Charlesto n an d the lowcountry. 14 Rutledge's fall from powe r was brief. Britain shifted th e brunt of its North American wa r effor t t o th e Sout h lat e i n 1778 , overrunnin g much o f Georgia . The legislature returne d Rutledg e t o th e governor ship in February 1779 , hoping tha t hi s leadership coul d preserv e th e state fro m invasio n a s it had i n 1776. 15 This time, though, loca l an d Continental military resources were insufficient t o resist the increased British pressure. Charlesto n an d th e souther n Continenta l Arm y sur rendered afte r a siege in May 1780. 16 Governor Rutledge reluctantly had left the city in April, just befor e the Britis h rin g aroun d Charlesto n tightened . Th e Continenta l com mander, Genera l Benjami n Lincoln , persuade d hi m t o g o in orde r t o organize reinforcement s fo r th e relie f o f th e cit y an d t o preserv e th e state government' s existenc e i f Charlesto n fell . Th e legislatur e ha d earlier arme d th e executive with broa d power s to do what was "nec essary to secure the peace, safety, and happiness of this State" until the legislators coul d mee t again. 17 Henc e Rutledg e wa s abl e t o ac t a s a one-man governmen t o f Sout h Carolin a whil e th e stat e wa s unde r British occupation . Rutledge mad e tw o trip s t o Philadelphi a i n 178 0 an d 178 1 t o so licit aid from Congress for th e southern theater. 18 He spent the rest of that period with the restored souther n Continenta l Army, reviving his state's militia and trying to supply it and the Continentals. In the summer and fall o f 1781 , as American force s regaine d contro l o f most of his state, Rutledge bega n to reestablish stat e government. Th e culmination o f hi s efforts wa s the electio n o f a new legislature tha t me t a t Jacksonborough i n January 1782 . There Rutledge, who was constitutionally ineligible for anothe r term , relinquished hi s office. 19 The Jacksonborough assembly elected Rutledge to Congress, where he served unti l November 1783 . The major issue s that h e dealt wit h in Congress were finance, support for the army, and peace terms. Rutledge wa s especiall y determine d tha t th e Unite d State s mus t hav e a western boundar y o n the Mississippi River . He distrusted France , believing correctly that th e French favored a line farther east. 20 Rutledge remained i n South Carolin a fo r th e next three and a half years. H e decline d congressiona l appointment s t o a specia l cour t t o

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decide a Massachusetts-New Yor k boundary dispute, and as minister to th e Netherlands. 21 Gou t an d a seriou s illnes s durin g th e wa r ha d permanently impaire d hi s health. 22 Moreover , h e neede d t o tur n hi s attention t o hi s persona l affairs , sadl y neglecte d i n a decad e o f full time public service. Rutledge's plantations , lik e those o f othe r Sout h Carolinians , ha d suffered considerabl e damag e durin g th e war . Rebuildin g require d a substantial investment; Rutledge incurred increased debt. Crops were poor throug h 1785 , an d price s suffere d fro m th e disruptio n o f ol d trading patterns. 23 Rutledge' s incom e wa s furthe r diminishe d b y hi s not resuming the practice of law. Instead he became one of the judges of th e ne w stat e Cour t o f Chancery , which exercise d equit y jurisdic tion, mainly involving wills and estates. Unable to rebuild his fortun e but continuing to live in a gentleman's style , Rutledge was in deep financial trouble b y the late 1780s. 24 In the Sout h Carolin a Hous e o f Representatives , Rutledge an d hi s allies were har d presse d t o preserv e th e politica l dominanc e o f low country gentlemen . Artisans , mechanics , an d som e merchant s i n Charleston unsuccessfull y challenge d aristocrati c dominatio n o f th e state a s contrar y t o republica n principles . Th e growin g upcountr y populace demande d legislativ e reapportionmen t an d remova l o f th e state capital to the interior, achieving the latter but making only modest gain s relate d t o th e former . Rutledg e wa s critica l o f th e paper money and debt-relief scheme s that the legislature adopted to assuage popular disconten t an d to save prominent planters and small farmer s alike from bankruptcy. 25 Thus Rutledg e ha d firsthand knowledg e o f th e problem s tha t hi s state and natio n face d i n the 1780s . As wartime governor , he experienced th e difficultie s tha t resulte d fro m th e inabilit y o f Congres s t o raise men and mone y fo r th e war effort . A s a result, he saw the need for a centra l governmen t capabl e o f providin g fo r th e nationa l de fense. He became convinced that Congress needed some power to tax. The economic difficulties o f the 1780s , both in South Carolina an d in the othe r states , made hi m an d hi s state willing to give Congress th e power t o regulat e trad e i n orde r t o counte r Britis h commercia l re strictions, but only if South Carolina' s interests were protected b y requiring a two-thirds majority o n trade issues and b y prohibiting con gressional interferenc e wit h th e slav e trade . Upcountr y discontent , challenges t o deferentia l politic s an d t o lowcountr y dominanc e i n

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South Carolina , an d paper-mone y an d debt-relie f scheme s portende d ill fo r th e futur e o f th e republic . John Rutledg e probabl y share d hi s brother Edward' s fea r tha t Shays' s Rebellio n threatene d " a genera l distribution of property." Gentlemen, Edward Rutledge warned, must rouse themselve s "t o suppor t th e centra l government." 26 Joh n Rut ledge accepted electio n to the Philadelphia conventio n o f 178 7 in the belief tha t the future o f the new nation hun g in the balance . The Constitutional Convention John Rutledge' s role at the Constitutional Conventio n reflecte d a political outloo k grounde d i n traditiona l Anglo-America n Whi g think ing, adapted t o th e circumstance s o f th e Sout h Carolin a lowcountr y gentry. Rutledge' s extan t writing s contai n n o explanatio n i n an y de tail of his political ideas. There are only a few brief, general comments reflecting hi s political theor y befor e 1787 . It is clear, though, tha t i n the 1760 s h e shared th e Whig view tha t th e Britis h constitutio n ha d reached a high degree of perfection, it s excellence resting on a balance of power between King, Lords, and Commons. After independenc e he advocated a continuatio n o f th e principl e o f balanc e between branches o f government s i n a republica n politica l order . I n 177 8 h e wrote that the purpose of government was the people's good, and that form o f government was best which made the people most happy. His own preferenc e a t tha t tim e wa s fo r a "compounde d o r mixed " re public rather tha n " a simpl e democracy , o r on e verging towards it, " at the stat e level . Democracy wa s a t first glance a n attractiv e theory , he noted , bu t "it s effect s hav e bee n foun d arbitrary , sever e an d destructive."27 T o Rutledge , a mixe d o r balance d republi c a t th e stat e level implie d a strong , independen t executive ; a legislatur e o f tw o houses, the upper house more independent o f public opinion than the lower; an independent judiciary; and a deferential politica l order tha t enabled gentleme n t o lead . Balanc e als o included protectio n fo r th e major interest s in society; in a South Carolin a context , protection especially fo r th e minorit y interest s o f lowcountr y planter s an d mer chants. Rutledge adapted thes e basic concepts to the national leve l in his view of a proper centra l government fo r th e United States . The mi x o f qualitie s tha t Rutledg e wante d i n th e nationa l legisla ture was "Honesty " i n the lowe r house , "Ability " an d experienc e i n

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the upper. 28 That formula , a s applied i n state governments, generall y implied popular electio n of at least the lower house, but Rutledge unsuccessfully oppose d popula r electio n o f eithe r hous e o f the nationa l legislature. The South Carolina delegate s at first wanted th e state legislatures to elect the lower house, which would then choose the upper house fro m nominee s submitte d b y th e stat e legislatures . Afte r th e convention opte d fo r popula r electio n o f th e lowe r house , th e dele gates moved unsuccessfully tha t the states be allowed to determine the method o f electin g the House o f Representatives , permitting indirec t election in those states that s o desired. Rutledge argued that the stat e legislatures would choos e more "prope r characters " than th e people, and there was no difference i n principle. "It was the same thing to act by oneself, and t o ac t b y another." Thi s position reflecte d Rutledge' s alarm a t th e poo r performanc e o f overl y democrati c stat e govern ments in the 1780s , and hi s desire that nationa l legislator s b e gentlemen o f propert y an d abilit y remove d fro m th e pressure s o f publi c opinion. Fo r th e sam e reason , h e als o advocate d propert y qualifica tions for offic e an d opposed salaries. 29 However th e legislators were chosen, Rutledge an d his South Car olina colleagues supported proportional representation of the states in both house s o f th e nationa l legislature . Ho w t o determin e th e pro portion wa s importan t t o them , sinc e Sout h Carolin a wa s onl y th e seventh largest state in total population, and the ninth in free popula tion, accordin g t o the census of 1790. 30 These figures were o f cours e unknown t o th e delegates , bu t the y ha d a general ide a o f th e states ' relative standing . Ver y muc h awar e tha t th e Carolina s an d Georgi a had regional interests in slavery, the slave trade, and commerce to protect, Rutledge worked for a formula tha t would give the southernmost states as much representation a s possible. Rutledge a t first endorse d representatio n i n proportio n t o th e states' "comparativ e importance, " the n fough t repeatedl y fo r a for mula base d o n state quotas o f the national government's expense s o r on national taxes paid. "Property was certainly the principal object of Society," he remarked. The theory that wealth and property deserve d consideration i n representation was widespread in eighteenth-centur y America, bu t i t had take n especiall y dee p root i n the Sout h Carolin a lowcountry. The state constitution o f 177 8 based representation o n a combination o f populatio n an d wealth . Tha t formul a gav e th e low country a majority i n the legislature despit e the upcountry's growin g

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majority i n population . No t full y articulate d a s o f 1787 , thi s low country vie w of representation apparentl y assumed tha t propert y deserved special protection; that the major propert y interests—planters , merchants, lawyers—deserve d a shar e o f powe r tha t woul d protec t each interest in an equipoise that theoretically promoted harmony and the good of the whole; and that those who supplied the bulk of the tax money for the state's defense and welfare deserved commensurate representation. Th e dee p Sout h wa s a numerical minorit y i n the Unite d States with special interests to protect, as was the lowcountry in South Carolina. Rutledge and his colleagues at the convention therefore ad vocated a familiar representation formula fo r familiar purposes. In the end, the y settle d fo r representatio n base d o n population , includin g three-fifths o f th e slaves. 31 Sinc e slave s wer e a for m o f wealth , the y found that provision an acceptable compromise, though they were not entirely pleased with it . Proportional representatio n i n bot h house s wa s unacceptabl e t o many delegate s fro m th e smalle r states . Rutledg e wa s electe d t o th e committee that devise d the Great Compromis e o n representation. H e urged "th e indispensable necessity of a representation fro m th e state s according to their numbers and wealth " an d wa s unhapp y wit h th e committee's report : proportiona l representatio n i n th e lowe r house , an equal vot e for eac h stat e in the uppe r house , and a provision tha t money bills must originate in the former an d could not be amended in the latter. 32 Rutledge continued t o oppos e the Grea t Compromis e o n the floor of th e convention . H e argue d agai n fo r representatio n base d o n wealth, o r wealt h an d populatio n combined . H e expresse d fea r tha t new, poore r wester n state s coul d gai n a majority i n a lowe r hous e based solel y o n population . Again , thi s argumen t reflecte d attitude s formed i n lowcountry-upcountr y conflict s i n Sout h Carolina . A s fo r the Grea t Compromise' s provisio n regardin g mone y bills , Rutledg e believed that i t was of no advantage, base d "o n a blind adherenc e t o the British model" and productive only of conflict i n his experience in South Carolina. 33 The South Carolina delegate s voted against the Great Compromis e but accepte d i t onc e i t wa s adopted . Whe n Virginia' s Edmun d Ran dolph an d other s expresse d dissatisfactio n an d som e spok e o f ad journing, Rutledge urged that the convention must go on. "Altho ' we could no t d o wha t w e though t best , i n itself , w e ough t t o d o some -

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thing" rathe r tha n "abando n ever y thin g t o hazard. " Defect s i n th e plan could b e remedied later. 34 Rutledge favore d vestin g th e executiv e powe r i n on e person . " A single ma n woul d fee l th e greates t responsibilit y an d administe r th e public affairs best. " He first suggeste d that the upper house of the national legislatur e alon e should choos e the executive, a doubly refine d choice that would ensur e ability, wisdom, and independence from di rect pressures of public opinion. Probably, too, Rutledge concurred in his state' s initia l preferenc e tha t th e executiv e hav e a relatively shor t term and b e eligible for reelection . The convention, however, decide d that the executive should be chosen by both houses of the national legislature fo r a seven-yea r term , an d b e ineligibl e t o succee d himself . Rutledge supporte d thi s arrangement fro m the n on , and oppose d th e electoral college. He also wanted th e executive to have sole responsibility fo r vetoin g bills . The proposa l t o joi n th e Suprem e Cour t jus tices wit h th e presiden t i n a counci l o f revisio n t o exercis e th e vet o was, h e thought , improper . "Th e Judge s ough t neve r t o giv e thei r opinion o n a law till it comes before them." 35 Rutledge wante d a more restricte d federa l judiciar y tha n th e con vention ultimatel y created . H e favore d onl y a single Suprem e Court , arguing tha t inferio r federa l court s wer e "a n unnecessar y encroach ment on the jurisdiction o f the States." State courts should "decid e in all case s i n th e first instance" ; appeal s t o th e Suprem e Cour t woul d protect th e nationa l government' s authority . Give n tha t power , though, the judges must b e independent. Rutledg e oppose d a motion to allo w the president t o remov e federa l judge s from offic e upo n th e application o f bot h house s of the national legislature . That woul d b e improper "i f the Supreme Court is to judge between the U. S. and particular States. " It would influence th e judges unduly to favor nationa l power.36 Rutledge believe d tha t th e powers o f the new government, thoug h substantially broadened , shoul d b e enumerated . H e di d no t lik e th e sweeping genera l gran t o f authorit y originall y containe d i n th e Vir ginia Plan. Nor was he happy with the proposal that the national legislature b e empowere d t o vet o unconstitutiona l stat e laws . Rutledg e eventually go t satisfactio n o n bot h points . He successfully advocate d replacing the latter provision with one that made the Constitution enforceable a s th e suprem e la w o f th e land . And , a s chairma n o f th e Committee of Detail, Rutledge had an important hand in substitutin g

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enumerated powers , plus the necessary and proper clause, for th e virtually unlimited authorit y give n to Congress in the Virginia Plan. 37 In general , Rutledge' s conceptio n o f federalis m thu s envisione d a central governmen t o f enhance d bu t limite d powers , reservin g al l other powers to the states or the people. His opposition t o lower fed eral court s indicate s tha t h e di d no t wan t t o exten d th e centra l gov ernment's authorit y beyon d wha t h e believe d experienc e ha d prove n necessary. But there was some room fo r implie d power s i n his think ing. He considered a constitutional provisio n guaranteein g th e state s against foreign and domestic violence unnecessary. It was "involved in the natur e o f th e thing," h e commented, tha t Congress "ha d th e au thority . . . t o co-operate with an y State in subduing a rebellion." 38 Chairing th e Committe e o f Detai l als o gave Rutledge a n opportu nity to protec t hi s state' s particula r interest s i n slave s an d commerc e against a northern majority i n Congress. The committee's report provided tha t Congres s coul d no t abolis h o r ta x th e slav e trade. A twothirds majority woul d b e required fo r passag e of navigation acts , and exports coul d no t b e taxe d a t all . Thes e concession s t o th e lowe r South proved to o much fo r th e majority o f the convention t o accept . When som e delegates spoke against slavery , Rutledge denied that th e slave trad e raise d an y issue s o f "Religio n an d humanity. " I t wa s purely a matte r o f interest , h e maintained . "I f th e Norther n State s consult thei r interest , the y wil l no t oppos e th e increas e o f Slaves , which wil l increas e th e commoditie s o f whic h the y wil l becom e th e carriers." The southernmost states , he predicted, would not ratify th e new constitution "unles s their right to import slaves be untouched." 39 Like most Sout h Carolinians , Rutledg e wa s unaffecte d b y the grow ing opposition t o slaver y i n the northern state s an d th e upper South . He saw slaves simply as productive asset s and source s of wealth . Ultimately, though, Rutledg e supporte d a compromise o n these issues. Th e conventio n agree d tha t Congress coul d prohibi t slav e im portation after 1808 , and could tax it up to ten dollars per slave in the meantime. It deleted the two-thirds majority fo r passage of navigation acts whil e retainin g th e prohibitio n o f expor t taxes . Rutledg e re marked tha t i t wa s importan t t o reope n th e Britis h Wes t Indie s t o American trade , "an d a navigatio n Ac t wa s necessar y t o obtai n it . . . . A s we are laying th e foundatio n fo r a great empire , we ought t o take a permanent vie w of the subject an d no t look a t the present moment only." 40

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Rutledge als o sought to advance his state's interests b y advocatin g appointment o f a committee to consider assumption o f state debts by the nationa l government . Tha t wa s bot h righ t an d necessary , h e ar gued, since state debts had been "contracted in the common defense, " and th e state s were yielding impor t duties—"th e onl y sur e sourc e of revenue"—to th e central government. Sout h Carolin a wa s strugglin g with a larg e wa r deb t an d stoo d t o gai n greatly fro m thi s proposal . But, though th e conventio n adopte d Rutledge' s motion , n o constitu tional provision resulted. 41 The final Constitution di d not entirely please Rutledge, but he considered i t a vast improvemen t o n th e Article s o f Confederation . Hi s own contribution a t the convention wa s substantial. Two authoritie s have concluded tha t onl y fou r o r five delegates playe d a greater rol e at Philadelphi a tha n Rutledge , thoug h severa l other s contribute d a s much.42 Rutledge spoke frequently i n the debates and was chosen fo r five committees. His effective chairmanshi p o f the Committe e o f Detail, his important rol e i n securin g th e enumeratio n o f congressiona l powers, th e necessar y an d prope r clause , the supremac y clause , an d safeguards fo r th e dee p Sout h o n th e slav e trade an d taxatio n o f ex ports rank amon g his more conspicuous contribution s t o the Consti tution. Not the least of his contributions was his frequent rol e as compromiser, bot h i n word an d b y force o f example. Ofte n Rutledg e di d not ge t wha t h e wanted , bu t h e remaine d satisfie d enoug h t o mak e and urge concessions in the overriding interest of a more effective cen tral government. The one partial exception was Rutledge's strong opposition to the Great Compromise. Once it was adopted, though, Rutledge exerted his influence to calm discontents and ensure a successfu l conclusion. When the South Carolina legislature considered the Constitution in January 1788 , Rutledge spok e i n defens e o f th e provisio n includin g treaties in the supreme law of the land. He remarked tha t the Articles of Confederatio n wer e "demonstrabl y . . . no t wort h a farthing, " while the new system promised a bright future fo r South Carolina an d the nation . A s a delegat e t o th e stat e ratifyin g convention , Rutledg e defended th e strength o f the Constitution' s safeguard s agains t abuse s of powe r b y officeholders an d argue d tha t rotatio n i n offic e wa s un necessary and undesirable. The convention ratified b y a vote of 149 to 73. 43

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Later Life and Judicial Career When the Constitutio n too k effect , Presiden t Georg e Washington of fered hi s old an d esteeme d frien d Joh n Rutledg e th e senio r associat e justiceship o f the United State s Suprem e Cour t i n September 1789. 44 Rutledge late r sai d tha t onl y Washington' s complimentar y persona l letter, which appeale d t o hi s patriotic duty , induce d hi m t o resig n a s chancellor o f Sout h Carolin a an d accep t th e appointment . Privately , he was disgruntled tha t h e had no t bee n offere d th e chief justiceship . Rutledge believe d tha t hi s own lega l knowledge an d experienc e gav e him a better clai m t o hea d th e hig h cour t tha n Washington' s choice , John Jay.45 His lack of enthusiasm for the job, combined with his poor health and the rigors of travel on circuit, as well as for session s of the high court, explain s why Rutledge remaine d o n the Cour t fo r onl y a year and a half. Rutledge mad e n o significan t contribution s t o th e Court' s wor k during his short tenure as associate justice. He did not atten d it s February term in either 179 0 or 1791 . Rutledge did make the trip to New York fo r th e Augus t 179 0 term , bu t h e suffere d a painfu l attac k o f gout in the capital that prevented his presence at the brief two-day session. Since the Court heard no cases in any of its first three terms, Rutledge's absence was not o f vital importance. 46 Rutl.edge an d Justic e James Iredel l wer e assigne d t o th e Souther n Circuit—the Carolina s and Georgia—in 1790 . They held the first sessions of the Circuit Court in South Carolina and Georgia in the spring of 1790 , bu t th e Nort h Carolin a cour t ha d no t ye t bee n organized . Rutledge attende d th e fal l sessio n o f th e Circui t Cour t onl y i n Sout h Carolina. H e arrive d i n Savanna h fo r th e Georgi a sessio n five day s late, to find that the district judge had also been absent and Iredell had adjourned th e court . Anothe r sever e attac k o f gou t prevente d hi m from goin g on to New Ber n for th e North Carolin a session . The sessions that were held in 179 0 were occupied with admittin g attorney s and establishing rules of procedure. Like the other early justices, Rutledge, Iredell, and the district court judges who sat with them adopte d the rules of the stat e courts where the y met . They went beyon d thei r colleagues i n adoptin g th e sam e principl e fo r equit y proceeding s a s well. No cases were decided on the Southern Circuit during Rutledge's tenure.47

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Rutledge was involved in one incident of potential importance dur ing his brief stint on the Court. In the fall of 1790, he was one of three justices who grante d Rober t Morris' s reques t fo r a writ o f certiorar i to transfe r a sui t t o whic h Morri s wa s a party fro m th e Nort h Car olina Superior Cour t to the U.S. Circuit Court . The case arose from a dispute betwee n Morris an d som e of his former partners—citizen s o f a differen t state—ove r financial responsibilit y fo r a shi p tha t th e British ha d capture d durin g th e War fo r Independence . Th e justices ' action revive d Antifederalis t fear s tha t th e Constitutio n imperile d state sovereignt y b y extending federa l jurisdiction . Certiorar i wa s b y common-law definitio n a n orde r fro m a superior t o a n inferior cour t based o n th e latter' s presumabl y imprope r o r biase d activity . Nort h Carolinians i n general , an d Antifederalist s elsewhere , coul d no t ac cept either the inferiority o f the highest state court to the U.S. Circuit Court or the implication of impropriety. The North Carolin a Superio r Court refuse d t o obe y th e order , denyin g tha t th e federa l court s ha d any authorit y i n th e matter , an d th e stat e legislatur e approve d tha t stand. The federa l judges , now unsur e o f thei r ground , di d no t pres s the issue, and a clash that might have damaged th e national judiciar y was avoided. 48 Rutledge' s actio n i n granting th e writ seem s inconsistent wit h hi s desire at th e Constitutiona l Conventio n t o limi t federa l jurisdiction. Perhaps he had changed his mind, or perhaps he believed that th e Constitutio n an d th e Judiciar y Ac t o f 178 9 authorize d th e writ an d he therefore fel t compelled t o grant it . Rutledge resigne d fro m th e Suprem e Cour t i n Marc h 179 1 t o become chief justice of the South Carolina Cour t of Common Plea s and General Sessions. 49 Most o f the cases that tha t cour t heard were rou tine. Nevertheless, Rutledge' s recorde d opinion s a s chief justic e pro vide some insight into his judicial philosophy . Rutledge's jurisprudenc e wa s roote d i n a dee p respec t fo r Englis h legal tradition, instille d durin g his legal education. He wrote in 176 9 that Coke' s Institutes wer e "almos t th e foundatio n o f ou r law, " an d found Blackston e "useful." 50 Rutledge' s judicia l opinion s generall y followed statut e law , common law , an d precedent . H e believe d tha t the courts must follow established legal constructions. Changes in the law wer e th e busines s o f legislatures , an d legislator s shoul d clearl y stipulate an y changes that the y wante d t o make . Rutledge expresse d this philosophy i n a case involving the order in which the debts of a n insolvent estate should b e paid. Specifically, were notes of hand in the

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same category with bonds , or did they fall under the heading of othe r debts? Rutledge, delivering the unanimous decision of the court, ruled that a conversation among several representatives was inadmissible as evidence o f th e legislature' s intent . "I f w e onc e admi t o f supposi tions," Rutledge wrote, "w e may suppose anything" about legislativ e intent; "an d on e judge may suppose one thing, and another judg e another thing. We have no rule to govern us , but, construing the act according to the legal and technical meaning, we stand on firm ground." "The lega l an d technica l meaning " o f a n ac t depende d o n it s clea r wording an d o n precedent . "I t i s o f grea t consequenc e t o ever y fre e country, that the laws should be fixed and settled; and that when they are so, and generally known an d understood , that they should no t b e changed by implication, or otherwise than by a clear, express and positive declaration o f th e will o f th e legislature. " Th e sam e philosoph y underlay Rutledge's ruling that Sout h Carolina's debt-installment la w did no t alte r th e principl e o f "th e commo n la w o r statut e o f frauds " that a judgment fo r deb t wa s fo r th e whol e amount , no t jus t th e in stallments due at the time of the judgment. 51 State v. Washington, Rutledge' s first cas e a s chie f justice , occa sioned perhaps the best extant display of his technical virtuosity in the law. H e delivere d th e court' s opinio n upholdin g a convictio n fo r forgery o f a state indent and receipt, which had bee n appealed o n the grounds of technical deficiency i n the wording o f the indictment. Th e appellant als o allege d tha t indent s an d receipt s wer e no t writing s obligatory withi n th e scop e o f th e applicabl e law . Rutledge's unusu ally lengthy opinio n wa s notabl e fo r it s close an d detaile d reasonin g on the technical issues and its careful applicatio n o f common law and precedent. He also emphasized that the jury was the judge of fact—in cluding, i n this case , the inten t t o defraud—an d th e cour t coul d no t question the jury's decision o n matters o f fact. 52 A few of Rutledge's rulings departed fro m hi s usual judicial philosophy. He occasionally decided exceptional cases on the basis of equity or practical political considerations. There was, for example , the case of a slave woman who was allowed to find her own employment an d keep he r earning s afte r payin g he r owne r a fixed sum . Whe n th e woman used her money to buy a slave girl in order to set her free, th e woman's maste r claime d ownershi p o f th e girl . Legally, he argued, a slave's property belonge d t o he r master . Rutledg e instructe d th e jur y that th e maste r ha d receive d th e stipulate d incom e fro m hi s slav e

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woman. He was entitled to no more, and the jury should not "do such manifest violenc e to s o singular an d extraordinar y a n ac t o f benevo lence." His instructions reste d o n principles o f equity , which counse l for the defense had argued should override the letter of the law in this case.53 Though Rutledge never questioned the legitimacy of slavery— indeed, he fought har d to protect it during the Federal Convention of 1787—he coul d apparentl y b e touche d o n occasio n b y manifes t in justice to an individual slave. Political considerations influenced Rutledg e when a former Loyal ist sought a new trial to regain ownership of a slave taken and sold by patriot militi a unde r wha t th e militi a terme d "Sumter' s law " durin g the war. Twice before, judges had given jury charges favoring the Loyalist, an d twic e jurie s ha d returne d contrar y verdict s i n a n apparen t display of bias against Tories. The court granted the motion for a third trial, bu t Rutledg e dissented . "A s this wa s a disput e abou t propert y taken during the war, it was best that there should be an end of it," he remarked.54 Th e Wa r fo r Independenc e i n Sout h Carolin a ha d in cluded a bitter civi l war betwee n patriot s an d Loyalists , especially i n 1780 an d 1781 , that lef t lastin g enmitie s amon g man y o f th e state' s citizens. Rutledge believed it prudent to let this case rest. Rutledge's lif e outsid e th e courtroo m i n th e earl y 1790 s becam e emotionally troubled. He sank into a depression so deep as to produce erratic and sometimes deranged behavior. His emotional problems apparently becam e seriou s afte r tw o death s i n 1792 . O n Apri l 22 Rut ledge's mother , Sara h Hex t Rutledge , passe d awa y a t sixty-eight . Some six weeks later, on June 6, his wife, Elizabeth, died after a brief illness.55 Rutledge was a "remarkabl y domestic " ma n who foun d hi s greatest pleasure "a t his own fireside." Th e loss in quick successio n o f the two mos t importan t wome n i n hi s life , especiall y hi s wife' s sudde n passing, was a terrible blo w to him . Rutledge withdre w int o length y periods of silent, solitary mourning. According to Ralph Izard, "Afte r the death o f his Wife, his mind wa s frequently s o much deranged , a s to b e in a great measure deprived o f his senses." 56 Bereavement was not the only source of Rutledge's depression. His physical health remained shaky , and hi s financial situation continue d to deteriorate. He realized that his debts were unpayable and all of his property woul d likel y b e lost. His eldest son , John Rutledge , Jr., an d his brothers, Edward an d Hugh Rutledge, became deeply involved by

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assuming obligations for his debts. Much of Rutledge's property went to John Jr. and Edward i n the 1790 s to compensate them for thei r assistance, perhap s t o th e disma y o f othe r creditors . Bu t i t wa s no t enough.57 In or before March 1795 , Rutledge executed a deed of trust that gave Hugh Rutledge and John Rutledge , Jr., the power to receive his income and sel l his remaining property, usin g the proceeds to pay his debts and reimburse the son for payment s he had made for hi s father. Rutledge almost immediately regretted the deed, but the trust remained i n effect a t least into 1797. 58 To be so dependent o n hi s fam ily was a serious blow to the personal morale of this proud aristocrat . In his depression, Rutledge' s behavio r becam e erratic. Charleston ian Willia m Rea d referre d i n 179 5 t o Rutledge' s "ma d frollick s an d inconsistent conduct. " I t also was reported a t that tim e that "severa l Grand Juries " ha d presente d Rutledg e "fo r wha t the y though t Mis conduct o r a t leas t Negligenc e o f hi s Duty. " Th e presentment s o f which evidenc e survives , though, wer e fo r tardiness , not conduc t o n the bench. 59 As far a s can b e determined fro m th e limited extan t evidence, Rutledge was a capable chief justice of South Carolin a despit e his emotional problems outside court. Indeed, that post of honor an d responsibility was one of the few things that sustained a degree of personal morale for him . By Jun e 1795 , Rutledg e ha d learne d tha t a positio n o f greate r honor an d responsibilit y woul d soo n b e vacant . Joh n Ja y ha d bee n elected governor o f New York, which would requir e him to resign a s chief justice of the United States . Rutledge wrote to Georg e Washington t o infor m th e president tha t h e was availabl e fo r th e post h e ha d desired si x years earlier. He stil l wanted i t to cap his career, erase his previous disappointment, and boost his morale. Rutledge was not unaware of the strain that the job would impos e on his ailing physique, but a 179 3 revisio n o f th e Judiciary Ac t o f 178 9 tha t require d eac h justice to ride circuit only once a year instead o f twice allowed him to hope that h e would b e able to perform th e requisite duties. 60 Washington receive d Rutledge' s lette r an d Jay's resignation o n th e same day : Jun e 30 , 1795 . Apparentl y unawar e o f Rutledge' s emo tional problems , th e presiden t immediatel y appointe d hi m chie f jus tice.61 I t wa s a reces s appointment , th e Senat e havin g recentl y ad journed unti l December . Before adjourning , o n June 24 , th e Senat e ratifie d th e treat y tha t Jay had brought back from Britai n earlier in the year. The vote was 20

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to 10 , following stric t party lines. When the treaty's previously secre t terms becam e public, there was a strong and widespread negativ e reaction t o a n agreemen t tha t man y considere d one-side d an d damag ing t o th e interest s an d hono r o f th e Unite d States . Th e Rutledg e brothers, who ha d bee n strongl y anti-Britis h sinc e the War fo r Inde pendence, were among the leaders of public protest against the treaty in South Carolina . After severa l day s o f crow d demonstration s i n th e streets o f Charleston, Rutledg e mad e a n impassione d speec h agains t th e treat y at a public meeting on July 16 . He probably had not yet learned of his appointment t o the chief justiceship . Having denounce d th e treaty in the stronges t terms , Rutledg e angril y declaime d tha t "h e ha d rathe r the President shoul d die , dearly a s he loves him, than h e should sig n that treaty." 62 The speech , mad e i n th e contex t o f disorderl y publi c protests , shocked Federalist s an d contribute d greatl y t o a rising oppositio n t o Rutledge's confirmatio n a s chie f justice . Hithert o see n a s a reliabl e Federalist, Rutledg e was suddenl y tie d i n Federalist mind s to a chain of threats running fro m th e Gene t affair , th e Democratic-Republica n Societies, an d th e Whiske y Rebellio n t o th e curren t Democratic-Re publican challenge over the Jay Treaty. "C[hief] Justices," wrote John Adams, "must not go to illegal Meetings and become popular orator s in favou r o f Sedition , no r inflam e th e popula r discontent s whic h ar e ill founded, no r propagate Disunion, Division, Contention, an d delu sion among the People." 63 This politicall y motivate d oppositio n strengthene d objection s t o Rutledge tha t alread y ha d arise n fro m question s abou t hi s characte r and competence. It was reported widely , and apparentl y with consid erable truth , tha t Rutledg e wa s "derange d i n hi s mind, " frequentl y drunk, indecorous in public, and unethical in his financial dealings. If true, these reports alone disqualified hi m for high office i n the opinion of men like Alexander Hamilton. 64 Federalists believed that an experimental ne w governmen t neede d gentleme n o f influence , character , and ability in positions of leadership to help it survive challenges fro m a disorderl y populac e infecte d wit h Frenc h revolutionar y ideas . Rut ledge share d th e Federalis t belie f i n elit e leadership , bu t Federalist s saw his conduct a s a betrayal o f them an d o f hi s own principles . Political opposition to the nomination an d doubts about Rutledge's per sonal fitness t o serv e wer e inseparabl y intertwined . Rutledge' s de-

John Rutledge 8 7 rangement, som e Federalists thought , explaine d hi s Jay Treaty speech , and "th e craz y speech " prove d hi s menta l incapacity. 65 Despite th e controvers y swirlin g aroun d him , Rutledg e behave d with dignit y whe n h e wen t t o Philadelphi a t o presid e a s interi m chie f justice ove r th e August ter m o f th e Suprem e Court . H e participate d i n two decisions , bot h involvin g th e legalit y o f shi p seizure s b y Frenc h privateers. I n Talbot v. Jansen, Rutledg e concurre d wit h a unanimou s Court i n invalidatin g th e captur e o f a Dutc h shi p b y wha t wa s rule d to b e an America n vesse l fraudulently operatin g a s a French privateer . The ship , he ruled , wa s illegall y fitte d ou t i n th e Unite d States , an d it s prize wa s take n i n violatio n o f internationa l la w an d o f Unite d State s treaty obligation s t o Holland. Th e decision supporte d Washingto n ad ministration neutralit y polic y tha t Frenc h privateer s coul d no t b e fitted ou t an d manne d i n U.S. ports. I n United States v. Peters, h e deliv ered th e majorit y decisio n tha t a Frenc h privatee r coul d no t b e de tained i n a United State s port b y order o f a federal cour t t o answe r fo r the legalit y o f a seizur e mad e o n th e hig h sea s an d take n t o a Frenc h port. Th e tria l o f prize s an d applicatio n o f internationa l la w i n suc h a case la y exclusivel y wit h Frenc h courts. 66 Thes e case s contribute d t o the definitio n o f Unite d State s maritim e an d neutralit y law . Rutledge continue d t o behav e circumspectl y throug h th e fal l o f 1795 a s the controvers y ove r hi s nominatio n mounted . H e woul d no t recant hi s oppositio n t o th e Ja y Treaty , bu t h e kep t quie t an d live d "very muc h retired " unti l h e embarke d o n hi s fal l tou r o f th e South ern Circuit . H e participate d i n fifteen decisions , mostly involvin g shi p seizures, a t th e Charlesto n sessio n o f th e Cour t fro m Octobe r 2 6 t o November 5 . Despite poo r health , h e journeyed o n t o Augusta , Geor gia, bu t coul d d o n o busines s ther e becaus e th e distric t judg e wa s ab sent, th e cler k ha d died , an d th e record s wer e no t available . Rutledg e then se t ou t fo r Raleigh , Nort h Carolina , th e las t sto p o n th e circuit . On Novembe r 2 1 , a fe w hour s afte r h e lef t Evan s Taver n o n Lynch' s Creek, h e becam e to o il l t o g o on . Afte r recuperatin g fo r a whil e a t Evans's, h e heade d fo r home. 6 7 This experienc e force d Rutledg e t o fac e th e fac t tha t h e wa s no t physically equa l t o th e demand s o f Suprem e Cour t service . That real ization gav e a final, crushin g blo w t o hi s alread y depresse d spirits . H e had los t hi s wife , hi s mother , muc h o f hi s property , an d contro l ove r what propert y remained . Alread y dependen t o n hi s brother s an d el dest son , h e face d th e prospectiv e los s o f al l o f hi s propert y an d wit h

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it the remnants o f the personal independenc e tha t eighteenth-centur y gentlemen s o highly valued . Th e publi c attack s o n hi s character ha d badly damage d hi s reputation , an d hi s confirmatio n a s chie f justic e was very much i n doubt. No w h e knew that h e could no t d o the jo b in any case. The proud aristocra t conclude d tha t h e had no reason t o live. He attempted suicid e by drowning at Camden on the way home. Rutledge's famil y watche d hi m closely to prevent anothe r suicid e at tempt, but they were not vigilant enough. On December 2 6 or 27, he left hom e before daw n and again tried to drown himself in the Ashley River. Blacks working nearby rescued him despite his protests. 68 After thi s second failure to take his own life, Rutledge became calm and rational. On December 28,1795, he resigned as chief justice, stating that h e had foun d hi s health "totall y unequa l t o the discharg e of the dutie s o f the Office. " H e apparentl y ha d no t yet learne d tha t th e Senate had rejecte d hi s nomination b y a vote o f 1 4 to 1 0 on Decem ber 15. It was a straight party-line vote that reproduced the alignment on th e Ja y Treaty , excep t fo r th e Federalis t senato r Jaco b Rea d o f South Carolina , wh o vote d t o confirm Rutledg e i n the belie f tha t hi s rejection woul d badl y damag e th e Federalis t Part y i n hi s state. 69 Doubts abou t Rutledge' s persona l fitness t o serv e an d politica l con siderations wer e bot h importan t t o th e outcome—an d inextricabl y linked—but the vote suggests that the political factor was the stronger one. The Senate's vote was significant a s a reflection of party conflict an d ideology in the 1790s. Its importance for the subsequent history of the Supreme Cour t i s debatable . On e schola r ha s argue d tha t ha d Rut ledge been confirmed, an d had he remained in office unti l his death in 1800, Olive r Ellswort h woul d no t hav e bee n chie f justic e i n the lat e 1790s, an d th e timin g o f Rutledge' s deat h woul d hav e mad e Joh n Marshall's appointment as his successor unlikely. 70 That conclusion is questionable. I f i n fact Rutledg e resigne d befor e learnin g o f th e Sen ate's vote on his confirmation, th e outcome of that vote was irrelevant to th e subsequen t personne l o f th e Court . Washingto n woul d hav e had t o appoin t a ne w chie f justic e earl y i n 179 6 eve n i f Rutledge' s nomination ha d bee n confirmed . Presumably , th e resul t woul d hav e been the same , and subsequen t judicia l histor y woul d hav e bee n un affected. Whethe r or not Rutledge would have resigned for health reasons if there had bee n no opposition to his confirmation is , of course, another question .

John Rutledge 8 9 Rutledge remaine d rationa l afte r hi s 179 5 suicid e attempts . H e lived i n seclusio n fo r mor e tha n tw o years , preoccupied wit h hi s debt s for a t leas t part o f that period . A t som e tim e afte r Augus t 1797 , he resumed contro l o f hi s ow n financial affairs . I n Ma y 179 8 h e suddenl y returned t o societ y i n a burs t o f hig h spirits . Rutledge' s improve d mood di d no t reflec t a chang e i n hi s fortunes . Betwee n 179 8 an d 1800, forty-on e judgment s fo r deb t wer e entere d agains t hi m i n th e Charleston Distric t Cour t o f Commo n Pleas . Bu t locally , a t least , hi s name continue d t o comman d respect . H e wa s electe d t o th e stat e House o f Representative s i n a December 179 8 specia l electio n t o fill a vacancy fro m Charleston . H e die d o n July 18 , 1800. 71

Conclusion John Rutledge' s majo r contributio n t o the constitutional histor y o f th e United State s was his significant rol e at the Philadelphia conventio n o f 1787. A s chairma n o f th e Committe e o f Detail , h e ha d muc h t o d o with th e enumeratio n o f Congress' s power s an d insertio n o f th e nec essary and proper clause . He fought, wit h partial success , to secure th e interests o f th e southernmos t state s o n slavery , th e slav e trade , an d commercial matters . H e ha d a n importan t han d i n securin g th e Con stitution's supremac y clause . Hi s willingnes s t o compromis e hi s de sires helpe d t o ensur e th e succes s o f th e convention . Rutledge decide d n o case s durin g hi s servic e a s associat e justic e o f the Unite d State s Suprem e Cour t i n 179 0 an d 1791 . His contributio n during tha t perio d wa s t o hel p ope n an d organiz e th e Circui t Cour t i n South Carolin a an d Georgia . A s interi m chie f justic e i n 1795 , Rut ledge participated i n two cases, both involvin g shi p seizures. Althoug h his rol e wa s no t pivotal , hi s opinion s helpe d defin e Unite d State s la w on neutralit y an d maritim e issues , and supporte d th e Washington ad ministration's neutralit y policy . The bes t exposition s o f Rutledge' s judicia l philosoph y wer e con tained i n hi s opinion s o n th e Sout h Carolin a bench . Ther e hi s ju risprudence reflecte d adherenc e t o commo n law , statut e law , an d precedent. Establishe d lega l constructions , h e believed , shoul d b e up held; th e court s shoul d leav e lega l innovatio n t o legislators , i n th e be lief tha t fixed an d know n law s wer e importan t t o liberty . Togethe r with hi s rol e a t th e Federa l Conventio n o f 1787 , Rutledge' s greates t

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services came in the Continenta l an d Confederatio n Congresses , an d in all three branches of colonial and stat e government. His two terms as wartim e chie f executiv e o f Sout h Carolin a stan d ou t amon g hi s contributions a t th e stat e level . History ha s generall y give n hi m du e credit for hi s achievements. NOTES

1. Hele n Koh n Hennig , Great South Carolinians; From Colonial Days to the Confederate War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolin a Press , 1940; reprint, Freeport, N.Y. : Book s fo r Libraries , 1970) , 123-24 ; Henr y Flanders , The Lives and Times of the Chief Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, vol . 1 (Philadelphia: T. & J. W.Johnson & Co. , 1881), 477-78,481; Liste des Membre s et Officiers d u Congres, 1788, Max Farrand, ed., The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, rev . ed. , 4 vols . (Ne w Haven : Yal e Universit y Press , 1940) , 3:238. 2. Flanders , Lives of Chief Justices, 1:600-601 ; Davi d Ramsay , The History of South Carolina, from Its First Settlement in 1670, to the Year 1808, 2 vols . (Charleston, S.C. : Davi d Longworth , 1809) , 2:271 . 3. Flanders , Lives of Chief Justices, 1:478 . 4. Alexande r Garden , Anecdotes of the Revolutionary War . . . (Charleston , S.C.: A . E. Walker, 1822) , 176 ; Charles Fraser , Reminiscences of Charleston . . . (Charleston, S.C. : Gamie r 8 c Co., 1854) , 71. 5. Note s from Ann a Wells Rutledge, Aug. 4,1977, Rutledg e file, genealogical materials, South Carolin a Historica l Society , Charlesto n (hereafte r SCHS) ; Ram say, History of South Carolina, 2:269 . 6. Walte r B . Edgar an d N . Louise Bailey, Biographical Directory of the South Carolina House of Representatives, vol . 2 (Columbia : Universit y o f Sout h Car olina Press , 1977) , 571-73 , 576-77 ; Colonia l Plats , 1:305 , Sout h Carolin a De partment o f Archives and History, Columbia (hereafte r SCAr) ; Robert Johnson t o Peter Lehup, Oct. 29,1732, quote d i n Hoyt P . Canady, Jr., Gentlemen of the Bar: Lawyers in Colonial South Carolina (Ne w York: Garland Publishing , 1987) , 298; wills o f Hug h Hext , Wil l Boo k 3:12-15 , an d o f Sara h Fenwick , Wil l Boo k 2:55-57, Probat e Court , Charlesto n Count y Courthouse , Charleston , S.C . 7. Hennig , Great South Carolinians, 109 ; Flanders , Lives of Chief Justices, 1:436; Canady , Gentlemen of Bar, 182 ; Edga r an d Bailey , Biographical Directory, 2:578 . 8. Judgmen t Rolls , Court o f Commo n Pleas , SCAr; Ramsay, History of South Carolina, 2:269 ; Canady, Gentlemen of Bar, 272 , 274, 276-78, 291; " Jo u r n a l o f Josiah Quincy , Junior , 1773, " Massachusetts Historical Society Proceedings 4 9

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(1915-1916): 446-47 ; Mabe l L . Webber , "Dr . Joh n Rutledg e an d Hi s Descen dants," South Carolina Historical & Genealogical Magazine 3 1 (1930) : 17-19 ; Edgar an d Bailey , Biographical Directory, 2:578 . 9. Edga r an d Bailey , Biographical Directory, 2:580-81 ; Jack P . Greene, The Quest for Power; The Lower Houses of Assembly in the Southern Royal Colonies, 1689-1776 (Chape l Hill: University of North Carolin a Pres s for th e Institute o f Earl y America n Histor y an d Culture , 1963) , 485; Commons Hous e o f Assembly Journals, 1761-1775 , SCAr . 10. Sila s Deane, Diary, [Oct. 5,1774], Paul H. Smith, ed., Letters of Delegates to Congress, 1774-1789, 2 2 vols , t o dat e (Washington , D.C. : Librar y o f Con gress, 1976-) , 1:144 ; Oliver M . Dickerson , The Navigation Acts and the American Revolution (Philadelphia : Universit y o f Pennsylvani a Press , 1951) , 208-26 ; Philip M . Hame r e t al. , The Papers of Henry Laurens, 1 3 vols , to dat e (Colum bia: University o f Sout h Carolin a Pres s for th e Sout h Carolin a Historica l Society , 1968-), 5 : 283-84 , 396-400 , 464 , 679-80 , 722-23 ; 6:5n , 31 , 295-383 , 400 , 455-567; 7:96 ; South Carolina Gazette (Charleston) , Sept . 7 , 2 1, 1767, July 11 , 18, 1768 . 11. Jame s Haw , "Th e Rutledges , th e Continenta l Congress , an d Indepen dence," South Carolina Historical Magazine 9 4 (1993) : 233-43. 12. Ibid. , 243 , 249 ; Feb . 11 , 1776 , Willia m Edwi n Hemphil l an d Wylm a Anne Waites , eds. , Extracts from the Journals of the Provincial Congresses of South Carolina, 1775-1776 (Columbia : Sout h Carolin a Archive s Department , 1960), 185 ; George Van Santvoord, Sketches of the Lives and Judicial Services of the Chief-Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States (Ne w York: Charle s Scribner, 1854) , 110 ; Draf t o f Temporar y Constitution , Mar . 26 , 1776 , Sout h Carolina Papers , Sout h Carolinian a Library , Universit y o f Sout h Carolina , Co lumbia. 13. Henr y Lumpkin , Prom Savannah to Yorktown: The American Revolution in the South (Columbia : Universit y o f Sout h Carolin a Press , 1981) , 10-26 ; William Moultrie , Memoirs of the American Revolution . . . , vol. 2 (Ne w York : David Longworth , 1802 ; reprint, Ne w York : Arno Press , 1968) , 282-84 . 14. Davi d Ramsay , The History of the Revolution of South-Carolina, from a British Province to an Independent State, vol . 1 (Trenton , N.J. : Isaa c Collins , 1785), 132-38 ; Jerome J . Nadelhaft , The Disorders of War: The Revolution in South Carolina (Orono : University o f Main e a t Oron o Press , 1981) , 38. 15. South Carolina & American General Gazette (Charleston) , Feb . 11 , 1779. 16. Lumpkin , Savannah to Yorktown, 41-49 . 17. Moultrie , Memoirs, 2:105 ; James Duan e t o Georg e Washington , Ma y 9 , 1780, Smith , ed. , Letters of Delegates, 15:97-98 ; Willia m Edwi n Hemphill , Wylma Anne Waites, and Nichola s Olsberg , eds., Journals of the General Assem-

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bly and House of Representatives, 1776-1780 (Columbia : Universit y o f Sout h Carolina Pres s fo r th e Sout h Carolin a Departmen t o f Archive s an d History , 1970), 252, 268. 18. J . Rutledg e t o Horatio Gates , July 4, 1780 , Gates Papers, New Yor k His torical Society , and to S. C. Delegates in Congress, Mar. 8,1781 , "Letter s of John Rutledge," annotate d b y Joseph W . Barnwell , South Carolina Historical & Genealogical Magazine 1 8 (1917) : 135-36 . 19. Th e source s o n Rutledge' s activitie s i n 178 0 an d 178 1 ar e to o numerou s and scattere d t o detail here. They are fully documente d i n my book John and Edward Rutledge of South Carolina (Athens : University o f Georgi a Press , 1997) . 20. A . S . Salley , ed. , Journal of the House of Representatives of South Carolina, January 8, 1782-February 26, 1782 (Columbia : Historical Commissio n o f South Carolina, 1916) , 38. The principal source s on Rutledge's congressional ser vice are Worthington Chaunce y Ford , ed., Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774-1789, 3 4 vols . (Washington , D.C. : Governmen t Printin g Office , 1904-1937), vols . 22-24, an d Smith , ed., Letters of Delegates, vol . 19 . 21. Ford , ed., Journals of Congress, 27:710 , 29:497; Richard Henr y Le e to J. Rutledge, Jan. 24 , 1785 , J. Rutledg e t o Presiden t o f Congress , Mar . 26 , Aug. 1 , 1785, Papers o f th e Continenta l Congress , National Archives , Washington, D.C . 22. Nathanae l Green e to Henry Lee , Aug. 19 , 1781, in Henry Lee , The Campaign of 1781 in the Carolinas . . . (Philadelphia : n . p. , 1824 ; reprint, Chicago : Quadrangle Books , 1962), appendix, xvi; John Sandfor d Dar t to Thomas Sumter , Sep. 14 , 1781 , Thomas Sumte r Papers , Librar y o f Congress , Washington , D . C ; Van Santvoord , Sketches of Chief-Justices, 187 ; J. Rutledg e t o Jacob Read , [Jan . 26, 1783] , Edmund C . Burnett, ed. , Letters of Members of the Continental Congress, 1 0 vols . (Washington , D . C : Carnegi e Institution , 1921-1936 ; reprint , Gloucester, Mass. : Peter Smith , 1963) , 7:200 . 23. Report s o f Senat e Committee , Dec . 17 , 1791 , an d Hous e Committee , Dec. 13 , 1791, on Petitio n o f J. Rutledge, Genera l Assembly Papers, ser. 4, 1791, no. 24, 60, SCAr; Edward Rutledge to John Rutledge, Jr., Nov. 1,1797, John Rut ledge Jr . Papers , Duk e University , Durham , N . C ; Charle s Greg g Singer , South Carolina in the Confederation (Philadelphia : Universit y o f Pennsylvani a Press , 1941), 14 , 1 7 - 2 0 , 2 2 , 2 4 . 24. Va n Santvoord, Sketches of Chief-Justices, 152-53 ; Liste des Membres e t Officiers d u Congres , 1788 , Farrand, ed. , Records, 3:238 . 25. Th e bes t sourc e o n th e 1780 s i s Nadelhaft , Disorders of War. Fo r Rut ledge's role , se e th e publishe d journal s o f th e Hous e o f Representative s an d th e Charleston newspaper s fo r th e period . 26. Lar k Emerso n Adam s an d Ros a Stone y Lumpkin , eds. , Journals of the House of Representatives, 1785-1786 (Columbia : Universit y o f Sout h Carolin a Press fo r th e Sout h Carolin a Departmen t o f Archive s an d History , 1979) , 349 , 370, 382-83 , 396 , 398 ; Nadelhaft, Disorders of War, 174 ; Charleston Evening

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Gazette, Oct . 5 , 1785 , Feb . 8 , 1786 ; E . Rutledg e t o Jeremia h Wadsworth , Oct . 21, 1786 , cite d i n Richar d Bren t Clow , "Edwar d Rutledg e o f Sout h Carolina , 1749-1800: Unproclaime d Statesman " (Ph . D . diss. , Universit y o f Georgia , 1976), 228-29 . 27. J . Rutledg e t o E . Rutledge, July 30 , 1769 , in Rev. J. Adams, Laws of Success and Failure in Life . . . (Charleston , S.C. : A . E . Miller , 1833) , 51 ; Ramsay, History of Revolution of South Carolina, 1:136-37 ; Speec h o f J. Rutledge , Mar . 5, 1778 , Christophe r Gadsde n Papers , Sout h Carolinian a Library , Universit y o f South Carolina . 28. Jame s H . Hutson , ed. , Supplement to Max Farrand's The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 (Ne w Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), 109 ; Farrand, ed. , Records, 2:279 . 29. Farrand , ed., Records, 1:50 , 52,130-32 , 353-54, 359, 364-65,216, 392 , 420, 426-27 , 2:249, 251; Hutson, ed. , Supplement, 71 . 30. Car l Van Doren, The Great Rehearsal; The Story of the Making and Ratifying of the Constitution of the United States (Ne w York : Viking, 1948) , 1 6 n . 31. Farrand , ed. , Records, 1:163 , 192-93 , 196 , 201, 534, 536-37, 582 , 586 . 32. Ibid. , 509 , 516, 522-23. 33. Ibid. , 534 , 571, 582, 2:279-80 . 34. Ibid. , 1:549 , 2:13-15, 17-20 . 35. Ibid. , 1:65 , 68-69 , 79 , 81 , 88, 230, 2:22-24 , 50-51 , 57 , 61-62 , 64 , 66, 68, 70-71 , 80 , 97, 116-18 , 121-22 , 511. 36. Ibid. , 1:119 , 124-25 , 2:428. 37. Ibid. , 1:53-54 , 164 , 168 , 2:17, 22, 24, 28, 95, 97, 181-83 , 390-91 . 38. Ibid. , 2:48 . 39. Ibid. , 2:183 , 364, 373. 40. Ibid. , 366 , 374 , 396, 408, 446-49, 452 . 41. Ibid. , 322 , 324, 327 . 42. Clinto n Rossiter , 1787: The Grand Convention (Ne w York : Macmillan , 1966), 247-49 ; Ma x Farrand , The Framing of the Constitution of the United States (Ne w Haven : Yal e University Press , 1913) , 196-99 . 43. Davi d Ramsa y t o Benjami n Rush , Feb . 17 , 1788 , Rober t L . Brunhouse , ed., "Davi d Ramsa y o n th e Ratificatio n o f th e Constitutio n i n Sout h Carolina , 1787-1788," Journal of Southern History 9 (1948) : 553 ; Jonathan Elliot , ed. , The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution . . . , 2nd ed. , vol . 4 (Philadelphia : J . D . Lippincott , 1888 ; reprint , New York : Bur t Franklin , 1974) , 267-68 , 311-12 ; City Gazette (Charleston) , May 20 , 21, 16, 1788 . 44. Washingto n t o J. Rutledge , Sept . 29 , 1789 , Maeva Marcu s an d James R . Perry, eds., The Documentary History of the Supreme Court of the United States, 1789-1800, 5 vols, to dat e (Ne w York : Columbi a Universit y Press , 1985-) , 1:2 0 (hereafter DHSC).

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45. Rutledg e t o Washington , Oct . 27 , 1789 , Jun e 12 , 1795 , DHSC, 1:22 , 94-95. Fo r hi s resignatio n a s chancellor , J . Rutledg e t o Gov . Charle s Pinckney , Dec. 17 , 1789 , General Assembl y Papers , ser. 6, no. 512, SCAr . 46. Fin e minute s o f Suprem e Court , 1790-1791 , James Iredel l t o Joh n Jay , William Cushing , an d Jame s Wilson , Feb . 11 , 1791, and Richar d Nichol s Hari son t o Rober t Morris , Sept . 7 , 1790 , DHSC, 1:171-91 , 2:132 , 87 ; Willia m Loughton Smit h t o E . Rutledge, July 30 , 1790 , William Loughto n Smit h Papers , SCHS. 47. Minut e books , U.S . Circui t Court s fo r N.C. , S.C. , Ga. , Federa l Recor d Center, Eas t Point , Ga. ; City Gazette, Oct . 26 , 29 , 1790 ; J . Iredel l t o Hanna h Iredell, Oct . 30 , 1790 , DHSC, 2:103-4 ; Juliu s Goebel , Jr. , The Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise History of the Supreme Court of the United States: Antecedents and Beginnings to 1801 (Ne w York : Macmillan, 1971) , 580-81 . 48. Wyth e Hol t an d Jame s R . Perry , "Writ s an d Rights , flashing s an d ani mosities': The First Confrontation betwee n Federal and Stat e Jurisdictions," Law and History Review 7 (1989) : 89-120 . 49. Rutledg e t o Washington, Mar . 5 , 1791 , DHSC, 1:23 . 50. J . Rutledg e t o E . Rutledge, July 30 , 1769 , Adams, Laws of Success, 51 . 51. Executors of Rippon v. Executors of Townsend (1795) , Tucker v. Lowndes (1791) , Elih u Hal l Bay , Reports of Cases Argued and Determined in the Superior Courts of Law in the State of South Carolina, since the Revolution, vol . 1 (New York: I. Riley, 1809) , 445, 213-14 . 52. State v. Washington (1791) , 1 Bay 120 . 53. The Guardian of Sally, a Negro, v. Beatty (1792) , 1 Bay 260. 54. Administrators of Moore v. Cherry (1792) , 1 Bay 269. 55. Webber , "Dr . John Rutledge, " 15 , 18; City Gazette, Apr . 27, 1792 ; Smith to E . Rutledge , Feb . 13 , 1792 , Georg e C . Rogers , ed. , "Th e Letter s o f Willia m Loughton Smit h t o Edwar d Rutledge , Jun e 6 , 178 9 t o Apri l 28 , 1794, " South Carolina Historical Magazine 6 9 (1968) : 236 ; Flanders , Lives of Chief Justices, 1:628. 56. Flanders , Lives of Chief Justices, 1:628 , 631 ; Mary Bra y Wheele r an d Genon Hickerso n Neblett , Chosen Exile: The Life and Times of Septima Sexta Middleton Rutledge, American Cultural Pioneer (Nashville : Rutledg e Hil l Press , 1980), 18 , 33; Izard t o Read , Nov. 17 , 1795 , DHSC, 1:807 . 57. J . Rutledge, Jr., memorandum, Ma y 1797 , and E. Rutledge to J. Rutledge , Jr., Apr. 24, 1794 , John Rutledg e Jr. Papers, Duke University; Charleston Count y Court o f Equit y Bills , 1803 , no. 29, SCAr. 58. Accoun t o f J. Rutledg e wit h J . Rutledge , Jr., n . d. , wit h J . Rutledge , Jr.' s notation, Ma y 1797 , and J. Rutledge , Jr., memo an d statemen t o f accounts , Ma y 1797, John Rutledge , Jr. Papers, Duke University . 59. Willia m Rea d t o J . Read , Jul y 27 , 1795 , Rea d Famil y Correspondence , SCHS; J. Adam s t o Abigai l Adams , Dec . 21, 1795, DHSC, 1:816 ; for reference s

John Rutledge 95 to presentments , Joh n C . Meleney , The Public Life of Aedanus Burke: Revolutionary Republican in Post Revolutionary South Carolina (Columbia : Universit y of Sout h Carolin a Press , 1989) , 245 , an d Joh n Belto n O'Neall , Biographical Sketches of the Bench and Bar of South Carolina, vol . 1 (Charleston, S.C. : S . G . Courtney 5 c Co., 1859) , 26-27 . 60. J . Rutledge to Washington, June 12 , 1795, DHSC, 1:94-95 ; Charle s War ren, The Supreme Court in United States History, rev . ed., vol . 1 (Boston: Little , Brown, 1937) , 89 . 61. Washingto n t o J. Rutledge , July 1 , 1795 , DHSC, 1:96-97 . 62. Georg e S . McCowan , Jr. , "Chie f Justic e Joh n Rutledg e an d th e Ja y Treaty," South Carolina Historical & Genealogical Magazine 62 (1961) : 13-14 ; Flanders, Lives of Chief Justices, 1:633 ; W. Read t o J. Read , July 2 1, 1795, Read Family Correspondence , SCHS ; South Carolina State Gazette (Charleston) , Jul y 17, 1795 , DHSC, 1:765-67 . It is not entirel y clea r whe n Rutledg e learne d o f hi s appointment. Leo n Fried man, "Joh n Rutledge, " i n Leon Friedma n an d Fre d L . Israel, eds., The Justices of the United States Supreme Court, 1789-1969: Their Lives and Major Opinions, vol. 1 (New York: R. R . Bowker, 1969) , 45, calculates that Rutledg e shoul d hav e heard o f th e appointmen t befor e th e speech . Edmun d Randolp h t o Washington , July 29 , 1795 , DHSC, 1:773 , agreed . Warren, Supreme Court, 1:129 , states tha t Rutledge receive d hi s commissio n o n Jul y 24 , afte r th e speech . W . Rea d t o J . Read, July 21 and 27, 1795 , Read Famil y Correspondence, SCHS , supports War ren. Read commented o n the speech in both letters but reacted to the appointmen t only in the secon d one . 63. J . Adam s t o A . Adams, Dec. 17 , 1795 , DHSC, 1:813 . 64. Randolp h t o Washington , Jul y 25 , 1795 , William Van s Murray t o Jame s McHenry, Dec . 24 , 1795 , Stephe n Higginso n t o Timoth y Pickering , Aug . 29 , 1795, J. Adam s t o A . Adams, Dec . 21, 1795, A. Adams t o John Quinc y Adams , Nov. 29 , 1795 , Columbian Centinel (Boston) , Aug. 26 , 1795 , Aurora (Philadel phia), Oct . 20 , 1795 , Alexander Hamilto n t o Rufu s King , Dec . 14 , 1795 , ibid. , 772, 817 , 793, 816, 819 , 784-86, 804-5 , 811-12 . 65. Willia m Bradford , Jr. , to Hamilton , Aug . 4, 1795 , Randolph t o Washing ton, July 29 , 1795 , ibid., 775 , 773. 66. Pierc e Butler t o Aedanu s Burke , Oct . 10 , 1795 , Pierce Butle r Letterbook , 1794-1822, Historica l Societ y o f Pennsylvania , Philadelphia ; Flanders , Lives of Chief Justices, 1:640 ; United States v. Peters (1795 ) an d Talbot v. Jansen (1795) , A. J. Dallas , Reports of Cases Ruled and Adjudged in the Several Courts of the United States . . ., 2n d ed. , vol. 3 (New York: Banks Publishing Co. , 1899) , 121, 131; William R . Casto , The Supreme Court in the Early Republic: The Chief Justiceships of John Jay and Oliver Ellsworth (Columbia : Universit y o f Sout h Car olina Press , 1995) , 77, 113. 67. W Rea d t o J . Read , Sep . 10 , Nov . 25 , 1795 , Rea d Famil y Correspon -

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dence, SCHS ; City Gazette, Nov . 6 , 1795 ; Minutes, U.S . Circuit Cour t fo r S.C. , Federal Recor d Center , Eas t Point , Ga. ; J . Rutledg e t o Washington , Dec . 28 , 1795, Aurora, Dec . 23, 1795, DHSC, 3:84-86 , 1:810 . 68. J . Adams to A. Adams, Dec. 21,1795, W. Read to J. Read, Dec. 29,1795, Columbian Centinel, Jan . 6 , 1796 , Rober t Lindsa y t o Samue l Johnson, Jan . 13 , 1796, Federal Gazette (Baltimore) , Jan. 8 , 1796 , Aurora, Feb . 3 , 1796 , DHSC, 1:816, 820-21 , 824 , 831 , 822, 826 . 69. W . Read t o J. Read , Dec . 29, 1795 , J. Rutledg e t o Washington , Dec . 28, 1795, Senat e Executiv e Journal, Dec . 15 , 1795, ibid., 820 , 100 , 98-99 . 70. Warren , Supreme Court, 1:139 . 71. W Rea d to J. Read, Aug. 19,1796 , Read Famil y Correspondence, SCHS; W Smit h to King , July 23, 1796, quoted i n Georg e C . Rogers, Jr., Evolution of a Federalist: William Loughton Smith of Charleston (1758-1812) (Columbia : University of South Carolina Press, 1962), 288; E. Rutledge to Henry Middleton Rut ledge, Nov. 1 , 1796 , Dreer Collection , Historical Societ y of Pennsylvania ; J. Rut ledge, Jr. to Robert Smith , Apr. 1 , 1798, Mar. 4, 1800 , and Frederic k Rutledg e t o J. Rutledge , Jr. , Mar . 2 1 , 1800 , Joh n Rutledge , Jr . Papers , Souther n Historica l Collection, University of North Carolina , Chapel Hill; J. Iredell to H. Iredell, May 8, 11-12 , 18 , 1798 , DHSC, 3:263-65 , 272-73 ; Judgmen t Rolls , 1798-1800 , Charleston District Court of Common Pleas, SCAr; City Gazette, Dec . 10,11,12 , 1798, July 24, 1800 .

Chapter 4

Deconstructing Willia m Cushin g Scott Douglas Gerber

Structuralism: The Dan Quayle of the Early American Republic Encyclopedia-Style Biographica l Entr y William Cushin g wa s bor n o n Marc h 1 , 1732 , i n Scituate , Massa chusetts, int o on e o f th e oldes t an d mos t powerfu l familie s i n th e colony. Hi s materna l grandfather , Josia h Cotton , wa s a count y judg e and membe r o f th e Genera l Court , a s wel l a s a grandso n o f th e Rev erend Joh n Cotton , th e theologica l gian t o f seventeenth-centur y Massachusetts. O n hi s father' s side , th e famil y descende d fro m Matthew Cushing , wh o settle d i n Hingham , Massachusetts , i n 1638 , and wa s ancesto r o f Thomas , Caleb , an d Luthe r S . Cushing . Willia m Cushing's grandfathe r an d fathe r bot h serve d a s members o f th e Gov ernor's Counci l an d o f th e Superio r Cour t o f Judicature , th e highes t court i n th e province . Cushin g graduate d fro m Harvar d Colleg e i n I like to think o f this essay as an exercise in "smal l 'd' " deconstruction . Wha t I mean b y that i s th e essa y attempt s t o revers e an d resituat e th e existin g conceptua l prioritie s upo n which th e various ordering s an d evaluation s o f William Cushin g thrive without forcin g th e reader to endure yet another exercis e in postmodern criticis m with it s attendant—often im penetrable—jargon. I thank Ji m Miclot , John Osborn , Scot t Roulier , Mar y An n Tetreault , and Bil l Weaver, each of whom i s skilled in the methodology o f postmodern theory , for thei r help in this regard. Thanks als o to Todd Ellinwood fo r hi s research assistance , to Mark Hal l for hi s twice reading the essay, to George Billias for hi s suggestions about historiography , t o Bill Casto for hi s thoughts o n textualism, an d t o Donald Dewe y and Her b Johnson fo r thei r strong support . Fo r a n exampl e o f th e variet y o f deconstructio n I attempt here , se e Mar y Ann Tetreault, "Deconstructin g th e Other : Teaching Politics of the Middle East, " PS: Political Science & Politics 2 9 (Decembe r 1996) : 696-700 .

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1751, studie d la w in the offic e o f a distinguished Bosto n attorney , an d was admitte d t o th e ba r i n 1755 . After practicin g la w briefl y i n hi s hometow n o f Scituate , Cushin g relocated t o Pownalboroug h (no w Dresden ) i n th e distric t o f Maine . Before th e move , h e wa s commissione d a s justic e o f th e peac e an d judge o f probate s fo r newly-create d Lincol n County . A s on e com mentator succinctl y put s it , "Fro m thi s modest beginnin g develope d a judicial caree r o f a ful l hal f century' s span , whic h wa s t o includ e ser vice i n nin e separat e judicia l position s an d embrac e th e caus e o f jus tice fo r th e Britis h Crown , a Revolutionar y province , a fre e Com monwealth, an d finally , th e Unite d States." 1 Wh y a ma n fro m s o prominent a family woul d choos e to bur y himsel f i n the frontier i s unclear. Cushing' s critic s maintai n tha t i t wa s becaus e h e wa s no t ver y bright. Hi s supporter s sugges t tha t i t ha d mor e t o d o wit h hi s desir e to mak e a reputatio n o f hi s own. 2 Cushing returne d fro m Main e i n 1771 . The occasio n fo r hi s retur n was hi s father' s retiremen t fro m th e Massachusett s Superio r Cour t o f Judicature an d William' s selection , throug h hi s father' s influence , a s successor. Willia m Cushin g wa s t o serv e o n th e variou s incarnation s of th e hig h cour t o f Massachusett s fro m 177 2 unti l hi s appointmen t to th e U.S . Supreme Cour t i n 1789 . William Cushin g wa s th e thir d justic e appointe d b y Presiden t George Washingto n t o th e origina l U.S . Suprem e Court . Generall y speaking, Cushin g wa s regarde d a s th e senio r associat e justice . Joh n Rutledge was appointed first afte r Chie f Justice John Jay, but Rutledg e never attende d a forma l sessio n o f th e Cour t (thoug h h e di d partici pate fro m hi s lodgin g i n variou s administrativ e matter s deal t wit h b y the Cour t an d rid e circuit) . Durin g Jay' s absenc e i n Englan d i n th e years 179 4 an d 1795 , Cushin g serve d a s acting-chie f justice . Afte r Jay's resignatio n an d th e Senate' s rejectio n o f Rutledge , Cushin g wa s nominated an d unanimousl y confirme d a s chie f justice . Cushin g hel d the chief justiceshi p fo r abou t a week i n 179 6 befor e h e decide d t o re sign th e cente r chai r fo r healt h reason s an d resum e hi s position a s se nior associat e justice. 3 The Conventiona l Wisdo m abou t Willia m Cushin g Surprisingly littl e has bee n writte n abou t Willia m Cushing . I n vie w of th e significan t contribution s Cushin g mad e t o America n la w an d

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politics throughou t hi s man y year s o f publi c life , th e ter m "surpris ingly little " i s applicable . The conventiona l wisdo m abou t Willia m Cushin g i s largel y nega tive i n outlook . Joh n D . Cushin g (n o relation) , autho r o f th e mos t comprehensive stud y o f Willia m Cushin g t o date , conclude s i n hi s 1959 Ph.D . dissertatio n tha t Cushing' s impressiv e resum e wa s mor e the produc t o f famil y an d politica l connection s tha n o f merit. 4 A s fa r as Cushing' s modes t plac e i n histor y i s concerned , thi s sam e schola r maintains, "I f th e maxi m 'A s yo u sow , als o shal l yo u reap ' i s valid, i t appears fro m al l availabl e evidenc e tha t posterit y ha s place d Cushin g in hi s rightfu l plac e i n history , o r clos e t o it." 5 Others shar e thi s unfavorabl e vie w o f Cushing . Donal d O . Dewe y opens hi s brie f essa y i n Melvi n I . Urofsky' s edite d collection , The Supreme Court Justices: A Biographical Dictionary, wit h th e unflat tering pronouncement tha t "Willia m Cushin g serve d longe r wit h min imal effec t tha n an y o f th e fourtee n Suprem e Cour t justice s whos e terms overlappe d his." 6 Herber t Ala n Johnso n expresse s a n equall y negative opinio n o f Cushin g whe n h e writes , "Throughou t hi s lif e Cushing wa s unsur e o f th e law ; decisio n fo r hi m wa s thu s a consulta tive rathe r tha n a deliberativ e process." 7 Still other scholar s insinuat e Cushin g wa s eithe r a dullard through out th e cours e o f hi s entir e life—on e stor y tha t i s repeate d i n almos t all th e biographica l account s i s ho w Cushin g allegedl y wa s s o bore d at th e Massachusett s Constitutiona l Conventio n o f 177 9 h e resorte d to making a list of materials h e would nee d fo r a new suit 8 —or a t leas t "somewhat senile " durin g muc h o f hi s tenur e o n th e U.S . Suprem e Court. 9 Wit h respec t t o Cushing' s interes t i n fabric , i t i s quit e a lea p of logi c to conclud e tha t becaus e h e too k a moment t o jo t dow n a de scription o f a sui t o f clothe s h e foun d attractive , h e wa s unintereste d in th e affair s o f state . Th e mor e reasonabl e suppositio n i s that Cush ing's fifty years o f publi c servic e signifie d a considerable interes t i n public affairs . As fa r a s Cushing' s bein g "somewha t senile " durin g muc h o f hi s tenure o n th e U.S. Supreme Cour t i s concerned, thi s charge i s also sus pect. Ther e is , after all , a differenc e betwee n bein g ol d an d sometime s ill—as Cushin g undoubtedl y was—an d bein g insan e o r "somewha t senile." A carefu l readin g o f th e summar y account s o f Cushing' s lif e reveals tha t th e disparagin g statement s abou t Cushing' s facultie s ar e supported b y littl e els e than Justic e Willia m Johnson' s assertio n i n a n

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1822 lette r t o Thoma s Jefferso n tha t "Cushin g wa s incompetent , Chase could no t b e got t o thin k o r write—Paterso n wa s a slow ma n and willingl y decline d th e Trouble, and th e othe r tw o [Marshal l an d Washington] . . . ar e commonl y estimate d a s on e Judge." 10 Wha t i s never mentioned is the fact that Justice Johnson was a Democratic-Republican, whereas Justice Cushing (an d the other justices attacked b y Johnson) was a Federalist. 11 Consequently, one reasonably may question Justic e Johnson' s objectivit y a s fa r a s hi s evaluatio n o f Justic e Cushing (an d hi s colleagues ) i s concerned. Frankly , th e Democratic Republican leadership' s well-known animosit y toward th e Federalistcontrolled federa l judiciary , coupled wit h th e vitriolic ton e o f Justice Johnson's letter, makes it difficult t o take Justice Johnson's character ization seriously . There hav e bee n a few favorabl e appraisal s o f William Cushing. 12 Unfortunately, suc h appraisals are dated and generally neglected. The more on e look s i n dept h a t Cushing' s career , however , th e mor e on e becomes impressed. This essay offers a fresh loo k at William Cushin g by actuall y examinin g hi s recor d rathe r tha n simpl y repeatin g wha t other scholar s hav e said before . Th e more on e reads the increasingl y popular encyclopedia-style biographical collections of Supreme Court justices, the mor e on e realize s th e essayist s merel y repeat—rephrase , but nevertheless repeat—wha t othe r essayist s have stated i n previou s collections/ Succinctl y put , ther e mus t b e reason s tha t preeminen t Founders suc h a s John Adam s an d Georg e Washington hel d Willia m Cushing in high regard fo r nearl y fifty years.13** * Cushing fares n o better outsid e the biographical encyclopedias . For example, Frank H . Easterbrook state s h e woul d hav e adde d Cushin g t o Davi d P . Currie's lis t o f th e "mos t in significant" justice s ever to serve on the Supreme Court, but for Cushing' s declining th e chief justiceship. Easterbrook writes : "[Cushing's ] singl e fortunate ac t o f declinin g the [chie f justice] pos t disqualifie s hi m fro m bein g Mos t Insignificant : ha d Cushin g take n th e job , Joh n Marshall neve r woul d hav e becom e Chie f Justice , an d w e woul d b e livin g i n a muc h changed nation. " Fran k H . Easterbrook , "Th e Mos t Insignifican t Justice : Furthe r Evi dence," University of Chicago Law Review 5 0 (Sprin g 1983) : 481, 484 n . l l . Se e generally David P . Currie, "Th e Mos t Insignifican t Justice : A Preliminary Inquiry, " ibid. , 466-80 . If Easterbrook seem s to believe that Cushin g did little more than ope n the door fo r John Mar shall, R . Ken t Newmyer , i n a n otherwis e super b biography , appear s t o sugges t tha t Cush ing's most importan t accomplishmen t wa s dying so the nation coul d hav e Joseph Story . See R. Ken t Newmyer , Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story: Statesman of the Old Republic (Chapel Hill : University o f North Carolin a Press , 1985) , 70 , 87 , 99, 407 n.81. **John Marshal l als o though t highl y o f Cushing . A Jun e 29 , 1807 , letter—th e tim e when critics allege Cushing was "somewha t senile"—finds Marshal l soliciting Cushing's ad -

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Reconstruction: A Force in American Law and Politics Ratifying th e Constitutio n William Cushing was not among the delegates who met in Philadelphia durin g the summer o f 178 7 to frame a new form o f governmen t for th e United State s of America. However, eve n Cushing's critics acknowledge h e played a significan t rol e i n securin g ratificatio n o f th e Constitution i n Massachusetts. 14 Give n tha t Massachusett s wa s on e of the most important state s in the Union an d tha t ratificatio n b y the commonwealth wa s far fro m certain, 15 this was a major contributio n indeed. Cushin g helpe d secur e ratification i n two principa l ways : (1) through a series of gran d jur y charge s that wer e designe d t o educat e the public abou t th e nee d fo r a new for m o f government , an d (2 ) by presiding ove r mos t o f th e ratifyin g conventio n sessions , which wer e held in Boston in January o f 1788 . As chief justice of Massachusetts, Cushing was in a unique position to apprise the public of the need to ratify th e proposed Constitution . A series o f well-receive d gran d jur y charge s delivere d shortl y befor e the ratifying conventio n assemble d foun d Cushin g making a passionate cas e fo r ratification . Th e followin g charg e i s representativ e o f Cushing's position o n this defining questio n o f the day: It seems to b e agreed tha t th e Confederatio n i s weak, withou t powers—to tally inadequat e t o al l grea t nationa l purposes—unabl e t o uphol d th e union—to protec t th e country—to pa y an y par t o f th e publi c deb t o r eve n the interest—tha t commerc e i s i n a wretche d situation , unregulated , un protected, unproductive o f revenue—that al l the world ar e become our car riers, excep t tha t w e ourselve s ar e i n a good manne r excluded ; ship-build ing and navigatio n i n a good manne r cease;—whil e . . . our carpenter s an d . . . honest seame n o n th e coast , wit h me n o f numerou s othe r trade s an d businesses dependan t upo n thos e no w b e still for wan t o f employ ; i n shor t the interest of all classes of men . . . i s essentially afflicte d fro m th e ocean t o the wilderness. 16 vice on severa l technica l aspect s o f Aaro n Burr' s treaso n trial . Whether Marshal l sough t the advice of hi s other Suprem e Cour t colleague s i s unclear. Marshall's lette r t o Cushin g suggests, however , tha t th e chie f justic e limite d hi s request s fo r advic e t o Cushin g an d Bushrod Washington. Se e Letter fro m Joh n Marshal l t o William Cushing , 29 June 1807 , in Charles F. Hobson, ed., The Papers of John Marshall, vol. 7 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolin a Press, 1993), 60-62. I thank Chuc k Hobson for bringin g this letter to my attention.

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In short, Cushing , lik e most Federalist s a t the time, saw ratificatio n of th e Constitutio n a s the bes t way , perhaps th e onl y way , to ensur e a stable an d effectiv e Union. 17 And fo r Cushing , a s for mos t Federalists , the most importan t differenc e betwee n th e proposed Constitutio n an d the existin g Article s o f Confederatio n wa s th e authorit y Congres s would enjo y unde r th e new for m o f government t o exercise on it s ow n accord al l power s tha t wer e necessary—bu t n o mor e power s tha n were necessary—t o th e legislativ e function . Thi s poin t wa s th e cen terpiece o f Cushing' s gran d jur y charges. 18 Turning t o th e Massachusett s ratifyin g convention , John Hancock , then governo r o f Massachusetts , wa s electe d presiden t o f tha t impor tant body . Cushin g wa s electe d vic e president . Give n tha t Hancock , one o f th e mos t notoriou s "finger-in-the-wind " politician s o f hi s day , was overtake n wit h hi s nearl y chroni c "politica l gout," 1 9 Cushin g presided ove r mos t o f th e convention' s proceedings . A s chai r o f th e proceedings, i t was no t Cushing' s plac e to tak e par t i n the debate . Hi s grand jur y charge s wer e widel y known , however , an d henc e hi s view s were apparen t t o al l who di d participate. Perhaps eve n more critically , the prestig e o f Cushing' s offic e a s chief justic e an d hi s proficient stew ardship o f th e proceeding s helpe d achiev e a majority , albei t a narro w one, i n favo r o f ratification . One o f th e mos t illuminatin g document s fo r discernin g Cushing' s views o n th e Constitutio n i s wha t i s describe d a s "Justic e Cushing' s Undelivered Speec h o n th e Federa l Constitution." 20 I t is not clea r wh y Cushing refrained fro m deliverin g it. The leading authority o n the mat ter, William O'Brien , suggest s that Cushin g was pressured b y Hancoc k to suppres s th e speech . B y late January a grou p o f leadin g Massachu setts Federalists had manage d t o persuade—or, bette r yet, to "bribe" — Hancock t o com e t o th e convention . Fathe r O'Brien' s colorfu l de scription o f wha t likel y transpired nex t i s worth quotin g a t length : Upon thi s sudde n development , Cushing , relieve d o f hi s chafin g dutie s a s presiding officer , fel t tha t h e could wit h perfec t propriet y giv e full voic e t o his own convictions and air in public his long pent-up emotions. Filled with his subject, h e di d no t tak e ver y lon g t o compos e a formal address . It ma y be surmised, however, that Hancock di d not relish the thought that anothe r major speec h beside s hi s ow n wa s t o b e give n b y the vice-presiden t o f th e convention a t one of its closing sessions. Vain as he is reputed to have been , the governor must have taken singular delight in the dramatic role in which he had bee n cast: a stricken man rising from a sick bed, coming before a di-

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vided convention , wit h gallerie s packed , peacemake r an d conciliator , th e expectation o f th e Federalists , yet a beare r o f bal m fo r thei r aggrieve d op ponents. H e mus t hav e demonstrate d il l humo r a t th e prospec t o f sharin g such a spotlight wit h another. 21

Cushing's Thought s o n Governmen t Although Cushin g chos e no t t o delive r hi s speec h i n suppor t o f th e Constitution, th e manuscrip t nevertheles s shed s considerabl e ligh t o n his thoughts o n government. Cushin g opene d th e speec h b y informin g his (prospective ) audienc e tha t h e woul d b e concentratin g o n th e "principal objections " t o the proposed Constitution. 22 Th e firs t o f th e objections h e addresse d wa s th e questio n o f annua l versu s biennia l elections fo r member s o f Congress . Delegat e Samue l Thompso n ex pressed thi s objectio n i n particularl y dramati c fashion . " O m y coun try!" exclaime d Thompson , "neve r giv e u p you r annua l elections ; young men , neve r giv e u p you r jewel!" 23 For Cushing , thi s objectio n wa s nothin g bu t a distraction . Tha t i s to say , what th e peopl e reall y neede d t o b e concerned about , Cushin g believed, wa s whethe r the y themselve s wer e sufficientl y virtuou s t o keep the governors i n their place—regardles s o f ho w lon g a particula r term o f offic e migh t be . "Boundarie s an d barrier s upo n pape r ar e o f no consequence, " Cushin g observed , "i f [the ] people ar e no t properl y watchful o f thei r liberties . Ruler s an d Representative s ma y overlea p two years , a s wel l an d a s eas y a s one." 2 4 What i s intriguin g abou t Cushing' s argumen t i s no t th e substanc e of it—th e "parchmen t barriers " them e wa s rehearse d b y man y o f Cushing's contemporaries—bu t wha t i t say s abou t Cushing' s abilit y to get to th e hear t o f the matter. Unlik e mos t o f hi s peers, Cushing di d not fill his public addresse s wit h seemingl y unendin g reference s t o his tory an d philosophy . And thi s was not becaus e he was unfamiliar wit h those references . Indeed , Cushin g wa s a voraciou s reader , s o muc h s o that durin g hi s circui t travel s hi s wif e woul d rea d t o hi m fro m book s he kep t i n specia l receptacle s h e ha d designe d fo r hi s carriage. 25 A s will b e discussed below , Cushin g approache d th e question s tha t cam e before hi m a s a U.S . Suprem e Cour t justic e i n th e sam e straightfor ward manner . The absenc e o f a bil l o f right s fro m th e propose d Constitutio n wa s of great concern t o many delegate s to the Massachusetts ratifyin g con -

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vention. Cushing's speech indicates that he did not share this concern. In fact, the speech reveals that Cushing was prepared to offer th e standard Federalis t respons e t o th e cal l fo r a bil l o f rights. 26 As Cushin g phrased it : The fact i s (and it is a self evident proposition)—we retai n all that we do no t part wit h . . . —going upo n thi s . . . ground . . . n o authorit y coul d b e exercised ove r th e people , bu t suc h a s shoul d b e expressl y grante d b y them , which in my opinion is better and safer tha n an y Bill of Rights, that the wisest morta l ca n dra w u p b y attemptin g a particula r enumeratio n o f al l rights. 27

Cushing skillfull y discusse d a variety o f othe r controversia l topic s in his speech—from th e "necessar y and proper clause," to Congress' s power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus, to the separation of powers. Hi s argumen t agains t ter m limit s fo r member s o f Congres s i s worth singlin g out, however . The Massachusetts ratifying conventio n was not immune from th e concern raise d i n many state s abou t th e propose d eliminatio n o f th e Articles o f Confederatio n provisio n o n mandator y rotatio n i n office . For instance, Charles Turner thought rotation i n the lower house necessary "t o guar d agains t th e dee p art s o f popula r men." 28 Cushin g could not have disagreed more with his fellow delegat e from Scituate . He explained : A rotation i n Congres s ha s bee n held u p a s necessary:—that i s when a per son ha s bee n i n office a certain period ; th e people, however the y ma y trus t in hi s experienc e abilit y an d integrit y shal l no t hav e a right t o choos e hi m for a certai n othe r period:—Thi s I thin k woul d b e a n ope n downrigh t abridgment o f the peoples liberties and right of election—and a bold strok e for an y Constitutio n maker s t o attempt ; beside s tha t i t migh t prov e dan gerous t o th e Commonwealth i n bein g oblige d t o brin g in , new an d unex perienced men, perhaps in all hazardous moment, a time of war, to conduc t the affair s o f State , instead o f thei r trie d an d faithfu l Servants , whom the y wish t o choose . Le t th e people , a s i t i s their right , judg e fo r themselve s i n this matter. 29

Put directly , Cushin g oppose d ter m limit s becaus e th e peopl e al ready had the power t o limit terms—and t o do so more severely than could an y formal requiremen t o f rotatio n i n office. Mor e important , Cushing insiste d tha t th e peopl e ha d th e right t o reelec t representa -

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tives with whom the y were satisfied, an d tha t i t was often i n the bes t interests of the political community tha t they did so. Like almos t al l th e leadin g figures o f th e American Founding , William Cushin g wa s a politica l leader , no t a politica l philosopher . Consequently, h e neve r wrot e a systemati c treatis e o n politica l the ory.30 Evidenc e exists , however , tha t provide s insigh t int o Cushing' s political theory . Mos t notably , thi s i s i n th e for m o f th e gran d jur y charges he delivered while on circuit as a U.S. Supreme Court justice. As Ralph Lerne r explain s in his classic article on the subject, th e justices often use d their gran d jur y charges to instruc t th e public o n th e basic purpos e o f politics. 31 Cushing' s charge s ar e consisten t wit h Lerner's thesis. Cushing's charg e o f November 7 , 1794 , in Providence i s the mos t detailed of his charges uncovered t o date. His opening remarks abou t the purpos e an d natur e o f governmen t ar e s o helpful i n understand ing his political theory that the y are worth quotin g a t length: The grea t en d o f government , yo u know , i s peac e an d protection ; peac e with nations , protectio n agains t foreig n force:—peac e an d orde r within ; protection o f individuals , of al l classes of men, whether poo r o r rich, in th e undisturbed enjoymen t o f their just rights, which ar e comprehended unde r a few , bu t importan t words— security of person and property, or , i f yo u please, rights of man. Henc e governmen t involve s i n i t a sacre d regar d t o the principles o f justice , and t o al l moral obligations . . . . Where people are not permitted t o enjoy thes e blessings, security of person and property, unmolested , ther e i s tyranny , whethe r i t arise s fro m monarchy, aristocracy , o r a mob. Where al l men ar e equall y an d promptl y protected i n the free exercis e of these rights, there is liberty and equality; — liberty, to do whatever jus t laws made b y a free representativ e allow ; equality, that is , as to righ t o f protectio n respectin g th e grea t object s o f life , lib erty an d property , whe n no t forfeite d t o th e stat e b y criminal conduct ; re specting property, which a man ha s fairly an d honestl y obtained—no t tha t which i s unrighteously take n o r force d fro m another;—no t equalit y i n re gard t o quantity ; fo r tha t seldom , i f ever, can happen , owing , unde r provi dence, to th e infinitely variou s facultie s an d diligenc e o f differen t individu als;—not a right for th e indolent t o rob the laborious—to shar e equally th e fruits o f th e virtuou s industr y o f others ; suc h idea s bein g founde d i n ex travagance o f enthusiasm an d delusion , or in downright dishonest y and de pravity o f mind—subversiv e o f th e first principle s o f justice , an d th e grea t ends o f society. 32

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As this quotation suggests , Cushing ha d th e outloo k o f a classical liberal o n government—on e h e articulate d wit h a straightforward , but nonetheles s learned , voice. 33 Indeed , Cushing' s contemporarie s held his grand jury charges in extremely high esteem. Abigail Adams, for one , thought s o highly of Cushing's charge on the Alien and Sedition Act that sh e urged he r husband, John, then president, to publis h the charge alongsid e copie s o f the act. 34 Consequently , i t seem s curious, to say the least, to cast aspersions upo n Cushing' s abilities without taking his grand jur y charges into account. Unfortunately, Cush ing's present-da y critic s neve r mention , le t alon e discuss , hi s gran d jury charges. Inventing Textualism William Cushing's critics focus most of their attention o n the opinions h e wrote a s a U.S . Supreme Cour t justice . The tw o stoc k criti cisms are (1 ) Cushin g di d no t autho r man y opinion s o n the Suprem e Court, an d (2 ) those opinion s h e did autho r ar e superficial . Wit h re spect t o th e first criticism , Davi d R . Warringto n report s i n The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States that Cushing's "ag e an d hi s increasingl y ill-health , couple d wit h th e rigor s o f circuit riding, so taxed his strength that he wrote only 19 opinions." 35 Similar statement s ar e repeate d i n virtuall y al l th e biographica l ac counts o f Cushing' s life. 36 Othe r tha n underscorin g th e repetitive na ture of most biographical encyclopedias, these statements tell us little. Nay, more, they are misleading. A fresh loo k at the record reveals that Cushing wrot e a s man y opinion s a s th e othe r member s o f th e pre Marshall Court . Admittedly , th e numbe r i s not great , bu t thi s i s because the Supreme Cour t ha d a light docket i n its early years. Consequently, the thinly-veiled attempts to characterize William Cushing as not much more than judicial deadwood ar e without foundation.* *By the tim e th e Suprem e Cour t ha d begu n t o hea r a significan t numbe r o f cases , John Marshall ha d assume d th e cente r chair . Tw o relate d change s i n th e inne r working s o f th e Court mean t tha t onl y Marshall authore d man y opinion s durin g th e formativ e year s o f hi s chief justiceshi p (whic h i s when Cushin g served with him): (1) the practice of seriati m opin ion writing cam e to a n end , an d (2 ) the "opinion s o f th e Court " wer e almos t alway s writ ten (o r a t leas t signe d an d delivered ) b y the chie f justice . See George Le e Haskins an d Her bert A . Johnson, Foundations of Power: John Marshall, 1801-15 (Ne w York : Macmillan , 1981), 382-87 . The Ellswort h Cour t (1796-1800 ) relie d heavil y upo n pe r curia m disposi tion o f cases , which als o reduce d th e numbe r o f opportunitie s Cushin g ha d t o writ e opin -

Deconstructing William Gushing 10 7 When on e turn s fro m th e quantit y o f Cushing' s opinion s t o thei r quality, Cushin g doe s no t far e an y bette r a t th e hand s o f hi s critics . David P . Currie , fo r one , asserts , "Cushin g wrot e pedestria n opin ions tha t adde d little." 37 A glanc e a t Currie' s footnot e reveals , how ever, tha t he , too, appear s t o b e relyin g heavil y upo n wha t othe r crit ics have sai d before . Hi s footnot e reads : "See G . Haskin s &C H. John son supra not e 7 , a t 87 , notin g Joh n Dickinson' s contemporaneou s view tha t Cushin g adde d nothin g t o hi s brethren' s expositio n o f th e law." 38 But why canno t th e argument b e reversed? I n other words , why no t point ou t tha t th e opinion s o f th e other justices adde d littl e t o Cushing's expositio n o f th e law ? N o on e eve r consider s thi s possibility . Similarly, critic s neve r mentio n that , a s senio r associat e justice , Cush ing wa s oblige d t o spea k last— a procedura l nuanc e tha t almos t cer tainly influence d th e leve l o f detai l i n hi s opinions . Mos t important , a careful examinatio n o f Currie' s tom e disclose s tha t th e comment s h e offers abou t th e qualit y o f th e opinion s i n individua l case s ofte n amount t o littl e more tha n a serie s o f throwawa y line s like "Paterson , Wilson, an d Cushin g issue d forgettabl e opinion s confine d almos t en tirely t o th e interpretatio n o f th e treaty" 3 9 an d "mos t o f th e Justice s had nothin g meaningfu l t o say." 40 Thi s i s assertion , no t analysis — something, ironicall y enough , Cushing' s critic s accus e Cushing of. 41 As now wil l b e seen, many o f Cushing' s opinion s ar e insightful;* * the y simply ar e not adorne d wit h th e myria d reference s t o histor y an d phi losophy contained i n the opinions o f his colleagues. In brief, Cushing' s style wa s differen t fro m hi s brethren's : Lik e hi s ratifyin g conventio n speech o n behal f o f th e Constitution , Cushin g cu t t o th e hear t o f th e matter. Som e migh t conside r thi s a virtue , rathe r tha n a vice . I n fact , it i s not unfai r t o sa y tha t Cushin g wa s on e o f th e earliest—an d mos t ions. Se e William R . Casto , The Supreme Court in the Early Republic: The Chief Justiceships of John Jay and Oliver Ellsworth (Columbia : Universit y o f Sout h Carolin a Press , 1995), 110-11 . * *Some critics of Cushing's opinion writing go so far a s to deny Cushing credit for qual ity opinion s tha t bea r hi s name ! See , fo r example , Haskin s an d Johnson , Foundations of Tower', 38 4 (insistin g "th e qualit y o f [Cushing's ] opinio n i n MTlvaine v. Coxe's Lessee [1805] lead[s ] on e t o questio n th e commonl y accepte d assumptio n tha t delivery o f a ma jority opinio n implie d authorship o f th e opinion") . I n fairnes s t o th e alway s fair-minde d Johnson, he advises this author tha t "seniorit y als o raises the question i f Marshall wrot e al l the opinion s he delivered , particularl y afte r Stor y joine d th e Cour t i n 1812. " Lette r fro m Herbert A . Johnson, 6 December 199 5 (cop y i n my possession) .

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consistent—proponents o f a schoo l o f lega l interpretatio n know n today as "textualism." 42 Chisholm v. Georgia (1793), Hylton v. United States (1796), Ware v, Hylton (1796) , and Colder u Bull (1798) ar e generally regarded a s the most important Suprem e Cour t cases of the 1790s. 43 Cushing did not participat e i n Hylton an d hi s Colder opinio n a s reporte d b y Alexander Dallas is only two sentences long. Consequently, Chisholm and Ware will be used to illustrate Cushing' s approac h t o legal interpretation. Chisholm v. Georgia (1793) 44 was the first full-scale constitutiona l law decision by the Supreme Court. At issue was whether a citizen of one state, South Carolina, could bring suit in federal court against another state, Georgia. The subject matter of the suit was a sizeable debt that the state of Georgia had incurred i n purchasing military supplie s from Chisholm' s testator . The first o f th e opinion s wa s Jame s Iredell's—th e onl y justic e among the five to reject the view that a state may be sued by a citizen of another state. 45 Iredell is highly regarded by modern students of the pre-Marshall Court. 46 Hi s opinio n i n Chisholm, however , wa s mor e appropriate fo r th e hall s o f Congress tha n i t was fo r a court o f law . That i s to say , Iredell ignore d th e plain word s o f th e Constitutio n t o press for a desired political result. 47 Most notably , Iredell ignored th e second paragrap h o f Articl e III , section 2 , which state s tha t i n case s "in which a state shall be a party the Supreme Court shal l have original jurisdiction. " Iredel l emphasized instea d th e Judiciar y Ac t o f 1789, essentially arguing that the Court's jurisdiction was not self-ex ecuting an d tha t Congres s ha d no t execute d i t i n that , o r an y other , statute. It took Iredel l twenty-on e page s i n Dallas's Reports t o reac h this conclusion, about half of which was devoted to a discussion of the law and practice of England. The point o f the latter discussio n seem s to hav e bee n tha t th e Cour t wa s boun d b y the commo n la w relativ e to suits against sovereigns. If Iredell' s opinio n wa s bette r suite d fo r th e hall s o f Congress , James Wilson' s wa s mor e appropriat e fo r th e ivor y tower s o f acad eme.48 Although Mark D. Hall contends that Wilson "wrot e the most memorable an d theoretically interesting seriatim opinion," 49 much of that opinio n wa s superfluous . Indeed , Wilson spen t mos t o f hi s thir teen pages off-point, rangin g far an d wide over history an d th e basi c concepts of sovereignty, the state, and man' s relation to the state. He

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invoked Reid , Bacon , Cicero , William th e Conqueror, th e Ephori of Sparta, Homer, Demosthenes, Loui s XIV, Bracton, and the author of the Mirror of Justice. Wilson's purpose was to show that in the United States th e peopl e ar e sovereign . Consequently , th e stat e o f Georgi a could b e sued. Almost los t amon g Wilson's elaborat e discussio n was the Constitution itself . In fact, Wilson devote d onl y a few lines of his opinion t o the document h e was charged wit h interpreting . When he did turn to the Constitution, he found th e answer to the question before th e Court readily available . He concluded th e fact tha t Georgi a could be sued in federal cour t "rest s not upon the legitimate result of fair an d conclusive deductio n fro m th e constitution: i t is confirmed , beyond all doubt, by direct and explicit declaration of the constitution itself." Chief Justice John Jay's opinion also contained elaborate reference s to history and philosophy.50 For instance, Jay devoted a sizeable por tion of his opinion to comparing the differences o f the feudal govern ments o f Europe wit h government s b y compact. I t was not until the end of his opinion that the chief justice, like the other members of the majority, conclude d tha t th e Constitution' s expres s referenc e t o fed eral jurisdiction over suits involving states made Georgia amenable to suit by a citizen of South Carolina . The opinion s o f John Blai r an d William Cushin g i n the Chisholm case hav e bee n called , amon g othe r things , "unimaginative." 51 I t is more accurat e t o sa y they staye d o n point . Blai r bega n hi s opinio n with a subtle expressio n o f disapprova l o f the rambling opinion s of Iredell, Wilson, an d Jay: Blair sai d h e would pas s ove r th e "variou s European confederations . . . . The Constitution o f the United State s is the only fountain fro m whic h I shall draw." 52 Blai r was true to his word. I n fact, h e needed bu t three page s t o decid e th e case, an d his decision wa s based o n a plain readin g o f the words o f the Constitu tion. William Cushing' s opinio n wa s similar t o Blair's in both ton e and method. He, too, began by saying, "th e point turns not upon the law or practic e o f England , . . . nor upo n th e law of an y other countr y whatever" an d he, too, emphasized th e words o f the Constitution. 53 Put simply, Cushing's opinion is a straightforward exampl e of textual analysis. To Cushing, the clause in question, "betwee n a state and citizens o f anothe r state, " neede d t o b e rea d i n conjunctio n wit h th e clause that immediately preceded it, "to controversies between two or

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more states"— a claus e tha t plainl y envisione d th e stat e a s a defen dant. I f any exception wa s intended i n the suabilit y o f a state, Cush ing insisted, it would hav e bee n written int o the Constitution . Cush ing drove this point home by explaining that another clause in the relevant sectio n subjecte d foreig n state s t o sui t i n federa l cour t b y American citizens. Thus, the "sovereignty " argumen t was of no avail, Cushing concluded , unles s on e accepte d th e improbabl e argumen t that th e clause meant "w e may touch foreig n sovereign s bu t no t ou r own." The editor s o f th e Documentary History of the Supreme Court perceptively not e that Chisholm "involve d a n issu e that continue s t o haunt constitutiona l jurisprudenc e t o thi s day : wha t weigh t wa s t o be give n th e plai n meanin g o f th e tex t agains t th e inten t o f it s au thors an d ratifier s insofa r a s tha t coul d b e determined." 54 Cushin g chose th e textualis t route , bu t tha t doe s no t mak e hi s opinio n "unimaginative" or , mor e disparagingly , h e himsel f "unsur e o f th e law" o r "simple. " Indeed , Cushin g demonstrate d i n Chisholm itsel f that h e well understoo d tha t question s o f politica l philosoph y ofte n underlaid case s that cam e before th e Supreme Court . As Cushing pu t it eloquently: "Th e rights of individuals and the justice due them, ar e as dea r an d preciou s a s thos e o f th e states . Indee d th e latte r ar e founded upo n the former; an d the great end and object o f them mus t be to secure and suppor t th e rights of individuals, or else vain is government." Ware v. Hylton (1796) 55 found th e Supreme Court confronting th e problem of state legislation during the American Revolution that confiscated the obligations American s owe d t o Britis h merchants. Under the Treaty of Paris of 1783 , which the Constitution adopted as part of the supreme law of the land, "creditor s . . . shall meet with no lawfu l impediment to the recovery . . . o f all bona fide debts heretofore con tracted." Th e issu e befor e th e Cour t wa s whethe r th e ratificatio n o f the Constitutio n repeale d ah initio a 177 7 Virginia statut e b y whic h citizens of Virginia discharged their debts by paying the amount owe d to British merchants into the state treasury. Samuel Chase' s opinion, 56 whic h a t twenty-fiv e page s wa s th e longest o f th e five opinions reporte d b y Alexander Dallas , is characterized b y moder n commentator s a s "somethin g o f a tour de force"57 Lik e Iredell's , Wilson's , an d Jay' s i n Chisholm, however , much o f Chase' s opinio n wa s superfluous . Fo r instance , h e spen t a

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good thir d o f his opinion describin g th e elements o f the defendants ' claim—and the n declare d tha t th e description amounte d t o nothing . After man y fits and starts, Chase turned t o the language of the treaty itself. "O n the best investigatio n I have bee n abl e to give the 4th article of the treaty," Chas e wrote , " . . . I am satisfied tha t th e words, in thei r natura l import , an d commo n use , giv e a recover y t o th e British credito r fro m hi s origina l debtor o f th e deb t contracte d before th e treaty, notwithstandin g th e payment thereo f int o th e public treasuries, o r loa n offices , unde r th e authority o f an y State law. " In short, Chas e conclude d tha t th e plai n languag e o f th e treat y sup ported th e creditor's claim : He simply too k a n eternity t o reach thi s conclusion. As in Chisholm, Jame s Iredel l appeare d t o forget i n Ware the dif ference betwee n a politician an d a judge. Iredell had been on e of the judges i n th e lowe r circui t cour t wh o adjudicate d th e case . Conse quently, it was not appropriate for him to participate in the appeal before th e Suprem e Court . Nevertheless , Iredel l decided , wit h hi s brethren's acquiescence, 58 to read int o the record hi s thoughts o n the matter. A t twenty-four page s i n length, Iredell' s thought s wer e con siderable.59 The y wer e als o a n unambiguou s exercis e i n result-ori ented jurisprudence. No matter wha t the plain language of the treaty said, Iredell—th e pre-Marshal l Court' s mos t ferven t guardia n o f states' rights 60—was goin g to find a way to uphold th e state law. The manner by which Iredell accomplished his aim was to offer a strained reading o f th e treaty' s language . A s Iredel l awkwardl y phrase d it : "When thes e genera l words , therefore , ca n comprehen d s o man y cases, all reasonable object s o f the article, I cannot think , I am compelled, as a judge, and therefore, I ought not to do so, to say, that the general words of this article shall extinguish privat e as well as public rights." Put more simply, Iredell concluded that the treaty did not pertain to private parties. Cushing's modern-da y critic s dismis s hi s Ware opinio n out-of hand. Willia m Paterso n an d Jame s Wilso n far e n o better . Juliu s Goebel, for instance, contends, "For what the Justices (Paterson, Wilson, and Cushing) who concurred i n Chase's conclusion had to offer , they might as well have let his opinion stan d a s that o f the Court." 61 David Curri e basicall y repeat s Goebel' s contention , albei t i n mor e caustic language . "Paterson , Wilson , an d Cushin g issue d forgettabl e opinions confined almos t entirely to the interpretation o f the treaty,"

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Currie declares. 62 What the critics fail to mention, however, is that the question befor e th e Cour t wa s what th e treaty said. Consequently, i t is odd, to sa y the least, to criticize Cushin g an d th e other s fo r doin g precisely what the Court was charged with doing . Cushing's two-and-a-half-pag e opinio n i n Ware was a workman like exercis e i n textualism, 63 jus t a s hi s opinio n i n Chisholm ha d been. Fo r Cushing , th e "grea t question " wa s th e "fourt h articl e o f the treaty. " An d t o him , "th e plai n an d obvious " meanin g o f th e treaty wa s to "nullify , ab initio" al l laws tha t frustrate d a creditor' s right o r remedy agains t hi s original debtor . There was nothing fanc y about Cushing' s opinion , bu t there di d no t nee d to be . This is not t o say tha t Cushin g wa s unawar e o f th e possibl e unfairnes s o f forcin g a debto r t o pa y hi s deb t twic e (onc e t o th e stat e treasur y an d a second tim e to the creditor). On thi s point, Cushin g invoked a well-settled rul e o f textua l construction ; namely , "A s t o th e rul e respectin g odious constructions ; tha t take s plac e wher e th e meanin g i s doubt ful, no t wher e i t is clear, as I think i t is, in this case." Here agai n w e see that while Cushin g tended t o boi l down t o the bone the questio n before th e Court , h e wa s sensitiv e t o th e principle s tha t underlai d that question. 64 Jurisprudence scholars recognize that there are a variety of methodologies available for interpretin g the law, generally, and the Constitu tion, specifically. Philip Bobbitt in his Constitutional Fate discusses six types of "constitutional argument": historical, textual, doctrinal, prudential, structural , an d ethical. 65 Scholar s disagre e abou t wha t th e prevailing approac h t o interpretatio n wa s amon g earl y America n judges and lawyers. 66 Cushing's opinions in Chisholm v. Georgia and Ware v. Hylton indicat e tha t h e too k a textualis t approac h t o th e law.67 In fact, Cushing was one of the earliest—and most consistent — proponents o f textualism. 68 Cushing' s present-da y critic s cal l his approach "simple " an d "unimaginative, " bu t they manage to overloo k the fact that even the more "flashy " member s of the Court almos t always returned t o the text t o decid e the case—albeit afte r rangin g fa r and wide over everything tangentially relevant. To reiterate, Cushing's style was different fro m his brethren's. It was not necessarily "worse, " and i t might eve n have been "better " becaus e it was easier t o under stand an d thereby easier to follow. 69 I t also is worth mentionin g tha t Cushing's textualism—like textualism generally—evidences deferenc e to th e lawmaker s wh o frame d o r legislate d th e particula r la w unde r

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consideration. Suc h deference was squarely within the jurisprudentia l mainstream o f Cushing' s time. 70* Establishing Judicial Review William Cushin g mad e othe r contribution s t o America n la w an d politics as well, not the least of which was the role he played in the development of judicial review. To date, Cushing has received almost no credit in this regard. A still compelling essay written b y F. W. Grinnell in 191 7 offers thre e explanations fo r wh y this might b e so: First, th e habi t o f lookin g fo r a precedent , rathe r tha n a principle, ha s le d men to rely on Chie f Justice Marshall's opinio n i n Marbury v. Madison; al though h e himsel f looke d fo r th e principl e withou t worryin g abou t th e precedents. Secon d an d third , th e combined force s o f Anti-Federalist "pol itics" o n on e side , an d th e America n tendenc y t o self-glorificatio n o n th e other, steppe d i n an d asserte d tha t i t was exclusivel y a n America n ide a in vented b y Chie f Justice Marshall . Th e fac t tha t ther e wer e fe w printe d la w reports befor e 180 3 whe n Marbury v. Madison wa s decide d helpe d thi s myth. Recen t researche s hav e uncovere d a mas s o f burie d informatio n showing tha t th e principl e wa s neithe r exclusivel y America n no r invente d by Marshall. 71

Although through these "researches " scholars have come to realize that judicia l revie w was not "invented " b y John Marshall , th e credi t Marshall receive s for th e development o f the doctrine still eclipses all others to this day. From basi c textbooks o n American government, 72 to more advanced treatises on the judicial process,73 judicial review remains synonymou s i n th e literatur e wit h Marshall' s opinio n fo r th e Court i n Marbury v. Madison (1803) . Indeed , recen t revisionis t ac counts of the origins of judicial review, most often writte n b y historians, continue to use Marbury a s the point o f departure. 74 *One furthe r poin t abou t Cushing' s textualis m i s worth noting , if onl y becaus e i t illustrates wel l how th e broade r tex t o f America n lega l history ha s bee n misread ove r th e years. The misreadin g i n questio n i s the credi t John Marshal l receive s fo r almos t every thing importan t t o com e fro m th e earl y Suprem e Court . Th e clearest exampl e o f thi s as far a s textualis m i s concerne d i s Lesli e Friedma n Goldstein , In Defense of the Text: Democracy and Constitutional Theory (Savage, Md.: Rowma n an d Littlefield , 1991) . In her book, Goldstein credits Marshall with being the founder o f the "textualis t tradition. " Not on e word i s said abou t Cushing . Marshall migh t hav e bee n a textualist—and a talented on e a t that—bu t Cushin g wa s employin g th e methodolog y lon g befor e Marshal l came on the scene.

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Cushing's contribution s t o th e developmen t o f judicia l revie w i n America wer e considerable . Fo r instance , eve n befor e independenc e was declare d Cushin g wa s chargin g gran d jurie s i n Massachusett s that court s ha d th e authorit y t o declar e act s o f Parliamen t unconsti tutional.75 A s fa r a s Cushing' s servic e o n th e federa l benc h i s con cerned, a strong argument ca n b e made that Cushin g and Jay, on circuit, were the first members of the Supreme Cour t to employ judicia l review—over stat e an d federa l legislatio n alike . The sporadi c natur e of case reporting durin g the early days of the federal judiciar y make s it unwise to declare unequivocally that Cushin g and Jay were "first, " but th e availabl e evidenc e point s i n thi s direction . Newspape r ac counts sugges t that Cushin g and Jay held stat e laws unconstitutiona l in Apri l an d Ma y o f 179 1 an d i n June o f 1792. 76 Thes e sam e tw o circuit justice s (togethe r wit h distric t judg e Duane ) "upheld " a fed eral law in April of 1792 , but they nevertheless recognized the power of th e federa l court s t o declar e act s o f Congres s unconstitutional. 77* There i s als o Cooper v. Telfair, a cas e brough t befor e th e entir e Supreme Cour t i n 1800 , i n whic h Cushin g declared , " I a m o f th e opinion[] tha t thi s cour t ha s th e same[ ] powe r tha t a court o f Geor gia woul d possess[ ] t o declar e th e la w void." 78 Last , bu t fa r fro m least, a careful readin g o f Marbury itsel f reveal s that Marshal l relie d heavily upo n th e Court' s 179 4 decisio n Chandler v. Secretary of War, whic h man y scholar s no w believ e declare d a congressiona l statute unconstitutional . Sinc e no official repor t o f Chandler existed , it i s likel y Marshal l wa s mad e awar e o f thi s preceden t b y Cushin g and/or Paterson , th e onl y justice s wh o serve d o n th e Cour t i n bot h cases.79 *They "upheld " th e statute—th e Invali d Pensioner s Act—b y interpretin g i t a s a n offe r of a nonjudicial commissionership , whic h the y eac h wer e fre e t o accep t o r reject . Maev a Marcus maintains that the New York Circui t was issuing an advisory opinion only , becaus e it "di d no t hav e a n actua l cas e befor e [it]. " Unfortunately , Marcu s provide s n o substantia l evidence for thi s proposition. Se e Maeva Marcus , "Judicia l Revie w i n the Early Republic, " in Launching the "Extended Republic": The Federalist Era, ed . Ronald L . Hoffman (Char lottesville: University Pres s o f Virginia , 1996) , 3 8 n.4 5 (citin g a n Apri l 10 , 1792 , lette r t o President Washingto n askin g tha t th e presiden t forwar d t o Congres s th e circuit' s Apri l 5 , 1792, opinion) . Th e lette r i s als o printe d i n Hay burn's Case, 2 U.S . ( 2 Dall. ) 409 , 41 0 n . (1792). Fathe r O'Brie n maintains , b y contrast , "claimant s appeare d befor e [Cushin g an d Jay] whil e o n circui t i n Ne w York. " Willia m O'Brien , "Th e Pre-Marshal l Cour t an d th e Role o f Willia m Cushing, " Massachusetts Law Quarterly 4 3 (Marc h 1958) : 52 , 57 . Mar cus does not mention Father O'Brien's readin g of the case. See also Max Farrand, "Th e Firs t Hayburn Case, " American Historical Review 1 3 (Januar y 1908) : 281-85.

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Abolishing Slaver y N o assessmen t o f William Cushing' s contributions t o American la w and politic s would b e complete withou t discussin g hi s role i n the abo lition o f slaver y i n Massachusetts / I n fact , Rober t M . Cover , i n Justice Accused: Antislavery and the Judicial Process, describe s a cas e i n which Willia m Cushing , the n th e Massachusett s chie f justice , partici pated a s th e firs t cas e i n th e Unite d State s t o confron t th e institutio n of slaver y a s a matte r o f constitutiona l law. 80 Tha t case—whic h ha s been called "th e most famous slav e case[] in America prio r t o the Dre d Scott decision" 81 —was actuall y a serie s o f case s no w know n a s th e Quock Walke r Case . The complex serie s of cases bega n i n 178 1 as civil actions (i n whic h Cushing di d no t participate ) fo r th e assaul t an d batter y a master, Jen nison, allegedl y perpetrate d o n hi s runaway slave , Walker, an d o n an other man , Caldwell , wh o sheltere d Walker . Jennison' s defens e wa s that h e wa s merel y attemptin g t o recove r hi s property , a runawa y slave. Walke r an d Caldwel l countere d tha t Walke r coul d no t b e a slave becaus e th e 178 0 Massachusett s Constitutio n abolishe d slavery . Article I read : All men ar e bor n fre e an d equal , an d hav e certai n natural , essential , an d un alienable rights ; a m o n g whic h ma y b e reckone d th e righ t o f enjoyin g an d defending thei r live s a n d liberties ; tha t o f acquiring , possessing , a n d p r o tecting property . . . .

The civi l action s resulte d i n inconsisten t verdicts : Jenniso n wa s found liabl e fo r beatin g Walker , bu t Caldwel l wa s foun d liabl e fo r enticing Walke r t o flee . A s th e civi l action s worke d thei r wa y through th e appeal s process , a crimina l indictmen t wa s brough t against Jenniso n fo r assaul t an d battery . Th e crimina l cas e wen t t o trial i n 1783 , an d i t wa s thi s tria l tha t resulte d i n a famou s jur y charge issue d b y Cushing . I t i s importan t her e t o poin t ou t tha t i n *A less momentous contributio n i s worth mentionin g a s well : the rol e Cushin g playe d in changin g th e practic e b y whic h lawyer s ar e admitte d t o th e U.S . Suprem e Cour t bar . When Chie f Justice Jay presided, whic h wa s mos t o f th e time , he insiste d tha t th e attorne y general b e an integra l par t o f th e admission s process . When Cushin g presided , b y contrast , he permitted lawyer s t o be admitte d o n th e motio n o f a curren t membe r o f th e bar . Cush ing's les s formal approac h becam e th e norm . Se e James R . Perr y an d James M . Buchanan , "Admission t o the Supreme Cour t Bar , 1790-1800 : A Case Study of Institutional Change, " Supreme Court Historical Society Yearbook (1983) : 10-18 .

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Massachusetts a t th e tim e al l judicia l cases , includin g appeals , wer e tried befor e a jury. In charging the jury, Cushing discussed "th e doctrine of slavery and the righ t o f Christian s t o hol d African s i n perpetua l servitude , an d selling an d treatin g the m a s we d o horse s an d cattle. " H e acknowl edged tha t suc h a practice ha d bee n common , bu t whil e th e law s of the province ha d tolerate d it , no ac t ha d eve r expressl y permitte d o r established th e institutio n o f slavery . H e describe d slaver y a s a "usage" that had grown out of European custom, and had come to be regarded a s lega l i n Americ a chiefl y becaus e th e Britis h governmen t had establishe d regulation s governing the slave trade. The remainin g portion o f Cushing's famous charg e should b e quoted i n full : But whatever usage s formerl y prevaile d o r sli d i n upo n u s b y the exampl e of other s o n th e subject , the y ca n n o longe r exist . Sentiment s mor e favor able t o th e natura l right s o f mankind , an d t o tha t innat e desir e fo r libert y which heaven , withou t regar d t o complexio n o r shape , ha s plante d i n th e human breast—hav e prevaile d sinc e th e gloriou s struggl e fo r ou r right s began. And thes e sentiments le d the framer s o f ou r constitutio n o f govern ment—by whic h th e peopl e o f thi s commonwealt h hav e solemnl y boun d themselves to each other—to declare—that all men are born free and equal; and tha t every subject is entitled to liberty ', an d t o hav e i t guarde d b y th e laws as well as his life an d property . In short, without resortin g to implica tion i n constructin g th e constitution , slaver y i s i n m y judgemen t a s effec tively abolishe d a s it can b e by the granting o f right s an d privilege s wholl y incompatible an d repugnan t t o it s existence . Th e cour t ar e therefor e full y of th e opinio n tha t perpetua l servitud e ca n n o longe r b e tolerate d i n ou r government, an d tha t libert y ca n onl y b e forfeite d b y som e crimina l con duct or relinquished b y personal consent or contract. And it is therefore un necessary t o conside r whethe r th e promise s o f freedo m t o Quaco , o n th e part o f hi s maste r an d mistress , amounte d t o a manumissio n o r not . Th e Deft mus t b e found guilt y a s the facts charge d ar e not controverted. 82

Cushing's charg e t o th e jury—whic h exemplifie s bot h hi s textual ism an d hi s appreciatio n tha t politica l philosoph y underlai d lega l texts—is unambiguous : Th e juror s ha d t o conside r slaver y t o hav e been abolishe d b y th e state' s constitutio n an d the y therefor e ha d t o convict Jenniso n o f th e crim e fo r whic h h e wa s accused . Unfortu nately, th e rol e thi s charg e playe d i n abolishin g slaver y i n th e com monwealth i s no t a s clea r a s th e charg e itself . Indeed , Cove r aptl y notes tha t th e questio n o f whic h cas e actuall y abolishe d slaver y i n

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Massachusetts "ha s becom e a historians' s perennia l football." 83 A t last count, there ar e no fewer tha n si x articles—all o f which ar e well researched an d wel l argued—devote d t o th e Quoc k Walke r Case, 84 and th e cas e i s als o mentione d i n al l th e biographica l sketche s o f Cushing's life . While this essa y cannot presum e t o pu t a n en d t o th e controvers y over th e Quoc k Walke r Case , a middle-ground positio n betwee n ar guing that Cushing played no role in the abolition o f slavery in Massachusetts and that h e played the definitive rol e is possible. That position i s that slaver y wa s a dyin g institutio n i n the Commonwealt h o f Massachusetts i n th e eighteent h century—witness , fo r example , th e "free an d equal " clause in the Massachusetts Constitutio n o f 1780 — but Cushing's prestige as chief justice and the forceful an d unambigu ous temper of his jury charge put the final nail in the coffin, a t least as far a s permanent resident s wer e concerned. 85 Cushin g was , after all , held i n high regard i n the commonwealth an d th e jury charg e he delivered in Quock Walker was widely reported . Conclusion: Is God Dead?* Poststructuralism i s often describe d as the most important intellectua l movement i n th e postmoder n age . History , however , ha s prove d fa r less receptiv e t o it s influenc e tha n hav e philosophy , literature , an d law.86 Thi s essa y ha s attempte d t o "deconstruct " Willia m Cushing , one of the original members of the U.S. Supreme Cour t appointe d b y President Georg e Washington. In essence, what I have endeavored t o do is disrupt th e conventional wisdo m tha t Willia m Cushin g i s but a footnote i n the text o f American history . For too long William Cush ing has been credited with little more than traveling in an elegant carriage, having a strange interest in fabric, an d wearing a funny wig. 87 The deconstructio n o f earl y America n lega l an d politica l histor y need no t procee d b y rando m doub t o r generalize d skepticism . Th e * Nietzsche, o f course , coine d th e phras e "Go d i s dead. " Se e Friedric h Wilhel m Niet zsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for Everyone and No One, trans . R. J. Hollingdal e (Baltimore: Pengui n Books , 1969) , 2 - 3 . Th e conventiona l wisdo m i n histor y i s tha t Joh n Marshall i s "Th e Fathe r o f th e Court. " See , for example , Gordo n S . Wood, "Th e Fathe r o f the Court, " New Republic, 1 7 February 1997 , 38-41. Th e conventiona l wisdo m i n philosophy i s that Nietzsch e i s the "father " o f postmodernism .

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only thin g I hav e aspire d t o "destroy " i s th e clai m t o unequivoca l domination b y Joh n Marshal l o n earl y America n jurisprudence . I n short, my objective ha s been to expose the fallacy o f excluding othe r members o f th e earl y Suprem e Court—specifically , here , Willia m Cushing—from significance . Cushin g ma y no t hav e "ratified " th e Constitution, "invented " textualism , "established " judicia l review, or "abolished" slavery , but he deserves as much credit for these things as Marshall does. John Marshall may have been a force in American law and politics,88 but William Cushing contributed his fair share as well.*

NOTES

1. Joh n D . Cushing , " A Revolutionar y Conservative : Th e Publi c Lif e o f William Cushing , 1732-1810, " unpublishe d doctora l dissertation , Clar k Univer sity, 1960 , 13. 2. Georg e J. Lankevich, ed., The Federal Court, 1787-1801 (Millwood , N.Y.: Associated Facult y Press , 1986) , 242-43. See generally John M . Murrin , "Angli cizing a n America n Colony : Th e Transformatio n o f Provincia l Massachusetts, " unpublished doctora l dissertation , Yal e University, 196 7 (pointin g ou t that i n th e colonial er a youn g me n ha d t o prov e themselve s an d di d no t immediatel y ste p into importan t position s unles s they had som e connection wit h th e crown) . 3. Se e Henr y Flanders , The Lives and Times of the Chief Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, vol . 2 (Philadelphia : T . an d J . W . Johnson , 1881), 46. 4. Se e generall y Cushing , " A Revolutionar y Conservative. " Onl y slightl y more tha n si x page s o f Joh n Cushing' s 337-pag e Ph.D . dissertatio n pertai n t o William Cushing' s U.S . Suprem e Cour t service . Give n tha t Joh n Cushin g i s largely responsibl e fo r th e conventiona l wisdo m abou t Willia m Cushing—i.e. , the mor e recen t assessment s o f Willia m Cushin g (abbreviate d thoug h the y ma y be) track John Cushing' s dissertatio n researc h an d conclusions—i t shoul d no t b e surprising t o lear n tha t Willia m Cushing' s U.S . Supreme Cour t servic e i s viewe d negatively b y John Cushing . See , fo r example , ibid. , 32 7 ("A s actin g Chie f Jus * Donald Dewey advises that those who findthis last paragraph "a bit excessive" should "welcome it as an appealing bit of nyah nyah bravado in behalf of an associate justice who will never be ranked among the greats, but is deserving of better treatment than he has had." Letter fro m Donal d O . Dewey, 13(?) December 199 5 (cop y in my possession). Perhaps it also shows that Peter S. Onuf is correct: history should not be the exclusive province of historians. See Peter S. Onuf, "Reflections o n the Founding: Constitutional Historiography in Bicentennial Perspective," William and Mary Quarterly 46 (April 1989) : 341-75 (criticiz ing his fellow historians of the American Founding for attempting to defend history against "alien disciplines").

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tice Cushin g di d nothin g t o distinguis h himself . Neithe r di d h e d o anythin g t o win lastin g fam e a s a n associat e justic e o r a s a judg e o f th e Unite d State s Cir cuit Court") . 5. Ibid. , 336 . 6. Donal d O . Dewey , "Willia m Cushing, " i n The Supreme Court: A Biographical Dictionary, ed . Melvin I . Urofsky (Ne w York : Garland , 1994) , 127 . 7. Herber t Ala n Johnson , "Willia m Cushing, " i n The Justices of the United States Supreme Court: Their Lives and Major Opinions, ed . Leo n Friedma n an d Fred I . Israel, rev. ed., vol. 2 (Ne w York : Chelse a House , 1995) , 4 1, 45. 8. See , fo r example , ibid. , 44 ; Clar e Cushman , "Willia m Cushing, " i n The Supreme Court Justices: Illustrated Biographies, 1789-1993, ed . Clar e Cushma n (Washington, D.C. : CQ Press , 1993) , 11 , 14. 9. Charle s Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History, rev . ed., vol. 2 (Boston : Little, Brown, 1926) , 400. 10. Quote d i n Georg e Le e Haskins an d Herber t A . Johnson, Foundations of Power: John Marshall 1801-15 (Ne w York : Macmillan, 1981) , 382 . 11. Se e Henry J. Abraham, Justices and Presidents: A Political History of Appointments to the Supreme Court, 3 d ed . (Ne w York : Oxfor d Universit y Press , 1992), 420 . 12. Mos t notabl e i n this regard i s a series o f article s written i n the lat e 1950 s and earl y 1960 s b y William O'Brien . Th e boo k t o whic h thos e article s were sup posed to lead never came to fruition. Se e also Arthur P . Rugg, "William Cushing, " Yale Law Journal 3 0 (Novembe r 1920) : 128-44 . 13. Th e profoun d estee m i n whic h Cushin g wa s hel d b y Adam s an d Wash ington i s evidenced by , among othe r things , Adams's lobbyin g t o get Cushin g ap pointed chie f justic e o f Massachusett s an d Washington' s nominatin g Cushin g t o the U.S. Supreme Cour t (an d later , to b e chief justice) . 14. See , for example , Cushing , " A Revolutionar y Conservative, " 314 ; John son, "Willia m Cushing, " 49 . 15. Th e final vot e fo r ratificatio n wa s 18 7 to 168 . A series o f letter s betwee n James Madison an d George Washington reveal s the depth of concern among lead ing Federalists about whether ratification effort s i n Massachusetts would succeed . See William O'Brien , "Justic e Cushing' s Undelivere d Speec h o n th e Federa l Con stitution," William and Mary Quarterly 1 5 (January 1958) : 74, 75-76 (discussin g the letters) . 16. Quote d i n Cushing , " A Revolutionar y Conservative, " 312 . 17. O f course , no t al l Federalist s wh o supporte d th e Constitutio n becam e Hamiltonian Federalist s afte r th e Constitutio n wen t int o effect . 18. Se e ibid., 313 . 19. O'Brien , "Justic e Cushing' s Undelivere d Speech, " 74-75 . 20. Ibid. , 74 . 21. Ibid. , 78-79 .

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22. Quote d i n ibid. , 80 . Cushing's speec h i s reprinted i n Fathe r O'Brien' s ar ticle. All references ar e fro m tha t article . 23. Quote d i n Samue l B . Harding, The Contest over the Ratification of the Federal Constitution in the State of Massachusetts (Ne w York: Longmans, Green , 1896; repr., New York : Da Cap o Press , 1970) , 69. 24. Quote d i n O'Brien , "Justic e Cushing' s Undelivered Speech, " 81 . Cushing made a simila r argumen t whe n defendin g th e respectiv e term s o f offic e fo r sena tors and the president. He also insisted that these longer terms would provide sta bility fo r th e government , somethin g h e believe d wa s i n "th e interes t o f th e peo ple and th e securit y o f thei r liberties. " Ibid. , 84 . 25. See , for example , Cushman , "Willia m Cushing, " 13 . 26. Se e Jame s Wilson , "Speec h o n th e Federa l Constitution , delivere d i n Philadelphia," 6 Octobe r 1787 , i n Pamphlets on the Constitution of the United States, ed . Paul L. Ford (Brooklyn : 1888 ; repr., New York: Da Cap o Press, 1968), 115, 156 ; James Madison , "Speec h i n th e Virgini a Convention, " 2 5 June 1788 , in The Writings of James Madison, ed . Gaillar d Hunt , vol . 5 (Ne w York : Put nam's Sons , 1900-10) , 231 ; The Federalist No . 8 4 (Alexande r Hamilton) , ed . Clinton Rossite r (Ne w York : New America n Library , 1961) , 513. 27. Quote d i n O'Brien , "Justic e Cushing' s Undelivere d Speech, " 83 . At th e end o f hi s speech Cushin g offere d som e support fo r Hancock' s specifi c proposal s for amendment s t o th e Constitution . Th e tepi d natur e o f Cushing' s suppor t sug gests h e wa s speakin g t o th e proposal s becaus e Hancock' s sponsorshi p o f the m required hi m t o sa y at leas t somethin g i n their behalf . 28. Quote d i n Harding, The Contest over the Ratification of the Federal Constitution in the State of Massachusetts, 70 . 29. Quote d i n O'Brien , "Justic e Cushing' s Undelivered Speech, " 85 . 30. The Federalist is about as close as one can get to identifying a political theory treatis e writte n durin g th e America n Founding . Scholar s hav e lon g under stood, however , tha t thos e essay s must b e read wit h a full awarenes s o f thei r un derlying objective: to convince the people of New York, and to a lesser extent, th e other states , t o ratif y th e Constitution . Th e pures t attempt s a t politica l philoso phizing durin g th e America n Foundin g wer e probabl y Joh n Adams' s A Defense of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of America (1787 ) an d James Wilson's "Lecture s o n Law " (1790-1792) . 31. Ralp h Lerner, "The Supreme Court as Republican Schoolmaster, " i n 1967 Supreme Court Review, ed . Phili p B . Kurland (Chicago : Universit y o f Chicag o Press, 1967) , 127-80 . 32. Willia m Cushing' s Charge to the Grand Jury of the Circuit for the Distric t of Rhod e Island , 7 Novembe r 1794 , i n Documentary History of the Supreme Court of the United States, 1789-1800, ed . Maev a Marcu s e t al. , vol . 2 (Ne w York: Columbia Universit y Press , 1985-) , 491, 491-92. 33. Th e gran d jur y charge s Cushin g delivere d a s a Massachusetts judg e wer e

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similar i n both styl e and substanc e t o thos e he delivered a s a U.S. Supreme Cour t justice. For instance, a grand jury charge delivered at the height of the debate ove r the ratificatio n o f th e Massachusett s Constitutio n o f 178 0 foun d Cushin g re minding hi s audienc e tha t th e purpos e o f an y prope r governmen t wa s t o rende r security t o th e individual ; to secur e "th e peaceabl e an d quie t enjoymen t o f thos e rights whic h ar e no t necessaril y give n u p t o som e bod y o f men , b y enterin g int o society for th e good o f the whole—that th e rich and powerful ma y not oppres s o r Tyrannize th e wea k an d th e indigent. " Quote d i n Cushing , " A Revolutionar y Conservative," 158 . 34. Se e Lette r fro m Abigai l Adam s t o Joh n Adams , 2 1 Decembe r 1798 , i n Marcus, Documentary History of the Supreme Court, vol . 3, 317. 35. Davi d R . Warrington , The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States, ed . Kermit L. Hall (Ne w York: Oxford Universit y Press, 1992), 213, 214 . Cushin g actuall y wrot e eightee n opinion s a s a Suprem e Cour t justice . The nineteenth was issued as a circuit court judge. See WDonough v. Dannery, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 18 8 (1796) . Of the three cases in which Cushin g participated o n circuit that were appealed t o the Supreme Court , two were reversed. Se e Bingham v. Cabot, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 1 9 (1795) ; United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cr.) 103 (1801) . However, th e Court , i n a n opinio n b y Chie f Justice Marshall , main tained tha t Schooner Peggy wa s "rightful " whe n Cushin g decide d it , an d onl y a subsequent chang e i n th e la w mad e i t impossibl e t o affir m hi s circui t judgment . The fact tha t s o few of Cushing' s circuit cases were appealed speak s well of Cush ing's handling o f them . 36. See , fo r example , Cushman , "Willia m Cushing, " 14 ; Dewey , "Willia m Cushing," 127 ; Johnson, "Willia m Cushing, " 50 . 37. Davi d P . Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The First Hundred Years, 1789-1888 (Chicago : University o f Chicag o Press , 1985) , 58. 38. Ibid. , 58n.8 . 39. Ibid. , 3 7 (discussin g Ware v. Hylton). 40. Ibid. , 41. 41. See , for example , Dewey , "Willia m Cushing, " 12 7 (negativel y character izing Cushing' s opinion s a s "simple") . 42. Se e generally Lesli e Friedman Goldstein , In Defense of the Text: Democracy and Constitutional Theory (Savage , Md.: Rowma n an d Littlefield , 1991) . 43. See , fo r example , Bernar d Schwartz , A History of the Supreme Court (New York : Oxfor d Universit y Press , 1993) , chapter 1 . 44. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 41 9 (1793) . 45. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) a t 429-5 0 (Iredell , J., dissenting) . 46. See , for example , Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court, 57 ("A s far a s th e individua l Justice s ar e concerned , Paterso n an d Iredel l see m th e mos t impressive"); William R . Casto , The Supreme Court in the Early Republic: The Chief Justiceships of John Jay and Oliver Ellsworth (Columbia : Universit y o f

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South Carolin a Press , 1995) , 25 0 ("Paterso n an d Iredel l stoo d hea d an d shoul ders above thei r fellows") . 47. Th e quick passage of the Eleventh Amendment indicate s Iredell's politica l instincts were correct . 48. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) a t 453-6 6 (Wilson , J.). 49. Mar k D . Hall , "Jame s Wilson : Democrati c Theoris t an d Suprem e Cour t Justice," i n this volume . 50. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) a t 469-7 9 (Jay , C.J.) . 51. Casto , The Supreme Court in the Early Republic, 192 . 52. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) a t 453 , 454 (Blair , J.). 53. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) a t 466-69 (Cushing , J.). 54. Marcus , Documentary History of the Supreme Court, vol . 5, 127 . 55. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 19 9 (1796) . 56. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) a t 220-4 5 (Chase , J.). 57. Juliu s Goebel , Jr., History of the Supreme Court of the United States: Antecedents and Beginnings to 1801 (Ne w York : Macmillan , 1971) , 751 . See als o James Haw , Franci s F . Beirne, Rosamond R . Beirne , an d R . Samue l Jett, Stormy Patriot: The Life of Samuel Chase (Baltimore : Marylan d Historica l Society , 1980), 18 0 (quotin g Goebel) . 58. Judicia l recusa l ethic s wer e apparentl y mor e flexibl e durin g th e Court' s formative year s than they are now. Herbert Alan Johnson, "Joh n Marshall's Chie f Justiceship," Speech to the Supreme Court Historical Society, 9 April 1997 , Washington, D.C . 59. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) a t 256-8 0 (Iredell , J.). 60. Se e Christopher T . Graebe, "Th e Federalism o f James Iredell in Historica l Context," North Carolina Law Review 69 (Novembe r 1990) : 251-72 . 61. Goebel , Antecedents and Beginnings to 1801, 753 . 62. Currie , The Constitution in the Supreme Court, 37 . 63. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) a t 281-8 4 (Cushing , J.). 64. Paterson' s opinio n wa s a bit more unfocuse d tha n Cushing's , bu t he , too, emphasized tha t "Th e phraseolog y mad e us e o f leave s i n m y min d n o roo m t o hesitate a s to th e intentio n o f th e parties. The term s ar e unequivoca l an d univer sal in their signification, an d obviously point to and comprehend al l creditors, and all debtors, previously t o the 3 d of September , 1783. " 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) a t 245-56 . Unlike hi s elaborate opinio n i n Chisholm, Wilson' s opinio n i n Ware was concis e to th e poin t o f abruptness , a s Wilso n himsel f acknowledge d whe n h e bega n b y saying, " I shal l b e concise i n deliverin g m y opinion , a s it depend s o n a few plai n principles." Wilson, too, emphasized th e text. He wrote: "I t is impossible, by any glossary, o r argument , t o mak e word s mor e perspicuous , mor e conclusive , tha n by a bare recital." 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) a t 281. 65. Phili p Bobbitt , Constitutional Fate: Theory of the Constitution (Ne w

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York: Oxfor d Universit y Press , 1992) . See also Michael J. Gerhard t an d Thoma s D. Rowe , Jr. , Constitutional Theory: Arguments and Perspectives (Char lottesville, Va.: Michie, 1993) . 66. Compar e Scot t Douglas Gerber , To Secure These Rights: The Declaration of Independence and Constitutional Interpretation (Ne w York : Ne w Yor k Uni versity Press, 1995) with Christopher Wolfe, The Rise of Modern Judicial Review: From Constitutional Interpretation to Judge-Made Law (Ne w York: Basic Books, 1986). 67. Othe r opinion s Cushin g wrot e o n th e Suprem e Cour t indicat e likewise . See, fo r example , Fowler v. Lindsey, 3 U.S . ( 3 Dall. ) 410 , 41 4 (1799) . Cushin g employed a textualist approac h o n th e stat e benc h a s well. See Cushing, " A Rev olutionary Conservative, " 165-77, especiall y 17 6 ("I n ever y instance , i t appear s that Cushing' s [Massachusett s hig h cour t opinions ] wer e possesse d o f th e sam e literal conservatism tha t marke d hi s entire judicia l career") . 68. Ther e ar e a numbe r o f definition s o f textualism , bu t Bobbitt' s i s as goo d as any. Bobbitt define s textua l argumen t a s "argumen t tha t i s drawn fro m a con sideration o f th e present sens e o f th e words o f th e provision." Bobbitt , Constitutional Fate, 7 . 69. Fo r a n analogou s interpretatio n o f th e implementatio n an d complianc e problems tha t hav e developed becaus e o f moder n Suprem e Cour t justices ' inabil ity to sta y o n point , se e David M . O'Brien , Storm Center: The Supreme Court in American Politics, 3 d ed . (Ne w York : W. W. Norton, 1993) , 346 . 70. See , for example, Sylvia Snowiss, Judicial Review and the Law of the Constitution (Ne w Haven : Yal e University Press , 1990) . 71. F . W. Grinnell , "Th e Anti-Slaver y Decision s o f 178 1 an d 178 3 an d th e History o f th e Dut y o f th e Cour t i n Regar d t o Unconstitutiona l Legislation, " Massachusetts Law Quarterly 2 (Ma y 1917) : 437, 442. 72. See , for example, James Q. Wilson and John J. Dilulio, Jr., American Government: Institutions and Policies, 6t h ed. (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1995) , 420. 73. See , fo r example , Davi d G . Barnum , The Supreme Court and American Democracy (Ne w York : St . Martin's Press , 1993) , 3-9 . 74. See , for example, J. M. Sosin, The Aristocracy of the Long Robe: The Origins of Judicial Review in America (Westport , Conn. : Greenwoo d Press , 1989) ; Gordon S . Wood, "Th e Origin s o f Judicial Review, " Suffolk University Law Review 2 2 (Winte r 1988) : 1293-1307 . 75. Se e Letter from Willia m Cushin g to John Adams , 20 May 1776 , in Papers of John Adams, ed . Rober t J . Taylor , vol . 4 (Cambridge : Harvar d Universit y Press, Belknap Press , 1979) , 199 . See also Rugg , "Willia m Cushing, " 14 4 ("Th e towering for m o f Marshal l ha s dominate d th e domai n o f nationa l constitutiona l law[,] [b]u t Cushin g ha d bee n interpretin g th e grea t constitutio n o f Massachu -

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setts fo r nearl y te n year s befor e th e Constitutio n o f th e Unite d State s wa s rati fied"). 76. Th e April 179 1 case voided, pursuant t o the supremac y claus e of the fed eral Constitution , a Connecticu t statut e tha t conflicte d wit h a provisio n i n th e Treaty o f Peac e wit h Grea t Britai n ratifie d i n 1783 . Tha t cas e i s chronicle d i n Connecticut Courant, Ma y 12 , 1791 , p. 3; Massachusetts Spy, Augus t 25 , 1791, p. 3 , and July 14 , 1791 ; Boston Gazette, Jul y 4, 1791 ; Columbian Centinel, Jun e 29, 1791 . The May 179 1 case, Barnes v. West, struc k dow n a Rhode Islan d lega l tender la w a s inconsisten t wit h th e "gol d an d silver " claus e o f sectio n X o f th e federal Constitution . Tha t cas e i s documente d i n Providence Gazette, Jun e 25 , 1791 an d July 9 , 1791 . The June 179 2 case , Champion and Dickason v. Casey, invoked th e contract s claus e an d adjudge d anothe r Rhod e Islan d prodebto r statute unconstitutional . Tha t cas e is described i n Salem Gazette, Jun e 26 , 1792 ; Columbian Centinel, Jun e 20 , 1792 ; New York Daily Advertiser, Jun e 22 , 1792 ; Providence Gazette, Jun e 16 , 1792 . Se e generall y Willia m O'Brien , "Th e Pre Marshall Cour t and the Role of William Cushing," Massachusetts Law Quarterly 43 (Marc h 1958) : 52, 54 (discussin g th e cases). 77. Se e Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S . ( 2 Dall. ) 409 , 41 0 n . (1792 ) (reportin g th e April 5 , 1792 , Ne w Yor k circui t opinio n o f Jay , Cushing , an d Distric t Judg e Duane). Justices Wilson and Blair, and District Judge Peters declared the statute— the Invalid Pensioner s Act—unconstitutional seve n days later in the Pennsylvani a Circuit, which marke d th e first time an ac t o f Congres s was nullifie d b y a federa l court. Se e ibid., 411-12 n . 78. 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 14 , 20 (1800 ) (Cushing , J.). 79. Se e Gordo n E . Sherman , "Th e Cas e o f Joh n Chandle r v . Th e Secretar y of War, " Yale Law Journal 1 4 (Ma y 1905) : 431, 437. Se e generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cr. ) 137 , 17 2 (1803 ) (discussin g th e case) . Susan Lo w Bloc h and Maev a Marcu s suggest , bu t d o no t conclude , that Chandler wa s decide d o n other tha n constitutiona l grounds . Se e Susa n Lo w Bloc h an d Maev a Marcus , "John Marshall' s Selectiv e Us e o f Histor y i n Marbury v. Madison," Wisconsin Law Review (March-Apri l 1986) : 301 , 315 n.54 . I prefer Sherman' s readin g o f the case , whic h i s als o Marshall's . Bloc h an d Marcu s accus e Marshal l o f ma nipulating a serie s o f precedent s t o ge t a desire d politica l result . Se e generall y ibid., 301-37 . Bloc h an d Marcus' s article , despit e occasionall y readin g a s im penetrably a s do most deconstructio n articles , is must readin g fo r an y studen t o f the earl y Court . Se e als o Maev a Marcu s an d Rober t Teir , "Hayburn's Case: A Misinterpretation o f Precedent, " Wisconsin Law Review (July-Augus t 1988) : 527-46. 80. Se e Rober t M . Cover , justice Accused: Antislavery and the Judicial Process (Ne w Haven: Yale University Press , 1975) , 8 , 43-50 . 81. Rober t M . Spector , "Th e Quoc k Walke r Case s (1781-83)—Slavery , It s

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Abolition an d Negro Citizenshi p i n Early Massachusetts," Journal of Negro History 5 3 (Januar y 1968) : 12 . 82. Quote d i n Joh n D . Cushing , "Th e Cushin g Cour t an d th e Abolitio n o f Slavery i n Massachusetts : Mor e Note s o n th e 'Quoc k Walke r Case," ' American Journal of Legal History 5 (Apri l 1961) : 118 , 132-3 3 (printin g fo r th e first tim e what i s evidently th e final versio n o f Cushing' s jur y charge) . 83. Cover , Justice Accused, 44 . 84. Se e Cushing, "Th e Cushin g Cour t an d th e Abolition o f Slaver y in Massa chusetts," 118-44 ; Grinnell , "Th e Anti-Slaver y Decision s o f 178 1 an d 1783, " 437-41; Willia m O'Brien , "Di d th e Jennison Cas e Outla w Slaver y i n Massachu setts?," William and Mary Quarterly 1 7 (Apri l 1960) : 219-41 ; Spector , "Th e Quock Walke r Case s (1781-83), " 12-32 ; Elain e MacEacheren , "Emancipatio n of Slaver y i n Massachusetts : A Reexamination , 1770-1790, " Journal of Negro History 55 (Octobe r 1970) : 289-306; Arthu r Zilversmit , "Quo k Walker , Mum bet, and the Abolition o f Slavery in Massachusetts," William and Mary Quarterly 25 (Octobe r 1968) : 614-24 . 85. Th e status of slaves in transit an d nonresident runawa y slave s was not before th e hig h cour t o f Massachusett s i n Cushing' s day . Thos e issue s wer e ad dressed b y Chie f Justic e Lemue l Shaw' s cour t i n th e nineteent h century . Se e Leonard W . Levy, The Law of the Commonwealth and Chief Justice Shaw (Cam bridge: Harvard Universit y Press , 1957) , 59-108 . 86. Se e generall y Sau l Cornell , "Earl y America n Histor y i n a Postmoder n Age," William and Mary Quarterly 5 0 (Apri l 1993) : 329-41 . 87. A story that is reported i n the biographical account s of Cushing's life wit h almost a s muc h frequenc y a s th e stor y abou t hi s makin g a lis t o f material s h e would nee d for a new suit is one about ho w Cushin g was the last American judg e to wear th e full-bottome d Englis h judicia l wig . 88. Marshall' s contribution s ar e wel l summarize d b y Johnson: (1 ) establish ing th e "opinio n o f th e Court " a s th e majo r vehicl e fo r announcin g th e Court' s decisions; (2 ) insistin g upo n "collegia l decorum " amon g th e justices ; and (3 ) en couraging th e justice s t o shar e expertise , t o wor k togethe r fo r th e goo d o f th e Court, an d t o b e sensitive t o th e abilitie s an d limitation s o f thei r brethren . John son, Speec h t o th e Suprem e Cour t Historica l Society . Se e generall y Herber t A . Johnson, The Chief Justiceship of John Marshall, 1801-1835 (Columbia : Uni versity o f Sout h Carolin a Press , 1997) .

Chapter S

James Wilso n Democratic Theorist and Supreme Court Justice Mark D. Hall

James Wilso n (1742-1798 ) i s perhaps th e most underrate d Foundin g Father. H e was one of si x men to sig n bot h th e Declaration o f Inde pendence an d the Constitution o f the United States , and his influenc e on th e latte r wa s secon d onl y t o Jame s Madison's . Wilso n playe d a central rol e i n the ratifying debate s a s well, and he also was the mov ing force behin d th e Pennsylvania Constitutio n o f 1790 . As a law professor an d U.S. Suprem e Cour t justice , Wilso n produce d som e o f the period's mos t profoun d commentar y o n the Constitution an d Ameri can law. Despite Wilson' s man y histori c contribution s an d the high qualit y of hi s politica l thought , h e ha s bee n largel y overlooke d b y politica l scientists, historians , an d academi c lawyer s alike . Althoug h mos t students o f th e early America n republi c ar e aware o f Wilson an d his role i n th e framin g an d ratificatio n o f th e federa l Constitution , fe w realize th e sophisticatio n o f hi s though t o r th e scop e o f hi s contri butions. Thi s i s evidenced , i n part , b y th e lac k o f scholarshi p abou t Wilson. 1 M y essa y attempt s t o fill thi s voi d i n th e literatur e b y demonstrating tha t Wilso n ha d a sophisticate d politica l theor y tha t strongly influence d hi s significan t rol e i n th e creatio n o f th e Ameri can regime . 126

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A Quick Rise to Prominence James Wilson was bor n i n Carskerdo, Scotland i n 1742 , the son o f a lower-middle-class farmer . Dedicate d t o the ministry a t birth , Wilson received a n uncommonl y goo d education , whic h culminate d i n hi s winning a scholarshi p t o th e Universit y o f St . Andrews . However , after fou r year s o f undergraduat e wor k an d on e yea r o f divinit y school, he was forced t o withdraw from th e university upon the death of his father. 2 B y the time Wilson's brother s wer e ol d enoug h t o tak e care of themselves an d their mother , Wilson decide d agains t continu ing his studies and emigrated t o America t o seek fame an d fortune . Wilson arrive d i n Ne w Yor k i n th e fal l o f 176 5 an d immediatel y moved to Pennsylvania, where a letter of recommendation helpe d him to receive an appointment as a tutor at the College of Philadelphia. Although Wilso n di d well there, he was much to o ambitiou s t o remai n in the academy. Instead, he applied to read law under one of Pennsylvania's most prominent lawyers , John Dickinson . After studyin g unde r Dickinso n fo r severa l years , Wilson opene d his own private law practice, first in Carlisle and later in Philadelphia. Wilson promptl y wo n a number o f importan t cases—som e i n whic h he represented hi s adopted state . A first-rate legal reputation thereb y was secured. 3 An indication of the high regard in which Wilson's legal abilities were hel d i s George Washington's willingnes s t o pay Wilso n one hundred guinea s to accept his nephew Bushro d a s a law student . Bushrod, aware that this fee was well above the going rate, begged his uncle to allow him to study elsewhere, but Washington was convinced of Wilson' s superio r abilit y a s a lawye r an d insiste d upo n him . Bushrod wa s evidentl y wel l serve d b y this arrangement , a s indicate d by his own successfu l lega l career an d eventua l appointmen t t o Wilson's seat on the U.S. Supreme Court. 4 Wilson als o was recognize d internationally . Fo r instance , i n 177 9 Conrad-Alexandre Gerar d bestowe d upo n Wilson the great hono r o f appointing hi m France' s advocate-genera l i n America . Th e appoint ment was confirmed b y Louis XVI in 1781 , and Wilson held the post until 1783 , when h e resigne d becaus e th e Frenc h monarc h wa s un willing t o pa y th e hig h fee s h e required . Ultimately , Loui s XV I pai d Wilson 10,00 0 livres for hi s services. 5 Wilson maintained a n activ e law practice unti l his appointment t o the U.S . Suprem e Cour t i n 1790 , bu t fro m th e star t o f th e Revolu -

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tionary War until his death he spent the largest portion of his time engaged i n affairs o f state . In 177 4 Wilson joine d Carlisle' s Committe e of Correspondence an d shortl y thereafter wa s elected a deputy to the July 15 meeting of Pennsylvania leaders. Although Wilson was not selected to go to the first Continenta l Congress , he was recognized a s a rising star on the political scene with the publication of his 1774 pamphlet, "Consideration s o n th e Natur e an d Exten t o f th e Legislativ e Authority o f th e Britis h Parliament." 6 I n thi s pamphle t Wilso n pro vided th e firs t publi c argumen t fo r wh y th e "legislativ e authorit y o f the British Parliament over the colonies [should be] denied in every instant"7 Wilson was able to put hi s theory o f resistance int o practice whe n in Ma y 177 5 h e wa s electe d t o th e Secon d Continenta l Congress . After makin g severa l importan t contribution s t o th e debat e ove r in dependence, he cast the deciding vote in the Pennsylvania delegation , and thu s switche d th e delegation' s vot e an d allowe d th e Declaratio n of Independenc e t o b e unanimously adopted . Wilso n the n turne d t o the tas k o f regim e building , first by opposing wha t h e considered t o be dangerou s aspect s o f Pennsylvania' s radica l constitutio n o f 177 6 and then by serving in Congress under the Articles of Confederation. 8 Wilson's principle d stand s i n bot h stat e an d nationa l politic s le d him t o offen d jus t abou t ever y American . Pennsylvania' s aristocrat s could no t understan d Wilson' s consisten t suppor t fo r full y democra tic institutions, while commoner s an d radica l democrat s neve r com prehended his advocacy of separated powers and checks and balances. Wilson's suppor t fo r th e latter , whe n combine d wit h hi s defens e o f several local merchants accused of treason, contributed t o his reputation a s a n enem y o f democracy. 9 Oppositio n t o Wilso n reache d it s zenith in October 1779 , when a mob descended upon Wilson and his allies. After a short gu n battl e th e mo b wa s chase d off , bu t th e "At tack on Fort Wilson," as the incident became known, exacerbated th e view that Wilson was an enemy of democracy—a view that has lasted in some circles to this day. 10 Democratic Theorist of the American Founding James Wilson's greatest contribution s t o th e American republi c wer e made in the Federal Convention o f 1787 . Among the few delegates to

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attend th e conventio n fro m star t t o finish, Wilson participate d i n al l of the most importan t proceedings . He spok e mor e time s (168 ) tha n any other member , save Gouverneur Morris , and h e often responde d to the most serious attacks on the concept of a strong and democrati c national government . Indeed , scholar s a s varie d i n thei r interpreta tions o f th e America n Foundin g a s Samue l Beer , James Bryce , Ma x Farrand, Ralp h Ketcham , Adrienn e Koch , Rober t McCloskey , an d Clinton Rossiter agre e tha t Wilso n wa s secon d onl y t o James Madi son, and was perhaps o n a par with him , in terms of influence o n the framing o f the Constitution. 11 Wilson's contributions t o the debates at the Federal Convention of 1787 were numerous and detailed . The best way to approach the m is not to review the story of the entire convention bu t instead to outlin e Wilson's political theory an d the n explor e its practical consequences . Once the framework o f Wilson's political theory is understood, his activities at the convention and, indeed, during his entire political career, fall readily into place. Central t o Wilson' s politica l theor y wa s hi s vie w o f morality . H e followed Richar d Hooker , wh o i n tur n borrowe d fro m St . Thoma s Aquinas, an d adhere d t o a traditiona l Christia n conceptio n o f nat ural law. 12 Wilso n adde d t o thi s traditio n b y hi s insistenc e tha t th e natural right s o f individual s ar e firmly base d o n thi s law , an d tha t any huma n la w tha t violate s natura l right s i s void. 13 Right s pla y s o important a part i n Wilson's political theory that he argued that thei r protection i s th e "primar y an d principa l objec t i n th e institutio n o f government."14 In hi s famou s la w lecture s o f 1790-179 2 Wilso n provide d a detailed discussio n o f th e right s government s mus t protect . Centra l among thes e ar e th e right s o f individual s t o safety , property , charac ter, an d liberty. 15 Wilso n ha d a fairl y expansiv e vie w o f th e latte r concept. In his judgment, liberty includes freedom o f religion and th e right t o "think , t o speak , t o write , an d t o publis h freely." 16 Wilso n also maintaine d tha t al l member s o f societ y shoul d b e equall y pro tected b y la w becaus e la w i s base d upo n mora l principles , no t pop ular opinion . An d i n a statemen t tha t foreshadowe d Joh n Stuar t Mill's On Liberty, Wilso n declared : "O n on e side, indeed , ther e stands a singl e individual : o n th e othe r side , perhaps , ther e stan d millions: bu t righ t i s weighe d b y principle ; i t i s no t estimate d b y numbers."17

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What sor t o f governmen t woul d bes t protec t rights ? Becaus e Wilson believed that people could know natural law through their mora l senses, and becaus e he had a relatively optimisti c view of human na ture, he concluded tha t majority rul e is the bes t way to make huma n laws.18 Consequently , h e embrace d th e concep t o f popula r sover eignty, and argue d tha t al l legitimate government s mus t b e based di rectly on the will of the people. His position is best illustrated throug h his most famous metaphor : The pyrami d o f government—an d a republica n governmen t ma y wel l re ceive that beautiful an d solid form—should b e raised to a dignified altitude , but it s foundations must , o f consequence , b e broad, an d strong , an d deep . The authority, the interests, and the affections o f the people at large are th e only foundation, o n which a superstructure, proposed to be at once durabl e and magnificent , ca n b e rationally erected. 19

Every aspect of government, therefore, must be founded upo n the authority o f the people. Their consent, he taught, is the "sol e legitimate principle of obedience to human laws." 20 Wilson's view s abou t popula r sovereignt y le d hi m t o b e th e mos t democratic membe r o f th e convention . Fro m th e convention' s open ing days, Wilson advocated the direct, popular electio n of both representatives an d senators. 21 To ensure that th e base of his pyramid wa s as broad a s possible, he successfully fough t th e inclusion i n the Con stitution o f a property qualificatio n fo r suffrage. 22 Fo r th e sam e rea son h e argued tha t becaus e people, not states , are the basi s of repre sentation, members o f bot h house s ough t t o b e elected fro m propor tionally-sized districts. 23 Mor e radica l still , h e move d tha t th e executive should be directly elected by the people.24 While some of his proposals were not adopted , Wilson was instrumental i n making th e Constitution a s democrati c a s i t was , an d h e successfull y kep t th e door ope n so that i t could becom e more democratic in the future. 25 For all his democratic idealism, Wilson was aware of the danger of tyranny b y th e majority . H e recognize d tha t peopl e ar e "imperfect " and tha t the y suddenl y ma y "becom e inflame d b y mutua l imitatio n and example" and do irrational or immoral things that they normally would no t do. 26 To prevent this, he supported th e Constitution' s system o f separate d power s an d check s an d balances . He reasone d tha t these mechanism s woul d divid e power an d mak e bot h minorit y an d majority tyrann y difficult .

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Wilson supporte d a number o f devices that h e thought woul d chec k the wil l o f a n erran t majority . Thes e include d a six-yea r ter m fo r sen ators an d a n executiv e veto. 27 Hi s mos t interestin g checks , however , involved th e judiciary . Earl y i n th e conventio n h e supporte d Madi son's Counci l o f Revision , whic h consiste d o f th e executiv e an d " a convenient numbe r o f the judiciary." 28 The council would hav e had a n absolute vet o ove r legislativ e acts . Madison's proposa l wa s eventuall y rejected, bu t Wilso n di d no t giv e u p o n effort s t o strengthe n th e judi ciary. Wilson wa s convince d tha t th e Suprem e Cour t neede d t o b e inde pendent fro m th e othe r institution s o f th e nationa l government . H e therefore adamantl y oppose d th e Virgini a plan' s provisio n tha t th e legislature appoin t th e justices. 29 H e als o fough t hi s ol d mento r Joh n Dickinson's proposa l tha t judge s b e easil y removable , an d h e sup ported th e constitutional prohibitio n agains t lowerin g thei r salaries. 30 After Wilso n helpe d t o for m a largely independen t Suprem e Court , h e proceeded t o argu e fo r a system o f lowe r federa l courts . He eventuall y agreed t o th e compromis e o f givin g Congres s th e powe r t o creat e lower federa l court s i n th e future. 31 Not onl y did Wilson suppor t a n independent Suprem e Court , h e intended i t t o hav e th e powe r o f judicia l review. 32 H e mos t clearl y ex pressed thi s expectatio n i n hi s la w lectures , where h e maintaine d tha t a ba d la w migh t b e vetoed b y the executiv e an d tha t i t is "subjec t als o to anothe r give n degre e o f control b y the judiciary department , when ever th e laws , though i n fac t passed , ar e foun d t o b e contradictory t o the constitution." 33 The Suprem e Cour t i s in a particularly goo d positio n t o check Con gress, Wilson insisted , becaus e th e justices ar e well trained i n comple x legal matter s an d ar e insulate d fro m popula r passions. 34 Wilso n late r showed tha t h e wa s seriou s abou t thi s propositio n whe n h e le d a cir cuit court i n Hay burn's Case (1792 ) i n refusing t o comply wit h a n un constitutional ac t o f Congress . Was Wilson' s suppor t fo r check s lik e judicia l revie w inconsisten t with his democratic theory? Elsewher e I argue in detail that i t was not , but her e I ca n merel y sugges t a solution. 35 Wilso n mad e i t clea r tha t he di d no t expec t countermajoritaria n check s t o b e use d often . Abou t judicial review , fo r instance , h e wrot e tha t "law s ma y b e unjust , ma y be unwise , ma y b e dangerous , ma y b e destructive ; an d ye t no t b e s o unconstitutional a s t o justif y th e judge s i n refusin g t o giv e the m ef -

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feet."36 H e also argued for judicial self-restraint. A judge, Wilson contended, shoul d "remember , tha t hi s dut y an d hi s busines s is , not t o make the law, but to interpret an d apply it." 37 Wilson did not believe that the Supreme Court would use its power to thwart th e majority o n many issues. Instead, he thought th e Cour t would use the power of judicial review only rarely: to strike down blatantly unconstitutional o r unjust laws . For Wilson, countermajoritar ian check s lik e judicia l revie w ar e a t bes t temporar y injunction s fo r preventing majorities fro m actin g out of "passions " and "prejudices " that ar e "inflame d b y mutual imitatio n an d example." 38 I n th e final analysis the Court canno t preven t the people from passin g a law, but this i s as it shoul d b e becaus e th e peopl e ar e bes t abl e t o creat e jus t laws. The purpose o f checks like judicial review is not, then, to mak e policy but to restrain imprope r o r unjust law s until the people recognize them as such and correct them . Wilson's democrati c views greatly influenced hi s theory o f federal ism. While partisans o f the states o r the national governmen t argue d (and argue ) abou t whic h i s sovereign, Wilson presente d th e truly democratic vie w of th e subject . Fo r Wilson, onl y th e peopl e ar e sover eign, and onc e this principle is settled the consequenc e i s that the y ma y tak e fro m th e subordinat e government s powers wit h whic h the y hav e hithert o truste d them , an d plac e thos e pow ers i n th e genera l government , i f i t i s thought tha t ther e the y wil l b e pro ductive of more good. They can distribute one portion of power to the more contracted circl e calle d stat e governments : the y ca n furnis h anothe r pro portion t o the government o f the United States . Who wil l undertake t o sa y as a stat e office r tha t th e peopl e ma y no t giv e t o th e genera l governmen t what power s an d fo r wha t purpos e the y please? how com e it sir, that thes e state government s dictat e t o thei r superiors?—t o th e majest y o f th e peo ple.39

In America the people decided to split the power of government between the states and the nation. O f course the difficulty wit h this approach i s deciding whic h power s belon g t o th e state s an d whic h belong t o th e nation . Wilso n taugh t tha t th e "genera l principle " tha t should b e used to draw " a lin e between the national an d the individ ual governments o f the states" is that whatever objec t wa s confine d i n it s natur e an d operatio n t o a particula r State, ough t t o b e subjec t t o th e separat e government s o f th e States ; bu t

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whatever i n it s natur e an d operatio n extende d beyon d a particula r State , ought t o b e comprehended withi n th e federa l jurisdiction. 40

Wilson attempte d t o pu t thi s principl e int o practic e when , a s a member o f the Committe e o f Detail , he played a key role in draftin g Article One, Section Eight of the Constitution. 41 Wilson believed that the scope of the national government was limited to powers enumerate d i n the Constitution . I t is true that h e supported th e necessary and proper clause . But he thought implie d pow ers must b e closely connected t o enumerate d powers—the y wer e no t a licens e t o d o anything. 42 Power s no t give n t o th e nationa l govern ment ar e reserve d t o th e people , who ma y o r ma y no t chos e t o giv e them to the states. 43 Wilson s o strongly believe d that the national government wa s limited t o enumerate d power s tha t h e oppose d th e additio n o f a bil l of rights t o th e Constitution . Why , fo r example , ad d a statemen t tha t Congress canno t restric t th e libert y o f th e pres s i f Congress ha s n o power ove r th e press ? Furthermore , Wilso n insisted , a bil l o f right s would b e dangerous becaus e i f an y rights ar e lef t ou t i t might b e assumed that the y are not retained b y the people. 44 Wilson wa s no t s o naive a s to thin k tha t a n enumeratio n o f Con gress's powers would prevent conflicts from arisin g between the states and th e nation . I n fact , h e warned Georg e Washingto n i n 179 1 tha t "the most intricate and the most delicate questions in our national jurisprudence will arise in running the line between the authority o f the national government and that of the several states."45 To prevent these conflicts fro m arising , Wilso n though t th e nationa l governmen t should commissio n hi m to prepare a digest o f the laws of the United States t o wor k ou t th e parameter s o f eac h government' s powers . Washington liked Wilson's codification projec t and encouraged him to pursue it . The project ultimatel y wa s abandone d a t the urgin g o f At torney General Edmund Randolph , who considered the task to be beyond an y one man. 46 Wilson di d no t rel y o n hi s codification projec t alone . He believe d that ultimatel y th e nationa l governmen t mus t judg e fo r itsel f th e proper applicatio n o f it s powers. Initially , thi s belie f le d hi m t o sup port Madison' s proposa l tha t th e national legislatur e hav e the powe r to vet o stat e laws. 47 Wilson supporte d thi s proposa l no t becaus e h e wanted Congres s to examine every state law and strik e down those it

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did no t like . Rather , h e considere d th e congressiona l vet o t o b e primarily a form o f self-defense agains t encroachments b y the states into matters of national jurisdiction . When it became clear that a congressional veto over state laws was not goin g to b e adopted, Wilson helpe d t o develo p a n acceptabl e al ternative. As a driving force behin d th e Committe e o f Detail, Wilson deserves considerable credit for the supremacy clause of the Constitu tion. This clause, he eventually was able to convince his ally Madison, was a reasonable alternativ e t o the congressional veto , for i t guaran teed tha t federa l laws , made pursuan t t o th e Constitution , woul d b e the supreme law of the land. 48 Of course the question stil l remained: Who decide s whether a particular federa l la w i s constitutional , an d therefor e supreme ? Wilso n thought tha t thi s task belonge d t o the Supreme Court . He noted tha t in this institution th e "judicial powe r o f th e Unite d State s i s vested" b y th e "people, " wh o "or dained and established" the constitution. The business and the design of the judicial powe r is , t o administe r justic e accordin g t o th e la w o f th e land . . . . When th e questio n occurs—Wha t i s the la w o f th e land ? i t [th e judi ciary] must als o decide this question. 49

Hence Wilson concluded that the Supreme Court had the power to resolve al l dispute s involvin g federalism , subjec t onl y t o th e ultimat e power o f the people themselves. The abov e page s outlin e James Wilson' s contribution s t o th e cre ation o f a stron g an d democrati c nationa l governmen t tha t protect s individual rights . It i s interesting t o not e ho w closel y America' s cur rent constitutiona l syste m resemble s th e on e h e envisioned . Earl y i n the nineteenth centur y state s bega n t o mak e som e of th e suffrag e re forms tha t Wilso n advocated . B y the twentiet h centur y hi s proposa l that senator s b e electe d b y th e peopl e ha d becom e enshrine d i n th e Constitution, an d hi s "chimerical " ide a tha t th e president b e elected by th e peopl e ha s becom e th e politica l practice , i f no t th e constitu tional rule . It was a t thi s time a s well that th e Suprem e Cour t bega n to exercise its power to check the other institutions of government and protect individual and minority rights to the extent Wilson conceived. In 1964 , for instance , the Court effectuated on e of Wilson's most important ideals when it applied the principle of one-person, one-vote to

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the U.S. House of Representatives. Indeed, Justice Hugo Black's opinion for th e Court cite d Wilson's law lectures on this point. 50 Leader in the Ratification Debate From th e Constitutiona l Conventio n Wilso n proceede d t o th e Penn sylvania ratifyin g conventio n where , a s th e onl y membe r t o atten d both, he became the leader of the proratification forces . He began his defense o f th e Constitutio n wit h hi s famou s "Stat e Hous e Yar d Speech," given in Philadelphia on October 6,1787. There Wilson promoted the benefits o f the Constitution and responded to several of the main Antifederalis t attacks. 51 Mos t significantly , a s note d above , h e defended th e absence of a bill of rights from th e Constitution . Wilson wa s the firs t membe r o f th e Federa l Conventio n t o defen d the Constitution publicly. He did his job so well that Pennsylvania became the secon d state , and th e first larg e one , to ratif y th e Constitu tion. Becaus e o f hi s success , Federalist s throughou t th e countr y en listed his aid in their own ratification efforts . Georg e Washington, fo r instance, sen t a cop y o f Wilson' s "Stat e Hous e Yar d Speech " t o a friend, an d noted tha t the enclose d Advertiser contain s a speec h o f Mr . Wilson's, as able, candid , and hones t membe r a s wa s i n th e convention , whic h wil l plac e mos t o f Colonel Mason's objections i n their true point o f light, I send it to you. Th e republication o f it , i f yo u ca n ge t i t done , wil l b e serviceabl e a t thi s junc ture. 52

By December 29 , 1787, the speech had bee n reprinted i n 34 newspapers i n twelv e states. 53 I n addition , i t wa s publishe d i n pamphle t form an d circulate d throughou t th e nation . I t wa s s o important , Bernard Baily n insists , tha t "i n th e 'transien t circumstances ' o f th e time it was not so much the Federalist papers that captured most people's imagination s a s James Wilson's speec h o f Octobe r 6 , 1787 , the most famous, t o some the most notorious , federalist statemen t o f the time."54 Many defenders of the Constitution in other states referred t o the speec h for ammunitio n i n their ow n ratificatio n battles. 55 It soo n became, in Gordo n Wood' s words, "th e basi s o f al l Federalist think ing."56

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As his final ac t of constitution making , Wilson was pleased to lead Pennsylvania i n disposing of its constitution o f 1776 . The Pennsylvania constitutiona l conventio n o f 1789-179 0 commence d wit h Wil son, the Federalist leader, and William Findley, the leader of the western radicals, agreeing t o renounce th e ol d constitution an d begi n debating a ne w draf t constitutio n Wilso n wrote . I n th e draf t Wilso n provided fo r a government base d firmly on the will of the people bu t limited through a strong system of separated powers . Ironically, Wilson, who ofte n ha d bee n labeled a n aristocrat , brok e with his old allies and joined th e western democrat s o n severa l issues. Most signifi cant, he led the fight for the direct, popular election of representatives, state senators, and the governor.57 Wilson's contributions to the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1790 are noteworthy for present purposes insofar a s they demonstrate tha t h e did no t argu e for democrati c insti tutions at the Federal Convention simpl y because he was from a large state. U.S. Supreme Court justice After th e Constitution was ratified, Wilson thought he deserved a position in the new national government. Accordingly, he wrote to President Washington an d suggeste d tha t h e be appointed chie f justic e of the Unite d States. 58 Washington responde d coolly , writing: "T o you , my dear Sir , and other s who kno w me , I presume i t will b e unnecessary for me to say that I have entered upon my office withou t the constraint o f a singl e engagement" 59 Eventually , however , Wilso n wa s appointed an d confirme d a s an associat e justic e o f th e first Suprem e Court. From this position he was to play an important role in the for mation o f American law . Although h e participated i n fewer tha n tw o dozen cases, he left hi s mark i n a variety of ways. One of the most significant decision s by Wilson as a Supreme Court justice i s also on e o f th e mos t overlooked . I n 179 2 Congress passe d the Invali d Pensioner s Act , which provide d federa l assistanc e t o vet erans injured i n the Revolutionary War. It also required federal circui t court judge s t o determin e whethe r individual s wh o claime d benefit s were eligible for them . The judges' decisions were subject t o final approval b y the secretar y o f wa r an d Congress . The first case aros e i n the New York Circuit, where Chief Justice John Jay and Associate Jus-

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tice William Cushing were presiding with District Judge James Duane. These judge s informe d Congres s tha t the y ha d problem s wit h thi s duty, but that the y would perfor m i t out o f respect for th e legislator s and the pensioners. 60 When a case arose in the Pennsylvania Circuit , Justices Wilson and John Blair, along with District Judge Richard Peters, refused t o accept the pensioner' s case . Unde r Wilson' s leadershi p th e justice s an d th e judge wrot e a lette r t o Presiden t Washingto n i n whic h the y argue d that reviewin g invali d pensioners ' claim s was no t a judicial functio n and, mor e important , tha t i t violate d th e principl e o f separatio n o f powers becaus e th e secretar y o f wa r an d Congres s ha d th e final say. They refused t o hear the claim. 61 In response t o th e letter , Attorney Genera l Edmun d Randolp h ap plied to the Supreme Court fo r a writ o f mandamus requiring the circuit cour t judge s t o perfor m thei r duty . Fortunatel y fo r Joh n Mar shall's reputation, the full Court did not have to rule on the matter. Before th e justices could act , Congres s altere d th e offendin g legislatio n and mooted th e case. Because the Suprem e Cour t neve r issue d a n officia l opinion , Hayburn's Case (1792 ) i s ofte n overlooke d b y student s o f th e judicia l process.62 But it is fair to consider the case to be, in Hayburn's words, the "firs t instanc e i n whic h a cour t o f justic e ha s declare d a la w o f Congress unconstitutional." 63 Jame s Madiso n evidentl y agree d wit h this assessment, as indicated by a letter to Richard Henry Lee in which Madison commented that the circuit court judges in Pennsylvania ha d pronounced th e ac t "unconstitutiona l an d void." 64 Similarly , St . George Tucker , i n his 180 3 "republicanized " editio n o f Blackstone' s Commentaries, cite d Hayburn's Case as evidenc e tha t th e judiciar y has th e dut y t o voi d a n unconstitutiona l ac t o f Congress. 65 Thus , eleven year s befor e Marbury v. Madison (1803 ) th e justices , le d b y Wilson, were engaging in judicial review of federal legislation . Without a doubt , Wilson' s mos t significan t opinio n cam e i n th e 1793 case Chisholm v. Georgia.66 The case arose when Chisholm , the executor o f th e estat e o f a Loyalist, sue d Georgi a fo r paymen t o f a debt incurred during the Revolutionary War. Georgia officials claime d that, as a sovereign, Georgia could not be sued. The state officials rec ognized that to submit Georgia to the jurisdiction of the federal court s would strike a major blo w to state sovereignty. This concern had been repeatedly raise d b y the Antifederalists , wh o ha d argue d i n many o f

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the ratifying convention s tha t individual s would b e able to su e states as states. 67 In Chisholm th e Antifederalists' wors t nightmar e seeme d t o com e true: th e Suprem e Cour t rule d fou r t o on e agains t Georgia . Wilso n joined th e majority an d wrot e th e most memorabl e an d theoreticall y interesting o f the seriatim opinions . He moved fa r beyon d th e simpl e legal question and concluded that the case was not primarily about jurisdiction bu t instea d concerne d th e question whethe r "th e people of the United State s form a Nation?" 68 Wilson provide d a n elaborat e answe r t o thi s question . A s he was wont t o do , h e bega n wit h a n examinatio n o f th e relevan t jurispru dential issues . He opene d wit h a quote fro m Thoma s Rei d abou t th e importance o f language . Languag e i s importan t becaus e imprecis e words can lead to bad political theory. For instance, people often misuse the terms "state " an d "sovereign. " T o define thes e terms, Wilson returned t o first principles and reminded hi s audience that peopl e are "fearfully an d wonderfully made, " and that they are endowed by their "Creator" wit h "dignity. " A state, on the other hand, is but an "infe rior contrivance o f man." Whil e a state is certainly "usefu l an d valu able," the people should never forget tha t a state exists to serve them, not vice versa. 69 Wilson buil t o n thi s distinction , an d informe d hi s readers tha t th e people alway s retai n thei r powe r o f origina l sovereignty . Whil e th e people may vest aspects of this sovereignty in states, this is merely sovereignty of a "derivative" nature. It is therefore inaccurat e to speak of a "sovereig n state," for onl y the people are sovereign. Wilson thereby looked at the issue from th e perspective of the Union and decreed that the people as a whole—including the citizens of Georgia—created th e Constitution. Consequently , "a s t o th e purpose s o f th e Unio n . . . Georgia i s NOT a sovereign State." 70 On th e basi s o f "genera l jurisprudence, " Wilso n conclude d tha t Georgia is not a sovereign state and that it has a duty to fulfill it s contracts. Although Wilson probably was tempted to rest his decision o n these theoretica l grounds , h e proceede d t o examin e a numbe r o f precedents that supporte d hi s proposition tha t government s coul d b e sued. Wilson admitted that in England this had not been the case since the Norman Conquest . Yet under the Saxon government, rulers were subject t o the law. Similarly, he pointed t o several Greek an d Spanis h precedents that seeme d to support hi s position.

James Wilson 13 9 Given tha t th e sovereig n peopl e ca n gran t th e nationa l governmen t whatever power s the y choose , th e onl y questio n tha t remaine d wa s whether the y di d indee d giv e th e Suprem e Cour t jurisdictio n ove r state governments. 71 T o answe r thi s questio n Wilso n finally turne d t o Article III , Section 2 o f th e Constitution , wher e i t state s tha t th e judi cial power "shal l exten d t o controversies , betwee n a state an d citizen s of anothe r state." 7 2 Clearly , Wilso n contended , thi s provisio n show s that th e peopl e gav e th e Suprem e Cour t th e jurisdictio n t o hea r case s like Chisholm's . Georgi a therefor e mus t submi t t o th e wil l o f th e sov ereign peopl e an d subjec t itsel f t o th e jurisdictio n o f th e Court. 73 Wilson's opinio n ha s bee n criticized—includin g i n this collection — for bein g unnecessaril y complex. 74 I t i s tru e tha t Wilso n coul d hav e forgone th e theoretical discussio n an d simpl y turne d t o th e tex t o f th e Constitution. Bu t Wilson recognize d th e power o f language an d ideas . He firmly believe d tha t popula r sovereignt y wa s th e foundatio n upo n which th e America n syste m o f governmen t wa s based . Consequently , he wante d t o attac k head-on—an d i n detail—th e notio n o f stat e sov ereignty, whic h h e correctl y perceive d coul d tea r th e natio n apart . Americans wer e no t ye t willin g t o embrac e Wilson' s view s o n sov ereignty. Indeed, states ' rights advocate s move d quickl y t o pas s a con stitutional amendmen t t o revers e Chisholm. Unfortunately , ther e ar e no record s o f Wilson's reactio n t o th e Elevent h Amendment . On e rea sonably ma y presume , however , tha t Wilso n woul d hav e considere d the Elevent h Amendmen t unwis e becaus e i t allowe d state s t o judg e themselves. Tha t said , Wilso n undoubtedl y woul d hav e accepte d th e amendment becaus e h e supporte d th e powe r o f th e peopl e t o chang e the Constitutio n a s the y sa w fit. Wilson playe d a rol e i n tw o othe r importan t earl y Suprem e Cour t decisions involvin g federalism . I n Hylton v. U.S. (1796) , he concurre d with th e Cour t tha t Congress' s unifor m ta x o n carriage s wa s no t a di rect ta x an d wa s therefor e constitutional. 75 Wilso n di d no t writ e a n opinion becaus e th e Cour t uphel d th e rulin g h e mad e o n circuit . Th e case significantl y strengthene d th e abilit y o f th e ne w nationa l govern ment t o rais e revenu e b y upholdin g a ke y elemen t o f Alexande r Hamilton's pla n fo r rescuin g the finances o f the fledgling republic . Th e mere acceptance o f this case also implied tha t th e justices believe d tha t the Cour t ha d th e powe r t o strik e dow n act s o f Congress . I n fact , when Wilso n wa s presidin g ove r th e circui t cour t argument s i n th e case, h e tol d th e government' s counse l tha t th e justice s wer e o f th e

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opinion tha t federa l court s coul d strik e dow n congressiona l legisla tion a s unconstitutional. 76 In Ware v. Hylton (1796) , Wilson hel d tha t th e nationa l govern ment's treaty-makin g powe r take s precedence ove r stat e law. Specifi cally, the 1783 treaty with Great Britain, which required repayment of prewar debt s t o Britis h citizens , preempted a 177 7 Virginia la w tha t effectively abolishe d thos e debts. 77 Wilson wa s tempted t o make thi s ruling solel y o n th e basi s o f th e "la w o f nations, " bu t h e ultimatel y joined the rest of the Court in declaring that the supremacy clause operated retroactively . A n importan t preceden t concernin g th e su premacy of federal la w thereby was established. 78 Throughout hi s legal career Wilson evidenced a profound commit ment to the idea that law must be based on the will of the people. He challenged, fo r instance , the conventiona l wisdo m tha t jurie s shoul d judge onl y facts . Instead , Wilso n propose d tha t i n a t leas t som e in stances they should b e able to judge law as well. In his first charg e to a federal gran d jury, Wilson stated tha t it may seem , at firs t view , to b e somewhat extra-ordinar y tha t twelv e men , untutored i n the study of jurisprudence, should b e the ultimate interpreter s of th e law , with a power t o overrul e th e direction s o f th e Judges who hav e made i t th e subjec t o f thei r lon g an d elaborat e researches , an d hav e bee n raised t o th e sea t o f judgmen t fo r thei r professiona l abilitie s an d skill. 79

Wilson believe d tha t a jur y coul d decid e bot h fact s an d law s be cause it is serving as a representative of society. 80 Jurors therefore ma y choose to reject a judge's instructions o n a point o f law, even thoug h a judg e i s bette r traine d i n la w tha n the y are . Fo r Wilson , whe n i t comes to principles of right and justice, the common person is able to know truth a s well as—if no t bette r than—the trained expert. 81 Wilson respected juries because he felt they represent the will of the people. For a similar reaso n h e cherished th e common law. 82 Indeed , Wilson declare d tha t "ever y lovel y featur e [o f commo n law ] beams consent."83 Common law is one of the most democratic of all types of law becaus e people hav e agreed t o i t and hav e participated i n its development throughou t th e ages. 84 As he did with democracy , Wilso n supported commo n law not as an end in itself bu t because it is an important mean s by which natural la w can be known. 85 This was not t o say , however, that commo n la w is perfect. Wilso n recognized tha t i t containe d errors , an d h e criticize d aspect s o f i t

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throughout hi s la w lectures. 86 But , lik e society , commo n la w i s i n a state o f progression becaus e its "authorit y rest s on reception, appro bation, custom, long and established . The same principles, which establish it, change, enlarge, improve, and repeal it." 87 Wilson taugh t tha t i n addition t o providin g a good rul e o f justice, common la w is practical. Among its other benefits , i t can help defin e terms and fill in gaps not covered by statutory law. 88 Further, common law is of such "vas t importance" tha t "b y it, the proceedings and decisions of courts of justice are regulated and directed." 89 Because common la w i s comple x an d important , h e encourage d lawyer s t o spe cialize in it. 90 One of the most pressing unsettled lega l issues in the new republi c was the exten t t o whic h commo n la w shoul d b e accepted b y American courts, particularly federa l courts. 91 Antifederalists generall y op posed a federal common law because they feared i t would increase the power o f the national government . Wilson joined many o f his Federalist colleagues in arguing that common law, insofar a s it is not in conflict with the Constitution or federal statutory law, should be accepted by federa l courts . Hi s mos t importan t contribution s i n thi s regar d were his grand jury charges in the United State s circuit court cases of Gideon Henfield an d Joseph Ravara . In Jul y 1793 , Gideo n Henfiel d wa s charge d befor e a gran d jur y with, among other things, engaging in acts hostile to nations at peace with th e United State s b y seizing a British ship . No statut e explicitl y forbade Henfield' s activities , bu t Wilso n argue d tha t th e commo n law is the basi s of jurisprudence i n America, that American commo n law, like Englis h commo n law , incorporated th e la w o f nations , an d that American s ar e therefor e liabl e fo r violation s o f commo n law. 92 Although t o the great rejoicin g o f the Antifederalists th e jury acquit ted Henfield , Wilson' s charg e contribute d t o th e eventual , thoug h short-lived, acceptanc e o f commo n la w claim s b y th e federa l courts.93 Wilson also played a role in the prosecution of Joseph Ravara, consul-general of the Republic of Genoa. Ravara was indicted by a grand jury, with Suprem e Cour t Justices Wilson an d James Iredell an d Dis trict Judg e Richar d Peter s presiding , fo r "sendin g anonymou s an d threatening letter s t o Mr . Hammond , th e Britis h Minister , Mr . Hol land, a citizen of Philadelphia, and several other persons, with a view to extor t money." 94 Becaus e thi s cas e wa s poorl y reported , scholar s

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long have debate d th e exac t natur e o f th e charges. 95 Recent scholar ship ha s show n tha t bot h th e prosecutor s an d th e defens e attorney s understood tha t th e centra l charg e wa s base d o n commo n law. 96 Ravara was found guilty , but he was pardoned b y President Washington fo r diplomati c reasons . The case is significant becaus e i t was th e first tim e a person wa s convicte d i n a federa l cour t fo r violatin g th e common law, and because Wilson was again at the forefront o f the action. As mentioned above, Antifederalists di d not want the federal courts to have jurisdiction in common-law cases because it would strengthe n the power of the national government. As a Federalist, Wilson did not share thi s concern . Rather , h e wa s s o enamore d o f th e democrati c character of the common law that he felt it necessary for courts to use it i f they ar e t o mak e jus t decisions . Because the commo n la w stem s from th e custom of many people over many years, it was, in Wilson's mind, simila r t o natura l law . Thus h e joined th e Federalist s i n advo cating federal common-la w jurisdiction no t becaus e he wanted to expand the power of the national government but, rather, because he believed common la w to b e extremely democratic , and therefore a n excellent approximation o f natural law. 97 Perhaps Wilson' s mos t importan t contributio n t o American ju risprudence too k plac e of f th e bench . Fro m 179 0 t o 179 2 h e foun d time t o teac h la w a t th e Colleg e o f Philadelphia . There , Wilson pre sented th e firs t se t o f lecture s o n American constitutiona l law. 98 Th e significance o f Wilson's lecture s i s indicated b y the audienc e tha t at tended hi s inaugural address , which included the Presiden t o f th e Unite d States , with hi s lady—als o th e Vice-President , and bot h house s of Congress , the President an d bot h house s of the Legisla ture of Pennsylvania, together with a great number o f ladies and gentleme n . . . the whole comprisin g a most brillian t an d respectabl e audience. "

Wilson's lecture s ar e important fo r th e presen t discussio n becaus e he believed law should be "studied and practiced as a science founde d in principle [not ] followe d a s a trade dependin g merel y upo n prece dent."100 Consequently , Wilso n spen t mos t o f hi s tim e focusin g o n philosophical matters , especiall y thos e tha t pertaine d t o morality , epistemology, metaphysics , an d politics . He though t tha t onc e thes e foundations o f jurisprudenc e wer e mastered , student s the n coul d learn what h e termed "th e retail business of law." 101

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This i s no t t o say , however , tha t Wilso n di d no t discus s mundan e legal matters. His lecture s progressed naturall y fro m abstrac t politica l theory t o mor e concret e constitutiona l issues , suc h a s th e power s o f Congress, th e president , an d th e Court . H e als o examine d stat e an d local governments , relativel y uninterestin g office s lik e sherif f an d coroner included . H e lecture d o n specifi c crime s agains t individual s and propert y a s well , an d th e punishment s associate d wit h thos e crimes. Yet even whe n Wilso n discusse d th e mos t bana l o f subject s h e was carefu l t o retur n a s ofte n a s possibl e t o th e first principle s o f American jurisprudence . It is unfortunate tha t Wilso n delivere d onl y hal f o f hi s planned lec tures. Although h e had writte n al l of them, severa l ar e in outline form . Wilson eventuall y hope d t o complet e an d revis e hi s lecture s an d thereby provid e th e definitiv e accoun t o f America n law . Even withou t these revisions , however , Wilson' s lecture s hav e bee n describe d accu rately as among th e most systemati c an d theoreticall y interestin g stud ies of th e Constitutio n an d America n la w articulate d b y a Founder. 102 Wilson's writing s illustrat e hi s grea t fait h i n "th e scienc e o f poli tics." 103 H e believe d tha t politica l scienc e wa s i n it s infancy , an d tha t the greates t discoverie s la y ahead. 104 H e attempte d t o contribut e t o this progres s throug h hi s investigatio n o f th e fundamenta l principle s of la w an d politics . An d unlik e man y politica l thinkers , Wilso n at tempted t o appl y th e knowledg e h e gaine d throug h stud y t o rea l po litical problems .

A Sad End to a Still Important Life Wilson spen t a n ever-increasin g amoun t o f tim e durin g th e late r year s of hi s lif e tryin g t o manag e hi s busines s affairs . H e ha d borrowe d heavily t o speculat e i n wester n land s an d wa s fighting constantl y t o meet bills and t o borro w mor e money fo r furthe r investments . In 179 7 an economi c downtur n devastate d th e overleverage d Wilson , alon g with man y othe r prominen t men—includin g Rober t Morris , th e "Fi nancier o f th e Revolution " an d a t on e poin t th e riches t ma n i n Amer ica. 105 Unabl e t o find assistanc e t o mee t th e variet y o f note s comin g due, Wilson wa s force d t o flee from hi s creditors. Thrown int o jai l o n two separat e occasions , h e spen t hi s final day s hidin g fro m creditor s in a taver n i n Edenton , Nort h Carolina , th e hometow n o f Justic e

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Iredell. Here, with his wife by his side, Wilson contracted malaria an d died on August 21,1798.106 He was buried with little ceremony on the estate of Mrs. Iredell's father. 107 Perhaps i t is as a result o f his early, ignoble deat h tha t James Wilson i s not bette r know n today . Becaus e he died a t a relatively youn g age h e was unabl e t o complet e hi s la w lecture s an d la w digests . Yet Wilson i s worthy o f stud y becaus e hi s sophisticate d an d innovativ e political theory informed hi s many important contributions to the creation of the American republic. As this essay has endeavored to show, Wilson wa s instrumenta l i n supportin g an d reconcilin g som e o f th e best ideas of his (and our) day: popular sovereignty, majority rule , and minority rights . Th e tensio n remain s between thes e ideas , whic h means that Wilso n shoul d b e regarded no t onl y a s an influentia l his torical figure but as someone who can inform curren t debate .

NOTES

1. Ther e i s on e goo d biograph y o f Wilson , an d severa l scholar s hav e pub lished interestin g bu t narro w article s abou t hi s politica l theory . N o work , how ever, provides a systematic account of Wilson's political and legal philosophy. I attempt t o d o s o i n The Political and Legal Philosophy of James Wilson (1742-1798) (Columbia : Universit y o f Missour i Press , 1997) , fro m whic h th e present essa y is adapted . The goo d biograph y o f Wilso n i s Charle s Pag e Smith , James Wilson: Founding Father (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolin a Press , 1956). Geoffrey See d provides a nice summar y o f Wilson' s politica l idea s i n James Wilson (Millwood , N.Y.: KTO Press, 1978). Additional scholarshi p about Wilson is cited throughou t the present essay . 2. Mos t nineteenth - an d early-twentieth-centur y scholarshi p abou t Wilso n holds that Wilson studie d a t the University o f Edinburgh an d tha t o f Glasgow , a s well as at St . Andrews. There i s little evidence t o suppor t thes e claims . 3. Th e mos t importan t o f thes e cases was th e 178 2 disput e betwee n Pennsyl vania an d Connecticu t ove r the Wyoming Valley. The case in question was argue d in Trenton, New Jersey, before a tribunal forme d unde r Articl e IX of th e Article s of Confederation . Wilson' s presentatio n convince d th e judge s o f Pennsylvania' s rightful clai m t o th e land . Significantly , Connecticu t acquiesce d t o th e decision , which marke d th e firs t tim e a disput e betwee n state s ha d bee n settle d unde r th e auspices o f th e nationa l government . Th e successfu l culminatio n o f thi s lawsui t likely inspire d Wilson' s late r suppor t fo r a stron g federa l judiciary . Se e Seed , James Wilson, 185 ; Smith, James Wilson, 170-76 .

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4. Bushro d Washingto n t o Bir d Wilson , 2 6 Octobe r 1822 , i n Jame s Wilso n Papers, Historical Societ y o f Pennsylvania , Philadelphia . 5. Se e The Burto n Alv a Konkl e Papers , Swarthmor e University , vol . Ill , esp . 81a. 6. I n The Works of James Wilson, ed . Rober t G . McCloske y (Cambridge : Harvard Universit y Press , 1967) , 721-4 6 (hereafte r cite d a s Works). Wilso n wrote th e pamphlet i n 1768 . He refraine d fro m publishin g i t at that tim e becaus e he considered i t to b e too radical . 7. Ibid. , 72 1 (emphasi s i n original) . O n th e pamphlet' s significance , se e Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution, enlarge d ed . (Cambridge: Harvard Universit y Press , 1992) , 225. 8. O n Wilso n an d th e Pennsylvani a Constitutio n o f 1776 , se e Gordo n S . Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 (Chape l Hill : Uni versity o f Nort h Carolin a Press , 1969) , 137-40 , 244-51 ; John Pau l Selsam , The Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776: A Study of Revolutionary Democracy (Philadelphia: Universit y o f Pennsylvani a Press , 1936) . O n Wilson' s rol e i n th e Continental Congress , se e Edmun d Cod y Burnett , The Continental Congress (New York: Macmillan, 1941) ; Merrill Jensen, The Articles of Confederation: An Interpretation of the Social-Constitutional History of the American Revolution, 1774-1781 (1940 ; repr., Madison: Universit y o f Wisconsin Press , 1962) . 9. Wilson' s participation i n these trials had importan t implication s fo r Amer ican treaso n law . Ther e i s goo d reaso n t o believe , Charle s Smit h proposes , tha t Wilson wa s th e primar y advocat e o f th e treaso n claus e o f th e federa l Constitu tion, which requires , amon g othe r things , two witnesse s t o th e sam e over t ac t o f treason. Smith , James Wilson, 116-28 . Se e als o Willia m Hurst , "Treaso n i n th e United States, " Harvard Law Review 5 8 (1944) : 404. 10. Fo r twentieth-centur y scholar s wh o continue d t o vie w Wilso n a s a n enemy of democracy , se e especially Merril l Jensen, review of Charle s Page Smith , James Wilson: Founding Father, Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography 8 0 (1956): 521-23; Jensen, The Articles of Confederation, 92 , 240; Gustavu s Myers, History of the Supreme Court of the United States (Chicago : Charle s H . Kerr, 1925) , 151-96 . 11. Samue l Beer , To Make a Nation: A Rediscovery of American Federalism (Cambridge: Harvar d Universit y Press , 1993) , 360 ; Jame s Bryce , "Jame s Wil son: A n Appreciation, " Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography 6 0 (1936): 360 ; Ma x Farrand , The Framing of the Constitution of the United States (Ne w Haven : Yal e Universit y Press , 1913) , 197 ; Ralp h Ketcham , James Madison: A Biography (Ne w York : Macmillan, 1970) , 229; Adrienne Koch , ed. , Notes of the Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 (Ne w York : W W . Norton, 1987) , xii ; Rober t G . McCloskey , "Jame s Wilson, " i n The Justices of the United States Supreme Court: Their Lives and Major Opinions, ed . Leo n Friedman an d Fre d Israe l (Ne w York : Chelse a House , 1969) , 1:79 ; Clinto n

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Rossiter, 1787: The Grand Convention (Ne w York : W . W . Norton , 1966) , 247-48. 12. Se e Works, 123-25 . Compar e St . Thoma s Aquinas , Summa Theologica, Q. 90-95 ; Richard Hooker , Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, boo k I of The Works of that Learned and Judicious Divine, Mr. Richard Hooker, ed . R . W . Church an d F . P. Paget (Oxford : Clarendo n Press , 1888) . Many moder n scholar s neglec t o r rejec t th e Christia n foundatio n o f Wilson' s natural la w theory . This i s most obviou s i n Roderic k M . Hills , "Th e Reconcilia tion o f La w an d Libert y i n James Wilson, " Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 1 2 (1989) : 891-940 . Fo r a contrar y view , se e Randolp h G . Adams , Selected Political Essays of James Wilson (Ne w York: Alfred A . Knopf, 1930) , 7-8 ; McCloskey, Works, 38 . Willia m F . Obering , The Philosophy of Law of James Wilson (Washington , D.C. : Catholi c Universit y o f Americ a Press , 1938) , i s th e best of severa l neoscholastic works o n Wilson that take Wilson's natural-law the ory seriously . 13. Works, 124 , 329 , 589 , 617 , 722 . Wilso n di d no t mak e th e sort s o f dis tinctions betwee n term s lik e "natura l law, " "natura l right, " an d "natura l rights " that som e moder n scholar s make . Se e generally Scot t Dougla s Gerber , To Secure These Rights: The Declaration of Independence and Constitutional Interpretation (Ne w York : New Yor k University Press , 1995) , 10 6 n.* . 14. Works, 585 , 592-93. It i s true, a s Barry Ala n Shai n point s out , tha t Wil son, like most Founders , would hav e rejected th e excessivel y individualisti c vie w of right s held b y many moder n Americans . Yet Wilson's vie w o f right s was mor e liberal an d les s communa l tha n Shai n claims . Fo r Wilson' s position , se e ibid. , 585-610. For Shain's argument, se e Barry Alan Shain , The Myth of American Individualism: The Protestant Origins of American Political Thought (Princeton : Princeton Universit y Press , 1994) . 15. Works, 592-93 . 16. Ibid. , 71 , 104, 579. 17. Ibid. , 577 . Compar e Joh n Stuar t Mill , On Liberty (London : Everyman' s Library, 1972) , 85. 18. Se e generally Works, 126-47 , 197-246 , 369-98 . For a n extende d discus sion o f this issue, see Mark D . Hall, "Th e Wilsonian Dilemma " (pape r presente d at th e Annua l Meetin g o f th e Souther n Politica l Scienc e Association , Savannah , Georgia, 5 November 1994 ) (pape r i n my possession) . Wilson's moral sens e theory an d vie w of human natur e were influenced b y the Scottish Enlightenment , especiall y Thomas Reid . Compar e Thoma s Reid , Essays on the Intellectual Powers of the Human Mind (London : Thoma s Tegg , 1827) , 276, 353 , 355, with Works, 213 , 136 . Se e also Arnau d B . Leavelle, "Jame s Wil son and the Relation of the Scottish Metaphysics to American Political Thought, " Political Science Quarterly 57 (1942) : 394-410. Morton Whit e argue s in Science

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and Sentiment in America (Ne w York : Oxfor d Universit y Press , 1972 ) tha t Wil son was primarily influence d b y David Hume . Wilson's view of human nature, while optimistic, was not naive. He recognize d that individuals have free wills and therefore ca n know the good but refuse t o pur sue it. On this subject, se e especially Works, 199 , 211, 385. Gordon S . Wood sug gests in The Radicalism of the American Revolution (Ne w York: Alfred A . Knopf, 1991), 239-40 , tha t Wilson' s positio n wa s no t uncommo n durin g th e America n Founding. 19. Works, 403 , 875. See also Max Farrand , ed. , The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, rev . ed. (Ne w Haven : Yal e University Press , 1937) , 1:49 . 20. Works, 180 , 77. O n thes e issue s Wilso n largel y followe d th e socia l con tract theorists , especiall y Joh n Locke . Wilso n wa s particularl y influence d b y Locke's view of sovereignty. Compare John Locke , Two Treatises of Government, ed. Peter Laslet t (Cambridge : Cambridg e Universit y Press , 1988) , 367 . 21. Farrand , Records, 1:52 , 132 , 151. 22. Wilso n believe d tha t ever y perso n "whos e circumstance s d o no t rende r him necessaril y dependen t o n th e wil l o f another , shoul d posses s a vote i n elect ing" representatives. Unlike many of the delegates, Wilson di d not think propert y ownership wa s necessar y t o b e independent . Works, 407-8 , 84 , 313 , 411, 605, 725; Farrand , Records, 11:201 . 23. Farrand , Records, 1:488 , 495. 24. Ibid. , 1:69,11:30, 56, 103 , 106. Even though th e Conventio n rejecte d thi s proposal, Wilso n stil l playe d a n importan t rol e i n shapin g th e presidency . Se e Robert E . DiClerico, "Jame s Wilson's Presidency," Presidential Studies Quarterly 17 (1987) : 301-17; Danie l J. McCarthy , "Jame s Wilso n an d th e Creatio n o f th e Presidency," Presidential Studies Quarterly 1 7 (1987) : 689-96 . 25. Wilso n als o oppose d restriction s o n officeholding , thos e base d o n age , country o f origin , lengt h o f residence , an d lengt h o f tim e i n offic e included . Far rand, Records, 1:375 ; 11:151, 201, 230-31, 237 , 268, 272. Recent scholarshi p abou t Wilso n ha s focuse d o n th e exten t t o whic h h e thought participatio n i n democratic institution s woul d hel p create more virtuou s citizens. See Beer, To Make a Nation, 341-78 ; Stephen A . Conrad, "Polit e Foun dation: Citizenshi p an d Commo n Sens e i n James Wilson' s Republica n Theory, " in 1984 Supreme Court Review, ed . Phili p B . Kurlan d (Chicago : Universit y o f Chicago Press , 1984) , 359-88 ; Stephe n A . Conra d "Metapho r an d Imaginatio n in James Wilson's Theor y o f Federa l Union, " Law and Social Inquiry 1 3 (1988) : 3-70; Jennifer Nedelsky , Private Property and the Limits of American Constitutionalism: The Madisonian Framework and Its Legacy (Chicago : Universit y o f Chicago Press , 1990) , 96-140 . 26. Works, 158,289-91 . 27. Farrand , Records, 1:94-100 , 421 , 426 ; Works, 328-30 , 341 , 391 ,

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416-17. Wilson als o played a n importan t rol e in the creation o f the contract an d guarantee clauses . 28. Farrand , Records, 1:95 . 29. Ibid. , 119 . 30. Ibid. , 11:428-29; Works, 297 . 31. Farrand , Records, 1:120 , 124-28 . 32. Ibid. , 1:104,11:73 . 33. Works, 300 . Wilson arguabl y supporte d th e ide a tha t judge s could strik e down law s tha t violat e natura l law . Se e ibid. , 329 ; Joh n Bac h McMaste r an d Frederick D . Stone, eds., Pennsylvania and the Federal Constitution, 1787-1788 (Philadelphia: Historica l Societ y o f Pennsylvania , 1888 ; repr. , Ne w York : D a Capo Press , 1970) , 340-43, 354. 34. Farrand , Records, 11:73 . 35. Fo r more, see Hall, "Th e Wilsonia n Dilemma. " 36. Farrand , Records, 11:73 . 37. Works, 502. 38. Ibid. , 291. 39. McMaste r an d Stone , Pennsylvania, 302 ; Works, 401-2 . Fo r excellen t discussions o f th e relationshi p betwee n Wilson' s theorie s o f sovereignt y an d fed eralism, see Beer, To Make a Nation, 317-25 ; George M. Dennison , "Th e 'Revo lutionary Principle': Ideology and Constitutionalism i n the Thought of James Wilson," Review of Politics 3 9 (1977) : 157-91 . 40. McMaste r an d Stone , Pennsylvania, 223 ; Works, 764 . 41. Se e Rossiter, 1787, 200-209 . 42. Works, 264 , 433-35, 824-40 ; Farrand, Records, 11:616 . Wilson mad e a n argument fo r implie d power s unde r th e Article s o f Confederatio n i n hi s essa y "Considerations o n th e Ban k o f Nort h America. " Works, 829 . Ralp h Rossu m contends that Wilson's theory of implied powers "wen t beyon d the 'implied pow ers' doctrine of McCulloch v. Maryland (1819 ) an d full y anticipate d th e 'inheren t powers' doctrin e o f suc h twentiet h centur y decision s a s Missouri v. Holland (1920) an d United States v. Curtis Wright (1936). " Ralp h A . Rossum , "Jame s Wilson an d th e 'Pyrami d o f Government', " Political Science Reviewer 6 (1976) : 115. 43. Works, 264 ; McMaster an d Stone , Pennsylvania, 143 . 44. McMaste r an d Stone , Pennsylvania, 143-45 , 253-54. Fo r further discus sion o f Wilson' s view s o f th e Bil l of Rights , se e Hadley Arkes , Beyond the Constitution (Princeton : Princeto n Universit y Press , 1990) , 58-80 . Wilson's positio n contributed t o the adoptio n o f th e Ninth Amendment . 45. Jame s Wilson to George Washington, 31 December 1791 , in Konkle MSS, 11:421. 46. Edmun d Randolp h t o Georg e Washington , 2 1 Januar y 1792 , i n Konkl e MSS, VL326-27. Se e als o Perr y Miller , The Life of the Mind in America, From

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the Revolution to the Civil War (Ne w York : Harcourt, Brace , and World , 1965) , 239-49. 47. Farrand , Records, 11:391 . 48. Ibid. , 11:168-69 . Se e als o Ketcham , James Madison, 228-29 , 302 ; Rossiter, 1787, 197,208,214 . 49. Works, 329-30 , 296-97 , 300 , 497, 502 . 50. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S . 1, 1 7 (1964) . 51. McMaste r an d Stone , Pennsylvania, 143-49 . Rober t Rutlan d suggest s that, althoug h Wilso n di d no t mentio n i t b y name , a substantia l portio n o f hi s speech wa s aime d a t discreditin g Georg e Mason' s "Objection s t o thi s Constitu tional Government. " Rober t A . Rutland , ed. , The Papers of George Mason (Chapel Hill : University o f Nort h Carolin a Press , 1970) , 111:1002, 991-99. 52. Georg e Washington t o David Stuart , 1 7 October 1787 , in The Writings of George Washington, ed . Jared Spark s (Boston : Russell, 1835) , IX:271, 357; Konkle MSS, 11:349. 53. Joh n R Kaminsk i an d Gaspar e J . Saladino , eds. , The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution (Madison : Stat e Historica l Societ y o f Wisconsin, 1981) , XIII:344. 54. Bailyn , Ideological Origins, 328 . 55. Jame s Madison , t o nam e th e most prominen t example , adopte d Wilson' s defense o f th e absenc e o f a bill of rights . James Madison, "Speec h i n the Virgini a Ratifying Convention, " 2 5 Jun e 1788 , i n The Writings of James Madison, ed . Gaillard Hun t (Ne w York : Putnam' s Sons , 1900-1910) , V:231 . I n Ne w York , Alexander Hamilto n als o utilize d Wilson' s argument . Se e The Federalist Papers, ed. Clinto n Rossite r (Ne w York : New America n Library , 1961) , No. 84:510-20 . See generall y Herber t J . Storing , What the Anti-Federalists Were For (Chicago : University o f Chicag o Press , 1981) , 65-67; Benjami n R Wright, American Interpretations of Natural Law (Cambridge : Harvard Universit y Press , 1931) , 140 . 56. Wood , The Creation of the American Republic, 530 , 539-40 . 57. Works, 781-84 ; Seed , James Wilson, 131-37 . Se e als o Rober t L . Brun house, The Counter-Revolution in Pennsylvania, 1776-1790 (Harrisburg : Penn sylvania Historica l Commission , 1942 ; repr., New York : Octago n Books , 1971) . 58. Jame s Wilso n t o Georg e Washington , 2 1 Apri l 1789 , i n Konkl e MSS , 11:372-73. This letter is reprinted i n Maeva Marcu s an d James R. Perry, eds., The Documentary History of the Supreme Court of the United States, 1789-1800 (New York : Columbi a Universit y Press , 1985) , 1:612-13 . Fo r mor e abou t Wil son's appointment , se e ibid. , 44-53 , 613-14 . Wilso n als o expecte d t o b e ap pointed chie f justic e upo n th e retiremen t o f Joh n Jay , bot h befor e an d afte r th e Senate rejected John Rutledge . Yet by this time Wilson's financial problem s mad e that appointmen t unthinkable . 59. Georg e Washington to James Wilson, quoted i n Smith, James Wilson, 30 4 (emphasis i n original) . Washington' s coo l repl y ma y b e attribute d to , a t leas t i n

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part, Wilson' s bein g a leade r o f Pennsylvania' s presidentia l electors . Perhap s Washington di d no t wan t t o rais e a n appearanc e o f impropriet y b y "rewarding " Wilson's support for Washington's election. See Konkle MSS, 11:364; Gordon De n Booer, ed., The Documentary History of the First Federal Elections, 1788-1790 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989), IV:164-65,167; Lucian Alexan der, "Jame s Wilson, Nation Builder, " Green Bag 1 9 (1907) : 271. 60. Joh n Jay , William Cushing , an d Jame s Duan e t o Georg e Washington , i n Hay burn's Case, 2 U.S . ( 2 Dall. ) 41 0 (1792) . I n th e unreporte d cas e o f United States v. Yale Todd (1794 ) th e Cour t state d tha t Jay , Cushing , an d Duan e acte d inappropriately. The Court als o may have declared the Invalid Pensioners Act unconstitutional. 61. Jame s Wilson , Joh n Blair , an d Richar d Peter s t o Georg e Washington , i n Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 411-1 2 (1792) . 62. Christophe r Wolfe , fo r instance , mentions neithe r Wilso n no r Hay burn's Case in his The Rise of Modern Judicial Review (Ne w York: Basic Books, 1986) . 63. Quote d i n Ma x Farrand , "Th e Firs t Haybur n Case , 1792, " American Historical Review 1 3 (1907-1908) : 284 . 64. Jame s Madiso n t o Richar d Henr y Lee , 1 5 Apri l 1792 , quote d i n Maev a Marcus an d Rober t Teir , "Hayburn' s Case : A Misinterpretatio n o f Precedent, " Wisconsin Law Review (1988) : 527, 531. 65. St . George Tucker, ed., Blackstone's Commentaries, vol . I, part I (Philadelphia: Birch an d Small , 1803) , Appendix:5. 66. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 41 9 (1793) . 67. Storing , What the Anti-Federalists Were For, 50. 68. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) a t 453. 69. Ibid. , 455 . William Cast o agree s tha t Wilson' s natural-la w jurisprudenc e played a n important rol e in his opinion. Cast o als o maintains tha t unde r moder n standards o f judicia l conduct , Wilso n shoul d hav e recuse d himsel f fro m th e cas e because of its implications for litigatio n ove r the Indiana Company , a company i n which Wilson owne d stock . Yet by eighteenth-century standard s Wilson' s partic ipation wa s no t inappropriate . Se e William R . Casto , The Supreme Court in the Early Republic: The Chief Justiceships of John Jay and Oliver Ellsworth (Co lumbia: University o f Sout h Carolin a Press , 1995) , 192-95 . 70. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) a t 457 . 71. Ibid. , 461-64 . 72. Ibid. , 457-58, 463, 465 (quotin g th e Constitution) . 73. Ibid. , 464-66 . 74. Se e Scott Douglas Gerber, "Deconstructin g William Cushing, " i n this volume. Se e also William R . Davi e t o James Iredell , 1 2 June 1793 , in Life and Correspondence of James Iredell, ed . Griffith J . McRee (1857 ; repr., New York: Peter Smith, 1949) , 11:382. 75. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 17 1 (1796) .

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76. Se e Casto, The Supreme Court, 215 . 77. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 19 9 (1796) . 78. Ibid. , 281. Wilson joined unanimou s Suprem e Cour t decision s in Georgia v. Brailsford, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 40 2 (1792 ) an d Glass v. The Sloop Betsy, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 6 (1794) that also helped strengthe n th e power o f the national government . 79. Marcus , Documentary History, 11:39 . Wilson repeate d thi s clai m verba tim in his law lectures. See Works, 541 . Wilson did not hesitate to use his position as a judg e t o educat e th e public . See , fo r example , hi s jur y charge s i n Marcus , Documentary History, 11:33-45 , 142-53 , 197-204 , 396-404 , 414-23 . Se e gen erally Ralp h Lerner , "Th e Suprem e Cour t a s Republica n Schoolmaster, " 1967 Supreme Court Review, ed . Phili p B . Kurlan d (Chicago : Universit y o f Chicag o Press, 1967) , 127-80 . 80. Marcus , Documentary History, 11:40 ; Works, 507-09 , 524 , 528-29 , 540-42. Se e generall y Shanno n Stimson , "' A Jur y o f th e Country' : Commo n Sense Philosophy and the Jurisprudence o f James Wilson," i n Scotland and America in the Age of the Enlightenment, ed . Richar d B . Sher an d Jeffre y R . Smitte n (Princeton: Princeto n Universit y Press , 1990) , 193-208 . 81. Wilso n seeme d t o leav e ope n th e doo r fo r a judge t o orde r a ne w tria l i f the jur y erre d t o a significan t degree . Works, 541-42 . I n addition , Wilson' s dis sent i n Wiscart v. D'Auchy, 3 U.S . ( 3 Dall. ) 321 , 324-27 (1796 ) supporte d th e power of the Supreme Cour t to rule on facts a s well as law when reviewing equit y and admiralt y decisions . Wilson' s argumen t wa s base d primaril y upo n th e Judi ciary Ac t o f 1789 , which h e rea d a s no t makin g a n exceptio n t o th e Court' s ap pellate jurisdiction . Intriguingly , althoug h Wilso n appeare d willin g to admi t tha t Congress coul d mak e exception s t o th e Court' s appellat e jurisdiction , i n dictu m in Wiscart h e suggeste d tha t "i f a positive restrictio n existe d b y law, it would, i n my judgement, b e superseded b y the superior authorit y o f the constitutional pro vision." Ibid. , 325 . It is not certai n wha t Wilso n mean t b y this, but h e likely wa s arguing that Congres s could no t limi t the Court' s appellat e jurisdiction i n at leas t some area s o f law . It should b e noted tha t Wilson was attacked i n the Pennsylvania ratifyin g con vention fo r bein g against the right to trial by jury in civil cases. Wilson responde d to thi s attac k b y notin g tha t althoug h h e wa s fo r th e righ t t o tria l b y jur y i n al most ever y case, the delegate s a t th e Federa l Conventio n believe d tha t stat e law s varied o n th e matte r s o muc h tha t i t woul d b e disruptiv e t o includ e anythin g about i t in the Constitution . McMaste r an d Stone , Pennsylvania, 403-5 . 82. Works, 122 , 183. 83. Ibid. , 182 . 84. Ibid. , 122 , 335. 85. Gar y McDowell confuse s th e relation betwee n consen t an d commo n law , at leas t i n Wilson' s lega l theory , whe n h e write s tha t "American s ha d begu n t o offer a new foundation fo r the common law . No longer seen to rest on the old nat -

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ural-law foundation, th e common law was viewed as resting on consent expresse d in the form o f custo m an d continue d usage. " Gar y L . McDowell, Equity and the Constitution: The Supreme Court, Equitable Relief, and Public Policy (Chicago : University o f Chicag o Press , 1982) , 54. For furthe r discussio n o f thi s issue, see J. C. D. Clark, The Language of Liberty, 1660-1832 (Cambridge : Cambridg e Uni versity Press, 1994) , 93-110, an d th e literatur e cite d therein . 86. See , for example , Works, 647 , 818-19 . Wilson als o recognized tha t com mon la w could b e misused b y unscrupulous lawyers . Ibid., 562 . 87. Ibid. , 353 , 564. 88. Ibid. , 811-15 . 89. Ibid. , 182 . 90. Ibid. , 560-61 . Wilso n als o maintaine d tha t ever y citize n shoul d hav e a t least a n elementar y knowledg e o f commo n law . Ibid., 69-96 , 559. 91. Maev a Marcu s an d Natali e Wexler, "Th e Judiciary Ac t of 1789 : Political Compromise o r Constitutiona l Interpretation? " i n Origins of the Federal Judiciary: Essays on the Judiciary Act of 1789, ed . Maev a Marcu s (Ne w York : Ox ford Universit y Press , 1992) , 14 , 28. 92. Willia m Cast o note s tha t Wilso n mad e a simila r argumen t a s a specia l prosecutor i n the De Longchamps Affair. Se e Casto, The Supreme Court, 131-32 . 93. Marcus , Documentary History, 11:414-23 . Thomas Jefferson, the n secre tary of state, endorsed Wilson's view that Henfield could , and should, be indicted. For furthe r discussion , se e Stephe n B . Presser , The Original Misunderstanding: The English, the Americans and the Dialectic of Federalist Jurisprudence (Durham: Carolin a Academi c Press , 1991) , 67-74; Stewart Jay, "Origin s o f Fed eral Commo n Law, " part s I and II , University of Pennsylvania Law Review 13 3 (1985): 1003-1115,1231-1333; Kathryn Preyer, "Jurisdiction t o Punish: Federal Authority, Federalism , an d th e Commo n La w o f Crime s i n th e Earl y Republic, " Law and History Review 4 (1986) : 223-65. The Cour t reverse d itsel f i n the earl y nineteenth centur y an d rejecte d common-la w jurisdiction . Se e United States v. Hudson and Goodwin, 1 1 U.S. ( 7 Cr. ) 3 2 (1812) ; United States v. Coolidge, 1 4 U.S. ( 1 Wheat.) 41 5 (1816) . 94. United States v. Joseph Ravara, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 29 7 (1793) . The "severa l other persons " mentione d i n the charge were Georg e Washington . 95. See , for example , Albert J. Beveridge, The Life of John Marshall (Boston : Houghton Mifflin , 1919) , 111:24-26 ; Peter Stephe n D u Ponceau , A Dissertation on the Nature and Extent of the Jurisdiction of the Courts of the United States (Philadelphia: A . Small , 1824) ; Julius Goebel , Jr., History of the Supreme Court of the United States: Antecedents and Beginnings to 1801 (Ne w York : Macmil lan, 1971) , 627; Preyer, "Jurisdictio n t o Punish, " 223 . 96. Joh n D . Gordo n III , "United States v. Joseph Ravara: 'Presumptuou s Ev idence,' To o Man y Lawyers, ' an d a Federa l Commo n La w Crime, " i n Marcus , Origins of the Federal Judiciary, 106-72 .

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97. Presser , The Original Misunderstanding, 71 . Willia m Oberin g stresse d that Wilson' s conceptio n o f th e commo n la w wa s "guide d b y th e philosoph y o f the Schoolmen . . . . " Althoug h thi s i s a n exaggeration , Wilso n clearl y believe d that th e common la w i s a way to kno w th e natura l la w an d tha t i t is closely con nected wit h religion . In his law lectures, Wilson note d tha t "Christianit y i s a par t of th e commo n law. " Se e Willia m F . Obering , "Ou r Constitutiona l Origins, " Thought 1 2 (1937) : 617; Works, 671 . For a different vie w o f Wilson's approac h t o th e commo n law , see Stephen A . Conrad, "Jame s Wilson' s 'Assimilatio n o f th e Common-La w Mind," ' Northwestern University Law Review 8 4 (1989) : 186-219 , esp . 195 , 198-99 . Conra d argues that Wilson's mai n concer n abou t th e common la w was the reconciliatio n of its reliance on tradition wit h the Revolution's principle o f consent. While ther e is muc h t o admir e i n Conrad' s essay , h e err s b y ignorin g Wilson' s positio n tha t common la w i s a means b y which natura l la w can b e known . 98. Georg e Wythe, professor o f law at The College of William and Mary fro m 1779 until 1791 , is regarded a s America's first law professor. Wilson is a close second, however , an d h e wa s th e firs t t o lectur e systematicall y abou t th e Constitu tion. 99. Pennsylvania Packet an d Daily Advertiser, 25 Decembe r 1790 , Philadel phia, quote d i n Conrad , "Polit e Foundation, " 374 . 100. Works, 564 . 101. Ibid. , 397-98 . Wilso n care d abou t lega l histor y a s well . Indeed , h e re peatedly referred t o law as a "historical science, " and he spent a good deal of time tracing th e origi n an d histor y o f differen t lega l concepts. This activit y fi t int o hi s conception o f la w a s a scienc e insofa r a s h e wa s usin g histor y t o investigat e th e fundamental principle s o f law . If precedents agree d wit h thes e principles, Wilso n was happ y t o us e them . I f the y di d not , h e wa s willin g t o abando n preceden t i n favor o f "good " law . Ibid., 350 , 356 , 384, 562-65. 102. McCloskey , "Jame s Wilson, " 91 ; Wright, American Interpretations of Natural Law, 281 . 103. Works, 785 . 104. Ibid. , 784-85 , 562-65. 105. Wilson' s attorney , Joseph Thomas , "wh o ha d bee n universall y though t an honest man," wa s discovered a t this time to have "absconded , afte r havin g defrauded amon g other s som e o f hi s most intimat e friends. " T o avoid prosecution , Thomas abandone d hi s pregnan t wif e an d fle d wit h hi s clients ' money . I t i s un clear t o what degre e Thomas wa s responsibl e fo r Wilson' s financia l collapse , bu t his flight i n th e mids t o f Wilson' s trouble s coul d no t hav e helpe d matters . Jame s Iredell t o Mrs . Iredell , 6 Augus t 1798 , i n McRee , Life and Correspondence of James Iredell, 11:533-34 . 106. Becaus e o f a mistake mad e b y th e federa l government , Wilson' s dat e o f death i s occasionally give n a s 2 8 Augus t 1798 . It actuall y wa s 2 1 Augus t 1798 ,

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as recorded b y Wilson's friend Jame s Iredell. James Iredell to Miss Gray, 25 Aug . 1798, ibid. , 534 . 107. I n 1906 Wilson's remains were reburied with great ceremony in Philadelphia. Se e Davi d W . Maxey , "Th e Translatio n o f Jame s Wilson, " Journal of Supreme Court History (1990) : 29-43 .

Chapter 6

John Blair

"A Safe and Conscientious Judge" Wythe Holt

" J o h n B l a i r , . . . whil e n o t a m a n o f th e firs t orde r o f abil ity, wa s a saf e an d conscientiou s judge . H e acte d a n im p o r t a n t p a r t i n th e histor y o f th e countr y b o t h befor e and afte r th e America n Revolution." 1 "This cour t i s trul y willin g t o mak e an y voluntar y sacri fice fo r th e attainmen t o f s o desirabl e a n objec t a s th e es tablishment o f courts , whic h b y th e expeditiou s adminis tration o f justice , wil l no t onl y giv e tha t relie f t o suffer ing creditors , whic h ha s alread y bee n t o o lon g withhel d from them , bu t contribut e muc h t o th e increas e o f indus try, an d improvemen t o f th e moral s o f th e people." 2

It i s an hono r an d a privilege fo r m y work t o be included i n a volume contribute d t o b y such distinguishe d an d knowledgeabl e scholar s o f suc h divers e background s an d ap proaches. It is a warm pleasure to have as fellow contributors my graduate school roommate , Jim Haw, and my good friends an d coworkers in the tiny field of early American federal cour t history, Steve Presser, Sandra VanBurkleo, and Bil l Casto. I have benefited greatl y from read ings of the prior versio n o f this piece, with astut e comment s rangin g fro m "cuttin g edge " t o "cutting block " mad e b y Scot t Gerber , Bren t Tarter , Ji m Haw , Bil l Casto , m y histor y col league Forrest McDonald , an d m y law colleague s Norma n Stei n an d Marth a Morgan . Thi s piece is dedicated t o Bill Casto, for withou t hi s steadfast encouragement , hi s staunch friend ship, and hi s helpful knowledg e an d insight s it would no t hav e been completed . Financial assistanc e t o suppor t th e extensive researc h projec t upo n whic h thi s piece ha s been base d ha s bee n provided mos t kindly b y my colleague and Dean , Ken Randall, and b y the University o f Alabama Schoo l o f Law , and I am deepl y thankful . I have kept spelling, punctuation usage , and grammar i n the fashion o f my 1790 s source s when quotin g fro m them , a s bes t I am able , though ou r ag e ha s los t muc h o f th e habi t o f colorful an d poignan t phrasin g t o sa y nothin g o f punctuatio n diversity , s o tha t I have no t always bee n successful .

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E HOL T

Lawyer, Jurist, and Politician in Virginia's Ruling Class Education and Social Relations Prosperity durin g th e 1750 s an d 1760 s greatl y increase d th e wealth bot h o f the planters an d merchant s o f tidewater Virgini a an d of th e smal l bu t abl e grou p o f lawyer s wh o wer e thei r allie s an d helpmates. Generall y in solid political control o f the colony, they became eve r mor e assertive , an d eventually , usin g th e languag e o f re publican politica l ideology , bega n t o see k independenc e fro m th e taxation, fro m th e restriction s upo n thei r trade , an d fro m th e pater nalistic political contro l exercise d b y a remote an d increasingl y mer cantilistic royal government i n Great Britain. 3 Precisely to this manor born wa s Joh n Blair , i n Williamsburg , th e colonia l capital , i n No vember 1732 . Blair's famil y wa s wealth y an d wel l connected . Hi s great-uncl e James Blair had been for nearly five decades the political despot of the colony, personally causin g the dismissa l o f two roya l governors , act ing as governor himself on one occasion, for fifty years both foundin g president o f Th e Colleg e o f Willia m an d Mar y an d membe r o f th e governor's Council. John Blair's father, fo r whom he was named, was for mor e tha n fou r decade s the colony's deput y auditor-general , wa s a member of the Council for a quarter century, and was four times acting governor . Moreover , Joh n Blai r pere obtaine d 100,00 0 acre s o f land i n wha t i s no w Wes t Virginia , owne d plantations , sa t o n th e Williamsburg cit y court, an d wa s a partner i n a prosperous mercan tile firm. 4 Blair graduated with honors from William and Mary in 1754. Tall, with a generous forehead, blu e eyes, red hair, and a gentle disposition, Blair used his family wealth to study law in the Middle Temple in London. In late December o f 1756 , in Edinburgh, he married his Scottish second cousin Jean Blair, a quiet, sickly, and perhaps mentally afflicte d person to whom he became deeply devoted. After h e was called to the bar in May 1757 , he returned t o Virginia. 5 Blair immediatel y bega n practic e befor e th e Genera l Court , Vir ginia's highest court, which sat only in Williamsburg. Virginia in 1748 had require d it s lawyer s t o choos e eithe r count y cour t o r Genera l Court practice. Most opted for the sixty-odd county courts where the local gentry sat as justices of the peace; there old-style informality an d

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gentry dignity prevailed over mercantile efficiency and , at times, mercantile justice. Only a few wer e abl e to mak e the journeys o r th e sophisticated arguments , or affor d th e lengthy apprenticeship, require d of the Genera l Cour t bar . "Fewe r tha n twelv e Virginians actuall y at tended the Inns, received a call to the bar, and returned to actual legal practice befor e 1776, " an d all , like Blair, became leaders o f the Gen eral Cour t bar . Other s ros e fro m th e pett y gentry , suc h a s Edmun d Pendleton, George Wythe, Patrick Henry, and Thomas Jefferson. Blai r was n o spellbindin g orato r lik e Henry , no r deepl y persuasiv e lik e Pendleton, being "without that ease in speech, which sometimes gives currency to dross, " bu t h e was clear-minded, thorough , learned , an d well connected , an d h e soo n gaine d a respectabl e shar e o f th e busi ness.6 Blair also started t o take hi s place in Virginia's socia l and politica l order. H e bega n a six-yea r stin t a s bursa r o f th e Colleg e o f Willia m and Mar y i n 1760 . He was selecte d a s the college' s representativ e i n the Hous e o f Burgesse s i n 1765 , and , despit e hi s ver y junio r status , was chosen for importan t posts in 176 6 and 1768 . He was appointe d Clerk o f th e Counci l i n 177 0 (resignin g fro m Burgesse s an d leavin g the active practice of law). And he received his father's place as deputy auditor-general and stepped into that octogenarian's shoes in the mercantile business upon his death the following year. Blair's rise to social eminence was also signaled b y his becoming the first gran d maste r of Virginia Masons, serving from 177 8 to 1784. 7 Emergence of the Republic of Virginia Blair, Pendleton, Wythe, and the rest of the tidewater elit e had op posed as premature Henry's shocking defiance of British authority embodied in his 1765 Stamp Act Resolutions, which passed the House of Burgesses b y one vote. However, "[a] s event s le d t o separatio n fro m Great Britain , Blair sided with those merchants an d landowner s wh o favored independence. " I n Ma y 176 9 h e preside d ove r th e House' s adoption o f a n addres s strongl y condemnin g Parliament , an d whe n the House was dissolved in 1769 and again in 1770, Blair joined with other merchan t an d plante r leader s t o draf t th e first nonimportatio n agreements. The dangers o f a n elit e revolt, and th e lie at the heart of American democracy , becam e momentarily apparen t when, upon th e sudden fligh t o f th e roya l Governo r Dunmor e t o hi s ship s i n Ma y

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1775, Blai r o n behal f o f th e Counci l wa s compelle d t o reassur e th e common peopl e tha t "odiou s distinctions " between elite s and other s were now cast aside, and that the councillors were really the "watch ful Guardian s o f the Rights of the People" rather tha n inten t o n preserving their own distinct interest. 8 Virginians no w me t frequentl y i n Convention , a t first as a temporary government. The Convention named Blair one of the three judges of a newl y create d admiralt y court , i n January 1776 . The followin g May th e Conventio n create d a ne w Declaratio n o f Right s an d Con stitution fo r a colon y tha t no w formall y declare d it s independenc e from th e crown , wit h Blai r amon g th e twenty-eigh t member s o f th e committee tha t wrot e th e tw o documents . Ther e i s n o recor d tha t Blair mad e an y contribution , ideologica l o r political , t o thes e novel , momentous republica n instrument s tha t prove d inspirin g model s t o many othe r rebel s around th e world. H e was, however, chosen t o b e one of the members of the new Council. 9 Thomas Jefferson's chie f contribution t o the new structure o f government wa s it s judiciary. Th e tria l an d appellat e jurisdictio n o f th e old General Cour t was split into three new courts, equity jurisdictio n being placed in a Court of Chancery, admiralty in a reconstituted Ad miralty Court , an d common-la w civi l an d crimina l jurisdictio n i n a fresh Genera l Court . A Cour t o f Appeals , compose d o f th e eleve n judges who sa t in the other thre e courts , was created t o supervis e al l three, primarily on important issues of law. All judges had tenure during goo d behavior . Despit e th e ne w Constitution' s insistenc e upo n separation of powers and the independence of the judges, prohibiting them fro m holdin g offic e i n th e othe r branches , John Blair , wh o o n January 23, 1778, was elected one of the first judges of the new General Court b y joint ballot of the two houses of the legislature, did no t resign from th e Council until February 28. 10 Eminence as a Virginia Judge Having becom e chie f justic e o f th e Genera l Cour t i n 1779 , Blai r was, in November 1780 , elevated to the Court of Chancery. There he joined Edmun d Pendleto n an d Georg e Wythe, perhaps th e two mos t celebrated an d competen t stat e court judge s of their time . Moreover , both ha d bee n lawyer s o f renow n befor e th e Revolution ; bot h ha d long been leaders in Virginia politics ; both had serve d with great dis-

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tinction in a Continental Congress full of capable men; both were well known for their political philosophies, Pendleton for his cautious conservatism, Wythe a s an independent-minde d i f intensely learne d pro ponent o f Enlightenmen t republicanism ; an d bot h remaine d revere d elders a s Virgini a achieve d nationhoo d an d the n joine d th e ne w United States . Blair paled i n comparison, a s perhaps would othe r ju dicial contemporaries , an d h e neve r achieve d an y distinctio n w e no tice today durin g their nine years together o n the bench . Yet Georg e Washington , Thoma s Jefferson , an d Josep h Jone s (Blair's predecesso r a s Genera l Cour t chie f justice ) mentione d th e three—and n o others—whe n anticipatin g whic h Virginian s migh t grace th e Unite d States' s firs t Suprem e Cour t i n 1789 , or , i n Jeffer son's case , ruminatin g abou t th e abilit y o f stron g judge s t o enforc e constitutional right s in the teeth o f majoritarian clamor. 11 Blair's eminence i s inexplicabl e i n th e apolitica l moder n languag e o f judicia l competence. H e was , however , a sturdy, wealth y gentlema n o f th e highest socia l standing , whose mildness excite d n o animosity , whos e judicial opinion s wer e clea r an d sound , an d wh o ha d show n tha t h e could b e counted o n t o suppor t th e prevailin g order . Blai r live d i n a time whe n la w wa s no t though t t o b e sharpl y separate d fro m poli tics, an d whe n judge s considere d themselve s an d wer e considere d part o f th e government , s o hi s connection s an d hi s loyalt y t o clas s and callin g go a long way toward providin g a n understandin g o f hi s reputation. Only fou r notabl e opinion s tha t Joh n Blai r wrot e o r joine d a s a state cour t judg e hav e com e dow n t o us : Commonwealth v. Caton (1782), Commonwealth v. Posey (1787) , th e Judges ' Remonstranc e (1788), and the Judges' Resignation (1789). 12 All four, decide d by the Court o f Appeals , ar e o f th e firs t ran k i n importance , sinc e they ar e among the earliest treatments b y judges of their role in a republic. In Posey, the whole court except Wythe and one other judge foun d a respected , pre-Revolutionar y Englis h judicia l interpretatio n o f a n even mor e ancien t Englis h statut e t o b e automaticall y bindin g upo n them just as though it were part of the statute. Wythe dissented irately, because, as historian Rober t Kirtland ha s shown, he believed suc h an ancient foreig n judicia l decisio n wa s no t binding ; a n emergin g posi tivist in outlook, Wythe wanted t o loo k a t the reason o f the law, and to be able to change poor o r outdated judge-mad e rules. Blair's opinion epitomize d th e staid , natural-la w positio n o f th e majority : "I f i t

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were a new case, I should b e at no loss to decide in favor o f the prisoner. But the decision i n Powlter's case, has prevailed s o long, that i t must b e submitte d to ; an d th e authorit y o f i t . . . canno t no w b e shaken." Blair , and th e majority, wer e unable to join Wythe in imagining tha t la w coul d b e judge-made. Rather , la w aros e fro m th e im perceptible consen t o f th e people , ove r th e ages , t o thos e opinion s about th e la w tha t ha d bee n consistentl y expresse d b y an d accepte d by legislators , judges , learne d treatis e writers , an d member s o f th e bar: mortals di d no t hav e the power t o alte r it , after suc h a time, except by positive act of the people's elected representatives. 13 The other three decisions are among the earliest judicial discussions of judicial review. Caton involved the alleged pardon o f three loyalist Virginians who had bee n convicted o f treason. The state constitutio n seemed to say that only the House of Delegates had the power of pardon, while a statute require d th e concurrence o f bot h th e House an d the Senate in any pardon. The House had give n pardon, bu t the Senate refused t o concur. The Court of Appeals heard the prisoners' claim that the statute violated the constitution. Only Wythe and James Mercer o f th e eigh t judges who sa t claime d th e power o f judicia l review . Mercer boldl y declared the statute unconstitutional. Wythe in dictum resoundingly defende d judicia l review as flowing from th e separatio n of powers, giving the people a recourse where the legislature had overstepped it s bound s a s lai d dow n i n th e constitution . Bu t h e actuall y joined mos t o f th e rest o f th e cour t i n a tortured constructio n o f th e constitution that eliminated any conflict with the act. They then foun d the act proper and denied the appeal. Blair did not speak at length, expressly "wa[i]v[ing ] th e question upo n th e power o f the Cour t t o declare a n anti-constitutiona l Ac t o f Assembl y void , sinc e th e Treaso n law was not so. " Onl y on e of the judges denied thi s power o f judge s to declare a statute void. 14 Blair's caution disappeared, however, when the issue next arose. Essentially, eve r sinc e popula r inabilit y t o repa y debt s owe d t o Britis h merchants ha d close d Virginia' s court s fo r fou r year s i n 1774 , tria l court dockets had been almost hopelessly clogged, primarily with debt cases. Especiall y choke d wer e th e count y courts , wher e dela y wa s a debtor's bes t friend; man y o f th e genteel justices were i n debt. Relie f schemes revolved around havin g the professional (an d more creditor oriented) upper-cour t Virgini a judge s ride circuit throug h th e hinter -

John Blair 16 1 lands. Thi s produce d muc h oppositio n fro m th e powerfu l count y courts durin g th e depresse d 1780s , bu t finally i n Octobe r 178 7 th e General Assembl y adde d fou r judge s t o th e Genera l Cour t an d re quired th e fifteen Cour t o f Appeal s judge s t o trave l aroun d th e stat e holding cour t i n eighteen districts . In a n opinio n penne d b y Pendleto n and entere d o n th e record withou t benefi t o f litigants or argument , th e Court o f Appeal s unanimousl y hel d th e schem e unconstitutional , since i t ha d mor e tha n double d thei r dutie s withou t an y increas e i n salary. Separatio n o f power s demande d tha t th e legislatur e no t b e "a t liberty t o compe l a resignatio n b y reducin g salarie s t o a copper , o r b y making i t a par t o f th e officia l dut y t o becom e hewer s o f wood , an d drawers o f water." 15 Instea d o f callin g th e judge s o n th e carpet , th e legislature accepte d judicia l revie w an d wrot e anothe r law , establish ing a ne w stationar y Cour t o f Appeal s (t o whic h Blai r an d Pendleto n were immediatel y elected ) an d confinin g judicia l travelin g t o th e en larged Genera l Court . Althoug h judicia l dutie s ha d agai n bee n in creased withou t extr a pay , thi s tim e th e judge s acquiesce d becaus e they wante d t o "giv e tha t relie f t o sufferin g creditors , whic h ha s al ready bee n to o lon g withhel d fro m them. " However , i n anothe r advi sory opinio n b y Pendleton the y unanimousl y hel d th e ne w ac t uncon stitutional too , a s "incompatibl e wit h thei r independence " becaus e i t terminated th e ol d Cour t o f Appeal s althoug h it s judge s shoul d hav e been "secur e i n th e enjoymen t o f thei r office." 16 Without commen t o n thei r momentou s import , Blai r joine d i n these opinion s tendin g t o protec t republica n court s fro m an y over sight b y republica n legislatures , whil e a t th e sam e tim e allowin g th e former, thoug h unelected , t o si t a s unreviewabl e censor s o f th e latter . Though Pendleto n ha d raise d th e issu e o f whethe r judicia l censorshi p might overste p th e sam e separation-of-power s bound s th e judge s had lai d dow n fo r th e legislature , abstrac t issue s o f prope r popula r governance di d no t troubl e th e benc h becaus e th e judge s ha d bee n reared i n a natural-la w cultur e tha t understoo d thei r rol e a s finding a la w th e peopl e ha d alread y consente d t o (whic h th e legislatur e ha d disobeyed), rathe r tha n exercisin g politica l will . Moreover , the y wer e members o f a rulin g elit e wit h littl e concer n fo r democrati c republi canism. Judicia l revie w itsel f wa s no t controversia l i n Virginia , an d Blair, a s usual , accepte d th e view s o f hi s socia l peer s an d eminen t ju dicial colleagues. 17

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A Federalist National Security Court Blair as Constitution Make r John Blair served but a short time on the new Court of Appeals, for nine months later one of his friends wrote to his niece, "I suppose you have hear d o f you r Uncl e Blair s appointment—h e set s ou t fo r Ne w york i n Jan'y." Georg e Washington, no w president o f a reconstitute d United States that Blair had helped to create, had named his old frien d to the new United State s Supreme Court. 18 Blair had (wit h his fellow chancellor Wythe) bee n a delegate to the Constitutional Convention , wher e Madison recorde d hi m a s makin g no speeches. Though in caucus he had opposed Madison on the issues of a multipl e executiv e an d legislativ e electio n o f th e executive , h e signed th e finished document . H e the n sa t i n Virginia' s Ratificatio n Convention. Whil e Pendleto n chaire d th e bod y an d spok e i n favor , and Wythe both served as chair of the Committee of the Whole (where all the debate was done) and moved for adoption , once again we find that, in the succinct words of James Monroe, "Blai r said nothing, but was for it. " I t is likely that man y delegate s in both augus t assemblie s agreed wit h Georgia' s Constitutiona l Conventio n delegat e Willia m Pierce that "hi s good sense , sound judgment, an d excellent principle s overbalanced an y oratorical deficiency," fo r Blair' s work shapin g an d promoting th e Constitutio n mus t hav e bee n done , in the tradition o f gentry politics, in the halls, at church, and a t the dining table. 19 Blair had mad e a definit e choice , however, fo r o n th e Suprem e Cour t an d even afterwar d h e continue d t o prov e himsel f a stron g supporte r o f the new government . The Embattled United States A stronge r federa l governmen t ha d bee n create d becaus e o f th e fears hel d largel y b y thos e citizens—b y n o mean s a majority—wh o supported it. 20 The fears ha d bot h foreign an d domesti c sources. The United State s was weak an d surrounde d b y the colonial territories of powerful Europea n nation s desirou s o f furthe r aggrandizin g them selves, suspicious o f bot h it s republican experimen t an d an y chance s of succes s i t migh t have , and , i n th e cas e o f Grea t Britain , smartin g under recen t defeat , contemptuous , an d hopin g t o giv e it s forme r

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colonies a comeuppance. Internally, som e poor cro p years, a decadelong depression , plu s th e astonishe d unwillingnes s o f establishe d seaboard elites to share power with the ordinary farmers an d artisan s who ha d actuall y fough t th e Revolutio n ha d create d internecin e squabbling, intermitten t revenu e collection , an d frequen t contro l o f legislatures b y anticommercia l soft-mone y force s tha t issue d pape r money and enacted other debt-avoidance measures. Flare-ups of far m folk, artisans , an d wag e worker s culminate d i n Shays' s Rebellio n i n New England— a seriou s revol t no t finally subdue d unti l afte r th e Constitutional Conventio n assembled . A procommercial , prodevelopmenta l threa d tie d togethe r thos e members o f th e elite s wh o wishe d t o reestablis h th e natio n upo n a stronger, mor e centralize d basis . Bot h th e abilit y t o exercis e arme d might eithe r i n self-defens e o r i n interna l policing , an d an y perma nent enlargement o f the government mean t tha t th e national govern ment mus t b e give n powe r ove r it s ow n revenue . Th e abilit y t o re cruit nava l ai d b y armin g merchantme n a s privateers, whic h i n tur n meant th e abilit y t o protec t a revenue-producin g merchan t marine , implied th e protection o f prize s captured i n war. Above all , in an in creasingly trade-consciou s an d commodity-desirou s world , t o gai n stability mean t borrowin g fro m Europea n source s t o finance trade , to stimulate manufactures, an d to begi n the development o f the huge trans-Allegheny territories , th e mer e acquisitio n o f whic h ha d al ready stimulate d a competitiv e frot h o f lan d speculatio n amongs t elites. Borrowin g mean t establishin g credit . Thi s i n tur n meant , a s with an y Third Worl d countr y today , eliminatio n o f soft-mone y an d other debtor-favorin g practices , an d neutralizatio n o f localisti c an d anticommercial juries . I t als o mean t a bette r debt-paybac k recor d than existe d wit h regar d bot h t o th e hug e an d largel y unpai d debt s incurred b y both state s an d th e federa l governmen t i n winning inde pendence, an d t o th e million s o f dollars ' worth o f debt s owin g fro m planters an d farmer s t o Englis h an d Scottis h merchant s lef t unpai d at th e onse t o f th e Revolutio n an d stil l mostl y unpai d i n 1787 , be cause o f lingerin g anti-Britis h hostilit y plu s th e generall y depresse d circumstances. Policin g mean t crimina l law ; revenu e protectio n meant th e establishmen t o f revenu e jurisdiction ; priz e mean t admi ralty jurisdiction ; an d th e neutralizatio n o f localis m mean t th e es tablishment o f independen t federa l court s wit h appropriat e jurisdic tion.

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The Constitutiona l Conventio n (a s interpreted b y William Casto ) did precisel y this , establishin g a well-articulate d syste m o f federa l courts wit h admiralt y (includin g revenue ) jurisdiction , jurisdictio n over suit s betwee n citizen s o f differen t state s (diversity ) an d suit s brought b y alien s (alienage) , an d jurisdictio n ove r state s a s defen dants. Federal judges were given independence through life tenure and a guarante e agains t diminutio n o f thei r salaries . "Federal-question " jurisdiction was granted ove r cases arising both under treaties—mos t importantly th e 178 3 Peac e Treaty , whic h guarantee d repaymen t o f the prewar British debts in pounds sterling (a guarantee the states had widely ignored)—and unde r the Constitution, becaus e most expecte d the federal court s to find state (an d national) laws in conflict wit h the Constitution t o b e void . State s wer e forbidde n t o impai r contract s (debts) or to make anything but gold and silver a legal tender. The federal government, i n addition, was allowed t o have a military, to raise revenue (largely through import duties), and to control all commerce. The Judiciary Act of 178 9 completed th e picture, setting up exclusive federa l crimina l jurisdictio n an d establishin g a residen t federa l district judg e i n eac h stat e t o hea r revenu e an d priz e cases . Circui t courts (comprise d o f tw o itineran t Suprem e Cour t judge s an d th e local district judge) would sit twice each year in each state to hear the most controversial cases—British debt cases, important federa l crimi nal cases, and case s founded upo n diversit y o f citizenshi p an d alien age—except tha t jurisdictio n ove r state s a s defendant s wa s confine d to the Supreme Court . Oppositio n b y Anti-Federalists t o the breadt h of federal-cour t jurisdictio n wa s diffuse d b y leavin g ou t al l pendin g and mos t petty Britis h deb t cases, by stripping the Suprem e Cour t of its constitutiona l powe r t o overtur n factua l findings o r damag e awards made by juries, and b y confining appeal s from stat e courts t o issues of federal la w decided agains t federal interests. 21 But the opposition was only temporarily diffused, a s most of the of ficials o f the new government well knew. In order to energize the new system, they had to walk a tightrope between action that exercised the government's powe r t o asser t nationa l interest s bu t tha t migh t acti vate o r heighte n divisiveness , an d inactio n o r nonthreatenin g actio n to promot e harmon y bu t tha t migh t permanentl y diminis h som e important nationa l power . When i t becam e necessar y t o emphasiz e th e government's power , none o f the judges hesitated, fo r the y were proponents o f a system that the y felt t o b e absolutely necessar y fo r thei r

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own and the nation's welfare. Moreover, their support for th e Constitution mean t consciou s suppor t fo r th e governmenta l policie s o f Washington and Hamilton. They firmly believed that the power of the government over revenue, civil order, prize, and trade had to be maintained; tha t alien s an d out-of-stat e citizens , mostly creditor s an d en trepreneurs, were not to be discriminated against by localistic juries or anticommercial law s or rulings; and tha t th e national dignit y an d in tegrity of the United State s must b e upheld, especiall y with regar d t o British creditors . I n gran d jur y charge s throughou t th e decade , th e judges trumpete d th e necessity , th e power, an d th e goodnes s o f th e Federalist government . Bu t i n court , the y ofte n hesitated , an d the y acted firmly only when the y thought i t was called for , sinc e they als o understood ho w perilou s th e government' s positio n was . Everythin g might collapse if too much domesti c opposition wer e excited. 22 Blair the Cautious Virginia Federalist John Blair had no debt problem, and his own social, economic, and political interest s a s a wealthy plante r an d merchan t wer e congruen t with thos e o f the Federalist regime . Several Virginians who were in a socioeconomic positio n simila r t o Blair's , bu t wh o wer e i n deb t o r were suspiciou s o f th e potentia l dominanc e o f th e nationa l govern ment ove r thei r larg e an d relativel y powerfu l commonwealth , op posed i t fro m th e beginnin g (thoug h man y o f these , suc h a s Patric k Henry, change d t o a positio n o f suppor t durin g th e 1790s) . Man y other Virginians in Blair's class, such as Edmund Pendleton, sooner or later moved from suppor t into opposition as the national governmen t exercised it s grea t powers. 23 Severa l factor s no t onl y kep t bu t strengthened Blair' s allegiance to the government o f Washington an d Hamilton. It s economi c policie s remaine d congruen t wit h hi s inter ests; for example , Hamilton's federa l redemptio n o f state-issued Rev olutionary War securities at par would greatly enhance the value of his Virginia loa n offic e certificates. 24 Blai r spen t muc h o f th e yea r awa y from Virgini a an d i n associatio n wit h othe r Federalist s (particularl y those o n th e Court , suc h a s his friend Jame s Wilson), and h e was always b y trainin g an d personalit y incline d t o liste n an d defe r t o th e strong members of his class. As judge he had continuous contacts with the federa l government , an d hi s trave l throughou t th e Unite d State s was as the living symbol of its presence and power .

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These traits and experiences kept his fires of devotion to the Federalist government an d it s policies burnin g strong . Lik e that o f hi s fel low Virginian s Georg e Washingto n an d Joh n Marshall , Blair' s sup port fo r th e government gre w as he witnessed wha t h e thought t o b e the disintegration of popular allegiance and an increasing foreign dan ger to the fledgling republic during the mid-1790s. But, like the othe r judges, Blair came to fee l th e danger s o f moving too precipitousl y i n exerting national power , an d the y al l began t o exercis e great cautio n in being bold abou t Federalism . Initially, Blair and the other judges may not have fully realize d th e depths of the potential opposition to federal power, but an instance in the first year of the Court brought starkly home to them the perils that might b e arouse d b y forthrightness , an d th e nee d t o flex the federa l muscle only in crucial situations. Robert Morris of Pennsylvania, merchant and financier, one of the wealthiest of Americans, and land speculator upo n a spectacula r scale—wh o a s financial wizar d o f th e United States during the Revolution had disfavored the interests of the southern states—ha d i n North Carolin a i n 178 3 suffere d a n advers e jury verdic t fo r mor e tha n thre e time s th e fac e valu e o f th e deb t h e owed. Morris, furious a t what h e considered loca l prejudice, i n 178 7 begged th e Nort h Carolin a Superio r Cour t fo r a n injunctio n t o sta y another judgment against him that he thought equally biased. The injunction had not been acted upon when the Constitution went into ef fect in North Carolin a in June 1790 . Without notice to the other side, he immediately asked the judges of the new federal Suprem e Court t o issue a writ of certiorari to the North Carolin a court , commanding it to transfer th e suit to the Circuit Cour t fo r Nort h Carolina . Blair joined Justices James Wilson and John Rutledge in approving the writ . Th e Nort h Carolin a judges , however , refuse d t o accep t a peremptory writ that would label them both biased and inferior to the federal court . Th e federa l deman d seeme d t o "justif y al l the fear s o f the Anti-Federalists about the creation of a consolidated national government" an d abou t th e eliminatio n o f th e stat e courts . Moreover , these very North Carolin a judge s were Anti-Federalists who ha d jus t spearheaded a n almos t successfu l effor t t o hav e thei r stat e rejec t th e Constitution. Their refusal plu s the action of the North Carolin a legislature i n praisin g the m create d a n uproa r i n Philadelphia . A n an guished Blai r wrot e Wilso n abou t "idea s whic h neve r befor e occur r'd" t o him , an d indee d i t seem s t o hav e bee n th e first tim e h e ha d

John Blair 16 7 thought deepl y abou t th e exten t t o whic h th e state s wer e no w subor dinate t o th e federa l government . H e suppose d issuanc e o f th e wri t "hasty" an d tha t "i t woul d b e mor e convenient t o acknowledg e ou r faults tha n t o plung e deepe r int o it, " sinc e "[t]her e appear s t o b e n o certain boundary , clearl y &c distinctly marked , betwee n federa l & State jurisdiction. " Th e judge s shoul d no t provok e unnecessar y dis sension, h e concluded; th e cas e was no t ver y important . However , th e fright an d cautio n o f th e Cour t wa s emphasize d when , i n 1791 , similar request s fo r certiorar i t o transfe r importan t pendin g Britis h deb t cases from th e stat e to th e federa l court s i n Virginia an d Georgi a wer e quickly denie d b y hi s colleague s whil e o n thei r circuits. 25 The Suprem e Court' s first announce d decision , in August 1791 , appears t o b e a simila r exercis e o f caution . West v. Barnes involve d a constitutional challeng e t o th e validit y o f Rhod e Island' s notoriou s 1786 la w makin g it s depreciate d pape r mone y lega l tende r a t fac e value. Federa l jurisdictio n ha d bee n erecte d precisel y t o stanc h suc h anticreditor practices . Bu t Blair' s opinion , lik e those o f hi s colleague s delivered seriatim , refused t o ignore the Judiciary Act' s plain i f ill-con ceived requirement tha t writs o f error (th e only mode o f appeal ) b e returned t o th e cler k o f th e Suprem e Cour t withi n te n day s o f th e ren dering o f th e judgmen t complaine d o f a t circuit . Tha t ha d no t bee n done in Barnes and , a s Barnes's counsel aptl y noted, becaus e distance s were s o great , stric t adherenc e woul d effectivel y den y t o mos t folk s their right to appeal; the requirement wa s an apparent legislativ e over sight concernin g wha t wa s a matte r solel y o f form . Th e Cour t wa s probably worrie d abou t ope n disagreemen t betwee n tw o branche s o f the ne w governmen t a t it s beginning . Moreover , a s wa s show n whe n the cas e wa s retrie d a t circui t th e nex t June , i t ha d bee n hastil y brought, s o that i t was a poor vehicl e i n whic h t o mak e suc h a poten tially upsettin g rulin g i n a stat e that , lik e Nort h Carolina , ha d bee n dubious o f enterin g th e union. 26 The Circuit-Ridin g Controvers y The judge s also , a t first, wer e cautiou s abou t makin g publi c thei r complaints t o th e presiden t an d t o Congres s abou t ridin g circuit , which wa s expensive , arduous , an d dangerous , an d too k the m fo r long period s awa y fro m thei r home s an d thei r families . Complicate d and brough t t o a boi l b y th e permanen t assignmen t o f a feist y Jame s

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Iredell to the sprawling Southern Circuit—h e thought the assignmen t arbitrary an d discriminatory , an d relentlessl y presse d hi s colleague s for relief—discussion o f circuit riding consumed much of their August 1790 meeting. Chief Justice John Jay argued that the practice was unconstitutional, lookin g solel y to the structur e o f the judiciary a s out lined i n Article s I and III : the Constitutio n contemplate d tha t lowe r courts woul d hav e thei r ow n judges ; tha t th e Suprem e wa s t o b e a court of last resort only "8c it is perhaps rather nice to distinguish between a cour t &c th e judge s o f tha t court" ; and , tendentiously , tha t only th e presiden t an d no t th e Congres s (throug h creatio n o f court s not staffe d b y their ow n judges) coul d nominat e federa l judges . Blair added th e separation-of-power s argument , which , i n hi s prio r Vir ginia experience, had bee n decisive: the judges were not given greater salaries for thei r extra circui t court duties. 27 Probably bot h becaus e of the dangers of allegations o f unconstitu tional congressiona l actio n s o early i n the ne w government's history , and becaus e the y learne d tha t Attorne y Genera l Edmun d Randolp h argued strongly against circuit riding in a report on the state of the judiciary he was soon to present t o the House o f Representatives upo n its request , th e judge s di d no t communicat e thei r sentiment s t o th e other department s o f government . However, Congres s di d no t ac t upo n Randolph' s suggestion s tha t winter, to the chagrin o f th e judges. At a contentious Februar y 179 1 Supreme Cour t session , Blair demonstrated tha t a t times he could b e independent o f th e dominan t leadershi p b y sidin g wit h Iredell' s de mand fo r rotatio n o f th e judge s amon g th e circuits . Whe n Jay , William Cushing , an d Wilso n adamantl y refuse d t o leav e thei r cir cuits, Blai r amiabl y helpe d Iredel l ou t b y swappin g hi s Middl e Cir cuit for th e brutal Souther n Circui t in the spring of 1791 . The judges continued t o mak e n o officia l protes t whil e refor m o f th e judiciar y was stil l befor e Congress ; a s i f t o underscor e thi s decision , evidenc e of continuing Anti-Federalist oppositio n to the judiciary bega n to appear durin g 1791. 28 By January 1792 , however, it had become clear that "n o radical reform o f the Judiciary law will be made," and caution gave way to action. Iredell's brother-in-law Senator Samuel Johnston, on Iredell's behalf, engineered a law requiring rotation o f the judges among the circuits. The judges openly ruled an act of Congress unconstitutional, in Hay burn's Case. And in August 1792 they openly petitioned Congress

John Blair 16 9 for a n en d t o circui t riding , i n languag e emphasizin g practica l diffi culties, no t constitutiona l ones . Th e draf t thi s tim e wa s writte n b y Iredell, not Jay. Congres s responde d onl y b y reducing t o on e the num ber o f justice s require d a t circuit , an d thu s t o on e th e numbe r o f cir cuits eac h ha d t o rid e pe r year . The justice s petitione d Congres s agai n in February 179 4 t o en d circui t ridin g bu t t o n o avail . No terminatio n of thes e dutie s cam e t o th e judge s i n th e 1790s . Thoma s Johnso n cer tainly, an d Joh n Ja y an d Joh n Rutledg e probably , lef t th e Cour t i n large par t ove r th e difficultie s o f circui t riding ; Iredell' s deat h a t ag e forty-nine i n 179 9 wa s likel y hastene d b y them ; an d i t i s not unlikel y that a n il l an d agin g Joh n Blair , wh o wit h uncharacteristi c ange r protested hi s consecutiv e assignment s t o circui t dutie s i n th e fal l o f 1794, th e sprin g o f 1795 , an d th e fal l o f 1795 , finally resigne d i n n o small par t du e t o them. 29 Blair Oppose s Virgini a Debtor s o n Britis h Debt s Caution als o initially accompanie d th e judges in their dealing s wit h the potentiall y explosiv e Britis h deb t case s i n Virginia . Abou t 4 5 per cent o f th e tota l deb t wa s owe d fro m th e Ol d Dominion—abou t $6. 5 million i n 179 0 terms—an d it s court s ha d bee n completel y shu t t o British creditor s sinc e sprin g 1774 . Man y Virginian s wer e adaman t about no t payin g bloo d mone y t o thei r erstwhil e enemies . Virgini a was b y far th e largest and mos t populous state , and i t had barel y vote d for th e Constitutio n t o begi n with. 30 It s continued membershi p i n th e imperiled Unio n wa s absolutel y essentia l i n th e 1790s . British creditor s filed dozen s o f claims once the federal circui t cour t in Virginia wa s established , an d the y expecte d a t las t t o obtai n justic e quickly. But Patrick Henry , John Marshall , an d th e othe r abl e lawyer s for th e debtors , wh o wer e determine d t o avoi d paymen t i f possible , raised complicate d defense s an d "employe d ever y devic e a t thei r dis posal to drag ou t th e proceedings." Probabl y i n part t o ensure bot h le gitimacy and prope r handlin g o f Virginia law , the Cour t assigne d Joh n Blair t o th e Virgini a circui t fo r thre e o f it s first fou r term s o f court . This included th e term when argumen t finally bega n o n November 24 , 1791, i n Jones v. Walker ', a cas e chose n b y th e attorney s becaus e i t raised al l o f th e importan t issues . The courtroo m wa s packe d fo r th e weeklong arguments . A n attendin g credito r bitterl y recounte d tha t "all th e declamator y talent s o f Patric k Henr y wer e displaye d t o in -

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flame Men s minds , prevent thei r Judgments & driv e the m t o act s of Outrage." It was Henry's last great case, and his three-day peroratio n not onl y close d dow n th e Genera l Assembl y fo r wan t o f attendanc e but wa s remembere d decade s late r b y awe d auditors . Th e court' s records sho w tha t Blai r wa s no t presen t t o enjo y Henry ; h e lef t th e bench on November 2 3 and did not return unti l December 3 because he wa s financially intereste d i n on e o f th e issue s i n dispute . Justic e Thomas Johnson of Maryland and District Judge Cyrus Griffin o f Virginia, the other two men on the bench, found "tw o [o f the] points of Law perfectl y novel " an d refuse d t o decide , callin g fo r a ne w argu ment at the next term. The creditors were outraged, bot h b y the procrastination an d becaus e debtor s theretofor e resigne d t o payin g u p were now defiant; "[T]h e courts of Justice in Virginia are still shut fo r the recovery of British debts," one of them fumed. 31 After anothe r postponement , th e cautiou s approac h o f th e circui t court bench ended, and all of the legal defenses Virginia debtors raised in Walker save one (th e question Blai r was interested in ) were unanimously denie d b y Judges Jay, Iredell, and Griffi n i n December 1793 . The single issue was appealed, but, to the grudging satisfaction o f the British creditors, scores of debts in cases not involving that issue were finally brought to judgment in the two long terms the Virginia Circui t held i n 1794 . Blai r patientl y sa t i n bot h o f them , sinc e th e issu e i n which he was interested could not be before him. Juries still frustrate d creditors b y deductin g a t leas t eigh t years ' interes t i n ever y cas e a s punishment fo r Britis h wartim e depredations . This was illega l unde r the treaty; Blair, in an equity case where there was no jury ordered ful l wartime interes t o n a British debt , bu t wa s helples s t o overtur n jur y verdicts in the other cases . He had als o joined a unanimous Suprem e Court the previous February, in Georgia v. Brailsford, i n holding that a Georgia wartime law sequestering British debts was ineffective t o divest British creditors of title. 32 Thus, after cautio n was replaced by action, Blair's legal position on the states ' "Britis h debts " impediment s prove d t o b e procreditor , courageously contrar y t o tha t o f mos t Virginian s an d th e sam e a s those of all his Federalist Cour t colleagues except the North Carolin ian Iredell . Give n Johnson' s equivocatio n o n th e Virgini a Circui t i n 1791, John Blai r was the only southern justic e who gave full suppor t to the British creditors' position .

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Blair as Able Judicial Technician Georgia v. Brailsford presente d no t onl y an important substantiv e question involving British debts but also two technical and difficult is sues of equity law on which the Court issued opinions in August 179 2 and Februar y 1793 . In these rulings Blai r demonstrated tha t hi s nine years on Virginia's highest equity court had made him an able judicial technician in that sometime s arcane field . Brailsford, a Britis h subject , ha d sue d Spalding , a Georgian , o n a 1774 debt in the Georgia federal circuit court. Spalding's chief defens e had bee n Georgia' s wartim e ac t sequesterin g t o th e stat e al l debt s Georgians owe d to British subjects , an d barrin g recovery on them b y any bu t th e state . Th e stat e o f Georgia , afrai d o f collusio n betwee n Brailsford an d Spalding , ha d asked t o b e impleaded i n orde r t o pro tect it s rights , bu t Iredell , ridin g circuit , ha d denie d th e reques t o n grounds that the Judiciary Act gave the Supreme Court exclusive fed eral jurisdiction over suits involving states. He had then found that the bar o n recover y wa s repeale d b y th e Peac e Treaty , an d ha d give n judgment fo r Brailsfor d o n the merits. 33 Georgia filed a bil l i n equit y i n th e Suprem e Court , askin g fo r a n injunction t o restrai n i n his hands an y money s collecte d b y the mar shal upo n executio n o f th e lowe r cour t judgment , an d demandin g payment o f th e deb t t o it . In August 1792 , Blair, understanding tha t one purpos e o f equit y wa s t o correc t defect s i n th e common-la w process, amon g whic h wa s th e inabilit y o f Georgi a t o hav e bee n heard i n th e lowe r court , forcefull y argue d fo r issuanc e o f th e re quested injunctio n i n order t o protect whatever right s Georgi a migh t have pendin g a hearin g o n th e merits . Sinc e Johnso n an d Cushin g found suc h protection unnecessary , th e chief justice' s vote with the m would hav e produced a tie denyin g th e injunction , bu t Jay sai d tha t his min d ha d bee n change d durin g th e argument , likel y b y th e clar ity o f Blair' s exposition , an d complete d th e 4- 2 vot e t o issu e th e in junction.34 The toughe r equitabl e questio n wa s it s availability : litigant s wh o had a n adequat e remed y a t la w coul d no t obtai n equitabl e relief . Three members o f the now five-member Court (wit h Johnson's resignation), upon argumen t th e next February, thought tha t Georgi a ha d an adequate remedy a t law. Blair alone argued tha t th e Court , sittin g

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in equity , ha d t o expan d th e equitabl e actio n i n th e natur e o f inter pleader t o tak e car e o f th e situatio n becaus e Brailsford , a n alien , might decam p wit h th e proceed s o f hi s judgment befor e an y prope r legal proces s fro m Georgia' s common-la w actio n reache d him . I t seems tha t Blai r agai n wa s persuasiv e i n part , sinc e th e majority , speaking throug h Jay , continue d it s injunctio n i n force. 35 O f al l th e justices, Blair alone seemed comfortable wit h the expansive powers of an equit y court , an d full y knowledgeabl e abou t equitabl e jurispru dence. Blair Upholds the Power of the Confederatio n Blair mad e tw o importan t circui t cour t rulings . On e o f thes e wa s Penhallow v. Doane, i n whic h h e ingeniousl y an d resoundingl y up held the power an d authorit y o f the national government . Hastenin g from Massachusett s th e week befor e Congres s was to ba n commerc e with Grea t Britai n i n 1775 , Elish a Doane' s shi p The Lusanna ha d taken o n Britis h registr y and , wit h possibl e Loyalis t Shearjashu b Bourne in charge, had traded a t London an d Gibralta r befor e sailin g for Halifax , Nov a Scotia , with a cargo of British war materiel . When captured b y John Penhallow' s privatee r McClary ou t o f Portsmouth , New Hampshire, Bourne claimed tha t h e was a Patriot bu t ha d bee n caught abroad an d had had to register falsely an d to take on war ma teriel to get home again. Two New Hampshire stat e prize court juries were dubiou s and , takin g Britis h registr y an d wa r materie l a t fac e value, awarded prize to Penhallow in 1778 (despite an able defense by John Adams in his last case). 36 New Hampshire la w did not allo w American citizen s an appeal t o Congress in prize cases. The Articles of Confederation gav e Congress plenary appellate power in prize, and a 1775 act provided for appeal s in such cases; the Articles were not ratified, however, till 1781. Doane, "one o f th e riches t me n i n Ne w England, " appealed , claimin g loca l prejudice. Congres s thereafte r establishe d a priz e court , whic h i n 1783 accepte d jurisdictio n ove r th e case , reverse d th e decree , an d awarded the ship to Doane's estate. This was typical of the Confeder ation court : "I n practicall y ever y suc h cas e decide d o n appea l [i n which American merchants trying to do business had had to resort "t o ruses" an d "t o giv e complicated an d implausibl e explanation s . . . t o protect their property," and were disbelieved by state prize juries], the

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[federal] judge s restore d th e capture d property. " No w Ne w Hamp shire appeale d t o Congress , an d a committee repor t b y Thomas Jefferson agreed with New Hampshire, and Penhallow, that before 178 1 Congress ha d ha d n o powe r t o requir e appeal s fro m a state' s priz e court unles s the stat e agreed . However , Congress too k n o action , either to reverse its court or to enforce th e decree. 37 After 178 9 th e cas e wa s brough t b y Doane' s estat e int o federa l court, seekin g enforcement . Blai r hear d i t o n circui t i n Ne w Hamp shire i n th e fal l o f 179 3 an d uphel d th e 178 3 Confederatio n cour t award. He deftly obviated the retroactivity issue raised by Jefferson b y finding priz e jurisdictio n t o b e a n inheren t aspec t o f th e powe r t o wage wa r tha t th e colonie s ha d give n Congress fro m th e beginning , deducing tha t thi s mad e competen t bot h appellat e powe r an d Con federation court . H e the n refuse d t o contemplat e a n attac k o n tha t court's finding that it had jurisdiction. This ringing affirmation o f national powe r wo n bot h admiratio n fro m Federalists , and , whe n th e case finally reached th e Suprem e Cour t i n 1795 , a choru s o f echoe s from th e othe r judge s endorsin g Blair' s rationale . Moreover , Blair' s calm an d straightforwar d bu t narro w lega l groun d fo r nationa l su premacy produce d n o Anti-Federalis t outcry , whil e th e additiona l angry, tendentious argumen t tha t Justice William Paterso n advance d in Penhallow—that th e states had never been sovereign and thus New Hampshire ha d to yield to a sovereign Congress—no t onl y provoke d the oppositio n bu t als o force d hi s Federalis t colleague s t o upse t an d disavowal.38 It was one of John Blair's finest hours as a supporter bot h of the Federalist government an d o f the commercial etho s o f "ruses " and profit . Blair, Judicial Review, and Natural Law Jurisprudence The othe r importan t circui t rulin g occurre d i n Pennsylvani a i n April 1792 . Not onl y ha d Congress faile d t o terminat e circui t ridin g in th e winte r o f 1792 , i t ha d saddle d th e justices , a s circui t cour t judges, with th e wearisom e dut y o f hearin g an d assessin g th e viabil ity o f pensio n claim s b y Revolutionar y Wa r veterans . Ange r an d frustration le d the m t o cas t of f thei r cautio n abou t revealin g dis agreements with Congres s ove r the meaning of the Constitution, an d they probably agree d upo n thi s bol d pat h durin g th e Februar y 179 2 Supreme Cour t session . O n Apri l 1 2 Blair , Wilson , an d Distric t

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Judge Richar d Peter s refuse d t o hea r th e pensio n clai m o f vetera n William Hay burn, holding unconstitutional th e 179 2 Invalid Pensio n Act. This first such judicia l declaratio n abou t a national statut e sen t shock wave s throug h Philadelphia , provokin g precisel y th e kin d o f divisive commentar y fro m Anti-Federalist s tha t Federalists ha d feared. Word soo n arrive d tha t Jay an d Cushin g ha d take n a simila r stand o n th e Ne w Yor k Circuit . Late r Iredell , o n circui t i n Nort h Carolina, an d Johnson , o n circui t i n Sout h Carolina , adde d thei r voices t o mak e th e decisio n a unanimou s on e amon g al l si x sittin g Supreme Cour t justices. 39 Blair's opinio n wa s entirel y consisten t wit h th e opinion s h e ha d joined a s a Virginia judg e i n 178 8 an d 1789 , demonstrating concer n with preservation o f the independence o f the judicial branch , an d refusing t o accept burdensome uncompensated duties . The Invalid Pension Ac t required th e circuit judge s to certif y t o th e secretar y o f wa r their findings and opinion , whic h migh t the n b e revised b y that offi cial befor e submissio n t o Congres s fo r possibl e furthe r revision . Jay and Cushin g had no t waited fo r a claimant, but , when cour t opene d on April 5, announced their wholly advisory opinion that the doctrine of separatio n o f power s forbad e judges ' opinions fro m bein g subjec t to revisa l b y members o f th e othe r branche s o f government . Wilso n and Blai r waite d unti l Haybur n an d othe r claimant s appeared , the n announced thei r opinio n based upo n th e sam e principle s bu t statin g plainly tha t "[s]uc h revisio n an d control " b y th e othe r branche s i s "radically inconsistent with the independence of that judicial power . . . so strictly observed b y the constitution o f the United States. " Con sistent with thei r opinio n tha t th e ac t was void, Wilson an d Blai r refused t o hea r th e claimants . Jay, Cushing , an d Iredel l chos e t o hea r pension claims as "commissioners." 40 Federalist ange r focuse d o n th e presume d "infallibility " o f th e judges an d o n their refusa l t o d o what Congres s ordere d the m t o d o rather tha n o n thei r belie f tha t judicia l revie w was unconstitutional ; that is , upon judicia l supremacy , no t judicia l review . Federalis t con gressional leade r Fishe r Ame s though t th e decisio n "indiscree t an d erroneous," likel y t o "embolde n th e state s an d thei r court s t o mak e many claim s o f power. " N o on e seeme d t o thin k tha t i t wa s im proper fo r th e judge s to exercis e judicia l review . The reput e o f Marbury v, Madison a s th e first ac t o f judicia l revie w b y th e Suprem e Court has been engendered b y several factors. Som e originated i n the

John Blair 17 5 1790s: th e lac k o f directnes s an d lac k o f cohesio n o f th e justice s (who issue d differin g opinion s i n differen t circuits) , Federalis t pho bias agains t promotin g dangerou s divisio n b y continuin g t o tal k about th e matter , an d muc h sentimen t tha t judicia l revie w wa s un controversial: man y wer e wel l awar e tha t severa l state statute s ha d already bee n rule d unconstitutiona l b y th e justice s o n circuit. 41 Bu t modern positivis t biase s hav e bee n th e chie f obstacle : positivist s a s authoritarians accep t judicia l lawmakin g onl y whe n entombe d i n formal opinion s i n litigate d cases; 42 an d positivist s focu s legalisticall y and hierarchicall y upo n th e title s o f courts , no t (a s di d th e natural law sentimen t o f th e 1790s ) upo n th e mora l authorit y o f th e justice s who sa t i n them . Iredell ha d promise d t o chang e hi s vie w "i f w e ca n b e convince d this opinio n i s a wron g one. " Th e attorne y general , Edmun d Ran dolph, move d th e Suprem e Cour t i n Augus t 179 2 t o issu e a wri t o f mandamus, commandin g th e Pennsylvani a circui t cour t t o hea r Hay burn's claim . Randolp h appeare d o n behal f o f n o client , bu t a s th e legal representativ e o f th e Unite d States , claimin g tha t th e Judiciar y Act's authorization tha t th e attorney genera l "prosecut e al l suits in th e Supreme Cour t i n whic h th e Unite d State s shal l b e concerned " ha d granted hi m th e sam e power a s the Englis h attorne y general , who reg ularly mad e suc h appearances . Chie f Justic e Jay challenge d hi m a s t o whether h e coul d thu s ac t withou t authorizatio n fro m th e president . Other question s wer e asked , bu t apparentl y n o justic e challenge d hi s ex parte appearance . "Th e questio n th e Suprem e Cour t too k upo n it self wa s apparentl y narrow : coul d th e Attorne y Genera l spea k o n hi s own, o r mus t th e Presiden t b e th e on e speakin g throug h hi s autho rized cabine t representative? " Blai r joine d Iredel l an d Johnson i n vot ing to allo w Randolp h t o appea r e x parte, bu t th e motio n faile d upo n an eve n division , Jay , Cushing , an d Wilso n votin g t o requir e presi dential authorization. 43 Given th e simila r actio n Blai r ha d joine d i n Virgini a a fe w year s earlier—issuing a n opinio n e x parte , a s i t were , an d havin g i t sprea d on the record—he di d not shar e modern positivis t notion s that requir e lawyers t o hav e client s whe n the y appea r befor e courts , an d court s t o issue opinion s onl y i n suc h litigate d instances . Further , neithe r Blai r nor th e othe r judge s though t i t od d when , i n 1782 , Chie f Justic e Pendleton aske d member s o f th e ba r t o giv e their opinion s o n judicia l review i n th e Caton case , o r when , i n 1793 , Chie f Justic e Ja y invite d

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any membe r o f th e ba r t o spea k o n behal f o f th e absen t stat e i n Chisholm v. Georgia.*4 Blair and the other southern judges shared the traditional notio n tha t th e attorne y genera l o f a government wa s it s general legal representative an d coul d appea r e x parte befor e th e ba r in th e publi c interest ; th e othe r justice s demande d onl y presidentia l authorization an d di d no t disapprov e suc h e x part e appearances . These actions and ideas appear strange to positivists today but excited no comment then . Positivists believ e that la w is commands, that thes e commands ar e positively mad e b y authoritativ e source s (eithe r b y legislative bodie s in statutes and regulations, or by judicial bodies in opinions), and that the la w wholly consist s i n these commands . Natural lawyers , on th e other hand, believed that the law was only what "th e community" accepted as the law and that it accreted over a course of years by acceptance of legal opinions of legislatures and o f those trained i n the law: judges, treatis e writers , an d member s o f th e bar . Any lega l opinio n was only evidence of the law, not "th e law." Members of the bar ha d a professiona l responsibility , a s well a s a civic one, to giv e their bes t opinion as to what the law was. Authority was moral and consensual, not legalistic and peremptory. Thus, the opinion o f a judge was more authoritative, but all professional opinion s deserved respect and were to be judged primarily by their wisdom, not by the status of their holders—which i s why the ol d reports ar e replete with th e arguments th e lawyers made ; why opinion s o f th e judge s were ofte n delivere d seri atim; why so many o f the old cases have little or no judicial opinion ; why the opinions of that time give treatise writers respect equal to that of prio r judicia l decisions ; why reportin g in baec verba was unusua l and no t demande d i n th e 1790s ; an d wh y w e cal l wha t judge s sa y "opinions" rathe r tha n "rulings. " I t i s also why Blair' s action s sum marized i n th e previou s paragrap h wer e no t strang e t o th e natural law-trained lawyer s and judges of the 1790s. 45 Ultimately, the action of Wilson and Blair in refusing to sit as "commissioners" wa s completel y vindicated . I n Februar y 179 4 Willia m Bradford, th e new attorney general, filed in the Supreme Court a debt claim on behalf o f the United States against Yale Todd, a Connecticu t pensioner whos e clai m ha d bee n approve d b y Iredel l a s "commis sioner" in 1792. The Court held for the United States, invalidating all the actions of the judges as "commissioners." 46

John Blair 17 7 Chisholm an d Nationa l Powe r The controvers y ove r Hayburn die d down , an d indee d Hayburn lessened fear s amon g Anti-Federalist s abou t th e powe r o f bot h th e Court an d th e national government . Bu t the Court' s decisio n on e yea r later, i n Chisholm, brough t al l those fear s bac k t o th e for e an d tende d to consolidat e th e emergin g Jeffersonia n oppositio n t o th e centraliz ing, commercially-oriente d Federalis t policies . Tha t decisio n gener ated th e larges t uproa r yet , alienatin g constituencie s theretofor e doubtful o r eve n Federalist . Chisholm's decedent , a Sout h Carolinian , ha d sol d supplie s t o th e state o f Georgi a durin g th e Revolutio n wort h nin e thousan d pounds , and ha d neve r bee n paid. 47 Chishol m sue d Georgi a i n th e Suprem e Court, an d th e state refused t o appear , claiming immunity fro m sui t a s a sovereign . Th e Constitutio n containe d expres s languag e givin g t o federal court s jurisdictio n ove r suit s "betwee n a Stat e an d citizen s o f another State, " whic h ha d provoke d man y Anti-Federalis t objection s during th e ratificatio n debates , bu t mos t Federalists , includin g Alexander Hamilto n an d Joh n Marshall , ha d take n th e positio n tha t Anti-Federalist fear s wer e groundless . Th e Judiciary Ac t o f 178 9 con tained a provision vestin g suc h jurisdictio n exclusivel y i n the Suprem e Court, bu t th e Anti-Federalis t fear s seeme d calmed . In Februar y 1793 , afte r severa l postponements , th e Cour t held , 4 - 1 , wit h Iredel l dissentin g an d Johnson jus t resigned, that th e clause s meant wha t the y said , and foun d tha t Chisholm' s sui t agains t Georgi a was properl y brough t befor e it , eve n thoug h Georgi a refuse d t o con sent. Justic e Wilso n an d Chie f Justic e Ja y gav e lon g an d elaborat e opinions—the on e lyric , the othe r angry—fro m whic h on e coul d con clude that they believed that state s were or could b e made entirel y sub ordinate t o th e federa l government , th e greates t fea r o f th e Anti-Fed eralists. 48 Blair's opinion , i n contrast , wa s simple , straightforward , an d con fined t o th e situatio n a t hand . Carefull y an d clearl y restin g himsel f upon th e plai n word s o f th e Constitution , "th e onl y fountai n fro m which I shall draw," h e found meaningles s it s word orde r (fro m whic h others ha d implie d tha t th e onl y jurisdictio n give n wa s whe n a stat e was a plaintiff): "[a ] disput e betwee n A . an d B . is surely a disput e be tween B . and A. " Th e Constitution' s othe r grant s o f jurisdictio n ove r

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"Controversies betwee n tw o o r mor e States " an d between " a Stat e and foreign States " were conclusive that it contemplated states ' being made defendants i n federal cour t without their consent. When a state adopted th e Constitution , h e concluded , "sh e has , i n tha t respec t [being 'amenable to the judicial power of the United States'], given up her righ t o f sovereignty. " Th e most importan t interes t Blai r ha d wa s to preserv e th e governmen t an d t o kee p it s power s intact , an d tha t "requir[ed] the submission o f individual state s to the judicial author ity of the United States. " Obedienc e t o th e ne w government, eve n in delicate situations like the one before him , was paramount. It seemed necessary to him, as Europe was becoming embroiled i n general war, as foreign state s cast covetous eye s toward Unite d State s territory, a s rural dissidents maintained oppositio n to the government, and as Jefferson emerge d as a viable leader of the opposition, to speak "clearl y and decidedly" in favor of its dignity and capability. As was true in the British deb t instance , Blai r wa s th e onl y southerne r o n th e Cour t t o take the Federalist position. 49 The uproa r wa s s o strong an d widesprea d tha t Congress devised , and th e state s passed , th e Elevent h Amendment , withdrawin g juris diction fro m th e federa l judiciar y i n diversit y an d alienag e suit s i n which a state was an unconsented-to defendant. 50 Thi s has remained, in the country's history , the only instance i n which th e constitutiona l grant o f judicial power was directly diminished throug h amendment . However, durin g Washington' s secon d ter m th e nation' s foreig n an d domestic trouble s grew , s o despit e increase d attack s o n Federalis t judges, they continued t o exercis e their authorit y t o suppor t an d up hold the federal governmen t where it was prudent t o do so. The Neutrality Crisis and Domestic Insurrection As 179 3 progressed , th e war i n Europe heate d up . The numerou s French partisans withi n th e United State s demanded tha t ai d b e provided to the new republican government o f the only country that ha d given th e colonie s significan t hel p durin g th e Revolution , an d th e Francophile secretar y o f stat e Jefferson an d th e domesti c oppositio n gained strength . Britis h partisans , mostl y merchant s an d thei r allie s (among who m wa s th e Anglophil e treasur y secretar y Hamilton) , pointed t o ou r cultura l tie s wit h an d economi c dependenc y upo n Great Britain , an d warne d o f th e danger s o f democrati c excess . Jef -

John Blair 17 9 ferson an d Hamilto n agreed , however , tha t th e weaknes s an d vulner ability o f th e Unite d State s mad e involvemen t o n eithe r sid e unadvis able. Th e presiden t declare d th e Unite d State s neutral , "friendl y an d impartial." 51 The activis t ne w Frenc h ambassador , Citize n Edmon d Genet , b y claim o f righ t unde r th e 177 8 treaty , outfitte d Frenc h privateer s i n American port s (crewin g the m wit h enthusiasti c America n volun teers), and ha d thei r prize s condemned b y members o f hi s staff sitting , on American territory , as French prize courts. The British minister wa s convulsed wit h protes t a t this disregard o f neutrality. "Al l members o f the c a b i n e t . .. agree d tha t th e fitting ou t o f privateers, the recruitmen t of America n crews , an d th e operatio n o f th e consula r [prize ] court s were improper. " Washingto n aske d th e Suprem e Cour t fo r assuranc e by way o f a n advisor y opinion . At thei r Augus t 179 3 ter m th e justice s unanimousl y rejecte d th e president's reques t t o answe r th e questions , citing separation-of-pow ers concerns an d thei r reluctanc e t o addres s question s extrajudicially , "our bein g Judges o f a Cour t i n the las t Resort. " Th e judges' respons e is surprising. Lik e th e e x parte appearanc e o f Randolph , th e givin g o f advisory opinion s wa s usua l i n the natural-law atmospher e o f Englis h tradition, an d w e hav e see n that , i n Hay burn, non e o f th e justice s thought th e practic e unconstitutional . Blai r ha d give n them , an d Ja y gave s o muc h advic e t o th e presiden t an d Hamilto n tha t h e coul d al most hav e bee n considere d a membe r o f th e cabinet ; h e wa s soo n t o become specia l ambassado r t o Englan d t o negotiat e a ne w treaty. 52 It was thu s no t advisor y opinion s i n genera l tha t wer e rejecte d bu t this particular advisor y opinion . I t woul d hav e bee n characteristi c o f Blair t o joi n hi s colleague s i n followin g th e lea d o f Jay , wh o (wit h Hamilton) believe d tha t onl y a stron g presiden t actin g alone , no t i n conjunction wit h an y othe r branch , coul d provid e adequat e leader ship i n th e crisi s o f foreig n affair s the n threatenin g th e nation . The y also wished a public rebuk e fo r Jefferson , wh o desire d tha t th e Cour t and Congres s joi n th e presiden t i n leadershi p i n foreig n affairs , an d who wa s becomin g th e foca l poin t o f domesti c opposition . Wilso n and Ja y ha d alread y give n well-publicize d gran d jur y charge s oppos ing Genet' s activities , an d lega l challenge s t o th e Frenc h priz e award s were i n th e federa l distric t court s an d coul d find thei r wa y u p t o th e Supreme Court , s o ther e wer e judicia l avenue s fo r th e judge s t o ren der thei r opinions. 53

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To the utter disma y o f the Washington administration , fou r o f th e five federal distric t court s tha t considere d challenge s t o th e French prize courts declare d that , accordin g to the law of nations, question s of prize were exclusively fo r th e courts o f the captor natio n an d tha t neutral nation s ha d n o jurisdictio n i n suc h matters . Th e Suprem e Court i n February 179 4 finally got to hear a n appeal in one of them , and in Glass v. Sloop Betsy, the judges unanimously asserted, without giving any legal rationale, that th e federal distric t court s did have jurisdiction, and that prize courts of another nation could not be erected in the United States . Thus, United State s courts no w had jurisdictio n to hea r thes e cases and a legal way to refus e t o giv e preclusive effec t to an y awar d o f a French priz e cour t o n American soil . The learne d district judges surely knew the law of nations. Just as surely Blair and his colleagues , whe n the y go t th e chanc e t o ac t judicially , mad e a n overtly political decision: to support the president's policy of neutral ity and t o oppose Gene t no matter wha t the law of nations said . The politically cagey caution o f summer 179 3 was followed b y direct political action in winter 1794 . For Blair and the other judges, troubles only mounted. Many poo r and middlin g farmer s an d wag e worker s foun d Federalis t nationa l policy to favo r merchant s an d th e seaboard elite s and to b e inconsistent with their more democratic view of the goals and meaning of the Revolution. Resistanc e coalesce d alon g th e wester n frontie r aroun d Hamilton's excis e ta x o n whiskey , whic h discriminate d agains t un derrepresented smal l farmer s an d smal l distillers , and, o n th e specieless frontier, at e directly into workers' wages and the local medium of exchange. It erupted into open armed protest in western Pennsylvani a (the onl y frontie r local e wher e official s actuall y trie d t o enforc e th e tax) in the summer and fall of 1794, with ensuing disturbances in central Pennsylvania , wester n Marylan d an d Virginia , an d Kentucky . President Washington personally led a thirteen-thousand-strong arm y westward t o crush the protest. Part of this show of force include d th e arrest, often fo r treason, of twenty or so mostly bedraggled protesters. Some wer e o f middlin g wealth , suc h a s Joh n Hamilton , sherif f o f Washington County ; Thomas Sedgewick , a magistrate; and th e Rev erend John Corbley . Over local protest the y were herded eastwar d i n November t o jai l i n Philadelphia , wher e the y remained , accuse d o f treason and awaiting indictment b y a grand jury, when the Court met in February 1795. 54

John Blair 18 1 Blair was clearly alarmed b y this event, and hi s two survivin g gran d jury charges , fro m th e fal l 179 4 circui t i n Delawar e an d th e sprin g 1795 circui t i n Georgia , demonstrat e tha t h e sa w i t a s th e graves t o f threats amon g man y the n pressin g o n th e government . Bot h directl y contradicted th e grievance s raise d b y th e westerners , assertin g th e re sponsiveness an d representativenes s o f th e government , th e mildnes s of th e tax , an d th e necessit y tha t th e burden s o f majorit y rul e b e ac cepted b y all . Bot h sa w th e governmen t a s wea k militaril y an d a s threatened wit h extinctio n b y the revolt becaus e o f its occurrence dur ing the delicat e internationa l situation . Despit e th e arrest s an d th e ap parent crushin g o f th e revolt , th e ton e o f th e late r charg e i s more des perate an d alarmin g tha n tha t o f th e earlier , indicatin g tha t Blair , lik e other Federalists , sa w th e rea l threa t a s comin g fro m th e Jeffersonia n opposition: "[H]o w dangerou s i t i s t o indulg e to o freel y disconten t with respec t t o th e measure s o f government. " H e wa s worrie d abou t designing individual s wh o "fre t th e mind s o f th e ignorant, " turnin g them int o "th e delude d multitude." 5 5 Blair's action s i n th e Suprem e Cour t i n Februar y 179 5 reflecte d these fear s an d prejudices . Corble y an d other s move d fo r th e erectio n of a specia l circui t court , t o b e hel d i n wester n Pennsylvani a clos e t o their witnesses . Hamilton , brough t fro m priso n o n a habea s corpu s writ, move d th e Cour t fo r discharg e becaus e h e ha d bee n jaile d fo r treason withou t a hearin g or , alternatively , fo r releas e o n reasonabl e bail pending indictment . Afte r holdin g thes e motions fo r severa l days , the Cour t unanimousl y denie d th e motion fo r a special circuit cour t i n the West , o n insubstantia l i f no t speciou s grounds , an d grante d Hamilton bai l i n th e enormou s su m o f $4,00 0 personall y an d $2,00 0 each fo r tw o sureties . Th e gran d jur y faile d t o indic t Corbley , Hamil ton, an d Sedgewic k fo r treason , an d prosecutio n o f Corble y o n a "true bill " fo r misdemeano r wa s dropped . Onl y tw o person s wer e convicted o f treaso n fo r th e revolt , bot h o f who m wer e poor , on e o f whom a t leas t wa s simpleminded ; bot h wer e pardoned. 5 6 A Federalist to the End Retirement Having suffere d fro m illnes s frequentl y whil e o n th e Court , Joh n Blair wa s force d t o leav e th e benc h o n circui t i n Sout h Carolin a an d

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to cance l th e ensuin g Nort h Carolin a circui t cour t i n th e sprin g o f 1795. He described the malady as "a rattling, distracting noise" in his head, "nothin g bu t an overbearing noise in [his ] head which distract s [his] attention. " Th e proble m persisted , causin g hi m t o mis s th e Court's August 179 5 session an d the fall circuits, and o n Octobe r 2 5 he tendered hi s resignation t o the president. 57 He lived for five more years, and, though he was ill at times, no fur ther mention of any rattling in his head has come to light. Though distraught b y the deaths o f his only son in October 179 1 and hi s wife a year later , Blai r engage d i n man y pursuit s happil y an d remaine d a sturdy supporter of the Federalist regime to the end. In the fall of 179 6 the Jeffersonians wer e sure that h e would becom e the Federalist can didate fo r th e United State s Senate , and i n the sprin g of 179 7 he appeared as foreman o f the federal circuit court grand jury in Richmond that presented Jeffersonian Congressma n Samuel Cabell for the "evil" contained i n a circula r lette r t o hi s constituents ; Cabel l ha d therei n castigated Federalist policies and the election of John Adams. The presentment raise d a great furor , no t leas t o f whic h wa s popula r aston ishment a t Blair' s participation. I n the summer o f 179 9 he suffered a stroke, and he died on August 31, 1800.58 A "Safe and Conscientious" Judge As a judge , Joh n Blai r was , i n historia n Ear l Greg g Swem' s ap t phrasing, "saf e an d conscientious." Neither innovative , complicated , nor deep, nor a n erudite legal scholar, Blair dealt with the immediat e problem, went only as far a s he had to, ruffled fe w feathers, an d ma y not hav e though t throug h th e finer lega l o r politica l points , a s h e showed i n hi s confusio n ove r th e Rober t Morri s certiorar i instance . But Blair was "saf e an d conscientious" in that he was knowledgeabl e in the law, as he demonstrated i n Brailsford, an d i n that h e held firm to hi s duty, hewed t o hi s Federalist principles , and spok e clearly an d directly, i f quietly , t o th e point s a t hand , a s i n Chisholm. A Ne w Hampshire Federalist , wh o ha d probabl y attende d an d admire d hi s handling o f Penh allow, remembere d hi m a s "fa r superio r t o Cush ing—a man of firmness, strict integrity, and of great candour." And he was "saf e an d conscientious " i n that h e was sufficientl y independen t not to be thought pliable . The Jeffersonian attorne y genera l of Massachusetts wa s "muc h please d wit h Judge Blair, " praisin g Blair' s "in -

John Blair 18 3 dependence" when , o n circuit , h e openl y i f respectfull y differe d o n a point o f law from th e Federalist-dominated Massachusett s hig h court , stating "tha t h e coul d giv e n o opinio n bu t hi s own." 5 9 More important , Blai r was "saf e an d conscientious " i n a way mod ern scholars of the judicial role do not customarily note . Both the Ne w Hampshire an d Massachusett s observer s jus t quote d like d th e politi cal a s well a s the lega l thrus t o f Blair' s judicia l opinions . Th e politica l dimension wa s the n a s no w a n inheren t par t o f judging , bu t the n i t was recognize d an d expected . Th e mos t importan t valu e i n Blair' s great opinions , i n Penhallow an d Chisholm, wa s tha t the y wer e clea r and forthrigh t lega l affirmation s o f th e powe r an d federa l superiorit y of th e nationa l government , a governmen t greatl y suspec t t o man y Americans, a wea k governmen t unde r seig e fro m foreig n powers , a new an d experimenta l governmen t liabl e t o momentar y dissolution . John Blai r prove d tim e an d agai n tha t h e coul d b e counte d upo n t o support th e Federalist position , whic h h e saw a s the national, th e con stitutional position . Blair's othe r qualit y o f greatnes s i s als o eviden t i n hi s opinion s i n Penhallow an d Chisholm, whe n contraste d wit h th e striden t tone s and tendentiou s Federalis m exhibite d i n th e sam e case s b y Justice Pa terson, i n th e one , an d Chie f Justic e Jay , i n th e other . Th e expansiv e and hard-edge d nationalis t metie r adopte d b y hi s norther n peer s evoked muc h antipath y fro m bot h Antifederalist s an d southerners , but Blair , whose opinion s wer e the opposit e o f those o f most o f hi s geographic compatriots , provoke d onl y calm disagreemen t abou t th e legalities o f th e problem , no t ho t politica l opposition. 60 Blai r wa s "saf e and conscientious " becaus e he wrote calml y an d maturely , clearly em phasizing nationa l powe r throug h deliberat e an d bounde d lega l argu ment withou t bein g politicall y threatenin g o r provocative . He exhibite d thi s qualit y i n al l hi s dealings . A Britis h credito r wh o traveled th e souther n federa l circui t i n th e 1790s , monitorin g hi s many suits , wa s critica l t o th e poin t o f contemp t o f man y o f th e jus tices fo r thei r dela y an d lac k o f courage , bu t h e gav e Blai r respect. 61 And astonishment , no t hars h words , forme d th e heigh t o f critiqu e from Virginian s o f hi s 179 7 federa l gran d jur y foremanship . I n a n ag e of increasingl y vituperative , politicall y charge d persona l attacks , Blair's Federalist partisanshi p stand s ou t a s calm, persuasive, and pro ductive o f ongoin g dialogu e an d continuin g relation s rathe r tha n a s disruptive an d divisive . Th e prope r criterio n agains t whic h t o judg e

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the Suprem e Court' s opinion s i n the perilou s 1790 s i s their politica l effectiveness i n persuasivel y upholdin g th e power , authority , an d re spect o f th e shak y ne w nationa l governmen t whil e excitin g n o dis membering dissent ; an d th e prope r gauge s o f it s member s ar e thei r courage an d consistenc y i n supportin g th e ne w Constitutio n an d it s constituted government. On both of these measures, the amiable, safe, conscientious Virginian John Blai r ranks at the top. Indeed, Blair was a "safe and conscientious" supporter o f his class. The Revolutionar y allianc e betwee n th e merchants o f the North an d the planters of the South, embodied i n the developmental an d plante r interests o f the first president, wa s still fluid an d viabl e in the 1790s , though i t wa s breakin g dow n an d woul d no t remai n s o fo r long . (Most supporters of the mercantile interest were still natural lawyers, like Blair, but the tendency would b e for the m to adopt th e emergin g positivist theor y o f law. ) Blair , who als o personified bot h sort s o f in terest, apparently (lik e most contemporaries) withou t seein g their in compatibility, emphasized solidarity with the developmental and mercantile interests o f the Jay/Hamilton Federalist s i n his opinions, consistently upholdin g th e might and , with regar d t o punishmen t o f th e whiskey rebels , the economi c scheme s o f thei r ne w nationa l govern ment. Thank s t o th e qualitie s an d circumstance s jus t mentioned , hi s divergence from th e planting interest also did not bring him criticism. Eulogizers recalled Blair's mildness, gravity, and piety, his own absence of fanaticism, and the lack of any assault upon him by an enemy. St. George Tucker, one of the leading Virginia lawyers of the next generation, remembere d hi m a s quiet , dull , an d gentlemanly. 62 Thoug h not a strong thinker as a jurist, John Blair did have an ability to get to the hear t o f th e matter , wa s a n abl e an d competen t judge , an d was , first an d foremost , sturdil y devote d t o hi s ow n interest s an d t o th e cause of mercantile and planter republican independence, as later embodied in the Federalist Party. NOTES

1. [Ear l Greg g Swem] , Book Review , William and Mary Quarterly (1st Ser.), 22:142 (1913) . 2. "Resignatio n o f th e Judges, " Marc h 11 , 1789 , i n Davi d Joh n Mays , ed. , The Letters and Papers of Edmund Pendleton 1734-1803 ( 2 vols., 1967 ) (cite d hereafter a s Pendleton Papers), 2:55 4 (opinio n o f th e Virginia Cour t o f Appeals ,

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written b y Edmund Pendleton , joined b y John Blair) , dealt with a t more lengt h in text accompanyin g not e 16 . 3. Se e generally A . G. Roeber , Faithful Lawyers and Republican Magistrates: Creators of Virginia Legal Culture, 1680-1810 (1981) , esp. pp. 112-36 ; Josep h A. Ernst , "Th e Politica l Econom y o f th e Chesapeak e Colonies , 1760-1775 : A Study in Comparative History, " i n Ronald Hoffma n e t al., eds., The Economy of Early America: The Revolutionary Period, 1763-1790 (1988) , pp . 196-243 ; Marc Egna l & ; Joseph A . Ernst , "A n Economi c Interpretatio n o f th e America n Revolution," W&MQ(3d), 35:401-2 8 (1972) ; Frederic k Thornto n Miller , "Ju ries an d Judge s vs . the Law : Virgini a fro m th e Revolutio n t o th e Confrontatio n Between John Marshall and Spencer Roane" (Ph.D . dissertation, University of Alabama, 1986) , pp. 1-14 . 4. Fre d L . Israel, "Joh n Blair , Jr.," i n Leo n Friedma n e t al. , eds., The Justices of the United States Supreme Court, 1789-1969: Their Lives and Major Opinions ( 4 vols., 1969), 1:109; Allen Johnson e t al., eds., Dictionary of American Biography (1 0 vols. , 1927-1938 ) (cite d hereafte r a s DAB), s.v. Jame s Blair , 1:335-37, s.v. Joh n Blai r (1687-1771) , 1:337 , S t s.v. Joh n Blai r (1732-1800) , 1:337-38 (al l written b y Earl Gregg Swem); Daphne Gentr y S t Brent Tarter, "Th e Blair Famil y o f Colonia l Williamsburg, " Virginia Magazine of Genealogy, 32:107,108 (1994) ; Edmund Morgan, American Slavery American Freedom: The Ordeal of Colonial Virginia (1975) , pp. 348-62; Deposition o f John Blai r in lawsuit o f Margare t Eustac e vs . Seth John Cuthbert , Dec . 29, 1787 , i n Blai r Famil y Papers, Earl Greg g Swe m Library , ViW ; Roeber, Faithful Lawyers 13 2 (confuse s John Blai r junio r fo r hi s father a s membe r o f Williamsbur g cit y cour t i n 1750s) . Blair's plantations suffere d terribl y fro m Britis h depredation s durin g th e Revolu tion, and man y o f his slaves escaped. John Blai r to hi s sister [Mar y Blai r Braxto n Burwell], Aug. 15 , 1783 , in Blair , Banister , Braxton , Horner , S t Whitin g Papers , ViWC. 5. DAB, s.v. Joh n Blai r (1732-1800) ; Maev a Marcu s e t al. , eds., The Documentary History of the Supreme Court of the United States, 1789-1800 ( 5 vols, to date , 1985- ) (cite d hereafte r a s Documentary History), 1:54-59 ; Rober t Boiling, Memoir of the Boiling Family (1868) , pp. 33-38; Gentry &c Tarter, "Blai r Family," pp. 10 9 & n.26 , 111; The [Richmond ] Virginia Argus, Feb . 29, 1804 ; E. Alfred Jones , American Members of the Inns of Court (1924) , p. 21. 6. Roeber , Faithful Lawyers, 12 1 (source of the first quote); Charles T. Cullen, St. George Tucker and Law in Virginia, 1772-1804 (1987 ) (reprinte d Ph.D . dissertation, Universit y o f Virginia , 1971) , pp . 25 , 56, 62-63 ; Fran k L . Dewey , Thomas Jefferson LAWYER (1986) , pp . 1-8 ; The [Richmond ] Virginia Arqus, Feb. 29, 180 4 (sourc e o f th e secon d quote) ; Israel, "Blair, " 109 . 7. Willia m & Mar y colleg e records , Joh n Blair , Jr. , Folder , Faculty/Alumn i Collection, Earl Gregg Swem Library, ViW; DAB, s.v. John Blai r (1732-1800) , p. 338; Israel , "Blair, " 109-10 ; Ear l Greg g Swem , "Williamsburg—Th e Ol d Colo -

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nial Capital, " W&MQ(lst), 16:30 7 (1907) ; Josep h A . Ernst , "Th e Robinso n Scandal Redivivus : Money , Debts , an d Politic s i n Revolutionar y Virginia, " Virginia Magazine of History and Biography, 77:146-7 3 (1969) ; journals of the House of Burgesses, 1766-1769, p . 15 8 ( I owe thanks to Brent Tarter fo r th e references to the journals i n this and th e succeeding note); Dewey, Jefferson, 44 , 53; Earl Greg g Swem , "Williamsbur g Lodg e o f Masons, " W&MQ(lst), 1:9-1 0 (1892). 8. Virginiu s Dabney, Virginia: The New Dominion (1971) , pp. 112-14; Journals of the House of Burgesses, 1766-69, pp . 214-15 ; Israel , "Blair, " p . 11 0 (source of the first quote); J. Elliot Drinard, "Joh n Blair , Jr., 1732-1800, " i n Proceedings of the Thirty-Eighth Meeting of the Virginia State Bar Association (1927), pp . 437-3 9 (Blair's counci l proclamatio n quote d o n p . 438) ; Joh n E . Selby, The Revolution in Virginia, 1775-1783 (1988) , pp. 48-49 . 9. Tha d W . Tate, "Th e Comin g o f th e Revolutio n i n Virginia: Britain' s Chal lenge t o Virginia' s Rulin g Class, " W&MQ(3d), 19:336-3 7 (1962) ; Selby , Revolution, 76-77, 95-104 , 106-2 1 (indeed , Selby' s carefu l revie w o f th e primar y sources found n o Blair contributions t o a single major o r minor politica l decisio n in these momentou s times) . Edmund Randolph , writin g muc h later , named Blai r as one of the persons whom the public esteemed to be important i n the 177 6 Con vention. Edmun d Randolph , A Political History of Virginia (H . Shaffer , ed. , 1970), p. 51. 10. Selby , Revolution, 119-20 , 147-48 , 156-57 ; Cullen , St. George Tucker, 28-31; Charle s F . Hobson e t al. , eds. , The Papers of John Marshall ( 7 vols , t o date, 1974- ) (cited hereafte r a s Marshall Papers), 5:xxviii-xxx ; Willia m T . Hutchinson e t al. , eds. , The Papers of James Madison (2 3 vols , t o date , 1962- ) (cited hereafte r a s Madison Papers), 1:23 7 n.l . Whether Blai r eve r actuall y sa t a s admiralty judg e i s unclear. Se e Selby , Revolution, 148 . He wa s appointe d t o th e Continental Congres s in 1781 , but he never sat. See Madison Papers 3:161 8c n.2. 11. Israel , "Blair, " p . 110 ; Joseph Jone s t o Jame s Madison , Nov . 24 , 1780 , Madison Papers 2:298; David John Mays, Edmund Pendleton, 1721-1803: A Biography ( 2 vols., 1952); Robert B . Kirtland, George Wythe: Lawyer, Revolutionary, Judge (1986 ) (reprinte d Ph.D . dissertation , Harvar d University , [197?]) ; Thomas Jefferson t o James Madison, Marc h 15 , 1789, Julian P . Boyd et al., eds., The Papers of Thomas Jefferson (2 5 vols, to date , 1950- ) (cite d hereafte r as Jefferson Papers), 14:659 ; Joseph Jone s t o Jame s Madison , Jun e 24 , 1789 , Documentary History 1:626 ; George Washingto n t o James Madison , undate d (befor e September 24,1789), ibid. 1:665; George Washington to Edmund Randolph , November 30 , 1789 , ibid., 1:680 . 12. "Pendleton' s Accoun t o f th e 'Cas e o f th e Prisoners ' (Commonwealth v. Caton)," Va . Ct . App. , Novembe r 1782 , Pendleton Papers 2:416 ; Commonwealth v. Posey, 8 Va. ( 4 Call ) 10 9 (Va . Ct . App . 1787) ; "Remonstranc e o f th e Judges," Va . Ct . App. , May 12 , 1788 , Pendleton Papers 2:504 ; "Resignatio n o f

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the Judges," Va. Ct. App., March 11 , 1789, ibid., 2:553. Call's fourt h volum e o f Virginia reports , whic h cover s th e 1780s , wa s no t publishe d unti l 182 7 an d fo r most o f the cases reported (fo r tha t period ) give s only the facts, th e arguments o f counsel, and the decree or judgment entered, but no opinions of the judges, which were, by that time, probably lost . It contains notoriou s errors , also, which i s why I have chosen t o us e David Mays' s treatmen t o f Caton an d hi s version o f the las t two opinions , bot h writte n b y Edmund Pendleton . 13. Kirtland , George Wythe, 252-62 ; Commonwealth v. Posey, 8 Va. (4 Call) 109,122 (Va . Ct. App. 1787) ; William R. Casto, The Supreme Court in the Early Republic: The Chief Justiceships of John Jay and Oliver Ellsworth (1995) , p . 3 ("When th e Cour t wa s created , virtuall y al l America n attorney s wer e natura l lawyers who believe d tha t judge s did no t an d shoul d no t resor t t o consideration s of polic y i n adjudicatin g cases . They believe d tha t la w wa s a comprehensive an d systematic bod y o f principle s base d upo n divin e wisdo m an d th e perfectio n o f human reason.") . To Blair, a s to man y o f hi s Virginia contemporaries , "th e peo ple" wer e thos e whit e male s o f sufficien t propert y an d standin g t o represen t th e community a s a whole . 14. Commonwealth v. Caton, 8 Va. ( 4 Call ) 5 , 8 (Va. Ct. App. 1782 ) (sourc e for Wythe's words); "Pendleton's Account o f the 'Case of the Prisoners'," Pendleton Papers 2:426 (sourc e for Blair's words); Mays, Pendleton 2:187-200 ; William Michael Treanor, "The Case of the Prisoners an d the Origins of Judicial Review, " University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 143:529-3 7 (1994) . 15. Roeber , Faithful Magistrates, 153-208 , 216-17 , 220 , esp . 172-73 , 176 , 189, 195-200 ; Cullen , St. George Tucker, 31-35 , 71-82 ; Mays , Pendleton 2:151-52, 273-75; Emory G. Evans, "Private Indebtedness an d the Revolution i n Virginia, 177 6 t o 1796, " W&MQ(3d), 28:349-71 , esp. 361-6 3 (1971) ; Peter J . Coleman, Debtors and Creditors in America: Insolvency, Imprisonment for Debt, and Bankruptcy, 1607-1900 (1974) , pp . 115 , 200-201 ; Norma n K . Risjord , Chesapeake Politics, 1781-1800 (1978) , pp. 160-66 , 174-79 ; John Marshal l t o Charles Simms , Jun e 16 , 1784 , Marshall Papers 1:124 ; "Remonstranc e o f th e Judges," Pendleton Papers 2:507-8 . Th e count y court s reopene d i n 177 8 onl y after Britis h creditor s wer e disable d fro m suin g i n them . Selby , Revolution, 148 , 155-56. 16. "Resignatio n o f th e Judges," Pendleton Papers 2:553 , 554. I n Rhod e Is land i n 1786 , judges favorin g judicia l revie w ha d bee n summone d t o appea r be fore the legislature, and four o f the five were replaced. Treanor, "Origins, " p. 558. The Court of Appeals established i n 178 9 was the first functioning moder n ap pellate court—compose d entirel y o f lawyers , having member s no t servin g i n an y other branc h o f government, withou t tria l jurisdiction, an d no t sharin g its judges with an y othe r court . Se e Wilfred J . Ritz , Rewriting the History of the Judiciary Act of 1789: Exposing Myths, Challenging Premises, and Using New Evidence (1990), pp. 27-46, esp. 43-44.

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17. "Pendleton' s Accoun t o f th e 'Cas e o f th e Prisoners,' " Pendleton Papers 2:422 (Pendleto n worried abou t how far a reviewing court might go "withou t ex ercising th e powe r o f legislation") ; "Remonstranc e o f th e Judges, " ibid . 2:50 8 (the judges were "withi n th e line of their duty , declaring what th e law is, and no t making a new law"); H. Jefferson Powell , "Th e Political Gramma r o f Early Con stitutional Law, " North Carolina Law Review, 71:996-97 , 1006- 8 (1993 ) (dis cussing th e contemporar y differenc e betwee n judicia l "judgment " an d politica l "will"); Treanor, "Origins, " pp. 538-40, 559-63 (judicia l revie w uncontroversia l in Virginia). See also William R. Casto , "Jame s Iredell and the Origin s of Judicial Review," Connecticut Law Review, 27:329-6 3 (1995) . 18. Charlott e Balfou r t o [Eliz a Whiting], November 10,1789 , in Blair, Banister, Braxton, Horner 8 c Whiting Papers, ViWC; George Washington to John Blair , September 30 , 1789 , Blair to Washington, Octobe r 13 , 1789, both i n Documentary History 1:58 . Th e phras e "Nationa l Securit y Court " i n th e subtitl e i s fro m Casto, Supreme Court, 7 1 et passim . 19. Israel , "Blair, " pp . 110-11 ; James Monro e t o Thoma s Jefferson, Jul y 12 , 1788, Jefferson Papers 13:352 ; William Pierce, "Characte r Sketche s of Delegate s to th e Federa l Convention, " i n Ma x Farrand , ed. , The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 (rev . ed., 4 vols., 196 6 [orig . pub. 1911 , 1937]), 3:95 . Pierce als o describe d Blai r a s "on e o f th e mos t respectabl e Me n i n Virginia , both o n accoun t o f hi s Famil y a s wel l a s fortune. " Onl y seve n othe r Constitu tional Conventio n delegate s wer e note d b y Pierc e fo r thei r wealth , an d onl y Charles Cotesworth Pinckne y of South Carolin a wa s also given the high accolad e of bein g great i n bot h famil y an d fortune . 20. Suppor t fo r thi s an d th e succeedin g thre e paragraph s ma y b e foun d i n Wythe Holt , " T o Establis h Justice' : Politics , th e Judiciary Ac t o f 1789 , an d th e Invention o f th e Federa l Courts , 198 9 Duke Law Journal, 1421-1531 , an d Casto, Supreme Court, 4-53 . For th e importanc e o f priz e an d priz e jurisdiction , see William R . Casto , "Th e Origin s o f Federa l Admiralt y Jurisdictio n i n a n Ag e of Privateers , Smugglers , an d Pirates, " American Journal of Legal History, 37:117-57 (1993) . Fo r th e origi n o f diversit y jurisdiction , se e Wyth e Hol t &C James R . Perry , "Writ s an d Rights , flashing s an d animosities' : Th e Firs t Con frontation betwee n Federa l an d Stat e Jurisdictions, " Law and History Review, 7:89-120 (1989) . For Shays' s Rebellion, see David P . Szatmary, Shays' Rebellion: The Making of an Agrarian Insurrection (1980) . 21. Als o importan t i n diffusin g oppositio n wa s th e Bil l of Rights , which wa s developed i n Congres s concomitantl y wit h th e Judiciary Act . Se e Ritz, Judiciary Act, 19-21 ; Holt , " T o Establis h Justice,'" pp . 1513-15 . 22. Th e best history of the Court i n this period i s Stewart Jay, "Most Humbl e Servants: The Advisor y Rol e o f Earl y Federa l Judges" (unpublishe d manuscript , May 1995 , in my possession), which emphasize s the intensely political role of th e judges and gives in detail the fluid and confusing constellatio n of political tension s

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and pressure s constitutin g wha t I hav e her e calle d th e "tightrope " the y ha d t o walk. (Jay's manuscript wa s published i n 199 7 by Yale University Press.) Se e also William R . Casto , "Olive r Ellsworth : ' I have sought th e felicity an d glor y of you r Administration,'" i n thi s volume ; Wythe Holt , "'Th e Federa l Court s Hav e Ene mies i n Al l Wh o Fea r Thei r Influenc e o n Stat e Objects' : Th e Failur e t o Abolis h Supreme Cour t Circuit-Ridin g i n the Judiciary Act s of 179 2 an d 1793, " Buffalo Law Review, 36:306- 8 (1987) ; Ralp h Lerner , "Th e Suprem e Cour t a s Republi can Schoolmaster, " 196 7 Supreme Court Review, pp . 127-80 . 23. Pendleton' s mov e can b e precisely date d t o th e announcemen t tha t state s could b e sue d i n federa l court , i n Chisholm v. Georgia, i n 1793 . Se e Edmun d Pendleton to Nathaniel Pendleton, August 10,1793 , Documentary History 5:23 2 (the opinion s o f Jay an d Wilso n ar e "ver y reprehensibl e a s tendin g t o prov e th e Fedral to b e a consolodated Governmen t fo r al l America, 8 c to Anihilate those of the States— a Principle , which , i f established , woul d mak e tha t Constitutio n a s great a curse a s I have hitherto though t i t a blessing") . 24. Fo r Blair' s investment , se e the stor y i n not e 3 1 below . This connectio n i s part o f m y ow n deb t t o Forres t McDonald . Se e McDonald, We the People: The Economic Origins of the Constitution (1958) , pp. 38-92 , esp. 74, 90 . 25. Hol t &C Perry, "Writ s and Rights " (firs t quot e is from p . 103 ; explanation of th e contemporar y meanin g o f certiorar i o n pp . 102-3) ; John Blai r t o Jame s Wilson, Februar y 2 , 1791 , Documentary History 2:126-2 9 (quote s ar e from pp . 128 and 129) ; John Sitgreave s to James Iredell, August 2,1791, ibid. 2:196; Jones v. Syme, Waterman v. Syme (C.C.D.Va . 1791 ) (Wilson , J.), Orde r Boo k [fo r th e Circuit Cour t fo r th e Distric t o f Virginia] , 1790-95 , Federa l Cour t Records , Vi; Richard Hanso n t o Willia m Jones , Ma y 1 4 8 c 30 , 1791 , Bo x 6 , Treasur y 79 , PRO; Stead v. Powell (C.C.D.Ga . 1791 ) (Iredell , J.), Minute Book [fo r the Circui t Court fo r th e Distric t o f Georgia] , 1790-93 , RG 2 1 , National Archive s Record s Administration, Eas t Point , Georgia . The regula r proces s unde r th e Judiciary Ac t o f 178 9 fo r takin g a case fro m a state cour t int o federa l cour t wa s "removal " unde r sectio n 12 , but , i n anothe r shrewd concessio n t o Anti-Federalists , th e righ t o f remova l ha d bee n limite d t o defendants. Britis h creditor s woul d hav e bee n plaintiff s i n th e stat e cour t deb t cases lying on th e book s fo r s o many years , so this provision i n effect mad e non retroactive th e jurisdictio n th e Constitutio n an d th e peac e treat y gav e t o federa l courts ove r Britis h debts . Hol t &c Perry , "Writ s an d Rights, " p . 100 ; Holt, " T o Establish Justice,' " pp . 1487-88 . Th e extraordinar y wri t o f certiorari , then , should als o have bee n unavailabl e t o transfe r pre-178 9 cases . 26. West v. Barnes, Federal Gazette and Philadelphia Advertiser, Augus t 1 1 &C 12 , 179 1 (U.S. , Augus t 3 , 1791) ; Barnes v. West (C.C.D.R.I . 1791) , Fina l Record Book , 1790-94 , R G 2 1 , NARA , Waltham , Massachusetts ; ibid . (C.C.D.R.I. 1792)(retrial of same case); Providence Gazette and Country Journal, June 16 , 179 2 (givin g dispositio n upo n retrial) ; James Iredel l t o Georg e Wash -

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ington, February 23,1792, Documentary History 2:239-4 1 (describin g West an d the troubles i t did no t solve ; requesting legislativ e relief) . Ther e doe s not see m t o have bee n a decision o n th e constitutionality o f th e tende r law , which expire d i n October 1789 ; but , a t th e sam e Jun e 179 2 term , i n Champion & Dickason v. Casey (C.CD.R.I . 1792) , Final Recor d Book , John Jay, Justice William Cushing , and th e distric t judg e unanimousl y hel d unconstitutiona l a three-year sta y o n re payment o f a debt granted specificall y b y the legislature t o Casey , on ground tha t it "impairjed ] th e Obligatio n o f th e Contrac t i n Question, " seemingl y a s volatil e an issu e a s tha t o f th e tende r law . [Boston ] Columbian Centinel, Jun e 20 , 1792 . Congress correcte d th e proble m underlyin g West v. Barnes i n th e Proces s an d Compensation Ac t o f Ma y 8 , 1792 , b y permittin g circui t cour t clerk s t o "issu e writs o f erro r . . . returnable t o th e Suprem e Court. " Se e Documentary History 4:180, 18 5 (sectio n 9) , 19 5 (sectio n 1) . 27. A much mor e detaile d histor y o f th e circuit-ridin g controvers y discusse d in this and th e next three paragraphs, plus citations to all the statutes mentioned , may b e foun d i n Holt , "'Th e Federa l Court s Hav e Enemies.' " Se e John Blai r t o John Jay, August [5] , 1790, Documentary History 2:8 3 (sourc e of the quote; contains Blair' s summar y o f th e Court' s Augus t 179 0 discussion , an d Blair' s addi tional suggestion) ; Justices o f the Supreme Cour t t o Georg e Washington, ca. September 13 , 1790, ibid., 2:89-9 1 (draf t writte n b y Jay an d containin g Jay's argu ments, circulated t o th e othe r justices , but never sent) . Of course , i t wa s als o dangerou s t o trave l t o Philadelphi a fo r th e semiannua l sessions of the Supreme Court. On his way in the summer o f 179 4 Blair's carriage "got overset six miles the other side of Dumfries" an d he "ree d a slight cut on the forehead 6 c bruise d hi s hea d jus t abov e th e temple . Y. e headach followe d fo r a short time ,& C a smal l degre e o f stupo r laste d somewha t longer. " Mar y [Blai r Braxton Burwell ] Prescott t o [Eliz a Whiting,] August 24 , 1794 , in Blair, Banister , Braxton, Horner , S c Whitin g Papers , ViWC . Th e whale-proportione d Samue l Chase nearl y drowned , an d ha d t o b e haule d ou t o f th e freezin g water s o f th e Susquehanna b y three men , when h e brok e throug h "Ic e tha t ha d bee n tried an d would bea r a Waggon an d horses" befor e sunris e on his way to Cour t i n the win ter o f 1800 . Samue l Chas e t o Hanna h Chase , Februar y 4 , 1800 , Documentary History 1:888-89 . 28. Wyth e Holt , "'Federa l Court s a s th e Asylu m t o Federa l Interests' : Ran dolph's Report , the Benson Amendment, an d th e 'Origina l Understanding ' o f th e Federal Judiciary, " Buff. L. Rev., 36:341-7 2 (1987) ; James Iredel l t o Joh n Jay , William Cushing , 8 c James Wilson , Februar y 11 , 1791 , Documentary History 2:132; John Blai r to James Iredell , July 25, 1791 , ibid., 2:196; John Jay to Jame s Iredell, March 16 , 1791 , ibid., 2:154 (note s Blair' s consenting t o tak e th e South ern Circuit) ; "Lette r Fro m a n Anonymou s Correspondent, " [Boston ] Independent Chronicle, Marc h 3 , 1791 , ibid., 5:20-2 1 (criticizin g state-defendan t juris diction); Jame s Sullivan , "Observation s upo n th e Governmen t o f th e Unite d

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States o f America " (Jul y 7 , 1791) , ibid., 5:21-3 2 (same) ; " A Citizen, " [Philadel phia] Dunlap's American Daily Advertiser •, Decembe r 20 , 179 1 (dateline d No vember 19 , 1791) , ibid. , 4:565-66 (criticizin g federa l crimina l jurisdictio n an d the possibilit y o f a jur y tria l fo r a Pittsburg h defendan t bein g hel d a t Philadel phia). 29. Roge r Sherma n t o Simeo n Baldwin , January 2 , 1792 , Documentary History 4:57 4 (sourc e of quote); William Richardson Davie to James Iredell, May 25, 1792, ibid. , 2:278-7 9 (" I congratulat e yo u o n th e interpositio n o f Congres s i n your behalf agains t the tyranny and injustice o f your brothers of the bench,"); Justices of th e Suprem e Cour t t o th e Congres s o f th e United States , August 9 , 1792 , ibid., 2:289-90 ; Justice s o f th e Suprem e Cour t t o th e Congres s o f th e Unite d States, Februar y 18 , 1794 , ibid. , 2:443-44 ; Joh n Blai r t o James Iredell , Septem ber 14 , 1795 , ibid., 3:6 8 (" I a m utterl y a t a los s t o conceiv e wh y tha t cours e o f duty [fal l 179 5 circuits ] shoul d hav e bee n assigne d t o eithe r o f us , when bot h o f us had take n a tour i n the spring,. . . besides [my ] having had th e Middle Circui t in the fal l [o f 1794].") . 30. Se e Holt, " T o Establis h Justice,'" pp. 1432-35 6 c nn.33, 36, 6c 41,1438, 1443-44 6 c n.78 , 1448-49 , 1461 , 1469-7 0 6 c n.179 , 1476-77 , 1487-8 8 6 c nn.233 6 c 234. Whe n th e Virgini a court s wer e shut , tota l colonia l indebtednes s to Great Britain exceeded five million pounds; about two-thirds came from belo w the Mason-Dixo n Line , and Virgini a alon e accounte d fo r mor e tha n tw o millio n pounds. Emor y G . Evans , "Plante r Indebtednes s an d th e Comin g o f th e Revolu tion i n Virginia," W&MQ(3d), 19:51 1 (1962) . A dollar wa s wort h abou t three tenths o f a pound i n 1790 . 31. Marshall Papers 5:259-9 4 (firs t quot e i s fro m p . 262) ; Willia m Wirt , Sketches of the Life and Character of Patrick Henry (9t h ed., 1845) , pp. 329-86 ; Alex[ande]r McCau l t o James Ritchie , Februar y 1 , 1792 , vol. 14 , Foreign Offic e 4, PR O (sourc e o f nex t tw o quotes) ; Richard Hanso n t o Willia m Jones, Januar y 29, 1792 , Clas s 30 , T79, PR O ("Mr . Blai r . . . thought himsel f intereste d i n th e payments into the Loan Offic e an d refused t o sit as Judge"); John Blair to William Cushing, June 12 , 1795, Documentary History 1:75 7 (i f Ware v. Hylton "shoul d be brought o n in August, I ought to remind you, that I have all along declined sit ing i n tha t cause") ; Henr y Glassfor d t o Willia m Molleson , Februar y 1 , 1792 , James Ritchie to William Molleson, February 1 , 1792 (sourc e of last quote), bot h in vol. 14 , F04, PRO . Blair was intereste d i n th e suit . On e o f th e "impediments " charge d b y th e plaintiff wa s th e 177 9 Virgini a la w tha t allowe d debtor s t o Britis h creditor s t o discharge their debts by payment, in depreciated Virginia currency, into the state' s Loan Office. I n 1779-178 1 Blair had made seventeen payments into the Loan Of fice, totalin g nearl y seve n thousan d pound s Virgini a pape r currency , t o cance l debts o f abou t 85 0 pound s sterling . RG4 8 (Registe r o f Loa n Certificates , 1777-1801), Vi . ( I am indebte d t o Bren t Tarte r fo r thi s information. ) Virginian s

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excused Blair' s nonattendance o n ground s o f hi s son' s death , see , e.g., [Secretar y of State ] Thoma s Jefferso n t o [Britis h Minister ] Georg e Hammond , Ma y 29 , 1792, Jefferson Papers 23:584 , bu t th e ver y sickl y Jimmy Blai r die d o n Octobe r 25, 1791 , see Gentr y 6 c Tarter, "Blai r Family, " p . 109 , while Blai r di d no t leav e court unti l a month later . In vivi d contras t t o Blair , James Wilson apparentl y gav e no though t t o recus ing himsel f i n Chisholm v. Georgia eve n thoug h h e wa s a name d plaintif f i n Hollingsworth v. Virginia. Sinc e th e latte r sui t wa s als o brough t unde r th e Supreme Court' s origina l jurisdiction ove r state-defendant litigation , the decisio n in Chisholm "wa s determinativ e o f th e Court' s jurisdiction " i n Hollingsworth. Casto, Supreme Court 195 . 32. Wane v. Daniel L. Hylton & Co. (C.C.D.Va . 1793) , Orde r Book , 1790-95, Federa l Cour t Records , Vi ; Richar d Hanso n t o Joh n Tyndal l Warre , June 23 , 1794 , Clas s 30 , T79 , PR O ("ha d bu t tw o Judgments, on e . . . withou t allowing an y interest , th e othe r . . . wit h Interes t fro m 7.t h Jul y 1782") ; Joh n Hamilton t o Lor d Grenville , November 29 , 179 4 ("severa l Judgements obtaine d for Britis h debts , bu t wit h th e Deductio n o f Eigh t year s Interest , thi s proceed s from th e Verdict give n b y the Jury t o whic h th e Judges d o not giv e their assent" ) and Andrew Ronald to John Hamilton, December 17,179 3 ("th e Juries, notwithstanding th e decisio n o f th e Cour t [Willia m Paterso n an d Cyru s Griffin ] tha t th e Plaintiffs wer e intitle d t o ful l an d unceasin g interest , mad e i t a unifor m rule , t o deduct 8 years interest") , bot h i n vol . 6 , F05 , PRO; Guls v. Murchie (C.C.D.Va . 1794), Orde r Book , 1790-95 , Federa l Cour t Records , V i (Blai r order s interes t from Ma y 7 , 1776) ; Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. (3 Dallas) 1 , 4-5 (1794 ) (unan imous jury instructions give n b y Jay, C.J.); Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dallas) 19 9 (1796). It was commonl y hel d tha t th e wa r ha d laste d fro m Apri l 177 5 t o Apri l 1783. Blair, sitting upon wha t was to b e his last circuit court i n Georgia i n the sprin g of 1795 , ha d onc e agai n t o recus e himsel f fro m al l Britis h deb t case s becaus e Georgia ha d a law like the one in Virginia stil l on appeal. John Hamilto n t o Lor d Grenville, June 20 , 1795 , Class 11 , F05, PRO. 33. Jame s Iredel l t o Georg e Washington , Februar y 23 , 1792 , Documentary History 2:24 1 (explain s hi s action s o n circuit) ; Juliu s Goebel , History of the Supreme Court of the United States: Antecedents and Beginnings to 1801 (1971) , pp. 742-47 . 34. 2 U.S. (2 Dallas) 402-9 , esp. 406-7 (opinio n o f Blair) , 408-9 (opinio n o f Jay)(1793). Commenting upo n th e decision, Edmund Randolp h (th e losing coun sel) was quite critical of three members o f the majority, an d o f the Court' s lack of familiarity wit h equity . He complaine d tha t Justice James Wilson "know s no t a n iota o f equity, " tha t Chie f Justic e Jay , whos e approac h t o th e la w "ha d n o method, n o lega l principle , n o syste m o f reasoning, " wa s "aim[ing ] a t th e culti vation o f Souther n popularity, " an d tha t th e member s o f th e Cour t i n genera l

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would "tak e a score of years to settle . .. a regular course of Chancery." Randolp h also criticized Iredell , who had denie d Georgi a acces s below bu t vote d with Blai r in the Supreme Court, but leveled no charges at Blair. Edmund Randolph to James Madison, Augus t 12 , 1792 , Madison Papers 14:348-49 . 35. 2 U.S. (2 Dallas) 417-1 8 (opinio n o f Blair) , 418-19 (opinio n o f Jay). Th e writ ne exeat forbad e a perso n fro m leavin g th e jurisdiction , and , a s Attorne y General Edmun d Randolp h ha d explaine d t o Congres s i n his report o n th e stat e of th e federa l judiciar y i n Decembe r 1790 , judicial powe r t o issu e suc h wa s nec essary i f a "prope r plan " wa s t o "b e devised " t o fill out th e detail s o f federa l eq uity jurisdiction. Sectio n 1 4 of th e Judiciary Ac t o f 178 9 ha d authorize d th e fed eral courts to issu e "al l othe r Writ s not speciall y provided fo r b y Statute," bu t ne exeat ha d nowher e bee n mentioned . Thu s i t wa s doubtfu l i n Februar y 179 3 whether suc h a writ could be issued. Spurred perhaps by Blair's concerns in Brailsford^ Congress in section 5 of the Judiciary Act of March 2 , 1793 , authorized sin gle justices o f th e Suprem e Cour t t o issu e writ s ne exeat. Se e Documentary History 4:16 2 n. 7 (Randolph' s Report o f Decembe r 31 , 1790), 71 (sectio n 1 4 of th e Judiciary Ac t o f 1789) , 20 5 (sectio n 5 o f th e Judiciary Ac t o f 1793) , 202 n. 8 &C accompanying tex t (explanatio n o f ne exeat). 36. Th e facts i n this and the succeeding two paragraphs hav e been taken fro m L. Kinvi n Wrot h e t al. , eds. , The Legal Papers of John Adams ( 2 vols. , 1965 ) (cited hereafter a s Adams Papers), 2:352-95 ; Henry Bourguignon , The First Federal Court: The Federal Appellate Prize Court of the American Revolution, 1775-1787 (1977) , pp. 242-52, 307-18 . 37. Adams Papers 2:35 5 (sourc e o f first quote) ; Bourguignon , First Court, 242 (sourc e o f secon d quote) . 38. Penhallow v. Doane, 3 U.S. (3 Dallas) 109-1 3 (1795 ) (Blair' s opinio n o n circuit, embedde d i n hi s Suprem e Cour t opinion) ; ibid. , 108-9 , 113-1 6 (Blair' s Supreme Court opinion); ibid., 80-91 (opinio n of Paterson, J., agreeing with Blai r and arguin g i n additio n tha t th e state s wer e neve r individuall y sovereign) ; ibid. , 91-108, 116-2 0 (opinion s o f Iredell , J., an d Cushing , J., agreein g wit h Blai r bu t disagreeing vehementl y wit h Paterson' s additiona l argument) . Interestingly, Blair , whose vot e was neede d t o mak e a majority o f th e six-per son Cour t (reduce d t o fou r i n thi s instanc e wit h Ja y i n England , negotiatin g a fresh treaty , an d Wilso n recuse d becaus e h e ha d represente d Doan e befor e th e Confederation court : Documentary History 1:23 1 n.16 0 6c 1:236 n.175) , did no t mention the difficulty o f his having already heard an d decided the case once, even though, whe n th e judges were contemplating a strong protest abou t thei r circuit riding dutie s i n 1790 , h e ha d writte n tha t i t wa s "liabl e t o objection , tha t me n who hav e decide d a cause i n on e court , shoul d determin e i t agai n i n a n appella tive capacity." John Blai r t o John Jay, August [5] , 1790, ibid., 2:84 . 39. Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dallas) 409 , 410-14n (1792 ) (not e containin g the opinion s o f Jay, Cushing , an d th e distric t judg e o f Ne w York ; Wilson , Blair ,

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and Peters ; and Iredel l an d th e distric t judg e o f Nort h Carolina , issue d a s letter s dated respectivel y Apri l 5 , April 18 , and June 8 , 1792) ; Opinion o f Justice Johnson and District Judge Bee, October 26,1792, Minute Book [fo r the Circuit Cour t for th e District o f Sout h Carolina] , RG 2 1, NARA, Eas t Point, Georgi a (Johnso n did no t rid e circui t i n the sprin g o f 1792) ; Maeva Marcu s 8c " Robert Teir , "Hayburn's Case: A Misinterpretatio n o f Precedent, " 198 8 Wisconsin Law Review, 527-46; Charle s Warren , The Supreme Court in United States History ( 2 vols. , rev. ed., 1926) , 1:69-8 2 (note s holdin g o f unconstitutionality ; detail s th e gleefu l responses o f Anti-Federalist s t o Hayburn)-, Edmun d Randolp h t o Georg e Wash ington, Apri l 5 , 1792 , Georg e Washingto n Papers , Librar y o f Congres s (Wilso n in chanc e meetin g wit h Randolp h declare d tha t h e an d Blai r bot h doubte d th e law's constitutionality) ; James Madiso n t o Henr y Lee , April 15 , 1792 , Madison Papers 14:28 8 (th e Pennsylvania federa l judge s had pronounce d th e law "uncon stitutional an d void") . The distric t judg e o f Vermon t late r joine d Ja y an d Cush ing t o repea t (verbatim ) th e declaratio n the y ha d previousl y mad e i n New York . See Opinio n o f Joh n Jay , Willia m Cushing , an d Nathanie l Chipman , Jun e 18 , 1792, file d wit h 180 3 cas e files o f Vermon t Circui t Court , R G 2 1 , NARA , Waltham, Massachusetts . 40. 2 U.S. (2 Dallas) a t 41 In; James Iredel l to Hannah Iredell , September 30 , 1792, Documentary History 2:30 1 (" I hav e reconcile d mysel f t o th e propriet y of doin g th e Invalid-busines s ou t o f Court . Judge Wilson altogether declines it."). Th e record s o f th e claim s o f th e invalid s indicat e tha t ver y fe w wer e hear d from th e Middl e Circui t court s attende d b y Blai r i n th e sprin g o f 1792 , an d al l of thos e ar e withou t dat e an d s o ar e consisten t wit h thei r havin g bee n handle d by Cushin g whe n h e rod e th e Middl e Circui t i n fal l 1792 . Se e American State Papers: Claims (3 8 vols. , 1854) , 1:56-68 , 107-2 2 (complet e recor d o f claim s filed befor e th e circui t judge s actin g a s commissioner s i n 1792 ; non e ar e certi fied b y Blair o r Wilson ; claim s fro m Virgini a an d Marylan d circuit s ar e withou t date). 41. Warren , Supreme Court 73-76 ; Fisher Ames to Thomas Dwight, April 25, 1792, in Seth Ames et al., eds., Works of Fisher Ames ( 2 vols., 1983), 2:942; Warren, Supreme Court 64-68 ; Holt, "'Th e Federa l Court s Hav e Enemies,' " p . 32 3 nn. 88-8 9 & ; accompanying text . 42. O f course , in Marbury onl y on e sid e argued th e cause . 43. 2 U.S. (2 Dallas) 414 n; Edmund Randolp h to James Madison, August 12 , 1792, Madison Papers 12:258 ; [Philadelphia] Federal Gazette, Augus t 18 , 1792 ; Marcus Sc Tier, "Hayburn's Case" 534-4 0 (quot e i s from p . 538) . After th e ti e vote, Randolp h argue d fo r mandamu s o n behal f o f Hayburn , wh o wa s present . The judges, not wanting to embarrass their Federalist administration furthe r wit h another holdin g of unconstitutionality, too k th e case under advisemen t unti l February, giving Congress another chanc e to act. Congress repealed th e 179 2 act an d gave the abusiv e dutie s to th e distric t judges .

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44. Mays , Pendleton 2:193-94 ; Georg e Morga n t o Alexande r McKee , Feb ruary [20] , 1793, Documentary History 5:222 ("N o counse l appearin g o n behal f of the State, the Bench expressed a desire to the Gentlemen o f the Bar, that o f an y of the m hel d th e negativ e o f th e question , the y woul d speak ; an d tha t th e Benc h would b e gla d t o hea r the m upo n it . Non e offering , th e Chie f Justice , afte r a proper pause , expressed a wish an d offe r o f whatever tim e should b e required b y any gentleman t o prepare himself, but this was also declined."). Interestingly, Ed mund Randolp h appeare d i n al l three cases , in Caton a s attorne y genera l o f Vir ginia, an d i n Chisholm a s private counse l fo r Chisholm . 45. O n the concept of natural la w as described i n this paragraph, se e Michael Lobban, The Common Law and English Jurisprudence 1760-185 0 (1991) ; A. W. B. Simpson, "Th e Common La w and Legal Theory," i n Simpson, ed., Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence (2 d ser. , 1973) , pp. 77-99 ; Wythe Holt , "Positivis m Over come: Natural La w i n the 1790s " (unpublishe d paper , 1994 , in my possession) . Natural lawyers of the 1790 s had bee n reared i n an openly classed society, and most viewed "th e community" whic h accorde d authorit y t o lega l opinion fro m a class standpoint. Positivists today usually deny class but hedge against lower-clas s participation i n government throug h thei r authoritarianism . 46. Marcu s & Teir , "Hayburn's Case," 540-41 ; Susa n Lo w Bloc h &c Maev a Marcus, "Joh n Marshall's Selectiv e Use of History in Marbury v. Madison," 198 6 Wise. L. Rev., 306-10 , 31 6 S t n.56 ; W. J. Ritz , "Unite d State s v. Yale Todd (U.S . 1794)," Washington & Lee Law Review, 15:220-3 1 (1958) . 47. Th e cas e i s thoroughl y treate d i n Documentary History 5:127-273 . Se e also Holt, " T o Establis h Justice,'" pp. 1464 nn.161-62,1466 n.170,148 6 n.228 , & 1495-9 6 n.258 . The opinion s ar e i n 2 U.S. (2 Dallas) 427-7 9 (1793) . 48. 2 U.S. (2 Dallas) 453-6 6 (opinio n o f Wilson), 469-79 (opinio n o f Jay). 49. 2 U.S. (2 Dallas) 450-5 3 (1793)(Blair' s opinion) ; [Philadelphia ] Dunlap's Daily American Advertiser, Februar y 18 , 1793, Documentary History 5:21 9 (re porting wha t eac h judg e ha d said : "O n th e whol e h e [Blair ] wa s clearl y an d de cidedly in favour o f the" jurisdiction); Shearjashub Bourn e to Robert Treat Paine , February 19 , 179 3 ibid. , 5:22 0 ("th e Chie f Justice , J.s Cushing , Wilso n & Blai r clearly an d decidedl y i n favour o f it") . 50. Documentary History 5:597-638 ; Casto , Supreme Court, 197-212 . 51. Th e neutralit y crisi s is covered abl y i n Casto , Supreme Court, 72-80 ; th e quote nea r th e end o f the next paragrap h i s from p . 77. My understandin g o f th e Court's rejectio n o f th e president' s reques t ha s bee n greatl y informe d b y Jay , "Most Humbl e Servants, " especiall y pp . 170-93 . 52. Joh n Jay , James Wilson , John Blair , James Iredel l & Willia m Paterso n t o George Washington , Augus t 8 , 1793 , i n Henr y Johnston , ed. , Correspondence and Public Papers of John Jay ( 4 vols. , 1891) , 3:488 ; Stewar t Jay , "Servant s o f Kings and Lords : The Advisory Rol e of Earl y English Judges," Am. J. Leg. Hist., 38:117-96 (1994) . For John Jay's quasi-cabinet statu s an d hi s advisory opinions ,

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see Jay, "Most Humble Servants," pp. 69-92,114; Casto, Supreme Court, 72-75. Casto als o details advisor y opinion s b y many o f th e othe r justices . 53. Fo r the preference o f Jay and Hamilto n fo r executiv e power, especially i n foreign affairs , se e Jay, "Mos t Humbl e Servants, " pp. 60-61, 72, 175-76; fo r th e preferences o f Jefferson an d the collision of personality and principle between Jefferson an d Hamilton , se e ibid. , 58-64 , 66, 173 , 176-77 ; fo r th e institutio n o f suits ove r th e Frenc h prizes , see ibid., 133-38 ; and fo r gran d jur y charge s o f Ja y to th e Virginia Circui t o n Ma y 22 , and o f Wilson t o th e Pennsylvani a Circui t o n June 22, both of which spoke to many of the questions Jefferson woul d put to the judges i n late July, see ibid., 131 , 147-49. 54. Se e generally Doroth y E . Fennell , "Fro m Rebelliousnes s t o Insurrection : A Social History of the Whiskey Rebellion, 1765-1802 " (Ph.D . dissertation, University o f Pittsburgh , 1981) ; Thomas P . Slaughter, The Whiskey Rebellion: Frontier Epilogue to the American Revolution (1986) ; Richard A . Ifft, "Treaso n i n the Early Republic : The Federa l Courts , Popular Protest , an d Federalis m Durin g th e Whiskey Rebellion, " i n Steve n R . Boyd , ed. , The Whiskey Rebellion: Past and Present Perspectives (1985) , pp. 165-82 ; Appendices A & B , ibid., pp. 191-20 1 (list of persons charged b y federal court s in Whiskey Rebellion, nature of charges, and dispositio n o f charges) . 55. Joh n Blair , Gran d Jur y Charge , Octobe r 27 , 179 4 (C.C.D.Del.) , Documentary History 2:485-90 ; Joh n Blair , Gran d Jur y Charge , Apri l 27 , 179 5 (C.C.D.Ga.), ibid., 3:31-3 7 (quote s ar e from pp . 32, 34). 56. United States v. Hamilton, 3 U.S. (3 Dallas) 17-1 8 (1795) ; Documentary History 1:233-35 , 238 ; Fennell , "Insurrection, " pp . 58-59 , 93 , 143 , 149-51 , 161, 278-90 ; Boyd , Whiskey Rebellion, Appendice s A &c B. 57. Thoma s Jefferso n t o Phili p Mazzei , Apri l 5 , 1790 , Jefferson Papers 16:307 (diar y entr y o f Decembe r 3 , 1789 : "Calle d o n Mr . Blair i n Wmsburg. H e was very sick.") ; Documentary History 1:18 3 n.5 6 (Blai r too il l to atten d Febru ary 179 1 ter m o f Court) ; John Blai r t o Willia m Cushing , June 12 , 1795 , ibid. , 1:756-57 (sourc e o f firs t quote) ; John Blai r t o James Iredell , Octobe r 10 , 1795 , ibid., 1:82 0 (sourc e o f secon d quote) ; ibid. , 1:24 4 n.19 1 (Blai r to o il l t o atten d August 179 5 ter m o f Court) ; Joh n Blai r t o Georg e Washington , Octobe r 25 , 1795, ibid. , 1:59 . 58. Joh n Blai r t o [Mar y Blai r Braxto n Burwel l Prescott] , January 15 , 1796 , January 27 , 1796 , Augus t 15 , 1796 , al l i n Blair , Banister , Braxton , Horne r &c Whiting Papers , ViW C (mention s col d an d colic , bu t n o rattlin g i n th e head) ; Thomas Jefferson t o Philip Mazzei, January 7,1792 , Jefferson Papers 23:29; "A n Address b y Henry T . Wickham, Esq. , o f Virginia " (pamphlet , 1913) , p. 29, Faculty/Alumni Collection, Earl Gregg Swem Library, ViW; The [Richmond ] Virginia Argus, Februar y 29 , 1804 ; Gentr y & Tarter , "Blai r Family, " p . 108 ; Henr y Tazewell t o Jame s Madison , Octobe r 3 , 1796 , Madison Papers 16:407 ; Gran d Jury Presentment , Ma y 22 , 179 7 (C.C.D.Va.) , Documentary History 3:180 ;

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Henry Tazewell to [Joh n Page?], June 3,1797 , ibid. , 3:189; Peregrine Fitzhugh t o Thomas Jefferson, Jun e 20, 1797 , ibid., 3:201; John Blai r to [Mar y Blair Braxto n Burwell Prescott], July 5,1799, i n Blair, Banister, Braxton, Horner &c Whiting Papers; DAB, s.v. Joh n Blai r (1732-1800) , 1:338 . 59. [Swem, ] Boo k Review ; Willia m Plume r t o Jeremiah Smith , Februar y 19 , 1796, Documentary History 1:838 ; James Sullivan to William Bingham, Octobe r 20, 1793 , ibid., 3:428 . 60. Se e Edmund Pendleto n t o Nathaniel Pendleton , Februar y 3 , 1794, Documentary History 5:25 0 (compar e "th e Ch. f Justice 8c " Judge Wilson plainly foun d theirs o n a favorit e wis h t o Anihilat e th e Stat e Governments " wit h "[t]h e othe r Judges [i n Chisholm, i.e. , Blair] appear t o adher e to o litterall y t o Genera l words , which wil l indee d bea r th e meaning , bu t havin g a n Applicatio n without , ough t not to be extended to so important a case, in which, if meant to be comprehended , a mod e o f proceeding woul d surel y hav e bee n pointed out") . 61. Compar e Joh n Hamilto n t o Lor d Grenville , Apri l 4 , 1793 , Fil e 2 , F05 , PRO (criticizing Justice Johnson's "evasiona l maneuver" o f postponing the Nort h Carolina Circui t becaus e o f indisposition ) wit h Hamilto n t o Grenville , June 20 , 1795, File 11 , F05, PRO (n o criticism of Blair's refusing t o hear cases in which h e was interested) . 62. The [Richmond ] Virginia Argus, Februar y 29 , 1804 ; "Wickha m Ad dress," pp . 5-6, 29 .

Chapter 7

James Iredell Revolutionist, Constitutionalist, Jurist Willis P. Wbichard

George Washington was ambitious for th e federal judiciar y of the infant American republic. Its "first arrangement," he told Edmund Ran dolph, was "essential to the happiness of [the] country, and to the stability of its political system." 1 Consequently, he sought "th e first characters of the Union" fo r hi s initial judicial appointments. 2 Within tw o day s of enactment o f the Judiciary Act of 1789 , President Washington appointed , an d th e Senat e promptly confirmed , si x justices for the original United States Supreme Court. As the president had wished, all brought distinguished biographie s to the new nation's highest bench . Washington's searc h wa s not over , however; five days after confirmatio n Rober t Hanso n Harrison , a prominent Marylan d judge and Washington's comrade-in-arms i n the Revolution, decline d the appointment . H e ha d bee n designate d chancello r o f Maryland , and he preferred tha t position. Further, his health was fragile, the circuit travel requirements were unsatisfactory, an d Suprem e Cour t ser vice would interfer e wit h his private affairs. 3 The vacuu m thu s create d wa s momentary , fo r th e presiden t soo n named anothe r "firs t character, " Jame s Iredel l o f Nort h Carolina . Thirty-eight year s ol d whe n appointed , Iredel l remain s on e o f th e youngest persons ever to ascend the high bench. 4 There i s no evidence o f a prior relationshi p between th e presiden t and his youthful appointee . While Washington knew Iredell's brotherin-law, Samue l Johnston , the n a Unite d State s senato r fro m Nort h Carolina, h e rested th e selectio n o n th e ne w justice's reputatio n "fo r 198

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abilities, legal knowledge and respectability of character." That Nort h Carolina was "o f som e importance i n the Union" an d had "give n No character t o a federal office " wa s also a factor. 5 Iredell's origins made him an improbable candidat e for thi s augus t station, an d hi s presence there reflecte d th e relative egalitarianis m o f the American experiment . The rigid class structure o f his native England likel y would hav e precluded th e attainmen t o f simila r statu s b y this grandson o f an unremarkable clergyma n an d son of a failed mer chant. Family poverty had impelled his voyage to America in 176 8 a t the age of seventeen . Health problem s ha d force d hi s father's prema ture retiremen t fro m th e mercantil e business , and hi s mother's uncl e secured for the youth the post of comptroller o f customs in the northeastern North Carolin a villag e of Edenton. 6 Fortunately, the position left time for other pursuits—among them , the courtshi p an d marriag e o f Hanna h Johnston , siste r o f Samue l Johnston, Iredell's law teacher and probably Edenton's most respected and influentia l citizen. 7 Iredel l als o courte d learnin g durin g thes e years, patronizin g Johnston' s librar y wit h it s book s o n man y sub jects.8 While Iredell' s studie s wer e eclectic , th e la w clearl y ha d priority . Roscoe Poun d list s Iredel l amon g earl y American leader s wh o im planted i n the colonie s a legal tradition i n which th e Englis h Inn s of Court ha d traine d them. 9 N o evidenc e support s thi s thesis . Iredell' s formal lega l education appear s to have commenced in Edenton unde r Samuel Johnston's tutelage . He pursue d th e stud y intensely , beratin g himself whe n he strayed fro m contemplatin g Lyttleton' s Tenures into losing at billiards. 10 Once licensed , Iredel l entere d a muc h maligne d vocation . I t wa s "dangerous t o virtue, " hi s wealth y plante r uncl e tol d him , an d in cluded peopl e properl y calle d "pettifoggers " wh o wer e "ver y pick pockets [whose ] compan y an d exampl e carr y contagio n alon g wit h them."11 Th e craf t ha d interna l critic s a s well . Archibal d Maclaine , Iredell's professional contemporary , blame d a perverse public fo r en couraging th e "profligat e character[s ] a t th e bar " whil e "uniforml y [opposing] every man o f abilities and virtue." 12 Iredell's la w practic e involve d othe r hardships , mor e sever e tha n adverse public opinion. It required extensiv e travel, and travel conditions wer e harsh , weathe r ofte n inclement , an d accommodation s poor.13 Th e nomadic , ofte n solitar y existenc e produce d desolation ,

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and Iredell occasionally acknowledged outright homesickness. 14 Considerable overhea d wa s a furthe r by-product , an d indifferen t court s often produce d inadequat e revenues. 15 Still, Iredell clearl y enjoye d hi s work. H e reporte d himsel f alway s "greatly refreshed " afte r doin g business. 16 Hi s economi c complaint s notwithstanding, h e wa s successful , ultimatel y acquirin g mor e busi ness tha n h e coul d wel l handle 17 an d th e reputatio n o f a superio r lawyer—second, if to anyone in his region, only to his mentor, Samuel Johnston.18 The confiscatio n o f Tor y estate s i n Nort h Carolin a followin g th e Revolution spawne d th e most significant cas e in which Iredell participated a s counsel , on e tha t marke d a confluenc e o f hi s privat e an d public personas. Iredell was an avid supporter o f the American caus e in th e Revolution ; an d a s attorne y genera l unde r th e ne w stat e gov ernment, h e prosecute d treaso n an d disloyalt y case s (discusse d below). Th e excesse s o f th e Revolution' s aftermat h appalle d him , however, particularl y th e confiscatio n act s an d practices . He decrie d both th e injur y t o individual s an d th e violation s o f th e peac e treat y with Britain. The laws, he said, sacrificed "ever y principle o f decenc y and justice," and "n o consideration unde r heaven" would induce him to participat e i n their execution. 19 Accordingly , h e ofte n represente d Tory clients who were attempting to retain or regain their property; 20 as a consequence, he was, he said, "looke d upo n b y the patrons of violence with a hateful eye." 21 A 1785 North Carolin a statut e sought to protect purchasers of expropriated estate s an d thei r heir s an d assign s "fro m expensiv e an d vexatious lawsuits " brough t b y "th e obnoxiou s an d disqualifie d per sons" specifie d i n th e confiscatio n act s an d thos e claimin g throug h them. Titleholder s unde r lawfull y conducte d confiscatio n sale s wer e deemed "no t liabl e to answer " suc h suits ; courts were to dismis s th e actions upon the defendants' presentatio n o f motions or affidavits ac companied b y deeds from confiscatio n commissioner s showing prima facie title in the defendants. Seeking unmistakable clarity, the Genera l Assembly provide d tha t th e ac t applie d notwithstandin g "an y law , usage or custom to the contrary." 22 The 177 6 North Carolin a constitution establishe d the right to trial by jury in all controversies respecting property. This provision, it emphatically declared, "ough t to remain sacred and inviolable [and ] . . .

James Iredell 20 1 never . . . b e violate d o n an y pretens e whatever." 23 Th e palpabl e con trariety betwee n thi s directiv e an d th e ac t fo r quietin g confiscate d ti tles virtuall y assure d a clas h betwee n th e legislativ e an d judicia l branches o f th e fledglin g stat e government . I t cam e whe n Elizabet h Cornell Bayar d sough t t o recove r fro m Spyer s Singleton , th e pur chaser a t a confiscation sale , property he r father , a Britis h subjec t an d Loyalist, ha d deede d t o her. 24 Iredell's precis e rol e i n thi s momentou s cas e i s unclear. Ther e i s evidence tha t Iredel l an d othe r leadin g attorney s receive d retainer s fro m Singleton, ostensibl y t o represen t hi m bu t i n realit y apparentl y t o si lence them. 25 However , th e officia l repor t o f th e case lists Iredell, wit h Samuel Johnston an d Willia m R . Davie , a s counse l fo r Bayard. 26 I t i s clear tha t Iredel l wa s a n earl y an d cogen t advocat e o f judicia l revie w of legislative acts, the formidable issu e at stake ; the theory tha t hi s ap pearance ma y hav e bee n a s a "frien d o f th e court, " takin g Bayard' s side o f thi s question, 27 i s thus plausible . Four year s befor e Bayard, Iredel l define d a republi c a s a for m o f government i n whic h "th e la w i s superio r t o an y o r al l th e individu als, an d th e constitutio n superio r eve n t o th e legislature , and of which the judges are the guardians and protectors." 28 Whil e Bayard was pending , h e forcefull y amplifie d thi s analysi s i n a pseudonymou s letter addresse d "T O TH E PUBLIC " fro m "A N ELECTOR. " Th e problem, Iredel l posited , wa s ho w t o impos e restriction s o n th e leg islature t o guar d agains t th e abus e o f unlimite d power . Th e consti tution undoubtedl y limite d an d define d legislativ e power . I t wa s th e fundamental la w tha t th e legislatur e coul d no t repea l an d fro m which i t derive d al l it s power . An y ac t inconsisten t wit h th e consti tution thu s wa s voi d an d coul d no t b e obeye d withou t disobeyin g the superio r law . Th e judicia l power , Iredel l concluded , ha d author ity t o determin e whethe r a legislativ e ac t wa s warrante d b y th e con stitution; thi s resulte d inevitabl y fro m th e constitutio n an d th e judi cial office , th e judge s bein g servant s o f th e whol e people , no t jus t o f the Assembly. 29 The court , compose d o f th e state' s thre e superio r cour t judges , es sentially adopte d Iredell' s position . I n on e o f th e earl y America n case s on th e power o f judicial review , it held tha t th e confiscation act , bein g inconsistent wit h th e constitution , ha d n o effect. 30 Iredel l ha d sai d such a la w wa s "void , an d canno t b e obeyed." 31

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In Bayard's wake , Richar d Dobb s Spaight , a delegat e t o th e Philadelphia Constitutiona l Conventio n and a champion of legislative supremacy, continue d t o challeng e th e revie w concept . Iredel l re sponded, persisting in defending it as not only proper but inevitable. 32 Scholars have considered Iredell's analysis superior even to Alexander Hamilton's i n th e Federalist Papers, viewing i t a s th e clearest , mos t straightforward, an d integra l expositio n o f th e subjec t i n th e litera ture.33 A compariso n o f Joh n Marshall' s languag e i n Marbury v. Madison34 wit h Iredell's discourses strongly suggests that Marshall was fa miliar with, and drew upon, Iredell's musings on the subject. O n constitutions a s border s o f legislativ e power , Marshal l sai d i n Marbury: "The powers of the legislature are defined an d limited; and that thos e limits ma y no t b e mistaken , o r forgotten , th e constitutio n i s writ ten."35 Iredel l ha d writte n similarly , though mor e cryptically : "[T]h e power o f the Assembly is limited an d define d b y the Constitution." 36 On constitution s a s fundamenta l law , voidin g al l repugnan t edicts , Marshall declared in Marbury: "[W]ritte n constitutions . . . [form ] the fundamental an d paramoun t la w . . . , and, consequently , . . . a n ac t . . . repugnant t o th e constitutio n i s void." 37 Earlier , Iredel l ha d af firmed: "[T]he Constitutio n i s . . . the fundamental law , and unalter able b y the legislature . . . . For tha t reason , a n ac t o f Assembly , in consistent with the constitution, i s void."38 O n court s a s the final arbiters o f constitutionality , Marshal l scribe d i n Marbury: "I t i s emphatically th e province an d dut y o f the judicial department t o sa y what th e law is. . . . [T]he court mus t determin e whic h o f these con flicting rule s [constitutio n o r statute ] govern s th e case . This i s of th e very essenc e o f judicia l duty." 39 Iredel l ha d antedate d him , saying : "The judge s . . . must tak e car e . . . that ever y ac t o f Assembl y the y presume to enforce i s warranted b y the constitution. . . . This is not a usurped o r a discretionar y power , bu t on e inevitabl y resultin g fro m the constitution o f their office." 40 Iredell's pre-Suprem e Cour t publi c servic e sort s readil y int o thre e categories: he served hi s state an d communit y i n a variety o f capaci ties, he was the leading essayis t i n his region fo r th e American caus e in the Revolution, and he was the bellwether fo r th e Federalist force s in the North Carolin a effor t t o ratify th e federal Constitution .

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State Service Following adoptio n o f th e Nort h Carolin a constitutio n o f 1776 , Iredell serve d o n a commission t o conside r statute s formerl y i n forc e and t o recommen d t o th e next Genera l Assembl y fo r adoptio n thos e "consistent wit h th e genius o f a free people. " Th e assembl y adopte d most of the commission's proposals. 41 Iredell also drafted Nort h Car olina's first court bill and served as one of the state's first three judges. He resigne d t o resum e hi s la w practice , however , afte r completin g only one circuit. 42 His absenc e fro m publi c servic e wa s brief , fo r th e followin g year , 1779, Iredel l becam e th e state' s secon d attorne y general . I n tha t ca pacity, he traveled twic e annuall y th e sam e circuit h e had a s a jurist . The offic e functione d a s a single , statewid e distric t attorne y no w would, prosecutin g crimina l offender s i n th e superio r courts . A s noted, punishing significant politica l dissent was then deemed impor tant to the internal security of the newly independent state, and much of Iredell's work involve d prosecuting treason an d disloyalty cases. 43 Iredell repeatedly declined importunings toward legislativ e service, pleading irreconcilable conflicts with his law practice. He actively followed events in the state assembly, however, and counseled legislator s who share d hi s governmental goals , particularly fo r th e judicia l sys tem. H e wa s directl y involve d i n man y legislativ e matter s i n th e 1780s, and legislative enactments of the period reflect his surreptitious activities.44 In 178 7 th e Nort h Carolin a Genera l Assembl y appointe d Iredel l the sole commissioner t o revise and compile the legislative acts of the late province an d the state. The compilation, stil l known a s "Iredell' s Revisal," wa s complete d i n 1791 , afte r Iredel l ha d assume d hi s Supreme Cour t duties. 45 The assembl y als o elected hi m to the Coun cil of State , an advisor y bod y t o th e governor, i n 178 8 an d 1789 ; he was its president i n 1788. 46 While Iredell was interested an d enmeshe d i n public affair s gener ally, education was a particular concern for him. He served as an original trustee o f the University o f North Carolina , the nation's first operative publi c university . Th e universit y charte r provide d tha t a trustee's remova l fro m th e stat e create d a vacancy ; Iredel l thu s re signed whe n h e move d t o Ne w Yor k upo n hi s appointmen t t o th e United State s Suprem e Court . H e maintained a n interes t i n the insti -

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tution, however , and continue d t o promote i t outside the state. 47 His pedagogic commitmen t wa s no t restricte d t o highe r education ; h e served a s a trustee o f lower-schoo l academie s i n th e Nort h Carolin a towns of Edenton and Hillsborough as well, actively recruiting facult y for th e Hillsborough facility. 48 The foregoin g inventor y woul d full y satisf y th e averag e ye n fo r public achievement. It represents the less significant aspect s of Iredell's pre-Court career , however. He is remembered primaril y no t fo r thes e contributions but for his efforts i n behalf of the American cause in the Revolution an d the adoption o f the federal Constitution . Revolutionist Early in Iredell's American stay , his uncle cautioned hi m that, bein g a king's officer , h e shoul d no t "meddl e wit h politics. " Iredel l rejecte d the counsel, becoming "the letter writer of the war . . . [with ] no equal amongst hi s contemporaries." 49 The friction betwee n Britain and the colonies was already extensive when Iredell assumed the comptroller's post at Edenton, and well before adoptio n o f th e Declaratio n o f Independence , hi s friend s wer e predicting a brea k wit h Englan d i f th e extan t tren d continued. 50 Iredell nevertheles s cam e t o th e Revolutionar y caus e reluctantly . A s late a s June 1776 , i n hi s essa y o n th e cause s o f th e Revolution , h e wrote tha t i n spite of great provocations, a continuing connectio n t o Great Britai n remaine d preferabl e t o independence . H e concluded , however, that h e would assen t to independence i f necessary to Amer ica's safety. 51 For som e tim e previous , Iredel l ha d writte n letter s tha t furthere d the American cause. The first responded to the royal governor's rejection of court laws allowing the provincial courts to attach property of defaulting debtor s residing in England. Acting under royal directives, the governo r the n unilaterall y establishe d court s lik e th e hars h pre rogative tribunals of earlier English history. Writing pseudonymousl y as " A Planter, " Iredel l bega n t o etc h hi s politica l essay s acros s th e pages o f history , attackin g th e clandestine rule s o f th e ne w courts a s "inconsistent with the very idea of civil liberty." 52 A second major polemi c assailed the concept of parliamentary sov ereignty ove r America . I f Parliamen t ha d absolut e dominion , Iredel l

James Iredell 20 5 posited, th e colonist s ha d n o liberty . Suc h a stat e wa s "th e ver y defin ition o f slavery, " an d th e crow n woul d b e "fatall y deceived " i f i t thought th e colonie s woul d "patientl y bear " thes e hardships . Ameri cans wer e not , h e concluded , "conquere d subjects." 53 Iredell's nex t literar y offering , "Th e Principle s o f a n America n Whig," bear s unmistakabl e trace s o f consanguinit y wit h th e Ameri can Declaratio n o f Independence . I t declaim s tha t "mankin d wer e in tended t o b e happy" ; tha t governmen t i s th e mean s o f securin g free dom an d happiness ; an d tha t whe n a governmen t deviate s fro m thi s end, i t i s n o longe r entitle d t o allegiance . Lik e th e Declaration , though i n les s detail , "Principles " recite s perceive d Britis h abuse s against th e colonies , includin g th e Stam p Ac t an d othe r dutie s an d taxation. 54 Though apparentl y precursiv e o f Jefferson' s mor e illustriou s Dec laration, "Principles " di d no t decre e Iredell' s irrevocabl e commitmen t to the American cause . More o r les s contemporaneously wit h it s com position, an d fo r reason s admittedl y pecuniary , h e seriousl y contem plated a retur n t o England . Patrioti c consideration s ultimatel y im pelled hi s decisio n t o stay . He was , he said , "impatien t t o b e attache d to [his ] friend s i n th e nobles t o f al l causes , a struggl e fo r freedom. " While maintainin g hop e fo r reconciliation , hi s primar y attachmen t was t o America , an d h e would s o op t i f force d t o choose. 55 In hi s next—apparentl y widel y circulated 56 —essay, Iredel l chroni cled th e events sinc e the Stamp Act that ha d brough t th e empir e t o th e verge o f decomposition . Th e onl y American crime , he wrote, was "an ardent love of liberty," whil e entirel y differen t principle s motivate d the enemy . Onl y slaves , h e said , woul d hav e submitte d t o th e Britis h indignities. Th e revenu e measure s expose d th e colonie s t o rui n an d had t o b e rejecte d a s inconsisten t wit h liberty . Iredell then drew upon hi s juridical expertis e a s he selected from th e Coercive Act s fo r specia l criticis m th e bil l fo r th e "Impartia l Admin istration o f Justice. " H e foun d it s provision s fo r trial s i n Englan d a t the cour t o f king' s benc h particularl y inconsisten t wit h liberty . Trial s by jurie s i n th e colonie s wer e crucial , h e posited , t o secur e bot h wit nesses an d fac t finders wh o kne w thei r character. 57 As th e ne w natio n focuse d o n th e wa r t o establis h it s freedom , Iredell becam e a clearinghous e fo r correspondent s o n th e progres s o f the struggle. 58 H e continue d t o expoun d justification s fo r th e cleav age, however , postulatin g tha t i t emanate d fro m th e king' s adoptio n

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of measures free me n could not support . Submittin g to such, he said, would hav e mad e American s "th e mos t despicabl e slave s o n earth."59 Iredell was among the first to take an oath of allegiance to the new state o f Nort h Carolina . A s a judge o f th e state' s courts , h e charge d grand juries with avowals of his patriotism, containing strong expressions of devotion to America. His instruction, the Edenton grand jury resolved, wa s "draw n fro m unalienabl e rights , an d fro m rea l neces sity, and grounded o n incontestable facts. " Iredell presided over numerous trials of Tories, which produced fre quent declamation s suffuse d wit h suasion s towar d patriotism . H e criticized th e Carlisl e Commission , throug h whic h Englan d sough t a reconciliation with its former subjects , signing his letter " A Man Who Despises Your Pardons." 60 Peace—to Iredel l " a mos t gloriou s affair"—di d no t en d his publi c service to th e American Revolutio n an d it s aftermath . H e submitte d resolutions t o th e citizen s o f Edento n callin g fo r fulfillmen t o f th e terms o f the peace, support o f public credit, an d redemptio n o f pub lic debts. And he drafted instruction s fro m th e citizens of Edenton t o their state legislators designed to promote national unity , particularly endorsing Washington' s appea l o n th e ev e o f victor y no t t o los e th e peace.61 Personal consequences , too , endured . Iredell' s wealthy , childles s uncle, who ha d advise d hi m agains t meddlin g wit h politics , rejecte d his attempt s t o explicat e hi s pro-American conduc t an d disinherite d him for adherin g to his convictions in the caldron o f imperial disintegration.62 Constitutionalist Having wo n bot h peac e an d independence , th e forme r Englis h sub jects confronte d th e necessit y o f establishin g a governmen t fo r th e new nation. Their initial effort, th e Articles of Confederation, prove d an inadequat e instrumen t fo r effectiv e governance. 63 Delegate s fro m the states thus assembled in Philadelphia i n 1787, ostensibly to revise the Articles but, in fact, ultimately , to form a new constitution . Iredell was not a member o f the North Carolin a contingen t t o th e federal Constitutiona l Convention . H e ha d decline d a n appointmen t

James Iredell 20 7 to Congres s i n 177 9 becaus e o f hi s "curse d poverty, " an d h e appar ently remaine d to o poo r t o undertak e a ventur e o f thi s nature. 6 4 H e nevertheless exerte d influenc e i n Philadelphi a throug h correspon dence wit h Nort h Carolina' s delegates . On e wrot e tha t h e woul d "trouble [Iredell ] frequentl y . . . and expec t [his ] opinio n withou t re serve." 65 Other s als o corresponded wit h him , an d thei r dispatche s un fold th e progres s o f th e convention. 66 Even befor e th e convention' s recommendation s wer e known , th e plan fo r a nationa l governmen t becam e a n issu e i n Nort h Carolin a politics. Becaus e th e nex t Assembl y woul d confron t th e measure s th e convention submitted , th e 178 7 legislativ e election s arouse d consid erable interest . Iredel l becam e a participan t inadvertentl y whe n friends nominate d hi m without hi s knowledge o r assent . H e ha d writ ten earlie r tha t h e ha d becom e s o unpopula r wit h th e people , proba bly becaus e o f hi s suppor t fo r refugee s wh o ha d lef t th e countr y dur ing the Revolution , tha t h e di d no t thin k h e woul d b e chosen . Hi s as sessment proved accurate , for h e lost the election to another Federalis t candidate. 67 Although neithe r a delegat e t o th e conventio n tha t propose d th e Constitution no r t o th e stat e assembl y tha t calle d a convention t o rat ify it , Iredel l rendere d perhap s th e mos t outstandin g o f hi s man y pa triotic service s i n th e ratificatio n effort . H e appear s t o hav e inaugu rated th e first publi c movement i n North Carolin a i n favor o f the Con stitution. H e drafte d th e preambl e an d resolution s fo r citizen s wh o convened a t Edento n t o instruc t thei r legislator s t o cal l a ratificatio n convention an d t o urg e approva l o f th e document . H e penne d a n ad dress delivere d b y th e forema n o f th e Edento n Gran d Jur y extollin g the Constitutio n an d urgin g th e appointmen t o f a conventio n fo r it s early consideration. 68 Indeed, Iredell' s pe n wa s seldo m idl e i n thes e day s o f birthin g th e new government . Th e Antifederalist s focuse d thei r ir e o n th e absenc e from th e proffere d documen t o f a bil l o f rights . Eve n Thoma s Jeffer son joine d thi s lament . I t wa s no t Jefferson , however , bu t hi s fello w Virginian Georg e Maso n wh o nex t impelle d Iredel l t o hi s inkstand . Mason ha d refuse d t o sig n th e propose d instrumen t an d ha d pub lished eleve n objection s t o i t i n a widel y circulate d document . An tifederalists rallie d aroun d hi s first sentence—"Ther e i s n o Declara tion o f Rights"—a s the y decrie d th e pac e a t whic h th e Federalist s were "hustling " ratification. 69

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Iredell assume d th e task o f answerin g Mason , respondin g t o eac h of his demurrers and concluding with a resonant plea for the proposed government. Hi s "Answers " precede d th e majority o f th e Federalist Papers, and i t thu s attracte d considerabl e attention . Th e autho r be came favorably know n i n all Federalist sections. 70 As Iredel l penne d hi s "Answers " t o Mason , Nort h Carolin a wa s moving towar d a ratificatio n convention . Iredel l wa s electe d a dele gate from Edenton . In thanking his supporters, he affirmed hi s deeply held conviction that "th e security of everything dear to us depends on our adoptio n o f th e propose d constitution." 71 Hi s sentiment s wer e not universall y shared , however ; battl e line s wer e bein g drawn , a s Thomas Person , a leading Antifederalist delegate , denounced Georg e Washington a s " a damne d rascal , an d traito r t o hi s country , fo r putting hi s han d t o suc h a n infamou s pape r a s th e ne w Constitu tion." 72 Iredell continued hi s literary efforts a s the convention approached , joining with William R . Davie in preparing a "collectio n o n the subject o f th e Federa l Government. " H e communicated wit h othe r Fed eralist leader s regardin g th e ratificatio n effor t i n othe r states . H e joined the m i n sharin g informatio n o n th e debate s i n othe r state s a s well as philosophical writings on the subject. 73 On July 21 , 1788, the debat e focalize d a t th e ratificatio n conven tion i n Hillsborough, North Carolina . Iredel l served o n a select committee to prepare and propose rules and regulations for governing the convention; many of the committee's recommendations, all but one of which were approved, were his work. He also served on the committee on privileges and elections , which recommended voidin g the election of delegates from on e county. 74 Iredell's principal contribution, though , was as floor leade r for th e Federalist forces. Fully conversant with arguments presented through out the country fo r an d agains t the Constitution , h e was prepared t o answer an y objection s tha t migh t b e offered . T o him , "thi s [was ] a very awful moment. " "O n a right decision of this question," h e said, "may possibl y depen d th e peac e an d happines s o f ou r countr y fo r ages."75 Thus motivated, h e vigorously defende d th e proposed docu ment, clause b y clause, over a period o f thirteen day s of Antifederal ist assaults . Th e effor t failed ; Iredell' s eloquen t words , a s on e An tifederalist delegat e stated , wen t "i n a t on e ear , an d ou t a t th e other."76

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From a persona l standpoint , Iredel l gaine d friend s an d benefite d greatly from hi s role in the convention. A new North Carolin a count y was soo n name d fo r him, 77 an d war m encomium s reflecte d th e na tional recognitio n h e ha d acquire d fro m hi s dialectica l prowes s a t Hillsborough.78 Iredell barel y pause d t o savo r thi s acclaim . Th e Antifederalists , while making an important point and deserving some credit for the ultimate adoption o f the Bill of Rights, had placed North Carolin a i n a maligned, precarious, and impotent position . It was now a foreign o r independent state , precluded fro m participatio n i n the firs t presiden tial election , th e devisin g o f th e constitutiona l amendment s th e con vention ha d demanded , an d th e makin g o f th e nation' s formativ e laws.79 If this status continued, the state would, on e Federalist leade r feared, "becom e a by-word amon g the nations." 80 These and other concerns prompted Iredell to continue the ratifica tion effort . H e again applied hi s considerable talents as a political essayist t o the cause o f the new government, notin g th e danger s inher ent in his state's status as independent not only of other nations but of other state s a s well. The path chose n would , h e said, "lead[ ] t o misery an d ruin , i f w e continue t o pursu e it. " On e convention , though , could repai r th e mischief o f another . "[T]hi s fata l disunion, " h e concluded, should "las t a very short time longer." 81 This essay was not Iredell's only contribution to the literature of the post-Hillsborough ratificatio n effort . H e an d Willia m R . Davi e ha d hired a reporter to record the convention debates, and they published them at their own expense. The publication was widely circulated an d aided in the Federalist election victories of 1789. 82 Iredell decline d t o b e a candidat e fo r th e nex t Genera l Assembly , the federal conventio n calle d t o consider amendments , o r the secon d ratification convention. 83 H e continue d t o devot e time , energy , an d money to the ratification endeavor , however, joining other Federalist s in circulating petitions requesting a second convention to consider the Constitution. Tw o month s befor e Nort h Carolin a finally ratified , h e was stil l sending material s favorin g ratificatio n fo r us e in "th e back country . . . i n a manne r i n which . . . they wil l hav e th e desire d ef fect."84 In Novembe r 178 9 a secon d Nort h Carolin a conventio n ratifie d the Constitutio n b y a larger margi n tha n tha t b y which th e first ha d defeated it. 85 Severa l factor s influence d th e reversal , no t leas t amon g

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them the educational effort s o f leaders such as Iredell and Davie. 86 In the immediate afterglow o f the Federalist triumph, Iredell was widely recognized a s a t leas t amon g it s principal architects; 87 late r scholar s would conside r hi m "outstandin g i n debate," 88 "th e acknowledge d leader fo r ratification," 89 an d th e "ables t defende r o f th e Constitu tion."90

Jurist The profoun d gras p o f constitutiona l question s Iredel l displaye d i n promoting ratificatio n wa s th e mos t significan t reaso n fo r hi s Supreme Cour t appointment . Th e selectio n surprise d bot h th e recipient an d hi s friends . Pierc e Butle r o f Sout h Carolin a ha d hope d Iredell would joi n hi m in the United State s Senate . Hugh Williamso n had though t hi s frien d migh t accep t a federa l judgeshi p i n anothe r state i f Nort h Carolin a faile d t o ratify . Upo n ratification , Archibal d Maclaine ha d pose d th e possibilit y o f Iredell' s bein g th e federa l dis trict judge fo r Nort h Carolina . Iredel l himsel f ha d though t h e woul d fill that position , thoug h h e disavowe d an y exertion s towar d tha t end.91 Iredell's expeditious , unanimou s confirmation 92 commence d a near-decade o f intimat e relationship s with—an d stalwar t suppor t for—George Washington , John Adams, and their administrations. Judicial service did not end his career as an essayist. When an excise tax on whiskey produced perhaps the new government's foremost domes tic oppositio n an d difficulties , Iredel l reverte d t o hi s ol d for m i n defending th e tax. 93 Whe n th e administratio n suppresse d a n insurrec tion agains t th e tax , Iredell' s friend s viewe d i t a s hi s persona l tri umph.94 Hi s ratification-er a utterance s containe d th e philosophica l roots o f thi s animate d suppor t fo r administratio n policie s an d th e measures use d t o enforc e them . A union wa s necessar y t o th e safet y and prosperity of the states, Iredell reflected; an d the Union could not be preserve d withou t reposin g grea t confidenc e i n thos e entruste d with its government. 95 Iredell's intimacy with the presidents and their administrations was characteristic o f jurists in the late eighteenth century . Federal judges, including Suprem e Cour t justice s on circuit, were seen as representa tives o r extension s o f th e Federalis t administrations . I t wa s largel y

James Iredell 21 1 through thei r contac t wit h th e judge s sittin g o n th e circui t court s tha t the America n peopl e becam e acquainte d wit h th e ne w institutio n o f the federa l judiciary , an d i t wa s mainl y throug h th e charge s thes e judges mad e t o gran d jurie s tha t th e principle s o f th e ne w Constitu tion an d th e governmen t i t establishe d becam e know n t o th e public . While th e partisa n natur e o f th e charge s i s discordan t wit h moder n concepts o f judicia l propriety , i t was patrioti c i n motivatio n an d con sonant wit h th e perceive d need s o f th e time. 96 Iredell wa s a consummate activis t i n thi s regard. A s a jurist h e was , as he had bee n in the ratification period , a bellman fo r th e Union. Pop ular sentimen t wa s no t prerequisit e t o hi s prais e fro m th e benc h fo r the government' s measures . H e rushe d t o defen d eve n th e Alie n an d Sedition Acts , despite mountin g resentmen t t o the m i n hi s hom e stat e and elsewhere. 97 Hi s charge s feature d genera l prod s towar d patrioti c appreciation fo r th e extan t government. 98 "Notwithstandin g al l th e efforts mad e t o vilif y an d undermin e th e government, " h e onc e in structed, "i t ha s uniforml y [risen ] i n th e estee m an d confidenc e o f th e people." 99 Iredell's passionat e commitmen t t o th e Unio n di d no t preclud e a dual-sovereignty motif , however . Th e Union , h e instructed , containe d two sovereignties , an d th e federa l Constitutio n di d no t interfer e wit h the interna l regulation s o f a stat e i n matter s solel y o f stat e concern . "Each o f thes e governments, " h e urged , "deserve s ou r equa l confi dence an d respect." 100 This dual - o r residual-sovereignt y them e wa s a fon t o f Iredell' s most significan t Suprem e Cour t opinion , hi s dissen t i n Chisholm v. Georgia.101 Th e issu e wa s whethe r th e Suprem e Cour t ha d jurisdic tion t o hea r an d determin e a sui t b y a citize n o f on e stat e agains t an other state . The questio n wa s importan t no t onl y becaus e o f lingerin g concerns a s to whethe r th e state s ha d relinquishe d al l their sovereign ties 102 bu t becaus e th e state s feare d tha t i f th e citizen-plaintif f pre vailed, the y coul d b e subjec t t o a delug e o f action s i n th e Suprem e Court b y refugee Loyalist s fo r debt s forfeite d b y act s o f attainde r an d similar legislation . Th e potentia l liabilit y o n th e par t o f th e state s wa s considerable. 103 Some leaders—notabl y Georg e Maso n an d Richar d Henr y Lee , both o f Virginia—ha d conveye d alar m ove r thi s prospec t i n th e pre ratification period . Other s o f grea t stature , however—includin g Alexander Hamilton , James Madison , an d John Marshall—ha d effec -

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tively countere d thes e charge s an d concerns . Th e majorit y opinion s holding Georgi a subjec t t o the suit thus shocked the country. 104 These opinions took the view that sovereignty in America pertained not t o prince s bu t t o th e peopl e collectively . Sovereignt y wa s no t in compatible with compulsory suability because princes had been liable to suc h suits . Since the individua l sovereig n o r citize n migh t b e sued by anothe r individual , logicall y a n aggregatio n o f individua l sover eigns organized into a state might also be. The states were clearly subjected t o th e Suprem e Court' s jurisdictio n a t th e sui t o f othe r states ; therefore, suc h suability involved no violation o f sovereignty . The onl y reaso n perhap s preventin g a sovereig n princ e an d th e United State s fro m bein g sue d i n their ow n courts—th e fac t tha t th e executive powe r necessar y t o enforc e th e Court' s judgmen t wa s hel d by the prince or the government—was inapplicabl e when a state was sued in the courts of the United States. Even if states had once had sovereign immunity , th e Constitution—b y it s declare d objective s o f justice, interstate harmony, and protection for individual human rights— had divested them of it. Its express language and its failure t o exclude suits by individuals against state s attested the same results, as did the practical necessitie s involve d i n enforcin g bot h th e power s th e Con stitution gav e the federa l governmen t an d th e restrictions i t impose d on the states. 105 Iredell alon e dissente d fro m thes e views . H e summarize d hi s rea soning as follows: -1st. Tha t th e Constitution , s o fa r a s i t respect s th e judicia l authority , ca n only b e carried int o effec t b y acts o f th e legislatur e appointin g Court s an d prescribing their method s o f proceeding. 2nd. Tha t Congress ha s provide d no ne w la w i n regar d t o thi s case, but expressl y referre d u s to th e old . 3d. That there are no principles of the old law, to which we must have recourse, that i n an y manne r authoriz e th e presen t suit , eithe r b y preceden t o r b y analogy.

The consequence, he concluded, "clearl y is that the suit. . . cannot be maintained."106 Iredell's positio n wa s consisten t wit h hi s answer s t o Mason' s ob jections t o th e Constitution, 107 hi s ratificatio n conventio n argu ments,108 an d hi s prio r charge s t o Gran d Juries. 109 I t als o accorde d with th e perspectiv e o f othe r Federalis t thinker s o f th e period—no tably Hamilton , Madison , an d Marshall. 110 Mos t important , i t re -

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fleeted contemporar y publi c opinion . A s John Marshal l wrot e year s later: "Th e alar m [ove r th e majorit y opinion ] wa s general." 111 Thi s ensured th e swif t introductio n an d passag e o f th e Elevent h Amend ment, which constitutionalize d th e result Iredel l would hav e reache d and protected th e states from suc h suits in the future. 112 Scholars an d jurist s hav e continued t o debat e who wa s "right " i n Chisholm—the justice s in the majority o r Iredell—a s well as the cor rect rational e underlyin g Iredell' s position. 113 Th e question s ar e o f academic interes t only , however . Th e significan t practica l realit y i s that the Eleventh Amendment incorporated th e outcome Iredell alone would have imposed, as well as his concept of divided or residual sovereignty, 114into th e Constitution , wher e the y remain almos t tw o cen turies later. It appears that th e early Supreme Cour t justice s did not alway s reduce thei r opinion s o r th e totalit y o f thei r opinion s t o writing. 115 Iredell's writte n an d reporte d opinion s othe r tha n Chisholm, t o th e extent that they merit summary treatment, d o so at least as much fo r his commentary i n dicta a s for th e significance o f their holdings . In Penhallow v. Doane's Administrators, 116 th e Cour t resolve d a n important issu e o f stat e versu s nationa l sovereignt y adversel y t o th e contentions o f th e states , upholdin g th e jurisdictio n o f th e federa l courts t o decid e priz e cases . Iredell's opinio n reflecte d a strongl y na tionalistic interpretation , a s he reverted o n occasio n t o hi s form a s a Revolutionary-period essayist , stating : When act s wer e passe d b y th e Parliamen t o f Grea t Britai n whic h wer e thought unconstitutiona l an d unjust , an d whe n ever y hop e o f redres s b y separate application s appeare d desperate , the n wa s conceive d th e nobl e idea, which lai d the foundation o f the present independenc e an d happines s of thi s country , (thoug h independenc e wa s no t the n i n contemplation ) o f forming a common council to consult for the common welfare o f the whole, so far a s an oppositio n t o th e measure s o f Grea t Britai n wa s concerned. 117

Congress, Iredell concluded , wa s the appropriat e bod y to exercis e the external national sovereignty . " I think all prize causes whatsoever ought t o belon g to the national sovereignty, " h e wrote: "The y ar e t o be determined b y the law of nations. A prize court is, in effect, a court of all the nations in the world, because all persons, in every part of the world, ar e conclude d b y it s sentence s i n case s clearl y comin g withi n its jurisdiction." 118

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Penballow marke d "[a ] notabl e beginnin g . . . i n th e assertio n b y judicial constructio n o f nationa l sovereignt y i n th e federa l govern ment." 1 1 9 Hi s dissen t i n Cbisholm notwithstanding , i t i s no t surpris ing that Iredell , who ha d champione d independenc e an d union , joine d in spawnin g thi s "notabl e beginning. " In Talbot v. Jansen,120 Iredel l discoursed o n the right o f national ex patriation. Legislativ e bodie s coul d impos e restraint s o n th e righ t i n the publi c safet y o r interest , h e declared , bu t shoul d s o limi t individ ual freedo m onl y fo r th e mos t compellin g o f reasons. 121 "[A ] Legisla ture," h e said , "mus t b e weak t o th e extrem e verg e o f foll y t o wis h t o retain an y ma n a s a citize n whos e hear t an d affection s ar e fixed o n a foreign countr y i n preferenc e t o hi s own." 1 2 2 In Hylton v. United States^ 113 Iredel l joine d hi s colleague s i n hold ing that a ta x o n th e us e o f carriage s wa s no t a direc t ta x require d b y the Constitutio n t o b e apportioned. I n hi s view, the Constitutio n con templated n o taxes as direct sav e those that coul d b e apportioned; thi s one clearl y coul d no t be , s o th e decisio n wa s self-evident. 124 Th e cas e is importan t becaus e i t wa s th e first i n whic h th e Suprem e Cour t passed upo n th e constitutionalit y o f a n ac t o f Congres s an d becaus e of it s significanc e i n th e histor y o f th e federa l government' s capacit y to rais e revenu e effectively. 125 Further , explici t declaratio n her e o f a n act's constitutionalit y implicitl y proclaime d th e Court' s equa l em powerment t o pronounc e act s unconstitutional . "[T]h e signpos t wa s up." 1 2 6 Ware v. Hylton 117 ha s simila r impor t a s th e first cas e i n whic h th e Court declare d a stat e la w unconstitutiona l (a s superseded b y the fed eral Treat y o f 1783). 128 Iredell , havin g sa t o n th e cas e o n circuit , re cused. H e nevertheles s filed a n extende d discussio n o n th e treat y power, 129 agai n o n occasio n revertin g t o hi s styl e a s a Revolutionary period essayist , sayin g o f th e treaty : "I t insured , s o fa r a s peace coul d insure them , th e frees t form s o f government , an d th e greates t shar e o f individual liberty , o f whic h perhap s th e worl d ha s see n an y exam ple." 1 3 0 Finally, an d mos t notably , th e cas e o f Colder v. Bull 131 i s les s known fo r it s resolutio n o f whethe r th e e x pos t fact o claus e applie d to civi l case s tha n fo r th e Chase-Iredel l debate , i n dicta , o n whethe r natural la w i s a vali d referenc e poin t fo r judicia l revie w o f legislativ e acts. Justice Chase , drawin g o n th e Preambl e t o th e Constitutio n an d "certain vita l principle s i n ou r free Republica n governments, "

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posited tha t i t was . I t wa s "agains t al l reaso n an d justice, " h e said , to trea t legislativ e power s otherwise. 132 Iredell , contrastingly , thought th e framer s ha d define d th e limit s o f legislativ e powe r wit h precision. A passion fo r certitud e prompte d thi s view . "Th e idea s of natural justic e ar e regulated b y no fixed standard," Iredel l observed , and court s an d legislature s thu s coul d hav e divergen t opinion s o n whether a measure wa s "inconsisten t wit h th e abstrac t principle s o f natural justice." 133 The Chase-Iredell debate has reverberated through two centuries of American constitutiona l law—" a runnin g battl e tha t neve r ha s sim mered dow n completely. " Iredell' s vie w i s generall y considere d t o have prevailed for nearly a century, but Chase's to have ultimately triumphed unde r suc h rubrics a s "substantiv e du e process." 134 Thus, as the Supreme Court in its early years "se t a pattern o f constitutional adjudicatio n tha t wa s t o endure," 135 Jame s Iredel l wa s a vigorous an d voca l participan t i n it s deliberation s an d decisions . I n Penhallow h e avowed a n approach t o opinion writing that character ized al l his work. " I will endeavor t o stat e my own principle s o n th e subject with so much clearness," he wrote, "tha t whether my opinion be right or wrong, it may at least be understood wha t the opinion really is." 136 Thi s passion fo r clarit y produce d opinion s tha t aide d on e scholar i n concluding that amon g the early justices, Iredell and Pater son "see m th e mos t impressive. " Iredel l "receive s favorabl e marks, " he writes, "fo r hi s attention t o history in Chisholm an d for hi s opposition to limitless judicial nullification i n Calder." 137 Anothe r schola r concludes that Iredell and Wilson "possesse d the finest legal minds on the high court during this period."138 To have participated i n setting a pattern o f constitutiona l adjudicatio n tha t wa s t o endure , an d t o b e considered on e of the most impressive of the early justices and one of the eighteenth-centur y Court' s finest legal minds , is clearly a worth y legacy. Supreme Court servic e meant that Iredel l would spen d most o f his last decade "lead[ing] the life of a postboy," traveling as much as nineteen hundred miles in covering a single federal circuit. 139 Under the Judiciary Ac t o f 1789 , the federa l circui t court s hear d appeal s i n som e instances fro m th e distric t court s bu t mainl y functione d a s th e pri mary federa l tria l court s fo r certai n categorie s o f cases . Two (later , one) of the six Supreme Court justices, together with the district court judge residen t i n th e stat e o r distric t wher e th e cour t sat , compose d

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the circui t court . Eac h justic e thu s travele d throug h on e o f th e thre e circuits twice annually. 140 The fact tha t Congress ha d establishe d court s without judge s created problems , especiall y th e conflict o f interes t whe n on e o r tw o o f the justices sitting in the Supreme Court had sat on the circuit court. 141 Considerations o f economy , qualit y control , politics , and uniformit y of federal la w supported th e arrangement, however . In particular, th e high judge s wer e t o ac t a s "republica n schoolmasters, " carryin g th e law to citizens in their own states and fashioning suppor t for th e new national government i n the process. 142 The judge s chafe d unde r th e plan , however , an d wer e i n th e van guard o f refor m efforts . Iredell , bein g th e mos t severel y affecte d be cause assigned to the harshest circuit, the Southern, led the endeavor . He described hi s duties as "ver y severe & expensive, " an d Chie f Justice Jay acknowledged that Iredell's "share of the task [was ] more than in due proportion." 143 Iredell first proposed internall y tha t th e circuits b e rotated amon g the justices o r that an y permanent assignmen t o f circuit dut y a t leas t be accomplishe d b y lot . H e alon e vote d agains t permanen t assign ments, however ; an d th e Court' s vot e favorin g the m surprise d him . With permanent assignments based on the home states of the justices, the mos t difficul t an d arduou s o f th e circuit s would b e his recurren t fate. H e thu s continue d t o protest , lamentin g tha t n o judg e coul d "conscientiously undertak e t o rid e th e Souther n Circui t constantl y and perform th e other parts of his duty." If his colleagues persisted in construing th e Judiciary Ac t as they had, he threatened, h e would b e forced t o seek congressional action. 144 When neithe r interna l no r legislate d chang e wa s forthcoming , a rather desperat e Iredel l suggeste d tha t th e judge s eac h agre e t o sur render $50 0 per year o f their salar y if circuit riding were terminated . All ultimately agreed , ye t there i s no evidenc e tha t th e proposa l wa s presented t o Congress . Iredel l obtaine d a modicu m o f relie f whe n Congress enacte d a bil l providin g fo r rotatio n o f th e circui t assign ments. No justice , without hi s consent, woul d hav e t o rid e the sam e circuit twic e consecutivel y unles s th e publi c servic e an d th e vot e o f four justice s required it. 145 The justices now united in their desire to eliminate circuit riding altogether. The goal proved elusive, however; and a near-century would pass befor e Suprem e Cour t justice s ceased t o b e regular rider s o f th e

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circuits. The y were , i n Iredell' s words , "doome d . . . t o b e wretche d Drudges." 1 4 6 In additio n t o thei r standar d far e o f suit s a t commo n la w an d i n chancery, crimina l prosecutions , an d admiralt y causes , fo r a tim e th e justices ha d th e dut y o f determinin g th e merit s o f claim s unde r th e In valid Pensions Act, which provide d governmen t financial assistanc e t o veterans injure d i n th e Revolutionar y Wa r an d t o thei r widow s an d orphans. 1 4 7 All justices sav e on e demurre d t o thes e ne w duties, 148 an d Justices Blai r an d Wilso n an d Distric t Judg e Peter s altogethe r refuse d to perfor m them. 149 Iredell responde d t o th e ac t b y writin g wha t was , i n effect , a n ad visory opinio n o n th e separatio n o f powers. 150 Philosophica l objec tions notwithstanding , however , h e ultimatel y rationalize d tha t h e could perfor m th e task a s a commissioner o n a n individual rathe r tha n a judicia l basis. 151 The wor k wa s onerous . "Th e Invali d busines s ha s scarcely allowe d m e on e moment' s time, " h e onc e wrote , "an d no w I am engage d i n i t b y candlelight , thoug h t o g o a t thre e i n th e morn ing." 152 The invalid-claim s functio n enhance d th e rigor s o f th e alread y ar duous circui t life . Th e familia l effect s wer e harsh , a s th e jurist s spen t months a t a stretch o n thei r treks. 153 "Man y a sigh directs me toward s Carolina," Iredel l wrot e durin g on e o f hi s man y prolonge d absence s from home. 154 There wer e othe r grievance s too . Stage s ra n irregularly , "brok e down," o r wer e misse d b y th e bares t o f tim e periods. 155 Horse s re placed the m an d a t time s becam e lame. 156 Road s wer e "execrable, " making trave l b y stage o r hors e severe. 157 Adverse weather condition s produced inconvenience , peril , an d criticis m fo r unavoidabl e default s in scheduled cour t appearances. 158 Accommodation s wer e meager bu t costly. 159 Sporadi c crimina l activit y affecte d th e rovin g jurists, 160 an d at time s persona l possession s wer e simpl y lost. 161 Accident s wer e common, 162 diseas e wa s a nea r neighbor, 163 an d fatigu e wa s a con stant companion. 164 Th e entir e lifestyl e was , a s Judg e Nathanie l Pendleton sai d o f travelin g th e Souther n Circuit , "mor e tha n th e strength o f an y ma n ca n bear." 165 Amenities di d abound . Ther e wer e pleasan t day s an d delight s t o Iredell's trave l a s h e witnesse d an d chronicle d th e earl y developmen t of hi s country. 166 Ther e wa s th e utmos t i n civility , cordiality, an d gen erosity a s h e wende d hi s wa y throug h th e cities , towns , an d country -

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side of an evolvin g nation. 167 There were pleasant travelin g compan ions,168 dinners, 169 teas, 170 dances, 171 and theater. 172 There were testimonials an d encomium s i n plenitude. 173 Foremost , ther e wa s felici tous interaction wit h contemporary eminences, 174 including the great lawyers of the time. 175 Still, the justices were no t jus t whinin g abou t th e hardships . They were real; they were severe; over time, they could be devouring. A prolonged and arduous session at Philadelphia followed b y an immensity of busines s a t Richmon d too k a specia l tol l o n Iredel l durin g th e spring circuit of 1799. After a brief respite at Edenton, he commenced his return to Philadelphia for the Supreme Court's August term. From Richmond, o n July 31 , he returned home , physically unabl e t o com plete th e journey . Whe n th e Cour t convened , th e hug e oake n chai r provided for the sixth of its original justices was again vacant. Its tenant for th e first near-decade o f the Court's history remained to o ill to attend. He would no t occup y the seat again. 176 On Octobe r 20 , 1799 , "[o]l d Time , tha t greates t an d longest-es tablished Spinne r o f all," 177 ceased t o weave for Iredell . While deat h came at age forty-eight befor e he had fully bloomed , he left a n epistolary legacy considered "invaluabl e for a n understanding o f social and political affairs i n the later eighteenth century." 178 His letters while on the Supreme Court "illuminate the contemporary scene." 179 "Withou t Iredell, th e chronicler, " editor s o f The Documentary History of the Supreme Court of the United States acknowledge , "thes e volume s would not b e possible." 180 Further, despit e the untimelines s o f hi s demise, his ardent Revolu tionary-period essays , his articulate defense o f judicial review and th e Constitution, and his abiding commitment to the residual sovereignt y of th e state s were firmly chiseled int o th e fabri c o f th e American ex periment. As a consequence, when the cold pen of history records the ablest of the American founders, it spares ink unwisely if James Iredell is not among them. NOTES

1. Georg e Washingto n t o Edmun d Randolph , Septembe r 27 , 1789 , i n Jare d Sparks, ed., The Writings of George Washington (Boston : Russell, Shattuck, an d Williams, 1836) , 10:34 . 2. Georg e Washington t o James Madison, Augus t 1 0 (?) , 1789, in ibid., 26 .

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3. Richar d B . Bernstein an d Ky m S . Rice, Are We To Be a Nation? The Making of the Constitution (Cambridge : Harvar d Universit y Press , 1987) , 260 . Se e also Douglas S . Freeman, George Washington: A Biography (Ne w York: Charle s Scribner's Sons , 1954) , 6:253 , 25 3 n.95 ; Charle s G . Haines , The Role of the Supreme Court in American Government and Politics (Berkeley : Universit y o f California Press , 1944), 1:121; Julius J. Marke, Vignettes of Legal History (Sout h Hackensack, N.J. : Fre d B . Rothma n & Co. , 1965) , 53 ; Charle s Warren , The Supreme Court in United States History (Boston : Little , Brow n an d Co. , 1922) , 1:42-43. Harriso n die d o n Apri l 2 , 1790 , just befor e th e Cour t hel d it s firs t ses sion; hi s tenur e thu s woul d hav e bee n transien t i n an y event . Freeman , George Washington: A Biography, 6:25 3 n.95 . 4. Hug h T . Lefler i n Virginius Dabney , ed. , The Patriots: The American Revolution Generation of Genius (Ne w York : Atheneum, 1975) , 140 . 5. Donal d Jackso n an d Doroth y Twohig , eds. , The Diaries of George Washington (Charlottesville : Universit y Pres s o f Virginia , 1979) , 6:28-29 ; se e als o William S . Baker, Washington After the Revolution MDCCLXXXIV-MDCCXCIX (Philadelphia : J.B. Lippincott Co. , 1898) , 171. 6. Do n Higginbotham, ed. , The Papers of James Iredell, 2 vols. (Raleigh: Div. of Archive s an d History , N.C . Dept . o f Cultura l Resources , 1976) , l:xxxvi i (ed . essay), 1 2 (Henr y E . McCulloh t o Franci s Iredell , March 3 , 1768) . 7. Ibid. , l:xlix , l i (ed . essay) ; Iredell t o Hanna h Johnston , ca . Apri l 1 , 1772 , ibid., 9 4 (proposin g marriage) ; Iredel l t o Samue l Johnston, Apri l 7 , 1772 , ibid. , 96 (requestin g permissio n t o marr y Hannah) . 8. Ibid. , l:xlv-xlv i (ed . essay) ; Archibal d Henderson , North Carolina: The Old North State and the New (Chicago : Lewis Publishing Co. , 1941) , 1:567-68 , 624. 9. Rosco e Pound, The Formative Era of American Law (Boston : Little, Brown and Co. , 1938) , 81 , 127 n.l . 10. Higginbotham , Papers of Iredell, l:l i (ed . essay), 172 (Iredell's diary entry, August 22 , 1790) . 11. Griffit h J . McRee, Life and Correspondence of James Iredell, 2 vols. (New York: D . Appleto n an d Co. , 185 7 (I) , 185 8 (II)) , 1:92-9 3 (Thoma s Iredel l t o Iredell, August 19 , 1771) . 12. Archibal d Maclain e to Iredell, August 29,1787, Iredell Papers, Duke University, Durham, N.C . (Duke) . 13. Trave l conditions : Christophe r C . Crittenden , "Overlan d Trave l an d Transportation i n Nort h Carolina , 1763-1789, " North Carolina Historical Review 8 (1931): 239 (passim) ; Higginbotham, Papers of Iredell, 2:3,14 7 (Iredel l to Hannah Iredell , January 14 , 1778 ; May 13 , 1780); McRee, Life of Iredell, 2:11 1 (Iredell to Hannah Iredell , October 15 , 1784). Accommodations: Higginbotham , Papers of Iredell, 1:452 , 2:7 , 39 , 36 4 (Iredel l t o Hanna h Iredell , Ma y 2 , 1777 ; March 12 , 1778 ; July 2, 1778 ; December 2 , 1782) .

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14. Higginbotham , 1:445 , 2:9 0 (Iredel l t o Hanna h Iredell , Apri l 28 , 1777 ; June 14 , 1779) ; Iredel l t o Nell y Blai r (Hannah' s niece) , Octobe r 22 , 1785 , Charles E . Johnso n Collection , N.C . Div . o f Archive s an d History , Raleig h (NCAH). 15. Higginbotham , Papers of Iredell, 1:10 6 (Iredel l to Francis Iredell, Sr., July 20, 1772) , 2:90 , 158 , 19 6 (Iredel l t o Hanna h Iredell , Jun e 14 , 1779 ; Ma y 24 , 1780; November 26,1780); Iredell to Hannah Iredell, October 17,1786 , NCAH . 16. Higginbotham , Papers of Iredell, 1:19 3 (Iredell' s diary entry, December 9 , 1772). 17. Ibid. , 2:194, 415 (Iredel l to Hanna h Iredell , November 18 , 1780; June 2 , 1783), 42 4 (Iredel l t o Arthu r Iredell , Jul y 30 , 1783) , 47 0 (Iredel l t o Thoma s Iredell, ca . Novembe r 1783) ; McRee , Life of Iredell, 2:10 1 (Iredel l t o Thoma s Iredell, May 28 , 1784) . 18. Higginbotham , Papers of Iredell, 1:44 9 (ed . note) ; se e als o Willia m H . Hoyt, ed. , The Papers of Archibald D. Murphey (Raleigh , N . C : E . M. Uzzel l & Co., 1914) , 1:20 5 (lette r refer s t o Iredel l a s amon g principa l lawyer s i n Nort h Carolina a t tha t time) ; John C . Waldrup, " J a m e s Iredel l an d th e Practic e o f La w in Revolutionary Era North Carolina " (An n Arbor, Mich.: University Microfilms , 1985), 150, 383 of unpublished Ph . D. dissertation, University of North Carolin a at Chape l Hill . 19. McRee , Life of Iredell, 2:5 1 (Iredel l t o Hanna h Iredell , Ma y 2 1 , 1783) , 133 (Iredel l to Willia m Hooper , January 29 , 1786) , 13 4 (Iredel l t o James Hogg , January 29 , 1786) . 20. Higginbotham , Papers of Iredell, l:lxxxv-lxxxv i (ed . essay) ; se e ibid. , 2:74-79 (Iredell' s petition o n behal f o f Henr y Eustac e McCulloh); ibid., 372-74 , 380-82, 383-85 (McCullo h to Iredell, February 5,1783; March 17,1783 ; March 28, 1783) ; McCullo h t o Iredell , Februar y 20 , 1784 , an d Augus t 1 (?) , 1790 , Duke; Higginbotham, Papers of Iredell, 2:395-96 , 467-69 (Iredel l to McCulloh : ca. May 1 , 1783; November 28 , 1783) ; McRee, Life of Iredell, 2:103-4 , 116-1 7 (Iredell t o McCulloh , Jun e 15 , 1784 ; Januar y 6 , 1785) ; ibid. , 25 2 (Nathanie l Dukinfield t o Iredell , Februar y 4 , 1789) ; Higginbotham , Papers of Iredell, 2:203-4, 20 4 (ed . note) (petitio n o f Margaret Pearson) . 21. McRee , Life of Iredell, 2:9 3 (Iredel l to Pierce Butler, March 14 , 1784) . 22. Walte r Clark , The State Records of North Carolina, 2 6 vols. (Goldsboro , N . C : Nas h Bros. , 1905) , 24:730-3 1 (178 5 N.C . Sessio n Laws) ; James Iredell , Laws of the State of North Carolina (Edenton , N . C : Hodg e & Wills , 1791) , 553-54 (same) . 23. Clark , State Records, 23:977 , 98 4 (177 6 N.C . Const . § § XI V ["Th e De claration o f Rights"] , XLIV). 24. Bayard v. Singleton, 1 N.C. 5 (1787) . 25. McRee , Life of Iredell, 2:119-2 0 (Archibal d Maclain e t o Iredell , Marc h 7,1785) (referenc e t o Singleton's having "silenced " Iredel l and others) ; ibid., 48 9

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(Iredell memorandu m tha t h e ha d "receive d a retaining fe e i n th e cas e o n behal f of the purchasers unde r th e act") . 26. 1 N . C . a t 10 . 27. Se e Quinto n Holton , "Histor y o f th e Cas e o f Bayard v. Singleton" (un published master' s thesis , Universit y o f Nort h Carolina , Chape l Hill , 1948) , 125-26, 126-2 7 n.29 ; Waldrup, "Iredel l an d th e Practic e o f La w i n Revolution ary Er a Nort h Carolina, " 261-69 . 28. Higginbotham , Papers of Iredell, 2:44 9 (Iredell' s "Instruction s t o Chowan Count y Representatives" ) (emphasi s added) . 29. McRee , Life of Iredell, 2:145-49 . 30. 1 N . C . a t 6-7 . 31. McRee , Life of Iredell, 2:148 . 32. Ibid. , 2:169-7 0 (Richar d Dobb s Spaigh t t o Iredell , Augus t 12 , 1787) , 172-76 (Iredel l to Spaight , Augus t 26 , 1787) . 33. See , e.g., John H. Dougherty, Power of Federal Judiciary Over Legislation (New York : G . R Putnam' s Sons , 1912) , 32 ; Charle s G . Haines , The American Doctrine of Judicial Supremacy (Ne w York : Macmillan Co. , 1914) , 54. For a recent genera l treatment , se e Willia m R . Casto , "Jame s Iredel l an d th e America n Origins o f Judicia l Review, " Connecticut Law Review 2 7 (1995) : 329 . A s t o Hamilton's thought, see The Federalist, Nos . 78, 80, 81 (J. Cooke ed., 1961) , 528, 535, 54 1 (Alexande r Hamilton) . 34. Se e Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 , 175-79 (1803) . 35. Ibid , a t 176 . 36. McRee , Life of Iredell, 2:14 6 ("T O TH E PUBLIC") . 37. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) a t 176 . 38. McRee , Life of Iredell, 2:14 8 ("T O TH E PUBLIC") . 39. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) a t 177 . 40. McRee , Life of Iredell, 2:14 8 ("T O TH E PUBLIC") . 41. Clark , State Records, 23:987 ; Higginbotham , Papers of Iredell, l:lxxvii i (ed. essay). 42. Clark , State Records, 11:825 , 13:341 , 24:iii ; Higginbotham , Papers of Iredell, ldxxvii i (ed . essay), 2:32-34 (Iredel l to Richar d Caswell , June 13 , 1778). 43. Joh n L. Cheney, Jr., ed., North Carolina Government, 1585-1979: A Narrative and Statistical History (Raleigh : N.C . Dept . o f Secretar y o f State , 1981) , 182, 19 5 nn . 47-49 ; Clark , State Records, 13:948 ; Higginbotham , Papers of Iredell, ldxxi x (ed . essay); Waldrup, "Iredel l an d th e Practic e o f La w i n Revolu tionary Er a North Carolina, " chapte r 2 (passim) . 44. Higginbotham , Papers of Iredell, 2:37 9 (Archibal d Maclain e t o Iredell , February 2 1 , 1783); Iredell t o H . E . McCulloh, June 15 , 1784 , NCAH ; McRee , Life of Iredell, 2:14 4 (Archibal d Maclain e t o Iredell , Augus t 3 , 1786) ; Iredell t o Electors of Edenton , Augus t 15 , 1788 , NCAH; McRee , Life of Iredell, 2:249-5 0 (Iredell to Willia m Cumming , January 6 , 1789) ; Waldrup, "Iredel l an d th e Prac -

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tice of La w i n Revolutionar y Er a Nort h Carolina, " 36 6 n. l (example s o f legisla tors reportin g t o Iredel l an d seekin g hi s advice). 45. Clark , State Records, 20:573 , 21:139, 24:888-89; McRee, Life of Iredell, 2:277 (ed . note); Iredell to speakers of N.C. Senate and House, October 16,1789 , NCAH. 46. Clark , State Records, 20:491 , 500; 21:26, 37,251, 611 ; 23:981-82 (177 6 N.C. Const . § XVI); Cheney, North Carolina Government, 1585-1979, 165 . 47. Clark , State Records, 25:22 ; McRee , Life of Iredell, 2:270 , 35 7 (ed . notes); Kem p P . Battle , History of the University of North Carolina, 2 vols . (Raleigh, N . C : Edward s & Broughton , 190 7 (I) , 191 2 (II)) , 1:821 , 2:426 ; R . D . W. Connor, A Documentary History of the University of North Carolina (Chape l Hill: University o f Nort h Carolin a Press , 1953) , 1:23 , 3 3 n.19 , 34 , 72-73 , 158 ; Iredell to University trustees, November 16,1790 , NCAH; William Samuel Johnson to Iredell , August 5 , 1795 , Duke. 48. Clark , State Records, 24:454-55 ; file marked "Jame s Iredell, Sr.—Miscellaneous Papers , Robert Smit h Estate," NCAH; John Witherspoo n t o Iredell, January 8 , 1787 , and Iredel l to Witherspoon, Februar y 25 , 1787, Cupola Hous e Pa pers, Southern Historical Collection , University of North Carolin a a t Chapel Hill. 49. McRee , Life of Iredell, 1:7 4 (Thoma s Iredell to Iredell, undated; David L . Swain t o Griffit h J . McRee , 1855) . 50. Higginbotham , Papers of Iredell, l:lv-lv i (ed . essay) , 23 1 (Willia m Hooper t o Iredell , April 26 , 1774) , lxxv (quotin g Joseph Hewe s to Samue l Johnston, July 8 , 1775 , and Februar y 11 , 1776), 30 5 (Josep h Hewe s t o Iredell , Ma y 23, 1775) , 348 (Samue l Johnston t o Iredell , April 5 , 1776) . 51. Ibid. , 410-11 (Iredell' s essay "Cause s o f th e American Revolution") . 52. Ibid. , lix-lxi (ed . essay), 163-6 5 (Iredell' s "Essa y o n th e Cour t La w Con troversy"). 53. Ibid. , 251-67 (Iredell' s essay "T o The Inhabitant s o f Grea t Britain") . 54. Ibid. , 328-3 8 (Iredell' s essay "Th e Principle s o f a n American Whig") . 55. Ibid. , lxxii (ed . essay), 354-55 (Iredel l to Joseph Hewes , April 29 , 1776) . 56. McRee , Life of Iredell, 1:28 3 (ed . note). 57. Higginbotham , Papers of Iredell, l:lxxii i (ed . essay) , 370-41 1 (Iredell' s essay "Cause s o f th e American Revolution") . 58. See , e.g., ibid. , 412-1 3 (Joh n Johnsto n t o Iredell , July 4 , 1776) , 415-1 6 (Thomas Jones t o Iredell , July 23 , 1776) . 59. Ibid. , 427-4 3 (Iredell' s essa y "T o hi s Majesty Georg e Th e Third, Kin g of Great Britain , & c " ) . 60. Hele n B . Smith an d Elizabet h V . Moore, "Joh n Mare : A Composite Por trait," North Carolina Historical Review 4 4 (1967) : 18 , 3 4 (oath) ; Higgin botham, Papers of Iredell, 2:16-2 3 (charge) , 1 5 (resolutio n o f appreciatio n fo r charge); Samuel A. Ashe, History of North Carolina (Greensboro , N . C: Charle s L. Van Noppen, 1908) , 1:591-92 (Tory trials; urging patriotism); Higginbotham ,

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Papers of Iredell, 2:45-4 8 (Iredell' s essa y "T o th e Commissioner s o f th e Kin g o f Great Britai n fo r restorin g Peace , & a " ) , 4 8 (ed . note) (Carlisl e Commission) . 61. Higginbotham , Papers of Iredell, 2:39 3 (Iredel l t o Hanna h Iredell , Apri l ?, 1783), 430-32 (resolutions) , 446-51 (instructions) , l:lxxxvii-lxxxix (ed . essay, Washington's letter) . 62. Ibid. , 2:43 8 (Arthu r Iredel l t o Iredell , Augus t 18 , 1783) , 45 8 (Arthu r Iredell to Iredell, November 17,1783) , 469-72 (Iredel l to Thomas Iredell, ca. November 1783) ; McRee, Life of Iredell, 2:101- 3 (Iredel l t o Thoma s Iredell , Ma y 28, 1784) , 134-3 7 (Iredel l to Thoma s Iredell , February 23 , 1786) . 63. Se e Alpheus T. Mason, The States Rights Debate: Antifederalism and the Constitution (Englewoo d Cliffs , N.J. : Prentice-Hall , 1964) , 11 , 27 ; Jame s G . Exum, Jr., and Gar y R. Govert , "Nort h Carolin a an d th e Federal Constitution : A Commitment t o Liberty, " i n A. E. Howard, ed. , The Constitution in the Making: Perspectives of the Original Thirteen States (Williamsburg : Nationa l Cente r fo r State Courts, 1993), 183,187-88. For Iredell's perspective on the problems unde r the Articles, see his Charge to the Grand Jury for th e District of Virginia, May 23, 1796, i n McRee, Life of Iredell, 2:484 . 64. McRee , Life of Iredell, 2:55-56 (Iredel l t o Rev . Arthu r Iredell , Jul y 30 , 1783); Clinton L . Rossiter, 1787: The Grand Convention (Ne w York: W. W. Norton & Co. , 1987) , 127 , 150 ; Gordon S . Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution (Ne w York : Vintage Books , 1991) , 287. 65. McRee , Life of Iredell, 2:16 1 (Willia m R. Davie to Iredell, May 30,1787) . 66. E.g. , ibid. , 162 , 168-7 0 (Richar d Dobb s Spaigh t t o Iredell , July 3 , 1787 , and Augus t 12 , 1787) , 163 , 16 7 (Hug h Williamso n t o Iredell , July 8 , 1787 , an d July 22 , 1787) , 167-6 8 (Willia m R . Davi e t o Iredell , August 6 , 1787) . 67. Ibid. , 104- 5 (Iredel l t o Archibal d Neilson , Jun e 15 , 1784 ) (re : unpopu larity), 170-7 1 (ed . note); Iredell t o Whitmell Hill , probably Ma y 1787 , NCAH ; Louise I . Trenholme, The Ratification of the Federal Constitution in North Carolina (Ne w York : Columbi a Universit y Press , 1932) , 100-102 . 68. McRee , Life of Iredell, 2:180-8 1 (ed . note) , 181-8 3 (Gran d Jur y Ad dress). 69. Rober t A . Rutland , James Madison: The Founding Father (Ne w York : Macmillan Co. , 1987) , 21-27 . 70. McRee , Life of Iredell, 2:18 6 (ed . note) , 186-21 5 (text) ; Hugh T . Lefler , ed., A Plea for Federal Union: North Carolina, 1788 (Charlottesville : Universit y Press of Virginia, 1947) , 1 2 (Answers "attracte d nationa l attention") . Fifty o f th e eighty-five Federalist Papers postdat e Iredell' s "Answers. " Compar e McRee , Life of Iredell, 2:18 6 ("Answers " date d Januar y 8 , 1788 ) wit h The Federalist (J . Cooke, ed., 1961) . 71. McRee , Life of Iredell, 2:22 0 (Iredel l t o Th e Freeme n o f th e Tow n o f Edenton, undated) . 72. Ibid. , 224-25 (Thoma s Iredel l to Iredell , May 22 , 1788) .

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73. Ibid. , 223-2 4 (Willia m R . Davi e t o Iredell , Ma y 1 , 1788) , 225-2 6 (Archibald Maclain e t o Iredell , Jun e 4 , 1788) , 227-2 8 (Hug h Williamso n t o Iredell, July 7 , 1788) , 230 (Willia m R . Davi e to Iredell , July 9 , 1788) . 74. Jonatha n Elliot , ed., The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution (Philadelphia : J. B . Lippincott Co. , 1907) , 4:1-3. 75. Trenholme , Ratification of Federal Constitution in North Carolina, 147 ; Elliot, Debates on Adoption of Federal Constitution, 4:228 . 76. Elliot , Debates on Adoption of Federal Constitution, 4:143 . 77. McRee , Life of Iredell, 2:23 5 (ed . essay); Samuel Johnston t o Iredell, November 20 , 1788 , NCAH ; Davi d L . Corbitt , The Formation of North Carolina Counties, 1663-1943 (Raleigh : N.C . Div . o f Archive s an d History , 1950) , 127-29. 78. Se e McRee, Life of Iredell, 2:24 8 (Hug h Williamson t o Iredell, January 5 , 1789), 263-64 (Pierc e Butler to Iredell, August 11,1789) , 265 (Hug h Williamso n to Iredell , August 12 , 1789) , 267 (Joh n Steel e to Iredell , September 26 , 1789) . 79. Trenholme , Ratification of Federal Constitution in North Carolina, 226-32; Willia m S . Powell , North Carolina Through Four Centuries (Chape l Hill: University o f North Carolin a Press , 1989) , 229. 80. McRee , Life of Iredell, 2:23 8 (Willia m Hoope r t o Iredell , Septembe r 2 , 1788). 81. Lefler , Plea for Federal Union, 21-22 , 35-38. While this essay is not iden tified beyon d peradventur e a s Iredell's, Lefler wa s convinced, an d th e present au thor i s convinced, tha t h e was the author . 82. Willia m S . Powell, North Carolina: A History (Chape l Hill : University of North Carolin a Press , 1977) , 91 ; Maeva Marcu s e t al. , eds. , The Documentary History of the Supreme Court of the United States, 1789-1800 (Ne w York : Co lumbia University Press, 1985), 1 (pt. 2): 649 n.l; John C . Cavanagh, Decision at Fayetteville: The North Carolina Ratification Convention and General Assembly of 1789 (Raleigh : N.C. Div. of Archives an d History , 1989) , 11. 83. McRee , Life of Iredell, 2:23 6 (ed . note) ; Trenholme, Ratification of Federal Constitution in North Carolina, 197 , 205, 215; Iredell to Hugh Williamson , January 22,1789, NCAH. Iredell may actually have sought election to the secon d ratification conventio n an d lost. See Archibald Maclaine to Iredell, September 15 , 1789, Duke . 84. Trenholme , Ratification of Federal Constitution in North Carolina, 199 ; McRee, Life of Iredell, 2:26 6 (Joh n Williams t o Iredell , September 11 , 1789). 85. Cavanagh , Decision at Fayetteville, 27 ; William Dawso n t o Iredell , No vember 22, 1789 , Duke; William R . Davie to Iredell, November 22 , 1789 , Duke; Samuel Johnston t o Iredell , November 23 , 1789, Duke. 86. Alber t R . Newsome , "Nort h Carolina' s Ratificatio n o f th e Federa l Con stitution," North Carolina Historical Review 1 7 (1940): 287, 297.

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87. McRee , Life of Iredell, 2:27 2 (Willia m Dawso n t o Iredell , November 22 , 1789; Samuel Johnston t o Iredell, November 23 , 1789), 273 (Charle s Johnson t o Iredell, November 23 , 1789) . 88. Trenholme , Ratification of Federal Constitution in North Carolina, 147 . 89. Henr y G . Connor , "Jame s Iredell : Lawyer , Statesman , Judge . 1751-1799," University of Pennsylvania Law Review 6 0 (1912) : 225, 236. 90. Trenholme , Ratification of Federal Constitution in North Carolina, 120 . 91. Hampto n L . Carson , The History of the Supreme Court of the United States with Biographies of all the Chief and Associate Justices (Philadelphia : P. W. Ziegler an d Co. , 1902 ; reprint , Ne w York : Leno x Hil l Publishers , 1971) , 1:154-55; McRee , Life of Iredell, 2:26 4 (Pierc e Butle r t o Iredell , Augus t 11 , 1789), 26 5 (Hug h Williamso n t o Iredell , Augus t 12 , 1789) , 27 5 (Archibal d Maclaine t o Iredell , Decembe r 9 , 1789) ; Iredel l t o Henr y McCulloh , Marc h 31 , 1790, NCAH; Iredel l t o John Rutledge , April 9 , 1790 , Duke . 92. Se e Samue l Johnsto n t o Iredell : Februar y 11 , 1790 , NCAH ; Marc h 6 , 1790, Duke . 93. McRee , Life of Iredell, 2:307-2 0 ("T O TH E CITIZEN S O F TH E UNITED STATES " from " A CITIZE N O F PENNSYLVANIA") . 94. Ibid. , 431 (Willia m R . Davi e to Iredell , December 15 , 1794) . 95. Ibid. , 32 0 ("T O TH E CITIZEN S . . ." letter) . 96. Ibid. , 431 (Willia m R . Davie to Iredell , December 15 , 1794, noting "con ciliatory effec t wit h respec t t o the government" o f Justice Wilson's conduct whil e holding court), 435 (ed . essay). 97. Ibid. , 551-7 0 (Charg e t o Unite d State s Gran d Jur y fo r th e Distric t o f Pennsylvania, Apri l 11 , 1799) ; a s t o resentment , se e Herber t S . Turner , The Dreamer Archibald DeBow Murphey (Verona , Va.: McClure Press , 1971) , 53. 98. E.g. , Charges to Grand Jury at Richmond, Virginia: May 23,1796, Duke ; May 22 , 1797 , McRee, Life of Iredell, 2:508-9 . 99. McRee , Life of Iredell, 2:56 9 (Charg e t o Unite d State s Gran d Jur y fo r Pennsylvania, Apri l 11 , 1799). 100. Charge s to United State s Gran d Juries: Trenton, April 2, 1793 ; Philadelphia, Apri l 11 , 1793 ; an d Annapolis , Ma y 7 , 179 3 (NCAH) . Th e Annapoli s charge i s in McRee, Life of Iredell, 2:386 , 387 . 101. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 41 9 (1793) . 102. Warren , Supreme Court in U.S. History, 1:92-93 . 103. Juliu s Goebel, Jr., History of the Supreme Court of the United States: Antecedents and Beginnings to 1801 (Ne w York : Macmilla n Co. , 1971) , 741-42 ; Kemp P . Yarborough, "Chisholm v. Georgia: A Study o f th e Minorit y Opinion " (Ann Arbor , Mich. : Universit y Microfilms , 1991) , 3 3 o f unpublishe d Ph . D . dis sertation, Columbi a University , 1963 . 104. Elliot , Debates on Adoption of Federal Constitution, 3:523-27 , 533 , 555-56; Warren , Supreme Court in U.S. History, 1:96 ; Yarborough , "Chisholm

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v. Georgia: A Study," 17 , 30-31, 52-58,194-95 ; see also William A. Fletcher, " A Historical Interpretation o f the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Constructio n o f an Affirmativ e Gran t o f Jurisdiction Rathe r tha n a Prohibitio n Agains t Jurisdic tion," Stanford Law Review 3 5 (1983) : 1033 , 1047-50 . 105. Se e 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 450-79 (passim) ; Yarborough, "Chisholm v. Georgia: A Study, " 178-79 . 106. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) a t 44 9 (Iredell , J., dissenting) . 107. McRee , Life of Iredell, 2:193 ; Yarborough , ''Chisholm v. Georgia: A Study," 192-95 . 108. Elliot , Debates on Adoption of Federal Constitution, 4:35 ; Yarborough , "Chisholm v. Georgia: A Study," 192 , 232-33. 109. McRee , Life of Iredell, 2:348 , 387; Yarborough, "Chisholm v. Georgia: A Study," 234-35 , 235 n . 1 . 110. The Federalist (J . Cook e ed. , 1961) , No . 9 , a t 55; No . 32 , a t 200 ; No . 81, a t 548-4 9 (Alexande r Hamilton) ; Elliot , Debates on Adoption of Federal Constitution, 3:53 3 (Jame s Madison) , 555-56 (Joh n Marshall) ; se e Samue l F . Miller, Lectures on the Constitution of the United States (Ne w York : Bank s & Bros., 1891) , 380-82 ; Yarborough , "Chisholm v. Georgia: A Study, " 233-34 , 240-41,318. 111. Cohens v. Virginia, 1 9 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 , 406 (1821) . 112. Rober t Shnayerson , The Illustrated History of the Supreme Court of the United States (Ne w York : Harr y N . Abrams , 1986) , 70 ; Franci s N . Thorpe , A Constitutional History of the American People, 1776-1850 (Ne w York : Harpe r &C Bros. , 1898) , 1:177 ; se e als o Jefferso n B . Fordham , "Iredell' s Dissen t i n Chisholm v. Georgia: It s Politica l Significance, " North Carolina Historical Review 8 (1931) : 155 , 162-63 ; Willia m D . Guthrie , "Th e Elevent h Articl e o f Amendment t o th e Constitutio n o f th e Unite d States, " Columbia Law Review 8 (1908): 183 , 185-86 ; Yarborough , "Chisholm v. Georgia: A Study, " 180-87 , 192-93. 113. See , e.g. , Joh n V . Orth , The judicial Power of the United States: The Eleventh Amendment in American History (Ne w York: Oxfor d Universit y Press , 1987), 13-14 , 22 , 42 , 69-70 , 74-75 , 137-38 , 149 , 159 ; Joh n V . Orth , "Th e Truth About Justice Iredell's Dissent in Chisholm v. Georgia (1793), " North Carolina Law Review 7 3 (1994): 255 (passim) . Professor Orth' s thesis is that Iredell' s dissent reste d o n th e absenc e o f a statutor y remedy , no t o n th e lac k o f constitu tional power . 114. Leo n Friedma n an d Fre d L . Israel , The Justices of the United States Supreme Court, 1789-1969: Their Lives and Major Opinions (Ne w York : Chelsea House , 1969) , 1:131 , 133 . 115. Se e David P . Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The First Hundred Years, 1789-1888 (Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1985), 9 n.29. In Colder v. Bull, Iredel l state d tha t h e ha d "no t ha d a n opportunit y t o reduc e

James Iredell 227 [his] opinio n t o writing. " 3 U.S . ( 3 Dall. ) 386 , 39 8 (1798) . Th e statemen t wa s made i n a n opinio n tha t covere d thre e page s o f th e officia l reports , s o his mean ing i s unclear . I t lend s suppor t t o th e notio n tha t opinion s wer e no t alway s re duced t o writing , however . 116. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 5 4 (1795) . 117. Ibid. , 90 . 118. Ibid. , 91. 119. Haines , Role of the Supreme Court, 1:141 . 120. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 13 3 (1795) . 121. Ibid. , 161-64 . 122. Ibid. , 163 . 123. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 17 1 (1796) . 124. Ibid. , 181-83 . 125. Goebel , U.S. Supreme Court: Antecedents and Beginnings, 778; Leonar d W. Levy , Original Intent and the Framers' Constitution (Ne w York : Macmilla n Co., 1988) , 59; Warren, Supreme Court in U.S. History, 1:146-47 . 126. Friedma n an d Israel , The Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court, 1:192 . 127. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199(1796) . 128. Currie , Constitution in the Supreme Court, 1789-1888, 4 , 39 , 4 1. 129. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) a t 256-80 . 130. Ibid. , 270 . 131. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 38 6 (1798) . 132. Ibid. , 387-89 . 133. Ibid. , 399 . 134. Currie , Constitution in the Supreme Court, 1789-1888, 47-48 ; Jethr o K. Lieberman , The Enduring Constitution: A Bicentennial Perspective (St . Paul , Minn.: West Publishing Co. , 1987) , 263. 135. Currie , Constitution in the Supreme Court, 1789-1888, 58 . 136. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) a t 92 . 137. Currie , Constitution in the Supreme Court, 1789-1888, 57-58 . 138. Willia m S . Powell, ed., Dictionary of North Carolina Biography (Chape l Hill: Universit y o f Nort h Carolin a Press , 1988) , 3:25 4 (entr y b y Do n Higgin botham). 139. McRee , Life of Iredell, 2:30 6 (Arthu r Iredel l t o Iredell , Februar y 1 , 1791). 140. Se e Wythe Holt , " T h e Federa l Court s Hav e Enemie s i n Al l Wh o Fea r Their Influenc e o n Stat e Objects' : The Failur e t o Abolish Suprem e Cour t Circuit Riding in the Judiciary Act s of 179 2 an d 1793, " Buffalo Law Review 3 6 (1987) : 301, 305-6 . 141. Se e Charles Warren, "Ne w Ligh t o n the History o f the Federal Judiciar y Act o f 1789, " Harvard Law Review 3 7 (1923) : 49, 95. 142. Se e Holt, "Failur e t o Abolish Circuit-Riding, " 307-8 ; Wythe Holt , " T o

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Establish Justice' : Politics , Th e Judiciar y Ac t o f 1789 , an d th e Inventio n o f th e Federal Courts, " Duke Law Journal (1989) : 1421,1488-89,1489 n.235 ; Maeva Marcus and Emily F. Van Tassell, "Judges and Legislators in the New Federal System, 1789-1800, " i n Rober t A . Katzmann, ed. , Judges and Legislators: Toward Institutional Comity (Washington , D.C. : Brookings Institution , 1988) , 31, 32. 143. Iredel l t o Thoma s Iredel l (uncle) , Jul y 6 , 1791 , NCAH ; Joh n Ja y t o Iredell, March 16 , 1791 , NCAH. 144. Holt , "Failur e t o Abolis h Circuit-Riding, " 311-12 ; Marcus e t al. , Documentary History of U.S. Supreme Court, 2:132,13 5 (Iredel l to John Jay, William Cushing, James Wilson, February 11,1791 ) (sam e letter in McRee, Life of Iredell, 2:322-25). 145. Holt , "Failur e t o Abolis h Circuit-Riding, " 328-29 ; Marcus e t al. , Documentary History of U.S. Supreme Court, 2:235-3 7 (ed . essay) , 24 7 (Iredel l t o Thomas Johnson, March 15,1792) , 248 n.6 , 249 (Joh n Jay to Iredell, March 19 , 1792). 146. Marcu s e t al., Documentary History of U.S. Supreme Court, 2:23 5 (ed . essay), 245 (Jame s Wilson to Thomas Johnson, March 13,1792) ; McRee, Life of Iredell, 2:46 5 (Iredel l t o Hanna h Iredell , March 31 , 1796). The Judiciary Ac t o f 1801, which temporarily eliminated circuit riding, came too late to benefit Iredell , who died in 1799. That act was repealed in 1802, and almost another ninety years would pas s befor e circui t ridin g b y th e justice s wa s agai n eliminated . Marcu s e t al., Documentary History of U.S. Supreme Court, 2:34 1 n.19 , 444 n.4 . 147. Ther e ar e numerou s account s o f th e Invali d Pension s Act . See , e.g. , Goebel, U.S. Supreme Court: Antecedents and Beginnings, 560-65; Marcu s et al., Documentary History of U.S. Supreme Court, 2:235-3 6 (ed . essay); McRee, Life of Iredell, 2:357-58 . 148. Goebel , U.S. Supreme Court: Antecedents and Beginnings, 560-61 . 149. McRee , Life of Iredell, 2:36 1 (Iredel l t o Hanna h Iredell , Septembe r 30 , 1792); Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 , 411-12 (1792 ) (reportin g th e Apri l 18, 1792 , Pennsylvania Circui t opinio n o f Justices Wilson an d Blair , and Distric t Judge Peters) . 150. See Maeva Marcu s an d Rober t Tier , "Hayburn's Case: A Misinterpreta tion o f Precedent, " Wisconsin Law Review (1988) : 527, 533-34 . 151. McRee , Life of Iredell, 1:36 1 (Iredel l t o Hanna h Iredell , Septembe r 30 , 1792); Iredell's "Reason s fo r actin g a s a Commissione r o n th e Invali d Act, " Oc tober 1792 , NCAH; Marcus an d Va n Tassell, "Judge s an d Legislators, " 39-40 . 152. McRee , Life of Iredell, 2:36 2 (Iredel l t o Hanna h Iredell , Septembe r 30 , 1792). 153. See , e.g., McRee , Life of Iredell, 2:44 0 (Iredel l t o Hanna h Iredell , Feb ruary 26,1795); Robert J. Wagman, The Supreme Court: A Citizen's Guide (Ne w York: Pharo s Books , 1993) , 4 1 (Iredel l awa y fro m hom e eleve n month s i n firs t year o n Suprem e Court) .

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154. Iredel l to Helen Blair Tredwell (Hannah' s niece) , May 27,1795, NCAH . 155. Iredel l t o Hanna h Iredell , Januar y 31 , 1795 , Duke ; January 2 1 , 1795 , July 29, 1796 , and January 23 , 1797, NCAH . 156. Iredel l t o Hanna h Iredell , Octobe r 27 , 1791 , an d Apri l 7 , 1794 , NCAH. 157. McRee , Life of Iredell, 2:38 5 (Iredel l to Hanna h Iredell , May 5 , 1793) . 158. E.g. , Iredel l t o Hanna h Iredell , Octobe r 2 , 1791 , and Apri l 10 , 1798 , NCAH; Iredel l t o Anni e Iredell , Augus t 5 , 1795 , NCAH ; Marcu s e t al. , Documentary History of U.S. Supreme Court, 3:25 7 (Cit y Gazette , Augusta, Georgia , May 5 , 1798) , 280-81 (Joh n Youn g Noel t o William Paterson , July 20, 1798) . 159. E.g. , Iredel l t o Hanna h Iredell , Septembe r 19 , 1791 , an d Octobe r 2 , 1791, NCAH . 160. Iredel l t o Hanna h Iredell , November 11 , 1791, NCAH. 161. Marcu s e t al. , Documentary History of U.S. Supreme Court, 2:295-9 7 (Iredell to Hannah Iredell , September 23 , 1792) . 162. McRee , Life of Iredell, 2:346-4 7 (Iredel l t o Hanna h Iredell , Apri l 26 , 1792); Iredel l t o Hanna h Iredell , Januar y 23 , 1795 , an d Februar y 3 , 1796 , NCAH. 163. Goebel , U.S. Supreme Court: Antecedents and Beginnings, 553 ; McRee, Life of Iredell, 2:400-40 1 (Dr . Duffield t o Iredell, September 5 , 1793 ; Pierce But ler to Iredell , September 9 , 1793) . 164. E.g. , McRee , Life of Iredell, 2:37 1 (Iredel l t o Hanna h Iredell , Octobe r 21,1792), 394 (Iredel l to Hannah Iredell , May 20,1793), 477 (Iredel l to Hanna h Iredell, July 29, 1796) . 165. Marcu s e t al. , Documentary History of U.S. Supreme Court, 2:24 9 (Nathaniel Pendleto n t o Iredell , March 19 , 1792) . 166. E.g. , McRee, Life of Iredell, 2:29 6 (Iredel l to Hannah Iredell , Septembe r 14, 1790) ; Iredel l t o Hanna h Iredell , Ma y 7 , 1795 , NCAH ; Januar y 29 , 1797 , Duke. 167. E.g. , McRee, Life of Iredell, 2:28 8 n . (har d mone y a t hi s disposal); John Hay to Iredell, November 1 , 1790, Duke (fre e lodging) ; Iredell to Hannah Iredell , May 28 , 1790 , NCA H (Justic e Rutledge' s kindness) ; Iredel l t o Hanna h Iredell , May 31 , 1790, Duke (Judg e Pendleton's wife' s "civilities") . 168. E.g. , McRee , Life of Iredell, 2:28 8 (Iredel l t o Hanna h Iredell , Ma y 10 , 1790); Iredell to Hanna h Iredell , February 3 , 1796 , NCAH . 169. E.g. , McRee, Life of Iredell, 2:37 3 (Iredel l to Hannah Iredell , Novembe r 5, 1792 ) (dinne r wit h Governo r John Hancoc k o f Massachusetts) . 170. E.g. , Iredel l t o Hanna h Iredell , Septembe r 25 , 1792 , NCAH ; Apri l 15 , 1795, Duke (tea s with Mrs . John Jay). 171. E.g. , McRee , Life of Iredell, 2:30 0 (Iredel l t o Hanna h Iredell , Octobe r 30, 1790) ; Iredell t o Hanna h Iredell , Octobe r 13 , 1792, NCAH . 172. E.g. , McRee , Life of Iredell, 2:43 9 (Iredel l t o Hanna h Iredell , Februar y

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5, 1795) , 45 6 (Iredel l t o Hanna h Iredell , Novembe r 27 , 1795) , 49 4 (Iredel l t o Hannah Iredell , February 24 , 1797) . 173. E.g. , Marcu s e t al. , Documentary History of U.S. Supreme Court, 2:480-81 (Joh n Gabrie l Guignar d t o Iredell, August 22, 1794) ; Resolution o f th e Grand Jur y a t Raleigh , [N.C. J Jun e 4 , 179 8 (Circui t Court , Jun e Ter m 1798) , NCAH. 174. E.g. , McRee, Life of Iredell 2:29 7 (Iredel l to Hanna h Iredell , Septembe r 15, 1790 ) (Thoma s Miffli n o f Pennsylvania) , 36 3 (Iredel l to Hanna h Iredell , Oc tober 7,1792 ) (Elbridg e Gerr y of Massachusetts); Iredell to Hannah Iredell , Ma y 9, 1791 , NCAH (Charle s Carrol l o f Maryland) ; Ma y 5 , 1793 , NCA H (Luthe r Martin o f Maryland) . 175. E.g. , Patric k Henry—se e McRee , Life of Iredell, 2:39 4 (Iredel l t o Han nah Iredell , May 27 , 1793) ; John Marshall—se e Alber t J. Beveridge , The Life of John Marshall (Boston : Houghto n Mifflin , 1916) , 2:188 ; Irwi n S . Rhodes , The Papers of John Marshall: A Descriptive Calendar (Norman : Universit y o f Okla homa Press , 1969) , 1:480-81 . 176. Se e Frank Nash, "A n Eighteenth Centur y Circui t Rider" (Proceeding s of the Twentieth an d Twenty-First Annua l Session s of the State Literary an d Histor ical Association o f North Carolina , Publications o f the North Carolin a Historica l Commission, Bulleti n No . 28 , Edward s 6c " Broughton, Raleigh , N.C. , 1922) , 69-70. 177. Charle s Dickens, Hard Times (Ne w York: Oxford Universit y Press, 198 9 ed.), 95. 178. Willia m K . Boyd , History of North Carolina: The Federal Period, 1783-1860 (Spartanburg , S.C. : Reprin t Co. , 1973 ) (origina l ed. , 1919) , 2:385. 179. Henderson , North Carolina, 1:418 . 180. Marcu s e t al., Documentary History of U.S. Supreme Court 2:4 .

Chapter 8

William Paterso n Small States' Nationalist Daniel A. Degnan, S.J.

Appointed b y George Washington i n 1793 as a justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, 1 William Paterson was in the unique position given to a Founder. At the Constitutional Conventio n of 1787, he had helpe d t o fram e th e Constitutio n unde r whic h h e exercised judi cial office.2 In the first Senate, he had been one of the principal author s of th e Judiciar y Ac t o f 1789 , whic h constructe d th e federa l judicia l system. Indeed , th e first nin e section s o f th e act , whic h include d th e composition o f th e Suprem e Cour t an d th e establishmen t o f th e dis trict and circui t courts, were in Paterson's handwriting. 3 Thus, Paterson was a Founding Father bot h of the nation an d of the federal judi ciary. Consequently, thi s stud y o f Paterson' s wor k a s a justic e o f th e Supreme Cour t ha s a n unusua l aspect . Paterson' s influenc e o n th e Court throug h hi s work i n the conventio n an d hi s structurin g o f th e federal judiciar y wer e mor e importan t t o th e natio n an d t o th e Supreme Cour t itsel f tha n eve n his substantial contribution s a s a justice. This essay, accordingly, has two parts: the convention and the Judiciary Act, and Paterson's work o n the Court . First, however, a brief loo k a t hi s roots i n New Jersey helps to explain much about William Paterson. He was born in Antrim, Ireland , in 1745. In 1747, his Scotch-Irish parents came to America. His fathe r An earlie r versio n o f thi s essa y appeare d a s "Justic e Willia m Paterson—Founder, " 1 6 Seton Hall Law Review 313-3 8 (1986) . Permission t o reprin t th e essa y i s appreciated .

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opened a general stor e i n Princeton, acros s fro m Nassa u Hal l o f th e College of New Jersey. Paterson was fourteen when he entered the college in 1759. He studied the classics and moral philosophy, read Pope and Dryden, was strongly religious, and saw no conflict betwee n religion and the rationalism of John Locke and Thomas Hobbes. He was anxious to advance himself an d to become a gentleman. 4 Paterson wa s rathe r short , slight , no t handsome , an d h e waite d fourteen year s afte r colleg e to marry . H e was a leader, however , an d he helped found th e Cliosophic Society, a social and debating club, at Princeton.5 After graduation , he read law in Princeton under Richar d Stockton.6 H e finally lef t Princeton , wit h misgivings , fo r a countr y practice in Raritan. There, besides being a surrogate, he seems to have spent a great deal of time handling his father's financial problems. 7 Paterson though t tha t bot h private an d public life rested o n mora l virtue, and virtue in turn rested on discipline. The enemy of virtue was luxury, an d Paterso n sa w luxur y i n the Britis h monarchy . A s a goo d Calvinist, Paterso n sa w th e peopl e a s als o pron e t o luxury. 8 H e thought, however , tha t moral s an d republica n governmen t togethe r would hel p t o kee p th e citizen s virtuous . Eve n so , to Paterson , gov ernment depended upon a natural aristocracy of virtuous leaders who would see k the public interest. 9 Paterson wa s a blend o f the moralistic an d th e practical, an ambi tious an d perhap s a somewha t insecur e perso n i n hi s earl y years . These persona l paradoxe s wer e eviden t durin g th e Constitutiona l Convention. A consisten t nationalist , Paterso n introduce d th e Ne w Jersey, or Paterson, plan fo r amendin g the Articles of Confederation ; he opposed Madison's Virginia plan, which became the eventual basis of the Constitution. 10 After achievin g equality for the small states, Paterson left th e convention o n July 23, when half o f the work was still to b e done. 11 Thes e contradiction s see m t o fit Willia m Pierce' s de scription o f Paterson a t the convention : [0]ne o f those Men whose powers brea k i n upon you, and create astonish ment. H e i s a Man o f grea t modesty , with look s tha t bespea k talent s o f n o great extent,—bu t h e i s a Classic , a lawyer, an d a n Orator;—an d o f a disposition s o favorabl e t o hi s advancemen t tha t everyon e seeme d read y t o exalt hi m with thei r praises. 12

In spite of these paradoxes, Paterson had a set of consistent principles and great opportunities . Property an d political stabilit y were sa-

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cred to him.13 As a lawyer, Paterson sued debtors, and as attorney general during the Revolution, he pursued Tories and fought fo r politica l and financial stability in New Jersey.14 Paterson joined his friends an d mentors from Princeto n in a rebellion against a monarchy that he saw as luxury-ridden an d contemptuous o f republican principles. 15 Paterson represente d th e middle-class, Presbyteria n Ne w Jersey of the colonial era . He serve d a s secretary t o bot h Ne w Jersey's Provin cial Congres s an d it s constitutiona l conventio n befor e bein g name d attorney general. 16 In 1787, he was chosen as one of New Jersey's delegates to the federal Constitutiona l Conventio n in Philadelphia.17 The convention, in the words of his biographer John E. O'Connor, was his finest hour.18 The Constitutional Convention It was as a politician, lawyer, and strategist that William Paterson distinguished himself a t the Constitutional Convention . Madison of Virginia an d Wilso n o f Pennsylvani a wer e t o b e the principa l architect s of the new government, not only because of ability and political principle bu t becaus e th e interest s o f thei r state s coincide d wit h th e cre ation o f a strong national governmen t an d wit h proportionat e repre sentation b y population i n both branche s of the legislature. Madison, Wilson, an d Gouverneu r Morri s wer e determine d t o institut e a na tional o r consolidate d governmen t tha t woul d giv e th e state s a dis tinctly subordinat e role , the opposit e o f governmen t unde r th e Arti cles of Confederation. 19 William Paterson , representin g Ne w Jersey , le d th e coalitio n o f small states that stopped the large-state juggernaut and brought abou t the Great Compromise. 20 The compromise provided for proportiona l representation i n the House of Representatives, bu t equal representa tion i n the Senate. 21 It ensure d als o tha t th e ne w governmen t woul d be a federal on e having a significant rol e for th e states. Indeed, Pater son was later to describe the federal syste m as "sovereigntie s movin g within a sovereignty." 22 To political thinker s lik e Paterson, the Grea t Compromise wa s necessar y t o preven t th e demis e o f smal l states ' rights and autonom y i n the new government . Nowhere was this more evident than in Paterson's home state. New Jersey, having no major ports , had to import and export through Ne w

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York an d Philadelphia , bot h o f whic h lai d dutie s o n Ne w Jersey' s commerce. Paterson's hom e stat e was, in Madison's words , "likene d to a cask tapped at both ends." 23 New Jersey, like Connecticut, Maryland, an d Delaware , wa s a relativel y smal l state . Alon g wit h thos e states and New York, it had no claims to western territory. If the new government were to be based on representation accordin g to popula tion, Paterso n an d other s believed , Ne w Jersey coul d anticipat e tha t the larg e state s suc h a s Virginia , Pennsylvania , Massachusetts , an d others would subordinat e Ne w Jersey's interest s t o their s an d woul d perhaps eve n destro y th e smalle r states. 24 B y contrast, fo r th e larg e states wit h significan t population s o r th e prospec t o f ne w wester n lands, proportional representatio n i n the national governmen t pose d little apparen t threa t t o thei r interests. 25 I n addition , Madison , Wil son, and som e of the others from th e large states had background s of national and even international experience, while Paterson had served New Jersey during the Revolution a s its attorney general. 26 We must analyze Paterson's role in the course of the convention i n order to understand an d appraise it. In the first two weeks, from Ma y 30 t o June 13 , the delegate s me t a s a committee o f th e whol e whil e Randolph, Madison, Wilson, and others formulated th e Virginia plan. The plan, largely drafted b y Madison, presented the idea of a national government consisting of three branches with broad national powers. Of thes e branches , the lawmakin g bod y wa s a two-house legislatur e to b e chosen accordin g t o proportiona l representation . Th e plan en visioned a new form o f government rather than a n amendment to the Articles of Confederation. 27 While th e differen t resolution s o f th e Virgini a pla n wer e bein g adopted, Paterso n remaine d silent. 28 O n Jun e 9 , however , Paterso n rose to objec t t o th e proposal fo r proportiona l representation . I n his carefully prepare d speech , Paterson argued that the body was moving beyond its mandate fro m th e states, which was to amend the Articles of Confederation. 29 Mor e important , Paterso n state d tha t th e smal l states could neve r agre e to the dominance b y the large states embod ied in the Virginia plan. 30 Madison's notes recorded the speech and the peroration: He allude d t o th e hin t throw n ou t heretofor e b y Mr . Wilson o f th e neces sity t o whic h th e larg e State s migh t b e reduce d o f confederatin g amon g themselves, b y a refusa l o f th e other s t o concur . Le t the m unit e i f the y

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please, bu t le t the m remembe r tha t the y hav e n o authorit y t o compe l th e others t o unite . Ne w Jerse y wil l neve r confederat e o n th e pla n befor e th e Committee. Sh e woul d b e swallowe d up . H e ha d rathe r submi t t o a monarch, t o a despot , tha n t o suc h a fate . H e woul d no t onl y oppos e th e plan her e bu t o n hi s retur n hom e d o everythin g i n hi s powe r t o defea t i t there. 31

Wilson replie d tha t th e larg e state s coul d no t agre e t o representa tion no t base d upo n population , i n whic h a minorit y coul d rul e th e majority. 32 Th e Committe e o f th e Whol e vote d o n Jun e 1 1 t o accep t the principl e o f representatio n i n bot h house s accordin g t o popula tion, bu t th e conventio n resolve d t o tak e th e matte r u p again. 33 On Jun e 13 , a Wednesday, th e Committe e o f th e Whole decide d t o report th e Virgini a pla n t o th e convention. 34 Paterson' s interventio n on Jun e 9 , however , ha d initiate d a grea t debat e betwee n th e larg e states an d th e small . The nex t mov e b y Paterson wa s th e introductio n of a n alternativ e t o th e Virgini a plan—th e Ne w Jersey , o r Paterson , plan. 35 Afte r obtainin g a reces s t o complet e it s preparation , an d wit h backing b y New Jersey, Connecticut , Delaware , an d Luthe r Marti n o f Maryland, Paterso n presente d th e pla n o n Jun e 15. 3 6 Essentially, Pa terson's pla n expande d th e power s o f th e Confederation. 37 Afte r sev eral day s o f debat e o n th e tw o plans , cappe d b y a speec h fro m Madi son, th e Virgini a pla n wa s approve d o n June 1 9 b y th e Committe e o f the Whole b y a vot e o f seve n t o three. 38 Madison , Wilson , an d other s had eloquentl y presente d th e Virginia plan , while the New Jersey pla n had bee n throw n togethe r hastily. 39 Th e smal l stat e delegate s wer e united onl y i n thei r deman d fo r equality. 40 Nevertheless, th e Ne w Jerse y pla n an d Paterson' s earlie r interven tion o f Jun e 9 ha d dramaticall y highlighte d th e caus e o f th e smal l states fo r equality . Fro m Jun e 2 1 t o Jun e 26 , th e conventio n too k u p each detai l o f th e Virgini a pla n a s submitte d b y th e Committe e o f th e Whole. 41 O n Jun e 27 , the debat e ove r representatio n wa s renewe d b y Luther Marti n o f Marylan d i n a long, rambling speech. 42 O n June 28 , Dayton o f Ne w Jerse y an d Lansin g o f Ne w Yor k move d fo r equalit y among th e state s i n th e lowe r branch. 43 Thei r motio n wa s lost , wit h Connecticut, Ne w York , New Jersey, and Delawar e o n th e losing side , and Marylan d divided. 44 Representatio n i n the Senat e was considere d next, wit h Ellswort h o f Connecticu t movin g fo r equalit y an d express ing doubt tha t an y stat e nort h o f Pennsylvania , excep t Massachusetts ,

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would consen t t o anythin g othe r tha n equa l representation. 45 A ti e vote ensued o n July 2, and a special committee wa s elected to repor t a compromise. 46 Paterson, who had remaine d silen t during this debate, was elected to the committee. 47 The composition o f the committee meant that the convention favore d a compromis e wit h th e smalle r states . Madiso n and Wilson were not elected; large state delegates who were willing to compromise wer e chose n instead. 48 Th e result , reporte d o n Jul y 5 , was th e Grea t Compromise : representatio n b y populatio n i n th e House and equal representation i n the Senate. 49 After a long debate on other parts of the compromise—the numbe r of representatives in the House, the counting of slaves, and the power over mone y bills 50—the conventio n adopte d th e ful l compromis e o n July 16. 51 Connecticut, Ne w Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, an d Nort h Carolina vote d ye s (Ne w Yor k wa s absent) ; Pennsylvania , Virginia , South Carolina , an d Georgi a voted no ; Massachusetts was divided. 52 Randolph o f Virgini a the n aske d fo r a n adjournmen t t o enabl e th e large states to evaluate their position, and he suggested that the small states migh t als o conside r a metho d o f conciliation. 53 A t thi s point , Paterson, not one to let the victory slip away, intervened. He would be happy t o second Randolph's motio n fo r a n adjournmen t fo r th e pur pose o f consultin g wit h hi s constituents , h e said , becaus e th e smal l states woul d neve r yiel d thei r deman d fo r equalit y i n th e Senate. 54 Randolph replie d tha t h e ha d neve r intende d mor e tha n a day' s ad journment.55 Th e nex t day , Jul y 17 , afte r inconclusiv e discussio n among large-state delegates, the compromise was left intact , much t o Madison's distress. 56 On this same day, Paterson wrote to his wife, " I expect to b e with you o n o r abou t th e firs t o f nex t mont h an d hop e tha t I shall not b e under the necessity of returning." 57 Paterson seems to have had pressing busines s a t home ; h e wa s uncomfortabl e i n Philadelphi a an d avoided th e socia l life th e convention calle d for; 58 an d h e had, a s always, one foot i n New Jersey. Perhaps he decided to leave only a few days later , o n July 23 , because h e realized tha t th e wor k o f th e con vention woul d tak e som e week s more . Nevertheless, h e returne d o n September 1 7 to sign the proposed constitution. 59 Despite persistent impression s t o th e contrary , which ar e attribut able in part t o Madison's notes of July 7 , it seems clear that Paterso n supported th e Grea t Compromise. 60 Abov e all , he was satisfie d wit h

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the work o f the convention. In the letter of July 1 7 to his wife, Pater son als o wrote , "Th e busines s i s difficul t an d unavoidabl y take s u p much time, but I think we shall eventually agree upon and adopt a system that will give strength and harmony to the Union and render u s a great an d happ y people." 61 Fo r Paterso n a t tha t time , the principle s had been settled upon to his satisfaction, an d only the detail remained. In an August 23 letter to Olive r Ellsworth, he stated: What ar e th e Conventio n about ? Whe n wil l the y rise ? wil l the y agre e upon a Syste m energetic k an d effectual , o r wil l the y brea k u p withou t doing an y Thin g t o th e Purpose ? . . . I hop e yo u wil l no t hav e a s muc h Altercation upo n th e Detail , a s ther e wa s i n gettin g th e Principle s o f th e System. . . . I wis h yo u muc h Speed , an d tha t yo u ma y b e ful l o f goo d Works, the firs t mainl y fo r m y ow n Sake , for I dread goin g dow n agai n t o 6 2 Philadelphia….

Paterson's departur e onc e the smal l state s were protected symbol ized hi s rol e a t th e convention. 63 Th e succes s o f th e conventio n de pended upo n a n accommodatio n wit h th e smal l states , which Madi son, Wilson, and Morris were unwilling to make. That the debate was held, that it was conducted o n legal and political principles (whateve r the issues of propert y an d powe r concernin g th e western lands) , an d that it was able to continue instead of leading to the dissolution of the convention ca n b e attributed i n large part t o Paterson, who was abl e to stand up to the ablest men of the convention, such as Madison, Wilson, and Gouverneu r Morris. 64 The focus o f Paterson's efforts, i n turn, is directly traceable to New Jersey's place in the nascent attempt s t o establish th e bases of American political philosophy. As a small state, New Jersey needed a strong national government t o protect it s interests. Paterson's intimac y wit h New Jersey as a student, lawyer, and public official mad e him acutel y aware of this need. This intimacy ensure d tha t Ne w Jersey an d othe r small state s woul d hav e a cogent an d formidabl e voic e speakin g fo r them at the convention . Well educate d an d thoughtfu l a s h e was , however , Paterso n wa s more th e skille d common-la w an d chancer y practitione r tha n th e scholar o r politica l philosopher . Ye t i n hi s ow n politica l an d mora l philosophy, he was a strong advocat e o f stabilit y an d authority , wit h these convictions often directe d to securing the rights of property. Paterson als o stresse d th e people' s compact , a principle apparentl y de -

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rived fro m Joh n Locke , and a theory o f sovereignt y tha t bor e echoe s of Thoma s Hobbe s an d ma y hav e owe d muc h t o Willia m Black stone.65 In his later arguments supporting the Constitution an d in his work o n th e Suprem e Court , Paterso n wa s a n outspoke n Federalist , or nationalist . N o fundamenta l chang e i n Paterson' s view s seem s t o have been necessary, only the kind o f development share d b y most of the Founders. He was, from hi s experience, a true Federalist, seekin g national, sovereig n powe r whil e retainin g a n importan t rol e fo r th e states, which woul d remai n "sovereign " i n the exercis e o f thei r ow n nonnational powers . One als o sense s about Paterso n a certain underlyin g modest y an d rectitude about his duties. On July 17 , when he saw that the compromise would hold , his contribution t o the convention wa s sufficient; i t was time to return hom e to his family an d hi s law practice. What Paterson ha d don e wa s t o furnis h th e stron g bu t moderat e oppositio n that th e grea t pla n o f Madiso n required . I f th e Constitutio n wer e t o be propose d an d adopted , i t wa s no t onl y essentia l tha t th e smal l states be protected; i t was als o critical that th e convention itsel f b e a means fo r argument , debate , an d compromise . Paterson' s first argu ment o n June 9 raised th e questio n o f representation . The n th e Ne w Jersey plan created the vehicle for the great debate. It is significant tha t Paterson wa s electe d t o th e Committe e o f Compromise , an d tha t Madison, Wilson , an d Gouverneu r Morri s wer e not . On e ca n onl y speculate abou t wha t migh t hav e happene d t o th e conventio n i f th e small state s ha d no t bee n represente d b y a skillful , determined , an d courageous advocat e wh o was , at base , in agreement wit h Madison , Washington, an d the other nationalists . The Judiciary Act of 1789 New Jersey was the third state to ratify th e Constitution. 66 B y August 1788, the required nine states had done so. 67 On November 25,1788 , William Paterson was chosen by a joint session of the legislature to be one of New Jersey's two senators. 68 He took hi s seat in the Senate on March 19 , 1789, in New York City. On April 7, the Senate appointe d a committe e "t o 'brin g i n a bil l fo r organizin g th e judiciar y o f th e United States.'" 69 Paterso n wa s appointe d t o thi s committee , whic h produced th e Judiciary Act of 1789. 70

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The first nine sections of the Judiciary Act of 178 9 were in William Paterson's handwriting. 71 Almost identica l to the printed version , the handwritten draft discovere d by Charles Warren72 led to a reappraisal of Paterson' s contributio n t o thi s "grea t law." 73 Olive r Ellswort h chaired th e committe e an d i s considere d t o hav e bee n th e leadin g draftsman, bu t Paterson played a considerable role. 74 While th e Hous e wa s considerin g th e constitutiona l amendment s that becam e th e Bil l of Rights , the Senat e wa s undertakin g t o estab lish the federal courts. The select committee numbered ten (half of the Senate), among whom Ellsworth, Paterson, and Caleb Strong were the leading lawyers. 75 In addition, Ellswort h an d Paterso n were the principal drafters. 76 Paterson , from hi s practice of law in New Jersey, had the most extensive experience in both the common law and the equity or chancery jurisdiction fo r whic h New Jersey was noted. 77 In the first nin e sections, written b y Paterson an d enacted int o law, the bill stated: "B e it enacted b y the Senate and representatives o f the United State s o f Americ a i n Congress assembled , Tha t th e Suprem e Court o f th e United State s shal l consis t o f a chief justic e an d fiv e as sociate justices, any four o f whom shall be a quorum. . . ,"78 The next paragraph provide d a s follows: "An d b e it further enacte d b y the au thority aforesaid, Tha t the United State s shall be, and they hereby are divided int o eleven districts. . . ." 79 The provision for United States district and circuit courts, in Paterson's hand, was of primary importance . The new federal governmen t had fashioned "it s own judicial machinery for enforcing its claims and safeguarding its agents against the obstructions and prejudices of local authorities."80 Importan t matter s suc h a s financing th e government , commerce among the states, and foreign trad e would be facilitated b y the federal courts. 81 The division of the country into districts recognized the interests of the states. Each federal distric t had a district court an d was made coextensive wit h th e geographi c boundarie s o f a state , helpin g t o eas e the apprehension , a s Goebe l put s it , tha t th e federa l court s woul d obliterate thos e o f th e states. 82 Second , excep t fo r admiralty , th e ju risdiction o f the district court s was narrowly limited, 83 an d th e original jurisdiction o f the circuit courts , while broader , was carefully defined.84 The famous sectio n 25 provided fo r revie w by the Supreme Court , through writ s o f error , o f th e judgment s o f th e highes t court s o f th e

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states in law or equity when federal question s were involved. 85 It was Paterson wh o ha d introduce d th e supremac y claus e durin g th e con vention a s par t o f th e Ne w Jerse y plan. 86 Sectio n 25 , "perhap s th e boldest" section of the Judiciary Act, was an essential implementatio n of this clause. 87 As Laurence Tribe puts it, the Judiciary Ac t gave the Supreme Cour t th e powe r "t o revie w federa l questio n decision s o f state courts." 88 The Suprem e Cour t late r conclude d tha t th e Consti tution gav e it the power t o accep t suc h review. 89 In addition, sectio n 34 of the act provided that stat e laws would furnis h th e rules of decision in common-law trials in the courts of the United States. 90 Paterson, wit h hi s unusua l combinatio n o f nationalis m an d con cern for th e states, must have been a force o n the committee for bot h national powe r an d th e integrit y o f th e states . Becaus e h e wa s th e most widely experience d lawye r o n th e panel, the more technical as pects o f th e bil l must als o have owe d muc h t o him . It is unnecessar y to detrac t fro m Ellsworth' s leadershi p i n order t o recogniz e this . Paterson's drafting o f the first nine sections seems a good sign of the importance o f his contribution t o the Judiciary Act . In short, the Judiciary Act of 1789 established the system of federa l courts, and Olive r Ellsworth an d William Paterson were its principal authors. Of the act itself, Frankfurter an d Landi s have written: The Ac t ha s thre e claim s t o greatness . I t devise d a judicia l organizatio n which, wit h al l it s imperfections , serve d th e countr y substantiall y un changed fo r nearl y a century . Throug h supervisio n ove r stat e court s con ferred upo n th e Suprem e Cour t b y its famous Sectio n Twenty-five , th e Ac t created on e of the most important nationalizin g influence s i n the formativ e period o f the Republic. But the transcendent achievemen t o f the First Judiciary Ac t i s the establishmen t fo r thi s countr y o f th e traditio n o f a syste m of inferio r federa l courts. 91

Pater son'sWork on the Supreme Court In 1790 , when Governo r Livingsto n died , William Paterson was chosen by the legislature t o b e New Jersey's secon d governor. 92 Then , in 1793, Georg e Washington appointe d Paterso n t o the Suprem e Cour t of th e Unite d States. 93 Paterso n wa s t o serv e o n th e Cour t unti l hi s death in 1806, 94 but there was also other evidence of his position an d influence i n the new nation. In 1795 , Washington, who ha d preside d

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at the Constitutional Convention , offered Paterso n the office o f secretary of state, but he declined.95 Before Oliver Ellsworth was appointed chief justic e in 1796 , published report s indicate d tha t th e promotio n of Justice Paterson was imminent. 96 I n 1800 , Paterson was the candidate of the Senate for th e chief justiceship, but the senators yielded t o Adams's determination t o appoint John Marshall. 97 In th e earl y day s o f th e Suprem e Court , nearl y ever y cas e estab lished precedent . A s in th e convention , therefore , th e wa y t o follo w Paterson's wor k i s chronologically , an d Paterson' s Suprem e Cour t opinions will be discussed in the order in which they were written. Paterson also presided in the circuit courts, most notably at two trials for treason arisin g from th e Whiskey Rebellion 98 an d a t two trials for violation o f th e alie n an d seditio n laws. 99 It suffice s t o sa y tha t i n th e treason cases , Paterson carefull y delineate d th e element s o f proo f o f treason,100 an d i n the sedition trials , Paterson too k a severe, Federalist position. 101 The importanc e o f Paterson' s wor k o n th e Suprem e Cour t paral leled th e importanc e o f th e earl y Cour t i n preparing th e way fo r th e great cases of the Marshall era . From a reading o f the early opinion s and fro m th e assessment s o f historian s o f th e earl y Court , thi s wor k appears t o have been a n indispensable prelude. 102 William Paterson' s opinions show that he was both a skillful lawye r on the bench and a n articulate exponent of national power, including the power of judicial review. I n fact , Paterson' s charg e t o th e jur y i n Vanhorne's Lessee v. Dorrance103 serve d a s one o f th e mos t importan t justification s o f ju dicial revie w i n th e initia l years . Nevertheless , t o th e reade r today , there is a somewhat unformed qualit y to these cases, not only because the opinions of the justices were delivered separately , or seriatim, bu t also becaus e th e grea t case s woul d tak e tim e t o develop . O n th e Supreme Court , Paterson , wh o ha d bee n th e right ag e for leadershi p in the Revolutionary Wa r an d th e Constitutiona l Convention , woul d help to prepare th e way fo r younge r me n lik e John Marshall , Joseph Story, and others . When William Paterson joined th e Supreme Cour t i n the Februar y Term o f 1794 , the federa l judiciar y ha d begu n t o wi n som e measur e of publi c confidence. 104 Paterson' s first ful l opinio n appear s i n Penhallow v. Doane's Administrators^ 05 th e mos t importan t o f thre e cases decide d i n th e Februar y Ter m o f 1795. 106 I n 1777 , Congres s formed a standin g committe e o f five members t o hea r appeal s fro m

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the stat e admiralt y court s i n cases o f capture. 107 That sam e year, th e brig M'Clary capture d th e bri g Susanna, an d th e owner s o f th e M'Clary, Penhallo w an d others , successfull y brough t a libe l i n th e New Hampshir e court s t o hav e th e Susanna declare d a lawfu l prize.108 Th e Ne w Hampshir e Superio r Cour t affirme d th e judg ment.109 I n 1778 , the Susanna's owners, Doane an d others , appeale d to Congress , and i n 1779 , the standing committe e determine d tha t i t had jurisdiction t o decide the controversy. 110 In 1780 , however, Con gress directe d tha t "al l appeal s i n case s o f capture , no w dependin g before Congress , o r th e Commissioner s o f Appeals " b e adjudicate d by th e newl y create d "Cour t o f Appeal s i n case s o f capture " estab lished b y th e Article s o f Confederation. 111 Tha t cour t i n 178 3 re versed th e decree s o f th e Ne w Hampshir e cour t an d declare d i n favor o f th e Susanna's owners. 112 I n 1794 , a Unite d State s circui t court decre e enforce d tha t judgment. 113 Th e owner s o f th e M'Clary appealed o n th e groun d tha t th e Ne w Hampshir e court s ha d exclu sive jurisdiction o f th e case. 114 Paterson narrated the facts of the case,115 and he then delivered the first an d longes t o f th e opinion s affirmin g th e decre e o f th e circui t court.116 H e state d tha t th e issu e wa s on e o f th e jurisdictio n o f th e Commissioners of Appeal and the Court of Appeals, and that the issue turned upo n th e competenc y o f Congres s t o authoriz e thes e tri bunals.117 He held that Congres s possessed suc h authority : Congress wa s the general, supreme, and controulin g counci l o f th e nation , the centre o f union , the centre o f force , an d th e su n o f the political system . To determine wha t thei r power s were , we mus t enquir e wha t power s the y exercised. Congres s raise d armies , [and ] fitte d ou t a navy . . . . These hig h acts o f sovereignt y wer e submitte d to , acquiesce d in , an d approve d of , b y the people of America …. I n every government, whether it consists of many states, or of a few, or whether it be of a federal o r consolidated nature , there must b e a supreme powe r o r will. . . . The trut h is , that th e States , individ ually, were not know n no r recognize d a s sovereign, b y foreign nations , no r are the y now ; th e State s collectively , unde r Congress , a s th e connectin g point, o r head , were acknowledged b y foreign power s a s sovereign, partic ularly i n tha t acceptatio n o f th e term , whic h i s applicabl e t o al l grea t na tional concerns. . . .118

Paterson also stated: "Besides , every body must be amenable to the authority unde r whic h h e acts." 119 Th e captai n o f th e M'Clary ha d been commissione d a s a privatee r b y Congress. 120 Therefore , "[th e

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captain] mus t ultimatel y b e responsible t o Congress , o r thei r consti tuted authority. 121 The othe r justice s expressed a narrower vie w of the powers o f th e Continental Congress , thoug h agreein g tha t th e state s ha d give n t o Congress external sovereignty sufficient fo r the present case. 122 Justice Blair note d th e argumen t tha t Ne w Hampshir e coul d revok e th e au thority i t ha d give n t o Congres s an d sai d tha t a satisfactor y answe r was made to this: if the state had the right, it was never exercised. 123 An overridin g issu e i n th e earl y federa l court s wa s thei r powe r t o review state acts and, especially, acts of Congress. 124 Paterson had in troduced th e supremac y claus e o f th e Constitutio n durin g th e con vention a s par t o f th e Ne w Jerse y plan. 125 I n addition , Olive r Ellsworth an d William Paterson ha d coauthored i n the Senate the Judiciary Act of 1789. 126 Section 25 of that ac t gave to the federal judi ciary no t onl y th e powe r t o pas s upo n stat e legislatio n bu t als o th e power to reverse or affirm a decision of a state court passing upon the validity of an act of Congress. 127 In the April Term of 1795, Justice Paterson, sitting in the Pennsylvania Distric t of the United States Circui t Court, me t th e issu e judiciall y fo r th e first time. 128 Th e Vanhorne's Lessee case involved conflicting claim s of title to Pennsylvania lan d in the possession o f the defendant. 129 Th e plaintiff base d hi s claim o n a chain o f title from th e proprietors o f the colony; the defendant base d his on the claim o f settler s fro m Connecticut , whos e titl e rested o n a "quieting an d confirmin g act " passe d b y th e Pennsylvani a legisla ture.130 Th e ac t declare d titl e t o th e lan d t o b e in the settler s an d re cited tha t thos e wh o ha d titl e t o th e lan d wh o wil l b e "deprive d thereof b y the operation o f this act" shoul d b e compensated i n equivalent lands. 131 Paterson's charge to the jury is reported.132 Th e principal questio n he considered was the constitutionality of the quieting and confirmin g act.133 Eigh t year s befor e Marbury v. Madison,134 Paterso n delivere d the following charge : What i s a Constitution ? I t i s th e for m o f government , delineate d b y th e mighty han d o f th e people, in which certai n first principle s o f fundamenta l laws ar e established . Th e Constitutio n i s certain an d fixed ; i t contain s th e permanent wil l of the people, and i s the supreme la w of the land; it is paramount t o th e Powe r o f th e Legislature , an d ca n b e revoked o r altere d onl y by the authorit y tha t mad e it . . . . What ar e Legislatures ? Creature s o f th e Constitution; they owe their existence to the Constitution; they derive thei r

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powers fro m th e Constitution ; I t i s thei r commission ; and , therefore , al l their act s must b e conformable t o it , or els e they wil l b e void. Th e Consti tution i s the work o r will of th e People themselves, in their original , sover eign, an d unlimite d capacity . La w i s the wor k o r wil l o f th e Legislatur e i n their derivativ e an d subordinat e capacity . Th e on e i s the wor k o f th e Cre ator, an d th e othe r o f the Creature . The Constitutio n fixe s limit s to the ex ercise of legislative authority , and prescribe s the orbit within whic h i t mus t move. I n short , gentlemen , th e Constitutio n i s the su n o f th e politica l sys tem, aroun d whic h al l Legislative , Executiv e an d Judicia l bodie s mus t re volve. Whatever ma y be the case in other countries, yet in this there can b e no doubt , tha t ever y ac t o f th e Legislature , repugnant t o th e Constitution , is absolutely void. 135

Paterson conclude d tha t th e confirmin g ac t wa s voi d becaus e i t gave compensatio n fo r th e land s take n i n th e for m o f othe r lands , when "[n] o jus t compensatio n ca n b e mad e excep t i n money." 136 Therefore, th e act was a deprivation o f "on e of the natural, inherent , and unalienable rights of man"—"the righ t of acquiring and possessing property"—whic h b y th e Constitutio n o f Pennsylvani a "wa s made a fundamental law." 137 Havin g state d tha t th e ac t wa s uncon stitutional, Paterson went on to say that eve n if it were valid, the settlers had failed t o comply with several of its requirements. 138 Becaus e the act was now repealed, however, it was too late for the m to establish title. 139 It seems sufficient tha t this opinion o r instruction stan d o n its own merits. In fact, ther e is little evidence of its impact o n the country, although work s o n constitutiona l la w not e i t a s a n earl y statemen t o f the doctrine o f judicial review. 140 In the August 1795 Term, the Supreme Court heard two cases.141 A long opinio n b y Paterso n appear s i n Talbot v. Jansen.142 Th e chie f question raised there, although unnecessary to the eventual resolution of the case,143 was whether a citizen of Virginia, one Ballard, had been expatriated.144 Ballar d ha d bee n commissione d a s a privateer b y th e French and had captured a Dutch brig. 145 If he had remained a United States citizen, his commission was invalid and the capture illegal. 146 The justices agreed that in any event, the initial outfitting of the brig in Charleston was done in violation of federal law, and hence the subsequent captur e wa s tainte d wit h illegality. 147 Paterso n an d Iredell , however, als o discusse d th e questio n o f expatriatio n an d conclude d that Ballar d ha d no t lost his United State s citizenship. 148 On e sectio n

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of Paterson's opinio n i s noteworthy fo r th e picture o f the federal sys tem that it presents. In rejecting th e proposition tha t the Virginia la w on expatriatio n coul d operat e o n Unite d State s citizenship , Paterso n said: The sovereigntie s ar e different; th e allegiance i s different. . . . We have sov ereignties moving within sovereignty. Of course there is complexity and difficulty i n the system , which require s a penetrating ey e fully t o explore , an d steady an d masterl y hand s t o kee p i n uniso n an d order . A sligh t collisio n may distur b th e harmon y o f th e parts , an d endange r th e machiner y o f th e whole. 149

In th e Februar y Ter m o f 1796 , th e importan t case s o f Hylton v. United States 15® an d Ware v. Hylton 151 wer e decided . Th e first i s fa mous a s holdin g tha t a ta x o n th e us e o f carriage s wa s no t a direc t tax.152 It was also the first instance in which the Supreme Court passed upon th e constitutionalit y o f a federa l law. 153 Paterson' s opinio n i n Hylton wa s the second in series; Justice Chase had been appointed recently, and as junior member, he gave the first opinion.154 Chase stated that the issue was whether "'[a] n ac t to lay duties upon carriages, fo r the conveyance o f persons,' is unconstitutional an d void. . . ." 155 The taxpayer's argument was that the tax was a direct tax, and was therefore void because it was not apportioned amon g the states as the Constitution required. 156 The three justices rendering opinions, Chase, Paterson, and Iredell, agreed that the tax was not direct. 157 Chase added that becaus e i t wa s no t direct , i t wa s unnecessar y t o determin e "whether thi s court , constitutionall y possesse s th e powe r t o declar e an ac t o f Congres s void." 158 Neithe r Paterso n no r Iredel l expresse d any such doubt. At the beginning of Paterson's opinion, he stated: "I f it be a direct tax , i t is unconstitutional, becaus e i t has bee n lai d pur suant t o th e rul e o f uniformity , an d no t t o th e rul e o f apportion ment."159 The justices agree d tha t sinc e the carriag e ta x woul d no t admi t o f apportionment, i t mus t b e a n indirec t rathe r tha n a direc t tax. 160 I n the word s o f Iredell , "[I] t i s eviden t tha t th e Constitutio n contem plated non e as direct bu t such as could be apportioned."161 Paterson , however, analyzed the nature o f the tax itself: All taxes on expences or consumption ar e indirect taxes. A tax on carriage s is of this kind, and o f course is not a direct tax. Indirect taxes are circuitou s modes o f reaching the revenue o f individuals , who generall y liv e accordin g

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to thei r income . In many case s o f thi s nature th e individua l ma y b e said t o tax himself . I shall close the discours e wit h readin g a passage o r tw o fro m Smith's Wealth of Nations. 162

Paterson then quoted Adam Smith's proposition that the state, finding it impossibl e t o ta x peopl e directl y i n proportio n t o thei r revenue , does i t indirectl y b y taxin g thei r expense s throug h a lev y upo n th e consumable commodities for whic h they pay out their income. 163 In Ware, the secon d landmar k cas e decide d durin g th e Februar y 1796 Term , th e Cour t declare d th e supremac y o f th e treat y powe r over stat e la w an d hel d tha t a clause in the treaty o f 178 3 providin g for recover y o f debt s owe d Britis h creditor s nullifie d a Virgini a la w that ha d confiscate d thos e debts. 164 O f th e fou r opinions , Justic e Iredell's furnishe d th e mos t extende d discussio n o f th e natur e o f th e treaty power. 165 Paterson' s opinio n wa s devote d principall y t o th e meaning of the treaty itself, ending on the note that commercia l con tracts shoul d b e inviolabl e eve n i n wartime. 166 Paterso n als o state d that u [t]he constructio n o f a treaty mad e . . . fo r th e restoration an d enforcement o f pre-existin g contracts , ough t t o b e libera l an d be nign."167 Justice Paterson' s nex t significan t opinio n appeare d i n Colder v. Bull,16S a 1798 decision. The Connecticut legislature had passed a law setting asid e a decre e o f th e probat e court , whic h ha d invalidate d a will.169 The law also granted a new trial. 170 O n appea l fro m th e ne w trial, which uphel d th e will, the Connecticu t la w was attacke d a s ex post facto. 171 Th e Suprem e Cour t o f Error s o f Connecticu t rejecte d this argument an d affirme d th e second decree. 172 The United States Supreme Court affirmed th e decision of the Connecticut court. 173 Th e justice s agree d tha t onl y pena l an d crimina l statutes could b e ex post facto law s and that the constitutional prohi bition does not extend to retroactive civil laws.174 Chase's opinion was again th e first and seem s to b e the most frequentl y cited. 175 Paterso n stated that his decision was made despite "an ardent desire to have extended th e provision . . . t o retrospective law s in general," sinc e such laws d o no t accor d wit h "th e fundamenta l principle s o f th e socia l compact."176 Nevertheless , h e was convinced tha t e x post fact o pro visions were limited to criminal laws. 177 Calder was th e first cas e t o revie w stat e legislatio n o n a wri t o f error to a state court. Ware, which had declared a state law invalid as

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in conflict wit h th e treaty power, an d Fletcher v. Peck/78 whic h wa s t o be th e firs t decisio n i n whic h th e Suprem e Cour t hel d a stat e la w vi olative o f a provisio n o f th e federa l Constitution, 179 cam e befor e th e Court fro m federa l circui t courts. 180 Th e Colder Court , i n reviewin g the decision o f the Supreme Cour t o f Errors o f Connecticut , tacitl y ex pressed no t onl y the rule of Fletcher bu t als o the power t o review stat e court decisions, 181 which woul d b e promulgated b y Stor y i n Martin v. Hunter's Lessee 181 an d Marshal l i n Cohens v. Virginia} 83 Paterson's contributio n t o thi s importan t questio n wa s no t limite d to hi s participatio n i n Colder, however . Th e powe r t o revie w stat e court decision s o n federa l question s wa s conferre d o n th e Suprem e Court b y th e twenty-fift h sectio n o f th e Judiciary Ac t o f 1789 , whic h Ellsworth an d Paterso n ha d coauthored. 184 I t wa s th e validit y o f thi s section tha t wa s challenge d an d uphel d i n Martin v. Hunter's Lessee and Cohens v. Virginia. There wer e n o opinion s b y Paterso n amon g th e thre e Suprem e Court decision s rendere d i n 1799 . In 1800 , Paterso n gav e opinion s i n Cooper v. Telfair 185 an d Bas v. Tingy. 186 I n Cooper, i t wa s contende d that a n ac t o f the Georgi a legislatur e tha t ha d confiscate d Cooper' s es tate fo r treaso n wa s a n unconstitutiona l exercis e o f the judicial powe r by the legislature an d als o constituted a denial o f the right to a trial b y jury. 187 Th e justice s foun d nothin g i n th e Georgi a Constitutio n pro hibiting th e act , an d Paterso n added : [WJherever th e legislativ e powe r o f a governmen t i s undefine d i t include s the judicia l an d executiv e attributes . . . . [T]h e powe r o f confiscatio n an d banishment . . . i s a power , tha t grow s ou t o f th e ver y natur e o f th e socia l compact, which must reside somewhere, and which is so inherent in the legislature, that i t cannot b e divested, o r transferred , withou t a n expres s pro vision o f th e constitution. 188

In Bas, Congres s ha d provide d tha t i f a shi p shoul d b e recapture d from "th e enemy " afte r bein g i n th e captor' s hand s fo r mor e tha n ninety-six hours , one-hal f instea d o f one-eight h salvag e woul d b e earned. 189 A n America n shi p ha d bee n recapture d fro m th e Frenc h under thes e conditions, bu t it s owners claime d tha t Franc e wa s no t a n "enemy" becaus e wa r ha d no t bee n declared. 190 Th e justices , includ ing Paterson , agree d i n separat e opinion s tha t th e limite d hostilitie s authorized b y Congres s agains t Franc e qualifie d he r a s a n enem y an d that therefor e a "limited " wa r wa s bein g conducte d a t sea. 191

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John Marshall joined the Supreme Court a s chief justice in the August Term, 1801. 192 His practice of writing the opinions for the Cour t necessarily relegated Paterson and the other justices to a relatively obscure role. 193 O n on e importan t occasion , however , Paterso n wrot e the opinio n fo r th e Court , Marshal l havin g disqualifie d himself . The case was Stuart v. Laird,194 decided less than a week after Marbury i n 1803. I n 1802 , Congres s repeale d th e Federalists ' Judiciar y Ac t o f 1801, 195 whic h ha d create d sixtee n ne w circuit cour t judgeship s an d had also relieved the Supreme Court justices of their circuit-riding duties.196 The repealer b y the Republican Congress , the Judiciary Act of 1802, wa s passe d ove r th e opposition' s clai m tha t Congress ha d n o power t o destroy th e judgeships it had created. 197 Stuart decide d thi s question. At issu e was th e transfe r o f a case fro m th e Fourt h Circui t t o th e Fifth, mad e pursuan t t o th e Ac t o f 1802 , whic h ha d abolishe d th e Fourth Circui t court. 198 Th e appellan t contende d tha t th e transfer i n question could not take place because the act was unconstitutional. 199 Congress had no constitutional power to destroy the circuit courts, it was argued , i f i t thereb y deprive d a judg e o f hi s office , becaus e th e Constitution place d th e federa l judge s beyon d th e reac h o f th e leg islative an d executiv e powers. 200 The appellan t als o claimed tha t th e act had unconstitutionall y assigne d Suprem e Cour t justice s to circui t court duty because the Constitution vested only appellate jurisdictio n in the Supreme Court. 201 Paterson wrot e a very brie f opinion . H e deal t first wit h th e argu ment raise d agains t th e transfer , an d state d merel y tha t "Congres s have [sic ] constitutional authorit y to establish from tim e to time such inferior tribunal s a s the y ma y thin k proper ; an d t o transfe r a caus e from on e such tribunal to another." 202 Th e present case, he held, was nothing mor e tha n suc h a transfer. 203 Thi s shor t rejectio n o r avoid ance o f th e argumen t raise d b y th e Federalist s no t onl y establishe d Congress's power in this field but disposed of an especially dangerou s threat t o th e Court' s power. 204 Th e Republican s wer e in no mood t o submit to an attempt to void the act. 205 Paterson's answe r t o the second argument—tha t th e justices could not rid e circuit—established a n importan t principl e o f constitutiona l construction. He stated : To thi s objection , whic h i s o f recen t date , i t i s sufficien t t o observe , tha t practice an d acquiescenc e unde r i t for a period o f severa l years, commenc-

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ing with th e organizatio n o f th e judicia l system , afford s a n irresistibl e an swer, an d ha s indee d fixed th e construction . I t i s a contemporary interpre tation o f th e mos t forcibl e nature . Thi s practica l expositio n i s to o stron g and obstinat e t o b e shaken o r controlled . O f course , the question i s at rest , and ough t no t no w t o b e disturbed. 206

When Marshal l disqualifie d himsel f i n a fe w othe r cases , the othe r justices delivere d opinion s i n series. 207 Paterson' s opinion s appea r i n these, but none of them ar e of special importance. Paterson vote d wit h Marshall i n Marbury, an d h e concurred i n the other opinion s b y Mar shall with on e exception. 208 Hi s relationship wit h Marshal l appear s t o have bee n a cordial on e durin g th e perio d the y serve d together . Pater son's las t opinio n wa s delivere d i n Randolph v. Ware, 209 th e las t cas e reported fo r th e Februar y Term , 1806 . Hi s wa s th e longes t an d mos t detailed o f th e separat e opinions , whic h deal t wit h a breac h o f a promise t o insure. 210

Conclusion The titl e pag e o f Cranch' s repor t fo r th e Februar y Ter m o f 180 7 list s a ne w justice , Brockhols t Livingston , appointe d "i n th e plac e o f th e honourable WILLIA M PATERSON , deceased." 211 Paterso n ha d be come il l durin g th e summe r recess. 212 H e die d o n Septembe r 9 , 1806. 213 William Paterson' s thirtee n year s o n th e Suprem e Cour t capped , i n a quie t way, the great work an d theme s o f hi s political life . There was , first, th e ne w syste m o f nationa l power , wit h th e state s operatin g a s "sovereignties withi n a sovereignty. " Paterso n consistentl y supporte d an extensiv e nationa l power . Althoug h th e state s retained th e inheren t powers o f government, the y remained subjec t t o federal law . Thus, th e doctrines o f judicia l revie w o f stat e law s an d o f act s o f Congres s wer e necessary element s o f nationa l sovereignt y an d constitutiona l govern ment. Behin d Paterson' s constitutiona l theorie s o f powe r an d sover eignty wa s a constant awarenes s o f th e principle upo n whic h th e Rev olution ha d bee n fough t an d th e Constitutio n established : th e com pact o r consen t o f th e people . Th e Constitutio n wa s th e suprem e la w of th e lan d no t becaus e i t sai d s o bu t becaus e th e peopl e ha d create d it. "Wha t i s a Constitution? " Paterso n aske d th e jur y i n Vanhorne's Lessee.214 "I t i s th e for m o f government , delineate d b y th e might y

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hand o f th e people , i n whic h certai n firs t principle s o f fundamenta l laws are established." 215 Paterson's devotio n t o law , property , authority , an d stabilit y an d his Federalist vie w o f th e judicia l rol e were tempered , on e thinks o n reading his opinions, by his experience at constitution making in New Jersey an d i n th e Constitutiona l Conventio n o f 1787 . The Constitu tion, h e continued i n Vanhorne's Lessee, "i s th e wor k o r wil l o f th e People themselves, in their original, sovereign, and unlimited capacity. . . . I n short, gentlemen, the Constitution is the sun of the political system, around which all Legislative, Executive and Judicial bodies must revolve."216 Thus, for William Paterson, no branch of government, including the judicial, was master o f the Constitution. 217 The Constitu tion belonge d to the people in their sovereig n capacity .

NOTES

1. J . O'Connor , William Paterson: Lawyer and Statesman, 1745-1806 22 4 (1979). 2. Se e M . Farrand , The Framing of the Constitution of the United States 84-86, 200 (1913) ; C. Rossiter, 1787: The Grand Convention 175-7 6 (1966) ; C. Warren, The Making of the Constitution 220-3 2 (1937) . 3. 1 J. Goebel , Jr. , History of the Supreme Court of the United States: Antecedents and Beginnings to 1801 457-50 8 (1971) . 4. Se e J. O'Connor , supr a not e 1 , at 7-19 ; C . Rossiter, supr a not e 2 , at 99 . 5. J . O'Connor , supr a not e 1 , at 28 . 6. Id . a t 32 . 7. Id . at 33-34 . 8. Id . a t 59-61 . 9. Id . at 18-19 , 48-55. 10. M . Farrand , supr a not e 2 , at 84-85 . 11. Se e C. Warren, supr a not e 2 , at 719 . 12. J . O'Connor , supr a not e 1 , at 134 . 13. Id . at 47-49 . 14. Id . a t 50 , 100 . 15. Id . at 45-55 . 16. Id . at 71 , 77, 84 . 17. Id . at 133-34 . 18. Id . a t 131 . See generally J. Pomfret , Colonial New Jersey 218-4 6 (1973 ) (explaining socia l an d politica l atmospher e i n Ne w Jerse y prio r t o th e Revolu tion).

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19. Se e generally C . Rossiter, supr a not e 2 , at 159-81 ; C . Warren, supr a not e 2, a t 134-200 . 20. Se e C. Rossiter, supr a not e 2, at 175-79 ; C. Warren, supr a not e 2, at 199 , 220-31. 21. C . Rossiter , supr a not e 2 , a t 186 . Se e generally C . Warren, supr a not e 2 , at 267-312 . 22. Talbot v. Jansen, 3 U.S. ( 3 Dall. ) 133 , 15 4 (1795 ) (opinio n o f Paterson ,

J.).

23. I . Brant , James Madison: Father of the Constitution 1787-1800 65 (1950). 24. Se e J. O'Connor, supr a not e 1 , at 135-36 ; see also I. Brant, supra not e 23, at 65 (notin g proble m o f trad e fo r Ne w Jersey an d Connecticut) . 25. I . Brant, supr a not e 23 , at 61. 26. Se e C. Rossiter, supr a not e 2 , at 99 , 101-9 , 117-26 . 27. C . Warren , supr a not e 2 , a t 146-219 ; se e C . Rossiter , supr a not e 2 . a t 171-73. 28. J . O'Connor , supr a not e 1 , at 138 . 29. Id . 30. C . Warren, supr a not e 1 , at 138 . 31. 1 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 179-8 0 (M . Farran d ed. 1911 ) [hereafte r cite d a s 1 Records] (Madison' s notes) ; see also id. a t 185-9 1 (Paterson's note s o f hi s speech) . 32. Id . a t 183 ; C. Warren, supr a not e 2 , at 200 . 33. 1 Records, supr a not e 31 , at 192-94 . Se e generally C . Warren, supr a not e 2, a t 207-12 . 34. 1 Records, supr a not e 31 , at 238-39 . 35. M . Farrand , supr a not e 2 , at 84-85 . 36. Id . 37. Se e 1 Records, supr a not e 31 , at 242-45 . 38. C . Warren, supr a not e 2 , at 231-32 . 39. Se e generally 1 Records, supr a not e 31 , at 248-322 . 40. C . Rossiter, supr a not e 2 , at 176 . 41. Id . a t 182-84 ; C . Warren , supr a not e 2 , a t 236-45 . Se e generall y 1 Records, supr a not e 31 , at 334-435 . 42. C . Warren, supr a not e 2 , at 245-47 . 43. Id . a t 249 . 44. 1 Records, supr a not e 31 , at 468 . 45. C . Warren, supra not e 2, at 255; see 1 Records, supr a not e 31 , at 468-69 . 46. M . Farrand , supr a not e 2 , at 96-98 . 47. J . O'Connor , supr a not e 1 , at 153 . 48. 1 Records, supr a not e 31 , at 516 ; C . Rossiter , supr a not e 2 , a t 187 ; C . Warren, supr a not e 2 , at 264 .

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49. M . Farrand , supr a not e 2, at 99 ; 1 Records, supr a not e 31 , at 526 . 50. Se e generally C . Warren, supr a not e 2 , at 274-308 . 51. Id . 52. 2 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 1 5 (M . Farran d ed . 1911) [hereafte r cite d a s 2 Records]. 53. Id . a t 17-18 . 54. J . O'Connor , supr a not e 1 , at 156-58 . 55. Id . at 158 ; C. Rossiter, supr a not e 2, at 194-95 . 56. Se e C. Rossiter, supra not e 2, at 192-94 ; C. Warren, supra not e 2, at 313. 57. 4 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 70 (M . Farrand rev . ed. 1937) [hereafte r cite d a s 4 Records]; se e J. O'Connor , supr a not e 1 , at 160 . 58. Se e J. O'Connor , supr a not e 1 , at 160-61 . 59. C . Warren, supra note 2, at 719. Once the small states like New Jersey had won equality , the y wer e stron g supporter s o f nationa l power . Se e C . Rossiter , supra not e 2, at 196 ; see also C. Warren, supra not e 2, at 31 0 n.l (quotin g Lette r from Jame s Madiso n t o Marti n Va n Buren, (Ma y 13 , 1828). 60. Madison' s note s hav e Paterso n a s saying , i n debat e wit h Madiso n an d Gouverneur Morri s o n July 7 , "Fo r himsel f h e shoul d vot e [against ] th e Report , because i t yields to o much. " 1 Records, supr a not e 31 , at 551 . King's note s als o report Paterso n a s saying , " I thin k I shall vot e [against ] th e Report. " Id . a t 554 . In any event, Paterson's words appea r i n the context t o b e a debating tactic . Paterson's Jul y 1 6 tactic s o n adjournmen t ar e cite d b y Warre n an d see m t o have influence d Rossiter , wh o quote s th e entir e exchange . Se e C. Rossiter , supr a note 2, at 194-95 ; C. Warren, supra note 2, at 311-12; see also supra notes 53-5 5 and accompanying text. O'Connor, however , correctly reads this as maneuvers b y Randolph t o upse t th e compromis e an d b y Paterson t o protec t it . Se e J. O'Con nor, supr a not e 1 , at 156-58 . 61. J . O'Connor , supr a not e 1 , at 160 ; 4 Records, supr a not e 57, a t 70 . 62. 4 Records, supr a 57, a t 73 ; see J. O'Connor , supr a not e 1 , at 161. 63. Clinto n Rossiter, appraising each of the Framers, calls Paterson "th e stub born an d successfu l advocat e o f stat e equality , whose departur e i n lat e July ma y have robbed him of a much higher ranking." C . Rossiter, supra note 2, at 250. Paterson, Rossite r says , "se t som e sort o f record fo r stubbor n courage. " Id . at 205 . 64. Rossite r note s that the Constitution an d its federal structur e were at stak e in the battl e betwee n "pridefu l Virgini a an d tenaciou s Ne w Jersey." Id . 65. Se e L. Rosenberg, The Political Thought of William Paterson 43-50,18 0 (1967). Rosenber g emphasize s th e influenc e o f Locke . Id. ; se e als o 1 2 W . Holdsworth, A History of English Law 71 2 (1938 ) (notin g Blackstone's influenc e in the American colonies) . 66. C . Warren, supr a not e 2 , at 768 . 67. J . O'Connor , supr a not e 1 , at 167-68 . 68. Id . at 168 .

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69. Id . at 168 . 70. Id . 71. Id . a t 170 . 72. Se e Warren, "Ne w Ligh t o n th e Histor y o f th e Federa l Judiciar y Ac t o f 1789," 3 7 Harv. L . Rev. 49, 50-51, 6 0 (1923); see also 1 J. Goebel, Jr., supra not e 3, a t 463-65. Goebel believe s that th e manuscript discovere d b y Warren mus t b e distinguished fro m a n undiscovere d "fina l version " fro m whic h th e bil l was the n reprinted. Id . at 465. Goebel's comparison o f the actual draf t an d th e printed bil l does sho w a few smal l differences . Se e id. a t 465-66 n.28 . For a reproduction o f the first pag e o f Paterson' s handwritte n draft , se e id. at 464 . 73. Se e F . Frankfurte r 8 c J . Landis , The Business of the Supreme Court 4 (1927). 74. 1 J . Goebel , Jr. , supr a not e 3 , a t 459 ; J . O'Connor , supr a not e 1 , a t 169-71; 1 C. Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History 8- 9 (1922) . 75. 1 J. Goebel , Jr., supra not e 3 , at 458-59 . 76. Warren , supr a not e 72 , at 50 . 77. 1 J. Goebel , Jr., supr a not e 3 , at 459 . 78. Id . at 469 . 79. Id. ; see also id . a t 46 4 (Paterson' s handwritte n manuscript) . 80. F . Frankfurter 8 c J. Landis , supra not e 73 , at 10 . 81. Id . a t 7-11 . Fo r a summar y an d appraisa l o f th e act , se e P . Bator , P . Mishkin, D . Shapiro , &c H . Wechsler , Hart and Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System 32-3 6 (2 d ed. 1973) . 82. Se e 1 J. Goebel , Jr., supra not e 3 , at 471. 83. Se e Judiciary Ac t o f 1789 , ch. 20, sec. 9, 1 Stat. 73 , 76-77. 84. Se e id. sec. 11, 1 Stat , a t 78-79 . Se e generally F . Frankfurter 6>c J. Landis , supra not e 73 , at 12 . 85. Judiciar y Ac t o f 1789 , ch. 20 , sec . 25, 1 Stat. 73 , 85-86 (curren t versio n at 2 8 U.S.C . sec. 1257(1982)) . 86. M . Farrand , supr a not e 2, a t 85 . 87. 1 J. Goebel , Jr., supr a not e 3 , at 480-81 ; 1 C. Warren, supr a not e 74 , a t 10-11. 88. L . Tribe , American Constitutional Law, sec . 3-4 , a t 2 7 (1978) ; se e G . Gunther, Constitutional Law 2 9 (11t h ed . 1985) . 89. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 4 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 , 342 (1816) . 90. Judiciar y Ac t o f 1789 , ch. 20, sec . 34, 1 Stat. 73 , 92. Section 3 4 wa s no t in th e bil l a s drafted . I t was , however, introduce d i n th e Senat e debate . It s origi nal versio n wa s i n Ellsworth' s hand , a s Charle s Warre n discovered . 1 J. Goebel , Jr., supra not e 3 , at 50 2 &c n.149 . 91. F . Frankfurter &c J. Landis , supra not e 73 , at 4 . 92. J . O'Connor , supr a not e 1 , at xii , 185 . 93. Id . at 223. As governor an d chancellor o f New Jersey, Paterson undertoo k

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a complet e compilatio n an d revisio n o f Ne w Jerse y statutor y law ; h e complete d the work whil e o n th e Suprem e Court . Se e id. at 202-22 . 94. Se e id. a t 278 . 95. Id . a t 238 . 96. 1 C. Warren, supr a not e 74 , at 140 . 97. J . O'Connor , supr a not e 1 , at 260 . 98. United States v. Vigol, 2 U.S . ( 2 Dall. ) 34 6 (Paterson , Circui t Justic e 1795); United States v. Mitchell, 2 U.S . ( 2 Dall. ) 34 8 (Paterson , Circui t Justic e 1795). 99. 1 J. Goebel , Jr., supr a not e 3 , at 638-39 ; 1 C. Warren, supr a not e 74 , a t 164-65; se e F. Wharton, State Trials of the United States During the Administrations of Washington and Adams 333-44 , 684-8 7 (Philadelphi a 1849) . See generally Sedition Act , ch. 74 , 1 Stat. 59 6 (1798 ) (repeale d 1801) ; Alien Enemie s Act , ch. 66, 1 Stat. 57 7 (1798 ) (repeale d 1801) . 100. Se e United States v. Vigol, 2 U.S . ( 2 Dall.) 346 , 346-4 7 (Paterson , Cir cuit Justice 1795) ; United States v. Mitchell, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 348 , 355-56 (Pater son, Circui t Justic e 1795) . Se e generall y L . Baldwin , Whiskey Rebels 262-6 4 (1939); Hurst, "Treaso n i n the United States, " 5 8 Harv. L. Rev. 226 (1944) . 101. Se e 1 J. Goebel , Jr., supra not e 3 , at 637-39 ; F. Wharton, supr a not e 99 , at 334-42 , 684-87 . 102. Se e 1 J. Goebel, Jr., supra note 3, at 722-93 ; 1 C. Warren, supra not e 74 , at 31, 65-84, 91-168. But see G. Haskins & H . Johnson, History of the Supreme Court of the United States: Foundations of Power: John Marshall, 1801-15 7 , 13-14 (1981) . Haskins and Johnson ter m the early Court "[a ] relatively feeble in stitution," ascribin g it s rea l beginnin g t o Marshall . Id . Nonetheless , the y als o state tha t "[b] y thi s dat e [1801] , the Suprem e Cour t ha d alread y uphel d an d ex tended Federalist principles of nationalization an d centralization; and under Mar shall's leadership i t would continu e muc h furthe r i n that direction. " Id . at 147 . 103. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 30 4 (Paterson , Circui t Justice 1795) . 104. 1 C. Warren, supr a not e 74 , at 65. Confidenc e i n the federa l benc h ha d eroded a s a result o f Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 41 9 (1793) . That cas e upheld th e righ t o f a citizen o f Sout h Carolin a t o su e the stat e o f Georgia . Id . a t 479 (opinio n o f Jay, C.J.). The Chisholm rul e was promptly repeale d b y a constitutional amendment. Se e U.S. Const, amend. XI. See generally 1 C. Warren, supr a note 74 , at 91-99 . 105. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 5 4 (1795) . 106. Th e Cour t als o decide d United States v. Lawrence, 3 U.S . ( 3 Dall. ) 4 2 (1795), and Bingham v. Cabhot, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 1 9 (1795) , during tha t Term . 107. Penhallow, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) a t 60 . 108. Id . at 60-61 . 109. Id . at 61. 110. Id .

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111. Id . a t 62 . 112. Id . 113. Id . a t 64 . 114. Id . 115. Se e id. a t 54-66 . 116. Se e id. a t 79-8 9 (opinio n o f Paterson , J.). 117. Id . a t 79-8 0 (opinio n o f Paterson , J.). 118. Id . a t 80-8 1 (opinio n o f Paterson , J.). 119. Id . a t 8 1 (opinio n o f Paterson , J.). 120. Id . 121. Id . Goebe l comment s tha t "Paterson , wh o kne w ver y wel l wha t th e ac tual politica l condition s ha d been , wa s evidentl y transporte d b y hi s ow n rhetoric." 1 J. Goebel , Jr., supr a not e 3 , at 768 . 122. See , e.g., Penhallow, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) a t 94-9 5 (opinio n o f Iredell , J.). 123. Id . at 112-1 3 (opinio n o f Blair, J.). Paterson's view of sovereignty playe d a rol e i n th e cas e o f United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 29 9 U.S . 30 4 (1936). Justice Sutherland' s opinio n dre w upon Paterson' s Penh allow opinio n fo r the doctrin e tha t i n th e foreig n relation s field, th e federa l governmen t possesse s inherent rather than enumerate d powers . Id. at 316-17, 319. The argument mad e was tha t a congressional resolutio n authorizin g th e presiden t t o declar e a n arm s embargo constitute d a n unconstitutiona l delegatio n o f legislativ e power . Id . a t 314. Sutherland answere d b y stating that the proposition tha t the government ca n exercise only such express an d implie d powers a s are granted t o it applies only t o internal affairs. Id . at 315-16. But see 1 J. Goebel, Jr., supra note 3, at 768 & n.2 9 (Supreme Court' s argumen t i n Curtiss-Wright wa s "historicall y indefensible") . 124. Se e 1 J. Goebel , Jr., supr a not e 3 , at 589-92 ; 2 G . Haskin s & H . John son, supr a not e 102 , at 186-91 . Accordin g t o Goebel , thi s powe r wa s no t ques tioned i n the earliest years . See 1 J. Goebel , Jr., supr a not e 3 , at 590 . 125. J . O'Connor , supr a not e 1 , at 146 ; see supra note s 28-4 0 an d accompa nying text . 126. Se e supra note s 71-7 4 an d accompanyin g text . 127. Se e supra note s 85-8 9 an d accompanyin g text . 128. Se e Vanhorne's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S . ( 2 Dall. ) 30 4 (Paterson , Cir cuit Justice 1795) . 129. Id . a t 304-5 . 130. Id . a t 304-7 . 131. Id . at 313. For the earlier history of the dispute, see 1 J. Goebel, Jr., supra note 3, at 188-94 . See also L. Rosenberg, supra not e 65, a t 165-66, 181. On e au thor describe d th e controversy a s " [a] few wealth y Philadelphi a lan d speculator s with paper titles in their pockets . .. arraye d agains t severa l thousand smal l farm ers wh o ha d brough t schools , churches , an d settlement s t o th e uppe r Susque hanna." Boyd , "Willia m Paterson, Forerunner o f John Marshall," i n The Lives of

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Eighteen from Princeton 1 6 (W. Thorp ed . 1946) . The dispute had bee n draggin g on fo r twenty-fiv e year s an d wa s extremel y bitter . Id . 132. Se e Vanhorne's Lessee, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) a t 307-20 . 133. Se e id. at 307-16 . 134. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 13 7 (1803) . 135. Vanhorne's Lessee, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) a t 308 . 136. Id . at 315 ; see id. a t 316 . 137. Id . a t 310 . 138. Id . a t 317-18 . 139. Id . at 319-20 . 140. E.g. , 1 J. Goebel , Jr., supr a not e 3 , at 590 ; 1 C. Warren, supr a not e 74 , at 69 . Boyd says that the landowners wh o filled the courtroom printe d Paterson' s charge i n pamphle t for m an d distribute d i t throughou t th e nation . Boyd , supr a note 131 , at 17 . Goebe l confirm s this . 1 J. Goebel , Jr., supr a not e 3 , a t 59 0 Sc n.l 77. 141. Talbot v. Jansen, 3 U.S. ( 3 Dall.) 13 3 (1795) ; United States v. Peters, 3 U.S. ( 3 Dall.) 12 1 (1795) . 142. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 13 3 (1795) . 143. Id . at 16 9 (opinio n o f Rutledge , C.J.) . 144. Id . at 152-5 3 (opinio n o f Paterson , J.). 145. Id . a t 133-34 . 146. Se e id. 147. Id . a t 154-5 5 (opinio n o f Paterson , J.). 148. Id . a t 152-5 4 (opinio n o f Paterson , J.) ; se e id . a t 161-6 5 (opinio n o f Iredell, J.). Justice Iredel l discusse d th e expatriation o f th e plaintiff, Willia m Tal bot. Id . 149. Id . at 15 4 (opinio n o f Paterson , J.). 150. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 17 1 (1796 ) [hereafte r cite d a s Hylton], 151. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 19 9 (1796 ) [hereafte r cite d a s Ware]. 152. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) a t 180 9 (opinio n o f Paterson , J.). 153. 1 C. Warren, supr a not e 74 , at 147 . 154. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) a t 172-7 5 (opinio n o f Chase , J.). 155. Id . at 17 2 (opinio n o f Chase , J.). 156. Id . at 172-7 3 (opinio n o f Chase , J.). 157. Id . at 17 5 (opinio n o f Chase , J.); id. a t 18 0 (opinio n o f Paterson , J.); id. at 18 3 (opinio n o f Iredell , J.). 158. Id . at 17 5 (opinio n o f Chase , J.). 159. Id . at 17 6 (opinio n o f Paterson, J.). 160. Id . at 18 1 (opinio n o f Iredell , J.). 161. Id . 162. Id . at 18 0 (opinio n o f Paterson , J.). 163. Id . at 180-8 1 (opinio n of Paterson, J.). "Paterson had been present at the

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Federal Conventio n whe n th e rule o f apportionmen t o f taxe s a s well as represen tation was decided. He was thus qualified t o speak with some assurance about th e intentions o f tha t body. " 1 J. Goebel , Jr., supr a not e 3 , at 781 . In hi s opinio n i n Hylton, Paterso n als o said: "I t is not necessary to determine, whether a tax on th e product o f lan d b e a direc t o r indirec t tax . Perhaps , th e immediat e produc t o f land, i n it s original an d crud e state , ought t o b e considered a s the lan d itself . . . . Land independentl y o f it s produce , i s o f n o value. " Hylton, 3 U.S . ( 3 Dall. ) a t 176-77 (opinio n o f Paterson , J.). Justice Fuller' s opinio n i n th e incom e ta x case , Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 15 7 U.S . 429, aff' d o n reh'g , 15 8 U.S . 60 1 (1895) , quote d this , an d Fuller appear s t o hav e relie d heavil y upo n Paterson' s notio n tha t lan d an d it s product ar e identical in order t o justify hi s holding that a tax o n the income fro m land is a direct tax on the land itself. Id. at 581, 583. Fuller stated: "Thi s law taxes the income received fro m lan d an d th e growth o r produce o f the land. Justice Pa terson observe d i n Hylton's cas e 'land , independentl y o f it s produce , i s o n n o value;' an d certainl y ha d n o though t tha t direc t taxe s wer e confine d t o unpro ductive land. " Id . at 58 1 (quotin g Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) a t 17 7 (opinio n o f Pa terson, J.)) . Th e dissentin g opinio n i n Pollock, however , pointe d ou t tha t Pater son ha d als o state d tha t h e "neve r entertaine d a doubt tha t th e principa l . . . objects that th e framer s o f th e Constitutio n contemplate d a s falling withi n th e rul e of apportionmen t wer e a capitation ta x an d a ta x o n land. " Id . a t 64 4 (Harlan , J., dissenting ) (quotin g Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) a t 17 7 (opinio n o f Paterson , J.)). 164. Ware, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) a t 244-4 5 (opinio n o f Chase , J.). 165. Id . a t 271-7 9 (opinio n o f Iredell , J.). 166. Id . a t 25 5 (opinio n o f Paterson , J.). 167. Id . a t 25 6 (opinio n o f Paterson , J.). 168. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 38 6 (1798) . 169. Id . a t 38 6 (opinio n o f Chase , J.). 170. Id . 171. Id . a t 386-8 7 (opinio n o f Chase , J.). 172. Id . a t 386-8 7 (opinio n o f Chase , J.) 173. Id . a t 401. 174. Se e id. at 390-9 1 (opinio n o f Chase , J.); id. at 39 7 (opinio n o f Paterson , J.); id. at 39 9 (opinio n o f Iredell , J.). 175. See , e.g., 1 J. Goebel , Jr., supra not e 3 , at 704-5 . 176. Id . a t 39 7 (opinio n o f Paterson , J.). 177. Id . 178. 1 0 U.S. (6Cranch)87(1810) . 179. Se e id. at 139 . 180. Se e id. at 87 ; Ware, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) a t 199 . 181. Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) a t 39 9 (opinio n o f Iredell , J.). 182. 1 4 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 30 4 (1816) .

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183. 1 9 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 26 4 (1821) . 184. Se e supra note s 85-8 9 an d accompanyin g text . Paterson' s coauthorshi p of th e Judiciary Ac t ha s ha d mor e effec t tha n al l o f hi s decisions . Warren quote s John C . Calhou n a s statin g tha t withou t th e Judiciar y Ac t o f 1789 , th e entir e course o f th e federa l governmen t woul d hav e bee n altered . 1 C . Warren , supr a note 74 , at 18 . 185. 4 U.S. (4Dall.)14(1800) . 186. 4 U.S. (4Dall.)37(1800) . 187. Se e Cooper, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) a t 16-17 . 188. Id . at 1 9 (opinio n o f Paterson , J.). 189. Bas, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) a t 37 ; see act o f Mar. 2, 1799 , ch. 24, sec. 7, 1 Stat. 709, 71 6 (repeale d 1800) . 190. Bas, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) a t 38 . 191. Id . at 43 (opinio n of Chase, J.); see id. at 45-46 (opinio n o f Paterson, J.). 192. Se e Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1 (1801). 193. 2 G . Haskins S c H. Johnson, supr a not e 102 , at 105 , 382-86 . 194. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 29 9 (1803) . Marshall ha d decide d th e cas e below . Id . at 308 . 195. 2 G . Haskins 8 c H. Johnson, supr a not e 102 , at 163-68 . 196. Se e id. a t 122-33 . 197. Id . at 163-68 . The argument o f the Federalists resulted in the famous de bate in Congress over the power o f the Supreme Court to review acts of Congress . 1 C . Warren, supr a not e 74 , at 215-22 . 198. Stuart, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) a t 302-3 . 199. Id . a t 303 . 200. Id . a t 304 . 201. Id . at 305 . 202. Id . at 309 . 203. Id . 204. Se e 2 G. Haskins 8 c H. Johnson, supr a not e 102 , at 217, 650; 1 C. Warren, supr a not e 74 , at 269-73. 205. Se e 1 C. Warren, supr a not e 74 , at 269-73 . 206. Stuart, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) a t 309 . 207. Se e 2 G . Haskins 5 c H. Johnson, supr a not e 102 , at 382-86 . 208. Simms v. Slacum, 7 U.S . ( 3 Cranch ) 300 , 309-1 1 (1806 ) (Paterson , J. , dissenting). 209. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 50 3 (1806) . 210. Se e id. at 510-1 3 (opinio n o f Paterson , J.). 211. 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) xii i (1807) . 212. J . O'Connor , supr a not e 1 , at 278 . 213. Id . at xiii . 214. Van Home's Lessee, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) a t 308 .

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215. Id . 216. Id . 217. Se e 2 G . Haskin s & H . Johnson , supr a not e 102 , a t 650 . Marbury v. Madison an d Stuart v. Laird "presage d th e development o f a full-scale concep t o f rule o f la w an d a deep-seated respec t fo r th e primacy o f legislativ e powe r a s well as for th e concept o f separatio n o f powers. " Id .

Chapter 9

The Verdict o n Samue l Chas e and Hi s "Apologist 55 Stephen B. Presser

Was the appointmen t o f Samue l Chas e to th e United State s Suprem e Court "on e o f th e mos t regrettabl e nomination s i n th e Court' s his tory,"1 or did his jurisprudence mak e an important an d positive contribution t o th e developmen t o f th e youn g republic ? Unti l recently , virtually ever y historia n o f th e earl y Cour t dismisse d Chas e a s th e "bad boy " o f th e Ellswort h Court 2—a rabi d partisan , a bully , a n American Jeffreys , o r worse . H e was , o f course , th e onl y Unite d States Suprem e Cour t justic e eve r t o b e impeached , an d thoug h th e impeachment di d no t resul t i n his removal fro m offic e b y the Senat e because th e require d two-third s majority coul d no t b e cobble d to gether, a majority o f senators di d vote to convict hi m on som e of th e charges. A t leas t on e prominen t reviewe r o f Chase's record , Raou l Berger, ha s flatly declare d tha t th e Senat e shoul d hav e throw n hi m off th e bench. 3 One ca n ofte n mak e a lot o f mone y i n the stoc k marke t b y doin g what everyon e else is not, and, similarly, young academics see k ofte n to make splashes by writing revisionist works. So it has been with me and Samue l Chase. No one , I figured, when I was young, and when I began writing the legal history of the Third Circuit, 4 for which Chas e served on e importan t ter m a s circuit justice , could hav e bee n a s ba d as Chase was then made out to be. Moreover, there had been times in our histor y whe n h e appeare d t o b e highly regarded, 5 an d I thought that thi s mad e hi m a rip e candidat e fo r a revisionis t work . I finally published th e book-lengt h wor k i n 1991 , The Original Misunder260

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standing: The English, The Americans, and the Dialectic of Federalist Jurisprudence, and , a s befits a revisionist effort , i t garnered a variety of interesting responses. I though t I would us e thi s forum , then , no t onl y t o describ e th e work o f Chas e but to examine an d repl y to the critics of my book i n the hop e tha t suc h a n effor t migh t furthe r contribut e t o th e ongoin g assessment of the early republic's Supreme Court and its most controversial judicia l figure . I n wha t follow s I wil l begi n b y settin g fort h Samuel Chase's relevant biographical facts, and I will go on to present the assertion s I mad e evaluatin g hi s career , reviewers ' response s t o those assertions , and wha t al l of this suggest s with regar d t o conclu sions to be drawn about constitutional jurisprudence on the pre-Marshall Court, about the character and value of Samuel Chase, about the perils of working the intersection of law and history, and about futur e avenues that scholar s might profitably pursue . The Facts Samuel Chas e o f Marylan d (b.l741-d.l811 ; associate justic e o f th e United State s Suprem e Court , 1796-1811 ) signe d th e Declaration o f Independence, served in the Revolutionary War Congress, and serve d as a judge on the Maryland benc h as well as the federal judiciary. 6 His political and judicial career was constantly the subject of criticism and controversy, flowing fro m tw o undeniabl e facts . First , h e ha d a per sonally rough manner, he denounced i n no uncertain terms those who disagreed with him, he was not given gladly to suffering fools , and his hair-trigger temper could be easily ignited by those who sought to discredit o r embarras s him . Second , ther e wa s admittedl y muc h wit h which his critics had to work. There was at least the appearance (if not the reality) of impropriety in his financial dealings, at least early in his career. H e appear s t o hav e profite d fro m hi s stat e legislativ e servic e through his participation in the issuance of paper money in Maryland, and fro m hi s congressional servic e by speculating i n the flour future s market a t a time when h e may have known tha t Congress was goin g to mak e significan t wartim e order s fo r bread. 7 Hi s politica l associa tions, say his critics, 8 turned mor e on personal advantag e than philo sophical conviction, with the best evidence being perhaps that he was a strong and vocal opponent of the federal Constitution , but, once the

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document ha d bee n approved, h e quickly sough t appointmen t t o th e new federal government . It wa s no t uncommo n fo r th e leadin g me n o f late-eighteenth-cen tury America to profit fro m thei r public service, to, as it were, do well by doing good—eve n John Marshal l wa s no t abov e engagin g i n thi s art9—but Chas e appears to have gone a bit beyond th e norm. 10 Nev ertheless, i f w e ar e abou t th e busines s o f judgin g hi s jurisprudentia l contribution an d no t simpl y o f seekin g to singl e him ou t fo r censur e because of his business dealings, it is what he did as a Supreme Cour t justice that will determine in what regard we ought ultimately to hold him. There is much i n his judicial record tha t show s proof o f at leas t his brilliance, if not his true eminence. 11 For example, in his maiden Supreme Court opinion in Ware v. Hylton (1796), 12 the longest of the four seriati m opinions delivered by the justices i n the case , Chase engage d i n an exhaustiv e stud y o f civilia n treatises on the law of nations to solve an exceptionally politically sensitive constitutiona l problem . A Virginia statut e passe d i n 177 7 ha d directed tha t debt s du e t o Britis h creditor s coul d b e obliterate d b y paying the m int o th e loa n offic e i n Virgini a (i n grossl y depreciate d Virginia currency) , bu t thi s conflicte d wit h a provision i n th e Treat y of Paris . That pact , whic h ende d th e Revolutionar y War , an d whic h was signed in 1783, provided that no legal impediments would be permitted t o defea t th e claim s o f Britis h creditor s agains t American debtors, an d tha t thos e debt s wer e payabl e i n sterling . I n Ware a British creditor, relying on the treaty an d the supremacy clause of the United State s Constitution , sough t t o collec t a deb t allegedl y dis charged b y th e Virgini a statut e o f 1777 . The Virgini a debtor' s posi tion, that the Virginia statut e was a valid exercise in state sovereignt y that th e federa l treat y coul d no t override , wa s argue d befor e th e Supreme Cour t b y none othe r tha n Joh n Marshall . Marshall' s argu ment was rejected b y Chase and his fellows, however . In his Ware opinion, whic h reflecte d no t onl y exhaustiv e stud y of the relevant treatises but also the theory of popular sovereignty, Chase held tha t th e plai n meanin g o f th e treat y an d th e supremac y claus e governed, an d that eve n though Virginia possesse d th e power t o nullify the debt in 1777, the treaty in 1783 had reinstated it. Chase noted that the effect o f his decision was to make the debtor liabl e to paying twice (since he had already paid into the Virginia loan office an d wa s now liable to pay a second time, to the British creditor), but that th e

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debtor ha d a clai m fo r jus t compensatio n unde r th e Constitution . Chase's opinio n wa s a "tou r d e force" 13 tha t no t onl y reste d o n th e law of nations, the construction o f treaties, and the nature of popular sovereignty bu t als o dre w heavil y o n th e concep t o f "justice " itself . His opinion als o has been taken b y commentators t o have performe d the valuable service of settling the question o f whether the supremac y clause would b e construed b y the court s a s meaning wha t i t said , o r whether exception s woul d b e carve d ou t t o mee t th e politica l demands of powerful states. 14 In his most widel y quote d Suprem e Cour t opinion , tha t i n Colder v. Bull (1798), 15 Chase explore d wha t migh t b e regarded a s the nat ural-law basis for the federal Constitution. 16 In that case he explained that ther e wer e som e supraconstitutiona l principle s tha t circum scribed an y legislature , whethe r o r no t suc h principle s ha d bee n ex plicitly spelle d ou t i n th e writte n fundamenta l law . Chas e gav e onl y two examples in his opinion—making a person judge and party in his or he r ow n case , an d takin g A' s property an d givin g i t t o B without any compensation t o A—but hi s work ha s bee n taken t o have established the doctrine no w referre d t o a s "substantiv e du e process," th e reading int o th e Fift h o r Fourteent h Amendment' s "du e process " clause guarantees o f particular right s o r libertie s not expressl y foun d elsewhere in the Constitution, rights or liberties generally drawn fro m some sort of conception o f natural-law theory. 17 This sor t o f approac h t o constitutiona l law , recentl y favore d b y many advocate s o f "liberal " constitutiona l theory , ha s alway s bee n opposed i n ou r histor y b y judicia l conservatives , wh o hav e main tained that "stric t construction" o r "origina l intent" i s more of a certain guid e t o appropriat e constitutiona l interpretation . Curiously , however, Chas e i s als o on e o f th e founder s o f th e "stric t construc tionist" approach . Whil e Chas e ma y hav e bee n revealin g a belie f i n natural la w in Colder v. Bull, h e apparently though t tha t the natural law basi s fo r constitutiona l jurisprudenc e wa s a ver y limite d one . Many, if not al l of his Federalist fellow s believe d that the natural-la w basis of th e federa l governmen t wa s broa d enoug h t o includ e th e ju risdiction to punish crimes that had not yet been prohibited b y federal statute, bu t i n on e o f hi s most notabl e opinion s whil e ridin g circuit , that in United States v. Worrall (1798),18 Chase became the only lateeighteenth-century federa l judg e t o rejec t thi s theor y o f th e "federa l common la w of crimes. " The argumen t o f th e champions o f the fed -

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eral commo n la w o f crime s wa s tha t an y governmen t ha d a sor t o f natural righ t t o self-defense , an d thu s th e federa l governmen t coul d punish crime s such as bribery or seditious libel even before Congres s prohibited suc h particula r conduc t b y mean s o f a specifi c statute . Chase apparently believed that these matters of the criminal law were more policy choices than they were immutable principles and, consequently, that fo r th e federal court s t o punish crime s without statute s would creat e too much uncertainty an d injustic e i n the law. His view on this point was eventually upheld by the Supreme Court, in the early nineteenth century . Riding on circuit, Chase also relied in his opinions on the principle of judicia l revie w t o declar e unconstitutiona l act s o f Congress void , the principl e late r famousl y brough t t o nationa l attentio n i n Mar shall's opinio n i n Mar bury v. Madison (1803) . Th e mos t importan t such instanc e wa s i n th e Callender trial o f 1800 , discusse d below , a federal prosecutio n fo r seditiou s libe l whe n th e defendants ' lawyer s sought t o ge t th e jur y t o rejec t th e Federalis t statut e a s unconstitu tional. Chas e carefull y borrowe d argument s fro m Hamilton' s Federalist 78 to demonstrate that only the judges—and not the jury—could declare a law void because it went beyond constitutional limits . Marshall was reporte d t o hav e bee n i n the audienc e durin g Chase' s pro nouncement o n judicia l revie w i n Callender, an d t o hav e adopte d some of Chase's language for us e in Marbury. Once he joined the Federalist bench, Chase made pronouncement s that clearly indicated tha t he had becom e a political as well as a judicial conservative. He found himsel f impeache d by the Jeffersonians a s a result of his presiding over several criminal trials and proceedings in which he sought to implement the Adams administration's attempts to silence what it believed to be destructive and dangerous attacks on the government b y rebels and mendacious critics. These trials occurred in Pennsylvania and Virginia when Chase rode circuit in 1800. Most important, perhaps, in Pennsylvania h e presided over the second trial of John Fries , a leader in the "Frie s Rebellion" o r "Ho t Water War," a n uprising ove r federa l taxe s i n easter n Pennsylvania . Befor e th e tria l began, Chas e distribute d a writte n opinio n t o counse l an d jur y i n which h e state d tha t h e woul d no t permi t citatio n o r discussio n o f English constructiv e treaso n cases . Chase's objectiv e wa s t o forestal l the defens e fro m usin g Englis h abuse s t o discredi t th e federa l prose -

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cutors' attempt to construe American treason law to include armed resistance t o federa l ta x officials . Thei r defens e strateg y foreclosed , Fries's counse l storme d of f th e case , claimin g Chas e deprive d thei r client of his rights to argue law to the jury. This became the first of the impeachment charge s brough t agains t Chase . Chase's defens e wa s that th e la w wa s th e law , it wa s th e judge' s jo b t o sa y what th e la w was, and no defendant ha d the right to try to mislead the jury on the law. The two other most notable 180 0 circuit cases involved allege d violations of the Federalists' seditious libel statute passed in 1798. In the Pennsylvania Circui t trial of Thomas Cooper, Chase, when the defen dant raised trut h a s a defense, applie d Englis h civil libel rules and required th e defendan t t o prov e trut h "beyon d a marrow. " Sinc e Cooper's assertions—that th e United State s had a standing army, that President Adams paid too high a rate of interest during peacetime, and that Presiden t Adam s improperl y interfere d i n a judicia l proceedin g involving a murder suspect 19—could hav e bee n construe d a s matter s of opinio n tha t migh t hav e gon e eithe r way , putting a severe burde n of proving truth o n Coope r probabl y ensure d hi s conviction. O n th e other hand , a t leas t som e o f Cooper' s charge s wer e demonstrabl y false,20 and, under the terms of the statute at least, his conviction wa s probably no t a miscarriag e o f justice . Fo r thi s reason , althoug h Cooper's case has provided fodder fo r Chase's critics, it was not made a part o f the impeachment proceeding s agains t him . This was not the case for th e other notabl e seditiou s libel prosecution ove r whic h Chas e presided , th e 180 0 tria l o f Jame s Thomso n Callender i n Virginia . Callender , wh o wa s perhap s charitabl y de scribed a s a "littl e reptile, " an d wh o wa s onc e ejecte d fro m th e Vir ginia legislatur e fo r bein g covered wit h lic e and filth, ha d writte n a n over-the-top boo k critica l o f Presiden t Adams , th e mildes t commen t of whic h wa s probabl y tha t Adam s wa s " a hoary-heade d incendi ary."21 Accordin g t o mos t accounts , Chas e wa s hande d Callender' s book by his friend Luthe r Martin (wh o was to be his principal defens e lawyer a t th e impeachment ) whe n h e bega n th e tre k b y stage t o Virginia, h e was enrage d b y what h e read, an d whe n h e got t o Virgini a he manipulated th e grand jur y to secur e Callender' s indictment . Thi s story is probably apocryphal , a t least insofar a s it suggests Chas e demanded tha t n o Jeffersonian sympathizer s b e allowe d o n th e gran d

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jury,22 but it was Chase's conduct a t the trial itself, of which we have a clear record, that was to provide some of the most serious impeachment charges against him . Callender ha d bee n indicted o n nineteen counts of violation o f the seditious libe l statute . Hi s lawyers , thre e aggressiv e Jeffersonians , after havin g failed t o convince Chas e to postpone th e trial fo r a year to allow them to gather more evidence (Chase said that they had faile d to demonstrat e a nee d fo r delay , althoug h h e apparentl y offere d a postponement o f on e month , whic h the y declined ) chos e t o defen d Callender b y arguing the truth o f only one of the charges, and, as indicated above, by trying to get the jury to throw out the federal statut e as unconstitutional . I n hindsight , i t seem s clea r tha t the y wer e fa r more interested in scoring political points off Chas e than they were in defending thei r haples s client. 23 Mos t probabl y sensin g wha t wa s going on , Chas e wa s condescendin g i n hi s treatmen t o f th e three , whom h e referred t o a s "youn g gentlemen, " refuse d thei r onl y offe r of evidence on the probably correct ground that it was of dubious relevance an d prejudicial, 24 and , a s als o indicate d earlier , refuse d t o allow them to make the constitutionality argumen t to the jury, on the grounds tha t constitutionality , a s a matter o f law , was fo r th e judge , not th e jury . Callender' s lawyers , as ha d Fries' s lawyer s befor e the m (one wonders whether they were imitating the latter's tactics) storme d off th e case. Callender, as Fries had been , was convicted . At Chase' s tria l o n th e impeachmen t charges , John Randolph , th e fiery manager fo r th e prosecution, sough t to portray Chase's conduc t in th e Callende r tria l a s that o f a zealou s partisa n hell-ben t o n Cal lender's conviction. Although John Marshall waffled somewha t when he wa s a witness i n defens e o f Chase' s tria l conduct , Chas e an d hi s lawyers did a fair jo b of demonstrating that his rulings were in accordance with an orthodox understanding of the law of evidence and the Constitution, an d that while he was guilty of being irritated b y counsel and what h e believed to b e their inappropriate arguments , he had violated n o law, and thus committed n o impeachable offense . In other moves that undoubtedly sparke d the interest of those who sought t o remov e hi m fro m th e bench , Chas e ha d unsuccessfull y sought to convince Marshall that the Jeffersonians' eliminatio n of the position o f circui t judge s (th e famou s "midnigh t judges, " appointe d pursuant to the 180 1 Judiciary Act passed in the waning hours of the Adams administration) 25 shoul d b e rule d unconstitutiona l an d re -

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versed. The final event that triggered his impeachment, however, happened during the early years of Jefferson's administration , when, having failed t o ge t Marshal l an d hi s othe r colleague s t o act , Chas e delivered a charge to a Baltimore grand jury blasting the Jeffersonians a t the federa l an d stat e level s fo r underminin g judicia l independence . Chase warned tha t suc h conduc t woul d destro y th e basi s o f th e rul e of la w o n whic h constitutiona l governmen t rested , an d violate d a s well basi c politica l principle s tha t insiste d tha t la w b e undergirde d with morality , an d moralit y wit h religion . Chase' s gran d jur y charg e borrowed heavily from th e philosophy of Edmund Burke, with whom Chase had spent a fortnight o n a trip to England in 1784, and warned that unthinkingl y democrati c Jeffersonian advocate s o f the "right s of man" wer e plunging the country in the direction o f mobocracy . This was too muc h fo r Jefferso n an d hi s Republican colleague s i n Congress, wh o ha d assume d contro l o f th e nationa l legislatur e fol lowing the defeat o f Adams and the Federalists in 1800. Following on the heels of John Marshall's reminde r i n Marbury tha t th e legislatur e would b e subject t o judicia l review , th e Baltimor e gran d jur y charg e apparently convince d Jefferson tha t Chas e (an d som e o f hi s Federalist allies) were set on using the judiciary to frustrate th e efforts o f the new Jeffersonian majoritie s i n Congress an d th e states . Jefferson ap parently gav e hi s consen t t o th e attempte d remova l o f Chase , an d urged hi s congressional lieutenant s t o act . Within a few months , an d following th e remova l b y impeachment o f th e mentall y incompeten t United State s District Cour t judg e John Pickering , impeachment arti cles were filed in th e Hous e agains t Chase . The bes t lawyer s amon g the Adams Federalists immediately enliste d in Chase's defense, agree ing to wor k fo r n o fee s becaus e o f thei r belie f tha t Jefferson an d th e congressional Republican s wer e attemptin g t o destro y th e indepen dence o f th e judiciary. A t Chase' s tria l befor e th e Senat e i n 1805 , he and hi s defender s argue d tha t th e impeachmen t charge s wer e littl e more than politically motivated calumny. The strategy was successful , as some of the more moderate Republicans joined the remaining Federalists i n preventin g a two-third s majorit y necessar y t o remov e Chase. A t Chase' s tria l befor e th e Senate , Joh n Marshal l playe d a rather disappointin g role, refusing t o do much in Chase's defense an d even suggesting, contrary t o hi s reputation a s a great defende r o f ju dicial review, that perhaps Congress ought to be the only arbiter of the constitutionality o f its own acts. 26

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The failure o f the Senate to remove Chase is usually pointed t o b y historians as a victory for judicial independence, and as having established the precedent that a judge could not be removed merely for stat ing political views from th e bench. More correctly, however, the proceeding ought to be seen as establishing the principle that it was dangerous fo r a judge, suc h a s Chase , to articulat e politica l philosophy , particularly on e a t odd s wit h th e prevailin g democrati c etho s o f th e Jeffersonians. There were some apparent inconsistencies in Chase's jurisprudence and politics , but they were more apparen t tha n real . He opposed th e federal Constitutio n befor e it s ratification , bu t h e becam e th e staunchest o f Federalis t defender s o f th e Adam s administratio n against it s critics. He was the only Federalist justic e to reject th e fed eral common la w of crimes, but, as indicated earlier , he believed tha t there wer e certai n supraconstitutiona l principle s tha t restraine d an y and al l governments. O n a t leas t on e occasio n h e expressed reserva tions abou t th e power o f the Suprem e Cour t t o rejec t legislativ e act s on the grounds that they conflicted wit h the federal Constitution , bu t on other occasions, most notably Callender's trial before a hostile Virginia audience , he made clea r tha t th e Cour t wa s the onl y bod y tha t could declare that a law was unconstitutional. He had originally been a professe d champio n o f th e people , particularl y agains t th e aristo cratic proprietar y interes t i n Maryland , bu t h e ende d hi s caree r op posed to the party of Madison and Jefferson, an d as a judge who carefully circumscribe d th e operation o f the petit jury, arguably th e mos t important popula r institutio n i n the legal system. Many o f these inconsistencie s evaporat e whe n Chase' s action s ar e put i n context. H e appear s t o hav e believe d tha t th e moment fo r ac tive popular sovereignty was the time of the American Revolution, but that once the American people had established a federal Constitution , their duties were to obey the rules of the government the y had estab lished, to refrai n fro m resistin g it s laws, and t o tak e direction s fro m their constitutionally selected judges. Throughout his life Chase was a firm supporte r o f th e notio n tha t judge s ha d limite d discretion , cir cumscribed b y the written word o f statute o r constitution. Neverthe less, he believe d tha t ther e wer e certain thing s n o governmen t coul d do and stil l call itself "Republican. " Fo r example, even if the Consti tution was silent on the point, Chas e indicated i n Caldet ', no govern ment coul d mak e a n ac t crimina l an d the n procee d t o punis h thos e

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who committed the act before the legislation was passed. Similarly, as he again state d i n Calder, no government coul d transfer th e propert y of one citizen to another, whether or not any written constitutional directives prohibite d suc h a transfer. Chas e apparentl y believe d tha t i t was the dut y o f th e judge t o enforc e suc h unwritte n rule s when nec essary. Still, because his study of law had convinced him that the commonlaw rules embrace d b y the thirtee n ne w state s wer e differen t i n eac h state, an d becaus e th e federa l governmen t ha d neve r explicitl y adopted an y state' s common law , Chase rejected th e notion o f a fed eral common la w o f crimes. For a judge to declare a particular ac t a federal common-law crime, to Chase, looked like a legislative act that prohibited something lawful when done. Thus, for the same reason he rejected e x post fact o crimina l legislatio n i n Calder —inherent uncer tainty—Chase rejecte d th e federal commo n la w of crimes. This notio n o f th e certaint y an d predictabilit y o f th e la w i s als o what le d hi m t o tr y t o restric t th e discretio n o f hi s juries . I t wa s a n American lega l maxim tha t th e jury was to b e the "judg e o f la w an d fact," an d while Chase appeared t o accept this notion, he gave it limited application . Man y o f th e Federalists ' foe s i n Virginia an d Penn sylvania believe d tha t th e jury' s abilit y t o rende r a general verdic t ( a verdict of "guilty " o r "no t guilty" without explaining the basis of the finding) meant that they could decid e for themselve s whether th e law they were aske d t o appl y was just. To them, this meant tha t th e jur y could refus e t o enforc e a law—for exampl e th e Federalists ' seditiou s libel legislatio n o f 1798—becaus e the y believe d i t t o b e unconstitu tional. Chas e woul d hav e non e o f that . H e informe d hi s jurie s tha t they wer e duty-boun d t o follo w th e la w a s he sa w it , h e issue d in structions on the law (in one case even before the evidence was heard) that his jurors were not to sway from, an d he made clear that the only body capable of passing on the constitutionality o f legislation was the court, no t th e jury . Fo r Chase , then , th e traditiona l America n (an d English radical) abilit y o f the jury to find "law " mean t onl y the ability to apply the law the judge gave them to the facts o f the case. They could find th e "la w o f th e case, " i n othe r words , bu t no t rejec t th e legal rules dictated to them by the judge. To do anything more, Chase believed, would b e for the individual jurors to substitute their will fo r the wil l o f th e America n peopl e expresse d i n legislatio n o r constitu tion. That, for Chase , would b e to betray nothing less than the Amer-

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ican ideal of popular sovereignt y itself. Because Chase feared th e possibility o f arbitrar y an d prejudicia l behavio r o n th e par t o f th e jur y above all , he was als o zealou s i n restricting argument s o f counse l t o the clearly relevant, and was probably the most sophisticated exposi tor o f th e rule s o f evidenc e o n th e earl y federa l bench . Fo r thi s h e earned th e enmit y eve n o f politicall y friendl y lawyer s i n som e o f hi s circuit sittings. All o f th e earl y federa l judge s coul d hav e bee n describe d a s "Re publican schoolmasters " becaus e o f th e manne r i n whic h the y use d their grand jury charges to instruct i n the finer points of the new fed eral government, bu t Chase pushed this practice to the limits, and beyond, triggering his impeachment by the Jeffersonians afte r h e blasted some o f thei r action s i n hi s famou s Baltimor e gran d jur y charg e o f 1803. I n tha t charg e Chas e lai d ou t th e fundamenta l maxim s o f hi s politics an d jurisprudenc e a s they ha d finally matured, includin g th e notions tha t propert y woul d b e insecur e i n a regim e wher e th e un propertied coul d vote ( a view he shared with most o f the Federalists ) and that the legislature had no power to abolish courts once they were established. T o elaborate o n the latte r point , Chas e believe d tha t th e courts were supposed to be the guardians of the security of person and property an d tha t an y trifling wit h the m coul d wel l lead t o "moboc racy"—the worst of all governments. Finally, Chase made clear in his grand jur y charge s tha t h e subscribe d t o th e fundamenta l Federalis t set o f belief s tha t whil e popula r sovereignt y migh t b e th e America n creed, that sovereignt y itsel f was subject t o the rules of the Almighty. Thus, Chas e believe d (a s di d Georg e Washington, fo r example ) tha t there could be no law without moralit y and no morality without religion. It was accordingly the job of the people and their government to promote moralit y an d religion , an d t o liv e an d legislat e pursuan t t o the directives of these twin pillars of good government . Themes from The Original Misunderstanding In The Original Misunderstanding I tried to limn Chase's judicial philosophy, on e tha t I thought corresponde d roughl y wit h th e "Court " philosophy o f seventeenth - an d eighteenth-centur y Englis h Tories , and contras t i t wit h a Jeffersonian "Country " variant , whic h owe d much t o th e though t o f Britis h theorist s Harrington , Sidney , Tren -

The Verdict on Samuel Chase and His "Apologist" 27 1 chard an d Gordon , an d others . I tried t o dra w a paralle l betwee n th e battles i n late-eighteenth-centur y Englan d (involvin g wha t migh t b e described a s a reru n o f "Court " an d "Country " philosophies , playe d out i n Englis h court s ove r th e issue s o f jur y prerogatives , especiall y i n seditious libe l cases ) an d wha t happene d i n Americ a durin g th e so called Federalis t "reig n o f terror " whe n Jeffersonia n editor s wer e prosecuted unde r th e Federalis t Alie n an d Seditio n La w o f 1798 . Es sentially, I suggested tha t judicia l event s in bot h Englan d an d Americ a could bes t b e understoo d a s a reactio n t o th e challeng e pose d b y rad ical ideas , especiall y thos e flowin g fro m th e contemporar y Frenc h Revolution. I tried t o buil d o n th e work o f man y America n historian s who ha d deal t wit h concept s o f "republicanism " an d "liberalism " i n the earl y republic , t o mi x i n th e reactio n t o th e Frenc h Revolution , and the n t o presen t Chas e a s an apostl e o f conservative "Republican " theory wh o confronte d wha t appeare d t o b e a Francophilic Jefferson ian "liberalism, " whic h h e sough t t o crus h i n hi s courtroom . I trie d t o presen t Chase' s conservatis m a s somethin g tha t ha d grown ove r time , that ha d le d hi m t o rejec t th e democrati c excesse s o f his yout h an d t o mov e fro m th e cam p tha t oppose d th e federa l Con stitution a s to o tightl y constrictin g th e sovereignt y o f th e state s (be cause o f thei r belie f i n democrati c prerogatives ) t o joi n th e force s o f Federalism i n th e Washingto n an d Adam s administrations . I trie d t o show tha t Chas e change d hi s min d abou t wha t th e natio n needed , partly a s a resul t o f a visi t t o Englan d i n 1783-178 4 an d partl y a s a result of developments i n the young republic, particularly th e Whiske y Rebellion an d th e Frie s Rebellion—whic h seeme d t o Chas e an d othe r Federalists t o com e to o clos e t o wha t wa s happenin g i n Franc e t o b e tolerated. I also trie d t o show , however , tha t ther e wer e som e consis tent strain s i n Chase' s judicia l philosoph y ove r th e years , principall y his regard fo r th e rule of law itself, and wha t I took t o b e a firm Chris tian basi s fo r hi s jurisprudence . I suggeste d tha t hi s foes , principall y Thomas Jefferson , evince d muc h les s o f a regar d fo r th e rul e o f la w and fo r th e notio n tha t religio n an d moralit y undergirde d th e law . At abou t th e sam e tim e tha t I began th e serie s o f article s tha t wer e incorporated i n The Original Misunderstanding, tw o biographie s o f Chase appeared. 27 I thought tha t th e tim e migh t b e rip e fo r rescuin g Chase fro m th e opprobriu m h e ha d bee n unde r fo r mos t o f th e twen tieth century , a n opprobriu m tha t I thought ha d somethin g t o d o wit h the current America n academy' s preferenc e fo r libera l democrati c pol -

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itics (whic h regards Jefferson a s its avatar)28 and its antipathy t o Jefferson's critics , such as Hamilton an d the High Federalists . I thought that Chas e was also something less of a trimmer than was John Mar shall, particularl y o n th e issue s o f judicia l revie w an d th e indepen dence o f th e federa l judiciary , an d I though t tha t i t wa s tim e tha t Chase received som e credit for the courage he demonstrated i n sticking to his principles. By the late eighties , when I was trying to put the manuscript int o book form , event s in Europe an d America suggeste d tha t th e turn to the left in national and European politics was coming to something of an end, and I thought tha t close r scrutin y o f an old conservative approach might have resonance for today. This seems to have been realized b y at least on e prominent formerl y left-leanin g American histo rian,29 and it is true as well that, at long last, the Supreme Court might be poised t o reexamine som e of what ha s usually bee n characterize d as the "liberal " decision s o f the Warren an d Burger Courts , particu larly those regarding race and religion. Can the study of Chase's trials and tribulation s hel p i n the working ou t o f a jurisprudenc e fo r the twenty-first century? Or i s this questio n eve n appropriate ? Thi s sor t o f teleological approach flie s i n th e fac e o f muc h tha t som e (perhap s most ) curren t American historian s hol d dear . Conceivabl y practicin g histor y for its own sake, they look with jaundiced mien on those whose study of history follow s th e directive of Santayana. For example, David Thoma s Konig, a distinguished colonia l legal historian, writing a few pungent paragraphs in a key professional journa l for American historians, the American Historical Review, state d tha t The Original Misunderstanding "mus t be read with great caution and an awareness of its intended 'relevance for the present.'" 30 Konig, al l bu t dismissin g th e boo k a s "idiosyncratic, " suggeste d that I drew "broadly , indiscriminatel y an d reductionistically o n numerous element s o f eighteenth centur y thought." 31 I suppose I was a reductionist, a s must b e anyone wh o tries to capture th e unmanageable spraw l o f realit y i n the pages o f a book , althoug h I thought I worked wit h more discrimination tha n Koni g apparently was willing to allow . Indeed, Konig' s revie w is a rather dangerou s exercis e in reductionism itself. Konig found "dubious " what he called my assertion that "American s understoo d n o distinctio n between th e la w of nations and . .. a federal commo n law, " while all I was doing was stat-

The Verdict on Samuel Chase and His "Apologist" 27 3 ing wha t i s increasingl y becomin g th e orthodo x understandin g tha t for earl y American s (a t leas t thos e o f who m wer e Federalis t judges ) there wa s a federa l commo n la w tha t incorporate d th e la w o f na tions. 32 Perhap s thi s i s a sig n tha t som e o f th e mor e orthodo x histori ans have found i t difficult t o kee p track o f what th e lawyers hav e bee n doing wit h th e jurisprudenc e o f th e earl y republic . We are now beginnin g to understan d tha t i n the early republic mos t members o f the legal profession wer e natural lawyers, 33 but positivis m continues t o reig n suprem e a t elit e la w school s an d th e uppe r reache s of ou r profession . Eve n amon g peopl e wh o woul d otherwis e describ e themselves a s conservatives , i t i s troubling , perhap s eve n horrifying , to sugges t tha t la w ough t t o b e coupled wit h morality . Knu d Haakon ssen, a n intellectua l historia n writin g i n th e William and Mary Quarterly, appeare d sympatheti c t o th e notio n tha t m y ai m i n writin g o n Chase wa s "t o delive r a mora l lesso n fro m history, " or , a s h e pu t it , that "Americ a ha s t o rekindl e th e righ t telo s fo r th e republic , a civi c humanistic communitarianis m fo r whic h th e judiciar y ca n b e th e guardian." 3 4 Still, whil e Haakonsse n concede d tha t a revie w o f Chase' s wor k might ad d t o th e ongoin g philosophica l an d politica l debat e ove r whether ther e i s somethin g t o b e learne d fro m ou r constitutiona l his tory, and, in particular, whether ther e was " a historicall y given essenc e of th e America n Constitutio n tha t a historicis t metho d o f unravelin g the dialectic s o f histor y ca n discern, " h e though t I hadn't capture d it , nor di d h e thin k tha t m y presentatio n ha d provide d a "sustaine d ar gument fo r th e moral , legal , an d politica l values " I wanted t o further . Moreover, Haakonssen , proteste d m y "uncritica l acceptance " o f th e dichotomy draw n b y J. G . A . Pococ k betwee n republicanis m an d lib eralism, becaus e "th e debat e betwee n Lockea n liberalis m vs . Neo-re publicanism i s . . . a fals e alarm." 3 5 Haakonssen, reflectin g hi s ow n notabl e researc h i n the natural-la w roots o f America n jurisprudence, 36 argue d tha t wha t America n con stitutional historian s ough t t o addres s wa s not th e battl e betwee n lib erals an d republican s bu t th e manne r i n whic h republicanis m wa s in tertwined wit h natural-la w argument s draw n no t onl y from Lock e bu t also fro m th e civilians . Haakonssen's poin t abou t th e importance o f natural-law theorie s i s well taken. Th e dominatio n o f lega l positivis m i n this countr y ma y b e facing a n uncertai n future , examinatio n o f th e pas t i s vita l i n finding

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a substitute , an d ou r natural-la w traditio n i s clearl y a goo d frame work withi n whic h t o search . I thought I understood an d communi cated this , bu t perhap s th e temptatio n t o dabbl e i n th e then-trend y "republicanism" rhetori c obscured the contribution I sought to make. I have had onl y limited succes s in getting my fellow lega l and con stitutional historians enthused about the value of studying Chase. Neil Duxbury, a prolifi c younge r lega l historia n wh o teache s a t th e Uni versity o f Manchester , writin g i n th e lega l histor y fraternity' s senio r professional journal, the American Journal of Legal History, provide d some grea t advertisin g cop y blurbs : "wel l researched, " "highl y en gaging," "wonderful jo b of putting Chase's ideas and attitudes in their historical context," a "delightfully ambitiou s book," "impressiv e an d provocative." Bu t eve n Duxbur y though t tha t th e boo k wa s a "to o flattering portrai t o f Chase, " an d "to o muc h o f a n apology." 37 Alas, it is difficult t o concoct precisely the right amount o f flattery or apology. The dea n o f practicin g American judicia l biographers , R . Ken t Newmyer,38 i n hi s revie w o f The Original Misunderstanding fo r th e Review of American History, declare d tha t "b y establishing th e doctrinal compatibility o f Chas e an d [Unite d State s District Cour t judg e Richard] Peters , who wa s recognize d a s a judge o f fairnes s an d pro bity, Presse r make s a goo d cas e fo r Chase' s bein g withi n th e main stream o f Federalis t jurisprudence—indee d bein g a courageou s an d uncompromising guardia n o f tha t conservativ e lega l tradition." 39 Upon reading this, I rejoiced, sinc e that's all I had se t out to do in the book. Nevertheless , Newmye r wondere d wh y ther e wasn' t mor e i n the book about the Supreme Court as a whole, and stated that, in particular, I probably erred by failing t o see the Callender trial and othe r developments as more about a contest between the federal courts an d "entrenched legal localism"40 than about competing distinct legal ideologies. Newmyer's magisteria l work o n Joseph Stor y did have a lot abou t the Supreme Court , an d i f his comprehensiveness i s the measure o f a successful effor t a t book writing in legal history, my effort clearl y falls short. O n th e othe r hand , s o do th e book s o f mos t o f th e res t o f us . The localis m versu s centra l authorit y poin t i s toughe r t o dea l with . That's bee n a staple of writing about th e Federalists an d Antifederal ists fo r years , bu t doe s i t mak e sens e when applie d t o th e judiciary ? The questio n stil l becomes , localis m o r centralis m t o accomplis h

The Verdict on Samuel Chase and His "Apologist" 275 what? Wh y i s local contro l better ? Wha t value s ar e thereb y promote d or discouraged ? I though t tha t b y focusin g o n question s involvin g judge, jury , an d th e natur e o f law , I migh t bette r addres s th e impor tant ideologica l question s tha t la y behin d th e centralis m an d localis m questions. Newmyer, t o m y surprise , suggeste d tha t wha t I had don e fit nicel y with Yal e la w professo r Bruc e Ackerman' s ongoin g revie w o f consti tutional la w a s a "communit y o f discourse. " On e couldn' t as k fo r more tha n t o b e linke d wit h on e o f th e la w schoo l faculties ' leadin g luminaries. Moreover , i t appeare d tha t Newmye r accepte d wha t h e called m y "mai n point, " tha t "i n th e unfragmente d intellectua l uni verse o f th e 1790's , politics , moralit y an d la w wer e interconnecte d i f not indistinguishable. " While Newmyer rejecte d part s o f my characterization o f John Mar shall a s presentin g a ne w synthesi s o f th e view s o f th e Adam s Feder alists and th e Jeffersonians, h e apparently agree d enough t o end hi s review wit h th e observatio n tha t "th e secula r pragmatic , instrumenta l American jurisprudenc e Marshal l helpe d creat e fo r th e ne w natio n finally lef t Chas e an d hi s friends i n the historica l dust." 4 1 Sinc e my tas k was explicitl y t o rescu e Chas e fro m th e "dustbin " o f history , I was a little miffed b y Newmyer's choic e o f metaphor , and , further , I' m com ing to believ e that Chase' s bran d o f jurisprudence neve r vanished afte r all (an d wa s eve n employe d b y Newmyer' s ma n Story). 42 Still , Newmyer ha d gotte n enoug h o f wha t I had t o say , he wa s mor e tha n fair i n callin g th e boo k "short , densel y argue d [and ] provocative, " and, baskin g i n th e kin d comment s o f on e o f m y rol e models , I wa s somewhat fortifie d fo r th e stingin g rebuke s tha t wer e stil l t o come . The mos t painfu l wa s fro m Seriatim's ow n Sandr a F . VanBurkleo , who teache s history a t Wayne Stat e University, writing i n the Law and History Review ', whic h i s now th e officia l journa l o f th e American So ciety fo r Lega l History . Sh e declare d tha t The Original Misunderstanding wa s " a maddenin g book." 4 3 VanBurkleo' s principa l poin t seems t o hav e bee n that , a s a monograph , th e boo k shoul d hav e con tained mor e elaboratio n tha n wa s include d i n th e previou s article s o n which i t was based . "[T]h e boo k disappoints, " sh e declared , suggest ing i t wa s "mystifying " tha t th e argumen t wasn' t "carrie d t o fres h ground." 4 4 I did thin k tha t I had sai d a fe w thing s I hadn't i n th e pre vious articles, but whence cometh th e rule that onc e you mov e to har d covers (wher e yo u ca n reac h a n audienc e greate r tha n yo u ca n wit h

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law reviews or specialize d historica l journals) , you must plo w "fres h ground"? While VanBurkleo adopte d th e familia r pos e o f th e reviewe r wh o wants very much to have something nice to say, who has great respect for th e author , an d wh o want s t o b e helpfu l ("T o avoi d misunder standing, le t m e sa y that I would greatly prefe r t o applau d thi s pro ject, and not just because we all work hard on our books and hope for better than I've been able to give"), 45 we seem to have again the problem that my book is not how she would have done it. She was gracious enough to pinpoint exactl y what I could d o to conform wit h her Platonic for m o f a work i n legal history: "On e [presumably , she ] hope s that h e wil l writ e another , les s idiosyncrati c accoun t o f th e motiva tions an d fat e o f Chas e th e Antifederalist-cum-Federalis t jurist , situ ate himself firmly within relevant literatures, and, as they say in Reno, let the chips (rea d 'polic y implications') fal l where they may." 46 One [I ] suspects tha t i t i s this "polic y implications " proble m tha t really disturb s VanBurkleo , an d I thin k sh e coul d spea k fo r man y members o f he r generatio n o f lega l historians . Still , her othe r point s need som e rebutta l befor e w e reac h thi s question . VanBurkle o be moaned it s "idiosyncrati c approach"—neithe r a comprehensiv e his tory of the courts at the time nor a full judicia l biography , nor a treatise on al l aspects o f earl y constitutional law . The writing o f history , or any other for m o f scholarship, it seems to me, benefits fro m diver gent approache s (isn' t tha t th e theoretical justificatio n o f "diversity " as an academic goal, after all?) , and if we seek to remove idiosyncrasy we'll b e th e poore r fo r it . Wh o want s a bunc h o f conformist s re spouting eac h generation' s conventiona l wisdom ? Isn' t th e powe r o f some of the greatest recent works in American legal history the strong individual voices of their respective authors? (On e thinks here of Morton Horwitz' s Bancrof t Prize-winnin g Transformation of American Law, 1776-1860 [1977].) 47 But I digress. VanBurkleo's objectio n t o m y idiosyncras y i s firmly grounded in two other problems. First, she argued that in my work on Chase, I had faile d t o situat e myself "firml y withi n th e relevant liter atures." Apparently unaware that others, such as Kent Newmyer, had concluded exactl y th e opposit e o n thi s point, 48 VanBurkle o declare d that th e dichotomous approac h I had employed was wrong, and tha t I would hav e done bette r t o us e the sam e Kent Newmyer's approac h of a "matrix or set of ideological choices." Instead of trying to situat e

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Chase within a bipolar construct of liberals and republicans, I should have examine d hi m a s a proponen t o f "libera l republicanism." 49 I should hav e done more with the earlier studies , she suggests, that led to th e recen t monograph s b y Isaa c Kramnick , Joyc e Appleby , an d Gordon Wood. 50 These , she asserts, do a much bette r jo b o f fleshin g out the nuances of philosophy an d ideolog y in the early republic. In sum , VanBurkle o declares , i t woul d hav e bee n bette r t o "full y exploit the crisis of the 1790' s to explain Chase's seeming conversio n to Federalis m a s wel l a s ongoin g resistanc e t o federa l judicia l over reach on the criminal law question." 51 Sinc e this was precisely what I thought I had done , should I have been satisfied wit h the implicatio n that I ha d a t leas t "partiall y exploited? " Isn' t tha t enoug h fo r on e work? It mus t b e said , however , tha t VanBurkle o doe s dra w som e rea l blood with her point that recent scholarship on the Antifederalists an d the Jeffersonian s doe s sugges t tha t th e forme r wer e mor e religiou s than the Federalists, and that the latter could b e as much free-marke teers as the Federalists. Thus, my claim tha t Chase' s religiosity coul d be regarde d a s typica l o f th e Federalists, 52 an d m y suggestio n tha t John Marshal l move d beyon d th e Jeffersonian s t o embrac e th e fre e market neede d furthe r amplification . Nevertheless , an d agai n invok ing Newmyer , he appeare d t o hav e foun d enoug h t o sugges t tha t Chase was a representative (i f extreme) spokesma n fo r th e Federalis t position, an d whil e VanBurkle o doubt s tha t Chas e ha s "utilit y a s a window int o juridica l federalism," 53 isn' t i t significant , a s Newmye r thought, that Chase's views do seem to correspond with those of other Federalists, particularly Richar d Peter s (who, after all , acknowledged that i n Fries's case Chas e had state d hi s views on the law bette r tha n Peters could have done himself)? 54 VanBurkleo asks , unconvince d b y th e argument s tha t move d Newmyer, "Wha t if Chase was indeed a loon (a s critics kept insisting) and a pseudo-Federalist bull y to boot?" 55 But it was a common tacti c in th e lat e eighteent h centur y t o labe l you r opponent s a s lunatics, 56 and a loon could not have written Colder v. Bull, Ware v. Hylton, th e opinions i n th e Fries, Cooper, an d Callender cases o r th e Baltimor e grand jury charge, all of which are sophisticated treatment s of constitutional la w an d theory . Perhap s VanBurkle o i s correc t tha t Chas e was " a loose cannon," bu t I think sh e too quickly reaches the conclusion that h e was "(occasionally ) n o friend o f liberty." 57

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What Chas e an d hi s Federalis t fellow s understood , i f the y under stood anything , was that fo r libert y to flourish ther e must b e security for perso n an d property , an d tha t wit h American right s had t o com e American responsibilities. 58 From the hindsight provided by two hundred years, it looks to us as if the Federalists were excessive in trying to implemen t thes e policies, but tha t doesn' t mea n the y were not th e correct one s fo r their time 59 (or , even , wit h som e modifications , fo r ours). I t i s the necessar y linkag e betwee n right s an d responsibilities , for example , tha t fuel s th e surprisin g (t o member s o f th e chatterin g classes) effor t t o pas s the Fla g Protection Amendment , whic h ha s s o far garnere d th e suppor t o f forty-nin e stat e legislatures , mor e tha n two-thirds o f th e United State s House o f Representatives , an d sixty three votes in the United State s Senate , as well a s (b y some polls) 8 0 percent of the American people. The Flag Amendment, like the views of th e Federalists , strike s mos t American academic s a s insufficientl y protective o f America n freedom s (th e Flag Amendment i s habituall y denounced b y those who ought to know bette r a s the first attempt i n two hundred years to amend the Bill of Rights), when it is really a simple statement o f the need for a baseline of civility, decency, and reciprocal responsibility s o that libert y may flourish. 60 VanBurkleo believes that Chase "bullied jurymen into ferreting ou t libels s o tha t h e migh t prosecut e them, " an d tha t h e "repeatedl y trashed politica l an d lega l processes." 61 Bu t i f I am a n apologis t fo r Chase, surely this is an uncritical acceptance of the calumny of the Jeffersonians. Th e historical record (eve n that whic h I reviewed) simpl y does not support such blanket assertions. Granted there are those who would disagre e (suc h as Raoul Berger), 62 but a study of the impeach ment defense tha t Chas e mounted make s clear that he had persuasiv e legal arguments to support eac h of the actions he took, as well as the concurrence o f respecte d judge s suc h a s Peter s o f Pennsylvani a an d Griffin o f Virginia. 63 Further , a t leas t som e o f th e impeachmen t evi dence adduce d agains t hi m come s fro m source s whos e credibilit y i s doubtful,64 an d muc h o f th e informatio n t o suppor t th e charg e tha t Chase zealousl y ferrete d ou t potentia l defendant s i n seditiou s libe l cases appears to be based on press accounts published by Jeffersonia n republican editors , hardly an objective source. 65 Is i t to o muc h t o sugges t that , i n th e final analysis , VanBurkleo' s own policy preferences may have colored her evaluation of what I had to say about Chase (and the Federalists generally)? Dismissing Chase,

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and a fello w Federalis t wh o hel d simila r views , Associat e Justic e William Pate r son, wh o cautione d gran d juror s tha t occasionall y th e people migh t d o bette r t o "min d [their ] ow n business " an d defe r t o their electe d representatives , VanBurkle o ask s wh y w e shoul d "giv e pride o f plac e t o a part y harborin g th e likes " o f th e tw o o f them. 66 VanBurkleo then quotes Linda Kerber to indicate that Americans need "Locke, not Machiavelli," and goes on to ask whether it isn't true that "every variety of revolutionary republicanism and civic humanism, by virtue of the privileging either of property rights or patriarchy and the establishment o f a singl e subjectivel y constructe d bu t functionall y 'objective' an d universalize d politica l truth , perpetuate d racism , sex ism, anti-Semitism , an d s o on , an d woul d d o s o agai n i f revive d wholesale. . . ." 67 The implicatio n appear s t o b e that unles s a historian i s willing t o accept the current ideolog y of politically correct feminism, an d probably willing to "trash" two thousand years of Western civilization and the attemp t t o fashio n a n objectiv e "rul e o f law " besides , the polic y "chips" will not be falling in the place from whic h VanBurkleo would like to gather them. Alas, I'm afrai d I' m doome d t o continue to mad den and disappoin t her. 68 The mos t ambitiou s o f th e reviewer s o f m y book , an d th e las t I'll consider here , wa s Stewar t Jay , a la w professo r a t th e Universit y o f Washington, bes t known i n legal history circles for tw o fine pieces on the federa l commo n law. 69 Jay di d m e an d Chas e th e hono r o f actu ally writing a thirty-page la w revie w essa y o n th e book. 70 Whil e Jay had som e nic e word s t o sa y abou t th e par t o f The Original Misunderstanding that deal t with th e federal commo n la w of crimes (chap ter 6 , i n whic h Chas e play s onl y a came o role) , noting i n particula r that h e and I agreed o n most issue s relating to that limite d topic , Jay dissented vigorousl y fro m m y interpretatio n o f Chase . Unlik e Van Burkleo, wh o t o he r credi t too k th e ideolog y o f th e lat e eighteent h century seriously , Ja y argue d tha t th e bes t wa y t o understan d late eighteenth-century Federalists an d Chas e i n particula r wa s a s me n concerned with furthering thei r own careers and seeking their own financial advantages . Essentially Jay mad e wha t i s best characterize d a s a neo-Beardia n argument that the "ai m of Federalist Constitutionalis m wa s the stabilizing of credi t throug h enforcemen t o f majo r debts"; 71 that th e pro ponents o f the Constitutio n wer e hypocritical i n their claim s that th e

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Constitution wa s base d o n popula r sovereignty; 72 tha t ther e wa s " a lack o f a n origina l understandin g abou t th e natur e o f th e Constitu tion"; an d tha t th e pre-Marshal l justice s ca n bes t b e viewe d a s "ad herents o f commercia l prosperit y an d [believers ] tha t th e nationa l government shoul d pla y a significan t par t i n it s accomplishment." 73 For Jay , Chas e an d hi s fellow s wer e cras s commercialist s ben t o n feathering thei r ow n nests , an d thu s h e rejecte d m y vie w o f the m a s sincerely seekin g t o articulat e a civi c republica n philosoph y base d o n popular sovereignty . Instea d o f thei r bein g altruisti c civi c republicans , Jay, as may b e true o f VanBurkleo a s well, finds th e Federalists to hav e been simpl y authoritaria n an d intolerant. 74 Jay marshale d a n impressiv e amoun t o f dat a t o suppor t hi s claims, an d demonstrate d a thoroug h familiarit y wit h th e biograph ical literatur e o n Chas e an d man y o f th e othe r late-eighteenth-cen tury Federalists . A point-by-poin t respons e o r refutatio n t o th e ar guments mad e b y Jay , whic h b y right s h e deserves , is , alas , no t pos sible here , i n a n essa y ostensibl y devote d t o fleshin g ou t a n understanding o f Chase , particularl y fo r thos e encounterin g hi m fo r the first time . Still , som e issue s ca n b e raise d an d suggeste d fo r reso lution b y others ' efforts . What the n o f Jay' s suggestio n tha t Chas e (an d hi s fello w Federal ists) wer e motivate d onl y b y "pursui t o f lucre, " selfis h financial con cerns, o r a desir e fo r power ? I n particular , i s i t correct , a s Jay states , that Alexande r Hamilton , wh o blaste d Chase' s dabblin g i n flour fu tures, 75 ha d a bette r gras p o n th e essentia l Chas e tha n I did? 76 Wha t did Hamilto n thin k o f Chase , an d particularl y o f Chase' s effort s t o battle th e Jeffersonians ? Perhap s Hamilto n altere d hi s enmit y t o Chase becaus e Hamilto n wa s solicited , alon g wit h othe r leadin g Fed eralists, to serv e o n Chase' s defens e tea m a t the impeachmen t trial , al though Bur r apparentl y kille d hi m befor e h e coul d reply . If Chas e wa s motivate d solel y b y hi s ow n persona l interest , a s Ja y suggests, i s it likel y tha t h e woul d hav e pu t hi s persona l politica l for tunes frequentl y i n jeopardy b y being as outspoken a s he was? Indeed , Jay, becaus e o f hi s thoroughness , unearth s som e behavio r o f Chase's—for example , seekin g t o clam p dow n o n pro-Frenc h demon strators i n Maryland , an d thu s losin g on e o f hi s Marylan d judiciar y positions, whe n som e Francophili c Marylan d legislator s sough t t o punish him—tha t doe s sugges t tha t principl e rathe r tha n advantag e motivated Chase. 77

The Verdict on Samuel Chase and His "Apologist" 28 1 I suppose that Jay could conclude that Chase' s Baltimore grand jur y charge (i n which h e criticized th e Jeffersonian legislatur e o f Marylan d and th e Jeffersonian s i n Congress ) wa s simpl y a n attemp t t o sti r th e citizenry t o tur n ou t th e Jeffersonian s an d retur n Chase' s Federalis t fellows bac k t o power, bu t sinc e Chase had littl e personally t o gain (h e was alread y ensconce d o n th e Suprem e Cour t a t th e time) , i t i s fa r more likel y tha t h e wa s agai n actin g fro m principl e no t persona l ad vantage. Isn' t i t eve n possibl e tha t Chas e kne w tha t th e Baltimor e grand jur y charg e an d hi s machination s wit h Marshal l t o ge t hi s fel low justice s t o condem n th e Jeffersonia n Judiciar y Ac t o f 180 2 wer e activities tha t migh t ris k impeachment , an d h e welcome d th e oppor tunity t o fight fo r wha t h e believe d i n rathe r tha n simpl y acte d onl y for short-ter m advantage ? Ja y i s graciou s enoug h t o sugges t tha t "Samuel Chas e ma y hav e bee n brave r tha n hi s Chie f Justic e [Mar shall] i n combating enemies , bu t Marshal l derive s hi s fame fro m pick ing th e fights h e coul d win." 7 8 Bu t i s "winning " wha t historians , o r those evaluatin g historica l actors , ought mos t to admire ? I s it better t o defend principl e a t grea t persona l cost , o r i s i t bette r t o la y lo w an d strike whe n yo u kno w you'r e no t i n danger ? Curiously, Jay defend s Joh n Adam s agains t m y charg e tha t Adam s acted cynicall y an d politicall y i n pardonin g Fries , afte r Fries' s secon d conviction, ove r which Chas e presided, 79 an d think s that Adams acte d out o f dispassionat e concer n wit h treaso n la w becaus e th e Frie s im broglio cos t Adam s heavil y wit h th e Hamilto n win g o f hi s party — which defecte d and , i n effect , mad e i t al l bu t certai n tha t Jefferso n would triump h i n th e electio n o f 1800. 80 I suspect tha t Adam s simpl y made a ba d politica l calculation , but , i n an y event , isn' t i t significan t and doesn' t i t say something positive about Chase , that, unlik e Hamil ton, Chas e remaine d loya l t o Adam s an d eve n (admittedl y raisin g other problems ) activel y campaigne d fo r hi s reelection? 81 I s i t likel y that Adam s was the only person o f principle amon g th e Federalists, o r is i t mor e likel y tha t th e Federalist s wer e lik e othe r huma n beings , sometimes principled , sometime s not ? Reading Jay , I di d wonde r whethe r Chas e reall y wa s a sor t o f Rorschach blo t that differen t lega l historians coul d rea d a s they chose , or whethe r w e lega l historian s wer e reall y a s muc h spinner s o f th e facts a s contemporar y politicians . Fo r example , knowin g tha t Chas e (no strange r t o th e knif e an d fork ) di d hav e persona l habit s tha t le d him to suffe r fro m th e gout, Jay declare s tha t Chase' s 180 3 gran d jur y

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charge (o f whic h I mak e s o much) "i s the bitte r lamen t o f a man whose declinin g healt h promise d a brie f futur e o f gout-ridde n dis comfort spen t observing his enemies implement a form of government he despised, but for which he was in no small part responsible." 82 But Chase live d o n eight year s mor e t o 1811 , and following a financial windfall afte r hi s impeachment, whe n hi s 1783-178 4 effort s i n recovering Englis h monie s du e on Marylan d debt s cam e t o fruition , Chase appear s t o have bee n quit e happ y wit h hi s lot in life. I f contemporary account s are reliable, he even was philosophical abou t his cherished and beautiful daughter' s marrying a Jeffersonian. 83 No doub t th e world looke d bleake r t o Chas e i n 1803 , but many other Federalists also were convinced that things had taken a dire turn for the worse in 1800, 84 and, for my money, it was not personal idiosyncrasy (of a kind from whic h Chas e and I both suffer) o r bitterness or self-loathing that led Chase to make the statements in the Baltimore grand jur y charg e but , rather , sincer e politica l beliefs . Bu t eve n i f Chase's (and Adams's, and even Hamilton's) political beliefs were sincere, jus t wha t were thos e beliefs ? Ja y joins Kitt y Preye r (an d Kent Newmyer) i n suggesting that , wit h regar d t o Chase's confrontation s with Virginian s a t th e Callende r trial , wha t wa s at stak e wer e not questions abou t the nature of the Constitution , o r the rule of law, or the abstract natur e of the roles of judge and jury but, rather, the Virginians' hostility to "a sustained defens e o f federalist centralizing." 85 And yet, when one considers that Chas e encountered simila r issues in Pennsylvania , an d tha t whe n Randolph , makin g th e cas e fo r Chase's remova l fro m offic e a t the impeachment tria l i n the Senate, criticized his conduct fro m a point of view about theorie s of the role of the judge and jury and the nature of the rule of law,86 it is very difficult to believ e that onl y localism versus centralism was at stake. Indeed, eve n Jay, who is very hostil e to interpretations base d o n ideological development or consistent ideology of actors,87 appears to concede that ther e was a "dominan t Republica n Constitutiona l theory " in Virginia unde r "Federalis t assault." 88 Furthe r research on the judiciary in the late eighteenth century, I think, ought to address whethe r the "dominant Republican Constitutional theories" were about localism versus centralism, "practica l politics," or, as I suspect, sincere differences ove r how American practice ought to emulate or differ fro m the Britis h model . Othe r question s includ e whethe r hierarch y an d aristocracy were inescapable components of any regime committed to

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the rule of law, 89 and whether jurie s ought to b e free t o disregard th e law i n th e servic e o f conscience , o r whethe r popula r sovereignt y i s best serve d b y holdin g jurie s t o th e direction s o f judges . A s anyon e who ha s bee n followin g contemporar y trial s ca n tel l you , non e o f these issue s has yet bee n resolved , an d ther e i s still much histor y ha s to offer i n putting them in perspective. Conclusion Perhaps Samue l Chas e is , when al l is said an d done , just to o strang e to han g muc h gran d theor y on. 90 O n th e othe r hand , i f h e didn' t exist, th e Jeffersonians migh t hav e ha d t o inven t him , o r find hi s at tributes i n somebod y else—perhap s Paterson , o r eve n Peter s (wh o was, afte r all , initially a target o f impeachmen t alon g wit h Chase). 91 Personality i s alway s o f interest , bu t th e issue s transcen d particula r persons. Althoug h i n Americ a th e tendenc y i s t o tr y t o undermin e principle b y demonizin g th e proponent s o f thos e principle s wit h which you disagree, 92 I think i t obscures more than i t clarifies t o boi l all disputes dow n t o personal tur f wars . J am convinced, a t an y rate, that th e appointmen t o f Chas e (admittedl y on e tha t cos t th e Feder alists dearly ) wa s no t a horrible mistake , a s s o many historian s no w believe. He articulated wel l the belief s o f hi s fellow Federalis t jurists , and h e boldl y stoo d u p fo r thos e beliefs . Hi s jurisprudence , I hop e we will on e da y understand , mad e a positive contributio n then , an d still has much t o recommen d i t now. After all , John Marshall , some one who learne d fro m others ' mishaps, appears t o have read Chase' s struggles wit h th e Jeffersonian s a s meanin g tha t h e shoul d see k t o have th e judiciar y portraye d a s someho w differen t fro m an d abov e "politics," th e bette r t o maintai n th e notio n tha t ther e ar e "objec tive" answers to constitutional questions . In our ow n time, when this view remains unde r sustaine d attac k and , i n particular , a s conserva tives search for a reasoned constitutiona l philosoph y emphasizin g responsibilities ove r rights , wha t I believ e t o b e th e honestl y hel d Burkean belief s o f Chas e an d hi s fellow s suc h a s Peters , Ellsworth , Paterson, Wilson , an d late r Story , migh t b e du e fo r a n impressiv e resurgence. I n th e flus h o f youthfu l enthusias m I onc e though t tha t there wa s a chanc e tha t whe n futur e scholar s bega n t o vie w Chas e as more than a rabid partisan, he might b e placed in the judicial pan -

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theon, ver y possibl y a t th e leve l o f Marshal l himself . I no w thin k that i f i t eve r happen s I won't liv e to se e it. Still, as I reach the point where I'm happy to leave archival research and th e refutation o f factua l hypothese s t o younger scholars , I begin to wonder whethe r i t makes an y sens e to tr y t o reac h ultimat e judg ments abou t th e wort h o f historica l characters . Th e generatio n o f legal historians to which I belong was given to emulating the lawyer s they studied . Lawyer s tr y t o wi n case s b y piling o n enoug h evidenc e to convict or acquit , an d hopin g to persuade a jury. A trial has a resolution, and, the way our court system works, there are definable winners and loser s and a n authoritativ e righ t an d wrong answe r t o lega l questions, a t leas t wit h regar d t o particula r litigants . But , i f I'v e learned anythin g fro m m y critics, the stud y o f histor y ma y no t actu ally resolv e anythin g othe r tha n th e foll y o f naivel y believin g tha t there are simple, eternally valid reductionist explanation s fo r histori cal events. Biographers i n particula r see m to striv e t o writ e th e "de finitive" wor k o n a particular person , bu t perhap s th e effor t i s misplaced. I hav e n o wis h t o ste p int o th e Ne w Criticism' s tra p o f believin g that every reader remakes the text, but I do think that we ought to regard al l of what we do in legal history a s leaving room fo r futur e en hancements o f understanding . Jefferso n Powel l ma y hav e a poin t when h e views ou r constitutiona l struggle s a s abou t th e articulatio n of a "politica l grammar " t o sustai n debate , th e sam e poin t Ken t Newmyer appeare d t o b e making (i f I understood hi m correctly ) b y suggesting tha t Bruc e Ackerma n an d I were engage d i n a n ongoin g conversation abou t fashionin g a morally base d principled alternativ e to hereditar y aristocrac y an d monarchy. 93 I n this endeavor, ofte n th e best (and perhaps the only) thing we'll be able to do is raise questions that will need to be pursued b y others. I now believe that Samuel Chase was neither completely a saint nor completely a demon bu t the same uneasy combination o f the two, as are mos t o f th e res t o f us . I n The Original Misunderstanding I ha d more kind things to say about Chase and fewer bouquets to toss in the direction of Jefferson an d Marshall, who represented for me less worthy proponent s o f th e ideal s o f constitutiona l governmen t tha n I thought Chas e did . O n th e othe r hand , a s at leas t on e of my reviewers, Duxbury, understood, I had no intention of obliterating these two titans of American history but merely sought to redress the balance by

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rescuing Chas e fro m utte r obloquy. 94 I wante d t o sav e Chas e fro m being perceived as only a loon; I wanted to transform hi m into a tool to b e use d i n unpackin g Federalis t judicia l theories , o r a s a windo w onto an interesting period in our history. There is some evidence that's beginning to happen. 95 I didn't expec t t o settl e the issue s regarding Chas e o r th e Federal ists, and sinc e the battle between the ideals of the Federalists an d Republicans are still motivating factors that divide Americans politically in the present , I don't expec t t o se e them resolve d anytim e soon . In deed, perhap s i t i s the tensio n betwee n divergen t approache s t o th e good polity that provides the dynamic to American life, and if the tension is ever resolved, the genius of our politics will evaporate. Mayb e Jefferson, i n hi s inaugura l address , wa s sayin g thi s whe n h e pro claimed that "w e are all Republicans, we are all Federalists." 96 If Jefferson was correct, then the task of future lega l historians ought to be to help explain to us just what i t meant (an d stil l means) to b e a Federalist o r a Republican , o r a Republica n o r a Democrat—o r al l a t once. As VanBurkleo an d Jay noticed , Samue l Chase , at on e tim e o r another, was all of the above, and studying Samuel Chase, I think, can only help in understanding wh o we are and who we might become .

NOTES

1. Willia m R. Casto, The Supreme Court in the Early Republic: The Chief Justiceships of John Jay and Oliver Ellsworth 9 7 (1995 ) (hereafter , Casto) . 2. Herber t A . Johnson, "Editor' s Preface " t o Casto , at xii , n.l . 3. I would hav e included Berger' s cogent comments i n criticism of my book i n this piec e bu t fo r th e fac t tha t ou r dialogu e o n Samue l Chas e ha s alread y bee n published in three pieces in the Brigham Young University Law Review. See Raoul Berger, Justice Samuel Chase v. Thomas Jefferson: A Response to Stephen Presser, 1990 B.Y.U.L.Rev . 873 ; Stephen B . Presser, Et tu, Raoul? or "The Original Misunderstanding" Misunderstood, 199 1 B.Y.U.L.Rev . 1475 ; Raou l Berger , The Transfiguration of Samuel Chase: A Rebuttal, 199 2 B.Y.U.L.Rev . 559 . Thos e seeking elaboratio n o f Berger' s view s o n Chase , an d m y repl y t o Berge r ar e di rected there . 4. Stephe n B . Presser, Studies in the History of the United States Courts of the Third Circuit (1983) . 5. Followin g the failure o f the Senate to remove Chas e from office , amon g bi ographers i n the nineteent h an d earl y twentiet h centurie s Chas e appear s t o hav e

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been uniforml y highl y regarded . See , e.g., th e source s cite d i n Stephe n B . Presser, The Original Misunderstanding: The English, the Americans, and the Dialectic of Federalist jurisprudence 19 5 nn.17-1 9 (1991 ) (hereafter , Original Misunderstanding), an d se e especiall y L . Carrol l Judson , The Sages and Heroes of the American Revolution (1851) , reprinted i n Multimedia U.S. History: The Story of a Nation (CD-ROM , 1993 , Bureau o f Electroni c Publishing , Inc. ) (hereafter , Jud son), where al l stop s ar e pulle d ou t i n praisin g Chase , wh o i s described as , inte r alia, "bold , fearless , undisguised , independen t i n mind , languag e an d actio n bu t honest, patriotic , an d pur e i n hi s motives, " "a n ornamen t t o th e judiciary , a n honor t o hi s country, the faithfu l frien d o f huma n right s an d equa l justice. " Jud son concludes , "H e possesse d a nobl e an d benevolen t disposition—wa s a frien d to th e poo r an d needy , t o educatio n an d t o everythin g tha t enhance d th e happi ness of thos e aroun d hi m an d th e human family. " 6. Th e "facts " i n thi s sectio n ar e take n i n par t fro m m y articl e o n Chas e i n Kermit L . Hall, ed., The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States 137-13 9 (1992 ) (hereafter , Hall) . 7. Se e generall y fo r th e flou r future s episode , James Haw , Franci s R Beirne , Rosamond R . Beirne , an d R . Samue l Jett , Stormy Patriot: The Life of Samuel Chase 105-108 , 118-11 9 (1980 ) (hereafter , Stormy Patriot). Whil e th e evidenc e that Chas e abuse d hi s congressional positio n wa s flims y a t best , ibid. , hi s specu lative activity resulted i n denouncement b y Alexander Hamilto n himself , writing, as h e was late r t o d o i n th e Federalist, a s "Publius. " 1 The Papers of Alexander Hamilton 58 0 (H . Syrett, ed., 1961) . 8. See , e.g., Stewart Jay, The Rehabilitation of Samuel Chase, 4 1 Buff. L. Rev. 273 (1993 ) (hereafter , Jay , Rehabilitation). 9. Fo r Marshall' s misdeed s i n thi s regard , se e Mar y Ka y Tachau , Federal Courts in the Early Republic 186-18 9 (1978) , an d Richar d Brisbin , John Marshall on History, Virtue, and Legality, i n Thoma s Shevory , ed. , John Marshall's Achievement: Law, Politics, and Constitutional Interpretations 10 1 (1989) (Mar shall "too k advantag e o f th e greatness o f th e natio n t o enric h himsel f an d a t th e same tim e improv e hi s community") . Se e als o Stormy Patriot, a t 10 4 ("Man y prominent merchants of the day, such as Philadelphia's Robert Morris, closely intertwined busines s and politics with no thought o f wrongdoing. Som e contemporaries found suc h dealings improper, bu t Chas e did not"). See also for James Wilson's peccadilloes i n this regard, Casto , at 60-61 , 195 . 10. Jay , Rehabilitation, at 291. 11. Casto , who still thinks that Chase' s appointment wa s a mistake, concede s his "obviou s brilliance. " Casto , at 97. 12. Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 19 9 (1796) . 13. Juliu s Goebel, Jr. 1 History of the Supreme Court of the United States: Antecedents and Beginnings to 1801 75 1 (1971 ) (hereafter , Goebel) . 14. Se e generall y Casto , a t 98-101 , 187 , 252 ; Charle s F . Hobson, Ware v.

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Hylton, i n Hall, at 910-911 . Julius Goebe l observed , "Fo r wha t th e Justices (Pa terson, Wilson , an d Cushing ) wh o concurre d i n Chase' s conclusio n ha d t o offer , they might as well have let his opinion stan d a s that of the court." Goebel , at 753. 15. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 38 6 (1798) . 16. Fo r furthe r developmen t o f thi s idea , se e Stephe n B . Presser , Should a Supreme Court Justice Apply Natural Law? Lessons from the Earliest Federal Judges, 5 Benchmar k 10 3 (1994) , an d R . Randal l Kelso , The Natural Law Tradition on the Modern Supreme Court: Not Burke, but the Enlightenment Tradition Represented by Locke, Madison, and Marshall, 2 6 St . Mary' s L.J . 105 1 (1995). 17. Fo r Robert Bork's condemnation o f Chase as the father o f substantive du e process, se e Rober t H . Bork , The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law 19-2 0 (1990) . Fo r m y refutatio n o f Bork' s vie w o f Chase , se e m y Benchmark articl e cite d i n note 16 . 18. United States v. Worrall, 2 8 Fed.Cas . 77 4 (C.C.Pa . 1798 ) (No . 16,766) . 19. O n thi s las t matter , involvin g th e infamou s cas e o f "Jonatha n Robbins, " see th e super b articl e b y Rut h Wedgewood , The Revolutionary Martyrdom of Jonathan Robbins, 10 0 Yale L.J. 229 (1990 ) (hereafter , Wedgewood) . 20. Th e charg e involvin g th e allege d interferenc e i n th e murde r cas e appear s to hav e bee n complet e fabrication . Se e in additio n t o Wedgewood , Duma s Mal one, The Public Life of Thomas Cooper, 1783-1839 12 1 (rev . ed., 1961 ) ("[T]h e action of Adams [i n the Jonathan Robbin s matter] seems to have been entirely justifiable, an d Cooper' s invectiv e appear s t o hav e bee n a bit o f shee r demagoguery , but hi s positio n wa s i n ful l accor d wit h tha t o f th e mos t distinguishe d Republi cans"). 21. Se e generally Original Misunderstanding, a t 132-136 , an d source s ther e cited. 22. Chase' s witnesses for hi s defense a t the impeachment tria l "destroyed " th e credibility o f thos e claimin g tha t Chas e ha d sough t t o influenc e jur y selectio n i n the Callender case . See Stormy Patriot, a t 231. Remarkably , this smear on Chase' s record ha s bee n accepte d a s true b y virtually al l modern historians . 23. 3 Albert Beveridge, The Life of John Marshall 191-19 2 (1919) , and Nor man Rosenberg , Protecting the Best Men: An Interpretive History of the Law of Libel 295-296 (1986) . See also Original Misunderstanding, a t 134,23 2 n.13 , and sources there cited . 24. Original Misunderstanding, a t 133-136 . 25. Se e generally Kathryn Turner , The Midnight Judges, 10 9 U.Pa.L.Rev. 49 4 (1961). 26. Se e generally Original Misunderstanding, a t 162-164 , an d source s ther e cited. 27. Se e Stormy Patriot, an d Jane Ellsmere , Justice Samuel Chase (1980) . 28. Stephe n B . Presser , Recapturing the Constitution: Race, Religion, and

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Abortion Reconsidered 5- 8 (1994 ) (hereafter , Presser , Recapturing the Constitution). 29. Eugen e D. Genovese, The Southern Tradition: The Achievement and Limitations of an American Conservatism (1994) . 30. Davi d Thoma s Konig , Book Review , 9 7 Am.Hist.Rev. 159 0 (1992) . 31. Ibid . 32. Se e generall y Original Misunderstanding, a t 67-99 ; Casto , a t 129-147 ; and Joh n D . Gordo n III , United States v. Joseph Ravara: "Presumptuous Evidence, " "Too Many Lawyers," and a Federal Common Law Crime, i n Maev a Marcus, ed., Origins of the Federal Judiciary: Essays on the Judiciary Act of 1789 106 (1992) . It is instructive tha t on e o f m y critics, Stewart Jay, himself a n exper t on th e federa l commo n law , whil e h e raise s othe r objection s t o m y portrai t o f Chase, agrees with wha t I had t o sa y about th e federal commo n law . See text fol lowing not e 70 . 33. See , e.g., Casto, at 2. See generally Scott Douglas Gerber , To Secure These Rights: The Declaration of Independence and Constitutional Interpretation (1995). 34. Knu d Haakonssen , Boo k Review , 3 4 Wm. & Mar y Q . (3 d ser. ) 186-18 7 (1993). 35. Ibid. , a t 188 . 36. See , e.g., Knu d Haakonssen , From Natural Law to the Rights of Man: A European Perspective on American Debates, i n Michae l J . Lace y an d Knu d Haakonssen, eds. , A Culture of Rights: The Bill of Rights in Philosophy, Politics and Law —1791 and 1991 1 9 (1991) ; Knud Haakonssen , Natural Jurisprudence in the Scottish Enlightenment: Summary of an Interpretation, i n Nei l Mac Cormick an d Zenon Bankowski, eds., Enlightenment, Rights and Revolution: Essays in Legal and Social Philosophy (1989) , 36; and Knu d Haakonssen , Natural Law and Moral Realism: The Scottish Synthesis, i n M. A. Stewart, ed., Studies in the Philosophy of the Scottish Enlightenment 6 1 (1990) . 37. Nei l Duxbury , Boo k Review , 3 7 Am . J. Leg . Hist. 36 3 (1993 ) (hereafter , Duxbury). 38. A statu s earne d b y virtu e o f th e magisteria l R . Ken t Newmyer , Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story: Statesman of the Old Republic (1985) . 39. R . Ken t Newmyer , Dusting Off Samuel Chase: Fresh Thoughts on Early National Jurisprudence, 2 0 Rev. Am. Hist. 487, 489 (1992 ) (hereafter , Newmyer , Dusting Off). 40. Fo r this point, Newmyer cite d Kathryn Preyer , United States v. Callender: Judge and Jury in a Republican Society, i n Maeva Marcus, ed., Origins of the Federal Judiciary: Essays on the Judiciary Act of 1789 173 , 18 5 (1992 ) (hereafter , Preyer). 41. Newmyer , Dusting Off, a t 491.

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42. Fo r th e extende d elaboratio n o f thi s assertion , se e generall y Presser , Recapturing the Constitution. 43. Sandr a F . VanBurkleo, Boo k Review , 1 2 La w & Hist . Rev . 40 9 (1994 ) (hereafter, VanBurkleo) . 44. Ibid. , a t 411. 45. Ibid. , a t 414 . 46. Ibid . 47. Morto n J . Horwitz , The Transformation of American Law, 1776-1860 (1977). For an appraisal of Horwitz's book, see, e.g., Stephen Presser, Revising the Conservative Tradition: Towards a New American Legal History, 52 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 70 0 (1977) . 48. Newmyer , Dusting Off, a t 48 7 (Newmye r declare d m y use of th e histori ographical literatur e "excellent") . 49. VanBurkleo , a t 411. 50. Ibid . 51. Ibid. , a t 412 . 52. I still suspec t i t was, at leas t amon g th e Suprem e Cour t justices . See, e.g., Casto's recent discussio n o f James Wilson's view s on America n commo n la w an d constitutional law , an d ho w the y wer e bot h grounde d i n divin e natura l law . Casto, a t 131-132 , 194-195 . 53. VanBurkleo , a t 413. 54. Lette r fro m Richar d Peter s t o Timoth y Pickerin g (Jan . 24 , 1804) , 1 0 Pe ters Papers, Historical Societ y of Pennsylvania , 91. 55. VanBurkleo , a t 413. 56. See , e.g. , Casto , a t 92 , suggestin g tha t charge s abou t Chie f Justic e Rut ledge's alleged insanit y wer e politica l cove r fo r attackin g hi m base d o n hi s oppo sition t o th e Ja y Treaty . Se e als o seditiou s libe l tria l defendan t Representativ e Matthew Lyon' s publicatio n o f th e suggestio n tha t whe n th e Hous e an d Senat e heard John Adam s quot e Edmun d Burk e o n th e perfidy o f th e French , "W e won dered that the answer o f both Houses had not bee n an order to send him to a mad house." Stephe n Presse r an d Jami l Zainaldin , Cases and Materials on Law and Jurisprudence in American History 201-20 2 (3 d ed. 1995 ) (hereafter , Presse r an d Zainaldin, Cases and Materials). 57. VanBurkleo , a t 413 . Compar e th e mor e admirin g vie w o f Chase' s com mitment t o libert y i n Judson, an d Stormy Patriot. 58. On e o f th e bes t statement s o f thi s poin t o f vie w i s to b e found i n Samue l Chase's manuscript jur y charge book , discusse d i n Original Misunderstanding, a t 141-149. 59. Ther e i s a n increasin g sensitivit y amon g historian s fo r approachin g th e late eighteent h centur y o n it s ow n terms , withou t bein g blinde d b y ou r precon ceptions. Especially valuabl e her e i s Casto .

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60. See , e.g., Stephe n B . Presser, Testimony Before the United States House of Representatives judiciary Committee Subcommittee on the Constitution in Support ofHJ. Res. 79 (Ma y 24, 1995) . 61. VanBurkleo , a t 414 . 62. Se e note 3 . 63. Se e generally Chase' s Answe r t o th e Articles o f Impeachment , edite d an d reprinted i n Presser an d Zainaldin , Cases and Materials, a t 232 . 64. Se e note 22 . 65. Thei r objectivit y als o ca n b e gauge d b y thei r unifor m distortio n o f th e Jonathan Robbin s matter . Se e notes 19-20 . 66. VanBurkleo , a t 414 . 67. Ibid . 68. Fo r furthe r maddenin g an d disappointin g reading , VanBurkle o migh t consult m y recent Recapturing the Constitution, a n attemp t t o buil d o n som e o f the work i n Original Misunderstanding s o a s to articulat e a n objectiv e constitu tional jurisprudenc e fo r th e present . 69. Stewar t Jay, Origins of Federal Common Law: Part One, 13 3 U.Pa.L.Rev. 1003 (1985) ; Stewar t Jay , Origins of Federal Common Law: Part Two, 13 3 U.Pa.L.Rev. 123 1 (1985) . 70. Jay , Rehabilitation. 71. Ibid. , at 305. See generally Charle s Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States (1913 ) (whic h argue s tha t thos e a t th e Philadelphia conventio n wer e motivated b y personal financial concerns) . But se e Forrest McDonald , We the People: The Economic Origins of the Constitution (1958) ( a powerful refutatio n o f th e Bear d thesis) . 72. Jay , Rehabilitation, a t 305 . 73. Ibid. , a t 306 . 74. Ibid. , a t 303 . 75. Se e note 7 . 76. Jay , Rehabilitation, a t 286-287 . 77. Ibid. , a t 290-291 . 78. Ibid. , a t 307 . 79. Original Misunderstanding, a t 112 . 80. Jay , Rehabilitation, a t 294-295 . 81. Stormy Patriot, a t 207-208 . 82. Jay , Rehabilitation, a t 302 . 83. Original Misunderstanding, a t 158 , 241 n.34 . 84. Ibid. , at 15-17 , 34-36 . 85. Jay , Rehabilitation, a t 299 , citing Preyer, 173 , 185. 86. See , e.g. , th e excerp t fro m th e impeachmen t proceeding s reprinte d i n Presser an d Zainaldin , Cases and Materials, a t 243-244 . 87. Basin g hi s comment s i n par t o n Wyth e Holt' s wor k suggestin g tha t th e

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early judiciary' s conduc t ca n b e explaine d b y th e "practica l politics " o f th e mo ment, Wythe Holt, "To Establish Justice": Politics, the Judiciary Act of1789, and the Invention of the Federal Courts, 198 9 Duke L.J. 1421 , Jay remarks that "Crit icizing a Jefferson o r a Chas e fo r ideologica l inconsistenc y o r alternatively , finding a coherent evolutio n i n thei r thinkin g i s an al l to o eas y an d ultimatel y unin teresting endeavor. " Jay , Rehabilitation, a t 304 . 88. Jay , Rehabilitation, a t 296 . 89. Jay , as was true o f VanBurkleo, apparentl y ha s som e trouble differentiat ing betwee n th e hierarch y t o b e foun d i n an y syste m committe d t o organi c civi l responsibility (o n the inevitability o f some aristocratic character i n any organize d society, see Russell Kirk, The Conservative Mind from Burke to Eliot 95-96 [7t h ed. 1986] ) an d authoritarianis m an d intolerance . Jay, Rehabilitation, a t 303 . 90. Raou l Berge r agree s wit h VanBurkle o an d Jay tha t Chas e i s too weir d t o support an y inference s abou t prope r judicia l philosophy . Se e generall y ou r dia logue referre d t o i n note 3 . 91. Original Misunderstanding, a t 12 . 92. Ja y accuses Chase of this, with some merit, Jay, Rehabilitation, a t 299, but I think Chase' s critic s wer e bette r a t demonizin g hi m tha n h e was a t demonizin g them. 93. Fo r Powell' s views , se e H . Jefferso n Powell , The Political Grammar of Early Constitutional Law, 7 1 N.C.L.Rev. 949 (1993 ) (hereafter , Powell) . See also Newmyer, Dusting Off, a t 490 . 94. Duxbury , a t 362 . 95. Som e of the evidence can b e found i n Powell, as well as H. Jefferson Pow ell, The Moral Tradition of American Constitutionalism: A Theological Interpretation (1993) . Casto' s fine boo k o n th e Ja y an d Ellswort h Court s support s thi s proposition a s well. Even thoug h h e claims tha t Chase' s appointmen t wa s a mistake, h e belie s thi s clai m b y his fulsom e discussio n o f Chase' s man y accomplish ments an d hi s intellectua l leadershi p o n th e Ellswort h Court . See , e.g., Casto , a t 100-108, 121-123 , 144-47 , 167-172 , 225-236 , 244-245 . 96. Thoma s Jefferson , First Inaugural Address (Marc h 4 , 1801) , i n Thoma s Jefferson, Writings 492 , 493 (Librar y o f Americ a edition , 1984) .

Chapter 10

Oliver Ellswort h

"I have sought the felicity and glory of your Administration" William R. Casto

In March 1797 , President Washington retire d fro m publi c office, an d Oliver Ellsworth , th e chief justic e o f th e United States , bid th e president a cordia l farewell . I n a privat e letter , Chie f Justic e Ellswort h noted that he had sought with "ardo r . . . th e felicity and glory of your Administration."1 Undoubtedly, Ellsworth was referring i n part to his service in the Senat e from 178 9 t o 1796 , but h e penned thes e word s at the end of his first year as chief justice . Surely no justice of today' s Supreme Court would claim to have sought with ardor the felicity and glory o f a particula r president' s administration . Chie f Justic e Ellsworth, however , probabl y di d no t distinguis h i n thi s regar d between hi s legislative an d judicia l service . Certainly hi s letter contain s not th e slightes t hin t o f suc h a distinction . A s a senato r an d the n a s chief justice, he consciously sought to support the Federalist administrations of George Washington an d John Adams. This them e o f suppor t wa s a n omnipresen t face t o f Ellsworth' s chief justiceship. Just five days after bein g sworn into office, h e wrote a detaile d privat e advisor y opinio n o n Presiden t Washington' s lega l obligation t o comply with a request b y the House o f Representative s for confidentia l paper s related t o the Jay Treaty. Similarly, he had n o qualms about advising cabinet-level officers o n issues related to criminal and civi l litigation impresse d wit h a national interest . Moreover , Ellsworth—like hi s fello w Federalis t justices—use d gran d jur y 292

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charges to delive r lecture s o n politic s an d t o provid e publi c advisor y opinions on pressing issues of the day. Finally, he assumed without objection a number o f mino r nonjudicia l dutie s an d spen t th e las t yea r of hi s chie f justiceship i n Europ e a s a commissione r t o negotiat e a n end to the undeclared quas i war with France. 2 Ellsworth's Personal and Intellectual Background Ellsworth's lon g caree r o f publi c servic e an d suppor t fo r th e estab lishment bega n i n Connecticut , wher e h e wa s bor n i n 174 5 i n th e wake o f the Grea t Awakening. As a consequence o f the Grea t Awak ening, Connecticut wa s riven b y a struggle between conservative Ol d Lights, who essentially opposed change , and evangelical New Lights, who sough t t o reinvigorate Calvinism . Among other things, the Ne w Lights emphasized th e importance o f receiving grace in an actual an d personal regeneratin g experienc e wit h God . Ellswort h wa s th e sec ond so n o f a prosperous (bu t no t wealthy ) Ne w Ligh t farmin g fam ily, an d hi s parent s intende d tha t h e shoul d ente r th e ministry . Fol lowing thi s plan , h e received hi s college preparator y educatio n fro m Joseph Bellamy , th e colony' s leadin g Ne w Ligh t minister , an d at tended Yal e Colleg e fo r tw o years . H e the n attende d th e Colleg e o f New Jersey (Princeton ) wher e he was graduated i n 1766 . After grad uation h e returne d t o Connecticu t an d spen t a yea r unde r th e tute lage o f Joh n Smalley , a respecte d Ne w Ligh t ministe r know n fo r preparing graduate s fo r th e ministry . Ellswort h decided , however , against th e ministr y an d afte r a brie f stin t a s a teacher turne d t o th e law. Althoug h Ellswort h becam e a lawyer , hi s earl y religiou s stud ies—especially unde r Josep h Bellamy—imbue d hi m wit h a thor oughgoing Calvinis m tha t completel y dominate d hi s understandin g of huma n society. 3 Although Ellswort h becam e a lawye r rathe r tha n a minister , h e was a deepl y religiou s individua l wh o cleave d t o hi s parents ' an d teachers' stric t Calvinis m throughou t hi s life . A s a youn g man , h e personally experience d God' s grac e an d mad e a public professio n o f his regeneration. H e never cease d bein g a serious studen t o f religion , and i n late r year s a s th e hea d o f hi s famil y h e preside d ove r dail y prayer meeting s withi n th e privac y o f hi s home . Shortl y afte r Ellsworth's retiremen t fro m th e federa l bench , a young Danie l Web-

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ster note d wit h obviou s respec t tha t Ellswort h wa s "a s eminen t fo r piety a s for talents " an d tha t hi s piety mad e hi m a n "ornament " t o the profession. 4 Ellsworth was trained i n the strict Calvinist tenets of the Westminster Confessio n o f Faith—the sam e creed that Ma x Weber posited a s the pures t basi s fo r th e Protestan t wor k ethic . H e epitomize d thi s work ethic , bu t hi s callin g wa s mor e i n publi c servic e tha n i n com merce. Because the Westminster Confession attaine d a certain amoun t of gloss throughout th e eighteent h century , the mos t reliabl e source s for the substance of Ellsworth's faith are found in two bookends to his adult life . At the end o f his life stand s A Summary of Christian Doctrine and Practice, written b y Ellswort h an d fello w member s o f th e Connecticut Missionar y Society . A t th e beginnin g o f hi s lif e i s th e work o f Joseph Bellamy , especiall y The Wisdom of God in the Permission of Sin. 5 The Westminster Confession , Josep h Bellamy , an d A Summary of Christian Doctrine al l envisione d a n all-powerfu l Go d an d a thor oughgoing doctrine of predestination. At the same time, "men are totally depraved; and, in themselves, utterly helpless." Individuals can not ear n thei r salvation . The y ca n onl y hop e tha t Go d wil l unilater ally pardon their inherent sinfulness. Even those whom God elects for salvation ar e personally undeservin g "because , the personal ill-deser t of believer s remains an d [even ] faith itself , which interest s them in it, is the gift o f God." 6 This rigorous , unbendin g mode l o f God' s pervasiv e omnipotenc e combined with man's inherent depravity had obvious implications fo r the governanc e o f huma n society . In 1790 , Nathan Strong , who ha d been Ellsworth' s ministe r whe n Ellswort h live d i n Hartford , note d that "huma n nature must be taken by the civil governor as he finds it." Ten year s later , Ellswort h reiterate d thi s ide a whe n h e insiste d i n a conversation wit h a French philosopher tha t any comprehensive pla n of government must take into account "The Selfishness of Man." Thi s concern abou t selfishnes s i s littl e mor e tha n a restatemen t o f th e Calvinist doctrin e tha t condemne d humankin d a s inherentl y depraved. Eve n the phraseology i s taken fro m th e New Lights ' Calvin ism that define d si n exclusively in terms of selfishness . Among other things, Ellsworth's Calvinist pessimism about huma n nature le d hi m t o distrus t democrac y an d jurie s chose n b y rando m ballot.7 At the Constitutiona l Convention , h e favored th e election of

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senators b y stat e legislature s becaus e "mor e wisdo m [would ] issu e from th e Legislatures ; tha n fro m a n immediat e electio n o f th e peo ple." Similarly , h e initiall y favore d th e ide a tha t th e Constitutio n should b e approved b y the state legislatures rather than b y the people in convention s becaus e "mor e wa s t o b e expecte d fro m th e legisla tures tha n fro m th e people. " Thi s pervasiv e distrus t o f th e genera l populace surface d agai n whil e h e wa s draftin g th e Judiciar y Ac t o f 1789. I n privat e conversation s h e expresse d a dislik e fo r usin g ran dom ballot s t o selec t jurie s becaus e " a ver y ignoran t Jur y migh t b e drawn b y Ballot." 8 At first glance, the doctrine of inherent depravity presents immense obstacles to good government. After all , rulers are themselves huma n beings. Calvinist theology, however, provided a n escape from thi s cul de sac . Ellsworth' s teache r a t Princeton , hi s forme r pasto r i n Con necticut, and other Calvinis t theologians took th e position that right eous ruler s wer e personall y selecte d t o thei r position s b y God . Thi s theology of divine appointment wa s embraced b y Ellsworth in Senate debates. Therefore goo d governmen t wa s possible, but goo d govern ment came from God' s intervention rathe r than fro m th e good work s of men. 9 In theory, Ellsworth's firm belie f i n and stric t compliance with thi s rigid, monolithi c theolog y migh t hav e mad e hi m a n unbending , tru e believer who could brok e no compromise. In fact, however , he was a gifted politicia n wh o thoroughl y understoo d th e ar t an d utilit y o f compromise. Therefore unles s he was quite a hypocrite, he must have been able to reconcile his active participation in shaping political compromises with his unbending personal beliefs. The theoretical basis for such a reconciliation i s Joseph Bellamy' s extende d essa y God's Wisdom, whic h was published i n 175 8 immediately befor e Ellswort h en tered Bellamy's tutelage and which Bellamy undoubtedly incorporate d into youn g Oliver' s studies . God's Wisdom wa s a rigorousl y logica l theodicy tha t remaine d ruthlessl y tru e t o Calvinis t doctrin e i n ex plaining th e existenc e o f evil . Bellam y explaine d tha t th e cours e o f human events follows a perfectly predestine d plan conceived by a perfect Go d t o craf t th e bes t possibl e world . Thi s plan , however , i s "a s absolutely incomprehensibl e b y u s a s i t i s b y childre n o f fou r year s old." A s part o f this plan Go d ha d decide d that th e permission o f sin is the bes t method fo r instructin g ma n i n God's perfection an d man' s imperfection. Onl y individuals who thoroughly understan d thei r sin -

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fulness ar e fit to b e saved b y God. Thus Bellamy's basi c message was optimistic. We should no t b e disheartened b y the presenc e o f evi l in the world. To the contrary, sin is part of God's plan, and all will come right in the end. 10 The skeptica l optimis m o f God's Wisdom provide s a wondrousl y flexible too l fo r comprehendin g life' s travails . Inevitable tribulation s are accepte d o n fait h a s par t o f God' s unknowabl e plan . I n th e po litical arena , a politicia n wh o is , himself , save d ma y nevertheles s deal freel y wit h th e unsave d an d eve n participat e i n apparentl y sin ful compromise s wit h th e confiden t fait h tha t al l i s part o f th e plan . These implication s ar e consisten t wit h th e histor y o f Connecticu t politics i n th e wak e o f th e Grea t Awakening . Initially , th e colony' s New Light s wer e persecute d i n th e 1740 s b y th e Standin g Order , but th e Ne w Light s quickl y becam e effectiv e manipulator s o f th e political system . The y wer e carefu l t o distinguis h themselve s fro m the radica l separatist s an d Baptist s an d mad e i t clea r tha t the y wer e Calvinists wh o intende d t o wor k withi n th e existin g religiou s an d political order . B y th e en d o f th e 1760s , the y ha d effectiv e politi cal contro l o f th e colon y an d retaine d thi s contro l throughou t Ellsworth's life. 11 In 1762 , the New Lights ' growing politica l powe r wa s recognize d when Ellsworth' s teacher , Joseph Bellamy , was chose n t o delive r th e colony's annual election sermon. In his sermon, Bellamy advocated religious toleranc e an d expressl y assure d Anglican s tha t i f fello w colonists "desir e t o declar e fo r th e Churc h o f England , ther e i s none to hinder them." Four years later, the Old Light Calvinists lost control of th e governmen t i n the electio n followin g th e Stam p Ac t crisis . As part o f th e political maneuvering , th e New Light s struc k a deal wit h the Anglicans in which William Samue l Johnson becam e the first Anglican electe d to th e uppe r hous e o f the colony's legislatur e i n retur n for Anglican support of New Light candidates. The Johnson dea l and similar arrangement s i n othe r election s establishe d a pragmati c ap proach t o th e allocatio n o f politica l powe r withi n th e colony . Thes e were th e rule s o f th e gam e tha t Ellswort h learne d a s h e climbed th e ladder o f politica l succes s i n Connecticut' s Ne w Light-dominate d Standing Order. 12

Oliver Ellsworth 29 7 Ellsworth's Early Political Career and Service in the Senate After terminatin g hi s postgraduat e religiou s studies , Ellswort h rea d law an d wa s admitte d t o th e ba r i n 1771 . His firs t fe w year s o f prac tice were a financial disaster , bu t hi s prospects improve d whe n h e mar ried int o on e o f Connecticut' s mos t influentia l families . Wit h thi s en tree int o th e colony' s powe r structure , Ellswort h wa s almos t immedi ately electe d t o th e Genera l Assembl y an d becam e a justic e o f th e peace. During the Revolutionary War , he progressed fro m obscur e bu t important administrativ e assignment s t o becomin g on e o f th e state' s most importan t youn g politica l leaders . B y 1780 , at ag e thirty-five, h e was state' s attorne y fo r Hartfor d Count y an d a membe r o f th e uppe r house o f th e stat e legislatur e an d th e Counci l o f Safety . H e als o wa s a delegate t o th e Continenta l Congress. 13 Ellsworth thrive d i n th e Continenta l Congres s an d ha d n o qualm s about th e mora l ambiguitie s o f powe r politics . I n 1779 , th e ministe r of hi s churc h evidentl y complaine d t o hi m abou t th e Revolutionar y War's impact upo n th e world's "mora l State. " Consisten t wit h Calvin ist theology , Ellswort h wrot e fro m Philadelphi a tha t h e di d no t kno w "the desig n o f Providenc e i n thi s respect, " bu t h e concede d tha t "th e powers a t wa r hav e ver y littl e desig n abou t [th e world' s mora l state ] and terminat e thei r view s wit h wealt h an d empire , leavin g religio n pretty muc h ou t o f th e question. " H e the n conclude d wit h a mil d re buke t o hi s doubtin g minister . Restatin g th e centra l them e o f God's Wisdom, Ellswort h noted , "[I] t i s sufficient , dea r Sir , tha t Go d gov erns th e world , an d tha t hi s purpose s o f Grac e wil l b e accom plished." 14 After th e war, Ellsworth wa s appointed t o the Connecticu t Superio r Court, th e state's highest judicia l court , an d serve d unti l 1789 . Durin g this service , h e als o represente d Connecticu t a t th e Constitutiona l Convention i n Philadelphi a an d playe d a significan t rol e i n craftin g the Constitution. I n the convention's plenar y sessions , he helped shap e the Constitutio n o n comparativel y mino r point s lik e enlargin g Con gress's authorit y t o defin e crime s an d th e electio n o f senator s b y stat e legislatures rathe r tha n popula r vote . Mor e significantly , h e wa s on e of th e five-person Committe e o f Detai l tha t wrot e th e workin g draf t of th e documen t finally adopte d b y th e convention. 15

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Ellsworth als o playe d a significan t rol e i n brokerin g som e o f th e convention's mos t importan t compromises . He was a leading propo nent of the compromise on the importation of slaves and was similarly involved in resolving the dispute over whether state s would b e represented i n Congress o n an equa l footing o r proportionally b y population. A s a small-stat e delegate , he was dea d se t agains t proportiona l representation, bu t h e wa s als o a skille d politicia n wh o understoo d the value of compromise. He clearly participated in shaping the Grand Compromise tha t gav e th e bi g state s contro l o f th e Hous e bu t pro vided for equal state representation in the Senate. He was the delegate who formall y move d th e adoptio n o f thi s compromis e an d subse quently was selected a s the only small-state delegat e o n the Commit tee of Detail. 16 In later years James Madison recollecte d tha t "fro m th e day when every doub t o f th e righ t o f th e smalle r state s t o a n equa l vot e i n th e senate was quieted . . . Ellsworth becam e one of [th e general government's] stronges t pillars. " I n th e subsequen t ratificatio n process , Ellsworth wrot e a n influentia l serie s o f essay s entitle d Letters of a Landholder^ an d a t leas t on e knowledgeabl e observe r commente d that "'th e Landholder ' wil l d o mor e servic e . . . than th e elaborat e works o f Publius. " A t th e Connecticu t ratificatio n convention , Ellsworth wa s th e Constitution' s leadin g advocat e an d amon g othe r things endorsed th e concept o f judicial review. He reassured th e convention, "I f th e general legislatur e shoul d . . . make a law which th e Constitution doe s not authorize, it is void; and the judicial power, the national judge s . . . wil l declar e i t t o b e void. " Afte r ratification , Ellsworth wa s Connecticut' s unanimou s choic e to represent th e stat e in the new federal senate. 17 For seven years Ellsworth was the de facto leade r of the Federalists in th e Senate , an d durin g tha t tim e h e worked o n mor e committee s than an y othe r senator . Hi s best-know n legislativ e wor k i s the Judiciary Act of 1789 , which he and his Calvinist friend Willia m Paterso n of Ne w Jersey drafted . Th e Constitutio n create d jus t th e bar e bone s of a federal judicia l system and left man y significant issue s to the discretion of Congress. In particular, Congress was to decide whether the new judicia l syste m woul d consis t o f a single , relatively isolate d na tional Suprem e Cour t o r whethe r ther e woul d als o b e a syste m o f lower federal court s distributed throughou t th e nation. 18

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In crafting th e Judiciary Act, Ellsworth had to bring to bear the ful l extent o f hi s remarkabl e abilit y t o broke r pragmati c compromises . There was substantial practical an d theoretical oppositio n t o the creation o f a n extensiv e syste m o f federa l courts . At a theoretical level , many were concerned that the federal court s would supplant the state judiciaries. I n addition , th e Suprem e Court' s powe r t o revie w stat e court decision s made conflicts betwee n the Court an d stat e courts inevitable. Thes e theoretica l objection s wer e directl y implicate d b y a huge number o f pre-Revolutionary Wa r contracts between America n debtors and British creditors. In the Treaty of Paris, the United State s had agreed that the British creditors "shal l meet with no legal impediment t o th e recover y o f th e ful l valu e i n sterlin g mone y o f al l bon a fide debts heretofore contracted. " Man y states , however, had notori ously refused t o enforce thi s treaty obligation an d had in effect close d their court s t o Britis h creditors . Whe n th e first Congres s wa s con vened, man y members—particularl y souther n members—wer e adamantly oppose d t o usin g th e ne w federa l court s t o enforc e thi s treaty obligation. 19 Ellsworth's approach t o this opposition wa s masterful. H e insiste d upon a complete system of federal tria l courts distributed throughou t the United State s an d supervise d b y the Suprem e Court . A t the sam e time h e agree d t o limi t th e federa l courts ' jurisdictio n t o compara tively narro w group s o f case s i n which th e federa l interes t wa s clea r and immediate. The federal trial courts were given plenary power over the enforcement o f federa l revenu e statute s an d federa l crimina l law . They were also given complete authority to resolve prize cases that so frequently involve d foreig n relations. 20 Under Ellsworth' s plan , litigatio n tha t demande d immediate , day to-day attentio n wa s entruste d t o a federa l distric t cour t tha t woul d be staffed b y a resident federal distric t judge in each state. In particu lar, these distric t court s wer e veste d wit h jurisdictio n ove r admiralt y cases, which included prize cases, and the enforcement o f federal rev enue laws . Further, h e create d a syste m o f federa l circui t court s tha t were given appellate authority ove r the district courts and original o r trial jurisdictio n ove r crimina l prosecution s an d civi l cases involvin g aliens o r citizen s o f differen t states . Th e expectatio n wa s tha t thes e circuit courts would b e the principal federa l tria l courts fo r civi l an d criminal litigation othe r than priz e and revenue cases. 21

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The circuit courts, which were to b e located i n each state, were t o be staffe d b y th e loca l federa l distric t judg e an d circuit-ridin g Supreme Cour t justices . Th e theor y behin d thi s innovativ e arrange ment wa s that th e circuit-ridin g justice s would provid e som e unifor mity o f decisio n throughou t th e nation , len d weigh t an d dignit y t o the federa l tria l courts , an d obviat e th e nee d fo r appeal s t o th e dis tant capital . I n practice , thes e objective s wer e largel y obtained , bu t the justices came to hate the rigorous an d onerou s travel required b y circuit riding. 22 The circuit courts ' alienag e jurisdiction obviousl y include d Britis h creditors' claim s an d therefor e migh t hav e bee n quit e controversial . But Ellsworth defused thi s potential problem by limiting alienage and diversity jurisdiction t o cases involving more than $500 . As a practical matter , thi s amount-in-controvers y requiremen t barre d th e grea t majority o f British claims from the federal trial courts because most of the claims were for lesse r amounts . In other words , Ellsworth acqui esced i n the ongoin g violations o f the Treaty o f Pari s in orde r t o ob tain an extensive system of federal trial courts with complete jurisdiction ove r th e essentia l categorie s o f priz e cases , revenu e cases , an d criminal prosecutions. 23 Ellsworth wa s equall y pragmati c i n limitin g th e Suprem e Court' s appellate jurisdictio n ove r stat e courts ' judgments . Ther e wa s sub stantial opposition to the Court's power to review state courts' deter minations o f facts , bu t Ellswort h moote d thi s objectio n b y strippin g the Court of this power. Undoubtedly this compromise was made easier b y the existenc e unde r hi s plan o f federa l tria l court s t o conduc t fact-finding i n litigation affecting th e federal government' s vital interests. I n additio n t o eliminatin g th e appellat e revie w o f facts , Ellsworth's plan limited the Court's power to review legal determina tions. I n case s appeale d fro m th e stat e courts , th e Cour t coul d con sider only specific issue s governed b y positive, written federa l laws — specifically, "th e constitution, treatie s o r law s of the United State s or [a federal] commission." 24 These an d othe r compromise s defuse d mos t o f th e congressiona l opposition t o a n extensiv e federa l judicia l system . Ellsworth' s pla n passed bot h houses of Congress by large majorities an d even received a majorit y o f souther n vote s i n eac h house . A s a resul t th e judicia l branch was launched with comparatively little controversy and a clear consensus of approval. 25

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Ellsworth's Appointment and Service as Chief Justice Ellsworth continue d t o serv e ably in the Senat e until 1796 , when, a s part o f th e Jay Treaty's fallout , h e becam e chief justic e o f th e Unite d States. The Jay Treaty was a national political watershed that enable d the Jeffersonia n Republican s t o focu s upo n thei r disappointment s with Federalist policy and to solidify thei r coalition of interests into a loose organizatio n resemblin g a n oppositio n politica l party . Befor e the treaty, the Republicans mor e or less deferred t o Georg e Washington's Federalis t administration . Th e treaty , however , convinced th e Republicans o f the need for firm and ope n opposition . In the early spring of 1794 , an effective Britis h maritime campaig n against American commerce in the West Indies brought the two countries to the brin k o f war. While the Congress was enacting legislatio n to prepar e fo r war , a smal l grou p o f influentia l senators , includin g Oliver Ellsworth , decide d tha t wa r coul d b e bes t averte d b y sendin g an envo y t o Englan d t o adjus t th e countries ' differences . Ellswort h went t o Presiden t Washington a s the group's representativ e an d pro posed th e mission . Th e presiden t agreed , an d i n th e sprin g o f 179 4 Chief Justice Jay was despatched as special envoy to Great Britain. Jay returned i n th e nex t yea r wit h a treat y an d almos t immediatel y re signed hi s chie f justiceshi p t o becom e governo r o f Ne w York . Presi dent Washington the n offered th e position t o John Rutledg e of Sout h Carolina.26 Meanwhile the Jay Treaty was being considered by the Senate in secret executiv e session , where i t met sever e oppositio n fro m souther n senators. Despit e thi s opposition , th e Federalists , le d b y Olive r Ellsworth, approve d th e treat y b y a clos e vot e o f 20-10 . Whe n th e terms of the treaty were published, the nation was furious. Britain had prevailed o n virtuall y ever y issu e in controversy. Fro m th e America n point o f view, the bes t that coul d b e said was that th e treaty avoide d a wa r an d establishe d a diplomatic preceden t tha t unde r certai n cir cumstances Britai n was willing to ente r int o a treaty wit h th e Unite d States. Man y viewe d th e treat y a s a nationa l humiliation . Laborer s demonstrated o n the Fourth o f July in Philadelphia, the nation's capital. They burne d John Jay in effigy, an d overpowere d a force o f cavalry called out to quell the "riot. " Alexande r Hamilton wa s stoned in New York . I n th e mids t o f thes e ignominiou s affront s t o Federalis t policy came a hubbub in Charleston, South Carolina. Mobs rioted fo r

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two days in opposition t o the treaty, and o n the third da y at a public meeting John Rutledg e vehementl y attacke d th e treat y an d Jay . Un fortunately fo r him , a detailed accoun t o f his intemperate speec h was published i n newspapers throughout th e nation, and his appointmen t was doomed. Althoug h h e served briefl y unde r a recess appointmen t as the second chief justice of the United States , the Senate rejected hi s nomination i n December o f 1795. 27 Rutledge was , abov e al l else , a gentlema n who m Washingto n trusted. Afte r Rutledg e wa s rejecte d b y th e Senate , th e presiden t turned t o anothe r truste d persona l acquaintance—Patric k Henry — but Henr y declined . Th e presiden t wrot e tha t thi s inabilit y t o fin d a new chief justic e was "embarrassin g i n the extreme," an d perhap s in desperation h e nominated Willia m Cushing , who was the Court' s senior associat e justice. But Cushing als o declined. Finally Washingto n turned t o Oliver Ellsworth a s his fourth choice. 28 Ellsworth wa s nominate d o n Marc h 3 , 1796 , an d confirme d b y the Senate the next day. Almost immediately h e became embroiled i n another face t o f th e genera l controvers y ove r th e Ja y Treaty . A s a practical matter , th e treat y coul d no t b e implemente d withou t money, and opponent s seize d upon th e appropriation s proces s i n the House of Representatives a s an opportunity t o reconsider th e treaty' s merits. Ellswort h wa s keenl y awar e o f thes e legislativ e maneuvers , and jus t a few day s befor e h e became chief justic e he wrote hi s wife, "[T]here remain s ye t t o b e mad e on e violen t effor t i n th e Hous e o f Representatives t o destro y th e Treaty. " H e believed , however , "tha t the effort wil l be unsuccessful an d that the Treaty will be carried int o effect, whic h th e hono r an d interes t o f thi s Countr y ver y muc h re quires."29 On March 7,1796, the day before Ellsworth took his oath of offic e as chief justice , the House demande d tha t th e president tur n ove r al l documents relevan t t o th e treaty' s negotiation . Toda y mos t justice s would remain aloof fro m thi s kind of controversy between the executive and legislative branches, but Ellsworth apparently sa w no reason for restraint . O n Marc h 13 , five days after becomin g chief justice , he wrote a detailed private advisory opinion on the House's authority t o demand the documents. 30 Ellsworth's opinio n i s foun d i n a nine-pag e lette r t o Connecticu t Senator Jonathan Trumbul l an d clearl y wa s intende d t o b e a n advi sory opinion . Senato r Trumbul l ha d discusse d th e treat y a fe w day s

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earlier with President Washington, and after tha t discussion Trumbul l asked Ellswort h fo r a lega l analysi s o f th e issues . Ellsworth' s lette r contains no chitchat and no customary closing enquiry about the wellbeing of Trumbull's famil y o r mutual friends . Instea d th e letter i s devoted exclusivel y t o th e legal question s presente d b y the House's de mand for documents. Ellsworth predictably concluded that the House lacked authorit y eithe r t o rejec t th e treat y o r t o deman d th e docu ments. Althoug h th e lette r wa s addresse d t o Senato r Trumbull , i t wound u p in President Washington's file s dockete d unde r th e subjec t "treaty makin g power. " Whethe r Ellswort h kne w tha t hi s opinio n would b e passed o n to the president i s not know n t o a certainty, bu t as a shrewd and knowledgeable politician, he must have known or anticipated thi s event. I n any case the letter obviousl y wa s intende d b y the chief justice as a detailed advisory opinion on a hotly debated constitutional controversy. 31 Almost a s soo n a s Ellswort h delivere d hi s advisor y opinion , h e wrote his wife with "som e pain" that he had to ride the Southern Cir cuit tha t sprin g an d presid e ove r th e federa l circui t court s i n eac h southern state . A mont h late r h e convene d th e cour t i n Savannah , Georgia, an d delivere d a grand jur y charg e tha t wa s publishe d i n a t least twelv e newspaper s i n eigh t states . Followin g th e custo m o f th e times, Ellsworth's charge was not so much an explanation o f criminal law a s i t wa s a politica l essa y extollin g th e federa l government' s virtue. In particular, he explained, "Th e national laws are the national ligatures an d vehicle s of life. Tho' the y pervade a country, a s diversified in habits , a s i t i s vast i n extent , ye t the y giv e to th e whole , har mony of interest, and unity of design." This emphasis upon "harmon y of interest , an d unit y o f design " i s a restatement o f th e Calvinis t vi sion of a perfect society , and i n the next sentence Ellsworth expressl y affirmed tha t the federal governmen t wa s part o f God's plan. The national laws , h e said , "ar e th e mean s b y whic h i t please s heave n t o make of weak an d discordan t parts , one great people." 32 While Ellswort h wa s pennin g thi s gran d jur y charge , h e wa s un doubtedly concerned abou t the Jay Treaty's fate i n the House of Representatives. In th e charge , he applaude d th e wisdo m o f distributin g legislative powe r t o tw o "maturin g an d balancin g bodies , instead o f the subjectio n o f i t to momentar y impulse , and th e predominance o f faction." I n this regard, he probably considered the Senate to be "ma turing an d balancing " an d th e Hous e t o b e subjec t t o "momentar y

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impulse, an d . . . faction. " Notwithstandin g hi s concer n abou t th e treaty's fate , hi s privat e convictio n wa s tha t th e treat y woul d b e funded, an d on April 30 the House approved the required fund s b y a close vote of 51-48. 33 This legislative victory confirmed Ellsworth' s Calvinist understand ing of governmen t unde r th e relativel y ne w Constitution . Soo n afte r learning about the Jay Treaty's victory in the House, he reiterated th e basic principle o f God s Wisdom t o hi s son-in-law Ezekie l Williams. "Of politicks, " h e wrote Williams , " I will converse with yo u whe n I come, and am satisfied i n the mean time that Go d governs the world, &C will turn al l the wrath &c folly o f men to good account. " A t abou t the sam e time , he reassure d Presiden t Washingto n tha t "th e public k mind, a s well Southwar d a s elsewhere , i s pretty tranquil , an d muc h more so than it would have been had ou r Country[ , through a failur e to fund the Treaty,] been dishonored and exposed by a violation of her faith."34 After defendin g the wisdom of the federal government in his charge to th e Georgi a gran d jury , Ellswort h proceede d fro m Savanna h t o South Carolina, where he dealt with the important neutrality questio n of whether th e Jay Treaty forbad e th e French t o sel l British prize s in American port s notwithstandin g a n ambiguou s provision possibl y t o the contrary i n the Treaty of Alliance with France. The British consu l in Charleston initiall y asked the local federal distric t judge to rule on this issue, but the judge, who usuall y ruled agains t th e British, seized upon a technicality and refused t o decide the matter. As soon as Chief Justice Ellsworth arrived in town, the consul renewed his petition, and Ellsworth immediatel y hear d th e cas e an d gav e ful l effec t t o th e Jay Treaty.35 Later that spring the chief justice held court in North Carolin a an d in Hamilton v. Eaton addresse d a conflict betwee n Britis h creditors ' treaty right s t o recove r debt s an d a North Carolin a statut e designe d to impede those rights. Ellsworth had not participated i n the Supreme Court's earlier decisio n o f Ware v. Hylton tha t nationa l treaties over ride state laws , so he used the North Carolin a cas e to pronounce hi s views on the subject and to reaffirm th e supremacy of federal law over state law . Amon g othe r things , h e brushe d asid e th e defendan t debtor's argument that the Treaty of Paris was an improper takin g of the defendant' s privat e property . Ellswort h me t thi s argumen t head on and bluntly ruled, "I t is justifiable an d frequent, i n the adjustment s

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of national differences, t o concede for the safety of the state, the rights of individuals." 36 When th e chie f justic e arrive d i n Philadelphi a fo r th e Suprem e Court's Augus t Ter m o f 1796 , he was presente d wit h ye t a third op portunity t o decid e a cas e i n a manne r tha t woul d suppor t th e na tional government. I n the 1790 s about 9 0 percent o f the federal gov ernment's revenue s cam e fro m th e impost , an d federa l admiralt y courts, which di d no t us e juries, were use d t o enforc e th e impost . I n United States v. La Vengeance, the Cour t wa s calle d upo n t o decid e whether ther e was an entitlemen t t o a jury tria l i n cases governed b y laws like the impost statute . Although traditiona l principle s of admi ralty la w clearl y indicate d tha t a jur y shoul d b e use d i n thes e cases , Chief Justice Ellsworth delivere d a majority opinio n tha t ignore d th e traditional principle s an d denie d a righ t t o tria l b y jury . Year s late r Justice Samue l Chas e recalle d tha t th e Cour t wa s motivate d b y "th e great danger to the revenue if such cases should b e left t o the capric e of juries." 37 Although President Washington finally decided that summer not to seek a third term of office, Ellsworth' s faith i n the federal governmen t was no t shaken . I n th e fal l o f 1796 , h e optimisticall y wrot e a goo d friend an d fello w Calvinis t tha t "w e ma y howeve r ye t hop e tha t th e gates of Hell will not prevail." This reference to the Book of Matthe w 16:18 wa s use d b y Connecticu t Calvinist s t o assur e themselve s an d others tha t Go d wa s lookin g afte r thei r institutions . Ellswort h con tinued i n thi s Calvinis t strai n b y immediatel y "pray[ing ] especiall y that goo d me n everywhere ma y make their Electio n sure. " Ellswort h was clearl y writin g abou t politics , bu t h e coul d no t hav e mean t th e word "Election " t o refer specificall y t o the coming political election s because all "good men everywhere" were not running for election. Instead, he was referring t o God's election of good men for salvation . In Ellsworth's mind , God' s elec t wer e supporter s o f th e federa l govern ment, an d the y made thei r persona l Electio n sur e b y voting properl y in the November elections . When the Fifth Congress was convened in 1797, the Federalists ha d a majority i n bot h houses . Moreover, John Adams, whom Ellsworth ha d full y supported , continue d th e Federalists' control o f the presidency. 38 Notwithstanding thes e Federalis t electora l triumphs , 179 7 wa s a bad yea r fo r Ellsworth . Th e Suprem e Cour t wa s convene d i n earl y February, bu t Ellswort h coul d no t atten d becaus e h e wa s sick . H e

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probably wa s suffering fro m gou t an d gravel . This extremely painfu l illness usually appears in middle age and is caused by either a hereditary metabolic disorder or excessive accumulations of lead in the body (among eighteenth-centur y English-speakin g people , typicall y fro m drinking large quantities of port wine). The illness is not degenerative, but it afflicted hi m with sporadic bouts of intense pain until he died in 1807. By the middle o f Marc h h e reported t o hi s son-in-law tha t hi s health was "prett y well restoring," an d he was ready to ride the Eastern Circuit. 39 While Ellsworth was recovering from hi s illness, he and other Federalists were deeply disturbed by a worsening of relations with France and th e impac t o f Franco-America n relation s upo n domesti c Ameri can politics . Th e previou s yea r th e Frenc h ha d unsuccessfull y at tempted to brin g about the election o f Thomas Jefferson t o the presidency. After Joh n Adam s was elected, they refused t o accredi t a new American minister t o Franc e an d increase d thei r maritim e depreda tions on American commerce. These affronts cause d the Federalists to believe that war with France was likely. At the same time Jeffersonia n Republicans seeme d t o suppor t France. 40 The Republicans ' domesti c support for French misconduct outrage d New England Federalists. In early April , Ellsworth' s friend , Connecticu t Senato r Uria h Tracy , wrote, " I presume we shall see at the coming Session of Congress the humiliating spectacle of a considerable number of the members of the Government tak e sid e wit h Franc e &C justif y al l th e depredations. " Tracy continued, "[I] f w e must suffe r th e French Natio n t o interfer e with our politics—by reason of a Geographical divisio n of Sentiment , perversely ben t o n humiliatin g thei r ow n governmen t t o a foreig n one—why then, Sir, I hesitate not a moment in saying a separation of the Union is inevitable." 41 On the same day that Senato r Tracy was speculating about a "separation o f th e Union, " Chie f Justic e Ellswort h delivere d a n embar rassing gran d jur y charg e i n Ne w York . Th e combinatio n o f hi s painful kidne y ailment an d uncertaint y abou t th e impact o f relation s with Franc e upo n domesti c politic s cause d hi m t o rai l agains t "th e baleful influenc e o f thos e element s o f disorganization , &c tenet s o f impiety." H e warne d th e natio n tha t ther e wer e "impassioned " an d "impious" peopl e wh o ar e "radicall y hostil e t o fre e government. " Even worse, this "disaffection open s a door to foreign [i.e. , French] in-

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fluence, tha t 'destroyin g ange l o f republics.' " Al l i n all , th e charg e verged upon disjointe d hysteria. 42 A writer in the New York Argus dislike d the religious undertone of Ellsworth's charg e an d wrote , " I like neither hi s politics no r hi s religion." Afte r readin g th e charge , Abigai l Adam s wa s s o exasperate d that sh e wrote he r husband , "[D]i d th e goo d gentlema n neve r writ e before? ca n it be genuine? I am Sorry it was ever published." Perhap s during thi s tim e Ellsworth—lik e hi s frien d Senato r Tracy—bega n t o have serious doubts about the viability of the new federal government . Within three years the chief justice was privately stating "tha t there is in a governmen t lik e our s a natura l antipath y t o syste m o f ever y kind." These are strong words indeed for a man who idealized system and order. 43 If Ellsworth was pessimistic as early as 1797 about the federal government's basi c viability , hi s doubt s wer e temporaril y abate d b y a speech that President Adams delivered to a special session of Congress in th e middl e o f May . T o counte r th e Frenc h depredations , Adam s chose the same strategy that Ellsworth had recommended to President Washington thre e year s earlie r durin g th e wa r scar e wit h Grea t Britain. Adams committed th e nation t o attemp t a n "amicabl e nego tiation" with France and simultaneously urged Congress to enact "ef fectual measure s o f defense. " Thi s strategy received immediat e widespread public approval, and b y the end of May, Ellsworth was feelin g "triumph[ant]" tha t th e president's speec h had strengthene d th e Federalists' "politica l faith." 44 The winter o f 179 8 brought a recurrence o f Ellsworth's painful ill ness. In January h e was "considerabl y unwell. " B y February h e wa s somewhat bette r bu t reporte d tha t hi s "wan t o f healt h require s tha t my movements shall be gentle & cautious." The illness continued int o March, an d h e determine d t o rid e a reduced circui t comprisin g onl y the state s o f Vermon t an d Ne w Hampshire . H e asked hi s Calvinis t friend Justic e Cushin g t o tak e Massachusett s an d Rhod e Islan d an d offered "t o furnish a little money for [Cushing's ] expenses." Ellsworth explained that he was offering mone y "as it may never be in my power to repa y yo u i n kin d [i.e. , by riding circui t fo r Cushing]. " This omi nous explanation indicate s that as early as April 1798 , Ellsworth was contemplating vacatin g hi s positio n b y resignatio n o r possibl y death.45

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There is no evidence that Ellsworth' s illnes s recurred i n the winte r of 1799 , an d tha t yea r h e wa s abl e t o presid e ove r th e Suprem e Court's February Term for the first and only time during his chief justiceship. With his health restored, he bent to the wheel of government and vigorousl y participate d i n attempt s t o resolv e domesti c an d for eign polic y issue s arisin g fro m th e ongoin g disput e wit h France . Ellsworth ha d bee n pleased with Presiden t Adams' s decisio n i n 179 7 to attempt a n "amicabl e negotiation" o f the two nations' differences , but the upshot of the negotiation was disastrous. When the American diplomatic missio n arrive d i n Europ e th e nex t year , th e Frenc h demanded bribes as a condition to opening formal negotiations, and the mission fel l through . Thi s failure, whic h becam e know n a s the XY Z Affair, exacerbate d th e rif t i n Franco-America n relations . Relativel y minor maritime skirmishing in the West Indies was escalated to a limited quas i war, and o n the domestic front Congress enacte d th e Sedition Ac t t o discourag e criticis m o f th e government . Ellswort h bega n 1799 by writing private and public advisory opinions calculated to establish the act's constitutionality. He finished the year on a diplomatic mission to Europe to negotiate an end to the war. 46 When the Sedition Act was initially debated i n Congress, the measure's opponent s vehementl y attacke d th e proposa l a s unconstitu tional, an d th e Federalist s responde d tha t th e ac t would b e a prope r use of the Constitution's "necessar y and proper" claus e to protect the federal government . In addition, the Federalists had a powerful argu ment based upon the federal courts ' preexisting authority to try common-law crimes. This idea o f common-law crime s was based upo n a natural-law belie f that certain activities were inherently criminal even in th e absenc e o f a statut e formall y declarin g the m t o b e criminal . These activities included conduc t like counterfeiting, bribin g a public officer, an d obviously seditious libel. Because the existence of the common-law doctrin e o f seditiou s libe l wa s no t seriousl y controverted , the only issue was whether common-law crimes against federal inter ests shoul d b e tried i n stat e court s o r federa l courts . The Federalists argued tha t common-la w crime s agains t th e federa l governmen t should b e tried i n federal court . Therefore th e Seditio n Ac t was constitutional becaus e it was essentially a codification o f a common-la w authority that the federal court s already had. 47 Because the logic of this constitutional argumen t was unassailable , the opponent s o f th e Seditio n Ac t ha d t o attac k th e argument' s un -

Oliver Ellsworth 30 9 derlying premise. The opposition coul d no t den y the existence of com mon-law crime s withou t appearin g foolis h o r ignorant , s o the y wer e forced t o den y tha t th e federa l court s ha d authorit y t o punis h them . Presumably, the y woul d hav e concede d tha t th e stat e court s ha d suc h authority. The opposition' s arguments , however, were unavailing , an d Congress passe d th e Seditio n Ac t i n th e summe r o f 1798. 4 8 In th e 1790s , cabine t responsibilit y fo r supervisin g th e U.S . attor neys' crimina l prosecution s i n th e variou s state s wa s allocate d t o th e secretary o f stat e rathe r tha n th e attorne y general , an d Secretar y o f State Timoth y Pickerin g evidentl y ha d som e concern s abou t th e Sedi tion Act . I n 1796 , Pickering ha d note d i n officia l correspondenc e tha t on "weight y points " o f la w h e coul d consul t Suprem e Cour t justices , whom h e calle d "ou r first law-characters, " an d th e attorne y general . Moreover, tha t sam e yea r Pickerin g actuall y sough t Chie f Justic e Ellsworth's lega l advic e i n coordinatin g ongoin g litigatio n i n th e fed eral courts. Consisten t wit h thi s prior practice , the secretar y evidentl y sought th e chief justice' s advic e o n th e Seditio n Act' s constitutionality . In an y event , i n a lette r penne d t o Secretar y Pickerin g i n Decembe r 1798, Ellswort h opine d tha t th e ac t wa s constitutional . Lik e othe r Federalists, th e chie f justic e believe d tha t becaus e th e ac t wa s a codi fication—actually, a n amelioration—o f th e federa l courts ' preexistin g authority t o punis h common-la w seditiou s libel , th e act' s constitu tionality wa s no t subjec t t o seriou s dispute . Ellswort h evidentl y ha d no qualms abou t givin g an advisor y opinio n o n a statute that he migh t subsequently hav e t o administe r i n a crimina l trial. 49 This remarkabl e advisor y opinio n di d no t en d th e chie f justice' s e x parte defens e o f th e Seditio n Act . I n earl y 1799 , th e act' s opponent s unveiled a new argument. Th e linchpin o f the constitutional argumen t in favo r o f th e act' s constitutionalit y wa s th e federa l courts ' preexist ing authorit y ove r common-la w crimes . Durin g a congressiona l re consideration o f th e ac t i n Februar y o f tha t year , Representativ e Wil son Car y Nichola s challenge d th e federa l courts ' pretensio n t o com mon-law jurisdictio n a s a dangerou s arrogatio n o f federa l authority . Because th e commo n la w wa s " a complet e system " tha t regulate d al l human relations , th e federa l courts ' jurisdictio n mus t exten d t o al l human conduct , an d Congress' s legislativ e authorit y mus t b e equall y comprehensive. I n othe r words , Nichola s argue d tha t th e constitu tional implicatio n o f th e Federalists ' positio n wa s t o consolidat e vir tually al l stat e authorit y int o th e federa l government. 50

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Chief Justice Ellsworth almos t immediatel y bega n writing anothe r advisory opinio n t o counte r thi s ne w argument , an d i n May h e presented his comprehensive analysis of federal common-la w crimes in a charge t o a grand jur y i n Sout h Carolina . Th e charg e was publishe d in a t leas t eleve n newspaper s i n eigh t states . Ellsworth use d a tradi tional natural-law analysis to establish the fundamental validit y of the doctrine of federal common-law crimes. Like Representative Nicholas and virtually al l American lawyers , Ellsworth assume d tha t th e common law—lik e th e la w o f gravity—existe d i n natur e independen t o f government. Representativ e Nichola s ha d argue d tha t t o recogniz e a federal common-la w jurisdictio n woul d giv e the federa l court s com plete powe r ove r al l huma n affairs , bu t Ellswort h emphaticall y re jected this idea. Given the fact that the common law of crimes already existed i n nature, the federal court s seeme d to b e the most appropri ate foru m fo r punishin g crime s agains t th e nationa l government . Ellsworth advised the jury (and the nation) that the doctrine was limited t o act s "manifestl y subversiv e o f th e nationa l government " an d emphasized tha t h e sai d "manifestly subversive , t o exclud e act s o f doubtful tendency , an d confin e criminalit y t o clearnes s an d cer tainty."51 In additio n t o explainin g th e substantiv e limit s o f thi s unwritte n criminal law , Ellsworth sa w th e gran d jur y proces s itsel f a s a proce dural limi t to common-law prosecutions . He cautioned th e grand ju rors that an indictment must not "b e founded o n suspicion-, and much less o n prepossession " an d reminde d the m tha t the y wer e " a shiel d from oppressio n [an d not ] th e instruments o f it. " H e conclude d b y emphasizing that grand jurors should not investigate "th e opinions of men, bu t thei r actions, an d weig h them , no t i n the scale s of passion, or o f party, bu t i n a legal balance—a balanc e tha t i s undeceptive — which vibrate s no t wit h popula r opinion ; an d whic h flatter s no t th e pride of birth, or encroachments o f power." 52 At the sam e time that th e chief justic e was defendin g th e Seditio n Act an d th e doctrin e o f federa l common-la w crimes , he was partici pating directl y i n effort s t o resolv e th e diplomati c impass e between the United States and France. The previous fall, France had intimate d to Willia m Van s Murray , th e Unite d State s ministe r residen t t o Th e Hague, that a new diplomatic mission to France for th e resolution of the nations' differences woul d be received favorably. President Adams kept this overture secret because his secretaries of state, war, and trea-

Oliver Ellsworth 31 1 sury were High Federalists . They deferre d t o Alexander Hamilton , ab horred Adams' s moderation , an d sough t wa r wit h France . I n Febru ary o f 179 9 Adam s nominate d Murra y t o b e minister plenipotentiar y to Franc e withou t prio r cabine t consultation . Thi s surpris e nomina tion wa s dea d o n arrival . As one Hig h Federalis t wrot e whe n th e pro posal wa s mad e public , "Surprise , indignation , grie f & disgus t fol lowed eac h othe r i n quic k successio n i n th e breast s o f th e tru e friend s of ou r country. " A selec t committe e wa s appointe d b y th e Senat e t o consider th e matter , bu t a privat e meetin g betwee n th e senator s an d the presiden t degenerate d int o a shoutin g match. 53 Although Chie f Justic e Ellswort h wa s quit e friendl y wit h an d re spected b y mos t o f th e Hig h Federalists , h e wa s no t on e himself . H e had bee n a firm supporte r o f Presiden t Adam s fro m th e beginning . I n addition Ellswort h wa s philosophicall y incline d t o see k politica l com promises. H e wa s i n th e capita l whe n Murray' s nam e wa s submitte d to th e Senat e an d undoubtedl y wa s appalle d b y th e explosiv e shout ing match betwee n th e presiden t an d th e Selec t Committee . Afte r thi s disaster, he reportedly too k i t upon himsel f t o spea k privatel y wit h th e president an d manage d t o convinc e Adam s t o appoin t thre e minister s instead o f one . Th e basi c ide a wa s tha t th e thre e woul d represen t dif ferent interest s an d guarante e tha t peac e woul d b e negotiate d o n ac ceptable terms. 54 The presiden t decide d t o nam e Ellswort h an d Patric k Henr y a s th e two additiona l nominees , an d Ellswort h wa s i n n o positio n t o refuse . Patrick Henry , however , di d refuse , an d th e presiden t subsequentl y had a numbe r o f conversation s wit h Ellswort h i n whic h eithe r Ellsworth o r Adam s mentione d Governo r Willia m Davi e o f Nort h Carolina a s a possibl e replacement . Whe n Ellswort h rod e th e South ern Circui t that spring , he consulted wit h Davi e an d recommende d hi s appointment. Followin g thi s recommendation , th e president the n for mally nominate d Davie. 55 Ellsworth di d no t reall y wan t t o g o t o Franc e an d feare d tha t th e voyage woul d brin g hi m illness . Nevertheless, h e tol d th e presiden t t o "disregard an y suppose d pain s o r peril s tha t migh t atten d m e fro m a voige a t on e seaso n mor e tha n another. " Finally , h e an d Davi e se t sai l in earl y Novembe r an d afte r a roug h passag e o f twenty-fou r day s made landfal l i n Portugal . Unfortunately , hi s journey t o Pari s was no t even hal f wa y through . Fro m Portuga l the y se t sai l fo r France , "bu t were 1 0 day s i n gettin g ou t o f th e harbou r owin g t o contrar y winds ,

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and wer e afterwar d 2 5 day s a t se a i n a successio n o f storm s on e o f which laste d 8 days, and wer e afte r al l oblige d t o pu t int o a port i n Spain abou t 90 0 [miles ] from Paris. " Then the y traveled overlan d i n the dea d o f winter. After a journey o f nin e weeks i n which thei r car riages broke down an d they wound u p on horseback, the y arrived i n Paris in early March. 56 During thi s arduou s tri p b y sea an d land , Ellsworth' s painfu l kid ney ailment recurred and continued throughout the negotiations with the Frenc h government . Th e persona l catastrophe , however , di d no t keep him from playing a leading role in the negotiations, and after si x months, a compromise was reached. The naval war in the West Indies was terminated, and the two countries formally agreed to suspend embarrassing Franco-America n treatie s datin g fro m th e Revolutionar y War and the period o f the Confederacy. Thes e aspects of the compromise wer e al l wel l an d good , bu t Ellswort h an d hi s fello w commis sioners had been instructed to insist that the French government compensate the United States for almost $20 million in spoliations against American commerce . As his opinion i n Hamilton v. Eaton indicates , Ellsworth was perfectly willin g to override individual property right s to secure safety for the nation. To obtain peace, he agreed to drop this important claim. 57 Ellsworth kne w tha t th e abandonmen t o f th e spoliatio n claim s would outrag e his High Federalist friends wh o were opposed eve n to the idea of negotiating with France, but he did not care. He had bee n a politician for nearly his entire adult life and was satisfied tha t "mor e could no t b e done without to o grea t a sacrifice , an d i t was bette r t o sign a convention tha n t o d o nothing." Moreover , hi s righteous self confidence gav e him the inner strength to accept the High Federalists' inevitable snid e attacks with equanimity . "If, " h e wrote, "ther e mus t be an y burnin g o n th e occasion , le t the m tak e me , who a m s o nea r dead alread y wit h th e grave l & gou t i n m y kidnies , tha t roastin g would d o me but little damage." 58 Ellsworth's Resignation In additio n t o acceptin g ful l politica l responsibilit y fo r th e treaty , Ellsworth di d something quit e uncharacteristic. He resigned hi s chief justiceship. Th e traditiona l explanatio n fo r thi s resignatio n i s tha t

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"the ministeria l journe y t o th e continen t brok e hi s health, " an d un doubtedly hi s recurring sicknes s playe d a significant rol e i n motivat ing his resignation. But his gravel and gout do not completely explai n the matter. 59 Gravel an d gou t ar e ver y painfu l afflictions , bu t the y ar e no t de generative. Ellswort h ha d alread y endure d a t leas t thre e an d a hal f years of this recurring pain without resigning. Nor did the illness seem to hav e muc h impac t afte r hi s resignation. H e continue d t o b e mentally and physically active. For example, upon returning to Connecti cut, h e insiste d o n walkin g a littl e ove r a mil e t o churc h eac h wee k rather than riding a carriage. The winter after hi s return from Europe , he invited five young men to study with him as law clerks, and in 180 4 he began a regular serie s of essays and note s on agricultural topic s in the Connecticut Courant. 60 More significantly , hi s 180 1 resignation wa s b y no means a retirement from publi c life. He retired from th e national political arena bu t continued t o play an active role in Connecticut publi c life unti l a few months befor e h e died. In 1802 , he was elected to the upper hous e of the state legislature and was reelected each year for the rest of his life. As the leading member o f that body , he chaired an d played a n activ e role in the 180 2 attempt t o resolve the Baptist Petition movement . In 1805, h e le d th e uppe r house' s consideratio n of , an d personall y drafted, th e resolution s rejectin g tw o propose d amendment s (on e o n the importation o f slaves; the other on the federal courts' jurisdiction) to th e Unite d State s Constitution . Tha t sam e yea r h e serve d o n th e three-person committe e charged with remodeling the state's judiciar y system.61 In addition to his legislative services, Ellsworth's position in the legislature automaticall y mad e hi m a n appellat e judg e becaus e i n Con necticut th e uppe r hous e als o wa s th e Suprem e Cour t o f Errors . Ellsworth wa s a dominan t membe r o f thi s tribunal' s consideration s and personall y wrot e man y o f it s opinions . Althoug h Day's Reports does no t tel l wh o wrot e th e opinions , survivin g docket s assignin g opinion-writing responsibilit y fo r th e court's June terms of 180 3 an d 1804 indicate that only one member of the court wrote more opinions than Ellsworth. 62 Although Ellsworth' s illnes s clearly playe d a significan t rol e i n hi s resignation fro m th e Suprem e Court , hi s healt h wa s hardl y broken . The illness , however , probabl y mad e hi m unusuall y susceptibl e t o a

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growing suspicion that th e federal governmen t wa s no longer a milestone on the direct path t o a graceful nationa l order . In 1796 , he had confidently pronounce d tha t th e federa l governmen t woul d giv e "harmony o f interest , an d unit y o f design " t o th e country . Bu t b y 1800 he was thinking "tha t ther e i s in a government lik e ours a nat ural antipath y t o syste m o f ever y kind. " I f th e federa l governmen t was no t t o pla y a direc t positiv e rol e i n God' s plan , Ellsworth , wh o knew himsel f t o b e one o f God' s elect , would hav e foun d continue d federal servic e t o b e gallin g an d surel y woul d hav e preferre d devot ing himself t o hi s orderl y an d righteou s stat e o f Connecticut . A t th e same time , however , ther e wa s somethin g inherentl y dishonorabl e about quitting . I n earl y middl e age , Ellsworth ha d describe d himsel f as a soldier i n public servic e an d affirme d tha t "whe n a soldie r goe s forth i n public k servic e h e mus t sta y unti l h e i s discharged , an d though th e weathe r b e storm y an d hi s allowanc e smal l ye t h e mus t stand t o hi s post." Thi s unbendin g nobless e oblig e ma y hav e cause d Ellsworth t o place inordinate emphasi s upo n hi s illness as the reaso n for no t standin g t o hi s post . Certainl y a goo d soldie r i n publi c ser vice coul d no t b e criticize d i f a seriou s illnes s beyon d hi s contro l forced hi s discharge. 63 Shortly afte r Ellswort h resigned , Joh n Adams' s los s i n th e 180 0 presidential electio n confirme d Ellsworth' s Calvinis t pessimis m about th e nationa l government . O n hearin g o f Jefferson' s victory , Ellsworth compare d th e task o f governin g unde r th e Constitutio n t o the legen d o f Sisyphus . "So, " h e wrote , "th e Antifed s ar e no w t o support their own administration an d take a turn a t rolling stones up hill." Thi s legen d woul d hav e bee n particularl y appealin g t o a Calvinist like Ellsworth who believe d generally in predestination an d specifically tha t government s wer e par t o f God' s plan . Sisyphu s wa s a cleve r rule r wh o tricke d an d betraye d th e gods an d who , as an ex emplary punishment , wa s doome d b y th e god s t o hi s eterna l task . Like Sisyphus, Jefferson wa s a clever ruler, and New England Calvin ists believe d tha t h e ha d betraye d God . B y suggesting tha t Jefferso n was as certainly doome d a s Sisyphus, Ellsworth wa s reaffirming tha t the federa l governmen t wit h Jefferson a t th e helm was par t o f God' s plan.64 Notwithstanding thi s pessimism , th e essentia l optimis m o f God's Wisdom prevailed as Ellsworth regained his health. Shortly after writ ing about "rollin g stones up hill," he commented tha t

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Jefferson dar e no t ru n th e shi p aground , no r essentiall y deviat e fro m tha t course whic h ha s hithert o rendere d he r voyag e s o prosperous . Hi s part y also must support the Government while he administers it, and if others ar e consistent &C do the same, the Government ma y even be consolidated & ac quire ne w confidence .

Later h e confide d t o hi s son-in-la w tha t "Mr . Jefferson' s Presidenc y may b e turned t o goo d accoun t i f peopl e wil l le t their reaso n &c no t their passions, tell them how to manage." 65 Concluding Thoughts Twentieth-century analyse s o f Chie f Justic e Ellswort h an d hi s fello w justices ten d t o b e slightl y ou t o f focu s becaus e ou r moder n under standing o f what Suprem e Cour t justice s d o has bee n shape d b y two hundred years of evolution in the judicial process. Today we view the Court a s a uniqu e politica l institutio n whos e powe r i s mor e o r les s limited t o th e resolutio n o f specifi c judicia l case s an d controversies . Consistent wit h thi s understanding , mos t moder n analyse s o f th e Court plac e predominant—eve n inordinate—emphasi s upo n th e justices' opinions in individual cases . This modern understanding , how ever, become s anachronisti c whe n i t i s transporte d t o th e lat e eigh teenth century. The justices of the early Supreme Court simply did not view their positions the way modern justices do. In his first grand jur y charge, Chief Justice Jay had viewe d separa tion o f power s an d judicia l independenc e a s a doctrine i n evolution . He frankl y admitte d tha t "ther e continue s t o b e grea t Diversit y o f opinions [about ] ho w t o constitut e an d balanc e [the ] Executiv e leg islative an d judicial. " I n his mind, th e natio n wa s embarking upo n a "Tryal," an d th e doctrine' s contour s woul d hav e t o b e worke d ou t "by Practice. " Chie f Justic e Jay' s approac h t o separatio n o f power s was pragmatic , an d Chie f Justic e Ellswort h continue d i n tha t tradi tion.66 As a teenager, Ellsworth had bee n instructed tha t a good public of ficial is a righteous rule r whos e obligation s an d action s ar e ordaine d by God. Moreover, he understood tha t there was no room for discor d or eve n disagreemen t i n a righteou s nation . Whil e Ellswort h wa s studying wit h Josep h Bellamy , Bellam y ha d emphasize d tha t i n a righteous o r perfec t natio n "ther e ar e n o sects , n o parties , n o divi -

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sion." Likewise unrighteous nations are "all riot and confusion." Thi s same monolithic understandin g o f society and government i s implicit in The Summary of Christian Doctrine and Practice written som e forty year s late r b y Ellsworth' s committe e a t th e Connecticu t Mis sionary Society . According t o th e Summary, "Th e desig n o f al l gov ernment i s to mak e ever y on e feel th e relatio n i n which h e stands t o the community , an d t o compe l hi m to conduc t a s becomes that rela tion." Similarly , in his first grand jury charge Ellsworth affirme d tha t the federal government would give "harmony of interest, and unity of design" to the nation. In contrast to this ideal of a monolithic society, the concep t o f separatio n o f power s i s designed fo r a society i n con flict—one i n whic h ther e i s disorde r an d confusion . Therefor e Ellsworth must have been mentally predisposed to reject separation of powers.67 As chief justice , Ellsworth probabl y di d no t vie w himself a s much a judge as a righteous ruler who happened to be serving as a judge. He wrote judicial opinions in support o f the Washington an d Adams ad ministrations, bu t h e was equally willing to suppor t thes e two presi dents i n a nonjudicia l capacity . H e wrot e privat e advisor y opinion s for th e president an d th e secretar y o f state . He activel y defende d th e Sedition Act. He even went to Europe as a diplomat. Therefore hi s letter assuring President Washington that he had "sough t the felicity an d glory of your Administration" is not surprising. All of his actions were part o f a seamless web of support fo r goo d government .

NOTES

1. Olive r Ellsworth to George Washington, Mar. 6,1979, Georg e Washingto n Papers, Library o f Congress , Washington, D.C . 2. Willia m R. Casto, The Supreme Court in the Early Republic: The Chief justiceships of John jay and Oliver Ellsworth (Columbia : Universit y o f Sout h Car olina Press , 1995) , 97-98, 115-17 , 149-52 , 174 , & 118-19 . 3. Willia m G . Brown , The Life of Oliver Ellsworth (Ne w York : Macmillan , 1905), 12-21 . For the Great Awakening in Connecticut, se e Richard L . Bushman, From Puritan to Yankee: Character and the Social Order in Connecticut, 1690-1765 (Cambridge : Harvar d Universit y Press , 1967) , ch . XII-XIV . A s th e century progressed , th e Ne w Ligh t minister s wh o worke d withi n Connecticut' s Standing Orde r elaborate d a theolog y know n a s Ne w Divinit y Calvinism . Thi s New Divinit y theolog y wa s heavil y influence d b y Jonatha n Edward s bu t wa s

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founded an d le d b y Joseph Bellamy , wh o wa s youn g Olive r Ellsworth' s teacher , and Samue l Hopkins . Se e Sydney E. Ahlstrom, A Religious History of the American People (Ne w Haven: Yale University Press , 1972) , ch. XXV; Joseph A . Con forti, Samuel Hopkins and the New Divinity Movement (Washington , D.C. : Christian Universit y Press , 1981) . 4. Willia m R . Casto , "Olive r Ellsworth' s Calvinism : A Biographical Essa y o n Religion an d Politica l Psycholog y i n the Earl y Republic, " journal of Church and State (1994) , 36:508 ; Brown , Oliver Ellsworth 328 ; Daniel Webste r t o Thoma s A. Merrill, Jan. 4,1803, in Papers of Daniel Webster, Legal Papers, ed . A. Konefsky 8 c A . Kin g (Hanover , N.H. : Universit y Pres s o f Ne w England , 1982) , 1:19-20. 5. Missionar y Societ y o f Connecticut , A Summary of Christian Doctrine and Practice: Designed Especially for the use of the People in the New Settlement of the United States of America (Hartford , Conn. : Hudso n & Goodwin , 1804 ) (Ellsworth's authorshi p explaine d i n Casto , "Olive r Ellsworth' s Calvinism, " 51 1 n. 23); Joseph Bellamy, The Works of Joseph Bellamy, 2 vols., ed. Tryon Edward s (Boston: Doctrinal Trac t an d Boo k Society , 1853) . 6. Summary of Christian Doctrine, ch . V, VIII, XIV; Joseph Bellamy , True Religion Delineated (1750) , in Bellamy, Works, 1:1-361 ; Westminster Confession of Faith (1648) , in Williston Walker , The Creeds and Platforms of Congregationalism (Ne w York : Scribner , 1893) , 367-402 . 7. Natha n Strong , A Sermon Delivered in the Presence of His Excellency Samuel Huntington, Esq. L.L.D. Governor, and the Honorable the General Assembly of the State of Connecticut (Hartford , Conn. : Hudso n an d Goodwin , 1790) 1 4 (Evan s No. 22913); Oliver Ellswort h Papers , Bancroft Transcript , Ne w York Publi c Library , 6 3 (emphasi s i n original) . 8. Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, ed . Max Farrand (Ne w Haven: Yale University Press , reprint ed . 1966) , 1:406 , 2:91; William Laughto n Smit h t o Edward Rutledge , Augus t 9 , 178 9 (quotin g Ellsworth) , i n South Carolina Historical Magazine 6 9 (1968) , 23. 9. Strong , Sermon, 20 ; Samue l Finley , The Curse of Meroz; the Danger of Neutrality, in the Cause of God, and our Country (Philadelphia : Jame s Cat tin, 1757) , 1 0 (Evan s No . 7893) ; Casto , "Olive r Ellsworth' s Calvinism, " 513-14. 10. Josep h Bellamy , "Th e Wisdo m o f Go d i n th e Permissio n o f Sin, " i n Bel lamy, Works, 2:1-155 . 11. Bushman , From Puritan to Yankee, ch . XV &c XVI. 12. Josep h Bellamy , "A n Electio n Sermon, " i n Bellamy , Works, 1:577-96 ; Bushman, From Puritan to Yankee, ch . XV; Bruce Steiner , "Anglica n Officehold ing in Pre-Revolutionary Connecticut : Th e Parameters o f New Englan d Commu nity," William and Mary Quarterly, 3 d ser . 31 (1974) , 369 , 381-87 . 13. Ronal d J . Lettieri , Connecticut's Young Man of the Revolution: Oliver

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Ellsworth (Hartford , Conn. : America n Revolutio n Bicentennia l Commissio n o f Connecticut, 1978) , ch. II & III . 14. Olive r Ellswort h t o Theodor e Hinsdale , Jan. 26 , 1779 , in Letters of Delegates to Congress, 1774-1789, ed . Pau l Smit h (Washington , D.C. : Librar y o f Congress, 1985), 11:518-19. For another lette r expressing similar sentiments, see Oliver Ellswort h t o Jonathan Trumbull , Marc h 18 , 1780, in ibid., 14:548-49 . 15. Farrand , Records of the Federal Convention, 1:466 , 2:97, 316 . 16. Lettieri , Connecticut's Young Man, ch . V. 17. Ibid. ; Farrand , Records of the Federal Convention, 4:88-89 ; The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution, ed . Merrill Jensen (Madi son: Stat e Historica l Societ y o f Wisconsin , 1978) , 3:55 3 (judicia l review) ; Rufu s King t o Jeremia h Wadsworth , Dec . 23 , 1787 , i n Jensen, Documentary History, 15:70-71. 18. Ro y Swanstrom , The United States Senate, 1787-1801, (Washington , D.C.: Governmen t Printin g Office , 1985) , 268-6 9 (Senat e Doc . 99-19) ; Casto , Supreme Court, ch . II. 19. Wyth e Holt , " T o Establis h Justice' : Politics , th e Judiciar y Ac t o f 1789 , and th e Inventio n o f th e Federa l Courts, " Duke Law Journal (1989) , 1989:1421-1531; Casto , Supreme Court, 8-9 , 29-31 . 20. Casto , Supreme Court, 31-33 . 21. Ibid. , 38-41 , 44-46 . 22. Ibid. , 45, 55. 23. Ibid. , 46-47 . 24. Ibid. , 33-38 . 25. Ibid. , 50-51 . 26. Ibid. , 87-90 . 27. Jeral d A. Combs, The]ay Treaty (Berkeley : University of California Press , 1970), 159-62 ; Annals of Congress, 4:862-63 ; Casto , Supreme Court, 90-94 ; Ronald Schultz , The Republic of Labor: Philadelphia Artisans and the Politics of Class, 1720-1830 (Ne w York : Oxford Universit y Press , 1993) , 137-39 . 28. Casto , Supreme Court, 95 ; Georg e Washingto n t o Henr y Lee , Jan. 11 , 1796, i n Documentary History of the Supreme Court of the United States, 1789-1800, ed . Maev a Marcu s (Ne w York : Columbi a Universit y Press , 1985) , 1:829. 29. Combs , Jay Treaty, 171-87 ; Olive r Ellswort h t o Abigai l Ellsworth , Feb . 26, 1796 , Oliver Ellswort h Homestead , Windsor , Connecticut . 30. Combs , Jay Treaty, 175-77 ; Olive r Ellswort h t o Jonatha n Trumbull , March 13 , 1796, Georg e Washingto n Papers , Library o f Congress , Washington , D.C. 31. Supreme Court Documentary History, 3:8 8 n . 7 ; Olive r Ellswort h t o Jonathan Trumbull , Marc h 13 , 1796 , Georg e Washingto n Papers , Librar y o f Congress, Washington, D.C .

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32. Olive r Ellsworth to Abigail Ellsworth, March 20,1796, in Supreme Court Documentary History, 3:99-100 ; Olive r Ellsworth, "Charg e to the Grand Jury of the Circui t Cour t fo r th e Distric t o f Sout h Carolina, " Apri l 25 , 1796 , i n ibid. , 3:119-20. 33. Ibid. ; Olive r Ellswort h t o Abigai l Ellsworth , Feb . 26 , 1796 , Olive r Ellsworth Homestead , Windsor , Connecticut ; Annals of Congress 5:1291 . 34. Olive r Ellswort h t o Ezekie l Williams, Jr., May 29 , 1796 , Williams Famil y Papers, Watkinso n Library , Trinit y College , Hartford , Connecticut ; Olive r Ellsworth t o Georg e Washington, June 19 , 1796 , George Washington Papers , Library o f Congress , Washington, Distric t o f Columbia . 35. Se e Casto, Supreme Court, 115-17 ; Alexander DeConde , Entangling Alliance: Politics & Diplomacy under George Washington (Durham : Duke Univer sity Press, 1958) , 437-38. 36. Hamilton v. Eaton, 1 1 F . Cas. 336 , 34 0 (C.C.D.N.C . 1796 ) (No . 5980) ; Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 19 9 (1796) ; Casto, Supreme Court, 98-101 . 37. United States v. LaVengeance, 3 U.S. ( 3 Dall.) 29 7 (1796) ; United States v. The Schooner Betsy, 8 U.S. ( 4 Cranch ) 443 , 446n. (1808 ) (Chase , J.); Casto , Supreme Court, 105-09 . 38. Olive r Ellswort h t o Cale b Strong , Oct . 25 , 1796 , Cale b Stron g Papers , Forbes Library , Northampton , Massachusetts . Th e phras e "gate s o f Hell " i s explained i n Casto, "Olive r Ellsworth' s Calvinism, " 52 0 n. 74. For Ellsworth's sup port o f John Adams, see Oliver Wolcott, Sr. , to Oliver Wolcott, Jr., Dec. 12,1796 , Wolcott Papers , Connecticu t Historica l Society , Hartford . 39. Olive r Ellswort h t o Ezekie l Williams, March 16 , 1797 , Conarro e Collec tion, Pennsylvania Historica l Society , Philadelphia . 40. Se e DeConde , Entangling Alliance, ch . XIV ; Alexande r DeConde , The Quasi-War: The Politics and Diplomacy of the Undeclared War with France, 1797-1801 (Ne w York: Scribner's, 1966) , ch. I. 41. Uria h Trac y t o Samue l Dana , Apri l 1 , 1797 , Pennsylvani a Historica l So ciety, Philadelphia . 42. Olive r Ellsworth , "Charg e t o th e Gran d Jury o f th e Circui t Cour t fo r th e District o f Ne w York, " Apri l 1 , 1797 , i n Supreme Court Documentary History, 3:158-60. 43. Argus, Apri l 11 , 1797; Abigail Adams to John Adams , April 17 , 1797, in Supreme Court Documentary History, 3:161-62 ; Alexande r Hamilto n t o Jame s McHenry, Feb. 19, 1800 (quotin g Ellsworth), in The Papers of Alexander Hamilton, ed . Harold Syret t (Ne w York: Columbia Universit y Press, 1976), 24:237-38. 44. Jame s D . Richardson, ed. , Messages and Papers of the Presidents (Wash ington, D.C. , 1896) , 1:233-39 ; Georg e Cabo t t o Olive r Wolcott , Jr. , Ma y 31 , 1797, i n Henr y Cabo t Lodge , Life and Letters of George Cabot (Boston : Little , Brown, 1877) , 139-140 ; Olive r Ellswort h t o Olive r Wolcott , Jr., May 29 , 1797 , in Supreme Court Documentary History, 3:182 .

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45. Frederic k Wolcott to Olive r Wolcott, Jr., Jan. 23,1798, in Supreme Court Documentary History, 1:857 ; Oliver Ellsworth to William Cushing, Feb. 4,1798, in ibid. , 1:857 ; Abigai l Adam s t o Hanna h Cushing , Marc h 9 , 1798 , i n ibid. , 1:859; Oliver Ellswort h t o William Cushing , April 15 , 1798, in ibid., 3:251 . 46. DeConde , Quasi-War, ch . II—III. 47. Se e James Morton Smith , Freedom's Fetters: The Alien and Sedition Laws and American Civil Liberties (Ithaca : Cornel l Universit y Press , 1956) , ch . VII-VIII. 48. Se e Casto, Supreme Court, 148-5 0 & 155-62 . 49. Ibid. , 116-17 , 149 ; Timothy Pickerin g t o Ambassado r Rufu s King , Jul y 27, 1796 , Kin g Papers , Huntingto n Library , Sa n Marino , California ; Olive r Ellsworth t o Timoth y Pickering , Dec. 12 , 1798 , Pickering Papers , Massachusett s Historical Society , Boston, excerpte d i n Henr y Flanders , The Lives and Times of the Chief Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States (Ne w York : Jame s Cockcroft, 1875) , 2:193-94 . 50. Casto , Supreme Court 149-50 . 51. Olive r Ellsworth , "Charg e t o th e Gran d Jury o f th e Circui t Cour t fo r th e District o f Sout h Carolina, " Ma y 7 , 1799 , in Supreme Court Documentary History, 3:357-5 9 (emphasi s i n original); Casto, Supreme Court, 149-52 . 52. Olive r Ellsworth , "Charg e t o th e Gran d Jur y o f th e Circui t Cour t fo r th e District o f Sout h Carolina, " Ma y 7 , 1799 , in Supreme Court Documentary History, 3:357-5 9 (emphasi s i n original) . 53. DeConde , Quasi-War, ch . V-VI; George Cabot to Rufus King , March 10 , 1799, i n The Life and Correspondence of Rufus King, ed . Charle s R . Kin g (Ne w York: G.P . Putnam's Sons , Da Cap o Pres s ed. 1971) , 2:551-52 . 54. DeConde , Quasi-War, 185 . 55. Ibid. , 185-87 ; Olive r Ellswort h t o Timoth y Pickering , Marc h 2 1 , 1799 , William R. Davie Papers, North Carolin a Stat e Archives, Raleigh; John Adams t o Timothy Pickering , Ma y 8 , 1799 , i n The Works of John Adams, ed . Charle s F . Adams (Boston : Little, Brown, 1856) , 8:641. 56. Olive r Ellswort h t o Joh n Adams , Sept . 26 , 1799 , Adam s Manuscrip t Trust, Massachusett s Historica l Society , Boston ; Olive r Ellswort h t o Abigai l Ellsworth, Feb . 10 , 1800 , Olive r Ellswort h Papers , Connecticu t Historica l Soci ety, Hartford . 57. Se e Peter P. Hill, William Vans Murray Federalist Diplomat: The Shaping of Peace with France, 1797-1801, (Syracuse : Syracus e Universit y Press , 1971) , ch. XIV-XV. Fo r th e Hamilton Case , see note 3 6 an d accompanyin g text . 58. Olive r Ellswort h t o Olive r Wolcott , Jr., Oct . 16 , 1800 , i n Georg e Gibbs , Memoirs of the Administrations of Washington and John Adams (Ne w York: W. Van Norden, 1846) , 2:434; Oliver Ellsworth to Elias Perkins, Oct. 10,1800 , Ne w London Historica l Society , New London , Connecticut . 59. Supreme Court Documentary History, 1:118 ; Michae l Kraus , "Olive r

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Ellsworth," i n The Justices of the United States Supreme Court, 1789-1969: Their Lives and Major Opinions, ed . Leo n Friedma n an d Fre d L . Israe l (Ne w York: Bowker, 1969 ) 1:234 ; Lettieri, Connecticut's Young Man, 88 ; Connecticut Courant, Dec . 9, 1807,3 . 60. Brown , Oliver Ellsworth, 332-38 . 61. 1 Day 1 , 91, 189 (Conn . 1802-04) ; 2 Day 1 , 227, 399 (Conn . 1805-07) . For th e Baptis t Petition , se e Willia m McLoughlin , New England Dissent, 1630-1833 (Cambridge : Harvard Universit y Press, 1971), 2: ch. XLVII-L; Casto, "Oliver Ellsworth' s Calvinism, " 521-25 . For the constitutional amendments , se e Connecticut Public Records, 12:221-22 ; Connecticu t Archives : Civi l Offices , 2 d sen, pp . 24-2 6 (manuscrip t resolution s i n Ellsworth' s han d an d marginali a not ing hi s leadershi p i n th e uppe r house ) Connecticu t Stat e Library , Hartford . Fo r the stat e judicial system , se e Connecticut Public Records, 12:xl-xli . 62. Brown , Oliver Ellsworth, 331-33 . Accor d Anonymou s Benc h Notes , 1802-03, RG3, box 5, Connecticut Stat e Library, Hartford. Suprem e Court of Errors Docket, 180 3 8 c 1804, Oliver Wolcott Jr. Papers, Connecticut Historica l So ciety, Hartford . 63. Se e note s 3 2 & 4 3 an d accompanyin g text ; Olive r Ellswort h t o Davi d Ellsworth, Marc h 24 , 1780 , in Brown, Oliver Ellsworth, 74 . 64. Olive r Ellswort h t o Rufus King , Jan. 2 1, 1801, Rufus Kin g Papers, Hunt ington Library , Sa n Marino , California ; Casto , "Olive r Ellsworth' s Calvinism, " 509, 520-21 . 65. Olive r Ellswort h t o Rufus King , Jan. 24, 1801 , Rufus Kin g Papers, Hunt ington Library , Sa n Marino , California ; Olive r Ellswort h t o Ezekie l Williams , March 20 , 1801 , Connecticut Historica l Society , Hartford . 66. Joh n Jay, "Charg e t o th e Gran d Jur y o f th e Circui t Cour t fo r th e Distric t of Ne w York, " Apri l 12 , 1790 , i n Supreme Court Documentary History, 2:25-30. 67. Josep h Bellamy , "A n Electio n Sermon, " i n Bellamy, Works, 1:58 3 8 c 586; Summary of Christian Doctrine, 54 . Stephen B. Presser has capably demonstrate d that Justic e Chas e ha d a simila r monolithi c vie w o f huma n society . Stephe n B . Presser, The Original Misunderstanding (Durham , N.C. : Carolin a Academi c Press, 1991) .

Chapter 11

Heir Apparen t

Bushrod Washington and Federal Justice in the Early Republic James R. Stoner, Jr.

Bushrod Washingto n (1762-1829 ) live d hi s lif e i n clos e associatio n with two great men, and to us two hundred year s later he appears t o have live d entirel y i n their shadows . They were , of course , hi s uncl e George Washington, who, lacking a son of his own, seems early on to have fixed upon the son of his closest brother as his principal heir, and John Marshall , seven years Bushrod's senior , who was his fellow stu dent of the law at William and Mary, fellow member of the Richmond bar in the 1790s, and chief justice of the United States for twenty-nin e of Bushro d Washington' s thirty-on e year s a s a judge . Washington' s modern obscurit y i s such a s never to hav e earned hi m a book-lengt h biography. Eve n his inclusion i n this study o f the Suprem e Cour t before John Marshall is paradoxical, not only because he spent the bulk of hi s judicial caree r a t Marshall' s lef t han d bu t becaus e h e was ap pointed t o th e Cour t b y Presiden t Joh n Adam s i n 179 8 onl y afte r Adams's first offer o f an appointment wa s turned down , b y Marshall himself. Yet Bushro d Washingto n merit s attentio n a s ver y muc h hi s ow n man, significant no t least for a modesty, noted even by his contemporaries, that was rather a virtue than a weakness. The tribute of Justice The author wishe s to expres s his gratitude t o the National Endowmen t fo r th e Human ities for a fellowship tha t mad e possibl e th e preparation o f thi s chapter .

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Joseph Story , his companion o n the bench for seventee n years, is particularly vivid : His min d wa s soli d rathe r tha n brilliant ; sagaciou s an d searching , rathe r than quic k o r eager ; slow , but no t torpid ; steady , bu t no t unyielding ; com prehensive, an d a t th e sam e tim e cautious ; patien t i n inquiry , forcibl e i n conception, clea r i n reasoning . H e was , b y origina l temperament , mild , conciliating, an d candid ; an d ye t h e was remarkabl e fo r a n uncompromis ing firmness . O f hi m i t ma y b e trul y said , tha t th e fea r o f ma n neve r fel l upon him; it never entered int o his thoughts, much less was it seen in his actions. I n hi m th e lov e o f justic e wa s th e rulin g passion ; i t wa s th e master spring o f al l hi s conduct . H e mad e i t a matte r o f conscienc e t o discharg e every dut y wit h scrupulou s fidelity an d scrupulou s zeal . I t mattere d not , whether the duty were small or great, witnessed b y the world, or performe d in private , everywher e th e sam e diligence , watchfulness , an d pervadin g sense o f justic e wer e seen . There wa s abou t hi m a tenderness o f givin g of fense, and yet a fearlessness o f consequences, in his official character , whic h I scarcel y kno w ho w t o portray . I t wa s a rar e combination , whic h adde d much t o th e dignit y o f th e bench , an d mad e justic e itself , eve n whe n mos t severe, softe n int o th e moderatio n o f mercy . I t gaine d confidence , whe n i t seemed leas t t o see k it . It repressed arrogance , b y overawing o r confound ing it. 1

Story preface s hi s characte r sketc h thus : "Fe w me n hav e lef t deepe r traces, i n thei r judicia l career , o f ever y thing , whic h a conscientiou s judge ought to propose for hi s ambition, o r his virtue, or his glory." I quote fro m Story' s tribute a t suc h lengt h becaus e i t set s in shar p relief the character o f a man who seemed never to have aimed at originality in his judicial thought, but whose character, thus sketched, nevertheless permeates hi s judicial opinions . Comin g to the Cour t a s the youngest ma n ye t appointe d t o tha t body , dyin g i n offic e wit h th e longest tenure then achieved, sitting for mos t of his judicial career o n the circuit tha t include d Philadelphia , unti l recentl y th e federa l capi tal. Al l thi s conspire d wit h hi s famou s nam e an d relatio n t o mak e Bushrod Washington a n important man in the early republic, a visible model of federal justice in its formative years , and a key figure for un derstanding the transition from th e Jay and Ellsworth to the Marshall Court. H e filled his role with a dedication t o exac t justic e unde r la w that mad e him , i n th e eye s o f hi s contemporarie s no t necessaril y a great statesma n bu t a great judge—eve n i f t o moder n eye s hi s mar k has fade d an d s o i s though t no t t o hav e bee n made . That , agai n i n

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Story's words, "h e indulge d no t th e rash desir e to fashio n th e law t o his own views; but to follow ou t its precepts with a sincere good fait h and a simplicity" testifie s t o the simultaneous suppressio n o f self an d assertion o f law that typified thi s enigmatic and influential judge . Preparation for "a Long judicial Life"

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Bushrod Washington was born on June 5,1762, a t his family's estate , Bushfield, i n Westmoreland County , Virginia. 3 Firs t so n o f John Au gustine Washington (th e general's next younger brother ) an d Hanna h Bushrod, bearin g th e name s o f tw o prominen t Virgini a families , young Bushro d wa s tutore d a t hom e an d i n th e hous e o f Richar d Henry Lee . H e entere d Th e Colleg e o f Willia m an d Mar y i n 1775 , when h e was onl y thirteen , an d graduate d i n 1778 , while hi s fathe r served i n various committee s an d convention s i n Revolutionar y Vir ginia. In the sprin g o f 178 0 h e returned t o William an d Mar y t o at tend George Wythe's lectures on the law, staying through the autumn; it was at this time that he was, with his fellow studen t John Marshall , elected a membe r o f Ph i Bet a Kapp a (h e ha d bee n to o youn g a t th e time of its founding i n 1776). The following winter , now eighteen, he joined Colone l John Franci s Mercer' s cavalry , servin g a s a private o f dragoons. He fought at Green Springs and witnessed Cornwallis's surrender to Georg e Washington a t Yorktown i n 1781. Apparently wit h som e hel p fro m hi s illustriou s uncle , Bushro d Washington remove d t o Philadelphi a late r tha t yea r t o begi n tw o years of legal study in the offices o f James Wilson, signer of the Declaration o f Independenc e an d sometim e membe r o f Congress , wh o was soon to be a leading participant in the Federal Convention and an associate justice of the original Supreme Court. No records survive to detail what young Washington read in 1782 and 178 3 or how Wilson may hav e guide d him ; surel y h e covere d th e classi c Englis h lega l books, from Si r Edward Cok e through Si r William Blackstone, and it would b e strange if Wilson di d not dra w hi s attention t o those man y parts of the latter needing modification i n America, a central theme of the "Lectures on Law" that Wilson delivered in Philadelphia less than a decad e later. 4 (Letter s d o sho w Georg e Washington' s concer n tha t his nephew keep to the straight and narrow while a student, as well as the latter' s financial straits.) 5 In an y event , between Wythe' s lecture s

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and Wilson's office, Bushro d Washington mus t have received the best legal education availabl e in America a t the time. Returning t o Virgini a fro m Philadelphia , Washingto n bega n t o practice la w in his native Westmoreland County . In 178 5 he marrie d Julia Ann Blackburn, daughte r o f on e of the general's aide s de camp, to whom h e remained devoted , though the marriage was childless. In 1786 he helped organiz e the Patriotic Society , an embryoni c politica l party, whic h occasione d a n interestin g exchang e o f letter s wit h hi s uncle, the n a t Moun t Verno n i n anxiou s retirement . Bushro d wrot e the genera l askin g hi s opinio n o f a societ y whos e objec t wa s "t o in quire into the state of public affairs, t o consider in what the true happiness of the people consists . . . , to inquire into the conduct o f those who represen t us , and t o giv e them ou r sentiment s upo n thos e laws , which ought to be or are already made[,] . . . [and] to instil principles of frugalit y int o the minds o f the people, bot h b y precept an d exam ple." Writing in haste before a journey, George Washington voiced his disapproval: Generally speaking , I have seen as much evi l as good resul t fro m suc h soci eties as you describ e the constitution o f yours to be . They are a kind o f imperium in imperio, an d a s often clo g a s facilitat e publi c measures . I am n o friend t o institutions, except in local matters, which are wholly or in a great measure confine d t o th e count y o f th e delegates . T o m e i t appear s muc h wiser and more politic to choose able and honest representatives, and leav e them, i n al l nationa l question s t o determin e fro m th e evidenc e o f reason , and th e facts whic h shal l b e adduced, whe n interna l an d externa l informa tion i s given t o the m i n a collective state. 6

To this defens e o f th e civi c republican ideal , Bushrod Washingto n offers a spirited , i f restrained , rejoinder . "Th e peopl e ar e th e bes t judges of their wants, their ow n interests , and ca n mor e sensibl y fee l those evils, which the y wish t o b e corrected," an d "the y hav e a right to instruct thei r delegates, " Bushro d wrote . The difficulty, h e continued, i s "tha t a n appearanc e o f corruptio n wa s discoverabl e i n th e mass of the people, or, what is as bad, a total insensibility to their public interest. " T o respec t th e people' s righ t an d a t th e sam e tim e t o check their corruption, the Patriotic Society "o f the most sensible and respectable gentlemen in this part o f the country" undertoo k th e task "of recommendin g t o th e peopl e a n attentio n t o thei r ow n interests , and o f furnishin g the m wit h th e sentiment s an d opinion s o f a few ,

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which the y may eithe r rejec t o r adopt." 7 Here , in the process o f for mation, i s the cast o f min d tha t establishe d th e Federalis t Part y ove r the next decade, the recognition that democratic politics requires that the people b e offered structure d choice s and the confidence tha t the y can be persuaded t o choose a common course with the "few. " In his politics, Bushrod Washingto n wa s fro m th e first, as he was, if we can trust Joseph Story , to the last, " a good old-fashione d feder alist" who "neve r los t his confidence i n the political principles whic h he first embraced," though "h e was always distinguished fo r modera tion, in the days of their prosperity, and for fidelity to them in the days of their adversity." 8 A s for th e spirite d letter , it caused th e general t o retreat a bit, pleading he had not understoo d tha t Bushro d was actu ally a member o f the society of which h e spoke, restricting hi s objection t o th e us e o f instruction s concernin g continenta l politics , o n which loca l informatio n wa s boun d t o b e incomplete , an d the n demolishing one of the Patriotic Society's instructions tha t would allo w the paymen t o f taxe s i n staple s rathe r tha n cash , a polic y tha t ha d starved th e arm y durin g th e Revolution , h e write s authoritatively . And he concludes with a question fo r hi s nephew: "Ho w come s it to pass, that yo u neve r turne d you r eye s to th e inefficac y o f th e federa l government, s o as to instruct your delegates to accede to the propositions o f th e commissioner s a t Annapolis , o r t o devis e som e othe r mode t o give it that energy , which i s necessary t o suppor t a nationa l character?" The sense of political engagement evident in Bushrod Washington' s letters makes his election the following yea r to the Virginia Hous e of Delegates seem a matter o f course. That he and his friends heede d his uncle's advic e o n th e federa l questio n i s confirmed b y his election i n 1788 to the Virginia conventio n calle d to ratify th e Constitution . H e sat wit h Madiso n an d Marshall , attendin g regularl y an d votin g i n favor o f ratification, bu t the record apparently attributes to him not a single speech. 9 Writing late r tha t yea r t o hi s uncle that h e had foun d "from Experienc e (th e best and onl y safe monitor) tha t the cares of a plantation an d th e attention du e to a professional life , are altogethe r incompatible wit h eac h other," 10 youn g Washington the n lef t behin d his family estat e an d hi s political career fo r Alexandri a an d full-tim e legal practice. Havin g onl y modes t succes s i n a cit y tha t wa s hardl y thriving and having been rejected b y his uncle, now president, for th e position o f United State s attorne y i n Virginia fo r fea r o f th e appear -

Heir Apparent 32 7 ance o f nepotism , h e move d again , thi s tim e t o Richmond , no w th e state capital , aroun d 1790 . Here , i n th e compan y o f th e bes t lawyer s in th e state , h e wa s soo n counte d amon g th e leadin g member s o f th e bar, appearin g ofte n i n th e Cour t o f Appeals , sometime s with , some times agains t hi s frien d Marshall . When, upo n th e deat h o f Jame s Wilso n i n 1798 , Presiden t Joh n Adams determine d t o mak e a n appointmen t fro m eithe r Pennsylvani a or Virgini a an d foun d th e thre e Pennsylvanian s o n hi s lis t indisposed , Marshall an d Washingto n wer e th e to p Federalis t lawyer s i n Virginia . While Marshal l had , th e previous year , servin g as a presidential envo y to France , distinguishe d himsel f fo r resistin g Frenc h pressur e i n th e XYZ Affai r an d returne d a hero , Washington ha d devote d himsel f t o more sedentar y pursuits , earnin g a reputatio n a s a lega l scholar , no t least fo r hi s tw o volume s o f Reports of Cases Argued in the Court of Appeals of Virginia, publishe d i n 1798 , a pioneerin g effor t i n a n ag e when ther e were no officia l cour t reporter s o r systemati c written opin ions. H e ha d als o continue d th e tradition , i n whic h h e ha d bee n raised, of training young lawyers in his office, hi s most famou s studen t being Henr y Clay . In lat e Augus t 1798 , retire d presiden t Georg e Washingto n sum moned Bushro d Washingto n an d Joh n Marshal l t o Moun t Verno n and ove r the course of several days in early Septembe r persuade d the m both t o sacrific e thei r lucrativ e lega l practice s i n Richmon d an d stan d for Congres s i n th e election s tha t year . Marshal l turne d dow n Adams's offe r o f a sea t o n th e Cour t i n par t t o complet e hi s (success ful) campaign , bu t youn g Washington , whos e ambitio n ha d turne d from politic s t o th e law , readil y accepte d Adams' s commission , drop ping ou t o f th e congressiona l rac e an d leavin g immediatel y t o atten d to circui t duties . Whe n th e Senat e me t i n December , hi s appointmen t was readil y confirmed, an d th e followin g Februar y h e took hi s seat o n the suprem e bench . Fo r th e res t o f hi s lif e h e wa s a judge , thoug h h e had neve r befor e preside d i n a court , an d hi s conscientiou s natur e made hi m devot e himsel f t o thi s calling befor e al l else. To b e sure, lik e his fellow s o n th e bench , h e continue d t o campaig n fo r Federalis t presidential candidates , although h e outlived hi s party a s an organize d force. H e serve d a s executo r o f hi s uncle' s will , a s h e ha d befor e han dled hi s lega l affairs , an d afte r th e deat h o f hi s aun t i n 180 2 h e inher ited Moun t Vernon , which becam e hi s permanent hom e an d whic h h e struggled t o maintain . Responsibl e fo r Georg e Washington' s papers ,

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he commissioned John Marshall to write an authorized biography and later Jared Spark s to produce an edition o f the writings. He served as a vice president of the American Bible Society from it s organization in 1816 until his death o n November 26 , 1829 ; he was president o f th e American Colonization Society from its inception on January 1,1817 , until hi s death . Whil e thes e othe r activitie s kep t hi m i n associatio n with th e leadin g me n o f hi s day , they see m t o hav e bee n a t bes t dis tractions from hi s principal work: presiding twice a year at sessions of the federal circuit court (afte r 1802 , for the Third Circuit, at Trenton, New Jersey, and Philadelphia , Pennsylvania ) an d sittin g every winte r at sessions of the United State s Supreme Court . Justice on a Court in Transition Bushrod Washingto n sa t o n th e Suprem e Cour t fo r tw o years befor e that bod y cam e unde r th e swa y o f Chie f Justic e Marshall , an d th e meager recor d tha t survive s o f hi s activitie s ther e an d the n contain s little t o distinguis h hi s jurisprudenc e fro m tha t o f hi s fellows . Onl y three of his opinions on the supreme bench were published during that span, eac h i n a case where th e opinion s o f al l the justice s sittin g ap peared seriatim , an d i n each h e votes with a n apparentl y unanimou s Court an d writes self-assuredly , differin g fro m th e other s onl y in nu ance. I f anythin g distinguishe s Washington' s opinions , i t i s hi s cau tious determinatio n t o decid e th e cas e o n th e strictes t grounds , es chewing a n assertio n o f judicia l powe r agains t th e legislative . I n th e first case , Fowler v. Lindsey (1799) , the parties to a property disput e concerning land that was claimed by both New York and Connecticu t attempt to remove the case from th e federal circuit court in Connecticut t o th e Suprem e Cour t a s a matter o f origina l jurisdiction , o n th e ground that the real dispute is between the two states. The Court will have none of it, all three participating justices agreeing that the states were not, in this case, "either nominally, or substantially," the parties. Justice Washington's opinio n her e i s the mos t thorough , treatin g th e technical issu e of certiorari an d suggestin g the process b y which "a n incorporeal right , a s tha t o f sovereignt y an d jurisdiction, " migh t b e settled: a bill of equity filed in the Supreme Court b y one of the states against th e other , wit h commissioner s the n appointe d b y th e Cour t "to ascertai n an d repor t thos e boundaries." 11 In The Eliza (o r Bas v.

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Tingy), decided the following year , the proportion o f salvage awarded for th e recaptur e o f a n American vesse l take n b y a Frenc h privatee r depends upon whether the term "enemy " in a 1799 statute was meant to includ e France , eve n thoug h n o declare d stat e o f wa r existe d be tween th e tw o countries . Th e Cour t decide s i t does , an d s o uphold s the circui t cour t awar d o f one-hal f rathe r tha n one-eight h salvage , with Washingto n submittin g th e mos t comprehensiv e opinion , in cluding an able discussion of the definition o f war to settle the matter of enmit y an d a probing searc h fo r th e "legislativ e will" o f Congres s to establish that Congres s meant to change the law. 12 Cooper v. Telfair (1800 ) wa s th e onl y on e o f th e thre e case s in volving a matter o f constitutional law. 13 The case was brought i n the federal circui t court for Georgi a b y an exiled Tory, now an inhabitan t of Jamaica , contestin g th e confiscatio n o f hi s propert y b y th e stat e during the Revolution, claiming a violation o n the part o f the state of its ow n constitutio n o f 1777 . I n contras t t o Justic e Samue l Chase' s more genera l discussio n o f constitutiona l matters , whic h note s tha t "there i s no adjudicatio n o f th e suprem e cour t itself " a s t o whethe r "the suprem e cour t ca n declare a n ac t o f congres s t o b e unconstitu tional, and therefore invalid, " an d which lays down that "th e general principles contained in the [Georgia?] constitution [i.e. , the separation of powers] are not to be regarded a s rules to fetter an d control; but as matter merel y declarator y an d directory, " Justic e Washington' s re ported opinio n i s succinc t an d restrained . Restrictin g hi s considera tion t o th e questio n o f whethe r th e confiscatio n ac t comporte d wit h the Georgi a constitution , sinc e that ac t was passed befor e th e federa l Constitution wa s adopted wit h it s prohibition o f state as well as fed eral bill s o f attainder , Washingto n take s fo r grante d th e powe r o f courts to review the constitutionality of legislation but establishes that "[t]he presumption, indeed, must always be in favor o f the validity of laws, i f th e contrar y i s not clearl y demonstrated. " Her e th e Georgi a constitution "doe s not expressl y interdic t th e passing o f a n ac t o f at tainder and confiscation, b y the authority of the legislature," so the remaining inquiry is whether b y "necessary implication" o f some "con stitutional regulation" th e act should fall . The most cogent argumen t he finds i s th e guarante e i n tha t constitutio n o f a jur y tria l "i n th e county where the crime was committed," bu t since Cooper's crime of taking up British arms was not committed in any Georgia county, that provision wa s no t crosse d b y th e confiscation . I n othe r words , b y

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reading constitutiona l protection s strictl y an d construin g th e legisla tive power broadly, the presumption o f validity wins out and the erstwhile Tory is denied the chance of using emergent American constitu tional law, so to speak, against the Revolution itself. That Washington adhered throughou t hi s career t o th e presumptio n o f validity , whic h was t o becom e s o centra l t o America n constitutiona l law, 14 wil l be come evident as we proceed. If Washington's brief record on the supreme bench before Marshal l shows him at once in harmony with his fellow justices and consisten t with hi s subsequent opinions , what t o make o f his work o n circuit is another matter. When, in the waning years of his life, he collaborated with Richard Peters, Jr., son of the federal judge with whom he sat on circuit fo r severa l decade s i n Philadelphia, t o publis h th e meticulou s notes h e ha d kep t o f hi s circui t opinions , th e tex t begin s i n 1803 , shortly afte r th e justice s resume d circui t dut y upo n th e repea l o f th e Judiciary Ac t o f 1801. 15 Hi s earl y year s o n variabl e circuits , some times i n th e dee p South , sometime s i n Ne w Yor k o r Ne w England , thus remain , apparentl y b y his choice , undocumented , excep t i n oc casional newspaper account s in an extraordinarily partisa n press. 16 It seems from thes e tha t h e was staunc h i n his suppor t o f prosecution s under th e Alien an d Seditio n Acts , and i f his actions wer e politicall y colored, he would b e almost unique among Virginians, for eve n Marshall, a s a Federalis t congressiona l candidat e i n 1798 , ha d oppose d the acts , albei t o n prudentia l rathe r tha n constitutiona l grounds. 17 Washington apparentl y preside d a t some stage of five sedition prose cutions: o f Luthe r Baldwi n an d Brow n Clar k o f Ne w Jersey ; o f William Duane , edito r o f th e Philadelphi a Aurora; o f Charle s Holt , editor o f th e Ne w Londo n Bee; o f Willia m Durrell , edito r o f th e Mount Pleasan t (N.Y. ) Register; and o f An n Greenleaf , publishe r o f the Ne w Yor k Argus. Th e first pai r (indicte d fo r drunke n remarks ) pleaded guilt y an d wer e fined; prosecutio n o f th e secon d wa s post poned, leadin g eventuall y t o dismissa l o f th e charg e afte r Jefferson' s election; Holt was fined and jailed for a few months; Durrell was fined and jailed and ordered to post bond, but President Adams quickly remitted al l bu t th e las t par t o f th e sentence ; and Adam s consente d t o drop prosecutio n o f Mrs . Greenlea f fo r politica l considerations. 18 I n short, thoug h Washingto n participate d i n Seditio n Ac t cases , th e "chilling effect " o f whic h ough t no t t o b e denied , an d thoug h hi s charges t o th e jurie s an d t o gran d jurie s insiste d upo n th e constitu -

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tionality o f th e act , hi s punishment s wer e mil d b y compariso n t o th e terms o f th e act , an d i n general hi s action s seeme d t o moderat e rathe r than promot e prosecutoria l zeal . The publishe d recor d doe s no t revea l wha t Bushro d Washingto n thought o f th e electio n o f Jefferso n t o th e presidency , thoug h appar ently h e ha d throw n hi s suppor t behin d no t Adam s bu t Hamilton' s candidate, Charle s Coteswort h Pinckney. 19 On e suppose s tha t h e viewed th e presidentia l electio n wit h circumspection , bu t surel y th e appointment o f hi s ol d frien d t o th e chie f justiceshi p mus t hav e give n him grea t satisfaction . A s th e studie s i n thi s collectio n hav e demon strated, Joh n Marshall' s innovatio n wa s no t th e assertio n o f th e power o f court s t o se t asid e legislativ e act s a s unconstitutional . Thi s was widely presumed a t the time of the Founding an d admitte d almos t universally b y th e first generatio n o f federa l judges , whos e younges t member Washingto n was . Marshall' s achievemen t wa s t o persuad e the Cour t t o spea k throug h a singl e opinio n i n mos t cases , abandon ing the practic e o f seriati m opinion s an d couplin g th e authorit y o f ju dicial rationalit y wit h th e authorit y conveye d b y a singl e voice . H e was t o d o fo r America n federa l jurisprudenc e wha t Si r William Mur ray, Lord Mansfield , ha d don e fo r th e commo n la w i n Englan d a gen eration before . Ho w Marshal l persuade d justice s i n th e habi t o f seri atim expression , a t leas t i n majo r cases , t o suppres s thei r difference s is a matte r o f speculation , fo r th e ne w polic y wa s no t publicl y dis cussed. Thomas Jefferson, wh o sa w the consequences o f a single opin ion i n strengthenin g th e authorit y o f th e Suprem e Court , late r de nounced th e practic e i n private correspondence. 20 I n hi s first appoint ment t o th e Court , Willia m Johnso n i n 1804 , Jefferson chos e a ma n who share d hi s opinio n o n thi s subject , thoug h i t i s remarkabl e ho w often Johnso n joine d wit h Marshal l i n decision , eve n i f h e expresse d himself independently . Johnson' s much-quote d remar k o n th e subjec t in a lette r t o Jefferso n deserve s repetition , fo r i t offer s a clu e t o th e change: When I wa s o n ou r Stat e Bench , I wa s accustome d t o deliverin g seriati m opinions i n a n Appellat e Court , an d wa s no t a littl e surprise d t o find ou r Chief Justic e i n th e Suprem e Cour t deliverin g al l th e opinions . . . . Bu t I remonstrated i n vain ; th e answe r was , h e wa s willin g t o tak e th e trouble , and i t i s a mar k o f respec t t o him . I soon , however , foun d th e rea l cause . Cushing wa s incompetent , Chas e coul d no t b e go t t o thin k o r write , Pa terson wa s a slo w ma n an d willingl y decline d th e trouble , an d th e othe r

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two judge s [Marshal l an d Washington ] yo u kno w ar e commonl y esti mated a s one judge. 21

Whatever th e justice or injustice Justice Johnson di d to his other col leagues—Cushing was old, and Chase after al l had troubles that might have made silenc e the prudent course—hi s mentio n o f the close relation betwee n Marshal l an d Washingto n i s suggestive . I n th e friend ship, personal, legal, and intellectual , o f John Marshal l an d Bushro d Washington la y a ke y t o th e Suprem e Court' s newfoun d unity , per haps i n the modest deferenc e o f the younger t o the senio r an d i n the respect of the senior for the legal scholarship of his longtime associate at the bar. To sa y tha t Bushro d Washington' s contributio n t o th e Marshal l Court, o r t o th e transitio n t o th e Marshal l Court , la y i n hi s silence , then, i s no t t o indulg e i n postmodernis t wordpla y bu t t o tak e not e of th e significan t chang e i n judicia l practic e tha t characterize d th e new era . I n Marbury v. Madison, Fletcher v. Peck, McCulloch v. Maryland, an d Gibbons v. Ogden, Washingto n silentl y joine d th e chief justice' s opinion , an d n o on e can kno w wha t influenc e h e ma y have exerted o n th e product. Th e remarkable livin g arrangements o f the Marshal l Court , wit h th e justice s boardin g togethe r i n a singl e house i n th e ne w capital , sharin g meal s an d conversation , workin g with extraordinar y spee d an d decisio n durin g thei r brie f lat e winte r term, withou t separat e offices , no t t o mentio n separat e clerks , sug gest tha t Washington' s contributio n wa s substantial . Wha t seem s clear i n th e cas e o f Justice Washingto n i s that, fo r th e remainde r o f his career , tha t is , from th e tim e h e wa s abou t fort y unti l hi s deat h at ag e sixty-seven , hi s judicia l though t o n matter s o f concer n t o th e Supreme Cour t mus t b e seen in relation t o Marshall , fo r tha t i s how he seems to hav e see n i t himself . Two case s fro m thei r firs t year s o n th e Cour t togethe r offe r a glimpse of such differences a s are discoverable between Marshall an d Washington. Both involve the interpretation of federal statutes, and in each Marshal l write s a n opinio n o f th e Cour t tha t overturn s a decision Washington himself made on the circuit level. In fact, both cases, which aros e a t circui t i n Apri l 1803 , might b e sai d t o b e holdover s from th e Federalis t era , sinc e th e statute s i n questio n dat e fro m th e 1790s. The first was the case of Coxe v. Penington, o r later, Pennington v. Coxe, a test case devised to determine the tax due on sugar that

Heir Apparent 33 3

had bee n refined bu t no t sol d a s of the time the tax was repealed. At the circui t level , Washingto n ha d distinguishe d th e refinin g o f th e sugar and the "sending out," holding the tax accrued at the first stage, to b e collected a t th e second ; h e based hi s interpretatio n upo n bot h the language of the statute in question and "th e general system of duties an d excise s impose d upo n othe r subjects, " especiall y th e ta x o n distilled spirits , whic h typicall y distinguishe d th e "even t . . . upo n which th e dut y accrues " fro m th e tim e o f payment. 22 Reversin g hi m the followin g year , i n a n opinio n severa l time s th e length , Marshal l concedes tha t "[t]h e cour t ha s fel t grea t difficult y o n thi s point. I t is one o n whic h th e mos t correc t mind s ma y for m opposit e opinions , without excitin g surprise. " Hi s opposit e conclusio n depend s i n par t on a different readin g o f the language o f the ac t bu t als o on a differ ent assessment of what "genera l system" is to be invoked. "I t has very properly been observed at the bar, that it was most apparently the object o f th e legislatur e throug h thei r whol e syste m o f imposts , dutie s and excise s t o ta x expens e an d no t industry, " suggestin g th e ta x ac crues when the sugar is "sent out " an d presumed sold , not when i t is refined; as for the different mode s of taxing distilled spirits and refine d sugar, "[w]here the legislature distinguishes between different objects , and in imposing a duty on them evidences a will to charge them in different situations , i t i s not fo r th e court s t o bea t dow n thes e distinc tions on the allegation tha t the y are capriciously made , and therefor e to be disregarded." While Washington sought a distinction that would maintain a certai n symmetr y i n th e statutor y scheme , Marshal l b y contrast look s to the "rea l effec t o f th e law" an d defer s t o mer e legislative will. 23 The other case, United States v. Fisher, was the more important o f the two, both fo r th e law itself an d fo r understandin g th e difference s between Washingto n an d Marshall , sinc e i t involve d a questio n o f bankruptcy, the one issue on which the two judges were to differ dra matically later on . In question wa s whether a 179 7 statute giving the United State s priorit y i n th e collectio n o f debt s owe d t o i t b y a n in solvent or bankrupt "revenu e officer, o r other person" shoul d b e read literally, to give the United States priority in any case where the bank rupt has a federal debt, or restrictively, so that federal priority attaches only to revenue officers an d certain specified others . At circuit, Washington too k th e latter view : Since the title of the statute was "A n Act to provide more effectually fo r the settlement of accounts between the

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United States and receivers of public money," and since the other sections of the act concerned onl y such people, the "othe r person[s] " of section 5 of th e ac t shoul d b e read t o mea n "othe r person s account able for public money." He explained his principle of interpretation as follows: Where a law i s plain an d unambiguous , usin g either genera l o r limite d ex pressions, th e legislatur e shoul d b e intende d t o mea n wha t the y hav e plainly expressed, an d n o room i s left fo r construction . But , if from a view of th e whol e la w take n together , o r fro m othe r law s in pari materia, th e evident intentio n i s differen t fro m th e impor t o f th e litera l expression s used i n som e par t o f th e law , th e intentio n ough t t o prevail , fo r tha t i n truth i s the will of the law-makers . So, if the literal expressions woul d lea d to absur d o r unjus t consequences , suc h a constructio n shoul d b e give n t o avoid suc h consequences , if , fro m th e whol e purvie w o f th e law , i t ca n fairly b e made . Thes e rule s ar e founde d i n law , an d i n plai n hones t goo d sense.

As he put the matter in his restatement on appeal, "These rules are not merely artificial ; the y ar e a s clearl y founde d i n plai n goo d sense , a s they are certainly warranted by the principles of common law." 24 That the consequences of a literal and hence expansive reading of the clause will be harmful, Washingto n ha s no doubt : As to public officers an d agents, they are or may be known, and an y perso n dealing wit h the m doe s i t a t th e peri l o f havin g hi s deb t postpone d t o tha t of th e Unite d States—h e act s wit h hi s eye s open . Bu t i f thi s preferenc e b e extended t o al l person s dealin g wit h th e government , ther e i s no mod e b y which othe r citizen s ca n b e pu t o n thei r guar d agains t them , an d conse quently al l confidence betwee n ma n an d ma n wil l b e destroyed. 25

Marshall begin s the opinion reversing Washington with a conciliatory claim : "O n th e abstrac t principle s whic h gover n court s i n con struing legislative acts, no difference o f opinion can exist. It is only in the application of those principles that the difference discover s itself." But to rely upon practical judgment i n the law itself suppose s a confidence in the capacity o f the judge to distinguis h th e weight o f differ ent causes , an d Marshal l concede s a s muc h b y formulatin g th e fol lowing principle: That th e consequences ar e to b e considered i n expounding th e laws, where the intent is doubtful, i s a principle not to be controverted; but it is also true

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5

that i t i s a principle whic h mus t b e applie d wit h caution , an d whic h ha s a degree o f influenc e dependen t o n th e natur e o f th e cas e t o whic h i t i s ap plied. Wher e right s ar e infringed , wher e fundamenta l principle s ar e over thrown, wher e the general syste m o f th e law s i s departed from , th e legisla tive intent must b e expressed wit h irresistibl e clearness to induce a court o f justice to suppos e a design to effect suc h objects. But where onl y a politica l regulation i s made, which i s inconvenient, i f the intention o f the legislatur e be expressed i n terms which ar e sufficiently intelligibl e to leave no doubt i n the min d whe n th e word s ar e take n i n thei r ordinar y sense , i t woul d b e going a great way to say that a constrained interpretatio n mus t be put upo n them, to avoid a n inconvenience which ough t to have been contemplated i n the legislatur e whe n th e ac t wa s passed , an d which , i n thei r opinion , wa s probably overbalance d b y th e particula r advantage s i t wa s calculate d t o produce.

That "onl y a political regulation" is at issue in the matter of federa l priority Marshall makes clear in his opinion, though he does consider a constitutional objection t o such a regulation, construing for the first time (a decade and a half before McCulloch) th e necessary and proper clause: "Congress must possess the choice of means, and must be empowered to use any means which are in fact conduciv e to the exercise of a power granted b y the constitution." 26 Although the decision in the Supreme Court was, strictly speaking, unanimous, since Washington, following th e custom of the Court, recused himself from review of his own circuit judgment, he took the extraordinary, perhaps unique, step of having the reporter publish a defense of his decision below, since "I owe it in some measure to myself, and t o thos e who ma y b e injured b y the expense an d dela y to whic h they hav e bee n exposed , t o sho w a t leas t tha t th e opinio n wa s no t hastily o r inconsideratel y given. " Her e h e repeats an d elaborate s th e argument fro m hi s as-yet-unpublishe d circui t opinion , eve n reiterat ing his fear tha t th e Court' s interpretatio n "woul d inten d t o destroy , more tha n an y othe r ac t I can imagine , al l confidenc e betwee n ma n and man." 27 See n i n th e ligh t o f Pennington v. Coxe, Washingto n again seems focused o n the formal symmetr y o f the law, Marshall o n legislative prerogative and judicial acquiescence, at least in matters of ordinary concern . Wh y th e heat , t o u s today s o apparentl y exagger ated, abou t th e crisis o f "confidenc e between ma n an d man " shoul d appear fro m th e discussion tha t follows .

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T O N E R, J R

.

The Contract Clause at the Crux of Federal Jurisprudence For th e remainde r o f hi s judicia l career , th e appellat e case s tha t seemed most earnestl y t o engage the attention o f Justice Washingto n and that led him to distinguish himself most clearly from the chief justice wer e thos e involvin g contracts , an d s o i n constitutiona l la w h e wrote especially about the contract clause. Because this clause appears in the Constitution a s a limit on the legislative authority of the states, it is important to make clear at the outset how a concern for the sanctity o f contract s i s consistent wit h th e probin g searc h fo r legislativ e will that characterizes even the earliest of Washington's judicial opin ions. "All confidence betwee n man and man," that is to say, society itself, is at risk when the rights of contract are obscured precisely if society itsel f i s base d upo n a socia l contract , i f th e term s o f socia l en gagement ar e themselve s a matte r o f huma n agreement . Fro m thi s point o f view , respec t fo r th e legislativ e wil l ha s a certai n para mountcy, since that will establishes authoritatively th e terms of social agreement, there being no other living source of law. At the same time, the legislative will might b e governed b y a written constitution , itsel f almost a socia l contract , a s wel l a s interprete d i n th e spiri t o f fai r agreement an d eve n limite d b y the nee d to reserv e to individual s th e liberty t o mak e agreement s o r contract s t o gover n thei r ow n affair s and b y the dut y to se e such contracts enforced . I t is not tha t th e theory o f th e socia l contrac t wa s th e onl y accoun t o f socia l cohesio n available t o Bushro d Washington . I t suffices t o recal l that h e lent hi s name as a vice president to the American Bible Society, formed largel y by laymen to supply Bibles for missionarie s seekin g to evangelize the western frontier, an d he was himself, according to Story, "a Christian , full o f religious sensibility , and religiou s humility." 28 Bu t however h e may hav e viewe d religio n a s a n underlyin g socia l bond , h e seem s t o have thought i t secondary i n civil affairs, o r to have interpreted fait h in the light o f contrac t o r covenan t rathe r tha n th e reverse. Nor wa s he, like Story, to seek in common law an inherited source of authorit y or a n emergin g science , at leas t no t immediatel y o r ordinarily . Con tract, rather, lay at the root of man's civil and legal affairs, with Christianity or common la w offering nourishmen t rathe r than a n anchor . Washington's interes t i n contrac t la w appear s i n th e page s o f th e Supreme Cour t reporters , fo r h e wa s ofte n calle d upo n t o offe r th e opinion o f th e Cour t i n case s involvin g contrac t o r commercia l la w

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that lacked a constitutional dimension. 29 In the leading constitutiona l contract claus e cas e o f hi s era , Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, Washingto n wa s no t conten t t o leav e expressio n o f th e case solely to th e chief justice , though h e apparently joine d hi s opin ion. I n a n opinio n les s proli x tha n th e chief' s an d considerabl y les s than hi s colleagu e Story's , Washington hold s tha t th e origina l roya l grant to the college established "a n obligation o f the nature of a contract" on the part of the state toward the founder an d the corporation. Then h e explains ho w th e statut e impair s th e obligatio n o f th e char ter/contract: "al l thes e powers , rights, and privilege s [o f a charitabl e corporation] flo w fro m th e propert y o f th e founde r i n th e fund s as signed fo r th e suppor t o f th e charity, " an d s o cannot b e unilaterall y altered b y the state. 30 Another importan t exampl e o f hi s uncompromisin g voic e o n th e Court for the adherence to contract comes in the case of Green v. Biddie, in which Washington on rehearing strengthens Story's decision invalidating a Kentucky law that allowed interim possessors of disputed land compensatio n fo r improvement s the y mad e befor e thei r title s were proven bad . This statute, Washington finds, impairs Kentucky' s obligation unde r a 178 9 compact wit h Virginia pledgin g to maintai n land titles; indeed, he finds the rightful owner s not only free from hav ing to pay for th e squatters ' improvement s bu t entitle d t o their prof its. Whateve r th e sentimenta l cas e fo r thos e seekin g compensation , Washington writes , "w e hold ourselve s answerabl e t o God , ou r con sciences, and our country, to decide this question according to the dictates o f ou r bes t judgment, b e the consequences o f the decision wha t they may be." 31 Dartmouth College and Green v. Biddle were , i n thei r ow n way , isolated case s dealin g wit h specia l circumstances , eve n i f th e forme r was t o becom e a n influentia l precedent . Th e bankruptc y cases , b y contrast, unfold a drama, not least for th e relation betwee n Washington an d Marshall . The stor y begin s in the Third Circuit , with Wash ington's remarkabl e 181 4 opinio n i n Golden v. Prince. Here th e defendant sough t t o bar a n actio n for th e collection o f a debt b y claiming discharge under a Pennsylvania insolvenc y act . After entertainin g and dismissing an attempt to use the Judiciary Act of 1789 to override the stat e insolvenc y law , Washingto n examine s th e latter' s constitu tionality an d finds i t doubl y wanting . First , a s applie d i n thi s case , where the debt was incurred befor e passage of the act that purports t o

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discharge the debtor, the act is an unconstitutional impairment of contract becaus e it would hav e altered th e terms of a contract retrospec tively. Second , eve n prospectivel y th e ac t woul d fail , accordin g t o Washington, becaus e the Constitutio n confer s o n Congres s exclusiv e power over the issue of bankruptcy. He arrives at this opinion in part through a clos e readin g o f th e tex t (i t i s implied , h e thinks , b y th e stress on "unifor m law s o n the subjec t o f Bankruptcies " i n Article I, section 8 , no t t o mentio n b y bein g couple d wit h th e naturalizatio n power) bu t als o b y his insistenc e tha t ther e mus t b e a way fo r Con gress t o establis h th e polic y tha t ther e wil l b e n o bankruptc y i n th e United States , that is , no forced insolvenc y an d subsequen t discharg e of debts. He writes in his opinion, "[W] e hold it to be our duty to embrace th e first opportunit y whic h present s itself , t o expres s th e un hesitating opinion which we entertain upon these great questions, and thus t o pav e th e way fo r a s early a decisio n o f them , a s possible, by the suprem e nationa l court." 32 Thoug h thi s cas e wa s no t t o b e ap pealed, Washington go t hi s wish a fe w year s later , when, durin g th e busy sprin g whe n th e judge s decide d McCulloch v. Maryland an d Dartmouth College, the case of Sturges v. Crowninshield cam e befor e the Supreme Court . Marshall wrote the only opinion in Sturges, apparently for a unanimous Court , bu t i t is clear fro m th e drif t o f the case and fro m wha t was reveale d abou t i t eigh t year s late r i n Ogden v. Saunders tha t Washington ha d t o b e persuaded tha t hi s "unhesitatin g opinion " i n Golden v. Prince would no t becom e the la w o f th e land , a t leas t no t in all respects. At issue in Sturges was a situation no t unlik e that be fore Judge Washington i n 1814 : The defendan t i n a suit to recove r a debt pleade d hi s discharg e unde r a stat e insolvenc y ac t (here , Ne w York's) passe d afte r th e deb t wa s established . Marshal l reverse s th e order o f the issues, beginning with the question o f whether an y stat e has th e authorit y t o pas s a bankrup t law . Th e complicatio n h e dis covers come s i n discernin g th e differenc e betwee n a bankruptc y la w and a n insolvency law; he acknowledges that th e states have unquestioned authority to pass laws of the latter sort, while the Constitutio n gives Congress power to pass the former, bu t since the distinction between insolvenc y an d bankruptc y i s unclear, it is inadequate t o serv e as a brigh t lin e between tw o grant s o f exclusiv e authority . Th e wa y out i s to hol d th e powe r ove r bankruptc y concurren t i n th e federa l government an d the states, so that Congress having chosen not to act

Heir Apparent 33 9

on the subject o f bankruptcy , power remains in the states to treat th e matter i n th e firs t instance . Th e applicatio n o f th e la w i n questio n here, however, fall s befor e th e contract clause , since it seeks to oper ate retroactivel y upo n a contract , tha t is , i t operate s t o impai r th e obligation. Marshall is willing to concede the distinction betwee n th e obligation o f a contrac t an d th e remed y th e la w affords ; thi s allow s for statute s of limitations, which are thus not said to impair the obligation of contracts. But here the insolvency law attempts to nullify th e contract itself , no t jus t tailo r th e remedy , an d s o fail s th e constitu tional test. 33 If Washington suppresse d his doubts in Sturges, eight years later, in Ogden v. Saunders, he breaks with Marshall, driving him to a rare dissent in a constitutional case. (Actually, Marshall's famous "dissent " is technically a concurrence , for , althoug h h e i s in th e minorit y o n th e question o f th e constitutionalit y o f stat e bankruptc y laws , Justic e Johnson vote s i n the en d t o sustai n th e debt , o n th e groun d tha t th e New Yor k insolvenc y law , thoug h vali d t o reliev e a debto r i n Ne w York, need no t b e recognized i n federal cour t i n Louisiana.) Thoug h Marshall characteristicall y write s for th e dissenter s a s a bloc, that is, for Justices Story and Duvall as well as himself, the majority opinion s on th e constitutiona l questio n ar e delivere d seriatim , now , however , with th e senio r justic e (Washington ) first, rathe r tha n th e junio r jus tice, as in the 1790s . Washington's opinion is remarkable not only for its careful reasonin g and modest expression—these ar e the hallmark s of his jurisprudence, after all—bu t for his admission that he continues in the opinion that the Constitution intended for Congres s to have exclusive power t o establis h bankruptc y laws , "[b]u t i t become s m e t o believe, that thi s opinio n was , an d is , incorrect, sinc e i t stand s con demned b y th e decisio n o f a majorit y o f thi s court , solemnl y pro nounced."34 Washington's argument in this case depends upon two distinctions: between a contract an d its obligation, an d between retrospective an d prospective laws concerning contracts. The contract is , of course, the agreement, while the obligation, writes Washington citing Marshall in Sturges, i s "th e la w whic h bind s th e partie s t o perfor m thei r agree ment." This law is neither the moral law nor the "common law of nations," although these stand behin d the law; it is the binding, positive "municipal law of the state" where the contract i s made. The obliga tion of a contract is colored in many ways, by the laws of evidence, or

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laws o f remedies , or statute s o f limitations , an d th e like . This amal gam o f municipa l law s "forms , i n my humble opinion , a part o f th e contract, and travels with it, wherever the parties to it may be found. " What is crucial is that the laws operate only prospectively, for onl y in that way can they be considered incorporated int o a contract withou t gross fiction. The constitutional ba n o n the impairment o f contracts , then, i s not a substantiv e limi t o n th e legislativ e powe r o f th e state s but a prohibitio n agains t th e alteratio n o f contract s alread y made . Washington reinforces this point with a close reading of the text of Article I, section 10 : The prohibition agains t impairing the obligation of contracts is grouped b y punctuation no t with the legal tender clause s but wit h th e prohibitio n agains t bill s o f attainde r an d e x pos t fact o laws. And he concludes his opinion as he began it, with expression of doubt a s to the correctness of his views, but then confident assertion : "But if I could rest my opinion in favor o f the constitutionality o f the law on which the question arises, on no other ground than this doub t so felt an d acknowledged , tha t alone , would, i n my estimation, b e a satisfactory vindicatio n o f it. It is but a decent respect due to the wisdom, the integrity and the patriotism of the legislative body, by which any law is passed, to presume in favor o f its validity, until its violation of the constitution is proved beyond all reasonable doubt." 35 That his adherence to the presumption i n favor o f state legislation gives Washington's jurisprudence a distinctive character ca n be seen by contrasting his opinion t o Marshall's , fo r th e latte r insist s that th e Constitu tion's ban on laws impairing the obligation o f contracts is not limite d to retrospectiv e legislatio n bu t ha s it s origin i n a duty t o enforc e th e natural-law obligation of contracts and in the intention of the framer s of the Constitution t o stop the interference wit h the relative situatio n of creditors and debtors by state legislatures that was tending to "de stroy all confidence between man and man." 36 The cod a t o th e debat e ove r contract s come s i n the cas e reporte d immediately afte r Ogden v. Saunders i n Wheaton's Reports , namel y Mason v. Haile, where Justice Washington delivers a rare, lone dissent to the opinion of the Court b y Justice Smith Thompson. 37 The Cour t upholds the constitutionality o f a peculiar insolvenc y arrangement i n Rhode Island, whereby a debtor petitions the state legislature "fo r th e benefit o f the insolvent ac t o f 1756, " no t otherwis e i n force, an d th e legislature, i n grantin g th e petition , release s th e individua l fro m hi s debts and, in this case, from prison . The Court finds the prison bon d

Heir Apparent 34

1

under which Haile was confined t o have been "given subject to the ordinary an d well-know n practic e i n Rhod e Island " o f petitionin g th e legislature fo r discharge . Justice Washington, however , in an opinio n delivered orally but not written, objects that the principle of prospectively is violated here , since the contrac t involve d i n the prison bon d had no provision for discharge , and the act of 175 6 was not generally in force and so incorporated int o the bond contract. Washington's singular leniency in giving the state legislatures room to experiment with the condition s o f contract s translates , upo n hi s stric t distinctio n o f prospectivity an d retrospectivity , int o singula r harshnes s i n th e en forcement o f contracts already made, even for debtors' imprisonment . Enforcing the Law in Pennsylvania and Virginia Washington's usua l reticence o n the Suprem e Cour t i n the District of Columbia obscures, to the modern observer, what was called in a tribute at his death "th e principal theatr e o f his judicial operations, " th e federal Circui t Cour t fo r th e Thir d Circuit , especiall y a s i t sa t i n Philadelphia.38 Here, in the city where he had served his legal apprenticeship and that was still capital of the United States when he was first appointed to the Supreme Court, Washington became a favorite o f the bar during his nearly thirty years assigned to its circuit. If his Supreme Court opinions are modest, even diffident i n tone, his circuit opinions, which usuall y take the form o f charges to the jury (wh o seem alway s to ac t a s he directs) bespea k th e confident authorit y o f on e who see s himself a s th e embodie d voic e o f federa l law . Busines s varie d i n hi s time o n th e court , th e earl y year s dominate d b y marin e insuranc e cases, later years giving rise to more general commercial cases and t o patent cases , wit h procedura l issue s o f evidenc e an d jurisdictio n al ways prominent. 39 Thoug h i t woul d b e beyon d th e bound s o f thi s essay to survey his circuit judgments in great detail, his portrait woul d be incomplet e withou t som e mentio n o f hi s wor k a s a federa l tria l judge. High praise to Washington in this capacity came in a memoir on the Philadelphia ba r b y David Paul Brown, presumably a n eyewitness: Perhaps the greatest nisi prius judg e that the world ha s ever known, not ex cepting Chief-Justic e Hol t o r Lor d Mansfield , wa s th e lat e Justic e Wash ington. I t i s impossible t o conceiv e o f a bette r judicia l manner , and , whe n

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to tha t i s added grea t lega l acquirement , grea t perspicuit y an d great-mind edness, exemplary self-possession an d inflexible courage , all crowned b y an honesty o f purpos e tha t wa s neve r questioned , h e ma y b e said , i n th e esti mate o f th e ba r an d th e entir e country , t o hav e stoo d amon g th e judiciary , as par excellence. 40

One finds littl e or nothing i n the reports h e assembled t o contradic t this assessment , an d muc h t o confir m it . I n crimina l cases , fo r exam ple, one can recogniz e i n his jury charges a scrupulous attemp t t o pre sent th e la w wit h perfec t clarit y an d fairness . I n a n 180 4 case , Wash ington carefull y explain s t o th e jur y tha t a n indictmen t fo r perjur y i n bankruptcy proceeding s canno t succee d afte r th e bankruptc y la w o n which th e prosecution wa s founde d ha s bee n repealed ; i n 1805 , he di rects a verdic t fo r acquitta l agains t th e charg e o f murde r o n th e hig h seas, when th e deat h i n questio n occurre d o n land , an d Congres s ha d made n o separat e provisio n fo r suc h a circumstance; i n 1814 , he pro tects a ma n fro m a charg e o f treaso n b y narrowl y construin g th e in tention o f hi s allege d over t act. 41 Hi s mos t spectacula r cas e cam e i n 1809 an d involve d th e prosecutio n o f a Pennsylvani a militi a office r for resistin g a federa l marsha l a t th e directio n o f th e stat e legislatur e and th e governor. The case dated bac k t o the Revolution an d involve d a Pennsylvani a cour t priz e awar d overturne d b y a specia l cour t o f ap peal establishe d b y Congress , th e money , however , remainin g i n offi cial hands in the state in defiance o f the federal decree . Finally in 1803 , process i s renewe d i n th e now-establishe d federa l distric t court , th e state governmen t resists , bu t finally th e militi a yield s t o th e marsha l and th e mone y passe s t o federa l hand s an d i s properl y awarded . A n interested Philadelphi a crow d wa s o n han d fo r th e tria l o f militi a General Michae l Bright , bu t Judg e Washingto n merel y adjourne d th e court unti l th e followin g da y i n a large r courtroo m an d delivere d a charge tha t vindicate d th e federa l lega l claim : "I t i s a trut h no t t o b e questioned tha t th e powe r t o declar e th e judgment s o f you r court s void ca n neve r b e safel y lodge d wit h a bod y wh o ma y enforc e it s de cision b y th e physica l forc e o f th e people . Thi s powe r necessaril y re sides in the judicial tribunals , an d ca n safel y resid e nowher e else. " H e then concluded : We ente r no t int o th e politica l discussion s whic h hav e bee n s o abl y con ducted o n bot h sides , but we admonish yo u to discar d fro m you r mind s al l political considerations , al l part y feelings , an d al l federa l o r stat e preju -

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dices. The question s involve d i n this case are i n the highest degre e momen tous, an d deman d a coo l an d dispassionat e consideration . W e rel y upo n your integrit y an d wisdo m fo r a decisio n whic h yo u ca n reconcil e t o you r consciences, and to the duties which you owe to God and to your country. 42

The jury convicted the defendants o n a special verdict, they were fined and imprisone d b y the court , bu t the y wer e "immediatel y pardone d by the president o f the United States." 43 If Washingto n wa s a t hi s bes t i n Philadelphi a a s th e staunc h defender o f federa l la w withou t regar d fo r popula r sentiment , th e les s pleasant sid e o f hi s unyieldin g suppor t fo r positiv e right s an d con tempt for public opinion appeared when the issue of slavery arose, especially after th e crisis of 1820 . If the indices to his Reports are to be trusted, issue s involvin g slaver y cam e befor e hi s circui t cour t thre e times in almost thirty years. The first, in 1806 , was a suit for hi s free dom by a servant of Pierce Butler, who established a house in Philadelphia durin g hi s tim e a s a member o f Congres s fro m Sout h Carolin a but staye d on , onl y occasionall y visitin g hi s old plantation . Th e jur y having ruled Butler a resident of the city, Judge Washington found hi m outside th e exceptio n fo r member s o f Congress o r sojourner s i n th e Pennsylvania emancipatio n statut e o f 1780 , thus settin g Ben Hoppe r free. Th e sam e term, Washington rea d a pair o f federa l statute s nar rowly t o defea t a prosecution fo r slav e tradin g agains t a n America n ship that had transported two French ladies and their attendant slaves from St . Thoma s t o Havan a i n th e Caribbean . A cas e som e fifteen years later involves a similar statut e an d the transport o f a slave who is later sol d a t th e destination ; Washington repeat s th e narro w read ing but leaves the matter to the jury, and an acquittal follows, perhaps, the record hints , because the witness was unreliable. 44 If there is nothing remarkable about these cases, Washington's personal involvemen t wit h th e institutio n i s more complex . As executo r of General Washington's will, he was responsible for freeing hi s slaves upon hi s widow' s death , an d apparentl y di d so , bu t t o maintai n Mount Vernon , h e brough t i n ne w slave s o f hi s own . I n 1821 , afte r four year s as president o f the Colonizatio n Society , which had begu n to make arrangement s t o establis h a colony i n Africa fo r fre e blacks , Washington's financial troubles at the plantation le d him to sell about fifty slave s t o tw o Louisian a dealers . Th e pres s foun d ou t an d a n angry exchang e followed , wit h Niles' Weekly Register commenting ,

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"[T]here i s something excessivel y revoltin g i n the fac t tha t a herd o f them shoul d b e driven fro m Moun t Vernon , sold b y the nephew an d principal hei r o f GEORG E WASHINGTON, a s he would dispos e of so many hogs or horned cattle ; violating ever y tie that fasten s o n th e human heart , an d dissolvin g th e connectio n o f husban d an d wife , mother and child." Washington's lengthy reply is more revealing than he probably intended , bot h o f his personal affair s an d o f the harden ing of attitudes startin g to take place on the slavery question. Admit ting that humanit y require s th e attemp t t o kee p families together , h e insists on his efforts i n this sale , families havin g bee n separate d onl y when a fe w slav e husband s owne d b y neighbor s refuse d t o b e sol d south, though he comments that it is "an extraordinary circumstance" that "s o muc h sensibilit y shoul d b e felt " a t th e separatio n o f slav e families whe n emigratio n o f white s t o Americ a routinel y involve s family separation . As to the necessity of the sale, he cites: his financial straits in maintaining th e plantation; "th e insubordinatio n o f my negroes, an d thei r tota l disregar d o f al l authority, " a circumstanc e h e blames o n th e stead y strea m o f visitor s t o Moun t Vernon , som e o f whom hav e presume d th e slave s ther e t o hav e belonge d t o th e lat e general and thus to be owed their freedom, now or "at my death"; and the likelihood o f "th e escape o f all the laboring men o f an y value, to the northern states , so soon as I should leave my home," several having "eloped without the pretense of a cause" the previous year. Seeing the whole controversy as designed to embarrass the Colonization Society, Bushrod Washington "take[s ] the liberty, on my own behalf, and on tha t o f m y souther n fello w citizens , t o ente r a solem n protes t against th e propriet y o f an y perso n questionin g ou r right , legal or moral, t o dispos e o f propert y whic h i s secure d t o u s b y sanction s equally valid with those by which we hold every other species of property."45 Her e i s exact justic e with a vengeance, excused , perhaps , b y the judge's having overlooke d th e maxim agains t sittin g i n judgmen t of one's own cause. Law and Liberty For the most part, then, Washington's contribution to the founding of the federal judiciary consisted in his steady enforcement o f the written law and his fidelity to the sanctity of contracts. Story's observation of

Heir Apparent 34 5

the marriage of mildness and firmness in his jurisprudence is apposite, for Washingto n wa s mil d i n deferrin g t o statut e an d preceden t a s he understood them but firm in resisting the temptation t o indulge either popular sentiment or noble rhetoric. He was a Federalist to the end in his support for the sanctity of property rights, but his emphasis on the importance o f contrac t an d hi s reluctanc e t o buil d a jurisprudentia l system from th e common la w distinguishe d hi m not onl y from som e of his colleagues o n the bench in the 1790 s but als o from th e judicial conservatives Jame s Ken t an d Josep h Stor y wh o cam e t o dominat e legal scholarshi p i n hi s late r years . Friend t o Marshal l of f th e benc h and o n it , perhap s th e ke y figure in establishin g th e deferenc e o f th e associates t o th e chief , hi s wor k o n th e Cour t formed , i n som e re spects, a bridge even beyond the Marshall Cour t to the Taney era, for his cautious opinion in Ogden v. Saunders anticipated th e sort of delicate balancing of federal power , property rights, and stat e legislativ e authority tha t cam e t o characteriz e th e wor k o f Marshall' s succes sor—even a s hi s staunc h defens e o f slaveholders ' right s anticipate d that Court's darkest hour. Indeed, his influence might even stretch fur ther becaus e he was apparently a n autho r o f the doctrine that corpo rations ought to be considered citizens of the state in which they were incorporated fo r purpose s o f federa l law , accepte d b y th e Cour t i n 1844 an d use d a s th e jurisdictiona l entr y fo r muc h o f th e federa l courts' business as the century progressed. 46 In on e o f thos e od d bu t familia r instance s i n America n constitu tional law , Bushrod Washingto n i s perhaps mos t commonl y encoun tered by students today in a circuit case decided late in his career tha t later too k o n adde d importanc e thank s t o development s h e coul d hardly hav e anticipated. Th e case is Corfield v. Coryell, in which th e issue is whether New Jersey can justifiably restric t fishing in its oyster beds to it s citizens, and Washington , agai n anticipatin g th e jurispru dence of the Taney Court, decides that it can. Citing dicta in Gibbons v. Ogden (th e Corfield case apparently cam e to the circuit befor e th e decision i n Gibbons, bu t argumen t an d decisio n wer e delaye d unti l after), Washingto n insist s tha t state s reserv e powe r t o regulat e thei r internal trade, not to mention "th e r i g h t . .. t o legislate, in such manner as in their wisdom may seem best, over the public property o f the state"; and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV he confines, wit h "n o hesitation," to "those privileges and immunities which are, in their nature , fundamental ; whic h belong , o f right , t o th e citi-

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zens o f al l fre e governments ; an d whic h have , a t al l times , bee n en joyed b y the citizens o f the severa l state s which compos e thi s Union , from th e time of their becomin g free, independent , an d sovereign." 47 Although the acknowledgment of extensive legislative authority in the states i s characteristic o f Washingto n throughou t hi s career , th e dis tinction betwee n th e fundamenta l an d th e incidenta l amon g rights , and the remarkable list of the former—including right s to protection , to the enjoyment o f life, liberty, and property, to travel, to the writ of habeas corpus , t o sue , to nondiscriminator y taxation , an d t o vote — seem more in the spirit of John Marshall or , for tha t matter, of James Wilson than of this usually cautious expounder of the letter of the law. Still, the passage from Corfield v. Coryell, known, o f course, because of its quotation i n The Slaughter-House Cases when a later Suprem e Court begin s the historic task o f interpreting th e Fourteenth Amend ment, is in a sense a fitting tribute to this friend o f Marshall's and heir of Washington's, fo r i t articulate s no t onl y the justice o f th e la w bu t its role as the source of liberty. In this Bushrod Washington professe d sincerely to believe, and it would b e churlish to deny his contributio n to its achievement .

NOTES

1. Willia m W. Story, ed., The Miscellaneous Writings of Joseph Story (Boston : Charles C . Little an d James Brown , 1852) , 809 ; quoted i n 3 Peters x-xi . 2. Thi s phrase i s from a tablet erecte d i n his memory b y the Philadelphia bar , the text o f which i s reproduced i n 3 Peters xiii. 3. I have relie d o n th e followin g source s fo r biographica l information : Clar e Cushman, ed. , The Supreme Court justices: Illustrated Biographies, 1789-1993 (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1993), 51-55; Albert P. Blaustein and Roy M. Mer sky, "Bushrod Washington," i n Leon Friedman & Fre d L. Israel, eds., The Justices of the United States Supreme Court, 1789-1969: Their Lives and Major Opinions (Ne w York : Chelse a House , 1969) , 1 : 243-257 ; Bushro d C . Washington , "The Lat e Mr . Justic e Bushro d Washington, " Green Bag 9 (1897) : 329-335 ; Joseph Hopkinson , Eulogium in Commemoration of the Hon. Bushrod Washington (Philadelphia : T . S . Manning , 1830) ; an d especiall y Davi d Lesli e Annis , "Mr. Bushrod Washington, Supreme Court Justice on the Marshall Court" (Ph.D . diss., Notre Dam e University, 1974) . 4. Se e Rober t Gree n McCloskey , ed. , The Works of James Wilson (Cam bridge: Harvard Universit y Press , 1967) , I: 76ff .

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5. Worthingto n Chaunce y Ford , ed. , The Writings of George Washington (New York: G . P. Putnam's Sons , 1891) , 10 : 133-3 5 (lette r o f 1 5 January 1783) . 6. Ibid. , 11 : 69-71. 7. Ibid. , 72 , 71. 8. Story , Miscellaneous Writings, 811 . 9. Se e Annis, "Mr . Bushro d Washington, " 56. 10. Quote d i n ibid., 57. 11. 3 Dallas 411; the quotations ar e all from Justice Washington's opinion , a t 412-13. 12. 4 Dallas 37 , at 42 . 13. 4 Dallas 14 ; Chase's opinio n i s at 18-19 , Washington's a t 18 . 14. Se e James Bradle y Thayer , "Th e Origi n an d Scop e o f th e America n Doc trine of Constitutiona l Law, " Harvard Law Review 7 (1893): 129-56. Justice Pa terson's opinion i n Cooper v. Telfair accords with Washington's presumption : "t o authorize thi s court t o pronounce an y la w void, it must b e a clear an d unequivo cal breac h o f th e constitution , no t a doubtful an d argumentativ e application. " 4 Dallas a t 19 . 15. Se e Reports of Cases Determined in the Circuit Court of the United States, for the Third Circuit, comprising the districts of Pennsylvania and New Jersey. Commencing at April Term, 1803. Publishe d fro m th e Manuscript s o f the Honourabl e Bushro d Washington . 4 vols . (Philadelphia : Phili p H . Nicklin , 1826-29) (cited a s Wash . C.C.) . Fo r a discussio n o f th e change s i n th e practic e of circui t riding , fro m th e origina l thre e fixed circuits , t o rotatin g annua l as signments, t o th e establishmen t o f separat e circui t court s i n th e Judiciary Ac t o f 1801, t o th e repea l o f tha t ac t an d th e practic e o f fixed individua l circui t as signments, se e Charle s Warren , The Supreme Court in United States History (rev. ed ; Boston : Little , Brown , an d Co. , 1926) , 1 : 58ff. , 85ff. , 185ff. , 204-9 ; also Maeva Marcus , ed., The Documentary History of the Supreme Court of the United States, 1789-1800 (Ne w York : Columbi a Universit y Press , 1990 ) 3 : 469ff. (Appendi x B) . 16. Se e Marcus, ed. , The Documentary History of the Supreme Court of the United States, 1789-1800, 398-401 , fo r a n example . Apparentl y n o copie s re main o f hi s grand jur y charges . 17. Annis , "Mr . Bushro d Washington, " 88 ; Willia m C . Stinchcomb e an d Charles T . Cullen, eds. , The Papers of John Marshall (Chape l Hill : University o f North Carolin a Press , 1979) , 3: 496ff. 18. Se e James Morton Smith , Freedom's Fetters: The Alien and Sedition Laws and American Civil Liberties (Ithaca : Cornel l Universit y Press , 1956) , 271 , 285ff., 379ff. , 388ff. , 415 . 19. Annis , "Mr . Bushro d Washington, " 97. 20. Se e hi s letter s t o Thoma s Ritchi e (Decembe r 25 , 1820 ) an d Justic e William Johnso n (Octobe r 27 , 1822 , an d Jun e 12 , 1823) , i n Thoma s Jefferson ,

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Writings, ed . Merril l D . Peterso n (Ne w York : Librar y o f America , 1984) , 1446-47, 1461-63 , 1476-77 . 21. Quote d i n Annis, "Mr . Bushro d Washington, " 116 . 22. Coxe v. Penington, 1 Wash. C.C . 65 (1803) , at 66. 23. Pennington v. Coxe, 2 Cranc h 3 3 (1804) , at 55, 61-62 , 59 , 54. 24. United States v. Fisher, 1 Wash. C.C . 4 (1803) , a t 7-8 ; United States v. Fisher, 2 Cranc h 35 8 (1805) , at 400 . 25. 1 Wash. C.C . a t 8 . 26. United States v. Fisher, 2 Cranc h a t 389-90 , 396 . 27. Ibid. , a t 398 , 402. 28. Se e Henry Otis Dwight, The Centennial History of the American Bible Society (Ne w York: Macmillan Co. , 1916) ; Story, Miscellaneous Writings, 810 . See also Annis, "Mr . Bushro d Washington, " 170-71 . 29. See , e.g., Eliason v. Henshaw, 4 Wheaton 22 5 (1819) ; Thornton v. Wynn, 12 Wheato n 18 3 (1827) ; Buckner v. Finley and Van Lear, 2 Peter s 58 6 (1829) . The Thornton cas e i s a n especiall y elegan t exampl e o f judicia l reasonin g i n th e common la w of contract . 30. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheaton 51 8 (1819) , a t 661. 31. Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheaton 1 (1821,1823); Washington's opinio n begin s at 69 , with th e quotatio n fro m 93 . 32. Golden v. Prince, 1 0 Fed. Case s 54 2 (No . 5,509) (C.C.D.Pa . 1814) . 33. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheaton 12 2 (1819) . 34. Ogden v. Saunders, 1 2 Wheaton 21 3 (1827) , at 264 . 35. Ibid. , a t 259 , 270. 36. Ibid. , a t 355 . 37. 4 Wheaton 370 ; Washington's dissen t begin s at 379 . 38. Hopkinson , Eulogium in Commemoration of the Hon. Bushrod Washington, 22 . 39. Se e the indices to the four volume s o f Washington's Reports, cite d above . 40. Quote d i n Bushrod C . Washington, "Th e Late Mr. Justice Bushrod Wash ington," 331 . 41. Anonymous, 1 Wash. C.C . 8 4 (1804) ; United States v. Magill, 1 Wash . C.C. 463 (1806) ; United States v. Pryor, 3 Wash. C.C . 234 (1814) . 42. United States v. Bright, 2 4 Fed . Cas . 123 2 (No . 14,647 ; C.C.D.P. 1809) , at 1237 , 1238 . For th e story , se e Bushrod C . Washington, "Th e Lat e Mr , Justic e Bushrod Washington, " 332-33 ; and Hopkinson , Eulogium in Commemoration of the Hon. Bushrod Washington, 2 2 ff . 43. Th e Pennsylvania militi a figured a s well in a notable Suprem e Cour t deci sion concerning criminal law rendered b y Washington: Ove r the dissent of Justice Story and one other justice unnamed, bu t with the authority o f The Federalist Papers i n his favor, Washington hel d that the states and th e federal governmen t ha d

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concurrent jurisdictio n t o punis h federa l crime s unde r federa l law , unles s Con gress expressly provide d tha t federa l jurisdictio n woul d b e exclusive. Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheaton 1 (1820). See also the discussion i n David P . Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The First Hundred Years, 1789-1888 (Chicago : University o f Chicag o Press , 1985) , 108-10 . 44. P. Butler, Esquire, v. Hopper, 1 Wash. C.C. 499 (1806) ; Brig Tryphenia v. Harrison, 1 Wash. C.C . 52 2 (1806) ; United States v. Kennedy, 4 Wash . C.C . 9 1 (1821). 45. Niles' Weekly Register, Septembe r 1 , 1821 ; September 29 , 1821 . See also Gerald T. Dunne, "Bushrod Washington an d the Mount Vernon Slaves," Supreme Court Historical Society Yearbook 1980 : 25-29 . 46. Se e the lette r o f Joseph Stor y t o James Kent , o f Augus t 31 , 1844, quote d in Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History, 2 : 121-22 . 47. Corfteld v. Coryell, 6 Fed . Cas . 54 6 (No . 3,230 ) (C.C.E.D.Pa . 1823 , 1825), at 551.

Editor's Not e

To preserve the multidisciplinary flavor of this collection, the contributors' respective citation an d indexing styles have been retained s o as to reflect th e style that exist s in their respective disciplines .

351

Contributors

William R. Casto i s a t th e Schoo l o f Law , Texa s Tec h University , Lub bock. Daniel A. Degnan, S.J. , i s a t th e Schoo l o f Law , Seto n Hal l University , Newark, Ne w Jersey. Scott Douglas Gerber i s at Florid a Coasta l Schoo l o f Law , Jacksonsville. Mark D. Hall i s in the Department o f Government , Eas t Centra l Univer sity, Ada, Oklahoma . James Haw i s i n th e Departmen t o f History , Indian a University/Purdu e University a t For t Wayne . Wythe Holt i s at th e Schoo l o f Law , University o f Alabama, Tuscaloosa . Stephen B. Presser i s a t th e Schoo l o f Law , Northwester n University , Chicago. James R. Stoner, Jr. , i s in th e Departmen t o f Politica l Science , Louisian a State University, Baton Rouge . Sandra Frances VanBurkleo i s in the Department o f History, Wayne Stat e University, Detroit . Willis P. Whichard i s at th e Suprem e Cour t o f North Carolina , Raleigh .

353

Index

Abraham, Henry , o n earl y Suprem e Cour t appointment process , 5 Ackerman, Bruce , 275, 28 4 Adams, Abigail, on Willia m Cushing , 106 ; on Olive r Ellsworth , 30 7 Adams, John, ix , 6, 7 , 19 , 106 , 172 , 182 , 210, 281 , 322, 327, 330; on Willia m Cushing, 100 , 119n . 13 ; and A Defense of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of America (1787) , 120n. 30 ; and Olive r Ellsworth , 310-11 ; on politica l conservatives , 36 ; on Joh n Rutledge, 86 ; on trade , 44; turnin g down th e chief justiceship , 2 8 Administrators of Moore v. Cherry (1792), 8 4 Admiralty jurisdiction , 16 4 Advisory opinions , 179 ; and Olive r Ellsworth, 293-96 , 297, 304 , 305, 314-16 Agrarianism, John Jay's relianc e upon , 44-45; an d morality , 65n . 6 0 Alien an d Seditio n Acts : and Willia m Cushing, 106 ; and Olive r Ellsworth , 308-11; an d James Iredell , 211; and Bushrod Washington , 330-3 1 American Bibl e Society, 328 , 33 6 American Revolution : impac t o n Jay Court, 29 ; and John Jay's contribution s to, 52-54 ; and relationshi p t o John Jay' s career, 30-31 ; rol e of James Iredel l in , 204-6 Anti-Federalists, 164 , 166 , 168 , 173-74 , 177, 183 , 189n. 2 5 Appleby, Joyce, 27 7 Articles o f Confederation , 102 ; disintegra tion of , 31 ; and John Jay's experienc e with, 37 ; and stat e obstructionism , 4 2

Bankruptcy law , 333-35, 338-41 , 34 2 Bar admission , an d Willia m Cushing , 115n.*;ofJohnJay, 3 0 Bas v. Tingy (1800) , 247, 328-2 9 Bayard v. Singleton (1787) , 200-20 1 Beard, Charles , 290n. 7 1 Bellamy, Joseph, 293-96, 315-1 6 Berger, Raoul, 260 , 285n. 3 , 291n. 9 0 Beveridge, Albert, an d John Marshall' s apotheosis, 8 Bill of Rights , 188n . 21; William Cushin g on, 10 4 Bingham v. Cabot (1795) , 121n . 3 5 Biography, insight s from , 4- 7 Blackstone, William, an d John Rut ledge, 7 4 Bobbitt, Philip , on constitutiona l interpre tation, 112 ; on textualism , 123n . 6 8 Bork, Robert , 287n . 1 7 Bradford, William , 17 6 Brailsfordv. Georgia (1792 , 1793) , rela tionship of , t o Chisholm v. Georgia (1793), 48-5 0 Bright, Genera l Michael , 34 2 British deb t cases , 164 , 169-70 , 17 8 Burke, Edmund, 267 , 283, 289n. 56 Butler, Pierce, 21 0 Calder v. Bull (1798) , 3, 214-15, 246 , 263-64, 268-69 , 27 7 Call, William, 186n . 1 2 Calvinism. See Bellamy, Joseph Casto, William, 164 , 196n . 52 ; on Samue l Chase, 18 , 291n. 95 ; on James Iredel l and Willia m Paterson , 121n . 46 ; on pre Marshall Court , 3- 4 Chandler v. Secretary of War (1794) , 114 , 124n. 7 9

355

356 Index Chisholm v. Georgia (1793) , 3, 17 , 47-50, 108-10,112, 137-39,176-78 , 182-83 , 192n. 31,211-13,21 5 Christianity, 336 ; and James Wilson, 129 , 146n. 1 2 Circuit courts , U.S., 6, 22n. 17 , 167-69 ; and Willia m Cushing , 103 ; and Olive r Ellsworth, 300 , 303-7 ; and Jame s Iredell, 215-18; and John Rutledge , 81-82, 87 , 89 ; Bushrod Washingto n on , 323, 328 , 330, 332-33, 341-4 3 Citizenship: internationalization of , 45 ; John Jay o n right s an d obligation s of , 52-53; John Jay's us e of gran d jur y charges to teach rudiment s of , 47 , 66n . 71; John Jay's views of, 3 2 Clay, Henry, 32 7 Coke's Institutes, an d John Rutledge , 8 2 Committee o f Sixty , and John Jay, 3 1 Committees o f Correspondenc e an d Safety , and John Jay, 3 1 Common law , 331, 334, 336, 345; James Wilson on , 140-42 , 153n . 9 7 Common la w crimes, 263-64, 267 , 269; and Olive r Ellsworth , 308-1 1 Common Plea s and Genera l Sessions , S.C . Court of : John Rutledg e a s chief justice , 82-85 Commonwealth v. Caton (1782) , 159-60 , 175 Commonwealth v. Posey (1787) , 159-6 0 Confiscation o f Tory estates , 200-20 1 "Considerations o n th e Ban k o f Nort h America," 148n . 4 2 "Considerations o n th e Nature an d Exten t of the Legislativ e Authorit y o f th e Britis h Parliament," 12 8 Constitutional Conventio n o f 1787 , 4, 162, 164 ; and Olive r Ellsworth , 297-98 ; and John Rutledge , 75-8 0 Constitutional reform : an d John Jay, 38; and separatio n o f powers, 38-39; an d weakness o f federa l judiciary , 5 1 Continental Congress , 4, 159 , 186n . 10 ; and Olive r Ellsworth , 297 ; and Joh n Jay's presidency, 31 ; and John Jay's rol e as secretary o f foreig n affairs , 37 ; and reputation i n Europe, 40-4 2 Contract clause , 336-41, 344-4 5 Contract law : and John Jay, 43; and cen -

trality of , i n John Jay's jurisprudence , 52-53 Convention o f 1800 . See Treaty o f Morte fontaine Cooper v. Telfair (1800) , 11 , 114, 247, 344-45 Corfield v. Coryell (1823 , 1825) , 345-4 6 Corwin, Edward , o n pre-Marshal l Court , 3 "Court" an d "Country " philosophies , 270-71 Court refor m (i n Virginia), 160-6 1 Cover, Robert , o n slaver y i n the Massachu setts judicial process, 115 , 116-1 7 Currie, David, o n William Cushing , 107 , 111-12; o n James Iredel l an d Willia m Paterson, 121n . 4 6 Cushing, John, o n William Cushing , 99 , 118n. 4 Dallas, Alexander, 108 , 11 0 Dartmouth College v. Woodward (1819) , 337 Davie, William, 201 , 208, 209, 21 0 Debt problems , i n U.S. in the 1780s , 160 , 163-64 Declaration o f Independence , 4 ; and Jame s Wilson, 12 8 Definitive Treat y o f Peac e with Britai n (Paris Treaty o f 1783) , and John Jay, 4 2 De Longchamps Affair , an d James Wilson , 152 Depression o f th e 1780s , in U.S., 16 3 Dewey, Donald, o n William Cushing , 99 , 118n.*, 121n.4 1 Diplomacy: an d John Jay's return to , in 1794, 47, 50-51 ; John Jay's view s about, 31,4 0 Dr. Bonham's Case (1610), 9 Duxbury, Neal , 274, 28 4 Easterbrook, Frank , o n Willia m Cushing , 100n.* Eastern Circuit , an d John Jay's grand jur y charges, 4 1 Economic theory : historiograph y of , 64n . 58; an d John Jay, 29; and protectionism , 44; relationship t o John Jay's jurispru dence, 32-45, 5 4 Education, o f John Jay, 29-3 0 Eleventh Amendment , 28 , 178 ; and

Index 35 7 Chisbolm v. Georgia (1793) , 3, 17, 49-50, 122n . 47; and sovereig n immu nity, 48-49; and stat e driv e toward , 49-50 Equity jurisprudence, John Blai r on , 171-7 2 Executive branch : an d cooperatio n wit h judicial branch , 46 , 55; John Jay' s vie w of, 3 1 Executors of Rippon v. Executors of Townsend (1795) , 82-8 3 Federal crimina l law , and John Jay, 66n. 7 0 Federalism: an d John Jay, 29, 39, 42, 55; James Wilson on , 132-34 , 139-4 0 Federalist Papers, 9 , 120n . 30 , 202, 208, 264 Federalists: 102 , 104 , 165-66, 173 , 175, 177, 180 , 182 , 183 , 326, 327, 330-31 , 345 Federal jurisdiction : alienage , 164 , 178 ; diversity, 164 ; over state s a s defendants , 164, 177-7 8 Fischer, David Hackett , o n John Jay, 2 6 Flag Amendment, 27 8 Founding fathers , compare d t o Joh n Jay, 2 7 Fowler v. Lindsey (1799) , 123n . 6 7 Fries Rebellion, 264-6 5 Galloway Plan , an d John Jay's position , 3 0 Georgia, an d limitatio n o f federa l courts, 4 9 Georgia v. Brailsford (1793 , 1794) , 170-72, 18 2 Glass v. Sloop Betsy (1794) , 47, 50, 18 0 Goebel, Julius, Jr., on William Cushing , 11 1 Golden v. Prince (1814) , 337-3 8 Goldstein, Leslie , on textualism , 113n. * Grand jur y charges: and Willia m Cushing , 101-2, 105-6 , 114 , 115-16 , 117 , 120n . 33; an d Olive r Ellsworth , 303 , 306, 310 ; Ralph Lerne r on , 10 5 Grayson et al. v. Virginia (1793) , 5 0 Great Britain : and commerce , 36 ; and ex ample o f th e French , 62n . 40 ; and Joh n Jay's deferenc e to , in law practice , 39-40, 51 ; John Jay's posture toward , 34-36 Great Compromise , an d William Paterson , 236-37

Green v. Biddle (1821 , 1823) , 33 7 Grinnell, F. W, o n th e origin s o f judicia l review, 11 3 Haakonssen, Knud , 273-7 4 Haines, Charle s Grove , on Jay Court , 2 8 Hamilton, Alexander , ix , 2, 7 , 165 , 177-80, 184 , 196n . 53 , 286n. 7 ; an d debt assumption , 47 ; and Federalist Papers, 202 ; and informa l advice , 46; an d manipulation o f electio n return s i n 1800, 55; on John Rutledge , 84 ; on sua bility o f states , 211, 212 Hamilton v. Eaton (1796) , 304-5, 31 2 Hancock, John: o n judicia l federalism , 50 ; and ratificatio n o f U.S . Constitution , 102-3, 120n . 2 7 Harrison, Rober t H. , 198 ; and pre-Mar shall Court , 2 , 5 Haskins, Georg e Lee , on pre-Marshal l Court, 2 Hayburn's Case (1792) , 3, 11 , 46, 114n.* , 124n. 77 , 168 , 173-77 , 179 ; and Jame s Wilson, 131 , 136-3 8 Henfield, Gideon , 14 1 Henry, Patrick, 2 , 6 , 157 , 165 , 169-7 0 Hobson, Charles , o n John Marshall , 7 ; on John Marshall' s apotheosis , 7- 8 Hollingsworth v. Virginia (1798) , 192n . 3 1 Holt, Wythe, 290-91n. 8 7 Horwitz, Morton , 27 6 Houston v. Moore (1820) , 348n. 4 3 Human nature : John Jay' s view s of , 32-33, 53-54 ; James Wilso n on , 130 , 147n. 1 8 Hylton v. United States (1796) , 3, 11, 139-40, 214 , 24 5 Interdisciplinary scholarship , ix , 12-14 , 24-25n. 36 , 35 1 International law , and John Jay, 53-5 4 Invalid Pensioner s Act , 11 , 124n. 77 ; an d William Cushing , 114n.* ; an d Jame s Iredell, 21 7 "Iredell's Revisal, " 20 3 Izard, Ralph , o n John Rutledge , 8 4 Jay, Peter an d Mar y Va n Cortlandt , 2 9 Jay, Stewart, 279-83 , 285, 288n. 32 , 291n. 8 9

358 Index Jay Treaty: and Olive r Ellsworth , 301-4 ; negotiation of , 50-52 ; and John Rut ledge, 6, 85-87 ; and Sixt h Article, 5 1 Jefferson, Thomas : ix, 7, 9n.*, 38 , 45, 157-59, 173 , 178-79, 181-82 , 207 , 285,314-15, 33 1 Johnson, Herbert : o n William Cushing , 99 , 107n.*; o n judicia l recusa l ethics , 122n . 58; o n John Marshall , 125n . 88 ; on pre Marshall Court , 2 Johnson, Thomas , an d pre-Marshal l Court, 4 , 5 Johnson, William , 331-32 ; on Willia m Cushing, 99-10 0 Johnston, Hanna h (late r Iredell) , 19 9 Johnston, Samuel , 17 , 198 , 199 , 200, 20 1 Jones v. Walker (1791) , 169-7 0 "Judges' Remonstrance, The " (1788) , 159 , 161, 174-7 5 "Judges' Resignation , The " (1789) , 159 , 161, 17 4 Judicial review , 2 , 160-61 , 164 , 173-74 ; and Willia m Cushing , 113-15 , 124n . 76; an d Olive r Ellsworth , 298 ; an d James Iredell , 201-2 ; an d Joh n Mar shall, 113 , 202; origin s of , x , 9-11 , 23nn. 27 , 28 , 24n. 33 ; and Willia m Pa terson, 243-44 , 245 , 250; presumptio n of legislativ e authority , 329 , 330 , 340 , 347n. 14 ; James Wilso n on , 131-34 , 136-37 Judiciary Ac t of 1789 , 5, 8n.* , 10 , 17 , 28, 82, 85 , 108, 164 , 175 , 177 , 189n . 25, 193n. 35 ; and Olive r Ellsworth , 298-300; and Willia m Paterson , 2 3 9 ^ 0 , 253n . 7 2 Juries: discretion t o find la w an d fact , 269-70; James Wilson on , 140 , 151n. 8 1 "Justice Cushing' s Undelivered Speec h o n the Federal Constitution, " 102 , 103- 4 Kerber, Linda , 27 9 Keynes, John Maynard , 1 3 King's College , and John Jay, 2 9 Kirtland, Robert , 15 9 Kissam, Benjamin , an d John Jay's legal ap prenticeship, 3 0 Konig, David Thomas , 272-7 3 Kramnick, Isaac , 27 7

Law, and John Jay's intellectua l system , 29 , 52-54, 67n . 7 9 Law lectures , by James Wilson, 120n . 30 , 129, 142-43 , 153n . 10 1 Lee, Richard Henry , o n John Jay, 26; o n suability o f states , 21 1 Legal profession i n Virginia, 156 , 16 1 Lerner, Ralph , o n gran d jur y charges , 105 ; on moder n republicans , 5 3 Leuchtenburg, Willia m H. , o n John Mar shall's apotheosis , 23n. 2 4 "Liberalism" an d "republicanism, " a s judicial philosophies, 271-72, 273 , 27 7 Livingston, Robert , Jr., and John Jay, 3 0 Livingston, Sara h Va n Brugh, marriage t o John Jay, 3 0 Llewellyn, Karl , on lega l scholarship, 1 2 Localism v . centralism, a s explaining ju risprudence i n 1790s , 28 2 Locke, John, an d James Wilson, 147n . 2 0 Loyalism, an d John Jay, 3 0 Loyalists, 160 , 172 ; and claim s of , 5 0 Maclaine, Archibald, 199 , 21 0 Madison, James, ix, 7 , 119n . 15 , 162; on Oliver Ellsworth , 298; on suabilit y o f states, 211, 212; and James Wilson, 129 , 131, 133 , 149n. 55 Marbury v. Madison (1803) , x, 2, 8n.* , 9-11, 24n . 33 , 27, 137 , 174 , 194n . 42 , 202, 264 , 26 7 Marcus, Maeva: o n Invali d Pensioner s Act , 114n.*; on origin s o f judicial review , 24n. 33 , 124n.79; on pre-Marshal l Court, 3 Marshall, John, ix , x, 1 , 2, 13 , 14, 15 , 18, 19, 117n.* , 123n . 75,137,166 , 169 , 177, 248-49; apotheosis of , 7-9 ; com pared t o John Jay, 26, 27, 56; an d William Cushing , 100n. % 117-18 ; o n William Cushing , 10 0 n.**, 121n . 35 ; and innovation s o n th e Suprem e Court , 331-32; an d judicia l review, 113 , 114 , 202; an d Marbury v. Madison (1803) , 2, 8n.*, 9-11 , 24n. 33 ; political skill s of , 8n.*; profits fro m publi c service , 262; and seriati m opinio n writing , 20 , 106n.*; significance of , 1-4 , 6 , 117-18 , 125n. 88 ; on suabilit y o f states , 211, 212; an d textualism , 113n.* ; Bushro d

Index 3 5 Washington's difference s with , o n bank ruptcy law , 337-40 ; Bushrod Washing ton's difference s with , o n interpretin g statutes, 333-35 ; Bushrod Washington' s professional associatio n an d friendshi p with, 322 , 324-28, 342 ; witness a t Chase impeachmen t trial , 266, 26 7 Marshall Court , compare d t o Jay Court , 27,28 Mason, George , objections t o th e U.S. Constitution, 17 , 207-8, 21 1 Mason v. Haile (1827) , 340-4 1 Massachusetts: an d limitatio n o f federa l courts, 49; and slavery , 115-17 , 125n. 8 5 McCloskey, Rober t G. , o n John Jay, 28; on pre-Marshall Court , 2 M'Donough v. Danbury (1796) , 121n . 3 5 Middle Temple, 156 ; and John Rut ledge, 8 2 "Midnight Judges Act " (Judiciar y Ac t of 1801), 266-6 7 M'llvaine v. Coxe's Lessee (1805) , 107n. * Moore, Alfred, an d pre-Marshal l Court , 4,6 Moral sense , James Wilso n on , 130 , 146n. 1 8 Morris, Gouverneur , 3 3 Morris, Richard, o n implie d power s o f ju dicial review , 55; on John Jay, 26, 27; on John Jay's limitations , 56 Morris, Robert, 166 , 182 ; and John Rut ledge, 8 2 Mount Vernon , 325 , 327, 343-4 4 Murray, Lindley , an d John Jay apprentice ship, 30 ; and assessmen t o f John Jay, 5 3 National unification , an d John Jay, 37 ; an d treaties, 4 8 Natural rights/law , 159-61 , 176 , 184 , 195n. 44, 263-64, 270 , 273-74, 289n . 52; James Wilson on , 129-30 ; 146n . 13 , 148n. 3 3 Newmyer, R . Kent , 274-75, 276, 277; o n William Cushing , 100n.* ; o n John Mar shall's apotheosis , 8- 9 New York : John Jay's tenur e a s governo r of, 5 2 New Yor k Counci l o f Revision , 4 6 New Yor k Counci l o f Safety , 3 3

9

New Yor k judiciary , an d John Jay, 3 1 New Yor k stat e constitution , an d Joh n Jay, 3 1 Nietzche, Friedrich , 117n. * Nonimportation policies , and John Jay' s position, 3 0 Objects o f government : an d Chisbolm v. Georgia (1793) , 49; and John Jay , 36-37; an d John Jay's fear s about , 5 0 O'Brien, William , o n William Cushing , 102-3, 119n . 12 ; on Invali d Pensioner s Act, 114n. * Ogden v. Saunders (1827) , 339-40, 34 5 Olive Branc h Petition , 30 , 3 5 Onuf, Peter , on historiograph y o f Ameri can Founding , 24n . 36 , 118n. * Oswald v. New York, 5 0 Paper money , 163 , 16 7 Parliamentary sovereignty , James Iredel l on, 204- 5 Pendleton, Edmund , 157-59 , 161-62 , 165 , 175, 189n . 2 2 Pendleton, Nathaniel , 21 7 Penhallow v. Doane's Administrators (1795), 172-73 , 182-83 , 213-14, 215 , 241-43 Pennington v. Coxe (1804) , 332-3 3 Pennsylvania constitutio n o f 1790 , James Wilson on , 13 6 Person, Thomas, 20 8 Peters, Richard, 217 , 28 3 Philadelphia, 323-25 , 341-4 3 Pickering, John, 26 7 Pinckney, Charle s Cotesworth , 2 , 5 , 188n . 19;onJohnRutledge, 7 0 Planter-mercantile rulin g clas s (i n Virginia), 156, 16 1 Political parties , Bushrod Washington' s ex change wit h Georg e Washington on , 325-26 Political philosophy : William Cushing's , 103-6; John Rutledge's , 72-73 , 75-77, 7 9 Politicians, John Jay's vie w of , 3 4 Popular sovereignty , James Wilso n on , 130, 132 , 136 , 138-4 0 Positivism, 159 , 175-76 , 184 , 195n . 4 4 Pound, Roscoe , o n James Iredell , 19 9

3 6 0 Index Powell, H. Jefferson, 284 , 291nn. 93 , 95 Presser, Stephen, o n John Marshall' s apoth eosis, 9; on pre-Marshal l Court , 7 , 1 8 Preyer, Kathryn ("Kitty") , 282 , 288n. 4 0 "Principles o f a n America n Whig, " 20 5 Prize, and priz e jurisdiction, 163-65 , 172-73 Professionalism, Joh n Jay's view of , 4 5 Public offices, o f John Jay, 3 0 Quock Walke r case , 115-1 7 Randolph, Edmund , 168 , 175 , 179 , 186n . 8, 192n . 34 , 193n . 35 , 198; and Cbisholm v. Georgia (1793) , 48; at con stitutional convention , 77 ; and revolu tionary wa r debts , 5 1 Randolph, John, 26 6 Ratification o f th e U.S. Constitution, 4 ; role of William Cushin g in , 101-3 ; rol e of James Iredel l in , 206-10; role of Bushrod Washingto n in , 326; James Wilson's contribution to , 135-3 6 Read, William, o n John Rutledge , 8 5 Religion: as foundation fo r moralit y an d law in thought o f Samue l Chase , 270; importance fo r John Jay, 30, 33-34 , 53-54 Reporter, Bushro d Washingto n as , 32 7 Revolutionary republica n thought : an d his toriography of , 67n . 85 ; and John Jay, 31-32; John Jay's critiqu e of , 32 ; John Jay's place within discours e of , 54 ; relationship t o John Jay's jurisprudence , 32-45, 53-5 4 Rossiter, Clinton , o n Willia m Paterson , 252n. 6 3 Rugg, Arthur, o n William Cushing , 123n. 7 5 Ruling class (merchants , planters, in Virginia), 156 , 16 1 Rutledge, Edward , 2 , 5 ; on executiv e au tonomy, 3 8 Schlesinger, Arthur, Sr. , 1 3 Schwartz, Bernard , o n pre-Marshal l Court, 2 Separation o f powers, 19 , 161 , 179 Seriatim, meaning of , 20-21 , 25n . 41; opinions, 331, 339

Shay's Rebellion, an d John Jay, 3 0 Slavery: William Cushin g on , 115-17 ; an d Massachusetts, 125n . 85 ; and Massa chusetts Constitutio n o f 1780 , 115 , 117 ; and John Rutledge , 77 , 79; Bushrod Washington's involvemen t with , 343-4 4 Small States ' (Ne w Jersey) Plan , an d Joh n Jay, 40; and Willia m Paterson , 234-3 5 Smith, Jean Edward , o n John Marshall , 7 Spaight, Richar d Dobbs , 20 2 Stamp Act, and John Jay, 3 0 Statesmanship, John Jay's views of, 4 1 State v. Washington (1791) , 8 3 Statutory interpretation : John Marshall' s principles of , 334-45 ; Bushrod Washing ton's principle s of , 33 4 Story, Joseph, 323 , 326, 336, 337, 344-4 5 Stuart v. Laird (1803) , 243-4 9 Sturges v. Crowninshield (1819) , 338-3 9 Supreme Court : an d informa l advice , 46; John Jay's vision of , 29 , 45-52; and ju risdictions, 46-47, 65n . 64 ; legitimac y of, 28-29 ; and rule s o f practice , 55; an d utility of , 51 ; James Wilson on , 131, 136^3 Swem, Earl Gregg , on John Blair , 18 2 Talbot v. Jansen (1795) , 87 , 214, 24 4 Term limits , William Cushin g on , 104-5 , 120n. 2 4 Textualism: an d Willia m Cushing , 106-13 , 123n. 67 ; definition of , 123n . 68 ; and John Marshall , 113n. * Thompson, Samuel , 10 3 Treason, James Wilson and , 145n . 9 Treaties, and federa l courts , 47-50; impor tance to John Jay, 42-4 3 Treaty o f Mortefontaine , 310-1 2 Treaty o f Paris , 110 , 262, 299, 300 , 304- 5 Tucker v. Lowndes (1791) , 8 3 Turner, Charles , 10 4 United States v. Callender (1800) , 10 , 11, 264, 265-66 United States v. Cooper (1800) , 265, 277, 287n. 2 0 United States v. Fisher (1803 , 1805) , 333-34 United States v. Joseph Ravara (1794) , 141, 152n . 9 4

Index 3 6 United States v. La Vengeance (1796) , 30 5 United States v. Peters (1791) , 8 7 United States v. Schooner Peggy (1801) , 121n. 3 5 United States v. Worral (1798) , 26 3 United States v. Yale Todd (1794) , 11 , 24n. 33, 150n . 6 0 University o f Nort h Carolina , James Iredel l as trustee of , 20 3 VanBurkleo, Sandra, 275-77, 285, 291n. 8 9 Vanhornes's Lessee v. Dorrance (1795) , 10 , 243-44 Van Santvoord , George , on John Rut ledge, 7 2 Vaughan, Benjamin , an d John Jay, 4 4 Virginia, 324-27 , 343-4 4 Virginia Cour t o f Appeals , 159-62 , 187n. 1 6 Ware v. Hylton (1796) , 3, 11 , 50, 108 , 110-12, 122n . 64 , 140 , 192n . 32 , 214, 246, 262-63 , 277, 30 4 Warrington, David , o n William Cushing , 106

1

Washington, George , ix , 6 , 7 , 17 , 19 , 114n.*, 119n . 15 , 162 , 165-66, 178-80 , 198, 206 , 208, 210, 292, 302 , 303, 304, 305, 306 , 322, 324, 325-26, 327 , 343-44; an d Willia m Cushing , 98 , 100 , 117, 119n . 13 ; and informa l advice , 46; and Neutralit y Proclamation , 39 ; an d John Rutledge , 81 , 85; signing John Jay' s commission, 28 ; on Suprem e Court , 5 , 22n. 1 4 Weber, Max, 29 4 West v. Barnes (1791) , 167 , 189-90n . 2 6 Whiskey rebellion , 46 , 180-81 ; an d Jame s Iredell, 21 0 Wickham, John, 1 1 William an d Mary , The Colleg e of , 322 , 324 Williamson, Hugh , 21 0 Wiscartv. D'Auchy (1796) , 151n . 8 1 Wood, Gordon , 277 ; on aristocracy , 31 ; on John Marshall , 7 Wyoming valle y case, 144n . 3 Wythe, George , 19 , 157-62 , 32 4 XYZ Affair , 30 8

About th e Edito r

Scott Douglas Gerber is Associate Professor a t Florida Coastal School of Law in Jacksonville. He received bot h a Ph.D. and a J.D. from th e University o f Virginia , an d a B.A . fro m th e Colleg e o f Willia m an d Mary. He is a former la w clerk to a federal judge . He is the author of First Principles: The Jurisprudence of Clarence Thomas (i n press) and To Secure These Rights: The Declaration of Independence and Constitutional Interpretation (1995) , bot h fro m Ne w Yor k Universit y Press.

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