Selling Public Policy: Rhetoric, Heresthetic, Ethics and Evidence 9819903807, 9789819903801

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Joseph Drew

Selling Public Policy Rhetoric, Heresthetic, Ethics and Evidence

Selling Public Policy

Joseph Drew

Selling Public Policy Rhetoric, Heresthetic, Ethics and Evidence

Joseph Drew The University of Newcastle Newcastle, NSW, Australia

ISBN 978-981-99-0380-1 ISBN 978-981-99-0381-8 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-0381-8 © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

Contents

1

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1 Motivation for the Book (and Who It Is For) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2 The Public Policy Product Lifecycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3 Outline of the Book . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4 What This Book Is . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.5 What This Book Is Not . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1 1 3 6 9 10 10

2

Public Policy Success: What Constitutes a Successful Sale? . . . . . . . . 2.1 What Is Public Policy Success? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 Lessons from the Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.1 A View of Policy Success for the Public Policy Salesperson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 New Approaches for the Public Policy Salesperson . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.1 The Distributions of Costs and Benefits Over Time . . . . 2.3.2 Kairos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.3 Framing Contests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4 A Guide to Using Policy Success to Clinch the Sale . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

13 13 16

Rhetoric: Not Just What Is Said, but Also Who Says It and How . . . 3.1 What Is Rhetoric? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 Lessons from the Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2.1 Lessons from the Classics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2.2 Lessons from Public Policy Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3 New Approaches for the Public Policy Salesperson . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.1 Words with Unexamined Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.2 Empirical Rhetoric . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.3 New Mediums for Tailored Messaging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4 A Guide for Using Rhetoric to Clinch the Sale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

29 29 31 31 34 37 37 38 39 40

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18 20 20 21 21 23 27

v

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Contents

Appendix 1—The Rhetorical Tropes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Appendix 2—The Practical Syllogism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

43 44 45

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Heresthetic: The Craft of Political Manipulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1 What Is Heresthetic? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 Lessons from the Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3 New Approaches for the Public Policy Salesperson . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3.1 Cost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3.2 Salami Tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3.3 Media Agenda Setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4 A Guide to Using Heresthetic to Clinch the Sale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Appendix—Heresthetic Tools and Choice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

47 47 50 52 53 55 55 56 59 60

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Blame Avoidance and Weapons of Mass-Expertisation . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1 What Is Blame? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2 Lessons from the Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3 New Approaches for the Public Policy Salesperson . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3.1 The Rise of the Independent Expert . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3.2 Weapons of Mass-Expertisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3.3 Blame Games as an Unintended Good . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4 A Guide to Using Blame to Clinch the Sale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Appendix—Blaming ‘Chance’ or ‘Nature’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

63 63 65 68 69 70 71 72 75 77

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Evidence: Extraordinary Claims Require Careful Presentation of Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.1 What Is Evidence? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2 Lessons from the Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2.1 Simple Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2.2 Multiple Regression Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2.3 Ratio Analysis (and Performance Monitoring) . . . . . . . . 6.2.4 Business Case Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2.5 Surveys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2.6 In-Depth Interviews . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3 New Approaches for the Public Policy Salesperson . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3.1 Difficulty Relating Complex Empirical Techniques . . . . 6.3.2 Correspondence and Data May Become Public . . . . . . . . 6.3.3 Empirical Claims May Be Tested . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.4 A Guide to Using Evidence to Clinch the Sale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Appendix—Academics and Evidence in the Media and Courtroom . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

79 79 82 82 84 86 87 89 90 90 91 92 92 93 96 98

Contents

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Ethics: Right and Wrong Can Be Contestable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.1 What Are Ethics? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2 Lessons from the Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2.1 Natural Law and Virtue Ethic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2.2 Utilitarianism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2.3 Egoism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3 ‘New’ Approaches for the Public Policy Salesperson . . . . . . . . . . 7.3.1 Principle of Double Effect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3.2 Creating Human Value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.4 A Guide to Using Ethics to Clinch the Sale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Appendix 1—The Role of Government and Rulers in the Natural Law Tradition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

vii

101 101 103 103 105 108 109 109 111 113 116 117

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Case Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120

9

Selling Public Policy in Practice: Fiscal and Monetary Stimulus Success? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.1 The Sales Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.1.1 Policy Success? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.1.2 Rhetoric . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.1.3 Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.1.4 Blame Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.1.5 Ethics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.1.6 Heresthetic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.2 How COVID-19 Fiscal and Monetary Stimulus Might Have Been Sold Better . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

121 121 124 127 128 130 133 135 137 138

10 Selling Public Policy in Practice: Failure in Ukraine? . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.1 The Sales Environment: Ukraine and the Donbas . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.1.1 Policy Success . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.1.2 Rhetoric . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.1.3 Heresthetic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.1.4 Blame Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.1.5 Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.1.6 Ethics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.2 How the Special Military Operation Might Have Been Sold Better References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

141 141 143 145 147 148 149 150 151 152

11 One More Lesson and the Future of Selling Public Policy . . . . . . . . . 11.1 The Power of Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.2 The Future of Selling Public Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.3 A Final Exhortation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

155 157 159 160 160

Chapter 1

Introduction

Abstract We have all witnessed good public policy fail because of a bad sales pitch, and bad public policy succeed against all expectations. This suggests that there may indeed be an art to selling public policy. Yet the art is largely compartmentalized (in the domains of political science, economics, sociology, ethics and the classics) and is thus difficult for the student of public policy to access—let alone synthesize—into a single toolkit to guide decision-making in the sales process. It is to this gap in the literature that we turn our attention—a gap which when filled should result in more public policy sales being clinched. Clearly a body of work of this type will have benefits for politicians, their staffers and public servants tasked with selling public policy. However, the benefits extend well beyond the self-interest of individuals; because better sales pitches will result in more good policy being sold and more stable public policy (revolving door public policy unnerves markets and makes it very difficult for one to undertake long term planning so there could be a case that successfully selling bad public policy is better than much of the status quo). I outline a case for change and discuss some of the benefits which will accrue to various actors as proficiency develops in Selling Public Policy. Keywords Selling public policy · Policy success · Public policy

1.1 Motivation for the Book (and Who It Is For) I am going to start this book with a confession. As will probably become clear I commenced this project back in 2017. At the time I was working with two colleagues who wished to expand their scholarly experience to the broader public policy domain. However, they both subsequently left the university sector and I struggled to motivate myself to finish the book. As subsequent events have testified (such as the abysmal policy selling in relation to the COVID-19 response) it was a mistake to not finish this project. I have come to repent of my earlier delay and have thus returned to re-write some sections of the seven completed chapters as well as construct and finish the very important Part II (whereby students get to see how to apply the theory that they have learned to real world problems).

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 J. Drew, Selling Public Policy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-0381-8_1

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1 Introduction

Accordingly, some of the material that follows—especially the examples I employ will be a little dated. However, their relevance is unquestionable as is the importance of teaching others to sell public policy. Many readers will recall fondly the 1980’s British sitcom Yes Minister (and its sequel Yes Prime Minister) in which Jim Hacker, MP for Birmingham-East, attempts to formulate and enact good public policy, despite the obstacles put in front of him by his Permanent Secretary Sir Humphrey Appleby and various political “colleagues”. (Those of you who do not recall the series fondly may not have be born when it was first televised (my young students have informed me that similar series are The Thick of It and Utopia)). In one memorable and witty exchange Sir Humphrey proudly asserts: Almost all government policy is wrong but frightfully well carried out

If only this were true (the frightfully well carried out bit at least)! In recent decades there has been a plethora of bad sales pitches for putatively good public policy (think of the various Middle East peace deals, the pitch for a carbon trading scheme in Australia and elsewhere, the ‘remain’ pitch in the Brexit debate, the unsuccessful sales spiel for the Trans-Pacific Trade Partnership, or the revolving door of COVID19 rules). There have also been a number of notable examples of (arguably) bad public policy meeting with the consent of key stakeholders against all expectations (the Iran nuclear deal immediately comes to mind). My mission is to identify the ingredients of a successful public policy sale—irrespective of the merits of a public policy position—and put together a toolkit for students of public policy which I define quite broadly (see below). When I first pitched this idea to my publisher I was met with one review that asserted that the theme and title of the book was “too cynical”. In reply I might, once again quote Sir Humphrey: ‘A cynic is what an idealist calls a realist’

Or simply shrug my shoulders and say “so what? Whether it is cynical or not is largely beside the point—what matters is whether it is needed”. Those of us who live in revolving-door public policy environs are well aware of a desperate need for our political elites to stop and think about the art of selling public policy (just stopping and thinking would be a good starting point). Moreover, the fact that you are reading this book right now, probably suggests that you also perceive a need for things to be done better than they currently are. So who does need a toolkit on selling public policy? The obvious answer is that our politicians need to become more proficient at selling public policy so that they can keep their jobs. So do their political staffers (for much the same reason). It also wouldn’t be a stretch to say that public servants also need to understand how to successfully sell public policy: firstly because there may be times when they are called upon, at least morally, to do so for the sake of the nation; secondly, because they will often be manipulated by those charged with selling public policy (and forewarned is forearmed). In addition, lobbyists have a keen interest in

1.2 The Public Policy Product Lifecycle

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selling public policy, sometimes directly to the public, but mostly indirectly through politicians. Yet clinching the deal in public policy sales is also important for the wider economy and the lives of persons. Many developed economies have been in a state of policy paralysis for the last few decades (for instance Australia is still to come up with a stable renewables energy policy) and this inaction tends to frighten economic markets. Worse still, we are increasingly seeing the rolling out of important public policy being followed by backflips by the same administration on the same public policy at a later date (for example, ‘Pastygate’1 in the United Kingdom— which might seem trivial, but not if one is a baker or a Cornish pastry devote). When there is uncertainty in public policy individuals find it difficult to plan their lives. So I contend that better public policy selling may result in more stable public policy which is a good thing for the economy and a good thing for citizens. Ideally good public policy will be sold well and we will all feel better for it—but even poor public policy sold well might be more desirable for the increased certainty that it brings to markets and people’s lives. In this sense then, everyone has a vested interest in improving the current state of play and everyone has good reason to become a student of public policy.

1.2 The Public Policy Product Lifecycle The mission of a public policy salesperson is to sell a “suitable” product to their target market and keep the product sold for the duration of the implied returns2 period. As my readers will discover, this definition has allowed me plenty of wriggle room, which I perceive to be critical in view of the relativism that pervades the sales lifecycle. For instance, I refer to a “suitable” product to emphasize that the product need not be fitfor-purpose according to the end-users’ needs, but rather simply deemed suitable by the policy salesperson or their masters. Similarly, I note that the “suitable” product is sold to a target market—not the public at large. Political pragmatism implies that the salesperson need not sell the product to everyone, only to the stakeholders that are critical to the policy being implemented, or have a critical voice in political decisionmaking (including whether or not to vote for the salesperson or the salesperson’s employer). For instance, President Donald Trump probably didn’t care that only 5% of Democrats approved of him after his first year in Office because they didn’t vote for him anyhow—instead he would likely have been more interested in the fact that he was “more popular with his own party than Barack Obama or Bill Clinton were at the same point” (Meers 2018). Indeed, it is likely to be the case that he was not trying to sell public policy to either the Democrats or the Australian (largely left-wing) 1

Pastygate was the proposal to levy value added tax on pastries such as sausage rolls and Cornish pasties which were allowed to cool on the shelf (in March 2012)—the Chancellor of the Exchequer later reversed his position. 2 Here I refer to the retail concept of a returns period—this is the maximum time period for which a retail store will accept a return of a product for refund due to either change of mind, failure of product to be fit-for-purpose, or a warranty claim.

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1 Introduction

media, so he was unlikely to judge his success by the approval that he received from these sources. It may not be pleasant to think of democracy as a winner takes all proposition—it gives a warm fuzzy feeling (just like an opioid) to believe that our leaders rule on behalf of all of their citizens—but it is undoubtedly the case that to the winner go the spoils and that the losers “must suffer outcomes in which one is economically or emotionally deeply deprived…truly it is politics, not economics, that is the dismal science” (Riker 1982, p. 206). Moreover, our working definition notes the importance of keeping the public policy sold—but only for the period that the salesperson or their masters needed it to be sold. Sometimes the after-sales returns period is defined by political or institutional constraints (for instance, the President of the United States can only hold Office for eight years in total (two terms) under the twenty-second constitutional amendment), whilst at other times the period is defined by an implied warranty that the salesperson may have been obliged to extend (or foolish enough to volunteer) as part of the sales pitch. The public policy sale occurs over three distinct phases (see Fig. 1.1). First, a sales campaign is planned, the product need is identified and a product is manufactured, the marketing campaign is prepared in cognizance of the target market and a price is determined (which as we will see sometimes comes at the expense of those who have little political power, and at other times comes at the cost of a convenient scapegoat). Second, the schmooze is executed and the target market is invited to buy the product. The final phase is after-sales care—this is where the salesperson may make adjustments to the product in an attempt to avoid a return of the product over the implied returns period. Each phase requires different skills and different tools and can result in different judgements regarding the success of the salesperson. Moreover, I argue that it is only at the very end of the lifecycle that the judgements of key stakeholders can be combined to render an overall assessment of the policy’s success and that even then the judgement would seem to be very much in the eye of the beholder (notwithstanding the fact that an entire field of scholarship, the media, and many observers spend considerable time pronouncing their judgements as if an objective measure could indeed exist). I also argue that it is important to remain mindful of the fact that there are different types of public policies that are manufactured by salespersons for very different purposes. For instance, some products have obsolescence designed into them. Examples of this kind of policy are the grand schemes that are announced by an incumbent government who knows that they will certainly lose an impending election. I don’t believe for a minute that these sort of products are meant to work or garner political support for the salesperson—they are designed to burden the next government with something that will sap its revenue and time or ultimately have it identified with something that will inevitably end in disaster (did someone say National Disability Insurance Scheme?). Other products are designed to be viewed fondly as antiques in due course—to be held up as a seminal moment in the history of a nation, even

1.2 The Public Policy Product Lifecycle

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Fig. 1.1 The public policy sales cycle

Product Development

After Sales Care

Schmooze

though they might meet with considerable opposition in the interim (perhaps legalizing same sex marriage). Yet another type of public policy product is meant to mature with age—like a fine goat cheese—an example of this might be the Kyoto Climate Protocol which was always meant to be renegotiated and reinvigorated over time. Then there are what we might call products of necessity—these aren’t desirable products and aren’t meant to excite the target market—they are products that are born because there is a need that absolutely must be met, even if meeting the need may well end badly (an example of this kind of product is the invasion of Afghanistan following 9/11—there had to be some sort of response to an attack on the American homeland even though most players probably realized that it would ultimately end in a quagmire like the Soviet invasion in the 1970s). However, this book is not about identifying types of products and establishing objective determinants of success—I will leave that for the public policy analysts to do. It is, instead, all about ensuring that public policy salespersons have the tools that they need to succeed. Accordingly, what I have just discussed will not be a feature of ensuing chapters, but will be constantly in the background of my various explications, and appealed to as necessary. However, despite the fact that the aforementioned is not a focus for this book, it is important for prospective public policy salespersons to be cognizant of the public policy product lifecycle and the different types of product out there (hence my brief discussion).

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1 Introduction

1.3 Outline of the Book This book is presented in two parts, each of which has an important pedagogical purpose. Part I is what I refer to as ‘Lessons from The Ivory Tower’–it presents the key ideas and some of the major theorists3 for what I believe to be the important ingredients to public policy success. However, it is not a textbook and it is (I hope) far from a dry academic discourse (there are plenty of those in the scholarly literature if that is the reader’s preference—I know because I have been guilty of writing some of them). Instead, it is an introduction to the quite disparate literature—all in one place and all eminently accessible—sprinkled with some real-life exemplars to add meaning and to also demonstrate why the lessons are so important. Since I started in academia I have prided myself on always seeking to give old ideas a big new twist and I have tried to do so at every opportunity throughout Part I. For me writing this book, has been an engaging (and very long) adventure, and I hope my readers will agree that it has resulted in a provocative piece. One of my heroes (Hirschman) was declared the great dissenter—I hope (or more likely I dream) that I might one day go down as a great provoker! If this book makes you angry, or curious, or perplexed, or confused—in short if it moves you out of your current comfortable intellectual abode – then I will have achieved my goal (this includes any less-than complimentary book reviews written by academics who enjoy criticizing the work of others—a common past-time for some it seems). In Chapter 2 I take on the imposing task of defining what public policy success looks like. This is no simple matter because success is not only largely in the eyes of the beholder, but it also depends a lot on when the eyes of the beholder are open. However, without a firm idea of what success will look like to different stakeholders at different times it would seem quite impossible for any prospective public policy salesperson to take deliberate actions to engineer a successful sale. I argue for the saliency of “who” one asks and “when” one asks the question, with respect to judgements on the success of a public policy sell (I leave the “why” largely to those who are intrigued with the process of the human mind rather than the outcome of the human person). Moreover, I note how the importance of “facts” and “impressions” change throughout the public policy lifecycle and the implications of same for the salesperson who must therefore give priority to certain tools at certain times. On the basis of this understanding, I propose a model of policy success that illustrates both the lens through which judgements are made at the distinct phases of the sale, and also how facts and impressions influence judgements throughout the lifecycle. I finish the chapter with a brief enumeration of the important lessons for understanding public policy success for those wishing to get a fit-for-purpose product sold to their target market and keep it sold for the duration of its implied returns period.

3

Inevitably in a book of this length—which has the sole purpose of introducing public policy students to the major strands of literature—I will miss someone who considers themselves to be a major theorist in their respective field. Should this person still live (most of the giants in the literature have sadly passed away), then I unreservedly offer my apologies.

1.3 Outline of the Book

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Chapter 3 looks at the rhetoric of a public policy sell. I start with the father of rhetoric—Aristotle—and his definition of rhetoric as finding all the available means of persuasion which might allow the rhetor to come as near to success as the circumstances allow. This is followed by contributions from more recent scholars, notably Albert Hirschman, the late great dissenter, and “one of the world’s most original social scientists” (Adelman 2013, p. vii) who claimed to have developed a taxonomy of public policy rhetoric—a claim that public policy architects and their opponents are “impelled” to argue according to just six “theses” (or lines of argument) when disputing public policy (Adelman 2013, p. 308). I then augment the work of Hirschman to also cover empirical rhetoric, before briefly considering how new communication mediums allow rhetors to tailor messages to identifiable stakeholders with great precision and thus maximize the chance of success. Thereafter I present my rhetoric heuristic chart followed by a brief discussion of the main lessons for those wishing to clinch the sale by employing rhetoric. Heresthetic—the craft of political strategy—is the lesson which I offer to my readers in Chapter 4 of the book. A term coined by the late William Riker to describe what he referred to as the art of political manipulation, heresthetic has had a chequered history in the scholarly literature, not least because of the failure to “prove” the concept empirically. Yet heresthetic—which is comprised of agenda control, voting games and dimension control—is used on a regular basis by politicians in the real world. I believe that spelling out political strategy can help to make the public policy proponent more conscious of the options available to them to structure the world so that they can win. I also extend Riker’s literature to make plain the costs (opportunity, contingency and legacy) associated with heresthetic ploys and the dynamics of heresthetic reprisals. I complete my account of this powerful yet largely neglected concept with an enumeration of the main lessons for budding public policy salespersons. The topic of the fifth chapter is blame games—a concept as old as humankind (embodied in the practice of laying one’s iniquities on the head of a scape-goat and banishing it to the wilderness) and a frequently employed tool of the political class (in particular). I explain the opportunity costs associated with the classic lightning rod strategy and use the concept of negativity bias to show why agents willingly forego possible credit and accolade in order to avoid blame. I then extend the literature to look at the emergence of two relatively recent trends in blame avoidance: the “expert brand” and deployment of weapons of mass-expertization. Both of these innovations offer great promise to the blame avoider (and public policy salesperson) but they are also prone to backfire if not carried out carefully. Consistent with all the other chapters, I present a heuristic decision chart for prospective public policy salespersons before setting out the main ways in which blame games can help to clinch the sale. In legal parlance “evidence” is given to mean “any object or information …which tends to prove or disprove the existence of a fact in issue” (Butterworths 2004, p. 156). Yet it is clear—or at least it will be for those who read this chapter— that when it comes to evidence the main aim is often to create an impression of proof rather than to rigorously establish fact. I provide my readers with an overview of the concepts (rather than detail) of how each major “proof” works. This will

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allow for an appreciation of what questions users of such proof should ask (and what questions those selling public policy on the basis of evidence should try to avoid). In addition, I discuss how information costs can be used to the public policy salesperson’s advantage. I present this information in a convenient heuristic chart and finish our account with my observations on how evidence might be best employed to clinch the sale. Part I concludes with an examination of the “moral dimension” which, as the Right Honorable Jim Hacker in Yes Minister found, can be both a compass to those charged with formulating public policy, but also a devastating weapon to use for one’s own advantage. I commence the chapter with a brief overview of ethical paradigms in order that they might demonstrate to the reader that “fair” is a very contestable concept (and moreover a concept that has changed markedly over time). In particular, I spend some time on the oft-neglected field of the natural law, which seems to me to be more important than ever in a world marred by both abandonment of reason and extreme relativism. I then show how ethics—contrary to common belief—is the bedrock of economics and how, moreover, a strict understanding and application of what is referred to as the Pareto Optimum state would mean that no public policy would ever be executed. This is followed by a brief account of how the economist’s “get out of jail card” works (and I also note how unsatisfactory the remedy is), before presenting a much more defensible position derived from (of all places) the theological treatise of St Thomas Aquinas. I chart the decisions which must be made on the “moral dimension” by public policymakers in my heuristic which follows the aforementioned explications. The chapter concludes with the main lessons on how the moral dimension can be used to sell public policy. Thus end the lessons from the Ivory Tower. Part II illustrates lessons from the school of hard knocks which our public policy makers have kindly given to us over recent years. Gone are the neat solutions to hypothetical cases that one might find in the Ivory Towers. Instead, I throw my readers into the rough and tumble of no-holds-barred disputatious public policy. Part II has two main objectives: first, I wish to show how the tools discussed in Part I can be synthesized to clinch real-life public policy sales; second, I wish to underscore that no single tool will ever be sufficient to successfully execute the “sale of the century” (another television show well-known to us senior citizens). In the first case study I examine the practical challenges of selling extremely accommodative fiscal and monetary policy. One wouldn’t think that giving away free money would be a difficult sell, but the experience of the Australian government begs to differ. In this chapter (9) I examine the sales success of economic intervention policies in response to COVID-19, with particular emphasis on avoiding buyer’s remorse. The chapter draws on Part I of Selling Public Policy with a view to showing how students of this work might have been expected to have optimised outcomes with respect to selling fiscal and monetary response in the years immediately following the pandemic outbreak. Notably, our application of theory to real world problems uncovers some new lessons regarding the attributes of suitable scapegoats and also underlines the critical importance of properly acknowledging legacy costs with respect to election cycles.

1.4 What This Book Is

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The second case study focuses on Putin’s attempts to sell his ‘special military operation’ to the world. In this chapter (10) I focus on what might be learned from examining policy failure. This second case study also draws heavily on Part I of Selling Public Policy with a view to showing how students of this work might have made different choices leading up to, and in the aftermath, of hostilities. Once again new lessons are uncovered—such as the futility of trying to avoid unavoidable words with unexamined power—and old lessons (such as the importance of salami tactic heresthetics) are underlined. Notably, the context of the chapter is not meant to be an endorsement of the war or anyone’s position regarding war—instead war is portrayed as a sad consequence of human failings and probably the trickiest matter for public policy salespersons to navigate. I believe that these case studies of some of the most imposing public policy challenges of modern history provide strong demonstration of the importance of competently selling public policy. I trust that my readers will agree.

1.4 What This Book Is First, and foremost, I have endeavored to provide an entertaining read. When it comes to learning, the old maxim “no gain, no pain” may often be true, but I do not feel that it must be true. To achieve this objective I have tried hard to resist the academic urge to impress with big words and jargon (although I concede that I have not always been successful), and have attempted to defy years of (probably well-meaning) academic training that tends to suppress disclosure of opinions and original thought. Readers will get to know what I think on a range of matters— and no-doubt some will disagree vehemently with me—and will also be exposed to original thinking (rather than thinking constrained to academic precedent). I hope that by largely setting aside the straight-jacket of stodgy academic writing, I can enter into a meaningful dialogue with you, the reader. Moreover, it is my hope that you find this dialogue engaging, just as I have found the more relaxed dialogue of some of my scholarly heroes (Maimonides, Riker, Hirschman, Ronald Coase—all of whom were never shy to tell the reader exactly what they thought about a matter), both entertaining and refreshing. I often lament that academia has become bogged down in recent decades—by the constraints of precedent, also a kind of laziness owing to cheap computing power which promotes empirical work over rational thought, and a ‘group-think’ of sorts—and I guess the kind of conversation I have tried to engage in here, is my small effort to reverse what I perceive to be a worrying trend. This book is also a toolkit for public policy salespersons. The whole motivation for this project is to improve the state of public policy selling—so it was important for me to link the theory to practice at every opportunity. Otherwise stated, this book is geared towards applied learning. One of the important elements of the book are the heuristic decision charts, which lead the public policy salesperson through the steps and decisions which must be made to successfully sell public policy. The other important way that I have sought to ensure that the lessons might be applied is through

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presenting examples and case studies so that the public policy student might learn through vicarious experience (the rationale Riker 1986 also used for his case-study like approach). If this book is successful in just two things—making public policy salespersons recognize their craft, and encouraging salespersons to stop and plan their sales campaign—then I will leave the project a happy man. This book is also an overview of the major theorists and ideas relevant to selling public policy—all located in a single volume and in an accessible manner. For too long, the art of selling public policy has been compartmentalized in the various disciplines that make up academia (specifically in political science, economics, ethics and the arts). I want to show how these different academic approaches can be distilled for their primary essence (Part I) then synthesized (Part II) to yield a complex yet desirable bouquet which we all intuitively recognize as public policy success. By introducing the reader to major ideas and theorists I hope to start you on what might well be a life-long journey into the world of public policy sales success. However, more than anything else, this book is a plea and hope for better public policy sells.

1.5 What This Book Is Not This is not a textbook—nor is it meant to convey in-depth knowledge of every discipline relevant to selling public policy. Each chapter has a reference list to guide further reading should the consumer of this book wish to pursue a particular topic in further detail. For instance, in the evidence chapter, I explain what statistical significance is and outline some of the problems with multiple regression, but I don’t attempt to teach the math and assumptions which underlie econometrics. If the reader has a desire to torture themselves, then there are plenty of good econometrics books out there (as well as university courses in the sub-discipline). Nor is this book merely a series of lessons from the Ivory Tower: of course, I have to cover the scholarly literature but anyone expecting that the book will have copious references to academic papers will be sorely disappointed. I often joke that my wife introduces me to people at parties as “my husband who gets paid to write papers which get published in other countries, about things that no-one is interested in and on matters which no-one does anything about”. I hope, through the pages of this book, to finally prove her wrong!

References Adelman J (2013) The essential Hirschman. Princeton University Press, Princeton Beigun S (2018) In U.S. Department of State. Remarks on the appointment of special representative for North Korea Stephen Beigun. Available at: https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2018/08/ 285370.htm. Accessed 14 October 2018

References

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Butt P (2004) Butterworth’s concise Australian legal dictionary. Butterworths, Chatswood Haseltine W (2021) What can we learn from Australia’s COVID-19 response? Forbes, 24 March 2021. Available at: https://www.forbes.com/sites/williamhaseltine/2021/03/24/what-canwe-learn-from-australias-covid-19-response/?sh=74abe4bc3a01 Lynn J, Jay A (1988) The complete “Yes Prime Minister”. BBC Books, St Ives Meers Z (2018) A year of turmoil, but Trump’s voters are with him. Australian Broadcasting Corporation. Available at: http://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-01-19/donald-trump-remains-pop ular-with-republicans-after-a-year/9333378. Accessed 14 September 2018 Quinn B (2012) A brief history of the pasty tax. The Guardian, 29 May 2012. Available at: https:// www.theguardian.com/politics/2012/may/29/pasty-tax-brief-history. Accessed 14 September 2018 Riker WH (1982) Liberalism against populism: a confrontation between the theory of democracy and the theory of social choice. Waveland Press, Illinois Riker W (1986) The art of political manipulation. Yale University Press, New Haven Trump D (2017) Associate Press. Trump threatens North Korea with “fire and fury”. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/video/us/politics/100000005346140/north-korea-trumpthreat-fire-fury.html. Accessed 14 October 2018

Chapter 2

Public Policy Success: What Constitutes a Successful Sale?

Abstract The mission of the public policy salesperson is to sell a ‘suitable’ product to their target market and keep the product sold for the duration of the implied returns period. I argue that successful achievement of this mission requires the salesperson to be attuned to how facts and impressions are received at various stages of the sales life-cycle by different stakeholders who are subject to dynamic cultural and political contexts. To build a model that can be operationalised by the public policy salesperson I first review the most important contributions to the scholarly literature on defining policy success and failure. I then explicate on how cognisance of the rhetorical concept of kairos, shifting distributions of costs and benefits over time, as well as framing contests (conducted principally through the media and commissions of inquiry) can help the public policy salespersons to ensure that a successful sale stays sold over the implied returns period. I conclude by presenting a model for public policy success that draws attention to how the public policy sales pitch is processed by stakeholders to arrive at judgements regarding the success of a given policy at critical phases in the public policy journey. Keywords Policy success · Kairos · Framing contests · Selling public policy

2.1 What Is Public Policy Success? This book is orientated towards public policy success for a particular actor—the public policy salesperson. As detailed in Chapter 1, the mission of the public policy salesperson is to sell a ‘suitable’ product to their target market and keep the product sold for the duration of the implied returns period. A suitable product need not necessarily be a ‘good’ product (assuming there was indeed an objective measure by which a product could be evaluated) and I have previously outlined how products may be designed with different objectives in mind—for instance, some products are designed for obsolescence, other products are designed for the purpose of eventually being regarded as antiques, some products are meant to mature with age (like a fine goats cheese), whilst a different class of product is never intended to be desirable (and maybe not even be popular for the long-term) but rather is simply born from necessity. I also noted how political pragmatism differs from warm fuzzy notions © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 J. Drew, Selling Public Policy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-0381-8_2

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of democratic leadership implying that a product need only be sold to a politically defined target market. In addition, I noted that the task of the public policy salesperson extends beyond the sales campaign and schmooze, and includes an after-sales care period that extends for the length of the implied returns period1 (which is constituted by external parameters—such as the political term—and also any warranty period promised by the salesperson). My efforts are entirely and unashamedly focussed on providing public policy salespersons with the tools they need to experience success. However, the scholarly community, by contrast, has been largely preoccupied with the study of public policy failures—moreover scholars have generally sought to argue that objective criteria for failure can be determined. For instance, two of the leading scholars of public policy failure—Mark Boven and Paul t’Hart (2016, p. 655)—recently made a claim that ‘few observers w[ould] hesitate to attach the label ‘policy failure’ to spectacular, unambiguous and highly consequential mishaps…such as the United States-led invasion of Iraq’. I believe that a claim of this type—based on hindsight and located in a particular context of time, culture and profession—may not receive quite the level of assent that these authors might believe that it deserves (and hence provides support for my view that judgements on public policy success and failure are subject to a good deal of relativism). Indeed, I would argue that whether or not persons hesitate or even refuse to attach the label ‘policy failure’ to the invasion of Iraq is largely contingent on who we ask and when we asked them. For instance, we might well expect hesitation and perhaps outright hostility towards Boven and t’Hart’s claim if the ‘who’ was a member of the American armed services, or the parent of a fallen serviceperson, who often take great pride in their accomplishment and sacrifice. Moreover, a ‘who’ from the Iraqi Shia Muslim community—who had been brutally persecuted under President Hussein—might also disagree with the aforementioned scholars. By way of contrast, if we were to ask a ‘who’ from the Ba’ath Party or the Sunni minority we might be more likely to elicit sentiments consistent with the august scholars. Even among the American public, perceptions of whether the invasion of Iraq was a success, is split along political lines—in 2018, 50% of Conservatives, but just 18% of Liberals, viewed the U.S. involvement in Iraq to be a success (Oliphant 2018). However, it also seems that success or failure judgements are strongly dependent on when we ask our question. For instance, President Bush proudly declared on May 1, 2003 that ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom was carried out with a combination of precision and speed and boldness the enemy did not expect and the world had not seen before’ under a banner reading ‘mission accomplished’ (CNN 2003a), but in 2008 admitted that the ‘Iraq war [is] my biggest regret’. Similarly, intelligence officials who probably applauded the successful invasion of Iraq as a means through which to hunt for and neutralise Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in mid-2003, probably saw the invasion in a completely different light by the time of the 1

Here I refer to the retail concept of a returns period—this is the maximum time period for which a retail store will accept a return of a product for refund due to either change of mind, failure of product to be fit-for-purpose, or a warranty claim.

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Chilcot inquiry (cited in BBC 2016) where it was determined that ‘policy on the Iraq invasion was made on the basis of flawed intelligence assessments’. Indeed, public opinion in America has changed significantly over time—when asked whether ‘the U.S. mostly succeeded in achieving its goals in Iraq’ 56% of Pew Center respondents agreed in 2011, but this figure had reduced to just 39% by 2018 (Oliphant 2018). Thus it should be clear that the judgement of scholars in 2016 writing from the safe confines of their campuses with the benefit of 20–20 hindsight, is likely to be quite different from those who experienced persecution under President Hussein, or served in the armed forces, or lost loved ones in the invasion, or supported the invasion according to flawed intelligence, or hold hawkish political views. Moreover, the judgements of these persons may well have changed over time, as has the story of what exactly prompted the invasion, how the invasion and post-war recovery transpired, and what political and human costs were incurred. Actual facts have changed over time as have our impressions of the facts—and the changes and relative importance of these dimensions will have been different for particular stakeholders. Just as the totality of memories and emotions associated with a failed relationship fade over time, to be replaced with memories and emotions of selected events (which invariably paint a more rosy picture of the relationship than was held at the time of the break-up), so too do our recollections and pathos associated with public policy events (indeed, how the event was experienced—whether we were the ‘dumper’ or the ‘dumpee’—determines in part the emotions and memories that we experience in the first instance). This is the human condition—to avoid being crushed by emotion and memories, we must prune some from our consciousness, and reconstitute the remnants over time into a story that often deviates from the recollections of others witnessing exactly the same events or even ourselves at different moments of time. There is no reason to believe that this experience will be materially different when it relates to significant public policy events. Some might argue that judgements of ‘success’ or ‘failure’ represent a false dichotomy—that they are inappropriate for weighty and complex public policy events and that there are many grey areas in between the two dichotomous points (see, for instance, McConnell 2010). In response, I would point out that it may not be wise, or even just, to make dichotomous judgements, but note that people do in fact do so most of the time. We judge whether something was an accident or not, whether an act was evil or not, whether a person will be hired or not, whether an accused is guilty of murder or not, whether multiple sacrifices on earth will be rewarded in an afterlife or not.….many complex and weighty questions in life are met with dichotomous judgements. Moreover, for the public policy salesperson charged with planning a sales campaign and schmooze, ringing up the sale, and after-sales care things really might be that simple—the sale is made, or it is not made; it stays sold over the implied returns period or it is returned for a refund. I believe that policy salespersons will experience more success in selling public policy if they know what a successful sale looks like and understand the key elements of a sale that need to be considered at discrete temporal periods in the sales journey. In particular, understanding how facts and impressions weigh on certain stakeholders at different times will help the public policy salesperson sell the product and keep

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it sold. I commence with a brief overview of the literature regarding public policy failure and success. Thereafter I consider some of the lessons from other fields of scholarship that might be applied to defining and specifying the ingredients for public policy success from the perspective of the public policy salesperson. I conclude by presenting a model for public policy success that draws attention to how the public policy sales pitch is processed by stakeholders to arrive at judgements regarding the success of a given policy at critical phases in the public policy journey.

2.2 Lessons from the Literature An important place to start one’s review of the literature is Boven and t’Hart’s (1996) seminal work Understanding Policy Fiascos. In this short, engaging and accessible book, the scholars raised a number of themes and ideas which they later refined in subsequent journal papers. For instance, the idea that failure can be measured along two orthogonal dimensions—program (actual outcomes—facts) or politics (impressions, images and symbols) is briefly introduced. Similarly, the idea that judgements of failure are contingent on stakeholders (different people judge things differently), dynamics of time (that judgements change over time), cultural and political context (that judgements are affected by cultural and political bias) are all covered. However, despite spending some time on these important ideas the authors conclude that they are ‘reluctant to adopt a fully relativist position’ (Bovens and t’Hart 1996, p. 147), maintaining that in ‘some cases the physical and symbolic manifestations are so powerful as to allow for little if any debate about the question “is this really a fiasco?” (emphasis added). As noted in the introduction, I beg to differ because I believe that actual human experience tends to be extremely relativistic—there will always be disagreement regarding whether a public policy was a success depending on who one asks and when one asks.2 The judgements of individual persons may not be rational, may result from misconceptions or even errors in fact, but they will inevitably differ. The authors also took pains to defend their focus on fiascos rather than successes—claiming that ‘at least as much can be learned from studying failure than from studying success’ (p. 156), and that they incidentally ‘in fact developed a framework for studying policy success’ (p. 157). As noted earlier, given that the current work is orientated towards the successful sale of public policy it is probably unsurprising to the reader that I disagree with these scholar’s rear-guard defence. Allan McConnell (2010), also disagreed with Bovens and t’Hart in a number of fundamental matters with respect to the study of public policy success and failure. First, and most importantly, he argued persuasively for a reorientation of public policy analysis towards success rather than failure (and strangely enough I concur). Failure may be more interesting to study, but it is undoubtedly the boring day-today successes—that never grab the headlines—that society depends on. Moreover, 2

Bovens and t’Hart (1996, p. 148) also explicated on the importance of determining ‘who sees what and why’.

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if all scholars ever did was to study failure it would be hard to see how these crucial best practices would ever get improved or disseminated. Second, McConnell (2010, p. 357) proposed that public policy could be assessed according to a third dimension, namely process (‘get[ting] decisions taken and legislation passed’) although in this instance I agree with Bovens (2010) that ‘process that led to the adoption of a policy can also be analysed both from a programmatic and from a political perspective’ thus meaning that it can’t possibly be an orthogonal dimension for analysis. Third, McConnell (2010, pp. 353–354) abandons the dichotomy of success and failure in favour of a four-part typology composed of: Resilient success (‘levels of opposition is more than government bargained for, but is nevertheless outweighed by levels of support’), conflicted success (‘it achieves its policy making goals in some respects, but has to backtrack or make significant modifications along the way’), precarious success (where ‘short-term success cannot be sustained’), and failure—but, once again, I find myself disagreeing with him. Precarious success will either remain a success or become a failure—this still amounts to a dichotomous judgement, but one dependent on the when. Conflicted success, is still success—merely a success that has been maintained by making some changes during the implied returns period to the product to keep it sold, and hence looks different depending on when it is judged—and resilient success seems to simply be a success that has not been judged by quite as many whos as the government may have hoped for (moreover, as I noted in Chapter 1, the pragmatic politician may only be interested in selling a product to their key target market in any case). In sum, the dichotomy of success and failure survives McConnell’s brave assault, but I note that his innovation does, indirectly, point to the importance of who makes the judgement and when it is made. Bovens and t’Hart (2016, p. 656) continued to refine their ideas over succeeding decades of scholarship culminating in a greater focus on the two dimensions of policy analysis which they define succinctly in the following terms, which bear repeating: ‘Programmatic evaluation [that] pertains to the world of facts and social balance sheets: observable costs and benefits, original intentions and eventual outcomes’, and ‘political evaluation…[that] pertains to the world of impressions: lived experiences, stories, counterframes, heroes and villains’.

These two dimensions, the authors argue, give rise to four (it seems this is every policy analysts’ favourite number) evaluations: success (which results from both a favourable political and programmatic assessment), tragedy (successful as a program, but not politically), farce (successful politically but not as a program), and fiasco (neither politically nor programmatically successful). One can’t help but think that this schema has gone a little too far in separating out the dimensions, and has lost sight of the who and the when. For instance, tragedy seems to be the view from political agents and their supporters who have failed, whilst the farce seems to be the view from disappointed members of the political opposition and persons intimately acquainted with the facts. Thus, the ‘who’ seems to be critical to the two ‘intermediate’ evaluations, and the ‘when’ seems to be missing in action entirely. The difficulties coming up with objective assessments are astutely noted by Bovens and t’Hart (2016, p. 654) who declare that there is ‘no Archimedean point, no self-evident

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yardstick’. They also point out the relativity of judgements regarding the frequency of public policy failure (which, of course, is proportional to the increasing levels of meddling that government plays in the lives of its hapless citizens—from regulating the sale of paracetamol (I kid you not) and making possession of a slingshot unlawful (police and baddies get guns) to deciding on who one can sleep with,3 Big Brother really is making public policy on you (at increasing frequency in Australia and abroad—see, for example, Donnison 2015; Lewis 2018). Quite simply, with more public policy comes more opportunities for failure (and thankfully more jobs for policy salespersons and policy analysts). The last piece of scholarship that I will survey is a recent paper by Ugyel and O’Flynn (2017) on evaluating success in public sector reform in Bhutan. The big contribution of this paper was to bring into starker relief the importance of when policy evaluation is conducted and to clearly articulate that ‘temporal aspects of perceptions are central to understanding policy success’ (Ugyel and O’Flynn 2017, p. 124). In particular the authors detail the importance of ex post evaluations to balance ex ante studies, and moreover, how evaluations might be expected to change as the years go by (that is, an argument that time within the ex post phase is also critical to the nature of evaluations).

2.2.1 A View of Policy Success for the Public Policy Salesperson It is one thing to critique the work of others and quite a different matter to put forward one’s own ideas that will inevitably attract critique. In our motivating case study (the invasion of Iraq) and throughout my review of the literature I have tried to underline the importance of who one asks and when one asks, with respect to the type of judgements that will be made on public policy matters. I believe that judgements are principally contingent on the who and when, and that we can only try to understand the why (because often even those making the judgements will be unable to articulate their reasons). The ‘who’ is defined in the mission of the public policy salesperson, that is, the target market informed by political reality. The ‘when’, I would argue, is also tied to the public policy sales process—specifically the schmooze, ringing up the sale, and over the after-sales care period as defined by the implied returns term. At each stage of the sales journey the public policy salesperson needs to give particular attention to distinct sales techniques, important stakeholders and potential risks. Notably, while I reject the idea that judgements about success lie along a four point continuum (perhaps I just don’t like the number as much as Bovens, t’Hart, or 3

Prime Minister Turnbull famously banned sexual relationships between Ministers and staff, and some universities have recently made sexual consent training mandatory for students and staff— both policy interventions into the bedrooms of citizens were probably born of pure motives, but it does go to show that nothing is off bounds to the public policy architect in this modern enlightened world of ours.

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McConnell), I do accept that it is helpful to view the why according to two, more or less, orthogonal dimensions (facts and impressions). This doesn’t mean that I believe that all stakeholders use both dimensions, or even that they could articulate the reason for their judgements, simply that I see facts and impressions as a helpful way through which the public policy salesperson can plan the campaign, schmooze the public, ring up the sale, and prevent product returns. An initial working definition of public policy success for public policy salespersons could therefore take the following form: Success to the public policy salesperson is to sell a ‘suitable’ product to their target market and keep it sold for the implied returns period. This requires that the salesperson is attuned to how facts and impressions are received at various stages of the sales life-cycle by different stakeholders who are subject to dynamic cultural and political contexts.

Returning to our Iraq invasion example for a moment, and putting ourselves in the shoes of President Bush, we can briefly glimpse the utility of our definition. In this example, our friend President Bush was the salesperson-in-chief and the ‘suitable’ product was the invasion of Iraq. I do not assert that President Bush considered this to be the ‘best’ product possible (he may well have understood that his troops would ultimately be bogged down in a remote war zone for decades)—but in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks the American public needed to see a strong response and the invasion may well have been a product born of necessity. The target market in this particular example changed somewhat over time—there were moments when President Bush sought to sell the product to the international community (especially during the initial sales campaign), American citizens (during the schmooze and after-sales care periods) and even Iraqi citizens and military personnel (proximate to ringing up the sale). The implied returns period was similarly associated with the target market: when seeking to obtain international support and hence a measure of legitimacy for the action most of the emphasis would have been placed on avoiding ‘returns’ during the invasion and early occupation; with respect to the support of American citizens the critical returns period was bounded by the upcoming presidential elections (November, 2004), and the most crucial time for maintaining support from Iraqis was the invasion itself and the time that it was expected for weapons of mass destruction and key regime personnel to be located and neutralised. Moreover it was important for the salesperson-in-chief to be cognisant of how facts and impressions were portrayed to key stakeholders over the product lifecycle, and there is evidence that he tried to accommodate same. For example, when President Bush stood under the now infamous banner ‘mission accomplished’ on the USS Abraham Lincoln and quoted from Isaiah Chapter 49 verse 9, it was clear that he was attempting to create positive impressions chiefly amongst conservative Christian voters, who represented his key electoral base. However, when the allegations of prisoner abuse surfaced in 2004, impressions of righteous behaviour were quickly replaced with facts of sodomy and other acts which are condemned by all three monotheistic faiths. Facts and impressions changed throughout the sales lifecycle and there is some reason to believe that President Bush was not always attuned to such changes.

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In the next section I explicate on why it is important for salespersons to be closely attuned to the dynamics of shifts in costs and benefits, emergence of kairotic events, and framing contests.

2.3 New Approaches for the Public Policy Salesperson Everything I describe in the succeeding chapters has relevance for the job of selling public policy and keeping it sold over the implied returns period. However, three ideas seem particularly important at this juncture: the distribution of costs and benefits over time, kairos, and framing contests (specifically the role of the media and Commissions of Inquiry in same).

2.3.1 The Distributions of Costs and Benefits Over Time Costs and benefits of any public policy are rarely distributed evenly amongst stakeholders, nor do they remain constant over time. If we were to look at just one set of stakeholders—the American public—the truth of this assertion becomes clear. For instance, the cost of the Iraq invasion certainly wasn’t distributed evenly—some Americans paid with their lives, some through their taxes (one estimate put the cost at $3 trillion USD), and others seem to have largely escaped any cost at all. Similarly, benefits were not distributed evenly—people fearful of weapons of mass destruction probably benefited more than others, as did those who had fled Iraq and been granted asylum in the USA. Moreover, costs and benefits did not remain static over time. Sticking with our example of American stakeholders, and focussing on the most poignant cost—loss of life—facts suggest that they were much higher after the ‘mission accomplished’ speech than they had been at any time leading up to same (for example, 134 U.S. military personnel had lost their lives prior to ‘mission accomplished’, but a further 3,924 died in the five years following President Bush’s speech). Further complicating matters is the fact that only a portion of Americans would have been considered to be the target market, and the distribution and shifts among the broader public probably differed significantly to this group of persons. The astute public policy salesperson will be cognisant of the initial concentration of costs and benefits, and also the way that costs and benefits change over time because the concentration of costs and benefits is likely to be proportional to the expected levels of support or opposition for the public policy. Moreover, given the evidence that most people suffer from negativity bias—the idea that people are more sensitive to losses than gains of a similar magnitude—suggests that the public policy salesperson should pay particular attention to shifts in costs over time (Weaver 1986, p. 373—see also Chapter 5). Indeed, it is this quirk of human nature, in concert with varying distributions of costs and benefits over time, that may well create distinct moments of kairos.

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2.3.2 Kairos Kairos is the qualitative aspect of time that stands in contrast to the chronos which is the quantitative face with which modern persons are more familiar. Essentially, it is the idea that there is a propitious moment for all things, a time when the stars will align and good fortune will follow (I discuss this idea at greater length in Chapter 3). Kairos is an essential, but a rather neglected, aspect of rhetoric. Because of the changing distribution of costs and benefits, it is important for the public policy salesperson to remain vigilant with respect to emerging kairotic moments. For instance, most opponents of the Iraq invasion perceived correctly that May 1, 2003 (President Bush’s victory speech) was not a propitious moment to attack the public policy. Moreover, it was not necessary to launch an attack on the policy at this juncture in time given that the planned temporary occupation of Iraq would undoubtedly give rise to kairotic moments—such as the inevitable reckoning of fiscal costs by the Congressional Budget Office, tragic moments of civilian deaths, and casualties among the occupying military forces. Indeed, ‘the fewer [the] deaths, the easier it is for news organisations to show every fallen soldier and frame the war’s cost in human terms’ and thus create kairotic moments for opponents to exploit at their leisure (Feaver cited in Tankersely and Parsons, 2008). Opponents simply had to bide their time and wait for the certainty of a more propitious moment in which to embark on framing contests.

2.3.3 Framing Contests Framing contest occur between supporters and opponents of a public policy in response to a kairotic event. Boin, t’Hart and McConnell (2009, pp. 85, 87), present a useful framework regarding the determinants of framing contests—notwithstanding their neglect of kairos—which focusses on the significance of the event (which they refer to as ‘ripple or crisis’), and the causality attributed to the event (‘incident or symptom’). Supporters of a policy will seek to downplay the significance of an event or the causality (or sometimes both), and opponents will seek to play up same. For example, President Bush referred to the tactics and precision of weapons employed in the invasions but acknowledged that ‘no device of man can remove the tragedy from war, yet it is a great advance when the guilty have far more to fear from war than the innocent’. In so doing, he didn’t seek to downplay the significance of civilian casualties, but did reject causality (the deaths are blamed on the vagaries of war, and also on the evil men responsible for 9/11, and of course on ‘a dangerous and aggressive regime’; CNN 2003a). The fact that support among Americans for the invasion was initially estimated at 71% suggests that President Bush won the initial framing contest (Oliphant 2018).

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However, a year later when a report of sexual abuse of prisoners emerged, President Bush came out very strongly in voicing his ‘deep disgust that those prisoners were treated the way they were treated… that’s not the way we do things in America’ (CNN 2004). Arguably the significance—whilst appalling—was not quite as pronounced as the deaths of civilians during the invasion, but despite censor from the Commander-in-Chief and a swift and strong military law response, supporters of the invasion seem to have lost the framing contest (as evidenced by a fall in support for the invasion to just 55%). The crucial factor, exploited by opponents to win the framing contest, seems to have been causality—American military personnel, in situ as a direct result of the invasion, had deliberately abused the prisoners—and there was no getting around this fact. The mass media plays a critical role in framing contests. One view of the media’s role is that supporters and opponents of a given public policy compete to capture the attention and support of the media in their framing war (Boin et al. 2009). Under this view the way that salespersons handle themselves is the major determinant of who wins the framing war. An alternate view is that the media frames an issue according to its own bias and organises material to achieve its agenda (see Chapter 4 for a discussion of the heresthetic of media reporting). This bias will be distributed according to the nationality of the media (undoubtedly the American media reported the invasion of Iraq in very different terms to the Iraqi media), and the political bias within national media (in the USA Fox is generally thought to have a conservative bias, whilst the Huffington Post is often considered to be left-leaning). My own experience with the media suggests that this latter view, of the media as herestheticians, is certainly valid in some instances. When the media do manipulate the public, then the performance of the salesperson is less important—however, it can still prove to be critical, as even the best heresthetician cannot make an opponent salesperson look uncaring, guilty, or inept without some material to work with. Another way in which framing contests may be played out is through commissions of inquiry set up to investigate a crisis (although given that almost no-one ever reads the entire report, media reporting, and hence media bias, is still important). Independent inquiries are a widely employed heresthetic (see Chapter 4) to assert agenda control and it would appear, at first sight, that the incumbent government holds all the cards when it comes to influencing the outcomes of commissions of inquiry—most importantly, the government selects the commissioner and it sets the terms of reference for the inquiry. However, Sir Humphrey Appelby, and many of his real-life contemporaries shy away from inquiries citing ‘two basic rules of government: Never look into anything that you don’t have to. And never set up an inquiry unless you know in advance what its findings will be’ (Lynn and Jay 1988, p. 453). The main trouble, it seems, is that it is difficult to know, with a satisfactory level of certainty what the findings will be. Sure, a ‘suitable’ person, ostensibly independent and eminent, can be sounded out and appointed to head an inquiry (which is bounded by ‘suitable’ terms of reference), but the devil of the matter is that the ‘sound’ person can succumb at the ‘“fateful day” of existential choice’ and go rogue, rather than acquiesce as expected (Grant et al. 2015, p. 32). Otherwise stated, there is a choice to be made, by the commissioner, between integrity and personal

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reputation, on the one hand, and doing the job for which they were commissioned on the other—and it is, for some, a perplexing fact that commissioners may place greater value in avoiding regret in the future, than doing what is required in the present (and hence demonstrating their loyalty to those who commissioned them in the present). When this occurs, commissions of inquiry may end up framing the crisis in a way that does not suit the incumbent politicians. Moreover, because the fortunes of governments and individual politicians wax and wane—and because it is in the interests of those working on the commission to prolong their employment and hence maximise their utility—it is entirely possible that the commissioner may ultimately report to a government of a different political bias than the one which set up the inquiry and therefore do so within different bounds of loyalty. Add to this, the potential for media to ‘re-frame the frame’ and it quickly becomes apparent that Sir Humphrey Appleby’s advice was sound—an inquiry is something to be avoided wherever possible, and heavily influenced whenever it is not. Our brief review of three important influences on public policy success suggests that keeping the public policy product sold to various stakeholders who constitute the target market requires the salesperson to be on constant alert for kairotic events (particularly one-off poignant events), constantly monitoring the shifting distribution of costs and benefits (and perhaps placate some stakeholders through remedial design should a concentration of costs threaten the balance of support within the target market), and remain constantly vigilant with respect to framing contests (seeking to nullify same wherever they threaten to alter the target markets’ satisfaction with the product). With this knowledge in hand I can now put forward a model to guide salespersons seeking to sell a public policy and keep it sold, during three critical phases of time, and in cognisance of dynamic cultural and political contexts in which both facts and impressions may hold sway.

2.4 A Guide to Using Policy Success to Clinch the Sale In the succeeding chapters I will outline five distinct tools for selling public policy to the target market and keeping it sold for the implied returns period: rhetoric (use of the pathos (emotions), ethos (portrayed character of the rhetor) and logos (reasoning to prove an apparent truth) to come as close as possible to selling the public policy product as the circumstances allow; Chapter 3), heresthetic (the strategy of politics; Chapter 4), blame games (use of lightning rod strategies and weapons of mass expertisation; Chapter 5), evidence (how to put together supporting evidence in a way that reduces the likelihood of contestation; Chapter 6), and ethics (how to tailor rhetoric and remedies to accommodate people’s ideas of right and wrong; Chapter 7). Each tool is important, but not sufficient, in its own right for the public policy sales journey. Moreover, the relative importance of each tool is not uniform but rather waxes and wanes throughout the journey as will become evident in our case studies of selling COVID stimulus (Chapter 9) and selling the Ukraine war (Chapter 10).

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Figure 2.1 is a depiction of a model for public policy success. Those of my readers who studied high-school physics have probably noted already that our model looks very similar to a ray diagram for a divergent lens. If you haven’t noticed this similarity there is no cause for alarm—I don’t presume that my readers studied physics, and I promise to refrain from a detailed science lesson here. All you need to know is that three rays of light can be traced from a single object (labelled A), which in our example is a public policy. Each of these rays passes through a divergent lens (which represent specific stakeholders in the target market; labelled B) which bends the rays and projects them to points on the right of the lens (labelled C, D and E respectively). Because these rays diverge no real image is formed. However, if one traces the rays back in a straight line (which I have marked in as a dotted line) then they do indeed converge at a point between the object and the lens on the left-hand side (labelled G). In physics this is referred to as a virtual image—to the observer it appears to be an image, but if we were to place a white sheet of paper or a projector screen on the left hand side of the diagram at point G, we wouldn’t see any picture there at all.4 By employing a model based on a divergent lens I seek to emphasise that the judgements made by specific stakeholders who constitute the target market at each phase of the public policy journey may differ markedly and that it is only at the end of a journey that one can really seek to grasp at a picture of whether the entire policy has been perceived to be a success by the stakeholder (but even then what an observer ‘sees’ is only a virtual image, a mere tracing-back of points that are specific to the stakeholder, that defies objective measurement). At each temporal phase of the public policy, rays are projected from the object to the divergent lens where information and events are processed by the stakeholder according to their intellect, cultural and political bias. What reaches the stakeholder is not the actual object, but rather the portrayal of the object through the five tools that I discuss in this book (rhetoric, heresthetic, blame games, evidence, ethics). In the sales campaign and initial schmooze, facts dominate—why is there a need for intervention, what will the intervention cost, what will the intervention achieve—and thus, evidence will be of critical importance; but also this is the time for heresthetic manoeuvres and blame games to be planned which may alter the way in which facts are received by the stakeholder. Whilst facts dominate in the sales campaign and initial schmooze, impressions are still important therefore the public policy salesperson will still need to pay due attention to rhetoric and ethics. The ray thus projected passes through the stakeholder who perceives costs and benefits and hence makes a judgement regarding the success of the public policy at the particular phase of time. Judgements are formed in a similar manner in the ringing up of the sale. Now new facts are being created (for instance, actual cost information is starting to be accumulated) and impressions (about how the implementation is proceeding against plans) are starting to take on greater significance. At this phase heresthetic and 4

Just like a mirror on a wall, we perceive a virtual image that appears to be staring out at us from the mirror, but it cannot be considered to be a real image (because the only thing on the other side of the mirror is the wall).

Fig. 2.1 A heuristic for success in selling public policy

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rhetoric are being employed to focus stakeholder attention on matters most conducive to the public policy salesperson’s cause, and those to whom the salesperson hopes to ultimately deflect blame are being brought out before the public in case their public sacrifice later becomes necessary. Moreover, the portrayed ethics of the salesperson and policy are being projected to stakeholders as is the evidence of success. The after-sales care phase is more difficult to define than the sales campaign and ringing up of the sale phases, in part because it may last months, years or even decades depending on the nature of the public policy. The principle determinants of the after-sales care period are generally likely to be the electoral cycle (the 55th quadrennial election in November 2004 in one sense marked the time where it was no longer critical for the salesperson-in-chief to have the support of his electoral base) and warranties (the promise made to Iraqis to ‘rebuild…then leave’ (Bush cited in CNN 2003b)) offered or implied during the sales campaign. There are however a few other seminal factors that will affect the calls made upon the salesperson during the after-sales care period. For example, a public policy that can’t be reversed (because the egg has been thoroughly scrambled (see Chapter 4)) provides less motivation to opponents to prod and poke around the policy looking for contrary evidence. In addition, the emergence of kairotic moments—sometimes entirely unpredictable (such as the rise of ISIS in Iraq)—is a sure way to provoke an exhumation and autopsy of a public policy corpse. In the after-sales care period, impressions dominate. This is the point at which one’s scapegoat5 is sent into the wilderness, rhetoric (particularly the ethos and pathos) becomes important in framing contests, judgements are made regarding the ethics of the policy and salesperson, and evidence emerges to support or refute the contention that the policy was a success (see Chapter 6 regarding the malleability of evidence). The heresthetician may still be called upon for their ability to raise new dimensions, block votes of no confidence or impeachment in parliament, or set the agenda (through selection of ‘suitable’ commissioners and terms of reference, should a commission of inquiry prove unavoidable). Thus, it can be seen that different tools come to the fore at different phases in the public policy journey. Public policy salespersons must seek to tailor the tools to both the specific policy and the stakeholder to which they direct their pitch. Moreover, it is not until the after sales care period has been exhausted that a virtual image of public policy success can begin to replace disparate points of projection arrived at during each phase of the public policy sales journey. Planning a sales campaign and schmooze is critical, but does not in itself determine success. Similarly executing a great schmooze can have the stakeholder begging to purchase the public policy product, but it is not quite the same as ringing up the sale. Even when the sale has been concluded, success is not guaranteed—the stakeholder may have second thoughts and try to return the product for a refund, or find a defect in the product and make a warranty claim, or decide they just don’t like it anymore. Thus the public policy salesperson must remain constantly on alert ready to convince important 5

The term scapegoat is derived from the Judaeo-Christian tradition. On the Day of Atonement two goat kids were taken; the first was sacrificed, and the second goat (chosen by lot) was cast out into the wilderness to carry the community’s sins away from the camp.

References

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stakeholders that the product, contrary to their perception or the perceptions of others, really remains suitable. Otherwise stated public policy success for the sales person is selling the suitable product and keeping it sold for the duration of the returns period, by ensuring that shifting distributions of costs and benefits, kairotic moments and the framing efforts of one’s rivals (in particular) are not allowed to generate a level of buyer’s remorse in the target market sufficient to result in wide-spread product returns. In sum, understanding public policy success has a lot to offer the public policy salesperson with respect to planning the sales campaign and schmooze, ringing up the sale and providing satisfactory levels of after sales care. If sales techniques are employed in a tailored manner reflective of how particular stakeholders which constitute the target market perceive matters with reference to their cultural and political biases at distinct phases of the sales journey, then greater success is likely to result. However, public policy salespersons must remain vigilant over the implied returns period for shifts in costs and benefits, as well as kairotic moments, that might give rise to reframing contests. Selling public policy is easier to accomplish when one understands what success looks like and also has the tools at one’s disposal required for each stage. In this chapter I have provided salespersons with a detailed description of their quest and in the next chapters I will equipped them with the tools required to carry out their mission.

References BBC (2016) Chilcot report: findings at-a-glance. 6 July 2016 Boin A, t’Hart P, McConnell A (2009) Crisis exploitation: political and policy impacts of framing contests. J Eur Publ Policy 16(1):81–106 Bovens M (2010) A comment on Marsh and McConnell: towards a framework for establishing policy success. Public Adm 88(2):584–585 Bovens M, t’Hart P (1996) Understanding policy fiascos. Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick Bovens M, t’Hart P (2016) Revisiting the study of policy failures. J Eur Publ Policy 23(5):653–666 Bush G (2003) Bush: ‘leave Iraq within 48 hours’. CNN, 18 March 2003 CBS News (2008) Mission accomplished, 5 years later. CBS CNN (2003a) White House pressed on ‘mission accomplished’ sign. CNN, 29 October 2003 CNN (2003b) Bush makes historic speech aboard warship. CNN, 2 May 2003 CNN (2004) Shock, outrage over prison photos. Father of soldier: “there’s two sides to the story”. CNN, 1 May 2004 Donnison J (2015) Australia’s Nanny State: a case of arrested development. BBC News Grant B, Ryan R, Lawrie A (2015) Dirty hands and commissions of inquiry: an examination of the independent local government review panel in NSW, Australia. In: Conscience, leadership and the problem of dirty hands. Emerald Insight, London Herszenhorn D (2008) Estimates of Iraq war were not close to Ballpark. New York Times, 19 March 2008 Lewis P (2018) After a tabloid storm and the bonk ban, voters are keen to move on. The Guardian, 27 February 2018 Lynn J, Jay A (1988) The complete “Yes Prime Minister”. BBC Books, St Ives McConnell A (2010) Policy success, policy failure and grey areas in-between. J Publ Policy 30(3):345–362

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Oliphant B (2018) The Iraq war continues to divide the U.S. public, 15 years after it began. Pew Research Center, Washington Tankersley J, Parsons C (2008) Measuring the political costs of war. Chicago Tribune, 22 September 2008 Ugyel L, O’Flynn J (2017) Measuring policy success: evaluating public sector reform in Bhutan. Int J Public Adm 40(2):11–125 Weaver K (1986) The politics of blame avoidance. J Publ Policy 6:371–398

Chapter 3

Rhetoric: Not Just What Is Said, but Also Who Says It and How

Abstract Colloquially, rhetoric is understood as empty words uttered with the intent to manipulate and deceive. However, in classical times rhetoric was conceived much more broadly as being the art of observing all the available means of persuasion— where “means” included the kairos (propitiousness of the moment), the ethos (character or portrayed character of the rhetor), pathos (the emotions of the rhetor and auditors), and the logos (the ways of proving a truth or apparent truth). This broad conception of rhetoric recognised that in a heterogeneous society, where public policy decisions are characterized by uncertainty, words alone are rarely enough to persuade citizens to trust in a particular public policy. By way of contrast, more modern scholarship has focused on identifying the types of arguments that can be used to win in disputatious public policy arenas as well as the costs associated with employing rhetoric. I contend that a fuller appreciation of the art of persuasion—one which combines the lessons of classical times with those of just three decades past—will expand the repertoire of the public policy salesperson and allow them to make better use of technologies and opportunities that these past scholars could not have even dreamt of (but certainly would have exploited). Keywords Rhetoric · Aristotle · Riker · Hirschman · Rhetoric of reaction · Public policy · Policy success · Selling public policy

3.1 What Is Rhetoric? If I were to walk outside my office now and ask a passer-by (assuming I could find a passer-by in the big smoke of Moonbi,1 Australia) what the word rhetoric meant I would probably receive a very disparaging reply along the lines of “mere words used by politicians to deceive us”. However, if I were to ask precisely the same question of a passing Greek around 2,300 years ago I am likely to have been told that rhetoric was a high art—one which, when mastered, allowed a rhetor to understand all the means available to come as near as circumstances permit to persuading auditors over to their position. Upon further inquiry, our friendly Greek would likely draw our attention to the salient aspects of the art, including inter alia the kairos, ethos, pathos and logos 1

Moonbi has a population of just 500. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 J. Drew, Selling Public Policy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-0381-8_3

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and direct us to the Lyceum where we might sit at the feet of Aristotle or browse the great library to learn from its wisdom. I imagine that the classical Greeks would have been dismayed to hear about our current cynical and narrow view of rhetoric and may have pointed out to us that our limited understanding of rhetoric must surely have deleterious implications for our ability to sell public policy—especially in a heterogeneous community where public policymaking occurs in conditions of great uncertainty. Despite the largely debased colloquial meaning assigned to rhetoric nowadays, it seems that there are still some rhetors who understand the importance of (at least) the kairos, ethos and pathos and employ same to convince the public of the merits of a given public policy. For instance, Kim Jong-Un (henceforth referred to as President Kim) provided us with a salient lesson on rhetoric in his response to United States of America (U.S.) calls for sanctions at the United Nations (arising from the North Korean public policy of developing intercontinental nuclear weapons): Now that Trump has denied the existence of and insulted me and my country in front of the eyes of the world and made the most ferocious declaration of a war in history that he would “destroy” North Korea, Mr. Kim said, “we will consider with seriousness exercising of a corresponding, highest level of hardline countermeasure in history….. “I will surely and definitely tame the mentally deranged U. S. dotard with fire”. (Sang-Hun 2017)

Here we see a fine example of recognizing an opportunity to persuade (Kairos— bound up with the meeting of the United Nations where media attention was focused on the North Korean “problem”), attacking the ethos of America’s Rhetor-In-Chief (and thus implicitly drawing our attention to the fact that the relatively young President Kim stands in stark contrast to a mentally deranged dotard) and seeking to stir up the pathos of fear amongst the citizens of the United States (by threatening a taming by fire) and the pathos of anger (at the asserted insult) amongst the citizens of North Korea. Unfortunately, President Kim’s rhetoric probably failed to impress anyone outside of his captive audience in North Korea, however, given the circumstances— which were wholly unconducive to nuclear armament of a “rogue” state—his use of the kairos, ethos and pathos is a good example of “coming as near to success as the circumstances of each particular case allow” (Aristotle 2012, p. 8; the formal definition of rhetoric). Not all public policy sales pitches will be successful—there are some public policies for which we might never find a buyer—however, I believe that President Kim, Aristotle, Hirschman and Riker (who we will also meet below) can all provide us with important lessons on how rhetoric can be best employed to at least give the salesperson a shot at persuading others regarding the merits of a given public policy. I commence by first reviewing the extant literature on rhetoric—both the lessons of antiquity and the lessons derived from more contemporary sources. Thereafter I briefly consider some promising and relatively new avenues for public policy rhetors which include the use of ‘words with unexamined power’, empirical rhetoric and deployment of new media channels. I conclude by outlining a heuristic developed to guide decision-making by prospective rhetors intent on successfully selling public policy.

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3.2 Lessons from the Literature Rhetoric has a long and distinguished history which cannot be thoroughly surveyed within a single book chapter. However, I can give the prospective public policy salesperson some exposure to the most important rhetorical tools by first briefly examining the classics; and then by augmenting this knowledge with more recent scholarship borne in the crucible of public policy analysis.

3.2.1 Lessons from the Classics Kairos (the notion of a season for all things—a qualitative idea of time that stood in contrast to chronos) held such importance in classical Greek conceptions of rhetoric that it was ultimately mythologized and Kairos became enrolled among the gods.2 Yet for most modern public policy salespersons it is not at all certain that they would pause to reflect should the rather strange character sporting a long forelock (with the remainder of his head shaved) wings and winged feet was to make an appearance at a public policy launch! This neglect of Kairos seems most unfortunate given that kairos fulfils an important role in drawing our attention to the fact that persuasion is often dependent on having the right circumstances combine with the right audience at the right time. King Solomon (and The Byrds who famously performed ‘Turn, Turn, Turn’) recognised that there was a season for all things under heaven, but it often seems that many public policy salespersons are appalling ignorant—or recklessly impatient—about the need to pause and consider whether the issue has come to public consciousness, whether there is a receptive and identifiable audience and whether the medium of communication (often the media) is ready and willing to convey the rhetors’ message. Otherwise stated, Kairos reminds us that we need to look to see if the stars are suitably aligned to give us the greatest chance for success, and cautions us that if they are not then perhaps the best course of action might be to direct our efforts towards preparing for a more propitious moment in the future. However, it is not just Kairos who has been relegated from the divine to obscurity. Auditor disposition—as represented in Aristotle’s ethos and pathos—seems to have also been largely forgotten by rhetors (although in all deference to modern rhetors we should note that Aristotle also expressed concern about the neglect of auditor disposition in The Art of Rhetoric—which, incidentally, is a thoroughly accessible and enjoyable read). The reason why ethos and pathos are particularly important to persuasion on public policy matters can be traced back to the nature of the political public: an enterprise that brings together people of disparate wealth, skills, knowledge and ideologies for the pursuit of the common good (the help accruing to persons in the pursuit of their ends as a result of co-operation with others—see Drew 2022). That 2

Kairos is usually attributed to the sophist Gorgias, although others have argued that the concept is implicit through much of Aristotle’s work, an argument which I agree with (see, for instance, Kinneavy and Eskin 2000).

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is, the public policy decision is made in an environment where there is no prima facie reason to trust, where the outcomes for each person are often largely unknowable (due to inter alia uneven initial distributions of advantage and different utilities derived from public goods) and where extreme levels of information asymmetry exist (for example, a President or Supreme Leader is likely to be in receipt of far more comprehensive information relating to a given public policy than any of his auditors). In this sort of environment, reasoning (logos) alone is unlikely to ever be sufficient to persuade—what is required is a reason to trust and a reason to pay attention and act. In classical rhetoric the ethos was declared to be “the most effective means of persuasion he (sic) possesses” (Aristotle 2012, p. 9). Yet somewhat surprisingly–at least for people familiar with Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics—Aristotle did not insist that the character be inherent to the rhetor, merely that the portrayed character be conducive to creating the conditions necessary for trust amongst disparate persons. Thus, Aristotle exhorts rhetors to portray their character in terms of good-sense, good-morals and good-will but allows that this might be invented. Interestingly, these attributes of ethos parallel the three ingredients that sociologists largely agree are necessary for trust—ability (good-sense), integrity (good-morals) and benevolence (good-will) (see, for example, Rousseau et al. 1998). Thus it seems that the ethos has an important role in generating the conditions necessary for trust between disparate persons. Indeed, in modern times the media still often focusses on the ethos of powerful political figures which can at times seem quite incongruous with behavioral norms in the wider population. For example, President Trump has been hounded by the media for many years regarding an alleged affair with a ‘porn star’ and an alleged payment of ‘shush money’ so that the story would never see the light of day. Now by many (but not all) moral paradigms a married man having an affair is neither good-sense, good morals, nor good-will (certainly not to his wife). However, research (De Paulo 2010) suggests that around half of married men in America have had extra-marital affairs, so it is prima facie hard to understand why a single case of infidelity might be considered news-worthy (unless of course the media proposes to report on hundreds of millions of similar cases). The reason why the media has grabbed hold of this particular alleged infidelity, like a dog with a bone, is that it goes to the heart of whether or not the person can be trusted on matters of contentious public policy (and also conveniently provides a left-leaning media with plenty of ammunition to throw at one of the most hated conservatives in American political history). The apparent reasoning of the media seems to be that the President does not have an ethos which inspires trust, and may therefore not be worthy of trust on weighty public policy matters where there is extreme information asymmetry. However, trust alone does not automatically lead to persuasion. For instance, one is likely to trust that the Pope has good-sense, good-morals and good-will however; one probably isn’t prepared to “care first for the poor, before concerning themselves

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with their own wants and needs” (Pope Francis cited in Bunderson 2014).3 For one thing many do not feel that it is dignifying to give the poor hand-outs, whilst others of us may feel that the needs of their close family must trump the needs of strangers. It would therefore seem that trust alone is insufficient to persuade us—something more powerful than trust appears to be required to motivate us (in this case, to put the needs of the poor ahead of our own). Aristotle, President Kim (it seems) and the author believed that this missing disposition element of persuasion is the pathos—emotions have the power to motivate us to action, to unite us for a common cause, to reach deep within ourselves to do things we never thought possible. Indeed, Aristotle (2012, p. 80) lists “anger, pity, fear and the like” as powerful forces that can change person’s judgments. That’s why some benevolent societies employ images of starving children in their advertisements despite the fact that aide is also provided to adults—because images of the helpless and innocent are more likely to motivate us to feelings of pity, and thus elicit the desired response (to set aside some of our wants for the needs of the poor). Another example of a powerful pathos might be found in the emotion of love, which can persuade us to give up almost everything (in some cases life itself) for our child, spouse, friend or G-d. Aristotle encourages rhetors to understand extant pathos in the auditor population—specifically, to consider (i) what is the state of mind, (ii) who is affected, and (iii) on what grounds are they affected. This knowledge allows the rhetor to tailor their schmooze to particular audiences in a heterogeneous population: where extant pathos is conducive to the message of the rhetor, then an appeal should be made to same (indeed Cicero—a successor to the Aristotelian rhetorical legacy— claimed that the rhetor should work themselves up to feel and display the emotion that they wished to appeal to in auditors); where the emotion is hostile to the course of action that the rhetor wishes to propose then the contrary emotion should still be raised as the discordance is almost certain to gain the auditors attention. However, where there is no extant pathos then the rhetor must either give auditors a reason to care (perhaps invent a pathos) or wait for a more propitious kairos. The last major element of classical rhetoric was the logos—the reasoning which complements the disposition of auditors in order to prove a truth or an apparent truth. In Part 2 of The Art of Rhetoric Aristotle (2012, p. 12) claims that “everyone who affects persuasion through proof does in fact use either enthymemes or example”. These two devices are thus worthy of some explication. Enthymemes are rhetorical syllogisms whereby one states some premises that lead, or appear to lead, to a logical conclusion. Thus, just prior to our motivating example, President Kim may have had the following thoughts to persuade himself and his inner sanctum of the wisdom of pursuing a nuclear arms program: MAJOR PREMISE: Nuclear weapons are a deterrent to hostile countries MINOR PREMISE: America is hostile to North Korea

3

I have briefly departed from our North Korea and United States example because, whilst I recognise their rhetorical prowess, I just couldn’t bring myself to declare that either party has good-sense or good-will.

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3 Rhetoric: Not Just What Is Said, but Also Who Says It and How CONCLUSION:

Therefore I (President Kim) should develop an intercontinental nuclear missile.

There are various different ways that the syllogism might be constructed—for instance, the first premise might have been an example rather than a reason—but the above illustration should give one the general idea. The problems with syllogisms are that they can result in truly strange conclusions—if extraneous premises are linked or if one or more of the premises are false (or not always true). For instance: MAJOR PREMISE: No country with a space program has yet been conquered MINOR PREMISE: America has a space program and is hostile to North Korea CONCLUSION:

Therefore I (Kim) should develop a space program.

Notwithstanding the fact that many of us might have preferred that President Kim present the above logos to his inner sanctum, it is clear that the conclusion that a space program would protect North Korea from attack, is a rather strange one (even though it is based on true premises). The use of examples (by themselves) are likely to be much more straightforward and familiar to readers than rhetorical syllogisms. Examples essentially take an observation about the past (a historical incident or even film or literature) to evoke rich memories in a kind of shorthand. For instance, President Kim may cite the following example: “Saddam Hussein didn’t have a nuclear weapon and Iraq was conquered by America” as justification for his public policy. In so doing, President Kim asserts that what was true in the past will also be true in the future—although this, of course, may not be the case at all. Notably, Aristotle (2012, p. 139) cautioned that enthymemes should always precede the example so as to avoid an “inductive air” and instead cast the example in the light of a witness giving evidence in support of truth (proved in the enthymeme). It would seem that there is some merit in this ordering for the schmooze given that an example alone might easily be dismissed as an unrepresentative case.

3.2.2 Lessons from Public Policy Analysis The late, great, Albert Hirschman—former freedom fighter, underground operative, soldier and developmental economist—was an academic of extraordinary breadth and innovation (Adelman 2013). His work The Rhetoric of Reaction: Perversity, Futility and Jeopardy represents a marked departure from Aristotle’s Rhetoric and it is thus important to understand given its potential to augment the public policy salesperson’s rhetorical skillset. Hirschman is barely interested in the ethos (and ignores most of the spectrum of the pathos—except fear) but instead seeks to identify the most probable and most penetrating arguments that might be employed by rhetors in disputatious public policy debates. To achieve this end, Hirschman surveys great historical debates—the French and American revolutions, the introduction of the poor laws and universal suffrage—and presents a compelling argument that both

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Table 3.1 Hirschman (1991) typology of progressive and reactionary rhetoric Progressive position

Reactionary position

Imminent Danger Thesis and Synergistic (fallacy) Emphasises the danger of passivity and the need to act to avoid impending disaster

Jeopardy The program involves unacceptable consequences of one sort or another

Desperate Predicament Thesis and Fracasomania The old order must be smashed and the new rebuilt regardless of possible consequences

Perversity Unintended consequences from reform including effects opposite to the proposed goal

Futility of Resistance Thesis Appeals to the historical inevitability of the proposed reforms

Futility Proposed reforms will not improve the circumstances at which they are aimed; they are a smoke screen for a political agenda

Source Adapted from Wallis and Dollery (1999)

reactionary rhetoric (reasoning put forward to oppose a given public policy) and progressive rhetoric (words employed to persuade others to support a public policy) can be classified according to just three theses apiece (see Table 3.1 for a description of each thesis). The purpose of Hirschman’s (1993, p. 314) work was to “stem the neo-conservative tide of the 1980s” by identifying flaws in the reactionary positions. However, his work also serves as an important heuristic for progressives: it not only provides a ready source of powerful ideas to promote a public policy, but it also provides public policy salespersons with a ready reckoner of the Opposition’s likely attacks (and forewarned would seem to be forearmed). To see how progressive arguments might be deployed we could—just for a moment—put ourselves in the shoes of our friend President Kim, just prior to trying to convince the world that he should vigorously pursue a nuclear armament program. One option available to him was to appeal to the “Imminent Danger Thesis” and argue that the region was about to descend into armed conflict because of the U.S’s provocations and that he therefore needed a deterrent of sufficient gravity to save the region from this real and present danger. Alternatively, President Kim might have argued from the “Desperate Predicament Thesis” that the old order of nuclear superpowers subjugating the rest of the world had led to exploitation, inequality and poverty and thus required an extraordinary act to re-balance power and hence improve the lives of the majority of the human race. Lastly, Kim might have invoked the “Futility of Resistance Thesis”, pointing out that Pakistan had achieved nuclear capability and that Iran was also well progressed along this road and that therefore a nuclear arms race was unavoidable—merely a progression of history akin to the adoption of gunpowder or the use of airplanes in warfare. Each of these arguments, had they been made by Kim, would have likely led to a predictable refutation. “The Imminent Danger Thesis” would have had the U.S responding that a nuclear arms race on the Peninsula would put the survival of all its inhabitants (including North Koreans) in peril (“Jeopardy Thesis”); the “Desperate Predicament Thesis” might elicit the response that nuclear armament was likely to

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exacerbate inequality as other nations would be obliged to invest more funds into countering the program and would therefore have less resources for foreign aid and the like (“Perversity Thesis”); whilst the “Futility of Resistance Thesis” would argue that the nuclear program was not designed to improve power balance or the prospects for peace in the region but was instead being used as a smokescreen for a political agenda to shore up support for President Kim’s regime at home (a “Futility Thesis”). The fact that many of these arguments have been raised by the North Koreans and the U.S during the crisis points both to the predictive power of the theses and also to the contention that the opposing parties probably believe the theses to be most efficacious (Riker 1990)—a contemporary of Hirschman who we will meet shortly—raised the idea that the frequency with which a rhetorical technique is employed could be used as a proxy to measure the persuasiveness of same. However, as I noted earlier, Hirschman’s theses are not just prompts for rhetors who might be looking for an argument to support their proposed public policy. They also allow rhetors to gain an edge over their opponents by pre-empting and, where possible, negating or increasing the costs of rhetorical reprisals. For instance, Kim might have foreseen the Jeopardy thesis response to his argument citing the Imminent Danger facing his region and used the absence of armed conflict between nuclear powers in the past (an Aristotelian logos) as testimony to his reasoning—thus increasing the rhetorical cost put before his external Opposition. The costs of rhetoric were very much on the mind of the 20th century’s other great rhetoric scholar, the late William H. Riker, shortly before his death in 1993 (see, for example, his attempt to explain the dynamics of rhetoric in his (1996) The Strategy of Rhetoric4 and his intriguing observations in an oft-overlook 1990 book chapter, somewhat uninspiringly, titled “Heresthetic and rhetoric in the spatial model”). First, Riker draws our attention to the costs of rhetoric inherent in its imposing remit of persuading those who disagree—or who just don’t care—about a public policy to support same. In the former case, we need to get persons to “acknowledge that they previously erred”—which most of us recoil from doing (well, after all, we all know that we are always right—so of course it must be the other party (in this case the rhetor) who is wrong). In the latter case—where there is a pathos vacuum—we have to invent a reason to care. Second, Riker uses his observation of rhetoric’s imposing remit to explain why it usually involves “predictions of extremely unlikely disasters” (Riker 1990, p. 60)—because a big threat is required to get people to contemplate that they might be wrong—which perhaps explains the alarmist claims that form the foundation of four of the six Hirschman theses. Indeed, Riker draws on the concept of negativity bias—the idea that people feel a loss much more than a gain of the same magnitude—as a tentative way5 of explaining why unlikely disasters are so effective for persuasion purposes (he also opines that ignorance of basic probability concepts in the general population also plays a large part—a belief that 4

Riker’s “Principles of Dispersal and Dominance” were roundly criticized—which seemed rather unfair given that the book was posthumously published on the basis of his notes. 5 Tversky and Kahneman (1992) probably hadn’t developed their theory sufficiently when Riker penned his book chapter.

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I, as a former mathematics teacher, share wholeheartedly). Third, Riker expounds a cogent argument for why rhetors engage in rhetoric in the first place (instead of perhaps Riker’s (1986) preferred art of heresthetic, which I explicate on in our next chapter)—because politicians, particularly, are often locked into political ideologies that they can’t abandon for fear of alienating their supporter base. Otherwise stated, for Riker a public policy salesperson may not necessarily be promoting a policy because they believe that it is good, but because they have little other choice (which leads me to note that I am not the only cynic in the scholarly academy—or perhaps us rhetorical types are the last of the realists in an academy full of optimists). Finally, Riker (1990, p. 48) alludes to the palatability of rhetorical flavoring, which I extend below in my concept of “words with unexamined power”.

3.3 New Approaches for the Public Policy Salesperson Despite its long and distinguished history, the study of rhetoric still has room to grow as academics borrow from other disciplines and react to new technologies and new meanings imparted to old words. I briefly review some promising relatively new avenues for the public policy salesperson.

3.3.1 Words with Unexamined Power Not all words are created equal—in particular, some words have come to be ascribed with qualities that probably wouldn’t stand up to rational inquiry. One good example of this trait is the word “efficiency”, which is considered by most people to be ipso facto good. Thus, we are often presented with a plan for reorganization or redeployment of government resources with the assurance that it will be efficient— as if efficiency, in and of itself, is some sort of holy trait worthy of all sacrifices (especially if an “unknown” minority of the population bears the sacrifice). Yet, this assumption, that efficiency must be good, really doesn’t stand up to close scrutiny. Certainly, most of us wouldn’t want inefficient government.6 However, this is an entirely different matter from pursuing efficiency as an end because it is deemed to be good. Indeed, if one asks the right questions then it generally becomes quickly apparent that efficiency is usually merely a means to achieving some other end. So, for instance, if we were to ask why public schools are being consolidated by governments across the developed world, we would probably be told something along the lines of: “Because it will allow us to provide better resources”, or “because it will allow us to reinvest savings into our health system”, etcetera. What we probably won’t hear by way of reply is: “Because efficiency is good”. That’s because efficiency is not 6

Although democracy inevitably must result in inefficiency as we attempt to satisfy the wants of diverse groups in the absence of price signals.

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the desired “good” at all, but rather is merely a means to achieving something that some people, at least, think is good—better resources or money reinvested for some other desirable end. Efficiency, when we think about it, is therefore little more than an exercise in trading-in some things that are thought to be good (smaller schools, administration staff jobs) for other things thought by some to be good. Another example of words with unexamined power are the words “independent” and “expert”. It seems as if Government policy is always being supported by at least one, if not multiple, independent experts (see Chapter 5 on Blame Games). However, the idea that someone selected, commissioned and paid by an incumbent government could somehow be independent really doesn’t stand up to anything other than a cursory examination. Moreover, it seems that everyone is now an “expert” irrespective of whether they have a record of expertise. It is hard not to think that the “independent expert” is a cynical attempt to assert the bona fides of things known to be untrue—just like the word “democratic” that invariably appears before the name of communist dictatorships (did someone say Democratic Republic of North Korea?). There are a number of other words that have power to convince as long as they remain unexamined—‘fair’, ‘right’, ‘just’ (see Chapter 7) are some more—and it would seem important for prospective public policy salespersons to be mindful of these terms when choosing the seasoning that might make their pitch most palatable (especially in view of the fact that the media seem unwilling to interrogate these powerful words). Moreover, in the age of the focus group it would be prudent of the rhetor to test the seasoning applied to their culinary masterpiece ahead of serving it up for public consumption.

3.3.2 Empirical Rhetoric Little attention has been given to the nature of empirical rhetoric and, in particular, how the costs of empirical rhetoric can be used to the public policy salesperson’s advantage. The classical authorities didn’t live in a big data world, nor did they have computers (or even the mathematical tools required to conduct econometrics or data envelopment analyses—see Chapter 6) which probably explains their neglect of the topic. Indeed, they might not have recognised empirical rhetoric as rhetoric at all—for Aristotle and his contemporaries’ rhetoric was an art involving invention, whereas facts were simply extrinsic proofs ready to be used by the rhetor as required. However, it would be a mistake to think that extrinsic proofs were taken at face value in Aristotle’s system—indeed, in classical rhetoric what we refer to as empirical proof might probably be best classified as testimony and the classical authorities had strict views on what constituted valid testimony. Specifically, classical authorities wisely declared that “detached persons [are] highly trustworthy” (Aristotle, 2012, p. 78)—that is, that the witness (in our case, the person or persons providing empirical proof) should not be subject to any corruption or apprehension of bias. Aristotle (2012, p. 78) also notes that a witness “who shares the risk of punishment if their evidence is pronounced false…are valid witnesses”—that is, the presence of a real

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consequence (reputational or financial) for providing misleading empirical proof might be important to ensure prudent empirical witness. He also notes the merits of testimony given under torture—although (sadly) for most scholars of selling public policy it is probably not an option to torture persons collating empirical proof! Fortunately for public policy salespersons (and especially for the consultants that they hire to produce empirical testimony) the criteria laid out by sages for valid witness are rarely applied today (see Chapter 6). This means that empirical proof can be used for persuasion purposes with little risk of being challenged. Moreover, because media like the sound of an incredible saving in taxpayer dollars, or an incredible quantum of stimulus for an economy, or an incredible creation of jobs, empirical proof has a ready audience (who probably won’t interrogate the headline number at all). This all augurs well for the prospective empirical rhetor (one who commissions and uses empirical proof for persuasive purposes). There are costs associated with empirical proof, however, that the public policy salesperson should remain mindful of. In the first instance, there is the potential for the media and audience to be lost in a technical discussion—so it is important to keep the message to a simple soundbite (for example, “Government reforms to create 10,000 new jobs”) and leave the detail of how it was calculated for some large imposing document that no-one will ever read.7 Second, empirical proof takes time (and money) to procure—so it is important for the rhetor to gather the proof, during the sales campaign planning, before an attempt is made to sell the public policy (and this has implications given the salience of kairos). Third, there is always a rather remote possibility that an alternative expert will contest the empirical proof or will offer alternative empirical testimony. In this last regard the empirical rhetor is welladvised to take full advantage of the information costs of empirical proof that we just noted (time) —principally by conducting the study over a long time horizon and employing as many variables from different sources8 as possible—as this will likely delay the response to a time well after the sale has been clinched, the public policy has been implemented, and the fickle media has moved on (see Chapter 6).

3.3.3 New Mediums for Tailored Messaging The most exciting and promising new avenue for public policy salespersons must be the rise of social media. The mere existence of an alternative to established media— which President Kim’s protagonist tells us is ‘fake news’—means that Kairos is now somewhat less shackled than it has been in the past. That is, the public policy salesperson may not need to wait until the popular media has taken note of an issue, but 7

Aristotle (2012, p. 145) notes that ‘we must not carry reasoning too far back, or the length of our argument will cause obscurity…..[and that] it is this simplicity that makes the uneducated more effective than the educated when addressing popular audiences’. It seems that little has changed in 2,300 years. 8 Preferably sources that are not summarized elsewhere in databases.

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may instead conduct their schmooze quickly to respond to public sentiment and circumstances through more direct communication channels. Moreover, because social media channels can be targeted at particular components of heterogeneous communities at times of one’s choosing, the ethos, pathos, logos can be tailored for maximum impact. For instance, a young male demographic may have their message delivered by a “friendly” rhetor, who appeals to their “fickle…hot-temper” and employs a “Futility of Resistance” thesis consistent with their “hopeful disposition”; whilst older male components of the community may have their message delivered by someone who is seen to be experienced and cautious, who appeals to their “cowardly” dispositions and employs an “Imminent Danger Thesis” (if we were to act on the advice of Aristotle regarding the characters of Young Men and Elderly Men [2012, pp. 123–126] respectively). As computer technology becomes more sophisticated and people continue to voluntarily put more and more of their lives up on the web for public consumption, clever public policy salespersons should be able to tailor messages with ever greater precision and thus achieve stunning persuasive successes.

3.4 A Guide for Using Rhetoric to Clinch the Sale Now that I have detailed the most salient aspects of rhetoric from both classical and contemporary sources, plus discussed some promising avenues for prospective public policy salespersons I am ready to lay out a heuristic for decision-making aimed at achieving the optimal conditions for clinching the sale (see Fig. 3.1). Examining Fig. 3.1, the first matter that would seem to need to be ascertained is whether the kairos is propitious for the desired public policy sale. Specifically, an appraisal needs to be made regarding whether the timing is right—are citizens and the media paying attention (or is there a more pressing matter on the current affairs agenda); are there looming matters that may threaten to forestall the public policy “sell” at an inopportune time; are there sufficient resources (time, money, political appetite) to carry the sale through to the desired conclusion? If an assessment is made that the season is not right, then a decision may be made to wait and perhaps prepare the sales campaign (in the hope that the stars may align at some future time), invent a kairos (by executing an act which brings the matter to the minds of citizens), or proceed with the schmooze (in the knowledge that the potential for a successful sale is somewhat diminished). On the other hand, if the kairos is opportune then all haste should be made to start preparations for the sale—although the salesperson must be conscious of the need to keep an eye out for any sign that the season may be passing by. Three matters must then be given serious consideration in order to further optimise the chances for success. First, attention should be paid to ensuring the right ethos is employed in prosecuting the sale—a rhetor or rhetors who match the intended audience/s, as suggested above. If the ethos is situated (it already exists) then preparation time is minimised, if not then the rhetor/s may need to invent an ethos paying

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Fig. 3.1 A heuristic for using rhetoric to sell public policy (Source Authors)

careful attention to the desired component of the heterogeneous society which they wish to reach and addressing the aspects of good-will, good-morals and good-sense in proportion to the weight placed on same by the identified group to thus establish trust. Of course, it is possible to neglect the ethos and carry-on regardless, however if one chooses to do so then one must accept that the chances of a successful sale will be greatly diminished (recall Aristotle’s sage advice on the relative importance of the ethos). Second, attention should be given to the pathos. What is the state of mind of the various components of the hetereogeneous public and on what grounds do they hold these emotions? Where emotions are conducive to the sale then one should feel, display and appeal to the emotion during the schmooze (noting that some emotions —such as anger—are particualrly transigent and thus have implications for kairos); where the eomotions are hostile to the public policy sale then it is best to brazenly oppose the emotions with a contrary pathos (thus capturing attention). The real

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problem would seem to occur when there is no extant pathos—in this case the public policy salesperson must either invent one during the sales campaign (and somehow stir the community up to a helpful emotion) or give up the persuasive potential of the pathos altogether, but noting that without a reason to unite and motivate that the public policy sale may get quagmired. Third, it is necessary to prepare the reasoning required to prove the truth or apparent truth for why the public policy product is required. Hirschman has provided public policy salespersons with a powerful typology proven in the crucible of some of the most disputatious and important public policy reforms of history, and it would thus be prudent of the prospective public policy salesperson to carefully review the “Progressive Theses” for their suitablity to advance the public policy argument. Moreover, the associated “Reactionary Theses” give the salesperson a powerful insight into the likely responses of those oppposing the “sell” and should therefore be reviewed carefully with a view to planning approaches that will foil same (this is particularly relevant for the after-sales care phase). Once the thesis has been selected, the salesperson needs to construct proofs to accompany the thesis—specifically an enthymeme followed by an example. Attention should also be given to the task of preparing empirical rhetoric—where appropriate—ensuring that an incredible soundbite is constructed, supported by a weighty and opaque document and buttressed against attack through drawing on a long panel of data from disparate sources. When all this has been done then the salesperson should think about the seasoning for the rhetoric dish that they propose to serve up to the public—particularly with respect to words and images that can convey power far beyond their literal meaning (perhaps testing this out on a focus group prior to the main event). Once the groundwork has been completed, then the public policy salesperson should check, once again, that the kairos is still propitious and proceed with the schmooze, confident in the knowledge that they have done everything possible to “com[e] as near to success as the circumstances of each particular case allow” (Aristotle 2012, p. 8). Indeed, I underline the importance of pausing, thinking through the process, and ensuring that all ducks are lined up in a row prior to shooting ones’ opening salvo of rhetoric. Moreover, I reiterate that this is a pragmatic heuristic aimed at selling public policy, I make no claims about the morality of inventing an ethos, feigning a pathos or the like. My claim is that this recipe will give the public policy salesperson the best chance at success—irrespective of the merits of the public policy. For now, let others (of the mould of the Honorable Jim Hacker) contemplate the “moral dimension”! As the reader will have surmised, rhetoric is most important during the schmooze and is a key component that must be considered when planning the sales campaign. However, it would likely be quite detrimental to the public policy salesperson if they were to disregard rhetoric altogether after the sale had been clinched. As I noted in Chapter 2, it is critical that the public policy salesperson remains conscious of the pathos, in particular, and that it may change in response to shifts in costs and benefits that occur following a sale. Moreover, particularly poignant events that might occur after a sale can easily give rise to kairotic moments, which in turn might generate

Appendix 1—The Rhetorical Tropes

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framing contests (see Chapter 2). Should framing contests arise then rhetoric will be incredibly important—particularly the ethos and the pathos. In sum, rhetoric has a lot to offer the public policy salesperson particularly in the schmoozing phase of a sale. If done correctly, rhetoric will facilitate the delivery of the right message, at the right time, through the most appropriate medium and appealing to the ethos, pathos and logos most likely to lead to success. However, it is important for the public policy salesperson to exercise patience and complete important preparations whilst they await propitious kairos. Selling public policy through the informed use of rhetoric clearly requires considerable work. Nevertheless, it is work that I believe will result in more successful public policy sales pitches delivered in a more nuanced and tailored manner, and thus likely to convince a larger and more heterogeneous portion of the population.

Appendix 1—The Rhetorical Tropes Tropes are the ornaments of language and were much studied as well as much prized, by the ancients. Sadly, modern students are rarely instructed in the tropes and our rhetorical dialogue is probably so much the poorer for this neglect. In its simplest terms a trope involves any substitution of a usual word or phrase for another. The ancients subscribed to a relatively stable list of ten tropes, but since at least the time of Vico (18th century) most of the focus has fallen on the master tropes—metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, and irony. Indeed, these four devices do much more than merely adorn our speech—they are said to also help us to think and comprehend. Metaphor has long been considered the vanquishing king of tropes (metaphorical turn intended) and was highly favoured by Aristotle in particular. As a thinking device metaphor stands above all others because it allows us to grasp at understanding through reference to a known thing. For example, the complex matter of government fiscal policy is often compared to the much better-known personal budget. Because metaphor has an educative function it can be a helpful device for explaining complex public policy. Metonymy is an art practiced by far fewer inhabitants of the ivory towers (metonymic device intended), than it once was. It involves ‘letting another thing merely associated with the thing in question stand as a symbol for it’ (McCloskey 1998, p. 49). For instance, salespersons might refer to the crown when wishing to allude to the monarch or the monarch’s authority. Metonymy’s utility is mostly constrained to its efficiency—an opportunity to provide a good deal of information with a carefully chosen emblematic word. Irony is both a well-known and well-worn trope, often employed by our honest politicians (ironic turn intended) with devastating effect. It is said to be the most sophisticated of the tropes (notwithstanding that some rhetoricians actually classify it as a ‘figure’) because it essentially invites auditors into the rhetors’ confidence for the sharing of private joke. For example, an opposition politician might refer to a

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Prime Minister of Australia as the Premier for New South Wales as a way of casting light on his inability to think about the other states that form the federation. Because irony jars and outrages it tends to stick in auditor’s minds and therefore can prove a telling weapon for public policy debates. Synecdoche is commonly defined as taking a part to stand for the whole (see, for example, its use in the performance monitoring literature as related by Drew et al. 2018), which is indeed synecdochical because the term also refers to taking a whole to stand for the part, or cause for effect (and vice versa). Synecdoche is often employed in everyday language and is helpful for understanding because sometimes people need to change perspective in order to fully appreciate matters. For example, the architects of performance monitoring regimes might have a better appreciation of behaviors that they often demonize as gaming, if they were to understand that those being monitored supply data devised from the perspective of the whole (see Drew et al. 2018; Drew and O’Flynn 2020). Because synecdoche can be used to shift the focus it is an especially useful tool for public policy salespersons wishing to have auditors perceive matters from a new perspective. In addition to the master tropes, reviewed above, it is probably worth spending a little time on the ornament of hyperbole which is making a rather regular appearance in the public policy sales pitches of recent years. Hyperbole is probably best described as an elegant stretching of the truth (that is meant to be immediately perceived as an over-exaggeration). For example, I believe that this book will revolutionise the selling of public policy (hyperbole intended). Because of hyperbole’s potential to make a neat headline that will allow public policy salespersons to be heard in an environment where media openings are scarce it is a very useful device for public policy salespersons. In sum, by using the ornaments of language one can improve the audibility and effectiveness of the sales pitch—it is therefore high-time that we once again assign value to these ancient arts.

Appendix 2—The Practical Syllogism The practical syllogism is a special species of syllogism that results in the command for a specific action in particular circumstances. Constructing the practical syllogism is thus a fundamentally practical task. In its simplest terms the practical syllogism is all about finding and articulating good reasons for acting, ideally orientated towards the proper ends of human existence. The ancient philosophers believed that all people should always act according to good reasons even if they might be mistaken with respect to proper ends. Indeed, to do otherwise would deny our peculiarly human capacity to reason and result in a directionless and animalistic existence (see Chapter 7 for a discussion of the relevant natural law). Ultimately, constructing and acting on practical syllogisms is thought to be a constitutive act that shapes the individual person and, when conducted by government, shapes communities.

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The structure of the practical syllogism differs a little to the format of the more general case presented earlier. It is constituted by first developing a major premise that states the end sought, second a middle premise which posits a means to achieve the said end, and finally a conclusion which commands an action directed by reason. Thus a practical syllogism regarding the development of a nuclear intercontinental missile by North Korea might take the form of: MAJOR TERM:

It would be good to ensure my (President Kim) safety as a ruler.

MIDDLE TERM: Having a nuclear weapon makes me safe. CONCLUSION:

Therefore, I must prosecute a nuclear missile program.

Notably, for the conclusion to prove valid requires that both of the first two terms are true. For example, if one counters that having a nuclear missile doesn’t necessarily protect a country from aggression—perhaps because the Americans possess accurate missile defense shields—then the conclusion is no longer persuasive and the commanded act no longer advisable. Similarly, if a better means is proposed, then the command is also likely to prove either invalid or less persuasive (Drew 2022). For instance, if an alternate middle term was proposed—such as ‘being a respected member of the international community would provide no cause for other countries to attack’—then the act commanded would be precisely the opposite. In sum, the practical syllogism is by no means a fool proof tool, but it does make it more likely that people will act—and persuade others—according to good reasons. Accordingly, it deserves both wider recognition as well as wider employment in the construction and selling of public policy.

References Adelman J (2013) The essential Hirschman. Princeton University Press, Princeton Aristotle (2012/4th Century BCE) The art of rhetoric. Collins Classics, London Bunderson C (2014) Provide for the needs of the poor, pope exhorts. Consulted 20th February, 2023 and available at: https://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/30202/provide-for-the-needsof-the-poor-pope-exhorts De Paulo (2010) How often do people really cheat on each other? Consulted 3rd July, 2019 and available at: https://www.psychologytoday.com/au/blog/living-single/201010/how-often-do-peo ple-really-cheat-each-other Drew J (2022) Natural law and government. Springer, Singapore Drew J, O’Flynn J (2020) A test of wills? Exploring synecdoche and gaming in the national literacy and numeracy performance monitoring regime. In: Blackman D, Buick F, Gardner K, Johnson S, O’Donnell M, Olney S (eds) Handbook of performance monitoring in the public sector. Edgar Elgar, Cheltenham Drew J, O’Flynn J, Grant B (2018) Performing what? Exploring and expanding the notion of synecdoche in performance management practice. Public Adm Q 42(3):113–122 Hirschman AO (1991) The rhetoric of reaction: perversity, futility, jeopardy. Belknap Press, Cambridge Hirschman A (1993) The rhetoric of reaction—Two years later. Gov Oppos 28(3):292–314 Kinneavy J, Eskin C (2000) Kairos in Aristotle’s rhetoric. Writ Commun 17(3):432–444

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McCloskey D (1998) The rhetoric of economics. University of Wisconsin Press, Wisconsin Riker WH (1986) The art of political manipulation. Yale University Press, New Haven Riker WH (1990) Heresthetic and rhetoric in the spatial model. In: Enelow J, Hinich M (eds) Advances in the spatial theory of voting. Cambridge University Press, New York, pp 46–65 Riker WH (1996) The strategy of rhetoric: campaigning for the American Constitution. Yale University Press, New Haven Rousseau D, Sitkin S, Burt R, Camerer C (1998) Not so different after all: a cross-discipline view of trust. Acad Manag Rev 23(3):393–404 Sang-Hun C (2017) Kim’s rejoinder to Trumps’ rocket man: “mentally deranged U.S. dotard”. The New York Times, September 21 Tversky A, Kahneman D (1992) Advances in prospect theory: cumulative representation of uncertainty. J Risk Uncertain 5:297–323 Wallis J, Dollery BE (1999) Market failure, government failure, leadership and public policy. Macmillan Press, London

Chapter 4

Heresthetic: The Craft of Political Manipulation

Abstract Heresthetic is the art of political manipulation. Although the term was only coined and defined in the late 20th century, the art has been practiced since classical times and usually involves splitting persons off from a dominant sect with the objective of gaining sufficient adherents in order to force through one’s desired change. Three strategies have been identified in the literature: Agenda control (which seeks to dictate what matters will be considered and the procedure for doing so); strategic voting (vote trading, or voting against ones preferred option in order to realize a sequential result), and manipulation of dimensions (which involves framing an issue in such a way that it taps into latent attitudes that are conducive to the heresthetician’s cause). Generally, the sale of policy to the public occurs quite outside of the Parliament and I thus mostly focus on explicating dimension control. In this regard, recent scholarship has pointed to the importance of prospective herestheticians considering costs and accordingly I outline three different costs that are worthy of cognizance: opportunity costs (the value of the next best alternative foregone); contingency costs (costs which only occur if future events transpire) and legacy costs (which are incurred when a public policy is subsequently reversed or discredited). I contend that an appreciation of heresthetic—particularly when executed after a careful consideration of costs—will provide public policy salespersons with the tools required to schmooze, ring up the sale and ensure that the public doesn’t later request a product return. Keywords Heresthetic · Riker · Dimension control · Strategic voting · Agenda control · Opportunity cost · Legacy cost · Selling public policy · Policy success

4.1 What Is Heresthetic? The chances are that up to the time you opened this chapter you had probably never heard the word ‘heresthetic’ and in all likelihood you will be unable to find the term in your dictionary. Indeed, at a recent political studies conference it was very apparent that the political scientists assembled had, in most cases, also never heard the word (or had forgotten it, or—perhaps equally likely—managed to perfect the much prized academic ability of sleeping through a presentation with their eyes open). This is © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 J. Drew, Selling Public Policy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-0381-8_4

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something of a surprise and a shame, because heresthetic is an incredibly powerful theoretical framework through which one can make sense of surprising political backflips, unlikely political triumphs, and stunning public policy sells. Heresthetic is a neologism coined by the late William H. Riker (who we met in Chapter 3) and shares the same Greek root (haireomai) as does the word “heresy” (that you will be able to find in a dictionary)—“a self-willed opinion, which is substituted for the submission to the power of truth, and leads to division and formation of sects” (Vines 1940, p. 2). Riker (1986, p. 8), claimed that he took Greek as the root of his neologism in order to draw attention to the fact that the “the Greeks should have, but did not, identify the heresthetic art”—presumably because they were too preoccupied with the explication of rhetoric (or was Aristotle diverted from heresthetic by his quest to cure baldness with goat urine1 ?). Riker and the research agenda that he spawned have defined heresthetic in a number of ways—for example, “structuring the world so that you can win”; “the strategy value of sentences”; “to manipulate” (Riker 1986, pp. ix–x); “changing the space and constraints on voters” (Riker 1990, p. 47) and “reinterpretation of the issue” (Riker 1990, p. 48). What is common to all these definitions and explications is a clear distinction between heresthetic and its better known cousin, rhetoric, whereby the former seeks to re-frame issues in a way that taps into existing latent tastes, whilst the latter seeks to persuade auditors to change their tastes. Because heresthetic does not seek to persuade—and hence does not require the auditor to ever admit to the possibility that they might have been wrong in their opinions—heresthetic seems to be a more cost effective way of achieving one’s goal. Moreover, because heresthetic makes no pretense at having an ethos, prospective herestheticians are only constrained by the creativity of their mind and it would seem that a heresthetic win will always be a more interesting win, executed with a kind of panache, that few will be able to resist admiring. Riker only coined the term in the late 20th century but claims that the art of political manipulation had been practiced (without a name) for millennia. I agree that there are some fine examples in recorded history. For example, Flavius Josephus records a brazen and surprisingly successful reinterpretation of an issue in the following account of Herod (The Great) who, after having backed the loser (Antony) in the battle at Actium, presented himself to the victorious Caesar and made the case to keep his kingdom thus: I desire that thou will first consider how faithful a friend, and not whose friend, I have been.

To which, we are told, Caesar replied: Thou shalt not only be in safety, but shall be a king, and that more firmly than thou wast before; for thou art worthy to reign over a great many subjects by reason of the fastness of thy friendship! (emphases added, Josephus [Whiston], 1 CE [1987]).

Herod was repeatedly a winner in an extremely competitive political environment and it is probably not surprising to learn that he was also a master heresthetician. 1

It should be clarified that while I do farm goats, and am not bald, it is a false syllogism to suggest that I have treated my scalp with goat urine (see Chapter 3 on syllogisms).

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Similarly those who wish to win in the present competitive political environment would also do well to learn the art of manipulation and I examine the advice of the Irish regarding same sex marriage as the case study through which to inform my explication of same. The Irish, apparently intoxicated by the experience of having been the first nation in the world to legalize same sex marriage by popular vote (which they inform the world to be a “vital social progression” Kenny 2017) freely dispensed advice to Australia (and indeed sent their citizens over to lead the “yes” campaign) prior to a similar vote2 taking place in the Antipodes in 2017. The issue at hand was whether the Marriage Act (1961 CTH) should be amended to remove constraints of gender for the legal instrument (but not the religious rite) of marriage. In dispensing (unsolicited) advice to the citizens of Australia, the issue at hand was reinterpreted by the Irish in a number of marvelous ways. For instance, citizens were told that the issue was one of “show[ing] the world that it was forward-looking, and no longer so tightlyshackled to religion” (Cornish 2017). Opponents also looked to re-cast the issue at hand and retorted that “anything that deviates from nature, from the norm, that cannot be good in the long-run” (Glenday 2017). Thus, the relatively straight-forward proposal to remove gender from the Marriage Act (1961) was re-packaged and represented according to releasing persons from the fetters of religion (which assumes that religion is a shackle and that somehow allowing homosexual marriage will suddenly destroy the asserted oppressive hold of religion over an entire country3 ), or disuading ‘unnatural acts’ (homosexual acts have been legal in every state of Australia since 1997 and was presumably practiced well before it was legalized, and certainly well before a homosexual could have the state attest to the relationship through issuing a marriage certificate). These are good examples of how new dimensions can be added to an issue space—not to persuade people to change their opinion—but rather to drive people to move themselves to the advantage of the heresthetician (perhaps even against their will) by tapping into latent attitudes (Riker 1990). I believe that public policy salespersons can improve their odds of selling public policy to citizens through mastering the art of heresthetic. Successful deployment of heresthetic will allow the public policy salesperson to schmooze and ring up the sale at minimum costs and can even contribute to reducing the chances of the public policy subsequently suffering a reversal (equivalent to the public requesting a product return). I commence by first reviewing the extant literature on heresthetic. Thereafter I briefly consider some promising new avenues for public policy herestheticians, which include the specific consideration of cost, the importance of salami tactics (immortalized by the Honorable Jim Hacker’s Chief Scientific Adviser) and the need 2

For political reasons—principally to defeat a High Court challenge—the vote was formally a postal survey conducted by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS), although it took the form of a voluntary postal vote. 3 Apparently the Irish were oblivious to the fact that 39 percent of respondents to the 2016 Australian Census reported having no religion and that a further 8 percent of the population were non-Christians (ABS 2016).

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to acknowledge the media as heresthetic allies (or enemies). I conclude by outlining a heuristic developed to guide decision-making by prospective herestheticians intent on successfully selling public policy.

4.2 Lessons from the Literature Heresthetic was developed as way of explaining why surprising political outcomes occur and most of the analytic narratives in the corpus of scholarly work on heresthetic feature politicians who have managed to pull off an astounding win despite being clearly headed for a loss (see, for example the account of the development of the U.S Constitution (Riker 1986) or the repeal of the corn laws by Prime Minister Peel (McLean and Bustani 1999)). Riker (1986) posits a tripartite typology of heresthetic acts—strategic voting, agenda control and dimension control—which all bear brief explication despite the fact that some are of little direct relevance to the public policy schmooze. For instance, Riker (1982) claims that strategic voting is ineradicable and occurs frequently in legislatures and probably also in popular elections. However, what happens in parliaments is probably well-beyond the remit of most public policy salespersons—as interesting (and deleterious for the public) as log-rolling and vote trading is—and most public policy sells do not entail a popular ballot (this is likely to occur sometime down the track, generally for the public policy salesperson’s political master and is often based on a multitude of issue judgements in any case). However, on rare occasions strategic voting may be relevant if the public policy is to be decided by referendum (as was Ireland’s same sex marriage debate) and in these instances prospective herestheticians should be aware of the potential of strategic voting to achieve or thwart their objectives. Agenda control is likely to be far more relevant to public policy salespersons during the schmooze and refers to attempts to dictate what matters will be considered, or manipulate procedural rules, or group alternatives (especially for sequential votes) in such a way that the voters are constrained in their options and how they might exercise same. Critically, before a public policy sell can be executed, it is first necessary to get the product in front of the consumer—that is, people need to be aware of the public policy “problem” as well as the proposed intervention. Sometimes this will be a matter of timing (see Rosenthal and Doron 2009) which is really an issue of kairos (see Chapter 3 on Rhetoric)—preparing one’s alternative while biding one’s time till a more propitious moment. Other times it would seem necessary for the heresthetician to capture the publics’ (or probably more accurately the media’s) attention through some kind of stunt or strongly worded speech (or if one is Donald Trump, then probably a tweet). Relatively little attention has been given to how the heresthetician might go about window dressing the public policy product and this is probably a gap that needs to be addressed (see below). Procedural rules refer to things such as valid quorums and required majorities necessary to pass a bill (and once again the focus has been on legislatures, although this would also seem pertinent to matters which are the subject of a referenda) while grouping of

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alternatives can be important when voting occurs in cycles, but is also probably of little relevance to most public policy salespersons. What is of great importance to the public policy salesperson, especially during the schmooze, is the matter of dimension control. Dimensions are discrete ways of thinking about an issue. For instance, as Herod the Great rightly perceived, one could think about his assistance to Antony at Actium as having been an act of aggression against Caesar, or one could think about Herod’s support for Antony as evidence of his unwavering loyalty to his former liege, despite the likelihood of defeat and despite an undisguised hatred for his lieges consort (Cleopatra). According to the first dimension, Caesar could probably have justly exacted retribution (execution, dethronement, reparations); according to the latter dimension Caesar had the opportunity to bind to himself a new vassal of unimpeachable loyalty. This example ably demonstrates how one set of facts can be thought about in two distinct ways, leading to two very different outcomes. The art in dimension heresthetic is to find the way of thinking about a matter that will prise off sufficient adherents from the dominant sect and thus secure victory for the heresthetician. The explication of dimension heresthetic, arguably, was Riker’s greatest contribution to political science for which he was rightly lauded and rightly proud (McLean 2002). It is also likely to be the greatest tool for the public policy salesperson as they go about the schmoozing process. The Irish advice to Australian citizens on same sex marriage provides some interesting examples, from two of the three categories, regarding how heresthetic might be employed. This was one of the rare occasions where agenda control—in terms of procedural rules—was salient to the sales campaign. Thus, an Irish-person declared that: [W]ith all the love in my heart for Australia I think you’re absolute idiots…surveys, plebiscites or referendums are a bad way to go about it—they’re stressful, they’re hurtful, people say a lot of horrible, homophobic things and your one isn’t even binding, so what’s the point.

This might have been sage advice—and perhaps might have been heeded by Australia’s politicians—had it not come from someone named Panti Bliss (Glenday 2017). By way of contrast, there was no advice forthcoming from Ireland about whether voters should vote strategically—although there were claims that certain religious groups did in fact do so in order to pave the way for future relaxation of bigamy and child marriage laws (see Bolt 2016, 2017). Predictably, and as I have already provided a few examples of, most of the heresthetic action during the sales campaign related to dimension control. On the “yes” side the vote itself was quickly transformed into a marriage “equality” poll rather than a same sex marriage poll, thus appealing to Australia’s favorite value of the “fair go”. This is exemplified by an unidentified Irish voter (perhaps said voter also had a peculiar name unlikely to inspire auditors to take them seriously?) who declared in a Sydney Morning Herald piece that: The referendum was about one question only, can all of us be able to get married to the person we love. It’s not about anything else, there’s no side-effect, there’s no consequence. I just don’t buy the argument, we didn’t buy it here and I hope the Australian people won’t

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4 Heresthetic: The Craft of Political Manipulation buy it. (https://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/tony-abbott-rebuked-overgender-fluidity-samesex-marriage-argument-20170820-gy0h9p.html)

The fact that the mystery Irish voter’s claim is patently incorrect (the vote did not allow the Irish to marry whomever they wanted to—presumably marrying one’s grandmother, child, or sibling is still out in Ireland) is beside the point for the clever heresthetician because “once a salient dimension is revealed, its salience exists regardless of one’s attitude towards it” (Riker 1986, p. 151). It is somewhat more difficult to find a “no” vote case from the Irish—or at least one that made it through the media gatekeepers—the most prominent is the declaration under a photo of a rather scary looking Catholic priest who declared that: Marriage between a man and a woman was what god (sic) intended to make us happy. Anything that deviates from nature, from the norm, cannot be good in the long run (Glenday ABC 2017).

This, of course, is a natural law philosophical position that probably went right over most people’s heads and demonstrates that not all heresthetic dimensions will be winners (it also probably demonstrates that the Catholic Church turns out clergy ill-equipped to be herestheticians, perhaps due to its emphasis on the ethos4 ). In the end, the Irish campaign managers imported to convince Australian’s of the need to get on board the “vital social progression”, focused on the “love is love” and “marriage equality” dictums, in an attempt to lead the inhabitants of the world’s smallest continent out of their barbaric darkness and into the Irishinspired enlightenment in what they believe to have been a “giant step forward for all mankind” (presumably dwarfing feats such as the abolishment of slavery and universal suffrage). In the words of Brady—Executive Director of the heresthetically named “Equality Campaign”—this conversion to the true light was all about getting “people [to] realize that marriage equality is not a what but a who” (Brady, in Kenny 2017)…. and given the Australian Bureau of Statistic’s reporting of the outcome in Australia, it seems that dimension heresthetic may well have carried the day.

4.3 New Approaches for the Public Policy Salesperson As I have noted, most of the work on heresthetic has been conducted by political scientists motivated by their desire to understand why surprising political outcomes sometimes occur. However, I feel that heresthetic would be an equally fruitful avenue of inquiry for public administration scholars desirous to learn why some public policy sells are stunning successes (despite appearing on paper to be sure-fire losers), whilst other public policy innovations are soundly rejected by the public despite being 4

If only they had instead quoted the Catholic Church’s U.S attack-dog, the highly esteemed John Finnis, who has some very confronting and persuasive “no” arguments (see Finnis 2013)—although arguments of this type probably wouldn’t have survived the media gate keepers (but certainly would have enlivened the debate).

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clearly in the interest of the common good and prima facie good ideas. I believe heresthetic has at least as much to offer as any other device for clinching the public policy sale—and perhaps, because of most people’s ignorance of the device and the low costs associated with its execution, it offers the best value to be derived from our book to the prospective public policy salesperson (although if you have purchased just this Chapter I would still point out that the rest of the book is an equally rewarding and entertaining read that will enrich your life immeasurably (not to mention my standing as an author with my publisher5 ) and therefore well worth purchasing). However, for the public policy salesperson to derive maximum value from heresthetic I believe that it is important to augment the extant literature with a consideration of cost, salami tactics, as well as the need to acknowledge the media as heresthetic agents.

4.3.1 Cost Riker (1986, p. 142) refers to “politicians continually poking and pushing the world to get the results that they want” and this idea of costless probes has resonated with his disciples (see, for example, Shepsle 2003). However, the implied idea that one can continually probe for winning heresthetic dimensions, in particular, does not stand up to close scrutiny, for the act of probing must surely come with costs. Specifically, because the human mind can only process a limited number of ideas at the one time (the famous 7 ± 2 from educational psychology) and because the media tends to operate in sound bites and has a short attention span, raising any one dimension is likely to incur opportunity costs. Opportunity costs is a concept borrowed from the discipline of economics and refers to the value of the next best option foregone. It would seem eminently suitable as a way of explaining why herestheticians shouldn’t expect success from constantly releasing a volley of heresthetic dimensions in a quest to disrupt extant equilibrium (in colloquial terms this is usually referred to as “carpet bombing” and generally yields poor outcomes (see Drew and Fahey 2017)). Opportunity costs also manifest in other ways that can be both a help and a hindrance to herestheticians. For instance, pushing one’s opponents towards a rhetorical strategy (by perhaps fixing the number of dimensions that might be appealed to in a public policy debate) would increase their opportunity costs and thus make a win more likely. Sometimes fixing the number of dimensions can be achieved at the agenda setting phase—for instance, the Irish and Australian governments could have put in measures to ensure strict truth in campaigning (thus eliminating marriage “equality” as a slogan6 ). Other times it might be possible to rhetorically insist that 5

Another example of a clever dimension heresthetic? Indeed, the Australian Broadcasting Commission, Australia’s public television broadcaster, did initially instruct staff that they could not use the phrase “marriage equality”, but should rather refer to “same sex marriage”. However, most of their reporters seem to have ignored the memo (Carmody 2017). 6

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only one dimension (the heresthetician’s preferred dimension no doubt) is valid and that all other dimensions are invalid or deceptive manipulations. The point is that fixing dimensions will usually raise the costs for one’s opponents and may even—in the happiest of circumstances—force said opponents to employ the more expensive option of rhetoric. Moreover, the choice of dimension itself is clearly critical. In this latter regard two pieces of “homework” should be carried out by the heresthetician when planning the sales campaign and, if done diligently, will likely reduce their opportunity costs. The first piece of homework is to study how the game has been played before—in most cases the public policy innovation has been tried in the past, either in the heresthetician’s jurisdiction or abroad, and studying how events transpired previously will give one a good insight into which tactics are likely to prove successful and how the opposition is likely to act (this is essentially what the “yes” campaign did by importing its executive from Ireland). The second piece of “homework” is to try the dimension out on a focus group or similar audience, before one launches the heresthetic device at the general public. In this way one can get a good idea of which dimension is likely to prove most successful and focus ones efforts accordingly. Moreover, focus groups provide the heresthetician with an opportunity to try out their rhetorical seasoning, which is important because even the best dimension needs to be made “palatable” through appropriate use of language (Riker 1990, p. 48). However, opportunity costs are not the only expense that a prospective heresthetician needs to worry—it is also important to be cognizant of contingency costs (expenses that arise only if a future event occurs) and legacy costs (expenses that occur if the public policy is subsequently reversed or is shown to have been invalid). Contingency costs can be combatted by fixing the number of dimensions available to opponents, preparing robust empirical proof in advance over a long time horizon (which reduces the likelihood that opponents will be able to refute the evidence at a later time—see Chapters 3 and 6), and using multiple expert friends to introduce the dimension (which makes it less likely that someone will try to argue a contrary position—because experts are always right, aren’t we?). So, for the same sex marriage debate, evidence could have been collected on some salient “side-effect” of allowing same sex marriage (divorce rates, various measures of psychological health for the same sex married couples compared to similar “unmarried” couples), and experts (prominent psychiatrists, domestic abuse consultants etc.) might have been paraded to attest to the truth of whatever claim was being put forward. In terms of legacy costs it is important for the heresthetician to do two main things. First, they should ensure that promised benefits (or promises that a certain bad side effect won’t occur) are made in a way that is difficult to test (that, is, they either can’t be proved or disproved due to data availability problems or because claims are made over a long time horizon (with the hope being that people will lose interest before the claim can be tested)). The other thing to do is to “scramble the egg” in such a way that the public policy can’t be reversed. With respect to the same sex marriage debate, a heresthetician mindful of legacy costs might have introduced legislation in advance to protect religious freedoms (rather than simply asserting that religious objectors wouldn’t be sued for failing to provide services for same sex marriages, and just

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hoping for the best), and would so thoroughly incorporate same sex marriage into institutions and other pieces of legislation that it would simply become impossible to undo the public policy intervention (even if the 40 percent or so who opposed it could ever get themselves in the position to attempt to reverse matters).

4.3.2 Salami Tactics There is an incredibly amusing scene in Yes Prime Minister where Jim Hacker’s Chief Scientific Advisor—Professor Rosenblum—outlines why the nuclear deterrent is a hollow threat. The idea is that the Russians (who at the time were Britain’s greatest threat) would never declare all-out war and thus put Hacker in a position where he would be forced to push the button, but would rather take Europe in a piecewise fashion (did someone say Crimea?). This Prof Rosenblum declares to be “salami tactics…the description given to slice by slice maneuvers” (Lynn and Jay 1988, p. 66). It would seem that salami tactics should probably be added to the list of heresthetic devices. Often introducing a public policy a piece at a time will allow it to go unremarked by the media and hence fly under the radar. This might be done by breaking a grand public policy into a series of smaller steps (for instance, some have claimed that the same sex marriage proposal was merely the first step in a series of planned measures to attack religious freedoms—if so, then it was wise not to declare the grand plan—see Koziol 2018), or by introducing the policy sequentially to a series of small geographic areas (a great example of this latter approach is the consolidation of public schools in Australia, which has gone on largely unremarked because it has taken place progressively on a town-by-town basis). When salami tactics are employed the public policy sell may be progressively executed without the majority of the public even being aware that it is occurring and I therefore feel that this delicatessen approach is worthy of a place in the heresthetic hall of fame.

4.3.3 Media Agenda Setting For some reason the idea that media personnel might be themselves active herestheticians has largely escaped the attention of the scholarly world (media bias however is attested to in the broader scholarly literature). However, if one pauses to think about it for a minute, editors and reporters are probably in the ultimate position to set the agenda and ensure that certain dimensions of an issue are prominently raised whilst others are relegated to the cutting room floor (or presented in a manner unlikely to do their proponents any good at all). For instance, the Irish “no” campaigners “believe[d] their arguments were drowned out by a surge of opinion and media from the other side” (Cornish 2017). Moreover, even when “no” arguments were raised it wasn’t always done in a perfectly

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equitable manner. A good example of this is Glenday’s (2017) ABC online article “Same-sex marriage: Yes and No voters in Ireland offer lessons for Australian debate”. In this report by Australia’s national broadcaster, the bias seems almost palpable. Arguably the fact that “yes” arguments are presented first and are given far more space (416 words compared to 308 for “no”) is a sign of bias. Similarly, spelling G-d with a lower case ‘g’ is a minor matter that could be excused as an accident. However, including quotes that refer to the Irish experience as marriage “equality” and pointedly referring to the Catholic Church child abuse scandals (which were largely irrelevant) were surely a deliberate dimension heresthetic ploy. Ironically, Glenday (2017) refers to “media [that was] unbalanced in its coverage” but takes little pains to ensure that he could not be accused of same! A similar apprehension of bias could also be taken from the SBS (Australia’s part-publicly funded broadcaster) report on the Irish experience (see Cornish 2017). The point is that there is every bit as much reason to suspect that media personnel will be as active herestheticians as any other public figure. The big difference is that the media is in an ideal position to control the agenda and select the dimensions through which a matter is reported. The media may not be “Fake News” disseminators as they are sometimes accused to be, however they are certainly selective news disseminators and as such are probably acting as “heresthetic field marshals” when the issue coincides with their personal values—therefore, prospective herestheticians should ensure they are aware of the enemy and ally troop deployments well before they launch their opening salvo.

4.4 A Guide to Using Heresthetic to Clinch the Sale Now that I have outlined the heresthetic literature, and augmented same with some observations on how the literature might be extended to better reflect the needs of the public policy salesperson, I am in a position to present and describe the heuristic (see Fig. 4.1). All three categories of heresthetic devices are illustrated in our heuristic (although for the purposes of the public policy salesperson, dimension heresthetic is generally the most relevant and I therefore direct the reader to this area of the heuristic in particular). With respect to agenda control, the prospective heresthetician will do well to ask themselves whether the matter is on the agenda, and if not, what kind of speech, stunt or tweet could be engineered to get the public aware of the perceived public policy problem. In this regard it may be important to recognise heresthetic assets in the media industry and cultivate likely allies. It is also important in the agenda setting heresthetic to consider whether the policy might be best dished up according to salami tactics (and hence deprive the opposition of resources and an agenda platform) if it is believed that some parts of the public policy are less objectionable than the entire program, or that some geographic areas are likely to be more receptive to the policy than others. In addition, if the public policy involves a public vote then it

4.4 A Guide to Using Heresthetic to Clinch the Sale

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Fig. 4.1 A heuristic for applying heresthetic to selling public policy

might be prudent to consider how different procedural rules might be employed to increase the likelihood of success (for instance, a voluntary vote will amplify the voice of those most passionate about an issue and a super majority requirement will significantly affect the odds of a given outcome being “passed”). Of course, if the matter is already on the agenda and if there is no plan to hold a popular vote, then there will be relatively little for the public policy salesperson to do in the agenda setting category of heresthetic (although salami tactics—particularly for the case where some components of a grand design are likely to be more acceptable than others— would always seem to be a good option for a patient heresthetician, especially if they have some time till the next election is due). Mostly a direct vote on a public policy issue will not occur and therefore public policy salespersons will rarely need to consider voting heresthetic devices with respect to the sales campaign and schmooze. However, if a vote is required, then attention should be paid to whether or not voters might be tempted to vote strategically and how this might be mitigated or encouraged (depending on the objectives of the heresthetician). For instance, one could encourage a “yes” vote by saying that the existing poll was a once-in-a-generation opportunity that would not be repeated for some time, if ever, if defeated. It is also important to consider whether arrangements

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might be made with prima facie opponent associations to stay out of the debate (and encourage their members to do so) in exchange for support or muted opposition on another matter in the future (for example, the claim that the Muslim community had their silence bought in exchange for support from the left on the issue of terrorism was raised in Australia (see, for example, Baird 2017)). Understandings of this nature, with potential opponent associations, are the equivalent of the log-rolling behaviors that occur in legislatures—it is probably impossible to “prove” that they occur; however it would be naïve and deleterious to the heresthetician’s armamentarium not to consider the possibility. Generally, the best opportunities for the public policy salesperson to structure the world so that they can win will lie with dimension heresthetic devices. In this regard, I suggest that the prospective heresthetician commences their campaign with some serious homework and a lot of thought in relation to what dimension will best serve their interest and how the rhetorical seasoning might best be applied to accompany the dish that they decide to ultimately serve up to the public. This “homework” component can be organized according to a consideration of three costs: Opportunity costs, contingency costs and legacy costs. In terms of opportunity costs, careful attention should be given to how the game has been played previously, choosing a dimension that constrains opposition options and is difficult to foil (example, all love is equal—only a philosopher would attempt to foil such a statement and they would probably receive short shrift for doing so), and testing the device (perhaps against a number of options) and rhetorical seasoning to ensure that it is in a form most likely to receive assent. To minimize contingency costs it will be helpful to try to fix the debate to just one dimension from the outset if possible (this might occur as an agenda setting task), prepare robust long-horizon empirical proofs (if applicable—these will increase the costs of refutation and will probably discourage the opposition from attempting to do so) and using multiple expert friends to introduce the dimension (if prominent expert brands are used then this will mean that opponents will first need to make a case for why they should be listened to rather than what appears to be a consensus of expert opinion). Legacy costs have particular relevance to the after-sales care phase of selling public policy and are all about ensuring that the public policy innovation is not later reversed or evaluated as “bad”. In this regard, it would seem particularly important not to make claims that can later be tested, to take pains to actively combat factors that the opposition might campaign on (Riker 1990 suggested making concessions on extremely unlikely events that may otherwise be used by oppositions as part of a scare campaign—for example, putting in religious freedom protections prior to launching a “yes” campaign), and actively increase the costs of evaluating the policy intervention down the track (the classic one here is to do policy change part way through a data year so that direct comparisons are confounded—see Chapter 6). As a general rule, locking-in the win as quickly as possible, preferably in an irreversible manner, will reduce contingency and legacy costs and should therefore always be part of the planning prior to the public policy launch. In particular, it is important to “scramble the egg” as thoroughly as possible to increase the costs, or prevent

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oppositions from reversing policies in the event that they get political power at some time down the track. In addition, herestheticians may be called upon for their talents should “unplanned and undesirable” events occur in the after-sales care phase (see Chapter 2). For instance, should a Commission of Inquiry be forced upon the public policy salesperson, then agenda control becomes extremely important—for ensuring propitious timing of the release of findings (for instance after the next election), innocuous terms of reference (to constrain the inquiry) and a “suitable” Commissioner (ideally). It is also possible that a public policy may be contested in parliament, and should this occur then it may become critical for the public policy salesperson to demonstrate their vote-trading skills. Thus, whilst heresthetic has its greatest relevance to the sales campaign planning and schmooze, one should not lose sight of the lessons from the heresthetic research program, after the sale has been clinched. In sum, heresthetic has a lot to offer the public policy salesperson despite the fact that explications of it in a public policy context are relatively rare. If done correctly heresthetic can be instrumental to the schmoozing of the public and can even reduce the chances that the public will later request a product refund. However, to achieve this desirable outcome (at least from the public policy salesperson’s perspective) it is critical to do one’s homework and take pains to ring up the sale as quickly as possible—because there is little point in executing a fabulous schmooze if we don’t go the next step and lock-in the sale (Drew and Fahey 2017). Selling public policy through the informed use of heresthetic promises to deliver more cost-effective sales pitches, delivered with relatively greater panache, which have less likelihood of resulting in requests for product returns and I thus commend same to my readers.

Appendix—Heresthetic Tools and Choice Sometimes accounts of heresthetic gloss over the fact that the various devices that make up this art all center on the manipulation of choice (Nagel 1993). As we have seen, scholars broadly agree that there are three main devices for changing the structure of choice: strategic voting, agenda control, and manipulation of dimensions. However, these devices act in different ways with respect to choice and it is useful to be clear around precisely how this takes place. For instance, strategic voting—things such as abstaining from a vote, vote-trading (or logrolling whereby people barter a vote on one issue in order to gain support for another), or vote-switching (Taylor 2005)—is centred on how one uses their individual choice in the face of a fixed agenda. Agenda control, by way of contrast, involves changing the order of how choices are presented, or the number of choices (Riker 1986). Otherwise stated strategic voting is about people changing how they exercise their choice, whilst agenda control focuses on others dictating the choices on offer. Dimension manipulation, is very different to the other two heresthetic devices because it involves ‘introducing new ways of thinking about an issue that tap into discrete preferences or tastes’ (Drew 2018, p. 2). Thus, when it comes to dimension

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control the focus is on changing the way people feel about their choice by bringing to their minds deep-seated preferences and biases. This probably explains why dimension control is such an effective weapon, because it often taps into the power of our pathos. Once emotions have been tapped they remain salient ‘even though those who are being manipulated know that they are being manipulated’ (Riker 1986, p. 151). Otherwise stated, once the genie has been let out of the bottle, there is often no chance of putting it back. Therefore, it seems that feelings about choices might trump the rational selfdirected execution of choice, or the manipulation of how choices are presented. Indeed, this seems to be one point of important overlap between rhetoric that we examined in the previous chapter, and heresthetic—an acknowledgement of the power of pathos.

References Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) (2016) National regional profile ABS, Canberra Baird J (2017) Same-sex marriage: why have Muslims been so quiet in the debate? ABC Online. http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-08-31/same-sex-marriage-why-have-muslimsbeen-so-quiet-in-debate/8860486. Accessed 16 September 2018 Bolt A (2016) Polygamy dating site is a warning: first same-sex marriage, next polygamy. Herald Sun, 5 September. http://www.heraldsun.com.au/blogs/andrew-bolt/polygamy-dating-site-isa-warning-first-samesex-marriage-next-polygamy/news-story/49a4165624b8d3eb6ddfd02131e 5a02b. Accessed on 16 September 2018 Bolt A (2017) Greens confirm: gay marriage is just the start. Herald Sun, 8 September. http://www. heraldsun.com.au/blogs/andrew-bolt/greens-confirm-gay-marriage-is-just-the-start/news-story/ e907aec54b7ee4ad020bc425c5a71040. Accessed on 16 September 2018 Carmody B (2017) ABC staff gagged over marriage equality. Sydney Morning Herald, 10 August 2017 Cornish D (2017) How has Ireland changed since its same-sex marriage referendum? SBS Dateline 12 September Drew J (2018) How losers can turn into winners in disputatious public policy: a heuristic for prospective herestheticians. Aust J Polit Sci. https://doi.org/10.1080/10361146.2018.1520195 Drew J, Fahey G (2017) Framing unpopular policies and creating policy winners—the role of heresthetics. Policy Polit. https://doi.org/10.1332/030557318X15241518778612 Finnis J (2013) Human rights & common good: collected essays volume III. Oxford University Press, Oxford Glenday J (2017) Same-sex marriage: yes and no voters in Ireland offer lessons for Australian debate. ABC, 2 September 2017 Josephus F (Whiston ed) (1987) The wars of the Jews. In: The works of Josephus complete and unabridged. Hendrickson Publishers, Massachusetts Kenny C (2017). Meet the Irish leading Australia’s marriage equality campaign. Irish Times, 10 September Koziol M (2018) “Yes” victors seek abolition of all church exemptions to anti-discrimination laws. The Sydney Morning Herald, 14 February Lynn J, Jay A (1988) The complete “Yes Prime Minister”. BBC Books, St Ives McLean I (2002) William H. Riker and the invention of heresthetic(s). Br J Polit Sci 32(3):535–558 McLean I, Bustani C (1999) Irish potatoes and British politics: interests, ideology, heresthetic and the repeal of the corn laws. Polit Stud XLVII:817–836

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Nagel J (1993) Heresthetics and political stability: Richard Seddon and the art of majority rule. Br J Polit Sci 23(2):139–174 Riker WH (1982) Liberalism against populism: a confrontation between the theory of democracy and the theory of social choice. Waveland Press Inc., Illinois Riker WH (1986) The art of political manipulation. Yale University Press, New Haven Riker WH (1990) Heresthetic and rhetoric in the spatial model. In: Enelow J, Hinich M (eds) Advances in the spatial theory of voting. Cambridge University Press, New York, pp 46–65 Rosenthal M, Doron G (2009) Israel’s 1993 decision to make peace with the PLO and how political losers (this time) became winners. Int Negot 14:449–474 Shepsle K (2003) Losers in politics (and how they sometimes become winners). Perspect Polit 1(2):307–315 Taylor A (2005) Heresthetics and the realignment of British politics. Br J Polit Sci 35(3):429–463 Vine WE (1940) Vine’s expository dictionary. MacDonald, Virginia

Chapter 5

Blame Avoidance and Weapons of Mass-Expertisation

Abstract Blame is the attribution of perceived or potential harm or loss to a person or persons considered, reasonably or otherwise, to have intentionally caused the harm or loss. Although the term “blame games”—which can be defined as efforts to minimize or redirect blame—only became popular in the last half century, blame games are as old as the written history of humanity. Blame games focus mostly on molding people’s perceptions regarding harm or loss, and the causality of same. In the main, blame games are used as a way of insuring against the attribution of culpability should a public policy prove less than successful, but elements of blame games can, in fact, also increase the chances of a successful sale. In particular, the rise— and indeed worship—of expert brands provides the policy salesperson with a good opportunity to assure the public of the validity of evidence. Moreover, when several experts are deployed (weapons of mass-expertisation) then it may force potential opponents to cower in their trenches and not even return fire. However, blame games must be played with care to ensure that the strategy does not figuratively blow up in one’s face. I contend that an appreciation of blame games will provide public policy salespersons with the skills required to assure the public of the rigor with which policy development has occurred, reduce the level of resistance that public policy meets with, and ensure the ongoing employment of the salesperson themselves should things go tragically wrong. Keywords Blame games · Hood · Weaver · Lightning rods · Weapons of mass expertisation · Expert brands · Selling public policy · Policy success · Agency strategy · Presentation strategy · Scapegoat

5.1 What Is Blame? To apportion blame requires one to be able to both identify a loss or harm (or potential loss or harm) at a particular moment in time and also to believe that the person or persons to be blamed have somehow caused, or failed to prevent, the perceived deleterious event. Thus there are two pre-requisites for blame: (i) a perceived or potential loss and (ii) a chain of supposed causality. There is nothing in our definition to suggest that the attribution of blame needs to be reasonable or rational, and © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 J. Drew, Selling Public Policy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-0381-8_5

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often this proves not to be the case. Moreover, blame is as old as humanity and one of the earliest written accounts of blame involves an apple (although some say a pomegranate, or even a fig—see Jensen 2012, p. 371), a serpent, a man and his wife. Josephus Flavius, who was a first-century Roman historian (and former Temple priest and rebel military leader) provides an account of the event in the first chapter of The Antiquities of the Jews: Adam excused his sin, and entreated G-d not to be angry at him, and laid the blame of what was done upon his wife; and said that he was deceived by her, and thence became an offender; while she again accused the serpent. But G-d allotted him punishment, because he weakly submitted to the counsel of his wife…. He also made Eve liable to the inconvenience of breeding…and this because she persuaded Adam with the same arguments wherewith the serpent had persuaded her…. He also deprived the serpent of speech, out of indignation of the malicious disposition towards Adam. (Josephus, cited in Whiston 1987, p. 30)

Here we see Adam attempt to attribute causality for the loss of his innocence onto his wife, Eve. Eve, in turn, sought to attribute causality for Adam’s loss (and indeed her own), onto the serpent. Notably, Adam was punished for weakly assenting to the counsel he was given even though he may have taken the counsel in good faith. Eve was punished for persuading Adam that her counsel was correct and the serpent also received a punishment. In sum, Adam’s blame game attempt was far from successful and it is clear that he had considerable room for improvement (as will become clear in the remainder of this chapter). Interestingly, Eve herself—or so we are told—produced a first-hand account of the incident with the forbidden fruit in The Life of Adam and Eve (cited from Porter 2001, p. 24): The serpent said to me, “May G-d live! For I am grieved over you, that you are like animals. For I do not want you to be ignorant; but rise, come and eat, and observe the glory of the tree.” And I said to him, “I fear lest G-d be angry with me, just as He told us.”…He went, climbed the tree, and sprinkled his poison on the fruit which he gave me to eat, which is his covetousness…And I bent the branch towards the earth, took the fruit, and ate.

This account is interesting because it gives us a glimpse of the power of the expert brand as it is manifest in the psuedepigrapha (literally “books with a false title”, which were penned under the name of some exalted person in order to lend their authority to what was written; Porter 2001). The account is dated to the same time (first century CE) as the writing of Josephus which I cited earlier, but unlike Josephus, the author of the account claimed that it was a story directly from the lips of Eve herself (and notably the fruit is now specifically named as a fig)! Why might the author have claimed the passage to be directly from the lips of Eve? The answer is that Eve was the ultimate expert brand—she, according to the account, was the only person to witness the entire event, and through recourse to this expert brand the author has sought to provide additional assurance of the validity of his account to readers. It seems nothing has changed in two thousand years. People still seek to attribute the causality of their loss to others in order to preserve themselves, and expert brands are still accorded exalted status and adoration bordering on religious fervor. Blame

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games are constantly being played out in public policy debates, and it is thus important that the public policy salesperson is aware of how to play and win. Indeed, to avoid becoming an unwitting scapegoat, it is only prudent that the salesperson spends some time studying the game. Incidentally, the scapegoat is also a concept from antiquity that Josephus relates thus: [T]hey bring two kids of the goats; the one of which is sent alive out of the limits of the camp into the wilderness for the scapegoat, and to be an expiation for the sins of the whole multitude; but the other is brought into a place of great cleanness, within the limits of the camp, and is there burnt, with its skin, without any sort of cleansing.

One shouldn’t take the description of Josephus to indicate that the scapegoat was in some way more fortunate than his fellow kid (as it happened their roles were determined by lot) —the one that was sacrificed immediately at least had a quick death; the scapegoat by contrast was sent into the wilderness where starvation, thirst and constant threat of predators led to a slow and painful demise. It seems to me that it would be much better for the public policy salesperson to master blame games rather than suffer something akin to the lingering death of a scapegoat. I believe that public policy salespersons can increase their chances of executing a successful sale – and preserve their job in the event that they do not – through mastering the art of blame games. Successful deployment of blame games requires one to understand the power of expert brands and the wisdom of molding people’s perceptions of loss or harm, along with causality of same. I commence by first outlining what the literature has to say regarding the marginal cost of failure, the potential price of insurance, lightning rods, and negativity bias. Thereafter I outline some of the more recent scholarship that examines directly the power of expert brands, and the advantages and risks associated with deploying weapons of massexpertisation. I conclude by outlining a heuristic developed to guide decision-making for the blame gamer intent on successfully selling public policy or successfully keeping their job in the event that they do not.

5.2 Lessons from the Literature There are two components of blame—perceived or potential loss or harm, and attribution of causality—which are located in a particular moment of time. Notably, the blamer need only perceive that they have lost or that they might lose; a loss itself is not necessary to occasion blame. Moreover, loss is a relative concept—thus, the perception that the salesperson’s opponent may have achieved greater gains for the blamer is sufficient to meet our first criteria for blame attribution (this quirk of human nature, attested to by experimental evidence, seems somewhat unjust, but such is life; Weaver 1986). Indeed, the proven concept of negativity bias—the idea that a person will feel a loss more keenly than a gain of the same magnitude—suggests that

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citizens are wired to feel aggrieved and act on said grievance at the slightest provocation (Weaver 1986). However, before blame is actually cast the blamer must find a blamee for which causality might be attributed. Notably, causality can be attributed to both acts (that the blamee did which the blamer feels might have given rise to the perceived relative or potential loss) and omissions (things that the blamee did not do that the blamer feels would have reduced or avoided the perceived relative or potential loss). Clearly, the capacity and actual involvement of the blamee in events will be an important determinant of the amount of blame attributed. In addition, it is important to remain cognizant that blame is located in time—different blamers may emerge over time and different blamees may be identified over time in response to their perceived involvement and capacity at various phases of the public policy sale. Blame is important because the marginal cost (another concept borrowed from economics – which refers to the cost of one more unit of production) of blame can be extremely high for the public figure—especially an elected one. Indeed, it is not necessary that blame be widely attributed to an elected figure for them to pay the ultimate price (loss of job); simply that a sufficient number of persons feel sufficiently aggrieved to cast a vote for the said person’s opponent (Drew et al. 2016). In this regard, it is clearly important for the public policy salesperson to be aware of the initial and shifting distribution of costs and benefits (see Chapter 2). Given that elections are frequently won by margins of only a few percent, it is clear that every single attribution of blame could well ultimately spell disaster. Therefore, it seems critical for the public policy salesperson to be conversant with the three main types of blame mitigation strategies (which I will describe henceforth). Christopher Hood (2011) developed a tripartite classification for blame mitigation techniques which is a useful way for us to think about what the public policy salesperson can do to protect themselves, and their masters, against the ever present danger of blame attribution. The first type of mitigation devices are presentation strategies that largely refer to the arguments made to convince blamers that they did not suffer relative loss or harm, or that the blamee did not have capacity or opportunity in the particular moment of time to act or omit to act in a manner that might have avoided the perceived harm or loss. However, those contemplating presentational strategies might do well to remember the sage advice of William Riker (1990), regarding the relative difficulty of persuading others that they are wrong in their judgements (most people are reticent to admit that they have previously erred) —and hence carefully consider the other two alternatives that I outline below (see Chapter 4). An example of the implementation of a presentation strategy may be found in Adam’s attempt to convince G-d that he had been deceived by Eve and hence did not have the capacity to refrain from acting on the forbidden fruit (notably Adam was completely unsuccessful in his presentation strategy). The second type of mitigation device is the policy strategy, which has potential blamees refraining from policies that might give rise to the perception of relative loss or harm—this might take the form of government not pursuing policies that could result in harm or loss (which would seem to be most policies), or withdrawing from public services that have or could give rise to loss or harm. The policy strategy works on avoiding the perception of relative harm or loss. In our example, Eve tells

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us that she had a policy of not causing “G-d to be angry with me, just as he told us” (Eve, cited in Porter 2001, p. 24) —presumably if she had kept to this policy, and not eaten the forbidden fruit, then she and her descendants would have been spared the “inconvenience of breeding” (Josephus, cited in Whiston 1987, p. 30). The third strategy for mitigating blame is the agency approach which involves selecting an institutional arrangement or single person to which causation can be attributed, thus avoiding blame. The agency approach is all about ensuring that blamers attribute causation to someone other than themselves. Of course, whether or not one can pass the blame to a suitable agent largely depends on public expectations regarding the degree of control that a public policy salesperson, or their master, is expected to exercise and also on whether a willing (or ignorant) agent can be found (or duped). In our example, Adam might have achieved agency mitigation had he, instead of partaking of the fruit himself, merely directed Eve to eat the forbidden fruit and relate to him the knowledge of good and evil (and hence overcome his ignorance through her enlightenment). Another example, of course, is the scapegoat, which I wrote of earlier, that represents the ultimate agency mitigation—the goat is cast into the wilderness with all the blame upon its head to suffer for the transgressions of others. Thus, there are three potential avenues to mitigate blame (presentation, policy, and agency) which all come with varying risks and potential payoffs. It would seem that five outcomes might arise from a public policy salesperson’s blame games. Ideal outcomes are blame destruction (through presentation or policy strategies the blamer is convinced that there is not loss or harm, even in a relative sense), blame shifting (through presentation or agency strategies the blamer is convinced that someone other than the public policy salesperson is causally responsible) and blame confusion (this uses time and multiple agents to deprive the blamer of a clean shot on their prey—see my discussion of weapons of mass-expertisation in the next section below). These three outcomes represent a sort of Holy Grail for the public policy salesperson. The consolation prize is the fourth possible outcome – blame sharing (whereby presentation or agency strategies are only partially successful and the public policy salesperson merely gets to move only some of the blame to another agent). In our example, Adam managed to share some of the blame with his dear wife and her malicious serpent associate—and thus merely received the consolation prize rather than the Holy Grail. However, it could have been worse. Blame games can go horribly wrong and end up with the public policy salesperson drinking from a poisoned chalice rather than the Holy Grail—this is our fifth possible outcome and is referred to as a blame reversion (whereby blamers perceive that a mitigation strategy is nothing short of a sham designed to allow the blamee to escape retribution). In this instance, the blamee is likely to receive both the measure of blame that they had hoped to avoid plus an additional portion of blame for trying to escape “justice” in the first place. A great example of blame reversion that parents of children (or readers young enough to remember when they were a child) will be familiar with is what happens when a child is caught-out lying about something that they shouldn’t have done—they are likely to be punished twice, once for the act, and then an extra portion for the lie about the act.

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Thus, to summarise, the five potential outcomes (and their associate strategies) are: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Blame destruction (presentation or policy) Blame shifting (presentation or agency) Blame confusion (time and multiple agents) Blame sharing (presentation and agency which are only partially successful) Blame reversion (when blame mitigation strategies have failed).

In one sense it would seem that the public policy salesperson would do well to always implement a presentation, policy or agency strategy and thus avoid what appears to be a real and present danger of becoming a blamer’s prey. However, unfortunately things are rarely so simple—in the case of blame games there are at least two factors that might dissuade the public policy salesperson from becoming a gamer (in addition to the possibility of blame reversion). The first factor that should be considered is that some blame mitigation strategies also mean that the blame gamer deprives themselves of the future opportunity of taking the credit for a public policy success. For instance, if presentation or agency strategies are efficacious in dissuading potential blamers from attributing causality to the public policy salesperson then it is extremely likely that creditors (by this I mean persons who wish to dispense praise, not money) may also get the message that the public policy salesperson was not the responsible party. Thus, in avoiding blame one is also likely to give up any opportunity for potential credit or praise. The second factor for the prospective blame gamer to meditate upon is that blame games are likely to suffer from diminishing returns. By this I mean that the more one employs blame mitigation strategies the less likely they are to succeed. Going back to my example of the naughty child: one is more likely to get away with blaming one’s brother or lying that one did not do the act the first time than one is on subsequent occasions (eventually the parent twigs and applies an appropriate degree of skepticism to future blame mitigation attempts). So the recommendation to the public policy salesperson (and my children) is perhaps to save one’s best blame mitigation strategies for one’s most desperate potential blame situations.

5.3 New Approaches for the Public Policy Salesperson Now that we have basic blame game concepts under our belts we can look at some of the more recent scholarship on blame—specifically, scholarship on expert brands, weapons of mass-expertisation, and how good can come out of blame mitigation strategies despite their “inglorious motivations” (Hood 2011, p. 164).

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5.3.1 The Rise of the Independent Expert Blame seems to be on the rise and the blame mitigation industry is a clear beneficiary of this trend (Hood 2011). Because the attribution of blame requires information, it is probably not surprising that the advent of new media channels and “open” government have in turn given rise to an increasingly nervous class of politicians and public figures, who seem to be willing consumers of the risk industry product. Indeed, the industry itself and the media which it feeds would seem to be constantly reinforcing the perception amongst potential blamees that they may well fall prey to marauding blamers at any moment (Hood 2002). A key figure in the blame mitigation industry is the independent expert brand. It seems that every time one turns on the news or one reads government policy promotion material (surely someone out there also reads this stuff) one is confronted with a prominent “independent expert” brand that has been employed (I use this word advisedly) to confirm the validity of whatever statement or proposal is being made. In Chapter 7 I spend some time discussing the importance of the independent expert to selling public policy—in particular, how it provides an apparent assurance that due diligence has been undertaken and hence that the proposal is sound. Of course, the whole idea of an “independent expert” consultant fails to stand up to close scrutiny, but fortunately for the public policy salesperson our media seems loathe to examine the inherent contradictions.1 The fact that the independent expert is employed with increasing frequency seems to suggest that public policy decision-makers believe it is an efficacious strategy (readers will recall from Chapter 3 that Riker (1990) made the sage observation that the frequency with which a rhetorical technique is employed is a good indicator of its perceived efficacy). Not only does the independent expert provide assurance for the public policy salesperson, but it also seems to provide insurance—the very same expert brand that can attest to the genius of one’s proposed public policy can also be used as an agency blame mitigation device (that is, a scapegoat). Thus a public policy salesperson keen to escape blame would do well to jump on the bandwagon and pay (ironically usually the prospective blamer’s) money over to a suitable “independent” expert. However, like most things, my advice comes with a few caveats. First, it cannot be certain that if a public policy ends with the perception of relative loss or harm, that blamers will indeed cast all or even part of the blame towards the independent expert. The public may feel that the public policy salesperson who engaged and paid for the independent expert should have interrogated the counsel they received rather than weakly submitting to same (as did Adam in our example). Second, one 1

There are two main problems with the independent expert brand engaged on government business: first, it is difficult to believe that a person or organisation who has been paid for their consultancy (and who no doubt hopes to receive future consultancies from the same source) can in any way be portrayed as independent. Second, the idea that government needs to go outside of the public service and hire private consultants or firms to provide expertise on government business seems to suggest that we are either being profoundly misled or that we ought to be profoundly worried.

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cannot be sure that the independent expert will be prepared to meekly accept the blame if things go wrong (see Drew and Grant 2016 for an excellent example of an independent expert who apparently failed to understand what he was ultimately being paid to do2 ). Third, if alternative independent expert brands are also employed by the salesperson’s opponents, then it may reduce both the sales and blame value yielded to the public policy salesperson as a result of engaging the brand —especially, if the public policy salesperson’s independent expert fails to act in an expert manner (see Drew and Grant 2016).

5.3.2 Weapons of Mass-Expertisation Drew and Grant (2016) coined the phrase “weapons of mass-expertisation” to describe an even more recent trend towards using multiple experts for blame mitigation purposes. It seems to be the case that some public policy salespersons believe that if one independent expert can allow them to share some of the blame with others, then it must follow that multiple independent experts would result in even better blame outcomes.3 Weapons of mass-expertisation are ideally suited to the blame destruction objective. If several high profile independent experts are engaged to attest to the wisdom of a public policy, then it is relatively less likely that the salesperson’s opponents will be able to produce a dissenting expert, for a number of reasons. First, the more independent experts who are employed by the salesperson to provide their sage endorsement regarding the wisdom of the public policy, the less prominent independent brands who remain outside the tent for opponents to engage. Second, some independent experts may baulk at engaging in battle against greater numbers, fearing that they might be outgunned and outflanked. Third, any opponent independent expert confronting weapons of mass-expertisation faces the daunting additional hurdle of explaining why they should be listened to instead of the corps of experts assembled by the public policy salesperson. It essentially ends up being a struggle of ethos, and it would seem more likely for the public to come down on the side of the majority in such situations. In sum, deployment of weapons of mass-expertisation may well result in opponents being unwilling to lift their heads above the trenches. Moreover, weapons of mass-expertisation are also well-suited to blame confusion objectives. Blame confusion uses the temporal dimension of blame to deprive blamers of their quarry. That is, if a succession of independent experts are employed sequentially over time it can be difficult for the media and citizens to pin down exactly 2

There is good reason to believe that the proportion of the business that the consultancy firm or independent expert derives from government might be a good predictor of their willingness to meekly accept blame. 3 This would appear to be a false syllogism: Engaging an expert brand allows for a portion of blame to be shared, more experts result in more sharing, hence engaging weapons of mass-expertisation will result in the smallest portion of blame to the public policy salesperson (see Chapter 3).

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who said what and when—and hence derive the degree of certainty that one would hope might be a pre-requisite for public sacrifice of a scapegoat. Thus, weapons of mass expertisation seem to have the potential to shift matters decidedly to the favour of the blamee. However, in addition to providing enhanced opportunities for blame destruction and confusion, weapons of mass-expertisation can also elicit new opportunities for tragedy to strike at the public policy salesperson. If multiple experts are engaged with similar skills then the public may well wonder whether the whole exercise is merely a sham to avoid blame and the efforts will have been wasted. Moreover, if the independent experts become unwilling to accept the portion of blame for which they have ultimately been paid to sustain, then they might attempt to cast blame to one another and the impression that might be left on the public could be that of a chaotic brawl. If this did eventuate, then the public policy salesperson might attract additional blame for failing to prevent such an unseemly spectacle. Finally, fearsome weapons of mass-expertisation come at a fearsome cost that occasionally attracts the attention of media or one’s minor party political opponents (major political oppositions are not likely to raise objections because they will also hope to engage in these practices in due course—only minor political parties which have no hope of getting their hands on the government cheque book are likely to take the moral high ground and ask difficult questions). After all, this is public money that is being spent to assemble these arsenals and the public may wonder, at some point, why their money is being spent with so much prolificacy (see Belot (2017) for the sort of unedifying news story that proliferate spending on independent experts can generate).

5.3.3 Blame Games as an Unintended Good The best known example of the unintended good is Adam Smith’s (2014, p. 243) observation regarding how the selfish aspirations of the new class of capitalists could “as if led by an invisible hand…promote an end which was no part of their intention”. It seems that there might be some possibility that an invisible hand might also work through the selfish motivations of the blame gamer and all three mitigation strategies seem to have the potential for unintended good (Hood, 2002). For instance, presentation strategies—sometimes referred to as spin—do have some information value and do provide some balance to media reports which otherwise tend to be weighted towards bad outcomes and projections of bad outcomes.4 With respect to agency strategies, if the independent experts are able to actually inject some expertise into the process of public policy formulation then there is also the potential of unintended good. Moreover, if decisions or decision implementation is outsourced to public institutions (an agency strategy) then there is a good chance that better decision-making and better policy implementation may occur under a professional 4

Because claims of doom and gloom will naturally capture media consumer attention more readily—see Chapter 3.

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bureaucracy imbued with greater autonomy (however, if too much decision-making is outsourced, then it could well leave voters wondering why they elect their politicians in the first place). However, I feel that the main potential for unintended good arising from blame games is that it puts a focus on avoiding harm – something that sadly is often inflicted by government on its hapless citizens. Thus, blame games, quite apart from their ethically suspect motivations, may nevertheless end up giving rise to positive outcomes for the public.

5.4 A Guide to Using Blame to Clinch the Sale Now that we have explored the opportunities and potential pitfalls of using blame games to assure and insure the sale of public policy, I am ready to lay out a heuristic for decision making aimed at both clinching the sale and surviving beyond the sale (see Fig. 5.1). This heuristic is a little different from the others in this book given that most of the action takes place well before the schmooze, and is orientated more towards the after-sales phase (where blame is likely to take place), rather than the actual sales pitch (although as I have noted agency strategies might help to clinch the sale). The most important decision that must be made with respect to blame games is also the most difficult decision to get right—is there a high potential for blame to arise from the particular public policy in question? This requires a certain level of prescience (or a good knowledge of how the game has been played before, if it has indeed been played before—see Chapter 4) and an error at this stage might mean that appropriate precautions are not taken when they should have been, or that opportunities for credit are needlessly foregone. If the policy is determined not to be a high blame risk then the public policy salesperson should still assess the potential credit relative to the potential marginal cost. Moreover, it is important that the marginal cost is evaluated according to the particular circumstances confronting the public policy salesperson. For instance, if the salesperson or their political master is in their second term of their presidency where the constitution only allows for two terms, then the blame credit trade-off is less important than if the salesperson or their master was just months out from a re-election campaign. It is also important to be conscious of where the cost and benefits of the public policy lie, and hence where the potential blamers are located in the political landscape. As I noted in Chapters 1 and 2, the pragmatic politician must be most concerned with avoiding blame from their political base and will be generally relatively less concerned with attracting blame from rusted on supporters of opposition political parties. In addition, the size of the public policy salesperson’s (or their master’s) electoral margin determines whether the ultimate cost might be paid and hence the degree of blame that can be tolerated. If potential marginal credit exceeds potential marginal costs, then the decision would seem to be quite straightforward—refrain from downplaying one’s causal role (although one may still wish to employ independent experts for the value of their attestation towards clinching

No

No

Will potential credit exceed potential marginal cost

Yes

No

Must the policy proceed?

Fig. 5.1 A heuristic for using blame games to sell public policy

Is there high potential for blame?

Yes

Yes

Consider whether it would be wise to keep one’s powder dry for a more desperate predicament

Refrain from downplaying casual role

Adopt policy strategy

Adopt presentation strategies Downplay personal causal role

Adopt agency c strategies

Downplay potential relative harm or emphasise danger of passivity

Arm weapons of mass c expertisation

Prepare a c scapegoat

Engage c independent expert brands

Delegate to an c institution

5.4 A Guide to Using Blame to Clinch the Sale 73

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the sale). If, however, the potential credit does not exceed the potential marginal cost then the public salesperson is still left with a bit of a dilemma—either to embark on blame games as if the policy were a high blame risk proposition or to take a loss at the margins on the chin (in the hope that by doing so one has left one’s powder dry for a more desperate blame predicament that might occur in the future – recall blame games are likely to be subject to diminishing returns5 ). If there is a high potential for blame, or a decision is made that blame games are still indicated despite the potential for diminishing returns, then the public policy salesperson should step through the three main blame mitigation strategies as identified by Hood (2011)—presentation, policy, and agency strategies. There is a certain inherent order to the three strategies given their sequential effect on one another, that appears to have been overlooked in the literature. For instance, the policy strategy, if adopted, means that presentation and agency strategies necessarily become redundant. On the other hand, downplaying the potential relative harm or loss as part of a presentation strategy does not affect decisions about agency strategy, however, deciding to downplay one’s personal role in the causal train of events would seem to lead naturally enough to a consideration of agency strategy. If the decision is made to address the causality aspect of blame, then there is yet another choice to be made. One could merely seek to downplay one’s role, capacity and responsibility or one can go big and seek to eliminate oneself from the causal train of events entirely. If the second option is chosen then agency strategies are clearly indicated; but it should be remembered that there will be little hope of later salvaging even a modicum of credit should the public policy surprise on the up side and turn out to be largely credit worthy. In the heuristic I have ordered the various agency strategies according to their value as schmoozing points (the cost to one’s virtue might be entirely opposite). The least helpful device for the schmooze is to find oneself a willing (or ignorant) scapegoat and prepare them (or dupe them) for the possibility of a public sacrifice should it become necessary. The scapegoat might be a junior minister or backbencher if the sales-person-in-chief also happens to be the president or prime minister and feels that they can demand or incentivize the potential scapegoat to identify themselves closely with the project. Alternatively, the scapegoat might be an independent expert or a series of independent experts (which I will deal with shortly). The next agency strategy is to potentially outsource decision-making or decision implementation to an independent regulatory authority (with appropriate terms of reference or legislative constraints designed to ensure that the delivered product is broadly in line with the desired product). This approach will likely allow for at least some of the blame to be shared with the hapless institution but has little value as a sales pitch. The final two approaches in the agency strategy suite have advantages for blame mitigation and for clinching the sale. Engaging an independent expert or multiple independent 5

I note that, once again, the electoral cycle will influence this decision—if one is close to the end of the maximum political term, then one need not worry much about diminishing returns. However, if one is at the beginning of one’s political term or political career, then it may be prudent to keep one’s powder dry.

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experts (arming weapons of mass-expertisation) can help to assure the public of the wisdom of the project and can allow for shifting of part or all of the blame, should the public decide that it does indeed cause potential or relative harm. As I have noted earlier the main considerations are the pecuniary cost, and the need to get independent experts who are likely to conduct themselves in a relatively expert fashion. If multiple independent experts are used, then efforts should be made to highlight the different specific skills brought by each expert so that it does not appear to be a sham designed solely to mitigate blame. In addition, the public policy salesperson might do well to choose independent experts who derive a good part of their revenue from government and who hope to continue to do so in the future. These sort of independent experts are much less likely to try blame reversion, which they might otherwise engage in to protect their personal brands. The choice about whether to merely enlist one independent expert brand, or whether instead to arm weapons of mass-expertisation, comes down to the number of willing independent experts out there in the risk market (which does not seem to be a particularly limiting factor), the budget (or what one thinks one can get away with spending on independent experts before it raises questions in the media), the ability to think up a sufficient number of specific skills to account for each of the experts, the relative likelihood of the experts trying to cast blame to one another, and one’s capacity to engage a sufficient number of experts who earn a sufficient part of their revenue from the government (and hope to continue to do so in the future). As a general observation there seems little reason not to arm a fearsome arsenal outside of the aforementioned constraints. In sum, blame games have a lot to offer the public policy salesperson—particularly in the after-sales phase of the public policy—but steps must be taken well before the schmooze to ensure that pieces are in place to ultimately avoid blame. If done correctly, blame games can result in either complete avoidance of any blame or the dispensing of relatively smaller portions of blame than otherwise might have been expected. It may even help the blame gamer to clinch the sale. However, there are dangers involved in using blame games, especially if the public see through the charade and perceive a sham. Thus, to avoid the quest for a Holy Grail turning into a poisoned chalice, public policy salespersons should therefore take particular care when selecting independent experts to ensure: (i) that they will indeed act expertly, and (ii) that they will be reticent to attempt to pass the blame back. Indeed, every public policy salesperson would be well advised to study this chapter carefully because great potential benefits often come with great risk (as Adam found out much to his disappointment).

Appendix—Blaming ‘Chance’ or ‘Nature’ In very recent times it has become popular to blame chance or mother nature for policy failure. This practice has clear benefits for the public policy salesperson but it also comes with some risks. People do accept that public policy can be a victim of bad luck, just like we sometimes experience in our personal lives. However, most

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people never really understand probability (Riker 1990) despite the fact that they are taught it every year in high-school (recall the author was a high school mathematics teacher for a decade). Thus, they may misapprehend the likelihood of sequential low risk events and instead blame poor management rather than poor luck (as intended). Indeed, chance and randomness are strange concepts that require a knowledge of probability theory to understand properly. For example most people would assert that the chance of getting a tails when tossing a coin is one half (or 50%). But this doesn’t mean that successive coin tosses will turn up heads and tails sequentially. Indeed, it is not that unusual to toss three tails in a row (one-eighth probability). What people don’t seem to internalize is that the chance of an event occurring is subject to a number of important assumptions. First, the probabilities are subject to a thing called the central limit theorem which, in layman’s terms, means that we only really expect the result to stabalise after one hundred experiments.6 Thus, one might toss a coin four times and get three tails but this doesn’t invalidate the assumption of a probability of one half because we don’t reasonably expect the probability to be validated in less than one hundred tosses of a coin. Second, probabilities based on past observations (to predict future events) implicitly assume that past occurrences ought to be suggestive of future events. However, we live in a constantly changing world and unless the relevant parameters are more-or-less fixed then it may not be reasonable to make this key assumption. For example, COVID-19 is often referred to as a one-in-one-hundred-year event (which is not actually correct anyhow7 ). But this doesn’t mean that we can breath a sigh of relief for the next 98 years! It is not until we observe at least one hundred such events that we could expect that the prediction will come true. We might be unlucky enough to get three pandemics in succession. If we did indeed experience successive pandemics then people would be less likely to blame chance and more likely to blame the public health managers in the World Health Organization or individual nations. If they did so then they would be attributing blame wrongly (an instance of blame reversion) however, as I stated at the outset of this chapter blame need not be reasonable nor rational. For these reasons a much safer bet would be to blame a capricious ‘Mother Nature’ for a disagreeable contingent event. Doing so would be reminiscent of how ancients viewed the deities—with bad contingencies blamed on them rather than their priests. Indeed, it might well be possible to have citizens adopt a more reverent attitude towards government as intercessor between themselves and mother nature! 6

As a school teacher I used to regularly conduct a class experiment where I would get small groups of students to toss coins say twenty times. They were frequently bewildered by the fact that the actual outcomes of their coin tossing was generally nowhere near fifty percent. However, when we collated results on a class-wide basis things usually settled down to the predicted probability. 7 According to Duke University (2022) the probability is more like one-in-fifty-nine years. Indeed, it seems that wide-spread ignorance of probability, as well as laziness, is at the heart of the one-inone-hundred year claim—people merely subtracted the date of the first appearance of COVID from the 1918 ‘Spanish’ flu event. Moreover, basing probabilities on past pandemics may not be a sure foundation given that air travel and the like has significantly increased the chances of a local event quickly becoming global.

References

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References Belot H (2017) Government spend on management consultants balloons as giant accountancy firms cash in. ABC News, 29 December 2017 Drew J, Grant B (2016) Multiple agents, blame games and public policy-making: the case of local government reform in New South Wales. Aust J Polit Sci 52(1):37–52 Duke Global Health Unit (2022) Statistics say large pandemic are more likely than we thought. Available at: https://globalhealth.duke.edu/news/statistics-say-large-pandemics-are-more-likelywe-thought. Accessed on 10 February 2022 Hirschman AO (1991) The rhetoric of reaction: perversity, futility, jeopardy. Belknap Press, Cambridge Hood C (2002) The risk game and blame game. Gov Oppos 37(1):15–37 Hood C (2011) The blame game: spin, bureaucracy and self-preservation in government. Princeton University Press, Princeton Jensen H (2012) Plant world of the Bible. Author House, Bloomington Josephus F [Whiston Ed.] (1987) The wars of the Jews. In The works of Josephus: complete and unabridged. Hendrickson Publishers, Massachusetts Porter JR (2001) The lost bible—forgotten scriptures revealed. Duncan Baird Publishers, London Riker WH (1990) Heresthetic and rhetoric in the spatial model. In: Enelow J, Hinich M (eds) Advances in the spatial theory of voting. Cambridge University Press, New York, pp 46–65 Smith A (2014) The wealth of nations. Shine Classics: Middletown, DE Weaver K (1986) The politics of blame avoidance. J Publ Policy 6:371–398

Chapter 6

Evidence: Extraordinary Claims Require Careful Presentation of Evidence

Abstract Evidence is information provided to prove or disprove the existence of a fact in issue. Since the relatively recent development of cheap computing power, prima facie sophisticated empirical analysis has taken on an increasingly important evidential role in the selling of public policy. It is now common practice to cite evidence of trends, statistically significant associations, economic savings and other “expert” analysis as part of the public policy sales pitch. This kind of evidence can provide important soundbites and rallying cries for proponents of a given public policy, but it is critical to deploy evidence skillfully to stifle dissent and protect legacy. Indeed, recent scholarship highlights the perils of providing opponents with the time and opportunity to garner contrary evidence, the folly of making testable claims, and the importance of being mindful that written records may ultimately be released to one’s opponents or the general public. I contend that an appreciation of how to present the different types of evidence that might be used to prosecute the case for a given public policy, is crucial to the sales campaign, schmooze and after-sale success of the public policy salesperson. Keywords Evaluating public policy · Selling public policy · Public policy · Policy success · Evidence · Regression · In-depth interviews · Expert brands · Simple statistics

6.1 What Is Evidence? There is a propensity in our society to accept evidence without critique, especially when it is presented as “research” by the academic community or it is proffered by other strong expert brands. The media, in particular, seems willing to run with media releases issued by universities and consulting firms often it seems without investigating the quality of the “research”, and this media practice can add a further layer of apparent expert brands to evidence claims. Presumably this reticence to investigate media releases with appropriate skepticism is a function of the savage staff cuts which have hit most media organisations over the last few decades— although, it could simply be one of the seven deadly sins (sloth) in action. Whatever the cause, it seems to be the case that a lot of “evidence”—often compiled by persons © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 J. Drew, Selling Public Policy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-0381-8_6

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and organisations with a clear moral hazard—is passed off to citizens as “fact”, despite dubious foundations. As an academic I have often been involved in heated public policy debates and stood aghast as “facts” have been misrepresented and manipulated—whilst at precisely the same time robust, rigorous and peer reviewed work has gone unmentioned. Of course, not every citizen is a gullible consumer of Newspeak—there is always a small group of people who try to interrogate the evidence. For instance, academics sometimes try to project a voice of reason into debates, but often find that they are quoted out of context, outmaneuvered by canny politicians (that always seem to get the last word in every media story), or have their peer-reviewed robust evidence summarily dismissed by apparent professors1 who prima facie outrank them (and yes all of these things have happened to me). Moreover, other less credentialed persons may go to the internet to try to provide some balance to the story—but these persons are quickly labelled “skeptics”, “conspiracy theorists”, or just plain “looney” and their concerns are often brushed under the carpet in a manner that speaks directly to the importance of labelling theory. In legal parlance, evidence is “any object or information ….which tends to prove or disprove the existence of a fact in issue” (Butt 2004, p. 156). However, the standards of the media and public opinion often fall far short of the rigor required to “prove or disprove” anything. Riker (1990) was probably correct when he pointed out that part of the problem is that most people never internalize the full implications of probability theory, despite the fact that most people receive at least twelve years of education. As a former mathematics and science teacher I can attest to the fact that a large proportion of the population just don’t understand what statistical significance or the scientific method mean—even among highly achieving postgraduate students it is often apparent that only a fuzzy appreciation of the ideas exists. Indeed, one comes across poor use of the most basic statistics (such as measures of central tendency and spread) far too frequently in peer-reviewed work, and as the complexity of analysis increases so do the errors and inability of many end-users to spot the errors. Otherwise stated, increased complexity in empirical evidence—particularly when it is proffered by persons credited as experts—is likely to be beyond the ability of most persons to critique, and complex analysis is therefore an important way to “prove” a fact, especially if one wishes to avoid close scrutiny of the details of the proof. A case that demonstrates the potential advantages and also the importance of careful use of complex empirical evidence for weighty public policy interventions is Climate-gate. Climate-gate revolved around the hacking and public release of prima facie damaging emails sent from the University of East Anglia’s very influential 1

The general public is often confused by what is meant by the term ‘professor’ and what skills must be attained to obtain same. As academics are aware scholarship is often but one of the three criteria for academic promotion (the other two generally being ‘teaching’ and ‘engagement’). Moreover, increasingly persons are awarded professorships in recognition of community service in their discipline and may have little or no record of scholarly writing or qualifications. However, when those outside academia hear the term ‘professor’ they assume (rightly or wrongly) that the person has been judge by their peers to be a superior scholar in the field, and thus believe (sometimes erroneously) that the person is the ultimate ‘expert’.

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Climatic Research Unit in two tranches in 2009 and 2011. The emails served to cast a shadow over complex modelling and analysis of climate data which had previously been considered to be robust evidence proving man-made global warming. In particular, the scientists involved with Climate-gate were accused of: (i) misrepresenting their research and the uncertainties associated with the research; (ii) resisting requests for information, so that their research might be interrogated; and (iii) manipulating the peer-review process for their advantage. Some salient quotes from the hacked emails of members of the Climate Research Unit, certainly appear alarming: I’ve just completed Mike’s Nature [a prominent scientific journal] trick of adding in the real temps to each series for the last 20 years ….to hide the decline (Jones, cited in Whiteman 2010). I also think the science is being manipulated to put a political spin on it which for all our sakes might not be too clever in the long run (Unnamed official, cited in Eilperin 2011). The fact is that we can’t account for the lack of warming at the moment and it is a travesty that we can’t (Dr. Trenberth wrote, cited in Revkin 2009). Can you delete any emails you may have had with Keith re AR4? Keith will do likewise (Jones cited in The Telegraph, 2009). I will be emailing the journal to tell them I’m having nothing more to do with it until they rid themselves of this troublesome editor (Jones, cited in The Telegraph, 2009). I can’t see either of these papers being in the next IPCC report. Kevin and I will keep them out somehow—even if we have to redefine what the peer-review literature is! (Jones, cited in The Telegraph 2009).

The first three quotes are suggestive of manipulation of data to provide “evidence” of a pre-determined position of man-made climate change. The fourth quote suggests that the scientists may have tried to delete some evidence to avoid public scrutiny, whilst the last two quotes seem to suggest that the scientists were actively involved in the manipulation of the peer-review process. It is important to note that Climate-gate gave rise to a number of inquiries into the conduct of persons associated with the Climatic Research Unit, which determined that the conduct of the scientists “did not unduly influence reports” (Whiteman 2010; emphasis added). However, the scandal undoubtedly did damage the anthropocentric global warming agenda and, more broadly, provides us all with some very important lessons on how to present complex empirical evidence to sell important public policy innovations (and keep them sold). I believe that policy salespersons will experience more success in selling important public policies if they master the art of presenting evidence. In particular, careful presentation of evidence will reduce the likelihood that the evidence is later critiqued or refuted and will avoid Climate-gate-like scandals. I commence with a quick overview of six types of evidence that are regularly employed to sell public policy, paying particular attention to the potential benefits and costs of each approach. Thereafter I consider some of the lessons arising from recent scholarship on the use of evidence for selling public policy. I conclude by outlining a heuristic developed to guide decision making by salespersons contemplating the use of evidence to secure the sale.

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6.2 Lessons from the Literature There is a pervasive assumption that evidence-based policy is ipso facto good, leading to a de rigueur employment of same. Evidence based policy can be a good thing, particularly if the evidence is robust and is used to inform the policy design (rather than simply justify it). However, evidenced-based policy can also be deleterious: it is more often than not backwards-looking (unless assumptions are employed, which are really nothing more than educated guesses anyhow and hence hardly robust evidence), context specific (where actual facts are employed they are often collected from other jurisdictions where it is claimed the policy has already been successfully implemented, but facts from one jurisdiction may not directly translate to another) and can be very selective (we discuss the potential to select “suitable” evidence a number of times in our examples below). Moreover, it is also often the case that evidence-based policy can be lazy policy—because the temptation is to rely unduly on the evidence rather than developing a comprehensive logos2 for why it might prove successful (Coase 1994). Indeed, it is important for public policy salespersons to be cognizant of these general criticisms—which I elaborate on in more detail below – when considering the whole question of evidence. “Evidence” for public policy reforms comes in many guises and a complete treatment would be beyond the scope of a single chapter, and probably a single book. Therefore, my aim is to review what I consider to be the six most common forms of evidence tendered in support of public policy changes, with an emphasis on explicating the benefits and potential costs of each type of evidence. I hope that the reader appreciates the fact that I have struggled valiantly to overcome my natural inclination to provide them with a treatise on econometrics (mathematics and statistics employed in economics)—if there are kindred spirits out there who also enjoy mathematical proofs of empirical techniques then I am sure that they will be devastated by my restraint (but I do offer a source of solace by referring them to the imposing texts of Wooldridge (2006) or Kennedy (2003) which will no doubt keep such persons entertained for months)! For the rest of my readers, I feel that the following brief account of simple statistics, multiple regression analysis, ratio analysis, business cases, surveys and in-depth interviews will serve my present purpose which is to show what type of evidence is best suited to “prove” public policy and how it should be handled carefully.

6.2.1 Simple Statistics For many years, I have been trying to work into the prose of a scholarly work my favorite quote from perhaps my favorite academic: 2

Indeed, as I emphasised in my recent book (2022)—Natural Law and Government—we should always have good reasons for acting in a public policy matter and such reasons are often the outcome of syllogistic practical reason, rather than empirical evidence (see also Chapter 3).

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It is well to remember that there is no such thing as a free statistic. (Coase 1994, p. 58)

This quote, from the Nobel laureate, the late Ronald Coase, serves to cut straight to the chase regarding statistics—statistics do come at a cost. It takes time and money to assemble appropriate statistics and there are at least two problems that result from our modern, almost slavish desire for statistical proof: first, not everything is amenable to quantification which means that some things inevitably get ignored; second, because statistics are so rarely challenged (and hence are powerful devices for schmoozing citizens regarding public policy) they tend to inhibit more deliberative reasoning which might otherwise have led to “men (sic) to succeed….in discovering together…new levels of truth (or at least agreement) that neither side suspected before” (Booth 1974, p. 11). However, whilst the use of statistics to provide evidence for public policy may ultimately have deleterious effects for deliberative democracy, it seems to offer great potential for the public policy salesperson who is initially primarily concerned with ringing up the sale. People tend to accept statistics at face value, despite the fact that most of us know far better than to do so. It seems to be the case that the mathematical certainty conveyed to most of us by our well-meaning teachers during school education has morphed into a belief that numbers always represent a sort of ontological truth. Certainly 3 + 4 does always equal 7, and we have little reason to doubt this answer to the question thus posed. However, when it comes to statistics, things are not nearly as certain—in terms consistent with my example we often don’t know for sure that the inputs are indeed ‘3’ and ‘4’, generally it is not clear why the two inputs were selected in the first place, and mostly we are not provided with compelling reasons for why addition (rather than a different method or mathematical operation) was chosen. Consider, for example, the break-down of tasks required to identifying the typical quantity of some item—perhaps the typical temperature for Moonbi (a bustling town of 500 citizens, 422 km north of Sydney Australia) in the month of May. Clearly we would first need to assemble some data—preferably actual temperatures recorded in Moonbi—however, this is not nearly as straight-forward as it might at first seem. For instance, what time of the day should the records be collected, how many days in May should we collect data for, how many years should we go back with the data, what type of scale (Celsius or Farenheit) should be used, what degree of accuracy should the data be recorded at (whole numbers or say six decimal places), where should it be recorded from (Moonbi is a geographically diverse and large farming area)? These questions have weighty implications for the answer that we will ultimately provide regarding the typical temperature in Moonbi in the month of May. Moreover, once we have the data, we then need to decide on an empirical technique to determine the “typical” data recorded. Should we use the mean (most people understand averages and they are quick and easy to calculate) or the median (which is a little more difficult to calculate but is resistant to skewing) as the measure of central tendency? What do we do about unusual results (for example, do we follow the reasonably common practice of dropping outliers), recording error (do we even test for recording error), or missing data (do we leave it blank or insert some sort of trend figure)? Do we

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also provide a measure of spread (standard deviation or inter-quartile range) to aide interpretation of our central tendency metric? The decisions are endless, and the answer we eventually get will be, in part, a function of the decisions that we make. Hopefully my simple example will convince my readers that even the most rudimentary statistic is the product of dozens of decisions—including the decision to calculate the statistics in the first place (I dare say other people might have opted to determine the typical temperature of a more populated town—although it is hard to imagine that a more important town than Moonbi3 exists out there). This illustration might indeed prove troubling for the consumer of statistics, but I imagine our public policy salespersons can now clearly see that statistical evidence offers a world of possibilities. This is because the public policy salesperson can decide what data is measured, how it is measured, the time horizon over which it is measured (etcetera) and hence obtain a “suitable” statistic for their sales pitch. The only downside to using simple statistics as evidence for public policy is that it is a reasonably quick matter for others to critique the approach and even provide contrary evidence. My next technique—multiple regression analysis—deals with these down-sides by considerably increasing the complexity and information costs for anyone inclined to dispute the evidence.

6.2.2 Multiple Regression Analysis Multiple regression analysis can be described as our simple statistics on steroids. In its absolute simplest of terms, multiple regression analysis seeks to extend elementary linear regression to include multiple independent variables. Linear regression, the reader may recall, determines a formula for a line of best fit that best captures the association between a dependent and independent variable over multiple observations, as illustrated in Fig. 6.1. To extend linear regression to account for multiple independent variables requires one to subscribe to a number of assumptions that most honest econometricians will admit are often, rather routinely, violated (see, for instance, Kennedy 2003). The main advantage of multiple regression analysis is that it allows for the analyst to test for the statistical significance between two variables of interest, whilst controlling for other salient factors (hence allowing for ceteris paribus—holding all other things constant—claims to be made). The major problems with this approach are that it ignores important Type II error (the chance of a false negative); that it tends to focus attention on statistical significance (rather than substantive significance4 ); that it generally ignores the effect of including control variables and transforming 3

This is where the author resides on his goat and flower farm. That is, a variable can be significant in terms of statistical reasoning but have absolutely no importance in a practical or policymaking sense: either the magnitude of the average response coefficient might be too small to make any material difference, or the variable in question might be something that can’t be controlled by public policy makers.

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Fig. 6.1 Basic linear regression (Source The Author)

variables (more on this shortly); that it often leads to spurious conjectures of causation (where only association has been demonstrated); that it tends to lead to ethically objectionable policy prescriptions (because statistical associations don’t impute ethical oughts—see Chapter 7), and that it tends to lead to non-statistically significant associations being ignored (when often the fact that something isn’t associated can be more powerful for prescriptive purposes). Indeed, the formidable economists Ziliak and McCloskey (2013, p. 2) declare that: “reducing the scientific problems of testing and measurement and interpretation to one of ‘statistical significance’, as some sciences have done for more than eighty years, has been an exceptionally bad idea”.5 Moreover, the relative ease with which econometrics can be conducted in the age of cheap computing power means that far too much emphasis is often placed on empirical evidence with a concomitant reduction in the effort put into theorising and extending theory (which was Ronald Coase’s point that I cited earlier). The consumer of regression analysis might be appalled by my brief recounting of the deficiencies that may be associated with same (and defensive econometricians will likely point to all sorts of bells and whistles that can be added to the basic model to attempt to deal with some of the criticisms). However, the public policy salesperson may well be intrigued and heartened by the possibilities. Being able to choose the control variables that one employs in multiple regression, and being able to transform same (by this I mean taking the natural log, or square root, or square, or just about anything else of the raw data to change it to a more “suitable” form) in a pretty untransparent process that few understand would seem to be a heaven-sent opportunity to provide apparently rigorous proof and use the compelling words “statistically significant”, with limited fear of critique. In addition, multiple regression analysis also allows flexibility in many of the matters I discussed in reference to my explication 5

Indeed, the cut-off points for statistical reasoning – such as the common 5% rule—are completely arbitrary rules of thumb devoid of logic and instead based on historical precedence (Kennedy 2003). Why should something with a statistical significance of 4.9% be given attention but another variable at the 5.1% level be largely ignored?

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of simple statistics (above). The potential downside for the public-policy salesperson is the risk of getting bogged down in technical jargon that will switch auditors off (my advice is to avoid all talk of transformations, co-variates, error terms and random effects), and the “travesty” (to quote our Climatic Research Unit scientists) that sometimes despite all manner of magic tricks the desired evidence will fail to appear!

6.2.3 Ratio Analysis (and Performance Monitoring) Ratio analysis typically employs fiscal and output production data to generate various metrics by which an organisation’s performance can be compared against itself over time, or itself and a peer group over time. This technique is relatively common in the discipline of accounting, although curiously a lot of the academics working in the field of ratio and performance analysis tend to be political scientists. Typically, metrics such as expenditure per unit of production (often erroneously referred to as “efficiency” ratios), debt as a function of revenue, cash reserves as a function of historical expenditure (measuring liquidity), asset renewals (for instance capital expenditure as a function of depreciation accruals) are used to evaluate the “performance” of public entities. Often the outputs yielded by the metrics are compared to dichotomous benchmarks whereby performance which fails to meet the benchmark is flagged as unacceptable and deserving of some remedial intervention. There is a large literature demonstrating that regimes of “targets and terror” (Bevan and Hood 2006, p. 517) often result in unanticipated consequences (my favorite example is the story of musk rats related by de Bruijn 2007, whereby a bounty paid per musk rat provided a disincentive to musk rat catchers to collect the bounty prior to spring because doing so would effectively deprive them of the opportunity to maximize their income by also catching the adult musk rat’s progeny). Moreover, there is a large body of scholarly evidence of the performance paradox (whereby actual performance is markedly discordant to performance on paper due to unintended distortions, intended distortions, and the synecdochical gap (using too few metrics to measure the whole of organization performance)) (de Bruijn 2007). However, despite the cautionary tales that can easily be found in the literature, governments across the globe have proven all too keen to implement performance management regimes. The beauty (and from the perspective of scholars in this field—the exasperating) aspect of using ratios combined with benchmarks is that in addition to the malleability of simple statistics that we observed earlier, the use of what are almost always entirely arbitrary benchmarks allows for one to control how the final judgements will fall. So, departing for a moment from our Climate-gate example, if one wishes to “prove” that a large number of local governments are not fit for the future, then one can assess achievement for certain ratios by unreasonably high benchmarks. A case in point was the benchmark of 100% for asset renewals used by the New South Wales government to assess local government “fitness” (that, by definition, required local governments to renew assets at a faster rate than their measured consumption) which led, in part, to a finding that over 60% of the local governments were “unfit”, thus

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providing “evidence” to justify a large program of forced amalgamations (see Drew and Dollery 2016). For some reason the benchmarks for this kind of analysis are rarely argued against and by allocating powerful labels—such as “fit” and “not fit” —it is possible to readily convert empirical assessments on a relatively small number of metrics into much more generalizable findings about the entire operations of entities being measured (which is pars-pro-toto synecdoche—see Drew, O’Flynn and Grant 2018). The downside to this kind of ratio analysis is that others may demonstrate—by the very same ratios and benchmarks—that the public policy remedy will not improve the situation, which may well prove embarrassing for the public policy salesperson (if done quickly enough to be used during the public policy debate) or destroy legacy down the track (see, for instance, Drew and Dollery 2014).

6.2.4 Business Case Analysis Many governments now employ business case analyses as the basis for political decisions on public policy—for instance, the use of business cases has become mandatory in Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom (OECD 2015). Business cases essentially subtract the costs of a project from the projected pecuniary benefits arising from the project to provide an assessment of the nett financial benefit of pursuing a given project. On the face of it, a business case approach to making public policy decisions should result in economically efficient outcomes (although some might argue that the purpose of government shouldn’t be about economic efficiency6 ), and generally ensure that taxpayers get the greatest “bang for their buck”. Moreover, business cases provide what appear to be precise dollar figures of nett benefits that are amenable to use in news sound-bites and thus represent a succinct sales pitch on the topic that many people hold dear to their hearts—money. However, the reality of the business case approach is that it must inevitably be based on multiple assumptions, due to the fact that the project hasn’t been delivered which means we can’t know with any certainty what the true cost will be—let alone the ultimate pecuniary benefit. If the assumptions are based on some kind of reliable evidence—for instance, costs and benefits that occurred in other comparable jurisdictions—then the business case has some chance of being realised (notwithstanding the fact that context may ultimately prove decisive). However, assumptions are almost always provided without rigorous supporting evidence (despite the fact that the assumptions are invariably stated in a manner which suggests both certainty and authority), which means that they are really nothing more than guesses (educated guesses perhaps, but undoubtedly guesses). Once this point has been appreciated, one quickly realizes that the nett financial benefit is nothing more than the arithmetic 6

People also value things such as transparency, accountability, responsiveness, and democracy. Indeed, if efficiency was our only concern then we would be best advised to deliver all services through the free market which has long been held to be the most efficient means of matching supply to demand (Drew 2022).

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outcome of a series of guesses. For example, if one assumes that a public policy will result in a 5% saving on a $10 million wage bill, and that it will cost just $200,000 to carry out the reform (redundancies, training and the like), then, not surprisingly, one will determine that the nett financial benefit is $300,000. To make this rudimentary arithmetic appear more sophisticated (and to allow more opportunities to “mould” the nett financial benefit) persons compiling business cases generally employ a discount rate (that assumes a change in value of money with time) so that the nett financial benefit can be presented in present value terms. This almost school-child level arithmetic dressed up as sophisticated business analysis forms a large and important part of the government advisory work (and hence revenue) of the “Big Four” accounting firms, despite some devastating critiques which have demonstrated significant weaknesses in execution (see, for instance, Dollery and Drew’s 2017 critique of the work of KPMG). Whilst business case analysis may represent poor value for taxpayers and decision-makers, it does provide public policy salespersons with an excellent opportunity to capture public attention (money talks), create a nice soundbite for proponents to rally around, and provide a prima facie compelling economic case for a given reform. There are however, a few possible down-sides. First, if political or public pressure (which may include freedom of information requests or even Court orders) force the disclosure of assumptions used to build the business case, then the edifice of sophisticated analysis can quickly come tumbling down (see, for example, the devastating critique of the role that implausible assumptions and discount rates played in the Stern report’s finding that global warming would reduce annual incomes from 5–20%; Tol 2014). Second, there is a legacy risk associated with business cases—if subsequent inquiry finds that implausible assumptions failed to materialize, this could cast public policy salespersons in a very poor light (see Drew et al. 2022). Fortunately, salespersons relying on business case analysis can take solace in the fact that post implementation reviews hardly ever happen7 (which is why highly paid consulting firms continue to grow their revenue from this source), although what has occurred in the past is not necessarily an accurate prediction of what might occur in the future (this is something that those seeking to produce an accurate business case on the basis of historical evidence should also be mindful of).

7

A simple fix to this important problem in public policy decision-making would be to bind the consulting firm producing business-cases to a contractually enforced post-implementation review. This would serve two purposes. In the first instance, it would encourage consultants to be more prudent in the assumptions that they employ given the likelihood of ultimate exposure. In the second place, it would demonstrate to taxpayers and decision makers the actual outcomes arising from reform (which could then be used as reliable evidence to inform future reforms). However, neither the government nor the opposition at the time of implementation are ever likely to be keen on such an approach given the uncertainty surrounding what a post-implementation review might find.

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6.2.5 Surveys Survey evidence allows the public policy salesperson to combine some public opinion with rudimentary quantitative analyses. It is a relatively more expensive proposition than the aforementioned purely quantitative techniques (in a pecuniary sense) because it requires that a survey poll company pose questions to a large number of people, and collate the responses. It may also prove expensive if the evidence thus developed does not support the public policy salesperson’s case. There are two main problems, and potential opportunities, associated with survey evidence. First, there is the matter of the wording of the question of interest and the wording of statements and other questions that may precede same. In a memorable scene from Yes Prime Minister, Sir Humphrey Appleby instructs the Prime Minister’s Principal Private Secretary, Sir Bernard Woolley, in how to conduct another opinion poll to contradict an unsuitable poll. Key to this process is to have a “nice young lady” (sic) come and ask leading questions that elicit a consistent response, ultimately resulting in the respondent being cornered into the “suitable” answer for the last question—which is the only response that is published. Apparently reputable polling companies would never do such a thing, but Sir Humphrey assures Sir Bernard that “there aren’t many of those [reputable companies]” (Lynn and Jay 1988, p. 106). The second type of problem, or opportunity, associated with survey evidence relates to the sample of people to which the question or questions are posed. For instance, it is important to have a sufficiently large sample size to allow for meaningful conclusions to be made, cognizant of sampling error (however, sampling error is generally ignored and if one is merely trying to justify a policy, rather than garner reliable evidence, it might be safe to do so because the population generally seems oblivious to the concept (despite the fact that it is taught at high school)).8 The representativeness of the sample also has important implications for the results that one receives from a survey—ideally, a sample would be constituted by informed people of voting age, from all walks of life, who are entitled to vote (and where voting is not compulsory, likely to vote). However, by selecting a “suitable” population all sorts of answers may be obtained for any given question. In addition, the way the survey is conducted matters—whether it is by phone, or mail or email has profound implications for the type of people who respond (for instance, few centenarians will respond to a SurveyMonkey “cheap” poll; and few homeless people will receive a postal poll) as does the response rate.9 8

For instance, it is generally the case that sample size is insufficient to reduce sampling error to a magnitude that would allow for two-party preferred political polls to be considered in any way determinative, but this doesn’t stop the media from gleefully reporting movements of as little as 1% as meaningful (which they aren’t), nor does it stop our esteemed political leaders from placing great store in small movements (which they shouldn’t). Sampling error of major political polls is generally in the order of ± 2.4%, because it is simply too expensive to survey the 10,000 or so respondents required to get it to a 1% error (which may still not be sufficiently small to provide reliable evidence (see, for example Burnett and Sisson 2018)). 9 Response rates indicate whether the feedback can be reliably extrapolated to the broader population or whether it is merely the opinions of the squeaky wheels of society.

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In sum, survey evidence is expensive to collect, has some malleability, but is not entirely predictable. The next technique—in-depth interviewing—is probably even more expensive, but undoubtedly offers more potential to yield “suitable” evidence for the public policy salesperson.

6.2.6 In-Depth Interviews In-depth interviewing is becoming an increasingly popular approach to garnering evidence to sell public policy, particularly because it is a means by which a human face can be brought to complement quantitative evidence, and hence combat potential claims of administrative evil (see, for example, Adams and Balfour 1998). In-depth interviews sound impressive but sometimes simply mean that one has had a chat with an interviewee according to some set themes (but not necessarily set questions), then selected quotes from these interviews to present “evidence” of typical responses to a particular issue. A lot of sociologists routinely conduct in-depth interviews with the highest standards of academic integrity and rigor. However, I am pretty sure that the public policy salesperson can quickly perceive all manner of ways to ensure that the reported human face of an issue is consistent with their sales pitch. Particularly important is the flexibility engendered by the usual practice whereby one gets to select who is interviewed, and the themes that will be explored in the said interview. Also salient is the likelihood that from the lengthy transcripts that one accumulates from an in-depth interview, one gets to select the method of analysis (there are computer programs available to analyze interviewee data, but these may be eschewed) and the actual quotes used for the publicly available evidence. In addition, if a particular interviewee proves unsuitable it would seem to be a simple matter to remove the person from the study entirely. The main down-side to this approach is that in-depth interviewing is a very time consuming task that is likely to come at a significant pecuniary cost. In addition, in-depth interviews alone may not be sufficiently compelling evidence—although as I suggest it is commonly employed to augment empirical evidence (and, moreover, to bulk out what might otherwise be slim quantitative reports). A common variation to the in-depth interview approach for qualitative evidence is a public consultation period (which shares many of the aforementioned opportunities to selectively report on ‘suitable’ opinions). However, this type of qualitative evidence is only possible after the initial launch of the public policy and is thus not directly relevant to our consideration of evidence to support the sales campaign.

6.3 New Approaches for the Public Policy Salesperson Climate-gate can provide prospective salespersons with some important lessons regarding how they should approach evidence with respect to selling public policy. In particular, the quotes that I related earlier suggest that a higher level of care should

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be taken with respect to relating complex empirical techniques and that one should be cognizant of both the potential for correspondence between evidence providers to become public and also for evidence to be contested.

6.3.1 Difficulty Relating Complex Empirical Techniques The quote regarding “Mike’s Nature trick” (Jones, cited in Whiteman 2010) looks terrible in isolation and viewed from a position outside of the empirical analyst profession. However, people working in the field often refer to perfectly reasonable practices as “tricks”, designed to correct some flaw in the data or something about an empirical methodology which would otherwise serve as a limitation. Indeed, econometrics is often referred to as an art, rather than a science, because it relies, in part, on professional judgements and rules of thumb.10 Almost no-one wants to read a lengthy debate on methodological approaches to perceived problems, hence the use of jargon such as “Mike’s Nature trick” to convey a large volume of information succinctly. The lack of interest in lengthy accounts of empirical methodologies means that public policy salespersons (who are rarely the empirical analysts) should stick to speaking about “statistically significant associations in robust studies”, and eschew any attempt to get into details about what made the study robust (lack of interest in detail is also one of the reasons for preferring complex empirical analysis as evidence for selling public policy). This “keep it simple” approach means that the findings will be more readily consumed by the public, and also means that anyone wishing to oppose the salesperson is first faced with the formidable task of outlining the details of the salesperson’s empirical methodology (including what they find objectionable about it), and then outlining a superior methodology, all without boring or vexing the media and public (see Drew et al. (2016) for a discussion of the problems with delivering empirical rhetoric). I note that aligning complex analysis with a strong corporate (Big Four) or scholarly (university or prominent professor) brand can provide an additional important disincentive to others contemplating an assault on the empirical methodology (first because strong brands carry an implicit assurance that the methodology is sound to most people—although, as the scholarly literature attests, this assurance is not absolute—few will think to question it and second because in addition to overcoming the formidable tasks involved in contesting complex analysis outlined earlier, one also has to mount a convincing case that runs against the ethos of the strong brand). With respect to the rhetoric surrounding evidence, one would do well to observe the lessons outlined in Chapter 3, particularly 10

John Ralston Saul (1995, p. 4) is somewhat less charitable: Economics as a prescriptive science is actually a minor area of speculative investigation. Econometrics, the statistical, narrow, unthinking, lower form of economics, is passive tinkering, less reliable and less useful than car mechanics. The only part of this domain [i.e., economics] which has some reliable utility is economic history, and that is being downgraded because, tied as it is to events, it is an unfortunate reminder of reality.

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the advice to test rhetorical seasoning in a focus group environment before launching publicly.

6.3.2 Correspondence and Data May Become Public It appears that the Climatic Research Unit scientists became somewhat panicked when they realized that a freedom of information request might have been made on them, and further compromised themselves with emails suggesting that others in the team delete emails. There is also a suggestion in the Climate-gate investigations that the scientists were less than forthcoming with requests to access the raw data upon which their modelling rested. As an academic I recognise that many of my brethren still operate under the misconception that membership of the academic community entitles one to the presumption of both academic integrity and academic rigor and that no-one (least of all persons from outside the academic community) have the right to call into question these traits which are ‘proven’ through the doctoral thesis process. However, increasingly small sections of the public are becoming sufficiently emboldened that they are prepared to ask questions and even seek copies of correspondence that might be exchanged between august members of the academic fraternity. Most countries have freedom of information laws that allow interested parties to obtain copies of documents from parties associated with government, be they academics, consultants working for government or public servants. Moreover, should a matter of public policy become contested in the courts then failure to provide details of assumptions and underlying evidence, will likely be considered a breach of procedural fairness, and documents may be subpoenaed as evidence. Thus, anyone involved with constructing or employing evidence for public policy should always remain cognizant that all written documents may be released to the public at some later stage, and accordingly demonstrate the requisite prudence.

6.3.3 Empirical Claims May Be Tested It is likely that evidence related to weighty or disputatious public policy will be tested and perhaps contested. The Climatic Research Unit scientists appear to have tried to dissuade testing of their evidence by delaying efforts of others to gain access to their raw data. It also appears that the scientists may have tried to keep the work of others that disagreed with their position from being published in prominent journals and reports. This sort of conduct is probably contrary to the Popperian philosophy of science, but is unfortunately not unknown in academia—high profile scholars and their close associates do dominate the peer-review system and occasionally do try to intimidate others who hold a contrary view to themselves. What is surprising is that the Climatic Research Scientists didn’t foresee efforts to test and contest their findings from the outset and take appropriate measures to deal with the contingency.

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For the public policy salesperson, it is relatively easier to avoid testing and contestation than it is for members of the academic community who are honor-bound to at least appear to observe scholarly convention. Contestation can be dissuaded by the use of long (which refers to the number of years of data used in analysis) and wide (which refers to the number of variables employed) panels of data that aren’t available in extant data sets in complex empirical analyses. To contest findings arising from studies of this kind one needs to expend considerable time and money extracting the data and also find a suitably qualified person who understands the intricacies of the method previously employed and who can recommend and execute improvements to the methodology (see Drew et al. 2016). This is no easy task, and the time it takes to conduct this sort of contestation will probably exceed the duration of the public policy debate. Moreover, the possibility that claims might be tested down the track, should alert one to the desirability of avoiding testable claims, and also executing reforms in a way that increase information hurdles for those wishing to conduct post-implementation evaluations. Indeed, it is sometimes possible to change an important public policy spruiking point into a claim that will defy testing. For example, rather than simply claiming that a public policy will result in savings of, say, $300,000 over five years, one could instead claim savings of $300,000 over five years, which can be invested in better quality services for the public. When a claim is presented in this latter manner any attempt to prove that the projected outcome failed to be realized can be met with the response that the money went to improving the quality of services (which can rarely be objectively measured). Similarly, the longer the window for which the claim is made—say instead a saving of $900,000 over fifteen years—the less likely it is that anyone will maintain sufficient ardor over such a lengthy period required to test the claim in its entirety. It is also possible to execute reforms in such a way that it makes subsequent testing and contestation difficult. For example, if the reform is progressively rolled out over a relatively lengthy period in discrete stages (especially in a dynamic environment) then it becomes difficult to isolate which part of the reform, or what environmental change might be responsible for a given measured outcome. In addition, timing reforms for part-way through a financial reporting period makes it very difficult (but not impossible) to make comparisons of pecuniary data. It has not gone unnoticed that the reforms with which I have been intimately acquainted with in the past have always occurred part way through the financial year, thus severely constraining my options for empirical evaluation, or significantly increasing the information costs for same.

6.4 A Guide to Using Evidence to Clinch the Sale Now that we have explored the opportunities and potential pitfalls of using evidence to sell public policy, I am ready to lay out a heuristic for decision making aimed at achieving the optimal conditions for clinching the sale (see Fig. 6.2).

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Fig. 6.2 A heuristic for using evidence to sell public policy (Source The Authors)

I advise that public policy salespersons consider evidence for selling public policy in two phases: First there is a “preparation phase”, which takes place when planning the sales campaign, where robust evidence can be put together often unencumbered by significant time pressures; second, there is the “delivery phase”, otherwise referred to as the schmooze, where the evidence is publicly employed in a manner designed to constrain opponents. As I have noted earlier, the use of long and wide panels not only improves the reliability of empirical evidence but also increases information costs for anyone who might have considered contesting the analysis. Long and wide panels take time to construct, but time is often a less important constraint prior to proposing a public

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policy reform than it is once the reform has been aired. Thus, by preparing high information cost empirical evidence prior to the schmooze,11 one can effectively steal a march on one’s opponents. We have also seen that generally prima facie sophisticated empirical analysis should be preferred as evidence because it is relatively more difficult to contest. In this respect multiple regression analysis seems appropriate where the policy reform can be viewed in terms of statistically significant associations. Alternatively, business case analysis, although often just simple arithmetic dressed up, has the appearance of sophistication and provides a very nice soundbite on many people’s favorite topic—money. In addition, there is good reason to believe that some in-depth interviews will be an important complement to quantitative evidence. It is relatively risk free (although expensive), and will head off any potential criticism that the policy is all about economics and ignores people—the sort of criticism that one often hears levelled at economically motivated reforms. It is important to get the rhetorical seasoning right to complement the main course (evidence), as I also detailed in Chapters 3 and 4. Once again, the work in this area should be done before the public policy reform is dished up. This includes testing the rhetorical seasoning in a focus group setting before public release, ensuring that benefits are described over long terms, constructing a rhetorical seasoning that keeps the message simple and free of complex jargon and other distractions (that is, focusing on the nett financial benefit or the statistically significant association), ensuring that the script is tweaked to avoid testable claims, and organising to have the evidence delivered or endorsed by a strong brand. Once the evidence dish has been prepared it is important for the public policy salesperson to serve it up in a manner which constrains potential opponents. First, as the Climatic Research Unit scientists learned the hard way, it is important to be cognizant that paper trails may ultimately be exposed, and it is thus a good idea to act prudently with respect to written materials. Second, the evidence dish should be served up at a time which increases information hurdles—if possible it might be helpful to implement proposals progressively to make it difficult for others to accurately assess the effects of the reform. If this is not possible then it is particularly important to implement reforms mid financial year (or mid-data year for non-pecuniary data) to frustrate post implementation analysts in their efforts to assess the effect of reforms. I have also noted the advantages conferred to public policy salespersons who avoid volunteering information on the methodology and assumptions employed to construct the evidence—this extends the time taken by opponents to reply and increases the hurdles that must be overcome should they decide to contest the evidence. Evidence, as I have noted, also has some salience after the sale has been clinched— opponents may try to produce evidence to suggest that the policy has been unsuccessful and it is therefore important for the public policy salesperson to be on the front foot collecting and promoting evidence of success, to deter opponents. Most of our lessons regarding the most “suitable” forms of evidence apply equally to evidence collected in the after-sales campaign and,of-course, my coaching regarding access to 11

And also refusing or delaying the public release of the panel of data.

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information by the public and testing of claims, if observed, will significantly reduce the chances of product returns. In sum, use of appropriate evidence has a lot to offer the public policy salesperson particularly with respect to the schmoozing phase of a sale. If done correctly, evidence will prove to be both compelling and difficult to contest. However, it is important for the public policy salesperson to put considerable effort into preparing evidence, particularly with respect to rhetorical seasoning, before dishing it up for public consumption. Selling public policy through the careful use of evidence promises to provide an impression of maximum assurance to the public and hence improve the chances of a successful schmooze and reduce the chances that the product might be returned by the customer during the implied warranty period.

Appendix—Academics and Evidence in the Media and Courtroom One would think that academics ought to play a pivotal role in providing good evidence for public policy decision-making. However, due to a lack of training and support most major public policy is indeed made without the robust, independent, and expert contribution of scholars. In this respect, I am certainly an outlier because I have completed millions of dollar’s worth of consulting as well as hundreds of media engagements. To do so required me to embark on a steep learning curve and in this appendix, I will draw on my experience to try to shed light on why most academics fail to have the impact that they ought to with respect to public policymaking. Academics generally produce very robust work, supported by a range of scholarly tools, experience (drawn from the literature), and convention (which ensures research is approached in a way that reduces bias and eliminates most mistakes). However, academics also tend to be very slow, specialized, focused on detail, and keen to express every conceivable potential caveat that might be applied to their work. Moreover, these academic ‘habits’ are deeply etched into the character of a scholar through the extensive training that they receive. When it comes to dealing with the media, most academics are shocked to find that the things they care most about, are of absolutely no interest to reporters. For instance, reporters generally do not value the peer review process, don’t understand the importance of academic titles (for example, the difference between a lecturer and a senior lecturer), are totally oblivious to impact factors, citations and journal rankings, and fail to get excited about innovative econometric techniques or statistical significance. Indeed, most academics struggle to get the attention of the media at all. In general the media isn’t proactive or discerning about discovering new research or bona fide expertise. As a result, they are probably most likely to interview commercial consultants who have well-oiled publicity machines behind them to promote their latest ‘research’ and ‘expertise’ (especially because doing so is likely to result in new

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business for them). Thus, it is often the case that scholarly voices are missing from important public policy debates because the media just don’t know that they exist.12 The media is most interested in simple stories that appear to have a profound impact on peoples lives. Thus, matters must be phrased in a manner likely to get people’s attention, and this often involves a good deal of hyperbole and sometimes irony (see Chapter 3). It definitely does not involve high levels of detail (especially on empirical methods), copious caveats, or lengthy expositions on theory. Instead, the messaging has to be closely focused on real-world implications and application. Moreover, often metaphor will prove an extremely valuable aid to getting the message across in a memorable way (especially if one combines metaphor with irony13 ). The other important thing to note about academics and the media is that the former group often find the methods of the latter to be more than a little unpredictable and chaotic. More often than not, reporters will invite one onto a show to discuss a particular matter and end up asking most of the questions about a matter totally unrelated to what was foreshadowed. This used to throw me somewhat because I had, understandably, only swatted up on the particular topic that I was supposed to be interviewed on. However, I have since learned to cope with this unpredictability— usually by explicitly turning the topic back to what I was invited to speak on14 (and also not swatting up so much on the invited topic, so that my mind is more flexible). The other main way that academics are likely to be called upon to provide evidence is as an expert witness for a Court (something I have also done many times). Generally, one is asked to write an expert report responding to various questions posed by the lawyers that engage the expert.15 Often this will be all that is asked of the scholar, although occasionally one will be required to give evidence in the actual courtroom, if the matter proceeds to trial. With respect to providing expert evidence in a written report, scholars tend to be quite comfortable because the style of writing—and requirements for evidence to support hypotheses—are very similar to the academic publication standards. However, if required to give evidence in a courtroom—usually in the form of cross-examination—then things get a little trickier. First, scholars need to come to 12

To combat these scholarly disadvantages, I have developed my own YouTube channel (Professor Joseph Drew) which has elicited a large number of media interviews. It gives me an opportunity to present my research in a way that the media will appreciate and allows me to try out rhetoric amenable to the making of headlines. 13 An example of this is my description of the rate increases visited upon residents following the disastrous amalgamations in my state: ‘it’s like someone running up the back of your car and forcing you—the innocent victim—to pay for all of the repairs’. Another metaphor I commonly use to explain why local government policy often goes so wrong is ‘because the government engages General Practitioners instead of Specialists for the amalgamation planning—if you go to a GP for brain surgery it is hardly surprising when things don’t end up well’. 14 Generally, I reply to unexpected questions along the lines of: ‘that is a really interesting question, but I think the much more important point is X’. 15 Indeed, I find that the lawyers often don’t know the best questions to ask in order to prosecute their case (presumably because they don’t have the same level of expertise in my field as do I). Accordingly, during the early engagement phase I spend a good deal of time steering them towards asking useful questions to which I might later reply.

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grips with the peculiar way that barristers pose ‘questions’—as short statements. That is, one will be hit with a series of short statements that won’t sound like questions, but will nevertheless require an answer. Second, answers are generally only supposed to be a ‘yes’ or a ‘no’ (no scholarly elaboration is appreciated). Third, the questions are all leading up to a point—which may be many statements away—so one has to think ahead to understand the implications of confirming or denying a particular statement. Fourth, academics need to be mindful that once they have answered a question it can’t be objected to and generally won’t be re-visited (therefore it is important to pause and give the engaging barristers the chance to object). In sum, being crossed examined in practice is completely different to what one may have watched on television and likely to leave the scholar bemused about the ways of lady justice. In summary, academics do have a crucial role to play in providing good evidence for designing and selling public policy. However, to properly fulfil this role scholars will likely need to make many adjustments to their usual practice and probably require strong guidance and support from experienced public policy salespersons.

References Adams G, Balfour D (1998) Unmasking administrative evil. Sage, London Barnett A, Sisson S (2018) A survey needs to involve how many people before I’m convinced? The Conversation, 1 June 2018 Bevan G, Hood C (2006) What’s measured is what matters: targets and gaming in the English public health care system. Public Adm 84(3):517–538 Booth W (1974) Modern dogma and the rhetoric of assent. University of Chicago Press, Chicago Butt P (ed.) (2004) Butterworths concise Australian legal dictionary.LexisNexis/Butterworths, Chatswood Coase R (1994) Essays on economics and economists. University of Chicago Press, Chicago de Bruijn H (2007) Managing performance in the public sector. Routledge, London Dollery B, Drew J (2016) Hired guns: local government mergers in New South Wales and the KPMG modelling report. Aust Account Rev 27(3):263–272 Drew J (2022) Natural law and government. Springer, Singapore Drew J, Dollery B (2014) Estimating the impact of the proposed Greater Sydney metropolitan amalgamations on municipal financial sustainability. Public Money Manag 34(4):281–288 Drew J, Dollery B (2015) Less haste more speed: the fit for future reform program in New South Wales local government. Aust J Public Adm 75(1):78–88 Drew J, McQuestin D, Dollery B (2021) Did amalgamation make local government more fit for the future? Aust J Public Adm. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8500.12530 Drew J, O’Flynn J, Grant B (2018) Performing what? Exploring and expanding the notion of synecdoche in performance management practice. Public Adm Q 42(3) Drew J, Grant B, Campbell N (2016) Progressive and reactionary rhetoric in the municipal reform debate in New South Wales (NSW) Australia. Aust J Polit Sci 51(2):323–337 Eilperin J (2011) “Climate-gate” resurfaces with a new round of e-mails. Washington Post, 23 November 2011 Kennedy P (2003) A guide to econometrics. MIT Press, Cambridge Lynn J, Jay A (1988) The complete “Yes Prme Minister”. BBC Books, St Ives OECD (2015) OECD public governance reviews: estonia and Finland. OECD Publishing, Paris Revkin A (2009) Hacked e-mail is new fodder for climate dispute. New York Times, 20 November 2009

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Riker WH (1990) Heresthetic and rhetoric in the spatial model. In: Enelow J, Hinich M (eds) Advances in the spatial theory of voting. Cambridge University Press, New York, pp 46–65 Saul JR (1995) The unconscious civilization. The Free Press, New York The Telegraph (2009) University of East Anglia emails: the most contentious quotes. 23 November 2009 Tol R (2014) IPCC report shows Stern inflated climate change costs. The Conversation, 3 April 2014 Whiteman H (2010) “Climategate” review clears scientists of dishonesty. CNN, 7 July 2010 Wooldridge J (2006) Introductory econometrics. Thomson, Mason OH Ziliak S, McCloskey D (2013) The cult of statistical significance. University of Michigan Press, Michigan

Chapter 7

Ethics: Right and Wrong Can Be Contestable

Abstract Ethics are generally given to refer to the set of standards through which one can judge the acts and failures to act of individuals, communities or oneself. Many people struggle to articulate their ethical paradigm but nonetheless have their pathos stirred mightily by acts or omissions that they deem morally illicit. In contemporary society three ethical paradigms are of particular importance to the public policy salesperson—natural law (inclusive of virtue ethics), utilitarianism, and egoism. I contend that an appreciation of these paradigms—especially how they are related to public policy evaluation and the democratic process—will provide public policy salespersons with the tools required to schmooze the public in a manner conducive to the management of legacy costs. Keywords Ethics · Natural law · Egoism · Utilitarianism · Selling public policy · Policy success · Public policy · Principle of double effect · Principle of subsidiarity

7.1 What Are Ethics? Ethics answers questions about right and wrong, the ought and the must and thus allows for judgements of individual and communal behaviour. Ethics often elicit emotional defences, and many in the public will be unwilling to bend on their principles, especially when they are associated with religious belief, even though often-times persons will struggle to articulate or provide a logos defence of same. Ethics can stir the pathos, and are sometimes the basis of evaluating the ethos (see Chapter 3), and are thus an indispensable element of selling public policy. To provide a sense of how important ethics are in public policy debates one would do well to consider two quotes relating to the emotive public policy issue of euthanasia, which bear repeating at length (below): Patients considered incurable according to the best available human judgement of their state of health, can be granted a mercy death True compassion does not marginalise, humiliate or exclude, much less celebrate a patient passing away … you know well that would mean the triumph of selfishness, of that ‘throwaway culture’ that rejects and despises people who do not meet certain standards of health, beauty or usefulness. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 J. Drew, Selling Public Policy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-0381-8_7

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Both quotes are from notable public figures and each reflects major strands of thought and argument employed in contemporary debates on euthanasia—the socalled ‘good death’. The first argument is a plea for mercy for those unfortunate enough to suffer from a medical condition beyond the therapeutic power of modern medicine. It speaks to the futility of providing medical treatment to those who cannot be cured (which, incidentally, is consistent with Hippocrates), and appeals to human compassion culminating in medicalised killing (inconsistent with the Hippocratic oath; Papadimitriou et al. 20071 ). The second quote rejects the argument that euthanasia is human compassion and asserts that those who campaign for the ‘good death’ do so only after consciously or unconsciously making judgements that defy the solidarity of the human condition (see my discussion of the natural law in the next section). Some might be surprised to learn that my first quote (in support of euthanasia) was taken from the October 1939 Fuhrer Decree of Adolf Hitler (cited in Lifton 2000). Perhaps less surprising, is the source of the second quote (opposing euthanasia)— Pope Francis (Catholic News Service 2016). I ask my readers to pause momentarily and consider their own position on euthanasia, the passions it stirs in them personally and also how the issue tends to galvanise politicians and the media. In many countries around the globe euthanasia has been debated and laws have been passed to allow or disallow the practice. The question of euthanasia whips up pathos, often to fever pitch, as the two camps campaign to ensure that their view of the right and wrong, the ought and the must, is the one that is legislated whereupon ‘the losers forfeit the values they believe in [and] also that they abide by, if not accept, the values that they despise’ (Riker 1988, p. 205). In the 1930’s, euthanasia was considered enlightened thought, particularly in Germany, but also abroad including in America (Lifton 2000). Curiously (given that it contrasts with contemporary campaigns focussed on the elderly), initial efforts were directed to the mercy killing of infants as ‘it seemed easier to start with the very young’, and one case in particular ‘an infant named Knauer, who was born blind, with one leg and a part of one arm missing and apparently an “idiot”’ has been cited as the beginning of the Nazi euthanasia program (Lifton 1986, n.p.). Great lengths were taken to ensure that an impression of medical and jurist supervision was provided that might be expected to prevent abuse of process. Moreover, it has been related that Hitler himself demonstrated compassion in expressing his concern that the parents should not be allowed to form the impression that they had in any way contributed to the death of their child (Brandt cited in Lifton 2000, p. 51). Indeed, the decision to euthanize had to be supported unanimously by three experts (Lifton 2000). On the face of it, appropriate checks and balances seem to have been in place for merciful medical termination of life that demonstrated compassion for all involved. However, as we now know, the ‘enlightened’ euthanasia programme of the Germans

1

‘I will neither give a deadly drug to anybody if asked for it, nor will I make any suggestion to this effect’ (cited in Papadimitriou et al. 2007).

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in the 1930’s eventually resulted in some of the darkest deeds of human history— the gassing of over six million Jews, and hundreds of thousands of homosexuals, handicapped people, Gypsies and political dissidents (Adams and Balfour 1998). Thus, it is clear that public policy does have a moral dimension, and that failure to consider same could well result in outcomes consistent with administrative evil. In addition to providing an important moral compass—because it is so closely tied to people’s beliefs and thus has both a great potential to stir the pathos and also affect public judgements relating to ethos (see Chapter 3)—ethics can be a powerful tool for selling public policy. I believe that public policy salespersons can significantly improve their odds of selling public policy by examining their personal ethics and the dominant ethical paradigms of the public in relation to the said policy. I commence our investigation of the role of ethics in selling public policy by first explicating on the basic tenets of major ethical approaches. Thereafter I briefly consider some ‘new’ approaches for the public policy salesperson with specific consideration of an ethical principle that ‘squarely confronts conflicts between the “economic must” and the “ethical ought”’ (Drew et al. 2016, p. 2). I conclude by outlining a heuristic developed to guide decision making by salespersons cognisant of the moral dimension.

7.2 Lessons from the Literature It would be folly to attempt to describe all of the established ethical paradigms within the confines of a single chapter (or perhaps even a single book). Thus, I will instead content myself with outlining the three ethical positions that best relate to the task of selling public policy: (i) natural law and virtue ethics (consistent with the idea of public policy targeted at creating the good society), (ii) utilitarianism (the bedrock of economics and most public policymaking, in practice), and (iii) egoism (which best describes most voter behaviour and is not only the Achilles heel of democracy (Brennan 1975) but also a major consideration for the public policy salesperson).

7.2.1 Natural Law and Virtue Ethic Natural law is something of a speciality of mine, so I hope that my readers will appreciate the self-discipline that I will demonstrate in explicating on this matter as briefly as practical.2 For my mind, natural law philosophy is the only approach that stands up to close interrogation, because it is the only one that explicitly starts with a plausible account of human nature (hence the word ‘natural’). The philosophy harks back to the time of Plato, but was probably best articulated by Aristotle (1998 [4th BCE]), Maimonides (1956 [1191]), and Aquinas (2018 2 For a more comprehensive treatment of natural law in a public policy sense see Natural Law and Government (Drew 2022).

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[1273]). Natural law posits that humans are unique creatures, possessed with an unrivalled capacity to reason and choose according to reason (and in doing so, over-ride the natural urges of most animals). Moreover, according to the function argument of Aristotle it is right and proper for a thing to perform in the ways that make it unique—thus, the ‘perfect’ person would always choose to act according to reason. When one does so, then one is asserting one’s human dignity (the right to choose our existential3 ends without undue interference). However, to fully realise human excellence it is essential that we also receive the help of others through co-operation (which is referred to as the common good; Drew 2022). Notably, despite its pagan origins, natural law was developed and is most closely associated with each of the three great monotheistic faiths: Islam (the leading proponent was Averroes), Judaism (Maimonides), and Christianity (Aquinas). Each of these faiths asserted that the revelation of their holy books was consistent with a natural law ‘built into’ the nature of every person by a Creator. Notably, elsewhere I have shown that it is not at all necessary to subscribe to the monotheistic faiths in order to practice the natural law (a point sadly and clearly lost on many; see Drew 2022). Natural law ethics differ markedly to other paradigms by emphasising the importance of developing the inner-life of the person, rather than laying out rules or guidelines about which acts might be considered ‘right’ or ‘wrong’. Otherwise stated, the objective is a teleological one—being a good person, or living a good life— rather than an immediate recipe for choosing in a particular instance. Specifically, the proper end of humans is said to be eudaimonia—a word horribly mistranslated as ‘happiness’ (the literal interpretation of the term is ‘good spirit’; Vines 1940). It is asserted by natural law philosophers that a good life can be best had by choosing in a manner consistent with reason. Indeed, virtue ethics (which is best understood in the context of natural law philosophy) is all about the habitual orientation of a person to choose according to reason. Generally, it is thought that the ‘good spirit’ will be a person who routinely chooses and acts according to a mean between extremes of human behaviour. Thus, Aristotle (1998) asserts that fortitude is the appropriate mean between cowardice and excessive fear, on the one hand, and rashness or excessive confidence, on the other. However, here again, people are inclined to profoundly misunderstand Aristotle—the mean he speaks of is not an arithmetic ‘middle’, but rather a position somewhere between the extremes and also informed by the circumstances (see also Maimonides 1952 [1191]). There are a number of lists of virtues that might form a locus for philosophical debate, but above these all sit the cardinal (from the Latin for ‘hinge’) suite of virtues favoured throughout antiquity. In order of generally accepted importance

3

Here, I mean for the term ‘existential’ to be understood in the manner that Messner (1952) used it—to choose with reference to our current existence.

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one finds (i) prudence (the exercise of practical reason4 ), (ii) justice (elevating each person’s human dignity as an acknowledgement of their rightful due), (iii) fortitude (steadfastness in the face of hardship or obstacle), and (iv) temperance (self-mastery over animal sensory appetites such as food, and sexual passions). It is also important to acknowledge the intellectual virtues which are largely dependent on the aforementioned character virtues and essential to natural law conceptions of the highest excellences of humans (the holding of true opinions5 ; Maimonides 1956). The Thomistic (2018) approach to intellectual virtue is a hierarchy starting with understanding (grasping) of principles (where principles are understood as the ‘why’ of a thing), knowing (accepting) principles, and philosophising (glimpsing connections between principles and reality as a whole). Practical traits associated with intellectual virtue include inter alia: perseverance, humility, open-mindedness, reflection, integrity, and honesty (Drew 2022). Notably, prudence is the link between the intellectual and character virtues respectively. Moreover, it is important to be clear that one only exhibits virtue when one chooses to act in accordance with reason—if one acts under duress or compulsion one does not exhibit the excellence of humans but instead acts in a manner consistent with beasts. Natural law is relevant to the task of selling public policy because it provide a useful guide to establishing a suitable ethos for one’s rhetoric (see Chapter 3). In addition, it reminds public policy architects and salespersons to clearly articulate good reasons for acting (see also my discussion of ‘creating human value’ in the next substantive section). Moreover, cognisance of natural law reminds us to always ensure that we at least give the appearance of choice to our citizens (see my discussion of heresthetic in Chapter 4). It might be noted that a natural law philosopher could never condone the practice of euthanasia because doing so would implicitly create hierarchies of human dignity whereby some human lives were deemed worth living, and some not (Finnis 2013). This is the kind of thinking that motivated the Popes’ comments at the introduction to this chapter.

7.2.2 Utilitarianism Let me say upfront that I find the dominant paradigm of my disciplines (economics and political science) morally deplorable. Utilitarianism might be a reasonable way 4

Practical reason is having good reasons for acting and it is therefore the weighing up of evidence or counsel with the objective of commanding the best means to an end. This kind of reasoning is supported by the practical syllogism (see Drew 2022). 5 Maimonides (1956) is the author of my preferred hierarchy of human excellences: (i) possessions, (ii) good health, (iii) virtue, and (iv) the holding of true opinions (see Drew 2022). Aquinas (2018) listed (i) seek knowledge of G-d, (ii) preserve oneself, (iii) preserve one’s species, (iv) live in society, and (v) to use one’s mind and will to pursue truth. In other work I have shown how these two lists can be reconciled (Drew 2022).

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to approach decisions about my farm animals, but it is not an appropriate way to treat people on which I must confer human dignity.6 It limits the ends of people in a temporal sense (to a particular decision rather than a lifetime), and appeals to a good which it either neglects to define, or does so inadequately. Nevertheless, utilitarianism is deeply embedded in political systems (such as representative democracy), public policy making, and economics. Thus, it deserves my attention even if it does not command my respect. Utilitarianism is a relatively new ethical paradigm when compared to natural law. Its most famous proponent was John Stuart Mill, a self-taught philosopher and political economist of nineteenth century Britain. His basic idea was that: actions are right in proportion that they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure. (Mill 2016)

Notably, Mills was no stranger to pain or the privation of pleasure having endured a prolonged period of melancholia which progressed as far as suicidal thinking (Brennan 1992). Mills’ most significant assertion was that consequence rather than motive was the major determinant of an ethical evaluation of an act or rule, and in this respect he departed markedly from the natural law. Moreover, his long affair and eventual marriage to Harriet Taylor—a young mother of three at the time—was not only a scandal of immense proportions but also an indication that he probably didn’t feel that his calculus for the determining the rightness of an act should always apply to his personal life.7 Unfortunately, some people have interpreted Mill’s work in a rather shallow and hedonistic way—indeed, some disciplines (such as economics8 ) have done so. However, the truth of the matter is that Mills (2016, p. 135) always intended happiness and pleasure to be conceived rather broadly to include such things as ‘pleasures of the intellect, of the feelings and of moral sentiments’. Moreover, he (2016, p. 136) conceded that ‘some kinds of pleasures are more desirable than others’ that is, that we must take account not just of quantity but also of quality. Indeed, he famously remarked that ‘it is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied’ (Mills, p. 165), although it seems that these distinctions may have been lost on modern public policymakers (see Part II).

6

My claim to human dignity rests on the evidence that humans are uniquely capable of reasoning and choice (even when a particular choice might seem contrary to our animal natures). For me to assert my right to human dignity it follows that I must accept your claim to same. Notably, utilitarianism often rides roughshod over human dignity. 7 Some may claim that this is a cheap shot but surely an ethical sage must be judged by his own standards of behaviour? Proponents of natural law such as Aquinas (who was later beatified) and Maimonides lived exemplary lives consistent with their theses, JS Mill did not (unless we think that he really determined that the pleasure experienced by Mrs Taylor and himself could somehow outweigh the betrayal and pain felt by the husband and her children as well as Victorian society at large). 8 Economics has largely reduced utility down to mere money.

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Moreover, utilitarianism comes in a number of different species—mostly as a response to attempts to mitigate flaws in the philosophy. For example, a distinction exists between intrapersonal utility comparison in which a person weighs up the expected utility of various possible courses of action that they might take, and interpersonal utility comparison which takes into account the utility of all affected. There is also a distinction between act utilitarianism (which assess each actions rightness compared to alternatives) and rule utilitarianism (in which matters are assessed according to both theory and practical consequences). In general, public policy architects tend to focus on interpersonal act utilitarianism, on a broader basis than mere hedonism, but in a more narrower way than Mills advocated. There are numerous criticisms of utilitarianism that seem to stand in stark contrast to its near universal adherence by economists and public policy architects, in particular. As I noted at the outset, utilitarianism can result in human dignity being completely disregarded which is fine by most people until they happen to be in the minority who are afforded no proper consideration. It also tends to result in less than ideal levels of distributive justice which is abundantly demonstrated by firmly entrenched practices such as the so-called progressive taxes (whereby the few rich people are taxed at a higher rate because it tends to fund goods and services desired by the many poorer citizens). Moreover, the outcomes from utilitarian calculus often lead to conclusions that just feel wrong—such as its implicit endorsement of slavery or the acceptance of sacrificing the few in battle (or politics) for the perceived good of the many. This discordance seems to confirm that natural law philosophers are correct to assert that a sense of right and wrong is ‘built’ into humans; that we don’t need to sit down and add up the happiness accruing to different people to know that the aforementioned practices of slavery and sacrifice are morally illicit. Utilitarianism is relevant to the task of selling public policy because it provides a useful logos for rhetorical purposes (see Chapter 3). However, using utilitarian calculus means that public policy architects have to make bold assumptions about happiness that may provoke the ire of some citizens. Indeed, the paradigm is all about creating and focussing on the winners of public policy and thus leaves open a significant risk that the losers will seek political revenge through capturing the ear of a sympathetic media. It has probably already been surmised that utilitarians are likely to find themselves in favour of euthanasia. This is because their calculations usually assert nett happiness—that is, it is contended that the elimination of suffering, freeing up of medical resources for other purposes, as well as the avoidance of watching a person die outweighs the moral outrage and feeling of guilt likely to be experienced by those who have strong beliefs regarding human dignity. This is the kind of ‘enlightened’ thinking prevalent in Germany almost a century ago, as well as in most of the contemporary developed world.

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7.2.3 Egoism I am old enough to remember when people were shy to display their egoist tendencies—nowadays, people seem to be comparatively brazen in their declarations of looking after their own interests (including at the political level). As a philosophy I find egoism rather pessimistic—it denies that people are capable of altruist acts and reduces the purpose of life down to something indistinguishable from common beasts. Nevertheless, it is one of the dominant paradigms to be found in the general citizenry and thus warrants our attention. Egoism harks back to at least the time of Plato—indeed, some have argued that The Republic exposes Plato as an ethical egoist (an argument that I don’t agree with). The basic idea driving the paradigm is that people are only capable of acting in selfinterest and that doing otherwise is contrary to fundamental human nature (this is referred to as psychological egoism). Thus, ethical egoists either claim that people only act in their own self-interest, or, that it is irrational to act in anyway contrary to self-interest. Otherwise stated, someone subscribing to ethical egoism either thinks everyone is in it for themselves or thinks that they are fools. Egoism comes in a number of different species as a result of attempts to explain apparent problems that we sometimes observe in practice. For example, without introducing a temporal dimension it would be impossible to evaluate whether the retiree spending the children’s inheritance is more praiseworthy than the miserly retiree trying to maximise the sum of their legacy. Both may do so out of selfinterest; the first to satisfy instant desires, the second to be remembered and praised after death. A second example of the (somewhat surprising) complexity in egoist thought seeks to explain why a parent might give up resources—and sometimes even their own lives—to save their children. Here we need to invoke the concept of subjective egoism to explain what is otherwise either impossible or irrational behaviour. Covert egoism is sometimes employed to try to explain why people may appear to act according to virtue (or deontology or the like) but really be acting out of self interest. To take our earlier example, an egoist may assert that the parent is willing to sacrifice because they are expecting to be looked after by the child in their dotage, or because providing for the child is really just a way of vicariously reliving their own lives. However, to do so really results in us assuming a motive that may not be provable, or asserting a pre-motive that may not be acknowledged, even by the actor. For this reason most philosophers find covert egoism rather spurious (see, for example, Nowell-Smith 1954). Egoism is sometimes justified on the basis that it does often result in good outcomes. Indeed, the father of economics—Smith (2014 [1776])—postulated an invisible hand that frequently turned the base and selfish motivations of economic actors into broader economic prosperity and progress. Notably Smith almost certainly had G-d in mind as the invisible hand, although most modern economists seem to have replaced the deity with the mundane market (Drew 2022). Moreover, when viewed in this light egoism can be reckoned consistent with interpersonal utilitarianism.

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Egoism is relevant to the task of selling public policy because it casts light on the choice behaviour of an increasingly large portion of the population. However, when combined with majoritarian democratic practice it can lead to short-sighted decision making that might come with high legacy costs (see Chapter 4). Indeed, an explicitly egoist approach to selling public policy might be expected to ultimately erode the common good which is the sole justification for the institution of government in the first place.

7.3 ‘New’ Approaches for the Public Policy Salesperson Both of our ‘new’ approaches to the matter of ethics are actually based on rather old ideas. However, these ethical principles have largely been ignored by public policy scholars in contemporary times and therefore warrant our attention. Moreover, neither principle has previously been used as a guide for selling public policy (something that I will address in the conclusion to this chapter).

7.3.1 Principle of Double Effect One of the most imposing problems for public policy makers and their salespersons is that we live in an uncertain world—often projects motivated with the best of intentions can go awry because of unconsidered deleterious side-effects. If ethical condemnation was always to be levelled at the proponents of policies that resulted in bad side-effects of this kind, then governments might well seize-up because risk is unavoidable. The solution to this problem comes from a rather unlikely source—the Summa Theologica, written by Thomas Aquinas (2018) sometime around 1274. The Summa,9 as it is mostly referred to, is an exhaustive treatment of almost every conceivable question of morality. It is executed in quite a legalistic style: questions are posed, multiple objections are surveyed, an answer is tendered, and then replies are given to the aforementioned objections. In Question 64 of the Summa, Aquinas (2018, p. 6128) asks ‘whether it is unlawful to kill any living thing’. He then goes on to consider specific types of killing such as the dispatch of animals for food, the killing of those who have transgressed in grave matters, the killing of oneself, as well as the killing of innocents.10 Ultimately 9

Not to be confused with the significantly lest hefty missionary work by the same author (the Summa Contra Gentiles). 10 He answers as follows: (i) it is lawful to kill for food because that is the function of animals, (ii) it is praiseworthy to kill grave sinners because this is necessary to guard the common good, (iii) it is wrong to kill oneself because it is contrary to nature, and (iv) it is unlawful to kill the innocent because doing so subtracts from the common good (Aquinas 2018).

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Aquinas (2018, p. 6148) inquires as to ‘whether it is lawful to kill a man in selfdefense’ and this is where western jurisprudence and public policy architects are provided with an insight of great importance: provided the intent was not to kill, the defense was proportionate to the gravity of the situation, and the means for achieving the desired end were morally licit, then no blame—either legal or moral— can be ascribed to the defender. This conclusive reasoning has come to be known as the principle of double effect because it recognises that at least two outcomes are always possible from any given action (the intended, as well as something besides the intention). Indeed, the principle of double effect is an established principle of jurisprudence and it is often used as a successful defence against accusations of euthanasia (where such acts are still unlawful)—where it can be shown that the intent was merely to relieve pain for those gravely ill and suffering (even if very large doses of painkillers were used). The principle is also invoked quite regularly in the area of medical ethics as well as business ethics more broadly (Drew et al. 2017). Moreover, most of us make recourse to elements of the principle in our own lives on a regular basis—for example few of us would morally condemn another for running into our car because of inclement weather (suggesting that intent and probability, are major determinants for our natural ‘feeling’ for justice). Philosophers have conducted an exhaustive inquiry into the principle (see, Woodward (2001) for an excellent review of the most prominent work) and true to their trade this has resulted in endless debates regarding the definition of the principle, with much being made of any potential vulnerability thereof. Accordingly, it is essential to have the definition carefully phrased and my own attempt at doing so (based on the works of the leaders in the field) appears below: It is morally permissible to undertake an action when one foresees that the undertaking may bring about at least one state of affairs, such that, if this state of affairs were intrinsic to the action undertaken, the action would be rendered impermissible, if and only if (i) the ‘bad’ state of affairs is not intended but brought about as a [foreseeable, but not certain], side-effect (and that all efforts have been made to mitigate the undesired side-effect) and (ii) there is a proportionally grave reason for undertaking the action. (Drew et al. 2017, p. 4)

The definition focusses on proportionality, the probability of the foreseen side-effects, and intent. With respect to proportionality the definition clearly states that to even contemplate an act that might end badly one must have grave reasons. Thus, the risk of possibly doing wrong is only deemed acceptable if one is trying to avoid or mitigate a substantial ill. In addition, the side-effect must be merely foreseeable, or even probable, but not definite. This injunction arises because when a side-effect is definite it is no longer possible to make meaningful distinctions between ends and means. Consistent with the natural law intent must not be bad in a moral sense,11 which means that it must be orientated to good reason, respectful of human dignity, and never involve using people as merely means for achieving other ends (see my earlier 11

The prohibition of doing wrong, even for ultimately good outcomes, is derived from the first self-evident precept of natural law—that good is to be pursued and evil shunned (Aquinas 2018).

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discussion on natural law). Indeed, much has been made by philosophers regarding how we can ever know the true intent of actors (which seems to be an especially imposing problem if we consider the likelihood that people often employ heresthetic [see Chapter 4]). Accordingly, my definition imposes an obligation to take all measures to mitigate possible side-effects—my reasoning being that one would hardly do so if the side-effect was in fact intended. Readers will have already noted that the principle of double effect has a curious focus on the consequences of an act which seems somewhat at odds with the natural law philosophy. In this regard then, the importance of intent cannot be overstated because this is the thing that most distinguishes it from a simple utilitarian calculus. Notably, because of the principle of double effect’s widely held wisdom it is important for public policy salesperson to at least create the impression that they have given due regard to proportionality, probability, and intent. In the conclusion to this chapter, I will detail how this might be done. However, before doing so I wish to discuss a new and important emerging public management paradigm—creating human value.

7.3.2 Creating Human Value Creating human value is in large part a reaction to the public value management paradigm that heralded in an era of big and intrusive government, exemplified by the COVID-19 response (see Drew 2022). It argues that rather than producing public value, government needs to instead focus on fulfilling its morally legitimate remit. Indeed, creating human value commences with the claim that it is right for anything (including people) to perform its proper function: moreover, when a thing does so then it is said to be good and desirable (Aristotle’s [1998] function argument). The paradigm is unashamedly situated in the natural law tradition so it will probably come as no surprise to learn that the perfection said to be proper to people is eudemonia (literally ‘good spirit’ but also sometimes rendered as ‘human flourishing’). To achieve this state of affairs it is argued that people must perform the functions peculiar and exemplary to the species—especially choosing according to reason. However, it is conceded that any person acting in isolation from their fellows is likely to fall short of desirable ends—thus it becomes necessary for people to secure the co-operation of others (which gives rise to the common good). To make this co-operation possible suggests the need for an ontology of plural social forms, starting with the family and ending with the supreme guardian of the common good, government (Messner 1952). Indeed, the ‘political community exists consequently for the sake of the common good in which it finds its full justification and significance and the source of its inherent legitimacy’ (Paul VI 1965, paragraph 74). Otherwise stated, government is fundamentally a moral enterprise (Drew 2022). In addition to defining the proper role of people, associations, and government the natural law insist that all human action should be reasoned and orientated towards proper ends. Indeed, a feature of natural law is its preference for practical reason

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which is the outcome of a syllogism predicated on good reasons for acting (see Chapter 3). To assist in these efforts a number of principles have been developed over time, including the principle of double effect, which we reviewed earlier, and the much more recent principle of subsidiarity. The principle of subsidiarity is some seven centuries younger than its distinguished Thomistic peer, but significantly more likely to be misrepresented in the scholarly literature. Often it is portrayed in a manner which denudes it of its moral roots and thus portrays subsidiarity as little more than a preference for services to be delivered at the lowest level of government possible. In truth, the principle of subsidiarity presumes no role for government and is indeed wary of the potential for concentrations of power and competence that most forms of government ultimately tend to drift toward (Drew 2022). The principle of subsidiarity states that all functions should be performed by the smallest competent unit possible. This might be the individual person, or one of the ‘lesser’ associations, and only rarely government (Drew 2021). Principally the concern is to avoid concentrations of power and competence, but those who advocate subsidiarity also point to the greater knowledge, efficiency, responsiveness, and efficacy of smaller associations (Drew and Miyazaki 2020). Associations are conferred dignity12 because they have unique capacities to bring forth specific munera (gifts) to the common good. As a consequence of this respect for associations to pursue their ends without undue interference the principle posits a negative obligation on greater societies, prohibiting them from subsuming the functions of lesser associations. In similar vein, with reference to the importance afforded to munera for the flourishing of humans, the principle also imposes a positive obligation on the greater associations to provide subsidium (a special kind of help that respects dignity) when lesser units stand in bona fide need. Subsidium is the required help necessary to bridge the gap between current competency and what is required for the person or association to fully bring forth their munera. It is essential that the absolute minimum help is provided and that this is undertaken in a manner designed to make it superfluous as quickly as possible. These stipulations for how help should be provide are made so that people and associations don’t grow into a dependency trap that would ultimately rob them of their dignity (Drew 2021). In a public policy sense the creating human value paradigm would deem an intervention ‘good’ if it satisfied all of the following minimum criteria: ● Consistency with the proper ends of people and government ● Based on practical reason ● Proportionate and well-intended with all reasonable efforts made to mitigate foreseeable bad side-effects ● Delivered by the smallest unit possible 12

People have specific ends that they can and should strive towards to be all that they can be, to the ultimate benefit of themselves and others. In response to this injunction people are conferred the right to pursue their existential ends without undue interference. It therefore follows that if there is in fact an ontology of plural social forms—each with specific ends required for the benefit of others—that they should similarly be invested with dignity (Drew 2022).

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● With carefully designed subsidium, where appropriate. Notably because of creating human value’s objective—which is likely to receive the broad assent of many—it is important for the public policy salesperson to at least create the impression of seeking to protect the dignity of people and their associations. In the conclusion to this chapter which follows I will outline how this approach can prove critical to selling public policy.

7.4 A Guide to Using Ethics to Clinch the Sale Before presenting the heuristic for clinching the sale according to the ethical dimension it is important to remind my readers that the purpose of this book and chapter is to teach people to sell public policy. As it turns out I am a very ethically sensitive person deeply wedded to natural law philosophy. I would therefore prefer my governments to act in a morally licit fashion—and indeed, if they were to follow the principles of the creating human value paradigm then I believe that we would all be immeasurably better off (see the appendix to this chapter). However, I don’t harbour any illusions about the ethical paradigm that many of our politicians and voters subscribe to (egoism), nor the nature of our public policy and democratic infrastructure (orientated towards act utilitarianism). Therefore, in describing my heuristic I will accommodate these views by allowing salespersons to merely create impressions rather than following through on desirable moral behaviour. Because the ideas of creating human value generally receive the assent of many (at least publicly), it becomes a good guide for how to approach the matter of selling public policy along the ethical dimension. I believe that too often public policy salespersons shy away from an explicit ethical defence of a project—notwithstanding the fact that the policy success literature clearly teaches us that citizens will judge policies according to subjective criteria (often according to notions of the justice of the outcomes; Howlett 2012). Getting on the front foot and presenting an ethos (see Chapter 3) concerned with treating all parties ethically is likely to skew these judgements to the public policy salespersons favour. Indeed, just getting public policy architects to think about the ethical dimension will probably result in better public policy and less undesirable side-effects. The first matter to establish for a public policy salesperson who is responsive on the ethical dimension is whether, or not, there is a moral case for intervention (see Fig. 7.1). If there exist good moral reasons already then one need only articulate them and proceed downwards to the next step in the heuristic (as is mostly the case for subsequent steps). If not, then the choice either becomes one of abandoning the proposed policy or ‘discovering’ good moral reasons for intervening. The next matter to determine is whether the proposed policy response is consistent with the proper ends of people and government. That is, will the intervention allow people to co-operate for greater human flourishing? If the answer is yes then the

Fig. 7.1 A heuristic for using ethics to sell public policy

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policy salesperson needs to progress down to the next level—if not, then the proposed intervention either needs to be abandoned, divested to others, or a case ‘discovered’ for why the proposal is consistent with proper ends (see my discussion of blame games in Chapter 5). Following this the heuristic considers whether the policy is being delivered by the smallest competent unit. This need not be government, or the particular tier of government that the public policy salesperson represents. Indeed, it may be a good strategy for government to merely fund a smaller provider to carry out the policy—that way the government can claim some of the credit for intervening but have a suitable scapegoat at the ready should undesirable side-effects result (see Chapter 5). However, doing so also means that the full extent of potential credit might go unrealised for the politician involved—thus they may elect to deliver the program even though their particular institution is not the optimal vehicle for doing so. In this case, the public policy salesperson might be well-advised to ‘discover’ some reasons for why smaller partners would not have been competent to carry out the important and necessary moral endeavour. The next matter that should be explored and responded to is whether the public policy intervention is proportionate to the seriousness of the problem or portrayed problem. If not, then it would be wise to increase perceptions of the apparent danger which prompted the policy and this should not be hard to accomplish given the human disposition for negativity bias (Chapter 5). An alternative to inflating perceptions of danger is to reduce the potential size or impact of the proposed policy (thus making it relatively more proportionate). Once proportionality has been satisfied it is important to make the case that the public policy intervention is well-intentioned. It is quite possible that not every intervention is well-intentioned, but as philosophers have long established intent is incredibly difficult to prove or disprove. In many cases it will be sufficient to make strong claims of good intent. To bolster these claims further, some attempts could be made to mitigate foreseeable bad side-effects. In this regard, Riker (1990) has astutely noted that the actual costs of guarding against the most devastating potential sideeffects tend to be negligible—because the potentially most damaging outcomes also tend to be the most unlikely. Thus, responding to the (quite predictable; see Chapter 3) jeopardy and perversity reactionary positions is likely to come at little, if any, actual cost (but nevertheless establish a perception of the public policy salesperson’s good will). The last step in the heuristic is to present choices wherever possible. Because human dignity is closely associated with choice, it is important to provide options where practical as a show of respect to the said dignity. Moreover, providing choices—or at least the appearance of choice—means that the citizen becomes personally involved in the execution of the policy. Should matters go astray they are then (at least rationally) likely to shoulder at least a little of the blame. Indeed, governments sometimes already cultivate the appearance of choice in a range of policy interventions—such as decision-making surrounding the brand of pharmaceutical consumed (even in public benefit schemes). Providing more choice more

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often would send positive ethical signals and may also soften the blow should bad side-effects arise. In sum, considering the ethical dimension has a lot to offer the public policy salesperson, especially in the schmoozing and after-sales care parts of the cycle. If done correctly, ethical messaging will convey to citizens that the government is really acting in the citizen’s best interests to address an imposing and important problem. If things do subsequently go awry people may then excuse the public policy salesperson for some of the blame. Moreover, using ethical heuristics for the development and selling of public policy may also improve the outcomes in any event. I thus believe that the ethical dimension of selling public policy deserves far greater attention than it has hitherto received in the scholarly literature and commend same to my readers.

Appendix 1—The Role of Government and Rulers in the Natural Law Tradition In order that I might avoid a charge of being a disciple of Machiavelli I think that it is prudent for me to set out my thoughts regarding the duties of government. I believe that government is fundamentally a moral endeavour and furthermore that good government is critical to the good society and hence the good life. Accordingly, I believe that government ought to encourage virtue and discourage vice. Perhaps this sounds a little like the Chinese Communist Party credit scoring—which my proposal is not—but the alternative is even less appealing. A government that promotes virtue and prohibits the worst vices is likely—at least in the long run—to give rise to a better society, not just in a moral sense but also in a practical way. When people share an appreciation and respect for virtue then social interactions become both more predictable and also more rewarding. For example, when we know that others believe in prudence, then it becomes reasonable to predict rational reactions to what we say and do. This encourages people to interact more and hence gives rise to higher levels of co-operation which in turn yields greater common good on which people might draw to achieve their desired ends. In addition, a virtuous society is also more economically efficient. For instance, if people know that there is a shared respect for the virtue of justice, then they can trade more freely without fear of being short-changed. Through ‘just’ trade everyone ought to end up better off. Indeed, a shared appreciation for virtue ought to mean that we need less laws to regulate conduct and thus free people and markets from substantial regulation which is otherwise necessary (but inefficient and unwieldy). A virtuous society is also likely to be a fairer society—where people act justly and don’t exploit power imbalances and the like. This ought to result in freer movement between classes, irrespective of apparent irrelevancies such as race or religion. Indeed, a virtuous society would seem the pre-requisite for an effective democracy (where voting preferences would reflect reasoned views about what would best promote the common good, rather than private interest).

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Thomas Aquinas (1949) considered how best to achieve a virtuous society in his relatively brief (but very incisive) work De Regno13 (On Kingship). In this treatise he sets out the pre-requisites for a good society—peace and sufficient resources for people’s needs—but goes further to also examine the moral dimension. Aquinas (1949) insists that good rulers must be virtuous rulers and lead by example—that is, they must be prudent, just, temperate, and possess fortitude. In addition, good rulers must legislate to stamp out the worst of vices, so that their subjects will not be led astray by too much exposure to vice-like behaviours. However, Aquinas (1949) cautions that introducing too many constraints and laws may ultimately prove counterproductive—causing people to lose respect for the law and its officers, and thus lead to even worse behaviour. Thus, to Aquinas (1949) the purpose of a ruler is clearly to contribute to the common good in a way that respects human dignity—indeed, he labels those who detract from the common good to be tyrants. Moreover, Aquinas (1949) astutely notes that a democracy is more likely to lead to vice and a populace that rules according to the good of the majority (and hence apt to become a tyranny of the multitude). In sum, Thomistic thought, represents a kind of golden mean between what we sometimes have (mob rule according to immediate lusts and passions of the majority; see Plato 2007) and the universally virtuous state that the Chinese seem to aspire to. Specifying precisely how to achieve this mean position is a far more difficult task and one which I seek to address in my recent book Natural Law and Government (Drew 2022) and forthcoming work Creating Human Value.

References Adams G, Balfour D (1998) Unmasking administrative evil. Sage, London Aquinas T (1949) De Regno: on Kingship to the King of Cyprus. Veritas Splendor Publications, Toronto Aquinas T [1273 (2018)] Summa theologica. Coyote Canyon Press, California Aristotle (1998) Nicomachean ethics. Oxford University Press, Oxford Brennan JM (1975) The limits of liberty: between anarchy and leviathan. Liberty Fund, Indianapolis Brennan JG (1992) Foundations of moral obligation. Presidio, California Catholic News Service (2016) Pope Francis: Euthanasia is a triumph of selfishness, not compassion. Catholic News Service, 11 June 2016 Drew J (2021) The principle of subsidiarity and COVID-19: how a moral assessment of public policy success can contribute to learning. Aust J Polit Sci. https://doi.org/10.1080/10361146. 2021.1998343 Drew J (2022) Natural law and government. Springer, Singapore Drew J, Miyazaki M (2020) Subsidiarity and the moral justification of intergovernmental equalisation grants to decentralised governments. Publius: J Fed 50(4):698–709 Drew J, Grant B, Fisher J (2016) Re-evaluating local government amalgamations: utility maximisation meets the Principle of Double Effect (PDE). Policy Polit 45(3):379–394

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Aquinas (1949) signals a clear preference for rule by a virtuous monarch, but if for some reason this was not possible, seems to be prepared to accept democracy.

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Drew J, Grant B, Fisher J (2017) Re-evaluating local government amalgamations: utility maximisation meets the principle of double effect. Policy Polit 45(3):379–394 Finnis J (2013) Human rights & common good. Oxford University Press, Oxford Howlett M (2012) The lessons of failure: learning and blame avoidance in public policy-making. Int Polit Sci Rev 33(5):539–555 Lifton RJ (1986) German doctors and the final solution. New York Times, 21 September, 1986 Lifton RJ (2000) The Nazi doctors: medical killing and the psychology of genocide. Basic Books, New York Maimonides M (1190 [1956]) The guide for the perplexed. Dover Publications, New York Maimonides M (1191 [1952]) The guide for the perplexed. Dover Publications, New York Messner J (1952) Social ethics: natural law in the modern world. Transl. J. Doherty. B Herder Book Co, St Louis Mill JS (2016) Utilitarianism (illustrated). Green World Publishing, India Nowell-Smith PH (1954) Ethics. Penguin Books, London Papadimitriou J, Skiadas P, Mavrantonis C, Polimeropoulos V, Papadimitriou D, Papacostas K (2007) Euthanasia and suicide in antiquity: viewpoint of the dramatists and philosophers. J R Soc Med 100:25–28 Paul VI (1965) Gaudium et Spes. The Holy See, Vatican City Plato [375 BCE (2007)] The republic. Penguin Books, Suffolk Riker WH (1988) Liberalism against populism. Waveland Press, Illinois Riker WH (1990) Heresthetic and rhetoric in the spatial model. In: Enelow J, Hinich M (eds) Advances in the spatial theory of voting. Cambridge University Press, New York, pp 46–65 Smith, A. [1776 (2014)]) The wealth of nations. Shine Classics Publishing, Middletown DE Vines WE (1940) Vine’s expository dictionary. Mac Donald, Virginia Woodward PA (2001) The doctrine of double effect: philosophers debate a controversial principle. University of Notre Dame Press, Indiana

Chapter 8

Case Studies

In this second part of Selling Public Policy our attention shifts to demonstrating some of the lessons from Part I with reference to real-world contentious public policy. Clearly, in just two case studies, I won’t be able to explicate on all of the techniques and strategies covered earlier, but it is my hope to give readers a good sense of why the sales techniques I explained are important and also show them how to make the transition from theory to practice. Indeed, I will conclude both case studies with a reflection on how readers of this book might have been expected to have sold the respective public policies better. The first policy that I explore is the fiscal and monetary response to the emergence of COVID-19. Most countries implemented extensive interventions both with respect to the market and individual households. However, the response in Australia was particularly illuminating because it shows the difficulties that public policy salespersons can find themselves in, even when they are selling something popular—like free money (Reuters 2020). Fiscal and monetary expansion is an ideal case study because it nicely illustrates the salience of legacy costs that we reviewed in Chapter 4. In addition, fiscal and monetary stimulus also highlight the importance of logos, dimension control, as well as agency blame strategies. The second policy that I explore is the sales pitch made by Putin to try to justify his incursion into Ukrainian territory on the 24th of February, 2022 (Al Jazeera 2022). Much to the surprise of many, the relatively small Ukrainan force put up a spirited defence, notwithstanding the refusal of NATO to put boots on the ground or planes in the air. Moreover, the Ukraine war was notable both for its antecedents and tragic outcomes. The Putin sales pitch regarding his special military operations in Ukraine is an important opportunity to learn about a policy destined for failure. In particular, the case study illustrates the value in knowing whom it is that one wishes to sell one’s policy to. Moreover, our exploration of the Ukraine sales pitch will also make clear the critical importance of getting one’s heresthetic strategy in order, taking care in

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the selection of one’s designated scapegoat, as well as the salience of words with unexamined power. In sum, case studies are helpful because they allow us to test theoretical speculations in the crucible of real-world challenges. Real life tends to be much more complex than textbooks and I trust that we will both learn a thing or two as we proceed.

References Al Jazeera (2022) Timeline: week one of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Available at: https://www. aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/2/timeline-week-one-of-russia-invasion-of-ukraine. Accessed on 3 March 2022 Reuters (2020) Timeline: Fed’s response—Pandemic downturn v financial crisis. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-fed-timeline-idUSKCN21R2BC. Accessed on 3 March 2022

Chapter 9

Selling Public Policy in Practice: Fiscal and Monetary Stimulus Success?

Abstract One wouldn’t necessarily think that it would be hard to sell accommodative fiscal and monetary policy in the face of a global pandemic—after all it essentially involved giving away free money. However, things are not quite as simple as they might seem. In this chapter I examine the sales success of economic intervention policies in response to COVID-19, with particular emphasis on avoiding buyer’s remorse. The chapter draws on Part I of Selling Public Policy with a view to showing how students of this work might have been expected to have optimised outcomes with respect to selling fiscal and monetary response in the years immediately following the pandemic outbreak. Keywords Selling public policy · Policy success · COVID-19 · Coronavirus · Fiscal stimulus · Monetary stimulus · COVID stimulus

9.1 The Sales Environment Most people were probably blissfully unaware of the report by the Wuhan Municipal Health Commission to the World Health Organisation (WHO) at the end of December 2019, regarding an unusual cluster of pneumonia cases. However, by the time that the WHO declared a pandemic in March 2020 the words ‘coronavirus’ and ‘COVID19’ were firmly installed in our lexicon and the implication for people’s lives was recognised as truly profound. This chapter examines the fiscal and economic response of the Australian federal government to the COVID-19 pandemic. Notably Australia’s response was similar to much of the developed world, therefore the lessons that I draw ought to have wide relevance. Moreover, much has been written about the health response to the pandemic (see for example Drew 2022), but comparably little has been done to evaluate economic interventions. Thus, this chapter addresses an important gap in the literature as well as performing a crucial pedagogical function. Early in the pandemic the World Bank (2020, n.p.) asserted that ‘COVID-19 [would] plunge the global economy into the worst recession since World War II’. Perhaps this statement was a little misleading because it was the public policy

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response to the virus that caused most of the economic carnage—things like lockdowns, restrictions on social gatherings, and the like. Nevertheless, the damage to the global economy was very significant (initially estimated to be a contraction in the order of 5.2%; World Bank, 2020) and its reverberations continue to this day. Since at least the time of John Maynard Keynes’ 1936 (2008) General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money a presumption has held sway that government ought to play a large role in sheltering economies and citizens from the effects of economic shocks. Thus, when the COVID measures came into force it was not surprising to find politicians and key decision-makers adopting aggressive neo-Keynesian postures. There are two main levers for doing so—fiscal and monetary stimulus respectively— and this chapter looks at why selling public policy techniques such as rhetoric, evidence, blame games, ethics, and heresthetic are important to such interventions. Fiscal stimulus refers to changes to taxation rules and government spending that might be expected to stimulate additional demand in an economy. This includes things such as tax cuts, tax rebates, cash payments to citizens, as well as increases to welfare payments. Monetary stimulus, on the other hand, involves activities conducted by a central bank aimed at increasing liquidity and money supply. This includes things such as interest rate reductions, and open market operations to purchase debt. Economic orthodoxy generally prescribes both fiscal and monetary stimulus as efficacious responses to significant economic downturns. However, in most developed economies the central bank is notionally independent of the government and as a result co-ordination in lever pulling is often a difficult problem to overcome. Notably the central bank in Australia—Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA)—has been considered to be independent since the 1996 joint statement on inflation targeting and independence, notwithstanding the provisions in the extant enabling legislation. At the time of writing (30th March, 2022) COVID-19 globally has infected some 481,756,671 people and been said to have caused 6,127,981 deaths (which implies an approximate death rate of 1.27%; WHO 2022). In Australia, 4,138,296 cases have been recorded (about 15.8% of the population) and 5,897 deaths attributed to the coronavirus (an implied death rate of 0.14%; WHO 2022). Notably, death rates have dropped dramatically since the early waves of COVID-19 due to better treatment protocols, weaker mutations, and perhaps (but by no means to the level that some believe) vaccination (Drew 2022). A rough chronology of events from the original report by the Wuhan Municipal health Commission to the WHO in December 2019 might prove instructive for the material that follows. On the 22nd of January the WHO established an Emergency Committee to investigate the virus (WHO 2020). A few days later, on the 25th January 2020, the first cases were detected in Australia (Parliament of Australia 2021). Later, on the 11th March 2020, the WHO declared COVID-19 to be a global pandemic and two days later the Australian government advised against travel overseas, or unnecessary public gatherings (WHO 2020; Parliament of Australia 2021). On the 18th of March the Health Minister had the Governor-General declare a biosecurity emergency and four days after this the first of many and lengthy formal social restrictions were introduced, including the world’s longest lockdown (also known as a stay at home order) for the city of Melbourne in Victoria.

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For most of the pandemic response the federal government relied on public health measures practiced widely during the bubonic plague of the middle ages—social isolation, and mask wearing (Drew 2022). A zero COVID policy was adopted with an eventual resolution presumed to lie in the development and mass adoption of a vaccine. These draconian health policies undoubtedly saved lives but also had significant implications for the economy—the country experienced a record fall in GDP of 7%, and official unemployment rose to the highest levels in 20 years (7.5%; ABS 2021). The fiscal response was also significant and at the time believed by many to be broadly proportionate to the grave circumstances faced. The 2021–2022 Budget documents claimed that $AUD311B (15.7% of GDP) had been committed since the start of the pandemic in direct financial support. Important items of support included JobKeeper wage supplements totalling $AUD89B, $AUD14B in new infrastructure spending, as well as $AUD7.8B in income tax cuts. Notably, just $AUD20B (1% of GDP) of additional health spending was directed to fighting the pandemic and of this money $AUD1.88B was set aside for the purchase of vaccines (Commonwealth of Australia 2021). Additional COVID-19 spending was also provided for in the 2022–2023 budget which came out just as I was penning this chapter. Notable items included $AUD1.6B for rapid antigen test subsidies, an additional $AUD1B for yet more vaccines, and $AUD 4.2B for general health measures. In addition, over six million Australians were provided with a $AUD250 one-off payment to mitigate cost of living pressures caused in part by the earlier coronavirus measures (as will be described below). Monetary stimulus provided by the RBA was perhaps even more supportive. In March 2020, the central bank reduced the cash rate to 0.25% and further reductions were made in November 2020 to set it at a record low of 0.1%. In addition, the RBA announced and prosecuted several rounds of federal, state, and territory bond purchases initially totalling $AUD200B, but supplemented by $AUD4B per week transactions up to early February 2022. Daily market operations injected ‘substantial extra liquidity’ into the economy (RBA 2022, n.p.). A term funding facility was also provided which allowed approved deposit taking institutions (ADIs—a term used to describe banks, building societies and the like) to borrow funds at the cash rate fixed for a period of three years. ‘For every extra dollar of loans by ADIs to small and medium sized businesses, ADIs had access to an additional five dollars of funding from the Reserve Bank…For every extra dollar lent to large businesses, ADIs had access to an additional dollar of funding’ (RBA 2022, n.p.). This chapter is important because it provides students with an opportunity to see how theory can assist public policy selling in the rough and tumble of real-world emergencies. Moreover, this case study has strong elements of respect for success consistent with the views of McConnell (2010) which I elaborated in Chapter 2— we can learn equally from the successes as we can from failures. As it turns out, giving money away successfully can even sometimes prove problematic and in the remainder of this work I will expose how matters might have been better arranged to maximise the credit for our COVID policy salespersons (and their political masters).

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To demonstrate why theory is important to selling popular public policy I will next consider the importance of who one asks and when one asks to the evaluation of policy success. Thereafter I will look at the application of rhetoric, evidence, blame games, ethics, and heresthetic to the problem of selling economic interventions in response to a global pandemic. I conclude with my thoughts on what I might have expected students of Selling Public Policy to have done better.

9.1.1 Policy Success? The key job of the public policy salesperson is to sell a product and keep it sold over the implied warranty period. As I stated earlier, it ought not be a difficult thing to get citizens interested in policies that essentially give away money. However, to keep accommodative economic polices sold long enough for the political masters to retain office at a subsequent election is an entirely more imposing task. In Chapter 2 I pointed out some important gaps in the extant policy success literature. One such gap was the failure to sufficiently recognise how facts and impressions alter over time. Facts are important, but as we saw in Chapter 6 can be easily manipulated or misunderstood. Moreover, many of us are inclined to form rather subjective judgements based on feelings and reflections that may not always accurately mirror what actually happened. It is human nature to do so (Chapter 7) and the political cycles are affected by this aspect more than is commonly acknowledged. When inaccurate memories, subjective judgements, and misunderstandings are combined with negativity bias—see Chapter 5—then it is easy to see how even the prima facie popular policy of giving away money can ultimately result in important legacy costs. A related point that I made in Chapter 2 was the observation that whether or not a policy is deemed to be a success ultimately depends on who we ask and when we ask them. For instance, the evaluation we might receive from a person in the vulnerable category with respect to COVID-19 (especially older persons) would be quite different to other groups. As Aristotle (2012) noted thousands of years ago, older people tend to be more fearful of events—and have a bias towards greater government intervention aimed at mitigating potentially deleterious outcomes. Moreover, they also have a well-known bias towards debt financing for government projects for the simple reason that most would not reasonably expect to be taxpayers long enough to pay back all of the debt incurred by government (Buchanan 1997). The situation for working aged people was quite different to that of the aged and vulnerable. Official data suggests that the number of hours work plunged by around 9.2% as a result of the public policy response to the coronavirus and this meant that many employees were immediately confronted with significant economic consequences arising from social distancing, lockdowns and industry shutdowns (Ketchell 2020). Moreover, within this category there were contrasting outcomes— women tended to be harder hit than employed men (a reduction in hours worked of approximately 11.5 percent for the former group), and younger workers (aged 15 to

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24) hurt far more than middle aged workers (a reduction of hours in the order of 11 percent and 3.4 percent respectively). Within even these more nuanced groups there were still important differences in burdens shouldered—people in the services and gig economy saw significant reductions in take home pay and liberty whilst people in health and education sectors were largely sheltered from many of these ill-effects. Indeed, people economically crippled by the coronavirus policy response may well evaluate it as an abject failure—especially if they were in a group unlikely to suffer important health consequences from the virus. Yet another group that is likely to have a critical view of the coronavirus response are young people (below working age). These individuals had their schooling disrupted, social relationships destroyed, and domestic situation put under enormous stress despite being almost at zero risk from the virus (Chiesa et al. 2020). Moreover, it is this group that will be called upon to pay back most of the public debt incurred. Burdening young people in such a fashion is quite disturbing given that they were given no political voice in the public decision-making process. When we inquire about policy success also has a determinative effect on the answer that we receive. It is reasonable to suggest that there were three distinct phases to COVID-19 in Australia and I for one know that my personal attitude to policy changed as we moved through the cycles. In the first phase people were suddenly confronted with a threat to life and livelihoods that was beyond anything that could reasonably have been predicted a few years earlier. Indeed, some of the health modelling at the time suggested that up to 400,000 Australians might die in the pandemic (Davey and Doherty 2020) and authorities were also predicting economic consequences akin to the Great Depression (World Bank 2020). Many people, and members of the government for that matter, responded to these alarming predictions with what can only be described as shear panic (this reaction provides a salient example of the importance of cultivating public virtues such as fortitude and prudence1 ). Indeed, the lack of prudence by governments resulted in excessive coronavirus stimulus for some households as evidenced by household savings data which has increased by $AUD249B since the pandemic (Kohler 2022a). Notwithstanding this lack of prudence by governments during the first phase of the pandemic most people seemed happy to buy into the public policy offering.2 After the initial wave Australia experienced a long period of remarkably low case numbers and few community transmissions and this achievement was widely lauded around the world (Haseltine 2021). In response, fear seemed to dissipate somewhat despite the grim reports emerging out of countries such as Italy and the United Kingdom. Had we asked most people at the time about the success of the coronavirus 1

As a result of a distinct lack of virtue governments largely over-reacted with unhelpful draconian rules, heavy handed police enforcement, and excessive fiscal stimulus (see Drew 2022 for salient examples of behaviour not normally associated with free democracies). 2 I was a rare exception, writing to the Prime Minister and my member of parliament in March 2020 to tell them of the risk of stagflation arising from their poorly thought-out policies—at the time I was a bit of a lone voice, but I note that many more have since jumped on the bandwagon (especially since the consequences of imprudent economic easing have become more clear).

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response I think that the far majority would have replied in the affirmative (although a few more voices did start to worry about the cost of the response, implications for mental health and the like, as well as the sustainability of a zero-COVID strategy). Indeed, state governments which were required to go to the polls during this period were returned with increased majorities and it seemed that the governments with the most draconian policies in fact fared best in a political sense (Norman 2021). Eventually it dawned on at least one state government that the cost of the zeroCOVID policies—both in an economic and social sense—was not sustainable as a long-term proposition. Accordingly, the New South Wales government led the charge in easing restrictions and adopting a more tolerant stance to community transmissions. As might be expected, COVID-19 numbers increased dramatically. The media reacted with blame and predictions of doom and the Premier of New South Wales promptly reintroduced the restrictions (ABC 2022). However, it was now too late to roll back the tide and the virus became firmly embedded in the community which meant that a zero-COVID policy was no longer an option going forward. At this time community opinion regarding the coronavirus was probably mixed—many people still feared the virus and insisted that it was reasonable to continue with draconian and economic destructive policies presumably for ever. However, as more people contracted the virus and recovered—as well as becoming aware of acquaintances that had recovered—the fear factor reduced considerably. Irrational fears of COVID being a death sentence subsided and even the media started using phrases such as ‘living with COVID’. When the Ukraine war emerged in February 2022 (see Chapter 11), COVID simply dropped out of consciousness—most people returned to pre-COVID behaviours and many started to wonder whether the previous two years of draconian measures and considerable economic expense had been worth it. Voters appear to have expressed growing attitudes of buyers remorse at subsequent state elections, and opinion polls suggest that this response might be repeated at the federal level as well as at other states (Puddy 2022). Therefore, there appears to be every reason to believe that evaluations of the coronavirus in the final phase may be much less glowing than in the earlier ones. Thus, it should be quite clear that evaluations of coronavirus public policy response depend on both who we ask and when we might ask them. The vulnerable were likely to approve of government intervention—especially if they personally escaped any economic cost—certainly in the early phases and may even do so to this day. Younger citizens, on the other hand, may have kept silent in the first phase (out of either respect for their fellow citizens or fear that they might be castigated as being heartless), but have become increasingly vocal and critical in recent times. Moreover, people are increasingly appearing to remember events through rather coloured lenses that emphasise the particular position that they now adopt—forgetting inconvenient facts and focussing on recollections that support their current appraisal of the danger of the virus (shaped by the considerable benefit of hindsight). It probably should have been clear to public policy salespersons that impressions, recollections and attitudes would change in this way according to demographics and the passage of time. Had salespersons paused to consider this likelihood then it is

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probable that they might have used different rhetoric, evidence, blame strategies, ethics and heresthetic. These are the matters that I now turn my attention to.

9.1.2 Rhetoric Rhetoric played a crucial role in selling the economic interventions executed to mitigate the ill effects of COVID-19 inspired public policies. I have already commented on the effective use of pathos (especially fear) to sell policy, and in an environment of this kind it seems that people were also quite receptive to a portrayed ethos of benevolent politicians doing their best because ‘we [were] all in this together’ (ABC Online, 2020), notwithstanding the fact that in normal times most people are rather cynical about the presumed motivations of their elected representatives. Accordingly, it now seems apposite to examine the logos, before moving on to a brief consideration of words with unexamined power (see Chapter 3). It seems that Hirschman’s typology does indeed cover a good deal of the logos regularly employed in important public policy debates. Indeed, most of the language surrounding the economic policy responses to the coronavirus clearly made use of the progressive Desperate Predicament thesis. Readers will recall from Chapter 3 that this line of argument emphasises the desperation of the situation (matters such as the 400,000 deaths modelled as well as the severity and rarity of a global pandemic) and calls for extraordinary measures to be taken, even when it was foreseeable that such interventions might have bad consequences. Otherwise stated, the Desperate Predicament thesis is the exact opposite of the principle of double effect that I recounted in Chapter 7—indeed the former argues that bad outcomes are no obstacle if a situation is portrayed as sufficiently grave. Clearly, use of the Desperate Predicament logos would be very effective for selling extremely accommodative economic policy in the early phases of the pandemic given the level of uncertainty and fear that pervaded the times. However, as I noted in Chapter 3, use of a progressive rhetoric also points to the rhetorical logos most likely to ultimately prove effective for potential opponents—in this case the Perversity counter-thesis. In this reactionary argument opponents of policy are expected to point to unintended outcomes and effects that were the precise opposite of the progressive’s aims. A salient example of the power of this Perversity thesis can be highlighted by looking at words with unexamined meaning, such as the neologism ‘JobKeeper’. At an unexamined level—and in the initial reactionary vacuum—coining this word probably appeared to be the perfect sales pitch. After all most people would accept that it is ipso facto good for both themselves and others to keep their jobs and thus be able to fund their own cost of living. However, further examination poses a number of potential problems—Why were some industries and associated jobs considered worthy of JobKeeper, but not others? Where did the money from JobKeeper ultimately flow? As it turned out these questions were raised with varying levels of success—for example the tertiary sector loudly decried its exclusion from the program even though

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the coronavirus response effectively halted the foreign student market that most Australian universities rely on to a significant extent (however this appears to have fallen on deaf ears with respect to the public who sometimes consider universities to be highly subsidised, inefficient and greedy). By way of contrast the question of where the JobKeeper money ultimately landed did attract significant media and public attention. When the story broke in August 2020 that the JobKeeper payments explained a considerable proportion of the dividends paid out by major corporations, the public and media became incensed. Very quickly the neologism of JobKeeper became hijacked and substituted by the damning label, ‘DividendKeeper’ (Kehoe et al. 2020). This brought to people’s attention that public (and borrowed) money meant to support vulnerable workers had indeed found it’s way into the the pockets of wealthy shareholders and corporate executives—a quintessential example of the Perversity thesis. Moreover, other reports emerged that JobKeeper was proving a disincentive for ordinarily low-paid workers to return to employment which was essential to a full economic recovery (Cranston 2020). Thus, there was emerging evidence that the policy that was meant to support economic dignity and economic recovery was in fact resulting in the exact opposite—dependency and a hampered economy. Indeed, the question of evidence was central to other government claims regarding the success of it’s post-COVID economic interventions and this becomes the matter to which I now turn my attention.

9.1.3 Evidence As we saw in Chapter 6 evidence is information put forward to prove or disprove an existence of fact. However, few bother to interrogate the quality of the evidence and this can lead to some seriously misleading conclusions. Moreover, reticence to interrogate matters is especially the case when the evidence is sourced from a prima facie reputable institution, and disseminated by ‘respectable’ media outlets. Numbers are often assumed to convey objective truth, but the reality is that most numbers are in fact the output of a series of subjective decisions. Indeed, there really is ‘no such thing as a free statistic’, notwithstanding the fact that most of the public fail to recognise this truism (Coase 1994, p. 58). As I detailed in Chapter 6, the problem with presenting evidence in a way that helps one to sell public policy is that others might contest matters. It is thus important to understand the opportunity costs of doing so, because a successful contestation can seriously undermine the public policy sales pitch. A case in point is the Australian government spruiking of its fiscal policies which it claimed had the effect of driving down unemployment to a predicted rate of ‘3.75% this year, its lowest figure in 50 years…..[and] a remarkable post-pandemic recovery’. (Butler 2022). On the face of it, this does indeed seem to be evidence of a notable public policy success. However, a closer examination reveals that matters are not at all this simple.

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8.0 7.0 6.0 5.0 4.0 3.0 2.0 1.0 Feb-20 Mar-20 Apr-20 May-20 Jun-20 Jul-20 Aug-20 Sep-20 Oct-20 Nov-20 Dec-20 Jan-21 Feb-21 Mar-21 Apr-21 May-21 Jun-21 Jul-21 Aug-21 Sep-21 Oct-21 Nov-21 Dec-21 Jan-22 Feb-22 Mar-22

0.0

Fig. 9.1 Unemployment rate, Australia (Source ABS 2022a)

In Fig. 9.1 (below) I plot the official unemployment rate since just before the outbreak of the coronavirus, until the present time. This graph does seem to suggest that Australia largely escaped the prophecies of economic destruction arising from the appearance of the coronavirus. Moreover, it appears that unemployment now stands at a rate more than an entire percentage point less than it was in February 2020. Indeed, the unemployment rate has only been above the pre-pandemic level for one month out of the last ten3 and has largely been on a pleasing downwards trend. This seems to support the government’s vociferous self-praise. However, matters become far less clear when one inquires into the subjective judgements that underlie the prima facie impressive numbers. For instance, the unemployment rate is extrapolated from a mere survey of 26,000 households (about 0.32% of the population and is therefore quite susceptible to error (the 95% confidence interval is 0.4 percentage points wide; ABS 2022a). In addition, many people are not aware that the ABS counts as employed anyone in the survey reference group who worked ‘one hour or more in the reference week’ (ABS 2022b). {This is important because one of the likely responses to business stress might be to reduce the numbers of hours worked by employees}. Furthermore, people who are not actively looking for work, or who are unable to attend work, are not counted as unemployed (ABS 2022a). During the pandemic—especially whilst rolling lockdowns were in force—many people were likely to be in this situation.

3

I hope that it has not escaped my reader’s notice that the time frame which I have employed here was chosen with the intent of making a point. For example, extending the reference period to a year would not send quite the same strong message. This should serve to further emphasise the ‘malleability’ of evidence.

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Fig. 9.2 Actual monthly hours worked, Australia (Source ABS 2022a)

For all of these reasons the unemployment rate may not be the best indicator of the government’s economic success in response to COVID-19. Indeed, when individual people reflect on the last few years they might be more concerned about whether they are indeed getting the amount of work that they desired (and how this compares to their pre-pandemic state of affairs). Accordingly, in Fig. 9.2, I plot the total hours worked by Australians over the same period. In fifteen out of the twenty-five readings presented, total hours worked was less than the pre-pandemic rate. Moreover, it has only just risen above pre-pandemic levels a few months ago and has been lower than pre-pandemic levels in four out of the last ten months (with quite volatile and chaotic movements that defy the drawing of a trend line). Perhaps this is still a good result—but hardly as convincing as the unemployment rate data in isolation might have suggested. Of course, just about nobody is going to go to the effort of downloading employment data and constructing graphs like I did a few moments earlier. Furthermore, even if they did so there is quite a bit of detail to get across (and communicate) before people can successfully dispute the evidence at the heart of the claims. Thus, the opportunity costs associated with evidence can prove quite formidable and therefore probably saved the day for public policy salespersons (as it appears to have done in this case). Indeed, opportunity costs also play an important role in blame games—the selling public policy technique that I will examine forthwith.

9.1.4 Blame Games As I detailed in Chapter 5, blame games are as old as history itself—with the first recorded case likely to have occurred in the Garden of Eden. The objective of a person

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seeking to deploy blame games is to alter other people’s perceptions regarding their loss, or alternatively, the cause of the harm. When conducted skilfully blame games might hope to result in blame destruction, shifting or confusion. If deployed with a little less skill—or at a time when the stars just refuse to align—then perhaps blame sharing might prove to be a satisfactory consolation prize. However, blame gamers must be on their guard because sometimes their efforts can go horribly wrong— people see straight through their manipulations—and the result can be blame reversion (the original blame plus an additional measure for trying to dodge responsibility in the first place). The economic response to the coronavirus involved two main blame game techniques—agency strategies (especially with respect to the use of expert brands), and scapegoating. Agency strategies were effectively set up many years prior to the pandemic as a consequence of conferring putative independence to the Reserve Bank of Australia with respect to the setting of monetary policy. Similarly, the scapegoating tapped into latent attitudes established many years ago, but also required some nimble work by politicians to take advantage of their opportunities. I first describe the agency strategy before, turning to an explanation of the scapegoat attempt. Economists generally agree that increasing money supply will result in rather sticky inflation—indeed, Milton Friedman was famous for his dictum that inflation is always and everywhere a monetary problem. It thus came as a rather unexpected and undesirable surprise to many when—Dr Philip Lowe, Governor of the Bank—made the following remarks: The current increase in inflation is only transitory and a period of contractionary monetary policy will not be required to return inflation to target. (2021)

Since at least March 2020 I had been openly predicting that reckless fiscal and monetary policy would result in a period of stagflation (stubbornly high inflation combined with low growth; see, for example, Drew 2022). Therefore, I was both bewildered and undermined (in my professional capacity) when the expert brand of our nation openly stated the opposite! Why Dr Lowe decided to turn his back on all of his economic training will probably never be known for certain (although I suspect he was influenced by both the panic pervading the times and also the wishes of his political masters). However, the fact that he did do so graphically illustrates the power of the expert brand to both deflect blame and overawe potential detractors. From the moment that Dr Lowe forcibly declared that inflation was merely transitory it was no longer an easy matter to argue that sticky and elevated inflation had been caused by a reckless government. After all, the most prominent economist in the nation was saying that inflation was not a problem—so how could anyone attribute harm to governing politicians? Moreover, in declaring that inflation was transitory, the Governor of the Reserve Bank also opened the door for future excuses to be made when the claim was ultimately proved erroneous by later events. Otherwise stated, because we had it on good authority that the economic response to COVID-19 had not caused sticky inflation, it thus became reasonable to claim that subsequent events must have instead been responsible for persistently

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increasing prices (for example the war in Ukraine, China’s COVID zero-tolerance policy and the like). It is more than a little interesting to note that just four months after Governor Lowe’s now infamous declaration the Deputy Governor of the Reserve Bank announced that he had decided to leave for the greener pastures of a mining corporation, Fortescue. This event was barely noticed by many but contains some really important lessons for prospective blame gamers. To understand why this is so important one needs to note that the convention in Australia is that the Deputy Governor generally replaces his boss at the expiration of the latter’s term (in this case September 2023). By then it would have been painfully obvious that inflation was anything but transitory and the incoming Governor would have likely been forced to inflict much pain onto citizens by raising interest rates (to try to tame rising costs). Governor Lowe would have got the credit for successfully guiding Australia through a grave pandemic, but his replacement would have born the brunt of the blame associated with the outcomes of the policies that his former boss had implemented. The ‘surprise’ resignation of Deputy Governor Guy Debelle probably suggests that he wasn’t interested in performing this role of scapegoat as prepared by his predecessor (Wright 2022). Similarly, the government of China seemed reticent to act the role of scapegoat— this time as part of an attempt to take away some of the blame from the Australian federal government which had implemented draconian and economic destructive responses to the coronavirus. The finger pointing commenced in April 2020, when the Australian Foreign Minister called for an open and independent investigation of China with respect to the genesis of the coronavirus (Walsh 2021). The message implicit in this call was that China might have played some part in visiting the pandemic onto Australians. The spark lit by the Foreign Minister was provided with fuel when the Prime Minister of Australia asserted that WHO would require ‘weapons inspector powers’ (Walsh 2021, n.p.). Now the message was clear that the government believed that China had done wrong, and perhaps even engaged in an act of biological warfare. In making these claims the Australian government sought to shift blame to China as the cause of the harm. The response from China was, somewhat predictably, a negative one—the diplomatic relationship deteriorated to the lowest levels in memory, and a trade war ensued. However, it seems that the blame game largely worked with the domestic audience— the media (of all political stripes) embarked on some rather vitriolic and speculative anti-China reporting that culminated in ‘almost one third of Australians blam[ing] coronavirus pandemic on [the] Chinese people’, which in turn resulted in some quite unedifying racism (SBS 2020). The fact that China merely detected the virus—which it reported promptly to the WHO4 seemed to be beside the point. A desirable scapegoat had been identified—one for which suspicions had long been harboured—and a good deal of blame had been irreversibly shifted. This blame shift was aided by 4

China made this report in December, 2019. The WHO delayed till the 11th of March 2020 to take decisive action, and then the Australian government delayed even longer (until the 18th March) to respond in a meaningful way.

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the fact that the scapegoat had an undemocratic government and tapped in nicely to latent fears of ‘reds under the bed’ prominent in the 1950s which still resonate strongly in a country where democracy and its associated utilitarianism (as well as egoism) rarely receive challenge.

9.1.5 Ethics Ethics relate to the standards by which we judge the acts and omissions of either ourselves or others (including the wider community). They become important to public policy salespersons because ethics can stir the pathos in mighty ways and motivate people to take drastic action (see Chapter 7). One has only to look at the bitter public policy debates on matters such as euthanasia, abortion, and homosexual marriage to understand the way that ethical paradigms can shape behaviour, entrench differences, and cause people to act (sometimes in violent and undesirable ways). Ethics are also important to the public policy salesperson because the political system that operates in most countries is intimately link to ethical perspectives. For instance, democracy5 reconciles differences through determining the preferences of majorities—that is, a government’s or a policy’s destiny is tied up with gaining the agreement of a majority of citizens. When this needed consent is based on what people feel will give rise to the greatest happiness for the relevant population, then democracy becomes the manifestation of utilitarianism. If, however, consent is provided based on what people feel will best give rise to their happiness, then it is probably more accurate to characterise the political system as the manifestation of egoism. There is good reason to believe that democracy has indeed descended from its formerly stated ideal to a situation much more akin to mass egoism, or Plato’s mob rule. From the perspective of an ethical egoist viable governments and policies thus become those which the majority of people believe will benefit them personally (unless the ethical egoist believes that citizens are irrational—see Chapter 7). A public policy salesperson operating from this perspective would therefore be well-advised to appeal to the self interest of the majority of people eligible to vote. If we look at some of the fiscal and monetary stimulus provided during the coronavirus response, it will allow us to cast greater light on the implications of ethics for public policy salespersons. As I have already outlined, the fiscal stimulus included generous cheque writing in favour of people on welfare—such as those in receipt of the aged pension or unemployment benefits. These people no doubt quickly decided that receiving cash handouts was definitely a good thing, especially given that others would ultimately be asked to pay the tax to cover the largess. As a result, stimulus cheques are likely to have been a very popular policy amongst these cohorts and probably strengthened the political support for the government at that time. 5

Of course the ethical paradigm will alter in accordance with the political system. For example, in the theocracy of Iran, public policy salespersons should be much more mindful of Islamic deontology.

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Similarly, JobKeeper payments—which allowed people to remain tethered to their employer despite being shutout of the workplace because of lockdowns and the like— would have been very popular with both business owners and their staff. Therefore JobKeeper is likely to have attracted yet more voters whose interests neatly coincided with the policy, and hence accumulated more political credit for the government. On the monetary front, the two policies that likely had the greatest impact on people were the well-advertised dropping of official interest rates to a historical low, as well as the (far less well-known) advance of cash to banks at just 0.1% which was in turn loaned out by them in their commercial operations at around three percent (a very healthy margin). People with variable rate debt were obviously the beneficiaries of the former policy, and shareholders of banks beneficiaries of the latter. The selfinterest of both groups of people would thus have probably been translated into significant support for the policy, as well as for the government. Of course, the aforementioned fiscal and monetary policies came with a steep price tag—debt and likely inflation—which probably explains why governments don’t hand out free money all of the time (not at this level anyhow) to keep in office. However, most people were blissfully ignorant of the debt and inflation implications of reckless fiscal and monetary policy—which, no doubt, played nicely into the hands of the public policy salespersons (until, at least, the implications started to become clearer in response to an inexorable rise in prices). In general, only people schooled in economics were likely to understand the full consequences of what was being done—and thus the ultimate detriment that this would bring to them—but these were few (and as I showed earlier) largely cowered by expert brands.6 Verily, some people did bear immediate costs from the monetary policy, in particular—especially self-funded retirees and people with substantial savings. However, the number of such people in a country which frequently vies for the record of most indebted households in the world, was probably insignificant. Moreover, both of these groups were able to leap into equity markets and hence experience the doubledigit growth in wealth that only a recklessly loose monetary policy could cultivate, (thus providing an opportunity for more than adequate consolation). In sum, most people were winners from the accommodative fiscal and monetary policies in the short term, at least. Given that the Constitution of Australia provides for a maximum term for a federal government of just three years—with the flexibility to call an election almost at will—this created opportunities for great success for the ruling political class. However, to lock-in this success it seems that a good grasp of heresthetic was called for—the matter to which I now direct my attention.

6

Some youngsters studying high-school economics probably also started to appreciate the implications of the extant policy for their lives—especially with respect to the debt that they were being burdened with. However, this group had absolutely no political voice and therefore could be safely ignored by public policy salespersons—at least for a few more years.

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9.1.6 Heresthetic Heresthetic can be described as the art of competitive politics. Unlike its classical cousin (rhetoric) heresthetic does not seek to persuade—instead it manipulates people into choosing options that may run counter to their initial evaluation. To achieve desirable political outcomes herestheticians employ one of three techniques—strategic voting, agenda setting, and dimension control—although, it is the latter approach which has proved to be the most devastating, and hence most popular, weapon of the political class. This is because dimension control brings to consciousness determinative latent biases, which once raised, cannot be easily dismissed. For example, an early heresthetic positioning for the COVID economic response was to emphasise, repeatedly, that its design focussed only on the need to protect lives and livelihoods. This mantra ensured that people became most conscious of the need to avoid death and maintain incomes—something that just about every mortal might be expected to respond positively to. Had this dimension not been raised, people might have subjected the enormous fiscal cost to more scrutiny. But once consciousness had been raised about lives and livelihoods it seemed that to criticise the size of the stimulus would almost certainly have attracted vitriolic condemnation.7 Thus, dimension control was used quite effectively to stifle any potential complaints regarding the largess of the coronavirus response. However, as I detailed in Chapter 4, it is also important for politicians to consider the salience of the various kinds of costs associated with their art. I have already touched on opportunity costs therefore I believe that it will be most helpful to contain my ruminations to the much less well-understood potential burdens—contingency and legacy costs, respectively. Contingency costs refer to public policy consequences that are only possible, rather than certain. As I have already described in this case study, dire predictions of death and economic destruction were important for establishing a pathos and hence selling COVID economic policies. Otherwise stated, the fear of COVID was critical to the acceptance of the radical measures implemented to deal with it. But what if people came to fear COVID less? Whilst infection numbers were low people had little chance of experiencing the disease or knowing someone who had. However, as community infections increased it became more probable that people would be directly confronted with COVID-19. In addition, there was some potential that aggregate death statistics might be put into more context—perhaps compared to recent influenza seasons, or analysed with respect to the deceased’s age—and thus further reduce fear and panic. If it did transpire that many people no longer perceived COVID-19 to be particularly dangerous then public policies sold on a foundation of fear and panic might conceivably become the subject of buyer’s remorse. Moreover, if other potential threats to lives and 7

Indeed, a colleague accused me of being heartless when I brought up the matter of reckless spending, and asserted that it was morally reprehensible for me to put a price on lives (presumably ignorant of the fact that we do so everyday when deciding how much to spend on road safety measures, or which drugs to add to the subsidised medicine list).

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livelihoods arose—such as a war—then perhaps this might further undermine the schmooze of COVID policy salespersons. Indeed, this seems to have been precisely what happened in Australia. Since the advent of the pandemic I made a point of gauging the attitudes of people to the virus— especially my students—and closely observing community behaviours. Prior to the explosion in community transmissions following the relaxation of restrictions in New South Wales, I found that most people feared the virus and complied willingly with hygiene measures. However, once the numbers were such that many people came to know of someone who had survived, the level of fear dissipated considerably and compliance waned. Then when the war in Ukraine broke people just stopped talking about COVID, and it is now a rare thing indeed to see people putting their hands under a sanitiser dispenser. Moreover, several students—who previously vociferously supported the governments measures—have told me straight-out that they now think that the last few years and hundreds of billions of dollars had been a complete waste. Clearly this is not a scientific study, however, I imagine that if you reflect on your own experiences that you might come to a similar appreciation of the importance of contingency costs. Another major set of risks were some rather inevitable legacy costs. As I have already noted, the bulk of neo-classical economic evidence pointed to the fact that extremely accommodative fiscal and monetary policy would ultimately result in high inflation and lower future growth (stagflation). Moreover, as the Barber Boom (circa 1971–1974) illustrated it takes a few years from inception of a reckless economic policy until the consequences of it are fully felt (Drew 2022). The acknowledgement of legacy costs had the potential to facilitate some artful political manoeuvring— especially with respect to the timing of the federal elections (which, as I said before, are not fixed). I remain in two minds about whether Australian herestheticians properly appreciated the aforementioned legacy costs, or not. It could be that they understood that inflation would start to bite after the first quarter of 2022, that this might cause the central bank to lift rates, and hence precipitate the ire of voters. The timing of the election for one of the last weeks of the allowable term might then mean that the incumbent government wished to lose, and hence usher in the former political opposition to be a willing scapegoat for when matters really deteriorated significantly (hence setting them up for blame, abject failure, and a resounding loss three years hence). Alternatively, it might be the case that no-one in the incumbent government had ever done high-school economics and didn’t see the inevitable legacy costs hurtling towards them, hence an unintended trainwreck election result. I guess only time will tell—probably when an outgoing politician writes their autobiography—but I hope the former explanation is true, because I much prefer to think of my politicians as manipulative rather than moronic.

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9.2 How COVID-19 Fiscal and Monetary Stimulus Might Have Been Sold Better On the whole, it can be said that the government’s economic package in response to the coronavirus was a success. But this hardly means that they were expert salespersons, for as I stated at the outset, it is not terribly difficult to give away ‘free’ money. Nor does it mean that lessons can’t be learned for future sales campaigns. Hindsight is a wonderful thing, but so is education. Most people would argue that it is relatively easy to see what could have been done better from the perspective of mid-2022 and I agree wholeheartedly. However, I also think that a canny student of Selling Public Policy wouldn’t have made some of the mistakes in the first place. I base my assertions on the fact that I did see potential problems looming and wrote about them at the time, well before the full consequences of sub-optimal policy became commonly known. One of the areas where matters might have been improved relates to the observation that evaluations of policy success are often contingent on who one asks. For instance, had our salespersons been more aware of this critical point then it might have changed their approach to the support provided for large voting blocs—such as women—who were always going to bear the brunt of the social restrictions (both in terms of income and family responsibilities). Another area where improvement might have been made related to the rhetoric of the sales pitch. The desperate predicament thesis was an obvious go-to pitch, but it should have been equally obvious that detractors would subsequently look for instances of perversity. A recognition of this response might have been expected to result in stricter criteria being employed for stimulus, such as JobKeeper. If this had been done then particular industries may not have felt so neglected (and their employee voters might not have become disgruntled) and less money might have ended up in the hands of the rich, to the ire of the poor. For example, a prudent salesperson might have established some sort of repayment criteria through the tax system in the event that particular stimulus proved to be un-needed. By way of contrast, the use of evidence was superb and really couldn’t have been improved upon. As I demonstrated earlier, the opportunity costs of contesting flawed methodologies were simply too high to pose a real threat to salespersons. Similarly, the agency strategy element of the blame games was executed flawlessly and could not reasonably have been expected to be better. However, the same cannot be said for the anointing of China as a scapegoat—it is clear that certain people, such as the Prime Minister, went far too far and therefore inflicted unnecessary damage on important trade relations. It was sufficient to raise the importance of an inquiry—especially given latent prejudices against the nation—it was not necessary to go to the extent of linking COVID-19 to weapons inspections. Perhaps doing so elicited a greater domestic short-term blame shift response—but it also saddled the salespersons (and their nation) with ongoing economic costs. With respect to the use of heresthetic, the deployment of ‘lives and livelihoods’ as a heresthetic dimension was an excellent choice that clearly resonated strongly

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with the public. However, I am not entirely sure that the contingency costs were fully acknowledged—although it must be said that salespeople were hardly in a position to do much about it (other than talk up the risks of future mutations and the danger of long-COVID, which they did). Perhaps the gravest error of the entire sales campaign was to neglect the matter of legacy costs. If salespersons had given greater consideration to the importance of the future then they might have been less inclined towards overcompensation, or might have called an election far earlier (before the inevitable inflation began to bite). It is probably the case that the over-compensation was a simple error made by salespersons gripped with panic and devoid of prudence. However, less certainty can be had with respect to the late election: I am just not sure whether it was a mistake or a stroke of genius—only time (and inevitable autobiographies) will tell. In sum, it can be seen that even successful instances of Selling Public Policy can yield important insights for future salespersons. In the chapter that follows I change my tack to instead examine an instance of policy failure—the invasion of Ukraine from Russia’s perspective—to see whether policy disasters can also yield pedagogical value.

References ABC (Australian Broadcasting Corporation) (2022) Restrictions reintroduced in NSW as 38,625 cases recorded. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Lhnf3SmAvjA. Accessed on 5 April 2022 ABC (2020) Scott Morrison says panic buying driven by coronavirus lockdown fears is ‘ridiculous’ and ‘un-Australian’, 18 March 2020. Available at: https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-03-18/cor onavirus-panic-buying-pm-tells-people-to-stop-hoarding/12066082 Aristotle (2012) The art of rhetoric. Collins Classics, London Australian Bureau of Statistics (2021) One year of COVID-19: Aussie jobs, business and the economy. Available at: https://www.abs.gov.au/articles/one-year-covid-19-aussie-jobs-businessand-economy. Accessed on 30 March 2022 Australian Bureau of Statistics (2022a) Labour force, Australia. Available at: https://www.abs. gov.au/statistics/labour/employment-and-unemployment/labour-force-australia/latest-release# unemployment. Accessed on 18 May 2022 Australian Bureau of Statistics (2022b) Labour statistics: concepts, sources and methods. Available at: https://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/[email protected]/Lookup/by%20Subject/6102.0.55.001~Feb%202 018~Main%20Features~4.%20How%20the%20ABS%20Measures%20Unemployment~50. Accessed on 18 May 2022 Buchanan J (1997) The balanced budget amendment: clarifying the arguments. Public Choice 90:117–138 Butler J (2022) Morrison government predicts unemployment will drop to 50-year low as it spruiks pre-election budget. The Guardian, 28 March 2022. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2022/mar/28/government-predicts-unemploym ent-will-drop-to-50year-low-as-it-spruiks-pre-election-budget. Accessed on 18 May 2022 Chiesa V, Antony G, Wismar M, Rechel B (2020) COVID-19 pandemic: health impact of staying at home, social distancing and ‘lockdown’ measures—a systematic review of systematic reviews. J Public Health 1–20. https://doi.org/10.1093/pubmed/fdab102 Coase R (1994) Essays on economics and economists. University of Chicago Press, Chicago

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Commonwealth of Australia (2021) Budget 2021–2022. Available at: https://archive.budget.gov. au/2021-22/index.htm. Accessed on 30 March 2022 Cranston M (2020) Some people on JobKeeper don’t want to return to work. Aust Fin Rev, 18 June 2020. Available at: https://www.afr.com/policy/economy/some-people-on-jobkeeper-dont-want-to-return-to-work-20200617-p553f9 Davey M, Doherty B (2020) Health minister says Australia cannot predict how many will die from coronavirus. The Guardian, 11 March 2020 Drew J (2022) Natural law and government: after the COVID-19 revolution? Springer, Singapore Haseltine W (2021) What can we learn from Australia’s Covid-19 response? Forbes, 24 March 2021 Kehoe J, Mitchell S, Cranston M, Thomson J (2020) JobKeeper becomes DividendKeeper. Aust Fin Rev, 11 August 2020 Ketchell M (2020) Were it not for JobKepper unemployment would be 11.7%, up from 5.2% in one month: here’s how the numbers pan out. The Conversation, 14 May 2020 Keynes JM (1936 [2008]) The general theory of employment, interest and money. BN Publishing, Hawthorne CA Kohler A (2022a) Some context around Australia’s largest quarterly GDP growth since 1976. ABC News, 6 March 2022 Kohler A (2022b) Budget says gloom, but states say economic boom! So what’s going on? Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P4l7ExW0abg. Accessed on 5 April 2022 Lowe P (2021) Recent trends in inflation. Available at: https://www.rba.gov.au/speeches/2021/spgov-2021-11-16.html. Accessed on 30 March 2022 McConnell A (2010) Policy success, policy failure and grey areas in-between. J Public Policy 30(3):345–362 Norman J (2021) Labor’s landslide victory win shows liberal party on brink of extinction in WA. ABC Online. Available at: https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-03-15/wa-election-federal-implic ations-voting/13239076. Accessed on 5 April 2022 Parliament of Australia (2021) COVID-19: a chronology of Australian government announcements. Available at: https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamen tary_Library/pubs/rp/rp2021/Chronologies/COVID-19AustralianGovernmentAnnouncements. Accessed on 30 March 2020 Puddy R (2022) SA election result a warning that incumbency is not as safe as it once was now we’re living with COVID-19. ABC Online, 20 March 2020 Razik N (2020) Almost one third of Australians blame Coronavirus pandemic on Chinese community, new poll finds. Special Broadcasting Service (SBS), 10 September 2020 Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) (2022) Supporting the economy and financial system in response to COVID-19. RBA, Sydney Walsh M (2021) Australia called for a COVID-19 probe. China responded with a trade war. ABC News, 3 January 2021 World Bank (2020) COVID-19 to plunge global economy into worst recession since World War II. Available at: https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2020/06/08/covid-19to-plunge-global-economy-into-worst-recession-since-world-war-ii#:~:text=According%20to% 20World%20Bank%20forecasts,shrink%20by%205.2%25%20this%20year.&text=That%20w ould%20represent%20the%20deepest,June%202020%20Global%20Economic%20Prospects. Accessed on 30 March 2020 World Health Organisation (WHO) (2020) WHO timeline COVID-19. Available at: https://www. who.int/news/item/27-04-2020-who-timeline---covid-19. Accessed on 30 March 2022 World Health Organisation (WHO) (2022) WHO Coronavirus (COVID-19) dashboard. Available at: https://covid19.who.int/. Accessed on 30 March 2022 Wright S (2022) RBA heir apparent guy Debelle unexpectedly quits to join Forrest’s Green Hydrogen Play. The Sydney Morning Herald, 10 March 2022. Available at: https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/rba-heir-apparent-guy-debelle-unexpectedly-quitsto-join-forrest-s-green-hydrogen-play-20220310-p5a3h4.html

Chapter 10

Selling Public Policy in Practice: Failure in Ukraine?

Abstract One wouldn’t necessarily think of war as a public policy that requires selling. However, governments and media alike have been very active in trying to sell the merits of respective policies with respect to events in Ukraine. In this case study I focus on what might be learned from examining policy failures—specifically the ‘special military operation’ of President Putin. This chapter draws heavily on Part I of Selling Public Policy with a view to showing how students of this work might have made different choices leading up to, and in the aftermath, of hostilities. Keywords Selling public policy · Policy success · Policy failure · Ukraine · War · Special military operation

10.1 The Sales Environment: Ukraine and the Donbas This chapter needs to commence with some disclaimers. First, and most important, I need it to be understood that I have a bias against all wars—certainly I acknowledge the existence of the philosophical ‘just’ war, but equally certainly I have a preference for no war at all. There are very few winners from any armed conflict—save perhaps the arms manufacturers and the rich and powerful people associated with them. By way of contrast there are legions of losers—mostly people who imbibe heavily on the rhetoric of battle glory only to be disillusioned by the reality of suffering and death. There is no good in any war, but rather varying degrees of bad. Moreover, I don’t believe that any single version of events surrounding any conflict has ever come close to portraying dispassionate truth. This realisation struck home to me many years ago when a close Japanese colleague related their version of World War II—American threats from expansionism in the region, crippling pre-war sanctions, an unwillingness to negotiate in good faith, an abhorrent use of weapons of mass destruction, and continued unwanted occupation. There are two sides to every story, and I suspect that the truth of matters generally lies somewhere in between. Similarly, there is no good guy and no dispassionate truth telling surrounding the Ukraine ‘special military operation’. As we will see most western media decries it as barbaric aggression, but non-western sites have an entirely different take on events. Moreover, the pursuit of truth is not our objective here—instead what we are trying © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 J. Drew, Selling Public Policy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-0381-8_10

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to do is understand how Putin could have sold his policy better. The evaluation of policy is simply beyond our remit. As I write (May, 2022), the Ukraine war continues unabated and still seems to have potential to spread to something far deadlier. Ultimately there will be a victor and like other victors they will write the history of what they did and why it was justified. But this is not our concern here—instead we need to focus on how the policy might have been better sold and it seems that this task exists quite independent of the ultimate outcome. Before we can evaluate the selling of public policy it is first necessary for us to have some idea regarding the antecedents to Putin’s special military operation. However, even this matter is thwart with some difficulty—do we go back to the Crimean kharnate, the former soviet empire, or far more recent events? Where we start is by no means certain because various protagonists have appealed to a multitude of events stretching far back into European history. For brevities sake, I believe that the starting point needs to commence around the undertakings provided by United States of America (US) secretary of state James A. Baker to former soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev during a meeting on February 9, 1990 (Sauvage 2022). Essentially a promise was made that the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) would not expand eastwards beyond the geography incorporated into the reunified Germany. Putin asserts that this promise was broken because NATO subsequently expanded considerably from its then membership of seventeen nations to thirty-plus today. Moreover, this expansion came despite warnings from western ambassadors and prominent foreign policy experts that Russia would view NATO expansion as an existential threat (Suny 2022). Notably western commentators do not deny that an undertaking had been made and broken, but instead point to the fact that the promise was an oral undertaking, not a treaty, and also made prior to the collapse of the USSR (Sauvage 2022). The next major event on the road to war was the Maidan Revolution which started in November 2013 when (then) President Yanukovych decided against signing an association agreement with the European Union in favour of closer ties with Russia (Oxley 2022). This prompted months of demonstrations attended by ‘hundreds of thousands’ mainly young pro-western citizens (suggesting, of course, that forty-four million plus people in Ukraine didn’t attend the protests) (Pifer 2020). In February of the next year police fired live rounds into protestors killing as many as one hundred civilians. European leaders rushed to Kyiv to broker an agreement between the democratically elected Yanukovych and opposition leaders resulting in the formers exile to Russia. Notably, Yanukovych heralded from the Donbas where he had previously held the post of governor of Donetsk Oblast (Mirovalev 2022). Shortly after Yanukovych’s exile Russia invaded the Crimean Peninsula putatively to protect the ethnic Russian majority who lived there. However, many people believe that the real motivation for the seizure of Crimea was the port of Sevastopol (at the time leased from Ukraine)—home to Russia’s Black Sea Fleet. Notably Sevastopol had been established by the Russians back in 1783, but transferred to the (then) regional district of Ukraine as part of a Soviet Union internal reorganisation in 1954 (Timsit et al. 2022). A referendum was held shortly after the invasion at which

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(a disputed) 97% of people voted to be incorporated into the Russian Federation prompting Putin to formally legislate accordingly. Shortly after the annexation of Crimea, separatist movements seized government buildings in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions (collectively referred to as the Donbas). Two referendums were held in the Donbas with an overwhelming majority in favour of secession, however these votes were not recognised by the Ukrainian government nor western powers (Houeix 2022). Separatists continued to fight Ukrainian government troops and right-wing volunteer brigades with some success leading to the Minsk I agreement in 2014. The peace deal largely failed, due to breaches on both sides, and the separatists subsequently inflicted more significant defeats on proUkrainian troops (CBS 2022). This led to a Minsk II deal in 2015 which crucially provided for a high degree of self-rule including the creation of an independent police force. Ukrainians later viewed the deal as a betrayal of their national interest and withheld the promised self-autonomy (CBS 2022). On Monday the 21st of February 2022 Putin formally recognised the two breakaway regions in the Donbas and sent ‘peacekeeping’ troops into the regions (Reuters 2022a). On the 24th of February 2022 Putin authorised his ‘special military operations’. The purpose of this chapter is to explore how the lessons learned in Part I of Selling Public Policy stand up to application in the context of a putative policy-sales failure. In this chapter I will illustrate how media evaluates policy very differently depending on where it emanates—that is, how the ‘who’ is influenced differently according to political and geographical lines. This case study will also serve as a cautionary tale against deployment of concurrent heresthetic dimensions. In addition, I will further explicate on the importance of finding a suitable scapegoat—one that will resonate with latent preferences, to borrow a term from heresthetic. The sad events in Ukraine will also provide us with a unique opportunity to assess the ethical dimension of policy sales through an amended version of the principle of double effect known to philosophers as the ‘just war’. To understand why theory is also important for understanding selling public policy failures I next explore the importance of who one asks and when one asks. Thereafter I will apply the various sales techniques that we have studied in this book—rhetoric, heresthetic, blame games, evidence, and ethics—to the Ukraine conflict. I conclude with my thoughts on what President Putin might have been expected to have done differently had he first took our course on Selling Public Policy.

10.1.1 Policy Success As I have alluded to a number of times in this book, policy success is largely in the eye of the beholder. Moreover, this eye is notoriously fickle—changing as new events emerge, feelings assert themselves, and memories become distorted. In addition, negativity bias also injects itself strongly into our judgements regarding policy

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success—we are more likely to deem a policy a failure as losses emerge and air our grudges longer in proportion to the scale of the perceived loss. Despite these truisms the literature to-date has largely skirted the importance of who one asks and when one asks, with respect to the evaluation of policy success. In the previous chapter I used real world COVID-19 fiscal and monetary stimulus winners and losers to illustrate my point. In this chapter I wish to focus a little more on the ‘who’ and how it might be influenced by geographically and ideologically domiciled media. Most people don’t go searching out alternate media sources in an active fashion so are possibly unaware that there are very different versions of the Ukraine conflict around the world. The western media (especially American outlets) have largely been scathingly critical of the military intervention labelling it as a ‘barbaric war against Ukraine….[a] war with democracy…[and a cynical attempt] to defend his [Putin’s] regime, preserve his legacy and set the stage for a successor to follow his monstrous path’ (Hoffman 2022). By way of contrast Russian media praised the ‘righteous de-Nazification of Ukraine’ and urged that ‘we need to win the war in Ukraine…liquidate the Nazi regime there….after that, whoever wants to, can talk to us’ (Vorobyov 2022). Notably, Nazi labels were a pointed reference to the ultra-right volunteer Azov brigade which played a pivotal role in earlier conflict but has since been absorbed into the Ukrainian military. Russians and their media also made frequent references to the ‘bullying and genocide by Ukraines’ government’ against Russian speaking people in the Donbas (Putin cited in Kirby 2022). Chinese media is renowned for its willingness to attack almost any American policy and didn’t allow the substantial US military support for Ukraine to go unremarked (about $USD 17.5 billion at time of writing; US Department of State 2022). Indeed, Chinese media asserted that the ‘development of the conflict does not at all depend on whether Ukraine is really determined to fight to the last man, but on whether the US needs the war to continue’ (Global Times 2022). Furthermore, ‘the US has its calculations—gaining interests comprehensively from the conflict, including making Europe much more reliant on it in terms of both energy and security; exhausting Russia’s strength…and further driving a wedge between the international community and Russia, drawing more countries to the US anti-Russia camp’ (ibid.). However, media coverage in India seems much more balanced with equal time apparently given to the claims and counter claims of both protagonists. For instance, on the day that hostilities commenced a Times of India article made note of the ‘differences between Russia and the NATO group’ (an implicit endorsement of Putin’s NATO expansion claims) and noted that the ‘first day of Ukraine invasion [was] ‘successful” but also featured Prime Minister Modi’s call to ‘diplomatic negotiations and dialogue’ (Times of India 2022a). Moreover, media has since noted India’s abstention from votes at the United Nations, along with its failure to condemn the Russian invasion as a ‘well thought out national position’ by a country ‘ready to support all efforts aimed at de-escalation while underlying the importance of a peaceful solution through dialogue and diplomacy’ (Time of India 2022b).

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News reports in other countries displayed various levels of bias and balance reflective not only of their nations’ political position, but also their viewer demographics. For instance, I have been pleasantly surprised by Germany’s DW’s willingness to examine the veracity of some western claims, but sadly not at all surprised by Australia’s ABC’s uni-dimensional approach to reporting. What has surprised me though is the mixed comments one finds on the YouTube sites of official news media agencies. In general, it would be fair to say that comments from people in developing nations seem to be pro-Russian and apparently respond to a view that Western nations have unfairly dominated the allocation of the world’s resources. Perhaps more surprising is that the comments on continental European sites are often critical of western policies, and notably these criticisms have become more pronounced since the full implications of sanctions and the like have become more clear. Of course, these impressions are far from a scientific survey, but they do seem to lend support for the notion that evaluations of policy success respond to ‘who’ one asks (as well as ‘when’ one asks). Indeed, as the costs of propping up Ukraine continue to mount Democrats have recently openly called for a change of strategy from the administration and the Republications have ruled out future ‘blank checks’ for Ukraine if they win control of the chamber (Reuters 2022b).

10.1.2 Rhetoric Rhetoric has featured prominently in connection with the military operations in Ukraine. Military activities pose a direct threat to human life, so it is therefore not surprising that two of the four basic pathos were triggered significantly by events— fear and anger. In addition, the ethos of various actors has also been emphasised— for example Putin tried to characterise himself as a ‘liberator’, although western opponents labelled him ‘monstrous’ (Khazan 2022). Thus the pathos and ethos were certainly important, albeit entirely predictable. The same could not be reasonably said of the logos. Certainly, Putin’s attempt at proving his truth fitted neatly into Hirschman’s (1993) typology—an imminent danger thesis which argued that the militarisation of Ukraine and expansion of the NATO alliance represented an impending disaster. However, the rhetorical response to this thesis was somewhat unexpected. Rather than the jeopardy argument which is the expected rebuttal—that the military operation involved unacceptable consequences—the dominant reactionary position became a perversity thesis. Specifically, it was argued that the military operation was producing effects opposite of the stated goals (deterring NATO expansion and improving national security). It is important to note that Hirschman (1991) never claimed that his typology was infallible or exhaustive, but rather merely indicative of how debates have proceeded throughout history. Thus, the appearance of an unexpected reactional response doesn’t invalidate this important work, it merely teaches rhetoricians that they need to keep their minds open to unexpected responses and plan their defences accordingly.

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Moreover, initial rhetoric did point to a jeopardy thesis—the introduction of sanctions and the like—it just seems that actual events blunted the penetration of this reactionary rhetoric. Most people thought that Putin would execute a quick victory and thus send a powerful signal to NATO and other former eastern European nations. However, the vagaries of war dashed this hope within weeks and opened the door to the perversity rhetoric that has since emerged so strongly. Perhaps Putin should have considered the possibility that the perversity argument might ultimately thrive if his plans failed to come to fruition, but it is difficult to see how he might have pitched his logos differently. Where Putin might have positioned himself better is in his ill-advised efforts to avoid words with unexamined power. Specifically, the order via Russia’s communication regulator threatening fines and censorship to outlets using the words ‘assault, invasion, or declaration of war’ seems counterproductive (see, for example, the reporting of this initiative by the Times of Israel 2022). If the intent was to avoid the penetration of negative pathos associated with the war, then this policy was a failure. Media abroad used the word ‘war’ liberally and much fun was had at Putin’s expense because of his reticence to allow the term. Moreover, ultimately Russian media ended up using the word “war” extensively anyhow—probably because the military operation did exhibited all of the characteristics of war (Vorobyov 2022). Thus, an important lesson should be taken from this recounting of events—there is nothing to be gained from trying to ban or otherwise avoid words with unexamined power if indeed they are the most apt descriptor for what has occurred. Putin did however, show better judgement and experienced higher success in his use (rather than avoidance) of words with unexamined power—specifically, the term ‘Nazi’ (Kirby 2022). This word conjures up a strong pathos of fear and disgust given events of the past and resonates well with a Russian population that counts the defeat of Nazi Germany as one of its greatest military achievements (Khazan 2022). Moreover, there is at least a little support for the claim—the former Azov brigade clearly was an ultra-right organisation whose founder (a Ukrainian MP until 2019) was quoted as saying that ‘Ukraine’s national purpose was to “lead the white races of the world in a final crusade … against Semite-led Untermenschen [inferior races]”’ (Khazan 2022; Bennetts 2018). Moreover, western nations did express concern for the situation ‘banning material support from going to the Azov Regiment in every Defense Appropriations budget signed into law for fiscal years 2018–2022’ (Stanford University Center for International Security and Cooperation 2022). The question seems to be whether it is reasonable to characterise the whole nation of Ukraine as Nazi-riddled when the brigade has since been absorbed into the regular military and the political movement has only managed to secure a few percent of the vote in recent elections. Nevertheless, the word ‘de-Nazification’ does have significant power especially when it is backed up with at least a little truth. Apart from being a word with considerable power ‘Nazi’ also represented the insertion of a dimension heresthetic and in the sub-section that follows I review the expertise with which heresthetic was applied as well as provide my thoughts on the appropriateness of ‘salami tactics’.

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10.1.3 Heresthetic Readers will recall from Chapter 4 that heresthetic is the art of political manipulation. It differs fundamentally from the aforementioned rhetoric because it does not seek to persuade people, but instead either: (i) alters the choices on offer, (ii) changes how people might exercise their choice, or (iii) affects how they feel about their choice. Often heresthetic is used as a weapon of last resort however given its devastating effectiveness—largely owing to the confirmation of latent preferences—it should probably receive far more attention from policy salespersons. Dimension heresthetic—changing how people feel about their choice—is undoubtedly the most powerful heresthetic device because it merely brings to the fore extant latent attitudes. Indeed, Riker (1986, p. 151) notes that ‘once a salient dimension is revealed its salience exists …. even though those who are being manipulated know that they are being manipulated’. For instance, once the dimension of purported Ukrainian Nazis was raised it likely persisted in the consciousness of people who abhorred the political ideology and may have explained why some countries, such as Israel initially refused to support Ukraine (Times of Israel 2022). Otherwise stated, despite objecting to Putin and his actions some auditors nevertheless chose to alter how they responded to him because of the persisting salience of the raised Nazi dimension. However, Putin did not just raise one dimension when he announced his special military operation—he also attempted to make salient other dimensions such as genocide, bullying, desired neutral status, and de-militarisation (Kirby 2022). As we noted in Chapter 4 this carpet-bombing strategy is ill-advised because people are generally unable to focus on multiple matters at the one time. Moreover, media attention is also short-lived and it is thus imperative that one drives home any point thoroughly before moving on to another. In addition, some of the dimensions raised by Putin seemed rather incongruous—for instance bullying appears superfluous and just plain odd when set next to genocide. It would seem that Putin might have fared far better had he focussed on just one or two powerful dimensions and used the scarce resource of media attention to hammer home his points, rather than providing a long list easily forgotten and dismissed as background noise. But how could Putin have known which dimensions to focus on? Recall from Chapter 4 that the idea of dimension heresthetic is to appeal to strong latent preferences. Thus, the dimensions that were likely to evoke the strongest reactions were those that should have formed the foundation for Putin’s heresthetic attack. As Riker (1990) suggested some time ago, a simple focus group made up of the target audience could have helped herestheticians to sharpen their attack and prise off greater numbers of adherents from the supposed dominant sect (of Russian intervention opponents). The other heresthetic misstep made for Putin with respect to selling his special military operation, related to his eschewing of the powerful ‘salami tactics’ that he had used with such success in Crimea back in 2014. The idea of ‘salami tactics’ is to exercise a public policy a piece at a time (see Chapter 4). Doing so is less

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likely to capture media and public attention and thus less likely to elicit as strong a response (because there is less objectional public information to respond to at any given moment in time). Otherwise stated, Putin may have been better advised to simply deploy his ‘peacekeepers’ to the Donbas and go no further. Certainly, doing so would have been met with criticism, sanctions and cynicism but it would have been an uphill battle to convince people that this was an unambiguous invasion and more difficult to justify arming Ukraine (to attack putative peacekeepers). Taking the decision to attack the capital Kyiv in the Ukrainian speaking west made it relatively easy for Putin’s opponents to organise a concerted response under the banner of arming ‘democracy’s defenders’ (Oxley 2022). As I alluded to earlier, it seems that Putin’s ill-fated decision to abandon the successful tactics of the Crimean invasion might have owed far more to rhetoric considerations than it did to heresthetic ones. Ironically, when the attack on Kyiv became bogged down (literally), Putin tried to pivot to salami tactics—but by then the optics of his military operation had been seared into public consciousness, opponents galvanised, and his public policy labelled a public failure. Moreover, heresthetic was not Putin’s only failure with respect to selling his public policy in Ukraine. He also fundamentally failed to competently execute blame games—the matter to which we now turn our attention.

10.1.4 Blame Games Blame games are about either altering perceptions of loss or redirecting the attribution of causation to an agent of one’s choosing. Ideally a blame gamer wishes to destroy or shift blame entirely, however blame sharing and blame confusion may also be considered to be reasonable consolation prizes (see Chapter 5). Military operations inevitably lead to significant and visible loss and thus rule-out the deployment of presentation strategies. Accordingly, Putin’s efforts were directed to the pursuit of agency strategies—specifically the nomination of a scapegoat. As we learned in the previous chapter (regarding fiscal and monetary policy arising from COVID-19) it is important that the designated scapegoat is not only amenable to taking on the role, but is also the subject of latent and widespread dislike. The latter criterion has been largely overlooked by the literature, and it seems also by President Putin. NATO was a poor choice for a scapegoat if the intent was to have western people attribute blame elsewhere. Certainly, NATO had been expanding its military alliance and equally certainly there was a case that doing so was contrary to previous undertakings. However, despite some contentious operations in the past, NATO is generally perceived quite favourably in most western countries (Wike et al. 2022a). Thus, the criterion of latent and widespread dislike for this proposed scapegoat was not satisfied: as a consequence, the claims received little media attention in the west and likely resulted in little if any change to attribution of causation. Notably, in nonNATO nations the proposed scapegoat resonated far more strongly but people in

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these countries were already inclined to take a sympathetic view of Putin’s military operation, thus suggesting that little value was gained by this first attempt at blame games (Global Times 2022). Putin’s second attempt at anointing a scapegoat related to the claim that the US was operating a ‘network of Western bioweapons labs’ in Ukraine (Goncharenko 2022). The proposed US scapegoat probably resonated a little stronger (including in NATO nations such as Germany; Wike et al. 2022b), but only marginally so. It would seem likely that populations pre-disposed to attribute blame to the US were already closely aligned with other Putin actions and claims (see, for example, Global Times 2022). Moreover, the US was by no means a willing scapegoat—vigorously denying ‘this kind of talk [as] malarky’ (Al Jazeera 2022b). Indeed, the US ambassador to the UN stated that ‘Ukraine does not have a biological programme… there are no Ukrainian biological weapons laboratories’. This US Ambassadorial claim was widely reported approvingly in the western media despite German biological weapon expert advice that ‘there are bioweapons labs in Ukraine which are supported by the US and also Germany, but the research conducted there is not covert but extremely transparent’ (Goncharenko 2022). Essentially the US deflected the attempt to make it a scapegoat by flatly denying the Russian claim. They did so successfully, because of a lack of compelling independent expert evidence, the matter which we will explore forthwith.

10.1.5 Evidence Evidence is information or objects set forth to prove a fact in dispute. As we saw in Chapter 6 there is a cost to assembling evidence and an art to delivering it. Far too often public policy salespersons fail to recognise the costs or the artistry and instead believe that the facts will speak for themselves. Sadly, they usually will not. Putin seems to have laboured under the misapprehension that facts alone would suffice regarding his claims of US bioweapon facilities. Thus, Russia presented their claims at the United Nations (UN) before assembling persuasive evidence; failed to engage compelling independent experts to attest to the asserted facts, and failed to keep their rhetorical seasoning simple and to the point. Putin’s opponents made no such mistakes. As I have already noted the US Ambassador simply flatly denied the claims of the Russian delegation relating to alleged Ukrainian bioweapons facilities. Their efforts to stonewall in the face of allegations were aided by the declaration of the UN Director of Disarmament Affairs that the UN ‘has neither the mandate nor the technical operational capacity to investigate’ the claims (United Nations 2022). Notably the US and its allies did not seek to expand the UN mandate nor mitigate capacity shortfalls. Instead, it was argued that cessation of hostilities would be a pre-requisite for any inspection of alleged facilities (Goncharenko 2022). It is noteworthy that Russia’s ‘friend’ China attempted to manipulate the US into removing the evidence vacuum that had arisen. Its’ Ambassador to the UN

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asserted that the ‘international community have already been raising concerns about the US military activities…they have 336 laboratories around the world’ (Jun cited in Sheng 2022). Moreover, it was observed that ‘if they [US] believe the relevant information is fake, they can just provide us with relevant data for clarification, so that the international community can draw a conclusion by itself’ (Sheng 2022). However, China and Russia did not have the numbers and could not force an investigation. The evidence vacuum could thus remain, and media interest quickly waned accordingly.

10.1.6 Ethics Ethics is the study of the standards through which we judge the acts and omissions of ourselves and others. Ethics are particularly important to the public policy salesperson because they can stir the pathos in mighty ways (see Chapter 7). In addition, ethics are intrinsically linked to political ideologies and religions. Ethics deals with rights and wrongs, oughts and musts. It may be hard to conceive how state-sponsored killing and destruction could ever be a right or an ought, however, people have argued for precisely this categorisation throughout history. For example, the Crusades were declared a just war as well as a Christian duty by various Popes, and the United States argued that their second Iraq war was necessary to defend itself against ‘an evil man’ (ABC News 2003). Indeed, the desire to make moral judgements on wars has led to the development of the widely-held secular just war criteria by scholars: (i) legitimate authority, (ii) just cause, (iii) proportionality, (iv) likelihood of success, (v) last resort, and (vi) right intent. Astute readers will note that there is a fair degree of overlap between these principles and the natural law principle of double effect that we explored in Chapter 7. Indeed, most scholars acknowledge the work of Aquinas ([1273] 2018) as being the foundation of modern consensus. However, few just war experts specify the precise nature of Aquinas’ work which is an important oversight that will be corrected forthwith. In Question 40 of secunda secundae of the Summa Theologica Aquinas’ (2018, p. 603) considers whether ‘it is always sinful to wage war’. He answers that indeed it is not always so provided that (i) ‘the sovereign that commands the war’ has appropriate authority to do so, (ii) a just cause exists (‘those who are attacked should be attacked because they deserve it on account of some fault’), and (iii) the ‘belligerents should have a rightful intention … the advancement of good or the avoidance of evil’ (Aquinas 2018, pp. 603–605). Furthermore, Aquinas (2018, p. 605) explains that appropriate authority is necessary to prevent a ‘private individual to declare war because he can seek redress of his rights from the tribunal of his superior’. Moreover, he cites Augustine to declare that a just war ‘avenges wrongs when a nation…has to be punished for refusing to make amends for wrongs inflicted by its subjects or to restore what it has seized unjustly’ (Aquinas 2018, p. 605). Indeed, it is important to hear first-hand from Aquinas in order to dispel common misconceptions regarding the just war criteria. For instance, it has been claimed that

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Putin did not have the requisite authority with reference being made to irregularities in the Russian voting process (Morkevicius 2022), but this entirely misses the point of the principle. Aquinas was not concerned with democratic legitimacy (indeed De Regno probably suggests that he favoured monarchic power), but rather the prevention of private wars with private armies (because this was unnecessary and contrary to good order (a natural law principle—see Chapter 7)). Moreover, by hearing Aquinas directly we can also better understand the natural law foundation of the just war criteria—good must be pursued and evil shunned (the first self-evident precept of natural law—Chapter 7). Secular understandings that neglect the natural law roots are likely to misconceive matters and also fail to perceive the close parallels between the just war criteria and the principle of double effect. So, was Putin’s military operation a just war, and does it matter? There is no doubt that Putin had appropriate authority consistent with the Thomistic criterion. Moreover, he claimed several just causes—self-defence, prevention of genocide, as well as righting Ukrainian language policies that discriminated against Russian speaking people (although the veracity of some of these claims is under dispute it is possible that at least one of the cited just causes are legitimate, albeit perhaps disproportionate). Where matters went awry for Putin, with respect to his just war claim, is in the area of intent. As I noted in Chapter 7 it is difficult to really ever know the thinking of a person, but actions certainly can give us some strong clues.1 For instance, it would seem that a person seeking to mitigate bad side-effects would take precautions against the damage of civilian infrastructure and civilians themselves. However, this prudence clearly has not been on display—indeed of late civilian infrastructure has been specifically targeted (Ebel 2022)—and it is therefore difficult to marry the stated intent to actual actions. Therefore, I (along with many others no doubt) believe that the belligerent lacked rightful intention and accordingly conclude that it was not a just war. The conclusion that the special operation was not a just war is important because the ethics of the matter have clearly fired up the pathos of many around the world and thus likely galvanised additional support for Ukraine. Indeed, even staunch allies of Russia have responded to the targeting of civilian infrastructure with calls for ‘deescalat[ion] as soon as possible’ (China Ministry of Foreign Affairs cited in Global Times 2022). We can therefore deduce that public policy salespersons would be well-advised to pay greater attention to the ethical dimension when selling public policy.

10.2 How the Special Military Operation Might Have Been Sold Better The war in Ukraine has had tragic consequences for tens of millions, if not billions, of people. Not only have we had direct deaths and destruction but the knock-on effects 1

That is why my version of the principle of double effect calls on actors ‘to make all efforts …to mitigate undesired side-effects’ (Drew et al. 2017, p. 4).

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from the accompanying supply shocks for energy and food will inevitably cost many lives (especially in developing nations). It would have been far better if the war had never begun, and it is easy to see how people might deem it an unmitigated failure for humanity. However, our task in this chapter was to assess the success or otherwise of the war’s sales pitch, not the conflict itself. Whether or not we deem the military operation’s sales pitch a success is likely determined by both our ideology and domicile. Most—but certainly not all—in the west would probably grade Putin with a ‘fail’. However, Putin’s sales pitch might be viewed much more favourably by people who live in allied nations, or who hold allied political ideologies. The question that we should probably first ask is who Putin was seeking to sell his policy to—his domestic audience, friendly nations, or the west— because this would be the only way to accurately evaluate matters. Indeed, I suspect that Putin may have failed to ask himself this question—which might explain his lack of effectiveness in some quarters. There are certainly a number of sales techniques that could have been much more expertly executed by the leader of the Russian Federation. In order of importance, I think Putin would have done better to pursue salami tactics, keep the heresthetic dimensions down to just two, choose his scapegoats with more care (and tailored to his audience), make sure that his actions were consistent with his portrayed intent and not played silly games trying to avoid inevitable words with unexamined power. Verily, it would be fair to say that Putin had considerable scope for improvement, but that is probably true of all of us when it comes to Selling Public Policy. Accordingly in the chapter that follows, and concludes this book, I reflect on some of the important lessons that I have learned whilst exploring this neglected field of scholarship.

References Al Jazeera (2022a) Profile: who are Ukraine’s far right Azov regiment? 1 March 2022. Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/1/who-are-the-azov-regiment Al Jazeera (2022b) UNSC: west dismisses Russian claims of bioweapons in Ukraine. 18 March 2022. Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/18/unsc-west-dismisses-russian-cla ims-of-bioweapons-in-ukraine Al Jazeera (2022c) UK envoy barbare woodward calls Russia’s allegations ‘Disinformation of the desperate’. Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/18/unsc-west-dismisses-rus sian-claims-of-bioweapons-in-ukraine American Broadcasting Company (ABC) (2003) Is Bush’s Iraq stance rooted in revenge? 18 March 2003. Available at: https://abcnews.go.com/US/story?id=90764&page=1 Aquinas T ([1273] 2018) Summa Theologica. Coyote Canyon Press, Claremont, CA Bennetts M (2018) Ukraine’s national militia: ‘we’re not neo-Nazis, we just want to make our country better’. 13 March 2018. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/13/ ukraine-far-right-national-militia-takes-law-into-own-hands-neo-nazi-links CBS News (2022) What you need to know about Ukraine’s separatist regions. Available at: https:// www.cbsnews.com/news/ukraine-breakaway-regions-russia-donbas-donetsk-luhansk/ Drew J (2022) Natural law and government. Springer, Singapore Drew J, Grant B, Fisher J (2017) Re-evaluating local government amalgamations: utility maximisation meets the principle of double effect. Policy Polit 45(3):379–394

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Ebel F (2022). Russian defense minister insists Ukraine infrastructure is a military target. Washington Post, 1 November 2022. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/11/ 01/russia-infrastructure-grain-war-ukraine/ Global Times (2022) Russian-Ukraine conflict spirals up due to US fanning flames. 10 October 2022. Available at: https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202210/1276863.shtml Goncharenko R (2022) No evidence of biological weapons in Ukraine. Available at: https://www. dw.com/en/are-russias-claims-of-ukrainian-biological-weapons-a-propaganda-ploy/a-61673434 Hirschman AO (1991) The rhetoric of reaction: perversity, futility, jeopardy. Belknap Press, Cambridge Hirschman AO (1993) The rhetoric of reaction: perversity, futility, jeopardy. Harvard University Press, Cambridge Hoffman D (2022) Three transformational developments since Putin’s war against Ukraine. Fox News, 24 August 2022. Available at: https://www.foxnews.com/opinion/three-transformationaldevelopments-since-putin-war-against-ukraine Houeix R (2022) From the Maidan protests to Russia’s invasion: eight years of conflict in Ukraine. Available at: https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20220228-from-the-maidan-protests-to-rus sia-s-invasion-eight-years-of-conflict-in-ukraine Khazan O (2022) I watched Russian TV so you don’t have to—according to Russian state TV, Putin is the good guy. Many Russians believe it. The Atlantic, 10 March 2022. Available at: https:// www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2022/03/how-russian-tv-portrays-war-ukraine/627010/ Kirby P (2022) Why has Russia invaded Ukraine and what does Putin want? BBC, 9 May 2022. Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-56720589 Mirovalev M (2022) Donetsk and Luhansk: what you should know about the ‘republics’. Al Jazeera, 22 February 2022. Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/22/what-are-donetskand-luhansk-ukraines-separatist-statelets Morkevicius V (2022) How do Russia’s reasons for war stack UP? An expert on “just war” explains. The Conversation, 6 March 2022. Available at: https://theconversation.com/how-do-russias-rea sons-for-war-stack-up-an-expert-on-just-war-explains-178135 Oxley M (2022) Is there any justification for Putin’s war? The Guardian, Sunday 13 March 2022. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/13/is-there-any-justification-for-put ins-war Pifer S (2020) Ukraine: six years after the maidan. Brookings Institute, 21 February 2020. Available at: https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/02/21/ukraine-six-years-afterthe-maidan/ Reuters (2022a) Timeline: the events leading up to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. 1 March 2022. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/events-leading-up-russias-invasionukraine-2022-02-28/ Reuters (2022b) US liberal democrats urge Biden to seek negotiated Ukraine settlement. 26 October 2022. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/world/us-liberal-democrats-urge-biden-seek-negoti ated-ukraine-settlement-2022-10-24/ Riker WH (1986) The art of political manipulation. Yale University Press, New Haven Riker WH (1990) Heresthetic and rhetoric in the spatial model. In: Enelow J, Hinich M, Advances in the spatial theory of voting. Cambridge University Press, New York, pp 46–65 Sauvage G (2022) Did NATO ‘betray’ Russia by expanding to the east? France 24. Available at: https://www.france24.com/en/russia/20220130-did-nato-betray-russia-by-expanding-tothe-east. Accessed on 25 October 2022 Sheng Y (2022) China urges hard evidence from US to Cklarify bio-weapons suspicion in Ukraine. Available at: https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202203/1254661.shtml Stanford University Center for International Security and Cooperation (2022) Mapping militant organizations “Azov movement”. Available at: https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/ profiles/azov-battalion Suny R (2022) Ukraine war follows decades of warnings that NATO Expansion into Eastern Europe could provoke Russia. The Conversation, 1 March 2022. Available

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at: https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-follows-decades-of-warnings-that-nato-expansioninto-eastern-europe-could-provoke-russia-177999 Times of India (2022a) Russian military says first day of Ukraine invasion ‘successful’: key points. 24 February 2022. Available at: https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/air-india-flightreturns-to-delhi-as-ukraine-closes-airspace/articleshow/89788483.cms Times of India (2022b) India abstains on UNGA resolution that condemns Russia’s ‘illegal’ referenda, attempts to annex parts of Ukraine. 13 October 2022. Available at: https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/un-principles-must-be-upheld-india-after-abs taining-on-unga-vote-on-russia/articleshow/94822034.cms Times of Israel (2022) Russia bans words ‘invasion’ and ‘assault’ in media, warns several outlets. 26 February 2022. Available at: https://www.timesofisrael.com/russia-bans-words-invasion-andassault-in-media-warns-several-outlets/ Timsit A, Westfall S, Taylor A, Francis E (2022) Why crimea is so important in the Russia-Ukraine war. The Washington Post, 18 August 2022. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/ world/2022/08/18/crimea-russia-ukraine-war/ United Nations (2022) No sign of Ukraine bioweapons labs says disarmament chief, after further Russian claims. 18 March 2022. Available at: https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/03/1114272 US Department of State (2022) $625 million in additional U.S. military assistance for Ukraine. Available at: https://www.state.gov/625-million-in-additional-u-s-military-assistance-for-ukr aine/#:~:text=This%20%24625%20million%20drawdown%20includes,the%20beginning% 20of%20this%20Administration. Accessed on 31 October 2022 Vorobyov N (2022) How are pro-Kremlin media portraying Ukraine’s victories? Al Jazeera, 13 September 2022. Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/9/13/how-are-pro-kremlinrussian-media-portraying-ukraines-victories Wike R, Fetterolf J, Fagan M, Gubbala S (2022a) Positive ratings for NATO. Pew Research Center, 22 June 2022. Available at: https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2022/06/22/positive-ratings-fornato/ Wike R, Fetterolf J, Fagan M, Gubbala S (2022b) International public opinion of the US remains positive. Pew Research Center, 22 June 2022. Available at: https://www.pewresearch.org/global/ 2022/06/22/international-public-opinion-of-the-u-s-remains-positive/

Chapter 11

One More Lesson and the Future of Selling Public Policy

Abstract This book commenced with a plea for better selling of public policy; it also started with the observation that most people simply don’t have the skills necessary to sell public policy in a competent manner. In Part I of selling public policy, I provided a toolchest for prospective public policy salespersons. In Part II, I showed how these tools could be applied to real world difficult sells in such a way that the product was sold and stayed sold over the implied returns period. However, it occurs to me that perhaps the most important lesson may have escaped the proper attention of my readers. In this chapter I will set matters straight and also provide some thoughts on the most fruitful areas for progressing the art of selling public policy in the future. Keywords Selling public policy · Policy success · Public policy · De-amalgamation In Chapter 1 I made a plea for better selling of public policy. My main reason for doing so was my observation that the state of the art had deteriorated to an alarming level. Indeed, few of our public policy salespersons probably appreciate that their job is an art—an art based on important skills and knowledge to be sure, but an art, nonetheless. Bad public policy sells tend to lead to policy backflips. This unnerves markets and also makes it quite impossible for people and businesses to plan for the future. Thus, even bad policy sold well, and therefore conferred a degree of stability, might be preferable to what most of us have experienced all too frequently over the last few decades. It seems to me—from my close observations of a number of policy backflips— that far too little effort is being put into the art of selling public policy. Indeed, I am in no way convinced that our political class have the skills required to do so or even understand the importance of explicitly selling public policy. Thus, one of the main aims of this book was to compile all of the disparate strands of policy sales knowledge—currently compartmentalised in the domains of political science, economics, sociology, ethics, and the classics—into a single accessible volume. In this regard I think it reasonable to declare ‘Mission Accomplished’ (to borrow a phrase from Chapter 2). Otherwise stated, there is no longer any good © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 J. Drew, Selling Public Policy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-0381-8_11

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reason for the political class to remain ignorant of how to sell public policy with respect to rhetoric, heresthetic, blame games, evidence, or ethics. Our second task—to make people understand the importance of selling public policy with care—may still be a work in progress. Certainly, our two case studies, on selling COVID stimulus and the war in Ukraine, ought to have illustrated the value of theory for producing better outcomes in the real world. However, I wonder if all of the lessons that might have been learned have indeed been made sufficiently explicit. I hope that it is now abundantly clear that policy success is in the eye of a very fickle beholder—that it matters a lot who we ask and when we ask them. If my descriptions of selling COVID stimulus and the Ukraine war respectively have better highlight the importance of lenses and time to the evaluation of policy success then I will take this as a win because previously the scholarly literature had largely neglected these facts. Similarly, if my case studies have better identified the importance of the pathos, then I will also chalk this up as a win. Fear, in particular, is a powerful motivation and any salesperson that doesn’t appropriately exploit this will be doing their master a disservice. The case studies also demonstrated the importance of preparing an appropriate rhetorical seasoning to accompany the heresthetic main course, as well as also ensuring that evidence was presented in the manner most likely to support one’s story. We also learned a few new lessons as a result of our examination of COVID stimulus and wars. Common to both was a new appreciation of the importance of selecting one’s prospective scapegoat with care. What I mean here is that we not only want a scapegoat that will put up limited resistance to their fate, but we also need a scapegoat that people are predisposed to dislike. Perhaps this is the reason why the Israelites used gangly smelly goats rather than cute little lambs for their communal sacrifice—if we want people to direct their ill-feelings towards another party then it would seem better that the intended victim was a dislikeable fellow. I don’t think that the importance of selecting a scapegoat that will appeal to latent prejudices has been sufficiently well-identified in the literature of the past. Perhaps I should therefore chalk this up as yet another win. In the second case study—Putin’s selling of the Ukraine war——we learned another important lesson that similarly was somewhat missing from the scholarly literature: the futility and cost associated with trying to avoid a word with unexamined power. There was nothing to be gained by trying to avoid the term ‘war’ for a military incursion that looked every part of a war. The main thing that these futile attempts succeeded in doing was to waste precious opportunities to launch important heresthetical and rhetorical attacks—although it seems that western media were also grateful for the opportunity to lampoon President Putin for his reticence to admit the obvious. The key thing that we should have leaned from these case studies is the absolute imperative of sitting down and planning one’s sales campaign thoroughly. I have mentioned the need to plan one’s sales campaign in passing, a number of times, but I think I have been remiss in failing to underscore that it is the single most important thing a salesperson can do. Moreover, we are not just talking about the need to plan the sales launch or the schmooze—instead a whole-of-sales-cycle plan needs to be

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developed. The COVID stimulus policy sell arguably failed at the last hurdle (the election). The war sales pitch failed because people didn’t think through what would happen next if the expected quick victory was not forthcoming. Otherwise stated, contingency and legacy costs may end up being the most determinative factors in a policy sales-cycle so it is thus important to think the sales cycle through all the way to its logical conclusion. In the subsection that follows I will recount a recent David and Goliath battle that further illustrates the primacy of planning and thinking to the successful policy sale.

11.1 The Power of Planning I have just finished submitting an academic paper titled ‘Mission Impossible’ (Drew et al. 2022) which tells the story of how a small community of just 3,755 souls pulled off a world’s first public policy sell.1 Specifically, Gundagai in southern New South Wales (NSW) managed to convince the incumbent state government to reverse its previous forced amalgamation with nearby Cootamundra. How they did so was largely down to planning and thinking as I will describe forthwith. In 2016 Gundagai had been forcibly amalgamated with its much larger neighbour, Cootamundra, despite fierce opposition from its residents who rightly feared that it would result in effective disenfranchisement and steep financial losses (Dollery and Drew 2022). Immediately after this disagreeable event the leaders of the community established the Gundagai Council in Exile which had a sole remit of deamalgamation. Shortly thereafter the group approached me for advice regarding how best to bring about their desired state of affairs. I told them of my previous work on heresthetic and also de-amalgamation and warned them that it would be a long journey—one which was only realistically possible after a change in government at the state level. They assured me that they were indeed committed to the long haul and then proceeded to prove me wrong (about the need for a change of government at least). The critical ingredient to their success was the extraordinary level of planning and time that the Council in Exile dedicated to their work. They met regularly and for lengthy periods. Moreover, they canvassed advice widely and also enlisted the help of the town’s most skilled residents—the local lawyer, doctor, a former council General Manager, the newspaper editor, as well as the wife of the Mayor (at that time). In their first salvo, the Gundagai Council of Exile (2018) obtained the signatures of 1,057 of eligible voters from the former local government area which was far in excess of the ten percent required to bring a boundary reform matter to the Local Government Minister for her decision. They also chose a heresthetic dimension—financial sustainability—and assembled the evidence and expert brand accordingly (I was 1

All other previous reversals of forced amalgamations have occurred after a change in the political fortunes of the state government that had executed the original policy (see, Drew 2021).

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their expert, and I produced a fifty-page report conclusively demonstrating that the amalgamation had resulted in diseconomies as well as precarious financial sustainability; see, Local Government Boundaries Commission 2021). They anointed their scapegoat—the former Boundaries Commission Delegate who had recommended the forced amalgamation—so that the Minister would have someone to blame other than her own self and political party. The Council in Exile also nominated natural justice as an ethical lens. In response to the Gundagai Council in Exile’s proposal the Minister appointed a four person Boundaries Commission to investigate the matter and make recommendations to her. This Boundaries Commission had putatively supervised the work of the Boundaries Delegate back in 2016 and contained three of the original members from that time. It was therefore somewhat surprising that the Boundaries Commission (2021) produced a report with a split decision—two votes for and against de-amalgamation—although the Minister decided to reject the application to de-amalgamate accordingly. The Gundagai Council in Exile, to some observers, had failed to sell their preferred public policy (de-amalgamation). However, people who knew the group well realised that this was merely the opening salvo in a likely long and arduous campaign. The Gundagai Council in Exile duly obtained the signatures of the respective residents again and presented the petition a second time to the Minister to trigger a new investigation. This time the Council in Exile chose a new heresthetic dimension—mental welfare—and assembled a new suite of experts including the town’s doctor, psychologist, priest, and staff (see, Local Government Boundaries Commission 2022). In addition, they seasoned their heresthetic with lines that must have exceeded 1,500,000 on a metaphorical Scoville heat unit scale.2 Moreover, in an act of sheer genius they selected a new scapegoat that would resonate well with the Boundaries Commissioners—the Gundagai community. This was particularly important because it allowed the Boundaries Commission to direct all of the blame—not on the Commissioners, their Minister, or their former delegate—but on the community who had been such a thorn in their side. They did so with relish, blaming community anger and unwillingness to co-operate for some appalling mental health outcomes in staff (Local Government Boundaries Commission 2022). The Boundaries Commission (2022) voted three to one to recommend deamalgamation. The Minister made her decision accordingly, and the Gundagai Council in Exile celebrated their success in having their public policy sold to the incumbent state government despite it being an apparent case of mission impossible. In pulling off this surprising win against all obstacles the Gundagai Council in Exile provided a masterclass regarding the importance of planning and thought. I 2

One particularly chilling piece of rhetoric was the focus of the Boundaries Commission report and was delivered by a staff member who declared ‘every time I know I have to go to the Cootamundra office to work, I just feel like driving into a tree’ (LGBC 2022, p. 5).

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thus trust that this story ensures that my readers are left in no doubt about why I consider planning and thinking to be the most essential ingredients to a successful sale of public policy.

11.2 The Future of Selling Public Policy There is much more work that still needs to be done in the field of selling public policy. The starting point will be for the scholarly community to fully appreciate the art and commit to remedying its long-neglect—a little like they did in response to Bovens and t’Hart’s (1996) now famous book (see Chapter 2). Until we as scholars understand that policy must be deliberately and carefully sold, the apparent vagaries of policy success outcomes will probably remain a mystery to most. There simply is no satisfactory alternative to a scholarly investigation of matters if we wish to understand why some sales campaigns are successful, and others are not. Furthermore, there are some particular questions that urgently require further investigations to properly illuminate what we have thus far only tenuously perceived in the shadows. For instance, why is it that the expert brand carries such disproportionate weight in public policy debates even when many understand that they are merely guns for hire? How is it that empirical rhetoric—seemingly devoid of any potential to appeal to pathos—nevertheless exert decisive effects on a policy sales campaign? Is it because people intrinsically believe that numbers convey truth, or are numbers somehow more impressive than words? Indeed, why would a politician seek to use rhetoric, rather than heresthetic, in the first place, given the cost in trying to convince people that they have previously erred3 ? A lot of questions remain, and these are just a few of the main ones that have intrigued me over the years. There is also a need for greater awareness of the art of selling public policy amongst both the media (that is often used as a free advertising vehicle), and the community (who is often their target market). At the moment, it seems that both media and community can easily be taken advantage of because they don’t even realise what is being done to them. How exactly we make these parties aware of what is happening to them—and also the opportunities that it presents for them to extract better value from the situation—is a matter that has yet to be resolved.

3

This was a question that clearly also troubled Riker (1996) and likely prompted his decision to write The Strategy of Rhetoric. However, sadly Riker died prior to finishing this important work and it is clear that the efforts of those who posthumously organised and recorded his notes didn’t manage to satisfactorily resolve matters.

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11.3 A Final Exhortation But you my dear readers do know what is happening and why it is important. Moreover, you are also now aware of the tools that ought to be plied by the public policy salesperson. Otherwise stated, you are now sufficiently skilled to go forth and sell public policy—and if you do so with reference to this book, then it seems to me that perhaps I might finally have been able to prove my dear wife wrong4 ! Best Wishes, Professor Joseph Drew. Moonbi, Australia. 12 December 2022.

References Bovens M, t’Hart P (1996) Understanding policy fiascos. Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick Dollery B, Drew J (2022) New south wales government failure? An empirical analysis of the Cootamundra Gundagai Regional Council forced merger. Public Adm Q, In Print (14/1/22) Drew J (2021) Saving local government. Springer, Singapore Drew J, Kim Y, Dollery B (2022) Mission impossible? Heresthetic and de-amalgamation despite imposing obstacles. Forthcoming Gundagai Council in Exile (2018) Correspondence to minister for local government. Local Government Boundary Commission (2021) Examination of a proposal to alter the boundaries of the Cootamundra-Gundagai local government area and create a new local government area. February 2021 Local Government Boundary Commission (2022) Examination of a proposal to alter the boundaries of the Cootamundra-Gundagai local government area and create a new local government area. July 2022 Riker WH (1996) The strategy of rhetoric: campaigning for the American constitution. Yale University Press, New Haven

4

Please see my recounting of her impression of my occupation as ‘writ[ing] papers which get published in other countries, about things that no-one is interested in and on matters which no-one does anything about” from Chapter 1.