Selected Topics in Migration Studies 3031196309, 9783031196300

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Frank D. Bean Susan K Brown   Editors

Selected Topics in Migration Studies

Selected Topics in Migration Studies

Frank D. Bean • Susan K Brown Editors

Selected Topics in Migration Studies

Editors Frank D. Bean Department of Sociology University of California Irvine, CA, USA

Susan K Brown Department of Sociology University of California Irvine, CA, USA

ISBN 978-3-031-19630-0 ISBN 978-3-031-19631-7 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-19631-7 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Contents

Introduction .......................................................................................................................... ix Frank D. Bean and Susan K. Brown Part 1 Africa ........................................................................................................................... 1 1. African Island Migration .................................................................................................. 3 Iain Walker 2. Southern African Migration ........................................................................................... 11 Eugene K. Campbell 3. Trans-Saharan Slave Trade ............................................................................................ 27 Michael Kehinde 4. Western African Migration ............................................................................................ 31 Paulina Makinwa Adebusoye Part 2 Asylees ....................................................................................................................... 39 5. Asylum and Human Rights ............................................................................................. 41 Thomas Southerden 6. Asylum and Language Analysis...................................................................................... 45 Peter L. Patrick 7. Gender and Asylum ......................................................................................................... 49 Amy Shuman and Carol Bohmer 8. Medical and Psychological Evidence of Trauma in Asylum Cases ............................. 53 S. Megan Berthold 9. Refugee Roulette .............................................................................................................. 57 Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Philip G. Schrag, and Andrew I. Schoenholtz 10. Relationship Between Asylum and Trafficking........................................................... 61 Jean-Pierre Gauci 11. Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity, and Asylum ..................................................... 65 Rachel Lewis Part 3 Contexts of Migration .............................................................................................. 69 12. Changing Contexts: From Multiculturalism to Transnationalism?.......................... 71 Stephen Castles 13. Citizenship in the Context of Immigration – Comparative Perspectives .................. 77 Thomas Faist, Kerstin Schmidt, and Christian Ulbricht 14. Group-specific Effects of Contexts of Migration ........................................................ 87 Suzanne Model 15. Migration, Diversity, and the Welfare State ............................................................... 95 Keith G. Banting 16. Role of Contexts and Political Culture in Political Incorporation: A Case Study of Chilean Migration to Toronto .............................................................. 103 Patricia Landolt

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Part 4 Human Trafficking ................................................................................................ 113 17. Child Trafficking ......................................................................................................... 115 Wendi Adelson 18. Human Trafficking ...................................................................................................... 121 Fabrizio Sarrica 19. Human Trafficking Policy Responses ........................................................................ 127 Kavitha Sreeharsha 20. Labor Trafficking ........................................................................................................ 131 Melynda Barnhart 21. Migration Industries, Legal Services, and Human Smuggling ................................ 137 David Kyle 22. Sex Trafficking ............................................................................................................. 141 Grace Chang Part 5 Internal Migration: Shorter Distance................................................................... 145 23. Gentrification ............................................................................................................... 147 Jan Brueckner 24. Intrametropolitan Population Distribution ............................................................... 151 Lincoln Quillian 25. Local Mobility .............................................................................................................. 155 William A. V. Clark 26. Migration-Defining Boundary .................................................................................... 159 Michael J. White 27. Place Utility .................................................................................................................. 163 David López-Carr and Daniel Phillips Part 6 Labor Market Context of Immigrant Reception ................................................. 167 28. Labor Migration Policies: A Typology ...................................................................... 169 Holger Kolb 29. Labor-Market Shifts and Immigration...................................................................... 173 Jason Gagnon 30. Trade Unions, Immigration, and Migrant Workers ................................................. 177 Judith Roosblad, Stefania Marino, and Rinus Penninx Part 7 Legalization and Citizenship of Immigrants........................................................ 181 31. Dual/Multiple Citizenship ........................................................................................... 183 Sara Wallace Goodman 32. Naturalization .............................................................................................................. 187 Sara Wallace Goodman Part 8 Measurements of Internal and International Migration .................................... 193 33. Age, Period, and Cohort Effects ................................................................................. 195 Claire E. Altman 34. Dual-System Estimation .............................................................................................. 199 Patrick J. Cantwell 35. Duration of Residence Measurement ......................................................................... 205 Ilana Redstone Akresh and Douglas S. Massey 36. Ethnographic Analysis ................................................................................................ 207 David FitzGerald

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37. Indirect Methods for Estimating Internal Migration ............................................... 213 Richelle Winkler and Katherine J. Curtis 38. Measuring Internal Migration Prospectively Using Longitudinal Data ................. 217 Randall Olsen and Elizabeth Cooksey 39. Measuring Internal Migration: Retrospective Self-Report...................................... 221 Matthew Hall 40. Methods for Estimating International Migration ..................................................... 225 Melissa Scopilliti, Kirsten West, and Jason Devine 41. Using Registration Data to Measure International and Internal Migration in the European Union .................................................................................... 231 Shushanik Makaryan Part 9 Oceania.................................................................................................................... 237 42. Gold Rushes (Australia) .............................................................................................. 239 James Jupp 43. Pacific Island Countries and Migration ..................................................................... 241 Carmen Voigt-Graf Part 10 Permanence of Migration .................................................................................... 245 44. Points-Based Immigration .......................................................................................... 247 Madeleine Sumption 45. Temporary Labor Migration ...................................................................................... 253 Christopher Foulkes Part 11 Population and Migration ................................................................................... 257 46. Fertility of Immigrants ................................................................................................ 259 Sylvie Dubuc Part 12 Refugees ................................................................................................................ 267 47. Forced Migration: Global Trends and Explanations ............................................... 269 Jeremy Hein and Tarique Niazi 48. Refugee Integration: Issues and Challenges .............................................................. 275 Theo Majka and Linda Majka 49. Refugee Mental Health: Child and Adolescent Refugees ......................................... 283 Eugenio M. Rothe, Andrés J. Pumariega, and Hector Castillo-Matos 50. Refugees Defined.......................................................................................................... 291 Peter I. Rose Part 13 Settlement and Integration Policies .................................................................... 299 51. Cultural Diversity: The Australian Social Cohesion Surveys .................................. 301 Andrew Markus 52. Jewish Diaspora ........................................................................................................... 307 Suzanne Rutland 53. White Australia Policy ................................................................................................ 315 Gwenda Tavan Part 14. Skill Level of Migrants........................................................................................ 323 54. High-Skilled Migration ............................................................................................... 325 Robyn Iredale 55. Labor Migration .......................................................................................................... 335 Mathias Sinning and Massimiliano Tani 56. Reservation Wages and Immigrants .......................................................................... 341 Mathias Sinning

Introduction Frank D. Bean and Susan K. Brown

This book is a collection of papers about migration. More specifically, each piece focuses on a specific aspect of international migration at a given time. We do not pretend the coverage is complete or exhaustive, because it is not. But it is multifaceted, and this is important. That is, the papers cover a wide range of topics dealing with multiple aspects of international migration that have taken place at various locales around the globe, usually during the past two or three decades. Thus, the notable advantage of the approach here is that it provides a basis for discerning broad features of international migration, and their change during the period examined, including the general policy auspices under which such patterns have occurred. This then provides a basis for judging whether and why such tendencies appear to be changing. Examining only a single country, or only a single aspect of migration, would not offer the possibility of such insight. What then are the important patterns that emerge, and what do they consist of? The old idea that “demography is destiny” still crops up, though now in nuanced analyses (Morland 2019, Schurman 2022). Although armchair analysts may fret that birth and death rates determine a country’s economic and/or geopolitical situations, high birth rates or aging populations rarely are the main drivers of countries’ well-being. They rarely determine overall socioeconomic standing for the simple reason that other factors generally intervene to compensate for their effects. Thus, for example, high nineteenth century European birth rates were often offset to a considerable degree by out-migration, thus easing negative pressures on national food supplies. The globalization of migration has emerged as the major trend of recent decades (de Haas et al., 2020). Despite enormous refugee flows caused by such geopolitical traumas as the Syrian civil war or the invasion of Ukraine, the overall levels of migration have grown only slowly. Amid that slow growth, however, the number of origin countries has increased. The scope of intercontinental movements has also grown, leading to greater diversity in of migrants in the more developed countries (Brown et al., 2019). The direction of dominant migration flows has changed across the 20th century, most notably in that post-war Europe attracted settlers rather than sending them. Another migration trend emerges in the rise of non-Western destinations in the Gulf and industrialized parts of East and Southeast Asia. As these countries transition from sending countries to immigrant-receiving countries, their populations can also become more ethnically diverse. These trends have raised questions of security and fierce political debates about belonging. With fertility rates falling or stabilized at or below replacement level in virtually all high-income countries, immigrants constitute a higher proportion of their national populations, especially among young adults. Although most developed countries generally encourage skilled migration, they try to restrict less-skilled migrants (Beine et al., 2016). Boucher and Gest (2018) argue that labor migration worldwide is becoming more transactional, that is, a “market model,” in ways reminiscent of the guestworker programs of the mid-20th century. In more than half of the countries they studied, most migration flows consisted of temporary migrants whose presence prioritizes the state’s hiring flexibility over any long-term investment in immigration. This temporary approach to migration may appease domestic nativist factions. This trend leads to what appears to be a divergence in migration patterns. On the one hand, the globalization of migration has coincided with greater liberalization of migration and rising acknowledgement of human rights. On the other hand, increasing restrictions on immigrants have in many cases criminalized some of their movement. This divergence, or “liberal paradox” (Hollifield et al. 2014: 8), centers on how states can ensure both enough labor for economic growth and enough control to appease their citizens. Ruhs (2013) argues for an

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inherent tradeoff in the quantity of migrant workers admitted by more developed nations and the quality of the rights that those nations bestow. Still, political scientists debate the degree to which states truly control the number and type of immigrants and the gap between immigration policy and its enforcement (Hollifield et al. 2014). The gap may reflect bureaucratic exigencies or perhaps a deliberate choice to try to satisfy multiple constituencies at once by placating public opposition to immigration with restrictive laws and then enforcing them only weakly (Boswell, 2007). This gap is yawning in the United States, where a vast border with Mexico, longtime agricultural migration, and willingness to overlook hiring laws resulted in millions of unauthorized immigrants (Martin, 2014). Thus, today’s “demographic destinies” appear increasingly to involve temporary labor migration as well as more refugees. To a considerable degree, and more so than at any time since the end of World War II, countries face the reality of having to deal with increasing numbers of migrants on the move. To have some chance of coping fruitfully with this phenomenon, it is thus important that we define carefully what we mean by the term migration. In its broadest sense, it means movement from one place to another. Clearly, the kind of place matters, with an essential starting point involving making a distinction between movement made within countries from movement made between countries. The former we call internal and the latter external migration. Thus, internal migration generally means movement from one governmentally defined place to another such place within a country. Thus, we often talk about movement between states (within a given country) or between cities (within a given country), or from one county to another (within a given state), and so forth. For external migration, however, we mean movement between countries. Furthermore, movements between countries can also involve various kinds of temporal characteristics. Perhaps most fundamentally, movement can be permanent or temporary, by which we mean officially it can involve long-term change (since nothing is truly permanent) or short-term change. Also, if the movement involves arriving at destination under the official auspices of the receiving country, we call it legal migration, and if it does not, we call it nonlegal (or irregular, unauthorized, or undocumented) migration. Temporary legal migration involves multiple forms as well, such as refugees, asylees, tourists, temporary legal workers, etc.). Each of these various kinds of migrants is important because the nature of migrant movements into a country determine the migrant’s official membership with the receiving society, and thus the initial kind of “societal membership” under which the migrant can live his or her life. Clearly, unauthorized migrants face the harshest and most difficult societal categorization (one involving the fewest and most precarious opportunities for achieving success) in their new homelands. Finally, it is important to realize that the latter category of migrant (who we have just used the phrase unauthorized to describe) consists of two kinds of migrants – those who have come under their own volition and those who have been forced to change their home country by dint of natural disaster, societal/economic collapse in their origin country, or extreme political or wartime danger in there. In short, migrants must also be distinguished by whether they seek new destinations voluntarily or forcibly. To a certain extent, those in the latter category can theoretically be accommodated in new countries as refugees, asylees, or victims of trafficking. However, in certain instances, especially recently, their numbers have been so large that, as a practical matter, it has seemingly been virtually impossible for many destination countries even to process them, let alone accommodate them as newcomer members of new destination societies. The United Nations formally defines refugees as people who have fled their homeland because of war or violence and have a well-founded fear of persecution based on their race, religion, nationality, political beliefs, sexual orientation, or membership in a social group. But despite the formal definition, refugees whose initial move was involuntary may become labor migrants, and some of the theories of labor migration may well apply to them (Bates, 2002; FitzGerald and Arar, 2018). Many of the countries of the world over the past few decades, as the papers in this volume suggest, have developed various strategies and auspices for incorporating migrants into their societies and economies. A notable example involves the formulation and adoption of policies facilitating the entry and legality of workers, although frequently only on a temporary basis (Wassink and Massey 2022; Bean et al. 2014). But obtaining full and complete membership

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in their new societies has thus far largely eluded such migrants. And taking the next step toward broader migrant integration is likely to prove challenging because of recent substantial growth in forced migration streams around the world stemming from weather and economic disasters associated with climate change and geopolitical conflicts.

References Bates, D. (2002). “Environmental refugees? Classifying human migrations caused by environmental change.” Population and Environment 23: 465-477. Bean, F.D., Bachmeier, J.D., Brown, S.K., Van Hook, J., and Leach, M. A. (2014). “Unauthorized Mexican Migration and the Socioeconomic Integration of Mexican Americans.” In J.R. Logan. (Ed.) (2014). Pp. 341-374 in Diversity and Disparities: America Enters a New Century. (Pp. 341-373). New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation. Beine, M., Boucher, A., Burgoon, B., Crock, M., Gest, J., Hiscox, M., McGovern, P., Rapoport, H., Schaper, J., and Thielemann, E. (2016). “Comparing Immigration Policies: An Overview from the IMPALA Database.” International Migration Review 50: 827-853. Boswell, C. (2007). “Theorizing migration policy: Is there a third way?” International Migration Review 41(1): 75-100. Boucher, A. K., and Gest, J. (2018). Crossroads: Comparative Immigration Regimes in a World of Demographic Change. Cambridge, GB: Cambridge University Press. DOI:10.1017/9781316416631. Brown, S. K., Bean. F. D., and Nasir, S. (2019). “International migration.” In D. L. Poston Jr. (Edit.). (2019). Handbook of Population. Second edit. (Pp. 421-455). Cham, CH: Springer. de Haas, H., Castles, S., and Miller, M. J. (2020). The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World. Sixth edition. New York, NY: The Guilford Press. FitzGerald, D. S. and Arar, R. (2018). “The sociology of refugee migration.” Annual Review of Sociology 44: 387-406. Hollifield, J. F., Martin, P. L., and Orrenius, P. M. (2014). Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective. Third edit. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Morland, P. (2019). The Human Tide: How Population Shaped the Modern World. New York, NY: PublicAffairs. Ruhs, M. (2013). The Price of Rights: Regulating International Labor Migration. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Schurman, B. (2022). The Super Age: Decoding our Demographic Destiny. New York, NY: HarperCollins Publishers. Wassink, J., and Massey, D. S. (2022). “The New System of Mexican Migration: The Role of Entry Mode-Specific Human and Social Capital.” Demography 59 (3): 1071-1092.

Part 1: Africa

African Island Migration Iain Walker* COMPAS, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK

Definition African Island migration concerns the islands off the east coast of Africa in the western Indian Ocean: Madagascar and the Comoros, the Mascarene Islands of Mauritius and Réunion, and Seychelles.

Detailed Description Islands are particularly distinctive sites of migration. They are geographically separated from their neighbors by water, which constrains movements of populations and grants island migrations a special character. Moving into and out of an island generally requires more effort than crossing a land border, and in the contemporary world, movements by sea and air are more easily controlled by the state. Island populations are often more aware of their identities than groups on the mainland, partly because of the difficulties faced in settling the island and partly because of the controlled character of contact with neighbors. However, islands require contact with the outside world: all but the very largest of islands are unlikely to be self-sufficient, and they rely on trading partners for foodstuffs, manufactured goods, labor, and capital.

Historical Migrations All the islands of the southwestern Indian Ocean have been settled by immigrants in a relatively recent past. Madagascar was the last of the world’s great land masses to have been colonized by humans, during one of the world’s great historical migrations. The Austronesian-speaking peoples of Southeast Asia began moving out of their ancestral homeland in Taiwan more than 5,000 years ago, and their descendants today are found across a wide swathe of the globe, from Easter Island in the southeast Pacific, through Polynesia and Indonesia to, in the western Indian Ocean, Madagascar itself. These migrations finally ended with the settlement of New Zealand in the fourteenth century. However, while there are indications of a human presence in Madagascar as early as the late third millennium BC, there is no reliable evidence of the existence of a settled human population prior to the fifth century AD, and linguistic and genetic evidence suggests that Austronesian settlers arrived later still, almost certainly via the East African coast. Regardless of the dates of their arrival, however, geneticists, linguists, and anthropologists all agree that the contemporary Malagasy are descended from African and Austronesian immigrants (Adelaar 2012; Cox et al. 2012). The same migratory movements probably led to the settlement of the Comoro Islands, to the northwest of Madagascar, but once again, evidence is lacking: the earliest reliably dated archaeological site in the archipelago is late first millennium. However, the historical record and the physical evidence from the nearby African coast confirms that Arab seafarers were navigating in the region some 2,000 years ago, and by the time Islam reached the area toward the ninth century, it is clear that the Comoros were already inhabited. Genetic analysis suggests that the bulk of the population has its roots in East Africa, but that both Arab men and Austronesian women contributed to the Comorian melting pot. The populations of *Email: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 F. D. Bean, S. K. Brown (eds.), Selected Topics in Migration Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-19631-7_1

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both Madagascar and the Comoros were subsequently augmented by substantial movements of slaves from the East African mainland: the Comoro Islands were a notorious slave-trading center, while in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, large-scale slave raids on the African coast by Betsimisaraka and Sakalava slavers from Madagascar saw the forced migration of large numbers of East Africans to the latter island, whence many were sold onward to the Mascarenes. Further east the smaller creole island states of Mauritius, Réunion, and Seychelles, uninhabited when first visited by Europeans in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, were populated by large-scale migrations during the colonial era. Plantation colonies were established on the islands, initially under French control, later, following the Napoleonic Wars and (with the exception of Réunion, which was returned to the French) under British control. In the early period large numbers of Africans were imported as slaves to work on the plantations, and they rapidly came to constitute a majority of the population and develop (much as in the Caribbean) a creole society. Although slaves were brought from all parts of the African continent, it seems likely that the majority were from East Africa and a substantial number were Malagasy. Malagasy immigrants were present in sufficient numbers in both Mauritius and Réunion to maintain their own language and culture until well into the second half of the nineteenth century; they were eventually assimilated to the general creole population, and while they lost their language in the process, creole culture in both states owes much to Malagasy origins (Larson 2009). Following abolition, initially of the slave trade, later of slavery itself, the colonists were forced to turn elsewhere for their labor force. The French administration in Réunion was the first to recruit laborers under the indenture system and began shipping contract laborers from their ports in India, particularly Pondicherry, in 1826; however, it was the British government who recruited the greatest number of indentured laborers, and it is estimated that nearly half a million indentured laborers arrived in Mauritius from India between 1834 and 1913, with several thousand more arriving from Madagascar, China, and parts of East Africa (Addison and Hazareesingh 1993; Carter 1995). Although indentured laborers were in theory accorded a degree of legal protection and a free passage home at the end of their indenture, the conditions under which they lived and worked differed little from slavery; nevertheless, few opted for a return, and these mass migrations of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries have shaped contemporary demographics in the creole islands: Mauritians of Indian origin today constitute some 67 % of the population, while people of mixed African and European descent represent close to 30 %. FrancoMauritians and Sino-Mauritians make up the remainder. In Réunion the proportions are more equitable: the three principal groups – of mixed African and European origin, of European origin, and of Indian origin – probably each account for approximately a third of the population; Réunion similarly has a small community of Chinese origin (Leguen 1979). In Seychelles – too small and remote for the development of a successful plantation economy – there are few of Indian descent and the population is largely of mixed European and African origin.

Internal Mobilities From the high-income island of Réunion (a French department(s) and an EU Outermost Region) to the resource-poor and overpopulated Comoros, contemporary migrations have left their mark on all the islands although the political, economic, and demographic diversity of these islands provide for significant differences in the character and magnitude of migratory flows across the region. In the creole islands internal migrations are of minor significance – employment prospects draw individuals to the urban areas, while facility of movement allows those employed in towns to move out: in Mauritius, for example, infrastructure improvements have prompted a slight net outward migration from urban areas to rural areas over the past two decades. There are minor movements between the islands of Seychelles, generally for profession reasons; there is also a small net out-migration from the Mauritian island of Rodrigues,

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although this has decreased significantly since the 1990s as the island’s economy and infrastructure improves (Govt. of Mauritius 2000). In Madagascar, internal migrations are more significant and are largely responsible for the growth in urban populations, particularly outside the capital, Antananarivo: while the capital’s share of the population has remained constant at about 9 % of the total population over the past 20 years, regional urban centers have been growing proportionately more rapidly for several decades, currently at a rate 2 % in excess of that of the national population growth rate. One in three Malagasy households now lives in an urban area (Freeman et al. 2010; World Bank 2011). Despite this relative shift in growth, Antananarivo continues to attract more than 100,000 internal migrants annually: urbanization in Madagascar is almost entirely due to internal migratory flows, which are facilitated by the cultural and linguistic homogeneity of the island and underpinned by the strong attachment that Malagasy feel toward their ancestral lands and their ancestral tombs. This tends to discourage international migration; it also allows migrants to maintain strong links with their homes. Although in many cases poverty is certainly a factor encouraging rural–urban migration – migrants are drawn to urban areas by economic opportunities and better infrastructure, particularly in health and education – internal migrations in Madagascar are also often made possible by the wealth and support of a home that funds the movement to the city. Many rural dwellers move to the cities in order to sell agricultural produce from their home regions, and many are successful. It is not without significance that the majority of urban dwellers in Madagascar are landowners: all but the very poorest possess their house and a small garden where they grow rice – a culturally significant foodstuff in Madagascar. Kin groups are particularly important in shaping migrant networks, and the importance of the ancestors in Malagasy society means that an individual may belong to several large and cohesive descent groups who can provide support, extending a welcome to new arrivals in the city. In a similar vein, regional and ethnic associations also provide valuable support to migrants in urban areas. The migratory process is therefore a dynamic relationship linking urban and rural economies: produce from rural areas permits movement to the cities and provides both for regular physical return and for remittances to the rural areas, thus in turn sustaining the rural economy and encouraging further rural–urban migration (Nawrotzki et al. 2012). Internal migrations are important on an interisland level in the Comoro Islands; the bulk of outward migrations are from the island of Ndzuani where the economy is exiguous, land shortages are acute, erosion is severe, and the population density (574/km2 at the 2003 census) is twice that of Ngazidja and more than three times that of Mwali. Ndzuani is the poorest of the islands and, unlike Ngazidja, has no significant diaspora on whom to rely for remittances. For many years migrants from Ndzuani have therefore settled in Mwali, taking up agricultural land and creating immigrant villages; they have also been drawn to Ngazidja, seat of the national government and where many work either in the civil service or in private enterprise; and they continue to travel to Mayotte, today (and despite Comorian claims over the island) a French département. All three of these movements have caused problems in the past. The influx of large numbers of immigrants to Mwali has occasionally caused tension, particularly over land, while in Ngazidja, migrants from Ndzuani are accused of being disproportionately represented in the civil service. These conflicts are exacerbated by sporadic outbreaks of secessionist sentiment on Ndzuani itself. In 1997, chronic political and economic instability at a national level finally prompted local leaders on Ndzuani to declare independence and seek recolonization by France; political reconciliation was achieved with the promulgation of the 2002 constitution, which devolved significant powers to the islands, but there are still regular expressions of separatist sentiment and, on a more social level, a general recognition and acceptance of strong and distinct island identities within the Comorian nation that often characterizes interisland migrants as being socially and culturally different.

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Mayotte Migrations to Mayotte are particularly problematic and are inscribed within a long-term circulation of individuals and families in the archipelago. In a 1974 referendum Mayotte voted against Comorian independence, and when the territory declared independence from France the following year, Mayotte expressed a desire to remain French. French support for Mayotte’s self-determination, contrary to UN resolutions on decolonization and Comorian claims over the island, culminated in the full incorporation of the island into France as a département in 2011; and although the island is significantly less developed than other French départements, it is significantly more prosperous than the other islands of the group. For two decades following independence, there was a freedom of movement between the islands, but in 1995 France imposed visa requirements on Comorian passport holders wishing to travel to Mayotte. However, Comorians from Ndzuani, in particular, continue to enter Mayotte in large numbers, traveling in small, overloaded, and often unseaworthy boats: these boats frequently sink and the loss of life is high (Causes Communes 2012). Many of those who travel to Mayotte do so to visit family and friends but others are seeking work. In Mayotte the undocumented are regularly exploited in the labor market; denied access to housing, education, and health services; and frequently denounced to French immigration. Those apprehended by immigration officials are held in overcrowded and insalubrious conditions in unfurnished cells in a detention center in Pamandzi that has repeatedly attracted condemnation from human rights organizations before being deported to Ndzuani: currently more than 20,000 individuals are deported annually from Mayotte – in 2011 this represented almost 15 % of the population of the island. Amnesty International has described the conditions in the detention center as “inhuman and degrading”; but the legal issues surrounding movements from the other islands to Mayotte are particularly difficult to resolve since from a Comorian point of view these are internal migrations. Furthermore, the nature of interisland mobilities and attendant kin-links, particularly between Ndzuani and Mayotte, is such that it is often difficult to determine with any precision who belongs where: many may have origins on the other islands but have been residents of Mayotte for decades.

Regional Flows Intraregional migrations tend to follow patterns established in the colonial period. Mauritius and Seychelles are reasonably prosperous middle-income economies and migratory flows to the other islands are limited, although there are some 3,300 Mauritian residents in Réunion; likewise a relatively small number of migrants from Réunion to the other islands tend to be professionals. Intraregional migrations to Mauritius and Seychelles are also limited. Seychelles is a small state, difficult to get to, and with limited prospects for immigrants; and while French is widely spoken in both Mauritius and Seychelles, English is the official language, thus also discouraging potential immigrants from the other islands. Both countries are less attractive than Réunion which, as a French département, is a high-income economy member of the EU; even if less prosperous than metropolitan France, the socioeconomic benefits of France, a shared colonial history and a common language, and the facilitating role of Réunion for onward migration to Europe are strong drawcards. More than three quarters of Réunion’s immigrant population come from neighboring islands: nevertheless, at 1.8 % of the population, there are proportionally far fewer immigrants in Réunion than in metropolitan France, where the figure is more than 8 %. There are, according to official figures, 6,400 Malagasy and 1,500 Comorians in Réunion. However, the latter are a particularly visible minority since their numbers are increased by a significant number of French citizens of Comorian origin, many of whom are from Mayotte: there may be as many as 30,000 Comorians in Réunion, almost all of whom, as citizens, are legally resident (INSEE 2010; Marie and Rallu 2012). However, identifiable both by their dress and by their practices as both Comorian and Muslim, they are frequently subject to

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discrimination, exploitation, and abuse. They frequently find it difficult to obtain employment and housing and many live in insalubrious conditions in the poorer urban areas of the island. Comorians are also present in Madagascar. French colonial policy encouraged the emigration of Comorians to Madagascar rather than East Africa to palliate labor shortages on the big island. However, rather than seeking work as agricultural laborers, the majority settled in the urban areas. A sizeable Comorian community was established in Mahajanga, on the northwest coast, and by 1960, Mahajanga counted some 23,000 Comorian inhabitants, almost 40 % of the town’s population. Muslim Comorians (the majority of Malagasy are Christian), often prosperous and, following independence, foreign, were not always viewed favorably by their Malagasy neighbors and strained relationships reached breaking point in December 1976 when, following a dispute between two families, intercommunal rioting broke out and over a three-day period some 2000 Comorians were massacred. More than 17,000 individuals of Comorian origin were subsequently repatriated to the Comoros, the largest forced migration in the region in recent history. Although largely reintegrated, many of those repatriated had been born in Madagascar and retain a distinct identity in the Comoros where they are known as Sabenas (from the airline whose aircraft repatriated them) or Zanatany (Malagasy, “children of the land”) (Etudes Océan Indien 2007). Forced migration was also responsible for the depopulation of the Chagos Islands, detached from Mauritius in the late colonial period to constitute the British Indian Ocean Territory. The colony was leased to the United States for military purposes, on the understanding that there was no local population, and between 1965 and 1973 some 2,000 Chagossians were forcibly removed, the majority to Mauritius (Evers and Kooy 2011). Compensation was derisory and many lived in extreme poverty in the urban fringes: unemployment was high, mental health problems were widespread, and there were several suicides. Following many years of legal battles, the Chagossians obtained some compensation and British passports, and they now have right of abode in the United Kingdom: a sizeable community now live in the United Kingdom, particularly in Crawley, Sussex (Jeffery 2011). Others continue to live in Mauritius, and there is also a small community in Seychelles. In 2000 the community won a judgment in the British High Court that their eviction from the islands was illegal, paving the way for the Chagossians to return; but in 2004 this right was effectively blocked by a British Order in Council. After several further decisions the community is now pursuing the case at the European Court of Human Rights.

International Migration Inward immigration to the Comoros is negligible, with the exception of return migrations of Comorians born elsewhere. The events of Majunga were a more brutal echo of the expulsion of a number of Zanzibaris of Comorian origin following the Zanzibar revolution in 1964. Prior to the French annexation of Madagascar (and the subsequent incorporation of the Comoros into the colony of Madagascar), the Comoros, and particularly the island of Ngazidja, had maintained strong links with East Africa, where Zanzibar was an economic and cultural center of some importance. A small Comorian community was present in Zanzibar at the beginning of the eighteenth century, but emigration from Ngazidja to Zanzibar increased rapidly following the French occupation of the former island in 1886. Enjoying the advantages of French citizenship, the small but influential Comorian community of Zanzibar enjoyed the respect both of the French government and of the British colonial administration and were generally employed in the civil service or served as religious leaders. Although many took up Zanzibari nationality in the run up to independence, they maintained their identity as a community and generally aligned themselves (with varying degrees of success) with the Arab communities and the ruling classes. One month after independence, the sultan of Zanzibar was deposed in a bloody coup that was followed by anti-Arab pogroms that saw widespread killings (the number of deaths remains obscure today) and the mass expulsion of Zanzibaris of Arab origin. Some Comorians, also perceived as foreigners due both to their French citizenship and, for many, their Arab origins, were expelled or forced to flee, and although their

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number was small, the experience has marked the collective memory of the Comorian community in Zanzibar. Comorian emigrants are found elsewhere in East Africa – there are communities in mainland Tanzania, Kenya, and Mozambique and individuals of Comorian origin in South Africa – and beyond. Ngazidja has long been a supplier of migrants, partly due to the lack of economic development of the island and partly due to the existence of an onerous customary marriage ritual, known as the ^a da, which forces individuals overseas to seek the capital with which to discharge their social obligations. For much of the late and postcolonial period, the preferred destination was France and there are sizeable Comorian communities in Paris, Dunkerque, and, above all, Marseille; and while the initial migrants are usually men, they are often later joined by spouse and children. Many of these Comorians are sans-papiers, undocumented migrants, and many more are French citizens and it is therefore hard to be precise about numbers – it is thought that 80 % of Comorians in France are French citizens, but that of the remainder 80 % are undocumented. Official French government statistics give a figure of 18,700 Comorian citizens in France and 25,800 Comorian-born, categories that presumably largely overlap, but these figures grossly understate the size of the population and it is thought that there are upwards of 100,000 Comorians in the country, of whom a majority live in Marseille (Vivier 1996). The Comorian community is one of the largest and most visible of immigrant communities and is frequently singled out for criticism, most notably in September 2011 when the French minister of the interior, Claude Guéant, claimed that the Comorian community was responsible for much violence in the city. Certainly the community, and particularly the younger, Frenchborn, suffers from the discrimination and social disadvantage that touch many immigrant communities; but they are also well organized: there are several dozen Comorian migrant associations in France and social cohesion is strong. Although much of the savings accumulated during a sojourn in France is destined for costs associated with the a^ da and its rituals, the social cohesion that is both at the heart of these rituals and is reinforced by them maintains immigrant links with the homeland. Most first-generation immigrants intend to retire to the Comoros (hence participation in the ritual), and the social investments prompt economic investments as the diaspora finance local development projects and send remittances to families at home. Remittances are crucial to the Comorian economy, perhaps accounting for as much as 20 % of GDP (da Cruz et al. 2004; Thierry and Axus 2007). Once again, exact figures are difficult to obtain since up to 75 % of funds are remitted in cash, but estimates range upward from €50 million annually. Criticism therefore that 75 % of these funds are spent on consumption items (implicitly the a^ da) should be tempered by the fact that without the ^a da the remaining 25 % would undoubtedly be very much smaller. Recently, Comorian migrants have moved beyond the traditional destination of France to the United Kingdom and Nordic countries, North America, and even Australia. These latter destinations also attract Mauritians, partly for linguistic reasons, and a small but significant group of Mauritians emigrated to Australia around the time of Mauritian independence in 1968 – the largest population, some 9,000, live in the Melbourne area. Although there are small communities of Indian and Chinese origin in Madagascar – both groups generally run businesses, the former in the urban areas of the west coast, the latter on the east coast – migratory flows to and from Madagascar and Réunion are also largely orientated toward France. More than 100,000 Réunionnais live in metropolitan France; but the lure of the tropics is strong and there are some 80,000 metropolitan French natives living in Réunion, where they are known as zorey. The French also constitute the largest immigrant group in Madagascar, numbering perhaps 30,000, and the Malagasy community in France is also sizeable, numbering perhaps 50,000. It is thus one of the larger sub-Saharan African groups in France but is significantly less visible – at least in the French imagination – than similar sized communities from West Africa. This is largely due to their profile. Many Malagasy migrate to France for study rather than as laborers and they are also better integrated into French society, partly no doubt, by virtue of the fact that Malagasy are Christian (albeit largely Protestant)

AfricanIsland Migration

9

and partly because many are phenotypically Asian rather than African and thus less likely to be subject to the sorts of prejudices suffered by West Africans or Comorians. Malagasy emigrate elsewhere – to other European destinations and North America – but one destination is egregious: some 7,000 Malagasy women work as domestic laborers in Lebanon. Maltreatment of domestic migrants in Lebanon is chronic, and in 2009, in response to complaints and a rising number of suspicious deaths and suicides, the Malagasy government imposed a partial ban on labor migration to Lebanon, preventing new departures but allowing those in possession of Lebanese work permits to return. In 2010, 17 Malagasy maids died in Lebanon, and at the end of the year, the ban was upgraded to prohibit all labor migration to Lebanon; the following year, in response to more than 600 requests for help from Malagasy in Lebanon, 86 domestic workers were repatriated (Human Rights Watch 2010). Nevertheless, Malagasy continue to emigrate as domestic workers and there are small numbers in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Jordan.

References Addison J, Hazareesingh K (1993) A new history of Mauritius. Éditions de l’Océan Indien, Rose Hill Adelaar A (2012) Malagasy phonological history and Bantu influence. Oceanic Linguistics 51(1):123–159 Carter M (1995) Servants, sirdars and settlers: Indians in Mauritius, 1834–1874. Oxford University Press, Delhi/Oxford Causes Communes: Mayotte, la déchirure (2012) La Cimade, Paris Cox M, Nelson MG, Meryanne T, Ricaut F-X, Herawati S (2012) A small cohort of Island Southeast Asian women founded Madagascar. Proc R Soc B Biol Sci 279(1739):2761–2768 da Cruz V, Fengler W, Schwartzman A (2004) Remittances to Comoros: volume, trends, impact and implications. Africa Region working paper series No.75. World Bank, Washington, DC Etudes Océan Indien No 38–39 (2007) Special issue: Les Comoriens à Majunga: Histoire, migrations, émeutes Evers S, Kooy M (2011) Eviction from the Chagos Islands: displacement and struggle for identity against two world powers. Brill, Leiden Freeman L, Rasolofohery S, Randriantovomanana EB (2010) Patterns, features and impacts of rural–urban migration in Antananarivo, Madagascar. http://www.hayzara.org/index.php/eng/Knowl edge-bank/Cross-Cutting-Themes/Patterns-Features-and-Impacts-of-rural-urban-Migration-in-Antanan arivo-Madagascar Government of Mauritius (2000) 2000 Housing And Population Census Analysis Report. Volume IV. Population distribution and migration. Government of Mauritius, Port Louis. http://www.gov.mu/ portal/sites/ncb/cso/report/hpcen00/census4/index.htm Human Rights Watch (2010) Without protection: how the Lebanese justice system fails migrant domestic workers. Human Rights Watch, New York INSEE (2010) Dossier Migrations: l’impact démographique et économique. Économie de La Réunion, No 136. INSEE, Paris Jeffery L (2011) Chagos islanders in Mauritius and the UK: forced displacement and onward migration. Manchester University Press, Manchester Larson P (2009) Ocean of letters: language and creolization in an Indian Ocean diaspora. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Leguen M (1979) Histoire de l’Ile de la Réunion. L’Harmattan, Paris

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Marie C-V, Rallu J-L (2012) Les tendances démographiques et migratoires dans les régions ultrapériphériques: quel impact sur leur cohésion économique, sociale et territoriale? Institut national d’études démographiques, Paris Nawrotzki R, Hunter L, Dickinson T (2012) Rural livelihoods and access to natural capital: differences between migrants and non-migrants in Madagascar. Demogr Res 26:661–699 Thierry B, Anne-Laure Axus (2007) Valoriser les potentialités économiques de la diaspora comorienne pour le développement de l’archipel. Etude de cas Programme Pays Comores. Union des Comores/ FIDA, Moroni. www.fidacomores.net/IMG/doc/DOSSIER_transfert_diaspora_comores.doc Vivier G (1996) Les migrations comoriennes en France: Histoire de migrations coutumières. Centre français sur la Population et le Développement, Paris World Bank (2011) L’urbanisation ou le nouveau defi Malgache. World Bank, Washington, DC

Southern African Migration Eugene K. Campbell* Department of Population Studies, University of Botswana, Gaborone, Botswana

Introduction Southern Africa is at the southernmost part of the African continent, and it is characterized by internal and international labor migration whose history goes way back to the seventeenth century. Internal migration is the movement of people within national borders of a country, while international migration occurs when people move across international borders. This entry will state very briefly about internal migration; but its focus is on contemporary international migration. Most recent studies of migration focus on international migration because of the increasing awareness of its importance in national and international development issues. Southern Africa experienced considerable forced migration from South Africa, Mozambique, Namibia, Angola, and Zimbabwe between the 1950s and 1990s due to violent civil wars. The major destinations in the region for refugees were Botswana, Malawi, and Zambia. While several economic, social and political, environmental, and demographic factors have influenced internal and international migration in Southern Africa, these movements have in turn influenced national and international development in these areas. Meanwhile, migration has had considerable effects on the incidence and spread of communicable diseases, such as malaria, HIV/AIDS, and other sexually transmitted infections and noncommunicable diseases, such as hypertension and obesity (Levitt et al. 1993; Collinson et al. 2006; Ansell and Van Blerk 2011).

Data Availability So much has been written about the limited data on migration, especially international migration (Byerlee 1974; Black 2003) that it is needless getting into that here. Studies in genetic anthropology indicate that the history of internal and international migrations in Southern Africa is ancient and may be traced back to several centuries before the birth of Jesus Christ. However, social scientists have been more occupied with investigating movements that occurred in modern history and contemporary times. There are indications from studies in African genome that the modern human migration in Africa originated in Southern Africa, especially Namibia and Angola, with pastoral occupation being the major motive for these movements (Tishkoff et al. 2009). However, several unexplained factors, such as cattle herding and tsetse fly-induced sleeping sickness in prehistoric times, have raised questions about the link between current and ancient geographical locations of Khoikhoi people of South-West Africa and their northern “cousins” in Botswana and Zambia (Boonzaier et al. 2000). Oral history and DNA were used in 1987 and 1988 by Spurdle and Jenkins (1996), with a sample of 49 unrelated Lembas, to explain the existence of people with non-African ancestry in the continent. These methods helped to identify the cultural origins and history of the Lemba ethnic people who live in Zimbabwe and claim that their ancestral parents were Jews who migrated from the Middle East to Southern Africa to trade in gold and other items. According to Spurdle and Jenkins (1996), the ancestors of the Lemba settled in Yemen and traded initially with East Africans. But a hostile invasion of their land, with devastating results, forced them to migrate to Africa with a part of the ethnic group settling in East Africa, while another part proceeded to Southern Africa. It was observed *Email: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 F. D. Bean, S. K. Brown (eds.), Selected Topics in Migration Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-19631-7_2

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that the Lemba people practice circumcision in a manner similar to the Jews. They also observe dietary laws similar to those of the Jews. The authors concluded that the Lemba was more likely a descendant of Middle Eastern Jews than Arabs at about seventh century B.C. Other data sources include censuses, random sample survey, and continuous recording systems especially at international border posts and airports. Official statistics on remittances are generally obtained from banks, post offices, and money transfer agencies. These sources have been widely used to estimate volumes, rates and patterns of migration as well as explain their determinants (Kok et al. 2006; Collinson et al. 2007; United Nations 2009a, b; World Bank 2011). Though little effort has been made to improve the collection of international migration data in Africa, Southern Africa has been fortunate to have over 12 years of continuous investigation of attitudes and behavior of internal and international migrants and nonmigrant citizens by the Southern African Migration Project (SAMP). SAMP surveys are mostly cross-sectional and cover several subjects including brain drain, brain circulation, remittance, diaspora, xenophobia, and health (see SAMP website www.queensu.ca/samp/sampresource). Several other researchers have done individual studies on the subject, and in 1978–1982, the government of Botswana conducted a National Migration Survey which remains one of few such exercises in the region. A notable finding from an individual researcher is the contribution of Ghanaian immigrants to economic development in Southern Africa where the professionals worked in the educational, legal, and administrative sectors. As many of the men were accompanied by their wives, the women brought along skills which they applied in commerce and service sectors and acquired considerable wealth (Van Dijk 2003). These women also invested in the importation and sale of clothing obtained mainly from Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire. The variety of data sources has occasionally raised questions about the consistency of variable definitions and measurements (Frayne and Pendleton 2001; Posel and Casale 2003; Campbell 2010).

Internal Migration The most documented of internal migration in the region is the Great Trek, a mass movement of Dutch settlers (or Boers) from the Cape Province in the western part of South Africa to areas which later became the province of Orange Free State, Natal, and Transvaal. Calvinist Dutch began settling in South Africa in the seventeenth century having moved from Europe to escape persecution at the hands of conservative followers of John Calvin. The Great Trek was motivated by a mix of economic, political, and religious factors. But central to these was a determination by the Dutch settlers to attain independence from British rule as it was perceived to be oppressive (Templin 1968). The blacks in South Africa were restricted in their ability to move to the cities. Movement from rural to urban areas was predominantly of the circular type and families were not permitted to stay with male workers in the cities. The situation was similar in Namibia and Zimbabwe. Black Namibians were confined in undeveloped communal farmlands with controlled movement to the town, mines, and commercial farms (Frayne and Pendleton 2001). Before independence in 1980, black people in Zimbabwe were restrained from undertaking rural to urban migration because of economic and political factors. Rural–urban migration increased after 1980 resulting in dramatic increase in urban population growth rates. For example, the growth rate of Harare rose from 3 % before 1980 to 6.2 % by 1990 largely due to internal migration (Potts 2010). Historically most labor migrants in Southern Africa (internal and international) were men, though within short distances, women dominated (Crush 2000; Crush et al. 2005; Posel and Casale 2003). Botswana is among the few exceptions where females were dominant among internal migrants (Gwebu 1987).

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Immigration and Emigration Southern African countries have a common economic goal (within the Southern African Customs Union) which is to attain maximum economic development. This and other factors, including national security and social development, contributed to the formation of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) which has recently been determined to facilitate international migration for development in the region. However, the level of cooperation on international migration in the region has been fraught with several challenges emanating from the markedly differential economic status of the countries. While South Africa, Botswana, and Namibia have made significant economic progress, several others have not done so well. This difference has been a major obstacle to the implementation of the protocol on free movement of persons within the region, settling instead for the protocol on the facilitation of movement persons in the region (United Nations 2011). The patterns of immigration and emigration in Southern Africa center on South Africa, a country that has historically been the economic hub of the region. The history of emigration in the region goes back to the nineteenth century when South Africa began recruiting foreign labor to work in the gold mines. The recruiting agency of the South African Chamber of Mines is The Employment Bureau of Africa (TEBA). The intention of the South African government was not to recruit foreigners to work in the gold mines permanently, but to restrict their stay and lifestyle by excluding families, keeping them in hostels and ensuring that they were repatriated periodically. For instance, the contracts of miners from Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland were for 6–9 months, while Malawians were granted 2 years, partly due to the travel risk associated with long distance from South Africa (Lucas 1987). Although most migrants to South Africa were men who sought employment in the mines and farms, women also migrated to South Africa primarily to work in the informal domestic sector. Most of the migrants were unskilled. The motivation for cross-border migration was primarily economic with the aim of increasing household incomes at home. Migrant remittances assisted much in this direction although there are conflicting views on the level of assistance. Table 1 indicates that the peak of mine labor recruitment in South Africa varied between countries of origin. The sudden stop in recruitment of Malawians was largely due to a conflict between the South African and Malawian governments over HIV testing of applicants. Botswana received tens of thousands of refugees from South Africa in 1976–1978 as they passed through to seek asylum in Zambia and Tanzania. At the same time, Zimbabwean refugees increased in Botswana by over threefold to 25,300. Many resided in the country with thousands receiving Botswana citizenship (Campbell 2003). The stock of immigrants in Southern Africa reached 2.2 million people in 2010 – with an average annual increase of 7.3 % between 2005 and then. South Africa hosts the majority of these migrants (1.9 million) (see Fig. 1). The high sex ratios in Table 2 indicate the persistence of male dominance among international migrants in the region. But with increasing education and personal liberation of women, these ratios are falling due to the growing feminization of international migrants in the continent. Since 1990, migration within the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and from the rest of Africa to SADC has increased dramatically. The direction of movement is highly influenced by the marked economic differentials in the region, with South Africa, Botswana, and Namibia being the dominant destinations. The number of persons migrating from Malawi, Mozambique, and Zambia to the commercial farms of Zimbabwe declined considerably since the land transfer program in Zimbabwe. Immigration in Zimbabwe began in the nineteenth century with Europeans and South Africans entering in the twentieth century (Mlambo 2010). Later in the century, an exodus of blacks and whites occurred in response to the liberation struggle. But the greater exodus occurred in the twenty-first century following the country’s economic recession which began in the late 1990s. The number of Zimbabweans migrating to work or to look for work in Botswana and South Africa has increased dramatically. Opportunities for Zimbabweans to work legally in other countries are limited but that has not prevented many from migrating (Crush et al. 2010).

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Table 1 Mine labor recruitment in South Africa, 1990–2000 Year 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000

Botswana 2,112 3,151 14,427 12,390 21,404 20,461 17,753 16,051 14,609 14,028 12,781 11,904 11,099 10,961 10,477 9,385 7,752 6,413 6,494

Lesotho 10,439 22,306 52,044 34,467 48,842 63,988 96,308 100,529 99,707 93,897 93,519 89,940 89,237 87,935 81,357 76,361 60,450 52,188 58,224

Mozambique 77,921 77,828 74,883 86,248 101,733 93,203 39,636 42,807 44,590 47,105 50,651 50,311 56,197 55,140 55,741 55,879 51,913 46,537 57,034

Swaziland 3,449 4,345 7,152 6,619 6,623 6,269 5,050 16,730 17,757 17,393 16,273 16,153 15,892 15,304 14,371 12,960 10,336 9,307 9,360

Malawi 354 0 8,037 7,831 21,934 78,492 13,569 72 – – – – – – – – – – –

Source: Crush et al. 2005

2009 (est.)

2005

2000 1,863

South Africa

1,249 1,022 139 132 125

Namibia

Botswana

115 80 56

Swaziland

40 39 37 6 6 6

Lesotho 0

200

400

600

800

1,000

1,200

1,400

1,600

1,800

2,000

Stock of migrants (in thousands)

Fig. 1 Stock of migrants in Southern Africa, by destination, in 2000, 2005, and 2010 (in thousands)

Skilled emigration on a large scale in Southern African is a relatively recent phenomenon and it is associated with tertiary education and brain drain. The most attractive African country for skilled migrants is South Africa. A distant second is Botswana, followed by Namibia. While it is quite difficult to estimate skilled immigrants in Southern Africa, the proportion of skilled immigrants in South Africa seems to be inversely related to social distance from the source countries. Most of the skilled migrants are from

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Table 2 Foreign-born population in Southern Africa (2007)a Country Botswana Namibia South Africa Swaziland Zambia

Male 17,995 63,056 1,206,287 17,049 72,623

Female 11,562 56,162 648,274 14,694 68,791

Sex ratio** 156 112 186 116 106

Source: UN (2009) Demographic Yearbook 2007 Information is for countries with adequate immigration data. It excludes persons whose migration status was not known

a

Western Europe, followed by the rest of Africa and southern Africa (Mattes et al. 2000). About 33 % of African labor migrants employed in South Africa are skilled (McDonald et al. 2000). Skilled Namibians are more likely than the unskilled to migrate to South Africa. Greater skills among urban than rural populations largely explain why urban Namibians are more likely to migrate to South Africa than the rural folks. Among Zimbabweans, 20 % of male and 14 % of female visitors to South Africa had completed at least high school education. The four principal sources of skilled immigrants in Botswana are South Africa, Zimbabwe, Zambia, and the UK. Just as South Africa and Botswana have experienced brain gain, it seems that there is the risk of brain drain from these countries. Brain drain occurs when the skills that a government invested in emigrate to work and live elsewhere. Up to 1992, South Africa gained more skilled immigrants than it lost (Mattes and Richmond 2000; Mattes et al. 2000). But since 1994, the country has been experiencing a deficit in skilled human resource. Effectively, it has consistently lost than gained skilled persons through international migration. The situation is similar in Zimbabwe. From the wealth of research-based information on Zimbabwe’s brain drain, it may seem that the country has lost the most skills in the region. But Table 3 indicates that Zambia is relatively the biggest skill loser with 17 % of its professionals having emigrated. Still, it is evident that Zambia and Zimbabwe have experienced the most brain drain in the region. Having previously been considered a curse, brain drain is now acknowledged to be a national blessing because it has contributed directly to the positive effects of international migration, namely, the diaspora, remittance, and brain circulation. From being a net immigration country between 1921 and 1975, Zimbabwe has been characterized by emigration for political reasons during the second half of the 1970s and for economic reasons since 2000 (Crush and Tevera 2010). The health sector has been the most affected by skilled emigration in and from Southern Africa. According to Table 3, every country has lost over 10 % of its native-born physicians and a fair proportion of its nurses. From the health point of view, Zimbabwe has lost the most skilled workers with the majority having obtained employment in the UK and South Africa. In view of the extent to which professionals felt obliged to leave their ancestral home countries, it appears that skilled emigration was underestimated. Between 1989 and 1997, about 233,000 South Africans emigrated to the UK, the USA, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. But official statistics revealed that 82,811 people actually left during this period. Throughout the 1990s, there has been a steady decline in the number of immigrants. In 1993, there were 9800 immigrants and this declined to 4100 in 1997. Meanwhile, from 1994 to 1998, South Africa experienced net emigration of close to 4,000 annually. Forty-eight percent of the 342,947 emigrants who lived in OECD countries were highly skilled (OECD 2006). Their exit left serious social, economic, and political consequences in its wake. Unfortunately the loss of skills was not offset by a proactive, aggressive recruiting immigration policy. The implications of these trends are very clear. There will continue to be a shortage of skilled workers as well as an oversupply of unskilled labor. The negative implications will reverberate throughout the South African economy and impact on the country’s global competitiveness given that skilled workers generally create jobs for unskilled workers and that the level of skills in the labor force is an attraction for foreign investment.

Lesotho 2,000,000# 63,000 3.2 3.6 11.4 2.2 114,800 5.8 141

Namibia 2,100,000 427,500 20.5 4.3 33.3 2.8 6,300 0.3 490

Source: World Bank (2011) Migration and Remittances Factbook a 2000 b 2008 # 2011 National Census figure + over US$500 million

Botswana Total population (2009) No. of emigrants (2010) Emigrant as % of total popa Skilled (tertiary) emigrant (%) Emigration of physicians (%) Emigration of nurses (%) Immigrant stock (2010) Immigrant as % of total pop Remittance inflow (US$ mil)b

Table 3 Immigration and emigration statistics South 2,200,000 16,500 0.7 3.5 45.0 5.4 138,900 6.3 17

Swaziland 49,300,000 878,100 1.7 7.5 21.1 5.1 1,862,900 3.7 834

Zambia 1,200,000 163,300 13.3 0.5 28.5 2.8 40,400 3.4 99

Zimbabwe 12,900,000 185,800 1.4 16.8 56.9 9.2 233,100 1.8 59

Africa 12,500,000 1,253,100 9.9 12.7 51.1 24.2 372,300 2.9 500+

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Southern African Migration

17

A clear gender dimension emerges; men are more likely to leave permanently than women (Dodson and Crush 2004).

Consequences of Immigration and Emigration Until the 1990s, the informal sector was almost absent in South Africa’s economy. Its growth owes much to the economic activities of contemporary immigrants especially from West and East Africa. The informal economic sector which has historically been a common feature of West and East African lifestyle hardly existed in South Africa, Botswana, and Namibia before 1990. Considering the high levels of unemployment in the cities, the informal sector is crucial for providing those not employed in the formal sector with a way out of poverty. Several migrants who fail to find work or are refused work permits in the country become self-employed, at times illicitly setting up barber, food, clothing shops, etc. Zimbabweans constitute the highest proportion of migrant street vendors. Mozambicans and, to a lesser extent, Batswana, Basotho, and Swazi are also quite active in promoting the informal sector in South Africa. Tevera and Zinyama (2002) observed that, among all visitors and migrants to South Africa, the highest proportion of men and women who buy and sell goods is from Zimbabwe. Basotho, Mozambican, and Namibian migrants also buy and sell goods in South Africa (Sechaba Consultants 2002). Zimbabwean males seem to be in South Africa as much to work or look for work as it is for commerce. But almost three quarters of migrant women are there for commercial purposes (Tevera and Zinyama 2002). Apart from personal development within the new diaspora, a common feature of this group is the remitting of money and goods to families in the ancestral home.

Diasporas in Southern Africa Between ancient and modern times, two categories of diaspora have been identified. These are the “classic” and “modern” diaspora. Classic diasporas are associated with the Jewish, African, Indian, and other diasporas which were formed several centuries ago, while modern diasporas were formed fairly recently from contemporary international migration (Cohen 1997). Examples of classic South African diasporas in the region are the Tswana in Botswana and Shona in Zimbabwe. The modern diasporas in the region were formed from contemporary migration from in and outside the region. The latter include Nigerian, Ghanaian, Somali, and Kenyan diasporas. Though the African Union recognizes that both groups should be encouraged to make significant contribution to economic and social development in the continent, the focus in Southern Africa is harnessing the potential of the modern diaspora for immediate and future socioeconomic development in the region. South Africa has taken the lead in this by organizing meetings for dialogue and cooperation as well as reaching out to the diaspora with provision of incentives. Diasporas in and out of Southern Africa have contributed much to the national economies at home through financial and social remittances. Financial remittances are monies and goods sent home by migrants, while social remittances include the ideas, identities, language, behavior, food, music, other arts, and social capital that are transferred from destination to origin countries (Levitt 1998). The altruistic relationship between African parents and their offspring explains much of the factors that influence migrant remittances. The South Africa diaspora is the highest remitter in the region, and it is estimated that Zimbabweans sent over US$500 million home in 2009 (IRIN 2012). Indeed, the nation of Zimbabwe would have collapsed without migrant remittances (Crush and Tevera 2010). Lesotho also receives a considerable amount of remittance, while Namibia is the lowest recipient (Table 3). Migrant remittances contribute significantly to poverty reduction in the region. The bulk of all remittances received in Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, and Swaziland comes from South Africa. Though the region receives the lowest amount of international remittances in Africa, they

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Table 4 Items remittance in Southern Africa is spent on, 2004 (in percentage)

Food School fees Clothing Transport fares Seed Fertilizer Tractor Savings Cement Funeral Roofing Bricks Fuel Labor Cattle purchase Repay loans

Botswana % 87.5 42.9 62.9 27.0 2.4 1.1 1.5 8.6 26.7 18.9 21.6 20.3 3.6 5.0 20.8 6.8

Lesotho % 89.3 56.0 76.1 50.0 24.4 18.5 12.5 18.7 5.2 16.3 3.6 4.5 9.9 5.1 1.4 1.9

Mozambique % 69.9 49.1 43.5 24.8 26.3 1.3 0.9 10.9 14.9 5.5 7.2 5.0 6.1 9.8 2.2 5.8

Swaziland % 83.4 54.9 24.0 29.2 44.4 34.2 39.7 4.7 7.2 5.0 3.5 2.7 2.0 4.1 1.6 4.2

Zimbabwe % 75.7 54.6 56.6 31.6 11.3 9.4 1.3 19.4 8.1 9.1 6.7 6.7 7.8 4.3 2.0 3.5

Total % 81.9 52.3 52.2 33.8 24.0 15.2 13.6 12.5 11.1 10.8 7.5 6.9 6.0 5.5 4.6 4.2

Other items excluded Source: Pendleton et al. (2006) Migration, remittances. . .. . .. SAMP

contribute significantly to national development in several countries, especially Lesotho and Zimbabwe where the remittance is 29 % and about 40 % of GDP, respectively (World Bank 2011; Bhebhe 2012). Migration, remittances, and development have a long history in the region. Bilateral agreements between South Africa and several Southern African countries, including Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland, ensured that foreign miners put significant proportions of their earnings into the national economies (referred to as deferred payment). In 1984, 18,691 Batswana miners generated nearly R17 million ($2.6 million) in officially recorded remittances alone, which helped to grow Botswana’s rural economies in particular. Remittances contribute substantially to several key areas within the Millennium Development Goals, especially mitigating hunger and enhancing children’s education. Most of the remittances to and in the region are used for personal and household consumption (Table 4). Food is the primary item on which remittances are spent, followed by school fees, clothing, and transport fares. Apparently, Batswana (citizens of Botswana) do not require remittances for children’s school fees as much as other nationals do, and this is partly because of the existence of government-induced public education system which is almost fee-free from primary to university levels (UNECA 2011). Meanwhile, the dominance of Botswana’s expenditure on cattle purchase is due to the great value the nationals place in cattle rearing (cattle is a major export product in the country). Most migrants remit through unofficial channels, including taking money and goods home when they visit, using bus drivers and friends. High frequency of visitation makes personal remitting the most popular. Others use banks, post office, and money transfer agent such as Western Union. Associated with diaspora and African development is ensuring that brain drain is moderated and encouraging brain circulation. Former President Mbeki of South Africa once pledged about US$71 million to encourage highly skilled citizens to stay in (or return to) the country (Campbell 2007). In an attempt to ease the effect of emigration of health workers in Lesotho, the Minister of Health and Social Welfare met with Basotho health professionals in the UK to discuss the plans that the Lesotho government had for those who returned. In order to attract skills back home, several governments are implementing

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economic policies that would guarantee employment, investment, and internationally competitive income. The government of Malawi has introduced economic and investment policies since 2000. These have helped improve economic performance and attracted the attention of potential professional returnees. In collaboration with DFID, the government is offering incentives to discourage emigration of health professionals. Sadly, brain circulation (generally defined as return home of skilled emigrants), which has been successful in developed countries and in India and China, has not quite taken off in Southern Africa because the social, economic, and emotional investment risks are high and minimize its usefulness in the region and the rest of Africa (Wickramasekara 2002). It works best within developed nations’ socioeconomic systems where the environment for setting up the networks required for profitable professional, academic, and commercial ventures are quite advanced and favor performance and competition. But it is not so in Africa where populations are transitional.

Human Rights Much of the policies on international migration either affects or is influenced by the rights of people to move freely between countries. Though human trafficking has become increasingly important in human rights issues, irregular migration takes precedence because of its general and more transparent nature. Irregular migration is movement of people across cross-international borders without appropriate travel documents (i.e., passport and entry visa). It also applies to migrants who entered another country legally but stayed beyond the time permitted by their visitor of work permit. An alternative concept of irregular migration is undocumented migration. The two terms are widely preferred to the apparently derogatory one “illegal migration” because the concept “illegal” criminalizes the act of irregular border crossing. Due to the absence of effective border controls in many African countries, irregular migration did not seem to exist until the twentieth century. While irregular immigration occurred in Zambia and Zimbabwe during the peak of mining, none is comparable to the attraction of South Africa. Irregular movement to South Africa by men and women began in the 1920s. Women were more disadvantaged than men in getting jobs. Apart from domestic work and street hawking, some women got into more demeaning activities such as prostitution (Crush 2000, p. 17). A decline in recruitment of foreign mine workers occurred in the 1960s partly due to the negative post-independence attitudes in several Southern African countries toward apartheid South Africa. The governments of Zambia, Tanzania, and Malawi did not favor labor migration to South Africa; so Zambia and Tanzania withdrew its mine workers shortly after independence and Malawi did so in 1972 (Crush et al. 2005). The policies which restricted migration to South African mines fostered irregular migration to South Africa in pursuit of employment and higher living standards in South Africa’s multi-sectoral economy. Several countries which did not permit their citizens to visit or work in South Africa suspended this policy when apartheid formally ended in 1994. The attraction to Zimbabwe, where almost a quarter of a million African migrants were employed in 1961, and Zambia had dwindled remarkable as their economies declined (Crush et al. 2005). Also, the lifting of apartheid occurred at a time of serious economic and political turmoil in most other parts of sub-Saharan Africa. These factors boosted irregular migration to South Africa. Initially, employment of irregular migrants was concentrated in the commercial farm sector and mostly in farms close to the borders of Zimbabwe and Mozambique (Crush 1999). But political changes in the 1990s enhanced opportunities for irregular employment in urban centers such as Johannesburg and Durban, and the social and environmental effects of this drew the most attention to the increasing inflow of irregular migrants to the country. Zimbabweans form the second largest group of irregular migrants in South Africa. Between 1994 and 1999, they grew much faster than the Mozambicans did (27.0 % annually), and from 2000 to 2004, they grew annually by 12 % (8.5 % points more than the

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corresponding growth rate of Mozambicans). In the absence of reliable statistics on irregular migrants, the deportation figures give some idea of the trend of irregular migration. The total number of deportees from South Africa between 1994 and 1995 increased from 90,692 to 183,861 (an increase of over 100 %). It is acknowledged that this increase may be an effect of the governments’ restriction of movements into the country and an intensified search for irregular migrants than increase in irregular immigration. Zimbabwe’s economy has struggled immensely since 1990. The decision by ZANU PF, the ruling party, in 2000 to redistribute highly productive white-owned farms to black nationals worsened the state of the country’s economy (Bracking 2005; Moyo and Yeros 2005). Zimbabwe’s poor rose markedly after the 2002 elections as a result of international discontent with the reelection of Robert Mugabe, the inability of blacks to maintain the commercial value of the land, and the political excesses of Mugabe. This forced scores of thousands of young Zimbabwean men and women to emigrate to South Africa and Botswana. Botswana has historically been a transit station for refugees and travelers who moved northward from South Africa to Zambia and Tanzania to escape violent conflict in their country. Between 1976 and 1978, about 10,000 refugees who escaped the apartheid regime of South Africa to seek asylum in Zambia and Tanzania went through Botswana whose government was exceptionally sympathetic to refugees. Botswana was also a popular destination of Zimbabwean refugees in the 1970s and remains so to irregular migrants from Zimbabwe. Deportation figures indicate that about 95 % of all deportees from Botswana are Zimbabweans. The average annual growth rate of irregular migrants in Botswana between 2000 and 2007 is 28.1 % (Campbell 2009). The surge in irregular migration to Botswana is largely due to geographical distance and cultural relationship between the two countries. The northeastern part of Botswana is dominated by the Bakalanga whose ancestry is in Zimbabwe and South Africa. Other contributors to irregular migration since the 1970s include: (1) the financial cost passport and visa may be too high for the poor, (2) poor education limits potential migrants’ access to information about where and how to obtain international travel document, (3) mileage distance between the potential migrant’s residence and the city (where travel documents are obtained) may be too far, (4) corruption of customs and immigration officers at border posts, and (5) close proximity of potential migrant’s residence to the destination country. Among the difficulties experienced by irregular migrants in Southern Africa is the abuse of their right to economic and social services. Much of this is due to negative opinion of nationals of the host country (i.e., the destination country) about irregular migration. Irregular migrants are usually stereotyped as criminals as well as being the perpetrators of unemployment and spread of sexually transmitted diseases in host countries. Irregular migration has therefore contributed to a rise in xenophobia in several countries in the region, especially Botswana, Namibia, and South Africa (SAMP 2001; Crush and Pendleton 2004). Table 5 indicates that Namibians and Batswana are less tolerant of irregular migrants than South Africans. Paradoxically, even nationals such as Mozambicans and Zambians who have been victimized by xenophobic reactions to their presence in major destinations like South Africa and Botswana are apparently also intolerant of irregular migrants (Crush 2000; Nyamnjoh 2002; Campbell 2003; Campbell and Oucho 2003; Crush and Pendleton 2004). Over half of Mozambicans and Zimbabweans would support a policy by their government if it denied legal protection to irregular migrants. Generally, there was overwhelming support for a policy which ensured that irregular migrants were never granted freedom of speech, voting right, and legal protection and giving policy the right to apprehend all irregular migrants as well as military presence along the country’s borders. Some preferred the arrest of employers of irregular migrants, while nearly a third approved the use of electric fencing of national borders. Notwithstanding these negative attitudes toward irregular migrants, the policies of governments should be guided by the United Nations International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families. Though irregular migrants have limited coverage within this Convention, it may be argued that, subject to correction of residence status, all migrants should be treated

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Table 5 Nationals support of government policies to minimize irregular migration, by country of enumeration (%) Support policy Police right to detain suspected irregular migrant Foreigners to carry identification always Increase tax to assist border patrol Use army to patrol border Allocate more money to border protection Punish employers of irregular migrant Turn on electric fence No freedom of speech for irregular migrant No voting right for irregular migrant No legal protection of irregular migrant No social service to irregular migrant

South Africa 82.4

Namibia 95.1

Botswana 87.6

Zimbabwe 77.5

Mozambique 88.3

Swaziland 56.9

74.9 20.6 82.6 61.1 81.1 60.4 85.5

89.6 49.9 94.6 80.7 94.8 79.8 90.9

82.0 37.7 94.9 68.5 95.4 62.7 94.8

65.7 14.6 62.0 39.8 57.7 47.5 82.9

92.3 35.7 71.7 61.0 86.6 22.9 84.5

47.7 11.4 73.3 51.4 66.0 33.7 87.3

88.7 62.1 65.4

98.8 64.7 49.9

98.4 59.9 77.3

90.4 50.4 46.5

96.1 57.3 33.9

95.8 46.2 40.7

Source: SAMP (2001) Raw data from 2001 NIPS survey

as equals with nationals and should therefore be granted freedom of expression of religious and cultural beliefs and practices, social independence, medical care, education of children, and judicial rights in cases of detention and deportation (United Nations 1990, Article 1.1; Bosniak 1991). Other contributors to irregular migration since the 1970s include: (1) the financial cost passport and visa may be too high for the poor; (2) poor education limits potential migrants’ access to information about where and how to obtain international travel document; (3) Mileage distance between the potential migrants residence and the city (where travel documents are obtained) may be too far; (4) corruption of customs and immigration officers at border posts; (5) close proximity of potential migrant’s residence to the destination country. Irregular immigration contributes substantially to economic development of the nations throughout the world. Contrary to “stealing” jobs from nationals, these migrants actually save the host citizens much from the low wages they receive and their willingness to work in sectors which nationals do not favor. Moreover, they do not necessarily benefit from health and unemployment insurance. Lack of data makes it difficult to determine the financial benefit of irregular migration to African nations; but there is evidence that in the USA, they save the private sector millions of dollars annually due to wage depression (Huddle 1995). An increasing area of concern to governments in the SADC region is the trafficking of women and children. Human trafficking involves deception of the victims and their parents about the eventual benefits of the transporting to the destination. Unlike people smuggling, the association between victims and traffickers does not end with the arrival at the destination. It continues and is often exploitive and violent (Orhant 2009, p. 4). In Africa, this occurs mainly between West and East Africa (the source) and South Africa where they are used mostly as prostitutes. Businesswomen in Malawi often work with longdistance truck drivers to recruit young women with promises of marriage, education, and jobs in South Africa. Trafficking of Asian women to South Africa involves trips through transit countries, such as Lesotho and Mozambique, to Johannesburg and Cape Town where they are forced to become commercial sex workers. Other sources of trafficked women include Eastern European countries from which women are flown to South Africa with false offers of employment as waitresses and domestic workers (Adepoju 2005).

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Table 6 Moving to another country Consideration of moving abroad A great deal Some None at all Do not know

South Africa 40.0 41.4 15.7 2.9

Namibia 28.9 40.4 26.6 4.1

Botswana 33.3 33.7 27.4 5.7

Zimbabwe 71.2 20.8 6.0 1.9

Swaziland 55.8 29.4 11.1 3.7

Lesotho 43.8 34.4 17.9 4.0

Average 44.8 34.4 17.2 3.6

Source: Crush et al. (2005)

Future Emigration Several studies by SAMP in the SADC region in 2002–2003 indicate strong intentions by young professionals to emigrate. The studies were done in six countries and the respondents were final year students in tertiary education institutions. The students were interviewed about their future emigration intentions. The results indicated that 45 % of students who were about to enter the labor market had given a great deal of consideration to emigrating (Table 6). The highest proportion of potential emigrants was in Zimbabwe and the lowest was in Namibia. Only 17 % of them had never considered moving to another country. The data also showed that 88 % of the students preferred to move to the USA, South Africa, and Europe (in descending order), and about 7 % of them had already applied for work permits in the country they were most likely to move to (Crush et al. 2005). With 62 % of the primary reasons for wanting to emigrate, economic factors dominated the emigration consideration. They include income, job availability, cost of living, professional advancement, etc. Thirty-two percent intended to stay in the destination for a long time (over 5 years), while for 28 % the intended length of stay was 2–5 years. There was a general desire to maintain socioeconomic links with families at home. The majority (37 %) wished to visit home yearly, while 28 % intended such visits to be once every few months. Meanwhile, 52 % intended to remit once a month, while 19 % wished to do so a few times a year. Relatively few students (17 %) expressed satisfaction with their countries’ current economic condition, and just over a quarter anticipated future improvements in the economy. Even economically prosperous countries (Botswana and South Africa) were not perceived favorably. While some people may argue that intentions and behavior are mutually independent, there is considerable reason to believe otherwise (see Campbell 2001 for a comprehensive discussion of the interrelationship between attitude and behavior). Considering the effect of the ongoing global financial crisis on the demand for luxury goods, it is more likely now than in 2002 that the professionals (especially health providers) would increasingly look elsewhere for higher real income.

International Migration Policy Until recently, migration (internal and international) was not considered a significant area in the development of human populations and was therefore excluded from national policies. This position has changed, and recognition of the positive economic effects of international migration has influenced several governments to develop policies which address especially brain drain, brain circulation, diaspora, and financial remittances. Several Southern African countries claim to have policies which address international migration, especially issues related to irregular migration. Table 7 indicates that the international migration in Botswana, Malawi, and South Africa operates on “policies” which determine their goals on some immigration and emigration issues. For example, Botswana seeks to reduce overall level of immigration while discouraging brain circulation (United Nations 2006). But the mechanism for attaining these goals does not exist. Presently, the government is actively working toward developing a comprehensive international migration policy. So far, it has addressed some immigration issues using the

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Table 7 Excerpts o f immigration and emigration policies of three countries Country Overall Level Malawi Botswana South Africa

Lower Lower Lower

Immigration policy Highly integration Skills of noncitizen level – Lower Maintain

Overall Yes Yes Yes

Emigration Encouraging Return of citizens No interview No interview Lower

Yes No Yes

Source: United Nations (2006)

Immigration Act (Botswana 1987). South Africa is the only country in the region with a comprehensive international migration policy (South Africa 2010). All other countries operate from the Constitution. This is not adequate because, as much as possible, the international migration policy should address all legal and development aspects of immigration and emigration. In order for Southern Africa to attain maximum benefit from the positive effects of emigration, the governments should endeavor to produce comprehensive international migration policies as soon as possible. South Africa’s experience shows that it requires considerable time, money, and commitment to produce a fairly humane migration policy.

Conclusion Southern Africa has been a center of considerable internal and international migration before the seventeenth century, and their importance has grown since 1990 due to positive and negative economic and political factors which have had significant effects on socioeconomic development in the region. Both internal and international migrations have been largely influenced by the markedly different economies in the region and particularly the dominant South African economy. Though government perceptions of international migration vary, there has been a general shift from the pessimistic to the optimistic because of the observed positive effects of the diasporas and migrant remittances. Hence, there has been increasing positive response to the idea that cooperation between governments and the diaspora is crucial to the enhancement of national economic development. The contributions of the Basotho, Batswana, Mozambican, South African, Swazi, and Zimbabwean diasporas to economic and social development in the home countries are highly commendable. Though it is not advisable to rely too much on migrant remittances, at the expense of macroeconomic sources of national development, they have the potential to improve the standards of living of families living in rural and urban areas. The contribution to children’s education alone constitutes a viable investment in human development. For many poor families, this may not have been possible without migration.

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Huddle DL (1995) The net national cost of illegal immigration into the United States. Curr World Lead 38(2):11–34 IRIN (2012) Zimbabwe: remittance saved the country from collapse. Humanitarian news and analysis. IRIN, United Nations, New York Kok P, Gelderblom D, Oucho JO, Van Zyl J (eds) (2006) Migration in South and Southern Africa: dynamics and determinants. Human Sciences Research Council Press, Cape Town Levitt P (1998) Social remittances: migration driven local-level forms of cultural diffusion. Int Migr Rev 32(4):926–948 Levitt NS, Katzenellenbogen JM, Bradshaw D, Hoffman MN, Bonnici F (1993) The prevalence and identification of risk factors for NIDDM in urban Africans in Cape Town, South Africa. Diabetes Care 16(4):601–607 Lucas RE (1987) Emigration to South Africa’s mines. Am Econ Rev 77(3):313–330 Mattes R, Richmond W (2000) The brain drain: what do skilled South Africans think? In: Crush J (ed) Losing our minds: skills migration and the South African brain drain, migration policy series no 18. Idasa, Cape Town, pp 9–35 Mattes R, Crush J, Richmond W (2000) The brain gain: skilled migrants and immigration policy in postapartheid South Africa. Migration policy series no 20. Idasa, Cape Town McDonald DA, Mashike L, Golden C (2000) The lives and times of African migrants and immigrants in post-apartheid South Africa. In: McDonald DA (ed) On borders: perspectives on international migration in Southern Africa. St. Martin’s Press, New York, pp 168–195 Mlambo AS (2010) A history of Zimbabwean migration to 1990. In: Crush J, Tevera D (eds) Zimbabwe’s exodus: crisis, migration, survival. IDRC, Ottawa, pp 52–76 Moyo S, Yeros P (2005) Land occupations and reforms in Zimbabwe: toward the national democratic revolution. In: Moyo S, Yeros P (eds) Resurgence of rural movements in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Zed Books, London, pp 165–208 Nyamnjoh FB (2002) Local attitudes towards citizenship and foreigners in Botswana: an appraisal of recent press stories. J South Afr Stud 28(4):755–775 Posel D, Casale D (2003) What has been happening to internal labour migration in South Africa, 1993–1999? S Afr J Econ 71(3):455–479 Potts D (2010) Internal migration in Zimbabwe: the impact of livelihood destruction in rural and urban areas. In: Crush J, Tevera D (eds) Zimbabwe’s exodus: crisis, migration, survival. IDRC, Ottawa, pp 79–109 SAMP (2001) National Attitudes to Immigration and Refugee Policies (NIPS) Tables. Southern African Migration Project, Johannesburg South Africa (2010) Immigration amendment bill. Government Gazette No 33478 of 20 August 2010. Ministry of Home Affairs, Pretoria Spurdle AB, Jenkins T (1996) The origins of the Lemba “black Jews” of Southern Africa: Evidence from p12F2 and other Y-chromosome markers. Am J Hum Genet 59(5):1126–1132 Tevera D, Zinyama L (2002) Zimbabweans who move: perspectives on international migration in Zimbabwe. In: Crush J (ed) Migration policy series no 25. Southern African Migration Project, Cape Town Tishkoff SA, Reed FA, Friedlaender FR, Ehret C, Ranciaro A et al (2009) The genetic structure and history of Africans and African Americans. Science 324(5930):1035–1044 United Nations (1990) International convention on the protection of the rights of all migrant workers and members of their families, resolution 45/158. UN General Assembly, New York United Nations (2006) International migration 2006, United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs. Population Division, New York

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Trans-Saharan Slave Trade Michael Kehinde* Department of Political Science, Lagos State University, Lagos, Lagos, Nigeria

Definition Trans-Saharan slave trade was conducted within the ambits of the trans-Saharan trade, otherwise referred to as the Arab trade. Trans-Saharan trade, conducted across the Sahara Desert, was a web of commercial interactions between the Arab world (North Africa and the Persian Gulf) and sub-Saharan Africa. The main objects of this trade were gold and salt; gold was in abundance in the western part of Africa, but scarce in North Africa. On the other hand, while salt remains indispensable to human societies, it was not producible in sub-Saharan Africa, but was abundant in North Africa. This created a rationale for trading between these two regions, separated by a vast and hostile terrain. Subsequently, there developed an intricate web of trade routes, powered by caravans of camels, between different sub-Saharan societies and the Arab world. It was during the course of trading that human beings gradually became items of exchange as the need for manpower grew on the north side of the Sahara. Trans-Saharan slave trade was the trade in “human commodity,” sourced from different places in sub-Saharan Africa, destined for locations north of the Sahara Desert, the Mediterranean shores, and the Middle East. Unlike its later trans-Atlantic variant, trans-Saharan slave trade took place within the context of a larger exchange relation between black Africa on the one hand and the Maghreb and the rest of the Arab world on the other. It has been argued that perhaps one of the most significant effects of the transSaharan trade was the establishment and proliferation of the trade in human beings (Brett 1969). Sub-Saharan African slaves were bartered for bars of salt and other Mediterranean goods.

Origin Trans-Saharan slave trade has its roots in classical times. Though it is difficult to specifically state the origin of the trade, evidence suggests that as early as 1000 BC, slaves were one of the chief commodities of the trade between Carthage (centered on present-day Tunisia) and regions located to the south of the Sahara Desert (Boahen 1962). By the fifth century BC, trans-Saharan trade, of which slave trade was an important component, had become very significant to the economy of Carthage. Trans-Saharan trade blossomed following the introduction of camels as pack animals for the arduous journey across the Sahara around 100 AD. While it is difficult to specifically date the origin of trans-Saharan slave trade, it is possible to state that the trade reached its peak between the eighth and the late sixteenth century AD. Indeed, by the tenth century AD, North Africa was “chiefly remarkable for black slaves” (Rose 2003). Trans-Saharan slave trade flourished following the establishment of Islamic kingdoms in North Africa around the seventh and eighth century AD. The wars waged to spread Islam beyond North Africa into other regions of the continent provided the initial impetus for trans-Saharan slave trade as prisoners of war became enslaved and transported to the north side of the Sahara. The first set of slaves during this period was transported to Islamized Egypt following the treaty of protection with Nubia (present-day Sudan), as tributes in exchange for peaceful relations between the two states (Shinnie 1978).

*Email: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 F. D. Bean, S. K. Brown (eds.), Selected Topics in Migration Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-19631-7_3

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Trans-Saharan Slave Trade

Though the Koran does not discriminate among races, racial prejudices were later used by Arab slave traders to justify slave trade and significantly influenced the enslavement of sub-Saharan Africans. Black people were regarded as “dim” of intelligence and that “. . .the moral characteristics found in their mentality are close to the instinctive characteristics found naturally in animals” (Reid and Lane 2004). Hence, they were considered right for enslavement, and sub-Saharan Africa gradually became the greatest reservoir of slaves to the Arab world. Slaves were sourced through raids and conquests and exchanged by local rulers for a wide variety of Mediterranean products, especially salt and horses. Slaves were transported in caravans of camels to North Africa through several routes across the Sahara. As a rule, slave caravans usually departed North Africa between September and October, and the return journey began just before the start of the rainy season in April or May. All things being equal, the duration of the journey was usually 70–90 days depending on the size of the caravan (Boahen 1962). The journey was hazardous and difficult. The major source of casualty being the harsh conditions of the desert and the unpredictable sandstorms could bury alive an entire caravan or obliterate routes. Slaves were transported naked, barefoot, and chained around the neck. They were also burdened with heavy loads of commodities on their head. About 80 % of slaves transported across the Sahara perished in the course of the journey.

Rationale Following the conquest and Islamization of the Maghreb and the Arabian Peninsula in the seventh and eighth centuries AD, the Islamic state supplanted the old order and inherited the trans-Saharan trade. Slavery is taken for granted in Islam; the religion provides a humane treatment of slaves with their rights protected under the Koran. It also states who can be enslaved – generally non-Muslims. As Islam was expanding through wars and conquests, prisoners of war, who refused to accept Islam, were enslaved as required by the Koran. As the growing need (economic, military, and prestige) for manpower in the courts of rulers in North Africa and the Middle East continued to outstrip the supply by conquests, slaves were sought from places far and wide. This was justified by the philosophy that it was legitimate to enslave black people as they were no better than animals. It was during this period that black Africa became the largest depot of slaves to the Islamic world. Slave labor was mainly used in the service sector – domestic chores as cooks, wet nurses for masters’ children, and waiters on ladies of the house and as concubines. It has been argued that the overwhelming desire for female over male slaves in the trans-Saharan trade was driven by the need for concubines. It is lawful under Islamic law for a man (Muslim) to have a number of slave women with whom (only) he could have sexual relations. Concubinage however allowed some degree of integration into the society for the slaves as they became excluded from resale and became free following the death of their masters (if they had children for them). Their children were free, as the assumption was that it was impossible for fathers to enslave their children. Other roles served by slaves included military and security. Slaves were trained as distinct corps of fighting men and bodyguards to rulers and merchants. Slave soldiers were a common phenomenon in the Islamic world. Black troops were first introduced into Egypt between 868 and 884 AD (Hunwick 1992). The Ifriqiya and the Fatimid also raised corps of black slave soldiers used in their many wars. Slaves were also used as bodyguards and gatekeepers for members of the royalty and merchants. Black troops were often used to counteract rebellious tendencies among local soldiers by the creation of a corps of alien soldiers who had no local connections and whose allegiance can be taken for granted. Slaves were also used as administrators and traders. They were used in the service of their lords as record keepers, as deputies, and as couriers. They engaged in commercial activities on behalf of their

Trans-Saharan Slave Trade

29

masters; they accompanied them on commercial trips and served as bodyguards as well as took care of the pack animals for the journey. These different uses for slaves aided the perpetuation of the trans-Saharan slave trade as it engendered growing demands for black slaves on the north side of the Sahara. Sub-Saharan Africa remained a vast repository of slaves as political instability and Muslim expansionism provided the impetus for slave raiding and slave trading. Trans-Saharan slave trade blossomed until the advent and growth of the transAtlantic slave trade in the sixteenth century and the eventual abolition of slavery in the nineteenth century. Even after the abolition, slaves continued to change hands in sub-Saharan Africa between local rulers and Muslim slave traders until European colonization.

Features Over 28 million sub-Saharan African slaves were enslaved in North Africa and the Middle East during the course of the trans-Saharan slave trade (see Austen 1992). However, the population of slaves taken from sub-Saharan Africa was much more as only about 20 % of slaves successfully made the trip across the Sahara to the slave markets on the Mediterranean coast. Trans-Saharan slave routes were littered with countless human skeletons – fatal remains of those who perished in the desert. Trans-Saharan slave trade was dominated by female slaves. The ratio of female to male slaves in North Africa and the Middle East was 2:1. This has been explained in the desire for slaves not primarily as laborers, but as concubines. Harem of rulers and merchants were reported to host hundreds of female slaves. For example, the harem in the Fatimid palace in Cairo had over 6000 concubines (Khan 2009). Most male slaves on the other hand were castrated and employed as soldiers, bodyguards, or administrators. For the greater part of the slave trade, slaves were exchanged for other good (salt, horses, and other Mediterranean goods). However, records from Morocco in 1876 show that market prices for slaves ranged between $48 and $140 (US Dollar of 1876) (Black Moor n/d). Other means of exchange included bars of salt, cowry shells, and much later, the French francs. Prices varied according to the quality of the human commodity, sex, and attractiveness. Female slaves commanded much higher price than male slaves, with “attractive virgins” costing between $192 and $386 (Black Moor n/d).

Decline Trans-Saharan trade generally began to decline with the entrance of European traders and adventurers into Africa beginning from the sixteenth century. Trans-Saharan slave trade was the most affected by the European with the emergence of trans-Atlantic slave trade, which diverted the direction of flow from the desert to the ocean. Furthermore, following the European and American abolition of slavery, major slave markets in North Africa and beyond began to decline, making the trade less attractive. Though these factors greatly hampered the flow of slaves across the Sahara, it was not until European colonization replaced local authorities that trans-Saharan trade in general experienced a fatal blow. Firstly, European colonizers enforced the abolition of slavery in their new domains and promoted “legitimate” commerce in place of slavery. In addition, as the European mode of organization of society and economy was imposed, altering the traditional pattern of conducting business, the desert trade was fundamentally affected. The stability and security engendered by the traditional power structure were shattered and could not be reproduced under European political control. This resulted in the desert becoming unsafe for caravans as they became easy targets for raiding desert bands. Finally, the transformation from the traditional to the

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Trans-Saharan Slave Trade

modern mode of production and the growth of the railway shifted the direction of trade from the Maghreb through the Sahara to Europe and the Americas across the ocean. While caravans were useful to cross the desert, they were comparatively slow and ineffective compared to the railway and the ocean liners, which were much faster and capable of conveying multiples of caravan cargoes. Trans-Saharan slave trade resisted these forces well into the second decade of the twentieth century when it was forced to an end. Though the trade is all but dead, slavery still existed in various forms in regions that were sources of slaves during the trans-Saharan slave trade. In Mauritania and parts of Mali, slavery remains an integral part of the society. However, slaves are no longer transported across the Sahara. In other words, contemporary slavery in Mauritania and parts of Mali are domestic in nature, and migration is limited to internal movement of slaves from poor regions to more affluent locations (within the same country).

References Austen R (1992) The Mediterranean Islamic trade out of Africa: a tentative census. Slav Abolit J Slav Post-Slave Stud 13(1):214–248 Black Moor (n/d) Arab racism and imperialism in Sudan (Africa). http://blackmoro.blogspot.ca/p/ moslims-de-pioniers-van-de-afrikaanse.html. Retrieved from 5 Dec 2012 Boahen A (1962) The caravan trade in the nineteenth century. J Afr Hist 3(2), Third conference on African history and archaeology: school of oriental and African studies, University of London, 3–7 July 1961, pp 349–359 Brett M (1969) Ifriqiya as a market for Saharan trade from the tenth to the twelfth century A.D. J Afr Hist X(3):347–364 Hunwick J (1992) Black Africans in the Mediterranean world: introduction to a neglected aspect of the African Diaspora. In: Savage E (ed) The human commodity: perspectives on the trans-Saharan slave trade. Frank Cass, London, pp 5–38 Khan M (2009) Islamic Jihad: a legacy of forced conversions, imperialism and slavery. iUniverse, Bloomington Reid A, Lane P (2004) African historical archaeologies. Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers, New York Rose C (2003) Minerals, medals, faith and slaves: the trans-Saharan commodity trade. Paper presented at the Hemispheres Summer Teachers’ Institute, Austin. http://www.utexas.edu/cola/orgs/hemispheres/_ files/pdf/presentations/Metals_Minerals_Faith_Slaves.pdf. Retrieved from 12 Nov 2012 Shinnie P (1978) Christian Nubia. In: Fage J (ed) The Cambridge history of Africa, vol. 2, c. 500BC – AD1050. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 556–588

Further Reading Fage J (1969) Slavery and the slave trade in the context of West African History. J Afr Hist 10(3):393–404 Law R (1967) The Garamantes and trans-Saharan enterprise in classical times. J Afr Hist V111(2):181–200 McDougall E (1992) Salt, Saharans, and the trans-Saharan trade: nineteenth century developments. In: Savage E (ed) The human commodity: perspectives on the trans-Saharan slave trade. Frank Cass, London, pp 61–88 Savage E (ed) (1992) The human commodity: perspectives on the trans-Saharan slave trade. Frank Cass, London

W

Western African Migration Paulina Makinwa Adebusoye Nigeria Institute of Social and Economic Research, Ibadan, Nigeria

Diaspora

Economic migrant

Glossary of Migration Terms Source

Asylum (territorial)

Brain drain

Clandestine/ irregular migration Country of destination Country of origin

http://www.un-ngls.org/IOMmigration-Glossary http://www.hrlawgroup.org/ resources/content/ IHRLGTraffickin_tsStandards. pdf Protection granted by a State to an alien on its own territory, based on the principle of non-refoulement, leading to the enjoyment of certain internationally recognized rights. Emigration of trained and talented individuals to a third country, due to causes such as conflict or lack of opportunities in their country of origin. Secret or concealed migration in breach of immigration requirements. Country that is a destination for migratory flows (legal or illegal). Country that is a source of migratory flows (legal or illegal).

Forced migration Migrant flow

Migrant stock Migration

Pull factors Push factors Refugee

Any people or ethnic population that leave their traditional ethnic homelands, being dispersed throughout other parts of the world. Person leaving his/her habitual place of residence to settle outside his/her country of origin in order to improve his/her quality of life. Movements of populations caused by the need to flee from danger, persecutions and violence. Number of migrants counted as moving to or from a country to access employment or to establish themselves over a defined period of time. Number of migrants residing in a country at a particular point in time. Process of any movement of persons, internal or international, whatever its length and causes. Factors that attract migrants to the country of destination. Factors that drive migrants to leave their countries of origin. A person who, “owing to wellfounded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinions, is outside the country of

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 F. D. Bean, S. K. Brown (eds.), Selected Topics in Migration Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-19631-7_4

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Western African Migration

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Trafficking

his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country.” All acts and attempted acts involved in the recruitment, transportation within or across borders, purchase, sale, transfer, receipt or harboring of a person involving the use of deception, coercion, or debt bondage for the purpose of holding such person in involuntary servitude (domestic, sexual, or reproductive).

Definition West Africa is a region extending over 6618 square kilometers and including 16 countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo, whose combined population in 2012 was estimated at 324 million (Population Reference Bureau 2012). In terms of population size, these countries range from Nigeria, with about half the region’s population, to Cape Verde with a population of 0.5 million. Seven West African countries are classified as “least developed” by the United Nations, three (Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger) are landlocked, and seven, located in the savanna zone of uncertain rainfall, have been seriously affected by drought in recent years. All West African countries have high annual population growth rates and low incomes per capita. In spite of the fact that three are oil-producing countries, levels of industrialization are low and the agricultural sector is the principal employer. Based on political, ethnocultural, geographical (climatic), and economic factors, the countries of West Africa form a loosely integrated organic region. The region became the Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS) by a 1975 treaty signed by all member states. Across much of the region, migrations of men, women, and children have long been an integral

part of labor markets and livelihoods. West African citizens are among the most mobile. Most migrations are, however, within the region representing about 90% of total migration. This intraregional migration is at least seven times greater than migration from West Africa to the rest of the world (U.N. 2002). Patterns of migrations in West Africa are shaped by two important sets of factors, namely, the climatic belts which run parallel to each other from the dry savannah belts in the north to the humid belt along the coast, and its political history of colonization by the French, English, and Portuguese metropolitan powers. Before colonization, West Africa was an aggregation of loosely defined kingdoms notably Dahomey, Ghana, Mali, and Songhai. Colonization brought partitioning into several countries which remained under colonial governments until independence in the 1960s. While precolonial migrations were motivated by the search for fertile land and pasture (by farmers and nomads) and the quest for security from various internecine wars, colonization by European powers established nation states and introduced an economic model that affected motives and flows of migrations. In recent years, globalization with concomitant increases in transnational capital movements and worldwide trade in goods and services has spurred people to move, with much greater frequency and beyond West Africa, to industrialized countries in Europe and America.

Data There is consensus on the definition of a migrant as a person over 15 years old living for more than 1 year in a country of which he is not a national. However, a major challenge to the study of causes and consequences of migration in West Africa is the dearth of migration data. Censuses yield reliable migration data bearing in mind major drawbacks; not many West African countries have conducted regular censuses, and censuses provide limited data on stocks rather than flows of migrants and contain little additional information on migration. Data collected at ports and land

Western African Migration

entry points are another source of data that are available for most countries. They are, however, less reliable for documenting transborder West African migrants who often utilize clandestine routes across scantily policed borders. Data generated from ad hoc surveys are among the best type of migration data provided it is recognized that, in large countries, surveys may not lend themselves to systematic national coverage. The Africa Union, mindful of the importance of reliable migration data to effective migration management, has suggested enacting laws for collection and dissemination of data and greater coordination between ministries and research institutions gathering migration data.

Precolonial and Colonial Migrations Precolonial migrations were spontaneous, little organized movements which were generally circular or seasonal. People moved in search of new land for settlements as havens of security from rampant internecine wars. Farmers practicing shifting agriculture also moved periodically in search of virgin, fertile land while climatic changes forced pastoralists to move from drier areas in search of greener pastures. Whole tribes are known to have moved long distances to escape hostilities or to search for fertile land or pasture (Amin 1974). There were also precolonial, long distance migrations that established links between West Africa and North Africa based on the transSaharan caravan trade in gold, kola nuts, and slaves. Colonial intervention brought an end to all internecine wars. It also led to the decline of trans-Saharan trade along with its population flows. Furthermore, the slave trade declined sharply at the end of the nineteenth century. The earlier lifestyle of frequent migrations mostly linked to nomadism and shifting agriculture was drastically changed when colonizing powers created large agricultural plantations and opened up new mining concerns which became favored enclaves for mining and production of cash crops for export. The establishment of plantations and mines formed the basis of areal inequalities as

33

the enclaves were gradually transformed into pockets of rapid economic development and prosperity in sharp contrast to poor surrounding areas. Other far-reaching structural changes introduced by colonial administrators include the improvement of transportation systems, monetization of the economy, and the imposition of a variety of levies and taxes requiring cash payments. With time, not only pastoralists in search of pasture but also sedentary farmers seeking supplementary income migrated during the dry season (slack farming period) from the drier interior to work on cocoa and coffee plantations of the more humid, coastal farm estates (MakinwaAdebusoye 1983). The combination of the traditional, climate-induced, north-to-south movements and colonial economic and administrative transformations permanently altered the nature of population movements in the region. French West Africa was characterized by the periodic, shortterm migration of workers from the drier countries of the interior (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, and Niger) to the coffee plantation of the Ivory Coast and the ground-nut belt of Senegambia. Similarly, in British West Africa, the coastal countries of Ghana, Sierra Leone, and The Gambia received migrant workers from northern Nigeria and the French colonies of Togo, Mali, and Burkina Faso (UN Economic Commission for Africa 1983).For economic and administrative reasons, colonial authorities also encouraged long distance movements between colonial blocks (as between British or French colonies). These movements were facilitated by colonial laws through bilateral agreements to ensure labor for colonial enterprises (Gould 1974). The colonial development strategy which increased the demand for labor also induced the creation of a highly mobile subpopulation referred to in the literature as a “floating population” which was forced to move from poor areas of subsistence agriculture to the colonial enclaves of agricultural plantations and mines. These movements were given added impetus by the colonial policy of forced conscription and forced labor particularly during the interwar years (1919–39). In French colonies, peasants were forced to work in the champs administratifs, plantations growing

34

crops considered essential to the colonial economy. Such policies prompted many peasants to migrate from the French colonies (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Ivory Coast, and Mali) to the English colonies of Ghana and Nigeria in order to avoid forced recruitment. The obligatory cultivation of cotton in the Upper Volta (Burkina Faso) was responsible for the migration of an estimated 100,000 peasants from that country to the Gold Coast (Ghana) in search of work (Ajayi and Crowder 1974).

Postindependence Migrations Beginning with Ghana in 1957, most West African countries gained independence from colonial rule during the 1960s. After independence, migration became more prominent as a significant livelihood strategy for the poor. The importance of both rural-rural and rural-urban migrations to the sustenance of poor families is underscored by the collective involvement of whole families in migration. The decision to migrate is seen as a family enterprise to which family members at both ends of the rural-urban migration pole contribute to ensure the attainment of two related goals; family survival and the accumulation of human capital. Usually, a prospective rural-urban migrant makes the decision to migrate in consultation with family members who, in most cases, bear part, if not all the financial cost of migration. Urbanbased family members and acquaintances from sending areas assist new migrants to adapt to life in cities. The moral and financial support to migrants is in expectation of reaping future benefit in the form of gifts or cash remittances. Family members left behind in rural areas are of particular importance. In the Sahel these migrants continue to maintain rights over their land through family members left behind (Findley 1997; MakinwaAdebusoye 1993). From the 1970s, migrations within West Africa were dominated by three migratory subsystems: a stream of migrants headed to Ghana and Ivory Coast to work in the production of gold, cocoa, and coffee which were major exports. Nigeria was the receiving country for a second subsystem as it

Western African Migration

attracted migrants on account of the petroleum boom. A third subsystem was dominated by Senegal because of trade in groundnuts. These migrations were, however, irregular and more importantly, changed or reversed directions according to the rapid changes in the economic fortunes of the major receiving countries. For example, the Nigerian economy enjoyed tremendous economic boom in the decade 1970 to 1980 due to increases in the exported volume and prices of petroleum. Consequently, Nigeria received an influx of West African migrants mostly from Ghana which accounted to over 80% while smaller percentages came from Niger, Togo, and Benin. However, by the mid-1980s, the economic recession led to the expulsion of illegal migrants from Nigeria. Ivory Coast suffered a similar fate. The export price of coffee and cocoa tripled between 1975 and 1978 resulting in an explosion in public and private investment. As a result, Ivory Coast was home to many migrants mainly from Burkina Faso, Mali, and Guinea until the mid1980s which coincided with the onset of recession. Thus, at various times, the traditional countries of immigration are Ghana, Ivory Coast, Nigeria, and Senegal, while Burkina Faso, Mali, Guinea Conakry, Cape Verde, and Togo are major labor exporting countries. Remittances emanating from rural-rural and rural-urban migrations within West Africa are important sources of livelihood to relatives in sending countries. The case of Burkina Faso, which is located in the drier Sahel region of West Africa, exemplifies the importance of remittances. Burkina Faso is a major source of migrant laborers into coastal areas for the production of primary export crops notably cocoa and coffee in Ivory Coast. Until the recent civil war in Ivory Coast, remittances from migrants accounted for a substantial portion, around a quarter of the gross domestic product (GDP) of Burkina Faso (Black et al. 2004).These sums sent back to Burkina Faso by emigrants in Ivory Coast keep entire families alive. Remittances are put to diverse use: to buy food, to pay school fees or medical bills, to finance weddings, to purchase cattle, ploughs, and agricultural vehicles, to acquire grain mills or shops,

Western African Migration

to buy plots for cultivation, to build houses, etc. A recent study of over 800 immigrant household heads in Abidjan suggests that the monetary transfer to family members both outside the country and those living in other parts of Ivory Coast remain substantial even during the civil war. As reported by Black et al. (2004), Roy Stacy, Program Director of the Famine Early Warning System (FEWS) Network, described the effect of trade liberalization and free movement of labor in West Africa as a spatial redistribution of people with approximately 8.0 million Sahelians dispersing into other parts of West Africa. Many of these migrants are now an important source of capital, ideas, and improved agriculture management techniques, which flow back to the Sahel as a result of the livelihoods diversification that has occurred with the labor mobility. A special category of migrants in West Africa were those forced to flee their homes on account of conflicts. West Africa has had waves of internally displaced persons due to successive tensions and conflicts. Notable conflicts are the Biafran war in Nigeria from 1967 to 1970, the elimination of the political opposition leaders of the Sékou Touré regime in Guinea, the liberation struggle in Guinea-Bissau from 1963 to 1973, border tensions between Senegal and Mauritania in 1989, the Chadian crisis from 1982 to 1990, the Tuareg conflict in Mali and Niger from 1990 to 1997, conflicts in the Mano River countries from 1989 to 2000, and, more recently, the crises in Ivory Coast and Sudan. These episodes generated a massive movement of internally displaced persons within the countries concerned and exodus of persons who fled abroad as refugees. As poor people fleeing in emergency situations, only an insignificant proportion of West African refugees can afford to seek asylum overseas. They usually settle in neighboring countries and have a strong desire to return to own countries when peace is restored. However, after a long exile, refugees lose refugee status and are categorized as migrants.

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Migrations in an Era of Globalization The scale of migration has increased tremendously in recent years. The timing of deteriorating socioeconomic conditions and deepening poverty in many West African countries has coincided with a period of increases in transnational capital movements and worldwide trade in goods and services spurring more West Africans to migrate to more developed countries. Beginning from the mid-1980s when the IMF introduced the structural adjustment programs which devalued the currency of most countries, traditional labor importing countries which were the relatively richer countries in the West Africa region experienced political and economic crises which spurred out-migration of their nationals. Many workers left Nigeria, Ghana, Ivory Coast, and other West African countries to South Africa, Europe, and North America, attracted by relatively higher salaries and better prospects of living conditions. North America is the main destination for West African nationals. This is mainly due to the immigration of Nigerians and nationals of other former English colonies. There is still a link between the former English and French colonies and their former colonizers; this also applies to Portugal and its former West African territories. More women, motivated by the desire for higher wages and better opportunities, are participating in recent migrations. They work in both the formal and informal labor markets as a survival strategy to augment family income, or in the case of unmarried or single mothers to fulfill their economic needs and cater for their children. There are instances in countries like Nigeria, Senegal, and Ghana where professional women who can earn higher wages leave the children in care of their husbands while they migrate; a major reversal of traditional sex roles. Table 1 sheds light on the volume of West African migrations to Europe and the USA. in the period 1995–2000. An important migration-related challenge is the “brain drain.” Since the middle 1980s, when the economies of many West African countries worsened drastically, many highly skilled workers including several medical personnel – doctors and nurses – who mainly received training locally at

Western African Migration

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Western African Migration, Table 1 Mean annual emigration to Europe and the USA, 1995–2000; selected West African countries

Ghana Senegal Cape Verde Liberia Sierra Leone Togo Gambia GuineaBissau Mauritania Total W. Africa

To Europe (1) 5840 4894 2514

To USA (2) 4563 480 951

Total (1) + (2) 10,403 5374 3465

Total population (1998 estimate) 18,449,370 9,033,530 412,240

Average annual emigration % 1995–2000 0.06 0.06 0.84

981 910

1817 1374

2798 2423

2,961,520 4,830,480

0.09 0.05

1155 1008 884

225 196 89

1380 1204 973

4,258,140 1,223,810 1,149,330

0.03 0.10 0.08

583 32,642

48 19,980

631 52,622

2,493,120 254,993,000

0.03 0.02

Source: Adapted from Black et al. 2004 Notes: 1. Migration of African citizens to European countries, by citizenship, 1995–2001, Copyright Eurostat. 2. US immigrants admitted by region and country of birth fiscal years 1995–2001, 2002 Year Book of immigration statistics, US Department of Homeland Security, and Office of immigration statistics 2003

great public expense, have left West Africa. According to the ILO up to 75% of persons emigrating from West Africa to the USA, Canada, or OECD countries have completed university level, or equivalent technical training (ILO 2003). On average, migrants who leave from West Africa have had schooling that is thrice as long as the average of the national population at migrants’ destination (UN Population Division 2002). A case study of Ghana exemplifies the damaging effect of “brain drain.” As shown in Table 2, in the period between 1995 and 2002, nearly a quarter of various cadres of health workers who were trained in Ghana emigrated. More than two thirds of medical officers (General Practitioners) left Ghana to seek livelihoods abroad leaving an increased work load for the remaining few and thus contributing to the poorer health care in Ghana. Another important migration-related challenge is trafficking in persons. The core element of trafficking is the fact that the victim is deprived of his will and is forced into slavery-like condition. Male and female children from Benin and Togo are traded to work as domestic servants in

Nigeria, and young adult girls and women from Nigeria are exploited sex workers in other West African countries, and countries of the European Union. Benin, Togo, and Nigeria are major source, transit, and destination countries for trafficked children. They are also countries of origin of trafficked women who are recruited into forced prostitution in various European and African cities.

Continuing Trends Although the changing nature of West African migrations throughout history make forecasting difficult, three migratory trends are likely to continue. First, international labor migrations from West Africa to developed countries of Europe and North America will continue due to regional economic inequalities. A second trend which is linked to the first and also likely to continue is the migration policy of developed countries that deliberately attract needed labor from West Africa. Third is the continuing rapid population growth which fuels high mobility in the region.

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Western African Migration, Table 2 Proportion of emigrated health workers as percentage of those trained, Ghana, 1995–2002 Profession GPs/medical officers Dentists Pharmacists Medical laboratory technologists Environmental health specialists Environmental health technologists Nurse/midwives Total

Trained 702 77 812 339 1 992 7876 10,799

Emigrated 487 21 352 66 1 25 1553 2505

% Leaving 69.4 27.3 43.3 19.5 100 2.5 19.7 23.2

Source: ISSER (2003) State of the Ghana Economy cited in Black 2004

The mobility will continue to generate internal rural-urban, intraregional, and international (intercontinental) migrations into the foreseeable future.

References Ajayi JFA, Crowder M (eds) (1974) History of West Africa, vol ii. Longman, London, pp 522–523 Amin S (ed) (1974) Modern migrations in western Africa. Oxford University Press for the International African Institute, Oxford Black R et al (2004) Migration and pro-poor policy in West Africa. Working paper C8 sussex centre for migration research Findley S (1997) Migration and family interactions in Africa. In: Adepoju A (ed) Family, population and development in Africa. Zed Books, London

Gould WTS (1974) International migration in tropical Africa: a bibliographical review. Int Migr Rev 8:347–365 ILO (2003) ILO activities in Africa, 2000–2003. Tenth African regional meeting. Addis Ababa. International Labour Organisation, Geneva Makinwa-Adebusoye PK (1983) Demographic aspects of climatic changes in Africa. AMAN, J Soc, Cult Environ 2(2):15–26 Makinwa-Adebusoye PK (1993) Labour migration and female-headed households. In: Federici N, Mason KO, Saogner S (eds) Women’s position and demographic change. Clarendon Press, Oxford, p 338 UN (United Nations) Economic Commission for Africa (1983) International migration, population trends and their implication for Africa, Africa population studies series, vol 4. UN Economic Commission for Africa, Addis Ababa UN Population Division (2002) International migration report. United Nations, New York

Part 2: Asylees

A

Asylum and Human Rights Thomas Southerden Department of Law, University of Sussex, Brighton, UK

Definition The legal process of allocating entitlement to international protection for migrants.

Legal Processes, International Protection, and Immigration Control While asylum is by definition a migration-related concept, the notion of human rights is applicable to a variety of contexts. In relation to migrants and migration, human rights issues can be raised both in connection to the physical and legal act of migration and also to the conditions in which migrants find themselves once having arrived in their host nation. In relation to this latter point, a number of studies have shown that migrants find themselves particularly vulnerable to human rights infractions as a result of state policies and their precarious position in host societies (see, e.g., Dembour and Kelly 2011; Benhabib 2005; Nash 2009). With regard to the former, the concepts of asylum and human rights can be considered together as essentially legal frameworks followed by states for formally recognizing and

allocating legal status to certain classes of migrant. As such, they tend not to relate to the direct intentions of the migrants themselves, but as post hoc concepts and processes States use to respond to the arrival of migrants in their territories. Despite being distinct in a number of ways, asylum and human rights, in this context, are often perceived as being similarly related to the concept of international protection. At the base of this notion is a legal expectation that a host state will refrain from returning migrants to a situation of persecution or serious harm in their home country. This expectation, known as the principle of nonrefoulement, is widely regarded as having achieved the status of a universal norm within international law. However, as mentioned above, asylum and human rights derive from differing international treaties and have differing political histories and legal statuses. Asylum as a legal process is based on the 1951 United Nations Convention on the Status of Refugees (which was principally designed to deal with the ongoing problem of refugees in postwar Europe) and its New York Protocol of 1967 (which universalized the original Convention’s application by removing its temporal and geographical limits). Under the Convention and Protocol, an individual who believes they are at risk of persecution for a specified set of reasons (political or religious opinion, race or nationality, or membership of a particular social group) and who presents themselves to the authorities of a

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 F. D. Bean, S. K. Brown (eds.), Selected Topics in Migration Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-19631-7_5

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host state seeking their protection from such persecution is regarded as an asylum seeker during the period when their claim for this protection is being considered. If such a claim meets with success, they are then formally and legally recognized as a refugee and are entitled to the forms of support and assistance described in the later sections of the Refugee Convention. In contrast, human rights concepts in migration are far more diverse in their sources of both legal legitimacy and procedures. Human rights’ relationship to international protection begins with the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, in which Article 14 declares the right “to seek and enjoy asylum.” This formulation, however, was expressly developed by the Declaration’s drafters to avoid any duty being placed on States Parties to actively grant such a status (Plender and Mole 1999, p. 81). In place of a single binding international Convention relating to the issue, then, a myriad of international instruments (including the United Nations Convention Against Torture, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child) make up a general basis for entitlements to international protection on human rights grounds, augmented by regional and national rights charters that have a greater or lesser utility for migrants’ rights claims (see, e.g., Plender and Mole 1999). However, these instruments cover a broader range of issues than the sole focus on the threat of persecution dealt with by the Refugee Convention and have either served as complementary to the role played by the Convention or as entirely separate bases for legal migration. Important in this regard is the capacity, especially in states party to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), for migrants to apply for legal residence on grounds that are distinct from issues related to international protection. Article 8 of the ECHR, the right to respect for private and family life, for example, has broadened dramatically the impact of human rights concepts on migration and has been applied to such disparate issues as family reunion, student migration, and regularization of long-term undocumented migrants. In such cases, the issue of non-refoulement does not normally arise, and

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so the key issue is therefore where a reasonable balance can be found between the legitimate exercising of states’ authority to control immigration and the individual claimant’s entitlement to exercise their rights in their adopted country. While such judgments frequently provoke controversy, they have introduced a form of independent assessment of the reasonableness of governmental efforts to manage migration. They thus provide a powerful counterpoint to the impacts of politicized immigration policy. Debate remains ongoing as to the relative superiority of asylum or human rights claims from the perspective of the protection and successful integration of migrants (see, e.g., Chetail 2012). Arguments in favor of the human rights model include its capacity to provide regularization to migrants who would fail under the Refugee Convention, for example, in cases where they are excluded from benefiting from the Convention as a result of serious nonpolitical criminality. Conversely, defenders of the Convention identify as crucially important the duties it places on host states to provide “treatment as favorable as possible and, in any event, not less favorable than that accorded to aliens generally in the same circumstances” across a range of social and economic issues related to integration. Whichever route is deemed most appropriate to a given case, it should be understood that both asylum and human rights as legal processes are necessarily focused on the circumstances of individual claimants, including their motivations for migrating and their characteristics as migrants. These processes are therefore highly personalized and, as a result, are ill-equipped to respond to the large-scale mass migrations following war and natural disasters that are often associated with the humanitarian concept of “refugees.” These limitations have been demonstrated across Western Europe during a period of unusually high migrant intake over the last decade, where national immigration authorities have failed to keep up with growing demand, resulting in systemic breakdowns and, in some cases, near abandonment of formal legal processes altogether (see, e.g. Vine 2012; MSS v Greece & Belgium 2011).

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A rigid adherence to the formalized legal categories that asylum and human rights processes are the results of can therefore provide extremely important tangible benefits to certain types of migrants but also risk excluding large numbers of others in broadly similar circumstances.

References Benhabib S (2005) The rights of others: aliens, residents and citizens. CUP, Cambridge Chetail V (2012) Are refugee rights human rights?: an unorthodox questioning of the relations between refugee law and human rights law. Social Science http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ Research Network. papers.cfm?abstract_id=2147763. Accessed 20 Dec 2012 Dembour M-B, Kelly T (2011) Are human rights for migrants?: critical reflections on the status of irregular

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migrants in Europe and the United States. Routledge, London MSS v Greece & Belgium. Grand Chamber Judgement No. 30696/09. The European Court of Human Rights. 21 Jan 2011 Nash K (2009) The cultural politics of human rights: comparing the US and UK. CUP, Cambridge Plender R, Mole N (1999) Beyond the Geneva Convention: constructing a de facto right of asylum from international human rights instruments. In: Nicholson F, Twomey P (eds) Refugee rights and realities: evolving international concepts and regimes. CUP, Cambridge Vine J (2012) An inspection of the UK Border Agency’s handling of legacy asylum and migration cases. Statutory Inspection Report. Independent Chief Inspector of the UK Border Agency. Available at http://icinspector. independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/UKBorder-Agencys-handling-of-legacy-asylum-and-mig ration-cases-22.11.2012.pdf. Accessed 20 Dec 2012

Asylum and Language Analysis Peter L. Patrick* Department of Language and Linguistics, University of Essex, Colchester, UK

Definition Language Analysis for Determination of Origin (LADO) is a new branch of applied linguistics, used by governments in processing asylum seekers who are applying for refugee status.

Overview Undocumented asylum seekers present two types of evidence to refugee status determination (RSD) processes: • Their body, i.e., medical evidence relating to age, torture, injury, etc. • Their speech, including both what they say about the reasons for their flight (the narrative content) and the way in which they say it (the linguistic evidence) Since the 1990s, when language expertise in Scandinavian government bureaux first became outsourced to private language firms, governments have appealed to linguistic evidence as one means of verifying asylum seekers’ claims of identity, ethnicity, origin or nationality, in the context of increasing reliance on scientific evidence (e.g., fingerprints, DNA, x-rays) from expert fields to assist in RSD. Academic and forensic linguists refer to this as Linguistic Analysis for Determination of Origin (Eades 2009; Patrick 2012). Governments commissioning LADO – from language firms, individual experts, or internal bureaux – include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Malta, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK. LADO practitioners before about 2002 were not scientifically trained academic linguists but had other language qualifications (interpreting, translating) or were simply native speakers of the languages in question, or related languages, without any formal linguistic training (Baltisberger and Hubbuch 2010). Such persons, termed nonexpert native speakers (given their lack of credentials for the task of scientific linguistic analysis that lies at the core of LADO and their consequent inability to qualify as linguistic experts according to the legal requirements for forensic experts in many courts), still play a controversial and central role in the practices of commercial and government LADO agencies today. Most agencies have since raised their technical standards and hired linguists with varying levels of professional qualifications, partly in response to pressures of competition, litigation, and the 2004 Guidelines (see below). LADO is a new and controversial application of linguistics, related to well-established areas such as sociolinguistics, language assessment, speaker profiling and identification, first- and second-language acquisition, language contact, and linguistic variation and change. Extensive academic research underlines linguistic findings crucial to the application of LADO: 1. “National origin, nationality and citizenship are all political or bureaucratic characteristics, which have no necessary connection to language” (Language and National Origin Group 2004).

*Email: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 F. D. Bean, S. K. Brown (eds.), Selected Topics in Migration Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-19631-7_6

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2. Linguistic science can sometimes correlate an individual’s way of speaking with language socialization into a particular speech community – a primary influence on native language acquisition – which may help identify their country of origin; however, there are many circumstances where this cannot be done with any certainty. 3. “Features of speech may vary in complex ways according to many. . . social and stylistic factors” (Foulkes and French 2012). Variation occurs in the speech of individuals, often explicable by the context in which they are speaking, while even greater cross-speaker variation is normal in stable, wellstudied speech communities, where it may be correlated with factors such as social class, age, gender, ethnicity, etc. LADO seeks to analyze a brief speech sample, specially collected in a formal, bureaucratic setting – generally an interview of an asylum seeker concerning whose origins doubt has arisen – to determine whether the person’s native language is as claimed. In forensic speaker comparison, typically performed for criminal cases by phoneticians with expert credentials, such a sample is compared explicitly, perhaps with statistical testing, to a dataset drawn from an adequately delimited reference population (Foulkes and French 2012). In LADO, however, comparisons are often based only on an analyst’s intuitions and beliefs as to what his native language (or some other language he knows) is typically like, with little documentation, on the basis of few features implicitly analyzed, and conclusions are expressed with great certainty (Patrick 2010). Linguistic research has documented typical speech patterns (e.g., pronunciation or accent, grammar including syntax and morphology, vocabulary, characteristic speech genres and discourse types, etc.) for many languages and explored interspeaker variation in many speech communities. However, little research specifically on LADO has been performed or published to date (fewer than 100 works). Relevant languages for LADO are often under- or undocumented, while their home communities may be inaccessible to research for the very reasons that produce refugees (civil unrest, armed conflict) and subject to dramatic change over recent generations (e.g., age/sex imbalances due to flight and conflict, exodus to refugee camps, change or interruption of education, abandonment of traditional ways of life and speaking). In addition, language choice and contact between languages and dialects are the norm in much of the world and may be extensive under normal circumstances for the communities in question, leading to complexities in the notion of “native language” – complexities often underappreciated by governments who commission and interpret LADO tests, as well as agencies who perform them and courts which review RSD cases. Such intricacies may increase exponentially for individual refugees whose family life is interrupted, who are raised or live for long in refugee camps, or whose flight carries them across regional, ethnic, or national boundaries for periods of years, such that the notion of typical native language habits may become wholly inapplicable (Blommaert 2009). For these reasons, most linguists familiar with LADO accept that its application should be approached with considerable caution, and that the ability of linguistics to give definitive answers to questions of origin and identity in the asylum context should not be overestimated. Some common and important reasons for caution are spelled out in the “Guidelines for the Use of Language Analysis in Relation to Questions of National Origin in Refugee Cases” (Language and National Origin Group 2004; available via UNHCR’s RefWorld, www.essex.ac.uk/larg/resources/guide lines.aspx). This document, intended to assist governments in assessing the validity of LADO, was coauthored by 19 academic and forensic linguists in six countries and has been endorsed by a dozen national and international linguistic organizations with membership numbering tens of thousands. Its recommendations, largely uncontroversial among academic linguists, concern the complexity of language use and the nature of linguistic expertise. The 2004 Guidelines are routinely cited in asylum appeals in European countries. Their program for improving the standard practice of LADO has been cited and responded to by various organizations,

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including De Taalstudio, Sprakab, and Verified language firms; the Swiss, Canadian, Norwegian, and Dutch government bureaux; UNHCR; and many NGOs and legal organizations. Since 2010, a second phase has been undertaken by the Language and Asylum Research Group (LARG), coordinated at the University of Essex by the author and Dr. Diana Eades of the University of New England, Australia, with a mission to stimulate research, contribute to the further development of guidelines, and promote best practice for practitioners working in the field of LADO (www.essex.ac.uk/larg/). An alternative resolution to the 2004 Guidelines, addressing the issue of the role of native-speaking analysts vis-à-vis qualified linguists in the LADO process, was passed in 2009 by the International Association for Forensic Phonetics and Acoustics (IAFPA) and is cited by a number of agencies whose practices resemble those recognized by the resolution (www.iafpa.net/langidres.htm). Since academic linguists became aware of LADO in the early 2000s, monitoring and engagement with government and commercial practices and legal cases has regularly featured in conferences, expert meetings, and networks involving sociolinguists and applied and forensic linguists, alongside people from many areas touching asylum and RSD: lawyers, doctors, immigration judges, policymakers, members of government immigration and asylum bureaux, police officers, human rights practitioners, forensic scientists, and academics from such fields as anthropology, genetics, interpreting, and psychoanalysis. Such efforts serve to introduce the complexity of language to actors in the RSD process and to engage language experts and practitioners with a high-stakes application of their fields of knowledge. They may ultimately function to minimize the misuse of language expertise in RSD, raise the standards at which it is applied, or eliminate the practice of LADO entirely.

References Baltisberger E, Hubbuch P (2010) LADO with specialized linguists: the development of Lingua’s working method. In: Zwaan K, Muysken P, Verrips M (eds) Language and Origin. The role of language in European asylum procedures: a linguistic and legal survey. Wolf Legal Publishers, Nijmegen, pp 9–19 Blommaert J (2009) Language, asylum, and the national order. Curr Anthropol 50(4):415–441 Eades D (2009) Testing the claims of asylum seekers: the role of language analysis. Lang Assess Q 6:30–40 Foulkes P, French P (2012) Forensic speaker comparison: a linguistic-acoustic perspective. In: Tiersma P, Solan L (eds) The Oxford handbook of language and the law. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 557–572 Language and National Origin Group (2004) Guidelines for the use of language analysis in relation to questions of national origin in refugee cases. In: Eades D, Arends J (eds) Language analysis and determination of nationality. Thematic issue of “Int J Speech Lang Law Forensic Linguist” 11(2):261–226 Patrick PL (2010) Language variation and LADO (language analysis for determination of origin). In: Zwaan K, Muysken P, Verrips M (eds) Language and origin. The role of language in European asylum procedures: a linguistic and legal survey. Wolf Legal Publishers, Nijmegen, pp 73–87 Patrick PL (2012) Language analysis for determination of origin: objective evidence for refugee status determination. In: Tiersma P, Solan L (eds) The Oxford handbook of language and the law. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 533–546

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Gender and Asylum Amy Shuman1 and Carol Bohmer2 1 The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, USA 2 Department of Government, Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH, USA

Definition The United Nations definition of refugees does not specifically refer to gender. Instead, refugees and asylum seekers must claim gender persecution under the category “membership in a social group.”

Discussion The 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees makes no reference to gender as a basis for asylum claims. There is, however, evidence that men and women are treated differently in the asylum process, with women’s asylum claims often being denied. This difference has been recognized since the 1990s when countries began to adopt gender guidelines, beginning with Canada in 1993 (Guidelines on Women Refugee Claimants Fearing Gender-Related Persecution), followed by the USA in 1995, Australia in 1996, and the UK in 2000. The purpose of these guidelines was to provide ways in which gender differences could be more effectively factored into the

determination of asylum, both in the inclusion of gender-based persecution as membership in a particular social group and in the treatment of women in the asylum process itself. There is some dispute about how effective they have been, but there is no doubt that there has been a significant increase in the acceptance by tribunals and courts to genderbased asylum claims. UNHCR provides the following guidelines: Even though gender is not specifically referenced in the refugee definition, it is widely accepted that it can influence, or dictate, the type of persecution or harm suffered and the reasons for this treatment. The refugee definition, properly interpreted, therefore covers gender-related claims. As such, there is no need to add an additional ground to the 1951 Convention definition (UNHCR 2002 Guidelines on International Protection No. 1: Gender-Related Persecution, paragraph 6). Although women experience subordination in one form or another in most of the world, differences in access to social services, to education, to health services, or even to redress against social violence are not necessarily considered as human rights violations warranting political asylum. Gender-related claims include both persecution based on gender and differences in assessments of applicants based on gender. Genderbased persecution refers to individuals harmed because of their gender, for example, women who experience sexual violence, female genital mutilation, honor killings, or domestic slavery.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 F. D. Bean, S. K. Brown (eds.), Selected Topics in Migration Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-19631-7_7

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Asylum applicants claiming these forms of persecution must prove not only that the events occurred but also that their home country failed to protect them from persecution. Gender differences can also play a role in immigration officials’ assessments of applications. The officials’ determinations of credibility often rely on assumptions about either expected gendered behavior in their home country or expectations of demeanor in the political asylum hearing. In particular, officials have been suspicious of women for their decisions about leaving their children behind or about choosing to participate in particular events rather than conform to gendered cultural restrictions. In some cases, officials have expressed suspicion when applicants’ expressions of emotion did not conform to the officials’ sense of gender norms. Differences in gender expectations also have consequences for how women report or omit reports of sexual violence. Some female applicants have been reluctant to report experience of sexual violence, whether to avoid further humiliation, out of fear of retaliation against family members, or based on prior experience of reporting. All political asylum applicants draw on their own cultural resources, prohibitions, and customs for talking about intimate and tragic experiences, and in many cases, applicants are reluctant to speak about rape. Further, some applicants are suspicious of the allegiances of courtappointed male translators who might further harm a family or individual’s reputation. Initially, the UN Convention supported a distinction between public and private domains of social life, and political asylum was considered a public matter, thus excluding persecution of women within the home. In some parts of the world, women have restricted access to public arenas, and their forms of political activism, or resistance to human rights violations, have been in more domestic spheres. In some cases, immigration officials have discounted activism in the private sphere as insufficiently political, for example, when women used domestic crafts or made t-shirts as acts of resistance. Women’s activism includes other nonpublic practices such as the use of clandestine networks to hide people or

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send messages. In some cases, women have been targeted for persecution because they were perceived to be violating local cultural gender restrictions, for example, women who participated in educational activities or who chose their own marital partners. Violence against women is often gender specific, for example, rape and sexual trafficking. Women experience violence as a part of war and as a part of cultural practices, for example, honor killings, female genital mutilation (FGM), or exclusions from education or other resources. Although the pervasiveness of these forms of violence is well documented, women have not often been successful in their political asylum applications. Immigration officials have been reluctant to grant asylum for general categories of political and cultural violence against women, for fear of opening the floodgates. Instead, they have been careful to grant asylum to very localized persecution, for example, Fauziya Kasinga, a Togo woman, was granted asylum as a member of the group, “young women of the TchambaKunsuntu Tribe who have not had FGM, as practiced by that tribe, and who oppose the practice” (Randall 2002). This specificity may make it difficult for a woman who wants to avoid or who has experienced FGM from claiming the right to asylum. Other decisions have similarly identified a very particular social group in granting asylum to applicants persecuted for sexual violence (Bohmer and Shuman 2008; Edwards 2012; McKinnon 2016). Demonstrating that a state has failed to protect someone from gender persecution is complicated by several factors including the fact that sometimes the persecution (especially rape) was done by a military or government employee and the fact that some states not only do not protect individuals but actually condone forms of persecution, especially restrictions regarding women’s education or participation in public life. Domestic violence has only recently become a crime in some countries and is not prosecuted in others. Some countries may have laws against sexual violence or sexual trafficking but do not provide protection or prosecute offenders.

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Asylum officials may be willing to consider traditional cultural practices, such as FGM or honor killings, as violations of human rights warranting asylum, but these categories of violence carry an implicit critique of the applicant’s culture and cultural values and deepen an east/ west divide in the political asylum process.

References Bohmer C, Shuman A (2008) Rejecting refugees: political asylum in the 21st century. Routledge, New York Edwards A (2012) Distinction, discretion, discrimination: the new frontiers of gender-related claims to asylum. UNHCR Gender, Migration and Human Rights

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Conference, Florence, European University Institute, Italy, June. www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/4ffd430c2.pdf Gender-Related Persecution and Women’s Claims to Asylum Fahamu Refugee legal aid. Heaven Crawley, resource person (nd) http://www.refugeelegalaidinformation.org/ content/gender-related-persecution-and-women%E2% 80%99s–claims-asylum McKinnon S (2016) Gendered asylum: race and violence in U.S. law and politics. University of Illinois Press. Urbana Randall M (2002) Refugee law and state accountability for violence against women: a comparative analysis of legal approaches to recognizing asylum claims based on gender persecution. Harvard Women’s Law Journal 25:281 Spijkerboer T (2000) Gender and Refugee Status. Ashgate, Burlington

Medical and Psychological Evidence of Trauma in Asylum Cases S. Megan Berthold* University of Connecticut School of Social Work, West Hartford, CT, USA

Definition Individuals who flee their homelands due to persecution often apply for asylum, seeking a safe haven in exile. Asylum adjudicators are frequently faced with making difficult asylum determinations. Medical and psychological evidence of the applicant’s trauma and its impact may be valuable in contributing to the asylum officer’s or immigration judge’s decision related to the credibility of the applicant’s claim of persecution.

Detailed Description The process of applying for asylum is often complicated, lengthy, and adversarial. Typically the applicant has the opportunity to provide evidence of their persecution. This evidence often includes documenting psychological evidence of the trauma and, if present, medical evidence. Some asylum claims put forward by applicants are fabricated or embellished. Asylum adjudicators are frequently faced with making difficult asylum determinations. Forensic medical and/or psychological assessments of an asylum seeker may provide valuable evidence of the persecution and its impact on the person’s psychological state and functioning in asylum proceedings and contribute to the asylum officer’s or immigration judge’s decision related to the credibility of the applicant’s claim (Einhorn and Berthold 2015; Herlihy and Turner 2007; Keast 2005; Quiroga and Jaranson 2005). Chronic pain is one of the more common physical consequences of torture and other forms of physical persecution frequently documented by physicians (Quiroga and Jaranson 2005). Evidence of physical abuse may be acute and/or temporary, observable upon medical examination soon after the trauma, such as with certain lacerations, burns, bruises, hematomas, and fractures of teeth or bones (Quiroga and Jaranson 2008). Quiroga and Jaranson (2008) indicate that more permanent lesions/scars have been documented in 40–70 % of torture survivors. Common medical consequences found with particular types of torture have been well documented. The use of a metallic or wooden baton to beat the soles of the feet (known as Falanga) typically results in a burning sensation, chronic pain, and MRI evidence of thickened plantar aponeurosis (Skylv 1995, as cited in Quiroga and Jaranson 2005). Skull fractures, disrupted brain function, brain hemorrhage and edema, dementia, and seizure have been found in survivors who have experienced severe traumatic brain injury, while those suspended by their arms have developed peripheral neuropathies, and tight handcuffing has been found to be associated with handcuff neuropathies (Moreno and Grodin 2002, as cited in Quiroga and Jaranson 2005). Certainly there can be multiple possible causes of pain and other medical symptoms and conditions. Often a physician may not be able to state with certainty that a given symptom or lesion is due to the persecution but rather that it is consistent with the history of persecution that the individual reports and that there is no evidence of alternative explanations (Physicians for Human Rights 2001). Severe and persistent mental health consequences of torture and other traumatic persecution include, most commonly, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and depression (often comorbid), other anxiety disorders (generalized anxiety disorder or panic disorder), substance abuse, changes in worldview and personality, and a host of other cognitive symptoms (impaired memory and concentration, disorientation/ *Email: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 F. D. Bean, S. K. Brown (eds.), Selected Topics in Migration Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-19631-7_8

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confusion), neurovegetative symptoms (insomnia, nightmares, lack of energy, sexual dysfunction), and other psychological symptoms (withdrawal, irritability, emotional liability, dissociation) (Gerrity et al. 2001; Quiroga and Jaranson 2005; Steel et al. 2009). A thorough mental health evaluation may provide evidence associating the development or exacerbation of these symptoms/conditions with the persecution. The Istanbul Protocol is an official document of the United Nations (UN Resolution 55/89) and provides international guidelines for legal, medical, and psychological professionals to investigate and document the consequences of torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment (experiences that qualify as persecution) (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 2001). The Istanbul Protocol recommends that an assessment cover, in part, a complete life history (including history of torture, ill treatment, and other non-torture-related traumas), mental status exam, medical and psychiatric history and current complaints, history of substance use/abuse, and an assessment of psychosocial functioning over time. A health and/or mental health professional’s assessment for malingering may provide information relevant to the adjudicator’s determination regarding the applicant’s credibility. For both medical and psychological reports, the inclusion of collateral information (if available), such as a medical report from the time of the persecution, an independent report from others present at the incident of persecution, and/or reports of family or friends noting changes in the person’s behavior or demeanor over time associated with their history of persecution, may be valuable. Documenting the presence of notable and visible scars not attributed to the persecution may lend strength to their claim. In addition to providing evidence of the persecution itself, medical and psychological experts can help the adjudicator understand that traumatized applicants might present with a variety of demeanors consistent with their experience of persecution and mental state, including a blunt or flat affect, emotional numbness, or a very emotional or labile affect. These demeanors are possible posttraumatic reactions and also may be influenced by the impact of testifying in a stressful asylum proceeding. In the absence of psychological explanation, an adjudicator may make an adverse credibility finding, erroneously concluding that the applicant was not sufficiently emotive or presented an overly emotional account based on their own assumptions of how a person who is recounting traumatic experiences should present. Culture and the impact of trauma can influence what is disclosed in an asylum application and/or testimony. An applicant may not initially disclose their rape in their asylum application, for example, due to the consequences and meaning of rape in their culture (e.g., being ostracized or disowned by family). If the rape is revealed later in the asylum process, credibility concerns often arise. Reports or testimony from a psychological expert may provide an explanation for this behavior (Einhorn and Berthold 2015). Over time, the recollection of details tends to be compromised, even for nontraumatic events or in those who have not experienced significant trauma. Medical and psychological experts may provide evidence about the impact of head injury and other trauma on the applicant’s ability to provide a coherent, consistent narrative of their experiences of persecution (Herlihy and Turner 2007; PHR 2001). Spatial perception (Pynoos and Nader 1989), report of date and time sequence (Terr 1983), and ability to concentrate may all be affected by trauma. As traumatic memories are usually triggered, the particular trigger present during the trauma survivor’s asylum proceeding (including variations in how they are asked about their experiences) may influence them to emphasize or recall different parts of their experiences and lead to discrepancies in their testimony. The strong desire to avoid revisiting their traumas and difficulty recalling aspects of one’s traumas (both possible symptoms of PTSD) may further compromise a survivor’s testimony (Berthold and Gray 2011). Trauma may be associated with memory blocks or dissociation in survivors such that their traumatic experiences are not integrated effectively, with their memories stored as disconnected fragments, comprised of sensory perceptions and emotional states. If asked to testify in detail about their persecution,

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their account may appear incoherent, and they may not be able to recount aspects of their trauma that the adjudicator believes is most salient to their case. Herlihy and Turner (2007) studied refugees with a history of torture or other traumas and no reason to embellish or fabricate an account of trauma for secondary gain. They found that inconsistencies in details of the traumas were common, particularly for those details the survivor perceived as more peripheral to their experience, the longer the time between interviews, and for those with PTSD. Inconsistencies are also more common when the individual is more anxious, under great stress (such as during an asylum proceeding), and/or has experienced multiple traumas that share some commonalities. Asylum adjudicators may perceive applicants who have experienced the most severe trauma as the most incredible for the reasons discussed here. Negative credibility determinations often result in an order of deportation for the asylum applicant. Medical and psychological evidence can play an important role, where relevant, in providing alternative explanations for the applicant’s demeanor, memory deficits, inconsistencies, and other aspects of their functioning that may inform an asylum adjudicator’s determination of credibility.

References Berthold SM, Gray G (2011) Post-traumatic stress reactions and secondary trauma effects at tribunals: the ECCC example. In: Van Schaack B, Reicherter D, Chhang Y (eds) Cambodia’s hidden scars: trauma psychology in the wake of the Khmer Rouge. Documentation Center of Cambodia, Phnom Penh, pp 92–120 Einhorn BJ, Berthold SM (2015) Reconstructing Babel: Bridging cultural dissonance between asylum seekers and asylum adjudicators. In Lawrance BN, Ruffer G (eds) Adjudicating Refugee and Asylum Status: The Role of Witness, Expertise, and Testimony (pp. 27–53). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press Gerrity E, Keane TM, Tuma F (eds) (2001) The mental health consequences of torture. Kluwer/Plenum Publishers, New York Herlihy J, Turner S (2007) Asylum claims and memory of trauma: sharing our knowledge. Br J Psychiatry 191:3–4 Keast R (2005) Using experts for asylum cases in immigration court. Interpret Releases Rep Anal Immigr Natl Law 82(30):1237–1243 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) (2001) Istanbul protocol: manual on the effective investigation and documentation of torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. Professional training series, no. 8. United Nations, Geneva (HR/P/PT/8, ISBN 92-1154136-0, ISSN 1020–1688). www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/training8Rev1en.pdf. Accessed 1 Jan 2013 Physicians for Human Rights (2001) Examining asylum seekers: a health professional’s guide to medical and psychological evaluations of torture. Physicians for Human Rights, NYC/Boston/Washington, DC Pynoos RS, Nader K (1989) Children’s memory and proximity to violence. J Am Acad Child Adolesc Psychiatry 28(2):236–241 Quiroga J, Jaranson JM (2005) Politically-motivated torture and its survivors. A desk study review of the literature. Torture 13(2–3):1–111 Quiroga J, Jaranson J (2008) Torture. In: Reyes G, Elhai JD, Ford JD (eds) The encyclopedia of psychological trauma. Wiley, New York, pp 654–657 Steel Z, Chey T, Silove D, Marnane C, Bryant RA, van Ommeren M (2009) Association of torture and other potentially traumatic events with mental health outcomes among populations exposed to mass conflict and displacement: a systematic review and meta-analysis. JAMA 302(5):537–549

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Terr L (1983) Time sense following psychic trauma: a clinical study of ten adults and twenty children. Am J Orthopsychiatry 54:244–262

Further Reading Bohmer C, Shuman A (2008) Rejecting refugees: political asylum in the 21st century. Routledge, London/New York Bremner JD, Marmar CR (eds) (2002) Trauma, memory and dissociation. American Psychiatric Press, Washington, DC Gangsei D, Deutsch AC (2007) Psychological evaluation of asylum seekers as a therapeutic process. Torture 17(2):79–87 International Rehabilitation Council for Torture Victims (2009) Psychological evaluation of torture allegations: a practical guide to the Istanbul Protocol – for psychologists, 2nd edn. Copenhagen, Denmark Jacobs U (2000) Psycho-political challenges in the forensic documentation of torture: the role of psychological evidence. Torture 10(3):68–71 Jacobs U, Lustig SL (2010) Psychological and psychiatric opinions in asylum applications: ten frequently asked questions by fact finders. Bender’s Immigr Bull 15:1066–1069 Jacobs U, Evans FB, Patsalides B (2001a) Principles of documenting psychological evidence of torture – part I. Torture 11(3):85–89 Jacobs U, Evans FB, Patsalides B (2001b) Principles of documenting psychological evidence of torture – part II. Torture 11(4):100–102 Moreno A, Grodin MA (2002) Torture and its neurological sequelae. Spinal Cord 40:213–223

Refugee Roulette Jaya Ramji-Nogalesa*, Philip G. Schragb and Andrew I. Schoenholtzb a Temple University Beasley School of Law, Philadelphia, PA, USA b Georgetown University Law Center, Washington, DC, USA

Synonyms Disparities in asylum adjudication

Definition The term “refugee roulette” refers to disparities in asylum adjudication, also known as refugee status determination. Asylum adjudication is the process by which a host state decides whether or not to grant lawful immigration status to individuals who seek protection from persecution or torture in their home countries. The adjudicator is generally a government official tasked with interviewing the applicant or hearing testimony, reviewing background facts relevant to their claim, and applying the relevant legal standards. In the developed world, this process may have several levels, entitling asylum applicants to two or more opportunities to have their claim heard and reviewed.

Overview Recent research on asylum systems in the United States and Canada has found high levels of disparity in rates of granting asylum across adjudicators at all levels of the asylum process (USGAO 2008; Rehaag 2008; Ramji-Nogales et al. 2009). Some scholars suggest that the outcome of asylum determinations in the United States is like a game of “refugee roulette,” depending in large part on the identity of the particular adjudicator to whom an application is randomly assigned, rather than on the merits of the asylum claim, and that this is cause for concern (Ramji-Nogales et al. 2009). Other commentators state that a good deal of disparity is inevitable and that refugees and their advocates must “learn to live” with “unequal justice” (Legomsky 2007). A different set of researchers reported that the amount of disparity diminished after 2008 (TRAC 2009). The study that coined the term “refugee roulette” presents an empirical analysis of decision-making at all four levels of the asylum process in the United States, namely, the asylum office of the Department of Homeland Security, the immigration courts of the Department of Justice, the Board of Immigration Appeals, and the United States Courts of Appeals, between 2000 and 2004 (Ramji-Nogales et al. 2007). The authors argue that their findings reveal an unacceptable level of disparities in grant rates, noting that the asylum adjudicators who were studied heard large numbers of cases from the same country in the same location over the same period of time. For example, in one regional asylum office, 60 % of the officers decided in favor of Chinese applicants at rates that deviated by more than 50 % from that region’s mean grant rate for Chinese applicants, with some officers granting asylum to no Chinese nationals, while other officers granted asylum in as many as 68 % of their cases. Similarly, Colombian asylum applicants whose cases were adjudicated in the federal immigration court in Miami had a 5 % chance of prevailing with one of that court’s judges

*Email: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 F. D. Bean, S. K. Brown (eds.), Selected Topics in Migration Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-19631-7_9

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and an 88 % chance of prevailing before another judge in the same building. Half of the Miami judges deviated by more than 50 % from the court’s mean grant rate for Colombian cases. Relying on public biographies, the study also explores correlations between sociological characteristics of individual immigration judges and their grant rates. The regression analyses determine that the chance of winning asylum was strongly affected not only by the random assignment of a case to a particular immigration judge but also by the quality of an applicant’s legal representation, by the gender of the immigration judge, and by the immigration judge’s work experience prior to appointment. The study concludes with recommendations for reforming the immigration adjudication system, including more comprehensive training, more effective and independent appellate review, mandated representation for asylum seekers, and other reforms that would further professionalize the adjudication system. A second book by the authors of Refugee Roulette explored in greater depth the disparities in decision making by asylum offices of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (Schoenholtz et. al 2014) In a 2008 study of immigration court decision-making between 1994 and 2007, the United States Government Accountability Office found that “the likelihood of being granted asylum varied considerably across and within the [immigration courts studied]” (USGAO 2008).

Cross-References ▶ Asylum and Expert Evidence ▶ Asylum and Human Rights ▶ Asylum: Overview ▶ Gender and Asylum ▶ Medical and Psychological Evidence of Trauma in Asylum Cases ▶ On US Refugee Laws, particularly stressing the 1975 Indochinese Refugee Assistance Act and the 1980 Refugee Act ▶ Refugees Defined ▶ Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and Asylum

References Legomsky S (2007) Learning to live with unequal justice: asylum and the limits to consistency. Stanford Law Rev 60:413 Ramji-Nogales J, Schoenholtz A, Schrag P (2007) Refugee roulette: disparities in asylum adjudication. Stanford Law Rev 60:295 Ramji-Nogales J, Schoenholtz A, Schrag P (2009) Refugee roulette: disparities in asylum adjudication and proposals for reform. NYU Press, New York Rehaag S (2008) Troubling patterns in Canadian refugee adjudication. Ottawa Law Rev 39:335 Schoenholtz A, Schrag P, Ramji-Nogales J (2014) Lives in the Balance: Asylum Adjudication by the Department of Homeland Security. NYU Press, New York Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC) (2009) Latest data from immigration courts show decline in disparity. http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/209/. Accessed 25 Jan 2013

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United StatesGovernment Accountability Office (USGAO) (2008) U.S. asylum system: significant variation existed in asylum outcomes across immigration courts and judges. http://www.gao.gov/ new.items/d08940.pdf. Accessed 25 Jan 2013

Relationship Between Asylum and Trafficking Jean-Pierre Gauci* British Institute of International and Comparative Law, The People for Change Foundation, Naxxar, Malta

Synonyms Asylum – trafficking nexus; Human trafficking; Long-term protection for trafficked persons; Refugee law and trafficking; Trafficking in persons Human trafficking refers to the coerced or deceitful recruitment and/or holding of persons for the purpose of exploitation. The crime of trafficking is composed of three related elements, each of which must be fulfilled for the crime to subsist. These are the act (recruitment, transportation transfer, harboring, receipt of persons), the means (deceit, coercion, abuse of a position of power or vulnerability), and the exploitative purpose (UN General Assembly 2000a). Actual exploitation is not technically a requirement and it is sufficient that there was an intention to exploit (UN 2000). Three broad types of exploitation are usually identified: sexual exploitation, labor exploitation, and the removal of organs (this should be distinguished from organ trafficking). Trafficking is often described as modern-day slavery and entails a variety of human rights violations. In particular circumstances, it may be a crime against humanity or a war crime (UN General Assembly 2000b). Trafficking must be distinguished from smuggling, another crime which involves the facilitation of irregular movement across borders. Smuggling is often the only option available to asylum seekers in their efforts to reach a safe country. In some circumstances, smuggling situations develop into exploitative situations amounting to trafficking and as such the distinction between the two crimes is often difficult to maintain. An increasing number of trafficked persons have been turning to refugee law in search of protection. This is partly because existing counter-trafficking law and policy does not prioritize the protection of trafficked persons but instead is concerned primarily with the law enforcement dimension of the crime (Gauci 2015). The international rules set out discretionary provisions on protection, and in some cases one will only get support and protection if he/she is able and willing to help the law enforcement agencies prosecute the traffickers. International protection (asylum) offers a number of advantages over the protection provided by antitrafficking laws. It broadens the scope of protection. It protects not only individuals who have been trafficked but may also, at least in theory, be used to protect persons facing real prospects of future trafficking. It can also be used to protect family members and other known associates facing risks as a result of their link to the trafficked person and individuals who are targeted due to their actions to combat the crime. Moreover, it broadens the scope of where such protection may be sought to cover countries that were not part of the trafficking route and experience. Another advantage is that protection is not made dependent on helping law enforcement but only the needs of and risks faced by the individual applicant. Moreover, asylum offers better protection in terms of the content and duration of the protection granted. It is critical to note however that the recognition of trafficked persons as refugees is neither straightforward nor an easy process. Asylum processes have increasingly become skeptical of asylum seekers meaning that recognition as a refugee is an increasingly complex and difficult endeavor. A culture of disbelief is often quoted as underpinning many asylum decisions at least at the initial decision stages. *Email: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 F. D. Bean, S. K. Brown (eds.), Selected Topics in Migration Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-19631-7_10

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UNHCR notes that not all trafficked persons or potential trafficked persons are refugees within the meaning of the Convention definition. Courts have often found it difficult to determine that trafficked persons form a particular social group. A trafficked person must fulfill all of the refugee definition criteria in order to be recognized as a refugee or a person who is otherwise in need of international protection. In 2006 the UNHCR issued guidelines regarding the application of the refugee definition to trafficked persons and persons at risk of being trafficked. Some of the subjective factors that impact the well-founded fear of persecution in the context of trafficking include the individual’s gender, age and past experiences, family background, as well as his/her own state of mind. Persecution in trafficking-based asylum claims can include: re-trafficking, retribution by traffickers, and ostracization by the family and/or the community. The agents of persecution in this context are usually non-state actors including past traffickers and their associates, other traffickers, family members, as well as society more broadly. This means that an asylum applicant must prove not only persecution but that the State in his/her country of origin is unable or unwilling to protect him/her. Past experiences of trafficking create a rebuttable presumption that such persecutory behavior will repeat itself and is therefore relevant to the examination of a trafficking-based asylum claims. As highlighted above the exploitation might have happened in the country of origin, in the country where asylum is being sought, or in a third country. However the risk of persecution must be established with regard to the country of origin. Many trafficking-based asylum claims have been filed under the Convention ground of membership of a particular social group, and different jurisdictions have found it difficult to accept this. Other grounds might also be relevant most notably race and religion. In Norway the Immigration Act explicitly states that victims of human trafficking are members of a particular social group.

Cross-References ▶ Gender and Asylum ▶ Human Trafficking ▶ Human Trafficking Policy Responses ▶ Labor Trafficking ▶ Protection of Victims of Trafficking ▶ Refugee ▶ Sexual Offences ▶ Transnational Crime ▶ Victim Protection

References Alfirev C, Bhabha J (2009) The identification and referral of trafficked persons to procedures for determining international protection needs. In: Division of International Protection Services (ed) Legal and protection policy research series. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Geneva Bhabha J (2002) Internationalist gatekeepers: the tension between asylum advocacy and human rights. Harv Hum Rights J 15:155 Gallagher AT (2009) Human rights and human trafficking: quagmire or firm ground? A response to James Hathaway. Va J Int Law 49(4):789–848

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Gauci JP (2015) Why trafficked perosns need asylum. In: Gauci JP, Guiffre M, Tsourdi E (eds) Forced migration(s). Current Challenges in Refugee Law, Brill Hathaway JC (2008) The human rights quagmire of human trafficking. Va J Int Law 49:1 Juss S (2012) Human trafficking, asylum and the problem of protection, Chapter 13. In: Juss S (ed) The Ashgate research companion to migration law, theory and policy. Ashgate, London, pp 281–319 Kneebone S (2010) The refugee–trafficking nexus: making good (the) connections. Refug Surv Q 29(1):137–160 Piotrowicz R (2005) Victims of people trafficking and entitlement to international protection. Aust Year B Int Law 24:159 UN General Assembly (2000a) Protocol to prevent, suppress and punish trafficking in persons, especially women and children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against transnational organized crime, 15 Nov 2000 UN General Assembly (2000b) Protocol against the smuggling of migrants by land, sea and air, supplementing the United Nations convention against transnational organized crime, 15 Nov 2000 UNHCR (2006) The application of Article 1a(2) of the 1951 convention and/or the 1967 protocol relating to the status of refugees to victims of trafficking and persons at risk of being trafficked. In: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (ed) Guidelines on international protection. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Geneva

S

Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity, and Asylum Rachel Lewis Women and Gender Studies Program, George Mason University, Fairfax, USA

Keywords Sexuality; Gender; Asylum; Refugee law; Human rights

Definition The process of seeking asylum for persecution on the basis of one’s sexual orientation or gender identity; the challenges to political asylum claims based on sexual orientation and gender identity.

Overview Since the United Nations Refugee Agency published its official guidelines on claims relating to sexual orientation and gender identity in 2008, there has been a growing interest in the treatment of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex refugees and asylum seekers (UNHCR 2008). While the European Union recently recognized sexual orientation as a cause of persecution in Article 10 of the EU Asylum Qualification

Directive, in December 2011, the United States issued specific guidelines for the evaluation of asylum claims based on sexual orientation and gender identity (USCIS 2011). Despite recent developments in political asylum policy, it is still difficult for LGBT refugees to translate their experiences of persecution into the kinds of narratives that are recognizable to the state. Like all asylum applicants, LGBT refugees must prove both that they have a “well-founded fear of persecution” and that they are members of a particular social group (in this case, gay men, lesbians, transgendered individuals, and so on). The primary challenge to LGBT asylum claims lies in the fact that the 1951 Refugee Convention was designed to protect individuals from racial, religious, or political persecution, and the category “social group” included neither women nor individuals persecuted for their sexual orientation. Although sexual orientation and gender identity have been included in the category “membership of a particular social group” since the mid- to late 1990s, it is still the case that the closer one’s application conforms to the traditional model of the male political activist fleeing an oppressive regime, the more likely one is able to obtain asylum (Bohmer and Shuman 2008). While a number of countries – including the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic, and Australia – have recently rejected the “discretion” argument (i.e., the notion that LGBT asylum applicants can return to their country of origin and be “discreet” about their sexual

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orientation or gender identity), a growing number of LGBT asylum claims are now being refused on the grounds that the applicant’s claimed sexual orientation is disbelieved (Jansen and Spijkerboer 2011; UKLGIG 2010). In assessing the credibility of a political asylum applicant’s claim, the immigration officials often rely on stereotypical assumptions and expectations (i.e., that all lesbians and gay men engage in practices of cross-gender identification, that they all form part of a common social group with shared cultural tastes and social spaces, and that they will all “come out” as lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgendered immediately upon arrival in the receiving country). Unlike other refugee claimants, who are not compelled to “perform” a visible identity as part of political asylum hearings, LGBT asylum applicants are frequently expected to conform to Western models of sexual citizenship grounded in visibility, consumption, and an identity in the public sphere in order to be considered worthy candidates for asylum. These sexual citizenship narratives, which are based primarily on racialized sexual stereotypes and behavioral white gay norms, pose particular challenges to lesbian asylum applicants. In the context of lesbian asylum cases, courts still equate lack of documented evidence of human rights abuses against lesbians in country of origin reports with an absence of such persecution (Minter 2000; NCLR 2006; UKLGIG 2010). Moreover, courts will often disregard the interrelation of gender and sexual identity in narratives of lesbian persecution. The privileging of credibility assessment in women’s and LGBT’s asylum claims means that lesbian asylum cases are frequently evaluated on the basis of heteronormative assumptions about lesbian sexuality. For example, lesbian asylum applicants are regularly asked by judges to “explain the nature of a sexual relationship between two women” (Human Rights Watch 2010). As a recent report examining asylum claims based on sexual orientation and gender identity in Europe has shown, bisexual and transgender identities tend to be similarly misunderstood by asylum adjudicators; while transgender and intersex individuals are commonly labeled as “medical

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problems” by immigration officials, bisexuals are deemed unworthy of protection because of the notion that it is possible for them to return to their country of origin and assume a heterosexual orientation (Jansen and Spijkerboer 2011). All of these stereotypes reinforce the idea that sexual orientation and gender identity can be strictly ordered according to a set of categories within which heterosexuality remains the norm. In the future, there is a need for greater selfawareness on the part of immigration officials about the challenges to establishing credibility in the context of asylum claims based on sexual orientation and gender identity. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has suggested that asylum adjudicators need to be sensitive to the difficulties of proving sexual orientation and focus instead on narratives that help individuals to articulate their sexual histories (UNHCR 2008). By showing asylum adjudicators how to better understand the complexities of refugee narratives, LGBT asylum cases could represent an important site of reform for political asylum policy in the twenty-first century. Because claims based on sexual orientation and gender identity are so far removed from the initial refugee convention, they serve as an instructive example for how the political asylum system might better account for the experiences of those subjects – namely, women, children, and sexual minorities – to whom international human rights discourses have traditionally been slow to attend.

References Bohmer C, Shuman A (2008) Rejecting refugees: political asylum in the twenty-first century. Routledge, New York Human Rights Watch (2010) Fast-tracked unfairness: detention and denial of women asylum seekers in the UK. Resource document. http://www.hrw.org/sites/ default/files/reports/uk0210webwcover.pdf. Accessed 30 July 2012 Jansen S, Spijkerboer T (2011) Fleeing homophobia: asylum claims related to sexual orientation and gender identity in Europe. Resource document. http://www. rechten.vu.nl/nl/Images/Fleeing%20Homophobia%

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Accessed 20report%20EN_tcm22-232205.pdf. 30 July 2012 Minter S (2000) Lesbians and asylum: overcoming barriers to access. Resource document. http://www. asylumlaw.org/docs/sexualminorities/Lesbian%20Issu esPacket.pdf. Accessed 30 July 2012 National Center for Lesbian Rights (2006) The challenges to successful lesbian asylum claims. Resource document. http://www.nclrights.org/site/ DocServer/challenges_lesbian_asylum_cases.pdf? docID=1142. Accessed 30 July 2012 The UN Refugee Agency (2008) UNHCR guidance note on refugee claims relating to sexual orientation and gender identity. Resource document. http://www. unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/48abd5660.pdf. Accessed 30 July 2012 UK Lesbian and Gay Immigration Group (2010) Failing the grade: home office initial decisions on lesbian and gay claims for asylum. Resource document. http://uklgig.org.uk/docs/publications/Failing% 20the%20Grade%20UKLGIG%20April%202010.pdf. Accessed 27 Jan 2013

United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (2011) Guidance for adjudicating lesbian, bisexual, gay, transgender, and intersex asylum claims. Resource document. http://www.uscis.gov/USCIS/ Humanitarian/Refugees%20&%20Asylum/Asylum/ Asylum%20Native%20Documents%20and%20Static %20Files/RAIO-Training-March-2012.pdf. Accessed 30 July 2012

Further Reading Berg L, Millbank J (2009) Constructing the personal narratives of lesbian, gay and bisexual asylum claimants. J Refug Stud 22(2):195–223 Morgan D (2006) Not gay enough for the government: racial and sexual stereotypes in sexual orientation asylum cases. Law Sex Rev 15:135–161 Randazzo T (2005) Social and legal barriers: sexual orientation and asylum in the United States. In: Luibhe´id E, Cantu´ L (eds) Queer migrations: sexuality, U.S. citizenship, and border crossings. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, pp 30–60

Part 3: Contexts of Migration

Changing Contexts: From Multiculturalism to Transnationalism? Stephen Castles* University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW, Australia

Definition When migrants come to another country, they become part not only of the economy but also of the society of that place. This is obviously the case where immigration is regarded as permanent, but applies even to temporary movements: despite the ideas of governments and employers who plan “guest worker” systems, you cannot have workers without people. In any case, many forms of migration are not primarily motivated by economic concerns – even though all migrations have economic effects. Migrants have widely varied experiences of reception and settlement, according to the policies, attitudes, and practices prevailing in the destination country. These differing contexts of migration affect the way migrants become incorporated into society, which in turn shapes processes of social and cultural change affecting both migrants and nonmigrants. This entry explores the historical background to varying migration contexts, discusses some of the dynamics of migratory processes, and then looks at the way migration contexts have changed over the period of accelerated mobility since 1945 with special reference to the emergence of global migration flows in the phase of neoliberal globalization since the mid-1970s. Two key conclusions are emphasized. One is that the growth of temporary mobility in the latest phase of the evolution of the world labor market presents a challenge to all existing forms of incorporation, whether they are labeled as assimilation, integration, or multiculturalism. The other is that the growth of transnational consciousness requires new ways of understanding and responding to migration and minorities. (Much of this text is based on Castles et al. 2014, where more detail and references are to be found.)

Nation-State Formation and the Treatment of Minorities “National models” for the treatment of immigrants and minorities depend on varying historical experiences of nation-state formation, which in turn gave rise to differing concepts of nationality and citizenship, and the extent to which these could include newcomers. Even countries as close as Britain, France, and Germany had quite different approaches. The British history of territorial expansion and responding to religious diversity led to a state that accepted difference: political loyalty was required, but a person’s group identity could be Welsh or Scottish, Protestant or Catholic. Thus, immigrants could become citizens without losing their cultural and religious distinctiveness. In France, the 1789 Revolution established principles of equality and the rights of man that rejected group cultural identity and aimed to include individuals as equal political subjects. Immigrants could be incorporated, but group difference was unacceptable. Germany by contrast was not united as a state until 1871, and the nation – defined on the basis of shared language and culture – came before the state. This led to a form of ethnic or folk belonging that was not consistent with incorporation of immigrants or minorities as citizens. Quite different approaches are to be found in the white settler societies of the New World. The nations of North and South America, of Oceania, and of some parts of southern Africa and Southeast Asia were built through the dispossession of indigenous peoples and through immigration from Europe. *Email: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 F. D. Bean, S. K. Brown (eds.), Selected Topics in Migration Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-19631-7_12

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Incorporation of immigrants as citizens was part of their national myths. In such settler societies, civic belonging was thought to lead to national identity, so that differing identities were acceptable as a passing phase on the way through the “melting pot” which led to “Americanization” (or the equivalent in other places). It was thought that only white people could be assimilated: nearly all of these emerging nations had racially selective immigration laws. Today in Northeast Asia, emerging immigration countries like Japan and South Korea have strong beliefs in ethnic homogeneity and find it very hard to incorporate people of different backgrounds. Southeast Asia countries like Malaysia have culturally mixed populations – often the result of colonial labor recruitment schemes – but the public and politicians often fear that incorporating newcomers could upset existing ethnic balances. Gulf oil countries recruit large numbers of migrant workers from Asia – often these outnumber local populations – but have strict rules to prevent family reunion and long-term settlement, so that migrants remain marginalized and politically excluded. Similarly, in postapartheid South Africa, immigration from other African countries is often seen as a threat and has led to violent clashes. In North Africa, increasing presence of sub-Saharan migrants is largely seen as an undesirable phenomenon.

The Social Dynamics of the Migratory Process The problem of “national models” of migrant incorporation (apart from their inherent “methodological nationalism”) (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2003) is that they are based more on ideological principles than on a real understanding of the migratory process. Governments believe that they can divide migrants up into neat categories and make differential rules that will allow them to maximize the economic benefits of immigration while keeping social costs down. But migration and settlement are parts of a long-drawn-out process that will be played out for the rest of the migrant’s life and affect subsequent generations too. Migration is often not an individual decision but a collective action, arising out of social, economic, and political change and affecting the whole society in both sending and receiving areas. Moreover, the experience of migration and of living in another country often leads to modification of the original plans, so that migrants’ intentions at the time of departure are poor predictors of actual behavior. Macro-social factors that lead migrants to revise their original intentions lie in the economic and social development of both origin and destination areas, and in the relationships between them. Migration systems approaches are very useful in understanding such issues, but cannot be dealt with here (Castles et al. 2014, pp. 43–46). Equally significant are micro-level factors: most migrants do indeed believe when they first arrive that they will return home, but as their stay in the new country lengthens, they get older, form relationships, and have children; their life goals often change. Virtually, every temporary movement leads to some settlement. Democratic states are rarely willing or able to adopt the draconian measures needed to prevent this, while more authoritarian states often lack the capacity to enforce departure and prevent a shift into irregular status – particularly, when employers are eager to retain experienced workers. Few circular or temporary programs provide opportunities for transition to permanent status yet the transition takes place nonetheless, and often under very difficult circumstances. That is why the “circular migration schemes” so favored by European Union countries at present, or the temporary employment schemes used not only by the Gulf oil countries but increasingly also by the USA, Canada, and Australia, often have unexpected results (Castles and Ozkul 2014).

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Migration Since 1945 and the Evolution of Incorporation Models Ideas on the position of immigrants in society changed rapidly in the post-1945 period, with the great majority of industrial (and later postindustrial) countries allowing immigration for various economic, demographic, and political reasons. Yet incorporation of the newcomers was not seen as a major issue, and there was little or no long-term planning. The numbers were not expected to be large, and there was a strong belief in the efficacy of existing national models for controlling cultural and religious difference. The “classical immigration countries” (such as the USA, Canada, and Australia) only wanted white settlers from their “mother countries” or other Western European countries and saw no problem in assimilating them. Assimilation meant that immigrants were to be incorporated into society through a one-sided process of adaptation. They were to give up their distinctive linguistic, cultural, or social characteristics and become indistinguishable from the majority population. Britain, France, and the Netherlands also expected to be able to assimilate immigrants from their colonies (or former colonies) and from other European countries such as Spain and Italy. Germany and other “guest worker” importers (e.g., Austria and Switzerland) did not permit family reunion or long-term settlement and therefore pursued polices of temporary admission to the labor market. The “guest worker” model can be described as differential exclusion: migrants were to be temporarily incorporated into certain areas of society (above all the labor market and work-related social insurance schemes) but denied access to others (especially citizenship and political participation). But the belief in the controllability of difference proved misplaced. In the post-1945 boom, immigration grew in volume and became a structural feature of Western societies. Racially selective immigration rules broke down, and migrants increasingly came from more distant or culturally different countries. When the economic boom faltered in the 1970s, family reunion took place – even in “guest worker” countries. Then, the end of the Cold War and globalization brought new migrations from ever more diverse origins. In the classical immigration countries, migrants from non-Western European backgrounds (Southern and Eastern Europe, Latin America, Asia, and Africa) tended to have disadvantaged work situations and to become concentrated in specific neighborhoods: generally inner cities or industrial peripheries. This led to separation from majority populations, community formation, and the maintenance of minority cultures, languages, and minorities. Assimilation had failed for many immigrant groups and new approaches were needed. Even in the European “guest worker” countries, settlement was taking place despite official denials. The absence of measures to assist incorporation often led to social exclusion and an enduring link between class and ethnic background. Governments replaced assimilation (initially at least) with the principle of integration, which meant recognizing that adaptation was a gradual process that required some degree of mutual accommodation. Acceptance of cultural maintenance and community formation might be a necessary stage, but the final goal was still absorption into the dominant culture – integration was often simply a slower and gentler form of assimilation. Today, of all the highly developed immigration countries, France comes closest to the assimilationist model. Elsewhere, however, there was a shift to approaches that recognized the longterm persistence of group difference. In some countries, such models were referred to as “multiculturalism”; in other places, terms like “minorities policy” and “equality and freedom of choice” were used. Multiculturalism meant that immigrants (and sometimes nonmigrant minority groups) should be able to participate as equals in all spheres of society, without being expected to give up their own culture, religion, and language, although usually with an expectation of conformity to certain key values. There have been two main variants. In the USA, cultural diversity and the existence of ethnic communities are officially accepted, but it is not seen as the role of the state to work for social justice or to support the maintenance of ethnic cultures. Access to the “American Dream” of individual advancement (and even wealth) is supposed to be provided by free public education and an open labor market. The second variant is

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multiculturalism as a public policy. Here, multiculturalism implies both the willingness of the majority group to accept cultural difference and state action to secure equal rights for minorities. Multiculturalism originated in Canada and was taken up under various labels between the 1970s and the 1990s in Australia, the UK, the Netherlands, Sweden, and elsewhere. All of the different approaches to incorporation have proved problematic in one way or another, leading to perceptions of a “crisis of integration.” In recent years, since violent attacks in the USA on 11 September 2001 and in other western countries in the following years, immigrant incorporation has been overshadowed by concerns about security. At the same time, anxiety about loss of national identity has become prominent, often linked with hostility against Muslim migrants. Since 2008, the global economic crisis and the eurozone crisis have added fears about economic competition from migrants, leading to a negative climate toward newcomers and the rise of extreme-right anti-immigration groups. The pendulum has swung back from celebrating diversity to insisting on policies of “civic integration” based on often rather unclear ideas about social cohesion and national values.

Temporary and Circular Migration: A Challenge to Assimilation and Multiculturalism All of the types of migrant incorporation discussed in the previous section share a common feature: they are premised on citizens who belong to just one nation-state. Migrant settlement is seen as a process of transferring primary loyalty from the state of origin to the new state of residence. This process is symbolically marked by naturalization and acquisition of citizenship of the new state. But key global trends question this premise. The neoliberal economic model, which has become dominant over the last 30 years, is based on dividing up work processes so that they can be carried out in the most cost-effective way, often over multiple sites in several countries. Many products, from electronic devices to garments, are now the result of transnational production processes giving rise to global value chains (Elms and Low 2013). Often, control of finance and marketing (and the capture of value) remains mainly in postindustrial countries like the USA, while much of the production work is done in emerging, low-wage economies. In this new model, medium- and lower-skilled migrants are generally only admitted to industrial and postindustrial countries to do jobs that are unattractive to generally well-educated locals. Examples are the recruitment of domestic workers to release educated women from home and child care duties in Singapore (Huang et al. 2012), the employment of farm laborers from Mexico in the USA, and temporary visa schemes for building workers in Germany or Australia (Castles and Ozkul 2014). Typical of such schemes is the lack of migrant rights – either because workers are admitted with strict time limits and no right to bring in dependents or because they have to enter or work as irregulars, that is, without official permission. Highly skilled personnel, by contrast, are welcomed by most destination countries, since they are in short supply, while recruitment from poorer countries saves education and training costs. This category of personnel – often seen not as “migrants” but as “professional transients” or even as “cosmopolitan experts” – is generally encouraged to bring in their families and stay permanently, and yet they are the least likely to do so. Since they are in demand everywhere, they often remain highly mobile, chasing opportunities wherever they find them, including in their countries of origin.

From Multiculturalism to Transnationalism Whatever the skill category of migrants and their migration situation, it is clear that they do not fit easily into the old model of transferring primary loyalty from the state of origin to the new state of residence.

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Temporary or circular migrants can use new forms of electronic communication and social media to remain actively involved in their communities of origin, wherever they are living at one particular time. The lack of residential security offered to the lower skilled keeps them mobile whatever their long-term intentions, while the opportunities available to the highly skilled also lead to repeated movements. Paradoxically, one reason why governments like temporary migration is because they believe it will save social costs, but it may also lead to a much greater social issue: the lack of commitment of many residents to a particular community and society. Thus, an additional type of migrant consciousness may be emerging: a transnational model in which the identities of increasing numbers of people transcend national boundaries, leading to multiple and differentiated forms of belonging. Transnationalism could have important consequences for democratic institutions and political belonging in the future. In the multicultural model, easy access to citizenship and continued acceptance of dual citizenship are important for building feelings of belonging. But trends to repeated mobility and transnational relationships make it vital to think through the consequences of multiple belongings. In future, many people may divide their careers and lives between several places. Citizenship will need to include portable civil, political, social, and health rights, to reflect the growing flexibility of social identities. One could imagine distinctions between active and dormant rights, to avoid privileging mobile people over those who stay put. The biggest adjustment will be to move away from singular national identities and jealously guarded borders to a much more open model that corresponds with our increasingly integrated and more mobile world.

References Castles S, De Haas H, Miller MJ (2014) The age of migration: international population movements in the modern world. Palgrave and Guilford, Basingstoke/New York Castles S, Ozkul D (2014) Circular migration: triple win, or a new label for temporary migration? In: Battistella G (ed) Global and Asian perspectives on international migration. Cham, Heidelberg, New York, Doordrecht and London:Springer 27–49 Elms DK, Low P (2013) Global value chains in a changing world. World Trade Organization, Geneva Huang S, Thang LL, Toyota M (2012) Global networks special issue: transnational mobilities for care: rethinking the dynamics of care in Asia. Blackwell, Oxford/Malden Wimmer A, Glick Schiller N (2003) Methodological nationalism, the social sciences and the study of migration. Int Migr Rev 37(3):576–610

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Citizenship in the Context of Immigration – Comparative Perspectives Thomas Faist1, Kerstin Schmidt1 and Christian Ulbricht2 1 Department of Sociology, Bielefeld University, Bielefeld, Germany 2 Bielefeld Graduate School in History and Sociology (BGHS), Bielefeld University, Bielefeld, Germany

Definition Citizenship defines membership in bounded states, and migration across borders raises the question: who is a member? The recent evolution in citizenship policies must be assessed in the context of divergent trends. The greater value placed on human rights, skilled migration, and the emphasis on global markets in national policies, have produced a shift toward more liberalized citizenship access. But such inclusionary processes have been accompanied by exclusionary tendencies based on specific cultural criteria, so that illiberal attitudes toward immigrants are increasingly accepted in public and policy discourses.

Converging Trends of Access to Citizenship Across countries, immigrants’ access to citizenship has been eased; concomitantly, legal opportunities for participation in all walks of life (Kivisto and Faist 2007) and tolerance of dual citizenship (Faist 2007) have increased. The 1980s and 1990s saw major debates over ethnonational understandings of nationhood (ius sanguinis: blood principle, parental lineage) and legal-rational understandings of political membership (ius soli: territorial principle, birthright; ius domicilii: residence principle, permanent abode) (Brubaker 1992; based on Meinecke 1908). But this debate is largely over: “we all are republican now” (Faist 2007). Access to citizenship focuses on individual skills and the selfresponsible individual who possesses or is eager to learn competences necessary to integrate in a political community, rather than on collective reciprocity, solidarity, and trust. This change is reflected in the increasing emphasis on human capital when admitting migrants. Paradoxically, such inclusionary processes have been accompanied by exclusionary tendencies in civil society, raising the questions of how citizenship and communal relations interact, and how this interaction has evolved. Exclusionary tendencies vary from religious issues in Europe to linguistic issues in the USA (cf. Zolberg and Woon 1999). While religious differences and social distance matter in most countries, the

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 F. D. Bean, S. K. Brown (eds.), Selected Topics in Migration Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-19631-7_13

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institutional channels for dealing with such heterogeneities differ. For example, the corporatist German system sets high hurdles for access of Muslim organizations in public policy, whereas the British system does not require such elaborate institutional inclusion (Faist and Do¨rr 1997). The extension of the rights of citizens from civil, political, and social rights (Marshall 1964) to include cultural rights of national minorities (Kymlicka 1995) also varies. Most major European countries have turned away from “multiculturalism,” but cultural rights continue to cause conflicts in civil society. Other issues include the significance of “securitization” in migration control and in civic life more generally; the implications of the fiscal, financial, and economic crisis for inclusion; and the penetration of economic criteria into the discourse of citizenship policy. Increasing liberalization of access to citizenship for migrants in western democracies is part of a shift from “ethnic” to “civic” nationalism, whereby membership based on descent (ius sanguinis) has been complemented by birth in the immigration country (ius soli). Moreover, almost half of all world states now tolerate some form of dual citizenship. Basically, a “rights revolution” underway since the 1960s is being expressed in citizenship legislation. Yet this trend runs counter to a second one which is twofold: (1) the prioritization of migrants who contribute actively to economic productivity, especially the highly skilled, and (2) the illiberal culturalization of undesirable migrants as the other. Merit-based citizenship and cultural devaluation represent opposite ends of a spectrum: at one end are migrants who are, to paraphrase Aristide Zolberg, “wanted and welcome” (Zolberg 1987); at the other are those “wanted but not welcome,” wanted for economic reasons but not welcome for cultural ones. The focus on the ends leaves out many other categories in an imagined middle, for example, those categorized legally as asylum seekers or those who immigrate in the context of family reunification. The so-called liberal paradox is one aspect of the opposing trends. The principles of liberal economies call for the opening of borders for

capital, goods, services, and people in the economic sphere. At the same time, the principles of political communities demand some closure against the outside, thus enforcing a logic of inclusion/exclusion of newcomers (Freeman 1986; Carens 2013). Political communities need boundaries to create a desired social order and lessen the ubiquitous, yet diffuse, threat of violence. Besides the fundamental Hobbesian idea of social order, the production and redistribution of collective goods for purposes of justice, including welfare, also requires a bounded community. Only by the monopolization of power through the nation-state (Tilly 1990) and by curtailing the liberty of individuals falling outside the nation-state can the liberty of those within be guaranteed (Bosniak 2008). In short, citizenship is both internally inclusive and externally exclusive.

Developments in Major Immigration Countries In what follows, we discuss the nexus between immigration and citizenship policies, taking a brief look at recent developments in several major migrant receiving countries: Germany, the UK, the Netherlands, France, the USA, Canada, and Australia (cf. Reitz 1998). Germany In 2000, Germany made a leap from being a historically restrictive country with respect to immigration and citizenship access by introducing the ius soli principle alongside ius sanguinis, making it possible to acquire German citizenship by being born on German soil, provided one parent had a permanent residence permit. Requirements for citizenship acquisition were lowered, and the general attitude toward naturalization, traditionally considered the most important result of immigration, was revised. The length of the residence period to qualify for naturalization dropped from 15 to 8 years. In 2008 it was further reduced to 7 years for applicants completing integration courses containing a language test (higher language skills reduce

Citizenship in the Context of Immigration – Comparative Perspectives

residence requirements to 6 years) and a naturalization test to demonstrate knowledge of German society. While restrictive, the civic integration courses are well within “the ambit of liberalism” (Joppke 2010, p. 68), as they relate to the individual level, implying they can be met by every individual. Yet with their language requirement, they are used as “an instrument for the selection of (more highly) skilled migrants” (Michalowski 2010, p. 191). Several exceptions to the rule of rejecting dual citizenship were also established, although Germany still does not tolerate dual citizenship as a rule, except for other EU member states with whom reciprocity rules apply. UK In contrast to Germany, the UK is a long-term immigration country and often defines itself as a multicultural nation, based on its colonial history and Commonwealth system. Yet since EU enlargement, particularly the inclusion of Eastern European countries, skepticism about the free movement of people within the EU and immigration has risen. Fears of an economic decline caused by immigrants occupying jobs needed by British citizens and their perceived abuse of the welfare system have created a climate of exclusion. The majority of British citizens oppose migration, believe too many migrants enter the UK, and perceive migration as a problem, not an opportunity. Public opinion of immigrants with skills required for the functioning of society, such as doctors or nurses, is less hostile (Blinder 2012). Government policies have contributed to the perception of migrants, especially asylum seekers, as a threat to be addressed by severe border protection and measures preventing migrants from overstaying or staying for purposes other than stated in their visas (Mulvey 2010). The British Government recently defined British citizenship as “a privilege and not a right,” demanding advanced language skills and knowledge about British culture (UK Government 2013). In theory, “citizenship is more esteemed and valued if it is earned, not given” (Crick Commission 2003, p. 3). At the same time, in the points system established in 2010, the highly

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skilled can enter more easily if they fulfill specific criteria considered important for British society. The selection criteria for becoming a UK citizen by naturalization became more rigid in October 2013. Along with some vague characteristics (“good character” and “sound of mind”), applicants must be 18 years of age or older, willing to live in the UK, and pass a test proving knowledge of the English language and about life in the UK (UK Government, 2014). The Netherlands In the 1960s and 1970s, the Dutch government considered immigration – mainly guest workers and their families from Morocco and Turkey – would be temporary. In 1980, a paradigm shift in policies on naturalization and integration of migrants led to the creation of the “Minorities Policy” based on the recognition that immigration was often a lasting phenomenon and “immigrant integration would be assisted by a secure residence status, equal rights, family reunification and full participation in education and the labour market” (OECD 2011, p. 336). During this time, the Netherlands defined itself as tolerant and multicultural. Over the last 15 years, this very liberal Dutch approach to immigration and citizenship (compared to other European countries) has been replaced by a narrow and restrictive one (Vasta 2006). Populist views saw the laissezfaire attitude as endangering “native Dutch” values and many citizens as unwilling/unable to integrate. The 2002 murder of the leader of antiimmigrant party Pim Fortuyn and the 2004 murder of filmmaker Theo van Gogh, known for his islamophobic statements, increased antiimmigrant sentiment among the self-defined “autochthonous” parts of the Dutch population (ibid.). These developments were mirrored at the policy level. The conservative government, elected in 2002, introduced an immigration (culture and language) test to acquire a visa. Unlike the integration courses offered since 1998, organized and financed by the government, the new test is offered by private institutes and paid for by the

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immigrants. Fines and residence status sanctions are imposed on those who do not pass it in time (OECD 2011). Policies promoting “naturalization as a right” for children of immigrants born in the Netherlands and the right to obtain dual nationality, established in 1984, resulted in a peak of applications for citizenship in 1996. In the context of a more critical policy and public debate on immigration, this right was revoked by the introduction of a naturalization test in 2003 framing Dutch citizenship as “something to be proud of, not a consumption article” (OECD 2011, p. 340). France The French case is an example of the republican principle, with nationality intricately connected to a confirmation of political values (Nicholls 2012). The double ius soli principle of citizenship acquisition, applied from 1899 until 1993, ensured the third generation (both parents born in the country) was automatically naturalized, while the second generation (at least one immigrant parent) was naturalized upon reaching maturity. French republicanism is related to a version of laicism; for example, in 2004, headscarves were outlawed in schools. In 2008, the highest court (Conseil d’E´tat) denied a burkawearing woman French citizenship because of “insufficient assimilation,” a case showing the fear of the destruction of the republican ideology (Lefebvre 2010). In 2003, under Interior Minister Nicolas Sarkozy, a compulsory integration course was introduced, emphasizing language training and knowledge about institutions and values of the French republic. Completing it meant establishing a “relationship of trust and mutual obligation” between the individual and the state. The government has since passed the law of immigration and integration, making civic integration courses obligatory to obtain a 1-year, renewable resident permit. After 2 years, immigrants can apply for a 10-year permanent residence card. As Sarkozy put it, the law facilitates a fundamental change in immigration policies from the “unwanted” (subie) to the “chosen” (choisie).

USA In the USA, debate has focused on citizenship status for undocumented migrants, mainly from Mexico. In 2013, the Obama administration proposed the 11 million undocumented immigrants in the USA could earn citizenship by passing national security and criminal background checks, paying taxes and a penalty, and learning English. At this point, this type of earned citizenship is the answer to include certain categories of Mexican immigrants, the highest proportion of undocumented immigrants with the lowest naturalization levels. Current legislation is based on amendments of the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act; no new and comprehensive immigration law has been created (Giovagnoli 2014). In 2010, the Senate rejected the Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors (DREAM) Act to provide temporary legal status and potentially US citizenship to children of undocumented migrants wanting to pursue tertiary education. A number of immigration bills introduced by Congress in 2013 and 2014 reflect the state’s intention to facilitate the permanent stay of highly qualified people, for example, foreign graduates at US universities. At the same time, fears about national security and a decline of employment opportunities in the economic downturn are leading to enhanced border protection measures and identity checks of prospective immigrants. Furthermore, new legislation criminalizes unauthorized stay, resulting in more deportations of undocumented migrants (IPC 2014). US naturalization rates are lower than in most OECD countries, and citizens of high-income countries renounce their right of becoming a US citizen despite qualifying, arguably because US citizenship will not provide increased benefits over their current citizenship. Yet US citizenship can have beneficial economic outcomes, including higher average salaries compared to noncitizens; that said, those applying for citizenship often possess a higher level of education (Sumption and Flamm 2012). For less privileged migrant groups, barriers to citizenship include a lack of knowledge of the application process, language difficulties, and prohibitive costs.

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Canada Canada is considered a classic example of an immigration country, defining itself as a settler society with a welcoming attitude toward newcomers and corresponding legislation facilitating citizenship acquisition and ius soli citizenship for children of immigrants born in the country (Bauder 2014). With about 85 % of legal immigrants becoming naturalized, the Canadian rate is among the highest in the world (NHS Canada 2011). It is the immigrants’ “way of showing thanks” to Canada’s open multicultural policies (Bloemraad 2002, p. 218). Immigration has historically been perceived crucial to Canadian economic well-being. Correspondingly, the points-based immigration scheme for highly skilled foreigners is based on criteria of education, work experience, financial independence, language proficiency in English and/or French, age, offer of employment by a Canadian employer, and personal or family links to the country. Recent changes have increased the importance of employment-related criteria; the citizenship test has also been revised to include more information about Canada and “Canadian values” (Reitz 2014). Australia Australia is another country with strong multicultural policies. At 80 %, the naturalization rate is close to Canada (Australian Government 2011). In 2007, Australia introduced civic integration requirements for immigrants to qualify for naturalization, with residence time doubled from 2 to 4 years and the addition of a citizenship test, requiring immigrants to demonstrate English language competence and familiarity with the Australian way of life. Immigrants also need a penal clearance certificate to prove they are of good character. Australia operates a points-based scheme based on skills and qualifications needed in the country. While Australia welcomes highly skilled migrants, its policies toward refugees and asylum seekers, including housing people for long periods in detention centers, is internationally criticized. In the public discourse, refugees and asylum seekers are framed as a threat to national security and identity (Bleiker et al. 2013).

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Other Countries Generally speaking, highly qualified workers are welcomed by rich, industrialized, and democratic countries, with mobility conceptualized as a feature of a highly skilled workforce possessing sufficient financial and human capital to move. The new mobile cosmopolitans, mainly highly skilled young urban populations, are recognized as a distinct type of migrant: “Eurostars,” for example, are young persons mobile within the European Union (Favell 2008). Their migration intentions are often temporary and circular, as opposed to migrants who establish long-term or permanent links to their destination countries. Mobile migrants from rich countries are also less interested in naturalization in other rich countries. For citizens of EU member states, it is easy to explain: migrants working or studying in other EU countries enjoy the same civil and social rights as national citizens, so their rate of naturalization is understandably low. In addition, acquisition of the citizenship of the immigration country has become legally less important for the internationally mobile, highly skilled migrants who are wanted and welcome, and who do not plan to stay in the destination country for an extended period. For many, citizenship in the host country is neither desirable nor necessary. Yet for migrants from poor countries, acquiring citizenship of rich countries remains important (see Rutter et al. 2008 for the UK). A main benefit of immigration country citizenship, and implicitly dual citizenship, is the ability to travel with fewer restrictions, such as the need for a visa.

Liberal and Illiberal Paths: Dual Citizenship Versus Citizenship Tests Toleration of dual citizenship in immigration countries is usually legitimated by positing that legal equality should be a prerequisite for substantive citizenship, that is, full participation in economic, political, and cultural life in the place of residence. Instrumentally, the claim hinges on the observation that those states tolerating dual citizenship have proportionally more immigrants who have naturalized. Citizenship as a human

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right also comes into play. First, in international law, for example, citizenship is increasingly viewed as a human right, as in the case of stateless persons (Chan 1991). Second, gender equality as a human right entered international law in the Convention on Nationality for Married Women in 1957 and later found its way into the law of national states. According to this body of law, women do not have to cede legal citizenship when marrying a spouse of another nationality. In a further step, taken by a Convention of the Council of Europe (1993), children from binational marriages have dual or multiple citizenships. Countries with significant shares of emigrants have adapted their citizenship laws, verging toward more tolerance of dual citizenship among their citizens abroad. However, in such cases, the abovementioned factors have played a less important role than maintaining and reforging ties to (former) citizens abroad (e.g., Go´rny et al. 2007). Third, it causes normative problems of legitimation if immigrants with permanent residency are denied access to citizenship in the long run (Baubo¨ck 1994). The increasing toleration of dual citizenship is reflective of multiple belonging, whereby insertion in the country of settlement is not necessarily accompanied by dismantling ties in countries of origin. Affiliation to transnationally connected families, religious communities, and transnational networks of entrepreneurs is, thus, not an anomaly but one of many pathways to incorporation (Faist and Gerdes 2008). Dual citizenship has different implications for political systems, depending on their design. It derives, above all, from the acquisition of citizenship at birth: from parents with different nationalities or a combination of ius sanguinis transmission by state of origin and ius soli acquisition in the state of residence. Moreover, dual nationality increasingly stems from naturalization without renouncing previously acquired legal citizenship. While dual citizenship may raise certain problems, it does not violate democratic principles. Some say dual citizenship violates equality of representation by giving people two votes, but even assuming they can also vote by absentee ballot in a country where they do not

presently live, dual citizens still have one vote only in each election. These separate votes are never aggregated in the process of electing representatives or in a referendum. Dual citizens have a stake in two different states, but their votes do not count twice in any decision. This is different in federal states, such as the USA, or protofederal systems, such as the EU. If a resident of both Germany and France were enfranchised in both countries for elections to the European Parliament, her vote is counted twice in determining the representation of these countries (more precisely, districts of these countries). Dual citizenship is not the only form of multiple citizenship. On the substate level, there are forms of local citizenship, and on the suprastate level, incarnations such as European Union citizenship. In the overall liberal framework, however, we observe restrictive countertrends. After 2001, many countries raised the bar for naturalization, with the implementation of assimilatory elements like language and citizenship tests, integration courses, and citizenship ceremonies (Green 2012). Obligatory civic integration points to concerns about liberal-democratic norms and principles being shared by all (Triadafilopoulos 2011). Consider, for example, the increasing securitization of citizenship and public concern about the compatibility of Muslim immigrants post 9/11. Finally, in the sphere of emigration, we see a re-ethnicizing, whereby home country governments promote dual citizenship to foster the affiliation of emigrants to their country of origin (Lafleur 2013).

Conclusion Despite tendencies toward re-ethnicization, rules of acquisition for citizenship depend less on ethnic criteria. This does not mean exclusionary tendencies are less pronounced. Instead, they have changed shape to focus on economic competitiveness and cultural modernity. This conclusion is borne out by the imposition of new rules for access to citizenship and more restrictive immigration rules, applying not only to labor migrants but also to asylum seekers and refugees.

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As the debate focuses less on the ethnic versus civic distinction in the legal status dimension of citizenship and more on the normative realm of the political community, it becomes crucial to understand the shifting boundaries of the political sphere, which go far beyond the migration field to touch on the principles of democracy. The liberalization/restriction of citizenship and the implications for state-citizen relations are often discussed in terms of the withdrawal of the nation-state and the erosion of social rights. A rights revolution occurred after World War II, especially in the late 1970s; this revolution is now considered by some observers in danger, with the reciprocity of rights and duties challenged by plural citizenship. Some argue the incorporation of highly diverse migrants will create a thin citizenship or cheapen citizenship (Schuck 2000; Spiro 2007) as the rights accruing to citizenship status and the obligations flowing from it become increasingly thin. It is up for debate whether this cheapening of citizenship is caused by plural citizenship and immigration. Be that as it may, the loss of a meaningful citizenship is observed by research noting the perpetuation of negative rights (protection rights against the state) and the decline of positive rights (the state must actively provide material and other resources to realize these rights), changes induced by government policies enforcing a civic and liberal universalistic orientation. As various authors have observed, the new social project in Europe favors a citizenship model that privileges individuals as bearers of human capital and draws a close link between work, economic productivity, and social justice (Soysal 2012, p. 4; M€ unch 2012; Somers 2008; Rose 1996). The free-floating individual in the market sphere only enjoys contract with a nationstate if she contributes to the community and is not a burden to the social welfare system. By the same token, individual migrants are evaluated as bearers of human capital; this is borne out by the spread of point systems in European immigration laws to favor young, highly skilled immigrants (Boucher and Cerna 2014). Increasingly, liberal democratic states are not per se directed against foreigners but against a specific type which seems incompatible with

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liberal ways of life. “Liberal nationalism” or identity liberalism practices a particularized universalism: “The liberal state is only for liberal people” (Joppke 2010, p. 140). The selection of immigrants has shifted from openly discriminatory group-level exclusion to an individualistic skills approach, in addition to criteria based on human rights, such as family reunification and asylum. The blurring of racial, ethnic, and religious boundaries is enforced by a human rights discourse that stigmatizes group-level exclusion but sanctions individual-level exclusion based on language, culture, and human capital. The nation-state that relies on and enforces liberal norms and universalistic rules can legitimately demand loyalty to the inside and autonomy and support to the outside. This represents both a liberalization of citizenship law and a liberal cultural discrimination of immigrants at the lower end. Empirical research must consider the management of this liberal paradox, including how nation-states incorporate universalistic norms, for example, through marketization at the upper end of the social status of the immigrants which then becomes the norm to create identity and difference. Researching the liberal nationalist architecture (Levey 2014) will yield further insights into the relationship between citizenship, inequality, and democracy.

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Group-Specific Effects of Contexts of Migration Suzanne Model* University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA, USA

Definition As the number of immigrant destinations grows, cross-national comparison becomes an increasingly popular research strategy. Most cross-national research on immigrant integration assumes that the policies and practices of destinations affect all immigrants equally. While this is often the case, in many situations, destinations privilege some groups over others. “Group-specific effects of contexts of migration” refers to the differential treatment that immigrant groups encounter within a single destination. Scholars comparing the integration of two or more groups within a single destination are more likely to acknowledge this phenomenon than are researchers comparing one or more groups in two or more destinations. Perhaps this asymmetry occurs because the emphasis of the former is differences between immigrant groups, while the emphasis of the latter is differences between destinations. Whatever the reason, a more balanced perspective is needed.

Detailed Description Since the Second World War, international migrants have settled in an increasing number of destinations. Yet, until relatively recently, few migration scholars thought in cross-national terms. Intra-Europe comparisons did not appear until the 1990s, when Europeans began worrying that non-EU nationals were failing to integrate (Niessen 2000). Since then, cross-national research has increased rapidly, with contemporary students of integration comparing migrants in the Old World with the New (Reitz et al. 1999; Heath 2007; Thomson and Crul 2007) and migrants in Asia with migrants in the West (Xi 2002; Skrentny et al. 2007). These comparisons have emphasized four explanations for cross-national variation in receiving country’s responses to foreigners: differences in demographic history, ideologies about national belonging, social policy, and institutional structure. To be sure, these explanations offer useful insights; yet, they can be misleading when translated into hypotheses for research. The reason is that they implicitly assume that the customs and laws of a given receiving country affect all immigrants similarly. This is rarely the case; rather, responses at destination vary with the characteristics of the immigrants themselves. Although this interaction is rarely a problem for cross-national studies in which the object of analysis is “immigrants in general,” when research focuses on migrants with particular characteristics – for instance, those with the same national origin, race, or ethnicity – then the potential for differential treatment within host societies increases. This is hardly a new insight. Interactions between origin and destination form part of the “context of reception” that Portes and his collaborators introduced to explain variation in immigrant outcomes in the United States (Portes and Böröcz 1989; Portes and Rumbaut 1996). Some reviews of cross-national differences in immigrant adaptation have also acknowledged it (Schmitter-Heisler 2000; Lahav 2004; Alba and Waters 2011). In addition, several quantitative analysts have included interactions between origins and destinations in their multi-level models (Kogan 2007a; van Tubergen 2006; Levels *Email: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 F. D. Bean, S. K. Brown (eds.), Selected Topics in Migration Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-19631-7_14

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et al. 2008). Yet, researchers studying the integration of two or more groups within a single destination are more likely to consider the implications of differences among immigrants than are researchers comparing two or more destinations. Perhaps this happens because the emphasis of the former is differences between immigrant groups, while the emphasis of the latter is differences between destinations. This entry highlights five theories that anticipate differences in how particular host societies respond to specific types of immigrants as opposed to how they respond to “immigrants in general.” The first three are broad; the processes they emphasize are expected to affect most dimensions of integration. Yet, integration is multifaceted and often proceeds unevenly (Freeman 2004; Bean et al. 2012). This imbalance is illustrated by the fourth and fifth theories, which have a narrower purview. One identifies some reasons for cross-national differences in economic integration, reasons that do not necessarily affect other dimensions of integration. The last posits that social integration is inversely related to political integration. From this perspective, progress on one dimension is associated with stagnation in the other. These differences aside, all five provide grounds for expecting host societies to privilege some groups and penalize others.

Segmented Assimilation Probably the most debated theory in migration studies today is segmented assimilation. As proposed by Herbert Gans (1992) and elaborated by Alejandro Portes and his collaborators (Portes and Zhou 1993; Portes and Rumbaut 1996), it predicts that the offspring of some American immigrant groups will assimilate into the ghetto underclass rather than into the mainstream. Among those at risk, the children of black and Latino immigrants rank high. The reasoning behind this prediction is complex. Since the 1980s, the number of well-paying, low-skilled jobs in America has been declining. Increasingly, a middle-class livelihood requires more than a high school diploma. Yet, residential segregation forces some dark-skinned immigrants to share neighborhoods with poor African Americans, Mexicans, and Puerto Ricans; hence, some immigrant children attend ghetto schools. In such schools, aspirations are low and education is substandard; large proportions of the student body do not graduate. Some African American, Mexican, and Puerto Rican students subscribe to an “oppositional subculture” that valorizes gangs, drug dealing, teenage parenthood, hustling, and honor. Unsurprisingly, this motivates some children of black and Latino immigrants to embrace these values too. “From their perspective, immigrant jobs are demeaning; moreover, illegal jobs and scams may pay more and look better socially – especially when peer pressure is also present” (Gans 1992, p. 182). Of course, immigrant parents hope “to promote educational success and to ward off threats posed by discrimination, narrowing labor market options and street culture” (Portes and Rumbaut 2001, p. 62). And some parents do prevail. However, Portes and Rumbaut identify two factors that weaken parental influence: single parenthood and dissonant acculturation. Single parents have less time, less money, and less authority than two parents do. Dissonant acculturation results when adolescents abandon their parents’ customs, values, and language for American ways, while the parents remain enmeshed in the customs, values, and language of the homeland. The resulting intergenerational conflict rarely resolves in the parents’ favor. Recently researchers have found that some children of black and Muslim immigrants in Europe also exhibit high rates of school dropout, idleness, and encounters with the criminal justice system (Sansone 1992; Batalha 2004; Alba and Silberman 2002; Silberman 2011). They also report experiencing labor market discrimination and police harassment. This discovery has triggered debate over whether segmented assimilation is occurring in Europe. But, in order to apply, segmented assimilation requires the presence of a marginalized and disaffected native minority. It is into their subculture that the children of nonwhite immigrants are expected to assimilate. This logic makes the adaptation uniquely American. No European host society houses a

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stigmatized, long-resident minority into whose subculture black and Muslim youth can assimilate. Nor are Europe’s immigrant neighborhoods as ethnically homogeneous and socially isolated as American ghettoes (Paulle 2005; Wacquant 2008). Thus, if a subset of Europe’s immigrant youth are participating in an oppositional subculture, a mechanism other than segmented assimilation must be responsible. In short, from the perspective of segmentation theory, the vulnerability of the children of black and Latino immigrants occurs only in the United States.

Legacies of Colonialism A second theory that addresses variation in ethnic outcomes within host societies draws on the consequences of colonialism. It assumes that imperialist nations denigrate the peoples they colonize and that decolonization has done little to diminish this propensity. If this expectation is correct, in their respective mother countries, immigrants from colonies and former colonies stand at the bottom of the ethno-racial ladder (Rex 1983). World systems theorist Ramon Grosfoguel (2003) uses this idea to create a three-tiered hierarchy. At the bottom are immigrants from past or present colonies who have relocated to their respective mother countries. Grosfoguel labels them “colonial/racialized subjects.” Next on the scale stand “colonial immigrants.” Their homelands are colonies or former colonies, but they have settled in host societies other than their respective mother countries. At the top sit “immigrants,” movers whose homelands have never been colonies. Since these sending countries have a relatively unblemished geopolitical position, their nationals outrank ex-colonials in any ethno-racial hierarchy. What about the United States? Although it never defined any of its “territories” as colonies, several of its minorities have been described as “internal colonials,” including African Americans, Native Americans, Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, and Filipinos (Blauner 1972; Barrera 1979). Other groups to which the label applies include Maoris in New Zealand, blacks in Brazil, or Palestinians in Israel. According to Grosfoguel, internal colonials experience exclusion on a par with “colonial/racialized subjects.” To sum up, according to world systems theorists, negative stereotypes about conquered and enslaved peoples were part and parcel of the expansion of Europe. If these peoples reside in a Western country, whether as migrants or internal colonials, negative stereotypes continue to undermine their integration, especially in comparison to the reception accorded other international migrants.

Ethnic Returnees A third category of movers who elicit a special response is ethnic return migrants. This is a label used for people who, after living abroad for a generation or more, return to their real (or imagined) homeland. Compared to other migrants, ethnic returnees face lower barriers to entry and may enjoy other advantages. Their privileged status is an extreme case of the general principle that the greater the similarity between the culture and phenotype of natives and newcomers, the warmer the relationship between the two groups (Lynch and Simon 2003). Still, similarity does not explain why countries initiate policies to attract return migrants. The most frequent motive is to protect co-ethnics from persecution. Israel was founded for this reason. Both Jews and their non-Jewish kin can establish permanent residency and, having done so, are eligible for a variety of benefits. Most non-Jews qualify only for temporary residence. Refugees from the wars for colonial independence were similarly favored. In 1968 the United Kingdom created a new category for admission: persons whose parents or grandparents had been born, adopted, or naturalized in the United Kingdom. Soon, persons not meeting this criterion – e.g., nonwhites – had difficulty attaining permanent residency. France introduced similar policies toward its Pied-Noirs from Algeria and Portugal toward its Retornados from Africa. Both these groups were white settlers displaced by decolonization.

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In other cases, ethnic groups migrated to neighboring regions without the protection of empire and were later ejected. The most prominent example are Aussiedlers, ethnic Germans who lived in Eastern Europe, often for generations, but who were persecuted after Germany lost the Second World War. The German government was so generous in its assistance that, after the fall of the Eastern Bloc, hundreds of thousands applied for resettlement (Joppke 2005). The Chinese too had a major presence abroad, primarily in Southeast Asia. But when Ho Chi Minh and the communists conquered Vietnam, Chinese were no longer welcome in that country. Although many relocated in the West, China accepted 270,000, resettling many close to the border over which they fled (Lam 2000). In Asia, scholars have identified a different motive for welcoming returning co-ethnics: economic development (Skrentny et al. 2007). In both Korea and Japan, co-ethnics are desired for their labor power. Because these countries are unusually homogeneous, neither government was eager to alleviate labor shortages by recruiting “foreigners.” To minimize these fears, they turned instead to co-ethnics. Korea introduced policies to attract persons of Korean ancestry from China (Joseonjok); Japan introduced policies to attract persons of Japanese ancestry from South America (Nikkejin). In sum, several nations have extended a warmer welcome to co-ethnics than non-co-ethnics. These policies are intended to benefit the state economically and/or politically. Though this goal is often accomplished, research indicates that ethnic return migrants are disappointed with their reception (Tsuda 2009). Despite expectations that cultural and phenotypical similarities foster integration, ethnic returnees are not on a par with natives, socially or economically. At the same time, they register better outcomes than non-co-ethnic migrants (Alba and Silberman 2002; Kogan 2007b). Perhaps this fact offers little solace because return migrants take their native-born counterparts as their reference group.

Queuing Theory The discussion now turns to queuing theory, a perspective that predicts within-destination differences in the economic realm. It is especially helpful in understanding ethnic and racial differences in unemployment and occupational status but has less relevance for earnings (Hodge 1973; Lieberson 1980). Its name reflects the assumption that motivates the theory, namely, that native employers rank racial and ethnic groups in a hierarchical fashion, favoring their own group over others. The theory does not specify the basis for assigning ranks to the remaining groups. It assumes only that native employers within a given locale agree on the ethno-racial composition of the hierarchy. From these principles, it follows that native employers view applicants for vacancies or promotions as arranged in a line or queue, with members of the most favored group at the front, followed by the second most favored, and so on, down to the least favored at the back. Controlling for credentials and skills, queuing theorists expect employers to start hiring (or promoting) at the front, moving down to the second ranked group only after members of the first are exhausted. Members of the least favored group are rarely hired but rank first when layoffs occur. An obvious implication of queuing theory is that, in every country, some ethnic and racial minorities experience more attractive economic opportunities than others. But there is a more subtle implication: the sizes of the competing groups also affect their economic well-being. The larger the proportion of the labor force ranked below a given group (or the smaller the proportion ranked above), the more successful that group will be. To offer a simple example, in a locale where only two groups compete, the larger the more favored group, the poorer the opportunities open to the less favored group and vice versa. Since most host societies house more than two groups, developing appropriate hypotheses about the trajectory of any specific group is a demanding task.

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Trade-Off Perspective Very recently an intriguing hypothesis has been proposed to explain ethno-racial variation in political integration. This argument, sometimes called the “trade-off” perspective, takes political participation and electoral representation as the main indicators of political integration. The theory holds that, the more socially segregated an ethnic minority – as measured by indicators like language, religion, and intermarriage – the more politically integrated it is likely to be (Maxwell 2012). Segregation is helpful because groups that are socially separate create their own institutions – voluntary organizations, religious centers, media outlets, etc. – which, in turn, facilitate political mobilization (Fennema and Tillie 1999). Conversely, groups that are socially integrated participate in mainstream associations and institutions, a pattern that discourages the emergence of leaders or organizations committed to benefiting group members. In other words, groups cannot have both social and political integration; they must “trade” one “off” for the other. Research designed to test this hypothesis finds that South Asians and Muslims in the United Kingdom, France, and the Netherlands exhibit high levels of social and geographic segregation and high levels of political activity. Conversely, Black Caribbean immigrants in these three host societies exhibit low levels of social and geographic segregation and low levels of political activity (Maxwell 2012). Black Caribbeans in the United States provide a useful extension of this relationship. In New York City, they have a high voting rate and strong representation in city offices, both elected and appointed (Kasinitz 1992; Mollenkopf et al. 2001; Kasinitz et al. 2008) As the trade-off hypothesis predicts, Black Caribbean Americans are also more segregated than Black Caribbean Europeans, usually sharing neighborhoods with African Americans (Peach 1999). These neighborhoods nurture a range of institutions, including churches, voluntary associations, civil rights groups, and “political clubs.” The latter are especially important because their purpose is to identify and support local candidates for political office and to distribute patronage to supporters. Although African Americans and Black Caribbeans sometimes compete for leadership roles, residence in or near African American neighborhoods has given Black Caribbeans an infrastructure for politics that is unavailable to their European counterparts (Foner 1985; Rogers 2006). Of course, social segregation has both a voluntary and an involuntary component. But, as the Black Caribbean example illustrates, host societies respond differently to different groups. On the one hand, the cultural gap between native whites and Black Caribbeans is modest on both sides of the Atlantic. On the other hand, antiblack sentiment is much stronger in the United States than in Europe, due in part to America’s legacy of slavery and institutionalized segregation (Vermeulen 2002). Consequently, despite their shared culture, America offers Black Caribbeans far fewer opportunities to interact socially with native whites than does Europe (Foner 1985, 2005). In many ways, the trade-off hypothesis challenges existing theories about integration. The assimilationist perspective, for instance, argues that integration brings ethnic minorities more advantages than does segregation (Alba and Nee 2003). In a similar vein, segmented assimilation theory associates the segregation of blacks in America, native or foreign born, with alienation, poverty, and crime (Portes and Zhou 1993). Yet, advocates of the trade-off hypothesis perceive segregation as politically advantageous because it facilitates mobilization. This example illustrates the multidimensional, nonlinear quality of the integration process.

Research Implications To conclude, cross-national comparisons are a useful tool for understanding the factors that promote immigrant integration. Understandably, the hypotheses that motivate cross-national comparisons operate at the level of nations. When the object of analysis is “immigrants in general,” this is the appropriate approach. Frequently, however, the relationship between a specific immigrant group and its host society is

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“special.” This special relationship may affect one or several dimensions of integration. And the result may help or harm the integration process. The goal of this article is to show that hypotheses formulated at the level of nations overlook these special relationships. Nor do the five theories outlined above provide the sole grounds for cross-national variation. Depending on the nations under scrutiny, a myriad of factors may produce special relationships. For example, applicants for refugee status in the United States must demonstrate “a well-founded fear of persecution. . .” unless they are Cuban, in which case their presence on American soil justifies granting them asylum. In this example, geopolitics trumps a level playing field. Exceptions like this mean that when scholars engage in cross-national comparisons of specific groups, they must consider hypotheses that operate both across host societies and within host societies. That integration is so complex is unfortunate, but ignoring this complexity diminishes scholars’ ability to understand it.

Cross-References ▶ Employment-Based Immigration ▶ Guest Workers ▶ Points-Based Immigration

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Kasinitz P (1992) Caribbean New York. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY Kasinitz P, Mollenkopf J, Waters MC, Holdaway J (2008) Inheriting the city. Russell Sage, New York Kogan I (2007a) A study of immigrants’ employment careers in West Germany using the sequence analysis technique. Soc Sci Res 36:491–511 Kogan I (2007b) Working through barriers. Springer, Dordrecht Lahav G (2004) Immigration and politics in the new Europe. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Lam T (2000) The exodus of Hoa refugees from Vietnam and their settlement in Guangxi: China’s refugee settlement strategies. J Refug Stud 13:374–390 Levels M, Dronkers J, Kraykamp G (2008) Immigrants’ educational achievement in western countries: origin, destination and community effects on mathematical performance. Am Sociol Rev 73:835–853 Lieberson S (1980) A piece of the pie. University of California, Berkeley Lynch JP, Simon RJ (2003) Immigration the world over: statutes, policies and practices. Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham Maxwell R (2012) Ethnic minority migrants in Britain and France. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Mollenkopf J, Olson D, Ross T (2001) Immigrant political participation in New York and Los Angeles. In: Jones-Correa M (ed) Governing American cities. Russell Sage, New York, pp 17–70 Niessen J (2000) Diversity and cohesion: new challenges for the integration of immigrants and minorities. Council of Europe Publishing, Strasbourg Paulle B (2005) Anxiety and intimidation in the Bronx and the Bijlmer. Dutch University Press, Amsterdam Peach C (1999) London and New York: contrasts in the British and American models of segregation. Popul Space Place 5:319–347 Portes A, Böröcz J (1989) Contemporary immigration: theoretical perspectives on its determinants and modes of incorporation. Int Migr Rev 23:606–627 Portes A, Rumbaut RG (1996) Immigrant America: a portrait, 2nd edn. University of California Press, Berkeley Portes A, Rumbaut RG (2001) Legacies. University of California Press, Berkeley Portes A, Zhou M (1993) The new second generation: segmented assimilation and its variants. Ann Am Acad Pol Soc Sci 530:74–96 Reitz JG, Frich J, Calabrese T, Wagner G (1999) The institutional framework of ethnic employment disadvantage: a comparison of Germany and Canada. J Ethn Migr Stud 25:397–443 Rex J (1983) Race relations in sociological theory, 2nd edn. Routledge & Kegan Paul, London Rogers RR (2006) Afro-Caribbean immigrants and the politics of incorporation. Cambridge University Press, New York Sansone L (1992) Shining in the shadow: survival strategies, subculture and ethnicity among lower class Creole young men in Amsterdam, 1981–1991. Het Spinhuis, Amsterdam Schmitter-Heisler B (2000) The sociology of immigration. In: Brettell CB, Hollifield JF (eds) Migration theory: talking across disciplines. Routledge, London, pp 77–96 Silberman R (2011) The employment of second generations in France: the republican model and the November 2005 riots. In: Alba R, Waters MC (eds) The next generation: immigrant youth in a comparative perspective. New York University Press, New York, pp 283–315 Skrentny JD, Chan S, Fox J, Kim D (2007) Defining nations in Asia and Europe: a comparative analysis of ethnic return migration policy. Int Migr Rev 41:793–825 Thomson M, Crul M (2007) The second generation in Europe and the United States: how is the transatlantic debate relevant for future research on the European second generation? J Ethn Migr Stud 33:1025–1041

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Migration, Diversity, and the Welfare pressing for recognition and accommodation of State their differences. But are these tensions real? Keith G. Banting School of Policy Studies, Queen’s University, Kingston, ON, Canada

Definition One of the most compelling challenges facing western democracies is how to maintain and strengthen the bonds of community in ethnically diverse societies. How can we reconcile growing levels of migration and multicultural diversity with the sense of a common identity and mutual support which underpins generous welfare states? In recent decades, a growing number of analysts argue that migration and growing ethnic diversity erode trust and a sense of community among citizens and that contemporary democracies face a trade-off between the accommodation of ethnic diversity on the one hand and support for redistribution on the other. This concern has been labeled the “progressive’s dilemma” (Goodhart 2004), which holds that reformist forces face a tough choice between pursuing greater redistribution or supporting a more diverse, multicultural society. If these trade-offs are real, the welfare state is in considerable trouble. Migration is a reality in virtually all western democracies; and there is no reason to assume that ethnic minorities will stop

More importantly, are they universal? Or do the cases of tension that we do observe reflect particular contexts and circumstances? This essay examines the evolution of research and scholarly debate on these questions. It begins by setting the debate in the larger context of research on the welfare state and then summarizes the trends in recent literature. A concluding section then draws together the general patterns and suggests some implications for future research.

Origins of the Debate Students of social policy have long argued that the welfare state was built on and can only be sustained by a strong sense of community and associated feelings of trust, reciprocity, and mutual obligation. An early expositor of this view was T.H. Marshall, who argued that the expansion of social rights reflected the emergence of a national consciousness in Britain. “Citizenship,” he argued in an oft-quoted passage, “requires a bond of a different kind, a direct sense of community membership based on loyalty to a civilisation that is a common possession” (Marshall 1950/1992, p. 8). In recent years, however, analysts have increasingly argued that ethnic/racial diversity will erode the sense of a common community. They fear that the public

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may withdraw support from social programs that redistribute resources to people they regard as “strangers,” or “outsiders” who are not part of “us.” Traditionally, researchers interested in the welfare state paid relatively little attention to such factors (Swank 2002; Huber and Stevens 2001; Esping-Andersen 1990). However, the issues surfaced in other fields. For example, development economists increasingly pointed to ethnic and tribal diversity in attempting to explain the poor economic performance and limited provision of public goods such as education in a number of developing countries, especially in Africa (Easterly 2001). More importantly for current purposes, analysts began to extrapolate from US experience. The crippling effects of race run through the history of social policy in that country, from Civil War pensions to the Social Security Act in 1935 to the Great Society programs in the 1960s to welfare reform in the 1990s (Schram et al. 2003). Traditionally, the politics of race was seen as contributing to American exceptionalism (Lipset and Marks 2000). Increasingly, however, the racialized dimension of US welfare politics is seen as evidence of a normal, even inevitable, reaction to ethnic/racial heterogeneity and a warning to other countries being transformed by migration. Gary Freeman described migration as a “disaster” for the welfare state and predicted that it would lead to “the Americanization of European welfare politics” (Freeman 1986: 62). Alesina and Glaeser worried that “As Europe has become more diverse, Europeans have increasingly been susceptible to exactly the same form of racist, anti-welfare demagoguery that worked so well in the United States. We shall see whether the generous welfare state can really survive in a heterogeneous society” (Alesina and Glaeser 2004, pp. 180–181). Since the early 2000s, research on these issues has exploded. Scholars in more and more countries are asking whether such warnings might be right. They also ask what governments can do to mitigate any tensions between migration and social solidarity. Not surprisingly, perhaps, the rapidly growing literature has generated a diverse

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range of findings and uncovered a terrain of considerable complexity. Nevertheless, some general patterns are beginning to emerge. We explore them here in several categories: public attitudes, political processes, the design of public policy, and social policy outcomes.

Public Attitudes Does migration and ethnic diversity weaken support for redistribution among the general public? In the US, Robert Putnam famously concluded that trust and community engagement, which he argues is critical for collective action, is weakened by ethnic diversity; individuals living in more homogeneous parts of the country are in effect “hunkering down” in social isolation (Putnam 2007). Putnam did not extend his analysis directly to support for welfare spending. But Luttmer concludes that support for welfare spending is lower in diverse neighborhoods (Luttmer 2001); Gilens has demonstrated how the interaction between racial attitudes and media-driven images of poor blacks as lazy explains “why Americans hate welfare” (Gilens 1999); and Fox (2004) has found that a greater proportion of Latinos in a state is correlated with lower public support for welfare spending. Comparative research, however, suggests that US story is not universal. Cross-national findings have been mixed at best, with contradictory results reflecting different outcome measures, different migrant populations, different control variables, and different time periods. Nonetheless, cross-national studies tend to find either no relationship or, at most, a weak negative relationship between migration and public support for the welfare state. Certainly, negative effects seem smaller than one might expect from simply extrapolating from US experience and tend to fade when a number of moderating factors are included in the analysis. Other factors are clearly more important in predicting welfare attitudes (See, e.g., Brady and Finnigan 2014; Senik et al. 2009; Finseraas 2008; Mau and Burkhardt 2009; Crepaz 2008).

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Case studies of other individual countries are similarly varied. In Canada, one the most diverse countries among western democracies, Soroka et al. (2006) find that although interpersonal trust tends to be lower in racially diverse neighborhoods, echoing Putnam, trust in government institutions and support for the welfare state are not strongly related to racial diversity. A more recent study qualifies this rosy image of multicultural Canada: perceptions of heavy migrant use of social assistance are not associated with a general rejection of redistribution, but perceptions of welfare dependence among aboriginal people are (Banting et al. 2013). In Germany, Stichnoth(2012) found greater opposition when he asked whether the native population supported state help for the unemployed in regions where the proportion of foreigners among the unemployed is high. However, after adjusting for individual differences such as income and East German origins, the negative association between migration and public support was relatively weak. Not surprisingly, perhaps, the effects of ethnic diversity are especially sensitive in Scandinavia. The Nordic model of the welfare state was constructed in the context of striking homogeneity, but migration is transforming these countries, most notably Sweden, where the proportion of the population born outside of the country has grown the fastest. Once again, the evidence is mixed. Gerdes and Wadensjo¨ (2008) study the ways in which the distribution of refugees across Danish municipalities affect voting patterns, and find no clear indication of a decline in support for the welfare state. In contrast, two studies in Sweden are less reassuring. Eger (2010) finds a negative association between the proportion of migrants in different regions and support for social spending, although the relationship is much weaker for universal social programs such as health care; and Dahlberg et al. (2012) report a negative impact of migration from nonwestern countries on public support for social benefits. In retrospect, the idea that the public would abandon social programs they value simply because of migration seems a bit implausible. Not surprisingly, several alternative hypotheses

have emerged. Some studies have found support for a “compensation hypothesis,” which holds that anxiety about migration actually increases support for the welfare state. High levels of migration generate economic insecurity in the majority population, among especially low-skilled workers, increasing their support for social programs (Finseraas 2008; Brady and Finnigan 2014). In effect, antimigrant attitudes and proredistribution views can and often do go together. Importantly, however, the compensation effect does not guarantee an inclusionary approach to social solidarity. In many countries, there is considerable support among the majority population for maintaining the welfare state but denying its benefits to newcomers. Migrants are consistently seen as the least “deserving” group of beneficiaries (van Oorshot 2006), and there is substantial support for what is, in effect, a two-tier welfare state, generous for natives but restricted for migrants. This exclusionary approach, often called “welfare chauvinism,” can take several forms: lower levels of support for social programs thought to disproportionately benefit migrants and support for lengthy residency requirements which delay access to general programs for newcomers (Sainsbury 2012; Reeskens and van Oorschot 2012; Koning 2013). It is worth underscoring that the compensation effect and welfare chauvinism are entirely compatible with each other. Interestingly, Brady and Finnigan (2014) find support for both in their cross-national analysis. Moreover, as we shall see next, this combination of support for the welfare state but exclusion of newcomers from its benefits resonates in the political processes of many countries.

Political Processes Scholars have asked whether diversity has weakened social movements and political parties which were traditionally the primary champions of the welfare state, indirectly undermining it over time. Once again, the classic case comes from the US. In the 1960s, racial politics swirled

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around Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and the Great Society programs. As welfare rolls expanded, the profile of the poor became racially charged: black families represented close to half of the AFDC caseload, and Hispanic groups were also increasingly overrepresented. Resentment against these programs helped fracture the New Deal coalition and the electoral base of the Democratic Party. White union members, white ethnics, and southerners deserted their traditional political home, especially in presidential elections, in part because of its image on race and welfare issues. The effect was so powerful that the Democratic Party sought to insulate itself in the 1990s by embracing hard-edged welfare reforms, which President Clinton signed in 1995. Clinton’s strategy may have helped his re-election in 1996, but it failed to alter Americans’ racialization of and opposition to welfare (Dyck et al. 2008). Migration has also had a dramatic impact on the party systems in Europe. A potent public backlash against migration has contributed to electoral volatility, voter realignment, and the rise of radical right parties. This backlash has placed immense pressure on mainstream parties, especially social democratic parties which traditionally have supported both the welfare state and cultural diversity. The voters most attracted to radical anti-immigrant parties have been white, low-skilled male voters who traditionally represented an important part of the base of left parties, which might suggest that US commentators about Europe’s future were right. However, as anti-immigrant parties became more dependent on working-class votes, they have moved left, increasingly defending the welfare state for the majority population and pledging to protect it from the “burden” of supporting migrants (Bay et al. 2013; Oesch 2008; Lefkofridi and Michel forthcoming). Welfare chauvinism is now the dominant position among these parties.

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The Mediating Role of Policy Regimes Some researchers have asked whether there is anything states can do to mitigate the progressive’s dilemma. In particular, they have investigated whether the structure of the welfare state itself or the nature of multiculturalism policies matter to the compatibility of migration and solidarity. Since Marshall (1950), the welfare state has been seen as an instrument of social integration, which can strengthen the sense of cohesion and solidarity in divided societies. Contemporary analysts, however, insist that such integrative potential depends heavily on the actual design of the welfare state. Some argue that heavy reliance on means-tested benefits lock societies into an unending conversation about the legitimacy of particular groups of recipients, such as migrants, while universal programs dampen discussion of which recipients are deserving and which are not. Others caution that easy access to the welfare state for newcomers reduces their incentive to integrate socially and economically and courts majority backlash as newcomers become associated with welfare dependence (Koopmans 2010). To date, the empirical evidence suggests that the public in countries with highly selective welfare states is more inclined to welfare chauvinism and that egalitarian policies and institutions can help in fighting such sentiments (van der Waal et al. 2013; Larsen 2006). Others argue that support for redistribution depends more on trust in government than interpersonal trust and that such trust is sustained by the quality of government, especially fairness and effectiveness in the administration of government programs (Rothstein 2011). Indeed, Rothstein (forthcoming) argues that a high quality of government institutions generates high levels of social trust even in societies with high levels of ethnic diversity, dampening down welfare chauvinism. Similar debates arise over the state’s own approach to diversity policy, especially the role of multiculturalism policies. Some countries have responded to growing ethnic diversity with the adoption of multiculturalism policies that

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recognize distinctive rights or entitlements for ethnic and religious groups. (Despite political rhetoric about a “retreat” from multiculturalism policies, there is strong evidence of their persistence, including in Europe (Banting and Kymlicka 2013; Koopmans et al. 2012).) However, multiculturalism policies have been controversial, and some countries have steadfastly resisted that approach. Not surprisingly, much of the debate has centered on their implications for social solidarity. Critics insist that multiculturalism policies exacerbate the tension between diversity and redistribution, by encouraging identity politics which crowds out redistributive issues from the policy agenda, corrodes trust among vulnerable groups who would otherwise coalesce in a proredistribution lobby, or misdiagnoses the real problems facing minorities, leading them to believe that their problems reflect their culture rather than economic barriers they confront (Barry 2001). Defenders of multiculturalism policies reply that such policies do not create distrust among groups but that such policies can ease intercommunal tensions over time and strengthen the sense of mutual respect, trust, and support for redistribution. Given the intensity of the debates, there has been surprisingly little empirical research on the impact of multiculturalism policies on support for redistribution. (Schaeffer 2014 notes the virtual absence of such studies. For analyses of the impact of multiculturalism policies on other aspects of integration, see Bloemraad and Wright 2014; Koopmans 2013.) Nevertheless, the studies that are available provide little evidence that multiculturalism policies weaken public support for the welfare state. Countries that have adopted such programs did not experience an erosion of their welfare states or even slower growth in social spending than countries that have resisted such programs (Banting et al. 2006). This finding has been replicated with updated data (available on request) and has been confirmed by Brady and Finnigan 2014.

Policy Outcomes Finally, research has analyzed the impact of migration, not on public attitudes or the political process but on actual social spending. Once again, there are two possibilities. The first is that migration increases social spending, especially in generous welfare states, because low-income migrants are drawn to countries with expansive social programs and rely on benefits when they arrive (Borjas 1999). The second possibility is that migration decreases social spending, because of the political mechanisms discussed earlier: migration tends to reduce support for social spending generally and/or increase support for excluding migrants from benefits. As discussed earlier, there is substantial evidence from the US that racial diversity weakens redistribution. Alesina and his colleagues demonstrate that public spending tends to be lower in cities and states with higher levels of racial heterogeneity (Alesina et al. 1999; Alesina and Glaeser 2004). However, a growing body of cross-national research suggests that negative effects on social spending are limited or are offset by other factors. Lipsmeyer and Zhu’s analysis of EU countries (Lipsmeyer and Zhu 2011) suggests that increased migration may increase social spending if left parties are strong or union density is high (also Taylor-Gooby 2005). Other studies suggest that the design of the welfare state is important, not only to public attitudes as discussed earlier but also to the impact of migration on spending levels (Mau and Burkhardt 2009). In short, the relationship between migration and welfare spending is complex and mediated by a variety of factors. One distinction that deserves more attention is that between levels of migration and change in migration. Consistent with much existing crossnational work, Soroka et al. (forthcoming) find no relationship between the proportion of the population born outside the country and the level of social spending. However, they find a negative relationship between the rate of increase in migration and the rate of increase in social spending over time. Countries with large increases in the proportion of their population born outside

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the country tend to have smaller increases in social spending. This suggests that public reactions take time to develop. The public needs to notice the change and react, and their reactions need to work through political processes. In addition, Soroka et al. find it useful to disaggregate social spending into subdomains, such as pensions, employment benefits, and so on. In most domains, there is only weak evidence of a relationship between changes in migration and changes in spending, but negative effects do emerge in the case of unemployment benefits and labor market programs.

Conclusions What can we conclude from the diverse and sometimes contradictory findings that populate this terrain? Most obviously, one needs to be cautious about sweeping statements about a toxic relationship between migration and social solidarity. The evidence is mixed at best. In many studies, there is no impact of migration on public attitudes about social programs or levels of public spending. In other studies, there is evidence of a relationship, but the association is often weak and the direction varies. In general, estimates of the impact of migration, positive or negative, tend to be small, and other factors emerge as more important in explaining the views of the public or the spending decisions of governments. (For a similar conclusion, see Stichnoth and Van der Straeten 2013.) (Similarly, in a related debate not discussed here, estimates of the net impact of migration on the fiscal position of government tend to be small (Rowthorn 2008). Interestingly, this pattern of mixed findings is consistent with research on the implications of ethnic diversity for social capital or social cohesion more generally. A survey of 464 findings found that “there are nearly as many studies rejecting the negative effects of diversity as arguing for them” (Schaeffer 2014, p. 4 and Table 2.1). A meta-analysis of 90 articles testing Putnam’s conclusions found that 26 articles tend to support his findings, 25 articles reject them, and 39 studies provide mixed or neutral evidence

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(Van der Meer and Tolsma 2014). In the words of two leading scholars “the debate about the consequences of ethnic diversity on social cohesion has reached a stalemate” (Stolle and Allison 2015, p. 117). Yet the progressive’s dilemma has not been laid to rest. Serious tension between migration, ethnic diversity, and the welfare state is clearly possible. The key challenge in future research is to identify more systematically the conditions which mitigate or exacerbate such tensions. To advance the debate, we need more differentiated understandings of both of our core concepts, migration and the welfare state. Which types of migrants are seen as “other”? Much of the literature assumes simply being foreign born is what matters. But other studies focus on low-skilled migrants, illegal migrants, racialized minorities, or religious minorities. A systematic comparison of the implications of different categories of migrants in different contexts would help. Similarly, we need more a systematic analysis of the dimensions of the welfare state at stake. Is it total social spending, the generosity of benefits, inclusive access to benefits, or the redistributive impact of the state? Relatedly, we need a finer-grained understanding of the politics of migration. How does the public decide who is "us" and who is a "stranger”? We need a fuller understanding of “othering” and of how to overcome it. In particular, more attention needs to be paid to the role of the media and political parties in framing migration and newcomers. Much of the “flash” potential of migration as a political issue undoubtedly flows from such processes. Future research should also pay more attention to the political agency of migrants themselves and their attitude to redistribution. As the size of the migrant electorate grows, their views and political behavior will increasingly shape the future (Koopmans et al. 2012). There are likely to be tipping points in this process. When the size of the migrant electorate reaches a critical mass, political parties will find it harder to win power by attacking migrants. Countries such as Canada are already at that stage. The Republican Party in the US is

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struggling with the electoral calculus. This too will be part of Europe’s future. Context clearly matters in all of this. Part of that context is the structure of the welfare state itself. The evolution of the welfare state reflects considerable path dependence, and welfare states at different stages of development respond differently to common social pressures. We therefore need to be cautious about simple extrapolations from the US to other contexts. There is considerable difference between the American experience of racial diversity constraining the development of a welfare state from its very beginning and European countries coming to terms with new forms of diversity in the context of mature welfare states which are well embedded in national cultures and voters’ expectations (Crepaz 2008). In the European context, the compensation hypothesis and welfare chauvinism clearly deserve primary attention. Finally, we should ask why migration has emerged so dramatically in debates about the future of the welfare state. Clearly, the redistributive state is subject to a wide range of pressures, rooted in globalization, economic restructuring, dualization, neoliberalism, and on and on. If the effects of migration appear small at best, why does the issue command so much attention? Is migration really a proxy for wider fears about the future? Does migration policy rise to the surface because it appears to be one final domain in which the nation state, so constrained elsewhere, can actually have an impact?

References Alesina A, Glaeser E (2004) Fighting poverty in the US and Europe: a world of difference. Oxford University Press, Oxford Alesina A, Baqir R, Easterly W (1999) Public goods and ethnic divisions. Q J Econ 114(4):1243–1284 Banting K, Kymlicka W (2013) Is there really a retreat from multiculturalism policies? New evidence from the multiculturalism policy index. Comp Eur Polit 11(5):577–598 Banting K, Johnston R, Kymlicka W, Soroka S (2006) Do multiculturalism policies erode the welfare state? An empirical analysis. In: Keith B, Kymlicka W (eds) Do

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Huber E, Stevens J (2001) Development and crisis of the welfare state: parties and policies in global markets. University of Chicago Press, Chicago Koning E (2013) Selective solidarity: the politics of immigrants’ social rights in Western welfare states. Ph.D. dissertation, Queen’s University, Kingston Koopmans R (2010) Trade-offs between equality and difference: immigrant integration, multiculturalismand the welfare state in cross-national perspective. J Ethn Migr Stud 36(1):1–26 Koopmans R (2013) Multiculturalism and Immigration: a contested field in cross-national comparison. Ann Rev Sociol 39:147–169 Koopmans R, Michalowski I, Strinnbe W (2012) Citizenship rights for immigrants: national political processes and cross-national convergence in Western Europe: 1980–2008. Am J Sociol 117(4):1202–1245 Larsen CA (2006) The institutional logic of welfare attitudes: how welfare regimes influence public support. Ashgate, Aldershot Lefkofridi Z, Michel E (Forthcoming) The electoral politics of solidarity. In: Banting K, Kymlicka W (eds) The strains of commitment: the political sources of solidarity in diverse societies. Oxford University Press, Oxford Lipset SM, Marks G (2000) It didn’t happen here; why socialism failed in the United States. Norton, New York Lipsmeyer CS, Zhu L (2011) Migration, globalization, and unemployment benefits in developed EU states. Am J Polit Sci 55(3):647–664 Luttmer E (2001) Group loyalty and the taste for redistribution. J Polit Econ 109(3):500–528 Marshall TH (1950/1992) Citizenship and social class. In: Marshall TH, Bottomore T (eds) Citizenship and social class. Pluto Press, London Mau S, Burkhardt C (2009) Migration and welfare state solidarity in Western Europe. J Eur Soc Policy 19:213–29 Oesch D (2008) Explaining workers’ support for rightwing populist parties in Western Europe: evidence from Austria, Belgium, France, Norway, and Switzerland. Int Polit Sci Rev 29(3):349–373 Putnam R (2007) E Pluribus Unum: diversity and community in the twenty-first century. Scand Polit Stud 30(2):137–174 Reeskens T, van Oorschot W (2012) Disentangling the ‘new liberal dilemma’: on the relation between general welfare redistribution preferences and welfare chauvinism. Int J Comp Soc 53(2):120–139 Rothstein B (2011) The quality of government: corruption, social trust, and inequality in international perspective. University of Chicago Press, Chicago Rothstein Bo (Forthcoming) Solidarity, diversity and the quality of government. In: Banting K and Kymlicka

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W (eds) The strains of commitment: the political sources of solidarity in diverse societies. Oxford University Press, Oxford Rowthorn R (2008) The fiscal impact of immigration on the advanced economies. Oxf Rev Econ Policy 24(3):560–580 Sainsbury D (2012) Welfare states and immigrant rights: the politics of inclusion and exclusion. Oxford University Press, Oxford Schaeffer M (2014) Ethnic diversity and social cohesion: immigration, ethnic fractionalization and potentials for civic action. Ashgate, Farnham Schram SF, Soss J, Fording RC (2003) Race and the politics of welfare reform. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor Senik C, Stichnoth H, van der Straeten K (2009) Immigration and natives’ attitudes towards the welfare state: evidence from the European social survey. Soc Ind Res 91:345–370 Soroka S, Richard J, Keith B (2006) Ethnicity, trust and the welfare state. In: Fiona K, Richard J (eds) Social capital, diversity and the welfare state. University of British Columbia Press, Vancouver, pp 279–303 Soroka S, Banting K, Johnston R, Kevins A, Kymlicka W (Forthcoming) Migration and welfare state spending. Eur Polit Sci Rev. First view online: 3 March 2015 Stichnoth H (2012) Does immigration weaken natives’ support for the unemployed? Evidence from Germany. Public Choice 151(3–4):631–654 Stichnoth H, Van der Straeten K (2013) Ethnic diversity, public spending, and individual support for the welfare state: a review of the empirical literature. J Econ Survey 27(2):364–389 Stolle D, Harell A (2015) The consequences of ethnic diversity: advancing the debate. In: Koopmans R, Lancee B, Schaeffer M (eds) Social cohesion and immigrant in Europe and North America. Routledge, New York, pp 105–122 Swank D (2002) Global capital, political institutions, and policy change in developed welfare states. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge/New York Taylor-Gooby P (2005) Is the future American? or, can left politics preserve European welfare states from erosion through growing ‘racial’ diversity. J Soc Policy 34:661–72 Van der Meer T, Tolsma J (2014) Ethnic diversity ad its supposed detrimental effects on social cohesion. Ann Rev Soc 40:459–478 van der Waal J, De Koster W, Van Oorschot W (2013) Three Worlds of welfare chauvinism? J Comp Policy Anal 15(2):164–181 van Oorschot W (2006) Making the difference in social Europe: deservingness perceptions among citizens of European welfare states. J Eur Soc Policy 16(1):23–42

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Role of Contexts and Political Culture Institutional Accounts of Political in Political Incorporation: A Case Incorporation Study of Chilean Migration to Toronto Immigrant political incorporation is an uneven, Patricia Landolt Department of Sociology, University of Toronto, Toronto, ON, Canada

Definition Immigrant political incorporation is an uneven, institutionally embedded, and context-contingent social process associated with political learning and political participation in the country of settlement (Gerstle and Mollenkopf 2001). Migration contexts and institutional opportunity structures affect the form and orientation of immigrant political incorporation in various, sometimes contradictory, ways. This entry examines the role of political culture and political learning to help account for these seemingly contradictory relations between migration contexts, institutional opportunity structures, and political incorporation. The focus of discussion will be a case study of the political incorporation of Chileans in Toronto for the forty-year period from 1973 to the 2000s. The case illustrates how political culture and political learning mediate the impact of context on political incorporation.

institutionally embedded, and context-contingent social process associated with political learning and political participation in the country of settlement (Gerstle and Mollenkopf 2001). It includes informal civic and grassroots organizing and participation in formal, electoral politics and can intersect with transnational engagement in homeland politics or politics in diaspora (Ostergaard-Nielsen 2003). The relationship between civic engagement, grassroots organizing, and formal politics and between these and the incorporationist, transnational, and diasporic orientations of political incorporation is complex and multidirectional and typically changes over time. Migration contexts and institutional opportunity structures affect the form and orientation of immigrant political incorporation in various, sometimes contradictory, ways. Mainstream political parties may marginalize immigrants even when the immigrants themselves maintain dynamic community-based organizations (Siemiatycki and Isin 1997; Odmalm 2005; Wong 2006). Civil society organizations such as labor unions, religious congregations, hometown associations, refugee resettlement organizations, and political parties may extend or restrict the pathway to citizenship for immigrants, as well as encourage passive or active forms of

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 F. D. Bean, S. K. Brown (eds.), Selected Topics in Migration Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-19631-7_16

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citizenship (Hardy-Fanta 1993; Rogers 2006). Government policies for immigrant selection, and for multiculturalism and citizenship, are sometimes associated with active transnational politics (Faist 2000; Koopmans and Statham 2003), while in other cases they are associated with incorporation (Bloemraad et al. 2008). Home-country state policies and non-state actors may promote transnational politics but do not guarantee it (Itzigsohn 2000; Levitt and de la Dehesa 2003). Participation in transnational grassroots or electoral politics may preclude immigrants’ interest in politics in the settlement society, but more often than not it serves as a in stepping-stone for engagement incorporationist politics (Karpathakis 1999). To help account for these seemingly contradictory relations between migration contexts, institutional opportunity structures, and political incorporation, the following discussion will focus on the role of political culture and political learning (Gerstle and Mollenkopf 2001; Landolt and Goldring 2010). Migration contexts and institutional opportunity structures set the stage for political incorporation, but political cultures interact with contexts to chart the process of political incorporation. Political culture refers to a group’s ways of doing politics and its established basis for organizing (cf. Swidler 1986). A group’s political culture shapes the types of alliances, partnerships, and dialogues it is likely to sustain, to which types of actors and institutions it is drawn and to which it is legible. As well, migrant political cultures vary and change further through the process of incorporation. Over time, encounters or interactions among actors generate political learning or reflection and evaluation of past experiences to adjust present and future political action. The distinct character of migrant political cultures and the group’s evaluations and adjustments over time shape the form and orientation of immigrant politics and explain why similar contexts and opportunity structures can easily lead to different incorporation outcomes. The focus of discussion will be a case study of the political incorporation of Chileans in Toronto for the forty-year period from 1973 to the 2000s.

This case illustrates how political culture and political learning mediate the impact of context on political incorporation. The entry draws on materials previously published in Landolt and Goldring (2009) and Landolt and Goldring (2010). The form and orientation of Chilean immigrant politics have had three phases, each of which was marked by distinct migration contexts and institutional opportunity structures. The three phases were: first, the formation of grassroots transnational organizations focused first on political change in Chile and later on bridging Chileans to Canadian society; then, participation in the creation of pan-ethnic, social service organizations; and, finally, migrant participation in electoral politics in Canada and Chile. In each phase, Chilean migrant political culture and the political learning that occurred over time informed how Chileans interpreted each moment, developed political priorities and strategies of action, and identified possible allies and partners. The presentation of the Chilean case is followed by a discussion of the broader implications for the study of contextual effects on political incorporation.

Context of Exit and Reception Chilean migration to Canada began in 1973 and was sparked by the overthrow of the Popular Unity coalition government of socialist president Salvador Allende. Just under 10,000 Chileans came to Canada between 1973 and 1978, including 4,000 who settled in the City of Toronto. By the 1990s, there were an estimated 10,000 Chileans in Toronto and 30,000 in Canada (Diaz 1999). The migration context for Chileans was characterized by forced migration from Chile, a chilly reception by the Canadian government, and a warm welcome by a well-organized and resource-rich civil society. During the Allende years (1970–1973), foreign relations between Chile and Canada were strained because of the Canadian government’s ideological hostility toward Marxism and its alliance with the United States. After the coup, the federal government in Ottawa refused to respond

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to the human rights crisis occurring in Chile and referred to the country’s growing refugee population as “Marxist riff-raff.” In contrast, civil society relations between Canadians and Chileans were extremely productive both during and after the Allende years. Canadian social justice groups organized student exchanges, interchurch dialogues, trade union visits, and a host of other activities. They also formed local chapters of the Committee in Solidarity with Socialist Chile. When the coup occurred, social justice and faith-based refugee rights groups lobbied Ottawa to respond to the human rights crisis. They launched a successful media campaign to shame the government and make Canadians aware of the situation in Chile. Lobbying was preempted and support for refugees accelerated when Chileans stormed the Canadian embassy in Santiago and demanded asylum. Pushed by social justice and refugee rights groups in Canada along with the events in Chile, the federal government launched Operation Chile, which granted Chileans the right to emigrate to Canada under relaxed criteria. However, the Canadian government lacked both the contacts and expertise to oversee the initiative and was required to partner with refugee rights activists to manage the selection and resettlement process. Rejecting the federal government’s “first-come, first-serve” approach, activists imposed their own criteria on the selection process. They identified people who were most at risk, visited jails in Chile to select 100 political prisoners for migration to Canada, and demanded that those at risk be able to migrate with their families. Migration contexts are dynamic moments of political action that set the stage for the process of political incorporation. In this case, the coup in Chile and the targeted nature of political repression resulted in the forced and unplanned migration of a politically homogeneous population. The political battle between the federal government and refugee rights activists had a direct impact on the demographic character and political tenor of Chilean migration to Canada. It determined the size of the first wave of Chilean

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migration and generated a migrant population with a large proportion of educated working and middle-class families with strong roots in Chile’s left-wing political party system and a clearly defined political culture. Chilean migrant political culture echoed the political landscape of the Allende years. Chileans considered political party affiliations important, respected the hierarchical decision-making process of Marxist party structures, and had a strong culture of activism as a mode of civic engagement. In turn, forced migration from Chile contributed to the socially expected duration of migration as temporary. Chileans refused to call Canada “home” and planned for an imminent return to Chile: they lived out of suitcases, bought used cars, and made no effort to learn English. The framing of migration as a temporary exile cemented pre-coup Chilean ways of doing politics as a legitimate point of reference for doing politics “while in Canada.” As such, migrant strategies of action rested on organizational habits rooted in pre-coup Chilean politics and drew on a diasporic network of exile contacts and resources.

Transnational Politics of Exile and Settlement The first phase of Chilean political incorporation includes two aspects, both involving transnational organizations. One is focused narrowly on transnational opposition politics organized through a diasporic network of political parties in exile and through partnerships with the Canadian social justice activist community. The other saw an expansion in the agenda of transnational organizations to include a concern with social incorporation and the formation of partnerships with a broader range of institutions in Canadian society. Chileans’ first political act in Toronto was to constitute political parties in exile. Their principal goals were to fundraise for the underground resistance in Chile, provide support for families of political prisoners, and raise local awareness about human rights violations. Political parties in

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exile had a dual structure that included a semiclandestine group of militants with links to a party leadership in exile and a sociocultural arm that organized public education and fundraising events. Over time, the number, size, and resources of Chilean political parties in exile have waxed and waned, but it has never ceased to be a relevant feature of Chilean political incorporation. Chilean party militants constituted an activist umbrella organization: the Toronto Chilean Association-Popular Unity (TCA, 1974–1980), later renamed the Toronto Chilean Society (TCS, 1981–1990). The TCS brought together local representatives from each political party in exile. The umbrella structure of the TCS allowed Chileans to overcome some of their ideological differences and to present a common political front vis-à-vis Canadian institutions. The TCS membership included Chileans and Canadians, although the latter were excluded from central decision-making. Canadians grew frustrated with the verticalism of the TCS, the expectation that Canadians learn and be tested on Chilean history, and what they perceived as ideological squabbling and paralysis generated by the fact that the TCS political agenda was set by distant political parties in exile. Eventually, a small group of Canadians and Chileans left the TCS and formed Toronto Action for Chile (TACH), an independent transnational solidarity organization. TACH had a diverse network of Canadian supporters including academics, lawyers, and both union and church leaders, as well as provincial and federal members of parliament. TACH also developed an independent network of political contacts in Chile and coordinated activities with Canadian transnational activist organizations such as the Inter-Church Committee on Human Rights in Latin American (ICCHRLA) and local OXFAM chapters. The establishment of TACH shifted the terms of political dialogue between Chilean and Canadian activists because it enabled the TCS and TACH to work as political equals. Collaboration between the TCS and TACH bridged and extended the reach of Chilean activist actions to

a larger web of contacts in Canadian institutions. High-impact political events resulted from this collaboration. In 1977, TACH and the TCS co-organized the Canadian Inquiry into Human Rights in Chile. The event marked the first time that members of the Association of Families of the Detained and Disappeared were able to leave Chile to denounce publicly the dictatorship’s human rights violations and impunity. In 1980, TACH and the TCS co-organized the Canadian Conference for Justice in Chile at the University of Toronto’s Faculty of Law. These two conferences provided the basis for a legal challenge to the Chilean Constitution of 1980. The findings of the two events were sent to the United Nations and, in 1990 (post-dictatorship), served as evidence for Chile’s Truth and Reconciliation Committee. By the late 1970s, Chileans’ transnational political party organizations began to develop a dual orientation and served as the base for community projects of social incorporation. Chilean cultural clubs sponsored soccer teams for Toronto city leagues at the same time that they raised funds for the underground resistance in Chile. Chileans participated in the city’s cooperative housing movement and secured affordable housing for many Chilean families. The Arauco Housing Complex cemented the socio-spatial concentration and visibility of Chilean exile politics in Toronto. The Toronto Chilean Society (TCS) created the President Salvador Allende School (EPSA, Spanish acronym) to teach the children of exiles Chilean history and Spanish in preparation for an eventual return. The EPSA partnered with teachers and elected school trustees to access the resources of the Toronto District School Board (TDSB). The EPSA and its Canadian allies eventually played an important role in the establishment of the heritage language program of the TDSB. In this first phase of political incorporation, Chilean exile political culture shaped the form and orientation of migrant organizations and the range and character of migrant contact with nonmigrant institutions and individuals. Chileans’ shared narrative of leftist solidarity and exile from dictatorship resonated with the

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ideals and concerns of the Canadian social justice community. Chileans’ modes of organizing were intelligible to Canadian social justice activists and, with minor adjustments, convertible to the Canadian institutional context. The TCS-TACH partnership generated a resource-rich social network for political incorporation and political learning for both Chileans and Canadians. In turn, transnational political organizations served as the platform for Chileans’ shifting political priorities, which began to include a concern with sports, housing, and schooling. This expanded orientation of political incorporation required the development of new partnerships and a new political vocabulary. Thus, the shifting form and orientation of Chilean political engagement generated new experiences of political learning and modifications in Chilean exile political culture.

Canadian Multiculturalism and the Rise of Pan-ethnic Politics The second phase of Chilean political incorporation in Canada was shaped by the new multiculturalism policy of 1971. This policy redefined the relationship between the Canadian state and both recently arrived immigrants and Canadian-born, multigenerational, ethnolinguistically distinct groups (Fleras and Elliott 1992). The policy emphasized cultural and linguistic differences, at the same time that it elided other dimensions of diversity such as race, class, and gender (Bannerji, 2000). Over time, the implementation of the official policy encouraged pan-ethnic forms of organizing clustered around shared language (e.g., Hispanics) or shared geography (e.g., South Asians, Asians). Political recognition vis-à-vis the state and the societal mainstream required an ethnic vocabulary of political engagement (Landolt and Goldring 2009). In this context, the structure of state funding shifted considerably. Of particular relevance to newcomers, the federal and provincial government encourage the use of a pan-ethnic framework for the design and delivery of immigrant settlement

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and social service programming (Lanphier and Lukomskyj 1994). Multiculturalism prompted a diversification of Chileans’ political repertoire as community activists participated in the formation of the Centre for Spanish-Speaking Peoples (CSSP). The CSSP was created originally by a group of Spanish women with financing from the Communist Party of Spain to offer solidarity to arriving Latin Americans. The CSSP provided refugee families with childcare, social support, and settlement information. Given political affinities between Spanish and Chilean exiles, Chileans went quickly from being recipients of assistance to frontline workers and leaders in the agency. The Centre was transformed into a well-funded, pan-ethnic organization with diverse partnerships and programs, including a legal clinic, English language classes, and a women’s program. Under Chilean leadership, the CSSP gained a reputation as an innovative and progressive community settlement and social service agency. The Latin American Women’s Collective (LAWC, 1983–1991) is a second example of the shift from ethno-national to pan-ethnic politics. After years of working within male-dominated organizations, Chilean women became aware of the contradictions between the progressive rhetoric of political parties in exile and their lived experiences of patriarchal decision-making, sexism, silencing, and violence. When women militants made instances of domestic violence known to the political leadership, it dismissed such violence as an inevitable effect of men’s traumas of exile. Women’s experiences of domestic and political violence were thus minimized and left unaddressed (Landolt and Goldring 2009). The LAWC was the first explicitly feminist Latin American organization in Toronto. Its membership included exile political party militants, first- and second-generation women, and both grassroots activists and frontline workers employed in social service agencies. The LAWC recognized the intersectional specificity of Latin American women’s political priorities and ways of doing politics (San Martin 1998). It advocated for the rights of Latin

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American women and children with a focus on equal access to culturally competent social services. The LAWC encouraged members to take the organization’s strategic priorities into other arenas in which they did political work. The LAWC also connected Latin American feminist activists to other migrant and nonmigrant women’s groups in the city, across Canada, and transnationally in the members’ countries of origin and beyond. In the 1980s, multiculturalism had a transformative effect on Chilean political incorporation. Chileans participated in the creation of pan-ethnic organizations that sat comfortably within Toronto’s multicultural landscape. However, the organizational structure and political mandate of these groups also embodied the distinct political culture and dual orientation of Chilean migrants. Both the CSSP and LAWC had an incorporationist agenda with a commitment to social justice and grassroots strategies of activism. Further, while the focus of their work remained local, their symbolic orientation and social networks reflected members’ transnational orientation to doing politics. The formation of Chilean-led pan-ethnic organizations reflected a diversification of political agendas and new forms of political learning. Chileans’ commitment to the CSSP implied moving away from Chilean-only spaces of political engagement to increased dialogue with other immigrant groups and the state. The formation of the LAWC, a product of intra-community conflict (cf. Trinh Vo˜ 2001), generated a political dialogue and partnerships with other migrant and nonmigrant women’s organizations. Both experiences further extended and transformed Chilean political culture.

Changing Contexts, Declining Activist Politics, and Entrance into Electoral Politics Beginning in the 1990s, the political and social context changed considerably in Chile and Canada resulting in a third phase of political incorporation of Chileans. In Chile the end of the

dictatorship redefined Chilean cross-border politics. In Canada, Chileans faced a new landscape of restricted opportunities for civic engagement resulting from fiscal austerity and government cutbacks. Changes in the institutional landscape prompted a redefinition and diversification of Chilean transnational politics, as well as an attenuation of Chileans’ distinct style of incorporation-oriented activist politics. This was also a period in which Chileans entered electoral politics at the municipal level. Each dimension of this transition reflects the layering of new modes of political engagement onto Chileans’ established trajectory of political incorporation. Regarding changes in Chile and the transition to democracy, transnational politics took three overlapping forms. There was a continuation of transnational oppositional politics (Bolzman 2011). Chilean and Canadian social justice activists provided evidence to Chile’s National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation. They also continued to fundraise and advocate for Chilean organizations that were largely excluded from the democratic transition. Chilean exiles also advocated for the rights of migrants themselves. They sought redress and compensation for forced denationalization and lobbied for changes to the Chilean Constitution to allow for dual citizenship, relaxed criteria for naturalization for children of Chileans born abroad, and the right to vote from abroad (Pereyra 2003). Finally, they participated in new arenas of transnational solidarity in Chile including the Mapuche land struggle in the south and the environmental movement against the Barrick Gold mining project in Pascua Lama. In Canada, government cutbacks in social service funding, restrictions on advocacy work by state-funded agencies, and increased requirements for reporting and accounting for the use of state funds curtailed activism in the immigrant settlement sector (Richmond and Shields 2005). The arrival of new waves of Latin Americans with an aversion to formal political party and activist politics weakened the contestatory spirit of pan-ethnic organizations. In this context, the Latin American Women’s Collective disbanded, and the Centre for Spanish-Speaking People was required to mainstream services to ensure

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continued funding; community members became clients of services and horizontal consultation weakened. Chileans in Toronto also made inroads into electoral politics. Using the tight-knit exile community’s resources and the President Salvador Allende School (EPSA) partnership with equity-minded school board officials as a springboard, one Chilean woman, a leading figure in the EPSA, was elected as a public school board trustee in 1990. The first Latin American to be elected to this post, she held the position for three terms until 1997. A second case is that of a second-generation daughter of Chilean exiles who ran for city council in 2006 and 2014. Raised in the midst of Chilean transnational politics, the candidate proudly attributes her passion for politics and commitment to social democracy to her family’s exile experience (Nice 2011). She has drawn heavily on the material and symbolic support of a rich network of first- and secondgeneration Chileans to run her campaign. More than 40 years after the coup in Chile, the dual orientation of the Chilean migrant political agenda in Toronto continues to generate a productive tension. The political priorities and ways of doing politics captured in the present period are layered onto decades of political action. Also part of the mix are many of the networks and resources created through 40 years of political engagement. Further, the present pattern of political incorporation continues to embody features of Chilean exile political culture – namely, a leftwing orientation and the ability to move comfortably between grassroots ways of organizing and political party structures.

The Lessons of a Longitudinal Case Study for Understanding Contexts This brief case study illustrates that the impact of contexts of exit and reception may be understood by reference to political cultures and processes of political learning. Chilean migrant political culture first emerged as a mix of pre-coup organizational capacity and party militancy and an exile narrative of forced migration. This deeply rooted

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political culture mediated Chileans’ interpretation of the migration context and institutional landscape when they first arrived and the form and orientation of the organizations they created. In tandem with the political learning that occurred over time, Chilean political culture informed how Chileans adjusted to changes in the context and institutional opportunity structure, the possibilities it afforded, or political gestures it required. Political culture also framed how other social actors interpreted Chilean politics and Chilean organizations and thus impacted the types of alliances and partnerships that Chileans were able to create. Chileans first came to Canada as political exiles hoping for a quick return home. This political agenda led them to focus on transnational politics of change in their country of origin. It also encouraged them to connect with particular kinds of Canadian and migrant organizations, namely, social justice and international solidarity groups. Chilean transnational political organizations and Canadian social justice groups had mutually intelligible political cultures, allowing for very productive alliances and partnerships that often lasted for decades, even as political priorities and strategies changed. Over time and in response to multiculturalism policies, Chileans restructured their organizations and become increasingly pan-ethnic, less overtly political and transnational in focus. Pan-ethnic organizing took different forms including: the development of a mainstream immigrant social service organization, the Centre for Spanish-Speaking People, and the formation of social justice-oriented, grassroots organizations such as the Latin American Women’s Collective. Pan-ethnic organizing required forging new partnerships and again the affinities of political culture were relevant. After 1990, the end of the dictatorship in Chile prompted significant changes in Chilean migrant political priorities. While never completely abandoned, transnational politics become a secondary focus and participation in Canadian electoral politics gained ground. Chilean participation in electoral politics in Canada drew on the networks, resources, and ways of doing politics developed decades earlier under a different context and with

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a very different set of priorities. This connection over time highlights the organizationally layered and path-dependent nature of the process of political incorporation. The focus on migrant political culture through an in-depth study of the forms and orientation of immigrant politics over time captures the relational, dynamic, and contingent nature of the process of political incorporation. While Chileans in Toronto have been my specific focus, the framework thus applies readily to other cases of political incorporation. Longitudinal studies capture change over time and confirm the cumulative, path-dependent, and multidirectional character of political incorporation. A diachronic approach illustrates how the forms and orientations of politics shift over time, making it possible to map interactions between grassroots and electoral forms of political engagement and between local, transnational, and diasporic orientations. Changes in contexts and institutional opportunity structures across multiple locations impact political forms and orientations, priorities, and initiatives and may even produce a retreat from political engagement. The layering of organizational experiences is revealed as a key mechanism of cumulative causation. Contextual changes do not erase past organizational forms and political experiences; rather, new forms and orientations are layered onto the existing landscape of political engagement. Capturing this layering of experiences in changing contexts is aided by the focus on political culture and political learning. Migrant political culture is a critical determinant of political incorporation because it regulates the form and orientation of migrant political priorities, as well as the modes and basis of the group’s organizing. Premigration experiences with politics and collective action shape the ways of organizing to which immigrants are disposed (White et al. 2008; Ginieniewicz 2009). Migrant modes of exit – lone or family migration, authorized or undetected – and the symbolic meaning of exit and return also feed into migrant political culture. In turn, the convertibility of premigration political culture frames the possibility for and character of alliances and partnerships with other groups

and institutions in the country of settlement. Over time changes in migrant political culture alter the character of dialogues and convertibility in relation to places of origin and in diaspora. Political learning involves reflection and evaluation of past experiences to adjust present- and future-oriented political actions. It occurs through encounters among individuals and organizations, each of which operates within a particular political culture. Encounters may occur between migrants and nonmigrants, within different institutional arenas and across multiple geographies. Contexts and institutional opportunity structures shape political encounters. Political learning, however, transforms the political culture of migrant and nonmigrant actors at the same time as it generates changes in the form and orientation of migrant political incorporation. Political learning also transforms the political vocabulary of migrant groups and thus their political legibility vis-à-vis other political actors in the country of origin and the place of settlement. Understanding political incorporation thus may be enhanced with a move toward an expanded temporal frame for research and identification of a broader range of relevant actors. Mapping organizational interactions for a single case and over an extended period offers important conceptual lessons for studies of immigrant political incorporation.

References Bannerji H (2000) The paradox of diversity: the construction of a multicultural Canada and “women of color”. Women Stud Int Forum 23:537–560 Bloemraad I, Korteweg A, Yurdakul G (2008) Citizenship and immigration: assimilation, multiculturalism, and challenges to the nation-state. Annu Rev Sociol 34:153–179 Bolzman C (2011) The transnational political practices of Chilean migrants in Switzerland. Int Migr 49:144–167 Diaz H (1999) Chileans. In: Magosci P (ed) Encyclopedia of Canada’s peoples. University of Toronto Press, Toronto, pp 347–355 Faist T (2000) Transnationalization in international migration: implications for the study of citizenship and culture. Ethnic Racial Stud 23:189–222

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Fleras A, Elliott JL (1992) Multiculturalism in Canada: the challenge of diversity. Nelson Canada, Scarborough Gerstle G, Mollenkopf J (2001) E pluribus unum? Contemporary and historical perspectives on immigrant political incorporation. Russell Sage, New York Ginieniewicz J (2009) Latin American Canadians rethink their political spaces: grass-roots or electoral participation? Polit Stud 58:497–515 Hardy-Fanta C (1993) Latina politics, Latino politics: gender, culture, and political participation in Boston. Temple University Press, Philadelphia Itzigsohn J (2000) Immigration and the boundaries of citizenship: the institutions of immigrants’ political transnationalism. Int Migr Rev 34:1126–1154 Karpathakis A (1999) Home society politics and immigrant political incorporation: the case of Greek immigrants in New York City. Int Migr Rev 3:55–78 Koopmans R, Statham P (2003) How national citizenship shapes transnationalism. A comparative analysis of migrant claims-making in Germany, Great Britain and the Netherlands. Rev Eur des Migr Int 17:63–100 Landolt P, Goldring L (2009) Immigrant political socialization as bridging and boundary work: mapping the multi-layered incorporation of Latin American immigrants in Toronto. Ethnic Racial Stud 37:1226–1247 Landolt P, Goldring L (2010) Political cultures and transnational social fields: Chilean Colombian and Canadian activists in Toronto. Glob Netw 10:443–466 Landolt P, Goldring L, Bernhard J (2009) Between grassroots politics and the ethnicizing imperative of the multicultural state: Latin American immigrant organizations in Toronto. In: CERIS working paper #73. CERIS, the Ontario Metropolis Centre, Toronto Lanphier M, Lukomskyj O (1994) Settlement policy in Australia and Canada. In: Adelman H, Borowski A, Burnstein M et al (eds) Immigration and refugee policy: Australia and Canada compared, vol I, II. Melbourne University Press, Melbourne

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Levitt P, de la Dehesa R (2003) Transnational migration and the redefinition of the state: variations and explanations. Ethnic Racial Stud 26:587–611 Nice D (2011) Maytree’s Alejandra Bravo shakes up the civic landscape. The Globe and Mail, Toronto Odmalm P (2005) Migration policies and political participation: inclusion or intrusion in Western Europe? Palgrave MacMillan, New York Ostergaard-Nielsen E (2003) The politics of migrants’ transnational political practices. Int Migr Rev 37:760–786 Pereyra B (2003) Los que quieren votar y no votan. El debate y la lucha por el voto chileno en el exterior. In: Caldero´n Chelius L (ed) Votar en la Distancia: La extensio´n de los derechos polı´ticos a migrantes, experiencias comparadas. Contemporanea Sociologı´a & Instituto Mora, Mexico, pp 191–216 Richmond T, Shields J (2005) NGO-government relations and immigrant services: contradictions and challenges. J Int Migr Integr 6:513–526 Rogers RR (2006) Afro-Caribbean immigrants and the politics of incorporation: ethnicity, exception or exit. Cambridge University Press, New York San Martin RM (1998) Picking up the thread: an oral history of the Latin American Women’s collective in Toronto, 1983–1990. University of Toronto, Toronto Siemiatycki M, Isin E (1997) Immigration, diversity and urban citizenship in Toronto. Can J Reg Sci 20:73–102 Swidler A (1986) Culture in action: symbols and strategies. Am Sociol Rev 51:273–286 Trinh Vo˜ L (2001) The politics of social services for model minorities. In: Lo´pez-Garza M, Dı´az DR (eds) Asian and Latino immigrants in a restructuring economy: the metamorphosis of Southern California. Stanford University Press, Stanford, pp 241–272 White S, Nevitte N, Blais A, Gidengil E, Fournier P (2008) The political resocialization of immigrants: resistance or lifelong learning? Polit Res Q 61:268–281 Wong J (2006) Democracy’s promise: immigrants & American civic institutions. The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor

Part 4: Human Trafficking

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Child Trafficking Wendi Adelson College of Law, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL, USA

Synonyms Child labor; Child trafficking

Definition Child trafficking is the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring, or receipt of a child for the purpose of labor or commercial sexual exploitation. Unlike the trafficking of adults, child trafficking can occur in the absence of threatened or actual force, coercion, or fraud.

Detailed Description Child trafficking is “the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation.” (United Nations protocol). When children are the victims, child trafficking has occurred whether or not “threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of abuse of power or a position of vulnerability or the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent

of a person having control over another person,” the means that define trafficking in adults (United Nations protocol), were used (United Nations protocol). According to UNICEF estimates, approximately 1.2 million children are trafficked worldwide ever year (http://www.youtube.com/watch? gl=CA&hl=en&v=ayg8NriNEdU, UnicefUK Campaign to End Child Exploitation, Last visited May 25, 2012), accounting for almost 20–50 % of the world total of human trafficking (However, in some parts of Africa and Southeast Asia, children are the majority (up to 100 % in parts of West Africa). “A Global Report on Trafficking in Persons,” http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/humantrafficking/global-report-on-trafficking-in-persons. html, Last visited, May 25, 2012; http:// siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTSOCIALDEVE LOPMENT/Resources/244362-1239390842422/6 012763-1239905793229/Human_Trafficking.pdf, page 7). Trafficking in children can occur within national boundaries, or across international borders, and can take on many forms. (Antonio Maria Costa, United Nations Office On Drugs and Crime, Global Report on Trafficking on Persons, February 2009, page 7, available at: http://www. unodc.org/documents/Global_Report_on_TIP.pdf.) These permutations range from bonded labor, domestic servitude, commercial sexual exploitation, and prostitution to exploitative labor practices in the restaurant industry and agricultural and industrial sectors. (UN definition also includes removing organs. The “Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 F. D. Bean, S. K. Brown (eds.), Selected Topics in Migration Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-19631-7_17

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Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime” Page 42 http://www.unodc.org/docu ments/treaties/UNTOC/Publications/TOC%20Con vention/TOCebook-e.pdf. See also Melynda Barnhart, Labor Trafficking, Encyclopedia of Migration (Springer 2013); Grace Chang, Sex Trafficking, Encyclopedia of Migration (Springer 2013).) Each of these types of trafficking involves the exploitation of a child’s vulnerability for the purposes of securing their bodies or their labor for use. A child is generally defined as a person who has not yet reached 18 years of age, unless their country has recognized them as an adult at an earlier age. (“The Convention defines a “child” as a person below the age of 18, unless the relevant laws recognize an earlier age of majority. In some cases, States are obliged to be consistent in defining benchmark ages – such as the age for admission into employment and completion of compulsory education; but in other cases the Convention is unequivocal in setting an upper limit – such as prohibiting life imprisonment or capital punishment for those under 18 years of age.” (UNICEF 2006); The FAQ page of the “Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime” uses the strict “under 18” definition. http://www.unodc.org/documents/tre aties/UNTOC/Publications/TOC%20Convention/ TOCebook-e.pdf.) According to UNICEF estimates, 130 million children are born each year, and in many countries, they represent more than 50 % of the population (UN Convention on the Rights of the Child). Given global increase in the population of people under 18 and deepening connections and communication between countries, children are far more likely now than at any time in the past to leave their homes in search of better economic opportunities. This migration can place children in harm’s way. Recognizing the special vulnerabilities of children, the law privileges childhood and carves out special protections for children. (See Franklin E. Zimring, Juvenile Justice Standards Project. By the Institute of Judicial

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Administration and the American Bar Association, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1936 (1978).) Factors that increase children’s vulnerabilities to being trafficked are similar to those that put adults at risk. Poverty is an important risk factor, though poverty alone is not enough (World Bank, “Human Trafficking, A Brief Overview,” Social Development Notes, Conflict Crime and Violence, No. 122, Dec. 2009, page 11, available at http:// siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTSOCIALDEVE LOPMENT/Resources/244362-1239390842422/6 012763-1239905793229/Human_Trafficking.pdf). Additional risk factors include lack of rule of law, marginalization based on gender, religion, race, ethnicity, or disability, lack of work or educational opportunities, political conflict or war, violence, instability due to natural disasters or climate change, and poor governance (World Bank, “Human Trafficking, A Brief Overview,” Social Development Notes, Conflict Crime and Violence, No. 122, Dec. 2009, page 11, available at http:// siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTSOCIALDEVE LOPMENT/Resources/244362-1239390842422/6 012763-1239905793229/Human_Trafficking.pdf). The socioeconomic status of their families can put children at risk. In many parts of the world attitudes that do not value education for girls put girls at a heightened risk for trafficking (World Bank, “Human Trafficking, A Brief Overview,” Social Development Notes, Conflict Crime and Violence, No. 122, Dec. 2009, page 11, available at http:// siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTSOCIALDEVE LOPMENT/Resources/244362-1239390842422/6 012763-1239905793229/Human_Trafficking.pdf). An organization working against child trafficking in Southeastern Europe also identified violence or abuse in the home, lack of family support or protection (e.g., children who were separated from families or in institutional care), leaving school early, and having been previously trafficked as risk factors for children in the region (UNICEF 2005). Within the United States childhood sexual abuse, exposure to domestic violence, homelessness, and inadequate care or supervision within the home have been identified as increasing the risks of children and teens of being commercially sexually exploited (Chicago Alliance Against Sexual Exploitation, “Know the Facts: Commercial

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Sexual Exploitation of Children,” page 2, available at http://fdff.org/docs/case_facts.pdf). Despite legal protection for trafficked children, exploitation of children for their labor and sexual services continues worldwide. Preventative efforts focus on enforcement of child labor laws, decreasing demand for child sex and punishing those who solicit sex from minors, advocating for Fair Trade products, and educating children about avoiding “too good to be true” schemes to make money (UNICEF Reference guide). Patterns have emerged around the world of scenarios involving trafficked children. Common patterns involve children who have been abused at home or are severely impoverished (World Bank: Social Development Notes: Conflict, Crimes, and Violence, No. 122, December, 2009, page 11 cites poverty as a key factor, but emphasizes the “poverty plus” approach, saying that poverty alone is not http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ enough. EXTSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/Resources/ 244362-1239390842422/6012763-123990579322 9/Human_Trafficking.pdf) and either run away or are given by their parents to a trusted person to earn money through work in a restaurant or as a domestic servant (World Bank: Social Development Notes: Conflict, Crimes, and Violence, No. 122, December, 2009, page 6 http:// siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTSOCIALDEVE LOPMENT/Resources/244362-1239390842422/60 12763-1239905793229/Human_Trafficking.pdf. “There are several identified common patterns for recruiting victims into sex trafficking,22 which include but are not limited to 1) a promise of a good job in another country; 2) a false marriage proposal turned into a bondage situation; 3) being sold into the sex industry by parents, husbands or boyfriends, and 4) being kidnapped by traffickers. Recruiters are often very familiar persons to the victims, such as neighbor, friend, a friend of a friend, boyfriend, acquaintance, and family friend.23”). The actual scenario is different from what was promised, and exploitative, either because it involves the commercial sex industry or because it involves labor without end, without just compensation. In cases of bonded labor, very poor families use the labor of their children, or of the

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entire family, as collateral against a debt in order to get a loan (United States Department of Labor). The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) states that governments must protect children from exploitation, abuse, and trafficking in Articles 34 and 35 (UNICEF 2006). 192 countries have ratified the CRC (UNICEF: Convention on the Rights of the Child, Frequently Asked Questions, available http://www.unicef.org/crc/index_30229. at html). The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child’s Optional Protocol on the sale of children, child prostitution, and child pornography became legally binding in January 2002 (UNICEF 2006). More than 100 nations have signed and ratified the protocol (UNICEF 2006). This protocol expands upon Articles 34 and 35 of the CRC by mandating that governments both punish those who buy and sell children and provide support for trafficked children by considering child victims’ best interests in the criminal justice system and providing legal, medical, psychological, and financial support to child victims of trafficking (UNICEF2006). Prosecutions involving children are different than prosecutions involving adult victims of trafficking. In the United States, a T visa is available to foreign-born victims of human trafficking on a few conditions (Questions and Answers: Victims of Human Trafficking T Non-Immigrant Status, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, http:// www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.5af9 bb95919f35e66f614176543f6d1a/?vgnextoid= 9a52923ee5dd3210VgnVCM100000082ca60aR CRD&vgnextchannel=02ed3e4d77d73210VgnV CM100000082ca60aRCRD (last visited 6/8/12)). The T visa enables a victim of trafficking without immigration status to stay in the United States while prosecutors assemble a case against the traffickers. One of those conditions is that adult victims must cooperate with law enforcement by testifying against their traffickers. However, a child in the same situation is not required to cooperate with law enforcement because it is thought potentially more harmful for a child to recount their experience with trafficking and to face the trafficker again.

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In the United States, there is federal law on human trafficking that addresses the role of children in the commercial sex industry (Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 22 U.C.S. 7105 § 107 (2000) – need to cite to the reauthorizations?). In essence, a child induced to perform a commercial sex act is considered a victim of human trafficking. The standard is similar to that present in cases of statutory rape: a child is unable to consent to sexual abuse (whether commercial or not) perpetrated against them. A child is therefore unable to consent to being prostituted, and prostituted children are considered victims of human trafficking according to US federal law. These children are victims regardless of their immigration status or country of origin. In contrast, most states in the United States define prostitution as a criminal act, meaning that regardless of the age of the person engaged in prostitution, they are considered criminals and not victims. Currently, only a handful of states make any distinction in culpability based on the age of the prostituted person. That said, many states are moving in the direction of having state laws on human trafficking mirror the federal standard to ensure that prostituted children receive the therapeutic services and safe living spaces that they require for recovery (Secure housing remains the most acute need for trafficked children, as well as intensive recovery and support services. Florida: http://www.kristihouse.org/safeharbor.php New York: Cynthia Godsoe, Finally, There’s a Safe Harbor, The National Law Journal, November 10, 2008 (available at Lexis Nexis)). Many different countries and regions of the world have made efforts to combat child slavery. These efforts have involved the enactment of strong antitrafficking laws, increasing investigations and prosecutions of traffickers, rehabilitation for the victims, and building public awareness of this crime. For example, the European Union passed a new comprehensive antitrafficking directive (21011/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2011 on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims.) in 2011 that defines the crime of human

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trafficking and sets standards for how EU member states should respond to this crime (http:// www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/2012/192359.htm (last accessed June 27, 2012)). This directive requires that special measures be implemented to provide child trafficking victims with care and support based on their vulnerabilities as children. In addition, the Organization of American States has partnered with many other countries to end human trafficking (http://www.state.gov/j/ tip/4p/partner/ (last accessed June 27, 2012)). Mauritania has outlawed slavery entirely, and Mauritius has provided care to children in bonded labor and helped bring around 2,000 children back to public school (http://www.state.gov/doc uments/organization/192596.pdf (last accessed June 27, 2012)). Many countries around the world have made laudable efforts to combat child slavery. However, one enslaved child is still too many.

Cross-References ▶ Human Trafficking ▶ Labor Trafficking ▶ Sex Trafficking

References UNICEF (2005) Action to prevent child trafficking in Southeastern Europe, A preliminary assessment. Available at http://www.unicef.org/ceecis/Assess ment_report_June_06.pdf. p. 36 UNICEF (2006) Convention on the rights of the child. Web. 7 Jun 2012. Available at http://www.unicef.org/ crc/index_30229.html UNICEF (2012) Convention on the rights of the child, optional protocol on the sale of children, child prostitution, and child pornography. Available at http:// www.unicef.org/crc/index_30204.html UNICEF Reference guide on protecting the rights of child victims of trafficking in Europe, talks generally about all of these things except fair trade. Available at http:// www.unicef.org/ceecis/UNICEF_Child_Trafficking3443.pdf. p. 33 United Nations protocol to prevent, suppress, and punish trafficking in persons, especially women and children, supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Organized Crime, general provisions, Article 3(c).

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Available at http://www.unicef.org/protection/conven tion_20traff_eng.pdf United States Department of Labor, Bureau of International Labor Affairs. Forced and bonded child labor.

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http://www.dol.gov/ILAB/media/reports/iclp/sweat2/ bonded.htm#.UI3rW8Ue6So

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Human Trafficking

Detailed Description

Fabrizio Sarrica Division for Policy Analysis and Public Affairs, Policy Analysis and Research Branch; UN Office on Drugs and Crime, United Nations Office at Vienna, Vienna, Austria

Introduction Human trafficking is a crime affecting all the countries around the world. Lives are stolen, violated, exploited, bought, and sold. In the year 2000, the United Nations presented to the international community the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children (henceforth the UN Trafficking Protocol). (The Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.) The UN Trafficking Protocol is certainly not the first piece of international legislation tackling human trafficking; however, it is the most complete. It frames it under the UN Transnational Organized Crime Convention, and by doing so it provides the legal tools to national authorities to combat it more effectively. In addition, the UN Trafficking Protocol has the great merit to define trafficking in persons internationally.

Synonyms Trafficking in persons

Definition The UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children defines trafficking in persons as The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.

Defining Trafficking in Persons The UN Trafficking Protocol supplementing the United Nations Transnational Organized Crime Convention was adopted by General Assembly resolution 55/25. It entered into force on 25 December 2003. It is the first global legally binding instrument with an agreed definition on

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trafficking in persons. Article 3, paragraph (a) of the Protocol defines trafficking in persons as The transportation, transfer, recruitment, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.

On the basis of the definition given in the Trafficking in Persons Protocol, it is evident that trafficking in persons has three constituent elements: • The act: recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of persons • The means: threat or use of force, coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or vulnerability, or giving payments or benefits to a person in control of the victim • The purpose: exploitation, which includes, at least, exploiting the prostitution of others, sexual exploitation, forced labor, slavery, or similar practices and the removal of organs From a criminological point of view, the exploitation is not only an element of the legal definition of the crime but also the motivation that drives the criminal to commit the crime. Trafficking in persons happens mostly because of money, as some human beings exploit others in order to gain profits. Exploitation normally takes place as the victim is vulnerable and/or discriminated. This is often the case for migrants, who are among the most frequently reported victims of human trafficking (75 % of the victims detected worldwide), or children because of their young age, or females in patriarchal societies. The most frequently reported victims of trafficking are those who suffer some sort of vulnerability vis-à-vis the more typical traffickers, adult men, and local nationals.

The definition of trafficking in persons allows for the categorization of exploitation in three ways: trafficking for sexual exploitation (prostitution of the others and other forms of sexual exploitation), trafficking for labor exploitation (forced labor, slavery or practices similar to slavery and servitude), and trafficking for organ removal. In addition, by introducing the term “at a minimum” in the definition of the purposes of trafficking, the UN Trafficking Protocol leaves open the option of including other forms of exploitation. In recent years, national legislation and jurisdictions have expanded the application of trafficking legislation. This has resulted in the inclusion of trafficking for child begging or the use of children to commit petty crimes or trafficking for forced marriages and others. Cases of trafficking for the trading of body parts for rituals and/or traditional healing and medicine and trafficking for child soldiering have also been identified in some parts of the world. The combination of a universal definition that is successful in addressing a variety of exploitative patterns and the evolving national jurisprudences makes this a complex dynamic transnational problem. At the same time, this necessarily brings challenges in terms of measurement, analysis, and evaluation of this phenomenon.

Research in the Field of Trafficking in Persons One of the most persistent issues on the human trafficking agenda has been the lack of knowledge about the phenomenon. Criminology and related social sciences developed different methods of research according to the type of crime under analysis. Victim surveys are largely used to estimate the severity of corruption, for instance. The methodological debate aiming at better studying and measuring human trafficking is still at its early stages, especially when moving to an international ambit. As indicated above, the first challenge lies in the definition and nature of

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the phenomenon. Trafficking in persons, as described in the protocol supplementing the Transnational Organized Crime Convention, is a criminal “process” rather than a criminal event. Indeed, the process may take place in different geographical areas and at each moment of the trafficking process, different complex events are occurring. These different events do not represent trafficking per se, but all the events connected produce the trafficking experience. The identification of instruments capable of capturing the severity of trafficking in persons would require identifying a set of measurements representing the prevalence of these different phenomena in each of the geographical areas affected by the process. In addition, the trafficking process can take a particular form (or forms) in the countries of origin of those who will potentially become victims of trafficking in persons. It takes different forms in transit countries and yet other forms in countries of destination. One single country could be affected at the same time by all of the steps of the process in the case of domestic trafficking, or because it is at same time a country of origin of trafficking toward other regions and a country of destination for victims of trafficking in persons from other countries. The trafficking process may also have different characteristics according to the specific type of exploitation. The phenomenon of child soldiers is very different, in form, from forced prostitution, which in turn is very different from trafficking for organ removal or for begging. Thus, it is extremely difficult to develop a research method, an indicator, or a research tool able to capture at once different forms of human trafficking. Moreover, trafficking in persons is (fortunately) a relatively rare phenomenon. The number of victims of trafficking is not as frequent as the victims of corruption or of property crimes. In comparison to these other crimes, fewer persons get in contact with trafficking events, do have direct trafficking experience, or define their perceptions on the base of facts or episodes. This makes human trafficking extremely difficult to assess using normal survey instruments.

The challenges indicated above may help to explain why it is so difficult to carry research in the field of human trafficking. The increased number of human trafficking National Rapporteurs and similar mechanisms whose function is to collect and report about cases detected from the different national authorities opens the door to a new approach to research trafficking in persons. A generally accepted, official statistics on trafficking in persons represents the tip of the iceberg, meaning that the large part of the phenomenon remains hidden, the so-called dark number of crime. As a consequence, by using information concerning the cases officially detected by the national authorities, it will not be possible to draw conclusions on the dimension of the phenomenon. Nevertheless, this data is proven to be effective to understand what the main patterns of the cases detected at national level are. The difficulties about grasping the size of the human trafficking phenomenon cannot in any way hinder investigating all the rest.

The Need for an International Monitoring Tool There is a clear need to enhance the knowledge on trafficking in persons in its national and transnational manifestations. Such observation of trafficking patterns and flows can be comprehensively conducted only from an international, objective, and independent observatory. While national-level studies and reports may accurately present the human trafficking situation in a particular country and provide valuable input to international analyses, an international authority is well placed to discern commonalities and differences between countries or regions and identify trafficking flows and patterns in different parts of the world. This is the reason behind the decision of the international community to assign UNODC the mandate and the duty to produce a Global Report on Trafficking in Persons to assess trafficking flows and patterns at national, regional, and international levels (General Assembly Resolution 64/293, para. 60).

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The first Global Report on Trafficking in Persons was published in 2009 (available at www. unodc.org/glotip). That Report was building upon the experiences of many National Rapporteurs existing in the world, using mainly information concerning the profile of the detected victims and of the offenders to grasp patterns and flows of human trafficking. It was a first global effort to collate official national-level information with the perspective of an international overview of trafficking in persons. This was done to assess the trafficking situation, particularly in terms of the criminal justice system response, at the national and international levels. Following that experience, a new Global Report was published by UNODC in December 2012 (available at www.unodc.org/glotip). This new edition of the Global Report continues the work started earlier in terms of the methodological approach, it pushes forward the explanatory power of the data collected in order to discern, for each region and subregion, the profile of the victims, the profile of the offenders, and the forms of exploitation detected. Currently, forced labor is the most frequently detected form of exploitation in Africa and in Asia, while trafficking for sexual exploitation is more prominent in Europe, and the two forms are somewhat equally detected in the Americas. Trafficking in children is affecting the African continent most heavily, while in Europe victims are more frequently adults, and child trafficking ranges around 15–17 % of the victims detected. The Report also registers trends globally and regionally, such as that concerning the increase in the detection of child trafficking, especially in Europe and especially when the victims detected are girls. Other patterns are also apparent. For example, there is a link between certain profile of the offenders and certain profile of the victims, such as women traffickers being involved in the trafficking of girls. There is also a relation between economic dynamics and trafficking. Certain nationalities are more frequently trafficked abroad when their own countries are undergoing economic downturn or a rise in unemployment. Conversely, there is a reduction of trafficking

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flows for certain nationalities whose countries enjoy economic improvements such as increased GDP or higher employment rates. UNODC has also been able to monitor trafficking flows from the perspectives of the destination countries. The regional and international relevance of the flow is then assessed, not on the basis of one source of information but by the number of destination countries in which a certain nationality among trafficking victims is detected. For instance, if a specific nationality among victims is detected in many countries and every region of the world, this may indicate that some trafficking flows occur globally as compared to trafficking flows limited to specific regions. On the basis of these assumptions, it is possible to compare the East Asian trafficking flows vis-à-vis the flows originating from Africa. During the reporting period (2007–2010), African victims were detected by national authorities in Africa, the Middle East, and Western Europe. At the same time, East Asian victims were largely detected by the authorities of many countries in the Americas, in Europe, in Africa and the Middle East, and in Asia and the Pacific. It is clear that East Asian trafficking has global prominence, while African trafficking flows are limited to certain areas of the world. The strength of the results just described lies in the fact that they are built on data analyses provided by a multitude of national authorities. This approach is also used to assess possible increases or decreases in trafficking from certain origins. While the reduction or increase of certain nationalities detected in one destination country may be due to local factors, the same trend registered in many other different countries of destination can only mean that trafficking from those origins is generally decreasing. This is the case of trafficking in persons originating from Eastern Europe, which has been decreasingly detected over the last decade by most or all the institutions reporting this trafficking flow affecting their own country.

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Conclusions During the last two decades, the international community has raised its head to combat and prevent this human trafficking, and more countries are identifying it as one of their top priorities. The UN Trafficking Protocol, open for signature in the year 2000, entered into force in a record time just 3 years later. As of August 2012, the vast majority of the countries in the world do have a comprehensive legislation on trafficking in persons. The number of prosecutions and convictions is (too) slowly rising around the world. More countries are nowadays systematically reporting and publishing about cases of trafficking detected in their territory, with the result that more is known about forms of exploitation, about the potential victims, and about the profile of the offenders and their modus operandi. The General Assembly decision to produce a United Nations Global Report on Trafficking in Persons is unprecedented, as individual countries are normally reluctant to have an international organization to look at their domestic crime situation. It is now clear that studying human trafficking is not

about blaming and shaming one or another government, but it is about understanding who, why, when, where, and how victims are exploited and trafficked around the world. This is needed to better combat it and prevent it, and this is what global research on trafficking in persons is trying to achieve.

Cross-References ▶ Global Trafficking in Persons ▶ Human Trafficking ▶ Human Trafficking Research ▶ UN Trafficking Protocol ▶ United Nations ▶ UNODC

References The Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. UNODC (2013) Global report on trafficking in persons

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Human Trafficking Policy Responses Kavitha Sreeharsha Mountain View, CA, USA

Synonyms Anti-trafficking legislation; Palermo Protocol; The three Ps; Trafficking Victims Protection Act

Definition Human trafficking, or modern slavery, is a process in which a person is compelled into service, psychologically or physically. Formal policy responses to human trafficking began toward the end of the twentieth century. Such responses include multilateral protocols, state legislation, bilateral agreements, local legislation, administrative oversight and implementation, and formal private sector endeavors.

Detailed Description While perceived as a separate human rights issue, there is evidence in some countries that slavery has bridged the span between the era of the transatlantic slave trade and modern slavery. Nevertheless, the estimated numbers of people currently enslaved, with estimates currently

ranging from 20.9 million to 29 million, require a coordinated global policy response applied to a modern context (Data on human trafficking is methodologically limited and accurate numbers are difficult to obtain. See Fabrizio Sarrica, Human Trafficking, Encyclopedia of Migration (Springer 2013) (discussing challenges in research on human trafficking)). On November 15, 2000, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the “Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children,” also known as the Palermo Protocol. The Palermo Protocol notably defined human trafficking as the “recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, or fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments of benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purposes of exploitation” including exploitation of prostitution, forced labor, and organ removal. The definition in the Palermo Protocol covers those under 18 years of age who are exploited as noted without requiring the means included in the definition. In addition to establishing a definitional framework that would be adopted in many countries, it also created a comprehensive framework dubbed the three Ps (prevention, prosecution, and protection) to address human trafficking, encouraging state parties to enact and enforce

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criminal offenses for human trafficking, develop protections for trafficking victims including permission to remain in a destination country, and facilitation of repatriation. The Protocol also required state parties to create prevention strategies including protection against revictimization. The adoption of this Protocol signaled the establishment of a comprehensive global effort to encourage state parties to enact legislative responses and coordinate multilateral efforts. During the same time period, a bill proceeded in the US Congress and was enacted as the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) on October 28, 2000. Adopting a framework similar to the Palermo Protocol, the TVPA included definitions and a framework to address human trafficking in the United States including prevention of human trafficking, protection of victims, and prosecution of human traffickers. The TVPA established the T visa, which offered foreignborn victims of a severe form of trafficking in persons who are cooperative in the investigation or prosecution of trafficking and meet other requirements the opportunity to receive temporary permission to remain and work in the United States and apply for permanent residence. The law includes an authorization of funding to implement these various efforts. Notably for global efforts, the TVPA also established a requirement that the US State Department issue an annual report that evaluates each international state government’s efforts to comply with “minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking,” resulting in the State Department’s Annual Trafficking in Persons Report. Following the passage of the TVPA, many US states began to pass additional state antitrafficking laws. While not necessarily comprehensive, nearly each US state has enacted legislation to address human trafficking, primarily focusing on criminal penalties available to state prosecutors. State laws also include victim service provisions and prevention efforts. US states have adopted their own definitions of human trafficking, which in some case exclude all forms of trafficking included the US federal definition. State parties have also begun to enact laws and strategies to address human trafficking. The

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United Nations Special Rapporteur on Trafficking in Persons, especially women and girls, conducts country visits and consults with international governments (See The Global Trafficking in Persons Report, UNODC (2013) (tracking legislative responses to human trafficking); see also Fabrizio Sarrica, Human of Migration Trafficking, Encyclopedia (Springer 2013)). The US State Department Trafficking in Persons Report, which now also evaluates US efforts, continues to influence and motivate international states to enact legislation and improve implementation. The report, issued annually by the US State Department’s Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, evaluates and ranks the efforts of countries to engage in antitrafficking efforts. The report evaluates indicia of a government’s effort to prosecute trafficking, protect victims, educate the public, cooperate bilaterally with prosecutions, monitor and respond to migration patterns related to trafficking, hold public officials accountable and cooperate with related US State Department efforts, assess percentage of noncitizen trafficking as insignificant, and monitor and assess these indicia. The report also evaluates a country’s relative annual progress in these efforts and efforts to reduce demand for commercial sex. The report ranks countries into three tiers. Tier 1 countries are deemed to be in full compliance with the TVPA’s anti-trafficking standards. Tier 2 countries are not in full compliance but are making efforts to come into full compliance. Tier 3 countries are not in compliance and are not making significant efforts toward compliance. Tier 3 countries are subject to US sanctions in the form of the withdrawal of economic assistance, which has been criticized by some commentators as ultimately harming victims of trafficking rather than encouraging governments to increase anti-trafficking efforts (Janie Chuang, The United States as Global Sheriff: Unilateral Sanctions and Human Trafficking, 27 Mich. J. Intl. L. 437 (Winter 2006)). Substantial gaps remain in human trafficking policy. For example, some country’s laws do not penalize all forms of trafficking or they fail to

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enforce criminal penalties uniformly, leaving particular sectors such as men and boys, foreign labor trafficking, or child labor unaddressed. Many countries fail to comprehensively protect trafficking victims to the same extent that they prosecute crimes related to human trafficking. Furthermore, there is very little formal policy development to institutionalize some of the best practices including training in health and education sectors, partnership with education and job training initiatives that prevent human trafficking, and resources to offer high-level services that prevent re-exploitation. Countries are beginning to advance formal mechanisms to offer foreign trafficking victims to remain and accept employment in their destination countries. Formal and informal partnerships between law enforcement and the NGO sector are yielding fruitful results to protect the rights of trafficking victims in concert with criminal justice interventions. Yet, in some cases, NGO and law enforcement partnerships may reinforce a “raid and rescue” approach to victim liberation that may result in harm to victims. Finally, several countries have engaged in bilateral and multilateral agreements to better address trafficking spanning and affecting multiple countries. However, such bilateral agreements may also result in repatriations of trafficking victims against their preferred interests. Policy initiatives involving the private sector have also evolved. For example, in the California Transparency in Supply Chains Act of 2010 (SB 657), California’s state legislature enacted a law with global reach, reflecting the global nature of slavery and human trafficking. Cal. Civ. Code, § 1714.43. The law requires qualifying retailers and manufacturers to disclose their efforts to address slavery in their supply chains. Because the law reaches companies merely doing business in California, many companies incorporated or based outside of California are still obligated to comply. In September 2012, President Obama signed Executive Order – Strengthening Protections Against Trafficking In Persons In Federal Contracts, to reach and prevent human trafficking by federal contractors. However, these measures still lack meaningful enforcement mechanisms.

The business community itself is also at the forefront of efforts to address trafficking involving their own corporations. In 2006, a coalition of business leaders came together and established the Athens Ethical Principles to Combat Human Trafficking. Many companies have signed onto these seven principles, which were aspirational in nature. Building on these principles, in December 2010, the Luxor International Forum endorsed the Luxor Protocol, which offered guidelines for the private sector to adhere to the Athens Ethical Principles. The Athens Ethical Principles and the Luxor Protocol formed the foundation for growing private sector interest and leadership in addressing human trafficking. The goal was to encourage the business community and governments to advance the seven ethical antitrafficking principles, yet there does not appear to be a continuing method of evaluation or enforcement of these principles. As multilateral agencies, countries and local governments, and the private sector continue to develop policies to address human trafficking, they will undoubtedly move beyond the framework of the initial decade following the Palermo Protocol and the TVPA to develop practical and institutionalized solutions that extend beyond formulaic criminal justice enforcement, protections, and prevention toward mechanisms that address the root causes of human trafficking.

Cross-References ▶ Athens Ethical Principles ▶ Executive Order: Strengthening Protections Against Trafficking In Persons In Federal Contracts ▶ Luxor Guidelines ▶ Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons ▶ The California Transparency in Supply Chains Act of 2010 ▶ Trafficking in Persons Report

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Further Readings Executive order – strengthening protections against trafficking in persons in federal contracts (2012). Available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/ 2012/09/25/executive-order-strengthening-protectionsagainst-trafficking-persons-fe Protocol to prevent, suppress and punish trafficking in children, persons especially women and supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, UN Doc. A/53/383 (2000). Available at http://www.uncjin.org/Docu ments/Conventions/dcatoc/final_documents_2/conven tion_%20traff_eng.pdf

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The athens ethical principles (adopted January 23, 2006). Available at http://www.endhumantraffickingnow. com/?page_id=77 The California Transparency in Supply Chains Act of 2010 (codified in sections of the California state code.) The luxor protocol (2010). Available at http://www. endhumantraffickingnow.com/wp-content/uploads/ 2012/08/The-Luxor-Protocol.pdf The Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, P.L. 106–386, 114 Stat. 1464 (codified as amended in various sections of the U.S.C.) UN General Assembly, Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 15 November 2000

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Labor Trafficking

Detailed Description

Melynda Barnhart New York Law School, New York, NY, USA

Labor trafficking is a form of human trafficking involving the exploitation of workers who are forced, defrauded, or coerced into a condition of servitude. Labor trafficking encompasses all forms of labor or services except sexual exploitation. Labor traffickers often target migrants, finding their victims at various stages of the migration process. Labor trafficking victims may be migrating for a variety of reasons, but most seek better employment or working conditions than what is available at home. While travel from home is not a necessary component of trafficking, labor trafficking commonly occurs in internal and external migration. The International Labor Organization reports that almost half of forced labor victims migrate within their country or across borders before enduring forced labor (International Labor Organization, Questions and answers on forced labor, http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/ newsroom/comment-analysis/WCMS_181922/ lang--en/index.htm. Last visited 18 Dec 2012), also confirming the connection between movement and labor trafficking. The cost of labor trafficking exploitation is estimated to be $20 billion annually in the amount of wages, and other benefits denied enslaved migrant workers (United States Department of State). The separation of human trafficking into two forms, sex and labor, does not have a clear defining line. In general, any form of sexual

Synonyms Forced labor; Human trafficking; Modern-day slavery

Definition Labor trafficking is a subset of human trafficking, involving the exploitation of a person’s labor by a variety of means whereby the person does not believe he or she is free to leave his or her work. Trafficking usually begins with the transportation, harboring, recruiting, or procuring of a person by means of force, deception or fraud, coercion, confiscation of identity documents, debt, or abuse of power or vulnerability, ending with the person in a form of labor servitude. Labor trafficking is more than the condition of servitude, slavery, or exploitation, as it also includes the process by which a person was placed in that servitude. It is a form of modernday slavery.

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exploitation, commercial or not, is considered to be sex trafficking rather than labor trafficking. Some forms of legal commercial sex work, such as erotic dancing, may be included in labor trafficking definitions rather than sex trafficking, depending upon the relevant laws. For the most part, labor trafficking is a catchall definition that encompasses all nonsexual labor exploitation. Legal definitions of what precisely encompasses the crime of labor trafficking vary at the state and international levels, but most include all forms of nonsexual labor or services, wherein the person’s services are procured initially through various methods and the person is kept in servitude by a variety of means. Labor trafficking shares many aspects of forced labor, but such terms are usually not legally synonymous. At the international level, forced labor focuses only on the conditions of servitude at the site of labor, while labor trafficking also encompasses the methods of recruitment and the means of controlling the victims. The methods of trafficking commonly include transporting, obtaining, recruiting, harboring, or selling a person for his or her services. These methods commonly involve deception and fraud, as many trafficking victims are willing migrants and trust their recruiters. The common means of control once the person is at the labor site involve restriction of movement and harmful living and working conditions. These means of labor trafficking encompass physical force or restraint, psychological coercion, fraud or deceit, abuse of power or vulnerability, confiscation of identity or travel documents, and threats against the person or their loved ones. Labor trafficking situations manifest in a variety of ways, but there are common patterns. The stereotypical migrant labor trafficking case involves traffickers who have established themselves in the foreign country or region and then recruit others in their hometown with promises of helping newer migrants to successfully migrate just as the trafficker did. The trafficking usually begins with recruitment for a “good job” elsewhere, such as a job with better pay, benefits, or working conditions than may be available to that person at home. The recruiter establishes trust with the victim, such that the victim usually

Labor Trafficking

willingly undertakes migration. Recruiters may be friends, relatives, or neighbors of the victim and approach them individually, or recruiters may set up storefronts advertising jobs in other countries, just like legitimate labor recruiters. Some recruiters are trafficked people themselves, who are offered the opportunity to “purchase” their freedom by recruiting others. Some trafficking recruiters find victims after they have entered or been smuggled into the destination country and may be crew foremen or recruiters paid by legitimate employers to hire laborers. Due to the constant market for workers in many parts of the world, traffickers usually have no difficulty recruiting their victims. Because this recruitment mimics usual migration patterns and traffickers often insert themselves into active migration paths, most victims are not aware that they are being trafficked until it is too late. Once the worker arrives at the worksite, the falsity of the “good job” is revealed. The promised job is instead labor exploitation, from which there is no apparent escape. Typically the migrant arrives at the foreign destination only to have his or her identification and travel documents confiscated, to be threatened and physically or sexually abused, and to be forced to perform work that is either unpaid or severely underpaid. Debt bondage is quite common, in which a manufactured fraudulent debt is required to be “repaid,” which can be a highly effective form of coercion. This debt is often in the form of a smuggling or recruiting fee, set so high that the person can never pay it. Labor trafficking cases may also involve indentured servitude, wherein the person is held in servitude for a certain period of time, but this is less common than debts. Time periods may be a harvest season or a term of years or months. The trafficking ends when the person frees himself or herself from the exploitative situation. The psychological trauma involved in labor trafficking is a primary reason victims find it so difficult to escape, even if the person is not being literally restricted in his or her movement. Common emotional responses to trauma and victimization include emotional detachment and feelings of self-blame, anxiety and fear, and

Labor Trafficking

difficulty in making decisions or concentrating. Many experience a loss of memory related to the traumatic event. Physical reactions, particularly where the person was physically or sexually abused, include weakened physical state, untreated medical conditions, and often hunger (2012 TIP report, p. 17). These traumas, combined with threats from traffickers, can cause a person to believe that he or she is not able to leave. Trafficked people often do not know that what they are experiencing is a crime, and many are unwilling to trust law enforcement or government officials in the country where they are. Modern-day slavery thus involves psychological chains more than physical ones. Identified labor trafficking cases range in scale from single victims, most commonly in household domestic service as nannies or maids, to hundreds of victims, often occurring at sweatshops or factories. Labor trafficking has been discovered in regulated and unregulated forms of labor. Industries common to labor trafficking include domestic service, restaurants, agriculture, construction, manufacturing, and mining. Worldwide, very few industries have not included trafficked workers. Even occupations requiring extensive education have included trafficking victims, such as teachers and nurses. Certain industries may have higher incidence of labor trafficking in particular geographic regions, such as fisheries in Western Africa or brickmaking in South Asia. The International Labor Organization (ILO), an international treaty organization, compiled the most accurate global statistics on forced labor in 2012. While the ILO’s Global Estimate of Forced Labor report focuses on more broadly defined forced labor rather than human trafficking, all human trafficking is encompassed within the definition of forced labor (International Labor Organization). The ILO estimates the division of forced labor as 90 % by the private sector and 10 % by governments, in the form of work imposed by militaries or prisons in contravention of ILO agreements (ILO Global Estimate of Forced Labor, p. 13). Sixty-eight percent of victims are estimated to be in forced labor exploitation, with the remaining 22 % in sexual

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exploitation (Id.). Forty-four percent of the total victims of forced labor had migrated either internally or internationally, although cross-border movement was more strongly associated with sexual exploitation than labor exploitation (Id. at 17). Women and children are often the focus of anti-trafficking campaigns, but comprise about half of all victims of labor trafficking. This focus means that male trafficking victims are often overlooked by governments and law enforcement and are often not identified properly. Women are the most likely victims of forced labor through migration, but this is largely due to their overrepresentation in sexual exploitation cases. Women are 98 % of sexually exploited forced labor victims, while comprising slightly less than half of the labor exploitation victims (Id. at 14). Women’s representation in labor trafficking cases is roughly consistent with their representation in migration overall (United Nations Population Fund). Children are also trafficked for labor; the type of labor and age of victims varies greatly by geographic region. Approximately 26 % of forced labor victims are children (ILO Global Estimate of Forced Labor at 14). The current international definition of human trafficking is from the “Palermo Protocol,” an anti-trafficking protocol to the United Nations’ Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (“Palermo Protocol”), Article 3(a), 25 December 2003, http://www.uncjin.org/Doc uments/Conventions/dcatoc/final_documents_2/con vention_%20traff_eng.pdf). The convention also included a separate protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea, and Air (United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children). Notably, the definition does not distinguish between labor and sex trafficking, focusing on the means and methods of trafficking for “exploitation” (Palermo Protocol, Article 3(a)). Exploitation

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is given an inclusive definition, enumerating exploitation of “the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs. . .” (Id.). This protocol has been ratified by 154 countries (United Nations Treaty Collection database, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src= TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-12-a&chapter=18& lang=en. Last visited 18 Dec 2012). As well as providing a common definition of human trafficking, the Palermo Protocol mandates legal and physical protection for victims of trafficking in persons, including counseling, housing, employment opportunities, and protections in repatriation (Palermo Protocol, Articles 6–8). The protocol also details the measures governments must undertake to prevent trafficking in persons, detailing particular policies and programs and cooperation with other nations (Palermo Protocol, Articles 9–13). In the wake of extensive political pressure from the United States, as well as to implement the ratification of the Palermo Protocol, most countries have adopted domestic criminal sanctions against labor trafficking as well as sex trafficking. Enforcement of these laws varies, but is relatively nonexistent. When most countries attempt to enforce anti-trafficking laws, the focus is almost exclusively on sex trafficking cases. Law enforcement officers are generally unfamiliar with enforcing labor laws, while prostitution crimes are quite familiar. Considering the estimates that most forced labor victims do not leave their country of origin, although they may move internally (ILO report at 16), the lack of enforcement of labor trafficking statutes in particular means that labor trafficking victims are unlikely to receive any assistance. Thus, implementation of domestic labor trafficking laws continues to be a widespread concern. Labor trafficking falls within a continuum of migrant labor exploitation. Migrants are often vulnerable to exploitation, traveling to places with which they are unfamiliar, with few support networks, where they may have few legal protections as migrants. Thus, slavery, forced labor, and labor trafficking are only one end of the

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continuum of abuses. The spectrum also includes difficult or dangerous working conditions, denial of safety equipment, underpayment or lack of payment, sexual harassment, overly longworking hours, no breaks, lack of union protections, the absence of promotion or advancement opportunities, etc. Just like with trafficking victims, exploited migrants may not seek the protections of labor or employment laws in the host country where such exist for fear of being deported, ignored, solicited for a bribe, or harmed. In many ways, migrants are perfect targets for labor exploitation because these are a group of willing workers who are less likely to demand fair treatment and may not have legal protections available to them. Until migration is made safer, labor exploitation of migrants is likely to continue.

References International Labor Organization, ILO global estimate of forced labor: results and methodology, 2012 report, pp 19–20. http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/ public/---ed_norm/declaration/documents/publication/ wcms_182004.pdf. Accessed 18 Dec 2012 United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and punish trafficking in persons, especially women and children. http://www.unodc.org/docu ments/treaties/UNTOC/Publications/TOC%20Con vention/TOCebook-e.pdf. Accessed 18 Dec 2012 United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), Female migrants: bridging the gaps throughout the life cycle, May 2006, p 3. http://www.unfpa.org/webdav/site/ global/shared/documents/publications/2006/bridging_ gap.pdf. Accessed 18 Dec 2012 United States Department of State, 2012 trafficking in persons report, p 13. http://www.state.gov/docu ments/organization/192587.pdf. Accessed 18 Dec 2012

Further Reading Brennan, Denise. Life Interrupted: Trafficking into Forced Labor in the United States. Duke University Press, 2014 Bales, Kevin. Disposable People: New Slavery in the Global Economy. University of California Press, Third Edition, 2012 European Commission Organized Crime and Human Trafficking website. http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/ home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/organized-crimeand-human-trafficking/index_en.htm

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Free the Slaves and Human Rights Center, University of California, Berkeley, Hidden Slaves: Forced Labor in the United States, Sept 2004. http://www. freetheslaves.net//Document.Doc?id=17 International Labor Organization Elimination of Forced Labor website. http://www.ilo.org/washington/areas/ elimination-of-forced-labor/lang--en/index.htm

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International Organization for Migration CounterTrafficking website. http://www.iom.int/cms/ countertrafficking United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime website. http:// www.unodc.org/unodc/en/human-trafficking/index.html ?ref=menuside US Department of State Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons website. http://www.state.gov/j/ tip/index.htm

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Migration Industries, Legal Services, and Human Smuggling David Kyle Davis Sociology, 1282 Social Sciences & Humanities, University of California, Davis, CA, USA

Synonyms Migration business; Migration entrepreneurs; Migration industries; Migration merchants

Definition Migration industry: the business of migration or migration merchants.

Detailed Description There has been much attention recently in what has been labeled alternatively the “migration industry,” the business of migration, or migration merchants. Much of the literature on international migration emphasizes either the role of social networks and social capital or highly stylized economic explanations. There is growing dissatisfaction with conventional models of migration, even when packaged together within a migration systems framework, for explaining contemporary

migration patterns generally, and the rise of migrant smuggling and trafficking specifically. Apart from focusing on the institutional intermediaries, the migration industry concept allows for an analysis of more asymmetric economic and political power relationships shaping the migration process and subsequent patterns of transnational mobility. The “business of migration” is often used casually to refer to the mostly legal set of formal businesses profiting from migration and human mobility more generally; at times, this is also used interchangeably with the “migration industry.” However, in both the academic and popular literatures, migrants and others inhabit either an entirely legal world facilitated by for-profit businesses and nonprofit organizations in which they follow the regulations and laws or they use criminal syndicates who smuggle them. In contrast, the migration industry concept includes a broader set of actors (variously labeled “migration merchants” or migration entrepreneur), but also potentially blurs the lines between legal and illegal businesses, recognizing that migrations are shaped by the complex interplay of economically motivated individuals and organizations, the legal frameworks established by states, and the culturally embedded rationality of migrants themselves. There is widespread agreement about the core definition of the migration industry. Kyle defines a “migration merchant” as anyone (individual or organization) profiting from the commodification

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of the migration process, legally or illegally, without specifying the many commercial activities connected to migration and transnational social life in sending, transit, and destination regions (Kyle 2000). Similarly, Castles and Miller define the migration industry as “a broad spectrum of people who earn their livelihood by organizing migratory movements. . . . [including] travel agents, labor recruiters, brokers, interpreters, housing agents, immigration lawyers, human smugglers (like the “coyotes” who guide Mexican workers across the Rio Grande, or the Moroccan fishermen who ferry Africans to Spain), and even counterfeiters who falsify official identification documents and passports” (Castles and Miller 2009). Hernández-Leo´n’s definition of a “migration entrepreneur” is similar to Kyle’s notion of a migration merchant, including an emphasis on embedded social relationships, though its rubric is restricted to co-ethnic relationships and the term is reserved for individuals. For HernándezLeo´n, a migration entrepreneur is “a distinct type of ethnic entrepreneur who specializes in the migration-driven mobility of people, remittances, and goods across international borders and moving between formality and informality, legality and illegality, depending on the activity, financial resources, and other circumstances” (HernándezLeo´n 2008). A migration industry, then, is the “ensemble of entrepreneurs who, motivated by the pursuit of financial gain, provide a variety of services facilitating human mobility across international borders” (Hernández-Leo´n 2008). These migration industries consist of the specialized services that have arisen in response to migration challenges and opportunities, becoming significant players in the perpetuation of the flow. Some of the common features of organizations that make them attractive and even necessary to contemporary migration within this mix are the higher levels of ongoing trust formalized in ways that transcend the concept of “social capital.” And, for the very same reasons that organizations have proliferated in every area of social life today, they also prevail in migration industries. They can be tailored to the unique demands of regional, economic, political, and

social dimensions growing or diminishing in size, developing or eliminating new products or services, and dynamically engaging with partners, subcontractors, and other migration industry actors in an ever-changing economic and policy environment. How the role of migration industries evolves in relation to state immigration policies and enforcement strategies is most striking in the case of Mexico. Until the 1990s, most Mexican migrants and others coming from further south quite often crossed the border without a guide or coyote; if they used a coyote, it was more out of convenience. However, in the 1990s, it became increasingly desirable as it would increase one’s in successfully crossing the chances border – today, it is rare not to use a smuggler or intermediary organization. With higher and higher smuggling fees, the direct costs of the transportation of the journey is now only a minor part of the total cost, especially when interest on smuggling debts is included. Mexican emigration, as striking as it may be, however, may not provide the most appropriate model for understanding the current and future role of migration industries connecting sending and destination regions without the long-standing ties or long contiguous border of the USA and Mexico. Specifically, the Mexico case may lead one to view migration industries as mostly responsive rather than as robust actors shaping many features of the migratory circuit, including initiating it. To the extent that a migration industry’s independent impact in shaping many aspects of migration patterns in ways that transcend either supply–demand models, or more sociological social network models, is debatable, we may conceptualize a “weak” versus more “robust” model of migration industries. In the weak version, migration entrepreneurs are more or less neutral middlepersons profiting from migration services without fundamentally shaping migration systems in significant ways. For this reason, this view would also not attribute to contemporary migration industries much historical significance in that similar migration entrepreneurs have operated for centuries.

Migration Industries, Legal Services, and Human Smuggling

Under a more robust conceptualization, the combination of punitive and restrictive immigration policies, while giving economic markets more power to organize nearly all aspects of social and political life, leads to novel forms of migration industries that increasingly act as gatekeepers and exert much sway over the evolution of migration flows. Thus, Castles and Miller note that “[Their] development. . .is an inevitable aspect of the social networks and the transnational linkages which are part of the migratory process . . . . [and] in time, the migration industry can become the primary motive force in a migratory movement” (Castles and Miller 2009). Today, in addition to crossing borders, migrants must also navigate various legitimate and illicit intermediary organizations – it is nearly impossible to migrate without an organization, whether it is to help in navigating state bureaucracies such as immigration and labor agencies or crossing borders using legal transportation or illicit smuggling strategies. Like the rise of bureaucracies everywhere, once the logic and capacity of organizations to successfully compete in transnational markets have taken hold, apart from the initial conditions from which they arose connecting supply with demand, they increasingly begin to play more of a gatekeeping role and assert strategic control over sectors, territories, and modes of transportation. There is a growing parallel not simply historically with past migration services, but specifically a global revival of a new form of indentured servitude in which most migrants and refugees today are expected to have invested large amount of resources in both their human capital but also go into debt, often without the protection of the state. Contemporary migration industries are much better at profiting from the journey and usurious financing than profiting from resettlement or regularization. Even under conditions of global recession, employers continue to find ways to reach migrant labor they so desperately feel they need (Kaye 2010). The truly novel aspect of migration industries today is the increasing power to transform migration into a

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new indentured servitude with ever-higher smuggling fees financed with future earnings. While the fact of for-profit intermediaries playing a role – even a significant one – is not entirely novel in the history of human mobility, these contemporary examples underscore two significant dimensions beyond the sheer numbers they are able to facilitate: illicit journeys or border crossings and the fact that they are indebted to intermediaries or facilitators, not employers. Profits can now be gained not only from labor at the destination but extracting more of their income through the debts, real or imagined, incurred by the journey itself and by the ongoing vulnerability of the immigrant population. The global scale and diversity of this phenomenon is new and expands the means by which individuals may be trafficked. Organizations with the financial, informational, and above all social resources to either navigate or overcome state barriers have quietly taken center stage in the migration process. The future of migration in the context of climate change and the resulting social and political complexities will certainly require an appreciation of the significant role of migration merchants and a complex migration industry more generally.

Cross-References ▶ Human Smuggling ▶ Human Trafficking

References Castles S, Miller MJ (2009) The age of migration: international population movements in the modern world, 4th edn. The Guilford Press, New York/London Hernández-Leo´n R (2008) Metropolitan migrants: the migration of urban Mexicans to the United States. University of California Press, Berkeley/Los Angeles Kaye J (2010) Moving millions: how coyote capitalism fuels global immigration. Wiley, New Jersey Kyle D (2000) Transnational peasants: migrations, networks, and ethnicity in Andean Ecuador. Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore

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Sex Trafficking

Detailed Description

Grace Chang Department of Feminist Studies, UC Santa Barbara, University of California, Santa Barbara, CA, USA

The US TVPA definition differs from international definitions of “human trafficking” in its narrow focus and privileging of that deemed to be “sex trafficking.” This both reflects and facilitates the priority within the US government approach to focus on the prosecution of prostitution. In contrast to the TVPA, international agreements such as the 2000 Palermo Protocol establish a broader definition of trafficking, allowing for greater attention to other forms of labor exploitation and an emphasis on the means by which the exploitation is achieved. The Palermo Protocol states (Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons):

Definition The definition of sex trafficking has been contested across international and US contexts and among US government policy and legal and advocacy frameworks as well. The US Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) defines “severe forms of trafficking” as: (1) sex trafficking in which a commercial sex act is induced by force, fraud, or coercion or in which the person induced to perform such an act is under 18 or (2) the recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision, or obtaining of a person for labor or services, through the use of force, fraud, or coercion, for the purpose of subjecting that person to involuntary servitude, peonage, debt bondage, or slavery. The TVPA also defines “sex trafficking” as “the recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision, or obtaining of a person for the purpose of a commercial sex act” (Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000).

(a) ‘Trafficking in persons’ shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs

The Palermo Protocol put forth one of the first international reformulations of the definition of “trafficking in persons” since the 1949 UN Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and the Exploitation of Prostitution of

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Others, which had focused exclusively on prostitution and considered all prostitution, whether voluntary or forced, to be trafficking. The Palermo Protocol, in contrast, recognizes the existence and possibilities of both voluntary and forced prostitution. The Palermo delegates had agreed that involuntary participation in prostitution constitutes trafficking, but the majority of delegates rejected the idea that voluntary participation by adults in prostitution should be identified as trafficking and thus left the definition of “prostitution” ambiguous to allow for different interpretations by nation-states. The language of the TVPA does not allow for such open interpretation or the autonomy of other states in defining prostitution and trafficking. This poses a concern that the TVPA precludes the possibilities offered and originally intended by the delegates in creating the terms of the Palermo Protocol and may lead to the assumption or bias in anti-trafficking policy or practice that all prostitution is trafficking, regardless of whether participation in this labor is voluntary or not (Chang and Kim 2007). Many scholars and advocates suggest that the lack of a consistent definition of trafficking reinforces the tendency within US government policies and practices to conflate human trafficking with prostitution and hinders the work of antitrafficking advocates in combating trafficking and protecting the rights of trafficking survivors. Furthermore, many argue that this conflation has facilitated the use of these policies to criminalize prostitution, rather than to combat human trafficking. Finally, the US government approach to trafficking has been dominated by a focus on prosecution of participants in the sex industry, within the “prevention, protection and prosecution” framework (Chang and Kim 2007). The disproportionate focus on prosecution of traffickers and search for potential victims of sex trafficking may leave many victims of trafficking in sectors other than the commercial sex industry without due attention, recognition, or protections. The 2012 Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Report, produced annually by the US State Department to assess efforts to combat trafficking in the USA, notes the prevalent focus on prosecuting sex

Sex Trafficking

trafficking cases, despite service providers’ observations of more cases of labor trafficking: Federal and state human trafficking data indicate more investigations and prosecutions have taken place for sex trafficking than labor trafficking; however, victim service providers reported assisting significantly higher numbers of foreign national victims in cases of labor trafficking than in cases of sex trafficking. . . (http://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/ tiprpt/2012/)

Anti-trafficking advocates across the USA consistently report that in the USA, domestic work is the industry in which people are most commonly trafficked, not sex work. One of the foremost anti-trafficking organizations in the country, CAST (the Coalition to Abolish Slavery and Trafficking), reported that among the trafficking survivors they have served in the Los Angeles region, 40 % were in domestic work, 17 % in factory work, 17 % in sex work, 13 % in restaurant work, and 13 % in servile marriage (McMahon and Coalition to Abolish Slavery and Trafficking 2002). Despite these reports, US government antitrafficking efforts have continued to be focused on sex trafficking, which continues to be conflated with prostitution. The US focus on sex trafficking has been imposed globally through restrictions that require any foreign nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) receiving US federal funding to sign on to the “antiprostitution” pledge, attesting that they do not support the practice or legalization of prostitution. Scholars and advocates argue that this reinforces the criminalization of prostitution and implies the criminalization of any activity in support of or serving sex workers. This hinders the work of some anti-trafficking organizations as well as sex worker rights organizations. It has forced some international NGOs to forego US funding in order to continue to provide essential services to sex workers or has led others to discontinue these services in favor of continued funding (Chang and Kim 2007). The US government has also pressured other countries to adopt the focus on “sex trafficking” through international “prevention” measures that are mandated, monitored, and enforced by the US State Department’s Trafficking in Persons (TIP)

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Report (U.S. Dep’t of State). The TIP Report ranks countries’ performance in preventing trafficking based on their compliance with antitrafficking measures endorsed by the USA. The US government sanctions countries with lower tier rankings, while offering higher ranked countries funding to aid their anti-trafficking efforts. Rankings are determined largely by each country’s adoption of the major elements of the US anti-trafficking approach: prostitution/trafficking conflation, level of focus on prostitution, and emphasis on prosecution. The case of Korea provides a good illustration of the consequences of the US government’s antiprostitution and prosecutorial approach as imposed internationally. Advocates report that the Korean government has defined human trafficking, in legal terms, only as prostitution. This interpretation did not change subsequent to the Palermo Protocol and was reinforced after introduction of the TVPA. After Korea’s initial low ranking as a Tier 3 country in 2001, the Korean government responded by establishing an interministry task force to combat trafficking and subsequently introduced a prostitution prevention law. Despite protests by sex worker rights groups, Korea instituted a sweeping antiprostitution law, the first of its kind since 1961. The law included prison sentences and fines for traffickers and for women in the sex industry. Encouraged by its subsequent higher ranking at Tier 1, the Korean government set a goal ultimately to eliminate prostitution. This illustrates the large-scale negative impact of the antiprostitution and prosecution-oriented framework of the TVPA and other US trafficking policy globally (Cheng 2005). Other government practices focused on prosecution within the sex industry, such as the dominant model of “raid and rescue” tactics in and outside of the USA, negatively impact both survivors of trafficking and migrant workers voluntarily engaged in sex work. One “raid and rescue” case in the USA, dubbed Operation Gilded Cage and reported to be the largest “sex trafficking” case in the history of the USA, illustrates this pattern (U.S. Dep’t of Justice). In July of 2005, law enforcement agents raided ten brothels in San

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Francisco identified as suspected trafficking sites and “rescued” over 120 women. Authorities detained the women at a military base in California, while federal officials questioned them to determine their status as possible victims of trafficking, before calling in trained service providers 24 h later. By the time advocates arrived, federal officials had already decided that the majority of the women were not legal victims of trafficking and placed them in immigration detention (Kim K (2006) Interview. 7 October). Advocates were able to convince officials to interpret the law more broadly in screenings of the remaining women, in direct conflict with the narrow federal framework. In this case and others, advocates report that when clients identify themselves as voluntary or consenting participants in their migration or employment at any point, authorities deem them ineligible for benefits under T-visas as legal victims of trafficking. If clients do not fit traditional conceptions of involuntary or non-consenting victims, they may face deportation, like many of the women in the Operation Gilded Cage case. Advocates also comment that often they can only secure certifications from law enforcement agents enabling their clients to apply for T-visas if their clients cooperate exactly as law enforcement demands during the investigation and prosecution process. Authorities deprived one woman “rescued” in Operation Gilded Cage of trafficking victim status, citing that she was “uncooperative,” after she decided that she did not wish to cooperate with law enforcement and instead, return to Korea. Authorities also denied her the ability to return to Korea and held her in jail as a material witness for the case (Leigh 2005). Comprehensive research by Melissa Ditmore of the Sex Workers Project (SWP) (Ditmore 2009) of the Urban Justice Center in New York has similarly documented the ineffectiveness and negative consequences of such raids through interviews with migrant sex workers and trafficked persons, social service providers (including caseworkers and attorneys), and law enforcement personnel (including federal and immigration agents) (Ditmore 2009). The interviewees identified the criminal justice approach to trafficking as a major

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problem, as it focuses on finding people to prosecute, rather than on victims’ needs and rights. Those who were targeted in raids experienced them as chaotic and traumatic and often experienced further trauma in subsequent detention. The research found that police and the criminal justice system have not been effective in either identifying or helping victims of trafficking, noting that in a number of cases, “trafficked sex workers have been arrested multiple times without ever being identified as victims of trafficking.” The report concludes that many of those who self-identified as being trafficked were able to help themselves, that the service providers who reported such cases did not learn of them as a result of raids, and that people familiar with sex work and those who have experienced trafficking situations themselves are better able to identify victims of trafficking. Thus, it recommends that anti-trafficking efforts be focused on building public awareness within sex worker and immigrant communities about resources available to people in coercive situations, instead of the current prevalent practice of raids. These examples reflect the potential negative impacts of US anti-trafficking policies and practices, both in the USA and globally, when trafficking is conflated with prostitution. The US government’s focus on trafficking for prostitution, and the assumption that prostitution is involuntary in all cases, has led to an inordinate emphasis on the prosecution of prostitution. This emphasis often results in human and labor rights abuses against exploited workers who are consenting adults in sex work and other industries yet may still face exploitation through labor rights abuses, poor working conditions, and debt bondage. Such exploitation should be recognized and addressed in the identification and treatment of all trafficking

victims. Moreover, all victims of trafficking need protection, rights, and access to benefits, regardless of whether they choose to cooperate with prosecution efforts or the form of trafficking they have faced.

References Chang G, Kim K (2007) Reconceptualizing approaches to human trafficking: new directions and perspectives from the field(s). Stanf J Civ Rights Civ Lib 3:318–344 Cheng S Anti-trafficking discourses and policies: a gendered and human rights perspective. Paper presented at Women’s Worlds 2005 conference, Ewha Women’s University, Seoul, Korea, 21 June 2005; see also Lisa Katayama, Sex Trafficking: Zero Tolerance, Mother Jones Blog, 4 May 2005. http://www.motherjones. com/news/dailymojo/2005/05/sex_trafficking.html Cheng S (2010) On the Move for Love: Migrant Entertainers and the U.S. Military in South Korea. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Ditmore M (2009) The use of raids to fight trafficking in persons: a study of law enforcement raids targeting trafficking in persons. Sex Workers Project (SWP) of the Urban Justice Center, New York. http://sexworker sproject.org/publications/reports/raids-and-trafficking/ Leigh C, Op-Ed. Behind the moral panic, an opportunity to work, S.F. Chron., 22 July 2005, at B9 McMahon K, Coalition to Abolish Slavery and Trafficking (2002) Speaking out: three narratives of women trafficked to the United States. Los Angeles Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 29 charged in connection with alien harboring conspiracy (1 July 2005) Protocol to prevent, suppress and punish trafficking in persons, especially women and children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, G.A. Res. 55/25, Annex II, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/25 (15 Nov 2000) Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, reauthorized and supplemented by the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA) of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108–193 and the TVPRA of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–164 U.S. Dep’t of State, Trafficking in persons report, http:// www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/ 2012/

Part 5: Internal Migration: Shorter Distance

Gentrification Jan Brueckner* University of California, Irvine, CA, USA

Definition Gentrification is an intra-urban migration process under which households with high socioeconomic status move into parts of a city formerly occupied by households of low socioeconomic status. According to the Free Dictionary, gentrification’s route word (“gentry”) refers to “people of gentle birth, good breeding, or high social position.” With gentrifying neighborhoods often located in central cities, where the poor are usually concentrated in the United States and some European countries, the phenomenon is commonly viewed as a path toward revitalization of ailing downtown areas. This view makes gentrification a popular subject for newspaper articles, and the anecdotal evidence they provide has been supplemented by data-driven scholarly research documenting and analyzing the phenomenon (for recent examples, see Vigdor 2002; Ellen and O’Regan 2011; McKinnish et al. 2010). Two main questions have been the focus of gentrification research by economists. The first question is why gentrification occurs. What forces lead high-income households to relocate into neighborhoods previously occupied solely by lower-income residents? The second question concerns the effect of gentrification on the poor. Does gentrification harm the poor households living in the areas that experience it either by displacement of these households or an escalation in their living costs?

Why Gentrification Occurs To analyze the forces leading to gentrification, economists usually rely on the standard model of a monocentric city, developed by Alonso (1964), Mills (1967), and Muth (1969). Under this model, all employment is located in the city’s central business district (CBD), and workers commute to the CBD from their residences, which are dispersed around the center. A stylized version of the model has two income groups, rich and poor. The model can be used to predict the relative locations of the rich and poor residential areas, along with possible changes in these locations over time. A pattern of gentrification would be observed if the poor initially live in the central city, with the rich living in the suburbs, and if this pattern is altered by the relocation of some rich households into central neighborhoods. In the basic model, the location of the rich group relative to the poor reflects the interplay of two forces. The first force is a household’s wish to economize on commuting costs, mainly time costs, a force that pulls the household toward the CBD. The second force is a desire to consume housing where it is cheap on a per-square-foot basis. This desire pulls the household toward the suburbs, where the model predicts that cheap land and correspondingly cheap housing are found. For the rich to live in the suburbs, this housing force must strengthen relative to the commuting-cost force at higher incomes, making the relative advantage of the suburbs stronger for the rich. When this pattern holds, the rich will outbid the poor for suburban housing, and the poor will outbid the rich for housing in the central city. Starting with this location pattern, which has the rich in the suburbs, the model can generate gentrification if some change in the economic environment causes the housing force to weaken, not strengthen, relative to the commuting-

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cost force at higher incomes. Then, the rich will outbid the poor for central city housing, reversing the locations of the two groups. For example, suppose that traffic congestion in the city grows, a pattern that has become common across the United States. With the rich having higher time costs, their commuting costs will increase proportionally more than the commuting costs of the poor in response to the higher congestion. With the commuting-cost force then stronger at higher incomes, the housing force, which is unchanged, will now weaken relative to the commuting-cost force as income increases. With the relative advantage of the center now stronger for the rich, the result will be gentrification, with the rich moving into the central city. Simply put, the rich’s stronger desire to escape worsening traffic congestion will pull them toward the CBD more strongly than the poor, leading to gentrification. While changes that affect commuting costs might promote gentrification, the urban model identifies other, more familiar forces that can lead to this outcome. These forces are (i) a change in consumer tastes, which places more weight on the amenities available in central cities; (ii) a change in the level of these amenities due to public investments in parks or other facilities or private investments in restaurants and other retail outlets, with no change in tastes; and (iii) replacement of a worn-out central city housing stock, which attracts high-income households in search of newer dwellings to downtown areas. The effects of these forces again can be analyzed using the monocentric city model. Central cities usually offer amenities such as museums and theaters, noteworthy architecture and public spaces, and a wide variety of restaurants, which create a third locational force in addition to the housing and commuting-cost forces. Like the commuting-cost force, the amenity force pulls consumers toward an amenity-rich CBD. In addition, the force is likely to be stronger for higher-income households, who may value the amenities offered by central cities more than the poor while having the purchasing power to enjoy them. The amenity force, however, could initially be weak, with the housing and commuting-cost forces determining the location pattern, and with the rich living in the suburbs. Rich households may then experience a change in tastes, with their valuation of central city amenities strengthening. With the amenity force now stronger for the rich and still inconsequential for the poor, it may then dominate the housing and commuting-cost forces, leading the rich to outbid the poor for central city housing. The result is taste-driven gentrification. Kern (1981) formalizes this argument using the monocentric city model. This kind of change in the taste for central city amenities is frequently mentioned in popular commentary as a cause of gentrification. The change is sometimes linked to the “empty-nester” phenomenon, where the departure of grown children from family households frees the parents to satisfy their suppressed tastes for downtown amenities by moving to the city center. Other trends, such as the growing culinary interests of consumers (which are more easily satisfied downtown), could also be a factor in such a change. Central city amenities can generate gentrification even in the absence of a change in tastes. If public investment or other factors cause amenities to increase in the central city, then even if tastes remain the same, the amenity force will strengthen, just as if tastes for amenities had become stronger. The amenity force may then once again dominate the housing and commuting-cost forces for rich households, leading them to outbid the poor for central city housing. Chicago, where substantial public investment in parks and street-side amenities has occurred since 1990, appears to offer an example of this phenomenon. As the central city has become a more appealing environment due to these public investments, anecdotal evidence suggests that a number of central neighborhoods have undergone gentrification, experiencing inflows of well-educated, high-income households. These conclusions are connected to the analysis of Brueckner, Thisse, and Zenou (1999), who extend the monocentric city model to capture the effect of amenity patterns on the location of the rich and poor. However, rather than attempting to explain gentrification in a single city, their goal is to explain differences in location patterns across cities. Arguing as above, they claim that in a city like Paris,

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which has strong central amenities, the rich will live in the center, whereas in a city like Detroit, where central amenities are weak, the rich will be found in the suburbs (both patterns match reality). The implication is that if Detroit could somehow generate Paris-style central amenities, the result would be gentrification in that city. Brueckner and Rosenthal (2009) attempt to explain gentrification by modifying the housing force to include dwelling age as a factor. In a city that has expanded outward over time and has not yet experienced any redevelopment, dwelling ages will decrease moving out from the CBD to the suburbs, where the newest dwellings are found. In the model, both rich and poor prefer younger dwellings, so that the age force (a modified housing force) then draws both groups to the suburbs, where dwellings are young. As before, the commuting-cost force again draws both groups toward the center. But assuming that the rich have a stronger preference and ability to pay for new dwellings than the poor, the age force is likely to strengthen relative to the commuting-cost force at higher incomes. The relative advantage of the suburbs will then be stronger for the rich, leading them to outbid the poor for young suburban dwellings, with the poor then living in older housing in the central city. Redevelopment of the central city, which occurs as its worn-out dwellings are replaced with new housing, leads to gentrification in this model. The reason is that along with the commuting-cost force, the age force will now also pull the rich toward the center, where new housing like that in the suburbs can be found. With the center offering both new dwellings and a chance to economize on their high time costs, the rich will outbid the poor for central housing, leading to gentrification. Some rich households, however, will remain in the suburbs.

Does Gentrification Harm the Poor? Although gentrification helps to revitalize central cities, many observers express concern about possible negative effects on poor households. In the case where the poor are renters and the incoming higherincome households are also renters rather than owner-occupiers, this concern has a logical basis. Then, the higher bids of gentrifying households will drive up rents in the area, either making housing unaffordable for the poor, who are then displaced, or crimping their budgets if they decide to stay. But the case where gentrification occurs in an owner-occupied area may not entail negative effects. Escalating home prices due to gentrification will confer capital gains on poor owner-occupiers, which can be cashed out if these households decide to move or could be realized at a later date if they decide to stay. Although property tax liabilities may rise with housing prices, poor owner-occupiers will generally gain from gentrification in their neighborhoods. Vigdor (2002), who studies Boston, casts some doubt on displacement as a consequence of gentrification by showing that low-status households living in gentrifying areas were no more likely to relocate than similar households outside such areas. McKinnish et al. (2010) present similar results for a broader sample, showing that the share of black and Hispanic residents staying in gentrifying census tracts matched their shares in the initial tract population 10 years earlier, showing no disproportionate displacement of these racial groups. In addition, gentrification seldom led to lower incomes among stayer households, regardless of race, indicating no displacement of the lowest-income households. Gentrification also raised the incomes of black stayers with high school degrees, suggesting that gentrification may spur better labor market outcomes for some existing households, reflecting a beneficial spillover from a more affluent neighborhood environment. Ellen and O’Regan (2011) find a similar “achievement” effect for stayer households in census tracts experiencing strong gentrification. In addition, like McKinnish et al. (2010), they find that renter households exiting census tracts with strong gentrification are similar to those exiting non-gentrifying

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tracts, with both exiters having incomes somewhat above those of original residents. Exiting owners in gentrifying tracts, however, had notably lower incomes relative to original residents than did exiting owners from non-gentrifying tracts. However, this pattern suggests that poorer owners were more inclined to cash out capital gains from gentrification by moving, as seems natural. Overall, the up-to-date evidence in these three studies mostly undercuts any concern that gentrification harms the poor.

References Alonso W (1964) Location and land use. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA Brueckner JK, Rosenthal SS (2009) Gentrification and neighborhood housing cycles: will America’s future downtowns be rich? Rev Econ Stat 91:725–743 Brueckner JK, Thisse J-F, Zenou Y (1999) Why is central Paris rich and downtown Detroit poor? An amenity-based theory. Eur Econ Rev 43:91–107 Ellen IG, O’Regan K (2011) How low income neighborhoods change: entry, exit, and enhancement. Reg Sci Urban Econ 41:89–97 Kern CR (1981) Upper-income renaissance in the city: its sources and implications for the city’s future. J Urban Econ 9:106–124 McKinnish T, Walsh R, White TK (2010) Who gentrifies low income neighborhoods? J Urban Econ 67:180–193 Mills ES (1967) An aggregative model of resource allocation in a metropolitan area. Am Econ Rev Pap Proc 57:197–210 Muth RF (1969) Cities and housing. University of Chicago Press, Chicago Vigdor JL (2002) Does gentrification harm the poor? In: Gale WG, Pack JR (eds) Brookings-Wharton papers on urban affairs. Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, pp 133–173

Intrametropolitan Population Distribution Lincoln Quillian* Northwestern University, Evanston, IL, USA

Definition Intrametropolitan population distribution refers to the distribution of population within one or more metropolitan areas. A metropolitan area is a city and its surrounding suburbs. Scholarly attention on intrametropolitan population distribution has examined overall population distribution but has more often focused on the relative distributions of population subgroups. Important subtopics of intrametropolitan population distribution are studies of segregation between race, ethnic, and socioeconomic status groups. Migration is a key mechanism of change of the intrametropolitan population distribution.

General Description In general, intrametropolitan population densities decline with distance from the city center, with the lowest densities at the metropolitan fringe. Population densities and the gradient of density with distance have declined over the twentieth century. Improvement in transportation, in particular the spread of the automobile, has been the key cause of declining densities, although increasing size of dwellings and smaller household sizes have also played an important role. The growth of lower-density areas around cities is explored in the literature on suburbanization and “urban sprawl” (Jackson 1985). A basic fact of intrametropolitan population distribution is that persons with like social characteristics tend to live near each other. Or as the early urban sociologist Robert Park put it, social distances tend to be reflected in spatial distances. Park’s dictum has been most thoroughly explored in studies of segregation. There is a large literature on the measurement of segregation (James and Taeuber 1985), but the most-used measures of segregation reflect the extent to which two or more population groups are unevenly distributed across neighborhoods (or another spatial unit). Complete evenness implies that the same percentage of population of the groups over which the measure is calculated live in each neighborhood, while complete unevenness implies that there is no overlap between the neighborhoods lived in by different groups. Segregation is most often applied to race and ethnicity (“segregation” without further qualifiers almost inevitably refers to racial or ethnic segregation), but a literature exists on segregation on the basis of income and socioeconomic status, and less commonly segregation measures are applied to other characteristics. One reason for the emphasis on racial and ethnic segregation is that in American cities segregation on the basis of race and ethnicity is higher than segregation measured on the basis of socioeconomic status or other social characteristics (White 1987). Segregation on the basis of race and ethnicity in American cities remains high. In the average U.S. metropolitan area in 2010, 57 % of blacks or whites would need to move to other neighborhoods to achieve an even spatial distribution between groups. Black segregation is consistently highest of major race/ethnic groups but is gradually declining. By contrast, about 48 % of Hispanics and 41 % of Asians would need to move to achieve an even distribution with whites in 2010; Hispanic and Asian segregation has stayed at about the same level since 1970 (Logan and Stults 2011). *Email: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 F. D. Bean, S. K. Brown (eds.), Selected Topics in Migration Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-19631-7_24

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Segregation on the basis of income in American cities has increased since 1970, with most of the increase occurring from 1980 to 1990 and 2000 to 2010. Both poor and affluent households have become more segregated from other households, although the most affluent households are consistently more segregated from other households than poor households. These trends are partly accounted for by increasing household income inequality (Reardon and Bischoff 2011). A distinct literature on intrametropolitan population distribution examines the spatial geography of population and land use. An early model of this sort is the concentric zone model of Burgess, which described land use and populations as distributed across concentric circles around the central business district. In Burgess’ model the affluence of residents increased with distance from the center. The sectoral model of Hoyt, in contrast, described land use and population characteristics as segmented into distinct sectors radiating from the central business district. Hoyt suggested the sectoral pattern resulted from land use around transport corridors like rails and roads (Barry and Kasarda 1977). Another research tradition in this area, factorial ecology, sought to define major dimensions of population that differentiate urban neighborhoods. Factorial ecologists took demographic measures of neighborhoods (like percentage in race/ethnic groups, percentage 25–35, etc.) and subjected them to factor analyses. Using this method Shevky and Bell identified three major bases of neighborhood population differentiation: socioeconomic status (income and education), life-cycle stage (age and household type), and race/ethnicity. Subsequent studies support these as major dimensions of urban spatial differentiation in many but not all metropolitan areas. Changes in the intrametropolitan population distribution are the product of several population processes, including births, deaths, household changes, changes in the housing stock, and migration. With about 15 % of households migrating each year, migration is the most important of these. Intrametropolitan population distribution has been studied in most detail in U.S. cities since 1940, making possible a detailed history. From the 1940s to the 1960s, rapid expansion of manufacturing employment in urban areas and the mechanization of Southern agriculture produced massive migration of blacks from Southern rural areas into cities. This migration in the context of housing discrimination outside of black neighborhoods produced highly segregated and dense black residential areas in Northern cities. Black-white residential segregation peaked in 1970, when 79 % of black or white households would need to relocate to achieve an even distribution over neighborhoods in the average metropolitan area. These decades also saw increasing suburbanization and “white flight” by which white households in racially transitioning neighborhoods moved to white middle-class or upper-class suburbs. Increasing deindustrialization and worsened economic conditions of cities in the 1970s resulted in a near halt to black migration into cities. Unemployment increased sharply, resulting in substantail increase in the number of high-poverty urban neighborhoods from 1970 to 1990. While most agreed the decline of urban manufacturing jobs was the most important factor contributing to growing high-poverty neighborhoods, there was debate about other potential causes. W.J. Wilson (1987) proposed that many middleclass blacks migrated from black to white neighborhoods with declines in the most overt forms of housing discrimination. In Wilson’s account, this migration stripped black neighborhoods of their middle-class residents and contributed to the formation of high-poverty black neighborhoods. Massey and colleagues argued, by contrast, that middle-class blacks did not move to white neighborhoods in significant numbers (see Massey and Denton 1993). Quillian (1999) found evidence that there was black migration to white neighborhoods, but it was often a part of racial turnover in neighborhoods, and thus the share of middleclass blacks in white neighborhoods did not significantly increase. The populations of many central cities saw resurgence in the 1990s and (to a lesser extent) the 2000s, with urban information and service economies prospering and more affluent households increasingly choosing to live in central cities. Urban population growth also reflected increased international

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immigration into cities, resulting in growing Latino and Asian populations. These decades also saw increasing racial diversity in suburbs and concentrations of poverty in some inner-ring suburbs. Finally, intrametropolitan population distribution influences the character of urban and neighborhood life and the quality of life, health, and life chances of residents. Living in close proximity to wealthier persons is associated with better access to jobs, lower crime, better local schools, lower pollution, and better access to urban amenities; close proximity to impoverished persons tends to be associated with the opposite of these conditions. A major reason for concern with race/ethnic segregation is that it contributes importantly to income segregation and increases the contact of blacks and Latinos with economically disadvantaged contexts. These topics are the subject of the literatures on neighborhood effects, spatial mismatch, and school effects (Sampson et al. 2002).

References Barry BJ, Kasarda JD (1977) Contemporary urban ecology. Macmillan, New York Jackson K (1985) The crabgrass frontier: the suburbanization of the United States. Oxford, New York James DR, Taeuber K (1985) Measures of segregation. Sociol Methodol 14:1–32 Logan JR, Stults B (2011) The persistence of segregation in the metropolis: new findings from the 2010 Census. Census brief prepared for project US2010. http://www.s4.brown.edu/us2010 Massey DS, Denton NA (1993) American apartheid: segregation and the making of the underclass. Harvard University Press, Cambridge Quillian L (1999) Migration patterns and the growth of high-poverty neighborhoods 1970–1990. Am J Sociol 105:1–37 Reardon SF, Bischoff K (2011) Growth in the residential segregation of families by income, 1970–2009. Census brief prepared for project US2010. http://www.s4.brown.edu/us2010 Sampson RJ, Morenoff JD, Gannon-Rowley T (2002) Assessing “neighborhood effects”: social processes and new directions in research. Annu Rev Sociol 28:443–478 White MJ (1987) American neighborhoods and residential differentiation. Russell Sage, New York Wilson WJ (1987) The truly disadvantaged: the inner city, the underclass, and public policy Chicago. University of Chicago Press, Chicago

Local Mobility William A. V. Clark* Department of Geography, University of California, California Center for Population Research, Los Angeles, CA, USA

Synonyms Household moves; Residential mobility; Short-distance migration

Definition Local mobility, or residential mobility, describes changes of residence that do not change the networks of local interaction, including links to schools, health care, friends, and usually the place of work. Most local moves occur within the same labor and housing markets and even in large metropolitan areas do not break up the fabric of daily activities.

Overview Most changes of residence involve very short-distance moves. In the last decade about 8.4 % of all moves in the United States were within the same county, that is, basically within the same housing and labor market. The proportion of changes of residence has been declining over the last three decades and is now much lower than it was during the period of population expansion after World War II (see Fig. 1). Traditionally, local mobility in Europe and Japan has been at lower rates than in the United States (Long 1992). Recent studies of OECD countries have documented their lower rates in general, but at the same time New Zealand and Australia have some of the highest mobility rates worldwide (Caldera-Sanchez and Andrews 2011).

Correlates of Mobility Both short-distance and long-distance moves are usually linked to age as an explanatory variable for household relocation, but in fact age is simply a proxy for the events that occur more frequently at younger ages. The desire for, and move to, ownership also occurs at younger ages though affordability has become an issue, especially in expensive housing markets, and often delays the transition to ownership. The move to ownership itself is linked to socioeconomic status and the ability to purchase more space and higherstatus housing with increasing income. Overall, the likelihood of changing residence declines with age and is lower overall for owners than for renters.

The Life Course and Residential Change Overall residential mobility is the process by which households match their housing needs to the houses available to them and is central to understanding how the housing market operates. As households change their space needs with changes in the life course, they make decisions about what housing to choose and where to move within the city. The choices are a function of their needs, external events, and the housing stock available to them. *Email: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 F. D. Bean, S. K. Brown (eds.), Selected Topics in Migration Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-19631-7_25

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Fig. 1 Sources: Percent of US population who change residence. US Census Bureau Current Population Survey (March estimates) and Frey (2009) Brookings Institute

Early research on residential change by Rossi (1955) established how changes in residence were related to the changing needs for housing space as families were established and grew with the addition of children. That work was extended by Quigley and Weinberg (1977), who provided a theoretical explanation for how residential change was linked to a disequilibrium between the space a family needed in contrast with the space they were currently consuming. In response to this disequilibrium the household engaged in a process of search and relocation (Brown and Moore 1970). Recent research has elaborated the way in which housing demand affects choices to include specific links to changes in the evolution of the life course. The concept of the life course recognizes that movement from one residence to another is embedded in a sequence of events which occur with relative regularity as individuals marry, have children, and experience interruptions to their life such as divorce and widowhood. This approach to the way in which residential change occurs emphasizes the link between specific events and the need to change locations (Mulder 1993; Clark and Dieleman 1996).

Mobility Across Neighborhoods Because most moves involve short-distance relocations there is considerable interest in the link between residential change and neighborhood choice. When the household makes a choice of an apartment or a single-family home they are also making a choice of a particular location within the city. That neighborhood choice brings with it a whole range of social and economic connections, including links to schools and urban services more generally. Neighborhood choice also involves selections which express preferences for particular combinations of other neighbors, choices which often reflect ethnic and socioeconomic preferences. These choices in turn lead to much of the residential patterning that we observed in modern metropolitan areas (Clark and Morrison 2012). Studies of relocation behavior out of poorer neighborhoods have shown that minority households have greater difficulty in leaving such neighborhoods (South et al. 2005).

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Models of Mobility Economists and demographers have suggested a number of ways of analyzing the probability of moving and have used a series of logit and discrete choice models to provide an explanation for both the decision to move and the choice of a house during the relocation process (Lee and Waddell 2010; Clark and Dieleman 1996). Because residential change often involves moving from renting to owning there is a substantial literature which links residential change and home ownership and how residential change is linked to the housing market more generally (Smith et al. 2012).

Cross-Reference ▶ Family Migration ▶ Housing Change ▶ Life Course

References Brown LA, Moore EG (1970) The intra-urban migration process: a perspective. Geogr Ann B 52:1–13 Caldera-Sanchez A, Andrews D (2011) Residential mobility and public policy in OECD countries. OECD J Econ Stud 2011(1):185–206 Clark WAV, Dieleman F (1996) Households and housing: choice and outcomes in the housing market. Rutgers, State University, Center for Urban Policy Research, New Brunswick Clark WAV, Morrison P (2012) Socio- spatial mobility and residential sorting: evidene from a large scale survey. Urban Stud 49:3253–3270 Frey W (2009) The Great American Migration Slowdown. Brookings Institution, Washington, DC Lee BH, Waddell P (2010) Residential mobility and location choice: a nested logit model with sampling of alternatives. Transportation 37:587–601 Long L (1992) Changing residence: comparative perspectives on its relationship to age, sex and marital status. Population Studies 46:141–158 Mulder CH (1993) Migration dynamics a life course approach. Thesis Publishers- PDOD Publications, Amsterdam Quigley J, Weinberg D (1977) Intra-urban residential mobility: a review and synthesis. Int Reg Sci Rev 2:41–66 Rossi PH (1955) Why families move: a study in the social psychology of urban residential mobility. Free Press, Glencoe Smith S, Elsinga M, Eng O, O’Mahony L, Wachter S (2012) International encyclopedia of housing and home, vol 7. Elsevier, Amsterdam South SJ, Crowder K, Chavez E (2005) Exiting and entering high-poverty neighborhoods: Latinos, Blacks and Anglos compared. Soc Forces 84(2):873–900

Further Reading Clapham D, Clark WAV, Gibb K (2012) The sage handbook of housing. Sage, London Flatau P, James I, Watson R, Wood G, Hendershot PH (2007) Leaving the parental home in Australia over the generations: evidence from the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) survey. J Popul Res 24:51–71

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Migration-Defining Boundary

International Migration

Michael J. White Department of Sociology, Brown University, Providence, RI, USA

While no migration definition is without some challenges, the international migration-defining boundary is relatively straightforward. Typically, for example, United Nations tabulations, as further promulgated by organizations such as the Population Reference Bureau, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the Migration Policy Institute, take the national border as determining international migration. Time intervals are generally taken to be a fixed census interval (since national census data are so often the source for such tabulations) or lifetime, that is, derived from a tabulation of country of birth by country of present residence. Of course, problems arise in determining the migration-defining boundary when territory is not systematically and consistently divided into geography. The twentieth-century rearrangements of Europe and the Former Soviet Union offer such examples. Places where territory is disputed create additional difficulties. Lastly, in survey data the difficulties of recollection can complicate the origin-destination classification for long-distance movers. While international migration suffers less from problematic geographical classification, issues of harmonization of these data still arise (DeWaard et al. 2012).

Definition The definition and measurement of migration is crucially dependent on both time and space. With regard to space, the migration-defining boundary (MDB) is the geographic delimiter beyond which geographic mobility is considered “migration” and within which it is considered “local mobility.” This issue of measurement is linked to the wellknown problem of the modifiable areal unit problem (MAUP) in statistical geography, but here is more focused on demographic accounting and its substantive consequence. In a worldwide framework for geographic mobility, one generally adopts a migration- defining boundary that also distinguishes internal migration from international migration. In virtually all such cases, the identification of migration rests on the classification of an individual as having made a change of usual place of residence over a specified time interval, the common notion of the demographic event of geographic mobility.

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Internal Migration The determination of the migration-defining boundary is of more than arcane or administrative interest. Significant behavioral concomitants are taken to be associated with the moves that occur on either side of the migration-defining boundary. In most characterizations, moves within the migration-defining boundary are taken to be residential changes that do not (necessarily) involve changes of job or social networks (Clark 1986). By contrast, migration – movement across this boundary – is taken to be too substantial to allow the mover to maintain the same job and local ties. This criterion is far from perfect in either theory or practice. In general, local mobility is more likely to be associated with life cycle adjustments and, to a degree, socioeconomic changes among individuals and households. Thus, changes in union status are likely to generate demand for different housing. The same can be said for the arrival and departure of children during the life cycle. In parallel fashion, changes in income and other socioeconomic circumstances might prompt a housing upgrade or downgrade. Such housing consumption shifts can usually be accommodated with local mobility. On the other hand, longer moves are typically associated with changes in labor force status: obtaining training, taking a new job, or retiring. Although there have been repeated calls for international comparability in internal migration measurement, action has generally not followed (Bell et al. 2015). The lack of comparability is of consequence for substance. As Bell and coauthors observe in their comprehensive effort to look at internal migration across countries, “. . .it is unclear whether apparent differentials in migration intensity between countries reflect real, underlying differences in the propensity to move between regions, or whether they are instead simply a product of variations in statistical geography” (Bell et al. 2015). Consider several specific examples of MDB choice and its consequences. US survey data indicate that 32.2% of all 2013–14 internal movers

Migration-Defining Boundary

crossed a county boundary and 13.5% made a move across a state boundary (US Census Bureau 2015: Table 1). Some 21.3% of US internal movers crossed a metropolitan boundary, that is, changed metropolitan areas, moved from metro to nonmetro or vice versa. If one takes the county boundary as the MDB, about a third of US movers made an internal migration; by contrast, metropolitan migration occurs at about one-third that rate, and interstate migration at about half that rate. About 4 in 10 intercounty movers relocated less than 50 miles, perhaps close enough to still be within their origin labor-housing market (US Census Bureau 2015: Table 16). White and Mueser (1988) investigated this issue to determine the degree to which boundary choice mattered. They found that indeed, the metropolitan and state boundaries were more selective, with the latter outpacing the former. Of course, while US states may provide a more demographically selective MDB, the metropolitan area is typically defined to aim to capture a coherent labor and housing market. The European Union has attempted to make use of consistent subnational units, using its Nomenclature for Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS), but even then, the scale of chosen spatial units “can dramatically affect the conclusions drawn from studying social and economic conditions. . .” (World Bank 2009: PP). Bell and Muhidin (2009: Table 10) have examined comparability for about two dozen countries with census data from around 2000. In Australia, moves across the 8 major state/territory boundaries occurred at a rate of 4.76%, while those across 61 temporally consistent statistical divisions yielded a migration rate of 10.39%. In Indonesia, migration defined upon the 7 largest geographic units (regions) produced a rate of 0.83%; while the intermediate 26 units (provinces) produced 2.19%, and the smallest 280 units (municipalities) produced 3.9%. In Brazil, movement across 5 major regions occurred at a rate of 2.2% while movement across 27 state boundaries occurred at 3.4%. The South Africa 2007 Community Survey (mini-census) indicates that 17.6% of the

Migration-Defining Boundary

population had changed residence in the previous 5 years. If one uses the Province (of which there are nine) as the MDB, the fraction of migrants is 3.7%, a sharp decline from the total movers. Furthermore, the province is seemingly the only MDB available from official statistics in South Africa, thereby limiting information about alternative scales. Of intraprovincial migrants, Landau and coauthors write, “StatsSA [the South African Statistical agency] provides no indication of migrants’ destinations within the provinces as it only considers migration when it crosses provincial boundaries. This poses a challenge to municipalities, which are required to host and plan for migrant communities” (Landau et al. 2011: 20).

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previous point coordinates may be less readily ascertained. Panel surveys – data gathered in repeated waves – is advantaged in this regard, as long as current address coordinates are recorded at each wave. Mobile phones with GPS data have generated some interest and promising applications to mobility (Palmer et al. 2013), yet research is still in an early stage. Additional concerns arise with regard to secure storage and handling of such detailed data that can potentially lead to personal identification. It remains to be seen whether more promise comes via the path of new technological innovation (and creative indirect assessment) or whether improved consistency arises from more coordination within the conventional agencies that collect, process, and promulgate population statistics.

Challenges and Prospects Cross-References New technological developments and analytic strategies hold some promise. One approach is to make indirect estimates from existing data. Bell and colleagues have done this and recently published a series of standardized rates for several dozen countries. Using this model to adjust for differences in measurement across countries, they calculate 5-year migration rates that range from 6% to 50% for 61 countries (Bell et al. 2015). Advances in Geographic Information Systems (GIS) are likely to benefit migration measurement. Increasingly, data are being identified with spatial point locations, typically longitude and latitude. To the extent that demographic and socioeconomic data are organized with a complete set of X-Y coordinates identified with a person (or the person’s housing unit), investigators can provide their own aggregations or conduct pointto-point analysis. Still, several challenges and obstacles remain. First, and of greatest substantive import, the ability to aggregate does not remove the substantive issue of deciding on a boundary. Often administrative units will still be of use, but other schemes can be considered. Point coordinates often can be readily identified for current residence, but

▶ Indirect Methods for Estimating Internal Migration ▶ Intrametropolitan Population Distribution ▶ Local Mobility ▶ Measuring Internal Migration Prospectively Using Longitudinal Data ▶ Measuring Internal Migration: Retrospective Self-Report

References Bell M, Muhidin S (2009) Cross-National Comparison of Internal Migration. MPRA Paper No. 19213. http:// mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/19213/. Bell M, Charles-Edwards E, Ueffing P, Stillwell J, Kupiszewski M, Kupiszewska D (2015) Internal migration and development: comparing migration intensities around the world. Popul Dev Rev 41:33–58 Clark WAV (1986) Human migration. Sage, Beverly Hills DeWaard J, Kim K, Raymer J (2012) Migration systems in Europe: evidence from harmonized flow data. Demography 49:1307–1333 Landau LB, Segatti A, Misago JP (2011) Governing migration & urbanisation in South African municipalities. Online: http://www.salga.org.za/. Accessed 8 July 2015

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Palmer JR, Espenshade TJ, Bartumeus F, Chung CY, Ozgencil NE, Li K (2013) New approaches to human mobility: using mobile phones for demographic research. Demography 50:1105–1128 U.S. Census Bureau (2015) Geographical mobility: 2013 to 2014. Current population survey, 2014 annual social and economic supplement. Table 1, Table 16.

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Online : https://www.census.gov/hhes/mgration/data/ cps/cps2014.html. Updated Mar 2015 White MJ, Mueser PR (1988) Implications of boundary choice for the measurement of residential mobility. Demography 25(3):443–459 World Bank (2009) World development report 2009: reshaping economic geography. World Bank, Washington, DC

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Place Utility

Place Utility Through Time

David Lo´pez-Carr and Daniel Phillips Department of Geography, University of California, Santa Barbara, Santa Barbara, CA, USA

Wolpert (1966) advanced this theory in proposing an ecological model based on his concept of place utility. He theorized that people are exposed to some amount of stress in a given place throughout their lifespan, and their reactions to stress (which he called “strains”) differ depending on their stage of life. Certain “noxious” elements such as traffic, pollution, noise, and crowding produce stress that detracts from the utility of the current place of residence, and people are more vulnerable to these stressful elements during certain life cycle periods, particularly infancy and old age. During such life periods, the utility of the current place diminishes and the relative attractiveness of another place increases; people at these stages will be more prone to migrate to that appealing place. Life stage, therefore, exerts considerable influence on the utility that people assign to places, and thus on who migrates, where they migrate, and when they migrate. Since economic factors are typically more substantial and thus more motivating than noneconomic ones, some writers have viewed place utility in the lens of economic utility, meaning those places with the most economic advantages will have the most utility and attract the most migrants, regardless of other factors. Economic factors that often earn mention include availability of employment, prospects for high income and remittances, and the general standard of living in

Definition The concept of place utility was introduced in a pair of articles published in the mid-1960s by Princeton geographer Julian Wolpert. In the first (1965), he coined the term “place utility” to describe “the net composite of utilities which are derived from the individual’s integration at some position in space.” Based on past experiences, both positive and negative, the individual measures the utility of the place in which he/she presently resides. According to Wolpert, place utility is operationalized by migrants or potential migrants who assess the outstanding attributes of their current place of residence relative to those same aggregate characteristics of a potential place of migration destination. Traditionally, most migrants have little or no personal experience in the potential destination. They make a judgment based on information they hear or read about, rather than from personal experience. In sum, Wolpert theorized that people will base their migration decisions on the varying values of utility they associate with potential destinations vis-à-vis their current place of residence.

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the destination place (Kok 2006). According to Datta (2003), people will migrate only if they believe that the destination will offer more livelihood opportunities than the present place of residence. Macrolevel political-economic factors frame migrant structural push and pull pressures, but microlevel processes determine who migrates, with the ultimate decision usually made at the household level (De Jong and Gardner 1981). The importance of the household scale is highlighted by the fact that most people choose to not migrate despite sometimes gaping spatial income disparities (Goldscheider 1971). Bilsborow and colleagues (1984), among several others, have framed migration decisions within perceptions of “place utility” given structural inequalities (Wolpert 1965, 1966). Together, these observations suggest that the way in which an individual (or household) relates to surrounding space, an attribute of which could be connections to other spaces, shapes the likelihood of migration. Some scholars have questioned the usefulness of place utility as a concept due to its perceived subjectivity. Measured through surveys in which individuals express their attitudes or preferences about certain places, the concept is largely based on opinions that vary from person to person and may shift in time for a single individual (Janelle 1969). Perhaps as a consequence, scholars have sought to find objective characteristics of places by which to measure their utility. Baker (1982) developed a utility function based on the interaction of points in space. Fotheringham et al. (2000) created what they called a relative intrinsic attractivity (RIA) measure for a given place generated by its relative accessibility from adjacent locales likely to attract migrants to that place. Though using the distinct term of “locational utility,” Janelle (1969) defined a formula for aggregate transport cost and effort needed for a place to meet its functional role in the regional and world systems. Recent scholarship has continued to provide fresh insight on the role of place in migration. While economic pushes and pulls constitute the primary motivations for moving to a given place,

Place Utility

environmental factors are increasingly examined in the context of migration pushes and pulls and many of these are directly related to shaping perceived place utility. For example, Adams and Adger (2013) found that a pleasant climate, simple lifestyle, lack of pollution, and the aesthetics of the landscape contribute greatly to a place’s attractiveness. Similarly, in his Guatemalan research, Carr (2008) observed that incentives for out-migration varied depending on place of origin. In addition to local sociocultural and demographic factors, he found that environmental change, in the form of increasing or decreasing frequency, timing, and magnitude of precipitation events, ultimately changes perception of place characteristics that relate to migration decisions. Place-related characteristics arguably remain the most important considerations in migration decisions. Further development of the concept of place utility promises greater understanding of age-old questions surrounding human mobility.

References Adams H, Neil Adger W (2013) The contribution of ecosystem services to place utility as a determinant of migration decision-making. Environ Res Lett 8(1):015006 Baker RGV (1982) Place utility fields. Geogr Anal 14(1):10–28 Bilsborrow RE, Oberai AS et al (eds) (1984) Migration surveys in low-income countries: guidelines and questionnaire design. Croom-Helm, London, 552 pp Carr DL (2008) Migration to the Maya Biosphere Reserve, Guatemala: why place matters. Hum Organ 67(1):37–48 Datta A (2003) Human migration: a social phenomenon. Mittal Publications, New Delhi, pp 25, 26 De Jong GF, Gardner RW (eds) (1981) Migration decision making: multidisciplinary approaches to microlevel studies in developed and developing countries. Pergamon Press, New York Fotheringham AS, Champion T, Wymer C, Coombes M (2000) Measuring destination attractivity: a migration example. Int J Popul Geogr 6(6):391–421 Goldscheider C (1971) Theoretical issues in migration research. Population, modernization, and social structure. Little, Brown, Boston Janelle DG (1969) Spatial reorganization: a model and concept. Ann Assoc Am Geogr 59(2):348–364

Place Utility

Kok P (2006) Migration in south and southern Africa: dynamics and determinants. HSRC Press, Cape Town, pp 275, 276 Wolpert J (1965) Behavioral aspects of the decision to migrate. Pap Reg Sci Assoc 15:159–169 Wolpert J (1966) Migration as an adjustment to environmental stress. J Soc Issues 22(4):92–102

Further Reading Arthur JA (2008) The African Diaspora in the United States and Europe: the Ghanaian experience. Ashgate, Hampshire, pp 27, 28 Bible DS, Brown LA (1981) Place utility, attribute tradeoff, and choice behavior in an intra-urban migration context. Socioecon Plann Sci 15(1):37–44 Brown L, Horton F et al (1970) On place utility and the normative allocation of intra-urban migrants. Demography 7:175–183 Findley AM, Li F (1999) Methodological issues in researching migration. Prof Geogr 51(1):50–67 Golledge RG, Stimson RJ (1997) Spatial behavior: a geographic perspective. Guilford Press, New York, pp 414–418 Henry S, Bilsborrow R (2006) How migrants choose their destination in Burkina Faso? A place-utility approach.

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Papers of the European population conference 2006. Liverpool, June 21–24 Session 32 “Population, development and environment in developing countries” http://epc2006.princeton.edu/papers/60302 Hugo G (1981) Village-community ties, the village norms, and ethnic and social networks: a review of evidence from the Third World. In: Jong GFD, Gardner RW (eds) Migration decision making: multidisciplinary approaches to micro-level studies in developed and developing countries. Pergamon Press, New York Lee ES (1966) A theory of migration. Demography 3:47–57 Lo´pez-Carr D (2012) Agro-ecological determinants of rural out-migration to the Maya biosphere reserve, Guatemala. Environ Res Lett 7(4):045603. pp 7 Massey DS (1990) Social structure, household strategies, and the cumulative causation of migration. Popul Index 56(1):3–26 Ravenstein EG (1889) The laws of migration. J R Stat Soc 52:241–305 Wood C (1982) Equilibrium and historical-structural perspectives on migration. Int Migr Rev 16(2):298–319

Part 6: Labor Market Context of Immigrant Reception

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Labor Migration Policies: A Typology Demand- Versus Supply-Driven Policies and Other Typological Approaches Holger Kolb Expert Council of German Foundations on Integration and Migration, Berlin, Germany

Definition Against the background of demographic changes and tendencies of aggravating skill shortages in various sectors of national economies, most industrialized countries have developed and implemented specific sets of policies to attract labor migrants in general and those with a particular set of skills in particular. Those specific approaches tended to vary significantly in terms of the technique applied for screening and selecting, the definition of the target group as well as the temporal outline of the programs and thus the question whether migration is planned to take place on a permanent or temporary basis. Given this variety of state approaches, a number of typological attempts emerged to develop a systematic and relatively general framework to categorize and compare different technical approaches of labor migration policies.

The most general and widespread method is to distinguish between demand- and supply-driven systems. The central feature of the first approach is that “the initiative for the migration comes from the employer,” whereas the second approach refers “to situations in which a host country advertises its willingness to take applications for immigration directly from potential candidates, independently of a specific job offer [. . .]” (Chaloff and Lemaître 2009, 17). Frameworks with differing categorizations have been proposed by Doomernik et al. (2009), Koslowski (2014), Hailbronner and Koslowski (2008), and McLaughlin and Salt (2002). A more fine-grained differentiation of Papademetriou and O’Neill (2006, 230), for example, distinguishes between three prototypes of the selection of labor migrants: – Employment-based mechanisms accept “workers who have been hired by duly registered corporate entities for a specific job” and make the admission predominantly dependent on the question whether an applicant has found employment. Classic examples for this category are the European Blue Card or the H-1B-visa of the United States, which generally grant temporary residence permits in the first place and then allow for a transition into permanent residence.

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– Occupation-driven systems grant access to “people who are qualified in occupations that the government decides are in short supply” and arrange accelerated procedures for persons with specific occupational qualifications without inevitably requiring a work contract. Well known for following this approach is Australia which has defined a Skilled Occupation List (SOL) in order to identify those occupations with a specific shortage of labor supply. – Human capital-oriented schemes follow an entirely different principle of selection and usually do not only prescind from the requirement of arranged employment but are also not limited to specific occupations. This philosophy of screening migrants is based on an evaluation of the observable characteristics of any individual applicant. Point systems that award points for specific desirable characteristics, such as the system that was used in Canada for a long time, are the best-known instrument in that area (Sumption 2015). Point systems usually grant permanent residence right from the start. This tripartite differentiation should not be misunderstood as an empirically accurate reproduction of the reality of labor migration policymaking around the globe, but rather might be helpful as a heuristic tool for comparison and a device to retrace the policy approaches of different immigration countries.

Processes of Convergence in Labor Migration Policies Conventional wisdom tended to view particularly Canada as a paradigmatic case for a country with an approach based on human capital considerations of screening and selecting, whereas Germany and other European immigration states were seen to follow a more reluctant method of an employer-based policy admitting labor migrants only in case of an existing work contract. One reason for this might be the fact that European immigration countries had felt a distinct need to

ensure immediate labor market integration of immigrants given their relatively comprehensive social security systems, whereas Canada rather followed a long-term perspective of labor migration as a specific tool of population policy. Recent developments in immigration countries on both sides of the Atlantic, however, give reason to assume that formerly robust differences between these countries in terms of designing and organizing labor migration policy begin to totter. Papademetriou, Somerville, and Tanaka coined the term of “Hybrid Immigrant-Selection Systems” (Papademetriou et al. 2008) which combine and correlate instruments and tools from different and (formerly) competing approaches of labor migration policy. As a very recent example of the emergence of hybrid models of labor migration policy which at the same time blurs formerly clear and explicit policy differences and causes a process of convergence might serve the Canadian and the German case of policy-making in that area (Finotelli and Kolb 2015). By introducing a new management system of immigration intake (Express Entry), Canada systematically introduced steering mechanisms such as preferring immigrants with arranged employment over those without a work contract and labor market tests, which in the past were rather to be found in immigration countries on the other side of the Atlantic. In contrast, Germany, the country with the highest influx of immigrants in Europe, deviated from its old pattern of accepting only those labor migrants who were able to provide a job offer of a German employer already from abroad, and introduced instruments following the idea of human capital selection.

References Chaloff J, Lemaître G (2009) Managing highly-skilled labour migration: a comparative analysis of migration policies and challenges in OECD countries. OECD social, employment and migration working papers 79. OECD. http://www.oecd.org/els/mig/46656535.pdf. Accessed 7 June 2017 Doomernik J, Koslowski R, Thränhardt D (2009) The battle for the brains: why immigration policy is not enough to attract the highly skilled. Brussels forum paper series. German Marshall fund of the United

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States. http://www.gmfus.org/publications/battlebrains-why-immigration-policy-not-enough-attracthighly-skilled. Accessed 7 June 2017 Finotelli C, Kolb H (2015) “The good, the bad and the ugly” reconsidered: a comparison of German, Canadian and Spanish labour migration policies. J Comp Policy Anal. doi:10.1080/13876988.2015.1095429 Hailbronner K, Koslowski R (2008) Models for immigration management schemes: comparison and analysis of existing approaches and a perspective for future reforms. Immigration paper series. German Marshall fund of the United States. http://www.trans atlanticacademy.org/sites/default/files/publications/ GMF6657-ImmigrationPaper_1210_Final.pdf. Accessed 7 June 2017 Koslowski R (2014) Selective migration policy models and changing realities of implementation. Int Migr 52:26–39 McLaughlin G, Salt J (2002) Migration policies toward highly skilled foreign workers. Report to the home

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office. http://www.geog.ucl.ac.uk/research/researchcentres/migration-research-unit/pdfs/highly_skilled. pdf/at_download/file. Accessed 7 June 2017 Papademetriou D, O’Neill K (2006) Selecting economic migrants. In: Papademetriou D (ed) Europe and its immigrants in the 21st century. a new deal or a continuing dialogue of the deaf? , Washington, DC, pp 223–256 Papademetriou D, Somerville W, Tanaka H (2008) Hybrid immigrant-selection systems: the next generation of economic migration schemes. Migration Policy Institute. http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/hybridimmigrant-selection-systems-next-generationeconomic-migration-schemes. Accessed 2 Decr 2015 Sumption M (2015) Points-based immigration. In: Bean F, Brown S (eds) Encyclopeida of migration. Dordrecht. https://link.springer.com/referenceworkentry/10.1007/ 978-94-007-6179-7_65-2. Accessed 7 June 2017

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Labor-Market Shifts and Immigration Detailed Description Jason Gagnon Development Centre, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris, France

Definition When immigrants enter a country, they affect the destination country’s labor market and labor force behavior in a variety of ways. Policy makers are thus interested in whether and under which circumstances immigration can shift the macro equilibrium of the labor market through variables like the average wage, the unemployment rate or the average hours worked, or an individual’s labor behavior in the presence of immigration. The economic literature on such questions, which generally draws from theories on labor economics, primarily attempts to answer two questions. The first is whether immigration has an impact on national income, while the second is how the impact is distributed across different groups in the labor market. In other words, if there are gains or losses, how is the pie divided? A large part of the literature focuses on defining an adequate labor market within which one could compare workers and assess their substitutability or complementarity with each other. What elements, exactly, define that labor market? Over time, the models have evolved with this question in mind.

A very basic labor economics model is the typical starting point to answering such a question and it turns out that several of the assumptions made in the model determine whether immigration brings a change in the labor market’s equilibrium wage and employment levels. The basic model assumes a labor market in which labor is homogeneous (all workers are substitutable) and capital is fixed (meaning it does not adjust to changes due to a shift in the labor market). Labor supply is also perfectly inelastic, meaning changes in wages have particularly little effect on employment levels. Because the labor demand curve is downward sloping, the shift of the labor supply curve to the right due to immigration brings the equilibrium wage down through competition in the labor market. In such a setting, there is a net surplus derived from immigration for the economy as a whole, but at the expense of a redistribution of income away from native-born labor and toward immigrant labor and capital owners. Native-born workers lose as they are substitutes for immigrants in this model. Such assumptions may not necessarily reflect reality. Labor and capital, for instance, may not turn out to be complementary. The aggregate supply of labor may react to changes in the equilibrium wage induced by immigration. Markets may, moreover, be less than perfectly competitive. And the returns to scale in production might not be constant, but increasing or decreasing. In fact, if

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we take the extreme case of a perfectly elastic demand curve – meaning changes in the equilibrium employment level have little impact on equilibrium wage levels – the previous predicted gain from immigration to the economy disappears. Economists experimented with these assumptions. What if capital were variable and not constant, like in a small open economy? The ratio between capital and labor in the host economy would, in this case, return to the level it was at prior to immigration and with this change, the wage would also resettle to what it had been. The immigration surplus in this case would be zero, since factor prices would remain unchanged. What if instead labor were made to be heterogenous and could be defined as being unskilled or skilled? In this case, the proportion of immigrants’ skills levels vs. those of native workers would determine whether wages are impacted. If the proportion is similar, the model predicts that wages would remain unchanged, even as the economy expands from an increase in labor. However, if they are different, the economy reacts by raising the wage for the less-abundant skill group, due to scarcity. For instance, if immigrants are primarily unskilled compared to the native-born labor force, the equilibrium wage of the skilled group would rise, while that of the unskilled would fall. In an open economy, the distribution of skills of the immigrant group must therefore be different from that of the native-born, in order for the destination country to benefit from the admission of immigrants. How can this be tested empirically? There are three main methods that have been developed and used to assess whether immigration empirically induces shifts in the labor market: the spatial correlation approach, which exploits differences in immigrant density across space; the production function method, which models a production function for the purpose of measuring the elasticity of a change in levels of one factor on the price of another; and the skill cell method, which measures the change in levels of workers within a defined skill cell on the wage of that cell in a national setting. The method of exploiting immigrant intensity over geographical space has been used in two

Labor-Market Shifts and Immigration

different ways. The first is through regression analysis, by measuring whether the varied intensity of immigration across a set of regions, in differences, lowers labor outcomes. The second method is the exploitation of a time series containing an unexpected and exogenous immigration “shock” and applying a difference-indifference model. Together, with the production function method, these types of empirical methods have yielded either very small or null impacts of immigration on labor outcomes of the native-born. The most famous and cited of these is the study of the Mariel Boatlift, which exploited the sudden influx of Cubans in Miami. The study concluded that the Miami labor market absorbed the influx of labor to a large extent, with little changes to the equibrium wage (Card 1990). Because nonimmigrants, including nativeborn workers and previous cohorts of immigrants, can react to an influx of labor (notably from internal migration) in a variety of ways, Borjas (2003) devised the skill cell method, which defines the national labor market, rather than a more localized one, as the relevant destination region. Substitutability between native-born workers and immigrants was tested by including individuals with similar education and experience levels within the same cell. Using this method, Borjas found a significant and negative impact from immigration on wages and hours worked in the USA from 1960 to 2000. However, more recent studies show that this result is sensitive to assumptions made on the substitutability between cells. Ottaviano and Peri (2008) make a number of changes to the model arguing that immigrants and native-born workers are not perfect substitutes. The basis of this claim is that quality of education (and of other skill learning activities), language and cultural differences combine to generate sufficient differences between the two groups to create imperfect substitution. What is important to account for are the interrelationships in production across different skill levels between the two groups. Expanding Borjas’ skill cell method, Ottaviano and Peri create specific cells for immigrant and native-born inputs and model the interrelationships between the cells and find that immigration actually

Labor-Market Shifts and Immigration

increases the equilibrium wage, as they complement each other. This highlights the fact that labor economics may not be capturing the whole picture and that the models need to encompass more of the dynamic created by an influx of immigration to an economy. High-skilled workers and owners of capital are likely to be complementary to low-skill immigration and are likely to gain from immigration (Johnson 1980). But the unemployment of low-skilled workers may also be a burden for higher-skilled workers, particularly if the tax system is progressive. Altonji and Card (1991) argued that models need to account for the fact that immigrants are also consumers in the host country. The point being, the more locally produced goods are consumed locally, the more downward pressure on wages is reduced. In general, the models often focus on the short term. However, as argued earlier, the labor market can adjust in several ways in the longer run, and not only because the skill ratios between immigrants and native-born workers are similar. The economy can also expand or reduce the diversity of products it produces (Dustmann et al. 2005). Economies can also adjust through the adaptation of technology. This can happen in two ways. First, capital owners can shift the type of technology they use to maximize profit from available labor. Second, they can delay the adoption of more advanced technology in the face of cheaper available labor. As patterns of migration and characteristics of immigrants are shifting, a number of new questions have risen. Some of these include whether the dynamics described above hold for lowincome countries as they do for higher income countries. In developing countries, informal labor markets are typically larger and borders more porous. How immigrants shift the labor market when they can more easily enter and leave the country, where labor markets are often more localized and workers are to a large extent outside of the formal reach of policy is an open question. Similarly, the distance between countries, duration in the country and whether migrants regularly migrate back and forth (circular

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migration) between the home and host country are also unanswered questions. Another question is how admission categories, such as labor, family, or humanitarian ones, affect the shift of immigration on the labor market. Such categories dictate immigrant status and to a large extent the labor market access granted to an immigrant. To this question, we could add how irregular immigrants affect such a shift and whether the impacts depend on whether immigrants arrive with their children or not.

Cross-References ▶ Admission Policy ▶ Employment-Based Immigration ▶ Family-Based Immigration ▶ Forced Migration: Global Trends and Explanations ▶ High-Skilled Migration ▶ Immigrant Entrepreneurs ▶ Labor Migration ▶ Labor Migration Policies: A Typology ▶ Legalization/Regularization ▶ Low-Skilled Migration ▶ Methods for Estimating International Migration ▶ Models of International Migration ▶ Reservation Wages and Immigrants ▶ Temporary Labor Migration ▶ Types of Immigrants (Stocks and Flows)

References Altonji J, Card D (1991) The effects of immigration on the labor market outcomes of less skilled natives. In: Abowd J, Freeman R (eds) Immigration, trade and the labor market. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, pp 201–234 Bodvarsson OB, Van den Berg H (2013) The economics of immigration: theory and policy. Springer Science and Business Media, New York Borjas G (2003) The labor demand curve is downward sloping: reexamining the impact of immigration on the labor market. Q J Econ 118:1335–1374 Borjas G (2014) Immigration economics. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA Card D (1990) The impact of the Mariel boatlift on the Miami labor market. Ind Labor Relat Rev 43:245–257

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Card D (2001) Immigrant inflows, native outflows, and the local labor market impacts of higher immigration. J Labor Econ 19:22–64 Dustmann C, Fabbri F, Preston I (2005) The impact of immigration on the British labor market. Econ J 115: F324–F341

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Johnson G (1980) The labor market effects of immigration. Ind Labor Relat Rev 33:331–341 Ottaviano I, Peri G (2008) Immigration and national wages: clarifying the theory and the empirics. NBER working paper 14188

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Trade Unions, Immigration, and Migrant Workers Judith Roosblad1, Stefania Marino2 and Rinus Penninx1 1 Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands 2 European Work and Employment Research Center (EWERC), Manchester Business School, University of Manchester, Manchester, UK

Definition The relationship between trade unions and migrant workers has been an area of increasing interest both in academic studies and within the trade union debate. Trade unions stances towards migrant workers are based on both their own ideological convictions, interests towards a potentially new component of their constituency, and on their role as labor market actors in the national regulatory framework. Penninx and Roosblad (2000) have posited three basic dilemmas that trade unions face regarding migrant workers: whether trade unions should resist or cooperate with government and employers in matters of immigration and (the recruitment of) migrant workers; whether settled migrants should be fully included in the trade union rank and file or be wholly or partly excluded from union representation; whether trade unions should devise

general policies for all workers or targeted policies to achieve material equality. The authors underline that even if trade unions can supersede these dilemmas in different countries and in different times, they cannot be completely solved. Instead, they tend to reemerge if contextual conditions change.

Trade Unions’ Stances on Immigration Trade unions’ stances towards immigration have varied considerably across time in relation to trade unions’ involvement in the national socioeconomic decision making and with the kind of immigration (Marino et al. 2015). Starting from the 1990s, trade unions in Northwest Europe have abandoned the past restrictive standpoint that had characterized their policies after the 1973 recruitment stop and, despite some differences, are generally in favor of immigration and free movement of labor. The new immigration countries of Southern Europe have been particularly active in lobbying against restrictive national immigration laws and have supported regularizations of undocumented migrants. These stances have been explained in terms of protecting the national workforce and national labor standards (Watts 2002). The same argument, namely protection of national workforce against a “race to the bottom” (Krings 2009), however, has led more recently to resistance against the free movement of labor in

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an enlarged Europe. Some West European trade unions, in fact, actively opposed the free movement of labor within the EU and, losing that battle, lobbied for maximal transitional arrangements after the 2004 and 2007 enlargements. Other scholars underline the risk of conflicts between eastern and western trade unions due to their diverging interests during the accession process (Meardi 2012). These examples show that, despite formal declarations of international solidarity, trade unions’ dominant frame of reference remains the national arena.

Trade Unions, Immigration, and Migrant Workers

unionization rate of native and migrant workers which varies substantially across countries (Gorodzeisky and Richards 2013). Less data are present on the involvement of migrant workers within the trade unions as workplace representatives, or within the trade union boards, but these numbers are generally considered low. Other indicators of inclusion such as the presence of migrants’ viewpoints within trade union general policies are not been sufficiently investigated.

Organizing Migrant Workers Migrants’ Inclusion in Trade Unions Unions may have a strategy of strict equal treatment of all members, often combined with union activity that restricts itself to work-related issues. In such cases, migrant workers’ specific needs and problems are not taken into account which may lead to unequal outcomes. Alternatively, unions may decide to install specific measures for migrant workers in order to promote material equality. This activity may meet with resistance from native members. Special measures may vary from weak services such as language and translation provisions, to strong, such as specific training and learning facilities as in the United Kingdom (Martinez Lucio and Perrett 2009) or the provision of services for the defense of migrant citizenship rights as in the case of Italy and Spain (Cachón and Valles 2003; Marino 2012). Nearly all trade unions that have a significant migrant membership have some basic specific facilities for the representation of migrant workers (such as special bodies for migrant workers). These bodies, however, tend to be of a top-down nature, while more rare have been the attempts to support migrant self-organizing within the trade with the aim of promoting their influence on the union general policies (Penninx and Roosblad 2000). Comparing unionization rates of migrant workers cross-nationally, the first and foremost conclusion is that membership of migrants reflects general membership levels (Penninx and Roosblad 2000). Within national contexts, however, there is on average a gap between the

Trade unions have also promoted organizing of migrant workers (among other underrepresented groups) as a strategy for their revitalization. Organizing campaigns have been particularly successful in the United States, where they have helped to reconnect the labor movement with its rank and file (Milkman 2006). In Europe, organizing has been implemented in several countries such as the United Kingdom (Holgate 2005), France, and the Netherlands. Some of these campaigns have been successful in gaining better conditions for the workers involved, such as the campaign for a living wage for cleaners in London or the Dutch cleaners’ campaign which profited from coalitions between trade unions and community and other associations. However, the extent to which these strategies have promoted effective and full inclusion of migrant workers in union remains uncertain. Turner et al. (2013) point to common strategies across countries that offer promise for successful migrant mobilization.

Explaining Differences across Countries Differences in the propensity to include migrants have been linked to a variety of explanatory factors. Penninx and Roosblad (2000) had found that variables such as the power position of the trade unions, economic and labor market conditions, and the context of the society as a whole, its institutions, legislation, national ideologies, and public discourse were fundamental in explaining trade union choices. Instead, the characteristics of

Trade Unions, Immigration, and Migrant Workers

the migrants themselves were less influential. More recent research has further stressed the influence of labor market regulations (Marino 2012; Gorodzeisky and Richards 2013), the national political discourse (Wrench 2004), as well as the influence of sectoral dynamics, EU regulation, and the agency of individual trade unions to explain differences across countries (Hardy et al. 2012).

Cross-References ▶ Employment-Based Immigration ▶ Guest Workers ▶ Labor Migration Policies: A Typology ▶ Labor-Market Shifts and Immigration ▶ Labor Migration by Sinning ▶ Temporary Labor Migration

References Cachón L, Valles MS (2003) Trade unionism and immigration: reinterpreting old and new dilemmas. Tran: Eur Rev Labour Res 9(3):469–482 Gorodzeisky A, Richards A (2013) Trade unions and migrant workers in Western Europe. Eur J Ind Relat 19(3):239–254 Hardy J, Eldring L, Schulten T (2012) Trade unions responses to migrant workers from the ‘new Europe’: a three-sector comparison in the UK, Norway and Germany. Eur J Ind Relat 18(4):347–363

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Holgate J (2005) Organising migrant workers: a case study of working conditions and unionisation at a sandwich factory in London. Work Employ Soc 19(3):463–480 Krings T (2009) A race to the bottom? Trade unions, EU enlargement and the free movement of labour. Eur J Ind Relat 15(1):49–69 Marino S (2012) Trade union inclusion of migrant and ethnic minority workers: comparing Italy and the Netherlands. Eur J Ind Relat 18(1):5–20 Marino S, Penninx R, Roosblad J (2015) Trade unions, immigration and immigrants in Europe revisited: unions’ attitudes and actions under new conditions. Comp Migr Stud 3(1):1–16 Martinez Lucio M, Perrett R (2009) The diversity and politics of trade unions’ responses to minority ethnic and migrant workers: the context of the UK. Econ Ind Democr 30(3):324–347 Meardi G (2012) Union immobility? Trade unions and the freedoms of movement in the enlarged EU. Br J Ind Relat 50(1):99–120 Milkman R (2006) LA story: immigrant workers and the future of the US labor movement. Russell Sage Foundation, New York Penninx R, Roosblad J (eds) (2000) Trade unions, immigration, and immigrants in Europe, 1960–1993: a comparative study of the attitudes and actions of trade unions in seven west European countries. Berghahn Books, New York/Oxford Turner L, Tapia M, Adler L (eds) (2013) Mobilizing against inequality: unions, immigrant workers, and the crisis of capitalism. ILR Press, Cornell Watts J (2002) Immigration policy and the challenge of globalization: unions and employers in unlikely alliance. Cornell University Press, Ithaca Wrench J (2004) Trade union responses to immigrants and ethnic inequality in Denmark and the UK: the context of consensus and conflict. Eur J Ind Relat 10(1):7–30

Part 7: Legalization and Citizenship of Immigrants

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Dual/Multiple Citizenship Sara Wallace Goodman University of California Irvine, Irvine, CA, USA

Definition Dual/multiple citizenship enables a person to hold full membership – conveying rights, access, and obligations – in two or more countries. A person may have a claim to dual citizenship by any number of circumstances: they may inherent citizenship from one or more parents, they may obtain citizenship through jus soli (birth in a territory, e.g., the United States recognizes all persons born in the country as citizens regardless of parental status), they may gain eligibility through ancestral claims (Israel, e.g., allows any Jewish immigrant to claim citizenship without renouncing other nationalities), they may gain a new citizenship through the process of naturalization, or they may acquire it through other means (e.g., through marriage).

Detailed Description Dual citizenship is often at the center of vigorous political debate, both internally among political parties and across borders between the conferring and sending states. On the one hand, allowing

citizens to hold multiple passports provides increased mobility and enables expatriates to maintain connections with their country of birth or heritage. Dual citizenship can also facilitate integration by encouraging immigrants to naturalize and participate politically in their new country without compromising other connections. According to this view, compulsory renunciation of prior citizenship(s) may not only stymie migrants’ personal integration but also generate a disincentive to citizenship acquisition altogether. On the other hand, critics of dual citizenship claim that it undercuts immigrant integration and that, in maintaining a second citizenship or identity, immigrants are never fully moored to their country of residence. Dual citizenship raises not only the specter of dual – and potentially divided – loyalty but it is also believed to create conflicts between states regarding an imbalanced distribution of the benefits and burdens of citizenship, as dual citizens could enjoy multiple rights and benefits (such as social benefits) or face multiple duties (such as military service) compared to mono-nationals. States also may take different positions on whether to allow dual citizenship for an immigrant naturalizing into the host society (as is the focus of this entry) compared to whether they allow expatriate citizens to maintain citizenship if they naturalize elsewhere. Politics are even further amplified when considering the implications not merely of dual nationality but multiple citizenships.

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Dual citizenship is widely accepted across many advanced democracies. Indeed, there has been a recent wave of change in the past couple of decades whereby more and more European states have begun to adopt dual citizenship laws for immigrants (Faist 2007; Sejersen 2008). Italy abolished a requirement that immigrants naturalizing as Italians renounce a previous citizenship in 1992, and other countries that have recently removed renunciation requirements include Sweden (2001), Finland (2003), and, most recently, Luxembourg (2008). These states join other Western European countries as well as the postcolonial traditional countries of immigration (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United States (While the United States maintains allowance for multiple citizenship de facto, naturalizing citizens formally swear to “absolutely and entirely renounce and abjure all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty, of whom or which I have heretofore been a subject or citizen” during the Naturalization Oath of Allegiance.)), which all tolerate dual citizenship. The following table identifies these states in the right-hand column as states that do not require renunciation as a condition for naturalization. (For a full discussion and where this table originally appears, see Goodman 2010.) This table pertains to the rules of dual citizenship for naturalizing immigrants; policies for nativeborn citizens who naturalize abroad may differ. Renunciation of Prior Citizenship as a Requirement for Naturalization Renunciation requirement Yes Postcolonial

No Australia Canada New Zealand United States

European union Austria Bulgaria Czech Republic Denmark

Belgium Cyprus Finland (2003) France (continued)

Estonia Germanya Latvia Lithuania Netherlandsb Polandc Sloveniad Spaine

Non-EU Croatia Moldova (2002) Norway

Greece Hungary Ireland Italy (1992) Luxembourg (2008) Malta Portugal Romania Slovakia Sweden (2001) United Kingdom Iceland Switzerland Turkey

a

Not for citizens of other EU member states (since 2007) Not between 1992 and 1997. After 1997, exemption for persons born in the Netherlands and for spouses of Dutch citizens c In practice, renunciation is requested discretionarily and performed in low numbers d Not for citizens of other EU member states where there is reciprocity e In practice, no evidence of renunciation is required b

This table also illustrates two additional patterns of interest. First, there remain a number of significant holdouts to the liberalizing trend of tolerating multiple citizenships. Austria and Denmark, as well as a majority of recent European Union accession countries, have firm requirements for renunciation. In the Netherlands, after a period of allowing dual citizenship (1992–1997), dual citizenship can now only be claimed by those applicants born in the Netherlands or by spouses married to Dutch citizens. The second trend this table indicates is that while a number of states maintain a renunciation requirement de jure, practices produce a de facto toleration of multiple citizenships. The many asterisks that appear next to country names in the left-hand column indicate some of these exceptions to the rule. Effective enforcement of renunciation exists in countries like Austria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Germany (with the exception of citizens of other EU member states), and the Netherlands (except for persons born in the Netherlands and spouses of Dutch citizens). In Spain, however, while persons

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granted citizenship need to declare renunciation of a prior citizenship, they do not need to deliver any proof that they have actually lost another citizenship, and no request for information or for evidence is sent to the country of the presumptively renounced citizenship. In Poland, persons granted citizenship are formally required to renounce a previous citizenship, but this is applied in a discretionary manner and, as a result, a high percentage of persons become dual citizens through naturalization. There are also exceptions practiced when renunciation is deemed unreasonable. The extent to which exceptions are granted in countries like Austria, Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands, for example, is based on the fee that candidates need to pay in their country of origin to be released from their previous citizenship, which varies from country to country. As a rule, renunciation is normally not required when this is not possible (as is the case, e.g., for citizens from most Arab countries). Also, for reasons of practical impossibility or unreasonable burdens, a number of countries make explicit exceptions to the renunciation requirement for refugees. Why do some states allow for dual citizenship while others do not? In some cases, countries have different historical interpretations of citizenship, which have led to particular bureaucratic practices and political debates in a pathdependent way (Faist et al. 2004; Howard 2009). Greece, Italy, and Hungary are often seen as more restrictive countries of immigration, but they have relatively liberal dual citizenship practices because they are historic nations of emigration. Sometimes the politics of dual citizenship hinges on the composition and political strength of immigrant populations within the country or co-ethnic communities living abroad. Thus, in the cases of Hungary, Greece, and Italy, dual citizenship is a strategy for keeping expatriates and co-ethnics living abroad connected to homeland identity. Spain is an exception to this rule, but allows for an easier, facilitated naturalization among co-ethnics from Spanish-speaking countries. Other countries that tolerate dual

citizenship do so as an instrument for promoting immigrant integration within traditionally inclusive conceptions of citizenship, such as in Belgium, France, and the United Kingdom. Beyond the question of whether or not states allow for immigrants to obtain dual citizenship, a second question is whether immigrants decide to take up multiple citizenships. Laws might make or allow people to hold multiple citizenships due to birth, heritage, marriage, or naturalization, but not everyone knows that they have the legal ability to hold dual citizenship or identify unique incentives for seeking out multiple passports. A study of naturalized immigrants in Canada in the 1990s Bloemraad (2004) showed that while reports of dual citizenship had tripled from 1981 to 1996, only 17 % reported multiple nationality (Bloemraad 2004). Immigrants born in countries that allowed multiple citizenship and who were naturalized Canadian citizens were, in the eyes of the law, dual citizens, but in every case but Switzerland, less than half of immigrants acknowledged their dual citizenship status. This brief overview of dual citizenship policies reveals patterns of both convergence toward toleration and continued divergence with regard to requiring renunciation of prior citizenship by a certain group or by all outsiders. Though many states that require renunciation by law do not adhere to this stricture, a number of European states continue to limit dual citizenship. The salience of the politics of dual citizenship only reaffirms the continued relevance of political belonging and national membership through citizenship in an age of migration, mobility, and diversity.

References Bloemraad I (2004) Who claims dual citizenship? The limits of postnationalism, the possibilities of transnationalism, and the persistence of traditional citizenship. Int Migr Rev: IMR 38(2):389 Faist T (2007) Dual citizenship in Europe: from nationhood to societal integration. Ashgate, Burlington Faist T, Gerdes J, Rieple B (2004) Dual citizenship as a path-dependent process. Int Migr Rev 38(3):913–944

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Goodman SW (2010) Naturalisation policies in Europe: exploring patterns of inclusion and exclusion. In: EUDO citizenship comparative reports. Florence: EUDO Citizenship, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, EUI

Dual/Multiple Citizenship

Howard MM (2009) The politics of citizenship in Europe. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Sejersen TB (2008) “I Vow to Thee My Countries” – the expansion of dual citizenship in the 21st century. Int Migr Rev 42(3):523–549

N

Naturalization Sara Wallace Goodman University of California Irvine, Irvine, CA, USA

Definition Naturalization is the primary process by which immigrants become citizens in a host society. It is defined as any acquisition after birth of a citizenship not previously held by a person and requires an application and decision by public authorities. While there are many procedures for obtaining citizenship (e.g., registration, declaration, automatic, and other ex lege procedures), naturalization is the most visible because of its connection to immigration policy and its regulatory effect on the size and composition of the national political community. In fact, naturalization is the most densely regulated and most politicized aspect of citizenship law. Its application ranges from ordinary, residence-based immigrants to refugees, spouses, as well as minors. The material and procedural conditions that comprise this journey can make acquisition either a liberal, relatively easy progression from settlement to citizenship or a restrictive, onerous process full of impediments that may not lead to citizenship at all. Detailed Description Conceptually, naturalization is understood as a transformative process whereby an immigrant,

or more generally someone outside of the national political community, “becomes natural” by becoming a full member of that community through citizenship acquisition. However, “naturalization” is a paradoxical expression; there is nothing “natural” about this process of membership acquisition. This contradiction is immediately visible when adopting a legal perspective, where the process of naturalization requires legal regulation. In this latter context, naturalization is the process of acquisition where a person applies for citizenship to the state represented by relevant public authorities. This emphasis on the aspiring citizen’s process of application is key. Unlike other procedures which require only a unilateral act of oral or written declaration, naturalization is conditional on a decision by relevant public authorities. In other words, applicants cannot merely declare themselves to be citizens; their applications are subject to conditions and evaluations. Acquisition through naturalization can either be a legal entitlement, by which public authorities must grant citizenship to the applicant if and when the relevant conditions specified by law have been acknowledged as being successfully completed, or a discretionary act. Discretionary naturalization is obviously the more precarious and contingent of the two types, where even upon successful completion of relevant conditions, public authorities reserve for themselves the right to deny citizenship to an applicant. In both cases, naturalization is conditional in the sense that it requires an individual

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Naturalization, Table 1 Comparison of naturalization policies across postcolonial and European states

Country Europe Austria

Residence duration (years)

Allows dual citizenship

Language

Citizenship test

Administrative fee

Right of appeal

10

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Denmark

9

No

Yes

Yes

France

5

Yes

Yes

Yes

Germany

8

Yes

€255

Yes

Netherlands

5

Yes

Yes

€810

Yes

UK

5

Only for non-EU citizens If born in the Netherlands or have Dutch spouse Yes

No, assimilation interview Yes

€1010 plus provincial fees 1000 DKK (€133) None

Yes

Yes

£851 GBP (€1018)

No

Postcolonial Australia

4

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

3 (1,095 days) in the past 4 5

Yes

Yes

Yes

300 AUD ($316 USD) 200 CAD ($203 USD)

Yes

Yes

No

5

Yes

Yes

Yes

Canada

New Zealand United States

action by the applicant as well as a positive response by public authorities. Naturalization allows immigrants not only to enjoy formal rights and protections through the legal status of citizenship but also to become members of a national political community through citizenship status. Therefore, it holds strong significance for both the receiving state and the aspiring citizen. From the state’s perspective, naturalization enables people to join and therefore expand the national political community. Changes to citizenship rules – either the loosening or tightening of them – yield a direct effect on the contours of national membership. From the immigrant’s perspective, naturalization in most states is still the key to full rights of citizenship. Citizenship matters for a number of reasons, including obtaining voting rights and other forms of political participation, access to

470 NZD ($395 USD) $680 USD

No

Yes, but not of federal decisions Yes Yes

certain job opportunities, free movement, rights to family unification, etc. Also, because citizenship represents full membership to the state, immigrants may aspire to achieve a sense of civic belonging through naturalization. The discipline of identifying, comparing, and explaining citizenship policies across advanced industrialized states is a growing preoccupation among scholars of political science, sociology, and legal studies. In its formative stage, this academic practice drew heavily from the nationalism literature and concepts of nationhood. (For an example of this, see Brubaker (1992).) This rendered a classificatory system of citizenship policy that was largely dichotomous, referring to state policies as either ethnic or civic. More recent works have presented alternatives to this nationhood framework by employing more membership-neutral terminology where policies

Naturalization

are described not by invoking a sense of belonging or by their outcome but by the process itself. These works include the constellation of both policies and practices that determine citizenship acquisition. (Work illustrative of this approach includes Baubo¨ck et al. (2006); Bloemraad (2006), Howard (2009), also see Koopmans et al. (2005).) Many of the fine-grained descriptions and nuanced comparisons of citizenship today rely on a closer look at the mechanics of naturalization, recognizing that the process is a complex aggregate, comprised of many small policies and procedures. These polices include, but are not limited to, residency duration, renunciation of previous citizenship, clean criminal records, evidence of integration (defined by language acquisition, knowledge of the country, demonstration of values, etc.), sufficient income, as well as procedures such as processing time, administrative fees, and process/right of appeal, all of which affect the ultimate experience and rate of naturalization. In comparing these different policy dimensions across the major, immigrant-receiving societies, we see significant variation, portending differences in both the priorities of and pressures for inclusion. Table 1 compares a handful of naturalization policies – both material and procedural – for a select number of traditional immigration countries (the “postcolonial” states) and European states, who have only transitioned into robust immigrant-receiver states in the postwar period. (For more on policies of naturalization in Europe, see the EUDO Citizenship Observatory website eudo-citizenship.eu. For more in-depth comparisons on polices across a larger number of European countries, see in particular Goodman (2010), RSCAS/EDUO-CITComp. 2010/7.) Beginning with residence, states exhibit a significant amount of difference in the duration of residence required of potential citizens. At a maximum level, Article 6 of the 1997 European Convention on Nationality (ECN) stipulates that no more than 10 years of residence should be required. At a minimum, Belgium has required 3 years of residence since a 2000 revision to its citizenship law (a 2012 change may raise this

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period to 5 years). No other state in Europe maintains residence durations lower than 5 years. By comparison, all postcolonial states boast low durations of residence. Moreover, it should be noted that the length of residence condition in citizenship law does not mean that every immigrant who has lived in a country for so many years can apply for naturalization. Many countries create additional hurdles by requiring periods of uninterrupted residence or only counting the years with a permanent residence permit, which may itself take up to 5 years to acquire in a number of European states (as is the case in Austria). Dual citizenship is a dimension of naturalization that is often at the center of vigorous political debate, both internally among political parties and across borders between the conferring and sending states. On the one hand, allowing citizens to hold multiple passports provides increased mobility and enables expatriates to maintain connections with their country of birth or heritage (as was vociferously advocated by former President Vicente Fox on behalf of Mexicans living in the United States). Dual citizenship can also facilitate integration by encouraging immigrants to naturalize and participate politically in their new country without compromising other connections. According to this view, compulsory renunciation may not only stymie one’s personal integration but also generate a disincentive to citizenship acquisition altogether. On the other hand, critics of dual citizenship claim also that it undercuts immigrant integration. In maintaining a second citizenship or identity, immigrants are never fully moored to their host country. Dual citizenship raises not only the specter of dual loyalty but is also said to create conflicts between states or an unfair distribution of the benefits and burdens of citizenship because of the multiple rights or multiple duties that dual citizens have compared to mono-nationals. In the sample of countries in the table above, all of the traditional immigration countries allow for dual citizenship. The United States does not have a de jure provision requiring renunciation of other citizenship and therefore establishes multiple citizenship de facto. Within Europe, only Austria and Denmark

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have firm requirements for renunciation. In the Netherlands, after a period of allowing dual citizenship (1992–1997), dual citizenship can still be claimed by those applicants born in the Netherlands or by spouses married to Dutch citizens. Language and citizenship tests can be categorized together as types of integration or cultural requirements for naturalization. While language has long been a requirement for citizenship in several states in Europe and beyond (Denmark since the nineteenth century; the United States since the early twentieth), the introduction of citizenship tests to assess country knowledge is a new facet of naturalization in many states. Indeed, only the United States and Canada could be considered experienced practitioners of citizenship tests by comparison. Every European state in Table 1 has only recently introduced a citizenship test (as well as integration tests for acquisition for permanent residence). (For more on integration requirements in Europe, see Goodman (2012).) Australia also is a recent addition to the list of test givers. However, not all states use citizenship tests to assess integration or knowledge. France, for example, has long maintained an assimilation interview in which the interviewing officer assesses an applicant’s adherence to Republican values as well as knowledge of social and political rights. While former President Nicolas Sarkozy passed legislation introducing a citizenship test for naturalization in France, plans were subsequently scrapped by the new Socialist government. Attempts to increase the period of residence and make more onerous other conditions for British citizenship (like adding a community service requirement) under Labour leadership were also rejected when the new Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition came into power. These attempts at policy change reveal the extent to which citizenship is often politicized and thus susceptible to revision with changes of government. Finally, it is meaningful to consider and compare variation in administrative practices for naturalization. Most obviously, the “price” of citizenship is quite divergent across states. Where administrative fees are high, naturalization is not only lengthy and difficult but also

Naturalization

costly. And considering that applicants’ decision to apply is strongly influenced by their expected chances of success, administrative fees factor into this decision-making process. Only in Germany and the Netherlands, from the list of European states above, is naturalization an entitlement (instead of a discretionary procedure) if an applicant satisfies all the conditions. In general, there is an acknowledged norm to allow for a right of appeal in response to a negative decision on an application. Exceptions to this include Denmark (an applicant can make a report to the ombudsmen, but not appeal the decision of Parliament) and the United Kingdom (which allows for judicial review since 2002 and appeal for asylum cases, but not on matters of naturalization). This brief overview of naturalization policies reveals patterns of both similarity and difference. Generally speaking, some states provide for a more facilitated naturalization process through more inclusive policies while others maintain higher barriers that impede a migrant’s political incorporation. An accurate empirical picture of naturalization policies identifies configurations and constellations of policies, recognizing that state practices are not dichotomously ethnic or civic or inclusive or exclusive. Policy combinations reflect a reality in which states pursue multiple policy goals for citizenship and immigration through naturalization, and governments frequently modify and reform citizenship laws to achieve these goals. As states continue to use naturalization to make citizens out of immigrants, the many policy choices that shape this procedure are consequential not just for the migrant but for the democratic nation-state itself.

References Baubo¨ck R, Ersbøll E, Groenendijk K, Waldrauch H (2006) Acquisition and loss of nationality. volume 1: comparative analysis. Policies and trends in 15 European Countries, vol 1. Amsterdam University Press, Amsterdam Bloemraad I (2006) Becoming a citizen: incorporating immigrants and refugees in the United States and Canada. University of California Press, Berkeley Brubaker R (1992) Citizenship and nationhood in France and Germany. Harvard University Press, Cambridge

Naturalization

Goodman, SW (2010) Naturalisation policies in Europe: exploring patterns of inclusion and exclusion.” In: EUDO citizenship comparative reports. EUDO Citizenship, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, EUI, Florence Goodman SW (2012) Fortifying citizenship: policy strategies for civic integration in Western Europe. World Polit 64(4):659–698

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Howard MM (2009) The politics of citizenship in Europe. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, New York Koopmans R, Statham P, Giugni M, Passy F (2005) Contested citizenship: immigration and cultural diversity in Europe. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis

Part 8: Measurements of Internal and International Migration

A

Age, Period, and Cohort Effects Claire E. Altman University of Missouri, Columbia, Missouri, USA

Definition Age effects refer to variation in life course experiences due to chronological age (e.g., an immigrant’s age upon arrival). Period effects are experienced by all groups in the population regardless of age (e.g., national immigration policies). Cohort effects include social and historical changes affecting a specific group with a shared event (e.g., immigration).

Detailed Description In 1965, Norman Ryder wrote about the cohort as a critical demographic element of social change and began to lay out the process for untangling the differences between cohort, age effects, and period effects. In doing so, he established an important approach for distinguishing changes experienced by a population or those experienced by a specific group. These approaches are still employed today by demographers and sociologists studying a range of events including immigration. We begin by discussing period, cohort, and age effects generally and then discuss how

they complicate our understanding of immigrant integration by providing empirical examples from published research. Period effects are defined as changes occurring over time experienced by all groups in the population regardless of age (Ryder 1965; Yang and Land 2008). Broad historical, social, cultural, or environmental changes such as wars and technological advances that affect all members of a society at a particular moment are considered period effects. Cohorts, in contrast, are defined by a common initial experience or event such as birth, marriage, migration, etc. Cohort effects include social and historical changes affecting a specific group with a shared initial event (Reither et al. 2009; Ryder 1965; Yang and Land 2008). Cohorts share a social history during the same historical time period (Alwin et al. 2006). Age effects denote “the variation associated with different age groups brought about by psychological changes, accumulation of social experience, and/or role or status changes” (Yang and Land 2008, p. 298). In other words age effects refer to a birth cohort moving through the life course because the biographical time of an individual or cohort is embedded in historical time. In thinking about immigrant incorporation, period, cohort, and age effects play important roles. For instance, migration to the USA has varied drastically during the last century. During the early twentieth century, the majority of migrants originated from Southern and Eastern Europe. The passage of the Immigration and

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 F. D. Bean, S. K. Brown (eds.), Selected Topics in Migration Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-19631-7_33

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Nationality Act of 1965, which served to eliminate national-origin quotas, resulted in larger flows of migrants from Latin America and Asia. Currently, the largest migration stream is from Mexico to the USA which has grown substantially since the 1970s (Durand et al. 2001). Period changes in geographic origin of immigrants have altered the size and composition of the US population and context of reception, as millions of nonwhite immigrants moving to the United States may now have difficulty integrating (Portes and Zhou 1993; Telles and Ortiz 2008). Furthermore, period changes in the US economic structure have served to bifurcate the economy which may limit the economic mobility and integration of immigrants (Foner 2000; Park and Myers 2010). Cohort effects on immigrant integration often refer to the arrival of a group of immigrants, regardless of the time period or their age at arrival. For instance, a cohort may include immigrants of any age arriving to the USA between 1987 and 1997. Recent research suggests that recent cohorts of immigrants are more racially and ethnically diverse than previous cohorts (Alba and Nee 2003; Bean and Stevens 2003; Park and Myers 2010; Portes and Rumbaut 2006). They are also more diverse in terms of education, earnings potential, occupation, language ability, and legal status. These factors may serve to propel or impede their integration. In terms of education differences, more recent cohorts of immigrants have slightly higher attainment than earlier cohorts, but compared to natives, recent cohorts have become less well educated (Betts and Lofstrom 2000). However, there is substantial variation by country of birth and period of immigration on years of schooling attained (Chiswick 1986). As a related point, recent cohorts of immigrants earn a smaller percentage of the median earnings of native males. For instance, the 1965–1969 immigrant entry cohort earned 65 % of the median earnings, the 1975–1979 immigrant entry cohort earned 50 %, and the 1985–1989 immigrant entry cohort earned only 41 % (Duleep and Regets 1999). Immigrant cohorts also vary in their occupational distributions. Among immigrants with children, a

Age, Period, and Cohort Effects

larger percentage of earlier cohorts of immigrants occupied professional or technical occupations compared to more recent entry cohorts (e.g., 32 % of immigrants arriving before 1965 were in professional occupations compared to 21.6 % of immigrants arriving between 1985 and 1990). Furthermore, more recent cohorts of immigrants work in service, farm, craft, or laborer occupations (Jensen and Chitose 1994). The increasing diversity of immigrants has increased the likelihood that recent cohorts of immigrants speak languages other than English. Carliner found an important cohort effect in language ability among immigrants: immigrants arriving since 1950 are less likely to be English language proficient (2000). Moreover, evidence from the 1990 Census found that recent cohorts of immigrants were less likely to speak English exclusively and more likely to speak Spanish or an Asian language (Jensen and Chitose 1994). Finally, two other cohort effects play a role in immigrant integration: legal status and selectivity. Larger shares of recent immigrant cohorts have unauthorized legal status compared to earlier cohorts (Durand et al. 2001). As migration has spread through community networks, recent cohorts are less positively selected (Durand et al. 2001; Feliciano 2005). An immigrant’s age at migration, also thought of as age effects, may have implications for their integration. Age at arrival denotes which life cycle stage an immigrant was in upon arrival (Myers et al. 2009; Piore 2011). In the immigration literature, these age effects are often used to distinguish among the foreign born or those in the first generation. Age at arrival is used to further distinguish the 1.5 generation (who arrived before age 12 or 15) from adult, first-generation immigrants (Rumbaut 1991). Immigrants arriving at younger ages spend a larger portion of their childhood and adolescence being socialized in the USA and may have outcomes similar to native-born children. Thus, age effects may have bearing on an immigrant’s language ability or acquisition, schooling, and other socioeconomic indicators of integration. Immigrants that arrive at older ages are less likely to speak English well than younger arrivals (Carliner

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2000; Stevens 2004). Mexican immigrants who arrive as children are more likely to be English proficient in adulthood than teenage/late adolescent arrivals (Myers et al. 2009). Further, those who migrate as teenagers have fewer completed years of schooling compared to those who migrated before or after teenage years (Chiswick and DebBurman 2004; Myers et al. 2009). Finally, child migrants earn higher wages as adults than migrants who moved at older ages (Bleakley and Chin 2004). Higher educational attainment and English proficiency mediate this earnings gap. Overall, the findings suggest that earlier age at arrival may lead to increased integration (Myers et al. 2009). In sum, period, cohort, and age effects play important roles in the immigrant integration process. However, distinguishing between cohort, aging, and period effects remains an empirical challenge since they are intertwined. The boundary of each effect blurs into the next effect; “The cohort record is not merely a summation of a set of individual histories. Each cohort has a distinctive composition and character reflecting the circumstances of its unique organization and history” (Ryder 1965, p. 845). In practical terms, one cannot include age, period, and cohort effects in a multivariate model because they are completely collinear. For example, for nonimmigrant populations, age is a function of birth cohort and time period. For immigrants, the situation is more complicated because more time scales are involved: the time since birth (indicating age) and the time since migration (indicating duration of residence). Thus the collinearity problem is magnified; for example, duration of residence for a particular immigrant entry cohort in a given year is a function of current age and age at migration. Some researchers have attempted to follow immigrant cohorts as they concurrently increase in age and duration of residence in the USA with the “generational cohort method” (Myers and Lee 1998; Park and Myers 2010). This method involves (1) pooling multiple cross-sectional surveys and (2) estimating the effects of multiple interaction terms among time period, age or birth cohort, and period of entry. Another approach involves

specifying one of the three effects (age, period, or cohort) as a random effect while treating the other two as fixed effects in a multilevel model (Yang et al. 2004). This approach has been used to simultaneously estimate age, period, and cohort effects for general populations, but to my knowledge has not yet been applied to immigrant integration. To date, the debate on how to best estimate age, period, and cohort effects is ongoing as evidenced by a scholarly exchange on the challenges of identifying age, period, and cohort effects in a 2013 issue of Demography (Tolnay 2013).

References Alba R, Nee V (2003) Remaking the American mainstream: assimilation and contemporary immigration. Harvard University Press, Cambridge Alwin DF, McCammon RJ, Hofer SM (2006) Studying baby boom cohorts within a demographic and developmental context: conceptual and methodological issues. In: Whitbourne SKE, Willis SL (eds) The baby boomers grow up: contemporary perspectives on midlife. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers, Mahwah Bean F, Stevens G (2003) America’s newcomers and the dynamics of diversity. Russell Sage, New York Betts JR, Lofstrom M (2000) The educational attainment of immigrants: trends and implications. In: Borjas GJ (ed) Issues in the economics of immigration. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, pp 51–116 Bleakley H, Chin A (2004) Language skills and earnings: evidence from childhood immigrants*. Rev Econ Stat 86:481–496 Carliner G (2000) The language ability of U.S. immigrants: assimilation and cohort effects. Int Migr Rev 34:158–182 Chiswick BR (1986) Is the new immigration less skilled than the old? J Labor Econ 4:168–192 Chiswick BR, DebBurman N (2004) Educational attainment: analysis by immigrant generation. Econ Educ Rev 23:361–379 Duleep HO, Regets MC (1999) Immigrants and human capital investment. Am Econ Rev 89:186–191 Durand J, Massey DS, Zenteno RM (2001) Mexican immigration to the United States: continuities and changes. Lat Am Res Rev 36:107–127 Feliciano C (2005) Does selective migration matter? Explaining ethnic disparities in educational attainment among immigrants’ children. Int Migr Rev 39:841–871 Foner N (2000) From Ellis Island to JFK: New York’s two great waves of immigration. Russell Sage, New York

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Jensen L, Yoshimi C (1994) Today’s second generation: evidence from the 1990 US census. Int Migr Rev 28:714–735 Myers D, Seong Woo L (1998) Immigrant trajectories into homeownership: a temporal analysis of residential assimilation. Int Migr Rev 32:593–625 Myers D, Gao X, Emeka A (2009) The gradient of immigrant age-at-arrival effects on socioeconomic outcomes in the US. Int Migr Rev 43:205–229 Park J, Myers D (2010) Intergenerational mobility in the post-1965 immigration era: estimates by an immigrant generation cohort method. Demography 47:369–392 Piore MJ (2011) Birds of passage. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Portes A, Rumbaut RG (2006) Immigrant America: a portrait. University of California Press, Berkeley Portes A, Zhou M (1993) The new second generation: segmented assimilation and its variants. Ann Am Acad Pol Soc Sci 530:74–96 Reither EN, Hauser RM, Yang Y (2009) Do birth cohorts matter? Age-period-cohort analyses of the obesity epidemic in the United States. Soc Sci Med 69:1439–1448

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Rumbaut RG (1991) The agony of exile: a study of the migration and adaptation of Indochinese refugee adults and children. In: Ahearn FL, Athey JL (eds) Refugee children: theory, research, and services. Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, pp 53–91 Ryder NB (1965) The cohort as a concept in the study of social change. Am Sociol Rev 30:843–861 Stevens G (2004) Using census data to test the criticalperiod hypothesis for second-language acquisition. Psychol Sci 15:215–216 Telles EE, Ortiz V (2008) Generations of exclusion. Russell Sage, New York Tolnay S (2013) Editor’s note. Demography 50:1943–1944 Yang Y, Land KC (2008) Age–period–cohort analysis of repeated cross-section surveys: fixed or random effects? Sociol Methods Res 36:297–326 Yang Y, Fu WJ, Land KC (2004) A methodological comparison of age-period-cohort models: the intrinsic estimator and conventional generalized linear models. Sociol Methodol 34:75–110

D

Dual-System Estimation Patrick J. Cantwell U.S. Census Bureau, Suitland, MD, USA

Definition Dual-system estimation is a statistical method, based on the capture-recapture technique, applied to estimate the size of a population of people, animals, farms, etc. One enumerates the units of interest independently in two separate frames and observes how many are found in each frame and in both frames. Under appropriate conditions, an estimate of the number missed – and thus an estimate of the size of the total population – can be calculated.

Concept and Use Dual-system estimation (DSE) is a statistical procedure used to estimate the size of a population. It is based on an approach, often referred to as “capture-recapture” or “mark and recapture,” long used to measure the number of wildlife in a region or setting (Petersen 1896; Lincoln 1930; Sekar and Deming 1949). In recent decades, DSE has been one of several methods applied to evaluate the quality of a national census by estimating the actual number of people in a country (demographic analysis is another; see Devine

et al. 2012). The name refers to the two frames or populations from which all or a sample of units (people, wildlife, farms) are selected for enumeration. Under specified conditions and assumptions, by comparing the enumerations between frames and noting whether the units were captured in both enumerations, one can estimate the size of the total population. The net coverage error of the census can then be defined as the difference between the estimated population size and the census count. If the census count is smaller than the estimated size, the difference is labeled as the estimated net undercount in the census. With a net overcount, the census count is larger than the estimated size. As noted, one can apply DSE to estimate the size of the total population. However, one of its strengths is that it can also be used to estimate the size of demographic subgroups or geographic subdomains. Since 1990, the US Census Bureau has conducted a survey following its census of population and housing and applied DSE to assess the quality of the census. The Census Bureau then released estimates of net undercount or overcount for the nation as a whole, the 50 states and the District of Columbia, and for demographic groups defined by race, gender, and age categories. To estimate the size of a subpopulation through DSE, the distinguishing characteristic or identifier should be collected or available in both enumerations. If the characteristic is not

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Dual-System Estimation, Table 1 Estimated undercount of Hispanics in the US census, 1990–2010 Census year 1990 2000 2010

Estimated undercount (%) 4.99 0.71 1.54

Standard error (%) 0.82 0.44 0.33

Source: US post-enumeration surveys (Mule 2012)

available in either enumeration, DSE cannot be used without additional assumptions or modifications to estimate the size of that subpopulation. For example, the US census attempts to count everyone living in the country as of census day, but it does not collect information on place of birth, citizenship, or legal status in the country. Thus, a dual-system estimate or net undercount is not produced for immigrants or noncitizens. On the other hand, the US census and its postenumeration survey collect information on Hispanic origin, allowing an estimate of the net coverage of Hispanics in the USA. Post-enumeration survey estimates of coverage among Hispanics have been used to set upper bounds on coverage among Hispanic subgroups, such as the Mexican or Hispanic foreign born (Van Hook et al. 2014), or among groups containing larger portions of Hispanics, such as the unauthorized foreign born (e.g., Passel and Cohn 2009) (Table 1).

How It Works To understand how DSE works, one can consider capture-recapture methodology. To estimate the number of fish in a pond using this approach, one captures a set of fish, tags them for later identification, and throws them back into the pond. After the fish have had time to disperse sufficiently, a second set of fish is caught, representing the “recapture.” One then counts the second set of fish and how many of them are tagged. All fish in the pond can be placed into one of four categories as depicted in the following Table 2: Note that the numbers in the Table 2, N11, N1+, and N+1, can all be observed by counting the fish. The entry N22, and thus the true size of the population N, is unknown. If we can assume

(a) that the capture and recapture are conducted independently, (b) that each fish has an equal chance of being captured initially, and (c) that each fish has an equal chance of being recaptured, then the ratios N11/N+1 and N1+/N should be approximately equal. Hence, an estimator for the unknown total, N, is N 1þ  N þ1 N^ ¼ N 11

(1)

or N^ ¼ no: counted in first enumeration  no: counted in second enumeration : no: counted in both enumerations

(2) Turning from fish to people, the census itself is the initial capture, while a second enumeration – often a post-enumeration sample survey – represents the recapture. In Eq. 1, N11 is the number of people enumerated in the census and then later in the second enumeration. They can be matched across the data files created from the two enumerations.

Erroneous Enumerations and Other Complications In extending the analogy of capture-recapture from fish to people, much has been simplified to focus on the basics. For example, the first row of the table portrays numbers of census enumerations. Before inserting N11 and N1+ into Eq. 1 or 2, “erroneous enumerations” must be removed from each. In the pond analogy, one can think of an erroneous enumeration as a captured “frog”; a frog does not contribute to the size of the fish

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Dual-System Estimation Dual-System Estimation, Table 2 Number of fish or people captured in the two enumerations

Found in first enumeration (captured)?

Yes No Total

population in the pond. In a census, erroneous enumerations include people who should not have been counted for any of several reasons: they had already been counted at a different (correct) location, they died before census day or were born after census day, they were only visiting from another country, etc. The US census count also includes people for whom so little valid information was collected that all the characteristics had to be imputed (statistically inserted). For these people, it would be difficult to determine whether their census records match to someone in the second enumeration. DSE addresses this problem by removing these records from the census count. The idea is that these people will generally be found in the second enumeration but not match to the census because of the missing census information. Algebraically, if the frequency of these records is relatively small, the effects on the terms N11 and N1+ in Eq. 1 essentially offset each other. The dual-system estimate removes erroneous and certain other census enumerations and then adjusts upward for units missed in the census. Breaking the census count and the estimate into these “components of census coverage,” as in the following table, can provide additional valuable information for assessing a census and preparing for the next one (Mulry and Cantwell 2010) (Table 3): In practice, two samples are often used in DSE. Although records from the entire census are usually available, determining whether a census enumeration is correct or erroneous is generally done for only a sample to save money and time. For similar reasons, the second enumeration to measure coverage of the census is usually conducted on only a sample of geographic

Found in second enumeration (recaptured)? Yes No Total N11 N12 N1+ N21 N22 N2+ N+1 N+2 N

areas. Sampling weights and other adjustments can be applied to produce estimates for the entire population or a subdomain of interest. A basic assumption on which DSE relies – whether estimating fish or people – is that the two enumerations are conducted independently. To satisfy this requirement, the second enumeration cannot use the same list frame or any results obtained from the first enumeration. An independent area sample or another approach is often used. In the 1980 US Post-Enumeration Program, the second enumeration was based on a sample from the US labor force survey (Wolter 1986). When collecting data for the two enumerations, care must be taken so that neither will contaminate the results of the other. In a census, the people enumerated are not actually “tagged” as the fish in a pond. To determine which ones are counted in both enumerations, sophisticated computer or clerical matching operations are conducted (Hogan 1993). Although matching errors can occur due to missing data or because addresses or people’s names may differ slightly between the two enumerations, procedures are implemented to minimize the errors. Follow-up interviews may be conducted to resolve a small portion of cases in which more information is needed. When catching fish on consecutive occasions, one might assume that the pond and the fish population have not had much opportunity to change before the recapture. A related issue when conducting a post-enumeration survey is the delay between census day and the occurrence of the survey enumeration. Such a delay may be warranted to maintain independence between the two operations. However, a longer delay carries with it several risks. First, as the time between enumerations grows, it is possible that the

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Dual-System Estimation, Table 3 Components of census coverage for the US household population, 2010 (in thousands) Component of census coverage Census count Correct enumerations Enumerated in the correct state Enumerated in a different state Erroneous enumerations Due to duplication For other reasons Minimal information Dual-system estimate from post-enumeration survey Correct enumerations Omissions Net overcount

Estimate 300,703 284,668 283,720 948 10,042 8,521 1,520 5,993 300,667 284,668 15,999 36

Standard error 0 199 206 31 199 194 45 0 429 199 440 429

Percent 100.0 94.7 94.4 0.3 3.3 2.8 0.5 2.0 100.0 94.7 5.3 0.01

Standard error 0 0.07 0.07 0.01 0.07 0.06 0.01 0 0 0.07 0.07 0.14

Source: US census coverage measurement survey of 2010 (Mule 2012) Does not include people living in dormitories, prisons, military barracks, etc., or remote Alaska

respondents forget where they or their household members lived on census day or other details relevant to the estimation. Perhaps more important, as this time grows, more people will have moved to another residence, making it more difficult to determine exactly who lived at which address on census day. One may recall, among the assumptions leading to Eq. 1, that each fish has an equal chance of being captured and that each fish has an equal chance for recapture. In fact, the accuracy of DSE generally increases if the underlying probabilities are equal for units (fish or people) in each enumeration separately. In reality, these probabilities are generally not equal among different units. As they become more and more heterogeneous, an error labeled “correlation bias” can increase (Konicki 2012). This problem can be addressed by defining a number of mutually exclusive groups, sometimes called post-strata, such that the probability of being captured in the pond or the census is more homogeneous among those units within the same post-stratum (US Census Bureau 2004). To estimate the population total, one then computes the estimated total within each post-stratum and adds the estimates across the post-strata. One can define the post-strata using available variables that are correlated with the chance of being

enumerated. In a census, these variables might include demographic characteristics such as age, gender, and owner/renter status, as well as operational variables such as whether census forms are mailed in the area or the level of the mail return rate. It can be shown that applying DSE within post-strata is simply a special case of a more general modeling approach that uses logistic regression to estimate the probability of being included in both enumerations (Mule 2012). Working with the more general model allows one to select a more efficient model – compared to forming post-strata – and thus reduces the correlation bias. Other innovations can be applied to the concept of DSE. With multiple-systems estimation, one extends the number of overlapping frames to three or more. A third frame might consist of a database of administrative records that covers all or part of the universe of interest (Zaslavsky and Wolfgang 1993). Matching records between any two frames, along with its difficulties and potential for error, become more important and complex.

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Cross-References

http://www.census.gov/coverage_measurement/pdfs/ g01.pdf. Accessed 14 October 2015 Mulry MH, Cantwell PJ (2010) Overview of the 2010 census coverage measurement program and its evaluations. Chance 23(3):46–51 Passel JS, Cohn D (2009) A portrait of unauthorized immigrants in the United States. Pew Hispanic Center, Washington, DC, http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/ 107.pdf. Accessed 14 October 2015 Petersen CGJ (1896) The yearly immigration of young plaice into the Limfjord from the German Sea. Rep Dan Biol Station 6:5–84 Sekar CC, Deming WE (1949) On a method of estimating birth and death rates and the extent of registration. J Am Stat Assoc 44:101–115 US Census Bureau (2004) Accuracy and coverage evaluation of census 2000: design and methodology. DSSD/ 03-DM. Issued September 2004. US Census Bureau, Washington, DC. Chapter 7. http://www.census.gov/ prod/2004pubs/dssd03-dm.pdf. Accessed 14 October 2015 Van Hook J, Bean FD, Bachmeier JD, Tucker C (2014) Recent trends in coverage of the Mexican-born population of the United States: results from applying multiple methods across time. Demography 51(2):699–726 Wolter KM (1986) Some coverage error models for census data. J Am Stat Assoc 81:338–346 Zaslavsky AM, Wolfgang GS (1993) Triple-system modeling of census, post-enumeration survey, and administrative-list data. J Bus Econ Stat 11:279–288

▶ Capture-Recapture ▶ Erroneous Enumerations ▶ Net Undercount ▶ Omissions ▶ Post-Enumeration Survey

References Devine J, Bhaskar R, DeSalvo B, Robinson JG, Scopilliti M, West KK (2012) The development and sensitivity analysis of the 2010 demographic analysis estimates. US Census Bureau, Washington, DC http:// www.census.gov/people/files/popworkingpapers/ Development%20and%20Sensitivity%20Analysis %202010%20DA.pdf. Accessed 14 October 2015 Hogan H (1993) The 1990 post-enumeration survey: operations and results. J Am Stat Assoc 88:1047–1060 Konicki S (2012) 2010 Census coverage measurement estimation report: adjustment for correlation bias. DSSD 2010 Census Coverage Measurement Memorandum Series #2010-G-11, https://www.census.gov/ coverage_measurement/pdfs/g11.pdf. Accessed 14 October 2015 Lincoln FC (1930) Calculating waterfowl abundance on the basis of banding returns. US Department of Agriculture, Circular No 118: 1–4 Mule T (2012) 2010 Census coverage measurement estimation report: summary of estimates of coverage for persons in the United States. DSSD 2010 Census Coverage Measurement Memorandum Series #2010-G-01.

Further Reading Anderson M, Fienberg SE (2001) Who counts? The politics of census-taking in contemporary America. Russell Sage Foundation, New York

D

Duration of Residence Measurement time spent in the receiving country, either as an 1

Ilana Redstone Akresh and Douglas S. Massey 1 University of Illinois, Champaign, IL, USA 2 Office of Population Research, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, USA

2

independent variable or, at least, as a control. Hence, most national censuses and surveys contain questions to ascertain the place of birth and year of arrival of foreign-born persons; and most analyses based on such data include a variable labeled “time since arrival” in statistical models involving immigrants.

Definition Duration of residence refers to the variable used in empirical research that captures the time a foreign-born individual has been in the USA. This time could be accumulated in one continuous stretch (e.g., an individual who left his or her home country, came to the USA, and remained in the USA), or it could be accumulated across multiple trips to the USA. While this variable is relevant in both qualitative and quantitative research on the foreign born, it is relied upon heavily in quantitative studies as a proxy for an individual’s exposure to the USA.

Concept and Background A fundamental attribute of all immigrants is the amount of time they have spent in the host country. Whatever theory of immigrant absorption one favors – whether classical assimilation theory, ethnic pluralism, human capital theory, segmented assimilation, or ethnic stratification – an adequate empirical test requires measuring the

Challenges to Measurement Despite its centrality to the process of immigrant adaptation, measuring the amount of hostcountry experience an immigrant has accumulated is far from straightforward. A question on the year of arrival works well in a world in which all immigrants arrive once and only once to settle permanently in the host society. Under these circumstances, subtracting the year of arrival from the year of the census or survey exactly yields the years of host-country experience, and there is no ambiguity. In addition, cross-sectional comparisons of immigrants by duration of residence may lead to biased estimates of the effects of US exposure due to cohort differences (for more detail on this point, see Park’s entry in this volume on following immigrant cohorts overtime). If migrants move back and forth in multiple trips, however, this methodology breaks down because it begs two crucial questions: on which of the several US trips did a respondent “arrive” and when did he or she decide to remain

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permanently? For instance, in the 2004 study referenced in the section below using data from the New Immigrant Survey – Pilot, 22 % of respondents stated they had made two trips to the USA before being granted legal permanent residency, and 17 % reported three or more trips prior to the same event. Perhaps more important is that no matter how one defines “settlement,” either objectively or subjectively, subtracting the year of arrival from the year of the census or survey will not equal the total amount of time the migrant has accumulated in the host society. Inevitably, picking 1 year to define “arrival” out of a series of entries and exits will either over- or understate the total amount of host-country experience the migrant has accumulated.

Known Biases The following are three of the biases found in a 2004 study (using the New Immigrant Survey – Pilot data) when comparing the census question on year of arrival with a more inclusive, cumulative measure of US duration (Redstone and Massey 2004): 1. One study of legal permanent residents found that roughly 45 % of all legal immigrants to the USA report a year they came to stay that is not the year of their first US trip; and among those with multiple trips, 54 % report a year

Duration of Residence Measurement

they came to stay that is not the year of their last trip. 2. Estimates of the total amount of US experience that are based on answers to the census question on the year of arrival produce numbers that are quite different from those that are produced by asking about US experience directly. Only 59 % of immigrants had their total US experience accurately estimated by the usual census-based procedure. In contrast, 31 % of immigrants had their experience understated and 10 % had it overstated, with an average difference of about 4 years. 3. Whether total US experience is under- or overestimated depends on the year of the first trip and the number of trips taken between the first trip and the survey date. Immigrants whose prior trips were in undocumented status tend to have their experience underestimated by the census procedure, whereas those whose trips are in documented status tend to have their experience overestimated. The size of the error is likewise determined by the year of the first trip and the number of trips taken.

References Redstone I, Massey DS (2004) Coming to stay: an analysis of the U.S. census question on year of arrival. Demography 41(4):721–738

E

Ethnographic Analysis David FitzGerald University of California, San Diego, CA, USA

Keywords Participant observation; interviewing; Fieldwork

Qualitative

Definition Ethnographic analysis is a set of methods involving direct, long-term engagement between the ethnographer and the individuals whose lives are the object of study.

Overview Ethnographic analysis is the principal method used in anthropological approaches to studying migration as well as an important technique in sociology. The most classical form of ethnography involves many months – even years – of “participant observation” in which the ethnographer becomes immersed in a field site. All ethnographers participate in the life of the community, though they vary in the degree to which they attempt to become social insiders and the degree to which they are successful in

that endeavor. Participant observation involves watching and analyzing social life as well, usually with great attention to details of social life that could not be captured in a standardized survey. Participant observation is often complemented by qualitative interviews, which differ from surveys in that they are unstructured or semistructured in a way that allows the researcher to probe for nuance, emotion, and explanations of actions. Qualitative interviews by a researcher engage the other individual less as a passive object, and more as an interlocutor, who together with the researcher creates the substance and meaning of the interview (Emerson 2001). Qualitative interviewing techniques are also easily adapted to focus groups. The line between informal conversations and formal interviews may be blurred in practice. What distinguishes ethnographies from journalism or travelogues is the systematic way in which evidence is collected (typically in the form of field notes, transcriptions of conversations, photographs, and audiovisual recordings), the extended time period of the study, and the engagement between findings in a particular site and broader theories of social life. The presentation of ethnographies, most often in the form of a monograph, usually emphasizes what Clifford Geertz described as a “thick description” of a setting that sheds light on social worlds with which the reader is unfamiliar. Carefully designed ethnographies also move beyond

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descriptions of processes to address broader theoretical questions.

Ethnographies of Migration Fieldwork among international migrants poses a host of challenges. Classical ethnographies involved a lone researcher working in a single site. Yet international migration is defined by movement that often takes place across multiple sites. Migration inherently means both emigration from some place and immigration to another, implying that research should include both sending and receiving areas as ethnographers “follow the people” on the move (Marcus 1995; Glick Schiller 2003; Sayad 2004). Among studies adopting a two-site strategy, Smith (2005) examined migration between a town in the Mexican state of Puebla and New York City, demonstrating migrants’ integration into New York at the same time as many remain deeply engaged in the political, economic, and cultural life of Puebla. A second strategy is to compare multiple destinations for migrants of a common origin, as Tilly and his associates (1998) began to do for Italians from the village of Roccasecca dispersed in Lyon, Sao Paolo, Buenos Aires, New York, and Toronto. Such a comparison sets up a natural quasi-experiment controlling for origins that explains how local and national receiving contexts pattern migrants’ economic mobility. The multi-sited framing of the field need not be exclusively geographic. Migrants and expatriates around the world have established Internet sites containing membership directories, chat rooms, political commentaries, advertisements for goods and services, and news about life in different nodes of the members’ network – all of which are grist for the virtual ethnographer’s mill. Internet sites linking dispersed virtual communities based on a common town of origin are important vehicles for maintaining cross-border ties and can be used to locate members in other nodes. Several cautions and objections about multisited fieldwork have been advanced. First, multisited work tests the limits of a method usually

Ethnographic Analysis

thought to rely on deep, local knowledge of everyday interactions as a means to understand members’ experience. The requisite intensity of fieldwork and linguistic competence may be difficult to achieve in multiple sites, with consequent variation in the quality of the fieldwork and the ability to make systematic comparisons between sites (Marcus 1995; Hannerz 2003). It is precisely because of the dangers of stretching time and resources too thin that successful multi-sited fieldwork is even more dependent on a clear theoretical orientation and strategic site selection than work in a single site. A second objection to multi-sited fieldwork is that scientific comparative ethnography is no longer possible. Colonialism and globalization have eroded the idea that discrete cultural units exist. In a world of rapid mobility of people, ideas, and goods, the cases themselves may be influencing each other. Without discrete units, causal processes are not independent of each other, and the logic of the Millian methods of agreement and difference breaks down (Ragin 1987; de Munck 2002). That is, similar outcomes across cases cannot necessarily be ascribed to similar conditions in each case (as in the method of agreement), and different outcomes among cases with different conditions cannot necessarily be ascribed to those different conditions (as in the method of difference). Seen from a different view, the linkages between sites are not the end of comparative ethnography, but rather an opportunity for its rejuvenation. Different source and destination localities can be selected precisely because they are linked by migrant networks while still shaping migrants’ experiences differently. Another objection to comparative ethnography is the ceteris paribus problem that bedevils comparative study regardless of method. In nonexperimental studies of social life, it is impossible to definitively isolate the effects of just one factor’s addition or removal. For instance, one should not assume a given difference between two migration destinations causes variation found between migration streams sharing the same source. That connection can only be made by carefully specifying process and exploring

Ethnographic Analysis

alternative accounts. It is because the methods of agreement and difference should never be applied mechanistically by simply creating a matrix of independent and dependent variables (Lieberson 1992) that multi-sited ethnographies are best positioned to tease out the influences of different ecologies on migration processes by explaining causal mechanisms through an evidence-rich encounter with theory. The practical difficulties involved in multisited research, particularly when they involve multiple languages, can be resolved in part by abandoning the “lone ranger” model of fieldwork and adopting a bi- or multinational collaborative model. Thomas and Znaniecki’s The Polish Peasant in Europe and America (1927) is an early template. The collaborative dimension combined the advantages of insiders’ intimate acquaintance with the social milieu and easier access with the advantages of outsiders’ fresh perspectives and autonomy (Merton 1972). The binational dimension enabled the researchers to examine the full range of migrants’ experiences, migration’s impacts on both countries, and the causes of migration from Polish push factors to US pull factors. There are inherent limits to rigorous multi-sited fieldwork, but collaborations are a way to approach those limits.

What Do Case Studies Represent? Ethnography’s capacity to show process in finegrained detail and to open “black boxes” to show mechanisms causally linking independent and dependent variables is a recognized strength of the method. Ethnography is also particularly well suited to describe and explain the articulation of macrostructures with members’ lived experience, micro-interactions, and a deep appreciation of members’ meanings. That same strength inherently limits the ability of the ethnographer to study a wide range of cases intensively. A commonly held view is that ethnographies can only explain a particular case (Blumer 1939, 1969). How can ethnographers hope to make general arguments about anything other than their field site?

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The extended case method offers a more ambitious alternative to the descriptive case study by showing how a single case can yield theoretical leverage (Gluckman 1961; Burawoy 1991). In any scientific research program, there is a set of “core” postulates. Surrounding the core is an “outer belt” of secondary postulates that explain outcomes the core postulates do not predict. If multiple ad hoc qualifications are necessary to explain anomalies, the research program is degenerative. If the secondary postulates can be revised to explain anomalous outcomes and predict new facts, the research program progresses (Lakatos 1978). A single case study that successfully explains an anomaly by developing a secondary postulate protects the core of the research program from negation and provides an ethnographer with justifiable claims to generalize based on the program’s enhanced explanatory capability. The dominant research program in the sociology of immigration analyzes “assimilation” or “integration.” Ethnographies have pushed the assimilation program forward by showing that the different domains of assimilation (e.g., cultural, marital, and economic) are not always mutually reinforcing and, in fact, can be at odds with each other. Specifically, economic assimilation, in the sense of upward mobility, can actually be increased through ethnic retention. For example, Zhou and Bankston (1998) mix ethnographic and quantitative school testing data to argue that Vietnamese students in a poor neighborhood of New Orleans performed well in school despite their impoverished material circumstances and low human capital when they became deeply involved in family and Vietnamese Catholic institutions that discouraged the adoption of the putatively “oppositional culture” of urban youth in the neighborhood. Zhou and Bankston help refine the assimilation program, even though their study only analyzes a tiny proportion of contemporary US immigrants, by adopting the logic of the crucial case. It is commonly held that Asians tend to do well on educational measures in the United States relative to other immigrant groups because of their generally higher levels of human capital. The case of

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Vietnamese in New Orleans was a good test of this proposition, because this population was generally low in human capital even as children tended to do well in school. The question still remains how ethnographers know if what they find are just “outliers.” If the case is just a product of rare conjuncture, the research program is not threatened. There are at least three complementary strategies for assessing representativeness (see Hammersley 1992). The first is collaboration via contemporaneous or serial ethnographies that capture a greater range of variation than is possible in one researcher’s project. For example, Levitt (2003) conducted research on the role of religion in contemporary “transnational life” by working with colleagues in India, Ireland, Brazil, and the Dominican Republic. The second strategy is using existing statistics to assess the degree of representativeness of a case, as ethnographers often do using census data (e.g., Guarnizo et al. 1999). The third is combining ethnographic and survey evidence gathered either on one’s own or in collaboration. The ongoing Mexican Migration Project “ethnosurveys” (Massey 1987) of more than 100 migrant sending communities, co-directed by demographer Douglas Massey and anthropologist Jorge Durand, are a premier example of this sort of collaboration. Armed with quantitative data on how representative a case is of a larger category, it is possible to convincingly adopt another strategy for developing a crucial case (Eckstein 1975). Knowing that a case is highly atypical can be grounds for generalizing if the case is an extreme crystallization of some theoretically significant phenomenon. If a theoretical prediction does not apply to the extreme case, it is unlikely to apply anywhere. The utility of using a single case or small set of cases to advance a research program is positively related to the degree of the theory’s determinism and inversely related to the scope of the theory. According to a Popperian (1968) logic of deterministic laws, a single case of negation is not a fatal blow to the research program if a secondary postulate consistent with the core explains the anomaly. But Popperian formulations are deliberately made to be easier to falsify with a few

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negative cases than probabilistic theories. If “laws” are conceived in probabilistic terms (Berk 1988), as they generally are even in the grander versions of social scientific theory, particular negative cases can still be useful for advancing general theoretical claims under two conditions. Negative cases are most useful when the gap is large between the theoretical prediction and the outcome, and an examination of the case is the basis of expanding a theory’s range of explanation (Emigh 1997). Research programs are not negated simply by the discovery of disconfirming evidence, but rather when competing research programs offer greater explanatory power (Lakatos 1978). Thus, a single ethnographic study cannot disprove a research program, but to the extent that the case refines an existing program or contributes to a competing program, an ethnographic study can make a theoretical contribution that indirectly warrants claims applicable beyond the cases studied. Ethnographies are less suited to falsify grander, even a historical, theories, like the theories of neoclassical economics, new economics of migration, and cumulative causation seeking to explain the generation and persistence of migration across many contexts (Massey et al. 1993). The inherently limited range of ethnographic cases means they are poorly suited vehicles for trying to reconfigure these broader theories, even if ethnographic studies do generate important insights into relevant processes and raise questions leading to more general formulations. Case studies are most useful in pushing forward theories that are restricted in their historical scope, for example, the “segmented assimilation” thesis that seeks to account for the experience of the contemporary second generation of American immigrants. Theoretically oriented ethnographic work is thus most useful when it is close to the scale of the theory it seeks to refine.

References Berk R (1988) Causal inference for sociological data. In: Smelser NJ (ed) The handbook of sociology. Sage, Newbury Park

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Blumer H (1939/1969) An appraisal of Thomas and Znaniecki’s the polish peasant in Europe and America. In: Blumer H (ed) Symbolic interactionism: perspective and method. Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall Burawoy M (ed) (1991) Ethnography unbound: power and resistance in the modern metropolis. University of California Press, Berkeley de Munck VC (2002) Contemporary issues and challenges for comparativists: an appraisal. Anthropol Theory 2:5–19 Eckstein H (1975) Case study and theory in political science. In: Greenstein FI, Polsby NW (eds) Handbook of political science, vol 7. Addison-Wesley, Reading Emerson RM (ed) (2001) Contemporary field research: perspectives and formulations, 2nd edn, Prospect Heights. Waveland Press, Long Grove Emigh RJ (1997) The power of negative thinking: the use of negative case methodology in the development of sociological theory. Theory Soc 26:649–684 Glick Schiller N (2003) The centrality of ethnography in the study of transnational migration. In: Foner N (ed) American arrivals: anthropology engages the new immigration. School of American Research Press, Santa Fe Gluckman M (1961) Ethnographic data in British social anthropology. Sociol Rev 9:5–17 Guarnizo LE, S´anchez AI, Roach EM (1999) Mistrust, fragmented solidarity, and transnational migration: Colombians in New York City and Los Angeles. Ethn Racial Stud 22:367–396 Hammersley M (1992) What’s wrong with ethnography? Methodological explorations. Routledge, London Hannerz U (2003) Being there . . . and there . . . and there! Reflections on multi-site ethnography. Ethnography 4:201–216 Lakatos I (1978) The methodology of scientific research programmes. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

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Levitt P (2003) You know, Abraham was really the first immigrant: religion and transnational migration. Int Migr Rev 37:847–874 Lieberson S (1992) Small N‘s and big conclusions: an examination of the reasoning in comparative studies based on small numbers of cases. In: Ragin CC, Becker H (eds) What is a case? Exploring the foundations of social inquiry. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Marcus GE (1995) Ethnography in/of the world system: the emergence of multi-sited ethnography. Annu Rev Anthropol 24:95–117 Massey DS (1987) The ethnosurvey in theory and practice. Int Migr Rev 21:1498–1522 Massey DS, Arango J, Hugo G, Kouaouci A, Pellegrino A, Taylor JE (1993) Theories of international migration: a review and appraisal. Popul Dev Rev 19:431–466 Merton RK (1972) Insiders and outsiders: a chapter in the sociology of knowledge. Am J Sociol 78:9–47 Popperian KR (1968) The logic of scientific discovery, 2nd edn. Harper & Row, New York Ragin CC (1987) The comparative method: moving beyond qualitative and quantitative strategies. University of California Press, Berkeley Sayad A (2004) The suffering of the immigrant. David Macey (trans). Polity Press, Cambridge Smith RC (2005) Mexican New York: the transnational lives of new immigrants. University of California Press, Berkely Thomas WI, Znaniecki W (1927) The Polish peasant in Europe and America. Knopf, New York Tilly C (1998) Durable Inequality. Berkeley: University of California Press Zhou M, Bankston CL (1998) Growing up American: how Vietnamese children adapt to life in the United States. Russell Sage, New York

I

Indirect Methods for Estimating Internal Migration Richelle Winkler1 and Katherine J. Curtis2 1 Department of Social Sciences, Michigan Technological University, Houghton, MI, USA 2 University of Wisconsin, Madison, WI, USA

Synonyms Cohort forward survival methods; Residual methods

Definition Indirect methods are a set of techniques used to estimate net migration and net migration rates based on population counts and other characteristics (i.e., vital statistics, life tables) at two successive time periods. The methods do not require administrative data collection of individuals’ moves or specific survey or census questions about migration. They are applied to geographic units (e.g., counties, states) and can be calculated for subpopulations (e.g., age, sex, race, ethnicity).

Detailed Description Indirect methods estimate net migration based on the principles of the demographic balancing equation, which explains that a population in a given geography changes through births, deaths, and migration. Population change between two time periods for any geographic area is the combined result of natural increase (births minus deaths) and net migration (in-migration minus out-migration). The demographic balancing equation can be rearranged to calculate net migration, shown below, whereby P0 is the population in a geography at time zero, P1 is the population at a future time, B is the number of births in that geography between the two time points, and D is the number of deaths: Net MigrationðNMÞ ¼ ðP1  P0 Þ  ðB  DÞ Because population counts are generally known from censuses and natural increase is generally known from vital statistics (or can be estimated using survival ratios), net migration is indirectly estimated as the residual of this equation. For this reason, indirect methods are sometimes referred to as residual methods. Residual methods can be applied to generate migration estimates by unchanging demographic characteristics including age, sex, race, and/or ethnicity. The basic strategy is to start with a beginning population at a particular age (i) at time zero, advance the population forward in time t years

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so age is i + t at time t, and adjust the population for natural increase that occurs over the time period (t) to generate an “expected” population at time t had there been no net migration. The estimate of the number of net migrants is the observed population at time t (based on the successive census) minus the expected population. This estimate is divided by the expected population to construct a net migration rate. Net migration captures the balance of in-migration and out-migration in a geographic area over the intercensal time period. It cannot measure inflows, outflows, gross migration (total sum of migrants), or migration streams from one location to another. Thus, indirect methods capture migration’s contribution to population redistribution, not individual migration experiences. Residual methods can be based on vital statistics or survival ratios. Vital statistics methods directly incorporate data on births and deaths to inform the demographic balancing equation. This approach provides “theoretically exact” estimates of net migration (Siegel and Hamilton 1952) since each of the data points is a count of the population or demographic events. Typically, it combines internal and international migration unless specific assumptions are introduced to subtract international migration. While conceptually simple, vital statistics approaches require more data points than other indirect methods and the amount of data that must be collected and organized can be overwhelming, particularly when generating estimates of demographic characteristics (e.g., age) for multiple small geographies. This approach is only feasible for geographies with reasonably complete vital registration systems and censuses. The greatest concerns associated with vital statistics methods center on errors in census or vital statistics data, including misallocations, undercounts/overcounts, and missing data. Moderate errors in census counts produce large errors in net migration estimates, although errors may be offsetting. Survival ratio methods estimate the natural increase portion of the demographic balancing equation using either life tables or census survival ratios. These methods provide reasonable estimates of net migration, not exact measures. Life

Indirect Methods for Estimating Internal Migration

table methods use established life tables to estimate natural increase for component geographies. This practice becomes problematic when appropriate life tables are not available for all geographies of interest. For instance, national life tables may not accurately represent mortality in each component geography of a country. Central challenges with this approach are the potential misrepresentation of mortality for constituent geographies, the inability to account separately for international migration without introducing specific measures, and the effects of census coverage and reporting errors. Census survival ratio methods estimate population “survival” by comparing the ratio of the number of people in the same national cohort at successive censuses. An example is to compare the number of people in the USA who are aged 20–24 in Census 2000 to the number of people in the USA who are aged 30–34 in Census 2010. This ratio captures mortality and the relative difference between census coverage and reporting errors in the two censuses. National data must be used since the goal is to create a survival ratio reflecting mortality, not migration. The census survival ratio approach is preferred for its few data requirements and generally works well in circumstances with incomplete data (McInnis 1974). However, the assumption that survival ratios, census coverage errors, and international migration for component geographies are the same as the nation can be problematic, particularly in circumstances with high mortality and geographic variability. Important limitations to all indirect approaches are that only net migration is available, with no counts for gross flows or streams; time periods must be defined for intercensal periods to generate highly accurate estimates; and it is not possible to estimate migration for characteristics that change in unpredictable ways over time (i.e., educational levels, marital status, or income). Potential complications common to each of the residual approaches include census misallocations and undercounts/overcounts, changes in census geographies, errors in vital statistics or life table data, inability to separately account for international migration, and a lack of

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options for countries or geographies without quality mortality data.

Application Indirect methods have been used by government statistical agencies and researchers to estimate net migration at least since the early 1900s and continue to be popular methods around the world because of the limited data collection required, high level of accuracy, applicability for small geographic areas, and low cost. Especially in the context of wide availability and highly accurate digital census and vital statistics data, vital statistics approaches provide cost-effective and robust estimates of net migration. In the USA, for instance, a set of county-level net migration estimates by age, sex, and race has been produced each decade from 1950 to 2010 by university- and agency-based demographers with support from federal agencies. They are publically available through the Inter-university Consortium for Social and Political Research (ICPSR) and online at www.netmigration.wisc.edu. The data are used by applied demographers in generating small area population estimates and projections, by planners for understanding community change, and by academics for ecological analyses of age- and race-specific migration patterns. The authors rely on the US county-level net migration estimates by age, race, and ethnicity in 1950–2010 in their own research. Winkler employs the data to understand the growing pull of environmental amenities for attracting migrants to specific places at different points in the life course. Curtis uses these data to investigate racial patterns of return migration to the US South, and she is currently relying on them to understand how natural disasters and climate change interact with age- and race-specific migration patterns to shift population composition in affected areas.

Cross-References ▶ Demographic Balancing Equation ▶ Inflows ▶ Migration Streams ▶ Net Migration ▶ Outflows

References McInnis RM (1974) Census survival ratio estimates of net migration for Canadian regions. Can Stud Popul 1:93–116 Siegel JS, Hamilton CH (1952) Some considerations in the use of the residual method of estimating net migration. J Am Stat Assoc 47(259):475–500

Further Reading Hamilton CH (1967) The vital statistics method of estimating net migration by age cohorts. Demography 4(21):464–478 Morrison PA, Bryan TM, Swanson DA (2004) Chapter 19: Internal migration and short-distance mobility. In: Swanson DA, Siegel JS (eds) The methods and materials of demography, 2nd ed. Elsevier Academic Publishing out of San Diego, CA, pp 503–508 on “Residual Estimates” Smith SK, Swanson DA (1998) In defense of the net migrant. J Econ Soc Meas 24(3–4):249–264 Thomas DS, Arias J, Bachi R, Eldridge HT, Elizaga JC, Kono S, Macura M, Shryock HS, van den Brink T, Zachariah KC (1970) United Nations. Chapter 2: Indirect measures of net internal migration. In: United Nations manual VI, methods of measuring internal migration. United Nations Publication, Sales No. E. 70.XIII.3 Voss PR, McNiven S, Hammer RB, Johnson KM, Fuguitt GV (2004) County-specific net migration by five-year age groups, Hispanic origin, race and sex 1990–2000, CDE Working Paper no 2004–24. Center for Demography and Ecology, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison Winkler RL, Johnson KM, Cheng C, Beaudoin JM, Voss PR, and KJ Curtis (2013) Age-specific net migration estimates for US counties, 1950–2010. Applied Population Laboratory, University of Wisconsin- Madison. Web. Accessed 9/29/2015. www.netmigration.wisc. edu

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Measuring Internal Migration Prospectively Using Longitudinal Data Randall Olsen1 and Elizabeth Cooksey2 1 Department of Economics, The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, USA 2 Department of Sociology, The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, USA

Definition Internal migration may be defined as a change in residence from one geographical unit to another.

Why Is Measuring Internal Migration Important? Accurately capturing a population’s spatial mobility patterns is highly important because residential moves have a direct effect upon population distribution and are associated with significant demographic processes across the life course. These patterns and processes have critical implications for policy makers at multiple geographic levels. For example, young people frequently move to pursue postsecondary education or training, enter the armed forces, or take a first step in their career. Household unions often involve a change in residence of at least one of the partners so that couples can live together, and this

may additionally involve on a job change for one or both partners. As children near school age, parents may decide on a different neighborhood or city that will allow for better child outcomes, also triggering migration. At retirement, opportunities for leisure activities or a desire to live near grandchildren may take precedence. At the oldest ages, there may be a need for assisted living.

Why Is Measuring Internal Migration So Difficult? Whereas a birth or death is readily distinguishable, a move can be difficult to classify and hence measure. This is especially true for internal migration and most residential moves occur within the United States. Whether a move counts as migration will depend on how we choose to incorporate other factors into our decision making: the distance between origin and destination, the length of stay at the destination, and the reason for moving. Precise measurement may also prove elusive. In 1970, a United Nations manual on “methods of measuring internal migration” United Nations, 1970 noted that it would only be possible to tabulate moves by distance covered if exact information was available on points of both origin and destination. At the time, most data on people’s moves were gathered retrospectively and hence were open to problems of recall error, a general lack of specificity

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regarding location, and an inability to also collect data on other life events that occurred both before and after moving. In order to really understand how migration fits into people’s life histories, the complexity of migratory patterns demands comprehensive data gathered prospectively over the life course.

The National Longitudinal Surveys as a Data Resource One of the best resources currently available to measure internal migration over a significant span of the life course is the geocode data in the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (http://www.nlsinfo.org/site/nlsy79/docs/79html/ Geocode79/geotoc.htm). Respondents provide their address at each interview, and these have since been geocoded to as precise a latitude and longitude as possible. By applying to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, users can obtain a restricted access version of the data containing created “matrix-of-moves” variables that measure the distance from each survey address to every other reported address. Using these “matrix-of-moves” variables makes it possible to summarize the movement that occurs over many years. Further, because social, economic, and behavioral information were also collected contemporaneously, moves of varying distance can be placed in the context within which migratory decisions were made. For example, when one considers the depressed labor market in 2013, a feasible way to find work if living in a chronically depressed area may well be to move. However, are people at higher risk of being out of work also less likely to migrate? The NLSY79 data can help answer such questions also taking past experiences into account.

Descriptive Analysis of Internal Migration Using the NLSY79 Moving and Returning Although short-term studies that gather information on every move made are important to

undertake, so too are studies that take a longerterm life cycle orientation. For example, a person who bounces back and forth between two locations every couple of years would appear to be highly mobile which in a sense they are. However, a longer-term study with a life cycle orientation may show this pattern of moving to be closely connected to spells of employment and to evidence a much more limited degree of mobility once return migration is taken into account. Below we use the NLSY79 matrix-of-moves data to assess the migratory behavior of 5,207 respondents who had given an interview in each of the 24 rounds of interviewing from 1979 (at ages 14–21) through 2010. One might think this restriction would rule out frequent movers. However, it is relatively rare that an NLSY79 respondent cannot be found. Nonresponse is primarily a problem of cooperation rather than a lack of contact. We begin with the question: how much do people really move? For illustrative purposes we classify a “change of location” to be a move outside a radius of 25 miles, hypothesizing that such a move would potentially cause a change in labor market location and disruption to social connections and hence be economically and socially significant. We also characterize “return” migration as any move to a location within 25 miles of a previous location. Note that if a person makes several short moves to the west and then returns to their original location, which is by now more than 25 miles from their most recent location, that move will be counted as both a “move” and a “return.” Using this standard, more than half of our sample did not move more than 25 miles between their mid/late teens and their late 40s/early 50s. Another 19 % only “move” once, 14 % twice, and 15 % three or more times. Accounting for return migration changes the story, however, as over 81 % of our respondents have lived in two or fewer “places” their entire adolescent and young adult lives, where unique places are at least 25 miles apart. Of those who move at least once, about half return to within 25 miles of a previous residence. Two-thirds of people, who had a long distance move and never returned to a previous location,

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Measuring Internal Migration Prospectively Using Longitudinal Data Measuring Internal Migration Prospectively Using Longitudinal Data, Fig. 1 Number of 25-mile moves by highest grade completed

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had only one 25+ mile move. For all the mobility that occurs within the United States, it appears that we stay pretty close to home base and only about 8 % of our sample population moved four or more times.

Patterns of Mobility by Population Subgroups Mobility for youth in the late 1970s over the next 30 years of their lives does not appear to be gender linked or differ significantly by income – at least when median income is the cut point for two comparison groups. There are some differences in the number of 25-mile moves between blacks and whites where whites are slightly more likely to report more moves. More of a difference is seen by education, however, as illustrated in Fig. 1. Highly educated people are quite mobile while those with fewer than 14 years of education are

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more likely to stay put and about half as likely to make four or more moves to new locations. These patterns may reflect the fact that those with substantial education place themselves in a national labor market and are more likely to move longer distances not only to gain their education in the first place but also to exploit post-educational opportunities. A corollary of lower mobility by the less educated is that local labor market disruptions in the form of losses of employment at local employers generate problems for the less educated as they are less likely to move toward better labor market opportunities.

References United Nations (1970) Manual VI: methods of measuring internal migration. United Nations Publications, New York

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Measuring Internal Migration: Retrospective Self-Report Matthew Hall Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, USA

Keywords Internal migration; Domestic migration; Migration measurement

Definition The direct retrospective self-report crosssectional method is a common approach for detecting and measuring migration that is based on a comparison of survey respondents’ current and prior places of residence. In its most basic form, “migrants” are those whose current and former places of residence differ. The method is highly flexible as it can be applied to various observation units (e.g., persons and households), can be easily aggregated (e.g., to those living in a particular region or possessing some demographic characteristic), can identify both recent and more distant migration events, and can capture moves at various spatial scales.

Concept and Usage The retrospective approach to migration is likely the most widely used method for estimating migration and is employed extensively to evaluate gross and net flows across areas, particularly in the United States where administrative data on migration is limited. The widespread use of this method is due to its many key strengths: First, the approach is simple to implement, requiring, in its simplest form, only two questions – i.e., where do you currently live? and where did you previously live? – that can be incorporated easily onto survey questionnaires. Second, the method allows migration events to be detected without actually observing them and can thus be applied as part of a survey administered at only a single point in time. Its ease of implementation and efficiency allow it to be administered to large samples, which make it possible to summarize migration flows at and between different geographic scales (e.g., across particular states, counties, or neighborhoods). Another advantage of the retrospective approach is its use in constructing migration histories. Like the more common marriage histories, migration histories allow researchers to track the timing and locations of migration events and can be constructed over a life history or a more limited time span (e.g., since adulthood). Despite these major strengths, the method has several weaknesses that limit its complete

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usefulness. Unlike panel-based migration approaches (see “▶ Measuring Internal Migration Prospectively Using Longitudinal Data” in this volume), retrospective survey instruments are prone to recall error – i.e., the potential to omit or misreport previous experiences or events (Bound et al. 2001). While memory errors are less common for physical moves than for other lesssignificant life events (e.g., wage change, voting behavior), they can bias migration estimates, particularly those assessing short-distance or temporary moves or those that occurred in the distant past. Evaluation research has demonstrated that migration-related recall errors are reduced for the better educated and are less likely to occur when migration events correspond with major life transitions (Smith and Duncan 2003). Memory errors also increase as the number of episodes or events grows – an important consideration in the design of survey instruments (Dex 1995). An additional limitation to the retrospective method is that, in its most basic two-question format, multiple moves are not captured and returning migrants can be wrongly identified as non-migrants. As an illustration, consider that a New York resident who moved to Florida in 1996 before returning to New York in 1999 would have been missed by the question in the 2000 Census inquiring about migration over the prior 5 years. In addition to these limitations that threaten the validity of migration estimates, cross-sectional approaches typically do not collect sociodemographic information on survey respondents preceding migration events. Thus, while retrospective questions indicate that long-distance (interstate) moves are more common among college-educated, divorced, and higher-income persons (Ihrke and Faber 2012), they do not indicate whether education, marital status, and income are causes or consequences of migration. Lastly, when used to calculate migration risk pools (i.e., the denominator in migration rates), the retrospective approach assumes that the sample drawn from the cross section (at time t) is the representative of the population at risk of moving (at time t-k).

Application Because the cross-sectional approach to measuring migration is cost-effective and can be administered to large samples, its use is ubiquitous. In North America, retrospective migration questions have been asked on censuses in Canada, Mexico, and the United States. More recently, 1-year migration questions are included in both the American Community Survey and the National Household Survey, the replacements to long-form census questionnaires in the United States and Canada, respectively. It is also used in the Current Population Survey, and most major surveys will, at a minimum, include questions on current place of residence and place of birth. Survey questions typically ask, as on the American Community Survey, “Did this person live in this house or apartment 1 year ago?” If the answer is “no,” then survey respondents are instructed to provide the address of past residence. The 2011 ACS shows, for example, that 1.5 % of New York State residents migrated from another US state in the last year. The ACS also collects data on place of birth and show, again for New York, that 11.8 % of 2011 residents were born in another US state. These aggregated data are used to calculate gross in-, out-, and net migration flows and rates and to assess streams across areas (e.g., patterns of migration between the 62 counties in New York). Demographers and other social scientists have used the cross-sectional approach to explore a variety of migration-related research topics. It has been used to study the Great Migration of blacks to northern cities (Tolnay 1998), their more recent return to the south (Frey 2004), and the movement of Latinos to new destination areas (Lichter and Johnson 2009). The method has been applied in research to understand whether welfare policies trigger poverty migration (Schram et al. 1998), how interstate moves affect children’s educational progress (Long 1975), and how migration induces social tolerance (Wilson 1991).

Measuring Internal Migration: Retrospective Self-Report

References Bound J, Brown C, Mathiowetz N (2001) Measurement error in survey data (pdf). In: Heckman J, Leamer E (eds) Handbook of econometrics, vol 5. North Holland, Amsterdam Dex S (1995) The reliability of recall data: a literature review. Bulletin De Methodologie Sociologique 49:58–89 Frey WH (2004) The New Great Migration: black Americans return to the south, 1965–2000, Living Cities Census Survey. Brookings Institution, Washington, DC Ihrke D, Faber CS (2012) Geographic mobility: 2005 to 2010, Current Population Reports, P20-567. US Census Bureau, Washington

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Lichter DT, Johnson KM (2009) Immigrant gateways and Hispanic migration to new destinations. Int Migr Rev 43:496–518 Long L (1975) Does migration interfere with children’s progress in school? Sociol Educ 48:369–381 Schram SF, Nitz L, Krueger G (1998) Without cause of effect: reconsidering welfare migration as a policy problem. Am J Polit Sci 42:210–230 Smith JP, Thomas D (2003) Remembrances of things past: test-retest reliability of retrospective migration histories. J R Stat Soc Ser 166:23–49 Tolnay SE (1998) Educational selection in the migration of southern blacks, 1880–1990. Soc Forces 77:487–514 Wilson TC (1991) Urbanism, migration, and tolerance: a reassessment. Am Sociol Rev 56:117–123

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Methods for Estimating International Migration Melissa Scopilliti, Kirsten West and Jason Devine U.S. Census Bureau, Suitland, MD, USA

Keywords International migration; Immigration; Emigration; Population estimates; Demographic analysis

Definition International migration is the movement of people across a national border. This includes both immigration (migration to a country) and emigration (migration from a country) or the combination of the two (net international migration). The US Census Bureau produces estimates of international migration annually as part of the Population Estimates Program and decadally as part of the Demographic Analysis Program.

Overview International migration is a component of population change (i.e., births, deaths, migration) that is difficult to measure directly using

administrative data sources. The Census Bureau annually produces estimates of international migration as part of its Population Estimates Program. The population estimates use the most recent decennial census as a base and measure population change from the census forward. They include one series of international migration estimates, using the most robust methods for estimating international migration. In addition, the Census Bureau produces international migration estimates every decade as part of the Demographic Analysis (DA) Program. The DA estimates are used to assess coverage of the most recent decennial census. Unlike the population estimates, the Demographic Analysis estimates do not use the decennial census as a base. They are developed using historical data on births, deaths, and international migration and are independent of the census being evaluated. The DA estimates for 2010 included a range of international migration estimates that reflected different assumptions and methods for estimating international migration. This entry will focus primarily on methods for estimating international migration in the 2012 Population Estimates Program although some alternative methods will be presented. The United States collects administrative data on some types of immigrants, but does not maintain administrative records on most persons leaving the country (emigrants). For example, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) collects and publishes information on immigrants

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who became naturalized US citizens, obtained legal permanent resident status, were admitted as refugees or granted asylum, or who entered the United States as nonimmigrants (foreign nationals who are granted temporary entrance), while the Department of State collects and publishes information on immigrant and nonimmigrant visa issuances and refugee admissions (Grieco and Rytina 2011). Although these administrative data sources are useful for measuring particular migration streams, they cannot be used to measure total immigration flows unless assumptions are made for immigrant groups not represented (e.g., persons entering the United States illegally and citizens relocating to the United States after residence abroad) or people obtaining multiple visas within the time period of interest (may be counted in the statistics more than once). In addition, little information is available on people leaving the United States. In the past, the Census Bureau used administrative data sources to estimate international migration as part of the Population Estimates Program and pre-2000 Demographic Analysis estimates. However, during the last decade, data sources and methods were altered to incorporate information from the newly implemented American Community Survey (ACS) (Dick and Bhaskar 2012). While administrative data are still used in research and evaluation, the Census Bureau’s current methods rely primarily on information from the decennial census, ACS, and data collected by other countries. The next several sections will describe methods the Census Bureau used to produce annual estimates of international migration as part of the 2012 Population Estimates Program. Alternative methods will be presented, and in some cases, alternatives described were used in the development of the 2010 Demographic Analysis estimates. For information on methods used in 2010 Demographic Analysis, see Bhaskar et al. (2013) and Devine et al. (2012).

Methods for Estimating International Migration

Producing National-Level Estimates of Net International Migration Net international migration (NIM) is estimated at the national level using the following subcomponents: (a) Foreign-born immigration (FBIM) (b) Foreign-born emigration (FBEM) (c) Net migration of the native-born population (NNM) (d) Immigration of the native- and foreign-born population from Puerto Rico (PRIM) (e) Emigration of the native- and foreign-born population to Puerto Rico (PREM) (f) Net movement of the Armed Forces population (AFM) where NIM ¼ FBIM  FBEM þ NNM þ PRIM  PREM þ AFM: Foreign-Born Immigration The term “foreign born” refers to people who were not US citizens at birth and includes both noncitizens and naturalized US citizens. Foreignborn immigration is estimated using information on residence 1 year ago (ROYA) from the ACS. The ROYA question is asked in two parts. The first asks “Did this person live in this house or apartment 1 year ago?” If not, the next part of the question asks “Where did this person live 1 year ago?” An annual estimate of foreign-born immigration is produced by tabulating the foreignborn population who lived outside of the United States, Puerto Rico, and outlying areas 1 year prior. Because of the large migration flows between Mexico and the United States, immigration estimates are produced separately for the population migrating from Mexico and the population migrating from “other countries” (U.S. Census Bureau 2012). The ACS is an annual survey (U.S. Census Bureau 2009); therefore, a time series of estimates can be produced using several years of ACS data.

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Although not used in the national-level estimates production process, foreign-born immigration flows can also be estimated using ACS data from a question on year of entry that asks, “When did this person come to live in the United States?” An annual estimate of immigration could be produced by tabulating the population who came to live in the United States in the year prior to the ACS survey year. Year-of-entry-based estimates were included in the range of 2010 Demographic Analysis estimates and tend to be higher than residence 1-year-ago-based estimates. There are also differences in the characteristics of immigrants estimated using the two survey questions (Borsella and Jensen 2013). The Census Bureau uses information from the ACS rather than administrative data sources primarily because the ACS includes the foreign born regardless of legal status. In addition, the survey measures migration of people, rather than migration events (i.e., multiple visas issued to a person for trips within the same year), so records do not have to be unduplicated. The ACS sample size is also relatively large for a survey, sampling roughly three million household addresses a year in the United States and 36,000 household addresses in Puerto Rico (U.S. Census Bureau 2009). However, there are several limitations of using survey data to estimate migration. Surveys have both sampling and non-sampling error that can impact estimates. Population controls are applied to surveys to help account for sampling and non-sampling errors. However, population controls are applied to the ACS by age, sex, race, and Hispanic origin but not by nativity (i.e., native born or foreign born) or migration status (U.S. Census Bureau 2009). Therefore, if immigrants are underrepresented relative to nonimmigrants within a control cell, the resulting estimate of immigration may be too low. While both the residence 1 year ago and year of entry approaches can be used to produce an annual estimate of foreign-born immigration, time lapses between the date an immigrant enters the United States and the time of the survey. The ACS’s residency rule excludes people who plan to stay at their current address for less than

2 months unless they do not have another place to stay. Therefore, immigrants with short durations of stay in the United States or who stay at multiple addresses for short periods of time may be underestimated in ACS-based estimates. In addition, ACS estimates are centered on July 1 of the survey year. If the aim is to produce immigration estimates for the calendar year, assumptions about the sub-annual distribution of estimates are needed. Foreign-Born Emigration Emigration of the foreign born is harder to estimate because censuses and surveys do not usually ask about people who reside outside of the United States. In addition, little information on migrants leaving the United States is collected by nationwide surveys or through administrative records. Therefore, a residual method is used to estimate emigration (Ahmed and Robinson 1994; U.S. Census Bureau 2012), where Emigrationtime 1 to time 2 ¼ ðPopulationtime 1 Deathstime 1 to time 2 Þ  Populationtime 2 : For example, to estimate foreign-born emigration from 2000 to 2008, the Census Bureau starts with the foreign-born population estimated by the 2000 Census (Population time 1) that arrived before 2000 (using year of entry); the population is then survived to 2008 (time 2) by subtracting deaths from 2000 to 2008 (calculated using life tables). This provides an “expected” foreign-born population in 2008 of the cohort arriving before 2000 if there were no emigration. An estimate of the “actual” foreign-born population in the United States in 2008 that arrived before 2000 (from the 2008 ACS) is subtracted from the “expected” population. The difference (residual) provides an estimate of emigration from 2000 to 2008 of the foreign-born population who resided in the United States in 2000. In the Population Estimates Program, residuals are annualized and divided by the estimated mid-period population to create annualized emigration rates that are applied to the population “at

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risk of emigrating” each year to obtain annual estimates of emigration (U.S. Census Bureau 2012). The “population at risk of emigrating” is obtained by tabulating the foreign-born stock in annual ACS files. For example, if the foreignborn population in the 2008 ACS is assumed to be “at risk of emigrating,” the emigration rate can be applied to this population to generate an estimate of emigration from 2008 to 2009. Since recent immigrants have a higher propensity to emigrate, emigration rates and estimates for two periods of entry groups are calculated, those that entered the United States in the past 10 years and those that entered more than 10 years prior. Rates are also calculated separately for people born in Mexico and those born in other countries. There are several limitations to this approach. The ACS is subject to sampling and non-sampling error that may impact the residual calculation. In the Population Estimates Program, several emigration rates are averaged before being applied to the population at risk of emigrating. Additionally, emigration rates are lagged because the residual calculation is limited to the population residing in the United States at time 1. This can be problematic if there are periodspecific changes in emigration rates. Information on year of entry is needed at both time 1 and time 2 to match entrance cohorts across time (and exclude immigrants who entered between time 1 and time 2). If this information is not available, the Warren and Peck (1980) model could be used to estimate emigration. Warren and Peck (1980) used information on the foreign-born population at time 1 and time 2 (regardless of year of entry) and subtracted a measure of immigration from time 1 to time 2 from the emigration residual. Since the immigration component is subtracted from the residual, the emigration residual is highly sensitive to the accuracy of the immigration component. While Ahmed and Robinson’s (1994) residual method is used in the population estimates program, there are several other methods for estimating emigration. These include panel attrition methods, indirect estimation and multiplicity sampling methods, using migration surveys or population registers, and statistical modeling

Methods for Estimating International Migration

(Suitland Working Group 2012, Suitland Working Group forthcoming). Native-Born Migration There is little direct information on the nativeborn US population residing abroad. The US Department of State maintains information on US citizens traveling or residing abroad, but registration is voluntary. Many overseas trips are for vacation and are short in duration and even longer-term migrants may not register with the Department of State when they move abroad. Due to the dearth of information, native migration is estimated as a net number using information on people born in the United States or US citizens (if place of birth information is not available) collected by censuses and population registers in other countries (Gibbs et al. 2003; Schachter 2008). Comparable data for two time points are needed to produce the native migration estimate. The US-born or US citizen population at time 1 is survived forward (subtracting deaths) and compared to the population at time 2. The difference in the time 1 and time 2 population provides an estimate of net native migration over the time period. For example, information on the US-born population was obtained from the 2001 to 2006 Census of Canada. The population in 2001 was survived to 2006 by age group and sex then compared to the population in 2006. The difference represents net migration between the United States and Canada from 2001 to 2006 of the US-born population. Schachter (2008) annualized the residuals and combined net native migration estimates from 84 countries to produce an overall estimate of native migration. There are several limitations to the method. Similar to the foreign-born emigration estimate, the native migration estimate assumes that current migration is similar to migration in prior periods. Additionally, not all countries collect information at the same point in time; therefore, the composite measure of migration is a sum of country-specific migration estimates across a variety of time periods. The quality of data also varies across countries, and coverage of the native-born US population may not be complete.

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The method for estimating the native-born population also has some imprecision, particularly when citizenship is used to classify the native born (person may be a US citizen by naturalization and therefore not “native born” or may have dual citizenship and not report their US citizenship). The measure is sensitive to errors in estimating mortality when surviving the population from time 1 to time 2 and is also time intensive to update regularly. Rather than using information from other countries, a method of estimating native-born immigration and emigration separately could be used. Information on residence 1 year ago can be used to measure the native-born population migrating back to the United States (note that year of entry is not asked of the US-born population). However, estimating emigration is more difficult. Flows of the native-born population are small relative to the size of the native-born population in the United States. Residuals (using the native-born population residing in the United States at time 1 and time 2) are sensitive to errors in estimation because the time 1 and time 2 population is large compared to the residual between the two time periods. Differential error in estimating the population at time 1 and time 2 results in a volatile residual estimate. Migration Between the United States and Puerto Rico Migration between the United States and Puerto Rico is estimated separately from foreign-born and native-born migration because data sources are available to measure both immigration and emigration flows. The ACS is fielded in Puerto Rico (Puerto Rico Community Survey or PRCS). Migration is estimated using information on residence 1 year ago (similar to the method for estimating foreign-born immigration). People who indicated on the ACS that they lived in Puerto Rico 1 year ago are considered immigrants to the United States. Those who indicated on the PRCS that they lived in the United States 1 year ago are considered emigrants.

Movement of the Armed Forces Population International movement of the Armed Forces population is estimated using restricted-use data obtained from the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC). DMDC provides monthly tabulations of military personnel stationed or deployed outside the United States by demographic characteristics. Net movement of the Armed Forces population is estimated by comparing the population overseas during consecutive time points.

Producing Subnational Estimates of International Migration Producing subnational (e.g., state, county) international migration estimates poses additional challenges. Foreign-born immigration can be estimated at the subnational level using information on current place of residence, residence 1 year ago, and/or year of entry. Since the ACS is based on a sample, the margin of error around the immigration estimate may be relatively large, particularly for smaller levels of geography or areas with few international migrants. Estimating foreign-born emigration and native migration at the subnational level is more difficult. If the residual method is used to estimate these components, it is not possible to distinguish between international migration and domestic migration unless an independent estimate of domestic migration is produced and included in the model. In the Population Estimates Program, state and county estimates (by age, sex, race, and Hispanic origin) are produced using a distributive method whereby national-level estimates are allocated to states and counties. This is done through the creation of “proxy universes,” or groups of people who are assumed to have similar characteristics to recent immigrants or emigrants. For example, to distribute the national-level estimate of foreign-born immigrants to states and counties by demographic characteristics, the distribution of the foreign-born population who entered the United States within 5 years of the ACS year is applied to the national total (age is adjusted to represent age at arrival instead of age at survey date). The foreign-born immigration totals are

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distributed separately for people born in Mexico and people born in other countries. There are two main reasons for using proxy universes. First, some of the estimation methods cannot distinguish between domestic and international movers when applied at the subnational level. Second, estimates must be produced for all states and counties by demographic characteristics, and sampling error around the ACS-based estimates of recent migrants by demographic characteristics is substantial for some cells. For information on the proxy universes for other components, see US Census Bureau (2012). The Population Estimates Program releases estimates of net international migration, but the subcomponents of net international migration are not publicly released. However, the 2010 Demographic Analysis subcomponent estimates for 2000 through 2010 are publicly available. Tables on residence 1 year ago, year of entry and place of birth are available on the Census Bureau website or through tabulations from the Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS). Additionally, ACS-based state-to-state and countyto-county migration files are publicly released on the Census Bureau’s website that includes a category for “movers from abroad.”

References Ahmed B, Robinson JG (1994) Estimates of emigration of the foreign-born population: 1980–1990, Population division working paper 9. U.S. Census Bureau, Washington, DC Bhaskar R, Corte´s R, Scopilliti M, Jensen E, Dick C, Armstrong D, Arenas-Germose´n B (2013) Estimating net international migration for 2010 demographic analysis: an overview of methods and results, Population division working paper 97. U.S. Census Bureau, Washington, DC

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Borsella CP, Jensen EB (2013) Evaluating methods for estimating foreign-born immigration using the American community survey. Paper presented at the population association of America annual meeting, New Orleans. 13 Apr Devine J, Bhaskar R, DeSalvo B, Robinson JG, Scopilliti M, West K (2012) The development and sensitivity analysis of the 2010 demographic analysis estimates, Population division working paper 93. U.S. Census Bureau, Washington, DC Dick C, Bhaskar R (2012) Improvements to the net international migration component in the U.S. Census Bureau’s population estimates: 2000 to 2011. Presentation at the southern demographic association annual meeting, Williamsburg. 10–12 Oct Gibbs JC, Harper GS, Rubin MJ, Shin HB (2003) Evaluating components of international migration: nativeborn emigrants, Population division working paper 63. U.S. Census Bureau, Washington, DC Grieco EM, Rytina N (2011) U.S. data sources on the foreign born and immigration. Int Migr Rev 45(4):1001–1016 Schachter J (2008) Estimating native emigration from the United States. Memorandum dated December 24, delivered to the U.S. Census Bureau Suitland Working Group (2012) Update on the Suitland Working Group project on reviewing methods for estimating emigration. Presentation at the joint economic commission for Europe and conference of European statisticians work session on migration statistics. Geneva. 17–19 Oct. http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/ DAM/stats/documents/ece/ces/ge.10/2012/WP_8_US. pdf. Accessed 13 May 2013 Suitland Working Group (forthcoming) A review of methods for estimating emigration U.S. Census Bureau (2009) Design and methodology: American community survey. U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC U.S. Census Bureau (2012) Methodology for the United States resident population estimates by age, sex, race, and hispanic origin and the state and county total resident population estimates (Vintage 2012): April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2012. Methodology statement. http://www. census.gov/popest/methodology/2012-nat-st-co-meth. pdf. Accessed 13 May 2013 Warren R, Peck JM (1980) Foreign-born emigration from the United States: 1960 to 1970. Demography 17:71–84

U

Using Registration Data to Measure International and Internal Migration in the European Union Shushanik Makaryan Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA, USA

Definition The European Commission Regulation (EC) No 862/2007, issued in 2007, makes it mandatory for all European Union (EU) member states to report international migration statistics. In its recommendations to make international migration statistics compatible with the United Nations (1998) definitions, the Eurostat – the DirectorateGeneral of the European Commission in charge of the statistical information from EU member states – conceptualizes an international migrant according to the United Nations (1998) definition of a long-term migrant: a person who for at least 12 months changes his/her usual residence, i.e., “the place at which a person normally spends the daily period of rest. . .” (Regulation (EC) No 862/2007). Because this definition is based on the previous place of residence, the concept I thank Jennifer Van Hook and Gordon De Jong for their useful comments on earlier versions of this entry and David Reichel for his advice on locating data sources and most recent policy research on migration statistics of the European Union.

includes the international migration both from one EU member state to another and from/to European Union to non-EU states. Accordingly, three categories of international migrants are included in the statistic and are distinguished by their citizenship. These three categories are EU citizens who migrate to another EU member state, citizens of a particular member state who return to their country of citizenship (i.e., return citizens), and non-EU citizens (Herm 2008). To define short-term migration, which is not mandatory to be reported to the Eurostat, the EU member states again rely on the United Nations (1998) definition: a change of place of residence for at least 3 months but not more than 12 months. In contrast to international migration, internal migration statistics describe only the migration contained within the same member state. The UN (1998) definitions are also used to compile data on internal migration. The Regulation (EC) No 862/2007 specifies the following sources for migration statistics: administrative and judicial records and registers, population registers, censuses, sample surveys, and other appropriate methods.

Overview In recent years, the European Union (EU) has initiated a number of policy initiatives to facilitate legal migration of EU and third-country citizens within the EU. To emphasize the benefits

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that migration can bring to EU local communities and member states, the EU policies have increasingly framed legal migration of labor migrants as mobility. However, this conceptualization should not be confused with statistical conceptualization of migration upon which all migration statistics of the EU are compiled. Prior to 2007, the data on international immigration and emigration flows in the EU were submitted to Eurostat based on a “gentlemen’s agreement,” with no legal binding (Eurostat metadata n.d.a). Statistics on international emigration were compiled by only sex and for immigration also by country of birth (Eurostat Metadata n.d.a). In 2007 Regulation EC No 862/2007 aimed to harmonize statistics on international migration and made their reporting mandatory for all EU member states. Since 2008 the data are reported by age, sex, citizenship, country of birth, country of previous/next residence of a migrant, and refer to the calendar year (Eurostat Metadata n.d.a). Many EU member states, among those the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Norway, Poland, Slovenia, and the United Kingdom, changed their migration collection systems to achieve harmonization with the Regulation (Eurostat 2011a). These changes in how international migration is reported created discontinuities in migration statistics between pre- and post-Regulation periods. Additionally, because the 2007 Regulation aimed to collect more demographic variables on migrants, the coverage period differs by the variable, and the oldest series date to 1998 (Eurostat Metadata n.d.a). Moreover, international migration statistics are not completely consistent across member states even after 2007. Even though the 2007 Regulation specified acceptable sources of data on international migration, the member states are free to choose among these sources (Herm 2008), which reduces comparability across EU member states. Further inconsistencies arise from differences in how international migration is operationalized, specifically whether in applying the UN (1998) and EC definitions the member states refer to the

migrant’s actual, intended, registered, or authorized stay of 12 months (Eurostat 2011a). Most member states rely on population registers (often used in combination with administrative records and registers), followed by censuses and sample surveys. Because other entries in this volume discuss the measurement of international and internal migration based on censuses and surveys, this entry focuses on population registers and administrative records.

Population Registers Population registers are designed to maintain demographic information on the population at selected points in time, such as on a quarterly basis. By tracking individuals over time and across space, they can be used to generate both migration stock and flow data. With improvements in population registration systems, and in some countries with transition to register-based population censuses, population registers have increasingly become an important source on migration flow data. To date, most of the EU member states rely on population registers to generate migration statistics for both international and internal migration of their own citizens and noncitizen migrants. One of the best examples is in Austria, where the establishment of the Central Register of Residence (CRR) in 2001 allowed a transition to a full register-based population census in 2011. Every resident of Austria is required to register his/her place of permanent/usual residence in Austria – i.e., the place of continuous residence for at least 90 days – at the CRR local municipal offices (Statistics Austria 2012:43). Homeless persons register without indicating their dwelling (Reeger 2009). Persons who change their place of permanent residence are required in person or by mail within 3 days to (de)register with the CRR office (Reeger 2009). The registration documents include the completed application form, the passport, and the birth certificate (Reeger 2009). Migration statistics are generated from the population register data as follows (Lebhart et al. 2007): upon registration at the CRR, each

Using Registration Data to Measure International and Internal Migration in the EU

individual is assigned a CRR identification number which is also the personal identification number (PIN) of the person, and the submitted information is coded into variables about the individual (the CRR identification number, citizenship, sex, country, and date of birth), the place of residence (record key, previous and next address of usual residence, building ID numbers), and the type of registration action (registration/ deregistration, birth/death, immigration/emigration within or outside of Austria, origin/destination country for migration, date and time of record filing). The CRR submits data to the Statistics Austria, the authority in charge of national statistics of Austria. Two files are submitted: individual-level data on (de)registration of place of usual residence for the previous quarter of the calendar year (to calculate migration flows on quarterly basis) and data on persons registered by main place of residence (to calculate stock population). The migration flow data include one record for the registration in the new place of usual residence and one record for deregistering from the prior place of residence. Based on the submitted data, the Statistics Austria compiles three statistical tables – of residents, residences, and citizenships. This detail of information allows analysts to generate statistics both for international and internal migration by various territorial units at municipal, regional, and national levels. The CRR data submitted to the Statistics Austria do not contain the person’s names, but instead include the person’s CRR identification number. The time coverage start/ end dates for both quarterly flow and stock data are harmonized to allow comparisons, and the stock data are compiled along the same variables as migration flow data. Population registers omit illegal migrants who do not possess residence permits. Another major disadvantage of population registers is the underreporting of emigration, especially international emigration. Because the registration of a change of place of residence is left on a selfdeclaratory basis, persons who emigrate are reluctant to register their move to continue receiving various state benefits and to retain their official status in the country (Reeger 2009)

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because they are not aware of the legal requirements to deregister (Lindhardt Olsen 2010). In contrast, in many EU member states, the migrants are required to have a residence permit to work, rent an apartment, use health and medical services, or open a bank account (Lindhardt Olsen 2010). Thus, the incentives to register immigration are higher than the incentives to deregister for emigration. Hence, EU international immigration statistics are more accurate than the international emigration statistics. Moreover, because migration of non-EU citizens depends on the residence permit and thus is regularly recorded, it is the migration of EU citizens that is typically underreported. Usually, data on emigration and on duration of stay abroad are missing for their own citizens, i.e., co-nationals of EU member states (as high as about 80 % in Germany in 2009; see Eurostat 2011b). Additionally, the deregistration requirements in EU member states also vary: in Austria, for example, persons who emigrate abroad for longer time periods are advised to deregister from the place of usual residence, but this is not obligatory (Reeger 2009), whereas in Denmark, the person is required to deregister, but this is in case the emigration is for more than 6 months (Lindhardt Olsen 2010). This variation in definitions and legal requirements creates additional sources of error for emigration statistics and cross-country comparisons within the EU. These variations in definitions also affect immigration statistics for return migrants as some EU member states are not able to report return migration of their own citizens (Herm 2008; Eurostat 2011b). Thus, typically, EU data on international migration of non-EU citizens are more reliable than migration data of EU citizens (Herm 2008), and international immigration statistics are more accurate than the international emigration statistics.

Administrative Records Many member states supplement or combine population register data with alternative administrative records and registers – to estimate the

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undeclared emigration or immigration both for annual migration statistics and for register-based population census results (Eurostat 2011b, c). These administrative sources include records on work or residence permits, national revenue and tax service data, health insurance or social security databases, dwelling or realty registers, unemployment registers, etc. Data from the national revenue service and the residence permits are typically used to estimate migration of non-EU citizens. Residence permits are authorizations valid for a minimum of 3 months and issued to non-EU citizens to stay legally in the EU (Scarnicchia 2011). According to the Regulation (EC) No 862/2007, the statistics on residence permits are mandatory for EU member states, should refer to the calendar year, and describe the number of persons issued such permits (not the number of acts issued; see Eurostat Metadata n.d.b). However, because various administrative registers use different definitions when recording observations (Reinhard et al. 2010), some uncertainty still remains when linking various administrative records with population registers to estimate migration flows. In EU Nordic countries, administrative records play an important role in the production of population statistics. In Denmark, for example, population registers are linked to the Central Business Register and the Dwelling Register (Lindhardt Olsen 2010). Linking these three registers allows analysts to accumulate information on the population size and the number of businesses and dwellings, to retrieve information on a wide range of sociodemographic attributes of a person, as well as to impute missing observations on a variable (Lindhardt Olsen 2010). Because emigration data are frequently underreported, as discussed above, tax records can be linked to the person through the Central Business Register and the population register and can help reveal emigrations when no income tax is reported for the person and the requests to submit tax report remain unattended. But typically, this type of information becomes available with some substantial delay (Lindhardt Olsen 2010), as can be the case with tax data. These missing data are imputed in the database eventually for previous

years. This is another reason that immigration statistics have higher accuracy than emigration data.

References Eurostat (2011a) Migrants in Europe: a statistical portrait of the first and second generation. Publications Office of the European Union, Luxemburg. http://ec.europa. eu/eurostat/documents/3217494/5727749/KS-31-10539-EN.PDF/bcf27a60-7016-4fec-98c5-e8488491ebbd. 7 Oct 2015 Eurostat (2011b) Annual migration statistics data collection, reference year 2009: summary of data sources used for immigration rates. http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/ cache/ITY_SDDS/Annexes/migr_flow_esms_an9.pdf. 13 Mar 2013 Eurostat (2011c) Annual migration statistics data collection, reference year 2009: summary of data sources used for emigration rates. http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa. eu/cache/ITY_SDDS/Annexes/migr_flow_esms_an10. pdf. 13 Mar 2013 Eurostat metadata (n.d.a) International migration flows: reference metadata, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/ cache/ITY_SDDS/en/migr_flow_esms.htm. Accessed on 12 Mar 2013 Eurostat metadata (n.d.b) Residence permits: reference metadata, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ ITY_SDDS/en/migr_res_esms.htm. Accessed on 12 Mar 2013 Herm A (2008) Population and social conditions. In: EUROSTAT statistics in focus, 98/2008 Lebhart G, Neustadter C, Kytir J (2007) The new population register at statistics Austria: conceptualization and methodology for register-based flow and stock statistics. Aust J Stat 36(4):277–289 Lindhardt Olsen A (2010) Information on migrants in register-based censuses: migration data in the Danish register-based statistical system. Working Paper 15 presented at the Joint UNECE/Eurostat Expert Group Meeting on Register-Based Censuses, The Hague, 10–11 May 2010 Reeger U (2009) Austria. In: Fassmann H, Reeger U, Sievers W (eds) Statistics and reality: concepts and measurements of migration in Europe. IMISCOE report. University Press, Amsterdam Regulation (EC) No 862/2007. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/ LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2007:199:0023: 0029:EN:PDF. Accessed on 9 Mar 2013 Reinhard F, Schwerer E, Berka C, Moser M, Humer S (2010) Quality of registers: quality assessment for register–based statistics in Austria. Working Paper 4 presented at the Joint UNECE/Eurostat Expert Group Meeting on Register-Based Censuses, The Hague, 10–11 May 2010 Scarnicchia L (2011) Residence permits issued to non-EU citizens in 2009 for family reunification, employment

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and education. In: EUROSTAT Statistics in Focus, 43/2011 Statistics Austria (2012) Wanderungsstatistik 2011: Herausgegeben von Statistik Austria, Wien

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United Nations (1998) Recommendations on statistics of international migration, papers series M, No. 58 ⁄rev.1, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations, New York

Part 9: Oceania

G

Gold Rushes (Australia) James Jupp The Australian National University, Centre for Immigration & Multicultural Studies, Building 70, Canberra, ACT, Australia

Definition Between 1851 and 1861, the British colony of Victoria in southern Australia increased its population from 77,345 to 538,628, constituting half of the total population of the Australian continent. This massive increase was predominantly due to uncontrolled immigration, mainly from Britain and Ireland, and internal migration from the adjacent colonies of Tasmania, South Australia, and New South Wales. The cause of these migrations was the discovery of gold in 1851. The second half of the nineteenth century saw many other Australian “gold rushes,” but none as large as that to Victoria (Hill 2010).

Detailed Description The isolation of Australia, which took shipping many weeks to reach it from the United Kingdom, previously limited immigration to schemes organized by the British state. These included convict transportation and assisted passages for free immigrants, who began to replace convicts

from 1831. But the gold rush overcame that distance and also attracted immigrants from China and the Californian gold rush of two years earlier. By 1861 there were 24,732 Chinese residents in Victoria, making up two-thirds of the continental total but only two percent of the Australia-wide population. The largest number of immigrants came from England (170,000), Ireland (87,000), Scotland (61,000), and Germany (10,000), including those already in Victoria. Small but influential numbers came from the United States and were regarded unfavorably by the British authorities, who feared their republican influence and their use of arms. The lasting impact of the Victorian gold rush cannot be understood only in terms of immigrant numbers, which made the arrival port of Melbourne the largest city in Australia until the depression of the 1890s (Serle 1963). The suppressed miners’ revolt against licensing fees at Eureka (Ballarat) in 1854 is credited with the foundation of a democracy based on manhood suffrage, before Britain or the United States (Molony 1984). Hostility to the Chinese eventually gave rise to the White Australia policy, which prohibited non-European immigration until the late 1960s. The predominance of British immigration consolidated the links with Britain, which still survive. A heritage of magnificent architecture in Melbourne, Ballarat, Bendigo, and other towns was built on the wealth which gold brought. The modern population of Melbourne exceeds four million and of Ballarat and

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Bendigo 100,000 each. Most other gold-created towns are much smaller or have faded away. Shipping connections with Europe were greatly improved, with clipper ships bringing out immigrants and returning with wool to Britain. Other gold rushes were launched over most of Australia (Blainey 1969). The only one with lasting influence was in Western Australia at Kalgoorlie and Coolgardie in the 1890s. This increased the population of Western Australia fivefold between 1885 and 1901 from 36,000 to 184,000. By then gold mining had moved from small-scale to major mechanized deep operations. Most migration to Kalgoorlie was from other parts of Australia. Labor migration in the west is now focused on the ore mines of the

Gold Rushes (Australia)

Pilbara and further north, but no longer on gold. Much of it is based on flying in miners from elsewhere in Australia for set periods, rather than on permanent communities. Foreign labor is mainly based on limited term contracts.

References Blainey G (1969) The rush that never ended. Melbourne University Press, Melbourne Hill D (2010) The gold rush. Heinemann, Sydney Molony J (1984) Eureka. Viking, Ringwood Serle G (1963) The golden age: a history of the colony of Victoria 1851-1861. Melbourne University Press, Melbourne

P

Pacific Island Countries and Migration Carmen Voigt-Graf Development Policy Centre, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University, Canberra, ACT, Australia

Definition Pacific Island countries (PICs) refer to the 14 politically independent island countries located in the Pacific Ocean which are members of the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (www.forumsec.org). These are Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Republic of Marshall Islands (RMI), Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu. The PICs can be divided into the three cultural regions of Melanesia, Polynesia, and Micronesia.

Introduction Numerous migration flows cross the Pacific region and link rural areas with urban areas, outer islands with main islands, different Pacific Island countries (PICs) with each other, and with the Pacific Rim. PICs are divided into three cultural regions: Melanesia (including Papua New Guinea, Fiji,

Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu), Polynesia (including Cook Islands, Niue, Samoa, Tonga, and Tuvalu), and Micronesia (including Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), Kiribati, Nauru, Palau, and Republic of Marshall Islands (RMI)). Proportionate to their home population sizes, migration has been significant, particularly in the smaller island states of Micronesia and Polynesia, and no other region in the world has in recent decades experienced a larger outflow of their populations than Polynesia. In contrast to Polynesians and Micronesians, there have been few migration opportunities for Melanesians, with the exception of Fiji citizens. Population growth rates in Melanesia remain among the highest in the world. Melanesian countries have suffered considerable civil unrest, partly caused by the absence of a migration outlet for their unemployed youth (Duncan et al. 2006). Melanesian countries currently experience a large influx of internal migrants into urban centers with the associated problems of a rise in squatter settlements, growing unemployment, increasing crime and violence, problems with waste disposal, and breakdown of basic social services.

Current Migration Patterns and Trends The largest contemporary international migration flows in the Pacific are those from the islands to the metropolitan countries of the Pacific Rim. Migration is primarily a response to real and

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perceived inequalities in incomes, education, training, socioeconomic opportunities, and health care. In postcolonial times, several PICs have continued to maintain close relationships with developed Pacific Rim countries which often result in special residency and work rights. The US grants free access to citizens of the three Compact States, FSM, RMI, and Palau. New Zealand has special relationships with several PICs. Cook Islanders, Niueans, and Tokelauans are New Zealand citizens with full residential and work rights in New Zealand. Both the Cook Islands and Niue have experienced substantial population losses, to the extent that both actively encourage return migration and, for Niue at least, there are concerns over future viability. The population in Niue has declined to just over 2,000 people while more than 22,000 Niueans live overseas, largely in New Zealand. Similarly, the Cook Islands recorded a resident population of 21,000 in 2006 compared to 58,000 Cook Islanders in New Zealand (Statistics New Zealand and Ministry of Pacific Island Affairs 2010). Due to high emigration rates, the resident population of the Cook Islands is projected to fall to less than 10,000 by 2029 (Duncan et al. 2006). A different migration pattern is prevalent in Tuvalu and Kiribati where the main overseas employment opportunity is as seafarers on German merchant ships and Asian fishing boats, leading to a specific form of temporary migration that ensures the economic survival of these two atoll states while also leading to less favorable social implications. Due to the huge emigration flows particularly from Polynesia, the smaller island states have been characterized as MIRAB states, where development is based on migration generating remittances and aid financing local bureaucracies (Bertram and Watters 1985). The MIRAB model suggests that external sources of financing that do not leave a residue of debt are the key to economic performance of small islands. In many Polynesian countries remittances represent the main source of foreign income and reach levels rarely found in other parts of the

Pacific Island Countries and Migration

world. In 2010, Tonga received 72 million US$ in remittances, equivalent to 19.7 % of the country’s GDP, while the corresponding figures for Samoa were 122 million US$ and 22.5 % (The World Bank). These figures would be even higher if unrecorded remittances were included. In recent years, migration opportunities in metropolitan states have increasingly targeted skilled migrants. Thus migration flows from the Pacific are increasingly likely to be of skilled migrants from various sectors including health (Connell 2009) and education (Iredale et al. 2015). In contrast to the MIRAB argument that development patterns in the Pacific, based on migration generating remittances and aid financing local bureaucracies, are durable and sustainable, the emigration of workers, particularly skilled workers, may have severe implications for small countries that have to cope with limited human resources. There has been a general shift in the debate on the effects of migration from a previous focus on the largely positive effect of remittances to the potentially more negative effects of skill loss or brain drain. In line with global patterns, Pacific Islander migration has become more diversified in recent years with the emergence of nontraditional destinations, new types of migration including temporary and seasonal migration, and new occupational groups. Among the nontraditional destination countries of Pacific Islander migrants are the oil-rich Middle Eastern countries that have attracted skilled migrants such as airline pilots from Fiji and PNG. An example of a new occupational group is that of Fijians working overseas as private security officers. Opportunities for employment in private security companies have expanded considerably in recent years, and Fijians, with their long history of serving in the British Army and as peacekeepers in various UN missions, have been able to make use of these opportunities. By mid-2005, there were over 1,000 Fijians working in Iraq and Kuwait as soldiers, security guards, drivers, and laborers. In addition there were more than 2,000 Fijian soldiers in the British Army in 2006 (Wikipedia).

Pacific Island Countries and Migration

In response to high migration pressures, PIC governments have been engaged in a campaign to allow short-term migrants into Australia and New Zealand. In April 2007, the New Zealand government introduced the “Recognised Seasonal Employer” scheme under which up to 8,000 seasonal agricultural workers from Kiribati, Samoa, Tuvalu, Tonga, Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu are given visas for New Zealand (Immigration New Zealand). A similar scheme was introduced in 2008 by Australia for three PICs, called the “Pacific Seasonal Worker Pilot Scheme;” in 2012 it was replaced by the Seasonal Worker Program which expanded the program to eight PICs (Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations). The USA has also included nine PICs into the list of countries eligible to participate in nonimmigrant visa programs, known as H-2A (agricultural work) and H-2B (nonagricultural work) (Hay 2011). Despite the significance of migration in PICs, research on the issue is lacking, partly due to the paucity of data in many countries. While some good qualitative studies have provided insights into the causes and consequences of migration, the absence of reliable statistical data on migration by skill level, age, sex, etc., has hampered demographic analyses.

Cross-References ▶ African Island Migration ▶ Australian Immigration

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▶ New Zealand Immigration

References Bertram G, Watters RF (1985) The MIRAB economy in Pacific microstates. Pac Viewpoint South 26(3):497–520 Connell J (2009) The global health care chain: from the pacific to the world. Routledge, New York Duncan R, Booth H, Zhang G, Rao M, Taomia F (2006) The young and the restless: population pressures in the pacific. In: World Bank (ed) At home and away: expanding job opportunities for Pacific Islanders through labour mobility. World Bank, Washington, pp 28–45 Hay D (2011) New pacific seasonal workers scheme. Development policy blog. http://devpolicy.org/new-pacific-sea sonal-workers-scheme. Accessed 1 Sept 2012 Immigration New Zealand Recognised seasonal employers. http://www.immigration.govt.nz/ employers/employ/temp/rse/. Accessed 2 Sept 2012 Iredale R, Voigt-Graf C, Khoo SE (2015) Trends in international and internal teacher mobility in three Pacific Island countries, International Migration, 53 (1):97–114 Statistics New Zealand and Ministry of Pacific Island Affairs (2010) Demographics of New Zealand’s Pacific population. Statistics New Zealand and Ministry of Pacific Island Affairs, Wellington. http://www.stats.govt.nz/browse_for_stats/people_ and_communities/pacific_peoples/pacific-progress-dem ography.aspx. Accessed 27 Aug 2012 Wikipedia. Economy of fiji. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Economy_of_Fiji. Accessed 29 Aug 2012 World Bank. Migration and remittance data. http://econ. worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTD ECPROSPECTS/0, contentMDK:22759429~pagePK:6 4165401~piPK:64165026~theSitePK:476883,00.html. Accessed 3 Sept 2012

Part 10: Permanence of Migration

P

Points-Based Immigration Madeleine Sumption Migration Policy Institute, Washington, DC, USA

Keywords Points system; Points; Human capital; Highly skilled immigration; Merits-based immigration; Employer-based immigration; Hybrid systems; Government-led immigrant selection, Canada; Australia; The United Kingdom

Definition A points system is a mechanism for determining eligibility for employment-based immigration. In a points-based immigration system, governments devise a list of attributes or characteristics that they deem important for prospective foreign workers or their employers to possess to receive a temporary, provisional, or permanent visa. Different attributes are assigned a certain number of points, and applicants who earn sufficient points are eligible to apply for a visa. The points system was first introduced in Canada in 1969 and has since been adopted and adapted by several other countries, including Australia, New Zealand, Hong Kong, Denmark, Austria, and Singapore.

Points systems can take many different forms, some of which have little in common with each other. In the purest version of the points-based immigration model, prospective immigrants apply directly to the relevant government agency and can qualify to migrate on the basis of their personal and human capital characteristics alone. As a result, points systems are often referred to as “government-led” selection mechanisms, because governments determine the selection criteria. They are also known as “supply-driven” selection systems because applications depend on prospective immigrants’ decisions rather than on employers’ demand for specific foreign workers. Points systems are usually defined in contrast with the more widespread “employer-led” systems, under which migrants qualify to receive work visas only when they are sponsored by prospective employers. In practice, points-based and employer-led selection approaches are not mutually exclusive, and several governments have experimented with hybrid selection models that combine elements of both systems (Papademetriou et al. 2008). In particular, while the term “points system” is often used to refer to a system that admits immigrant workers without a job offer, several recently introduced versions of points systems either require or prioritize a job offer in the application process. Points systems were traditionally used to admit immigrants on a permanent basis, although more recent adopters such as Austria and Denmark have used them to admit workers on an

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initially temporary basis, adjudicating permanent residence applications a few years later. Austria also uses a points system to determine eligibility for job-search visas that allow prospective immigrants to come to the country to find work. More unusually, some Chinese provinces and cities have used points systems to award urban hukou registration (a status which confers various social benefits and rights) to internal, mostly rural, migrants.

Commonly Used Criteria in Points Systems The most basic points system comprises a pass mark and a list of points for various individual, occupational, or employer characteristics. Points are typically awarded for criteria that imply that applicants have high levels of human capital or that their skills are in high demand. The most common attributes for which points are awarded are language ability, education, age (i.e., youth), and work experience, especially in occupations considered to be in high demand. Less common criteria include the intention to settle outside of the major destination regions or cities, the presence of close relatives in the country, and the education and work experience of an applicant’s partner (these criteria are also less valued, earning considerably fewer points). Points systems generally allocate points to factors that are associated with (a) a positive economic contribution (such as high levels of human capital or specific occupational skills) and (b) the ability to integrate successfully into the receiving country’s labor market. Most points systems award points for age, with younger applicants generally receiving higher scores. Age is valued for several reasons. First, people who migrate at a younger age, on average, integrate more seamlessly into the labor market, are more likely to be able to learn the local language, and have a longer time horizon in which to invest in local human capital (such as qualifications or in-work training). Second, younger migrants contribute more to resolving demographic imbalances, because they have a longer

Points-Based Immigration

working life ahead of them. Third, awarding points for age may help to offset the disadvantage that younger applicants otherwise face because they have had less time to accumulate work experience. Education and relevant work experience appear in almost all points systems. Applicants can often earn additional points if their education and experience were gained in the host country, on the basis that local education and experience are among the factors that best demonstrate migrants’ ability to integrate. Local education is valued because it is easily recognized by local employers, reducing the barriers to employment than foreign-trained professionals often face. Local work experience is a signal that hostcountry employers have “endorsed” an individual’s qualifications by choosing to employ them. Language skills appear in all of the major points systems and are considered one of the most important predictors of an immigrant’s ability to find employment at their skill level. All systems award points for proficiency in the national language or languages, while some non-English-speaking countries reward English or other widely used second languages. Austria rewards English language skills as well as as its native German, for example, and applicants in Denmark can earn points for Danish, Swedish, Norwegian, German, or English. Some points systems award points for specific occupational skills considered to be in high demand. New Zealand, for example, gives extra points for applicants with qualifications, a job offer, or work experience in one of a list of occupations perceived to face a shortage of qualified workers. In 2002, Canada stopped awarding points for specific occupations because of concerns that immigrants selected on this basis did not fare well in the labor market; the revised points test instead emphasized education and language more strongly, and the data from the program suggest that immigrants selected under the new system have fared better in the labor market (even if poor labor market outcomes from pointstested migrants is still a major concern in Canada) (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2010). In 2011, Australia also stopped awarding points for

Points-Based Immigration

specific occupations; the new system required all migrants coming under the national-level points test to work in one of a narrower list of occupations, while pushing applicants in other occupations toward employer-sponsored visas. Other points systems have used more unusual criteria. In 2012, Australia introduced a new “innovation points test” for migrants applying under its business innovation and investment program designed to attract investors and entrepreneurs. This test include several criteria that do not usually appear in points systems. In addition to age, language, and educational qualifications, it gave points for years of business and investment experience, financial assets that the individual may be able to invest, the turnover of businesses they own, and certain indicators of innovation such as having registered patents or being involved in joint ventures or export trade. In China, some subnational jurisdictions use points systems to award hukou registration to residents from other areas within China; these systems have rewarded criteria such as property ownership, charitable giving, and blood donation (Zhang 2012).

The Mechanics of Points Systems Points systems can come in many forms, adapted to a country’s policy objectives and circumstances. They generally provide significant flexibility for determining eligibility – for example, applicants might qualify if they have either very high levels of education or substantial work experience in the host country and they might be able to compensate for deficiencies in one area (such as language ability) with higher achievement in another (such as education). As a result, the points system is essentially a way of organizing information about the different ways in which applicants can qualify for visas. The criteria in points systems are not weighted equally. Some characteristics earn their holders more than others, and the emphasis that the various attributes receive varies widely by country. In late 2012, for example, Denmark’s points test valued academic credentials above all else, and

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some prospective immigrants could earn sufficient points for entry on the basis of their education alone. Canada, by contrast, gives most weight to having a job offer or sponsorship by a Canadian province. By way of example, Table 1 shows the points allocations in Australia for prospective migrants applying without an employer or regionalgovernment sponsor. Applicants can reach the required 60 points in numerous ways. For example, an individual between the ages of 25 and 32 who speaks excellent English will reach the pass mark with relative ease by earning just 10 points in other areas (e.g., having a diploma or trade qualification or higher). An older applicant would need higher qualifications; for example, a 42-year-old applicant (15 points) might reach the pass mark with 10 years of work experience (20 points), a bachelor’s degree (15 points), and proficiency in English (10 points). Several points systems have compulsory requirements in addition to optional ones. For example, Australia and New Zealand require a minimum threshold of English language ability, while Denmark requires applicants to have at least a bachelor’s degree. Australia also requires applicants to have their credentials and skills assessed and validated by the relevant assessing agency in Australia before prospective candidates apply for a visa. Traditionally, points systems have made applicants eligible for a visa if their points equal or exceed the specified pass mark. However, recently the ‘expression of interest’ model has become more popular. Under this system, created in New Zealand and later adopted in Australia and Canada, applicants with more than a certain number of points are instead admitted to a “pool,” from which candidates are then invited by the government (or, potentially, by employers or regional governments); this system is designed to give the government greater control over the number of applicants that are eligible in a given period and to select people from the pool who are considered most skilled or most closely matched to current labor market needs. The UK policy, meanwhile, specifies that a points test should be used to prioritize applications for employer-

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Points-Based Immigration

Points-Based Immigration, Table 1 Points table for Australian skilled independent visa (subclass 189) Category Age English language ability Work experience in Australia Work experience overseas Education qualifications From Australian institution or overseas qualification of recognized standard Other qualifications, including: Study within Australia Professional year in Australia Skilled partner Speaks community language Studied in regional Australia Pass mark

Maximum points awarded 30 20 20 15 20

Attribute for which maximum points are awarded 25–32 years old Superior English 8–10 years 8–10 years Doctorate degree

5 for each attribute

60

Source: Australian Department of Immigration and Citizenship (2012)

sponsored visas only in the event that the numerical limit on these visas is oversubscribed this happened for the first time in June 2015. Since points systems are, at their core, a way of presenting information about eligibility criteria, almost any country’s immigration could be organized into a points system without any change to the underlying eligibility criteria. A typical employer-led immigration system could be presented as a points system in which immigrants earn 100 % of the required points by having an employer sponsor. The United Kingdom, for example, uses a points system to organize information about eligibility requirements in what is – in all but name – a relatively traditional employer-driven immigration system. Table 2 shows the points table for workers applying as an employer-sponsored skilled worker (known in the United Kingdom as “Tier 2 of the pointsbased system”). Applicants must earn at least 70 points to qualify; the only way of earning 70 points is to meet all of the listed criteria. This is not a points system as the term is typically understood. It does not allow immigrants to apply without an employer sponsor, applicants do not earn points on the basis of their human-capital characteristics such as age or education, and there is no flexibility in how applicants can meet the

criteria. The United Kingdom previously operated a traditional points system that allocated points for human-capital characteristics and admitted immigrants without a job offer, but this route was closed to new entrants in 2010.

Policy Rationale and Critiques of Points Systems Governments that rely on points systems have done so for a number of reasons. First, the points system allows governments to choose the characteristics of selected immigrants. Points systems that admit immigrants without a job offer have largely been used as a mechanism to accumulate human capital, bringing in workers with high levels of qualifications who are thus expected to contribute economically in the long run (even if their integration is not always immediate). Points systems may also have a demographic objective, prioritizing applications from younger immigrants who have a full working (and tax-paying) life ahead of them. Meanwhile, points systems that require a job offer or employer sponsor are often designed to ensure that the immigrants that employers select have a minimum threshold of human capital and thus (a) have the potential to

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Points-Based Immigration

Points-Based Immigration, Table 2 Points awarded in the United Kingdom for employer-sponsored skilled workers Attribute Employer sponsorship Job will pay appropriate salary English language Individual has GBP 945 to support self Pass mark

Points 30 20 10 10 70

Source: United Kingdom Borders Agency (2012) “Appropriate salary” is defined in regulation according to the applicant’s occupation and experience level

integrate in the long run, even when no longer working for their initial employer, and (b) are less likely to compete for jobs with low-wage local workers. Second, points systems are transparent, since the selection criteria can be easily published and explained; this allows governments to demonstrate to their publics that immigrants are selected on merit and are bringing valuable human capital. The major critique of the points-based selection model is that it has often been used to admit immigrants without a job offer; there is thus no guarantee that these individuals will find work at their skill level. Employers routinely dedicate very substantial resources to vetting prospective hires through interviews and tailored assessments, but points systems are by their nature based on a relatively narrow set of criteria. Points systems can only assess quantifiable skills and credentials, and it is difficult for them to distinguish between qualifications of different quality or value to local employers. Some countries have attempted to address this problem by maintaining lists of academic institutions from which points for education can be claimed or awarding extra points for degrees from top-ranked institutions. Denmark, for example, awards bonus points if the applicant’s university is among the top 400 world universities, as ranked by the higher-education consultant Quacquarelli Symonds. Points systems are also ill equipped to identify “soft” attributes that are rewarded in the labor market, such as interpersonal skills or informal on-the-job training. A research from Canada, in particular, points to substantial un- and underemployment among points-selected foreign

workers – giving credence to the concern that points systems often lead to “brain waste” and do not identify workers with skills that local employers value. A further criticism of points systems is that they are slower than employerled systems to react to changing labor market conditions (including business cycles) and that they do not satisfy employers’ demand for specific workers to fill specific vacancies in real time. In recent years, several countries have sought to address these problems by relying less on “pure” points systems that admit immigrants without a job offer. Canada and Australia have scaled back the share of immigrants admitted without a job offer and encouraged greater use of employersponsored visas. Hybrid selection systems that use a points test but also require or prioritize a job offer have also become increasingly popular. Some systems, such as Canada’s and New Zealand’s, offer high numbers of points for a job offer, making it harder for people to qualify if they do not already have employment lined up. The points system in Austria is also a hybrid of points-based and employer-led selection. Under the Austrian system, most applicants must have a job offer and pass a points test; applicants who pass a slightly more stringent points test but do not have a job offer can receive a 6-month job-search visa which can be converted into a work permit if they find skilled employment. Finally, some countries, including Australia and New Zealand, allow workers initially selected by an employer to qualify for permanent residence or a status independent of their employer, by applying through the points system; points tests that reward local work experience naturally facilitate this transition.

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References Australian Department of Immigration and Citizenship (2012) Skilled independent (subclass 189) visa. Online http://www.immi.gov.au/skills/skillselect/ document. index/visas/subclass-189/#australian-study-requirements. Accessed 3 June 2016 Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Evaluation of the federal skilled worker program. http://www.cic.gc.ca/ english/pdf/research-stats/FSW2010.pdf. Accessed 3 Dec 2012 Papademetriou D, Somerville W, Tanaka T (2008) Hybrid immigrant-selection systems: the next generation of

Points-Based Immigration

economic migration schemes. Migration Policy Institute, Washington, DC, http://www.migrationpolicy. org/transatlantic/HybridSystems.pdf. Accessed 1 Dec 2012 UK Visas and Immigration (2016) Tier 2 of the Points Based System – Policy Guidance. https://www.gov.uk/gov ernment/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file /514054/Tier_2_Policy_Guidance_04_2016. Accessed 3 June 2016 Zhang (2012) Economic migration and urban citizenship in China: the role of points systems. Popul Dev Rev 38(3):503–533

T

Temporary Labor Migration Christopher Foulkes International Organization for Migration Afghanistan, Kabul, Afghanistan

Keywords Circular migration; Seasonal Sojourners; Guest workers

migration;

Definitions Temporary migration is migration to a country that is not intended to be permanent, for a specified and limited period of time, and usually undertaken for a specific purpose. Host countries admit temporary migrants for the purposes of employment, study, tourism, business activities, and religious or cultural visits and exchanges. This entry focuses on employment- or labourrelated temporary migration. Temporary labor migration programs are often referred to in host countries as guest-worker programs. As Abella (2006, p. 5) says, “[t]he term ‘guest workers’ is the generic label for all migrant workers who have no right to permanent settlement.” Within the guest-worker category, circular migration programs are defined as programs that facilitate “the process of leaving and then returning to one’s place of origin” (Newland

2009, p. 6). Again, this is a very broad term that requires only that migrants leave their country of origin and at some point return. Circular migration is often used in literature to describe cyclical temporary migration, where migrants repeatedly leave and then return to their place of origin. In sociological literature, temporary labor migrants are often referred to as sojourners, as compared with settlers. Uriely defines a sojourner as having both a general intention and concrete plan to return to their place of origin, whereas a settler is defined as someone with the absence of either of these things. As such, it is possible to equate temporary migrants with sojourners as compared to settlers (Uriely 1994, p. 435). Longer-term temporary migration programs last longer than a year and do not necessarily involve seasonal employment in the agricultural or horticultural sectors. Under this type of guestworker scheme, migrants are generally annually granted the right to remain, that is, contingent on them remaining employed.

The Purpose of the Temporary Labor Migration Programs Temporary labor migration programs are used by both countries of destination (receiving) and countries of origin (sending) countries to address their labor needs at various skill levels and can be expanded or curtailed in response to changing economic conditions, thus providing greater

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flexibility in the labor market (Abella 2006). From the point of view of host countries, robust and well-designed temporary labor programs for migrants are often viewed as a safeguard mechanism against illegal labor migration (e.g., the United States of America) (Papademetriou 2013). These countries also rely on temporary programs to satisfy labour supply shortages when permanent immigration of foreigners, especially low-skilled ones, is not desired or socially accepted. This is the case in many MiddleEastern states such as the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia (Baldwin-Edwards 2005). Sending states, most of whom are developing countries, participate in temporary labor programs to help their citizens find work abroad when economic opportunities at home are limited, to tap into remittances for the country’s economic development, and to benefit from the enhanced qualifications and experiences of temporary migrants who return home (Abella 2006). While generally considered a positive phenomenon, temporary labor migration – particularly of low-skilled migrants – tends to leave migrants vulnerable to abuse in a foreign country. Because temporary labor migrants’ right to remain in their country of employment is contingent on them continuing that employment, these migrant workers are less likely to complain when the employers violate labor and wage conditions. This turns temporary migrant laborers into “precarious workers” over whom employers and labor users have particular and wide-ranging mechanisms of control (Anderson 2010). In addition, local government bureaucrats and enforcement agents may take advantage of the workers’ lack of language skills and cultural knowledge and make them pay bribes. Formal temporary labour migration programmes often come with a contract of employment, predeparture cultural orientation, and consular services in the country of employment. These programmes go some way to protecting migrant workers from being taken advantage of by unscrupulous employers and corrupt officials in host countries. Temporary migration programs for employment purposes generally take two forms: short-term,

Temporary Labor Migration

seasonal migration programs and longer-term migration programs.

Short-Term Programs A subset of circular migration programs is seasonal migration programs. These are circular migration programs where the migrants are “persons employed by a country other than their own for only part of a year because the work they perform depends on seasonal conditions” (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 1998). Seasonal migrants typically migrate in order to provide agricultural or horticultural labor services in the on-season and return to their country of origin in the off-season. While seasonal migration is not a new phenomenon, specific government policy responses to it are a relatively recent occurrence. It has been argued that seasonal migration “has only become a policy issue since governments have started to expend great efforts to control movement across their borders in ways that make spontaneous circulation more difficult” (Newland 2009, p. 23). Seasonal migrants generally do not remain in their county of employment for longer than 9 months at a time. The governments of developed host countries are increasingly regulating circular migrants through recognized seasonal employer (RSE) schemes, seasonal work permits, and specialized circular migrant visas. One example of this is New Zealand, where an RSE scheme has been in place since 2006 to regulate low-skilled migrant workers from the Pacific Islands Forum countries (including the Federated States of Micronesia, Papua New Guinea, Kiribati, Nauru, Palau, the Republic of Marshall Islands, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Samoa, and Vanuatu) and employers in the horticulture and viticulture industries. Under the scheme employers are required to be recognized as seasonal employers by meeting certain criteria, including being in sound financial state, having human resources and workplace policies and practices that follow a high standard, demonstrating a commitment to hire New Zealand

Temporary Labor Migration

nationals, and having not violated relevant immigration and employment laws in the past. Pacific Island workers can then be recruited under the RSE. There are up to 5,000 seasonal work visas per year available under the scheme. These visas require workers to attend predeparture orientation; are valid for up to 7 months, or 9 months for workers from Kiribati and Tuvalu; and tie workers to a specific location, type of work, and employer (ILO 2008). Longer-Term Programs Longer-term temporary employment schemes are common in Southeast Asia as well as in Europe and North America and fall loosely into two categories. One type of program facilitates the movement of low-skilled, low-paid workers. For instance, nationals of less developed Asian countries such as Indonesia, Bangladesh, and the Philippines arrive in more developed states such as Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, and Saudi Arabia to take construction, domestic, and manufacturing jobs that the locals are no longer willing to do (Appave and Cholewinski 2008, pp. 445–447). Other programs facilitate the temporary migration of highly paid, high-skilled workers invited by host countries to fill skills shortages in the information technology, aviation, engineering, medicine, and academia (Appave and Cholewinski 2008, p. 447). The United States has in place a number of guest-worker programs for low- and high-skilled employment. For instance, the H-1B “specialty occupations” visa program provides annually at least 85,000 3-year visas to employ foreign scientists, engineers, and computer programmers, among other professionals. The H-2B program issues 66,000 visas to foreign workers from eligible countries to fill temporary nonagricultural jobs, such as in construction, hospitality, and landscaping. Similarly, Singapore has well-established longer-term temporary migrant programs for both highand low-skilled workers (Abella 2006). There were an estimated 1,305,011 migrant labours in Singapore in 2010; of them, the vast majority (87 %) were low-skilled laborers that worked mostly in the

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construction industry, domestic and household services, and manufacturing and marine industries. These low-skilled workers generally come from other Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries as well as from China, India, and Sri Lanka. Singapore uses its migrant-worker scheme as a policy lever to ensure flexibility in the size of the low-skilled migrant-worker population. Low-skilled workers are admitted to the country provided they remain in employment and are not allowed to bring spouses or family members with them, and employers are required to pay levies to the government to retain them (Cerna 2010). This stands in contrast with Singapore’s highskilled migrant laborers that mostly come from the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Australia, as well as from Japan and South Korea. These migrants generally either hold advanced degrees or specialized skills in particular fields and are granted employment passes (types P, Q, or S) by the Singapore government. These migrants are entitled to bring dependants with them, and only family members of S passholders are subject to a monthly levy of SGD50 (USD32). High-skilled migrants are also the only category of labor migrant entitled to apply for permanent residency or citizenship (Cerna 2010).

Working-Holiday Programs Another form of temporary employment migration is the working holiday or overseas experience (OE). For instance, it is common for young, university-educated people from Australia and New Zealand to migrate to the United Kingdom for up to 2 years on their OE after university graduation. Working-holiday programs are available in many countries around the world, including Argentina, Japan, Canada, the United States, Israel, South Korea, Taiwan, and many European countries. These visa types are generally utilized by well-educated young people around the world, not necessarily for career advancement, but rather to spend time traveling and experiencing new places – while making enough money to cover the basic necessities – before returning home to begin their careers.

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References Albella M (2006) Policies and best practices for management of temporary migration. International Symposium on International Migration and Development, Turin Anderson B (2010) Migration, immigration controls and the fashioning of precarious workers. Work Employ Soc 24(2):300–331 Appave G, Cholewinski R (eds) (2008) World migration report 2008: managing labor mobility in the evolving global economy. International Organization for Migration, Geneva Baldwin-Edwards A (2005) Migration in the Middle East and Mediterranean. Global Commission for Migration, Geneva, http://iom.ch/jahia/webdav/site/myjahiasite/ shared/shared/mainsite/policy_and_research/gcim/rs/ RS5.pdf. Accessed 18 Apr 2013 Cerna (2010) Policies and practices of highly skilled migration in times of the economic crisis. International Labour Organization, Geneva, International Migration Papers 99 International Labour Organization (2008) The recognized seasonal employers scheme (RSE) New Zealand. http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/ @asia/@robangkok/documents/projectdocumentation/ wcms_120560.pdf. Accessed 15 Feb 2013 Newland K (2009) Circular migration and human development, human development research paper. United Nations Development Programme, New York, http://

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www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/newland_HDRP_2009. pdf. Accessed 18 Apr 2013 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (1998) Recommendations on statistics of international migration, revision 1, Statistical Papers, Series M, No. 58. United Nations, New York. http:// stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=2402 Papademetriou D (2013) The fundamentals of immigration reform. University of North Carolina, North Carhttp://prospect.org/article/fundamentalsolina, immigration-reform. Access 18 Apr 2013 Uriely N (1994) Rhetorical ethnicity of permanent sojourners: the case of Israeli immigrants in the Chicago area. Int Sociol 9(4):431–445

Further Reading Daly B (2005) Australian and New Zealand university students’ participation in international exchange programs. J Stud Int Educ 9(1):26–41 Immigration New Zealand (2011) u.3.20, Immigration New Zealand operational manual. http://www.immi gration.govt.nz/opsmanual/43653.htm. Accessed 18 Apr 2013 Newland K, Agunias DR, Terrazas A (2008) Learning by doing: experiences of circular migration. Migration Policy Institute, Washington, DC United Kingdom Border Agency (2013) Tier 5 (Youth Mobility Scheme). http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov. uk/visas-immigration/working/tier5/government-au thorised-exchange/. Accessed 18 Apr 2013

Part 11: Population and Migration

F

Fertility of Immigrants Sylvie Dubuc Department of Social Policy and Intervention, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK

Definition Fertility and immigration is a subject area of demography and population studies, investigating how the fertility behavior of immigrants and their descendents is influenced by the migration process and the sending and resettlement environments.

Detailed Description Immigration affects the size and composition of the population directly and indirectly, through childbearing. Understanding the ways in which resettlement and adaptation to the socioeconomic and cultural context of the receiving country may influence the fertility of immigrants and that of their descendants is of interest to minority group integration processes and of practical value for ethnic population projections. Because fertility is a major characteristic of immigrant groups – reflecting on socioeconomic and cultural norms – changes in childbearing behavior can serve as indicators of assimilation and integration processes of immigrants and ethnic

minority groups. The fertility and immigration subject area complements the field of sociology concerned with social and cultural assimilation/ integration processes of minority groups. Today, the field is mainly concerned with the adaptation of fertility to the country of resettlement following international migration, although some of the concepts are derived from earlier work studying fertility of internal migrants, notably rural–urban migrants. Most of the work on fertility and immigration has been conducted in developed Western countries, where the fertility of immigrants and that of their descendants increasingly shape national ethnic compositions. Many of the early studies on the fertility of immigrants were conducted in Western countries with long immigration histories, particularly the USA, Australia, and Canada. Strong immigration flows into Western European countries commenced during the economic recovery after World War II and were often fuelled by migrants from former colonies. The rather heterogenic terminology used to describe the incorporation process of new comers to the receiving society probably reflects the absence of theoretical consensus on the matter. While the general concept of integration is widely but not exclusively used in Europe, the somewhat differing notion of assimilation prevails in the USA, mainly pivoting on the assimilation theory (see Schneider and Crul 2010 and references therein). Although criticized, assimilation theory remains prevalent to analyze the incorporation of immigrants (Barkan

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Fertility of Immigrants, Table 1 Theoretical framework to analyze fertility of immigrants Disruption hypothesis Interrelation with family formation Selectivity effects

Socialization hypothesis Adaptation hypothesis Socialization hypothesis Assimilation and intergenerational adaptation Characteristics hypothesis Subculture hypothesis Segmented assimilation hypothesis Minority status hypothesis

Stress associated with migration resulting in temporary fertility disruption, lowering fertility Migration linked with union/family formation, fertility often especially high following migration Characteristics of migrants are different to that prevalent in their country of origin. Family/childbearing aspirations are closer to the receiving country than the norms in the sending country Influence of the context of socialization in influencing fertility choices Immigrant’s adaptation with duration of settlement to the fertility norms in the receiving country Influence of the context of socialization in influencing fertility choices Intergenerational fertility adaptation toward the mainstream, pace of fertility convergence depending on duration of settlement and socialization Differences in fertility between immigrants and natives are due to unequal socioeconomic characteristics Prevalence of the norms and values in the sending country on fertility choices of immigrants and their descendants Impact of ethno-cultural dimension in the process of incorporation, groups may assimilate to various socioeconomic strata of the society In response to minority status penalty, individuals/families have fewer children in order to facilitate upward social mobility

2007; Alba and Nee 2003) and is applied to understand fertility of immigrants’ children in the USA (e.g., Bean et al. 2000; Parrado and Morgan 2008), although assimilation is increasingly understood in a broader sense, compared to its initial conceptualization. The more recent emergence of conflicting and complementary hypotheses to explain fertility of immigrant groups in Western countries (Table 1) probably reflects on their heterogeneity and our increasingly detailed understanding of the underlying factors influencing fertility of immigrants.

Early Work Although the link between fertility and international migration has received much attention, earlier work on rural–urban migration has nourished our understanding on how newcomers adapt to the environment of resettlement. Park’s first conceptualization of assimilation of newcomers was based on the socioeconomic adaptation of internal migrants to urban Chicago. The socialization hypothesis applied to fertility

behavior – whereby the values and norms at the childhood place of residence largely influence later reproductive behavior – was supported by the fertility behavior of first-generation migrants in industrialized countries (e.g., Duncan 1965). The socialization hypothesis and Gordon’s seminal work (1964) on the influence of the cultural and socioeconomic environment at destination underpinned the linear assimilation theory. Applied to fertility, the linear assimilation theory assumes that immigrants are influenced by reproductive norms and values in their place of origin and childhood environment (Goldstein and Goldstein 1983) and the fertility of immigrants at destination would be weighted by the duration of stay in each place, resulting in ethnic fertility differentials. The fertility adaptation to the destination country would occur over time and particularly from generation to generation (Goldstein and Goldstein 1983; Stephen and Bean 1992). Immigrants’ children are therefore expected to show a fertility pattern closer to the local norm (i.e., traditionally white mainstream levels) than the one of their immigrant parents and that of the new comers from the same region of origin,

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Fertility of Immigrants 250

Births per 1,000 women

Fertility of Immigrants, Fig. 1 Prior and postmigration ASFRs of immigrant women in the UK (Source: Dubuc (2012))

200 Prior women's migration

150

Post migration

100

Total immigrant women 50

0 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 5 years age group of women

assuming a constant selectivity effect of migration over time. According to Gordon (1964), immigrants’ social and economic adjustment to the receiving country would follow their cultural assimilation. Therefore, socioeconomic assimilation to the general profile of the society of settlement would result in full fertility convergence (Bean and Marcum 1978).

Influence of the Migration Process on Fertility Major sources of criticism of the traditional linear assimilation theory include the association between structural (social and socioeconomic) assimilation and acculturation and the view of assimilation as a linear process. Deviation from the expectation of the linear assimilation theory with respect to fertility has led many contemporary analysts of immigrants’ fertility to mobilize a number of concurrent and/or complementary hypotheses (e.g., Milewski 2010). These include hypotheses related to the migration process per se. The disruption hypothesis postulates that prolonged partner separation and stress associated with the migration process would disrupt childbearing postmigration. The depressed fertility of some immigrant groups shortly after immigration to Canada (Ram and George 1990), the USA (Stephen and Bean 1992), and Australia (Abbasi-Shavazi and McDonald 2000) support

the disruption hypothesis, although lower fertility after migration may be temporary. A “catch up” effect a few years after resettlement was observed in some studies. Many studies, notably in Europe, found a higher parity progression of immigrants compared to that of nonmigrants shortly after arrival. For instance, in France, a peak of fertility within 3 years following migration was observed (Toulemon 2004). The interrelation of migration and union/family building is likely to increase fertility following migration. The high postmigration fertility is often thought to fully compensate for especially low premigration levels, presumably due to earlier childbearing postponement in the country of origin. Low premigration fertility and high postmigration levels were evidenced for immigrants in France (Toulemon 2004), the USA (Parrado 2011), and the UK (Dubuc 2012, Fig. 1). For instance, Emilio Parrado (2011) found that the apparent high fertility of Hispanic immigrants in the USA recorded in previous studies was the result of postmigration fertility measurements, whereas the total fertility was significantly lower when premigration fertility history of immigrant women was taken into account. These differences called into question the use of standard period total fertility rates (period TFRs) that are based solely on birth registration data in the receiving country to approximate the average number of children of immigrants. For instance, in France, the period

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TFR of immigrants based on vital statistics was 0.86 higher than the TFR of the French native (1.86) over the period 1991–1998. Over half of this difference was shown to be attributable to period TFR calculations compared with calculations including the premigration fertility history (Toulemon 2004). The selectivity or selection hypothesis postulates that migrants are a select group with specific sociodemographic characteristics (e.g., age, family/marital status, education, employment, and inspirational model) influencing family formation and reproductive choices. Therefore, fertility of immigrants may be closer to those at destination than the fertility norms in their place of origin (e.g., Sobotka 2008). Although the selectivity hypothesis is often considered in studies of fertility and immigration, its validity has rarely been tested. Immigrants from high-fertility countries tend to exhibit fertility levels lower than those in their country of origin (e.g., Abbassi Chavazi and Mc Donald 2000). Potentially, this may be an effect of selectivity, as it has been suggested of Indian immigrants in Australia and the UK. However, other factors may apply, including the disruption effect and/or the influence of the host country.

Settlement of Immigrants in the Host Society Other hypotheses relate to the influence of the context in which immigrants are living. The influence of the immigrant background and that of the receiving country’s environment in determining fertility remain a matter of debate. Immigrants tend to exhibit fertility levels between those in the sending country and those at destination. The difference between immigrants’ and natives’ fertility may fluctuate over time linked to fertility dynamics either in the sending or receiving country. For instance, fertility of immigrants from Hispanic countries to the USA was stable during the baby boom years when US natives’ fertility was rising, resulting in a narrowing of the fertility gap (Parrado and Morgan 2008). In contrast, in the 1970s and

Fertility of Immigrants

1980s, fertility decreased more rapidly among non-Hispanic White natives than among Hispanic immigrants, contributing to widen the gap (Bean and Tienda 1987; Kahn 1994). The decrease in fertility of Hispanic immigrants in recent years is consistent with and is reflective of the fertility transition in their sending country (Parrado 2011). The socialization hypothesis emphasizes the role of the main place/environment of socialization in shaping norms and consequently reproductive choices. According to the socialization hypothesis, the main place of childhood largely shapes the fertility of women. Evidence in support has been provided by studies showing that the women’s age at immigration largely influences fertility behavior (e.g., Andersson 2004; Toulemon 2004). The adaptation hypothesis focuses on the role of the duration of settlement of new comers in converging fertility across immigrant groups toward the local norm – generally estimated by the average fertility at destination, potentially as a result of an adjustment to the new institutional, economic, cultural, and political context (e.g., Hervitz 1985). The adaptation hypothesis is supported by a number of studies, showing a convergence of immigrants’ fertility to the local norms or childbearing behaviour depending on the duration of residence in the receiving country (e.g., Ford 1990; Kahn 1994; Sobotka 2008). In accordance with the socialization hypothesis, immigrants who arrived in their early childhood (the so-called 1.5 generation) show stronger signs of adaptation to the receiving country’s childbearing prosil. For example, Lebanese who migrated to Australia in their childhood show considerably lower fertility than other migrants from Lebanon and similar to that of the second generation (Abbasi-Shavazi and Mc Donald 2000).

Intergenerational Adaptation Processes The descendents of immigrants are mostly nationals of their resident country. These are commonly referred to as second, third, and

Fertility of Immigrants

successive generations the and may further be distinguished by ethnic or racial categories when these differ from the majority white population of Western countries. Recalling and extending the socialization hypothesis, the fertility of the second and successive generations has been generally assumed to converge toward that of the majority ethnic group. This assumption was supported by the rapid converging fertility of the descendants of earlier European immigrant waves to the USA (Morgan et al. 1994). In Europe, the converging fertility trends of descendants of immigrants from high-fertility countries further support ongoing intergenerational integration. Nonetheless, persisting fertility differentials over generations of some ethnic minority groups may suggest some ethnic-specific fertility distinctiveness. Early critique of the linear assimilation theory was based on the intergenerational fall in fertility of the Jews and some segments (middle and upper class) of Black and Japanese Americans in the USA, below the level of White Americans of similar socioeconomic position. In response to the divergence from the expected intergenerational fertility convergence, Goldscheider and Uhlenberg (1969) proposed the minority status hypothesis. Due to perceived minority status penalty, and in the absence of pro-natal norms, individuals/families would have fewer children in order to facilitate upward social mobility, potentially until full assimilation is completed. Further evidence of this effect was found among relatively high-fertility minority groups in the USA like Black Americans (Ritchey 1975) and the Chicanos (Lopez and Sabagh 1978). The effect of the minority status on childbearing choices may apply independently of cultural and structural factors influencing fertility. Intergenerational adaptive fertility behavior should accompany sociodemographic change (like age composition, marital status, age at marriage, education, and social class) of the second generation, assuming no strong inherited cultural distinctiveness. Adaptation of fertility behavior would involve changes in family norms and values, for instance, from traditional

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(presumably with large family) to more modern (small nuclear family) attitudes to fertility. Persistence of differences in fertility between ethnic in differences groups reflect would sociodemographic and/or economic characteristics of their members over generations, according to the characteristic hypothesis. The role of female education in shaping fertility patterns and differences between immigrant groups and natives appears particularly significant and inversely related (e.g., Bean and Tienda 1987). Some authors tend to distinguish the social characteristic hypothesis from the economic hypothesis, derived from the economics of the family and particularly the “opportunity-cost” of rearing children. In contrast, the subculture hypothesis assumes the dominance of parental and ethnic community values in the socialization process of the second generation and the maintenance of community or ethnic-specific cultural and family norms (independently of socioeconomic factors), influencing fertility behavior across generations, shaping ethnic minorities. For instance, pronatalist values promoted by traditional familism in Hispanic countries have been proposed to explain some of the maintenance of high fertility among Hispanic immigrants and their children in the USA, which are not fully explained by their social characteristics (Bean and Tienda 1987). The causal link formulated at the origin of the linear assimilation theory between cultural and structural integration/assimilation processes and later the co-occurrence between these dimensions have been repeatedly contested. The more recent segmented assimilation theory (Portes and Zhou 1993) proposes alternative combinations between these two dimensions of assimilation and an attempt to integrate some of the multiculturalist and structuralist views. The segmented assimilation theory, whereby various groups may assimilate to various socioeconomic strata of the society (i.e., mainstream, upward, and downward paths), includes an ethno-cultural dimension to the process of incorporation of immigrants and their children into the society of settlement. The segmented assimilation proposition has hitherto mainly focused on social

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Fertility of Immigrants, Table 2 Children ever born (CEB) to women of Mexican origin: immigrant and two successive generations in the USA In Mexico Immigrant generation Second generation Third generation Non-Hispanic White

CEB 6.5 4.3 3.5 2.4 2.0

Birth cohort 1910–1914 1910–1914 1935–1939 1960–1964 1960–1964

Period of completed fertility 1950–1954 1950–1954 1975–1979 2000–2004 2000–2004

Sources: Drawn from Parrado and Morgan (2008), Tables 2 and 3

mobility, education, and socioeconomic achievement but is increasingly considered in immigrants’ fertility studies. Emerging research analyzing fertility behavior of immigrants’ children converging toward the national average in the USA remains inconclusive. A number of studies comparing fertility of Hispanic Americans by immigration status (i.e., immigrant, second, and third and successive generations) found a relatively high total fertility of third and successive generations often above levels recorded for the second generation (e.g., Carter 2000; Bean et al. 2000). The apparent persistence of highfertility levels of Hispanic Americans across generations is inconsistent with the expectation of the linear assimilation theory and has been interpreted as indicative of downward social mobility and racial stratification (Frank and Heuveline 2005). However, more recent findings on fertility of successive cohorts of immigrants and subsequent generations of Hispanic Americans may suggest otherwise (Parrado and Morgan 2008). Comparing completed number of children over the parent immigrant generation in the early twentieth century and successive second and third generations of Hispanic background, Emilio Parrado and Philip Morgan found evidence for a continued intergenerational decrease in fertility and convergence toward the native childbearing behaviour (Table 2). Changes in fertility of Hispanic American generations also follow the same general trends as the US mainstream, providing arguments for the impact of the US context in influencing fertility of immigrants’ descendants. Similarly, an ongoing process of intergenerational fertility convergence toward

the national levels has been evidenced for immigrants from high-fertility countries in the UK (Dubuc 2012), in the Netherlands (Garssen and Nicolaas 2008), and Germany (Milewski 2010). In Australia, Abbasi-Shavazi and Mc Donald (2000) found that adaptation of immigrants to the local fertility pattern was the norm, although with some signs of cultural persistence over the second generation of Italian and Greek ancestry.

The Contribution of Immigrants to Fertility Replacement in Receiving Countries Immigrants from high-fertility countries tend to dominate international migration movements contributing to a rise in overall fertility in receiving countries with below-replacement fertility. In Europe, the contribution of higher fertility of migrants to the total fertility of receiving countries remains relatively small (Sobotka 2008). Immigration and fertility of both Hispanic and non-Hispanic immigrants, particularly Asians, have fuelled the recent population growth of the USA. However, their expected contribution to radical changes in the demographic and ethnoracial composition of the USA may well be overestimated according to a recent study of cohort fertility of Hispanic immigrants (Parrado 2011). The global fertility transition over the past decades, showing rapidly decreasing fertility in many developing countries, is likely to influence the fertility differential between sending and receiving countries in the future.

Fertility of Immigrants

Glossary Age-specific fertility rate (ASFR) Refers to the number of live births to females in a particular age category in a particular year compared to the number of females in that age category. Most commonly 1 and 5 years age categories are used. Children ever born (CEB) CEB to women in a particular age group is the mean number of children born alive to women in that age group. The number of children ever born to a particular woman is a measure of her lifetime fertility experience up to the moment at which the data are collected. Cohort fertility A cohort is a group of women born in the same year. Cohort completed fertility rates (CFR) may be used to compare fertility of successive generations of women who have completed their fertility life. Total period fertility rate (TFR) Is the average number of children that women would have if they experienced the ASFRs for a particular year throughout their childbearing lives (typically between 15 and 44/49 years old).

References Abbasi-Shavazi MJ, McDonald P (2000) Fertility and multiculturalism: immigrant fertility in Australia, 1977–1991. Int Migr Rev 34(1):215–242 Alba R, Nee V (2003) Remaking the American mainstream: assimilation and contemporary immigration. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA Andersson G (2004) Childbearing after migration: fertility patterns of foreign-born women in Sweden. Int Migr Rev 38(2):747–775 Barkan ER (2007) Introduction: immigration, incorporation and assimilation; the limits of transnationalism. In: Barkan ER (ed) Immigration, incorporation and transnationalism. Library of Congress, Washington, DC, pp 1–24 Bean FD, Marcum JP (1978) Differential fertility and the minority status hypothesis: an assessment and review. In: Bean FD, Parker Frisbie W (eds) The demography of racial and ethnic groups. Academic, New York, pp 189–211 Bean FD, Tienda M (1987) The Hispanic population of the United States. Russell Sage, New York, 461 p

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Bean FD, Swicegood GC, Berg R (2000) Mexican-origin fertility: new patterns and interpretations. Soc Sci Q 81:404–420 Carter M (2000) Fertility of Mexican immigrant women in the U.S.: a closer look. Soc Sci Q 81:1073–1088 Dubuc S (2012) Immigration to the UK from high-fertility countries: intergenerational adaptation and fertility convergence. Popul Dev Rev 38(2):353–368 Duncan OD (1965) Farm background and differential fertility. Demography 2:240–249 Ford K (1990) Duration of residence in the United States and the fertility of U. S. immigrants. Int Migr Rev 24(1):34–68 Frank R, Heuveline P (2005) A crossover in Mexican and Mexican-American fertility rates: evidence and explanations for an emerging paradox. Demogr Res 12(4):77–104 Garssen J, Nicolaas H (2008) Fertility of Turkish and Moroccan women in the Netherlands: adjustment to native level within one generation. Demogr Res http://www.demographic19(33):1249–1280. research.org/Volumes/Vol19/33/19-33.pdf Goldscheider C, Uhlenberg PR (1969) Minority group status and fertility. Am J Sociol 74(4):361–373 Goldstein S, Goldstein A (1983) Migration and fertility in Peninsular Malaysia: an analysis using life history data. Rand Corporation, Santa Monica Gordon MM (1964) Assimilation in American life the role of race, religion, and national origins. Oxford University Press, New York, 276 p Hervitz HM (1985) Selectivity, adaptation, or disruption? A comparison of alternative hypotheses on the effects of migration on fertility: the case of Brazil. Int Migr Rev 19(2):293–317 Kahn JR (1994) Immigrant and native fertility during the 1980s: adaptation and expectations for the future. Int Migr Rev 28(3):501–519 Lopez DE, Sabagh G (1978) Untangling structural and normative aspects of the minority status-fertility hypothesis. Am J Sociol 83(6):1491–1497 Milewski N (2010) Fertility of immigrants. A two-generational approach in Germany, Demographic Research Monographs Series. Springer, Berlin, p 176 Morgan SP, Watkins SC, Ewbank D (1994) Generating Americans: the fertility of the foreign-born in the US, 1905–10. In: Watkins S (ed) After Ellis island: newcomers and natives in the 1910 census. Russel Sage Foundation, New York Parrado EA (2011) How high is Hispanic/Mexican fertility in the United States? Immigration and tempo considerations. Demography 48(3):1059–1080 Parrado EA, Morgan SP (2008) Intergenerational fertility among Hispanic women: new evidence of immigrant assimilation. Demography 45(3):651–671 Portes A, Zou M (1993) The new second-generation: segmented assimilation and its variants. Ann Am Acad Polit Social Sci 530:74–96 Ram B, George MV (1990) Immigrant fertility patterns in Canada, 1961–1986. Int Migr 28(4):413–426

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Ritchey PN (1975) The effect of minority group status on fertility: a re-examination of concepts. Popul Stud 29(2):249–257 Schneider J, Crul M (2010) New insights into assimilation theory: introduction to the special issue. Ethn Racial Stud 33(7):1143–1148 Sobotka T (2008) The rising importance of migrants for childbearing in Europe. Demogr Res 19(9):225–248 Stephen HE, Bean FD (1992) Assimilation, disruption and the fertility of Mexican-Origin women in the United Sates. Int Migr Rev 26(1):67–88 Toulemon L (2004) Fertility among immigrant women: new data, new approach. Popul Soc 400:1–4

Further Reading Bach RL (1981) Migration and fertility in Malaysia: a tale of two hypotheses. Int Migr Rev 15(3):502–521 Carlson ED (1985) The impact of international migration upon the timing of marriage and childbearing. Demography 22:61–72 Courgeau D (1989) Family formation and urbanization. Popul: Engl Sel 44(1):123–146 Espenshade TJ, Ye W (1994) Differential fertility within an ethnic minority: the effect of ‘trying harder’ among Chinese-American women. Soc Probl 41(1):97–113 Gans HJ (1997) Toward a reconciliation of “assimilation” and “pluralism”: the interplay of acculturation and ethnic retention. Int Migr Rev 31(4):875–892. Special Issue: Immigrant Adaptation and Native-Born Responses in the Making of Americans. http://www. jstor.org/stable/2547417 Goldberg D (1959) The fertility of two generation urbanites. Popul Stud 12:214–222

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Goldstein S (1978) Migration and fertility in Thailand. Can Stud Popul 5:167–180 Kahn JR (1988) Immigrant selectivity and fertility adaptation in the United States. Soc Forces 67(1):108–128 Kulu H (2005) Migration and fertility: competing hypotheses re-examined. Eur J Popul 21:51–87 Mookherjee H (1998) Reproductive behavior of the Asian-American population in the United States of America. J Asian Afr Stud 33(4):331–344 Morawska E (1994) In defence of the assimilation model. J Am Ethn Hist 13:76–87 Ng E, Nault F (1997) Fertility among recent immigrant women to Canada, 1991: an examination of the disruption hypothesis. Int Migr 35(4):559–580 Park RE, Burgess EW (1921) Introduction to the science of sociology. University of Chicago Press, Chicago Rindfuss RR, Morgan SP, Offutt K (1996) Education and the changing Age pattern of American fertility: 1963–89. Demography 33(3):277–290 Roberts ER, Lee ES (1974) Minority group status and fertility revisited. Am J Sociol 80(2):503–523 Rumbaut RG (1997) Assimilation and its discontents: between rhetoric and reality. Int Migr Rev 31(4):923–960 Rumbaut RG (2007) Turning points in the transition to adulthood: determinants of educational attainment, incarceration, and early childbearing among children of immigrants. Ethn Racial Stud 28(6):1041–1086 Sly DF (1970) Minority-group status and fertility: an extension of Goldscheider and Uhlenberg. Am J Sociol 76(3):443–459 Yang Y, Morgan SP (2003) How big are educational and racial fertility differentials in the U.S.? Soc Biol 50(3–4):167–187

Part 12: Refugees

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Forced Migration: Global Trends and Explanations Jeremy Hein and Tarique Niazi Department of Sociology, University of Wisconsin-Eau Claire, Eau Claire, WI, USA

Definitions World War II still exerts a great influence on definitions and explanations of forced migration. The policy makers who established the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in 1951 believed that forced migration was caused by extreme nationalism, which led to wars that pushed people from one country to another. The 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, therefore, defined a refugee as a person “outside the country of his nationality” due to “a well-founded fear of persecution” (UNHCR 2000). Its most important guarantee of protection is that refugees may not be forcibly returned to the country from which they fled – non-refoulement. But the 1951 Convention only covered refugees from events that occurred in Europe before January 1, 1951. At the time, 58 % of the world’s refugees resided there. Once they were taken care of, policy makers assumed that forced migration would not be a problem because the new international system expressed

in membership in the United Nations (UN) would never again allow nationalism to disrupt Europe. Two developments disproved this assumption. First, in 1964, the number of refugees in Africa and Asia surpassed those in Europe for the first time. Forced migration was now a global problem due to the independence struggles of countries that had been European colonies. Thus, in 1967, the UN removed the geographic and time limitations from the 1951 definition. Second, in the early 1990s, the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) surpassed the number of refugees for the first time. IDPs are people who flee from violence but they stop moving when they reach a safer place within their own country. Refugees are people who flee for the same reasons but seek safety by crossing an international border and residing in a neighboring country. In 1998, the UN adopted the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (Cohen and Deng 1998). With regard to protection, these are much weaker than the 1951 Convention. UN members were reluctant to intrude on a country’s sovereignty when it concerned treatment of its own citizens. By contrast, the UN extends more protections when citizens of one country flee to another country since these refugees then become part of the international political system.

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Statistical Overview In 1978, the number of refugees in the world surpassed 5 million for the first time since World War II. It reached 10 million in 1981 and 15 million in 1990. In 2012, the UNHCR’s mandate covered 46.3 million people (UNHCR 2013, 2015). The largest concentration resides in Africa (30 %) with the second largest concentration in the Middle East and North Africa (27 %). There are large populations of forced migrants in Asia (19 %) as well as in Latin America (14 %). Today, Europe accounts for only 6 %, although in 1996 and 1997, Bosnia produced the second largest number of refugees in the world. The populations of concern to the UNHCR are primarily IDPs (56 %) and refugees (28 %). The UNHCR is less able to assist IDPs since they remain under the territory and jurisdiction of their national government, which either foments, condones, or cannot control local violence. The UNHCR provides far more assistance to refugees because they live in someone else’s country and are, thus, covered by international law. Most refugees reside in UN-operated camps for many years until political conditions improve and they can return to their homeland. This protracted waiting is termed “warehousing” and places a great burden on host countries such as Pakistan, Iran, and Kenya (each of which allows more than 500,000 refugees to live in its territory). Some refugees apply for permanent resettlement to a third country. In 2012, the USA accepted 66,200 refugees who applied for admission while residing overseas. Other major resettlement countries include Canada (9,600), Australia (5,900), and Sweden (1,800). The UNHCR also advocates for several other types of forced migrants: IDPs and refugees who have returned to their homes but still need assistance (5 %), stateless persons (8 %), and asylum seekers (3 %). Asylum seekers resemble refugees in the conditions that push them and their motivations. But unlike refugees who first move to an adjacent country, asylum seekers flee directly to a potential place of permanent settlement (usually Europe, North America, and Australia) and then request retroactive refugee status from

Forced Migration: Global Trends and Explanations

immigration officials. Asylum seekers argue that they would suffer persecution if they had to return to their homelands. On average, about 25 % of asylum seekers receive a positive decision. In 2012, the USA granted asylum to 25,200 people who applied while already residing in the country. Other major asylum countries include Germany (17,000), Sweden (13,700), and Canada (10,200). People deemed “stateless” are the most vulnerable people on earth. At present, the world is divided into 211 independent countries and territories. The international system expects every person to be a member of one of them. But some governments never recognize or even revoke the citizenship of its people so as to discriminate against unpopular groups. The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe in 1989, and then the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, created large stateless populations as the newly independent countries established their own citizenship criteria that often excluded ethnic minorities. In 2012, there were still significant numbers of stateless people in Latvia (280,000), the Russian Federation (178,000), and Estonia (94,000). The largest population of stateless people, how800,000 approximately ever, are the Rohingya – the Muslim population in the Myanmar state of Rakhine, bordering Bangladesh. Myanmar does not recognize their citizenship even though the Rohingya were born there. It also does not give citizenship to the children born in Thailand to Myanmar refugees, nor does Thailand provide them with birth certificates. There is little the UNHCR can do for stateless people other than advocate that they be granted citizenship and make sure the world does not forget them.

Explanations of Forced Migration A number of explanations have been offered for the various types of forced migration. The geopolitical explanation emerged after World War II with the onset of the Cold War between the former USSR and the USA. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the ethnic conflict and

Forced Migration: Global Trends and Explanations

failed state explanation became influential. The natural resources explanation and the climate change explanation have gained support since 2000. The Geopolitical Explanation To explain the increase in forced migration since the 1960s, social scientists first studied international politics and conflicts between states (Hein 1993; Zolberg et al. 1989). They concluded that refugees were primarily produced by decolonization, revolutions, and proxy wars in which the USA and USSR provided weapons and training to allies around the world. The UNHCR (2000) reached similar conclusions. It used types of geopolitical conflicts to summarize the main refugee crises it addressed during the mid to late twentieth century: The 1950s Cold War in Europe The 1960s decolonization in Africa The early 1970s birth of the state of Bangladesh The mid 1970s communist revolutions in former Indochina The 1980s proxy wars in Africa, Asia, and Latin America The early 1990s separatist conflicts in the Caucasus The late 1990s ethnic cleansing in Iraq, Balkans, and Rwanda Although refugees from Cuba did not receive assistance from the UNHCR, their migration to the USA following the Cuban Revolution in 1959 is significant and merits a place on this list. It was the first time that the USA became a country of first asylum (Pedraza 2007). Currently, about 20 % of Cubans live outside of Cuba. The Syrian refugee crisis (which errupted in 2014 and is currently the largest in the world) can also be explained by the geopolitical theory (Russia and Iran v. the US and Saudi Arabia). The Ethnic Conflict and Failed State Explanation Studies of international relations and state sovereignty continue to define some explanations of

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forced migration (Betts and Loescher 2011; Haddad 2008). But many scholars think that the refugee crises that began in the 1990s do not fit this geopolitical model. They argue that the global dynamics of forced migration changed in 1991 with the end of the Cold War between the USA and the former Soviet Union. Instead of conflict between states, the underlying cause of most forced migration is now ethnic or religious conflict in fragile, failing, or failed states (Keely 1996; Nurussaman 2009). The case of Afghanistan is very important for debates about the causes of forced migration and its solutions. At its peak in the late 1990s, about 8 million people had fled the country creating an Afghan diaspora that stretched across Pakistan, Iran, the United Arab Emirates, Europe, the USA, Canada, and Australia. Estimates suggest that from one-third to 64 % and possibly even two-thirds of all living Afghans have been refugees at one point in their lives (Kronenfeld 2008). The conflict first erupted in 1979 with the Soviet Union’s invasion. Now Afghanistan is cited as an example of a failed state that is too weak and destabilized to protect its citizens from ethnic power struggles (Rubin 2002). The failed state explanation of forced migration assumes that citizens need a strong central government to protect them. Afghan refugees disprove that assumption (Hein and Niazi 2012). Since 1973, a series of different regimes – socialist, Islamist, and capitalist – have used repression in failed attempts to create various states in Afghanistan. From 1979 to 1992, the USSR targeted rural and religious segments of society as it pursued socialist modernization and secular modernity. From 1992 to 1996 in the new Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, the targets were the urban middle class, the feminist movement, and the Shiite religious minority. Under the Taliban (1996–2001), all women were repressed and the Tajik minority singled out for persecution. Since 2001, the Pashtuns have been discriminated against because some have links to the Taliban. The fact that virtually every group in Afghan society has been subject to state persecution at some point since 1979 indicates that the underlying cause of

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forced migration is not a state that is too weak but one that is too strong. Contrary to the ethnic conflict and failed state explanation, no ethnic group in Afghanistan has sought independence and sovereignty. The Natural Resources Explanation State-centered explanations of forced migration have limitations because they are primarily informed by the lessons drawn from World War II. An alternative approach emphasizes globalization’s environmental impact and conflicts over natural resources (Hein and Niazi 2009). From a demographic perspective, the increasing size of the world population and expanding middle-class consumption causes competition for scarce resources (Homer-Dixon 1999). From a political economy perspective, the conflicts are caused by private and sovereign wealth corporations seeking ownership and quick profits from natural resources all over the world (Peluso and Watts 2001). The two perspectives are in fact complementary. Demography explains demand for natural resources while political economy explains the supply. Controlling natural resources is therefore central to almost all the world’s conflicts which produce forced migration (see Table 1). The groups in these conflicts often use ethnic names to define each other, but what they are really fighting over is wealth production from nature (Niazi and Hein 2013). Globalization has vastly increased the value of land, fresh water, wood, metals, gems, energy sources, and the transportation routes to move these commodities. Competition over access, appropriation, development, and shipping of natural resources leads to conflicts among resource-dependent local communities, resource-extractive states, and elites that seek profits from resources. Often, the result is human rights violations followed by forced migration. The state and elites coerce subnational communities in resource rich areas in order to rapidly produce wealth for the global market. This pattern of resource extraction, violence, and forced migration is very evident in Sudan. The conflict is so severe that in 2005 the UN investigated charges of genocide in the country’s Darfur region (de Waal 2007). But the conflict is

Forced Migration: Global Trends and Explanations Forced Migration: Global Trends and Explanations, Table 1 Seven largest producers of forced migrants in 2012 and natural resource conflicts Origin Colombia

Numbera 4.356

Afghanistan

4.122

DRC Syria Sudan

3.613 2.846 2.574

Somalia

2.313

Iraq World

2.203 61.5%b

Natural resource conflicts Oil, metals, cattle, and agricultural produce Land transit for oil and natural gas Metals and diamonds Land transit for natural gas Water, pasture, cattle, arable land, and oil Mogadishu as entrepot and transit site Oil and water

a

In millions of people of concern to the UNHCR (2013). Population of concern comprises refugees, returned refugees, asylum seekers, internally displaced persons, returned internally displaced person, stateless persons, and others of concern b Percent of total world population of concern to UNHCR originating from Colombia, Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Syria, Sudan, Somalia, and Iraq

not new (Collins 2008). Independence in 1956 led to a civil war between the Arab and Islamic dominant group which controlled the capital of Khartoum and minority groups in the south. The north–south conflict is part of a larger pattern resulting from Sudan’s extreme ecological and cultural regionalism. Some of the main ethnoecological groups are Fur farmers and herders from the west (Darfur means land of the Fur people), Nuba farmers and herders in the Nuba Mountains, and Dinka and Nuer pastoralists in the south. These groups became forced migrants as the state and economic elites in Khartoum exploited regional resources. Pasture and water are of great value in arid Darfur, oil reserves are in the south, while the Nuba Mountains are valued for their strategic location along the north–south oil pipelines. South Sudan became an independent country in 2011 but its oil resources are still a source of conflict. The Climate Change Explanation The UNHCR (2009) and the US Department of Defense (2010) predict that climate-induced natural disasters will cause massive population

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displacement. In fact, forced migration due to climate change has already begun in Asia among island nations and coastal populations (Niazi 2013). On 8 November 2013, Typhoon Haiyan caused massive destruction in the Philippines, displacing more than 3 million people from their homes. It was the largest and most powerful tropical storm to ever hit land. More are likely to occur. Bangladesh predicts that 20 million of its coastal residents are threatened. The country’s policy makers propose their “managed migration” to western nations before future disasters strike. Since the migration is inevitable, the country’s leaders advocate that Europe and the USA accept Bangladeshi “climate refugees” now rather than wait until forced migration occurs. The United Nations’ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change supports this proposal. The concept of environmental refugees (El-Hinnawi 1985) first called attention to this problem. During the 1990s, scholars began to systematically document how deforestation, rising sea levels, desertification, drought, and other forms of environmental disruption were forcing people from their homes. By the early 2000s, it appeared self-evident that nature, not state persecution, was to blame for uprooting people throughout the world (Myers 2001). Numerous neologisms are now used to describe these populations, such as climate refugee, environmentally displaced people, and eco-migrant. Proponents of these terms argue that flight from catastrophic ecological problems should be added to the United Nations’ definition of refugee (Environmental Justice Foundation 2011). Climate change explanations of forced migration are quite complex and can lead to oversimplification. The perspective sometimes unintentionally naturalizes displaced people – i.e., conceptualizes them as a problem, like a flood. Some scholars argue that many “natural disasters” are, in fact, not caused by nature but by maldevelopment in pursuit of economic growth at all costs (Freudenberg et al. 2009). In 2005, Hurricane Katrina displaced 800,000 people in New Orleans. It was indeed a “natural” phenomenon, but a deeper analysis showed powerful economic interests were also a root cause. The destruction of

wetlands and diversion of rivers to accommodate housing developments proved unsustainable when the hurricane hit. Blaming only nature for causing this destruction neglects the interaction between social systems and ecosystems. At present, we have been warned that carbon-fueled climate change is raising sea levels and sea temperatures, both of which will lead to more frequent and more destructive hurricanes and typhoons (Environmental Justice Foundation 2011).

Conclusion At the end of World War II, there were about 42 million forced laborers, prisoners of war, and displaced civilians all over Europe (Marrus 1985). The UNHCR was established in 1951 to assist them and by 1954 there were less than one million. Now the UNHCR seeks to protect about 36 million forced migrants in 79 % of the world’s 211 countries and territories. Rather than being due to episodic instability in a subset of countries, forced migration is now a continuous by-product of globalization. There is a global level of violence comparable to, but far more dispersed than, the most destructive war in world history. While revolutions and proxy wars still occur, the underlying cause of forced migration at the start of the twenty-first century is society’s unbalanced relationship with the environment. World War II and its aftermath in the Cold War showed that extreme nationalism can disrupt the international state system and lead to human flight for survival. This geopolitical perspective is now only one of several explanations for forced migration. Some scholars and policy makers focus on the ethnic conflicts that lead to failed states. Others emphasize that the causes of violent conflict and flight can be found in globalization’s demand for natural resources and its attendant commodity transportation routes. The climate change explanation also focuses on the environment. Geopolitical and failed state explanations of forced migration should be complemented by explanations emphasizing the damage done to humans and the environment by the rapid production of wealth from natural resources.

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References Betts A, Loescher G (eds) (2011) Refugees and international relations. Oxford University Press, Oxford Cohen R, Deng FM (1998) Masses in flight. Brookings Institute, Washington, DC Collins RO (2008) A history of modern Sudan. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge de Waal A (2007) Sudan: The turbulent state. In: de Waal A (ed) War in Darfur and the search for peace. Global equity initiative. Harvard University, Cambridge, pp 1–38 El-Hinnawi E (1985) Environmental refugees. United Nations Environmental Program, Nairobi Environmental Justice Foundation (2011) Climate change and migration. http://ejfoundation.org/sites/default/ files/public/EJF_climate%20change%20and%20migra tion%20%282011%29.pdf. Accessed 24 Dec 2013 Freudenberg WR, Gramling R, Laska S, Erikson K (2009) Catastrophe in the making. Island Press, Washington, DC Haddad E (2008) The refugee in international society. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Hein J (1993) Refugees, immigrants, and the state. Annu Rev Sociol 19:43–59 Hein J, Niazi T (2009) A well-founded fear: a social ecology of twenty-first century refugees. Harvard Int Rev 31(3):38–42 Hein J, Niazi T (2012) State-society incompatibility and forced migration: the violent development of Afghanistan under Socialist, Islamist, and Capitalist regimes. Soc Without Bord 7(3):341–363 Homer-Dixon TF (1999) Environment, scarcity, and violence. Princeton University Press, Princeton Keely CB (1996) How nation-states create and respond to refugee flows. Int Migration Rev 30:1046–66 Kronenfeld DA (2008) Afghan refugees in Pakistan: not all refugees, not always in Pakistan, not necessarily Afghan. J Refugee Stud 21(1):43–63

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Marrus MR (1985) The unwanted: European refugees in the twentieth century. Oxford University Press, New York Myers N (2001) Environmental refugees. The Royal Society, London Niazi T (2013) The Asia-Pacific in the eye of superstorms. Asia-Pacific J 11: 5 Dec. http://www. japanfocus.org/-Tarique-Niazi/4043/article.html Niazi T, Hein J (2013) Political economy of the world system: the social-ecological theory of human rights. In: Brunsma DL, Smith KEI, Gran BK (eds) The handbook of sociology and human rights. Paradigm Publishers, Boulder, pp 374–383 Nurussaman M (2009) Revisiting the category of fragile and failed states in international relations. Int Stud 46(3):271–294 Pedraza S (2007) Political disaffection in Cuba’s revolution and exodus. Cambridge University Press, New York Peluso NL, Watts M (eds) (2001) Violent environments. Cornell University Press, Ithaca Rubin B (2002) Fragmentation of Afghanistan. Yale University Press, New York U.S. Department of Defense (2010) Quadrennial defense review report. U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, DC UNHCR (2000) The state of the world’s refugees. Oxford University Press, Oxford UNHCR (2009) Climate change, natural disasters, and human displacement. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/ texis/vtx/home/opendocPDFViewer.html?docid=4901 e81a4%26query=%22climate%20change,%20natural %22. Accessed on 18 Dec 2013 UNHCR (2013) 2012 statistical yearbook. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. http://www.unhcr. org/52a7213b9.html. Accessed 18 Dec 2013 UNHCR (2015) UNHCR Mid-Year Trends 2014. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Geneva Zolberg A, Suhrke A, Aguayo S (1989) Escape from violence. Oxford University Press, New York

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Refugee Integration: Issues and Challenges

Theo Majka and Linda Majka Department of Sociology, Anthropology and Social Work, University of Dayton, Dayton, OH, USA

Definition Since integration depends on the adaptation by both refugees and host communities and includes participation in the wider community by refugees as well as increasing social relations outside one’s ethnic group, we adapt Alba and Nee’s updating of the assimilation approach to define refugee integration as “the decline of an ethnic distinction and its corollary cultural and social differences” (Alba and Nee 2003, p. 11). Integration is multidimensional and dependent on both the efforts of refugees and the willingness of individuals, communities, organizations, and institutions for the host society to accept and incorporate the newcomers. The key component of integration is the ability to participate in the institutions of the larger society. Achieving integration is also dependent on immigrants and refugees absorbing important cultural norms of the Linda Majka: Deceased

society, learning the dominant language, and developing interpersonal ties and contacts outside their particular group. Integration for both immigrants and refugees is attained when they are able to participate in their new country economically, socially, politically, and culturally, without necessarily losing their cultural distinctiveness and ties with their homeland (Ives 2007). For refugees, English language proficiency, acculturation, employment, education, and access to health care are all considered to be vital elements of the resettlement and integration process (Ives 2007; Gilbert et al. 2010).

Background Refugees who seek to build a new life in a different country face distinct challenges. Many of the findings of the extensive literature on the assimilation of immigrants apply to refugees. However, there are crucial differences as well that are based on the nature of the refugees’ experiences and their insufficient preparation for becoming residents of specific societies. We focus on those fleeing their country of origin who have been officially classified as refugees by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and were resettled in Western countries, particularly the USA. The USA has resettled over three million since 1975, far more refugees than any other nation. For example, of the 69,000 refugees resettled in

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 F. D. Bean, S. K. Brown (eds.), Selected Topics in Migration Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-19631-7_48

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2012, the USA took in 53,000 or 77 %, even as Norway and Australia had slightly higher per capita resettlement rates (UNHCR Global Resettlement Report 2012). The challenges to integration are also relevant for many asylum seekers who flee their country due to violence and locate in Western countries via other means, such as a temporary visa. Resettlement agencies receive refugees as they arrive and assist them in obtaining services that are crucial to their integration, including employment services, housing, school enrollment for children, English as a Second Language (ESL) enrollment, applications for public assistance, and health screenings. Resettlement agencies may often serve as cultural mentors to help with the transactions among refugees and local institutions (Nawyn 2010). As a variety of problems can arise concerning the adequacy and accessibility of services refugees need, it becomes important to evaluate the roles that institutions play in the resettlement process. In particular, the ability and willingness of institutions to accommodate refugees are crucial to the integration process since institutional policies and practices can facilitate or inhibit incorporation. Moreover, at present, the US Office of Refugee Resettlement expects refugee households to be financially self-sufficient within only eight months after arrival, and federal assistance is similarly limited to that time period. In comparison with voluntary immigrants, a greater divergence in the experiences of resettlement and adjustment exists among refugee populations, even when controlling for characteristics such as level of education, age, and occupational experiences. Refugee populations vary with respect to their knowledge and exposure to Western cultures and languages, educational levels, transferable skills, and experiences useful in the job market. Also, their exposure to violence and traumatic events varies considerably. For those who spent time in refugee camps, the amount of time there can range considerably. For example, many Burundian refugees were in refugee camps in Tanzania for more than three decades, and many Bhutanese were in camps in Nepal since the early 1990s

Refugee Integration: Issues and Challenges

before being resettled beginning in 2008, primarily in the USA, Canada, and Australia. Due to the limited opportunities for employment and education in camps, refugees that have spent a longer time in them tend to have more difficulties establishing themselves after resettlement.

Challenges to Integration Research on the process of refugee resettlement has identified several factors that have contributed to and facilitated successful integration into the refugees’ new communities. Although their importance can vary among communities and for refugee groups, there is consistent mention of adequate employment, satisfactory and affordable housing, and access to education and health care as crucial elements of the process of incorporation. Language barriers often create difficulties for refugees. Also, a lack of community support expressed by, for example, institutions that do not accommodate non-English speakers, can significantly inhibit the process of successful and comprehensive resettlement and integration. Unlike some immigrant populations, refugees have fewer problems with respect to law enforcement, the legal system and the courts, proof of identity, and, of course, immigration status. In contrast, issues related to mental health and knowledge of institutional practices and norms (“how things work”) are considerably more prominent among many refugee populations. Employment Employment issues illustrate the interrelated nature of these challenges. Employers frequently require job applications and supporting documents to be submitted in English. Initially, refugees have assistance from resettlement agency case managers in preparing the necessary materials, but time limits on aid place the burden of the application process on refugees. Sometimes, case managers need to accompany refugees to their jobs for several days so as to explain to them what they are supposed to do. Also, many employers make English language fluency a

Refugee Integration: Issues and Challenges

precondition for employment, even for jobs that do not really require interaction in English. Part-time jobs tend to be more readily available to refugees than full-time ones. Part-time schedules do allow more time to address family needs, attend ESL classes, and even continue the search for more adequate jobs, but the short hours frequently do not provide sufficient income to cover all the necessities. Employment difficulties are exacerbated by the difference in kinds of employment between home countries and the USA. For those living in refugee camps, opportunities for employment were very limited. Culturally, many refugees need to adjust to what to them seem like very formalized and routinized work schedules. Studies have found that refugees are often forced to take entry-level jobs, regardless of previous employment or education history. Many have to work long hours in multiple low-paying jobs, and unlike their previous experiences, they recognize that at least two incomes are required per household to insure economic survival (Hume and Hardwick 2005; Ives 2007; Smith 2008). Their employment situations are also dependent on the general employment pattern and economic activities of the region where they live. Employment nevertheless provides benefits in addition to income and re´sume´ building. Some refugees report that their jobs provide their primary sources of contact with native-born Americans and they used these opportunities for interaction to improve their English and knowledge about American norms, culture, and institutions and “how things work” (Gahimer 2013). For better-educated refugees, their educational credentials (e.g., a college degree in a particular field) or occupational credentials (e.g., prior work as a doctor or judge) are frequently not recognized or accepted by American institutions, so they are unable to obtain a job in their field (Ager and Strang 2008; Gilbert et al. 2010; Nawyn 2010). Thus, many refugees with a college education and even with advanced degrees end up employed in unskilled occupations. For example, in our study, two Iraqis with engineering degrees and computer skills were sweeping

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floors (Majka and Majka 2012). The lack of acceptance of educational degrees earned in their country of origin appears to be particularly significant. These obstacles can be overcome if a particular program is designed to do so, as was the case with the Cuban Refugee Program that was put in place from 1960 to 1974, to enable Cubans then coming to the USA to “translate” their educational and occupational credentials in Cuba, making them valuable in America. As a result of retraining programs and recertification efforts, former Cuban lawyers became librarians or social workers; former Cuban professionals went on to become Spanish teachers in the USA (cf. Pedraza-Bailey 1985). Language Compared to other immigrants, a lower percentage of refugees come to the USA with a familiarity of Western cultures and knowledge of the primary language of their new country. Research consistently shows language to be the primary barrier to better integration. Gilbert et al. (2010) found that the most important indicator of refugee integration in the USA was acquiring an adequate level of English language fluency. Acquisition of the English language plays a crucial role in long-term prosperity and well-being for refugees. For example, higher levels of English proficiency, as well as education, were associated with lower levels of acculturation stress among Bhutanese refugees living in the southwestern USA (Benson et al. 2012). Refugees often feel that a lack of English proficiency can create serious problems when searching for and retaining employment (Ives 2007). Although the vast majority of foreign born becomes English proficient over time, the rate of English language acquisition is a factor influencing opportunities for mobility and success (Portes and Rumbaut 2006). Refugees and immigrants who are overwhelmingly concentrated in ethnic enclaves, however, need to rely less on English language proficiency to be successful than those who are resettled at large or who constitute a minority in their area of settlement (Portes and Bach 1985).

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In our own research on refugee integration, language issues also emerged as the primary barrier to better integration (Majka and Majka 2012). A higher proportion of agency officials, refugee leaders, and participants in refugee focus groups chose language issues and barriers as the most frequently mentioned obstacles to becoming integrated into our communities than any other factor. This was also the finding of a prior study we conducted on the integration of immigrants in the Dayton area (Majka and Majka 2011). Acquisition of English (or any other language) is more difficult for those who are older, have fewer years of formal schooling, and lack exposure to or fluency in another Western language. Motivation to learn English varies considerably as well. Those lacking employment or employed in jobs that do not require English and offer little prospect of advancement have less of an incentive to learn. In her study of Bhutanese refugees in Dayton, Ohio, Winslow (2013) found these patterns pertain mostly to adult women. For some, the hope and expectation that they will eventually return to their homeland makes it difficult to justify the investment required to learn English. Refugees are enrolled in ESL classes shortly after their arrival by the resettlement agency. Attendance, however, cannot be enforced. Access to classes is influenced by the times and places the classes are offered, the capacity of the classes to accommodate the demand, and, for some, adequate and affordable transportation and child care. Class times may also conflict with work hours. They may be taught at a level that is too advanced or too basic for individual refugees. Some refugees feel that classes that focus on conversational English would be more useful, as would classes that make connections between texts and their lives (Sarroub et al. 2007; Baynham 2006). Local organizations often lack the resources to provide bilingual ESL classes for specific language groups. Nevertheless, ESL classes are generally the most effective way to gain a basic knowledge of English.

Refugee Integration: Issues and Challenges

Health Care The refugee experience is one of loss. Many still carry physical and psychological injuries from their experiences in their homeland, trauma which led them to become refugees. Consequently, health-care issues are particularly salient concerns for refugees. These include access to treatment of previously undiagnosed conditions (e.g., intestinal parasites), lack of insurance, lack of knowledge regarding how to negotiate the system, availability of trained medical interpreters, and cultural misunderstandings. Access to adequate health care is influenced by a variety of factors, many of which refugees share with other Americans. As noted previously, many refugees take low-paying, entry-level employment, and most of their employers do not provide health-care insurance. Nevertheless, some of those with low-paying positions that included health coverage were less motivated to look for jobs that were more commensurate with their skills and experiences because of the uncertainty of future access to health care (Ives 2007). Like many other foreign-born residents, refugees frequently encounter difficulties with language barriers when trying to communicate with health professionals, and they generally experience a great deal of difficulty navigating the healthcare system (Ager and Strang 2008). For example, many refugees report that they have not had a physical exam or received dental care for a while or received medical information in their native language. Instances where a physician did not understand them are too common, and many had to reschedule medical appointments due to the lack of an interpreter (Mukunzi 2011). Mental health issues are regarded as particularly important among both refugees themselves and service providers. It can be difficult to adequately address mental health needs since there is no systematic screening or evaluation of resettled refugees for mental health problems. Also, some leaders of refugee communities may lack an awareness of mental health problems within their group, even though others recognize them as significant. As Pipher described in her study of refugees in Lincoln, Nebraska, there are different cultural

Refugee Integration: Issues and Challenges

interpretations of mental health problems and the appropriate means for treating them. Even when accessible, Western psychotherapeutic methods are not often utilized by refugees from non-Western cultures. Sometimes the reasons are practical, such as language barriers, access to health insurance, more pressing demands, and scheduling difficulties. But more important are the cultural reasons. Some refugees come from cultures where discussing problems outside the family, especially mental ones, is simply never done. Also, some issues, such as rape and family violence, are taboo to discuss even within the family, let alone to anyone else. Finally, mental anguish may be thought to be due to physical or spiritual problems. Sometimes, talking to a traditional healer or a trusted member of their cultural community, such as a spiritual or religious leader, is the most effective way to begin the healing process. Participating in cultural rituals and festivities, sharing positive emotions, and nurturing and being nurtured by family and friends are ways that help individuals move beyond the traumas (Pipher 2002; Stein 1986). Examples from a study of Rwandan and Burundian refugees in the Dayton, Ohio, area illustrate some of the mental health issues many refugees experience (Mukunzi 2011). Slightly over half reported that stress was their number one health issue. Rwandans mentioned that they still carry psychological wounds from the loss of many relatives during the 1994 genocide and later mass killings in the neighboring Democratic Republic of the Congo. Similarly, Burundians reported stresses due to the loss of their relatives during the 1972 and 1993 genocides and other losses during their decades in refugee camps in Tanzania and elsewhere. Also, both groups reported many post-migration stressors, such as unfamiliarity with the culture and norms, lack of adequate English fluency, unemployment, unpaid medical bills, and housing expenses. How important integration is for refugees is emphasized by these kinds of traumas and, for some, lingering conditions of what we now term post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Failure to integrate these refugees could delay recovery and

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in effect prolong the consequences of the violation of human rights that they experienced. Some refugees understandably manifest posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) symptoms, such as flashbacks, unsettling dreams, emotional numbness, inability to concentrate, anger, selfdestructive behavior (including substance abuse), and hopelessness about their future (Pipher 2002). One consequence is what Kai Erikson called “collective trauma,” stemming from the erosion of communality accompanying the loss of a particular community. It is often manifested in the feeling that time is suspended and the inability to put shattered lives back together and plan for the future (Erikson 1978). As Pipher (2002) noted, the integration of refugees into their new society and communities is a critical aspect of recovery from traumatic experiences. Institutions have a crucial part to play in this regard. By making research-informed efforts to accommodate refugees, they can facilitate recovery and create conditions for refugees and their children to become productive members of their new communities. Refugees who remain unintegrated risk prolonging their mental health problems, and this can have detrimental impacts on their families, especially on the children. Housing For housing, research presents a mixed picture. In their study of Cuban refugees in Texas, Barnes and Aguilar (2007) found low-income refugee housing conditions to be crowded, squalid, and neglected, and they were almost always in the undesirable parts of town with higher crime rates. In contrast, Ager and Strang (2008) found that refugees generally were less concerned with the physical conditions or size of a house than they were concerned with the ability to form a community with fellow refugees and close relationships with neighbors. Belonging to a community often provides refugees with a much-needed sense of being “settled,” as well as opportunities to learn from each other. A study of refugees in Utica, New York, showed that refugees helped revitalize neighborhoods, buying older run-down houses for a low price and subsequently renovating them, resulting in an increase in real estate

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values in these neighborhoods of around 25 % between 2003 and 2006 (Smith 2008). This contribution led to a more positive perception of refugees by both community members and landlords. Moreover, former refugees often became landlords themselves, renting to newer refugees, often of different nationalities. Housing issues also interact with employment. The cost of housing, transportation to jobs, long commutes, and the limitations of public transportation and carpooling all constitute obstacles. Housing tends to be less expensive in the central city, and many refugees live there. Nevertheless, the more desirable jobs are often located outside the radius of public transportation. Sandoval et al. (2011) note that research has consistently shown that cars have a significant impact on the ability of individuals and households to attain economic self-sufficiency. Obtaining a car can be more complicated for many refugees, however, since it requires sufficient English proficiency and obtaining a drivers’ license, along with the expenses of auto ownership (such as insurance, fuel costs, and maintenance/repairs), which can be particularly expensive for older cars. Youth and Education In general, the integration of refugee youth has been largely successful, both for those who came to the USA as children and those born in the USA. The resettlement process places a priority on enrolling refugee children and adolescents in school as soon as possible, and this contributes to rapid English language understanding and usage. School environments also offer social incentives that cause refugee youth adapt quickly. In fact, their acculturation contrasts strongly with the cultural distance experienced by many of their parents. Refugee parents tend to have high expectations for their children’s education. In our study (Majka and Majka 2012), many parents praised the city’s public schools and noted the efforts of schools and some individual teachers to accommodate their children, make them aware of opportunities (e.g., summer programs), and facilitate their learning of English.

Refugee Integration: Issues and Challenges

Similar to many immigrant groups, the different rates of acculturation and English acquisition do result in parents relying on their children to be translators and cultural mediators for them. Sometimes children get in trouble at school for absences due to their parents’ demands for translation.

Responses In general, refugee populations face distinctive situations and challenges due to their experiences in their homeland and the frequently unplanned nature of their migration to the USA or other, mostly Western, countries. The studies cited above illustrate similar issues and challenges for refugee groups or resettled refugees. Taken together, they show that while progress is being made, many refugee populations still experience difficulties dealing with some local agencies and organizations due to both their own circumstances and agency practices. Since the issues and challenges are interrelated, improvements in one area can be expected to have positive impacts on the others. Similar to other immigrants, refugee communities and networks are important forms of mutual support and information, and members facilitate each other’s integration. All else being equal, the cohesiveness of refugee communities is important for the adaptation and success of their members. For both immigrants and refugees, the institutional context is important for the trajectory it can set for either incorporation and generational mobility or marginalization and prolonged generational disadvantage. Some communities and organizations have responded in conscious ways to assist refugees. Often this is part of more general efforts to attract immigrants to cities with declining populations (Davey 2014; Preston 2013). Some of this involves changes in institutional policies and practices among both public and private organizations to make them more accommodating. It also involves recognizing and appreciating the resources, strengths, and benefits that

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immigrants/refugees bring to communities and the positive aspects of their cultures and values. For example, in receiving an All-American City Award in 2009, the city of Fort Wayne, Indiana, was recognized for its “efforts in assisting refugees and helping them integrate and succeed in the community” (MacLachlan 2012). In 2011, the city of Dayton, Ohio, adopted an “immigrant friendly city” plan, officially called “Welcome Dayton,” and undertook a number of initiatives to assist the integration of immigrants/refugees (Sewell 2011). It is in part an evolving response to refugee resettlement that endorses improving and governmental cooperation between nongovernmental organizations. It recognizes that no single institution bears responsibility for and can alone accomplish successful refugee resettlement in their community (City of Dayton Human Relations Council 2011). Our study of refugees in Dayton, Ohio, resulted in an assessment report for the local community (Housel et al. 2012) and a conference on refugee integration. In addition, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) website is a rich source of information on how best to respond to the challenges that refugees bring to their new communities. Two other websites listed are also good sources. The UNHCR’s summary report titled “The State of the World’s Refugees: In Search of Solidarity” (2012) called for a new paradigm to respond effectively to the fact that refugees increasingly live in cities and towns where they struggle to survive as highly diverse populations. The report stated: “To respond to the protection and assistance needs of refugees living in urban areas, humanitarian agencies, development agencies and host governments will need to work together more closely and more consistently” (p. 25). Solidarity is viewed as managing challenges “in a way that distributes costs and burdens fairly” (p. 29). To make the principle of solidarity more concrete, the report underlined, “Responsibility sharing is the expression of solidarity in practice” (p. 30). The UNHCR report concluded:

. . .the nature and scale of refugee flows, internal displacement and statelessness puts national and considerable international under systems pressure. . . But solidarity is not only a matter for states. Civil society organizations, communities and individuals often make the most meaningful contributions to improving the state of the world’s refugees. (p. 31)

Refugees do need specific programs to address their needs, as well as supportive local initiatives and advocates. Integration into the new society is blocked both by refugee circumstances and agency practices, but these are for the most part surmountable obstacles. Churches, mosques, synagogues, and other faith-based organizations, as well as local public schools, local libraries, and police departments, can and should take up initiatives to assist refugees in becoming integrated into their new communities and the larger society. Acknowledgments This entry is dedicated in loving memory to my spouse and co-author Dr. Linda Majka (1947–2014). It represents the last of many works we collaborated on during our careers as professional sociologists.

Cross-References ▶ Asylum and Human Rights ▶ Citizenship ▶ Forced Migration, Natural Resources, and Violence ▶ Forced Migration: Detention ▶ Integration Policies ▶ Refugee Mental Health ▶ Refugee Roulette ▶ Refugees Defined ▶ Social Assimilation ▶ Women at Risk Refugee and Humanitarian Visas

References Ager A, Strang A (2008) Understanding integration: a conceptual framework. J Refug Stud 21(2):166–191

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Alba R, Nee V (2003) Remaking the American mainstream: assimilation and contemporary immigration. Harvard University Press, Cambridge Barnes D, Aguilar R (2007) Community social support for Cuban refugees in Texas. Qual Health Res 17(2):225–237 Baynham M (2006) Agency and contingency in the language learning of refugees and asylum seekers. Linguist Educ 17:24–39 Benson G, Sun F, Hodge D, Androff D (2012) Religious coping and acculturation stress among Hindu Bhutanese: a study of newly-resettled refugee in the United States. Int Soc Work 55(4):538–553 City of Dayton Human Relations Council, Welcome Dayton: immigrant friendly city. Report. September 2011. www.daytonohio.gov/ Resource document. welcomedaytonreport. Accessed 23 Nov 2012 Davey M (2014) Immigrants seen as way to refill Detroit ranks. New York Times, 23 Jan 2014. Resource document. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/24/us/ immigrants-seen-as-way-to-refill-detroit-ranks.html Accessed 24 Jan 2014 Erikson K (1978) Everything in its path: destruction of community in the buffalo creek flood. Simon and Schuster, New York Gahimer E (2013) Refugees in Dayton: the job search & employment experience in their new home. Senior research thesis Gilbert P, Hein M, Losby J (2010) Exploring refugee integration: experiences in our American communities. ISED Solutions, Washington, DC Housel J, Majka L, Majka T, Redko C, Saxen C (2012) Dayton refugee community assessment, 2012. Resource document. www.welcomedayton.org/ dayton-refugee-community-assessment or http:// www.udayton.edu/artssciences/forum_on_immigration/ images_files/refugee_report.pdf. Accessed 3 Jan 2014 Hume S, Hardwick S (2005) African, Russian and Ukrainian refugee resettlement in Portland, Oregon. Geogr Rev 95(2):189–209 Ives N (2007) More than a “Good Back”: looking for integration in refugee resettlement. Refuge 24(2):54–63 MacLachlan H (2012) Creating Pan-Karen identity: the wrist-tying ceremony in the United States. Asia Pacific Migr J 21(4):459–482 Majka T, Majka L (2011) Institutional obstacles to incorporation: Latino immigrant experiences in a mid-size rustbelt city. In: Martinez R (ed) Latinos in the Midwest. Michigan State Press, East Lansing Majka T, Majka L (2012) Refugees in a mid-sized midwestern urban area: circumstantial and institutional challenges to incorporation. Paper presented at the American Sociological Association meetings, Denver, CO, Aug 2012 Mukunzi J (2011) Assessment of refugees health in montgomery county: a case study of refugees from Rwanda and Burundi. Resource document. http://corescholar. libraries.wright.edu/mph/63/. Accessed 13 July 2012.

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Nawyn S (2010) Institutional structures of opportunity in refugee resettlement: gender, race/ethnicity, and refugee NGOs. J Sociol Soc Welf 37(1):149–167 Pedraza-Bailey S (1985) Political and economic migrants in America: Cubans and Mexicans. University of Texas Press, Austin Pipher M (2002) The middle of everywhere: helping refugees enter the American community. Harcourt, Boston Portes A, Bach R (1985) Latin journey: Cuban and Mexican immigrants in the United States. University of California Press, Berkeley Portes A, Rumbaut R (2006) Immigrant America: a portrait, 3rd edn. University of California Press, Berkeley Preston J (2013) Ailing Midwestern cities extend a welcoming hand to immigrants. New York Times, 6 Oct 2013. Resource document. http://www.nytimes.com/ 2013/10/07/us/ailing-cities-extend-hand-to-immigrants. html. Accessed 3 Jan 2014 Sandoval J, Cervero R, Landis J (2011) The transition from welfare-to-work: how cars and human capital facilitate employment for welfare recipients. Appl Geogr 31:352–362 Sarroub L, Pernicek T, Sweeney T (2007) “I was bitten by a scorpion”: reading in and out of school in a refugee’s life. J Adolesc Adult Lit 50(8):668–679 Sewell D (2011) “Welcome Dayton” Ohio city makes it a policy to encourage immigrants to come. Associated Press, 30 Oct 2011. Resource document. http://www. dailyherald.com/article/20111030/news/710309972/ . Accessed 3 Jan 2014 Smith RS (2008) The case of a city where 1 in 6 residents is a refugee: ecological factors and host community adaptation in successful resettlement. Am J Community Psychol 42(3–4):328–342 Stein B (1986) The experience of being a refugee: insights from the research literature. In: Williams C, Westermeyer J (eds) Refugee mental health in resettlement countries. Routledge, New York UNHCR (2012) “The state of the World’s refugees: in search of solidarity.” Resource document. http:// www.unhcr.org/4fc5ceca9.html. Accessed 23 June 2012 UNHCR global resettlement report, 2012. Resource document. http://www.unhcr.org/52693bd09.html. Accessed 24 Dec 2013 Winslow M (2013) Resettled: a portrait of Bhutanese refugees in Dayton, Ohio. Senior research thesis

Selected Websites Bridging Refugee Youth and Children’s Services (BRYCS) of the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops. http://brycs.org Migration and Refugee Services of the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops. http://www.usccb.org/ about/migration-and-refugee-services United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. http:// www.unhcr.org

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Refugee Mental Health: Child and Adolescent Refugees

Child Development and Psychological Trauma in Refugees

Eugenio M. Rothe1, Andre´s J. Pumariega2 and Hector Castillo-Matos3 1 Herbert Wertheim College of Medicine, Florida International University, Miami, FL, USA 2 Department of Psychiatry, Cooper Medical School, Camden, NJ, USA 3 Nueva America Community Mental Health Center, Miami, FL, USA

The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) has estimated that 80 % of victims of modern wars are children and women, many of whom will become refugees. The United States admits from 20,000 to 27,000 child and adolescent refugees each year (UNHCR 2013). Mental health experts have framed the problems that result from these experiences under the diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD); its treatment now constitutes a separate field of investigation (Lustig et al. 2004). In spite of this, accurate data on the mental health status of young refugees is still lacking, as is information on their help-seeking and service utilization. Furthermore, controversy is ongoing as to whether mental health care is among the primary needs of refugees and, particularly, what a child refugee needs and how to provide it. Our focus here is on the types of mental health issues that affect child and adolescent refugees around the world today, the diagnosis and treatment that have been utilized to treat these children and adolescents in Europe and the United States, and the risk factors and protective factors that may influence their mental health outcomes (Rothe and Pumariega 2010). Due to differences in samples, methods, and instrumentation, we lack consistent prevalence rates for psychiatric disorders in refugee children. Also, there is a wide variability in the exposure to different forms of trauma in these

Definition A refugee is a person who is outside their home country because they have suffered (or feared) persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, and political opinion or because they are a member of a persecuted social category of persons or because they are fleeing a war. Such a person may be called an “asylum seeker” until recognized by the state where they make a claim. Unaccompanied immigrant children sometimes fit the definition of “refugee,” because they arrive at a host country to escape domestic abuse, gang violence, human trafficking, or extreme poverty in their home countries and seek asylum in the host country. In contrast, other unaccompanied children arrive in the host country to seek better opportunities and some simply to reunite with family members already living in that host country.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 F. D. Bean, S. K. Brown (eds.), Selected Topics in Migration Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-19631-7_49

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children. Nevertheless, there seems to be agreement that refugee children are at a higher risk of developing multiple, coexisting psychiatric disorders than the general pediatric population, risk which is calculated at around 20 % (US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants (USCRI) 2013). Persecution, violence, war, killing, or torture as well as the losses suffered by these children and adolescents increase the risk of psychological distress and psychiatric disorders. PTSD can be understood as a neurophysiological disorder characterized by an exaggerated response to the “fight-flight” reaction, though such distress is expressed differently culturally. Given the multiple losses experienced and the violent and traumatic nature of the events, depression, anxiety, and grief are also commonly found among young refugees. Other commonly reported, but less well-researched, problems include physical complaints, such as sleep problems, social problems, and conduct disorder; emotional problems, such as social withdrawal, generalized attention problems, fear, overdependency, restlessness, irritability, and eating disorders; and learning problems, such as those involved with school functioning, peer relationships, defiance, hyperactivity, and aggression. Among child refugees, there can be a loss of previously acquired skills, such as loss of bladder control with secondary bedwetting, soiling, intense separation anxiety, and nail-biting. Sadness, introversion, tiredness, suicidal ideation, attempted suicide, and violent self-harm have also been reported. The risk for developing psychosis (becoming out of touch with reality) has been found to increase in adolescent refugees. Even more, a syndrome of pervasive devitalization has been found, characterized by a refusal to eat, drink, talk, walk, engage socially, or accept help. Other preexisting conditions such as attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) may become exacerbated by the trauma of migration. It is important to note that the presence of PTSD is related to earlier experiences of war trauma and resettlement stress, while depression is exacerbated after arrival in the receiving country, as it consists of mourning the multiple emotional losses experienced, as well as the life difficulties

and acculturation stress initially encountered in the host country. Despite these many difficulties, refugees oftentimes demonstrate remarkable resiliency and resourcefulness (Rothe and Pumariega 2012).

Phases of the Refugee Experience Refugee children and adolescents are often exposed to experiences of war, persecution, violence, torture, killings, disrupted attachments, and emotional losses which increase the risk for psychological distress and may contribute to the risk of their developing psychiatric disorders. These young refugees may undergo a series of very stressful experiences prior to arriving to the host country that fit within the three phases of the refugees’ experience: preflight, flight, and resettlement (Lustig et al. 2004). Preflight This phase before the escape from the country of origin is often fraught with uncertainty and dread. Refugee families begin to experience the disruption of their lives and increasing chaos. Children may face changes in their daily routines and limited access to schools, with both their education and social development being disrupted. At times, they encounter threats to their safety; they suffer the separation from their parents and caretakers; and many even witness or engage in violence. Flight This phase begins with the displacement of the refugees from their home environments; it often entails being at the mercy of external circumstances that they cannot control. The children’s emotional state and stability depend in large part upon the availability and emotional state of their caretakers. One of the most common effects of war and persecution is the separation of children from their caretakers. In a clinic sample of 300 Cuban child and adolescent refugees seen in an infirmary located inside a refugee camp, 58 % of preschoolers and 31 % of elementary school boys had been separated from their fathers during

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the process of flight (Rothe 2005). In another sample of 100 Cuban adolescents released from refugee camps and seen after arrival in the United States, 69 % had left behind grandparents and 79 % had left behind aunts, uncles, and other members of their extended families, many of whom were the child’s primary caretakers while their parents worked (Rothe et al. 2002).

are unaware of their legal rights (Women’s Commission for Refugee Women and Children 2013). Once refugees resettle in the new host country, they need to undergo a process of acculturation which brings about inherent stressors. Families often need to learn a new language and to adjust to new values, beliefs systems, social mores, and family roles. In the process of resettlement and acculturation, the child and the family need to work through a process of mourning similar to the one that is experienced when people are faced with the loss of a loved one, but in this case, the losses are multiple and simultaneous (Rothe et al. 2010). Continued psychological distress in this stage may result from delays in processing asylum applications, uncertainty about asylum status, negotiation with immigration authorities, obstacles with obtaining employment and adequate housing, frequent moves, language problems, racial discrimination, and social isolation. Oftentimes, traditional Western mental health services and treatment approaches have not been effective with immigrants and refugees, who underutilize traditional mental health services as a result of the stigma associated with mental illness in their culture, the lack of clinicians who speak the language, the more pressing human needs, and the lack of finances or insurance coverage to pay for the services. Most recently, standardized principles for culturally competent mental health services and community-based systems of care applicable for child and adolescent immigrants and refugees have been developed (Pumariega et al. 2013). Upon arrival in the host country, many child refugees and their families are undergoing significant turmoil in their lives, so a treatment approach that fluctuates back and forth between the different phases of treatment is the most appropriate intervention. These phases are establishment of safety and trust, trauma-focused therapy, and reintegration.

Resettlement and Access to Care The resettlement phase is characterized by massive losses of the person’s homeland, family, friends, and material possessions. Refugee camps are oftentimes situated on foreign soil. In these camps, inhabitants are depersonalized: becoming numbers without names and experiencing traumatic events are common. In the massive exodus of balseros (rafters) that took place in the summer of 1994, Cuban children and adolescents who left the island on rafts and boats were later detained in the Guantanamo refugee camps for months, prior to arriving in the United States. These refugees reported they had faced storms at sea, witnessed people drowning, and had observed corpses floating being devoured by sharks. Inside the refugee camps, fully 80 % witnessed acts of violence, and 37 % saw someone attempt or commit suicide (Rothe et al. 2002). Many children and adolescents experienced involuntarily soiling themselves and bedwetting at night, as well as nightmares, separation anxiety, aggression, and other disruptive behaviors (Rothe 2005). Many young refugees are unaccompanied and lack identifiable adult guardians when they arrive in the host country. They may have traveled long distances and experienced many traumatic events without adult supervision. Political violence may sometimes render entire villages devoid of adults (Lustig et al. 2004). Children who come to the United States without a guardian are faced with having to negotiate the legal system without advocates. Children awaiting asylum hearings in the United States are sometimes held up to 2 years in detention facilities or juvenile jails. Resources for refugee children are scarce, and many who may have legitimate asylum claims

Establishment of Safety and Trust The first goal of the therapeutic intervention is to help the child and the family to develop a sense of stability and safety and a sense of control over their lives. Liaison work with agencies is

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necessary to provide for their basic needs and to focus on solving housing, educational, and financial problems through the use of attorneys as well as educational, health, religious, cultural, and leisure organizations.

health service utilization while downplaying their resiliency and strengths (Summerfield 1995, 2000, 2001, 2003). The most recent models of mental health care for refugees utilize the principles of Brofenbrenner’s (1979) ecological systems theory, which explains that human beings develop in an interaction with their environment at four levels: the macrosystem (societal rules and beliefs), the exosystem (community and neighborhood factors), the microsystem (the family), and the ontogenic level (individual factors). The interplay between these four levels determines the adaptation of the refugees to their new environments in the host country. This model is useful in designing treatment interventions that will take into account different cultural views of traumatic events, life cycles, and family systems (Hodes 2002).

Trauma-Focused Therapy For children suffering from symptoms of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) which results from being exposed to overwhelming life circumstances that produced damage to the central nervous system and resulted in psychiatric symptoms, this phase of treatment involves working through the trauma experienced (at a pace that is emotionally manageable). Alternative interventions may be offered for a range of difficulties, including depression, anxiety, sleep problems, somatic complaints, and behavioral difficulties. Reintegration During this phase, the focus is on creating future goals and aspirations and integrating into a new community and culture. Young refugees usually begin this process with help from their schools and community resources. Sometimes, geographical relocation is considered (Ehntholt and Yule 2006).

Psychological Development of Child and Adolescent Refugees Children and adolescents depend on adults for guidance and safety, and if the child’s trust in the adult’s ability to care for them is shaken, this may complicate or derail the stages of their normal psychological development. The trauma they experienced during war and persecution and the inability of adults to protect them under these circumstances may result in the children’s feelings of mistrust, betrayal, humiliation, and a sense of vulnerability in children and adolescents. However, some controversy exists in that the concept of psychological vulnerability is based predominantly on Western values and may well exaggerate the psychiatric pathology of refugees and lead to an increase in mental

Risk Factors and Protective Factors “Resilience” is the term used to describe a set of qualities in people that foster a process of successful adaptation and transformation despite the risk and adversity faced. We are all born with an innate capacity for resilience, by which we are able to develop social competence, problemsolving skills, a critical consciousness, autonomy, and a sense of purpose. Longitudinal studies over the lifespan have consistently documented that from half to two-thirds of children growing up in families with mentally ill, alcoholic, abusive, or criminally involved parents, or in poverty-stricken or war-torn communities, do overcome the odds and turn a life trajectory of risk into one of adaptation and success. However, a number of risk factors and protective factors also contribute to determine these outcomes (Garmezy 1991). Factors that have been found to increase the risk of mental health problems and PTSD in young refugees are experiencing a large number of traumatic events; being in close proximity to the traumatic events; witnessing someone being injured, tortured, or killed; the perceived degree of personal threat; separation from family members; immigration detention; and being an

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unaccompanied child refugee. The political persecution or incarceration, injury, torture, or loss of a parent or close family member has been found to have a devastating effect on young refugees. Also, the stresses inherent in the asylumseeking process, the effects of acculturation and resettlement stress, and if the social support system in the receiving country is inadequate have all been found to increase the risk for mental health problems. While traumatic events contribute to PTSD, problems related to loss, lack of social support, and acculturation stress all contribute to depression. Yet many refugee children have been found to be free of mental health problems. What accounts for their resilience is only now beginning to receive attention (Hodes 2000; Summerfield 2000). Some of these protective factors include being of a young age at the time of the trauma, having good self-esteem and an easy temperament that allows them to respond well and effectively to new situations, having religious faith, and holding a strong ideological commitment to a political or national cause. In addition, characteristics of the family and peers also have been found to be protective during the flight as well as the resettlement period, such as adaptability and cohesion within the family, the positive psychological well-being of caregivers, and good peer group and social supports.

humiliation – events that oftentimes continue to occur even after they have been placed in refugee camps, group homes, or foster homes with little supervision or support where they continue to be victimized. Uncertain legal status can also complicate their emotional adjustment and contribute to their being further isolated in detention facilities for extended periods, interfering with their resettlement adjustment and acculturation process. Unaccompanied child refugees may also encounter ambivalence and even rejection by their natural family when they reunify. Their natural family may also hardly believe the extent of their psychological problems and distress – in part out of denial and guilt at their having made the decision to allow them to emigrate alone (Ehntholt and Yule 2006). In the early 1960s, close to 15,000 unaccompanied children and adolescents fled the island of Cuba and arrived in the United States in what became known as Operation Pedro Pan. This exodus was precipitated by the panic that ensued after the newly installed communist dictatorship on the island announced that the parental guardianship of all children (Patria Potestad) no longer belonged to the parents but to the state. Fearing that these children would be conscripted into the militias or sent to communist-run boarding schools, parents allowed the children to immigrate alone with the help of the Catholic Church and the US government. These children were placed in youth camps and in Catholic boarding schools or foster homes. Many of their parents were unable to leave the island until years later, when many of these children were already adults. Although no systematic empirical studies have been done on a good sample of this population, the existing reports paint a mixed picture of the outcomes, alternating between those that harbor deep psychological scars and those that have demonstrated admirable resilience and success in the United States (Eire 2003; Triay 1999; Torres 2003).

Unaccompanied Child and Adolescent Refugees Unaccompanied child refugees are typically exposed to a higher number of traumatic stressors prior to fleeing than their accompanied counterparts. These children flee their nations alone after the death of parents or guardians during the war or political strife. They also flee alone to avoid threats of persecution or violence toward them or their families, the threat of war and resulting victimization, the threat of enslavement or recruitment as child soldiers, or the threat of ideological reeducation. A great number of them were raped, including some males, or have been subjected to other forms of subjugation and

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Child Soldiers

which combines elements of testimonial psychotherapy with cognitive-behavioral therapy; and the more experimental eye movement desensitization and reprocessing (EMDR), which uses bilateral stimulation when processing traumatic memories in individuals with PTSD (Lustig et al. 2004). Psychodynamic psychotherapy has recently been shown to be as efficacious as cognitivebehavioral therapy for the treatment of depression and generalized anxiety (Leischenring et al. 2009). The goals of psychodynamic therapy in refugee children and adolescents include providing a safe place within therapy for the adolescent to express affect and experience containment and tolerance; facilitating the mourning process associated with the migration, including the expression of grief which may not be allowed by their family members because they think it expresses ingratitude for their sacrifices or because it may exacerbate their own grief; allowing identification by the immigrant adolescents with the therapist, so as to rehearse new aspects of their identity from the host culture while dropping aspects that are no longer useful in the receiving country; allowing transferences to develop and to be analyzed, utilizing the therapy as a new, reconstructive emotional experience; mediating affects between the adolescent and his family, allowing for both to complete their process of adaptation to the new culture; and serving as the mediator between the adolescent’s family and the new culture while empowering the family and enabling them to create a new supportive milieu within the host culture (Rothe 2004). A number of communitybased interventions have been identified as increasingly important for helping immigrant youth improve academic achievement, stay in school, and avoid risky behaviors such as pregnancy and substance abuse (Rothe and Pumariega 2010).

Approximately 300,000 child soldiers under 18 years of age are actively fighting in 14 different countries around the world today. Child soldiers are at risk of rape, torture, and war injuries and may later suffer from substance abuse, depression, and anxiety. In addition, child soldiers lose trust in authority figures and also may lose their moral perspective, engaging in stealing, looting, and killing when being ordered to do so and told that killing for political reasons is morally justified. The complex psychodynamic factors involved in being a child soldier often translates into feelings in which the military becomes a surrogate family, particularly in children separated from their biological families. We have scarce information regarding the long-term mental health outcomes and efforts at reintegration into society of these child soldiers, including where they end up seeking asylum and what happens in their lives when they become adults, given that many chose to remain silent about their past experiences (Human Rights Watch/Child Soldiers Worldwide 2012).

Assessment and Treatment Although a number of diagnostic mental health instruments for child and adolescent refugees have been identified, only extensive, openended interviewing and assessment have proven accurate to establish a diagnosis. Standardized diagnostic questionnaires tend to overidentify pathology and have been designed for mainstream populations with Western values, which often prove useless for populations of developing countries (Kinzie et al. 2006). Different models of types of psychotherapy have been found effective in addressing the mental health needs of refugee children and their families. Some of these are trauma-focused cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT); testimonial psychotherapy, which works by helping the refugee transcend grief, anger, and resentment through using testimonies for purposes of education and advocacy; narrative exposure therapy,

Preventing Mental Health Problems Dealing with sudden refugee crises, the receiving community may find itself besieged by their

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massive arrival, which may overwhelm the available mental health infrastructure. To avoid this situation, it is advisable to compose teams of mental health professionals, including translators, that take into account the particular circumstances of the refugee crisis, composed by culturally competent professionals (Sack et al. 1997). A preventive model of intervention to treat refugee children while they are still inside refugee camps aims to minimize their psychological damage (Rothe 2008). Psychiatric symptoms and mental health difficulties in young refugees have been found to persist over many years (Sack et al. 1999). It is important to take into account that symptoms of emotional distress in child and adolescent refugees may sometimes be experienced subjectively even though the child may function well socially and academically, without the parents and teachers becoming aware of the child’s internal suffering (Rothe 2005). Refugees have historically been a significant proportion of the immigrant population in the United States, and it is reasonable to expect that large numbers of refugees will continue to emigrate to the United States and other developed nations seeking safety, security, and freedom. Mental health and support services are most effective in the context of a refugee and immigration policy based on rational national interests rather than on reactions to crises. Part of such a policy should be to actively prepare all Americans for the demographic changes resulting in increased cultural diversity, which may well culminate in the lack of any numerical majorities by the middle of this century.

Garmezy N (1991) Resiliency and vulnerability to adverse developmental outcomes associated with poverty. Am Behav Sci 34:416–430 Hodes M (2000) Psychologically Distressed Refugee Children in the United Kingdom Child Psychology and Psychiatry Review 5(2):57–68 Hodes M (2002) Three key issues for young refugees’ mental health. Transcult Psychiatry 39(2):196–213 Human Rights Watch. Child Soldiers Worldwide (2012) March 12, http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/03/ 12/child-soldiers-worldwide. Accessed 27 Dec 2013. Kinzie JD, Cheng K, Tsai J, Riley C (2006) Traumatized refugee children: the case for individualized diagnosis and treatment. J Nerv Ment Disord 194:534–537 Layne CM, Pynoos RS, Saltzman WR, Arslanagic B, Black M, Savjak N, Popvic’ T, Durakovic’ E, Musˇic’ M, Campara N, Djapo N, Houston R (2001) Trauma/grief-focused group psychotherapy: schoolbased postwar intervention with traumatized Bosnian adolescents. Group Dyn Theory Res Pract 5:277–290 Leichsenring F, Salzer S, Jaeger U, Ka¨chele H, uger U, Winkelbach C, Kreische R, Leweke F, R€ Leibing E (2009) Short-term psychodynamic psychotherapy and cognitive-behavioral therapy in generalized anxiety disorder: a randomized, controlled trial. Am J Psychiatry 166(8):875–881 Lustig SL, Kia-Keating M, Knight WG, Geltman P, Ellis H, Kinzie JD (2004) Review of child and adolescent refugee mental health. J Am Acad Child Adolesc Psychiatry 43(1):24–36 Pumariega AJ, Rothe EM (2010) Leaving No Children or Families Outside: The Challenges of Immigration. J. Orthopyschiatry 80(4):505–515 Pumariega A, Rothe EM, Mian A, Carlisle L, Toppleberg C, Harris T, Gogineni RR, Webb S, Smith J (2013) Practice parameters for cultural competence in child psychiatric practice. J Am Acad Child Adolesc Psychiatry 52(10):1101–1115. Available at: http://www.aacap.org/App_Themes/AACAP/docs/ practice_parameters/Cultural_Competence_Web.pdf. Accessed 29 Dec 2013 Rothe E (2004) Hispanic adolescents in the United States: psychosocial issues and treatment considerations. Adolesc Psychiatry 28:251–278 Rothe EM (2005) Post Traumatic Symptoms in Cuban Children and Adolescents During and After Refugee Camp Confinement In: Trends in Post-Traumatic Stress Syndrome Research. T.A. Corales (Ed) 67–100 Nova Science Publishers Inc. New York Rothe E (2008) A psychotherapy model for treating refugee children caught in the midst of catastrophic situations. J Am Acad Psychoanal Dyn Psychiatry 36:625–642 Rothe EM, Pumariega AJ (2012) Mental health issues of child and adolescent refugees. In: Segal U, Elliott D, Mayadas N (eds) Immigration worldwide: policies, practices, and trends. Oxford University Press, New York

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Rothe EM, Lewis J, Castillo-Matos H, Martinez O, Busquets R, Martinez I (2002) Posttraumatic stress disorder among Cuban children and adolescents after release from a refugee camp. Psychiatr Serv 53(8):970–976 Rothe EM, Tzuang D, Pumariega AJ (2010) Acculturation, development and adaptation. Child Adolesc Psychiatry Clin N Am 19(4):681–696 Sack WH, Seeley JR, Clarke GN (1997) Does PTSD transcend cultural barriers? A study from the Khmer adolescent refugee project. J Am Acad Child Adolesc Psychiatry 36:49–54 Sack WH, Him C, Dickason D (1999) Twelve-year follow-up study of Khmer youths who suffered massive war trauma as children. J Am Acad Child Adolesc Psychiatry 38(9):1173 Summerfield D (1995) Addressing human response to war and atrocity: major challenges in research and practices and the limitations of western psychiatric models. In: Kleber RJ, Figley CR, Gersons BPR (eds) Beyond trauma: cultural and societal dynamics. Plenum Press, New York, pp 17–29 Summerfield D (2000) Childhood, war, refugeedom and ‘trauma’: three core questions for mental health professionals. Transcult Psychiatry 37(3):417

Summerfield D (2001) Asylum-seekers, refugees and mental health services in the UK. Psychiatr Bull 25(5):161–163 Summerfield D (2003) Mental health of refugees. Br J Psychiatry 183:459–460 Torres MA (2003) The lost apple: operation Pedro Pan, Cuban children in the U.S., and the promise of a better future. Beacon, Boston Triay VA (1999) Fleeing Castro: operation Pedro Pan and the Cuban children’s program. University Press of Florida, Gainesville U.S. committee for Refugees and Immigrants USCRI (2013) http://www.refugees.org/resources/for-serviceproviders/ptsd.html. Accessed 27 Dec 2013 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (2013) Global trends: refugees, asylumseekers, returnees, internally displaced and stateless persons. http://www.unhcr.org/statistics. Accessed 27 Dec 2013 Women’s Commission for Refugee Women and Children (2013) http://womensrefugeecommission.org/. Accessed 27 Dec 2013

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Refugees Defined Peter I. Rose Smith College, Northampton, MA, USA

Definition Refugees are people who have been forced to leave their homelands due to persecution, war, or natural disasters and seek asylum in other countries.

Other migrants are those who go from one country to another seeking economic opportunities where they are thought to abound. When such a contemplated move is anticipated to be a permanent one, or what is commonly known as emigration. Debating and planning to leave one’s homeland usually involves a complex calculus, weighing the centripetal attraction of a particular destination as well as centrifugal factors, those that draw them away and those that make people hesitate to leave hearth and home. Refugees rarely have a choice. Their departure is usually an absolute necessity in order to survive either man-made conflicts or natural disasters. To be sure, sometimes there is a conflation of “push” and “pull” factors. One classic example is that of beleaguered Irish farmers, who, toiling under the heavy-handed rule of English landlords under near serf-like conditions, were devastated by the potato blight that swept Ireland in the middle of the nineteenth century. Millions joined

a massive diaspora to the New World seeking both political freedom and economic prospects. (See Miller and Wagner 1994.) Still, the most common cause of sudden flight is the targeting of individuals or groups – tribal, racial, religious, political, or ideological – to which they belong. This may result in their actual expulsion or more often the decision to escape lest those singled out be arrested, segregated, incarcerated, or killed, sometimes in genocidal campaigns known today as “ethnic cleansing.” Sometimes people caught in the crossfire of wars and other conflicts that have little to do with who they are also seek safer havens in other lands. In popular parlance, those who are victims of calamities ranging from famine to earthquakes and sudden storms – hurricanes, tornadoes, tsunamis, and floods – are also called refugees, but the term is more commonly used to refer to those who fit the formal definition recognized by the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), that is, as border crossers “with a well-founded fear of persecution,” in other words, those who are “forced to flee.” According to reliable statistics, in 2013, there were 45.2 million forcibly displaced people worldwide at the end of 2012. At that time, three quarters of the world’s refugees were to be found in nations neighboring their countries of origin, with more than half (55 %) of all refugees worldwide coming from five countries:

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Afghanistan, Somalia, Iraq, Syria, and Sudan (UNHCR 2012). In addition to those who do find a way to cross into other lands, there are many, many others under threat or under fire who cannot exit from their beleaguered countries. They are sometimes said to be “in a refugee-like situation” and are otherwise known by the apt phrase used by international agencies as being “internally displaced persons,” or “IDPs.” Their plight is in many ways the most precarious of all for they often remain captives of the very regimes that may have driven them from their homes and otherwise sought ways to oppress them through humiliation, ostracism, mass internment, and, in some cases, mass murder. The same source cited earlier indicates that, at the end of 2012, there were 15.4 million people recognized as “official” refugees in the world, plus 937,000 asylum seekers and 28.8 million internally displaced persons. By 2015 these figures had more than doubled.

Expellees and Escapees In ancient times, many of those seen as threats by those in power were chased into the countryside – or “into the wilderness”– or sent abroad. They were known as exiles. The word itself comes from the Latin exilium, meaning banishment. Then as now others under threat of persecution took it upon themselves to get away from oppressive political regimes, powerful rivals, or racial, ethnic, or religious persecution. Such acts, like those of the classic exiles, are as old as human history, and both forms of dispossession – removal and flight – have been clearly documented from the time of Moses’ exodus from Egypt and the Babylonian exile of Jews nearly 600 years before Christ. They are featured in sacred texts as well as in the writings of Euripides, Sophocles, Virgil, and Ovid, in descriptions of Muslims who escaped the wrath of zealous Crusaders, and in the writings of Jews who fled into the Levant to avoid forced conversion or the flames of the Inquisitor’s pyre in Spain at the end of the fifteenth century. All were refugees as

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defined above, but they were never referred to as such. The term refugee did not appear until late in the seventeenth century. It was first used in reference to Huguenots, a French Protestant group. After the revocation of the Treaty of Nantes in 1685, a treaty which for almost a century had guaranteed freedom of religion in France, many fled the Catholic-dominated country and sought asylum in other lands, especially in England, Holland, and Switzerland. They said of themselves that they were in Le Refuge and called themselves re´fugie´s since they had gone in search of havens of security where their right to worship as they chose was not impeded. The term would soon be applied to others belonging to persecuted groups who found themselves in a growing dispersion of stigmatized people subjected to intimidation, maltreatment, and discrimination. While it is often assumed that all refugees are persons wanting to live under democratic rule, and this is generally the case, there are exceptions. For example, a century after the Huguenots left France, pro-British loyalists who escaped from New York and New England fled to Nova Scotia and other parts of Canada because of their unwillingness to live under the new Republican administration or because of fear of being maltreated by it. They were mentioned and referred to as refugees in the pages of the Encyclopaedia Britannica as early as its 1797 edition. Throughout the last three centuries, the world has witnessed domestic upheavals and national conflicts that have coerced or compelled the emigration of millions. The mass movement of asylum seekers that has already occurred in the early decades of the twenty-first century, highlighted by the millions who have fled Afghanistan and Syria for neighboring countries and by hundreds of thousands crossing the dire straits of the Mediterranean trying to get to European shores, does not bode well for the present era. Still, there is little question that to date no period has been as bloody nor caused more upheaval than the twentieth century. That was an era marked by Russian pogroms and the Bolshevik Revolution; a world war from 1914 to 1918 that left nine million dead and millions of displaced and stateless people;

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genocide in Armenia; an exchange of population of ethnic Greeks born in Turkey and Turks born in Greece; World War II and the Holocaust generated by the Nazi regime, which left six million Jews dead and many more displaced persons; the Hungarian Uprising in mid-century; the mass exodus of Cubans beginning with the “Triumph of the Revolution” in the 1960s, exodus that has never ceased; the war in Vietnam and the panic of losers eager to get away lest they be placed in “reeducation camps” or worse; the Cambodian genocide and the struggles of those who survived it; the brutalities of various factions in the aftermath of decolonization of many states in Africa as well as between tribal groups on that continent; and the Balkan Wars at the end of the century. Even before it was over, the German novelist, Heinrich Boll, described the twentieth as “a century of refugees and prisoners” (Mooneyman 1980) and many others addressed the matter as one of mass flight and asylum (see Kahn and Talal 1986). And it is small wonder that Samantha Powers described the same century as “the age of genocide” (Powers 2003).

Refugees in Law After World War I, attempts began to be made to give a clear universal definition to the dispossessed. But aside from providing League of Nations’ sponsored “Nansen passports,” internationally recognized identity cards for stateless persons (named for the Norwegian explorer, Nobel Prize winner, and refugee advocate, Fridtjof Nansen), little else was done until the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 affirmed in one of its articles that “Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.” That principle was reaffirmed in 1951, when the United Nations sponsored a convention on the status of refugees. On January 31, 1967, an amended version of what was drawn up earlier became the basis for the famous United Nations Protocol on the Status of Refugees, which defined refugees as being persons who, owing to “a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality,

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membership in a particular social group or political opinion, are outside the country of their nationality and are unable to avail themselves of the protection of that country.” Even with such a definition, clear seemingly ambiguities remained – and still remain. As Kathleen Newland put it: The technical and sometimes tiresome question of who is and who is not a refugee has enormous significance for the displaced people themselves. The answer determines the degree of support and protection the individuals receive as well as the long-term resolution of their plight. The fundamental right that refugee status gives people is the right not to be sent back against their will to the country from which they have fled; the right, in legal parlance of “non-refoulement.” Nations that ratify the U.N. Convention and Protocol obligate themselves not to expel refugees from their territory without due process of law, and, if grounds for expulsion are found, to give the refugee time to seek legal admission to another country of asylum. The obligations of the host country also include issuing identity papers and travel documents, allowing refugees at least the same civil rights as those enjoyed by other legal immigrations, and facilitating as far as possible the refugees’ assimilation and naturalization. (Newland 1981)

In the United States, there was no official mention of refugees in law until the McCarranWalter Act dealing with immigration and naturalization was passed by Congress in 1952. This meant that during the mass migration of Jews from the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries, motivated by the anti-Jewish riots known as pogroms, Jews were free to come to the United States and passed through Ellis Island from 1880 to 1924 just like predominantly economically motivated immigrants coming from Poland, Italy, Greece, and other European countries at that time. But, with severe restrictions imposed through the highly restrictive “Quota Acts of 1921 and 1924” and the lack of recognition of those in special circumstances and desperate flight of those targeted by Hitler, many who could have been saved were refused entry into the United States in the 1930s and early 1940s. Even those fleeing other right-wing and often fascist regimes after World War II were not welcomed for the McCarran-Walter Act only officially

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recognized refugees as those who were fleeing communism or were from the Middle East. This narrow definition did, however, open the door to those fleeing the failed Hungarian Uprising against Soviet domination in 1956 and the Cuban Revolution that took place several years later and some Czechs in 1968 and hundreds of thousands at the end of the war in Vietnam in 1975. Exceptions were sometimes granted by what was known as the “parole authority” of the Attorney General as had been the case in World War II, but the United States did not accept the United Nations’ broader, nonpartisan definition of who is a refugee until the Refugee Act of 1980 was passed by Congress, with language matching that of the UN Protocol.

The Dependency of the Dispossessed In addition to the continuing general problem of defining refugees in international law and by national governments, equally long-pressing has been what to do with them once they are legally recognized. The plight of refugees does not end once a border crossing is successful. In some ways it compounds it, as it puts special burdens on those in the host societies; the organizations drawn in to provide aid and assistance, care, and succor; and other, much larger cohorts of those who see their own precarious situations threatened by the presence of foreigners on their soil and by competition for jobs and scarce resources. At the time many refugees were trying to leave Vietnam on boats operated by traffickers; Bruce Grant succinctly noted that, to many people, A refugee is an unwanted person. He or she makes a claim upon the humanity of others without always have much, or even anything to give in return. If, after resettlement, a refugee works hard or is lucky and successful, he may be accused of taking the work from someone else. If he fails or becomes resentful or unhappy, he is thought to be ungrateful and a burden on the community. A refugee is especially unwanted by officials: his papers [if he has them] are rarely in order, his health is often suspect, and sometimes, although he claims to be fleeing from persecution, he is simply trying to get from a poor overpopulated

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country to a rich, under-populated one. (Grant 1980)

Today the vast majority of refugees, especially those leaving oppressive or failed states in Africa, the Balkans, Latin America, and the Middle East and hoping to go to countries in Europe and North America, tend to be found in lands that are immediately contiguous to those they have left. These are known in the international community as “countries of first asylum.” With the Cuban exodus that began around 1960, the United States became, for the first time, a country of first asylum. The recognition that they were, as then President Lyndon B. Johnson put it, “victims of communism,” impelled the United States to create the multifaceted Cuban Refugee Program to help them “translate” their education and occupations into valuable American credentials (Pedraza 2007). Even in those nations where governments willingly allowed their entry, the worry is that they might stay. And for good reason, they cannot go home; in many cases, others will not take them. They end up waiting and languishing in overcrowded camps or in new enclaves sometimes for months, sometimes for years, or even, as in the case of the Palestinians, for decades. Local residents often feel overwhelmed as they see their own scarce resources dwindle; they also find themselves under additional stress created by imported factionalisms. Moreover, foreign agencies concerned with the protection and care of the refugees resent the fact that donors and agency officials often fail to take their needs, wants, and fears into sufficient account. Thus, at times, the term refugee becomes pejorative – and those encamped on such foreign soil have a new stigma to contend with. They are often viewed and even referred to as “the unwanted.” (See Marrus 1985.) A well-known poster used by the UNHCR shows a displaced person in front of a wall on which were painted the words “REFUGEES GO HOME.” Beneath it are typed the telling words, “They would if they could.” It is not unusual for host governments, especially those driven by political tensions of their own, to worry when confronted with large

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cohorts of people who look, act, or pray in ways similar to their own minorities and to see them as a threat to the status quo. A recent example is the situation in Jordan, which borders Syria. But it is also true that refugees ensconced just inside the border of the new place of asylum or scattered throughout it often become convenient scapegoats for those with grievances that have little to do with their presence or the reasons they felt compelled to seek asylum. “Third-country resettlement” is quite different. It is what happens to those who, having fled from their own countries, spend only a short period of time in bordering lands and then move on to another haven. This is what occurred when nearly one million refugees from Southeast Asia managed to get to the United States in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Despite the publicity, such movement is rare and, when it does occur, is often related to geopolitical or ideological concerns, not just humanitarian considerations. After the fall of Saigon in 1975, policy makers in the United States felt a special obligation to assist those who were their allies throughout the war in Vietnam. The South Vietnamese were fleeing the newly installed communist regime that had reconquered the whole of the country and renamed the southern capital, Ho Chi Minh City. Since they were escaping from the yoke of communism, they could readily attain refugee status under the then-extant US law. Once in this country, most were welcomed by the felt responsibility of both the war’s supporters and its critics. On the one side were the “hawks” who had supported the war and felt that the US government and its troops had let the South Vietnam regime down by failing to win the war. On the other side were the “doves” who had opposed the war and felt the US government and its troops were responsible for the incredible destruction in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Many on both sides came to the conclusion that “We owe them something.” While having positive results for those from the former states of Indochina, as well as for the Hungarians and for the Cubans, the policy reflected what the political scientists Gilbert Loescher and John Scanlan called “calculated

kindness” (Loescher and Scanlan 1986) in regard to the making and implementing of US refugee policy. And the United States was not alone in exercising a kind of willful altruism based on “strategic considerations.”

Of Madonnas and Maestros For Americans and others around the world, the whole refugee experience is often compressed into an evocative representation of “The Madonna of the Refugee Camp” (Rose 1984), an iconic Pieta of a wan, empty-eyed ragged woman clutching her tiny infant to her breast. It is a poignant image frequently used by international organizations to highlight the plight of the dispossessed. But not all refugees are the same. Not all are poor. Not all are destitute. While it is true that the vast majority of refugees in today’s world are “low skilled,” there are many who are highly trained and well educated (Koser 2007), some of the latter being academics, musicians, and artists – once referred to as “the maestros in exile” (Rose 1997) – and others being businesspeople, scientists and engineers, and, not infrequently, leaders of opposition parties and political factions. Yet they share certain common characteristics with those who are less worldly than they. Most significant is the dependence upon others to rescue them from their plight, to provide them with assistance to meet immediate physical needs, and, for those who are fortunate enough to be resettled in another country, to aid them in making a new life once the initial trauma of escape has been addressed.

Political and Personal Causes and Effects In addition to examining both international and national definitions and laws relating to their situation, a number of issues are relevant to the study of refugees: a critical examination of the root causes of flight; the disorientation that results from dispossession and deprivation and being abruptly alienated from all that is familiar; the

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politics of rescue, relief, and resettlement; the impact refugees have on their host countries, their new homes; the continuing search for what are called “durable solutions” to the general plight of refugees and ways to address them – usually specified as “voluntary repatriation” and “local resettlement”; the role of refugees in international law today (Rodriquez 2013), as well as how refugee policies transform societies (Essed et al. 2005); and a closer look at the psychology of altruism itself. The last asks the age-old question, “Are we really our brother’s keeper?” If so, what are states and individuals prepared to do for those seeking assistance and protection because they are dispossessed? Finally, when one experiences the trauma and tumult of exile, when, if ever, does a person stop being a refugee? Some say not until they die. Without a fatherland the landless find all brown earth an insult, all soil rootless. The exile is a stranger even to his grave. (Zaroukian 1985)

Put another way but expressing the poignant spirit of that poem by the Armenian exile, Antranik Zaroukian, the sociologist Lewis Coser, a Jewish escapee from Nazi Germany who became an American citizen, offered his own illuminating answer: “I will always be a refugee. But my children speak without accents” (Rose 1986).

References Boll H, as quoted in Mooneyman WS (1980) Sea of heartbreak. Plainfield Logos, p 207 Essed P et al (eds) (2005) Refugees and the transformation of societies: agency, policies, ethics and politics, vol 13, Forced migration series. Refugee Study Centre, Oxford University, Oxford Grant B (1980) The boat people. Penguin, New York, p 2 Khan AS, Bin Talal H (eds) (1986) Refugees: dynamics of displacement: a report for the Independent Commission on International Humanitarian Issues. Zed Books, London/New York, pp 9–19 Koser K (2007) International migration: a very short introduction. Oxford University Press, London, p 17

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Loescher G, Scanlan J (1986) Calculated kindness: refugees and America’s half-open door, 1945 to the present. Free Press, New York Marrus M (1985) The unwanted: European refugees from the First World War through the Cold War. Oxford University Press, New York/London Miller KA, Wagner P (1994) Out of Ireland: the story of Irish emigration to America. Elliot and Clark, Washington, DC Newland K (1981) Refugees: the new international politics of displacement. Worldwatch, Washington, DC, pp 7–8 Pedraza S (2007) Political disaffection in Cuba’s revolution and exodus. Cambridge University Press, New York/London Powers S (2003) A problem from hell: America in an age of genocide. HarperCollins, New York Rodriquez S (2013) Immigration and refugee law and policy: 2013 Supplement. West Group, Los Angeles Rose P (1984) The harbor masters: American politics and refugee policy. In: Lewis M (ed) Social problems and public policy. JAI Press, Greenwich, pp 273–312 Rose P (1986) Toward a sociology of exile. Int Migr Rev 19(Winter):768–773 Rose P (1997) Tempest-Tost: exile, ethnicity, and the politics of rescue. Soc Forum 8(1):5–24 UNHCR (2012) Global trends: refugees asylum seekers, returnees, internally displaced and stateless persons. http://unhcr.org/globaltrendsjune2013 Zaroukian A (1985) Let there be light. In: Bouvard MG (ed) Landscape and exile. Rowan Tree Press, Boston, p 18

Further Readings Abella I, Tropem H (1983) None is too many: Canada and the Jews of Europe, 1933–1948. Lester and Orpen Dennys, Toronto Agier M (2008) On the margins of the world: the refugee experience. Polity Press, Cambridge/Boston Agier M (2011) Managing the undesirables: refugee camps and humanitarian government (trans: Fernback D). Polity Press, Cambridge, UK/Boston Balakian P (2004) The Burning tigress: the Armenian genocide and America’s response. Harper Collins, New York Coser LA (1984) Refugee scholars in America: their impact and their experiences. Yale University Press, New Haven Dinnerstein L (1982) America and the survivors of the Holocaust. Columbia University Press, New York Edwards JK (2007) Sudanese women refugees: transformations and future imaginings. Palgrave Macmillan, New York Fermi L (1968) Illustrious immigrants: the intellectual migration from Europe, 1930–1941. Chicago University Press, Chicago Gil Loescher G et al (2008) UNHCR: the politics and practice of refugee protection into the twenty-first century. Routledge, London

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Gold SN (1991) Refugee communities: a comparative field study. Sage, New York Goodwin-Gill GS, Jane McAdam J (2007) The refugee in international law. Oxford University Press, Oxford Hein J (2006) Ethnic origins: the adaptation of Cambodian and Hmong refugees in four American cities. Russell Sage, New York Helton AC (2002) The price of indifference: refugees and humanitarian action in the new century. Oxford University Press, New York/London Howe I (1976) World of our fathers: the journey of the East European Jews to America and the life they found and made. Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, New York Hughes HS (1975) The sea change: the migration of social thought, 1930–1965. Harper and Row, New York Karadawi A, Woodward P (1999) Refugee policy in Sudan, 1967–1984. Berghahn Books, New York/ Oxford Lewis B (2010) In Ishmael’s house: a history of Jews in Muslim lands. Yale University Press, New Haven Mertus JA et al (eds) (1997) The suitcase: refugee voices from Bosnia and Croatia. University of California Press, Berkeley Nasser R (2004) Palestinian identity in Jordan and Israel. Taylor and Francis, Oxford/New York Nikolic-Ristanovic V (2000) Women, violence and war: wartime victimization of refugees in the Balkans. Central European University Press, Budapest Parsoun SK, Zacharia CE (1997) Palestine and the Palestinians. Westview Press, Boulder Pedraza P, Rumbaut R (eds) (1996) Origins and destinies: immigration, race, and ethnicity in America. Wadsworth, Belmont Rieff D (1995) Slaughterhouse: Bosnia and the failure of the West. Simon and Schuster, New York

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Rieff D (2003) A bed for the night: humanitarianism in crisis. Simon and Schuster, New York Rose PI (ed) (1983) Working with refugees. Center for Migration Studies, Staten Island Rose PI (ed) (2005) The dispossessed: an anatomy of exile. University of Massachusetts Press, Amherst Rose PI (2014) They and we: racial and ethnic relations in the United States – and beyond, 7th edn. Paradigm Publishers, Boulder Roumani M (1977) The case of Jews from Arab countries: a neglected issue. World Organization of Jews from Arab lands, 1983, Tel Aviv Said E (2002) Reflections on exile and other essays. Harvard University Press, Cambridge Sanders R (1988) Shores of refuge: a hundred years of Jewish emigration. Henry Holt, New York Schulz HL (2003) The Palestinian diaspora. Routledge, London Smith-Hefner NJ (1999) Khmer Americans: identity and moral education in a diasporic community. University of California Press, Berkeley Tabori P (1972) The anatomy of exile: a semantic and historic study. Harrap, London Wyman D (1984) The abandonment of the Jews: America and the Holocaust, 1941–1945. Pantheon Books, New York Wyman M (1998) Europe’s displaced persons, 1945–1951. Cornell University Press, Ithaca Zolberg AR et al (1989) Escape from violence: conflict and the refugee crisis in the developing world. Oxford University Press, New York Zucker NL, Zucker NF (1987) The guarded gate. Houghton Mifflin, New York Zucker NL, Zucker NF (1996) Desperate crossings: seeking refuge in America. M.E. Sharpe, New York

Part 13: Settlement and Integration Policies

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Cultural Diversity: The Australian Social Cohesion Surveys Andrew Markus Monash University, Melbourne, Australia

Definition The Scanlon Foundation social cohesion surveys, first conducted in 2007 and repeated on seven occasions, provide a rich body of surveying data on Australian attitudes to immigration, cultural diversity, and social cohesion. The survey findings indicate that Australia ranks alongside Canada as the most receptive to immigration among Western nations. There is, however, a substantial minority in Australia, close to 40 %, who do not support immigration. The Scanlon Foundation surveys – and other polling over the last 30 years – have consistently found that the vast majority of Australians have a high level of identification with their country, the fundamental prerequisite for any cohesive society. Consideration of attitudes of recent arrivals provides evidence of rapid integration. Of those who arrived since 2000, 86 % of English-speaking background and 88 % of non-English-speaking background indicate a sense of belonging to a “great” or “moderate extent.” There is strong endorsement of the view that “Australia is a land of economic opportunity where in the long run, hard work brings a better life.” These views are consistent with

international indicators, which rank Australia at or near the top of developed countries in terms of standard of living, education, health services, and quality of life. There is, however, also a consistent finding of lower levels of social cohesion in regions of high immigrant concentration, indicated by survey findings on trust, experience of discrimination, political participation, and involvement in voluntary work.

Detailed Description Over the last 10 years, Australia’s population has increased by over three million, or 15%, to an estimated 22,485,000 (2011). There has been a steady increase in the proportion overseas born, from 23 % in 2001 to 24 % in 2006 and 26 % in 2011; this represents an increase from 4.1 million overseas-born persons in 2001 to 5.3 million in 2011. The proportion overseas born ranks Australia first within the OECD, among nations with populations over ten million. The Australian proportion compares with 20 % overseas born in Canada, 13 % in Germany, 13 % in the United States, 11 % in the United Kingdom, and 12 % in France. The average for the OECD is 12 %. In 2011, of the overseas-born population of Australia, the leading countries of birth were the United Kingdom (20.8 %) and New Zealand (9.1 %). Over the last 30 years, an increasing proportion of immigrants have been drawn from the Asian region. Thus, between 2007 and 2011,

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the leading country of birth for immigrants was India (13 %). Among settler arrivals in 2010–2011, immigrants from New Zealand and the United Kingdom ranked first and third; of the remaining seven top countries of origin, five were Asian and one was African. A high proportion of the overseas born in Australia live in capital cities, with concentrations above 50 % in some local government areas. The full extent of cultural diversity is indicated by census findings on the proportion of Australians who speak a language other than English in the home. In 2011, suburbs with a large proportion indicating that they speak a language other than English in the home include Cabramatta (88 %), Canley Vale (84 %), and Lakemba (84 %) in Sydney and Campbellfield (81 %), Springvale (79 %), and Dallas (73 %) in Melbourne. Given the significance of immigration for Australia, there has been surprisingly little investment in systematic public opinion research. In England, the Citizenship Surveys were conducted biennially and then every 3 months between 2001 and 2010. The first three Citizenship Surveys were each administered to some 15,000 respondents (including a minority ethnic boost of 5000) in face-to-face interviews, taking approximately 60 min to complete. The Canadian Department of Citizenship and Immigration for more than 20 years undertook annual surveys to track attitudes to immigration (EKOS 2010). Statistics Canada, in conjunction with other government departments, conducted an Ethnic Diversity Survey in 2002 which interviewed 42,500 respondents. Within the EU, major surveys include the annual Eurobarometer, established in 1973, with a minimum of 1,000 respondents in each member state, and the biennial European Social Survey, which reaches over 30,000 respondents. In Australia, knowledge of public attitudes to immigration and cultural diversity has in large measure been dependent on commercial polling for the print media. The problem with such polling is that it is reliant on a handful of questions, often just two or three, administered to small samples and without consistent wording to track change over time. A few government and academic surveys have provided richer insights. (For a detailed

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discussion of Australian surveying, see Goot 1999; Goot and Watson 2011.) The Scanlon Foundation social cohesion surveys, for the first time in Australian social research, provide a rich body of surveying data on public attitudes to immigration, cultural diversity, and social cohesion. Eight Scanlon Foundation national surveys have been conducted to date (2007, 2009–2015), with an average sample of 1,750 respondents, utilizing a uniform methodology and a survey instrument of some 70 questions; in addition, three parallel surveys (2007, 2009, 2012) have been conducted in Sydney and Melbourne in areas of high immigrant concentration (Markus 2007–2015). The Scanlon Foundation surveys are distinctive not only for the scale, consistency, and frequency of surveying but for exploring attitudes in multiple dimensions: at the national level, within selected localities, within subgroups, and with comparative reference across these dimensions. The large sample makes possible reliable analysis of subgroups of the population, for example, by age group, educational attainment, and political alignment. What Does the Corpus of Australian Surveying Establish? The evidence indicates that Australia, together with Canada, ranks as the most receptive to immigration among Western nations (Markus 2012; Reitz 2011). In Australia and Canada, a majority of the population supports the level of immigration, in contrast with a number of European countries. For example, in 2003, an international survey found that 32 % of Canadian and 39 % of Australian respondents favored a reduction of immigration, compared with 58 % in Sweden, 66 % in France, 70 % in Germany, and 78 % in England. The 2010 Transatlantic Trends survey found that 27 % of Canadian respondents agreed with the proposition that “immigration is more of a problem than an opportunity,” compared to 52 % of respondents in the United States and 65 % in the United Kingdom (Markus 2012, pp 117, 119). There is, however, a substantial minority in Australia, close to 40 %, who do not support immigration. This includes a core element,

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To a moderate extent

Only slightly

Not at all

2012

74%

21%

4%

2011

73%

21%

6%

2010

72%

23%

3%

2009

72%

23%

4%

2007

77% 0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

19% 50%

60%

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90%

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Cultural Diversity: The Australian Social Cohesion Surveys, Fig. 1 To what extent do you have a sense of belonging in Australia? 2007–2012

comprising an estimated 10 % of the population (or 1.5 million adults), who consistently indicate a strong level of opposition to immigration and cultural diversity. The Scanlon Foundation surveys – and other polling over the last 30 years – have consistently found that the vast majority of Australians have a high level of identification with their country, the fundamental prerequisite for any cohesive society. Almost unanimously, Australians express a sense of belonging (95 % in 2012), indicate pride in the Australian way of life (90 %), and believe that its maintenance is important (91 %). Less than 5 % of respondents to the 2012 Scanlon Foundation survey indicated that they had slight or no sense of belonging (Fig. 1). Consideration of attitudes of recent arrivals provides evidence of rapid integration. Of those who arrived since 2000, 86 % of English-speaking background and 88 % of non-English-speaking background indicate a sense of belonging to a “great” or “moderate extent.” There is strong endorsement of the view that “Australia is a land of economic opportunity where in the long run, hard work brings a better life.” In 2007, 81 % of respondents “strongly agreed” or “agreed,” 82 % in 2010, and 81 % in 2012. These views are consistent with international indicators, which rank Australia at or near the top of developed countries in terms of standard of living, education, health services, and quality of life (Fig. 2).

A prime objective of the Scanlon Foundation surveys has been to further understanding of the social impact of Australia’s increasingly diverse immigration program. A central focus is on the emerging challenges of cultural diversity. To further this specific objective, the Scanlon-Monash Index (SMI) of Social Cohesion was developed, using the findings of the 2007 national survey to provide baseline data. As a concept, social cohesion has a long tradition in academic enquiry, of fundamental importance in discussion of the role of consensus and conflict in society. From the mid-1990s, interest in the dynamics of social cohesion grew amid concerns prompted by the impact of globalization, economic change, and fears fuelled by the “war on terror.” There is, however, no agreed definition of social cohesion. Most current definitions dwell on intangibles, such as sense of national belonging and attachment, willingness to participate in community life, mutual respect, and common aspirations or identity. The Scanlon Foundation surveys adopted an eclectic, wide-ranging approach, influenced by the work of social scientists Jane Jenson and Paul Bernard, to incorporate five domains related to: sense of belonging, valuation of the Australian way of life; worth: satisfaction with financial status and level of happiness; social justice and equity: views on economic opportunity, income distribution, government

Cultural Diversity: The Australian Social Cohesion Surveys

304 Strongle agree

2012

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Neither agree nor disagree 42%

10%

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Cultural Diversity: The Australian Social Cohesion Surveys, Fig. 2 Australia is a land of economic opportunity where in the long run, hard work brings a better life, 2007–2012 Cultural Diversity: The Australian Social Cohesion Surveys, Table 1 The Scanlon-Monash Index (SMI) of Social Cohesion, 2007–2012 SMI – average result

2007 100

2009 101.2

policies to assist people on low incomes, confidence in government; participation: in the political process of the nation, indicated by voting in an election, contact with a member of parliament, participation in a boycott or protest sense of acceptance/ rejection: experience of discrimination, view of cultural diversity and government assistance to migrant communities, expectations for the future. (Markus and Kirpitchenko 2007)

The key finding of the SMI is the stability of Australian society. Despite the continuing large immigration intake and global economic uncertainties, the variance in the Index over five surveys has been within 10 points, from a high of 101.2 to a low of 92.6. The major shift in the Index occurred between 2009 and 2010, associated with the growing unpopularity of the federal labor government, with trust in the government declining from 48 % to 31 %. The two surveys after 2010 registered marginal upward movement in the Index (Table 1). A major point of interest in the Scanlon Foundation surveys has been the findings of three local

2010 92.6

2011 93.8

2012 94.4

surveys, conducted in suburbs defined by their high concentration of immigrants – and relatively high economic disadvantage. The local surveys, parallel with the national surveys, have found consistent evidence of strong identification with the Australian way of life among both native born and immigrant. Immigrants, presumably reflecting on their previous conditions of life, provide strong endorsement of Australia as a land of economic opportunity and social justice. There is, however, also a consistent finding of lower levels of social cohesion in regions of high immigrant concentration, indicated by survey findings on trust, sense of safety, experience of discrimination, political participation, and involvement in voluntary work. At 82.9 in 2012, the SMI for areas of high immigrant concentration is markedly lower that the national Index (94.4). A relatively high proportion of respondents of non-English-speaking background (NESB) in areas of high immigrant concentration indicate a positive response when considering the level of immigration, the contribution of immigrants, the impact of immigration in the local area, and the

Cultural Diversity: The Australian Social Cohesion Surveys

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Cultural Diversity: The Australian Social Cohesion Surveys, Table 2 Which, if any, of the following have you done over the last 3 years or so? Response Voted in an election Signed a petition Written or spoken to a federal or state member of parliament Joined a boycott of a product or company Attended a protest, march, or demonstration

National Australia born 91.8 % 58.6 % 28.2 %

Local Australia born 83.5 % 38.4 % 17.7 %

National NESB 81.8 % 42.3 % 28.5 %

Local NESB 81.9 % 26.9 % 9.6 %

14.7 % 13.5 %

12.8 % 11.4 %

12.0 % 16.8 %

5.7 % 8.3 %

ability of people of different backgrounds to get on with each other. Thus, among NESB respondents to the 2012 local survey, 77 % agreed that “my local area is a place where people from different national or ethnic backgrounds get on well together,” and 66 % agreed that “people in my local area are willing to help their neighbors.” Just 36 % considered that the immigration intake was “too high,” and 63 % agreed that “accepting immigrants from many different countries makes Australia stronger.” But the local survey found markedly higher reported experience of discrimination on the basis of “skin color, ethnic origin, or religion.” The reported level in 2012 was 12 % for Australian-born and 11 % for NESB respondents in the national survey, 23 % for both groups in the local survey. The survey in areas of high immigrant concentration also found markedly lower levels of political participation and trust (Table 2). In response to the question, “generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or you can’t be too careful in dealing with people,” 52 % of respondents in the national survey indicated that “most people can be trusted.” In marked contrast, in the local survey, just 34 % of Australian-born and 30 % of NESB respondents agreed that “most people can be trusted,” while close to 65 % disagreed. A further finding of significance is the relatively high proportion of third-generation Australian respondents who indicate dissatisfaction with their neighborhoods in the local survey, an increase of close to 20 percentage points when compared to the national survey.

The fact that these areas are also classified at the most economically disadvantaged raises the question of whether the lower levels of social cohesion are more a consequence of poverty than cultural diversity. Robert Putnam, in an influential 2007 article, argued that ethnic diversity has a negative impact on social cohesion. Putnam’s argument was based on a US survey of 30,000 participants, which was analyzed using a range of bivariate and multivariate processes. He concluded that in areas of ethnic diversity, there were, among other outcomes, lower confidence in ability to influence local decisions, less expectation that people will work together on community projects, lower likelihood of giving to charity or volunteering, lower indication of life satisfaction, and lower perception of quality of life. Putnam concluded that “inhabitants of diverse communities tend to withdraw from collective life,” but the evidence did not establish that ethnic diversity led to “bad race relations” or to “ethnically defined group hostility” (Putnam 2007). The 2009 and 2012 Scanlon Foundation local surveys found evidence consistent with Putnam’s findings. Using the 2012 survey, economically disadvantaged areas of low ethnic diversity (less than 20 % overseas born) were compared with economically disadvantaged areas of high diversity (over 50 % overseas born). Economically disadvantaged areas were identified using the Australian Bureau of Statistics Socio-Economic Indexes for Areas (SEIFA), which provides a ranking of postcode areas in deciles, from rank 1 for the most disadvantaged to rank 10 for the least disadvantaged. Analysis of seven general

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questions related to neighborhood and level of life satisfaction across the most disadvantaged SEIFA deciles found lower participation and higher levels of negativity in the areas of high ethnic diversity. Thus, 65 % of respondents in highdiversity areas indicated low levels of trust (“you can’t be too careful in dealing with people”), compared with 44 % in the low-diversity areas; 28% of respondents in high-diversity areas disagreed with the proposition that “people are willing to help their neighbors,” compared to 16 % in low-diversity areas. In conclusion, the Scanlon Foundation surveys in conducted between 2007 and 2012 indicate that Australia is a socially cohesive and welcoming country, but areas of high immigrant concentration present a complex and far from uniform picture: they are characterized by many positive findings but also lower levels of trust and sense of safety, lower levels of political participation and involvement in voluntary work, and heightened experience of discrimination. There is also clear evidence of disaffection and negative valuation of the impact of immigration among a minority of third-generation Australians in high-diversity areas. The survey identifies a constituency potentially receptive to advocacy of discriminatory immigration policies, which if translated into action would present a threat to social cohesion.

Cultural Diversity: The Australian Social Cohesion Surveys

References Ekos (2010) Ekos Research Associates, annual tracking survey – winter 2010. Submitted to Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Apr 2010 European Commission Public Opinion, Eurobarometer Surveys, available at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opin ion/cf/index.cfm?lang=en Goot M (1999) Migrant numbers, Asian immigration and multiculturalism: trends in the polls, 1943–1998, National Multicultural Advisory Council, Australian Multiculturalism for a New Century Commonwear of Australia, Canberra Statistical Appendix part 2 Goot M, Watson I (2011) Population, immigration and asylum seekers: patterns in Australian public opinion, Parliament of Australia, Parliamentary Library, Commonwear of Australia, Canberra, May Markus A (2012) Immigration and public opinion. In: Pincus J, Graeme H (eds) A greater Australia: population, policies and governance, CEDA Pollara 2003, A Pollara report on Canadian’s attitudes regarding immigration. Prepared for Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Dec 2003 Markus A, Kirpitchenko L (2007) Conceptualising social cohesion. In: Nieuwenhuysen J, James J (eds) Social cohesion in Australia, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Markus A, Mapping Social Cohesion, The Scanlon Foundation Surveys (2007–2015) available at Mapping Australia’s Population internet site. http://www.arts. monash.edu.au/mapping-population/ Putnam R (2007) E pluribus Unum: diversity and community in the twenty-first century. Scand Polit Stud 30(2):137–174 Reitz J (2011) Pro-immigration Canada. Social and economic roots of popular views, IRPP Study, No 20, Oct

J

Jewish Diaspora Suzanne Rutland University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW, Australia

Synonyms Galut (Heb: exile); Tfusot (Heb: dispersions)

Definition The word “Diaspora” is a Greek term referring to “dispersion.” It refers to the dispersion of Jews to countries outside of the Land of Israel, perceived as the Jewish homeland. Over time the Jewish people have, indeed, been dispersed across the four corners of the world. Today, the term is used to refer not only to Jews living outside Israel but also to other groups of people who have been dispersed from their homelands, such as the Greeks, Italians, and Chinese.

Overview The concept of the Jewish Diaspora began with the biblical narrative, when according to tradition Joseph, the second youngest son of the patriarch, Jacob, was sold into slavery in Egypt and his entire family ended up joining him there. Jewish dispersion has been partly due to persecution and

expulsions and partly due to creation of Jewish trade routes, which by the medieval period stretched from France to China. Since the recognition of Christianity as the official religion of the Roman Empire in the fourth century, there have been major four seismic shifts in the Jewish Diaspora, which have led to the formation of four major Diaspora centers, each of which lasted for centuries. These have been located in Babylon, Spain, Eastern Europe, and currently America. In the first three cases, a specific name has emerged to describe the Jewish descendants from these centers: Mizrachi (Oriental Jews) for the Jews of the Arab, Muslim world; Sephardi (Spanish Jews) for medieval Spain; and Ashkenazi (lit. German Jews) for Eastern Europe. In each case, Jewish practice was influenced by the majority society, and issues of acculturation and integration came into play. These factors are relevant in general for migration. The Babylonian Diaspora The Babylonian Diaspora began with the defeat of the Jews of Judea and the destruction of the First Temple in 586 BCE by the Babylonian king, Nebuchadnezzar, who enslaved the Israelite leadership and took them back to Babylon. The pain of the loss of their homeland in Israel is expressed in the words of Psalm 137: By the rivers of Babylon, there we sat down, yea, we wept, when we remembered Zion. . . If I forget thee, O Jerusalem let my right hand forget her cunning. If I do not remember thee, let my tongue

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cleave to the roof of my mouth; if I prefer not Jerusalem above my chief joy.

However, this first exile did not last long, since Cyrus, known as “the Great,” defeated Babylon in 550 BCE and permitted the conquered Israelites to return to their homeland. By 515 BCE the Second Temple had been rebuilt, inaugurating the period of the Second Jewish Commonwealth. Jewish independence was to last another 600 years. Even after the defeat of the two major Jewish rebellions against the Romans in 70 and 135 CE, the Jewish population remained substantial in the land the Romans renamed Palestina-Syria after 135, although the epicenter of Jewish life moved to the Galilee in this period. Little is known about Babylonian Jewry during the Second Temple period, apart from the fact that there were annual pilgrimages to the Temple in Jerusalem for the Biblical festivals of Passover and Tabernacles. In this period, a second Diaspora center emerged in Alexandria, Egypt, and there were other substantial Jewish settlements in Egypt. However, following the second major Jewish Revolt of 132–135, the Bar Kokhba Revolt, key Babylonian scholars began to emerge so that we have more information about Jewish life in Babylon. By the fourth century CE, this community emerged as the center of Jewish thought and life as a result of Byzantine Christian persecution of Jews in Palestine. The predominance of Babylonian Jewry by the fifth century is seen in the emergence of key Babylonian academies, which discussed rabbinic laws and developed what has become known as the Babylonian Talmud, which is considered to be more authoritative than the Jerusalem Talmud (also known as the “Palestinian Talmud”). The leading academies were located in Sura and Pumbedita. Twice a year before Passover and the Jewish New Year (Rosh Hashanah), scholars across the Jewish world would gather around the lake of Sura to discuss Jewish law and make legal decisions for what was called the “Yarchei Kallah” or month of learning. While the rabbis were appointed on the basis of their scholarship, Babylonian Jewry was led by the exilarch, who was also known as Resh Galuta

Jewish Diaspora

(head of the exile/Diaspora). This position was hereditary, claiming to date back to King David and the leading Jewish scholar, Hillel, who had originated from Babylon in the first century BCE. The exilarch enjoyed the status of a prince and was extremely wealthy and powerful. With the Muslim conquest of Babylon in the seventh century, the position of the Jewish community continued largely unchanged. As the People of the Book (Ahl al-Kitab), they were granted dhimmi status (the tolerated ones), provided that they paid both a poll tax and a land tax for their protection by the Muslim ruler. Theoretically, according to the Pact of Umar, they had to be inferior to the Muslim population, but the restrictions placed upon them were not always strictly enforced. Thus, the exilarch continued to enjoy his elevated status. However, due to the land tax and other external factors, the Jews of Babylon gradually gravitated to the urban centers and changed from being farmers to traders and craftsmen. In the post-Talmudic period, from the eighth to the eleventh centuries, Jewish scholarship continued to thrive, under the leadership of the Geonim (geniuses), who were the heads of the Babylonian Talmudic academies. The most famous of these was Saadia HaGaon, who was born in Egypt, but moved to Babylon and became head of the Sura Talmudic academy. Saadia translated the bible into Arabic and was one of the first Jewish scholars to synthesize GrecoArabic philosophy with Jewish thought. When conflict developed between Saadia and the exilarch, he was sent into exile, but his reputation went with him. Eventually the exilarch recalled him and reestablished him as head of the academy, indicating that while the hereditary position was the most powerful in theory, in practice it was scholarship that predominated. In this period, the rabbinical responses to legal questions that were sent to them from across the Jewish world developed a body of literature known as “responsa.” By the eleventh century, the conditions for Babylonian Jewry had begun to deteriorate. Even though a Jewish community continued to

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exist there, and throughout the Arab world, these Oriental Jews, or Mizrachim, no longer enjoyed the privilege of being the epicenter of the Jewish Diaspora – that center had moved to Spain. The Spanish Diaspora There are records of Jews living in Spain from the time of the Roman Empire. After the two major revolts in the first and second centuries CE, many Jewish slaves were brought to Rome, but the local Jewish community quickly purchased and freed them, since “redemption of the captives” is considered a very important commandment in Jewish tradition. Some of these liberated Jews moved into the Iberian Peninsula. The history of the Jews in Spain is a complicated one, which can be divided into three main periods: the Visigoth period, the Muslim period, and the Christian Reconquista (conquest). Each of these began well, but ended up in religious persecution with the Jews being faced with the alternatives of conversion or death. The Visigoths conquered the Iberian Peninsula with the disintegration of the Roman Empire in the fifth century. Originally pagan, they initially converted to a form of Christianity known as Arianism, which rejected the concept of the Trinity and papal power. During this period, the Jews were permitted to continue to live in peace. However, in 586 CE one of the Visigoth kings converted to Roman Catholicism and insisted that the Jews leave, accept Christianity, or die. In response to this ultimatum, many decided to convert to Christianity, while secretly continuing to practice Judaism. This response provided a precedent for the ongoing decision of Sephardi Jews to accept conversion rather than martyrdom when faced by such choices. In 711, the Muslims under the Umayyad dynasty from Babylon conquered the Iberian Peninsula. Initially reaching as far as France, they were pushed back by the Christians, who retained control of the northern provinces of Leon and Navarre. Under the Umayyads, Cordova became the center of power. Jews followed the Muslim conquerors, and many of the secret Jews again openly became practicing Jews, inaugurating a period of symbiosis between Jews and Muslims, which has been described as “The

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Golden Age of Spain.” Jewish life flourished, as seen in the rich poetry, rabbinic literature, and leading roles played by Jewish figures in this period. This was particularly the case under Abd-ar-Rahman III, who appointed Hasdai ibn Shaprut as his adviser in the tenth century. Ibn Shaprut was able to purchase the library of the Academy of Sura, which was facing a period of decline, and bring it to Cordova. The area where this rich Jewish culture emerged was known as Andalusia or al-Andalus and included centers in Seville, Granada, Malaga, and Cádiz, in addition to Cordova. For the next two centuries, under the Umayyads, Jewish life continued to flourish, but the situation began to deteriorate with the gradual Christian reconquest, which led to first the Almoravides and later a more radical Muslim group, the Almohades, and Berbers from North Africa, taking control in Southern Spain. While Jewish scholarship flourished in Spain during this period, much of the Spanish Jewish poetry reflected a sense of pain at the fact that the Jewish community was living in the Diaspora and did not have their own homeland in Israel. One of the best known of these poems was written by Yehudah HaLevi (Judah the Levite): My heart is in the East, and I am at the ends of the West; How can I taste what I eat and how could it be pleasing to me? How shall I render my vows and my bonds, while yet Zion lies beneath the fetter of Edom, and I am in the chains of Arabia? It would be easy for me to leave all the bounty of Spain As it is precious for me to behold the dust of the desolate sanctuary.

Zion is the name of a mountain in Jerusalem and is a term which has come to represent not only Jerusalem but also the Land of Israel, while Edom refers to the Christian crusaders then ruling Palestine and Arabia to the Muslim rulers of Spain. HaLevi in the end followed his heart and attempted to return to the Land of Israel. While there are historical records that he spent time in Egypt, it is unclear what happened to him after that, even though legend claimed that he was murdered when he reached Jerusalem.

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The leading scholar of the Spanish period was Moses Maimonides (also known as Rabbi Moses ben Maimon – son of Maimon – or the acronym RAMBAM). He was born shortly before the conquest of the Almohades, when his family was forced to convert to Islam, before escaping to Fez in Morocco, which was also under the Almohades. The family then tried to settle in Palestine, but had to leave because of the crusaders and in the end settled in Fustat, the Jewish quarter near Cairo. After his younger brother died in a shipwreck, Maimonides became the physician to the caliph. In addition to his medical works, he is known as the leading Jewish scholar who attempted a major codification of Jewish law, called the Mishneh Torah, as well as taking a scientific and philosophical approach to assist Jews who were questioning the traditions in his The Guide for the Perplexed. His Thirteen Principles of Faith are included in the Jewish prayer book and are considered foundational to Jewish belief. As a result of this Muslim persecution, the Jews in Andalusia welcomed the Christian conquerors, who initially needed the assistance of the Jews, due to their knowledge of Arabic and their willingness to resettle those areas from where the Muslims had fled. Under Christian rule, Jewish life again flourished with the symbiosis. The first warning of deterioration came in 1263, with the Barcelona Disputation, when a leading Jewish scholar, Nachmanides, was forced to debate Judaism with a Christian convert from Judaism. The king ended the debate before a final conclusion was reached and subsequently Nachmanides was attacked and left Spain for Palestine. However, the situation for the Jews of the Iberian Peninsula seriously deteriorated from the end of the fourteenth century, when riots against Jews in 1391 forced many to convert to Christianity. While some became committed Christians, many sought to secretly practice Judaism and became known by the derogatory term Marranos or “pigs.” They are also called New Christians, conversos in Spanish, or Anusim, the forced ones in Hebrew. Many of the New Christians were extremely successful, creating a sense of jealousy among the Old Christians, and in Toledo in the 1450s, blood purity laws were

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introduced, to limit the positions that the New Christians were permitted to fill. In 1469, Isabella and Ferdinand married, uniting Leon and Aragon, the two most powerful kingdoms in Spain. Initially the Jews were promised protection, and two leading Jewish figures, Isaac Abravanel and Abraham Seneor, became advisers to the king and played a key role in fundraising for his campaign against Muslim Granada. In 1480, the monarchs introduced the Inquisition, which was aimed at heretics, rather than the open Jews. This placed the New Christians under immediate threat, since any of them could be accused of “Judaizing” and face the Inquisition with torture, forced confessions, and the autoda-fe´ or burning at the stake. While the open Jews were not the target of the Inquisition, they were also at risk of being accused of converting Christians or assisting conversos. Once the Muslims in Granada were defeated in 1492, Ferdinand and Isabella issued the Edict of Expulsion, giving the Jews just four months to leave Spain or convert to Christianity. Initially, 100,000 Jewish refugees – around one third of Spain’s Jewish population – fled across the border to Portugal where they formed 10 % of the Portuguese population. However, in 1496 King Manuel of Portugal negotiated for the hand of Isabella and Ferdinand’s daughter, and they insisted that he expel his Jewish population before they would consent to the marriage. Manuel issued an Edict of Expulsion but he was reluctant to lose his Jews, whose financial expertise he valued. Thus, when they arrived in Lisbon, there were no boats waiting for them, and instead they were all forcibly converted to Christianity. However, the Portuguese Inquisition itself was only introduced in 1536, after Manuel’s death, and the first auto-da-fe in Portugal was held in 1540. Despite the risk of exposure, many New Christians continued to practice Judaism secretly, while creating trading networks in Amsterdam and Antwerp. The situation developed after 1600 when the Netherlands became Calvinist, where Jews could again become openly practicing Jews. A number of Sephardim managed to escape the Iberian Peninsula and create the Jewish communities of Amsterdam and later London.

Jewish Diaspora

East European Jewry The third major Diaspora center emerged in Eastern Europe from the thirteen century onwards, when the Polish kings invited the Jews of the German Rhineland area, as well as non-Jewish Germans, to settle in their kingdom. A rich Jewish life had emerged in France from the eighth century under Charlemagne the Great and from the tenth century along the Rhineland, in towns such as Cologne, Speer, Mainz, and Bonn. They became known as Ashkenazim, literally German, and they developed a rich Jewish learning tradition exemplified by Rabbenu Gershom and Rabbi Solomon Isaac, known by the acronym “RASHI,” who till the present day is considered one of the greatest biblical commentators. These communities suffered severe attacks during the First and Second Crusades in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, and even though their numbers were reinforced with the expulsion of the Jews from English in 1290 and from France in 1306, they felt under threat. The invitations from the Polish kings offered them a possibility of escape to a more welcoming environment. This movement of Jews from Western Europe to Eastern Europe was reinforced in 1348–1349, during the terrible plague, known as the Black Death. Jews were accused of causing the plague and suffered terrible attacks across the Germanicspeaking kingdoms and duchies. The most important of the Polish kings was Casimir, who offered the Jews special protection and the right to organize themselves, provided they paid him a communal tax under the charter system. Many Jews were invited in by the Polish nobility to run their estates and collect the taxes from the serfs. They settled in shtetls (private towns), with each shtetl being ruled by the council (kehilla), consisting of 12 representatives of the leading citizens. In 1580, a united Jewish Council, known as the Council of Four Lands, was formed, and it continued to operate until 1764, so that Polish Jewry became a state within a state. The kehilla was responsible for every aspect of communal life, including running the synagogue and mikvah (ritual bath) and providing assistance to the sick, the poor, the widows, and the orphans through an extensive system of charity.

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Jewish scholarship in Poland flourished during this period. In a period when most people were illiterate, Jewish literacy was valued. All boys studied Hebrew, the Torah, and Talmud from the age of three in what became known as heder, literally room, as they learned in a room in the teacher’s home. The more talented students, regardless of their economic status, were then selected to continue their studies after their Bar Mitzvah, the coming of age at 13, in a Talmudic academy, or yeshiva, located in the bigger Jewish centers. The system known as “tag” developed, where the yeshiva boys would sleep in the synagogue, and each day a different family in the shtetl would host them for their meals. Sometimes they would earn some money by matchmaking. One of the key centers of Jewish scholarship to emerge in this period was in Krakow, with Rabbi Moshe Isserles emerging as the most significant scholar in the mid-sixteenth century. He responded to the codification of Jewish law by the Sephardi scholar, Joseph Caro, who was born in Spain just before the expulsion, lived in Italy, and then moved to Safed in the Galilee, where he produced his codification called Shulchan Aruch (Prepared Table). Isserles produced a critique of Caro’s work, which aimed to undermine it, but instead his comments were incorporated into the work, so that a unified code of Jewish law relevant for both the Sephardi and Ashkenazi Jewish traditions emerged. This is used as the basis of Jewish law to the present day. The positive Jewish life in Poland was disrupted in the mid-seventeenth century, when the Cossacks attempted to conquer the country. They were supported by the serfs, who attacked the nobility, and the Jews were caught between the two opposing groups, suffering enormous losses in 1648–1649. With this tragedy, the center of Jewish life moved north to Lithuania. By the beginning of the eighteenth century, the Jews of Poland and the Ukraine were suffering from great poverty and a spiritual crisis. The system of Talmudic scholarship excluded the lower classes, who felt alienated from their Jewish traditions. In response, the Hassidic movement was created by the Baal Shem Tov (Master of the Good Name or Besht), a

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pseudonym referring to his healing powers as a naturalist. The Besht focused on the joy of Judaism, stressing that love of God, expressed through song and dance, and the allegiance to a rebbe or tzaddik were what was required to be a good Jew. After his death, his movement splintered into different Chassidic sects, each led by a dynasty of rebbes. In Lithuania, there was a movement called the Mitnagdim, which opposed the Chassidic approach, fearing the undermining of the Jewish intellectual tradition. Elijah ben Shlomo Zalman Kremer, known as the Gaon (genius) of Vilna, led this oppositional movement. He sought to introduce more secular knowledge, including translations into Hebrew of key mathematical and scientific works by his students. While he attacked the Chassidim, they admired his Talmudic scholarship. The period of the Enlightenment resulted in radical changes in Western Europe, with the gradual breaking down of the ghetto walls, particularly after the French Revolution. However, while classical Christian anti-Judaism waned in Western Europe, a new form of prejudice, called anti-Semitism, based on racial characteristics emerged in Western Europe by the end of the nineteenth century. Dominated by tsarist Russia, the situation for Jews in Eastern Europe deteriorated in the nineteenth century. In 1772, Catherine the Great conquered Eastern Poland and the country was carved up between Russia, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and Prussia. Catherine disliked Jews and did not wish them to enter Russia proper, a policy continued by her successors. The Jewish Pale of Settlement was established from the Baltic to the Black Sea, with Jews only being permitted to live within these boundaries. During the rule of Nicholas I, the position of the Jews was particularly difficult, as he sought to introduce Russification and forcibly conscripted Jewish boys into the Russian army, from the age of 12. Under Alexander II, who emancipated the serfs in 1860, the position of the Jews was slightly liberalized, but after his assassination in 1881 by a group of radical students, one of whom was Jewish, their situation again deteriorated. Jews faced

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pogroms and government-sponsored attacks, and in May 1882 new laws were introduced forcing many to move from their small shtetls into the larger towns. The unofficial tsarist policy was that one third of the Jews should emigrate, one third should die of starvation, and one third should convert. While the latter two goals were not achieved, Jewish there was mass Jewish migration from Eastern Europe, as will be discussed in the next section. The perilous existence of Jews in Eastern Europe continued after World War I, and Polish Jewry experienced almost total devastation with the Nazi Holocaust. Of the six million Jews murdered in Europe, three million were from Poland, leaving a tiny residue of less than a quarter of million. Most died in the six death camps, all located in Poland. The gas chambers were fully operational by 1942. The numbers 1942 can be transposed to 1492 – marking the destruction of the two major Jewish Diaspora centers in Spain and Poland. American Jewry The most recent Diaspora center is located in the United States. The first Jews to settle in the North America were Dutch Sephardi Jews, fleeing persecution in the Portuguese and Spanish colonies of South America. However, by the early nineteenth century, these communities, reinforced by some British Jews, were still very small with about only 10,000 Jews living in North America in the early nineteenth century. However, between 1830 and 1880, around 300,000 German Jewish refugees fled to the United States, following the defeat of Napoleon and the failure of the 1830 and 1848 revolutions in Western Europe. Then, from 1880 to 1924, over two million Russian Jews arrived on American shores, in what they called the Goldene Medina (the Golden Country). While the German Jews became hawkers and traders and tended to spread out across the country, including the Californian gold fields after 1848, the East European Jews clustered in the East Coast in the major urban centers of New York, Chicago, and Boston. In 1924 America closed her doors to refugee migration in response to the anti-migrant Populist

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Jewish Diaspora

movement, which saw the introduction of a quota system. The American Jews rapidly acculturated and moved up the socioeconomic ladder, from working in the industrial sweatshops, largely of the textile industry, to becoming professionals and businessmen, within a generation. After the war, one third of New York’s population was Jewish – the other two thirds of the nation’s economic center being black and Irish/Italian. The Jewish population had increased to five million by the 1950s, and with the destruction of European Jewry and the forced expulsions of the Mizrachi Jews from the Arab Muslim lands, America had emerged as the new Jewish Diaspora center. Hybrid Languages One of the key features of all the different Jewish Diaspora centers has been the development of hybrid languages. The first hybrid language to emerge in the Jewish world was Aramaic, the spoken language across the Greek and Roman worlds. With the emergence of Islam and the Muslim conquests, Judeo-Arabic and JudeoPersian developed. Thus, Maimonides wrote his The Guide for the Perplexed in Judeo-Arabic. Ladino, a mixture of medieval Spanish, Hebrew, and Arabic, developed first in the Iberian Peninsula and later in the Balkans, while Yiddish, a mixture of medieval German, Slavic languages, and Hebrew developed in Eastern Europe. The cementing element of these different hybrid languages, representing the cultures of the Mizrachi, Sephardi, and Ashkenazi Jews, was that they were always written in the Hebrew alphabet, since Hebrew remained the language of prayer and scholarship. Hebrew was the glue that kept the Jewish Diaspora together, throughout all the period of the Diaspora. It can be argued that no other ethnic or religious group has experienced such radical demographic changes over the history of its Diaspora or dispersion. This phenomenon has been particularly dramatic from the mid-nineteenth century. In the early nineteenth century, the bulk of the Jewish world lived in Europe and the Arab lands, with only a tiny minority in America and Palestine/the Land of Israel. Today, 40 % of the Jewish

world lives in North America and over 40 % in Israel. There are only around 4000 Jews remaining in the Arab world, and Europe’s population is less than one and a half million and declining.

Further Reading Antony P (2012) The Jews in Poland and Russia (volume 3: 1914–2008). Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, Portland Baron SW (1983) A social and religious history of the Jews, vol 3. Columbia University Press, New York Bauer Y (1982) History of the Holocaust. F Watts, New York Bauer Y (2010) The death of the Shtetl. Harvard University Press, London/New Haven Ben-Sasson HH (ed) (1976) A history of the Jewish people. Harvard University Press, Cambridge Biale D (1986) Power & powerlessness in Jewish history. Schocken Books, New York Cohn-Sherbok D (1994) Atlas of Jewish history. Routledge, London/New York Cohn-Sherbok D (2003) Judaism: history, belief, and practice. Routledge, London/New York Dawidowicz L (1996) The golden tradition: Jewish life and thought in Eastern Europe. Syracuse University Press, Syracuse Deshen S, Zenner WP (eds) (1996) Jews among Muslims: communities in the pre-colonial Middle East. Macmillan Press, London Eisen A (1986) Galut: modern Jewish reflection on homelessness and homecoming. Indiana University Press, Bloomington Elazar DJ (1991) Land, State and Diaspora in the history of the Jewish polity. Jewish Polit Stud Rev 3:1–2, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs (JCPA), http:// www.bjpa.org/Publications/details.cfm? PublicationID=3641 Eliach Y (1998) There once was a World: A 900-year chronicle of the Shtetl of Eishyshok. Little Brown, Boston Flannery EH (1985) The Anguish of the Jews: twentythree centuries of Antisemitism. rev. edn. Paulist Press, New York Gerber J (1992) The Jews of Spain: a history of the Sephardic experience. The Free Press, New York Goitein SD (1974) Jews and Arabs: their contacts through the ages. Schocken Books, New York Goodman M (ed) (2002) The Oxford handbook of Jewish studies. Oxford University Press, Oxford, New York Hertzberg A (1999) Jews; the essence and character of a people. Harper, San Francisco Holtz BW (1992) Back to the sources: reading the classic Jewish texts. Simon & Schuster, New York

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Johnson P (1988) A history of the Jews. Harper Perennial, New York Neusner J (1965) A history of the Jews in Babylonia, vol 1 & 2. Brill, Leiden Parkes J (1965) The conflict of the Church and the Synagogue. Meridian, New York Poliakov L (1974) The history of anti-semitism. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London Polonsky A (1914) The Jews in Poland and Russia (volume 2: 1881–1914). Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, Portland Polonsky A (2010) The Jews in Poland and Russia (volume 1: 1350–1881). Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, Portland Raphael C (1985) The road from Babylon: the story of Sephardi and Oriental Jews. Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London Sachar H (2005) A history of the Jews in the modern world. Knopf, New York

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Sarna JD (2004) American Judaism: a history. Yale University Press, New Haven Scheindlin R (1998) A short history of the Jewish people: from legendary times to modern statehood. Oxford University Press, Oxford Seltzer RM (1982) Jewish people, Jewish thought: the Jewish experience in history. Macmillan, New York Stillman NA (1979) The Jews of Arab Lands. JPS, Philadelphia Telushkin J (1991) Jewish literacy: the most important things to know about the Jewish religion, its people and its history. William Morrow, New York Wistrich R (1991) Antisemitism: the longest hatred. Schoken Books, New York Zohar Z (ed) (2005) Sephardic & Mizrahi Jewry: from the golden age of Spain to modern times. New York University Press, New York/London

W

White Australia Policy

Detailed Description

Gwenda Tavan LaTrobe University, Melbourne, Australia

The White Australia policy, in the form of the IRA 1901, was one of the first pieces of legislation introduced by the newly created Commonwealth Parliament of Australia. Another related measure was the decision to abolish the use and settlement of Pacific Island labor in northern Australia (Pacific Island Labourers Act 1901). Various other laws denied voting, naturalization, and welfare rights to non-Europeans, including the country’s indigenous peoples, in order to discourage the growth of non-European populations (Franchise Act 1902; Naturalization Act 1903). The roots of “White Australia” lay in BritishAustralian colonial experiences during the mid-to-late nineteenth century and broader political and intellectual currents across the white, English-speaking world. Economic competition on the Australian goldfields, and later in shipping and manufacturing, saw the various colonies introduce restrictions on Chinese migration (Fig. 2). The use of Pacific Island labor on northern Australian sugar plantations was also a source of political concern (Fig. 3). Hostility towards the Chinese and other non-Europeans, including the country’s indigenous population, found affirmation in Social Darwinist theories of the supremacy of the white races and the incompatibility of interracial mixing (Fig. 4). By the end of the century, the growing nationalist consciousness of colonists, and concern about Australia’s vulnerability as a white outpost on the edge of Asia

Synonyms White Australia

Definition A euphemism for both a national doctrine and a government policy aimed at severely restricting non-European immigration and maintaining Australia’s racial, cultural, and legal integrity as a white, British nation-state (Fig. 1). The Immigration Restriction Act (IRA) of 1901 did not expressly prohibit non-European immigration but permitted Australian officials to enforce migration restrictions through discretionary application of a “dictation test.” The policy helped keep Australia “white,” though exclusion of non-Europeans was never absolute, and its enduring record damaged Australia’s international reputation. The final vestiges of the policy and doctrine were abolished during the period 1973–1975.

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White Australia Policy

White Australia Policy, Fig. 1 The Immigration Restriction Act 1901 severely prohibited the entry of non-European settlers through the nefarious use of a ‘dictation test’. https://museumvictoria.com.au/pages/22912/1900s_3.jpg

reinforced the popular view that racial and cultural homogeneity were fundamental to national development and that all “Asiatic” migration should be restricted (Fig. 5). Similar evolving restrictions in other “white” countries, including

Canada, New Zealand, and the USA, no doubt provided powerful legitimacy. Political leaders could not completely ignore the diplomatic sensitivities of immigration restrictions. To mitigate the offence to Asian

White Australia Policy

White Australia Policy, Fig. 2 Economic competition on the Australian goldfields deepened European hostility towards Chinese diggers. This hostility spilled over into outright violence on numerous occasions, including the infamous Lambing Flat riots in New South Wales in 1861

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which left approximately 250 Chinese miners severely injured. http://www.nma.gov.au/collections/collection_ interactives/endurance_scroll/harvest_of_endurance_html_ version/explore_the_scroll/lambing_flat_riots

White Australia Policy, Fig. 3 A group of South Sea Islanders , Cairns, Qld, 1890 (Wikimedia commons) www.google. com.au/search?as_st=y& tbm=isch&hl=en&as_q= kanaka+labour+qld&as_ epq=&as_oq=&as_eq=& cr=&as_sitesearch=&safe= images&tbs=sur:f#imgdii= j1XOn9W_7PN5hM%3A %3Bj1XOn9W_7PN5hM %3A%3BDvib1mMTc 6SEmM%3A&imgrc= j1XOn9W_7PN5hM%3A

countries, outright prohibitions were avoided and restrictions relied upon Section 3(a) of the IRA, which defined “prohibited” immigrants as “any person who when asked to do so by an officer fails to write out at dictation and sign in the presence of the officer a passage of fifty words in length in

an European language directed by the officer” (IRA 1901). The policy proved remarkably successful. By 1933, Asian “races” represented less than 1 % of the national population (Census 1933, p 902). Political and public consensus underpinned

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White Australia Policy

White Australia Policy, Fig. 4 Philip May’s cartoon captured common fears about the ‘Chinese’ threat to white Australians. These ‘threats’ took various forms including disease, cheap labour, opium smoking and

moral degeneracy. Phil MAY, Phil. The Mongolian Octopus - His Grip on Australia, The Bulletin (Sydney), August 21, 1886. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/ File:Mongolian_octopus.png

White Australia Policy, Fig. 5 Cartoons such as Livingstone Hopkins ‘Piebald Possibilities’ evoked deep anxieties amongst early Federation white Australians about inter-racial sexual relations and racial ‘miscegenation’ mixing. Livingstone Hopkins ‘Piebald Possibilities – a

little Australian Christmas family party of the future’, The Bulletin (Sydney) 13 December 1902. http://www. aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/ Parliamentary_Library/pubs/APF/monographs/Within_ Chinas_Orbit/Chapterone

“White Australia’s” status as a settled policy and the foundation of national identity and sovereignty. Yet, commercial and diplomatic considerations meant a considerable amount of

transnational movement between Asian countries and Australia continued. Small but dynamic communities remained, concentrated in major cities like Sydney and Melbourne and parts of northern

White Australia Policy

White Australia Policy, Fig. 6 Controversial cases like that of little Nancy Prasad helped to build domestic and international pressure on Australian governments to end

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immigration restrictions in the 1960s. Sun Herald, 8 August 1965

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White Australia Policy, Fig. 7 Vietnamese boat people arriving in Darwin Harbour 1976 (image courtesy of National Museum of Australia). http://www.nma.gov.au/ online_features/defining_ moments/featured/ vietnamese_refugees_ boat_arriv

Australia (Fitzgerald 2007). Neither did Australian political leaders ever completely hide their racial preferences, at great cost to Australia’s reputation. Prime Minister Billy Hughes was instrumental in blocking Japan’s request for a racial equality clause to be included in the Paris Peace Settlement of 1919. Hughes later boasted that his actions had saved “White Australia.” Japanese authorities were deeply offended by the public slight. Pressure built on the policy after World War II, despite repeated claims that the policy was inviolable. State-sponsored racial discrimination was increasingly unjustifiable after the horrors of Nazism and as postcolonial movements across the globe, including Australia’s own indigenous people, demanded independence, racial equality, and respect. Australia’s increasing strategic and economic enmeshment with the Asia region made it particularly vulnerable to criticism. A mass immigration program, introduced in 1945 on defense, labor and nation-building grounds and focused on British and European migration, was profoundly changing Australian society but tended to reinforce the racial biases at the heart of immigration policy. The abandonment of racial restrictions by other settler states,

including Canada and the USA, and the decline of traditional British and European migration sources by the late 1960s also prompted a rethink. Policy change itself was gradual and slow, beginning with citizenship rights to long-term non-European settlers in 1956 and the replacement of the IRA with the Migration Act 1958. In 1966, the Holt Liberal Government liberalized non-European migration on the basis of people’s capacity for “ready integration into the Australian community” and “ability to make a contribution to Australia’s economic, social and cultural progress” (Cabinet sub. 31 1966) (Fig. 6). By 1970, almost 10,000 non-Europeans a year were entering the country, though immigration policy remained discriminatory (Cabinet sub. 713 1972). The final “official” phase of the abolition occurred with the election of the socially progressive Whitlam Labor Government in 1972. Whitlam introduced a universal visa system and removed privileges for British migrants providing assisted passages, citizenship, and voting. The introduction of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 made it illegal to discriminate on the grounds of race, color, descent, or national or ethnic origins (RDA 1975).

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The policy’s substantive end occurred in the late 1970s with the arrival of thousands of IndoChinese refugees and the expansion of family reunion provisions (Fig. 7). By the late 1990s, around 40 % of annual immigration intakes were from the Asia region. Today, the majority of Australia’s top ten source countries for migration are from there as well and the country proudly proclaims itself as “multicultural”. Yet successive immigration debates since the 1970s indicate continuing disquiet amongst some Australians about the rate and impact of migration from Asia and, increasingly, from Africa and the Middle East. This has prompted some commentators to claim that the ghost of “White Australia” still lingers (Tavan 2005).

References Cabinet submission 31, ‘Entry and stay of non-Europeans’, 2 March 1966, National Archives of Australia, Canberra (NAA): A5908, submission 713 Cabinet submission 713, ‘Report on entry and stay of non-Europeans and persons of partly non-European descent’, 15 June 1972, NAA: A5908, submission 713 Commonwealth Franchise (Cth), no 8, (1902) Commonwealth Naturalisation Act 1903 (Cth) no 11, (1903) Commonwealth Naturalisation Act, Census of the Commonwealth of Australia, 30 June 1933, Part 1. Commonwealth Government Printer, Canberra Department of Immigration and Citizenship (2013) Factsheets. http://www.immi.gov.au/media/fact-sheets/. Accessed 20 Mar 2013 Fitzgerald J (2007) Big white lie: Chinese Australians in white Australia. University of New South Wales Press, Sydney

Immigration Restriction 1901 (Cth), no 17 of (1901) Pacific Island Labourers Act 1901 (Cth) no 16, (1901) Racial Discrimination Act (1975) (Cth). http://www. Accessed comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2013C00013. 20 Mar 2013 Tavan G (2005) The long, slow death of white Australia. Scribe, Melbourne

Further Reading Bagnall K. A legacy of White Australia: records about Chinese Australians in the national archives. http:// www.naa.gov.au/collection/publications/papers-andpodcasts/immigration/white-australia.aspx. Accessed 4 Mar 2016 Bagnall K, Sherratt T (2010) Invisible Australians [electronic resource]: living under the white Australia policy. http://invisibleaustralians.org/http:// invisibleaustralians.org/. Accessed 4 Mar 2016 Brawley S (1995) The white peril: foreign relations and Asian immigration to Australasia and North America 1919–1978. UNSW Press, Sydney Jupp J (2007) From white Australia to Woomera: the story of Australian immigration, 2nd edn. Cambridge University Press, Port Melbourne Lake M, Reynolds H (2008) Drawing the global colour line: white men’s countries and the question of racial equality. Melbourne University Publishing, Carlton Markus A (2001) Race: John Howard and the remaking of Australia. Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest Palfreeman AC (1967) The administration of the white Australia policy. Melbourne University Press, London Richards E (2008) Destination Australia: migration to Australia since 1901. UNSW Press, Sydney Rivett K, Immigration Reform Group (Australia) (1975) Australia and the non-white migrant. Melbourne University Press, Carlton Walker D, Sobocinska A (eds) (2012) Australia’s Asia: from Yellow Peril to Asian century. University of Western Australia Publishing, Crawley Willard M (1967) History of the White Australia policy to1920, 2nd edn. Melbourne University Press, Melbourne

Part 14: Skill Level of Migrants

H

High-Skilled Migration Robyn Iredale Australian Demographic and Social Research Institute, ANU, Canberra, ACT, Australia

Definition “Highly skilled workers are normally defined as those having a university degree or extensive/ equivalent experience in a given field” (Iredale 2001, p. 8). According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD SOPEMI 1997, p. 21), it includes highly skilled specialists, independent executives and senior managers, specialized technicians or tradespeople, investors, business people, “key workers,” and subcontract workers. Individuals in this category often seek to maximize the return on their investment in education and/or training by moving around in search of the highest paid or most rewarding employment.

Introduction Highly skilled migrants represent an increasingly large component of global migration streams. The phenomenon is not new, but the numbers and trends have been rapidly changing. Historically there was skilled mobility between countries with similar cultures and training systems, such

as between the Commonwealth countries, or from former colonies to the UK, the Netherlands, and France. There was a major change in the period leading up to World War II as Jewish refugees left Eastern Europe for the USA, Canada, Australia, and elsewhere. A significant proportion of these European refugees were highly skilled, and the arrival of non-British doctors, engineers, and other professionals led associations/boards in receiving countries to start developing procedures to ensure that only “the fully qualified” were admitted to the profession. “Fully qualified” often did not extend to Eastern Europeans, and a large proportion of these skilled refugees in the 1940s and 1950s were destined for unskilled employment. In the 1960s and 1970s, the main focus came to be on “brain drain” and the “losses” that developing countries allegedly sustained when their highly skilled workers emigrated permanently to more industrialized countries. Though some of these skills went under- or unutilized in receiving countries, there was still a clear economic benefit to these countries. In 1970 the monetary value to the USA from admitting technical and professional immigrants was estimated at $3.7 billion (Sassen 1990, p. 191). There were persistent calls for taxes and levies to compensate sending countries that were not yet industrially developed for their human capital losses, but such schemes received very little favorable attention as they were seen as unworkable and they were politically unpopular in receiving countries.

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Increasingly, by the 1980s, some countries came to see skilled migration as a means of filling skilled labor shortages so as to ensure that economic growth was not held back. For others, it was primarily to improve the “stock” of brains generally. Papademetriou and Yale-Loehr (1995, p. 2) argued that more than ever before human resources constituted as much the wealth of a company as of a nation and that immigration should play its proper role in the broader strategy of making the next century “America’s Century.” Measuring Skilled Migration The total number of highly skilled migrants at any one time is unknown. One of the major problems in estimating the numbers is that there are many types of movement: permanent settlement to immigrant-receiving countries; temporary international migration within and increasingly outside of multinational corporations; and highly skilled refugee flows and skilled people who move as part of family reunion policies. Very few countries take highly skilled migrants on a permanent basis, but an increasing number have been seeking them on a temporary basis, supposedly to meet skills shortages until they can train up their own stock of skilled workers. This opening of doors to “legally admitted, ostensibly temporary, high-skilled foreign workers” (Cornelius and Espenshade 2001, p. 3) has become a global phenomenon. In more recent years it has been supplemented by the rise of trade in services under the World Trade Organization’s General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and similar arrangements. Such trade has largely been confined to skilled contract service suppliers. The increased level of mobility is also a manifestation of the internationalization of professions and professional labor markets and the desire of many people to move to widen their skills base and gain more international experience. Skilled migrants often seek to maximize the return on their investment in education and training by moving around in search of the highest paid and/or most rewarding employment. Another issue in accurately measuring the flows is how to define highly skilled migration. According to the Organization for Economic

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Cooperation and Development (OECD 1997, p. 21), highly skilled migrants include specialists, independent executives and senior managers, specialized technicians or tradespeople, investors, business people, “key workers,” and subcontract workers. Others tend to want to limit “highly skilled” to professionals with a university degree or equivalent, but this is a narrow definition that places too much stress on only the highest level of formal education. The OECD definition is more universally acceptable. Other measurement problems that have been enunciated by the OECD (2010, p. 31) include: “movements that appear . . . as temporary are classified as permanent because the migrants in question, for example, intracorporate transfers, are granted a status that essentially places them on a permanent migration track. Some movements, for example, those involving cross border service providers, may not be explicitly identified. In still other cases, work assignments are short and the movements may escape recording entirely.” Given these difficulties, any attempt at measuring skilled migration will be fraught with problems. Until recently, there was no systematic empirical assessment of skilled migration or especially of the economic impact of the brain drain. The main reason for this seems to have been the lack of harmonized international data on migration by country of origin and education level (Docquier and Mafouk 2004). One exception was a paper by Carrington and Detragiache (1998) in which they estimated 1990 skilled emigration rates for 61 developing countries. There are two major global approaches to measurement. The first approach takes data that are available in receiving countries to build up figures on stocks of skilled immigrants generally or from particular countries. For example, using OECD data Stalker (2000, p. 107) estimated that there were 1.5 million skilled expatriates from developing countries in Western Europe, the USA, Japan, and Australia. Docquier and Mafouk (2004) used a database covering 92.7 % of the OECD immigration stock and showed that in absolute terms the largest numbers of highly educated migrants in 1990 and 2000 were from Europe, Southern and Eastern Asia, and, to a lesser extent, Central

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America. Such data were also used to estimate emigration numbers or rates of skilled personnel from particular countries, as a proportion of the potential educated labor force. The highest brain drain rates were observed in the Caribbean, Central America, and Western and Eastern Africa. Most data sets on international skilled migration define skilled migrants according to education level, independently of whether education was acquired in the home or in the host country. According to Beine, Docquier, and Rapoport (2006), this led to an overestimation of skilled emigration/immigration. They introduced immigrants’ age of entry (as a proxy for where education was acquired) into their statistical analyses. Using this technique they estimated that six small (less than four million population) countries in Africa and the Caribbean suffered losses of over 50 % of their skilled labor force (i.e., they emigrated after age 22). For countries with more than four million population, Haiti suffered the greatest rate of loss (73.7 %) with Sierra Leone, Mozambique, and Ghana experiencing loss rates in the 40–50 % range. The second approach involves the national measurement of skilled migration. This occurs in some countries by means of tabulating permanent and temporary visa-issuance figures or arrivals/ departure data, where such data are collected. These data vary in quality and the categories used, so they are not universally comparable. Many countries are only just beginning to improve their data collection systems so that they can measure how many skilled migrants are coming and/or going.

Changing Trends in High-Skilled Migration Escalation and Differentiation in High-Skilled Migration Whereas “brain drain” was seen by analysts as being confined to a small set of countries that were “losers” (e.g., India, Pakistan, the Caribbean, and parts of Africa) and to a similarly small group of countries that were perceived as “winners” (the UK, the USA, Canada, and

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Australia), the scale and extent of skilled migration is now very widespread. Few parts of the world remain excluded from the systems at work, and the majority of countries embody both inflows and outflows. Where the outflows severely outweigh the inflows, the perception of brain drain is still very evident, as will be described later. While the early skilled migrants were largely doctors, nurses, engineers, scientists, teachers, and academics, the variety of skilled migrants is now enormous. These early occupations have escalated in the size and direction of their flows and have been joined by a myriad of others. The outstanding examples are in the information technology (IT) field where the growth of IT has created worldwide opportunities and intense competition for skilled workers in this field, leading many countries to ease restrictions on the entry of such workers. The German “green card” system is a good example of this. It would be easier to list the skilled occupations where there is relatively little mobility than vice versa. For example, the legal profession is one that stands out as being characterized by low levels of mobility as trained professionals find their skills as usually highly specific to particular jurisdictions. However, even this is changing with the growth of international business, trade and the provision of services across international borders.

The Rise of Temporary Migration Early skilled migrations were generally seen as permanent though some did return home or move on elsewhere. One of the most dramatic changes in recent decades has been the rise of “temporary” skilled migration. For example, the “number of temporary workers entering OECD countries was approximately 2.3 million in 2008, significantly higher than the number of permanent labor migrants, which stood at roughly 1.5 million. A significant proportion of this migration occurred between OECD countries” (OECD 2010, p. 30). Australia’s skilled migration program has undergone a revolution: temporary skilled migrant arrivals rose from 48,610 people (including dependants) in 2004–2005 to 110,570

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in 2007–2008, compared with permanent arrivals of 108,500 in 2007–2008 (Hawthorne 2011). This change has been facilitated by a number of factors. First, the development of new visa entry categories, often based on points systems, has enabled short-term migration of skilled (and sometimes unskilled) workers. Many countries now have complex arrangements to enable temporary skilled migrants to enter for a specified period. They are constantly evolving as new shortages emerge or other pressures lead to changes in critical shortages lists or methods of selecting skilled employees. Second, the rise of more varied methods of selection has been used to expedite migration in areas of high demand and where this does not disadvantage local workers. In the USA, the major avenue for large-scale temporary entry has long been the H1-B visa scheme (no assessment of qualifications but must hold university degree), which admitted 462,000 in 2007 and 410,000 in 2008, along with many other visa types. “The US Department of Labor certifies employer applications for both permanent and temporary foreign workers. Certification procedures vary according to the type of visa requested, but generally require that the employer advertise the job or intent to hire, and meet certain wage conditions to prevent adverse effects on American workers. Certification is required for application for a visa” (OECD 2010, p. 250). Third, the increased mobility of intracompany transferees has led to new categories of skills mobility. “The structure of business, particularly the process of internationalization by large employers, is leading to increasing international mobility among highly skilled employees of these companies to meet client needs, provide input into project teams, and aid in professional development” (Khoo et al. 2007, p. 480). As companies become more global and competition for their location intensifies, OECD countries, for example, have increasingly adopted policies to facilitate the ensuing secondment of staff: Belgium amended its work permit conditions to allow lower management the same benefits as executive personnel; 2007 legislation in France relaxed the conditions for granting a residence permit to

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intracompany transferees by reducing the period of secondment from 6 to 3 months; Germany no longer requires a resident labor market test in the case of intracompany transferees or their family members who are posted to Germany, and Poland introduced new work permits for highly skilled workers, including intracompany transferees, with stays of 3–5 years depending on seniority (OECD 2010, pp. 59–60). Few countries collect information on intracompany transferees, but the data that are available show that the annual numbers rose in most countries between 2000 and 2008: from 3,900 to 10,200 in Canada; from 1,300 to 5,700 in Germany; from 3,900 to 7,300 in Japan; from 6,200 to 7,300 in Switzerland; and from 55,000 to 84,000 in the USA. Only France and Korea registered falls (OECD 2010). Fourth, increased transnational accreditation/ recognition with the creation of regional blocs, such as the European Union (EU), the AustraliaNew Zealand Mutual Recognition Agreement (MRA), and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), has facilitated skills mobility. The EU introduced measures to achieve general mutual recognition and harmonized training that has enabled skilled workers to move relatively freely within the bloc. The Trans-Tasman MRA created a mini-common labor market with mutual reciprocity arrangements in some occupations and a sharing of resources in others. NAFTA has few mutual recognition provisions but permits qualified Canadian and Mexican citizens to seek temporary entry into the USA to engage in business activities at a professional level, providing the following provisions are met: • The profession qualifies under the regulations. • The position in the USA requires a NAFTA professional. • There is a prearranged full-time or part-time job with a US employer (not self-employment). • The person holds the qualifications of the profession. Fifth, increased trade in services, under the World Trade Organization’s (WTO’s) General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and

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other agreements, has dramatically increased the mobility of temporary service providers. The GATS covers four modes (1, 2, 3, and 4) of operation, but modes 3 (commercial presence) and 4 (movement of natural persons) specifically cater for the cross border mobility of service providers. At the global level this provides a mechanism for skilled people to move temporarily (for a defined length of time) to provide a service in another WTO-member country. Few data are available on highly skilled service provider flows, partly because of the difficulty of isolating these flows from highly skilled migration flows. The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) has replicated the WTO agreement as a means of speeding up service provider flows between its ten member countries. Arrivals and departures data are at present patchy for ASEAN, but some data indicate that Singapore and Malaysia are currently the two major destinations within ASEAN. They are both heavily involved in international business, and the consequent flow of intracompany transferees is substantial, though independent movement is also considerable. The Philippines is the major source of independent service suppliers – a proportion is highly skilled and most are destined for non-ASEAN member states. Emerging economies in ASEAN, such as Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Thailand, and Viet Nam, are beginning to benefit from flows of skilled service suppliers associated with foreign direct investment (Iredale et al. 2010). The Role of Educational Services and the Link to Migration In recent years there has been a growing awareness of the role played by the international migration of students in the global mobility system. In the most popular destination countries, they are seen by governments as a major source of finance for educational institutions, thereby reducing the need for state funding, as well as an important source of foreign revenue and future skilled immigrants. Postgraduates especially are often viewed as new knowledge creators who will contribute to economic growth, either directly or indirectly. The USA has consistently drawn a large number of both permanent and temporary skilled workers

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from the flow of international students, averaging 264,200 a year between 2000 and 2008, that it continues to attract (OECD 2010, p. 251). Many OECD countries have new measures to encourage international students to stay and enter their labor markets, in order to provide the domestic labor market with highly skilled migrants who have received education in the host country. The issues of recognition of qualifications and language knowledge, which are often obstacles to high-skilled migration, are largely avoided when students stay on after graduation. For example, the Canadian Experience Class, implemented in September 2008, facilitates permanent residence for international student graduates who have gained professional and skilled work experience in Canada. Encouragement for international students to stay and work is also part of the new green card regime in the Czech Republic. From 2009, those who have completed secondary or higher education in the country no longer need a work permit. Similarly, those students awarded a masters degree or a PhD in Italy may request the conversion of their residence permit for study purposes to a work or job-seeking permit, valid for a period of 12 months. Germany and Poland have both made it easier for international students and those trained in other countries to gain access to the labor market, through removing the need for a resident labor market test. In the UK, post-study students are part of Tier 1 of the new point-based system. The category provides a bridge to highly skilled or skilled work. International graduates accepted under Tier 1 may stay in the UK and look for work without needing a sponsor (OECD 2010, pp. 63–64). Greater Involvement of Governments Many of these changes have resulted in the increasing involvement of governments in migration and tertiary education policy and management. Increasingly, countries have sought to identify workers/students in demand by their policy formulation. Point-based systems (based on occupation, work experience, education, age, language skills, job offer, finances available, and intended location) were originally developed in traditional settlement countries (Australia,

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Canada, and New Zealand) in the 1980s to select permanent migrants from a broad pool of applicants for a limited number of visas available. These countries continue to periodically review their points system to adapt them to changing demands and cater for expanded temporary migration. In the past five years, a number of European countries – the UK, the Netherlands, and Denmark – have introduced their own points systems. The recently introduced point-based systems in Europe are modeled on established systems, but they introduced several new parameters: for example, the UK assesses earnings in the home country; Denmark and the Netherlands, in order to overcome the problem posed by assessment of qualifications obtained abroad, use international survey rankings to classify educational degrees, and Denmark gives points for experience gained elsewhere in the European Economic Area and Switzerland (OECD 2010, p. 59). These policies are constantly under review, and in recent years, Australia has moved from “points tested” to “employer nominated” (similar to the USA) as the dominant basis of entry so that by “2009 . . . 70% of Australia’s labor migrants were employer-sponsored, entering through the temporary and permanent skilled migration streams” (Hawthorne 2011, p. 6). Further, recent decisions in Australia to allow skilled US workers to get work licenses on arrival instead of in the USA and the introduction of Enterprise Migration Agreements for large-scale resources projects will both escalate this trend. Another role of some governments has been evident in enabling/encouraging the expansion of training arrangements to provide skilled workers/ service providers for overseas countries. For example, in the Philippines nurse production has not only exceeded the country’s numerical requirements but focused largely on preparing practitioners for the health-care needs of developed nations rather than the public health needs of the indigenous population (Brush 2010). Explicit policies to send skilled workers abroad are increasingly common.

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Major Debates and Dilemmas Brain Drain, Brain Circulation, and Brain Waste Ongoing debate has prevailed since the 1960s about the occurrence, scale, and consequences of “brain drain.” In the 1990s to 2000s, it became common for many to argue that even if brain drain occurred it was of little policy concern for developing countries as the benefits provided by a diaspora of skilled emigrants potentially outweighed the loss of human capital resources through emigration. That is, brain drain should not be interpreted as a sheer loss to a source country because in the longer term the country could benefit from return migration if its former residents brought back foreign knowledge and skills, and extensive foreign diasporas could be instrumental in building business/research and other relationships between sending and the receiving countries. That is, converting “brain drain” into “brain circulation” [could] play an important role by facilitating the transfer of foreign technologies or by helping the development of cultural and economic ties with other countries (Soubbotina 2004, p. 93). Developing countries were advised to develop mechanisms for encouraging the actual or virtual return migration of their qualified workers. While some countries, most notably India, Taiwan, and China, have clearly benefited from their diasporas of their skilled expatriate workers, return of ICT, medical and research workers, networks established, and subsequent flows of business investment, there is less evidence to support this argument elsewhere. Sub-Saharan African countries, Caribbean countries, much of South America, and parts of Asia argue that they do not benefit from their diasporas, and brain drain has not turned into general brain circulation. This is not to say that in specific fields of scientific expertise, some countries may make gains from their foreign nationals. For example, recent research into scientific networks shows that some expatriate scientists from less industrialized countries participate in research related to their source countries’ development problems, such as

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Angola Antigua and Barbuda Barbados Benin Cape Verde Congo Cook Islands Dominica Fiji Grenada Guinea-Bissau Guyana Haiti Jamaica Liberia Mozambique Sao Tome and Principe Senegal Sierra Leone St Vincent and the Grenadines Togo Trinidad and Tobago UR of Tanzania 0

10

20

30 40 50 60 70 Emigration rate of doctors (%)

80

90

100

High-Skilled Migration, Fig. 1 Rate of emigration of doctors for the 23 most seriously affected countries, 2000 (Source: OECD 2007b)

eradicating malaria or improving crop production. But in order for this to happen, it is necessary to have sufficient local scientific capacity that is able to access these dispersed science networks (Turpin et al. 2008). Moreover, many skilled emigrants continue to experience “brain waste” in the destination, potentially detracting from any possible benefits of this emigration. For example, in the USA “[h] ighly skilled European and Asian immigrants” rates of underutilization approximated those of natives; Latin Americans fared worse. About 44 % of recent immigrants and 35 % of longterm immigrants from Latin America were

working in unskilled jobs in 2005–2006. “African-born skilled immigrants also found themselves at a disadvantage, having the highest unemployment rates of all foreign-born groups” (Batalova et al. 2008, p. 2). The role of migration in promoting development is the subject of ongoing debate about the scale and usage of remittances, impacts on levels of investment in human capital and enterprises, impacts of returning and circulating migrants, and the role of the diasporas. In relation to migration of the highly skilled, it is clear that a positive outcome is dependent on a number of key factors: rates of return (actual or virtual); networks that

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develop between groups of researchers/business people; and the economic, social, and political climate in the source country and employment and social outcomes in the destination. “The hope that change will be propelled by skilled and business returnees or non-residents is overly optimistic . . . and ignores the crucial importance that negative factors play in influencing decisions to both leave and return: such as the lack of individual autonomy and freedom, the high level of “red tapism,” the lack of reward for excellence and promotion on merit and the general poor level of governance at the institutional, regional and national level” (Iredale and Guo 2002, p. 22). The return migration of skilled and business people may play a major role in transforming an economy and society, but it is in a complementary way. Local-National-Global Policies The situation in some occupations is such that outflows of skilled migrants are particularly damaging for the source countries and special steps need to be taken to ameliorate the impacts. By the late 1990s, the OECD began collecting data from destination countries that enabled it to estimate the expatriate rate of doctors and nurses from various source countries. Studies have found that the most significant indicator of “loss” is the percentage of trained doctors who have left a country, or the emigration rate. Using WHO Global Health Atlas data on the number of doctors at home and the number working in OECD countries, the OECD calculated emigration rates. The 23 most seriously affected countries are shown in Fig. 1 where it is seen that all have rates above 40 %. Those with above 50 % emigration rates have more doctors working in OECD countries than at home. They could, of course, have doctors working elsewhere as well, but they do not show up in the OECD data (For example, most Filipino doctors and nurses and Sudanese doctors work outside of OECD countries, in the Middle East (OECD 2007a, p. 177)). Figure 1 shows that some Caribbean and Pacific Islands, and parts of sub-Saharan Africa, are most affected by the loss of medical practitioners to OECD countries. The most severely

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affected, Antigua and Barbuda, Grenada, and Guyana, had 89.3 %, 72.7 %, and 72.2 %, respectively, of their medical workforces in OECD countries in 2000. Fiji (58 %) and the Cook Islands (54 %) from the Pacific feature in the graph. Five African countries, Mozambique, Angola, Sierra Leone, United Republic of Tanzania, (URT) and Liberia, had rates above 50 %. Countries that have both high emigration rates and low doctor density ratios (number of doctors per 1,000 population) are particularly badly affected: French-speaking African countries, such as Senegal and Malawi, fall into this category. On the other hand, some countries with high emigration rates may be less impacted as they have “not-too-low” density ratios: Cuba, Barbados, Bahamas, and some other Caribbean countries fall into this category. Other World Health Organization data (2006) show that 57 “priority” countries are suffering severe health worker shortages, often compounded by the out-migration of their precious health workers. There is now widespread agreement that the cooperation of all stakeholders is needed to ensure that migration factors are addressed coherently to have a positive impact on the management of the movement of healthcare workers. Discussion of policy implications has canvassed the major options available for countries experiencing extreme shortages to improve the quantity and quality of health workers: improving national health sectors with additional (obviously limited) finance; training to meet local needs; creating new types of practitioners to fill specific roles; bans, bonds, and taxes; and more managed migration schemes. On the other hand, recipient country policy options include improving workplace conditions, increasing training and reducing attrition rates, compensating sending countries for the training costs embedded in their health workers, encouraging return migration to countries of shortage, and making use of their own diasporas. Compensation for scarce skills gained from overseas could be addressed by more generous overseas aid to specific countries. International solutions, such as codes of ethical recruitment, have limited chance of producing much effect though the WHO Global

High-Skilled Migration

Code of Practice on the International Recruitment of Health Personnel (2010) code is unique in its broad focus and its emphasis on more overseas aid to support struggling health systems and selfsufficiency in developed countries.

Conclusion High-skilled migration has become a very complex and nuanced phenomenon in the twenty-first century. In part, it has come to be seen in part as competition between more industrialized countries for skills, with benefits for receiving countries being encapsulated in terms such as “Advantage Canada,” “Benefiting Australia,” and “America’s Century.” At the same time, they may complain about the emigration of their own skilled personnel. On the other hand, less industrialized countries that are faced with the emigration of many of their skilled workers continue to voice concern about their human capital losses. These concerns are not necessarily assuaged by promises of brain circulation or the benefits of networks incorporating their skilled expatriates. The rise of temporary migration has been the most dramatic part of this process as countries seek workers to meet short-term needs, not permanent migrants that will absorb government resources or change the ethnic composition of populations. While some of these temporary migrants will remain permanently, others may return home, which could be to the advantage of less industrialized sending countries. The growth of trade in services has introduced a new dimension with short-term flows of service providers being seen as potentially beneficial for both sending and receiving countries. These flows are less unidirectional, that is, not only from poorer to richer countries, and could potentially aid development in less industrialized countries. Sending government selection of countries for the movement of natural persons could be based on which country offers the best conditions and options for benefiting the sending country (Mayer 2009). The globalization of business, the internationalization of many occupations, the export of skilled workers as explicit government policy,

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and increased regionalism mean that the mobility of skilled migrants has escalated. The role of governments has become more complicated as they seek to balance national and international interests and responsibilities. And within this broad framework, the opportunities for skilled individuals to expand their horizons and more freely choose their work destination/s mean that the world is truly now their oyster.

Cross-References ▶ Australian Immigration ▶ Business Migration and Intra-Company Transfers ▶ Employment-Based Immigration ▶ International Students ▶ Points System ▶ US Immigration Though the Diversity Visa Program

References Batalova J, Fix M, Creticos PA (2008) Uneven progress, the employment pathways of skilled immigrants in the United States, migration policy institute, Washington, DC. https://secure.migrationpolicy.org/images/2008. 10.22_Batalova.pdf. Accessed 10 Nov 2009 Beine M, Docquier F, Rapoport H (2006) Measuring international skilled migration: new estimates controlling for age of entry, world bank research report. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRES/Resources/ 469232-1107449512766/MeasuringInternationalMigra tion_paper.pdf. Accessed 25 July 2012 Brush BL (2010) The potent lever of toil: nursing development and exportation in the postcolonial Philippines. Am J Public Health. http://ajph.aphapublications.org/ cgi/content/short/AJPH.2009.181222v1. Accessed 20 Mar 2011 Carrington WJ, Detragiache E (1998) How big is the brain drain? IMF working paper 98/102, Washington, DC. http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/ wp98102.pdf. Accessed 2 July 2012 Cornelius WA, Espenshade TJ (2001) The international migration of the highly skilled: “high-tech braceros” in the global labor market. In: Cornelius WA, Espenshade TJ, Salehyan I (eds) The international migration of the highly skilled. Center for Comparative Immigration Studies, University of California, San Diego, pp 23–54

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Docquier F, Marfouk A (2004) Measuring the international mobility of skilled workers (1990–2000), world bank policy research working paper No 3381, August. http:// ideas.repec.org/p/wbk/wbrwps/3381.html. Accessed 25 July 2012 Hawthorne L (2011) Competing for skills: migration policies and trends in New Zealand and Australia. Department of Labour, Wellington and DIAC, Canberra. http://www.immi.gov.au/media/publications/research/_ pdf/migration-policies-trends-summary.pdf. Accessed 26 July 2012 Iredale R (2001) The migration of professionals: theories and typologies. Int Migr 39(5):7–26 Iredale R, Guo F (2002) The transforming role of skilled and business returnees: Taiwan, China and Bangladesh. Paper presented at IUSSP regional population conference, Bangkok Iredale R, Turpin T, Stahl C, Getuadisorn T (2010) Flow of skilled labour study, ASEAN Australia Development Cooperation Program (AADCP Phase II). ASEAN Secretariat, Jakarta Khoo S-E, McDonald P, Voigt-Graf C, Hugo G (2007) A global labour market: factors motivating the sponsorship and temporary migration of skilled workers to Australia. Int Migr Rev 41(2):480–510 Mayer J (2009) Trade trends and what they mean in terms of income gains for developing countries. In: Caliari A, Yu III VP (eds) Debt and trade: making linkages for the promotion of development, report from a policy roundtable. South Centre and Centre of Concern, Geneva, pp 29–36. www.southcentre.org/index.php? option=com–docman&task=cat–view&gid=45&limit= 5&limitstart=20&order=date&dir=DESC&Itemid= 313&lang=en. Accessed 20 Mar 2011 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (1997) Trends in international migration, continuous reporting system on migration annual report

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1996. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2007a) Immigrant health workers in OECD countries in the broader context of highly skilled migration. In: International migration outlook, SOPEMI, part III. OECD, Paris, pp 161–228 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2007b) Statlink. http://dx.doi.org/10/ 1787/022648458554. Accessed 10 July 2009 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2010) International migration outlook, SOPEMI 2010. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris Papademetriou D, Yale-Loehr S (1995) Putting the national interest first: rethinking the selection of skilled immigrants, international migration policy program. Carnegie Endowment, Washington, DC Sassen S (1990) The mobility of labor and capital. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Soubbotina TA (2004) Beyond economic growth: an introduction to sustainable development, 2nd edn. World Bank. http://www.worldbank.org/depweb/english/ beyond/beyondco/beg_all.pdf. Accessed 30 July 2012 Stalker P (2000) Workers without frontiers. The impact of globalization on international migration. International Labor Organization, Geneva Turpin T, Woolley R, Marceau J, Hill S (2008) Conduits of knowledge in the Asia Pacific: research training, networks and country of work. Asian Popul Stud 4(3):247–265 World Health Organization (2006) Working together for health. WHO, Geneva World Health Organization (2010) WHO global code of practice on the international recruitment of health personnel. www.who.int/hrh/migration/code/practice/en/ index.html. Accessed 11 Mar 2011

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Labor Migration Mathias Sinning1 and Massimiliano Tani2 1 The Australian National University, Canberra, ACT, Australia 2 The University of New South Wales (Canberra), Canberra, Australia

Definition International labor migration refers to the movement of individuals from one country to another for employment and other economic reasons that often may be inseparable from reasons such as family reunification, education, and seeking refuge or asylum. Labor migration is regulated by selective immigration policies of destination countries and may affect economic and social conditions in source and destination countries. An increasing number of international labor migrants are temporary workers who return to the source country after a certain period of time.

Detailed Description Labor migration affects most countries in the world. People do not necessarily find employment or employment adequate to support themselves and their families where they normally live, while other places face local shortages of workers and offer attractive job opportunities. Labor

migration, as a notion, emerges as a spatial reallocation to pursue better economic opportunities relative to those available at the place of residence. The International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, adopted by the United Nations (UN) General Assembly on 18 December 1990 and which came into force on 1 July 2003, defines a “migrant worker” as “a person who is to be engaged, is engaged or has been engaged in a remunerated activity in a State of which he or she is not a national” (Art. 2.1). As most UN members, particularly those with the largest number of immigrant workers, did not ratify the Convention (United Nations 2013), the definition of labor migrant still varies across countries, affecting the international comparability of data on labor migration. Additional sources of internationalçvariation in the definition of labor migration include (a) different usages of the concepts of “residence” (the minimum length of time to record someone leaving or arriving in a region may not match between origin and destination) and “nationality” (which can be based on where a person is born, jus soli, or the nationality of the parents, jus sanguinis), (b) whether employment information is collected on the basis of where someone lives (national concept) or works (domestic concept) (examples of countries which adopted the domestic concept are Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK), and (c) minimum and maximum working

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ages which vary according to national practices in relation to the end of compulsory schooling and the retirement age. Movements of illegal and undocumented migrants which the UN Convention includes in its definition of “migrant workers” tend to be reported separately, if at all, from official statistics on labor migration. The estimated stock of international migrants worldwide increased considerably during the recent decades of globalization from nearly 156 million in 1990 to about 214 million in 2010. As a percentage of world population, it grew only slightly from 2.9 % in 1990 to 3.1 % in 2010 (United Nations 2011). The expansion in international migrants lagged far behind those of international trade and capital flows, with global exports growing by more than 300 % and foreign direct investment by more than 500 % over the same period (IMF 2012; OECD 2012). In 2010, about 60 % of international migrants resided in economically more developed regions, where they constitute 10.3 % of the population. International migrants make up only 1.5 % of the population in economically less developed regions (United Nations 2011). People movements do not necessarily represent labor movements, and labor migration may or may not include movements of workers that can be accounted for as either a flow of a factor of production or a service. If labor migration is related to an employment contract (contract of services), then it is accounted for as a movement of labor, regulated by employment and immigration laws of the place of destination. If labor migration is bundled with the provision of a service (contract for services), the World Trade Organization in the General Agreement for the Trade of Services (GATS) Mode 4 (Movements of Natural Persons) argues that it should be treated as a service, and hence be governed by trade legislation (e.g., Charnovitz 2003). As identical tasks can be performed using alternative contractual engagements with different normative obligations and costs, labor migration statistics may omit some movements of highly specialized workers occurring because of globalization, outsourcing, and technical change. (The GATS makes no provisions for either self-employed temporary

Labor Migration

migrants or foreign citizens temporarily employed by a domestic company. Hence identical services delivered by the same person under an employment contract with a local company or a services contract with a foreign provider may be treated differently (Charnovitz 2003).) Labor migrants may enter their destination country through various channels. In many countries most labor migrants enter under family reunification schemes (Lucas 2008). In addition, international students have become a rapidly increasingly part of international migrants. The estimated number of international students worldwide grew from about 1.8 million in 2000 to 2.8 million in 2007 (Altbach et al. 2009). Regardless of the program under which they arrive, international migrants often work. International migrants entering through reunification schemes typically exhibit high labor force participation rates. Many international students have jobs while studying and they often stay in their destination countries for employment after graduation. Refugees in higher-income countries participate in the labor force, although asylum seekers often do not have the right to work. Despite attempts to barricade international borders to limit international migration, irregular migration of undocumented workers represents a considerable part of international migration around the world. Moreover, many international labor migrants return to their home countries after a certain period in the destination country. Return migrants are not only temporary visa holders but also “permanent” settlers who decide to return to their country of origin. Over the last decades, the number of temporary migrant workers around the world has increased considerably (Lucas 2008). In particular, the globalization process has increased the dependence of employers on temporary migrant workers and induced a growth in the number of temporary migrant worker programs in destination countries, mainly in low-skilled sectors such as agriculture, construction, the food industry, and services (Baruah and Cholewinski 2006). Labor migration is a flow concept, though both flow and stock of labor migrants at different points in time are studied. The two key interests of the

Labor Migration

literature on labor migration are documenting the flows of workers and identifying their determinants and impacts in both places of origin and destination. Several studies are carried out by institutional organizations such as the International Labour Organization, which promotes “decent and productive work opportunities” for migrants; the International Office for Migration, which promotes good practices in “migration management”; as well as the United Nations, the World Bank, and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development among others, which have labor migration and labor market units. Two distinct theoretical approaches have characterized studies of labor migration since the 1960s. The first is a neoclassical economic approach, which models labor migration as an optimization choice carried out by individual agents (Lee 1966) or households (Stark and Bloom 1985). Labor migration is determined by the economic incentive of higher discounted earnings available in the place of destination once transport/lodging, psychological/social (e.g., no friends and family), and uncertainty costs associated with the move are netted out (Hatton and Williamson 1998; Borjas 1994; Chiswick 2005; Freeman 2006). The second is a heterodox economics/historical/structuralist approach (Castles and Kosack 1973; Massey 1988) whereby institutional forces associated with the development of a capitalist production system cause an almost insatiable demand for migrant labor, which therefore emerges from institutional/systemic circumstances rather than rational individual choices. Between these two competing interpretations, some relevant work has addressed specific determinants of labor migration, while others have tried to combine elements of these two approaches (e.g., summary in Abreu 2010). More recently, the development of large and detailed datasets on migrants and advancements in statistical analysis have contributed to identifying key individual and institutional determinants of labor migration, providing a better understanding of this phenomenon. Within the neoclassical economic framework, microeconomic studies have posited that labor migration occurs when there is a difference in

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expected earnings (average wage weighted by the probability of being unemployed) between places of origin and destination (Harris and Todaro 1970). Interregional differences in income distribution also matter when places of origin and destination have similar average earnings because income dispersion is viewed as a proxy of an individual’s skills and abilities. As a result, given a level of observable characteristics, workers in the upper part of a compressed income distribution will have an incentive to migrate to places with higher income inequality, while those on the lower part of the compressed distribution will have no incentive to migrate. In other words, labor migrants self-select (Roy 1951; Borjas 1994) and take advantage of different earning opportunities caused by an uneven spatial distribution of jobs. Under this interpretative framework, labor migration is akin to an investment in the pursuit of optimal returns to one’s human capital. Regions may hence experience contemporaneous in- and outflows of workers and wide differences between their gross and net migration rates (Sjaastad 1962). Macroeconomic theoretical models have analyzed labor migration as a complement or substitute of trade in other factors or commodities in perfectly competitive markets (Mundell 1957; Markusen 1983; Bhagwati and Srinivasan 1983). In models of imperfect competition, workers migrate in response to agglomeration externalities exploited by firms locating near their market (Krugman 1991). International labor migration affects economic conditions in sending and destination countries. In destination countries with a flexible wage structure, such as the USA, there is some evidence that immigration may lower the wage of competing workers. Evidence on countries with a more rigid wage structure and stronger influence of unions in the wage-setting process, such as many European countries, suggests that immigration may increase unemployment. However, in both cases, labor market effects of immigration are rather small. From an economic perspective, migrant workers do not only constitute factors of production but are also consumers, and their arrival in the destination country may increase demand for all

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factors of production, including migrant labor. By paying taxes and receiving state support, they may also have a sizeable impact on the fiscal balance of the destination country. In addition, labor migrants have the potential to foster technical progress by the introduction of new ideas and knowledge. On balance, empirical studies on the impact of immigration on these outcomes have generated mixed results (Bodvarsson and Van den Berg 2009). The economic impact of labor migration on destination countries relies heavily on the relationship between individual skills of migrant workers and labor market needs. Consequently, several traditional immigration countries, including Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, have introduced a point scheme to select immigrants on the basis of their skills to improve the match between foreign-born workers and skill requirements in the domestic labor market. Other countries, such as the USA, require prior job offers for some visa categories to ensure a close match between migrant workers and the demand of employers (Lucas 2008). Many developed countries, which typically face a declining workingage population, require skilled workers. As a consequence, these countries have started to compete for skilled workers in the international labor market (OECD 2010). The effects of international labor mobility on the population in the sending countries also depend on the skill profiles of international labor migrants. On the one hand, the departure of skilled emigrants, commonly referred to as “brain drain,” is considered as a serious cost of immigration for the sending countries. A number of policies have been suggested to address the problems related to the phenomenon but very few are actually in place, partly because there is a lack of consensus on the actual costs and benefits of the brain drain for sending and destination countries (Bodvarsson and Van den Berg 2009). On the other hand, remittances have become an enormous source of external funding for many developing countries, exceeding three times the size of official development assistance in 2010 (Ratha and Silwal 2012). Highly skilled emigrants typically earn relatively high wages that allow them to transfer large sums

to their country of origin, but less skilled emigrants are usually those who send remittances to lower-income families (Lucas 2008).

Cross-References ▶ Brain Drain ▶ Circular Migration ▶ Economic Migration ▶ Illegal Migration ▶ International Migration ▶ Labour Mobility ▶ Migration ▶ Permanent Migration ▶ Skilled Labour Migration ▶ Temporary Migration

References Abreu A (2010) The new economics of labor migration: beware of neoclassicals bearing gifts. Springer online http://www.academia.edu/349009/The_ New_Economics_of_Labor_Migration_Beware_of_ Neoclassicals_Bearing_Gifts Altbach PG, Reisberg L, Rumbley LE (2009) Trends in global higher education: tracking an academic revolution. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), Paris Baruah N, Cholewinski R (2006) Handbook on establishing effective labour migration policies in countries of origin and destination. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), International Organization for Migration (IOM), International Labour Office (ILO), Vienna Bhagwati J, Srinivasan TN (1983) On the choice between capital and labour mobility. J Int Econ 14(3–4):209–221 Bodvarsson OB, Van den Berg H (2009) The economics of immigration – theory and policy. Springer, Berlin/ Heidelberg Borjas GJ (1994) The economics of immigration. J Econ Lit 32(4):1667–1717 Castles S, Kosack G (1973) The function of labour immigration in Western European Capitalism. New Left Rev 73(1):3–21 Charnovitz S (2003) Trade law norms on international migration. In: Aleinikoff TA, Chetail V (eds) Migration and international legal norms. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague, pp 241–253 Chiswick, Barry R (2005) The Economics of Immigration. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing

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Freeman R (2006) People flows in globalization. J Econ Perspect 20(2):145–170 Harris J, Todaro M (1970) Migration, unemployment and development: a two-sector analysis. Am Econ Rev 60(1):126–142 Hatton TJ, Williamson JG (1998) The age of mass migration: causes and economic impact. Oxford University Press, New York/Oxford IMF (2012) IMF Data mapper: international financial statistics, International Monetary Fund (IMF). http://www.imf. org/external/datamapper/index.php. Accessed 4 Oct 2012 Krugman PR (1991) Geography and trade. The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA/London Lee E (1966) A theory of migration. Demography 3(1):47–57 Lucas REB (2008) International labor migration in a globalizing economy. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Working Paper No. 92 Markusen JR (1983) Factor movements and commodity trade as complements. J Int Econ 14(3–4):341–356 Massey D (1988) Economic development and international migration in comparative perspective. Popul Dev Rev 14(3):383–413 Mundell RA (1957) International trade and factor mobility. In: Bhagwati J (ed) International trade. The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA/London, pp 321–335 OECD (2010) International migration outlook. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Paris OECD (2012) Most recent FDI statistics for OECD and G20 countries. Organization for Economic

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Co-operation and Development (OECD). www.oecd. org/investment/statistics. Accessed 4 Oct 2012 Ratha D, Silwal A (2012) Remittance flows in 2011 – an brief and development migration update. no. 18, migration and remittances unit. The World Bank, Washington Roy AD (1951) Some thoughts on the distribution of earnings. Oxf Econ Pap 51(3):135–146 Sjaastad LA (1962) The costs and returns of human migration. J Polit Econ 70(5):80–93 Stark O, Bloom D (1985) The new economics of labour migration. Am Econ Rev 75(2):173–178. Papers and proceedings of the ninety-seventh annual meeting of the American Economic Association United Nations (2011) Trends in international migrant stock: migrants by age and sex. United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (United Nations database, POP/DB/MIG/ Stock/Rev.2011) United Nations (2013) http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-13& chapter=4&lang=en

Further Reading Borjas GJ (2003) The labor demand curve is downward sloping: reexamining the impact of immigration on the labor market. Q J Econ 118:1335–1374 World Bank (2012) World development indicators 2012. The World Bank, Washington Zimmermann KF (2005) European migration: what do we know? Oxford University Press, Oxford

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Reservation Wages and Immigrants Mathias Sinning The Australian National University, Canberra, Australia

Definition A reservation wage is the lowest wage rate at which a worker is willing to accept a particular type of job. Reservation wages are important in the context of immigration because they may affect the immigration process at various stages, including the individual decision to migrate, the economic integration of immigrants in their destination country, the labor market success of the native-born population, and the attitudes of the native-born population toward immigration.

Detailed Description Reservation wages may influence the individual decision to migrate. Although migration decisions depend on numerous factors, economists typically view wage differentials between source and destination countries as the most important determinant of international labor migration. In his seminal article on the costs and returns of human migration, Sjaastad (1962) studies migration in a human capital framework, which implies that workers decide to migrate if the wage in the

destination country exceeds the reservation wage plus the costs of migration. Economic studies that extend Sjaastad’s basic framework also recognize the importance of reservation wages. In particular, Borjas (1987) discusses a framework that accounts for self-selection of immigrants resulting from the distribution of human capital among workers in source and destination countries. According to this model, the decision to migrate also depends on differences in income distributions between source and destination countries and the extent to which immigrants may transfer their skills to the labor market of the destination country. Reservation wages of immigrants are typically lower than those of native-born workers. Differences in reservation wages between native- and foreign-born workers are not only the result of sizeable wage disparities between poorer source and richer destination countries, but may also be attributed to differences in individual characteristics. Recent labor migrants often do not possess relevant country-specific human capital – such as language skills – and have not received firmspecific training in the destination country (Chiswick 1978). Education and labor market experience acquired in the source country are typically less valued in the labor market of the destination country (Friedberg 2000), and many migrant workers do not even have a license to apply the skills they acquired in the country of origin (Chiswick 1978). As a result, a considerable nativity wage gap may be observed, which

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typically declines over the settlement process (Chiswick 1978). If reservation wages of immigrants are lower than those of native-born workers, they may have adverse effects on labor market outcomes of native-born workers. Economic theory suggests that immigration may reduce wages or increase unemployment (or both) if foreign-born workers are substitutes to native-born workers. The economic literature on the effects of immigration mainly focuses on the empirical analysis of unskilled immigrants, because they are more likely to substitute native-born workers than skilled immigrants. The size of the effects does not only depend on the substitutability of skills but also on the wage flexibility in the labor market. If wages are highly flexible – such as in the US labor market – then immigration is expected to have relatively large wage effects. By contrast, if wages are more rigid and unions play an important role in the wage-setting process – such as in many European labor markets – then immigration is expected to increase unemployment. Empirical studies typically find that immigration has relatively small or no effects on wages and employment (Borjas 2003; Longhi et al. 2005; Zimmermann 2005). Low reservation wages of immigrants are usually a source of concern and a matter of intense debate among policy-makers and the public. Actual and perceived labor market effects of immigration have important implications for immigration policies designed to regulate immigration flows and shape immigrant populations. Since unskilled immigrants are more likely to be a substitute for native-born workers than skilled immigrants, many immigration countries, including Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, have started to select immigrants on the basis of their

Reservation Wages and Immigrants

skills. The United States requires job offers for some visa categories to ensure a close match between migrant workers and the demand of employers (Lucas 2008). Many developed countries, which typically face a declining workingage population, have started to compete for skilled workers in the international labor market (OECD 2010).

References Borjas GJ (1987) Self-selection and the earnings of immigrants. Am Econ Rev 77:531–553 Borjas GJ (2003) The labor demand curve is downward sloping: reexamining the impact of immigration on the labor market. Q J Econ 118:1335–1374 Chiswick BR (1978) The effect of Americanization on the earnings of foreign-born men. J Polit Econ 86:897–921 Longhi S, Nijkamp P, Poot J (2005) A meta-analytic assessment of the effect of immigration on wages. J Econ Surv 19:451–477 Lucas REB (2008) International labor migration in a globalizing economy, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, working paper no 92 OECD (2010) International migration outlook. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Paris Sjaastad LA (1962) The costs and returns of human migration. J Polit Econ 70:80–93 Zimmermann KF (2005) European migration: what do we know? Oxford University Press, Oxford

Further Reading Borjas GJ (1991) Immigration and self-selection. In: Abowd J, Freeman R (eds) Immigration, trade, and the labor market. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, pp 29–76 Friedberg R (2000) You can’t take it with you? immigrant assimilation and the portability of human capital. J Labor Econ 18:221–251 Harris JR, Todaro MP (1970) Migration, unemployment and development: a two-sector analysis. Am Econ Rev 60:126–142